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Aristotle's poetics,
C. XXV

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IN THE

Light of the Homeric Scholia,

BY

MITCHELL CARROLL.

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THESIS

ACCEPTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY,

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,

MAY, 1893.

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
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TO MY FATHER.

οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης
ἐστὶν τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς
οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς.

Ar. Poet., c. xxv, 1460 b 13–15.

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ARISTOTLE'S POETICS, C. XXV,

IN THE

LIGHT OF THE HOMERIC SCHOLIA.

After his treatment of Tragedy and Epos in the *Poetics*, Aristotle adds, in chapter XXV, a special section which treats of objections brought by critics against poetry and the principles on which they are to be answered. The presence of such a chapter is peculiarly appropriate, as it is the object of the *Poetics* to teach not only the nature of poetry, but also the right criticism of poetic works. Yet it has given rise to any amount of misunderstanding among editors and commentators. Some have gone so far as to deny its genuineness, as Ritter and Susemihl[1]; and while it has usually been accepted as Aristotelian, only Vahlen and Butcher can be said to have recognized the intimate relation it bears to the rest of the *Poetics:* and even their observations frequently show a narrow perspective, because of a limited knowledge of the range of poetic problems and the methods of solving them.

The faulty interpretation of many doubtful passages of this chapter, and the mistaken views as to its purport and import-

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[1] Ritter (Comm. ad Poet., p. 265) thinks that the chapter has intruded improperly and absurdly, being added by some follower of Aristotle who was deeply versed in poetic προβλήματα. Susemihl (Gesch. d. Griech. Litt. in d. Alex. Zeit., I, p. 164, Anm. 847) characterizes it as 'ein peripatetischer Schulzusatz.'

ance, have been due to a lack of appreciation of its intimate relation to the Porphyrian *ζητήματα* of the Homeric scholia, of which the *προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά* of Aristotle and his followers were a fruitful source. The design of the *προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά* was to consider and answer the criticisms and censures of Homer by philosophers and sophists—an aim similar to that of the chapter under consideration—and the fragments preserved to us, more extensive, perhaps, than has heretofore been recognized, furnish numerous illustrations of the principles briefly stated in the *Poetics*. It is the object of this paper to make a study of *Poetics*, c. XXV, in the light of the Porphyrian scholia. But before entering upon the treatment proper, it is necessary to trace the early manifestations of Homeric criticism, to show Aristotle's interest in the same, and to indicate Porphyry's indebtedness to Aristotle and his followers.

Aristotle and the Early Criticism of Homer.

The Homeric Question was playing a rôle prior to the rise of scientific criticism, in the fifth century B. C., in the days of the philosophers and sophists. The philosophers rebelled against the Homeric representations of the gods. Xenophanes,[1] for instance, accused Homer (and Hesiod) of ascribing to the gods everything

> *ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,*
> *κλέπτειν, μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.*

Herakleitos,[2] the contemporary of Xenophanes, is quoted as saying that Homer (and Archilochos) deserved to be scourged; and Plato, on grounds of morality, banished Homer and other poets from his ideal Republic. The early defenders of the poet against the philosophers sought refuge in allegorical interpretation.

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[1] Mullach, Xenoph., fr. 7.

[2] Diog. La., IX, I, 1.

The sophists[1] and rhetoricians censured Homer, not for impiety in mythology, but for errors in grammar and diction. In their rhetorical displays treating of Homeric themes they would object to certain passages as faulty in expression or doubtful in meaning, and strive to detect incongruities in thought and language. Such discussions had as their object not so much the gaining of an accurate knowledge of the poet, as an exhibition of sophistic dialectic and rhetorical elegance of diction. Protagoras,[2] for example, censured Homer because he had invoked the muse unbecomingly by using the imperative mood; in Plato's dialogue (*Hippias Minor*) Hippias is represented discussing with Sokrates the words and actions of Homeric heroes; and Gorgias and Prodikos and other sophists treated in similar fashion various Homeric themes. The best known type of this class was Zoilos[3] of Amphipolis, who won for himself, through his Homeric activity, the designation Ὁμηρομάστιξ. His strictures on the poet were embraced, most probably, in works styled by Suidas, ψόγος Ὁμήρου and κατὰ τῆς Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως λόγοι ἐννέα.

Notwithstanding the faulty methods of the sophists their criticisms were frequently just and they deserve credit for this,

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[1] Friedel, W. O., De soph. stud. Hom. Diss. philol. Hal., vol. I, p. 130 ff., 1873. Examples of the objections of sophists are present in Ar. Soph. El., c. IV, and Poet., c. XXV, as almost all are of such a nature that they could not be regarded as the objections of philosophers.

[2] Poet., c. XIX, 1456 b 15–19.

[3] Blass, Att. Bereds., II, pp. 344–9.

Schol. Por., K 274: Ζωΐλος ὁ κληθεὶς Ὁμηρομάστιξ . . . ὃς ἔγραψε τὰ καθ' Ὁμήρου γυμνασίας ἕνεκα, εἰωθότων καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων ἐν τοῖς ποιηταῖς γυμνάζεσθαι. Two of the objections in Poet., c. XXV, that Apollo should shoot first senseless animals, οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον (A 50), and that Achilles should command, "ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε" (I 203), are attributed to Zoilos (Heracl. Alleg. Hom., 14, Plut. Q. C., V, 4, 2). For other instances of his criticism cf. Longin. περὶ ὕψους, 9, 14: Schol. Por., E 7, E 20, Σ 22, ι 60. Zoilos is the leading representative, at this early period, of the class of critics known as ἐνστατικοί ('objectors'), the term especially applied to grammarians who impugned points in Homer, while the term λυτικοί ('solvers') was applied to those who, in defence of the poet, answered the objections of the ἐνστατικοί. Receiving

that by their questionings they aroused others through approval or objection to a more accurate study of Homer. By citations from Homer in their lectures and by special works on his poems they called the attention of thinking men not only to the study of single passages and the significance of Homeric terms, but also to the nature of epic poetry and the aesthetic value of poetic faults.

All the literary, philosophical and critical exegesis of the period immediately succeeding this crude and undeveloped form of criticism centres around Aristotle and his School. Aristotle seems to have realized that the attacks of detractors of Homer and other poets were assaults on the very nature of poetry. He saw into the deeper meaning of the alleged faults of poetry, and in answer to the cavilling criticism of the day, formulated certain principles of explanation based on the fundamental tenets of his poetic theory. In his hands what had before been crude and unscientific receives a systematic treatment.

Aristotle's hearty veneration for Homer is shown by the numerous citations[1] of the Iliad and the Odyssey in his works, and by the frequent expressions of admiration occurring in the *Poetics;*[2] perhaps to this we may attribute his appearance as

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an impetus from the interest taken in the explanation of Homeric difficulties by Aristotle and Zeno, the criticism of the *ἐνστατικοί* and *λυτικοί* continued in vogue for many centuries. At Alexandria and later at the courts of the Roman emperors such criticism was at its height, and afforded a leading source of entertainment at all gatherings of learned men. For full accounts of their criticism, cf. Wower de Polymath, Leipz., 1665, cap. 10, § 15 ff.; Lehrs, de Aristarch. stud. Hom., p. 221 ff.; Schrader, Proleg. ad Por., p. 368 ff.; Gräfenhan, Gesch. d. Klass. Philol., I, p. 201 ff.; II, p.77 ff.; III, p. 223 ff.; IV, p. 268 ff.

[1] See Römer, "Die Homercitate und die Homerischen Fragen des Aristoteles."

[2] e. g., 1448 b 34–36: *ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος ἦν, μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν.* 1451 a 23–25: *ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καλῶς ἰδεῖν ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν.* 1459 a 30–31: *διὸ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους.* 1459 b 12: *οἷς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς.* 1460 a 5: *Ὅμηρος δὲ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἄξιος καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν.* 1460 a 18, 19: *δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.*

a defender of the poet against his many detractors. Isokrates[1] testifies that the Homeric poems were objects of study in the Lyceum, and Dio Chrysostom[2] is authority for the statement that Aristotle in a number of dialogues concerned himself with Homer. Besides these and other indications[3] of Aristotle's Homeric activity, of peculiar interest is an especial work which had the Homeric poems for its exclusive object, and which has come down to us under different titles, *ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά* or *προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά*.[4] In these problems, as will be seen later, certain principles and methods for the solution of objections to Homer were applied to special passages. Fragments of the work, found chiefly in the Homeric scholia, have been collected and edited,[5] and have given rise to various views[6] as to their exact relation to Aristotle.

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[1] Isok., Panathen., 18: *ἔλεγον ὡς ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ συγκαθεζόμενοι . . . διαλέγοιντο περί τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως.*

[2] Dio Chrys., LIII, 1: *καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀφ' οὗ φασι τὴν κριτικήν τε καὶ τὴν γραμματικὴν ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν, ἐν πολλοῖς διαλόγοις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ διέξεισι θαυμάζων αὐτὸν ὡς τὸ πολὺ καὶ τιμῶν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός.* Schrader (Epileg., p. 1804) is inclined to see in these words a possible reference to the *ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά*. Cf. Dio Chrys., II, 36.

[3] See Wolf, Proleg., p. clxxxiii ff.; Sengebusch, Hom. Diss., I, p. 72 ff.; La Roche, Hom. Textkrit. im Alt., p. 7 ff. (especially on the *ἡ ἐκ νάρθηκος ἔκδοσις*).

[4] According to Diog. La., V, 1, 26, the whole work embraced 6 books; according to the third Vita of Aristotle, 10 books; Sengebusch decides that the number of books was 10, and suggests an emendation of Diog. accordingly.

On Aristotle's relation to *προβλήματα* and *λύσεις* in general, see Prantl, Ueber die Probleme des Aristoteles, Abh. d. Münch. Akad., 1851, I, cl. VI, pp. 339–377. Treating the extant thirty-eight books *περὶ προβλημάτων*, Prantl concludes that while Aristotle cannot in any sense be the author of the whole work, yet from the manner in which the themes proposed in the problems are answered it is evident that the principles at the basis of the explanations are Aristotelian. Cf. Susemihl, Gesch. d. griech. Litt. in d. Alex. Zeit., I, p. 159 ff.

[5] Valentinus Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 149 ff.; also Aristotelis Opusc., ed. Berl., vol. V, 1870; Aristotelis fragmenta coll., Rose, Lips., Teubn., 1886; Emil Heitz, Aristotelis Opusc., ed. Paris, vol. IV, 1868.

[6] Lehrs (de Aristarchi stud. Hom., ed.[3], p. 219) was probably the first to doubt the genuineness of the *ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά*. His arguments were

These evidences of Aristotle's activity in the study of Homer justify the presence of a chapter in the *Poetics* devoted almost exclusively to the defense of the poet, and account for the traces of Aristotelian influence in the Homeric criticism of the Peripatetics and of later λυτικοί.

Following in the footsteps of their master, Megakleides,[1] Herakleides, Chamaileon and other Peripatetics devoted attention to the solution of Homeric problems. The προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά of Aristotle and his immediate followers were embraced in what Schrader styles a Corpus Peripateticorum, probably in the second century B. C. This work was largely used by Porphyry in his ζητήματα Ὁμηρικά,[2] and through

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answered by Sengebusch, p. 75 ff. Later Val. Rose (Ar. Pseudepig., p. 149) pronounced the work a 'volumen ex studiis Peripateticorum philologicis profectum.' La Roche (p. 24), Heitz (die verl. Schriften d. Ar., p. 288), Schrader (Proleg., p. 413) and Vahlen (p. 351) declare for the genuineness of the work.

[1] See Schrader, Proleg., p. 414 ff.; Epileg., p. 187 ff.; Philol., XLIV, p. 236 ff. For Megakleides, see schol. Por., Κ 274, Π 140, Χ 36, 205, ζ 106; for Herakleides, schol., Β 649, Γ 236, β 51, 63, ν 119. Susemihl (Gesch., II, Anm. 445 d.) does not think the evidence conclusive that Herakleides was a Peripatetic; on this cf. Schrader, Philol., XLIV. Herakleides' treatment of Homeric problems so fully accords with that of Aristotle that, in this species of criticism, there can be no doubt that he is Aristotle's follower. On Chamaileon, see schol. Por., ε 334.

[2] The fragments of Porphyry's Ζητήματα Ὁμηρικά, preserved in Vat. MS. 305, containing Πορφυρίου φιλοσόφου Ὁμηρικῶν ζητημάτων βιβλίον α', and in the Homeric scholia, first received favorable attention from Valckenaer (Op., II, p. 95 ff.) in 1747. His view that the Ζητ. Ὁμ., the little work Περὶ τοῦ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ τῶν νυμφῶν ἄντρου, and other fragments, were derived from a continuous commentary of Homer was refuted by Gildersleeve, De Porphyrii studiis Homericis, Göttingen, 1853, who also established the genuineness of the preface to the Ζητ. Vat. A dissertation of Wollenberg, De Porphyr. stud. philol., I, Berolini, 1854, appeared about the same time. Hermann Schrader has devoted years to the Homeric Questions of Porphyry. The results of his researches are embodied in the two works: Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium Reliquiae, Lipsiae, 1880, and Porphyrii Quaestionum Homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium Reliquiae, Lipsiae, 1890.

Porphyry fragments of it are present in the Homeric scholia Ven. B.

Schrader[1] recognizes three main sources for Porphyry's[2] *Ζητήματα Ὁμηρικά*: (1) a collection of the solutions of Alexandrian scholars, referred to in schol. Por., I 682; (2) a Corpus of the *ζητήματα* of Zeno and other Stoics; (3) a Corpus Peripateticorum, consisting of solutions from *προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά* of Aristotle and his followers. His argument for a Peripatetic source is based on a comparison of the *ζητήματα* ascribed to Aristotle in the scholia with the examples treated in *Poetics*, c. XXV; he concludes from the evident uniformity in design and in method, that solutions bearing the name of Aristotle, solutions mentioned in the *Poetics* and treated at greater length in the scholia, and *ἀπορίαι* of the scholia agreeing with those of the *Poetics*, though solutions are not stated, are to be derived from the same source. Further he does not go. This source Schrader identifies with the *προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά* of Aristotle and his immediate followers, which were embraced in one volume most probably before the close of the second century B. C. He infers that this work is referred to in schol. Por., K 252, which he considers the beginning of some book of Porphyry's Homeric Questions: *ἡ συναγωγὴ τῶν ζητουμένων γέγονε μὲν ἤδη καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὰ προβλήματα λαμβάνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἐζητηκότων τὰς λύσεις ἐπικρίνομεν κ. τ. λ.* He thinks that lectures of Aristotle on Homeric questions, delivered in his

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[1] Prolegomena, c. III, 2, 3; Epileg., c. II, 2 a–e.

