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
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ART IN THEORY

AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF

COMPARATIVE ÆSTHETICS



BY

GEORGE LANSING RAYMOND, L.H.D.

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FORM," "RHYTHM AND HARMONY IN POETRY AND MUSIC,"
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PREFACE.

A PROMINENT Review, in noticing the first book published of this series, entitled "Poetry as a Representative Art," took the author to task, apparently, for not following exclusively that which he by no means ignored,—the prevailing and popular method of Historic Criticism. Had the critic read the book more carefully, he would have had no difficulty in detecting in the course criticized the result of a deliberate purpose. That historic criticism, in the last few decades, has been of vast benefit to truth and to thought of every kind, no one can deny. But it has its limits; and there is no region in which, if applied exclusively, it is fitted to do more harm than in that of æsthetics. Holding that all the products of the arts and all the changes in their general conditions and effects are subject to the laws of development, two of its most prominent propositions are: first, that art is the expression of the spirit of the age in which it appears; and, second, that all art, for this reason, is of interest to the artist. Neither proposition is true. If there be anything which, very often, the higher arts are distinctly not, it is the expression of the spirit of their age. Greek architecture of the fourth century before Christ, and Gothic of the thirteenth after him, may have been this; although even they were developments of what had been originated long before. But all the unmodified examples of Greek or Gothic

architecture produced since then—and at certain periods they have abounded to the exclusion of almost every other style of building—have been expressions not of the age in which they were produced, but of that long past age in which their models were produced. The same in principle is true in all the arts. The forms most prevalent in poetry, painting, sculpture, even in music, are always more or less traditional, determined, that is, by the artists of the past. As, in its nature, the traditional is not essentially different from the historic, it is doubtful whether these conditions will not continue in the direct degree in which, in the study of art, the historic is made to dominate; and it is not at all doubtful whether the criticism calling itself historic is not belying its title when, in a proposition such as has just been stated, the historic fact is ignored that forms, which logically ought to develop according to the spirit of an age, very often, owing to a servitude to conventionality that interferes with a free expression of originality, do not so develop.

If this first proposition fall to the ground, of course the second must. But there are other reasons why this must be the case. The claim of the historian that all art is of interest and deserving of study is not true as applied to the artist as an artist. To him only such art is of interest as has attained a certain high level of excellence, which it is the object of criticism to discover, and which excellence, as we know, has appeared only at certain favored periods. It is worth while to notice, too, as just suggested above, that these periods are not necessarily identical with those that are under the influence of the historic tendency. The effect of this, unless counter-balanced, is to direct attention to forms as forms, not to these as expressions of spirit; or, if so, only of the spirit

of the past. The practical results of such a tendency are, in the first place, as already intimated, imitation, and, in the second place, degeneracy. The nature of the mind is such that it must vary somewhat that which it imitates; and if its variations be not wrought in accordance with the principles underlying the first production of the imitated form, the original proportions of the different parts of this as related to one another are not preserved, and the whole is distorted. For this reason, it is fully as important—to say no more—for the artist to continue to work in accordance with the methods of the great masters as to continue to produce the exact kind of work that they did. And if we inquire into these methods, we shall find that, in art as in religion, philosophy, and science, the one fact which distinguishes not only such characters as Socrates, Aristotle, Confucius, Gautama, Paul, Copernicus, and Newton, but also Raphael, Angelo, Titian, Shakespeare, Goethe, Beethoven, and Wagner, is that they have resisted the influences of traditionalism sufficiently, at least, to be moved as much from within as from without; as much by their own feeling and thinking as by those of others who have preceded them, and whose works surround them; as much, therefore, by that which results from a psychologic method—for we must not forget that there is always a necessary connection between one's method of studying art and of practising it—as by that which follows an historic. In an age when the influence of the latter is so potent that not one in ten seems to be able to detect, even in his own conceptions, the essential differences that separate archeology from art, it is well to have emphasized again, as is done in every period when production is at its best, the importance of the former, *i. e.*, the psychologic method.

So much in explanation of the chief endeavor of this book, which is to get back to the first principles of our subject as revealed in the way in which they manifest themselves in the conditions of mind as related to those of matter.

No comment seems to be required here with reference to the somewhat extended consideration in this volume of the different theories concerning beauty; or with reference to the way in which the conclusion derived from them has been made to meet the prominent requirements of them all; as well as to explain certain of the characteristics of beauty, like complexity, unity, and variety, and certain also of its effects, both physiological and psychical. Everybody will recognize that the treatment of these subjects was simply essential to the completeness of the discussion in hand.

A few words, however, may be in place in order to make more clear the reason for the use of the term *representative* to express the general effect produced by all the art-forms. This term is not a new one, though it has not previously been applied without more limitation. Nor has it been selected in ignorance of the distinction which certain English critics have made between what they call the representative and the presentative arts; but in the belief that this distinction springs from misapprehension, and in its results involves that tendency to error to which misapprehension always leads. The way in which the term came to be chosen was as follows. In order to simplify the task of art-criticism, it seemed important to search for a single word expressive of an effect, the presence or absence of which in any work should determine the presence or absence in it of artistic excellence. This word representative, without any distortion of its most ordinary mean-

ings, was found to meet the requirements. It was found, moreover, that it could be applied to all the art-forms considered in either of the two relations which exhaust all their possibilities; considered, in other words, either as expressive of thought and feeling in the mind of the artist, or as reproducing by way of imitation things heard or seen in the external world. To illustrate this—and from an art, too, which we are told is merely presentative—let one be listening to an opera of Beethoven or Wagner, and desirous of determining the quality of the music as conditioned by its power of expression—how can he do this?—In no way better than by asking: first, what phase of feeling is the music intended to represent; and, second, does it represent what is intended. With equal success, he can use the same questions with reference to the story told in a ballad, the characters delineated in a drama, the events depicted in a painting, the ideal typified in a statue, the design embodied in a building. He can apply the same questions, too, to the forms considered as imitations of things heard or seen. Handel's "Pastoral Symphony," and the music of the Forest Scene in Wagner's "Seigfried" express not only certain phases of feeling, but these as influenced by certain surrounding conditions of external nature; and though, for reasons to be given hereafter, music is the least imitative of the arts, it is not, for this reason, as some have claimed, merely presentative. Such works as have been mentioned must contain at least enough of the imitative element to represent, by way of association, if no more, the supposed surroundings. The same may be affirmed of the accessories or situations in a ballad or a drama; and of the colors, proportions, or natural methods of adapting means to ends in a painting, a statue, or a building.

The term representative, as thus applied, moreover, is appropriate not only in the sense indicated by ordinary usage, but in the specific sense indicated by its etymology. The peculiarity of art, and of all art, is that it not only presents, but literally re-presents ; that is, presents over and over again in like series of movements, metaphors, measures, lines, contours, colors, whatever they may be, both the thoughts which it expresses and the forms through which it expresses them. These facts, however, will be brought out hereafter. They have been mentioned here merely in order to suggest the general conception in which the thoughts of this essay had their origin. That purpose having been accomplished, there is no call for further comment.

PRINCETON, N. J., October, 1893.

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INTRODUCTION.¹

HUMAN intelligence is a manifestation of many different tendencies, but all may be resolved into three,—those having their sources in the understanding, in the will, and in the emotions; and the departments in which mainly the three are respectively expressed are science,—not philosophy, for this is a broader term, derived from a different principle of classification,—religion, and art. Science, as a development of the understanding, begins in observation and tends toward knowledge; religion, as a development of the will, begins in conscience and tends toward conduct; and art, as a development of the emotions, begins in imagination and tends toward sentiment. It must not be supposed, however, though we can thus in conception separate the three departments, that there is ever a time when in practice they fail to act conjointly or mutually to affect one another. When we examine some of the oldest monuments of the world,—like the Pyramids of Egypt,—it is difficult to tell the results of which of the three we are studying. Mathematicians and astronomers say of science; moralists and theologians, of religion; and archæologists and artists, of art. So with the older civilizations of the world,—those of Judæa, Greece, Rome. The physician or the jurist traces in them as many indications of the science

¹ Being an address delivered by invitation before the American Social Science Association, on the occasion of its establishing, in 1898, a department combining "Education and Art."

of the laws of health or government as the ritualist or the rationalist does of the religions of theism or stoicism, or as the litterateur or the critic does of the arts of poetry or sculpture.

The dark ages rendered men equally unable to carry on scientific observations, to recognize the spiritual claims of a human brother, or to reproduce his bodily lineaments. When the Renaissance began to dawn, it is difficult to determine from which the sky first gathered redness,—from the flash of Roger Bacon's gunpowder, the light of Wycliffe's Bible, or the fire of Dante's hell. When it was bright enough to see clearly, no one knows which was the foremost in drafting the plan of progress,—the compasses of Copernicus, the pen of Calvin, or the pencil of Raphael. Even in the same country, great leaders in all three departments always appear together,—in Italy, Columbus, Savonarola, and Angelo; in Spain, James of Mallorca, Loyola, and Calderon; in France, Descartes, Bossuet, and Molière; in Germany, Humboldt, Schleiermacher, and Goethe; in England, Watt, Wesley, and Reynolds. In fact, the three seem as inseparably connected in indicating sovereignty over civilization as were of old the three prongs of the trident of Neptune in indicating sovereignty over the sea.

When things go together, they usually belong together. When they belong together, no one of them can be at its best without the presence of the others. The bearing of this fact upon the subject before us is sometimes overlooked. There are scientists who think that, when they give forth a word from their department, they have about as much need of re-enforcement from the utterances of religion as a locomotive engineer from the pipings of a penny whistle. There are religionists who think that

they can get along without the mathematical exactness of science about as well as the leader of a processional without a marionette-show; while both are inclined to an impression that art may actually interfere with their success, as much as a liveried footman with that of a country doctor. Nevertheless, art not only furnishes important aids to the full development of the other two, but is even essential to it. If neglecting knowledge, toward which science tends, religion lacks intelligence, and art observation. If caring nothing for conduct, at which religion aims, science lacks practicality, and art inspiration. If destitute of imagination and sentiment, which art cultivates, science becomes divorced from philosophy, and religion from refinement. It was in the dark ages, when they had no art, that the test of a sage was the ability to repeat by rote long, senseless incantations; and the test of a saint was to fulfil the rule, scrupulously passed for his guidance by the councils of the Church, that he should never wash himself.

But to indicate more specifically what is meant. Science has to do mainly with matter, religion with spirit, and art with both; for by matter we mean the external world and its appearances, which art must represent, and by spirit we mean the internal world of thoughts and emotions, which also art must represent. The foundations of art, therefore, rest in the realms both of science and of religion; and its superstructure is the bridge between them. Nor can you get from the one to the other, or enjoy the whole of the territory in which humanity was made to live, without using the bridge. Matter and spirit are like water and steam. They are separate in reality: we join them in conception. So with science and religion, and the conception which brings both into

harmonious union is a normal development of only art.

In unfolding this line of thought, it seems best to show how art develops the powers of the mind,—first, in the same direction as does science; and, second, in the same as does religion,—and, under each head, so far as possible, to show, in addition, how art develops them conjointly also in both directions.

Let us begin, then, with the correspondences between the educational influence of the study of art and of science. The end of science is knowledge with reference mainly to the external material world. We must not forget, however, that the latter includes our material body, with both its muscular and nervous systems. To acquire a knowledge of the world, the primary condition, and an essential one,—a condition important in religion, but not nearly to the same extent,—is keenness of the perceptive powers, accuracy of observation. No man can be an eminent botanist, zoölogist, or mineralogist, who fails to notice, almost at a first glance, and in such a way as to be able to recall, the forms and colors of leaves, bushes, limbs, rocks, or crystals. No man can make a discovery or invention, and thus do that which is chiefly worth doing in science, unless he can perceive, with such retention as to be able to recall, series of outlines and tints, and the orders of their arrangement and sequence. Now can you tell me any study for the young that will cultivate accuracy of observation, that will begin to do this, as can be done by setting them tasks in drawing, coloring, carving, or, if we apply the same principle to the ear as well as to the eye, in elocution and music? In order to awaken a realization of how little some persons perceive in the world, I used to ask my classes how many windows there were in a certain building that they had passed

hundreds of times, or how many stories there were in another building. Scarcely one in six could answer correctly. Is it possible to suppose that one could have avoided noticing such things in case his eyes had been trained to observation through the study of drawing, to say nothing of the effect of special training in the direction of architecture? Of course, there are men born with keen powers of perception, on which everything at which they glance seems to be photographed. But the majority are not so. They have to be trained to use their eyes as well as their other organs. President Chadbourne, of Williams College, at a time when professor of botany in that institution, was once lost in a fog on the summit of Greylock Mountain. It was almost dark; but, in feeling around among the underbrush, his hand struck something. "I know where we are," he said. "The path is about two hundred feet away from here. There is only one place in it from which you see bushes like these." I used to take walks with an old army general. Time and again, when we came to a ravine or a rolling field, he would stop and point out how he would distribute his forces in the neighborhood, were there to be a battle there. These are examples of the result of cultivating powers of observation in special directions. The advantage of art-education, given to the young, is that it cultivates the same powers in all directions. While the nature is pliable to influence, it causes a habit of mind,—in a broad sense, a scientific habit, important in every department in which men need to have knowledge. Not only the botanist and the soldier, but the teacher, the preacher, the lawyer, the politician, the merchant, the banker, is fitted to meet all the requirements of his position in the degree in which his grasp of great and

important matters does not let slip the small and apparently insignificant details that enter into them. Some years ago a poor boy from the country, hoping to obtain a position, brought a letter of introduction to a London bank; but he found no place vacant. He turned away disappointed; but, before he had gone far, a messenger overtook and recalled him. The proprietors had decided to make a place for him. Years afterward, when he had become the leading banker of London and the Lord High Treasurer of the kingdom, he was told the reason why he had been thus recalled. As he was leaving the bank, he had noticed a pin on the pavement, and had stooped down, picked it up, and placed it in his waistcoat. The one who saw that single little act had judged, and judged rightly, that he was the sort of boy whose services the bank could not afford to lose.

Observation of this kind contributes to success, not only in the larger relations of life, but still more, perhaps, in the smaller. What is the germ of tact, courtesy, and kindness in social and family relations? What but the observation of little things, and of their effects? And notice that the observation of these in one department necessarily goes with the same in other departments. What is the reason that a man of æsthetic culture is the last to come into his home swearing like a cow-boy, cocking his hat over the vases on the mantelpiece, or forcing his boots up into their society? Because this sort of manner is not to his taste. Why not? Because, for one reason, he has learned the value of little matters of appearance; and for any man to learn of them in one department is to apply them in all departments. But, to turn to such things as are especially cultivated by art, what is it that makes a room, when we enter it, seem

cheerful and genial? What but the observation of little arrangements that prevent lines from being awry and colors from being discordant? What is the matter with that woman whom we all know,—the woman who, when on Sundays she is waved into the pew in front of us, makes us half believe that the minister has hired her to flag the line of worshippers behind, so as to give them a realizing sense that, even while taking the name of the Lord upon their lips, they may be tempted to expressions appropriate only for miserable sinners? She gets into the street-car, and we feel as if we had disgraced ourselves in bowing to her. She comes to our summer hotel; and the mere fact of recognizing her involves our spending much of the rest of our time in proving to others the contradictory proposition that, notwithstanding her extravagance in lending lavish color to every occasion, she has not yet exhausted all the capital that keeps her from being “off-color.” But think what it must be to live perpetually in the glare of such sunshine! Physically, inharmonious hues produce a storm amid the sight-waves, and amid the nerves of the eye, too, and, as all our nerves are connected, amid those of thought, emotion, digestion. In fact, the whole nervous system sails upon waves, just as a ship does; and storms may prove disagreeable. It has not a slight bearing, then, upon comfort, health, geniality, and sanity to be color-blind, or -daft, or -ignorant. It is not of slight importance to have children trained so that they shall realize that warm colors and cold colors, though not necessarily inducing changes in temperament, may induce changes in temper; that the cheering effects of the room characterized by the one are very different from the sombre effects produced by the presence of the other; that the brilliance of the full hues echoing back

wit and mirth in the hall of feasting might not seem at all harmonious to the mood in need of rest and slumber.

Fully as important as that which leads to personal or social advantage is that which enhances one's own inward satisfaction. It is no less true that our lives are worth to others exactly what they see that we find in the world, than that the world is worth to us exactly what we find in it for ourselves. If this be so, how important is it for us to learn to observe!

One method of learning this, as has been said, is through studying the elements of art practically. Few can study them thus, however, without beginning to study them theoretically also; *i. e.*, without beginning to take an interest in the products of the great artists in all departments. And here again, to whatever art we look, in the degree in which a work rises toward the highest rank, it continues to train our powers of observation. One difference between the great poet, for instance, and the little poet is in those single words and phrases that indicate accuracy in the work of ear or eye, or of logical or analogical inference. Recall Tennyson's references to the "gouty oak," the "shock-head willow," the "wet-shod alder." We all admit that genius, especially literary genius, is characterized by brilliance. A brilliant concentrates at a single point all the light of all the horizon, and from thence flashes it forth intensified. This is precisely the way in which a brilliant stylist uses form. In describing anything in nature, he selects that which is typical or representative of the whole, and often not only of the whole substance of a scene, but even of its atmosphere. Notice the following from Shakespeare:

“ The battle fares like to the morning’s war,
When dying clouds contend with growing light ;
What time the shepherd, blowing of his nails,
Can neither call it perfect day nor night.”

3 *Henry VI.*, ii., 5.

Observe what a picture could be made of this; yet that which most suggests it is put into exactly four words, *blowing of his nails*. The same fact is true of painting and sculpture. Of course, many factors enter into excellence in these arts, and pre-eminent success in certain directions may compensate for deficiencies in other directions. But, as a rule, the rank of a picture or a statue is determined by the relative manifestation in it of accuracy in observing and in reproducing the results of observation; *i. e.*, by the manifestation of imitative skill and of technical facility. Not that all products equally successful in these are of equal excellence. Back of one product there may be a spiritual significance, a psychologic charm lifting it into a sphere where are gathered only the works of those who are the gods of the artistic Olympus, while back of another may be nothing suggestive of the possibility of what we term artistic inspiration. Nevertheless, what has been said will be found to be true. Art always deals with effects which nature presents to the ear or eye, and never survives the fashions of the times in which it is produced except in the degree in which it manifests accuracy in the observation of nature. Music survives in the degree in which it fulfils laws founded upon the observation of tones, the blendings and sequences of which cause agreeable effects upon the ear; architecture in the degree in which it fulfils laws founded upon the observation of shapes and outlines, the harmonies and proportions of which cause agreeable effects upon the eye.

Painting and sculpture fulfil not only the formative laws, but reproduce the formal effects of outline and color; and the first condition of successful reproduction is accuracy. This accuracy is not inconsistent with leaving out some features and emphasizing others, and presenting the whole from different points of view. But it is inconsistent with distortion of any kind. Why? For the same reason that, if we wish a man to see anything through a field-glass, we must adjust the glass exactly to the point of sight. If not, he sees mainly certain obscuring effects of the glass. Though meant to be an agent, it has become an end. When we look at a picture in which the drawing or coloring is defective, causing disproportion in the parts, unatmospheric sharpness of outline, absence of shadowy gradation,—above all, a predominating impression of paint everywhere,—the effect is exactly like that of powder and rouge on a woman's face. It is impossible to see any soul through it. It is impossible to look through or past the form. This, if it do not blur or blind the eye to ulterior suggestions, at least, appeals to it in such a way as to be a barrier preventing them from exerting their normal imaginative influence. Therefore, though, viewed in this aspect, imitative skill and technical facility are merely conditions for making possible the spiritual and mental effects of art, viewed in another aspect, they have more importance than the word *condition* might imply; for they are indispensable. As most of us know, Mr. Beardsley's name is sometimes mentioned by prominent and able American critics with a certain degree of respect, owing to his manifestation, as is said, of originality and invention. One cannot refrain from feeling that further reflection would cause these critics to withhold anything in the direction of actual commendation. The

truth is that Mr. Beardsley's work was legitimate neither to decorative painting nor to figure-painting. Decorative art, like architecture, should fulfil certain mathematical laws controlling the intersection and curvature, the balance and symmetry, of lines, as well as certain physical laws controlling concord and contrast of colors, introducing figures, if at all, only in a subordinate way. These principles of decorative art Mr. Beardsley's work did not fulfil. Figure-painting, though partly fulfilling the same principles, subordinates them to the reproduction of natural appearances. Yet Mr. Beardsley failed to reproduce these appearances with accuracy, showing either that he did not know how to observe or that he did not know how to draw, or, at least, failed to manifest the results of his knowledge. If this be true, it follows, as a corollary from what was said a moment ago, that, just in the degree in which it is true, his work failed to be a medium connecting the mind with nature, and influencing it according to the method of nature. But what of that? it may be asked. Why not treat his pictures and others of the "Yellow Book" and the posters of the period—for all manifest the same tendency—as artistic jokes or caricatures? Why not? For the very sufficient reason that artists and critics insist upon our not treating them so. The style has begun to influence serious work, and, by consequence, to accustom, not only people in general, but artists to pictures not accurately drawn and colored. I have lately seen certain angels in a stained-glass window by a well-known artist, capable of doing fine work. They manifest their poster-progeniture in limbs so deformed, flesh so dropsical, colors so diseased, and expressions of countenance so forbidding that no sane mind conceiving them to represent an ideal would ever—to

say no more—"want to be an angel." Indeed, if one after death were to meet angels like them, however good he might be, he would be sure to turn around, and go straight down hill.

It is a fact overlooked by many how rapidly art, owing to its other necessarily imitative methods, when it once begins to decline, continues to do so. The sense of proportion in the human face and form was entirely lost once, and recovered again, during the period of the art of ancient Egypt. It was lost in Europe all the time between the third and thirteenth centuries. It has been lost many times in China and Japan. In architecture, as developed in Greece, the same sense was lost before Rome was in its prime. It continued lost till the rise of Gothic architecture. It is lost again in our own time. The simplest principles of proportional perspective, which the Greek applied to buildings precisely as we do to pictures, are not merely misapprehended, but are not considered possible either of apprehension or of application by our foremost architects. So with color,—from Apelles to Leonardo an almost constant decline. And think what a sudden decline there was after the period of the great Italian painters. And, mark you, these declines were largely owing to the inability of the people, to whom the art-works appealed, to perceive the defects. Little by little, they had accepted these, one after the other, because supposing them to accord not necessarily with nature,—for some knew better than that,—but with the conventionalities of art. Just as everybody in Italy, before the time of Dante, supposed that literature could be written only in Latin, though unintelligible to the common people, so everybody in these ages of decline had come to expect, in art, forms that were not natural,

and so far, for the reasons just given, not intelligible; and all were disappointed if they saw anything else. Suppose that, because the poster-art has commercial value, our younger artists begin to imitate it,—I mean keep on imitating it,—or, if not its precise forms, the principles underlying them,—what will follow?—A framed picture will begin to occupy exactly the same position in the eyes of the populace as a dressmaker's show-window. What is there this year seems beautiful. What was there five years ago seems ugly. Not because either is beautiful or ugly intrinsically,—perhaps I ought to say neither is beautiful intrinsically,—but because the dressmaker has to make money. And people call, and most of them think, the prevailing style beautiful, merely because it happens to be current and popular. They are so constituted that, consciously or unconsciously, they are unable to resist the tide that, apparently, is bearing along every one else. When the same tendencies appear in art it strikes me that the critic who is of value to the world is the man who, in case public opinion be setting in the wrong direction, is able to resist it, is able to look beneath the surface, analyze the effects, detect the errors, put together his conclusions, and have independence enough to express them. When the current theory is riding straight toward the brink, he is the man who foresees the danger, screws down the brakes, and turns the steeds the other way,—not the sentimentalist irresponsibly swept into folly by the fury of the crowd, or the demagogue whooping its shibboleth to the echo, because, forsooth, he must be popular. The truth is that, just so far as the tendency of the kind of art of which we are speaking has its perfect work, just so far there will be no necessity for accuracy in drawing or coloring, and very

little discipline afforded the powers of observation, while trying either to produce or to appreciate the completed artwork.

This last sentence suggests that we have not quite done yet with all that can be said of the tendency of the study of art to cultivate these latter powers. With observation of the external material world must be included, as has been intimated, that of our own material bodies, involving both their muscular and nervous systems, involving, therefore, so far as developed from the nervous system, especially through physical exercise, the mind and its various possibilities. Science does much, of course, toward bringing us to a knowledge of these possibilities. No man can use his eyes, ears, memory, as science necessitates, to say nothing of his powers of analysis and generalization, without learning a very great deal. But think how much more he can learn, when he is forced into the repetitious and conscientious practice which is always necessary before one can acquire that skill which is essential to success in art.

Just here, in our survey of art, we are approaching the boundary line which separates its relations to science from its relations to religion. Notice how, while a man is acquiring skill, he is being brought into the conditions of life and of method which are necessary in order to attain religious ends. What is the object of religion except through practice, in obedience to will and conscience, to make the mind supreme over matter, to make a man's higher powers the master of his lower powers, to make the body, as the Bible terms it, a living temple for the spirit? When we think of it, we recognize that, while science does comparatively little in this direction, art does an immense deal. The student of art cannot keep

from learning through personal experience how months and years of exercise in voice and gesture, in playing music, in drawing, in painting, in carving, give one a mastery over the physical possibilities of the body not only, but of the mind. He is forced to realize as others cannot that there comes to be a time when every slightest movement through which music, for instance, passes with the rapidity of electricity from a printed score through the mind and fingers of a performer, is overseen and directed by mental action which, while intelligent, works unconsciously, all the conscious powers of the mind being absorbed in that which is producing the general expressional effect. The student of art has thus before him constant experimental evidence of the way in which the higher mental nature can gain ascendancy over both the lower physical and the lower psychical nature. He knows practically as well as theoretically in what sense it can be true spiritually that the man who is to enter into the kingdom of heaven, who is to become with all his powers subject to the spirit that is sovereign there, and who is, without conscious effort, to embody in conduct its slightest promptings, is the man who consciously starts out with scrupulous and often painful efforts to do the will of the Father who is in heaven. Thus, in this regard, the study of art completes the lesson learned from science; and it does so by co-ordinating it to the lesson learned from religion.

Now let us unfold further the thought suggested in what has just been said. We have been considering art-education as related to developing the powers of observation, and everything that enables the mind to master—as is mainly, though not exclusively, necessary in science—that which comes to it from the material world without.

Let us turn from this to consider the same branch of education as related to developing powers of reflection; *i. e.*, of constructive thinking, and the mastery—which is mainly, though not exclusively, necessary in religion—of that which comes from the mental world within.

A man begins to reflect, to construct thought, when he learns to draw an inference as a result of putting together at least two things. Of course, he does this when engaged in scientific pursuits. For success in them, nothing is more essential than classification; and the fundamental method of classification is grouping like with like. But notice to how much greater extent a man is obliged to carry on this process at the very beginning of his work in art. Art is distinctively a product of imagination, of that faculty of the mind which has to do with perceiving images,—the image of one thing in the form of another. While science, therefore, may find a single form interesting in itself, art, at its best, never does. It looks for another form with which the first may be compared. While science may be satisfied with a single fact, art, at its best, never is. It demands a parallel fact or fancy, of which the first furnishes a suggestion.

This imaginative and suggestive character of art does not need to be proved. We can recognize its influence in every artistic result. The movements of sound in music image, for the sake of the beauty that may be developed in connection with the construction of such an image, the movements of the voice in speaking. The metaphors and similes of poetry image by way of description the scenes of nature. Pictures and statues image them on canvas or in marble; and architecture, even when devoid of sculptural ornamentation, is a method of working into an image of beauty the forms through which

the primitive savage provides for security and shelter. We may say, therefore, that the very beginning of the mental tendency that culminates in art is a suggestion to the imagination of a relationship existing, primarily, between forms, and, secondarily,—because both are necessarily connected,—between methods or laws which these forms illustrate. And how is it with the continuation and conclusion of this mental tendency? Do these, too, emphasize, in a way to be of assistance to science, the same conception of a relationship? A moment's thought will reveal to us that they do, and that here, too, therefore, as in the former part of this discussion, the study of art can be shown to be of assistance to the study of science by way both of anticipating its needs and of completing its results. Consider, for instance, the two directions in which it is important for the scientist to notice relationships, and in connection with this consider the respective classes of studies which are usually considered the best for training the mind to think in these directions. The directions are those corresponding to space and time, which are ordinarily termed comprehensiveness of thinking and consecutiveness. The studies supposed to develop thinking in these directions are language, especially that of the classics, and mathematics. The classics, requiring the student, as they do, to observe several different relationships between almost every word and every other word, as of gender, number, case, mood, voice, etc., are supposed to cultivate breadth, or comprehensiveness, of thinking; *i. e.*, the ability to consider things not as isolated, but as related to many other things, and, in the last analysis, to all things, *organically*. The mathematics cultivate consecutiveness of thinking; *i. e.*, the ability to consider things as related one to another, *logically*.

Everybody admits the importance of training the mental powers in both directions. But notice, in the first place, how much art has to do with furnishing the possibility of either form of training. Where would have been any study whatever of the classics, had art done nothing for literature? We should have had no laws of Latin and Greek prosody unless the poets had written in rhythm, and no laws of syntax unless philosophers and historians, as well as poets, had been careful about art in style. Again, where would have been our study of mathematics, of the resulting effects upon one another of lines, curves, or angles, or our study of physical science as determined by such laws as those of sound, or of color, had it not been for the interest first awakened by their æsthetic effects in architecture, music, painting, or sculpture? Whether considering nature or art, men always notice appearances before they investigate the causes determining them. The old Egyptians were studying architecture when they began the investigations which built up their system of mathematics. Pythagoras was studying music when he began the discovery of the laws of sound, and Leonardo and Chevreul were studying art when they made their contributions to the understanding of color; and, though the time has now come when those composing the advancing army of science have moved into every remotest valley of the invaded country, apparently needing no longer any leadership of the kind, they never would have begun their advance unless, like the hosts of almost every conquering army, they had at first marched behind a standard that in itself was a thing of beauty.

