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**PLATO'S**

**APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, CRITO,  
AND PHÆDO,**

FROM THE TEXT OF BEKKER;

WITH

THE LATIN VERSION OF FICINUS;

AND

**NOTES**

BY

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TO  
BARTHOLOMEW LLOYD, D. D.,  
PROVOST OF TRINITY COLLEGE.

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DEAR SIR,

I beg leave to dedicate to you the following work, with the hope that it may not be found, in its execution, unworthy of the sanction with which you favored the design.

I desire to avail myself of this opportunity to express my grateful sense of your unvaried personal kindness, and to record my individual concurrence in the general estimation of the energy and ability which you have so successfully devoted to the improvement of the interests, and advancement of the character of the University over which you preside.

I remain, Dear Sir,

With great Respect,

Most faithfully yours,

CHARLES STUART STANFORD.





## P R E F A C E .

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THE Apology, Crito, and Phædo have been arranged in their present order, with the intention of affording a connected view of the conduct of Socrates at the periods, and with the attendant circumstances, which they were composed to commemorate, and which include the defence of the philosopher before his judges; his opinions and demeanour in prison, subsequent to his condemnation, with a detail of the important topics which engrossed his attention and discourse upon the day of his decease. Of these selections, it is hard to say whether the subject is more interesting, or the style more fascinating, partaking, as they do, of the leading characteristic of their great author's skill, and combining, as has been justly remarked of Plato's writings, the sublime of simplicity, with all that is beautiful in fancy and profound in thought.

From the commencement of the Apology, to the closing scene in the Phædo, may be considered as a

complete and accurate portraiture of the character, feelings, and philosophy of Socrates. Supported through his trial by a sense of the duty which he owed himself, as conscious of his innocence; enduring his imprisonment, from a sense of duty towards the laws of his country, and contemplating his appointed death, as a duty which he owed the Deity, and ought cheerfully to pay, he has left upon record an example of wisdom, fortitude, resignation, and piety, for which the annals of heathenism supply no parallel.

In preparing the following work for publication, the Editor has endeavoured to avail himself of the able exertions of preceding commentators. His object has been to select and condense the most valuable information which they severally afford, and where the necessary limits of the work interfered with the more copious discussion of any subject occurring throughout its course, sufficient has been said for immediate explanation, and the more inquiring student is referred to the authorities by whom it has been argued and developed at more considerable and satisfactory length.

The text of Bekker has been adopted, with but two or three, and these unimportant changes. Those who are desirous of collating the various readings in the several editions of the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phædo*, are referred to Priestley's *Plato*; the Editor of the present work having noticed very few, and those only by which the sense of any passage was manifestly influenced or altered: his wish having been to secure, in the first instance, an approved and corrected text, and then illus-

trate his author, rather than to crowd his annotations with minute and unnecessary discrepancies, which, however curious, are but little instructive, and by which commentators are too often led, in their conjectures as to what might have possibly been written, to overlook the more important consideration of the sense of the passage as it stands.

The Notes have been compiled principally from Bekker's edition of the Complete Works of Plato, comprising the greater number of commentaries hitherto published, which will be found detailed at length in the Prolegomena, and from the edition of the Apology, Crito, and Phædo, by G. Stallbaum, Goth. et Erford. 1833. The Editor has availed himself also, in many instances, of M. Victor Cousin's French Translation of Plato, which is accompanied by philosophical arguments, and historical and philological notes. This eminent writer who has confessedly attained to the highest rank amongst the professors of metaphysical science, has promised an introductory volume to the above work, containing an account of the Platonic philosophy, a desideratum which could not be more efficiently supplied.

In compliance with the desire of the Publishers, a Latin version has been annexed, that of Marsilius Ficinus, a Florentine, born A. D. 1433, and educated by Pletho, under the patronage of Cosmo di Medici, for the express purpose of translating the writings, and reviving the philosophy of Plato. It has undergone several requisite corrections by subsequent hands, and is generally considered a faithful version,

though far from elegant, or in any degree suitable to the original either in spirit or strength.

For the use of the new fount of Greek type in the University Press, the Editor begs to acknowledge his obligations to the Provost, by whom it was kindly allowed.

18, TRINITY COLLEGE,

*Oct. 20th, 1834.*

# PROLEGOMENA.

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## SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF PLATO.<sup>a</sup>

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PLATO<sup>b</sup> was born of Athenian parents, Aristo and Perictione, in the island of Ægina, where his father resided after it had become subject to Athens. The time of his birth is generally fixed in the third or fourth year of the 87th Olympiad, 430 or 429 B. C.<sup>c</sup> On his father's side his origin is traced to Codrus, and on his mother's through five generations to the family of Solon. In early life<sup>d</sup> he

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<sup>a</sup> Compiled principally from Enfield's History of Philosophy; Stanley's History of Philosophy, folio, 1687; Tennenann's Manual of Philosophy; the Encyclop. Metropol. Art. Plato; J. A. Fabric. Dissert. de Plat. ejusque Scriptis, &c.; and Biographie Universelle, Ancienne et Moderne. Paris, 1823.

<sup>b</sup> His real name was Aristocles: the various conjectures as to the cause of its having been changed, Brucker looks upon as uncertain and vague.

<sup>c</sup> According to Corsin. and Fabric. on the 7th of Thargelion, 430 B. C. in the third year of the 87th Olymp.; according to Dodwell a year later; to Dacier, in the first of the 88th Olymp., upon the authority of Diog. Laert. But the first date assigned, besides being in accordance with other circumstances, is supported by a paramount authority, Athen. Deipnosoph. l. v. A. 13.

<sup>d</sup> The birth of Plato is said to have been accompanied by a number of prodigies, which doubtless owed their origin to the subsequent development of his character

devoted himself with great assiduity to the study of poetry, in which, as in the sister arts of music and painting, he made such progress as might be expected from a vivid imagination, exquisite sensibility, and a richly cultivated taste. His efforts in lyric, epic, and dramatic composition were far from unsuccessful, but with a modest distrust of his own poetical powers he committed an epic of some length to the flames upon his perusing the Iliad of Homer, and destroyed an elaborate effusion of his tragic muse<sup>a</sup> upon hearing a discourse of Socrates, which prevailed in awakening his feelings to a sense of a more sublime and important pursuit.

It is probable, that Plato received the first rudiments of his philosophical education from Cratylus and Hermogenes, who inculcated the systems of Heraclitus and Parmenides.<sup>b</sup> At the age of twenty years he became a disciple of Socrates, and continued with him for eight years,<sup>c</sup> till that great and amiable philosopher fell a sacrifice to the rancour of party, disguised under the pretext of zeal for the national religion. By the advice of Socrates he resigned his poetical studies for the graver investigation of philosophical truths, to which he also sacrificed his early inclinations towards a public life, from which he was further diverted by a feeling of disgust, arising from the perpetual changes which took place in his time in the government of Greece, from the corruptions of the democracy, and the moral depravity of his countrymen.

While under the guidance and instruction of Socrates, Plato not unfrequently occasioned uneasiness to his fellow disciples and to

and attainments. Diogenes, Apuleius, Plutarch, and Lucian concur in the story of a swarm of bees having gathered round his cradle, and settled on his lips as he slept. This was not lost upon Cicero, de Divinat. lib. i. 36. "Platoni cum in cunis parvulo dormienti apes in labellis consedisent, responsum est, singulari illum suavitate orationis fore, ita futura eloquentia provisa in infante est." It was also reported of him that he was born of a virgin mother, and that Apollo himself had condescended to become his father.

<sup>a</sup> This was a dramatic piece which he had composed at the age of twenty. It consisted of three distinct tragedies and one comedy, forming what the ancients called a tetralogy. He destroyed it the very day before its intended exhibition, from the cause as above.

<sup>b</sup> Apuleius de Dogmat. Plat. Arist. Met. i. c. 6.

<sup>c</sup> Xenophon. Memorab. iii. 6.

Socrates himself, by engrafting upon the doctrine and precepts of the latter a class of opinions derived from sources totally distinct.<sup>a</sup> He never failed, however, in the zealous attachment, nor changed from the devoted veneration, which he justly regarded his master as eminently entitled to deserve. Plato attended during the trial of Socrates, was one of those who offered to speak in his defence, (though refused leave by the judges to proceed,) and to be bound as a security for the payment of the fine: he attended him during his imprisonment, and was present at the discourse which occupied the last moments of Socrates, on the Immortality of the Soul.<sup>b</sup>

It is supposed, with good reason, that during the life-time of Socrates, Plato had written the dialogues called the *Lysis*, *Phædrus*, the *Banquet*, and probably the *Protagoras*. Soon after the death of the philosopher, and the dispersion of his disciples, he withdrew to Megara, where he remained till the ferment subsided at Athens. During his sojourn there he is believed to have composed the *Apology of Socrates*, the *Crito*, and the *Phædo*, those affecting and beautiful dialogues which are so intimately connected with his master's history and its unhappy close.

At Megara he and the surviving friends of Socrates were hospitably entertained at the house of Euclid, under whom Plato studied the art of reasoning, and probably increased his natural zeal for disputation.

Anxious to obtain all the information which an acquaintance with the wisdom and learning, and an insight into the habits and manners of civilized countries could afford, he proceeded from Megara on a course of travels, and first visited that part of Italy called Magna Græcia, where he found the two philosophical schools of Heraclitus and Pythagoras, in direct opposition of system and

<sup>a</sup> "The Memoirs of Socrates, written by Xenophon, afford a much more accurate idea of the opinions of Socrates and his manner of teaching, than the Dialogues of Plato, who every where mixes his own conceptions and diction, and those of other philosophers, with the ideas and language of his master. It is related that when Socrates heard Plato recite his *Lysis*, he said, "How much does this young man make me say which I never conceived." *Enf. Phil.* vol. i. b. 2. c. 4.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, however, for obvious reasons, denies this himself. See in *Phæd.* c. 2. and the conjecture of Forster in loc.

principle to each other; and in full repute and daily collision as, on the one hand, physical analysts and annihilators of existence, and as metaphysical realists and assertors of eternal relations on the other. Plato adopted the doctrines of Heraclitus as far as they related to physics, but was distinctly and decidedly opposed to the sceptical inferences by which those doctrines were accompanied as a necessary result. He embraced the notions of the Pythagoreans as to the permanence of essences, but he modified the doctrine considerably, by incorporating it with those notions of a moral system and an organizing Providence, which he had inherited from Socrates as part of the purer creed of Anaxagoras. In another important particular also he qualified the metaphysical system of Pythagoras: he considered the intellectual world as being in some degree embodied in the visible one. Instead of inferring, as the Pythagoreans had done, that things related were a semblance of the abstract relations, he thought that they participated in those relations.<sup>a</sup> Some other differences subsisted between his notions and those of the Pythagoreans, on the origin and nature of numbers, which are involved in considerable obscurities, and on which it would be impossible to enter here.

He next visited Cyrene, where he became the pupil of Theodorus, under whom he studied mathematics, and from hence he is said to have travelled into Egypt;<sup>b</sup> but there is no information which can be depended on, either as to the circumstances of his visit, or the length of his stay in that country. According to some accounts he assumed the character of a merchant, that he might travel with safety, and passed through the whole kingdom of Artaxerxes Mnemon as a seller of oil.<sup>c</sup> Others relate that he visited the priests there, and was initiated in their profoundest mysteries.<sup>d</sup>

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<sup>a</sup> Encyclop. Metrop. Art. Plat. Arist Metaph. l. i. c. 6. *Οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μίμησιν τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν. Πλάτων δὲ μέθεξι, τοῦνομα μεταβαλὼν τὴν μὲν τοῖ γε μέθεξι ἢ τὴν μίμησιν ἤ τις ἂν εἴη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν.*

<sup>b</sup> Ancient writers vary so widely in their accounts of the life of Plato, that it is impossible to attempt to reconcile them. Diogenes Laertius asserts, that Plato visited Cyrene first, whence he proceeded to Italy, and from thence to Egypt.

<sup>c</sup> Diog. Laert.

<sup>d</sup> Apuleius. Plutarch.



But Plato himself speaks of the reserve maintained in Egypt towards strangers with regard to the peculiar institutions of the country, and asserts, that, so far from their mysteries being accessible to foreigners, "the animals of the Nile used to drive foreigners away by their meats, sacrifices, and rude proclamations."<sup>a</sup>

The most likely reason of his visit, besides general curiosity, is that stated by Cicero,<sup>b</sup> that he went for the purpose of completing his mathematical studies, and becoming acquainted with their astronomical systems. It must be attributed to the ignorance or vanity of the Alexandrians of a later period, that they insist upon Plato's having been indebted to the sages of Egypt for his earliest knowledge, and for those treasures of moral and political wisdom which he afterwards imparted to his countrymen. Plato's own authority is decisive on this point, which is to the effect, that though the abstract sciences were cultivated in Egypt with great success, the other liberal sciences were but indifferently attended to.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> De Legg. lib. xii. p. 953. E. It has been asserted that Pythagoras learned his cosmogony in Egypt; the doctrine of transmigration, and the immortality of the soul. But it is more likely that he adopted the latter from Socrates, and the former from Pythagoras. It is not probable that Plato, in the habit of a merchant, could obtain access to the sacred mysteries of Egypt; for when Pythagoras was introduced by the recommendation of Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, to Amasis, king of Egypt, a great patron of all learned men, that he might the more easily obtain access to the colleges of the priests, the king himself could scarcely, with all his authority, prevail upon the priests to consent to the admission of a stranger, or to permit his being made acquainted with their mysterious rites. Herodot. l. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sic. l. i. c. 2. Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 12. s. 1.

<sup>b</sup> "Cum Plato Ægyptum peragravit ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et cœlestia acciperet." de Fin. v. 29. upon which the author of the able and eloquent article in the Encyclop. Metropol. observes, that it is strange how this passage has been misinterpreted, and what latitude has been given to the term *cœlestia* here, even by some writers who were acquainted with another passage of Cicero, which is the best commentary on this, if indeed it stood in need of any. "Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerant, evocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreret: *cœlestia* autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre."

<sup>c</sup> Cf. de Legg. lib. v. p. 746. B.

There are no better grounds, either, for supposing that during his residence in Egypt, Plato became acquainted with the doctrine of the Hebrews, and introduced into his own system the principles and precepts of their sacred books. This opinion has been eagerly maintained by several Jewish and Christian writers, but it has been satisfactorily proved to have had no other foundation than mere conjecture, and may be supposed to have originated in that zeal for the honour of revelation which would assign the Hebrew Scriptures or traditions as the source of all Gentile wisdom.<sup>a</sup>

On<sup>b</sup> his return to Greece,<sup>c</sup> richly stored with the philosophical treasures of distant countries, Plato settled in Athens, and took possession of a small house and garden, which he purchased for three thousand drachmas, adjoining the groves and grounds which had been bequeathed by Academus, or Ecademus, to the public, and as it would appear within one common enclosure. There Plato put in execution a design, in contemplation doubtless long before, of forming a new school for the instruction of youth in the principles of philosophy. In this delightful retreat, accordingly, which, from its situation and scenery, was admirably calculated to charm and tranquillize the mind, and which harmonized so well with the study of philosophy and the muses, he opened the academy, and placed above the door of his school, to testify his high sense of the importance of mathematics as a necessary step to higher speculations, the celebrated inscription,

ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Enf. Phil.* b. ii. c. 8. s. 1. where this opinion is examined and refuted at length.

<sup>b</sup> The sources of Plato's philosophy have been ascertained with some degree of precision to be as follows: his Dialectics he borrowed from Euclid of Megara; the principles of natural philosophy he learned in the Eleatic school from Hermogenes and Cratylus; and combining these with the Pythagorean doctrine of natural causes, he framed from both his system of metaphysics. Mathematics and astronomy he was taught in the Cyrenaic school, and by the Egyptian priests. From Socrates he imbibed the pure principles of moral and political wisdom; but he afterwards obscured their simplicity by Pythagorean speculations. *Enf. Phil.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ex Ægypto reversus Delis exposuit sensum oraculi quod Græcos jussit aram, quæ in Delo erat, cubica ratione duplicare.* J. A. Fabric. For an account of the

This new school soon obtained an extensive celebrity, to which the travels and reputation of Plato contributed not a little among his Socratic brethren. None of these had ventured to institute a school at Athens, except Aristippus, who had confined his instructions almost entirely to ethical subjects, and had brought himself into some discredit by the freedom of his manners. Plato, consequently, remained alone to inherit the patrimony of public esteem which Socrates had bequeathed to his disciples; and he was not deficient in the talent and energy which enabled him to extend the study of philosophy beyond the limits in which his master had enclosed it. The result was, that his school was crowded with pupils of the first distinction; even women<sup>a</sup> are said to have attended his lectures, disguised in male attire. Among the illustrious names which appear in the catalogue of his followers are Dion, the Syracusan prince, and the orators Hyperides, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, and Isocrates.

His political wisdom stood so high that several states applied for his assistance in new modelling their respective forms of government. He rejected proposals of this nature from the Arcadians and Thebans, because they refused to adopt the plan of his republic, which required an equal distribution of property. He gave his advice in the affairs of Elis and other Grecian states, and furnished a code of laws for Syracuse; he was also in great esteem with several crowned heads, amongst others, Archelaus, king of Macedon, and Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily.

Plato is said to have visited the court of this latter prince at three different periods.<sup>b</sup> The professed object of his first visit, which happened in the fortieth year of his age, is stated to have

circumstance here alluded to, and the mechanical duplication of the cube, see Dr. Lardner's *Elements of Euclid*, book vi. prop. 13. (586,) (587.)

<sup>a</sup> *Enf. Phil. Athen.* l. vii. p. 279. l. xi. p. 546. *Fabric. Bib. Græc.* v. ii. p. 69.

<sup>b</sup> It seems well established that Plato, at some period, visited the court of Dionysius at Syracuse. One visit only of his is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus; but the spurious letters which have passed under the name of Plato, have given rise to very circumstantial accounts of three different visits. Of that visit which really took place, little can be satisfactorily said. *Encyc. Metr. Art. Plat.* Compare with this, *Mitford, Grec. Hist.* vol. v. 469. and note; vi. 7.

been a desire, on the part of the philosopher, to take a survey of the island, and particularly to examine into the wonders of Mount *Ætna*. While residing at Syracuse, he succeeded in converting Dion, the brother-in-law of the king, who, though possessed of distinguished abilities, had allowed them to merge in the luxurious dissipation of a licentious court. No sooner had he been inspired by Plato with a taste for that philosophy which leads to virtue, than he devoted himself with unwearied diligence to the pursuit of wisdom and truth, and endeavoured, in order that Dionysius might if possible be likewise reclaimed, to procure an interview between him and Plato. The free censures and unreserved opinions of the latter excited first the displeasure, and then the suspicions of the tyrant, and the philosopher, in endeavouring to secure his safety by flight, was sold as a slave at *Ægina*, the inhabitants of which were then at war with the Athenians, by Pollis, the master of the vessel in which he was returning, who had been bribed for that purpose by Dionysius. He was redeemed by Anniceris, a Cyrenaic philosopher,<sup>a</sup> for the sum of thirty minæ, and so enabled to reach home.

He is said to have visited Sicily a second time after the younger Dionysius had succeeded to the throne, vacated by the decease of the elder, but his sojourn was unsatisfactory and brief. He returned again to Athens in consequence of the breaking out of a war, upon the adjustment of which Dionysius promised to send for him, and for Dion also, who having become obnoxious to the tyrant, was banished into Italy, and who had retired to Athens to confirm and complete, by a constant attendance upon the lectures of his master, and a diligent study and practice of his moral precepts, his conversion from the effeminate and enervating habits of his early life.

After no long time the third invitation arrived, which the philosopher would have gladly declined, pleading as an excuse the infirmities of advancing age; but he was prevailed on by the en-

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<sup>a</sup> Repayment having been afterwards offered to Anniceris by Plato's relations, he refused the money, saying, with that generous spirit which true philosophy always inspires, that he saw no reason why the relations of Plato should engross to themselves the honour of serving him. *Enf. Phil.*

treaties of Dion and his family, and also by the urgent solicitations of some Pythagorean philosophers, and went accordingly. For a time every thing seemed to proceed favourably; Dionysius appeared to lend an attentive ear to the counsel and suggestions of Plato, who now, in the midst of a numerous train of philosophers, possessed the chief influence and authority in the court of Syracuse; and who, while Aristippus was revelling in splendid luxury, while Dionysius was indulging his natural acrimony, for which the court afforded such ample scope, and while Æschines was intent upon his favourite pursuit, the amassing of wealth, supported the credit of philosophy in a manner which his friends regarded as indicative of superior wisdom, but which was attributed by his detractors to pride.

Mutual distrust, however, soon intervened, and Plato was put in confinement by Dionysius, from which he was rescued with difficulty by the spirited interference of his Pythagorean friends, and once more restored in safety to Athens.

He now devoted himself with unabated assiduity to his school and the instruction of youth. Having enjoyed naturally a robust constitution, and having lived temperately, he arrived at the eighty-first, or, according to some writers, at the seventy-ninth year of his age, and died from the mere decay of nature in the first year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad. As he had never been married he left no natural heirs, but transferred his effects by will to Adimantus.<sup>a</sup> A monument was raised to his memory in the academy, in-

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<sup>a</sup> Stanley, Hist. of Philosophy, part v. c. 12. "Thus continuing a single life to his end, not having any heirs of his own, he bequeathed his estate to young Adimantus, (probably the son of Adimantus, his second brother,) by his will; thus cited by Laertius.

*These things Plato hath bequeathed and disposed: the Eniphistiæan grounds bordering north, on the highway from the Cephisean temple, south on the Heracleum of the Eniphistiades, east on Archestratus the Phrearian, west, Philip the Cholidian; this let it not be lawful for any man to sell or alienate, but let young Adimantus be possessor thereof in as full and ample manner as is possible. And likewise the Eneisidæan farm which I bought of Callimachus, adjoining on the north to Eurymedon the Myrrinusian, on the south to Demonstratus Xypeteron, on the east to Eurymedon the Myrrinusian, on the west to Cephissus. Three minæ of silver; a golden cup weighing 160; a ring of gold, and an ear-ring of gold, both together weighing four*

scribed with an epitaph written by his pupil Aristotle, in terms of gratitude and enthusiastic reverence.<sup>a</sup>

It is from the works of Plato, principally, that the judgment is to be formed of his merits as a philosopher, and of the advantages which he conferred upon science. They are chiefly in the form of dialogues, and are justly considered as models of excellence for the rare union of a poetic and philosophic spirit; they are also the only incontestible authorities respecting his opinions, although his entire system can only be attained by conjecture, as he had certain doctrines (*ἄγραφα δόγματα*) which he did not communicate except to those whom he entrusted with his *esoteric* philosophy.<sup>b</sup>

His language and style have been the subject of many and high encomiums from ancient and modern critics. Cicero gives it as an assertion of the philosophers, that if Jupiter were to speak Greek, he would speak like Plato;<sup>c</sup> Aristotle describes his style as “a middle species of diction between verse and prose.”<sup>d</sup> Some of his dialogues are elevated by such sublime and glowing conceptions, as plainly indicate the bias of his early taste. The several characters are ably and consistently supported, the course of the debate distinctly marked, the scene depicted in the most lively and efficient colouring, and the style of expression in perfect harmony with the subject, time, and place.<sup>e</sup> In a word, his profound and humane philosophy

*drachms and three oboli. Euclid, the stone-cutter, oweth me three minæ. Diana I remit freely. I leave servants, Ticho, Bictas, Apolloniades, Dionysius, goods, whereof Demetrius keepeth an inventory. I owe no man anything. Executors: Sosthenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, Thrasippus.*

If this will be not forged that of Apuleius is false, who avers, that “the patrimony he left was a little orchard adjoining to the academy, two servants, and a cup wherein he supplicated to the gods. Gold no more than he wore in his ear when he was a boy, an emblem of his nobility.”

<sup>a</sup> *Ibid.* “He died in the 81st year of his age, which number he completed exactly, dying that very day whereon he was born. For which reason the Magi at Athens sacrificed to him, as conceiving him more than man, who fulfilled the most perfect number, nine multiplied into itself.”

<sup>b</sup> Tennemann, *Man. Phil.* 130.

<sup>c</sup> *Orat. c. 3. 20. Brut. 31.*

<sup>d</sup> *Arist. apud. Laert.*

<sup>e</sup> It must be allowed, however, that amongst other difficulties which are to

have ranked him as a writer amongst his country's highest ornaments, while his works remain as a noble memorial of Athenian genius, elegance, and urbanity.<sup>a</sup>

According to Thrasyllus<sup>b</sup> he published his Dialogues in conformity to the rules of the tragic tetralogy. The first tetralogy has a common subject illustrative of the life which becomes a philosopher; every dialogue has also a double title, the one from the principal person concerned, the other from the subject.

<i>The first Tetralogy.</i>	{	Euthyphron, or, Of Piety.
		The Apology of Socrates.
		Crito,—Of that which should be done.
		Phædo,—Of the Immortality of the Soul.
<i>The second.</i>	{	Cratylus,—Of Etymology.
		Theætetus,—Of Science.
		The Sophist,—Of Ens.
		The Statesman,—Of Political Prudence and Sovereign Power.
<i>The third.</i>	{	Parmenides,—Of Ideas, and the Intelligible Essence of Things.
		Philebus,—Of Pleasure, and in what it really consists.
		The Symposium,—Of the Good.
		Phædrus,—Of the beautiful, the false, and the true.

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be met with in the writings of Plato, there are many which arise from the language in which he expresses his conceptions. Sometimes the reader is dazzled by the splendour of his poetical diction; and sometimes he is perplexed by studied ambiguities, and finds the same term used in different senses, besides different terms being employed to express the same meaning. He also frequently confounds the ideas and language of mathematics with metaphysics, and attempts, after the example of the Pythagorean school, to express philosophical conceptions by mathematical diagrams and proportions, which, added to the extreme subtlety of his speculations upon abstract and sublime topics, shall be frequently found to interfere materially with the perspicuity and intelligibility of his meaning and composition. *Enf. Phil.*

<sup>a</sup> *Encyc. Metropol.*

<sup>b</sup> *Diog. Laert. iii. 56. s.*

- The fourth.* { Alcibiades 1,—Of Human Nature.  
Alcibiades 2,—Of Prayer.  
Hipparchus,—Of the Love of Gain.  
The Rivals,—Of Philosophy.
- The fifth.* { Theages,—Of Wisdom.  
Charmides,—Of Temperance.  
Laches,—Of Fortitude.  
Lysis,—Of Friendship.
- The sixth.* { Euthydemus,—Of Disputation.  
Protagoras,—The Sophist.  
Gorgias,—Of Rhetoric.  
Menon,—Of Virtue.
- The seventh.* { Hippias 1,—Of Honesty.  
Hippias 2,—Of Deceit.  
Io,—Of Poetry.  
Menexenus,—The Funeral Oration.
- The eighth.* { Clitopho,—The Exhortation to Virtue.  
The Commonwealth,—The best Condition of a Republic.  
Timæus,—Of Nature.  
Critias,—Of the Island Atlantis, (mentioned in the 'Timæus.')
- The ninth.* { Minos,—Of Law.  
Laws,—Of Legislation.  
Epinomis,—The Nocturnal Convention, or the Philosophers.  
Epistles, in number thirteen; one to Aristodemus; two to Archytas; four to Dionysius; to Hennias, Erastus, and Coriscus, one each; to Leodamas, one; to Dion, one; to Dion's friends, two.<sup>a</sup>

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<sup>a</sup> Certain dialogues generally introduced into the editions of Plato, have been long ago admitted to be spurious by general consent. These are *the Axiochus*, *Demodochus*, *Eryxias*, *Sisyphus*, *Clitopho*, and the two short dialogues on Justice and Virtue. Other dialogues generally received as genuine, *the Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *the Epinomis*, *the Latter Alcibiades*, *the Rivals*, *Clitopho*, and *Theages*, bear



From the writings of Plato, which were originally collected by Hermodorus, one of his pupils, is to be derived the knowledge of the philosophy and opinions of the earlier Academics, as of the founder of the sect himself, a brief outline of which may not inaptly be introduced here.<sup>a</sup>

Philosophy was divided by Plato into three parts; Morals, Physics, and Dialectics. Under Morals he comprehended politics, and under Physics that science which was afterwards distinguished by the name of metaphysics. Of these sciences he clearly laid down the principal attributes and mutual dependencies, and drew the distinction between the analytical and synthetical methods. Philosophy, therefore, is under great obligations to him *quoad formam*. She is no less indebted to him for the light he has thrown upon the above parts considered separately; though he did not profess to deliver a system of each, but continually excited the attention of others to further discoveries.<sup>b</sup>

Wisdom, in the strict Platonic sense of the term, is the knowledge of those things which truly exist, and are comprehended by the intellect, particularly those which regard the Deity, and the human soul as distinct from the body. Philosophy is the desire of divine science, or the liberation of the mind from the body, and its direction towards those real essences, which are perceptible only by the understanding. A philosopher must possess a mind naturally inclined to contemplation, an ardent love of truth, a penetrating

strong marks of spuriousness. The dialogues last enumerated are accordingly rejected by Böckh. (*Comment. in Plat. Min.* &c. Hal. Lax. 1806,) Bekker (in his edition of Plato, Berlin, 1818,) and Von Ast (in his *Platons Leben und Schriften*, &c. Lips. 1816, 8vo.) Von Ast not only concurs in this judgment, but goes much greater lengths. He questions the genuineness of the *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Menexenus*, *Laches*, the *Greater Hippias*, *Io*, *Euthyphro*, the *Defence of Socrates*, the *Crito*, and the *Books of Laws*. These are ably defended by the writer in the *Encycl. Metropol.* Cf. J. A. Fabric. de Plat. et Script. Bib. Gr. l. iii. c. 1.

<sup>a</sup> It is impossible, as Wyttenbach justly observes, (*Epist. Crit. ad Van Heusde*, prefixed to the latter's *Specimen Crit. in Plat.* Lugd. Bat. 1818.) to convey, by an abstract, an adequate notion of the merits of the original, owing to some peculiar excellencies in Plato's method and style.

<sup>b</sup> Tennemann, *Man. Phil.* 133.

judgment, and a retentive memory. He must be also inured to the exercise of temperance and fortitude, that nothing corporeal may divert him from the pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy, as it is employed in the contemplation of truth, is termed theoretical, and, as it is concerned in the regulation of actions, practical. Theoretical philosophy produces a contemplative life, in which the mind, occupied in meditations purely intellectual, acquires a resemblance to the divinity. Practical philosophy leads to an active life, and applies the principles of wisdom to the benefit of society. Besides the contemplation of truth and virtue, the philosopher will inquire into the right conduct of the understanding, and the powers of speech, or will make himself conversant with the art of reasoning and disputation.<sup>a</sup>

The chief heads of Plato's moral doctrine are, that, independently of other ends, virtue is to be pursued as the proper perfection of man's nature; that vice is a disease of the mind, originating in some delusion or misapprehension of our proper interests; that the real freedom of a natural being consists in his being able to regulate his conduct by the determinations of his reason; that every person who is not guided by his reason encourages insubordination in the faculties of his mind, and becomes the slave of caprice or passion; that a course of virtuous conduct, independently of its advantages to society, is beneficial to the individual practising it, as ensuring that regularity of imagination, that tranquillity and internal harmony, which is the mind's proper happiness.<sup>b</sup>

Concerning politics, which Plato defined to be the application,

<sup>a</sup> Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

<sup>b</sup> Encycl. Metropol. Cf. de Repub. I. iv. p. 444. in Gorg. p. 491. 492. de Repub. I. ix. p. 577. in Phæd. c. 9. Albin. *Εἰσαγ. εἰς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόγματα*. c. 27. See also the beginning of the fourth *Book of Laws*. The interesting research which Plato carried so far, respecting the supreme good, (especially in *the Theætetus*, *the Philebus*, *the Meno*, and *the Republic*.) belongs to the subject of morals. Virtue he defined to be the imitation of God, or the effort of man to attain to a resemblance to his original (*ὁμοίωσις θεῶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*); or in other words a unison and harmony of all our principles and actions according to reason, whence results the highest degree of happiness. Tennemann, *Man. Phil.* 136.

on a great scale, of the laws of morality, he has written at large in his Republic, and in his Dialogue on Laws. There is a good deal in his plan of a republic deserving of serious consideration; the great object of laws he judges to be to provide for the natural accommodation of the members of the community, as subsidiary and in subordination to the cultivation of their moral virtues. He considers the perfection of the state to consist not solely in the health, beauty, wealth, and strength of the individuals composing it, but also in their prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude. He defines education to be that which qualifies men to become good citizens, and renders them fit to govern or to obey. He looks upon it as most important, that the early principles instilled into the minds of youth should be those of strict moral virtue, and considers that if poems and fables, early taught, are able to impress the mind through life with a belief of the most improbable fictions, that the same means might be applied, with equal success, for inculcating realities and important truths. Idleness he regards as the bane of all virtue, and urges to industry as the grand source not only of wealth but happiness. He perceives, with great clearness, the advantages resulting from the subdivision of labour, and points out the necessity and natural progress of such subdivision in proportion as civilization advances. As to crimes, he regards them as originating in a love of pleasure, in passion, or in ignorance and folly.<sup>a</sup> But with these and other similar principles which are to be met with in his favourite system, Plato has embodied some which, to those who are conversant with mankind, and capable of entirely investigating the motives of human actions, will make the whole project appear chimerical, and the offspring of a mind replete with philosophical enthusiasm; his design, for instance, of admitting, in his republic, a community of women, in order to give reason an entire control over desire, and the perfection in the contemplation of abstract ideas, which he required in the civil functionaries of his imaginary state.<sup>b</sup>

Dialectics, according to Plato, embrace the essence and the acci-

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<sup>a</sup> Encycl. Metrop. Cf. de Legg. l. i. l. ii. de Rep. lib. i.

<sup>b</sup> Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

dents of things; concerning the former it makes use of division, definition, and analysis. Division separates the genus into its species, the whole into its parts, &c. Definition expresses the genus of the thing to be defined, and distinguishes it from all others by adding its specific difference. Analysis rises from objects of sense to intelligibles; from demonstrable propositions to axioms, or from hypothesis to experience. Induction rises from individuals to universals. Syllogism produces a conclusion by means of some intermediate proposition.<sup>a</sup>

These topics are cursorily touched upon by Plato, and it is rather by example than by precepts that he teaches the true art of reasoning, or exposes the fallacies of sophistry. The ingenious artifices and deceptions practised by the sophists, are clearly represented in several of Plato's dialogues, particularly in his Euthydemus and Sophist. The animadversions of Plato upon the rhetoric of his day, are not to be understood so much as a general and indiscriminate censure of the art itself, as an exposure of the technical refinements, the imposition, and absurdities of cotemporary rhetoricians. This must appear to be the case to any who may attentively study the dialogues connected with the subject.

On theology, the fundamental doctrine of Plato, as of the other ancient philosophers, is that from nothing nothing can proceed. This universal axiom he applied not only to the infinite efficient, but to the material cause.<sup>b</sup> Hence Cicero,<sup>c</sup> Apuleius,<sup>d</sup> Alcinous,<sup>e</sup> and the later commentator Chalcideus,<sup>f</sup> have correctly understood him as admitting two primary and incorruptible principles, God and Matter. Through the whole dialogue of the *Timæus* he supposes two eternal and independent causes of all things; one, that *by* which all things are made, which is God; the other that *from*

<sup>a</sup> Enf. Phil. *ibid.* Cf. Theætet. p. 148. 147. 210. Polit. p. 262. Phædr. p. 266. Laert. iii. c. 80. Apul. de Dogm. Plat. iii. p. 313.

<sup>b</sup> He represented the Divinity as the author of the world, inasmuch as he introduced into rude matter (*ἔλη—τὸ ἄμορφον*) order and harmony. Tennemann, Man. Phil. 135.

<sup>c</sup> Acad. Quæst. l. 1. c. 6.

<sup>d</sup> L. i. p. 284.

<sup>e</sup> C. 12.

<sup>f</sup> Op. p. 3. Comment. in *Timæ.* c. 13. s. 305.

which all things are made, which is matter. Plutarch seems to have given a just representation of the doctrine of Plato, when he speaks of matter as neither made nor produced, but as presenting itself before the great artificer to receive form and arrangement.<sup>a</sup>

Matter, according to Plato, is an eternal and infinite principle. His doctrine on this head is thus explained by Cicero.<sup>b</sup> "Matter, from which all things are produced and formed, is a substance without form or quality, but capable of receiving all forms and undergoing every kind of change; in which, however, it never suffers annihilation, but merely a solution of its parts, which are in their nature infinitely divisible, and move in portions of space which are also infinitely divisible. When that principle which we call quality is moved, and acts upon matter, it undergoes an entire change, and these forms are produced, from which arises the diversified and coherent system of the universe." This doctrine Plato unfolds at large in his *Timæus*, and insists upon the notion that matter has no form, but is capable of receiving any. He calls it the mother and receptacle of forms, by the union of which with matter the universe becomes perceptible to the senses; and maintains that the visible world owes its forms to the energy of the divine intellectual nature.<sup>c</sup>

It was also a doctrine of Plato, that there is in matter a necessary, but blind and refractory force; and that hence arises a propensity in matter to disorder and deformity, which is the cause of all the imperfection which appears in the works of God, and the origin of evil. On this subject Plato writes with considerable obscurity, but as far as his meaning can be traced, he appears to have thought that matter, from its nature, resists the will of the supreme artificer, so that he cannot perfectly execute his designs, and that this is the

<sup>a</sup> *Enf. Phil. b. ii. c. 8. s. 1.*

<sup>b</sup> *Acad. Quæst. i. c. 1.*

<sup>c</sup> *Enf. Phil. ibid.* It may be observed here that matter is not to be understood as body, but that from which bodies are formed. Body is that which is produced from matter by the energy of an efficient cause. This distinction is to be found in almost all the ancient systems of philosophy; it is necessary, therefore, in examining them not to understand the terms *incorporeal* and *immaterial* as synonymous. *Enf. Phil. l. c.*

cause of the mixture of good and evil which is found in the material world.

The principle opposite to matter in the system of Plato is God. He inculcated an intelligent cause, the origin of all spiritual being, and the framer of the material world.<sup>a</sup> The nature of this great being, he pronounced it difficult to discover, and when discovered, impossible to divulge.<sup>b</sup> The existence of God he inferred from the marks of intelligence, which appear in the form and arrangement of bodies in the visible world;<sup>c</sup> and from the unity of the material system he concluded that the mind by which it was formed must be one.<sup>d</sup> God, according to Plato, is the supreme intelligence, incorporeal, without beginning, end, or change, and capable of being perceived only by the mind. He distinguished the Deity not only from body, and whatever has corporeal qualities, but from matter itself, from which all things are made. He also ascribed to the Deity power and wisdom sufficient for the formation and preservation of the world, and supposed him possessed of goodness, which inclined him to desire, and, as far as the refractory nature of matter would permit, to produce the happiness of the universe.<sup>e</sup>

By Ideas, Plato appears to have meant patterns or archetypes, subsisting by themselves as real beings in the divine reason, as in their original and eternal region, and issuing thence to give form to sensible things, and to become objects of contemplation and science to rational beings. In the *Timæus* it is argued, that the reason of the Deity (*ὁ λογισμὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*) comprehends exemplars of all things; and that this reason is one of the primary causes of things. According to Plutarch,<sup>f</sup> Justin Martyr,<sup>g</sup> and Pseudo Origen,<sup>h</sup> Plato maintains the three principles, God, Matter, and Idea. Laertius speaks of but two principles in nature, as according to the Platonic system, God and Matter, but he may be supposed to allude to those two sources only of being which are primary and

<sup>a</sup> *Tim. t. iii. p. 29.*

<sup>b</sup> *Tim. l. c. Ep. vii. t. iii. p. 341.*

<sup>c</sup> *De Legg. p. 886.*

<sup>d</sup> *Tim. t. iii. p. 30. Polit. t. ii. 174.*

<sup>e</sup> *Polit. t. ii. p. 174. de Legg. x. t. ii. p. 899.*

<sup>f</sup> *Plac. Phil. l. i. §. 10.*

<sup>g</sup> *Ad Græc. p. 7.*

<sup>h</sup> *Philosoph. c. 19. p. 108.*

independent; for the third, the Idea or exemplar, is to be considered but as instrumental and dependent on the efficient cause. "The exemplar," according to Seneca,<sup>a</sup> "is not the efficient cause of nature, but an instrument necessary to the cause." This branch of the Platonic philosophy will be found explained, where it is made available for argument, in the course of the Phædo.

Visible things were regarded by Plato as fleeting shades, and ideas as the only permanent substances. These he conceived to be the proper objects of science to a mind raised by divine contemplation above the varying scenes of the material world. His impressions on the subject are appropriately expressed in a passage of his Republic,<sup>b</sup> in which he compares the state of the human mind with respect to the material and intellectual world, to that of a man, who, in a cave into which no light can enter but by a single passage, views upon a wall opposite to the entrance the shadows of external objects, and mistakes them for realities. So strongly was he influenced by this impression, that Plato, in the election of magistrates for his Republic,<sup>c</sup> required that none should be chosen who had not, by the habitual contemplation of the world of ideas, attained a perfect power of abstraction. It was another doctrine in the Platonic system, that the Deity formed the material world after a perfect archetype, which had subsisted eternally in his reason, and endued it with a soul. "God,"<sup>d</sup> according to Plato, "produced mind prior in time as well as excellence to the body, that the latter might be subject to the former."—"From that substance which is indivisible and always the same, and from that which is corporeal and divisible, he compounded a third kind of substance, participating in the nature of both." This substance, which is not eternal but produced, and which derives the superior part of its nature from God, and the inferior from matter, Plato supposed to be the animating principle of the universe, pervading and adorning all things.<sup>e</sup> This third principle in nature is, in the Platonic system, inferior to the Deity, being derived from that divine reason which is the seat of the ideal world; wherein it differs completely from

<sup>a</sup> Ep. 65.

<sup>b</sup> Lib. vii. init. t. ii. p. 515.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. p. 518. *Enf. Phil.* l. c. <sup>d</sup> *Tim.* t. iii. p. 34.

<sup>e</sup> *Cratyl.* t. iii. p. 53. Cf. *Aristot. Metaph.* l. xiv. c. 6.

the Stoical doctrine of the soul of the world, which supposed the essence of the divine nature to be diffused through the universe.<sup>a</sup>

Upon the foundation of the preceding doctrines concerning the Deity, matter, ideas, the soul of the world, and dæmons,<sup>b</sup> Plato raised the structure of his Physics.

To account for the origin and present state of human souls, Plato supposes that when the Deity formed the universe, he separated from the soul of the world inferior souls, which were thus mediately derived from the divine nature itself, equal in number to the stars, and assigned to each its proper celestial abode; but that these souls (for what reason does not appear) were sent down to the earth into human bodies as into a sepulchre or prison. He ascribes to this cause the depravity and misery to which human nature is liable, and maintains that it is only by disengaging itself from all animal passions, and rising above sensible objects to the contemplation of the world of intelligence, that the soul of man can be prepared to return to its original habitation.

<sup>a</sup> The doctrine of a twofold soul of the world, the one presiding over it (*ὑπερκόσμιος*) and the other residing in it (*ἐγκόσμιος*), was appended to the Platonic system by the later Platonists, to accommodate this system to the notions adopted by many of the Christian fathers respecting the divine nature. (Plotin. *Ennead.* iii. l. v. c. 2.)

It will appear evident, from an examination of the doctrine of Plato concerning God and the soul of the world, that it differs materially from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Plato did not suppose three subsistences in one divine essence, separate from the visible world; but taught that the *λόγος*, or reason of God, is the seat of the intelligible world, or of ideas, and that the soul of the world is a third subordinate nature, compounded of intelligence and matter. *Enf. Phil.* l. c. See Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, book i. c. 4. where the subject is discussed at length.

<sup>b</sup> These Plato probably conceived to be subordinate divinities, produced at the same time with the soul of the world, (*Tim.* t. iii. p. 40. *Conviv.* t. iii. p. 201.) and supposed them to have been appointed by the supreme Being to the charge of forming animal bodies and superintending the visible world; a doctrine which he seems to have borrowed from the Pythagoreans, and particularly from Timæus the Locrian, according to whom, "the ruler of all assigned the inspection of human affairs to dæmons, and committed to them the government of the world." *Enf. Phil.* l. c.



With regard to the conduct which should be adopted and adhered to through the trials and perplexities of this life, so as to afford the most consoling hope of a happier life to come, Plato has laid down, through the course of his works, the most admirable and efficient precepts. From the system of the universe, as being regulated by a wise and beneficent providence, he argues against the captious querulousness of those who are induced to complain of or deny this governing influence, because they do not feel it sufficiently near in their circumstances or themselves so as to protect them against the common accidents and disasters of life. He argues against that contracted and selfish feeling which cannot comprehend how at times the general good must be promoted at the sacrifice of particular interests, and in all anxieties and difficulties suggests the patience and comfort which cannot fail to be derived from conscious virtue. To despair, under any circumstances, is a mark of disloyalty to Providence, who never eventually deserts that spirit which has aspired, as far as its faculties would permit, to assimilate itself in goodness to its great original, or suffers it, when thus purified and advanced to a congenial nature, to undergo any real calamity. Those, on the other hand, are really unfortunate, who have succeeded in the purposes of mischief and have become rooted in the delusions of vice. For it is an eternal and immutable law, the operation of which pervades the entire universe, and from the obligation of which no created being of whatever grade is free, that the rewards of virtue are not more unerringly sure than the punishment of vice.

It has been already observed, that, as preparatory to the study of theoretical philosophy, Plato required from his disciples a knowledge of the elements of mathematics. Upon this subject, although he has not left any express treatise, he has yet made frequent use of mathematical ideas and language to explain and illustrate his philosophical tenets; and he recommends these studies as peculiarly adapted to raise the mind from sensible to intellectual objects, and to inure it to abstract and general conceptions.

Such is a comprehensive sketch of the Platonic philosophy, which has been compiled, and of necessity contracted, from other and more extended treatises on this interesting and important subject. A good deal has been designedly omitted, or but slightly

noticed here, which, however, shall be found more largely and, it is hoped, satisfactorily explained and developed throughout the course of the following work, where it is practically applied; but sufficient, probably, has been said at the outset to give some insight into the character, system, and style of Plato, which in the study of this selected portion of his writings may not appear unuseful.

It is needless to enter here upon the praise or censure to which Plato has been subjected, in the extremes of both; it was only natural that where extraordinary ability and deserts demanded admiration and respect, envy and jealousy should essay to thwart the just award by the ready instrumentality of obloquy and detraction. His respect for his great master, if Plutarch may be credited, was exemplified in his life, in an assimilation of manners, in his equanimity of temper, and in that uniformity of character which is the best proof of sincerity and integrity; Οὕτω καὶ Πλάτων ἐν Συρακούσαις οἶος ἐν ἀκαδημίᾳ καὶ πρὸς Διονύσιον οἶος πρὸς Διάνα.<sup>a</sup>

The doctrines of Plato were expounded in the academy after his decease by his nephew Speusippus, of Athens (died B. C. 339.) He was succeeded by Xenocrates of Chalcedon, one of Plato's favourite pupils, (died B. C. 314.) who in his manner of expression resembled Pythagoras, having, for instance, defined the soul to be *a self-moving number*. After him Polemo of Athens presided at the academy, who considered the "summum bonum" to consist in a life regulated according to nature; and subsequently Crates of Athens. Finally Crantor of Soli, the friend and disciple of Xenocrates and Polemo, maintained the original system of the founder of the school, with the exception of a few alterations, applied principally to the popular doctrines of practical morality. The name of Crantor is the last of distinction in the Old Academy.

In Germany Plato has been a favourite study of the ablest philosophers, amongst others, John Reuchlin, Leibnitz, and Kant. Amongst his British admirers are to be reckoned Gale and More, Cudworth, Bacon, Berkeley, and Shaftesbury. The minds both of Milton and Gray were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Plato's writings. Of this there is sufficient proof in the *Comus*, II

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<sup>a</sup> Plutarch, in *Opp.* vol. 8. p. 193. ed. Reiske.

Penseroso, the Tractate on Education, and the Answer to Smectymnus, of the former. The poems of Gray bear likewise an evident impression of the peculiar philosophical bent of the author's taste. This will appear still more obvious upon reference to his posthumous works, published by Mr. Matthias, in quarto, 1814, which evince upon the subject of Plato's writings, the most earnest study and laborious research.

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### EDITIONS OF PLATO'S WORKS.<sup>a</sup>

ALDUS. Venet. 1513. fol. Græce.

EDITIO PRINCEPS. Edited by Musurus. (See Roscoe's *Leo X.* vol. ii. 238—9. 4to. edit.) Although the editorial talents in this edition have been greatly excelled by subsequent scholars, it is still entitled to attention from the number of good manuscripts and ancient publications which were consulted in its compilation.

GRYNÆI. Basil. 1534. fol. Gr.

An elegant, rare, and respectable edition, the joint production of Valderus the printer, and Simon Grynæus, a well known scholar and critic. The *Timæus* and *Politicus* have the commentary of Proclus. The text is not so pure as that of the Aldine edition.

ARLENI. Basil. 1556. fol. Gr.

This edition, which, upon the whole, copies the preceding, has many curious passages and remarks. It was compiled by Arnoldus Arlenius, who, in travelling through Italy, collected some manuscripts of Plato, and in his own copy of Grynæus' edition marked down the corrupt passages of that work, supplied the chasms, and sent the copy thus corrected to HOPPERUS, the son-in-law of the printer Petrus, to have it published accordingly. Still it has many errors in common with that of Grynæus.

SERRANI. Paris, 1578. fol. 3 vols. Gr. et Lat.

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<sup>a</sup> For the subjoined list and the accompanying remarks the Editor is indebted to that valuable work, "Introduction to the Classics," by the Rev. T. F. Dibdin, London, 1827.

Printed by H. STEPHEN. This celebrated and magnificent edition is well known in the history of classical literature. The first vol. is dedicated to Queen Elizabeth; the second to James the Sixth of Scotland, (then a boy, and subsequently James the First of England;) and the third to the Republic of Berne. This edition has been subjected to some animadversion. The assistance professed to have been received from different sources, is, in fact, from Ficinus, Aldus, Arlenius, Hopperus, and Cornarius, although their names are studiously suppressed. The Latin version is said not to be so faithful as that of Ficinus. See preface to Fischer's *Dialog. Platonis*, Lips. 8vo. 1783; R. Simon's *Bibl. Choisie*, t. i. 360; Brucker, *Hist. Philosoph. Crit.* t. i. c. xii. p. 659; and Harles, *Introd. L. Gr.* t. i. 397. The text of this edition is deemed very accurate and faithful.

—— Lugduni. 1590. fol. Gr. et Lat.

—— Francof. 1602. fol. Gr. et Lat.

These editions follow the order of Ficinus in the arrangement of the books, and contain his notes and commentaries. In the opinion of John Fabricius (*Hist. Bibl. Fabric.* t. iii. 189.) they are the best editions of Plato, and preferable to that of Serranus; from which, however, Harles dissents.

CROLLII, &c. Bipont. 1781. 12. vols. Gr. et Lat.

One of the few Greek writers, edited by the Bipont Society. The Greek text is taken from Serranus, and the Latin version from Ficinus. The first vol. contains an account of the manuscripts and editions of Plato; the ninth vol. has an excellent tract, or "Introduction to the Reading of the Works of Plato," the illustrations and arguments of the Dialogues, in a separate volume, are by Professor Tiedemann. It is considered as one of the most beautiful productions of the Deux Ponts press.

BEKKERI. Berol. 1816. 8vo. 10 vols. Gr. et Lat.

The united labours of BEKKER, WOLF, and HEINDORF, appear in this truly critical and valuable edition. The Latin version is by Wolf. In the arrangement of the text numerous MSS. have been consulted. All the ancient scholia, deserving of being collected, are incorporated. One volume is devoted to an account of the life, doctrine, and writings of Plato.

ASTII. Lipsiæ. 1819—24. 7 vols. Gr. et Lat.

A very excellent edition. The version, with the exception of the earlier part, which is that of Cornarius, is by the editor. The annotations are admirable, and the indices full and complete.

STALBAUMII. Lipsiæ. 1821—25. 8vo. 8 vols. Gr.

These volumes form part of the series of Greek prose-writers, published at Leipsic. They contain the ancient scholia, "from a MS. in the Bodleian library, with the annotations of RUHNKEN." The prolegomena and annotations are ample and learned.

There have been three Latin editions of Plato; the first by Marsilius Ficinus, Florence, 1491; the second by J. Cornarius, Basle, 1558; and the third by J. Serranus, Paris, 1578.

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#### DETACHED WORKS OF PLATO.

ASTIUS. *Politeia sive de Republ.* Lips. 1804: reprinted in 1814: 8vo. Gr. *Phædrus*, Lips. 1810, 8vo. Gr. with the scholia of Hermias, and a most ample editorial commentary.

BEISTER. *Mario, Crito, Alcibiades: Uterque Berol*, 1780. 8vo. Gr. with some notes of Gottleber and Schneider. Reprinted in 1790, 1812, and 1822. 8vo.

BEKKER. *Dialogi*, Berol. 1816. 8vo. 2 vols. *Commentaria Critica in Platonem a se editum. Accedunt Scholia. Berol.* 1821—3. 8vo. Gr. et Lat.

ETWALL. *Alcibiades et Hipparchus.* Oxon. 1771. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. to which is prefixed the life of Plato by Olympiodorus.

FINDEISEN. *Gorgias.* Gothæ, 1796. 8vo. Gr. The editor having died before the completion of his labours, the work was continued and completed by HAAS. An excellent edition; with the scholia of Hermias.

FISCHER. *Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phædo.* Lips. 1770. 8vo. Gr. *Cratylus et Theætetus.* Lips. 1770. 8vo. Gr. *Sophista, Politicus, Parmenides.* Lips. 1774. 8vo. Gr. *Philebus et Symposium.* Lips. 1776. 8vo. Gr. *Euthyphro, Apologia Socratis, Crito, Phædo.* Lips. 1783. 8vo. Gr. Such are the labours of the celebrated FISCHER upon Plato. Of these the

last performance, which contains much more than its title announces, is in all respects, the most valuable as well as copious.

FORSTER. *Dialogi V.* Oxon. 1745. 8vo. Gr. et Lat.

First and best edition. It was inaccurately reprinted in 1752.

HEINDORF. *Dial. IV. Lysis, Charmides, Hippias Major, Phædrus.* Berol. 1802. 8vo. Second edition, greatly improved from the publications of Bekker. The latter has a critical annotation on the *Apologia Socratis*. The same editor also published the *Gorgias, Theætetus, Parmenides*, and *Euthydemus*. Berol. 1806, 8vo. The labours of Heindorf, inasmuch as they contain according to Fuhrmann, many happy illustrations of difficult passages, are indispensable to the student of Plato.

MULLER. *Chrestomathia Platonica.* Turici, 1756. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. The Latin version is that of Serranus.

NITZSCH. *Ion.* Lips. 1822. 8vo. Gr. with learned prolegomena and annotations. The best separate edition of this work of Plato.

NORTH. *Socratis Apologia, Crito, Phædo, de Legib.* l. x. *Alcibiades Secundus.* Cantab. 1673. with the Latin version of Ficinus.

ROUTH. *Euthydemus et Gorgias.* Oxon. 1784. 8vo. Gr. et Lat.

THOMSON. *Parmenides.* Oxon. 1728. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. with learned prolegomena and running notes.

WYTENBACH. *Phædon.* Lugd. Bat. 1810. 8vo. Gr. "We dismiss this volume by stating that the perusal of it has by no means diminished the respect which we had always entertained for the talents and erudition of the learned editor." *Mus. Crit.* p. 258—61.

A VARIORUM EDITION of the works of Plato has been published by Mr. Priestly, whose name stands deservedly high in the annals of Greek classical literature; in nine vols. 8vo. Gr. et Lat. Lond. 1826, comprising the annotations of the following editors: Bekker, Astius, Beister, Buttmann, Bockh, Baumgarten, Crusius, Cornarius, Creuzerus, Etwall, Faehse, Findeisen, Fischer, Forster, Gottleber, Heindorf, Heussde, Korner, Lange, Massey, Morgenstein, Muller, Nitzsch, Nurnberger, Pinzger, Raabe, Routh, Stallbaum, Stutzmann, Thomson, Winckler, Wytttenbach, and Zeunius.

The works of Plato have been translated into English by Floyer Sydenham, Taylor, and Spens. "Of Sydenham's translation," observes an accomplished writer, "every scholar will speak with respect, and every man of taste with fondness and regard. Its imperfect and unfinished condition bears with it a deep interest as a memorial of Sydenham's melancholy fate; when a man of the highest talents and most elegant accomplishments, after struggling with the inequalities of fortune, and suffering mortifications, not the less galling because concealed and uncommunicated, gave way to the sudden impulse of his indignant spirit, and quitted a world which he disdained to flatter.<sup>a</sup>

"Spens' work bears the marks of being a version from the French, and not from the original. Taylor's translation is a lamentable contrast to the work of his predecessor Sydenham. It is deficient both in spirit and taste, and the difficulties of the original are not only increased by the translator's grammatical ignorance, but its obscurities are rendered still more impenetrable by idle comments written in the unintelligible jargon of the Alexandrian school."

A. Dacier has translated ten of Plato's dialogues into French, with a life of Plato, and an introduction to his Philosophy prefixed, Paris, 1699. Some of these dialogues had been previously translated by F. de Maucroix, *Œuvres de Prose et de Poesie*. t. i. 1685. From the French of Dacier an English version was published in 1701, called "Plato abridged." Dardi Bembo published an Italian translation in three vols. Venet. 1601. Selected dialogues were translated also by Sebast. Erci, with notes. The works of Plato were translated into Persian, according to Agathias, lib. ii. by command of Chosroes, king of Persia. Fabricius mentions also a translation of the Republic into the Hebrew tongue, as extant in Bibl.

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<sup>a</sup> The subject of this beautiful eulogy was a Master of Arts in Wadham College, Oxford. He proposed to publish a translation of the whole works of Plato, but nine dialogues only were completed. He was thrown into prison for a debt to a victualler, and died in 1787 or '88. He was generally beloved for the candour of his temper and gentleness of his manners. His circumstances excited sympathy among the friends of literature in England, and are said to have occasioned the institution of the benevolent Literary Fund.

Vatic. upon the authority of J. Bartoloc. Bibl. magna Rabbin. tom. iv. p. 353."

A catalogue of the various works written upon the subject of Plato, his doctrine, and writings, will be found in Tennemann's Manual of Philosophy, translated by the Rev. A. Johnson, M. A. Oxford, D. A. Talboys, 1832.

TRINITY COLLEGE,

*March* 19, M.DCCC.XXXV.

The edition of Matthiæ's Grammar, to which frequent allusion is made in the course of this work, is the fifth, revised and enlarged by John Kenrick, M. A. London, J. Murray, 1832.

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*The Reader will please to make the following Corrections :*

- Page 58. note ; *read*—"without an additional," &c.
- 99. note ; *for* Sect. 63. *read* Lect. 63.
- 126. note ; *read*—"deny that they were extant, in a collected form, in the time," &c.
- 150. note ; *read*—"If any where at all."
- 172. note ; *for* lorsqu'un *read* lorsqu'un.



ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ

**ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.**

## ARGUMENT.

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THE Apology consists of three parts ; of which the first contains the general answer of Socrates to his accusers, both open and concealed. He meets the objection, that he had brought his misfortunes on himself, by showing that death, which was only feared by those who pretended to wisdom, should never influence him to abandon the course assigned him by integrity and truth. He then proceeds, in a strain of well managed irony, to describe the loss which the Athenians should suffer in him, inasmuch as one who should prefer their interest to his own, and to the prejudice of his personal safety, was not likely to be met with again. He assigns as a reason for his withdrawing from the management of the republic, that his Genius, or Dæmon, did not allow him to engage in civil affairs ; that his appearance in public had not been different from that of any one in a private capacity, and that he had never fulfilled the office of a public preceptor, or given different instructions to one of his followers from what he prescribed to the rest. He then explains the cause why his acquaintance and conversation were so eagerly courted by numbers of the citizens, whom he proves plainly not to have been corrupted by him, from the sympathy they evinced in his distress, and their solicitude to extricate him from peril. In fine, he manifests to his judges his courage and magnanimity, by declining to avail himself of those appeals to their pity and compassion, which were usually adopted by the accused, and which he had refused to resort to, not through pride, but because such conduct would be but little consistent with his general reputation for wisdom. Besides, he would have shown but little respect for the laws, had he endeavoured by supplications and tears to mislead their ministers, and so to check the progress of justice and truth.

The second part of the defence contains what Socrates is supposed to have addressed to his judges, when he had been condemned by their first sentence, and was directed to assign his own penalty ; an order with which he was so far from complying, that he asserted himself, on the contrary, to be worthy rather of public support in the Prytaneum ; since it could not be just, that one who had never done injury to others should wrong himself. Having added, then, a few observations upon his plan of life, he offers to fine himself in a sum evidently expressive of his self-acquittal.

The third portion of the defence contains what Socrates is supposed to have said after he had been condemned to die ; in which he first forewarns the authors of his sentence of the evils which were likely to befall them, in consequence of their injustice towards him ; then addressing himself to those who had moved for his acquittal, he expresses his readiness to encounter death, which he had ceased to regard as a misfortune ; the Deity having given him no intimation of any calamity having been likely to befall him, either at his departure from home, or when he came before the tribunal. Hence he was induced to hope, that what was about to occur was to be regarded as a blessing ; for if death were an end of all consciousness, it could not be a misfortune, and if it were the passage to a better life, it should be a blessing. Therefore, he entertained no feelings of enmity or anger towards those by whom he was condemned, since he had learned to regard his decease as, in any case, desirable to himself. Adding a few words upon the subject of his children, he concludes in a manner worthy of the intrepidity and integrity which had made his life eminent, and his fame imperishable.

## ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ

# ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

§. 1. Ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν

ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.] This apology contains the substance of the defence delivered by Socrates, in answer to the accusations of Anytus, Melitus, and Lycon, who brought a two-fold charge against him; the introduction of new gods, to the prejudice of those already acknowledged, and the corruption of the Athenian youth. His accusers, influenced solely by an invidious jealousy of his great reputation, espoused, severally, the cause of the different classes to which, from the severity of his censures, the philosopher had become an object of extreme dislike. Anytus urged his condemnation in behalf of the craftsmen and burghers, whilst Lycon advocated the interests of the rhetoricians, and Melitus of the poets.

Several apologies were drawn up for Socrates by his own immediate friends, or admirers of his wisdom and integrity: of these, two only, beside the present, are now extant, one by Libanius, and the other compiled by Xenophon, from the instructions of Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus. As the writer was absent, himself, from Athens at the period of the trial, the work was but indifferently executed; it is useful, however, as corroborating the leading points of the

above. Lysias, who was one of the most distinguished orators of the age, prepared a defence, which he submitted to Socrates, to be delivered in presence of the judges. It was highly and elaborately wrought, but the philosopher declined it, observing, that with all its merits as a composition, it was deficient in those qualities which were best adapted to evince the magnanimity, firmness, and dignity, no less requisite for the position in which he was then placed, than he had previously considered them for the purposes of his profession. Hence he preferred the plainness and simplicity, at all times characteristic of his argumentative discussions, and the efficacy of which he had long learned to appreciate, to the ordinary form of a forensic address, with which he was but little familiar, and which consequently, under the circumstances, it should have been hazardous to adopt.

The law which Socrates was accused of having violated, and by which he was condemned, appears, according to the digest and commentary of the learned Petit upon the Athenian laws, to have been the following, the second in the code; Θεσμός αἰώνιος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις νεομύμενος κύριος τὸν ἅπαντα χρο-

καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἔμαντου ἔπελαθόμεν' οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἔξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς

νον, Θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ Ἡρώας, ἐγχωρίους ἐν κοινῷ, ἐμπονίμοις νόμοις πατρίοις, ἰδίᾳ, κατὰ δυνάμιν σὺν εὐφημίᾳ, καὶ ἀρχαῖς καρπῶν πελάγους ἐπετείουσι. The infringement of this law brought the offender before the court of the Areopagus, where he also received sentence, as appears in the case of St. Paul, Acts, xvii. 18, and Diodorus, surnamed Ἀθεός, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius. As Socrates, however, though charged with a similar offence, does not appear to have been summoned before the same tribunal, Petit conjectures that it only took cognizance of such delinquencies, when committed by those who were not freemen of Athens, as in the instances mentioned above; "Licetque suspicari, civibus dicam (hujuscemodī) non fuisse scriptam apud Areopagitas, sed peregrinis tantum, quales erant male compositum par B. Paulus et Diodorus." In Legg. Attic. Comment. S. Petit.

§. 1. "Ὁ, τι μὲν.] Le Clerc, Art. Crit. i. p. 165. Amstel. reads ὁ μὲν; Cod. Coisl. 155. apud Montefalcon. Catal. bibl. Coisl. p. 218. Τί μὴν ὑμεῖς πεπόνθατε. FISCH. Tr. *How, or, in what degree, you have been influenced, men of Athens, by my accusers.* For the construction of ὑπο with a neuter verb, see Matthiæ, Gr. s. 496. 3.

Ἦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.] In so addressing his judges, Socrates pays them a peculiar compliment; Ἀθηναῖος signifying not merely a citizen of Athens, but more emphatically, one who was worthy of such a privilege, as being eminently remarkable for every moral and social quality. See cap. 17. a med. ὅτι ᾧ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, &c. STALL.

Ἦπ' αὐτῶν.] *Præ eorum oratione.* STALL., who compares it with ὑπὸ φόβου, ὑπὸ φιλίας, ὑπὸ μίσους, &c.

Ἦ ὀλίγου.] i. e. σχεδόν, ἐγγύς, almost, nearly, Hesych. and Suid. It occurs frequently without δεῖ or δεῖν. Bos. El-

lips. Græc. Schæf. Δεῖν, *abesse, cum ωστε, eleganter reticetur in ὀλίγου, et μικροῦ, ut apud Ælium Var. Hist. lib. iv. 8. Καὶ ὀλίγου καὶ τὴν πόλιν κατελαβον.*

Ἦ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.] For ὡς ἐν (ἐν) λόγῳ εἰπεῖν, *in one word; or συντόμως, concisely.* FISCH. There is some difference of opinion upon the exact meaning of this phrase. Le Clerc considers it as intended to soften or qualify an expression which might otherwise appear too harsh, and so compares it to the French, *pour dire le mot.* This is approved by Weiske, in reference to the passage in the text, and several other instances where the form occurs. Stephens also prefers a nearly similar interpretation, *ut ita dicam; prope dixerim.* Thes. Ling. Græc. in voc. V. Cousin renders it, *a parler franchement.*

Οὐδέν.] Several editions read οὐθέν; which, however, is the Æolic form, and not likely to have occurred in an Attic writer.

Μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν, κ. τ. λ.] *But one, in particular, of the many falsehoods which they advanced, I wondered at in them; αὐτῶν being masculine, and referring to the accusers.* STALL. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 317, and Obs.

Ἦν ᾧ.] *By or through which; an ordinary acceptance of ἐν, especially in Pindar, when a mean or cause is assigned, on which something depends.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 577. Viger. c. ix. s. 3. 11.

Ἦς χρῆν, κ. τ. λ.] The imperf. χρῆν, ἔδει, προσῆκεν, are often used, not for the presents, but like the Latin *oportebat, debebam*, to denote that something should be, or should have been, which is not; so Cic. Phil. i. 11, "Irasci quidem vos mihi—non oportebat."—Hence the accusers are to be understood as charging the Athenians with having neglected the precaution, which the character of Socrates had rendered indispensable, against deception on his part.

δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυρθῆναι ὅτι αὐ-  
 τικά ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδ'  
 ὀπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν  
 αὐτῶν ἀναισχυρντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν κα-  
 λούσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ  
 τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τού-  
 τος εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὡς περ ἐγὼ λέγω,

Δεινοῦ.] *Ingenious, keen, crafty*, opp. to *ιδιώτης*, or *eloquent*. Hermog. Formul. Orat. iii. 9, and *περὶ Μεθόδου Δεινότητος*. It is sometimes used with a preposition; Aristot. Pol. *δεινὸς περὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν*. Aristoph. B. 968. *δεινὸς εἰς τὰ πάντα*; and with a preposition understood; Xen. *δεινὸς ταύτην τὴν τέχνην*; more frequently with an infinitive; Plat. Prot. *δεινὸς γραφεῖν*. Aristoph. N. 243. *δειν. φαγεῖν*.

Ὅτι.] Editt. Bass. and Forst. ὅ τι, which Heindorf, edit. 2nda, 1805, approves. Either reading is admissible, as *τοῦτο* might be easily understood before ὅ τι, instead of which it is, however, more likely Plato would have written ὅ simply; whence the reading in the text has been sanctioned by the best authorities.

Μηδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.] *Ne tantillum quidem; nulla ex parte; nulla tenus*. STALL. According to Phavorinus and Thom. Mag. ὀπωστιοῦν is the Attic form of ὀπωσοῦν: whence, however, it must not be concluded that the latter was unusual with Attic writers. Ducqer. ad Thucyd. vii. 49. Intpp. ad Xen. Cyr. i. 4. 15. With this opinion of the philosopher, in regard to his own powers, compare Cic. Orat. iii. 16. "Quorum princeps Socrates fuit, is, qui omnium eruditorum testimonio, totiusque judicio Græciæ, cum prudentia et acumine, et venustate, et subtilitate, tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam se cunque in partem dedisset facile princeps."

Φαινῶμαι.] Ald. Bass. Norib. φαίνομαι; incorrectly. FISCH.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα.] *Unless perchance*. ἄρα is very commonly subjoined to another word, and so takes nearly the signification of *που* or *ἴσως*. Aristid. Plat. Sympos. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐν τῷ Ἠλυσίῳ πεδίῳ τὸ Συμπόσιον συνεκροτεῖτο; *Nisi forte in Campis Elysiis, &c.* VIGER.

Οὗτοι.] Correctly, instead of *αὐτοί*, which is found in several editions; because the former implies contempt; so Crit. cap. 4. a med. *τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας, &c.*

Ἐγωγε.] *I, indeed, at least, or, I, for one*. Although γέ as well as μὲν may be commonly rendered by *quidem, indeed*, and both particles are of a restrictive character, yet they differ in the following respects: μὲν regards the whole, and γέ only parts of propositions; μὲν excludes other things, γέ distinguishes something as most remarkable among other things, but not so as to exclude them; hence, μὲν has δέ for its opposite, but γέ has no opposing particle. The distinction effected by γέ may, consequently, be twofold, in expressing what is least or what is greatest; the former is more common by which γέ may be rendered as above; so Dem. de Coron. εἰ μὴ ὅλον, μέρος γέ, &c.

Οὐ κατὰ τούτους.] *Me oratorum esse istorum dissimilem, quam ego vera dicam, non falsa*. STALL. Muretus Varr. Lectt. iii. 3. would omit οὐ, and so understand Socrates to say, that if his adversaries made eloquence to consist in truth, he was an orator upon their principle. But, as Fischer correctly observes, Socrates evidently intends to express his assent, should such be the opinion of his accusers, to its justice, and in proof of this, he did not act as they did, and deal in falsehoods; he was an orator, according to their principle, for he spoke the truth, but not according to their practice, for they dealt in lies. V. Cousin renders οὐ κατὰ τούτους, by *non pas a leur manière*. Κατὰ is frequently used to express similitude: as Gen. ii. 18. *βοηθὸν κατ' αὐτόν*. h. e. ὁμοιον αὐτῷ, Hesych. and Phavor., as in v. 20. *βοηθὸς ὁμοιος αὐτῷ*, which is rendered in the Vulgate,

οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπημένους γε λόγους, ὥς περ οἱ τούτων ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δὴ που πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία, ὥς περ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ

*adjutorium simile sibi.* So Job, i. 8, *οὐκ ἔστι κατ' αὐτὸν*; and Hesych. Gloss. *κατὰ σε ὁμοίός σοι.*

Οὐδὲν ἀληθές.] Several editions read *ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθ.* κ. τ. λ. which is approved by Stallbaum, and explained, *nilil propemodum veri dixerunt.* The form *ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς* is negative, yet with the expression of doubt, *next to none.* Herod. iii. 140, *ἀναβέβηκε δ' ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς κεν παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν*; whence the passage may be rendered, according to this reading, *they have hardly spoken any truth.*

Πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.] *Omniem rem.* FISCH. *The whole truth*; oppo. to *κεκαλλιεπ' λόγ.* as *εἰκῆ λεγόμενα*, *infr.* to *κεκοσμημ.*

Κεκαλλιπημένους λόγους.] Valckenaer, *Diatrib.* in Eurip. reliqu. explains *καλλιπεῖν, uti oratione venusta et eleganti, eleganter dicere*; whence, *λόγοι κεκαλλιπημένοι ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασι, orationes et sententiis venustis, et verbis elegantibus compositae.* The distinction must be observed here between *ῥήματα* and *ὀνόματα*; the former signifying the sentiments of the speaker, the latter, the terms in which they were conveyed. *Κεκοσμημένους*, sc. *λόγους, orationes ornatas; harangues set off by rhetorical ornament, tropes, &c.*

Εἰκῆ λεγόμενα.] *Orationem subito ac sine prævia meditatione quasi profusam.* STALL. His genius or angel prevented Socrates from preparing a formal defence, as appears from his reply when pressed to do so by Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, with whom he was on terms of the closest friendship; ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, καὶ δις ἤδε ἐπιχειρήσαντος μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας

*ἐναντιουταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον.* Xen. Socr. Apol. sec. iv. and Mem. iv. 8. 5. Τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασι, h. e. *nullo verborum delectu instituto, sed verba quae sponte quasi se offerunt.* STALL. *Les termes qui se presenteront a moi les premiers.* COUSIN. The phrase is incorrectly rendered by Fischer, *verba vulgaria et trita*; Socrates merely asserts his intention of expressing the truth in the most simple and unpremeditated language.

Τῆδε τῆ ἡλικία.] h. e. *Non decuerit senem, qualis ego sum.* STALL. The abstract term being used in the text for the concrete; whence it is opposed to *μειρακίῳ*. Socrates was upwards of seventy years old at the time of his public accusation.

Μειρακίῳ.] A dimin. from *μειραξ*; qu. *εἰραξ*, from *εἶρω*; qui jam est ætate ut dari possit. KOEN. The period of life to which *μειράκιον* is applied, was generally considered subsequent to that of the *ἡβώντων*.—*πλάττειν*, in music and declamation, signifies, *to follow an affected style*, in which sense it is to be taken in the text. Its derivative *πλάσμα*, in music, signifies studied ornament, as opposed to simplicity; in declamation, an affected and delicate, as opposed to a bold and manly delivery.—*εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι*, i. e. *εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον εἰσιέναι*; so Demosth. adv. Spudiam init. *ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ῥαδίως φέρει, πολλάκις εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰθισμένος εἰσιέναι.* and *infr.* cap. 10. *οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον*, h. e. *prodiens in concionem.* Hence it appears that *πρὸς* would be incorrectly substituted, as some proposed, for *εἰς* in the text. STALL.

πάνν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἔὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου δι' ὧν περ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. (νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγρονὸς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὡς περ οὖν ἂν

Παρίεμαι.] *I implore, conjure*; so Phavorinus: παρίεσθαι τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοῦ παραιεῖσθαι δύναμιν ἔχειν· τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι. Timæus explains it likewise by παραιτούμαι, Gloss. Platon., upon which Ruhken: "Hujus rarissimæ notionis ratio, non-dum, quod sciam, explicata, pendet ab indole mediorum. Ut ἴημι et ἐφίημι est mitto, ἴεμαι et ἐφίεμαι mitti mihi volo, i. e. cupio, peto; sic παρίημι admitto, παρίεμαι ad me admitti volo, i. e. precor, deprecor." Some derive it from ἴεμαι, cupio. Abresch. Auctar. Thucyd. 376.

Καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ.] Socrates was continually before the public. Early in the morning he used to frequent the gymnasium and the promenades. When the forum was most crowded, he was sure to be found there; and throughout the day, wherever he could meet with the greatest concourse. His discussions were numerous and lengthy, to which all who wished might attend. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 10.—ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν; in some editions this is preceded by καὶ, which, however, is not noticed by Ficinus, as will appear by reference to the Latin translation. It does not occur either in a similar expression, Hipp. Min. p. 368. B. ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις; nor can it be correctly introduced in its ordinary sense, for the τράπεζαι were in the forum, and Socrates alludes here to his custom of resorting to the tables of the money-changers, and conversing with the noble and wealthy citizens by whom they were frequented. The corresponding phrase to the above is καὶ ἄλλοι, h. e. in officinis et palæstris: upon which Fischer quotes Aristid. Orat. Platon. T. iii. p. 223. ὅτι πλείστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν καὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων διελέγετο. Ἄλλοι is a form pe-

culiar to the Attic writers, who use, however, ἀλλαχόθι in common with the rest of the Greeks. So Mæris: Ἄλλοθι—Ἀττικῶς—ἀλλαχόθι—Ἀττικῶς, καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς.

Μήτε θορυβεῖν.] This was a common form of address adopted by the Grecian orators, when the subject of their discourse was likely to prove unpalatable to their hearers. Θορυβεῖν signifies to cause disturbance, to express disapprobation by tumult and noise, especially at a public meeting

Δικαστήριον.] This was the βασιλειον δικαστήριον, or regal tribunal, situated in the forum, near the Στοά τοῦ Διὸς Ἐλευθέριον; and so called from the βασιλεύς, or king-archon, the title of the second archon, who held his court of judicature in the royal portico, where he decided all disputes occurring between the priests and sacred families, the Ceryces, Eteotabudæ, &c., to whom certain offices in the celebration of divine worship belonged by inheritance.

\*Ἐτη γεγρονὸς πλείω ἐβδομήκοντα.] More than seventy years old. When ἔλαττον, πλεόν, πλείω are followed by a numeral, ἦ, than, is often omitted. Thucyd. vi. 95. ἡ λεία ἐπράθη ταλάντων οὐκ ἔλαττον πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν. So in Latin, amplius.

\*Ἀτεχνῶς.] Ἀληθῶς καὶ χωρὶς πανουργίας, καὶ οἷον ἀπλάστως. Tim. Lex. Platon. *I am, therefore, absolutely unacquainted with the form of language here*: fully, ξένως ἔχω ἑμαυτὸν περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ἔχω, with an adverb, is elegantly joined, in the Attic, to a genitive case, taking in such instances, for the most part, the sense and force of the adverb: so ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν, to be unable; τοῦτων ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν, to neglect these things. By ἡ ἐνθάδε λέξις

εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὦν, ξυνεγινώσκετε δὴ που ἂν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον ἐν οἷς περ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔαν—ἴσως, μὲν γάρ τι χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη —, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μὴ δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετὴ, ρήτορος δὲ τάληθῆ λέγειν.

§. 2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. Ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες· οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβουῖμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καὶ περ ὄν-

Socrates intends to designate the peculiar character of a forensic address.

Ὡς περ οὖν ἂν, κ. γ. λ.] Ἄν is sometimes redundant, when the principal proposition to which it belongs is divided by a parenthesis, as in the text, and Soph. Antig. 466. ἀλλ' ἂν, εἰ τὸν ἐξ ἐμῆς μητρὸς θανόντ' ἄθαρτον ἐσχόμην νέκυν, κείνοις ἂν ἤλθουν.—Matth. Gr. s. 600. 5.

Τοῦτο δίκαιον.] i. q. Τοῦτο ὡς δίκαιόν τι; so cap. 5. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων.

Αὕτη ἀρετῆ.] The article being expressed, the sentence runs thus, αὕτη ἢ ἀρετῆ (sc. ut videat, utrum vera dicantur necne,) δικαστοῦ ἐστίν. However, when the pronoun forms the subject, and the substantive the predicate of a proposition, the article is frequently omitted. STALL. V. Engelhardt ad Lachet. s. 1. Ἄρετῆ here signifies the duty; in the Attic writers it is most commonly used to denote a moral virtue.

§ 2. Δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι.] *Me respondere par est, vel æquum est.* Marg. Steph. *I am justified in defending myself; for δίκαιόν ἐστίν ἐμὲ ἀπολογήσασθαι, or ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀπολογήσαμην* as Crit. 4. ἡμεῖς—δίκαιοι ἐσ-

μεν—κινδυνεύειν τοῦτον τὸν κίνδυνον. FISCH. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 297.

Πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 425. c. 2. πάλαι is not always to be understood as expressing a period long past; it may be applied to years, months, or days; whence its proper meaning in the text is expressed by the addition of πολλὰ ἔτη; so Phavorinus: πάλαι οὐκ αἰεὶ μακρὸν χρόνον σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ἐστίν οὐ καὶ πρόσφατον Ἀττικῶς. Vid. Abresch. Dilucid. Thucydid. iii. 89. So with the *dudum* and *jamdudum* of the Latins. Drakenborch. ad Silium Ital. and Broukhuis. ad Tibull. iii. 6. extr. Stallbaum explains the passage: καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη λέγοντες καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες: *Multi enim apud vos mei accusatores exstiterunt, qui quum jamdudum multosque per annos me criminati sunt, tum nihil veri afferunt.* Twenty-four years at least had elapsed from the time that Socrates had been brought forward by Aristophanes, in the Νεφέλαι. FORST.

Τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον.] *Anytus and his associates:* sc. Melitus and Lycon. ἀμφὶ being taken in its distributive sense. Matthiæ Gr. s. 583. 1. Anytus was the principal person who headed



τας καὶ τούτους δεινούς. ἄλλ' ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἀνεζητηκῶς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἠγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτὰ

and instigated the adversaries of Socrates; whence Horace, Sat. ii. 4. 3, "Anyti reum;" he was by birth an Athenian, son of Anthemion; and from the successful exercise of his trade as a tanner, had attained to great opulence, a circumstance which, together with the nature of his occupation, drew upon him the sarcastic ridicule of the philosopher, and also of Theopompus and Archippus. His considerable wealth, and the service he had rendered the republic in assisting Thrasybulus towards the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, and the restoration of public freedom, gave him a powerful and extensive influence among the citizens, of which he fully availed himself on the present occasion. He was subsequently condemned to exile, and retired to Heraclea, where he was not allowed by the inhabitants to remain a single day.—Diog. Laert. ii. 38. 43. See cap. 10.

[Ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι.] It is beyond a doubt that Socrates here alludes to the invectives contained in the Nubes of Aristophanes. But many, with good reason, have conjectured that the philosopher does not intend to condemn [the poet himself, whom it is unlikely that Plato would have introduced as in familiar converse with Socrates in the Symposium, had he been a bitter or implacable enemy. V. Fr. A. Wolf. Prolegomen. ad Nubes Aristoph. p. 3. sqq. and Reisig. Præfat. ad Nub. p. 12, sqq. Whence it may be concluded that the words in the text are rather intended to apply to the sophists and poets generally, who were not content with having ridiculed the philosopher and his tenets, in the first instance, but subsequently laboured to inflame against him the

odium and angry passions of the ignorant crowd. It appears from the testimony of numerous ancient writers, that Socrates had proved a fertile subject for more than one of the comic poets, Eupolis, amongst the rest, who treated him with considerable severity. V. Scholiast. Aristoph. ad Nub. v. 96. See infr. c. iii. ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφ. κ. τ. λ. STALL.

Μετέωρα φροντιστῆς.] *A speculator in celestial matters.* So Horace, Epist. ii. 12, 15, "Nil parvum sapias et adhuc sublimia cures." The title in the text was one by which, amongst the ancients, natural philosophers were commonly designated. It would appear that Socrates, in early life, had not confined his attention solely to ethics, but had engaged with some zeal in the subtle discussions of the philosophers in physical science; whence he is occasionally called, simply, φροντιστῆς, and his school or study, φροντιστήριον, Aristoph. Nub. 95, sqq. STALL. FORST. See Mitch. Aristoph. 11. p. 17. n.

[ὑπὸ γῆς.] Ald. Bas. 1. Steph. Norib. Forst. ὑπὸ γῆν; but Bas. 2, ὑπὸ γῆς, which is the Attic form, and correct. FISCH. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, κ. τ. λ. So Aristophanes, of the disciples of Socrates; Ζητοῦσιν οὗτοι τὰ κατὰ γῆς—Nub. 118, and Οὔτοι δ' ἐρεβοδιφῶσιν ὑπὸ τὸν Τάρταρον. 193. FORST.

Καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον, κ. τ. λ.] Aristoph. Nub. 113. ΣΤΡΕΨ. Ἔναι παρ' αὐτοῖς φασὶν ἄμφω τῷ λόγῳ, τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἔστι, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα, τοῦτοι τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγῳ τὸν ἥσσονα Νικᾶν λέγοντα φασὶ τὰ δίκω-  
τατα.

Ταύτην τὴν φήμην.] Heindorf proposes to read οἱ ταύτην, κ. τ. λ.; but

εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μεράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. (ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναί καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὧν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ

the article is unnecessary since the participle κατασκεῖδ. expresses the mode by which this class of the accusers became especially mischievous. *Isti quod eam famam sparserunt graves et periculosi accusatores exstiterunt.* STALL. μόνον would seem to be required after φήμην, but Plato appears to have omitted it, lest its subsequent repetition should offend the ears of the auditors. FISCH.

Ἐν ἧ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε.] “Tum ea ætate vobis hæc dicebant, qua maxime credere possetis.” WOLF.; approved by Stall. who understands by ἂν—ἐπιστεύσατε, the liability to which childhood is subject of having its confidence abused, and not that the judges had actually been imposed upon, by those who would willingly have availed themselves of youth and inexperience to instil the more easily their unfounded prejudices. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 509. c.

Μεράκια.] Serranus reads παῖδες ὄντες καὶ μεράκια ἀτεχνῶς, q. d. *inferiore etiam ætate quam pueri*; explaining μερακία by *pueruli*, and joining ἀτεχνῶς with it, to make the phrase more emphatic; and some of you absolutely children; Forster, however, and after him the later editions, adopted the reading as supr. Ficinus, Lat. interp., appears to agree with Serranus.

Ἐρήμην.] Δίκη is understood in ἐρήμη, a cause or trial, in which one of the litigants fails to appear; or in which, as above, the accused is not present. This was called, *εἰς τὴν κυρίαν οὐκ σφθῆναι*, or *μὴ ἀπαντῆσαι*; so Demosth. in Mid. 540. 22. ed. Reisk. Δί-

κην δὲ τούτῳ λαχὼν ὕστερον κατηγορίας, εἶλον ἐρήμην. (*I obtained a decision against him in his absence; on his failure of appearance.*) οὐ γὰρ ἀπῆντι. Bos' Ellips. by Seager. Whence ἐρήμην κατηγορεῖν, to accuse one in his absence. According to the Athenian code, a day was appointed for the accused to answer the charges preferred against him; if he did not appear, he was condemned in consequence, and the sentence was called ἐξ ἐρήμης καταδικασ θῆναι, and ἐρήμην ὀφλισκάνειν. But if, within the space of ten days, he presented himself, with any feasible excuse for his absence, the former sentence was annulled; and this proceeding was called *δίκη μὴ ούσα*, after which the trial went on afresh. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. xxi.

Κωμωδοποιός.] Ald. Bas. 1. 2. Norib. Steph. κωμωδιοποιός; but the text is correct. Κωμωδοποιοί, Ἀττικῶς κωμωδιοποιοί, Ἑλληνικῶς. Mæris apud Pierson. Socrates alludes here to Aristophanes and the comic poets already mentioned.

Φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι.] i. e. Φθονοῦντες καὶ διαβάλλοντες. STALL.

Ἀπορώτατοι.] *Most perplexing: tales qui minime possunt oppugnari et convinci.* STALL. Fischer explains κατήγοροι ἀποροὶ by *criminales inexpugnabiles, quod oppugnare, convincere, aut omnino non aut ægre licet.* Some editions read ἀπειρώτατοι; but a similar use is made of the reading in the text, in Lysid. where ἀποροὶ προσφέρεσθαι is applied to those whom it was difficult to manage in argument. Ficinus must have adopted the former, as he

αναβιβάσασθαι οἶόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδ' ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὡς περ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. Ἀξιῶσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὡς περ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἑτέροισ δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω. καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.

Εἶεν. ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιησαὶ ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἶόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

§. 3. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἢ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ἢ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἣ (δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μελίτιος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.

renders the passage, *hi omnes infiniti omnino sunt*, which is plainly incorrect.

'Αναβιβάσασθαι.] *To bring forward.* Scap. Lex. "In voce media ἀναβιβάζομαι, ascensurum produco, prodire facio, produco."

Σκιαμαχεῖν.] *To contend with a shadow.*

Εἶεν.] This term was used by the Attic writers to express their having discussed sufficiently one branch of a subject, and their engaging in another. Stall. ad Euthyphr. p. 88. sqq.

Ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν.] h. e. *Adimere et evellere animis vestris malam de me opinionem.* STALL. who explains διαβολὴ by *mala opinio, suspicio, quatenus falsis criminationibus excitata est.* So Hesych. Gloss. Διαβολή· ὑπόπτει-

σις ἢ ὑπόληψις.

Ἠλέον τι.] Socrates was desirous to effect something further than the mere removal of the unfavorable impression caused by the calumnies of his adversaries, from the minds of his judges; he wished it to be replaced by one of an opposite character, which he trusted to establish in the course of his defence.

Γραφὴν ταύτην.] *Γραφή* means an indictment or legal accusation of a public delinquent; *δίκη*, as opp. to *γραφὴ*, is applied to a private cause, suit, or action, pleaded in a court of justice; but, taken absolutely, it signifies either public or private suits. *Γράφεσθαι γραφὴν* is an ordinary form, as also *γράφεσθαι τινα*; hence the verb is often used with a double accusative, as in the text.

Εἶεν. τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὡς περ οὖν κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἦττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτὰ διδάσκων. Τοιαύτη τίς ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἐρωᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτην τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε

“Ὡς περ οὖν κατηγορῶν, κ. τ. λ.] *Debet accusatio eorum ut libellus actorum proprie dictorum recitari.*—STALL. Ἀντωμοσία. Tim. Plat. Lex. γραφὴ κατὰ τινος ἔνορκος, περὶ ὧν ἠδικήσθαι φησιν. At Athens, an oath was required of both parties at trial; the plaintiff swore ἀληθῆ κατηγορεῖν, to allege the truth; the defendant, ἀληθῶς ἀπολογῆσθαι, to make true defence. This oath, on the part of either plaintiff or defendant, was called ἀντωμοσία; a term which was also applied to the information upon oath of the accuser; *accusationis formula*, FISCH; written upon a tablet, whence ἀναγνῶναι, *supr.* and delivered to the judge. See Potter, *Grec. Antiq.* vol. i. c. 21.

Περιεργάζεται.] *Is officiously inquisitive.* Περιεργάζεσθαι, *proprie est curiose aliquam rem tractare* adeoque nimium studii in re aliqua ponere; deinde curare ea, quæ nihil ad te pertinent: curare res inanes, vanas, inutiles, ut *supr.* STALL.

Ἐπουράνια.] i. q. Μετέωρα, *supr.* c. 2. and *infr.* c. 10. So Seneca, *Quæst. Natur.* ii. 1, “*cælestia etiam sublimia vocat, hoc est, nubila, imbres, nives, et humanas motura tonitrua mentes, quæcunque aer facit patiturve.*” FISCH.

Τὸν ἦττω λόγον κρείττω.] *Quintil.* ii. 16. 3. “*Nam et Socrati objiciunt comici, docere eum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem faciat.*” FISCH.

Ἀεροβατεῖν.] *Hesych. interp.* εἰς τὸν ἀέρα περιπατεῖν. See *Aristoph. Nub.* 226, where Socrates is introduced as suspended in a basket in the air, and to the inquiry of Strepsiades, πρῶτον μὲν, ὅ τι ὄρας, ἀντιβολῶ, κατεπε μοι, replying, ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν

ἦλιον. In like manner Abaris, the Pythagorean, was called Αἰθροβάτης.—*Porphyr. in Vit. Pythag.* sec. 29. According to Stallbaum, the learned have erred in concluding, that from Socrates having been, in the first instance, represented by Aristophanes as morose in his disposition, and ridiculous in his pursuits, he was subsequently condemned as a slanderer and a sophist. For a considerable time had elapsed since the first representation of the clouds; the play was unsuccessful, and the poet and philosopher were on such terms of intimacy afterwards, that the former could either never have intended to be seriously malicious; or, if he had been carried away so far as to commit a wanton injury upon an innocent and inoffensive object, he found good reason to regret his error. Hence Stallbaum infers that the allusion which Socrates makes to the comedy, is at once ironical and sarcastic; he appears to talk gravely upon a subject which in reality afforded only occasion for mirth, and so inflicts a severer censure upon the folly of his accusers, who, in the warmth of their animosity, availed themselves of arguments which were either unfounded in fact, or merely advanced in jest. Victor Cousin, in his *Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques*, Paris, 1829. p. 151. sqq. gives it as his opinion, that Aristophanes made a complete distinction between the doctrine of Socrates and his character and abilities. V. *Aristoph. Brunck.* p. 65. t. 2. “Ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν.] See *Aristoph. Nub.* 223. sqq.

Ἦν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν, κ. τ. λ.] Ἦν is governed of πέρι, before ἐπατῶ, which is used in construction either with a ge-

σ μικρὸν περὶ ἐπαίω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἐστὶ μὴ πῶς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελίτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δ' αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοὶ εἰσι. φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰ πώποτε ἢ σ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὰλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν. *ie vtrine*

§. 4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστὶν οὐδέ γ' εἴ τις ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. *ret* ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἴός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὡς περ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεον- *in des*

nitive simply, or with *περὶ* and a genitive, as *supr.* Ὀυδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σ μικρὸν, is a proverbial expression; *quorum ego nihil omnino scio: quæ ego prorsus ignoro.* FISCH. So *infr.* ἢ σ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα, *quidquam.*—Σμικρὸν. Merid. auctor. is the Attic form of *μικρὸν.*

Μὴ πῶς ἐγὼ, κ. τ. λ.] *Let me not be accused by Melitus upon so grave a charge.* The sentence is ironical, and is thus explained by Stallbaum: *Neque ego contemno et rejicio illam scientiam rerum cælestium, et artis cujus ope causa inferior fiat superior: atque utinam Melitus me nullo modo tante injuriæ possit reum agere.* δίκην φύγειν signifies, *to be accused, to be the defendant in a cause,* and is so opposed to *διώκειν, to accuse, as plaintiff.* It is not clear how Ficinus understood the passage. V. Lat. *Interp.* Οὐδὲν μέτεστι.] i. q. Οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι. c. 4. extr. FISCH.

Καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *Et volo s. postulo, ut vos ipsi alius alium edoceatis.* STALL.

Ἐκ τούτου.] sc. Ἐκ τοῦ διδάσκειν, κ. τ. λ. *supr.* Some editions read *τούτων.*

§. 4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates proceeds to discuss another of the charges alleged against him: that he was in the habit of instructing for hire. See Aristoph. *Nub.* 95. sqq.

Χρήματα πράττομαι.] *I exact payment.* πράττειν has the force of *ἀπαιτεῖν*, and signifies, *to demand on another's account; πράττεσθαι* i. q. *ἀπαιτεῖσθαι, to demand on one's own account.* The expression in the text was chiefly applied to those sophists who taught for money, and is equivalent to the phrase *μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας πράττομαι.*—Xen. *Memorr.* i. 2. 60. where Xenophon declares that Socrates had never required any remuneration from his disciples: he also introduces the philosopher as speaking to the same effect, *Apol.* 16. *ὅς παρ' οὐδενός, οὔτε δῶρα, οὔτε μισθὸν, δέχομαι.* FISCH.

Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό, κ. τ. λ.] This must be understood ironically; Socrates wishes to stigmatise and ridicule the avarice of the sophists.

Εἴ τις οἴός τ' εἴη.] See *Matthia Gr.* s. 524. Obs. 3.

Γοργίας, κ. τ. λ.] A disciple of Empedocles, and a distinguished sophist and

τίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας δὲ ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιποντάς σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσεδάδειναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σο-

rhetorician, born at Leontium, a town of Sicily. According to Suidas, he was the first who moulded rhetoric to an art. His talent for extemporaneous eloquence commanded the admiration and respect of all Greece; and during an abode of some years at Athens, in the office of ambassador, he received from that state the most flattering testimonies of their consideration. He enriched himself by giving courses of public lectures, for which he exacted from each of his disciples one hundred minæ. Pausanias relates, Phoc. ch. 18, that he presented the temple at Delphi with a gilded statue of himself, and that after a life full of glory, he died, aged one hundred and five years; according to Diog. Laertius, Suidas, and Philostratus, at one hundred and nine years old. Diog. Laert. 9. 52. Cic. de Orat. i. 22. iii. 32. Platon. Gorg.—Prodicus was born at Ceos, one of the Cyclades, he was a rhetorician and physician, a disciple of Protagoras, and cotemporary of Democritus. Xenophon has preserved his beautiful allegory, the judgment of Hercules. He devoted himself with great assiduity to ascertaining and fixing the exact meaning of words. His instructions were never gratuitous, and he justified his conduct in this particular by his favourite maxim from Epicharmus: ἅ δὲ χεῖρ τὰν χεῖρα νίξεν ὅδες τι καὶ λαβέει. —Hippias was born in Elis, a city of Peloponnesus; in wealth, reputation, and prosperity, he was in no respect inferior to Gorgias, to whose eloquence his own bore a marked resemblance. He was charged with several missions of importance by the Lacedæmonians, and always acquitted himself with high credit and honourable distinction. Platon. Hipp. Min. Cratyl. passim.

Προῖκα.] Κατὰ δωρεάν, ἄνευ μισθοῦ. SCHOL.

Τούτους πείθουσι.] The usual kind of *anacoluthon* is that of a writer commencing a period in the way which the process of his speech requires, but afterwards, and especially after some interpolations which make the hearer forget the beginning of the construction, passing over to a new construction; as in the text, where the τούτων in the beginning of the sentence refers to the sophists already mentioned, and both the process of the speech, and its emphasis, required the new period to commence with *any one of them is capable of persuading young people, &c.* The following proposition must then have had the *ἡσθη. πειθεῖν* to correspond to οἷός τ' ἐστίν. But farther on, the mention of the young people being interpolated with circumstances rendered necessary to establish a contrast, (the young people, who are at liberty to have a gratuitous intercourse with any of their fellow-citizens whom they like,) the writer forsakes his construction, of which the grammatical junction is now obscured, and finds it more natural to refer with a second τούτους to the νέους, and to commence a new construction, τούτους πείθουσι—i. e. *those sophists persuade the young people, &c.* Buttman's *Intermed. Gr. Gr.* pp. 422. 423. The terms ξυνεῖναι and ξυνουσία are applied to the habits of intercourse which existed between master and pupil; whence auditors or disciples are generally called οἱ ξυνόντες. STALL.

Ἀνὴρ Πάριος.] Evenus, born in the island of Paros, a sophist and elegiac poet. Harpocr. in. voc. δύο ἀναγράψουσι Εὐήνους ἐλεγείων ποιητάς, ὁμώνιμους ἀλλήλοισι, καθάπερ Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν τῷ περὶ Χρονογραφῶν,

φός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσ-  
 ελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ  
 ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἴππονίκου. τοῦτον  
 οὖν ἀνηρομην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἰέε—<sup>3</sup>Ω Καλ-  
 λία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τὸ υἰέε πῶλῳ ἢ μῶσχῳ  
 ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ  
 μισθώσασθαι ὃς ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ τε κάγαθῶ ποιή-  
 σειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν  
 ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώ-  
 πῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν;  
 τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολι-  
 τικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ  
 τὴν τῶν υἰέων κτήσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ;  
 Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός; καὶ  
 πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐήνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος,  
 πέντε μνῶν. Καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐήνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς  
 ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς

ἀμφοτέρους λέγων Παρίους εἶναι γνωρίζεσθαι δὲ φησιν τὸν νεώτερον μόνον. μέμνηται δὲ θατέρον αὐτῶν καὶ Ηλιάτων.

"Ὁν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα.] *Ad quem ego aliquando animum adverti in nostra urbe commorantem.* STALL. Socrates had not seen Evenus, but had heard from Callias what he was going to state concerning him. It is probable that Ficinus read ἡσθην or ἡδόμην, See Lat. interp.

"Ὅς τετέλεκε, κ. τ. λ.] *h. e. qui inter omnes, qui apud nos sapientiæ student, plurimum pecuniæ sophistis solvit.* STALL. The wealth of Callias was proverbial, whence it is said that he was commonly called, simply, ὁ πλούσιος. But his profligacy was extreme, and his extravagance unbounded; failings which the sophists were not slow in turning to their own advantage. Xenoph. Sympos. i. 5.

"Ἦν δ' ἐγώ.] "Ἐφην δ' ἐγώ. SCHOL. Αὐτοῖν.] Ald Bas. 1. Norib. αὐτῶν. Bas. 2. αὐτοῖς.

"Ἐπιστάτην.] Soph. in Ajace, ποιμνίων ἐπιστάται, *gregis curatores, ovili-*

*um magistri.* Μισθώσασθαι—μισθοῦν, *locare*: μισθωσασθαι, *conducere, redimere.* STALL.

Ἐέντε μνῶν.] The Attic mina was equivalent to a hundred Attic drachms. Hence it appears that Evenus was much less exorbitant than the sophists previously mentioned, Gorgias, of Leontium, &c. It is said of Prodicus, that he received fifty minæ from each of his auditors, individually, for a single lecture. FORST.

Εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει.] The Greeks often quote the words of another narratively, and yet suddenly change into the *orat. recta*, as if the person himself spoke. Thus they put ὡς, ὅτι itself before the actual words of the speaker. Matthiæ Gr. s. 529. 5. So Socrates, as *supr.*, repeats the observation he made to Callias after his comment on the good fortune of Evenus.

Ἐμμελῶς.] In Actis Erudit. a. 1749. p. 22. *εὐτελῶς*; but Socrates would not have expressed himself as if the value of the knowledge which the children of Callias derived from Evenus consisted in its cheapness, πέντε μνῶν, *supr.* The

διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμεν ἄν, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

§. 5. Ὑπολάβοι οὖν ἄν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως, Ἄλλ' ὦ Σώκратες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; ποθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πού σου γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. Ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποιήκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα

reading in the text is decidedly preferable: ἐμμελῶς, from μέλος, signifying literally, harmoniously, and thence suitably, tastefully, &c. Socrates meaning at the same time to convey an ironical compliment upon the zeal of Evenus, which led him to rate his instructions in such important branches of education, at a price so far below what has been already mentioned as demanded by others. STALL. ἐμμελῶς, Hesych. interpret. προθύμως. FISCH.

Ἐκαλλυνόμεν τε καὶ ἠβρυνόμεν ἄν.] I should have plumed and prided myself. Fischer explains it; *gloriando me effertem, jactarem me magnifice*, and refers both these expressions to that species of superfluous ornament in dress, less indicative of taste than effeminacy. Hesych. Suid. Phavor. hh. vv.

Ἄλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι.] h. e. ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμαι καλλύνεσθαι καὶ ἠβρύνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι. v. ad cap. 3. STALL.

§. 5. Πόθεν.] Ficinus appears to have read καὶ ποθεν, *et unde*, &c. Lat. interpr.

Οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον.] h. e. nihil curiosius quam ceteri. STALL. Ἐπειτα.] *Etta* and *ἐπειτα* signify

both afterwards, thereupon, and both are often used to express reproaches in a scolding manner, the motive of anger or surprise having been first stated. Buttmann's *Intermed. Gr. Gr.* p. 400; see also 144. *Obs.* 6. and *Herm. ad Viger. n.* 239.

Εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες, κ. τ. λ.] This may be considered merely as emphatic, the condition having been expressed in the beginning of the sentence, οὐ γὰρ δὴ πού, κ. τ. λ. Stallbaum explains the passage, *Non orta esset, opinor, hæc de te fama, quæ tamen revera orta est, nisi alia ageres atque alii*; as if the sentence in full were, λόγος γέγονεν, ὅς οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες, κ. τ. λ. See *Matthiæ Gr. s.* 508. *Obs.* 2. extr. and s. 636. init.

Αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν.] *Αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, to act thoughtlessly or precipitately*; applied in the text in reference to such judges as are apt to form hasty and unfounded decisions.

Τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν.] Ὄνομα refers to the reputation of Socrates; διαβολήν to the calumnies of his adversaries. Muretus, *Varr. Lectt.* vii. 16. compares ποιεῖν ὄνομα with the Latin *famam conficere*.



ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἢ πέρ ἐστιν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὔτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅς τις φησι, ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδ' εἰ δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. οὗτος ἐμός τε

Μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον.] *Majorem sapientiam quam quæ in hominem cadat: sapientiam humana excellentiorem.* FISCH. When it is not a substantive that is compared with another, but the quality of a thing expressed by an adjective that is considered in its proportion to another quality, and compared in degree with it, (where in Latin *quam pro* is used), then ἢ κατὰ or ἢ πρὸς is put after the comparative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 449.

Ἦ οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι λέγω.] *Alioqui non habeo quod de ea dicam.* STEPH. Forster would prefer ἢν οὐκ, κ. τ. λ. as if Socrates were at a loss by what name he should call this greater than human wisdom of the sophists. But the text is more likely to be correct as it stands; for Socrates, who was liberal of his irony whenever it could be introduced with effect, may be fairly considered to have purposely placed the sophists in a dilemma, as being either possessed of divine wisdom, or none at all. FISCH.

Ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει.] h. e. *mei calumniandi causa*, STALL. ἐπὶ frequently signifying *with the prospect*, or *in order to*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 585. The possessive pronouns are equivalent in signification to the genitives of the personal pronouns, Matthiæ Gr. 466, as appears in the above passage; so Homer, *Odys. xi. 202, σὸς πόθος.* *Iliad. xix. 320. ν. 336, ἐμὴν ἀγγελίην*, i. e. *περὶ ἐμοῦ.* *Sophocl. (Ed. t. 969, τῷ ἐμῷ πόθῳ.* *Plat. Gorg. εὐνοία τῷ σῷ. Com-*

pare also Sallust. *Jug. c. 14. "Vos in mea injuria despecti estis."* *Liv. ii. 1, "regium metum"* for "metu regis," and *iii. 16, "terrorem servilem"* for "terrore servorum."

Μέγα λέγειν.] h. e. *admirabile quid dicere.* STALL.—Οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον. By this Socrates intends to remove all appearance of presumption or self-sufficiency on his part, and so to conciliate the good will, while he commands the attention of his auditors. Cf. *Horat. Sat. ii. 2. 2. "Nec meus hic sermo est."*

Ἀξιόχρεων.] Properly *solvent*, one to whom money may be safely entrusted; hence, as in the text, *creditable*. So the Latin *locuples* is asserted of a *competent witness*. Hesych. *ἀξιόχρεως, ἀξιόπιστος.* Suid. *ἀξιόχρεως ἱκανός, ἐχέγγυος, ἀξιόπιστος.*

Τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς—καὶ οἷα.] h. e. *παρέξομαι γὰρ ὑμῖν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς μάρτυρα τῆς ἐμῆς σοφίας, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστιν, καὶ οἷα ἐστιν.* v. Krüger. *de Attract. p. 202.* STALL.—Ὁ θεός ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς. *Interpr. Schol. Thucyd. i. 134. ὁ Ἀπόλλων.* *Nep. Pausan. v. 5. "deus Delphicus."* FISCH.

Χαιρεφῶντα.] *Χαιρεφῶν οὗτος ὁ Σωκρατικός ἰσχνός ἦν καὶ ὠχρὸς, τὸ δὲ ἦθος συγκοφάντης καὶ κόλαξ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ κλέπτῃς καὶ ἀνχηρόδ, τὴν δὲ περιουσίαν πέννης.* *Εὐπολις μὲν οὖν ἐν Πόλεσι διὰ τὴν χροῖαν πύξινον αὐτὸν καλεῖ, Ἀριστοφάνης δ' ἐν Ὀρνισι νυκτερίδα· ἐν δὲ Τελαμσεῦσιν*

ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου, καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἶος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ πότε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι,—καὶ ὃ περ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες. ἤρето γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἶη σοφώτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὕτωσιν μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε.

εἰς ἀνχηρὸν καὶ πένητα. Εὐπολις δ' ἐν Κόλαξιν Καλλίου κόλακα λέγει, Ἀριστοφάνης δ' ἐν Δράμασι κλέπτην. ἐν δ' "Ὀραις νυκτὸς αὐτὸν παῖδα καλεῖ. SCHOL. v. Aristoph. Nub. 104. 501. sqq. Xenoph. Memorab. ii. 3.

Ἰμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος.] Lysias, Orat. adv. Agorat. pp. 94. 96. 99. 100. 108. makes frequent use of the term *πλήθος* in reference to the advocates of the popular cause, in which sense it is to be understood in the text—*Ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην*. Upon the capture of Athens by Lysander, and his subsequent appointment of the thirty tyrants, a great concourse of the Athenians, disgusted with their government, retired to Thebes and Megara, whence they soon afterwards returned under the conduct of Thrasybulus, and restored the republic. Xenoph. Hist. Græc. ii. Diod. Sic. xiv. The *φυγὴ* took place a. 1. Olymp. 94; the return to the city, a. 4. Olymp. 94. Meursius de Archont. iii. 13. 15; and Socrates drank the hemlock a. 1. Olymp. 95. Laert. ii. 44. Gellius, xvii. 21. whence *τὴν φύγην ταύτην*; expressive of a recent event. The verbs *κατένειναι* and *κατέρχεσθαι* are commonly applied to those who return from exile to their native land. So Tho. Magister and Phavor. *Κατέρχομαι, ὅταν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφ' ἧς ἐξήλθον, ἐπανέλθω*. Schol. Arist. ad Rann. 1196: *ιδίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν φυγάδων χρῶνται τῷ κατέρχεται*.

Χαιρεφῶν.] ὁ Χαιρεφῶν, BECK. *Chærephon ille*.

Μαντεύσασθαι.] *Μαντεύεσθαι*, h. l. est oraculum sibi edi jubere, h. e. *consulere, interrogare, sciscitari*. STALL.

"Ὁ περ λέγω.] This phrase is to be taken parenthetically: Plato frequently using ὃ περ λέγω or ὁ λέγω in reference to an expression not long preceding; it is to be understood in the text as al-

luding to the *θορύβησις*, which Socrates had already deprecated more than once. Hence Stephanus would read, *καὶ (ὅπερ λέγω) μὴ θορυβεῖτε*, as in Crit. ὥστε (ὅπερ λέγω) *μήτε, ταῦτα φοβούμενος, ἀποκάμψς σῶσαι σαυτὸν, κ. τ. λ.* So in Apol. *εἰ οὖν με (ὅπερ εἶπον) ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίετε, κ. τ. λ.* The other mode of construction by which ὅπερ should be made to depend on *θορυβεῖτε*, is harsh, and at variance with its ordinary government in its present sense: *θορυβῶ πρὸς τοῦτο, or ἐπὶ τούτῳ, τούτου ἕνεκα, or ἐπιθορυβῶ τούτῳ*, are among its received forms, in which it will seldom be found with a simple accusative.

"Ἦρето γὰρ δὴ, εἴ τις.] When the Greek writers resume their subject after a parenthesis, they generally repeat the same verb, or one similar in substance to that which had preceded the interruption, with the addition of a particle γὰρ, δὴ, or οὖν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 615. s. 616.

'Ανεῖλεν.] *'Αναρεῖν, to make an oracular response; Xen. Mem. i. 3. 1, announce oracularly*. In Herodot. freq. *to lift up the voice, (φωνήν, or a similar word, underst.) and so deliver an oracle or prophecy, the voice rising from the depth of the sanctuary*. Donn. Gr. Lex. According to Laertius, ii. 37, the response of the oracle was, *'Ανδρῶν ἀπάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος*.—Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 144. *Σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης*. *'Ανδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτατος*. Socr. in Xen. Apol. c. 14. *ἀνεῖλεν ὁ Ἀπόλλων, μηδένα εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον, μήτε δικαιώτερον, μήτε σωφρονέστερον*.

'Αδελφός.] *Chærecrates*. Xen. Mem. ii. 3.

§. 6. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωςί, Τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοίδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὢν· τί οὖν ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ που ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ.] καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τιὰ ἐτραπόμην· ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἰ πέρ που, ἐλέγξω τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι Οὗτός γ' ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτου—ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ. κᾶπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἶη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι Τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι,

*what on earth is he riddling?*

§. 6. Αἰνίττεται.] Hesych. Αἰνίττεται· ἀσήμως λέγει, ἀποτείνεται, ἐπισημαίνει. Phavor. Αἰνίττεται, ἀντὶ τοῦ δηλοῦ.

Ξύνοίδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὢν.] So Eurip. Med. 495. Ξυνοισθά γ' εἰς ἐμ' οὐκ εὖορκος ὢν: the participle being put in the nominative, because the same subject is continued in the person of the verb. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 548.

Ψεύδεται.] The Delphian oracle was in such high repute for veracity, that Τὰ ἐκ τρίποδος, the responses given from the tripod, came to be proverbially adopted as infallible truths. See Potter's Grec. Antiq. 1. c. ix.

Τί ποτε λέγει.] FISCH. λέγοι: but instances of similar transitions to that in

the text, from the *obliqua oratio* to the *oratio recta*, are of frequent occurrence with the Greek writers, who in narration consider the main verb as well as the accompanying circumstances of an event as present, and hence use the present indic. Matthiæ Gr. s. 529. 5.

Αὐτοῦ.] sc. χρησμοῦ, or some word of similar import, which is implied in the preceding τί ποτε λέγει. Præfat. ad Welleri Gr. p. 9. s. FISCH.

Πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν—ἐλογιζόμην.] h. e. *Mecum cogitabam*. STALL. As in Phæd. c. 45. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκεψάμενος.

Οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθόν.] *Neque bonum neque honestum*; h. e. *uterque nostrum videtur plane stultus esse, omnisque omnino sapientiæ expers*. FISCH.

ἐν τῷ ὄρει  
— ἐπιτομή 137

ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἶεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ ὥς περ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι. ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι.] ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

§. 7. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔδοκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκούντας εἰδέναι.] καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,—δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς

“Ὁς περ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 625.

Σμικρῷ τινὶ αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.] Cic. Academ. l. 4. “Socrates ita disputat, ut—nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque præstare ceteris, quod illi quæ nesciant scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat; ob eamque causam se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod hæc esset una hominis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat.”

Πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.] Hence Laertius records of Socrates, ii. 21. πολ- λάκις δὲ βιαιότερον ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι διαλεγόμενον κονδυλίζεσθαι καὶ παρατίλλεσθαι, τὸ πλέον τε γελάσθαι καταφρονούμενον, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα φέρειν ἀνεξικακῶς.

§. 7. “Ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην.] This is to be referred not merely to δεδιώς, but to αἰσθανόμενος and λυπούμενος preceding; hence Wolf correctly explains the passage; *videns quidem et dolens invisum me fieri, atque ob id metuens*. STALL.

Τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.] The neuter of the article is often put absolutely, with the genitive of a substantive, and in that case signifies every thing to which the substantive, which is put in the genitive, refers, all that concerns it, that arises from it, that belongs to it. Eurip. Ph. 415. τὰ φίλων δ' οὐδὲν, ἦν τις δυσ- τυχεῖ, the assistance of friends is nothing, &c. Ib. 393. δεῖ φέρειν τὰ τῶν θεῶν,

the visitation of the gods. Matthiæ Gr. s. 284.

Νῆ τὸν κύνα.] The opinions of both ancients and moderns upon the origin and efficacy of this and other equally strange oaths, by the oak, plane tree, &c. of which the philosopher frequently made use, are various and undecided. Some have supposed that the demon of Socrates was intended by the dog; Pet. Petit. Observatt. Miscell. 4. 7. Others, that the dog was sworn by as the emblem of fidelity; Joach. Camerar. Opusc. de R. R. p. 28; and that consequently νῆ τὸν κύνα was equivalent to the Latin *medius fidius*. Olympiodorus, in Vit. Platon. ex Gorg. explains it of the Egyptian deity Anubis. Forster coincides with those who imagine that Socrates adopted these oaths after the example and upon the authority of Rhadamanthus, who avoided swearing by the gods themselves. So the Scholiast: “Ραδαμάνθους ὄρκος οὗτος ὁ κατὰ κυνὸς ἢ χηνὸς ἢ πλατάνου ἢ κριοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλου τοιοῦτου. Ὁς ἦν μέγιστος ὄρκος ἅπαντι λόγῳ κύων, ἔπειτα χῆν· θεοὺς δ' εἰσιγῶν· Κρατῖνος ἐν Χείροσι. κατὰ τούτων δὲ νόμος ὁμνῆναι, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ θεῶν οἱ ὄρκοι γίνωνται. τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ Σωκράτους ὄρκοι. There are some, however, who imagine that Socrates used such oaths in ridicule of the generally received divinities.

τάληθῆ λέγειν—ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς περ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο. Μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἢ ἀ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων] καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους,

*in regard to being wise*

Ἐπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα—.] Sentences which are subjoined for the sake of explanation, are frequently added without the connexion of any conjunctive particle, as in the passage above: so in Phæd. τί δ' οἱ κόσμοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν· ἀκολασία τινὶ σφρόνες εἰσι;

Ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν.] Ζητεῖν κατὰ τὸν θεόν, est explorare aliorum sapientiam, auctore Apolline. FISCII. For by the oracular sanction, which conferred upon Socrates the precedency in wisdom, he was bound to investigate the claims of others so as to justify the judgment which had been pronounced upon his own.

Πλάνην.] Mæris: Πλάνος, Ἄττικῶς πλάνη, Ἑλληνικῶς. Fischer supposes, that in πλάνην some allusion is conveyed to the wanderings of Ulysses, which he asserts to be still further shadowed forth by the addition of ὡς περ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος; the wanderings and toil of the philosopher in his efforts to establish the veracity of the deity, bearing a remarkable analogy to the perilous adventures of the Ithacan prince. Forster imagines that Hercules is the intended parallel.

Ἴνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος. κ. τ. λ.] Ἴνα μὴ μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος, κ. τ. λ. STERN. who explains the passage; *Operæ pretium est vobis ostendere quantum oberraverim ne comperiretur oraculum esse ejusmodi quod a me refelli non posset*; as Socrates had previously expressed his intention of endeavouring to confute the oracle; ελεξῶν τὸ μαντεῖον, κ. τ. λ. c. 6. But the text as it stands appears unobjectionable: for Socrates, unwilling to distrust the deity, and yet amazed that he should have been the

objet of his singular approval, engaged freely in all the difficulties connected with the ultimate discovery of the truth, in order that his own experience might lead to a satisfactory conviction, i. e. ἵνα—ἀνέλεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γένοιτο; that the prediction might be incontrovertible. So V. Cousin. “Mais il faut achever de vous raconter mes courses et les travaux que j'entrepris pour m'assurer de la vérité de l'oracle.”

Τῶν διθυράμβων] Suid. Διθύραμβος, ὕμνος εἰς Διόνυσον, i. e. Dithyramb means the Bacchic hymn. The first author of the Dithyramb was, according to some, Lasus Hermionensis, in the time of the first Darius; according to others, Arion Methymnæus, in the time of Periander. But as it appears from Pindar and his scholiast, Pind. Olymp. xiii. the antiquity of it was so great that the inventor could not be known; the very word occurring in these Dithyrambic verses by Archilochus, who was prior to both Lasus and Arion; Ὠς Διωνύσοι ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος Οἰδα Διθυράμβον, οἶνῳ συγκεραυνῶθεις φρένας. Athen. p. 628. The etymology of the word is doubtful as its import; various derivations have been assigned it, which are registered by Gerard Vossius in his *Institutio Poetica*, iii. 16. 2. The most common etymology is διθύραμβος for διθύραμος, double-doored, i. e. he who has passed through two doors; in which term allusion is supposed to be made to the double birth of Bacchus—from the womb of Semele and the thigh of Jove. For a copious account of the Dithyramb, see the *Theatre of the Greeks*, edit. 3. 1830. from which admirable work, and indispensable to the classical student, this note was compiled.

ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαντὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἢ ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τάληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. [ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ πεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἂ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμωδοί·] καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ

[Ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ.] Schol. ἐπ' αὐτόπτῳ, ἐπ' ὄψει. Suid. ἐπ' ὀφθαλμοῖς.

[Ἄ μοι ἐδόκει—πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς.] h. e. *quæ ab iis maxima diligentia composita videbantur.* STALL. Διηρώτων ἂν. The part. ἂν frequently gives to the *indic.* the signification of *being habitual, customary*; Demosth. *pro Cor.* 301. *None of the ancient orators has been of such a various influence, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν γράφων οὐκ ἂν ἐπρέσβευεν, ὁ δὲ πρεσβεύων οὐκ ἂν ἔγραφε,* it was not usual for him, who proposed laws, to be an ambassador, and *vice versa.* Compare also Soph. *Philoct.* 290. 92. Buttman's *Intermed. Gr. Gr.* s. 139. *Obs.* 5.

Αὐτῶν.] This genitive depends on the comparat. βέλτιον, and refers to the poets; it is omitted by Ficinus. FISCH. Οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον, κ. τ. λ. *Omnes qui aderant, melius istis de carminibus solebant judicare, quæ illi ipsi composuerant.* STALL. So V. Cousin: *De tous ceux qui étaient là présents, il n'y en avait presque pas un qui ne fût capable de rendre compte de ces poèmes mieux que ceux qui les avaient faits.* Wolfe renders οἱ παρόντες, qui hic adsunt, as if it referred to the judges; incorrectly, for Socrates evidently alludes to those who were present at his discussion with the poets.

[Ἐν ὀλίγῳ.] Acts, xxvi. 28. ἐν ὀλίγῳ με πείθεις Χριστιανὸν γενέσθαι; where

Michaelis understands *chrónos*, so as to make the signification *in a short time*, which is equivalent to the ordinary interpretation, *almost.* Blackwall in *Class. Sacr.* v. 2. p. 84. Ficinus correctly renders ἐν ὀλίγῳ, *brevi.*

Ποιοῖεν.] Stephens omits ἂ ποιοῖεν; which is found, however, in all other copies, and translated as part of the text by Ficinus and Serranus. Fischer supposes the omission to have occurred not by the direction of Stephens, but by the negligence of the transcribers, which was not subsequently remedied.

Φύσει τινὶ, κ. τ. λ.] So Cic. p. *Archia.* 8. "Poetam natura ipsa valere, et quasi divino quodam spiritu inflari." Compare also Horat. *A. P.* 408. "Natura fieret laudabile carmen an arte." Carm. iv. 3. "Quem tu Melpomene, &c." Ἐνθουσιάζοντες. Ovid. *Fast.* vi. 6. "Est Deus in nobis; agitante calescimus illo."

Τοιοῦτον τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος.] Hence the strictures of Aristophanes upon the dithyrambic and tragic poets, in Avib. 1388. Τῶν διθυράμβων γὰρ τὰ λαμπρὰ γίνεται Ἄερια καὶ σκότια γε καὶ κνανανγὰ καὶ πετροδόνητα, κ. τ. λ.; and his Scholiast in loc. *πλείστη γὰρ αὐτῶν ἢ λέξεις τοιαύτη· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐλάχιστος· ὡς ἡ παροιμία· Καὶ διθυραμβοποιῶν νοῦν ἔχεις ἔλαττόνα.* FORST.

ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες. καὶ ἅμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τᾶλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, τῷ αὐτῷ αὐτῶν οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι, ᾧ περ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

§. 8. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦα ἑμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνῆδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γ' ἤδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὧ ὦνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅ περ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἢ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν. ὥστ' ἐμὲ ἑμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὡς περ ἔχω ἔχειν, μὴ τέ τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ἃ ἐκείνοι

Ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν—εἶναι ἀνθρώπων.] The verbs αἰσθάνεσθαι, πυνθάνεσθαι, γινώσκειν, are sometimes found with the genitive, instead of the accusative, which otherwise is the more usual case with them; e. g. *Thuc.* 5. 83. ὡς ἦσθοντο τειχιζόντων. *Plat. Apol. Soc.* c. 7. ἡσθόμην—οἰομένων, for αὐτοὺς τειχιζοντας, οἰόμενους, "that they were erecting a wall," "that they thought." *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 349. Obs. 2. *Buttmann, L. Gr. Gr.* s. 132. "A οὐκ ἦσαν, sc. σοφοί. *STALL.*

§. 8. Ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνῆδειν.] See *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 548. 2.

Ἡδῆ.] See cap. 19. n. ἀπολώλη. Τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην.] See *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 332. s. 338.

Διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην.] *Steph.* διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν τέχνην, to which the Latin of *Ficinus* is accommodated.

Καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα, κ. τ. λ.] *Forster* justly observes that *Socrates* makes an ironical allusion here to the administration of the republic, which in

his own time was vested in the most opulent, and generally the most ignorant; whose vain and ridiculous ambition incurred not only the derision of the philosophers, but afforded a copious subject to the comic poets for the exercise of their most poignant wit. See *Mitford's Greece*, ed. 1829. vol. iv. pp. 132. 133. sqq.

Πλημμέλεια.] *Lit.* a violation of the rules of harmony; hence a fault, transgression, oversight.—ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν; h. e. error ille atque stultitia scientiam istorum hominum ac sapientiam ita quasi obscurabat, ut hæc nulla esse videretur. *STALL.*

Ἐπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ.] *In the name or behalf of the oracle.*—πότερα δεξαίμην κ. τ. λ. whether I should prefer to continue as I am. *Δεχομαι*, cum infinit. exp. volo, sicut et οὐ δεχομαι, nolo.—*Scap. Lex.*

Ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν.] *Sc.* αὐτῶν, i. e. the artizans.—ἀμφοτερα, intell. σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν.

ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἑμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ, ὡς περ ἔχω ἔχειν.

§. 9. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἢ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα

§. 9. Καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται.] h. e. *longe gravissimæ et acerrimæ*. STALL. τοιαῦται being understood before οἶαι; Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8. 11. ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός γε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 461. Viger. de Idiot. sec. 8. v. vi.

Τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *quum tamen revera deus videatur sapiens esse*. STALL. τὸ δὲ is an elliptical expression, not easily supplied, which introduces a proposition opposed to what has been stated before, nearly like the English *as however, but as yet*. Heind. ad Plat. Theæt. 37. Buttm. ad Menon. 37. and Int. Gr. Gr. s. 150. Sometimes, however, it is more fully expressed; De Repub. iv. p. 443. τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτον μὲν τι ἦν—ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Tim. p. 86. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία—νόσος ψυχῆς γέγρονε: in which sense it is to be taken in the text; *but as yet truly the Deity, &c.* “Etenim articulus cum δὲ conjunctus indicat id, quod alii cuidam ita onponitur ut pro vero haberi debeat.” STALL.

Τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.] This was in reality the grand point which Socrates was labouring to prove; the mere nothingness of human wisdom contrasted with the divine intelligence. Lactant. de Ira Dei, c. i. 7. “Vidit (Socrates) ex parte aliqua veritatem, testatusque est etiam in judicio, sicut traditur a Platone, quod nulla esset hu-

mana sapientia.”

Καὶ οὐδενός.] *Et vero, sc. immo nullius pretii*. STALL. Ruding. p. 217. ἢ καὶ, or ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον οὐδ.; incorrectly, for καὶ by itself has the force of *atque adeo, immo, vero*; as c. 16. ὅπου τι, καὶ συμκρόν, ὄφελός ἐστιν. Besides ἢ καὶ and ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον are not conformable to the rules of Greek construction, which would require μᾶλλον δὲ, or ἢ simply; for ὀλίγον ἢ οὐδὲν and ὀλίγον καὶ οὐδὲν, with similar forms, occur frequently in the best writers: so infr. c. 10. εἰδόντων δὲ ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. FISCH.

Καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν.] h. e. *atque videtur (sc. Deus) non de Socrate hoc dicere*. STALL. τοῦτο being referred to σοφὸν εἶναι. Λέγειν τινά for λέγειν περὶ τινος, is a usual form with Attic writers: Cf. in Criton. φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς. Aristoph. Acharn. v. 593. ταυτὶ λέγεις σὺ τὸν στρατηγόν. Some editions for τοῦτ' οὐ read τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σ. as if it should be understood *δεικτικῶς* for ἐμὲ; but the adversative particle in the succeeding member of the sentence manifestly requires the negative οὐ, as in the text. Other editions read *τούτο*, as referring to the oracle, or propose *τούτον*, depending upon *ἐνεκα* or *χάριν* understood, which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus; Lat. Interpr.; however the objection already stated holds good against all but the adopted reading.



ποιούμενος, ὡς περ ἂν εἴποι ὅτι Οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὃ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅς τις ὡς περ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν μοι μὴ δοκῆ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὗ τέ τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολή γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

§. 10. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀν-

"Ὡς περ ἂν εἴ.] *As if*—these particles, in construction, take the opt. in cases merely supposed, but in such a way that ἂν, which precedes εἴ, refers to an opt. in the apodosis of the conditional proposition. *Dem. pro. Cor.* p. 293. 1. ὡςπερ ἂν εἴ τις ναύκληρον τῆς ναυαγίας ἀτιψῶτο, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐκυβέρνων τὴν ναῦν, φήσειεν ἂν, where ὡςπερ ἂν φήσειεν ἂν are to be taken together, as *Plat. Gorg.* p. 465. C. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ...τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἂν πολλὸν ἦν. *Matthiæ Gr. Gr.* s. 523. 2. So the Latins use both *quasi* and *quasi si*; *Plaut. Asin.* v. 1. 11; as *nisi si* and *nisi*; *Drakenb. ad Liv.* vi. 26. 5. p. 376. tom. ii.; in imitation of the Greek ὡςπερ ἂν and ὡςπερ ἂν εἴ, ἂν μὴ and ἂν εἴ μὴ.—*FISCH.*

Τῶν ἀστῶν—τῶν ξένων.] These genitives depend on τίνα following.

Τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι.] h. e. *Id agens, ut appareat responsum Apollinis esse verum.* *STALL.* Ἀσχολία, *Thom. Mag.* ἡ περὶ τι ἀναστροφή. h. e. *occupatio, studium quod in aliqua re ponitur.* *Id.*

Ἐν πενία μυρία.] *In the greatest poverty.* πενία and πτωχεία differ as the Latin *paupertas* and *egestas*; πενία, consequently, is applied to those who are indebted to manual labour, and its attendant wages for their daily support:

πτωχεία, to mendicants. The poverty of Socrates was such, that he is said to have valued his whole house and substance at five Attic minæ; *Xenoph. Œconom.* ii. 3; whence he was commonly called Πένης. *Libanius*, in *Apol. Socr.* p. 640., mentions that eighty minæ were bequeathed him by his father, which he lost by some mischance, and ever after lived in distress.

Διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.] *On account of my serving the god.* The gen. expresses the object of an action or feeling expressed in another noun, and is used objectively, as in Latin; a relation which in English is expressed by prepositions, e. g. πόθος υἱοῦ, *desiderium filii*, not *thy son's regret*, i. e. which the son has, but *regret for the son*, like σὸς πόθος. *Od.* λ. 202. *Soph. Œd. C.* 631. τίς δῆτ' ἂν ἀνδρὸς ἐμμένειαν ἐκβάλαι τοιοῦδε, *good will towards such a man.* *Eurip. Phæn.* 1757. *Ξυγγόνου ὕβρισματα, injuria fratris; insults offered to the brother.* *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 367. διὰ τὴν τῷ θεῷ λ. would answer equally well to express the meaning of the text, such nouns as λατρεία, ὑπηρεσία, &c. generally governing the case of the verbs from which they are derived.

§. 10. Οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων.] *Socrates* uses this expression, in order that the cause of the odium against him may be made more apparent.

θρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἴτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κάπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζουσιν· καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν· τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ,

Μιμοῦνται.] Fisch. μιμούμενοι; (as εἴτα, ἐπειτα, τότε, and οὕτως are elegantly subjoined to participles: Matthæ Gr. s. 603,) which has been adopted by Ficinus; but εἴτα and ἐπειτα are frequently used for καὶ εἴτα and καὶ ἐπειτα, in constructions similar to that in the text, where εἴτα has the force of καὶ τότε, and then.

Ἐπιχειροῦσι ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν.] This practice of the young men, and the indifferent repute in which philosophy came to be consequently held by the vulgar, has been thus forcibly described by Socrates; Plat. De Rep. vii. 148. Οἶμαι γὰρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύωνται, ὡς παιδιᾶ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, αἰεὶ εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι· καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγοντας, αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐξελέγουσι, χαίροντες, ὥσπερ σκυλάκια, τῷ ἔλκεν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λογῷ τοῦς πλησίον αἰεὶ—καὶ ἕκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὄλον φιλοσοφίας ἐπερὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβιβλῆνται. FORST.

Δὲ ἢ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν.] Stallbaum prefers δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν, as more emphatic, explaining ἢ, aut potius. So Plat. Phædr. p. 244. Β. βραχέα ἢ οὐδέν. Alciphron. iii. 4. ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν διαφέρουσι.

Ἄλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς.] sc. Quod se erroris et inscitia ab illis coargui patientur. STALL., who thus explains the passage, which contains a bitter irony: mihi isti succensent, quum tamen sibi potius de-

beant, ut qui se patientur refutari ab illis adolescentulis. The sentence is far more effective in this way than by adopting with Stephens, Ficinus, and others, the common reading οὐκ αὐτοῖς; which should probably have been οὐκ ἐκείνοις, had Socrates intended to refer to the youths.

Ἄτι τὰ μετέωρα.] Steph. ὅτι τὰ μ. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ζητεῖ καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζει καὶ τ. ἢ λ. κρ. ποιεῖ; but this reading is at variance with that adopted by the greater number of copies, which sanction the text as supr., and seems to have arisen from an attempt to make the passage more obviously intelligible; which, however, is easily effected by repeating διδάσκων at the end of the sentence; Gell. Biblioth. Crit. Nov. Libr. iv. 417.; by which it becomes the commonplace answer which Socrates asserts to have been generally given, for want of a better, to the question ὅ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων: a preceding construction being a very general cause of a deviation from the regular construction, whence that used in the question is continued in the answer. Matthæ Gr. s. 631. 2. extr. Ficinus has adopted the reading of Stephens, omitting ζητεῖ, and making τὰ μ. καὶ τὰ ὑπο γῆς depend, with θεοῦς, upon μὴ νομίζει, which is evidently at variance with the sense of the passage.

Τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. For I imagine, they would be unwilling to confess the truth, that they are convicted of

οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὄτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλιτος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλιτος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων. ὥστε, ὃ περ

an affectation of knowledge, while they are possessed of none. "Ὅτι κατάδηλοι—προσποιούμενοι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 296. Heindorf. μὲν τι εἰδέναι; but τι need not be expressed, as it is implied in οὐδέν following.

Πολλοί.] *Persevering*; so in Latin, *multi in opere* is asserted of those who are intently engaged in any occupation. FISCH. This interpretation is preferable to the ordinary one, *numerous*, or that commended in Abresch. Auctar. Thucyd. p. 328. s. *vehement*, which is expressed sufficiently by *σφοδροί*, *preced*.

Ξυντεταγμένως.] *In a well-arranged or orderly manner*. A metaphor taken from an army in battle array; so Æschines in Ctes. *τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν ὄρατε, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὴν παράταξιν ὅση γέγνηται*. Socrates makes use of this term to signify the systematic proceedings of his adversaries in the diffusion of their calumnies, and the plans which they concerted to ensure their effect; hence *πιθανῶς*, h. e. *apte ad persuadendum*. STALL. Some copies read *συντεταμένως*; Ficinus appears to have united the force of both readings; Lat. *Interp.*

Ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὄτα.] Plat. *Lysid.* p. 204, C. *ἡμῶν γοῶν ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὄτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος*. Lucian. *Amor.* s. 1. T. V. p. 265. ed. Bip. *ἑρωτικῆς παιδιᾶς ἐξ ἑωθινοῦ πεπλήρωκας τὰ ὄτα*.

Μέλιτος—ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν.] Melitus, who stood forward as the accuser of Socrates on behalf of the poets, was himself a tragic poet, but of indifferent repute; whence his *σκόλια* incurred the satirical censure of Aristophanes; *Ran.* v. 1337. He was very young at

the time when he submitted the indictment of Socrates to the archon, s. Βασιλεὺς; and remarkable for his excessive arrogance, which may have irritated him the more against Socrates, and led him more eagerly to resent the strictures of the philosopher upon the class to which he affected to belong. Socrates had but little personal knowledge of him; a fact which has induced many to suppose that Melitus was rather an instrument in the hands of others than one who had voluntarily made a private pique the subject of a public inquiry. But there was another circumstance which might have contributed to mature his growing enmity. When, amongst the many enormities of the thirty tyrants, an order was issued for the apprehension of Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon, three men of distinguished eminence in the commonwealth, Critias was most anxious to involve his master, Socrates, in the execution of Leon, who was remarkable in those turbulent times, for a blameless life, and unblemished character. A message from the Thirty required the attendance of Socrates, with four others. Critias, himself, gave the order for them to go to Salamis, to apprehend Leon and bring him to Athens. Socrates resisted this order, knowing its purpose, and disobeyed it, as being most unjust. The other four, of whom Melitus was one, less scrupulous, or less courageous, fulfilled their directions; in consequence of which Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon were apprehended and condemned. See *infr.* c. 22. *Mitford's Greece*, iv. 46. 47. *Andocid. de Myster.* p. 46. *Orat. t. iv.* ed. Reisk.

Τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.] Socrates evidently alludes again here

ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἴός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθῆ· καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυσφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καὶ τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι. ὁ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι τάληθῆ λέγω καὶ

with some severity to that principle in the Athenian constitution by which ignorant artificers, if qualified by wealth, were permitted to intermeddle with the government of the state. Anytus, who had been banished by the thirty tyrants on account of his opulence and influence, on his return enjoyed an ample share of those civil honours in the management of the republic, which, from the time of Clisthenes, had been accessible to the above-mentioned class. And hence Socrates mentions him as the advocate not of the *δημιουργοὶ* merely, but with bitter irony of the *πολιτικοὶ* also. "Xenophon," says Mitford, "begins his memorials of his revered master with declaring his wonder how the Athenians could have been persuaded to condemn to death a man of such uncommonly clear innocence and exalted worth." Ælian, though for authority not to be compared with Xenophon, has nevertheless, I think, given the solution. "Socrates," he says, "disliked the Athenian constitution. For he saw that democracy is tyrannical, and abounds with all the evils of absolute monarchy." *Σωκράτης δὲ τῆ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία οὐκ ἠρέσκετο· τυραννικὴν γὰρ καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἔώρα τὴν δημοκρατίαν οὖσαν.* Ælian. Var. Hist. iii. c. 17. So Aristotle, Polit. v. c. 10. *Ἐναντία δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι Δῆμος μὲν Τυραννίδι, καθ' Ἡσιόδον, Ὡς κεραμεῖ κεραμεύς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ Δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία Τυραννίς.* Socrates, moreover, as he says of himself, Xen. Apol. s. 29. had attacked Anytus, after his usual custom, with considerable warmth, because he preferred that his son, the heir of such ample wealth, should rather be instructed in his own trade, by which that wealth might be increased, than be educated on a scale suitable to the situation, which the young man was already possessed of

sufficient claim and right to maintain in the control of the state. This supplied one of the pretexts against Socrates, as a corrupter of the youth, whom he was supposed to have allured from the profits of their several occupations to indulge in the ease and indolence of a philosophical life. To have been charged with an accusation of this nature at Athens, where such especial care was devoted to industry and invention in the mechanical arts, even of itself, was likely to terminate unfavourably to the accused.

Lycon, who assisted in arranging the prosecution of Socrates, was one of the ten orators, originally instituted by Solon, whose duty it was to defend the interests of the state in both senate and assembly; to recommend what was likely to result to the public advantage, and to dissuade from such measures as might endanger its security. They were called *Ῥήτορες*, and sometimes *Συνήγοροι*; but from a wanton abuse of their privileges and influence, and a ready sacrifice of principle whenever it interfered with their popularity or peculations, their very name became odious to all good men; whence it may easily be seen how Lycon became the enemy of Socrates. See Aristoph. Vesp. 1292. where Lycon is introduced with Antipho, another of his class.

*Ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. hæc sunt illa, quæ me vobis vere expositurum et narraturum me esse antea dicebam.* STALL. Socrates referring here to c. 1. *ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.*

*Οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος.] Ὑποστελέσθαι, properly signifies to withdraw one's self, to depart secretly; thence to dissemble or disguise.* Dresig. de Verb. Med. 1. 140.

*Τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι.] Norim,*

ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ταῦτά ἐστι. καὶ εἰάν τε νῦν εἰάν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

§. 11. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν, αὕτη ἔστω ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλιτον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους\* μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογήσασθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ, ὡς περ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀνωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα, καὶ θεοὺς, οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστι· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν.] Φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλιτον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ραδίως εἰς

*me ob eadem fere in odium incurrere.*—Fisch.

§. 11. Αὕτη ἔστω—ἀπολογία.] See c. 1. n. extr. Αὕτη ἀρετὴ.

Τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν.] Ἀγαθός was generally used by the Greeks as expressive of respect towards the individual to whom it was addressed; in the present instance it is rather ironically applied. According to Suidas and others, φιλόπολις is the common, and φιλόπατρις the Attic dialect; but this is erroneous, for both are equally familiar to the Attic writers; Ducq. ad Thucyd. vi. 92; but they differ in sense, as φιλόπατρις would be used by an Athenian to designate a lover of Greece; φιλόπολις, a lover of Athens. STALL.

Αὖθις γὰρ δὴ—λάβωμεν αὖ.] See c. 3. init. n. Ὡσπερ οὖν. Socrates having explained away the charges of one class of his accusers, proceeds now to the refutation of the charge upon oath, as it were, preferred against him by the other; hence αὖθις αὖ.—STALL.