[2] That Porphyry was an expert critic and commentator of Aristotelian philosophy is evident from his *Εἰσαγωγὴ περὶ τῶν πέντε φωνῶν*, an introduction to the Categories, frequently printed with the Organon, and the titles of two lost works, *Ἐξήγησις τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐν ἑπτὰ βιβλίοις πρὸς Γεδάλιον* and *Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἵρεσιν, βιβλία ζ'*. The strongest external evidence of Aristotle's influence on Porphyry is found in Proklos on Plato's Timaeus, p. 18 C. (quoted by Wollenberg), who represents Porphyry as "*Περιπατητικὰς ἀποδόσεις παρεισφέροντα λύειν τὰς Πλατωνικὰς ἀπορίας.*" On the nature of Porphyry's criticism see Wollenberg, p. 15 ff.; Gildersleeve, p. 10.

earlier period, were taken down by his students and that these lecture-notes were afterwards supplemented by their own observations (cf. schol. Por., B 649, Γ 236, X 165, μ 128); and hence that the *ζητήματα* finally embraced in one work are fruits, in a sense, of the Homeric disputations held in the Lyceum. Schrader doubts whether books of problems were edited by Aristotle himself, but declares for the authorship of Aristotle in the collected work, at least so far as concerns its fundamental ideas.[1]

As is evident from the foregoing discussion, it is proper to regard the twenty-fifth chapter of the *Poetics* as an abridged statement of principles and methods treated and illustrated more fully in the *προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά*. In this manner its apologetic tone and the preponderance of examples drawn from the Homeric Epos can be understood. That Aristotle so closely identifies his methods of solving problems with his theory of poetry bespeaks for the *προβλήματα Ὁμηρικά* a far greater value than has heretofore been attributed to them. And as the design of the chapter and of the *προβλήματα* was the same—to consider and answer the criticisms and censures of Homer by philosophers and sophists—it is manifest that the key to the solution of the difficult problems to which the chapter has given rise is a faithful study of the traces of Aristotelian influence in the *ζητήματα* of Porphyry. Where the principles laid down in the chapter exhibit themselves in the scholia, it is evident that passages containing them are either

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[1] Cf. Susemihl, Gesch. d. Griech. Litt. in d. Alex. Zeit., II, p. 329: "Jedenfalls ungleich älteren Datums, spätestens wohl aus der zweiten Hälfte des zweiten Jahrhunderts war eine Sammlung der Lösungen homerischer Probleme von Ar. und den ältesten Peripatetikern, hie und da auch von Anderen, wie Herakleides dem Pontiker und Timolaus, welche von Dioskurides dem Verfasser der Schrift über die Sitten bei Homeros, und später von Porphyrios in seinen homerischen Untersuchungen reichlich ausgebeutet ist, mag nun diese Sammlung nur eine neue Auflage der aristotelischen *Ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά* oder, was doch wohl wahrscheinlicher ist, eine Ergänzung derselben mit manchen Wiederholungen aus ihnen gewesen sein."

from the Peripatetic source or that Porphyry in his own solutions is following Aristotelian teachings: in either case we are justified in availing ourselves of all the light they afford for the correct interpretation of the chapter.

Analysis of Poetics, C. XXV.[1]

I.

Aristotle begins by laying down certain general propositions which lie at the basis of his treatment both of the objections brought against poetry and the principles on which they are to be answered. These are intimately connected with his theory of the serious style of poetry developed in the earlier chapters of the *Poetics*.

A. *The objects of representation* (1460 b 7–11). The poet, being an imitator, like the painter or any other artist, must of necessity always imitate one of three objects—either things as they were or are (*οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν*), or things as they are said to be and thought to be (*οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ*), or things as they should be (*οἷα εἶναι δεῖ*). Thus the objects of poetic representation are either (*a*) real events, or (*b*) current traditions and popular belief, or (*c*) the ideal, the universal, the 'higher reality.' These observations are more fully treated in cc. II, IX, XV.

B. *The means of representation* (1460 b 11–13). The objects of poetic imitation find expression in language[2] which employs

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[1] In what follows frequent references are made to the following works: Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, Halle, 1867, vol. I, pp. 135–168; Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik, IV, Berlin, 1867; Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, London, 1895. Citations of the schol. Por. are from the two volumes of Schrader already mentioned (p. 14[2]). The passages, with slight exceptions, occur also in Dindorf, but sometimes under different verses. The text of the *Poetics* cited is Vahlen's.

[2] Reading with Vahlen, *λέξει, <ἢ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν> ἢ καὶ γλώτταις καὶ μεταφοραῖς*. Cf. V., Anm. zu S. 353.

either ordinary words or rare words or metaphors; besides, poetic language has the right to use many turns of phrase varying from the normal. Aristotle embraces in this short expression the various εἴδη λέξεως treated in cc. XXI, XXII.

C. *The standard of correctness in poetry* (1460 b 13–21). 'There is not the same standard of correctness in the poetic art as in the political[1] art, nor as in any other art or science.'

Aristotle then distinguishes two kinds of fault possible to poetry: the one affects its very essence, the other is accidental. If one propose to himself to imitate something, but has imitated it incorrectly through want of ability (*ἀδυναμία*), the error is inherent in the poetry. But if the failure is due to an incorrect conception of what he proposes to represent, if, e. g., he has represented a horse advancing both right legs at once, or has introduced technical inaccuracies in medicine, it may be, or in any other art, the error is not essential; though the *προαίρεσις* or proposal be faulty, he could in the *μίμησις* meet fully the demands of art.

In this distinction Aristotle asserts that poetry is to be measured not by a moral but by a purely aesthetic standard. All important in his eyes is the perfection of the imitation, the shaping activity of the artist. Poetry must be judged by its own laws, its own basal assumptions, and errors, that are errors only according to some alien standard, are faults *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, and accordingly excusable.

II.

The Ἐπιτιμήματα.

'From these considerations,'—the objects of imitation, the means of imitation and the standard of correctness in poetry,—proceeds Aristotle, 'must be solved the objections contained in

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[1] Politics here has special reference to Ethics, and the observation is in answer to Plato. See Vahlen, p. 363; Butcher, p. 207. Aristotle retains the term "*ὀρθότης*" used by Plato (Vahlen).

the problems' (*τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα*[1] *ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν*, 1460 b 21, 22).

What then is the nature of the objections to poetry made by critics? To understand this a study of the closing section of the chapter is necessary, 1461 b 22–24: *τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμήματα ἐκ πέντε εἰδῶν φέρουσιν, ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἀδύνατα ἢ ὡς ἄλογα ἢ ὡς βλαβερὰ ἢ ὡς ὑπεναντία ἢ ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην.*

We must, therefore, before proceeding further, define the five *εἴδη* from which *ἐπιτιμήματα* are drawn.

I. *ὡς ἀδύνατα*,[2] as 'impossible.'

The term *ἀδύνατα* is to be understood from its opposite, *δύνατα*, and by a study of the intimate connection of these terms with the Aristotelian law of the necessary and the probable, *κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*, as expounded in the *Poetics*, c. IX, and elsewhere. It designates those elements in poetry which were regarded by critics as impossible, as not real, not true to life, and therefore proper objects for censure. The pursuit of Hektor[3] is mentioned as a case in point (c. XXV, 1460 b 26) in which the attendant circumstances (X 205 sq.) were regarded as *ἀδύνατα* (mentioned in c. XXIV as *ἄλογα*). The scholia furnish numerous illustrations of *ἀδύνατα*: e. g., schol. Por., Γ 397, *ἀδύνατόν φασιν εἰς γραῦν μεταβαλεῖν τὴν ἰδέαν τὴν Ἀφροδίτην καὶ νοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλένην τὴν τῆς θεᾶς δειρήν, κ. τ. λ.*; schol. Por., E 7, speaking of the flame from

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[1] *ἐπιτιμήματα*, i. e., fault-finding objections, are not identical with *προβλήματα*, questions or doubts requiring solution. The former always imply a decision unfavorable to the poet, as is seen in the use of the term and its cognate verb in the Poetics; cf. c. XIX, 1456 b 14–19, *οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται . . . . τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά," τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι φησὶν ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν.* Cf. c. XXV, 1460 b 33–36, 1461 b 1–8; XXII, 1458 b 5–7.

[2] For an estimate of *ἀδύνατα*, cf. Poet. IX, 1451 a 36 ff.; XXIV, 1460 a 26–28; XXV, 1460 b 24, 1461 b 10, 11; and see Teichmüller, p. 137 ff., and Butcher, p. 157 ff., on their place in Aristotle's theory of poetry.

[3] Cf. p. 28.

the head and shoulders of Diomede, *ἀδύνατον τοῦτο· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἔζησεν ὁ οὕτω καιόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τῶν ὤμων;* cf. schol. Por., Γ 144, Γ 379, 80, Δ 105, Δ 491, H 9, Θ 555, K 11, K 447, *a* 284, *ζ* 221.

Poetry may use with confidence impossible elements, if it make them appear natural and credible (c. IX, c. XXIV, 1460 a 26). Hence, if it be objected that the thing represented is impossible, the poet can answer *ἀδύνατον μὲν, πιθανὸν δέ,* appealing to the standard of correctness in his art. Accordingly, right here can originate a correct *ἐπιτίμημα,* and this is an objection against the *πιθανόν,* against the *εἰκός.* Words or actions objected to on this score are regarded,

II. *ὡς ἄλογα,*[1] as 'irrational,' 'improbable.'

The *ἄλογον* is frequently mentioned in the Poetics: in c. XV, 1454 b 6–8, *ἄλογον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τῆς τραγῳδίας, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι τῷ Σοφοκλέους* (cf. c. XXIV, 1460 a 28); in c. XXIV, 1460 a 13, *μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον;* and in c. XXIV, 1460 a 35 sq., as an example of the *ἄλογον,* is cited the putting out of Odysseus by the Phæacians on the shores of Ithaca (*ο* 119 sq.), which contains irrational elements veiled by the poetic charm with which the poet invests the narration. Also the pursuit of Hektor already mentioned (c. XXIV, 1460 a 11 ff.).

Of the many instances of *ἄλογα* in the scholia, most worthy of mention are:

Schol. Por., Γ 236, *διὰ τί τὴν Ἑλένην πεποίηκεν ἀγνοοῦσαν περὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὅτι οὐ παρῆσαν, δεκαετοῦς τοῦ πολέμου ὄντος καὶ αἰχμαλώτων πολλῶν γινομένων; ἄλογον γάρ, κ. τ. λ.,* explained by Aristotle and Herakleides.

Schol. Por., A 399, *τί ποτε ἄρα βουλόμενος ταῦτα ἔπλασε πολὺ ἔχοντα τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ἀνάρμοστον, εἴ γε Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἥρα καὶ Ποσειδῶν ἐβούλοντο συνδῆσαι τὸν Δία, ἡ μὲν θυγάτηρ οὖσα οἱ δὲ ἀδελφοί.* Cf. schol. Por., A 62, 63, A 420, Γ

[1] Teichmüller, p. 138 ff.; Vahlen, p. 293 ff.; Butcher, p. 163 ff., p. 363.

122, Γ 315, 16, Γ 365, E 341, E 741, M 25, δ 1, θ 564, ι 240, κ 190, χ 412, ω 1.

III. ὡς *βλαβερά*,[1] 'as morally hurtful.'

Strange to say this term occurs nowhere else in the Poetics, seldom if at all as a source of objection in the scholia. Yet the *βλαβερόν* is indicated in certain passages where depravity of character (*πονηρία, μοχθηρία*) is censured because introduced without an inner necessity demanding it: c. xv, 1454 a 28–9, *ἔστιν δὲ παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἤθους μὴ ἀναγκαῖον οἷον ὁ Μενέλαος ὁ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ*; c. xxv, 1461 b 19 ff., *ὀρθὴ δ' ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγεῖ, ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου*. Art commits a fault if it injure morality.

The *βλαβερά* of this passage is the *βλαβερά* of Plato, Rep. 391 E, whose criticisms are mainly from the moral standpoint. Cf. schol. Por., Ω 527 ff., *μέμφεται τὴν δόξαν Πλάτων* (resp., II, p. 379 D) *λέγων, ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἀγαθὸν βλαβερόν, ὃ δὲ μὴ βλαβερὸν οὐδὲ βλάπτει κ. τ. λ.* Aristotle's point of view, on the other hand, is ever aesthetic, even when considering the morality requisite in poetic characters. Yet, as Butcher shows, the aesthetic ideal of character in the Poetics implies a high though not a perfect morality.

IV. ὡς *ὑπεναντία*,[2] as 'contradictory.'

τὸ ὑπεναντίον has been badly rendered 'the inconsistency,' since *τὸ ἀδύνατον* and *τὸ ἄλογον* are likewise inconsistencies, the former with the truth, the latter with probability. It never expresses simply the contradictory to truth or probability; when such is the case the dative must be added (as 1461 b 3, *ὑπεναντίον τῇ οἰήσει*) or the relation understood unequivocally from the connection. Where *ὑπεναντίον* stands alone it expresses inconsistency with the special representation, whether

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[1] Teichmüller, p. 140 ff.; Butcher, c. v, p. 200 ff.

[2] Teichmüller, p. 144 ff.; Vahlen, p. 383 ff.

it be in the composition of the dramatic action (as in c. XVII, 1455 a 22–26) or in the narration.

A proper conception of the term is derived from a study of its usage in c. XXV, 1461 b 15–19: *τὰ δ' ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται.* Hence *ὑπεναντία* is to be understood as *τὰ ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα* or, as Twining and Vahlen and Butcher prefer, *τὰ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα*, i. e., the inconsistent *as said*, in the words, in the representation made by means of language. Hence in this *ἐπιτίμημα* we have a contrast drawn to *ἄλογα* and *ἀδύνατα* denoting inconsistencies with actuality and probability, as in the *τὰ ὑπεναντίως εἰρημένα* it must be considered 'whether the poet contradicts either what he says himself or what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence.' The correct translation, therefore, of *ὡς ὑπεναντία* is 'as contradictory.'

Instances of *ὑπεναντία*,[1] or 'contradictions' objected to and accounted for, are very numerous in the Homeric scholia: e. g., schol. Por., B 649, *διὰ τί ἐνταῦθα μὲν πεποίηκεν "ἄλλοι θ' οἳ Κρήτην ἑκατόμπολιν ἀμφενέμοντο," ἐν δ' Ὀδυσσείᾳ* (τ 174) *εἰπὼν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ Κρήτη καλὴ καὶ πίειρα καὶ περίρρυτος ἐπά-*

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[1] Certain formulae for the expression of *ὑπεναντία* are present in the scholia.

1. Frequently the contradictory passages are quoted or the substance stated in the formula:

$\left\{\begin{matrix}\pi\hat{\omega}s\\ \delta\iota\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\iota}\end{matrix}\right.$ - - - - *εἰπὼν* - - - - *νῦν φησι*, or in some similar form. Cf. schol. Por., A 194, E 741, K 561, Ξ 200, etc.

2. Certain terms are used to express that passages cited are contradictory, usually some form of *μάχομαι* or of *ἐναντίον*:

(*a*). $\left\{\begin{matrix}\tau\grave{o}\\ \tau o\hat{\upsilon}\tau o\end{matrix}\right.$ - - - - *μάχεται τῷ* - - - - Cf. schol. Por., E 576, quoted above, X 147, etc.

(*b*). $\left\{\begin{matrix}\tau\grave{o}\\ \tau o\hat{\upsilon}\tau o\end{matrix}\right.$ - - - - *μάχεσθαι* - - - - *δοκεῖ τῷ* - - - - Cf. schol. Por., B 844, B 822, Υ 268, etc.