So much for the services of art in anticipating the needs of scientific study. Now let us notice how art aids in completing its results. When the mind has attained all that

classical and mathematical training can give, when one has learned to relate organically and logically everything on each side of him and in front of him, what then? Where does the breadth of view cultivated by classical culture cease? Where does the line of logic projected along the vista of mathematical sequence end? I think that you will admit that the one ceases and the other ends where it should, in the degree in which each attains to something hitherto undiscovered in the knowledge of facts or in the understanding of principles. Now I wish to show that this result follows only in the degree in which imagination, in the form in which it is cultivated in art, works in conjunction with the other powers of the mind. There always comes for the scientist a place where material relationships are no longer perceptible, a time where logical sequences of ascertainable phenomena end. He finds the course of his thought checked, whether he look sidewise or forward. There is still infinity in the one direction and eternity in the other; and the mind that can make discoveries of great truths and principles is, as a rule, the mind that, when it can advance no longer, step by step, can wing itself into these unexplored regions. How can it do this? Through imagination. How can imagination, when doing it, detect the truth? According to a law of being which makes the mind of man work in harmony with the mind in nature, which makes an imaginative surmisal with reference to material things a legitimate product of an intelligent understanding of them. This is the law of correspondence or analogy, which can often sweep a man's thoughts entirely beyond that which is a justifiable scientific continuation of the impression received from nature. Only in art is the mind necessitated and habituated to recognize this law, which

fact may not only suggest a reason why so many successful inventors have started in life, like Fulton, Morse, and Bell, by making a study of some form of art; but it may almost justify a general statement that no great discovery is possible to one whose mind is not able to go beyond that which is ordinarily done in science. As a rule, before an expert in this can become what we mean by even a philosopher, not to speak of a discoverer, he must possess, because born with it or trained to it, that habit of mind which leaps beyond scientific conclusions, in order to form imaginative hypotheses. It is only after some one has made suppositions, as Newton is said to have done, when he saw the image of gravitation in the falling of an apple, that those who adhere strictly to a scientific method find work to do in endeavoring to prove them. Nevertheless, many scientists have a subtle, even a pronounced disbelief, in that arrangement of nature in accordance with which matter and mind, knowledge and surmial, always move forward on parallel planes with the mind and its surmial some distance ahead. Their disbelief is owing to a lack of imagination, and this is often owing to a lack of the kind of culture which they might derive from giving attention to some phase of art. And yet the majority of them, perhaps, believe that art is a mere adjunct to intellectual training,—an ornamental adjunct, too, introducing, like the carving on the keystone of an arch, what may be interesting and pretty, but is not essentially useful. This is a mistake. In important particulars, it may be said that art is not the carving on the keystone, but the keystone itself, without which the whole arch would tumble.

It will be noticed now that we are approaching the place at which, in a far more important sense than has

yet been developed, art may be said, in accordance with what was affirmed at the opening of this paper, to spring the bridge across the gulf that separates religion from science. The mind is never strictly within the realm of science when it is arriving at conclusions otherwise than through methods dealing with material relationships. Nothing is scientifically true, unless it can be shown to be fulfilled in fact; *i. e.*, in conditions and results perceptible in ascertainable phenomena. The moment that thought transcends the sphere possible to knowledge, it gets out of the sphere of science. But, when it gets out of this, what sphere, so long as it continues to advance rationally, does it enter? What sphere but that of religion? And think how large a part of human experience—experience which is not a result of what can strictly be termed knowledge—is contained in this sphere! Where but in it can we find the impulses of conscience, the dictates of duty, the cravings for sympathy, the aspirations for excellence, the pursuit of ideals, the sense of unworthiness, the desire for holiness, the feeling of dependence upon a higher power, and all these together, exercised in that which causes men to walk by faith, and not by knowledge? The sphere certainly exists. Granting the fact, let us ask what it is that can connect with this sphere of faith the sphere of knowledge? Has any method yet been found of conducting thought from the material to the spiritual according to any process strictly scientific? Most certainly not. There comes a place where there is a great gulf fixed between the two. Now notice that the one who leads the conceptions of men across this gulf must, like the great Master, never speak to them without a parable,—*i. e.*, a parallel, an analogy, a correspondence, a comparison. Did you ever think of

the fact that, scientifically interpreted, it is not true that God is a father, or Christ a son of God, or an elder brother of Christians, or the latter children of Abraham? These are merely forms taken from earthly relationships, in order to image spiritual relationships, which, except in imagination, could not in any way become conceivable. This method of conceiving of conditions, which may be great realities in the mental, ideal, spiritual realm, through the representation of them in material form, is one of the very first conditions of a religious conception. But what is the method? It is the artistic method. Without using it in part, at least, science stops at the brink of the material with no means of going farther, and religion begins at the brink of the spiritual with no means of finding any other starting-point. Art differs from both science and religion in finding its aim in sentiment instead of knowledge, as in the one, and of conduct, as in the other. But notice, in addition to what has been said of its being an aid to science, what an aid to religion is the artistic habit of looking upon every form in this material world as full of analogies and correspondences, inspiring conceptions and ideals spiritual in their nature, which need only the impulse of conscience to direct them into the manifestation of the spiritual in conduct. This habit of mind is what art, when legitimately developed, always produces. It not only necessitates, as applied to mere form,—and in this it differs from religion and resembles science,—great accuracy in observation, but also, as applied to that which the form images,—and in this it differs from science and resembles religion,—it necessitates the most exact and minute fulfilment of the laws of analogy and correspondence. These laws, which, because difficult and sometimes impossible to detect, some imagine not to

exist, nevertheless do exist; and they give, not only to general effects, but to every minutest different element of tone, cadence, line, and color, a different and definite meaning, though often greatly modified, of course, when differently combined with other elements.

This fact is exemplified in all the arts; and it is that which makes an art-product, as distinguished from a scientific, a combined effect of both form and significance, —of form, inasmuch as it fulfils certain physical laws, as of harmony or proportion, which make the effect agreeable or attractive to the physical ears or eyes; and of significance, inasmuch as it fulfils certain psychical laws, as of association or adaptability, which cause it to symbolize some particular thought or emotion. If, for instance, we ask an artist why he has drawn a figure gesturing with the palm up instead of down, he cannot say, if giving a correct answer, that he has done it for the sake merely of the form, in case he means to use this word in its legitimate sense as a derivation of the old Latin word *forma*, an appearance. The one gesture, if as well made, may *appear* as well as the other. The difference between the two is wholly a difference of significance. This difference, moreover, is artistic. For merely scientific purposes the one gesture, in such a case, might be as satisfactory as the other.

That form in art as contrasted with form in science is suggestive in the sense just explained, we all, to a certain extent, recognize. When, in music or poetry, we are discussing the laws of rhythm, harmony, or versification, we are talking, as the very titles of most books written upon these topics indicate, about the science of these subjects. When we are discussing the influence upon thought or emotion of consecutive or conflicting themes or

scenes in an opera of Wagner or a drama of Shakespeare, we are talking about that which, though partly conditioned upon the laws of science, nevertheless transcends its possibilities. No matter how perfect rhythm or rhyme one may produce through arrangements of words, the result is prose, not poetry, unless the thought, instead of being presented directly, is represented, as we may say, indirectly, so as to cause it to afford virtually an argument from analogy. Frequently, one judges of poetic excellence by the degree in which the thoughts or emotions could not be communicated at all unless they were thus suggested rather than stated; by the degree, therefore, in which their essential character is subtle, intangible, invisible,—in short, spiritual. The same is true of sculpture, architecture, and painting, though the fact is not equally acknowledged in each of these arts. No one thinks of not judging of a statue by its significance for the mind—*i. e.*, by the subject represented in its pose, gestures, and facial expression—fully as much as by the mathematics of its proportions or the technical skill of its chiselling. Large numbers of persons judge of a building in a similar way, considering the embodiment of the mental conception in the general arrangements and appearances causing them to be representative of the plan of the whole, or illustrative of special contrivances of construction in the parts, to be fully as important as the character of the material or even the proportion and harmony of the outlines. But, when we come to pictures, although apparently the rest of the world, aside from those who are in art-circles, accept without question the view that has just been presented, we find that many painters and many critics influenced by them deny the importance of considering mental and spiritual signifi-

cance as distinguished from that which has to do with the appeal of the form to the eye. Of course, if they deny this, we are obliged to infer from what has been said already that they do so because, in some degree, they fail to perceive that art involves that which transcends the possibilities of science. If, with this suggestion as a clew, we examine the facts, we shall find that those of whom we are speaking are apt to be colorists, not draughtsmen. Of late years the development of coloring has necessarily proceeded on scientific lines. This fact, in connection with the fact that color in nature is not fixed, but changes with every shifting of the sun, may furnish one reason why certain students of color hold to the view that in art as in science the meaning that a form conveys by way of exercising definite control over the imagination need not be specially considered.

But beyond this reason there seems to be another. It may be suggested by the following: a friend of mine, who sent his son to a school in England, told me that the boy came back a "perfect fool." To restore a rational action of mind, it became necessary to resort to argument. "What do you roll so for, when you walk? Are you drunk? What do you stick out your elbows so for? Are your arm-pits chapped? Do you think yourself drowning every time you try to shake hands?" "Oh," said the boy, "you Americans have n't any way of letting people know that you have been in good society." This answer may give us a hint of one reason why the opinion of common people is not always accepted by those who wish to be thought uncommon. Thus put, it may seem an unworthy reason, not consistent with earnestness and sincerity. Yet such an inference would scarcely be justified. The fact that people ordinarily judge of a picture

by its significance is a proof that the ordinary picture has significance. But the artist does not wish to produce an ordinary picture. So, he says: "The kind of picture that I produce need not have significance." His motive is praiseworthy. He wishes to attain distinction. But, intellectually, he starts with an erroneous premise; and this, of course, leads him to an erroneous conclusion. It is not significance that makes a picture ordinary: this merely makes it a picture rather than a product of decorative art. That which makes it ordinary is the form in which the significance is presented. To change a theological essay into a "Paradise Lost," it would not be necessary to drop the significance: that could be kept; but it would be necessary to change the form.

We may be sure that any theory true as applied to one art is in analogy to that which is true of every other art of the same class; and I, for one, refuse to take from the art of painting its right to be classed among the other higher arts. It is on account of the distinctive appeal, beyond that which can be made by decorative art, which painting can make through significance to the human mind that it has a right to be classed with the humanities. Some time ago I heard a story intended to represent the effect that should be produced by this art. It was said that some one, in a French gallery, noticed two painters approach a picture, and heard them discuss the coloring of some fowls. After about ten minutes they turned away; and, just as they were doing so, one of them said to the other: "By the way, what was that picture about? Did you notice?" "No," said the other. Now, while this illustrates the kind of interest which not only the painter, but the artist in any art,—music, poetry, sculpture, or architecture,—necessarily comes to have in the

technique of his specialty, it does not illustrate all the interest which one should have who has a true conception of what art can do for people in general. It does not illustrate the sort of interest that Angelo, Raphael, or Murillo had in their productions. A musician or poet who should have no higher conception of the ends of art would produce nothing but jingle. In this the laws of rhythm and harmony can be fulfilled as perfectly as in the most inspired and sublime composition. Do I mean to say, therefore, that every artist, when composing, must consciously think of significance and also of form? Not necessarily. Many a child unconsciously gestures in a form exactly indicative of his meaning. But often, owing to acquired inflexibility or unnaturalness, the same person, when grown, unconsciously gestures in a form not indicative of his meaning. What then? If he wish to be an actor, he must study the art of gesture, and for a time, at least, must produce the right gestures consciously. And besides this, whether he produce them consciously or unconsciously, in the degree in which he is an artist in the best sense, he will know what form he is using, and why he is using it. The fact is that the human mind is incapable of taking in any form without being informed of something by it; and it is the business of intelligent, not to say honest, art to see to it that the information conveyed is not false, that the thing made corresponds to the thing meant. Otherwise, we all know or ought to know the result. Who has not had experience of it? I have seen college dormitories meant to be comfortable and healthy, but so planned that not a ray of sunshine could get into more than half of their study rooms; libraries meant to read in, but with windows filled with stained glass that would injure the eyes of every one who

attempted to read in them; auditoriums meant to see and hear in, yet crowded with stone pillars preventing large numbers from doing either, or filled with rectangular seats crowded together so that no one could even remain in the place with comfort. These were results of paying attention to form, and not to significance, or that for which the form is intended. Analogous effects are just as unfortunate in painting. I have been in court-rooms, supposed to be decorated for the purpose—for this is all that decoration of the kind is worth—of producing upon those entering them an impression of justice; but the only possible impression that could be produced was that the halls were to be devoted to perpetual investigations into the mysteries of orgies not conducted according to the conventions of Puritanic propriety:—women who ought to have been in a warmer place, and whom it was impossible to conceive of as winged creatures, doomed to eternal roosting upon the cornice against the domed ceiling. And what inspiration there might have been for the common people, accustomed to gather there, had the walls been filled with representations of great acts of justice and humanity with which the pages of history of almost every age and country are crowded! Granted that some paintings like this are flamboyantly panoramic. A great painter can make them something else; and historic paintings in themselves are as legitimate as historic dramas. Granted that the literary tendency in painting is sometimes misleading, though not so misleading as the deductions which artists and critics without ability to think have drawn from the fact. The paintings of which I speak now need not be literary in any sense that makes them inartistic. Indeed, a very important element in the suggestion made, that which allies it to

what has just been said of architecture, is the fact that every elementary line or color before as well as after being combined into the general effect of a picture has in nature, owing to its predominating uses and associations, a meaning appropriate to itself; and an artist who does not recognize that this is the case, no matter how well he understands the science of line and color, fails. "What kind of a painter is he?" I asked the other day of an artist-friend, mentioning at the same time the name of one of whom all of us probably know. "Why," replied the artist, "he is what I call a vulgar painter." "Are you getting ethical in your tastes?" I said. "Not that," he answered, "but don't you remember that picture of a little girl by Sargent in the National Academy Exhibition last year? You could n't glance at it, in the most superficial way, without recognizing at once that it was a child of high-toned, probably intellectual, spiritually-minded, aristocratic parentage and surroundings. Now, if this man had painted that child, he could not have kept from making her look like a coarse-haired, hide-skinned peasant." It is easy to perceive that, if this criticism were justifiable,—and the one, at least, who made it must have thought that it was,—the fault would lie back of any scientific knowledge of color or any technical facility in the use of it. It would lie in the fact that the artist had never learned that the round, ruddy form of the vital temperament that blossoms amid the breeze and sunshine of the open field has a very different significance from the more complex and delicate curves and colors that appear where the nervous temperament is trained up behind the sheltering window-panes of the study. An artist who believes in significance merely enough to recognize the necessity of representing it in some way can, with a very

few thrusts of his knife, to say nothing of his brush, at one and the same time relieve the inflammation of chapped cheeks, and inject into the veins some of the blue blood of aristocracy.

As intimated a moment ago, those who claim that the highest quality of art can be produced without regard to significance are conceiving of art as if it involved exclusively that which is in the domain of science. Yes, it may be answered; but are not those who insist upon the requirement of significance, especially significance of an elevated character, conceiving of art as involving that which is in the domain of religion? Certainly they are, yet not as involving this exclusively. Art includes something that pertains to the domain of science, and also something that pertains to the domain of religion. When an artist depicts nature just as it is, if there be any such thing as natural religion, he produces upon the mind something of the effect of natural religion. If he depict humanity, he produces—if there be any such thing—something of the sympathetic effect of social religion. And in both cases he adds to the effect the influence which each has had upon his own character, and produces, if he have any, something of the effect of personal religion. Art combines the influences of God in nature, God in humanity, and God in the individual. It makes an appeal that is natural, sympathetic, and personal; but it does all this in a way that seems divine, because the factors of representation are reproductions of the divine handiwork. As applied to literature, for instance, it is a fact that, when spiritual discernment and brotherly charity that judge by faith that is deeper than creeds, and by motives that lie nearer to the heart than actions, fulfil their missions of guidance and enlightenment for their


age, the very same ideas which, if stated in plain prose, would send their writer to ostracism or the stake, are accepted and approved, if, through the suggestive methods of art, they are represented in what may be called the divine terms of nature. What would have become of Dante, in his age, if he had proclaimed that a pope could be kept in hell or a pagan be welcomed in Paradise? Yet, when he pictured both conditions in his great poem, how many persecuted him merely because of that? We may apply the same principle to any form of literary art. It is less the influence of the pulpit than of the novel that in our own land, within the memory of some still living, has not only freed the slave and unfrocked the aristocrat, but has snatched the standards of sectarianism from the hands of hypocrites and bigots, and restored for all the Church the one standard of Constantine, and that one not held up by the hands of man, but flaming in the sky. So with the other arts. Even in the rhythm and harmony of music, though representing laws almost too subtle for our comprehension, there is something that tends to make throb in unison not only every pulse, but every protoplasmic fibre whose deep roots are the soul. Under the pediment of the temple, the arches of the cathedral, the dome of the mosque, always, too, in the degree in which these are great works of art, the predominating impression is that of the universal fatherhood of God, which all alike represent. Nor is there a statue or a painting which depicts natural life, especially human life, as we are accustomed in our own day to see it,—yet notice that this argument could not apply, even remotely, to anything approaching deformity or vulgarity, — but every curve or color in it seems to frame at times the soul of one to be loved, not by another, but by

ourselves; and, so far as Providence sends spiritual development through imparting a sense of sympathy with friend, brother, sister, father, mother, wife, or child, there, in the presence of art, that development for a while is experienced.

In fact, in every department of art, if only our powers of apprehension were sufficiently subtle, such influences might be perceived in the aspects of great natural forces streaming up from the surface of the globe through the senses of those inhabiting it, and radiating into a spiritual halo stretching starward above every realm and age that the world whirls into sight, as it goes spinning onward.

But enough. The conception suggesting this paper has been sufficiently unfolded, if it have been made clear in what sense it is true that æsthetic studies, among which one may include anything that has to do with elocution, poetry, music, drawing, painting, modelling, building, or furnishing, whether we consider their influence upon the artist or upon the patron of art, are needed, in order to connect and complete the results of education as developed through science alone or through religion alone. These studies can do for our minds what science cannot, crowning its work with the halo of imagination and lighting its path to discovery. They can do for us what religion cannot, grounding its conceptions upon accuracy of observation and keeping them true to facts. Art unites the separated intellectual influences of the two other spheres. It can not only hold the mirror up to nature, but it can make all nature a mirror, and hold it up to the heavens. In times of intellectual and spiritual storm and stress, when night is above and waves below and winds behind and breakers ahead, the voice of art can sometimes speak peace to conflicting elements, and bring a great

calm; and then, in the blue at our feet, we can see not only a little of the beauty of a little of the surface of the little star in which we live, but something also of the grandeur of all the stars of all the universe.



ART IN THEORY.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND ART.

Art a Method—Artlessness and Art Illustrated—Differing not as Originality from Imitation—Nor as the Natural from the Unnatural—But as an Immediate Expression of Nature from Mediate or Represented Expression, Art being Nature Made Human or Nature Re-made by Man—Definitions of Nature, Human, and Re-made—This Definition of Art Applicable Universally—Art-Products, not Creations, but Reproductions of Nature—And also Results of Design which is Distinctively Human—Known to be Art in the Degree in which both Natural and Human Elements in them are Recognizable—Conclusion.

WHEN we say that a man has *an art* or *the art* of producing effects of any kind, we mean that his words or deeds manifest a certain method. *Works of art* are products revealing this method. They may not reveal it to a first glance; they must to careful inspection. Otherwise none could distinguish them from other works and designate them by a special term.

What is this method? A child talks to us with grace in her movements and sweetness in her voice, and we admire what we term her *artlessness*. A grown woman, an actress, perhaps, produces almost identical effects that seem equally pleasing, but what we admire in her we term her *art*. What is the difference between an absence

of art and a presence of art, as indicated in these two cases?

We cannot fully answer this question by saying merely that the child's actions appear to be spontaneous or original, and that the woman's appear to be imitated; though, of course, there is often a sense in which this statement is true. But the very actions of the child which the grown person imitates, may themselves be imitative. A large part of all children's actions are so. The actress, in repeating them, does not necessarily change them from the non-imitative to the imitative. What she does that is different from the action of the child, is to produce her imitations according to a different method.

Nor can we answer the question by saying that the child's actions are *natural* and the woman's *unnatural*; though here again, inasmuch as the woman is not acting as we naturally expect a woman to act, there is a sense in which this statement is true. But if her actions be absolutely unnatural we fail to admire them. That which pleases us in them is the very fact that they are not this, but, on the contrary, are similar in form to those of nature. Yet we term the result *art* because we recognize that it is produced not according to the method of nature—in this case, of a child's nature,—but according to a different method.

In what now consists this difference in method? Is it not in this? The child's words and deeds, like the bleating and gambolling of the lamb, seem to be immediate expressions of nature, or of what, in this case, we may term *natural instinct*. But we know that a mature woman's natural instincts would never prompt her to express herself in the child's way; and that therefore her childish words and deeds, while expressions natural

enough to a very young person, are not so to one of her age. They are expressions, therefore, of something which nature has presented to her, and which she, according to a process which, as distinguished from *instinctive*, we may call *mental*, re-presents to us. As the result, which we term *art*, is a combination of what comes, in the first place, from nature or *natural instinct*, and, in the second place, from a *human* being exercising the distinctive traits of the human *mind*, we may say that, in this case at least, art is *nature made human*, or *nature re-made by the human mind*. The term *nature*, as used thus, may apply to every effect, aside from the supernatural, that is not produced directly by the agency of distinctively human intelligence; *human* may apply to every effect that is produced by this agency, and *made* or *re-made* may include all such ideas as might be expressed specifically by terms like *shaped*, *arranged*, *applied*, *combined*, or, as has been intimated, by *reshaped*, *rearranged*, *reapplied*, *recombined*, or, to repeat the term already used, *re-presented*.

But is not what has just been affirmed of one illustration of art true in all cases? In the first place, are not all art-products necessarily reproductions of that which *nature* furnishes, though, of course, in different degrees and ways? A man can absolutely create none of the materials which he uses, nor the laws according to which they operate. He can merely put into new shapes and use with new combinations and applications that which already exists in the world about him. This is true not only in the lower arts where the fact is evident, but in the higher.

“The term *invention*,” says Henry Fuseli in the third of his “Lectures on Painting,” “never ought to be so far misconstrued as to be confounded with that of *creation*,

incompatible with our natures as limited beings . . . and admissible only when we mention Omnipotence. . . . It discovers, selects, combines the *possible*, the *probable*, the *known* in a mode that strikes us with an air of truth and novelty at once. . . . To *invent* is to find ; to find something, presupposes its existence somewhere, implicitly or explicitly, scattered or in a mass.” “The art of seeing nature, or, in other words, the art of using models,” says Sir Joshua Reynolds in the twelfth of his “Discourses before the Royal Academy,” “is in reality the great object, the point to which all our studies are directed.” “Agassiz, who examined this drawing of ‘The Nightmare,’” says S. P. Long on page 48 of his “Art ; its Laws and the Reasons for Them,” “and another of a ‘Devil Tormenting St. Anthony,’ by Salvator Rosa, thought he detected in the head of the former the monkey with ass’s ears, and in the head of the latter the hog, in the beak some ravenous bird, in the arms the skeleton wings of the eagle, in the legs the bones of a man, and in the tail the monkey. The original of all but the head of ‘The Nightmare’ he could not determine with any exactness, but he had no doubt of its being selected and combined from *real existences*”—an opinion with which, probably, we shall all be prepared to agree when we recall the unmistakable absence of any appearances that fail to resemble those of the earth in all attempts on the part of men to picture spiritual beings or a place of spiritual existence. A similar assertion could be made with reference to the results produced in all the other higher arts. In poems and dramas, the characters represented, although Homeric gods or Miltonic angels, speak and act in ways showing that the artist’s ideas concerning them have been modelled upon forms natural to men and

women of the earth. Even in music and architecture, the principle holds good, though in a more subtle sense. There would be no melodies if it were not for the natural songs of men and birds or for what are called "the voices of nature"; nor would there be buildings were there not in nature rocks and trees furnishing walls and columns and water-sheds, to say nothing of the innumerable forms suggested by the trunks, branches, leaves, flowers and other natural figures which architectural details unmistakably imitate. In a word—to repeat what was said before,—the effects of art are not what they are because they are *unnatural*. On the contrary, they all do no more than *remake, reproduce, reshape, rearrange, re-apply, recombine, represent* appearances that nature first supplies.

In the second place, is it not true that in all cases art results from influences that have been exerted upon nature by man as the possessor of a *human mind*, and that, in this sense, it is *made human* or is *re-made by the human mind*? To go back again to the contrast between what is done by the child and by the actress, it is impossible for us to believe that a woman can act the part of a child, except as a result of that mental application of means to ends which we term *design*. It is because we recognize this element in her actions that we attribute them to *art*. In fact, the words *art* and *design* are sometimes used as if synonymous. A cousin of mine went to a ball. He came back raving about a young miss fresh from the country who had fascinated him there. A few days later, he was told that she was an experienced coquette who had long been out of her teens. Then he began to talk of her *arts*, he began to recognize in her a creature of *design*. And we shall find that universally when we speak

of art, whether of its lowest or highest manifestations,—all the way from sighs to symphonies or canes to cathedrals,—we mean something which is a manifestation of *design*.

Not, however, of design *per se*; but only of human design. Men speak sometimes of the designs of the lower animals, but were they asked if what they knew to be a choice specimen of coral were a work of art, they would answer “No,” and give as their reason, the fact that it is produced by a polyp. Men speak too of the designs of the Almighty, and these they may believe to be manifested by everything produced or done in the universe. Design, as applied to the methods of art, signifies that adaptation of means to ends which results from the action of the *human mind* only.

So far as we have yet been able to define it, art is *nature made human*. It is important to notice now that we can recognize a product to be a work of art in the degree only in which we can recognize in it both of the elements—natural and human—which enter into its composition. An ordinary walking-stick, for instance, shows both that it grew and that it has been shaped by a man. More than this, we recognize in it the effects of the man’s work in the degree only in which we perceive the difference between the condition in which natural growth left it and that into which man has shaped it,—in other words, only as it reveals the results both of *nature* and of *human design*. *Nature made human*, or *nature re-made by the human mind*, is, of course, a very broad definition of art—one that scarcely begins to suggest all that is needed for a full understanding of the subject. But it is one that all can accept, and therefore it will serve as a starting-point for what is to follow.

CHAPTER II.

FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE IN ART.

The Fine Arts, The Arts, Les Beaux-Arts—These Manifest the Finest and most Distinctive Art-Qualities—Arts Ranked by the Degree in which they most Finely and Distinctively Reproduce Nature : Useful, Operative, Mechanical, Technic, Applied Arts in which the Appearance is Non-Essential ; Ornamental and Æsthetic Arts of Design in which the Appearance is Essential—In these Latter, Form is Essential—Forms Modelled upon those of Nature most Finely and Distinctively Reproduce it, and Belong to The Fine Arts or The Arts—Universal Recognition of the Study of Nature as Essential to the Production of these—Forms Addressing and Expressing the Higher Intellectual Nature through Sound and Sight are Finely and Distinctively Human,—So are Forms Attributable to a Man as Distinguished from an Animal—These Forms are such as are Traceable to the Use of the Human Voice—And of the Human Hand—What Arts are Highest, and their Two Main Characteristics—The Artist, the Artisan, and the Mechanic—Effectiveness of the Products of the Former.

WE are to deal in this essay not with all the products of art, but with a particular class of them, to some of which, among other terms, that of *the fine arts*, and to all of which the term *the arts* is applied. It may be of interest to recall here, too, that the former term is an English substitute for the French "Les Beaux-Arts," first used in the "Réflexions Critique sur la Poésie et la Peinture," published by the Abbé Du Bos in 1719. According to the first and historic part of Professor William Knight's "Philosophy of the Beautiful," a work which has proved of much service in the preparation of the present volume, the term afterwards came to be used as follows :

“In the seventeenth century certain schools of Painting and Sculpture were instituted. A school of Architecture followed. In 1793 these were united in one, an ‘*École des Beaux-Arts.*’ When, subsequently, an ‘*Académie des Beaux-Arts.*’ was established, Music was added. Poetry was left out, partly because it could not be taught, and partly from an idea that it belonged to a loftier sphere. In the ‘*Dictionnaire des Sciences, des Lettres, et des Arts,*’ the arts of Design only are included—Painting, Sculpture, Engraving, Architecture, Music, and Drawing.”

Thus far we have gone upon the supposition that men use different terms, like *nature* and *art*, in order to express different conceptions. We may as well apply the same supposition here, and infer that men class among *the fine arts* or *the arts* those products which, according to their conceptions, manifest the qualities of art that are the finest and most distinctive. What products are these? Evidently, if art be *nature made human*, they are those which most finely and distinctively belong to nature, and, at the same time, are the most finely and distinctively made human.