Πως ὧδε.] Someway thus. Socrates does not profess to give the exact terms of the indictment, but merely its import. According to Diogenes Laertius,

ii. 40. the bill of the indictment was extant in the time of the Platonic philosopher, Phavorinus, in the temple of Cybele, at Athens, where the δημόσια γράμματα, or public records, were kept: Ἡ δὲ ἀνωμοσία τῆς δίκης τούτων εἶχε τὸν τρόπον· ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἐτι καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φαβωρίνος, ἐν τῷ Μητροῦφ· Τάδε ἐγράψατο, καὶ ἀνωμολογήσατο, Μέλιτος Μελίτου, Πιπθεὺς, Σωκράτει Σωφρονισκου, Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια ἐισηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφείρων. Τίμημα θάνατος. v. Xen. Mem. Socr. init. Socrates, in his defence, inverts the order of the charges, as thus alleged against him.

Ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται.] Schol. August. εὐτραπελίζεται, σκώπτει: Tr. jests too seriously: for Melitus, in charging Socrates with a crime of which he was incapable, and affecting, himself, an interest about the instruction of the youth, which he did not feel, is said χαριεντίζεσθαι, to jest or jibe; but in reference to his accusation of Socrates, for corrupting the youth, and his steady prosecution of the charge, he is said by the philosopher, σπουδῇ χαριεντ. by which

ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

§. 12. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο ὦ Μέλιτε, εἰπέ, Ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; Ἐγώ γε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσον αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστίν. ὅρας, ὦ Μέλιτε, ὅτι

a serious impression was attempted to be effected upon ridiculous grounds.—*ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, rashly putting men upon trial.*

§. 12. *Δεῦρο.*] “Absolute nonnquam ponitur, (omisso imperativo ἴθι, ἔλθε aut simili,) *pro adesdum.* Aristoph. in pace, δεῦρο σὺ, *huc adsis tu.* Musæus, Δεῦρό μοι εἰς φιλότητα, *huc ades mihi.* Hinc factum est adverbium adhortandi, idem significans quod φέρε, ἄγε, *age, agedum.* Plato in Apol. καὶ μοι δεῦρο εἰπέ, *agedum dic mihi.*” Scap. Lex.

Ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ, κ. τ. λ.] Ἄλλο τι is used in questions, but in such only, as are intended to elicit an acknowledgment or confession; never in such as are employed merely for the sake of information; hence ἄλλο τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῶ, ὅπως; &c. *do you not esteem it of great importance? are you not very solicitous that? &c.* The form ἄλλο τι ἢ περὶ πολ. or πλείστ. is also common; but when ἢ is omitted, the interrogation is in ἄλλο τι, alone, not in the other words of the sentence—ὅπως—ἔσονται. The indicative of the future (as the optative) is construed with ὅπως, when something is to be signified, which is contemplated as future at the time denoted by the principal verb. Wherefore that tense occurs in construction with a present, as in the text, a future, and a past tense: ἔτοιμοι εἰσιν, ἔσονται, ἦσαν, πράττειν ἢ πως ἔσεται—*χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελόμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα*: Plat. Apol. c. 17. *βουλευσόμεθα περὶ τῶν*

*τέκνων, ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστα παιδεύσομεν αὐτά.* Xen. Cæc. vii. 12. *ἐπεβουλεύεσθε ὅπως μὴ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ψηφίσεσθε, πολλῶν τε ἐνδείξει ἔσεσθε.* Viger. by Seager. c. VII. s. x. v. 4. III. xi. v. 8. IX. vii. 3.

Μέλον γέ σοι.] Steph. in marg. *quum id tibi cura sit.* Those impersonal verbs, or impersonal constructions, when the preposition dependent on such a verb (commonly an *infin.* or a sentence with ὅτι, and the like) properly is the actual subject of the verb, are treated as *casus absoluti*, in two different ways: 1. when it is a mere relation of time, it is the *gen.*; 2. in any other combination, we have the *accusative neutrals*, *Εἰρημένον αὐτοῖς παρῆναι οὐκ ἦκουσι, they do not come, though they have been told (εἴρηται) to be present, and this is the case with all verbs commonly called impersonal: Δία τί μένεις, ἔξδὸν ἀπιέναι, why do you stay when you are at liberty, (it is allowed to you) to go, (εξεστίν.)* Plat. Phæd. 28. *Δίς καὶ τρίς τὰ αὐτὰ εἴρηκεν, ὡς οὐ πάνυ εὐπωρῶν—ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου.* Buttmann. Int. Gr. Gr. s. 129. 11. s. 145. 6. obs. 7. Herm. ad Viger. n. 214. Matthiæ Gr. s. 564.

Ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτοισί.] The term *εἰσάγειν* was used either in reference to the magistrates, who, in any cause upon which they were not warranted in deciding finally, were obliged to refer to the cognizance of the judges, which was generally called *εἰσάγειν τὴν δίκην εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον*; or in reference to the accuser, who was said, *εἰσάγειν δίκην*

σιγῆς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ τοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον οὐδὲ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦ γαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅς τις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλιτε; οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἅπαντες ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἄπαντες. Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων. τί δαὶ δῆ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δαὶ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλιτε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες; Κάκεινοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς καγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀποκρίναι ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τούναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἰς

κατά τινος εἰς τὸ δικ. *to impeach, to sue or bring another before the court.*—The cause itself was called *δίκη εἰσαγωγίμος*, and the person that entered it, *εἰσαγωγεύς*.—*τουτοισι* in the text is equivalent to *εἰς δικαστήριον*. *infr.* c. 17.

Πότερον ἅπαντες.] *Ald.* *πότερον ἄν, παντός.* *Bas.* 1. *Norib.* *πότερον ἄν παντες*: both incorrectly. *Fisch.*

Νῆ τὴν Ἥραν.] It was usual, among the Greeks, for men to swear by the goddesses. *V. Ernest.* *ad Xen. Mem.* 1. 5. 5.

Τῶν ὠφελούντων.] *i. q.* τῶν βελτίους ποιούντων.

Οἱ βουλευταί.] *See* c. 20. *n.* Ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν—ἡρῶα.

Ἐκκλησιασταί.] Those were so

called who either took an active part in the debates, or who merely stood by and listened to the business of the Athenian Ἐκκλησιαί, or public assemblies. *See* *Potter, Grec. Antiq.* v. i. c. 17.

Ἐμον κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν.] *You convict me of great ill-fortune.* Verbs compounded with *κατά* (*against*, with a genitive,) which represent an action as taking place to the disadvantage of a person or thing, take the genitive of the person or thing against which the action is directed, together with the accusative of the thing which is this passive object of the verb. *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 378. *Æschin. adv. Ctes.* s. 12. *τίς ἄν οὐν ὑμῶν τολμήσειε τσαυτήν ἀνελευθερίαν καταγνώναι τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων.*

μέν τις ὁ βελτίους οἶός τ' ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἔάν περ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλιτε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων; πάντως δὴ που, ἔάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἔάν τε φῆτε πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελούσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλιτε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

§. 13. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλιτε, πότερον ἔστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τᾶν ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι;

Ἐάν τε—οὐ φῆτε, κ. τ. λ.] *Whether you and Anytus deny or admit it.* It has been proposed to read *μη φῆτε*, on the grounds that *μη* is the negative particle by which *εἰ, ἔάν, ὅφρα*, and *ὅπως* should be properly followed; but *εἰ* or *ἔάν* δὲ οὐ is not equivalent to *εἰ* or *ἔάν* δὲ *μη*. In all passages in which the former phrase occurs, *οὐ* is to be referred to some following verb with which it is intimately connected in sense and construction: as *εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχέυσεις, φονεύσεις δὲ*, now if thou commit no adultery, yet if thou kill, &c. Epist. Jac. ii. 11. *εἰ δὲ τοι οὐ δώσει ἐὸν ἄγγελον*, but if he will not give, i. e. if he refuse, &c. Hom. II. ὦ, 296. So in the text, *ἔάν—οὐ φῆτε*, whether you do not confess, i. e. whether you deny, &c. Seag. Viger. c. VIII.

Εἰ εἷς—διαφθείρει.] h. e. *Magna fuerit adolescentium felicitas, si unus tantum eos corrumpat, quod tu ais.*—STALL. Socrates so expressing himself, as if he founded his conclusion upon his admitting what Melitus had previously asserted to be true. Cf. c. 27. a med. *πολλὴ μὴν τ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχου—εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι.* c. 17. sub. fin. *εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω*

τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά. Et with the indic. and in the apodosis the opt. with *ἂν*, viz. when the condition contains a determinately expressed case, and the apodosis is uttered with the expression of a mere conjecture, or contains a consequence which is merely possible or probable, forms one of various deviations from the general rules affecting the opt. and conjunc. after conditional particles. See Matthiae Gr. s. 524.

§. 13. Ὡ τᾶν.] Hesych. Ὡ τᾶν—πρόσρημα τιμητικῆς λέξεως λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ εἰρωνείᾳ πολλάκις. Tim. Gloss. Plat. Ὡ τᾶν ὦ οὗτος. Mæris. Ὡ τᾶν, Ἀττικῶς ὦ σὺ, Ἑλληνικῶς. Hermann, ad Soph. Philoctet. 1373. makes it a crasis for ὦ ἔτᾶν, voc. of ἔτης. Scap. Lex. "Interdum usurpatur pro, bone vir, Plat. in Apol. Ὡ τᾶν ἀπόκριναι, pro quo paulo post ἀπόκριναι ὦ γαθέ." Schol. August. Ὡ τᾶν—ὦ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ τάλαν, ὦ μέλε. ταῦτα παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν λέγεται μονῶν, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πλήθους φασὶ τὸ ὦ τᾶν, ὡς παρὰ Κτησιφῶντι. οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν περισ-



Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅς τις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελείσθαι; ἀποκρίναι, ὦ γαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅς τις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δῆ, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νέους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα; Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλιτε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὢν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται αἰετὸς τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω, ὥστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σύ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλιτε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐσ-

πῶσι, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν βαρύνουσι. καὶ βέλτιον ἀδύνατον γὰρ μίαν λέξιν εὐρεθῆναι δύο ἔχουσαν περιπωμένας. Δίδυμος δὲ τὸ πλήρες εἶναι φησιν ὡς ἔταν, ἀγνοῶν ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔτης ἢ κλητική ἔστιν ἔτα καὶ Δωρικῶς ἔταν.

[Ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι.] The following are the terms of the law to which Socrates alludes; Demosth. c. Steph. orat. ii. p. 1131. Νόμος, τοῖν ἀντιδικῶν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι, ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ. FORST.

Καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα.] Ficinus has omitted the translation of this phrase in his Latin translata; it is implied however in διαφθείροντα preced. FISCH.

Τηλικόσδε ὢν.] Melitus was but a young man at this time, s. 14. sub. fin. καὶ νεότητι, κ. τ. λ. and Socrates was more than seventy years old, c. 1. a med. τῷδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, and n. in loc.

Εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας.] The neuters τοῦτο, τοσοῦτο, τόδε, with a preposition, often take a genitive as a definition; Thuc. 1. 49. ξυνέπεσον ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγ-

κης, they came to this, with respect to necessity, i. e. into such necessity; where in Latin eo with the genitive is used, eo necessitatis adducti sunt, eo dementiae progressi sunt, &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 341. Buttman. Interm. Gr. Gr. s. 132. Obs. 4. ἤκω is a remarkable instance of that class of verbs which appear to have something in them which disturbs the succession of the tenses; instead of being rendered I come, it is constantly to be considered as a præterite, I am come, i. e. I am here; Criton. init. Ἄρτι ἦκεις ἢ πάλοι. Eurip. Hec. 1. ἤκω νέκρων, κ. τ. λ. So in the text, to such a degree of stupidity have I come, as to be ignorant, &c. Buttman. s. 137. Obs. 8.

Οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον—οὐδένα.] sc. πείσεσθαι σοι; a common ellipsis after οἶμαι δε καὶ, to be supplied by the principal verb from the preceding member of the sentence. STALL.

Νόμος—ἔστιν.] Νόμος, besides its primary signification of a law, is also affirmed of a custom, habit, or usage, founded upon natural principles, in any

τίν, ἀλλ' ἴδια λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ· σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

§. 14. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη ἐστὶν οὐ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελίτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. Ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῆς διαφθεῖρειν, ὦ Μέλιτε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἢ ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐς ἢ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθεῖρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλιτε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, [πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναι τινος θεοῦς,] καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοῦς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ

of which latter senses it is to be taken in the text. For it is evident that private advice and admonition, and not a formal public accusation, should be adopted as the most salutary and efficient means of correcting such errors as arise from inattention and ignorance. Hence there is no need of requiring, with Rudinger, any particular law, as expressly alluded to in the text, and bearing especially upon the subject under discussion. FISCH.

Παύσομαι.] Sc. ποιῶν; which Heindorf conjectures should be supplied.

§. 14. Οὐ γὰρ.] Steph. Ald. Bas. 1. ὃ ἐγώ. Bas. 2. Norib. Forst. But the reading in the text is preferable; the Attic writers delighting in such crases: so Aristoph. Acharn. 503. οὐπὶ for ὃ ἐπὶ. Plat. 275. οὐπίτριπος. Eurip. Phœn. οὐμός. FISCH.

ἢ δῆλον, κ. τ. λ.] ἢ is frequently used in a question, when, as in the text, a preceding and indefinite question is made more definite. Plat. Parm. p. 137. 13. τίς οὖν μοι ἀποκρινέται; ἢ ὁ

νεώτατος; Matthiæ Gr. s. 619.

Ἐπι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν.] Intell. ἐμὲ φῆς διαφθεῖρειν τοὺς νεωτέρους.

Ὅτι ταῦτα λέγεις.] Ταῦτα depends upon the part. διδάσκων following. STALL.

Ἐν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν.] Ἐν depends here upon λόγος, and not, as Rudinger and others have supposed, upon περί, which they require either to be understood or supplied. It has been already remarked, c. 9. supr., that λέγειν τινά is an equally legitimate construction as λέγειν περί τινός; whence λόγος τινός and λόγος περί τινός may likewise be indifferently used. See c. 9. a med. λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, extr. τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν. Cf. Plat. Charmid. p. 156. A. οὐ γὰρ τί σου ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστίν. Demosth. de Cor. p. 281. ed. R. τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν, i. e. περί αὐτῶν. Eurip. Med. 541. οὐκ ἂν ἦν λόγος σέθεν, i. e. περί σοῦ. Schæfer. ad Sophocl. Antig. v. 11. μῦθος φίλων, i. e. περί φίλων. STALL.

μέντοι οὐς πέρ γε ἡ πόλις ἀλλ' ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους] ἢ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ὡ θαυμάσιε Μέλιτε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὡς περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἶε κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέ-

"Ἴνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις.] Ἴνα τί, *why* or *wherefore*, is an elliptical form, to be supplied as denoting present or past time, by γένηται or γένοιτο. Schættgen would rather understand γέγονεν in ἵνα τί, and supplies the phrase, τί γέγονεν, ἵνα, e. g. Acts, vii. 26. "Ἴνα τί ἀδικεῖ τεάλληλους; which he explains: Τί γέγονεν, ἵνα ἀδικεῖτε ἀλλήλους. Cf. Terent. Phorm. iii. 3. "Quamobrem ut quidnam facturus," where ut quidnam is equivalent to ἵνα τί. Liv. iv. 49. "quid ut a vobis sperent." Bos. Ellipsis. Gr.—Οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην. Dacier understands this question as ironical, and would thence infer that Socrates intended to expose the folly of the Athenians in regarding the sun and moon as divinities. But the commentator appears to have forgotten that the sun and moon were not only the principal objects of religious veneration amongst the Persians and other barbarous nations, but that they were worshipped by the Greeks also, by whom they were venerated under the titles of Apollo and Diana, and who dedicated a common temple to both in their own proper name. Now, it is well known that although Socrates was free from many of the grosser superstitions of his country, and, deeply impressed with a reverential belief in one, great, first cause, was always inclined to reprobate the absurd extremes incidental to polytheism, still he was not certainly exempt, nor could it have been expected, from the errors of a system, which unaided reason might prevail to modify, but never to destroy. It is most likely then that he put the question seriously to Melitus; the more so as he afterwards disavows the theory which should have

been utterly inconsistent with the belief that he professed.

Μὰ Δί'.] Melitus replies in the negative: Μὰ Δί'—οὐ νομίζει θεοὺς εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. which is to be supplied from the question preceding.

Ἀναξαγόρου.] Anaxagoras, born at Clazomene in the first year of the seventieth Olympiad, was a disciple of Anaximenes, the hearer and associate of Anaximander, who has been generally considered the founder of the Ionic sect, having been the first to teach philosophy in a public school. At the age of twenty Anaxagoras went to reside at Athens, where he devoted himself with diligence and success to the study of eloquence and poetry, and where he became conversant with the writings of Homer, of whose merits as an author and a moralist he entertained as high an opinion as that recorded by the Roman satyrist; Horat. Epist. i. 2. The repute of the school at Miletus attracted him thither, where he studied the philosophical doctrines of Anaximenes and his predecessors with considerable zeal and distinction, and after a residence of some years returned to Athens, where he gave private lectures in philosophy, and numbered among his pupils Euripides, Pericles, and as some say, Socrates and Themistocles. His high character, and his open derision of some of the popular superstitions drew upon him the envy of his cotemporaries and the enmity of the Athenian priesthood. He was imprisoned and condemned to death, but through the influence of Pericles, the penalty was commuted to fine and banishment. He retired accordingly to Lampsacus, where he died, aged seventy-two years, and

λιτε' καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀπειροὺς γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων. καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθητῶν σου, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν

whose inhabitants expressed their opinion of his attainments by the following inscription upon his tomb :

Ενθάδε πλείστον ἀληθείας ἐπὶ τετραμπερησας

Οὐρανίου κοσμοῦ κῆται Ἀναξαγόρας. According to Plutarch, whose testimony is confirmed by that of Plato and Aristotle, Anaxagoras was the first of the Ionic philosophers who separated mind from matter, and attributed the modifications of the latter to the control of a supreme and pure intelligence: *Νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος*. The particular branch of his doctrine, alluded to in the text, is mentioned by Diog. Laertius, ii. 8. 9, who states that Anaxagoras conceived the sun to be a *μύδρον διάπυρον*, an ignited mass, of iron, as some take it, or of stone, as it appears to have been understood by Socrates, who endeavours, in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 7. 7., to refute the opinion: *φάσκων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἡγνόει, ὅτι λίθος μὲν ἐν πυρὶ ὦν οὔτε λάμπει, οὔτε πολλὸν χρόνον ἀντέχει*. etc. Cf. *infra*. καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. The moon, Anaxagoras judged to be inhabited like the earth, and divided into hills, vallies, lakes, &c. Hence the charge of asserting, *τὸν ἥλιον λίθον—εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν*, which Melitus urged against Socrates, whom he knew to have been the hearer of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, if not actually the disciple of the latter himself.—*Βιβλία*—Diog. Laertius, ii. 11., and Clemens Alexandr. state, that Anaxagoras was the first who *βιβλίον ἐξεδωκε συγγραφῆς, librum a se scriptum edidit*: but, according to some, Anaximander was the first who committed to writing the principles of natural science: others assert it of Pherecydes, a native of the Isle of Scyrus, the first preceptor of Pythagoras. See Lucret. i. 831. sqq.

Δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους.] Dacier understands Socrates as alluding here to the possibility of purchasing the books of Anaxagoras for a drachma in the orchestra, where they were exposed, for this price, to sale. But there is not a shadow of foundation for such a supposition. The ὀρχηστρα, it is well known, was a part of the theatre; a level space, twelve feet beneath the lowest range of seats, partly enclosed by the sweep of the excavation, and partly extending outwards, right and left, in a long parallelogram. See the Theatre of the Greeks, cap. iii. sec. 2, and plan of the theatre of Bacchus. At Athens, both the tragic and comic writers were in the habit of introducing upon the stage, through the medium of the chorus, the precepts and doctrines of the philosophers; Euripides, for instance, was so used to the practice, especially in the case of his preceptor, Anaxagoras, that he was called by many ὁ σκηνικός φιλόσοφος. Forster conjectures that Socrates makes a direct allusion in the text to the speech of Electra, in Orest. 980. *Μόλοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ μεσὸν καὶ χθονὸς Τεταμέναν αἰωρήμασι πέτραν ἀλύσει χρυσείαισι, φερομένην Δίναισι, βῶλον ἐξ Ὀλύμπου, "Ἴν' ἐν θρήνοισιν ἀναβοᾶσω Γέροντι πατρὶ Ταντάλῳ—where, under the image of the stone impending over Tantalus, the poet is said to have expressed the dogma of Anaxagoras, respecting the sun. So the Scholiast in loc. Ἀναξαγόρου μαθητῆς γενόμενος ὁ Εὐριπίδης, μύδρον λέγει τὸν ἥλιον. οὕτω γὰρ δοξάζει. μύδρον δὲ καλοῦσι τὸν πεπυρακτωμένον σίδηρον. πέτρον δὲ καὶ βῶλον κατὰ ταῦτο ἔρηκεν:* and further on, *εἰ δ' ἄρα τινες διαφοροῦσι πῶς ἐξ ἀλύσεως περιηρητῆμος περιήνην ὁ δ' ἥλιος, γινωσκέτωσαν ὅτι τὰ φυσικὰ τοῖς μυθικοῖς καταμίγνυσιν ὁ Εὐριπίδης*. Hence it may be concluded, that,

προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὧ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὧ Μέλιτε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωςί, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράφασθαι. εἴκει γὰρ ὡς περ αἰνίγμα ξυντιθέντι καὶ διαπειρωμένῳ, Ἄρα γινώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντί' ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὡς περ ἂν εἰ εἶποι Ἄδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντας.

§. 15. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δέ, ὧ ἄνδρες, ἧ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκρισαι, ὧ Μέλιτε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅ περ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμ-

as the sentiments of the philosophers were expressed chiefly by the chorus, as supra, in Orest., and as the orchestra was the situation assigned to the chorus; οὐ καὶ οἱ χοροὶ ἦδον, Phot. Lex. Ms. from whence it always took a part in the action of the drama, joining in the dialogue through the medium of its κορυφαῖος, or leader, so Socrates intends to say that he should bring ridicule upon himself, were he to lay claim to those doctrines as his own, which the payment of a drachma, at most, for a seat in the theatre, should satisfy the auditors had originated with another:—Εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, even at most, or for the highest price; fully, εἰ ἀντι πάνυ πολλοῦ τιμήματος or ἀργυρίου. Originally no payment was required for seats in the theatre at Athens, but the strife and confusion consequent upon a gratuitous admission, and the immense crowds which endeavoured to avail themselves of the privilege, occasioned the passing of a law, by which the entrance price was fixed at one drachma for each individual. This regulation, which bore

hardly upon the poorer classes, was repealed by the influence of Pericles, who omitted no chance of popularity, and a decree brought in, by which the price was reduced to two oboli; and even these were made payable out of a public fund. From the text, however, it would appear that as high a sum as a drachma was demanded for the best places, while the ordinary were set at two oboli.—Harpor. and Suid. θεωρικά. Theat. Greek. cap. iii. 2.

Ἔοικε—ξυντιθέντι καὶ διαπειρωμένῳ.] Expressive of the modesty of the speaker, and used elegantly for ξυντιθῆσι καὶ διαπειράται; as Cyrop. viii. 8. 7. εἰκάσι ταῦτα διδασκομένοις, h. e. διδάσκονται. FISCH.

Γινώσεται—ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 349. Obs. 2.—Ὁ σοφὸς δὴ—sapiens scilicet ille. STALL.

§. 15. Ἦ μοι φαίνεται.] h. e. Quatenus, quomodo mihi videatur. STALL. Socrates proceeds to prove the inconsistency of Melitus, who at the same time denied and admitted that he believed in the gods.

νησθέ μοί μὴ θορυβεῖν, εἰ ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.

Ἔστιν ὅς τις ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὃ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω. ἔσθ' ὅς τις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ ἀλλήτας μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἀλλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι. ἔσθ' ὅς τις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὠνησας, ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζεις καὶ διδάσκεις, εἴτ' οὖν καινὰ εἶτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαιμονας δὴ που

[Ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ.] In his usual method of interrogation, and deducing his conclusions from the replies of his opponent.

[Καὶ μὴ—θορυβεῖτω.] It is to be supposed that Melitus, who was fully aware of the object which Socrates had in view, and equally so of the unerring skill by which it could not fail to be established, felt but little inclination to entangle himself in his own concessions, and sought rather by blustering upon extraneous subjects to divert the attention of the judges, and evade the hold of his too powerful adversary.

[Ὡς ὠνησας—ἀναγκαζόμενος.] *Ut me jūvisti eo quod ægre aliquando respondisti.* HEINDORF. Casaubon, ad Pers. Sat. i. 112, remarks, that *ὠνήσαι*, as the Latin *juvare*, besides being synonymous with *βοηθεῖν*, to assist, has also the force of *delectare*, to delight, in which latter sense it is to be taken in the text. So V. Cousin; *que tu m' obliges de répondre enfin*, &c. Stephens reads *ὠκνησας*, which has been adopted by Ficinus, v. Lat. Interp., and approved by Fischer, who renders *ὡς ὠκνησας, quam*

*cunctatus es! quam tergiversatus es! quam longas nexuisti moras!*—as alluding to the surprise of Socrates in having, at last, contrary to his expectation, extracted an answer from Melitus. Fischer understands, further, the succeeding part of the sentence, *ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρ. ὑπὸ τουτ. ἀναγκ.*, as explanatory of the nature of this hesitation on the part of Melitus. This, however, is objected to by the advocates of the present reading, who, in the case of the proposed emendation, look upon the latter part of the sentence as an unnecessary repetition. Stallbaum would prefer *ὡς μ' ὠνησας.*

[Διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ.] Most of the editions read *διωμόσω*, in which they are followed by Ficinus, and the Latin translations, and which has been adhered to by Ruhnken ad Tim. Gloss. Plat. voc. *Διωμοσία*. But the reading in the text scarcely admits of a question; for Socrates wished to show that his belief in the tutelary influences of some presiding genius or divinity had not only been conceded to him in the course of the verbal admissions of Melitus, but

πολλή ἀνάγκη νομίζειν ἐμέ εἶσιν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε.] Οὐκοῦν εἴ περ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμέ θεοὺς αὐτῶν ἡγέισθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ πέρ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι] εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ

that it had been acknowledged in the very terms of the indictment, upon oath, of the accuser; cap. 11. supr. Besides the Attic writers use *ἁμοῦμαι*, not *ἁμῶσω*, consequently not *διομῶσω*. Tim. Plat. Lex. *Διωμοσία*. ὄρκοι οἱ ὑπὸ τῶν δικαζομένων γινόμενοι· τοῦ μὲν ἁμῶντος, ὅτι παθῶν ἐγκαλεῖ· τοῦ δὲ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίησεν. So Suid. Lexicon Rhet. Ms. *Διωμοσία ὄρκος*· ἐστίν, ὃν ὦμνον οἱ φόνου ἀγῶνα διώκοντες ἢ φεύγοντες. ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ ὦμνον μετὰ τὸ εἰπεῖν τον παρόντα λόγον· (ὃ μὲν) ἢ μὴν ἀληθῆ κατηγορηκένα καὶ δικαίως· ὃ δὲ ἢ μὴν ἀληθῆ ἀπολελογησθαι καὶ δικαίως. ὦμνον δὲ καὶ πρὶν εἰπεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον ἀμφοτέροι, ἐπενεχθείσης ἤδη τῆς ψήφου, εἰ μὴ δικαίως νενικηκένα, ἐξώλειαν ἀντιῶ ἐπαρόμενος, εἰ ἐξηπάτησεν. Ἀντιγραφῆ, in the passage above, is equivalent to *ἀντωμοσία*, cap. 3. supr. Suid. Phavorin. v. *ἀντιγραφῆ*·—Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖ *ἀντωμοσίαν*, καὶ *ἀντιγραφῆν*. Hesych: *ἀντιγραφῆ*· τὸ ἐν ἰσῶ τῇ *ἀντωμοσίᾳ*.

Εἰ δὲ *δαίμονια*, κ. τ. λ.] V. Cousin Œuvres de Plat. tom. i. p. 336: "Socrate admettait une révélation surnaturelle qui lui enseignait en toute occasion ce qu'il devait faire et surtout ce qu'il devait éviter. Il croyait sentir en lui quelque chose au-dessus de l'humanité qui l'éclairait et le dirigeait. Il ne disait pas que ce fût un être positif; il s'arrêtait au fait dont il avait la conscience, et le servait de l'expression: *τὶ δαίμόνιον*, non pas un dieu tout-à-fait, mais une espèce d'intermédiaire entre les dieux et les hommes, quelque chose qui

appartient à la nature des démons que la mythologie païenne place entre le ciel et la terre. L'Orthodoxie du tems ne reconnaissant pas là précisément ses dieux, avec leur histoire et leurs noms propres, accuse Socrate de substituer à la religion établie *κατὰ δαίμονια*, c'est à dire, une religion nouvelle, fondée sur un mysticisme démoniaque. Soit, reprend Socrate a Melitus, du moins alors ne suis-je pas athée. Car enfin tu ne m'accuses pas d'admettre l'accident sans le sujet, l'adjectif sans le substantif. Si j'admets *τὶ δαίμόνιον*, quelque chose relatif aux démons, il faut que tu m'accordes que j'admets des démons, *δαίμονας*. Or, les démons sont enfans des dieux, ou dieux eux-mêmes; donc j'admets des dieux."

Νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν.] Socrates speaks thus in compliance with the popular belief, that demons were the offspring of the intercourse between the gods and nymphs, or some other class of women. [ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων.] It was not his business to attack this error now, though it is certain that such was not his own opinion, for he had adopted the theory of Pythagoras, that demons or angels and heroes were descended from the deity, to whom they owed their origin, as light owes its own to a luminous body. In his *Timæus*, also, speaking of the generation of angels or demons, he asserts it to be beyond the reach of human nature. DACIER. See Hesiod, \*Eργ. κ. Ἡμ. 1. 120. sqq. For the opinions of Aristotle, Democritus, and Epicurus upon the subject of those inferior intelligences, see Enfield's *Philosophy*, B. 2. ch. ix. s. 1. ch. xiii. and ch. xv.

καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἶη, ὡς περ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο [ἦ] καὶ ὄνων τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὦ Μέλιτε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἣ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

§. 16. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελίτου γραφὴν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογία, ἀλλ' ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχ-

[Ὦν δὲ καὶ λέγονται.] Eurip. Hipp. 474. Ἐς δὲ τὴν τύχην πεσοῦσ', ὕσση σὺ, πῶς ἂν ἐκνεῦσαι δοκεῖς. Thuc. 1. 28. δίκας ἤθελον δοῦναι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεσιν, αἷς ἂν ἀμφότεροι ξυμβῶσιν, for παρ' αἷς: so in the text, where the relative ὧν, referring to τινῶν ἄλλων joined with a preposition, is used without it. Matthiæ Gr. s. 595. extr.

[Ἠγοῖτο [ἦ] καὶ ὄνων.] Forster was the first who proposed to remove the particle ἦ, in which he was followed by Schleiermacher, to whose judgment Bekker would have gladly deferred, had he not been restrained by the authority of the MSS., whence he has enclosed it in brackets as supr. Fischer defends the text as it stands, as mules may have for their sires either horses or asses. Wolf also justly preserves the ἦ, and renders it *vel asinorum*.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως—οὐχί.] *You have by all means preferred this indictment,* &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 482. Obs. 2.

[Ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *But there is no possibility of your persuading, by any means, a man with even a moderate share of sense, that the same individual can believe in the attributes of demons and divinities, and disbelieve in the existence of demons, gods,*

*and heroes themselves.* Stephens explains the passage: *nullo autem fieri modo potest, ut ullis, qui tantillum sane mentis habeat, persuadeas, ejusdem esse hominis, et dem. et divina (aliqua esse), et rursus ejusdem, neque d. n. d. n. h. esse, existimare; and Stallbaum: non poteris cuiquam persuadere, unius hominis esse, et credere esse dæmonium quiddam ac divinum, et rursus credere nec dæmonas nec deos esse.*

§. 16. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες—.] Socrates having closed his defence of the particular charges alleged against him, proceeds to the discussion of some other subjects which these charges involved. And first he complains in a degree of the odium excited against him amongst the crowd, and the dangers of its terminating in his death. But at the same time, with a simple and touching eloquence, he inculcates the value which a good man should attach to his duty and integrity, and how little life should be regarded as the forfeit of adherence to high principle.

Ὅν πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολ.] *Seems to me to require no great defence;* as Plat. Gorg. p. 461. A. οὐκ ὀλιγῆς συνουσίας ἐστι; *it requires no short conversation.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 316.



θεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εἶ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴαν περ αἰρή, οὐ Μέλιτος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας ἤρρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ.

Ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις, εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; Ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντίποιμι, ὅτι Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὃ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἶε δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἀνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη τι, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἀδίκᾳ πράττει καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῶ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασι, οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἐκτορα

Ἄληθές.] Ald. ἀληθής; incorrectly, for it must be referred to ὃ preceding. FISCH.

Ἄλλ' ἡ—διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος.] These words, as Fischer correctly observes, might have been omitted, for they were already implied in τοῦτ' ἐστὶν supr. However the ancient writers were frequently in the habit of adding, generally after a break in the sentence, some words by which the preceding member of the sentence might be better defined, or the

subject more vividly recalled.

Οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ.] For there is no danger of its stopping with me. Steph. in marg. *haud enim timendum est, ne hæc in me cessent, vel finem faciant.* Fischer: *neque vero, vel enim, (δὲ for γὰρ) ullum periculum est, ne ego sim ultimus, quem damnet invidia et odium multitudinis.* V. Cousin: *car il ne faut pas espérer que ce fléau s'arrête à moi.* So in Phædon. cap. 34. sub fin. οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ.

εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει.] εἴτα and ἐπειτα are used in questions of impatience and sarcasm, as supr. Matthiæ Gr. s. 603.

ὑπολογίζεσθαι.] i. q. φροντίζειν, *movere, rationem habere.* FISCH.

Ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός.] See Iliad. xviii. 94. sqq.—Παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομεῖναι, *præ turpitudinis macula et opinione,* h. e. *ne diceretur mortem Patrocli amici æquo animo tulisse.* FISCH. *παρα, præter,* with an accusative, being one of the forms for the construction of the comparative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 455.

ἀποκτείναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὕτωςί πως, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλω τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ' Ἐκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὀλιγόρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὦν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, Αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίνην δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου;] οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὐδ' ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῆ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

§. 17. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἀρχοντες ἔταπτον,

[Πότμος.] Bass. Norib. πότμος; incorrectly. Hesych. πότμος· μόρος. Apollonius Lex. Homer. πότμος· θάνατος. FISCH.

[Τιμωρεῖν.] Mudge conjectures τιμωρῶν in order to effect a similar construction to κακὸς ὦν preced. But τιμωρεῖν may depend, like, and with ζῆν upon τὸ, which reading has been adopted by Ficinus. FISCH. The infinitive ζῆν, as it expresses the object of fear, takes the article. Matthiæ Gr. s. 520. Obs. 1.

[Παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν.] i. e. in castris nauticis.—Ἀχθος ἀρούρης, homo nequam, homo nullius frugi. FISCH.

[Μὴ αὐτὸν οἶει.] A negative is used interrogatively for affirming more emphatically; so John, xviii. 26. οὐκ ἐγὼ σε εἶδον ἐν τῷ κήπῳ μετ' αὐτοῦ. Plat. Gorg. p. 512. B. μὴ σοὶ δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν ἰκανικὸν εἶναι.

§. 17. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ, κ. τ. λ.] The distinction between the indicative and optative with εἰ, is particularly marked in this passage: ἐγὼ δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, . . . εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἀρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἰδισθε ἀρχεινον μου, . . . τότε μὲν, οὐδ' ἐκείνοι

ἔταπτον, ἔμενον, ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις τις, καὶ ἐκινδύνεον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος . . . λείπομι τὴν τάξιν; where the indic. expresses a determinate circumstance which had happened, but the opt. an action which is merely assumed and possible. Matthiæ Gr. s. 524. Obs. 2. 1. See also s. 622. 4. upon the above.

[Οἱ ἀρχοντες.] Callias, Cleo, and Hippocrates; of whom the last was commander-in-chief of the Athenian forces when they were routed by the Bœotians, under Pagondas, at Delium; upon which occasion Socrates, who served in the Athenian infantry, being pressed by the pursuing enemy, was only enabled to secure a retreat for himself and those about him by the protection of his pupil Alcibiades, who came up with a body of cavalry. Cleon commanded the Athenians at Amphipolis, a town of Thrace or Macedonia, near the Strymon, where he was defeated by Brasidas, the Lacedæmonian general, upon which occasion Socrates also distinguished himself. Callias, the Athenian general, was killed at the siege of Potidæa, a town situated on the isthmus which connects the penin-

οὐς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον ὡς περ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθείς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν μὲντ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί ἐστιν ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστί. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδέναί ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὕτω

sula of Pallene with Macedonia, where it bordered on Thrace. While the Athenians were before the town a skirmish occurred, in which Alcibiades, who, though still very young, had joined the expedition, was wounded, and his life preserved by Socrates, who managed to have the prize of valour, which he had manifestly earned himself, bestowed upon his favourite pupil. V. Laert. ii. 22. sqq. Athen. iv. 15. Cic. de Divin. 1. 54. Plut. Alcibid. Thucyd. 1. 56. sqq.

[Ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ.] sc. Τοῦ θεοῦ.  
 Δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναί—οἶδεν.] Fully: ἔστι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο (sc. τὸ θάνατον δεδιέναι) δοκεῖν εἰδέναί ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν.

Τοῦτο—ἀμαθία ἐστίν.] Plat. Phædr. p. 245. C. τοῦτο πηγή καὶ ἀρχὴ γενέσεως, which Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1. 23. 53, renders *hic fons, hoc principium est*

*movenāi*; so in Phædon. c. 18. sub. fin. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις. The neuter of the demonstrative pronoun, as the subject of the proposition, seems to be used when the word to which it refers is to be emphatically distinguished.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 440. 7.—Ἡ τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδέναί, *quæ in eo cernitur, ut quis se scire opinetur quæ non sciat*. STALL. Tr. *And how is not this the veriest reprehensible ignorance, this of thinking that one knows, &c.*; so V. Cousin: *que de croire connaître, &c.*; Cf. Demosth. de Coron. p. 231. l. 1. ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, εἴτε χρῆ κακίαν, εἴτε ἄγνοιαν, εἴτε καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρα εἰπεῖν.

Τούτῳ ἂν.] sc. φαίην εἶναι ὀρθῶς.

[Ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς—οὕτω.] i. q. ὅτι, ὡς περ οὐκ οἶδα ἰκ. περ. τ. ἐν Ἄιδ. οὕτω καί, κ. τ. λ. STALL. Οὕτω often

καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, οὐδέποτε φοβηθήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι. ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ ἐπειδὴ εἰσηλθὼν οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασιν διαφθαρήσονται, — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἶποιτε, Ω Σώ-

follows after participles, whose meaning it thus repeats for the sake of emphasis. Matthiæ Gr. s. 610. 7.

Τῷ βελτίονι.] *Ei qui vobis superior præsit.* Serran. περιφραστικῶς. Βελτίων signifying here, one who excels another in authority and influence. So *melior* is used for *potentior*, Horat. Epl. 1. 10. 34. "Cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis Pellebat," &c.; and those are designated as *Optimates*, who are possessed of the most considerable power in a republic. Stephens renders it *meliori*, or *præstantiori*, which Fischer approves and explains by *sapientiori, prudentiori*.

Πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates had just asserted that an unwarrantable disobedience to a better than himself, either god or man, was, in his conviction, both criminal and dishonorable; he now proceeds to say that he never should feel afraid of, or inclined to fly from what, for all he knew, might be a blessing, sooner than feel so affected with regard to those things which he knew to be actually evil. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 575. voc. προ.—Φοβεῖσθαι and φεύγειν πρὸ τῶν κακῶν—ἃ μὴ οἶδα, is used for φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ κακὰ ἢ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα ἢ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει. STALL.

"Ὅστε οὐδ' εἴ με, κ. τ. λ.] Stephens considers this passage as elliptical, and reads and supplies it thus: ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε θέλωμι ἂν ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀφίεσθαι, or ἀξιώσαιμι ἂν, etc. But the force of οὐδ' may either be carried on to the firm refusal of Socrates

to alter his conduct, on the condition of his acquittal, or it may be presumed that this is one of the many interruptions familiar to the philosopher, by which the sense was only meant to be suspended during one or more parentheses, and yet was neglected to be afterwards supplied, owing to the greater importance of the subjects thus introduced.

'Ἀπιστήσαντες.] Ald. Bas. 1. Norib. ἀπιθήσαντες. Steph. Forst. ἀπειθήσαντες. Bas. 2. ἀπιστήσαντες, sanctioned by Eusebius, and certainly the most correct. For ἀπιστεῖν, ἀπιστος, and ἀπιστία are not merely used in reference to those who distrust, who place no confidence in others, but to those also who, from this want of confidence, resist being led by any whom so they mistrust.

Τὴν ἀρχὴν.] *From the first, at all.*  
'Ἀποκτεῖναι.] *To condemn to death, vote the death of.* *Sententiis damnare mortis*, STALL., in which sense it occurs also cap. 18. infr. and Xenoph. Mem. IV. 8. 5, where it is opposed to ἀπολύειν.

"Ἦδη ἂν ὑμῶν—διαφθαρήσονται.] Those who could not admit the use of ἂν with the future, have proposed to read διαφθαρήσονται: but almost all the editions support the reading in the text. Matthiæ, Gr. s. 599. d. states that ἂν is sometimes joined with the indicative of the future, to designate as only probable, that which the future alone would declare decidedly about to happen; but the quotations adduced in proof can be otherwise explained by anacolu-

κρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζήτησει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἀλῶς ἐτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ. εἰ οὖν με, ὅ περ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι Ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὡ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕως περ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἴός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσομαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος, ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἰά περ εἶωθα, ὅτι Ὡ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείιστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῆ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω

tha, various readings, &c. Whence he concludes, that it is even very doubtful whether the genuine Attics ever used ἂν with the future indicative; for this usage is found, in Euripides, only in lyrical passages, and perhaps was still prevalent in the old language. Dawes, Misc. Critic. p. 104, denies that ἂν is used with the future, in which he is followed by most English critics. Brunck and Wolf express themselves doubtfully; App. Crit. ad Dem. 1. 604. Sept. p. 343. See in Phædon. cap. 5. init. οὐδ' ὀπωσιτοῦν ἂν, etc.

Ἐφ' ᾧτε.] For ὥστε, upon condition that. This should be, properly, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὥστε, as Thucydides, 3. 114. says, σπονδᾶς καὶ ζυμμαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο . . . ἐπὶ τοῖσδε, ὥστε μήτε Ἀμπρακιώτας μετὰ Ἀκαρνάνων στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Πελοποννησίους, &c. Thus ὥστε, Thuc. 3. 34. 75. 114. 5. 94. 7. 82. But because the relative properly refers to the demonstrative, so, according to Gr. s. 473, they said ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ᾧ, or ᾧτε, or with the preposition repeated, ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ἐφ' ᾧτε as supr.

Matthiæ Gr. s. 479. a.

Ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ.] Ἀσπάζεσθαι, aliquem salutare ita ut eum amplectaris; φιλεῖν, salutare aliquem ita ut eum osculeris; whence the passage in the text means: grato lætoque animo vestram humanitatem et clementiam amplector atque veneror. STALL.

Μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ.] Stephens compares this passage with Acts, v. 29. πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ θεῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνθρώποις.—Ἐως περ ἂν ἐμνέω. So Cicero p. red. ad Quir. 10. "dum anima spirabo mea."

Καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος.] So cap. 9. extr. τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδεικνυμι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός.

Ἴσχύνη.] Ficinus has mistaken the sense of this word in explaining it potentia, it is here expressive of the magnanimity and resolution which consist in the contempt of wealth and worldly grandeur. The qualities of the body are not uncommonly affirmed of the mind; so Xenoph. Apol. 34, uses ῥώμη, as synonymous with γενναϊότης, s. 33. It is evident, from what Socrates con-

π/

καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εἰάν μοι μὴ δοκῆ κεκτηῆσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι δέ, ὄνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φανλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρῳ ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε. καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδὲν πῶ ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τᾶλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερὰ· εἰ δὲ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετέ με ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλακίς τεθνᾶναι.

tinues to say, that *ισχὺν* is opposed to a concern about riches and an anxiety for dignity and fame.

Νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ.] See *Matthiæ Gr. s. 415. Obs. 1.*

Μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς ὅσω μου ἐγγύ.] A similar construction occurs, cap. 30. a med. καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσω νεώτεροί εἰσι. Cf. *Liv. ii. 51. "Quo plures erant, major cædes fuit."* *Ovid. Epist. iv. 19. "Venit amor gravior quo serius."*

Τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.] See cap. 9. extr. τοῦ θεοῦ λατρίαν.

Μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.] *Neither to be solicitous for the body nor for riches, prior to, nor with such zeal, as for the soul. It is impossible not to observe in what grand and beautiful relief these noble sentiments of the philosopher stand out upon the dark ground of pagan*

superstition. But while this amazing exercise of self-instructed mind may well furnish a subject for surprise and admiration, it must be remembered that reason is but the dawn within ourselves, revelation the day-spring from on high, that can alone mature its light.

Εἰ μὲν οὖν—διαφθείρω—ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλ.] See cap. 12. extr. Εἰ εἰς—διαφθείρει.

Ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερὰ.] So Xenophon, of Socrates; πῶς ἂν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἢ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια διαφθορά ἐστίν. *Mem. Socr. i. c. 2. 8.*

Πρὸς ταῦτα.] *Harum rerum habita ratione, quocirca. STALL. So Soph. El. 382. πρὸς ταῦτα φράζου, accordingly, therefore, consider. Matthiæ Gr. s. 591. β.—Ως ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος.— For the construction of ἂν with the in-*

§. 18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμένειντά μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ἐρεῖν ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. Εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἶον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν οὔτε Μέλιτος οὔτε Ἄνυτος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνوني ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μὲντ' ἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶε-

finitive in participle futures, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 599. d.

Μέλλω—τεθνήναι.] Stallbaum remarks upon this construction, that the Greeks, desirous to express more effectively the sadness attendant upon death, used the past tense, as if the event had actually occurred. Thom. Magister. v. μέλλω, suspects this form to be an error of the transcribers; he admits the present and future infinitives with μέλλω, and the infin. of the aor. with ἂν, which he would also supply before μέλλω, in the text. But the use of the perf. for the pres. infin. is by no means unusual; it occurs in Criton. cap. 1. sub. fin. ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δὲ ἀφικόμενον τεθνήναι με. and cap. 29. infr. a med. ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνήναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν. Cf. Demosth. de Coron. p. 301. πῶς οὐκ ἀπολωλέναι πολλάκις ἐστὶ δίκαιος. Some make τεθνήναι, in the text, the pres. infin. from τέθνημι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 498. d.

§. 18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε.] Socrates proceeds to another part of his defence of common interest, like the preceding, to the Athenians and himself. For he proves that his condemnation and death should be accompanied by considerable injury and loss to the state, and in the progress of his pleading continues to exhibit that unbending fortitude in his manner, and freedom in his language, which, mingled occasionally with judicious irony, had characterized his dis-

cussions through life; and which drew from Cicero the remark, that Plato had brought forward Socrates, so defending himself, on trial for his life, that he less resembled a suppliant or a culprit, than the master and guide of his judges.

Μείζω βλάψετε.] According to the analogy of ποιεῖν τινα κακά, the verbs ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν, and others in which the idea of "doing" is implied, take, beside the accusative of the person, another accusative neuter plural of an adjective, where the English uses the adverbs "more," "very;" as supr. Matthiæ Gr. s. 415. Obs. 3.

Δύναιτο.] Stob. Trincavel. δύναιτο; either reading is equally admissible. FISCHE.

Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι.] h. e. Neque enim legibus divinæ sapientiæ respondere existimo. STALL. Ἀμείνوني ἀνδρὶ, i. q. ἀμείνω ἄνδρα, but used in the dative, from its proximity to εἶναι, on which it depends by attraction. See Buttmann. Intermed. Gr. Gr. s. 142.

Ἀποκτείνειε—ἢ ἐξελάσειεν—ἢ ἀτιμάσειεν.] Ἀποκτείνειεν est facere ut quis morte damnetur atque interficiatur: ἐξελαυνεῖν, facere, ut quis multetur exilio et urbe ejiciatur: ἀτιμάζειν facere ut quis vel omnem civitatem amittat vel certe maximam et præcipuam civitatis commoda atque jura. STALL. There were three degrees of ἄτιμία, infamy, or public disgrace. 1. When the criminal retained his possessions, but was deprived of some privilege, which was enjoyed by

ται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. εἰ γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς περ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρω καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος· οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνειδί-

other citizens. 2. When he was, for the present, deprived of the rights of citizenship, and had his goods confiscated, as in the case of those indebted to the public exchequer, until the debt was discharged. 3. When the criminal, with his children and his posterity, were for ever deprived of the rights of free citizens, both sacred and civil. Potter. *Grec. Antiq.* v. 1. c. 25. Ficinus and Dacier, who follows him, have rendered ἀτιμάσειεν incorrectly; v. Lat. Interpr.

Ἄλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον.] *Intell.* οἶομαι μέγα κακόν.

Ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι.] Theodoret. ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποκτείνει; incorrectly, for ἀποκτινύναι is the Attic form. Mæris: Ἀποκτινύναι, Ἀττικῶς ἀποκτείνει, Ἑλληνικῶς. FISCH.

Μή τι ἔξαμ.—καταψηφισάμενοι.] h. e. *ne temere repudietis hoc Apollinis beneficium, vobis tributum, qui me jussit vos ob errores et vitia castigare atque ad virtutis studium cohortari.* STALL. *Tr. Lest in condemning me you may offend in any wise against the gift of the God to you; περὶ* with an accus. signifying frequently *in, adversus, against*, as Aristoph. *Nubb.* 990. *περὶ τοὺς σαντοῦ γονίας κακουργεῖν: ὑμῖν* being the dat. upon δόσιν; see c. 9. n. extr. *Διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν.* Cf. Cic. *Legg.* “*obtemperatio scriptis legibus.*”

Προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει, κ. τ. λ.] The sense of this passage depends upon

the signification of μύωπός, which may be interpreted either as a *gadfly*, according to Fischer in *loc. Rigalt. ad Ones.* c. 1. p. 17. and Blomfield. *Gloss. ad Æschyl. Prom.* 583. or as a *spur*, which is approved by Ficinus, Serranus, Wolf, Schleirmacher, and others, who suppose that Socrates represents himself as a horseman or charioteer, obliged by the direction of the deity to rouse the activity and energies of a noble but indolent steed, the type of the republic, by the application of the spur, which represents his own discourses and exhortations. In the former signification, which from the preceding, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, and the customary style of the speaker, is likely to be more expressive and correct, Socrates may be understood as comparing himself to a gadfly adhering to, and rousing the dormant faculties of the fine but lazy animal, which needed such excitement to keep its powers in action and alive. This latter explanation agrees better not only with the scope, but the terms of the argument; *προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τ. θεοῦ*, upon which see *Matthiæ Gr. s.* 496. 3., *προσθεθεικέναι, and προσκαθίζων* *infr.* which are all in keeping with, and refer most happily to this view of the subject.—*Νωθεστέρω*, *Suid. interpr.* βραδυντέρω.

Οἷον δὴ μοι—τοιοῦτόν τινα.] *Τοιοῦτ. τιν.* is joined by apposition to οἷον preceding. to facilitate the completion of the



ζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου. ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι ὡς περ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡν τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῆ πόλει δεδόςθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὡς περ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμεν, εἶχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἰοίτε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἰκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

§. 19. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ζυμβουλεύω περιωὼν καὶ πολυ-

sentence, ὅς ὑμᾶς κ. τ. λ. STALL.

Ἵμεῖς δ' ἴσως—ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε.] *At vos, offensi forsitan, velut dormitantes quum excitantur, me ferietis, atque Anyto obsequiū temere occidētis: posthac reliquum tempus perdormiscētis, nisi quem alium deus vobis miserit, cura permotus vestri.* WOLF. In which, it will be observed, there is a marked allusion to the simile as supr. Upon τάχ' ἂν see Matthiæ Gr. s. 599. c. s. 600. 5.

Οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θ.—δεδόςθαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 536.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε.] h. e. non videtur esse consilii et arbitrii humani.

STALL. Every one being most inclined to devote his attention and regard to what most nearly concerns his own welfare and interest, and such having been especially the case at Athens, where the neglect of personal and domestic duties came little short of a crime.—Ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων, *æquo animo negligere rem familiarem, res suas perire sinere*; Matthiæ Gr. s. 550. b.

Οὐκ οἰοίτε ἐγέν. ἀπαναισχ.] *Were incapable of having the effrontery to say, that I, &c.*

§. 19. Ταῦτα ζυμβουλεύω.] i. q. ταῦ-

πραγμονῶν, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλευεῖν τῇ πόλει. Τούτου δὲ αἰτίον ἔστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται [φωνή], ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλιτος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐ ποτε. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅς τις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ'

τα παρακελεύεσθαι, c. 18. *cohortari ad studium sapientiae et virtutis*. FISCH.—Πολυπραγμονῶν, *intermeddling in the affairs of others*; an expression used by Socrates to express one of the causes of the prejudice of the Athenians against him.

Θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον.] See c. 31. n. 'Ἡ γὰρ εἰωθῦῖα μοι, κ. τ. λ.—Φωνή. This word, which appears to some to have been inserted as an explanation of the preced. θεῖον τι, etc. is to be found in all the copies, and is approved by Forster. Fischer would reject it as a mere gloss, rendered wholly unnecessary by τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, following.

'Ἐπικωμῶδῶν ἐγράψατο.] Socrates alludes here to the terms of the ἀνωμοσία; "Ἐτερα δὲ δαιμόνια. c. 11.—'Ἐπικωμῶδειν, i. q. διασύρειν, χλευάζειν; to expose to public derision. Κωμῶδειν and διακωμῶδειν have a similar signification, owing to the practice of the old comedy, the entire poem of which, as Schlegel remarks, is one great jest, which again contains within itself a

world of separate jests. Cf. Horat. Sat. i. 4. l. sqq.

Προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε.] Cic. Divin. i. 54: "Hoc nimirum est illud, quod de Socrate accepimus, quodque ab ipso in libris Socraticorum sæpe dicitur, esse divinum quiddam, quod dæmonion appellat, cui semper paruerit, nunquam impellentī sæpe revocanti."

'Ἀπολώλη.] 'Ἀπόλλυσθαι, *ejici e patria*, aut *in vincula conjici*, aut *morte damnari*. FISCH. One who escaped these penalties was said σώζεσθαι.—'Ἀπολ. καὶ—ὠφελήκη. The primitive termination of the pluperfect, act. and med. appears to have been *ea*, which occurs in Homer and Herodotus, e. g. in the perf. med. *πεποιθεα*, Od. i, 44. *συνηδέατε*, Herod. 9. 58. This *ea* was changed, as in the augment, sometimes into *η*, whence the Attic and Doric form *ῥῆη*, *χεχῆνη*, sometimes into *ει*, with the addition of *ν*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 188. Obs. s. 198. 3.

Οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει.] See cap. 10. n. Τῶν δημιουργῶν, κ. τ. λ. a med. Γνησίως, *seriously, sincerely*.

ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεται, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

§. 20. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵν' εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπείκῃθιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμ' ἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. Ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρα-

Καὶ εἰ.] Καὶ εἰ expresses something hypothetical, *even if*; εἰ καὶ, something actual, *although, notwithstanding that*; καὶ εἰ ἀθάνατος ἦν, *even if I were immortal*; εἰ καὶ θνητὸς εἰμι, *although I am mortal*. Viger. c. viii. s. vi. v. 6.

Ἰδιωτεύειν.] *Vitam privatam agere, privatam esse*: δημοσιεύειν, i. q. πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά πράγματα, *remp. administrare, magistratum esse*. FISCH.

§. 20. Ἴν' εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν, κ. τ. λ.] Steph. in marg. *Me eum esse, qui nemini contra jus et æquum cessurus sim, mortis metu: non cedendo autem, simul sim interiturus*.

Ἵπείκῃθιμι.] Ald. Bas. 1. Steph. Norib. ὑπέικομι; but Mæris: Εἰκάθοιμεν, Ἀττικῶς· εἰκοιμεν, Ἑλληνικῶς. Φορτικά καὶ δικανικά.] *Arrogant and petulant*.

Ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν—ἤρξα.] h. l. *nulum unquam magistratum gessi*. STALL. whence, it will be observed, the term ἀρχη could not be properly applied to the senatorial office.—Ἐβούλευσα δέ. Socrates belonged to the senate of five hundred, Βουλὴ τῶν πεντακοσίων, out of whom were chosen fifty officers, Πρυτάνεις, to preside in the senate during thirty-five days, or five weeks. These fifty officers were divided into five *decuriæ*; each *decuria* being to govern for the space of one week, during which time they were called Προέδροι, out of whom one, elected by lot, presided over the rest for each of the seven days. This president of the προέδρι was termed Ἐπιστάτης, and to his charge the public seal,

the keys of the citadel, and the public exchequer were committed. The φυλή, or tribe out of which the πρυτάνεις were chosen, was called the φυλὴ πρυτανεύουσα, and Socrates was the ἐπιστάτης of the Antiochean tribe, of which his birth-place, Alopee, was a ἕημος, or borough, at the period stated in the text. See Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. c. 18. c. 9.

Τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς.] Every year ten generals were appointed at Athens, called Στρατηγοὶ, who were intrusted with the command of all the forces and warlike preparations, to be managed as they judged best. About the period of their institution, it frequently happened upon occasions of moment that they were all sent out together, but afterwards it was considered unnecessary, and perhaps inexpedient, for so many to be sent out, with equal power, to superintend the military arrangements, and consequently, though the same number continued to be appointed every year, they were not all obliged to attend the wars, but one, two, or more, as occasion required. Upon the deposition of Thrasylus and Alcibiades, the ten generals alluded to in the text, Conon, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Arcestratus, Protomachus, Thrasylus, and Aristogenes, were appointed in their stead. Eight of these ten generals of the commonwealth were on board at the battle of Arginusæ, a small island between Lesbos and the main, where the Lacedæmonian fleet, under Callicratidas, encountered that of the Athenians under

τηγούς τούς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τούς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρω χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότ' ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων

Conon. During the engagement twenty-five Athenian vessels were sunk or disabled, and at the conclusion of the battle, which terminated unfavourably to the Lacedæmonians, a council of war was held to consider what steps should be adopted next. Diomedon proposed that the wreck should be collected, and the dead, and immediate relief afforded to such as might be discovered still alive, either floating on the ruins of the galleys, or endeavouring to save themselves by swimming. Erasinides recommended that the whole fleet should at once proceed to the assistance of Conon. Thrasylus differed from both, and prevailed in his advice, that forty-six ships should remain to collect the wreck, while the rest of the fleet proceeded to Mitylene. None of the generals took the command of the squadron appointed for the former purpose; it was committed to Theramenes and Thrasylulus, who had held high naval commands, but were then in the subordinate rank of captains of triremes. The generals were meanwhile to proceed with the main body of the fleet to Mitylene. Both designs were frustrated by a storm, which compelled all the vessels to shelter at Arginusæ, and the crews of the wreck were thus left to perish. Upon this charge, preferred against six of the eight generals who returned to Athens after the engagement, Diomedon, Pericles, Lysias, Aristocrates, Erasinides, and Thrasylulus; (the other two, Protomachus and Aristogenes, having remained with Conon at Samos;) by Archedemus, the popular orator at Athens, and Theramenes, already mentioned, who unaccountably appeared as principal accuser, they were sentenced and put to death. Socrates, as one of the prytanes, opposed this proceeding to the last for many reasons, independent of its illegality; for each of the accused should have had a separate day for trial, a provision contained in the decree of Canonus, which was strongly urged by

Euryptolemus, the relative of Pericles, and intimate of Diomedon, but in vain. Xen. Hel. 1. c. 7. s. 10. Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. cap. 5. Mitford's Greece, iii. 434—459.

The battle of Arginusæ was fought in the year of *Callias*, not long before the *Apaturia* (Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. p. 427.) which were in the month of *Pyaneuston*. This action may therefore be fixed to the third month of *Callias*, Boedromion of B. C. 406. Clinton's Fasti Hellen. p. 271.

'Ανελομένους.] 'Αναρῆσθαι, *corporum mortuorum tollere, ut sepeliantur*. STALL.

'Αθροους κρίνειν.] h. e. *de omnibus simul sententias ferre*. STALL., which has been already shewn to be illegal; whence παρανόμως. Xen. Memor. i. 1. 18. ἐπιθυμήσαντος τοῦ δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους—μᾶ ψήφῳ—ἀποκτεῖναι πάντας. H. Gr. i. 7. 11. ἡ δὲ τῆς βουλήσ ἦν μᾶ ψήφῳ ἅπαντας κρίνειν: while the laws decreed that this inquiry should be held upon each individual separately; κρίνεσθαι τοὺς ἀνδρας δίχα ἕκαστον. Xen. Hist. Gr. as supr.

Ὡς ἐν ὑστερ. χρόν.—ἔδοξε.] Xen. Hellen. i. 7. 12. καὶ οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὕστερον μετέμελε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, κ. τ. λ.

'Ἠναντιώθην.] In allusion to the opposition which Socrates made to the unlawful resolution of Callixenus, that the people should ballot by wards; that there should be for each ward two vases; and that proclamation should be made by the herald, informing the people that whoever deemed the generals criminal, in neglecting to save from the waves those who were conquerors in battle, must put his die in the first vase; whoever deemed them innocent, in the second: that the punishment, in case of condemnation, should be death. Mitford, iii. p. 453. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4. 2. Hellen. i. 7. 9. 14. 15. Cf. Socrat. in Æschin. Dial. iii. 12. p. 102. οὐκ ἐπη-

ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾧ μὴν μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὸ μεταπεμφάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνας Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν' ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταπτον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν. τότε μέντοι

ρόμην τὴν γνώμην, i. e. *populi sententias non rogabam vel populum suffragia ferre non permittebam.*—FORST.

Ἐνδεικνύναι καὶ ἀπάγειν.] Ἐνδεικνύναι, *aliquem in aliquo facinore deprehensum ad magistratus continuo deferre*: ἀπάγειν, *abducere quo puniatur*. STALL. Hence ἐνδείξις, a prosecution, and ἀπαγωγή, a conveying to prison. Fischer reads ὑπάγειν in the text, which he supports by references; but the following are sufficient to support the adopted reading: Demosth. adv. Lep- tim. p. 504. 24. ed. Reiske. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐνδείξεις καὶ ἀπαγωγάς. Contr. Timocrat. p. 745. οὐδ' ὅσον ἐνδείξεις, ἐστὶ τινι ἢ ἀπαγωγή, προσεγέγραπτ' ἂν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, τὸν δ' ἐνδεικθέντα ἢ ἀπαχθέντα ἡσάντων οἱ ἔνδεκα ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ. Adv. Theocrin. p. 1325. 9. ἔαν τις ποιῇ τὰ τῶν συκοφαντούντων, ἐνδείξιν αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἀπαγωγήν.—Τῶν ῥητόρων.—See cap. 10. sub. fin. ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων.

Οἱ τριάκοντα—με πέμπτον.] See c. 10. n. Μέλιτ.—ὑπ. τ. ποιητ.—πέμπτον αὐτὸν, h. e. *me cum quatuor aliis*; so Xen. H. Gr. ii. 2. 11. ἡρέθη πρεσβευτῆς—δέκατος αὐτὸς, h. e. *ipse cum novem aliis*; and 2 Pet. ii. 5. ὄγδοον Νῶε—ἐφύλαξε, h. e. *Noachum cum septem aliis*, FISCH., Μεταπεμφάμεν μεταπέμπεσθαι, signifies sometimes, *to send one to bring another*—and also *to send one with full powers*, as in the text, confirmed by προσέταξ. ἀγαγ. ἐκ Σαλαμῖν. following. SERRAN.

Θόλον.] Tim. Gloss. Plat. Θόλος· οἶκος περιφέρεις, ἐν ᾧ οἱ πρυτάνεις συνιστῶντο. Pollux, ix. 155. Ἡ Θό-

λος, ἐν ᾗ συνεδείπνον ἐκάστης ἡμέρας πεντήκοντα τῆς τῶν πεντακοσίων βουλῆς, ἢ πρυτανεύουσα φυλή. Pausan. i. 5. τοῦ βουλευτηρίου τῶν πεντακοσίων πληθίων Θόλος ἐστὶ καλουμένη, καὶ θύουσι τε ἐνταῦθα οἱ πρυτάνεις. It was so named from its circular form and coved roof; and was called also Πρυτανεῖον, according to Timæus, from its having been a corn store, πορῶν ταμεῖον.

Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον.] Leon, distinguished for his virtues as his opulence, was one of the ten generals already mentioned, born at Salamis, but a freeman of Athens. Upon the appointment of the Thirty, he retired, a voluntary exile, to his native island; the avarice, which, no less than cruelty and revenge, formed a leading characteristic of the new administration, having warned him that his life, if he remained at Athens, might become the penalty of his wealth; a result which, it appears, was only deferred, and against which his character proved no protection. v. c. 10.

Ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.] h. e. *conmaculare culpa et criminibus.*—STALL. From the united evidence of Xenophon, Lysias, and Plato, it appears that the most abominable policy guided the measures pursued at this period by the Thirty. Revenge and avarice had then full sway; many suffered death for private enmities; many merely for their wealth. Every eminent man was to be destroyed or gained: but, as means were wanting to attach a sufficient number by favours, the infernal expedient was

ἐγὼ οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὐ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μελεῖ. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὔσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὄχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

§. 21. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὡς περὶ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιοῦμην; πολλοῦ γέ δεῖ,

practised, of forcing men to a community of interest through a participation in crime. Driven by terror to execute tyrannical orders, they became involved in the same guilt, and obnoxious to the same resentment; and thus theirs and that of the Thirty became common cause. Mitford's Greece, iv. p. 46.—'Αναπλήσας, Suid. Interpr. ἀναπληρώσας. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἀντὶ τοῦ μολύνας, having infected or defiled: in which sense the verb occurs in the description of the plague at Athens, Thucyd. ii. 51. ἕτερος ἀφ' ἑτέρου θεραπείας ἀναπιπλάμενοι, ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα.—contagione infecti; which Gesner, in Thes. L. L. v. Impleo, compares with Livy, iv. 30. "vulgarique contactu in homines morbi, et primo in agrestes ingruerant servitiaeque. Urbs deinde impletur." Ruhnken. ad Tim. Lex. Plat. v. ἀναπλήσας.

Θανάτου μὲν μέλει—οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν.] *Moveor morte nullo prorsus modo.* FISCH. εἰ μὴ ἀγροικ. ὡς με ἀγροικ. Serran., which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus; the sense, however, is the same, as Socrates intends to apologize for the use of a term, which, though expressive, was considered, probably, too homely or inelegant by the refined and scrupulous Athenian.

Τὸ πᾶν μέλει.] h. e. *omnino, omni-*

*bus modis mihi cura est.* STALL. Steph. in marg. *me nisi hoc dictu agrestius erat, nihil mortem curare: ut autem nihil injustum neque impium perpetrarem, in eo vero meam omnem curam versari: vel nisi hoc dictu subagreste erat aut etiam subrusticum.* FISCH.

Ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχή.] So ἡ τῶν Τριάκοντα.—ἐκπλήττειν, *percellere et movere aliquem ita ut quasi extra se rapiatur.* Thom. Mag. p. 186. intt. Lexic. Xenoph. s. h. v.

Ἐπιχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε.] h. e. *continuo abii.* STALL. Frequently, instead of a simple verb denoting *to go away*, its participle is joined with *οἴχομαι*, e. g. ὄχετ' ἀποπτάμενος, for ἀπέπατο, Il. β'. 71. ὄχετο φεύγων, *he escaped.* Herod. i. 157. Matthiae Gr. s. 559. c. Seneca remarks, in reference to the conduct of Socrates upon this occasion, de Tranq. Animi. c. 3. "inter triginta tyrannos liberum (Socratem) incessisse;" and Consol. ad Helv. c. 13. "aliquando solum triginta tyrannos in ordinem redegit."

Εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ—κατελύθη.] The government of the Thirty lasted four years, from its commencement until its overthrow, by Thrasybulus.

§. 21. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε, κ. τ. λ.] See Matthiae, s. 508. b.—διαγενέσθαι, i. q. *σώζεσθαι.* c. 19.

ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἶπού τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὓς δὴ οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τις ἐμοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαντοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα. οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαντὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ, εἴ τέ τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μὴ, οὐκ ἂν διακαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μῆτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μῆτε ἐδίδαξα. εἰ δέ τις φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

§. 22. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; Ἀκηκόατε, ὦ

Οὐδὲ—ἂν ἄλλ. ἀνθρ. οὐδ.] sc. διέ-  
γνετο.

Τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι.] Τοιοῦτ. is explained by οὐδενὶ πώποτε ξυγχώρησας, κ. τ. λ. following.

Ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι.] In allusion to Alcibiades and Critias, whose vices were said to be owing to the instructions of Socrates, a calumny which he now proceeds to refute. Xenoph. Mem. Socr. i. c. 2. 12. Ἄλλ' ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένῳ Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃς, πλεῖστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιήσατ'ην, etc. Æschines, Orat. in Timarch. p. 217. mentions the intimacy of Socrates with Critias in his early life, as the principal cause of his condemnation.

Τὰ ἐμαντοῦ.] The task assigned to Socrates, by Apollo, of convincing the Athenians of their errors, and rebuking

them accordingly, as well as exhorting them to the study and practice of virtue.

Οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμ.] In reference to the avarice of the sophists. c. 4.

Παρέχω ἐμαντὸν ἐρωτᾶν.] h. e. *copiam facio et potestatem me interrogandi*, STALL., when the infin. act. is used for the passive, Matthiæ Gr. s. 532. a. Καὶ ἐάν τις, i. q. καὶ παντί, ὅστις ἂν βούλ. κ. τ. λ. ἐάν τις and ὅστις admitting of frequent interchanges.

Οὐκ ἂν δικ. τὴν αἰτ. ὑπέχ.] h. e. *hoc recte mihi tribui non poterit*. STALL.

§. 22. Χαίρουσί—διατρίβοντες.] Verbs which express any emotion of the mind, take in the participle the object, or operative cause, as supr., which in Latin is expressed by *quod*, or by the accus. with the infin. When the se-

ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· πάσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὓσι δ' οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ πρόπῳ, ᾧ πέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὀτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. Ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔστι καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νεωτέρων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δὴ πού, εἴ τέ τινες αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὓσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πρόποτέ τι ξυμβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφούς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴ περ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι, νῦν μεμνήσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ, οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὔτοσί, ἐμὸς ἠλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατῆρ' ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήητιος, Αἰσχίνου τούτου

cond verb refers to a different subject from the first, then, according to the different construction of the verbs, the gen. dat. and accus. are used; χαίρειν and ἠδέσθαι take the object in the dative, as infr. χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις, κ. τ. λ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 555. i.

Τοῦτο—προστέτακται.] Intell. τὸ ἐξετάζειν.

Παντὶ πρόπῳ.] Divination by dreams, sacrifices, birds, cats, &c. by which the Athenians believed that the pleasure of the gods was signified to men. Steph. in marg. qua (ratione) nunquam ulla etiam alia sors divina quicquam ulli homini, ut faceret, imperavit.

Καὶ εὐέλεγκτα.] Quæ redargui possint, si non vera sint. SERRAN. The term is more generally used in reference to what is easily refuted or disproved, but in consequence of ἀληθῆ preced. it must admit of the extension of its ordinary sense, as given by Serranus. Tr. easily confirmed.

Εἴ τε.] Εἴγε. FISCH. Adopted by Ficinus.

Κακὸν—τι ξυμβούλευσα.] This, as well as κακὸν τι πεπονθέναι, and κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, infr. refers to the charges advanced against Socrates of his having led his associates astray, and instilled into their minds an enmity to their country and contempt of their gods.

Πάρεισιν—ἐνταυθοῖ.] Have come to be present here.—Παρεῖναι ἐνταυθοῖ, luc venisse ibique presentem esse, ibique versari; so Protagor. p. 310. A. τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ μὴ σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθοῖ; i. e. luc considens et nobiscum sedens. STALL.

Κρίτων οὔτοσί.] See in Criton. init. Critobulus, the son of Crito, the contemporary of Socrates, ἠλικιώτης, and of the same borough, Alopece, δημότης; was a disciple of Socrates, and was present at the trial, as were also Lysanias, the father of Æschines, who belonged



πατήρ· ἔτι δ' Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεύς οὐτοσί, Ἐπιγέ-  
 νους πατήρ. ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι, ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν  
 ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος ὁ Θεοδο-  
 τίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετε-  
 λεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδη-  
 θεῖη—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης  
 ἀδελφός· ὅδε τε Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελ-  
 φὸς οὐτοσί Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλό-  
 δωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω  
 ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινὰ ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ  
 λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μελίτον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε  
 ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λε-  
 γέτω εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τούναν-  
 τίον εὐρήσετε, ὧ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοι-  
 μους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰ-  
 κείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέλιτος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ  
 μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοη-

to the borough of Sphectus, of the tribe of  
 Acamas: Antiphon to that of Cephisus,  
 or Cephisia, of the tribe of Erectheus, &c.

"Ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι.] "Male ἀσύν-  
 δεστος est oratio neque commodum est  
 h. l. istud τοίνυν, igitur, ut depravata  
 hæc verba videantur, sic fortasse corri-  
 genda; ἄλλοι τε ἐνταυθοῖ." So Hein-  
 dorf, who seems however to have un-  
 necessarily restricted the signification of  
 τοίνυν, which is frequently used in or-  
 atorial transitions in the sense of *jam*  
*vero*, as Isocr. in Panegy. τῶν τοίνυν  
 τὰς πανηγύρεις καταστησάντων, δι-  
 καίως ἐπαινουμένων, etc.; i. e. *jam*  
*vero*, cum ii suo jure laudentur, qui pub-  
 licas celebritates instituerint. Demosth.  
 pro Coron. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἐποίησατο  
 τὴν εἰρήνην ἢ πόλιν, etc.; *jam vero*,  
 postquam respublica pacem fecisset. Viger,  
 c. viii. s. 9. v. 9.

"Ὥστε οὐκ ἂν—καταδηθεῖη.] Steph.  
 in marg. Ita ut ille (Theodotus) non  
 jam eum (Nicostratum) rogare possit, ne  
 contra me testetur, neque testimonio suo  
 levitatem meam et improbitatem ita ulcis-  
 catur, ut me sententiis vestris condemnan-  
 dum tradat. Καταδεῖσθαι, aliquem pre-  
 cibus vincere ac commovere. STALL.

Πλάτων—Ἀπολλόδωρος.] See in  
 Phædon. c. 2. sub fin.; of the others  
 mentioned above nothing is known con-  
 nected with any interest, further than  
 their having been the friends and dis-  
 ciples of Socrates. Plat. in Theog. and  
 Demosth. de Repub. ii. p. 357.

Ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ.] h. e. *per me ei*  
*hoc licet.* STALL. I give him leave. The  
 accuser was not allowed in an Athenian  
 court of justice to interrupt the accused  
 in the progress of his defence. But it  
 happened not unfrequently that, as in  
 the present case, the defendant, when he  
 felt that he had truth and justice at his  
 side, challenged the accuser to refute his  
 statement, and volunteered to resign a  
 portion of the time allotted to himself,  
 for his adversary to reconcile his charge  
 with some contradictory evidence on the  
 part of the accused. See Potter, Græc.  
 Antiq. 1. c. 21.

Λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες.] *Would*  
*have an excuse for defending me;* lest it  
 should appear that they had associated  
 indiscreetly with an individual by whose  
 impiety and iniquity their own characters  
 had become liable to a similar imputa-  
 tion.

θοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὃν ξυνίσασι Μελίτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

§. 23. Εἶεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἀν' ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν τί ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. Τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῖ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ' ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας ἀθθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ

Οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες.] *Their relatives*: so Eurip. El. 337. ὁ ἐκείνου τεκνόν, *his father*. Thucydides is remarkable for using participles as substantives, in which case they frequently take a genitive or possessive pronoun. Thuc. i. 128. βασιλέως προσήκοντές τινες. i. 36. τὸ δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ (τοῦ δέος) . . . τὸ θαρσοῦν (τοῦ θάρσος). ii. 19. τὰ ἐν Πλαταιῇ τῶν ἰσελθόντων Θηβαίων γενόμενα. Arist. Eccl. 1118. ἡ ἐμὴ κεκτημένη. Eurip. Iph. A. 1280. τὸ κείνου βουλόμενον, *his will*.

Ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν.] Ἄλλ' ἢ signifies *except, unless*, and therefore usually follows a negative, or an interrogation implying such. Οὐκ—ἀλλ' ἢ is to be explained by supposing a member of the sentence to be omitted on account of the doubt or ignorance of the speaker or writer, which omitted member is to be joined by means of ἢ to a preceding one: Aristoph. in Pac. 475. οὐδὲν Ἀργεῖοι πάλοι ἀλλ' ἢ κατεγέλων τῶν ταλαιπωρουμένων, i. e. ἀλλ' ἢ κατεγέλων, ἢ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐποίησαν. So *supr.* ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον λόγ. ἔχ. ἢ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅν τινα ἄλλον, κ. τ. λ. Seag. Viger. viii. s. ii. 10. See in Phædon, c. 30. n.

§. 23. Τί.] Ald. Bas. 1. Norib. τοι. Steph. τι, which is the more correct, the pronoun being often elegantly joined to σχεδόν, πάνυ, and such particles, by Plato, Xenophon, and others. FISCII.

Τάχα δ' ἂν τις ἀγανακ.] Socrates proceeds to assign his reasons for not bringing forward his children, as was customary with the accused at Athens, to move the compassion of the judges in his favour, a resource which he held to be inconsistent with his own character, and opposed to the spirit of the laws. That it was not unusual to employ the tears and entreaties of wives and daughters to avert a threatened sentence will appear from Aristoph. Plut. 383. s. Vesp. 566. s.

Ἐλάττω—ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος.] h. e. *causam agens minus periculosam*. STALL.

Οὐδὲν—ποιήσω.] Cic. Tusc. i. 29. "His, et talibus, rationibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quæsit ad iudicium capitis, nec iudicibus supplex fuit."

Ἀθθαδέστερον—σχοίη.] *Should be more obstinately prejudiced against me*; the term ἀθθαδέης being applied to a judge, who, although the accused

ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θέϊτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπεικῆ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λόγον, ὅτι Ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶ μὲν ποῦ τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν' αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐδέν τούτων ποιήσω; Οὐκ ἀθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρράλεως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδέν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψευδὸς· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι

might have expected an acquittal, from the justice of his cause, should refuse his sanction thereto, from the requisite form of supplication not having been previously adopted.

Θεῖτο—τὴν ψῆφον.] Ovid. Metam. xv. "Mos erat antiquis, niveis atrisque lapillis, His danmare reos, illis absolvere culpa." See c. 25. sub. fin. Εἰ τρεῖς μόν. u.

Οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν—ἔγωγε.] h. e. *Nolim equidem quenquam vestrum hoc animo esse.* FISCH. It might, probably, be more effectively rendered, *I do not take it for granted, or, admit and establish it as a principle;* from which latter sense of the verb ἀξιῶμα derives its meaning, as a philosophical term; Socrates by no means intending to assert, that the judges should be necessarily so disposed towards one who conscientiously rejected an alternative, with which, under the circumstances, he might have been expected to comply. But addressing them on the supposition, εἰ δ' οὖν sc. τας ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει, that some amongst them might have been influenced by such a feeling, he uses the terms, as supr., in the sense proposed. Nearly in a similar sense, V. Cousin appears to

have understood the text; *S'il y a ici quelqu'un qui soit dans ces sentimens, ce que je ne saurais croire, mais j'en fais la supposition,* etc.; though he fails in assigning the requisite force to ἀξιῶ. Ficinus loses sight of the meaning altogether.

Τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου.] *Odyssey.* τ', 163. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ δρυὸς ἔσσι παλαιφάτου οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης: where Penelope, before she recognises Ulysses, inquires into the circumstances of his birth.

Υἱεῖς—τρεῖς.] Lamprocles, by Myrto, called supr. μειράκιον, in Phædon. μέγας, Sophroniscus, and Menexenus, by Xantippe, supr., παιδία, in Phædon, σμικροὶ. Seneca, Ep. 104, mentions them as unmanageable, and but little resembling their father.

Οὐκ ἀθαδιζόμενος.] Cic. Tusc. i. 29. de Socrat. "Adhibuitque liberam contumaciam, a magnitudine animi ductam, non a superbia."

"Ἄλλος λόγος.] *Alia questio est, ad hunc sermonem non pertinet.* STERN.

Τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα.] i. e. *Florentem tanta sapientiæ laude,* STALL., to which Socrates subjoins, to obviate the charge of presumption, εἴτ' οὖν—

τὸν Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων· εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε ἀνδρία εἴτε ἄλλη ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχροὺν ἂν εἴη, οἴους περ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας, ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὡς περ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετὴν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὀπητιοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἔλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστου τὴν πόλιν ποιούντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

§. 24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ

ψεῦδος; i. q. ψευδές. Matthiæ Gr. s. 429. 4.

Τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται.] To be taken with οἴους περ ἐγὼ πολλ. etc. following: αἰσχροὺν ἂν εἴη being parenthetical.

Δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι.] h. e. qui videntur esse sapientia nescio qua præditi. STALL. Τις, without ad additional adjective, has the sense of eminent, distinguished: in Phæd. c. 8. εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι. Matthiæ Gr. s. 487. 5.—Θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, qui ea faciunt, e quibus intelligi possit, ipsos commoveri morte. FISCH.

Ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομ. πείσ.] Quipe, vel utpote putantes se indigni quid esse passuros. STALL.—Ὡσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 568. 3.

Διαφέροντες—εἰς ἀρετὴν.] Eic, with respect to, quod attinet ad, a general reference, which in English is often expressed by the more definite on account of, in consequence of. Matthiæ Gr. s. 578. c.

Οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν.] h. e. neque nos decet talia facere—, nec, si nos faciamus, vos decet ea concedere et permittere. STALL.

Τὰ ἔλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα.] These doleful tragedies; alluding to the custom already mentioned, of endeavouring to awaken the sympathies of the judges by the tears of wives and children.—Εἰσάγοντος. See c. 12. n. Ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις, κ. τ. λ.

§. 24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης.] h. e. sed præterquam quod illud existimationi meæ non responderet. STALL.

τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκουν χρῆ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε πάντως νῆ Δία, μάλιστα μέντοι καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελίτου τουτουῖ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἑμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

§. 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε,

Ἐπὶ τούτῳ—ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι.] When the demonstrative pronoun precedes the infinitive, it seems to increase the attention to what follows. Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 2. b. Καταχαρίζεσθαι τὸ δίκαιον, *justitiam donare gratiæ, jus negligere, quo alteri gratum facias.*—STALL.

Καὶ ὁμώμοκεν.] Pollux, viii. 122. Ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἦν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσὶ, κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ψηφιεῖσθαι· περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσὶ, σὺν γνώμῃ δικαιοσύνην.

Μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτε.] *Nolite igitur putare.* STALL.

Ἄλλως τε πάντως—μάλιστα μέντ. κ.] h. e. *quum alias omnino, tum maxime nunc, quum impietatis accusatus sum a Melito.* STALL.

Εἰ πείθοιμι—βιαζοίμην.] Intell. χαρίζεσθαί μοι τὰ δίκαια.

§. 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν.] In the Athenian court, when the plaintiff and defendant had concluded their harangues, the public crier called upon the judges to announce their verdict. In the case of trial for crimes for which penalties had been assigned by the laws, *ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι*, a single verdict, declaring the guilt or innocence of the accused was sufficient; but in cases which were not so cognisable by the laws, *ἀγῶνες τίμητοι*, if the accused was found guilty, a second sentence was required to determine the punishment due to the offence. To the latter class the cause of Socrates must have belonged. All that he had already advanced in his behalf was with a view to the primary verdict of the judges, as to his being actually guilty or not guilty of the charges preferred against him by Melitus: upon

ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπισ-  
τόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλ-  
λον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγυότα  
ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ὄμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσ-  
θαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τρεῖς  
μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέ-

which, in the first instance, the judges decided against him; it remained then for Socrates, in compliance with the usual form, intended, in some degree, to exonerate the judges, and confirm their sentence, by obliging the accused to acknowledge his guilt, to condemn himself to one of three penalties, perpetual imprisonment, a fine, or banishment. Such a confession, however, should have seriously involved the character of Socrates, and impaired, in no small degree, the truth and sincerity of his previous defence. Accordingly, in the triumph of conscious innocence, instead of submitting to a penalty, he demanded a reward, and was only prevailed on at length, from a desire of gratifying the wishes, and tranquillizing the apprehensions of his friends, to amerce himself in a fine, which, being incompetent himself, they undertook to pay.

It has been questioned whether this trial, founded upon such an indictment, should not rather have been classed with the *ἀγῶνες ἀτίμητοι*, but there were criminal causes, and degrees of the guilt imputed, in which, as well as in civil causes, the punishment was discretionary with the judge. Of such a character, it is plain, was the present trial, in which, as Cicero remarks, *de Orat. l. 1.* "Socrates was not only condemned by the first sentence of the judges, which determined whether the criminal should be condemned or acquitted, but by that, also, which the laws obliged them to pronounce afterwards." According to Xenophon, *Apol. Socr. p. 25*, Socrates, in asserting his innocence, subsequent to his condemnation, declared that if every charge had been completely proved, still, all together did not amount, pursuant to any known law, to a capital crime. In the Public Economy of Athens, by Boeckh, one of the most valuable works in classical litera-

ture, the subject of damages, fines, and penalties for illegal acts is ably and comprehensively discussed. And though with a particular view, as affecting the public revenue, still the general question is made easily intelligible. See vol. ii. 97. sqq.

*Παρὰ πολὺ.*] h. e. *non sperabam futurum ut numerus calculorum, quibus absolveret, tam parum differret ab eorum quibus damnarer, numero: immo putabam, numerum calculorum absolutiorum longe superatum iri damnatorum numero.* FISCH.—*παρ' ὀλίγον, so little different; ἀλλὰ παρα πολὺ, but different by a great excess.* Viger. c. ix. s. 6. v. 7. *Matthiæ Gr. s. 588. c.*

*Εἰ τρεῖς μόναι.*] According to Fischer, who has taken considerable pains in comparing and reconciling the conflicting authorities, the judges of Socrates were in number 556. Of these, 281 were for conviction, and 275 for acquittal; had three more from the former been added to the latter, the votes on either side had been equal, and, according to the Athenian law, he should have been discharged. *Eurip. Elect. 1265.* and *Iphig. Tauric. 1469.* Stephens, Dacier, and others, read *τριάκοντα τρεῖς*, of which Fischer justly disapproves; as it is scarcely possible that such a majority could have been followed by *μόναι*.—*Μετέπεσον, had fallen to a different side: μεταπίπτειν, aliter cadere, h. e. in aliam urnam incidere.* FISCH. The judges took the *ψῆφοι*, or pebbles, which were succeeded by the *σπόνδυλοι*, small balls of brass, and later, by the *κιάμοι*, beans, all employed for a similar purpose, and cast them through a small tunnel, called *κημὸς*, into two urns, one for receiving the condemning, and the other, the absolving votes, called *κάδοι* or *καδίσκοι*; whence the meaning of the term, as *supr.* is obviously correct. Cf. *Potter, Grec. Antiq. l. c. 19. c. 21.*

λιτον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγοροῦντες ἐμοῦ, κὰν ὄφλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

§. 26. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. Εἶεν. ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμῆσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἀξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' π

Κὰν ὄφλε χιλίας δραχμάς.] *He should have been liable to a penalty of a thousand drachms, not having obtained a fifth part of the suffrages.* Melitus escaped the fine to which those who, having commenced a prosecution, failed in obtaining a fifth of the suffrages, were liable, in consequence of Anytus and Lycon having devoted their interest and advocacy to the cause, which, without them, should have terminated in the discomfiture and disgrace of the prominent accuser.

§. 26. Τιμᾶται, κ. τ. λ.] The accuser was accustomed to subjoin to the indictment, ἀντωμοσία, whatever penalty appeared to him to have been deserved by the accused, unless the law had already prescribed what the precise penalty should be. For which τιμᾶσθαι, to estimate a crime at such a price, with a dat. of the person and a genit. of the punishment, was the technical phrase; and to which were opposed ὑποτιμᾶσθαι, to estimate or assign a penalty for one's self, and ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι, which has a similar purport, Pollux. viii. 150. Xen. Apol. 23. Melitus, c. 11, supr. made death the consequence of Socrates' conviction. See Boeckh, Econ. of Athens. ii. 99.

Παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι.] The question put to the accused was, "Ὅτι χρῆ, or τί ἀξιός εἰ, παθεῖν, ἢ ἀποτίσαι: the former referring to corporeal, the latter

to pecuniary punishment.

"Ὅ τι μαθὼν—οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον.] *Quod non remisit a discendo.* BOECKH. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 567. Ficinus misunderstands the passage altogether. Tr. *What penalty do I deserve to suffer or pay, because [ὅ τι μαθὼν] during my life I have not kept quiet, etc.*

Ἦν περ οἱ πολλοί.] *Intell. ἐπιμελοῦνται; a word being sometimes obliged to be supplied of an opposite tendency to the preceding one expressed.—Matthiæ Gr. 634. 3.*

Δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν.] *Τῶν ἄλλων* is used here as in Gorg. s. 54. ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, h. e. ξένων ὄντων: δημηγορία, signifying a popular harangue, or the province of one who dealt in such, which could not be properly designated by ἀρχή. Fischer reads δημιουργιῶν, but on the strength of a conjecture, which he fails in establishing, that at Athens δημάρχοι and δημιουργοὶ were synonymous. By ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων Socrates intends an allusion to the troubles of his own times, in which he was not otherwise engaged than, as has been already shown, in a manner which was creditable to his country and honorable to himself.

Ἐπιεικέστερον.] i. e. *Supposing myself to be possessed of too much integrity*

ίοντα σώζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως· τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν; ἀγαθόν τι, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὅ τι ἂν πρόπει ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ, δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπιάσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς

to ensure my security by having recourse to such practices.

Εὐεργέτῃ.] This was an honorary title conferred upon such as had deserved well of the state, and to which σωτήρ was not unfrequently joined: Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 317. ed. Lips. "Viri principes, inmo reges reipublicæ Atheniensis εὐεργέτας τοῦ δήμου γραφῆναι ceu eximium decus adfectaverunt."

Μᾶλλον—οὕτως ὡς.] This was not an unusual form with the Greek writers; Cf. Min. 318. E. Οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅ, τι τούτου ἀσεβέστερον ἔστιν, οὐδ' οὕτω χρὴ μᾶλλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἕξαμαρτάνειν. Dial. Eryx. p. 392. C. Ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν μικρῶν τούτων ἂν μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται οὕτως ὡς ἂν μάλιστα χαλεπώτατοι εἴησαν. HEUSD.

Ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι.] This was one of the highest honours in the Athenian commonwealth; to be supported at the public expense in the Pry-

taneum, or common hall. Cic. Orat. i. 54. Demosth. de fals. Leg. ii. 267. Pollux. ix. 40.

Ἴππῳ ἢ ξυνωρίδι.] Horse-races were performed with single horses; whence ἵππῳ, supr., *equus singularis*, FISCH., which were called *κελητες*, or *μονάμπυκες*; chariot races, with a pair of horses yoked, *ξυνωρίς*, *bigæ*, Hesych. interpr. *συζυγία*, ἢ ἄρμα ἐκ δυοῖν ἵππων συνεζευγμένον. Suid. ἐκ δύο ἵππων: and with three or more, *ζεύγος*, *trigæ*, *quadrigæ*, Hesych. interpr. *πᾶν τὸ ἐζευγμένον, καὶ ὄχημα, καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν, καὶ τεσσάρων, ἔτασσον*. For the Olympic games see Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. c. 22. The victors enjoyed little short of divine honours.—Ὀλυμπιάσιν.—The following distinction, arising from the accenting of this term, is stated by Phavorinus, from the Scholiast in Aristoph. Vesp. p. 361. Ὀλυμπιάσιν· νῦν προπαροξύνηται λέγεται γὰρ περὶ τόπον· ἐὰν περὶ πράγματος ἢ δηλοῦσα ἢ λέξις, οἷον ὡς εἰ λέγοι



οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἴ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως.

§. 27. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὡς περ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα, ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὡς περ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνην κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε ἄν νῦν δ' οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἀξίός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιοῦτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δέισας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο,

τις, δέκα Ὀλυμπιασιν' ἐφεξῆς ἐνίκησεν ὁ δέινα, προπερισπᾶται.

Τούτου τιμῶμαι.] h. e. *si confiteri me oportet, quam aestimationem maxime commuerim, fateor, me meruisse, ut quotidianus mihi in Prytaneo victus publice præbeatur.* FISCH. Cf. Lucian. Prometh. iv. p. 188. tom. 1, ἐφ' οἷς ἐγωγε τῆς ἐν Πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως, εἰ τὰ δίκαια ἐγίγνετο, ἐτιμῆσάμην ἂν ἐμαυτὸν.

§. 27. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν, κ. τ. λ.] *Perhaps in addressing you thus, I appear to express myself with a similar presumption as on the subject of pity and supplication.* v. c. 23. Ἀντιβολεῖν, i. q. ἰκετεύειν, whence ἀντιβόλησις, i. q. ἰκετεία. STALL.

Ἐκὼν εἶναι.] h. e. *quantum quidem a mea pendeat voluntate.* STALL. Ἐκὼν εἶναι non est simpliciter sponte sed quantum quis sponte quid faciat. Οὐδὲ μὴν φίλοις γε, οὐδὲ ξένοις ἐκὼν εἶναι γέλωτα παρέχεις: Xen. Cyrop. ii. 2. 15. *ut id quidem sponte facias, [by choice; if you can help it.]* Hermann. ad Viger. p. 888.

Ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα.] In allusion

to the preceding portion of the Apology.

Ὡς περ.] Steph. ὕπερ: adopted also by Picinus and Forster.

Μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνην.] S. Petit enumerates in the Athenian code the following law: "Sol occasus suprema in judiciis tempestas esto." Potter, Grec. Antiq. 1. p. 192.

Εἶμι του.] Εἶμι του, h. e. *τινος κακοῦ*, Kæhl. Bekk. Heind. in preference to τοῦ; the necessity of the correction being evident from c. 28. οὐκ εἶθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιούν κακοῦ οὐδενός. Socrates expresses himself as supr. in Xenoph. Apol. s. 23. ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὁμολογοῦντος εἶη ἀδικεῖν.

Τί δέισας; ἢ μὴ πάθω.] *Through fear of what? [should I acquiesce in the order to assign a penalty for myself?] is it lest I should suffer what Melitus assigns me? i. e. Socrates would not allow the probability of his being sentenced to death, as proposed in the indictment, to divert him from the unwavering assertion of his innocence, which he felt that it would be an injustice to himself to render dubious, under the influence of fear, by a voluntary amercement.*

οὐ Μελίτος μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὐτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαί τι ὧν εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων, τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ [τοῖς ἔνδεκα]; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταυτόν μοι ἔστιν ὃ περ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὀπόθεν ἐκτίσω. Ἄλλα δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσομαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μέντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυκτὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη, ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλιν πόλεως ἀμει-

Μελίτος—τιμᾶται.] This verb is used in the middle voice in reference to the accuser and accused; τούτου τιμησάμενος, *infr.* in the active of the judges; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε, *infr.*

"Ἐλωμαί τι ὧν εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι." i. q. ἔλωμαί τι τούτων, or ἐκείνων, ἃ εὐ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν: or, ἔλωμαί τι τῶν εὐ οἶδα, κακῶν ὄντων; both of which constructions appear to be combined in the text. STALL. Cf. Gorg. p. 481. D. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκάστοτε καὶ περ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι, ὀπόσ' ἂν φῆ σου τὰ παιδικὰ, καὶ ὅπως ἂν φῆ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου.

Τοῖς ἔνδεκα.] These magistrates were selected from the ten tribes, one from each, to whom was added a registrar, γραμματεὺς, to complete the number, eleven. They were called also νομοφύλακες, *keepers of the laws*, from the nature of their office, which consisted in superintending the execution of malefactors, and taking charge of such as were committed to the public prison.

Hesych. "Ἐνδεκα ἄρχοντες, οἷς παρεδίδοντο οἱ θανάτω καταδικασθέντες. Etymol. M. e Lex. Rhetor. "Ἐνδεκα—προεστηκότες τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου. Cf. in Criton. c. 2. οἱ τούτων κύριοι. in Phædon. c. 2. οἱ ἄρχοντες. These magistrates sat as judges in a court called Παράβυστον μέσον; see Potter, Græc. Antiq. 2. c. 21.

Δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω.] Those upon whom a pecuniary fine was imposed, were imprisoned until it was discharged; which in the case of Socrates would have been a perpetual confinement, as he had not the means of paying it, so that this would be the same as if he had sentenced himself to the custody of the eleven at once; ταυτόν μοι ἔστιν ὃ περ, etc.

Εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι.] Cf. c. 12. *supr.* extr. Εἰ εἷς—διαφθείρει; and c. 17. extr. Εἰ μὲν οὖν—διαφθείρω—ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλ.

"Ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς, κ. τ. λ.] This is to be taken ironically, as also *infr.* καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη. FISCII.

βομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εἶ γὰρ οἷδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὡς περ ἐνθάδε. καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

§. 28. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι, Σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; Τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινας ὑμῶν. ἐὰν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐὰν τ' αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγόμενου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὃ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδια. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἄμ' οὐκ εἶθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἐμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ —οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην

Ἐξελῶσι.] Ἐλάω, the th. of ἐλαύνω, seldom occurs in the present tense, but ἐλῶ, ἐλάς, ἐλά, &c. infin. ἐλῶν, is in prose the Attic future. Buttm. Int. Gr. Gr. p. 252. So Mæris: Ἐλῶ, Ἀττικῶς ἐλάσω, Ἑλληνικῶς.

§. 28. Ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ.] Εἰρωνεία, as applied particularly to Socrates, signifies a method of argument conducted chiefly by affecting ignorance, and putting captious questions; the answers of the antagonist furnishing their own refutation, and often exposing him to ridiculous contradictions. Donneg. Gr. Lex.

Μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὄν.] Many editions omit the particip. ὄν, incorrectly; Phrynic. p. 120. Τυγχάνω· καὶ τοῦτο προσεκτέον. Οἱ γὰρ ἀμελεῖς οὕτω λέ-

γουσι, φίλος σοὶ τυγχάνω, ἐχθρός μοι τυγχάνεις· δεῖ δὲ τῷ ῥήματι τὸ ὄν προστιθέναι, φίλος μοι τυγχάνεις ὄν, ἐχθρός μοι τυγχάνεις ὄν. Οὕτω γὰρ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἐχρήσαντο. Cf. c. 17. supr. οὐδ' εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κ. τ. λ.

Ἄνεξέταστος βίος.] *Vita ea, quum quis, neque ipse suum animum excutit neque eum ab aliis excuti jubet, ut videat, verene sapiens sit et virtute ornatus, an sibi videatur tantum talis esse; ut videat, quam longe progressus sit in studio sapientiae et virtutis, quantum spatii restet quod sit conficiendum.* FISCH. Βίος οὐ βιωτὸς· i. q. βίος ἀβιωτος, Hesych. interpr. ἀηθής: a joyless existence. Cf. in Criton. c. 8.

Νῦν δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν.] After νῦν δέ intellig. οὐ δύναμαι μοι τιμήσασθαι

ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν που μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμῆσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι. τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου· ἐγγυηταὶ δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι.

§. 29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτην ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὄνειδίζουσιν. εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τότε πρὸς

χρήματων. Most editions join *νῦν δε* with what follows, but do not attempt any explanation of *γὰρ*. The aposiopesis, as in the text, is decidedly the more correct. Cf. Plat. Sympos. 8. *Εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἔρως, καλῶς ἂν εἶχε· νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εἷς·* intell. *οὐ καλῶς ἔχει.*—*Εἰ μὴ ἄρα.* Sometimes *εἰ μὴ* expresses, not so properly a condition as the sarcastic *nisi forte*, unless forsooth. Matthiæ, Gr. s. 617. c.

[Ἐγγυᾶσθαι.] Intell. *φασί, ὑπισχνοῦνται*, or some such word, the sense of which is implied in *κελεύουσί* preced.—*Ἐγγυητής*, Etymol. M. ὁ ἀναδεχόμενος δίκην.—*Ἀξιόχρεως μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπιλύσαι τι ἰκανός.* Ammon. FISCH.

§. 29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου.] Socrates having amerced himself, in obedience to the laws, in a penalty of thirty minæ, it remained for the judges to pass the decretory sentence confirming the fine. But irritated by the independent spirit and dauntless energy of his demeanour and defence, and too successfully tampered with by the perse-

vering assiduity and art of his accusers, they decided upon his death. What follows Socrates is supposed to have addressed to them when acquainted with the result. Οὐ πολλ. γ' ἔνεκ. χρόν. *propter non longum temporis spatium.* Steph. i. q. *εὐτελεστάτου ἔνεκα κέρδους.* SERRAN. Socrates having arrived at a very advanced period of life, his accusers, by succeeding in their malicious designs, secured but an unenviable triumph, that of anticipating by a very short interval his natural decease, *εἰ γοῦν περιεμ. &c. infr.*—*ὄνομα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν, you shall incur, from those who are anxious to calumniate the city, the censure and reproach, etc.*

[Ἐμὲν τοῦτο ἐγένετο.] Sc. *ἐμὲ τεθνάναι.*

[Πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου.] h. e. *etatem meam eo provecam esse, ut non longum sit reliquæ vitæ spatium.* STALL. So Plutarch. Vit. Demosth. p. 846. E. ὄψε ποτε καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἠψάμεθα Ῥωμαϊκοῖς γράμμασιν ἐντυγχάνειν. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 340. 3.

τούς αὐτοὺς τούτους. Ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορία λόγων ἐάλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾤμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἷ' ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἡδιστ' ἦν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντος τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιῶντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φῆθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πράξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὄπλα ἀφείς καὶ ἐφ' ἰκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλάι εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἔάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπὸν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν· θάττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν

\*Ἴσως με οἴεσθε, κ. τ. λ.] *Perhaps you imagine that I have been convicted from a deficiency in arguments such as I could have persuaded you by, had I thought it incumbent on me to make every exertion by word and deed to escape from punishment.*—ἅπαντα ποιεῖν, πᾶν ποιεῖν, *omnem lapidem movere, nihil intantum relinquere.* STALL.

Ἐκείνως.] *Intell. ἀπολογησάμενος.*

Ὅστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον.] See *Matthiæ Gr. s. 540. Obs. 3.*

Ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν.] *Steph.*

*in marg. si quis sustinerit quidvis facere et dicere; q. d. si quem non pudeat quidvis f.*

Ἐάλων.] *Socrates plays upon this word, which signifies properly to overtake and seize one by running, and uses the phrase ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἀλῶναι in reference to his having been condemned himself to death by the judges; and ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας, in reference to his accusers, who were consigned to infamy by the voice of truth.*

ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὔτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὔτοι. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν που ἴσως οὔτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

§. 30. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμορθεῖσαι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γὰρ εἶμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρημφοδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δί' ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώ-

ῶφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν.] h. e. a veritate improbitatis et injustitiae convicti et condemnati. STALL.—Τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω, *paratus sum pœnam, qualis a vobis aestimata est subire*, h. e. *morì*. FISCH.—Μετρίως ἔχειν, h. e. *recte se habere*: μέτρια, *quæcumque conveniunt, et decent viros honestos et bonos: recta, honesta*. FISCH.

§. 30. Ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρῆσμορθεῖ.] The ancients believed that as death, and consequently the period of disunion between soul and body, approached more nearly, the dying were endued with the faculty of foresight, and the spirit, freed from its material fetters, and mingling with the more congenial elements of the celestial world, was thus enabled to prophesy the course of human events. See Cic. de Divin. i. 30. Davis, interpr. Cf. Eustath. in Iliad. p. 1089. Ἔστι δὲ δόγμα παλαιόν, ὡς ὅτι ἀπαλλασσομένη σώματος ἢ ψυχῆ, καὶ θεία φύσει ἐγγίζουσα, ἔχει τι μαντικῆς. Ἀρτέμιωνα δὲ φασί, τὸν Μιλήσιον, λέγειν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ὀνειρώων, ὡς ὅτε ἀθροισθῆ ἢ ψυχῆ ἐξ ὄλου τοῦ σώματος, πρὸς τὸ ἐκκριθῆναι μαντικωτάτη γίνεται. Cf. Iliad. xxii. 358.

Æneid. iv. 622. Instances of prophetic inspiration, towards the close of life, are not rare in Holy Writ; See Genesis, c. 49. Deuteronomy, c. 33. etc.

Τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν.] According to Laertius, and others, this prediction of Socrates was borne out by the result. The Athenians, with their characteristic fickleness, soon found cause for a bitter repentance of their most iniquitous and merciless proceeding. Melitus was torn in pieces, and the rest of the accusers, and their party, were either expelled the state or died by their own hands, while every possible respect was paid to the memory of Socrates, as a benefactor of the republic.

Ἡ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε.] h. e. *quam qua me affectistis*. STALL.—Τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, h. e. *ne vita exploretur, eoque reprehendatur*. ID.

Χαλεπώτεροι.] sc. τοσοῦτω. See c. 17. sup. sub. fin. Μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστ. κ. τ. λ. n.—Ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους—Steph. in marg.—*homines interficiendo, fore, ut deterreatis omnes ab exprobanda inhonesta vita, non recte sentitis*. Ficinus omits ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθ. ζῆτ. See Lat. Interpr.

τεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἶεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὄνει-  
δίξειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς δια-  
νοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐστ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ  
δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ  
ράστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρα-  
σκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν  
ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλ-  
λάττομαι.

§. 31. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἠδέως ἂν δια-  
λεχθῆην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγυότος τουτουῖ πράγματος, ἐν  
ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἱ  
ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθῆναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παρα-  
μείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυ-  
θολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἕως ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς  
φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδείξει ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς  
τί ποτε νοεῖ. Ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς  
γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην—θαυμάσιόν  
τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμο-  
νίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ  
ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοι-  
μι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἃ περ

Μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν.] This verb signifies, literally, *to amputate*, or *maim by cutting short*, thence *to hinder*, *prevent*, or *suppress*. Κολοῦει, Hesych. interpr. κωλέει.

§. 31. Οἱ ἄρχοντες.] sc. οἱ Ἐνδεκα. c. 27. supr. Into their custody the condemned were committed by the judges; upon which they gave the necessary directions to the attendants, ὑπηρεταίς, to prepare every thing for the execution of the sentence. By ἀσχολιαν ἄγουσι Socrates alludes to their having been so occupied at the time, as by οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθ. to the prison whither he was to be immediately led. Διαμυθολογῆσαι, *confabulari*; h. e. *dissere*, *colloqui*: Cf. in Phædon. c. 14. sub. fin.

Δικαστὰς καλῶν.] *If I called you*

*judges*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 558.

Εἰωθυῖα μοι μαντικὴ.] Intell. φωνή—Ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου, h. e. *ea* (vox vaticinatrix) *videlicet, quam demonio illi, de quo mentionem supra inieci, debeo*. STALL. Socrates, c. 19. supr., speaking of this φωνή, calls it θεῖον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, something of a celestial and angelic character; in the text he mentions it more directly as the warning and admonitory influence, τοῦ δαιμονίου, of his guardian genius. Schleiermacher would omit ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου, as a mere gloss upon μαντικῆ; but Socrates evidently intends to express here the mode in which the agency of his genius was made effectual, and the nature of the result.

Εἴ τι μέλλοιμι.] h. e. *quotiescunque in eo essem, ut, etc.* STALL.

ὄρατε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτί, ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἠνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καί τοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντιώταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγενῆσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

§. 32. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῆδε, ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. Δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι

[Οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται.] i. e. which any one would imagine to be, and are actually considered as the very verge of misfortune. Ficinus appears to have read νομίσαιτο, but the members of the sentence are distinct, as already stated. For the construction, ἔ, put once with verbs of different government, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 428. 2.

[Ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον.] Cic. de Divin. i. 54. "Illud tamen ejus philosophi (Socratis) magnificum, ac pæne divinum, quod, cum impiis sententiis damnatus esset, æquissimo animo se dixit mori: neque enim domo egredienti, neque illud suggestum, in quo causam dixerat, adscendenti, signum sibi ullum, quod consensisset, adeo, quasi mali cujus impendentes datum."

[Λέγοντα μεταξύ.] h. e. eo ipso tempore, quo dicebam, inter dicendum. STALL. μεταξύ is elegantly joined with participles in any case with the signification of *inter*, and gerunds in *dum* in Latin, and of *while*, *during*, *in the middle of*, &c. in English. Æschin. Ctesiphon, p. 306. l. 28. τις ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος ἰατρός, ὅστις τῷ νοσοῦντι μεταξύ ἀσθενοῦντι μηδὲν συμβουλεύει; *during his illness.*

Demosth. pro Cor. p. 284. ed. Reisk. εὐθὺς ἐξασπάντες μεταξύ δειπνοῦντες; in the middle of supper. Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 9. r. 1.

[Τί οὖν—ὑπολαμβάνω.] Stephens and Ficinus omit the note of interrogation, but as Stallbaum correctly observes, this mode of self-interrogation not only adds to the point and spirit of the subject, but is quite in conformity with the style of Plato's dialogists.

[Τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον.] Sc. ἡ εἰωθῆα μαντικῆ, supr.

§. 32. Ἐννοήσωμεν, κ. τ. λ.] This chapter has attracted the peculiar attention of many of the ancient writers. V. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. xiii. 10. p. 661. Stob. Sermon. c. 119. p. 606. Theodoret. Therapeut. Sermon. xi. p. 651. Cic. Tuscul. Disput. 1. 41. &c.

[Δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερον ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι.] It is not to be supposed that Socrates calls in question here the immortality of the soul; his own conviction on the subject is fully and satisfactorily demonstrated through the course of the Phædo. But he alludes in the text to the two conflicting opinions of philosophers, some of whom supposed that the



τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι μὴδ' αἰσθησιν μὴδεμίαν μὴδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὔσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μὴδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἶον ὕπνος, ἐπειδὴν τις καθεύδων μὴδ' ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ἧ ὄντω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μὴδ' ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας

soul survived, and others that it perished with the body. In either case he argues that death is not an evil; as an eternal and dreamless sleep it should of necessity be unaccompanied by any feeling of either pleasure or pain arising from past or present circumstances, whereas if death were merely an affection of the body by which the spirit was wholly uninfluenced, it should not only outlive its mortal frame, but enjoy the pure and perfect happiness arising from communion with the just. It must be understood, however, that Socrates only treats of this alternative with reference to those whose lives, like his own, had been such as to warrant them in the anticipation of future felicity; the eternal punishment of the guilty, in the world beyond the grave, was a no less prominent feature than the former in the doctrine and discipline of this exalted sage.

Ἡ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι.] h. e. τοιούτων τι ὥστε μὴδὲν εἶναι, as also infr. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημηῖσαι ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος. Eusebius and Theodoret, in quoting this passage, read μὴδὲν τι εἶναι, whence the conjecture of Heindorf, μὴδὲν ἐτι εἶναι.

Μετοίκησις τῆς ψυχῆς.] Stob. Cod. Euseb. Oxon. τῇ ψυχῇ; approved by Stallbaum, who refers to Matthiæ Gr. s. 389. 1. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1. 12. "Mortem non ita interitum esse omnia tollentem atque delentem, sed quandam quasi migrationem commutationemque vitæ." Antonin. Philos. vii. 32. Περὶ θανάτου—ἦτοι σβέσις, ἢ μετástασις. Senec. ep. 65. "Mors quidem est, aut finis aut transitus."

Καὶ εἴτε δὴ μὴδεμία.—] Ἔτετε refers to the second hypothesis, εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον, κ. τ. λ., further on.

Θαυμάσιον κέρδος.] Aristotle, though brought up in the school of Plato, deduces, from the same principles as those in the text, a very different conclusion: Eth. Nicom. iii. 6. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρασ γάρ· καὶ οὐδὲν ἐτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ, οὔτε ἀγαθόν, οὔτε κακόν εἶναι. Epicurus, however, uses this Socratic argument against the fear of death, which he asserts that philosophy is able to conquer by teaching that it is not a proper object of terror, since while we are, death is not; and when death arrives we are not: so that it neither concerns the living nor the dead. Enfield's Philosophy, v. 1. p. 514.

Ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. For I imagine that if one were obliged; having selected the particular night during which he slept without dreaming, and having contrasted with this the other nights and days of his life; were obliged [I repeat] to consider and say how many days and nights he had passed, through his existence, better and more agreeably than this night; I think [I say] that not only a private person, but the mighty sovereign himself, would find them easily counted [i. e. very few] in comparison with other days and nights; i. e. in a life where sorrow and suffering are admitted to be so widely disproportionate to its pleasures and tranquillity, it must be also conceded that the enjoyment of the latter is as limited and transient as the influence of the former is extended and enduring.—Μὴ ὅτι ιδιώτην, h. e. ne privatum aliquem. STALL. On μὴ ὅτι, for οὐκ ὅπως, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 624. 4.—Τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα, the king of Persia, so called κατ' ἔξοχην.—εὐαριθμητοὶ ἡμέραι, dies admodum perpauci. Pollux. iii. 88.

τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινὰ ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμῆτους ἂν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημησαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσὶν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεώτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδου, ἀπαλλαγείς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἳ περ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἢ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὅρφεϊ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστῇ ἂν εἴη ἢ διατριβῇ αὐ-

Οὐδὲν πλείων.] Fischer, from Eusebius, reads πλείων; adopted by Ficinus; but πλείων is preferable in the sense of *longior, more lasting*.

Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς, κ. τ. λ.] For this construction see Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. b. and the parallels adduced. Triptolemus, and the demigods alluded to in the text, were classed among the judges of the lower regions, probably from some popular superstition originating in, and connected with the Eleusinian mysteries. For Triptolemus was said not only to have instructed the Athenians in agriculture, but to have suggested a code of laws, especially relating to the boundaries and division of lands, whence he obtained the title of Θεσμοφόρος. Creuzer, Mytholog. iv. p. 101. sq.

Μὲν γὰρ.] *Profecto sane.* BUTTM.

Θαυμαστή—ἢ διατριβῇ, κ. τ. λ.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 636. p. 1145. *Conversatio delectabilis, si colloqui licebit cum P.* etc. WOLF. opp. to φαύλη ἢ ἀποδημία, sup. *vita, peregrinatio, injucund. neque beata.* FISCH.—Παλαμήδευ—stoned by the Greeks, through the stratagems of Ulysses, v. Æneid. ii. 81. sq. Socrates, in Xenoph. Apol. s. 26, mentions the similarity between the cause of Palamedes and his own. Lucian, in allusion to this, as also to the passage in the text, makes Palamedes the sole companion of Socrates in the infernal regions. Ajax, son of Telamon, slew himself when Ulysses was adjudged, in preference, the armour of Achilles, Homer. Odys. λ'.

τόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν· ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἔμαντοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνοῦντα ὡς περ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστι δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσεά ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας πάντως. οὐ δὴ που τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴ πέρ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἐστίν.

§. 33. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται

Ἄντιπαραβάλλοντι — ἀηδὲς εἴη.] This is to be understood as an explanation of θαναστῆ διατριβῇ, supr. whence there is no necessity for inserting, with Viger, καὶ before ἀντιπαραβάλλ. or of reading with Stephens, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντα, and consequently explaining the passage, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη ἐμὲ διάγειν ἀντιπαραβάλλοντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐξετάζοντα, κ. τ. λ.—FISCH.

Ἡ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι.] Stephens proposes οὖς μυρίους, probably following Ficinus. v. Lat. Interpr. Fischer would separate the passage from what preceded altogether, and so make a new sentence of it. But the construction is fully explained in Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. d. s. 472. 3. Cf. Gorg. 483. D. Ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δίκαιῳ χρώμενος; ἢ ἐρῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν; ἢ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέ-

γειν. Phædon. c. 43. καὶ ἄλλα πού μυρία, κ. τ. λ. HEUSD.

Ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας.] h. e. *immensum esset respectu felicitatis*. STALL. i. q. ἀμήχανος ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονία. Cf. Theætet. p. 175. A. ἀποπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 320.—Ἐξετάζειν—Socrates intends by this, that he would examine into the principles and feelings, by which those with whom he expected to associate had been influenced during their lives, and the wisdom of which they actually were, or imagined themselves to be then possessed of; not that he would make such inquiries, and promote such discussions, as if their errors and inexperience had continued to attend them, and were still liable to be confuted, when their earthly ordeal was past.

§. 33. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή.] i. e. *Vos iudices qui me absolutistis*. CIC. Tusc. l. 41.

ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δηλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῖς οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καί τοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἴομενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι.

Τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι. τοὺς υἱεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἠβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὧ ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅ περ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς· καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίξετε αὐτοῖς ὡς περ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανου-

"Ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι—βέλτιον ἦν μοι.] Cf. Young, N. T. iii. 495—500. 511—515.

— Death is victory ; It binds in chains the raging ills of life : Lust and Ambition, Wrath and Avarice, Dragged at his chariot-wheel, applaud his power.

That ills corrosive, cares importunate Are not immortal too, O Death, is thine. And feel I, then, no joy from thought of thee, Death, the great Counsellor, who man inspires With every nobler thought and fairer deed ! Death, the deliverer who rescues man ! Death, the rewarder who the rescued crowns !

Οὐ πάνυ.] *Non magnopere.* STALL.

Δέομαι, κ. τ. λ.] *Peto a vobis, Athenienses, quum filii mei adoleverint, ut eos ulciscamini, easdem illis molestias exhibente [λυποῦντες, h. e. eos ad virtutem cohortantes, tentantes eorum sapientiam, convincentes eos stultitiæ. STALL.] quas ego vobis exhibere consueveram, si, aut pecuniæ, aut ullius omnino rei, quam virtutes studiosiores esse videantur.*—FISCH.—Τιμωρήσασθαι—λυποῦντας, Salvin. adopted also by Ficinus.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα.] This simple but essentially sublime conclusion is in perfect accordance with the tone of

the entire Apology. It was in vain to present the intrepid front of integrity and innocence to the iniquitous array of those dark and malignant passions, which were the more effective and successful because unscrupulous in the extent and character of their resources. The vaguest and most unfounded falsehoods were brought to bear upon the clearest truth ; detraction and envy were busied in misinterpreting the amiable proposals of a wise and beneficent philosophy : the language and exhortations that were addressed with a moral, were received as with a depraved intent ; the correction of vice was stigmatized as presumption, and encouragement to virtue condemned as a crime. The accusers prevailed, and the annals of Athens were stained with a reproach perhaps unparalleled. But the object of this deadly persecution, undaunted through its progress, met calmly its result. He forgave the act of his accusers, for, so far, he was alone concerned, but he deprecated the motive, for it affected the well-being of society

μένω, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἡ τῷ θεῷ.

at large. In fine, he addresses them: "It is now time to depart—for me, to die; for you, to live; but which to the happier destiny, the Deity alone can tell."

How admirable, observes Dr. Brown, is that goodness which knows so well how to adapt to each other feelings that

are opposite, which gives to man a love of life, enough to reconcile him, without an effort, to the earth, which is to be the scene of his exertions; and which, at the same time, gives those purer and more glorious wishes which make him ready to part with the very life he loved.



# ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

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ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

## ARGUMENT.

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THE scene of this dialogue is the prison to which Socrates was committed, previous to the execution of his sentence. Crito, his friend and disciple, enters for the purpose of persuading him to take advantage of the means provided for his escape. He finds Socrates in a tranquil slumber, and gazes for a while with wonder upon so calm a rest, unbroken by any dread of impending death. The philosopher awaking, expresses his surprise at the unusual earliness of his friend's customary visit; and learns that he came as the harbinger of dismal tidings, the sacred galley, whose return was the signal for the death of Socrates, having been that day expected to arrive from Delos. He implores his master, in terms of the strongest affection, to secure his safety by immediate flight, and seeks to shew by arguments of no ordinary weight, that Socrates was called upon by the obligations due to his friends, his family, and himself, not to reject this favourable chance, which devoted affection had laboured to procure. But the efforts of the most sincere attachment, and most tender expostulation, proved as ineffectual as the dread of positive and instant danger, the noble firmness of Socrates could not be undermined, and by the example of his death, he gave the last great lesson in that wisdom and virtue which he had inculcated by precept during life.

He opposes the arguments of Crito upon the following grounds:

That the opinions of men should be disregarded in comparison with the judgment of the Deity.

That not life, but to live virtuously, should be the object of our desires.

That justice is the life, and injustice the death of the soul.

That we should not requite evil for evil, or resent the wrongs we may receive.

That it is better to die than live unrighteously.

That we must obey the laws of our country, which the injustice of man furnishes no pretext for treating with disrespect. And that the laws of this world have kindred laws in that to come, which revenge the insults put upon them here.

Stallbaum supposes Plato to have composed this dialogue for a double purpose: one, and his primary design, being to defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth; and the other, his secondary, to teach, from the precedent of Socrates, that a good man, under any circumstances, should render implicit obedience to the dictates of established law.

Crito is eventually overcome by the cogency and truth of the philosopher's objections, and abandons his design as untenable, when brought to the test of a strict and unyielding morality.



# K P I T Ω N .

§. 1. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρῶ ἐτι ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνικά μάλιστα;

ΚΡ. Ὁρθρος βαθύς.

KRITΩN.] This dialogue is also entitled Κρίτων, ἢ περὶ πρακτέου in several editions; in others, ἢ περὶ δοξῆς ἀληθοῦς καὶ δικαίου, for which Thrasyllus is adduced as authority, quoted by Laertius, iii. 57. διπλαῖς δὲ χρῆται ταῖς ἐπιγραφαῖς ἐκάστου τῶν βιβλίων· τῇ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος· τῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος. RAABE. According to Idomeneus, Diog. Laert. iii. 35, the part imputed to Crito in this dialogue belonged in reality to Æschines, but as the latter was the friend of Aristippus, who was Plato's enemy, it was inscribed as above.

§. 1. Τί τηνικάδε.] *Why have you arrived so very early.*—Τηνικά and πηνικά are used properly, and by the Attic writers, to signify a certain time of the day, as the *morning, noon, or evening.* Cf. Phrynic. p. 14. s. Πηνικά μὴ εἶπης ἀντὶ τοῦ πότε· ἐστι γὰρ ὥρας δηλωτικόν· οἷον, εἰπόντος τινός, πηνικά ἀποδημήσεις; ἂν εἶπης, μετὰ δύο, ἢ, τρεῖς, ἡμέρας, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐρεῖς· ἂν δὲ εἶπης, ἔωθεν, ἢ περὶ με-

σημβρίαν, ὀρθῶς ερεῖς.—Τηνικά, in its ordinary usage, signifies *then, this, or that time.*—Πρῶ, *before day.*

Πηνικά μάλιστα.] *Quota hora est quum maxime.* STALL. μάλιστα being used here in the same sense as when adjoined to numerals, of *nearly, pretty nearly, almost exactly.* Seag. Viger. vii. 8. 7. Aristoph. Ran. 659. πηνικά ἐστὶ τῆς ἡμέρας, *quodnam diei tempus est, seu, quænam hora.* Scap. Lex. in voc.

Ὁρθρος βαθύς.] *Early dawn.* Crito answers more accurately the general question of Socrates, ἢ οὐ πρῶ ἐτι ἐστι; supr., for πρῶ, like the Latin *mane*, signifies any period of the early morn, ὀρθρος, *the very point of day break, primum diluculi punctum.* Scap. Lex. "Ubi nox abiit, nec tamen orta dies." Ovid. Amat. 1. 5. 6. Cf. Phrynic. p. 120. Οἱ δὲ ἀρχαῖοι ὀρθρον, καὶ ὀρθρεῦσθαι, τὸ πρὸ ἀρχομένης ἡμέρας, ἐν ᾧ ἐτι λύχνω δύναται τις χρῆσθαι.—ὀρθρος βαθύς, *primum diluculum*, as in Luke, xxiv. 1. FISCH.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καί τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἢ πάλαι;

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ παρακάθησαι;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνία καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἠδέως κα-

Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλ.] *Miror qui factum sit ut.* STALL. Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 1. 20. Θαυμάζω οὖν, ὅπως ποτὲ ἐπίεσθησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. Eurip. Med. 51. πῶς λείπεσθαι θέλει. Socrates expresses his surprise at Crito having obtained admission into the prison so early; cf. in Phædon. c. 3. ἀνεψῶγγυτο γὰρ οὐ πρό.—ὑπακούειν, which in its primary sense means, *to listen* to those knocking, τοῖς κρούουσιν, signifies thence *to open the doors*, and *admit them*. Buttmann reads ἤθελε for ἠθέλησε, but the imperfect denotes a custom of doing any thing, and it was not usual for the gaoler to open the doors so early; he made the exception in favour of Crito, as appears above.

Τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου.] At Athens there were three public prisons; the first was in the vicinity of the forum, and was designed for debtors and such as were guilty of minor offences; the second was called *σφρονοστήριον*, or house of correction; the third was situated in a wild and uninhabited place, and was designed for malefactors guilty of capital crimes; ὅπη περ ἂν ξρημός τε καὶ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος ἢ τόπος, τιμωρίας ἔχων ἐπωνυμίαν φήμην τινά. Plat. de Legg. x. c. 15.; in the last of which it is probable that Socrates was imprisoned. He was fettered also, as appears in Phædon. c. 3. but whether with the *χοιμίζ* or *ποδοκάκη*, a wooden instrument in which the feet and legs were placed and fastened with cords; the ξύ-

λον, N. T. Acts, xxvi. 24., which Luther correctly renders *the stocks*; or with the *πέδη*, a chain which confined the legs, is not sufficiently clear. RAABE.

Φύλαξ.] Phædon. c. 3. θυρωρός.

Φοιτᾶν.] This verb, which answers to the Latin *itare, venitare*, is used especially of scholars *frequenting* a school, thence called *φοιτηταί*. It is also used to express the recurrence of a dream in Phædon. c. 4. πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον, &c. LOEWE.

Καί τι καί.] The latter καί signifies *even* or *too*. Cf. Pausan. in Lacon. p. 168. οὐ παριε εἰών ὁ θεός, καὶ τινες καὶ ἀπώλοντο τῶν στρατιωτῶν κεραυνωθέντες.—Εὐεργέτηται—εὐηργέτ. is the common form: Buttmann prefers *εὐεργετῆται*.

Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.] *Pretty long since*. Seag. Viger. vii. 6. Cf. in Phædon. c. 29. ἀλλ' ἐπιεικῶς συχρὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.

Εἶτα.] See Apolog. Socr. c. 16. Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει. n.

Οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἠθελον, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *neque ipse vellem tamdiu insomnis esse in tanto quidem pavore*. FISCH. Crito alleges as his motive for not having awakened Socrates, that he should not himself have wished, were he in so great affliction, to be also deprived of rest.

Θαυμάζω.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 317. Obs.

Ἦς ἠδέως.] i. q. ὅτι οὕτως ἠδέως καθ. Cf. infr. ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτήν, κ. τ. λ. in Phædon. c. 2. a med. ὡς ἀδέως καὶ

θεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἦδιστα διάγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστῶσῃ ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ραδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶως φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἶη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτου ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸ ἀφίξαι;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτη-

γενναίως ἐτελεύτα; c. 38. a med. ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς, &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 480. Obs. 3.

[Ἴνα ὡς ἦδιστα διάγης.] The conjunctive is frequently used after ἵνα, ὅπως, ὅφρα, and ὡς, although the preceding verb be in the time past, when the verb which depends upon the conjunction denotes an action which is continued to the present time; e. g. Iliad. ἔ. 127. ἀχλὺν δ' αὐτοὶ ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ἢ πρὶν ἐπῆεν, Ὅφρ' εὖ γινώσκης ἡμὲν θεόν, ἡδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα, because at the time at which Minerva is speaking, γινώσκεις is a consequence still continuing of the past action, ἀφαιρεῖν ἀχλὺν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 518. 1.—τὸν βίον must be understood to διάγης: Cf. Persius, v. 139. "Contentus perages, si vivere cum Jove tendis."

[Εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου.] Plat. Sympos. p. 194. C. . . . τοὺς ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονίζειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὧν ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῖς αἴτιος. Matthiæ Gr. s. 368. a. Cf. Virgil. Æneid. xi. 126. "Justitiæne prius mirer belline laborum."—Τρόπος, h. l. sentiendi agendique ratio in ipsa vita conspicua; mores. STALL.

[Πλημμελὲς εἶη.] It would be incongruous.

[Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς, κ. τ. λ.] Neque tamen senectus eos liberos reddit quod attinet ad illud, ne morte non indignentur, STALL, or quo minus [τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ

morte indig. v. Herm. ad Viger. n. 265. p. 772. Stephens, following Ficinus, reads τοῦ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακ. But the correction is superfluous: in its primary sense, ἐπιλύεσθαι, referring to ἀλίσκεσθαι preced. signifies to loose, or unbind, thence to concede or allow; a meaning omitted in Stephens' Thes. Ling. Græc., but taken by Phavorinus from Suidas: Ἐπιλυόμενον, i. e. συγχωροῦντος, whence τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγ. may be taken as an accusative. Tr. But not in any degree does old age admit of their feeling no sense of annoyance at their present distress. Cf. Herod. 5. 101. τὸ μὴ ληλατῆσαι σφεας ἔσχε τόδε. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 543. Obs. 2. Buttman proposes οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐπιλ. as the verb taken in the sense assigned by Suidas supr. might better govern a dative, and in the case of such a trifling variation in the reading as between αὐτοῖς and αὐτοὺς in the text, the authority of the best copies should be of little weight.

[Ἔστι ταῦτα.] i. q. c. 4. ταῦτα μὲν δὲ οὕτως ἐχέτω, and εἰεν elsewhere. So Cic. Læl. ii. "sunt ista."—Ἄλλὰ τί δὴ, h. e. sed ut ad superiora revertar, cur tandem, &c. STALL.

[Τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείσις.] The friends and disciples of Socrates, who are frequently so designated, cc. 3. 5. 6. 15. Phædon. c. 2.

δείοις πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγώ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτετα' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἐκ Δήλου, οὐ δεῖ ἀφικομένον τεθνᾶναι με;

ΚΡ. Οὐ τοι δὴ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἤκουτές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἤξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ ἐσαύριον ἔσται, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

§. 2. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὧ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῆ. εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἤξειν αὐτὸ τήμερον.

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἤξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος

Ἐν τοῖς βαρύτετα.] h. e. ἐν τοῖς φέρουσιν ἐγὼ βαρύτετα ἂν ἐνέγκ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 290.

Τίνα ταύτην.] Intel. φερέεις, h. e. τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢ ἀγγελία ἣν φερέεις.

Τὸ πλοῖον.] See in Phædon. c. 1. Τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, n.

Ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν.] i. e. q. ἐκ τούτων ἢ ἀπαγγέλλουσι: secundum ea, quæ illi nuntiant. STALL. Cicer. Epist. xvi. 22. "ex tuis epistolis."

Σουνίου.] A promontory of Attica, looking towards the Cyclades. Odys. γ', 278. Σούνιον ἱρὸν—ἄκρον Ἀθηνῶν. Strab. ix. p. 598. τὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἄκρον. now C. Colonna.

§. 2. Τύχη ἀγαθῆ.] h. e. quod bene feliciterque veritat. RAABE. Cf. Plaut. Aul. iv. 10. 57. "quod bonum, faustum, felix, fortunatumque sit."

Ταύτην.] Οὕτως, τοῦτ' ἢ τρόπῳ. Hesych.

Ἐστεραία—ἢ ἢ.] Lit. I must die on the day later than (i. e. the day subsequent to) that on which the vessel arrives:

ἢ being used on account of the comparative signification of ὑστεραία. Cf. Sympos. p. 173. A. τῇ ὑστεραία ἢ ἢ τὰ ἐπινίκια ἔθυσεν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ χορευταί.

Ἐ τοι δὴ.] These particles are to be taken in an affirmative sense, but with restrictions. See Seag. Viger. viii. s. 4. 6.—Οἱ τούτων κύριοι. The eleven, Apol. Socr. c. 28., who took charge of prisoners, and superintended the punishment of the condemned, as expressed by τούτων, such matters, supr.

Τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας.] Thom. Mag. and Phavor. Τῇ ἐπιούσῃ ἔρεῖς, οὐ προσθεῖς τὸ ἡμέρα τῆς ἐπιούσης δὲ ἡμέρας.

Ἄλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας.] But the day after. Ὀλίγον πρότερον.] i. e. Which I saw this very night a little before you arrived: consequently after midnight, when the ancients supposed that dreams were true. Cf. Horat. Sat. i. 10. 33. "Quirinus Post mediam noctem visus quum somnia vera."

ἐνυπνίου ὃ εἴωρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινὶ οὐκ ἐγείραι με.

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ πρασελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ὡς ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργὲς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

§. 3. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ' ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι, ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ξυμφορὰ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ

Κινδυνεύεις.] Κινδυνεύει. ἐγγίζει. Tim. Plat. Lex. So the Latins use *periculum est, ne hoc ita sit, for parum abest, quin ita sit.* Ruhnke. Ἐν καιρῷ τινι, *peropportune*: ἐν καιρῷ, *opportune.* Fisch.

Ἐδόκει.] Δοκεῖν is used properly in reference to dreams and visions: Eurip. Iphig. Taur. v. 44. ἰδοξ' ἐν ὕπνῳ. Orest. v. 402. ἰδοξ' ἰδεῖν τρεῖς νυκτὶ προσφερεῖς κόρας. Those who appeared in dreams or visions were believed by the ancients to partake of the divine nature, and were therefore in general represented of a semblance more noble and imposing than human: Cf. Juvenal, 13. 221. "Te videt in somnis: tua sacra et major imago Humana," &c. Xen. Cyrop. viii. 7. κρείττων τις ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων. Dion. Cass. iv. 1. γυνὴ γὰρ τις μείζων, ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπου φύσιν. Tacit. Annal. xi. 21. "Species muliebris ultra modum humanum." Plin. vii. ep. 27. "Muliebris figura humana grandior pulchriorque." So supr. καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, *beautiful in countenance, and graceful in mien.* They were also said to be dressed in white, a sign that the dream was favourable: Plin. *ibid.* "venerunt per fenestras in tunicis albis duo." Cf. Matth. xxviii. 3. τὸ ἐνδύμα—λευκὸν ὡσεὶ χιῶν. Mark, xvi. 5. John, xx. 12. Supr. λευκὰ, i. e. λαμπρὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, *clothed in robes of radiant white.*

Ἠματί κεν τριτάτῳ.] Hom. Iliad. i, 163. Phthia, a city of Thessaly, the birth-place of Achilles, where he tells Ulysses he hoped to arrive on the third day after his departure from Troy, is to

be understood in the language of the vision as the *abode* of Socrates after his decease: v. Apol. Socr. c. 32. and to which his life was merely *the passage.* So Aristotle interpreted the dream of his friend Eudemus of Cyprus, to whom a youth of remarkable beauty appeared, and told him that in five years more *he should return home.* Cic. Div. i. 25. Laert. ii. 35. Cf. Antonin. iv. 47. "Ὡσπερ εἰ τις σοι θεῶν εἶπεν, ὅτι αὐριον τεθνήξῃ, ἢ πάντως εἰς τρίτην.

Ὡς ἄτοπον—.] Ὡς θαυμαστὸν καὶ παράδοξον, Thom. Mag.—Ἐναργὲς, *so clear,* that there could be no mistake as to its import. Cf. Lucian. Somn. tom. i. p. 4. Græv. *δνειρος—ἐναργὴς οὕτως, ὥστε μηδὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας.*

Ἐτι καὶ νῦν.] It would hence appear that Crito had made some previous efforts to prevail upon Socrates to save himself by flight. Unless ἔτι may convey an allusion to the advice which Crito and others had formerly given upon the subject of the fine, v. Apol. Socr. c. 28.—Ὡς ἐμοί, κ. τ. λ., i. e. *Since, if you die, not one calamity only shall befall me; but besides my having lost a friend, such as I never may obtain again, I shall, further, seem to many who do not thoroughly know both, to have neglected when I might have preserved you, had I been willing to encroach upon my wealth.* Upon the construction ὡς οἷος τ' ὦν σε σώζειν, κ. τ. λ. the terms in which it is to be supposed that Crito would be reproached for his apathy, see Matthiæ, Gr. s. 529. 5.

χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου οἶον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἰός τ' ὦν σε σώζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καὶ τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχύων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζεις, ἠγγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πεπραχθαι ὡς περ ἂν πραχθῆ.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλ' ὁρᾶς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυνὶ ὅτι οἰοί τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εἴαν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾗ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἰοί τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν αὐ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα· καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχε.

Ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν.] *And what more disreputable character could there be than this, namely [ἦ], to appear to value money more than one's friends. The genitives τούτου, οὗ, which are governed by a comparative, are often followed by an explanation with ἦ, instead of the infinitive with the article. Matthiæ Gr. s. 450. Obs. 2.*

Οἱ πολλοί.] *The many. i. e. the vulgar and illiterate, to which is opposed ἐπιεικέστατοι, infr. the wisest, most reasonable, or intelligent.*

Αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα.] *Intell. εἰσι: the very circumstances of the immediate case are self-evident, that the many, &c. ὅτι οἰοί, κ. τ. λ. being subjoined in explanation of the preceding. Stephens, Forster, and Cornarius read δηλοῖ, which seems to have been also adopted by Ficinus.—Fischer receives δηλα, but in the sense of δηλωτικά. Buttman defends the reading as supr. in its ordinary signifi-*

cation. Scap. Lex. in voc. Sæpe, δηλον, esse dicitur, quod manifestum est adeo ut de eo constet.

Διαβεβλημένος.] *i. e. qui est in odio et invidia vulgi, quem odit vulgus.—FISCH.*

Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον.] *A mode of expressing a wish, especially familiar with the poets; with the infinitive present of actions which should have taken place but have not. Matthiæ Gr. s. 513. Obs. 3.*

"Ἴνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν.] *Quo efficere possent, etiam id quod non est in eorum potestate. STALL. ἵνα, ὡς, μὴ, (more rarely ὅπως,) are found very frequently with the indicative of a past tense of actions which should have happened but have not. Matthiæ Gr. s. 519. 6. Οἶος, and οἶός τε, able, is a shorter phrase for the equivalent and more regular τοιοῦτος ὥστε: τε being a remnant of the antique language, signifying*

νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα θιοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιούσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

§. 4. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι. ἄρα γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασι, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι

*ferre*, as the Latin adjunct *que*. Seag. Viger. c. iii. 8. 1.

[Τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.] h. e. *non rationem sequuntur sed cæcum quendam animi impetum*. STALL. Cf. c. 5. init. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν, τοῦτο πράξουσιν.—Protogor. p. 353. Α. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο λέγουσι.

[Ἄρα γε μὴ.] The difference between ἄρ' οὐ and ἄρα μὴ is, that ἄρ' οὐ, *nonne*, requires an affirmative answer, ἄρα μὴ, *num*, a negative, as ἄρα does by itself; but μὴ imparts some degree of dubiousness to the question, and that for the purpose, sometimes, of irony. Seag. Viger. c. viii. 4. 4.—Προμηθεὶ—the Attic form, as *αἰσχύνει* and *ἐντρέπει*. c. 14. a. med.

[Οἱ συκοφάνται.] The proverbially litigious disposition of the Athenians, and the gross mismanagement of their government and judicature, gave birth to the evil which, with the name of SYCOPHANCY, so peculiarly infested the state. The term *συκοφάνται*, which sometimes signifies false witnesses, but more properly denotes common *barators*, derived ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ σῦκα φαίνειν, was originally applied to those who gave information of clandestine exportation of figs; a law having been procured by some demagogue, apparently to gratify the populace at the expense of the landholders, which forbid the exporting of this plentiful production of the Attic soil. This law being allowed to continue in force, afforded ample occasion for the mean and malicious to make its attendant accusations, whether true or false, the screen of their invidious attacks upon the objects of their envy and dislike; whence the term sycophant came into

use as a general appellation for all vexatious informers, many of whom had but little hesitation in advancing their own interests, by preferring the most frivolous and unfounded charges. Cf. Lys. Δήμ. καταλύς. ἀπολογ. p. 171. Τούτων γὰρ (τῶν συκοφάντων) ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἡμαρτηκότας εἰς αἰτίαν καθιστάναι. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα χρηματίζειν. According to some authorities, the name originated from the numerous informations occasioned by a law which prohibited the stealing of figs. Mitford's Greece, iv. p. 25. sq. 77. 78.