γει· "ἐν δ' ἄνθρωποι πολλοὶ ἀπειρέσιοι καὶ ἐννήκοντα πόληες;" τὸ γὰρ ποτὲ μὲν ἐνενήκοντα ποτὲ δὲ ἑκατὸν λέγειν δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. Solutions from Herakleides and Aristotle follow.

Schol. Por., E 576, τὸ "ἔνθα Πυλαιμένεα ἐλέτην" . . . μάχεται τῷ ἐν τῇ παρὰ νηυσὶ μάχῃ ζῶντι καὶ ἑπομένῳ τῷ παιδὶ Ἀρπαλίωνι· "παρὰ δέ σφι πατὴρ κίε δάκρυα λείβων" (N 658), κ. τ. λ. Cf. schol. Por., Γ 277, E 741, etc.

V. ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην,[1] as 'contrary to artistic correctness.'

The interpretation of this, the fifth source of ἐπιτιμήματα, has presented great difficulty to certain commentators. Twining and Vahlen do not see how it could be identified with objections against the poetic art as such. If such were meant, says Vahlen, ἀδύνατα and ἄλογα are also offences against the poetic art, and, as G. Hermann actually proposed, παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην might be expected. And Twining offers the objections: (1) that κατὰ συμβεβηκός will be entirely omitted in the enumeration; (2) that the twelve λύσεις, shortly to be treated, will not meet the ἐπιτίμημα, as bad imitation admits of no answer; and (3) that it makes the four preceding ἐπιτιμήματα not essential but accidental faults. Accordingly they both understand it as referring to the correctness, not of poetry itself, but of other arts, which may be incidentally treated in poetry, thus to a

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(*c*). δοκεῖ μάχεσθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁ ποιητής; e. g., schol. Por., H 9.

(*d*). ὡς μαχόμενα λέγοντος; e. g., schol. Por., Υ 234.

(*e*). { τὸ / τοῦτο } - - - - ἐναντίον τῷ - - - - e. g., schol. Por., B 848, A 3, B 266, etc.

(*f*). { τὸ / τοῦτο } - - - - ἐναντίον - - - - { φαίνεται / δοκεῖ } τῷ; e. g., schol., A 3, B 649, λ 239, etc.

(*g*). ἐναντία ἑαυτῷ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει; e. g., schol., Z 265, A 52, etc.

(*h*). Note the terms ἐναντιολογία (schol. Por., B 649, Ξ 200), ἐναντίωμα (schol. Por., B 649 and Ξ 200) and διαφωνία, διαφωνεῖν (schol. Por., Z 265, 488, Φ 388–90).

[1] Vahlen, p. 388; Twining, vol. II, N. 261; Teichmüller, p. 146.

technical correctness, to the inaccurate in respect of some special art. So too, Butcher.

Teichmüller, on the other hand, understands the phrase as referring to objections against the art of poetry itself. He justifies the distribution of the *ἐπιτιμήματα*, by distinguishing the fifth from the first two *εἴδη*. He shows that the *ἄλογα* and *ἀδύνατα* cannot always be considered as incompatible with good imitation as *ἀδύνατα* are admissible if the artist knows how to deceive us with our own mistaken conclusions, and even *ἄλογα* are allowed, if possible not on the stage, but yet in what precedes the action; and in this the Epos has much greater freedom than tragedy. In this view I accord with Teichmüller.

The *παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην* is treated fully in the earlier section of the chapter, 1460 b 13–33, which explains what is meant by artistic correctness. By the various expressions, *μιμήσασθαι < ἥμαρτε δ' ἐν τῷ μιμήσασθαι δι' > ἀδυναμίαν,—αὐτῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία,—ἁμάρτημα . . . . καθ' ἑαυτήν,—εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν,—παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην,*— Aristotle means to indicate all such faults as are incompatible with good imitation—that is, in his view, with good poetry. Hence all cases of *ἀδύνατα, βλαβερά*, etc., which do not meet the end of poetry, and all instances of censure of the poetical *technique* of the Epos and other poetry, fall naturally under this head.

Of the latter class the scholia furnish examples not a few, some bearing the name of Aristotle, and no doubt many a good observation in the scholia touching on technical questions in the poetry of the Epos is derived from the *ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά* of Aristotle and his followers.

Certain of these scholia exhibit a terminology with which we are already familiar in the Poetics in the treatment of *ἦθος* in the representations of poetry.

(*a*). *τὸ ἀνώμαλον*, 'the inconsistent in character.'

In the schol. Por., Ω 559 ff. (fr. 168, ed. Teubner), in which passage Achilles addresses Priam in harsh terms, we read:

Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ Ἀχιλλέως ἦθος. Römer[1] thinks rightly that Aristotle does not mean by this to censure the poet, but in defending the character of Achilles, perhaps against Plato (*Hippias Minor*, 370 A), he explains that Homer has represented Achilles, as far as concerns ἦθος, from the first to the last book, perfectly correctly: namely, ἀνώμαλον τὸ ἦθος. It is what is emphasized in Poet., c. XV, 1454 a 25: τέταρτον δὲ τὸ ὁμαλόν· κἂν γὰρ ἀνώμαλός τις ᾖ ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων καὶ τοιοῦτον ἦθος ὑποτιθείς, ὅμως ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι. Aristotle accordingly understands the ἦθος of Achilles as ὁμαλῶς ἀνώμαλον.[2] Eustathios' observation on the passage (p. 1365) seems to justify this view: σημείωσαι δὲ ὅτι Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς φασιν οἱ παλαιοί, ἀνώμαλον εἶναι τὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἦθος συνάγει, ὃς τὰ πρῶτα μειλιχίοις δεξιωσάμενος τὸν ἱκέτην Πρίαμον, εἶτα λεοντωθεὶς οἷον, ὡς δηλοῖ τὸ "λέων ὣς ἅλτο θύραζε" (572) . . . . συνάγεται δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἄστατον καὶ ἐν τῇ ἁ ῥαψῳδίᾳ καὶ ἐν ταῖς Λιταῖς. Cf. A 169, I 357, I 619–650. It seems evident, therefore, that Aristotle solved an ἀπορία based on the inconsistent character of Achilles in the above mentioned manner.

(*b*). τὸ ἀπρεπές,[3] the improper or unbecoming in character, is not expressly mentioned in c. XXV, but it is hinted at in the reference to the current stories concerning the gods (1460 b 35–6; cf. schol. Por., A 211, B 8, Δ 4, Υ 67). Aristotle's conception of τὸ ἀπρεπές is to be understood from c. XV, where 'propriety' is mentioned as one of the four requisites of char-

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[1] Römer: Die Homercitate und d. Homerischen Fragen d. Aristoteles, p. 297 ff.

[2] It would be well for modern separatists of the Homeric poems to take to heart the discrepancies which Sokrates, in the *Hippias Minor*, discovers in the words and actions of Achilles, and to weigh well Aristotle's solution of the difficulties they suggest.

[3] Römer (p. 308) forcibly brings out the treatment of ἀπρεπῆ by the Alexandrian grammarians, and ascribes most of the passages in the scholia, in reference to the πρέπον, to the Alexandrian time. The employment of Aristotelian λύσεις to so many of them bespeaks an earlier date.

acter: δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα· ἔστιν γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁρμόττον γυναικὶ οὕτως ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι (1454 a 22–24). Two examples of character, inappropriate and incongruous (ἀπρεποῦς καὶ μὴ ἁρμόττοντος), are mentioned, on which see Twining, vol. I, p. 144[6]. Accordingly, as propriety of character is a prime requisite of good imitation, τὸ ἀπρεπές may appropriately be classified under ὡς παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην. Its application in the scholia is extensive. See, for example:

Schol. Por., B 183 (fr. 143, ed. Teubn.): ἀπρεπὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὴν χλαῖναν ἀποβαλόντα μονοχίτωνα θεῖν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα διὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, καὶ μάλιστα οἷος Ὀδυσσεὺς εἶναι ὑπείληπται. φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, κ. τ. λ. Cf. schol. Por., E 778, Ath., v. 6, p. 188[e], for other ἀπρεπῆ treated by Aristotle.

Schol. Por., B 8 ff.: ἀπρεπὲς δὲ τὸ λέγειν πανσυδίῃ· "νῦν γάρ κεν ἕλοι Τρώων πόλιν εὐρυάγυιαν" (v. 12). τὸ γὰρ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν Δία αἱρήσειν μέλλοντα τὴν πόλιν ἄτοπον, κ. τ. λ. Cf. schol. Por., A 18, A 31, A 42, A 211, B 82, Δ 4, E 778, I 186, I 203, I 453, I 591, γ 72, ζ 244, θ 78, ι 5, λ 489, ω 192.

Akin to ἀπρεπές is the term ἀσύμφορον, 'inexpedient,' which occurs occasionally in the scholia. See e. g., schol. Por., Υ 67: τοῦ ἀσυμφόρου μὲν ὁ περὶ θεῶν ἔχεται καθόλου λόγος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀπρεποῦς· οὐ γὰρ πρέποντας τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν μύθους φησίν· κ. τ. λ. Cf. schol. Por., Λ 405, Z 234, ι 106, etc.[1]

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[1] τὸ ἄτοπον, 'the odd,' 'the absurd,' a term occurring frequently in the Poetics and in the scholia, seems to be used to characterize any variation from the necessary and the probable, and is in consequence often used in conjunction with ἄλογον, ἀπρεπές, etc. It occurs in the chapter in connection with the incident of Ikarios: τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε τὰ περὶ Ἰκάριον· οἴονται γὰρ αὐτὸν Λάκωνα εἶναι· ἄτοπον οὖν τὸ μὴ ἐντυχεῖν τὸν Τηλέμαχον αὐτῷ εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθόντα (1461 b 4–6). And in c. XXIV, in the discussion of the wonderful and the irrational in Epic poetry, Aristotle adds: ἂν δὲ θῇ καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογωτέρως, ἐνδέχεσθαι [sc. δεῖ] καὶ ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἄλογα τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἀνεκτὰ δῆλον ἂν γένοιτο, εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιητὴς ποιήσειεν· νῦν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἀφανίζει ἡδύνων τὸ ἄτοπον (1460 a 35–b 2) (cf. Butcher, p. 163). Cf. schol. Por., ν 119: τὴν τῶν Φαιάκων

III.

The Λύσεις.

In the brief summing up at the close of the chapter, Aristotle states that the number of λύσεις considered is twelve,[1] and that they should be sought under the heads above mentioned. The precise determination of the twelve meant, has given the editors trouble, as is seen in the attempts of Hermann,[2] Twining, Susemihl, and Ritter, who is followed by Teichmüller and Vahlen. Twining, referring to the number twelve, aptly remarks: "The reader who regards his own ease will, I believe, do well to take this for granted."

ἀτοπίαν, καθ' ἣν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα καθεύδοντα μὴ διυπνίσαντες εἰς τὴν γῆν κατέθεντο τοῦ τε Ὀδυσσέως τὸν ἄκαιρον ὕπνον διαλύειν πειρώμενος ὁ Ποντικὸς Ἡρακλείδης φησὶν ἀτόπους εἶναι τοὺς ἐξ ὧν εἴρηκεν ὁ ποιητὴς μὴ στοχαζομένους περὶ τοῦ παντὸς τρόπου τῶν Φαιάκων κ. τ. λ.

The term frequently occurs in Aristotelian προβλήματα, e. g., schol. Por., B 649, treating the ἐναντίον in passages about Crete, ... Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐκ ἄτοπόν φησιν, εἰ μὴ κ. τ. λ. Cf. schol. Por., Δ 297, ι 106. See further, schol. Por., Δ 297, Z 129, I 167, I 453, I 591, Π 7, etc.

Other scholia touching upon technical questions in poetry are as follows:

Schol. Por., B 73 (fr. 142, ed. Teubn.): διὰ τί ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων ἀπεπειρᾶτο τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ οὕτως ἔπραξεν ὥστε ὀλίγου τὰ ἐναντία συμβῆναι ἢ ἐβουλεύετο; καὶ τὸ κώλυμα ἀπὸ μηχανῆς· ἡ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ ἐκώλυσεν· ἔστι δὲ ἀποίητον τὸ μηχάνημα λύειν ἄλλως εἰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μύθου. φησὶ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ποιητικὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τὰ εἰωθότα γίνεσθαι καὶ ποιητῶν μᾶλλον τὸ κινδύνους παρεισάγειν κ. τ. λ. Cf. Poet., XV, 1454 a 37–b 5.

Schol. Por., τ 467 ff.: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ, φασὶν, ἐπιλαμβάνεται τοῦ τοιούτου ἀναγνωρισμοῦ, λέγων ὡς ἄρα κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πᾶς οὐλὴν ἔχων Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν. κ. τ. λ. Cf. Poet., c. XV, 1454 b 25. See further, schol., N 521, Ξ 1, Π 25, Π 152, Σ 125, Σ 245, Τ 108, Χ 165, Ω 221, Ω 527, θ 100, θ 267, μ 3, 4, for passages, probably of Peripatetic origin, touching upon the art of Homer.

[1] αἱ δὲ λύσεις ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀριθμῶν σκεπτέαι, εἰσὶν δὲ δώδεκα, 1461 b 24, 5.

[2] G. Hermann, Comm. ad Poet., p. 189; Twining, vol. II, N. 262; Susemihl, Poet. Anm., p. 349; Ritter, p. 287; Teichmüller, p. 155; Vahlen, p. 390.

In the following classification, I differ at two important points with Ritter and agree most closely with Twining, who, out of sixteen possible solutions, thinks that the twelve which are adopted in this paper are most probably the twelve meant by Aristotle.

Aristotle expressly refers to the general propositions previously considered, as premises from which the answers are to be derived: *ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα ἐν τοῖς προβλήμασιν ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκοποῦντα λύειν* (1460 b 21, 2). Hence the *λύσεις* of the chapter range themselves naturally under the following heads:

A. *Λύσεις from a consideration of artistic correctness.*

First to be considered are solutions for *ἐπιτιμήματα* affecting the poetic art itself (*πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην*, 1460 b 22).

I. The *End of Poetry*.[1] When something impossible is represented, it is an error; but yet the fault may be justified, if the end of the art be thereby attained. This Aristotle finds in the pleasurable astonishment, the heightened wonder (*τὸ θαυμαστόν*) proper in a peculiar degree to epic poetry; the fault is justified if the presence of the *ἀδύνατον* makes the passage containing it more marvellous (*ἐκπληκτικώτερον*). The instance cited by Aristotle is the pursuit of Hektor (Il., X 105 ff.), treated in c. XXIV as an *ἄλογον*, which on the stage would appear highly improbable and ludicrous, but in the epic narrative is powerfully imaginative.