What products, then, most finely and distinctively belong to nature? Those certainly which, other things considered, appear to be the least changed from the state in which they are found in nature. As a first step toward the discovery of these, it is important to notice that all possible art-products can be divided into two classes—those in which appearances, whether of nature or of any kind, are not essential, and those in which they are essential. In the former class we may place all those compounds and constructions, from the lightest fluids and fibres to the heaviest instruments and machines,

which are designed, not for the appearance that they present, but for the work that they do. They belong to what are termed, when chief reference is had to the motive, the *useful arts*; when to the method, the *operative* or *mechanical arts*; when to the effect, the *technic* or *applied arts*. In the class contrasted with these we may place everything in which appearances are a chief matter of consideration, the word *appearance* being universally used in this connection to indicate an outward effect upon either the eye or the ear. Here belong what are termed, when chief reference is had to the motive, the *ornamental arts*; when to the method, the *arts of design*; and when to the effect, the *æsthetic arts*. In a general way, these arts may be said to include all products, alike in kind, that range between a carved penholder and a palace, between a jews-harp's humming and an overture. Of course, in certain respects, the æsthetic arts may be as useful as any that are termed *useful*: but the æsthetic utility is always such as produces not a material but a mental result, and even no mental result except indirectly through an effect upon the senses.

Because appearance is essential in æsthetic art, it is essential that all its products have what is termed *form*. The word is from the Latin *forma*, meaning an *appearance*, and is applied especially to what presents a definitely outlined or concrete appearance. All art-products, in one sense, have form, but only in the degree in which the appearance is essential can we say that form is essential.

This statement implies—what needs to be noticed next—that there are different degrees and classes among the æsthetic arts. House-painting cannot rank as high as landscape-painting nor masonry as sculpture. What are the characteristics of the products for which we are in

search—of products which, in the finest and most distinctive sense, are those of nature? The very phraseology of the question answers it. They are the products which have forms or appearances the most like those of nature, products which we could unmistakably define as *forms of nature* made human. Unfigured silk, however ornamental, is not one of these products because it is not, or has not, necessarily, an appearance in any sense attributable to nature; nor is a steam-engine, however elaborately its parts may be mounted and polished. A man accustomed to use words with discrimination, and with the idea of *the fine arts* or *the arts* in mind, might say of the latter, "It looks like a work of art," but he would not say, "It is a work of art"; and this not only because he would feel that it should be classed with objects designed for use rather than for ornament, but also because he would feel that its forms, however ornamental in this case, were not in the finest and most distinctive sense those of nature. To be this, their outward effects upon the eye or ear should suggest, like the carving of a man's head, the picture of a tree, the dialogue of a drama, the bird-trill of a song, certain outward effects of nature upon which they have been modelled. Only to classes of products containing suggestions like these can terms like *the fine arts* or *the arts* be applied by way of distinction.

That this is so seems to be universally recognized in practice, at least, if not in theory. Who does not acknowledge that one characteristic of all great artists, especially of those who are leaders in their arts, is the faithful study that they give to nature. We may not admire the social customs of ancient Greece that allowed its sculptors frequent opportunities to observe the unclothed forms of both the sexes; we may shrink from

believing the story of a Guido murdering his model in order to prepare for a picture of the crucifixion ; or of a David coolly sketching the faces of his own friends when put to death amid the horrors of the French Revolution ; yet, in all these cases, there is an artistic lesson accompanying the moral warning. It was not in vain that Morland's easel was constantly surrounded by representatives of the lower classes ; that Hogarth always had his pencil with him on the streets and in the coffee-houses ; or that, morning after morning, Corot's canvas caught its colors long before the eastern sky grew red with sunlight. Or, if we turn to literature, it is not an insignificant fact that Shakespeare and his contemporaries who gave form to the modern drama, as well as Goethe, who records in his "Wahrheit und Dichtung" the way in which he spent his youth in Frankfort and his age in Weimar, were for years the associates both of the audiences and actors in city theatres ; or that Fielding, who gave form to the modern novel, was the justice of a police court. High art is distinctively a form *of nature*—a form that is this in the sense of being perceptible in nature, or at least directly suggested by it.

Now let us ask what arts those are, which can be said to be in the finest and most distinctive sense *made human*. Here, too, we can begin by accepting the ordinary judgments of the world. Later on, if we choose, we can go deeper into the question. There is no doubt that men associate with the production of the highest art, the highest results of human intelligence. "As it is by his mind that man is superior to animals," says F. T. Palgrave in his essay on "Poetry and Prose in Art," "so it is ever by the quality of that mind that one man's work differs from another's." For this reason, the class

of art for which we are in search obliges us to exclude from consideration, first of all, such phenomena, whatever of ornament, design, or æsthetics they may suggest, as appeal to attention through merely one of the lower senses of touch, taste, or smell. The poet Coleridge, in the third of his "Essays on the Fine Arts," says that this is so because the effects of these are "not divisible into parts." Notice what is said in Chapter XII of complexity as an element of beauty. At present we shall sufficiently recognize the truth of his remark upon recalling that only something radically complex in its nature naturally stimulates us to think in order to understand it. But waiving the exact explanation at present, we know at any rate that for some reason effects appealing through these senses do not address, and therefore we conclude that they do not express, the higher intellectual and spiritual nature. Accordingly, we must find the arts that in the finest and most distinctive sense are *human* among those alone the products of which are apprehended in the realms of sound or of sight.

Again, the class for which we are in search obliges us to exclude from consideration even those products in sound or sight which are not clearly attributable to a *human* being as distinguished from an animal. In trying to determine exactly what these products, and the classes to which they belong, are, it would evidently be illogical to start by theorizing with reference to such subtle differences distinguishing the two as are dependent upon merely mental states or capacities. These differences can, at best, be only indirectly inferred. Actual observation never starts with them; and we should start where it starts, namely, with something directly perceptible, which itself is the occasion of their being inferred—with

something belonging, therefore, not to the hidden psychical but to the apparent physical nature. What then are the physical differences—not all of them, but those connected with the reproduction of effects of sound and sight—which distinguish the human from the merely animal body?

The question is readily answered. They are the *vocal organs* and the *hands*. To begin with the former, a man can produce such variations of intonation and articulation as to enable him to represent wellnigh every object of thought and phase of feeling in a definite vocal form; and with this possibility none of the lower animals are endowed. Notice now the inferences that follow. A man can select for imitation such sounds of nature, or can originate such sounds, as are appropriate for expression, and he can use these as in language. The lower animals, whatever may be the character or extent of their thoughts and feelings, cannot make these selections of sounds, nor originate them; and, therefore, they cannot construct language, nor know what it is to use it. Accordingly, their mental experience, however full it may be of recollections of sounds or of sights, is, at least, not an aggregate of consecutive processes resulting from the grammatical and logical arrangement of sounds used as symbols, which is the case with that accumulation of inflections and words and of scenes suggested by them, which together constitute a man's internal world of imagination. Or, even if these animals may, at times, think and feel as a man does, they certainly do not express themselves as he does. The bird can sing and the beast can roar; but neither can do both; nor is there any proof that either has the power of making new sounds in order to indicate newly discovered distinctions between thoughts or feelings.

The other physical difference between a man and the lower animals, which applies to the subject before us, is noticeable in his *hand*. The structure of this is such that there is hardly any limit to the variety of objects that he can produce. The animals have nothing comparable to it. Notice the inferences from this fact too. A man can select for reproduction such phases of the products of nature appealing to sight, or he can originate such of these, as are appropriate for expression: and he can so vary the objects that he makes as to cause them to be very definitely expressive. But the animals can reproduce little that they see; and never much more than is necessary for their physical sustenance. They cannot with their mouths, beaks, paws, or claws construct a single written character or picture of such a nature as to indicate clearly any particular thought or any particular scene suggesting it. They can scarcely construct even an implement or a machine showing unmistakably that it was designed to be a means of accomplishing an end conceivable only as a result of a consecutive and complicated mental process.

The higher arts which are attributable to the possibilities of expressing thought and feeling through the use of the human voice and hands are usually represented as being the following: *music*, developed from expression through the intonations of the *voice*; *poetry*, from expression through both its intonations and articulations; and *painting*, *sculpture*, and *architecture*, from expression through the use of the *hands* in pictures, carvings, and constructions. But until intervening matter can make clear the explanations to be given in Chapter IX, there is nothing in what has been said so far, to lead us to exclude from this class either *elocution*, *oratory*, *dancing*,

pantomime, dramatics, decorating, or landscape-gardening. Without pausing to determine here the exact limitations of the arts for which we are in search, it is sufficient if we recognize, at this point, that all the products of them are clearly differentiated from those of any other class, in being, first of all, reproductions of the appearances of nature, and, second, in connection with this, expressions of thought and feeling. Every artist, as John Ruskin says of the painter, in his "Modern Painters," Part II, Sec. I, Chap. I, "must always have two great and distinct ends; the first, to induce in the spectator's mind the faithful conception of any natural object whatsoever; the second, to guide the spectator's mind to those objects most worthy of its contemplation, and to inform him of those thoughts and feelings with which these were regarded by the artist himself," a statement which is exactly paralleled by one of John Opie, who declares in the first of his "Lectures on Design," that "the end of painting, in its highest style, is twofold: first, the giving effect, illusion, or the true appearance of objects to the eye; and secondly, the combination of this with the ideal."

These affirmations which might be multiplied indefinitely, accord with those of the majority of thinkers upon this subject. It is wellnigh universally recognized that the poet is not a reporter, nor the painter a photographer, nor any artist at all entitled to the name, a mere copyist. For this reason, it is felt that while, in the main, he is a careful observer of outward appearances, he, too, as well as the workman in so-called useful art, must have ability to penetrate in some way to something underlying these; that pathos in ballads, passion in dramas, groupings on canvas, attitudes in marble, arches in cathedrals, cannot be produced so as to have anything approximating an

artistic effect—be produced so as to cause forms to fulfil both physical and mental laws,—if their authors have either studied the sounds and sights of nature to the exclusion of its operations,—under which term may be included its effects upon thought and feeling as well as upon matter,—or have studied the latter to the exclusion of the former. Men name the producer of the highest æsthetic results an *artist*. By this term they distinguish him from one whose skill exhibits a more partial exercise of his various possibilities, whom they term, if his products repeat merely the appearances of nature, an *artisan*; if they repeat merely its operations, a *mechanic*. The highest æsthetic art must do both.

There is a sense, too, in which this art is often able to repeat the most effective even of nature's operations in the most effective way. What is it in nature that operates the most powerfully? Not the wind or fire or earthquake, but rather the still small voice, sighing for us in the silence of our reveries. So in the works of man, not in the railway or the telegraph, in the rattle or the flash of material forces that deafen or dazzle us, do we apprehend the presence of the most resistless power. Just as frequently, more frequently, perhaps, we recognize it in connection with those products of art which, though they seemingly may influence activity as slightly as the ministering angels of a dream, yet, like them too, come often summoning souls to high companionship, and everything that this can signify, with all that is most true and good and beautiful.

CHAPTER III.

FORM AND SIGNIFICANCE AS ANTAGONISTIC: CLASSICISM AND ROMANTICISM.

The Two Antagonistic Requirements of Art—Mention of the Symbolic—Of the Realistic or Naturalistic—Origin of the Terms Classic and Romantic—Classicism—Its Earlier Influence—Later Tendency toward Imitation—Toward Decline in Music and Poetry—In Painting and Sculpture—Reason of this in Architecture—Revivals in Styles—Romanticism—In it the Idea Supreme—But the Best Results are Developed from Previous Excellence in Form—Tendency of Romanticism in Music—Wagner's Dramatic Effects—Romanticism in Poetry—Whitman—In Painting and Sculpture—Early Christian Art—Beneficial Effects upon Romanticism of Classicism—Condition in our own Times—Architecture: Exclusive Classicism Debasing—Exclusive Romanticism Debasing—The Best Periods Manifest Both—Necessity of Considering the Double Character of Art.

IT has been shown that the kind of art, or of *nature made human*, which we are to consider in this book necessitates two things: first, a reproduction of the appearances of nature; and second, an expression of thought or feeling. These two requirements are apparently very different. How can any one who has to deal with art pay due regard to each and yet do full justice to both? This is a question which just here must evidently confront any attempts at solving the problems before us, whether theoretical or practical; and it must be answered. To show the difficulty of answering it, as well as the fact that the way in which the mind preserves or loses the balance between the two horns of the dilemma which the question

presents, let us, in this chapter, review briefly the results of the two main tendencies which, throughout the history of art, have respectively exemplified them. They are termed, conventionally, the classic and the romantic; and the methods for which they stand, however they may be named, have probably always existed and always will exist.

It is true that the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel, and later writers who have adopted his classifications, in an endeavor—always a perilous one—to harmonize the factors of historic and logical development, divide the tendencies of art into the symbolic, as in Assyria and Egypt, the classic, and the romantic. But the symbolic, in its earlier and more distinctive period, previous to the time when it becomes traditional and conventional and hence more or less classical, is really a preliminary phase of the romantic, from which in its incipency it does not differ in the radical sense, nor according to the same principle, in which both differ from the classic. We shall find that the germ of the latter is the conception, which inevitably tends to imitation, that art should chiefly emphasize the form; whereas the germ of both the symbolic in its initial stages and the romantic is the conception that the ideas expressed in the form should be chiefly emphasized. We shall find also that it is in the degree in which the balance is maintained between these two conceptions, that art-production of any kind is at its best.

It ought to be added here, too, in order to prevent misunderstanding, that neither of these tendencies is identical with the modern one that is termed *realistic* or *naturalistic*. This occupies a middle ground between the two, but not in the sense of necessarily embodying the best features of either. Like the classic, it emphasizes

the importance of form, if by this be meant a form that appears in nature, which fact it frequently takes as a sufficient justification for reproducing both the ugly and the vile; but unlike the classic, it is little guided to its results by forms that have previously appeared in art. Like the romantic again, the naturalistic emphasizes the importance of ideas, if these be such as are necessarily associated with the forms of nature; but unlike this, it is little guided to its results by such ideas or ideals, however suggested or wherever aimed, as are plainly due, in the main, to the artist's own imagination. With the tendencies of the naturalistic as thus understood we have nothing to do now. It will be noticed, however, that, so far as they lead astray, they do this because it is supposed to be all one to art whether its subjects be beautiful or deformed, or whether its effects be inspiring or debasing. The first of these suppositions evidently differs from that of classicism, which would not emphasize form as it does, unless having other conceptions with reference to the need of beauty in art. For a like reason the second supposition differs from that of romanticism, which would not emphasize ideas as it does, unless having other conceptions with reference to what effects art should produce upon the mind. With this general indication of the relationship of the three tendencies, we drop the consideration of the naturalistic for the present, and go back to the two that suggested this paragraph, namely, the *classic* and *romantic*.

What is meant by these terms as ordinarily used? Centuries ago, people who spoke one of the two languages, Greek or Latin, the degrees of proficiency in which even in our own colleges indicate the *class* to which a student belongs, and which everywhere since the revival

of learning have been termed, because the literature composed in them is supposed to belong to the highest class, the classic languages,—these people produced certain works of art, noticeably in poetry, sculpture, and architecture, that are still considered to equal, if not to excel, anything produced in modern times. For almost a thousand years, during the Middle Ages, this art was scarcely known, little appreciated, and seldom imitated. In the meantime, however, an artistic development manifested itself among the different Romanesque or Romantic nations, as they are termed, *i. e.*, nations both Latin and Gothic, formed from the fragments of the former Roman Empire. In architecture this development culminated in the style termed Gothic. In sculpture, years before the revival of learning, it produced statues and busts like those in Wells and Lincoln cathedrals, which in form are wellnigh perfect. In music and poetry it brought forth the songs of the troubadours and the minnesingers, and also the early rhyming chronicles and ballads. It gave rise, too, to the “mystery plays” and the “moralities,” and was the mainspring of the English drama.

About the fifteenth century, however, owing partly to the wars in the Orient and the attendant renewal of commercial intercourse with the East, partly to the fall of Constantinople and the consequent dispersion of Greek scholars through Europe, and partly to that general revival of interest in intellectual pursuits that soon afterward led to the Reformation, the older classic languages and art began to attract attention. The matured results, as they were, of a matured civilization, they could not but have a moulding influence upon the theory and practice of western art with which they were now brought into contact.

Whatever increases intelligence tends to increase intellectual power, and the influence of schoolmen learned in the classics was at first only beneficial. Nearly all modern literature in every country of Europe dates from the Renaissance. Painting and sculpture attained, at that time, an almost unprecedented degree of excellence; and the style of building originated by Brunelleschi, Bramante, and Alberti in Italy was based upon principles that still underlie the most successful street architecture for large cities, and which, artistically developed, might have led then, and might still lead, to results equalling anything termed Grecian or Gothic.

But increased intelligence tends to increase not only intellectual activity but also pedantry. The artistic expression of pedantry is imitation. As soon as that which was classic became fashionable, artists began to forget to embody their thoughts and feelings in what they produced. They paid attention to forms alone; even then to forms as they could be found, not in nature, but in celebrated works of art. With these for their models, and being artisans rather than artists, they attained the highest object of their ambition in the degree in which they attained success in copying. Their copying, moreover, necessarily extended, after a little, beyond the forms to the ideas expressed in them. The subjects of art came to be not modern nor even Christian, but ancient and mythologic. For these reasons, the production of something that imitates a previously existing form or subject is now one of the recognized meanings of the term classic. When the word was used first, Greece and Rome supplied the only classic products. Now any works of any nation are so called as soon as they have become admired sufficiently to be used as models. The

music of Bach and Haydn is now classic ; so, for English-speaking peoples, is the poetry of Shakespeare, though at the time when it was written it was a result of the opposite tendency. The same term is applied to certain modern—because resembling mediæval and ancient—styles of painting ; but never to Gothic architecture, though this might be done and not violate the meaning, which, broadly applied, the word has now come to have. It was the classic tendency that Ellis manifested when exclaiming to the rising Reynolds, “ This will never answer ; why, you do not paint in the least degree in the world in the manner of Kneller ! ” and then, while leaving the room and slamming the door, crying out in rage at Reynolds’ expostulations, “ Shakespeare in poetry and Kneller in painting for me ! ”

The results of this classic tendency, when manifested in excess, have been injurious to all the arts,—to music, of course, less than to the others, because all music of a high order is comparatively modern. Yet, as we know, before obtaining recognition, every successive composer with original musical methods, from Gluck to Wagner, has been obliged to fight hard and long against the classicists of his day. The works of two of our greatest English poets are not all that they might have been, merely because their desire to imitate classic models overbalanced a mode of expression natural to the current of their own thought in their own age. The “ Faerie Queen ” of Spenser, to use the language of Ferguson in his “ History of Modern Architecture,” Book IV., Introd., “ is a Christian romance of the Middle Ages, interlarded with classical names and ill-understood allusions to heathen gods and goddesses.” Whenever these latter are introduced, few fail to feel the presence of incongruity, and that this inter-

feres with artistic effects. Milton, again, might have given us a poem more unique, had he been as free as Shakespeare and Dante from the spirit of imitation which made him model his great epic upon the works of Homer and Virgil. The romantic tendency in poetry, however, that, with its modern forms giving expression to modern ideas with reference to modern subjects, rose imperceptibly in Spain, and, flowing through Provence and Normandy, broke in spray over England in the time of Chaucer, and watered it like a Nile-flood in that of Shakespeare, had but partly subsided in that of Milton. It receded entirely only in that high and dry "classic" age that immediately followed him, when nothing could have manifested less of the purely romantic than the poetry and criticism of the eighteenth century. Even then, however, the springs of the opposite tendency still lingered in humanity, and when our Revolution and the French Revolution had broken apart forms that had arbitrarily checked other sources of energy, this too burst forth with renewed vigor in the writings of Goethe and Schiller and Scott and Wordsworth.

The same principle is exemplified in the history of painting and sculpture. After original workers like Raphael, Angelo, Titian, Correggio, Claude, Rubens, Teniers, come the mere imitators, and we care scarcely to remember their names. Then art goes on degenerating, till, as fortunately in some of the schools of our own day, men arise who shake off the undue influence of the classic masters and look more immediately to present conditions and, in connection with these, to nature for their models. Thus they do, not *what* the former artists did, but *as* they did, and so pursue the only course through which it is ever possible to originate styles that, in their turn, will deserve to become classic.

It is hard enough to produce a work of art which is natural, when one models directly from nature. It is wellnigh impossible to do so, when one models merely or mainly from that which another man, however accurate his eye, has seen in nature. The work of the imitator will be as much inferior to the work of art after which he models, as the latter is to nature's original.

But of all the arts, architecture, perhaps mainly because of the double character of its products as both useful and æsthetic, has suffered the most from this classic tendency. In the majority of cases, what thought, what design, do we find embodied in the modern building? Of what inward plan are the outward forms an expression? Through the façade that confronts us, what can we read, what can we even guess, about the shapes or sizes or uses of the rooms that are behind it?

During the most of the present century, little more has been done than to imitate what have been thought to be the best features of Grecian, Gothic, or other styles. We have had what have been termed "revivals." Several decades ago, the effects of these showed themselves in a literal reproduction of Greek temples, with their porticos and high steps, certainly not by any means quite as convenient for a hurried merchant of the north on a sleety day, as for a lazy Oriental taking his ease where abundant shade could shelter him from the burning sun. In a form of imitation just as classic in its essence, this development was followed a little later by a literal reproduction, but a diminished one, of Gothic cathedrals, used indiscriminately for either markets or jails. Even when employed as by the older architects in church edifices, their excess of pillars often made them not at all adapted to modern requirements. After this came the "Queen

Anne" revival; and it is a sufficient commentary upon what it has done for us to notice how universally it is recognized as appropriate to term the style of some of the phases to which it has led, the "Bloody Mary" or the "Crazy Jane." The forms of these latter, however, really stand on the border line between the classic tendency of which we have been speaking and the romantic. This is so, because, although called "Queen Anne," they really manifest very little regard for the forms of this or of any classic style; often, indeed, very little for any new forms which one has a right to dignify by placing them among the possibilities of any style whatever.

The classic tendency being that which prompts the artist to imitate forms and subjects of the past, the romantic has come to mean just the opposite,—namely, that which allows the form to be determined solely by the exigencies of expression and the expression solely by the exigencies of the period. In fact, it is hardly right to say that this latter tendency has *come* to mean this,—it has always meant this. The mediæval pictures were poorly drawn. Their forms, as forms, were exceedingly defective. Yet they were fully successful in expressing exactly the religious ideas of the time. Similar conditions underlay also, as first developed, mediæval music, poetry, and sculpture.

This being so, it is evident that romanticism, if manifested to the total exclusion of classicism cannot lead to the best results. The same fact is still more evident when we consider that the forms and themes of all art of the highest character, whenever and wherever it appears, are developed upon lines of previously developed excellence; and that to model after others, even in a slight degree, is to manifest something of the classic tendency.

A Beethoven, for example, would have been improbable without a Haydn; a Raphael without a Perugino; a Tennyson without a Keats; Corinthian architecture without Doric; and decorated Gothic without pointed.

It is a question whether the most enduring work of even the most original artist is that in which he manifests to the full his tendency to forsake the methods of his predecessors. Wagner, for instance, will probably be remembered chiefly not for the extended passages in his "Siegfried" or "Tristan und Isolde," in which he carried his theories to excess; but for the passages mainly in the operas of his middle period, in which his themes were developed more in accordance with the requirements of form, as established by his predecessors. That he neglected these requirements is more evident, perhaps, in the works of his imitators than in his own. To say nothing of some of the songs that are now in vogue, the composers of which seem to have lost entirely the sense of form in melody, let the members of an opera troupe that has been devoted almost exclusively to the study of Wagner, attempt to render such an opera, say, as Gounod's "Faust"; and in view of the way in which they sing passages like those of the "Soldier's Chorus," or the "Old Man's Chorus," or the "Flower Song," one will have reason to ask himself whether these performers are not in danger of losing entirely the sense of form in even such a simple matter as musical rhythm. Wagner was, possibly, the greatest of musicians, and in the orchestration of some of his operas, noticeably "The Meister-singer," he introduced more melodies even, not to speak of harmonies, than alone would suffice to immortalize an ordinary composer; yet there is reason to fear that his followers, if they develop some of his peculi-

arities a little further, may ultimately produce successors who can really be benefited in their own chosen line of development by studying the art of music where our decorators, though not without justification, are now studying that of painting,—in China or Japan.

Even the dramatic effects, too, to which Wagner often sacrificed melody in song, seem to have been lessened by his insensibility to what might have been taught him by the experience of the past. There is that indisputable requirement of variety, for instance, which certainly is violated when, in an opera over four hours long, the monotony of continuous *recitative* is not relieved by a single duet or chorus. Again, there is that other equally indisputable requirement in dramatic representation of fidelity to the facts of nature. If it were regarded in "Tristan und Isolde," we should not have a clandestine meeting of lovers in which both often let fly explosive tones at the tops of their voices. Such are the tones neither of secrecy nor of love, which latter, in the degree in which it is deep-seated, expresses itself, not in quantity of tone, but in quality, and in force that is not explosive but suppressed—except, of course, in the case of the feline tribe; but it is reasonable to suppose that Wagner imagined himself to be working up a catastrophe that was not intended to be in any sense of the term inhuman.

To turn from music to poetry, almost everybody recognizes that Goethe and Schiller, who were, at first, exceedingly romantic, the one in "The Sorrows of Werther," the other in "The Robbers," would never have become the great artists that they did, had they not subsequently studied criticism and form, in which pursuits the classics of Greece and Rome, as well as those of England, aided

them not a little. Of English poets, Chaucer and Shakespeare both accepted from writers whom they succeeded, not only their romantic methods and themes, but even, in some cases, their plots and characters. The same is true of Scott, whose first literary work was to study and collect the "Ballads of the Border Minstrels." Among the most exclusively original and, in this sense, romantic, of modern poets, are Wordsworth, Browning, and Hugo. All, like Wagner, are really greatest when they fail to carry out fully their own theories, and write in a manner approximating that of others before them. The last two, with all their chaotic magnificence, would have produced works still more effective artistically, if their ruling tendency had been balanced by a little more of what they could have learned from the classics. Like Wagner again, both are excessively dramatic; yet both, like him, are given to almost interminable declamation, purely subjective in its nature, and therefore, in important particulars, undramatic.

Our American representative of the exclusively romantic tendency is Whitman. Most of his productions are entirely devoid of either metre, tune, or verse, nor do they treat of subjects in themselves æsthetic, or present them in picturesque phraseology. They are written at times in rhythm, but so is most prose; and the prose of some, both in spirit and form, is more poetic than that which his admirers call his poetry. That he has been a force in literature, no one can deny. The virility and suggestiveness both of his matter and manner cannot but affect for good, thoughtful minds able to appreciate their scope and meaning. But how many distinctive characteristics of poetic form do his works embody? And if works like these are to become the models of poetic form,

what, in the future, will separate poetry from poetic prose? If poetry, *per se*, be not destined, one of these days, to become a lost art, it is because the classic tendency, no trace of which Whitman manifests, will never be completely overcome.

The same lesson of the importance of holding on to the traditions and teachings of the art of preceding periods, is taught still more strikingly, perhaps, in the history of painting and sculpture. The majority of the extant Assyrian and Egyptian pictures and statues of the so-called symbolic style show that the story, the idea to be presented, was uppermost in the mind of the artist. So long as those for whom this story was depicted recognized that a particular figure was intended to represent a man or an animal, absolute fidelity to the appearances of the forms in nature after which it was modelled was of minor importance. There was an earlier period of very high attainment in Egypt, however, and a later one in Greece, in which form as form was an end in itself. The Greek artists and their pupils continued to regard it in this light for many centuries. But with the rise of Christianity, artists, if we may call them this, sprang up, whose main object, like that of most of the Egyptians, was, through the use of symbolic illustrations, to communicate to the common people, who could not have interpreted less graphic forms, religious conceptions.

The earlier of these artists had undoubtedly enjoyed the benefit of Greek culture; and it would have been no detriment to the religious effectiveness of pictorial art, had all of them continued to remain acquainted with what this had taught them of the principles underlying correct drawing and coloring. But these principles were forgotten or neglected; and, for almost a thousand years,

because wholly uninfluenced by the methods of the Greek classic artists, no sculptures or paintings such as would be thoroughly admired in our day, were produced. After a time, however, even out of this state, artists arose of such excellence that their works became standards and thus, too, the bases of imitation and further development.

It was only after this at least partial revival of the classic tendency, that Romanesque art began to produce what, as art, is, in our time, worthy of attention. Finally, with the revival of classic learning, the older methods of the Greeks began to be practised again ; and in the works of men like Angelo and Raphael, we have the Christian ideas of the period embodied in forms worthy of the Greek masters. It certainly was unfortunate for the artists who lived in mediæval times that it took a thousand years and more to find those who had sufficient sense to know how to strike the balance between the romantic and classic tendencies, and to give due weight to both.

But that it should take this length of time should not appear strange to any who have noticed the tendencies of art in our own age. To have that breadth of view which is able to balance apparently conflicting extremes and to perceive how both can influence the same product, is apparently the least common of human traits, especially in those who have dealings with art, either as producers or critics. For instance, no one will deny, probably, that most of the present French painters of the highest rank excel in imitation, *i. e.*, in reproducing the exact appearances of nature ; or that most of the English painters excel in expression, *i. e.*, in arranging these appearances so as to be significant of ideas. As a consequence, the French are accused by their detractors of caring only for *technique*, and the English, especially

so far as their arrangements suggest a story, of being *literary*.

But why cannot and why should not a work of art be equally successful in imitation and in expression, in execution and in invention?—there is no reason except that the most of us are narrow in our aims and sympathies, and prefer to have our art as contracted and one-sided as ourselves. But this is not the spirit that will ever lead to the development of great art. It may foster the mechanical school, where everything runs to line, and the impressionist, where everything runs to color, but it will not always blend both lines and colors sufficiently to produce even satisfactory form, and it will never make this form an inspiring presence by infusing into it the vitality of that thought and feeling which alone can entitle it to be a work of the humanities.