Boeckh asserts, that the prohibition of the export of figs did not exist in the times of which anything is known with certainty; all that occurs in the ancient writers upon this subject serving only to explain the meaning of the term sycophant. He supposes that if the ancients had possessed an account of any such law, that could be at all depended upon, they would not have spoken in a manner so vague and indefinite concerning the origin of the appellation, and conceives the account to be far most probable, which states that the sacred fig-trees were robbed of their fruit during a famine, and that the wrath of the gods having been felt in consequence of this sacrilege, accusations were brought against the suspected. Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 31. Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Athen. i. 59. 60.

[Πράγματα παρέχωσιν.—πράγματα παρέχειν, molestiam alicui creare, negotium alicui facessere. STALL.

[Ἡ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *aut omnem adeo rem familiarem amittere, aut certe magnam partem opum*

πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἕασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοί ἐσμεν σώσαντές σε κινδυνεύειν τούτον τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ, ἔτι τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μῆτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τ' ἀργύριον ἐστὶν ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σώσαι σε καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθὲνδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὄρας τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας, ὡς εὐτελεῖς καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἰκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἶει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὔτοι ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τούτο ἀργύριον ἰκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὥστε, ὃ περ λέγω, μῆτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σαυ-

nostrarum. STALL. "Ἄλλο τι παθεῖν, h. e. ne ipsi in vincula conjiciamur, exilio mulctemur, necemur. ID.

"Ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν.] *Bid adieu to, or take leave of it.*

Δίκαιοί ἐσμεν—κινδυνεύειν.] See *Matthiæ Gr. s. 297.*

"Ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθὲνδε.] *Senec. ep. 24.* "In carcere Socrates disputavit, et exire, cum essent, qui promitterent fugam, noluit, remansitque ut duarum rerum gravissimarum hominibus metum demeret, mortis et carceris."—*Τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας*, expressive of contempt. v. *Apol. Socr. c. 1. a med. Οὔτοι. n. infr. c. 9. τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.* *Demosth. Philipp. 1. p. 41. παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τε τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων—καὶ τῇ νῦν ὕβρει τούτου.*

Ὡς εὐτελεῖς.] *Criminatos, accusatores, ad quos placandos non opus est magna pecuniæ vi. FISCH.—Ces délateurs sont à bon marché, et ne nous coûtent pas grand' chose. V. COUSIN.—Ἐπ' αὐτούς, h. e. ad eos corrumpendos.—STALL.*

Ἐπ' αὐτούς, h. e. ad eos corrumpendos.—

*Tibi meæ opes paratæ sunt, sc. suppetunt. STALL.*

Ἐξένοι οὔτοι ἐνθάδε.] *Peregrini ecce hic adsunt: are at hand here;* by the demonstrative οὔτοι, Crito does not mean to say that they were then present, but that they resided in the city, and were in the habit of constant intercourse with him. BUTTM.

Σιμμίας—Κέβης.] Both Thebans, and on terms of close intimacy with Socrates; v. in *Phædon. c. 2. sub. fin. c. 6. a med. Diog. Laertius* mentions the titles of thirty-three dialogues which were ascribed to the former, and of three by Cebes, of which the *Πίναξ*, or Picture of Human Life, only remains, and to which his claim is disputed. It is a very able allegory, truly Socratic in its moral spirit and character, but containing some sentiments which appear to have been borrowed from the Pythagorean school.

Μῆτε—ἀποκάμης.] *Do not despond.—ἀποκνήσῃς, ne cesses.* Jacobs; who thought that the reading as *supr.* would make Socrates appear to have despaired



τὸν σῶσαι, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὃ τι χρῶο σεαυτῷ. πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη, ἀγαπήσουσί σε. εἰ δὲ βούλη εἰς Θετταλίαν ἰέναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται, ὥς τέ σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

§. 5. Ἐπι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι ἐξὸν σωθῆναι καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἃ περ ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσάν σε διαφθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχῆσει καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὃ τι ἂν τύχῃ, τοῦτο πράξουσι· τεύξονται δέ, ὥς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων οἷά περ εἴωθε γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρῆν ποιεῖσθαι παιδᾶς ἢ ξυνδιαλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σὺ δ' ἐμοὶ

of his escape as impracticable, instead of, as was actually the case, declining it as unjust, and proposed the emendation ἀποκνήσ. But Crito may have easily used the term in the text, for he was as yet but little acquainted with the views of Socrates on the subject, and might have readily imagined that the objections which he endeavoured to meet were rather the results of some doubts which were only proposed with the hope of being dissolved, than of a steady determination, on the part of the philosopher, to abide by the decision of his country's laws.

Ὁ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικ. ] V. Apol. Socr. c. 27. a med. Ἄλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς, &c.

Ὁ τι χρῶο σεαυτῷ. ] Steph. in marg. *incertum fore, quid de te ipso statuere debeas.* Tr. *That if you had gone out of the city, you would not have known what to do with yourself, whither to betake yourself.* So V. Cousin; *que si tu sortais d'ici, tu ne saurais que devenir.*—

Matthiæ Gr. s. 409. 6. Cf. Lucian. Nocyom. s. 3. οὐκ εἶδως ὃ τι χρῆσαιμην ἱμαντῷ.

Ἄλλόσε. ] The corresponding form to ὅποι, otherwise the verb ἀγαπήσουσί would have required ἀλλαχοῦ after πολλαχοῦ; upon this species of attraction see Buttman, Larg. Gr. Gr. s. 138. i. 4.

Κατὰ Θετταλίαν. ] According to Lærtius, and Libanius, in Apol. Socr., the acquaintance of Socrates was sought by some of the most noble in Thessaly.

§. 5. Τὸ σὸν μέρος. ] *Quantum in te est, quod ad te attinet,* STALL. as cc. 11. 16.

Ὁ τι ἂν—πράξουσι. ] h. e. *eam sortem habebunt quam iis fortunæ arbitrium tribuerit; quidvis iis accidere poterit. They shall endure whatever they may meet with.* STALL.—πράττειν, especially with εὖ or κακῶς, is used to express good or evil fortune. Eurip. Iphig. Aul. 345. πράσσειν μεγάλα i. q. μάλ' εὐτυχεῖν.

δοκείσ τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δέ, ἅ περ ἄν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δι᾽ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπραχθαι, καὶ ἢ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθες ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, ὡς περ κατάγελως τῆς πράξ-

Τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι.] *Tu autem mihi videris ea, quæ cum maxima pigritia atque supinitate conjuncta sunt elegisse.* SERRAN.

Ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης.] Forster and others suspect τῆς δίκης, which has been omitted by Ficinus, to be a mere gloss. But as a *suit*, ἡ δίκη is said εἰσιέναι or εἰσερχεσθαι, to be brought into court, ἢ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης appears to be obviously admissible. Schleiermacher would omit εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, but there is a precedent for this also; Cf. Demosth. adv. Phormion. ii. p. 912. 27. μελλούσης τῆς δίκης εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον.—Ὡς εἰσῆλθες, added in explanation of the preceding: Wolf and others read ὡς εἰσῆλθεν, sc. δίκη, but εἰσελθεῖν may be affirmed indifferently of the litigants and the suit.—Εξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν. It is not clear how Socrates could have avoided his trial; Libanius, in Apol. i. p. 644, mentions that Anytus, after the accusation had been preferred, had offered to be reconciled to Socrates upon certain conditions; but the παραγραφή, or παραμαρτυρία, the defendant's plea, when he alleged by competent witnesses, that the action brought against him was not δίκη εἰσαγωγίμος, a cause which could then be lawfully tried, and by which he could defer the trial, or institute a cross cause and so protract the threatened judgment, should be put in before the cause had been submitted to the magistrate who proposed it for the decision of the judges. It is more likely that Crito alludes to a law of which Socrates might have availed himself, commended by Lysias, p. 354. ed. Reisk. and by which it was allowed δεδιότι δίκης ἔνεκα δρασκάζειν, *causa sua diffidenti fuga se subtrahere*. This seems accordant

with the tenor of Crito's present arguments; he is now recommending Socrates to fly, and ensures him a kind and honourable reception among his friends in Thessaly; such a course was at the option of Socrates in the first instance, and could have been scarcely less obvious than at the present, aware, as he must have been from the beginning, of the number and influence of his enemies, and the nature and extent of their design.

Ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς δίκης.] *The conduct of the trial*; referring particularly to the defence of Socrates. V. Cousin: *la mère dont le procès lui-même a été conduit.*

Ὡς περ κατάγελως.] Cornarius compares the case of Socrates to a dramatic representation, of which the impeachment formed the πρότασις, the trial the ἐπίτασις, and his death in the gaol the καταστροφή. Crito, as yet unconvinced by the arguments of Socrates, and unable to understand why he would not take advantage of the proffered means of flight, endeavours to influence him by a sense of the utter absurdity and ridicule which should be imputed in consequence to himself and his friends. He sets out with a general proposition, that it was possible to suspect a mismanagement about the whole affair, which made him feel ashamed for both Socrates and his friends. Their supineness betraying itself in three special instances; the first in permitting the indictment at all, which it is to be supposed might have been counteracted by due precaution; the second in not avoiding its being put to issue, which appears to have been considered practicable; and the third, which crowned all, τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτί, the

εως, κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἡμετέρα διαπεφευγέ-  
ναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἳ τινές σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ  
σαυτόν, οἶόν τε ὄν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν  
ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτ' οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὄρα μὴ ἅμα  
τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἦ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βου-  
λεύου. μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι ἔτι ὦρα, ἀλλὰ  
βεβουλευσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσης  
νυκτὸς ταῦτα πάντα δεῖ πεπραχθαι. εἰ δέ τι περι-  
μενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶόν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ  
τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως  
ποιεῖ.

§. 6. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολ-  
λοῦ ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἶη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ  
μείζων, τοσοῦτῳ χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρῆ  
ἡμᾶς, εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή, ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον

ridiculous dénouement of the piece was, his appearing to have slipped through their fingers, as it were, from their fear and hesitation which prevented their making more efforts for him, than he did for himself, when they could have preserved him had they been of the smallest worth, or, the least assistance. There is some difficulty about the dependence of *δοκεῖν* supr. Buttman and others understand an anacoluthon in the sentence, and so refer it to *μὴ δόξῃ* preced. Stallbaum considers it to be redundant, as c. 3. *καὶ τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχιῶν εἶη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν*, κ. τ. λ. Buttman compares it with Alcib. Secund. c. 17. extr. *μεταβαλλόμενος γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδ' ὅτι οἶόν παύει, ἀλλ' ὅ περ ἂν μά-  
λιστά σοι δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυνέειαι αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν*: which he professes only to be able to explain by an anacoluthon as above; as also the following passage from Plat. Menon. c. 22. init. *ὁ περ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῶ ὄντι αὐτῶ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ πα-  
ραγινομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς*: where the genitive is in anacoluthon after the dative; *αὐτῶ* and *ἀρε-  
τῆς* appearing to be distinct, and yet being the same, and an anacoluthia in

the sense also, for if *φύσει προσγιγνε-  
ται ἢ ἀρετῇ*, how can it be said *δεῖν  
ἐπιχειρεῖν αὐτῇ*. V. Cousin takes *δο-  
κεῖν* absolutely for *δόξει*, ὡς *δοκεῖν, de  
sorte que l'on croira . . . et l'on croira  
. . . Oui, on va croire que*, &c.—*Δια-  
πεφευγένας*, Scap. Lex. Dicitur et *δια-  
φεύγειν ἡμᾶς* illa res, qua excidimus,  
quæve e manibus quasi nobis elabatur:  
apud Æschin. in Ctesiph. Item quod  
nobis e memoria elabatur et excidit, quo  
modo usus est Isocrat. et Plutarch.—  
*Οἵτινες σε οὐχὶ, qui te non conservaverim-  
us, quemadmodum nec tu teipsum, quum  
tamen fieri illud potuisset*. STALL.

[*Ἀλλὰ βεβουλευσθαι.*] The time had arrived when deliberation should have ceased, and at which Socrates should have adopted, if so inclined, the sugges-  
tions of his friend, and the plan for his escape, to be put in execution on the coming night, or the opportunity was lost.

[*Εἰ δέ τι.*] Ficinus appears to have read *εἰ δ' ἔτι*: Lat. Interpr.

[*Περιμενοῦμεν.*] See in Phæd. c. 3. *περιμένειν*.

§. 6. ἡ προθυμία σου, κ. τ. λ.] h. e. *studium tuum mei servandi valde probandum est et laudandum, si cum recta ratione conjuncta sit*. STALL. *Εἰ μετ. τιν. ὀρθ. εἶη*. V. Matthiæ Gr. s. 524. Obs. 3.

νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους οὓς ἐν τῷ ἔμ-προσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἦδε ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ οὓς περ καὶ πρότερον· ὧν ἂν μὴ βελτίω ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὧς περ παῖδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. Πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα αὐτά; Εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι

Οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν.] h. e. ὥστε—πείθεσθαι: V. Matthiae Gr. s. 479. Obs. 2. a. s. 617. 5.—Τὰ ἐμά, *quæ ad me pertinent, tum animi affectiones et cupiditates, tum externæ rerum conditiones.* STALL.

Ὅυδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν, κ. τ. λ.] Buttman arranges the passage: οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις μορμολύττηται ἡμᾶς ὡσπερ παῖδας, ἐπιπέμπουσα πλείω, δεσμοὺς, κ. τ. λ. Stallbaum joins πλείω, as an accusative absolute, taken adverbially, with μορμολύττηται, which appears to agree better with the position of the words in the text. Cf. c. 14. infr. sub fin. ἀλλ' ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπειδή-μησας, etc.

Μορμολύττηται.] Ruhnken, in Tim. Plat. Lex. μορμολύττεσθαι, *gestu quodam et pronuntianda voce Mormō pueros terere.* V. Gesner, ad Claudian. Carm. xxxi. 111. Cf. Schol. Basil. in Gregor. Nazian. Or. cxv. p. 563. C. Μορμολύττειν ἐστι, τὸ ἐκφοβεῖν, καὶ Μορμουλκεῖον, προσωπεῖον εἰς φόβον παιδιῶν ἀνοήτων, καὶ τύπος τις ἀλλόκοτος ὄψεως. εἴρηται ἀπὸ τῆς Μορμῶς, τῆς καὶ Λαμίας. In order to hush and soothe their crying infants the nurses at Athens used to sing a lullaby called λαλά, Ovid. Fasti, ii. 599, or βαγκαλῶν; but when they were peevish and fretful they endeavoured to quiet them with threats of a bugbear or spectre called μορμολύκειον, μορμολύκη, and more briefly

μορμῶ, whence the verb as supr., which is always used by the Attic writers in the middle voice.

Ἐπιπέμπουσα.] Ἐπιπέμπειν frequently signifies emphatically to visit with good or evil fortune.—Καὶ θανάτους—καὶ ἀφαιρέσεις. The plural is used to increase the force of the expression. Cf. Plat. Lachet. p. 191. D. ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἀνδρείοι εἰσι. The punishments of infamy, banishment, slavery, or death, were always attended with the confiscation of property. V. Boeckh, Pub. Econ. ii. c. 14.

Μετριώτατα σκοποίμεθα.] Μετριῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, *querere ita ut par est, ut rei convenit, ut res postulat,* h. e. recte, bene. STALL.

Πρῶτον μὲν.] V. infr. c. 8. a med. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν, κ. τ. λ. where this first part of the discussion concludes, and the second is immediately subjoined, ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, &c.—Τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν—ἀναλαμβάνειν, *disputationem retractare, iterum diligentius tractare,* WYTTENBACH; correctly, for Socrates alludes to what had been already said upon this subject, c. 3. supr., which he now proposes to resume.

Πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγ. ἐκάσ. ἢ οὐ.] h. e. *Utrum quotiescunque superiore tempore de hac re disputabamus, recte a nobis dictum sit, necne, alias hominum opiniones respiciendas esse, alias non.* STALL.

ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ· ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς. ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἐγώ γε ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὧ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πῶς, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὧδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὡς περ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἅς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μῆ. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὧ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούοι ἢ παρούσα ξυμφορά. σκόπει δὴ· οὐχ ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρῆ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; τί φῆς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

ΚΡ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μῆ;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

Wieland, Mus. Attic. iii. 2. p. 159. sqq. would omit ἢ οὐ, and understand καλῶς ἐλέγετο after ἀποθνήσκειν ironically. In the text ἢ οὐ refers to καλῶς preced.

Νῦν δὲ—ἐγένετο.] Νῦν, signifying time either actually present, or bordering on the present, is often placed in contraposition to πρὶν, τότε, or other particles expressive of time past. With a past tense, as supr. it means *lately, just now*, as in Phædon. οὐκοῦν ὅπερ νῦν προὔθεμεθα σκίψασθαι—σκεπτέον. Cf. Horat. Od. i. 37. 2. "Nunc taliaribus Ornare pulvinar deorum Tempus erat dapibus." See Matthiæ Gr. s. 506. V.—Κατάδηλος, sc. ὁ λόγος.

Ἄλλως.] *Idly, vainly*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 597.—Ἐνεκα λόγου, *for argument's sake*.—Ἐπειδὴ ὧδε ἔχω, *postquam mor-*

*tis periculum mihi imminet, postquam veni in periculum vitæ*. STALL.

Τι λέγειν.] Opp. to παιδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία preced.

"Ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια.] h. e. *ut quidem sunt res humanæ, i. e. quantum quidem ex iis, quæ hominibus solent fere contingere, conijcere licet*. STALL.

Παρακρούοι.] Παρακρούειν, Hesych. interpr. ἐξαπατᾶν, πλανᾶν: FISCH. *facere, ut quis male statuat, et existimet, ut erret, ut non ponderet satis et examinet aliquid; properly, to trip in wrestling, or to cheat by touching the beam in weighing*. Stallbaum explains the passage: *Te enim præsens calamitas non ita conturbaverit ut a recta judicandi ratione abduci te patiaris*.

Τιμᾶν.] *To respect*.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

ΚΡ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

§. 7. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὢν;

ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάξασθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ξύμπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίοντων ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

§. 7. Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων.] i. e. Practising athletic exercises, and wholly intent upon them: —τοῦτο πράττε, a proverbial form, the Hoc age of the Latins. v. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 152.

Ὅς ἂν τυγχάνῃ—ὢν.] i. e. whoever he may be that is, &c. See Viger, de Id. Gr. viii. 2. 1. sqq.—Ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης. The former gave the necessary directions for the diet, &c. of the future athletes, whence ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον infr. The office of the latter consisted chiefly in exercising the bodies of their

scholars in the palæstra, whence πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον. Both professions were practised together first by Herodicus, of Selybria, of whom Plato, in Repub. iii. p. 406. A.—παιδοτρίβης ὢν καὶ νοσώδης γενόμενος, μίξας γυμναστικὴν ἰατρικὴν ἀπέκναισε πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτὸν, ἔπειτ' ἄλλους ὕστερον πολλοὺς. V. Intpp. ad Aristoph. Nub. 969.

Τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι.] V. Cousin: celui qui préside à la gymnastique et qui s'y connaît; referring to ἰατρὸς and παιδοτρίβης, preced.

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διόλ-  
λυσιν.

ΣΩ Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα, ὃ Κρίτων,  
οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δι-  
καίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν  
καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἡ βουλή, πότερον  
τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι  
αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴ τις ἐστὶν ἐπαίων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ  
αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας  
τοὺς ἄλλους; ᾧ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν  
ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον  
ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. ἢ οὐδέν ἐστι  
τοῦτο;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

§. 8. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, εἰ μὴ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν  
βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρό-  
μενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίωντων  
δόξῃ, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ;  
ἔστι δὲ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ  
διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρ-

“Ἐπεσθαι.] i. q. προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν  
supr.

Τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο.]  
i. e. βέλτ. γίγνεσθαι ἐλέγομεν. See  
Matthiæ Gr. s. 505. 2. whence it will  
appear that the proposed emendation of  
Buttmann, who reads, after Theodoret,  
(Θερ. Παθ. p. 27.) ἐγένετο—ἀπώλετο,  
is wholly unnecessary. Tr. was being  
improved, was in progress towards im-  
provement, by justice, &c. The imper-  
fects, according to Lange, bear a distinct  
and definite relation to the period at  
which this subject came first under dis-  
cussion, whence he explains the passage;  
quod justo quidem melius fiebat (sc. ex

sententia, priusquam in mortis pericu-  
lum incideram a nobis proposita,) in-  
justo autem depravatur.

§. 8. Πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ.] Fischer  
supposes here a synchysis, or hyper-  
baton, and understands the passage,  
τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπ. as also Ficinus. Lat.  
Interp. But Lange, more correctly,  
explains μὴ as opposed by ἀλλὰ in a  
corresponding sentence not expressed.  
sc. πειθόμε. μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπ. δόξ. ἀλλὰ  
τῇ τῶν μὴ ἐπαίωντων: approved by  
Buttmann.

βιωτὸν.] i. q. βιωτὸς ὁ βίος. See  
Apol. Socr. c. 28. a med.

Μοχθηροῦ.] Miserable.

μένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνη-  
σιν; ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος  
ἐκεῖνο, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ ὃ ἢ τε ἀδι-  
κία καὶ ἢ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ᾧ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φρον-  
τιστέον ὅ τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαί-  
των περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλή-  
θεια. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτη οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ,  
εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φρον-  
τίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ  
τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἄν τις, οἰοί τ'  
εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύναι;

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἄν, ᾧ Σώκρα-  
τες.

[Ὅτι τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται.] For the relative preceding verbs of different construction, ὀνίνημι always governing an accusative, see *Matthiæ Gr. s. 391*. Eusebius, Stephens, and others, read ὄ, approved by Fischer, who construes λωβᾶσθαι with an accusative only, incorrectly. Cf. Phrynich. in *Bekk. Anec. i. p. 50*. Λωβᾶσθαι τόνδε καὶ τῷδε, αἰτιατικῇ καὶ δοτικῇ. *Dion. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii. 77. fin. p. 1561. ed. Reisk. (ἢ βουλή) ἀναζητήσασα τὸν τῷ θεράποντι λωβησάμενον.*

[Ἡ φαυλότερον.] Or do we imagine that to be of less importance than the body, whatever it is belonging to us, about which justice and injustice are concerned. If, in order to enjoy the many and important blessings connected with bodily health, we should conform to that regimen by which they might be best secured; arguing from its success the capabilities and skill of the adviser; that life should then be worth living, whose termination should be equally desirable, were the means of its enjoyment neglected, or the voice of the adviser to be mistrusted and condemned. So with the soul, the TRUTH

alone, the test of justice and injustice, should decide upon their effects in relation to this their primary object. Is it then possible to make light of a bodily infirmity which poisons life, and give no heed to its obvious cause? or is the soul more trivial still, and is the voice of the many to drown the solemn and sober dictates of this omniscient truth, which dispels the cloud of mental error, and so removes the possibility of moral taint?

[Ὅτι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς.] *V. Apol. Socr. c. 9. Καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ, κ. τ. λ.*

[Οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ.] *Eισηγεῖσθαι, legem vel conditionem aliquam ferre et suadere; auctorem esse alicujus rei.—Sturz. Lex. Xenoph. s. h. v.*

[Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα, κ. τ. λ.] Several editions ascribe δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα to Socrates, which is approved by Buttmann. But it would seem strange for Socrates so to affirm his position in the first instance, that it should be consented to by Crito, and then confirmed anew.—ΣΩ. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις, κ. τ. λ. Bekker's reading, as *supr.*, obviates the difficulty. For when Socrates had as-



ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὧ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὁμοίος εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τὸνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταυτόν ἐστι, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

§. 9. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθύνδε πειραῖσθαι ἐξίεναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐῶμεν. ἂς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε χρημάτων ἀνα-

sented that the objection might possibly be made, that the opinion of the many ought to be rejected, because its influence prevailed, even to the deprivation of life, Crito caught up the idea, as favourable to his own views, and at once pronounces the argument to be valid. Socrates accepts his admission, but proceeds to show that the impression was false, and its result unfounded. Stephens and Cornarius read *δηλαδὴ*, but γὰρ, which is emphatically affirmative in the text, is to be found in all the editions, which would render the former superfluous.

[*Οὗτος τε ὁ λόγος.*] i. e. The discussion which Socrates had just concluded, concerning the opinion of the multitude; one which he set no value on, nor thought the many a more competent judge because they exercised control over life and death. Especially as they had no power over the conduct of life, which was not to be desired for itself alone, but should rather be reckoned as consisting in the amiable development of chastened and virtuous feelings, which are always independent of external sway, and must reconcile all who are so actuated to the anticipation of that unwelcome reception in most instances, and that unmitigated persecution in many, to which excellence is ever liable from

powerful and petulant vice. By τῷ καὶ πρότερον, the philosopher must allude either to his previous argument on the subject, c. 3. which he subsequently discussed in detail, or to some debate which he had held with his disciples previous to his accusation. Stallbaum adopts the latter conjecture, which appears to be more in consonance with what follows; καὶ τὸνδε αὖ σκόπει εἰ ἔτι μένει, κ. τ. λ. For Socrates being about to speak of the love of life, and a due moderation of the passion to preserve it, desires Crito to consider further, whether what they had formerly agreed to on the subject ought still to be abided by as true.

§. 9. [*Ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων.*] h. e. *ex iis, de quibus consentimus.* STALL.

[*Μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων.*] *Without leave of the Athenians: ἀφίεναι, sinere, permittere.* FISCH. Cf. Eurip. Med. 374. *τῆνδ' ἀφῆκεν ἡμέραν μείναι με, allowed me to remain this day.* Cod. Tubing. *ἐφιέντων* as in c. 13. extr.

[*Ἐῶμεν.*] *Let us give it over.*

[*Περὶ τε χρημάτων ἀναλώσεως.*] See c. 4. a med.—*Καὶ δόξης;* Ficinus appears either to have read *καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δόξης*, or to have given the sense of the text as supr. in full. Socrates alludes here to the argument of Crito, c. 3. init.

λώσεως καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὧ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἄν, εἰ οἰοί τε ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ ὁ περ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν ταῦτα πάντα ποιοῦντες· κὰν φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

Μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς.] The imperative ὅρα is understood in μὴ here and infr. μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο: *Vide ne aliud nihil considerandum sit*—μὴ οὐ δέη: *Vide, ne nulla ne mortis quidem habenda sit ratio*. STEPH.

Σκέμματα.] i. q. σκέψεις supr.  
Καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων.] Ἀναβιώσκεισθαι, *in vitam revocare, vitam reddere, si tua intersit, si tibi ipsi prosis*. FISCH. Cf. in Phædon. c. 38. sub. fin. καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. Wyttenbach, Ep. Crit. 232. ed. Lips., proposes ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' αὐ, incorrectly, for ἄν, subjoined to participles and infinitives, gives to these moods (not the sense of the future, although in Latin it can only be expressed by this sense, but) the same signification as the optative, conjunctive, or indicative, with ἄν, would have in the resolution, by means of the finite verb. Whence the passage above is to be explained; καὶ τούτων, οἱ ἀναβιώσκοντό γ' ἄν, εἰ οἰοί τε ἦσαν, and who would restore to life again, were they capable. Matthiæ Gr. s. 598. 1.—Τούτων τῶν πολλῶν; contemptuously, cf. c. 4. supr. τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας.

Ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ.] *Quum res, quum ratio, ita postulet et dicet*. FISCH. Cf. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 250. "Si puerilius

his, ratio esse vincet amare."

Χρήματα τελοῦντες.] It is to be observed that τελειν is applied with propriety to χρήματα only; χάριν ξεχειν, and χάριν εἶδεναι or προσειδέεναι, also χάριν ἀποδιδόναι and ἐκτίνειν are usual forms, but not χάριν τελεῖν. It should have been written χρήματα τελοῦντες—καὶ χάριτας προσειδότες; Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 4. init. The Greek writers, however, not unfrequently accommodated the same verb to several nouns, to one only of which it should have been joined, but at the same time, in a sense so extended, that it contained the force of the verbs which belonged properly to the other nouns. This practice originated with the Hebrews, by whom it was transmitted to the Greeks, and so to the Latins. Cf. Cic. pro. Arch. 3. "Quorum alter res ad scribendas maximas, alter, cum res gestas, tum etiam studium, atque aures adhibere posset."

Κὰν φαινόμεθα ἄδικα, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. And if we should so appear to act unjustly, observe that we are not to take into account the death that must result from our remaining and keeping quiet here, nor any other suffering whatever, in preference to the injustice of the act; [i. e. should we accomplish our es-

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ γαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πη ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε καί σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι, ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμαι πείσαι σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. Ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴαν σοι ἰκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, ἧ ἂν μάλιστα οἴη.

ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

§. 10. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὲ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὲ δὲ οὐ; ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογήθη; ὃ περ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο. ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκείναι αἰ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμένοι εἰσὶ, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοί-

cape.] Παραμένειν, manere in vinculis neque inde aufugere. STALL. It is properly applied to faithful slaves, παραμόνοι, opp. to ἀποδιδράσκοντες.

Ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ.] Commentators have varied considerably in their explanations of this passage, of which they severally propose such emendations as may best accord with their own views. The text as it stands is interpreted accurately by Stallbaum: *Magni aestimo te mihi iterum iterumque persuadere conari, ut id agam, h. e. ut fugam capessam, modo ne me invito hoc facias, i. e. more fully, generosam tuam amicitiam, qua fit, ut mihi hoc consilium identidem suadeas* (the aorist being expressive of an action repeated) *utique plurimi facio, sed noli hoc committere, ut meae ipsius voluntati ac sententiae nihil tribuas, quum ego soleam non rerum externarum momentis commoveri, sed solius veritatis virtutisque rationibus.* Socrates attached a due importance to the benevolent efforts of his faithful friend, but he could not allow himself to be persuaded against his own conviction, ἀλλὰ μὴ [μού] ἄκοντος, which being not at all likely to be overcome by the arguments of Crito, he begs

of him to resign the vain attempt. So V. Cousin: *Cesse enfin, je te prie, de me presser de sortir d'ici malgré les Athéniens; car je serai ravi que tu me persuades de le faire, mais je n'entends pas y être forcé.* Ficinus has strayed altogether from the sense and spirit of the passage. V. Lat. Int. For μὴ ἄκοντος several editions read μὴ ἄκοντα, which is probably more correct, but the genitive absolute is often found, though the subject is another case, in the principal proposition, especially if it is to be distinguished by the emphasis. Cf. Thucyd. vii. 48. *χρημάτων μὲν ἀπορία αὐτοῦς ἐκυρνώσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐπὶ πλεον ἤδη ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις ναυσὶ θαλασσοκρατούντων.*

Ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.] See Matthiae Gr. s. 409. 6.

§. 10. Ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι.] Cf. Plat. Repub. 7. p. 520. D. *καταβατέον ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ξυνοίκησιν.* For this construction, see Matthiae Gr. s. 447. 4.

Ἐκκεχυμένοι εἰσὶ.] *Profusa, i. e. abjecta sunt.* STALL. Jacobs elegantly compares the forms *ἐκχεῖν πλοῦτον, ἐκχεῖν χρήματα.*—Γέροντες ἄνδρες ἰσ

δε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς περ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν; εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πρᾶότερα, ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὃν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὐ;

KP. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

KP. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν.

KP. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δαὶ δῆ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὧ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;

KP. Οὐ δεῖ δῆ που, ὧ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;

KP. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

KP. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

redundant, but contrasts more strongly with παίδων seq. Cf. *Apol. Socr.* c. 23. *τηλικῶδε ὄντα.* c. 27. *τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπων.*

*Παντὸς μᾶλλον.*] *Unquestionably, beyond all doubt:* a particularly emphatic affirmation. Cf. in *Phæd.* c. 17. c. 56.

*Ὅμως τό γε ἀδικεῖν.*] So, in *Gorg.* p. 469. when Socrates is asked by Calicles; *σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν*, he makes answer: *βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἐγώ γε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοιμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀδικεῖν.*

*Ὅς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται.*] Cf. *Archil.* apud *Theophil.* ad *Autolyc.* ii. 37. *Ἐν δ' ἐπίσταμαι μέγα, τὸ κακῶς τι δρῶντα*

*δεινοῖς ἀνταμείβεσθαι κακοῖς.* Solon, in *Brunc.* *Poet. Gnom.* p. 73. *εἶναι δὲ γλυκὴν ὠδὲ φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρὸν τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν.* *Fragm. Eurip.* ap. *Valcken.* p. 157. *ἐχθρὸν κακῶς ὄραν ἀνδρὸς ἡγοῦμαι μέρος.* That such was the opinion of the vulgar can be proved by many ancient authorities, forbearance having been commonly deemed inconsistent with fortitude.

*Οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχη.*] *Sivei maximis et gravissimis injuriis efficiatur.* *STALL.* *Euseb.* *Theodoret.* *πάσχη τις ὑπ.* *Ficinus* reads *πάσχυς, passus fueris*, but it is more correctly taken in the person of *κακῶς πάσχοντα* preced., besides that it refers to the indefinite subject of the infinitive *ἀνταδικεῖν.*

καὶ ὄρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογήῃς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευήματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εἰ μάλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ σοὶ δ' εἰ πῆ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθεν, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ. πότερον ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῶ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον ἢ ἐξαπατητέον;

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

§. 11. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινὰς ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐς ἤκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις οὔσιν ἢ οὔ;

Matthiæ Gr. 205. 2. For an analysis of the principle deprecated by Socrates as supr. see Dr. Brown's *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, sect. 63. and Dugald Stewart, *Philos. of the Active and Moral Powers of Man*, c. 3. sec. 6.

Βουλευήματα.] i. q. σκέψεις and σκέμματα, c. 9. supr.

Οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα.] i. e. Nor that one who is ill-used should revenge himself, requiting evil for evil. Ficinus incorrectly refers ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς to the aggressor.

Τῆς ἀρχῆς.] The principle: *disputationis principium*. STALL.

Τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο.] The conclusion deduced from the principle, as supr.— Ἄλλὰ λέγε, omitted by Ficinus, but incorrectly, as appears from λέγω δὴ αὖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο seq.

§. 11. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει.] h. e. *jam si hæc vera sunt, nefas esse lædere quenquam ullo modo, vide quid inde sequatur*. STALL.

Μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν.] i. q. ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων, or μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, c. 9. supr.

Οἷς ὁμολογήσαμεν.] h. e. *de quibus ut justis et æquis nobis cum civitate convenit*. STALL.

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὁ ἔρωτάς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἶτε ἀποδιδράσκειν εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ἐπιστάντες ἔρrouντο, Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετραφῆθαι, ἐν ἣ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μὴδὲν ἰσχύωσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται; Τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολυμένου, ὅς τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ

Ἄποδιδράσκειν.] This term was generally applied to fugitive slaves, but its harshness is qualified by εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο, h. e. *vel quo alio nomine istud nobis appellandum erit.* STALL.

Ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι.] This beautiful passage has been imitated by Cicero, in *Catil.* i. 7. "Patria—quæ tecum, Catilina, sic agit et quodam modo tacita loquitur, &c." Cf. *Cæuvres de Frederic II.* iii. p. 54. "Que pourroient répondre ces cœurs tièdes et lâches—si la patrie personifiée se présente subitement devant eux, est leur tenoit à peu près ce langage, &c." BIEST. Quintilian, ix. 2. observes on the effects of this figure *προσωποποιία*: "Mire quum variant orationem, tum excitant—urbes etiam populique vocem accipiunt."

Τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως.] i. q. *Ἐύμπασα ἢ πόλις, universa civitas.* Xen. *Cyrop.* τὸ Περσῶν κοινόν, *Persarum civitas universa.* FISCH. Cf. Cic. *Verr.* ii. 46. 63. "Commune Siciliae," i. e. *Sicilia universa; Siculi omnes.* V. Cousin, *La République elle même.*

Ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ.] See *Apol. Socr.* c. 12. init. and *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 487. 9.

Τὸ σὸν μέρος.] i. q. *καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι,* c. 12. infr.

Εἶναι.] i. q. *σῶν εἶναι, σταθῆναι,* Mark, iii. 24. opp. to *ἀνατετραφ.* infr. *To continue, to exist;* Cf. Cic. *de Off.* i. 12. 38. "bellum gerebatur, uter esset, non uter imperaret."—*Μὴ ἀνατετραφῆθαι,* h. e. *neque eversam jacere.* STALL.

Αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι.] Sc. αἱ δίκαι δικασθεῖσαι, infr. *judicia e legibus facta, judicata.* STALL. V. Cousin; *les jugemens rendus.*

Τούτου τοῦ νόμου.] See Robinson's *Grec. Antiq.* c. xxx. extr. Demosthenes commends this law, *Orat. adv. Timocrat.* p. 782. *Τὰς δίκας καὶ τὰς διατάξας, ὅσαι ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἐν δημοκρατουμένη πόλει κυρίας εἶναι.*

Ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις.] The particle *ὅτι* is used when the very words of the speaker are quoted in *oratione recta*, whereas these in other languages can be only quoted in the way of narrative. *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 624. b. Heindorf preferred *ὅτι ἀδικεῖ γὰρ,* &c., however Socrates is not speaking in general terms of the injustice of the state, but in reference to his own peculiar case, as appears from *καὶ οὐκ ὁρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε,* seq. The latter verb Buttman correcty understands as the aorist. Stallbaum explains the passage: *Enimvero injuste nobiscum civitas agebat, quum nos*

ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινε; Ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δί, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 12. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἢ πόλις δικάζη; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἔλαβε τὴν μητέρα σου ἁ πατήρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέ σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους μέμφει τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; Οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. Ἄλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφὴν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἣ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ

*damnant et in carcere retineret.*

ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;] h. e. ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν.

§. 12. Ἡ καὶ ταῦτα ὠμολόγητο.] Various readings and interpretations have been proposed for this passage, which however has been fully and correctly explained by Fischer, as it stands in the text; ταῦτα being understood to refer to ἡδέικει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις, κ. τ. λ. supr. and so opp. to ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις seq. Whether, say the laws, was this the compact which was made between us, that you should charge the state with injustice, and its proceedings as illegal; or was it, that you would abide by the decisions which the state, with our sanction, might pronounce? At Athens, before the ephēbi were permitted to be enrolled among the citizens, they were bound by an oath, in which, among other things, they promised calling the gods to witness; Τοῖς θεσμοῖς τοῖς ἰδρυμένοις πείσομαι, καὶ οὓς τινὰς ἂν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος ἰδρύσῃται ὁμοφρόνως· καὶ ἂν τις ἀναρῆ τούτους θεσμούς, ἢ μὴ πείσῃται, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω, ἀμυνῶ δὲ, καὶ μόνος, καὶ μετὰ πάντων. Stob. Eclog. Eth. c. 41. p. 243. Gesner. It is

not clear how Ficinus read the passage in the text, but he has lost sight of the meaning.

Τῷ ἐρωτ. τε κ. α.] *Question and answer.* Οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν.] Πρῶτον μὲν should properly be followed by ἔπειτα, but the sense of the latter is implied in Ἄλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου, κ. τ. λ. seq. where it might have been written: ἔπειτα οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ τροφῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγ.—παιδεύειν; ἢ καὶ τούτοις μέμφει;—Καὶ δι' ἡμῶν—this explains σε ἐγεννήσαμεν preced. The Athenian law obliged all citizens, especially such as held any important office in the state, to be married, with a view to the procreation of children, which were considered as a kind of security for the good conduct of the parents, and their being well affected towards the interests of the republic. Dinarch. contr. Demosth. Meurs. Them. Att. i. 14. ii. 6.—Ἐλαβ. Cf. Mark, 12. 19. sqq.

ἢ οὐ καλῶς, κ. τ. λ.] The laws repeat here emphatically the subject of the preceding question, Ἄλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τ. τ. γ.—ἐπαιδεύθης.

ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῶ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; Καλῶς, φαίην ἄν. Εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδευθῆς, ἔχouis ἄν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἶει εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἄτ' ἄν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἰ σοι ὦν ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε ἄ περ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντιτύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐξέσται σοι, ὥστε ἐάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφὸς ὥστε λέληθέ σε ὅτι μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμιώτερόν ἐστι πατὴρ καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρα καὶ

[Ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ.] The Greeks, with the exception of the Lacedæmonians, were accustomed to have their sons instructed in letters, γράμματα, or γραμματικὴ τέχνη, which at first denoted ἐπιστήμην τοῦ γράψαι καὶ ἀναγνῶναι, the art of writing, and with propriety. This became subsequently so extended as to be designated by the term φιλολογία, which implied a knowledge of history, poetry, eloquence, and general literature. They were also taught the gymnastic exercises, music, and, not unfrequently, painting. See in Phædon, c. 4. a med. μουσικὴν ποιεῖ.

Καὶ δούλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρ.] For this species of apposition, see also Sophocl. Œd. Colon. 452. ἐπάξιος μὲν Οἰδίπους κατοικτίσαι, αὐτός τε παῖδες

θ' αἰδ'. 864. τοιγὰρ σέ, καὐτὸν καὶ γένος τὸ σὸν, θεῶν ὁ πάντα λεύσσων Ἥλιος δοίη βίον τοιοῦτον.

Οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν.] This is added in explanation of ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν preced., consequently it is not joined by any connecting particle with what goes before.

Ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετ. ἐπιμ.] A form particularly expressive of indignation and sarcasm; see Matthiæ Gr. s. 276. V. Cousin; *Toi qui as réellement consacré ta vie à l'étude de la vertu.*

Ἐν μείζονι μοίρα.] *Quod pluris æstimatur: quod in majorē pretio et honore est.* FISCH. Cf. Herodot. iii. p. 99. 25. Steph. Αὐτὸν ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ μεγάλῃ μοίρῃ ἦγον. Hom. Il. i, 818. ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι, καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι.



παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νουν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπέικειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατριδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ ἀν κελεύη, καὶ πάσχειν, ἂν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα, ἂν τε τύπτεσθαι ἂν τε δεῖσθαι, ἂν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον· ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἢ ἀν κελεύη ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε· βιάζεσθαι δ' οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα. Τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

§. 13. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν, ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὧν οἰοί τ' ἡμεν καλῶν σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ

Θωπεύειν.] *Blande palpari, verbis blandis precari, FISCH., to conciliate, to caress.* Θῶψ, *adulator, palpo*, whence Theætet. p. 128. Ε. θῶψας λόγους, *wheeling or flattering discourses.* V. Wesseling. ad Herodot. iii. 80. Both these terms have a common origin with θανμάζω, Ion. θωμάζω, the former through θάπω, Ion. θήπω, from θεάομαι, *to wonder, to admire*; thus θῶψ, *one who affects admiration*; Th. θάομαι, act. θάω, obsol.

Καὶ ἢ πείθειν, ἢ ποιεῖν.] *Aut persuadendo contendere te oportere.* WOLF. πείθειν, *placare oratione, ita ut doceas quomodo res habeat; meliora docere.* STALL.

Εἰς πόλ. ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον.] Steph. in marg. *ad bellum ubi vulnera sis accepturus.*

Ἡ πείθειν αὐτὴν ἢ τὸ δίκ. πέφ.] *Plane docere eam, quomodo justum sese natura habeat, i. e. plane docere naturam justi.* FISCH. The infin. πείθειν is used as if the verbal ποιητέον preced. had been resolved into ποιεῖν δεῖ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 447. 2. Cf. Gorg. p. 492. D. τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πληρωσιν ἄλλοθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν: where Heindorf, "Supplendum δεῖν, quod latebat in illo κολαστέον."

ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα.] Cic. ad Famil. i. ep. ix. 44. "Id enim jubet idem ille Plato, quem ego vehementer auctorem sequor: Tantum contendere in re publica quantum probare tuis civibus possis: vim neque parenti neque patriæ afferre oportere."

ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέαι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὴν δοκιμασθῆ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξείναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εἴαν τέ τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εἴαν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐλθῶν, ἵεναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἔχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ. ὃς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν ὃν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τὰλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν, ἤδη φαμὲν τοῦτον ὠμολογηκέαι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν, ἃ ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν, ποιήσειν ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῆ φαμὲν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννήταις οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ

§. 13. Τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέαι.] i. e. Nevertheless we proclaim, in having granted the indulgence to any of the Athenians who may desire to use it as soon as he has arrived at the years of discretion and become acquainted with the business of the state, and us, the laws, that it is lawful for him, having collected his effects, to depart whithersoever he pleases.—*Δοκιμασθῆ, postquam sui juris factus est, et res publicas cognovit.*—*STALL.* i. e. The age at which one became competent to decide upon such matters as affected the republic. Allusion is made here to the *δοκιμασία εἰς ἄνδρας*. For the names of those who wished to enjoy the full privileges of an Athenian citizen, and to participate in those honours to which they became entitled by their freedom, were obliged to be enrolled, in the first instance, in the *κοινὸν γραμματεῖον*, or register of their particular *φρατρία*, or ward, with an oath on the part of the parents, that every son so registered was lawfully born, or lawfully adopted. At what age children were thus enrolled does not appear; some suppose at one, others, at three or four years old. The second enrolment was at the age of eighteen, when young persons were admitted into the number of the *ephebi*. The third, before the festival of the Pa-

nathææa, when those who were twenty years old were introduced at a public meeting of the *δημόται*, and entered in the register called *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον*, in which were inserted the names of all persons of that borough, who were of age to succeed to the *ληξίς*, or inheritance of their fathers. This was called *εἰς ἄνδρας ἐγγράφεισθαι*, or *δοκιμ. εἰς ἄνδ.* as *supr.* The persons so enrolled were thenceforward at their own disposal, and not subject to the control of guardians. Cf. *Æschin. adv. Timarch.* p. 26. ed. Bremi. *ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγγραφῆ τις εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, καὶ τοὺς νόμους εἶδῃ τοὺς τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἤδη δύνηται διαλογίζεσθαι τὰ καλά καὶ τὰ μῆ, οὐκ ἐτι ἐτέρῳ διαλέγεται (ὁ νομοθέτης.)* v. *Demosth.* in *Midiam.* c. 43. *Ulp. Boeckh, de Epheb. Attic. in lib.*—*Τῷ βουλομένῳ—λαβόντα,* Cf. *Sophocl. Electra,* 470. *Brunck.* ὑπεστί μοι θράσος, ἀδυπνῶν κλύουσαν ἀρτίως ὄνειράτων. *Lysias Epitaph.* p. 28. *ἄξιον γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις—ὑμνοῦντας.*

*Εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι.*] i. e. To emigrate into a Grecian, and that an Athenian colony; *μετοικεῖν*,—into a foreign country, Grecian or barbarian; *παραμένειν*, to continue to abide at Athens. *FISCH.*

*Ὁμολ. ἔργῳ.]* Has virtually agreed.

ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἢ μὴν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιούμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταπτόντων ποιεῖν ἂν κελύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφιέντων δυεῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

§. 14. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴ περ ποιήσεις ἂ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. Εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴποιμι διὰ τί δὴ; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπτοιτο, λέγοντες ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίην γὰρ ἂν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἠρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτε ἐκ τῆς

Ὁμολογήσας — πείθεσθαι.] Cf. c. 14. infr. ὁμολόγηεις — πολιτεύεσθαι. n.

Οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς.] Intell. *that we are acting unjustly*, implied in *εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιούμεν*, seq.—*Προτιθέντων ἡμῶν*, &c. h. e. *Quum nos et potestatem faciamus eorum, qua publice jubentur cognoscendorum atque indicandorum, neque immani severitate quemquam cogamus, ut faciat quae fieri velimus, imo vero concedamus, ut aut doceat meliora, aut, si hoc non potuerit, nobis pareat, tamen iste neutrum horum facit.* STALL. The laws are said here *προτιθέναι*, in allusion to the proposing of a law in public, written upon a white tablet, and suspended at the statues of the *ἐπώνυμοι*, for due consideration, and subsequent approval or rejection on the part of the people, upon the former of which it became either a *νόμος*, a general and perpetual law, or a *ψήφισμα*, which was limited to particular places and times, but the obligation of both was the same.

Τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.] Ficinus appears to have read *ποιεῖς*; but the text is correct. BUTTM.

§. 14. Ἐνέξεσθαι.] *Would become liable*: whence *ἐνοχος, reus*; *obnoxious*.—*Ἐπινοεῖς*,—*ἐπινοεῖν* and *ἐπινοία*, are generally taken in a bad sense as expressive of evil or mischievous contrivance.

Ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα.] Intell. *ἐνεχομένοισ*. See Matthiæ Gr. 290. 3.

Καθάπτοιτο.] *Καθάπτεσθαι*, Hesych. interpr. *λοιδορεῖσθαι, δνειδίζειν, πραῦνειν*. Homer uses it in this sense, as also in the opposite one, *to soothe, to pacify*. Cf. Iliad. *ά*, 582. Odys. *β'*, 39. 240. *κ'*, 70. Plato uses it as *supr.* in conformity with the delicacy of the Attic writers, who generally adopted such equivocal terms as might temper their severity in rebuke with the mildness they should have otherwise implied.

Ἐπὶ θεωρίαν.] Ἐπὶ is often put after verbs of motion with substantives which do not denote a place, but an action which is the end of one's going, &c. as Herod. i. 37. *ἵεναι ἐπὶ θήραν*, and *supr.* Matthiæ Gr. 586. c. *Θεωρία* means here the Olympic, Nemean, Isthmian, and Pythian games, for which see Robinson's Grec. Antiq. book iii. c. 21. 22. 23. 24.

πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, ὅ τι μὴ ἄπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν, οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμῶσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἐποιήσω ἀποδημίαν πώποτε ὡς περ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδ' ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἡροῦ, καὶ ὁμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παιδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω, ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμῆσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅ περ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλ' ἡροῦ, ὡς ἔφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὐτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅ περ ἂν δοῦλος ὁ φαυλότατος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὁμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ ἄλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. Τί

“Ὅ τι μὴ ἄπαξ.] *Except once.* See Matthiæ Gr. 624. 3. b. Seag. Viger. c. viii. 10. 5.

Εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος.] See Apol. Socr. c. 17. init.

Οὐδ' ἄλλων—εἰδέναι.] h. e. ὥστε εἰδέναι αὐτούς. See Matthiæ Gr. 630. h.

Ὁμολόγεις—πολιτεύεσθαι.] Stallbaum meets the corrections proposed by Stephens, here, πολιτεύεσθαι, inf. ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι, and ὁμολογηκεναι πολιτεύεσθαι, as c. 13. extr. ὁμολογήσας—πέσεισθαι, the futures for the present, by supposing the case of a citizen who was binding himself, by an oath, to conform to the laws of his state, and contrasting the effect of the two constructions, in either of which he might acknowledge his submission: ἡ μὴν ὁμολογῶ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολι-

τεύεσθαι; or ἡ μὴν ὁμολ. κατὰ τοὺς νόμ. πολιτεύεσθαι; the latter of which he justly prefers as the more emphatic; the restraint of the law being felt simultaneously with the consent to abide by it. There remains no difficulty then in applying a rule which so holds good in the *oratio recta* to the *oratio obliqua*, as in the text *supr.* and similar passages.

Ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμῆς.] See Apol. Socr. c. 25.

Ἐκαλλωπίζου.] Properly, *to beautify or embellish*; thence *to assume airs of pride or affectation, to vaunt one's self.* For τεθνάναι, which is present in sense, but past in form, see Apol. Socr. c. 17. extr.

“Α περ.] Euseb. ὁ περ, adopted also by Ficinus; v. Lat. Interpr.

Ξυνέθου.] *You covenanted.*

φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἂν φαῖεν, ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλευσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι. σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαίμονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομείσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροί· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι· τίτι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; εἰ μὲν γὰρ πεῖθῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθών.

§. 15. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἐξαμαρτών τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπι-

Ἄς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομ.] Cf. Alcib. Prim. c. 38. ΣΩΚ. Εἰ δ' αὖ ἴθελήσεις εἰς σωφροσύνην τε καὶ κοσμοτήτα ἀποβλέψαι καὶ εὐχέριαν καὶ εὐκολίαν καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνην καὶ εὐταξίαν καὶ ἀνδρίαν καὶ καρτερίαν καὶ φιλοπονίαν καὶ φιλονεικίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων, παῖδα ἂν ἠγγήσαιω σαυτὸν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. In Minos. c. 17. a. med. ΣΩΚ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω, δοκοῦσι σοι παλαιστάτοις Κρήτες οἱ Μίνως καὶ Ραδάμανθος πολῖται νόμοις χρῆσθαι; Εἶ. Φαίνονται. ΣΩΚ. Οὗτοι ἄρα τῶν παλαιῶν ἄριστοι νομοθέται γεγονᾶσι, νομεῖς τε καὶ ποιμένες ἀνδρῶν, ὡς περ καὶ Ὅμηρος εἶπε ποιμένα λαῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν στρατηγόν.

Οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροί.] Pollux, ii. 61. Ἀνάπηρος δὲ ἔστιν ὁ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα πεπηρωμένος. Schol. min. ad Iliad. β', 599. Πηρὸς καλεῖται ὁ κατὰ τι μέρος

τοῦ σώματος βεβλαμμένος. See Luke, xiv. 13. 21.

Οἱ νόμοι δῆλον ὅτι.] i. e. So particularly with you beyond the rest of Athenians, did both the state find favour, and ourselves, the laws to wit; for to whom could a state without laws recommend itself? Buttmann, in explan. δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι ἠρεσκομέν σοι; whence the effect of τίτι γὰρ ἂν, κ. τ. λ., is considerably increased.—Stephens would reject οἱ νομ. δῆλ. ὅτι. as a gloss; it is plain in the case of either explanation as supr., which are both equally admissible, that much of the spirit and force of the passage depends on the phrase being retained.

Ἐάν ἡμῖν γε πεῖθῃ.] The laws answer themselves: But you will remain (ἀλλ' ἐμμενεῖς underst.) if you obey us, Socrates, and will not become contemptible by departing from the state.

τηδείους τοὺς σαυτοῦ. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύουσὶ γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δήλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πολεων ἔλθης, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε, — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφοτέραι — πολέμιος ἦξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἠγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅς τις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς ἐστὶ, σφόδρα που δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἢ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος — τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὖς περ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἢ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἶεσθαί γε χρή. Ἄλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἦξεις δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἠδέως σου ἀκούοιεν, ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθέμενος ἢ διφθέραν λαβὼν ἢ

§. 15. Ἡ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε.] Cf. in Phædon. c. 47. a med. πάλα ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀσᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν.

Ἐποβλέψονται.] Ἐποβλεπόμενος. Hesych. interp. ὑπονοῶν, ἐχθραίνων: ὑποβλέπεσθαι, to look upon one with anger or suspicion. V. Cousin: tout bon citizen t'y regarder] un œil de défiance.

Τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους.] Κόσμοι.— Fisch. interp. qui vitam, mores, studia diligenter dirigunt et componunt ad legum normam; modesti, probi.

Ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται.] Cf. in Phædon. c. 9. extr. ὃ μηδὲν ἠδὲ τῶν τοιού-

των μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν.

Ἡ οὖς περ ἐνθάδε.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 619.

Τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι.] Usages and laws.

Ἄταξία καὶ ἀκολασία.] Steph. in marg. maxima licentia est et petulantia. The luxury, licentiousness, and intemperance of the Thessalians have been recorded by several of the ancient writers. Athenæus. pp. 137. 418. 527. 663. Xen. Mem. i. c. 2. 24. &c.

Σκευὴν τέ τινα.] Σκευή, Hesych. Suid. interp. στολή. Phavorin.: Σκευή·

ἄλλα οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας. ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἀνὴρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμῆν ζῆν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἐρεῖ; ἴσως, ἂν μὴ τινα λυπηῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὧ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων, τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐχόμενος ἐν Θετταλία, ὡς περ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς εἰς Θετταλίαν. λόγοι δὲ ἐκείνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; Ἄλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν ἕνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δαί; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτό σου ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέψον-

όξυτόνως, τὸ ἐνδύμα ὅθεν καὶ σκευάζομαι τὸ ἐνδύομαι. A robe which enveloped the whole person; whence περιθήμενος and ἐνσκευάζεσθαι infr.

Τὸ σχῆμα.] Σχῆμα, Hesych. interp. ἱματισμός, habitus et vestitus.

Ἐτόλμησας οὕτω γλίσχρως, κ. τ. λ.] Had you the assurance to be so tenaciously desirous of life?—γλίσχρως ἐπιθυμῆν ζῆν, quom quis omnia molitur et machinatur ut vitam servet. FISCH. Ficius misinterprets γλίσχρως; Lat. Int.

Εἰ δὲ μὴ.] Otherwise: negative propositions, especially with the Attic writers, being usually followed in the antithesis by a negative condition, as supr. instead of an affirmative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 617. b. Cf. in Phædon. c. 8. sub. fin. δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ ἄς καὶ τρεῖς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιούντας.

Ἐπερχόμενος.] Ἐπερχέσθαι, properly, to go under, to creep into; thence to insinuate one's self into the favour of another by abject submission and flattery. So Phavorin. Ἐπερχομαι τὸ ὑποκάτω τινὸς ἔρχομαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου κολακεῖω. Schol. Aristoph. ad Equit. 269. Οἶον ὑπέρχεται ὡς ὑπάγεται

τὸν δῆμον ὑποτρέχων, καὶ κολακεύει, καὶ καταπραῖνει: Schleiermacher would omit δουλεύων seq. but incorrectly, as it implies either a gradation or a consequence of the quality implied in ὑπερχόμενος preced. Stallbaum explains the passage: *Vives igitur adulator adeoque servus aliorum: quid quæso aliud faciens quam convivans in Thessalia, quasi ad epulum quoddam e patria profectus sis in Thessaliam.*

Ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται.] Cf. Soph. CEd. Tyr. 965. ὦ θεῶν μαντεύματα, ἕν' ἐστέ; Eurip. Supplic. 127, τὸ δ' Ἄργος ἡμῖν ποῦ ἔστιν; ἢ κόμπει μάτην.

Ἀπολαύσωσιν.] Ἀπολαύειν is properly, to enjoy anything, in a favourable sense; it is in frequent use with the Attic writers in the opposite. Cf. ἐ Legg. p. 910, B. καὶ πᾶσα οὕτως ἢ πόλις ἀπολαύη τῶν ἀσεβῶν τρόπῳ τινὰ δικαίως. Lucian. Dialog. Deor. 10. Sol. τοιαῦτα ἀπολαύσονται τῶν Διὸς ἔρωτων. Mercur. Σιώπα, ὦ Ἥλιε, μὴ τι κακὸν ἀπολαύσῃς τῶν λόγων.

Αὐτοῦ.] At Athens. Αὐτοῦ Hesych. interp. ἐκεῖ, αὐτόθι· ἐπὶ τόπου.—Θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, have the force of passives here. v. Kuster, Voc.

ται καὶ παιδεύονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδαιοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν; πότερον ἂν μὲν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσης, ἐπιμελήσονται· ἂν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδου ἀποδημήσης, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται, εἰ πέρ γε τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι; οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

§. 16. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἄιδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς ταῦτα πάντα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιοτέρον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένω ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδίκημένος ἄπει, ἂν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων· ἂν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχροῦς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβάς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἦκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡτέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

§. 17. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι

Med. c. 3. Matthiæ Gr. 496. 8. Steph. in marg. *An hoc quidem non facies, sed, si hic (Athenis) ducentur, te superstite, melius educabuntur et instituentur, te cum illis non versante? tui enim necessarii illorum curam gerent.*

[Πότερον ἂν.] Ficinus appears to have read *πότερον δὲ ἂν*, approved by Fischer, rejected by Buttmann, as impairing the effect of the asyndeton, caused by omitting the adversative particle, as *supr.*

§. 16. Πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.] Cf. c. 9. a med. πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

Οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε.] *For neither in*

*this life, &c.* Ταῦτα πράττοντι, sc. pursuing the course proposed by Crito. Ἄμεινον εἶναι; a common form for ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: See Matthiæ Gr. s. 457. p. 757. Cf. in Phædon. 63. extr.; whence by a kind of attraction οὐδὲ δικαιοτέρον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, seq.

Ἄλλὰ νῦν μὲν.] Sc; now that he had declined to adopt the counsel of Crito.

Ἀδελφοί.] The Greek writers elegantly applied the terms ἀδελφοὶ and ἀδελφὰ to things which were the same or similar in character and kind.

Τὸ σὸν μέρος.] C. 11. *supr.* a med.



ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡς περ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐ-  
λῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἡχῇ τούτων  
τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλ-  
λων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν-  
τα, εἴαν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὅμως μέν-  
τοι εἴ τι οἶει πλέον ποιήσῃς, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰ τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη,  
ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

§. 17. Κορυβαντιῶντες.] The Corybantes, priests of Cybele, used to disturb, with the clash of cymbals, and especially with flutes, the reason of those who took part in their frantic orgies, and so rendered them insensible to every other impression except the sound of the instruments; whence *κορυβαντιῶν*, Tim. Plat. Lex. *παρεμ-  
μαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῶς κινεῖσθαι*. The term was properly applied to those who were troubled with delirium, noises in the ears, and broken rest, for which the most efficient cure was in rocking the patient like a child, and soothing him with music to sleep: so Plat. de Legg. vii. p. 628. D. V. Lucret. ii. 617. "Tympana tenta tonant palmis, et cymbala circum Concava, raucisonaque minantur cornua cantu, et Phrygio stimulat numero cava tibia menteis, Te-  
laque præportant violenti signa furoris, Ingratos animos, atque impia pectora vulgi Conterrere metu quæ possint numine Divæ."

Ἡ ἡχῇ—βομβεῖ.] Cf. Horat. Ep. i. 1. 7. "Est mihi purgatam qui crebro personet aurem." Mæris. ἡχῇ, Ἄττικῶς ἡχος, (for which Thom. Mag. ἡχώ) Ἑλληνικῶς.

Ἄλλὰ ἴσθι—μάτην ἐρεῖς.] Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 5. *εὐ μέντοι ἴσθι, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ*; *ibid.* c. 17. *ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει εὐ ἴσθι*.

Καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτη.] Under the direction of the Deity Socrates expresses his purpose of adhering to the principle of which Crito is finally induced to approve. The grand point in the dialogue,

the moral obligation imposed upon every citizen to submit under all circumstances to the laws of the state, is argued by the philosopher with a zeal and distinctness, which show sufficiently how deeply his thoughts were engaged, and his feelings were interested, upon a subject of such moment to his country and himself.—To his country, because a government could not be supposed to be otherwise than indifferently administered, whose laws it would be possible for one with impunity to evade; and to himself, because there could be no more effective refutation of the falsehoods of his adversaries, than his persisting, on the forfeit of his life, to uphold by the sanction of example, the respect and reverence due to those laws, whose restraint he was said to contemn. Through a long and arduous life, their friend and instructor as the advocate of virtue at home, and their no less competent champion and model of valour in the field, Socrates made the civil and military glory of the Athenians the object of his indefatigable exertions. It was not then to be otherwise expected than that the voice of his country should have been obeyed at the last, and that the existence which had long been devoted to the improvement, and often exposed for the safety of Athens, should have been willingly and obediently resigned when its services had ceased to be felt, and when an implicit submission at the present could not fail to furnish a triumphant and irrefragable proof of the upright sincerity that had ever influenced the past.



# Φ Α Ι Δ Ω Ν .

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ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ,  
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ, ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ,  
Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΥΠΗΡΕΤΗΣ.

## ARGUMENT.

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THIS dialogue, like the former, was held in the prison in which Socrates was confined. The last hours of his life were devoted to the discussion of the momentous subject, the immortality of the soul; Phædo, with whose name the dialogue is inscribed, is introduced as the historian of the scene and the arguments of the respective actors.

The first part of the dialogue is occupied in establishing the incorruptibility of the intellectual principle, and its total independence of organic decay.

The second contains a review of the popular and mythological creeds, respecting the ultimate condition of the soul when removed from the sphere of its earthly existence, and concludes with a circumstantial account of the philosopher's death.

## Φ Α Ι Δ Ω Ν .

§. 1. Αὐτός, ὃ Φαίδων, παρεγένου Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἣ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ ἠκουσας ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα ; ἠδέως γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσαιμι.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ.] Entitled also, Φαίδων, ἢ περι ψυχῆς, Ἡθικός, on the authority of Thrasyllus, Diog. Laert. iii. 58. Αὐτός ὃ Φαίδων—Hermogenes, περι μέθ. Δειν. i. p. 518, remarks upon the singular force of αὐτός in the question and reply : καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι.—Ἀντὸς, ὃ Φαίδων, παρεγένου ; Αὐτὸς ὃ Ἐχέκρατες. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἤρετο ὡς θαυμάζων καὶ μακαρίζων τὸν παραγενόμενον, ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο σεμννόμενος καὶ μέγα φρονῶν. WYTTENBACH.

Phædo, of Elis, was a disciple of Socrates ; he was nobly descended, but having lost his property in early life, he was sold at Athens as a slave. Socrates, in passing the house where he lived, was struck with his intelligent and ingenuous look, and persuaded one of his friends, Alcibiades or Crito, to redeem him. Thenceforward Phædo applied himself diligently to the study of moral philology, under Socrates, and adhered

to his master, with the most affectionate attachment, to the last. He instituted a school at Elis, after the Socratic model, which was continued by Plistanus, an Elean, and afterwards by Menedemus, of Eretria. — Echecrates, of Phlius, a town of Achaia, in the territory of Sicyon, is supposed to have been the same alluded to by Diogenes Laertius, viii. 46. and Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. i. 35. Plat. Epist. ix. p. 726. A., as one of the last of the Pythagorean School.

Τὸ φάρμακον.] *The hemlock ; κώ-  
νειον*, Laert. ii. 35. Senec. Ep. 13. “Cicuta magnum Socratem fecit.” Ep. 67. “Calix venenatus, qui Socratem transtulit e carcere in cælum.” Cf. Persius, iv. 1.—“barbatum hæc crede magistrum Dicere, sorbitio tollit quem dira cicuta.”

Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἅττα.] Cf. Theæt. c. 10. τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα. Gorg. c. 136. σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα, and infr. c. 2. τί ἦν τὰ λεχ-

καὶ γὰρ, οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλιασιῶν οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήναζε, οὐδέ τις ξένος ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ ἐκείθεν, ὅς τις ἀνὴρ ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἀγγεῖλαι οἶός τ' ἦν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πῶν ἀποθάνοι τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχε φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδὲ τά περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπύθεσθε ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

ΕΧ. Ναί, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγεῖλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῶ ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανῶν. τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχη τις αὐτῶ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρῦμμα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν.

θέντα καὶπραχθέντα. Τι as predicate, with ἐστὶ following, is sometimes accompanied by the subject in the neuter plural. Matthiæ Gr. s. 488. 7.

Ἐπιχωριάζει—Ἀθήναζε.] Phædo is supposed to narrate to Echecrates, at Phlius, the circumstances connected with the death of Socrates, of which little was known beyond the event having actually occurred, owing to the infrequent intercourse between the Phliasiens and Athenians. See Mitford's Greece, c. xxv. s. 4. p. 408.

Οὐδεὶς πάνυ τι.] Ἐντὶ τοῦ οὐδαμῶς. ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐξῆς οὕτως: πάνυ οὐδεὶς ἐπιχωριάζει. Schol. Cod. Bodl.

Ὅστις ἀνὴρ ἡμῖν—οἶός τ' ἦν.] Οἶός τ' ἦν. Edd. Cod. Aug. But the imperfect is correctly used here, both in reference to ἀφίκται, preced. which is to be taken in a past sense, because of χρόνου συχνοῦ subjoined, and also to εἶχε seq. HEIND. Cf. Aristoph. Lysistr. 109. Οὐκ εἶδον οὐδ' ὄλισβον ὀκτωδάκτυλον, ὃς ἦν ἀνὴρ ἡμῖν σκυτίνῃ πικουρία.—Πλὴν . . . ὅτι . . . ἀποθάνοι, except that he was dead, &c.

Περὶ τῆς δίκης.] Not περὶ τὴν δίκην, as infr. c. 2. περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, but in the genitive, as Fischer

justly observes, on account of ἐπύθεσθε, seq. Cf. Xenoph. Cyrop. V. 3. 26. ὡς—ἐπεὶ πύθοιο τὰ περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου χαλεπῶς ἐνέγκοι. Anab. ii. 5. 37. ὅπως μάθῃ τὰ περὶ Προξένου. Herod. 2. 102. ἀριθμοὶ δὲ περὶ, μὴ πύθῃ, &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 589. 5.

Πολλῶ ὕστερον.] Thirty days after; Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8. 2.

Τύχη τις—ἔτυχε γὰρ.] An agreeable paronomasia, referring the event to its cause. Cf. Achil. Sat. i. p. 55. (speaking of the Phœnix,) ἔτυχη γὰρ τύχη τινι συμβῆν τότε τὸν ὄρνιν ἀναπτέρωσαι τὸ κάλλος. Upon the force of συνέβη, which implies a combination of circumstances, Plutarch, having quoted the passage as supr. observes: Ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ ΣΥΝΕΒΗ οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ ΓΕΓΟΝΕΝ ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκ συνδρομῆς τινος αἰτιῶν ἀπέβη, ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο γεγονότος. Simplic. ad Aristot. Phys. ii. p. 79. B. καὶ Πλάτων δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τύχην καλεῖ, λέγων ἐν Φαίδωνι, Τύχη τις αὐτῶ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ τύχης τὶ αὐτῶ συνέβη.—WYTT.

Τῇ προτεραιᾷ.] Thom. Mag. and Phavor. Προτέρα, ἐπὶ τάξεως προ-

ΕΧ. Τοῦτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστίν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ᾧ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δις ἑπτὰ ἐκείνους ᾤχετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὖξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθείεν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἢν δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐξ ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. Ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρῆναι τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι, πρὶν ἂν εἰς Δῆλόν τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεῦρο· τοῦτο δ' ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς

τεραῖα δὲ, ἐπὶ μόνῃς ἡμέρας. Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραία τῆς δίκης.

Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πλοῖον.] Minos, king of Crete, to avenge the death of his son Androgeos, besieged Athens, and withdrew his forces only on condition that seven virgins, and so many boys [ἡθέους ἑπτὰ καὶ παρθένους τσαυτάς. Plutarch. Thes. p. 6. παρθένους ἑπτὰ καὶ παῖδας ἴσους. Pausan. i. 27. extr.] should be sent every ninth year to Crete, to be devoured by the Minotaur; δις ἑπτὰ ἐκ. sup. The third time of paying this tribute, Theseus was included in the number to be so sacrificed, but he succeeded in killing the Minotaur, and preserving himself and his companions. Cf. Virgil *Æn.* vi. 20. In commemoration of this event, and pursuant to their vow, as sup. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι, &c., the Athenians sent every year a solemn deputation, θεωρία, to Delos. The individuals who composed it were called θεωροὶ and δηλιασταί, their principal, ἀρχιθέωρος, and the vessel in which they sailed, θεωρίς or δηλιάς. See Robinson's *Grec. Antiq.* B. iii. c. 9. and Mitford's *Greece*, i. c. 1. s. 3. p. 60.

Θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν.] Schol. ad h. l. ἅντι τοῦ θυσίαν ἀπενεγκεῖν. Θεωροὶ δὲ εἰσὶν οἱ πεμπόμενοι θῦσαι καὶ θεραπεύσαι τὸν θεόν· ὅθεν καὶ αἱ ὁδοὶ

δι' ὧν ἐπορεύοντο, θεωρίδες κέλευθοι ἐκαλοῦντο, καὶ τὰ διδόμενα θεωρικά, καὶ ἡ ναῦς ἢ εἰς Δῆλον πεμπομένη θεωρίς, καὶ ὁ ἱερεὺς θεωρός. There was another Δῆλια, a quinquennial festival, held to commemorate the purification of Delos by Pisistratus; for which see Thucyd. iii. 104. See also Potter, *Grec. Antiq.* i. p. 438.

Ἄει καὶ νῦν ἔτι.] Plutarch. Thes. p. 10. C. τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ᾧ μετὰ τῶν ἡθέων ἐπλευσε καὶ πάλιν ἐσώθη, τὴν τριακόντορον, ἄχρι τῶν Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως χρόνων διεφέλαττον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. The materials of the vessel were hence called ἀεζώοντα, Callim. *Hym. in Bell.*, but, in reality, it had undergone so many repairs and alterations, that it might have been reasonably doubted whether it was the same ship, in consequence of which it afforded the sophists an opportunity for a zealous discussion on the subject of its identity. See a parallel case quoted by Brown, *Philos. Lect.* xii.

Ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἄρξωνται.] The priest of Apollo decorated the poop of the vessel with garlands of laurel, as a signal for the commencement of the voyage, and the purification of the city.—Ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, during the celebration of the Δῆλια.

Ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς.] Ἀπολαμβάνειν is used sometimes of contrary winds which intercept and de-

θεωρίας ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔτυχεν, ὡς περ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλὸς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

§. 2. ΕΧ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδων; τί ἦν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶπραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶων οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσάν τινες, καὶ πολλοί γε.

ΕΧ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω τε καὶ πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνησθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε αἰεὶ πάντων ἡδιστον.

ΕΧ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους γε τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διελεῖν πάντα.

tain those at sea. Cf. Herodot. ii. 115. ὅσοι ὑπ' ἀνέμων ἤδη ἀπολαμφθέντες ἦλθον, κ. τ. λ. and Wesseling in loc. Demosth. de Chers. p. 98. δέκα μῆνας ἀπογενομένου τάνθρώπου καὶ νόσφ καὶ χειμῶνι καὶ πολέμοις ἀποληφθέντος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἐπανελθεῖν οἴκαδε. So the Latins use *deprendere* and *prendre*.—Αὐτούς, sc. τοὺς πλέοντας implied in πλοῖον preced.

Ἦς περ λέγω.] See Apol. Socr. c. 5. sub. fin. ὁ περ λέγω.

Πολλὸς χρόνος.] Xen. Memor. iv. 8. 2. Ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ, μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιώναι, διὰ τὸ Δῆλα μὲν ἐκείνου τοῦ μηνός εἶναι, τὸν δὲ νόμον μηδένα ἔξν δημοσίᾳ ἀποθνήσκειν, ἕως ἂν ἡθεωρία ἐκ Δήλου ἐπανέλθῃ. Suidas v. Σωκράτης.— ἐδέδετο οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ,

μέχρις ἂν ἡ ἀπὸ Δήλου θεωρία ἀφίκηται.

§. 2. Τῶν ἐπιτηδείων.] Mæris. Gl. p. 164. Ἐπιτηδεῖους, οὐκ ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς Ὑπομνήμασι [i. e. Scholiis Grammatic.] μόνους τοὺς ἐκ γένους προσήκοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐταίρους, ὡς Πλάτων Φαίδωνι. WYTT.

Οἱ ἄρχοντες.] sc. οἱ ἑνδεκα. Apol. Socr. c. 27. c. 31. Crit. c. 2.

Ἦνές, καὶ πολλοί γε.] *Aderant aliqui, imo vero multi.* STALL. Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 9. Καὶ οὐδενός n. Wytttenbach loses the force of καὶ in explaining the passage *Aderant quidam, et multi adeo.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 602.

Ἦς σαφέστατα—ἀπαγγεῖλαι.] *Quam diligentissime referre, narrare.* FISCH.

Τοιούτους ἐτέρους ἔχεις.] *Even such have you to listen to you, i. e. si-*



ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε θαυμάσια ἔπαθον παραγε-  
νόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνδρὸς  
ἐπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆγει· εὐδαίμων γὰρ μοι ἀνὴρ ἐφαί-  
νετο, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων,  
ὡς ἀδεῶς καὶ γενναίως ἐτελεύτα, ὥστ' ἔμοι ἐκείνον  
παρίστασθαι μὴδ' εἰς Ἄιδον ἰόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας  
ιέναι, ἀλλὰ κάκειϊσε ἀφικόμενον εὖ πράξειν, εἴ πέρ  
τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι

milarly affected with yourself; so Hein-  
dorf; *At vero etiam qui te audituri sint,*  
*similiter affectos habes;* who compares  
de *Repub.* vi. p. 498. G. ἀνδρα ἀρετῇ  
παρασημένον καὶ ὁμοιωμένον μέχρι  
τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελῶς, ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ  
δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἑτέρα τοιαύτη,  
οὐ πώποτε ἐωράκασι. *Lach.* p. 200. A.  
αὐτὸς ἄρτι φάνηξ ἀνδρίας περὶ οὐδὲν  
εἰδῶς· ἀλλ' εἴ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕτερος τοιοῦτος  
φανήσομαι, &c. *Phædr.* c. 45. γεννά-  
δας καὶ πρῶτος τὸ ἦθος, ἑτέρου δὲ τοι-  
ούτου ἱρῶν. Cf. *infr.* c. 29. a med.  
τοιούτον τόπον ἕτερον.

Παρόντα με—εἰσῆγει] *Eισιέναι* and  
*εἰσέρχασθαι*, like the Latin *subire*, are  
used to express the affection of the mind  
by the passions of hope, joy, sorrow,  
compassion, &c. *Eurip. Med.* 931. εἰ-  
σῆλθε μ' οἴκτος. *Iphig. Aul.* 491. μ'  
ἔλεος εἰσῆλθε. v. *Valckenar. ad Phœ-*  
*niss.* 1378. p. 464. sq. This construc-  
tion is varied *infr.* οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἐλει-  
νὸν εἰσῆγει; verbs compounded with  
prepositions which never govern a da-  
tive, sometimes taking the dative, when  
they express such a direction to an ob-  
ject, as *εἰσέρχεται τινι*. *Matthiæ Gr.*  
s. 402. c.

Τῶν λόγων.] *Aug. Int.* τοῦ λόγου,  
adopted by *Ficinus*; but the former is  
the more correct. Cf. *infr.* καὶ γὰρ οἱ  
λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινες ἦσαν, and *extr.*  
τινες, φῆς, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι.

Ὡς ἀδεῶς.] For ὅτι οὕτως ἀδεῶς.  
Cf. *Criton.* c. 1. Ὡς ἡδέως. n.—*Γεν-  
ναίως*; *Xen. Apol.* 33. ἐπεδείξατο δὲ  
τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ῥώμην—οὐδὲ πρὸς  
τὸν θάνατον ἑμαλακίσατο, ἀλλ' ἰλα-  
ρῶς, καὶ προσεδέχετο αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐπε-  
τελέσατο.—*Παρίστασθαι* is frequently  
used by itself, in reference to the  
thoughts which arise from present cir-

cumstances. *Hemsterhuis. ad Lucian.*  
*Contempl.* c. 13. *Taylor. ad Lysiam ed.*  
*Reiske,* p. 83. It is found, too, with *δόξα*  
or *τοῦτο*, as *Lys. in Eratosth.* p. 424.  
καὶ μηδενὶ τοῦτο παραστῆ, ὡς—*Θη-  
ραμένους κατηγορῶ*; and without any  
such addition as in the text, and *Thu-  
cyd. vi.* 68. καὶ παραστήτω παντὶ, τὸ  
μὲν καταφρονεῖν, &c.

Εἰς Ἄιδου.] See *infr.* c. 29. a med.  
εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς. *Socrates,* in  
*Cratyl.* cc. 44. 45. p. 45. 46., argues  
against the common acceptation of Ἄι-  
δης, and its attendant prejudices. ΣΩΚ.  
Καὶ τό γε ὄνομα ὃ Ἄιδης, ὃ Ἐρμό-  
γενες, πολλοῦ δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰδοῦς  
ἐπωνομάσθαι ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ  
τοῦ πάντα τὰ κατὰ εἰδέναι, ἀπὸ τού-  
του ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου Ἄιδης ἐκλή-  
θη—οὕτω καλοῦς τινας, ὡς ἔοικεν,  
ἐπίσταται λόγους λέγειν ὃ Ἄιδης,  
καὶ ἔστιν ὡς γε ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦτου  
ὃ θεὸς οὗτος τέλος σοφιστῆς τε καὶ  
μέγας ἐνεργέτης τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ, ὅς  
γε καὶ τοῖς ἐνθάδε τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ  
ἀνίησιν οὕτω πολλὰ αὐτῷ τὰ περι-  
όντα ἐκεῖ ἐστί, καὶ τὸν Πλούτωνα  
ἀπὸ τούτου ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα: whence  
he infers that the manes of the just  
should be unwilling to return again to  
earth. Opposed to this ἄδης φωτεινός,  
or habitation of the good, after death,  
was the ἄδης σκοτεινός or ζωφερός,  
the abode of the impious. *Orpheus* is  
said to have introduced this figment  
first, from *Egypt* into *Greece*. See  
*infr.* c. 13. sub. fin. εἰσι γὰρ δὴ φ. οἱ.  
π. τ. τ.

Ἄνευ θείας μοίρας.] *Sine consilio*  
*et voluntate deorum qui ei consulerent.*  
*STALL.*, because of ἀλλὰ κάκειϊσε ἀφ.  
εὖ πράξειν seq. Cf. *Plutarch. ii.* p.  
499. B. ἀποθνήσκοντα δὲ αὐτὸν

ἐλεεινὸν εἰσῆι, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει· οὔτε αὖ ἡδονὴ ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὡς περ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινες ἦσαν· ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἄτοπον τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀήθης κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένῳ ὅτι αὐτίκα ἐκείνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὔτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύνοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἴσθα γάρ που τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ΕΧ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐκεῖνός τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὔτως εἶχε, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔγωγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΕΧ. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων τίνες, παραγενόμενοι;

[Σωκράτην] ἐμακαρίζον οἱ ζῶντες, ὡς οὐδ' ἐν ᾧδου θείας ἀνευ μοίρας ἐσόμηνον.

Παρόντι πένθει.] *To one present at a sorrowful scene:* παρόντι depending on εἰκὸς and governing πένθει, in the dat. Heindorf. understands μοι το παρόντι, but this would require τῷ πένθει. The application of the passage is general; the composure of Socrates was such, that Phædo felt none of that commiseration which it was natural for any one to indulge who was witness to any similar affliction.

Ἦς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων.] i. e. *As when we were engaged in our philosophical studies.*—ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ εἶναι, in *philosophia versari, eadem occupari, quætere de locis philosophicis.* KÖRNER. Cf. Sophocl. *Ced. Tyr.* 570. *τότ' οὖν ὁ μάντις ἦν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ;* Xenoph. *Cyrop.* iv. 3. 23. *οἱ μὲν δὲ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἦσαν.* Maxim. *Tyr.* p. 396. i. ed. Lips. *τούς δὲ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ πανυ ἂν τις μέμψαιτο.*—STALL.

Τοιοῦτοι τινες.] i. e. Partaking of the character of their previous and customary discussions.

Ἄτοπον.] See in *Crit.* c. 2. extr.

Κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τε τῆς ἡδ. ] See *infr.* c. 3. Ἦς ἄτοπον. Cf. Liban. *Epist.* lxxiii. *κρᾶσις ἔχει μέ τις ἡδονῆς καὶ*

*τοῦναντίου.*

Ὅτε μὲν γελ. ἐνίοτε δὲ δακ.] These participles are added in explanation of οὔτω preced. otherwise the construction should be οὔτω διεκείμεθα· ὅτε μὲν ἐγελῶμεν, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἐδακρύομεν. [as *Lys.* p. 779. *ὅμεις δὲ οὔτω διετέθητε· τοὺς μὲν φεύγοντας κατεδέξασθε, &c.*] Compare with the text as *supr.* Sophocl. *Ced. Tyr.* 10. *τὴν τρόπον καθέστατε; Δείσαντες, ἢ στέρξαντες;* Xenoph. *Anab.* iv. 1. 4. *τὴν δὲ—ἐμβολὴν ὡδε ποιοῦνται, ἅμα μὲν λαθεῖν πειρώμενοι ἅμα δὲ φθάσαι, &c.* HEIND.

Ἀπολλόδωρος.] A zealous and attached friend of Socrates; ἐπιθυμητῆς ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ, Xen. *Apolog.* c. 28. He was morose in temper, and gloomy in disposition, whence in *Sympos.* c. 2. ΕΤΑΙ. Ἄει ὅμοιος εἶ, ὦ Ἀπολλόδωρε· αἰεὶ γὰρ σαυτὸν τε κακηγορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκεῖς μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἀθλοῦς ἠγεῖσθαι πλὴν Σωκράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενος. καὶ ὁπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἔπιθυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς [*nimius in laudando.* AST.] καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος εἶ· σαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγρῆαινεῖς πλὴν Σωκράτους—and possessed of but little strength of mind: see *infr.* c. 66. a med. *Ælian,* V. H. i. 16. mentions, as an instance of his

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Κριτών, καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης. ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δέ, οἶμαι, ἡσθένει.

simplicity, his having brought with him into the prison a tunic and splendid cloak, in which Socrates was to be dressed before his death.

Καὶ Κριτόβουλος.] Crito, who gave name to the preceding dialogue, had four sons, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes, and Ctesippus. Laert. ii. 121. But the Hermogenes mentioned supr. appears to have been the son of Hipponicus, and brother of Callias. Cratyl. c. 2. ΣΩ. Ὁ παῖ Ἱππονίκου, Ἑρμογένες, &c. and Epigenes to have been the same as in Apolog. Socr. c. 22. a med. the son of Antiphon. Of Æschines, Diog. Laertius writes, iii. 37. Αὐτοῦ δὲ (Αἰσχίνου) Πλάτων οὐδαμῶθι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ συγγραμμάτων μνήμην πεποιήται, ὅτι μὴ ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ Ἀπολογία. c. 22. He had lived in great poverty for many years at Athens, as an attached disciple and friend of Socrates, when he resolved to visit the court of Dionysius, who was, or affected to be, a patron of philosophers. He was introduced by Aristippus, and liberally rewarded for his Socratic dialogues.—He remained in Sicily until the expulsion of the tyrant, and then returned to Athens, where he gave instructions in philosophy, for payment, in private, as he could not publicly compete with Plato or Aristippus. He then, to enlarge his means, took up oratory, and appeared as the rival of Demosthenes. Antisthenes was born at Athens, about the ninetieth Olympiad, and served, in his youth, with considerable distinction, particularly at the battle of Tanagra. He first directed his attention to rhetoric, in which he was instructed by the sophist Gorgias; but abandoned a pursuit so unsatisfactory, for the more important study of moral and intellectual philosophy. He became a disciple of Socrates, and, in imitation of his master, sacrificed everything to the attainment of

virtue. After the death of Socrates, while Plato and the rest of his disciples were forming schools, Antisthenes selected for his a place of public exercise without the city, near the Lyceum, called *Κυνόσαργες*, the temple of the white or swift dog; which, when Diomus was sacrificing to Hercules, seized upon part of the victim, whence the name of the place. Some writers derive from hence the name of the sect *Κυνικοί*, which Antisthenes founded here, others, and the more numerous, ascribe their title to the surname of their master, *Κύων*, which he obtained in consequence of the harshness and severity of his censures upon the manners of the age.—Ctesippus; Euthydem. c. 5. *νεανίσκος τις Παιανιεύς, μάλα καλὸς τε κάγαθος τὴν φύσιν ὅσον μὲν, ὑβριστῆς δὲ διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι.* Cf. Lysid. p. 206. 207. seq.—Menexenus, son of Demophon, was born of a noble family, and applied himself, early in life, to the study of philosophy. He was a follower of Ctesippus, whence they are mentioned together here, as in Lysid. locc. cit. One of the dialogues of Plato, on the subject of the Athenians who died for their country in battle, is inscribed with his name, *Μενέξενος, ἢ Ἐπιτάφιος, ἠθικός.*

Πλάτων — ἡσθένει.] Forster conjectures that Plato would have it inferred from hence, that his illness was occasioned by his grief for the impending death of his valued master. Athenæus, having recounted the several arguments in proof of the misunderstanding which was said to have existed between Plato and Xenophon, brings forward, in further confirmation, the passage in the text, where the name of the latter is omitted in the enumeration of those who had assembled to pay the last tribute of affection and respect to their venerable instructor and friend;

ΕΧ. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρήσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Συμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης, καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

ΕΧ. Τί δαί; Ἀριστίππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;

l. xi. c. 15. p. 505. *Κάν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ Πλάτων καταλεγόμενος ἕκαστον τῶν παρατυχόντων οὐδὲ κατὰ μικρὸν τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος μέμνηται.* Neither indeed could Plato have made any mention of Xenophon, who had departed into Asia a year before the death of Socrates; ἐνὶ προτέρῳ ἔπει τῆς Σωκράτους τελευτῆς. Laert. ii. 55.—Whence it is not likely that it ever occurred to Plato to explain the cause of his absence, and with regard to any jealousy which was reported to have existed between them, Xenophon was too far beneath his cotemporary to have ever been considered in the light of a rival. HEIND. So V. Cousin: “Je ne crois pas inutile de répéter que ce n’est aucunement par envie que Platon ne parle pas ici de Xénophon, ou qu’il ne remarque pas qu’il était absens pour une cause sérieuse. Il ne dit pas que Xénophon était alors à la guerre, parceque c’était une chose assez connue de son temps, et qu’il ne pouvait soupçonner qu’on lui ferait, cinq siècles plus tard (Athénée, liv. xi. 15), l’accusation de jalousie contre Xénophon. Heindorf est le premier qui se soit élevé contre la prétendue inimitié de ces deux grands hommes. Ils différaient sans doute; mais supposer qu’ils aient écrit pour se décrier, ou pour se distinguer l’un de l’autre, comme on l’a dit souvent, c’est une puérilité dont il n’existe aucune preuve.”

*Συμμίας τέ—καὶ Κέβης.*] Disciples of Philolaus, infr. c. 5. a med. a native of Crotona, who lived subsequently in Heraclea. He was a disciple of Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher of Tarentum, and cotemporary with Plato, to whom he sold the written records of the Pythagorean system, contrary to the express oath of the society, that they would keep secret the mysteries of their sect. It is probable that among these

books were the writings of Timæus, the Locrian, one of the Italic school, upon which Plato formed the dialogue which bears his name. Philolaus having interfered in civil affairs, fell a sacrifice subsequently to political jealousy. Enfield, Philosophy, B. ii. c. 12. s. 2. Phædonides, also a Theban v. Rhunk. ad Xenoph. Mem. i. 2. 48.—Euclides of Megara, founder of the Megaric sect, called the Eristic, from its contentious character, devoted himself to the study of philosophy in early life, and removed from Megara to Athens, for the purpose of joining the disciples of Socrates. He displeased Socrates by engaging in forensic disputes, to which he was led by an immoderate passion for controversy, and returned to Megara, where he became the head of a school, in which his chief occupation was to teach the art of disputation. He is not to be confounded with the mathematician, who flourished at a later period under Ptolemy Lagus, and died in the 123rd Olympiad. Enf. Phil. ii. c. 6. Of Terpsion nothing is known, further than that he is one of the speakers in Plato’s dialogue, entitled Theætetus. Aristippus was the well-known founder of the Cyrenaic sect, which was so called from his native city, Cyrene, in Africa. It is not clear whether Cleombrotus, mentioned supr., was the native of Ambracia, of the same name, who furnished the subject for the celebrated epigram of Callimachus, to the effect that Cleombrotus of Ambracia, having paid his last respects to the sun, threw himself headlong from the top of a tower, not that he had done anything worthy of death, but had only read Plato’s treatise on the immortality of the soul, and courted, by self-destruction, the death which he felt convinced to be the passage to a happier life. Callim. Epigr. xxiv. Tuscul. i. 34. Some suppose that he was not the one alluded

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

ΕΧ. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχηδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

ΕΧ. Τί οὖν δῆ; τίνες, φῆς, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

§. 3. ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγῆσασθαι. αἰὲ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτᾶν καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι ἔωθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου. Περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμοτήριον, διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἀνεφύγνυτο γὰρ οὐ πρόω. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον ξυνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἐσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφικνόμενον εἶη· παρηγγειλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἦκειν ὡς πρωϊαίτατα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἦκο-

to in the text, but there is nothing clearly known of any other friend of Socrates of this name.

[*Ἐν Αἰγίνῃ.*] It is conjectured, with great probability, that Plato intends covertly to rebuke Aristippus and Cleombrotus for their neglect of Socrates, in remaining to indulge their luxurious and effeminate pleasures at Ægina, from which they might have sailed with ease to Athens, a distance of but two or three and twenty miles: Diog. Laert. iii. 36. εἶχε δὲ φιλέχθρος ὁ Πλάτων καὶ πρὸς Ἀριστιππον· ἐν γούν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς διαβάλλον αὐτὸν φησίν, ὅτι οὐ παρέγένετο Σωκράτει τελευτῶντι, ἀλλ' ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ἦν καὶ σύνεγγυς. Athenæus, xii. p. 544. D. διέτριβεν δ' ὁ Ἀριστιππος τὰ πολλὰ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ τρυφῶν. Aristippus annoyed Socrates by his passion for dress and extravagant habits, and offended his friends by the freedom of his manners, so much so, that he withdrew from Athens to the island of Ægina, and there met with the celebrated Lais, whom he brought on with him to Corinth. Cf. Horat. Sat. ii. 3. 99.

Ep. i. 17. 23.

§. 3. [*Ἐωθεν.*] Suid. and Phavor. i. q. Πρωῖθεν, h. e. *diluculo, prima aurora, sub aurora, ante lucem.* FISCH.

[*Ἐως ἀνοιχθείη.*] If an action has been frequently repeated in times past, ἕως has the opt. without *ἀν.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 522. 1.

[*Διατρίβοντες μετ' ἀλλήλων.*] i. e. *διαλεγόμενοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς*, as c. 65. *infr. init.*—*ἀνεφύγνυτο*; the Attic form of the common *impf. ἠνοίγετο.*—Matthiæ Gr. s. 168. Obs. 1.

[*Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθείη.*] The optative is put with the particles *ἐπεὶ, ἐπειδὴ, ὅτε, ὅποτε*, when the discourse is concerning a past action, which, however, was not limited to a precise point of time, but was repeated by several persons, or in several places; so *supr. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἕως ἀνοιχθείη τὸ δεσμ. . . . ἐπειδὴ. δὲ ἀνοιχ. εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σ.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 521.

[*Διημερεύομεν.*] Attic. Anon. ap. Villosion. Anec. Grec. p. 80. t. ii. *διημερεύει, ἀντι τοῦ πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμέραν*

μεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅς περ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπε περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι ἕως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ· Λύουσι γάρ, ἔφη, οἱ ἔνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῆδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολλὸν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν ἦκε καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς εἰσιέναι. Εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην, γιγνώσκεις γάρ, ἔχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμησέ τε καὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα εἶπεν, οἷα δὴ

περὶ τι αναλίσκει. Hesych. Διημερεύοντες· πᾶσαν ποιῶντες τὴν ἡμέραν.

Ἐπακούειν.] *Respondere et aperire.*

WYTT. Cf. Crit. c. 1.

Περιμένειν.] So the best editions read, instead of ἐπιμένειν, which signifies, *to be patient, to wait the consequence of anything*; but περιμένειν, generally, *to await, in one place, the arrival of some one, or to look for the appearance of something.* Whence the more frequent use of the latter in an absolute sense, whereas the former is more commonly joined with ἕως ἂν, and has certain derivatives which περιμένειν could not form. Wolf ad. h. l. Beck. Lectt. Phil. p. 89. supr. περιμένομεν οὖν. Infr. c. 65. ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. Sympos. init. οὐ περιμενεῖς; καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστάς περιέμενα.—STALL.

Λύουσι.] See Crit. c. 1.

"Ὅπως ἂν—τελευτήσῃ.] "Ὅπως ἂν is used with the conjunctive of the present, when referring to a continued action. Protag. c. 43. σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦνται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσι: and with the conjunctive of the aorist in reference to an action which is concluded at once, Plat. Gorg. 167. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ, ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτὸ αὐτῶν. HEIND. v. Matthiæ Gr. s. 518.

Οὐ πολλὸν—χρόνον ἐπισχὼν.] i. e. *after no long delay.* For ἐκέλευσεν, many editions read ἐκέλευεν, in consequence of ἦκε imp. preced. but this connexion of the aorist with the imperfect

is not unfrequent; Parmenid. p. 127. A. ἀνεγνώρισέ τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ ἡσπάζετο, καί—τὸ μὲν πρότερον ὄκνει, — ἐπεὶτα μέντοι διηγείτο. Phædr. p. 228. B. ἰδὼν μὲν ἰόντα ἦσθη, ὅτι ἔξοι τὸν συγκορυβαντιῶντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε. Different tenses may be connected, as supr. when two or more actions are to be considered as distinct in their character and intent. STALL.

Εἰσελθόντες.] Vulg. εἰσιόντες.—HEIND.

Τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην.] It is highly probable that the failings of Xanthippe have been greatly exaggerated. Socrates, in a dialogue with his son, Lamprocles, Xen. Mem. l. ii., gives her credit for many domestic virtues; nor are these so completely inconsistent with the evidences which she, no doubt, occasionally afforded of an intractable temper. The child, παιδίον, alluded to in the text, must have been either Sophroniscus or Menexenus: infr. c. 65. σμικροί. Apol. Socr. 23. παιδία, for Lamprocles, the eldest son of Socrates, was now grown up; infr. c. 65. μέγας. Apol. Socr. 23. μειράκιον.—Xen. Memor. ii. 2. 1. νεανίσκος. Plato, Xenophon, and Seneca appear to have known of one only of the wives of Socrates, Xanthippe, and nothing of the other, Myrto.—αἱ οἰκτεῖαι γυναῖκες, infr. c. 65. referring to his female relations and kindswomen. FISCH.

Ἀνευφήμησε.] *Wept aloud.* Suidas: ἀνευφήμησεν· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰθρήνησε· Πλάτων.—Hesychius explains it by ἀνώμωξε; κατ' ἀντίφρασιν, as

εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, ὕστατον δὴ σέ προσερούσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδευοι καὶ σὺ τούτους. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγαγέτω τις ταύτην οἴκαδε. Καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπήγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν τε καὶ κοπτομένην· ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἔτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα ὧς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, εἰσὶν εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ· ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δόκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἅμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεται αἰεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ὡς περ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δύ' ὄντε. Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἡδύνατο, ξυνήψεν εἰς ταῦτόν αὐτῶν τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὦ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται, ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτε-

ἀνευφημεῖν and εὐφημεῖν are properly applied to words of auspicious and favorable import; [approved by Stallbaum.

Τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος.] *Some of Crito's attendants.* The noble and wealthy at Athens never went abroad without a considerable retinue. Cf. Menon. c. 15. ἀλλά μοι προσκάλεσον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολουθῶν τουτωνὶ τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὄντινα βούλει.

Ἀνακαθιζόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνην.] *Sitting up in the bed.* Socrates having been unfettered early, did not rise until now, when he sat up in the bed; presently, c. 5. infr. καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, κ. τ. λ. Some editions read εἰς τὴν κλίνην, but ἕζεσθαι and καθίζειν εἰς τι, signify properly, *to go and sit down somewhere*, whence the text as supr. is the more correct. HEIND.

ὧς ἄτοπον—τοῦτο—ἡδύ.] *How strange, my friends, said he, this thing appears to be which men call plea-*

*sure, and how wonderfully it is disposed towards that which seems to be its opposite, pain; in that they are not willing both to befall a man at once, but should any pursue and attain the one, he is almost invariably compelled to admit the other, as if, being two, they were connected by one head.* Xenophon, in his retreat of the ten thousand, mentions that the tumult of joy in which the Greeks indulged at the sight of the Euxine, was succeeded, almost immediately, by a passion of tears;—ὧς ἀναμεικται τὰ πάθη! was the apposite remark to which the circumstance gave rise. Upon τῷ—μὴ ἐθέλειν supr., see Matthiæ Gr. s. 241. Compare with the passage in the text, Antiphon. apud Stob. Serm. vi. p. 78. ἔνθα τὸ ἡδύ ἐστι, πλησίον που καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ οὐκ ἐκ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐκπορεύονται, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθοῦσιν αὐταῖς λύπαι καὶ πόνοι.

Πολεμοῦντα.] *At variance.*

ρον. ὡς περ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει πρότερον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἦκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.

§. 4. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας, ἐντίνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον, καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤρουντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐηνὸς πρῶην, ὃ τί ποτε διανοηθεῖς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πρόποτε ποιήσας. Εἰ

§. 4. Ὑπολαβὼν.] Cf. Virg. Æn. vi. 723. "Suscipit Anchises atque ordine singula pandit." GORTL.

Εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με.] If the participle denotes an action coinciding in time with that of the finite verb, and completed along with it, the partic. is in the same tense, especially with *λανθάνειν* and *φθάνειν*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 559. c.

Ἐντίνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισώπου λόγους.] Ἐντίνας, sc. εἰς ἔπος, s. εἰς μέτρον. HEIND. *In carminis modum ligans, in versus redigens, Æsopi fabulas.* WYTT. Augustin. de Consens. Evang. i. 12. Opp. t. iii. pt. ii. p. 5. D. "Socrates autem, quem rursus in activa (virtute) qua mores informantur omnes prætulerunt, ita ut testimonio quoque dei sui Apollinis omnium sapientissimum pronuntiatum esse non taceant, Æsopi fabulas pauculis versibus persecutus est, verba et numeros suos adhibens rebus alterius. Usque adeo nihil scribere voluit; ut hoc se coactum imperio sui dæmonis fecisse dixerit; sicut nobilissimus discipulorum ejus Plato commemorat: in quo tamen opere maluit alienas quam suas exornare sententias." Bentley, in his dissertation on the fables of Æsop, appears to deny that they were extant in the time of Socrates, which, however, is affirmed, with greater probability, by Tyrwhitt, Dissert. de Babr. From which it is not to be concluded that Socrates had a copy in the prison, but merely that he retained some of the fables in his recollection. Diogenes Laertius, ii. 41. mentions the beginning of a fable by Socrates himself: ἐποίησε δὲ

καὶ μῦθον Αἰσώπειον οὐ πᾶν ἐπιτε-  
τενγμένως, οὐ ἡ ἀρχή. Αἰσώπος ποτ'  
ἔλεξε Κορίνθιον ἀστὺ νέμουσι, Μὴ  
κρίνειν ἀρετὴν λαοδίκεψ σοφίη.—  
WYTT.

Τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον.] *A Pæan*, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 41. καὶ δεθείς—καὶ παιᾶνα κατὰ τινὰς ἐποίησεν, οὐ ἡ ἀρχή, Δῆλι' Ἀπολλων χαῖρε καὶ Ἄρτεμι, παιδε κλεινώ.— Dio. Chrys. Or. xli. p. 507. C. Σωκράτης—καὶ παιᾶνα ἐποίησεν εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ τὴν Ἄρτεμιν. Epictet. Dissert. iv. 4. p. 590. καὶ πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἦν Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ὠδύρετο; πῶς ἂν ἔτι τῇ φυλακῇ παιᾶνας ἔγραφεν.— Προοίμιον seems to be peculiar to hymns in honor of Apollo, whence Thucydides iii. 104. δηλοῖ δὲ μάλιστα "Ὀμηρος ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν, ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσι τοῖσδε, ἃ ἔστιν ἐκ προοιμίον Ἀπόλλωνος. Diog. Laert. viii. 57. mentions a προοίμιον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα by Empedocles. Pausan. x. 8. p. 817. Ἀλκαῖος ἐν προοίμιῳ τῷ εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα. Plutarch, de Musica, p. 1132. D. 1133. l. commends the προοίμια, or preludes, of Terpander, where the term is used by itself, without reference to a deity. WYTT.

Ἀτὰρ καί.] Frequently answers to καί in a collateral proposition in the sense of καὶ-δέ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 621. Εὐηνὸς; See Apol. Socr. c. 4. ἀνὴρ Πάριος.—"Ὁ τι ποτὲ διανοηθεῖς; see Apol. S. 26. ὃ τι μαθῶν.—Ἐποίησας αὐτά; ποιεῖν, to compose, is used simply in reference to poets. Apol. Socr. c. 7. Euthyphron. c. 13. λέγω τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν, ὁ ποιήσας, κ. τ. λ.



οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐνήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἔρηται, εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἶπέ τί χρή με λέγειν. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τάληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα· ἦδειν γὰρ ὡς οὐ ράδιον εἶη· ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφασιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζου. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, ὃ περ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὡς περ

[Ἀντίτεχνος.] *A rival or competitor.* V. Cousin. *Son rival.* The term is emphatic in the text, as ἀντίτεχνος is properly applied to poets who contend upon the stage, with their productions, for a prize. Casaub. ad Athen. vi. 7. p. 413. Ficinus gives two interpretations for the word, the former of which, besides being unnecessary, is incorrect.—FISCH.

[Καὶ ἀφασιούμενος.] *Acquitting my conscience;* Socrates having feared to provoke the anger of the deity by neglecting his will as conveyed through the medium of dreams.

[Εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις.] *If so perchance.* Cf. Lach. p. 179. B. εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχέκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ. p. 194. B. εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις αὐτῇ ἢ καρτέρησις ἐστὶν ἀνδρία.

[Ἄττα τοιάδε.] *Τις* is often put with adjectives of quality, quantity, magnitude, especially when these stand alone, without a substantive, or in the predicate. Ἄττα and ἄσσα, particularly, are thus used, which are rarely found by themselves without an adjective.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 487. 4.

[Ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει.] i. e. *At various times in a varied form, but its burden was the same, &c.*

[Μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζου.] *Mu-*

*sicam fac et tracta.* WYTT. *Cultive les Beaux-Arts;* V. COUSIN, who subjoins the following just and explanatory note; “Si l' on traduit comme tout le monde, *fais de la musique*, il faut avouer qu'il est bien étrange que Socrate entende par là la philosophie, et, quand il se ravise, et veut prendre le mot dans le sens ordinaire, qu'il ne songe pas encore à la musique, mais à la poésie; au lieu que dans l'interprétation que nous avons préférée, il est naturel que, lorsque le songe dit a Socrate: *cultive ton esprit, exerce-toi dans les Beaux-Arts, livre-toi à des nobles occupations*, Socrate songe d'abord à la philosophie, qu'il regard comme l'occupation la plus noble, et plus spécialement encore à la poésie. Voyez dans le *Criton*, dans la *République*, dans les *Rivaux*, et partout, le contraste de *Μουσική* et de *Γυμναστική*, et consultez la note de Locella sur Xenophon d'Ephèse, p. 124. En général *Μουσική* veut dire occupations distinguées, arts libéraux; dans le détail il se prend pour la philosophie ou pour la poésie à-peu-près également, ou pour la musique proprement dite, mais plus rarement.” V. Alcibiad. Prim. cc. 10. 11.

[Παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν.] i. e. *Adhortari et insuper hortari, prout qui currentes ut currant hortari pergunt.* WYTT. *Παρακελεύεσθαι, hor-*

οἱ τοῖς θεοῖσι διακελεύομενοι· καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὃ περ ἔπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πρᾶττοντος. νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἦ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν· ἀσφα-

*tari aliquid, ut aliquid faciat; ἐπικελεύειν, incitare facientem.* FISCH. There is a peculiar force in the repetition of the same verb, differently compounded. Cf. Cic. Fin. v. 2. "Te autem hortamur omnes currentem quidem."

Τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν.] i. q. τοῦτο λέγειν ἐπικελεύου μουσικὴν ποιεῖν. HEIND. A conciseness of expression familiar to Plato.

Ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγ. μουσ.] i. e. *Since, indeed, philosophy is the highest exercise of the art.* Learning or discipline, in general, παιδεία, is frequently designated by the term μουσική, of which the origin and use, in its present sense, are developed, with great beauty and clearness, in the following passage in Lachet. p. 118. C. ὅταν—ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγόμενον ἢ περὶ τινος σοφίας, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίον τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει, χαίρω ὑπερφυνῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα τὸν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοισι καὶ ἀρμόττοντα ἐστὶ καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμωσμένους· οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμωσμένους [οὐ] αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα ἀτεχνῶς Δωριστί ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἴαστί, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ Φρυγιστί οὐδὲ Λυδιστί, ἀλλ' ἡπερ μόνῃ Ἑλληνικῇ ἐστὶν ἀρμονία. Cf. Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xxxi. c. 2. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν μελῶν ἀρμονίαις τὸ παραλειφθὲν, κἂν σμικρὸν ᾖ, διαλύει τὸν κόσμον τοῦ μέλους· οὕτω κἂν τῷ τοῦ βίου ἀρμονία, εἰ περ μὴ ἐκμελής ἡμῶν ἔσται, μηδὲ εἰκῆ διαπεραινώμενος, ὁμοίαν εἶναι δεῖ ἔργον καὶ λόγον.—Gorg. c. 83. καὶ τοι ἐγώ γε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον

εἶναι ἀναρμωστῆν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοῖην, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν. The writings of Plato abound with similar allusions; virtue in general he compares ἀρμονία τινὶ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ de Rep. iv. p. 430. F. And wisdom he calls τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην τῶν συμφωνιῶν. Legg. iii. p. 689, D. whence Sextus Empir. adv. Mus. p. 353. οἷ τε μέγα δυνηθέντες ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καθάπερ καὶ Πλάτων, τὸν σοφὸν ἕμοιόν φασιν εἶναι τῷ μουσικῷ, τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρμωσμένην ἔχοντα. For this, amongst other things, Plato was evidently indebted to the Italic school. The harmony which Pythagoras asserted to be the necessary result of the systematic movements of the celestial bodies, is in like manner affirmed, by Plato, to proceed from the attuning of the soul to wisdom and virtue, the due regulation and control of the feelings and affections, which are to be kept in unison with the voice of conscience; that no jarring passion may interfere to destroy that perfect concord in the character of the good, which depends upon the due adjustment and direction of their desires and hopes.

Ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτή.] Supr. c. 1. νόμος ἐστὶν—μηδὲνα ἀποκτινύναι.

Δημώδη μουσικῆν.] i. e. *Popular poetry*, as opp. to the μουσικῆ of the philosophers, which had been always the study of Socrates, and towards which he now required no new impulse from the deity. V. Cousin explains the passage correctly; *Mais depuis ma condamnation et pendant l'intervalle que me laissait la fête de Dieu, je pensai que si par hasard c'était*

λέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα, πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὐ ἦν ἡ παρούσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴ περ μέλλει ποιητῆς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἄλλ' οὐ λόγους καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, οὐς προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἠπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

§. 5. Ταῦτα οὖν ὦ Κέβης, Εὐηνῶ φράζε, καὶ ἐρῶσθαι καὶ ἂν σωφρονῇ ἐμὲ διώκειν. ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς

*aux beaux-arts dans le sens ordinaire que les songes m'ordonnaient de m'appliquer, il ne fallait pas leur désobéir et qu'il était plus sûr pour moi de ne quitter la vie qu'après avoir satisfait aux dieux, en composant des vers suivant l'avertissement du songe.*

Ποιεῖν μύθους ἄλλ' οὐ λόγους.] The fables of Æsop, which were called λόγοι supr. are here, and infr., entitled μύθοι. They are both used indifferently, like other synonyms, by the best writers, and their authors designated either as λογοποιοὶ or μυθοποιοὶ. But when they are intended to be opposed, as in the text, μύθος is to be understood as the fabulous department of composition in general, λόγος. Theon. et Aphthon. in Progymnasm. μῦθος ἐστὶ λόγος ψευδῆς, εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν, or fiction in writing, as opposed to fact. The moral of the fable, contained in the ἐπιμύθιον, is also frequently called λόγος. Wytenbach explains the whole passage: "*cogitans, poetam debere, si poeta futurus esset, [et huic muneri ac nomini satisfacere vellet] fabulas componere ac non orationes [id est non vera argumenta] et me fabularum peritum et artificem non esse; propterea fabularum Æsopi, quæ mihi in promptu [et memoria] erant, quosque sciebam, harum eas, in quos primum inciderem, versibus conscripsi.*" V. Cousin: *ensuite faisant réflexion qu'un poète, pour être vraiment poète, ne doit pas composer des discours en vers, mais inventer des fictions, &c.*—*Αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν*, the indic. instead of the opt. which might seem to

be required here, because Socrates passes from the *obliqua* to the *oratio recta*, by which the spirit and force of the passage are increased.

Μυθολογικός.] Plutarch, de Aud. Poet. αὐτὸς μὲν (Socrates) ἄτε δὴ γεγονῶς ἀληθείας ἀγωνιστῆς τὸν ἕπαντα βίον, οὐ πιθανὸς ἦν οὐδ' ἐμφυῆς ψευδῶν δημιουργός.

Τούτων ἐποίησα.] h. e. *versibus ligavi, in carminis modos redegi.* Cf. Herodot. ii. c. 53. οὗτοι [Homer and Hesiod] δὲ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην "Ελλησι. i. e. *hi vero sunt, qui deorum generationes Græcis carmine prodiderunt.* V. Wesseling in loc. cit. Pausan. iii. 25. p. 275. ἐποίησαν δὲ Ἕλληνων τινές, ὡς Ἡρακλῆς ἀναγάγοι ταύτη τοῦ Ἀἰδίου τὸν κύνα—. *Græcorum nonnulli versibus prodiderunt, &c.*— WYTT.

§. 5. Εὐηνῶ φράζε.] Epist. Socr. xiv. p. 35. Εὐηνὸν τὸν ποιητὴν παρεκάλει δι' ἡμῶν, εἰ εὐ γινώσκοι, ἵνα θάπτον παρ' αὐτὸν, ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφος ἐστὶ διὰ τὴν ποίησιν.

Ἐμὲ διώκειν.] Some editions read *διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα*; rejected by Heindorf, as Socrates is not speaking of a voluntary death, but the *θανάτου μελέτη*, which he subsequently explains as peculiar to philosophers. Stallbaum admits ὡς τάχιστα, on the grounds that Socrates might recommend Evenus to follow him as soon as possible, without inciting him to self-destruction, which it is evident he did not intend, but merely to advise him against a too strong attachment to the world. This reading would

ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Οἷον παρακελεύει, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐνήνῳ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ἦσθημαι, οὐδ' ὅπως οἶον σοι ἐκὼν εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δαι, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐνήνός; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθελήσει τοίνυν, ἔφη, καὶ Εὐνήνός καὶ πᾶς ὅτῳ ἀξίως τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι γ' ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γάρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι. Καὶ ἅμα λέγων ταῦτα καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη ἀπὸ τῆς κλίνης ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεζόμενος οὕτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελέγετο.

appear to be further borne out by the Socratic epistle, as supr.—*εἶναι θάπτον*, &c.

[Οἷον παρακελεύει] h. e. οἷόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὁ παρακ. By means of the demonstrative pronoun, propositions, the first of which contains the verb εἰμί, and the second the relative pronoun, are contracted into one. Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 4. From this passage, which is so constructed as to be expressive of surprise in the speaker, and the context, it may be concluded that Evenus was not notorious for the soundness of his philosophy in this particular.

[Πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδε ἐντετύχηκα.] Cf. Lachet. p. 197. D. ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πησιάζει. Cratyl. c. 30. ἔωθεν πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆν, καὶ παρεῖχον τὰ ὤτα.

[Σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν.] Sc. ἐκ τούτων ὧν; when the word to which the relative refers is a demonstrative pronoun, the pronoun is generally omitted, and the relative takes its case. Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. b. and s. 574.

[Ὅπως οἶον σοι.] Al. ὅπως οἶον ἄν σοι, upon which see Apol. Socr. c. 17. ἤδη ἄν ἡμῶν—διαφθαρήσονται.—Ἐκὼν εἶναι. The infinitive εἶναι, especially with ἐκὼν, is often redundant in Attic authors. See Apol. Socr. c. 27. init.

[Τούτου τοῦ πράγματος.] Intell. φιλοσοφίας.

[Ὁ μέντοι.] Ald. Bass. οὐ μέν.—Turneb. οὐ μὴν. Stephens, as supr. οὐ μέντοι, correctly. Cf. Olympiod. Schol. Εἰπὼν ὁ Σωκράτης ὅτι εἰ φι-

λοσοφεῖ ὁ Εὐνήνός, ἐθελήσει ἀποθνήσκειν, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ διὰ τούτων παρεγγυᾶν ἡμῖν τῷ ἔκονσίῳ θανάτῳ, φησὶν, ὅτι οὐ μέντοι ἴσως βιάσεται αὐτόν. Καὶ τοῦτο ἢ μὲν λέξις δεικνύσι διὰ δύο ἐπιχειρημάτων, ἐνὸς μὲν μυθικοῦ καὶ Ὀρφοῦ, ἑτέρον δὲ διαλεκτικοῦ καὶ φιλοσόφου. Ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τῆς λέξεως φέρε οἰκείους ἐπιχειρήμασι τοῦτο αὐτὸ δειξόμεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἐξαγαγεῖν αὐτούς.—Βιάσεται αὐτόν, i. e. ἀποκτενεῖ αὐτόν. infr. c. 6.

[Ὁ γὰρ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. e. This was a dogma of the Platonic, and prior to this of the Pythagorean school; Cic. de Senec. c. xxi. "vetatque Pythagoras injussa imperatoris, id est, dei, de præsidio et statione vitæ decedere." On the other hand, the Stoics held that it was lawful for a wise man to withdraw from life whenever he judged it expedient; not only because life and death are to be classed with those things which are in their nature indifferent, but because life may be less consistent with virtue than death; and since all duty arises from a conformity to nature, it may happen that one may be so situated, that to remain in life may be more contrary to nature than to depart from it. Enfield's Philos. B. ii. c. 11. s. 1.

[Καθῆκε τὰ σκέλη.] Schol. συντονώτερον ἀνέλαβε σχῆμα καὶ σεμνότερον ὡς περὶ προβλήματος σεμνότερον μέλων διαλέγεσθαι.

[Καθεζόμενος οὕτως, κ.τ.λ.] i. e. καθεζέτο καὶ οὕτως ἤδη—διελέγετο—and so proceeded with the rest of the discussion.

\*Ἦρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης, Πῶς ταῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἂν τῷ ἀποθνήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεισθαι; Τί δαί, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάφ συγγεγονότες; Οὐδέν γε σαφές, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἅ μὴν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκόως, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν

[Φιλολάφ συγγεγονότες.] A. Boeckh, in lib. Philol. des Pythag. Lehren nebst den Bruchstücken seines werkes Berol. 1819. has settled the age of Philolaus to have been nearly from the seventieth to the ninety-fifth Olympiad. Plutarch mentions that he was one of those who escaped from the house which was burned by Gylon, at Crotona, during the life of Pythagoras, but this cannot be correct, as the latter died, according to the chronicon of Eusebius, in the third year of the sixty-eighth Olympiad. It is probable that Philolaus was a hearer of Lysis, who, with Archippus, escaped the conflagration of the Pythagorean school at Crotona, upon which the latter withdrew to his native city, Tarentum, and the former to Thebes, where it is to be supposed that Philolaus met Simmias and Cebes. Cf. Schol. in loc. ἦλθεν οὖν (Philolaus) καὶ εἰς Θήβας τεθνεῶτι τῷ διδασκάλῳ Λύσιδι χράς ποιήσασθαι ἐκεῖσε τεθαμμένῳ. This is the most likely account that can be collected from testimonies which are at variance, in some degree, with each other. V. Jamblich. Vit. Pythag. cc. 104. 199. 248. 250. Bentley, Dissert. de Ætate Pythag. p. 49. Plutarch. de Genio Socratis, p. 583. A. Porphy. Vit. Pythag. s. 54.

Οὐδὲν—σαφές.] Schol. δι' αἰνυμάτων ἐδίδασκε, καθάπερ ἦν ἔθος τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις. Philolaus treated the doctrine of nature with great subtlety, but at the same time with great obscurity; referring all things existing to mathematical principles. He taught, that reason, improved by mathematical learning, is alone capable of judging concerning the nature of things; that the whole

world consists of infinite and finite; that number subsists by itself, and is the chain by which its power sustains the eternal frame of things; that the Monad is not the sole principle of all things, but that the Binary, or Duad, is necessary to furnish materials from which all subsequent numbers may be produced, &c. Hence it appears probable that Philolaus, following Timæus, whose writings he possessed, so far departed from the Pythagorean system as to conceive two independent principles in nature, God and Matter, the Monad and Duad, and that Plato derived from the same source his doctrine on the subject. Enfield, Philos. B. ii. c. 13.

Ἐξ ἀκοῆς.] i. q. Herod. iv. 16. ἀκοῆ τι λέγειν, from hearsay. Upon this assertion of Socrates', that he knew nothing of the doctrines of Philolaus, further than by repute, Boeckh, l. c. p. 23. sq. remarks, in discussing the subject; "daher mir denn jene Wendung mit dem Hörensagen bloss eine mit der Platonischen Ironie sehr wohl zusammenstimmende Manier scheint, durch welche die etwas geringschatzige Behandlung des gottlichen Mannes etwas verhüllt werden soll." [It seems, therefore, to me, that that allusion to the hearsay hardly agrees in manner with the usual style of Platonic irony, through which the half-contemptuous expression of the god-like man should be somewhat concealed.] STALL.

Φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν.] There is no objection to tell. Viger. c. iii. s. 12 r. 2.

Καὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ μάλιστα.] Etenim vel maxime [καὶ μάλιστα] decet illuc projecturum disquirere et fabulari de pe-

τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τιν' αὐτὴν οἴομεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

§. 6. Κατὰ τί οὖν δὴ ποτε οὐ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτινύναι, ὧ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὃ περ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφές δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ προθυμείσθαι χρη, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις. ἴσως μέντοι θανμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων

*regeneratione, quæ illic est.*—WYTT.—μέλλοντα, is to be understood indefinitely, of any one. Ἐκέισε ἀποδημεῖν, i. q. εἰς Ἄιδον ἀπέναι.—Διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν: the former of these verbs is used in reference to a philosophical inquiry, the latter, to a speculative consideration of the subject in question.

Μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν.] Schol. ὡς ζήσεσθαι μέλλων μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν ἐν γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ φονεύειν ἀπίρητο.—Olympiod. ad. h. l. νόμος δὲ ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸ μηδένα φονεύειν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ. A similar law prevailed in Sparta, where the punishment of death was not inflicted in public, during the day, but in the night, in a certain part of the prison called δεκάς. Valer. M. iv. 6.

§. 6. Κατὰ τί, κ. τ. λ.] The principle laid down here for discussion is, that the period of death should be looked forward to, but not so as to be compassed by self destruction. For men, in this life, stand in the same relation to the gods, as servants to their masters, nor have they any right to leave it, unless the gods themselves discharge them.—Death is, therefore, to be endured with equanimity, because it is the limit which the gods assign to their protection of men here. Socrates then indulges a hope, that after death he might associate with those who, of mankind, had also lived uprightly, but asserts it as his positive belief, that he should enjoy the fellowship of the gods, the best of masters. This argument implies an un-

fitness in the body to assist the mind in the investigation of virtue and truth, and further, a divine providence exercised in behalf of those who have made this investigation the object of their lives, who are thus ensured its attendant blessings after their bodily decease.—Κατὰ τί,—Steph. in marg. *Quam igitur ob causam nefas esse aiunt, sibi mortem consciscere? Ego enim jam pridem illud non solum a Philolao, &c.*

Αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν.] So in Latin, *se ipsum.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 468. 6.

Νῦν δὴ.] Tim. Plat. Lex. Πρὸ ὀλίγου χρόνου: *just now, a little while since.*

ἴσως μέντοι θανμαστόν σοι, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *Perhaps it shall, however, appear strange to you, if this alone, of all things, is unexceptionably true, ἀπλοῦν, [sc. that death is better than life,] and that never at any time, as is the case with the rest of human affairs, it should occur that at particular times, ὅτε, and to particular persons, οἷς, death is better than life. But [seeing that at all times and with all persons, this principle holds good, or, according to V. Cousin, granting that there are particular individuals who prefer death to life,] it appears strange to you, perhaps, if it is irreverent for those to whom death is preferable, to benefit themselves, [by self-destruction,] but that they must await another benefactor. Cf. Simplic. in Epictet. p. 63. Ὁ δὲ γε Πλάτων καὶ ὁ Πλάτωνος Σωκράτης, καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν [τὸν θάνατον] εἶναι καὶ κρείττονα τῆς μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ζωῆς ἀποφαίνε-*

ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡς περ καὶ τᾶλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν. οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὀσιόν ἐστιν αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἠρέμα ἐπιγελάσας Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπών. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον· οὐ

ται οὐ τοῖς μὲν, τοῖς δ' οὐ· ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς πᾶσι. For all things else vary in their character and nature, and are good or evil, according to the agents by which they are employed, and the mode in which they are applied, Plat. in Sympos. p. 318. D. πᾶσα γὰρ πράξις ὧδ' ἔχει· αὐτῇ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πραττομένη, οὔτε καλῆ, οὔτε αἰσχροῦ· οἶον ὁ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν, ἢ πίνειν, ἢ ᾄδειν, ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδὲν· ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει ὡς ἂν πραχθῆ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη· καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον καὶ ὀρθῶς, καλὸν γίγνεται· μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ, αἰσχροῦν. But death is, on all occasions, as supr. represented by Plato as an unchangeable good. V. Cousin explains the passage; *Mais il pourra te sembler étonnant qu'il n'en soit pas de ceci comme de tout le reste, et qu'il faille admettre d'une manière absolue que la vie est toujours préférable à la mort, sans aucune distinction de circonstances et des personnes; ou si une telle rigueur paraît excessive, et si l'on admet que la mort est quelquefois préférable à la vie, il pourra te sembler étonnant qu'alors même on ne puisse sans impiété se rendre heureux soi-même, et qu'il faille attendre un bienfaiteur étranger.* To which he subjoins the following note: "C'est-à-dire, en rétabissant tous les intermédiaires utiles, et supprimant tous ceux qui ne sont pas rigoureusement nécessaires : ou la vie est toujours préférable à la mort, quelles que soient les circonstances et les personnes, ce qui est bien singulier, les choses humaines n'étant point aussi absolues ; ou si l'on admet la plus légère restriction à ce principe, si pour certaines personnes, dans certaines circonstances, la mort est préférable à la vie, alors il

est bien étrange qu'à ces personnes, dans ces circonstances, il ne soit pas permis de se procurer elles-mêmes les avantages de la mort, et qu'il leur faille attendre un bienfaiteur étranger. Socrate avait avancé qu'il ne faut pas se tuer. Quoi ! jamais ! la vie est-elle donc toujours préférable à la mort ? ce serait bien absolu et fort extraordinaire ; tu n'oserais l'affirmer. Or, si la mort est quelquefois préférable à la vie, comment avancer qu'il n'est jamais permis de se tuer ? L'objection devait se présenter à l'esprit de Cébès, et il est naturel que Socrate la lui prète, et aille au devant."

ἀπλοῦν.] *Plane verum et sine controversia.* Scap. Lex. in voc.—*Τυγχάνει*, is sometimes used as supr. without the participle ὦν or ὄν, Matthia Gr. s. 553. δ. Obs. 1.—*Καὶ τᾶλλα*,—i. e. *καὶ κατὰ τᾶλλα.* Schol. οἶον πλοῦτος, δόξα, ἔξιος. ἐπαμφοτερίζει γὰρ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. θάνατος δὲ μόνως ἀγαθόν ἐστι.

Ἐπιγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεὺς.] Schol. Ἐγέλασε, διότι ἐκάλεσε τὸν φονεύοντα ἑαυτὸν εὐεργέτην. τὸ δὲ Ἰττω ἐπιχωριάζοντός ἐστιν ἀντι τοῦ ἴστω, τῷ Βοιωτῷ διαλέκτῳ· ὃ δείκνυται ὅτι φύσει τὸν Σωκράτην θαυμάζει. Olympiod.—*καὶ ἐικότως ἐγχωρίᾳ γλώττῃ ἐχρήσατο, ἐνδεικνύμενος τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἐγχώριον θαῦμα, ὃ εἶχε πρὸς τὸν Σωκράτην.* Cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 910. *Τῷ δ' ἐμὰ θεΐβαθεν, Ἰττω Ζεὺς.*—Cebes so expresses his surprise at the nature of Socrates' remark.

Οὕτω γ' εἶναι.] *Sic primo aspectu, re nondum satis expensa.* HEIND. i. 4. ὡς οὕτωσὶ ἀκοῦσαι, *if so it be heard, or understood.*—*Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως, sed fortassis : verum fortassis tamen.*—FISCH.

μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διῦδειν· οὐ μὲντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους

[Ἐν ἀπορρήτοις.] The secret or esoteric doctrine of the Pythagoreans, of which the former portion of what is stated in the text, ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν, belongs to the Orphic school. Cf. Tim. Plat. p. 291. ἂ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δι' ἀπορρήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παραέδωκε, πάντα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν ὀργασθεὶς ἐν Λειβήθροις τοῖς Ὀρακικοῖς. Cratyl. c. 38. Δοκοῦσι μὲντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, ὣν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσι. τοῦτον δὲ περιβόλον ἔχειν, ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμοτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτισθῇ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, τὸ σῶμα. Forster, approved by Heindorf, understands by ἀπορρήτα, *mysterium arcana*, the Orphic mysteries; according to others, the Eleusian or Bacchic. But Wyttenbach, in h. l., and Boeckh, l. c. p. 179. sqq. explain it correctly as supr. Most of the philosophical sects had their ἀπορρήτα, or secret doctrines, Clem. Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 575. Α. οὐ μόνον ἄρα οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων τὰ πολλὰ ἐπεκρῦπτοντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι φασὶ τινὰ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀπορρήτα εἶναι καὶ μὴ πᾶσιν ἐπιτρέπειν ἐντυγχάνειν τοῦτοις τοῖς γράμμασιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνωνι τῷ πρώτῳ γεγραφῆσθαι τινὰ, ἃ μὴ ράδιος ἐπιτρέπονσι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀναγινώσκειν μὴ οὐκί πείραν δεδωκόσι πρότερον εἰ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῖεν· λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ μὲν ἐσωτερικὰ εἶναι τῶν συγγραμμάτων αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ ἐξωτερικὰ.

[Ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν, κ. τ. λ.] That we are in a certain prison, &c. Cf. Cicero. Somn. Scip. 3. "Nisi Deus is, cujus hoc templum est omnē quod conspicio, istis te corporis custodiis libe-

raverit, huc tibi aditus patere non potest. Quare et tibi—et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis, nec injussu ejus, a quo ille est vobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est, ne munus humanum assignatum a Deo defugisse videamini." Tusc. i. 30. "Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis Deus, injussu suo, nos hinc demigrare: cum vero justam causam Deus ipse dederit, ut tum Socrati, nunc Catoni, saepe multus, næ ille, medius fidius, vir sapiens lætus ex his tenebris in lucem illam excesserit: nec tamen illa vincla carceris ruperit: leges enim vetant: sed tanquam a magistratu, aut ab aliqua potestate legitima, sic a Deo evocatus atque emissus exierit."

[Ὁ ράδιος διῦδειν.] The infin. active for the infin. pass. Matthiæ Gr. s. 535. b. Obs.—Ὁ μὲντοι ἀλλὰ, it is no otherwise, but, i. e. however. Id. s. 610. 4.—Ἐπιμελομένους. Mæris.—Ἐπιμέλον, παροξυτόνως, Ἀττικῶς. περισπωμένως, Ἑλληνικῶς. Thom. Mag. Ἐπιμέλομαι κάλλιον ἢ ἐπιμελοῦμαι.

Ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους—τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.] Cf. Legg. x. p. 902. B. θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμὲν εἶναι πάντα ὅποσα θνητὰ ζῶα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὄλον. Ibid. p. 906. A. ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτὰ κτήματά θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων. Critias. p. 109. B. κατοικίσαντες οἷον νομῆς κτήματά καὶ ποιμνία καὶ θρέμματα ἑαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἔτρεφον. Upon the indifferent use of θεός and θεοί, Wyttenbach observes, that the latter is affirmed of the whole race of deities, under whose care, individually, mankind is placed, each mortal having a deity for his guardian. But the former is affirmed of the one supreme, who has the charge of those deities themselves, no less than of their dependents, as may be collected from the Phædrus, Timæus,



ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως: Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτινύοι μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ, καὶ εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτη οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὁ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥς πέρ καὶ τὴν νῦν παροῦσαν ἡμῖν.

§. 7. Ἄλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τουτό γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, ἔοικε τοῦτο, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴ περ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ἧ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἷ περ ἄριστοὶ εἰσι τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ οἶεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος

Leges. x., and other of Plato's writings.—Ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τ. θ. a dogma, as Heindorf conjectures, of the Pythagoreans.

Τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων.] *Of your slaves.* Cf. Eurip. Med. 49. Παλαιὸν οἰκῶν κτῆμα, *O vetus ancilla.*

Μὴ σημήναντός σου.] In like manner, Epictetus expresses it as a reasonable motive for departing from life; θεοῦ σημαίνοντος τὸ ἀνακλιτικόν, *when the deity sounds a retreat.*

Ὅτι βούλει.] Heindorf. would prefer βούλοιο' because of the opt. ἀποκτινύοι, χαλεπαίνοις, &c. but a similar construction occurs in Gorg. c. 45. ὥστ' εἰ δεοί—διαγωνίζεσθαι—πότερος ἐπαίει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν—λιμῶ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἱατρόν.

Ταύτη.] *In this light,* V. Cousin. *Sous ce point de vue.*

Ἀνάγκην τινὰ.] Plato admits necessity as a plea for self-destruction, in two cases, in Legg. ix. p. 873. either

when περιωδύνησ ἀφύκτω προσπεσούσῃ τύχῃ ἀναγκασθεῖς, or αἰσχύνης τινὸς ἀπόρου καὶ ἄβιου μεταλαχῶν, Πρὶν ἂν—ἐπιπέμψῃ. Cf. de Legg. ix. p. 872. E. πρὶν ἂν φόνον φόνῳ—ἢ δράσασα ψυχὴ τίσῃ, Lachet. p. 187. E. πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ δίδοναι λόγον. HEIND. Stallbaum would omit ἂν.

§. 7. Ῥαδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν.] h. e. *libenter mori velle.* STALL. Ἔοικε τοῦτο—ἀτόπῳ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 555. Obs. 2.

Ὅτι περ—ἐπιστάται, θεοί.] Θεὸς and θεοὶ are frequently used for ὁ θεός, οἱ θεοί. Schäfer. in Meletem. Crit. p. 4. Οὐκ ἔχει λόγον.] i. e. *Is quite unreasonable.*

Αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ.] This transition from the plural to the singular is very usual with Plato. Cf. Gorg. p. 478. B. C. ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἱατρεῦσθαι ἢ δὲ ἔστι καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἱατρευόμενοι;—Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, κ. τ. λ. Protagor. p. 319. D. &c.

τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ δὲ νῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν αἰεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίονι. καὶ τοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνήσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δ' ἄφρονας χαίρειν. Ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἠσθῆναι τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, Ἄεϊ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾶ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅ τι ἂν τις εἴπῃ. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε δοκεῖ τί μοι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιεν αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς. Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέ-

Οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον, κ. τ. λ.] *Putaret hoc, fugiendum esse a dominis: in hac opinione esset, WYTT.*—ταῦτα is emphatic and demonstrative, as *infr.* c. 14. σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα εἶπε, κ. τ. λ.

Ἀγανακτεῖν.] *Etymol. M.* Ἀγανακτεῖν. ἀντὶ τοῦ στένειν, παρὰ Πλάτωνι.

Πραγματεία.] *The ingenuity.* h. l. *operosa et arguta dubitandi, sc. disputandi ratio, quæ solet esse subtilior quam verior.* KÖRNER. Olympiod. τὴν πραγματεῖωδῃ ἀπορίαν, πραγματείαν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Πλάτων· ἀνωτέρω δὲ ἠνίκα ὁ Σιμμίας ἠρώτα, ἀπορίαν μόνην ἐκάλεσε τὴν ἐρώτησιν αὐτοῦ.

Ἄεϊ τοι—ὁ Κέβης.] *Toi* is emphatic here, as in *Iliad.* ε. 873. Ἄεϊ τοι ῥίγιστα θεοὶ τετληότες εἰμὲν.

Ὅ τι ἂν τις εἴπῃ.] *Quodcumque illud sit quod quis dixerit.* STALL. *Vulg.* εἴποι, incorrectly, for the verb is used in reference to what Socrates had said,

not what he was going to say.

Τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι, κ. τ. λ.] *For with what intent, would men who are really wise fly from those masters who are better than themselves, and heedlessly, or, for a trivial cause, depart from them; i. e. what could induce them to fly, what would they have by flying &c. as in Latin; "quid spectantes hoc fecerunt."*—ὡς ἀληθῶς being joined to ἄνδρες σοφοὶ, as c. 9. ὄντως φιλόσοφος, c. 11. ὁ γνησίως φιλόσοφος, c. 12. ὁ φιλοσοφῶν ὀρθῶς. c. 29. a med. εἰς Ἄιδον ὡς ἀληθῶς. Cf. *Cicer. pro Milon.* 30. "Proposita invidia, morte, pœna, qui nihilo segnius rempublicam defendit, is vir vere putandus est."

Εἰς σὲ τείνειν.] h. e. *Te petere hac oratione, his verbis.* STALL. V. Cousin. *Et c'est contre toi, je pense, qu'est dirigé le raisonnement de Cebes.*—ῤαδίως φέρεις—ἀπολείπων. See *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 555. i.

Ὡς αὐτ. ὁμολ.] *As you yourself admit.*

γετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡς περ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

§. 8. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὅς, πειραθῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πιθανώτερον ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾧμην ἤξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὐ ἴστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθοὺς,—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ δυσχυρισαίμην· ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότης πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἤξειν, εὐ ἴστε ὅτι, εἴ πέρ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δυσχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καὶ ὡς πέρ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.

§. 8. Οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν.] Olympiod. μὴ ἀγανακτῶν. But all the MSS. and best editions read as in the text, which is decidedly correct. Tr. *I should have erred in not being annoyed at death*, which, with μὴ ἀγαν., should be, *if I were not annoyed*. See Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 12. r. 11. upon the distinction between μὴ and οὐ or οὐκ: the latter denying something directly, and as a matter of fact; the former, denying only in reference to a conception or view, which has either been before expressed, or which, according to the sense, is implied in what precedes. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 608.

"Ὅτι — ἤξειν.] "Ὅτι is sometimes followed by an infinitive, as supr. Cf. Acts, xxvii. 10. θεωρῶ ὅτι—μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι τὸν πλοῦν. Plat. de Legg. x. p. 892. D. εἶπον ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρῆναι πειραθῆναι κατ' ἐμαυτόν. Xenoph. Cyrop. v. 4. 1. ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι, εἴ τι οὗτος πάθει, αὐτὸς ἂν λάβειν πάντα. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 539. 1.

Εἴ πέρ τι ἄλλο.] Εἴ πέρ τι καὶ ἄλλο. HEIND.

Οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ.] Socrates

intends to say, that feeling such an assurance of his future communion with the gods, he was not, consequently, so annoyed as if death were unaccompanied by such a trust.

Εἶναί τι.] i. e. *Vivere*. GOTTL. as infr. c. 14. ὡς ἔστι ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος ἀνθρώπου. Cf. Cic. Epp. ad. Div. vi. 3. "nec enim, dum ero, angar ulla re—et, si non ero sensu omni carebo."

Πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον.] Cf. Gorg. p. 332. Bas. 2. ἦν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐτι ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὀσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα, οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἐκτὸς κακῶν· τὸν δὲ ἀδικῶς καὶ ἀθέως, εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσιώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμοτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσι εἶναι. v. Apol. Socr. c. 32. According to Herodotus, the Egyptians were the first who taught the doctrine of the soul's immortality; ii. 123. Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εἰσι οἱ εἰπόντες εὐ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος ἐστὶ τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνοντος ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον

Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες ; πότερον αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῶ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν μεταδοίης ; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο. καὶ ἅμα σοι ἢ ἀπολογία ἔσται, εἰάν ἄ περ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσης. Ἄλλὰ πειράσομαι γε, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι ; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦ-

αἰεὶ γινόμενον ἐσδύεται, &c. ; but the transmigration of souls into beasts, birds, and fishes, as stated in loc. cit., which continued for three thousand years, when the soul assumed its human form again, was most probably held by some of the Egyptians, while others, it is equally probable, held that the souls of the good, having wandered for a time among the stars, were allowed to return to the society of the gods. Following the Thracians and Egyptians, from whom he derived his philosophy, Orpheus affirmed the soul to be immortal ; and was the first, according to Diodorus Siculus, i. p. 86., who taught, among the Greeks, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. v. Orph. Argon. 1105. 1136.

Αὐτὸς.] *Alone, by yourself?* Cf. *Iliad*. ἦ. 99. Τυδείδης δ' αὐτὸς περ ἰών.

Μεταδοίης.] Aug. μεταδώσει : incorrectly. Moeris : Δοίημεν, δοίητε, Ἀττικῶς ἔφημεν, ἐφήτε, Ἑλληνικῶς. Mosquem. vol. i. p. 59. Ἀλοίη, δοίη, γνοιή, διὰ διφθόγγου δεῖ γράφειν κατὰ τοὺς Ἀττικοὺς, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀλόη, ἐφή, γνῶη.

Ἡ ἀπολογία.] i. e. *Ea quam dixisti defensio*. HEIND. in reference to οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή, κ. τ. λ. sup. c. 7. extr.

Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα.] h. e. σκεψώμεθα, τί ἐστὶν ὃ Κρίτων ὄδε βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ π. ε. Ὑπομ. σουδε, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 470. 2.

Τί δέ—ἄλλο γε.] Fully, τί δὲ ἄλλο

γέ ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦτο, ὅτι πάλαι μοι λέγει, &c.

Ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον.] The executioner, infr. c. 65. ὁ τῶν ἐνδὲκα ὑπὲρέτης. P. Petit, Misc. Obs. i. 17. argues from Plutarch in Phocion. p. 758. E. that the beadle did not make the suggestion, as in the text, from compassion, but because he was obliged to purchase the poison himself, at twelve drachms the dose ; πεπωκότων δὲ ἤδη πάντων, τὸ φάρμακον, ἐπέλιπε, καὶ ὁ δημόσιος [i. e. ὁ τῶν ἐνδὲκ. ὑπηρετ.] οὐκ ἔφη τρίψην ἔτερον, εἰ μὴ λάβοι δώδεκα δραχμάς, ὅσον τὴν δόσιν ὠνεῖται. Χρόνου δὲ γενομένου καὶ διατριβῆς, ὁ Φωκίων καλέσας τινὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι μὴδὲ ἀποθανεῖν Ἀθήνησι δωρεάν ἐστι, ἐκέλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοῦναι τὸ κερμάτιον. However, the person who administered the poison to Socrates appears to have been of a very different character, as may be judged from the description given. c. 65. which cannot be understood otherwise than seriously.

Θερμαίνεσθαι.] Olympiod. ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως θερμανθῆς, καὶ πέψης τὸ κώνειον. The efficacy of hemlock, as a poison, lies in the extreme coldness it produces, which might be counteracted by increasing the bodily heat either by exercise or warm draughts, especially of wine, when taken in time to obviate the chill and consequent check of the vital action. V. Plin. H. N. xiv. 5. xxv. 13. Dressig. Dissert. de Cicut.—Μᾶλλον, sc. τοῦ δεινότητος. HEIND.

τον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιούντας. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δις δάσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέη, καὶ τρίς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἦδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει. Ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἦδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρέψας τὸν βίον θαρρῆεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπίς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὃ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης; ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

§. 9. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς

Δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον.] See Matthæ Gr. s. 608. 3.—Εἰ δὲ μή. See in Criton. c. 15. sub. fin.

Ἄλλὰ — ἦδη.] Olympiod. Φησὶ καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἰδέναι ὅτι τοῦτο μέλλει (λέγειν) ὁ Σωκράτης· διότι πέραν αὐτοῦ εἶχεν ἐν ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ, ὡς καταφρονητικῶς ἔχοντος περὶ τὸν θάνατον.

§. 9. Κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates proceeds to argue that philosophy consists in meditation upon and preparation for death. For the duty of the philosopher is to lead away the mind from what is corporeal and transient, and to direct it to the study of its own capabilities for the discovery of pure and simple truth. But in this life, this object cannot be satisfactorily accomplished; for the mind is then chiefly most energetic in thought, when it withdraws itself from the influence of the body, and makes itself the scope of its own contemplation. Whence it appears that so far from requiring the assistance of the body towards the strength and efficiency of its reflective powers, it is only when emancipated from the thrall of the body that it attains to the perfection of its nature. The body seduces from the investigation of truth;

the senses, and their subordinate feelings, distract the mind, and lead it into erroneous and false conclusions. The body is hostile, and the opposite to virtue; it is the source of all corruption, and while it depends upon the mind for its pleasure and support, the latter is allured into the commission of vice and crime. It is most likely, then, that after the decease of the body the mind shall attain to the fuller recognition of truth, and shall fix its abode among the gods, provided, that in this life, as far as it could, it cleansed itself from the impurity of the body by a diligent inquiry into truth, and the study of justice, wisdom, and fortitude. The further object of this argument is to show, from the analogy of all things in nature, that death is not annihilation, but a passage to another state of existence; the purport of which has been comprised by Mendelsohn in his Phædo, thus: Since every change in the nature of things takes place mediately, and by successive gradations, a change at once from life to death, from existence to annihilation, would not be gradual, nor, therefore, natural. Besides, nothing can be so diminished as to be utterly destroyed, whence the mind cannot naturally perish.

ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας, λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δὴ πού ἂν εἶη προθυμείσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἦκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάσαι προϋθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρηῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφά- ναι ἄν, τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσι τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ

Κινδυνεύουσι.] Olympiod. ὅτι ἀ-  
δεῶς ἔξει περὶ τὸν θάνατον δὲ μελε-  
τήσῃ, νῦν δέικνυσι. οὗο γὰρ ὄντων  
τοῦ τε ἐπιτηδεύειν ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ  
τοῦ ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν μὲν  
προαιρετικὸν θάνατον καὶ τὸν χωρισ-  
μόν τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύει καὶ  
ἐθέλει τὸν δὲ σωματικὸν ἐθέλει μὲν,  
οὐ μὴν ἐπιτηδεύει. Cic. Tuscul. 1. 30.  
“ tota enim philosophorum ista, ut ait  
idem (Socrates,) commentatio mortis  
est.”—31. “Secernere autem a corpore  
animum nec quidquam est, quam emori  
discere.” Senec. Ep. xxv. “egregia res est  
mortem condiscere—hoc est ipsum quare  
meditari debeamus.” Infr. c. 12. τὸ  
μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν φιλο-  
σόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς  
ἀπὸ σώματος.

Ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.] i. e.  
Mori et mortuum esse; the former being  
the passage to the latter. WYTT. Cf.  
Cic. Tusc. i. 8. “Emori nolo: sed me  
esse mortuum nihil aestumo.”

Ἀγανακτεῖν ὁ.] Ὅ may be taken  
here as depending upon ἐπετήδευον or  
ἀγανακτεῖν: the latter construction is  
preferable. Cf. Demosth. de Chersones.  
p. 103. καὶ τοι ἐγωγ' ἀγανακτῶ καὶ  
αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ  
τὰ μὲν χρήματα λυπεῖ τινὰς ὕμῶν,  
&c. Id. adv. Conon. p. 1261. ἐγὼ δὲ—  
χαλεπῶς, ἐφ' οἷς πίπονθα, ἐνηνοχῶς  
οὐχ ἦπτον τοῦτ' ἀγανακτῆσαιμι ἄν,  
&c. Lysias. p. 787. ὃ δὴ ἀγωνιῶ καὶ

ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ ταύτη τῇ ἐλπίδι εἰς  
ὑμᾶς ἔκει πιστεύων. HEIND. Steph.  
in Thes. Ling. Græc. v. ἀγανακτεῖν;  
“ rarior præcedentibus constructio est  
in eadem Phædonis Plat. p. 32. ubi ac-  
cusativo rei jungitur.” Abresch. Lect.  
Aristonet. p. 266. understands αὐτῷ  
before ὁ.

Γελασείοντα.] Schol. γελαστικῶς  
ἔχοντα, γελάσαι θέλοντα.

Τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν.] i. e. The  
Thebans and Bœotians, who were nat-  
urally averse to philosophy and its  
professors. Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 9. εἰ-  
κότως Ἐθαῖος γὰρ ἦν ὁ Σιμμίας  
παρ' οἷς καὶ ἡ Βοιωτία ἔσ. Dacier  
reads παρ' ἡμῖν, Athenienses vestri;  
approved by Schleiermacher, who under-  
stands an evident allusion to the Athe-  
nians. V. Cousin reads and refers παρ'  
ἡμῖν to the Thebans, and notes the  
passage: “C'est comme si Simmias di-  
sait: Il y a des gens qui consentiraient  
volontiers. . . . du moins nos Thébains;  
car pour les Athéniens, ils n'en sont pas  
capables assurément. . . . Ici la restric-  
tion explicite aux Thébains est une ex-  
tension indirecte aux Athéniens eux-  
mêmes dont un étranger devait s'abste-  
nir de parler.”

Καὶ πάνυ.] In particular.—Θανα-  
τῶσι; Schol. θανάτου ἐπιθυμοῦσι. Cf.  
Lobeck. ad Phrynich. p. 80. sqq. For  
οὐ λελήθασι the ordinary form should  
be οὐ λέληθε, but the verb is suited to

γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λελη-  
 θῆναι. λέληθε γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἧ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἧ ἄξιό-  
 εἰσι θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσο-  
 φοι. εἶπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν  
 εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι ;  
 Πάνυ γ', ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἔρα μὴ ἄλλο  
 τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν ;  
 καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνᾶναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς  
 ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς  
 δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν  
 καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι ; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο ;  
 Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη. Σκέψαι δὴ, ὦ γαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα  
 καὶ σοὶ ξυνδοκῇ ἅ περ καὶ ἐμοί· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μάλ-  
 λον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν. φαί-  
 νεταιί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ  
 τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἴου σιτίων τε  
 καὶ ποτῶν ; Ἡκιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.  
 Τί δαί ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δαί ;

its subject here as in Xenoph. Œcon. i. 19. ὅτι πονηρότατοι εἰσι, οὐδὲ σὲ λαν-  
 θάνουσιν.

Πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθ.] See  
 Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. e.

Ἠγούμεθα τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι.]  
 i. e. Estne mors aliquid an nihil? estne  
 ejus notio aiens, an negans. WYTT. v.  
 Cicer. Tuscul. i. 9.—Ἔρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ;  
 See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. a. Obs. 3.

Τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι.] Olympiod.  
 ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶναι εἶπε (Σω-  
 κράτης), διότι ἀγγένητος αὐτῆ· ἐπὶ  
 δὲ τοῦ σώματος τὸ γεγονέναι, γεννη-  
 τὸν γὰρ τοῦτο.

Ἐσπουδακέναι.] To be solicitous.

Σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν—ἀφροδισίων—  
 καλλωπισμῶν.] Cf. Olympiod. p. 9.  
 τριῶν οὐσῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ φυσικῶν  
 καὶ ἀναγκαίων ὡς τὸ τρέφεσθαι καὶ  
 καθεῖδειν· ἢ φυσικῶν μὲν οὐκ ἀναγ-  
 καίων δὲ, ὡς τὸ ἀφροδισιάζειν· ἢ οὔτε  
 φυσικῶν οὔτε ἀναγκαίων, ὡς καλλω-  
 πισμός, καὶ ὅσα τὰ τῆς ποικίλης ἐσ-  
 θῆτος· αὐταὶ γὰρ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε  
 ἀναγκαῖαι, ὡς δηλοῦσι τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα,

ταύταις μὴ χρώμενα· τριῶν οὖν οὐ-  
 σῶν ἐνεργειῶν, ταῖς μὲν φυσικαῖς οὐκ  
 ἀναγκαῖαις, καὶ ταῖς οὔτε φυσικαῖς  
 οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαις οὐ χρήσεται ὅλως ὁ  
 φιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ ἀπόσεται αὐτάς.—  
 So, temperance, according to Epicurus,  
 is that discreet regulation of the pas-  
 sions and desires, by which pleasure  
 may be enjoyed without consequent in-  
 convenience. They who maintain such  
 a constant self-command, as never to be  
 enticed by the prospect of present in-  
 dulgence, to do that which will be pro-  
 ductive of evil, obtain the truest plea-  
 sures by declining pleasure. Since of  
 desires, some are natural and necessary ;  
 others, natural but not necessary ; and  
 others neither natural nor necessary,  
 but the offspring of false judgment, it  
 must be the office of temperance to gra-  
 tify the first class, as far as nature re-  
 quires ; to restrain the second within  
 the bounds of moderation ; and as to  
 the third, resolutely to oppose, and if  
 possible, entirely subdue them. Enfield's  
 Philos. B. ii. c. 15.

τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐν-  
 τήμους ἡγείσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόν-  
 των κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλω-  
 πισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν σοι δοκεῖ  
 ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν  
 αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς  
 φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἢ τοῦ  
 τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ  
 καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν  
 ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; Ἐμοιγε. Ἄρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν  
 τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι  
 μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας

[ἱματίων διαφερόντων.] *Distin-*  
*guished robes*; in opposition to those  
 ordinarily worn by philosophers, which  
 were called, in contempt, *τρίβωνες* or  
*τριβώνια*. Xenophon, Memor. i. 6. 2.  
 calls the apparel of Socrates, *ἱμάτιον*  
*φαῦλον*, and Apuleius, Metam. i. p. 104.  
 Elment. *Scissile palliasitum*.—*Υποδη-*  
*ματων*: for the various species of  
 shoes in use among the Greeks, see  
 Robinson's Grec. Antiq. B. V. c. 25.  
 Socrates makes an express allusion to  
 this part of their appointments here, be-  
 cause they were particularly fastidious,  
 both men and women, about this article  
 of dress, while the philosopher himself  
 went barefoot. Epist. Socr. vi. p. 13.  
*ἔμοι μὲν οὖν ἀπαρκεῖ τροφῇ τε χρῆσ-*  
*θαι τῇ λιτοτάτῃ, καὶ ἐσθῆτι θέρους τε*  
*καὶ χειμῶνος τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποδήμασι*  
*δὲ πάνπαν οὐ χρῶμαι*. Aristoph. Nub.  
 103.—*τὸς ἀλαζόνας, τοὺς ὠχρῶν-*  
*τας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις, ὦν*  
*ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρε-*  
*φῶν*.—*τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς*.—  
*Cætera, alia, corporis lenocinia*. FISCII.  
 Cf. Isocr. ad Demonic. p. 12. *εἶναι*  
*βοῦλον τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα φιλόκα-*  
*λος, ἀλλὰ μὴ καλλωπιστήης*.—*καλλω-*  
*πιστοῦ δὲ τὸ περιέρχον*.—*Καλλωπισ-*  
*μός* is generally used to designate a cul-  
 pable affectation in superfluous orna-  
 ment and dress.

[Ἄρ' οὖν.] Ἄρα, frequently by it-  
 self denotes *nonne*, like the Latin *ne* en-  
 clitic. Matthiæ Gr. s. 614.

[Ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν.]  
 This ἀπόλυσις of the soul is explained,  
 infr. c. 12. *τὸ χωρίζειν ἀπο τοῦ σώ-*  
*ματος τὴν ψυχὴν, κ. τ. λ.* Cf. Cic.  
 Tusc. i. 30. "Quid—tum agimus, nisi  
 animum ad seipsum advocamus, secum  
 esse cogimus, maximeque a corpore ab-  
 ducimus? Secernere autem a corpore  
 animum, nec quidquam aliud est mori  
 discere." Senec. de Sap. Ment. Ep. 57.  
 "Animum cogi sibi intentum esse, nec  
 avocari ad externa, omnia licet foris re-  
 sonent, dum intus nil tumultus sit, dum  
 inter se non rixentur cupiditas et timor."  
 Ep. 65. "Corpus hoc animi pondus ac  
 pæna est, premente illo urgetur, in vin-  
 culis est; nisi accessit philosophia." So  
 Virgil, in allusion to the body being, as  
 it were, the prison of the soul, and the  
 faculties of the latter benumbed by its  
 earthly bondage, and blinded towards  
 the attainment of celestial truth, Æn. vi.  
 733. "Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque; do-  
 lent gaudentque: neque auras Despici-  
 unt clausæ tenebris et carcere cæco."  
 Horace is supposed to have alluded to  
 this Platonic doctrine, speaking of De-  
 mocrates, Ep. i. 12. v. 13. "dum pere-  
 gre est animum sine corpore velox."—  
 The remedy for this adulteration of the  
 soul by its connexion with the body, is  
 philosophy. The philosopher would  
 withdraw the heart and affections from  
 the perishable and deceptive objects of  
 present and worldly hopes and fears;  
 would struggle to break the chain which



διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ᾧ μὴδὲν ἤδὲ τῶν τοιούτων μὴδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μὴδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

§. 10. Τί δαὶ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν, πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἴαν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσῃ κοινῶν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ

binds the ethereal and immortal to the corporeal and decaying portion of his nature, and raising himself above the mists of prejudice and vice, would make the TRUTH his study here, and contemplate its sure fulfilment in the time to come. Hence the vulgar and illiterate, engrossed by selfish and immediate sensual pleasures, are unable to appreciate the purpose of philosophy, and reject, as an unwise and unaccountable desire for death, the doctrine that it is a passage only to a future and a better life.

Διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων.] *Præ reliquis omnibus.* STALL. Cf. Criton. c. 14. init.

Τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις.] Elsewhere, τοῖς πολλοῖς, simply.

Ἦ—μὴδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.] i. e. καὶ ὅς μὴ μετεχει αὐτῶν. In the second member of a sentence there must sometimes be understood a case of ὅς different from that expressed in the first Cf. *Odyss.* β'. 114. ἀνωχθε δὲ μιν γαμέσθαι Τῷ, ὅτεψ τε πατὴρ κέλεται, καὶ ἀνδάνει αὐτῇ: i. e. καὶ ὅστις ἀνδάνει αὐτῇ—V. *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 428. 2. Upon μὴδεν and μὴδε, see *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 608. 5. c. Cf. Criton. c. 15. οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν.

Ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι.] *Prope mortuum esse, similem esse mortuo.* HEIND., τι being referred to ἐγγύς, as in ὅμον τι, πάνυ τι, μεταξύ τι, &c. Cf. *Soph. Antig.* 1179. τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίθημ' ἐγὼ Ζῆν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχον ἠγοῦμαι νεκρόν.

§. 10. Τί δαὶ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν.] See

*Matthiæ Gr.* s. 630.

Αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν.] “L’idée de la science, implique l’indépendance de l’âme et son immortalité. On ne parvient à la science qu’en se séparant des sens, en ramenant l’œil de l’âme sur elle-même, en l’accoutumant à se servir des puissances intérieures qui lui appartient, comme des seuls instrumens légitimes dans toutes ses recherches. En fait, ce n’est pas des sensations et des notions contingentes et purement collectives que produit leur généralisation la plus élevée, que nous viennent les idées universelles et nécessaires du bien du beau du juste, de l’activité, de la force, et de l’essence des choses; et, sous le rapport de la méthode, si l’on veut acquérir d’exactes connaissances, le meilleur moyen assurément n’est pas d’aborder ce qu’on veut connaître par l’intermédiaire infidèle et mobile des organes corporels, mais par la raison et l’intelligence, élevées à leur plus haut degré d’abstraction et de pureté. Le procédé de l’âme, dans l’acquisition de la connaissance et la direction de l’esprit, temoigne donc aussi d’une énergie qui lui est propre, et de son indépendance du corps.” V. Cousin, *Œuv. de Plat.* tom. i. 162. 163.

Ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα.] Virgil, *Æn.* vi. 730. πλατωνίζων, “*Ignis est olis vigor et cœlestis origo Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.*”—GOTTL.

Κοινωνόν.] *A partner or ally.* Οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω.] h. e. *Quod quidem ita intelligi volo.* STALL.

ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν αἰεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβῆς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὀρώμεν; καὶ τοι εἰ αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶ μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῆ αἴ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοι οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῆ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογιζέσθαι, εἰ πέρ που ἄλλοθι, κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναί. Λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν μηδὲν τούτων αὐτῇ παραλυπῆ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μήτε

Οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν αἰεὶ.] Olympiod. Ποιητὰς λέγει Παρμενίδην, Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ Ἐπίχαρμον· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀκριβῆς λέγουσιν εἰδέναι τὴν αἴσθησιν· καθάπερ Ἐπίχαρμος φησι,—Νοῦς ὄρα καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

Parmenides was a disciple of Xenophanes, and an equally distinguished member of the Eleatic school, the doctrines of which he put into verse.—The remaining fragments of his composition are inadequate to explain his system of philosophy, which is not much more intelligible from the dialogue which Plato has written, entitled by his name, in which the tenets of Parmenides are mingled and confounded with his own. The dogma alluded to in the text was that, probably, by which he asserted that nothing in nature is produced or destroyed, but merely seems to be so to the senses. Empedocles, of Agrigentum, in Sicily, appears to have belonged to the Italic school. He possessed some poetical talent, and is supposed by Fabricius, Bib. Gr. i. p. 466, to have been the real author of the "Golden verses of Pythagoras." He asserted that it was impossible to judge of truth by the senses, without the assistance of reason, which is, however, led by their intervention to the contemplation of real nature, and the immutable essences of things. Epicharmus, of the

island of Coos, whence he was removed by his father, at an early age, to Megara, and thence to Syracuse, was a disciple of the Pythagorean school. Having been prevented, by the tyranny of Hiero, from a public profession of philosophy, he devoted himself to dramatic poetry, and offended his sect by the introduction of the doctrines and precepts of Pythagoras on the stage. He is supposed by some to have been the inventor of comedy; an honor which is by others ascribed to Susarion. v. Horat. Ep. ii. 1. 58.—"Plautus ad exemplum Siculi properare Epicharmi." Among the poets alluded to in the text, Xenophanes is also to be reckoned, the founder of the Eleatic sect, and a native of Colophon. He left his country early in life, and supported himself, in the court of Hiero, by reciting elegiac and iambic verses, written in censure of the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. vii. 49. 110. Diog. Laert. iii. 12. ix. 27. Cic. Academ. ii. 5.

Θρυλοῦσιν.] Al. Θυλλοῦσιν.

Ἐν τῷ λογιζέσθαι.] *In reasoning.* i. e. in the exercise of that reason, λόγος, which is a faculty of the mind, ὁ νοῦς.

Παραλυπῆ.] Steph. in marg. *Ipsi nullus corporis sensus molestus est: negotium facessit.* Infr.—τοῦ σώματος, ὡς παρὰπτοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῷτος τὴν ψυχὴν, κ. τ. λ.

τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνηται ἕωσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μὴδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; Φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία. Καὶ αὐτὸ καλόν γέ τοι καὶ ἀγαθόν; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Ἦδη οὖν πρότερον τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς. Ἄλλ' ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν ἄρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδ' ἔχει ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσῃται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ

[Ἐνταῦθα.] Sc. while occupied in active thought.

Φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον.] See c. 50. init. εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.— Olympiod. αὐτὸ δίκαιον καλεῖ τὴν ἰδέαν, h. e. *formam, speciem justi*; which is attainable by the mind alone. Cf. Tertullian. de Anima. c. 18. p. 247. t. iv. Seml. "Vult enim Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporales, supermundiales, divinas et æternas: quas appellet *ideas*: i. e. formas exemplares, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus sensibus, et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines earum." Φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία. Olympiod.— Ὁ Σιμμίας ἐτοιμῶς συγκατατίθεται τῷ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν λόγῳ, ὡς συνήθης Πυθαγορείου.

[Ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας.] Cf. Timæus, p. 27. 28. Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δοξάν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε: τί τὸ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε. τὸ μὲν δὴ νοῦσι μετὰ λόγον περιληπτὸν, αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν· τὸ δ' αὐτὸ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγον, δοξασ-

τὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν. Hence οὐσία, or *essence*, is the term employed to designate the αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν, so called in contradistinction to the objects of sense, which are continually fluctuating, so that none of them can ever continue uniform, constant, and the same. The divine reason, according to Plato, contains eternally within itself, ideas or intelligible forms, which, flowing from the fountain of the divine essence, have in themselves a real existence, and which, in the foundation of the visible world, were, by the energy of the efficient cause, united to matter, to produce sensible bodies. These ideas Plato defines to be the peculiar nature of things or essences as such; and asserts that they can remain the same, without beginning or end. Phædr. p. 278. de Rep. vii. p. 531. Timæus. c. 6. Enfield, Philos. B. ii. c. 8. s. 1.—Ὁ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν; subjoined in explanation of οὐσία preced. HEIND. V. Cousin—*en un mot de l'essence de toutes choses, c'est à-dire de ce qu'elles sont en elles memes?*

σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκείνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσῃ καθαρώτατα, ὅς τις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μή τέ τιν' ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφελκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγείς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὠτῶν καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταραττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔωντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωῇ; Ἄρ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃ Σιμμία, εἰ πέρ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

[Ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσθαι.] h. e. Qui maxime ac diligentissime instituerit; assuefecerit, &c. STALL.

[Αὐτὸ ἕκαστον.] Unumquodque τῶν εἰδῶν νοητῶν [intelligible forms] si per se ipsum spectetur. HEIND.

[Καθαρώτατα.] Most purely. i. e. most independently of the organs of sense.

[Παρατιθέμενος.] Apponens sibi, adhibens ut comitem ac socium. WYTT. Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 580. A. Ὁ γὰρ μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι, μήτε τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐφελκόμενος, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐντυγχάνων, τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν μέτσει. de Repub. vii. c. 12. sub. fin.—οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὀρμᾶ καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, &c.

[Εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ.] Εἰλικρινεῖ is in a degree redundant, being implied in αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν preced. It signifies unmixt, unalloyed, and is derived qu. τῇ εἰλῃ κρινόμενος, "quoniam ad splendorem solis, qui εἰλη dicitur, τὰ μεμιγμένα καὶ τὰ ἀμιγῆ facile διακρίνεται." Scap. Lex. V. Cousin.—dé-

gagée de tout élément étranger et sensible, d'appliquer immédiatement la pure essence de la pensée en elle-même à la recherche de la pure essence de chaque chose en soi, sans le ministère des yeux et des oreilles, sans aucune intervention du corps qui ne fait que troubler l'âme et l'empêcher de trouver la sagesse et la vérité; pour peu qu'elle ait avec lui le moindre commerce? Si l'on peut jamais parvenir à connaître l'essence des choses, n'est-ce pas par ce moyen?

[Θηρεύειν.] This term is in frequent use with Plato and his followers, in reference to the investigation of truth.—Olympiod. Οἰκεῖον τὸ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν, διότι ἀφανεῖ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς γινώσκειται ταῦτα, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ θηραταὶ ἀφανεῖς σπεύδουσιν εἶναι τοῖς θηράμασιν.

[Ἀπαλλαγείς.] Cic. Acad. iv. 46. "Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis, veritatemque ipsam, abductam ab opinionibus, et a sensibus, cogitationis ipsius et mentis, esse voluit."

[Ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν.] See Apol. Socr. c. 1. init.

[Ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος.] Qui rerum naturam, i. e. veritatem (segregans animum a corpore) intelligit. GOTTL. Τὸ ὄν, i. q. ἀλήθεια, because truth is permanent and the same; besides, truth

§. 11. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαύτ' ἅττα λέγειν, ὅτι Κινδυνεύει τοι ὡς περ ἄτραπός τις ἡμᾶς ἐκφέρειν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, ὅτι ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ ξυμπεφυρμένη ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοῦ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησόμεθα ἰκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ

is the knowledge of what a thing actually is. Whence Plato, Tim. c. 9. speaks of the Deity as τί τὸ ὄν αἰεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, and of the body as τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν αἰεί, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε, thus explained by Sextus Empiric.; διὰ τὴν λεγόμενὴν συνεχῆ ῥύσιν αὐτῶν, (viz. τῶν σωματῶν) ὡς μηδὲ τὴν τότε δεῖξιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι, μηδὲ εἶναι νομιζέσθαι. παρὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων γινόμενα μὲν, ὄντα δὲ οὐδέποτε καλεῖ τὰ σώματα.

Ἵπερφυῶς—ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις.] *Mirifice quantum vera dicis.* WYTT.—ὡς having here the force of ὅσον in the forms οὐράμιον ὅσον, μυρία ὅσα, &c. It occurs frequently in this sense in the writings of Plato.

§. 11. Τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις.] *Veros, genuinosque philosophos,* GOTTL.—so called in opposition to the πολιτικοί, or those who aimed no higher than the practice of such virtues as affected the well-being of society, temperance, justice, &c. Olympiod. Γνησίως φιλοσόφοις εἶπε διὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς.

"Ὅτι.] See Matthiæ Gr. 624. 2. b.

Κινδυνεύει τοι ὡς περ ἄτραπός, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Schol. Φησὶν ὅτι ταύτην τὴν ἄτραπὸν ἰτέον, οὐ τὴν λεωφόρον· τοῦτ' ἔστι, καθαρτικῶς ζητέον· ἄτραπός γὰρ ἡ ὁδὸς, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἢ καθαρσις ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ἄγουσα· οὐ τὴν λεωφόρον δὲ δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἔστι, τὴν τῶν πολλῶν. Καὶ Πυθαγόρειον γὰρ ἦν παράγγελμα, φεύγειν τὰς λεωφόρους. Heindorf understands the passage to mean that a certain by-path, pursued by the true philosopher, who separates the soul from the things of sense, and not the high road, traversed by the many who make

sense the medium of their judgment, appeared most likely to conduct the searchers after truth, who in their scrutiny took reason for their guide, and on this account, because while the soul is united to, and encumbered with the body, it is incapable of attaining the object of its otherwise unrestrained exertions. So V. Cousin. *Il n'y a qu'un sentier détourné qui puisse guider la raison dans ses recherches; car tant que nous aurons notre corps et que notre ame sera enchaînée dans cette corruption, jamais nous ne posséderons l'objet de nos desirs, c'est-à-dire la vérité;* to which he subjoins in a note; "Ce sentier détourné est évidemment le dégagement de l'ame; i. e. λύσις καὶ χωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. Heindorf further explains μετὰ λόγον, *præunte et ducente ratione;* Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 587. 3. Demosth. Leptin. c. 90. παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν λόγῳ μετὰ τῶν νόμων [*ducentibus, præeuntibus legibus,* WOLF.] τὰ δίκαια, λαμβάνοντες; and in this sense proposes ἐν τῇ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου σκέψει as an equivalent arrangement to that in the text. Stallbaum understands by ἡ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου σκέψις—*veri investigatio mente et ratione instituta, segregata ac sejuncta corporis communionē.* Schleierm. connects ἡμᾶς with μετὰ τοῦ λόγου in the sense of ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν λόγον. But the spirit of the passage is best evinced and supported by the construction and explanation of Heindorf, as supr.

Μυρίας μὲν γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ διὰ παραδειγμάτων ἐκτραγώδουσιν ἀφηγοῦμενοι, [i. e. *tragicæ exaggerant, sc. tragedias excitant in describendis impedimentis, quæ sunt animo a corpore.* GOTTL.] τὰ συμβαί-

τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἔτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν· ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ἡμῖν γίνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ ταῦτα. τὸ

νοῦτα ἐμπόδια τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντος ἐν ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις τροφαῖς, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐν ταῖς νόσοις.

Καὶ φλυαρίας.] Olympiod. φλυαρίαν καλεῖ ὁ Πλάτων πᾶν τὸ περιττόν, οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἔργοις.

Ἔστε τὸ λεγόμενον.] *Ut, quod vero proverbio dicitur, omnino ne sapere quidem unquam quidquam propter corpus possimus*, WYTT., where it is to be observed that the adage is one to be confined altogether to the class of philosophers. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 432. 5. Ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 636. Cf. de Repub. i. p. 347. D. Ὁ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι. Lachet. p. 183. D. Τοῦτον—ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἔθεσάμην ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον.

Καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις, κ. τ. λ.] Cic. Fin. i. 13. "Cupiditates enim sunt insatiabiles: quæ non modo singulos homines, sed universas familias evertunt: totam etiam labefactant sæpe rempublicam. Ex cupiditatibus odia, dissidia, discordia, seditiones, bella nascuntur: nec hæ sese foris solum jactant, nec tantum in alios cæco impetu incurunt: sed intus etiam in animis inclusæ inter se dissident atque discordant; ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici; ut sapiens solum, amputata circumcisæque inanitate omni et errore, naturæ finibus contentus, sine ægritudi-

ne posset et sine metu vivere." James, Epist. iv. 1. Πόθεν πόλεμοι καὶ μάχαι ἐν ἡμῖν; Ὅκ ἐντεῦθεν, ἐκ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡμῶν τῶν στρατευομένων ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν; Ἐπιθυμεῖτε, καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε· φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε, καὶ οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν· μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε, οὐκ ἔχετε, διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς· Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε, διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε, ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἡμῶν δαπανήσητε. Μοιχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλίδες, οὐκ οἴδατε, ὅτι ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἔχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔστιν;

Διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Πῶς διὰ τὰ χρήματα πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται; πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας ἐγένοντο· Ῥητέον οὖν ὡς μὲν Ἀρποκρατίων, ἢ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, ἢ ὅτι καὶ ἡ τῶν λαφύρων ἐλπίς ἐπιτείνει τὸν πόλεμον ὡς δὲ Λογγίνος, τὰ ἐκτὸς πάντα χρήματα καλεῖ. V. Ruhken in Dissert. de Longin. c. 6. p. 8. Fabric. Bib. Græc. ii. p. 61. Cf. Virg. Æneid. iii. 54. "Quid non mortalia pectora cogis, Auri sacra fames."

Καὶ ἐκ τούτου—διὰ ταῦτα πάντα.] i. e. *Et ex hac corporis causa, propter hæ cupiditates, et negotia, otium tractandæ philosophiæ nobis intercipitur*. WYTT.—Ἐκ τούτου, in consequence of the body, as a means;—διὰ ταῦτα πάντα, on account of its affections, as a result, &c.

Φιλοσοφίας πέρι.] *Quod ad philosophiam attinet*. HEIND.

δ' ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὐ πανταχοῦ παραπίπτου θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τάληθές. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἶσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμούμεν τε καὶ φαμὲν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσι δὲ οὐ. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γινῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασι· τότε γὰρ αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὐ. καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτῳ ἔσομεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς. καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαρὸι ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε

Τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι, κ. τ. λ.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 432. 5.

Παραπίπτου.] *Quod casu et fortuito adeoque tempore interveniat alieno.*—FISCH. Θόρυβον is used in reference to what affects the ears, ταραχὴν, the eyes, and ἐκπλήττει, of the senses generally. KÖRNER.

Οὐ ἐπιθυμούμεν—φρονήσεως.] See Matthiæ Gr. 474. b.

Ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει.] i. e. What has been hitherto said of the body and its passions, as infr. c. 12. Ὑπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται.

Δυοῖν θάτερον.] These words form an apposition, being introduced into a proposition with ἢ—ἢ, without having any other connexion with it. Matthiæ Gr. s. 433. Obs. 1.

Ὅ τι μὴ.] See in Criton. c. 14. sub. init.

'Αναπιμπλώμεθα.] See Apol. Socr. c. 20. a med. ἀναπλήσει αἰτιῶν.

'Ὡς τὸ εἰκός.] *In all likelihood.* Aristid. Orat. i. p. 253. fully, ὡς τὸ εἰκός ἔχει.—Μετὰ τοιούτων, i. e. the gods and good men. c. 8. supr.—'Ἴσως τάληθές, probably true; ἴσως being used as indicative of a high degree of probability, ὄντως, of certainty itself. Legg. xii. p. 695. G. ΚΑ. Ἴσως. ΑΘΗΝ. Οὐκ ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὄντως, ὃ δαιμόνι, ταύτης οὐκ ἔστι σοφώτερα μέθοδος ἀνθρώπων οὐδενί. Heindorf observes upon ἴσως; supr., that it is peculiarly expressive of the modesty of the Attic style, to speak hesitatingly of what was positively known and believed. The prudent reserve [ἐυλάβεια, Olympiod.] which Plato generally used in treating of such subjects as were manifestly beyond the grasp of human comprehen-

ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἴσως τάληθές, μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαρῶ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ. Τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 12. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἀφικομένῳ οἱ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἰκανῶς, εἰ πέρ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὐ ἔνεκα ἢ πολλὴν πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν ἐμοὶ προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίνεταί καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἠγεῖται οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς περ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει ὃ περ πά-

sion, was a well-known and commendable characteristic of the Socratic school. Plutarch. de S. N. V. p. 549. B.

Μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ, κ. τ. λ.] Plutarch. de Is. et Osir. p. 352. D. καθαρῶ γὰρ, ἢ φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, οὐ θεμιτὸν ἀπτεσθαι μὴ καθαρῶ. Hierocl. in Aur. Carm. p. 6. μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαρῶ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 517. Obs. 4. and s. 608. c.

Λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν.] *Dicere et existimare omnes, qui doctrinæ recte student.* WYTT.

§. 12. Πολλὴ ἐλπίς—κτήσασθαι.] The construction would probably require κτήσεσθαι or κτήσασθαι ἂν, but after verbs of a like signification to that in the text, the aorist is not unusual. Cf. *infr.* ἐλπίς ἐστίν—τυχεῖν. Sympos. p. 193. D. ὅς—εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ἐλπίδας μεγίστας παρέχεται καταστήσας ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν καὶ ἰασάμενος μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι. Pindar, Pyth. iv. 432. Ἥλαπετο δ' οὐκέτι οἱ κείνόν γε πράξασθαι πόνον.

Εἰ πέρ που ἄλλοθι.] *If anywhere at all.* Ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι.] Stephens, and others, read, ἐν τῷ παρόντι, which, as Heindorf justly observes, should have

been followed by γίνεταί, not γέγονεν.

Καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ.] Socrates had already asserted of himself, ὥστ' εὐελπίς εἰμι εἶναι τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καὶ—πολὺ ἀμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς—but now that he had shown it to be the province of all true philosophers, to aim at a perfect freedom of the mind and its attributes from the body and its influences, he concludes that any other, who had so achieved his moral independence, should welcome like himself, with willingness and hope, the prospect of a pure and perfect life to come.

Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι—τοῦτο ξυμβαίνει.] For ξυμβ. κάθαρσιν εἶναι τοῦτο, as *infr.* c. 19. init. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, &c. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 297. This doctrine of the purification of the soul was borrowed from the Orphic and Pythagorean schools, which inculcated an austere and constant course of discipline, as tending to emancipate the soul from the contagion of things terrestrial, and to restore it unspotted to its celestial source.—KÖRNER.



λαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσει αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγαείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα μόνην καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὡς περ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντάπασι γ', ἡ δ' ὅς. Λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὡς φαμέν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. ἡ οὐ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν ὁ περ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἶη ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ' ἦκουτος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; οὐ γελοῖον; Πῶς δ' οὐ; Τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἦκιστ' αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν

Συναγαείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι.] Cf. Hom II. θ. 240. ἐσαγαίρατο θυμὸν and Schol. in loc. νῦν ἠθροίζετο.

Ὡς περ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.] In such appositions the Greek writers seldom repeat the preposition, except for the sake of emphasis, as supr. and infr. c. 33. ὡς περ δι' εἰργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι, &c. c. 64. ὡς περ κατ' ἔχνην κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα. — Phædr. p. 250. D. ὡς περ δὲ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἐρῶντι ἑαυτὸν ὁρῶν λέληθε. Whence the latter ἐκ has been in some editions incorrectly omitted.

Τοῦτο γε θάνατος.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 2. e.

Τὸ μελέτημα.] *The study, practice, or pursuit.*

Ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι.] h. e. qui se ita componit et hoc studet,

ut vitam agat mortī quam proximam.—STALL.—οὕτω ζῆν, is elegantly redundant here; Cf. Herodot. i. 196. ἐγγυτάτας χρῆν καταστήσαντα, ἡ μὴ συνοικῆσειν αὐτῇ, οὕτω ἀπάγεσθαι.—WYTT.

Τούτον.] Sc. τοῦ τεθνάναι.

Ἀποθνήσκειν — καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι] Supr. c. 9. init.

Διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι.] Schol. ἀντὶ τοῦ διαβέβλημένως ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ σῶμα. *Ab omni parte inimici sunt corpori, infensi; corpus ut inimicum suspicantur et oderunt.* WYTT. Upon εἰ γὰρ preced. see Matthiæ Gr. s. 630. 2. f.—upon αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, seq. s. 616. and upon the indicatives, διαβέβληνται and ἐπιθυμοῦσι, with the optatives, φοβοῦντο and ἀγανακτοῖεν following εἰ, s. 524. Obs. 1.

ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἶη, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστίν, οὐδὲ διὰ βίου ἤρων, τυχεῖν ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως ᾧ τε διαβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι ξυνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἰέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἄιδου ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαι τι ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ ξυνέσεσθαι φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῶ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἄιδου, ἀγανακτῆσει τε ἀποθνήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε; οἴεσθαι γε χρή, ἐὰν τῶ ὄντι γ' ἢ, ὧ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῶ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ περ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἶη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;

§. 13. Πολλὴ μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μελλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ'

Εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν.] Here the original proposition repeated, is turned into a question. Math. Gr. s. 636.

Ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν.] For the sake of human objects of affection, to which are opposed, ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία, which may be considered as θεῖα παιδικά, divine objects of regard; παιδικά, admitting of being applied to whatever is dearly cherished or beloved, may be affirmed of philosophy, as the favorite of its genuine professors. Heindorf compares Gorg. p. 482. Α. ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. V. Markland ad Tyr. Max. Diss. xxxv. 1.—Ἐκόντες ἠθέλησαν, i. e. having sought the accomplishment of their desires, by self-destruction.

Τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα.] This same hope. sc. which was entertained by

those who had descended into the lower regions, of renewing their interrupted love.

Μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 3.

Ἀξίως λόγου.] i. q. ἱκανῶς, supr. c. 11. and καθαρῶς, seq. KÖRN.

Οἴεσθαι γε χρή.] Sc. ὡς πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἶη. WYTT.

Ὁ περ ἄρτι ἔλεγον.] Stephens correctly refers this to οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἶη, seq.

§. 13. Τοῦτο ἀνδρὸς.] Τοῦτο is explained by ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγαν. seqq. HEIND. Cf. Xenoph. Œcon. iv. 19.—Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἠγοῦμαι μέγα τεκμήριον ἀρχοντος ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ᾧ ἂν ἐκόντες ἔπωνται καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς παραμένειν θέλωσι.

Ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν.] Thus explained by Heindorf; non erat philosophus tum

ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὧν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἥτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ καὶ ἀμφότερα. Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δὴ που, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἦν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ' ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἄρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγοροῦσί τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρίαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι

*quam esse videbatur*; ἄρ' ἦν being a form in frequent use with the Greek writers, to indicate the deceitfulness and disappointment of a previous hope. Cf. *Odyss.* π. 418. sqq. Ἄντινο', ἕβριον ἔχων, κακομήχανε, καὶ δέ σέ φασιν Ἐν δῆμψ Ἰθάκης μεθ' ὀμήλικας ἐμμεν' ἀρίστον Βουλῆ καὶ μύθοισι σὺ δ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῖος εἴηθα. Eurip. Hipp. 360. Κύπρις οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν θεός, Ἄλλ' εἰ τι μεῖζον ἄλλο γίγνεται θεοῦ, Ἡ τήνδε κάμει καὶ δόμους ἀπώλεσεν.

[Τὶς φιλοσώματος.] See *infr.* c. 32. *init.*

[Ἡ καὶ ἀμφότερα.] *Apol. Socr.* c. 8. *extr.* Cf. *Homer. Il.* γ'. 178. Οὗτος γ'—Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθός, κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.

[Τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις.] *Videl. iis, qui student animum se jungere a corpore atque sperant se sapientiam esse assecuturos, ubi venerint ad inferos.* *STALL.*

[Οἱ πολλοὶ.] *Vulgus*, [*inf. τῶν ἄλλων*], i. e. *ii, qui non possunt in numero virorum philosophorum haberi.* *STALL.* v. *infr.* c. 31. *sub. fin.* Μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι. *Suid.* θανμάζειν. See *Horat. Ep.* i. 6. 1. "Nil admirari—" 9. sqq. "Qui timet his adversa, fere miratur eodem Quo cupiens, pacto; pavor est utrobique molestus, Improvisa simul species exterrit utrumque:" and *M'Caul*, in *loc. cit.* The verb *προεῖσθαι* is used here like the Latin *trepidare*, or *metuere*, as

expressive of that tremulous apprehension attending the desires and affections of the body, which arises from the uncertainty of their future fulfilment. Cf. *infr.* c. 57. *πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένην.* This temperance, or equanimity with regard to the affections, which even the vulgar, though they do not possess, are still competent to define, is limited in truth, as well as the preceding virtue, ἀνδρία, to philosophers alone. *V. Cousin.*—*et la tempérance, cette vertu qui consiste à maîtriser ses passions, ne convient-elle pas particulièrement à ceux qui méprisent leur corps et qui se sont consacrés à l'étude de la sagesse?*

[Εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις—δόξει σοι.] *Heindorf* compares with this construction, *Protag.* c. 39. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκρ. τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτὸ σε διδάξει.—*Menon.* p. 71. A. εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρεσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὕσους οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ; whence he prefers the reading as *supr.* to *Vulg. ἐθέλησεις.*

[Τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρίαν τε καὶ σωφρ.] i. e. The semblances and counterfeits of these virtues amongst the vulgar many, the reality of which could be only felt and appreciated by the wisest few. See *Cicero, de Fin.* i. 10. 14. 15. ii. 14. 15. *Socrates* now proceeds to prove how it is that the philosopher

ἄτοπος. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἴσθα, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἠγούνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρείοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρείοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι. καὶ τοι ἄτοπόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλία ἀνδρείου εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δαί, οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν; ἀκολασία τινὶ σῶφρονές εἰσι; καὶ τοι φαμέν γέ που ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην· φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ' ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καὶ τοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅμως ξυμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατούμενοις ὑφ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ'

alone is possessed of those virtues in all their perfection and efficacy. The dread of some greater evil emboldens the ignorant against the fear of death; but there is an inconsistency in courage arising thus from cowardice: equally so in the abstinence which is owing to intemperance, and yet amongst the vulgar, these incongruities do actually exist.—And for this reason; their's is not like the philosopher's, an utter independence of the passions, but a reciprocation of them, like the interchange of money. They call it intemperance, to be subject to their yoke, but still, if they forbear from the pursuit of one pleasure, it is but to secure the enjoyment of another and a more probable. So with their fortitude, which is the offspring of despair, and not like the philosopher's, the calmly anticipated result of hope. Hence it is evident that the latter is imbued with the essence of those virtues of which the former are but familiar with the name, and of which, in their attempt to practise, they only can succeed in the abuse.

Τῷ δεδιέναι—καὶ δέει.] i. e. *By the*

*act and principle of fear.*

Δειλία ἀνδρείου εἶναι.] Cf. Plutarch. Vit. Romul. p. 37. D. ὁ δὲ (sc. Romulus) δουλείας φυγῆ παρούσης καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιφερομένης, ἐκείνο τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ἀτεχνῶς ὑπὸ δέους ἀνδρείος γενόμενος.

Οἱ κόσμιοι.] *Homines moribus compositis, temperantiae et munditiei studiosi.* GOTTL. In the text it appears nearly synonymous with σῶφρονες. "What," says Socrates, "of the temperate amongst them? Are they not so affected as to owe their abstinence to intemperance? Which, impossible as it may appear, still to such an affection as this they are assuredly liable, in consequence of their foolish and inadequate notions upon the subject of the virtue which they have not the sense to comprehend."—'Ἄλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς, κ. τ. λ.—h. e. ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην, ὃ αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει, τούτῳ ὅμοιον ἐστίν.—Εὐήθη, i. q. ἄτοπόν, supr. Cf. Alcibiad. ii. c. 5. οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ ἀκάκους καὶ ἀ-

ὁμοίον ἔστιν ᾧ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι' ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι. Ἔοικε γάρ. Ὡ μακάριε Συμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὡς περ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνο μόνον το νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα

πείρους καὶ ἐνεούς. Terent. Phorm. iii. 2. 63. "homo suavis!" KÖRNER.

Ἔοι νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο.] Fully, ᾧ ὁμοιον εἶναι ἐλέγετο. Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. Obs. 1.

Μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη.] Sc. ὄρᾱ or φοβοῦμαι μὴ γὰρ, &c. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. Stallbaum explains the passage; *Noli hunc sentiendi agendique rationem probare; vide enim, ne hæc non sit recta ad virtutem adipiscendam permutatio, ut voluptates cum voluptatibus commutemus.* V. Cousin: *Songe que ce n'est pas un très-bon échange pour la vertu que de changer des voluptés pour des voluptés, des tristesses pour des tristesses, &c.* In the older editions ἀλλαγὴ was not found, and ὁδός was understood, by a common ellipse, to ἡ ὀρθή, to which, however, Wytttenbach supplied ἀρετή, as virtue itself, and not the way to it, was the subject of discussion, and so read ἡ ὀρθὴ ἀρετή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς, κ. τ. λ.—Καταλλάττεσθαι—Cf. Aristot. Ethic. Nicomach. iii. 9. ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. Ælian. Nat. An. viii. 1. θάνατον δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀνδρείας ἠλλάξατο.

Καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω.] *Omninoque majora permutare minoribus velut numismata.* HEIND. i. e. balancing the passions and affections, with a view to being guided by their relative degrees, a mode which is evidently inadmissible in estimating the virtues. V. Cousin—*Et de mettre, pour ainsi dire, ses passions en petite monnaie.*

Μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν.] *The only sterling coin.* V. Cousin. *la seule bonne monnaie.* Cf. Philo Jud. de Somn. p. 1120. C. τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόμισμα, παιδείαν, ἐξιστάντες καὶ κατακερμα-

τίζοντες οἰκτρῶς ἀναλίσκουσιν.

Ἄνθ' οὗ.] The preposition ἀντί, with the genitive, sometimes accompanies the verbs signifying *to exchange.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 365. Obs. 1.

Καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα, κ. τ. λ.] *Vereorque ne quæ hoc numismate emuntur vendunturque, ea omnia sint re vera, tum fortitudo, tum temperantia, tum justitia, omninoque vera virtus sit cum sapientia conjuncta, &c.* HEIND., who proposes, however, as ὠνεῖσθαι is seldom, if ever, used in a passive sense, to read the passage, καὶ ἂ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμεθα τε καὶ πιπρασκόμεθα. Wytttenbach objects to the text, on the grounds that ὠνούμενα cannot be referred to τούτου, i. e. φρονήσεως. For if anything be purchased for prudence, it would appear that prudence should then be parted with as the price, which is contrary to the injunction of Socrates, that prudence should be the thing to be acquired. Accordingly he arranges and interprets the passage as follows; καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα τε πιπρασκόμενα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενα i. e. *et si hac omnia vendantur, et cum hac (i. e. prudenter) omnia emantur, tum revera constat et fortitudo et temperantia, et justitia, et summam vera virtus, quæ sine prudentia esse nequit.* But the passage may be admitted as it stands, as a general explanation of καταλλάττεσθαι supr., and, as Socrates had asserted that a reciprocation of pleasures, pains, or fears, with similar affections, even though unequal in degree, was not ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, so he proceeds to affirm what this exchange, properly so called, consisted in, which was nothing else than the interchange of prudence for its equivalent virtues. Prudence was the τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, (the metaphor being

καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἦ, καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχη, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ

continued from μίζω πρὸς ἐλάττ. ὡσπ. νομ. supr.) which none who possessed would part with for less than its value, nor could any so part with except in name, prudence being only the aggregate of the virtues, as mentioned supr. in detail.

Ἀνδρία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη.] Cf. Plat. de Repub. iv. cc. 6. 10. 16. where the four virtues, as supr., prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, are mentioned, as also in Legg. iii. p. 688. p. 963. B., a division which Wytenbach supposes to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. Cf. Cic. de Offic. i. 5. "Omne quod honestum est, id quatuor partium oritur ex aliqua: aut enim in perspicuita veri sollertiae versatur, aut in hominum societate tuenda, tribuendoque suum cuique, et rerum contractarum fide: aut in animi excelsi atque invicti magnitudine ac robore: aut in omnium quæ fiunt, quæque dicuntur, ordine et modo, in quo inest modestia et temperantia." The Stoics held these to be the primary virtues; prudence, as respected the choice and pursuit of good; temperance, the government of the appetites and desires; fortitude, the endurance of what is commonly esteemed evil, and justice, the offices of social life. Enf. Phil. ii. 11. 1. [Ξυλλήβδην] In sum.

Ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως.] Socrates decides upon wisdom or prudence as the sum and basis of all the virtues; Cf. Meno, c. 24. Upon which Aristotle, Eth. Nicom. vi. 13. Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐξήγει, τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ

φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως ἔλεγε.

Καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγ. h. e. Sive adsint sive absint. STALL.

Χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως—] *Disjuncta autem hæc a sapientia et invicem commutata vide ne nihil sint nisi adumbratio quædam virtutis.* STALL.—χωριζόμενα—καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα referring to ἡδονας—λυπας, &c. supr.

Σκιαγραφία.] *A semblance, or similitude;—* a metaphor taken from painters or sculptors who only imitate reality. So virtue does not actually, but in appearance merely, exist among those who reciprocate the passions apart from wisdom. Cf. Cic. pro M. Cæl. 5. "Habuit ille maximarum non expressa signa, sed adumbrata virtutum." Tusc. Quæst. iii. 2. "Consectatur nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, sed adumbratam imaginem gloriæ." Offic. i. 15. "simulacrum virtutis;" which Cicero applies to the mere shadowing-forth of virtue, after Plato, Sympos. 190. εἶδωλα ἀρετῆς. Cf. Theætet. c. 7. p. 111. Fisch. ψευδῆ καὶ εἶδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Plutarch. adv. Epicur. p. 1091. D. Πλάτων—ἀπηγόρευε τὰς λυπῶν καὶ πόνων ἀπαλλαγὰς ἡδονὰς μὴ νομίζειν ἀλλ' οἷον τινα σκιαγραφίαν ἢ μίξιν οἰκείου καὶ ἀλλοτρίου, καθάπερ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος.

Τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι.] Supr. c. 11. ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι. *Revera autem certo purgatio talium omnium, et temperantia, et justitia, et fortitudo: atque ipsa prudentia vide ne sit purgatio.*

ἀνδρία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἤ. Καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίπτεσθαι ὅτι ὁς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκείσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ δὴ, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι· οὐ-

WYTT. Virtue, in truth and reality, consists in the purification of the passions, which is effected by temperance, justice, fortitude, and prudence itself; through the medium of these qualities, and as their origin and source.—Τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, Intell. ἡδονῶν, φόβων, κ. τ. λ. This doctrine of the purifying of the mind by the study of virtue, i. e. by philosophy, was inculcated by many of the ancient philosophical writers, but eminently by Plato, through the whole range of his compositions, whence the frequent mention of the virtues and courses of discipline, entitled *καθαρτικαί*. V. Aristot. Poet. 16. Politic. viii. 7.

*Καθαρός τις.*] This was the first part of the *μυήσις*, or initiation, which took place by the river Ilissus, where the person to be purified stood, having under his feet the *Διὸς κώδιον*, or skin of a victim offered to Jove. The second grade of initiation was the *τῆς τελετῆς παράδοσις*; the third, *ἐποπτεία*; the fourth, *ἀνάδεσις καὶ στεμμάτων ἐπιθεσις*, and the fifth, *τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεοῖς συνδιαίτος εὐδαιμονία*. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. iii. c. 19.—*ἘΑΕΥΣΙΝΙΑ*.

*Οὔτοι.*] *Noti illi, celebrati illi*; Orpheus, Musæus, &c. STALL. *Καταστήσαντες*; Eurip. Bacch. 21. *Κάκεϊ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας ἐμὰς Τελετὰς—ἐς τὴνδε—ἡλθον πόλιν.*

*Ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται.*] This doctrine was taken, according to Olympiodorus, from one of the Orphic hymns. Fragm. Orph. p. 509. Herm. Hymn. in Cerer. 485. *Ὀλβιος, ὃς τὰδ' ὄπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων· Ὅς δ' ἀτελής, ἱερῶν ὅς τ' ἄμμορος, οὐποθ' ὁμοίων Αἴσαν ἔχει, φθίμενος περ, ὑπὸ Ζόφῳ εἰρώωντι.* Schol. Olymp.

*διόπερ καὶ παρωδεῖ ἔπος Ὀρφικὸν τὸ λέγον ὅτι ὅστις δ' ἡμῶν ἀτέλεστος, ὡσπερ ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται ἐν ἄδου.* Cf. de Rep. ii. p. 363. D.—*Μουσαῖος—καὶ ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ—τοῦς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλὸν τινα κατορύττουσιν ἐν ἄδου,*—and *infr. E. Βίβλων ὄμαδον παρέχονται (οἱ μάντις) Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως—καθ' ἧς θηηπολοῦσι πείθοντες—ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαροὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν ἀπολοῦσιν ἡμᾶς· μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει.* Whence Diog. Cynic. apud Laert. vi. 39. *γελοῖον εἰ Ἀγησίλαος μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμινώνδας ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διάζουσιν, εὐτελεῖς δὲ τινες μεμνημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσονται.—Βορβόρος, properly ἡ ἐκ τῆς βορᾶς κόπρος.* Scarp. Lex.

*Ὁ δὲ κεκαθαμένος—μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.*] The ancient writers have frequently made mention of the future felicity of the initiated. Soph. apud Plutarch. de Aud. Poet. c. 4. *ὡς τρισόλβιοι Κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη Μολῶς' εἰς ἄδου.* v. Aristoph. Ran. 346. Æschin. in Axioch. c. 20. Upon this sense of *τέλη*, Cf. Cic. in Verr. v. 72.—“*teque Ceres, et Libera, quarum sacra, sicut opinioniones hominum et religiones ferunt, longe maximis atque occultissimis cæremoniis continentur: a quibus initia vitæ, atque victus, legum, morum, mansuetudinis, humanitatis exempla hominibus et civitatibus data ac dispartita esse dicuntur.*”

*Ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ βάκχ. δ. τ. π.*] Taken also from an Orphic hymn. Schol. Aristoph. Equit. 406. *βάκχον οὐ τὸν Διόνυσον ἐκάλον μὸ-*

τοι δ' εἰσὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προύθυμήθην γενέσθαι. εἰ δὲ ὀρθῶς προύθυμήθην καὶ τι ἡνυσάμην, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, εἰάν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.

Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογούμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότης οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κάκει οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπότης τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει. εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογία ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίῳ δικασταῖς εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.

§. 14. Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπολα-

νον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντας τοὺς τελοῦντας τὰ ὄργια βάκχους ἐκάλουν. Casaub. de Satyr. Poes. i. p. 57. "Proprie βάκχοι sunt orgiastæ et ministri. Clem. Alex. Διόνυσον Μαινόλην ὀργιάζουσι βάκχοι. Orpheus in hymno Sileni Ναῖσι καὶ βάκχοις ἡγούμενε κίττοφόροι. Sic accipiendum in proverbio, πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφοροί παῦροι δὲ τε βάκχοι. In Dionysiis solennibus, puta in phallagogiis, sacris trietericis, Iacchi exagoge, similibusve pompis multi arrepto thyrso aut ferula προσκαίρουσ se præbebant Liberi patris orgiastas: nec solum viri, sed etiam honestæ matronæ ac virgines. Lege Diodorum Sic. lib. iii. 73. Sed hi θυρσοφόροι aut ναρθηκοφοροί solum appellabantur: ut qui orgia jugiter et legitime curabant neque a suscepto ministerio recedebant, hi non solum narthecophori dicebantur, sed ναρθηκοφόροι βάκχοι, &c." Olympiod. Schol.—τελετὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν βακχεία καὶ φησι [Πλάτων] "Πολλοὶ μὲν ναρθηκοφόροι, παῦροι δὲ τε βάκχοι" ναρθηκοφόρους, οὐ μὴν βάκχους τοὺς πολιτικοὺς καλῶν ναρθηκοφόρους δὲ βάκχους, τοὺς καθαρτικοὺς. v. Barnes. ad Eurip. Bacch. 145. sqq. Clem. Alexandr. compares with the above, Matthew, xx. 16. xxii.

14. Πολλοὶ εἰσι κλητοὶ, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί: and Fischer correctly explains the adage: *multi præ se ferunt amorem et studium philosophiæ, sed pauci sunt veri philosophi.*

[Ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγώ.] i. e. *Quorum unus ut fierem, nihil, quantum in me fuit intentatum reliqui, sed omnibus modis studui.* HEIND.—οὐδὲν ἀπολείπειν, *nihil reliqui facere, omnia experiri. Id.*

Ἀπολείπων—οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω.] For this construction see Matthiæ Gr. s. 555. i.

Ἀπιστίαν παρέχει.] *Quod tamen vulgo incredibile est.* HEIND., who understands αὐτὸ, sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα, as the subject of παρέχει.

Εἴ τι—πιθαν. εἰμι—εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.] See Apol. Socr. c. 12. sub. fin. εἰ εἰς—διαφθίρει. n.

§. 14. Εἰπόντος δὴ, κ. τ. λ.] To obviate the objection that the soul cannot exist independently of the body, Socrates proceeds to argue that it existed before its union with the body. The prevailing law of nature, according to the philosopher, is, that all things are produced from their contraries; the greater from the less, swift from slow, strong from weak, heat from cold, and vice versa. Life and death are subject to the same necessity, and reproduce each



βῶν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ἦ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολύηται ἢ ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα, ὡς περ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα, οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ, ἐπεὶ εἰ περ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν ξυνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νῦν δὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐλπὶς εἴη καὶ καλή, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἔστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις. Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ

other; unless it is to be supposed that here the law of nature is infringed, and these two principles exempted from its sway. But this is not so, and to understand the former position more clearly it is to be observed, that of every change there are three stages: the first, when the change begins; the second, while it is in progress; and the third, when it is complete. For instance, waking and sleeping are the two extremes, the intermediate state, or progress from one to the other, is that of falling asleep. So between sleeping and waking there is the middle stage, becoming awake. In like manner, that one should be alive or dead, it is necessary to have passed through the intermediate states of coming to life and dying, which states, as in the case above, must be alternated again, for if sleeping were not reciprocated by waking, all things should at last be buried in unbroken slumber, and equally if dying and death were not reciprocated by becoming alive and life, all nature should eventually sink and be destroyed. Wherefore the soul does not perish by death, but passes to another state, a future life, embittered to the evil, and enjoyed by the good. This argument is founded upon a certainty and an uncertainty. It is certain that in nature nothing new is produced, nor is what does exist destroyed. The production or destruction of anything does

not arise from creation or annihilation, but from the union or disunion of its parts. It is uncertain whether all souls existed before their junction with the body, whether they were created in the first instance by the Deity himself, or consisted of material particles. But that the soul, if created by the Deity, does not perish with the body, follows, as well from the rest of the Platonic doctrine, as from what has preceded upon the subject of a divine Providence.—To remove this uncertainty, then, it is to be proved that the thinking faculty of the mind does not arise from a combination of the parts of matter, which will be made appear in the course of the dialogue.

Εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη.] *Statim ut discedit a corpore.* HEIND.

Ὡσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνός.] Cf. Lucret. iii. 456. "Ergo dissolvi quoque convenit omnem animai Naturam, ceu fumus in altas aëris auras." Hom. Iliad. ψ'. 100. ψυχή δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἢ ὅτε καπνός ὠκέτο τετριγνία.

Οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ.] *Nil amplius usquam sit, omnino nihil sit, funditus perierit.* WYTT. Cf. Cic. de Senec. 22. "Nolite arbitrari, rarissimi filii, me, cum a vobis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fore." Plaut. Cistell. iv. 2. 18. "Nulla est neque ego sum usquam; perditā perdidit me."

Παραμυθίας.] *Persuasion*: παρα-

πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύνάμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μῆ; Ἐγὼ γ' οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἠδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἢν τινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐκ οὖν γ' ἂν οἶμαι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινὰ νῦν ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιούμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

μυθία signifying, not merely consolation, but, as Wyttenbäch justly observes, an assurance of the judgment, when it hesitates to admit an apparently improbable position.

Ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ, κ. τ. λ.] This sentence contains the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul.—Τινὰ δύνάμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν; Olympiod. Τινὰ ζῶνιν ἔχει καὶ γνωστικὴν ἐπιστήμην. ἢ μὲν γὰρ δύνάμεις τὴν ζωτικὴν ἐνέργειαν δηλοῖ, ἢ δὲ φρόνησιν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν. STALL.

Διαμυθολογῶμεν.] Olympiod. Τί οὖν μῦθος τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ Σωκράτους; ἢ τὴν ἐξ ἐπομένου πίστιν μυθολογίαν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Σωκράτης, οἷός ἔστιν ὁ προκείμενος λόγος; κατασκευάζει γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὁρμώμενος, ἀλλ' ἐκ τινος ἐπομένου τοῦ μεταβάλλειν τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν ζωὴν εἰς ἄλληλα. ταύτην οὖν μυθολογίαν εἰπεν.

Ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης.] Infr. c. 18. a. med. ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας. Cf. Æschyl. s. c. Th. 555. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τῷδ' ὄν λέγεις τὸν Ἀρκάδα, ἀνὴρ ἄκομπος.

Οὐδ' εἰ κωμωδοποιὸς εἴη.] In allusion to Aristophanes, Amipsias; Diog. Laert. ii. 28; and Eupolis. Olympiod. τί βούλεται ἐναυθῆτα τῷ Πλάτωνι ἢ μνήμη τῶν κωμωδοποιῶν; ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐ δῶσω χώραν τοῖς κωμωδοποιῶσι διαλοιδορεῖσθαι μοι ὁ γὰρ Εὐπόλις φησι περὶ Σωκράτους, Τί δὴτ' ἐκείνον τὸν ἀδολεσχῶν καὶ πτωχόν, Ὅς τ' ἄλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν, Πόθεν δὲ κάταφαγεῖν ἔχει, τούτου κατημίληκεν. The com-

mon taunt, τῆς ἀδολεσχίας περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, which the vulgar threw out against Socrates and the philosophers in general, was taken up by the comic poets, and occurs in several instances throughout the writings of Plato, in many of which the expression is evidently repeated in sarcastic ridicule of the ignorance and folly by which its proper meaning was abused. Cratyl. c. 39. κινδυνεύουσι γοῦν—οἱ πρῶτοι τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενοι οὐ φαῦλοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μετεωρολόγοι τινές καὶ ἀδολεσχαί. Parmenid. c. 19. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὐ ἴσθι, ἢ ὄρμη, ἢν ὄρμας ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. ἔλκυσσον δὲ σαυτοῦ καὶ γύμνασον μάλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἔως νέος εἶ. εἰ δὲ μῆ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἢ ἀλήθεια. So in that celebrated passage, de Repub. xi. p. 488, where the true philosopher is compared to the pilot of a vessel, and the ignorant mob in a state, to its mutinous crew, Socrates says: τοιοῦτων δὴ [i. e. the mutiny on board,] περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων, τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνητικὸν οὐκ ἠγγὺ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκοπὸν τε καὶ ἀδολεσχῶν καὶ ἀχρηστῶν σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτήρων;—Οὐ δὴ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι σε ἐξέταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινούς φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν εἴκειν. Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 1482. ἀλλ', ὦ φίλ' Ἐρμῆ, ἠμδαμὸς θύμαινέ μοι, μηδέ μ' ἐπιτριψῆς ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην ἔχει, ἐμοῦ παρανοήσαντος ἀδολεσχίαι, &c. The term ἀδολεσχῶ,

§. 15. Σκεψόμεθα δ' αὐτὸ τῆδέ πη, εἴτε ἄρα ἐν Ἄιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος, οὗτος

whence ἀδολεσχῶ supr., had been originally applied to those who undertook to explain the difficulties and obscurities of natural phenomena, without an adequate knowledge of the subject of which they professed themselves competent to treat; it was subsequently used in a commendatory sense, but continued to be employed in the former by those who could only vituperate the virtues they did not care to possess.

§. 15. Σκεψόμεθα.] Olympiod. Ὁ σκοπὸς τῷ προκειμένῳ λόγῳ δεῖξαι, οὐκ ἀθάνατον τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐπιδιαμένουσαν χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ Ἰαμβλῖχος οἰεῖται ἕκαστον λόγον δεικνῦναι τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἔρωτων τοῦτο ἠρώτησε τὸ πρόβλημα, οὔτε ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος ἔδειξε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κέβης ἠρώτησεν, εἰ δυνατὸν τὴν ψυχὴν χωρισθεῖσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιδιαμένειν, καὶ μὴ δίκην πνεύματος διασκοπιζέσθαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης δείκνυσιν ὅτι ἐπιδιαμένει χρόνον τινὰ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος, οὐ μὴν ὅτι καὶ αἰεὶ, ἔδειξε. FORST.

Αὐτὸ τῆδέ πη.] Αὐτὸ is explained by εἴτε ἄρα ἐν αἰδ. and τῆδέ πη refers to seqq. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν, &c.—HEIND.

Παλαιὸς μὲν — τις λόγος.] See Herodot. ii. c. 123. where the historian evidently refers to the doctrines of the Pythagoreans. How closely the pre-existence of the soul was united with the idea of its immortality amongst the ancient philosophers, appears from the following passage in Cudworth. *Intell. Syst. B. i. c. 1. s. 31.* "It is also further evident, that this same principle which thus led the ancients to hold the soul's immortality, or its future permanence after death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προῦπαρξις, or pre-existence, and consequently its μετενσωμάτωσις, or transmigration. For that which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else,

must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But, as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of the ancients admitted it also, yet, Timæus Locrus, and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation that is made of men's souls by vice.—Aristotle tells us again, agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλησαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι τι προῦπαρχοντος. That the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more than this one thing, that anything should be made out of nothing pre-existent. And, therefore, they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals preexisted before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely, its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there any of the ancients, before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might also be corrupted. And, therefore, the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly began here; first to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence, afterwards, to establish its permanency after death." Cf. Tertullian de Anima. xxiii. p. 275. "Illius (Platonis) est enim in Phædone, quod animæ hinc euntes sunt illuc, et inde huc." Olympiod in *Fragm. Orph.* p. 510. ed Herm. Ὀρφικός τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος ὁ πάλιν ἄγων τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀνάγων, καὶ τοῦτο κύκλωσιν πολλάκις. in *Menon.* p. 81. B. καὶ Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅσοι θεοὶ εἰσιν—φασὶ—τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνα-

οὐδ' μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνούνται καὶ γίνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. Καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι εἶεν ἂν ἡμῶν αἰ ψυχαὶ ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὔσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῶ ὄντι φανερόν γένοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἂν του δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἧ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην ὅσα περ ἔχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν, ἄρ' οὕτως

τοῦ καὶ τότε μὲν τελευτᾶν, ὃ δὲ ἀποθνήσκων καλοῦσι, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ οὐδέποτε, κ. τ. λ.] Plat. Epist. vii. 716. B. πείθεσθαι δ' οὕτως αἰεὶ χρῆ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἳ δὲ μνημόσιν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι. Compare the following passages from Empedocles: "Ἄλλο δὲ σοι ἐρέω φύσις οὐδ' ἐνός ἐστιν ἕκαστω θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένη θανάτω γενέθλη (al. lect. τελεύτη) Ἄλλα μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μίγντων Ἔστι, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν:—and again, Νήπιοι, οὐ γὰρ σφιν δολιχόφρονες εἰσὶ μέριμναι, Οἳ δὲ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἔδον ἐλπίζουσιν, Ἦτοι καταθνήσκων τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντη:—Οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιοτο, Ὡς ὄφρα μὲν τε βιώσῃ, τὸ δὲ βίον καλέουσι, Τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσι, καὶ σφὶ πάρα δεινὰ καὶ ἐσθλα Πρὶν δὲ παγῆναι βροτοὶ, λυθέντες τ' οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσὶ. So Euripides likewise gives the sense of the ancient philosophers on this head. Clem. Alex. Strom. vi. p. 750: Θνήσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γινόμενων, Διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο Μόρφην ἑτέρα ἀπέδειξεν. "Agreeably whereunto," observes Cudworth, "Plato also tells us that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition, or doctrine, before his time, τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν

ζώων. That as well as the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living; and that this was the constant circle of nature. Moreover, the same philosopher acquaints us, that some of those ancients were not without suspicion, that what is now called death, was to men, more properly, a nativity or birth into life, and what was called generation into life, was, comparatively, rather to be accounted a sinking into death; the former being the soul's ascent out of these gross terrestrial bodies, to a body more thin and subtle, and the latter its descent from a purer body to that which is more gross and terrestrial: Τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ καταθεῖν, τὸ καταθεῖν δὲ ζῆν." Intell. Syst. B. i. c. 1. 33.

Εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, κ. τ. λ.] And if this is indeed the case, namely, that the living are reproduced out of the dead, &c. STALL.—"Ἄλλο τι; see Apol. Socr. c. 12. init.

Μὴ οὔσαι.] i. e. εἰ μὴ ἦσαν: see Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. d.

Τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι.] i. e. τοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ εἶναι. HEIND.

Κατ' ἀνθρώπων.] With regard to mankind. Matthiæ Gr. s. 581. a.

Κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν.] Olympiod. Τινὲς ἐκ τούτου ῥησιδίου ἀπατηθέντες, ψήθησαν τὸν Πλάτωνα πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀθανατίζειν... ἀμεινον δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος Ἀμμώνιος ἐξηγή-

γίνεται ἅπαντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ἔν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχυρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. Τοῦτ' οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίνεσθαι; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐλάττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἐλάττον γενήσεται; Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάττον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δαί; ἂν τι χειρὸν γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἐὰν δικαιοτέρου, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιούδε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων

σατο τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο, λέγων ὅτι τοῦτο φησι πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐπιχείρημα, τὸ κατασκευάζον ὅτι τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλλα.

[Ἰδῶμεν.] *Videamus.* HEIND. Vulg. *ειδῶμεν, sciamus;* incorrectly. WYTT.

[Ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία.] Added in explanation of ὀνόμασι preced. Tr. *But—taking the whole in connexion, let us see, whether all things do not mutually originate in the following manner, that is, in no otherwise than the contrary out of the contrary.* STALL. Olympiod. [Ὅτι γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλλα, δείκνυσιν ἡ λέξις τριχόθεν. πρῶτον μὲν, ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. παρατίθεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἐναντία, ἃ δείκνυσσι μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἄλλα. δεύτερον, ἐκ τῶν γενεσέων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁδῶν. εἰ γὰρ αἱ ὁδοὶ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλας, οἷον ἡ λεύκανσις εἰς τὴν μέλανσιν, πολλῶ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλλα, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν. τρίτον, ὅτι χλωεῖοι ἢ φύσις, εἰ ἐν μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ ἄλλο, ἐν δὲ οὐ μεταβάλλει. καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐπιλείπει θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων,

καὶ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἔσται, τὸ λοιπὸν μηδὲν ἔχον εἰς ὃ μεταβαλεῖ. This doctrine of the generation of contraries from contraries, according to Aristotle, in *Phys. i. c. 6.* was held, in common, by nearly all the philosophers.

[Τοῦτ' οὖν σκεψ. ἄρα ἀναγ.] *Let us consider this then, whether it be necessary, &c.*

[Αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι.] More accurately, αὐτῶν ἕκαστον γίγν. HEIND. But for a similar change from a plural to a singular, see sup. c. 7. init. *αὐτός γε ἐαυτοῦ. n.*

[Ἰκανῶς οὖν—ἔχομεν τοῦτο.] *Are we sufficiently assured of this?*

[Τί δ' αὖ; ἔστι, τ. κ. λ.] Olympiod. Ἐντεῦθεν τὸ δεύτερον ἐπιχείρημα, τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁδῶν, ὅτι αἱ ὁδοὶ ἐναντία εἰσὶ καὶ μεταβάλλουσι εἰς ἄλληλας, πολλῶ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ τέλη. Socrates now proceeds to describe the passage between the two extremes, that is the progress of the change, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, and vice versa; whence the δύο γενέσεις, or two generations by which the contraries are

τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντων δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον; μείζονος μὲν γὰρ πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκ οὖν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, καὶ εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχει ἀναγκαῖον, γίνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα; Πάνυ γ', ἦ δ' ὅς.

§. 16. Τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ὡς περ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίνεταί ταῦτα, εἰ περ ἐναντία ἐστί, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντων; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρ-

eventually produced, and which must, of necessity, be two-fold, for as of all contraries there must be two extremes, πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντων, so there must be two γενέσεις, or stages of generation, from one to the other and back again. The principle of which is fully developed in the text.

Κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμ. τοῖς ὀνόμ. ἐνιαχ.] There being, at times, no names by which these intermediate changes can be designated, does not interfere with the fact, that they do exist, and necessarily lead to the specified results.

Γίνεσθαι—γένεσιν τε εἶναι.] Olympiod. Οὐκ ἀδολεσχεῖ ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν γίνεσθαι αὐτὰς ἐξ ἀλλήλων περὶ τῶν ὀδῶν εἶρηται, τὸ δὲ γένεσιν εἶναι ἑκατέροις, περὶ τῶν τελῶν.

§. 16. Καὶ αἱ γενέσεις—δυοῖν ὄντων.]

h. e. et rationes quibus hæc gignuntur, duæ sunt duobus illis quasi interjectæ. STALL. Upon the construction as supr., see Matthiæ Gr. s. 595. 3.

Ἐτέραν συζυγίαν.] Socrates proceeds to contrast two pair, or combinations of contraries, the one, τὸ καθεύδειν, and its opposite, ἐγρηγορέναι; the other, τὸ ζῆν and τεθνάναι, which are mutually analogous. GOTTL.—Συζυγία, copulatio disjunctorum, par contrarium. WYTT. Cf. Columella de R. R. ii. 2. 2. "Recurrendum est igitur ad qualitatum inter se dissidentium quasi quasdam conjunctiones, quas Græci, συζυγίας ἐναντιότητων, nos discordantium comparationes tolerabiliter dixerimus."

Σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν.] Intell. ἐρεῖς.

θάειν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. Ἰκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὐ-  
τω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῆς τῷ  
ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; Ἐγωγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλή-  
λων; Ναί. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; Τὸ  
τεθνηκός, ἔφη. Τί δαί, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος;  
Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν  
τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὧ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες  
γίγνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυ-  
χαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἄιδου. Ἐοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γε-  
νεσείων τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἑτέρα σαφῆς οὔσα τυγ-  
χάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν σαφές δὴ που. ἢ οὐ;  
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν;  
οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ  
ταύτη χωλὴ ἔσται ἢ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ  
ἀποθνήσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως που,  
ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι. Οὐκοῦν,  
ἢ δ' ὅς, εἴ περ ἔστι το ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθ-  
νεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀνα-  
βιώσκεσθαι; Πάνυ γε. Ὅμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ  
ταύτη τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγενεῖναι οὐδὲν  
ἤττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζῶντων. τούτου δὲ  
ὄντος ἰκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον  
τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναι που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν  
γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν  
ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

§. 17. Ἴδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδί-

Τοῖν γενεσείων τοῖν.] With femi-  
nines in the dual, the article is often put  
in the masculine. Matthiæ Gr. s. 281.  
Cf. de Legg. x. p. 898. A. Τούτοιον δὴ  
τοῖν κινήσειον τοῖν ἐν ἐνὶ φερομέ-  
νοιον.

Χωλὴ ἔσται ἢ φύσις.] The term  
χωλός is elegantly applied to things  
which are imperfect or deficient in their  
proper proportions. Suid. in v. Χω-  
λός. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀτελής· περὶ ψυχῆς

Πλάτων. Ἄλλ' εἰ ταύτη ἔσται χ.  
ἢ φ.

Ἄλλ' εἰ ταύτη ἔσται χ.  
ἢ φ.] Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς—ψυχὰς, κ. τ.  
λ.] The accusative, with the infinitive,  
is also used after particles which begin a  
protasis, and in construction with the  
relative; both in the *oratio obliqua*.—  
Matthiæ Gr. s. 538.

§. 17. Ἴδὲ τοίνυν, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates  
proceeds to argue, that if the course of  
generation were direct instead of circu-

κως ὠμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ αἰὲ ἀνταποδιδοίῃ τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἐτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὡσπερὲν κύκλω περιμόντα, ἀλλ' εὐθείᾳ τις εἴη ἢ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιούτο, οἴσθ' ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ' οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίῃ γιγνόμενον ἐκ

lar, that is, if all living were to proceed straight on to death, nor return again, by a winding in the route, to life—all nature gradually should sink in death, and remain buried in an equally profound repose as that of the fabled Endymion. But there is in nature a restorative principle, whereby life is reproduced from death, the living from the dead. Hence is inferred a future state of existence, of which the character depends upon the conduct of those to whom, according as they are good or evil, it must either prove a blessing or a curse. Cf. V. Cousin: "Les contraires naissent des contraires: la mort, de la vie; et la vie de la mort. L'existence est un cercle actif et fécond dont les extrémités opposées reviennent sur elles-mêmes, rentrent sans cesse les unes dans les autres, par deux mouvements contraires qui les séparent à la fois et qui les rapprochent, composent pour décomposer, décomposent pour composer encore. . . . Et il faut bien qu'il en soit ainsi, car si la vie engendrait la mort sans que la mort à son tour reproduisît la vie, la mort aurait bientôt aboli tout être vivant, et les propositions harmonieuses de l'éternelle seraient altérées *Circulus æterni motus*. . . La vie n'a donc rien à craindre de la mort, in l'ame de la dissolution de ses organes." Œuv. de Plat. tom. 1. 165.

"Ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδίκως ὠμολογ.] *That we have not rashly or unadvisedly allowed, &c.*

'Ανταποδιδοίῃ τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἐτέροις.] i. e. *If matters did not mutually alternate with, or correspond to each*

*other, as if revolving in a circle, &c.*—Upon the intransitive use of the verb in this passage, see Viger de Idiōtism. cap. v. s. 1. v. 4. Κύκλω περιμόντα—Cf. in Tim. τοῦτο ἅμα πᾶν οἷον τροχου περιαιρομένου γίγνεται. Analogous to the above was the opinion of Heraclitus, and some other philosophers, that the rational principle which animated the eternal fire, or ethereal exhalation, ἀναθυμίασις, from which all things in nature were produced, pervaded the universe, and formed, preserved, and destroyed, in perpetual succession, the visible world. Enfield. Philos. B. ii. c. 14.—Μὴ ἀνάκαμπτοι πάλιν, κ. τ. λ. A metaphor taken from the stadium, in which καμπὴ or καμπτήρ was applied not only to the goal itself, but to the act of turning round it to return to the place of starting. It is elegantly used, as supr., by Plato, in explaining this doctrine of contraries, for which the Stoics, also, and Ænesidemus, the sceptic, of Gnosus in Crete, were indebted to Heraclitus.—'Ανακάμπτειν signifies merely to round the goal, but καμπὴν ποιῆσαι, to return again to the place of starting. This was called the δρόμος ὃ ἐν καμπῇ, and included the race to the καμπτήρ and back; but sometimes the race ended at the καμπτήρ, and was then called δρόμος ἀκάμπτιος, ἀπλοῦς or ἐνθύς.

Οἴσθ' ὅτι.] Commonly inserted παρηνθέτως by the Greek writers. Cf. de Rep. iii. p. 393. D. Εἰ γὰρ Ὀμηρος—μὴ ὡς Χρύσηος γενόμενος ἔλεγεν, ἀλλ' ἐτι ὡς Ὀμηρος, οἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν μίμησις ἦν.—Τελευτῶντα, in fine, or at



τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἷσθ' ὅτι τελευτώντα πάντ' ἂν λή-  
ρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαί-  
νοιτο, διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ταῦτ' ἐκείνῳ πεπον-  
θέναι, καθεύδειν· κἂν εἰ ξυγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, δια-  
κρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς  
εἶη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Ὡσαύτως δέ, ὃ φιλε

length. Matthiæ Gr. s. 557. 4.

Τελευτώντα πάντ' ἂν λήρον, κ.τ.λ.]  
i. e. *All things coming to an end would render the fable of Endymion a mere jest, and he should no longer be considered of importance*: because all nature would then be circumstanced like himself, and he would be no longer remarkable for the singularity of his situation. Heindorf correctly understands ὁ Ἐνδυμίων as the subject of φαίνοιτο, and compares the construction, as supr., with Euthyd. s. 10. φοβούμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ—μή τις φθῆ ἡμᾶς ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας αὐτὸν τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ διαφθαρή (sc. αὐτός.) Wytenbach explains the passage: *tandem omnia fabulam Endymionis nugas esse ostenderent et nusquam apparerent*; making πάντα the subject of both verbs; but the former interpretation is the more effective, and equally admissible. The beauty of Endymion, whose slumbers were proverbial for their continuance and soundness, captivated Diana, and induced the enamoured deity to visit the object of her love upon Latmos, a mountain of Caria, the favorite place of his repose. Cf. Olympiod. Ἐλέγετο δὲ οὗτος ἀεὶ καθεύδειν, διότι ἀστρονομῶν ἐπ' ἐρημίας διέτριβε· διὸ καὶ φίλος τῇ Σελήνῃ· ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ Ἡτολεμαίου φασίν· οὗτος γὰρ ἐπὶ μ' ἔτη ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις περσοῖς τοῦ Κανώβου ἔκει ἀστρονομία σχολάζων· διὸ καὶ ἀνεγράφατο τὰς στήλας ἐκεῖ τῶν εὐρημένων αὐτῷ ἀστρονομικῶν δογματῶν.

Τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἶη.] See Apol. Socr. c. 14. Diog. Laert. ii. 6. records the opening dogma of the system of Anaxagoras; Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ, εἴτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ δικοσμήσει. Adhering to the principle, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, he admitted the existence of a chaotic matter, the constituent elements of which, always united

and identical, (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ), are incapable of being decomposed; and by the arrangement of which, and dissemination, he undertook to account for the phenomena of the natural world: adding, that this chaos, which he conceived surrounded by air and ether, must have been put in movement and animated, at the first, by the Intelligent Principle. Νοῦς he defined to be the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. From this principle he deduces motion, at first circular; the result of which rotation (he maintained) was the separation of the discordant particles; the union and amalgamation of those which were homogeneous; and, in fine, the creation of symmetry and order. Anaxagoras was more inclined to the study of physics than of metaphysics, for which he is blamed by Plato; see infr. c. 46.; and by Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1. 4., who accuses him of using the Deity only as a machine in his philosophy. Accordingly he explained, on physical principles, the formation of plants and animals, and even of the heavenly bodies, as in Apol. Socr. loc. cit. supr. which drew on him the reproach of atheism. He admitted, to a certain extent, the validity of the evidence of the senses; but reserved for reason (λόγος) the discrimination of *objective* truth. Tennemann's *Hist. of Philos.* sect. 106. By some, Anaxagoras is asserted to have been the disciple of Hermotimus, of Clazomenæ, who is said to have recognized a superior Intelligence as the author of nature, and to whose mystical revelations the former is supposed to have been considerably indebted.

Ὡσαύτως δέ.] Referring to οἶον preced. as οὕτως δέ, (not δὴ) is generally used after ὥσπερ. Cf. *Soph. Antig.* 423. Ἡ παῖς ὀράται κἀνακωκίει πι-κρᾶς Ὀρυιθος ὀξύν φθόγγον, ὡς ὅταν κενῆς Εὐνῆς νεοσσῶν ὀρφανόν

Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνήσκουσι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνουσι, μενοὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκειτο, ἄρ' οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνήσκουσι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, ὃ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατῶμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶς τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς μὲν γ' ἀγαθαῖς ἀμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον.

§. 18. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ'

βλέψῃ λέχος. Οὕτω δὲ χ' αὐτῆ— γόοισιν ἐξέμωξεν. Electr. 25. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἵππος ἐγγενῆς—'Εν τοῖσι δεινοῖς θυμὸν οὐκ ἀπόλεσεν, Ἄλλ' ὄρθον οὐς ἴστησιν' ὡσαύτως δὲ σὺ Ἡμᾶς τ' ὀπρύνεις, &c. HEIND.

[Ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων.] i. e. *From any thing else*; not from what once had lived for a time, and then died; but had what lived been once in any way produced, and subsequently died without revival, it would be impossible but that all things should have come to an end, as the source of life should be wasted and destroyed. So Heindorf explains the phrase, to obviate the necessity of Dacier's emendation, εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα μὴ γίγνοιτο.

[Τίς μηχανή.] i. q. *Ὀυδέμια μηχανή*; whence μὴ οὐ is correctly used as in ordinary after a negative. Cf. c. 37. sub. nn. *δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνο μηκέτι συγχωροίη, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν, &c.* and infr. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρροῦντι, &c.—*Καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι, i. e. what remedy is there against all things being destroyed by death?* So Epicurus, in Epist. ad Herodot. Diog. Laert. x. 39. καὶ εἰ

εφθείρετο δὴ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἀν' ἀπολώλει τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύετο.—*Ὀυδὲ μία*; more emphatic, as Stallbaum observes, than *οὐδέμια*, which signifies simply, *none*, but the former, *none at all, none whatsoever*.

[Ἔστι τῷ ὄντι—τὸ ἀναβιώσκεισθαι.] From what has preceded, Socrates draws his conclusion of a resurrection from the dead, which is to be followed by the judgment, and the distribution of rewards and punishments, according to the meed of the immortal souls. Compare with the text, as supr. St. Paul, Corinth. i. 15. 35. sqq.

§. 18. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, κ.τ.λ.] Socrates having established the point of the soul's surviving the body, proceeds now to argue in favour of its preexistence. *Knowledge or science (μάθησις)* he asserts to be, in reality, but *reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις)*; because, in the first place, if one is fairly questioned upon a subject with which he is unacquainted, his answer will evince a knowledge of, and power of reasoning upon that, of the existence of which he was previously unaware. This is equally the case in things sensible or corporeal, and in

ἐκείνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἢ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο

things abstract or intelligible. Of the latter there exist in the mind exemplars or types, by which qualities and degrees are recognized and decided. — What is beautiful, for instance, is acknowledged from its conformity to the idea of beauty preconceived in the mind. So of an action which is perceived by the senses, the merits are weighed by a standard or test which is innate and incorporeal, that is, by a preexisting, abstract idea of the qualities of actions and their degrees of good and evil, not derived from the senses; besides it is from these universal ideas that we arrive at the perception and knowledge of singulars. Consequently their preexistence, and independence of the body, infer that of the mind, which was also living and active before the body came to light. This doctrine, as Wytttenbach justly observes, however ingenious, is not unexceptionable, for it is possible for those abstract ideas to be attained in many ways during life. There are two opposite opinions of philosophers respecting their origin, the one maintained by Aristotle and Locke, that they are acquired through the medium of the senses, and introduced, like the notions of all things external, into the as yet unoccupied mind; the other maintained by Plato, who inculcates their innateness and preexistence, upon the grounds that the mind could not understand and acknowledge the appearance of what is presented to the senses, unless there was something within to which the external object might be referred, and with which it might be compared. This latter doctrine has been adopted by Leibnitz; but Plato uses it to prove that the mind existed, while the former would merely infer that it contained those ideas before its union with the body. According to Leibnitz, necessary truths are innate: not that we are from our birth actually conscious of them, but are born with a capacity for them. . . . *Sensible perceptions are indistinct; all precise knowledge being the property of the understanding* . . . . The ideas which relate to objects *without* the soul, must have a correspondency with such ob-

jects; otherwise they would be mere illusions. Tennemann's Manual of Philos. s. 347.

Μάθησις.—*ἀνάμνησις.*] Cf. in Menon. c. 15. "Ἀτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος τε οὖσα καὶ πολλακίς γεγυυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακῦα καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν "Αἰδῶν καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ μεμάθηκεν, ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷον τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἢ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο, &c. in Phædr. p. 249. C. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, ἢ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῶν.—ἀναμνησθήσεσθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἐκείνα, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπίστω, &c. Bceth. in Consol. "Quod si Platonis Musa personat verum, Quod quisque discit immemor recordatur." This doctrine, which is imputed, as *supr.* by Plato, to Socrates, appears to have been borrowed from the Pythagoreans. V. Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 24. and Davis in loc. Augustin. de Immortalitat. s. 6. t. i. p. 290. D. De Quantitate Anim. s. 34. p. 310. D. V. Cousin explains the argument, Œuvres de Plat. i. 165. "Toute science n'est que réminiscence: s'il en est ainsi, il faut que nous ayons su avant cette vie; il faut donc que l'ame ait existé avant de revêtir cette forme humaine; elle peut donc lui survivre.

"Par exemple, les sens nous découvrent des choses que nous jugeons égales; savoir, des arbres, des pierres, &c.—Mais l'idée d'égalité renfermée dans le jugement que nous portons sur ces choses, d'où l'avons nous tirée? L'égalité ne doit pas être confondue avec les choses égales qui ne sont telles que par leur rapport à l'égalité. L'idée de l'égalité ne vient donc point des sens; il suit qu'il faut qu'elle naisse avec nous, ou que nous l'ayons eue avant cette vie, et qu' à l'occasion des objets extérieurs elle nous revienne à la mémoire. Est-elle innée, et le seul fait de la naissance la développe-t-il en nous? Loin de là: ce n'est pas en entrant dans ce séjour des ténèbres qu'on découvre la lumière; on la perdrait bien plutôt! Reste donc que nous ayons acquis l'idée de l'égalité avant notre naissance, et que nous ne

τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμνησκοόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἶδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτη ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἢ ψυχὴ εἶναι. Ἀλλ', ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβῶν, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, εἴαν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσι πάντα ἢ ἔχει· καί τοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔπειτα εἴαν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο

fassions que nous en ressouvenir. Ce que nous disons de l'idée de l'égalité, il faut le dire aussi de l'idée du beau, du bien, du juste. Encore une fois, nous ne puissions pas toutes ces idées dans les impressions extérieures, mais nous les trouvons d'abord dans notre ame qui les possédait avant cette vie; il faut alors que notre ame ait existé avant cette vie; elle peut donc lui survivre.

“On voit que nous avons gardé ici à dessein, et avec un respect scrupuleux, les formes et la phraséologie sous laquelle cette théorie célèbre a paru pour la première fois dans le monde philosophique. Mais il faut percer ces enveloppes, pour entrevoir les hautes vérités qui sont dessous. La théorie de la science considérée comme reminiscence, ne nous enseigne-t-elle pas que la puissance intellectuelle prise substantiellement, et avant de se manifester sous la forme de l'ame humaine, contient déjà en elle, ou plutôt est elle-même le type primitif et absolu du beau, du bien, de l'égalité de l'unité, et que lorsqu'elle passe de l'état de substance à celui de personne, et acquiert ainsi la conscience et la pensée distincte en sortant des profondeurs où elle se cachait à ses propres yeux, elle trouve dans le sentiment obscur et confus de la relation intime qui la rattache à son premier état comme à son centre et à son principe, les idées

du beau, du bien, de l'égalité, de l'unité, de l'infini, qui alors ne lui paraissent pas tout-à-fait des découvertes, et ressemblent assez à des souvenirs? C'est ainsi du moins que j'entends Platon.”

Πρὶν ἐν τῷδε—εἶδει.] Explained by Cicero, Tusc. i. 24. “nisi animus ante quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset.”

Ἐνὶ μὲν λόγῳ—καλλίστῳ.] i. e. To comprise all in one most admirable argument; ἐνὶ λόγῳ is in frequent use for *in sum*.

Ἐπειτα εἴαν τις.] Heindorf and Stallbaum object to ἔπειτα supr., as it is a new argument which is introduced, not the preceding one illustrated by an example. The former would read ἐπεὶ τοι, which is not sanctioned, however, by any of the copies.—Ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα; *geometrical figures*. Cic. Tusc. i. 17. *Descriptiones*, (explained by Fischer,) *formæ, figura, geometricæ*. Allusion seems to be made here to the passage already quoted from the Meno; where Socrates asks one of the attendant boys in Meno's train, a series of questions upon the properties of a square, to which he makes such answers as might be expected from his age, and at the same time is led, by the easy progress of the interrogatives, to evince such an acquaintance with the subject as might have been supposed consistent with a previous knowledge

τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτη γε, ἔφη, πείθει, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῆδέ πῃ σοι σκοπούμενῳ συνδόξῃ, ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν ἔγωγ', ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι· καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι, οὐδὲν μὲντ' ἂν ἦττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν σὺ πῇ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῆδε ἔγωγε, ἡ δ' ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ πού, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω

of the principles of geometry; which is adduced by Socrates as a proof of his argument.

Κατηγορεῖ.] Sc. ὁ ἄγων ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα, or it may be taken impersonally in the sense of, *it appears*, like ἐδήλωσε, προσημαίνει, δείξει, &c. HEIND.

Ἄπιστεῖς γάρ.] *For you hesitate to admit, &c.*

Δέομαι παθεῖν.] i. e. *But I require to be made sensible of this very thing, which is the subject of the argument, that is, to be reminded.* Simmias evidently refers here to the preceding ἀνάμνησις, with which Ficinus, who reads δέομαι μαθεῖν, understood ἀναμνησθῆναι, as synonymous, but incorrectly, as Serranus justly observes, as it should have been in this case preceded by the article τὸ, besides that the obvious bearing of the whole passage is against it. Simmias means to say, that he did not disbelieve the doctrine, but wished his memory to be refreshed upon it, whence he asks, as *supr.* ποῖαι τούτων αἰ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με, &c. And he now addresses Socrates to a similar effect, and desires to be made recollect what had been previously argued upon the very subject of all our knowledge being nothing but recollection. All the copies read μαθεῖν, which

is adhered to by Wyttenbach, who would insert ἡ before περὶ, and explains the passage: *hoc autem ipsum, scil. πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μαθήσις ἀνάμνησις ἐστίν, desidero discere, aut reminisci, de quo nunc loquimur.* But Serranus first altered it to παθεῖν, which is in every respect suitable to the sense of the text as *supr.* and has been adopted by Heindorf, who supports the present reading by comparing what follows shortly after: Οὐκοῦν—τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκείνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπιλέληστο; c. 19. *init.* ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προπάσχειν, ἰννοεῖν, &c. c. 25. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι—δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποιῶντινί ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάνυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδῆναι, &c.

Οὐδὲν μὲντ' ἂν ἦττον ἀκού.] i. e. *Nevertheless, I would now hear how you essay to argue the subject; ἂν* being taken with ἀκούοιμι, as Stallbaum, after Schæfer, ad Gregor. Corinth. p. 1015. correctly observes, and not as Wyttenbach proposes, with μέντοι in the sense of *tamen.* Heindorf, from Ficinus, v. Lat. Int., would insert ἡδέως after ἦττον.

Ἄρ' ὅταν ἐπιστήμη, κ. τ. λ.] See *infra*. c. 34. τὸ ἀδοξαστον.

δέ τινα τρόπον τούτου· εἴαν τις τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκείνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἅρ' οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη οὐ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Οἷον τὰ τοιαύδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσι λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ τι ἄλλο οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἶωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσαν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος ποῦ παιδὸς οὐ ἦν ἢ λύρα; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις· ὡς πέρ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ' ἀνείη. Μυρία μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα

[Ἐάν τις τι ἕτερον.] i. e. If one should, by sight or hearing, or any other perception, receive an idea of some one object distinct from any other, (as the idea of a lyre, which is distinct from that of its owner,) and along with this idea should receive another impression, (that of the owner of the lyre,) of which the knowledge is equally distinct as in the former instance, how is it not justly argued that he remembered that of which the latter impression was so received? V. Cousin renders the passage; *Par exemple, lorsqu'un homme en voyant ou en entendant quelque chose, ou en l'apercevant par quelque autre sens, n'acquiert pas seulement l'idée de la chose aperçue, mais en même temps pense à une autre chose dont la connaissance est pour lui d'un tout autre genre que la première, ne disons-nous pas avec raison que cet homme se ressouvient de la chose à laquelle il a pensé occasionnellement.*

Οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσι λύραν, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Maxim. Tyr. Diss. xvi. 7. p. 185. ἦδη τις καὶ λύραν ἰδὼν ἐμνήσθη τῶν χρησαμένων τῇ λύρᾳ· κοῦφον γάρ τι χρῆμα ἀνάμνησις καὶ ἔκκολον. viii. 10. αὐτὸ ἐκείνο τὸ τῶν ἐρώτων πάθος, οἷς ἦδιστον μὲν θέαμα οἱ τῶν

παιδικῶν τύποι, ἠδὲν δὲ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν καὶ λύρα—καὶ πᾶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐπεγεῖρον τὴν μνήμην τοῦ ἐρωμένου. J. Chrysostom. Homil. ad Antioch. xxii. t. i. p. 249. D. τῶν φιλουμένων καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια, καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα, καὶ τὰ ὑποδήματα, καὶ οἱ στενωποί, πτεροῦσιν ἡμᾶς εὐθέως ὀφθέντες.—Τὰ παιδικὰ, the object of their love.

[Πάσχ. τοῦτο.] i. e. Are thus affected.

[Ἐγνωσαν τε τὴν λύραν, κ.τ.λ.] Whenever any habitual occurrence, or any customary event is mentioned, without its being an express narrative, the Greeks frequently have, instead of the pres., by which it is stated in other languages, and even the Greek itself, the aor. (which then marks an indefinite time in the strictest sense.) Demosth. Olynth. 2. Μικρὸν πταῖσμα ἀνεχαίτισε καὶ διέλυσε πάντα, a small mistake overthrows and destroys all again. Buttman's Lr. Gr. Gr. s. 137. Obs. 5. So infr. πολλάκις—ἀνεμνήσθη, where the adverb explains the full force of the aorist.—Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 440. 7.

[Μέντοι νῆ Δί'.] Μέντοι is of frequent occurrence in answers, in the sense of *certainly, very true, indeed.* Matthiæ Gr. 622. 6.

μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπιλέληστο; Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δαί; ἡ δ' ὅς' ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνν γε. Οὐκουν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

§. 19. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα ξυμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπ' ἀνομοίων; Ξυμβαίνει. Ἄλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηταί τις τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἰ τέ τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐ ἀνεμνήσθη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φασί μὲν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθω οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαν-

[Ἐπὶ χρόνον καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπ.] i. e. *Owing to length of time and want of observation.*

[Αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου.] *Simmias himself;* as opposed to his picture, Σιμμίαν—γεγραμμένον, *supr.*

§. 19. Τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν. See *Matthiæ Gr.* 472. 2. b.

[Εἰ τέ τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο—ἐκείνου.] i. e. *Whether this, as far as regards the likeness, comes short in any respect, or not, of that which he remembered.*

[Φασί μὲν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον.] See *supr.* c. 10. a. med. τι εἶναι δικαίον. n. c. 50. *init.* Socrates alludes here to the τὸ ἴσον παχυμερές, the equality supposed by the vulgar to exist between one thing and another, which were in reality unequal, and the τὸ ἀκριβές ἴσον, or αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον *infr.*, which is the idea of equality contained within the mind, and from which it is made apparent, that there is no actual equality or similitude between the things in nature; "Tantum enim," says *Quintilian*, *In.*

*Or.* x. 11., "difficultatem habet similitudo, ut ne ipsa quidem natura in hoc ita evaluerit, ut non res quæ simillimæ videantur discrimine aliquo discernantur." Whence it appears that the ancients were not unacquainted with those views of the subject which have occupied the attention of more recent philosophers. *GOTTL.*

[Οὐ ξύλον ξύλω λέγω, κ.τ.λ.] *Olymp.* Τὸ ἐναυθα ἴσον οὐκ ἀκριβές ἔστι. πῶς γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ἴσον τὸ καὶ ψαμμίον μεγέθους ἀφαιρεθέντος ἢ προστιθέντος ἴσον μείναν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀρῶμεν οὐδὲν ἀκριβές, οὐδὲ ἀκούομεν κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον. ἀπὸ οὖν τοῦ παχυμεροῦς ἴσον ἐπὶ τὸ ἀκριβές ἴσον ἔρχεται.

[Ἄλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτ. τι.] i. e. *But something else distinct from all these.* Cf. *Politic.* p. 295. E. μὴ ἐξέστω δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερα προστάττειν. de *Repub.* i. p. 337. E. δεῖξω ἕτεραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας.

[Φῶμεν μέντοι νῆ Δί'.] *Olympiod.*

μαστῶς γε. Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκείνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὃν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκοπεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίστε ταῦτ' ὄντα τοτὲ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τοτὲ δ' οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δαί; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἔστιν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν

Ὁ δὲ Σιμίας ἐτοίμως (ἔχει) τῷ εἶναι τὰ εἶδη. διὸ καὶ ὄρκον ἐπάγει καὶ φησιν ὅτι θαυμασιῶς πέπεισμαι, ὡς συνήθης τῶν Σωκρατικῶν δογμάτων.—Θαυμαστῶς γε; h. e. σφόδρα.

[Πόθεν λαβόντες.] Sc. ἐπιστάμεθα.

[Ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι—τοτὲ δ' οὐ.] Socrates asks whether it does not sometimes occur, that stones which are equal, and logs which are so likewise, although they continue the same, yet at one time seem equal, and again seem not? that is, of the objects submitted to the senses, of which an equality, τὸ ἴσον παχυμερές, may be in the first instance affirmed, this property, though the objects remain unaltered, is not invariable, for it is liable to be affected by a change of the judgment, but the αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον remains unchangeably the same. Socrates evidently intends to draw this distinction between the objects of sense, and their intelligible forms, that the latter only admit of being certainly known, and are the only tests of truth. This is the view taken of the passage by Stallbaum; Heindorf explains it: *eisdem lapides eademque ligna alii lapidi lignove aequalia apparere alii inaequalia: contra aequale ipsum, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, semper esse aequale, nunquam inaequale*; and for φαίνεται would read δοκεῖ, but either is applicable to the objects of sense. He objects further to τοτὲ μὲν, and τοτὲ δὲ after ἐνίστε, and proposes τῷ μὲν—τῷ δὲ instead. This

is unnecessary, however, from the position which ἐνίστε may be made to occupy in the interpretation of the sentence which is thus given by Stallbaum; *annon interdum accidit ut lapides et ligna sibi aequalia, quamquam eadem sunt tamen modo aequalia, modo inaequalia videantur*, h. e. *sensibus apparent*. This is decidedly preferable, the question being simply to decide upon the superiority of the ideal over the corporeal in the investigation and discernment of truth. Upon τοτὲ δ' οὐ, see Matthiae Gr. s. 608. 5. e.

[Αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα.] i. q. αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, but used in the plural, as the affection, not of one, but several minds. So Olympiod Cod. i. ex Plut. t. v. p. 741. Wytt. Ὅτι ποτὲ μὲν ἴσον, ποτὲ δὲ αὐτὰ ἴσα λέγει ἢ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀποβλέπων νόας, ὧν ἐν ἐκάστῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἴσον ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ νῷ ἀποδοτέον, τὸ δὲ πεπληθυμένον τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ, διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ πρός ἑαυτὴν ὑπόβασιν. Cf. Parmenid. c. 7. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν, &c. According to Heindorf, the plural may be used, because more than one object is involved in the notion of equality or similitude.

[Ταῦτά—τὰ ἴσα.] Applied, demonstratively, to the individual objects submitted to the senses.



ἐπιστήμην ἐννευόηκας τε καὶ εἴληφας; Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δέ γ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδέν. ὅταν οὖν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴτε ὁμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγόνεναί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δαὶ τόδ'; ἢ δ' ὅς. ἢ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὡς περ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῶ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὀρῶ, εἶναι οἶον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον ἐκείνο, ἀλλ' ἔστι φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδόμενα ἐκείνο ᾧ φησὶν αὐτὸ προσοικεῖναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; Ἀνάγκη. Τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὐ, περὶ τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; Παντάπασι γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναί τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐννοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτ' εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἴσον,

"Ὅταν οὖν.] "Ἐως γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο, κ. τ. λ. ΒΕΚΚ.

"Ἄλλο ἰδὼν—ἄλλο ἐννοήσης.] The distinction must be observed here between the perception of the eye and of the mind, which are both caused by the same glance. Both together constitute the ἀνάμνησιν of Socrates, as he proceeds to prove.—Αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγόνεναί—αὐτό, i. e. τὸ ἄλλο ἰδόντα ἄλλο νοήσαι.

"Ἄρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν.] Added in explanation of ἢ πάσχομέν τι—τοῖς ἴσοις preced.

"Ἡ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου.] Sc. τοῦ ἴσου.

"Ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο.] Βούλομαι, and ἐθέλειν, signify to intend, to aim or endeavor, and are used in this sense of things as well as persons.

"Ἀναγκαῖον—τυχεῖν προειδόμενα ἐκείνο, κ. τ. λ.] Olymp. "Ὅτι γὰρ δευτέρα ἐστὶ γνώσις, δηλοῖ αὐτὴ ἢ μετάβασις. εἰ γὰρ πρώτη ἦν, οὐδὲν προστιθῆναι ὄλως ἠδυνάμεθα, οὐδὲ μετάβασις ἐγγίγντο. ὃ γὰρ τὴν εἰκόνα Σωκράτους θεασάμενος, μὴ πρότερον δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην θεασάμενος, ἴσταται μέχρι τοῦ εἰκότος.—Αναγκ. που, either εἶναι may be understood here, or the construction explained by an anacoluthon.

Τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν.] i. e. *Are we similarly affected*; as ἢ πάσχομεν τι τ. supr.

"Ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα τ. ἐν.] h. e. *Hæc omnia, (τὰ ἴσα) appetere ipsi æqualitatis speciei fieri similia, nec tamen fieri posse.* STALL. According to

ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἄλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἄψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταῦτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταῦτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά ἐστιν. ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὕτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὄραν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου, ὅ τι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκείσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκείνο, ἔστι δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὃ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐρωώμεν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἔδει δέ γε, φασί, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναί. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. Ἔοικεν.

§. 20. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ

Plato, when the objects submitted to the senses are compared, with respect to their qualities, with the intelligible forms, *ιδέαι*, existing in the mind, they make an effort to attain the uniformity and perfection, of which, from the uncertainty and defectiveness of their nature, they are proved to be incapable. Cf. *infr.* ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷον ἐκείνο, κ. τ. λ., whence Stephens would read πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι for πάντα ταῦτ' εἶν. as *supr.*

Ταῦτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.] Socrates asserts that the senses had in this way no effect upon the point which he desired to prove, that whether the perception was awakened in the mind from

the sight, the touch, or any other of the senses, still the conclusion to be deduced should be necessarily the same.

Πρὸς γὰρ ὃ βούλεται δ.] i. e. Πρὸς τοῦτο ὃ βούλεται δ., as far, at least, as regards that which the argument tends to establish. V. Cousin; *du moins pour l'objet de ce discours.*

Τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον.] h. e. Τοῦ ὄντως ἴσου ὄντος, sc. *ideæ æqualitatis.*—STALL.

Ἀνοίσειν.] Put *βραχυλόγως* for *ἀναφέροντες ἐνθυμεῖσθαι.* HEIND.

Γενόμενοι εὐθὺς.] *At once, on being born.*

Πρὸ τούτων.] Sc. *Previous to the exercise of the organs of sense.*

§. 20. Καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθ.

μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μάλ-  
 λόν τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ  
 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου, καὶ ὃ περ λέγω,  
 περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔσ-  
 τι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς  
 ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν  
 εἶναι τούτων ἀπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσ-  
 θαι εἰληφέναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόν-  
 τες μὴ ἐκάστοτε ἐπιλελήσμεθα, εἰδότες αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι

γεν.] *Tum ante ortum nostrum, tum statim ut nati eramus.* STALL.

Περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.] Beauty, Plato considered to be the sensible representation of moral and physical perfection; consequently it is one with truth and goodness, and inspires love (*ἔρωσ*) which leads to virtue. (Platonic love.) De Legg. p. 62. sqq. p. 89. sqq. Phædr. p. 301. Euthyphr. p. 20.

Ἄπερ λέγω.] See Apol. Socr. c. 5. sub. fin.

Οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι.] h. e. *Quibus t̄ης οὐσίας signum imprimimus, quæ nomine essentiae insignimus.* STALL. Upon which we set the seal of substance, οὐσία, or real existence, τὸ ὄν, as opposed to the φαινόμενον or apparent truth. The source of knowledge, Plato pronounces to be not the evidence of our senses, which are occupied with contingent matter, nor yet the understanding, but reason, whose object is that which is invariable and absolute (τὸ ὄντως ὄν.) He held the doctrine of the existence, in the soul, of certain innate ideas, (νοήματα), which form the basis of our conceptions, and the elements of our practical resolutions. To these ἰδέαι, as he termed them, (the eternal παραδείγματα, types or models of all things, and the ἀρχαί, or principles of our knowledge,) we refer the infinite variety of individual objects presented to us (τὸ ἀπειρον, and τὰ πολλά). Hence it follows that all these details of knowledge are not the result of experience, but only developed by it. The soul recollects the ideas in proportion as it becomes acquainted with their

copies (ὁμοιώματα), with which the world is filled; the process being that of recalling to mind the circumstances of a state of pre-existence. Inasmuch, as the objects thus presented to the mind correspond in part with its ideas, they must have some principle in common: that principle is the Divinity, who has formed these external objects after the model of the ideas. Tennemann's Man. of Phil. s. 132.

Ἐρωτῶντες καὶ — ἀποκρινόμενοι.] So infr. c. 25. a med. ἡ οὐσία, ἣς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, i. e. διαλεγόμενοι, discussing or arguing in the form of question and answer. Cf. Theæt. p. 146. C. ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ ἐρωτῶντας τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενους ἀλλήλους σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν λαβόντες — εἰδέναι.] Socrates had already arrived at the conclusion, that those ideas which constituted knowledge had been received by the mind before birth. He now unfolds the subject more fully and expressly, and argues, that if this knowledge, having been once received, was not in every instance lost at the time of birth, we should be born with it, and possess it through life, for to know anything is to retain the knowledge of it when once acquired, as oblivion or forgetfulness is to lose it afterwards. If, then, we were possessed of this knowledge before being born, and are unconscious of it at the period of our birth, and that it is subsequently so called into operation as to convey a satisfactory proof of its pre-existence in the mind, it should be

καὶ αἰεὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὧ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάντως δὴ που, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε, οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἅς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἶχομεν, ἄρ' οὐχ, ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν, οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν εἶη; τοῦτο δέ που ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγομεν; Πάνυ γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ὧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὃν ἢ ὧ ὅμοιον. ὥστε ὃ περ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἦτοι ἐπιστάμενοί τε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον οὐς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκονται οὗτοι καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἶη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὧ Σώκρατες.

§. 21. Πότερον οὖν αἰρεῖ ὧ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν

called *remembrance*, if we would designate it correctly. This view of the passage appears to be borne out by the succeeding portion of the chapter, which is devoted to a development of the same principle, and closes with a statement in sum of both sides of the question; either that we are born conscious of those ideas, and continue so through life, or, the knowledge is revived after a temporary loss; in other words, it is remembrance, which is the position to be proved.

[Ἀπολωλεκέναι.] Cf. Horat. Epist. ii. l. 84. "Vel quia turpe putant parere minoribus et quæ Imberbes didicere, senes perdenda fateri."

[Ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν.] Cf. Sympos. c. 26. λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἕξοδος. Nemes. de Nat. Homin. p. 202. ed. Matth. λήθη δ' ἔστι μνήμης ἀποβολή.

[Περὶ ταῦτα.] i. e. Τὰ ἐνταῦθα, ea

quæ in hac vita sensibus nostris subjiciuntur. HEIND. Ficinus appears to have read αὐτὰς, which is obviously incorrect. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. 4.

[Οἰκείαν.] i. e. Our own proper knowledge.

[Δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη.] h. e. *Nam fieri sane posse videbatur antea, ut quis vel oculis vel auribus vel alio quodam sensu aliquid perciperet, et simul mente sua conciperet notionem rei, ab illa quam sensibus percipit, diversæ, cuius oblitus erat, quæ huic conjuncta erat vel dissimilitudine vel similitudine sua.* STALL. where Socrates again alludes to the lyre, &c. as c. 18. supr.

[Οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ.] Intell. ποιοῦσι. Cf. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4. 24. μόνος ἐκείνος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοὺς πεπτωκότας περιελαύνων ἐθεάτο. Memor. ii. 3. 17. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ κινδυνεύσεις. So the Latins, nihil aliud quam.

πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἡμεν ; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δέ ; τόδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῆ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχει ἀν δούναι λόγον ἢ οὐ ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σωκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ; Βουλοίμην μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκ ἔτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἶός τε τούτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά ; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀναμιμνήσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον ; Ἀνάγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ' οὗ γε ἀνθρώποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δῆτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναί. Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γινόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος. Εἶεν, ὦ ἐταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γινόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν· ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ λαμβάνομεν ; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον

§. 21. Ὡν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. a.

Πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ.] In many cases δεῖναι μὴ (as in Latin *vererè ne, cavè ne*) is only a softened expression of a categorical declaration, and then the other negations which follow μὴ, with the subjunctive, are expressed by οὐ. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. a. Obs. 2.— Αὔριον τηνικάδε, *this time to-morrow*.

Πάντες αὐτά.] Sc. περὶ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, as appears from what precedes, where, as here, reference is made to the ideas of the beautiful, the good, &c.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνομεν.] i. e. *Unless, perhaps, we receive this knowledge at our birth*.

Ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ.] *At what other time*, sc. than that of our being born: the argument then is, we cannot receive these ideas at our birth, for that is the time when they are admitted to be lost ; nor can any other period be made out in which we may be said to lose them. Olympiod. Exerp. Cod. i. p. 62. Ὅτι ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσει ἢ σφοδροτάτῃ μεταβολῇ ἐστὶν αὕτη δὲ ἐκπλήττει τὴν μνήμην καὶ ταραττοῦσα λήθην ποιεῖ· τότε ἄρα οὐκ ἂν ἐλάβομεν ἐπιστήμην· πρότερον ἄρα τοῦ σώματος· ἦτοι δὲ προσεχῶς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν νεοτελῶν τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἢ καὶ ἐκ προγενεστέρων ἔτι βίωον.

Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτ.] In reference to Οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσι—ἐπίστασθαι—πάντες αὐτά, *supr.*

τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔλαθον ἔμαντον οὐδὲν εἰπών.

§. 22. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἅ θρυλοῦμεν αἰεὶ, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἢ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνη ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὡς περ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέαι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη; ἄρ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέαι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλόν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος, εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὕτω μοι ἐναργὲς ὢν ὡς τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἅ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἔμοιγε ἰκανῶς ἀποδέδεικται.

[Ἐλαθον—οὐδὲν εἰπών.] Heindorf observes that the part. of the aorist is always joined to the aorist λαθεῖν, as in the form λάθε βιώσας, and quotes Protag. s. 31. ἐλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις. Demosth. Leptin. c. 104. ἵνα μὴ λάθῃτε ἐξαπατηθέντες. &c. Stallbaum had expressed himself as nearly of the same opinion, ad Phileb. p. 86. but found reason to change it from the following passages amongst others; in Criton. c. 10. ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες. Theætet. p. 169. C. μὴ πον παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι. de Repub. vi. p. 486. A. μὴ σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας. Ibid. v. p. 457. E. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔλαθες—ἀποδιδράσκων, &c.

§. 22. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν.] Vulg. καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν, which is nei-

ther sanctioned by the best copies, nor by the sense of the passage, the present question not being whether any thing deserved to be called beautiful and good, but whether there was the αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν and αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, which alone had a real existence; whence οὐσία, i. e. αὐτο ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστι τὸ ὄν.—Cf. Parmenid. p. 152. καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἀρα εἴπερ μὴ ἔστι.

Καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσ.] h. e. *Et ad harum essentialium notionum ea, quæ sensibus percipiuntur, omnia referimus.* HEIND.

\* Ἄλλως.] *In vain.*

Εἰς καλόν γε.] i. e. *The argument has an excellent or apposite tendency, in establishing that our soul exists, in like manner, previous to our birth, as also the substance of which you are speaking now.*

Ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα.] *With all pos-*

Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι. καὶ τοὶ καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τοῦτο πεπεῖσθαι αὐτόν, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ.

§. 23. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδ' αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποδειχθαι, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν, ὃ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἅμα ἀποθνήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάννυται ἢ ψυχῇ καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦτο τέλος ἦ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει γίνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ξυνίστασθαι ἀλλόθεν ποθὲν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀφίκεται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; Εὐ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Κέβης φαίνεται γὰρ ὡς περ ἡμῖν ἀποδεδείχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ· δεῖ δὲ προσποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνωμεν, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἔξειν. Ἀποδέδεικται μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι

sible certainty.

Καρτερώτατος ἀνθρ.] Καρτεροὶ καὶ μαλακοὶ are terms in frequent use with Plato, by whom they are applied, respectively, to those who are persevering and obstinate, or those who are easily convinced, and yielding in debate.

Οὐκ ἐνδεῶς.] Sufficiently, satisfactorily.

§. 23. Εἰ μέντοι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 617. 5.

Ἐτι ἐνέστηκεν.] *Is still in the way.* i. e. obstructs conviction. — Ὅπως μὴ, *lest*; see Viger, c. vii. s. 10. r. 4. Matthiæ Gr. 565. Obs. 2.— Διασκεδάννυται; a form of the subjunctive for διασκεδανύηται, as c. 24. init. μὴ—διαφνῶ καὶ διασκεδανύσιν for διασκεδανύ. V. Buttman. Gram. Ampl. i. p. 540.

Ἀλλόθεν ποθὲν.] *From some place or other.* ἀρόθεν ποθ. Bekk.—Ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἀφίκεται, *Intell. εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα.*

Προσποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπ.] The second part of the argument Cebes asserts to be still wanting, the proof that the soul survives the body, and is not lost when it leaves it. This, Socrates answers, is sufficiently apparent to himself, for it is a natural consequence of what had been demonstrated already; since, if it be true that nothing in nature is destroyed, but merely undergoes a change, and if it be equally true that the mind is possessed of a certain knowledge without the aid of the body, it is necessary that the soul should survive the death of the body. But to remove all

τούτον τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταῦτόν καὶ ὄν πρὸ τούτου ὠμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δ' αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούση τε καὶ γιγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάει γίνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν, ὃ περ λέγετε, καὶ νῦν.

§. 24. Ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἠδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχη τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμία ἀλλ' ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων. Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, Ὡς δεδιότων, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπεῖθαι μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅς τις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. τοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ-

doubt on the subject the philosopher proceeds from c. 24. to advance new arguments upon this branch of the subject.

Τεθνάει.] *Status hominis mortui; θάνατος, transitus ex vita in illum statum.* WYTT.

§ 24. Διαπραγματεύσασθαι.] *To discuss, or examine into diligently, as c. 45. supr. περί γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.*

Τὸ τῶν παίδων.] *Id quod pueri faciunt.* as τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, supr. STALL. *Id quod pueri dixerint, as τὸ τοῦ λόγου, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου.* HEIND.

Διαφυσᾷ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν.] *Should disperse and destroy.* The doctrine of the destruction of the soul by the dispersion and dissolution of its component atoms, upon the death of the body, was inculcated by Epicurus, and adopted by his followers. He compared the soul to the eye, which is incapable of sight when detached from the organization to which it properly belongs.

Μὴ ἐν νηνεμία.] h. e. *Non tum,*

*quum fuit ventorum pax, sed tum, quum venti vehementer saevierunt.* FISCH.—Suidas, in v. Ταῦτόν, ex Alex. Aphrodis.—*Νηνεμία, καὶ γαλήνη, ἡ αὐτῇ δὲ γὰρ γαλήνη ἐν θαλάσῳ, τοῦτο νηνεμία ἐν ἀέρι.* Hesych. *Νηνεμία γαλήνη ἀνέμων.*

Ὡς δεδιότων.] As genitives absolute are sometimes found where the partic. should conform to the case of the preceding noun, so the genitive or accusative absolute are used as supr. instead of the case of the preceding noun. Matthiæ Gr. s. 568. 3.

Ἀναπεῖθαι.] Some copies read μεταπεῖθαι: ἀνά and μετά, both, in composition, convey the idea of some change or alteration, whence either reading would answer as implying the persuasion to adopt a new opinion: ἀναπεῖθαι, *aliam cui sententiam persuadere.* V. Abresch. Dilucid. Thucyd. Auct. p. 258. WYTT.

Ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς.] It might be supposed, as Wytténbach observes, at first, that allusion was made here to Apollodo-



μεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὡς περ τὰ μορ-  
μολύκεια. Ἄλλα χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν  
αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἕως ἂν ἐξεπάσητε. Πόθεν οὖν,  
ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθὸν ἐπῶδον ληψ-  
όμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σύ, ἔφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλή  
μὲν ἢ Ἑλλάς, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐν ἣ ἔνεισί που ἀγαθοί

rus, but upon consideration it will appear that the sense and connexion of the passage require it to be explained of the mind; that part of it which, being left neglected and unenlightened, continues to be puerile and irrational. So the ancients interpreted the passage; τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν παῖδα, *puerum intus in animo nostro additum*. Cf. Porphy. de Abstin. i. 41. p. 69. πανταχοῦ γὰρ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν παιδὸς ἦν ταῦτα τὰ πάθη.—Themist. Or. i. p. 13. D. ἐστι γὰρ τις ἐν ἡμῖν, οὐ παῖς, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ' οἷόν τις εὐγενεῖς νεανίας, φιλό-  
νεκος γε ὑπεροχῆς ἑραστής, &c. V. Cousin renders it, *Prends que nous le craignons, ou plutôt que ce n'est pas nous qui le craignons, mais qu'il pourrait bien y avoir en nous un enfant qui le craigne; tâchons donc de lui apprendre à ne pas avoir peur de la mort, comme d'un masque difforme*; and adds upon the passage, "J'entends παῖς τις ἐν ἡμῖν comme les Alexandrins. La preuve de ce sens philosophique est l'opposition de ἡμῶν et de ἐν ἡμῖν. Ce n'est pas nous, dans notre essence propre, ce n'est pas moi qui crains la mort; mais c'est quelque chose en nous, un élément étranger au moi, quoi qu' accidentellement en rapport avec lui la partie puérile de l'ame. ἐν ἡμῖν opposé à ἡμῶν ne peut vouloir dire que dans nous, et non parmi nous, ce qui serait nécessaire au sens ordinaire: il y a peut-être parmi nous un enfant."

Τὰ μορμολύκεια.] See in Crizon. c. 6. μορμολύττηται.

Ἐπάδειν.] *To charm or enchant*; hence *to soothe or tranquillize*. This word appears to have been used on account of μορμολύκεια preced. The mind is diseased when it dreads the approach of death as it would the supernatural, and it must be relieved of its complaint by those remedies which are most likely to operate towards its even-

tual cure. Whence Plato has adopted the term, which seems to have been familiar with the medical practitioners in Greece, who not unfrequently had recourse to the ἐπῶδαι in the treatment of such disorders as arose from a morbid imagination. Cf. Charmid. p. 243. — ἐπῶδῃ δέ τις ἐπί τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἶη. ἦν εἰ μὲν τις ἐπάδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῆτο, παντάσιν ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖ τὸ φάρμακον ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπῶδῆς, οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶη τοῦ φύλλον.—A little further on (p. 244.) condemning the system of those who in relieving the body did not extend their care to the mind, Plato explains the ἐπῶδῃ;—Θεραπεύεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπῶδαίς τισι· τὰς δὲ ἐπῶδας ταύτας, τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλοὺς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγινομένης—ῥάδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν, &c. Cf. Horat. Epist. i. 1. 34. "Sunt verba et voces, quibus hunc lenire dolorem Possis, et magnam morbi deponere partem." Eurip. Hippolyt. v. 491. εἰσὶν δ' ἐπῶδαί καὶ λόγοι θελκτήριοι· φανήσεται τι τῆσδε φαρμακον νόσον.

Ἐξεπάσητε.] Ἐξεπάδειν, properly, *to disenchant*, signifies here, *to alleviate or cure*. Some copies read ἐξίασηται, others ἐξάσεται, *excantabitur*. Cf. Sophocl. Oed. Colon. 1193. εἰσι χατέροις γοναὶ κακαὶ καὶ θυμὸς ὀξύς, ἀλλὰ νοουθετούμενοι Φίλων ἐπῶδαῖς ἐξεπᾶδονται φύσιν.

Πόθεν οὖν ἔφη—ἐπειδ. σύ ἔφη.] Examples are frequent of a similar repetition of ἔφη. Xenoph. Econ. viii. 15. 'Ο δ' εἶπεν, ἐπισκοπῶ, ἔφη, ὦ ξένη, εἶ τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, πῶς κείται, ἔφη, τὰ ἐν τῇ νηῒ, εἶ τι ἀποσταεῖ, &c. Sueton. Cæsar. 32. "Tunc Cæsar, Eatur, inquit, quo deorum ostenta et inimicorum iniquitas vocat. Jacta alea esto inquit."

Πολλή μὲν ἢ Ἑλλάς.] Cf. Theo-

ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὓς πάντας χρὴ διερευνᾶσθαι ζητοῦντας τοιοῦτον ἐπιδόον, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὃ τι ἂν εὐκαιρότερον ἀναλίσκοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἴσως γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εὔροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δῆ, ἔφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· ὅθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν, ἐπανελθωμεν, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε· πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

§. 25. Οὐκοῦν τοιούδε τι, ἧ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, δεῖ

crit. Idyll. xxii. 154. Οὐχ οὕτω, φίλοι ἄνδρες, ἀριστήεσσιν ἔοικε Μναστεύειν ἀλόχους, αἷς νυμφίοις ἤδη ἐτοῖμοι. Πολλὰ τοι Σπάρτα, πολλὰ δ' ἰππήλατος Ἄλις.—Ἐνθα κόραϊ τοκέεσσιν ὑπὸ σφιτέροισι τρέφονται Μυρίαί, &c.

Ζητεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ αὐτοὺς.] *But it is necessary that you should yourselves examine into the matter, amongst each other, for you could not perhaps easily find any more competent to do so than you are.* Heindorf explains ζητεῖν, in the general sense of τὴν ζήτησιν τοῦ πράγματος ποιεῖσθαι, *operam dare rei indagandæ*, and Stallbaum, *rem investigare*; correctly, for the meaning of the passage is opposed to τοιοῦτον ἐπιδόον being understood here from what precedes.

Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν—ὑπάρξει.] h. e. *Sed hæc quidem suppetent, non deerunt.* i. e. *but this shall be done, indeed, or shall certainly appear.* HEIND.

Ἄθεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν, ἐπανελθωμεν.] i. e. *To return from our digression.* Cf. Demosth. de Coron. p. 341. Β. ἐπανελεῖν οὖν, ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἐξέβην βούλομαι. Cic. de Nat. Deor. iii. 23. “Sed eo jam, unde huc digressi sumus, revertamur.”—Ἐἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν, *si hoc tibi lubenti accidit, si tibi placet.* WYTT. The verbs εἶναι and γίγνεσθαι are of ten accompanied by a participle of the verb “to wish,” &c. in the dative; in which case the participle only, as the leading idea, is translated by the finite

verb. Matthiæ Gr. s. 388. e. Cf. Cratyl. I. εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ ἐστίν, h. e. εἴ βούλει. Hom. Iliad. ζ'. 108. ἐμοὶ δὲ κεν ἀσμένῳ εἴη, h. e. ἀσμένῳ ἔχω, interp. Eustath. This form was adopted by the Latins from the Greeks. Macrob. Saturn. vi. 1. vi. 6. vii. 13. “Si volentibus vobis erit, &c. Sallust. Jugurth. 100. “Uti militibus exæquatus cum imperatore labos volentibus esset.” Tacit. Agr. 18. “Quibus bellum volentibus erat.”—Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει. The infinitive is often wanting to μέλλει, when it can be easily supplied from the context or otherwise. Matthiæ Gr. s. 498. d.

§. 25. Οὐκοῦν τοιούδε τι, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates now proceeds to meet the objection against the immortality of the soul, that it perishes upon the decease of the body, in consequence of the disunion of the particles of which it is composed, by considering what the nature of the soul is, and proving from hence that as it does not consist of parts, but is in itself simple and uniform, it cannot be affected like what is compound, and consequently changeable, from the different affections of its component parts. Into these two classes all things are divided, simple and compound, between which there is this further distinction, that the latter are concerned with, and discerned by the senses, while the former is rendered intelligible by the mind alone. That the mind is itself simple, there is no reason to doubt; it is independent of the senses, and by the ex-

ἡμᾶς ἀνερέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάννυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδιέναι μὴ πάθῃ αὐτό, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὐ; καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ψυχὴ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρῆναι ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, εφη, λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν ξυντεθέντι τε καὶ ξυνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει

ercise of its own faculties comes to know that it exists. It is also independent of the changes of the body, and retains its power of thought, whatever injury the body may sustain by the loss of any of its customary media of sensation. The mind receives impressions of what is simple and immutable, while the body is incapable of any knowledge further than of what is transient and liable to change. Socrates presses, again, the perception of truth, to which the mind can best attain when collected within itself, apart from the body; when it is conversant with, and merges into a nature similar to its own, and abides in the contemplation of unmixed and unerring truth. The mind commands and the body obeys, the one fulfils the office of a master, and the other of a slave; hence it will appear which part of man is the more noble and divine. But as the attributes of contraries are also contrary, it follows that as the body, consisting of parts, is destroyed by their disunion in death, so the mind, which is one and simple, continues to exist, and departs into some sacred and unseen spot, to hold communion with its God; the destiny, sooner or later, of those who never lived in subjection to the body and its appetites. Those who have done so and are polluted in consequence, seek, after death, for other bodies which they are again obliged to animate.

Τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα προσ.] h. e. ποῖον ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐκείνο, ᾧ προσ. v. Hermann. ad Viger. p. 705. STALL. The question Socrates proposes to consider is, first, what it is that is liable to this affection of being dissolved and destroyed; for what reason, (ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς,) it should apprehend this result, and what it was that was not thus liable either to the affection or the dread

of it, (καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὐ); then to consider which of the two the soul is, and to found our hopes or fears on the result. Hence will appear the correctness of Heindorf's emendation, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὐ for τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ, which without the negative is but a useless repetition. Wyttenbach and Cornarius would reject this member of the sentence, but without sufficient reason, as is evident from the sense of the passage as *supr.*

Τῷ μὲν ξυντεθέντι.—καὶ ξυνθέτῳ.] i. e. *Ei quod componendo factum est, ei quod natura sua compositum est.* WYTT.—ξυντεθέν, signifying a compound which was not always so, but the result of art, and ξυνθετον ὃν φύσει, a compound which was always, and naturally so; a distinction to which Plotinus seems to refer, *Ennead. v. ix. 3. p. 557. A. ὁρῶμεν δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι πάντα σύνθετα, καὶ ἀπλοῦν οὐδὲ ἓν, ἅτε τέχνη ἐργάζεται ἕκαστα ἅτε φύσει.* By some ξυνθέτον is taken in the sense of the verbals ὁρατὸν, *id quod potest videri, visibile; ἀκουστὸν, quod auditū potest; αἰσθητὸν, sensible, &c.* whence they interpret the passage of *that which is actually compounded (ξυντέθειον, compositum) and that which is liable to be so, (ξυνθέτον quod componi potest.)* But the former interpretation is in every way preferable. — Ταύτῃ ἢ περ ξυντεθή, that is, that the whole should be divided into its component parts, preserving these parts distinct, as in the case of the division of body into the four elements of which it consists, from a separation of the links by which they are combined. Plotinus refers to this; *Ennead. iv. 7. 12. p. 466. B. πᾶν τε τὸ λυόμενον σύνθεσιν εἰληφὸς, ταύτῃ διαλύεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἢ συντεθήναι ψυχὴ δὲ μία καὶ ἀπλῆ ἐνέργεια οὐσα ἐν τῷ ζῆν φύσις (f. φύσει ἐστὶ) οὐ τοίνυν ταύτῃ φθα-*

τοῦτο πάσχειν διαιρεθῆναι ταύτη ἢ περ ξυνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὃν ἀξύνθητον, τούτῳ μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα, εἴ πέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν ἄ περ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξύνθητα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τὰ ξύνθητα; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Ἴωμεν δὴ, ἔφη, ἐπὶ ταῦτά ἐφ' ἃ περ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἣς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ ἔχει καὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ἢ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως; αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, τὸ ὄν, μὴ ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται; ἢ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι μονοειδὲς ὃν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ

ρήσεται. To the body, according to Plotinus, belongs multiplicity, divisible with reference to space. The soul is an essence devoid of extent, immaterial and simple in its nature; without body, or with a body which has two natures, the superior one indivisible; the inferior one divisible. The metaphysical arguments for the immateriality and immortality of the soul, have been ably stated by Plotinus, (born A. D. 205, at Lycopolis, in Egypt,) in his Six Enneades, a collection of his various scattered treatises by Porphyry. Porphyry. Vit. Plot. c. 6. 24. Tennem. Man. Phil. s. 203. sqq.

"Α περ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά—ἔχει.] So in Parmenid. p. 152. Οἶόν τε, τὸ ἔχον πως, μὴ ἔχειν οὔτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως; οὐκ οἶόν τε. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον, μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὔτω τε καὶ μὴ οὔτως ἔχη. Cf. Apul. de Dogm. Plat. p. 252. "Τὰς οὐσίας, quas essentias dicimus, duas esse ait: per quas cuncta gignantur. Sed illa, quæ mentis oculis comprehenditur, semper et eodem modo et sui par, et sui similis invenitur, ut quæ vere sit." (ὅ ἐστι τὸ ὄν) It is to be observed, that the tenor of this passage is consistent rather with the Pythagorean than the Socratic school. Bruck. Hist. Phil. i. p. 696. GOTTL. For κατὰ ταῦτά Wyt-

tenbuch proposes κ. τὰ αὐτά, and adduces numerous passages in support of its constant application to ideas which are constant and uniform, as also to immutable natures and essences. de Legg. vii. p. 631. A.—ταχθῆν μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ μετασχόν τοῦ τὰ αὐτά κατὰ τὰ αὐτά καὶ ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς παίζειν, etc.

Τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως.] Sc. ἔχοντα. Heindorf proposes ἃ δ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως.—Ταῦτα δέ,—When a proposition beginning with the relative precedes, and another with the demonstrative follows, δέ is sometimes repeated; (Matthiæ Gr. s. 622. 5.) in order, as Buttmann observes, to increase the force of the opposition between the two members of the sentence when divided into the protasis and apodosis. Excurs. xii. ad Demosthen. Or. Midian. p. 147. sqq.

Ἡ οὐσία, ἣς λόγ. δίδ. τοῦ εἶναι.] The essence, with respect to which we give the definition that IT IS.—See Matthiæ Gr. s. 540. Obs. 2.—λόγον, i. q. ὀρισμον, as frequently elsewhere. Cf. c. 20. supr. οἷς ἐπισφαιζόμεθα τοῦτο, ὃ ἔστι.

Τὸ ὄν] Added merely in explanation of ὃ ἔστι preceded.

Μονοειδὲς.] Simple, uniform; i. e. that which contains nothing foreign to or unlike itself. V. c. 28. infr. a med. Cic. Acad. i. 8. "Earum qualitatum sunt

ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχειν, ὡς Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων ἢ ἱματίων ἢ ἄλλων ὠντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἴσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἐκείνοις ὁμωνύμων; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔχει, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐκείνοις οὔτε αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὐδέποτε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν; Οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα, ὁ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κὰν ἄψαιο κὰν ἴδοις κὰν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτ' ἄν ἄλλω ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀειδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁράται.

§. 26. Παντάπασι, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν,

aliæ principes, aliæ ex iis ortæ: principes sunt uniusmodi et implices. Itaque aer et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt." V. Ernest. Clav. Cic. V. *Simplex*. Whence Virgil, vi. 747. calls the mind, "Ætherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem." h. e. ἀζύνητον, having been cleansed of its pollution. The term is applied to different subjects: in Tim. p. 59. B. gold is called μονοειδὲς γένος: to a rock or stone. Porphy. Ant. Nymph. p. 310. τὰ ἄντρα ὑπὸ πέτρας περιεχόμενα μονοειδοῦς, etc.—Αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό,—this is to be understood of identity, as ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὁ φησὶν ἀειδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα of permanence.

Οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς.] Plato not unfrequently uses this strengthening of the negative by a repetition of its compounds. Cf. de Legg. xii. p. 951. C. οὐ πρότερον ἐν εὐνόμῳ πόλει γίγνεσθαι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς. Timæ. p. 50. C. ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς. Sophist. p. 162. F. — p. 251. E. μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δυνάμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδὲν. It was not unusual also with the tragic and other writers amongst the Greeks. Eurip. Cycl. 120. Νομάδες· ἀκούει δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν οὐδενός. It is remarked that in such

cases the letter δ is constantly repeated, and the letter π in affirmatives. FAHSE.

Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν.] The genitive absolute, serving to point out the object of the following proposition. Matthiæ Gr. s. 342.

Πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐκείνοις.] Completely an opposite case to the former; τοῦναντίον being put absolutely.

Οὕτως αὖ, ἔφη, ταῦτα.] Sic contra, inquit, hæc. WYTT.—αὖ in opposition having usually the sense of contra.

Ὅτ' ἄν — ἐπιλάβοιο.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 330.

Τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ.] i. e. reflection; according to Plato, διάνοια is a mean between νοῦς, which is engaged in what is abstract and intelligible, and δόξα which regards the sensible and concrete, whence it is concerned with both, as the progressive state from the sensible to the intelligible by which the latter becomes certainly known.

§. 26. Θῶμεν οὖν βούλει κ. τ. λ.] Olymp. Διαρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύστασιν εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καὶ ζητεῖ τί μᾶλλον ἔοικε τοῖς ἀδιαλύτοις, πότερον ἢ ψυχῇ ἢ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ κατασκευάζει ὅτι ἢ ψυχῇ μᾶλλον ἔοικε τοῖς

τὸ δὲ αἰιδές; Θῶμεν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰιδές αἰὶ κατὰ ταῦτά ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὄρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, θῶμεν. Φέρε δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἶδει φαίμεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντί, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε δῆλον ὅτι τῷ ὄρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ; ὄρατὸν ἢ αἰιδές; Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη. Ἄλλα μὲν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὄρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῆ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἐλέγομεν. ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ οἴει; Τῆ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὄρατὸν εἶναι ἢ οὐχ ὄρατόν; Οὐχ ὄρατόν. Ἄειδές ἄρα; Ναί. Ὁμοιότερον ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστι τῷ αἰιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄρατῷ; Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

§. 27. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε πάλαι λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὄραν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δι' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δι' αἰσθήσεως σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἔλκεται ὑπὸ

ἀδιαλύτοις διὰ τριῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων, ἐκ τοῦ ἀόρατου αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ δεσπόζειν τοῦ σώματος. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 516. 3.

Ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *Is any other the case than that one part of ourselves consists of body and the other of soul?* V. Viger. de Idiotism. c. iii. s. q. r. 8. Matthiæ Gr. s. 487. 9.—ἡμῶν αὐτῶν depending upon τὸ seq.

Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε.] *Not by mankind at least.* Intell. ὄραται (ὄρατόν ἐστιν.)

Ἄλλα μὲν ἡμεῖς κ. τ. λ.] *But we indeed were speaking of what was visible and what invisible according to the nature (i. e. the capabilities) of man.—ὄρατὰ—ἐλέγομεν, i. q. περὶ τῶν ὄρατῶν ἐλέγ.* Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 9. Καὶ φαίνεται τουτ' οὐ λέγειν. — τῆ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, an elegant periphrasis

for τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Οὐχ ὄρατόν.] *Quod cerni nequit—αἰιδές ἄρα, quod speciem formamve non habet.* HEIND.

§. 27. Καὶ τότε πάλαι λέγομεν.] Cf. c. 10. supr. et seq. Πάλαι, according to Fischer, is used here, as occasionally elsewhere, like the *dudum* of the Latins, to signify *just now, a short time since*. Phot. Lex. v. Πάλαι τὸ ἤδη λέγειν εἰώθασι Πάλαι: Eustath. ad Il. θ'. p. 702. Phavor. in. voc.—Ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρῆται; Cf. Laert. iii. 12. φησὶν ὁ Ἄλκιμος καὶ ταυτί φασιν οἱ σοφοί, τὴν ψυχὴν, τὰ μὲν διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον ἀκούσαν, βλέπουσαν τὰ δ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, μηδὲν τῷ σώματι χρωμένην.

Τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι, κ. τ. λ.] In this passage τὸ διὰ τοῦ σ. σκοπεῖν is the subject, and τὸ δι' αἰσθ. σκ. the predi-

τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλιγγιᾷ ὥσπερ μεθύουσα, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνυ γε. Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκείσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὔσα αὐτοῦ αἰεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταν περ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῆ αὐτῆ, καὶ πέπανταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκείνα αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἶδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχῇ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ ξυγγενέστερον; Πᾶς ἂν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ξυγχωρῆσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλω καὶ παντὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχῇ τῷ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μῆ. Τί δὲ το σῶμα; Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

§. 28. Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τῆδε, ὅτι ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὧσι ψυχῇ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι

cate introduced by τοῦτο. Matthiæ Gr. s. 540.

Τότε μὲν ἔλκεται.] "Ἐλκεσθαι is used here of the soul, to signify the unwillingness with which it is forced into the consideration of the corporeal and sensible.

Ἰλιγγιᾷ.] *Is affected with dizziness. becomes dizzy or perplexed. Vertigine correptus rotatur et circumagitur.* STALL. v. Pierson. ad Moer. p. 196. sq. Lennep. ad Phalar. p. 35—38. Cf. Macrob. Somn. Scip. i. 12. "hoc est quod Plato notavit in Phædone: animam in corpus trahi nova ebrietate trepidantem: volens novum potum materialis alluvionis intelligi, quo delibuta et gravata deducitur."

Τοιούτων.] Sc. Πλανωμένων καὶ ἐν παραχῇ ὄντων.

Τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται.] Olympiodorus objects to the application of πάθημα to φρόνησις. (As in Xe-

noph. Cyrop. iii. 1. 10. πάθημα ἄρα σὺ λέγεις τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι τὴν σωφροσύνην, ὥσπερ λύπην οὐμάθημα) upon which Wyttenbach observes: "Ratio aute oculos in modo dictis: πέπανταί τοῦ πλάνου, κ. τ. λ. indeque et sensu quietis et perceptione veritatis suaviter afficitur et bene patitur, εὐπαθεία fruitor, εὐπαθεῖ." So in Phædr. p. 345. B.—ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνον τὸ ὄν, ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τάληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ.

Καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ.] Cf. Terent. Adelph. iv. 3. 18. "Et recte et verum dicis."

Ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου.] *From this investigation.*—"Ὅλω καὶ παντί, a proverbial form; in all and every, i. e. completely, altogether. Upon the addition of μᾶλλον to the comparative, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 458. So with the Latins, *magis certius, magis dulcius, magis mollior, &c.* STALL.

ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπάζειν· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αὐ πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἔμοιγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰσικεν; Δῆλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ αἰεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχὴν, τῷ δ' ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὐ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομέν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο λέγειν, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, ὡς οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

§. 29. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἔχόντων ἄρ' οὐχὶ σῶματι μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὐ τὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐγγύς τι τούτου; Πῶς

§. 28. Τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν.] Albinus Doctrin. Plat. c. 25. p. 370. καὶ μὴν ἡγεμονεῖ ἢ ψυχὴ φύσει· τὸ δὲ δὴ φύσει ἡγεμονικὸν τῷ θείῳ ἔσικεν.

Θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν.] Cf. Somn. Scip. c. 8. "Deum te igitur scito esse; siquidem Deus est, qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur et movet id corpus cui præpositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps Deus: et ut mundum ex quadam parte mortalem ipse Deus æternus, sic fragile corpus animus sempiternus movet." Apul. de Dogm. Plat. p. 255. "animam—imperare et regere ea, quorum curam fuerit diligentiamque secuta."

Ξυμβαίνει.] h. e. *An ex iis, quæ disputata sunt, hoc consequatur.*—STALL. The verb *συμβαίνειν* is frequently used in a logical sense, to express a deduction from established premises. Cf. c. 41. a med. *Αἰσθάνει οὖν—ὅτι ταῦτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λέγειν*, &c. Aristot.

Topic. viii. 22. θίντες γὰρ τὰ πλείστα, ἐπὶ τέλους τερθρεύονται, ὡς οὐ συμβαίνοντες ἐκ τῶν κειμένων· i. e. *quum plurima posuerunt, in sine argutantur, quasi non consequatur ex positis.*—WYTT.

Νοητῷ.] *Intelligible, intellectual*, i. e. not material, or falling under the senses. Donn. Gr. Lex. Proclus in Tim. i. p. 90. τὸ νοητὸν ποτε μὲν φέρουσι κατὰ πάσης τῆς αἰδοῦς καὶ ἀοράτου φύσεως, ὡσπερ ὅταν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν νοητὴν εἶναι λέγωσιν· ὡς ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης.

Πολυειδεῖ.] *Multiform.*

§. 29. Ἀδιαλύτῳ.] Olympiod. Ἀδιαλυτόν ἐστιν, ὡς μὴ ἐκ μερῶν συγκείμενον, τὸ γὰρ διαλυόμενον εἰς οἰκεία μέρη διαλύεται. Cic. de Senect. c. 21. "Cum simplex—animi natura esset, neque haberet in se quiddam admistum dispar sui atque dissimile, non posse eum dividi: quod si non possit, non posse interire."



γάρ οὐ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὄρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὄρατῷ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ᾧ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν καὶ διαπνεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν ἀλλ' ἐπεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον, εἰ μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάννυ μάλα. συμπεσὼν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθέν, ὡς περ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὀλίγου ὅλον μένει ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον. ἕνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ εἰ μὴ σαπῆ, ὅσῳ τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστιν. ἢ οὐ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰδέες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον οἰχόμενον, γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ αἰεδῆ, εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἷ, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἰτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφικυῖα ἀπαλλαττομένη

[Ἐπεικῶς συχνὸν—χρόνον.] h. e. *Satis diu; a moderately long time.* — STALL. Cf. in Criton. c. 1. init. Ἐπεικῶς πάλοι.

[Ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως, κ. τ. λ.] The point of the present argument is to evince that if the body, whose inferiority, in all respects, to the soul is already conceded, does not disappear, is not dissolved and dispersed, at once, when death takes place, but continues to last, according as circumstances may admit or effect, it is then only reasonable to allow that the soul does not perish instantaneously at the moment of decease.—Stallbaum explains the passage as supr. (referring ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ τοῦ χαριέντως, as if the reading were ἐν χαριέντῳ ὥρᾳ.) *Si quidem quis et corpore florente mortuus fuerit et florente ætate; and understands καὶ πάννυ μάλα as a confirmatory assertion of its truth. Χαριέντως and ὥρα, he further observes justly, are not applied merely to what is graceful and beautiful, but to the strong and healthy disposition of the frame, by which, in the prime of life, the qualities of grace and beauty are best developed.*

Dacier and Wytenbach, both incorrectly, refer ὥρα to the time of the year.

[Συμπεσὼν.] *Having collapsed.* — Ταριχευθέν, *embalmed.* See Herodot. ii. 86. Cic. Tusc. i. 45. Cf. Lactant. vi. 12. 6. “Non enim simul interit, sed, anima discedente, integrum, per multos dies manet, et plerumque medicatum diutissime durat.”

[Καὶ ἐὰν σαπῆ.] *Intell. τὸ ἄλλα σῶμα.*

[Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ—τὸ αἰδέες.] Compare with this, Paul, Corinth. ii. 4. 18.—“for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.” 5. 1. and Whitby in loc.

[Εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἕτερον.] *Even into such another place as itself.* Cf. c. 2. supr. *Τοιοῦτους ἕτερον ἔχεις.*

[Εἰς Ἄιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.] *In eum, qui vere est ἄδης; ὡς ἀληθῶς* being used in reference to the fictions of the poets and the vulgar on the subject; for doubtless the place where the τὰ αἰεδῆ, and τὰ ὄντως ὄντα were, properly deserved a name synonymous with that of its occupant.

τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσῃται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Συμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ὧδε ἔχει· ἂν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ συνηθροισμένη αὐτῇ εἰς αὐτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα αἰεὶ τοῦτο,—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεθνάσαι μελετῶσα ραδίως. ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασί γε. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὡς περ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὃ Κέβης, ἢ ἄλλως.

§. 30. Οὕτω νῆ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ σώματι αἰεὶ ξυνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θε-

Διαπεφύσῃται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν.] i. e. *Is wont to be dissipated and destroyed*; the perfect being used in this sense, with reference to the complete fulfilment, succeeded by a state analogous to it.—*Matthiæ Gr. s. 502. 2.*

Οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι.] Elsewhere οἱ πολλοί, simply; ἄνθρωποι is probably added in contempt.

Ἐκοῦσα εἶναι.] *Quantum quidem ab ipsius voluntate penderet.* STALL. Cf. c. 5. supr. a med. ἐκὼν εἶναι. *Apol. Socr. c. 27. init.* See *Matthiæ Gr. s. 545.*

Μελέτη θανάτου.] Cf. *Cic. Tusc. i. 30.* "Tota enim philosophorum vita, ut ait idem (Plato) commentatio mortis est." *Hermias Comment. MS. n. Phædr. p. 45.* καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἡ μελέτη θανάτου.

Ἐπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι.] h. e. *Ei contingit esse beatæ.* STALL. Cf.

*Xenoph. Cyrop. ii. 1. 23.* ὑπῆρχε δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον μὲν θεραπεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων.

Ἀγρίων ἐρώτων.] *Wild or unbridled desires*, which, together with the fears, produce those disturbances of the mind which are comprehended in ἀνοία preceding.

Διάγουσα.] Heindorf would read *διαγούσῃ*, because of ἀπηλλαγμένη preced. but there is no sanction in any of the copies for the change, which certainly seems requisite. Stallbaum attributes the reading, as supr., to the not unusual negligence of prose writers, who attend, in many instances, to the sense rather than the grammatical construction. He compares *Thucyd. vii. 42.* καὶ τοῖς μὲν Συρακουσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις κατάπληξιν ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα οὐκ ὀλίγη ἐγένετο, εἰ πέρασ μηδὲν ἔσται σφίσι

ραπούουσα καὶ ἐρώσα καὶ γεγοητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθές ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές οὐ τις ἀν' ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πίοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιοτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτώδες καὶ ἀειδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἷε ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἢ ὁμιλία τε καὶ ξυνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε ξύμφυτον. Πάνυ γε. Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἷεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὀρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ

τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ κινδύνου, ὀρώντες οὔτε διὰ τὴν Δεκέλειαν τειχιζομένην οὐδὲν ἦσον στρατὸν ἴσον — ἐπεληλυθότα, κ. τ. λ., where ὀρώντες does not appear to have required emendation. V. Ducker. in loc. Porpo Prolegomen. ad Thucyd. i. P. 1. p. 111. Whence he conjectures the nom. διάγουσα to have been used as if the preceding construction had been οἱ ἀφικομένη εὐδαίμων ἔσται, κ. τ. λ.

§. 30. Ἐρώσα.] Sc. αὐτοῦ.—Υπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν,—added in explanation of ὑπ' αὐτοῦ preced.

'Αλλ' ἢ.] See Apol. Socr. c. 22. fin. 'Αλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν. This form, which is frequently adopted by the Greek writers, arises from the union of two constructions, of which the one denotes opposition, and the other comparison, whence the passage, as supr. combines the effect of the separate propositions ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ τὸ σωματοειδές—and ὥστε μ. ἄ. δ. εἶναι ἀληθές, ἢ τὸ σωματ. So with πλὴν ἢ. STALL. Cf. Schaefer, Appar. ad Demosthen. i. p. 752.

Οὐ τις ἀν' ἄψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι.] If there are two verbs of different regimen in the proposition which begins with the rela-

tive, with each of which, therefore, the relative should be in a different case, it is commonly found only once, and in the case required by the nearest verb.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 474. d. Upon the sense "to be able," implied in the optatives as supr. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 514. b.

Νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἰρετόν.] i. q. In Tim. p. 29. A. λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτόν.

Δειλημμένην.] *Involved, engrossed, or enmeshed.* According to Heindorf; *ita occupata a corpore, ut id per eam dispersum quasi et dissipatum sit.* Wyttenbach gives it the force of *ligatam, interceptam, interligatam*, in which he is followed by V. Cousin; *toute chargée des liens de l'enveloppe matérielle.*

'Εμβριθὲς.] Nearly synonymous with βαρὺ seq. Hesych. Ἐμβριθὲς: βαρὺ. Sap. Sal. ix. 15. Φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρίθει το γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφροντίδα. Philo de Gigant. 288. Πλατωνίζων: ὅσαι (sc. ψυχὰι) τῶν σαρκῶν φόρτον ἀχθοφοροῦσι, βαρυνόμεναι καὶ πιεζόμεναι, ἄνω μὲν βλέπειν εἰς τὰς οὐρανόους περιόδους ἀδυνατοῦσι, κάτω δὲ ἐλκυσθεῖσθαι τὸν αἰχένα βιαίως, δίκην τετραπόδων, γῆ προσεβρίζωνται.

Αιδου, ὡς περ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὄφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν σκοτοειδῆ φάσματα, οἷα παρέχοντα αἰ τοιαῦται ψυχὰι εἶδωλα, αἰ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ

Περὶ τὰ μνήματα—καὶ τοὺς τάφους.] This doctrine was held by many of the ancients. v. Hieron. Mag. in Miscell. iv. c. 12. Elsner, in Observ. Sacr. p. 47. It was adopted by the Jews also, who believed that the soul was not admitted to the celestial joys immediately after death, but that it wandered in this world, chiefly about the place where its body had been deposited, and after a species of purgatory, by which it was cleansed from its stains, it passed again into other bodies of men or inferior animals. V. Lightfoot on John, c. 11. v. 39. Vitringa in Synagog. Vet. i. p. 222. Mosheim, on Cudworth, cap. 5. Sect. 3. note 21. in fin. “Hæc nempe spectra nonnulli animos esse hominum decernebant mortuorum, aut potius eorum simulacra; quibus oppositi alii duplicis ea generis esse, constituebant: alia dæmonum ex ordine seu animorum nondum corporibus sociatorum, alia ex animis corpore solutis. Et erant aliqui tam audaces, ut datum sibi esse prædicarent, hæc duplicis naturæ spectra certis notis inter se discernere et distinguere. Scilicet nil intentatum relinquit superstitione.” *Κυλινδουμένη, — κυλινδεῖσθαι, volutari, versari.* — FISCH. Cf. Cic. Somn. Scip. ix. “eorum animi qui se corporis voluptatibus dederunt—corporibus elapsi circa terram ipsam volutantur.” Lactant. Instit. ii. 2. 6. “Vulgus existimat animas circa tumulos et corporum suorum reliquias oberrare.”

Σκοτοειδῆ φάσματα.] Appul. Apol. p. 315. Elm. “At tibi duat deus ista semper obvias species mortuorum; quicquid umbrarum est usquam, quicquid Lemurum, quicquid Manium, quicquid Larvarum, oculis tuis aggerat: omnia noctium occursacula, omnia bustorum formidamina, omnia sepulchrorum terculamenta.” Sallust. de Diis et Mundo. c. 19. p. 106. Πάντως δὲ μετὰ τῆς ἀλόγου ὑπομένουσι, μεθ’ ἧσπερ καὶ ἤμαρτον’ εἶ’ ἦν καὶ τὸς σκιοειδῆς σῶμα ὑφίσταται, ὃ περὶ τοὺς τάφους, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν κακῶς ζησάντων ὁράται.

Εἶδωλα.] Mosheim on Cudworth, cap. 5. sec. 3. note 23. “Constans est veterum et concurs sententia, animos corporis terreni vinculis solutos ad inferos seu εἰς ἄδην abire: sapientum quidem et heroum mentes ipsum una cum corpore mortali simulacrum (εἶδωλον) amittere, statimque cum Diis post excessum conjungi, tametsi simulacrum seu animus sentiens ad civitatem *Plutonis* descendat; vulgares autem animos una cum simulacro in subterraneum huncce locum commigrare: in eo animos sanabiles varii generis cruciatibus, quo puri fiant et liquidi, subijci: nimis vero sceleratos et inveterata malitia infectos æternis suppliciis torqueri.” Ibid. note 19—“Modo—monuero non iisdem apud omnes nominibus secundarium hoc animæ corpus appellari. Plerique eorum εἶδωλον illud nominant—alii vero, in quibus Porphyrius et Hierocles sunt, φύσιν illud dicunt, alii πνεῦμα nominant alii ψυχὴν πνευματικὴν, ut Synesius Libro de Insomniis, p. 137. Ex his nominibus varii nascuntur qui familiares sunt Platonicis, loquendi modi, in quibus exponendis facile aliquis erraverit, nisi nomina quæ diximus calleat.” The subject of the εἶδωλα is discussed at considerable length by Mosheim in locc. cit. and with a distinctness which throws all possible light upon this portion of the Platonic philosophy. Cf. Hom. II. ψ’. 103. Ὡ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἶν’ Αἰδαο δόμοισι Ψυχὴ καὶ εἶδωλον ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἐνὶ πάμπαν. and Kennedy in loc. Odys. λ’. 600. Τὸν ὁ μετ’ εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακληίην, Εἶδωλον.—which is mentioned as distinct from Hercules himself, who was dwelling amongst the gods. Lucret. i. 121.—“Esse Acherusia templa Ennius æternis exponit versibus edens; quo neque permanent animæ, neque corpora nostra; sed quædam simulacra modis pallentia miris.” Æneid. iv. 654. “Et nunc magna mei sub terras ibit imago.” vi. 292. “Et ni docta comes tenues sine corpore vitas Admoneat voltitare cava sub imagine formæ, Irruat

ὄρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὀρῶνται. Εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύτας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς, κακῆς οὔσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται ἕως ἂν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμία πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα.

§. 31. Ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὡς περ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθη ὅποι' ἄτ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; Οἶον τοὺς

et frustra ferro diverberet umbras," and Heyne in loc.

Τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς.] Etymol. M. and Suid. Τροφή.—λαμβάνεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας. where τροφή, a mode or plan of life, implies the instruction or discipline by which it was originally framed.

§. 31. Ἐνδοῦνται.] Olympiod.—"Ὅτι παλαιὸς λόγος, Ὀρφικός τε γὰρ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, ὁ πάλιν ἄγων τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀνάγων, καὶ τοῦτο κύκλω πολλάκις. This doctrine, which, as Olympiodorus justly observes, should rather be called μετεσσωμάτωσις, as being the transmigration of the same soul into different bodies, than μετεμψύχωσις, which strictly signifies the transmigration of different souls into the same body, was borrowed from Pythagoras and the Egyptians. Plato, says Enfield, disdaining the sober method of reasoning introduced by Socrates, left his first master in search of other preceptors. This natural propensity towards excessive refinement in speculation, and the celebrity of the Italic school, which abounded in subtleties, induced him to attach himself to the Pythagorean philosophy. He afterwards studied under the Egyptian priests, who, doubtless, seduced him still farther from the plain path of common sense which had hitherto been followed in the Socratic school. Whence it was not without reason that Xenophon, or whoever else was the author of the epistle of Æschines, preserved in his

works, censures Plato for neglecting the sober philosophy of Socrates, and through a vain affectation of extraordinary refinement, and a fond partiality for the mysteries of Egypt, and for the prodigies of Pythagoras, devoting himself to subtle speculations, and becoming a haughty professor of wisdom. Hist. of Philos. ii. c. 8. s. 1.

Τοιαῦτα ἦθη.] h. 1. Ζῶα τοιούτοις ἦθεσι χρώμενα. HEIND.

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις.] Moshheim, in Cudworth. c. 5. sect. 3. note 21. "Antiquiores humanam tantum formam huic animæ vestimento attribuerunt, nec ullo putem veterem scriptorum dicto demonstari posse, visum fuisse cuiquam remotiori ævo, canis, lupi, leonis, aut aliorum animalium figuram mentem adsciscere posse. At Platonicum genus nullos respuebat credulæ plebis rumores et fabulas: quare quum sermones passim circumferri non ignoraret de spectris, luporum aut aliorum animalium forma vagantibus et vim hominibus inferentibus, et hos sibi minime repudiandos, verum ita temperandos esse, ut suis non adversarentur præceptis existimavit. Hinc talem esse docebat animæ formam exteriorem, qualis interior ejus status esset: Humanam plerisque animos formam referre: at aliquos tamen, ceteris scilicet corruptiores et ad improbas libidines propensiores, talibus similes apparere bestiis, qualium vitia et naturam consecrati essent in hac vita: crudelem tyrannum leonis, intemperantem prorsus et voracem lupi, libidinosum hirci simulacrum gerere.—

μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας με-  
μελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων  
γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι. ἢ οὐκ  
οἶει; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας  
τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ  
τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη. ἢ ποῖ ἂν  
ἄλλοσε φαίμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμελει, ἔφη ὁ  
Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ  
καὶ τᾶλλα, οἱ ἂν ἐκάστη ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότη-  
τας τῆς μελέτης; δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη, πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐ-  
κοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς  
βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πο-  
λιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι σω-

Omnes tamen an huic dediti fuerint sen-  
tentiae sectae hujus philosophi, haud e-  
quidem dixerim. Consentiant etiam in-  
ter se de caussis et initiis hujus formae.  
Animam enim ipsam universi statuunt;  
formam istam corpori, quod adjunctum  
habet, imaginandi qua pollet, facultate  
imprimere. Accendi nimirum animum  
amore corporum: hunc amorem efficere,  
ut humidum is spiritum copiose attrahat:  
per spiritum hunc crassiorem aspecta-  
bilem fieri animum: accedere denique  
imaginationem animae et forma corpus,  
quod gerit, donare tali, qualem interior  
ejus poscat affectio. Quot hic recito  
sententias, tot scio, me portenta narrare  
videri illis, qui nihil probant praeter id,  
quod rationibus et argumentis vident  
munitum esse: verum nihil me sectae  
huic tribuere, quod ab ejus alienum dis-  
ciplina sit, innumeris confirmare mihi  
locis eorum licet." Cf. in Tim. p. 42.  
91. de Repub. x. sub. fin. in Phædr.  
p. 249. Tim. Socr. de Anim. Mundi in  
fin.

[Ὑβρεις.] *Stupra, flagitia*; whence  
ὕβ. μεμελετηκότες, *lascivi, libidinosi,*  
*flagitiosi.* FISCH. Φιλοποσίας, *inebriety.*  
Edd. φιλοσησίας, which does not ac-  
cord with the tenor of the passage.

Μὴ διευλαβημένους.] h. e. *Qui sibi*  
*non prorsus ab illis vitiis caverunt, qui*  
*illa non omni modo fugerunt.* STALL.—  
Ficinus appears to have read καὶ μηδὲν  
διευλαβημ. which is approved by Hein-

dorf. V. Cousin; *qui n'ont eu aucune*  
*retenue.*

[Οἱ ἂν ἐκάστη ἴοι, κ. τ. λ.] *Quocum-*  
*que quaeque ierit, ierit secundum simi-*  
*litudinem consuetudinis.* WYTT. Some  
copies read ἢ ἂν ἐκάστ. upon which see  
Matthiae Gr. s. 486. 2. a.

[Καὶ τούτων.] *Even of these*; i. e.  
who have not studied to withdraw their  
attention altogether from things terres-  
trial. The happiest amongst them were  
those who forbore the excesses which a  
merely moral discipline enabled them  
to withstand.

[Τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικ. ἀ-  
ρετ.] Cf. c. 13. supr. The virtues un-  
connected with philosophy, and which  
were attainable by study and practice,  
without any exercise of those higher in-  
tellectual faculties which were necessary  
to, and frequently made synonymous  
with philosophy itself, were called πολι-  
τικαί. They were social or moral vir-  
tues only, and received their name from  
the sense in which Plato understood po-  
litics, which he defined to be the appli-  
cation, on a great scale, of the laws of  
morality; a society being composed of  
individuals, and therefore restricted by  
similar obligations. According to Plo-  
tinus, the human soul cannot attain per-  
fection or felicity but by the contem-  
plation of the Supreme Unity, by means  
of an absolute abstraction (ἀπλώσις,  
simplification), from all compounded

φροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγουνῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; Πῆ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι; Ὅτι τούτους εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικόν τε καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ που μελιτῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμηκῶν, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταῦτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους. Εἰκός.

§. 32. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶ ἀπίονται οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὧ ἑταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς αὐτούς, οὔ τι

things, and by ascending to the heights of pure existence. In this consists virtue, which is two-fold; inferior virtue, (or πολιτικὴ) belonging to such souls as are in the progress of purification; and superior virtue, which consists in an intimate union, by contemplation, with the Divine Being (ἔνωσις). Tennemann, Philos. s. 214. Cf. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. i. 8. "Plotinus inter philosophiæ professores cum Platone princeps, libro de Virtutibus, gradus earum vera et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per ordinem digerit. Quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum: ex his primæ politicæ vocantur, secundæ purgatoriæ, tertiæ animi jam purgati, quartæ exemplares," &c.

Πολιτικόν — γένος, ἢ που μελιτῶν.] The familiar economy of the bee-hive renders the application of πολιτικόν γένος easily obvious. Cf. Aristot. Hist. Anim. i. 1. p. 471. Virgil. Georg. iv. 3. "Admiranda tibi levium spectacula rerum, Magnanimosque duces, totisque ordine gentis Mores, et studia, et populos, et prælia dicam."

§. 32. Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος.] It would appear, Wyttenbach remarks, from this passage as it stands, that although one were not a philosopher, nor perfectly clear, at his departure from life, of corporeal taint, still he might be classed among the gods, if only he were φιλομαθής: an interpretation

which the commentator observes to be at variance with the reasoning and sense of Plato, whence he proposes to read; Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἄλλω ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῶς ἀπίονται, i. e. *In deorum autem genus nefas est alii pervenire quam doctrinæ studioso philosophato et plane puro abeunti.* Heindorf conjectures; ἀλλὰ μόνω τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. τούτων ἕνεκα, κ. τ. λ. Φιλοσοφίας and φιλομαθής are nearly synonymous, so much so as to prevent any distinction that could be drawn between them affecting the passage to such a degree as might obviate the difficulty. It is suggested as a probable explanation, that 'ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ is added to increase the force and emphasis of the sentence, as if he said, that it was unlawful for one who was not a philosopher, and who had not departed from life unstained by moral guilt, to rank among the gods; unlawful that this should occur in any case, except to the genuine philosopher.

Some suppose the words οὐδ' ἄλλω ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ, to have been inserted by a copyist in explanation of μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι, preced. and ἄλλω changed afterwards to ἀλλά as supr. According to Wyttenbach, φιλομαθής is the genus of which φιλόσοφος is the species, whence every φιλόσοφος was also φιλομαθής but not v. v. Hence Cicero

οικοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι ὡς περ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὡς περ οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', ἡ δ' ὅς. τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἅπασιν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ἐκείνοι οἷς τι μέλει τῆς αὐτῶν ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματα πλάττοντες ζῶσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπη ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρῶ ταύτῃ τρέπονται, ἐκείνη ἐπόμενοι ἢ ἐκείνη ὑψηγείται.

§. 33. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη. γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἡ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκασομένην δὲ ὡς περ δι' εἰργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα

uses *docti* and *doctissimi* for *philosophi*.

Οικοφθορίαν.] *Rei familiaris jacturam*. WYTT. *The ruin or dilapidation of a family property*. Donn. Gr. Lex.

Ἐπειτα.] *So, therefore, things being so*.

Μὴ σώματα πλάττοντες.] *Qui quidem animum suum curant, neque corpus unice colunt et fovent*. STALL.—Ζῶσι, sc. αὐτοί, Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 3.

Τῇ ἐκείνης λύσει τε καὶ καθαρ. ταύτῃ.] Explained c. 33. sq.

§. 33. Παραλαβοῦσα—τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ φιλοσοφία.] *Παραλαμβάνειν* is affirmed of those who take up, or take charge of any for the purposes of education and discipline. Hence it is justly applied to philosophy as above, under whose tutelage the soul is delivered from the thraldom of the body and its organs, and restored to the purity and freedom to which it is entitled as an immortal and independent essence.

Ὡς περ δι' εἰργμοῦ.] *As if through*

*a dungeon*. Cod. Aug. δι' εἰργμοῦ, after Hesych. Εἰργμός· κώλυσις, δεσμός, συνέχεσις., but εἰργμοῦ is correct, as appears from Eustathius, ad Odys. á. p. 14. ed. Bas. τὸ εἰργῶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ κωλύω ἐψίλουν οἱ Ἀττικοί, καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀπειρῶσαν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλείω ἐδάσυνον, ὡς δῆλοι τὸ καθείρῶσαν, ὅθεν καὶ δασύνεται καὶ ἡ ἐρκτηί. The soul, imprisoned within the body, is obliged to receive impressions through the senses, which are usually as false as the medium is fallacious. It cannot, while thus confined, become properly the object of its own contemplation, nor can it devote itself, while trammelled by the body and its appetites, to those purely intellectual exertions and researches, by which alone it is enabled to arrive at truth. But it is assisted, and in fine successfully, in attaining to a knowledge of the intelligible and invisible, by philosophy, which is at once its ransom and guide.

Κυλινδουμένην.] *Grovelling*.



κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος ξυλλήπτωρ εἴη τῷ δεδέσθαι,—ὁ περ οὖν λέγω, γιννώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἢ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὄτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλ' ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὅτι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὃν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὄρα, νοητόν τε καὶ ἀειδές. ταύτη οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ

"Ὅτι δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν.] i. q. "Ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ, sc. ὁ εἰργμός. Whence Stallbaum; et quum philosophia claustris istius vim et diritatem perspexit, quippe quod cupide quasi circumspiciat, quomodo ille ipse, qui devinctus est, maxime ad id conferat, ut captus teneatur.—Heindorf objects to the affirming δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν in an active sense of τοῦ εἰργμοῦ as supr., but as it has already received the attribute, τὴν δεινότητα, it may be easily said ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὡς ἂν μάλ. κ. τ. λ. Upon the construction δι' ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 580. 2. c. For τῷ δεδέσθαι infr. Heindorf proposes τοῦ δεδέσθαι and compares Phædr. c. 29. ξύμ. μοι λαβέσθε τοῦ μύθου. Aristoph. Vesp. 733. νῦν δ' αὖ παρών τις—τῶν θεῶν ξυλλαμβάνει τοῦ πράγματος. Xenoph. Mem. ii. 2. 12. ἵνα—ἀγαθοῦ σοι γίγνηται συλλήπτωρ. ii. 2. 32. ἀγαθὴ συλλήπτρια τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων, &c.

'Ἡρέμα παραμυθεῖται.] See c. 14. supr. a med. Παραμυθίας.

"Ὅτι δ' ἂν δι' ἄλλων—ἐν ἄλλοις ὃν

ἄλλο.] Δι' ἄλλων is opposed to αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν preced. in the sense of δι' αἰσθήσεων or διὰ τοῦ σώματος. So τὸ ἐν ἄλλοις ὃν ἄλλο is opposed to αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, the former being understood of those things which, as submitted to the senses, are subject to continual uncertainty and change, whence they are said to be ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα. Wytenbach explains the passage; *Quidquid vero per alia consideret* (i. e. *corporeum per sensus corporis*), *quum in aliis sensibus aliud appareat, nihil horum verum putare*; and compares Phædr. p. 345. C.—καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμη, οὐχ ἣ γένησιν πρόσεστιν· οὐδ' ἢ ἐστὶ που ἕτερα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὔσα, ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν ἄλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὃν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὔσαν.—V. Cousin: "Et de tenir pour faux tout ce qu'elle apprend par un autre qu'elle même, tout ce qui varie selon la différence des intermédiaires.

'Ἐναντιοῦσ.] *Counteract by opposition.* Οὕτως.] i. q. "Ἐπειτα. supr. c. 32.

sub. fin.

φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῆ ἢ φοβηθῆ ἢ λυπηθῆ ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὅσον ἂν τις οἰηθείη, οἶον ἢ νοσήσας ἢ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ' ὁ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγείσθαι, περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὀρατά. ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δὴ; Ὅτι ἕκαστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὡς περ ἡλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσιν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅ περ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῆ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οἶμαι, ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Αἴδου ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶ-

Τοσοῦτον.] i. e. *Merely such an evil as one would suppose to result from sickness, &c.—but that which is the greatest and extreme evil of all, &c.*—τοσοῦτον being taken in the opposite of its more usual sense, which is sometimes the case with *tantum* of the Latins. See Cic. Epist. i. 7. and Manut. in loc. c.—'Ἀπ' αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν.

'Ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγείσθαι.] h. e. *animus cogi simul et gaudere vel dolere magnopere de re quariam et putare, &c.*—HEIND.—Οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον, *though it is not so.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. d.—Ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὀρατά.—*Hæc autem potissimum ea sunt, quæ cerni possunt.* HEIND.

'Υπὸ σώματος.] i. e. By the bodily appetites and passions, with which the soul being infected, is called *infr. τοῦ*

σώματος ἀναπλέα. Cf. in Tim. p. 43. 86. Steph. where Plato shows the diseases of the mind to derive their origin from this material contagion, uncorrected by proper discipline.

'Ἡλον ἔχουσα.] Cf. Iamblich. Vit. Pythag. s. 228. *μήτε προσηλούντων τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων καὶ προσπερονῶντων ἐπιστρέφεται.* de Myster. Ægypt. ii. 6. p. 48.—*Παθῶν πληροὶ προσηλούντων τοὺς θεωροῦντας τοῖς σώμασι.* Horat. Sat. ii. 2. 79.—*Atque adfigit humo divinæ particulam auræ.*"

Οἷα μηδέποτε—ἀφικέσθαι.] h. e. *καὶ τοιαύτη, ὥστε μηδέποτε ἀφ.*—STALL.

Τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα.] *Corpore polluta et inquinata.*—STALL. Ruhnken ad Tim. Gloss. *'Ανάπλεως. ἀναπεπλησμένος. χρῆται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ*

μα καὶ ὡς περ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαρῶ καὶ μοιροειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σωκράτες.

§. 34. Τούτων τοίνυν ἕνεκα, ὦ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κοσμοῖ τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι, οὐχ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἕνεκά φασιν. ἢ σὺ οἶει; Οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἰστὸν μεταχειριζομένην· ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρσκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον

μεμολυσμένον. See Apol. Socr. c. 20. a med. Ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.

§. 34. Οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς.] i. q. Οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι. c. 33. init. Vere philosophantes, doctrinæ recte studentes. WYTT.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' οὕτω.] Non profecto: sed sic.—WYTT. Cf. Luke, Acts, xvi. 37. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλὰ ἐλθόντες αὐτοὶ ἡμᾶς ἐξαγαγέτωσαν, nay, verily; but let them come themselves and fetch us out.

Ἀνήνυτον ἔργον.] Irritum opus facere, quod nunquam ad exitum perducitur. HEIND. The soul, when disenthralled by the aid of philosophy it has shaken off its corporeal chains, should continue to abide in the purity and freedom secured by its deliverer. It should never again be subjected to the bondage of those passions by which it had been once degraded and debased: if it were so, the offices of philosophy were then rendered nugatory and vain. And as Penelope unwove by night what she had wove by day, so incomplete and unavailing was the task of philosophy in the purification of a soul, which reversed, however, the plan of Penelope, inasmuch as when loosed at first it submitted to be bound again;—hence ἐναντίως. Some

copies read μεταχειριζομένης, and take ἐναντίως in the sense of ἀντικρως, i. e. instar Penelope tractantis telam; but the text as supr. is preferable.

Γαλήνην τούτων.] Heindorf refers τούτων, as put for τούτου, to ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν, κ. τ. λ. preced. — Fischer, more correctly, to τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν underest.

Ἄει ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα.] Always engaged in this, sc. the contemplation of truth, &c.; τούτῳ referring to τὸ ἀληθὲς, κ. τ. λ. seq.—Τὸ ἀδόξαστον, certain: V. Cousin; hors du domaine de l'opinion. Truth is discerned not by the senses, but by the understanding. The human intellect is employed, either upon things which it comprehends by itself, and which are in their nature simple and invariable, or upon things which are subject to the senses, and are perpetually liable to fluctuation and change. (De Repub. vii. p. 531. 4. Phileb. t. ii. p. 63.) The contemplation of the former creates science, ἐπιστήμη; attention to the latter produces opinion, δόξα. (Cic. Acad. Quest. i. c. 5. Plat. Theæt. i. p. 186.) Sense is the passive perception of the soul through the medium of the body. When the forms of things are, by means of the corporeal organs, so deeply

θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οὕτως οἶεται δεῖν, ἕως ἂν ζῆ, καὶ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ, ταῦτά γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, ὧ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχεται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμῶ ἦ.

§. 35. Σιγῇ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίμετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Συμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῶ ἤρετο, Τί, ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα; μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ

impressed upon the mind, as not to be easily effaced by time, this permanent impression is called memory. From the union of sense and memory, or from the comparison of a present with a recollected perception, arises opinion. Where these agree, the opinion is true; where they differ, it is false. *Enf. Phil. ii. c. 8. s. 1.* Opinion, then, as being uncertain, from the nature of its origin, and variable in its result, cannot enter into the contemplation of the truth, which can only be regarded in conjunction with what is unerring and divine. It is to be observed, that memory and reminiscence differ in time and in degree: the latter is conversant with the ideas which the soul contemplated before its union with the body, the former with the perceptions to which it became subject after; consequently memory is employed upon sensible things, reminiscence upon the purely intelligible.

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς.] *Sc. Ἄδῶξαστης τροφῆς*, to which is opposed the *δοξαστή τροφή*, of those souls which were incapable of attaining to philosophy and its results. Cf. in *Phædr.* p. 345. E. Πᾶσαι δὲ πολὺν ἔχουσαι πόνον, ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θείας ἀπέχονται καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῆ χρόνται. *Wyt-*

tenbach arranges and explains the passage as *supr.* ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς, ταῦτα γ' ἐπιτηδεύσασα, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ—ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα, κ. τ. λ. i. e. *Ex tali profecto nutritione, et quam hæc tractaverit, non est verendum ne timeat—ne distracta in discessu a quibusdam ventis dispersa ac difflata evadat, nec quidquam amplius usquam sit.*—Οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῆ. Cf. *Apol. Socr. c. 16. init.* οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή.

Διαφυσθεῖσα.] See *supr.* c. 24. *init.*

§. 35. Αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημ. λόγ. ἦν.] *Socrates, himself, was engaged in meditation upon, or, was occupied in thought with the subject that had been argued.* Cf. *Philostr. de Vit. Apollon. v. 31.* πρὸς τουτῷ ὅλος ἐμὶ, *I am wholly occupied in this*—such being an ordinary signification of *πρὸς* with a dative.

Ἵς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίμετο.] *As he appeared to view.* See *Matthiæ Gr. s. 535.* A similar pleonasm occurs in *Tim.* p. 535. F. Παντοδαπὴν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι.—*Alcib. i. p. 30. E.* Φαίνομαι, ὡς ἔοικα.

Τί—ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα.] *Intell. δοκεῖ.* Cf. *Soph. Electr. 766.* Ὡ Ζεῦ, τί ταῦτα, πότερον, εὐτυχῆ λέγω; i. e.

ἐνδεῶς λελέχθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ διεξελθεῖν, εἴ πη ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ ξυμπααραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ' ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη, Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τάληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μὴ σοι ἀηδὲς ἢ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ξυμφορὰν. Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέ τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησι, Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἢ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους πείσαιμι ἀνθρώπους ὡς οὐ ξυμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ' ὑμας δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ. καὶ ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οἷ

τί ταῦτα λέγω, πότερον εὖτ.—Μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ,—μῶν, an Attic particle of interrogation, in Latin *an forte*, is occasionally joined with each of its component parts, with *μη* pleonastically, and commonly the question asked with it as well as with *μη*, involve a negation. Seag. Vig. de Id. c. vii. s. 9. r. 3.

Εἴ πη ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτ. λεχ. *If it appears to you in any degree that it could be better expressed; where ἂν would seem to be required before λεχθῆναι, but it is not unusually omitted in the case of other moods to which it gives the force of the optative or conjunctive.*

Τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ.] Cf. Aristænet. Ep. i. 24. init. Ἄρτι παρ' ἐμοὶ συναθροισθέντες οἱ κορυφαῖοι τῶν ἐμῶν ἐραστῶν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐσίγων καὶ ἄλλος τὸν ἄλλον προῶθει, κελεύων διεξελθεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ τὰ μελετηθέντα πᾶσι κοινῶν.

\*Ὀχλον παρέχειν.] *To give trouble.* Lex. Coislin. p. 483. Ὀχλος ἐπὶ τῆς ὀχλήσεως φασὶ θετέον εἶναι, οὐκ ἐπὶ

πλήθους. Phavor. Ὀχλος· ἢ ὀχλήσις, παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς· παρὰ δὲ τῷ θεῖῳ γραφῆ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἐλλησι, τὸ πλήθος τοῦ λαοῦ· Piers. ad. Mærin. p. 290.

Ἐγέλασε τε—καὶ φησι.] Heindorf compares with this construction of the present with the aorist, Eurip. Iph. T. 16. Εἰς ἔμπυρ' ἦλθε καὶ λέγει Κάλχας τάδε. Soph. Electr. 897. Ἰδοῦσα δ' ἔσχον θαῦμα καὶ περισκοπῶ. Trach. 767. Ἰδρῶς ἀνίγει χρωτὶ καὶ προσπτύσσειται. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 504.

\*Ἡ που]—Serves, sometimes, the purpose of assuring, but so that *που* somewhat moderates the assurance contained in ἢ; *certainly, if I mistake not.* — Matthiæ Gr. s. 604.

\*Ὅτε γε.] *Since indeed.*

Μὴ δυσκ.—διάκειμαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 240. κειμαι. s. 520. Obs. 2.

Τῶν κύκνων.] Cf. Horat. Od. ii. 20. Ovid. Heroid. Ep. vii. 1. "Sic ubi fata vocant, undis abjectus in herbis Ad vada Mæandri concinit albus olor." Cic. Tusc. i. 30. "Itaque commemorat (So-

ἐπειδὴν αἰσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιεῖναι, οὐ πέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασὶν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογιζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον ἄδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγοῖ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἢ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ ἢ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν· ἀλλ' οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἄτε, οἶμαι, τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοί τ' εἰσὶ καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ἀγαθὰ ἄδουσί τε καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ

crates,) ut cygni, qui non sine causa Apollini dicati sint, sed quod ab eo divinationem habere videantur, qua providentes quid in morte boni sit, cum cantu et voluptate moriantur; sic omnibus bonis et doctis (i. e. philosophis) esse faciendum." Ælian. Nat. Hist. v. 34.—Ὁ κύκνος μελωδεῖ τινα ἐπικήδειον αὐτῷ μούσαν, ἐφόδια διδοὺς τῆς ἀποδημίας ἢ θεῶν ὕμνους, ἢ ἐπαινον οἰκείον τινα, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι ἄδει οὐ λυπούμενος, ἀλλ' εὐθυμούμενος μᾶλλον. Vid. I. H. Voss. Epistol. Mythol. Br. t. ii. p. 98. Martial. Epigr. xiii. 77. and infr. οἱ κύκνοι—μαντικοί.

Οὐ πέρ εἰσι θεράποντες.] Infr. τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες.

Τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται.] *Belie the swans.* Cf. Legg. vii. p. 821. B. καταψεύδόμεθα—μεγάλων θεῶν. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 378.

Ἐξάδειν.] Explained by Stephens, *to sing for the last time, to take leave of their art of song*; by Heindorf, *to sing out life*, i. e. *to die by singing, or die*

*singing.* Serranus attributes to the ἐξ an intensive force, as in ἐκδιδάσκειν, ἐξευρεῖν, ἐκσώζειν, ἐκπίνειν; and like that of the Latin *de*, in *decanto, desævio, detono*, and renders the term *vehementius canere*, comparing ἄδουσί—διαφερόντως, infr.

Ἄ δὴ φασὶ.] In reference to the fabled metamorphoses of Tereus, Procne, and Philomela.

Μαντικοί.] Orpian Cyneg. ii. 547. s. Οὐκ ἄρα τοι μούνοισιν ἐν ὄρνιθεσσιν ἔασι Κύκνοι μαντιπόλοι γόνον ὕστατον αἰείδοντες. Æschyl. Agam. 1453. ἢ δὲ τοι κύκνου δίκην, τὸν ὕστατον μέλψασα θανάσιμον γόνον.—whence the language of one at the near approach of death was called κύκνειον ᾄσμα. Cic. Orat. iii. 2. *Cycnea.*

Διαφερόντως ἢ.] *Rather than.* See Matthiæ Gr. s. 366. Obs. 2.

Ὁμόδουλός—τῶν κύκνων.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 405. Obs. 1.—Ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 315. 1.

Οὐ χεῖρον—τὴν μαντικὴν.] See Apol. Socr. c. 30. Ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄν-

βίον ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρῆ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν οἱ Ἴ�θηναίων ἑώσιν ἄνδρες ἔνδεκα. Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγὼ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὁ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὅδε, ἧ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὡς περ καὶ σοί, τὸ μὲν σαφές εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ πρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῆ σκοπῶν ἀπέιπη τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν, ἢ εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχοῦμενον, ὡς περ ἐπὶ σχεδιάς κινδυνεύοντα, διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύναται ἀσφαλέστερον

θρωποι χρησιμῶδ.—Παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότητος, sc. Apollo.

“Ὁ ἀπορῶ.] h. e. Περὶ οὗ ἀπορῶ.

Τὸ μὲν σαφές εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. St. Paul. Corinth. i. c. 13. 12.

Καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι.] Added in explanation of παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν preced. whence the passage might have been arranged so—παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν μὴ προαφισταμένους πρὶν ἂν π. &c. Stephens and Forster would omit μὴ, which, however, is more correctly retained and explained by Fischer and Heindorf, as supr.—Ἀπειπεῖν, ἀπανδᾶν, and ἀπαγορεύειν, as Stallbaum observes, are used in reference to those who are wearied and exhausted in pursuit of an object, which it is either difficult or impossible to attain.

Ἡ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὐρεῖν.] i. e. *Either to learn from others, or to find out, upon investigation, by one's self.* Μανθάνειν occurs frequently also in the sense attributed to εὐρεῖν here, but it is properly used with reference to διδάσκειν, to teach. Hence the three methods of acquiring knowledge, by learning, invention, and inspiration, as Soph. apud

Plutarch. de Fortuna. p. 98. A. τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὐρετὰ ζητῶ. Τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἤγησάμην.

Τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων.] h. e. *Inter rationes et argumenta, quæ humano ingenio excogitata et inventa sunt.*—STALL.—to which is opposed λόγου θείου τινός infr.

“Ὡς περ ἐπὶ σχεδιάς.] Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 30. “Itaque dubitans, circumspiciens, hæsitans multa adversa reverens, tanquam ratis in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio.” This metaphor is taken from the Greek adage, ἐπ' ἐλπίδος ὀχεῖσθαι. v. Plat. Legg. iii. p. 59. C. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὀχοῦμενοι ταύτης εὕρισκον καταφυγὴν αὐτοῖς εἰς αὐτοὺς μόνους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς. Some idea of risk or hazard is implied in κινδυνεύοντα, as if the very best of human reasonings were still an uncertain vessel to embark in and traverse the sea of life. Hence ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον, &c. as applied to the more steady and unerring vehicle, the reason inspired from above. On the phrase διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, see Wesseling ad. Herodot. v. 6. p. 422. Toup. αἰ Suid. i. p. 20.

καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θείου τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδὲ ἔμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρω χρόνω ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἅ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἔμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἰκανῶς εἰρηῆσθαι.

§. 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπη δὴ οὐχ ἰκανῶς.

Ἡ λόγον θείου τινὸς.] Heindorf would omit ἡ; but it may be retained in a similar sense to that in which it is used in Criton. c. 3. init. ταύτης δόξα, ἡ δοκεῖν. Seag. Viger. c. vii. s. 7. r. 2.—Θεῖον is to be understood here in the sense of θεσπέσιον, or θεία μόρφα προσγενόμενον. It is scarcely necessary to say that there is no foundation for the conjectures of those who have understood the above passage as containing an implied reference to Holy Writ.—The idea, to say no more, involves, in the first instance, a misapprehension of the sense in which λόγος is used in the text.

Ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις.] i. e. Especially since you yourself advise me to it.

Πρὸς ἔμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ.] h. e. Quando et mecum hæc animo reputo, et cum hoc una considero.—STALL.

§. 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ.] Socrates now proceeds to meet the objections which he had encouraged Simmias and Cebes to advance against the conclusion at which he had arrived from the preceding part of the discussion. Simmias asserts that the faculty of thought might be a quality of body, arising from the due disposition of its several affections, heat, cold, moisture, and dryness, in the same way that concord results from a well-tuned lyre; in other words, that the mind is a harmony, which ceases to exist upon the decease of the body and the dispersion of its particles, as the music of the lyre is destroyed when the chords are broken and

the instrument past use, a doctrine held by Parmenides, Zeno, and others.—Cebes, using a different image, argues to a similar effect against the soul's surviving the body. V. Cousin sums up the argument and its answer, Œuv. Plat. i. p. 160. "Mais si l'âme n'était qu'un être collectif, un résultat, une relation, l'harmonie d'une lyre! l'harmonie aussi ne semble-t-elle pas quelque chose de simple, d'invisible, de fixe, et pourtant elle se dissipe quand la lyre et les cordes sont brisées! Non, l'âme qui pré-existe substantiellement a son apparition sous cette forme corporelle, l'âme ne peut être la collection, le résultat, la relation, l'harmonie de parties qu'elle précède. D'ailleurs une collection, un résultat, un rapport n'ont pas d'essence propre, et n'existent recellement que dans les élémens qui les constituent, tandis que l'âme sait et sent qu'elle a une existence à soi. Enfin la force de toute composition est dans l'accord le plus intime de ses composans; la force de l'âme au contraire est de se separer violemment de plusieurs de ses prétendues élémens, et de leur faire la guerre. L'âme n'est donc ni une collection, ni un résultat, ni une relation; c'est une unité individuelle, subsistante par elle-même." Hence the conclusion to which those who subsequently adopted this doctrine of Plato have justly arrived, that the faculty of thought cannot be inherent in the body, as being that whose every action and passion depend upon the change and motion of its component parts.

Οὐκ ἰκανῶς.] Inadequately.



Ταύτη ἔμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἢ μὲν ἀρμονία ἀόρατόν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν [τι] καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἢ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ ἢ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, εἴ τις δισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡς περ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι· οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἄν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρώγωνιῶν

[Ἡ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας.] i. e. *So far as any one could advance the same argument, in respect to a lyre, &c.*

[Ἡρμοσμένη λύρα.] *A well-tuned lyre.*

[Ἐπειδὴν οὖν κατάξῃ.] From this to πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν contains the protasis to which is subjoined a parenthesis, καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὡς Σώκρ.—ἢ κατασαπῆ; then the apodosis is introduced ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγ. where οὖν, as usually, renews the interrupted sense. HEIND.

[Ὡς περ σύ.] Fischer, following Forster, reads ὡπερ, incorrectly. Cf. Priscian. xviii. p. 1195. "Demosthenes ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Φιλίππικῷ, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὡσπερ οἱ δικαζόμενοι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄνπερ." Plat. Legg. p. 671. C. Τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν πλάστην τὸν αὐτὸν ὡσπερ τότε. Sophoc. Electr. 532. οὐκ ἴσον καμῶν ἐμοὶ Λύπησ, ὅτ' ἐσπεῖρ', ὡσπερ ἢ τίττουσ' ἐγώ. Lys. pro. Aristoph. bon. p. 637. ἡγοῦντο καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ὅμως σφίσιν εἶναι ἴσα ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 629.

[Οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἄν εἴη.] The sense of this passage and the context is somewhat involved, and it may be well to develop it more largely and clearly. Simmias objects to the proofs deduced by Socrates, from the nature and connexion of the soul and body, of the immortality of the former, by shewing that in the supposed analogous case of a lyre, and the harmony which results from its being sound and in tune, a similar train

of reasoning cannot hold good. The harmony, which is analogous to the soul is invisible, incorporeal, perfectly beautiful and divine, when the instrument is in order; the lyre itself, and its chords, are typical of the body, being actual bodies, consequently partaking of their nature, compound, terrestrial, and allied to mortality. Should one break the lyre, cut or rend its strings, according to the mode of argument adopted by Socrates, one would say that the harmony still existed and had not been destroyed. For it could not be possible that the lyre in its broken and imperfect state should continue to exist, and that the strings, after they had been cut or rent, should still obviously though uselessly exist, while the harmony, of the same nature with, and congenial to the immortal and divine, should disappear, having perished previous to that which was mortal, and naturally subject to decay. But one should assert that the harmony, of necessity, existed somewhere, and that the frame and chords of the instrument ought to be utterly decayed before any such affection could befall the harmony itself. Here, then, was the difficulty arising from the argument of Socrates. If the soul was a harmony, resulting from the due adjustment of the bodily affections, it is plain that like the harmonies of music, or of the other works of art, it could not exist when the body had been too much relaxed or overstrained; but the bodily relics still continued to exist for a long

τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἄρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυᾶ τε καὶ ξυγγενῇ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην· ἀλλὰ φαίη ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι πού εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἄρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν, καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὡς περ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ ξυνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῆ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἢ ψυχὴ οὔσα ἄρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι ὅταν χαλασθῆ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῆ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθύς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καί περ οὔσαν θειοτάτην, ὡς περ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἄρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν,

time, until consumed by fire, or wasted by decay, in other words, the corporeal evidently survived the spiritual, which could not be the case if the previous conclusions of Socrates were adequate and just.

Τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι.] h. e. *Tecum reputasse, ita ut in animo tuo quasi residere hujus rei cogitatio.* STALL.

Ὡς περ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος.] Cf. Aristot. de Anim. i. 4. Καὶ ἄλλη δὲ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πῆθαν ἢ μὲν πολλοῖς, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἤτων τῶν λεγομένων λόγουσ δὲ ὡς περ εὐθύνας δεδωκυῖα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοις ἄρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν τινες λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἄρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν τινα ἐναντίων εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων. Lucret. iii. 98. 105. “Multa quidem sapientum turba putarunt Sensum animi certa non

esse parte locatum; Verum Habitum quandam vitalem corporis esse, Harmoniam Græci quam dicunt; quod faciat nos vivere cum sensu, nulla cum in parte siet Mens: Ut bona sæpe Valetudo cum dicitur esse Corporis, et non est tamen hæc pars ulla valentis.” This doctrine, though somewhat diversified in its aspect, was held nearly in common by all the schools of Greek philosophy, whence Simmias, h. l. μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν, &c. not ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, and Aristotle in loc. cit. supr. ἐν κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοις. It does not appear to which of the philosophers prior to Plato this opinion is to be attributed. It was subsequently appropriated by Aristotle and his followers, Dicaearchus of Messene, and Aristoxenus of Tarentum, the musician.

Κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄρμονίαν.] Nemes. de Nat. Hom. ii. p. 41. Δικαίταρχος δὲ

ἕως ἂν ἡ κατακαυθῆ ἢ κατασαπῆ. ὄρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, εἴαν τις ἀξιοῖ κρασιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.

§. 37. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς περ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι, τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθά τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντας ἢ ξυγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, εἴαν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἢ δ' ὄς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε τί ἦν ὁ σὲ αὖ θρᾶπτον ἀπιστίαν παρέχει. Λέγου δὴ, ἢ δ' ὄς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ ὅ περ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθε-

ἄρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ φθόγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κρασιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. So Zeno, apud. Diog. Laert. ix. 29. γεγενῆσθαι δὲ τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, λαμβανόντων αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλα τὴν μεταβολὴν· γενεσὶν τε ἀνθρώπων ἐκ γῆς εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κράμα ὑπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων κατὰ μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν.

§. 37. Μέντοι.] Used emphatically, h. l. in affirmation, as the Latin *vero*, *indeed*, *in truth*. c. 13. supr. init. c. 18. sub. fin.

Ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου.] i. e. *Seems to have impugned the justice of the argument with no mean success*—this sense being attributed to ἀπτομένῳ, supr. in consequence of τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ seq. as applied to the objection of Cebes.

\* Ἐπειτα ἀκούσαντας.] Vulg. ἔπειτα δὲ—but both *εἶτα* and *ἔπειτα* occur in numerous instances without the particle, the latter almost always, even when πρώτον μὲν precedes. HEIND.

Προσάδειν.] i. e. *If they seem to speak reasonably*; προσάδειν being used here in the sense of λέγειν τι, *aliquid veri firmique dicere*. WYTT.—the term being applied as supr. in reference to the nature of the subject in dispute. Cf. infr. c. 41. Οὗτος οὖν σοὶ ὁ Λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνάσσεται καὶ μὴν—πρέπειε γε, εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ, ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας.

Ἐπερδикеῖν τοῦ λόγου.] *To defend or support the argument.*

Θρᾶπτον.] Att. for θραῖσσον i. q. *ταράσσω*.

\* Ἐτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ—εἶναι.] i. q. *Οὐ προκεχωρηκέναι*, i. e. *to have made no advances towards being established as a truth*; *to remain in the same place, or be liable to the same objections as before.*

Εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος.] Sc. ἀνθρώπινον.

μαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθαινόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔστιν, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε. ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ ξυγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν. Τί οὖν, ἀνφαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ γε ὄρας ἀποθαινόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σώζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ· πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκειψαι εἴ τι λέγω· εἰκόνοσ γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ γὰρ ὡς περ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὡς περ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφαντου

Cf. c. 21. supr. ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει.

Οὐκ ἀνατιθεμαι.] *I do not retract, or, change my opinion.* The term is frequently used by Plato in this sense, in Menon. p. 89. D. Protagor. p. 211. E. Charmid. p. 240. It is properly applied to players at draughts; Suid. Ἀναθέσθαι τὸ μεταθέσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν περτεούντων καὶ τὰς κεικνημένας ἡδὴ ψήφους διορθούντων — σημαίνει ἢ λέξις — τὸ μεταβουλεύεσθαι καὶ μεταγῶναι. πολὺ ἔστι παρὰ Πλάτωνι φιλοσόφῳ.

Εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν.] *If it is not too fulsome, &c.* — ἐπαχθής being affirmed of any praise or commendation which is so intemperately and injudiciously bestowed as to disgust not only the auditors, but the object of it. Cf. Plutarch. de Sui Laude, p. 54. F. — τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἐπαίνους — τινὰς ἑλλείψεις ἢ ἀποτεύξεις ἢ ἀμαρτίας εὐαφράς ἐκβάλλοντες, ἀφαιροῦσι τὸ ἐπαχθές αὐτῶν καὶ νεμεσητόν.

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τῆδε.] *Intell. ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδείχθαι.*

Ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον, κ. τ. λ.] Cebes does not agree with Simmias as to the relative strength and durability of the soul and body, but upholds, in either respect, the superiority of the former.

Ἄν φαίη ὁ λόγος.] *Sc. the argument personified.*

Ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, κ. τ. λ.] The objection of Cebes to the argument of So-

crates was, that it did not prove the immortality of the soul, although it might have established its pre-existence and other advantages over the body, but was still liable to the exception, that after it had survived several bodies, the soul might eventually perish itself. Cebes uses, as an illustration, the case of an aged deceased weaver, of whom, according to Socrates, it might be affirmed that he was yet alive somewhere, because the garment which he wove and wore had continued to exist after he had died. And this objection might be fairly advanced, even by those who admitted the superiority of the nature of man above that of the garment, because the weaver, it is to be supposed, had, during a long life, wrought and worn out several habits, although he had been survived by the last. So that one would be easily justified in still asserting the garment to be, in its nature and quality, inferior to and frailer than the man. Thus with the soul and body, the former of which one might reasonably admit to excel the latter, inasmuch as it survived several bodies, more or less, according to the longer or shorter term of its own existence, and yet this would not interfere with its being destroyed at last, and consequently perishing before the relics of the last body it inhabited had mouldered in decay. Hence one could not encounter death with a courage and a

πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τούτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ' ἔστι που ἴσως, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὃ ἠμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑψηλάμενος, ὅτι ἔστι σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλε, καὶ εἴ τις ἀπιστοῖ αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῶη πότερον πολυχροσιώτερον ἔστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρεῖα τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δέ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷοιτο ἀποδεδείχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὃ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχροσιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλε. Τὸ δ' οἶμαι, ὃ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἅ λέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὐηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων. ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑψηλάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλε πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου, οἶμαι, πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φανλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην, οἶμαι, εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχροσιώτιον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχροσιώτερον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βιώη· εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἢ ψυ-

confidence arising from a secure belief in the immortality of the soul, for he could not tell but that the body, which was then itself on the eve of dissolution, was also that which was to be accompanied by the death of the soul.

Περὶ αὐτῶν.] Sc. ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.—μέτρι' ἂν μοι, i. e. *rightly, correctly, suitably to reason*. Cf. in Criton. c. 6. a med. μετριώτατα σκοποῖμεθα.

'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη.] Intell. ὁ λέγων ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν.

Εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. If, while a man is still living, the body is liable to change and waste, and the

soul weaves, as it were, anew what had completely decayed, or, in other words, if it uses one body after another, it should follow of course that when the soul perished, it should do so prior to its last tenement only, which would still evince its inferiority, for on the destruction of the soul, it would give evidence of its weakness by a speedy dissolution.—Hence, according to Cebes, it would appear that the greater strength and durability of the soul, and its being necessary to the continued existence of the body, cannot be trusted to as an argument against its own final dissolution, which may take place previous to the

χή αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι, ἀναγκαῖον μὲν τὸ ἂν εἴη, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἢ ψυχὴ, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπολλύσθαι· ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότε ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο. Ὡστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὐπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρῆναι, ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχὴ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἂν σὺ λέγεις ξυγχωρήσεις, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἐνίῳν ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὐθις· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν· δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνο μηκέτι συγχωροίη, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι καὶ

corruption of one, and that the last body it may dwell in.

Τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας.] i. q. Τὴν ἀσθένειαν, — φύσις being in frequent use in similar periphrases. Cf. Plat. in Epinom. p. 702. C. θεοὺς γὰρ δὴ ὄρα τοὺς — τὴν τῶν ἀστρῶν φύσιν λεκτέον, i. q. τὰ ἄστρα. Legg. xii. 697. ἐπιτηδεῖοι πρὸς τὴν φυλακὴν φύσιν, i. e. πρὸς τὴν φυλακὴν. — Plotin. Enn. ii. 1. 3. p. 98. A. — καὶ ἄηρ μήποτ' ἐπιλείπει, οὐδ' ἡ ὕδατος φύσις. Cic. de Fin. v. 11. — "hoc intelligent, si quando naturam hominis dicam, hominem dicere me; nil enim hoc differt."

Εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι.] This, as well as what immediately preceded, Cebes addressed to Simmias, who while he admitted the pre-existence of the soul, yet by contrasting it with a harmony, denied its superior strength and durability, as compared with that of the body. Cebes now asserts, that if one were to concede to another, who insisted upon still more than Simmias did, namely, not merely the soul's pre-existence, but that the souls of some existed after their decease, and were subject to the successive changes of birth and death, the nature

of the soul being such that it could survive these repeated births; if one were to concede this, he could not still by any means allow that the soul suffered no injury from these many changes, and that it did not eventually sink in some of them, but which, it would be impossible to say. Hence, according to Cebes, one should entertain but a foolish and unfounded confidence who would fearlessly encounter death without the ability to prove that the soul was, in every respect, immortal and imperishable, in which case it would be impossible but that the person about to die should fear with regard to his soul, that its doom was involved in the approaching dissolution of the body.

Οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ.] Αὐτὸ h. l. referring to ψυχὴν, is used for αὐτὴν. Demonstrative pronouns are often not in the gender of the substantive, to which they refer, but in the neuter, provided the idea of the substantive in the abstract be considered generally as a thing or matter. Matthiæ Gr. s. 439. — Ἀντέχειν, i. q. διαμένειν, σώζεσθαι, to endure, to continue.

Μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν.] Μὴ οὐ is used after negative propositions or verbs,

τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλ-  
 λυσθαι· τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διά-  
 λυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον, μηδέ-  
 να φαίη εἰδέναί· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὄφρουν αἰσθά-  
 νεσθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει  
 θάνατον θαρρόντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρέϊν, ὃς ἂν μὴ  
 ἔχη ἀποδείξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν  
 τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκην εἶναι αἰετὸν τὸν  
 μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυ-  
 χῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν  
 ἀπόληται.

§. 38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν  
 ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν, πρὸς ἀλλή-  
 λους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισ-  
 μένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπισ-  
 τίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις,  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ  
 οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ  
 ἄπιστα εἶη.

ΕΧ. Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαῖδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω  
 ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν  
 τι λέγειν πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται, Τίμι οὖν ἔτι πισ-  
 τεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὢν, ὃν ὁ  
 Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπ-

with infinitives which are themselves  
 negated, where it is equivalent to the  
 Latin *quoniam*, or *quominus*. Matthiæ Gr. s.  
 609. e. Cf. *supr.* c. 17. sub. fin. *τίς*  
*μηχανή μὴ οὐχί*, κ. τ. λ.—Πονεῖν, i. e.  
*frangi viribus, confici, fatiscere*. STALL  
*ἐν παῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι, quum mi-*  
*grat sæpius et proficiscitur in alia atque*  
*alia corpora*. ID.

Οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον.] Ex-  
 plained by Heindorf; *In neminem fiden-*  
*ter obfirmatoque animo mortem expectan-*  
*tem cadit, ut non stolide hanc habeat*  
*fiduciam, qui non possit, &c.* Upon θά-  
 νατον θαρρόντι see Matthiæ Gr. s.  
 414. 12.

Δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς.]  
 To fear concerning his soul; the more  
 usual form being, according to Heindorf,  
 δεδιέναι περί τινος, or περί τινι.

§. 38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες,  
 κ. τ. λ.] This interruption of the dia-  
 logue, and the transition from the sub-  
 ject to the narrator himself, is admirably  
 adapted, as Wytenbach observes, to in-  
 terest and affect the reader.

Εἰς ἀπιστίαν — τοῖς προειρημένοις  
 λόγοις.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 390.

Τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *A*  
*like reflection strikes myself.* Upon αὐ-  
 τόν με νῦν ἀκ.—ἐπέρχεται, See Mat-  
 thiæ Gr. s. 402. a. Obs. 1.

τωκε. θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὡς περ ὑπέμνησέ με ρηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προὔδεδόκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν, ὡς περ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχὴ. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πῆ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κἀκείνος, ὡς περ ὑμᾶς φῆς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πράως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγοι ἐκείνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ἦσθετο ὁ πεπόνθειμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὡς περ πεφευγότας καὶ ἠττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προὔτρεψε πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ ξυσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

Θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου—ἀντιλαμβάνεται.] i. e. *Makes a wonderful impression upon, takes a wonderful hold of me*: see Matthiæ Gr. s. 330. Stallbaum explains it; *mirifice me capit, ita ut ab altera illa sententia quasi abstrahar et abducar.*—Καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ, *nunc, ut jam semper antea.* STALL. Cf. Schæfer, ad Sophocl. Antig. v. 181.

Καὶ ὡς περ ὑπέμνησέ με.] *And has reminded me, as it were, that I have myself held the same opinion.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 629. v. ὡσπερ.

Μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον.] *Followed up the argument*; for the purpose of explaining away the objected difficulties.

Πράως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ.] *Temperately bore out, supported, the argument*; i. e. defended and sustained it against the doubts and censures of his opponents, with good temper and discretion.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν.] This construction arises from the attraction of the subject; otherwise the passage would run, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἐκείνον ὃ λέγοι. Tr. *That he was able to make a reply is not, perhaps, so much to be wondered at.*

Πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο—ἔπειτα—ἔπειτα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 603.—Ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς. Cf. in Criton. c. 1. ὡς ἡδέως καθεύδεις.—Ἀγαμένως—ἀπεδέξατο. i. e. *With what respect and admiration he attended to the argument of the young men.* Ruhnken, ad Tim. Gloss. p. 9. explains it; *orationem mirifice probavit*, and Hesychius understands *ἀγαμένως* in the sense of *θαυμασίως*, but it is obvious that the spirit and sense of the passage are best evinced by the interpretation of Stallbaum as supr.

Ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ἦσθετο.] See Mat-



## ΕΧ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ κα-  
θήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ  
ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν  
κεφαλὴν καὶ ξυμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—  
εἰώθει γάρ, ὅποτε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—  
Αὔριον δὴ, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας  
κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἔοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
Οὐκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πείθῃ. Ἄλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τήμε-  
ρον, ἔφη, καγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, εἴαν πέρ γε  
ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀνα-  
βιώσασθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἂν εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ με διαφύγοι  
ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὡς περ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ

thiæ Gr. s. 317.

Ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός.] Intell. δίφρου, or θρανίου. Tim. Plat. Lex. v. χαμαιζήλος; δίφρου μικρὸν ἢ ταπεινὸν σκιμπόδιον.

Καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν.] Cf. Terent. Heaut. iv. 5. 14. "Non possum pati, Quin tibi caput demulceam; accede huc Syre."

Τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερεῖ.] One of the modes by which the Grecians expressed their regret for the decease of their friends was, by cutting off or shaving the hair, of which they did not think it sufficient to deprive themselves of a small part only; Eurip. Orest. v. 128. They disposed of the hair in several ways. Sometimes it was thrown upon the corpse. Hom. Il. ψ'. v. 135. Θριξὶ δὲ πάντα νέκυν καταίονον, ἃς ἐπέβαλλον Κειρόμενοι—sometimes it was thrown upon the funeral pile, or placed in the hands of the deceased, to be consumed with the body, Il. ψ'. 152—ἐν χερσὶ κόμην ἐτάριοιο φίλοιο Θῆκεν.—and at other times it was laid on the grave. Æschyl. Choeph. Ὅρῳ τομαῖον τόνδε βόστρυχον τάφῳ. It has been objected, v. Meurs. ad Lycophr. 976. de Funer. c. xlv. that shaving the hair was rather, as appears from several ancient authorities, a sign of rejoicing; see the discussion of this subject in Potter's Grec. Antiq. ii. c. 5.

Ἄλλὰ τί.] Suppl. βούλει ποιῶ. Cf.

Aristoph. Ran. 489. Οὐκ ἂν ἔτερος ταῦτ' εἰργάσατ' ἀνὴρ. Ξ. Ἄλλὰ τί; [sc. ἂν εἰργάσατο]. Δ. Κατίκειτ' ἂν ὀσφραϊνόμενος, εἴπερ δειλὸς ἦν.

Ἐάν περ—ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ.] The forms ὁ λόγος οἴχεται, — ἐκφεύγει, — σώζεται, are familiar with Plato, instead of which he now uses one less frequent, but more suitable to the immediate nature of the subject.—Ἀναβιώσασθαι, to recall to life. Cf. in Criton. c. 9. init. Καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων.

Εἰ—με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος.] i. e. If he should lose hold of his argument, and be consequently unable to prove his point, the immortality of the soul.—Ἐνορκὸν ἂν ποιησαίμην, I would bind myself by oath.

Ὡς περ Ἀργεῖοι.] The Argives having lost Thyrea to the Spartans, bound themselves, by a decree and imprecation, to cut their hair and never permit it to grow again to its accustomed length until the place had been recovered. The Spartans, on the contrary, who used to wear their hair short, decreed that from thenceforward they would nourish their hair, as a reproach to their enemies. Herodot. i. 82. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν νῦν ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου (the time of the loss of Thyrea) κατακειράμενοι τὰς κεφαλὰς, πρότερον ἐπάναγκες κομῶντες, ἐποίησαντο νόμον τε καὶ κἀτάρην, μὴ πρότερον θρέψειν κόμην Ἀργείων μηδένα μηδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας

πρότερον κομήσειν πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίον τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς λέγεται οἴος τε εἶναι. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐμέ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἕως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν. Παρακαλῶ τοίνυν, ἔφη, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ. Οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἔφη.

§. 39. Ἄλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμέν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ' ὅς, μισολόγοι, ὡς περ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι,

σφι χροσοφορήσειν, πρὶν ἂν θυρίας ἀνασώσωνται. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἔθεντο νόμον, οὐ γὰρ κομῶντες πρὸ τούτου ἀπὸ τούτου κομῶν.

[Πρὸς δύο οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς.] The application of this proverb is plain, but its origin is uncertain. It arose, according to some, from Hercules having called Iolaus, son of Iphiclus, king of Thessaly, to assist him in destroying the hydra, which he did by applying a burning iron to the wound, as soon as one head was cut off, to prevent the growth of another; the attention of Hercules having been drawn away for a time by a sea-crab, which Juno, jealous of his glory, had sent during the combat to bite his foot. Cf. Schol. in loc. Ταύτης τὴν αἰτίαν ὁ Δοῦρος οὕτως ἀφηγείται. Ἡρακλῆα φησὶ βωμὸν δειμάμενον ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀλφειῷ, πυγμῆς ἀγῶνα καταθεῖναι, καὶ νικήσαντα τὴν ἐξῆς Ὀλυμπιάδα, πάλιν ἀγωνιζόμενον, ὑπὸ Ἐλάτου καὶ Φεράνδρου πάλη ληφθῆναι, καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου τὸ, Πρὸς δύο οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, παροιμασθῆναι . . . . Ἡρόθωρος δὲ καὶ Ἑλληνικός φασιν, ὡς ὅτε τὴν ὕδραν Ἡρακλῆς ἀνῆρει, τὴν Ἡραν αὐτῷ καρκίνον ἐφορμήσαι πρὸς δύο δὲ οὐκ ἐνδυνάμενον μάχεσθαι, σύμμαχον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τὸν Ἰόλεων καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ῥηθῆναι τὴν παροιμίαν. V. Geel. in Bibliothec. Crit. Nov. ii. p. 15. sqq.

[Ἔως ἔτι φῶς ἐστίν.] i. e. Before sunset, after which time, those who had been condemned to die were obliged to drink the poison. Cf. infr. c. 66.

§. 39. Πρῶτον.] *First of all.*—Τὸ

ποῖον, i. e. ποῖον ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὁ λέγεις. The article is prefixed to interrogative pronouns, when it always refers to something previously said by the person interrogated; the article appearing to be the commencement of an anticipation of what the person questioned is expected to say, and the interrogative pronoun to be resorted to after a short aposiopesis, from inability to proceed. Tr. εὐδαιμονεῖ πάσχει δὲ θαυμαστόν. Merc. τὸ—τί. Aristoph. Pac. 696.—Merc. ὦ, ὦ. οἶα μ' ἐκέλευσεν ἀναπυθέσθαι σου; Tr. τὰ—τί; Aristoph. Pac. 693.—Π. πράγμα πορσύρων μέγα. K. τὸ —ποῖον, ὦ ξέν'; Soph. τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; when there is nothing in the preceding words to which the article thus employed can be grammatically referred, some noun with which it may agree is expressed in the interrogation itself: Prom. θνητοῦς ξηπανσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον. Chor. τὸ ποῖον εὐρών τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου. Æschyl. Prom. 248. *the remedy which you discovered for this malady was what?* Seag. Viger, c. 1. r. 19.

[Μὴ γενώμεθα—μισολόγοι ὡς περ οἱ μισάνθρωποι.] Cf. Minucius Felix in Octavio xiv. 4. "Id accidere pernotum est auditorum facilitate, qui, dum verborum lenocinio a rerum intentionibus avocantur, sine delecta adstantur dictis omnibus, nec a rectis falsa discernunt, nescientes inesse et in incredibili verum, et in verisimili mendacium. Itaque quo sæpius adseverationibus credunt, eo frequentius a peritioribus arguuntur: sic assidue temeritate decepti, culpam iudicii (sic leg. pro iudicis) transferunt ad

ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅ τι ἂν τις μείζον τούτου κακὸν πάθει ἢ λόγους μισήσας. Γίνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἢ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἠγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὐρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρὸν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ ἀθις ἔτερον. καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἠγήσαιο οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἠγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιῆς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι οὕτω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν; καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἐχρήτο, ὡς περ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἠγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφό-

incerti querelam; ut, damnatis omnibus, malint universa suspendere, quam de fallacibus judicare. Igitur nobis providendum est, ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus; ita ut in execrationem et odium hominum plerique simpliciores efferantur. Nam incaute creduli circumveniuntur ab his, quos bonos putarunt: mox errore consimili jam suspectis omnibus, ut improbos metuunt etiam quos optimos sentire potuerunt."

Τούτου κακὸν π. ἢ λόγ. μισ.] Compare Gorg. p. 500. C. οὐ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάζει τις—ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντινα χρῆ τρόπον ζῆν. and Heindorf in loc. Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 15. "Quo quid absurdius, quam aut res sordidas atque deformes deorum honore afficere."

Ἐνδύεται.] *Arises in the mind.* Cf. Æschin. Socr. iii. 8. φροντίδες ὑπεδύσαν—where the verb is also used absolutely and in a similar sense.

Ἀθις ἔτερον.] i. e. Upon a different occasion from that in which the favorable opinion was formed of him in the first instance, he will be found quite a different character. V. Cousin; *et tout*

*autre encore dans une autre occasion.*

ἑταιροτάτους.] Comparatives and superlatives of substantives, which are taken in an adjective sense, and which, for the most part, are adjectives, are not unusual. Cf. Herodot. vii. 7. δουλότερος. Aristoph. Equ. 45. διαβολώτατος.

Οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιῆς εἶναι.] Cf. Aristoph. Plut. 362. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ὑγιῆς ἔστιν οὐδενός. Schol. in loc. "Ὅτι οὐδεὶς ὅς δοκεῖ ἔχειν πλειονέκτημα ἀρετῆς ὑγιῶς ἔχει.

Οὐκοῦν—αἰσχρόν.] Suppl. τοῦτο ἔστι.—Ἄνευ τέχνης; Cf. Lucian, in Timon. where Jupiter inquiring from Mercury the cause of the misery and complaints of Timon, is answered; χρηστότης ἐπίτριψεν αὐτὸν καὶ φιλανθρωπία—ὡς δὲ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ, ἄνοια καὶ εὐήθεια καὶ ἀκρισία περι τοὺς φίλους, ὅς οὐ συνίει, κόραξι καὶ λύκοις χαριζόμενος.

Ὡς περ ἔχει, κ. τ. λ.] *Such as it really is he would have judged the case to be, that the excessively good and evil are but few on either side, but that the middle class is the more numerous.*—σφό-

δρα ὀλίγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ὡς περ, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἶει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδύν, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὐκοῦν οἶει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι; Εἰκὸς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφespόμην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἦ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κᾄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι, ἐνίστε μὲν ὦν, ἐνίστε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αὐθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος· καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες

δρα being taken with *χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς*. Cf. *Apul. de Doctr. Plat. ii. p. 22. ed. Elm.* "Sed apprime bonos et sine mediocritate deterrimos paucos admodum rarioresque, et, ut ipse ait, innumerabiles esse: eos autem, qui nec plane optimi nec omnino deterrimi sint, sed quasi medie morati, plures esse."

[Τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων.] *The extremes.*

'Ἀλλὰ ταύτη μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι.] Socrates does not assert his analogy to hold good so far as that reasonings may be considered liable to the extremes of good and evil which he had just declared to be few as in the case of mankind, nor to the more widely extended mediocrity which prevailed amongst them. These observations applied to men alone, and he was led out of his way to express them, in explanation of a foregoing remark, by the question of Phædon, Πῶς λέγεις; *supr.* whence ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφespόμην. After which Socrates proceeds to show where

the points of similitude, to which he had in the first instance alluded, lay, and which appeared to arise from a hasty and inconsiderate mode of judgment, by which, inferring as it did a constant and perplexing change of opinion with regard to truth and falsehood in philosophy, as with regard to good and evil in man, the former was also condemned as deficient in those qualities of certainty and stability which alone enhanced its pursuit.

'Ἄλλ' ἐκείνη.] *Sc. ὅμοιοι εἰσι.* Upon *ἐκείνη ἦ*, see *Matthiæ Gr. s. 480. c. and 474. d.* Schleirmacher observes upon this, that the consequence loses itself here, but in such a manner that it is possible to be drawn out in the parenthesis.

Οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικ. λόγ. διατρ.] *Those who are conversant in sophistical reasonings.* Wyttenbach explains ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους, *sophismata, argumenta in utramque partem composita, ratio contra omnia disputandi.* Cf. *infr.*

οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὔδενος οὔδεν ὑγίης οὔδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ἀτεχνῶς ὡς περ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ, ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὔδενα ἐν οὔδενι μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἶη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίον λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι, ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτὸν τις αἰτιῶτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἄσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπόσαιτο, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθεῖη. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.

§. 40. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ παριῶμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων

c. 49. sub. fin. ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο, ὡς περ οἱ ἀντιλογικοί

["Ὡς περ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ.] A narrow strait dividing Eubœa from the main land of Greece. The currents were so strong that, according to some of the ancient writers, the sea was said to ebb and flow seven times a day, and as often during the night, whence it became proverbial for inconstancy and unsteadiness. Livy, xxviii. 6. whose account appears the more rational, denies that it ebbs and flows as stated supr. but says that it is subject to the influence of furious winds from the high mountains on either side, and that the current itself, changing irregularly, like the wind, from one point to another, is hurried along like a torrent from a mountain, so that ships cannot lie quiet in it day or night.

Ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται.] In allusion to the uncertainty which such reasoners attach to every thing, and the insecurity of the knowledge which results from such fluctuating principles.

Ἐπὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφ. vid Wesseling, ad Herodot. p. 195. iii. 195.

Δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 535. b. Obs.

Ἐπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι, κ. τ. λ.] Would it not, says Socrates, be a deplorable grievance, if, while there is a mode of reasoning which is true, solid, and intelligible, yet from having encountered such a description of reasons as at one time appeared to be true, and at another false, one should in fine, through discontent and vexation, be glad to transfer the blame from himself and his inertness in not endeavouring to dispel his doubts, and arrive by investigation at certainty, to the reasons, and should dislike and condemn them through life, while he remained a stranger to the truth and knowledge of the realities which those reasons evinced?—Ἐπειτα, yet, nevertheless.

Οἰκτρὸν δῆτα.] Grievous indeed.

§. 40. Μὴ παριῶμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν.] Let us not admit into our minds, let us not be persuaded, &c.

κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὡς περ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονείκως. Καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητήσωσιν, ὅπη μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ἦ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσι, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἂν ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε· καὶ θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἂν λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι,

Ἄλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον.] Intell. ἐννοούμεν.

Ἀνδριστέον.] i. e. *We must exert ourselves with manly resolution and energy.*

Περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου.] Sc. the immortality of the soul.

Οὐ γὰρ ὅπως.] Γὰρ, like the Latin *namque*, serves for the explanation of a preceding proposition, in which was contained a demonstrative pronoun, preparing the way for that which follows. Matthiæ Gr. s. 615.

Εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον.] *Unless it should occur incidentally,—should occur as a matter of but secondary importance; V. Cousin; Au moins n'est-ce pas là mon but principal; for Socrates was anxious in the first instance, from the nature of his situation at the time, to be himself convinced of the soul's immortality, that his arguments might not fail either of their due effect upon those to whom they appeared not to be primarily addressed.*

Λογίζομαι γάρ—] i. e. *For I am considering, and observe how favorably to myself, if what I say happens to be true, it is well to be persuaded of it, &c.*

Ficinus appears to have read λογίζομαι γὰρ ὡς.—Εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει. The most learned among the ancients generally hesitated to admit the immortality of the soul as an absolute and incontrovertible truth, and accordingly they often appeared, at one time, to yield to that, as an established certainty, which they nullified at another by their many and perplexing doubts. So Cyr. Socrat. ap. Xenoph. viii. 7. on this subject; εἰ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα—εἰ δὲ μὴ. Cf. Cic. de Senec. 22. Epist. ad Div. v. 16. Senec. Epist. 102. “Juvat ad æternitate animorum quaerere, immo hercle quaerere. Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium, quam probantium.” The ancients mostly were inclined to receive this opinion upon the grounds of what was asserted respecting the immortality of the soul, rather than upon a conviction resulting from close and suitable arguments, by which they seldom laboured to prove its truth. GOTTL.

Εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτῶν.] i. e. If all sensation is destroyed by death, and the soul itself ceases to exist.

ἀλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδῆς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἡ δὲ ἄγνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολείται. παρεσκευασμένος μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, ὦ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον. ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἂν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ξυνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ, ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὡς περ μέλιτα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.

§. 41. 'Ἄλλ' ἰτέον, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἂν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνήμενος. Συμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅμως καὶ θεϊότερον καὶ κάλλιον ὄν τοῦ σώματος, προαπολλύηται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἶδει οὖσα. Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ ξυγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦ-

: 'Ἄλλ' οὖν τοῦτόν γε—] Yet (ἀλλά) I will for this reason (οὖν) now at least (γε), &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 615.

· Ἅμα ἐμαυτὸν τε.] Vulg. ἅμα ἐαυτὸν τε; the reflexive pronoun ἐαυτοῦ being frequently used by the Attic writers for the other personal pronouns compounded with αὐτος.

· Ὡς περ μέλιτα.] This very beautiful metaphor Plato seems to have borrowed from Eupolis, de Pericl. orat. Οὕτως ἐκῆλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις. Diod. Sic. xii. 40. Lucian Nigrin. p. 24. καὶ γὰρ τοι, κατὰ τὸν κωμικόν, ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐγκατέλειπε τὸ κέντρον τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. Cic. de Orat. iii. 24. "Tantumque in eo (Pericle) vim fuisset (dixerunt), ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinqueret."

§. 41. 'Ἄλλ' ἰτέον.] A usual form of expression, in proceeding to enter upon an argument. Vid. Wytttenbach, Biblioth. Crit. part. i. p. 59. xii. p. 12.

· Ὅμως καὶ θεϊότερον—ὄν.] Ὅμως is sometimes put before its participle as supr. Cf. Plat. Lysid. c. 22. Theact. c. 9. So ἔμπας, Pind. Pyth. v. 74. Soph. Aj. 1338. and more frequently εἶτα.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 566. 3. Cf. Terent. Eun. i. 2. 90. "Tamen contemptus abs te hæc habui in memoria."

· Ἐν ἀρμονίας εἶδει οὖσα.] i. e. Ἀρμονία οὖσα. Cf. Menex. p. 249. A. ἐν πατρὸς σχήματι καταστᾶσα ἡ πόλις. Vid. Heusd. Spec. Crit. p. 44.

· Ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί.] Suppl. φάναι, which is implied in ξυγχωρεῖν preced.

Κατατρίψασα.] Having worn out.

σα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται, καὶ ἦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμα γ' αἰεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὃ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; Ξυνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὐ; Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὐ. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθί που πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπίεσθην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἀνθαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ ἔτι δόξειεν. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης Ἄλλ' ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὃ ξένε Θηβαίε, ἄλλα δόξαι, εἴαν περ μείνη ἡδε ἢ οἴησις, τὸ ἄρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι ξύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἄρμονίαν τινα ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι. οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἄρμονία συγκεκλιμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ᾧν ἔδει αὐτὴν ξυντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἰδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι

Ὅκ ἀποδέχεσθε.] *Do you not admit, or allow.*

Θαυμαστῶς ὡς.] *See Matthiæ Gr. s. 628. 3.*

Ἀποδέξει γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος.] *You will not assent to, or approve of yourself assenting, &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 373. Obs.*

Ταῦτά σοι ξυμβαίνει λεγ.] *It follows that you assert this, &c. Simmias admitted the pre-existence of the soul, but by comparing it to a harmony, which he could not assert to exist prior to the instrument by which it was produced, he was obliged to deny what he had al-*

ready, and, as he allows, satisfactorily conceded. For if the soul bore the same relation to the body as the harmony to the lyre, the body should not only exist before it, but its qualities and affections should be so duly disposed and regulated as that they should combine to produce faculty of thought, in like manner as the harmony could only result from the proper tension of the strings. After ξυμβαίνει λέγειν, *intell. ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἄρμονία συγκεκλιμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, ἐξ ᾧν ἔδει αὐτὴν ξυντεθῆναι.*

Εἰς ἀνθρώπ. εἰδ.] *The human form.*



δ' αὐτὴν ξυγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἢ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἢ ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς ξυνάσεται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε, εἰ πέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ, ξυνωδῶ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ ξυνωδός, ἀλλ' ὄρα· πρότερον αἰρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκείνον, ᾧ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις ξύνοῖδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσι, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίας καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται. ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως

[Ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων.] i. e. Ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἃ οὐπω ἦν.

[Οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρμονία.] For neither is harmony any such thing as that to which you compare it.—τοιοῦτον ἐστιν, ᾧ ἀπ. i. e. τοιοῦτον ἐστιν ὅσον ᾧ ἀπ.

[Οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος.] Sc. the argument of Simmias, that the soul was a harmony; how, Socrates asks, will he reconcile this with his former admission, that science was nothing but reminiscence, and that the soul existed before its union with the body?—Ἐκείνῳ, sc. τῷ τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι.—HEIND.

[Ὅδε μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. For this argument (that the soul was a harmony), occurred to me, independent of any demonstration, but in consequence of a certain verisimilitude and speciousness, whence many men entertain this same opinion. But I am convinced that the arguments which derive their proofs

from verisimilitudes, both in geometry and all other instances, are futile, and if one be not on his guard against them, especially deceptive. Upon the εἰκότα of the rhetoricians, see in Phædr. p. 353. B. 355. E. Cf. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 26. ad Alexandr. 7.—Εὐπρεπείας, and εὐπρεπῆς are frequently used in reference to the plausibility of a speaker and his arguments. Cf. Thucyd. iii. 11. εὐπρέπεια λόγου. 38. τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειράσεται.

[Ξύνοῖδα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 548. Ἄλαζόσι, Tim. Plat. Lex. Ἄλαζών· ψευδῆς.—ἐξαπατῶσι, decipientibus.—WYTT.

[Δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι.] Upon a principle deserving of admission or assent.

[Ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. For thus, indeed, our soul was said to exist before the body, since to it be-

ἡμῶν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὡς περ αὐτῆς ἔστιν ἢ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἰκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαί. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μῆτε ἐμαυτοῦ μῆτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἀρμονία.

§. 42. Τί δαί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῆδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχη ἐξ ὧν ἂν ξυγκέηται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῆ ἢ πάσχη. Ξυνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἠγεῖσθαι γε προσήκει ἀρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ὧν ἂν ξυντεθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔπεισθαι. Ξυνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονίαν κινήθηναι ἢ φθέγγασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δαί; οὐχ οὕτως ἀρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστη ἀρμονία, ὡς ἂν ἀρμοσθῆ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἡ οὐχί, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὲν

longs (ὡς περ αὐτῆς ἔστιν,) the essence (ἢ οὐσία), which bears the name of "that which is." (τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν, i. q. τοῦ ὄντος). In other words, the soul as certainly existed before it was united to the body as did those essences, or intelligible forms, inseparable from and innate in the soul itself, and of whose pre-existence, it was likewise allowed, there was no doubt. Cf. cc. 22. 25. supr. in the former of which ἡμετέραν οὔσαν, as applied by Socrates to οὐσία, is equivalent to what is expressed as supr. by Simmias, ὡς περ αὐτῆς (τῆς ψυχῆς) ἔστιν ἢ οὐσία. V. Cousin, in h. l. "Ce passage se rapporte directement à celui qui précède, c. 24. ou Socrate dit: *si le beau, le bon, καὶ πᾶσα ἢ τοιαύτη οὐσία, et cet ordie d'idées auxquelles nous rapportons, comme à des principes supérieurs toutes les impressions des sens et que nous trouvons d'abord en nous-mêmes, oui, si toutes ces idées existent réellement avant de se développer en cette vie, il faut, nécessairement que l'ame qui les possède en propre, lui préexiste également.* Platon appelle les idées des essences, οὐσία, ou

même collectivement ἢ οὐσία, parce qu'elles constituent la vraie existence, toutes les choses visibles n'en étant que des formes passageres. Il les appelle souvent τὰ ὄντα ὄντως; et c'est dans ce sens qu'il dit ici: ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν."

§. 42. Οὐδὲ μὴν.] *Not yet.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 605.—Ἄλλο παρ' ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα, anything else except, or otherwise than, that which it does and suffers itself. Matthiæ Gr. s. 588. c. Socrates proceeds to show, by a further argument, that the soul is not a harmony; for harmonies vary in their degrees, and one may be more a harmony than another, but one soul cannot be more a soul than another, whence it easily appears that the similitude fails here also.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἐναντία.] *It is then far from being the case that harmony is contrariwise (ἐναντία) produced, or utters sounds, or in any other respect is opposed to its component parts.*

Οὐχ οὕτως ἀρμονία.] *The harmony naturally depends upon the arrangement which is best adapted to produce*

μᾶλλον ἄρμοσθῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴ περ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἄρμονία εἴη καὶ πλειων, εἰ δ' ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἔλαττον, ἦττόν τε καὶ ἐλάττων; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον [μᾶλλον] ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆν ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον καὶ ἦττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν, ἔφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθὴ, ἢ δὲ ἀνοϊάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακὴ; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν τιθεμένων ψυχῆν ἄρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἄρμονίαν αὐτὴν τιν' ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄρμονία οὐσῆ ἄλλην ἄρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ

it; consequently, according to the degree of perfection in the arrangement of the instrument, strings, &c. the harmony itself, if it can admit of degrees at all (εἴ περ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίνεσθαι infr.) will be more or less complete.

[Ἡ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο, κ. τ. λ.] Is this then the case, Socrates asks, with regard to the soul, that even in the least degree possible, one soul should be more or less a soul than another? Assuredly not; therefore in this respect the soul is not a harmony.—Heusde would reject μᾶλλον, justly, as having no connexion with the sense of the passage; so, likewise, Stallbaum and Heindorf, but as it is found in all the editions it is preserved, and enclosed in brackets.—Αὐτὸ τοῦτο, Matthiæ Gr. s. 439. Obs. 1. b.

[Φέρε δὴ, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός.] Socrates advances another argument against the position of Simmias. If souls are variously imbued with virtues and vices, so that some appear to be better attempered, and, as it were, attuned than others, it follows that one who insists on the soul being a harmony, should also admit that in this harmony, that is, in the soul, the

forms and degrees of harmony should be manifold, which is obviously against the nature of the thing itself. Besides, if what was lately conceded be true, that one soul is not more or less so than another, one may be easily compelled to allow that no soul can excel or come short of another, which is the same as to assert that different minds are not capable of being endowed with different degrees of justice, temperance, and wisdom. But the experience of every one is against such an assertion as this. Further, if the nature and notion of harmony be more deeply and accurately investigated, it will be easily allowed that *true harmony* can, as such, at no time, and on no principle, admit of or participate in discord. Hence, whoever argues the soul to be a harmony, must also contend for its perfect freedom from all impurity and vice, and for the souls of all animals as partaking of the perfections of the soul of man; a conclusion which is obviously unwarrantable and absurd.

Τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν—ἄρμονίαν—καὶ ἀναρμ.— Cf. c. 4. supr. Ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐσῆς μεγ. μουσ.

ἔχω ἔγωγε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τοιαυτ' αὐτ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκείνο ὑποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἐπὶ πλεόν μηδὲ ἦττον μηδ' ἐπ' ἔλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι. ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Τὴν δέ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἁρμονίαν οὐσαν μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἡρμόσθαι. ἔστιν οὕτως; Ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήθ' ἦττον ἡρμωσμένη ἔστιν ὅ τι πλεόν ἢ ἔλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἴσον; Τὸ ἴσον. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἄλλη ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἡρμωσται; Οὕτως. Τοῦτο δέ γε πεπονθυῖα οὐδὲν πλεόν ἀναρμωστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχει ἄν; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ' αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἄρ' ἂν τι πλεόν κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχει ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴ περ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρμωστία, ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη; Οὐδὲν πλεόν. Μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴ περ ἁρμονία ἐστίν. ἁρμονία γὰρ δὴ που παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμωστίας οὐ ποτ' ἂν μετασχοί. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὐδέ γε δὴ που ψυχὴ, οὐσα παντελῶς ψυχὴ, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἔκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῶων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴ περ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχαί, εἶναι; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πασχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος,

Virtue, according to Pythagoras also, is the harmony and unison of the soul, (Aristot. Eth. Nicom. ii. 5. cf. i. 4. Diog. Laert. viii. 33. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. c. 23); or in other words, *similitude to God, ὁμολογία πρὸς τὸ θεῖον.*

Μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 3.

Εἴ περ ὁμοίως ψυχαί.] h. e. *Si quidem animæ pariter a natura hoc ipsum habeant, ut sint animæ.* WYTT.

Καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. Whether do you suppose that such an assertion could be made with any shew of justice, or that our reasoning should be subjected to the censure

εἰ ὀρθὴ ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἔφη.

§. 43. Τί δαί; ἢ δ' ὅς· τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσθ' ὅ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Πότερον ξυγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἶον καύματος ἐνότος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν· καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία ὀρώμεν ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μὴ ποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὔσαν, ἐναντία ἄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνονται καὶ χαλῶτο καὶ πάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκείνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἔπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὐ ποτ' ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τούναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φήσει τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγων πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ

of such senseless inferences if the position be correct, that the soul is a harmony?—Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, is to be referred to ἢ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ—οὐτ. λέγ. preced. making the sense of the passage; οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν καλῶς· δοκεῖ οὕτω λέγεσθαι.

§. 43. Τί δαί, ἢ δ' ὅς·]—The last argument against the soul's being a harmony. The soul of the wise and prudent is always opposed to the passions and affections of the body, which, by various expedients it endeavours to curb and control. But if the soul were a harmony arising from and depending on the tension, relaxation, or vibration of the corporeal qualities, it could no more be independent of or opposed to them than the harmony of the lyre could be, which is evidently under the influence of the instrument itself. Whence the soul cannot be a harmony in this sense, or it would agree with the body, from which it is manifestly distinct in the case of all who choose to keep the body in

subjection to the higher and more noble principle.

Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὁμ. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν.] Cf. supr. c. 42. init. Τί δέ—τῆδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἄρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τι συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκείνα ἔχη, ἐξ ὧν ἂν ξυγκέηται.—Heindorf gives Spalding's explication of the passage as supr.—ἐναντία ἄδειν τούτοις ἄ (καθ' ἃ) ἐπιτείνονται καὶ χαλῶτο—ἐκείνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχ. οὔσα, i. e. ἐναντία ἄδειν ταῖς ἐπιτάξεσι καὶ χαλάσεσι καὶ παλμοῖς καὶ ἄλλῃ ὄψω οὐν πάθει ἐκείνων ἐξ ὧν τυγχ. οὔσα. Stallbaum compares a similarly remarkable species of attraction, Demosth. adv. Mid. p. 515. καὶ δίκην ἡμὰ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν ὧν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐτεθέατο θρασὺν ὄντα καὶ βδελυρον, where ὧν is put for ἄ, depending on θρασὺν εἶναι. Butt. in loc.

Ἐναντιουμένη—καὶ δεσπόζουσα.] Cf. Rep. iv. p. 440. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀλοθι—πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζωνται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν

βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις, ὡς ἄλλη οὔσα ἄλλω πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐα πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεΐα,

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·

τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.

ἄρ' οἶε αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἷας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ

ἐπιθυμία, λοιδοροῦντα τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὡς περ δυοῖν στασιαζόντων ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου.

Τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.] Νουθετεῖν properly governs an accusative, but the case is sometimes determined by the remoter verb, as by ἀπειλοῦσα supr. Cf. *Odys.* κ'. 531. ἐτάροισιν ἐποτρῦναι καὶ ἀνῶσαι. *Soph. Antig.* 537. καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας. *Lobeck. ad. Soph. Aj.* 475. p. 295.

Οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσεΐα.] *Odys.* ὕ. 17.—*Στῆθος δὲ πλήξας.* Plato makes a similar use of this argument, *Rep.* iii. p. 434. A. iv. p. 454. A. Cf. *Heraclid. Allegor. Hom.* p. 63. ed. Schow.—*Ταῦτα τοίνυν ὡσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς τῶν Ὀμηρικῶν ἐπῶν εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους διαλόγους ὁ Πλάτων μετῆρδενυσεν· καὶ πρῶτον γε περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς σκεπτέον· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς εἴληχε τὸν ὑποκάροδον χώρον, ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ποιήσει τοῦτο σαφές ἐν τῇ κατα μνηστήρων ὀργῇ, καθάπερ οἰκόν τινα τῆς μισοπονηρίας θυροκρουστῶν τὴν καρδίαν.* ' *Στῆθος δὲ πλήξας, κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ, Τέτλαθι δῆ κραδίη, καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.* ' *Ἀφ' ἧς γὰρ αἱ θυμικαὶ βέουσι πηγαί, πρὸς ταύτην ὁ λόγος ἀποκλίνει.* *Proclus. in Rep.* p. 392. ἐν Φαί-

δωνι μὲν γὰρ ὅπου διαφερόντως ὁ Σωκράτης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ζωὴν ἀναπλοῖ, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πλήθος ἀνοίγει τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ ζηλωταῖς, πολλοῖς δῆ τισι καὶ παντοδαποῖς λόγοις καταδησάμενος ὡς ἄρα ἄλλη μὲν ἔστιν ἡ ἀρμονία τῶν σωμάτων, ἄλλη δὲ ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, καὶ διέζευκται ταῦτα κατ' οὐσίαν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τελευτῶν ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν ποιητὴν καταφεύγει, καὶ τοῖς ἐκείνου ῥήμασιν ἐνεργεστάτοις τεκμηρίοις χρώμενος ἐξυρημένην ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν ψυχὴν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα τῶν κράσεων ἀρμονίας· τὸ γὰρ διαμαχόμενον φησι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ στήθει τεταγμένην ζωὴν κινουμένην, καὶ λέγον· *τέτλαθι δῆ κραδίη*· πάντως που κατὰ φύσιν ἐξήλλακται τοῦτου πρὸς ὃ διαμάχεται· καὶ τὸ κατεξανιστάμενον τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῷ σώματι τὴν ὑποστασιν ἔχοι· καὶ οὕτω δῆ προῖων ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ συμπεραίνόμενος ὅτι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ψυχῆς ἐρᾷν (f. ἐναντίαν) χρῆ φάναί τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀρμονίας, ὡσπερ εἰς ἀφυκτον ἀνάγκην κατακλείων (sic. leg. pro ἀνακλείων) τὸν σύμπαντα λόγον· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν φησιν Ὀμήρῳ θεῖφ ποιητῇ ταύτῃ λέγοντες ὁμολογοῖμεν, οὔτε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

Διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας—οὔσης.] See *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 569. 5.—*Καὶ οἷας ἄγεσθαι, i. e. καὶ τοιαύτης ὥστε ἄγεσθαι.* *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 476. a.

καθ' ἄρμονίαν; Νῆ Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὃ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῆ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς εἴκειν, Ὀμήρω θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἔχειν οὕτως ἔφη.

§. 44. Εἶεν δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἄρ-

[Ἡ καθ' ἄρμονίαν.] i. e. *Than that it could be compared to a harmony.*—When it is not a substantive, that is compared with another, but the quality of a thing expressed by an adjective that is considered in its proportion to another quality, and compared in degree with it (where in Latin *quam pro* is used), then ἡ κατα or ἡ πρός is put after the comparative. *Matthiæ Gr. s. 449. c.*

[Νῆ Δία—ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.] *Sc. ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοοῦμενος ὡς αὐτῆς οὔσης οἷας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσποζειν,* &c. *Simmias* allows that, according to his view, the intention of Homer, in the passage as cited above, was to evince the superiority and sway of the mind over the body.

[Οὐδαμῆ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν.] It is to be observed that the harmony against which Socrates has argued as being in any respect analogous to the soul, is totally distinct from the harmony alluded to c. 4. *supr. a med. n.* Ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς. The one being a physical harmony, arising from without, and necessarily dependent upon what is external and perishable in its origin and result; the other a moral, intellectual, or as *Jamblichus* calls it, a mathematical harmony, *apud Stob. Eclog. Phys. p. 864.*, arising from the accordant affections of the soul, inseparable from and co-existent with the soul itself.

§. 44. Εἶεν δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης.] From this to c. 56. *infr.* Socrates argues against the position of Cebes, that although the soul was more excellent than the body, and lived before it, still by changing into one body after another it impaired and wasted its influence and strength, and at last was utterly destroyed. The answer is, that the nature of the soul is the same as that of things intelligible, that is, ideas and essences. For that anything should be beautiful, the

immediate presence of beauty is required in the object, as that of heat, that anything should be warm, or life, that anything should exist. Now what is warm may be made cold, but heat itself cannot become cold; what is beautiful may be unsightly, but not so with beauty itself. For on the appearance of cold, heat is not changed into cold, but disappears, so beauty is not changed into, but gives place to deformity. Thus on the approach of death, the soul departs, and is not changed into death. For by the presence of the soul the body is animated and alive, and the nature of the soul is the same as that of those imperishable and undecaying ideas and essences which are innate in the mind; therefore the soul is immortal. *Wytenbach* sums up the argument thus; the essences of things are constant and immutable, the essence of the soul consists in thought, therefore the soul can never lose the faculty of thought, consequently it is immortal.—This argument is objectionable upon other grounds, but principally owing to a defect in Plato's system of ideas, in not sufficiently distinguishing between those which originate in the mind itself and those which are acquired by experience, or by confounding, as *Wytenbach* observes, things actual with things possible. For as anything set in motion cannot be otherwise understood than as changing its place, yet there is no necessity that it should be always in motion, or always exist. So with the soul, although it cannot be otherwise understood than as living, yet it cannot for this reason be conceded that it always lives or is eternal. But Plato arrived at this conclusion as one conformable to his design. For by deciding on the immutability of those ideas, and classing souls with them as identical in their nature, it followed that he should decide upon the soul's being no more possible to be deprived of life than a triangle could continue to be

μονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἰλαά πωσ, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονε· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἰλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,

one when deprived of its three sides.

The nature of this argument, and its application, is clearly and ably developed by V. Cousin. Œuvr. de Plat. i. p. 171.

“ Ici se rencontre épisodiquement la théorie des *Ideés*.

“ Toute philosophie qui se renferme dans les phénomènes apparens du monde extérieur, se condamne à n’atteindre jamais ni les causes ni les principes. La physique croit faire merveille par exemple d’expliquer la situation dans laquelle je suis assis, par la disposition des os, la tension des muscles, n’oubliant rien dans le détail minutieux de ses laborieuses et superficielles explications, si ce n’est le principe réel, la cause première du phénomène, la détermination de ma volonté. L’erreur commune, celle du peuple et du physicien qui n’est pas philosophe, est de confondre l’apparence avec la réalité, ce sans quoi la cause ne pourrait pas se développer, avec la cause elle-même. ‘La physique se perd dans une multitude de petites causes qui ne sont pas des causes, et prend pour une chimère la grande cause qui fait, lie et vivifie tout . . . . En parlant de la cause et du principe, il ne faut pas s’arrêter aux effets, si l’on veut pénétrer dans la réalité des choses.’

“ La cause, le principe suprême, c’est l’intelligence.

“ Les vrais principes, les vraies causes, ce sont donc les *idéés*.

“ L’*idéé* est, dans chaque chose, l’élément intérieur et essentiel qui, s’ajoutant à la matière, l’organise et lui donne sa forme. L’*idée* est le type interne de toute chose.

“ L’*idée*, ne venant pas du dehors, ne peut être saisie par les sens.

“ Elle ne tombe pas davantage sous le raisonnement ; le caractère de la perception que nous en pouvons avoir, est d’être immédiate, simple et indécomposable. Par exemple, c’est l’*idée* seule du beau qui fait que toute chose belle, est belle. Qu’on y pense : ce n’est pas tel ou tel arrangement de parties, tel ou tel accord de formes, qui rend beau ce qui l’est ; car indépendamment de tout

arrangement, de toute composition, chaque partie, chaque forme pouvait être déjà belle, et serait belle encore, la disposition générale étant changée. La beauté se déclare par l’impossibilité immédiate où nous sommes de ne pas la trouver belle, c’est-à-dire, de ne pas être frappé par l’*idée* du beau qui s’y rencontre. On ne peut donner d’autre explication de la perception de l’*idée* du beau. Il en est de même du bien, du juste, de l’étendue et de la grandeur, de la quantité et du nombre, et des forces élémentaires de la nature.

“ Sans doute ce n’est point ici le lieu de rechercher si la critique moderne, tout en reconnaissant la solidité et la profondeur des bases de cette théorie fameuse, pourrait en admettre toutes les applications, surtout celles qui se rapportent au détail des nombres ; mais on ne peut s’empêcher de remarquer, en passant, que la théorie de Platon a cela de propre et d’excellent parmi les théories idéalistes, qu’elle ne s’arrête pas à la qualité logique des *idéés* et qu’elle va jusqu’à leur essence réelle. Les *idéés* de Platon ne sont pas seulement des directions pour la pensée, comme les catégories d’Aristote et de Kant, ce sont des éléments intégrans de la réalité. Principes et causes tout ensemble, elles planent à la fois sur l’humanité et sur la nature, et réunissent en elles le *principium essendi* et le *principium cognoscendi*, si mal à propos divisés par la scholastique, comme si l’essence de l’être pouvait être déstituée d’intelligence, ou que l’intelligence ne fût pas aussi de l’existence, et l’existence à la fois la plus puissante et la plus pure !

“ Les *idéés*, les principes et les causes, bien que, par leur rapport aux choses qu’elles animent et qu’elles constituent, elles tombent accidentellement dans le temps et dans l’espace, sont essentiellement étrangères aux revolutions de l’espace et du temps ; elles ne connaissent ni commencement ni fin pour elles-mêmes : elles sont éternelles, incorruptibles.

“ Le caractère propre d’un vrai prin-



ἐξευρήσειν· τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον εἴ τι ἕξει τις χρῆσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθύς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐδέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὡ γαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῖν βασκανία πε-

cipe, d'une vraie cause, c'est d'exclure son contraire, et même le contraire de ce qui émane directement d'elle. Or, suivant Platon, et toute l'école platonicienne, dont Stalh n'a fait que recueillir la tradition, l'ame est le principe, la cause de la vie: 'Si vous demandiez ce qui fait que tel corps est chaud, je ne répondrais pas, ce qui est bien vrai, mais n'explique rien, que c'est la chaleur; mais, allant d'abord au principe, je répondrais avec précision, que c'est le feu. Si l'on demandait ce qui fait que telle personne est malade, je ne répondrais pas, c'est la maladie, mais la fièvre; si, quelle est la raison de l'impair, je ne dirais pas l'imparité, mais l'unité. De même ici, m'élevant à l'idée primitive, au principe, à la cause de la vie, je dis que c'est l'ame.' Ainsi l'ame, constituant la vie, et excluant, en sa qualité de principe, le contraire de ce qu'elle constitue, et ce contraire étant ici la mort, elle n'a rien à craindre de la mort, et l'exclut éternellement. Elle est donc éternelle et incorruptible."

Τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας.] i. q. 'Ἀρμονία; whence Ἰλιά, which in its proper sense is applied to the propitiation of a deity. Tr. *The Theban Harmonia has been tolerably well reconciled, or appeased.* Harmonia was the daughter of Venus and Mars, and wife of Cadmus, whence Socrates makes mention of her, as supr., in allusion to the native country of Simmias as well as to the nature of his argument, that the soul was a harmony, which as represented by the deity Harmonia, the philosopher professes to have now in some degree propitiated, by his success in convincing Simmias. Hence he passes to the doubts proposed by Cebes, also a Theban, which by a natural

transition he designates as τὰ Κάδμου. A more recondite sense has been attributed to the above passage by different commentators, less felicitous than ingenious: the explanation given by Dacier affords a satisfactory specimen of the rest; i. e. that as Amphion by the harmony of his lyre built the walls of Thebes, so Simmias formed, by his harmony, the human soul: and as Cadmus, having sowed the dragon's teeth, produced the men who almost immediately perished, so Cebes by his argument would destroy the soul!

Εἴ τι ἕξει τις χρῆσασθαι.] *If one could be able to do anything with his argument, i. e. if one could extricate himself by any means from the difficulty which, as Cebes had supposed, lay in the way of any attempt to answer Simmias.* Cf. Hipp. Maj. p. 299. B. ἀλλ' ἔχεις τι χρῆσθαι τῷ λογῷ ἢ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐροῦμεν.

Ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι.] *I should not be surprised if the same thing should befall the argument of Cadmus, (Cebes' own,) i. e. that it should at once prove unable to withstand the first encounter of Socrates' reply.*

Μὴ τις ἡμῖν βασκανία.] Socrates asks of Cebes not to commend or eulogise him too highly, lest the efficacy of his future reasoning should be defeated by that fascination, βασκανία, by which those who had been too much commended by others, were in danger of losing the advantages in which they were said to excel. Upon the βασκανία, or evil eye, so called, παρὰ τὸ φάσει καίνειν, from destroying with the eyes, see Potter, Grec. Antiq. i. c. 18. sub. fin. This power of fascination was called by the Latins *fascinus*; and the usual remedy

ριτρέψη τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα λέγεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἴοντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς· ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανῶν ἐκεί ἐὺ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοῦς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει. Τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τι

for its injurious effects was the herb *bacchar*. Cf. Virgil, *Ecl. vii. 27*. "Aut si ultra placitum laudarit baccare frontem Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro." and Serv. in loc. "quicquid ultra meritum laudatur, dicitur fascinari." Hence the Greeks, when expressing their approval of any person or thing, used the terms *μετὰ προβασκανίου*, or *ἀβασκάντως*, and the Latins used to add to their praises *præfiscine*, or *præfiscine dixerim*, to avert the mischief of the evil eye. The goddess Nemesis was supposed to have been the cause of this infliction, which was intended as a judgment on the arrogant and proud; whence de Legg. iv. p. 601. D. *κούφων καὶ πτηνῶν λόγων βαρυτάτη ζημία πᾶσι γὰρ ἐπίσκοπος τοῖς περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα Δίκης Νέμεσις ἄγγελος*. For *περιτρέψη* Ruhnken proposes *περιστρέψη*. It will be observed that in this word the metaphor is kept up from *ἐφοδον δεχέσθαι* *supr.*

[Ὀμηρικῶς.] Explained by Stephens, *ut Homeri verbis utar*, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου; in which sense, however, it should rather have been written ὡς Ὀμ. εἰπέιν. The term is better explained by Heindorf, to mean *after the manner of Homer's heroes*, i. e. boldly, undauntedly. Cf. *Iliad. δ'. 496. ε'. 611.*

[Ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι.] i. e. *You require that the soul should be proved to be imperishable and immortal, if a philosopher on the eve of death, full of confidence and expectation that after his decease he will be far happier than if he had died, having passed through a different life* (i. e. from that of a philosopher), *is to entertain this confidence on wise and prudent grounds*. Socrates adds

ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοῦς ἐτελεύτα, as if summing up anew the former part of the argument, in which he had shown that philosophers, only, were admitted after death to the society of the gods, and consequently to a happier life. Heindorf observes that there is no occasion to supply *δεῖν* to the verbs *ἡγεῖσθαι*, *λογίζεσθαι*, *οἶεσθαι* *δοκεῖν* *ρομίζειν*, when used in the same signification as *ἀξιοῦν*, *aquum*, s. *opus judicare*. Whence it need not be understood either to *ἀξιοῖς* *supr.* For *ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοῦς ἐτ.* Wyttenbach proposes *ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ ἐν ᾧ βιοῦς ἐτ.*

[Τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *But the demonstration that the soul is something potent and divine, and that it was yet in existence before we were born ourselves—you say there is nothing to prevent all this from signifying, not that the soul is immortal (an immortality,) but only that it is of a long duration, and pre-existed for an immeasurable time, and was both conversant with and engaged in the execution of many things*. The difficulty of this passage, which all the editions read as *supr.*, arises from the construction *ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή*, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον, κ. τ. λ. which Heindorf proposes to obviate by reading; *οὐδὲν κωλύει φησὶ πάντα ταῦτα μνῆναι οὐ τὴν ἀθανασίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι πολυχρόνιον τὲ ἐστι*, κ. τ. λ.; the meaning of the passage being certainly this, that all the arguments advanced by Socrates had only gone the length of establishing satisfactorily the soul's pre-existence and durability, but assuredly not its immortality. But, as Stallbaum observes, there is no change requisite in the text to elucidate its sense, for what

ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδές, καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μνηύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τ' ἔστι ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἦδει τε καὶ ἔπραττε πόλλ' ἄττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὡς περ νόσος, καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῶη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο. διαφέρει δὲ δὴ, φῆς, οὐδὲν εἴτε ἄπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδοτι μὴδ' ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὧ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγη ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βούλει, προσθής ἢ ἀφελῆς. Καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἃ λεγώ.

might have been expressed simply thus; πάντα ταῦτα μνηύειν μόνον, ὅτι πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστι, κ. τ. λ. might, when the contrary argument respecting the soul's immortality was mentioned, have been more fully expressed; ἀθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, ὅτι δέ, &c. in which ἀθαν. μὲν μὴ is a kind of equivalent for the omission of μόνον. The reason is obvious also for the use of μὴ instead of οὐ, as Socrates was speaking the opinion of Cebes. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 608. 5. e.—Hence ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδέν τι μ., κ. τ. λ. seq. which are also spoken as the opinion of Cebes, must be referred to, and closely connected in sense with ὅτι πολυχρόνιον. ἔστ.—ἔπρατ. πολλ' ἄττ. preced. Tr. But nothing the more was the soul immortal (i. e. in its pre-existence, before it was united to the body,) but its very entrance into the human body, like a disease, was the very principle and cause of its decay. Wherefore it passed through this life in misery and perished finally in that which is called death. Upon the

legitimate use of the optatives ζῶη and ἀπολλύοιτο without the conjunction which as well as ἄν is sometimes omitted, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 529. 1. 3.

Πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι.] i. e. Πρὶν ἡμᾶς (τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν) εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν.

Οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον.] Sc. Previous to its junction with the body.—ἀθάνατον, h. l. signifies *endued with an immortal nature*.

Διαφέρει δὲ δὴ, φῆς, οὐδέν, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. But you assert that it makes no difference whether the soul is united to a body once, or often times, as far as regards our several apprehensions; for it is right that he should feel afraid, unless he is a fool, who is not fully aware, and cannot advance a satisfactory argument in favour of the immortality of the soul; that is, he must feel afraid, and justly, lest the soul being eventually exhausted, should perish in the same death as the last body which it had ceased to animate.

§. 45. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεψάμενος, Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλη, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἔπειτα, ἂν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὧν λέγεις χρήσει. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαί γε. Ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβης, νέος ὦν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἔδοκε εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαν-

Εἰ τί τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλῃς.] h. e. Καί ναι, εἰ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἢ ἀφέλῃς. Cf. Matthiæ Gr. s. 516. 3.

Προσθεῖναι δέομαι.] i. e. βούλομαι. I desire to add nothing more.

§. 45. Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα.] No trivial matter, — Περὶ γενέσεως, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 380. 4.

Τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη.] h. e. "A ἐγὼ ἔπαθον.—Socrates proceeds to show how he was, himself, affected in the course of this investigation.

Ἐγὼ γάρ ἔφη—νέος ὦν θ.] By some, what is stated by Socrates here is supposed to be applicable to himself, by others, it is understood to refer more distinctly to Plato, upon other grounds besides the doctrine of ideas *infr.* c. 49.—Τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν, of the wisdom which they call a knowledge of nature, i. e. natural philosophy. The starting point of philosophy was the question concerning the origin and the elementary principles of the world; the resolution of which was attempted, after the experimental method, by the Ionic school, and the formal by the Pythagoreans. The Eleatic school opposed to each other the experimental and intellectual systems, which were combined by the Atomistic philosophers. Last of all came a sophistic school, which threatened to destroy all belief, religious and moral. But this

progress of investigation was a sort of prelude to a more scientific philosophy, which by-and-by turned from the external *object* to the internal *subject*; from the world without to the mind within. Tennemann, *Hist. Phil.* 83. 84. The study of human nature, self-knowledge, observes V. Cousin, was, according to Socrates, the true beginning of philosophy; who, while the Pythagoreans, before him, placed all philosophy in theology, and the Ionians in physics, was the first to show that the relation in which man stands to the world and to God, is by virtue of his own nature, and that nature's laws. Wherefore this nature ought to be primarily and preferably examined into and investigated, to the end, that when once the nature of human beings is known, we may understand their true relations to what is not known—to the world and to God. In a word, Socrates added *psychology* to theology and cosmology, or substituted it for them. *Introduction generale à L' Histoire de la Philos.* 3<sup>me</sup>. Leçon. The name *ἱστορία φύσεως* was anciently applied generally to that knowledge of nature and acquaintance with its principles, which resulted, in practice and theory, from observation and reason.

Ἐπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἔδοκε εἶναι.] Sc. αὕτη ἡ σοφία. For this appeared to me to be a consummate wisdom, to be ac-

τὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε, ἄρ' ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὡς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα ξυντρέφεται, καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονούμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀήρ ἢ

quainted with the causes of every thing, &c.—εἶδέναι τὰς αἰτίας being added in explanation of ὑπερήφ. γὰρ μοι preced. Heindorf compares Gorg. p. 462. C. οὐκὼν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις.

[Ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον.] There is no doubt but that this expression frequently has the meaning assigned to it by Heindorf, who understands it of the variableness and continual changing of the different opinions which Socrates had successively embraced. But it should rather be interpreted here of the perplexity in which Socrates was involved, not from the variety of opinions or systems which he had recourse to himself, but from the doubts and difficulties which he met with in the pursuit of his physical researches and the many different opinions which he found severally advocated there. So V. Cousin; “—L' expression Grecque ne marque proprement que l'agitation en sens contraires, et cette signification suffit ici. Si Socrate eût embrassé tout à tour des opinions diverses, la chose étoit assez grave pour la développer davantage, et Platon n'eût pas manqué cette occasion de donner plus de mouvement et d'intérêt à son drame. Mais il n'est question de ces changemens de Socrate, ni dans toute l'antiquité, ni dans ce dialogue. Cela d'ailleurs répugne au caractère de Socrate, qui ne faisoit pas assez vite ses opinions pour être sujet à en changer.” Notes sur le Phedon p. 363.

[Σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ.] Σηπεδών, properly *putrefaction*, is used here to signify the *digestion of food in the stomach*; in which sense *σήπειν*, *σῆψις*, and *ἀσηπτος* are also used; whence Galen, in Hippocrat. Aphorism. vi. 1. Παλαιὰ τις ἦν συνήθεια τούτοις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἀσηπτα καλεῖν ἕπερ ἡμεῖς ἀπεπτα λέγομεν. Hence, too, κατὰ σῆψιν and ἡ πέψις are synonymous, the food being corrupted in the process of digestion. V. Hippocrat. de Diæta, i.

11.—᾽Ως τινες ἔλεγον, the Ionic philosophers, Anaxagoras, who said, according to Laertius ii. 9.—τὰ ζῶα γενέσθαι ἐξ ὑγροῦ τε καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ γεώδους, ὕστερον δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων.; and Archelaus, who maintained that all things were disengaged from the original chaos by the operation of two discordant principles of heat and cold, (or of fire and water); Diog. Laert. ii. 16. ἔλεγε δύο αἰτίας εἶναι γενέσεως, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἀπὸ τῆς ἰλύος γεννηθῆναι.—γεννᾶσθαι δὲ—τὰ ζῶα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ ἰλὸν παραπλήσιαν γάλακτι οἷον τροφήν ἀνείσθη. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιῆσαι.—ξυντρέφεται, i. e. συνίσταται, πήγνυται Suid. *Coagulantur*. HEIND. *Are made of a due and proper consistency*.

[Τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονούμεν.] This was the opinion of Empedocles, who defined the soul as consisting in a combination of the four elements (to account for the knowledge it possesses of external objects, which he conceived to be owing to an analogy subsisting between the subject and the object); and pronounced the seat of the soul to be principally the blood. Tennemann's Hist. Phil. 108.—Ἡ ὁ ἀήρ,—the opinion of Anaximenes, who was led by certain observations on the origin of things, and the nature of the soul, to regard the air (ἀήρ) as the primitive element.—Auct. de Placit. Phil. i. 3. Ἀναξιμένης ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων τὰ πάντα ἀπεφήνατο ἐκ γὰρ τούτων τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι, οἷον ἢ ψυχῇ, φησὶν, ἢ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ οὐσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει. Diogenes, of Apollonia, held this opinion also. Aristot. de Anim. i. 2.—Ἡ τὸ πῦρ,—Fire was the elemental principle, according to Heraclitus, the foundation of all things, and the universal agent. He maintained the excellence of the soul to consist in its *aridity*, or freedom from aqueous particles—*ἀνῆ*

τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστὶν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὄραν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτὰ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. Καὶ αὐ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυῆς εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρήμα. τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἰκανόν· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἂ πρὸ τοῦ ὄμην εἰδέναί, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ὄμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ

ψυχῇ ἀρίστη ἢ σοφωτάτη; according to Stob. Serm. 17. and Ast, on the Phædrus of Plato, c. 111. ed. Lips. 1810. *Ἀγγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη.* On this expression compare Pet. Wesseling, Obs. de Heracl. *αὕη ψυχῆ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*, in ej. Obs. Misc. Amst. v. c. 111. p. 42. Leucippus and Democritus also held the opinion that the soul consisted of globular atoms of fire, which imparted motion to the body.

Ἄλλοις παρὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον.] Cic. Tusc. i. 9.—“*Aliis pars quædam cerebri visa est animi principatum obtinere.*” So Laetius, viii. 30, in explanation of the doctrine of Pythagoros; *εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ καρδίας μέχρι ἐγκεφάλου, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ μέρος αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν θυμόν· φρένας δὲ καὶ νοῦν τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ.* Hippocrat. de Morb. Sacr. c. 17. Κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον δύναμιν πλείστην ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥερος γενομένων ἐρμηνεύς, ἢ ὑγαιῖνων τυγψάνη. Τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν αὐτῷ ὁ ἄηρ παρέχεται. Οἱ δὲ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ τὰ οὐατα καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα καὶ αἱ χεῖρες καὶ οἱ πόδες, οἷα ἂν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος γινώσκῃ, τοιαῦτα ὑπηρετοῦσι. Γίνεται δὲ παντὶ τῷ σώματι τῆς φρονήσεως, ὡς ἂν μετήχη τοῦ ἥερος. Ἐς δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστὶν ὁ διαγέλλων.

Ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο.] The optative is used here, not as if according to Heindorf, it had been preceded by a past tense, thus; ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἔλεγόν τινες, ὅτι ὁ ἐγκέφαλος εἶη—but because Socrates passes from the *oratio recta* to the *oratio obliqua* as if he had used ὅτι ἢ ὡς. Hence, too, the infin. γίγνεσθαι seq. STALL. Ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης. See supr. c. 34. Τὸ ἀδοξαστον.—*Λαβούσης τὸ ἡρεμεῖν*, i. e. *being steadied, settled, or at rest*; for, according to Plato, ἐπιστήμη or science alone, is durable, firm, and unchanging; while δόξα or opinion, is variable, shifting, and insecure. Κατὰ ταῦτα, in the same manner as memory and opinion were said supr. to arise from the sense of hearing, seeing, &c.

Ἄλλοις οὐδὲν χρήμα.] i. e. *I looked upon myself at last as completely* (that nothing could be more so) *unsuited* (from want of natural capacity) *for this investigation.* Ἄλλοις οὐδ. χρήμα., *ut nihil quidquam*, i. e. that I was more unsuited than any one else. HEIND. So in Latin; *nihil videbatur me ineptius esse ad hæc investiganda.*

Ἄλλοις καὶ πρότερον σαφ. ἠπιστ.—οὕτω σφόδρ. ἐτυφ. For the things which I formerly with certainty knew—in these (ταῦτα being supplied to ἐτυφλώθην

δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἕκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστοις προσγένηται τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. οὕτω τότε ᾤμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ᾤμην γὰρ ἔγωγε ἰκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστάς μέγας σμικρῶ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτῶ πλείονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχναίου μείζων εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν; Πόρρω που, ἔφη, νῆ Δί' ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἰεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἔμαντοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὴν ἐνὶ τις

from *α* preced.) *I was so utterly blinded, &c.*

Ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται.] In allusion to the Homœomeria of Anaxagoras, the doctrine that bodies of every kind were generated from homogeneous particles; a bone, for instance, from a great number of bony particles, a piece of gold from golden particles, &c., the character of which particles was assumed by the body itself. Lucret. in Anaxag. doct. i. 835. "Ossa videlicet e paucillis atque minutis Visceribus Viscus gigni; Sanguenque creari, Sanguinis inter se multis cœuntibus guttis."

Μετρίως.] *Justly, with sufficient reason.* i. q. ἰκανῶς. infr.

Αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ.] Wyttenbach proposes αὐτοῦ τῇ κεφ. i. e. taller than him by the head; but all the editions retain αὐτῇ, and the correction does not appear to be required. Vers. Sic. homo magnus parvo major esse ipso capite, et equus equo.

Ἐτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 432. 5.

Διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.] Cf. infr. c. 49. a med. καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχναίου ἡμίσει μείζων εἶναι.

Πόρρω που—ἐμὲ εἶναι.] *I am far from thinking that I am, in any degree, conversant with the cause of these things.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 380. Obs. 4. s. 354. ε.

Ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἔμαντοῦ—] i. e. *I, who cannot convince myself even of this, whether, when to one a person should add one, that one to which it was added has become two, or that one added, and that to which it was added, have become two on account of the addition of the one to the other.* [There are in this hypothesis, according to Wyttenbach, three ways in which e. gr. A and B may be made two: either A becomes two by the addition of B, or B becomes two by being added to A, or A and B become two by a common addition.—Hence he reads the passage; οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὴν ἐνὶ τις προσθῆ ἔν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐν προσετίθῃ δύο γέγονεν· ἢ τὸ προστεθῆν· ἢ τὸ προστεθῆν, καὶ ᾧ προσετίθῃ, διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο.] *For I wonder if*

προσθῆ ἔν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τῷ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ᾧ ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αὐτοῖς αἰτία ἐγένετο δυοῖν γενέσθαι ἢ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. Οὐδέ γε [ὡς] ἔάν τις ἐν διασχίση, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν ἢ σχίσις τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι· τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ξυνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπαγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδέ γε διότι ἐν γίγνεται, ὡς ἐπίσταμαι ἔτι πείθω ἑμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ, διότι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῆ προσίεμαι.

when each of them was separate, each separately was one, and they were not then two. But when they are joined together, this is the cause of their becoming two, namely, the conjunction by which they are approximated to each other. Neither, indeed, if any should divide one (from the other of two) can I yet be persuaded that this, on the other hand, is the cause, namely their division, of their becoming two. For this is quite an opposite cause to the former, of their becoming two; for then it was because they were mutually conjoined, and added, the one to the other; but now it is because the one is divided and separated from the other. Neither, yet, according to this system of investigation, am I persuaded that I know how one becomes two, nor in a word, anything else, how it is produced, or perishes, or exists, but I proceed to compound without due consideration some other system, and by no means approve of this.

[Ἐν ᾧ ἑκάτερον.] Theopomp. Comic. ap. Diog. Laert. iii. 26. ἐν γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἐν, τὰ δὲ δύο μόλις ἐν ἐστίν, ὡς φησὶν Πλάτων.

Αἰτία—δυοῖν γενέσθαι.] See Mat-

thiæ Gr. s. 542. b. β.—Τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι, inasmuch as they are near each other; added in explanation of ἢ ξύνοδος preced. Matthiæ Gr. s. 540. Obs. 2.

Οὐδέ γε [ὡς] ἔάν τις.] Ὡς, as Fischer observes, is incorrectly placed before ἔάν τις, but such negligence, he adds, is not displeasing in the easy style of familiar dialogue. It is omitted in Vat. et Flor. d., and justly. STALL.

[Ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται.] Olympiod. Εἰ τάναντία εἶδη αἰτία τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, πῶς ἢ τε σύνοδος καὶ ἢ σχίσις ἐναντία οὔσαι τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσι.—Ἡ τότε αἰτία,—Vett. edit. Bas. 2. ἢ τότε αἰτία, incorrectly, for τότε must then be referred to ἢ σχίσις, whereas it is plain from τότε μὲν γὰρ infr. that it refers to ἢ ξύνοδος. Tr. For this (sc. ἢ σχίσις) is an opposite cause to the former, &c. Cf. Plat. Gorg. p. 481. C. καὶ πάντα τάναντία πρᾶττομεν, ὡς εἶοικεν, ἢ ἀδεῖ. Upon ἢ after ἐναντία, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 619.

[Τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.] i. e. Physics; περὶ φύσεως ιστοριαν supr.

Αὐτὸς εἰκῆ φύρω.] *Aliam quandam*



§. 46. 'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτία ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχη· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιο τὴν αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου, ὅπη γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐρεῖν, ὅπη βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναί· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος εὐρηκέναι ᾧμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαντῶ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν,

*rationem quasi commisceo temere et comminiscor.* STALL.—a metaphor taken, as Fischer correctly observes, from those who mix up clay or flour with water to make mud or dough. Aristoph. Av. 462. προπεφύραται λόγος εἰς μοι, ὃν διαμάττειν οὐ κωλύει. By τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον, Socrates alludes to the system of Anaxagoras, c. 46. *infr.*, to which he had recourse in the hope of being extricated from the difficulties which physics had left unexplained. He certainly does not intend by it any reference to the subsequent theory of ideas, which he adhered to with a firmness and constancy quite inconsistent with the form of expression as *supr.* αὐτὰς εἰκῆ φύρω.

§. 46. 'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε.] i. e. 'Αλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἀναγιγνώσκοντος τινος ἐκ βιβλίου, ὡς ἔφη, (sc. ὁ ἀναγιγνώσκων) Ἀναξαγ. See *supr.* c. 17. Τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἶη.

Ἄδιακοσμῶν.] Διακοσμεῖν, and κοσμεῖν, which Cicero renders in *ordinem adducere* are peculiar to the system of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cratyl. c. 37. καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων φύσιν οὐ πιστεύεις Ἀναξαγόρα νοῦν τε καὶ ψυχὴν εἶναι τὴν διακομοῦσαν καὶ ἔχουσαν. Plutarch. de Plac. Phil. i. 7. t. ii. p. 881. A. ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας φησὶν ὡς εἰστήκει κατ' ἀρχὰς τὰ σώματα, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε θεοῦ.

Κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαντῶ.] i. e. *An instructor to my mind, one who answered my wishes*; Socrates plays upon the word which sustained a province of such importance in the system of Anaxagoras. Cf. Aristoph. Eqq. 499. 'Αλλ' ἴθι χαίρων καὶ πράξιαις κατὰ νοῦν τὸν ἐμὸν.

Πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγύλη.] On this point Anaximander and Anaximenes, who preceded Anaxagoras in the Ionic school, disagreed;

ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. Καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῆ ποτὲ ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾤμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμηῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὡς περ ἔχει· ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾤμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ἀγαθόν. καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ' ἢ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἴν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

§. 47. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς, ὧ ἑταῖρε, ἐλπίδος ᾤ-

the latter taught that the form of the sun and moon, both fiery bodies, was that of a circular plate, that the stars, also fiery bodies, were fixed in the heavens like nails in a crystalline plane, and that the earth itself was a plane tablet [πλατεῖα or τραπεζοειδῆς] resting upon the air. The former taught that the stars, planets, &c. were globular, and that the earth was a globe, whence *στρογγύλη* supr. or, as some say, cylindrical, to which the same term will apply. By *πλατεῖα*, Heindorf, h. l. understands Plato as alluding to the Ionic, and by *στρογγύλη*, to the Pythagorean school. Voss. ad Virg. Georg. iv. 357. Laert. ii. 1. 2. iii. 4.

Ἔως οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος.] So as no more to require any other species of cause. Vulg. ὡς οὐκέθ' ὑποθησομενος, which appears to have been adopted by Ficinus, but is neither sanctioned by the best editions, nor is it at all consistent

with the obvious and necessary sense of the passage.

Τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα.] i. e. Concerning their mutual velocity, revolutions, and other affections or accidents.

Καὶ ποιεῖν.] Sc. ἢ ποιεῖ.

Ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδόντα, κ. τ. λ.] I thought therefore, that he ascribing a cause to each thing in particular, and all things in common, would enlarge more clearly upon what was best for each, and the general good of all.—Οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, I would not for a great consideration have parted with my hopes; i. e. I had the fullest assurance that I should obtain the knowledge I required.—Πάνυ σπουδῇ, with the greatest earnestness. Upon this Attic formula, especially familiar with Thucydides, see Valcken. ad Phalarid. Epp. p. xvii.—Τὰς βίβλους, i. e. the physics of Anaxagoras.

χόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖον καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὀρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὡς περ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κάπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι ξύγκειται μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστὶ στερῖρά καὶ διαφνὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος, ὃ ξυνέχει αὐτὰ· αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ ξυντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ξυγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας τινὰς τοιαύ-

§. 47. Ἐπὶ δὲ θαυμαστικῆς—ἐλπίδος ὡς φερ.] *I was baffled then in this wonderful hope.* Upon the form *ὡχόμην φερόμενος*, see *Matthiæ Gr.* s. 559. c. *Stephens* explains the passage; *Mirifica illa spe ducebar*, or, *Hanc in spem erectus eram, quum ecce ulterius in illorum lectione progressus*, &c. incorrectly, for *φέρεσθαι* ὑπὸ ἐλπίδος means, *to be led*, or *induced*, by a hope, as ὑπὸ δόξης *φερόμενα* *infr.* But *φέρεσθαι* ἀπὸ ἐλπίδος signifies, *to be baffled*, *disappointed in*, or *be deprived of a hope.* So *Euthyphr.* p. 15. E. *καταβάλλεσθαι ἀπ' ἐλπίδος.* *Ficinus* has adopted the sense of *Stephens* as *supr.*

Τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον.] i. e. *Making no use of* (that divine) *intelligence*, nor *alleging any causes for the arrangement of all things*, otherwise than *assigning the air, atmosphere, and water, as causes*, besides many other things equally *absurd.* Cf. *Aristot. Metaphys.* i. 4. Ἐπειδὴ ἀναξαγόρας μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιῖαν· καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης

ἰστί, τότε ἔλκει αὐτόν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γενομένων ἢ νοῦν. *Simplic.* in *Aristot. Phys.* i. p. 2. A. Ἐπειδὴ ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐπίστησε μὲν ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸν νοῦν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς αἰτιολογίαις ὀλίγα αὐτῷ προσεχρήσατο ὡς ὃ ἐν *Φαίδωνι* Σωκράτης ἐπέσκηψε.

Διαφνὰς.] *And have their diaphyses* (or bodies) *separately, one from the other.* *Cloquet's System of Human Anat.* c. 1. 29. "The long bones (*ossa longa* sive *cylindrica*) occur in the limbs. Those nearest the trunk are longest and less numerous. Their extremities are enlarged, and their middle part, which is named their *body* or *diaphysis*, is contracted, and most commonly triangular and twisted."—*διαφνὴ* signifies also the intervals between the knots on the stalk of a plant.

Οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι.] i. e. *Τοιαῦτα ὡστε ἐπιτείνεσθαι.*

Αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστέων, κ.τ.λ.] *The bones being suspended from, swinging, or playing in their joints.*—*Ξυμβολαῖς*,

τας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιοτέρον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν ἂν κελεύσωσιν, ἐπεὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρά τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιοτέρον ᾧμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἦντιν' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ' αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἴός τ' ἢ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἂ ποιῶ, καὶ ταύτῃ νῶ πράττω, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῇ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ραθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶον

Cic. de Nat. D. ii. 55. "Quid dicam de ossibus? quæ subjecta corpori, mirabiles commissuras habeat, et ad stabilitatem aptas, et ad artus finiendos accommodatas, et ad motum et ad omnem corporis actionem. Huc adde nervos, a quibus artus continentur, eorumque implicationem corpore toto pertinentem."

Φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας.] Another instance of the absurdity of those who stopped at secondary causes, through incompetence or unwillingness to carry their inquiries beyond the unsatisfactory limit of physical science. V. Plutarch. de Placit. Philos. p. 902.

Νῆ τὸν κύνα.] See Apol. Socr. c. 7. init.

Περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν.] As the nearest cities to which Socrates could have fled for the purpose of escape. Cf. in Crit. c. 4. c. 15.

Καὶ ταύτῃ νῶ πράττω.] And so far act under the influence of mind (as far as I have bones and nerves) and not from the choice of what is best; ταύτῃ being equivalent to ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἂ ποιῶ, and so opposed to τῇ τοῦ βελτίσ-

του αἰρέσει. Hence there seems no necessity for the emendation of Heindorf, ταῦτα, which is to be found in some editions, and would appear to have been adopted by Ficinus.

Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι.] That one should not be capable of distinguishing that the real cause is one thing, and that without which the cause would not ever be a cause is another! suppl. εὔηθερς s. φαῦλόν ἐστιν.—the infinitive being often used in exclamations and questions of indignation. Cf. Cic. Fin. 2.10. init. "Hoc vero non videre maximo argumento esse," &c. Matthiæ Gr. s. 544. Seag. Viger, c. 5. s. iii. r. 8. Socrates exclaims against the folly of those who cannot distinguish between the real or primary cause, and the concause, without which the former could not exist. For instance, the real or primary cause of the change of posture in the human frame is the will, and the secondary cause, the muscles, nerves, &c., upon which it is obvious that the former of necessity depends, in order to be effectually fulfilled.

τ' εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ἐκείνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς περ ἐν σκότῳ, ἄλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὡς περ καρδόπῳ πλατεία βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα

Ἔο δὴ μοι φαίνονται.] The accus. ὃ depends both on ψηλαφῶντες and προσαγορεύειν. HEIND. — Ψηλαφῶντες, — Phavor. ψηλαφῶ λέξις αὐτῆ μουσικῆ· ἐπεὶ κυρίως ἐπὶ χορδῶν τὸ ψηλαφᾶν λέγεται παρὰ τὸ ψαλτήριον ἀφᾶν. Hence it signifies, *to seek anything by feeling for it, to search in the dark.* Cf. Acts. xvii. 27. Ζητεῖν τὸν θεόν, εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ εὔροιεν, καὶ τοῖ γε οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ ἐνός ἐκάστου ἡμῶν ὑπάρχοντα: *That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us.* — Aristoph. Pac. 690. Προσοῦ μὲν οὖν Ἐψηλαφῶμεν ἐν σκότῳ τὰ πράγματα· Νυνὶ δ' ἅπαντα πρὸς λύχνον βούλεύσομεν. According to Valckenaer, this verb is composed in a manner rare in Greek, of two verbs, ψάω or ψάλλω and ἀφᾶν.

Ἄλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι.] i. e. *Which the majority feeling for, as it were, in the dark, appear, while they call it by a name quite foreign from the true, to designate as the very cause itself.* Vulg. ἄλλοτρίῳ ὀμματι; incorrectly, which, however, is curiously defended by Reisig, Enarrat. CEdip. Colon. 142. "Alieno oculo, inquit, significantur ea membra, quibus in tenebris rem obscuram tentant. Hæc autem non sunt intellecta ab editoribus Platonis."

Δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ.] *Whence one indeed encompassing the earth with a vortex of the heavens, causes the earth to remain fixed; in the centre of the universe.* Heindorf correctly joins δίνην τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, which he explains *vorticem qui a caelo fit;* and compares with this construction, Politic. p. 291. D. καὶ μετὰ μοναρχίαν εἴποι τις ἂν, οἶμαι, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν δόλιγων δυναστειαν. de Rep. iii. p. 390. C. Ἄρεώς τε καὶ Ἀφροδίτης ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσ-

μός. Cf. for a similar construction in Latin, Terent. Andr. I. i. 129. "Ea primum ab illo (i. e. ejus,) animadvertenda injuria est;" and Westerhov. in loc. Sallust, Jugurth. 31, "Multa me debortantur a vobis." and Cort. in loc. It would appear that Empedocles was especially alluded to in the text as supr. from Aristotle, de Cælo, ii. 13. Οἱ δὲ, ὡς περ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰν κύκλῳ περιέβουσαν καὶ βάπτον φερομένην τὴν τῆς γῆς φορὰν κωλύειν, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κνάθοις ὕδωρ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο, κύκλῳ τοῦ κναθοῦ φερόμενον, πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γιγνόμενον ὕμωσ οὐ φέρεται, κάτω πεφυκὸς φέρεσθαι, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. According to Diog. Laert. ix. 45. this theory was also maintained by Leucippus and Democritus; πάντα τε κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὐσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀναγκὴν λέγει, and by Anaxagoras also, as appears from Aristoph. Nub. 379. Δίνος; τουτί μ' ἐλελήθει, Ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὦν, ἀλλ' ἄντ' αὐτοῦ Δίνος νυνὶ βασιλεύων and Schol. in l. καὶ τοῦτο ἐθρολλεῖτο παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς, τοῦτέστι, δίνησις ἢ αἰερία ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν Ἀναξαγορείων λαμβάνει.

Ὡς περ καρδόπῳ.] Schol. τῇ μάκτρα τοῦ ἀλεύρου. i. e. *But another supports the earth like a broad kneading-rough, upon the air, as a foundation, or base.* Socrates alludes here to the opinions of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritas, whose notions upon the form of the earth are aptly expressed by καρδόπῳ πλατεία; Anaxagoras, from whom it does not appear that the others disagreed, having determined that the earth, εἶναι αὐτὴν κοιλὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ὕδωρ ἐν τοῖς κοιλώμασι. Aristot. de Cælo, ii. 13. Ἀναξίμενης δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος τὸ πλάτος

ὑπερείδει· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κείσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὐδέ τινα οἶονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου ἄν ποτε "Ατλαντα ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα ξυνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τάγαθόν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν οὐδὲν οἶονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητῆς ὄτουοῦν ἥδιστ' ἂν γενοίμην· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἶός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης; Ὑπερφνωῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

§. 48. Ἔδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἢ δ' ὅς, μετὰ ταῦτα,

αἴτιον εἶναι φασὶ τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν. οὐ γὰρ τίμνειν ἀλλ' ἐπιπωματίζειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν κάτωθεν ὡσπερ φαίνεται τὰ πλάτος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων ποιεῖν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνέμους ἔχει δυσκινήτως διὰ τὴν ἀντέρευσιν. ταυτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν τῷ πλάτει φασὶ τὴν γῆν πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον ἀέρα τὸν ὄ' οὐκ ἔχοντα μεταστήναι τόπον ἰκανόν, ἀθρόον τῷ κάτωθεν ἡρεμεῖν, &c.

Τὴν τε τοῦ ὡς οἶόν τε.] h. e. Τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ οὕτω νῦν αὐτὰ κείσθαι, ὡς οἶόν τε βέλτιστα τεθῆναι. It is manifest that the philosophers who advocated the theories as supr., never thought of ascribing to a supreme disposing cause, a more than human power, the arrangement of the system, which in their efforts to explain upon the strength of physical science alone, they had involved in the most puerile absurdities and perplexing doubts.

Ἄλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου.] *But they think that they would find a more powerful, a more enduring, and a more comprehensive Atlas than this; i. e. they imagine that they can discover a sustaining cause, ("Ατλαντα,) better established and more lasting, one that more efficiently combines everything within itself than this cause, (τούτου supr.,) according to which the system of the*

universe has been most wisely modelled, in which it has been most consistently and effectively preserved, and in which, from ignorance or arrogance, they decline to acquiesce.—Καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τάγαθόν, κ. τ. λ. i. e. *And what is excellent (in design) and suitable (in its result) they believe to be incapable of uniting and combining anything.*—δέον may be also understood as the part. pres. of δέω, δεῖν, *ligare, to bind*, in which sense it is used of the Stoics, *περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, apud Diog. Laert. vii. 98. 99. πᾶν δὲ ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον εἶναι, καὶ δέον, καὶ λυσιτελές, καὶ χρήσιμον, καὶ εὐχρηστον, καὶ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ αἰρετόν, καὶ δίκαιον· συμφέρον μὲν ὅτι φέρει τοιαῦτα, ὧν συμβαινόντων ὠφελούμεθα· δέον δὲ, ὅτι συνέχει ἐν οἷς χροί· κ. τ. λ.

Τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν.] Schol. *Παροιμία, Δεύτερος πλοῦς, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων, καθόσον οἱ διαμαρτόντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον.* The expression is proverbial, and asserted generally of those who, having failed in the first, make trial of a second attempt. Eustath. in *Odyss. B. p. 106. Bas. δεύτερος πλοῦς λέγεται ὅτε ἀποτυχόν τις οὐρίου κώπαις πλέη κατὰ Πανσανίαν.*

Ἦι πεπραγμάτευμαι.] *Vulg. ἦν*

ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθῆναι μὴ πάθοιμι ὃ περ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι· διαφθείρονται γάρ που ἔνιοι τὰ ὄμματα, εἰ μὴ ἐν ὕδατι ἢ τινι τοιοῦτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενόηθην, καὶ ἔδεια μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ἢ εἰκάσω, τροπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὄρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἐρρώμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ ξυμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.

πεπραγμ. Upon which see Matthiæ Gr. s. 421. Obs. 4. But the reading as supr. is preferable, besides being sanctioned by the best editions, as obviating the necessity of any circumlocution which ἦν would infer; δεύτερον πλοῦν being governed, as above, of πεπραγμ. whence the passage may be explained; *would you, Cebes, that I should show you in what manner (ἦ) I set about a second voyage for the discovery of this cause.*

§. 48. Τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν.] h. e. *Rerum vim et naturam.* STALL.

ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ἢ εἰκάσω—] i. e. *Perhaps, however, this similitude does not hold good so far as I judge from the comparison.—Οὐκ ἔοικεν, non videtur verum; impersonal as Protagor. p. 312. A.—*STALL. Some understand τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα.

Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ.] i. e. *For I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons (or as Gottleber explains ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, in their natural principles,) is contemplating them more by means of images (i. e. indirectly) than he who contemplates them in their operations or effects, sc. by the*

aid, and with the co-operation of the senses. Socrates had already expressed himself to the effect that had he, with the aid of the senses alone, endeavoured to arrive at the true cause and nature of things, he feared he should resemble those who injured their sight by attempting to look at the sun itself in an eclipse, rather than its image or reflection in water, or through some other medium, by which the brightness of the luminary might be tempered and accommodated to the human eye. He therefore thought that in like manner he should contemplate and consider the truth of things in their reasons, as media or images; but still this similitude did not hold good throughout, for these reasons were not properly images of the truth, they were the truth itself, and consequently they were realities, and were contemplated and considered as such, equally as the operations and effects were looked upon as realities by those who judged them to be so by the help of the senses. Hence, says Socrates, he who considers things in their reasons cannot be said to contemplate

Βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἢ λέγω· οἶμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

§. 49. Ἄλλ', ἣ δ' ὅς, ὧδε λέγω, οὐδὲν καινὸν ἀλλ' ἃ περ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἃ εἴ μοι δίδως τε καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τήν τε αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἐνευρήσειν ὡς ἀθανατον ἢ ψυχῇ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς δίδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις. ἔάν σοι ξυνδοκῇ ὡς περ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. τῇ τοιαύδε αἰτία ξυγχωρεῖς;

them in images any more than he who considers them in their visible effects, for, in both cases, there is reality presenting itself, in the latter case, however, to the eye of the body, in the former, to that of the mind.

§. 49. Ἄεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε, κ. τ. λ.] *On every other occasion as well as in the preceding discussion.*

Ἐρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν.] i. q. Ἐπιχειρήσων; the present participle being equally admissible, as the verb ἐπιχειρεῖν has of itself a future sense. Otherwise the future is constantly used in this form, v. c. ἐρχομαι λέξων. Cf. Portus, in Lex. Ionic. voc. Ἐρχομαι.—Heindorf gives as an equivalent to the phrase as supr. ἐρχομαι ἐπιδειξόμενος.

Πολυθρύλητα.] i. e. Διαβεβημένα. Hesych. interpr.

Τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ.] Cf. supr. c. 19. 20. 22. infr. c. 50. Upon the εἶδη to which Socrates here alludes, see in Tim. p. 28. Steph. and Parmenid. p.

141. sqq. Bas. 2. He now proceeds to show that the immaterial and eternal qualities have a necessary relation to the immortality of the soul, such as a cause has to its effect.

Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων.] *Come to your conclusion then at once; περαίνειν, in dialectics, having the sense of concluding or deducing from admitted premises. Upon the optative used imperatively see Matthiæ Gr. s. 514. c. 515. γ.—Τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνοις, i. e. what follows the preceding, as in Cratyl. p. 399. A. p. 420. D. Legg. vii. p. 796. E.*

Οὐδὲ δι' ἐν ἄλλο.] *On account of no one thing else; i. e. that which is beautiful is only so by its partaking of the αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν.—Ἡ διότι μετέχει, —Plato makes frequent mention throughout his writings of this μετοχή or μέθεξις, the true nature of which will be easily understood from the following passage in Parmenid. c. 13. sub. fin. ἀλλὰ—μάλιστα ἐμοιγε (says Socrates) καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν. τὰ μὲν εἶδη ταῦτα*



Ἐνύχωρῶ, ἔφαθ'· Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γινώσκειν· ἀλλ' ἐάν τις μοι λέγῃ διότι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὅτιοῦν, ἢ ὅτι χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον ἢ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐῶ, ταραττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς, καὶ ἀτέχνως, καὶ ἴσως εὐήθως ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῶ, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δυσχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέςτατον εἶναι καὶ ἑμαυτῶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ

ὡς περ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦτοις εὐκείναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἐκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. Cf. sup. c. 20. a med. Οἱς ἐσφραγίζομεθα, κ. τ. λ. and see infr. μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου.

[Τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας.] *These subtle causes.*

[Ἡ ὅτι χρῶμα εὐανθὲς ἔχον.] *Intell. ἐστίν;* this form ἔχον ἐστὶ for ἔχει, being not unusual. Cf. Sophist. c. 32. εἰ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ ἄρα τινὰ ἔχον διαίρειν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας.—Aristoph. Ran. 1160. Οὐ δῆτα τοῦτό γ', ὧ κατεστρωμλμένε· Ἀνθρωπε, ταῦτ' ἐστ', ἀλλ' ἄριστ', ἐπῶν ἔχον; and Brunck, in loc.

[Ταραττομαι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι.] h. e. For I am troubled and perplexed at all the other arguments which any might adduce, so much so as to be incapable of discerning the truth. Ἀτέχνως, *artlessly*; so Wytttenbach and Heindorf in preference to ἀτεχνῶς. Harpocrat. Ἀτέχνως, περισπωμένος μὲν ἀντι τοῦ σαφῶς ἢ βεβαίως ἢ ἀσφαλῶς ἢ φανερώς παροξυτόνως δὲ ἀντι τοῦ ἀμελῶς καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης.—Εὐήθως, Hesyeh. interpr. ἀνοήτως.

[Εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία.] *Either the presence or participation.* For Plato was yet in doubt in what manner the εἶδη, or eternal and immutable forms, were joined to and connected with things themselves; he had not certainly, as

yet, as appears from Parmenid. p. 130. E.—132., discovered a word by which he might designate their communion; hence εἴτε παρ. εἴτε κοιν. sup.—Εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη, or by whatever means and in whatever manner it is communicated, sc. as a presence or participation. Heindorf objects strongly to προσγενομένη being referred to παρουσία or κοινωνία, and throws out as a first-sight conjecture, that some word may have been lost after προσγενομένη, upon which also may have depended the gen. ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ sup. Ald. παρουσία—κοινωνία—προσγενομένη, which does not lessen the difficulty unless it might be further amended thus: ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἐκείνο τὸ καλὸν εἴτε παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένον. Wytttenbach, followed by Stallbaum, would read προσαγορευομένη, of which he supports the admission and propriety by many quotations, and so explains the passage;  *nihil aliud reddere illud pulchrum, nisi ipsius pulchritudinis sive presentia sive communio sive quocumque alio nomine appellatur.* But nearly all the editions agree in προσγενομένη, which Ficinus refers to παρουσία and κοινωνία sup.

[Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο δυσχυρίζομαι.] Socrates says that he does not yet insist upon establishing the manner or degree in which things are connected with their intelligible forms. Aristot. Met. i. 6. p. 272. τὴν μέντοι γε μέθεξιν,—ἦτις ἀν

τούτου ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὄψοῦν ἄλλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίνεταί καλά. ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μείζω μείζω, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναί. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρ' ἂν ἀποδέχοιο, εἴ τίς τινα φαίη ἕτερον ἐτέρου τῆ κεφαλῇ μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο ἂν ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν μείζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἐτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλω μείζον ἐστίν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλω ἐλάττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτό ἐλάττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος, οἶμαι, μή τις σοὶ ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, εἰς τῆ κεφαλῇ μείζονά τινα φῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον μείζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλάττον ἐλάττον, ἔπειτα τῆ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ οὔσῃ τὸν μείζω μείζω εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τινὶ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ

εἶναι, τῶν εἰδῶν, ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν. It may be deduced, as Stallbaum observes, from hence, that Plato had not as yet brought his Parmenides to light, in which this subject is argued at large.

Καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος—οὐκ ἂν ποτε πεσεῖν.] *And holding firmly by this, I think that I shall never fall.*

Μεγέθει ἄρα τὰ μεγάλα.] Cf. in Parmenid. c. 10. a med. δοκεῖ σοι—εἶναι εἶδη ἅπτα ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίνεσθαι.

Οὐδὲ σὺ ἄρα ἂν ἀποδέχοιο.] *Neither indeed would you approve, or admit of it.*—Τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζω, a head taller; the dative expressing usually the relation of the measure, degree, &c. with the comparative. Matthiæ Gr. s. 400. 8.

Ἄλλὰ διαμαρτύροιο.] Socrates objects to the generally received expression as supr. taller or greater by the head, upon the grounds of its reducing

to matter and figure that essence, by the presence or participation of which, that to which the quality was attributed might really be considered what it was. For instance, to say of one man that he was greater than one, and smaller than another, by the head, would seem as well to imply that the head was the cause at the same time of a thing being greater and smaller, as also that by reason of the head, which is but a small part of the body, that which is greater becomes what it is. But one should rather assert that everything which was greater than another was so by means and on account of nothing else than magnitude itself, and likewise that which was smaller was so by means and on account of parvitute itself. So with two numbers ten and eight, and the cubit and two cubits infr.

Μή τις σοὶ ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ.] *Lest any arguments of a contrary tendency should oppose you, i. e. should be objected by any against you.*

Τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι.] *Τέρας, in*

ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα ; Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτῶ δυεῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος ; καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχναίου ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ μεγέθει ; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ που φόβος. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Τί δαί ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν προσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶντις ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου, οὗ ἂν μετάσχη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλη ἐν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέ-

dialectics, is equivalent to τὸ παράδοξον, ἀτοπον, ἀδύνατον. Cf. in Menon. p. 21. B. καὶ τοὶ τέρας λέγεις. Parmenid. p. 55. E. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια τις ἀπέφαινε ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα, ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια, τέρας ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν.

Τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δ. γ.] See supr. c. 45. sqq.

Καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶντις.] So of the authoritative tone of the philosophers, Plutarch de Stoicis, t. ii. p. 1058. D. ὃ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Στοῆς βοῶν μέγα καὶ κεκραγῶς, ἐγὼ μόνος εἰμι βασιλεὺς—1169. D. μέγα βοῶντες, ὡς ἐν ἔστιν ἀγαθόν.

Μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου.] h. e. Τῆς ἰδέας ἐκάστου; referring to the μέθεξις or communion, by which individuals are made to participate in the one, indivisible and immutable εἶδος. That such should be its characteristics, however numerous the individuals with which it is communicated, and that it is not separated from itself while it is observable in each individual of its peculiar class, at the same time that it is known to exist prior to and independently of any, appears obvious from a happy illustration with which Socrates is made to answer the doubts of Parmenides on

the point; Parmenid. c. 10. ; Πότερον οὖν (says Parmenides) δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν, ἐν ὄν; ἢ πῶς; Τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἐν εἶναι; Ἐν ἄρα ὄν καὶ ταῦτόν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη. Οὐκ ἂν, εἰ γε, φάναι, οἶον ἢ ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ οὐσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτῇ αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν,—εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταῦτόν εἴη.—No truly, Socrates replies, the εἶδος is not capable of division or change; for, since a day being one and the same, is in many places at the same time, and is not on this account the more divided and distinct from itself, so every εἶδος exists in individuals, one and the same whole. Everything, therefore, that is beautiful, excellent, and just, is stamped with and known by its peculiar character; and that character is the idea or intelligible form of beauty, goodness, and justice, identical, impartible, and eternal. Upon the construction as supr. see Matthiæ Gr. s. 565. 2.

Τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν.] i. e. Numeri binarii per se spectati μετάσχεσιν. STALL.—the participation in the

σεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφῆς ἂν χαίρειν παρὲς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις· σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν; εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα σκέψαιο, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοισι ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ; ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἢ τις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἰκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύριοι ὡς περ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς δια-

elementary principle of equals (ἀρτίου), duality, whence things are made and said to be *two*, as *infr.*, καὶ μονάδος, &c. the participation in the elementary principle of unequals (περιττοί), unity, by which anything is made and said to be *one*.

Τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας] i. e. Ποικίλας λαλιὰς καὶ πανουργίας. — Hesych. *interpr.*

Δεδιὼς ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκιάν.] *In dread, as the proverb says, of your own shadow.* Schol. in *loc. p.* 12. Τὴν αὐτοῦ σκιάν δέδοικεν Ἐπὶ τῶν σφόδρα δειλοτάτων μέμνηται ταύτης Ἀριστοφάνης Βαβυλωνίως. Upon τὸ λεγόμενον, see *Matthiæ Gr. s.* 571.

Ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς.] i. e. *Clinging firmly to that security which the principle affords.* But it is to be observed that the expression *ἔχουσι* is capable of two distinct acceptations, the one, as *supr.*, to *cling to*, or *depend upon*, and the other, to *assail* or *bear down upon any one or thing*; whence *infr.*; εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, *if any one should attack this self-same principle, &c.* It is not often, however, that a verb is to be met with in two different senses in the same period.—Ἐπιθέσεως, the ὑπόθεσις was this, εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἄλλα πάντα *supr.*, of which the τὸ ἀσφαλές, *security or certainty* was, ὅτι τῆς καλῆς αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίνονται καλὰ

καὶ μεγέθει τὰ μεγάλα μεγάλα, &c. *supr.* Upon the construction ἐφῆς ἂν . . . ἕως ἂν τὰ—σκέψαιο, see *Matthiæ Gr. s.* 522. s.

Ἐπιθέθεντα σκέψαιο.] This whole passage, it is to be remarked, is in accordance with the usual system of dialectics. He who opposes the original thesis or principle (αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο,) can do so in two ways. First, he may show that its deductions involve a contradiction, i. e. ὅτι τὰ ὀρμηθέντα ἀπ' ἐκείνης διαφωνεῖ: in which case χαίρειν ἐφῆς ἂν, you would take leave of him, as it were, and make him no answer until you had considered whether the consequences attributed to your principle mutually coincided or disagreed: secondly, he might contend for the truth of a principle opposite to your own, upon which αὐτῆς ἐκείνης δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, i. e. it would be necessary to advance the reasons upon which your principle was founded, which you should do by so enlarging upon it, and sustaining it by one principle after another, whichever appears to be the best of the more universal, τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη, until you shall have arrived at a result which may justify the original proposition. Thus in pursuing this method you will avoid the errors of those contentious disputants, who, by confounding the principle and its consequences, are unable to arrive at the distinct knowledge of the truth. V. *Wytt. in Præcept. Log. iii. 10. 1.* By ἄνωθεν

λεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὠρμημένων, εἴ περ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν; ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἰς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· σὺ δ' εἴ περ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι, ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὃ τε Σιμμίας ἅμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

ΕΧ. Νῆ Δία, ὦ Φαίδων, εικότως γε· θαυμαστῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι εἰπεῖν ἐκείνος ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔδοξεν.

ΕΧ. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀποῦσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούουσιν.

§. 50. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἦν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα ξυνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὠμολογεῖτο εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν

supr. is to be understood *the more abstract or universal principle*; Cf. Aristot. Topic. i. 20. λέγω δὲ ἄνω μὲν, τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον (κατηγορίαν)· κάτω δὲ, τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος.—i. e. *but I call the category which is higher up, that which rises to the more universal, and that which is lower down, that which descends to the more particular.* Plutarch. Defect. Orac. p. 248. Ε. τῶν ἀνωτάτω ἀρχῶν, λέγω δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστον δυάδος.—Ἐἴ σοι—ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ,—an, *te judge, invicem consentiant an dissentiant.* WYTT. Cf. Theætet. p. 119. Ε. πότερον ἡμῖν (in our judgment) αὐτὰ ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ.

§. 50. Εἶναι τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.] i. e. *That every idea (or intelligible form,) was something, self-existent, and that other things, τᾶλλα, (i. e. distinct from these ideas, submitted to the senses), participated in the former so as to receive their name; as, for instance, true includes the idea of truth, good of goodness, beautiful of beauty, greatness of great, from which they are severally so*

called. Cf. Parmenid. p. 140. C. δοκεῖ σοι εἶδη εἶναι ἅπτα, ὧν τάδε τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν. οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια, &c.—Parmenid. c. 13. τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα ὡς περ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει· τὰ τε ἄλλα τούτοις εὐκίεσαι, καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα.—where as supr. τὰ ἄλλα, elsewhere called also τὰ ἕτερα is to be understood of the things submitted to the senses. Cf. supr. c. 10. a med. τι εἶναι δίκαιον sqq. c. 20. init. οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τούτο, ὃ ἐστι. It is to be observed that εἶδος and ἰδέα are used indifferently in this dialogue, as in the Parmenides which contains the whole substance of the system. Parmenid. p. 56. F. Οἶμαι σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πολλ' ἅπτα μεγάλα δοξῆ σοι εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα αὕτη εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγῆ εἶναι· p. 57. D. F. Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκειται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν.—Ἀγνώστον ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ

καὶ τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἠρώτα, Εἰ δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτω λέγεις, ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φῆς μείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότε εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα; Ἐγωγε. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν; οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων· οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδέ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπω-

καλὸν ὃ ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· καὶ πάντα ἢ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὐσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν. Η. τοιαῦτα—καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτους πάντων πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐτὰ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων. p. 58. A.—εἰ δὴ γε τις. ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὴ μὴ ἐλάσῃ εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ δὴ νῦν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδὲ ὀρειεῖται εἶδος ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν αἰεὶ εἶναι. Aristot. Metaph. xii. 4. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν πρῶτον αὐτὴν τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν δόξαν ἐπισκεπτέον—ὡς ὑπέλαβον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας φήσαντες εἶναι συνέβη δὲ ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα τοῖς ἐποῦσιν διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρακλειτέοις λόγοις, ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ῥεόντων. Plotin. Enn. i. vi. 8. p. 58. A. ἦξει γάρ πρῶτον ἀναβαίνων ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν· κἀκεῖ πάντα εἰσεται κατὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ φήσει τὸ κάλλος τοῦτο εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας. Enn. iii. ix. 1. p. 356. A. Νοῦς φησὶν ὁρᾶ ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ ὃ ἐστι ζῶον—οὐκοῦν φησὶν ἡδὲ εἶναι τὰ εἶδη πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ. They are sometimes, however, mentioned as distinct, and ἰδέαι is understood as the immaterial essence or

exemplar, εἶδος the form of the external object which is modelled after the preceding. Cf. Senec. Epist. 58. p. 150. Olympiod. in Phaed. Cod. iii. p. 35. ὅτι ἐστὶ τὰ εἶδη· οὔτε φημι αἱ ἰδέαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶδη—where ἰδέαι has the same sense as supr., and εἶδη is applied to mental perceptions.

[Ἰσχειν.] Mæris: Ἰσχειν, Ἀττικῶς ἔχειν, Ἑλληνικῶς.

[Οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν.] i. e. That Simmias did not in reality exceed Socrates, as he was said to do, for Simmias was not so adapted by nature as because of his being Simmias to exceed Socrates, but by reason of the magnitude which he had as compared with the parvitude of Socrates. The object of this is to show, that it is only relatively speaking that the same thing can be said to be small and great. Simmias was small, compared to Phædo, but his parvitude could not admit its contrary, the magnitude of the latter; neither could his magnitude admit of the relative parvitude of Socrates; therefore, in reality, the contraries, magnitude and parvitude, did not and could not meet together in Simmias.—The application of this will appear subsequently.

[Πρὸς.] In comparison with.

νυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὦν ἀμφοτέρων, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπερέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχων. Καὶ ἅμα μειδιάσας, Ἔοικα, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγγραφικῶς ἐρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γέ που ὡς λέγω. Ξυνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅ περ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον

'Ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει.] i. e. Ὀνομάζεται εἶναι. Cf. Herodot. ii. 44. ἰδὼν Ἑρακλέος, ἔπωνυμίαν ἔχοντος Θεσίου εἶναι.

Τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν.] i. e. *Surpassing the parvitude of the one by his magnitude, but yielding to the other a magnitude which surpasses his own parvitude*; V. Cousin arranges and explains the passage correctly; Ὑπερέχων τοῦ μὲν (κατὰ) τὴν σμικρότητα τῷ ὑπερέχειν μεγέθει, *surpassant l'un dans sa petitesse, par la superiorité de sa grandeur, καὶ παρέχων τῷ δὲ, et laissant à l'autre, reconnaissant en lui, lui accordant parce qu'il ne peut pas ne pas lui accorder τὸ μέγεθος ὑπερέχων τῆς σμικρότητος, une grandeur qui dépasse sa petitesse.* Heindorf and Wyttenbach propose emendations of this passage as corrupt, which, however, from the interpretation as *supr.* appear unnecessary; the one would read τοῦ μὲν τὴν σμικρότητα τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχων, τοῦ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπεροχὴν, *alterius parvitatem magnitudine (sua) superans, alterius vero magnitudinī parvitatem (suam) superandam præbens*: the other remodels the whole; τῷ μὲν, τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν, τὴν σμικρότητα παρέχων. τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος, τῆς σμικρότητος ὑπερέχων' i. e. *illi quidem, quod magnitudine eum superat, parvitatem præbens huic autem magnitudinem, quæ parvitatem superat.*

Ξυγγραφικῶς.] i. e. *To speak with the accuracy of a written contract*; owing to the minute attention with which he discussed the subject in its several details. Fischer interprets the term *historicum more*, and Wyttenbach, *scriptorum ratione*, both incorrectly.

Λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἔνεκα, βουλόμενος.] i. e. Ὅτι βουλομαι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 505. 2.

'Ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον, κ.τ.λ.] *For it appears to me not only that magnitude itself (the abstract idea) is never disposed to be at the same time great and small, but that the magnitude also in ourselves (the concrete, in a sensible object) never admits the small nor is disposed to be surpassed, but one of the two cases occurs, either that it retires and withdraws upon the approach of its contrary, the small, or ceases to exist when it has actually come, but it is not disposed, abiding and admitting parvitude, to be anything else than what it was before*; Socrates means now to say that in reality neither absolute nor relative magnitude and parvitude could exist together at the same time, for magnitude either withdrew as parvitude advanced, or completely disappeared when it had arrived, but it never was disposed by awaiting and admitting parvitude to become different from what it was before, which in such a case it should be, as it might then be as well affirmed to be parvitude as magnitude, which never could occur, for the one being great, never endured (τετόλμηκε) to be the other, small.—Ὡς περ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος, κ. τ. λ.—Magnitude, Socrates had observed, is not disposed by the admission of an opposite quality to be different from what it was, but was actually and in truth determined to remain the same, in like manner as Socrates who had received and sustained parvitude, and still continuing the same, was the same small individual, and had not admitted magnitude with which its contrary could not evidently coexist. This passage, ὡς περ ἐγὼ—ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἶμι. is introduced parenthetically as an illustration of the truth and justice of what precedes. Stallbaum explains ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμ. κ. τ. λ.; *Quum autem τὸ μέγεθος τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν sustinuit et in se recepit parvita-*

αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε ἑθέλειν ἅμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεται τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ' ἑθέλειν ὑπερέχεται, ἀλλὰ δεῦν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομένον δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἑθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ ὁ περ ἦν, ὡς περ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὦν ὅς περ εἰμί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἰμί ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκε μέγα ὂν σμικρὸν εἶναι. ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἑθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ἔτι ὂν ὁ περ ἦν ἅμα τούναντίον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνονται μοι.

§. 51. Καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὅς τις δ' ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὠμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μείζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλάττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἢ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κε-

*tem, videtur tamen non aliud esse velle, quam quod erat antea*; which as well as the accompanying note is neither correct nor intelligible. Wytttenbach's interpretation is equally infelicitous; *alterum de duobus accidit: aut fugit et decedit veniente contrario, scilicet parvitate: aut quum venerit contrarium, perit expectans et suscipiens parvitatem, nec tamen aliud vult esse quam quod fuerat*. The conclusion to which Socrates intended to come was simply this; one might be said, when spoken of relatively, to possess at the same time the opposite qualities, i. e. the contraries, magnitude and parvitude, but they could not

in reality coexist or be reciprocated in the concrete, any more than their ideas themselves could coexist, or be reciprocated in the abstract, so as to be indifferently affirmed of each other, that magnitude was parvitude or *vice versa*. The application of this argument, which is continued through the four preceding chapters, will be found at the close of c. 54. and in c. 55.

Οὐκ ἑθέλει ποτὲ μέγα—] *Is neither disposed to become, nor to be great.*

§. 51. Ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις.] Cf. *supr.* c. 15. sqq.

Παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν.] *Having moved his head forward; to hear more*



φαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὧ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ' ἐκείνα οὐκ ἂν ποτέ φάμεν ἐθειλῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. Καὶ ἅμα βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, Ἔρα μή που, ἔφη, ὧ Κέβητος, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν; Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβητος, οὕτως ἔχω· καί τοι οὐ τι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει. Ξυνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

distinctly, as the objection was probably made in a low voice and hesitatingly, as in the case of Simmias and Cebes *supr.* c. 35.—Οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς, *you do not, however, observe the distinction between what is advanced now and at that time, &c.*

[Ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος.] Socrates, *supr.* c. 15., spoke of things which are capable of producing, receiving, and reciprocating their contraries, as for instance, in the case of anything becoming greater, it must have been formerly less, and *vice versa*. Or when anything was stronger or swifter, it must have been generated from weaker and slower, &c. But Socrates is now speaking, not of the πράγματα ἐναντία, which are so produced, but the αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, the contrary itself, the contrary as an essence or intelligible form, which cannot become its own contrary, (e. gr. the ideas of the just, beautiful, and good, which, with their opposites, being severally immutable and eternal cannot be changed so as to reciprocate with each other, nor are they so de-

pendent on each other as to be mutually produced,) neither in the concrete, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, nor in the abstract, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. Socrates was then speaking of those things which contain the contraries, (τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία), and which are called by the name of their several inherent contrary essences; but now he is speaking of those essences, by reason of the presence of which, (i. e. which being inherent or contained, ὧν ἐνότων,) those things which were so called received their name; and these he asserts to be such as are incapable of being mutually produced.—Οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. It is to be observed that Plato did not consider these ideas as mere notions of things impressed upon the human mind; he held them, on the contrary, to be self-existent and perfectly distinct from those things which bore their name.

Οὐδ' αὖ—οὕτως ἔχω.] i. e. Οὐδ' αὖ τεταραγμένος εἰμί, in which allusion is made to c. 22. *supr.* sub. fin. καὶ τοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. Heindorf pro-

§. 52. Ἔτι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα ξυνομολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἐγωγε. Ἄρ' ὁ περ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλ' ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὔσαν, δεξαμενηνὴν τὸ θερμόν, ὡς περ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσσεσθαι ὁ περ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολείσθαι. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὐτὸ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξίεναι ἢ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὁ περ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἔστιν ἄρ', ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἓνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ

poses οὐκ αὐ.—Καὶ τοι οὐ τι λέγω,—*although I by no means deny that there are many things which perplex me.* Ficinus appears to have read καὶ τοιοῦτο τι λέγω, ὡς οὐ πολλά με τασάττει.

§. 52. Ἔτι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε.] Socrates proceeds to show that not only the actual contraries themselves, ἀντὰ τὰ ἐναντία, could not be reciprocated but that even those things, which though not of themselves, nor strictly contraries, yet inferred some contrariety, did not admit of a form contrary to what they had, but rather on the approach of such, retired and disappeared. Thus the number three, which does not seem to have any contrary, or anything opposed to itself, yet because it always contains the idea of inequality, i. e. is always odd, it never admits of equality, i. e. never can become even. And so with fire and heat; for though the fire itself is one thing, and heat, the contrary of cold, another, yet both are so closely connected that fire cannot receive cold so as to coexist with it, but must disappear on the approach of the latter. In like manner snow, which is always connected with cold, disappears on the approach of heat, with which it obviously cannot mix. This argument with its conclusions, as applied to the soul, is made available thus: the soul, into whatever body it

enters, brings with it the principle of life; but since death is contrary to life, it follows that the soul cannot receive and admit a form contrary to that with which it is of necessity joined, (as the idea of inequality is inseparably connected with the odd number three,) and which is called life. But whatever does not admit of death, is immortal, whence it follows that the soul is imperishable and immortal.

Ἄλλ' ἕτερον τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν.] The latter being the result or consequence of the former; fire being the essential principle of heat, as snow of cold.

Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι—] i. e. *But this I think is evident to you, that snow, while it is snow, can never, having admitted heat, as we said before, (supra c. 50. a med.) continue to be what it was, snow, and (at the same time) hot, but on the approach of heat it will either give way to it or utterly disappear.*

Ἐπεξίεναι.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 404. 1. 3. Εἶμι and its components have always a future signification in the Attic writers. Dawes, M. Crit. 82.

Ἔστιν ἄρ'—ὥστε.] *It happens, therefore, that, &c.—Αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος.*—Here Plato appears to make the inequality, τὸ περιττόν, the genus or εἶδος, and the number three, which contains the

τὸ εἶδος ἀξιούσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰὶ ὅταν περ ἦ. ἔτι δ' ἐν τοῖσδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν αἰὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν, ὃ περ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Ἔρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὃ περ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν αἰὶ, διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος· ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὀνόματι αἰὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὃ περ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ ὦν ὃ περ τὸ περιττὸν αἰὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός. καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ

inequality, the species or *μορφή*; from which it varies infr. c. 53., calling three, *ἰδέα*, and the inequality, *μορφήν*.

[*Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος.*] i. e. That not only the genus itself at all times, but that something else which is not the genus, but retains its form (is its species) as long as it lasts, is always designated by the same name. For example, inequality must always be so called, but the numbers three, five, &c. which are not the same with inequality, yet, (besides their own proper and peculiar names,) as participating in and admitting inequality, are called also by the same name, unequal. That is, not only the τὸ περιττόν has the name τοῦ περιττοῦ, but the τριάς, πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας.

[*Μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο.*] Along with its own name (as τριάς, πεμπτάς, &c.) to designate it by this, sc. τὸ περιττόν: because its nature is such as that it cannot become distinct from or independent of the idea of inequality.

[*Οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος.*] Οὐχ οὐ περ τ. τ. Bekk. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 473. b. Fischer considers ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ as equivalent to ἐτέρου, as supr. ἐτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν, καὶ ἐτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν: and τὸ περιττόν, he observes, to be applied to inequality, or odd numbers, because they appear to have something superfluous, over and above what is necessary. Theo. Smyr-næus M. II. c. 5. Καὶ ἄρτιοι μὲν εἰσιν οἱ ἐπιδεχόμενοι τὴν εἰς ἴσα διαίρεσιν, ὡς ἡ δυνάς, ἡ τετράς· περισσοὶ δὲ οἱ εἰς ἀνισα διαιρούμενοι, οἶον ὁ ε, ὁ ζ.

[*Ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας.*] The entire half of number: number being divided, as it were, into two equal parts, the one consisting of odd, and the other of even numbers, consequently the former formed one-half. Upon the adj. ἡμισυς with a substantive in the gen. see Matthiæ Gr. s. 442. 2.

[*Στίχος.*] Series; the odd numbers being placed in one line, and the even in a parallel one. Cf. Plutarch, de Anim. Creat. in Tim. p. 1022. D. ὁ γὰρ θεός-

ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὢν ὁ περ τὸ ἄρτιον, ὅμως ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν αἰεί. Ξυγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστι δὲ τὸδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντα ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία ἔχει αἰεί τὰναντία, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἔοικε δεχομένοις ἐκείνην τὴν ιδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσῇ ἐναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἤτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομείναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μὲν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον γ' ἐστὶ δυνὰς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα ἀλλήλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

§. 53. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐὰν οἰοί τε ὦμεν, ὀρισώμεθα ὅποια ταῦτ' ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, τάδ' εἴη ἄν, ἃ ὁ τι ἂν κατάσχη, μὴ

ἄρτιος, οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, δύο στίχους ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μιᾷ εὐθείας ἐφεξῆς τοῦς τε διπλασίους ἐκτάτων καὶ τοῦς τριπλασίους.

Ἔστι δὲ τὸδε—ἔχει αἰεί τὰναντία.] Socrates says that this was what he was concerned to show; not only that contraries themselves did not receive their contraries, but that also as many things, as without being mutually contrary, yet contain contraries, (three, for instance, not being the contrary of two, yet containing as an odd number the inequality τὸ περιτόν, which is the contrary of the equality τὸ ἄρτιον, contained in the even number two,) neither did these appear to receive the idea which is the contrary of that which they already contain, but on its approaching, either disappear or recede.

Ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα.] Sc. φαίνεται. Cf. supr. c. 29. οἱ ἀφικόμενῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ, κ. τ. λ.

Οὐδὲ μὲν—ἐναντίον γ' ἐστὶ δυνὰς τριάδι.] Hence it appears that the

τριάς is not to be reckoned amongst the εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία, for if it were a contrary itself, the contrary to it should be the δυνὰς, which is not and could not be the case.—Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τὰ ἐναντία,—but some other things also do not await the approach of those which are really contraries. Cf. supr. c. 52. Ἔστιν ἄρ'—περὶ ἕνια τῶν τοιούτων, κ. τ. λ.

§. 53. Ἄρ' οὖν—τάδε εἴη—] *Would they then be such as to compel whatever they occupied, not only itself to retain the idea (or form) of itself, but always of something which is itself a contrary: for example the τριάς, whatever it may have occupied or become inherent in, it not only forces that to be three, but also to contain within it the notion of that which is of itself a contrary, the περιτόν.* That this is the sense of the passage is evident from its subsequent explanation by Socrates; οἶσθα γὰρ δὴ που ὅτι ἃ ἂν ἢ τῶν τριῶν, κ. τ. λ. whence the reading of Heindorf has

μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αἰὲ αὐτοῦ τινός; Πῶς λέγεις; Ὡς περ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἶσθα γὰρ δὴ που ὅτι ἂν ἢ τῶν τριῶν ιδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς; Πάνυ γε. Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ιδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτε ἂν ἔλθοι. Οὐ γάρ. Εἰργάζετό δέ γε ἢ περιττή; Ναί. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτη ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναί. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει; Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία; Ἄμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἢ τριάς; Ναί. Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ [τὸ ἐναντίον], οἷον νῦν ἢ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ αἰὲ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἢ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα, ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴη,

been selected as supr. Bekker reads ἐναντίου αἰὲ αὐτῷ τινός, so likewise Stallbaum, who encloses αὐτῷ in brackets as dubious. Ficinus appears to have read ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου δεῖ αὐτῷ τινος, but none of the proposed emendations, which are not a few, afford the easy and obvious interpretation supplied by the text as it stands.

Ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον.] *To such, we say now, the idea contrary to the form which effected this, can never at all arrive: i. e. as infr. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία—ἢ τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέα οὐδέποτε ἤξει.—Τῇ μορφῇ; see supr. c. 52. ἐκείνου μορφῇν—Τοῦτο, sc. τὸ περιττὸν εἶναι.*

Ἡ περιττή.] *Sc. μορφῇ, i. q. ἢ τοῦ περιττοῦ ιδέα s. μορφῇ. HEIND.*

Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι.] *That therefore which I proposed to determine—see now if you determine thus; ἀλλ' ὅρα, δὴ, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, κ. τ. λ., the apodosis commencing with ἀλλ' ὅρα, which takes up the sentence interrupted by the parenthesis οἷον νῦν ἢ τριάς—ἀλλὰ*

πάμπολλα.

Τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ.] *Αὐτῷ sc. τῷ ἀρτίῳ, i. e. the τριάς or ternary always brings against the even, ἀρτίον, its contrary, the odd, περιττὸν. The verb ἐπιφέρει supr., also φεύγειν, ὑπεκχωρεῖν, προσεῖναι, προσελθεῖν, δέξασθαι and ὑπομῖναι, which are in frequent use through the course of this argument, are obviously peculiar to military tactics.*

Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο.] *i. e. But that also which brings any contrary against whatever it approaches, can never at any time receive the contrary of that which is so brought; as the τριάς which brings to whatever it approaches, the περιττὸν, (which is of itself ἐναντίον τι) does not receive the ἄρτιον which is the contrary τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου sc. τοῦ περιττοῦ. Olympiod.—τοῦ ἐπιφερόμενου, τοῦτ' ἔστι, του συμπεφυκότος αὐτῷ εἶδους. Gottleber calls τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον the attribute of anything, τὸ συμβαῖνον τῷ πράγματι. V. Mor. ad*

αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρου τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. Πάλιν δὲ ἀναμνησκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλω ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴ περ ἔπει τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

§. 54. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μὴ μοι ᾧ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλ' ἄλλω, μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην

Longin. p. 62.

Αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρου.] This is merely a repetition of the nominative ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι preced.; a familiar usage with Greek and Latin writers.

Οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον.] *It would be profitable.* Cf. in Crit. c. 16. ἀμεινον εἶναι. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 457. p. 757.

Τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου.] *Sc. ἰδέαν.*—Οὐδὲ τὰ ἕκκα—τὸ διπλάσιον, *nor ten, the double of five, &c.*—Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλω ἐναντίον; *this double, which is itself contrary to something else, (than the περιττόν,) will not nevertheless receive, &c. i. e. the number ten not being the contrary of the genus περιττόν, but of its species, the number five, (the contrary of a double being its half, and everything having but one direct contrary,) still does not receive the περιττόν, that is, never can become an odd number, because it contains the idea of equality, which is inseparable from the doubling of numbers, as supr. So with the sesquialter or three halves, the half, and the third, which do not receive the idea of the whole, which is still not the contrary of any of them, (the contrary of half being the double, of a third the triple, &c., and the direct contrary of whole being part,) but because they include the general idea of fraction, which is contrary to the idea of integer—Οὐδὲ*

δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον [the passage being so arranged by Stallbaum, with a view to unfolding its sense,] οὐδὲ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα (δέχεται) τὴν τοῦ ὅλου.

§. 54. Μὴ μοι ᾧ ἂν ἐρωτῶ—] Socrates says, do not answer me by a repetition of the word which I use in the question, but with a different one, imitating me, or following my practice. As when I ask of you whence a body becomes hot? do not say from heat, but from fire; or why a body is diseased? do not say from sickness, but from fever, &c.—Socrates wishes to be answered so as that the species of the genus, to which the subject of this inquiry belonged, should be named, not the genus itself.—STALL.

Λέγω δὲ παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον.] The reason why Socrates required to be so answered was, because he saw and understood (ὀρώων) from what was immediately then under discussion (ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων, c. 53.) that besides that answer which, as he had formerly shown, (παρ' ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, V. c. 49. supr. δισχυρίζομαι—ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά, κ. τ. λ.) could be justly and safely given, (τὴν ἀσφάλειαν,) there could be another given of equal

ὄρων ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη, ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττός ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης ἀλλ' ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅ τι βούλομαι. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἧ δ' ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὡς ἂν ψυχῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν αἰεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἧ δ' ὅς. Ἡ ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῆ κατάσχη, αἰεὶ ἦκει ἐπ' ἐκείνο φέρουσα ζωὴν; Ἦκει μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῆ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτῆ ἐπιφέρει αἰεὶ, οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξεται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὠμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα, ὁ Κέβης.

§. 55. Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται; Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν· ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον

certainty and truth (ἄλλην ἀσφάλειαν). FISCHE.

[Ὡς ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται.] Stephens proposes, ᾧ ἂν τί σώματι, or ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί, as infr. So Koehler and Gottleber. Zeunius.—τί ἂν σώματι ἐγγένηται, ᾧ θερμὸν ἔσται. Wyttenbach follows Stephens as supr. Tub. Ald. and Bass. ὃ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι, and seq. ὅτι δ' ἂν θερμότης, and ὅτι δ' ἂν πῦρ. Almost all the editions are at variance on this passage, from which however Heindorf, approved by Stallbaum, has made the happiest effort at an intelligible reading and obvious sense: ὅταν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι,—ὅταν θερμότης, and ὅτι ὅταν πῦρ. The remaining portion of the passage requires no emendation.

[Ὅ τι βούλομαι.] *What I mean.*

Οὐκοῦν ἢ ψυχῆ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐ-

τη]. h. e. Τὸ ἐναντίον τούτου ὃ αὐτῆ ἐπιφέρει.

§. 55. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον—μουσικὸν.] *The just—and the graceful.* Cf. Apol. de Doctrin. Plat. i. p. 10. Elmenh. “fietetque (homo) totus ipse modulatus ac musicus.” Fischer explains μουσικὸν, *modulatum, concinnum*, and consequently ἄμουσον, *immodulatum, inconcinnum*.

[Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.] More fully, τὸ μὲν ἄμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον: but μὲν is sometimes understood when δε, not preceded by it, is expressed in the latter clause or member of a sentence. So *quidem* appears to be omitted in “*Libertas, que sera tamen respexit inertem*,” Virg. Eclog. i. 28; and “*matura res erat, tergiversantur tamen*,” Liv. ii. 45. Seag. Bos', Gr. Ell. p. 234. Viger, p. 197.

μὴ δέχεται, τί καλοῦμεν ; Ἄθνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον ; Οὐ. Ἄθνατον ἄρα ἢ ψυχὴ ; Ἄθνατον. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδειχθαι φῶμεν ; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἰκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης ; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν ; Πῶς γάρ οὔ ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὅποτε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῆει ἂν ἢ χιῶν οὔσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατ' ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὡς δ' αὐτως, οἶμαι, καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπίοι, οὔ ποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὸν ὄχθετο. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν ; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνα-

Τί καλοῦμεν.] *By what name do we call ; as supr. τί νῦν δὴ ὠνομάζομεν.*

Οὐκοῦν ἢ ψυχῇ, κ. τ. λ.] Olympiod. Ἡ ἀπόδειξις πρόεισιν ἐκ τῶν ὑποθέσεων τοιαύδε συλλογισμῶ. ἢ ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν παρῇ ζῶν τούτῳ ἐπιφέρει. πᾶν δὲ ὃ ἐπιφέρει τί, ἀδεκτόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ. ἢ ψυχῇ ἄρα ἀδεκτός ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου ὡς ἐπιφέρει. τὸ ἐναντίον ἐστίν οὗ ἐπιφέρει, θάνατος. ἢ ψυχῇ ἄρα ἀδεκτός θάνατος.

Ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία.] See *Apol. Socr. c. 12. init. in Criton. c. 14.*

Ἄθερμον.] Aug. Tub. and Stob. τὸ θερμόν, which is obviously incorrect. Stephens omits ἄθερμον, in *Thes. Gr. L.*, which Wyttenbach observes should rather be ἀθρομαντον supr. Heindorf remarks, that in all probability the word has only been used by Plato, and in this passage alone : ἀνάρτων as used for περιττόν supr. he considers almost equally rare.

Ὅποτε τις—ἐπαγάγοι—ὑπεξῆει ἂν.] Even of actions still present, the aorist is sometimes used, if, rapidly passing, they are limited to a single point of

time ; (*Plat. Phæd. p. 106. A. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὅποτε τις, κ. τ. λ.*, as supr.) where ὑπεξῆει must be used in the sense of the aorists ἀπώλετο and ἐδέξατο seq. because the yielding of the unmelted snow can only be momentary, like the being destroyed and the reception of warmth. So in *Gorg. p. 447. E.* and the passages there produced by Heindorf, c. 3. p. 6. the aorist is used, not of a continued or repeated, but single act. *Soph. Ant. 755. εἰ μὴ πατήρ ἦσθ', εἶπον ἂν* (as an act) *σ' οὐκ εὖ φρόνειν. Matthiæ Gr. s. 508. c.*

Εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον, κ. τ. λ.] Ἄθνατον is here applied to that, ὃ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται : ἀνώλεθρον to that which on the approach of its contrary οὐκ ἀπόλλυται. But they are generally used as synonyms, the one signifying *immortal*, and the other *imperishable*, so, however, as that the latter is rather more general in its acceptation than the former, death being one of the modes of corruption or decay. So Aristotle distinguishes between ἀθάνατον and ἀφθαρτον, the latter of which is



τος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἴη, ἀπόλλυσθαι· θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθηκυῖα, ὡς περ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ' αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. Ἄλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἄν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττόν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπίοντος τοῦ ἄρτιου, ὡς περ ὠμολόγηται, ἀπολλυμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγενῆσθαι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὠμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἄρτιου τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπίοντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἔνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι

equivalent to ἀνώλεθρον *supr.* Topic. vi. p. 694. edit. Pac. t. i. p. 376. ed. Sylb. The argument as *supr.*, is thus summed up by Albinus, Doctr. Plat. c. xxv. p. 370. Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφαίνει τοῦτον ἐπιὼν τὸν τρόπον· ἡ ψυχὴ ὅτῳ ἂν προσγένηται ἐπιφέρει τοῦτῳ τὸ ζῆν, ὡς σύμφυτον ὑπάρχον ἑαυτῇ· τὸ δὲ ἐπιφέρειν τινὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀνεπίδεκτόν ἐστι θανάτου· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον, ἀθάνατον· εἰ δὲ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἂν εἴη· ἀσώματος γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐσία, ἀμετάβλητος κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ νοητὴ, καὶ ἀειδὴς καὶ μονοειδὴς· οὐκοῦν ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιάλυτος, ἀσκέδατος.

Ἄλλὰ τί κωλύει.] But, says an objector, what is there to prevent this,—granting that the odd cannot become the even on the accession of the even, as had been already conceded—that on the annihilation of the odd (ἀπολλυμένου δὲ αὐτοῦ) the even should succeed in its stead (ἀντ' ἐκείνου)? That is, that the soul, while it is a soul, cannot receive death, but on the approach of death it ceases to be what it is. To this

Socrates says, that he cannot make any answer on the grounds of the odd being imperishable, since its not being so did not interfere with the main of the argument which regarded the ἀθάνατον. If, however, it were conceded to be so, he might easily contend for the disappearance merely (that being one of the alternatives mentioned *supr.* c. 50. sub. fin., ἡ φεύγειν—ἡ ἀπολωλέναι.) of the odd and its species, three; and so with fire, heat, &c. Therefore with regard to the immortal, if it was agreed that it was also imperishable, the soul then, in addition to its being immortal, (πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι,) should be incorruptible likewise. But if this was not agreed to, some other argument would be required in proof, for which, however, there was no necessity, since nothing could be imperishable if that which was immortal and eternal in its nature should yet be subject to decay.

Διαμάχεσθαι.] To contend with, to argue against.

Τούτου γε ἔνεκα.] As far as regards this.

ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίου φθορὰν δέξεται.

§. 56. Ὁ δέ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχῆ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπου, τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, τὸ δ' ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἶχεται ἀπίον, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχῆ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Αἴδου. Οὐκ οὐκ ἐγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμίας ὁδε ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι, ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὃν τιν' ἂν τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μεντοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ', ἔφη,

§. 56. Τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος.] Sc. ἡ ζωὴ αὐτῆ.

Παντὸς μᾶλλον.] *Unquestionably, beyond all doubt.*

Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἢ δ' ὅς, κ. τ. λ.] Simmias acknowledges that the importance and greatness of the subject, being such as almost to overpower the natural weakness of man, occasion the uncertainty and distrust with which the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is received. Consequently, he advises his friends to return again and again to the principles

at first laid down, from the minute, patient, and unprejudiced investigation of which, if they appear at all worthy of credit, the admission of the doctrine will naturally follow as an obvious and undeniable truth.

Τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων.] *Disparaging human infirmity;—humanam imbecillitatem tantæ rationum magnitudini perspicendiæ imparem existimans.* WYTT.

Οὐ μόνον γ' ἔφη—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε.] After οὐ μόνον supply ἀπιστίαν σε δεῖ

ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εἶ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἰκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαι· κὰν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

§. 57. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι εἴ περ ἢ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλούμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὕσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Αἴδου ἢ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ

ἔχειν περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Cf. in Menon. p. 71. B. ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἰκαδε ἀπαγγέλωμεν. ΣΩΚΡ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλῳ πῶ ἐνέτυχον ἐδότι. de Legg. vi. p. 752. A. ΚΑ. Ἄριστ' εἰρηκας ὦ ξένε. ΑΘ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ δρᾶσω κατὰ δύναμιν οὕτω.

Καὶ εἰ πισταὶ—ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 447. 3. b.

§. 57. Οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. Not for the sake of this period only, during which that is which we call life; ἐν ᾧ καλούμεν τὸ ζῆν being equivalent to ἐν ᾧ τὸ καλούμενον ζῆν ἐστι. Cf. Hom. Iliad. λ'. 757. καὶ Ἀλειςίον ἐνθα κολώνη Κέκληται. Soph. Trach. 648. Ἐνθ' Ἑλλάνων ἀγοραὶ Πυλάτιδες καλέονται. Matthiæ Gr. s. 472. 4. Obs.

Εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.] Εἴ is not unfrequently accompanied by the future indic., when the opt. with ἂν follows in

the apodosis. Matthiæ Gr. s. 524. Obs 2. 1.

Ἄ θάνατος τοῦ παντός ἀπαλλαγῆ.] If death were a deliverance from every thing; the soul perishing along with the body. The theme of ἀπαλλαγῆ is ἀπαλλάττεσθαι pass. or mid. not ἀπαλλάττειν.—Ἐρμαιον, Tim. Plat. Lex. εὔρεμα· ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν ἔθει λέγομένου, Κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς. Schol. interpr. τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος· ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς τιθεμένων ἀπαρχῶν, αἳ οἱ ὁδοιπόροι κατεσθίουσι. ταύτας δὲ τῷ Ἐρμῆ ἀφιερῶσιν ὡς ὄντι καὶ τούτῳ ἐνὶ τῶν ἐνοδίων θεῶν.

Τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς.] Τροφή and παιδεία are frequently so joined, and indifferently used for each other; but where there is any distinction intended, the former is applied to the soul, the latter to the body, and τροφή is then used metaphorically of that knowledge by which, as its proper nu-

καὶ λέγεται μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαί-

triment, the soul is sustained. To these two is added ἀγωγή, education or discipline.

[Λέγεται δὲ οὕτως.] Having fully established the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, Socrates proceeds in the second part of the dialogue to the consideration of its future state, as an imperishable and incorruptible essence.—This subject is discussed also in the *Gorgias*, p. 512. sqq. de *Repub.* x. p. 614. ed. Steph. which may be advantageously compared with the above, as also in *Phædr.* c. 56. where the condition of the soul is described previous to its descent into the body. Upon this important portion of the heathen mythology it is to be observed, that Socrates is not made to express himself as convinced of the absolute truth and certainty of the things he describes. Plato, as Stallbaum justly remarks, in his frequent references to myths, does not appear to have introduced them for ornament merely, although the ‘poet of philosophers’ was by no means unmindful of this, but it would seem that he had some more useful and graver object in view. For in his discussion of such subjects he generally makes it to be understood, that there is more room for doubt and conjecture than valid argument and conclusive reasoning: to accomplish which, he so uses, for the most part, the popular fables and traditions of Greece, as that he not only alters or rejects what is unsuited to his purpose, but at the same time makes an effort to reform and remove the superstitions of his countrymen, which is his evident design throughout. It is equally evident that he was also desirous to emancipate the minds and judgments of his friends from the thralldom of a blind and absurd belief, and lead them, by a requisite preparation, to comprehend and partake of the benefits resulting from a purer and more exalted wisdom. The sum of the arguments advanced by Plato on the subject of a future state is simply this; that the good are happy and the evil miserable; that the happiness of the former consists in virtue and

truth, and the misery of the latter, in the contrary of both; but for the probability of his own, or the speculations of others upon what this happiness or misery is to be in quality or degree, he does not by any means contend, nor dilate upon with any other view than that already ascribed. Cf. V. Cousin, *Œuvr. de Plat.* i. 177.—“Vient ensuite la seconde partie avec le cortège de croyances populaires et mythologiques sur la destinée et l’état ultérieur de ce principe immortel, transporté hors des conditions de son existence actuelle. La première partie était un discours entre philosophes; la seconde est un hymne, un fragment d’épopée; c’est, en quelque sorte, un accompagnement doux et gracieux, destiné à relever l’effet des démonstrations précédentes, et à charmer le cœur et l’imagination, après que l’intelligence est satisfaite.

“La philosophie démontre qu’il y a dans l’homme un principe qui ne peut périr. Mais que ce principe reparaisse dans un autre monde avec le même ordre de facultés et les mêmes lois qu’il avait dans celui-ci; qu’il y porte les conséquences des bonnes et des mauvaises actions qu’il a pu commettre: que l’homme vertueux y converse avec l’homme vertueux, qui le méchant y souffre avec le méchant, c’est la une probabilité sublime qui échappe peut-être à la rigueur de la démonstration, mais qu’auto-  
risent et consacrent et le vœu secret du cœur, et l’assentiment universel des peuples. Elles ne sont pas d’hier, elles ne s’éteindront pas demain, ces naïves et nobles croyances qu’un destructible besoin produit, répand, perpétue parmi les hommes, comme un héritage sacré; et, en vérité, ce serait une philosophie bien hautaine que celle qui défendrait au sage, à l’heure suprême, d’invoquer ces traditions vénérables, et d’essayer de s’enchanter lui-même de la foi de ses semblables et des espérances du genre humain. Ce n’est pas là du moins la philosophie de Socrate. Trop éclairé pour accepter sans réserve les allégories populaires qu’il raconte à ses

μων, ὅς περ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δῆ τινα τόπον, οἱ δὲ τοὺς ξυλλεγέντας διαδικασαμέ-

amis, il est trop indulgent aussi pour les repousser avec rigueur; et l'on voit tout au plus errer sur le lèvres du bon et spirituel vieillard ce demi-sourire qui trahit le scepticisme sans montrer le dédain."

To this part of the dialogue Olympiodorus gives the name *Νεκνία*, which is likewise applied to the similar passages in the *Gorgias* and de *Repub.*, and by the ancients to the eleventh *Odyssey*, which being occupied with a like subject was called by the ancients *Νεκνία* or *Νεκνομαντεία*. Socrates now proceeds to say that every soul has its own genius for its guide, which conducts it after death to the lower regions; a wise and well-informed soul pursuant to its own desire, but a vicious and foolish soul, and devoted to the body, against its will. Having been so conducted to a particular place, they are there tried, and those who lived moderately well suffer such punishment for their misdeeds as may tend to their being cleansed, and restored to virtue, at the same time that they receive the reward of their good actions. Those, however, who have committed greater, but yet excusable crimes, such as homicides, or those who ill-treat their parents, are afflicted with severer penalties, from which they are not discharged until they have made the requisite atonement to the objects of their injustice.—But those who have committed unpardonable and irremediable offences, by many and gross acts of oppression and violence, are plunged into Tartarus, to abide there for ever. Finally, those who have led a blameless and an upright life, and especially those who have studied philosophy intently and effectually, are exalted into the upper regions, whence they return no more. This abode of the blessed is on the earth itself, but in a lofty and celestial quarter; for what is water with us is air with them, and our air is their æther: all things are purer, brighter, and more subtle there; endued with more acute perceptions, they enjoy a more vigorous intelligence, and a nearer intimacy with the gods. While we, as fishes in the depths of the sea, so live in the lower air, whence few ascend into the

more ætherial space; all things with us are coarse and earthly, our perceptions dull, intelligence slow, nothing really and sincerely good.

Throughout this discussion, though *the mind* and *the soul* appear to have been used as synonyms, yet there is a distinction to be observed between them. The soul is that whole, whatever it is in us which thinks, feels, acts, desires, is conscious to itself of itself and all things else. It is called by the Greeks *ψυχή*, and is attributed to all animals (*ζῷοις*). But these are either rational (*λογικά*), or irrational (*ἄλογα*, i. e. brutes); of rational beings there are four classes, gods, dæmons, heroes, and men. Platonists divide the soul into three parts or faculties; two irrational, *ἐπιθυμίαν*, and *θυμόν*, the affections and passions, and the third rational, *λόγον*, reason, which, if it is regarded not as a faculty of the soul, but as a part, and that, too, the most excellent and influential, is called *νοῦς*, the mind. This part, then, which is mainly concerned in the question of immortality, is generally implied by the term *mind*, the whole is designated as the *soul*. Cf. Tennemann, *Man. Philos.* s. 134. Plato considered the soul to be a self-acting energy, (*αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ κινεῖν*, de *Leg.* x. p. 88. sqq.) and viewed as combined with the body, he distinguished in it two parts, the rational (*λογιστικόν, νοῦς*); and the irrational or animal (*ἄλογιστικόν* or *ἐπιθυμητικόν*): mutually connected by a sort of middle term (*θυμός* or *τὸ θυμοειδές*, de *Rep.* iv. 349. ed. Steph.) The animal part has its origin in the imprisonment of the soul in the body; the intellectual still retains a consciousness of the *ideas*: whereby it is capable of returning to the happy condition of spirits.

[*Ὁ ἐκάστον δαίμων.*] i. e. The dæmon or genius which was appointed as the guide and associate of every human being during life. Whether every individual had his own peculiar dæmon, or that one dæmon took charge of a greater number of individuals, the learned are not agreed, nor does it appear that Plato himself thought proper to decide.

vous εἰς "Αιδου πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε πορεύσθαι. τυ-

Some supposed the dæmon to be a part of the soul itself, or the νοῦς, Plat. Tim. p. 551. A. or an ἦθος. Cf. Porphyr. Epist. ad Aneb. p. d. b. Διαμφισβητῶ δὲ μήπω δαίμων ἴδιος μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς εἶη· καὶ οὗτος ἄρα εὐδαίμων εἶη ὅστις νοῦν ἔχει σοφόν. Olympiodorus, Cod. i. p. 288. is of opinion that one dæmon has the charge of several souls, for it was not allotted to a soul but to a life; ἀλλὰ βίον τι δὲ κωλύει τὸν αὐτὸν βίον πλείους αἰρεῖσθαι ψυχάς: therefore every species of life had its own presiding dæmon which also took charge of the souls by which that species of life was adopted. With this he aims at reconciling the passage in Rep. x. p. 250. C. where the soul in its choice of a new life selects also a dæmon for itself, the dæmon does not select the soul, whence he concludes that each dæmon presides over a particular kind of life; to which also Plotinus refers, Enn. iii. iv. 3. p. 284. B. ὀρθῶς οὖν λέγεται ἡμᾶς αἰρήσεσθαι τὸν γὰρ ὑπερκείμενον κατὰ ζωὴν αἰρούμεθα. To which opinion Jamblichus also so far accedes as to determine the dæmon to be a part, but the predominant one, of the soul, ix. 6. p. 169. Εἰ δὲ δεῖ σοὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ περι τοῦ οἰκείου δαιμονος λόγον ἀποκαλύψαι, οὐκ ἀφ' ἐνὸς μέρους τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, εὐδ' ἀπό τινος στοιχείου τῶν ὀρωμένων ἀπονέμεται ἡμῖν οὗτος· ἀφ' ὅλου δὲ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς παντοδαπῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῆς, καὶ τοῦ παντοδαποῦ σώματος, δι' ὧν ἡ ψυχὴ κάτεισιν ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν, ἀπομερίζεται τις ἐν ἡμῖν μοῖρα ἰδίᾳ πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπομεριζομένη κατ' ἰδίαν ἐπιστασίαν· οὗτος δὲ οὖν ὁ δαίμων ἔστηκεν ἐν παραδείγματι πρὸ τοῦ καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς κατείναι εἰς γένεσιν· ὃν ἐπειδὴ ἔληται ἡ ψυχὴ ἡγεμόνα, εὐθὺς ἐφέστηκεν ὁ δαίμων ἀποπληρωτῆς τῶν βίων τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅς καὶ εἰς τὸ σῶμα κατιούσαν αὐτὴν συνδεῖ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα· καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ζῶον αὐτῆς ἐπιτροπέει. ζωὴν τε τὴν ἰδίαν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτὸς κατευθύνει· καὶ ὅσα λογίζομεθα, αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡμῖν ἐνδιδόντος, διανοοῦμεθα, πράττομεν τε τοιαῦτα, ὅσα ἂν αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἀγγ· καὶ μέχρι τοσοῦ-

τον κυβερνᾷ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἕως ἂν διὰ τῆς ἱερατικῆς θεουργίας θεὸν ἐφορον ἐπιστήσωμεν καὶ ἡγεμόνα τῆς ψυχῆς: For the better understanding of which, the passage in Rep. x. 520. 521. may be adduced, when the souls are addressed, previous to their election of a life; 'Ανάγκης θυγατρὸς, κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. Ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι, ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητῶν γένους θανατηφόρον· οὐχ ἡμᾶς δαίμων λήζεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε—. 'Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἡρῆσθαι, ὡς περ ἔλαχον ἐν ταξεί προσεῖναι πρὸς τὴν Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνη δὲ ἕκαστῳ ὃν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα ξυμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἰρέετων. From which it is not more clear that one dæmon presides over several souls, than that every individual soul has its own peculiar dæmon. Cf. Apul. de Deo Socr. p. 50. "Ex hac ergo sublimiori dæmonum copia Plato autumat singulis hominibus in vita agenda testes et custodes singulos additos, qui nemini conspicui semper adsint, arbitri omnium non modo actorum verum etiam cogitatorum. At ubi vita edita remeandum est, eundem illum, qui nobis præditus fuit, raptare illico et trahere veluti custodiam suam ad iudicium, atque illic in caussa dicenda assistere: si qua commentiatur, redarguere: si qua vera dicat, asseverare: prorsus illius testimonio ferri sententiam." Origen. c. Cels. viii. p. 767. B. 'Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὖν οἱ σοφοὶ λεγέτωσαν δαίμονας εἰληχέναι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως. WYTT. According to Empedocles, the soul of man consists of two parts; the sensitive, produced from the first principles with the elements: and the rational, a dæmon sprung from the divine soul of the world, and sent down into the body as a punishment for its crimes in a former state, to remain there until it is sufficiently purified to return to God. Xenocrates taught the inferior gods or dæmons to be derived from the soul of the world, and therefore, like that principle, to be compounded of a simple or immutable and a divisible or changeable substance. He assigned them a middle rank be-

χόντας δ' ἐκεῖ ὧν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρόνῳ  
 χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμῶν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς  
 χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία  
 οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει· ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ

tween the gods and man, partaking of the nature of mind and body, susceptible of passions like human beings, and consequently liable to diversity of character. Nearly similar is the doctrine of Ocellus, from whom, however, as he makes dæmons the inhabitants of the sublunar regions, Aristotle differs essentially, who supposed no such intelligences except in the celestial sphere. *Enf. Phil. passim.* Cf. Horat. *Epist.* ii. 2. 187. Theocrit. *Id.* iv. 40. Λι, αἰ, τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμωνος ὅς με λέλογκε. *Lys. Epitaph.* p. 130. νῦν δὲ ἢ τε φύτις καὶ νόσων ἤττων καὶ γήρωσ, ὅ τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῖραν εἰληχῶς ἀπαραίτητος. Menand. *apud.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. p. 727. "Ἀπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρασταεῖ Εὐθύς γενομένη μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου. *Virg. Georg.* i. 302. *Tibull.* ii. 2. 1, iv. 6. 1. *Pers. Sat.* ii. 3. "Ὅς περ ζῶντα εἰλήχει.] *Kœhler* reads ὡσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, after ed. *Francof.* a. 1602., and explains the passage; *Dæmonem suum quemque ducere, quemadmodum eum viventem deprehenderit, eo, quo defuncti se colligant, &c.*, which is obviously incorrect both in sense and arrangement. "Ὅς περ (so in *vett. edit.*) is the true reading, and consistent with the doctrine of Plato. For in *Rep.* x. l. c. *supr.* he makes Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity, address the souls; ψυχὰι ἐφήμεροι—οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε: the genius which the soul selected being so allotted by Lachesis to that life upon which the soul chose to enter, and in which, according to its future destiny, it was called εὐδαίμων, or κακοδαίμων. Whence *Gottleber* correctly renders the passage, ὅς περ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, qui *genius viventem eum sorte accesserat.* V. *Cousin*; le même génie, qui a été chargé de lui pendant sa vie. *Dacier*; le démon (le génie) qu'il a eu en partage.

Εἰς δὴ τινα τόπον.] *Into a certain place*; this τόπος is called by *Socrates*, *Æschin.* *Socr.* iii. 19., πεδίον ἀληθείας.

Οἱ δεῖ τοὺς ἐυλλεγέντας διαδικασμένους.] i. e. *Where having been assembled, they must undergo their trial*: διαδικάζεσθαι, as *Reiske* correctly observes, in *Ind. Demosth.*, signifying, to commit one's cause to a legal investigation, whence διαδικασμένους *supr.* is equivalent to διαδικασμὸν ὑπέχοντα elsewhere. Cf. *infr.* c. 62. *init.* πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο, κ. τ. λ.

Πορεύσαι.] *Interpr.* *Hesych.* πίμψαι, ἀγαγεῖν.

Ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακρ. περ.] *Plato* does not accurately define the number of years in which the περίοδοι, or revolutions of years allotted to transmigrating souls, were completed; but to some he assigns the space of one, to others of three, and again to others, of ten thousand years. He has not either laid down his doctrine of metempsychosis so simply and obviously as the Pythagoreans, but has studied to explain its principles from the nature of the soul itself. For the soul, from the habits of its former life, being tied down to the love of pleasure, naturally seeks for a body of such a description as may be best adapted to the gratification of its desires. Consequently, being deceived through ignorance of what is really good, in the choice of a new existence, it abandons the better for the worse.

Ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος.] *Wytttenbach* conjectures the verse alluded to, to be; Ἀπλὴ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οἶμος εἰς ἄδου φέροι.—*Heindorf*; Ἀπλὴ γὰρ οἶμος πάντας εἰς Ἄιδου φέροι, or as *Wyt.* *supr.* Cf. *Clem. Alex. Stromm.* iv. p. 492. B. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν κατὰ τὸν Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφον νοεῖν ἀπλὴν οἶμον εἰς Ἄιδου φέρειν. *Dionys.* *Hal. Art. Rhet.* vi. 5. p. 73. εἰ μὲν τις ἐτελεύτησε—ἐν ἀποδημία, ὅτι οὐδὲν διενήνοχε, μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἶμος, κατὰ τὸν Αἰσχύλου, εἰς ἄδου φέρουσα. *Cic. Tusc.* i. 43. "Præclare *Anaxagoras*: qui cum *Lampsaci* moreretur, quaerentibus amicis, velletne *Clazomenas* in patriam, si quid accidisset, auferrī: Nihil necesse est in-

ἀπλὴν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἄιδου φέρειν, ἢ δ' οὔτε ἀπλὴ οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης. νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω. Ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἔπεται τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἢ δὲ

quít: undique enim ad inferos tantumdem viæ est." Horat. Od. i. 28. 16.—"Et calcanda semel via leti." Virg. Æneid vi. 126.—"facilis descensus Averno." For Telephus, see Class. Dic. His story formed the subject of the last tragedy of Æschylus, inscribed with his name.

Νῦν δὲ.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 607.

Ἐπὶ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων.] Τὰ ὅσια is used of the last duties towards the dead, and so likewise τὰ νόμιμα, and νομιζόμενα, in Latin *justa*, of the customary and established rites of burial, &c., whence Wyttenbach understands the phrase by the figure ἐν διὰ δυοῖν, to signify *religio mortuorum, sacra inferis et manibus exhibita*. Upon the different parts of such ceremonies, which Socrates alleges as an argument for the diversity of routes conducting to the lower regions, Cf. Schol. in loc. ex Cod. Olymp. i. p. 235. "Ὅτι μία μὲν κατὰ το κοινὸν, ἢ εἰς ἄδου πορεία· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ αἱ μετὰ τὴν μίαν ὁδοί, ἅτε τοιοῦτων καὶ τοσοῦτων οὐσῶν τῶν λήξεων, ἃς τέλη ποιούνται αἱ ὁδοιποροῦσαι (ψυχᾶι)—ἢ διὰ τὰς Δήμητρος πλάνας· ὡς γὰρ διαφόρων οὐσῶν τῶν ὁδῶν ἐπλανήθη· ἢ ὅτι ἐπὶ τριόδου θύουσι τῇ τριόδῃ ἐκᾶστη (leg. τριόδιτι Ἐκᾶτῃ) καὶ παραδεικνύουσι τὰς τριόδους ἐν ἄλλοις νομίμοις. Ἄλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀποικομένων τὰς ψυχὰς τριχῶν θεραπεύουσιν· ἄλλως μὲν τὰς τῶν παναγῶν ἱερέων· ἄλλως δὲ τὰς τῶν βιοθανάτων· καὶ ἔτι ἄλλως τὰς τῶν πολλῶν. For ὁσίων, Vulg. Aug. Ald., &c. read *θυσιῶν*, adopted by Ficinus, and by Olympiodorus, who understands an allusion to the sacrifices offered to Hecate, where three ways met;—Ὁ Σωκράτης διχῶν δέικνυσι, φιλοσόφως μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δέισθαι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων· μιᾶς γὰρ

οὔσης ὁδοῦ, μὴ ἂν δεηθῆναι τῶν ἀγόντων· ἱερατικῶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τριόδοις τιμῶν τῆς Ἐκᾶτης. Heindorf receives ὁσίων, but considers it to imply a reference to the mysteries, in which the circuitous approaches to Orcus were exhibited to the view of the spectators. Upon the construction *supr.*, *τεκμαιρόμενος* without an accusative of the object, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 396. 2. Cf. in Criton. c. 2. init. *τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου*. Xenoph. Cyrop. vii. 5. 62. Ἐτεκμαίρετο δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, &c.

Ὁὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα.] Heusde, Spec. Crit. p. 23. denies the sense of *οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ* *supr.* and proposes *οὐκ ἀγανακτεῖ τὰ παρ.* as being correctly joined with ἔπεται *preced.* and so opposed to *ἀντιείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσι*, βία καὶ μόλις, κ. τ. λ. *seq.* But all the editions sanction the reading in the text, which requires no emendation, and signifies that the soul is not unacquainted with its present state; its immediate condition has not befallen it suddenly nor unexpectedly, for it had already been familiarized with it, by the study of philosophy, and meditation upon death. Therefore it must be pleased with a change which it was long since aware was to be for its good, and would gladly accompany the guide, of whose conduct its own felicity was the undoubted object. This sense, it is evident includes the meaning which Heusde desired to make more obvious, but which is thus sufficiently apparent without his correction. Ἄγνοεῖ, besides, may be taken in the full signification here, in which its aorist occurs in that splendid passage Iliad. ν'. 18. sq.—*ἄταλλε δὲ κῆτε' ὑπ' αὐτῷ Πάντοθεν ἐκ κερθῶν, οἰδὲ ἡγνοήσεν ἄνακτα*,—where it evidently implies the joyful recognition, or confession of the



ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὄρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγισ ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἶχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθι περ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ταύτην μὲν ἄπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ξυνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμῶν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορία, ἕως ἂν δὴ τινες χρόνοι γένωνται, ὧν ἐξελθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν ἢ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα,

presence of their sovereign by the monsters of the deep.

Ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώμ. κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Milton, Comus, 463. sqq.,

— but when Lust  
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,  
But most by lewd and slavish act of sin,  
Lets in defilement to the inward parts,  
The soul grows clotted by contagion,  
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose  
The divine property of her first being.  
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp,  
Of seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres  
Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave,  
As loth to leave the body that it loved,  
And linked itself by carnal sensuality  
To a degenerate and degraded state.

Ἄπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον.] See supr. c. 30—περὶ ἐκεῖνο, sc. τὸ σῶμα.—ἐπτοημένη—expressive of the soul's reluctance to abandon the body, to which it clung as the instrument of its sensual appetites. Cf. supr. c. 13. μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι, c. 30. sqq.—ὄρατὸς τόπος, monuments or sepulchres.—πολλά—used here for καταπολὸν,—making violent resistance. Πολλὰ παθοῦσα, intell. ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐπιθυμιῶν.

Ἄ τούτων ἀδελφά.] Suid. Ἄδελφά οἰκεῖα, ἀρμόζοντα, πρέποντα. Etymol. M. ἀδελφά ὅμοια. Phavor. ἀδελφά ὅμοια, οἰκεῖα, ἀρμόζοντα, πρέποντα, συγγενῆ. Whence τούτων ἀδελφά is used of crimes similar to homicides, &c., as ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν of similar or congenial souls; i. e. impure, ἀκαθαρτῶν.

So Cic. Acadd. iv. 43. "Germanissimus Stoicus," or as some read "Stoicus." Orat. 9. "Germanos se putant esse Thucydides," or according to some—"Thucydidas."

Ταύτην—ὑπεκτρέπεται.] Matthiæ Gr. s. 393.—Ἄπας, used as more emphatic, for πᾶς. Politic. p. 259. C. βασιλεὺς ἄπας. Eurip. Bacch. 70. στόμα τ' εὐφημον ἄπας ὀσιούσθω.

Ἐυνέμπορος.] Tim. Plat. Lex. συν-οδοιπóρος, fellow-traveller.

Ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορία.] Involved in complete perplexity. de Rep. iii. p. 395. D. ἐν ξυμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐχομένην. Gorg. p. 522. A. ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορία ἔχουσα.—Ἔως ἂν—χρόνοι, sc. περίοδοι χρόνου πολλὰ καὶ μακρὰ supr.; whence χρόνοι is used in the plural.—Γένωνται, expire; used here in a different sense from c. 37. supr. χρόνου ἐγγενομένου.

Ἐπ' ἀνάγκης.] Perforce, of necessity. Forster incorrectly reads ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, from de Repub. x. 344., but had that deity been intended here, the allusion should have been more distinct, besides it would have been written ἄγεσθαι, not φέρεσθαι, ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.

Καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως.] i. e. Καθαρῶς καὶ κοσμίως, one that has led a pure and well-regulated life.

καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησε τὸν αὐτῇ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα.

§. 58. Εἰσὶ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτῇ οὔτε οἶα οὔτε ὄση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; περὶ γάρ τοι τῆς γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἂ σὲ πείθει. ἠδέως ἂν οὖν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου γέ μοι τέχνη δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἃ γ' ἐστίν· ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ' ἂν οἶός τε εἶην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι ιδέα τῆς γῆς, οἶαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ

§. 58. Καὶ αὐτῇ οὔτε οἶα.] After αὐτῇ intell. ἐστίν. Anaximander and Hecataeus may be here alluded to, who had set such inquiries on foot respecting the form and magnitude, &c., of the earth. V. Strabon. i. p. 13. c. Diog. L. ii. 2. STALL. Forster correctly renders ὄση, *tantula*: cf. infr. "Ἐτι τοίνυν—πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό.

'Ὡς ἐγὼ—πέπεισμαι] Vulg. πέπυσμαι; but the former is preferable, both on account of ἂ σὲ πείθει seq. and. ὑπὸ τινος preced.

Οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου γέ μοι τέχνη.] This proverb was in use among the ancients in regard to difficulties which required no great power of intellect or ingenuity to solve. It is so applied in the present instance; but how the proverb itself originated is altogether uncertain. Schol. Plat. Γλαύκου τέχνη· ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ῥαδίως κατεργαζομένων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν πάνυ ἐμπείρως καὶ ἐντέχνως εἰργασμένων. "Ἰππασος γάρ τις κατεσκεύασε χαλκοῦς τέτταρας δίσκους οὕτως, ὥστε τὰς μὲν διαμέτρους αὐτῶν ἴσας ὑπαρχούσας (1. ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου δίσκου πάχος ἐπίτριτον μὲν εἶναι τοῦ δευτέρου, ἡμίολον δὲ τοῦ τρίτου, διπλοῦν δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου κρονομένου δὲ τούτου ἐπιτελεῖ συμφωνίαν τινα.

καὶ λέγεται Γλαῦκον ἰδόντα τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν δίσκων φθόγγον πρῶτον ἐγχειρησαι δι' αὐτῶν χειρουργεῖν· καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγεσθαι τὴν καλουμένην Γλαύκου τέχνην. (Conf. Pausan. Phoc. c. 16.) ἕτερος δὲ Γλαύκου αὐτὸν ἀναθεῖναι εἰς Δελφοὺς τρίποδα χαλκοῦν οὕτω δημιουργήσαντα τοῖς πάχεως τε (f. δημιουργ. θαυμαστῶς ὥστε) κρονομένου τούτε πόδας, ἐφ' ᾧ βέβηκε, καὶ τὸ ἄνω περικείμενον καὶ τὴν στεφάνην τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λέβητος καὶ τὰς ῥάβδους διὰ μέσου τεταγμένας φθέγγεσθαι λύρας φωνῆ. Καὶ αὐθις ἕτερος ἀπὸ Γλαύκου τινὸς δόξαντός τι πλεονεποικέναι, εἰρησθαι τὴν παροιμίαν.

'Ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπ. μοι φαίν.] Sc. ἀποδείξει, which, as Wyttenbach observes, is understood from διηγήσασθαι preced. Tr. *But to prove that these things are true seems to me more difficult than is consistent with the art of Glaucus.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 628.—Ἡ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην. See Matthiæ Gr. s. 449. c.

'Ἄμα μὲν ἐγὼ.] Xenoph. Cyrop. iii. 1. 2. ἅμα μὲν διέπεμπεν ἀθροίζων τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν,—ἅμα δὲ ἔπεμπεν εἰς τὰ ὄρη, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. iv. 1. 13. Anab.

τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἄλλ',  
ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.

Πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὄς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ  
ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερῆς οὔσα, μηδὲν  
αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης

iii. 4. 11. This form is rarer among the Latin writers. Liv. iii. 50. "Decemviri simul iis, quæ videbant, simul his, quæ acta Romæ audierant, perturbati." Ibid. xxxi. 46. "Simul minarum, simul promissionum in futurum memores."—STALL.

[Ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφ. οὔσα.] Cf. in Tim. c. 15. a med. Γῆν δὲ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλουμένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτὸς τε καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο, πρῶτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων ὅσα ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γέγονε.

Upon the word *εἰλουμένην*, in this passage, the disputes have arisen concerning Plato's opinion of the earth; whether, according to Aristotle (de Cælo. 11. 13. p. 659. B.—11. 14. p. 663. E.), who, reading *εἰλουμένην*, gives it the sense of *κινουμένην*, and Diogenes Laertius (111. s. 85.), he maintained the earth's *rotation* upon its axis, or whether, according to Proclus, ad h. l. who condemns this interpretation, (and reading *ἰλλομένην* gives it the sense as in Tim. Plat. Lex. *συγκεκλεισμένην καὶ περιειλημμένην*. Ἰλλάδες γὰρ οἱ δεσμοί;) he held the earth to be immoveably fixed upon its axis. But in fact, as Ruhnken and Hemsterhuis justly observe, the reading in this case makes no difference, for both *εἰλουμένην* and *ἰλλομένην* are precisely the same. The former, in Plat. Lex. as supr., quotes two translations of the passage which do not remove its ambiguity. Cic. Acad. ii. 39. *Jam vero terram, altricem nostram, quæ tracto axe sustinetur, dieique noctisque effectricem*, &c. Chalcid. p. 41. *Terram vero matrem et altricem omnium terrenorum animantium constrictam limitibus per omnia vadentis et cuncta continentis poli*, &c. And the latter, *ibid.*, admits the possibility of either interpretation; *Terram quæ circum axem se summa celeritate convertit et torquet.*" Cic. Acad. ii. 39. or "quæ circum axem

*protensum convoluta et adstricta hæret. Vincula quibus terram natura constrictit.*" Macrob. ad Somn. Scip. i. The second opinion is ably advocated by Letronne (Journal des Savans. 1819, Juin) in an article upon M. J. V. Le Clerc's *Pensées de Platon, sur la Morale*, &c. Paris, 1819, in which the author supports the opinion of Aristotle, as supr. Letronne understands *εἰλουμένην* (*περὶ*) in a passive sense, and instead of signifying, *the earth revolving*, i. e. *turning itself on its axis*, he takes it to mean rather *being rolled*, i. e. *agglomerated round its axis*; the expression being metaphorical, from wool or flax *twisted or coiled in a ball* round the spindle of a distaff. So the term is applied to the earth as being *wound* round its own axis, which, prolonged at either extremity, becomes the axis of the universe.—*πόλον διὰ παντὸς τεταμένον*. Hence it will appear that *εἰλουμένην περὶ πόλον* is nearly synonymous with *περιφερῆς οὔσα* in the text, which Letronne quotes in further confirmation of his opinion. He cites two passages also from the *Timæus* in favour of the earth being immoveably fixed; in which Plato seems to have sufficiently decided the point himself. In the one he speaks of the double motion of the sun and planets, their diurnal and proper, and in another he describes their diurnal motion as a revolution of the whole firmament, which is evidently incompatible with the rotation of the earth upon its axis, whence it is certain that he, then at least, believed the earth to be immoveable in the centre of the universe. This opinion, however, he is said by Theophrastus, apud Plut. Quæst. Plat. t. x. p. 183., to have repented of late in life. It may be added, that this passage, as supr., *ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ*, κ. τ. λ., is borrowed from *Timæus the Locrian*, 111. s. 1. to whom, among others, Plato is indebted for his acquaintance with the tenets of Pythagoras, and whose doctrine respecting the

ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἰκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσορροπὸν γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον οὐδαμῶσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἧ δ' ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· Ἔτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ τινὶ μορίῳ, ὡς περ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους, περὶ

earth was, that being placed in the centre of the universe, it formed the boundary of night and day, causing sunrise and sunset by the separation of the horizons, and that it was the most ancient body which the universe contained.— This is also in favour of the argument of Proclus, to which Letronne's is nearly alike. But the question cannot still be considered as divested of an uncertainty which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to remove. V. Boeckh. de Plat. Syst. Cael. Glob. p. vii.—xi. Wytt. ad Bak. Posid. p. 61.

Ἄλλα ἰκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν—] h. e. ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτὴν ἰσορροπὸν ἰκανὸν εἶναι, intell. *ad eam sustinendam*. STALL.—the dative ἑαυτῷ depending upon ὁμοιότητα: so in Theætet. p. 176. B. ψυχῇ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῶν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Stephens correctly explains the passage: *verum ad eam retinendam satis esse, quod cælum sibi quaquaversus simile sit et quod ipsa sit æquilibris*.

Ἴσορροπίαν.] A spherical body, which is ἰσορροπὸν, i. e. equally attracted on all sides towards its centre, has no need of any foundation to support it, but remains fixed and still; but besides, the earth is situated in the centre of the universe, οὐρανός, which is itself ἰσορροπός, and with which the earth has a common centre. Aristotle attributes the origin of this theory to Anaximander; de Cælo, ii. 13. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά φασιν αὐτὴν μένειν, ὡς περ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξίμανδρος· μᾶλλον γὰρ οὐθὲν ἄνω ἢ κάτω, ἢ εἰς

τὰ πλάγια φέρεσθαι προσήκει (f. προσήκειν) τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἰδρυμένον, καὶ ὁμοίως πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον· ἅμα δὲ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰναντία ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν· ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης μένειν. These are the earliest notices of the phenomena of gravitation and the centripetal forces, which have been since developed in such complete and amazing perfection by the great Interpreter of "nature and nature's laws" to man.

Ἴσορροπὸν γὰρ πρᾶγμα.] Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 39. "de principio terra universa cernatur, locata in media sede mundi, solida et globosa, et undique ipsa in sese nitibus suis conglobata." De Orat. iii. 45. "Incolunitatis ac salutis omnium causa videmus hunc statum esse hujus totius mundi atque naturæ, rotundum ut cælum, terraque ut media sit, eaque sua vi nutuque teneatur."—Ομοίου τινός, of something like itself, like the πρᾶγμα. ἰσοφ.

Πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτό.] Αὐτό must be referred here to τὴν γῆν. Cf. supr. c. 37. sub. fin. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτό.

Μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος.] Heindorf arranges the passage with a view to its sense; καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακ. στηλ. ἀπὸ Φάσ. ἐν σμικρῷ τινὶ μορίῳ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, ὡς περ περὶ τέλμα μύρμ. ἢ βατράχους sc. οἰκοῦντας: the words περὶ τὴν θάλατταν pertaining to ἡμᾶς preced. and not, as some incorrectly explain it, Ficinus among others, to βατράχους. Socrates says that the then known portion of the habitable world, between Phasis, a river of Colchis on the east, and the pillars of Hercules

τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιοῦτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῆ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἃ ξυνεῖρρυκέναι τό τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κείσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐν ᾧ πέρ ἐστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα ὀνομάζουσιν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν

on the west, was but a small portion of the globe itself, compared with whose magnitude, men were but as ants and frogs, and the Mediterranean sea, which is here understood as extending from Pontus to the pillars of Hercules, a mere marsh. India afterwards succeeded the Phasis and Pontus as the eastern boundary of the habitable world, whence Juvenal, 10. 1. "Omnibus in terris quæ sunt a Gadibus usque Auroram et Gangem," &c. Aristot. de Cælo, ii. 14. fin. Meteorolog. ii. 5. Upon the use and sense of τὴν θάλατταν simply, as supr., Larcher observes, ad Herodot. i. 185., "We must recollect that Herodotus wrote for the Greeks, and therefore understood by this term, 'this sea,' that part of the Mediterranean near which the Greeks abode. He has used the same expression B. i. c. 1. 'This sea,' therefore, (*cette mer—ci*) in Herodotus, signifies the sea nearest to the Greeks, i. e. that whose coasts they inhabited, the Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα in B. v. c. 54., the Ἑλληνίς θάλασσα of B. vii. c. 28., the sea in which was the island of Cyprus, that is so say, the Mediterranean or some part of it. Diodorus Siculus, in like manner, calls the Mediterranean, *our sea*, B. v. c. 18. p. 264. v. c. 25. p. 349. Thus in Horace, 'hoc mare' signifies the sea nearest Rome. Epod. ii. 49. sqq." For μέγρι supr. Aug. Tub., and Orig. read μέγρις, but the former is sanctioned by the more numerous and better editions, besides its being in accordance with the precept of the old grammarians, that μέγρι and ἄχρι were to be used in the Attic dialect even before words beginning with a vowel.—Lobeck, ad Phrynic. p. 14.

Τέλεσμα.] Etymol. M. et Hesych. interp. τόπος πηλώδης ὕδωρ ἔχων. Fischer incorrectly explains it, *locus cultus*,

*rura*, τὰ γεωργήσιμα χωρία. Cf. Cels. apud. Orig. iv. 517. Β. καταγελῶν τοῖς Ἰουδαίων καὶ Χριστιανῶν γένος, πάντας παραβέβληκε νυκτερίδων ὄρμαθῶ, ἢ μύρμηξιν ἐν καλιᾷς προελθοῦσιν, ἢ βατράχοις περὶ τέλεσμα συνεδρεύουσιν, ἢ σκώληξιν ἐν βορβόρον γωνίᾳ ἐκκλήσιάζουσι. Senec. Quæst. Nat. i. Præfat. p. 505. "Hoc est illud punctum quod inter tot gentes ferro et igni dividitur. O quam ridiculi sunt mortalium termini! Ultra Istrum Dacus non exeat; Strymo Thracas includat:—Si quis formicis det intellectum hominis, nonne et illæ unam aream in multas provincias dividunt?" &c.

Παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ιδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη.] i. e. *Diversified both in their shape and size.*—Εἰς ἃ ξυνεῖρρυκέναι, Compare with this construction of the infin. in the orat. obliq. c. 16. supr. sub. fin. "Οτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς—ψυχὰς, κ. τ. λ.—τὴν ὁμίχλην, Hesych. ὁμίχλη· ἀήρ παχύς, σκοτεινός, ἀχλύς, ὕδατῶδης σκοτία.

Αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν.] Proclus, in Tim. l. i. p. 56., acknowledges that Socrates and Plato were indebted for this idea of the pure Earth to the sacred tradition of the Egyptians; ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς μὲν ἐν κοίλῳ φησὶν οἰκεῖν· αὐτὴν δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ὅλην ὑψηλὴν· ὁ καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἱερὰ φῆμη παραδεδωκε.

Κεῖσθαι.] *Rests.*

Ὅν δὴ αἰθέρα, κ. τ. λ.] *Which the majority of those who are accustomed to treat of such subjects, call by the name, æther.*—Ὑποστάθμη, *sediment, grounds, or lees.* Anaxagoras also held the doctrine of a higher and celestial earth.—Simplic. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 33. B. 34. A. Hesychius explains ὑποστάθμη by *τρυγία, τρύξ.* V. Wessel. ad Diod. Sic. t. i. p. 211.

περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰωθότων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ ξυρρεῖν αἰεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς. Ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λεληθῆναι καὶ οἰεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὡς περ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οἰοιτό τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ὄρων τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα τὴν θάλατταν ἠγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτά τε καὶ ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακῶς εἶη, ἐκδὺς καὶ ἀνακύψας ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσῳ καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὢν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοῶς εἶη τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι· οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἰεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανὸν καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἄστρα χωροῦντα. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτόν, ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτήτος οὐχ οἴους τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα, ἐπεὶ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἄκρα ἔλθοι ἢ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπ-

Ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκοῦντας—λεληθῆναι.] Sc. λεληθῆναι ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, i. e. that we are unconscious to ourselves of our inhabiting the cavities of the earth, and imagine that we are dwelling upon its surface.

Τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους.] The bottom of the sea, as opp. to τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης infr.

Τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι.] Properly, παρ' οἷ, or παρ' ἑαυτῷ, but the plural is frequently so used after εἴ τις in consequence of its indefinite signification.—Cf. Xen. Mem. Socr. 1. 2. 62. εἴαν τις φανερός γένηται κλέπτων...τούτοις θάνατός ἐστιν ἢ ζημία. So ὅστις and οὔτοι answer to each other. Matthiæ Gr. s. 475. a. s. 487.

Ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.] h. e. Οἰόμενοι, sc. νομίζοντες διὰ τούτου (τοῦ ἀέρος) οὐρανοῦ ὄντος, τὰ ἄστρα χωρεῖν.—The accusative of the participle being used in this and similar constructions, because in ὡς is im-

plied the sense of the verb νομίζω, ἠγοῦμενος, or οἰόμενος. Seag. Viger, c. viii. s. 10. r. 3.

Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦτόν.] Explained by Wyttenbach; Hoc autem idem esse, ac nos propter tarditatem atque infirmitatem ad summum aerem pervenire non posse. Bib. Crit. part x. p. 12. Heindorf will not allow that Plato could have so written after ταῦτόν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμ. πεπον. immediately preced. and as Eusebius reads τοῦτον for ταυτόν, he proposes the further correction τὸ δὲ εἶναι τοιοῦτον· ὑπ' ἀσθ. quum tamen res ita se habeat, ut propter imbecillitatem—ad extremum aerem emergere nequeamus.—Ficinus appears to have read τὸ δὲ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀσθ. Ταυτόν is wanting in Cod. Zittav.

Ἐπεὶ εἴ τις—κατιδεῖν ἂν.] Ἐπεὶ in the orat. obliq. is sometimes followed, as supr., by an infinitive. Seag. Viger, c. vii. s. 6. r. 1. Stephens gives κατιδεῖν ἂν the sense of κατόψεσθαι. The

τοίτο, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, ὡς περ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτουτες ὀρώσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκείνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ. Ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἅπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστὶ καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὡς περ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης· καὶ οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροι εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ἦ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσ-

omission of ἂν in vett. editt., which has been supplied after him, he accounts for from the participle following beginning with ἂν.

'Ανακύψαντα.] *Having emerged* : ἀνακύπτειν properly signifies *to lift up the head after stooping*, as birds do when they drink. Cf. Lucian, de Sacrific. t. i. 532. ὑπερβάντι δὲ καὶ ἀνακύψαντι μικρὸν εἰς τὸ ἄνω, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ νώτου γενομένῳ, φῶς τε λαμπρότερον φαίνεται, καὶ ἥλιος καθαρώτερος, καὶ ἄστρα διανγέστερα, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἡμέρα καὶ χρυσῶν τὸ δάπεδον. Plato uses the term in a similar sense, in Phædr. p. 346. A., where he speaks of the soul as elevating itself above the darkness of the material world, to the full enjoyment of the pure light of truth; ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαιμέν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄντως ὄν.

Οὕτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κ.] Repeated after the parenthesis ὡς περ ἐνθάδε, κ. τ. λ., to make the sense more clear.—Καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανή,—and if our nature were capable of enduring the sight (of those things which are in heaven, and on the surface of the earth,) one would perceive that it was of a truth the heaven, of a truth the light, and of a truth the earth. Ὑπὸ ἀνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 550. b.

Ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ.] h. e. Τὰ κοῖλα τῆς γῆς, ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦντες λελήθαμεν.—Καὶ οἱ λίθοι, Cf. infr. c. 59. Καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους, κ. τ. λ.

Οὔτε φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ θ.] *Nothing at all worthy of consideration, or regard, exists in the sea, &c.* This opinion was held by Plato, Pythagoras and the Egyptians generally, who looked upon all the various productions of the ocean with contempt, and spoke of them in terms of disparagement and abuse. Wyttenbach explains the passage by the figure Hendiadys; *nil existere perfectum (τέλειον) cuius aliqua ratio habeatur, (ἄξιον λόγου).* Cf. in Tim. c. 73. sub. fin. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον γένος ἐνυδρὸν γέγονεν ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἀνοητάτων καὶ ἀμαθεστάτων, οὐς οὐδ' ἀναπνοῆς καθαρᾶς ἐτι ἠξίωσαν οἱ μεταπλάττοντες, ὡς τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ πλημμυλείας πάσης ἀκαθάρτους ἐχόντων, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ λεπτῆς καὶ καθαρᾶς ἀναπνοῆς ἀέρος εἰς ὕδατος θολερὰν καὶ βαθεῖαν ἔωσαν ἀνάπνευσιν ὅθεν ἰχθύων ἔθνος, καὶ τοῦ ὄντων ὀστρέων ξυναπάντων τε ὅσα ἐνυδρὰ γέγονε, δίκην ἀμαθίας ἐσχάτης ἐσχάτας οἰκήσεις εἰληχότων. Hom. Iliad. α'. 316.—παρὰ θῖν ἀλόδς ἀτρυγέτοιο. Orph. Ἄποσπ. vi.

Σήραγγες.] *Σήραγξ* means, according to Hesych. and Suid., *a hollow rock under the sea*; ὕφαλος πέτρα ῥήγματα ἔχουσα. Cf. Virgil, Æneid. i. 108.—"Tres Notus abreptas in saxa latentia torquet," sc. ἔρματα ὕφαλα.

Ἄπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ἦ.] *Ubicumque in mari terra sit.* WYTT.; for some parts of the sea were considered as immense bodies of water only, which were utterly sterile and

θαι οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν ἄξια. ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὐ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔτι πλέον φανεῖν διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν καλόν, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι, ὧ Σιμμία, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τούτου τοῦ μύθου ἠδέως ἂν ἀκούσασθαι.

§. 59. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὧ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὕτη ἰδεῖν, εἰ τις ἄνωθεν θεῶτο αὐτήν, ὧς περ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαιραὶ, ποικίλη, χρώ-

productive.—Καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη. i. e. *they are not in any degree worthy of being compared to the specimens of the beautiful with us.*—Ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὐ—διαφέρειν, i. e. *but on the other hand those things* (already spoken of in the celestial portions of the globe) *would appear still further to excel the things with us.*

Μῦθον λέγειν καλόν.] See supr. c. 4. sub. fin. ποιῆν μύθους ἄλλ' οὐ λόγους. From the text as supr. it would appear, that what had preceded was to be considered as λόγος, and what followed as μῦθος. However, as Simplicius observes, in Aristot. de Cælo, iii. p. 158. A., this branch of the discussion appears to contain an admixture of both; καὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς γῆς ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι ὁ Πλάτων συνεπαίνει, ὡς μέχρι τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐκτεταμένα· πολλῶν τῶν μυθῶν καὶ αἰνυγματικῶν ὡς οἶμαι χρώμενος· καὶ γὰρ μῦθον καλεῖ τον περὶ αὐτῆς λόγον. Cf. Olympiod. in h. l. Ἴσως δὲ ὅτι, καὶ μῦθος, καὶ λόγος, ὁ αὐτὸς εἶναι δύναται λόγος μὲν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ πράγματα τοιαῦτα, μῦθος δὲ, ὅτι αἰνιξασθαι δύναται καὶ βελτίονα ὑπερέχοντα. in Gorg. c. 166. Ἄκουε δὴ, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὅν σὺ μὲν ἠγάγῃς μῦθον, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον.

Τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ.] i. q. *Tà ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ γῆς, ea quæ sunt in terra subjacenti: in proxima cælo terra: in altissima terra.*—WYTT.

§. 59. Τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὕτη ἰδεῖν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 535. b. For αὕτη, Heindorf and Bekk. αὐτή, incorrectly, for there is a distinct reference to τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα supr. But

τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκ. is correct, because there the earth itself is spoken of as opposed to something preceding.

Εἰ τις ἄνωθεν θεῶτο.] *Should one survey it from above; being placed on an eminence.*

Ὡς περ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαιραὶ.] *Balls made of twelve pieces of different coloured leather.* Socrates alludes here to the dodecahedron, which is according to Plato, the figure of the world. The elementary parts of the world he held to be of regular geometrical forms, whence the five regular, or Platonic bodies, the cube, tetrahedron, octahedron, icosahedron, and dodecahedron; the particles of earth he held to be cubical, those of fire pyramidal, those of air in the form of an octahedron, and those of water in that of an icosahedron; that these are adjusted in number, measure, and power, in perfect conformity to the geometrical laws of proportion; that so from perfect parts one perfect whole was produced, of a round figure, as in itself most beautiful, and best adapted to contain all other figures. The dodecahedron is a body comprehended under twelve equal sides, each of which is a pentagon, or it may be conceived to consist of twelve quinquangular pyramids, whose vertices meet in the centre of a sphere conceived to circumscribe the solid, with consequently equal altitudes and bases. Cf. Plutarch, de Placit. Phil. ii. 6. Πυθαγόρας, πέντε σχημάτων ὄντων στερεῶν, ἕπερ καλεῖται καὶ μαθηματικά, ἐκ μὲν τοῦ κύβου φησὶ γεγενῆσθαι τὴν γῆν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς πυραμίδος τὸ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὀκταέδρου τὸν ἄερα, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ εἰκοσαέδρου τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δωδεκαέδρου τὴν τοῦ παντὸς σφαιραν. Πλάτων δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις Πυθαγορίζει.



μασι διειλημμένη ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὡς περ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρῶνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἄλουργῆ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὄση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ξυγκειμένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἔμπλεα ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἐν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος ξυνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὕσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὐτὰ ὄρη ὡσαύτως, καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν

Quæst. Plat. iv. p. 1003. C.—πότερον, ὡς ὑπονοοῦσιν εἶναι τὸ δωδεκάεδρον τῷ σφαιροειδεῖ προσέκειμεν, εἰπὼν ὅτι τούτῳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντός ὁ θεὸς κατεχρήσατο φύσιν, ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν; καὶ γὰρ μάλιστα τῷ πλήθει τῶν στοιχείων, ἀμβλύτητι δὲ τῶν γωνιῶν, τὴν εὐθύτητα διαφυγόν, ἐνκαμπές ἐστι, καὶ τῇ περιτάσει καθάπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι κυκλοτερές γίνεται καὶ περιληπτικόν· ἔχει γὰρ εἴκοσι γωνίας στερεάς, ὧν ἐκάστην ἐπίπεδοι περιέχουσι ἀμβλεῖαι τρεῖς· ἐκάστη γὰρ ὀρθῆς ἐστι καὶ πέμπτον μορίον· συνήρμωσται δὲ καὶ συμπέπηγεν ἐκ δώδεκα πενταγώνων ἰσογωνίων καὶ ἰσοπλευρών. Senec. Quæst. Nat. iv. 11. "Pila proprietatis est cum æqualitate quadam rotunditas: æqualitatem autem hanc accipe, quam vides in lusoria pila. Non multum illi commissuræ et rimæ earum nocent, quominus par sibi ab omni parte dicatur. Quomodo in hac pila nihil illa intervalla officiant ad speciem rotundi: sic nec in universo quidem orbe terrarum editi montes, quorum altitudo totius mundi collatione consumitur."

Ἦν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι.] *Of which the colours which the painters use are, as it were, samples or patterns: καταχρῶνται being used here in the sense of χρῶνται as frequently, and especially by Plato.*

HEIND.

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ.] Sc. γῆν, i. e. for this part of the earth, indeed, &c.

Γύψου.] Gypsum, or chalk. Herodot. vii. 69.

Στίλβοντα — ποικιλία.] *Refulgent amid the diversity of the other colours.— Ξυνεχὲς ποικίλον--ξυνεχὲς used here, as frequently elsewhere, for ξυνεχῶς; hence the earth is said to be completely and throughout diversified with colours; the necessary property of a variegated surface.*

Καὶ αὐτὰ ὄρη—καὶ τοὺς λίθους, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. Isaiah, 54. 11. 12., "O thou afflicted, tossed with tempest and not comforted! behold, I will lay thy stones with fair colours, and lay thy foundations with sapphires. And I will make thy windows of agates, and thy gates of carbuncles, and all thy borders of pleasant stones." Ezekiel, c. 28. 13., "Thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God; every precious stone was thy covering, the sardius, topaz, and the diamond, the beryl, the onyx, and the jasper, the sapphire, the emerald, and the carbuncle, and gold: the workmanship of thy tabrets and of thy pipes was prepared in thee in the day thou wast created." Cf. St. John, on the New Jerusalem; Apocalypse, 21. 18. sqq.

λόγον, τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδιά τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων κάλλιον. Τὸ δ' αἴτιον τούτου εἶναι, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι καθαροὶ εἰσι καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι, ὡς περ οἱ ἐνθάδε, ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης, ὑπὸ τῶν δεῦρο ξυνεῤῥηκόντων, ἅ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσθαι τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῆ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν. ζῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας,

[*Τὴν τε λειότητα.*] So Stephens correctly, for Vulg. *τὴν τελειότητα*, the former being most applicable, not to stones merely, but equally suitable as the *διαφάνεια* and *χρῶμ.* *καλλ.* to mountains also; besides that *τὴν τελειότητα* is evidently by no means compatible with *καλλίω* seq.

[*Ἵν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε.*] i. e. ὧν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα εἶναι μόρια, of which those well known (ταῦτα) little stones here which are so precious, or so highly prized, are merely fragments. STALL.

[*Σάρδιά.*] *Cornelian*, or *chalydon*; so called from Sardis in Lydia, where it was discovered first. Plin. H. N. xxxvii. 7.—*ἰάσπιδας*, *jasper*; of which the varieties are purple, blue, and green. Id. xxxvii. 8.—*Σμάραγδοι*, *emerald*, or according to others *beryl*, or *aqua marina*, probably *green crystal*, *spar*, or *malachite*. Id. xxxvii. 5.

[*Κάλλιον.*] Vulg. *καλλίω*. Sc. ἐκεῖ εἶναι πάντα.

[*Κατεδηδεσμένοι.*] i. e. *καταβεβρωμένοι*, Hesych. interpr.

[*ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμ.* ὑπ. τῶν δ. ξ.] Eusebius inserts *καὶ* after *ἄλμης*, approved by Heindorf, from both of whom

Wytenbach dissents, and would remove the second ὑπὸ. But as Stallbaum justly observes, it is by no means unusual for prepositions to be repeated in apposition, when one noun is added to another for emphasis' sake, as supr. V. Bremi. ad Æschin. c. Ctes. c. 24.

[*Καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φ.*] *To other things, to animals, and even plants.* When *τε* and *καὶ* are joined in the same member of a sentence, *τε* is copulative and *καὶ* ~~copulative~~ *argumentative*. Seag. Viger. c. viii. s. 7. r. 1.

[*Τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν.*] i. e. *The earth itself*; as opposed to those precious things which were just said to have been found in it.

[*Θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν.*] Cf. Origen, adv. Celsum, iii. p. 499. Ε. ὅσον ἐπὶ σοί, ὃ οὗτος, κούφαις ὑπάγονται ἐλπίσι καὶ οἱ τὸν Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος παραδεξάμενοι περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον, πεφυκνίας ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀψίδα (the arch or vault) τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπουρανίῳ τόπῳ θεωρεῖν τὰ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν θεάματα.

[*Τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ, κ. τ. λ.*] Some of those men and animals inhabited the midlands, others lived in the vicinity of the air, which was to them what the sea

τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀέρα ὡς περ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νήσοις ἄς περιρρέειν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἡπίερω οὐσας· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὃ περ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. Τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κρᾶσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὥστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν ἐνθάδε καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ἢ περ ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκε καὶ αἰθῆρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἔδη τε καὶ ἱερά αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας ξυνουσίας γίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὀράσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

§. 60. Καὶ ὄλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι

was to those who dwelt in the cavities of the earth. And others inhabited the islands near to the mainland, which were encompassed by the air.—Ως περ ἡμεῖς, sc. οἰκοῦμεν. Dorvill. ad Chariton. p. 538. ed Lips. "In comparatione post ὡς περ modo casus præcedenti nomini convenit, modo nominativus ponitur, intellectu verbo ex antecedentibus."

Τὰς δὲ ὥρας.] Cf. Ovid. Met. i. 107. "Ver erat æternum, placidisque tepentibus auris Mulcebant Zephyri."—Κρᾶσιν, temperature.

Φρονήσει.] Vulg. ὀσφρήσει, approved by Heind. and Stall.

Θεῶν ἔδη καὶ τὰ ἱερά.] Tim. Plat. Lex. "Ἐδος. τὸ ἀγαλμα. καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἴδονται. So the Latins use *sedes* for the temples of the gods. Drakenborch. ad Sil. Ital. xii. 41. Burmann. ad Ovid. Met. x. 229. "Ἐδος is also frequently used for the statue or image itself, Arpian. Mithridat. p. 717. τὸ δὲ τῆς Ἀθηναῆς ἔδος, ὃ Παλλάδιον καλοῦσι. Herod. Att. Inscript. ii. 2. Ῥηγάλλης ἔδος ἀμφὶ θυοσκῶον ἱρὰ φέρουσαι. Hence ἔδη, h. l. *templa cum statuis*; ἱερα, *quævis loca diis consecrata*. HEIND. For

ἔδη, τ. κ. i. Vulg. ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερα, i. e. *sacred groves, and shrines consecrated in them to the gods*; so in Liv. xxxv. 51. "fanum et lucus."

Ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς, κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *In which the gods, in reality, dwell, &c.* that is, their presence is immediately acknowledged, not secondarily and by uncertain revelations. Philostr. Heroic. p. 666. θεοὺς τε γὰρ, ὧν ὀπαδοὶ εἰσι, γινώσκουσι τότε, οὐκ ἀγάματα θεραπεύουσαι καὶ ὑπονοίας, ἀλλὰ ξυνουσίας φανεράς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιούμεναι.—Φήμας, *colloquial intercourse with the gods*; Æneid. vii. 90. "deorum colloquio."—Μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις, *oracular responses and visions* (lit. sensible perceptions, either in dreams or waking) of the gods.—Αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς, and such like communication takes place between men (αὐτοῖς) and gods (αὐτούς.)

Ἀκόλουθον.] *Conformable, analogous.*

§. 60. Καὶ ὄλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν.] Such Socrates describes the earth naturally to be, and all that pertains to it. Having divided it into upper, middle, and lower, and fully discussed the nature and character of the first, he passes rapidly

καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοῖλα αὐτῆς κύκλω περὶ ὅλην πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς οἰκοῦμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτῶν ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τόπου, ἔστι δ' οὓς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. Τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρῆσθαί τε πολλαχῆ, καὶ κατὰ στενώτερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἢ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ ρεῖν ἐξ ἀλλήλων

over the second, which he supposes to be the habitation of the less pure and unenlightened mortals, and proceeds to a deliberate consideration of the third, the nethermost parts of the earth. His portraiture of the infernal regions is drawn forcibly and effectively, but is involved in no ordinary difficulty from his minute and mazy description of the four rivers by which those regions are traversed, upon which Aristotle remarks, *Meteorolog. ii. 2.* Τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένον περὶ τε τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ἀδύνατόν ἐστι. κ. τ. λ.

Τόπους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι—πλατυτέροις.] Cf. *supr. c. 58. a med. καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλούς ἐν πολλοῖσι τοιοῦτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῆ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντοδαπά καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μέγεθη, &c.* Socrates now proceeds to say, that amongst or throughout those cavities (κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοῖλα) there were many places, themselves of course cavities, bearing different proportions as to shape and size, to that space which we inhabit, *supr. c. 58,* from Phasis to the pillars of Hercules, i.e. Europe; (those being called Europeans by Aristides, *t. 2. 307. ed. Cant., ὅσοι στηλῶν Ἡρακλέους ἐντὸς καὶ ποταμοῦ Φασίδος.*) Some of those places being deeper down and wider (ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον) than the region in which we dwell; some deeper and more narrow (τὸ χάσμα—ἔλαττον ἔχειν); others more shallow (βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει) and broader. *Olympiodorus* mentions a fourth class, which was both shallow and narrow, *Cod. i. p. 157.* "Ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄκρων εἰς τὰ μέσα αὐτῆς καταβάς ὁ λόγος, τετραχῆ διέιλε τὰς κοίλας οἰκήσεις· τὰς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι βαθείας καὶ στενάς· τὰς δὲ κατὰ

διάμετρον (i. e. *on the contrary,*) εὐρείας τε καὶ ἐπιπολαίους· τὰς δὲ ἐπιπολαίους καὶ στενάς τὰς, δὲ καὶ βαθείας τε καὶ εὐρείας.—*Ἀναπεπταμένους, rarentiores.* GOTTL. Cf. *Iliad. φ'. 531. πεπταμένας δ' ἐν χειρὶ πύλας ἔχει.* Mosch. 2. 19. εἰς ἐτι πεπταμένοισιν ἐν ὄμμασιν εἶχε γυνάικας.

"Ἔστι δ' οὓς.] i. e. ἐνίους δέ. See *Matthiæ Gr. s. 482.*

Τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν.] i. e. But all these places have a subterranean communication, by frequent and mutual perforations, some more narrow and others broader. They have conduits also, by which means great quantities of water flow from one place to another, as into craters. There are also perennial rivers of inconceivable magnitude under the earth, both with warm and cold waters; there are vast rivers of fire too, and many of liquid mud, some thinner and some more miry; like the streams of mud which precede the burning torrent of lava in Sicily, and the torrent of lava itself; with which those places severally are filled, to whichever each time the overflow may chance to come.

Κατὰ στενώτερα.] *Vulg. στενώτερα.* Heindorf suggests the Ionic form *στενότερα.* *Herod. ii. 8.* Cf. *Schol. ad Xenoph. Anab. iii. 4. 19. in marg. Cod. Guelf. στενώτερον κοινῶς. στενώτερον κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τὸν καθόλου γραπτέον ἀναλόγως καὶ τὸ ξεινώτερον καὶ ξεινώτερον.* *Etyim. M. p. 275.* τὰ διὰ τοῦ—στερος καὶ—οστος.—εἰ μὲν ἔχει τὴν πρὸ αὐτοῦ συλλαβὴν μακράν, διὰ τοῦ ο μικροῦ γράφεται—εἰ δὲ βραχεῖαν διὰ τοῦ ω μεγάλου, οἷον νεώτερος, σφώτερος· πλὴν τοῦ στενότατος καὶ κενότατος, ἄπερ φησὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ στείνοτος καὶ κείνοτος γεγενέσθαι.

εις ἀλλήλους ὡς περ εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν, καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμούς, πολλοὺς δὲ ὑγροῦ πηλοῦ, καὶ καθαρωτέρου καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὡς περ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ῥύακος πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ· ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὧν ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχη ἐκάστοτε ἢ περιρροῇ γιγνομένη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡς περ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἢ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μέγιστον τυγχάνει ὄν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὁ περ Ὅμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

Κρατήρας.] V. Wesseling, ad Diodor. v. 4. where Ceres is said to have lighted the torches with which she continued to search by night for Proserpine, ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην κρατήρων, i. e. from the fires which burst from the summit of Ætna. Cf. Lucret. vi. 701. "Nunc tamen, illa modis quibus irritata repente Flamma foras vastis Ætnæ fornacibus efflet, Expediam . . . In summo sunt ventigeni Crateres, ut ipsi Nominitant, nos quos fauceis perhibemus et ora."

Πηλοῦ ῥέοντες ποταμοὶ.] Strabo, vi. p. 413. Β. τακίσης ἐν τοῖς κρατήρσι τῆς πέτρας, εἰτ' ἀναβληθείσης τὸ ὑπερχυθὲν τῆς κορυφῆς ὑγρὸν πηλὸς ἐστι μέλας, ῥέων κατὰ τῆς ὄρεινῆς· εἶτα πῆξιν λαβῶν γίνεται λίθος μυλίας τὴν αὐτὴν φυλάττων χροῶν ἢν ῥέων εἴχεν, &c.

Ὁ ῥύαξ.] So the stream of burning lava, from the craters of Ætna, was properly called; Diod. S. xiv. 59. ἐφαρμύων τῶν παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν τόπων ὑπὸ τοῦ καλουμένου ῥύακος, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸ πεζὸν στρατόπεδον περιπορεύεσθαι τὸν τῆς Αἴτνης λόφον. Thucyd. iii. 116. Ἐρρόη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔαρ τοῦτο ὁ ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης.

Ὡς περ αἰώραν τινά.] Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 162. Ὅτι τῆς τῶν ὑπογείων ῥευμάτων ἀντιθέσεως αἰτίαν εἶναι φησι τὴν αἰώραν, ἣ ἐστὶν ἀντιαλάντωσης· καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ζῶον ποιοῦσα τὴν γῆν, εἰσπνέον καὶ ἐκπνέον· καὶ

ὅτι (ε. ἔτι) πρὸ ταύτης ἡ δαιμονία καὶ θεῖα αἰτία: where αἰώρα is correctly explained by ἀντιαλάντωσης, a reciprocal preponderance of the bowls of a balance when set in motion, in which there are equal weights. So this αἰώρα, or *libration* which existed in the earth, caused a perpetual efflux and influx of those rivers, according to the elevation and depression of the places themselves. Αἰώρα, in gymnastics, is applied to an exercise familiar to early life; two boys, one at either end of a beam whose centre rests on a log, reciprocally rising and falling, are said ἀντιαλαντεύειν, i. q. αἰωρεῖν. See infr. αἰωρεῖται καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Ficinus, Scap. Lex., and others, explain αἰώρα by *vas pensile*, which is wholly inconsistent with the sense and tenor of the passage. Ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὕτη ἢ αἰώρα,—i. e. that this αἰώρα is owing to a certain innate property in the earth. One of the chasms or ἔγκοιλα in the earth is far larger than the rest, called by Homer and other poets Tartarus; into this all the rivers already mentioned are emptied, and from this they are again discharged to their respective beds and currents; hence the αἰώρα, which some interpreters removing the stop after τινά, explain as if it was itself ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων, &c. which is utterly inadmissible as far as regards both meaning and grammar.

Ὁ περ Ὅμηρος.] Iliad. θ'. 13. See notes to Pope's Homer, Iliad. θ'. Odysse. λ'. and ω'.

τῆλε μάλ', ἦχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον·  
 ὃ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκείνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποι-  
 ητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ  
 χάσμα συρρέουσί τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ  
 τούτου πάλιν ἐκρέουσι· γίνονται δὲ ἕκαστοι τοιοῦ-  
 τοι δι' οἴας ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ῥέωσιν. Ἡ δ' αἰτία ἐστὶ  
 τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσρεῖν πάντα τὰ ρεύ-  
 ματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ὑγρὸν τοῦ-  
 το. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἀήρ  
 καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταυτὸν ποιεῖ· ξυνέπεται  
 γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ  
 καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὡς περ τῶν ἀναπνεύτων  
 αἰὲ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ  
 ἐκεῖ ξυναιωρούμενον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινὰς  
 ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιὸν καὶ ἐξιόν.  
 ὅταν τε οὖν ὀρμήσαν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν τό-

βάθιστον—βέρεθρον.] Cf. Virg. Æneid. vi. 577. "—tum Tartarus ipse Bis patet in præceps tantum, tenditque sub umbras, Quantus ad ætherium cæli suspectus Olympus." Hesiod. Theogon. 720. Τόσσον ἐνερθ' ὑπὸ γῆς, ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης. Paradise Lost, B. I. "Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace And rest can never dwell; hope never comes That comes to all; but torture without end Still urges, and a fiery deluge fed With ever-burning sulphur unconsum'd: Such place eternal Justice had prepared For those rebellious: here their prison ordained In utter darkness, and their portion set As far removed from God and light of Heaven, As from the centre thrice to the utmost pole."—Βέρεθρον, Hesych. interpr. βαθος, βάραθρον, κατώτατον, ἐσχατον, ἢ πηλάδης τόπος, ἢ κοίλωμα καταχθόνιον.

\* Ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν.] Hesiod. loc. cit. Æschyl. Prom. 154. Eurip. Hippol. 1290.

Εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο.] These words are to be referred to ἐν τι—τερρημένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, supr. of which they explain the cause, whence γὰρ. τ. τ. χ.

Τοιοῦτοι δι' οἴας ἂν κ.] h. e. οἴα ἐστιν ἡ γῆ, δι' ἧς ἂν ῥέωσιν.

Πυθμένα οὐχ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν—.] *Hic liquor nec fundum nec fundamentum habet.* WYTT.—Αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει, rolls or librates, and fluctuates up and down; ἄνω and κάτω are not to be understood of two places only, but of all the parts of this earth which are diametrically opposed. It is to be observed that the cause of this motion in this liquid body is its being equally attracted on all sides towards its own centre, as in the case of the earth, supr. c. 58.

Τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ.] Olympiod. "Ὅτι ὄντος πυρός ἐν μέσῳ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, εἰκότως γίνεται πολὺ πνεῦμα ἐκεῖ. τοῦ μὲν πυρός ἐξατμιδοῦντος τὸ ὕδωρ (*turning the water into vapour*), τὸ δὲ ὕδατος εἰς πνεῦμα ἀναλομένου.—Περὶ αὐτὸ, sc. τὸ ὑγρὸν.

"Ὅταν τε οὖν ὀρμήσαν—ἐπαντλοῦντες.] *When, therefore, the water rushing with violence, descends into that place which is called κάτω, the region underneath, (—καλούμενον is added because in reality neither ἄνω nor κάτω can be applied to the earth, except relatively, according to the different situations of its inhabitants), then (τότε) having passed through the earth (διὰ τῆς γῆς) it flows*

πον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τότε κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ ρεύματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὡς περ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὖ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπη, δεῦρο δὲ ὀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὖθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ρεῖ διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἕκαστα ἀφικνούμενα εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὁδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ. Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγον· πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἔνια

into the beds of the rivers (τὰ ρεύματα) there (κατ' ἐκεῖνα), and fills them up in the manner of those who pump up the water from the hold of a ship. This is suggested as a feasible interpretation of a passage involved in some perplexity. It is to be observed, that τότε κατ' ἐκ. has been adopted supr. after Zeunius and Wyttenbach, as corresponding to ὅταν preced., for τοῖς κατ' ἐκ. the reading of Bekker and Heindorf, who arranges the passage in explan. τὰ ρεύματα εἰσρεῖ διὰ τῆς γῆς τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ, in which, however, he admits, "duriusculum esse ἐκεῖνα sejungere a seq. τὰ ρεύματα, durum itidem, εἰσρεῖν ad dativum τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα trahere; sed aliter tamen non constare sensus." The latter and more serious difficulty is obviated by τότε; but with regard to the former it is absolutely necessary to the sense that κατ' ἐκεῖνα should have the force of ἐκεῖ, as being opposed to ἐνθάδε infr. Further, as κάτω is but a relative term, the water may be said, when it has reached the opposite surface, to have emerged, ἄνω, διὰ τῆς γῆς, and to have spread itself not through the rivers, (as Wyttenbach explains τὰ ρεύματα, in flumina, and again, ὡς περ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες, ut apud nos faciunt hi, qui aquam antlia haurientes eam alteri aquæ affundunt;) but through the beds of the rivers, which became empty again on the return or ascent of the waters to us here, ἐνθάδε, who dwell in some one of the, relatively speaking, superior ἔγκοιλα τῆς γῆς. So V. Cousin;—vers des lits de fleuves.

The sense in which ἐπαντλοῦντες is taken supr. clearing a ship's sink by pumping, evidently accords both with κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω supr. and ἡ ἐπαντλεῖτο infr. It agrees also with the interpretation of Schleiermacher and Schneider V. Ἄντλια. V. Cousin in loc. "Tous les traducteurs: Comme quand on verse de l'eau qu'on a puisée, ou quelque chose d'équivalent, à l'exception de Dacier: comme quand on puise de l'eau avec deux seaux, interprétation arbitraire et ridicule. Quant à la première, elle est tout-à-fait insignifiante et indigne de Platon. Il faut qu'il ait voulu indiquer quelque mécanisme particulier dont on se servait de son temps pour vider les vaisseaux, et par lequel on mettait l'eau en mouvement dans une autre direction que celle de la pesanteur. Nous n'avons que le mot pompe pour exprimer cela."

Τὰ ἐνθάδε.] Intell. ρεύματα.—Διὰ τῶν ὀχετῶν, through the channels.—Εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους, into which severally they make their way.

Πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ ἐπηντλεῖτο.] Far deeper down than they were drawn up; referring to οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες supr., and so obviously as to preclude the emendation of Heindorf, ἐξηντλεῖτο. See upon this construction ἡ ἐπηντ. Matthiæ Gr. s. 450. Obs. 2. Wyttenbach explains it more fully κατωτ. ἢ ὑ' ἐπ. inferius quam ubi, &c., but he is certainly wrong in giving adfundebatur as the sense of ἐπηντλεῖτο.

Πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω—τῆς ἐκροῆς.] But all below or lower than their efflux,

μὲν καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ ἐξέπεσεν, ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἅ παντάπασι κύκλω περιελθόντα, ἢ ἅπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὡς περ οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατόν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. δυνατόν δ' ἔστιν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι, πέρα δ' οὐ· ἄναντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

than the place of their discharge: τῆς ἐκροῆς being the same as ἡ ἐπηγλυεῖτο preced. Socrates meaning to say that these waters, upon their return to Tartarus, issued out again, some deeper, others less so, but all in some degree below the point at which they were discharged.

Καταντικρὺ ἢ εἰσρεῖ.] i. e. καταντικρὺ τῆς εἰσροῆς. Matthiæ Gr. p. 749. note d. s. 481. Obs. 2. V. Cousin in loc. "Aristotle, en refutant cette théorie de Platon, paraît avoir entendu par le mot καταντικρὺ une opposition de lieux par rapport au centre de la terre: πάντα δὲ κύκλω περιάγειν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν . . . πολλὰ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρὺ τῇ θέσει τῆς ἐκροῆς, οἷον, εἰ ρεῖν ἤρξατο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν εἰσβάλλειν. (Meteor. ii. 2.) Et Olympiodore, son commentateur, interprète ce passage dans le même sens. Cette idée ne peut se concevoir qu'en supposant que la figure de l'abîme du Tartare soit circulaire autour du centre de la terre, ce qui est contraire à ce que dit Platon, que le grand abîme est διαμπερὲς τετραμένον δι' ὅλης τῆς γῆς, paroles qu'on ne peut guères adapter à une figure circulaire, car alors il n'y devrait plus de terre, et tout serait abîme. Il faut donc que l'abîme soit plus long que large; mais alors deux points de son contour, pour être à l'opposite l'un de l'autre, ne sont pas pour cela l'un en bas et l'autre en haut, comme le veut Aristotle. L'hypothèse de la figure longitudinale de l'abîme me paraît encore confirmée par les expressions δυνατόν δ' ἔστιν ἐκατέρωσε . . . τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν μέρος . . . ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι, qui indiquent évidemment une opposition des points, sur la direction d'une seule et même ligne, et non sur une infinité des lignes différentes, ce qui devrait ré-

sulter de la figure circulaire, qui a une infinité de diamètres."

Περιελιχθ. περὶ τὴν γῆν ὡς, π. οἱ ὄφ.] Coiled around the earth like serpents.

Εἰς τὸ δυνατόν κάτω καθέντα.] i. e. When they have descended or sunk as low as possible; of the intransitive sense, as here, of καθιέναι, Heindorf adduces examples ad Theæt. c. 65. V. Lobeck, ad Soph. Aj. 842. where μεθιέναι, ἐφιέναι, ἀφιέναι, &c. are shown to be capable of a similar construction.

Ἐκατέρωσε.] Socrates had already said, that on the return of these streams to Tartarus they re-entered the earth always at a lower point than that of their discharge into Tartarus, also that some emptied themselves at a place transversely opposite to that at which they had so entered, and others at the same side. While others, having made one or more circuits of the earth, emptied themselves again into Tartarus, as low down as they could. But as all these waters, which so penetrate in different directions through, and girded round the earth, were forced to return to a common centre, they could only as they re-entered at both sides of the chasm, descend so low as its centre, but not beyond this, for on both sides, if they descended lower, they would be ascending a steep, whereas they could evidently not pass at either side beyond the sphere of their attraction. Ἐκατέρωσε,—ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς ρεύμασι, and τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν μέρος, may be explained by ἄνω καὶ κάτω,—εἰς τὸ ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τὰδε—κατ' ἐκεῖνα—τὰ ἐνθάδε supr. Heindorf refers it to ἔνια μὲν καταντ.—ἔνια δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. But it is not easy to arrive at any certainty upon the de-



§. 61. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ρεύματά ἐστι τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὄντα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέον περι κύκλω ὁ καλούμενος Ὀκεανός ἐστι, τούτου δὲ καταντικρὺ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων Ἀχέρων, ὃς δι' ἐρήμων τε τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, οὗ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχὰι τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινες εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπονται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῶων γενέσεις. Τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῶ καόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ζέουσιν ὕδατος καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλω θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῆ ἄλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἔσχατα τῆς Ἀχερουσιάδος λίμνης, οὗ ξυμμιγνύμενος τῷ ὕδα-

tails of this theory regarding Tartarus, which is elaborately and most needlessly perplexed.

§. 61. Τέτταρ' ἄττα ρεύματα.] Cf. Procl. in Plat. Rep. p. 396. ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης—καὶ τῶν ποταμῶν ἐκεῖθεν τὴν ἱστορίαν παρείληφε, καὶ γὰρ ὅτι πάντων ἐστίν. “Ὀκεανὸς μὲν πρῶτα, τὸν οὕτως ἐστι περῆσαι,” (Od. λ'. 157.) καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. “Ἐνθα μὲν εἰς Ἀχέροντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ρέουσι, Κωκυτός θ' ὃς δὴ Στυγὸς ὕδατος ἐστὶν ἀπορρώξ,” (Od. κ'. 514.) “Ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης Στύγιον αὐτὸν προσείρηκεν.

Εἰς τὰς τῶν ζῶων γενέσεις.] See supr. c. 15. init. c. 31. init. Ἐνδοῦνται. n. V. Cousin; *Sont renvoyés dans ce monde pour y animer de nouveaux êtres.*

Τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει.] h. e. Ἐκρεῖ, as in c. 60. Supr. here called ἐκβολή. Musgrave, ad Eurip. Iph. T. 1042.—Πόντον νοτερόν εἶπας ἐκβολῶν, reads ἐκβολήν, and adds,—“ἐκβολῆ hic a poeta dici videtur, tanquam *scaturigo quædam a terra proveniens.*—

Ἐκβολή enim est *fons, scaturigo.* Auct. de Mundo: *πηγῶν ἀναβλύσεις, καὶ ποταμῶν ἐκβολαί, καὶ δένδρων ἐκφύσεις,* p. 12. Pausanias; *πρὸς δὲ ταῖς Ἐρασινοῦ ταῖς κατὰ τὸ ὄρος ἐκβολαῖς;* p. 67. Ed. Sylb. Non hic loquitur de Erasini in mare exitu, sed de loco ubi e terra ἐκβάλλει.”—Κατὰ μέσον, i. e. between Ocean and Acheron.

Καόμενον.] Att. for καίόμενον. V. Pierson on Mæris, p. 231.—Τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν θαλάττης, *the Mediterranean.* c. 58. supr. *περὶ τὴν θάλατταν.*

Θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης.] *Turbid and muddy.*—Περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῇ γῆ, i. e. *but making the compass of the earth, it arrives, among other places, at the extremity of the Acherusian lake, &c.*—Heindorf proposes to read *περιελιττόμενος δὲ τῆς γῆς ἄλλοσέ τε* (*et in alias terræ partes*) ἀφικνεῖται, &c.; making τῆς γῆς to depend upon ἄλλοσέ, because the reading in the text would imply that the river encompassed the earth externally, whereas the sense requires that the passage should be understood of its windings under ground. But proba-

τι περιελιχθεῖς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωρέω τοῦ Ταρτάρου. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσι Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσῶσιν, ὅπη ἂν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δ' αὖ καταντικρὺ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρῶμα δὲ ἔχοντα ὄλον οἶον ὁ κυανός, ὃν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλον, Στύγα. ὁ δ' ἐμπροσθεν ἐνταῦθα καὶ δεινὰς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίως τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχερουσιάδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτου ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτος κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίως τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι· ὄνομα δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Κωκυτός.

§. 62. Τούτων δὲ οὕτω πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὴν ἀφίκωνται οἱ τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἕκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο οἱ τε καλῶς καὶ ὀσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μῆ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέ-

bly περιελιτ. τῇ γῇ may be used in reference to the earth externally, and περιελιχθεῖς δὲ—ὑπὸ γῆς of its internal windings after it had reached the extremity of the Acherusian lake, and before it arrived at Tartarus. Τῇ γῇ is wanting in Theodoret. Cur. Aff. xi. p. 154. and Euseb. MS. Oxon. Præp. Evang. xi. 38. p. 567.

Κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου.] i. e. Εἰς τι κατωτέρω μέρος τοῦ Ταρτάρου. Cf. supr. Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυνόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς—πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει.

Οὗ καὶ οἱ ῥύακες ἀποσπᾶσ. ἀναφ.] i. e. Of which (Pyriphlegethon), the burning currents emit with violence distinct and forcibly separated portions, in whatever part of the earth they may be.

Εἰς τόπον πρῶτον δεινόν.] i. q. Ἐκπίπτει πρῶτον εἰς τόπον δεινόν.—Κυανός, not only signifies a cerulean, or

bluish colour, but also a gem of a similar colour, but inclined to yellow, which some make a species of jasper, others of sapphire. Plin. H. N. 37. 9. Theophr. de lapidd. p. 218. Bas. Meurs. Cypr. ii. 5. p. 94. Schneider, in Lex. explains κυανόν, as copper ochre, and also lapis Lazuli.

Δεινὰς δυνάμεις.] i. e. A mischievous efficacy.

Χωρεῖ ἐναντίως.] i. q. Ἐξ ἐναντίας χωρεῖ.

§. 62. Διεδικάσαντο.] h. e. *Judicium subeunt*. STALL. See supr. c. 57. init. *διαδικασαμένων*.