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[1] 1460 b 23 ff.: *< εἰ > ἀδύνατα πεποίηται, ἡμάρτηται, ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει, εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους τοῦ αὐτῆς, τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται, εἰ οὕτως ἐκπληκτικώτερον ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο ποιεῖ μέρος. παράδειγμα ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος δίωξις, κ. τ. λ.* Cf. c. XXIV, 1460 a 11–18: *δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι' ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαστόν, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα, ἐπεὶ [τὰ] τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἕκτορος δίωξιν ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα γελοῖα ἂν φανείη, οἱ μὲν ἑστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δὲ ἀνανεύων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔπεσιν λανθάνει. τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ.*

Schol. Por., X 205: *Μεγακλείδης πλάσμα εἶναί φησι τοῦτο τὸ μονομάχιον. πῶς γὰρ τοσαύτας μυριάδας νεύματι Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀπέστρεφεν;* Vahlen, p. 356 ff.; Butcher, p. 163 ff.

With the 'End of Poetry' I would identify the phrase, *πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν*, occurring in 1461 b 9, 10: *ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν . . . δεῖ ἀνάγειν*, and offer in confirmation the Aristotelian schol., Γ 236 (fr. 147, ed. Teubn.), *. . . οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἔργου ἦν ἡ τούτων μνήμη, κ. τ. λ.*

Yet, adds Aristotle, this justification of a fault through an appeal to the end of poetry is only a proper one when a like effect could not have been produced by other means, for, if it is possible, no fault at all should occur.

II. To the *Accidental* (*πρὸς συμβεβηκός*)[1] is to be referred all technical inaccuracies as regards other arts and sciences present in the poem. This refers to the distinction, already established, between essential and accidental faults in poetry. In answer to an objection one can raise the question, in which does the fault consist (*ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα*)—in something affecting the art, i. e., the *μίμησις*, or in something only accidental to the *μίμησις*. It is a less error not to know that a doe has no horns than to paint one inartistically.

An excellent illustration of this is found in c. XIX, where Aristotle, after saying that a knowledge of the figures of speech belongs to the art of declamation and to the masters of that science, continues: *παρὰ γὰρ τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν ἢ ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐπιτίμημα φέρεται ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς· τί γὰρ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἡμαρτῆσθαι ἃ Πρωταγόρας ἐπιτιμᾷ, ὅτι εὔχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπὼν "μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά;" τὸ γὰρ κελεῦσαι φησὶν ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπίταξίς ἐστιν. διὸ παρείσθω ὡς ἄλλης καὶ οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ὂν θεώρημα* (1456 b 13–20). On the rhetorical significance of this objection of Protagoras, see A. J. P., XIII, pp. 399, 433.

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[1] 1460 b 29–32: *ἔτι ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἢ κατ' ἄλλο συμβεβηκός; ἔλαττον γὰρ εἰ μὴ ᾔδει ὅτι ἔλαφος θήλεια κέρατα οὐκ ἔχει ἢ εἰ ἀμιμήτως ἔγραψεν.* Vahlen, p. 358. On *τὸ συμβεβηκός* in Aristotle, see Butcher, p. 169.

B. Λύσεις *from a consideration of the objects of imitation.* The solutions following, introduced by πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, are derived from a consideration of the objects of representation. As the poet, being an imitator, endeavors to represent either (1) actual events, or (2) current traditions and belief, or (3) poetic ideality, if the objection is based on one of the three, the explanation is to be derived from one of the other two.

III. To *Poetic Truth*,[1] or the ideality peculiar to poetry, the appeal is made in case a representation is censured as being not true to fact. The expression here used, ἀλλ' ἴσως <ὡς> δεῖ[2] is identical in meaning with οἷα εἶναι δεῖ[3] (1460 b 11), οἵους δεῖ sc. εἶναι (b 34), βέλτιον (b 36), and πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον (1461 b 10), all of which are intended to signify the principle of ideal truth in poetry, emphasized by Aristotle in c. IX and elsewhere. The δεῖ sc. εἶναι of these expressions, the 'ought to be,' and the βέλτιον, 'the better,' are to be taken in the aesthetic, not in the moral sense; and while a high degree of morality is demanded in poetic characters it is viewed by Aristotle purely from the aesthetic point of view. So Sophokles asserts that he represents men as they ought to be; Euripides men as they are.

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[1] 1460 b 32–35: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπιτιμᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἴσως δεῖ, οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷοι εἰσίν, ταύτῃ λυτέον. Butcher, p. 153 ff.

[2] ἀλλ' ἴσως <ὡς> δεῖ scil. εἶναι, a conjecture of Vahlen's.

[3] The passages here cited for βέλτιον and οἷα δεῖ are synonymous with βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς (c. II, 1448 a 4; cf. a 12, c. XV, 1454 b 9)—βελτίους . . . . τῶν νῦν (c. II, 1448 a 18)—καλλίους (c. XV, 1454 b 11); cf. schol. Por., Γ 236 (fr. 147, ed. Teubn.), φησὶ μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοτέλης . . . . ὅπως τὸ ἦθος βελτίων φανῇ κ. τ. λ.; and with οἷοι εἰσίν, in the remark of Sophokles, are to be compared οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, 1460 b 10, ἀληθῆ, b 36, and τοιούτους sc. καθ' ἡμᾶς, and ὁμοίους of c. II (1448 a 5, 6, etc).

On the observation of Sophokles, see Twining, N. 237; Vahlen, p. 359; Butcher, p. 343. From a study of the synonymous phrases I agree with Vahlen in understanding εἶναι with οἵους δεῖ, rather than ποιεῖν which Butcher wishes. As the 'ought' is the 'ought' of aesthetic obligation in either case, the distinction in meaning is slight whichever word be understood.

IV. To *Current Legends and Popular Belief*[1] an appeal is made in case the representation is censured as being neither idealistic nor true to fact. *οὕτω φασίν* of this passage is synonymous with *οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ* (1460 b 10), *πρὸς τὴν δόξαν* (1461 b 10) and *πρὸς ἃ φασιν* (1461 b 14), all of which are intended to express the traditional legends and established opinions of people in general, proper subjects for poetic treatment because they gain ready credence. For instance, objection was made to the stories of the gods told by the poets. These, explains Aristotle, are neither higher than reality nor true to fact, but yet men say so and believe so, and the poet is perfectly right in accommodating himself to the popular belief. The principle here laid down receives striking confirmation in the scholia. Fault was found with T 108 ff., where Hera demands an oath from Zeus: . . . *τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον μυθῶδες · καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ταῦτά φησιν* Ὅμηρος, *οὐδὲ γινόμενα εἰσάγει, ἀλλ' ὡς διαδεδομένων περὶ τὴν Ἡρακλέους γένεσιν μέμνηται. ῥητέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ μῦθος εἰκότως εἰσάγει τὴν* Ἥραν *ὁρκοῦσαν τὸν Δία . . . οὕτως* Ἀριστοτέλης (fr. 163, ed. Teubn., schol. Por., T 108).

As we have seen, the tales concerning the gods were regarded as *ἀπρεπῆ* (cf. schol. Por., Υ 67, Σ 489). This *λύσις*, accordingly, is the object of appeal in cases of *ἀπρεπῆ*, of *ἀδύνατα* (*τὸ ἀδύνατον . . . πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν*, 1461 b 10) and of *ἄλογα* (*πρὸς ἃ φασιν τἄλογα*, 1461 b 14).

V. To *Real Events*,[2] or to *Custom*, an appeal is made in case the poetic idealization of a representation is questioned. The phrase *ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν* is synonymous with *οἷα ἦν ἢ*

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[1] 1460 b 35 ff.: *εἰ δὲ μηδετέρως, ὅτι οὕτω φασίν · οἷον τὰ περὶ θεῶν· ἴσως γὰρ οὔτε βέλτιον [οὔτε] λέγειν οὔτ' ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ' ἔτυχεν ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης · ἀλλ' οὖν φασι.* Vahlen, p. 359; Butcher, p. 165 ff.

[2] 1461 a 1–4: *τὰ δὲ ἴσως οὐ βέλτιον μέν, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἶχεν, οἷον τὰ περὶ τῶν ὅπλων, "ἔγχεα δέ σφιν Ὀρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος·" οὕτω γὰρ τότ' ἐνόμιζον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν Ἰλλυριοί.* Cf. Eustath., 1477, 9: *Ὅμηρος γὰρ ἔθη καταλέγει οὐ μόνον ὅσα πολιτείας ἐστὶν ἀστείας καὶ ἐπηκριβωμένης καὶ ἐμβριθοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα ἐπεχωρίαζε τοῖς τότε.*

ἔστιν of 1460 b 10, and with οὕτω . . . τότ' ἐνόμιζον below. This appeal to what actually takes place is intimately connected with the Aristotelian law of probability or necessity, as is evident from Poet., c. IX, 1451 b 16–19: *αἴτιον δ' ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι τὸ δυνατόν· τὰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γενόμενα οὔπω πιστεύομεν εἶναι δυνατά, τὰ δὲ γενόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι δυνατά, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο, εἰ ἦν ἀδύνατα.*

The example cited is Iliad., K 152 f., *ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρος ἐλήλατο,* 'but their spears were driven into the ground erect on the spikes of the butts,' referring to the arms of the comrades of Diomedes, and the scholia to the passage make clear the nature of the objection (fr. 160, ed. Teubn.): *φαύλη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρας στάσις· καὶ δὴ πανταχοῦ θόρυβον ἤδη πεποίηκε νύκτωρ ἓν μόνον πεσόν. λύει δ' Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος οἷα ἦν τότε. ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ οἷάπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις· πολλοὶ δὲ οὕτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων.* Hence it was regarded as poetically bad (*φαύλη = οὐ βέλτιον* of the *Poetics*) that the lances were placed near the sleeping warriors with the butt-end on the earth, as the sudden falling of one of them would arouse nightly disturbance and confusion. Perhaps true, says Aristotle, but such was the custom at that time, just as now among the Illyrians.

Other Aristotelian *ἀπορήματα* contain *λύσεις* based upon a consideration of the *οἷα ἦν τότε* or *ἔθος*. Thus in schol. Por., K 194 (fr. 159, ed. Teubn.), Aristotle raises the question why the leaders were represented as deliberating in council outside the wall when it was possible to deliberate inside in safety, and answers his own question as follows: . . . *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκὸς ἦν ἀποκινδυνεύειν τοὺς Τρῶας οὕτ' ἐπιτίθεσθαι νύκτωρ· οὐ γὰρ τῶν εὐτυχούντων ἦν ἀποκινδυνεύειν, ἔπειτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ καὶ καθ' ἡσυχίαν βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν τηλικούτων ἔθος. κ. τ. λ.* Further, in response to the objection that Achilles dragged Hektor around the tomb of Patroklos, contrary to the custom with respect to the dead, . . . *ἔστι δὲ λύειν, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀνάγοντα ἔθη, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ Θετταλίᾳ περιέλκουσι περὶ τοὺς τάφους,*

schol. Por., Ω 15, 16 (fr. 166, ed. Teubn.); cf. schol. Por., Ψ 269 (fr. 164, ed. Teubn.). Cf. schol. Por., Γ 281 : . . . *ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς μιμητὴς ὢν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐποίει, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ μέλλοντα.*

In the *προβλήματα* of the scholia this appeal to the custom receives a technical designation, *ἐκ* or *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους* or *ἔθει*, and is a source of appeal for the removal of difficulties in passages censured as containing:

1. *ἀδύνατα*, schol. Por., Γ 379, E 7, K 11, K 447, ζ 221.
2. *ἀπρεπῆ*, schol. Por., B 8, I 203, γ 72.
3. *ὑπεναντία*, schol. Por., B 827, Δ 2, *κ* 103, 4.
4. *ἄτοπα*, schol. Por., Δ 297.

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς,[1] κ. τ. λ.

Following the treatment of the five λύσεις thus far considered, and finding its immediate occasion in what has been said of the *οἷα δεῖ*, is a general observation which indicates the proper method of testing the artistic merit of the speech or actions ascribed to a poetic character, the conformity of the imitation to the end of poetry : *περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἢ εἴρηταί τινι ἢ πέπρακται οὐ μόνον σκεπτέον εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πεπραγμένον ἢ εἰρημένον βλέποντα εἰ σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα <ἢ>*[2] *πρὸς ὃν ἢ ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, οἷον εἰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γένηται,<ἢ> μείζονος κακοῦ ἵνα ἀπογένηται*, 1461 a 4–9.

Twining, Teichmüller, Vahlen and Butcher would have this remark refer solely to the morality of the poetic representation, and Teichmüller and Vahlen, following Ritter, consider it a λύσις to be applied exclusively to *βλαβερά*.

This is a faulty conception of the passage which is justified neither by the *Poetics* nor by the scholia. A proper under-

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[1] Twining, vol. II, N. 239; Teichmüller, p. 154; Vahlen, p. 361 ff.; Butcher, pp. 201, 207.

[2] Examination of numerous applications in the scholia, in which *τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα* (cf. schol. Por., A 42, B 649, Z 265, etc.) and *πρὸς ὃν*<sc. *εἴρηταί τινι ἢ πέπρακται*> (schol. Por., H 229, *θ* 564, λ 489, etc.) show themselves to be distinct objects of appeal, leads me to accept this emendation made by Dr. C. W. E. Miller to meet the requirements of the sense of the passage.

standing of the thought here expressed can only be gained by a study of certain technical expressions it contains, by a comparison with passages of similar import occurring elsewhere in the *Poetics*, and by tracing its application in *ζητήματα* of the scholia.

1. The terms *περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς* and *σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον* must be interpreted with the aid of the rest of the *Poetics*.

(*a*). *καλῶς* is used repeatedly by Aristotle to express the aesthetic correctness of a poem or any of its special features; e. g., c. I, 1447 a 9, 10: *καὶ πῶς δεῖ συνίστασθαι τοὺς μύθους, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ἕξειν ἡ ποίησις;* c. VIII, 1451 a 22–24: *ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικεν καλῶς ἰδεῖν ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν;* c. XIII, 1453 a 12: *ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον ἁπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ διπλοῦν;* c. XIV, 1453 b 25–27: *αὐτὸν δὲ εὑρίσκειν δεῖ καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις χρῆσθαι καλῶς. τὸ δὲ καλῶς τί λέγομεν, εἴπωμεν;* c. XXIV, 1459 b 11–13: *ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς· οἷς ἅπασιν Ὅμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς.* Cf. schol. Por., E 778: *καλῶς τῶν βουλομένων λαθεῖν τὰ ἴχνη περιστεραῖς εἴκασεν· ἀφανῆ γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ ἴχνη, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης;* cf. Soph., Elench., XXVI, 181 a 2. For Aristotle's definition of *τὸ καλόν*, see Rhet., I, 7, 1364 b 27, IX, 1366 a 33.

Further, note the phrases: *ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία* (1453 a 21), *αἱ κάλλισται τραγῳδίαι* (1453 a 19), *καλλίστη δὲ ἀναγνώρισις* (1452 a 33), *καλλίους μύθους* (1452 a 12), *τὸ μὲν φαίνεται καλὸν τὸ δ' εὐτελές* (1458 b 22). For Aristotelian terms expressing moral goodness and its opposite, cf. c. XIII, 1452 b 34: *τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας;* b 36, 7: *τοὺς μοχθηρούς;* 1453 a 2: *τὸν σφόδρα πονηρόν;* c. XV, 1454 a 15, 16: *περὶ δὲ τὰ ἤθη . . . πρῶτον ὅπως χρηστὰ ᾖ.*

Hence it is evident that Aristotle uses *καλός* and its adverb *καλῶς* to express conformity to the aesthetic ideal of poetry, and not primarily in a moral sense.