Reference has been made already to the way in which, in accordance with the operation of the classic tendency, the different styles of architecture are developed from one another. The Greek, for instance, passed from the Doric through the Ionic and Corinthian to the Composite; and the Gothic passed from the Romanesque, through that of the Pointed Arch to the Decorated and the Tudor. But while it is true that the very highest developments of art have usually appeared some time after the sway of what we might term the classic tendency has begun, it is also true that the continuance of this sway has ultimately debased the art. Composite Greek architecture and Tudor-Gothic are universally recognized to rank lower than the styles preceding them, though higher than the ones which followed. In this art, too, therefore, the classic tendency alone cannot lead to the most satisfactory results.

Again, it will be noticed that the methods manifesting the Romantic tendency, have full sway only when a new style is beginning, or—what is the same thing—when an old style is being discarded. Periods of this kind, too, are never those in which we find produced the best works; and, accordingly, the romantic tendency alone cannot lead to the most satisfactory results. These latter appear almost universally in the middle period of a style, the period in which the romantic tendency is still working, and the classic is not yet predominating.

When a style is just beginning to be developed, a builder, having learned nothing from his own experience or that of others, necessarily makes mistakes. His work is the expression of his thought. It is original; but not always artistic. Much later on, in the development of the style, precisely the opposite condition is found. The highest conception of the builder seems to be that his forms should be modelled—not partly, which would be unobjectionable, but entirely,—upon those of preceding buildings, ancient or modern. These preceding buildings are either wholly copied by him, in which case the new product is a mere imitation; or else several different buildings are copied in part, and in part combined with other forms that he originates; in which case, because the method in accordance with which such forms as he combines were brought together by the earlier architects is not known, often not even studied, his new product is incongruous. Its effects are produced with too little regard for the considerations which must have influenced those who produced the original forms which are imitated—namely, the requirements of the design of the building and of the eye and mind as affected by great natural laws like those of propriety, proportion, and symmetry.

In fact, in whatever way we may look at this subject, we shall find that the one thing which can enable an architect to produce that which, so long as it survives, may have a right to claim attention as, in its own style, a model, is for him to bear in mind the double character of all artistic effects. Depending partly upon outward form, which mainly requires a practice of the method pursued in classic art, and partly upon the thought or design embodied in the form, which mainly requires a practice of the method pursued in romantic art, these artistic effects appeal partly to the outward senses and partly to the inward mind ; and only when they appeal to both are the highest possibilities of any art realized.

CHAPTER IV.

ART-FORMS AS REPRESENTING RATHER THAN IMITATING NATURAL FORMS.

Necessity for Making the Requirements of Form and Sentiment in Art Seem One—Necessity of Finding a Bond of Unity between the Arts and their Aims—Two Requirements Radically Different—The Results of this upon Theories and Methods—Can the Two Requirements be Made to Seem One?—The Character of Artistic Reproduction of Natural Forms not merely Imitative: In Music—In Poetry—In Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture—Why Imitation alone is not Sufficient—Art must Reproduce the Effect of Nature upon the Mind—This Done by Representation—Connection between this Fact and the Appeal of Art to Imagination—To the Sympathies—In Music—Poetry—Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture—The Artist's Reason for Reproducing the Forms of Nature with Accuracy.

IT is natural that the practical developments of art just considered, tending to emphasize on the one hand form and on the other hand significance, should manifest themselves in the theories that, in different ages, have been propounded with reference to the subject. "What is the bond of unity," inquires Mr. E. S. Dallas, the eloquent and suggestive author of "The Gay Science," "which knits poetry and the fine arts together? What is the common ground upon which they rest? What are we to understand by the sisterhood of the Muses? . . . Whenever the philosopher has encountered this question, as a first step to a science of criticism, he has come forward with one of two answers. All attempts

to rear such a science are based on the supposition either that poetry and the fine arts have a common method or that they have a common theme. Either with Aristotle it is supposed that they follow the one method of imitation; or with men whose minds are more Platonic, though Plato is not one of them, it is supposed that they are the manifestations of one great idea."

Without dwelling upon the exact connection suggested by this author between these two general conceptions of art and the theories of Aristotle and Plato, which will be considered in Chapter XV., it will be noticed that all that has been said thus far naturally leads us to accept his general conclusion that "both the suppositions upon which these two systems rest, are delusive," except that we might modify it by saying that each is delusive in the degree in which it disregards whatever of truth there may be in the other. So far as the arts reproduce natural form they must, to some extent, follow a method of imitation. So far as they express thought or feeling they must to some extent be manifestations of ideas, even if not "of one great idea."

But if we say no more than this, it is evident that we have not said enough to obtain a working theory that will effectually meet the practical difficulties suggested in the last chapter. Still less have we obtained a theory that, however it may solve the problem of conflicting aims as manifested in a single art, can be applied to these as manifested in the different arts, which latter is the chief consideration influencing Mr. Dallas when referring to "the bond of unity knitting poetry and the fine arts together," "the common ground upon which they rest." His general inference, however, is universal in its application, whether it be made to refer to the different aims

of a single art or to the aim of this as related to that of other arts. If for instance we emphasize the fact that art reproduces the appearances of *nature*, we thrust sculpture and painting into prominence. We term these "the fine arts," and music or poetry on the one hand, and architecture on the other, are classed in the same company only by a doubtful courtesy which allows them to cling to the skirts of the former. If, again, we emphasize the fact that the arts are *human*, in that they are means of communicating thought and feeling, then literature and poetry are unduly exalted. Nor does the emphasis of either fact do justice either to music or to architecture. But is it not surmisable that each of these facts should result from some other fact, and that this fact should be equally recognizable in the reproduction of forms in nature and in the expression of the formative thought and feeling in the artist's mind? If so, is it not evident that we can classify all the arts according to the one fact, and arrange them according to the influence upon each art of each of the other two facts, and that, thus doing, we can find a place somewhere where each art, when so arranged, can stand without danger of having the qualities that render it artistic either exaggerated or belittled?

With this suggestion in mind, let us examine again more carefully the conflicting factors before us, as represented in the two different requirements of art with which we are dealing. They are the reproduction of the appearances of nature and the communication of thought and feeling; or, as is usually said, *imitation* and *expression*. There is no doubt that if these two could be shown to involve practically the same mental process, this result would be of great advantage not only to a proper understanding of the fundamental principles of all art, but also to

facility in the application of them. Yet, at first thought, the two seem very different. How then can they be made to seem not so?

In order to answer this question satisfactorily, we must begin by understanding distinctly the conditions of the two factors to be considered in it; in other words, we must determine, in a general way, at least, just what is to be done by the artist in view of each of the requirements of art to which they refer. Take the first of them—the reproduction of the appearances of nature. What is the character of this reproduction? Is it literally and exclusively an imitation? Or being this at times, is it also, at times, something more? Let others decide this. “This principle of imitation,” says Hegel, to quote from the “Critical Exposition” of his “*Æsthetics*,” as translated by J. S. Kedney, Part I., Chap. I., “cannot even apply to all the arts. If it can seemingly justify itself in sculpture and painting, what does it mean in architecture, or in any poetry other than mere description? This is mere suggestion, not imitation.”

But to consider the question as related to each of the arts individually, how is it with music? “What has music done,” asks H. R. Haweis in his “*Music and Morals*,” “for the musician? She has given him sound, not music. Nowhere does there fall upon his ear, as he walks through the wide world, such an arrangement of consecutive sounds as can be called a musical subject or theme or melody. Far less does he find anything that can be described as musical harmony. The thunder is not affecting because it is melodic, but because it is loud and elemental. The much extolled note of the lark is only pleasant because associated with the little warbler, the ‘sightless song’ in the depths of the blue sky; for

when the lark's trill is so exactly imitated (as it can be with a whistle in a tumbler full of water) that it deceives the very birds themselves, it ceases to be in the least agreeable, just as the sound of the wind, which can also be well imitated by any one compressing his lips and moaning, ceases under such circumstances to be in the least romantic. The nightingale's song, when at its best, has the advantage of being a single and not unpleasantly loud whistle. That, too, can be imitated so as to defy detection. But once let the veil of night be withdrawn, and the human nightingale disclosed, and we shall probably all admit that his performance is dull, monotonous, and unmeaning."

How is it in the art of poetry? "The very existence of poetry," says Sir Joshua Reynolds in his thirteenth "Discourse on Painting," "depends on the license it assumes of departing from actual nature in order to gratify natural propensities by other means which are found by experience fully as capable of affording such gratification. It sets out with a language in the highest degree artificial, a construction of measured words such as never is and never was used by man. Let this measure be what it may, . . . rhyme or blank verse . . . all are equally removed from nature." In a less degree the same might be affirmed, perhaps, of the rhetoric of oratory. "Did you ever hear me preach?" demanded Coleridge of Lamb. "I never heard you do anything else," was the reply.

Turn now to painting, sculpture, and architecture. In the latter of these arts, the evidences of adaptation so overbalance those of imitation, that it is the presence of the latter rather than its predominance, that needs to be proved. With reference to painting, Henry Fuseli, in

the first of his "Lectures on Painting," says even of Aristotle and other ancient writers, usually quoted as advocating the view that all art is imitation: "Their imitation was essential, characteristic, and ideal. The first cleared nature of accident, defect, excrescence; the second formed the stamen which connects character with the central form; the third raised the whole and the parts to the highest degree of unison." And in his fourth lecture, when treating of the most imitative department of painting, that of portraiture, he speaks of "that characteristic portrait by which Silanion in the face of Apollodorus personified habitual indignation; Apelles in Alexander, superhuman ambition; Raphael in Julio II., pontifical fierceness; Titian in Paul III., testy age with priestly subtlety, and in Machiavelli and Cæsar Borgia, the wily features of conspiracy and treason . . . that portrait by which Rubens contrasted the physiognomy of philosophic and classic acuteness with that of genius in the conversation piece of Grotius, Memmius, Lipsius, and himself." Again he says: "The landscape of Titian, of Salvator, of the Poussins, Claude, Rubens, Elzheimer, Rembrandt, and Wilson, spurn all relation with map work." "It does not look like a man which it is not," declares Ruskin, referring to statuary, "Modern Painters," Part I., Sec. I., Ch. III., "but like the form of a man which it is. Form is form, *bona fide* and actual, whether in marble or in flesh, not an imitation or resemblance of form." "If the producing of a deception," remarks Sir Joshua Reynolds significantly in his tenth "Discourse on Painting," "is the summit of this art, let us at once give to statues the addition of color." "Art," says W. W. Story, the sculptor, in a late article in "Blackwood's Magazine" entitled "Recent Conversations in a Studio," "art is art

because it is not nature ; and could we absolutely produce anything by means of form, tone, color, or any other means, so as actually to deceive, it would at once fail to interest the mind and heart as art. However we might, on being undeceived, wonder at the skill with which it was imitated, we should not accept it as a true work of art. It is only so long as imitative skill is subordinated to creative energy and poetic sensibility that it occupies its proper place. . . . The most perfect imitation of nature is therefore not art. It must pass through the mind of the artist and be changed. . . . Art is nature reflected through the spiritual mirror and tinged with all the sentiment, feeling, passion of the spirit that reflects it."

Evidently the general idea underlying all these quotations, even when it is not explicitly stated, serves to confirm what we have already found in this essay, namely, that imitation in art does not suffice because, in addition to it, there must be an expression of thought or feeling. The object in view in making these quotations, however, has not been merely to confirm what has been said hitherto, but to furnish a trustworthy beginning for that advance in thought promised at the opening of the chapter. The question before us is, whether it is possible to state in a single proposition exactly what that is, in all cases, which, according to the acknowledgment of the best authorities, is neither merely an imitation nor merely an expression. In order to attain our end, let us go back and examine once more the words of Dr. Haweis. He says that imitation is not sufficient because the reproduction of sounds like those of the lark, the wind, or the nightingale is not accompanied by a blue sky, romance, or a veil of darkness. By this he means that they are

not accompanied by that which recalls, in connection with them, the associations of nature. But what are these associations, and how can they be recalled? Are they other forms which, for a satisfactory effect, need to be imitated in addition to those that are imitated? How could one imitate, in connection with a whistle, a blue sky, or romance, or night? A blue sky might be imitated by passing from the element of sound to that of sight, and producing a picture; but, even then, and still more in the cases of romance and night, the association could not be reproduced except indirectly through an appeal to the mind. What is needed is an *association of ideas*, in other words, an appeal to thought or feeling in connection with the appeal (not lacking in the imitation) to the ear.

How can we describe, in general terms, applicable in all special cases, this condition, in which there is needed an additional appeal to thought or feeling? How better than by saying that mere imitation is not satisfactory, because, notwithstanding it, *the effects of nature upon the mind* are not reproduced. Art is the work of a man possessing more than merely physical senses. The reason why he desires at all to construct an art-form, is because natural forms have produced an effect upon his mind. And it is this effect that he wishes to reproduce. If he can do it by mere imitation, well and good; but there are many cases in which he cannot do it thus. Yet even then, even in poetry, in which, as shown in the quotation from Sir Joshua Reynolds, the imitative element is often very slight, who can fail to perceive that, as in the "Voices of the Night" of Longfellow, or the tragedies of Shakespeare, *the effects of nature upon the mind* may be reproduced; that the reader or hearer feels sad or joyous,

weeps or laughs, precisely as he would, were he, in natural life, to experience the actual moods or perceive the actual events imaginatively presented to his contemplation? A similar principle evidently applies also to the products of painting, sculpture, and architecture. When we say that it is the work of art to reproduce *the effects of nature as exerted through eye or ear upon the mind*, there is no doubt that we have put into a single phrase that which, at once, renders it impossible to exclude from consideration either imitation or expression, and at the same time makes it imperative to include something of both, no matter how much literalness of meaning we apply to either.

The effects of nature as exerted through eye or ear upon the mind being the material of art what is its method? For we must not forget that to find this latter is the chief object of our present inquiry. Let us notice if there be any term in our language which, according to etymology and conventional usage, can always be employed to designate this method, even though applied with as much apparent difference as in music and in portraiture? If there be such a term, it is evident that to use it will contribute greatly to clear thinking upon this subject. There is such a term. It is the word *represent*, meaning in its verbal form "to present again," which is precisely what the artist does with the forms presented for his use by nature. To represent, moreover, means, according to Webster, "to present again either by image, by action, by symbol, or by substitute," and there is no possible method of reproducing natural forms in art that cannot be included under one of these heads. An orchestral passage in an opera, or a declamatory scene in a drama, does not, strictly speaking, copy or imitate, but it does *represent* an exchange of thought between a demi-god

and a forest bird, as in Wagner's "Siegfried," or a conversation between historic characters as in Shakespeare's "Henry the Eighth." A painting of a man on canvas, or a statue of him in marble, does not, strictly speaking, copy or imitate a man, who, actually considered, could be neither flat nor white; but it does *represent* him. Columns, arches, and roofs do not, by any means, copy or imitate, but they do *represent* the trunks and branches and water-shedding leaves of the forest. Nothing in fact that a man can make of the materials at his disposal can, strictly speaking, copy or imitate in all its features that which is found in nature; but he can always represent this.

It is precisely for this reason, too, because art does and can represent, and does not and need not literally imitate, that the faculty through which it exerts its chief influence upon the mind, as has been so often observed but seldom explained, is the *imagination*. A literal imitation, leaving nothing for the imagination to do, does not stimulate its action. Whistles or bells in music; common-place phrases or actions in poetry; and indiscriminate particularities of detail in the work of pencil, brush, or chisel, usually produce disenchanting effects entirely aside from those that we feel to be legitimate to art. This is largely because the artist, in such cases, has forgotten that his object is not to imitate but to represent. It is well to observe here, too, that an effect, appealing primarily to the imagination, necessarily passes through it into all the faculties of mind; and therefore that the distinctive interest awakened in them all by works of art is really due to that which affects first the imagination.

The fact that art represents explains, too, in part at

least, the sympathetic interest awakened by its products, an interest often noticed and as often deemed essential. To what can this with better reason be attributed than to a recognition of the difficulties overcome—as must always be the case where a form of presentation is changed—when producing in one medium effects that appear in nature in another, and to a consequent appreciation of the particular originality and skill of the individual artist who has overcome such difficulties?

To apply these statements to the different arts, it is mainly owing to a lack of all appeal to the imagination or the sympathies, that accurate imitations of the sounds that come from birds, beasts, winds, and waters fail to affect us as do notes which are recognized to be produced by wind and stringed instruments in the passages descriptive of the influence of a forest, in Wagner's opera of "Siegfried," or in the "Pastoral Symphonies" of Handel and Beethoven. Nor do any number of tones imitating exactly the expressions of love, grief, or fright compare, in their influence upon us, with the representations of the same in the combined vocal and instrumental melodies and harmonies of love songs, dirges, and tragic operas. The truth of this may be more readily conceded in an art, like music, perhaps, than in some of the other arts; for in it the imitative elements are acknowledged to be at a minimum. To such an extent is this the case, in fact, that some have declared it to be *presentative* rather than *representative*, not recognizing that a use of the elements of *duration*, *force*, *pitch*, and *quality*, such as enables us to distinguish between a love-song, a dirge, and a tragic passage, would altogether fail to convey their meaning, unless there were something in the movement to *represent* ideas or emotions which we were accustomed to associate

with similar movements as they are *presented* in nature, especially as they are presented in natural speech.

But how, it may be asked, is it with poetry? Is it true that our interest in this art is owing to the representation in it? Why not? Figurative language that calls up to imagination scenes that are described, is not necessarily imitative but it always is representative; and an imitation, so exact apparently that we should think it written down within hearing, of the ravings of a mad king, or of lamentations at the loss of a friend, would not appeal to us like what we know to be merely *representations* of these in the blank verse of Shakespeare's "King Lear," or in the rhyming verse of Tennyson's "In Memoriam." The talk of the phonograph will never be an acceptable substitute for the soliloquy or dialogue of the artistic drama or novel.

A like fact is true of the photograph. For the very reason that it is an imitation, in the sense of being a literal presentation, of every outline on which the light at the time when it was taken happened to fall, it does not awaken in us the kind or degree of imaginative interest or of sympathy that we feel in paintings or statues. Unlike the impressions that we receive from the photograph, in gazing at these latter, we feel that we are looking through an artist's eye, seeing only what he saw or thought fit for us to see, and that everything in them is traceable to the skill displayed by him in transferring what in nature is presented in one medium into another, as in delineating flesh and foliage through the use of color and in turning veins and lace into marble. The same principle applies in architecture. The man of the backwoods who came to an early centre of civilization, and stood before the first stone colonnade that he had

seen, was not charmed with it because it imitated so exactly the row of poles that supported the projecting eaves of the huts which for centuries had been constructed by his ancestors; his delight was owing to the fact of his perceiving in another material, exceedingly difficult to work, that which *represented* the forms presented to his view at home.

In fact of whatever art we may be speaking, it will not do to say that its sole aim is to imitate nature, not even, putting it in a milder form, that it is to reproduce the appearances of nature. Few would surmise this aim in the case of either music, poetry, or architecture; and in the quotations from artists and art-critics at the opening of the chapter, it was shown that, in their opinion, such is not the aim primarily in either painting or sculpture. The most that can be said with truth, is that the forms of nature are reproduced by the artist with the aim of having them appear to others as they have appeared to himself, as they have exerted an effect upon his mind, as they have influenced his thoughts and feelings. Of course, in order to accomplish this aim merely, he must represent the appearances so as to recall their state in nature, and, where imitation is demanded, he must imitate with accuracy. But he would be the last in the world to acknowledge that he has added to his work nothing originated in his own brain, and that what he has produced is a simple reproduction. He considers it a representation.

CHAPTER V.

ART-FORMS AS REPRESENTING RATHER THAN COMMUNICATING THOUGHT AND FEELING.

The Second Requirement of Art—The Materials of Artistic Expression—The End of it not to Communicate Thought or Feeling—Distinct Communication Lacks the Reproduction of Effects of Nature which Art Needs—Art Emphasizes the Natural Factors Used in Expression—Elaboration of Art-Forms Necessitates Repetition—These Constructed by Repeating Like Effects in Music—Poetry—Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture—Repetition Involves Representation—As Does all Expression, whether Thought Comes from without the Mind—Or from within it—Representation the Method of the Higher Arts—These Represent the Effects of Nature upon the Mind and also of the Mind upon Nature—Connection between this Latter Fact and the Expression in Art of Imagination—And of Personality—Why Art Elaborates Expressional Methods—Artistic Uses of Nature as Revealing Personality and Suggesting God—Art Creative—Possibly so in a very Deep Sense—The Divine Faculty.

NOW let us examine the second requirement of art, namely, that it should be *expressive*, by which is meant here that it should be a means of communicating thought and feeling. What is the character of artistic expression? or, to divide the question, in order to answer it satisfactorily, what are the materials used in this expression, and how are they used?

The materials need not detain us long. As shown in Chapter II., the germs of them all are furnished by certain of the possibilities of voice and action, through which men naturally manifest to their fellows that with which

their minds are occupied. These possibilities, too, before being adapted to the purposes of art, have already been developed as in intonation, language, drawing, coloring, stone-cutting, and house-building. Evidently, it is the difference in method between that which produces these latter and that which produces the higher results of art, that we are to try to discover in this chapter.

Every method is a means to an end; for which reason we can never come to a satisfactory conclusion with reference to a method until we have exactly determined its end. As related to the fact that the higher arts are human we have found that they involve a communication of thought or feeling. But is it true, in any sense, that their object or chief object is to communicate this, even though it be done not in an ordinary manner, but in one so effective that it may be termed extraordinary? Let us answer this question in a practical way, by applying it to each of the arts. If the communication of thought or feeling be their chief object, they ought to attain this object better than does any other form of expression that is not so artistic. Do they? Do poetry, painting, and sculpture, to say nothing of music and architecture, which all men know to be very deficient in ability to convey definite information of any kind—do poetry, painting, and sculpture give a more satisfactory expression to thought or feeling, in the sense of indicating more clearly exactly what a particular thought or feeling is, than do sounds and sights as they are used in ordinary speech and writing? The moment we ask the question, we are ready to answer, No. A frequent effect of making any method of communication more artistic is to make it less intelligible; and probably no form of art is ever quite so easy to understand as the unelaborated form of natural expression

from which it is developed. As a rule, sighs, laughs, shrieks, wails, can communicate, and cause a listener to realize, too, the particular thought or feeling to which they give expression far more unmistakably than is possible for a musical passage, unaccompanied by words, whatever may be the amount of its hush, trill, force, or pathos. As a rule, a plain, direct utterance of sentiment, or statement of fact, is far more readily apprehended, if that be all that is desired, than the most imaginative effort of poetry. As a rule, a few objects carelessly but clearly drawn or carved, even if as rudely as in an ancient hieroglyph—a few tree-trunks roughly built together for support and shelter, can convey intelligence of their purpose much more distinctly than works of painting or sculpture or architecture upon which men have expended years of labor. Were the communication of thought or feeling the object of art, it would be a very senseless undertaking to try to attain this object and expend years of labor upon it by making the forms of communication from which art is developed less communicative.

Yet, evidently, these forms of natural expression—intonation, speech, drawing, coloring, constructing,—just at the point where most satisfactory as means of communicating thought and feeling, lack something that art needs. What is this? It is not difficult to tell, and is clearly suggested by all that has been unfolded thus far in this essay. They lack that which can be given, in connection with expression, by the reproduction of the effects of nature. Penmanship and hieroglyphics lack the appearances of nature that are copied in painting and sculpture. Prose lacks the figures of speech and descriptions that in poetry are constantly pointing attention to the same appearances; and, as shown in the last chapter, even the elements sub-

sequently developed into music and architecture lack traces of a very keen observation and extensive use of effects in nature which would not need to be observed or used at all, were the end in view attainable by the mere communication of thought or feeling. Were communication the object of effort, the elaboration of the forms of nature would cease at the point where it became sufficient for this purpose. Indeed, as Hegel says, according to J. S. Kedney's translation in his "Critical Exposition" of that philosopher's "*Æsthetics*," the form of art is mere "surplusage if its mission is only to teach, and all the delight we receive from art-representations might as well be missed."

These facts confirm what has been said hitherto with reference to the two requirements of art ; but, as in the last chapter so here, that which we wish to do is to find a single proposition stating exactly what, in all cases, that method is which involves neither merely the one nor the other. The last paragraph shows us that expression in art differs from ordinary forms of expression in the emphasis given to the effects of nature, as factors of the expressional form. All expression, in order to be what it is, in order to convey audible and visible information of inaudible and invisible thought and feeling, necessitates a use of the sights and sounds furnished by nature. Only art emphasizes this use of them. Notice that, in doing so, art does not emphasize the thought and feeling in themselves ; and this is the reason why it is not solely an expression of these. What art emphasizes is the use that by way of development is made of the factors of expression. What music emphasizes, for instance, grows out of the possibilities of rhythm, melody, and harmony in sound ; what poetry emphasizes, grows out of the possi-

bilities of rhythm, figurative language, description, and characterization ; what painting and sculpture emphasize, grows out of the possibilities of outline, color, pose, and situation ; what architecture emphasizes, grows out of the possibilities of support, shelter, strength, and elevation. In short, what all art emphasizes in expression, is not the thought and feeling of it, but the effect which the thought and feeling have had upon the factors of it ; in other words, the *effect that the mind has had upon the appearances of nature.*

Now, waiving, for a little, any questions that may be suggested inquiring into reasons, let us accept the fact merely as a fact, and notice the method necessitated on the part of the artist. This is universally and inevitably the same. Inasmuch as every form employed in art is chosen because it is a natural mode of human expression, having a recognized meaning, it is impossible for the artist to change the form essentially. If changed, the form would not continue to convey the same significance in art that it conveyed in the natural mode of expression which occasioned his selection of the form. And yet, to make the form artistic, he must, in some way, work over it, labor with it, elaborate it, as is said. The only way of elaborating it without changing its effect upon the mind, is to cause whatever is added to repeat the general effect of that to which it is added. Only in the degree in which this is done, will the elaborated form as a whole have the same significance that its germ had before it was elaborated.

Bearing in mind this plain deduction from first principles, we shall not be surprised to find that the one method of composition common to all the arts is to group about the form that is first selected as a nucleus

of expression, other forms that are like it, or if, in order to prevent monotony, slightly changed, are at least allied to it. In other words, the method of art-composition is, above all else, a method of repeating effects. To illustrate this statement, look first at music; and, to begin with, take those forms of it which seem constructed the most arbitrarily. What is rhythm or metre? Nothing but a development of sounds based upon a repetition of similar intervals of time in notes and rests. What, wherever found, or however varied, is the musical scale that conditions all our present systems of melody and harmony? Nothing, as might be shown, but a repetition and emphasizing of the possibilities of pitch already existing in compounds of the tone that forms the keynote. But to pass to a region where the underlying facts are better understood, how is a song or a symphony that is expressive of any given feeling, composed? Always thus: a certain duration, force, pitch, or quality, of voice, varied two or three times, is recognized to be a natural form of expression for a certain state of mind,—satisfaction, grief, ecstasy, fright, as the case may be. A musician takes this form of sound, and adds to it other forms that in rhythm or modulation or both, repeat it, or vary it in such subordinate ways as constantly to suggest it; and thus he elaborates a song expressive of satisfaction, grief, ecstasy, or fright. Or if it be a symphony, the method is the same. The whole, intricate as it may appear, is developed by repetitions of the same effects, varied almost infinitely but in such ways as constantly to suggest a few notes or chords which form the theme or themes.

Look, again, at the method underlying construction in poetic form. What are rhythm, verse, metre, rhyme,

alliteration, assonance? Nothing but repetitions of the same effects of sound, obtained by putting like with like. What is the method underlying construction in poetic thought? Nothing but a repetition of the same particular or general idea in different phraseology or figures, *e. g.* :

And what is music then? Then music is
 Even as the flourish when true subjects bow
 To a new-crowned monarch ; such it is,
 As are those dulcet sounds in break of day,
 That creep into the dreaming bridegroom's ear,
 And summon him to marriage.

Merchant of Venice, iii., ii.—*Shakespeare*.

Brutus and Cæsar : what should be in that Cæsar ?
 Why should that name be sounded more than yours ?
 Write them together, yours is as fair a name ;
 Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well ;
 Weigh them, it is as heavy ; conjure with them,
 " Brutus " will start a spirit as soon as " Cæsar."

Julius Cæsar, i., ii—*Idem*.

'T is not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
 Nor customary suits of solemn black,
 Nor windy suspiration of forced breath ;
 No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
 Nor the dejected haviour of the visage
 Together with all forms, modes, shows of grief,
 That can denote me truly.

Hamlet, i., ii.—*Idem*.

Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased ;
 Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow ;
 Raze out the written troubles of the brain ;
 And with some sweet oblivious antidote
 Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff
 Which weighs upon the heart ?

Macbeth, v., iii.—*Idem*.

What, too, is poetic treatment of a subject as a whole in an epic or a drama? Nothing but the repeated delineation of the same general conception or character as manifested or developed amid different surroundings of time or place.

How now are the forms of painting, sculpture, and architecture composed? Every one knows that, as a rule, certain like lines, arches, or angles are repeated in the columns, cornices, doors, windows, and roofs of buildings. Few, perhaps, without instruction, recognize that the same principle is true as applied to both the outlines and colors through which art delineates the scenery of land or water or the limbs of living creatures. But one thing none fail to recognize: this is that, in the highest works of art, every special effect repeats, as a rule, the general effect. In the picture of a storm, for instance, every cloud, wave, leaf, bough, repeats, as a rule, the storm's effect; in the statue of a sufferer, every muscle in the face or form repeats, as a rule, the suffering's effect; in the architecture of a building—if of a single style—every window, door, and dome repeats, as a rule, the style's effect.