Μέσως βεβιωκέναι.] Those who have not been distinguished for the extremes of good or evil in life, are said μέσως βεβιωκέναι, to have run a middle course between virtue and vice, without being remarkable for an adherence to either. Eutrop. de Claudio, 7. 8. “*medie im-*

ροντα, ἀναβάντες ἂ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τις τι ἠδίκηκε, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος· οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξεργασμένοι ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἢ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ρίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐ ποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. Οἱ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκῆναι ἀμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βιάιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνου τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτὸν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὴν δὲ

peravit." Tacit. Hist. i. 49. de Galba. "ipsi medium ingenium magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus."—"Ἄ δὲ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά, —it is not certain what Plato meant by ὀχημα, the material vehicle of the soul; upon which Wyttenbach;—"Itaque accipiendum ex fabulæ verisimilitudine, in fluvialis itineris usum navigia postulantibus." V. Cousin; *ils s'embarquent sur des nacelles, &c.*

Καθαίρομενοι.] Cf. Virgil, *Æneid.* vi. 735. "Quin et supremo quum lumine vita reliquit, Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes Corporeæ excedunt pestes; penitusque necesse est Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris. Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum Supplicia expendunt.—" Suid. v. Ἀχέρων· Ὁ δὲ Ἀχέρων καθαρσίῳ ἔοικε καὶ οὐ κολαστηρίῳ, ῥόπτων καὶ σμύχων τὰ ἀμαρτήματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Εὐεργεσιῶν τιμὰς φέρονται.] *They obtain the reward of their good works.—* Cf. de Rep. x. p. 615. B. εἴ τιςνας εὐερ-

γασίας εὐεργετηκότες καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἴεν.

Ἀνιάτως ἔχειν.] Cf. *Æneas Gaz.* in Theophr. p. 52. οἱ δὲ κακοὶ εἰς Τάρταρον ἐμπεσόντες, ὅθεν οὐ ποτε ἐκβάλλονται, αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκετι ὄνιανται, παράδειγμα δὲ τῆς δίκης γενόμενοι, εἰς αἰεὶ κείσονται· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν Φαίδῳ καὶ Γοργία Σωκράτης δῦσχυρίζετο.

Καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς.] *And when it has repented them.—* Matthiæ Gr. s. 564.

Ἐκβάλλει τὸ κύμα.] Cf. *supr.* c. 60. Αἰωρεῖται καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω.

Κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτὸν.] i. e. *Into Cocytus, so as to be borne a'long the course of its current.* Cf. Xenoph. *Cyrop.* vii. 5. 16. τὸ ὕδωρ κατὰ τὰς τάφρους ἐχώρει ἐν τῇ νυκτί. But κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα seq., at the *Acherusian lake.* Xen. *Anab.* v. 2. 16. Ξενοφῶν στὰς κατὰ τὰς πύλας ὀπίσθους ἐδύνατο κατεκώλυε τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἔξω.—Φερόμενοι, sc. ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν ποταμῶν.

φερόμενοι γένωνται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχερουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα βοῶσί τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὖς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὖς ὕβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἴκετεύουσι καὶ δέονται ἑᾶσαι σφᾶς ἐκβῆναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ ἂν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσί τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον κάκειθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὖς ἡδικήκασιν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐτάχθη. Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὀσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὡς περ δεσμοτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκίζόμενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν

'Ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν.] i. e. *If they should succeed in appeasing them.*

Λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν.] Cf. Eurip. Phœn. 1078. ἕξελλθε—λήξας ὄδυσμῶν πενθίμων τε δακρύων.

Εἰς τοὺς ποταμούς.] Sc. The homicides into Cocytus, the matricides and parricides into Pyriphlegethon.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι, κ. τ. λ.] See upon this construction, Matthiæ Gr. s. 634. 1. where βιῶναι, only once expressed, is understood after *προς το*.—Wytttenbach takes τὸ ὀσίως in the sense of τὴν ὀσιότητα, and explains the passage—*qui autem egregie ad sanctitatem viâsse videatur*: adverbs being frequently used with the article for substantives, as τὸ ἀδίκως for ἡ ἀδικία, τὸ δικαίως for ἡ δικαιοσύνη: so in Phileb. p. 92. G. τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν, for τοῦ καλοῦ. Heindorf proposes, from Theod. Cur. Aff. viii. p. 118. xi. p. 115. to read οἱ δὲ δὴ δόξωσι διαφ. πρ. το ὄσ. β. προκεκρίσθαι, *Quicumque autem videntur, præ cæteris sancte vivendo excelluisse*; but it is probable that προκεκρίσθαι was inserted in Theod. as supr. in explanation of διαφερόντως.—Besides the reading in the text is sanctioned by all the copies, and in the case

of either of the interpretations given above, is alike independent of any correction.

\*Ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν.] Cf. supr. c. 59. Milton, *Il Penseroso*:

— Or let my lamp at midnight hour,  
Be seen in some high lonely tower,  
Where I may oft outwatch the Bear,  
With thrice-great Hermes, or unsphere  
The spirit of Plato, to unfold  
What worlds, or what vast regions hold  
The immortal mind, that hath forsook  
Her mansion in this fleshly nook.

\*Ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.] h. e. *In supernas illas terræ regiones, ubi omnia sunt illustriora, pulchriora, diviniora.* STALL.

Οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκ. καθηράμενοι.] i. e. Those who have weaned themselves from the body and its appetites, and in the study of the sublime precepts of philosophy, enjoy the only real freedom, that of the unpolluted and unshackled mind.

— Wisdom's self  
Oft seeks to sweet retired solitude;  
Where, with her best nurse, Contemplation,  
She plumes her feathers, and lets grow her wings,  
That in the various bustle of resort  
Were all-to ruffled, and sometimes impaired.  
He that has light within his own clear breast,  
May sit i' the centre and enjoy bright day:  
But he, that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,  
Benighted walks under the mid-day sun;  
Himself is his own dungeon.—*Comus.*

ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνουῦνται, ἄς οὔτε ράδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι.

§. 63. Ἄλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα χρῆ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δυσχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἅττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὔσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ χρῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς περ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. Ἄλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἔνεκα θαρρῆν χρῆ περὶ τῆ αὐτοῦ ψυχῆ ἀνδρα, ὅς τις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἶασε χαίρειν ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὄν-

[Ἄνευ τε σωματίων.] Olympiod. Αἱ καθαρθεῖσαι τελῶς εἰς τὸν ὑπερκόσμον τύπον ἀποκαθίστανται ἄνευ σωματίων.

§. 63. Πᾶν ποιεῖν ὥστε.] i. e. Παντι τρόπῳ μηχανᾶσθαι; to make every effort, to leave no means untried, so as to, &c.—Καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη, for the prize is glorious, and the hope is great.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δυσχυρίσασθαι.] It is to be observed that Socrates expresses himself strongly here against any one insisting upon the truth of the theory just laid down, of which and all such it is impossible but that the principles should be speculative and vague. The grand point of the whole discussion had been fully established as an immutable and incontrovertible truth; this once disposed of, as if to unbend the minds of his auditors, and to divert them, for the brief remaining period of his life, from dwelling upon its afflicting close, the philosopher entered upon the subject of a future state, and its concomi-

tant punishments and rewards. From the first he disclaimed being himself assured, or any attempt to assure others that these opinions were to be admitted as well founded or true; that the good and evil should be after this life requited according to their works, was not to be denied, but the nature of this retribution, upon which reason can only speculate, as still remaining unrevealed, it would be absurd to endeavour to illustrate or define.

Τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει.] h. e. Τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι (sc. οἰομένῳ οὕτ. ἔχ.) i. e. this (ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ. ἄτ. κ. τ. λ.), it appears to me to be both becoming in one who so thinks, and worth one's while who so thinks to run the risk of the belief, or to run the risk of having it so thought.—V. Cousin; *La chose vaut la peine qu'on hasarde d'y croire.*—Ἐπάδειν, see supr. c. 24. a med.

Περὶ τῆ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆ.] In respect to his soul.

τας καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσπούδασέ τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ ἐλευθερία, καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περιμένει τὴν εἰς Ἄιδου πορείαν, ὡς πορευσόμενος ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλῇ. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαυθις ἔν τινι χρόνῳ ἕκαστοι πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἡδη καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ σχεδὸν τί μοι ὦρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρόν· δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν νεκρὸν λούειν.

§. 64. Ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἶεν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἢ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παιδῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου του, ὅ τι ἂν σοι ποιούντες ἡμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν; Ἄπερ αἰεί, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν καινότερον· ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιήσετε ἅτ' ἂν

Πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος.] *Thinking that they make the evil (θάτερον) greater:—θάτερον being an Attic euphemism for τὸ κακόν.* V. Valcken. Diatrib. in Eurip. Fragm. p. 112. C. Cf. Plat. in Euthydem. p. 218. F. πλείον γὰρ πον, οἶμαι, θάτερον ἐστίν, ἐάν τις χρῆται μὴ ὀρθῶς ὀψοῦν πράγματι, ἢ ἐάν ἔξ, for the evil, I think, is greater if one mismanages anything than if he leaves it altogether untouched. Ibid. p. 255. C. ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἰόλειος Πατροκλήης εἰ ἔλθοι, πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν, i. e. would do more evil than good. See Wettst. ad Timoth. i. v. 25.

Φαίη ἂν ἀνὴρ τραγικός.] *As a tragic writer would say.* Heindorf justly observes, that if an allusion were intended to any particular poet, Plato would have written κατὰ τὸν τραγικόν, or φησὶν ὁ τραγικός. But it is rather to be supposed that, in the cheerful and happy spirit which never forsook him, Socrates

assumes the mock gravity and pomp of tragedy, and expresses himself in terms analogous to those in which a catastrophe, like his own, might be most movingly described.

βέλτιον εἶναι.] Cf. in Crit. c. 16. ἄμεινον εἶναι.

§. 64. Ἐπιστέλλεις.] The verb ἐπιστέλλειν is peculiarly used in reference to the last injunctions of the dying. Infr. c. 65. καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο.

Ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῖμεν.] i. e. *We may act most agreeably to you.* Seag. Vig. c. iii. s. 12. r. 2.

Ἐμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι.] *Taking care of yourselves; sc. that you may be improved and increased in wisdom and the practice of virtue.*

Ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς.] *To me and mine;—τοῖς ἐμοῖς referring chiefly to his children.*—*κἂν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε, although you should not promise it*

ποιῆτε, κὰν μὴ νῦν ὁμολογήσητε· ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἀμελήτε, καὶ μὴ θέλητε ὡς περ κατ' ἔχνη κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ζῆν, οὐδ' ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν προθυμηθησόμεθα, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάν πέρ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἅμα ἡσυχῆ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀποβλέψας εἶπεν, Οὐ πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οὗτος ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ νυνὶ διαλεγόμενός καὶ διατάττων ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἶεταί με ἐκείνου εἶναι ὃν ὄψεται ὀλίγον ὕστερον νεκρόν, καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι ὡς ἐπειδὴν πῖω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενῶ ἀλλ' οἰχῆσομαι ἀπῖὼν εἰς μακάρων δῆ τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἅμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἅμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με πρὸς

κω.

Οὐδ' ἐὰν πολλὰ ὁμολογήσ. κ. τ. λ.] i. e. *No matter how many promises you may have made, or how earnestly, you will avail nothing the more; it will be all to no purpose.* Seag. Vig. c. iii. s. 10. r. 6.

Οὐ πείθω, ἔφη,—Κρίτωνα, κ. τ. λ.] *I do not convince Crito that I am this Socrates who now confers with you, &c.* i. e. Socrates could not yet, he says, persuade Crito, that he who had hitherto conducted this discussion, and arranged its several arguments, was actually Socrates, the living and immortal mind and soul, whereas Crito spoke as if the dead body, concerning the disposal of which he had asked the question, was still Socrates himself, even after the spirit had fled. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 43. "(De humatione) Socrates quidem quid senserit, apparet in eo libro, in quo moritur: de quo jam tam multa diximus. Cum enim de immortalitate animorum disputavisset, et jam moriendi tempus argueret, rogatus a Critone quemadmodum sepeliri vellet: 'Multam vero,

inquit, operam, amici, frustra consumsi; Critoni enim nostro non persuasi, me hinc avolaturum, neque mei quidquam relicturum. Veruntamen, Crito, si me assequi poteris, aut sicubi nactus eris, ut tibi videtur, sepelito. Sed, mihi crede, nemo me vestrum, cum hinc excessero, consequetur.' Præclare id quidem, qui et amico permiserit, et se ostenderit de hoc toto genere nihil laborare."

Ἐἰς μακάρων δῆ τινας.] Supr. c. 57. Οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δῆ τινα τόπον.—Ἄλλως, *to no purpose, fruitlessly.*

Ἐγγυήσασθε οὖν με—τὴν ἐναντ. ἐγγ.] *Enter then into security for me to Crito, of an opposite character to that which he gave the judges.* Ἐγγυᾶσθαι τινα signifies, *to become security or caution for another.* Demosth. p. 809. ed. Reisk. πρῶτον ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρασχέσομαι, ὡς οὐκ ἠγγυησάμην ἐγὼ τὸν Παρμένοντα, *that I did not go security for Parmeno.* Μάχην μάχεσθαι, ἐχθὸς ἐχθαίρειν, &c. are forms familiar to the Greeks, so supr., ἐγγυᾶσθαι ἐγγυήν, and since ἐγγυᾶσθαι governs an accu-

Κρίτωνα, ἔφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην, ἢ ἣν οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἠγγυᾶτο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴ παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσεσθαι ἀπίοντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥᾶον φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὀρών μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτῆ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεῖν ἅττα πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτῃ ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύττει. Εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρῆν τε χρὴ καὶ φάναι τοῦμὸν σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἠγῆ νόμιμον εἶναι.

§. 65. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκείνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἶπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευε περιμένειν. περιεμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξιόντες, ὅση ἡμῖν γεγонуῖα εἴη, ἀτεχνῶς ἠγούμενοι ὡς περ πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάξιν ὄρφανοὶ τὸν ἔπειτα

sative of the person, hence the form ἐγγύην ἐγγυᾶσθαι τινά τινα or πρὸς τινά.

Οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμ.] Intell. ἠγγυήσατο.

'Αγανακτῆ.] *Should lament or be troubled.* Infr. c. 66. 'Απολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαίετο ἀκρόων, καὶ ὅη καὶ τότε κλαίων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε.

'Ὀς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτῃ.] Ficinus appears to have read ὡς ἢ προτίθεται Σωκράτῃς ἢ ἐκφέρεται ἢ κατορύττειται: but as Heindorf observes, there is no reason for changing the text as supr., as Crito is understood from c. seq. to have undertaken the charge of the funeral rites. Προτίθεσθαι, *to lay out the dead body.* Eurip. Phœn. 1329. ἐγὼ δ' ἦκω μετὰ—γραῖαν Ἰοκάστην, ὅπως Λούσῃ προθῆται τ' οὐκ ἔτ' ὄντα

παῖδ' ἰμόν. Hecub. 609—611. ὡς παῖδα—λούσῃ προθῶμαί θ'. Virg. Æneid. ix. 486. "—nec te tua funera mater Produxit, pressive oculos, aut vulnera lavi." Ἐκφέρειν and κατορύττειν are terms also peculiar to the burial ceremonies. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. B. v. cc. 3. 4.

Οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο.] *Not only as far as regards itself, sc. τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν.* HEIND. With Socrates, Epictetus observes, ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως, ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις; in Arrian. i. c. 17. p. 93.—Πλημμελές, sc. ἐστίν, *is culpable.* Schæfer Melett. p. 4. conjectures that it should be written πλημμελεῖ, upon which Heindorf.—*de hominibus frequens est πλημμελεῖν: num itidem de rebus?*—Φάναι, *to direct.*

§. 65. Ἄνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι.] i. e. *He arose and went into a certain chamber.* Eurip. Heracl. 59. ἀνίστασθαι σε χρὴ



βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούσατο καὶ ἠνέχθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς σμικροὶ ἦσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεχθεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἄττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπιέναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριψεν ἔνδον. Ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πόλλ' ἄττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἔνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτόν, Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαί γε σοῦ ὅ περ τῶν ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρῶνται, ἐπειδὴν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πρόποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπανεῖς, γινώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ' ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον

Εἰς Ἄργος, οὗ σε Λεύσιμος μένει δίκην.—Περιεμένομεν οὖν, κ. τ. λ., more fully, περιεμ. οὖν τοτὲ μὲν—ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διεξιόντες.—Τοτὲ μὲν being omitted sometimes before τοτὲ δὲ as ὁ μὲν before ὁ δέ. Cf. supr. c. 55. init. Ἄμυσον,—τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.

Δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ υἱεῖς.] Cf. Apol. Socr. c. 23. Υἱεῖς—τρεῖς. supr. c. 3.—Τὴν δὲ Ξανθίπην.—Αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες, the female attendants, relations, or kinswomen. Some commentators explain this of the wives of Socrates, in which case, as Heindorf correctly observes, it should have been written, not αἱ οἰκεῖαι γυναῖκες, but αἱ γυναῖκες αὐτοῦ. Cf. Ælian. Var. Hist. xii. 1. 18. ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων γυναικῶν αἱ ἔτηχον αὐταῖς συναελθοῦσαι, διαπεπλεγμέναι τε ἦσαν τὰς κόμας, καὶ διαπεποικιλμέναι τὰ πρόσωπα. In the variety of conflicting testimonies it is not easy to arrive at the truth of this part of Socrates' history, regarding his wives and children. That he had two, Myrto and Xanthippe, most of the an-

cient writers agree upon, but whether they were both alive at the same time, and whether Myrto or Xanthippe was mother to Lamprocles, or Sophroniscus and Menexenus, seems still a matter of great doubt. The probability is, that Lamprocles, the eldest, was the son of Myrto, and that the two younger were the sons of Xanthippe, of whom only mention is made by Plato and Xenophon. Cf. Hemsterhus. ad Lucian. Halcyon. i. p. 184. et Præfat. xxxiii. Panæt. in Plutarch. Aristid. p. 335. C. Athen. xiii. p. 556. A. Bentl. in dissert. Phalarid. de Epist. p. 73. Diog. Laert. ii. 26. Jo. Luzac. in Lect. Att.

Καὶ ἦν ἤδη ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν.] And it was now near sunset. Cf. infr. Ἄλλ' οἶμα—ἔτι ἡλίον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι καὶ οὐπω δεδυκέναι.

Οὐ πόλλ' ἄττα.] i. q. Ὀλίγα ἄττα, pauca quædam. HEIND.

Οὐ καταγνώσομαι γε σοῦ.] I will not reproach you at least with what I reproach others.

Τῶν ἀρχόντων.] Sc. Τῶν ἔνδεκα.

ἀγγελῶν, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἅμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπήει. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, Καὶ σύ, ἔφη χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὡς ἀστεῖος, ἔφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσήει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λῶστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδακρύει. ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ, ὦ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τριψάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἄλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεσι καὶ οὐπῶ δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἅμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνν ὀφρὲ πίνοντας, ἐπειδὴν παραγγελθῆ αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας εὖ μάλα, καὶ ξυγγενομένους γ' ἐνίοις ὧν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου· ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοί τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οὓς σὺ λέγεις, οἴονται γὰρ κερδανεῖν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιήσω· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνειν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πῖων ἄλλο γε ἢ γέ-

Καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν.] Referring to πειρῶ ὡς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα *supr.*

Καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον.] *And during the whole time* (of his imprisonment, *sc.* thirty days) *he used to visit me, and occasionally* (when his other occupations allowed), *conferred with me, and proved himself the kindest of men.*

Εἰ τέτριπται.] The seed of the hemlock was brayed or ground to extract the juice. *Plin. N. H. xxv. 13.*—Ὁ ἄνθρωπος, *sc.* ὁ τῶν ἑνδεκα ὑπηρέτης.

Ἄλλ' οἶμαι—ἔτι ἥλιον εἶναι—] *But I think that the sun is still upon the mountains, and has not sunk as yet.*—There is something exquisitely touching in this short and simple sentence; it is the language of heartfelt but despairing tenderness, that would protract to its latest limit the fatal and unavoidable

result, and claim for a few brief moments more from death, the object in whose life it lived, and in whose sacrifice its only hope had perished.

Πίνοντας.] *Bibere solitos.* WYTT.—the present for *præterite*.

Εὖ μάλα.] *Very freely.*

Καὶ ξυγγενομένους.] *Ei quidem non-nullos suis amoribus potitos.* STEPH.—“*De Venere enim h. l. intelligendum ξυγγένεσθαι.* HEIND.

Ἐγχωρεῖ.] *Phavorin.* Ἐγχωρεῖ λαμβάνεται ἀντὶ τοῦ οἴον τε καὶ δυνατὸν ἐστὶν οἶον, ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι τόδε.

Οἶμαι κερδαίνειν.] With this construction of the infinitive, *Cf.* in *Crit. c. 14. a med.* Ὀμολόγεις—πολιτεύεσθαι. *Ficinus* appears to have read κερδανεῖν.—Ἡ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, *i. e.* *than to bring ridicule upon myself, to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes.*

λωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἑμαυτῷ, γλιχόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνότος. ἀλλ' ἴθι, ἔφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

§. 66. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδί πλησίον ἐστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συχνὸν χρόνον διατρίψας ἦκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, εἶπεν, ἔφη, ὦ βελτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη, ἢ πιόντα περιεῖναι, ἕως ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἔπειτα κατακεῖσθαι καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει. Καὶ ἅμα ὠρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Σωκράτει. καὶ ὡς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἵλεως, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὡς περ εἰώθει ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἔφη, περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείσαι τι; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὐ; Τοσοῦτον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τρίβομεν, ὅσον οἰόμεθα μέτριον εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' εὐχέσθαι γέ που τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρὴ, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. Καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ταυ-

Φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνότος.] Socrates alludes here, probably, to a distich of Hesiod, Ἔργ. κ. Ἡμ. 365. Ἀρχομένου δὲ πίθου καὶ λήγοντος, κορέσασθαι· Μεσσόθι φεῖδεσθαι· δεινὴ δ' ἐνὶ πυθμῆνι φειδῶ.

§. 66. "Ἔως ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκ. γεν.] Senec. de Provid. c. iii. p. 195. "Male tractatum Socratem judicatas, quod illam potionem publice mixtam, non aliter quam medicamentum immortalitates obduxit, et de morte disputavit usque ad ipsam mortem: male cum illo actum est, quod gelatum est sanguis, et paulatim frigore inducto venarum vigor constitit." Plin. Hist. Nat. xxv. 25. "Cicuta quoque venenum est, publica Atheniensium pœna invisâ.—Schol. in Aristoph. Ran. 125. ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν γὰρ οὕτος ὁ θάνατος ἀρχεται,

πρώτους αὐτοὺς ἀποψύχων ὡς τοῦ ζωτικῆς αἵματος περὶ τὴν καρδίαν συστελλομένου.

Οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσει.] And so (while walking up and down,) the poison will work or be effectual of itself; i. e. will require nothing more. V. Cousin; le poison agira de lui même. The Latins use *facere* in a similar sense. Ficinus appears to have read ποιήσεις; so Steph. and Bas. 2.

Καὶ μάλα ἵλεως.] With the utmost cheerfulness; καὶ μάλα is often so used, with an intensive or augmentative power in καί: so *infr.* καὶ μάλα εὐχέρως, κ. τ. λ.

Ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας.] Looking steadfastly, or intently.

"Ἐξεστί τε καὶ χρὴ.] It is both lawful and expedient.

τα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπτε. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύνειν, ὡς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπεκλασον ἔμαντόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἔμαντοῦ τύχην, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἰός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύνων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος, κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν, οὐδένα ὄν τινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων, πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκείνος δέ, Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἦκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναικας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημμελοίεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἦσου-

Ἐπισχόμενος.] i. e. *Putting the cup to his lips* : CORNAR., correctly, according to the sense of the middle voice : ἐπέχειν τινὶ πιεῖν, act. signifying *to give a drink to any one*, as in Aristoph. Nub. 1385. εἰ μὲν γε βρῦν εἴποις, ἐγὼ γνοῦς ἂν πιεῖν ἐπέσχον.

Κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύνειν.] i. e. *Τὰ δάκρυα*. Matthiæ Gr. s. 543. Obs. 2.

Ἄλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ—] *But in spite of myself the tears flowed copiously, &c.* : ἀστακτὶ, *non stillatim, fuse*. HEIND. Valcken. ad Theocr. Adon. p. 228.—Ἐγκαλυψάμενος, *having covered my face with my garment*. Dorvill. ad Charit., p. 274.—Ἀπέκλασον ἔμαντόν, Cf. Cic. Lael. 3. “*Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitrator, nemo unquam erit—nihil enim mali accidisse Scipioni puto : mihi accidit, si quid accidit—*”

Οἷον ἀνδρὸς.] i. e. “*Ὅτι τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς, &c.* Hom. Iliad. ε'. 757. Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὐ νυμεσίζῃ” *Ἄρει τὰδε καρτερὰ ἔργα, Ὅσσάτιόν τε καὶ οἶον ἀπώλεσε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν Μάψ—*;

Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθ.—] i. e. *But Apollodorus, even before this, never ceased weeping, and*

*then indeed bursting out into lamentation, bewailing and complaining, he pierced the heart of every one present except Socrates himself.*—Οὐδένα ὄντινα,—upon this construction, see Matthiæ Gr. s. 306.—Κατέκλασε, Steph. conj. for κατέκλασε. Thes. Gr. Ling. voc. κατακλαίω.

Οἶα.] *In what manner ! how !* Cf. Hom. Odys. β'. 239. Aristoph. Pac. 33.—Οὐχ ἦκιστα,—the superlative of negative adjectives or adverbs is often put with οὐ for the positive without οὐ, especially οὐχ ἦκιστα for *μάλιστα*.—Matthiæ Gr. s. 463.

“Ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευτᾶν.] Correctly rendered by Ficinus, *cum faustis acclamationibus* : so Cornar., *cum laudatione et bonorum verborum pronuntiatione*. See Robinson's Grec. Antiq. pp. 162. 202. 214. 268. Olympiod. Cod. i. p. 168. 261. “Ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ τελευτᾶν ἠξίουσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἱερῶν τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος· καὶ ὅτι ἐνίοτε περισπᾶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν ἀνάγωγον ὁρμήν. The precept of Pythagoras generally, as regarding this *εὐφημία*, is mentioned by Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 149. and its especial importance at the time of

χίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἠσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρυεῖν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑπτίος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δούς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκοπεῖ τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κάπειτα σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κνήμας· καὶ ἐπανιών οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο, καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῶ, τότε οἰχῆσεται. Ἦδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο, Ὡ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῶ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρούνα. ἀλλ'

death, c. 257. "Ὀλως δ' ἄχρι τῆς τέλευτῆς εἶναι τι προστεταγμένον" καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστατον καιρὸν παρήγγελλε μὴ βλασφημεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀναγωγαῖς οἰωνίζεσθαι μετ' εὐφημίας, ἦν περ ἐποιοῦντο διωθουμένους τὴν ἀνδρίαν. (or as Wytt. conj. διορθοῦμενοι τὴν ἀνδρίαν *confirmantes fortitudinem*.)

'Ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν.] See Matthiæ Gr. s. 355.

Διαλιπὼν χρόνον.] *After some time.* Matthiæ Gr. s. 557. p. 969.

'Ἐπανιών.] *Going higher up*, sc. with his hand.—Ψύχοιτο· Ælian. H. A. iv. 23. κωνεῖον δ' ἄνθρωπος πίων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος πῆξιν καὶ ψύξιν ἀποθνήσκει.—Πήγνυτο: Plin. H. N. xxv. 13. in cicut. "Semini et foliis refrigeratoria vis: quæ si enecat, incipiunt algere ab extremitatibus corporis.—Semine trito expressus (succus) et sole densatus in pastillos, necat sanguine spissando. Hæc altera vis. Et ideo sic necatorum maculæ in corporibus apparent." Upon the opt. πήγνυτο, see Buttman Gram. Ampl. t. i. p. 539. Cf. supr. c. 23. διασκεδάννυται. Hom. Iliad. ὦ. 665. Τῷ δεκάτῃ δέ κε θάπτοιμεν, δαινυτὸ τε λαός. Odyss. ε'. 237. λελύτο.

Καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο.] *And he himself touched him*; sc. after he had made those

who were standing by touch him, to show how far the poison had already operated in removing all sensation.

Περὶ τὸ ἦτρον.] *The lower belly*; from the navel downwards. Timæus, Plat. Lex., explains ἦτρον from Hom. Iliad. ν'. 568. ὁ μεταξὺ ὀμφαλοῦ τε καὶ αἰδοίου τόπος,—"ἔνθα μάλιστα Γίνετ' Ἄρης ἀλεγεινὸς διζυροῖσι βροτοῖσιν." Lex Rhetor. MS. "ἦτρον" τὸ ὑπογάστριον οὕτως καλεῖται.

'Ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ.] According to the usual custom on such occasions. Cf. Eurip. Hyppol. 1458. Κρούφον δέ μου πρόσωπον ὡς τάχος πέπλοις. Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 7. 28. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν (ὁ Κῦρος) καὶ πάντας δεξιωσάμενος συνεκαλύψατο καὶ οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν. Liv. iv. 12. viii. 9. Sueton. Cæsar. c. 82. Robinson, Grec. Antiq. B. v. c. 3.

Τῷ Ἀσκληπιῶ—ἀλεκτρούνα.] Those who during sickness had been in danger of death, used to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius, in fulfilment of a vow to that effect, when the deity appeared, by their recovery, to have attended to their prayers. So Socrates would have it understood by this injunction to Crito, that he now felt himself on the eve of liberation from the many pains and perils of his mortal career, and of being restored to the enduring and unmixed

ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων ἄλλ' ὅρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὄς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς.

§. 67. Ἦδε ἡ τελευταία, ᾧ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε

enjoyment of another and a better life. Many different opinions have been given on this subject as to the actual intention of Socrates: Lactant. iii. 20. Tertullian. Apolog. 46. and Havercamp. in loc. Luperc. Beryt. Gram. περὶ τοῦ παρά Πλάτωνι ἀλεκτρύονος. Eudoc. Ion. p. 282. Suid. v. Λούπερκος: to all of which the answer of Fischer is at once the most feasible and satisfactory—"Ego vero assentior iis qui putant, id a Socrate propterea factum esse, quod sperasset, animum suum, ubi vinculis corporis solutus esset, servatum iri et salutem esse consecuturum.—Nam ægroti saluti restituti, Æsculapio gallum immolarunt." So V. Cousin understands the intended sacrifice to be—"en reconnaissance de sa guérison de la maladie de la vie actuelle." That Socrates should just at this moment have recollected, as some say, a vow which he had made in consequence of his recovering from an illness after the battle of Delium; or that he wished to show by this that he did not disown, as he had been accused, the gods of his country; that he was afraid of being charged before Rhadamanthus by Æsculapius for a forgotten vow; or desired of Crito to make such an offering on his behalf, because Apollo had pronounced him the wisest of men:—all these, and similar explanations of the subject, are so far out of keeping with the whole tenor of the dialogue, and this portion of it especially, that it is enough to mention them to prove that they are inappropriate and misplaced; whereas the interpretation which has been preferred as supr. has been not only authorized by the best commentators, but is evidently in complete accordance with the speaker

and the scene.

Εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.] i. e. *But observe, if you have any other charge to give.*

Ὅς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν.] i. e. Ὅς, sc. ὁ Σωκράτης, κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν, *his eyes were fixed: atque illius oculi diriguere.* HEIND. Cf. Chariton. iii. 9. ἐμμανῆς γενομένη σήσασα τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς ἀνεκραγή. Dorvill. in loc.

Ξυνέλαβε τὸ στόμα τε—] *Closed his mouth and eyes.* Kirchman. de. Fusedrib. i. 6. Potter, Archæol. B. iv. c. 3.

§. 67. Ἦδε ἡ τελευταία.] Aristippus, on being asked how Socrates had died, answered; ὡς ἄν ἐγὼ ἐνζαίμην. Diog. L. in Vit. Arist. ii. 8.

Τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν.] i. e. *The very best of those of whom we had experience then, and moreover the most sensible and just.* The passage must be rendered according to the reading as supr., which is sanctioned by all the copies; but Wyttenbach objects to τότε, as conveying but a limited share of praise, and unsuited to the recency of the event, whence he proposes τῶν πώποτε, *eorum qui unquam fuerunt.* Heindorf would read the passage; ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἄν, πάντων, τότε (i. e. *extremo vitæ Socratis die,*) ὡς ἐπειράθημεν, ἀριστον, καὶ, ἄλλως (*per totam ejus vitam*) φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου. V. Cousin prefers the emendation of Buttman and Schleirmacher, ἐκ τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν, &c., which however Plato is more likely to have written so; ἐξ ὧν τότε ἐπειρ.—Stallbaum conj.: ἀνδρός, ὡς φαίμεν ἄν, τότε θ', ὡς ἐπειράθημεν, ἀριστον, καὶ ἄλλως φρ. *viri et tum, quum moreretur, optimi, id quod in eo experti sumus, et per totam vitam prudentissimi atque JUSTIS-*

ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

SIMI. Cf. Xenoph. Anab. i. 9. 1. Κῦρος μὲν οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀνὴρ ὧν Περσῶν τῶν μετὰ Κῦρον τὸν ἀρχαῖον γενομένων βασιλικώτατος τε καὶ ἀρχειν ἀξιώτατος, ὡς παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται τῶν Κύρου δοκούντων ἐν πείρᾳ γενέσθαι.

Upon closing the Phædo, it may probably be asserted with safety, that one only, and that a deeply serious impression, will remain upon the minds of those who have attentively considered the grandeur and importance of its subject,—one not the less interesting because it fully proves how far unaided reason can advance alone, and at what point it fails without the support and guidance of revelation, by which it is finally enabled to arrive at the eminence, from whence, with a vision unimpaired and unobscured, it surveys and comprehends the otherwise inscrutable control of the Supreme “in the heavens above and in the earth beneath.”

Again, to turn from the subject to the philosopher himself, what noble or generous emotion of the heart can fail to be awakened in the contemplation of his character, as portrayed by the master-hand of his devoted and admiring disciple? With the same calmness, self-possession, and gentle affability which had adorned his life; with the same firmness of soul, integrity of purpose, and singleness of heart which had dignified his pursuits, and with the same

zeal which had ever signalized his investigation of unclouded truth, Socrates, on the last day of his earthly existence, appears in the successful support of the soul's immortality, and the uncompromising advocacy of that virtue and purity which alone can render that immortality blessed. The prison, the poison, and the monstrous injustice of the sentence which ordained them, form no theme of complaint with the truly martyr-philosopher; if adverted to at all, it is in language best calculated to deprive death of its worst concomitant, despair, and to console the grief in which he could not participate, by imparting to his mourning friends a share of his own cheering conviction, that to die was really but to begin to live.

The circumstances attending the last moments of Socrates are detailed with the most affecting simplicity, and a fidelity undeviatingly true to the principal and subordinate characters in this unrivalled scene. There is no unnatural straining after false effect; no inappropriate overlay of highly-wrought poetical embellishment. The death of such a man is drawn from the model of his life; unostentatious, meek, and resigned throughout; it may be presumed that there are but few can quit this record of his great yet unobtrusive virtues, and not exclaim with Cotta—“Quid dicam de Socrate? Cujus morti illacrymari soleo, Platonem legens.”

Socrates was born at Alopece, a village near Athens, in April or May, B. C. 468, in the eleventh month of the Archon Apsephion; or, according to others, in April or May, B. C. 469, in the fifth month of Apsephion, and died B. C. 400, in the first year of the 95th Olympiad, in the month Thargelion, during which the annual offering was sent to Delos.—Clint. Fast. Hellen. introd. p. xix.

He was the son of Sophroniscus, a poor sculptor, and Phænareta, a midwife, and was trained to his father's art, which he appears to have studied

not without success, having executed a group of the habited graces, which, it is said, were allowed admission into the Acropolis. At his father's death he was left but a small inheritance, which he lost by the dishonesty of a relative, and still continued to support himself by the exercise of his art, devoting all his leisure moments to the study of his more favorite pursuit, philosophy.

His disposition, abilities, and strong propensity towards learning, recommended him to the notice of Crito, a wealthy Athenian, who took him under

his protection, and entrusted him with the tuition of his children. He now relinquished his former occupation, and became a diligent attendant upon the public lectures of the eminent philosophers of his time. His first preceptor was Anaxagoras, upon whose departure from Athens, he attached himself to Archelaus. Prodicus, the sophist, was his preceptor in eloquence; Evenus, in poetry; Theodorus, in geometry; and Damo in music; Aspasia had also some share in the philosophical education of Socrates.

He was not long in attaining to the eminence he deserved; he was the first who checked and exposed, by his own character and influence, the mischief and impositions of the sophists, a large body of professional preceptors at Athens, who, by a vicious system of instruction, being themselves possessed merely of a superficial and seeming knowledge, by an idle abuse of language, and a pernicious perversion of reason, were gradually corrupting the minds and misleading the abilities of the Athenian youth. His successful opposition, and overthrow of this class of false philosophers, whom he encountered with the arms of good sense, irony, and powerful argument, though in the highest degree advantageous to his country, proved, among other things, eventually fatal to himself.

He became, says Tennemann, the instructor of his countrymen and of mankind, not for the love of lucre nor of reputation, but in consequence of a sense of duty. He was desirous, above all things, to repress the flight of speculative theories by the force of an imperturbable good sense; to submit the pretensions of science to the control of a higher authority, that of virtue; and to re-unite religion to morality. Without becoming, properly speaking, the founder of a philosophical school, yet by his example, by what he taught, and by his manner of communicating it, he rendered, as a wise man and popular teacher, immense service to the cause of philosophy; calling the attention of inquirers to those subjects which are of everlasting importance to man, and pointing out the source from which our knowledge (to be complete) must be derived; from an investigation of our own minds.

Concerning the genius, or *dæmon* of Socrates, there have been many and different opinions. The Abbè Fraguier,

Mem. Acad. Bell. Lett. t. iv., understands it of the wisdom and prudence of the philosopher, which enabled him to foresee what others never would have thought of; for prudence, according to Cicero, is a kind of divination. Plutarch and Apuleius, who have written separate treatises on this subject, are in favour of a similar explanation. So also Dr. Nares, in his *Essay on the Dæmon of Socrates*, 8vo. 1782., who remarks, that Socrates believed in the gods of his country, and was not free from the superstition connected with that belief; whence it may be inferred, that in the expressions usually understood to refer to his *dæmon*, he alludes only to some species of divination perfectly analogous to the omens of his age and country, calling the sign, whatever it was, by means of which the supposed intimations were made to him, a *dæmon* or divinity. He would otherwise, as Xenophon observes, have incurred the charge of falsehood and arrogance if he had not declined assuming to himself the merit of an unerring judgment, and if he had pretended to any gift superior to that which is obtained from the divine wisdom by the suggestions of reason.—Whatever Socrates may have intended by it, still, as the same writer observes, it afforded abundant scope for that portion of his accusation in which he was charged with the introduction of new deities.

Socrates has left nothing in writing after him, but his illustrious pupils, Plato and Xenophon, have in some measure supplied this defect. Of the disciples who survived him, Xenophon, Æschines, Simo, Crito, and Cebes disseminated the principles of their master, and lived agreeably to them. Among those who especially devoted themselves to the pursuits of philosophy, Antisthenes, the Athenian founder of the Cynic school, subsequently Aristippus, the chief of the Cyrenaic, and afterwards Pyrrho, gave their attention exclusively to questions of morals, and their practical application. Euclid of Megara, Phædo of Elis, Menedemus of Eretria, were occupied with theoretical or metaphysical inquiries. But the superior genius of Plato embraced both these topics at once, and united the two principal branches of Socraticism, either of which was found sufficient to employ the generality of the Socratic philosophers alone. (Cf. Tennemann, *Man. Phil. Enf. Hist. Phil.*)



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## Ο.

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## Ψ.

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VERSIO LATINA.



## APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

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(1.) **QUA** vos ratione, o viri Athenienses, affecerint accusatores mei, nescio equidem: me certe sic affecerunt, ut mei ipsius pene oblitus fuerim; tanta persuasione dicere visi sunt: quamvis nihil, ut ita loquar, veri ad vos detulerint. Sed ex multis, quæ falso asseverabant, id sum potissimum admiratus, quod vobis cavendum esse monuerunt, ne a me, quasi eloquente, deciperemini. Quod enim asserere id minime erubuerint, cujus ego mox redargutionem opere ipso facturus eram, quandoquidem in præsentia vobis appareo longe ab eloquentia alienus: hoc, inquam, mihi super omnia visum est impudentissimum: nisi forte eloquentem isti vocant vera dicentem. Si enim ita dicant, profiterer equidem me, quamvis non eorum more, rhetorem esse. Quippe cum hi, ut equidem dico, veri nihil dixerint; a me vero vos vera omnia audituri sitis. Neque vero, per Jovem, o viri Athenienses, fucatam a me orationem, quemadmodum ab istis, verborum nominumque elegantia, neque aliter exornatam, sed ex improvise passim contingentibus verbis coacervatam audietis. Confido enim me justa dicturum, neque quisquam vestrum speret, me aliter esse dicturum: alioquin neque ætatem hanc, o viri, deceret, adolescentulorum more verbis studiose formatis huc ad vos ingredi. Quin immo vehementer, o viri Athenienses, id oro et obsecro, ut, si iisdem me verbis in respondendo utentem audietis, quibus et in foro argentariorum mensas, ubi plerique vestrum me nonnunquam audiverunt, et alibi uti soleo; ne admiremini, neve graviter id feratis. Sic enim se res habet. venio equidem nunc primum in iudicium, plures quam septuaginta annos natus: ex quo fit, ut in hac judiciali causa revera sim peregrinus. Et profecto, quemadmodum si peregrinus Athenas venissem, ignosceretis utique mihi peregrina voce et forma loquenti, pro educationis meæ consuetudine: ita et in præsentia vos precor, neque id quidem injuria, ut loquendi formam minime attendatis; quæ prout contingit, tum melior, tum deterior esse po-

test: sed id ipsum consideretis, huc mentem adhibeatis, justane, an injusta dicam. hoc enim iudicis officium est: rhetoris autem officium, vera loqui.

(2.) Justum est autem, o viri Athenienses, me primo quidem ad accusationem primam falso confictam, et ad primos accusatores respondere: deinde ad novissimam, atque novissimos. Me quidem multi jam multis annis falso apud vos accusarunt: quos equidem magis formido, quam Anyti adstipulatores; quanquam et hi sunt in persuadendo potentes. Sed illi potentiores, o viri, qui plerosque vestrum a pueritia occuparunt, accusantes me procul a veritate, atque vobis persuadentes, esse videlicet Socratem quendam sapientem, eorum quæ super aerem, quæque sub terra fiunt, perscrutatorum, qui soleat inferiorem rationem disserendo superiorem ostendere; hi profecto, o viri Athenienses, qui hunc de me rumorem divulgaverunt, mei accusatores potentissimi sunt. Qui enim hæc audiunt, opinantur harum rerum perscrutatores non credere deos esse. Profecto accusatores hujusmodi et permulti sunt; et longo jam tempore me accusant; et in ea ætate vobis suaserunt, in qua plerique vestrum pueri, aut certe adolescentuli, perfacile credidistis, deserta in causa, nemine me defendente. Atque id, quod a defensionis ratione omnium alienissimum est, neque nomina quidem illorum scire licet, atque proferre; præterquam si quis illorum comædus sit. Quotcunque vero per invidiam et calumniam hæc vobis rursus persuaserunt, quive ipsi persuasi persuaserunt aliis; hi omnes infiniti omnino sunt: nec eorum quemquam in iudicium traducere, nec redarguere licet; sed necesse est, adversus istos, tanquam in nocte, pugnare defendendo, atque refellendo, nemine respondente. Existimate ergo et vos, quemadmodum dicebam, accusatores meos duplices exitisse: et qui nuper accusarunt; et qui jamdiu, quales modo describebam: atque iudicate, me quidem oportere prius respondere illis, quos et ipsi prius, multoque magis audivistis. Sed jam respondendum mihi est, o viri Athenienses, illis criminibus, canandumque in hoc tam brevi tempore opinionem istam delere, quam vos per calumnias decepti, longo jam tempore contra me concepistis. Opto autem ita demum adversarios refellere, atque obtinere, si modo id vobis et mihi melius sit futurum. Quamquam difficile id fore arbitror: neque admodum, quale id sit, me latet. Verum, ut Deo placet, ita succedat. nos autem legi parere oportet, ac defensionem pro nobis afferre.

(3.) Repetamus igitur ab initio, quæ sit accusatio, ex qua adversus me nata est illa calumnia, qua confisus Melitus mihi diem dixit. Quid ergo aiunt accusatores mei? tanquam enim si in iudicio adessent, eorum recitetur accusatio, in qua contra me jurant, quæ et vicissim a me exigat iuramentum. *Socrates injuste agit, atque nimium curiose perquiri, quæ sub terra et quæ in cælo sunt, inferioremque rationem reddit superiorem. Præterea alios eadem docet.* Talis utique est accusatio. Nempe talia quædam et vos vidistis in Aristophanis comædia: Socratis enim illic persona circumfertur, affirmans, se per aerem pervagari: et complures ejusmodi nugas. Quarum ego rerum neque multum, neque parum



quidquam scio. Neque propterea hæc dico, quod harum rerum scientiam parvi faciam, si quis in hujusmodi rebus sit sapiens; absit ut tanti criminis reus a Melito accuser, ut præ timore hæc negem: sed quia revera, o viri Athenienses, horum nihil scio. testes autem hujus plerisque vestrum adduco. Oro vobiscum ipsi repetendo invicem aperite, quotquot me colloquentem aliquando audivistis: audivistis autem plerique vestrum. Recensete igitur invicem, num quis vestrum aliquando iis de rebus quidquam, sive multum, sive parum audiverit disputantem: atque ex hoc denique cognoscetis, ejusmodi esse cetera, quæ multi de me circumferunt.

(4.) At enim horum nihil est verum. Quin etiam a quopiam audiveritis, me homines docere, atque inde pecunias cumulare, neque id quidem verum est. Atqui præclarum id mihi videtur, si quis docere homines possit, quemadmodum Gorgias Leontinus, et Prodicus Chius, et Hippias Eleus. horum namque singuli eam facultatem habent, per quam ad singulas profecti civitates, adolescentibus, quibus liceret in patria suorum se civium disciplinæ gratuito commendare, persuadent, ut ipsos aliorum disciplina relicta sectentur, ac data pecunia, gratiam insuper habeant. Est et alius quidam vir hic sapiens, quem ego huc advenisse sum admodum delectatus. contigit sane, ut aliquem offenderem, qui plus pecuniarum Sophistis perpenderat, quam ceteri omnes, Calliam, Hipponici filium. Hunc ergo interrogavi. (duos enim habet filios.) O Callia, inquam, si filii tui pulli equini aut taurini essent, haberemus aliquem, quem illis mercede adhibita præficeremus, qui eos pulchros, et ad propriam virtutem bonos efficeret: (esset vero talis aut equestrium aliquis, aut agricultorum.) Nunc vero, cum filii tui sint homines, quemnam cogitas illis præficere? et quisnam virtutis hujus humanæ atque civilis scientiam habet? Arbitror, id te, cum filios habeas, cogitavisse. estne, inquam, talis aliquis, an non? Est profecto, inquit ille. Quis, inquam, est? et unde? et quanta mercede docet? Evanus, inquit, est, o Socrates, Parius; merces vero ejus quinque minæ. Atque ego Evantum existimavi beatum, si revera hanc habet artem, atque adeo diligenter docet. Atqui ipse, si talia scirem, admodum gloriarer, et magni me facerem. sed certe, o viri Athenienses, hæc equidem nescio.

(5.) At vero requireret forsitan aliquis vestrum, Quidnam, o Socrates, tuum est opus? et unde adversus te exortæ sunt hæc calumniæ? nisi enim aliquid præter aliorum consuetudinem ageres, nunquam tantus de te rumor concitatus esset. nam unde de te sermo tam frequens, nisi egisses aliquid a ceteris alienum? Dic ergo nobis quid tandem id sit, ne nos de te temere aliquid judicemus. Justa sane hæc mihi videtur interrogatio: atque ego vobis conabor ostendere, quidnam id sit, quod mihi nomen hoc, et calumniam peperit. Sed audite jam; etsi vereor, ne forte quibusdam vestrum joculari videar. verumtamen existimate, me vobis vera omnino dicturum. Equidem, o viri Athenienses, non ob aliud certe, quam ob sapientiam quandam, ejusmodi nomen nactus sum. Sed ob quam sapientiam? forte ob eam, quæ humana sapientia est. nam hac revera sapiens esse videor. Illi vero, quos paulo ante commemorabam, majorem

forte quandam humana sapientiam haberent; vel quid dicam, non habeo: neque enim ego ea præditus sum. Quod si quis me hanc possidere dicat, mentitur, et in meam calumniam hæc dicit. Sed ne vobis molestum sit, o viri Athenienses, si quid vobis magnum dicere videar: neque enim ex me duntaxat dicam, sed testem vobis afferam fide dignum. Profecto, si qua mihi est sapientia, qualis ea sit, testem adhibebo vobis Delphicum deum. Chærephontem certe novistis. ille familiaris mihi erat ab juventute, vestræque multitudini amicus, ac pulsus una vobiscum fuit, et simul in urbem reversus. Novistis plane qualis erat Chærephon, quam vehemens ad quodcunque se convertisset. Hic ergo quandoque profectus in Delphos, vaticinium id experiri ausus est. Ne graviter feratis, o viri, quod in præsentia sum dicturus. Interrogavit utique, an esset ullus me sapientior. Respondit Pythia, sapientiozem esse neminem. De his quidem frater iste suus vobis testificabitur: nam ille vita functus est.

(6) Considerate vero, quorum gratia hæc dicam, debeo enim vobis aperire, unde hæc adversum me calumnia sit exorta. Profecto, cum hæc audissem, ita mecum ipse reputavi, Quidnam Deus ait? quidve voluit? Ego enim mihi conscius sum, neque in magnis, neque in parvis esse me sapientem. Quid igitur sibi vult, cum me asserit sapientissimum? Deum quidem mentiri non est credendum: neque enim id fas est Deo. Atque ita in diuturna ambiguitate versatus sum, perscrutans, quid significarit oraculum: post hæc autem vix tandem post longas ambages viam ejusmodi sum ingressus. aggressus enim sum quendam ex his, qui sapientes videntur, quasi in hoc, sicubi unquam, redargutionem vaticinii facturum, oraculoque ostensurum, non me quidem, quem præfecerat, sed illum, esse in sapientia præferendum. Dum ergo illum examinarem: (hujus vero nomen promere non est necessarium; sed erat quidam ex his, qui in republica versantur:) illum, inquam, dum examinarem, unaque dissererem, o viri Athenienses, hunc in modum affectus sum: visus mihi est vir ille videri quidem sapiens tum aliis, tum vel maxime sibi ipsi; esse vero nequaquam. deinde conatus sum illi ostendere, putare quidem eum, esse se sapientem, sed minime esse. Quapropter et ille infensus mihi redditus est; et multi qui aderant, graviter id tulerunt. Itaque ad meipsum reversus, ita mecum ipse reputavi: Ego profecto sum hoc homine sapientior. apparet enim neuter nostrum pulchrum bonumque aliquid nosse: sed hoc interest, quod hic quidem cum sciat nihil, scire se aliquid opinatur; ego vero, quemadmodum nescio, ita nescire me puto. Videor ergo in hac tantula re hoc homine sapientior esse, quod, quæ ignoro, neque scire me arbitror. Post hæc alium adii ex his, qui illo insuper sapientiores habentur; in eoque considerando omnino similiter judicavi, atque illum aliosque multos mihi reddidi inimicos.

(7) Proinde similiter deinceps processi ad alios, non ignorans, quantum adversum me odium concitarem; ideoque non absque dolore quodam timoreque procedebam. Veruntamen necessarium mihi visum est, oraculum divinum omnibus anteferre, passimque

progredi perscrutaturum, quid sibi velit oraculum; hujusque gratia omnes, quotcunque aliquid scire videntur, adire. Et per canem, o viri Athenienses, (oportet enim vobis vera fateri,) tale aliquid mihi contigit hæc ex divino oraculo perquirenti, ut, qui opinione hominum maxime probabantur, eos quasi omnium imprudentissimos invenirem; qui vero inferiores habebantur, eos, quantum ad prudentiam spectat, probabilius se habere. Operæ pretium est, referre vobis errores laboresque meos, quos equidem propterea sustinui, quo a me oraculum adeo probaretur, ut redargui ultra non posset. Post civiles homines ad poetas me contuli, tragœdiarum et dithyramborum aliorumque carminum auctores, quasi hic perspicue admodum deprehensurus, esse me his rudiores. Acceptis itaque eorum libris, in quibus elaboravisse maxime videbantur, sciscitatus sum eorum sensa, ut nonnihil ab ipsis perdiscerem. Erubesco, o viri, verum hic vobis aperire: dicendum est tamen. Alii pæne omnes præsentis, ut ita dixerim, melius de rebus his loquerentur, de quibus ipsi poemata conscripserunt. Deprehendi igitur brevi id in poetis, eos videlicet non sapientia facere, quæ faciunt, sed natura quadam, ex divina animi concitatione, quemadmodum et hi, qui divino furore afflati vaticinantur. nam et hi multa quidem dicunt, atque præclara; sed eorum quæ dicunt, nihil intelligunt. Tali quodam pacto poetæ affecti fuisse mihi videntur: et simul animadverti, eos in aliis quoque propter poesin omnium se sapientissimos judicare, in quibus non sunt sapientes. Abii ergo et hinc eadem omnino sententia, qua et a civilibus vobis abieram.

(8) Tandem vero me ad artifices contuli; mihi ipsi conscius, me, ut ita loquar, in artificii nihil scire; hoc autem noveram multa et pulchra scire: neque in hoc equidem deceptus sum. sciebant enim, quæ ipse nesciebam, et hac in parte me sapientiores erant. Sed, o viri Athenienses, in eodem errore, quo et poetas, peritos artifices deprehendi. nam ob hoc ipsum, quod sua rite perficiebant, unusquisque eorum se in ceteris quoque vel maximis sapientissimum esse putabat. Atqui hic error illam quoque, quæ ipsis inerat, sapientiam offuscabat. Quamobrem, si meipsum oraculi loco interrogarem, utrum eligam, itane me habere, ut habeo, videlicet neque scientem quæ illi sciunt, neque meam inscitiam ignorantem; an utraque habentem, quæ illi habent: responderem plane mihi ipsi simul atque oraculo, præstare, ita ut habeo me habere.

(9) Ob hanc utique inquisitionem meam, o viri Athenienses, inimicitia multæ difficillimæ atque gravissimæ adversus me coortæ sunt; ex quibus multæ sunt calumniæ consecutæ. Nomen vero sapientis mihi propterea exortum est, quod præsentis plurimum illa me putant scire, in quibus alios refello. Videtur autem, o viri Athenienses, revera solus deus sapiens esse; atque in hoc oraculo id sibi velle, humanam videlicet sapientiam parvi, immo nihili pendendam esse. quod vero Socratem nominat sapientem, ob id facere, quo nomine meo, tanquam exemplo quodam utens, quasi sic dicat: Is, o viri, sapientissimus est, qui, quemadmodum Socrates, novit revera sapientiam suam esse nihili pendendam. Hæc igitur ego sic affectus, et nunc perquirere passim, deo parens, et perscrutari non

desino, conveniens si quem aut civium aut peregrinorum esse existimem sapientem. ac si quando mihi ille talis non videatur; tunc ipse deo suffragatus, illum sapientem non esse demonstro. Atque ob occupationes ejusmodi nullum mihi ferme relinquitur otium vel ad publicum aliquid agendum, vel privatum; sed in extrema paupertate ob Dei cultum sum constitutus.

(10) Præterea adolescentes maxime opulenti, quive a negotiis vacant, me ultro sequentes delectantur, cum refelli a nobis homines spectant. quin etiam ipsi nonnunquam me imitati, alios deinde confutare contendunt. Qua quidem in re plurimam reperiunt turbam hominum, aliquid se scire putantium, cum aut nihil sciant, aut perparum. qui vero ab his convincuntur, non tam illis quam mihi redduntur infensi: clamantque esse Socratem quendam scelestissimum juventutisque corruptorem. At si quis sciscitetur ab eis, quidnam vel agendo vel docendo corrumpat, nihil quidem assignare possunt, immo prorsus ignorant. Sed ne deesse illis materia videatur, ad ista confugiunt, quæ communi voce facile philosophantibus objici solent: eos scilicet neque sublimia super terram neque profunda sub terra: neque deos esse putare, rationemque inferiorem quasi superiorem ostendere. vera enim, ut puto, fateri nolunt, se scilicet indignatos, propterea quod convicti fuerint, simulare se illa scire, quæ nesciunt. Utpote igitur ambitiosi et vehementes, et multi, ac velut ex composito, atque obnixæ diligentisque persuasivonis studio me criminantes, vestras aures impleverunt, et jamdiu et nuper calumniis in me studiose confictis. Ex his autem Melitus, et Anytus, et Lycon contra me surrexerunt. Melitus quidem ob poetas mihi infestus; Anytus vero ob artifices atque reipublicæ gubernatores; Lycon denique gratia rhetorum. Quamobrem, quemadmodum ab initio dicebam, admirarer equidem, si opinionem istam tantis conceptam calumniis, tam inveteratam, nunc in tam brevi tempore amovere a vobis possem. Hæc equidem, o viri Athenienses, vera vobis loquor: neque celo, neque subtraho aut magnum quidquam, aut parvum; quamvis ferme norim, in his dicendis me eisdem fore molestum. Quod quidem argumentum vobis est, me vera loqui, atque hanc esse calumniam contra me exortam, ejusque causas ejusmodi esse, et sive in præsentia sive in posterum hæc inquiretis, ita esse inveniatis.

(11.) Ad illa igitur, quæ primi accusatores detulerunt, hæc mihi sufficiens apud vos sit defensio. Ad Melitum vero bonum et, ut ipse ait, patriæ amatorem, ceterosque sequentes accusatores deinceps respondere pergam. Sed horum rursus, tanquam alii quidam accusatores sint, accusationem juramento assertam vicissimque asserendam in medium adducamus. Habet vero ferme se hunc in modum: Socrates injuste agit, juventutem depravans, ac deos, quos civitas putat, ipse non putans, sed alia quædam nova dæmonia. Accusatio quidem est ejusmodi. hujus autem accusationis quamlibet partem discutiamus. Juvenes depravare me objicit, atque in hoc injuriam facere. Ego vero, o viri Athenienses, contra injuriari Melitum dico; propterea quod serio ludit, tam facile homines in judicium trahens, simulansque seriis se rebus incumbere, earumque

rerum habere curam, quæ ipsi nunquam curæ fuerunt. Hoc autem ita esse, conabor et vobis ostendere.

(12.) Heus Melite, responde mihi, numquid ipse maxime cures, ut quam optimi adolescentes evadant. Curo equidem. Age ergo his nunc dicas, quisnam juvenes meliores efficiat. constat enim scire te, cum tibi id curæ sit. Me certe corruptorem eorum, ut ais, jam deprehendisti, accusasti his, in judicium traxisti. ergo age, et eum qui efficit meliores dic his, et quisnam sit ostende. quidnam, o Melite, taces? Videsne, nihil te habere quod dicas? Atqui nonne turpe id tibi videtur esse, ac sufficiens argumentum ad id quod ipse dico, te hæc nunquam curasse? Verum dic jam, bone vir: Quisnam eos efficit bonos? Leges. At vero non istud interrogo, o vir optime. sed quis homo, qui et primum id ipsum norit, leges scilicet, quibus illi meliores fiant. Hi, o Socrates, judices. Quid, o Melite, ais? istine juvenes erudire possunt, bonosque reddere? Et maxime quidem. Utrum omnes? an alii quidem possunt, alii vero nequaquam? Omnes. Bene per Junonem loqueris, et magnam eorum qui prosint juvenibus copiam. Verum quidnam hi, qui audiunt? faciuntne et ipsi meliores, an non? Ipsi quoque. Quid vero senatores? Et senatores. Sed enim, o Melite, cavendum est, ne concionatores forte adolescentes corrumpant. an vero et hi omnes similiter faciunt meliores? Hi quoque. Omnes igitur, ut videtur, Athenienses honestos bonosque reddunt, præter unum me. ego enim corrumpo solus. Itane ais? Ita certe; et quidem vehementer. Magna tu quidem me damnas infelicitate. Proinde mihi responde, an et de equis idem putes: omnes scilicet homines equos bonos efficere, unum vero duntaxat eos corrumpere. an omnino contra unum esse: vel certe perpaucos equitandi peritos reddere meliores equos: quamplurimos autem esse, qui si inter equos versentur, illisque utantur, depravant? Nonne ita se res habet, o Melite, et de equis, et de ceteris omnibus animantibus? Penitus ita, sive tu et Anytus non confiteamini, sive confiteamini. Etenim permagnam juvenes nacti essent felicitatem, si unus duntaxat eos posset pervertere, ceteri vero omnes ipsis prodessent. Ceterum, o Melite, satis demonstras, te nullam juventutis curam habuisse unquam; ac plane declaras incuriam tuam, teque nunquam meditatam fuisse ea, de quibus me accusas.

(13.) Præterea obsecro te per Jovem, o Melite, responde nobis, utrum melius versari possumus inter bonos cives, an inter malos. Responde amabo. nihil enim difficile te rogo. Nonne mali semper mali aliquid agunt his, quibuscum versantur? boni autem bonum? Procul dubio. Estne ullus, qui detrimentum suscipere potius quam emolumentum velit ab his, quibus familiariter utitur? Responde, o bone vir. lex enim respondere te jubet. Estne quisquam qui damnum pati velit? Nullus. Age ergo, tu me huc in judicium vocas quasi juventutis depravatore. an dicis, me id volentem facere, vel nolentem? Equidem volentem dico. Numquid tu, o Melite, longe minor natu usque adeo me grandiori sapientior es, ut plane cognoscas tu quidem, malos obesse familiaribus, bonos vero prodesse? ego autem in tantam insaniam prolapsus sim, ut neque

id cognoscam, si quem ex familiaribus pejorem reddidero, periclitatum me, ne quid ab eo mali perpetiar; atque hoc tantum mihi ipsi malum, ut tu ais, volens inferam? Hæc equidem tibi, o Melite, non credo. arbitror quoque, neminem tibi alium concessurum. Sed aut non depravo adolescentes; vel, si depravo, invitus facio. quapropter tu in utroque mentiris. At si invitus corrumpo, non huc in iudicium involuntaria delicta lex trahi jubet, sed privatim doceri atque castigari. constat enim, si didicero, non amplius me id facturum, quod per ignorantiam faciebam. Tu autem familiariter me emendare noluisti: sed in iudicium rapis, quo eos trahi lex jubet, qui pœna indigent potius, quam disciplina.

(14.) Jam vero ex his manifestum est, o viri Athenienses, quod modo dicebam, nullam huic Melito aut magnam, aut parvam eruditæ juventutis curam fuisse. Nunc age dic, qua ratione me asseras, o Melite, pervertere juventutem. An videlicet, quemadmodum in accusatione scripsisti, quia doceam, non putare deos, quos civitas putat, sed alia quædam nova dæmonia? an non? in his docendis affirmas, juvenes me corrumpere? Omnino quidem ac vehementer hæc assero. Per deos ipsos, o Melite, de quibus nunc nobis est sermo, apertius et mihi et his enarra. Nam ego quidem nondum plane intelligo, utrum dicas, docere me juvenes, ut putent aliquos quidem deos esse. quod si ita est; ego deos esse puto, neque omnino sum absque deo: neque in hoc injuste ago, quamvis non eos, quos habet civitas, sed alios esse deceam. Utrum, inquam, hoc est, in quo me criminaris, quod videlicet deos alios introducam? an me ais omnino negare deos, rursusque, ut negent, alios quoque docere? Assero equidem, te omnino negare deos. O admirabilis Melite, curam ista dicis? Neque solem igitur, neque lunam esse deos credo, ut homines alii. Per Jovem ita, o iudices. nam solem quidem lapidem esse dicit; lunam vero terram. Anaxagoram tu quidem, o amice Melite, accusandum censes; atque ita hos parvi facis, existimans, eos literarum ignaros esse, quasi nesciant, libros Anaxagoræ Clazomenii ejusmodi opinionibus esse plenos, et locus est gymnasticus. Juvenes ais hæc a me discere? quæ liceret interdum, etiam si multa sint, unius drachmæ pretio emere ex orchestra Socratemque deridere, si sua esse fingeret, præsertim quum tam absurda sint. Sed per Deum, o Melite, putasne revera, nullum me deum existimare? Nullum per Jovem. Incredibile est, o Melite, quod dicis; et quidem, ut mihi videtur, etiam tibi ipsi. Mihi enim, o viri Athenienses, nimis contumeliosus ac petulans iste vir, ipsamque accusationem contumelia quadam et petulantia et juvenili temeritate procul dubio conscripsisse videtur. videtur enim ceu ænigma quoddam componere, tentans, an Socrates sapiens deprehendat ipsum quasi ludentem, sibi que ipsi contraria proponentem; vel Socrates una cum auditoribus ipsis decipiatur. Hic namque repugnare sibi in ipsis accusationis verbis mihi videtur, ceu si dixerit, Contra leges agit Socrates deos non putans, sed deos putans. Quæ quidem jocantis nugæ esse videntur.

(15.) Animadvertite, o viri, quo pacto Melitus mihi videtur hæc dicere. Tu vero responde nobis, o Melite. Sed vos, quod ab initio

oravi, ne graviter feratis si pro more meo verba facio. Estne quisquam, o Melite, qui humana quidem esse putet, homines vero nequaquam? Respondeat mihi, o viri, neque modo in his, modo in illis perturbet. estne aliquis, qui equos non putet esse, sed equestria? vel tibicines quidem non esse, sed tibicinum officia? Non est quisquam, o virorum optime. Ego enim pro te et tibi et his aliis respondeo, siquidem ipse non vis respondere. Sed ad hoc saltem, quod magis ad rem pertinet, responde. An est quisquam, qui dæmonia quidem opera opinetur esse, dæmones autem minime? Nullus. Quam tarde et vix respondisti ab his coactus? Nonne igitur dæmonia opera confiteris me et putare et docere, sive nova, sive antiqua sint? omnino enim, ut tu confiteris, dæmonia ego assero, atque hæc quidem in responsione vicissim accusationi rescripta jurabo. Quod si dæmonia puto, necessarium est omnino, putare me dæmones quoque esse. an non ita se res habet? Ita certe. Pono enim te confidentem, quandoquidem respondere non vis. Dæmones autem, nonne aut deos arbitramur esse, aut deorum filios? faterisne hoc, an negas? Prorsus. Nonne si dæmones esse arbitror, ut ipse concedis, dæmonesque dii quidam sunt, id evenit, quod modo dicebam? ænigma proponere te et quasi nugari dicendo, me deos non existimantem, deos tamen rursus existimare, quandoquidem dæmones esse duco? Rursus, si dæmones deorum filii sunt, spurii videlicet quidam, aut ex nymphis, aut ex aliis quibusdam, ut fertur, quisnam hominum filios quidem deorum esse putet, deos vero neget? Perinde enim absurdum foret, ac si quis equorum quidem filios vel asinorum mulos esse putet, equos autem et asinos esse non putet. Sed, o Melite, videris procul dubio accusationem istam idcirco ita posuisse, vel ut ingenii nostri periculum faceres, vel quia, in quo re vera me criminareris, nihil haberes. Tu vero quam ratione persuaderes alicui, vel minimum quidem mentis habenti, non esse ejusdem viri, dæmonia simul et divina putare; ac rursus ejusdem, neque dæmones, neque deos, neque heroes? Nulla certe ratione fieri posse aliter ostendi potest.

(16.) Ceterum, o viri Athenienses, quod quidem ego non deliquerim, quemadmodum Melitus accusat, haud magna mihi purificatione opus esse videtur: sed ea, quæ dicta sunt, sufficere judico. Quod autem ab initio dixi, malevolentiam plurimam esse contra me apud plurimos concitatum, id profecto verissimum est: et hoc me perimet, si quidem perimar; non Melitus, neque Anytus; sed multorum calumnia et invidia; quæ quidem alios quoque multos viros bonos perimit hactenus, et, ut arbitror, perimet. nihil enim grave, vel mirum, si in me obesse non desinat. Forsitan vero ita me quispiam interrogabit: Nonne te pudet, o Socrates, tale quiddam exercere, ex quo continuo in periculum venias moriendi? Equidem huic objectioni justam hanc responsionem dabo: Haud recte, o vir, loqueris, si putas, magnam aut vitæ aut mortis habendam esse rationem homini, cujus vel parva quædam utilitas sit: ac non illud potius duntaxat considerandum, quoties aliquid agit, utrum justa agat, an injusta, aut boni viri opera, sive mala. Alioquin ex hac ratione tua spernendi fuissent semidei omnes, quotcumque apud

Trojam occubuerunt, et alii, et in primis ipse Thetidis filius: qui usque adeo mortis contempsit periculum, ne turpem subiret infamiam, ut cum sibi dea mater properanti ad Hectorem occidendum prædixisset, his ferme, ut arbitror, verbis: O fili, si pro vindicta Patrocli amici tui ab Hectore interfecti, Hectorem interfeceris, ipse peribis; inquit enim, Subito post Hectorem infelix tibi sors imminet: cum, inquam, ab ea hæc accepisset, usque adeo discrimen mortemque contempsit, ut multo magis timuerit turpem vitam amicorum inultis injuriis, quam mortem: statimque responderit, mori se malle pro justa amici vindicta, quam moras trahentem apud naves ridiculum contemptumque vivere. Hunc ergo periculi mortique curam habuisse quisnam dixerit? et profecto ita res se habet, o viri Athenienses. Quo quisque in loco vel seipsum constituit, arbitratus id optimum esse, vel a superiore jubetur consistere; in eo, ut mihi videtur, permanere oportet, periculumque subire, neque mortem, neque aliud quidquam magis quam turpitudinem formidantem.

(17.) Equidem, o viri Athenienses, graviter aberrarem, si cum illis paruerim præfectis, quos ipsi mihi præposuistis et in Potidæa, et in Amphipoli, et in Delio: (tunc enim, ubi illi me consistere jusserunt, ibi constitui, ut quisquam alter, mortisque discrimen subivi:) ubi deus me posuit, permanereque voluit, ut opinatus sum atque existimavi, videlicet philosophantem me vivere, ac meipsum aliosque scrutari; ibi ob mortis alteriusve rei metum ordinem desererem. Pergrave, inquam, id esset delictum, et tunc revera me juste quis in iudicium traheret, quasi deos non putantem, videlicet oraculo non parentem, atque mortem timentem, putantemque me sapientem esse, quum sapiens minime sim. Nam mortem timere, o viri, nihil est aliud, quam sapientem videri eum, qui non sit sapiens. quippe cum id sit scire videri, quæ nesciat. Nemo enim scit, utrum mors summum bonorum omnium contingat homini. metuunt autem, perinde ac si eam scirent maximum esse malorum. Cui vero dubium esse debet, quin hæc ipsa inscitia sit maxime vituperanda, per quam aliquis se putat scire, quæ nescit? Ego autem, o viri, in hoc forsitan a multis hominibus differo: ac si qua in re sapienterem me aliquo esse dicerem, in hac utique dicerem, quod cum haud sufficienter, quæ sunt apud inferos, norim, similiter me non nosse cognosco. Injurias autem inferre, superiorique non obedire vel deo vel homini, malum turpeque esse scio. Hæc igitur, quæ nescio, utrum bona sint, nunquam magis timebo, atque fugiam, quam illa, quæ mala esse cognosco. Quamobrem si me nunc absolvatis, (non credentes Anyto, qui dixit, aut me in iudicium ab initio vocandum non esse, aut vocatum necessario esse damnandum: nam si a vobis absolveret, fore ut filii vestri, Socratis secuti vestigia, omnes omnino corrumperentur) si, inquam, ad hæc vos ita dicatis: o Socrates, Anyto non credimus, teque sententiis nostris absolvimus, hac tamen conditione, ut nunquam post-hac in hac inquisitione philosophiaque verseris: ac si id facere [deprehendere, mortem obeas.] si igitur, ut dicebam, his conditionibus dimittere me velitis, respondebo utique vobis: o viri Athenienses,



diligo vos equidem atque amo ; Deo tamen parere malo, quam vobis. et quamdiu spirabo viresque suppetent, philosophari non desinam, exhortans et docens quemcumque nactus fuero, sicut soleo, hunc in modum : Quid tu, o vir optime, cum civis sis Atheniensis, civitatis amplissimæ ac sapientia et potentia præstantissimæ, non erubescis in eo omnem operam ponere, quo tibi pecuniarum et gloriæ et honoris quam plurimum sit ? ut autem prudentia et veritas, et optimus animi habitus in te sit, neque cogitas, neque curas ? Ac si quis vestrum mecum contenderit, id se curare asseverans, haud statim dimittam illum, neque recedam, sed sciscitabor, examinabo, redarguam. Quod si mihi non videatur possidere virtutem, attamen profiteri ; objurgabo, quod ea, quæ plurimi pretii sunt, nihili pendat, vilissima vero plurimi faciat. Hoc equidem officium præstabo juniore et seniori, quemcumque nactus fuero, rursusque peregrino et civi ; magis autem civibus, quanto mihi genere propinquiores estis. Hoc enim Deus ipse jubet. Reor autem, quod et vos latere non debet, nullum adhuc bonum vobis in hac urbe majus contigisse, quam hoc meum ministerium, quod Deo parens exhibeo. Nihil enim aliud agens circumeo, quam suadens junioribus senioribusque vestrum, neque corporum, neque pecuniarum, neque aliarum omnino rerum curam prius vehementiusque, quam animi, habendam esse, ut quam optimus sit ; docens, non ex pecuniis virtutem, sed ex virtute pecunias, aliaque bona omnia et privatim et publice hominibus provenire. Si igitur hæc docens perverto juvenes, essent certe perniciose. at si quis dicat, me alia quam hæc docere, nihil dicit. Horum gratia, o viri Athenienses, profiteor equidem, sive credatis Anyto, sive non credatis, sive dimiseritis me, sive non dimiseritis, profiteor, me nihil aliud esse facturum, nec si mihi sit pluries moriendum.

(18.) Ne conturbemini, o viri Athenienses ; sed quemadmodum ab initio rogavi, me æquo animo audiatis : erit enim vobis, ut arbitrator, utile, si, quæ nunc dicturus sum, audietis. equidem vobis nonnulla dicturus sum, quæ audientes forsitan ad clamorem in præsentia provocemini. ego vero silentium a vobis exposco. Scitote, si me occideritis talem, qualem vobis modo dicebam, non me læsuos esse vos magis, quam vos ipsos. Me quidem neque Melitus, neque Anytus unquam lædet. neque enim posset : siquidem nefas est, ut arbitrator, meliorem virum a deteriore lædi. Interficere tamen potest, vel pellere, vel contumelia quadam afficere. atque hæc iste quidem et alius aliquis ingentia putet esse mala : ego vero non puto ; sed multo pejus esse, illa facere, quæ nunc iste facit, aggrediens, injuste virum occidere. Quamobrem, o viri Athenienses, non tam mihi nunc opus est, defensionem pro me ipso meditari, ut aliquis existimaret, quam vobis : ne quid me condemnantes contra id munus, quod deus vobis tribuit, delinquatis. Si enim me interfeceritis, haud facile alium talem reperietis, vere quidem, etsi forte id dictum ridiculum est, civitati vestræ a deo adhibitum, velut equo cuidam magno et generoso, sed ipsa mole pigriori, atque calcaribus excitari indigenti : qualem videtur me deus civitati addidisse, qui singulos exsuscitans et monens, et objurgans, non cesso diem totam

ubique vobis assistere. Talem vero alterum non facile nanciscemini, o viri Athenienses. ergo, si mihi credideritis, me vestris sententiis absolvetis. At vero si forte dormitantium more, graviter ferentes vos exsuscitari, me, ut vult Anytus, temere occideritis; reliquum omne tempus dormietis, nisi forsán deus vobis prospiciens alium quendam miserit. Me vero esse talem, ut a deo civitati tributus fuisse videar, hinc potestis animadvertere. Non humanum certe id esse videtur, quod ego mea quidem omnia omnino neglexerim, atque in hac rei familiaris negligentia tot annos jam perseverem, vestro semper intentus bono, dum singulos adeo, tanquam pater, aut frater natu major, suadens, curam virtutis habere. Quod si quam pro officio meo mercedem reciperem, humanam quandam id rationem haberet. nunc vero, quod et vos plane videtis, accusatores isti mei, quanquam impudentissime alia contra me omnia coarcevarunt, hoc unum tamen solita illa impudentia nequaquam ausi sunt pertentare, testesque adhibere, qui probent, me unquam pro his mercedem ullam exegisse, aut petisse. Hujus autem rei sufficientem vobis, ut arbitror, testem afferó, paupertatem meam.

(19.) Sed forsán absurdum alicui videri potest, me privatim hæc consulere singulis, anxie nimis circumeuntem; publice vero in concionibus ausum non fuisse hoc idem civitati consulere. Hujus autem causa est, de qua sæpe me passim dicentem audivistis, divinum videlicet quiddam atque dæmonicum in voce quadam mihi adesse. quod quidem Melitus in accusatione derisit, sed mihi quidem ab ipsa pueritia hoc adest, vox scilicet quædam, quæ quoties fit, me prohibet agere, quod acturus eram, provocat vero nunquam. hoc, inquam, est, quod mihi repugnet, quo minus me ad publica conferam. Et recte admodum mihi adversari videtur. constat enim, o viri Athenienses, si quondam negotia publica aggressus fuisset, jamdiu mihi fuisse percundum: itaque nullam vel vobis, vel mihi attulissent utilitatem. Ne mihi succenseatis, oro, vera dicenti. nemo enim diu salvus esse potest, si aut vestro, aut alteri cuiquam populo legitime adversetur, quo multa injusta atque iniqua, quæ fieri solent in civitate, prohibeat. sed necesse est, eum qui revera pro justitia pugnat, si modo brevi salvus futurus sit, privatam degere, neque rempublicam attingere.

(20.) Horum equidem magna vobis afferam argumenta; non verba quidem, sed, quod vos multifacitis, facta. Audite jam, quæ mihi contigerint, ut planius perspiciatis, nulli me quidquam contra justitiam ob mortis metum concessurum fuisse, atque non concedentem, simul fuisse periturum. Referam vobis equidem molesta quædam atque judicialia, vera tamen. Ego enim, o viri Athenienses, nullo adhuc publico functus sum munere, nisi quod ad consilium sum electus. contigit autem, tribum meam Antiocheam eo tempore præsidere, quo vos decem illos exercitus duces, quia navali pugna interemptos non susceperint, damnare simul omnes prope-rastis, injuste quidem, ut cunctis postea vobis notum fuit. Tunc ego solus ex omnibus præfectis me vobis opposui, ne quid ageretis præter leges, meisque suffragiis restiti. Quo in tempore, cum oratores multi parati essent deferre meum nomen, atque in judicium

trahere, vosque ipsi ingenti idem clamore juberetis; existimavi, oportere me magis pro lege atque justitia subire periculum, quam vobiscum sentire, non sentientibus justa, ob metum carceris aut mortis. Et hæc quidem facta sunt, civitate adhuc sub libertate populi constituta. postquam vero ad paucorum potentiam devenit, est, rursus triginta illi, qui rempublicam occuparunt, vocantes me una cum aliis quatuor in Tholum, jusserunt Leontem Salaminium ex Salamine adducere, quo ille necaretur; qualia videlicet multa illi, et aliis multis eo tempore mandabant, ut complures criminibus suis insolverent. Tunc ego non verbis quidem, sed re ipsa, rursus ostendi, nihil omnino, quamvis dictu rusticus videatur, curare mortem; illud vero omnino curare, ne quid injustum neve impium facerem. Me vero potestas illa terribilis nequaquam ita conterruit, ut injuste aliquid facerem. Sed ubi Tholo egressi sumus, reliqui quatuor in Salaminam adventantes captum Leontem duxerunt: ego vero domum abivi: ac forsitan propterea me illi interfecissent, nisi brevi eorum potestas dissoluta fuisset. Atque horum testes vobis erunt permulti.

(21.) An ergo putatis, tot annos me victurum fuisse, si publica tractavissem, bonique viri officio fungens, justitiæ suffragatus essem, atque, ut oportet, unum id officium omnibus prætulissem? Permulum abest, o viri Athenienses: neque enim alius quisquam hominum ita se gerens, diu salvus esse potuisset. At ego per omnem vitam, sicubi publica tractavi negotia, talem me præstiti, et privatim idem ipse, nemini unquam præter id quod justum est, concedens, vel aliis, vel horum alicui, quos ii, qui me criminantur, meos affirmant esse discipulos. Ego autem nullius unquam præceptor fui. Sed si quis dicentem me ac mea tractantem audire desideravit, sive junior, sive senior, nulli unquam id negavi. Neque vero is ego sum, qui pecuniis acceptis disputem, non acceptis vero taceam: sed pariter diviti atque pauperi interrogandum me præbeo; ac etiam, si quis respondendo audire velit, quæ dico. Et si quis horum probus fiat, vel non, haud juste crimen subirem: quippe cum nulli unquam doctrinam vel tradiderim ullam, vel promiserim. Quod si quis dixerit, privatim a me quidquam vel didicisse, vel audisse, quod nec aliis omnibus commune fecerim, non verum dicit.

(22.) Sed quam ob causam quidam mea consuetudine oblectentur, o viri Athenienses, audite. Omnino verum est, quod vobis supra dicebam, delectari homines, cum redargutioni eorum adsunt, qui se, cum non sint, existimant sapientes. Est enim res non injucunda: mihi vero, ut dixi, a Deo injuncta et per vaticinia, et per somnia, et per omnem modum, per quem aliqua alia sors divina homini quidquam mandarit agendum. Hæc, o viri Athenienses, et vera sunt, et facile arguenda. Enimvero, si ego juvenum alios quidem nunc corrumpo, alios vero jamdiu corrupti, consentaneum esset, ut nunc illorum aliqui seniores facti, quoniam intelligerent, me sibi adolescentibus male consuluisse, contra me insurgerent, ac pœnas deposcerent. at si ipsi nollent, saltem necessarios illorum aliquos, patres et fratres, et alios cognatos, si quid mali a me eorum necessarij passi fuissent, commemorare nunc et pœnas exigere.

Sed adsunt hic, quos cerno, illorum permulti. Primum quidem Crito iste, æqualis meus atque contribulis, Critobuli hujus pater. deinde Lysanias Sphettius, Æschini hujus pater. præterea Antipho Cephisius, pater Epigenis. Adsunt et alii, quorum fratres familiariter me usi sunt, Nicostratus, Theosdotidi filius, Theodoti frater, (et Theodotus quidem defunctus est, ut fratrem precari non possit,) et Paralus hic, filius Demodoci, cujus Theages frater erat: Adimantus quoque, filius Aristonis, cujus frater est iste Plato: denique Æantodorus, cujus Apollodorus hic est frater. Alios permultos referre possum, quorum unum aliquem, præsertim in ejus oratione, oportuit a Melito testem produci. At vero, si tunc oblitus est, nunc saltem producat: ego permittam, afferat, inquam, si quid tale habet, in medium. Sed contra omnino se res habet, o viri Athenienses. omnes enim, ut videtis, convenerunt libenter ad opem mihi ferendam, qui corrupisse eorum necessarios detrimentumque attulisse, a Melito Anytoque accusor. Quod si ipsi, qui depravati sunt, mihi opitularentur, nihil mirum esset: at propinqui eorum, seniores a me nunquam depravati, qua tandem ratione mihi suffragantur, nisi recta quadam et justa? quippe cum et Melitum mentiri, et me vera loqui, cognoscant.

(23.) Quæ igitur pro defensione mea, o viri Athenienses, habeo, ferme hæc sunt, et alia forte similia. Sed forsân vestrum aliquis, ad se moresque solitos se recipiens, graviter ferat, quod, cum levioribus etiam in causis reus multis cum lacrymis soleat deprecari, atque supplicare, ac filios in judicium producere, ut commiserationem commoveant, et alios domesticorum amicorumque permultos: ego nihil horum faciam, quamvis in extremo, ut videtur, discrimine constitutus. his ergo offensus aliquis contra me pertinacius irritetur, atque ipsa in ira sententiam contra me ferat. Si quis ergo inter vos ejus mentis est, ego tamen non censeo obsecrandum, sed hac ratione potius æque me hunc allocuturum: Sunt et mihi, o vir optime, cognati quidam. Neque enim, ut inquit Homerus, ex quercu vel petra, sed ex hominibus natus sum. Itaque et cognatos habeo, o viri Athenienses, et filios tres; quorum unus jam adolescit, duo autem sunt parvuli. nullum tamen eorum huc adducam, supplicaturus eo pacto a vobis absolvi. Curnam igitur nihil horum faciam? Non pertinacia ulla, neque contemptu, viri Athenienses: utrum vero audacter me habeam ergo mortem, an non, alia ratio est. Ad existimationem tamen, et mei, et civitatis totius, non arbitror pertinere, ut ista faciam in hac ætate, et hoc nomine, quod nactus sum; sive id verum sit, sive falsum. Attamen jam opinione hominum præoccupatum est, Socratem inter multos præcipuo quodam excellere. Si ergo hi, qui inter vos sapientia, vel fortitudine, vel quavis alia virtute præstare existimantur, tales erunt, quales sæpe quosdam, cum de illis judicaretur, vidi, turpe nimium erit. qui cum esse alicujus pretii existimarentur, attamen in judicio mirum in modum commiserationi studebant; quasi grave aliquid passuri, si ex hac vita decederent: perinde ac immortales essent futuri, si vos illos non occidatis. Atqui hi mihi videntur civitati dedecus afferre: propterea quod existimare peregrinorum aliquis potest, eos, qui in-

ter Athenienses virtute præstant in magistratibusque ceterisque honoribus superiores habentur, nihil a mulieribus differre. Hæc autem, o viri Athenienses, nec vos, qui alicujus auctoritatis esse videmini, facere decet; neque, etiamsi nos facere velimus, permittere: sed hoc ipsum ostendere, vos eum multo magis damnaturos esse, qui commiserationes ejusmodi introducens, ridiculam reddiderit civitatem, quam illum, qui quietus judicium exspectaverit.

(24.) Proinde, o viri Athenienses, accedit ad ea, quæ de civitatis existimatione dicta sunt, quod nec justum mihi videtur esse, judicem precari, neque precando absolvi, sed docere atque suadere. Non enim ad hoc sedet judex, ut per gratiam concedat, sed ut judicet secundum leges. Atque id jurejurando promisit, non per gratiam cuicumque libuerit condonare, sed judicare secundum leges. Non igitur licet, vel nobis assuefacere vos dejerare, vel vobis, assuefieri. neutri enim nostrum religionem servarent. Nolite ergo, o viri Athenienses, exigere, talia me apud vos agere, quæ neque honesta, neque justa, neque sancta esse puto: et id quidem omnino, præsertim vero per Jovem, cum impietatis erga deum a Melito hoc accuser. Profecto, si pergerem persuadere vobis, precandoque flectere, cum juraveritis, docerem utique, vos non putare deos esse; ac revera, dum pro me defensionem paro, me ipsum interim accusarem, quasi deos nequaquam existimantem. Sed multum abest, ut ita se res habeat. existimo namque esse deos, o viri Athenienses, magis quam quisquam meorum accusatorum; ac vobis deoque permitto, de me judicare, ut mihi et vobis sit conducturum.

(25.) Quod vero non graviter feram, o viri Athenienses, me a vobis esse damnatum, et alia multa faciunt, et illud in primis, quod non præter spem id accidit: verum multo magis admiror utrorumque numerum calculorum. Siquidem non putabam, tam paucorum calculorum numero ab absolute abesse. nunc autem, ut videtur, si tres solum calculi aliter cecidissent, evadebam. Melitum certe nunc evasisse videor: neque evasisse solum; sed unicuique constat, nisi surrexissent Anytus et Lycon, me accusantes, mille drachmas illum fuisse pensurum, quoniam partem quintam calculorum non accepisset.

(26.) Licetur ergo judicium morte vir iste. esto. sed ego, o viri Athenienses, quonam me liceamini postulabo? An non videlicet eo, quo dignus sum? Quid ergo? quidnam dignum est, pati me aut pendere, ob id, quod quæ didici, non siluerim, sed neglexerim, quæcunque multi facit vulgus, quæstum, rem familiarem, præfecturas, conciones, ceterosque magistratus; præterea aufugerim conjurationes atque seditiones, quæ in republica contigerunt, arbitratus, meipsum revera ad æquiora officia esse natum, quam ut ab his salutem meam pendere existimarem? Ad hæc, inquam, me non contuli, quibus occupatus, neque vobis, neque mihi ipsi fueram profuturus: sed uni huic officio duntaxat incubui, ut privatim unumquemque vestrum salutans, maximam, ut equidem existimo, afferrem utilitatem, suadens videlicet unicuique, nihil ex rebus suis prius, quam seipsum esse curandum, ut quam optimus prudentissimusque evadat; nec res civitatis curandas esse prius, quam civi-

tatem ipsam ; et aliarum item rerum curam eadem ratione esse habendam. Quid igitur, cum sim talis, a vobis reportare dignus sum ? Bonum certe, o viri Athenienses ; si modo pro dignitate revera existimetis : ac tale quidem bonum, quale mihi conveniat. Quid igitur convenit viro egeno beneficoque, cui vacare a ceteris occupationibus expediat, quo vos ad virtutem cohortari queat ? Nullum certe est aliud præmium, o viri Athenienses, quod magis virum talem deceat, quam in Prytaneo publico sumptu nutriri : et multo quidem magis, quam si quis vestrum equo, aut bigis, aut quadrigis Olympia vicerit. Nam ille quidem facit, ut felices videamini ; ego vero, ut sitis. præterea ille nutritione non indiget, ego indigeo. Itaque, si pro dignitate ac justitia æstimari oportet, ego me hoc dignum existimo, alimonia scilicet publice in Prytaneo mihi exhibenda.

(27.) Forte vero hæc vobis dicens ita protervus videor, ut in superioribus visus sum, ubi commiserationes supplicationesque detestabar. Id autem haud tale est ; sed ejusmodi potius, o viri Athenienses. Persuasum est enim mihi, ut nemini sponte injuriam faciam. quod quidem idcirco vobis non persuadeo, quia breve tempus habuimus colloquendi. Verum, si lex talis apud vos esset, qualis apud ceteros, ut, ubi mors pœna sit, in eo judicio non diem unam, sed plures disceptetur, vobis, ut arbitrator, persuasissem. nunc vero haud facile fuit, in tam brevi tempore calumnias magnas diluere. Cum igitur mihi persuasum sit, nemini faciendam esse injuriam, permultum abest, ut mihi ipsi sim facturus. Quid ergo ? numquid veritus, ne id subeam, quo Melitus me dignum censet, quod equidem aio nescire me utrum bonum sit, an malum, ut hoc devitem, eligam eorum aliquid, quæ plane mala esse scio, atque hoc me dignum esse censebo ? Utrum ergo vincula ? Et quid oportet me in carcere vitam agere, semper undecimviris servientem ? Utrum pecunias solvere, atque, donec solutæ sint, in vinculis permanere ? At vero id tantundem est, atque quod supra dicebam, cum mihi desit, unde pecunias persolvam. An forte exsilium ? forte enim hoc dignus esse censebor : nimia tamen, o viri Athenienses, me cupiditas vitæ teneret, si adeo imprudens essem, ut non possem animadvertere, si vos cives mei consuetudinem meam sermonesque perferre non potuistis, sed usque adeo gravis invidiosaque vobis fuit mea consuetudo atque oratio, ut mox liberare vos ab illa jam decreveritis, alios tamen facile me putem toleraturos. Permultum abest, o viri Athenienses. Præclara scilicet mihi vita foret, in hac ætate exsulanti, et aliam ex alia civitatem permutanti, et in continua repulsa viventi. Equidem, ut plane intelligo, quocumque proficiscar, audituri me, sicut et hic, sequentur adolescentes : ac si eos repellam, ipsi vicissim, senioribus id persuadentes, me repellent. si non repellam, eorum patres et cognati ob hos ipsos me expellent.

(28.) Forsitan vero dicet aliquis : Nonne potes, o Socrates, in exsilio silentium et quietem agere ? At hoc omnium est difficillimum aliquibus vestrum persuadere. Sive enim respondero, id esse non parere Deo, proptereaque me non posse quiescere, non credetis mihi, quasi per ironiam loquenti : sive dixerò, me ab hoc officio

nolle vacare, quia id homini maximum contingit bonum, diebus videlicet singulis de virtute verba facere, atque de aliis, de quibus me quotidie loquentem vos auditis, atque ita me ipsum aliosque scrutari, vitamque inconsideratam respuendam esse censere; hæc etiam multo minus mihi credetis. Hæc vero, o viri Athenienses, ita ut dico, se habent; sed haud facile persuaderi possunt. Et simul nunquam malo dignari me consuevi. Quod si mihi forent pecuniæ, iudicium pecuniæ licerer, quot pensurus forem; neque obsesset mihi illas amittere. Nunc vero non adsunt; nisi forte, quantum valeo solvere, tanti æstimari velitis. possum vero ferme argenti minam. tanti ergo iudicium æstimo. Plato autem hic, o viri Athenienses, et Crito, et Critobulus, et Apollodorus jubent me triginta minis liceri. ipsi vero tantum vobis promittere parati sunt. liceor ergo tanti. promissores vero argenti hujus hi vobis erunt sufficientes.

(29.) Non multi temporis gratia, o viri Athenienses, criminandi materiam præbuisitis volentibus civitatem vituperare, quia scilicet Socratem occideritis, virum sapientem. dicent enim illi, licet non sim, me sapientem, qui vos vituperare volent. Si ergo breve tempus exspectavissetis, absque vestra opera me contingebat mori. Videte ætatem meam, quam procul jam sit a vita, morti vero propinqua. Neque vero hæc adversus vos omnes dico, sed adversus eos tantum, qui me morte damnarunt. Dico etiam hæc ad hos ipsos. Forsan putatis, me, viri Athenienses, in iudicio concidisse talium verborum inopia, quibus utique persuasissem vobis, si omnia facienda dicendaque putavissem, quibus a vobis absolverer. Longe vero se res aliter habet. Certe ob paupertatem damnatus sum, non verborum quidem, sed audaciæ atque impudentiæ, et quia talia apud vos dicere nolui, qualia vobis auditu gratissima contigissent, audientibus videlicet me deflentem atque lamentantem, et alia facientem multa atque dicentem, ut dixi, me indigna; qualia frequenter ab aliis audire consuevistis. Sed neque ab initio censui, decere, ob periculum devitandum, illiberale aliquid facere; neque nunc me pœnitet, hac defensionis ratione usum fuisse. malo equidem, tali quadam defensione fretus, mortem obire, quam contraria supervivere. Neque enim in iudicio, neque in bello, vel mihi, vel alteri, omnia, quibus vitemus mortem, sunt facienda. nam in præliis sæpe constat interitum vitari, si quis, objectis armis, supplex ad insequentes se convertat. Alia quoque in singulis periculis machinamenta sunt, quibus interitum quis effugiat, si quem non pudeat facere quælibet atque dicere. Sed considerate, o viri Athenienses, haud id quidem difficile esse, mortem effugere, sed multo difficilius, pravitatem. velocius enim illa currit, quam mors. Atqui ego nunc, utpote ob senectutem, tardior a tardiori captus sum; accusatores autem mei, utpote vehementes atque veloces, ab ea, quæ velocior est, pravitate. Et nunc quidem ego abeo damnatus a vobis, mortem subiturus; isti vero a veritate ipsa damnati, pravitati injustitiæque obnoxii. atque ego quidem pœnæ acquiesco, et isti. Hæc igitur forte sic oportebat se habere; arbitrorque, ea habere se mediocriter.

(30.) Post hæc autem vobis, qui me condemnastis, cupio divinare. nam illuc mihi jam perventum est, ubi solent homines divi-

nare, quando videlicet sunt prope mortem. Prædico equidem vobis, o viri Athenienses, si me interfeceritis, supplicium vobis statim post mortem meam esse venturum, ac per Jovem multo durius eo, quo me affeceritis. nunc enim id egistis, putantes liberare vos, quo minus rationem vitæ vestræ redarguenti cuiquam reddere compellamini. Id vero contra omnino vobis accidet. Nam plures futuros arbitror, qui vos redarguant, quos ego compecebam, etsi vos id non sentiebatis: tantoque illi infestiores erunt, quanto et juniores; ideoque vos gravius id feretis. Profecto, si putatis per interfectionem hominum a vituperatione vos absolvere, nimium aberratis. Non enim est hæc liberatio vel valida satis, vel honesta. sed illa tam facillima, quam optima est, non disturbare quidem alios, sed se ipsum comparare, ut quam optimus evadat. Hæc ergo vobis, qui me condemnastis, vaticinatus, finem facio.

(31.) Vobis autem, qui me absolvistis, libenter de hujusmodi re, quæ contigit, verba facerem, quamdiu magistratus negotio distingerentur, necdum eo vado, ubi me oportet mori. Sed, o viri, assistite mihi id tempus. Nihil enim prohibet, invicem (dum licet) confabulari. Nempe vobis tanquam amicis demonstrare volo, quod mihi modo accidit, quidnam menti significet. Mihi quidem, o iudices, (vos enim iudices recte appellare possum,) mirabile quiddam contigit. vox enim illa dæmonis vaticinatrix mihi semper in superiori tempore frequenter omnino offerre se consuevit, et in rebus quidem levissimis se opponens, si quid minus recte facturus fuisset. Nunc autem ea mihi, quæ videtis, acciderunt, quæ profecto putaret aliquis atque existimaret, extrema esse malorum. sed mihi neque domo exeunti mane Dei signum adversatum est, neque dum in iudicium veniebam, neque in aliqua sermonis parte, dum verba faciebam: quamvis alias frequenter, dum loquerer, in medio sermonis cursu consueverit cohibere. nunc autem in hac re nusquam, vel agenti, vel loquenti est adversatum. Quam vero hujus rei causam esse putem, vobis aperiam. Apparet enim, mihi quod contigit, bonum esse. nec recte ullo modo iudicatur a nobis, quicumque mortem opinamur esse malam. Cujus quidem rei magna apud me hæc est conjectura, quod signum mihi, ut consuevit, repugnasset, nisi bonum quid acturus fuisset.

(32.) Cogitare autem hoc pacto possumus, spem multam esse, id esse bonum. duorum enim alterum mors est. nam aut tanquam nihil omnino sit, sensum nullum ullius rei retinet is qui decessit e vita; aut, quemadmodum dicitur, permutatio quædam et transmigratio animæ ab hoc in alium locum. Sive ergo nullus remanet sensus, sed tanquam somnus quidam est, in quo quis somnium cernit nullum, admirabile lucrum erit in morte. Reor equidem, si quem oporteat ad eam noctem, quam tanta transegit quiete, ut ne insomnium quidem ullum videret, alias noctes diesque vitæ totius conferre, atque dicere, quot ipse noctes atque dies in vita melius dulciusque peregerit: reor, inquam, nedum privatum aliquem, sed nec magnum quidem regem, aliquas numerare posse. Si ergo tale quiddam est mors, lucrum esse equidem dico: (etenim nihil plus hoc pacto totum tempus quam nox una esse videtur:) sin autem mors



est tanquam transmigratio quædam hinc in alium locum, ac vera sunt quæ dicuntur, videlicet in alio seorsum a nobis loco omnes defunctos esse, quidnam melius quam hoc esse potest, o iudices? Si quis enim illuc profectus, liber ab his qui profitenter iudices esse, veros repererit iudices, qui iudicare illic perhibentur, Minoem, Rhadamanthum, Æacum, Triptolemum, aliosque, quotcunque semidei juste vixerunt, nunquid ejusmodi transmigratio parvi pendenda censebitur? Rursus Orpheum Musæumque convenire et Hesiodum et Homerum, quam multo aliquis nostrum redimeret? Equidem, si hæc vera sunt, sæpius mori velim, quippe cum mihi imprimis mirifice grata sit futura habitatio illa atque consuetudo, quandoquidem una cum Palamede futurus sum, et Ajace, Telamonis filio, et aliis antiquorum, quicumque falso damnati iudicio decesserunt e vita, apud quod meos casus cum illorum casibus conferre utrinque, ut arbitror, non injucundum foret. Illud præterea maximum, illic degere scrutantem singulos atque examinantem, quemadmodum hic feci, quisnam illorum sapiens sit, et quis, cum non sit, se tamen existimet sapientem esse. Proinde quanti faciendum est, o iudices, perscrutari ducem, qui tantum ad Trojam dixit exercitum? vel Ulixem vel Sisyphum aliosque quam plurimos, quos referre quis potest, viros et mulieres? quibuscum loqui atque examinando versari, inæstimabilis prorsus felicitas esset. siquidem hujus causa, qui illic degunt, haud amplius moriuntur: suntque illi nobis et in rebus aliis beatiores, et in eo insuper, quod reliquum jam tempus permanent immortales; si quidem vera sunt, quæ dicuntur.

(33.) Vos quoque, o iudices, bene de morte sperare debetis, idque unum cogitare verum esse, viro videlicet bono nihil mali accidere posse neque viventi, neque defuncto; neque res illius a diis negligi. Neque vero mea nunc casu aliquo acciderunt, sed mihi id constat, mori jam et a laboribus liberari, mihi melius extitisse. atque hanc ob causam divinum illud signum mihi non obstitit. Nec equidem haud admodum his indignor qui accusarunt me vel condemnarunt: quamvis non hac mente accusaverint me atque damnaverint, sed quia detrimentum mihi inferre sperabant. ob hoc utique illis est succensendum. (Sed jam ad eosdem illos reversus, sic eos alloquor :) Tantum tamen vos precor, o viri, ut meos quoque filios, cum adoleverint, si ipsi similiter atque ego vobis molesti sint, pœnis similiter afficiatis; præsertim, si videantur vobis vel pecuniarum, vel alterius cujusquam rei majorem, quam virtutis, curam habere: atque si videri velint, putentve, se alicujus esse pretii, cum nullius sint, illos objurgetis, quemadmodum ego vos; quod non illis incumbant, quibus est incumbendum, ac existiment, cum nullius pretii sint, se aliquid esse. Quod si hæc feceritis, justa a vobis passus fuero, egoque et filii. Sed jam hora est hinc abire, me quidem, ut moriar; vos autem, ut vitam agatis. Utri vero nostrum in melius eant, omnibus præterquam deo est incertum.



## CRITO.

SOCRATES, CRITO.

(1) **CURNAM** hac hora venisti, o Crito? annon valde adhuc est ante lucem? **CR.** Valde quidem. **SO.** Quando vero maxime? **CR.** Profunda aurora. **SO.** Admiror, quemadmodum ipse custos carceris tibi obtemperare voluerit. **CR.** Familiaris jam mihi est, o Socrates, ob crebrum huc adventum meum. Præterea beneficii nonnihil a me accepit. **SO.** Venistine modo? an jam est dudum? **CR.** Satis dudum. **SO.** Proinde cur non statim me excitasti, sed silentio assedisti? **CR.** Nunquam per Jovem, o Socrates, excitassem. neque enim ipse vellem in tanto dolore evigilare. Sed te jamdudum admiror, sentiens, quam suaviter dormias; et consulto non excitavi te, ut quam placidissime degeres. Equidem et per omnem vitam ob hujusmodi morem beatum te judicavi; maxime vero in præsentī calamitate, quod eam tam facile ac placide feras. **SO.** Perabsurdum esset, o Crito, si quis tam grandis natu imminentem mortem moleste ferat. **CR.** Sed et alii, o Socrates, æque senes similibus calamitatibus opprimuntur, quos tamen ætas ab afflictione, quam sors præsens affert secum, non liberat. **SO.** Ita est. Sed curnam adeo mane venisti? **CR.** Nuntium, o Socrates, ferens acerbum; non tibi quidem, ut mihi apparet, sed mihi potius, et familiaribus tuis omnibus, et acerbum et gravem. quod equidem inter gravissima, ut arbitror, numeraverim. **SO.** Quidnam hoc? nunquid navis ex Delo jam rediit? qua reducta, mihi est moriendum. **CR.** Nondum rediit quidem; sed reditura videtur hodie, quemadmodum nuntiant nonnulli e Sunio venientes, qui ibi eam reliquerunt. constat ergo ex his nuntiis, hodie esse venturam; ideoque necessarium fore, te cras, o Socrates, e vita decedere.

(2.) **SO.** Bona, o Crito, fortuna: si ita diis placet, ita esto. non tamen existimo, illam hodie redituram. **CR.** Udenam id conjectas? **SO.** Dicam equidem. siquidem postridie, quam navis redierit, mihi est obeundum. **CR.** Sic utique aiunt hi, penes quos rei hujus potestas est. **SO.** Itaque non hac die venturam puto, sed altera. conjecturam vero ex somnio quodam accipio, quod paulo

ante hac ipsa nocte mihi visum est : opportuneque videris somnum mihi non perturbasse. CR. Sed quale id somnium erat? So. Videbatur mihi mulier quædam adveniens, pulchra et aspectu grata, vestes habens candidas, vocare me, atque dicere, o Socrates, tertia hinc die Phthiam pervenies latiglebam. CR. Quam mirum id insomnium, Socrates? So. Manifestum tamen, ut mihi videtur.

(3.) CR. Manifestum certe. sed, o beate Socrates, etiam nunc crede mihi, ac salvus esse velis. Mihi enim, si tu obieris, non una tantum calamitas imminet: sed præter id, quod te orbatus fuero tali necessario, qualem alterum nunquam reperiam, videbor utique multis, qui neutrum nostrum satis noverint, cum potuissem te servare, si minus pecuniis pepercissem, te penitus neglexisse. Atqui quænam major potest esse infamia, quam videri, pluris fecisse pecunias quam amicos? non enim poterit persuaderi compluribus, te hinc abire noluisse, nobis, quo id ageres, omni studio contendentibus. So. Quid vero a nobis, o beate Crito, tanti vulgi opinio æstimatur? probatissimi enim viri, quorum magis habenda ratio est, hæc ita gesta esse, ut gesta sunt, arbitrabuntur. CR. Attamen vides, o Socrates, compelli nos opinionem quoque vulgi curare. præsentia enim hæc declarant, posse vulgus non minima malorum, immo fere maxima, si quis in populo calumniis agitetur, inferre. So. Utinam, o Crito, posset vulgus maxima inferre mala, ut vicissim maxima posset bona. et bene quidem se res haberet. neutrum vero potest; quippe cum neque prudentem, neque imprudentem efficere valeat. faciunt vero quodlibet, utcunque contingit.

(4.) CR. Hæc quidem ita se habeant. Ad id vero, Socrates, mihi responde, num forte mei ceterorumque necessariorum tuorum respectus te retinet, ne, si hinc evaseris, calumniatores nos postea vexent, quasi te hinc furati fuerimus: cogamurque vel totum patrimonium, vel permultas pecunias amittere, vel præter hæc aliud quippiam pati. Si quid tale times, curam ejusmodi pone. justum namque est, nos tuæ salutis gratia non hoc solum, verum etiam, si oportuerit, majus aliud subire periculum. Verum mihi obtempera, neque aliter facias. So. Et hæc equidem et alia multa, o Crito, considero. CR. Ne igitur hæc vereare. neque enim multum est argentum, quod postulant hi, qui servare te atque hinc educere pollicentur. Vides præterea, quam tenues sint calumniatores tui, ut non magna ad eos placandos largitione sit opus. Tibi vero pecuniæ adsunt meæ, ad hoc, ut opinor, sufficientes. Proinde si quo mei respectu adductus non putas meas pecunias erogandas, adsunt hospites isti parati persolvere. quorum unus etiam huc attulit sufficientem pecuniam, ad hoc ipsum paratam, Simmias Thebanus. ad hoc ipsum promptus est et Cebes, aliique permulti. Quamobrem, ut modo dicebam, nihil tale metuas, quo minus serves teipsum. Sed neque etiam illud, quod in judicio dixisti, te remoretur, si hac urbe exires, quo teipsum verteres te minime habiturum. aliis enim multis in locis quocunque profectus fueris, te homines colent: ac si velis in Thessaliam te conferre, reperies illic hospites meos, qui te plurimi libenter libentissime complectentur; tutumque præsidio suo adeo reddent, ut nemo in Thessalia tibi injuriam sit facturus.

(5.) Accedit ad hæc, o Socrates, quod rem minime justam aggredi videris, si, cum salvus esse possis, teipsum perdas, taliaque contra te facere studeas, qualia inimici ipsi tui contenderent, contenderuntque, te perdere properantes. Proinde filios quoque tuos perdere mihi videris. quos cum liceat tibi educare atque erudire, deseris omnino, et quantum in te, eorum mores fortunæ committis. Accident vero eis verisimiliter, qualia evenire orphanis consueverunt. Profecto oportebat non genuisse filios; aut in eis educandis erudiendisque laborem non recusare. Tu vero mihi videris, quæ elegisset vir segnis ac piger, nunc elegisse: decebat autem contra viri boni fortisque eligere; præsertim te, per omnem vitam virtutis studium profitentem. Itaque non possum tua nostraque vice, familiarium tuorum, non erubescere, veritus, ne tota hæc res tua ignavia quadam nostra sic tractata fuisse videatur. Et primum quidem ille tunc in iudicium ingressus, cum liceret non ingredi; deinde concertatio ipsa iudicii similiter acta; et extremus hic finis, tanquam ridiculum quiddam, per ignaviam segnitiamque nostram effugisse nos videbitur, quod nec nos te servaverimus, neque tu ipse te, cum id fieri absque magna difficultate potuerit, si vel parum in nobis usus industriæque fuisset. Hæc igitur, o Socrates, considera, ne præterquam quod mala sunt, etiam dedecori tibi nobisque sint: sed tibi consule. immo vero non jam amplius consulendi tempus, sed consultum jam esse oportuit. unicum vero consilium est; videlicet venienti hac nocte cuncta hæc facta esse oportere. Sin autem ultra tardamus, nihil omnino fieri ulterius poterit. quamobrem omnino mihi adhibe fidem, o Socrates, nec ullo modo aliter facias.

(6.) So. O amice Crito, studium hoc tuum permulti faciendum esset, si qua ratione recta susceptum esset. sin minus, quanto vehementius est, tanto molestius. Considerandum est igitur, agendane hæc nobis sint, an non. nam ego is sum non modo nunc, sed et semper, qui meorum nulli paream, præterquam rationi, quæ ratiocinanti mihi optima videatur. Rationes itaque illas, quibus superioribus temporibus usus sum, nec nunc quidem, postquam in hanc fortunam incidi, rejicere possum: sed similes mihi ferme apparent, eademque in præsentia, quas et prius, veneror atque profiteor: adeo, ut nisi nunc meliores afferre possimus, plane scire debeas, me tibi non concessurum: non, si etiam plura, quam nunc, multitudinis potentia comminata, nos tanquam pueros larvali terribilique facie perterrere conetur, pecunia et damna, catenas, cædes objiciens. CR. Quanam igitur ratione mediocriter considerabimus? So. Hac utique, si id, quod tu de opinionibus paulo ante dicebas, resumamus: utrum semper recte se habeat necne, oportere scilicet quarundam opinionum rationem habere, quarundam vero minime. An forte prius quam in periculum mortis inciderem, recte id dicebatur: nunc vero constat, frustra, disputationis gratia, ita dictum fuisse, cum revera joco cuidam nugisque esset adductum. Cupio equidem, o Crito, una tecum considerare, nunquid sermo ille prior alienus appareat mihi, nunc in hac fortuna constituto; an prorsus idem qui et prius: atque utrum dimittendus sit a nobis, vel ipsi obtemperandum. [Dicebatur autem, ut opinor, semper sic ab iis, qui se

aliquid dicere existimabant, ut nunc quidem ego dicebam: nempe, hominum opiniones partim plurimi faciendas ac sequendas, partim vero minime. Hoc, per Deos, o Crito, nonne tibi recte dici videtur? tu enim, ut fert hominum conditio, tantum abes a periculo ut crastino die moriaris; nec te in errorem inducit præsens calamitas.] Considera igitur: an non sufficienter tibi dici videtur, non oportere omnes opiniones hominum sequi; sed alias quidem sequi, alias vero negligere: neque omnium quidem, sed duntaxat quorundam. quid ergo dicis? hæc non recte dicuntur? CR. Recte. So. An non bonas honorare decet, malas vero contemnere? CR. Ita decet. So. Bonæ autem nonne prudentum? malæ contra sunt imprudentum? CR. Quidni?

(7.) So. Age vero, quonam modo rursus talia dicebantur? qui in gymnasiis se exercet, utrum cujuslibet hominis laudi, vel vituperationi mentem adhibebit; an illius tantum, qui medicus sit, aut gymnasii magister? CR. Hujus solius. So. An non timere decet vituperationes, et optare laudes illius unius potius, quam multorum? CR. Procul dubio. So. Hac itaque ratione illi agendum est, exercendumque, et edendum atque bibendum, qua illi unico videatur, qui præsideat intelligatque, potius quam, ut videtur vulgo. CR. Vera hæc sunt. So. Quid vero, si illi uni non pareat, opinionemque ejus et commendationes nihili pendat, honoret vero vulgi ignorantumque commendationes, nunquid a malo tutus erit? CR. Minime. So. Quid autem est id malum, et quonam tendit, et in quam non obedientis partem? CR. In corpus videlicet; hoc enim corrumpitur. So. Recte dicis. Nonne et de aliis, o Crito, eadem ratio est? Ne omnia percurramus: de justis inquam injustisque, de turpibus et honestis, bonisque et malis, de quibus in præsentia nobis consultatio est, utrum multorum opinionem sequi vererique debeamus, an unius potius, qui intelligat, quem decet et venerari et timere magis, quam cunctos alios. cui nisi obtemperaverimus, lædemur et corrumpemur in eo, quod justo quidem melius fieri, injusto autem corrumpi soleat. an nihil id est? CR. Id quidem, o Socrates, arbitror.

(8.) So. Age vero, si id, quod a salubri quidem fit melius, ab insalubri vero corrumpitur, corruerimus, imperitorum potius quam peritorum sequuti judicia, an nobis eo destructo vivendum erit? est autem id corpus. nonne? CR. Corpus. So. Nunquid ergo vivendum nobis cum depravato corpore atque destructo? CR. Nullo modo. So. An forte cum illo vivendum est nobis corrupto, quod injusto quidem læditur, justo vero juvatur? nunquid vilius illud, quam corpus existimamus, quidquid illud est e nostris, circa quod justitia, injustitiaque versatur? CR. Nullo modo. So. Sed pretiosus? CR. Valde. So. Non igitur, o vir optime, admodum nobis curandum est, quid de nobis multi loquantur; sed quid dicat is unus, qui intelligit justa et injusta, atque ipsa veritas. Quamobrem primo quidem non recte adduxisti, opinionem vulgarem de rebus justis, et honestis, et bonis, harumque contrariis, esse alicujus existimandam. At vero dicet aliquis, posse vulgus nos interficere? CR. Nimirum dici id potest, o Socrates. So. Vera loque-

ris. Sed, o mirabilis, hæc ratio, quam percurrimus, superiori similis esse videtur: atque hanc rursus considera, utrum nobis maneat, necne: videlicet, non multi faciendum esse vivere, sed bene vivere. CR. Manet quidem. So. Sed hoc quoque manetne? bene, et honeste, et juste vivere idem esse? CR. Constat.

(9.) So. Igitur ex his, quæ confessi sumus, hoc considerandum, utrum justum sit conari me hinc exire, Atheniensibus non dimittentibus, vel injustum: ac si appareat, justum esse, tentemus: si minus, dimittamus. Quas vero tu affers considerationes de pecuniarum sumptu, de vulgari opinione, de filiis educandis: cavendum est, o Crito, ne excogitationes revera horum multorum sint, qui facile interficiunt, atque eorum, qui similiter, inquam, si possent, reviviscerent, et id quidem absque mente. Nobis vero, quandoquidem sic exigit ratio, nihil aliud attendendum est, quam quod modo dicebamus, utrum agamus justa, pecunias largiendo, gratiamque habendo his, qui me hinc educant: utrum, inquam, in hoc agamus justa, nos quidem educti, illi vero educentes; an potius utrinque in his omnibus agendis, agamus injuste: atque si appareat, nos iniqua aggredi, ne excogitandum quidem id est; sed mansuete subire decet et mortem, et quodvis aliud supplicium prius, quam quidquam agamus inique. CR. Recte loqui videris, Socrates. considera tamen, quid agamus. So. Consideremus, o bone vir, una. ac si qua in parte me dicentem redarguere poteris, redargue. ego enim assentiar. sin minus, desine quæso, o vir beate, jam toties eadem verba repetere: oportere scilicet me hinc, Atheniensibus invitis, abire. Equidem multi facio, persuaso te hæc agere; non autem invito. Attende itaque, nunquid considerationis initium tibi sufficienter dictum sit; conareque quod rogatus sis ita respondere, ut maxime censeas respondendum. CR. Conabor equidem.

(10.) So. Dicimus sane, nullo modo sponte esse injuriandum; an forte quodam pacto injuria facienda est, aliter vero nequaquam? vel potius injuriari nullo modo vel bonum est, vel honestum, quemadmodum in superiori tempore sæpe confessi sumus? Quod quidem et nuper est confirmatum. An forte omnes illæ superiores conventiones nostræ in paucis his diebus prorsus evanuerunt, ac jamdiu nos tam grandes natu homines, o Crito, tamque studiose invicem disserentes, latuit, nihil a pueris nos differre? An potius sic prorsus res se habet, ut jamdiu dicebamus, sive affirmet id multitudo, sive neget; et, sive graviora præsentibus, sive leviora subire cogamur, attamen injuriam facere omnino malum turpeque esse fatemur illi ipsi, qui facit, an non? CR. Fatemur certe. So. Quamobrem nullo modo injuriandum est. CR. Nullo quidem. So. Neque, si injuriam passus fueris, eam ulciscendum, ut vulgus putat. siquidem nullo modo injuriandum. CR. Ita videtur. So. Quid verò? mala alicui facere decet, o Crito, an non? CR. Non certe, o Socrates. So. Quid autem, qui mala patitur, num mala vicissim referre illi debet, qui intulit, ut vulgo videtur? justumne id esset, an injustum? CR. Injustum. So. Nempe mala inferre hominibus, non discrepat ab injuria. CR. Vere loqueris. So. Neque igitur ulcisci decet, neque malefacere cuiquam hominum,

quodcumque ab aliis ipse passus fueris. Et vide, o Crito, ne quid, dum hæc concedis, præter sententiam tuam nobis assentiare. Per paucis enim, scio quid loquar, sic vel apparet, vel apparebit. At vero quibus sic apparet, et quibus aliter, his non est communis deliberatio; sed necesse est, eos, cum ultro citroque consilia sua respiciunt, invicem se despiciere. Animadvertite igitur et tu diligenter, utrum tibi mihiq̄ue communis sit hæc opinio, mecumq̄ue sentias: atque utrum ab hoc principio exorsi deliberemus, quasi nunquam rectum sit, vel injuriari, vel ulcisci injuriam, vel malum referre in eum qui intulit. An hic discedis a nobis, in hoc principio non consentiens? Mihi quidem et jamdiu et nunc ita videtur. Quod si tibi apparet aliter, dic, et doce. sin autem in superioribus permanes, jam quid sequatur audi. Cr. Consentio equidem et permaneo. So. Dico ergo deinceps, immo potius interrogo, Utrum quæ quis confiteatur alicui, justa esse, facere debeat, an fallere? Cr. Facere.

(11.) So. Ex his jam ita considera. Si nos hinc abeamus præter civitatis consensum, utrum male aliquibus faciemus, et his quidem, quibus minime decet, vel non: et utrum in his permanebimus, quæ justa esse convenimus, vel contra? Cr. Nequeo equidem, o Socrates, ad hæc respondere. neque enim intelligo. So. Verum ita considera, perinde ac si, volentibus nobis hinc sive aufugere, sive quomodocumque hoc vocandum sit, veniant leges, civitatisque hujus respublica, et instantes nobis sic inquam: Dic nobis, o Socrates, quidnam cogitas facere? an non intelligis, hac re, quam aggredieris, te nobis legibus, totiq̄ue patriæ, quantum in te est, interitum machinari? an putas, civitatem ullam amplius stare posse, ac non subverti, in qua judicia publica nullam vim habeant, sed a privatis hominibus contemnantur atque frangantur? Quid ergo dicemus ad hæc, o Crito, aliaque hujusmodi? Per multa enim in hanc sententiam afferre quis potest; præsertim orator, pro lege ita soluta declamans, quæ quidem sententias publico judicio latas jubet ratas esse. an respondebimus illi, civitatem non recte judicando nobis injuriam intulisse? itane, an aliter? Cr. Ita per Jovem, o Socrates.

(12.) So. At enim leges ipsæ sic responderent: O Socrates, nonne nobis tecum id convenit, standum tibi esse judiciis, quæ civitas tulerit? Quod si leges ita loquentes admiraremur, forte dicerent: Noli, Socrates, quæ modo diximus, admirari: immo responde, cum tibi et interrogare et respondere sit consuetum. Dic age, quidnam nobis civitatisque succenseas, quo dissolvere nos contendas? principio, nonne nos te genuimus? atque per nos pater tuus matrem accepit tuam, et provocavit? Dic ergo, an has inter nos leges, quæ sunt circa conjugia, improbes, atque his aliqua in parte, quasi minus rectis, succenseas. Nihil succenseo, dicerem. Sed an his legibus, quæ educatione eruditionique natorum provident, in qua ipse quoque eruditus es? an non recte disposuerunt hæc leges ad hoc officium conditæ, cum juberent patrem tuum in musica te et gymnastica erudire? Recte disposuisse concederem. Age ergo, postquam per nos genitus es, educatusque ac cruditus, primo qui-



dem num potes negare, te nostrum esse et natum et servum, ipsumque te et progenitores? deinde, cum id ita se habeat, an putas jus ex æquo tibi atque nobis esse; et quæ nos tibi facere aggrediamur, eadem vicissim in nos abs te referri justum esse judicas? An, cum nec ad patrem, nec ad dominum, si eam habeas, tibi jus ex æquo sit, ut, quæ ab illis patiare, in eos referre possis; neque si jurgio hi te lacessant, contra jurgare, neque si te verberent, vicissim verberare, neque alia ejusmodi in eos tentare liceat: contra patriam vero ac leges tibi licebit? adeo ut, si, nos judicantes id esse justum, interficere te velimus, tu vicissim nos leges et patriam pro viribus coneris occidere, dicasque, te in his agendis justa facere, qui virtutis curam revera habere profiteris. An sic es sapiens, ut te latuerit, et patri et matri et progenitoribus omnibus patriam esse anteponendam; atque esse venerabilibus quiddam sanctiusque, et in superiori sorte, tum apud deos, tum apud homines mentis compotes, patriam collocandam? colereque eam oportere magis, eique obedire; ac rigidius se gerenti mitius assentiri, quam patri: et, si quid jubeat, vel dissuadere illi quantum liceat, vel facere; et patientissime sustinere, quidquid jusserit patiendum? ac, sive mandaverit verberari te, sive in vincula conjici, sive in prælium miserit ad vulnera excipienda, mortemque subeundam, obediendum est omnino. jus enim ita dicit; et neque tergiversandum, neque fugiendum, neque ordinem deserendum, sed et in bello, et in judicio, et prorsus ubique, ea sunt, quæ respublica patriaque jusserit, facienda: aut certe verbis, quatenus justum est, uti licet ad persuadendum illi eamque placandam: vi autem uti nefas est, vel contra matrem, vel contra patrem, maxime vero omnium contra patriam. Quidnam ad hæc dicemus, Crito, verane loqui leges, an contra? CR. Mihi quidem videntur.

(13.) So. Proinde leges fortasse dicent: Animadvertite, o Socrates, utrum vere dicamus, te injusta contra nos aggredi. Nos quidem, quæ te et alios cives genuimus, educavimus, nutrivimus, participes bonorum omnium, quæ in nostra erant potestate, effecimus: tamen permisimus cuilibet Atheniensium, cognitis jam civitatis moribus legibusque, et reipublicæ gubernandæ forma, si cui non placeamus, licere, acceptis suis, quocumque placuerit hinc abire. Nec ulla ex nobis legibus impedit aut denegat, sive quis vestrum, cui nos civitasque minime placeamus, in coloniam aliquam hinc velit discedere, sive habitationem alio transferre cupiat, quo minus id pro arbitrio facere valeat, secumque sua perferre. At vero quicunque ex vobis, postquam cognoverit, quemadmodum nos judicia disponimus, et in ceteris omnibus regimus civitatem, permanserit tamen, hunc jam asseveramus, opere ipso convenisse nobiscum, quæcunque jusserimus, se facturum. Atque eum, qui non paruerit, tripliciter injuriari censemus: et quod genitricibus nobis non obtemperat; et quod nutricibus non obsequitur; et quod pactus nobis obedire, neque obedit, neque persuadere nobis studet, si quid minus recte facere videamur: cumque præcepta nostra libere proponamus, neque mandemus rigide, sed permittamus alterum e duobus, aut ver-

bis persuaderi nobis, aut mandata explere; tu horum neutrum facis.

(14.) His ergo criminibus te, o Socrates, obnoxium judicamus fore, si, quæ cogitas, feceris: nec minime Atheniensium te, sed maxime omnium. Ac si causam requiram, ob quam præ ceteris sim obnoxius, forte juste me remorderent, dicentes, me maxime omnium Atheniensium civitatis legibus consensisse. sic enim inferrent: Magna nobis, o Socrates, horum sunt argumenta, tibi nos civitatemque placuisse. nunquam enim maxime omnium Atheniensium in ea moras traxisses, nisi tibi mirifice placuisset. Itaque nec spectaculi gratia urbe unquam egressus es, nisi semel in Isthmum, nec alio usquam, nisi in militia; neque aliam fecisti peregrinationem unquam, quemadmodum ceteri solent; neque alterius civitatis te cepit cupiditas, aliarumve legum; sed nos tibi nostraque civitas satisfacimus; usque adeo vehementer probasti nos, nostrisque moribus victurum te consensisti: tum in ceteris rebus, tum quia in ea filios procreasti, utpote quæ tibi placuerit. Quin etiam licebat tibi in ipso iudicio exsilium postulare, si voluisses; atque quod nunc invita civitate aggredieris, tunc ea volente poteras facere. Tu vero verbis tunc te extulisti, quasi non graviter ferres, si mori te oporteret. quinimmo mortem ipsam, ut dicebas, potius quam exsilium elegisti. Nunc vero nec verba illa tua crubescis, neque nos leges vereris, sed nobis interitum machinaris. Facis autem, quod deterimus faceret servus, fugam arripere tentans, contra pactiones conventionesque, in quibus convenisti nobiscum, nostris te præbens institutionibus gubernandum. Primum responde nobis, num id ipsum vere dicamus, consensisse non verbis, sed re ipsa, moribus nostris gubernari debere. An non vera hæc sunt? Quid ad hæc dicemus, Crito? an non confitebimur? CR. Necesse est, o Socrates. So. Nonne igitur (leges inquit) conventa nobiscum et pacta transgredieris? quæ neque coactus es nobiscum inire, neque deceptus, neque ad breve tempus deliberare ad hæc eligenda es compulsus, sed annos septuaginta deliberare licuit: quo in tempore licuit et abire, nisi tibi placuissemus, conventionesque justæ tibi visæ fuissent. Tu vero nec Lacedæmonem, neque Cretam nobis anteposuisti, quas ipse urbes assidue prædicas recte gubernari, neque aliam ullam, vel Græcarum civitatum, vel Barbararum. immo ex hac rarius peregrinatus es, quam claudi et cæci, manique alii soleant. usque adeo Atheniensibus tibi præ ceteris civitas placuit, atque nos, videlicet leges. cui enim placere potest civitas, cujus non placeant leges? Nunc vero non permanes in his, in quibus jamdiu nobis tibi que convenit. Permanebis certe, si nobis credideris, ne egrediens urbe deridendus evadas.

(15.) Considera rursus, si hæc transgressus fueris, et ea quæ inique cogitas perpetraveris, ad quid tandem id vel tibi, vel necessariis tuis conducet. Cuique enim constat, in periculo necessarios tuos fore, ne ipsi quoque in exsilium expellantur, priventurque civitate, et patrimonio suo exspolientur. Tu autem si quam in civitatem finitimam te contuleris, vel Thebas, vel Megaras, (utræque

enim gubernantur recte) hostis primum reipublicæ illius accedes, et omnes, quibus curæ est patria, despicient abominabunturque te, corruptorem legum existimantes. ideoque confirmabis eorum qui te damnarunt opinionem, ut recte contra te tulisse sententiam videantur. quisquis enim corruptor est legum, is potissimum et juvenum imperitorumque hominum videbitur esse corruptor. Quid ergo? civitatesne, quæ recte gubernantur, et modestissimos quosque homines devitabis? Atqui si id feceris, vitane dignus eris? an forte impudenter te his admiscebis, nec erubesces, de eisdem apud eos disserere, de quibus apud nos consuevisti; virtutem videlicet et justitiam, legesque, et instituta legum plurimi esse existimanda? neque putas, absurdum et ab his dissonans apparere Socratis factum? Procul dubio putandum est. Fortasse vero civitates has declinans in Thessaliam ad Critonis hospites abibis. illic enim absque ordine et temperantia vivitur. Ac forsán libenter illi te audient, narrantem quemadmodum e carcere ridicule fugeris, ut fascem quendam tibi super imponens, aut corio tegens, vel aliis quibusdam te involvens, quemadmodum solent qui fugam surripiunt, et in alienam figuram te transmutans illinc aufugeris. quemadmodum vero vir senex parvo admodum tempore, ut verisimile est, victurus, ausus fueris, ob vivendi cupiditatem in tam sordida inopia vivere, maximas transgressus leges, nullusne dixerit? forte: si neminem offenderis. alioquin multa, o Socrates, atque indigna te audies. vives autem obnoxius cunctis hominibus atque deserviens. Quid vero facies in Thessalia? conviviane frequentabis? utpote qui in Thessaliam, quasi ad cœnam aliquam, adventaveris. Disputationes vero illæ de justitia, ceterisque virtutibus ubinam ulterius nobis erunt? Enimvero filiorum gratia vivere cupis, ut nutrias eos atque erudias. An ergo in Thessaliam eos perduces, ut illic nutrias eos, atque erudias, hospites eos efficiens, ut hoc insuper commodi abs te reportent? an id quidem non facies; hic vero relictis melius te vivo alentur, atque erudientur a necessariis tuis, te absente? Utrum vero, si in Thessaliam abibis, tui id curabunt: sin autem in alteram transibis vitam, non curabunt? Profecto si quid opis est in his, qui aiunt se tuos necessarios esse, credendum est, curaturos.

(16.) Ceterum, o Socrates, fidem nobis adhibens nutricibus tuis, neque filios tuos, neque vitam, neque aliud quidquam pluris facias, quam justitiam: ut cum in vitam alteram transmigraveris, valeas illic præsidibus horum omnium reddere rationem. Nempe si leges transgressus hæc feceris, neque melius, neque justius, neque sanctius id vel tibi continget, vel tuis; neque illuc tibi profecto conduxet. quin potius injuriam passus abito, si abieris, non a nobis quidem legibus, sed ab hominibus. Verum si adeo turpiter aufugeris, etiam versa vice injurias malaque referens, conventiones nobiscum initas et promissa transgressus, atque lædens eos, quos minime oportebat, te ipsum scilicet et amicos et patriam, nosque leges: nos utique et viventi tibi infensæ hic erimus, et in altera vita leges, quæ illic sunt nostræ sorores, haud quaquam te benigne recipient, scientes, te nos pro viribus disperdere conatum fuisse. Quamobrem, ne Crito aliter tibi quam nos persuadeat, caveto.

(17.) Hæc equidem, o dulcis amice Crito, audire videor, quemadmodum Corybantes tibias audire se putant. atque in me sermonum ejusmodi sonitus adeo reboat, ut alia audire non possim. Vides, quæ in præsentia mihi apparent: quibus si quid contradicere aggrediaris, frustra conabere. verumtamen si quid te profecturum confidis, dicas. Cr. Ergo vero quod dicam, o Socrates, nihil habeo. So. Desine ergo, Crito; et pergamus hac, quandoquidem hac nos Deus ipse ducit.

## PHÆDO.

ECHECRATES, PHÆDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEBES, SIM-  
MIAS, CRITO, MINISTER UNDECIM VIRORUM.

(1.) **I**PSENE, o Phædon, affuisti, qua die Socrates venenum bibit in carcere? an ab alio audivisti? **PH.** Equidem, o Echeocrates, affui. **ΕCΗ.** Quænam sunt ea, quæ vir ille, antequam moreretur, locutus est? et quomodo e vita decessit? libenter enim audirem. Nam neque quisquam Phliasiarum civium frequenter proficiscitur nunc Athenas, neque jamdiu hospes aliquis inde ad nos accessit, qui certum aliquid ea de re nuntiare nobis posset, nisi illum potato veneno e vita migrasse. de ceteris vero nihil, quid referrent, habebant. **PH.** Nec ergo, quæ ad iudicium pertinebant, quo pacto tractata fuerint, audivistis? **ΕCΗ.** Audivimus. hæc enim nobis quidam retulit. et admirati profecto sumus, quod, jam peracto iudicio, diu postea obiisse videatur. quidnam in causa fuit, Phædon? **PH.** Sorte quadam id Socrati, o Echeocrates, accidit. nam pridie quam iudicaretur, ornari contigit puppim navis ejus, quam mittunt Athenienses in Delum. **ΕCΗ.** Id vero quidnam sibi vult? **PH.** Hæc est illa navis, ut aiunt Athenienses, in qua Theseus olim bis septem illos secum tulit in Cretam, servavitque illos et ipse servatus est. Voverat autem, ut fertur, Apollini, si servarentur, quotannis in Delum spectaculum quoddam mittere. quod quidem nunc etiam, ac semper ex illo tempore singulis ad Deum mittunt annis. Cum igitur spectaculi principium agitur, ex lege interim lustrant urbem, neminemque eo tempore publice necant, donec Delum perveniat navis rursusque Athenas revertatur ex Delo. id vero nonnunquam longo peragitur tempore, quando eos occupant venti. Initium vero spectaculi est, postquam Apollinis sacerdos navis illius coronaverit puppim. id vero, ut modo dicebam, pridie quam iudicaretur, factum erat. Quamobrem longum tempus Socrates fuit in carcere iudicium inter atque mortem.

(2.) **ΕCΗ.** Circa vero mortem ipsam, o Phædon, quænam sunt ab eo dicta, quæ facta, quive familiarium aderant? an forte magistratus adesse non permittebant? atque ita orbatus decessit amicis? **PH.** Permittebant quidem: ideoque aderant aliqui, et quidem multi.

ΕΧ. Hæc igitur omnia para te quam planissime nobis referre, nisi quid negotii te impediat. ΠΗ. Otiosus equidem sum, atque enarrare vobis conabor: quippe cum meminisse Socratis, sive ipse loquar sive loquentes alios audiam, mihi semper omnium sit dulcissimum. ΕΧ. Similiter, o Phædon, hos qui te audituri sunt, affectos habebis. Sed jam pro viribus diligentissime refer omnia. ΠΗ. Atque mira quadam ratione, o Echeocrates, illic præsens affectus eram. Neque enim misericordia me habebat, ut familiarissimi viri morti præsentem. Sane beatus vir ille mihi, o Echeocrates, videbatur, tum animi illius habitum, tum orationem consideranti: adeo intrepide generoseque migrabat e vita, ut videretur mihi illum in vitam alteram non absque divina sorte migrare, sed illic quoque beatus fore, si quis unquam alter. Quamobrem neque admodum commovebar, (ut consentaneum videretur hominem rei præsentem lugubri commoveri) neque rursus afficiebar lætitia, quemadmodum solebamus alias, cum in philosophia versabamur. Nam sermones quidem ejusmodi erant: sed revera affectus quidam mirus atque insolita voluptatis dolorisque permixtio me invaserat considerantem, illi paulo post moriendum esse, et quicumque aderamus, ferme similiter eramus affecti, alias quidem ridentes, alias vero lacrymantes. unus autem præ ceteris Apollodorus: nosti enim virum ejusque mores. ΕΧ. Quidni? ΠΗ. Ille igitur ita prorsus erat affectus: atque ego ipse aliique omnes distractum similiter perturbatione animum habebamus. ΕΧ. Sed quinam forte aderant, o Phædon? ΠΗ. Cives quidem et indigenæ aderant ipse Apollodorus et Critobulus paterque ejus: rursus Hermogenes, Epigenes, Æschines, Antisthenes. aderat et Ctesippus Pæaneus et Menexenus atque alii quidam indigenæ. Plato autem, ut arbitror, ægrotabat. ΕΧ. Sed num aliqui aderant peregrini? ΠΗ. Aderant et peregrini, Simmias Thebanus et Cebes et Phædondes: Megarenses vero Euclides et Terpsion. ΕΧ. Aristippus autem et Cleombrotus nunquid aderant? ΠΗ. Non. In Ægina enim dicebantur esse. ΕΧ. Aderantne insuper alii? ΠΗ. Hos ferme, quos narravi, interfuisse existimo. ΕΧ. Dic vero, quales fuerunt sermones?

(3.) ΠΗ. Conabor equidem a principio tibi omnia enarrare. Solebamus quotidie diebus superioribus ad Socratem proficisci ego atque alii, convenientes mane in illa curia, in qua et iudicium factum fuerat: carceri enim erat proxima. Colloquentes igitur inter nos operiebamur semper illic, quoad carcer aperiretur. aperiebatur enim haud admodum mane, eo autem aperto ingrediebamur ad Socratem, et ad plurimum diem cum ipso confabulabamur. Tunc ergo prius solito convenimus, pridie namque ejus diei, cum e carcere egressi essemus vespere, navem ex Delo audivimus rediisse, itaque ediximus invicem, summo mane nobis fore ad locum solitum redeundum. Cum vero reversi essemus, exiens nobis obvius janitor, qui nos solebat admittere, cxspectare jussit nec prius ingredi quam ab ipso accersiremur. Solvunt enim, inquit, undecim viri Socratem, illique denuntiant hodie mortem esse obeundam. Neque deinde admodum commoratus rediit ad nos, jussitque intrare. Itaque introeuntes Socratem quidem invenimus compedibus paulo ante solutum; Xan-

thippen vero (nosti mulierem) juxta sedentem puerumque ejus manibus tenentem. Quæ nos cum vidisset, ejulare cœpit, et qualia mulieres solent, exclamare: O Socrates, inquit, nunquam amplius affabuntur te tui familiares, neque tu illos. At Socrates Critonem intuitus, o Crito, inquit, deducat quis hanc domum. Et illam quidem redlexerunt quidam Critonis domestici, vociferantem atque plangentem. Socrates autem sedens in lectica contraxit ad se crus, manuque perfricuit, atque inter fricandum sic inquit: Quam mira videtur, o viri, hæc res esse, quam nominant homines voluptatem, quamque miro naturaliter se habet modo ad dolorem ipsum, qui ejus contrarius esse videtur: quippe cum simul homini adesse nollint. attamen si quis prosequitur capitque alterum, semper ferme alterum quoque accipere cogitur; quasi ex eodem vertice sint ambo connexa. Arbitror equidem Æsopum, si hæc animadvertisset, fabulam fuisse facturum: videlicet Deum ipsum, cum ipsa inter se pugnancia vellet conciliare nequæ id facere posset, in unum saltem eorum apices conjunxisse; proptereaque cuicumque adest alterum, eidem mox alterum quoque adesse. Quod quidem mihi accidit in præsentia. siquidem modo crus propter vincula afficiebatur dolore; sed huic succedere voluptas jam videtur.

(4.) Ad hæc Cebes, per Jovem, inquit, o Socrates, opportune mihi id in memoriam revocasti. cum enim poemata composueris, intendens sermones Æsopi proœmiumque in Apollinem: tum alii multi me interrogaverunt, tum Evanus præcipue atque prius, quoniam consilio, postquam huc devenisti, hæc feceris, quæ prius feceras nunquam. Si igitur tibi curæ est, ut habeam, quod respondeam Evano, quando iterum ex me quæsierit, quod certo scio ipsum esse facturum; dic quæso, quid illi sit respondendum. Vera, inquit, o Cebes, responde, me id effecisse, non ut vel sibi gratificarer vel cum suis carminibus decertarem: sciebam enim facile id non esse: verum ut insomnia quædam experirer, me simul expians, num forte hæc sit ea musica, quam sæpius jam exercere me jubent. Nam frequenter in superiori tempore insomnium idem, licet alia atque alia forma sese mihi offerens, eadem semper ita præcepit, Fac, o Socrates, musicam, atque exerce. Ego igitur, quod in superiori tempore faciebam, hoc mihi præceptum arbitrabar: et quemadmodum currentes adhortari solemus, sic, quod ipse antea faciebam, ad idem me insomnium cohortari putabam; quasi philosophia maxima musica foret. Postquam vero facto jam de me judicio mori me interim Dei festivitas inhiberet: censi oportere, si forte insomnium totiens jubeat popularem hanc musicam exercere, non negligere ejus præceptum. Tutius enim fore arbitratus sum, antequam e vita migrarem, expiare animum atque, ut monet insomnium, poemata facere. Quamobrem primo equidem cecini eum ipsum, cujus tunc sacra celebrabantur: atque post Deum, judicans oportere eum, qui poeta futurus sit, non sermones sed fabulas facere, me vero non esse fabulatorem, nonnullas ex fabulis Æsopi, quas sciebam, promptioresque habebam, ut in quamque prius incidi, modulatus sum.