(*b*). *σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον.*[1]

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[1] On the significance of *σπουδαῖος* and *φαῦλος*, see Teichmüller, vol. II, p. 172 ff.; Butcher, p. 210 ff.

The adjectives *σπουδαῖος* and *φαῦλος*, in addition to their ethical sense (c. II) and the extension of their usage to express ideal and vulgar characters in poetry (c. III, 1448 a 27; c. V, 1448 b 35, etc.) and representations serious and light (c. VI, 1449 b 24–28), are also used in a purely aesthetic sense, to express that which is excellent, or the reverse, in its kind, and that too, of objects either animate or inanimate. The following passages show this:

C. V, 1449 b 17: *διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγῳδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν, κ. τ. λ.*, 'tragedy good and bad,' in the purely aesthetic sense.

C. IX, 1451 b 36: *τοιαῦται δὲ ποιοῦνται ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν φαύλων ποιητῶν δι' αὐτούς, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς.*

C. XXIV, 1460 a 37: *εἰ αὐτὰ φαῦλος ποιητὴς ποιήσειεν.*

C. XXVI, 1461 b 31: *οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταί.*

C. XXVI, 1462 a 9: *εἶτα οὐδὲ κίνησις ἅπασα ἀποδοκιμαστέα εἴπερ μηδ' ὄρχησις ἀλλ' ἡ φαύλων.*

Schol. Por., K 152 ff., already cited: *φαύλη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ τῶν δοράτων ἐπὶ σαυρωτῆρας στάσις*, where *φαύλη* can signify only 'poetically bad.'

2. The passage must be studied in conjunction with other passages.

Thus, in c. IX, 1451 b 8–10, after stating that it is the poet's business to relate not actual occurrences (*τὰ γενόμενα*), but what might occur (*οἷα ἂν γένοιτο*), Aristotle continues: *ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μέν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.* And in c.XV, 1454 a 33–37, after stating the four requisites in respect of character, *χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων συστάσει, ἀεὶ ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός, καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός.* Also c. XXV, 1461 b 19: *ὀρθὴ δ' ἐπιτίμησις καὶ ἀλογίᾳ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ, ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ . . . ἢ τῇ πονηρίᾳ.*

These passages emphasize that poetic characters should say and do what is, according to necessity or probability, right they

should say or do. Accordingly, in the light of the *Poetics*, I render the passage under consideration as follows:

"Again, in examining whether what has been said or done by some one is poetically good or not, we must not look merely to the particular action or speech, and ask whether it is poetically good or bad (*σπουδαῖον ἢ φαῦλον = καλὸν ἢ μὴ καλόν*). We must also consider by whom it is done or said, or with reference to whom (*πρὸς ὅν*), or when (*ὅτε*), or in whose interest (*ὅτῳ*),[1] or for what end (*οὗ ἕνεκεν*); whether, for instance, for the sake of gaining some greater good or averting some greater evil."

Speech or action, the observation teaches, must be interpreted in the light of all the circumstances—the persons, the occasion, the end it is designed to serve; and if, from a study of these, the speech or action shows itself to be in accordance with necessity or probability, then its artistic excellence—and this is ever supreme with Aristotle—is assured. Morality enters into consideration only as implied in the aesthetic ideal.

3. That this interpretation is correct is evident from certain scholia containing explanations of Aristotle, in which the relativity emphasized in the above remark is made the ground of explanation. In all these passages objection is made to some speech or action as falling short of the *σπουδαῖον* or the *βέλτιον*, and Aristotle invalidates the various objections by showing that what was said or done was what, according to necessity or probability, ought to have been said or done, appealing to one of the features specified—the *τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα* or the *πρὸς ὅν*, or the *ὅτε* or the *ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν*.

In schol. Por., H 93 (fr. 156, ed. Teubn.), it is enquired why Menelaos, at first so eager to fight, was afterwards not among the nine who presented themselves for single combat: *. . . φησὶ δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅτι ἅπαξ ἀκούσας "μηδ' ἔθελ' ἐξ ἔριδος σεῦ ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχεσθαι" Ἕκτορι"* (v. 111) *οὐκ ἔμελλεν αὖθις ἀνίστασθαι, . . . καὶ ὅτι ἤδη μονομαχήσας ἐτύγχανεν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἀπαλλάξας, καὶ νεωστὶ ἐτέτρωτο ὑπὸ*

[1] On the sense of *ὅτῳ*, see Vahlen, p. 362.

Πανδάρου, καὶ ὅτι ἀποκινδυνεύειν τοῦτον οὐκ ἐχρῆν ἐν ᾧ τὸ τέλος ἤρτητο τοῦ πολέμου. Here we have an appeal to the τὸν πράττοντα and the ὅτε in answer to a charge of cowardice made against Menelaos.

Again, schol. Por., η 258 (fr. 178, ed. Teubn.), in response to the inquiry why Odysseus did not accept immortality when offered him by Kalypso: . . . Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς Φαίακάς φησι ταῦτα λέγειν Ὀδυσσέα, ἵνα σεμνότερος φαίνηται καὶ μᾶλλον ἄλλων σπουδάσαι πάντων τὸν νόστον· συνέφερε γὰρ αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ θᾶττον ἀποσταλῆναι, κ.τ.λ. In this is an appeal to the οὗ ἕνεκεν, οἷον εἰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ, ἵνα γένηται.

Finally, in schol. Por., μ 374, 75 (fr. 149, ed. Teubn.), it is enquired why the poet who says that Helios sees everything and hears everything, should represent him as needing a messenger to inform him about his oxen (μ 374, 75): . . . λύων δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, . . . ἁρμόττον ἦν εἰπεῖν οὕτως τόν τε Ἀγαμέμνονα, ὁρκίζοντα ἐν τῇ μονομαχίᾳ ὅτι "Ἥλιος, ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις," καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους λέγοντα . . . . . κ.τ.λ. Here we have an appeal to the ὅτε and the πρὸς ὅν in answer to a ὑπεναντίον. See further schol. Por., H 229, θ 564, Z 265, π 188.[1]

When we consider the further application of this principle of relativity in the scholia, we find that it is usually employed in answer to strictures on the speeches and actions of Homeric heroes, and that the τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα < ἢ > πρὸς ὅν and the ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, κ. τ. λ., have separated and a technical designation has been given to the application of each—

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[1] I do not consider the observation one of the twelve λύσεις, as Ritter and Teichmüller and Vahlen, for the following reasons: (1) It is not illustrated by an example, as the λύσεις proper are without exception; (2) it accords in manner of statement rather with the general remarks (ὅλως δέ, 1461 b 9 ff.) at the close of the chapter, especially the remark concerning τὰ ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα, than with any of the special λύσεις; (3) in its general import and in its application in the scholia, it appeals to the first λύσις of the End of Poetry, or to the third λύσις of Poetic Truth or aesthetic idealization in the imitation of characters of the higher type.

to the first *ἐκ* or *ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου* or *προσώπῳ*, to the second *ἐκ* or *ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ* or *καιρῷ*.

(*a*). *Ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου.*

The appeal to the *τὸν πράττοντα ἢ λέγοντα<ἢ>πρὸς ὅν* is closely interwoven with the Aristotelian doctrine of *μίμησις*. It studies the appositeness of speeches and actions to the persons in any way involved, and in this manner is appealed to for the explanation of *ἀπρεπῆ*, *ἄλογα* and *ὑπεναντία*. Thus the *ἀπρεπές* that Odysseus should speak of good cheer and feasting as the *summum bonum*, *λύεται . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου· πρὸς οὓς λέγει, αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ φάσκοντες "αἰεὶ δ' ἥμιν δαίς τε φίλη κίθαρίς τε χοροί τε"* (*θ* 248), schol. Por., *ι* 5.

And in schol. Por., Δ 2, the *ὑπεναντίον* seen in representing both Ganymede and Hebe as cup-bearers of the gods (Δ 2, Υ 234), is solved: *προσώπῳ δέ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ποιητοῦ λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἐξ Αἰνείου, ὃν εἰκὸς μεγαλύνειν τὸ αὐτοῦ γένος.*

Ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου is used for the solution of:

ἀπρεπῆ, schol. Por., A 42, *ζ* 244, *ι* 5, *λ* 489.

ἄλογα, schol. Por., Γ 122, M 25, *χ* 412.

ὑπεναντία,[1] schol. Por., B 649, Δ 2, Z 265, Z 488, Ξ 434, Ψ 71, Ω 527, etc.

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[1] In the treatment of *ὑπεναντία*, *ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου* received a special development, as is indicated by the following passages:

Schol. Por., Z 265 (assigned by Schrader, Epileg., p. 191, to the Peripatetics, and evidently from Aristotle himself): *. . . οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστὸν εἰ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ἐναντία λέγεται ὑπὸ διαφόρων φωνῶν. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐξ ἰδίου προσώπου, ταῦτα δεῖ ἀκόλουθα εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις· ὅσα δὲ προσώποις περιτίθησιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων νοεῖται, ὅθεν καὶ ἐπιδέχεται πολλάκις διαφωνίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις.*

Schol. Por., Z 488 (evidently from the same source): *. . . ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ποιητοῦ οἱ λόγοι, ἐκ προσώπων δὲ διαφόρων εἰς μίμησιν παραληφθέντων. ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ λέγει πρὸς Ἀνδρομάχην ὁ Ἕκτωρ, ποτὲ δὲ ὁ Ζεύς· διαφωνεῖν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα οὐδὲν ἀπεικὸς τὰ διάφορα πρόσωπα.*

Schol. Por., B 649: *. . . Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐκ ἄτοπόν φησιν, εἰ μὴ πάντες τὰ αὐτὰ λέγοντες πεποίηνται αὐτῷ· οὕτως γὰρ καὶ ἀλλήλοις τὰ αὐτὰ παντελῶς λέγειν ὤφειλον.*

(*b*). Ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ.

καιρός,[1] which signifies literally 'precision,' 'the instinct of drawing a line, as it were, at the right place,' has in it, beyond the mere time element, an element expressing measure, seasonableness, appropriateness, opportuneness. It is the term which most fully designates the 'Hellenic obedience to the sense of fitness or measure.' Ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, accordingly, is an apt phrase to express the study of the ὅτε ἢ ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, κ.τ.λ., in the criticism of aesthetic correctness in the actions and speeches of poetic characters.

We have already observed how the fundamental notions in καιρός, the ὅτε and the ὅτῳ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκεν, were appealed to by Aristotle in the explanation of difficulties. In other λύσεις of the scholia, not ascribed by name to Aristotle, they also play a great rôle under the technical designation ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, at one time the 'time' element being the source of appeal, at another the occasion. For instance, the ὑπεναντίον treated in schol. Por., B 848, that Pyraichmes is here announced as general of the Paionians, while in Φ 140 Asteropaios is their leader is explained: τῷ καιρῷ· τὸν γὰρ Ἀστεροπαῖον οὐκ ἀπεικὸς χρονίζοντος τοῦ πολέμου ἐλθεῖν ἄγοντα πάλιν τινὰς τῶν Παιόνων, where the 'time' is the ground of explanation. Cf. schol. Por., Δ 2, Υ 329, μ 374. And the ἀπρεπές that Phoinix should tell the story of his intercourse with his father's concubine is explained by some ἀπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ, ὅτι τὰς παλλακίδας διαβάλλει πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἕνεκα τῆς Βρισηΐδος χαλεπαίνοντα, schol. Por., I 452. Cf. schol. Por., A 18, A 31.

The varied application of ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ is shown by the following:

Schol. Por., μ 3, 4: . . . οὐ μόνον δέ ἐστι βίαιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον τῷ ποιητῇ· οὐ γὰρ παραδίδωσιν ὁ Ὅμηρος τοὺς ἥρωας ἐπισταμένους, ὅτι ἐξ Ὠκεανοῦ αἱ ἀνατολαὶ τοῦ ἡλίου, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου τὸ τοιοῦτον παρέδωκεν, κ. τ. λ.

Cf. schol. Por., Ξ 434, θ 63, ι 275, 76.

[1] 'Es ist also überhaupt der rechte Moment, *momentum rei* d. h. das worauf es ankommt, was den Anschlag gibt, was man richtig trifft.' Schmidt, Syn. d. Griech. Sprache, II, 44, 9.

1. ἄλογα explained ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ, schol. Por., A 420, Γ 315, 16, Γ 365, K 194, M 25.
2. ἀπρεπῆ, schol. Por., A 18, A 42, I 186, I 203, I 453, I 591, ι 5, λ 489.
3. ὑπεναντία, schol. Por., B 848, Δ 2, γ 20, γ 147, μ 374.
4. An ἀδύνατον, schol. Por., Γ 379.
5. An ἄτοπον, schol. Por., I 591.
6. An ἀσύμφορον, schol. Por., Υ 67 ff.

C. Λύσεις *from a consideration of the means of representation.*

Other objections, proceeds Aristotle, must be solved by a consideration of the linguistic expression.[1] Here the λέξις, laid down in the general εἴδη as the means of representation, finds its application. There are various λύσεις classified under λέξις, and a greater fullness of examples is offered than has heretofore been given. Why this should be so is evident from the scholia, where the interpretation of the linguistic expression shows itself to have been the readiest and most frequently applied means for the solution of προβλήματα. The technical designation of this solution is ἐκ τῆς λέξεως and similar forms. Vahlen[2] confines its application to one of the ἐπιτιμήματα, the ὑπεναντίον, in its two phases, as expressing the contradictory to something the poet himself says or the contradictory to 'what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence.' That this is a mistaken view is evident by its varied application in the scholia, where ἐκ τῆς λέξεως is used to explain:

1. ἀδύνατα, schol. Por., Γ 144, Δ 105, Δ 491, E 7, H 9, Θ 555.
2. ἄλογα, schol. Por., A 62, Γ 121, Γ 365, E 341, M 25, χ 412.
3. ὑπεναντία, schol. Por., A 3, B 844, Δ 105, E 576, Ξ 434, O 189, ζ 221, η 54, η 64, ι 25, μ 374.
4. ἀπρεπῆ, schol. Por., A 31, A 42, A 211, B 8, B 82, E 778, I 453, ι 5.
5. ἀσύμφορα, schol. Por., Z 234, Λ 405, ι 106.
6. ἄτοπα, schol. Por., Δ 297.

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[1] 1461 a 9, 10: τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν. Cf. Soph. El., c. IV, 165 b 23. [2] Beitr., p. 363.