To extend this subject here would be to anticipate what is to follow. It suffices to say again that the method in which art elaborates a natural form of expression without changing its meaning is to repeat it with, of course, any amount of variety consistent with this. But now, what is a form of expressing thought and feeling, as it appears in nature, but a method of presenting these? And what is a repetition of the form but a method of re-presenting them? In fact, while it is not true, in all cases, that there is literal repetition,—for, as has been intimated all along, and will be brought out more clearly in

another place, effects are often greatly varied—it is true, in all cases, that the natural form of expression is literally represented. To represent, both according to etymology and to conventional usage, means,—to quote from Webster again,—“to present a second time by a transcript what was originally presented to the mind.” This is exactly what is done when forms of expression are repeated with the effect of repeating that which is expressed through them.

The possibility of this kind of representation exists, of course, in the very nature of all expression. Otherwise there could be no artistic development of it. The fact of the existence of this possibility is evident the moment that we consider the sources of the thought or feeling which a man expresses. These are either outside of his mind or inside of it. If they be outside of it, the thoughts and feelings come from what we mean in this essay by nature. But if they come from this, they are suggested to him by a form of nature, and if he wish to communicate them to others, to accomplish his object he must use this form. If he be thinking or feeling about a sound or sight, he must refer to this sound or sight; and, in order to express his thoughts or feelings concerning it, he must do something with it in the way of reshaping, rearranging, or recombining it. In other words, in order to use nature so as to express thought and feeling, he must not present it as he finds it, but re-present it.

Suppose, however, that the sources of the thought or feeling to which he wishes to give utterance lie within his mind. How must he express them then? He cannot do it at all except by making an appeal to the eye or ear, or to some other of the outward senses of those whom he wishes to address. But there is nothing in thought and

feeling as they exist in the mind capable of making such an appeal. They are beyond the apprehension of the senses. They are immaterial, and cannot be presented directly through a material medium. They must therefore be presented indirectly. They must be re-presented.

But while all expression is thus representative, only that which is elaborated, in the ways explained in this chapter, for the distinctive purpose of representation can rightly be termed representative by way of distinction.

It was noticed in the last chapter that to *represent*, meaning to *present again* by image, by action, by symbol, or by substitute, indicates accurately what the artist does in all cases in which, in accordance with the first requirement of art, he reproduces the appearances of nature. Now we find that the same word indicates accurately what he does in all cases in which, in accordance with the second requirement, he uses these forms for the purpose of expressing thought and feeling. The word *represent*, therefore, is a term applicable to the action of his mind when fulfilling both requirements. Moreover, when we recall that we have found, in addition to this, that what is represented in accordance with the first requirement is *the effects of nature upon the mind*; and, in accordance with the second requirement, is *the effects of the mind upon nature*, we have suggested to us by each of the terms, *representation* and *effects*, a sense in which both requirements of art, though apparently necessitating ends and methods distinct and different, really necessitate one and the same thing. Is it not a clear deduction from what has been said up to this point that art represents the *reciprocal effects of nature and of mind*? The word *effects*, as thus used, including, as it does, all natural influences, however utilitarian or ugly, needs to be limited in its

application before it can be applied to the higher arts. Nevertheless, the statement, on the whole, is plainly in advance of any at which we have yet arrived.

Nor is the general agreement between the thought in this chapter and in the last manifested by merely the use of the words *representation* and *effects*. The connection was pointed out there between the method of representation and the appeal of art to the mind through imagination and sympathy. Notice now the connection between this same method and an exercise of such powers of mind on the part of the artist as necessitate such an appeal. Like stream like source: that which appeals to imagination is most certain to do so in the degree in which it springs from imagination. What is the faculty of mind from which springs the kind of repetition developed in art when elaborated in accordance with the principle of representation. What is it but the imagination, the faculty which has to do with the imaging of one thing in or by another? In an art-product, forms are grouped together because imagination perceives that they are alike or allied, in other words that they compare, either exactly or very nearly. If, for the sake of variety, a few subordinate features are introduced of which this is not true, even then the clearest possible consciousness that comparison is the process and that these features are exceptional, is manifested by the fact that they are acknowledged to be introduced artistically in the degree in which they exactly contrast with the other features. But no one can originate or recognize a contrast,—which is an effect caused by agreement in many features but disagreement in, at least, one feature,—except as a result of comparison, which itself is merely the mode of procedure of imagination.

Once more, besides an appeal to imagination, a work of art, as shown in the preceding chapter, involves an appeal to sympathy. Nothing can appeal to this except when having its source in personality. Let us observe then in what sense the fact of representation necessitates the ascribing of art to this source. It has been said that upon the elaboration of the factors expressing thought and feeling an artist expends much labor beyond what is needed in order to make them merely express these. Let us ask now upon what exactly does he expend this labor? Of course it must be upon that which the expression contains in addition to the thought and feeling. What does it contain in addition to these? Nothing more, certainly, than the expressional factors. As it is not the thought and feeling, it must be the expressional factors that are intended to be emphasized; and when we recall that it is the expressional factors that are repeated in art, and that, as a rule, repetition necessarily emphasizes, we shall recognize the truth of this inference. But why should expressional factors, aside from that which they express, be emphasized? For no reason, of course, except to emphasize the fact that they are expressional, which fact, as will be noticed, is unimportant except so far as it involves the existence of something behind them, *i. e.*, of a mind capable of using them for expression. But what interest has the artist in manifesting, or the world in knowing, that certain forms of nature are factors used for the purpose of expression by a mind behind them? What interest has a man in manifesting, or the world in knowing, that behind any appearances of nature there is a mind? He who can answer this, will find a reason for the interest that men take in art, either as producers or as patrons.

But are there any problems of life of interest so pro-

found as those which have to do with the relations of mind to matter? Is it not enough to say that mortals conscious of a spirit in them struggling for expression, feel that they are doing what becomes them when they give this spirit vent, and with care for every detail, elaborate the forms in which they give it this? What are men doing when thus moved but objectifying their inward processes of mind; but organizing with something of their own intelligence, but animating with something of their own soul, the scattered and lifeless forms that are about them, and infusing into their product something of the same spirit that is the source of all that they most highly prize within their own material bodies.

Motives like these are facts to men, not fancies; and appeal as such to mankind. It is because such motives exist that art, aside from any particular thoughts or feelings that it may express, but in connection with them, reveals the personality of the artist, and therefore is addressed to human sympathy. It is because of such motives, that the Platonist draws the inference that, if the forms of nature furnish men with the means of representing to others thoughts and feelings and themselves as well, then behind the forms of nature, too, there must be thoughts and feelings and a life which is divine, and that in the aspects of these forms the truths concerning the divine life must be revealed.

In our second chapter it was said that the arts cannot create. But it was not said that they cannot be creative. If by the creative we mean the power which seems to represent divine intelligence through the sights and sounds of nature, what can more resemble this than can the power of him who makes a further use of these same sights and sounds for the purpose, through them, of representing

the processes, which otherwise could not be manifested of his own thoughts and feelings? Is it strange that he should take delight and pride in work like this, and in connection with it feel the sources of the deepest inspiration stir within him? Who is there that could not draw delight and pride and inspiration from the consciousness of being in the least degree a follower, an imitator, a child of Him who created the heavens and the earth?

There may be, too, a deeper reason even than this for that which moves the artist to his task; a deeper reason even than Hegel fathomed when in his "*Æsthetics*" he declared that "in the nature of man itself Art finds its necessary origin." In the midst of mere dreams the author of this book, with clearest consciousness that he was dreaming, has applied, with others who appeared to be with him, tests, scientific in their way or enough so for the purpose, to the things surrounding him. He has struck against the stones of pavements and of walls, and has found them all as solid as in actual life. Now if tests like these can be applied in a dream, which subsequently proves to be a fabric of imagination only, why may they not be applied in waking hours to things called actual, yet prove no more with reference to reality? What though we all, when not insane, agree substantially about the character of these surroundings? This may not prove a thing beyond the fact that the spirits of us all are under similar subjection to the same conditions,—a perfectly conceivable result of a spell that may be exercised over us by some superior intelligence, a result that is conceivable, because not differing essentially from that with which the phenomena of hypnotism have or could have made us all familiar.

But if this be so, if, in the world that we call real, our

spirits be in prison, then in the world ideal of art in which the spirit freely conjures forms at will, there may be an actual and not a fancied exercise of that which men in general, not knowing why, but following, as so often, an unerring instinct, have agreed to call "the faculty divine." At least, with all the possibilities suggested, if not indicated, by the facts that are beyond dispute, we certainly have no necessity for asking why the artist should desire to use the forms or appearances of nature in such a way that, in addition to merely communicating his thoughts and feelings, he may also, through visible and audible forms, represent them.

CHAPTER VI.

REPRESENTATION OF NATURAL APPEARANCES AS INVOLVING THAT OF THE MIND.

Further Explanations Needed—Two Ways of Showing a Similar Method Involved in Representation of Nature and of Mind—Line of Thought to be Pursued in the Two Following Chapters—Limitations of the Natural Appearances Used in Human Art as Distinguished from Animal Possibilities—Its Development from Vocal Sounds must Call Attention to their Agency in Expressing Thought and Feeling Irrespective of Ulterior Material Ends—The Same True of its Development from Objects of Sight Constructed by the Hand—Connection between these Facts and Leaving the Materials of Art Unchanged from the Conditions in which they Appear in Nature.

TO come to the conclusion that art has to deal with the reciprocal effects of nature upon the mind and of the mind upon nature ; and therefore that art necessitates, on the part of the artist, a representation both of the appearances of nature and, through them, of the processes of the mind, involves an important suggestion in the direction toward which our thought is tending. It is not supposed, however, that the end in view can be fully reached by what, at first thought, may seem to some little more than a play upon the word *representation*. It has to be acknowledged that the mere use of this term has not yet shown beyond dispute a common basis underlying both of the apparently conflicting requirements of art of which we have been speaking. How then can we find this common basis? May we not, at least, be encouraged

in an endeavor to find this by recalling that it is always possible, in this world, by going deep enough below the surface, to reach a foundation-rock sufficiently broad to hold any superstructure, however complex. Simply by pursuing further the course of thought that up to this point has been gradually leading us away from the more superficial and general aspects of our subject, we may hope, at any rate, to get nearer to those that are deeper and more specific.

Bearing in mind that a single method, applicable to the representation both of apparent effects of nature and of invisible effects in the mind, is that for which we are in search, it is evident that we can accomplish our object in either one of two ways. We can show either that in the art which is in the finest and most distinctive sense *nature made human*, the representation of the appearances of nature—in other words, to put it more narrowly, *imitation*, necessitates a representation of the thoughts and feelings of the mind; or else we can show that the representation of the thoughts or feelings of the mind—in other words, *expression*, necessitates a representation of the appearances of nature. Either of these supposed conditions, if proved actually to exist, would certainly accomplish our object. It will be the aim of the course of thought upon which we are now to enter to show that both exist.

In showing, in the present chapter, that imitation involves representations of mind, we shall incidentally yet necessarily reach and reveal the primal mental source of art in what is termed the *art-impulse*. This will be treated by itself in Chapter VII.; and in the chapter following, when considering the methods in which the art-impulse vents itself, its expressions will be shown to involve repre-

sentations of natural appearances. In the remainder of the book an endeavor will be made to show how, as directed by the art-impulse, the reciprocal effects of nature and of mind are represented, first, as influenced chiefly by those artistic features which come from nature; and second, as influenced chiefly by those artistic features which come from the mind. The former point of view will necessitate our discussing the character of form in general as reproduced in art, and therefore, as connected with this, the general character of beauty. The latter point of view will necessitate our discussing the character of forms in particular, when used as means of communicating to others an intelligent apprehension of mental processes, and therefore, as connected with this, the various expressional peculiarities and possibilities of different departments of art, or of different arts, as we term them.

In going on now to show the existence of the first of the conditions supposed above—the fact, namely, that an artistic representation of the appearances of nature, as in *imitation*, necessitates a representation of thoughts and feelings, as in *expression*,—it will be best for us to begin by noticing the general limitations which the requirement that the arts must be *human* as well as natural puts upon the use of natural material. Nature gives the artist sounds like the rushing of waters, the rustling of leaves, the chirping of birds, the growling of beasts, and the whistling, humming, crying, groaning, scolding, laughing, and talking of human beings. But, although these sounds furnish the elements of art, only certain phases of them can be reproduced in it, and they can be reproduced in it as a result only of a peculiar mode of observing, analyzing, selecting, combining, and applying them. In the

same way, nature gives us things seen, like the shapes of men, animals, flowers, trees, streams, valleys, mountains, and clouds; and while these too furnish the elements of art, only certain phases of them can be reproduced in it; and they can be reproduced in it as a result only of a peculiar mode of observing, analyzing, selecting, combining, and applying them. Now what phases of sight and of sound can the art that is the most distinctively human reproduce, and what is its peculiar mode of doing this?

To a certain extent we have already considered the answers to both these questions. In Chapter II. it was shown that the art which is most finely and distinctively human is developed from methods of expression possible to the human voice and hands. Merely to come to this conclusion, however, was not to reach the limits of the fields of inquiry thus suggested. Beyond that preliminary answer, still rises the question, "What department of the possibilities of expression derivable from the physical formation of the human vocal organs and hands, is human in the finest and most distinctive sense?" In determining this, we can start, as all will recognize, with the broad statement that it must be that department in which the general characteristic distinguishing a man's work from an animal's work is the most apparent. This general characteristic is the definite representation, in utterances and constructions, of particular thoughts and feelings. The characteristic is most apparent, of course, in products, if there be any, which exist for no other reason than to represent thoughts and feelings,—in other words, that exist for expressions's sake alone. Such products *represent* less because of what they express, than because, existing to express it, they necessarily call attention, as other products do not, to the thought or feeling to which they

give form ; and it is in this fact and possibility of giving form to thought or feeling that the human product differs from that of the lower animal. Having reached this conclusion, it will be recognized that the finest and most distinctively human art is not that which primarily directs attention to a material end outside of itself for which it is used. There is a sense in which every utterance of a man gives expression to thoughts or feelings ; but if he employ it only for some materially useful purpose, as in calling for assistance or even as in imparting information, what he emphasizes is his conception of assistance or information, not his mode of communicating this conception, which alone differentiates his action from that of the lower animal. A dog, when in trouble, can whine to call for assistance, and, when disturbed by a burglar, can bark to impart information of the fact. What the dog cannot do, is to turn his whine into intonation and melody, and his bark into articulation and language.

The same, in principle, is true with reference to objects produced by the hands. There are compounds, like syrups and pastes, which can scarcely be distinguished from such things as sap and gum, needing no intervention of any animal life whatever. There is network and matting which one might easily imagine to have had their origin in thought or feeling of no higher order than that which spins the spider's web or builds the bird's nest. When, however, we come to implements even as rude as the arrow-heads found with the bones of the mound-builders, we recognize an adaptation of means to ends which we are obliged to attribute to design that is human. Still more are we forced to ascribe this to that which contrives a thrashing machine or a steam-engine. But even such products, great inventive genius as they display, are not

those which are the most finely and distinctively human. They are all planned in order to be used as means to material ends, and for this reason necessarily direct attention to these rather than to the fact that they are modes of giving form to thought or feeling.

Now are there any products, whether of the voice or the hands, that necessarily direct attention to the latter fact? Are there any products which, however materially useful they may subsequently prove to be, are, at any rate, not planned, primarily, for the purpose of being useful? Of course, there is but one answer to this question. Such products are plentiful. Moreover, it is one invariable characteristic of all of them that in certain features, to a certain extent, their appearances are left in the condition in which they are found in nature. This is the case even with factors of a musical melody. The composer accepts the different elements of movement and pitch as they come to him, rendering them more useful not even by adding to them articulation. Much more is the same fact evident in poetry, the imitative, figurative, or descriptive language of which is recognized to be successful according to the degree of fidelity with which it recalls the sights of nature. So too with the products of painting, sculpture, and of the ornamental parts, at least, of architecture. Were forms in these arts—and in principle the statement is applicable to the arts of sound also—shaped or combined, as are most implements and machines, into appearances wholly unnatural, they would necessarily suggest a material end intended to be accomplished by them. But this they do not suggest, for the very reason that their appearances are not changed from those that are presented in nature. Here then we come upon a clear point of agreement between the arts that are the most

finely and distinctively *forms of nature*, and those that are the most finely and distinctively *human*. There is an indissoluble connection between employing in a product the appearances of nature and having it in a condition in which it will pre-eminently direct attention to the fact that it is used for the sole purpose of giving expression to thought or feeling. An artificially shaped machine or implement at once suggests the question, "What can it do?" But a drawing or carving never suggests this question, but rather, "What did the man who made this think about it, or of it, that he should have reproduced it?" This is a fact which at this place need only be suggested. The truth of it, and the legitimate inferences from it, will be brought out beyond the possibility of dispute in the chapters following.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ART-IMPULSE.

Art-Products not Planned to Obtain Material Ends are Due to Play rather than Work—Concurrence of Opinions of the First Authorities on this Subject—Views of Schiller and Spencer—Errors in Views of the Latter—Imitation the only Invariable Characteristic of Play—Excess of Life-Force as Indicated in the Activity behind the Play-Impulse—Life-Force behind the Art-Impulse may be Mental and Spiritual—Philosophic Warrants for Ascribing Art to Inspiration—Art Consciously Gives Material Embodiment to that which has its Source in Subconscious Mental Action—Practical Warrant for Ascribing Art-Effects to Inspiration.

IT is easy to recognize that, when considered as results of mental action, the art-products mentioned at the end of Chapter VI.,—products which, however useful in attaining material ends, are not planned primarily for this purpose, are of the nature of those owing their origin, in the sphere of thought, to dreaming rather than to planning; in that of feeling, to spontaneity rather than to responsiveness; in that of action, to play rather than to work.

In different ways and degrees, this general fact has been acknowledged by almost all the ablest writers on this subject. Among these we may include, first of all, those who have emphatically denied an aim of utility to any reproduction whatever of the beautiful, as is done in systems differing so essentially in other regards as those of the German Arthur Schopenhauer, who, in his "Die Welt als

Wille und Vorstellung," conditions it upon effects "beyond the measure which is required for the service of the will"; of the Swiss Adolphe Pictet, who in his "Du Beau dans la Nature, l'Art et la Poésie," conditions it upon analogous effects as related to the intellect; and of the French Théodore Jouffroy, who in his "Cours d'Esthétique," as well as the Italian Vincenzo Gioberti, in his "Trattato del Bello," conditions it upon the same as related to the sympathies. We may include in this class also those who have attributed æsthetic results to the subconscious mind—the mind not conscious, therefore, of adapting means to ends—as suggested by G. W. Leibnitz in his "Principes de la Nature," and, again, by F. W. J. Schelling in his "Æsthetik"; and as formulated into a system by E. von Hartmann in his "Philosophie des Unbewussten," and developed, in an exceedingly suggestive and stimulating manner, especially for English readers, in "The Gay Science" of E. S. Dallas. A similar conception is clearly indicated, too, in the views of that large majority of those treating of the subject, who, in one way or another, have associated, though without always identifying, the chief feature of æsthetic effects with the production of pleasure; whether the source of this be considered mainly psychological as by such writers as Moses Mendelssohn in his "Morgenstunden"; Immanuel Kant in his "Kritik der Urtheilskraft"; Hieronymus van Alphen in his "Theorie van Schoone Kunsten en Wetenschappen"; Edmund Burke in his "Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful"; Abraham Tucker in his "Light of Nature Pursued"; Dugald Stewart in his "Philosophical Essays"; Dr. Thomas Brown in his "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind"; Sir William Hamilton in his "Lectures on Metaphysics"; and John Ruskin in his "Modern

Painters"; or whether the source of this pleasure be considered psycho-physical; as in the theories held by Alexander Bain in his "Mental and Moral Science"; by James Sully in his "Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics"; by Grant Allen in his "Physiological Æsthetics"; by Eugène Véron in his "L'Esthétique"; by the two Darwins, Erasmus in his "Zoonomia," and Charles in his "Descent of Man," and, in fact, by the most of our more recent authorities.

Still more decided in its recognition of what has just been stated, is the attributing of æsthetic results by the poet Friedrich von Schiller in his "Briefe über die æsthetische Erziehung des Menschen" to what he terms "der Spieltrieb" (*play-impulse*). Developing this theory so as by implication to exclude, as Schiller is very careful not to do, the spiritual sources of art, Herbert Spencer, in his "Principles of Psychology," says that "as we ascend to animals of high types, having faculties more efficient and more numerous, we begin to find that time and strength are not wholly absorbed in providing for immediate needs"; and again: "A cat with claws and appended muscles adjusted to daily action in catching prey, but now leading a life that is but in a small degree predatory, has a craving to exercise these parts; and may be seen to satisfy the craving by stretching out her legs, protruding her claws, and pulling at some such surface as the covering of a chair . . . This useless activity of unused organs, which in these cases hardly rises to what we call play, passes into play ordinarily so called, when there is a more manifest union of feeling with the action. Play is . . . an artificial exercise of powers which, in default of their natural exercise, become so ready to discharge that they relieve themselves by simulated actions in place of real

actions. For dogs and other predatory creatures show us unmistakably that their play consists of mimic chase and mimic fighting. It is the same with human beings. The plays of children—nursing dolls, giving tea parties, and so on, are dramatizings of adult activities. The sports of boys, chasing one another, wrestling, making prisoners, obviously gratify in a partial way the predatory instincts. . . . The higher but less essential powers, as well as the lower but more essential powers, thus come to have activities that are carried on for the sake of the immediate gratifications derived, without reference to ulterior benefits; and to such higher powers, æsthetic products yield substantial activities, as games yield them to various lower powers." G. Baldwin Brown, in his recent work on "The Fine Arts," after quoting this passage, adds: "In conclusion, we may sum up the matter by saying that on every grade of his being man possesses an ideal self-determined life, existing side by side with, but apart from, his life as conditioned by material needs. This life expresses itself in, and is nourished by, various forms of 'free and spontaneous expression and action,' which on the lower grades of being may be termed simply 'play,' but in the higher grades take the shape of that rational and significant play resulting in art."

This last quotation suggests what seems to need more emphasis than has been given to it, namely, that the Spencerian philosophy tends, at least, to interpret wrongly the facts that have been mentioned by making the very common mistake of taking an effect for a cause. A grown cat, with no mice to catch, undoubtedly goes through the forms of catching them. But a kitten that has never caught a single mouse goes through the same forms a hundred times more often. In the same way a

veteran soldier may, now and then, play at being a soldier; but, as a rule, it is the boy wholly inexperienced in battle, who amuses himself thus. The truth seems to be that every animate creature is an embodiment of vitality, or *life-force*, as we may term it; and, as if to prevent a lack of it in him, it is usually given him in excess. For this reason, as in the case of the desires behind all the appetites, it always tends to overflow the channels of necessary activity. This excess of force, moreover, because it is to some extent, as Mr. Spencer correctly holds, hereditary, tends to expend itself in the same directions as those taken by the necessary activities of his progenitors. But does heredity account for all the facts? Not, certainly, for all that are true of the human race. The descendants of the longest conceivable line of farmers, none of whom have ever seen a battle, a city, or a palace, will play at being soldiers, merchants, or princes with just as much zest, when shown by their comrades how to do so, as will the sons of soldiers, merchants, or princes.

The only really invariable characteristic of play is the one suggested by Mr. Spencer in the third sentence of his quoted above—namely, *imitation*. As a rule, of course, young dogs in their play imitate old dogs; and young monkeys old monkeys—but not always; both sometimes imitate men. But the general fact that the *play-impulse*, when it assumes form, invariably tends to manifest itself in imitation, no one can deny. The same is true, too, or at least largely true of the *art-impulse*. Not only is all dramatizing, as Mr. Spencer intimates, imitation, but so, in a sense, is all poetizing, being all supposedly representative of what men say, or think, or do. So, too, are all reproductions of scenes in nature through drawing, coloring, or modelling; and the same may also

be affirmed, in a sense that need not be explained here, of much that is reproduced in music and architecture. Those, therefore, who identify the art-impulse with the play-impulse are justified when they apply their tests either to the results of the two, or to their sources.

There are many conditions in activity and in nature behind the play-impulse and the imitation caused by it, which now suggest themselves. Considering these in the order in which they can be best interpreted, let us begin by noticing that imitation resulting from play, imitation of manner without reference to matter—in other words, imitation without reference to that which underlies the manner, or has to do with the object which it is desired to attain—always arises from a condition in which the tendency to activity on the part of the imitator is in excess of that which needs to be expended, or which, in the circumstances, can be expended, upon gaining what is really necessary for the supply of material wants. The young neither realize the need of expending effort upon these, nor do they know how and where to expend it thus. Therefore they play, and the form of their play is imitative. Their elders, on the contrary, realize that they must work; and they have learned how and where to do it. Therefore they seldom play, having neither the time nor the inclination required. But that which causes indulgence in play in any case is *excess of life-force* which, if it cannot be expended in obtaining that which is needful for the supply of material wants, must be expended in other directions.

Now, going back, let us recall that products which are human in the finest and most distinctive sense, do not result from an excess of *life-force* in general, but only of that particular phase of it which is expended distinctively

upon modes of expressing thought or feeling. But *force* is something which derives its importance, if not its quality, less from itself than from that in which or upon which it operates. A clear recognition of this fact would have rendered unnecessary much of the criticism to which this theory of the *play-impulse* has been subjected, such, for instance, as abounds in "Les Problèmes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine," by Jean Marie Guyau, and adds piquancy to "The Spirit of Beauty" by H. W. Parker. The truth is that we all recognize a difference in both importance and quality between what we term hand-power, horse-power, or steam-power and electric-power. According to the same analogy, a moment's consideration will enable us to recognize that the force which is expended upon the imitation of nature may be much more important and also different in quality when it is used in the expression of thought and feeling than when it is expended upon merely physical phases of activity, as by the lower animals. As distinguished from the latter force, which is rightly termed vital, physical, or animal, the former may be termed mental, psychical, or spiritual. A clear perception of a difference between these two is essential. Only when it is understood can one understand how art, while traceable to that which, in one sphere, is a play-motive, and while produced with an aim irrespective of any consideration of material utility, nevertheless often springs from mental and spiritual activity of the most distinctive kind, and results in the greatest possible benefit to the race. What if a product does exist for expression's sake alone? A being with a mind and spirit perpetually evolving thought and feeling possesses that which, for its own sake, ought to be expressed. Beyond his material surroundings and interests, there exists for him a realm in which excess of mental

and spiritual force may be directed toward the production of veritable *works* of art; and the effects of these upon mental and spiritual development may be infinitely more important than all possible energy that could expend itself in seeking "what shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed."

Just here, in fact, we come upon a philosophic, if not scientific, warrant for that common opinion, so often held without reasoning and expressed without discrimination, that the products of art are to be ascribed to what is termed *inspiration*. When we have traced them to this overflow at the very springs of mental vitality, no one who thinks can fail to feel that, if human life anywhere can come into contact with the divine life, it must be here. There are reservoirs behind the springs of the mountain-streams. Are there none behind those of thought? And if there be, what are they? The answer to this question must depend, of course, upon the general character of one's theologic or philosophic conceptions. He may attribute that which he calls inspiration directly and immediately to the divine source of life. Or, recognizing the erroneous nature of the forms in which truth, even when most unmistakably inspired, is often presented, he may suppose that there are gradations of intelligences beyond one's ken through which, even before undergoing subjection to human limitations, the brightness of the divine light, in order to become attempered to the requirements of earthly conditions, loses not only its brilliancy but with this much of its defining power. Or he may suppose that the soul itself comes into the world stored with forces directly created for it, or else indirectly acquired in a previous existence of which not only every otherwise unaccountable intuition but every impulse is a

consequence,—a previous existence, which, if not human and personal, may, at least, have existed as a psychic force developing in the lower orders of life according to the laws of psychic evolution through successive physical forms, themselves developing according to the laws of physical evolution. Or, finally, he may suppose that this reservoir is in a man's own subconscious nature; and this, again, he may suppose to be either psychical or physical. With those whose tendencies are toward idealism, he may deem the reservoir to be the receptacle of experiences in his present state of existence, stored in the inner mind with all their attendant associations and suggestions, and, in accordance with some law, surging upward in order to control thought and expression whenever, as in dreams or reveries, or abnormal states of trance or excitation, or merely of poetic enthusiasm, the conscious will, for any reason, is subordinated to the impulse coming from within. Or, with those whose tendencies are more materialistic, he may consider this subconscious nature to be the accumulated result merely of that which, through physical sensation, has come to be stored up in the nerve-cells and, in circumstances similar to those just mentioned, aroused to conscious vitality as a consequence either of intense external stimulation, or of unusual activity in the nervous centres. See Chapter XII. Whether a man incline to the acceptance of one of these theories, or of a combination of them; however he may account for what lies in the realm of mystery beyond the art-impulse, it is evident that the theory just presented of it can accord with every possible view. That, back of all conscious intelligence, there is an unconscious intelligence of some kind, in which the powers of memory and of deduction are wellnigh, if not absolutely, perfect, the phenomena of accident, disease, and

hypnotism seem to have established beyond all question. How, otherwise, could men with memories naturally weak recall, as at times they do, in abnormal conditions, whole conversations in a foreign tongue with not one word of which they are consciously acquainted? Or how could those of the very slightest powers of imagination or of logic, argue for hours, when in such states, with superlative brilliancy and conclusiveness? Whatever be the final explanation of these facts, in themselves—as will be brought out clearly in the volume of this series treating of the nature of the thought that can be represented in art—they cannot now be doubted. Behind conscious mental life, sources exist of intellectual energy. They find expression in many ways—in the words and deeds of ordinary observation, as well as in extraordinary moods and methods of prophets and reformers. But there is only one department of activity which humanity appears to have developed for the special purpose of giving expression—if we may so say, of consciously giving material embodiment—to that which has its source in these subconscious regions of the mind; and this department of activity is art.