(5.) Hæc igitur, o Cebes, refer Evano: et valere jube, atque consule, ut si probe sapit, me sequatur. migro enim hinc hodie.

sic enim Athenienses jubent. Tunc Simmias, Quale id est, inquit, o Socrates, quod Evano mandas? sæpe quidem cum illo fui: et quantum de illo sentio, nullo pæne modo libens ille tibi parebit. So. Quid vero? nonne philosophus est Evanus? SIM. Mihi quidem videtur. So. Volet igitur et Evanus et omnis, quicumque hujus rei digne est particeps. Non tamen forte sibi vim inferet, non enim fas esse aiunt. Et simul hæc dicens, crura e lectica demisit in terram; atque ita sedens deinceps reliqua disputavit. Quæ-sivit igitur ab eo Cebes, Quonam id modo ais, o Socrates? fas quidem non esse seipsum violare; philosophum tamen optare morientem sequi? So. Sed dic, o Cebes, nonne tu Simmiasque talia quædam audivistis a Philolao, quo familiariter utebamini? CE. Manifesti quidem nihil, o Socrates. So. Atqui ego quoque de his rebus ex auditu loquor. Quæ igitur forte ipse audiui, referre vobis nulla invidia prohibebit. etenim forte maxime decet, illo migraturum considerare, atque effingere, qualis fore putanda sit hæc ipsa migratio. quid enim aliud usque ad solis occasum quis faciat?

(6.) CE. Quam ob causam, o Socrates, nefas esse aiunt, sibimet manus inferre? jam enim, quod modo quærebas, ego a Philolao audiui, cum apud nos observaretur, et ab aliis insuper nonnullis, non decere id facere: apertum tamen hac de re quicquam nihil ab aliquo unquam audiui. So. Sed attentione jam opus est., nam et si audiveris, mirum tamen forte videri possit, si hoc solum ex aliis omnibus simplex sit; nec accidat unquam homini, quemadmodum cetera, quando et quibusdam melius mori quam vivere. itaque mirum tibi forte videbitur, si his, quibus præstat mori, non liceat sibimet prodesse, sed alium oporteat expectare, qui prosit. Tunc Cebes subridens Thebanorum more, Proh Jupiter, inquit. So. Atqui videri quidem potest id sic absurdum. fortasse tamen quandam habet rationem. Profecto sermo ille, qui de his in arcanis habetur, in quadam custodia esse homines, neque decere quenquam ex hac seipsum solvere neque aufugere, magnus quidem mihi videtur neque cognitu facilis. Veruntamen id mihi, o Cebes, recte apparet dictum, Deos quidem curam habere nostrum; nos vero homines unam quandam ex possessionibus esse Deorum. an non ita tibi videtur? CE. Mihi quidem. So. Nonne igitur et tu, si quid ex mancipiis tuis seipsum perimeret, cum tu nullo modo id permisisses, irascereris utique illi, et, si potestatem haberes, pœna quadam afficeres? CE. Omnino. So. Forte igitur hac ratione haud præter rationem est, non prius decere seipsum interficere, quam Deus necessitatem aliquam imposuerit, qualem nobis imposuit in præsentia.

(7.) CE. Consentaneum id quidem apparet. Quod vero dicebas modo, philosophos perfacile velle mori, absurdum, o Socrates, videtur esse; siquidem, quod nunc diximus, rationem habet, Deum videlicet nostrum esse curatorem, nos vero in rebus ejus positos esse. Nullam enim id rationem habet, prudentissimos videlicet homines non ægre ferre, ab ea cura se amoveri, quam sibi præstant Dii, optimi omnium rerum gubernatores. Nunquam enim putaret vir prudens, ipsum se melius esse curaturum, si liber evaserit: sed



demens aliquis forsitan id putaret, fugiendum scilicet esse a domino; neque cogitaret non esse id, quod bonum est, fugiendum, sed in eo maxime permanendum. ideoque absque ratione fugeret. Qui vero mentem habet, semper apud eum, qui sit melior, esse cupit. Atque ita, o Socrates, contra omnino conveniens esse videtur quam quod paulo ante dicebatur. Sapientes quidem decere graviter mortem ferre; insipientes vero libenter. Socrates igitur, cum hæc audisset, delectari visus est argutia Cebetis. conversusque ad nos, Semper, inquit, hic Cebes rationes quasdam perscrutatur; neque admodum facile, quod quis dixerit, vult admittere. Tunc Simmias, Mihi quoque, inquit, nonnihil videtur Cebes dicere. Quo enim consilio sapientes viri meliores revera quam ipsi sint, fugiant illisque carere facile patiantur? Atque mihi videtur Cebes sermonem in te intendere, quod tam facile et nos relinquas et Deos, ut tu ipse fateris, principes bonos. Justa dicitis, inquit Socrates. arbitror enim vos dicere, meipsum tanquam in judicio oportere purgare. SIM. Et maxime quidem.

(8.) So. Age ergo, conabor nunc apud vos accuratius, quam nuper apud Atheniensium judices fecerim, me defendere. Equidem, o Simmia atque Cebes, nisi me migraturum putarem primum quidem ad Deos alios sapientes et bonos, deinde ad homines defunctos his, qui hic sunt, meliores, injuste agerem non moleste ferens mortem. Nunc certe habetote, sperare me ad viros bonos iturum. sed hoc quidem haud omnino asseverarem. Quod vero ad Deos dominos valde bonos iturus sim, certum habetote, si quid aliud ejusmodi, et hoc utique me affirmaturum. Propterea haud similiter mortem moleste fero: sed bono animo sum; speroque superesse aliquid his, qui defuncti sunt; atque, ut jam diu dicitur, multo melius bonis fore quam malis. SIM. Quidnam, o Socrates, cogitas? nunquid ipse cum isthac sententia hinc abire? an nos quoque participes ejus relinquere? nempe commune nobis quoque id bonum arbitror esse debere. præterea ita demum te apud nos purgaveris, si, quæ dicis, nobis etiam persuaseris. So. Dabo equidem operam. sed Critonem prius auscultemus. videtur enim mihi jamdudum nonnihil significare velle. CRI. Quidnam putas aliud, o Socrates, quam quod jamdudum mihi dicit is, qui tibi venenum est daturus? jubet enim te moneri, ut quam parcissime loquaris: dicens eos qui disputant, nimium incalescere: nihil vero tale bibituris venenum convenire. alioquin eos, qui id fecerint, cogi interdum bis, quandoque ter venenum bibere. So. Mitte ipsum. tantum id, quod est officii ejus, paret, tanquam bis et, si oportuerit, ter præbiturus. CRI. Et antea quidem ferme id responsurum sciebam. sed me ille jamdudum stimulat. So. Mitte ipsum. Ego vero, o judices, rationem vobis jam reddere volo, ob quam mihi videatur vir, qui per omnem vitam incubuerit philosophiæ, merito magna cum fiducia imminentem exspectare mortem, atque bona spe esse, se ibi, postquam hinc migraverit, maxima bona reportaturum. quemadmodum igitur id ita se habeat, o Simmia atque Cebes, conabor equidem aperire.

(9.) Quicumque philosophiam recte aliquando attigerunt, nimirum

videntur latuisse ceteros homines, quod nihil aliud ipsi commentarentur quam mori atque esse se mortuos. Quod si id verum est, perabsurdum foret, si, cum nihil præter hoc aliud per omnem vitam studuerint, hoc ipso adveniente, quod jam diu agitabant exercebantque, graviter ferrent. Hinc Simmias arridens, per Jovem, inquit, o Socrates, mihi quidem haud multum ridere cupienti risum expressisti. Nam multos arbitror fore, qui, si id audiverint, aptissime in philosophos dictum putent: nostrosque homines consensuros et valde quidem, philosophos eos revera se ipsos morti præbere; nec tamen se latuisse, quam digni sint morte. So. Forte id recte, o Simmia, dicerent, præter id quod se non latuisse addunt. latuit sane eos, qua ratione veri philosophi et mori studeant et morte sint digni. Sed jam relinquamus illos, nobisque ipsis loquamur. Putamusne aliquid esse mortem? SIM. Aliquid certe. So. Nunquid aliud quam animæ a corpore solutionem? esseque id mortuum esse, scilicet solutum ab anima corpus per se seorsum esse? seorsum quoque a corpore animam solutam, ipsam per seipsam existere? nunquid mors præter hoc aliud est? SIM. Nihil aliud. So. Considera, bone vir, num tibi idem quoque et mihi videatur. ex his enim nos arbitror planius, quæ perquirimus, inventuros. Vide-turne tibi philosophi officium esse sectari eas, quæ appellantur voluptates, quales sunt epularum atque poculorum? SIM. Minime quidem, o Socrates. So. Sed nunquid venereorum? SIM. Nullo modo. So. Quid? reliquum corporis cultum an multi facere philosophus tibi videtur? ut habere vestes egregias calcosque et alia, quæ circa corpus sunt ornamenta; utrum multi facere tibi videtur, an nihili pendere, nisi quatenus magna cogat necessitas illis uti? SIM. Mihi quidem videtur verus philosophus hæc omnia floccipendere. So. An non tibi videtur ejusmodi studium haud ad corpus quidem declinare, sed, quantum fieri potest, ab illo discedere atque ad animum se convertere? SIM. Mihi quidem. So. Nonne igitur in ejusmodi rebus primum manifeste apparet philosophus præter ceteros homines animum, quam maxime potest, a commercio corporis segregare? SIM. Apparet. So. Putant vero plerique, o Simmia, eum hominem, cui nihil talium dulce sit neque illis fruatur, revera vivere existimandum non esse, sed pæne mortuum, cum voluptates corporis non percipiat. SIM. Verissima narras.

(10.) So. Quid autem circa sapientiæ ipsius acquisitionem? utrum impedimento est corpus, si quis ipsum socium ad investigandum assumpserit: necne? quale utique, tale aliquid dico. Habentne visus et auditus veritatem in hominibus aliquam? an talia quædam ipsi quoque poetæ semper canunt, nihil nos audire, nihil videre sincerum? Atqui si ii corporis sensus sinceri certique non sunt, neque etiam alii: quippe cum ceteri omnes his quodammodo deteriores sint. an non tibi videntur? SIM. Prorsus. So. Quando igitur animo veritatem attingit? quando enim aliquid cum corpore tentat investigare, procul dubio decipitur a corpore. SIM. Vere loqueris. So. An non sicubi proprie in ipsa ratiocinatione fit sibi aliquid eorum, quæ vere sunt, manifestum? SIM. Ita est. So. Ratiocinatur autem tunc optime, quando horum nihil eum per-

turbat, neque auditus neque visus, neque dolor neque voluptas: sed quam maxime seipsum in se recipiens, deserit corpus, neque quicquam, quoad fieri potest, cum illo communicans neque attingens, ipsum, quod vere est, affectat. SIM. Est ita. So. Nonne et in hoc philosophi animus maxime contemnit corpus, ab eoque aufugit, quæritque secundum seipsum vivere? SIM. Apparet. So. Quid vero hæc, o Simmia? Dicimusne justum ipsum esse aliquid an nihil? SIM. Aliquid per Jovem. So. Rursus ipsum pulchrum ipsumque bonum aliquid esse? SIM. Quidni? So. Num aliquando horum aliquid percepisti? SIM. Nunquam. So. An alio quodam sensu corporis attigisti? loquor autem de omnibus, veluti de ipsa magnitudine, de sanitate, de robore ipso, ac summatim de ceterorum omnium essentia, id est, quod unumquodque sit: nunquid per corpus quod in his verissimum est perspicitur? an ita se res habet, quicumque nostrum maxime et sincerissime cogitare mente se comparat ipsum, quod aggreditur cogitandum, hic proxime ad cognitionem ipsius accedit? SIM. Prorsus. So. Nonne igitur ille purissime faceret, quicumque ipsa mentis excogitatione quam maxime se ad unumquodque conferret, neque visum in excogitando adhibens neque sensum prorsus ullum ratiocinationi conjungens: sed ipsa secundum se ipsam mentis excogitatione sincera utens, ipsum per se quodlibet sincerum existens studeret venari, ab oculis, ab auribus et, ut summatim dicam, a toto corpore liber, utpote perturbante animum, neque permittente veritatem sapientiamque assequi, si quando in communionem recipiatur? An non hic erit, o Simmia, si quis unquam alius, ipsius, quod vere est, compos. SIM. Mirifice vera loqueris, Socrates.

(11.) So. Nonne igitur ex his omnibus necessario sequitur, opinionem ejusmodi legitimis philosophis usque adeo constare debere, ut ad se invicem ita loquantur? Necessaria jam ratione concluditur, nos quadam rationis ipsius via ad id considerandum perducii, videlicet donec corpus habemus, animusque noster tanto malo erit admixtus, nunquam nos id, quod desideramus, verum ad votum consecuturos. Impedimenta enim pæne innumerabilia corpus præbet propter necessariam ejus alimoniam. præterea morbi nobis hinc incidentes investigationem veritatis impediunt: amoribus, cupiditatibus, timoribus, multiplicibusque imaginibus, multis denique nugis nos implet, ut verissime dicatur nihil pensi unquam ac veri nobis afferre. Nam ad bella, ad seditiones, ad pugnas nihil aliud quam corpus multiplex, ejusque cupiditates impelli. Omnia enim pecuniarum gratia fiunt. Pecunias autem quærere cogimur corporis gratia, usui ejus inservientes, atque ita fit, ut propter hæc omnia a philosophiæ studiis abstrahamur. Extremum vero omnium est, quod si quid ab ipso otii nobis contingat, nosque ad considerandum aliquid conferamus, investigantibus nobis rursus ubique sese opponens, tumulto quodam perturbat animum, et quasi percutiens reddit attonitum, adeo ut hoc obstaculo impediti verum perspicere nequeamus. Ceterum nobis revera demonstratum est, si quando optamus pure aliquid intelligere, recedere a corpore oportere atque ipso animo res ipsas considerare. atque tunc, ut apparet, com-

potes evademus ejus, quod affectamus, cujusve amatores profiteremur nos esse, scilicet sapientiæ, cum videlicet mortui fuerimus, quemadmodum significat ratio: dum autem vivemus, nequaquam. nempe si nihil cum corpore pure discerni potest, e duobus alterum: aut nullo modo possumus scientiam consequi aut post mortem. Tunc enim animus ipse per seipsum erit seorsum a corpore; prius vero nequaquam. Atque dum vivimus, ita; ut videtur, proxime ad scientiam accedemus si quam minimum cum corpore commercium habuerimus, neque quicquam cum illo communicaverimus, nisi quantum summa cogat necessitas; neque hujus natura replebimur, sed ab ejus contagione cavebimus, quoad deus ipse nos solvat. Atque ita puri et a corporis insaniam liberati, ut consentaneum est, cum talibus erimus, cognoscemusque per nos ipsos sincerum quodlibet, id est, forsitan ipsum verum. nam impuro quidem purum attingere nefas est. Talia equidem, o Simmia, judico necessarium esse omnes discendi cupidos loqui invicem atque opinari. an non ita tibi videtur? SIM. Et maxime quidem omnium, o Socrates.

(12.) So. Si hæc igitur vera sunt, o amice, magna spes est eunti illuc, quo nunc ego proficiscor, sicubi, et ibi sufficienter ejus rei se compotem fieri, cujus gratia tantum nos negotium in superiori vita suscepimus. Hanc ergo migrationem, in præsentia mihi injunctam, bona cum spe suscipio: similiterque quivis alius, qui modo putavit præparatam sibi mentem tanquam purificatam. SIM. Ita prorsus. So. Purificatio vero nonne in hoc consistit, quod jamdudum dicebamus, videlicet ut, quam maxime possumus, sejungamus a corpore animum, eumque assuefaciamus per se undique a corporis contagione sevocari et colligi, itaque (quoad ejus fieri potest) habitare; idque, et in præsentem tempore et in futuro, a corpore tanquam a vinculis resolutum? SIM. Maxime quidem. So. Nonne igitur hæc mors appellatur, solutio animæ et separatio a corpore? SIM. Prorsus. So. Solvere vero ipsum, quemadmodum confitemur, omni tempore maxime ac soli student, qui recte et philosophantur, atque hæc ipsa philosophorum meditatio est, animum a corpore solvere atque separare. nonne ita? SIM. Ita videtur. So. Quamobrem, ut in principio dicebam, ridiculum foret, si vir, qui se in vita sic comparavit, ut quam proxime ad mortem accederet, ea deinde adveniente perturbaretur. nonne ridiculum? SIM. Quidni? So. Revera igitur, o Simmia, recte philosophantes mortem commentantur, atque ab ea minime omnium perterrentur. Ita vero considera. Cum enim corpus quidem ubique aspersionem, animum vero ipsum cupiant secundum seipsum habere; nonne summa esset absurditas, si tunc, quando id evenit, expavescant molesteque ferant; neque libenter illuc proficiscantur, quo cum pervenerint, spes est eo quidem, quod amabant in vita, potiri (amabant autem sapientiam); eo autem, cujus commercium moleste ferebant, liberari? An vero amatis et mulieribus et filiis defunctis, multi jam sponte voluerunt ad inferos proficisci, sperantes eos ibi visere cum eisque versari, quos amaverant: sapientiæ autem verus amator, vehementer in hanc ipsam spem adductus, non aliter eam pro dignitate ulla se comparaturum, quam si moriatur, imminentem mortem

ægre feret, ac non libenter hinc illuc emigrabit? Arbitrari quidem, o amice, oportet, si vere philosophus sit, magnopere apud ipsum hanc opinionem valere, ut non alibi puram sapientiam posse assequi speret quam in futura post mortem vita. Si autem hoc ita se habet, nonne, quemadmodum modo dicebam, præter rationem foret omnino, si mortem vir ejusmodi formidaret?

(13.) SIM. Per Jovem, contra rationem. So. Sufficiens ergo conjectura erit, inquit, si quem videris moleste mortem ferre, eum non esse philosophum, sed philosomatum quendam, id est corporis amatorem, atque eundem ferme philocrimatum et philotimum, id est pecuniarum honorumque cupidum: ac talem, ut alterum horum affectet aut utrumque. SIM. Omnino ita est, ut ais. So. Proinde quæ, o Simmia, fortitudo nominatur, an non viris ejusmodi maxime convenit? SIM. Maxime. So. Nonne et temperantia (cujus plerique aiunt officium esse nequaquam prosternere se libidinibus, sed parvi pendere illas, modestiamque servare) his duntaxat convenit, qui corpus despiciunt maxime atque in philosophia vivunt? SIM. Necesse est. So. Si enim considerare velis fortitudinem temperantiamque aliorum, tibi perabsurda videbitur. SIM. Quanam, o Socrates, ratione? So. Scis utique, ceteros omnes mortem unum ex maximis malis existimare. SIM. Et maxime quidem. So. Nonne igitur majorum metu malorum, quicumque inter eos fortes sunt, sustinent mortem, quando sustinent? SIM. Hoc pacto. So. Metuendo igitur atque metu fortes sunt omnes præter philosophos: etsi absurdum est, metu vel timiditate aliquem esse fortem. SIM. Nimum certe. So. Quid autem? qui inter eos moderati dicuntur, nonne simili quodam pacto affecti sunt, intemperantia videlicet quam temperati? quamquam impossibile id esse dicimus. Verumtamen illis evenit affectio quædam huic similis, in istac eorum fatua temperantia. timentes enim, ne aliis careant voluptatibus, easque appetentes, a ceteris abstant, ab aliis superati; etsi vocant intemperantiam a voluptatibus superari. verumtamen accidit eis, ut superati a voluptatibus alias superent voluptates. Jam vero id illi simile est, quod modo dicebatur, scilicet quodam modo per intemperantiam fieri temperatos. SIM. Simile quidem. So. Animadvertendum est, o beate Simmia, ne hæc haudquaquam recte sit ad virtutem via, voluptates videlicet voluptatibus, dolores doloribus, et metum metu, et majus minori, tanquam nummos, commutare: sed ille duntaxat rectus sit nummus, cujus gratia hæc omnia oporteat commutari atque venundari, scilicet sapientia sive prudentia: pro qua et cum qua omnia empta ac vendita revera sit et fortitudo et temperantia et justitia, ac summatim vera virtus cum sapientia sive prudentia: et accedentibus et recedentibus voluptatibus et timoribus ceterisque generis ejusdem. Sin autem a sapientia segregata invicem commutantur, adumbratio quædam sit ejusmodi virtus, ac revera servilis, nihil sani verique possidens: virtutis autem veritas in horum omnium purificatione revera consistat: et temperantia et justitia et fortitudo, et sapientia ipsa sit purificatio quædam. Quamobrem hi, qui mysteria nobis constituerunt, minime contemnendi videntur; sed revera jamdiu occulte nos admonere, quicumque non

expiatus neque iniatus migrabit ad inferos, eum jacere in luto: quicumque vero purgatus atque initiatus illuc accesserit, cum diis habitare. aiunt enim, qui mysteria tractant, ministri Bacchi ferentes ferulas narthecophori quidem feruligeri multi sunt, Bacchi vero pauci. Hi vero, ut equidem opinor, non alii sunt, quam qui recte philosophati sunt. quorum quidem in numero esse me, neque inferiorem quidem omni studio pro viribus conatus sum; an vero recte contenderim aliquidve profecerim, cum illuc pervenerimus, certo sciemus, si deus voluerit, paulo post, ut mihi videtur. Hæc igitur mea excusatio est, o Simmia et o Cebes, quam videlicet ob causam, cum vos eosque, qui hic sunt, dominos relinquam, merito non ægre feram neque perturber, spero enim, me et illic non minus, quam hic, bonos dominos amicosque inventurum. Multi vero id minime credunt. Si igitur defensio mea vobis magis quam Atheniensibus iudicibus persuasit, bene se res habet.

(14.) Cum hæc Socrates dixisset, suscipiens sermonem Cebes sic inquit, Cetera quidem, o Socrates, recte dicta videntur: quantum vero ad ipsam animam spectat, valde ambigunt homines, ne anima a corpore separata nusquam sit ulterius, sed ea ipsa die, qua homo mortem obierit, intereat statimque sejuncta a corpore dissolvatur, atque exhalans, quasi ventus aut fumus, dissipetur atque evanescat, neque usquam ulterius omnino sit aliquid. Profecto si esset alicubi collecta in semetipsam, et ab his malis, quæ tu modo narrabas, liberata, multa nimirum bonaque spes esset, o Socrates, vera, quæ dicebas, fore. Ceterum ad id fortasse persuasione fideque non parva opus est, ut credatur, superesse animam post interitum hominis, atque aliquam vim intelligentiamque habere. So. Vera, o Cebes, loqueris. Verum quid agendum censes? an forte de his ipsis confabulandum, utrum ita fore an aliter probabile sit? Ce. Libenter equidem audirem de his rebus, quid sentias. So. Neminem arbitror hæc audientem, nec si comædus quidem sit, esse dicturum nugari nunc me, ac de quibus minime oporteat verba facere. Si ergo placet oportetque considerare.

(15.) Id hoc pacto consideremus, utrum videlicet apud inferos sint mortuorum animæ, necne. Vetus quidem hic exstat sermo, cuius memores sumus, abire quidem illuc animas defunctorum, rursusque huc reverti fierique ex mortuis. Atqui si hoc verum est, ut ex mortuis iterum viventes fiant, essent animæ illic nostræ. neque enim rursus fierent, si alicubi non essent. Atque hæc sufficiens conjectura est, ita esse, si revera constet, haud aliunde viventes fieri quam ex mortuis. at vero nisi id sit, alia opus erit ratione. Ce. Omnino. So. Neque vero id in hominibus solum, si planius intelligere vis, consideres, sed in animalibus omnibus et plantis atque, ut summatim dicam, in omnibus quæ gignuntur, in his, inquam, omnibus consideremus, nunquid omnia sic fiant, neque aliunde quam ex contrariis contraria, quibuscunque tale aliquid contingit: quemadmodum pulchrum turpi quodammodo contrarium est et iustum injusto, aliaque ejusmodi quamplurima videmus. Ergo utrum necessarium sit, cuicumque aliquid est contrarium, nullo modo aliunde id quam ex suo contrario fieri? Veluti quando quid majus

efficitur, necesse est ex eo, quod ante fuerat minus, postea majus evadere. CE. Ita est. So. Nonne et si minus aliquid fiat, ex eo, quod ante majus erat, postea fiet minus? CE. Sic omnino. So. Quin etiam ex robustiori debilius, ex tardiori velocius? CE. Prorsus. So. Quid vero? si quid evadat deterius, nonne ex meliori? et si justius, ex injustiori? CE. Quidni? So. In omnibus igitur satis id exploratum habemus, omnia ita fieri, contraria videlicet ex contrariis. CE. Prorsus. So. Quid rursus? Estne medium aliquid inter contraria duo? duæ videlicet inter illa generationes, sive progressionem ab altero quidem in alterum, atque in alterum vicissim ab altero? Sane inter majus atque minus medium obtinent incrementum et decrementum: dicimusque id quidem crescere, illud vero decrescere. CE. Ita. So. Nonne similiter discerni vicissim atque confundi, frigescere et incalescere, omniaque eodem pacto? et si nomina nobis desunt alicubi, ubique tamen ita necesse est, fieri videlicet omnia ex contrariis invicem, generationemque esse utriusque vicissim in alterum? CE. Omnino quidem.

(16.) So. Quid vero? ei quod est vivere, estne aliquid contrarium? quemadmodum ei, quod vigilare est, dormire contrarium? CE. Sic est omnino. So. Quidnam? CE. Mori. So. An non ex se invicem hæc fiunt? siquidem contraria sunt: cumque duo sint, duæ quoque inter hæc generationes mutæ sive progressionem? CE. Nihil prohibet. So. Alteram quidem conjugationem eorum, quæ modo dicebam, ego tibi dicam, tam ipsam quam generationes eorum? tu vero mihi aperies alteram. Dico autem illud quidem dormire, illud autem evigilare; atque ex somno vigiliam fieri et ex vigilia somnum: horumque generationes hanc quidem connivere, illam vero expergisci. satisfaci tibi, necne? CE. Satisfecisti certe. So. Dic tu mihi quoque similiter de vita atque morte. an non contrarium vivere dicis esse atque mori? CE. Equidem. So. Et ex se invicem fieri? CE. Ita. So. Ergo ex vivente quidnam fiet? CE. Mortuum. So. Quid autem ex mortuo? CE. Necesse est confiteri vivens. So. Igitur ex mortuis, o Cebes, viventia fiunt atque viventes. CE. Apparet. So. Sunt igitur apud inferos animæ nostræ? CE. Videtur. So. Nonne ergo et generationum, quæ circa hæc sunt, altera quidem manifesta est? Mori enim manifestum est: nonne? CE. Ita prorsus. So. Quidnam igitur faciemus? non reddemus vicissim generationem huic contrariam, sed hac in re duntaxat mancam dicemus naturam esse? an vero necesse est reddere ei, quod mori est, contrariam quandam generationem? CE. Omnino. So. Quam vero istam? CE. Reviviscere. So. Nonne igitur, si reviviscentia est, progressio quædam hæc est ex mortuis ad viventes? CE. Est utique. So. Convenit ergo nobis hac insuper ratione, viventes ex mortuis fieri nihilo minus quam mortuos ex viventibus. quod cum ita sit, sufficientem conjecturam hinc haberi, animas mortuorum necessario alicubi esse, unde iterum revertantur. CE. Videtur mihi, o Socrates, hoc ex his, quæ concessa sunt, necessario sequi.

(17.) So. Animadvertite ergo, o Cebes, haud ab re nos hæc, ut arbitror, concessisse. Nisi enim continue altera vicissim alteris

redderentur, quasi quodam circulo remeantia, sed directa quædam progressio foret, duntaxat ex altero in ejus oppositum, neque rursus reflecterentur in alterum facerentque regressum; omnia tandem, mihi crede, eandem subirent figuram atque affectionem, fierique cessarent. *CE.* Quonam id pacto dicis? *So.* Haudquaquam intellectu difficile est, quod loquor. Perinde enim ac si in somnum caderetur quidem, ab eo vero in vigiliam nunquam resurgeretur, minime te latet, omnia tandem eo deventura, ut *Endymion* ridicula quædam fabula videatur, neque appareat usquam; cum cetera quoque universa somno similiter opprimantur. Proinde si confunderentur quidem omnia, nunquam vero discernerentur, *Anaxagoræ* illud repente contingeret, *Universa* videlicet esse simul. Eadem ratione, o amice *Cebes*, si, quæcunque vitam acceperint, moriantur, mortua vero cum fuerint, mortua relinquuntur neque iterum reviviscant; an non necessarium est omnino, cuncta demum interiisse nihilque vivere? Nam si ex aliis quidem viventia fierent, postea vero perirent, quid obstaret, quo minus in interitum cuncta consumerentur? *CE.* Nihil prorsus, o *Socrates*; sed mihi omnino vera loqui videris. *So.* Est certe, o *Cebes*, maxime omnium ita, ut mihi videtur; neque nos hæc ipsa quasi decepti confessi sumus: sed revera reviviscentia est, atque ex mortuis viventes fiunt, mortuorumque supersunt animæ. atque bonis quidem melius est; malis vero pejus.

(18.) *CE.* Atqui et secundum illud, o *Socrates*, quod frequenter usurpare soles, si modo verum est, *Disciplinam* videlicet nostram nihil esse aliud quam *reminiscentiam*: et secundum hoc, inquam, necesse est, nos in superiori quodam tempore ea, quorum nunc reminiscimur, didicisse. Id vero fieri non posset, nisi prius anima nostra fuisset alicubi, quam in hanc humanam speciem deveniret. quamobrem et hac ratione *immortale* quiddam anima videtur esse. *SIM.* Quales hujus rei demonstrationes habes, o *Cebes*? *Commemora* eas nobis. Non enim satis in præsentia memini. *CE.* Una quidem ratio est pulcherrima, quod interrogati homines, si quis eos recte interroget, ipsi omnia quemadmodum sunt, respondent. Atqui nunquam id facere possent, nisi inesset ipsis scientia rectaque ratio. Deinde, si quis eos ad *geometricas* figuras descriptionesque vel simile aliquid converterit, ibi manifeste comperiet, ita id se habere. *So.* Si hæc, o *Simmia*, ratio tibi non satisfacit, attende, an sic tibi consideranti idem quod nobis videatur. *Diffidis* enim, eam, quam disciplinam vocant, *reminiscentiam* esse posse. *SIM.* Haud equidem diffido. Veruntamen id expedit mihi discere, de quo sermo est, scilicet *reminisci*. Ac ferme ex his, quæ *Cebes* cœpit dicere, jam recordor, et credo. Nihilominus tamen et a te, o *Socrates*, qua ratione id modo probare ipse aggrediebaris, perlibenter audirem. *So.* Hac equidem ratione. confitemur sane quodammodo, si quis alicujus reminiscatur, oportere ipsum prius aliquando id scivisse. *SIM.* Prorsus. *So.* Nunquid ergo et hoc confitemur, quotiens scientia hoc modo provenit, *reminiscentiam* eam esse? dico autem hoc pacto. si quis aliud quiddam viderit vel audiverit vel alio perceperit sensu, neque solum id ipsum cognoscat, verum etiam agnos-



cat aliud quiddam, cujus non una eademque, sed alia scientia sit; nonne merito dicemus, hunc ejus rei reminisci, in cujus pervenerit notionem? SIM. Quonam pacto id dicis? So. Hoc. alia quodammodo hominis scientia est, alia lyræ. SIM. Quidni? So. An ignoras hoc amantibus evenire, cum lyram aut vestem aut quid aliud ex his aspiciant, quibus uti eorum puellæ amatæ consueverunt. nam et agnoscunt lyram, et simul mente formam recolunt puellæ, cujus erat lyra. Hoc vero est reminisci. ceu si quis, cum Simmiam viderit, sæpe Cebetis recordetur; et cetera ejusdem generis infinita. SIM. Infinita, per Jovem. So. An non igitur tale quiddam recordatio quædam est? maxime vero, si id nobis in illis contingat rebus, quas longitudine temporis et negligentia oblivioni jam tradiderimus? SIM. Ita certe. So. Quid vero? contingitne, ut, qui equum pictum viderit pictamque lyram, reminiscatur hominis? atque cum pictum aspexerit Simmiam, veniat illi in mentem et Cebes? SIM. Sic utique. So. Nonne evenit etiam, ut, qui Simmiam inspexerit pictum, ipsius quoque Simmiæ recordetur? SIM. Evenit certe.

(19.) So. An non secundum hæc omnia contingit, tum a similibus, tum a dissimilibus reminiscentiam provenire? SIM. Contingit. So. Verum quotiens a similibus quispiam reminiscitur, an non necesse est id insuper intelligere, utrum deficiat hoc secundum similitudinem, necne, ab illo cujus repetita memoria est? SIM. Necesse est. So. Attende sane, nunquid hæc ita se habeant. dicimus aliquid esse æquale? non dico lignum ligno, neque lapidem lapidi, neque aliud ejusmodi quicquam, sed præter hæc omnia aliud quiddam æquale ipsum dicimusne aliquid esse, an nihil? SIM. Dicimus, per Jovem; et quidem mirifice. So. An scimus et ipsum, quod est æquale? SIM. Omnino quidem. So. Undenam scientiam ejus accepimus? an non ex his, quæ modo diximus, videlicet conspiciati vel ligna vel saxa vel alia quædam æqualia, ex his illud excogitavimus, quod aliud est quam hæc? an non aliud quiddam apparet? Considera vero et hoc pacto. nonne saxa vel ligna æqualia, dum eadem sunt, alias æqualia, alias inæqualia nobis apparent? SIM. Penitus. So. Quid autem? ipsa æqualia possunt inæqualia tibi videri? vel æqualitas, inæqualitas? SIM. Nunquam, o Socrates. So. Quamobrem non idem sunt hæc æqualia atque ipsum æquale. SIM. Nullo modo idem mihi apparent, o Socrates. So. Veruntamen ab his æqualibus, quæ alia sunt quam ipsum illud æquale, ipsius simul excogitasti scientiam atque percepisti. SIM. Verissima loqueris. So. An non, sive simile ipsum sit sive dissimile? SIM. Omnino. So. Nihil sane refert. quatenus enim aliud conspicatus, ex hac ipsa perspectione aliud intellexeris, sive simile sive dissimile, necesse est hinc reminiscentiam provenire. SIM. Et maxime quidem. So. Quid vero ad id? an sic nos habemus circa ea, quæ sunt in his, quæ modo dicebamus, æqualia, lignis, saxisque et aliis? videntur ita æqualia hæc esse, ut ipsum, quod est æquale? an deesse potius aliquid, quo minus talia sint, quale est æquale ipsum, an nihil? SIM. Permiltum certe deest. So. Nonne confitemur: quando quis aliquid intuens animadvertat, appetere quidem hoc, quod in præsentia videt, esse tale, quale quiddam aliud ex his quæ

sunt ; verum deficere, neque posse tale esse æquale, quale sit illud, sed deterius esse ; nonne necesse est eum, qui animadvertit, ante cognovisse illud, cui dicit hoc quodammodo simile fieri, sed ad plenam similitudinem non accedere ? SIM. Necesse est. So. Quid ergo ? talene aliquid contingit et nobis, nec ne, circa æqualia ipsumque æquale ? SIM. Quam plurimum. So. Necesse est ergo, nos æqualis ipsius scientiam ante illud tempus habuisse, in quo primum videntes æqualia, agnovimus conari quidem hæc omnia talia evadere, quale est ipsum, attamen a perfectione ipsius abesse. SIM. Ita est. So. Atqui et hoc confitemur, nos neque aliunde id agnovisse neque agnoscere posse, quam ex visu vel tactu vel alio quodam sensu. similiter enim de his omnibus judico. SIM. Similiter, o Socrates, ad id se habent, de quo agitur, ostendendum. So. Atqui a sensibus quidem intellexisse oportet, omnia, quæ subjecta sunt sensibus, illud, quod est æquale, appetere, quamvis ipsum non assequantur. an aliter dicimus ? SIM. Haud aliter. So. Ante enim, quam inciperemus videre aut audire aliisque uti sensibus, oportuit nos æqualis ipsius scientiam possedissee, videlicet quid ipsum sit : si modo æqualia hæc, quæ sensibus subjacent, ad ipsum adeo relaturi simus, ut judicemus anniti quidem hæc omnia talia, quale ipsum est, evadere, veruntamen deteriora relinqui. SIM. Necessario ex superioribus, o Socrates, sequitur. So. An non statim nati vidimus et audivimus aliosque sensus exercuimus ? SIM. Omnino. So. Oportuit autem, ut diximus, ante hæc ipsius æqualis scientiam habuisse. SIM. Oportuit. So. Quamobrem, ut videtur, necesse est, antequam nasceremur, eam comprehendisse. SIM. Sic apparet.

(20.) So. Nonne, si eam sortiti ante nativitatem ipsam jam habentes nati sumus, scivimus et ante ortum atque statim nati, non solum ipsum æquale majusque et minus, verum etiam ejusdem generis omnia ? non enim de æquali magis nunc nobis est sermo quam de ipso pulchro, de ipso bono, de ipso justo atque sancto, et, ut dico, de omnibus, quibus proprie hoc ipsum, quod est, assignamus, et interrogationibus interrogantes et responsionibus respondentes, ut necessarium sit nos, antequam nasceremur, horum omnium scientiam habuisse. SIM. Est ita. So. Ac si, acceptis scientiis, non semper oblivisceremur, oporteret et cum ipsis nasci, semper etiam per omnem vitam scire. Nam scire id est, acceptam alicujus rei scientiam retinere nec amisisse. an non oblivionem scientiæ jacturam esse dicimus ? SIM. Ita prorsus, o Socrates. So. Sin autem acceptam ante ortum scientiam nati amisimus ; deinde vero freti sensibus circa ipsas scientias illas, quas ante habueramus, recipimus : nonne id, quod discere appellamus, esset scientiam propriam recuperare, atqui id Reminisci nominantes recte nominaremus ? SIM. Recte. So. Fieri enim id posse apparuit : videlicet ut cum quis aliquid senserit vel videndo vel audiendo vel aliter sentiendo, aliud quiddam ex hoc agnoscat, cujus erat oblitus, cui quidem hoc quodammodo propinquabat, sive simile id sit sive dissimile. Ita, quod jam pridem dico, e duobus alterum. aut enim scientes nati sumus, scimusque per omnem vitam omnes ; aut, quos deinde dici-

mus discere, duntaxat reminiscuntur; atque disciplina reminiscencia est. SIM. Sic omnino se res habet, o Socrates.

(21.) So. Utrum igitur eligis, o Simmia? vel cum scientia nos esse natos, vel reminisci postea, quorum prius scientiam acceperimus? SIM. Ambigo, utrum in præsentia, Socrates, eligam. So. Quid vero? potesne eligere, quid de hoc videatur tibi? Vir sciens potestne eorum, quæ scit, reddere rationem, an contra? SIM. Necesse est, o Socrates, posse. So. An vero tibi videntur omnes rationem de his, quæ modo tractabamus, afferre posse? SIM. Optarem equidem: sed multo magis vereor, ne cras nullus hic homo sit, qui pro dignitate id sciat efficere. So. Non igitur, o Simmia, putas omnes hoc intelligere? SIM. Nullo modo. So. Reminiscuntur ergo, quæ aliquando didicerant. SIM. Necesse est. So. Quando vero acceperunt animæ nostræ scientiam? non enim postquam homines nati sumus. SIM. Non certe. So. Ergo prius. SIM. Ita. So. Erant igitur, Simmia, animæ etiam prius, quam in humanam speciem devenirent, seorsum a corpore, intelligentiamque habebant. SIM. Nisi forte, o Socrates, dum nasceremur, ipsas scientias acceperimus. nam id etiam tempus reliquum est. So. Esto sic, o amice. sed quonam alio tempore eas amisimus? non enim habentes jam eas nascimur, ut modo confitebamur. An in eodem perdimus, quo et accepimus? an aliud tempus afferre potes? SIM. Nullo, Socrates, modo. sed nihil me dicere minime advertēbam.

(22.) So. An ergo sic nobis se res habet, o Simmia? Si quidem sunt ea, quæ quotidie prædicamus, pulchrum scilicet quiddam atque bonum et omnis ejusmodi essentia, ad quam omnia sensibus percepta referimus, quæ et prius erat nostra et tanquam nostram quærentes invenimus atque ad ipsius exemplar referimus; necesse est, ita, ut et ipsa sunt, nostram quoque animam prius etiam, quam nasceremur, exstitisse. At si hæc non sunt, frustra utique ratio hæc tractata esset. An non ita se habet, atque par necessitas est, et ipsa esse et animas nostras, antequam nasceremur: et nisi ipsa sunt, neque hæc utique sunt? SIM. Mirifice, o Socrates, eadem mihi videtur esse necessitas: atque pulcherrime huc ratio nos perducit, ut similiter tam animam nostram quam essentiam ipsam, quam modo dicebas, ante quam nasceremur, exstitisse confiteamur. Nihil enim tam certum habeo quam esse ejusmodi omnia, et quidem maxime, scilicet pulchrum ipsum et bonum aliaque omnia, quæ tu modo dicebas. Et quantum ad me attinet, satis est demonstratum. So. Quid vero videtur Cebet? oportet enim illi quoque persuadere. SIM. Satis et illi arbitror persuasum, quamvis omnium repugnantissimus sit et ad credendum tardissimus. opinor tamen sufficienter illi probatum, ante ortum nostrum animam exstitisse.

(23.) An vero post interitum nostrum etiam futura sit, nec mihi quidem ipsi, o Socrates, satis adhuc videtur ostensum. sed nunc etiam restat multorum dubitatio illa, quam in medium Cebes adduxerat, ne videlicet homine moriente simul anima dissipetur atque ita esse desinat. quid enim prohibet fieri quidem illam et aliunde constitui, atque esse prius etiam, quam in corpus hominis laberetur:

postquam vero ab eo discesserit, tunc illam insuper interire? *Ce.* Recte loqueris, *Simmia*. Videtur enim quasi dimidium ejus, quod oportet, probatum, ante videlicet, quam nasceremur, nostram animam exstitisse: oportere autem id quoque ostendere, postquam mortui fuerimus, non minus fore quam esset, antequam nasceremur, si modo finem suum demonstratio sit habitura. *So.* Demonstratum quidem est istud, o *Simmia* et o *Cebes*, etiam nunc, si modo velitis, et id, quod modo probatum est, et illud, quod ante concesseramus, videlicet omne vivens ex mortuo fieri, in unum connectere. Si enim est anima prius, et cum in hanc venit vitam fitque homo, necesse est non aliunde eam quam ex mortuis proficisci: cur non necessarium sit, ut etiam post mortem corporis maneat, cum oporteat ipsam ad hanc vitam reverti? Demonstratum igitur et nunc est, quod dicitur.

(24.) Veruntamen videmini tu atque *Simmias* cupere idem rursus diligentius pertractari: ac forsitan puerorum more formidatis, ne revera corpore egredientem ventus dissolvat atque dispergat, præsertim si ventis vehementius flantibus exeat. Ad hæc *Cebes* subridens, tanquam nobis id formidantibus, inquit, o *Socrates*, contra persuadere conare: immo vero non tanquam formidantibus nobis: sed fortasse est inter nos puer aliquis talia metuens: huic ergo annitamur persuadere, ne mortem ceu larvas pertimescat. *So.* Oportet certe huic mederi carminibus quotidie, quoad sanus efficiatur. *Ce.* Sed ubinam medicum ejusmodi nanciscemur, o *Socrates*, cum tu discesseris? *So.* Ampla est, o *Cebes*, Græcia, in qua sunt viri præstantes: quam plurimæ sunt barbaræ nationes; per has omnes ejusmodi medicum debetis perquirere, neque pecuniis parentes neque laboribus. nihil est enim, pro quo comodius omnia quis expendat. Perscrutandum quoque est etiam inter vos ipsos. forte enim non facile invenietis, qui melius quam vos id queat efficere. *Ce.* Fiet id quidem. sed redeamus jam, si tibi placet, unde digressi sumus. *So.* Mihi quidem placet. quid enim prohibet? *Ce.* Recte respondes.

(25.) *So.* An non tale aliquid a nobis ipsis sciscitari debemus, cuinam et quali conveniat ea passio, per quam dissolvi possit: et cui qualique sit metuendum, ne id patiat, et secundum quam qualemque ejus partem: deinde considerare, cujusmodi anima sit: demum ex his animæ nostræ gratia vel confidere vel timere. *Ce.* Vera loqueris. *So.* Nonne igitur ei, quod componitur jamque compositum est, natura id pati convenit, ut, quatenus est compositum, dissolvatur? si quid vero non sit compositum, huic soli potissimum nulla accidit dissolutio. *Ce.* Mihi quidem sic apparet. *So.* An non, quæ semper secundum eadem eodemque modo se habent, hæc maxime esse convenit simplicia? quæ vero alias aliter, nec unquam secundum eadem, hæc esse composita? *Ce.* Ita equidem opinor. *So.* Redeamus jam ad illa, ad quæ in superiori disputatione processimus. Ipsa essentia, cujus interrogando respondendoque rationem hoc ipsum, quod est, assignamus, utrum eodem modo et secundum eadem se semper habet? an alias aliter? videlicet et ipsum æquale, ipsum pulchrum, ipsum unumquodque, quod est ens, utrum mu-

tationem aliquando aliquam ipsa recipiunt? an ipsorum unumquodque semper id, quod est uniforme, existens ipsum per seipsum, eodem modo et secundum eadem se habet, neque unquam neque usquam nec ullo pacto mutationem aliquam suscipit? CE. Necesse est, o Socrates, hæc eodem modo et secundum eadem se semper habere. So. Quid autem dicemus de multis, quæ similiter pulchra dicuntur, scilicet hominibus, equis, vestibus vel aliis quibuscunque talibus, quæ vel pulchra dicuntur vel æqualia, vel etiam de omnibus, quæ illis synonyma sunt? num hæc secundum eadem se semper habent? an potius omnino contra quam illa, videlicet neque ipsa sibi met neque invicem unquam, ut simpliciter loquar, ullo pacto secundum eadem eodemque modo se habent? CE. Hæc, o Socrates, nunquam eodem modo sunt. So. Et hæc quidem tangi, videri aliisque sensibus attingi possunt, quæ vero semper secundum eadem permanent, sola intelligentiæ ratione percipiuntur; suntque invisibilia, quæ talia sunt, neque cernuntur.

(26.) CE. Vera omnino loqueris. So. Vis ergo duas rerum species ponamus, alteram visibilibus, invisibilium alteram? CE. Ponamus. So. Et invisibile quidem modo semper eodem esse, visibile vero nunquam eodem? CE. Hoc quoque ponamus. So. Age jam, aliudne in nobis est, quam hinc quidem corpus, inde vero anima? CE. Nihil aliud. So. Utrinam speciei corpus esse similis cognatusque dicimus? CE. Nemini dubium, quin visibili. So. Quid vero anima? visibilene aliquid est, an contra? CE. Non hominibus quidem, o Socrates. So. Atqui nos de his duntaxat, quæ ab hominum natura videri vel non videri possunt, loquebamur. an de his, quæ ad aliam naturam spectant, tractabamus? CE. De his duntaxat, quæ ad humanam. So. Quid ergo de anima dicebamus? nunquid visibilem esse? CE. Non visibilem. So. Invisibilem ergo? CE. Ita. So. Anima igitur invisibili speciei similior est quam corpus: corpus vero visibili. CE. Necessarium id est omnino.

(27.) So. An non et hoc evenire in superioribus dicebamus, ut cum anima ad aliquid considerandum socium sibi corpus assumit, vel per visum vel per auditum vel per alium sensum (hoc enim est per corpus considerare, quia per sensus id agitur) tunc quidem a corpore trahatur ad ea, quæ nunquam eodem modo sunt, atque ipsa aberret perturbeturque, quasi ebria vacillet, utpote quæ talia quædam attigerit. CE. Prorsus. So. At vero quotiens ipse animus per seipsum excogitat, illuc se confert ad purum, sempiternum, immortale, semper eodem modo se habens: et tanquam ipsius cognatus semper inhæret illi, quotiens ipse redierit in seipsum, eique liceat, cessetque ab errore: et circa illa semper secundum eadem eodem modo se habet, utpote qui talia jam attigerit. atque hæc ejus affectio sapientia sive prudentia nominatur. CE. Præclare ac vere omnino loqueris, Socrates. So. Utri igitur speciei rursus tibi videtur, ex his quæ et in superioribus et modo dicta sunt, anima esse similior atque cognatior? CE. Arbitror equidem, o Socrates, quemlibet vel indocilem prorsus et pertinacem et hac discursione concessurum, animam et per totum et per omne similiorem esse ei, quod semper eodem

modo est, quam opposito. So. Quid autem corpus? Cē. Alteri speciei.

(28.) So. Considera rursus hoc pacto. Quamdiu in eodem sunt anima atque corpus, hoc quidem servire atque subesse natura jubet, hanc verò præesse atque dominari. Secundum hæc rursus utrum tibi videtur simile esse divino, utrum mortali? an non putas divinum quidem tale esse natura, ut præsit et ducat; mortale vero, ut subjiciatur ac serviat? Cē. Puto equidem. So. Utri igitur horum est anima similis? Cē. Constat, o Socrates, animam quidem similem esse divino; corpus vero mortali. So. Animadvertite jam, o Cebes, num hæc ex omnibus, quæ dicta sunt, consequantur: videlicet ipsi divino, immortalis, intelligibili, uniformi, indissolubili, semper eodem modo et secundum eadem seipsum habenti, animam esse simillimam: humano vero, mortali, nec intelligibili, multiformi, dissolubili, nunquam eodem modo sibimet se habenti, simillimum esse corpus. Possumusne, o amice Cebes, hæc præter aliud quicquam afferre, quo minus ita sit? Cē. Non possumus.

(29.) So. Quid ergo? cum hæc ita se habeant, nonne corpori convenit, ut brevi solvatur: animæ vero, ut omnino indissolubilis sit, vel aliquid rei omnino indissolubili propinquum? Cē. Quidni? So. Cernis igitur, postquam mortuus homo fuerit, quod in eo visibile est corpus, et in loco visibili positum, (quod cadaver appellamus, cui convenit, ut dissolvatur, concidat, diffluat,) nihil horum subito pati, sed multum aliquando tempus superesse, si quis corpore perbelle affecto decesserit. Corpus enim servatum et rebus quibusdam ad durationem curatum, quemadmodum in Ægypto faciunt, incredibile quoddam tempus ferme integrum manet. Quin etiam si putrescat, tamen nonnullæ corporis partes, ossa videlicet nervique atque similia, ut ita dicam, immortalia permanent. an non? Cē. Ita. So. Anima vero, quæ invisibile quiddam est, in similem quandam aliumque locum migrans, excellentem, purum, invisibilem, nobis occultum, revera ad bonum sapientemque Deum: quo, si Deus voluerit, paulo post meo quoque animo est migrandum: anima, inquam, talis, talique natura prædita nunquid, cum primum a corpore liberata fuerit, dissipabitur atque interibit, ut multi putant? Permulum abest, o dilecte Cebes atque Simmia. immo multo magis ita se res habet: si quidem pura discesserit, corporeum nil secum trahens; utpote quæ sua cum illo in vita communicaverit, sed fugerit illud semper seque in se collegerit, tanquam semper id meditata. quod quidem nihil est aliud quam recte philosophari mortemque revera facile commentari. an non hæc est meditatio mortis? Cē. Est omnino. So. Anima, inquam, si sic affecta discesserit, nonne ad aliquid sibi simile divinum abit? divinum et immortale et sapiens? quo cum pervenerit, evadit felix, ab errore, dementia, timoribus durisque amoribus ceterisque humanis liberata malis: et quemadmodum de initiatis dici solet, revera reliquum tempus vitam cum diis agit? Itane dicendum est, o Cebes, an aliter?

(30.) Cē. Ita per Jovem. So. Sin autem polluta impuraque a corpore decedat, utpote quæ corpus semper amplexa ipsum duntaxat

coluerit et amaverit, ejusque voluptatibus et libidinibus quasi beneficiis quibusdam delinita fuerit, ut usque adeo capta, ut nihil aliud putet esse verum, nisi quod corporeum sit, quod tangi, quod videri possit, quodve bibat et quod edat, et quo in venereis utatur: quod vero oculis quidem occultum et invisibile sit, verumtamen intelligibile et philosophia comprehendendum, habere odio consueverit formidareque et fugere: sic, inquam, institutam animam putasne ipsam per se sinceram evadere? *CE.* Nullo modo. *So.* Sed infectam involutamque, ut arbitrator, contagione corporea, quam consuetudo congressusque cum corpore, propter continuam familiaritatem plurimumque ejus cultum, inseruit quasi jam naturalem? *CE.* Ita putamus. *So.* Ponderosum vero, o amice, id putandum est et grave terrenumque et visibile, quod anima ejusmodi secum trahit: ideoque ab eo graviter et ad visibilem retrahitur locum, metu invisibilis atque occulti: et quemadmodum fertur, circa monumenta sepulchraque revolvitur, circa quæ jam nonnulla apparuerunt animarum umbrosa phantasmata, qualia præferunt simulacra tales animæ, quæ videlicet non puræ decesserunt a corpore, sed visibile aliquid trahentes: quo fit, ut videri possint. *CE.* Consentaneum est, o Socrates. *So.* Consentaneum tamen, o Cebes, non esse has bonorum animas, sed malorum, quæ circa hæc oberrare coguntur, pœnas dantes vitæ improbe actæ. itaque tam diu circumvagantur, quoad cupiditate naturæ corporeæ comitante, rursus induant corpus.

(31.) Induunt autem, ut decens est, ejusmodi mores, quales in vita exercuerunt. *CE.* Quales dicis mores, o Socrates? *So.* Ejusmodi eos quidem, qui ventri dediti per inertiam atque lasciviam vitam egerunt, neque quicquam pensi pudorisque habuerunt, decens est, asinos similiaque subire. an non putas? *CE.* Consentanea loqueris. *So.* Qui vero injurias, tyrannides, rapinas præ ceteris secuti sunt, in luporum, accipitrum, milvorum genera par est pertransire. num alio has migrare dicendum est? *CE.* Ita potissimum. *So.* Similiter et in ceteris: abeunt enim in ea genera quælibet, quibus in vita mores similes contraxerunt. *CE.* Manifestum id quidem. *So.* Nonne horum felicissimi sunt et in optimum proficiscuntur locum, quicumque popularem civilemque virtutem, quam temperantiam et justitiam nominant, exercuere, absque philosophia quidem atque mente, sed et consuetudine exercitationeque acquisitam? *CE.* Quonam pacto hi felicissimi sunt? *So.* Quoniam decens est, hos in tale quoddam genus iterum civile miteque demigrare, quodam modo apum aut vesparum vel formicarum; atque deinde in idem rursus genus humanum, modestosque ex illis homines fieri. *CE.* Ita decet.

(32.) *So.* In deorum vero genus nulli fas est pervenire præter eos, qui descendi cupiditate flagrantes et philosophati sunt et puri penitus decesserunt. Horum quidem gratia, o amice Simmia atque Cebes, qui recte philosophantur, ab omnibus corporis cupiditatibus abstinent; atque ita perseverant, nec se illis unquam tradunt: neque familiæ jacturam paupertatemque formidant, quemadmodum multi pecuniarum cupidi: neque rursus contemptum atque ignominiam, quemadmodum qui magistratus ambiunt et honores, deinde ab his

abstinent. CÆ. Neque enim deceret, o Socrates. So. Non, per Jovem. Quamobrem hi, qui animum suum colunt neque corpori fingendo vivunt, spretis his omnibus, haudquaquam ea gradiuntur via, qua superiores illi, quos narravimus : quia videlicet, quo profisciscantur, ignorent. Ipsi vero, existimantes philosophiæ ejusque solutioni repugnandum non esse, hanc ea sequuntur via, qua eos ipsa ducit.

(33.) CÆ. Quonam pacto, o Socrates ? So. Dicam equidem. Cognoscunt profecto viri scientiæ cupidi, quemadmodum eorum animam suscipit revera ligatam in corpore atque implicitam, ac per ipsum quasi per carcerem quandam res considerare coactam ; cumque per seipsam id non faciat, omni prorsus inscitia involutam : (cognoscunt præterea,) quemadmodum philosophia perspicuens, quam callide corporum vinculum adstringat animam ; quippe cum per ipsam fiat concupiscentiam, per quam devinctus animus adjutor sit ad seipsum devinciendum : cognoscunt, inquam, viri scientiæ cupidi, quemadmodum philosophia eorum animam ita constitutam suscipiens, paulatim instruit solvereque aggreditur, ostendens quam fallax oculorum, quam fallax aurium ceterorumque sensuum sit judicium, suadens ab his discedere, quatenus hæere illis summa non cogat necessitas, seque in se ipsam revocare atque colligere, nec ulli credere, præterquam sibi, quatenus videlicet ipsa per seipsam intelligat quodlibet eorum, quæ sunt, existens per seipsum : quod vero ipsa per alia consideret, existens in aliis aliud, nihil existimare verum : (esse vero ejusmodi quidem sensibile atque visibile :) quod autem ipsa per se consideret, intelligibile atque invisibile. Huic ergo solutioni veri philosophi animus repugnandum non esse judicans, sic a voluptatibus, cupiditatibus, doloribus, timoribus, pro viribus abstinet : judicans, quando quis vehementer delectetur vel metuat vel doleat aut cupiat, haud tantum ab his duntaxat pati malum, quantum quis forsitan existimarit, videlicet si propter concupiscentias vel ægrotet quispiam vel pecunias comsumperit : sed quod malorum omnium maximum, extremum, turpissimum est, perpeti, neque tamen illud animadvertere. CÆ. Quidnam hoc est ? So. Quod videlicet omnis anima hominis cogitur delectari vel dolere circa aliquid vehementer, simulque putare illud, circa quod hoc maxime patitur, manifestissimum esse atque verissimum, cum longe sit secus. hæc autem maxime sunt, quæ visibilia sunt. nonne ? CÆ. Omnino. So. An non in hac passione anima quam maxima ligatur a corpore ? CÆ. Quonam pacto ? So. Quoniam omnis voluptas atque dolor, quasi clavum tenens, animam corpori affigit atque connectit, efficitque corpoream adeo, ut jam opinetur ea esse vere, quæ suadeat corpus. nempe ex eo, quod eadem opinetur cum corpore eisdemque oblectetur, cogitur, ut puto, ejusdem moris ejusdemque alimonie fieri : ut nunquam possit pura in vitam alteram profiscisci, sed semper plena corporis labe egrediatur ; ideoque cito cadat rursus in aliud corpus, et quasi sata iterum innascatur, atque propterea a commercio divini, puræ, uniformis essentiæ aliena prorsus evadat. CÆ. Verissima narras, o Socrates.

(34.) So. Horum igitur gratia, o Cebes, justis scientiæ studiosi



temperantiam fortitudinemque sequuntur; non autem illorum, quorum gratia censet vulgus, an tu putas? CE. Minime quidem. So. Non certe, sed ita veri philosophi animus cogitaret: nec ullo modo arbitretur, cum ipsum philosophia solvisset, oportere iterum voluptatibus doloribusque se dedere iterumque vinciri, atque irritum opus facere, quasi telam Penelopes retexentem, immo vero horum tranquillitati studens, sequensque rationem, ac semper in ea permanens, verum et divinum opinionemque supereminens contemplatur: a quo nutritus ita vivendum censet, quam diu vivat; atque sperat se, ubi decesserit, in cognatum atque tale migrantem ab humanis eximi malis. Ex hujusmodi quidem educatione non est, cur metuat, o Simmia et Cebes, ne cum recedat a corpore, distrahatur et dissipetur, omnisque in ventos viva recedat.

(35.) Cum hæc Socrates dixisset, longum factum est silentium, et ipse quidem Socrates, quæ dicta fuerant, secum, ut videbatur, repetebat, idemque plerique nostrum faciebant. Cebes autem et Simmias parumper insuper invicem collocuti sunt. Hos ergo intuitus Socrates, Quidnam vobis, inquit, de his, quæ dicta sunt, videtur? an forte aliquid insuper in his desideratis? multæ enim adhuc dubitationes objectionesque supersunt, si quis sufficienter ea sit tractaturus. Si igitur aliud quiddam inter vos agitatis, nihil dico, sin autem in his, quæ dicta sunt, hæsitatis, ne vereamini loqui atque percurrere, si qua in parte putatis melius dici posse, quin etiam socium me assumite, si mecum id commodius fieri posse existimatis. SIM. Verum equidem, Socrates, tibi fatebor. Jamdudum ambigens uterque nostrum impellit alterum jubetque interrogare propter audiendi cupiditatem, veremur autem, ne id tibi ob præsentem calamitatem rogitando simus molestiores. Hæc Socrates audiens leniter arrisit, dicens, Papæ, o Simmia, quam difficile aliis persuaderem, hanc me fortunam haudquaquam adversam existimare, quando ne vobis quidem id persuadere possum: quippe cum metuatis, ne difficilior mæstiorque sim in præsentia, quam in superiori fuerim vita. Atque, ut apparet, deterior cygnis ad divinandum vobis esse videor, illi quidem, quando se brevi præsentiant morituros, tunc magis admodum dulciusque canunt, quam antea consueverint, congratulantes, quod ad Deum sint, cujus erant famuli, jam migraturi. Homines vero, cum ipsi mortem expavescant, cygnos quoque falso criminantur, quod lugentes mortem ob dolorem cantum emittant: profecto haud animadvertunt nullam esse avem, quæ cantet, quando esuriat aut rigeat aut quovis alio afficiatur incommodo: non ipsa philomela nec hirundo, nec epops, quas ferunt per querimoniam cantare lugentes. At mihi neque hæ aves præ dolore videntur canere, neque cygni, sed quia Phæbo sacri sunt, ut arbitrator, divinatione præditi præsciunt alterius vitæ bona: ideoque cantant alacrius gestiuntque ea die quam superiori tempore. Atque et ego arbitrator me cygnorum esse conservum eidemque Deo sacrum; neque deterius vaticinium ab eodem domino habere quam illos; neque ignavius e vita decedere. Quapropter licet vobis hujus gratia dicere et interrogare quicquid libet, quoad Atheniensium undecimviri sinunt. SIM. Præclare loqueris, itaque et ego tibi ape-

riam, qua in re dubitem : et rursus hic Cebes, quidnam ex superiori disputatione minus admittat. Mihi quidem, o Socrates, quemadmodum fortasse tibi quoque, videtur de his quidem rebus manifestam veritatem in vita præsentī aut nullo modo aut summa cum difficultate intelligi posse. Quæ tamen de his dicantur, ea nullo modo redarguere, adeo ut non prius desistas, quam examinando alteruter acquiescat, mollis nimium iudico esse viri. oportere enim circa hæc alterutrum efficere : aut discere vel invenire, quemadmodum se habeant : aut, si hæc fieri nequeant, optimam atque tutissimam humanarum rationum eligere, qua quis tanquam rate vehatur, atque ita procellas hujus vitæ pertranseat, si nequeat firmiori quodam vehiculo vel divino aliquo verbo tutius ac minori cum periculo tranare. Atqui ego nunc non verebor interrogare, præsertim cum ad hoc ipse nos adhorteris : ne forte meipsum quandoque sim culpaturus, quod nunc, quæ mihi videantur, minime dixerim. Profecto mihi, o Socrates, una cum hoc Cebete tua reputanti haud satis confirmata videntur.

(36.) So. Forsan vere, o amice, opinaris. sed dic, qua in parte minus sufficienter dicta fuisse censeas. SIM. In hac utique. Nempe de harmonia et lyra et fidibus idem posset quispiam dicere, harmoniam videlicet esse invisibile quiddam et incorporeum et perpulchrum atque divinum in lyra rite temperata : ipsam vero lyram fidesque corpora esse atque corporea et composita terrestriaque et mortali cognata. Cum igitur aliquis vel lyram fregerit vel fides inciderit sive disrupterit, poterit quis eadem, qua tu, ratione affirmare, necessarium esse illam superesse harmoniam neque disperdi. nulla enim machinatio foret, lyram quidem esse adhuc, fidibus jam disruptis, atque ipsas fides mortalis generis : harmoniam vero, quæ divini et immortalis cognata erat, prius quam mortale illud interisse. Ille vero diceret adhuc esse alicubi harmoniam, atque prius ligna et fides putrefieri, quam illa aliquid patiatur. Arbitror equidem, o Socrates, te animadvertisse, nos tale aliquid potissimum esse animam cogitare. Esse videlicet in corpore nostro intensionem et complexionem quandam ex calido, frigido, sicco, humido ceterisque talibus ; horumque temperantiam consonantiamque animam esse, resultantem videlicet in corpore, postquam hæc ipsa bene moderateque invicem temperata fuerint. Si ergo anima harmonia quædam est, quotiens horum natura in corpore propter morbos aliaque mala immoderate vel remittitur vel intenditur : necesse est, animam quidem, quamvis divinissimam, subito interire, sicut solent ceteræ consonantiæ, sive quæ in vocibus, sive quæ in aliis artificum operibus fiunt ; reliquias autem corporis cujusque diutius permanere, quousque vel ardeant vel putrefiant. Considera igitur, quid huic rationi sit respondendum, si quis censeat animam temperantiam quandam esse eorum, quæ sunt in corpore, prioremque in morte perire.

(37.) Tunc Socrates, quemadmodum sæpe solebat, intuens acrius atque ridens, Juste, inquit, tu quidem loqueris, Simmia. Si quis ergo vestrum me facundior est, cur his non respondebat ? non enim ignave rationem attigisse videtur. Iudico tamen, antequam Simmiæ respondeatur, quid Cebes quoque damnet, esse audiendum, ut tem-

pore interjecto deliberandi habeamus facultatem: deinde, his auditis, vel his concedendum, si consentanea vero videantur afferre: sin vero minus, rationem superiorem defendendam esse atque retinendam. Quamobrem dic age, o Cebes, quidnam potissimum te turbet, quo minus assentiaris. Cē. Mihi quidem videtur eodem revolve eidemque quod in superioribus diximus, crimini obnoxia esse. Quod enim fuerit anima nostra, prius quam in humanam descenderet speciem, haud equidem retracto, quin bellissime dictum fuerit; ac nisi dictu esset invidiosum, sufficienter demonstratum asseverarem. Attamen nobis mortuis superesse, non sic assentior. Neque tamen Simmiæ concedo objicienti, non esse animam validiorem corpore atque diuturniorem. videtur profecto mihi his omnibus anima præstare quam plurimum. Hic ergo ratio superior (ad me conversa) sic inquiet: Quidnam ulterius ambigis? cum videas homine defuncto, quod in eo imbecillius fuerat superesse; cur non concedis oportere etiam, quod validius diuturniusque erat, hoc ipso in tempore superesse? Sed adverte jam, quanti momenti sit, quod ad id respondeo. similitudine mihi quoque opus est, quemadmodum Simmiæ. Profecto mihi perinde hæc dici videntur, ac si quis de homine textore sene defuncto diceret, nondum interisse illum, sed forte alicubi superesse, conjecturamque afferret vestis, qua ipse, cum texuisset, usus fuerit; assereretque eum adhuc esse incolumem neque interiisse: ac si quis id non credat, interrogaret ab eo, utrum diuturnius sit hominis genus an vestis, qua quotidie quis utatur. quod si respondeat genus humanum diuturnius esse, tunc demonstratum id esse putaret, videlicet multo propterea magis sospitem esse hominem, quandoquidem, quod in eo erat fragilius, nondum perierit. Hoc autem, o Simmia, ita se habere non arbitror. sed considera tu quoque, quid dicam. profecto quivis intelligeret, inepte illud adduci. Nam hic textor, qui multas contriverit vestes multasque texuerit, multis quidem posterior obiit, ultima vero prior: neque propterea magis sequitur, hominem esse veste viliorem atque debiliorem. Eandem fieri similitudinem animæ ad corpus posse arbitror: ac si quis de his duobus eadem illa adducat, congrue dicere videretur: videlicet animam quidem esse diuturniorem, corpus vero debilius minusque diuturnum: verum diceret, quemlibet animorum plura consumere corpora, præsertim si multos vivant annos. Si enim fluat corpus homineque etiam vivente dissolvatur, anima vero, quod consumitur, retextat continue; necessarium tamen erit, quando perierit anima, tunc ultimam habere vestem, eaque sola priorem perire. Cum vero perierit anima, tunc demum imbecillitatem naturæ suæ corpus ostendere, cito putrescens atque evanescens: ut hac ratione nondum confidere valeamus, tunc etiam cum decesserimus, animam nostram superfore. Nam si quis dicenti etiam plura, quam quæ tu dicis, concesserit, nec solum ante ortum nostrum animam exstitisse, verum etiam nihil prohibere, etiam post obitum quorundam remanere; sæpiusque accedere ac decedere fateatur: (adeo enim naturam animæ validam esse, ut sæpius corpori indita se corpusque servet:) his tamen concessis, nondum illud tibi daret, non defatigari in multis generationibus animam; sed

tandem aliqua ex pluribus morte diceret omnino deleri. quin etiam adderet, neminem mortem illam dissolutionemque corporis, quæ animæ quoque iteritum infert, posse discernere: esse enim impossibile, ut quisquam nostrum id sentiat. Quod quidem si ita se habeat, nemo non stulte in morte confidit, nisi demonstrare possit animam omnino immortalem atque indissolubilem esse. alioquin consentaneum est necessarium esse, ut, qui moriturus est, animæ metuat suæ, semperque sit sollicitus, ne in ea, quæ proxime imminet, corporis disjunctione prorsus intereat.

(38.) Omnes igitur, cum hæc audivissemus, conturbati sumus, ut postea invicem aperuimus, quod cum superiori disputatione nobis fuisset magnopere persuasum, viderentur nos ab eo statu in præsentia deturbasse, atque eo jam dejecisse, ut nedum rationibus jam adductis, sed et dicendis insuper fidem ullam adhiberemus; verentes, ne vel nos nequaquam boni essemus iudices, vel res ipsæ fide essent indignæ. *Εχ.* Veniam equidem per Deos do vobis, o Phædon. nam mihi quidem, modo te audienti, tale quiddam veniebat in mentem: Cuinam ulterius rationi credemus? quippe cum ratio illa Socratis, usque adeo paulo ante probabilis, jam fidem amiserit. mirum est enim, quantum apud me contra possit ratio illa semperque potuerit, quæ animam nostram harmoniam quandam esse probat: et nunc quidem audita me subito in memoriam revocavit, quantum mihi quoque alias persuaserit. Quo efficitur, ut alia quadam ratione iterum, tanquam ab initio, prorsus indigeam, quæ mihi persuadeat animam cum corpore non interire. Dic ergo, per Jovem precor, quo pacto disputationem peregerit Socrates, et utrum ipse quoque, quemadmodum de vobis ipse fateris, graviter id ferre visus fuerit; an contra benigne suam defenderit rationem: præterea utrum satis, necne, eam tutatus fuerit. hæc nobis, quam potes diligentissime, refer omnia. *Πη.* Equidem, o Echecrates, sæpe admiratus Socratem, nunquam majori cum voluptate, quam tunc præsens, sum admiratus, meque affuisse ibi mirifice gaudeo. Habuisse quidem illum, quod objectionibus responderet, forte non est mirandum. sed hæc in eo potissimum sum admiratus, primo quidem quam jucunde, benigne, amice adolescentium verba recepit: deinde quam sagaciter sensit nos illorum rationibus fuisse commotos: demum quam opportune nobis adhibuit medicinam, et quasi fugientes atque victos revocavit nos, convertitque ad prosequendum atque considerandum. *Εχ.* Quonam pacto? *Πη.* Dicam equidem. Sedebam forte ad dexteram ejus in subsellio quodam humili, juxta lectulum. ipse vero Socrates sedebat longe superior. Attretans igitur caput meum comprimensque crines super cervicem: (consueverat enim nonnunquam, ubi contigisset, in meos crines ludere) Cras forsitan, inquit, o Phædon, istas pulchras incidēs comas. *Πη.* Sic arbitror, o Socrates. *So.* Non certe, si mihi assensus fueris. *Πη.* Quid ergo? *So.* Immo hodie et ego meas et tu tuas, si nobis ratio intereat, neque eam ipsi suscitare possimus. Atque si ego tu essem ac me fugeret ratio, more Argivorum jurarem non prius comam nutriturum, quam vicissim Simmiam Cebetemque expugnavissem. *Πη.* At vero contra duos ne Hercules quidem

dicitur suffecisse. So. At tu me Iolaum, dum lux est, advoca. PHÆ. Advocœ equidem, sed non tanquam Hercules Iolaum, immo tanquam Iolaus Herculem. So. Nihil refert.

(39.) In primis vero cavendum, ne id nobis accidat. PHÆ. Quidnam? So. Ne rationum evadamus osores, quemadmodum nonnulli hominum osores sunt. nullum enim majus quam hoc malum nobis posset accidere; videlicet si rationes odio habuerimus. Fit autem eodem pacto odium et adversus rationes et adversus homines. Odium quidem contra homines tunc maxime subit, quando alicui nimium credimus absque arte, putamusque ipsum omnino verum et sincerum fidumque virum esse, deinde vero mox pravum infidumque deprehendimus, rursusque alium eodem pacto. Itaque quando quis sæpius offensus ita decipitur, præsertim ab iis, quos præcipue familiarissimos amicissimosque existimabat; odit tandem plurimum universos, putatque nihil omnino apud quenquam esse sincerum. an te latuit, id ita accidere consuevisse? PHÆ. Animadverti equidem. So. An non turpiter et absque humanarum rerum arte hic aggreditur hominibus uti? si enim ex arte uti studeret, cogitaret utique rem ipsam ita se, ut habet, habere, videlicet homines vehementer bonos aut malos perpaucos esse, medios vero plurimos. PHÆ. Quo id pacto dicis? So. Quemadmodum videlicet in rebus contingit valde aut parvis aut magnis. An tu arbitraris, quicquam esse rarius quam valde magnum aut valde parvum reperire hominem vel canem vel quodvis aliud? atque rursus celerrimum et tardissimum, pulcherrimum, turpissimum, albissimum, nigerrimum? an ignoras in his omnibus extremorum summa rara quidem et pauca esse; media vero frequentia atque multa? PHÆ. Sic arbitror. So. Nonne igitur arbitraris, si improbitatis proponeretur certamen, admodum paucos in hoc genere summos inveniri? PHÆ. Consentaneum est. So. Consentaneum quidem. verum non hoc pacto similes rationes sunt atque homines: (sed te nunc ducentem prosecutus sum:) immo vero in hoc similitudo consistit, quando videlicet quis absque rationum arte crediderit rationem aliquam esse veram, sed paulo post appareat falsa: quæ quidem aliquando talis est, aliquando minime, et rursus altera similiter atque altera. Præcipue vero illis id evenit, qui plurimum rationes contradictorias agitant. hos enim scis putare, tandem se sapientissimos evasisse, solosque animadvertisse neque in rebus neque in rationibus esse sanum aliquid aut firmum; sed omnia revera tanquam in Euripo sursum deorsumque jactari, nullumque tempus in aliquo permanere. PHÆ. Vere nimium loqueris. So. Nonne ægritudo hæc, Phædon, miserabilis esset, si cum ratio aliqua vera firmaque sit comprehendique valeat, postea tamen, auditis hujuscemodi rationibus, quæ modo afferre vera, modo falsa videntur, aliquis hinc in ambiguitatem deductus, non seipsum, neque ejus inertiam ob id accuset, sed tandem velut æger libenter culpam omnem a seipso in ipsas transferat rationes, et in reliqua vita eas odio habeat atque vituperet, rerum jam ipsarum veritate scientiaque privatus. PHÆ. Per Jovem miserabilis ægritudo.

(40.) So. In primis igitur diligenter id caveamus, ne persuadea-

mus nobis nihil in rationibus esse sanum ; sed multo magis, nondum esse nos sanos. Itaque totis viribus, ut sani efficiamur, est annitendum : tibi quidem et aliis totius reliquæ vitæ gratia, mihi vero gratia mortis : qui in periculo sum, ne in hoc ipso tempore non ut philosophum me geram, sed ut contentiosum atque pertinacem ; quod quidam homines a disciplina alienissimi facere solent. Illi enim, ubi aliqua de re ambigitur, non ut res ipsa, qua de agitur, se habeat curant ; sed ut, quæ posuerunt ipsi, præsentibus videantur vera, obnixè contendunt. Atque ego mihi videor in hoc duntaxat in præsentia ab illis differre, quod non, ut præsentibus probem ea, quæ dico, annitar, (nisi quatenus forte contigerit,) sed ut mihi ipsi vera quam maxime videantur. Sic enim cogito, dulcis amice ; et vide quanto cum lucro sit ratio mea. Si forte vera sunt, quæ dico, operæ pretium est ita credere : sin autem nihil superest post mortem, attamen hoc ipsum tempus ante obitum præsentibus minus ero molestus minusque deplorabo. Hæc autem ignorantia minime perseverabit mecum, (malum id quidem esset,) sed paulo post deletur. Sic equidem, o Simmia, paratus, et Cebes, revertor ad disputandum. Vos tamen, si mihi assentiamini, non Socrati cedite, sed veritati ; si enim verum vobis loqui videbor, concedite : sin minus, omnino contradicite, diligenter caventes, ne ego dum annitor, meipsum simul vosque decipiam, et velut apes, aculeo in vobis relicto, abeam.

(41.) Sed jam accedendum est. Primum quidem redigite in memoriam mihi, quæ dicebatis, si minus meminisse vobis videbor. Simmias quidem, ut arbitrator, diffidit ac metuit, ne anima, quamvis divinius pulchriorque corpore, prius tamen pro harmoniæ natura intereat. Cebes autem mihi visus est concedere diuturniorem esse animam corpore ; sed his addidit scire posse neminem, ne cum multa sæpius consumpserit corpora, tandem quandoque postremum relinquens corpus ipsa quoque pereat, atque mors ejusmodi tantum sit interitus animæ ; corpus vero dissolvi continue consueverit. An non hæc sunt, o Simmia et Cebes, quæ nos oportet considerare ? SIM. ET CE. Confitemur profecto. SO. Sed nunquid omnia, quæ dicta in superioribus fuerant, negatis ? an quædam negatis, sed conceditis alia ? SIM. ET CE. Quædam procul dubio. SO. Quid igitur de eo, quod disciplinam diximus reminiscentiam esse ; atque si ita se res habeat, necessario consequi, alicubi fuisse animam, priusquam corpore clauderetur ? CE. Mihi quidem istud dum diceres, mirifice placuit : atque nunc, si qua unquam in alia, in hac maxime sententia permaneo. SIM. Similiter ego quoque affectus sum ; vehementerque admirarer, si mihi unquam hac de re aliter videretur. SO. At vero necesse est, hospes Thebane, aliter tibi videri, si in hac opinione permanseris, harmoniam videlicet esse compositum quiddam ; animam vero harmoniam quandam ex his, quæ per corpus intensa sunt, constitutam. Nunquam enim admittes consonantiam compositam prius esse quam illa, ex quibus componi consonantiam oportebat. nunquid admittes ? SIM. Nullo, Socrates, modo. SO. Animadvertis igitur cogi te id confiteri, quando dicis, animam quidem esse prius quam in humanam spe-

ciem corpusque deveniret, atque esse corporis consonantiam, videlicet ex his, quæ nondum sunt, constitui. Neque enim talis tibi est consonantia, cui tu simile esse dicis. Immo vero prius est ipsa lyra et fides et soni adhuc inconcinni: tandem vero ex omnibus componitur consonantia omnium postrema, primaque disperditur. Hic itaque sermo quonam pacto tuo illi concinet? SIM. Nullo modo. So. At vero sicubi verba concinnitatem servare debent, præcipue decet esse concinna, ubi de contentu tractatur. SIM. Decet nimirum. So. Hic igitur sermo tibi dissonat. sed vide, utrum ex his duobus eligas, disciplinamne reminiscentiam esse, an potius animam esse concentum? SIM. Primum equidem potius eligo. id namque alterum absque demonstratione admisi ex verisimili quadam convenientia; quemadmodum videtur et multis. Ego autem ea verba, quæ per id quod convenit demonstrationes faciunt, semper inania judicavi: ac nisi quis caveat, valde decipiunt, et in geometria et in ceteris omnibus. Ratio vero de reminiscentia atque disciplina fundamento innititur fide digno. Dictum est enim, animam nostram ita esse alicubi, prius etiam quam laberetur in corpus, ut illa ipsius essentia habens ipsius, quod est, cognomentum. Ego vero hanc, ut mihimet persuadeo, sufficienter recteque admisi. propterea neque mihi neque aliis animam appellandis harmoniam assentiri possum.

(42.) So. Quid vero, Simmia? Videtur tibi vel consonantiæ vel alteri cuiquam compositioni congruere, ut aliter se habeat quam illa ex quibus conflatur? SIM. Nullo modo. So. Neque etiam, ut aliud quicquam, ut arbitror, patiatut aut agat, quam illa vel agent vel patiantur. SIM. Assentior. So. Non igitur convenit, consonantiam ea ducere, ex quibus composita est, sed sequi. SIM. Opinor ita. So. Quare permultum abest, ut harmonia in contrarium moveatur aut sonet, aut quicquam aliud edat partibus suis adversum. SIM. Permultum procul dubio. So. Quid vero consonantia? nonne eatenus pro natura sua consonantia est, quatenus temperatur? SIM. Haud satis intelligo. So. Nonne si magis plusque contemperetur, si modo id admittit, magis plusque consonantia est? sin vero minus atque perpaucum, minus in paucumque similiter? SIM. Omnino. So. Nunquid de anima id dici potest, ut vel in minima quadam re alia anima hoc ipsum, quod est anima, vel magis vel plus aut contra sit quam alia? SIM. Minime. So. Dic, age, per Jovem precor, num animam dicimus aliam quidem habere mentem virtutemque, atque esse bonam; aliam vero dementiam et pravitatem, malamque esse: hæcne, inquam, vere dicuntur? SIM. Vere quidem. So. Eorum ergo, qui animam esse asserunt harmoniam, quis quidnam dicet esse animabus? hæc scilicet, vitium et virtutem? an aliam quandam consonantiam atque dissonantiam? et bonam quidem esse consonantem; et cum ipsa consonantia sit, alteram in se consonantiam possidere: malam vero dissonantem et ipsam esse nec aliam in se habere? SIM. Quid respondeam, non habeo. constat tamen eum, qui animam esse consonantiam posuisset, talia quædam responsurum. So. At vero jam concessum est, nihilo magis aut minus aliam alia animam esse. ejusmodi vero concessio est,

neque magis neque plus neque minus, neque sub paucioribus gradibus aliam alia consonantiam esse. nonne? SIM. Prorsus. So. Eam vero, quæ neque magis neque minus consonantia est, nimirum neque magis neque minus esse temperatam. Est ita? SIM. Est. So. Quæ vero neque magis neque minus temperata est, potestne pluribus paucioribusve gradibus particeps consonantiæ esse? an potius æque? SIM. Æque potius. So. Quapropter anima, si quidem neque magis neque minus alia quam alia secundum animæ naturam anima est, consequenter neque magis neque minus est temperata. SIM. Est, ut dicis. So. Cum vero sic affecta sit, nihilo magis consonantiæ est vel dissonantiæ particeps. SIM. Nihilo magis. So. Præterea cum ita comparata sit, num plus aliquid pravitatis vel virtutis alia quam alia possidet? si quidem pravitas dissonantia est, virtus vero consonantia. SIM. Certe plus nihil. So. Quinimmo secundum rectam, Simmia, rationem nulla usquam anima pravitate erit affecta, si fuerit consonantia: quando quidem consonantia vera secundum id, quod consonantia est, nunquam fit dissonantiæ particeps. SIM. Nunquam certe. So. Neque igitur anima, quæ omnino sit anima, pravitate inficietur. SIM. Quo enim modo per ea quæ dicta sunt, id fieri posset? So. Hac igitur ratione omnes animalium omnium animæ bonæ similiter erunt, si secundum animæ ipsius naturam similiter animæ sint. SIM. Mihi quidem, Socrates, ita videtur. So. Nunquid recte sic tibi dici videtur, atque hæc sequi, si vera esset illa positio, animam consonantiam esse? SIM. Nullo modo.

(43.) So. Quid vero? ex omnibus, quæ in homine sunt, aliudne præter animum asseris dominari, præcipue prudentem? SIM. Nihil aliud. So. Utrum corporis perturbationibus indulgentem, an potius repugnantem? Dico autem tale quiddam: veluti si sub æstu sitis angat, interea tamen adversatur animus, retrahitque in contrarium, ne bibat: similiterque si premat fames, ne edat: in aliisque quam plurimis animum videmus corporis affectibus repugnantem. nonne? SIM. Et quidem maxime. So. Nonne in superioribus confessi sumus animam, si consonantia fuerit, nunquam dissonaturam his, quibus intenditur vel remittitur vel evibratur, vel quodcunque aliud patiantur illa, ex quibus ipsa conflatur; sed secuturam illam, nunquam vero ducturam? SIM. Confessi sumus. So. Quid vero nunc? nonne contra omnino videtur agere, quatenus ea ducit omnia, ex quibus dixerit aliquis ipsam constitui, atque ferme omnibus per omnem vitam repugnat multisque dominatur modis? interdum rigidius quodam cum supplicio puniens per gymnasticam atque medicinam, interdum vero mitius castigans comminando aut monendo adversus cupiditates et iras atque timores, tanquam altera quædam res contra alteram loquens, quemadmodum Homerus tradit in Odyssea:

Tum pectus pulsans, cor sic affatur Ulixes,  
Hoc quoque cor perfer, namque et graviora tulisti.

An putas Homerum hæc dixisse, tanquam harmonia quædam sit, ac talis, ut corporis passionibus subiciatur, non autem ducat atque



dominetur? an potius, quasi quiddam longe divinius quam harmonia sit animus? SIM. Divinius per Jovem mihi videtur significasse. So. Non ergo, vir optime, recte harmoniam esse animam diceremus, sic enim, ut apparet, neque Homero divino poëtæ neque nobis ipsis consentiremus. SIM. Sic est.

(44.) So. Age, harmoniam Thebanam satis, ut videtur, jam placavimus. rationem vero Cadmeam, o Cebes, quonam pacto et qua ratione placabimus? CE. Tu mihi, Socrates, viam inventurus videris. nempe rationem hanc adversus harmoniam mirifice, præter opinionem nostram, excogitasti. Cum enim audirem Simmiam dubitantem, valde admirabar, si quis rationibus ejus resistere posset. Itaque summæ mihi fuit admirationi, ipsum nec primum quidem potuisse orationis tuæ impetum sustinere. Quapropter non admirarer, si Cadmeus quoque sermo idem pateretur. So. Parcius ista, bone vir; ne qua invidia nobis sequentia inturbet. Sed hæc quidem Deo curæ erunt: nos autem, ut ait Homerus, cominus congressi periculum faciamus, an forte quid dicas. Summa vero eorum, quæ perquiris, est ejusmodi: demonstrandum esse judicas, animam nostram indissolubilem immortalemque esse; ne vir philosophus in morte securus, magnaque cum fiducia sperans, in alia vita longe beatiorem ob philosophiæ studium se futurum, insipiens sit stultaque confidat. Ostendere autem, validum quiddam esse animam atque divinis persimile, priusque etiam quam nos exstitisse, nihil impedimento esse ais, quo minus hæc omnia non immortalitatem quidem significant, sed duntaxat animam corpore diuturniorem esse, multaque ante nos secula fuisse, novisseque et egisse permulta; nihilo tamen magis ob hoc immortalem esse existimandam, immo hunc ipsum in humanum corpus ingressum, quasi morbum quandam, interitus ejus initium esse: adeo, ut et in hac vita sit misera et in corporis morte deperat. Nihil autem differre censes, sive semel tantum sive sæpius labatur in corpus, ut quivis nostrum pertimescat. Merito namque timendum esse, nisi stultus sit, ei, qui neque sciât neque assignare queat immortalitatis animæ rationem. Talia quædam sunt, quæ dicis, o Cebes: egoque ea consulto sæpius repeto, ne quid nos fugiat, sive addere hic quicquam velis sive demere. CE. Nihil equidem in præsentia habeo, quod aut minuum aut adjungam: atque hæc sunt, quæ dico.

(45.) Tunc Socrates, cum aliquantum se recepisset, ad se conversus, Haud leve quiddam requiris, inquit, o Cebes, sed cujus gratia oporteat generationis corruptionisque causam pertractare. Ego igitur, si vis, ea tibi, quæ mihi evenerunt, enarrabo. deinde si quid eorum, quæ dixero, ad quæstionis tuæ veritatem aperiendam conducere putabis, utere. CE. Volo equidem. So. Audi igitur jam narrantem. Equidem, o Cebes, cum essem juvenis, mira quadam ejus sapientiæ cupiditate flagrabam, quam naturalem vocant historiam. Præclarissimum enim esse censebam, causas intelligere, per quas singula fiant atque intereant, et qua sint ratione: sæpiusque me sursum deorsumque jactavi, talia quædam primo considerans, nunquid, postquam calidum et frigidum putrefactionem aliquam acceperunt, quemadmodum nonnulli dixerunt, tunc

animalia coalescant. præterea, utrum sanguis sit, quo sapimus, vel aër vel ignis: aut nihil horum sit, sed cerebrum, quod præbeat sensus audiendi, videndi, olfaciendi: ex his autem memoria et opinio fiat: ex memoria vero et opinione quietem accipiente, per hæc scientia oriatur. proinde horum corruptiones considerans, atque eas, quæ circa cælum terramque passiones contingunt, tandem adeo mihi ad hæc considerata visus sum hebes, ut nihil magis. Conjecturam vero ad id afferam tibi sufficientem. nempe ob ejusmodi considerationem usque adeo sum occæcatus, ut ea etiam, quæ prius manifeste sciebam, ut mihi aliisque videbatur, dediscerem, et alia videlicet multa, quæ antea me scire putabam, et qua ratione homo crescat. id namque opinabar ante esse cui-libet manifestum, hominem videlicet per cibum potumque augeri. Quando enim per hæc carnes carnibus ossaque ossibus adduntur, eodemque modo in aliis, quando sua cuique adhibentur, tunc sane molem primo parvam, deinde magnam evadere, atque ita parvum hominem effici magnum. Sic ego tunc opinabar. nonne satis belle tibi videor? Cæ. Mihi quidem. So. Animadvertite hæc insuper. Arbitrabar enim, satis recte mihi videri, quotiens hominem vel equum, magnum parvo propinquum, alterum altero judicarem capite ipso esse majorem. atque multo etiam evidentius decem plura apparebant mihi quam octo propterea, quod denarius duo præter octonarium contineret. præterea bicubitum cubitali majus, quoniam dimidio superaret. Cæ. Nunc vero quidnam de his judicas? So. Procul equidem, per Jovem, abesse mihi videor, ut alicujus horum causam intelligere putem, qui nondum mihi ipsi persuadere possum, ut, quando quis uni addat unum, tunc vel illud unum, cui unum adjunctum est, fiat duo: vel et adjunctum et illud, cui adjunctum est, propter alterius ad alterum adjunctionem evadat duo. admiror equidem, si, cum utrumque horum separatum erat, utrumque unum erat, neque erant tunc duo: postquam invicem cohæserunt, hæc ipsa causa fuerit, ut duo fierent, congressio videlicet, per quam propius jam posita sunt. neque etiam, si quis unum dividat, adhuc possum persuaderi, hanc ipsam divisionem causam esse, ut duo evadant. contraria enim tunc atque superius causa fit, qua duo fiant. tunc enim, quia conjungebantur propius invicem, alterumque admovebatur alteri: nunc vero, quoniam removetur alterum ab altero atque separatur. Neque, propter quid unum fiat, adhuc scire me arbitror; neque, ut summatim dicam, aliud quicquam, quare fiat aut pereat aut sit, per hanc ipsam viam me nosse profiteor: sed alium quandam ipse modum frustra misceo; hunc vero nullo modo admitto.

(46.) Verum, cum audissem aliquando ex libro, ut ille aiebat, Anaxagoræ, legentem quandam hanc Anaxagoræ ipsius sententiam, videlicet mentem omnia exornare omniumque causam esse: hoc utique causæ genere magnopere sum delectatus, existimans quodammodo consentaneum, mentem esse omnium causam: putabamque, si id ita esset, ut mens omnia exornaret, singula per hanc ita esse disposita, ut optime disponi potuerant. Propterea, si quis vellet causam invenire, qua singula fiant aut pereant aut sint, hoc

ipsum esse inveniendum, qua videlicet ratione optimum sit unicuique, aut esse aut quodvis aliud pati vel agere. Atque hoc pacto nihil aliud considerandum homini vel de seipso vel de aliis, nisi quod potissimum sit et optimum. Necesse vero est eum, qui id norit, illud quoque, quod est deterius, cognovisse: quippe cum eadem horum scientia sit. Hæc utique mecum ipse reputans, gaudebam, invenisse ratus Anaxagoram magistrum, qui me, id quod tantopere cupiebam, causas rerum doceret; primumque mihi diceret, utrum plana sit terra vel rotunda: et cum hæc dixisset, subjungeret mihi causam atque necessitatem, afferens videlicet id ipsum, quod melius est; meliusque fuisse eam esse talem. Proinde si terram diceret in mundo mediam esse, mox exponeret melius existisse, ut media esset. Quod si ille hæc ostenderet, ita me comparabam, quasi nullam amplius causarum speciem positurus. Præterea de sole et luna ceterisque stellis, earumque inter se velocitate conversionibusque, et de hujusmodi omnibus me similiter quæsiturum auditorumque comparaveram, quod videlicet et qua ratione hæc melius sit singula vel facere vel pati, quodcunque agant vel patiantur. Neque enim putabam, cum ab initio dixisset mente omnia exornari, ipsum aliam postea causam rebus assignaturum, præterquam quod optimum sit eas ita se, ut habent, habere. Itaque arbitrabar eum in reddendis tum singulorum tum cunctorum communiter causis, singulis quidem assignare, quod unicuique optimum, cunctis vero commune bonum. Neque vero spes ipse meas parvi faciebam, sed summo quodam studio acceptos libros, quam velocissime poteram lectitavi, ut occissime, quid optimum quidve ejus contrarium esset, cognoscerem.

(47.) Hac igitur mirabili spe ductus, cum legere pergo, video hominem mente quidem nullo modo utentem, nec causam ullam ad ipsum rerum ornatum referentem, sed aëreas naturas et æthereas aqueasque et talia multa incredibilia pro rerum causis assignantem. Qua quidem in re ille mihi perinde visus est agere, ac si quis diceret, Socratem, quæcunque facit, mente facere: deinde volens singulorum, quæ facio, causas explicare, dicat primum quidem nunc me hic propterea sedere, quoniam corpus meum ex ossibus nervisque componitur: et ossa quidem solida sunt et juncturarum intervalla inter se habent: nervi autem sic instituti ut et extendi et contrahi valeant, complectantur ossa cum carnibus atque cute, quæ illa continet. Elatis igitur ossibus in suis conjunctionibus, nervi, qui et intendunt et remittunt commode, faciunt, ut flectendi cujusque membri habeam facultatem, atque hanc ob causam hic inflexus sedeam. Ac rursus disputationis meæ alias quasdam ejusmodi causas assignaret, voces et aërem et auditum aliaque generis ejusdem quam plurima, causas verissimas negligens: videlicet quoniam Atheniensibus melius visum fuerit me condemnare, ideoque mihi etiam melius sit visum hic sedere; justiusque judicari exspectantem dare pœnas, quas illi jubeant. profecto per Canem, jamdiu, ut arbitror, hi nervi atque hæc ossa apud Megarenses aut Bœotios essent, ipsius, quod optimum est, opinione delata; nisi justius honestiusque censuissem pœnas civitati pendere, quascunque a me exigat, quam

subterfugere atque exsulem vivere. Verum talia quædam causas appellare a ratione est remotissimum. Si quis autem dixerit absque ossibus et nervis atque similibus non posse me, quæ mihi facienda videantur, implere, vere utique dicet. Attamen asserere propter hæc me facere, quæcunque facio, dum ipsa mente ago, non autem ejus quod optimum sit optione, multa magnaue sermonis negligentia esset. Nam qui sic est affectus, nequit discernere, aliam quidem esse veram rei alicujus causam; aliud vero illud, sine quo ipsa causa esse non potest causa. quod quidem multi mihi videntur, quasi in tenebris attractantes, alieno appellare nomine, dum causam nuncupant. Quapropter nonnulli vertiginem circumponentes terræ, sub cœlo eam stabilem faciunt. alii vero tanquam latum pistoris alveum aëre velut base suffulciunt. Potentiam vero ipsam, qua nunc ita disposita sit, ut optime disponi poterat, neque perquirunt neque dæmonicam quandam habere vim putant: sed Atlantem quandam robustiorem et immortalioem, magisque omnia continentem invenisse se opinantur. ipsum autem bonum atque decens connectere atque continere revera nihil existimant. Ego igitur libentissime cujusvis essem discipulus, ut quemadmodum se habeat hæc ipsa causa, discerem. Postquam vero hac privatus sum; neque ipse invenire neque ab alio discere potui: secundam navigationem ad causam investigandam molitus sum. Visne, o Cebes, hanc tibi a me demonstrari? CE. Mirifice cupio.

(48.) So. Censui tandem, cum in rebus considerandis jam defessus essem, cavendum fore, ne mihi idem accideret, quod accidere illis solet, qui in solem deficientem figunt intuitum. orbantur enim nonnunquam visu, nisi in aqua vel in ejusmodi aliquo imaginem ejus aspiciant. Tale quiddam ego reputavi, timuique ne animus mihi prorsus occæcetur, si oculis res aspicerem sensuque quolibet attingere illas aggrederer. Quapropter operæ pretium esse censeo, ut ad rationes confugerem atque in aliis rerum veritatem considerarem. Forte vero nostra hæc similitudo non omni ex parte congruit. non enim prorsus assentior, eum, qui res in rationibus contemplatur, in imaginibus aspicere potius quam qui in operibus intuetur. Verumtamen hac via iter direxi meum, supponensque rationem semper, quam esse judico validissimam, quæcunque huic consonare videantur, pono equidem tanquam vera; idque ago et circa rerum causas et circa reliqua omnia: quæ vero dissonant, vera esse nego. Volo equidem, quæ dico, tibi apertius explanare. puto enim te nondum intelligere. CE. Per Jovem, haud multum.

(49.) So. Verum novum nihil adduco; sed quæ et sæpe alias et in superiori disputatione dicere nunquam destiti. Pergo jam igitur demonstrare tibi causæ speciem, quam continue pertractavi; ac redeo ad illa jam sæpius decantata, ab eisque exordior, supponens aliquid esse ipsum per se pulchrum et bonum et magnum, et cetera omnia. quæ quidem si tu mihi dederis, eaque esse concesseris, spero tibi ex his ipsam causam demonstrare; itemque invenire, esse animam immortalem. CE. Quasi vero jam tibi concesserim, nihil tibi opus est præludio, quo minus jam concludas. So. Considera jam, quæ sequuntur deinceps, utrum in his mihi consentias. Arbitror

enim, si quid est aliud pulchrum præter ipsum pulchrum, non ob aliud quippiam esse pulchrum, quam quia pulchri ipsius est particeps. atque omnia dico similiter. nunquid hanc causam recipis? CE. Recipio equidem. So. Ergo nondum ultra percipio, neque possum ceteras istas præclaras causas cognoscere. Si quis autem mihi dixerit, quare pulchrum sit quodlibet, videlicet quia vel colorem habeat floridum vel figuram vel aliud quodvis talium, cetera equidem valere sino: (in ceteris enim omnibus soleo perturbari:) id vero unum simpliciter atque procul dubio, et forte jam inepte, penes me teneo, nihil aliud esse, quod aliquid faciat pulchrum, quam ipsius pulchri sive præsentiam sive communionem, sive qualicunque ratione et quocunque modo id proveniat. Neque enim id adhuc affirmarem: sed pulchro pulchra omnia esse pulchra, id mihi videtur tutissimum, tam mihi quam aliis respondere: atque huic fundamento innixus, puto nunquam cadere; sed et me et quemvis alium tuto respondere posse, quæcunque pulchra sunt, ipso pulchro fieri pulchra. nonne et ipse consentis? CE. Consentio equidem. So. Ergo et quæ magna sunt, ipsa magnitudine esse magna: et quæ majora sunt, similiter esse majora: et quæ minora, parvitate esse minora. CE. Ita est. So. Igitur neque tu quidem assentieris, si quis aliquem dixerit alio quodam capite esse majorem; atque eum, qui minor est, eodem capite esse minorem: sed testificaberis, te quidem nihil aliud esse dicturum, quam omne majus alio non alia re ulla quam magnitudine esse majus; atque ob hoc majus, ob ipsam scilicet magnitudinem: minus autem, nullo similiter alio quam parvitate, et propter hoc esse minus, propter ipsam videlicet parvitatem: metuens, ut puto, ne, si quem dixeris capite majorem esse vel minorem, quispiam tibi sic objiciat: primum quidem eadem re et majus fore majus et minus fore minus: deinde, quod capite, quæ res parva est, majorem affirmes esse majorem. hoc autem dicet monstro esse persimile, ut parvo aliquo magnum quiddam esse dicas. nonne hæc metueres? Tunc Cebes subridens, Equidem, inquit. So. Nonne similiter quoque metueres dicere, decem plura quam octo esse duobus, atque ob hanc causam superare, potius quam multitudine atque propter multitudinem? ac similiter bicubitum cubitali majus esse dimidio, potius quam magnitudine? id enim similiter est metuendum. CE. Omnino. So. Quid vero, si uni addatur unum, additionem ipsam esse causam, ut duo fiant, vel si dividatur, divisionem ipsam duorum esse causam, dicere non formidares? altiusque exclamares, nescire te, quonam alio pacto quicquam fiat, nisi participatione quadam essentiae unicuique propriæ, cujus sit particeps? atque in his nullam aliam habere te causam, cur duo fiant, præter duitatis ipsius participationem: sed oportere hujus participia fore, quæcunque futura sunt duo: et similiter unitatis, quodcunque futurum sit unum? Has vero divisiones adjunctionesque et ceteras ejusmodi argutias valere sineres; relinquesque sapientioribus te, per eas pro arbitrio responsuris: tu vero tuam, quemadmodum dici solet, metuens umbram et imperitiam, atque innixus tutissimæ illi positioni, sic utique responderes? at vero, si quis eandem positionem complexus instaret, valere si-

neres; neque prius responderes quam, quæ inde manant, considerasses, utrum consonent invicem aut dissonent? Ubi vero illius ipsius rationem oporteret afferre, eodem modo afferres, atque aliam rursus positionem adduceres, quæ superiorum optima videretur, quoad ad aliquid sufficiens pervenires? Nunquam vero simul confunderes contentiosorum more, ubi et de principio et de his, quæ a principio deducuntur, disputas; si modo velles eorum aliquid, quæ vere sunt, invenire? nam illis fortasse nullus hac de re sermo est, nulla cura. Possunt enim præ sapientia et simul omnia commiscere et tamen sibimet placere. Tu vero, si ex philosophorum numero es, quæ dico, ut arbitror, facies. SIM. ET CE. Verissima loqueris. ECH. Per Jovem, o Phædon, merito admodum consenserunt. mirifice enim ille mihi videtur rem ipsam vel hebetissimo cuique explanasse. PHÆ. Sic prorsus, o Echebrates, præsentibus omnibus similiter virum fuit. ECH. Quid mirum? cum nobis quoque, qui non interfuimus, nunc similiter audientibus videatur.

(50.) Verum quænam post hæc dicta fuerunt? PHÆ. Ut equidem arbitror, postquam hæc illi Socrati concesserunt, concesseruntque, speciem quamlibet aliquid esse, et quæ harum participia sunt, ipsarum denominationem habere; deinceps hunc in modum interrogavit. Si hæc ita se habent, nonne, quando Simmiam dicis Socrate quidem majorem esse, Phædone vero minorem, tunc affirmas in Simmia utrumque esse, et magnitudinem simul et parvitatem? CE. Equidem. So. Attamen Simmiam confiteris excedere Socratem, non ita revera, ut verba sonant. non enim ita natura institutum esse existimas Simmiam, ut ea ratione superet, qua est Simmias; sed magnitudine, quam habet: neque rursus Socratem, eo quod Socrates est, excedi; sed quia parvitatem præ magnitudine illius habeat. CE. Vera loqueris. So. Similiter nec a Phædone superari, eo quod Phædon sit Phædon; sed quia Phædon præ Simmiæ parvitate magnitudinem habet. CE. Ita est. So. Sic itaque Simmias denominationem parvi habet et magni: siquidem in amborum medio positus, alterius quidem parvitatem magnitudine superat, alterius vero magnitudini parvitate cedit. Et simul subridens inquit: Videor equidem affectatius descripsisse. verumtamen est, ut dico. CE. Sic apparet. So. Dico autem propterea, quia cupio videri vibi, quod et mihi videtur. Opinor enim, non solum magnitudinem ipsam nunquam velle magnam simul parvamque esse; verum etiam neque hanc, quæ in nobis est, magnitudinem unquam recipere parvitatem, neque superari velle: sed e duobus alterum accidere: vel fugere seque subtrahere, quando adventat contraria parvitas; vel cum advenit, interire: nolle autem exspectare, atque in parvitate recipienda aliud esse quam erat. quemadmodum ego, cum susceperim sustinuerimque parvitatem, quamdiu is ipse sum, qui sum, sic ipsemet sum parvus. Illud autem, magnum quod ipsum est, nunquam sustinuit esse parvum. similiter parvum, quod est in nobis, nunquam vult magnum aut fieri aut esse: neque aliud quicquam contrariorum, quamdiu est id, quod erat, patitur simul contrarium fieri aut esse; sed aut abit aut perit, cum adventat contrarium. CE. Ita prorsus existimo.

(51.) PHÆ. Tunc quidam eorum, qui aderant, hæc audiens, (quis autem ille fuerit, non satis memini,) Dii boni, inquit, nonne in superioribus contrarium eorum, quæ dicuntur, nobis est concessum, videlicet ex minori majus fieri atque ex majori minus; esseque procul dubio generationem contrariorum ex contrariis? nunc autem videmini, fieri id non posse, dicere. Cum vero Socrates, admo-vens caput, auscultasset, Viriliter, inquit, id recordatus es: non tamen intelligis differentiam inter id, quod modo dictum est, atque illud superius. Tunc enim dicebatur, ex contraria re rem contrariam fieri: nunc vero contrarium ipsum sibimet contrarium fieri nunquam; neque quod in nobis, neque quod in natura contrarium est. tunc quidem, o amice, de his, quæ habent contraria, dicebamus, hæc illorum cognomine appellantes. at nunc de illis ipsis loquimur, quæ his insunt, quorumve præsentia cognomen habent ea, quæ nominantur. Illa vero ipsa dicimus nunquam velle mutuum inter se generationem suscipere. Et simul Cebetem intuitus, inquit: Num te quoque, Cebes, aliquid eorum, quæ nunc objecta sunt, perturbavit? CE. Haud equidem ita sum affectus: ac tibi affirmo non multum me turbari. So. Id ergo simpliciter confessi sumus, contrarium nunquam sibimet fore contrarium. CE. Omnino.

(52.) So. Adverte præterea, nunquid et in hoc mecum sentias. vocasne aliquid calorem atque frigus? CE. Voco equidem. So. Num tanquam nivem atque ignem? CE. Non, per Jovem. So. An aliud quiddam calorem esse quam ignem, et aliud frigus quam nivem? CE. Ita. So. Sed hoc quoque tibi videri puto, nivem, quamdiu nix est, nunquam suscepturam esse calorem, quemadmodum in superioribus dicebamus: ac esse nivem, ut erat prius, simulque calidam: sed adventante calore aut subterfugere aut interire. CE. Penitus. So. Similiter et ignem subintrante frigore aut subterfluere aut extinguui; nec unquam posse et suscipere frigus et simul esse ignem, sicut prius erat, et frigidum. CE. Vera narras. So. Sunt igitur quædam ejusmodi, ut non solum speciem ipsam nomine suo dignentur per omne tempus, sed et aliud quiddam: quod quidem non est primum illud, habet vero, quamdiu est, illius formam. In hoc rursus tibi, quod volo, forte manifestius erit. Impar enim semper oportet nomen id, quod nunc dicimus, possidere. nonne? CE. Oportet sane. So. Num id solum ex omnibus? hoc enim quæro: an et aliud quiddam, quod quidem est non idipsum impar, attamen hoc oportet una cum suo nomine hoc insuper nomine alio semper appellari; propterea quod ita natura sit institutum, ut nunquam ab impari deseratur? Dico autem, hoc affectum esse ceu ternarium aliaque permulta. Considera vero de ternario. an non tibi videtur, hunc et sui ipsius nomine semper nuncupandum esse et simul nomine imparis? quod quidem impar non idem est, quod est ternarius. Veruntamen ita natura comparatus est et ternarius et quinarius et omnis medietas numeri, ut quamvis non idem sit, quod impar, semper tamen eorum quivis est impar. Præterea duo et quatuor omnisque alter numeri ordo, quamvis idem quod par non sit, simul tamen quilibet illorum par semper existit. concedis, necne? CE. Quidni? So. Contemplant ergo, quid velim. est au-

tem ejusmodi. Videntur quidem non solum ipsa inter se contraria sese invicem non recipere; verum etiam, quæcunque talia sunt, ut licet contraria inter se non sint, semper tamen contraria possideant, nunquam recipere speciem illam, quæ ipsi speciei, quam in se habent, contraria sit: sed hac adveniente aut perire protinus aut abire. an non dicemus tria et deficere et aliud quodvis pati, prius quam sustinere, ut, quatenus tria sunt, paria fiant? CE. Ita prorsus. So. Non tamen contraria est duitas trinitati. CE. Non certe. So. Non solum ergo species ipsæ contrariæ nunquam invicem se recipiunt: sed etiam alia quædam contrariorum ingressum mutuum non suscipiunt. CE. Verissima narras.

(53.) So. Visne igitur hæc, si possumus, qualia sint, definiamus? CE. Volo equidem. So. An non, Cebes, hæc erunt, quæ, quodcunque occupant, tale reddunt, ut non solum sui ipsius ideam retinere cogatur, sed etiam contrario illi sit opus? CE. Quonam pacto dicis? So. Quemadmodum paulo ante dicebamus. scis enim, quæ trium continentur idea, oportere non solum tria, sed etiam imparia esse. CE. Certe. So. Ad hoc tale utique dicebamus ideam contrariam formæ illi, quæ id perficit, nunquam accedere. CE. Nunquam. So. Perfecit autem imparis idea. CE. Hæc ipsa. So. Contraria vero huic paria idea. CE. Ita est. So. Ergo ternario numero idea paris se nunquam insinuabit. CE. Nunquam. So. Quapropter ternarius numerus paris est expers. CE. Expers. So. Trinitas ergo est necessario impar. CE. Est. So. Quod ergo definiendum assumpseram, qualia videlicet sint, quæ, etsi alicui non sunt contraria, ipsum tamen contrarium non admittunt, perinde se habet, ut trinitas: quæ cum pari non sit contraria, nihilo tamen magis ipsum accipit, propterea quod semper ejus contrarium affert. similiterque binarius ad impar, et ignis se habet ad frigidum, aliaque quam plurima. At vide jam, num ita definiendum putes, ut non modo contrarium non admittat contrarium, verum etiam illud, quod aliquid affert contrarium illi, ad quod ipsum accedat, ipsum videlicet quod affert, nunquam contrariam ejus, quæ affertur, recipiat formam. Rursus autem recordare: neque enim inutile sæpius admonere. Neque quinque paris speciem admittent; neque decem imparis, quod est duplum. hoc quidem ipsum alii contrarium, speciem tamen imparis accipiet nunquam. neque etiam numerus sesquialter, neque alia hujusmodi, quæ dimidium habent, formam totius suscipiunt; similiterque numerus, qui partem habet tertiam, atque ejusdem generis alia: si modo assequeris ita atque consentis. CE. Omnino equidem consentio atque assequor.

(54.) So. Rursus tanquam a principio mihi dicas. nec tamen per id, quod nunc interrogo, sed per aliud quiddam mihi respondeas, me imitatus. dico autem præter tutam respensionem illam a principio positam, juxta tutam quoque respensionem aliam per ea, quæ modo dicta sunt, adinventam. Nempe si me interrogas, O Socrates, quidnam in corpore si sit, calescet corpus: non tutam respensionem illam rudemque tibi dabo, videlicet si caliditas; sed exquisitiorem ex præsentibus verbis, ut si insit ignis. Similiter si me interrogas, quid si in corpore sit, ægrotabit: non respondebo, si ægrotatio;



sed si febris. Rursus si perconteris, quid si insit numero, fuerit impar: non dicam, si imparitas, immo si unitas; atque in ceteris eodem pacto. Sed vide, an dum, quid velim, plane cognoveris. CE. Planissime. So. Responde igitur: quidnam si in corpore sit, erit vivum? CE. Si anima. So. Nonne id semper ita se habet? CE. Semper. So. Anima igitur quicquid occupat, semper ad illud vitam affert? CE. Affert procul dubio. So. An est aliquid vitæ contrarium, necne? CE. Est utique. So. Quid istud? CE. Mors. So. Anima vero contrarium ejus, quod ipsa semper adducit, subibit nunquam, quemadmodum ex superioribus est concessum. CE. Sic est omnino.

(55.) So. Quid vero? quod paris ideam non accipit, quonam modo paulo ante nominabamus? CE. Impar. So. Quod vero non accipit justitiam, quodve non capit musicam? CE. Injustum dicimus et immusicum. So. Age jam, quod non subit mortem, quomodo appellabimus? CE. Immortale. So. Et anima quidem mortem non suscipit. CE. Nequaquam. So. Est igitur anima immortalis. CE. Immortalis quidem. So. Age utique, hocne jam demonstratum dicemus? an aliter tibi videtur? CE. Et sufficientissime quidem, o Socrates. So. Quid ergo, Cebes? si necesse foret, quod omnino est impar, et imperdibile fore, nonne tria imperdibilia forent? CE. Quidni? So. Præterea, si, quod incalescibile sit, necesse foret imperdibile esse, quando quis ad nivem calidum admoveret, nix quidem incolumis illiquefactaque subterfugeret? neque enim vel periret vel permanens calorem admitteret. CE. Vera narras. So. Simili, ut arbitror, ratione, si, quod infrigescibile, etiam imperdibile esset, quando in ignem adventat frigus, non extingueretur et evanesceret ignis, sed abiret incolumis. CE. Ita necesse foret. So. Eodem pacto de immortalis quoque necesse est dicamus. Si enim, quod est immortale, est etiam imperdibile, impossibile est animam imminente morte perire. Nam mortem quidem, quemadmodum ex superioribus constat, non recipiet neque interierit: quemadmodum ternarius nunquam, ut diximus, par erit: neque rursus impar erit par: neque ignis frigidus, neque caliditas, quæ inest igni, frigiditas unquam erit. Ceterum dicet quispiam, quidnam prohibet, quo minus ipsum impar par quidem non fiat adveniente pari, quemadmodum inter nos convenit, attamen eo dissoluto par pro ipso succedat? Ita dicenti repugnare non valeremus, quin sit destructum. quippe cum non idem sit impar atque indissolubile. Alioquin si nobis id constitisset, facile obtineremus, invadente pari impar ternariumque salvum discedere. similiterque de igne et calido ceterisque assereremus. nonne ita? CE. Prorsus. So. Jam vero de immortalis, si nobis id constat, quod est immortale, esse etiam imperdibile; consequens est, animam præter id, quod est immortalis, imperdibilem quoque esse. sin vero minus id concedatur, ratione alia opus erit. CE. Sed nihil opus est, quantum ad id spectat, alia ratione. Siquidem quidnam aliud indissolubile posset esse, si immortale ipsum et sempiternum dissolveretur?

(56.) So. Deum vero et ipsam vitæ speciem, et si quid aliud est immortale, indissolubile quoque esse omnes confiterentur. CE.

Universi, per Jovem, homines, et multo magis ipsi, ut arbitror, dii. So. Cum igitur, quod immortale est, etiam incorruptibile sit, quidnam prohibet animam, si fuerit immortalis, incorruptibilem quoque fore? CE. Necessario sequitur. So. Imminente igitur homini morte, quod mortale quidem in eo est, interit: quod vero immortale, incorruptum sospesque morti se subtrahit. CE. Manifestum est. So. Itaque maxime omnium, o Cebes, anima immortalis incorruptibilisque est; eruntque apud manes animæ nostræ. CE. Nihil equidem, o Socrates, adversus hæc habeo, quo minus rationibus tuis assentiar. Verum si quid aut hic Simmias aut alius quisquam habet, quod dicat, operæ pretium fuerit non siluisse. nescio enim, in quod aliud quis differat tempus, si quid de rebus ejusmodi vel dicere vel audire desideret. SIM. Atqui nec ego habeo quicquam, quo minus superioribus assentiar rationibus. Verumtamen rei ipsius, qua de agitur, magnitudinem et humanam imbecillitatem considerans, cogor intra me dictis nondum acquiescere. So. Quinimmo et hæc bene dicis, o Simmia, et positiones primæ, quamvis fide vobis dignæ videantur, diligentius tamen considerandæ: atque si illas sufficienter, ut arbitror, susceperitis, hanc sequemini rationem, quantum fieri ab homine potest. quod si hoc ipsum fuerit manifestum, nihil ulterius perquiretis. SIM. Vera loqueris.

(57.) So. Hoc autem, o viri, justum est, cogitare, si anima sit immortalis, eam non solum temporis hujus, in quo vivere dicimur, verum etiam universi gratia curatione plurimum indigere. nam grave periculum fore putandum est, si quis neglexerit animam. Si enim mors totius dissolutio esset, nimirum improbi lucrarentur, cum et a corpore et ab eorum pravitate cum anima liberarentur. Nunc autem, cum anima immortalis appareat, nulla superest malorum declinatio, nulla salus, nisi ut optima et prudentissima fiat. Nihil enim aliud, cum migrat ad manes anima, secum transfert præter eruditionem atque educationem. quæ quidem statim in principio transmigrationis illius plurimum vel prodesse vel obesse dicuntur. Ferunt enim, quemlibet hinc illuc emigrantem ab eo dæmone, quod viventem sortitus fuerat, in locum quendam duci, ubi oporteat omnes una collectos judicari, ac deinde ad inferos proficisci eo duce, cui mandatum erat, ut hinc decedentes ad illa loca traducat. sortitos vero illic, quæ oportebat sortiri, tempusque debitum commoratos, ab alio quodam duce rursus huc reduci post multos temporis longosque circuitus. Est autem iter non tale, quale ait Telephus apud Æschylum. ille siquidem simplicem inquit viam ad inferos ferre. Ego vero neque simplicem neque unam esse puto. Alioquin nullis ducibus opus esset: quippe cum unica via aberrare possit nemo. Quinimmo multos tramites multosque anfractus habere. quod quidem ex sacrificiis et ritibus conjectare licet. Animus ergo moderatus et prudens ducem sponte sequitur, neque ignorat præsentia. sed qui cupiditate corporis est infectus, quemadmodum supra dixi, per multum tempus ad ipsum ardentem afficitur: et circa locum visibilem multis reluctatus modis multaque perpessus vix tandem ab eo abducitur dæmone, cui ejus cura erat injuncta. Cum vero ad ea

loca, ubi alii quoque animi sunt, pervenerit, quisquis admodum immundus est et hujusmodi obnoxius crimini, qui vel injustis se contaminaverit cædibus, vel alia his similia similibumque animorum opera perpetraverit; hunc quidem animum omnes fugiunt atque declinant, nec reperitur ullus, qui vel socius vel dux ejus fieri velit. itaque omni auxilio destitutus eo usque pererrat, quoad certa temporum curricula impleantur: quibus tandem impletis in habitationem sibi convenientem ab ipsa necessitate transfertur. Qui vero puram moderatamque transegerit vitam, deos socios ducesque nactus ibi habitat, ubi unicuique convenit.

(58.) Multa vero sunt mirabiliaque terrarum loca: ipsaque terra neque talis neque tanta est, qualem aut quantam hi, qui de terra loquuntur, existimant; quemadmodum mihi a quodam traditum est. SIM. Quanam ratione hæc ais, o Socrates? equidem de terrarum orbe multa audivi: non tamen hæc, quæ tanquam vera accepisse te ais. libenter igitur ex te audirem. So. Atqui, o Simmia, nequaquam mihi videtur ars Glauci, quæ ea sint, narrare: sed, quod vera sint, probare, artis Glauci facultatem mihi videtur excedere. Præterea ego forsitan non sufficerem. quin etiam si id scirem, hæc tamen vita mea, o Simmia, longiori huic narrationi nequaquam sufficeret. Formam tamen orbis terræ ejusque loca cujusmodi esse rear, nihil prohibet dicere. SIM. Satis id erit. So. Persuasum quidem mihi est, primo, si est terra in cœli medio rotunda, nihil ei opus esse vel aëre vel alia ulla necessitate ejusmodi, ad hoc, ut nunquam decidat: sed ad eam sustinendam satis id esse, quod et cœlum undique sibi ipsi simillimum est omnino et terra undique æquilibris. Res enim æquilibris in similis alicujus medio posita, nec magis nec minus potest in partem aliquam inclinari: cunque similiter se habeat, ab inclinatione permanet aliena. Primo igitur mihi esse ita est persuasum. SIM. Et recte quidem. So. Præterea ingentem esse terrarum orbem: nosque a Phaside ad Columnas Herculeas habitare in parva quadam ejus particula, ceu formicas atque ranas circa paludes atque mare: esse vero et alios in similibus multisque locis multos habitatores. esse enim passim per terram multas variasque concavitates secundum formas et moles, in quas aqua, nebulae aëreque confluant. Puram vero ipsam terram in puro jacere cœlo, in quo sunt astra, quem plerique eorum, qui hæc tractant, ætherem nominant. Ei quidem subjecta quasi residendo hæc esse, semperque in hiatus terræ confluere. Nos itaque in his concavitatibus habitantes adeo falli, ut in terræ superficie alta nos habitare credamus. perinde ac si quis in medio profundo pelagi habitans putet se altiora maris incolere; atque solem ceteraque astra per mare prospiciens, mare ipsum esse cœlum existimet: quippe cum propter tarditatem imbecillitatemque nunquam ad summum maris evaserit, neque caput undis extulerit, planeque aspexerit, quanto hic locus profundo illo purior pulchriorque sit: quin etiam nec ab alio, qui hunc intuitus sit, acceperit. Hoc igitur idem et nobis accidere, qui in quadam orbis terreni concavitate habitantes altam incolere superficiem arbitremur, atque aërem nominemus cœlum, utpote qui per ipsum, quasi cœlum, astrorum motus intueamur. Idque nobis

accidere propterea, quod propter imbecillitatem tarditatemque ad supremum usque aërem transcendere nequeamus. Quod si quis ad summum evaderet, vel alis fretus eo volaret, hinc prodeuntem inde jam prospecturum; quemadmodum pisces emergentes e mari nostra hæc aspiciunt. Ac si natura ad inspiciendum sufficeret, cogniturum protinus, cœlum illud esse verum veramque lucem, veram quoque terram. siquidem quæ a nobis incolitur terra, hique lapides totusque hic locus adesa sunt atque corrupta; ut ea, quæ in mari sunt, a salsedine, neque nascitur in mari quicquam existimatione dignum; atque ut ita dixerim, nihil est in eo perfectum; sed cavernæ, arena, limus incredibilis atque sordes, ubicunque sit et terra. quæ quidem ad has nostras pulchritudines nullo modo sunt conferenda. Illius vero loci pulchritudo hanc nostram multo magis apparebit excedere. Proinde si fabulam quoque narrare oportet perpulchram, operæ pretium, Simmia, est, audire, quales sint hæc terrarum plagæ, quæ subjacent cœlo. SIM. Immo vero libentissime hanc fabulam audiemus.

(59.) So. Ferunt igitur, o amice, primum quidem talem videri terræ illius faciem, si quis superne despiciat, quales sunt hæc pilæ, quæ ex coriis duodecim contextæ sunt, variis scilicet distinctam coloribus: quorum hi nostri colores, quibus pictores utuntur, similitudinem quandam retinent. Illic vero universam terram ex talibus multoque etiam nitidioribus ac purioribus esse: partim quidem purpuream, mira pulchritudine præditam; partim vero coloris aurei; partim gypso et nive candidiorem: præterea ex coloribus aliis similiter exornatam, ac etiam pluribus pulchrioribusque, quam in nostram notitiam pervenerint. Enimvero has ipsas ipsius concavitates, aqua aëreque repletas, speciem quandam coloris splendidam in primis afferre inter ceterorum colorum varietatem, ut una quædam species ejus varia semper appareat. In hujusmodi vero terra convenienti ratione similes nasci arbores et flores et fructus. præterea montes et lapides ibidem simili ratione habere perfectionem atque perspicuitatem coloresque admodum pulchriores: quorum quidem particulæ quædam sint lapilli, qui apud nos habentur in pretio, Sardia, Jaspides, Smaragdi ceterique ejusmodi. illic vero nihil esse, quod non tale sit aut etiam pulchrius. Cujus quidem rei causa sit, quoniam lapides illi puri sint neque, quemadmodum nostri, a putredine salsugineque attriti atque corrupti; quibus in hunc locum confluentibus lapides et tellus animaliaque et plantæ inficiuntur atque ægrotare coguntur. Terram vero ipsam his omnibus exornari, atque auro etiam et argento ceterisque similibus. præfulgentia quidem hæc ibi nasci et multa et magna, perque omnem terram; ut eam videre spectatorum felicitum sit spectaculum. Proinde ibi esse animalia multa et homines, partim regionem mediterraneam incoherentes, partim circa aërem, quemadmodum nos circa maris litora, partim etiam insulas quæ haud procul a continenti positæ aëre circumdantur. Sed, ut summatim dicam, quod nobis aqua est et mare ad usum nostrum, idem illic esse aërem: quod vero nobis aër, id illis ætherem esse. Tempora vero apud illos tantam habere temperiem, ut illi et sine morbo continue et longe diutius, quam nostri,

vivant. item visu, auditu, prudentia ceterisque talibus nobis tantum præstare, quantum et aër aquæ et æther aëri puritate præstat. Præterea illic esse deorum templa et lucos, in quibus revera dii familiariter habitent, et responsa et divinationes deorumque sensus familiaritatesque ejusmodi hominibus ad deos esse. Solem quoque et lunam stellasque alias, quales revera sunt, apud eos videri: ceteris in rebus beatitudinem eos his rebus congruam possidere.

(60.) Itaque universam terram sic natura institutam, et quæ circa eam sunt similiter tradunt. Esse præterea in ipsa per ejus concavitates loco in circulum multa, partim quidem profundiora atque ampliora, quam sit regio a nobis culta; partim vero profundiora quidem, sed hiatum angustiore habentia nostra hac regione. esse et alicubi minus profunda, sed ampliora quam nostra. Hæc autem omnia sub terra sibi invicem obviare, atque irrumpere multis undique modis, tum per angustiora, tum per ampliora; discursusque habere et exitus, quibus magna aquarum copia ex aliis in alia, velut in crateres, confluat. item perpetuorum fluminum sub terra incredibiles magnitudines aquarum, tum calidarum, tum etiam frigidarum: plurimumque ignem et ignis ingentes amnes: multos quoque lutulenti humoris, partim quidem purioris, partim vero sordidioris; ceu torrens luti, qui in Sicilia est, et juxta ipsum amnes lutei inde fluentes. Quibus singula compleri loca, quacunque eos contingit perfluere. Hæc autem omnia sursum deorsumque ferri, veluti suspendiculo quodam sub terram posito, atque ita librato, ut utrinque vicissim inclinet atque attollat. Est autem id suspendiculum ob naturam quandam ejusmodi: unus aliquis ex terræ hiatibus est profecto quam maximus, perque universam terram trajectus et patens. de quo Homerus, *Longe nimis barathrum stat sub tellure profundum*. quod et ipse alibi, et multi poëtarum Tartarum appellarunt. In hoc utique receptaculum omnia confluent flumina, atque inde rursus effluunt. Talia vero sunt singula, per quales labuntur terras. Quod autem hinc effluant omnia rursusque refluant, hæc est causa, quod hic humor nec fundum habet nec fundamentum. itaque elevatur, et sursum deorsumque redundat. Idemque facit aër et spiritus, qui circa ipsum versatur. Sequitur enim ipsum, et quando ad superiora terræ, et quando ad hæc nostra perlabitur. Et quemadmodum in respirantibus flatus continue exspirat atque respirat, sic et ibi spiritus una cum humore elatus vehementes quosdam ventos et incredibiles commovet, sive influat sive effluat. Quapropter cum aqua in locum inferiorem delabitur, per meatus terræ juxta ejusmodi rivos influit, passimque per eos exundat et implet, velut hi, qui hauriunt. Cum vero illinc huc erumpit, hæc quoque iterum loca complet. Plena vero cum sunt, per rivos terræque meatus exuberat. et cum humores singuli illuc profluxerint, quo quisque profuit opportunius, maria, lacus, flumina, fontes efficiunt. Proinde rursus hinc relabentes per terram, partim quidem per longiores pluresque anfractus, partim vero per pauciores atque breviores rursus in Tartarum confluent: alii certe multo profundius quam hausti fuerint, alii vero paulo; omnes autem inferius influunt, quam effluerint: et alii per contrariam partem elabuntur, quam

illapsi fuerint ; alii vero per partem eandem. at quidam passim circumfluentes aut semel aut sæpius, spirasque circa orbem terrarum instar anguium replicantes, quantum fieri potest, infra relapsi iterum commiscentur ; licet autem utrinque partem ad medium usque defluere, ultra vero nequaquam. ulterior nam prolapsus utrinque foret ascensus.

(61.) Proinde sunt et alia multa, et magna variaque fluentia ; sed præcipua quatuor. quorum quidem maximum atque extimum terram circumdans Oceanus appellatur. E contraria vero hujus regione fluit Acheron : qui per deserta alia fluens loca, atque per subterranea in paludem defluit Acherusiam : quo plerique defunctorum deveniunt animi, ibique per fatalia quædam temporum curricula commorati, partim quidem longiora, partim vero breviora, rursus in generationes animalium relabuntur. Tertius vero fluvius horum medius duorum interfluit : nec admodum longe progressus in locum cadit vastum, multo igne flagrantem, efficitque paludem nostro mari majorem, aqua lutoque ferventem. Hinc vero turbidus lutulentusque circumfluit ; terraque circumdata, et alibi, et ad extrema paludis Acherusiæ pervenit : nec tamen illius aquæ miscetur ; sed sub terra sæpius revolutus absorptusque defluit infra Tartarum. hunc fluvium Pyriphlegethontem nominant : cujus rivi quidam, inde velut evulsi, quacunquē terrarum contigerit, manant. E contraria vero hujus regione fluvius quartus primum in locum erumpit ferum et asperum, ut ferunt. colorem vero locus talem habet totus, qualis est cyaneus : quem Stygium nominant. hic autem fluvius prolapsus paludem efficit Stygem. In hunc vero incidens locum, viresque vehementes in aqua assumens, sub terram se condit, circumvolutusque adversus Pyriphlegethontem labitur, et in Acherusia palude e contraria parte illi fit obviam. nec ulli hujus aqua miscetur ; sed revolutus in gyrum contra Pyriphlegethontem irrumpit in Tartarum. Poëtæ vero hunc appellant Coeytum.

(62.) Cum vero hæc ita natura disposita sint, quando in eum locum defuncti pervenerint, quo dæmon unumquemque perducit, primo illic judicantur, et qui honeste sancteque, et qui aliter vixerint. Itaque quicumque in vita quodam modo tenuisse medium quoddam comperiuntur, ad Acherontem profecti vehiculis, quæ unicuique adsunt, in paludem perveniunt Acherusiam : ibique habitant, purganturque pœnas dantes injuriarum : et, cum purificati sunt, absolvuntur : rursusque pro merito singuli benefactorum præmia reportant. Qui vero ob scelerum magnitudinem insanabiles esse videntur, qui videlicet sacrilegia multa et magna vel cædes iniquas vel alia horum similia perpetraverint, hos omnes conveniens sors mergit in Tartarum, unde nunquam egrediuntur. Qui autem sanabilia quidem peccata, sed ingentia commiserunt, veluti si qui contra patrem vel matrem irati per vim aliquid fecerint, sed pœnitentia ducti eos in cetera vita coluerint, vel qui simili quodam pacto fuerint homicidæ, eos in Tartarum quidem necesse est cadere : sed ibi per annum commorati a fluctu ejiciuntur, homicidæ quidem per Coeytum, parentum vero violatores per Pyriphlegethontem. Postquam vero ab his delati fluminibus ad paludem Acherusiam perve-

nerunt, clamant illic vocitantque eos, quos vel necaverunt vel injuriis affecerunt; suppliciterque rogant atque deprecantur, ut eos permittant progredi per paludem ibique absolvi: ac si impetraverint, penetrant illuc finemque malorum accipiunt: sin minus queant persuadere, referuntur in Tartarum atque inde rursus in flumina; neque per hæc mala deferri prius cessant, quam ab his, quos affecerunt injuriis, impetraverint. hæc enim pœna illis a iudicibus est imposita. Qui autem pie præ ceteris vixisse inveniuntur, hi sunt, qui ex his terrenis locis, tanquam e carcere, soluti atque liberati ad altiora transcendunt, puramque supra terram habitant regionem. Inter hos autem quicumque satis per philosophiam purgati sunt, absque corporibus omnino totum per tempus vivunt, habitationesque his etiam pulchrioris nanciscuntur: quarum pulchritudo neque facilis dictu est, neque præsens tempus ad dicendum sufficeret.

(63.) Sed horum, quæ narrata sunt, gratia, o Simmia, omni studio est annitendum, ut in hac vita virtutem et prudentiam sapientiamque consequamur. Præmium namque pulchrum est, et spes est ingens. Hæc igitur eo se pacto prorsus habere, quo ego disposui, non decet virum sanæ mentis asserere: esse tamen vel hæc vel talia quædam circa animos nostros eorumque habitationes, quandoquidem animus ipse immortalis apparet, et decere mihi videtur, et dignum, quasi periclitantes ita existimare. honestum enim periculum est; oportetque hæc quasi carmina quædam magorum ritu mentibus nostris infundere. quamobrem ipse jam diu protraho fabulam. Sed horum gratia bonam spem de animo suo habere debet, quicumque voluptatibus ornamentisque corporis neglectis, tanquam alienis ad diversumque declinantibus voluptates, quæ in discendo percipiuntur, studiose sectatus fuerit, animumque non alieno, sed suo decoraverit ornamento, temperantia, justitia, fortitudine, libertate, veritate; sic ex hac vita migrationem expectans, tanquam cum fatum vocaverit, migraturus. Vos quidem, o Simmia et Cebeus aliique præsentibus, in posterum quodam in tempore singuli transmigrabitis. me vero nunc, ut tragicus aliquis diceret, jam vocat fatum. ac ferme tempus est, ut ad lavandum divertam. præstat enim, ut puto, post lavacrum venenum bibere, ne in lavando cadavere molestiam mulieribus præbeamus.

(64.) Cum hæc dixisset Socrates, Crito sic inquit: Dic age, o Socrates, quidnam hic aut mihi mandas agendum vel erga filios tuos vel circa cetera? quidve agendo maxime tibi gratum fecerimus? Nihil equidem, inquit, novi præcipio, sed quod semper vobis prædico, videlicet si vestri curam habebitis, et mihi et vobis ipsis grata evadent, quæcunque feceritis, etiamsi nunc verbis non concedatis. at vero si vos ipsos neglexeritis, nolentes secundum ea, quæ nunc et superiori tempore dicta sunt, quasi per vestigia vitam dirigere, nihil prorsus perficietis, etsi multa nobis nunc disputantibus concedatis. Ista quidem, ait Crito, curæ nobis erunt. sed quemadmodum sepeliri te jubes? Utcunque, inquit, libet: si tamen me apprehendetis, ac nisi ego vos effugero. Et simul subridens, et ad nos conversus, Non persuadeo, inquit, Critoni, me esse hunc Socratem, qui nunc disputo et singula dicta dispono. sed opinatur me

illud esse, quod paulo post videbit, cadaver. itaque interrogat, quemadmodum me sepeliat. Quod autem jamdiu plurimis verbis contendendo, postquam venenum bibero, haud ulterius apud vos me esse futurum, sed ad beatorum profectorum felicitates, hoc quidem mihi videor frustra Critoni dixisse, consolans vos simul atque meipsam: Fidejubete igitur pro me Critoni contraria quadam fidejussione, quam ipse iudicibus fidejussit. Ille enim me iudicio sistere; vos autem me non sistere, cum obiero, fidejubete, sed abiturum: ut Crito obitum facilius meum ferat; neve meum corpus vel cremari cernens vel sepeliri, me deploret, quasi dira patientem: neque dicat in funere proponi Socratem aut efferrī aut sub terram condi. Certum id habeto, optime Crito, maledictum non solum in hoc ipso delinquere, verum etiam animis nonnihil officere, at enim confidere oportet, atque dicere corpus sepeliri meum, atque ita sepeliri, ut tibi placebit maximeque justum esse censebis. His dictis surrexit, intravitque cubiculum quoddam, quasi lavaturus. Crito autem secutus est. Nos vero exspectare jussit. Exspectabamus ergo, de his, quæ dicta erant, inter nos colloquentes rursusque considerantes. Præterea conquerebamus fortunam nostram: qui tanquam parente orbatī reliquum vitæ tempus orphanī futuri essemus. Cum Socrates lotus esset, delati sunt ad eum pueri sui: duos enim filios habebat parvulos, unum vero jam grandem. venerunt et mulieres domesticæ. Ad eas Socrates cum in præsentia Critonis verba fecisset, et quæ volebat mandavisset; mulieres quidem et pueros abire jussit, ipse vero ad nos rediit, jam circiter solis occasum; permultum enim tempus intus fuerat commoratus. Cum vero ad nos venisset letus, consedit. Nec multa post hæc locutus erat, cum venit Undecimvirorum lictor, qui illi adstans, O Socrates, inquit, non arbitror eam in te novitatem me deprehensurum, quam deprehendere in ceteris soleo. illi enim indignantur mihi atque execrantur, quando illis denuntio venenum esse bibendum, ita magistratibus compellentibus. te vero cognovi præsertim in hoc tempore generosissimum mansuetissimumque et optimum virum omnium, qui unquam hunc in locum devenerunt: et nunc equidem certo sciō te mihi haud infestum fore, sed illis, penes quos rei hujus causam esse cognoscis. Nunc ergo scis, quem tibi nuntium afferam. Vale, atque annitere, quæ necessaria sunt, pro viribus facile ferre. et simul his dictis abibat lacrymans. Socrates autem in eum respiciens, Et tu, inquit, vale, et nos id faciemus. Simulque ad nos conversus, Quam urbanus est homo hic? inquit. neque solum in hoc, sed in superiori etiam tempore me salutabat colloquebaturque nonnunquam, fuitque semper virorum optimus. Et nunc quam ingenue me lacrymat? Sed age, o Crito, illi pareamus, ac si jam tritum est venenum, aliquis huc afferat. si nondum est tritum, conterat ille. At reor equidem, inquit Crito, o Socrates, nondum solem reliquisse montes nec occidisse. Et novi alios, postquam id sibi nuntiatum est, valde sero bibere illud consuevisse, largiter cœnatos atque potos, interdum vero etiam illorum potitos, quorum amore afficiebantur. Quamobrem ne adeo festines; adhuc enim superest tempus. Tunc Socrates, Merito, inquit, o Crito, illi ista faciunt. putant enim hæc



facientes lucrari. Atque ego merito ista non faciam. nihil enim me lucraturum spero, si paulo posterius venenum bibero, nisi ut mihi ipsi sim ridiculus, tanquam vitæ cupidus atque parcus ejus rei servator, cujus nihil jam mihi amplius adest. Sed age jam mihi obtempera, nec aliter facias.

(65.) Crito vero his auditis annuit puero, qui longe non aberat. ille vero egressus, et aliquantum commoratus, rediit, eum, qui venenum daturus erat, secum ducens. attulit autem in calice id attritum. Hunc adspiciens Socrates, Cedo, inquit, bone vir, (tu enim harum rerum peritiam habes,) quid me facere oportet? Nihil, inquit, aliud quam post potionem deambulare, quoad gravari tibi sentias crura; postea vero jacere: atque ita tu facies. Hæc dicens porrexit calicem Socrati. Socrates vero hilariter admodum, o Echeocrates, accepit, nihil omnino commotus, neque colore neque vultu mutato: sed quemadmodum consueverat, taurine illum aspiciens, Quid ais, inquit? licetne ex hoc poculo nonnihil spargendo sacrificare? Tantum, inquit, o Socrates, contrivimus, quantum satis fore putavimus. Intelligo, inquit, sed et licet et oportet orare deos, ut felix sit transmigratio nostra. quod equidem obsecro, atque utinam ita fiat! Et simul his dictis admonens facile admodum alacriterque ebibit. Plerique nostrum eoque retinere quodammodo lacrymas potueramus. at postquam et bibentem vidimus et bibisse, ulterius non potuimus; sed me quidem dolor adeo superabat, ut lacrymæ largiter jam mihi profluerent. Quapropter me protegens deplorabam, non illum quidem, sed fortunam meam, qui tali amico orbatus essem. Crito autem etiam prius, cum lacrymas nequiret continere, surrexerat. Sed Apollodorus nec in superiori quidem tempore unquam lacrymare cessaverat: tunc vero præcipue vociferans, seque ipsum afflicans, neminem reliquit præsentium, cujus vicem non deploraret, præter unius Socratis vicem. Ille vero hæc animadvertens, Quidnam, inquit, o viri mirabiles, agitis? atqui ego maxime hanc ob causam mulieres abegeram, ne talia facerent. audiveram enim, in benedictione esse ex hac vita migrandum. Qui-escite igitur atque tolerate. Nos vero hæc audientes erubuimus, destitimusque a lacrymis. Sed ipse, cum inter deambulandum crura jam gravari sentiret, jacuit resupinus: sic enim, qui venenum præbuit, jusserat. qui paulo post eum tangens, pedes et crura consideravit; deinde gravius comprimens pedem ejus, quæsit an sentiret. negavit Socrates. Ille rursus pressit tibias, paulatimque manu ascendens ostendit nobis frigere eas atque rigere. et ipse attingit rursus, atque, cum ad cor pervenerit, tunc esse decessurum. Jam igitur frigerant ei præcordia, cum detegens (erat enim veste coopertus) dixit, quæ vox illi extrema fuit: O Crito, Æsculapio gallum debemus: quem reddite; neque negligatis. Fiet, inquit Crito, quod jubes. sed vide, nunquid aliud velis. Hæc interroganti nihil ultra respondit, sed paulo post commotus est. Et minister detexit eum: atque ipse lumina fixit. Quod quum Crito, cerneret, ora oculosque composuit.

(66.) Hic finis fuit amici nostri, o Echeocrates, viri, nostro quidem judicio, omnium, quos experti sumus, optimi et apprime sapientissimi atque justissimi.



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