These passages supplement the illustrations of the various λύσεις in the *Poetics*, which Aristotle treats in the following order (1461 a 9–b 10):

VI. Γλώττῃ,[1] i. e., *a solution based on the acceptance of a rare term, the antique or dialectical meaning of a word.*

Of this, three examples are offered: 1. To the objection to A 50, οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον, as shown by the scholia, that Apollo's arrows should first hit mules and dogs and afterwards the men, Aristotle offers the possible explanation that οὐρῆας has here not its usual sense of 'mules,' but its rare sense (γλώττῃ) of 'sentinels.' 2. Objection was made to K 316 (where Dolon, who presents himself to perform Hektor's commission, is described, "ὃς δή τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός, ἀλλὰ ποδώκης"), most probably on the ground that, as swift-footedness would presuppose a symmetrical bodily structure, the line presented an inconsistency. Aristotle offers the odd explanation that the expression did not signify ill-shaped in body, but ugly in visage, for the Cretans use the word εὐειδές, 'well-favored,' to denote a fair face—thus understanding εἶδος not as a κύριον ὄνομα, but as a γλῶττα. 3. I 202 ff. offers a third example, where Achilles, after receiving his unexpected guests, gives the command to Patroklos:

> μείζονα δὴ κρητῆρα, Μενοιτίου υἱέ, καθίστα,
> ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε, δέπας δ' ἔντυνον ἑκάστῳ, κ. τ. λ.

The objection made to this is evident from the scholium, which contains an explanation practically the same as that of the *Poetics*: ἀπρεπές· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ κῶμον ἥκουσιν ἀκρατότερον διδόναι παρακελεύεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως λύουσι· τὸ

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[1] 1461 a 10–16: *οἷον γλώττῃ "οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον·" ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας, καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα "ὅς β' ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός" οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸ "ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε" οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ θᾶττον.*

γλῶττα has been treated in c. xxi, 1457 b 4 ff.

γὰρ ζωρότερον εἶναι τάχιον. Aristotle removes the difficulty by understanding 'ζωρότερον' not as ἄκρατον, but as θᾶττον, a rare use of the term. Cf. Plut., Symp., v, 4.

VII. Κατὰ μεταφοράν,[1] i. e., *a solution by an appeal to metaphor.*

Aristotle offers two illustrations of explanations by means of metaphor: τὸ δὲ κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, οἷον "ἄλλοι μέν ῥα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες Εὗδον παννύχιοι·" ἅμα δέ φησιν "ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωικὸν ἀθρήσειεν, Αὐλῶν συρίγγων θ' ὅμαδον·" τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ < τοῦ > πολλοί κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν πολύ τι· καὶ τὸ "οἴη δ' ἄμμορος" κατὰ μεταφοράν, τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον, 1461 a 16–21.

In the first illustration there exists much confusion. The second of the citations, ἦ τοι ὅτ' ἐς πεδίον, κ. τ. λ., is read K 11 ff., of which Aristotle cites only so much as is important for his purpose, while the first is found in B 1 ff., the unnecessary epithet ἱπποκορυσταί being purposely omitted. On this account Vahlen[2] holds that Aristotle could only have meant the beginning of K when he quoted the similarly sounding beginning of B.[3]

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[1] The term μεταφορά, as used by Aristotle, included every transfer of a word from its natural sense. Cf. c. XXI, 1457 b 6 ff.: μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. The four forms mentioned in this passage are included, in a general way, in the figures adopted by later rhetoricians in addition to metaphor, viz.: synecdoche, metonymy, katachresis and metalepsis. Synecdoche corresponds roughly to the first two—embracing metonymy, which stands for many uses of the second,—metalepsis represents the third, katachresis the fourth. Volkmann recognizes only the last of Aristotle's divisions as true metaphor. See Volkmann, Rhetorik d. Griechen u. Römer, p. 417 ff.; Blass, Hermeneutik und Kritik, p. 193.

[2] Beitr., p. 365 ff.

[3] Römer, p. 278 ff., who shows that Aristotle cited Homeric passages from memory, and, following Spengel, that σφάλματα μνημονικά are no rarity in his writings, cites an interesting parallel to the above case by a comparison

Now between the beginning of K and the verses 11 ff., there is absolutely no inconsistency to be recognized; and, even if the first lines of B, undoubtedly cited by Aristotle, be understood, there is nothing in them to which the solution *τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοί κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται* can answer, as no *πάντες* is present in the text.

After rejecting certain attempts to remove the difficulty, Vahlen says there remain two views worthy of consideration—either Aristotle wrote *πάντες μέν ῥα θεοὶ, κ. τ. λ.*, and *ἄλλοι* has crept from the Homeric into the Aristotelian text, or the solution *τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοί, κ. τ. λ.*, refers not to the passages cited, but to another citation, which, along with the solution of the first citations, has been lost from the Aristotelian text. Vahlen inclines to the former view, that the Homeric *ἄλλοι* has displaced *πάντες* written by Aristotle, the restoration of which brings clearness and coherence into the passage. Christ and Butcher, following Gräfenhan, adopt *πάντες* in their texts.

I cite in confirmation of Vahlen's view schol. Por., Ξ 304, which gives evidence of Peripatetic origin: . . . . *ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰπὼν ὅτι πάντες ἐκάθευδον—"ἄλλοι μὲν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἀριστῆες Παναχαιῶν εὗδον παννύχιοι"* (K 1)—*ὅμως ποιεῖ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐγρηγορότα καὶ τὸν Μενέλαον—"οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕπνος ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἔπιπτεν"* (K 25)—*οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ πλείστου τὸ πάντας ἠκολουθηκέναι τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ Διὶ εἴρηκεν.*

The formula *τὸ γὰρ πάντες ἀντὶ <τοῦ> πολλοί* occurs frequently in the scholia in explanation of *ὑπεναντία*, as e. g.:

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of Pol., III, 14, 1285 a 9 ff., and Nikom. Eth., III, 11, 1116 a 34. In the latter passage, *ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ*

> *"ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω*
> *οὗ οἱ . . . . .*
> *ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας,"*

Aristotle has cited B 391 ff., when he meant to cite O 348 ff.

1. Schol. Por., Ξ 304, treating the *ὑπεναντίον* between A 424 and A 104: .... *καὶ διὰ τί φήσας πάντας τοὺς θεοὺς εἰς Αἰθιοπίαν ἐληλυθέναι, "θεοὶ δ' ἅμα πάντες ἔποντο," τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φησιν ἐλθεῖν παρὰ τῆς Ἥρας πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα; μήποτε δὲ συλληπτικῶς εἴρηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πλείστου τὸ πᾶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰπὼν ὅτι πάντες ἐκάθευδον, κ.τ.λ.*

2. Schol. Por., *μ* 374, 75[1] (fr. 149, ed. Teubn.): *μ* 374 ff., representing long-robed Lampetia bearing word to Helios about the slaughter of his kine, is considered *ἐναντίον* to *Ἠέλιός θ' ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις*, Γ 277, as he ought to know it without being informed, *λύοιτο δ' ἂν . . . τῇ λέξει· τὸ γὰρ πάντα δηλοῖ τὰ πλεῖστα.*

3. Schol. Por., O 189 ff.: Referring to Poseidon's account of the division of territory between Zeus, himself and Hades (O 189 ff.), *δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὸ πάντα ("τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται," O 189) τὸ "γαῖα δ' ἔτι ξυνὴ πάντων" (O 193)· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι πάντα δέδασται τούτων μὴ δεδασμένων. λύοιτο δ' ἂν τῇ λέξει· .... ἀντὶ τοῦ πλεῖστα· συνεχῶς γὰρ τὸ πάντα ἐπὶ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τίθεται· ὡς εἰ ἔλεγεν· τὰ πλείονα μεμέρισται πλὴν γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔτι κοινά.*

4. Schol. Por., Ξ 434: *ἐναντίον δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα μὲν φάναι "Ξάνθου δινήεντος, ὃν ἀθάνατος τέκετο Ζεύς," ἅμα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ φάναι (Φ 196)· "ἐξ οὗπερ πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θάλασσα." λύοιτο δ' ἂν ἐκ τῆς λέξεως καθ' ἑκάτερα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάντες δύναται λέγειν ἀντὶ τοῦ πλείους, κ.τ.λ.*

5. Schol. Por., B 649 (fr. 146, ed. Teubn.): The contradiction in the statements concerning Crete in B 649 (*Κρήτην ἑκατόμπολιν*) and *τ* 174 (*ἐν δ' ἄνθρωποι πολλοὶ ἀπειρέσιοι καὶ ἐννήκοντα πόληες*) receives, among others, the explanation: *μήποτε δὲ καὶ μεταφορά ἐστι τὰ ἑκατόν, ὡς ἐκ "τῆς ἑκατὸν*

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[1] On the Peripatetic nature of this passage of the scholia, see Schrader, Epileg., p. 184, n. 1.

θύσανοι" (B 448)· *οὐ γὰρ ἑκατὸν ἦσαν ἀριθμῷ . . . . . ἤτοι οὖν ἐκεῖ τὸ ἑκατόν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κεῖται, ὡς "τῆς ἑκατὸν θύσανοι."*[1]

A second example of a difficulty removed by means of a metaphorical explanation is offered by Σ 489, where it is said of the Bear which, along with other stars, Hephaistos wrought in the shield of Achilles:

οἵη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο.

The scholia show the nature of the objection: . . . *κατηγοροῦσι μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν περὶ τῆς Ἄρκτου λόγον φάσκοντος "οἵη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο," καθόλου γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀρκτικῷ μὴ δύνειν*—a censure of Homer's ignorance of astronomy, in asserting as true of the Bear alone what is true also of other stars. Aristotle explains that *οἵη*, 'alone,' is to be understood as used metaphorically for that which is best known, for the best known may be called the only one (*τὸ γὰρ γνωριμώτατον μόνον*).

Other solutions in the scholia based on an appeal to metaphor are as follows: 1. *ὑπεναντία*, schol. Por., Δ 105–111, E 576, E 741, P 125; 2. *ἀδύνατα*, schol. Por., E 7, K 11.

VIII. Κατὰ *προσῳδίαν*, i. e., *a solution by a change in accent or breathing.*

The examples under *προσῳδία—κατὰ δὲ προσῳδίαν, ὥσπερ Ἱππίας ἔλυεν ὁ Θάσιος τὸ "δίδομεν δέ οἱ" καὶ "τὸ μὲν οὖ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ,"* 1461 a 21–23—are treated more fully, without mention of the name of Hippias, in Soph. El., c. IV, 166 b 1 ff.[2]

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[1] Cf. Poet., 1457 b 11 ff.: [*μεταφορὰ*] *ἀπ' εἴδους δὲ ἐπὶ γένος "ἦ δὴ μυρί' Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐσθλὰ ἔοργεν·" τὸ γὰρ μυρίον πολύ ἐστιν, ᾧ νῦν ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλοῦ κέχρηται.*

Schrader, Epileg., p. 182, accepts the view of Römer (p. 287), that Aristotelica continue through this explanation. It is worthy of note that Ἡρακλείδης *μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλοι* are mentioned earlier in the scholion, and that the explanation quoted accords with the Peripatetic schol. K 252: . . . *ἄλλοι δέ φασιν ἔθος ἔχειν τοὺς ποιητὰς τῷ ἀπηρτισμένῳ χρῆσθαι ἀριθμῷ, κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Παρὰ *δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ῥᾴδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιήμασι μᾶλλον, οἷον καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔνιοι διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα "Τὸ μὲν οὖ καταπύθεται*

The first expression, *δίδομεν δέ οἱ*, as the Soph. El. shows, must have referred to the beginning of B, and Vahlen concludes that in Aristotle's copy of Homer was read in B 15, *Ἥρη λισσομένη, δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.* To this passage objection was made that Zeus appears as a liar and a deceiver, and Hippias sought to set this aside, 'acumine artibus Loyolae digno,'[1] by the change of accent from *δίδομεν* to *διδόμεν*, an infinitive used as an imperative; so that Zeus only commands the dream to entice Agamemnon with vain hopes, etc. Through this cunning artifice the blame is rolled off the shoulders of Zeus on the *ὄνειρος*.

As to the second example, it is evident from the Soph. El. that some took exception to the awkwardness (*ἀτόπως*) of the expression *τὸ μὲν οὖ* (= *οὖ τὸ μέν*) in Ψ 328—*ἔστηκε ξύλον αὖον . . . τὸ μὲν οὖ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ*—and Hippias overcame this by changing the *οὖ* into *οὐ*, and this gained for the passage a proper sense. Worthy of note for the conception of *προσῳδία*, as showing that it includes also a change in breathing, is Soph. El., 177 b 3. See, also, 169 a 27, 177 b 35, 179 a 14, quoted by Vahlen, p. 368 f.

IX. *Διαιρέσει*, i. e., *a solution by a change in punctuation.*

A related point of view is the solution through *διαίρεσις*, i. e., through punctuation, the separation or grouping of words. Vahlen cites, as clarifying its meaning, Soph. El., 166 a 35, 177 b 10 ff.; Rhet., II, 24, 1401 a 24 ff., III, 9, 1409 b 10 ff.

The example cited in the *Poetics* (1461 a 23–25) is a verse of Empedokles: *τὰ δὲ διαιρέσει, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς "αἶψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα Ζωρά τε πρὶν κέκρητο"* (Mullach, fr. 202). On the variants in citations of this passage and the *ἐπιτίμημα* here to be understood, see Vahlen, p.

ὄμβρῳ." λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσῳδίᾳ, λέγοντες τὸ οὔ ὀξύτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλλετο διδόναι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν ἐστίν.

[1] Wolf, Proleg., c. CLXVIII.

370 f. It turns on the possibility of understanding one of two punctuations—either *θνήτ' ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα ζωρά τε, πρὶν κέκρητο,* or *θνήτ' ἐφύοντο τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατα, ζωρά τε πρίν, κέκρητο.* It is clear how, through different union and separation of the words, the sense of the passage is very considerably varied.

We see from the *λύσεις κατὰ προσῳδίαν* and *διαιρέσει* that some difficulties were removed not by interpretation of the terms or phrases causing the difficulty, but by some change in the traditional text.

Whatever may be our views as to *ἡ ἐκ νάρθηκος ἔκδοσις*, there is abundance of evidence in the scholia (e. g., Φ 252, ε 334, κ 176, etc.) and elsewhere that Aristotle made critical comments[1] on the text of Homer, and that in this he was followed by the Peripatetics (e. g., schol. Dind., M 231, T 62, Ψ 94, ζ 106). Hence it is not out of place to cite here certain *ἐπιτιμήματα* treated in scholia betraying Peripatetic influence, to which are given explanations based on a criticism of the text, in a manner similar to those treated under *προσῳδία* and *διαίρεσις*.

1. In the scholia to Σ 489, *οἵη δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο*, already considered (p. 45), we read: *κἂν διαιρῆται δὲ οἱ, εἶτα "ἡ δ' ἄμμορός ἐστι λοετρῶν Ὠκεανοῖο," κατὰ λέξιν ἡ λύσις ὑπάρχει.*

2. Schol. Por., ε 334 (fr. 171, ed. Teubn.): . . . *ζητεῖ γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, διὰ τί τὴν Καλυψὼ καὶ τὴν Κίρκην καὶ τὴν Ἰνὼ αὐδηέσσας λέγει μόνας · πᾶσαι γὰρ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι φωνὴν εἶχον · καὶ λῦσαι μὲν οὐ βεβούληται, μεταγράφει δὲ ποτὲ μὲν εἰς τὸ αὐλήεσσα, ἐξ οὗ δηλοῦσθαί φησιν ὅτι μονῳδοὶ ἦσαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Ἰνοῦς οὐδήεσσα · κ.τ.λ. . . . . ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐδήεσσαν γράφει, οἱονεὶ ἐπίγειος. οὕτως καὶ Χαμαιλέων.*

See further schol. Por., A 63, λ 239, for the treatment of certain cases of *ὑπεναντία* by textual criticism.