Few, indeed, derive their impressions of art-inspiration through considerations at all similar to those which have just been presented. Men infer it as a cause from what they have experienced of its effects. And, surely, if anywhere there be anything that is inspired, this must be true of some of these. What else than a subtle sense of influences traceable to the deepest springs in life of which we know, could cause us all to recognize it as a legitimate tribute to the art of a singer like Pacchierotti, when we hear of an entire orchestra so entranced by his voice as to cease playing, and, with eyes filled with tears, to break down in the midst of an accompaniment?—or of

a poet like Euripides, when we read of the Sicilians saving the lives of such of their Athenian captives as could remember and repeat his verses?—or of an actor like Cooke, when we are told of his portraying his conception of Iago so as to be hissed by his audiences with cries of: “Villain, Villain” ?—or of an orator like Whitefield, when we think of a Franklin, previously resolved not to give a penny to a cause which the preacher was to advocate, emptying the whole contents of his pockets at the end of the discourse?—or of a painter like Cimabue, when we learn that the whole city of Florence turned out to celebrate the day on which he was to set up a new picture?—or of a sculptor like Phidias, when we find it recorded that Paulus Emilius in the presence of his statue of Jupiter Olympus was struck with awe as if in the presence of the god himself?—or of an architect like Michael Angelo, when we listen to the muffled exclamations that invariably announce that a stranger stands for the first time in the Sistine Chapel, or under the dome of St. Peter’s? Other products of men, products that are not distinctively works of arts, sometimes have marvellous effects. A machine, a galvanic battery, can electrify a body just bereft of life into movements for a moment almost deceiving the senses into surmising life’s return. But what are such effects to those of art? men ask. What else but it can put such spirit into matter which never yet had life that the vitality can remain forever?—More than this, what else can reach outside the forms in which it is embodied, and electrify all beings that have souls? And when one yields to arts of this kind, the highest homage that can be bestowed upon the products of intelligence and skill, to himself, at least, he seems to do so, recognizing not alone that the finest and most distinctive

qualities of mind have been expended on them ; not alone that they have issued from an intellect exerting all its power, throned in the regal right of all its functions ; not alone that they have involved activities of mind at the sources of the useful and of the ornamental arts combined. But he does so, because he feels that such activities, when exercised conjointly, adjusting thought to form and form to thought, necessitate, even aside from any other consideration, a quality of action that is not the same as that manifested by either of the same activities, when not combined. Gunpowder and a match give neither of the two, nor both. No wonder then that mental possibilities, united as in art, suggest a force and brilliancy different in kind from that exhibited in any other sphere. "I tell you," said King Henry VIII. to a nobleman who had brought him an accusation against the painter Holbein, "I tell you of seven peasants I can make as many lords, but of seven lords I could not make one Holbein."

CHAPTER VIII.

REPRESENTATION OF THE MIND AS INVOLVING THAT OF NATURAL APPEARANCES.

Connection between the Art-Impulse and Imitation of Natural Appearances—A Utilitarian Desire to Produce Something Fitted to Attract Attention as a Mode of Expression not the Reason for Art-Imitation—But Charm or Beauty in the Object Imitated, which has had an Effect upon Desire—What Forms of Nature made Human Reproduce these Beautiful Effects?—Natural Intonations and Articulations of the Voice as Developed into Music and Poetry—Natural Marking, Shaping, and Combining by the Hands as Developed into Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture—Connection between an Expression and an External Product—Both Essential to Art in Music—In Poetry—In the Painting and Sculpture of Figures—Of Still Life—The only Explanation of the Existence of these Arts—Architecture Apparently both Useful and Æsthetic—So are All Arts—Architecture as Representing Man—As Representing Nature—Its Further Possibilities in the Latter Direction—Not Separated in Principle from the Other Arts.

IN Chapter VI. it was shown that artistic representation or imitation of the appearances of nature involves a representation of the thoughts and feelings in the mind of the artist. Now that we have traced these thoughts and feelings back to their mental sources in the art-impulse, we are prepared to retrace our steps, and to show how all thoughts and feelings, to which it gives rise, in order to represent themselves in outward expression, must also represent or imitate the appearances of nature. While the art-impulse is the mental cause of artistic activity, the appearances of nature, by which the

one moved by this impulse is surrounded, are material causes perpetually furnishing conditions for its exercise. Were it not for these appearances, the activity could find no means of outward expression, no means of appealing to the senses. To do this, as was shown on page 3, it must make use of forms which nature has furnished. Moreover, in order that these, when thus used in art, may call attention to the fact that they are intended to be modes of expression, it is also important, as has been shown too, that they be imitative.

Now let us ask, as having an evident bearing upon determining that for which, all through this essay, we have been in search, namely, the forms that are the most finely and distinctively those of nature made human—let us ask what it is in any case that causes one form rather than other forms to be imitated. Must we not attribute this (see page 58) to the artist's recognizing that the form chosen is the best fitted to call attention to itself as a mode of expression? But why does the artist recognize this fact? Is it owing to some quality in the form appealing to his rational nature so that he argues and concludes that this form is best adapted to his ends? Were this the case, would not his mental action be consciously controlled by an aim of utility? and if so, how could his efforts be attributed to an absence of this aim, which has been said to be characteristic of all work traceable to the art-impulse? Any endeavor to deal fairly with such questions must evidently force us to conclude that this aim, however certainly it may be attained, is not that which is chiefly present to his consciousness. Moreover, when we recall that the play-impulse in animals, to which the art-impulse in man has been shown to be analogous, is also imitative, and is so in circumstances showing

that it springs not from intentional adaptation of means to ends, but from instinct, we must admit that the chief reason for art-imitation must lie deeper than any conscious intention on the part of the artist to make it useful.

What is this reason? As it cannot be attributed, as shown on page 74, to any external constraint or necessity, nor, as just shown, to the imitator's deliberate designs, must it not be attributed to his instinctive desires? But desires cannot be aroused in view of an external appearance and excited to action imitating it, except as something connected with it appears desirable. A pup or kitten not only, but a child, imitates the action of his elders only when allured to do so by some subtle charm connected with the action, which causes him—of course, because in some way it fits the requirements of his nature—to be attracted to it, and so to be desirous of reproducing it. To apply this to the appearances of nature, which, as we must remember, are always surrounding the man, and, therefore, are always furnishing the conditions in connection with which his activities may vent themselves, we are forced to conclude that it is only when an effect, whether appealing to the ear or eye, exerts a subtle charm upon the mind and spirit that it influences a man sufficiently to cause him to desire to reproduce it. But what is it that exerts this subtle charm upon the mind and spirit? It must be something, of course, connected with the appearance or form; for it is this, presumably, which is imitated. But charm exerted by appearance or form is due, as a rule, to that which men ordinarily associate with the term *beauty*—a term, the full significance of which cannot be brought out here. It suffices to say that “*Les Beaux Arts*,” as the French call them, “the beautiful arts,” “the fine arts,” “*the arts*,” as we term them, are

those in which a man gives expression to the excess within him of mental and spiritual, or, as we may say, intellectual and emotional vitality through a representation of effects exerting that subtle charm which, as a rule, is traceable only to appearances having what is called beauty.

Before going on now to consider more specifically this subject of beauty which is, at once, suggested here, let us, in the rest of this chapter, notice still more in detail than has yet been done, and now for the last time, exactly what are the forms of nature made human in which effects, beautiful in themselves, are represented, and through the use of the human vocal organs or hands, as indicated on page 65, are made to give expression to an excess of mental or spiritual vitality.

In using the vocal organs, two kinds of effects are possible, namely, *intonations*, as we may term them, caused by adjustments of the vocal chords in the larynx, and *articulations* caused by adjustments of the lips, tongue, and palate. For ends of material utility, men command, assert, question, cry, call, and express many other wishes through intonations; and they make their wishes more intelligible by forming them into words through articulations. But how and when does excess of force manifest itself in each form? or how and when do men indulge in each form irrespective of any end of material utility? Evidently whenever, influenced by no demand of actual necessity, by no need of giving anything to others, or of getting it from them, they intone or talk to themselves, as we say. But when they are intoning to themselves without articulation, what are they doing? Humming. And what is humming, as related to art? Undoubtedly, the beginning of music—the beginning of the development of the beautiful in sound. So much all will recog-

nize; but probably few will recognize that unless a man could and did hum in this apparently useless way, it is not likely that any conception of musical art could ever be suggested to him. At any rate, it is true as a fact that it is never until something in connection with the form in which he hums—the movement, the tune—attracts his attention, charms him, seems beautiful to him, and he begins to experiment or play with it for its own sake, irrespective of any aim having to do with material utility, that he begins to develop the possibilities of the musician. In a precisely similar way, talking to oneself may be said to be the underlying condition of poetry. When a man, because interested in some ulterior object, is talking to others, he has neither the time nor the inclination to think of the form that he is using. It is only when something in connection with the form—the metaphors, similes, sounds of the syllables, or words—attracts his attention, charms him, seems beautiful to him, and he begins to experiment or play with it for its own sake—it is only then that he begins to develop the possibilities of the poet.

How now is the same motive manifested in results necessitating the use of the hands? These results we may divide into three classes, namely, those produced respectively by *marking*, as in drawing or coloring, by *shaping*, as in separating compounds into their elements or in modelling them; and by *combining*, as in constructing and building single objects from scattered material. As actually applied to products, all these methods are sometimes used conjointly; but they are clearly distinguishable and can sometimes be used separately. Each, too, can serve ends of material utility, and this even in the expression of thought and feeling. In this way, the first method

leads a man to draw outlines on his material, whether board or stone, preparatory to shaping or coloring it. Often, too, such drawings can aid his own memory in recalling scenes, or aid his pupils when he wishes to teach them how to copy sites or figures. The same method leads him, too, after a time, to invent, first, ideographic and hieroglyphic, and then phonetic forms of writing. The second method leads him to put the results of his drawing to further use by cutting up the material that he has marked in order to shape it for certain other ulterior ends. Moreover, the material itself, when so shaped, as in cases of clothing, knives, forks, and most implements, usually shows exactly what these ends are. The third method leads him to join together materials that have already been thus marked and shaped, and in this way to bring the whole procedure to a conclusion, the most primitive, as well as still the most necessary and important adaptation of this method being that employed in house-building. We are ready now to ask, how and when do men manifest excess of expressional force according to each of these methods? or indulge in each irrespective of any end of material utility? Evidently, whenever influenced by no demand of actual necessity, by no need of doing anything for others, or of getting anything from them, they mark, or shape, or combine merely to gratify themselves, that is, to embody their own conceptions of what is attractive, charming, or beautiful. A rude outline can convey all that is essential to suggest to oneself or to others the idea of a horse. When a man, simply to give vent to the excess of energy in his expressional nature, delays over the outline, adding to what would be necessary in hieroglyphic writing, for instance, limnings and colors that make the representation more complete or

ornate, he is moved by the art-impulse. When again, merely to give vent to this energy, besides shaping, he shapes carefully, or ornaments clothing, knives, forks, or other implements; and, still more, when he does all this in connection with busts and statues, which from their very nature by imaging human forms and faces, are peculiarly adapted for the expression of human thought and feeling, then again he is moved by this impulse. Once more, when in constructing by way of combination any object, but especially a house with which we always associate human occupants, he adds to it, above what is necessary, pillars, porches, window-caps, cornices, cupolas, and always in the degree in which these are distinctly expressive of human sentiment—as in a church, for instance,—then, too, he is influenced by the art-impulse. It is almost superfluous to point out that, in these three cases, respectively, we find the conditions leading to painting, sculpture, and architecture.

Some who have read these last paragraphs will now recall, and be right in recalling, that when men speak of *expression*, they ordinarily associate it with the use of the human body as in intonations, words, postures, and gestures, especially as in the first two of these. But in what has been said here, it has been associated with the use of the hands in the construction of *external products*. At first thought, notwithstanding the fact that painting and sculpture, in some of their phases, reproduce postures and gestures, it certainly seems that expression can be attributed to these products in only a secondary and different sense from that in which it is attributable in the other cases. If this be so, why are not music and poetry, which are developed from the direct and primary form of expression in the use of the voice, more emphatically results of

the art-impulse than are painting, sculpture, and architecture, which are developed only from the indirect and secondary form of expression attendant upon the constructive uses of the hands? This is a question with reasons behind it; and it needs to be answered. The answer will be suggested by that other fact, pointed out on page 55, namely, that *expression* necessarily involves an appeal to the ear or eye through that which is an *appearance* or *form*—in other words, an *external product*. If this be so, that art which is in the highest and most distinctive sense an *expression*, must also involve in the highest and most distinctive sense an *external product*. It is true that the term *expression* is primarily associated with that which results from the use of the voice; but it is also true that secondarily it is associated with that which is made by the hands. It is true, moreover, that an *external product* is primarily associated with that which is made by the hands; but here, too, it is also true that secondarily it is associated with that which results from the use of the voice. These two facts, as will be seen, counterbalance each other, and in this way correct the apparent inequalities in the conditions underlying the different arts. For, if music and poetry suggest most with regard to *expression*, painting, sculpture, and architecture suggest most with regard to an *external product*; and the whole truth is not taken into consideration until it is recognized that a work of the finest and most distinctive human art in necessitating *expression* for expression's sake necessitates also an *external product* of beauty embodying this.

Let us observe now in what sense this statement is true as applied to each of the arts in succession.

Music has been traced to humming. But only a slight development of this latter is needed in order to turn it

into a song; and a song is not merely the beginning of music, but music. Cannot a man sing without constructing a product external to himself? Certainly he can, and so can a bird; and, if a man could do no more, he could do nothing entitling music to be placed in a class different from that to which, for example, dramatic representation belongs. A melody, in itself considered, is not necessarily, in the finest and most distinctive sense, a natural form made human. Yet it may be this. It is so in the degree in which it is unmistakably a product of the *art* of music. What is such a product? A composition that consists not merely of unstudied subjective expressions in sounds. It is objective. It is a result of labor and practice. Even aside from its usually involving an external writing in musical notation, it is a development of a complicated system of producing notes and scales and chords, not only with the human voice, but with numerous instruments, invented, primarily, so as to imitate every possibility of the human voice, all these working together in accordance with subtle laws of melody and harmony which, as a result of years of experiment, men have discovered and learned to apply. Indeed, almost the slightest musical composing suggests an external product. Simple humming is not only a method of expression for its own sake, but it is a form of nature, of nature as manifested in a man. A symphony is a development not only of the possibilities of this expression, but of its peculiar form; and it involves, therefore, especially in connection with the necessity for a written score and for manufactured instruments, the existence and elaboration of form such as is possible only to an external product. Notice, too, that to the last detail of this elaboration, there is nothing whatever in the art that is not attributable to the satisfac-

tion which the mind takes in developing the form not for the purpose of attaining an end of material utility; but for the sake of its own intrinsic beauty.

Similar facts are true of poetry. A man like an animal could express his actual wants in a few different sighs, cries, grunts, and hisses. But from these he develops, in their various forms, the innumerable words and phrases that render possible the nice distinctions of language. These words and phrases are often freshly invented by the poets, and they are almost always invented as a result of what is recognized to be the poetic tendency latent in all men. As for poems considered as wholes, their metres or rhymes are never produced as immediate subjective utterances, such as we hear in ordinary speech. They are always the work of the imagination, bringing together the results of experience and experiment, according to the method termed composition. In other words, even aside from the fact that they are usually written or printed, but necessarily when considered in connection with this, they evidently involve the construction of an external product. Nor can we explain their existence at all, except by attributing them to the intense and unadulterated satisfaction which the poet derives from elaborating them, not for ends of material utility, but for effects of beauty that pertain only to themselves.

Passing on to painting, sculpture, and architecture, let us notice in what sense the statements just made with reference to music and poetry are true of them too. As has been said, they all appeal to sight. How does a man express to sight what is passing in his mind? Undoubtedly by his postures and the gestures of his hands, feet, head, and countenance, and by these as we see him when standing alone not only, but when surrounded by

other persons and things. Postures and gestures, though never as definitely intelligible as the sounds of the voice, are, nevertheless, in as true a sense natural forms of communicating thought and feeling; and may be developed into the subordinate art of pantomime, just as natural forms of utterance in sound may be developed into the art of speech. But pantomime is no more painting or sculpture than speech is poetry. It is when a man becomes so attracted and charmed by the methods through which he naturally expresses thought in pantomime that he begins to make an external product, embodying thought through like methods,—it is then that he begins to work in the sphere of the higher arts. Moreover, when he does this, he does not pose with his own figure, as in dramatic representation, but he makes other figures pose—that is to say, he draws, colors, shapes, and combines the different parts of the figures of other men, either alone, or in connection with their fellows or with objects of nature animate or inanimate. Besides this, too, very often without making use of any human figures, he draws, colors, shapes, or combines other animate or inanimate objects. It is for these reasons and in these circumstances that he produces a work of painting or of sculpture. In other words, instead of conveying a thought or feeling through a posture of his own body, he conveys it through representing a posture in a pictured man's body; and if his conception have reference to surrounding persons and objects, he represents these latter as surrounding the pictured man;—clouds, rain, and a waste, for instance, if his idea be the same as that expressed in lines like these:

The clouds have broken in a dreary rain
And on the waste I stand alone with heaven.

Lady of Lyons : Bulwer.

Or if his idea involve nothing that needs to be represented by human figures; if it be something that could be conveyed by his pointing to animate or inanimate objects, were they present in a certain location, then he leaves the human figures out of his picture, and reproduces merely these objects—darkness, rain, wind, a clinging vine, and dead leaves, for instance, if his idea be like that expressed in the following :

The day is dark and cold and dreary,
It rains and the wind is never weary ;
The vine still clings to the mouldering wall,
But at every gust the dead leaves fall.

The Rainy Day : Longfellow.

Paintings and statues are thus *external products* that are embodiments of distinctively human methods of expression. But, besides this, notice how true it is that they are not directed primarily toward ends of material utility. The infinite pains taken with the lines, shadings, hues, and modellings, that alone make them works of art, cannot be explained on any other supposition than that they are owing to the satisfaction which a man takes in developing the forms for the sake of their own intrinsic beauty, wholly aside from any desire to make them convey clear intelligence of that which they express. This could usually be conveyed equally well by the rude outlines of hieroglyphics.

All that has been said may be acknowledged, so far as the statements are applied to products of painting and sculpture. But how, it may be asked, can they be applied to those of architecture? The external character of its products is, of course, evident; but it has other characteristics, which cause many to doubt whether, in

important regards, it does not differ too greatly from music, poetry, painting, and sculpture, to admit of its being placed in the same class with them. "Architecture," says Fergusson in his "History of Modern Architecture," "is, in fact, nothing more than the æsthetic form of the purely technic art of building." "Architecture," says Prof. Henry N. Day in his "Science of Æsthetics," "belongs under the denomination of dependent beauty, for it characteristically seeks an end of utility"; though in another place he says: "It appears sometimes as properly a free art." "In . . . architecture," says Prof. John Bascom in his "Æsthetics or Science of Beauty," "we come yet more immediately under the law of utility. Architecture becomes a fine art, addresses itself to the tastes and feelings of men, through the thoughtful and emotional manner in which the particular object of protection, transit, or motion is reached." As will be noticed, the idea in all these quotations—and they might be multiplied almost indefinitely—is the same. Architecture is sometimes technic and sometimes æsthetic, sometimes useful, sometimes ornamental.

But to some extent the same holds true of all the arts. They are all elaborations of modes of expression which, in their natural forms, serve ends of material utility. An ordinary wood-shed has no more to do with architecture than the cry of our nursery, the talk of our kitchen, the paint of our stable, or the rock of our curb-stone has to do with the respective art to which it seems allied, whether music, poetry, painting, or sculpture.

But underlying all these latter arts, it may be said, there are subjective modes of expression, like humming, speaking, gesturing, whereas architecture is always developed from an objective product—a dwelling. The answer

to this is that, underlying architecture too, there are subjective modes of expression. There are the ideas, for instance, of support and shelter; and these ideas it is by no means impossible or unusual to represent by gesture. Moreover, in all the other arts too there are objective products intervening between the subjective and the artistic forms. Artificial resonant sounds, spoken and written language, hieroglyphic drawings and carvings are conditions that antedate music, poetry, painting, or sculpture, no less than house building antedates architecture. House building, moreover, according to the principles that have been unfolded, is no less truly a form of natural expression than these others are. It springs from the nature of the primitive man, precisely as nest building or dam-building from the nature of the bird or the beaver.

That architecture does not reproduce the forms of nature in as strict a sense as do poetry, painting, and sculpture is true; yet, as we shall find hereafter, its products are modelled upon these forms in as strict a sense as is the case in music. This art, like it, is evolved from the unfolding of the principles underlying nature's methods of formation even more than from a reproduction of its actual forms. And yet architecture does reproduce these latter. The portico of the Greek temple is acknowledged to be nothing more than an elaboration in stone, for the sake merely of elaborating its possibilities of beauty, of the rude wooden building with a roof supported by posts, which was used by the primitive man in his natural state. A Chinese or Japanese temple or palace, with its many separate small structures, each covered by a roof sagging downward from the apex before moving upward again at the eaves, is nothing more than

an elaboration in wood, for the sake of elaborating the possibilities of beauty in it, of the rude tent used by the nomadic ancestors of these people in their primitive natural states. That Gothic columns and arches are merely imitative elaborations, for the same reason, of the methods and manners of support suggested by arrangements of rows of tree-trunks and their branches, has been strenuously denied and even ridiculed. But the fact remains that an avenue of trees with bending branches invariably suggests the effect of a Gothic cathedral. If so, why could it not have suggested the conception of a Gothic cathedral to the architect who first planned one?

Whatever answer may be given to this question, or whatever may be thought of the previous statements, none can fail to recall that we frequently find in architecture actual reproductions of the figures of men, animals, leaves, and flowers, chiselled, carved, or worked in some way into the ornamentation; and who can say that the world has seen the utmost developments in these directions? Why might not the columns, walls, and ceilings of buildings be made to suggest, according to methods that present artistic taste would deem impossible of realization, the effects of groves and glens with tree-trunks and rocks covered with leaves and vines? Is it not conceivable in this age, when artificial tile and brick and stone can be produced in all possible colors, and when iron can be moulded into beams and platings of all possible shapes, that, with judicious selections of natural models and artistic fore-shortenings, structures might be produced in wholes or in parts of which the resemblances to the effects of growth as manifested in the external world would be much more close than at present?

To answer either of these questions in the affirmative

is to admit that there is nothing in the art itself necessarily removing it from a sphere very near to that of painting and sculpture. Its products, it is true, must fulfil the purely technical principles of mechanical contrivance. But so must works of music fulfil the principles of harmony, to say nothing of the technique of execution. So must works of poetry or painting or sculpture fulfil the principles of rhythm, rhyme, grammar, color, or proportion. But in all these arts equally the fulfilment of such laws is only a means to an end. That end is the distinctively human satisfaction derived from elaborating forms in excess of that which is demanded in order to meet the exigencies of material utility, elaborating them simply because they are felt to be attractive and beautiful in themselves.

CHAPTER IX.

THE HIGHER AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER REPRESENTATIVE ARTS.

Other Representative Arts besides those already Considered—Elocution, Pantomime, Dancing, Costuming, Jewelry, Personal Adornment, and Dramatic Art—These do not Necessitate a Product External to the Artist—Oratory Necessitates neither this nor an End Different from One of Utility—Decorative Art, Landscape Gardening, and Artistic Phases of Civil Engineering have less Possibilities of Expression—Yet All these are Allied to the Higher Arts and Fulfil the Same Principles—What is Meant by the Humanities?—Phonetic and Plastic Art—Æsthetic—Vagueness of these Distinctions—Appropriateness of the Term Representative—The Terms: Arts of Form, Beaux Arts, Fine Arts, Belles Lettres; The Higher, The Higher Æsthetic, and The Higher Representative Arts.

AN application of the principles thus far unfolded to the arts with which we are chiefly concerned, necessitates our making at this point certain distinctions, rendered possible through the thought advanced in the preceding chapter, between various branches of that kind of art which may properly be termed representative. The question arises whether the arts from which our illustrations have been drawn, and which all acknowledge to be the higher arts, are not representative in some peculiar sense or manner? If not so, how can we separate them from other arts which are at once suggested, which, indeed, have often been mentioned hitherto in this argument, but which, according to common opinion, at least, do not possess quali-

ties entitling them to be included in the same class with music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture? Let us, for a little, consider this question.

It has been said, for instance, that music and poetry are forms of representation developed from the use of the voice. But is not the same fact equally true—indeed, because of the more immediate connection traceable, is it not more true—of elocution? And if painting, sculpture, and architecture are forms of representation developed from the use of the body, particularly of the hands, in expression and construction, is not the same fact true, and, because of the more immediate connection traceable, more true of pantomime and dancing? And if painting, sculpture, and architecture again, can represent æsthetically, through the uses of colors, metals, or stones, the thoughts and feelings indicated by the positions, postures, or surroundings of the body, why cannot the same be done as applied to the actual body by the arts of costuming, jewelry, and personal adornment in general, including certain phases of upholstery? But to pass to a more dignified art—there is the dramatic. What can be more unmistakably a form of representation, or more unmistakably developed from a use of the human body? Now why is it that these arts—especially the dramatic—are not included in the same class as the five considered to rank highest.

The only thoroughly satisfactory answer to this question seems to be the one that follows logically upon the line of thought in the chapter preceding this, which answer is, that none of the arts last indicated necessitate that which was shown to be requisite in the cases of the other five—namely, an external product. Take the dramatic art—a better term, by the way, than histrionic, though perhaps, because liable to be confounded with dramatic literature,

not so distinctive a term as *dramatics*—take this art. In important particulars, it certainly stands at the centre of the higher æsthetic system, containing in itself, as it does, the germs of all its artistic possibilities. It may use not alone the sustained intonations of the voice that are developed into melody and music, but also the unsustained articulations that are developed into language and poetry; and besides these, too, it may use the posturing in connection with surrounding scenes and persons and stage settings that are developed into painting, sculpture, and architecture. Why then is it not usually included in the same class with music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture? Is not this the reason?—Because its effects result mainly from the use of means of expression that are connected with the artist's own body, whereas the other arts necessitate the use and consequent production of a medium of expression that is external to him. There is little doubt that externality in this sense is important in order to give completeness to the conception of a product of art as a thing that is *made*: and there is no doubt at all that it is important in order to give a conception of a product of superlative value. While the effects of music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture are embodied in such forms that they can continue to influence the world through ages, the effects of the dramatic art, except so far as it becomes literature, die with the actor who produces them. Elocution, pantomime, dancing, costuming, jewelry, methods of personal adornment, and dramatics, are all representative arts; but none of them necessitate a product external to the man; of none of them can it be said that they result in "art-works."

The same statement applies, to some extent also, to oratory, and to certain forms of rhetoric. But with refer-

ence to these, as also to decorative art, and to landscape gardening, to say nothing of the combinations of the latter with architecture which characterize some of the results of civil engineering, an additional principle often operates, which is, that they are not solely and therefore are not strictly representative.

Oratory involves some of the representative characteristics not only of elocution but also—and here it is at one with rhetoric—of poetry. Like the latter, both oratory and rhetoric result in an external product. But, counteracting this latter fact, is another which causes both to differ not only from the dramatic art but equally from music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture. It is the fact that, at their best, neither public address nor rhetoric is attributable, as we have found to be true of the effects of these arts, to the satisfaction derived from elaborating a form of expression as a thing of beauty aside from an end of utility. Oratory invariably springs from a desire to influence, in certain definite directions, the thoughts and feelings of those to whom it is addressed. This fact makes its rhetoric differ from poetry no less than its delivery does from acting. Anything that attracts attention merely to the manner of expression, to form as form, is injurious both to oratory and to rhetoric *per se*. But it is often essential to the effects of the actor and the poet.

Still more closely allied to the arts that are distinctively representative, especially to architecture, are decoration and landscape gardening. Their products are external to the man, and seem to spring from the satisfaction which he takes in a form of expression aside from an end of utility. Why then are they not included among the arts of the highest character? Perhaps they should be. At the

same time, there are reasons justifying the course of those who assign them to a lower rank. Their effects, especially those of landscape gardening, are produced through a use of inanimate nature not wholly out of analogy with that in which those of the dramatic are produced through a use of the human form. And besides this, although conventional figures and gardens and parks are certainly works of nature made human, it is a question whether an ornamentation by colors and outlines, often merely conventional, neither imitative of nature, nor suggestive to the mind; or whether fields or forests however transformed by the hand of man, can express or address the sympathies and intellect in the same sense, to say nothing of degree in which the works of the arts of the highest rank do this. The majority of people seem to think not; and as common opinion has been the test which we have applied hitherto, we are justified in applying it here.

All the arts, however, that have just been mentioned—especially elocution, pantomime, dancing, costuming, dramatics, oratory, decorative art and landscape gardening—are, either wholly or partly, representative in character, and thus necessarily have many features in common with the arts that it is the special object of this essay to consider. For this reason, references will often be made to them; and in many places they will be treated as themselves belonging to the class in which the ordinary judgment of men allows us to place only music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture.

Indeed, elocution, pantomime, dancing, dramatics, and oratory are often grouped with these latter arts; and all together called "the humanities." A special appropriateness will be recognized too in applying this term to them. They are the arts through which a man can cause forms,

otherwise often merely material in their influence, to thrill and glow with emotion and meaning; through which he can show himself able to breathe, as it were, something of that sympathetic and intellectual life which has already given life and humanity to his own material frame.

For similar reasons we can recognize, as applied mainly to poetry, painting, and sculpture, the origin of the term *phonetic*, from the Greek *φωνή*, a sound, the conception being that the forms of these arts are peculiarly related to the expression of thought and feeling, and so resemble the use of the human voice in language. Strictly applied, however, the term would be used only for arts that actually make use of sound; and in this sense would form the true contrast to the term *plastic*, from the Greek *πλαστικός*, fit for moulding, which is applied only to art-products made by the hands.

It may be as well to add here too that the term *æsthetics*, first used by Baumgarten in his book called "Aesthetica," published in Germany in 1750,—a term derived from the Greek *αἰσθητικός* and meaning fitted to be perceived, is used by some, as by Fergusson in his "History of Architecture," to apply more particularly, by way of distinction from *phonetic*, to music, architecture, and gardening, as well as also, with gradually lessening appropriateness, to ceramique, clothing, jewelry, gastronomy, joinery, and heating.

There seems to be no great need for this distinction. *Phonetic*, indicating, as it does, not merely a relationship between expression and sound, but between language and all art, as if its chief aim were to be a substitute for language, is a term misleading in itself (see page 50); and it separates uselessly arts belonging to the same class; and *æsthetics* is a general term which can be rightly applied

to the whole class of the arts with which we are now to deal. It may be applied, in fact, to every form or appearance, whether appealing to the ear or eye, which has been fitted especially to be perceived—in other words, adapted to the requirements of the senses (see page 9).

The most distinctive term applicable to all the arts of which we are to treat, and applicable to these, too, in all its meanings, appears to be the term *representative*. As a proof of both the exactness and comprehensiveness of this designation, notice, as already pointed out in the last page but one of the Preface, that there are none of the products of these arts, the chief excellences and deficiencies of which cannot be suggested by an endeavor to answer the question, "What does it represent?" The answer, moreover, will direct attention equally well to the natural appearances reproduced in the product and to the thoughts or feelings expressed in it. Ask a number of persons, for instance, what a certain musical composition or passage represents. If half of them assert it to be a tempest in a forest followed by sunshine, or a storm at sea followed by a calm; the other half will assert it to be opposition, conflict, and victory in thought; or anxiety, terror, and restfulness in feeling. As a proof of this statement, read the results of an experiment of playing thirteen musical selections before twenty-eight persons, recording their impressions, as related in an article on "Musical Expressiveness," published by Benjamin Ives Gilman, in the "American Journal of Psychology," for May, 1893. So with poems, pictures, or statues. If to some they represent characters, occurrences, or scenes,—speaking, acting, or appearing in any way as they naturally would in real life or in the real world,—they represent to others, by way of

analogy if no more, ideas, emotions, moods, types, expressed or suggested, which can exist only in mental conception. And so, too, with buildings. While to some they may mainly represent natural proportions and methods of adapting means to ends in securing shelter and support; or, at times, indeed, as in the contours of towers or vistas of colonnades, the actual natural appearances of cliffs and forests; to others they represent mainly certain ideas embodied in the designs—strength, repose, dignity, gracefulness, aspiration. Full confirmation of these statements, together with illustrations of their applicability to the minutest details of form and significance, will be given in the volumes of this series entitled “Poetry as a Representative Art,” “Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts,” and “Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music.” In this place, the general appropriateness of the term representative, is all that the reader need recognize.

At the same time, we must not forget that this term is applicable to a whole department of art, of which the arts just mentioned form only a single class. What peculiarly distinguishes these is the objective, external character of the product. In a stricter sense than is true of the other arts, they necessitate embodiment, or form. This fact might lead us to term them “The Representative Arts of Form.” But, in a broad sense, all the other representative arts necessitate form. Have these higher ones, then, any peculiarities of form? A feature essential to them, and not to all the others, is beauty. This might justify our using the French terms “*Les Beaux Arts*,” applying it to all the higher arts, including poetry; or, as the French themselves do, only to music and the arts of sight, which latter we term “The Fine Arts,” and using, as

applied to literature, the other French term, "Belles Lettres." But here, again, while perhaps certain phases of elocution, oratory, and the dramatic art do not necessitate beauty in connection with representation, dancing, pantomime, and landscape gardening cannot ignore it. For all these reasons, there seems to be no distinctive term for these arts of the highest rank better than that which we have been forced to use hitherto, namely, "The Higher Arts,"—a term which can be changed into "The Higher Æsthetic Arts," if we wish to emphasize chiefly their effects upon the senses; and into "The Higher Representative Arts," if we wish to emphasize also their effects upon the mind.

CHAPTER X.

REPRESENTATION IN ART AS DETERMINED BY NATURAL APPEARANCES: THEORIES CONCERNING BEAUTY.

Form as Manifested in Nature and Reproduced in Art—Characteristically Possesses Beauty—This should Predominate over the Ugly, but Need not Exclude it—The Distinction sometimes Drawn between Beauty and Expression—Necessity for a Definition of Beauty—The Three General Views with Reference to it—Mention of Writers Conditioning it upon Form—Of Writers Conditioning it upon Expression Traceable to Man—To a Source above the Man—The German Idealists—Mention of Writers Conditioning Beauty partly upon Form and partly upon Expression—The Term Beauty as ordinarily Used Indicates a Truth in All Three Theories, so far as they do not Exclude the Truth in the Others—Beauty may be in Form aside from that in Expression—It may be in Expression aside from that in Form—But Beauty is Complete only in the Degree in which that of Form and of Expression are Combined.

AN attempt will now be made to show, as promised on page 64, how, as directed by the art-impulse, the reciprocal effects of nature and of mind are represented as determined chiefly by such of their features as come from nature. Later on, we shall consider the same effects as determined chiefly by such of their features as come from the mind. As stated on page 64, the first of these subjects necessitates a discussion of the character of form in general as manifested in nature and reproduced in art; and a discussion, therefore, as connected with this, for reasons to be given presently, of the general character of beauty.

The chief of these reasons, indeed, has already been indicated. As pointed out on page 83, the art-impulse, owing to its very nature, *i. e.*, to the spontaneous and un-necessitated character of all its activity, invariably tends to choose for representation such appearances as exert upon the mind that subtle charm which in some way is connected with what men term beauty. It is only natural, therefore, in view of this fact, that it should be held almost universally that in reproducing the effects of nature, art should give the preference to such as have this quality. To what extent this preference should be given, is not so well established; but usually the amount of beauty is deemed sufficient if it merely predominate.

An authority, indeed, ranking as high as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing is often quoted as saying, in his famous criticism of the "Laocoön," to use the language of a translation by E. Frothingham, that the "Greek artist represented nothing that was not beautiful. Even the vulgarly beautiful, the beauty of the inferior type, he copied only incidentally for practice or recreation. The perfection of the subject must charm in his work. . . . He confined it strictly to the imitation of beauty." It is a question, however, whether these words were intended to mean as much as is suggested upon first reading them. This all depends upon what Lessing meant by the term beauty. He may have meant to include in it effects of contrast produced often in objects of both nature and art by the presence in them of certain features not beautiful in themselves. And what else could he have meant? A very little observation will convince any one that in the very statue of the "Laocoön," which he was then criticising, as well as in that of the allied "Group of the Niobe," to say nothing of innumerable Greek representations of

satyrs, there is much, even in the expressions of the countenances, where, if anywhere, one might expect to find beauty, which is not beautiful in itself. It is the same with the demons and dragons that Michael Angelo and Raphael introduce into so many of their compositions, as well as with the criminals and peasants that appear on so many of the canvases of later painters. How, too, with the villains and crimes portrayed in poems and dramas, the drums and cymbals in music, and the gargoyles and griffins in architecture? Certainly, facts do not confirm any theory to the effect that all the features chosen for art should be beautiful. The most that can be said is that in the main they should be so; and that those which are not so should be introduced only in order, by way of contrast, to enhance the beauty of others with which they are combined.

Even admitting, however, that ugliness is allowable for purposes of contrast, many writers are inclined to treat the latter as if it were a mere mental requirement. In other words, they are inclined to look upon a certain amount of ugliness as excusable only so far as needed in order to cause a work of art to be expressive of thought or feeling. They thus draw a distinction between beauty and expression similar to that which seems to accompany, as a postulate, the assertion of H. Taine in his "Philosophy of Art," as translated by John Durand, page 82, that "the end of a work of art is to manifest some essential or salient character, consequently some important idea, clearer and more completely than is attainable from real objects"; and similar also to that which seems to be indicated, though it is not meant in this sense, by G. Baldwin Brown, who, on page 153 of one of the most suggestive of our recent works on the "Fine Arts," has

a section entitled "Beauty and Significance." An indisputable adoption of this view, however, is manifested in writers like J. G. MacVicar, who, in his essay "On the Beautiful, the Picturesque, and the Sublime," declares that "the most regularly beautiful countenances are usually the most inexpressive." A similar conception is suggested, too, in a note on page 89 of J. H. Bernard's translation of Kant's "Kritik der Urtheilskraft." "It will be found," it is said there, "that a perfectly regular countenance, such as a painter might wish to have for a model, ordinarily tells us nothing, because it contains nothing characteristic, and therefore rather expresses the idea of the race than the specific traits of a person. Experience also shows us that these quite regular countenances commonly indicate internally only a mediocre man, presumably because if no mental disposition exceeds that proportion which is requisite in order to constitute a man free from faults, nothing can be expected of what is called genius, in which nature seems to depart from the ordinary relations of the mental powers on behalf of some special one."

The acceptance or rejection of this opinion with reference to the extent to which art can deal with that which is not beautiful, must depend, of course, as has already been suggested, on the definition that is adopted of beauty itself. Those who claim that, even as manifested in forms of nature, it includes effects so appealing to the mind that they can be rightly considered to be effects of significance, will, of course, differ greatly in their conclusions from those who say that it excludes these effects; and we shall find presently that, for each side of the question, there are abundant advocates.

Both parties, however, agree in the statement made a

moment ago, namely, that, in the main, works of art should be characterized by beauty as distinguished from ugliness; and as agreement with reference to this fact alone is a sufficient basis on which to build the discussion that is now to follow, we may proceed at once to it. Beauty being acknowledged to be a predominating characteristic in works of art and in appearances of nature fitted to be reproduced by it, there can evidently be no thorough understanding of its methods until in some way an answer has been given to the question, What is beauty? Indeed, there is a sense in which this question lies at the basis of almost all the subjects which we have been considering since the opening of Chapter II. For if men think with the classicists of the extreme type mentioned there, that the chief end of art is imitation, either of classic models or of nature, is it not because, consciously or unconsciously, they hold to a belief that beauty is conditioned mainly upon form? And if, on the contrary, they think with the romanticists that the chief end of art is the expression of ideas, is it not because they believe that beauty is a result of thought or feeling either of the human mind as in art, or of the creative mind, as, according to the Platonists, in nature? The inference, therefore, from what has been said hitherto, is that there must be some who attribute beauty to form; and some who attribute it to the thought or feeling expressed in the form, with a probability also of the existence of some who attribute it partly to the one source and partly to the other.

This inference a very slight survey of facts will confirm. All theories ever held on the subject may be classified in accordance with their tendencies in one of these three directions. With those who believe beauty to be

conditioned upon form, we may place not only writers avowedly tracing the sources of art to imitation, as was done by the chief authority on this subject in France in the middle of the eighteenth century, the Abbé Charles Batteux, in his "Cours de Belles-Lettres" and his "Les Beaux-Arts Réduits à un Même Principe"; by Voltaire and Denys Diderot in their articles in the "Encyclopédie," the one on "Goût," and the other on "Beauté," in the latter of which the sole corrective of errors in art was said to be to "go back to nature"; and also by T. B. Éméric-David, in his "Recherches sur l'Art Statuaire," etc.; but we may place here, too, writers—though some would object to this classification—whose deductions are logical only upon the supposition that certain conditions of form, whenever they are perceived, affect the ear or eye in a certain way, and that their influence upon thought or feeling is invariably determined by their preliminary influence upon the senses. Such deductions we have in the writings of Aristotle, the supposed originator of this opinion; in those of M. Vitruvius Pollio, in his "De Architectura"; of Alex. G. Baumgarten, mingled, however, with tendencies in the direction of idealism, in the earliest German essay on this subject, his "Aesthetica"; of his successor, Johann Georg Sulzer, who, in his "Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste," declares objects to be beautiful not subjectively, but in themselves; of Gotthold E. Lessing, whose whole discussion in the "Laocoön" is founded on the supposition of the intrinsic beauty or ugliness of subjects chosen for artistic reproduction; of the English writer, Edmund Burke, who, in his "Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful," argues mainly upon a similar supposition; of William Gilpin, who follows the same course in "Three Essays on Picturesque Beauty";

of Richard Price, a contemporary of Burke's, who, in his "Review of the Principal Questions of Morals," attributes beauty to "objects as such"; of Sir Chas. Bell, whose essays on "The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts" are argued from a realistic basis, the superiority of the Greeks being attributed merely to a "more extended study of nature"; of William Hazlitt, who, in his "Essay on the Fine Arts," says that the works of the great masters are all "careful copies from nature"; of the Dutch Humbert de Superville, who, in his "Signes Inconditionnels de l'Art," insists upon certain directions of outlines as indicative of character in the human countenance and in inanimate forms resembling it; of H. G. A. L. Flock, of the same nationality, who, in his "Populaire aesthetische Beshouwingen over de Symmetrie of de Bevallige Proportien," presents a theory similar in principle, though different in detail, to that of Zeising, to be mentioned below, as does also D. R. Hay, as appears, indeed, from the very titles of his books, like "Proportion, or the Geometric Principles of Beauty," etc.; of William Bellars, whose "Fine Arts and Their Uses" declares that it is by "comparing one of nature's products with another that we find the standard of beauty"; of the American S. P. Long, who, in his "Art, its Laws, and the Reasons for Them," treats of beauty as "inherent" in objects of perception; and of many modern critics like J. McNeill Whistler, who says in "The Gentle Art of Making Enemies" that "the subject-matter has nothing to do with harmony of sound or of color"; and that "art . . . should . . . appeal to the artistic sense of eye or ear, without confounding this with emotions entirely foreign to it, as devotion, pity, love, patriotism, and the like." Finally, we seem justified in including among these writers

attributing beauty to form, those who do this indirectly by holding that the higher phases of feeling which we term æsthetic have come to be produced in the course of the development of the organism through simple experiences of pleasure and pain in the eye or ear. This is really the basis of the theories of the German Adolf Zeising, who, in his "Aesthetische Forschungen," insists upon certain fixed ratios of numbers as governing all acceptable proportions; of H. L. F. von Helmholtz, who applies physical laws not only to music but to other arts in his "Die Lehre von der Tonempfindungen," etc.; of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, as a necessary sequence of the evolutionary theories unfolded by the one in his "Descent of Man," and by the other in his "Principles of Psychology," and of Grant Allen, who has further developed the same in his "Physiological Æsthetics."

On the other hand, with those who believe beauty to be conditioned upon significance, we may place, lowest on the list, the English school of writers who refer it to the "associations" suggested by objects, beginning with Archibald Alison, who published, near the end of the last century, his "Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste," and followed by Lord Francis Jeffrey in an "Essay on Beauty," by Dr. Thomas Brown with developments of the same theory in his "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," and, in more recent times, in part at least, by Thomas Purdie in his "Form and Sound." On a higher level, considered in their relation to idealism, we may place the writers who seem to look upon beauty as something not merely suggested by forms, but, as it were, embodied in them and expressed through them. Among these we may place the German U. W. F. Solger, who, in his "Vorlesungen über Aesthetik," at-

tributes it to objects for "what they symbolize"; also the Swiss Rodolphe Topffer, who, in his "Réflexions et Menus-Propos d'un Peintre Genevois—ou Essai sur le Beau dans les Arts," holds that it comes from "human thought liberated from every obstacle except the revelation of itself through the use of natural appearances"; and the American John Bascom, who, in his "Æsthetics, or Science of Beauty," attributes it, in the arts of sight, to the "utterance in visible form of some thought or feeling." It is but a slight step from the position of these writers to that of the German Arthur Schopenhauer, who, in his "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," and also in his "Metaphysik des Schönen und Aesthetik," asserts that things are beautiful in the degree in which they conform to the type or ideal, meaning by this something the source of which is not traceable beyond the influence of man or nature.

But, almost without exception, those who adopt this view go further and ascribe this type or ideal to some conditioning cause that is above and behind man or nature. With these we may rank, of course, all the Platonists, beginning with Plotinus and Proclus and coming down through such systems as were represented, in the third century, by the lost "De Apto et Pulchro" of St. Augustine; in the early part of the seventeenth century by "La Vite di Pittori, Scultori, ed Architetti moderni" of the Italian J. P. Bellori; in the latter part of the same century, in England, by the "Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher," of Bishop George Berkeley; and in this century, in Switzerland, by the "Du Beau dans la Nature, l'Art et la Poésie" of Adolphe Pictet, and by the "Journal Intime" of H. F. Amiel; in France by the "Discours" of A. C. Quatremère de Quincy, and by the "Proclus" and "Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien" of Victor Cousin; by the

“Cours d'Esthétique” of Théodore Jouffroy, who, however, departed from the system of his teacher Cousin in giving more emphasis to the real, which the ideal was represented as transcending; by “La Science du Beau” of Charles Lévêque; in Italy by the “Letteratura e Arti Belle” of A. Rosmini-Serbati; in Holland by the “De Socratische School” of P. W. van Hensde; and in England by such works as the “Essays on the Fine Arts” of S. T. Coleridge, “The Beautiful in Nature, Art, and Life” of A. J. Symington, and the “Discourses on Beauty” of J. S. Blackie.

As Platonic in general tendency also, though deviating from this system with profound originality, and claiming to harmonize it with the Aristotelian theory, we must class the great German idealists of the beginning of this century, especially Immanuel Kant, who, in his “Kritik der Urtheilskraft,” argues from the appearance of reason and intelligence in nature, combined with the universality with which the same appearances in it are recognized as beautiful, that the source of beauty is in the *vernunft* or reason; F. W. J. Schelling, who, in his “Aesthetik,” claims that in nature the absolute reveals itself, and that the work of art is to “rend the veil” in which the reason in nature is hidden; and G. W. F. Hegel, the foundation principle of whose department of the philosophy of the absolute devoted to “Aesthetik” is that “beauty is the revelation of mind or the idea through sensuous appearances.” Differing not radically from these, though writing with the avowed purpose of counteracting their too idealistic tendencies, we must place F. T. Vischer, a follower of Hegel, who, in his “Aesthetik oder Wissenschaft des Schönen,” by introducing still more pronounced pantheistic conceptions into Platonism, endeavored to associate an element of actual beauty with each individual form,

and Moritz Carrière who, in his "Das Wesen und die Formen der Poesie" and his "Aesthetik," opposed the pantheism of Vischer, holding that beauty consists in a certain unity of idea underlying various and different individual and concrete forms of sense.

Besides these two classes of writers of whom we have spoken, it has been said that there is a third class, who attribute beauty partly to the nature of the form, and partly to the ideas or ideal expressed through it. These writers are not always clearly distinguishable, because their very endeavors to do justice to both sides of the question almost necessarily render certain of their statements upon one side, when taken alone, apparently exclusive of what they are really willing to concede to the other side.

Few, of course, incorporate the absolute contradictions intentionally introduced by C. V. Cherbuliez into his ingenious discussion over a horse carved on a metope of the Parthenon, entitled "A Propos d'un Cheval, Causeries Athéniennes"; but there is this tendency in all of them. It might be supposed, for instance, that those who accept what is termed the "natural-history conception" of the development of the higher æsthetic from the lower animal sensibilities, would not belong to this class. But many of them unmistakably do, giving full credit to the influence both of the physical and of the psychological. One school of these writers, approaching this result from the realistic side, is represented by such men as J. F. Herbart, who, in his "Psychologie und Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik," says that the subjective phenomenon, or the idea (due to sense-influence), implies an objective reality of the truth of which it is the assurance and test; as G. T. Fechner, who, in his "Vorschule der Aesthetik," declares that

both imitation and idealization are necessary in art; as Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who in his "Outlines of *Æsthetics*" as translated by Professor G. T. Ladd, an American philosopher of the same school, starts out with the proposition that "the beautiful corresponds to so much of the idea as is actualized in us," and asks "how beauty, which is so often found in external forms, can correspond to an ideal condition of the human spirit"; and as J. Mark Baldwin, who, in his "Handbook of Psychology," distinguishes "two kinds of *æsthetic* emotion: that which attaches to more sensuous experiences, and is almost exclusively *formal*, and that which attaches to more representative experiences as having *meaning*." Another school of the same general class of writers, approaching the same general result from the idealistic side, recognizes, the "natural history conception" to be valid as an empirical one, but passes from it by means of what are termed "judgments of worth" to the view that there is an ideal principle which is embodying itself in experience, thus giving rise to conceptions of the beautiful and the good. This latter school is represented by such writers as T. H. Green, author of "The Prolegomena to Ethics"; Bernard Bosanquet, whose definition of beauty, in his "History of *Æsthetic*," is "that which has characteristic or individual expressiveness for sense-perception, or imagination, subject to the conditions of general or abstract expressiveness in the same medium"; and as the American, John Dewey, who, in his "Psychology," says that "a purely realistic, as a purely idealistic, art is impossible."

In addition to these, without reference to any relationship to their general philosophic tendencies, it is probably fair to include among those who recognize the dual nature of the effects of beauty such writers as the poets

Schiller and Goethe, as their views are expressed, by the former in his "Briefe über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen," and by the latter in his "Wilhelm Meister." Even F. von Hartmann, rightly classed with Schopenhauer (page 114), in his "Philosophie des Unbewussten," and his later "Aesthetik," distinguishes what he terms *shine* or *glow*, which, according to him, is a quality in which beauty resides, as being different from either form or the idea, inasmuch as it is something which in nature cannot be separated from reality, but in art can be produced by combination. More unmistakably belonging to this class are such writers as the Dutch J. van Vloten, who, in his "Nederlandsche Aesthetik," assigns equal importance to expressing truth and to embodying proportions like those of Zeising; as the French Charles Blanc, whose "Grammaire des Arts du Dessin" seems not only to acknowledge, but to emphasize both sides of the question; and as the Abbé P. Vallet, who, in his "L'Idée du Beau, dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," seems to take a suggestion from von Hartmann's idea of the *shine*, substituting for it the term *splendor*, and to hold equally to the necessity both of imitating beauty which for him has objective reality, and of interpreting it so as to reveal the idea that it embodies. Finally, we may include in the same class such English writers as were represented during the first part of the seventeenth century by the third Lord Shaftesbury, author of "The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody," usually classed as an idealist, but who, in his "Miscellaneous Reflections," asserts the "originality" and "independence" of natural beauty in such things as figure, color, motion, and sound; by Francis Hutcheson, another so-styled idealist, who, in his "Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and

Virtue," with like distinctions between "original" and "relative" beauty, argues often from distinctively realistic view-points; by the Scottish philosophers, notwithstanding their extremely subjective treatments of the whole subject, Thomas Reid, who, in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," declares the beauty acknowledged to be in natural objects to be derived from "some relation that they bear to mind," and that the greatest beauty lives in "expression"; Dugald Stewart, who, in his "Philosophical Essays," develops the same general theory, though his discussion often leaves one in doubt whether he is not arguing from a purely materialistic view-point; and Sir William Hamilton, whose definition of the beautiful, in conformity with the natural realism or dualism of his general philosophic system in his "Lectures on Metaphysics," is one which "occupies the Imagination and Understanding in a free and full, and consequently in an agreeable activity"; by John Ruskin in his "Modern Painters," and other works (see page 15); by St. John Tyrwhitt, who, in his "Natural Theology of Natural Beauty," accepts both a physical explanation of the origin of beauty and the theory that it is "a spiritual supplement to the sense of sight"; by ex-President James McCosh of Princeton, who, in his "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation," as well as in his later "Emotions," while accepting many of the deductions of writers like Hay and Darwin, endeavors to "correlate" them to mental phenomena; by E. J. Poynter, who, in his "Ten Lectures on Art," insists throughout on both idealism and realism; as do also F. T. Palgrave in his "Essays on Art," especially in the one on "Poetry and Prose in Art," and J. A. Symonds in his "Essays, Speculative and Suggestive," especially in the one on "Realism and Idealism."

If now we apply to these theories the same test that we have been applying so far throughout this book, namely, the meaning of the term beauty as understood and used in ordinary intercourse, we shall find that there is some truth in all of them, and that each theory is fallacious so far alone as it excludes from consideration that which is true of theories seemingly opposed to it.

There is a degree of truth, for instance, in the first theory. The word *beautiful*, as ordinarily used, implies a recognition of a phase of beauty existing in mere appearance, aside from any thought or feeling expressed through it. Omitting consideration of a few eccentric theories with reference to the subject, which no large number of thinkers have adopted, and which, even by their authors, are applied only to the primary uses of the word—such, for instance, as the statements by Johann Joachim Winckelmann in his “Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums,” by Kant in his “Kritik der Urtheilskraft,” and by Henry Fuseli in the “Lectures by the Royal Academicians,” that beauty is ascribable to shape or form rather than to color or sound; of Henry Home, Lord Kames, in his “Elements of Criticism,” that it is ascribable only to objects of sight; and of Dugald Stewart in his “Philosophical Essays,” that our first ideas of it are derived from colors—it may be said that, to men generally, a fabric of a single hue hanging in a shop-window, two or three of different hues thrown accidentally together, and certain figures, even rooms, on account, sometimes of their colors, sometimes of their proportions, sometimes of both, are termed, and properly termed, *beautiful*. When so used, the word does not refer necessarily to any human thought or feeling that men recognize as being suggested through or by these forms. All that

is meant is, that certain colors and spaces have been so presented as to fulfil requirements of physical laws that make them attractive or agreeable to the sense of sight. Women are not wrong in principle, only in their application of the effect to a lower sense, when they apply the same word to soups and pies agreeable to taste.

Again, there is truth in the second of the theories. Ordinary language recognizes a phase of beauty in mere significance, despite the form. Let one come upon a woman with a deformed figure and homely countenance, dressed in most inharmonious colors, and in a most illy proportioned room ; yet if she be engaged in the utterance of some noble sentiment, or in the performance of some sublime act of charity or of self-sacrifice, the expression of the motive in her face and frame, together with her surroundings, may be so accordant with the demands of his soul as to transfigure the mere forms, and prepare him to swear before a court of justice that he has seen what is beautiful.

At the same time, probably, most men will be willing to admit that in the case neither of the fabrics nor of the woman does the beauty exhibited manifest all the elements capable of rendering it complete. They recognize that the beauty of form in colors or outlines could be enhanced by supplementing it with more beauty appealing to the intellect, and that the beauty of expression in the deformed woman could receive a more harmonious setting if accompanied by more beauty of color and outline. So far as appearances appeal merely to one's æsthetic nature, it is preferable to see a beautiful woman doing a beautiful act, to seeing one not beautiful doing it. It does not seem to be true, therefore, that beauty can be referred merely to form, or merely to significance,

or merely to both together. To cover all the facts indicated by, at least, the ordinary use of the term, we must acknowledge that all these theories contain some truth; and, at the same time, that beauty is complete alone in the degree in which beauty of form and of significance are combined. Whether or not the ordinary use of the term is a justifiable use of it, we must leave to be determined by what will be unfolded in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER XI.

BEAUTY AS ABSOLUTE, RELATIVE ; OBJECTIVE, SUBJECTIVE, ETC.

The Term Beauty as Used by the Foremost Authorities Indicates the Same as its Ordinary Use Noticed in the Last Chapter—Mention of Writers who Consider Beauty Relative—Of those who Distinguish Relative, Natural, Derived, or Dependent Beauty from that which is Essential, Divine, Typical, Absolute, Intrinsic, Free, etc.—Distinction between Relative and Absolute Beauty the most Common—All these Distinctions Imply an Appeal to the Senses through Forms and to the Mind through Suggestions—Beauty as Objective and Subjective—Mention of Writers Considering it Objective : these Claim it to be Recognized through its Subjective Effects—Mention of Writers Considering it Subjective : these do not Deny its Origin in Forms Considered by them Objective—They, too, Mean that Beauty must be Judged by its Effects—Mention of Other Writers Holding Unequivocally that Beauty is both Objective and Subjective.

THAT the statement made in the last paragraph of Chapter X., namely, that beauty is complete alone in the degree in which it is manifested both in form and in significance, conforms to general opinion, including that also of the foremost authorities, though these often apparently acknowledge it unconsciously to themselves, can be confirmed by noticing certain terms that almost all writers upon beauty have concurred in using in order to define it or to distinguish certain phases of it.

It has been urged, for instance, by some, and these of every nation, that all beauty of whatever kind is *relative* or a matter of relations. It was so with Aristotle ; and

his view has been sustained in modern times, in Switzerland, by J. P. de Crousaz, in his "Traité du Beau"; in France, by Père Buffier, in his "Traité des Vérités Premières," as well as by Denys Diderot, in his "Beauté" in the "Encyclopédie"; in Holland, by Hieronymus van Alphen, in his "Theorie van Schoone Kunsten en Wetenschappen"; in Germany, by J. Jungmann, in his "Aesthetik"; and in England, as a necessary supplement underlying their theory of "association," by Alison, Jeffrey, and Dr. Thomas Brown, as well as by James Sully, whose whole argument in the æsthetic portion of his "Sensation and Intuition" is based upon the assumption that the relative validity of æsthetic principles is all that the science needs.