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[1] La Roche, Hom. Textkritik, Leipzig, 1886, pp. 7–49; Ludwich, Aristarchs Hom. Textkritik, Leipzig, 1884, I, p. 67.

X. Ἀμφιβολίᾳ, i. e., *a solution by a study of the ambiguity of an expression.*

Closely related to διαίρεσις is ἀμφιβολία, the next method of solution mentioned: τὰ δὲ ἀμφιβολίᾳ, "παρῴχηκεν δὲ πλέω νύξ" · τὸ γὰρ πλείω ἀμφίβολόν ἐστιν, 1461 a 25 f.

On the usage of ἀμφιβολία in dialectic, see Soph. El., c. IV, 166 a 6 ff.; and on its close connection with διαίρεσις, Topica, 145 b 22–30. The distinction between διαίρεσις and ἀμφιβολία is that διαίρεσις indicates such ambiguity as arises from the different senses of a passage due to different punctuation, while ἀμφιβολία is the ambiguity arising from the different senses of which two or more words are capable in consequence of their grammatical relations.

The passage quoted is from K 251 ff.:

> ἀλλ' ἴομεν · μάλα γὰρ νὺξ ἄνεται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς
> ἄστρα δὲ δὴ προβέβηκε, παρῴχωκεν δὲ πλέων νὺξ
> τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται.

As is shown by the scholia to the passage, the ἐπιτίμημα was the contradiction existing between the last two clauses. Aristotle's explanation is also preserved by Porphyry. It was, in brief, that Homer did not say that more than two parts of the night had passed by, with which the statement that the third part yet remained would be contradictory; the words are rather to be interpreted that, of the two parts (or halves) into which the night falls, the greater part (or the greater half) has passed by, and this indefinite statement of the time is more accurately determined by the additional clause, τριτάτη δ' ἔτι μοῖρα λέλειπται. Hence the πλέων clause is ambiguous, and an objection which is due to an interpretation based on one of the possibilities of meaning is removed by the acceptance of the other possibility present in the ἀμφιβολία.

XI. Κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως, i. e., *a solution by an appeal to the custom of speech.*

The language of the *Poetics*, in which Aristotle states this λύσις, is badly confused, and has presented much difficulty to

commentators. It is given by Vahlen as follows: *τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως · <ὅσα> τῶν κεκραμένων οἰνόν φασιν εἶναι, ὅθεν πεποίηται "κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο," καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους, ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης Διὶ οἰνοχοεύει, οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοῦτό γε <καὶ> κατὰ μεταφοράν*, 1461 a 27–30.[1]

Vahlen, following an early editor, transposes the *ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γαν.* clause to the position after *φασιν εἶναι*, and understands the first clause, 'everything that belongs to the mixed drinks is called (according to the *ἔθος λέξεως*) wine'[2]—which finds its application in the statement—'hence of Ganymede it is said "*Διὶ οἰνοχοεύει*" (Δ 3, Υ 234), although the gods do not drink wine (E 341), but nectar.' Thus, from a consideration of a popular usage of *οἶνον* to embrace all mixed drinks, the statement that Ganymede '*Διὶ οἰνοχοεύει*' is justified as not contradictory with the statement that the gods "*οὐ πίνουσ' αἴθοπα οἶνον*" (E 341).

The clause, *<ὅσα> τῶν κεκραμένων οἰνόν φασιν εἶναι*, as it implies that likewise nectar belongs to the mixed drinks, is inconsistent with the Aristotelian scholium ε 93 (fr. 170, ed. Teubn.): *εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο πίνουσιν οἱ θεοὶ ἢ τὸ νέκταρ* (E 341), *διὰ τί αὐτὸ ἡ Καλυψὼ τῷ Ἑρμῇ κεράσασα δίδωσιν; εἰ γὰρ κεκέρασται σὺν ὕδατι, οὐ μόνον τὸ νέκταρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕδωρ πίνουσιν. καίτοι, φησὶ, ψιλὴν ἀμβροσίαν παρέθηκεν, "κέρασσε δὲ νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν." λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ κέρασσε φησὶν ἤτοι τὸ μῖξαι ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ὑγρῷ δηλοῖ ἢ τὸ ἐγχέαι · ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τὸ κεράσαι. νῦν οὖν τὸ "κέρασσε δὲ νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν" οὐ τὸ μῖξαι δηλοῖ, ἀλλὰ ψιλῶς ἐγχέαι.*

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[1] See, on the interpretation of this passage, Wachsmuth, De Ar. stud. Hom., p. 29 ff., who endeavors to justify the present order, and Vahlen, p. 372 ff. and p. 419 f., who shows the untenableness of Wachsmuth's interpretation and presents many arguments in favor of his own, which is here adopted. Butcher emends, *τῶν κεκραμένων <ἔνια> οἰνόν φασιν εἶναι.*

[2] Cf. Plut. Mor., 140 F.: *ὥσπερ τὸ κρᾶμα, καίτοι ὕδατος μετέχον πλείονος, οἶνον καλοῦμεν, κ. τ. λ.*, which indicates how widespread was this popular usage of *οἶνον*.

Vahlen holds rightly that this inconsistency does not call in doubt either his interpretation of the passage or the Aristotelian origin of the *ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά*, as such a consistency of views is not attempted by Aristotle in the explanation of different passages, and is not to be expected in the problems, which frequently present several solutions of the same difficulty.

The second example of the *ἔθος λέξεως* also presents difficulty: *καὶ χαλκέας τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους* (scil. *φασὶν εἶναι*), to which is joined the citation, *ὅθεν πεποίηται "κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο."* In our treatment of it we follow Vahlen.

The schol. (B) to T 283 have noted the popular usage of *χαλκέας* for workers in iron: *δεδαϊγμένον ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ*: *παλαιὰ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ χαλκὸν ὀνομάζειν τὸν σίδηρον· ἀμέλει καὶ χαλκέας λέγομεν τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους.* One would expect in the application of this popular usage a passage, as the one just cited, in which *χαλκός* or *χαλκεύς* occurs in the sense mentioned. In the example cited by Aristotle, Φ 592, it is at first sight not clear in what the objection lay which is to be removed with the help of the *ἔθος λέξεως*. Yet, if one considers the passage in its connection—

> *ἦ ῥα, καὶ ὀξὺν ἄκοντα βαρείης χειρὸς ἀφῆκε,*
> *καί ῥ' ἔβαλε κνήμην ὑπὸ γούνατος, οὐδ' ἀφάμαρτεν.*
> *ἀμφὶ δέ μιν κνημὶς νεοτεύκτου κασσιτέροιο*
> *σμερδαλέον κονάβησε· πάλιν δ' ἀπὸ χαλκὸς ὄρουσε*
> *βλημένου, οὐδ' ἐπέρησε—*

the objection seems to consist in this: that it is odd for the softer metal of the greaves to ring under the blow of Agenor's brazen spear and for the bronze to rebound from a greave of new wrought tin. Accordingly, Aristotle does not take *κασσίτερος* in its literal sense, but, just as *χαλκεῖς* is used also of workers in iron, so too, by a custom of speech, one could speak of greaves of tin, though they were made of other metal, or at least not of pure tin.

Hence, by a λύσις κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως we are to understand an explanation of a disputed passage which appeals to popular usage, to the custom of speech, in the interpretation of the word or phrase that causes the difficulty.

This λύσις is mentioned in the Soph. El., IV, 166 a 17 ff., and is used in the scholia for the treatment of certain ἐπιτιμήματα—as, e. g.:

1. The ὑπεναντίον that Kalypso should mix nectar for Hermes if the gods drink only pure nectar, treated in schol. Por., ε 93, above quoted. Aristotle removes the difficulty by understanding '*κέρασσε*' not in its literal sense, '*μῖξαι*,' but in a popular sense, '*ψιλῶς ἐγχέαι*.'

2. The ἄλογον found in A 62, ἀλλ' ἄγε δή τινα μάντιν ἐρείομεν ἢ ἱερῆα, in seeking to enquire from a priest concerning future events, as priests were not seers, λύεται . . . ἐκ τῆς λέξεως· τὸν γὰρ νῦν λεγόμενον θύτην ἱερέα φαίνονται καλοῦντες πάλαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἑτέρωθεν (Ω 220), schol. Por., A 62 f.

Cf. schol. Por., η 54 f., and η 64 f.

XII. Ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε or Ὁμωνυμία, i. e., *a solution by an appeal to the various possibilities of meaning in a word.*[1]

After his treatment of κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως, Aristotle continues: δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ὄνομά τι ὑπεναντίωμά τι δοκῇ σημαίνειν, ἐπισκοπεῖν ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, οἷον τὸ "τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος," τὸ ταύτῃ κωλυθῆναι ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται ὠδί, ἢ ὡς μάλιστ' ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι· κατὰ τὴν καταντικρὺ ἢ ὡς Γλαύκων λέγει, κ. τ. λ., 1461 a 31 ff.

This signifies that, if a word causes some inconsistency, one is to examine the various possibilities of meaning in the word or abide by one's first conception of it. The verse cited is from Υ 267 ff., and the objection indicated can be best understood from the connection:

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[1] Cf. Vahlen, Adn., p. 227, Beitr., p. 375.

οὐδὲ τότ' Αἰνείαο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος
ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο·
ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἄρ' ἔτι τρεῖς
ἦσαν, ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε κυλλοποδίων,
τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ' ἔνδοθι κασσιτέροιο,
τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσέην, τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο μείλινον ἔγχος.

Porphyry, in a lengthy scholium to this passage, presents various attempts at solution. The difficulty, according to the scholia, originates in this, that one starts out from the supposition that the gold plate was the outermost one, which would cause *τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο μείλινον ἔγχος* to be inconsistent with what has preceded. Others give up this supposition, and situate the gold plate as the central of the five plates of which the shield was made; then it is easily understood how the lance, after it had broken through two plates, could make a halt at the third, the gold one. As this explanation results from a study of the various possibilities under which the *ἔσχετο* (= *ἐκωλύθη*) in that verse is to be understood, Vahlen considers it final and satisfactory. But this explanation does not remove the whole difficulty. *τῇ ῥ' ἔσχετο* may be understood as meaning 'stuck' or 'was fastened in it,' as the word clearly means in a similar passage, H 248 f. (where, however, it is used with the preposition *ἐν*):

ἓξ δὲ διὰ πτύχας ἦλθε δαΐζων χαλκὸς ἀτειρής·
ἐν τῇ δ' ἑβδομάτῃ ῥινῷ σχέτο.

This sense, however, might lead to a manifest contradiction, for Homer says above not only that the gold stopped it—*χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε*—but still more expressly that the spear penetrated two plates, etc.—*ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ' ἄρ' ἔτι τρεῖς*—implying that the three remained unpierced. But the spear could not well be fixed or fastened in the gold plate, which was the third, without piercing it. Now, if a different sense of *ἔσχετο*, as 'stayed' or 'was held,' be understood, the contradiction is satisfactorily explained, and Aris-

totle's suggestion—to examine the various possibilities of meaning in a word—has been successfully carried out.

Aristotle, in immediate connection with the above, characterizes under the name of Glaukon the precisely opposite methods of many critics, who jump at certain groundless conclusions and, assuming that the poet has said what they happen to think, find fault with anything which seems contrary to their own preconceived suppositions and notions. For example, the question about Ikarios has been treated in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a Lakedaimonian. They think it strange (*ἄτοπον*), therefore, that Telemachos, when he went to Lakedaimon, should not have met his grandfather. But, says Aristotle, the story of the Kephallenians may be the true one, who allege that Odysseus took a wife from among themselves and that her father was Ikadios, not Ikarios. So then, it is merely a mistake that gives plausibility to the objection. Thus Aristotle sets over against an arbitrary assumption another possibility which removes the occasion to censure the poet. The Ikarios incident was much discussed in antiquity, as is evident from schol. Por., δ 1 ff., schol., *o* 16, etc.

Vahlen does not classify the foregoing, which may be briefly styled *ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε*, as a *λύσις*, but regards it as the statement of a general principle of interpretation which, applied exclusively to *ὑπεναντία*, involves the six special *λύσεις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως* which have been just treated. At this point I have been unable to agree with Vahlen and I classify it as the seventh of the special *λύσεις* from the language and the twelfth and last *λύσις* of the chapter. My reasons for so doing are the following:

1. It proposes a method of solution which falls naturally under the head of *λέξις* and which stands in marked distinction to the preceding six *λύσεις*. *ἀμφιβολία* is concerned with the variety of senses in two or more words from their grammatical connection; *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως* regards merely a popular and, therefore, an irregular usage of a term; *ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε* considers which of a variety of the

natural senses of a word is the proper one in the disputed passage.

2. It is illustrated by an example as the eleven λύσεις already considered.

3. It corresponds in its sense and application to ὁμωνυμία, treated and illustrated in Soph. El., IV, 166 a 6 ff., as a λύσις from the language.

4. It is frequently employed in the scholia to explain difficulties, chiefly ὑπεναντία. So, e. g.,

1. Schol. Por., Ξ 434, where Ξάνθου δινήεντος, ὃν ἀθάνατος τέκετο Ζεύς is considered ἐναντίον to Φ 195 f.: Ὠκεανοῖο, ἐξ οὗ περ πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θάλασσα. λύοιτο δ' ἄν, says the scholiast, ἐκ τῆς λέξεως καθ' ἑκάτερα· καὶ γὰρ . . . ποταμὸς ὁμωνύμως λέγεται ὅ τε θεὸς καὶ τὸ ῥεῦμα, ὥστε τὸν μὲν θεὸν ἐκ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ῥεῦμα ἐξ Ὠκεανοῦ.

2. Schol. Por., Z 488. The question was raised, how it is that the same poet who says that μοῖρα cannot be infringed—μοῖραν δ' οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν—yet implies in the Odyssey that it can be—ὡς καὶ νῦν Αἴγισθος ὑπὲρ μόρον Ἀτρεΐδαο γῆμ' ἄλοχον (α 35 f.), and is answered: λύεται δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ δείκνυσθαι ὅτι τριχῶς ἡ μοῖρα παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ λέγεται· ἡ εἱμαρμένη, ἡ μερὶς καὶ τὸ καθῆκον . . . καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν οὖν προκειμένων ἐν μὲν τῷ "μοῖραν δ' οὔ τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν" τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγει, ὅταν δὲ "ὡς καὶ νῦν Αἴγισθος ὑπὲρ μόρον," οὐ τὸ σημαῖνον τὴν εἱμαρμένην λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ καθῆκον.

3. Schol. Por., B 2. Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε νήδυμος ὕπνος seems ἐναντίον to Ζεὺς . . . ἔνθα καθεῦδ' ἀναβάς (Α 609 ff.). λύοιτο δ' ἄν, says the scholiast, κατὰ λέξιν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καθεύδειν ἐνίοτε δηλοῖ τὴν ψιλὴν κατάκλισιν ἐπὶ τῆς εὐνῆς, κ.τ.λ.

See further schol. Por., A 3, Z 265, Ξ 200 for ὑπεναντία; A 211, B 8 for ἀπρεπῆ.

Under ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε are to be classified certain cases where ὁμωνυμία is appealed to in the explanations of contradictions arising from a coincidence in the names of Homeric characters. The incident of Pylaimenes is a famous

one, who is slain in E 576, but yet reappears in N 658, following the corpse of his son Harpalion on its way to sacred Ilium. The scholium Por., E 576, explains as follows: . . . *ἡ δὲ λύσις ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως· καὶ γὰρ ὁ Πυλαιμένης ὁμώνυμος εἶναι δύναται, κ.τ.λ. . . . ἔνιοι τοῦτον* (N 643, 658) *ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τὸν ἐν τῷ* E *ἀναιρεθέντα. "ἔνθα Πυλαιμένεα ἐλέτην ἀτάλαντον Ἄρηϊ ἀρχὸν Παφλαγόνων." ἔστιν οὖν ὁμωνυμία, ἐκείνου μὲν ἄρχοντος ὄντος, τούτου δὲ βασιλέως. πολλαὶ γὰρ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ὁμωνυμίαι, κ.τ.λ.*[1]

Further, in schol. Por., H 9, the poet is accused of contradicting himself in calling Nestor the oldest of the Achaians (A 250), and yet representing Menestheus as the older of the two by two generations (H 8 ff.). He is said to be the son of Areithoos, surnamed Korynetes, and from Nestor's account of the latter's armor (H 124–160), it is considered impossible for his son to be younger than Nestor: . . . *ἡ δὲ λύσις ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως· ὁμώνυμος γὰρ πατὴρ υἱῷ, καὶ ὅταν φησὶν* (H 138) *ὁ κορυνήτης, οὐ τὸν Μενέσθιον λέγει ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἀρηίθοον τὸν Μενεσθίου πατέρα, ὥστε εἶναι τὸν κορυνήτην πάππον τοῦ Μενεσθίου.*

IV.

The remaining section of the chapter (1461 b 10–21), beginning *ὅλως δέ*, contains general observations on the proper treatment of the various *ἐπιτιμήματα*.

In general, proceeds Aristotle, *τὸ ἀδύνατον* is to be referred (1) to the End of Poetry (*πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν*[2]), which is illus-

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[1] As an evidence that explanations of this difficulty were sought prior to the time of Aristarchos, see Aristonikos (Dind., schol. Il., I, p. 133): *ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι Πυλαιμένης περὶ οὗ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐζητήκασιν.*

Kammer (Burs. Jahresb., 1878, S. 71) does not accept the view of A. Schimberg, Analecta Aristarchea, diss. Gryphisw., 1878, who tries to show that Aristarchos made a collection of homonyms in Homer and wrote a special treatise *σύγγραμμα περὶ Πυλαιμένους* to account for this discrepancy. Zenodotos wrote, in N 658, Κυλαιμένεα for Πυλαιμένεα (Dind., Il., I, p. 1; Eustath., 953, 29) to avoid the discrepancy.

[2] In my conception of *πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν*, I agree with Butcher, p. 157[2]. Vahlen (p. 379 f.) maintains that *ἀδύνατον πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν* is a generic

trated below by the observation, *πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν* (cf. c. XXIV, 1460 a 27); or (2) to Poetic Truth (*πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον*) (cf. p. 30), illustrated by the observation, *τοιούτους εἶναι οἷον Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν;* or (3) to Popular Belief (*πρὸς τὴν δόξαν*) (cf. p. 31).

Τὸ *ἄλογον* is to be referred (1) to Popular Belief (*πρὸς ἃ φασιν τἄλογα*); or (2) is to be explained thus: that an *ἄλογον* does not always violate reason, as 'it is probable that a thing may happen contrary to probability.'

Next occurs an observation for the treatment of contradictions: *τὰ δ' ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα* (scil. *ἐστὶν*) *οὕτω σκοπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔλεγχοι* (sc. *σκοποῦσιν*) *εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν* (sc. *τὸν ποιητὴν δεῖ σκοπεῖν*) *ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται,* 1461 b 15–19.[1]

The meaning of *τὸ ὑπεναντίον* has been already considered (p. 21 f.). In the treatment of contradictions in poetry, says Aristotle, one should observe the same procedure as is applied to *ἔλεγχοι* in Dialectic. In this, in order to establish whether the *ἔλεγχος* is actually an *ἔλεγχος*, one must enquire whether the *ἀντίφασις* which the *ἔλεγχος* contains applies to the same object and holds in the same relation and in the same way and manner, and in other respects as indicated by Soph. El., 181 a 3: *τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν ὁρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου . . . ἁπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν,*

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description of the objection, for the removal of which two *λύσεις* are mentioned, (1) *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον*, (2) *πρὸς τὴν δόξαν*. To this view I offer the following objections: (1) *πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν*, as we have seen (p. 29), aptly expresses the general principle of poetic imitation, and therefore may properly be classed with the End of Poetry, the first *λύσις;* (2) "*πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν* for *κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν* (see 1460 b 15 ff.) would be strange, and, side by side with *πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον* and *πρὸς τὴν δόξαν* in a different sense of the preposition, scarcely conceivable;" (3) if it were meant to be understood with *ἀδύνατον*, it would hardly be used alone in the clause below, *πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετώτερον, κ. τ. λ.*

[1] See Vahlen, Adn., p. 233; Beitr., p. 384 ff.

ὅπως ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. Cf. 167 a 26 and 170 a 7.

Just as in sophistical refutations, therefore, so in the treatment of poetic contradictions it should be examined 'whether the same thing is meant' 'in the same relation' and in the same sense. And contradictions are said to be of two sorts, contradictions in statements expressly made by the poet himself (*πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει*) and contradictions to the tacit assumption which a person of intelligence naturally makes (< scil. *πρὸς* > *ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται*).[1] "As in ethics Aristotle assumes a man of moral insight (*ὁ φρόνιμος*), to whose trained judgment the appreciation of ethical questions is submitted, and who, in the last resort, becomes 'the standard and the law' of right," so too here a person of sound intelligence is assumed who is to judge whether discrepancies exist in the poetic narration, though the poet may not in so many words contradict himself. Vahlen compares with the whole thought Soph. El., xv, 174 b 19: *καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν, ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς δοκοῦντας τοιούτους ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους, κ.τ.λ.*

Both Teichmüller[2] and Vahlen connect the lines under consideration with the six *λύσεις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως* and the observation *ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε, κ. τ. λ.*, which we have adopted as a *λύσις*. Vahlen goes so far as to say: "Kurz die verschiedenen Wege der Einzellösung mit Hülfe des sprachlichen Ausdrucks und dessen Erklärung lassen sich wohl unter den allgemeinen zusammenfassenden Gesichtspunkt unterbringen der für die *ὑπεναντία* an dieser Stelle bezeichnet wird." That this view is extreme is very obvious. The *λύσεις* from the language, as is shown by the scholia (see p. 40), are by no

[1] As an example of a *ὑπεναντίον* <*πρὸς*> *ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται*, I would cite schol. Por., Υ 329: *μάχεται τῷ μὴ κατειλέχθαι Καύκωνας ἐν τῷ καταλόγῳ τὸ "ἔνθα δὲ Καύκωνες πόλεμον μέτα θωρήσσοντο," κ.τ.λ.*

[2] Teichmüller, p. 162 f.; Vahlen, p. 383 ff.

means restricted to the treatment of contradictions. Moreover, they arrive at solutions by the study of special words or phrases, while the present observation calls for a study of the relations of the passages seemingly contradictory, so that one may have an accurate appreciation of the situation in each case, of the thought expressed, etc., etc. In fact, the similarity between the suggestion here offered and the observation *περὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς*, which Vahlen falsely recognizes as one of the twelve *λύσεις* (see p. 37[1]), is far more striking than its resemblance to the *λύσεις* from the language.

Hence it is wrong to regard these lines as merely a summary of something which has been said, as a reduction of the *λύσεις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως* to a comprehensive point of view. It is rather the supplementing of methods of solution previously stated, in so far as they are applicable to *ὑπεναντία*, by a general principle of interpretation for the treatment of contradictions. The truth of this is evinced by the fact that this principle of interpretation—namely, study the setting, the relations, the sense of the passages to see whether the alleged contradiction is actually a contradiction—is the basis of certain explanations in the scholia, as the following citations show:

1. Schol. Por., Γ 276 (fr. 148, ed. Teubn.): *διὰ τί βουλόμενος ἐπιορκῆσαι τοὺς Τρῶας ὁ ποιητής, ἵνα εὐλόγως ἀπόλωνται, οὐδαμοῦ πεποίηκεν ἐπιορκοῦντας ἀλλ' οἴεται; ὁ γὰρ ὅρκος ἦν, εἰ Ἀλέξανδρον ἀποκτείνειεν ὁ Μενέλαος, ἀποδοθῆναι τὴν Ἑλένην· οὐκ ἀναιρεθέντος δὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἠδίκουν μὴ ἀποδιδόντες οὐδ' ἐπιώρκησαν. φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅτι οὐδ' ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει ὡς ἐπιώρκησαν, καθάπερ ἐπ' ἄλλων· "ὣς φάτο καί ῥ' ἐπίορκον ὤμοσεν"* (K 332), *ἀλλ' ὅτι κατάρατοι ἦσαν· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς κατηράσαντο εἰπόντες· "Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι, ὁππότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια πημήνειαν, ὧδέ σφ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὡς ὅδε οἶνος"* (Γ 298–300). *οὐκ ἐπιώρκησαν μὲν οὖν, ἐκακούργησαν δὲ καὶ ἔβλαψαν τοὺς ὅρκους· ἐπάρατοι οὖν ἦσαν. ταῦτά τοι καὶ Ἥρα πειρᾶται, κ.τ.λ.*

2. Schol. Por., Δ 2: The poet is accused of making contradictory statements in representing Ganymede as cup-bearer of

the gods in one passage (Υ 234) and in another having Hebe perform that service (Δ 2): . . . *οὐκοῦν λύσομεν ὀνόματι καὶ λέξει, ὅτι οὐχὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διὸς αὐτὸν οἰνοχόον ἀποφαίνει—ἔχει γὰρ ἡ λέξις οὕτως· "τὸν καὶ ἀνηρείψαντο θεοὶ Διὶ οἰνοχοεύειν"* (Υ 234)—*ἡ δὲ "Ηβη τοῖς θεοῖς οἰνοχοεῖ*, evidently Porphyry's own.

3. Schol. Por., B 844: That Akamas and Peiroos are mentioned as leaders of the Thracians (B 844) is taken as contradictory with Λ 221, which intimates that Iphidamas was their king: . . . *ἡ δὲ λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως· οὐ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀκάμαντα πάντας τοὺς Θρᾷκας ἄγουσιν, ἄλλως τε ἐπεὶ εἴρηκεν "ὅσσους Ἑλλήσποντος ἀγάρροος ἐντὸς ἐέργει," ὥστε τῶν ἐκτὸς Θρᾳκῶν καὶ τὸν Ῥῆσον καὶ τὸν Ἰφιδάμαντα δύνασθαι βασιλεύοντας ὕστερον εἶναι βοηθούς.*

See further schol. Por., B 848, Φ 388 ff., γ 147, ζ 221, ρ 291, etc.

There follows a general observation on *ἀλογία* and *μοχθηρία*, which are only justified when poetic necessity requires their presence (1461 b 19–21). This has been already mentioned, pp. 20, 21.

Thus it seems evident that the twenty-fifth chapter of the *Poetics* and the *ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά* of Aristotle and his followers are worthy of more consideration than has heretofore been accorded them. The woof of the former is so closely woven into the warp of the *Poetics* that it is simply impossible to deny its right to be recognized as an important section of this great work on the philosophy of art. And the latter, so far from being merely relics of Peripatetic wit and ingenuity, must be considered, in many cases, serious attempts to meet on aesthetic principles difficulties suggested by learned critics. Hence the Aristotelian element of the Homeric scholia, probably larger than has usually been recognized, may prove of service for the solution of many of the difficult problems suggested by the *Poetics*.

This chapter, in a word, may be said to contain the elements of a systematic treatment of the faults of poetry and of the so-called inconsistencies of Homer. Of these two themes, which demand an aesthetic rather than a philological treatment, I hope to speak in another paper; in this preliminary study I have hardly broken the ground for an adequate consideration of them.

SYNOPSIS OF ARISTO

Λύσ

I. ἡ ὀρθότης τῆς ποιητικῆς τέχνης...
(1460 b 13 ff.)

1. εἰ τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους o
(1460 b 24.)

2. κατὰ συμβεβηκός
(1460 b 13).

..... περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς, κ.τ.
(1460 a 4 ff.)
(which involves λύσεις (1) and (3).)

II. μιμητὴς ὁ ποιητής.....
(1460 b 8 ff.)

3. οἷα εἶναι δεῖ o
(1460 b 11, b 33).

4. οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ o
(1460 b 10, b 35).

5. οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν o
(1460 b 10, 1461 a 2).

III. ταῦτα δ' ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει or ἐκ τῆς λέξεως.....
(1460 b 11 ff.)

εις. Ἐπιτιμήματα.

- πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν (1461 b 9.)
  - a. ἀδύνατα (1460 b 23).
  - b. ἄλογα (1461 b 21).
  - c. βλαβερά (1461 b 21).
  - d. ἀνώμαλα.
- λ... 1. ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου
  - a. ἄλογα.
  - b. ὑπεναντία.
  - c. ἀπρεπῆ.
- 2. ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ
  - a. ἄλογα.
  - b. ὑπεναντία.
  - c. ἀπρεπῆ.
  - d. ἀδύνατα.
  - e. ἄτοπα.
  - f. ἀσύμφορα.
- πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον (1461 b 10.) — ἀδύνατα (1461 b 10, 1460 b 33).
- πρὸς τὴν δόξαν (1461 b 10.)
  - a. ἀδύνατα (1461 b 10).
  - b. ἄλογα (1461 b 14).
  - c. ἀπρεπῆ (cf. 1460 b 36).
- ἐκ τοῦ ἔθους
  - a. ἀδύνατα.
  - b. ἀπρεπῆ.
  - c. ὑπεναντία.
  - d. ἄτοπα.
- .... 6. γλώττῃ (1461 a 10.)
  - a. ἀπρεπῆ.
  - b. ὑπεναντία.
- 7. κατὰ μεταφοράν (1461 a 16.)
  - a. ὑπεναντία.
  - b. ἀδύνατα.
- 8. κατὰ προσῳδίαν (1461 a 22.)
  - a. ἀπρεπῆ.
  - b. ἄτοπα.
- 9. διαιρέσει (1461 a 24.) — ὑπεναντία.
- 10. ἀμφιβολία (1461 a 25.) — ὑπεναντία.
- 11. κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως (1461 a 27.)
  - a. ὑπέναντία.
  - b. ἄλογα.
- 12. ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε or ὁμωνυμία (1461 a 32.)
  - a. ὑπεναντία.
  - b. ἀπρεπῆ.

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