Generally, however, in connection with the term *relative*, another term has been used, indicative of the existence of an entirely contrasting phase of beauty. Francis Hutcheson, for instance, in his "Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," distinguishes it from *absolute* beauty, meaning by this the beauty of an object without relation to anything beyond it from which it may be imitated. He thinks that art, besides reproducing absolute beauty, may occasion relative beauty by using that which has not absolute beauty. Père André, in his "Essai sur le Beau," distinguishes the *natural* beauty of the external world from *essential* or *divine* beauty, by which he evidently means the *typical* beauty. Lord Kames, in his "Elements of Criticism," distinguishes *relative* from *intrinsic* beauty, meaning by the latter a quality in the form as contrasted with that which is recognized (by thought, of course) to be its end or purpose. Dugald Stewart, in his "Philosophical Essays," distinguishes *relative* from *absolute* or *intrinsic* beauty, meaning by the

latter the same as Lord Kames. Lord Shaftesbury, in his "Miscellaneous Reflections," and also Thomas Reid, in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," make distinctions between what they both term *derived* and *original* beauty; but with the former the *original* beauty is that which is in nature, as distinguished from art, and with the latter it is that which is in mind as distinguished from nature; and Sir William Hamilton speaks of *dependent* or *relative* beauty as contrasted with that which is *free* or *absolute*, in the sense of being (of course, to the conception of the mind) *complete*.

The most common and authoritative distinction, however, is that between *relative* beauty which pertains to actual appearances, and *absolute* beauty which pertains to the typical or ideal form. This is a distinction essential, as is evident, not only to the fundamental theory of the German philosophy of the absolute, as mentioned on page 115, but to any phase of Platonism, as mentioned on pages 114, 115.

Notice now the double nature of the effect—the effects, that is both of form and also of what is expressed through the form—to which the employment of any of these terms must necessarily be attributable. The word *relative*, even when used alone, and much more when used in connection with an opposite term, implies, if it does not express, a contrast,—as applied to beauty, a contrast resulting from a recognition of influences appealing both to the senses through forms and also to the mind through suggested thought. The use of the word must result from a recognition of forms, because, otherwise, no relativity could be perceptible; and it must result from a recognition of suggested thought also, because otherwise none could be conceivable. The conception of relativity always neces-

sitates a mental comparison with something like the *absolute*, the *intrinsic*, the *inherent*, or the *original*. This latter, therefore, must be suggested to the mind and held there as an idea, ideal, type, or standard, before it is possible to conceive that, as contrasted with it, any other form, actually presented for consideration, is *relative*.

Equally well, the recognition of the fact that beauty is complete in the degree alone in which it is manifested both in form and in significance, is shown by the application to it of the terms *objective* and *subjective*. Each of these terms is assigned by different writers to different conditions. When we search for the reasons of this we find indications of its being traceable to a subtle and unconscious desire to account in a satisfactory way for the sources of both effects which we are now considering. For instance, we might naturally suppose that those who attribute beauty to the conditions of form as form, inasmuch as form is objective to the mind influenced by it, would assert that beauty too is *objective*. But they do the contrary. As a rule, these are the very writers who argue strenuously that it is *subjective*, meaning by this that it is apprehended through the effects that it has upon the sensibilities of the person subjected to its influence. For an analogous reason, we might naturally suppose that those who attribute beauty to the idea, or ideal, or typical form, would conceive of this latter as existing in the mind, and, therefore, would conceive of beauty itself as something also in the mind, and, therefore, as *subjective*. But the facts here too are just the contrary. Plato himself, and the Platonists generally, are the very ones who argue that it is *objective*, meaning by this that it is a divine or spiritual essence actually existing outside of us, inasmuch as it is behind the perceptible forms of nature.

To extend these statements we find, on the one hand, such advocates of objectivity as Richard Price, who, in his "Review of the Principal Questions of Morals," begins by asserting that beauty is an attribute so "*inherent* in objects that it would exist in them whether any mind perceived it or not"; and as the Abbé P. Vallet, whose very first endeavor, as stated by himself in his "L'Idée du Beau dans la Phil. de St. Thomas d'Aquin," is to prove the *objectivity* of beauty,—we find such writers ending by analyzing its effects into those of unity and variety and the like,—effects which, whether appealing to the senses or to the mind, can be recognized only *subjectively*. A similar fact is true of almost every other writer whom we have quoted on pages 111–113 as either explicitly or implicitly attributing beauty to form as form. There are few of these of whom one might not say, as William Knight in his "Philosophy of the Beautiful" says of the first of their series: "Aristotle's analysis of the philosophy of the beautiful seems, however, to conduct us in the end to a doctrine not very far removed from that of Plato. So far as he reaches a principle at all, it is that of order and symmetry." It is always qualities in principle like these—unity and variety, one in the manifold, harmony, proportion, symmetry, etc.—that are emphasized in such systems as on pages 111–113 are ascribed to writers like Vitruvius, Batteux, Éméric-David, Baumgarten, Sulzer, De Superville, Flock, Burke, Bellars, Hay, Day, Long, Zeising, and Helmholtz. By others mentioned with them, as by Voltaire, Diderot, Gilpin, and Sully, emphatic denials are given of any *absolute* standards of taste. But such denials are virtual admissions that beauty is a result of effects as they appeal *subjectively* not only to the eye or ear, but to personal feeling, thought, or judgment. A

similar assertion could be made, too, of the systems, including almost all those ascribing beauty to form as form, which attribute it to certain sensations, mainly of pleasure, excited in those by whom it is perceived. In fact, all that the advocates of *inherent* beauty or of the consequent theory of the *imitative* nature of art seem to mean is that certain *objective* conditions inevitably and necessarily produce in the senses of hearing or sight, or in the mind as influenced through these, certain *subjective* effects. Their opponents do not always admit the inevitable or necessary sequence of these effects, nor that they are produced upon the mind on account of only their previous effects upon the senses. But these are differences merely in methods of explaining the origin of effects exerted by the forms and by their significance, differences that involve no denial but rather an admission that there is something in beauty traceable to both sources, the existence of which admission is all that we are now trying to show.

The condition of thought just indicated, is paralleled in the case of those too who make much of the *subjectivity* of beauty. Who of these deny the *objectivity* of the phenomena occasioning it? Lord Kames, for instance, in his "Elements of Criticism," declares that "an object is said to be beautiful for no other reason than that it appears so to a spectator." Abraham Tucker, in his "Light of Nature Pursued," denies that there is any absolute or essential beauty in objects existing independent of the *subject*, and Thomas Reid, in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," seems to agree in this regard entirely with Schopenhauer, who affirms that it is not through the senses of understanding or reason but by *direct intuition* that beauty is recognized. Not essentially differing in tendency, Sir

William Hamilton defines a beautiful object as one whose form "occupies the Imagination and Understanding in a free and full and consequently in an agreeable activity." David Hume, in his essay, "Of the Standard of Taste," as also Charles Blanc, in his "Grammaire des Arts du Dessin," claims that beauty exists only "in the mind of man"; and Eugène Véron, in his "L'Esthétique," that the beautiful in art is *subjective* because it is an (objective) expression of the artist's personality. Von Hartmann, in his "Aesthetik," takes clearer ground, arguing that a work of art while *objectively* real is beautiful only in its *subjective* effect; and Julius Bergmann, in his "Ueber das Schöne," claims that the *subjectivity* of beauty is capable of scientific demonstration. The ground taken by these writers, especially by those who hold the perception of beauty to be a direct intuition, is certainly very different from that of most of the writers mentioned in the last paragraph, who believe it to be an effect of either judgment or feeling excited by symmetry, proportion, or other such qualities as are produced first upon the senses; but the ground thus taken does not deny the objectivity of the conditions through the instrumentality of which the effects upon mind are set in operation except in the sense in which extreme idealism excludes all objectivity. Kant, for instance, in his "Kritik der Urtheilskraft," makes all conceptions of beauty, as well as of all other qualities supposed to be perceived *subjective*; but he does not deny that they arise in forms that men consider to be objective.

"The principle," he says, as translated by J. H. Bernard, P. I, Div. I, S. 22, page 95, "which concerns the agreement of different judging persons, although only subjective, is yet assumed as subjectively universal (an idea necessary

for every one), and thus can claim universal assent (as if it were objective) provided we are sure that we have correctly subsumed (the particulars) under it."

The same view may be said to be taken by Schelling and Hegel and their lesser followers. Practically these writers, in applying the term, mean little more than that beauty must be judged in all cases by its *effects*. They would be willing to admit that these come partly from that which the mind conceives of as outside itself, and partly from that which it conceives of as within itself. Often, too, they mean that the man perceiving forms must decide by a purely subjective judgment the degree in which they conform to good taste. If, moreover, it can be shown that with men universally this subjective judgment, when acting normally, has a tendency to attribute beauty to similar combinations of forms or ideas, then it can be argued logically that, practically considered, the beauty resulting from their combination is objective and real. "Though subjective, as Kant says," to quote from Bernard Bosanquet in his "History of Æsthetic," "it is also objective, as he meant." By many of these writers, in fact, this conclusion is distinctly admitted.

Others, who by no means overlook the expressional side of the subject—such writers, for instance, as Weisse, in the "System der Aesthetik als Wissenschaft von der Idee des Schönen," Rosmini-Serbati, in his "Letteratura e Arti Belle," John G. MacVicar, in his essay "On the Beautiful, the Picturesque, and the Sublime," John Ruskin, in his "Modern Painters," Joseph Jungmann, in his "Aesthetik," and Prof. J. S. Kedney, in his work on "The Beautiful and the Sublime," hold to the opinion that beauty, as well as being subjective, is also, and this too in the most distinctive sense, objective.

CHAPTER XII.

BEAUTY THE RESULT OF HARMONY OF EFFECTS, PHYSICAL AND MENTAL.

Results of our Review of Different Theories—The Term Effects and its Suggestions—Illustrations of Beauty as Attributable to Effects upon the Senses and the Mind and Both—As Incomplete because Attributable to Effects upon the Senses and not the Mind, or upon the Mind and not the Senses—Complexity of Effects thus Suggested as Essential to Beauty—Connection between this and our Present Line of Thought—Complexity of Effects Essential to the Beauty of Single Sounds, Lines, and Colors—Much more in Combinations of these in Art-Products—Besides Complexity, Variety, Unity, and the Phase of the Latter Termed Harmony of Effects Necessary to Beauty—Harmony of Tone Explained—Of Color—The Relations of Both to Vibratory Action upon the Acoustic or Optic Nerves—Harmony of Effects as Produced in Rhythm and Proportion—Some Sense-Effects Entering into Harmony are Produced without Conscious Action of the Mind, but Some are not—Thought and Emotion as Determined according to Physiological Psychology, by Vibratory Action upon Nerves of Hearing, Sight, and the Whole Brain—But Thought and Emotion, Spontaneous or not Conveyed through the Senses, may also Determine Hearing and Sight—Effects Causing Beauty in this Case are Produced in the Mind—Facts with Reference to Vibratory Action in Connection with all Conscious Sensation should not be Ignored, but Need not be Solved in an *Æsthetic* System—Sufficient Data for this Obtained by Accepting Effects in their Ascertainable Conditions.

IN this brief review of opinions held and of distinctions made with reference to beauty, which in all cases, as must not be forgotten, involves the existence of a form appealing to the mind either through hearing or sight, we

have found one set of writers attributing that which is essential in this quality to effects produced upon the physical senses; another set attributing it to effects produced upon the mind; and still a third set attributing it in part to the one source and in part to the other.

This word effects, as thus used, explicitly or implicitly, by the advocates of each theory, cannot fail to awaken a suggestion of a possibility of finding a common principle exemplified in the theories of all. But before we follow out this suggestion, before we ask exactly what it is that effects, whether produced upon the senses or the mind, have in common, let us first confirm, by an illustration or two, the universality with which the ordinary use of terms shows that the conception of beauty involves that of effects produced upon both.

First of all, let us recall a woman, in prominent position, of great beauty of form and excellence of character, a woman with the reputation, say, of Queen Louise of Prussia, the mother of the first Emperor William. Here was one whose form and face were of such a nature that, owing solely to their effects upon the organs of sight, they would cause almost any observer of ordinary taste, however ignorant of whom or of what she was, to declare her to be beautiful. But, behind and above the attractions of her mere appearance, she had such a character, such mental and sympathetic traits, that none of her own family, intimately acquainted with these, would have been willing to admit that she was beautiful to others in as deep and spiritual a sense as to themselves. But to what would their unwillingness to admit this be owing, except to a subtle belief in a phase of beauty dependent upon effects exerted not upon physical organs only, but upon mind and soul? At the same time, had one of their number

been blind, all the others would have regretted the impossibility of this one's recognizing her beauty as they did. But to what would this feeling be owing, except to an inward conviction that beauty is a result of effects coming from form as well as from character; and, not only this, but also from both of them when combined. "To know just how beautiful she is," they would all have felt like saying, "you should know not only how her appearance fits the requirements of the senses, but also how perfectly her appearance fits her character, and her character and appearance together fit every requirement of both the senses and the soul."

Or take another example. There are certain combinations of colors and sounds, say a flag like that of Italy, or a tune like the "Austrian National Hymn," the effects of which, in every land, without something to interfere with the normal action of the eye or ear, are recognized to be beautiful. Yet it is possible that, owing to certain associations of ideas, or to certain suggestions excited by their effects upon the mind, the indisputable beauty both of the flag and of the tune may fail to appeal to some. Did the Italian flag seem beautiful at the time of the unification of Italy to the adherents of the Pope? or the Austrian hymn seem so to the Italians when Austria was their oppressor? On the contrary, for exactly opposite reasons, the sound of a Scotch bagpipe or the sight of a Scotch plaid, neither of which fulfils æsthetic laws in its effects upon the physical organs of perception, excite in the Scottish head and heart that which, with his hand on the Bible and fear of eternal punishment in store for perjury, the Scotchman would be willing to declare an effect of beauty. Yet even he might be willing to admit, too, that certain other things could be more beautiful,—

an admission which, logically carried out, would lead to the acknowledgment that complete or ideal beauty is attained only by effects, if there be any, recognized to be beautiful not only by the senses irrespective of the quality of their appeal to the mind, and by the mind irrespective of the quality of their appeal to the senses, but also by both the senses and the mind; in other words, when the effects upon the senses seem to fit those upon the mind in such ways that both together seem to fit the whole duplex nature of the man to whom they are addressed.

It has to be acknowledged that these illustrations do little more than reiterate what has been indicated before; and, even at that, merely touch the surface of the subject. Nevertheless, they contain suggestions that are important just here, and, aided by which, we shall presently go deeper. Notice, first of all, the decided suggestion that complexity of effects is characteristic of beauty. It is attributed, in each instance, so far as it is complete and ideal, not to a single effect, as to one upon the senses, or to one upon the mind, but, necessarily, to more than one, often to many of them, conjointly exerting both a physical and a psychical influence. In view of this fact, we are naturally prompted to ask whether it may not be found that this complexity of effects, which, so far, has been treated as merely incidental to beauty, is essential to it.

That we should ask the question is not strange. It has been asked many times before, as well as answered in the affirmative (see page 12). But neither the question nor its answer is that which concerns us here, so much as the bearing of the answer, when we have found it, upon our present line of thought. We wish to show that, if beauty be complex, there are reasons connected with its

very existence rendering it incapable of being complete and ideal, except in the degree in which it realizes the conditions that have just been claimed for it.

Let us begin by applying the question of the complexity of beauty to effects that are experienced solely in the organs of hearing and sight, and to these effects as they exist in their rudiments, *i. e.*, in elementary sounds, lines, or colors. To take up the first of these. When is a sound beautiful? Few would think of answering this except by saying, when it is a blending together, in accordance with the laws of harmony, of several sounds, as in melodies or chords, or series of these,—in other words, when the sound is not simple but complex. But let us be accurate in this matter. Is it not true that a single sound, like the solitary, unvaried note of a bird or of a prima donna, is sometimes beautiful? Certainly it is. But when is it beautiful? Of course, when it is musical. But when is it musical? As all physicists know, in the degree in which it is complex; and complex under such conditions that all its component effects work together in ways causing them to fulfil the same laws of harmony that are fulfilled in chords or series of them. What is meant in saying this will be explained on page 138. At present the fact needs only to be stated.

A similar fact is true with reference to lines. When is a line beautiful? Who, if asked this, would not answer, when it outlines a figure? And when does it outline a figure?—When it is a combination of many lines of different directions; and, therefore, when its effects are *complex*. But here again it may be asked, is a single line never beautiful? And again we may answer, “certainly.” But, if so, the line is never perfectly straight; it is never a line having the simple effect of only one direction. The

line of beauty is a curve ; in other words, it has a complex effect. Nor is it really beautiful even then, except when its different sections are conditioned and related so as to produce effects which, for reasons that cannot be given here, are recognized to be harmonious. The same is true of colors also. It is with the harmony or contrast occasioned by the presence of many of these used together that we ordinarily associate the idea of beauty. But yet a single color may be beautiful. At the same time, when this is so, it is owing either to the contrast between it and every color surrounding it, or else to harmonious effects of light and shade, as they apparently play upon the surfaces of a hue, when subtly occasioning those exact subdivisions of the elements of light, and of its absence, which determine what the hue is.

If sounds, lines, and colors, even when considered in their elements, owe their beauty to a complexity in which different effects are blended harmoniously, this must be still more true of these elements when combined in what all recognize to be the extremely complex products of nature and of art.

In what has just been said, it has been necessary to anticipate that which has yet to be explained, by using several times the term harmonious. Complexity alone could not produce effects of beauty ; it could produce not even effects of form. Complexity alone produces merely effects of variety ; and variety alone produces merely effects of many separate forms. Not until, in spite of variety, unity is apparent, can either the senses or the mind attribute all the effects to a single source or agency. No less important, therefore, than complexity, and its necessary attendant, variety, is unity as a condition underlying beauty. But what phase of unity ? There is one phase

of it necessary to scientific grouping. In spite of variety in size, shape, or color, there is a unity of apparent effects traceable, for instance, to a dog, and this causes us to assign every member of his family to the same general class. Another phase is necessary to philosophic comprehension. In spite of variety in objects of worship, creeds, or codes of morals, there is a unity of apparent effects traceable to religion or superstition, and this causes us to ascribe every development of it in every nation to the same general cause. So, too, there is a phase of unity which is necessary to æsthetic appreciation. In spite of variety in sounds or sights, there is a unity of effects traceable to a symphony, a poem, or a picture, which causes us to assign every particular effect of it to the same general form. The phase of unity appealing to scientific apprehension is usually the basis of conscious or unconscious classification as it is termed; that appealing to philosophic comprehension is usually the basis of what, if distinguished at all from classification, is termed systemization; and that appealing to æsthetic appreciation can be defined by no better term, perhaps, than harmony, as the word is used not in a technical but in a general sense. As we shall find presently, it is the phase of unity that we have in harmony, which, as manifested in connection with a variety of complex effects, produces the result that is termed beauty.

In order to perceive the truth of this statement, we must begin by ascertaining exactly what harmony is, and this not in its general but in its technical sense. An answer to the question can be found in no better way than by recalling the discoveries of the scientists as a result of analyzing harmony as it appears in music, the art to the effects of which the term was first applied technically.

In this art, through the use, among other methods, of resonators, so constructed as to enable one to detect the presence in a tone of any particular pitch, it has been found that notes which are harmonious are such as contain the same elements of pitch, or—what is the same thing—are notes in which effects of *like* pitch are repeated. For instance, when a string like that of a bass viol is struck, its note, if musical, is not single or simple : it is compound. Suppose that it produces the tone of the bass C—representing a sound-wave caused by the whole length of the string. This C is the main, or, as it is termed, the *prime* tone that we hear. But, at the same time, this same string usually divides at the middle, producing what is called a *partial* tone of the C above the bass, representing a sound-wave caused by one half the string's length. It often produces, too, *partial* tones of the G above this, of the C above this, and of the E above the last C representing sound-waves caused, respectively, by one third, one fourth, and one fifth of the string's length. These are not all the possible partial tones ; nor are all the partials, in every instrument, invariably compounded with every prime tone : but only the pitch of these and, at times, of partials caused by waves of one sixth and one seventh of the string's length, with these partial's halves, duplicates, quadruplicates, etc., can produce harmony, the ear being apparently unable to detect like effects with more complicated subdivisions. In other words, the C, G, C,



and E in this upper staff are in harmony with the lower C, because made up of effects that already enter

into its composition. The chord as a whole, therefore, or any analogous development of it, is a result of putting *like effects with like*.

The term harmony, though applied primarily to tones, is applied also to colors; and here it results from the same process, from the putting together of things that, in subtle senses, are *alike*. For instance, a picture of objects selected on account of having the same general color—as a window with a blue curtain, a table with a blue spread, a floor with a blue carpet, and a woman with a blue dress—is said to manifest harmony of color, or, as this is technically termed, *tone*. So too a picture of objects having the same general color but varied in a way natural to high degrees of light and shade, is said to manifest harmony. And, still again, a picture of objects having colors apparently very different but of the kind termed complementary, is said to manifest harmony. But what are complementary colors? Science, by analyzing them has ascertained that, first of all, they are two colors that together make white. Sometimes, indeed, three colors are said to harmonize; but, in this case, one of the two complementary colors is present and the other colors, as can be proved by mixing them, are two that together make the second of the complementaries. For this reason, the compound of the three has a like general effect to that of the original one or two; and an analogous principle applies to combinations of more colors. Harmony in hues, therefore, in as true a sense as in sounds, results from likeness in effects. To say nothing of physiological causes, just as a *mi* or *sol* can be said to harmonize with a single bass note of which they are compounds, as well as with one another, the two colors or the three colors can be said to harmonize on the one hand with the white light necessarily surrounding them of which they are compounds,

and on the other hand with one another. In fact the main difference in art between harmony as produced by the selection of like colors under like conditions of light and shade, and the harmony produced by the selection of what are termed harmonious, in the sense of complementary, colors, is that, in the latter, nature or natural light has completed, as it were, the alchemic processes, for which, in the former, she has merely presented the preparatory elements.

To speak now of physiological causes, it is noticeable that the number of double effects of color in a ray of light is limited only by the number of pairs into which it is possible to divide it; yet that only those effects are pleasurable, the relations between the divisions causing which can be represented by ratios so small—say between 1:2 and 5:6, or exact duplicates of these—that the senses, acting, as they seem to do, irrespective of conscious intellection, can approximately determine these relations. Apparently, because the essential requisite is the like action upon the organism subjected to it of vibratory waves in what is termed the ether of the atmosphere, it is only when these waves are perceived to be alike—*i.e.*, of exactly the same size, or else fitted to go into some other wave an exact number of times—that their effects are entirely satisfactory. Just here modern æsthetics has been strangely misled by physical science. The inventions of the latter have revealed an almost infinite number of pairs of colors produced by different twin divisions of a ray of light. But not all of these—only a very few of them—can produce the harmony ascribable to what, in art, are termed complementary colors. In fact, the same principle with reference to ratios represented by small numbers appears to apply to waves both of sound and of sight, although its

application does not involve, as some suppose, any exact numerical correspondence between the ratios representing our present musical scale, as we have constructed it, and our present spectrum, as we interpret it.

The method of the senses in receiving the impression of what is technically termed harmony, may be made more apprehensible by noticing the analogous method through which the conscious mind receives the impression of such phases of harmony as are associated with rhythm and proportion. An appreciation of rhythm is usually supposed to furnish the earliest evidence of æsthetic capability on the part of either a child or a savage. In fact, almost the only form of musical harmony over large sections of the earth to-day continues still to be merely a rude development of rhythm. But what is rhythm? A result of making, by series of noises, or strokes, certain like divisions of time—small divisions, and exact multiples of them in large divisions. But the moment that the smaller become so numerous that the fact that they exactly go into the larger divisions is no longer perceptible—as often, when we hear more even than eight notes in a musical measure, or more even than three syllables in a poetic foot,—the effect ceases to be rhythmical. A like fact is true of proportion. Owing to the very great possibilities and complications of outlining, as in squares, angles, and curves, its laws are intricate and difficult to apply; but, as will be shown in the volume of this series entitled “Proportion and Harmony in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture,” the harmonic effects of proportion all result, in the last analysis, from exact divisions and subdivisions of space in every way analogous to the methods underlying the effects of rhythm in time.

Now the question comes, Are all the effects entering

harmoniously into that complex result which constitutes beauty traceable to such as influence merely the physical organs of the ear or eye? Of some of the effects undoubtedly this must be affirmed. So far as can be ascertained, the æsthetic quality of a single tone or color, as also the concord caused by the blending of it with others, is recognized to be what it is by the physical senses irrespective of the conscious action of the mind. Only the analysis of science has been able to detect the way in which, in such cases, the effects are made to harmonize. But can the same be affirmed of all the effects of beauty? Can it even be affirmed of all of them that are indisputably connected with form as form? How is it with the beauty of effects undoubtedly imparted through rhythm and proportion? These, certainly, though apprehended through the physical senses, are recognized only in connection with the conscious action of the mind. It is because we can consciously count the beats and accents in music and poetry, as well as compute the distances between straight lines and curves in painting and architecture, that we detect those results in them of exact measurements in time or space causing rhythm or proportion. But if it be true that certain characteristics of art which are determined only by form demand action on the part both of the senses irrespective of the mind and of the mind also, how much more true must this appear when we consider that in all cases, as shown in Chapter VI., this form is, in some sense at least, a form of expression; and therefore a form of something that in any circumstances must, in some way, appeal to the mind.

What now is the best way in which to take up and trace to its sources the thread of this suggestion? The most

popular method of the day, undoubtedly, is that of physiological psychology. According to this, effects causing rhythm and proportion, which are consciously apprehended by the mind, and those causing harmony of sound and color, which are unconsciously apprehended by the senses, having been discovered by science to be the same in principle, it is argued that all æsthetic effects are the same in principle. Moreover, it has been discovered that not only do the nerves of the eye and ear vibrate as affected by sound and sight, and communicate to the brain intelligence of particular degrees of pitch and hue as determined by the rates and sizes of the vibratory waves, but it has been proved beyond a doubt that the nerves constituting the substance of the brain vibrate also, and thus give rise to thoughts and feelings; and, not only so, but that the vibrations of the nerves in particular parts of the brain give rise to thoughts and feelings of a particular character; such, for instance, as those connected with particular exercises of memory in recalling general events or specific terms. This fact has been ascertained through various observations and experiments in connection with the loss or removal of certain parts of the brains of men or animals, or with the application of electricity to certain systems of nerves accidentally or artificially exposed or else naturally accessible. Of course, such discoveries tend to the inference that all conscious mental experience whatsoever, precisely as in the case of sensations excited in the organs of the eye and ear, are effects of vibrations produced in the nerves of the brain. If this inference be justified, the line of thought that we have been pursuing apparently justifies the additional inference that all conscious mental experiences of the beautiful are effects of harmonious vibrations produced in the

nerves of the brain. As just indicated here, as well as by the reference to this theory on page 77 there are many facts that warrant us in holding it.

In holding it, however, let us not neglect noticing, as do many of its advocates, certain other facts. Through the experiments of mesmerism and hypnotism, it has come to be acknowledged that the outer senses can be completely deadened and yet the inward processes of intelligence kept in a state of activity; and not only so, but that sometimes, merely at the mental suggestion of an operator, irrespective of any appeal to the eye or ear, irrespective therefore of any possible vibrations in the outer ether to account for vibratory effects upon the physical organs of the senses, the one operated upon is made to see pictures and to hear music. In fact, do we not all have experiences of a realization of the same conditions in our dreams?

Now, in such cases, either actual physical vibrations take place in these organs, or else they do not take place for the simple reason that they are not necessary to the result; and whichever of these theories we adopt, we are forced to the conclusion that the effects of beauty are dependent upon influences operating in what we understand to be the sphere of the mind. They are awakened there by the mesmerizer irrespective of any appeal through the outer senses, and, when awakened, they operate so powerfully that they produce either actual vibrations in the senses, or, if not, at least results identical with those caused by actual vibrations. Assuming now what it does not seem possible to doubt—namely, that the existence of these vibrations constitutes the substance of that of which we are conscious in æsthetic effects; that these vibrations are, so to speak, indispensable to the operation

of the battery of the brain, which without them cannot communicate their peculiar influence to intelligence,—what are we to infer, when we find that they can be set in motion not only from the physical side, but—as in cases of hypnotism, telepathy, dreams about music and painting, etc.—from the non-physical side?—what but that on this latter side also the same vibrations exist, or, if not so, a force capable of causing the same; and that the sphere in which we are mentally conscious of the vibrations, or the sphere of personal consciousness, as we may call it, occupies a region between the material and what we may term—because we cannot conceive of it as otherwise—the immaterial? Add to this another fact universally admitted, which is that vibrations harmonious in the sense that has been explained are particularly agreeable, whereas inharmonious vibrations are particularly disagreeable; and why have we not, from modern science, a suggestion of the possibility of there being exact truth in the theory of Pythagoras and the earlier Greeks, who held that the mode of life so far as it is normal, true, divine, blissful, is not only physically but spiritually a mode of harmony, a mode fitted to produce a literal “music of the spheres”? As has been said, our minds are conscious of experiencing from a world which we can see and hear harmonious effects which are identical with effects coming from a world of which we can only think and feel. Now if by scientific analysis we can ascertain the method through which effects come from the one, why have we not a right to argue that it is through the same method that they come from the other? Nor does it necessarily lessen the force of this argument to point out—if indeed this can be satisfactorily done—that the sensations of music cannot be communicated from the imma-

terial side to those who have been born deaf, nor the sensations of color to those who have been born blind. These facts prove simply an absence of the needed conditions, an absence, that is, of a nerve-battery sufficiently developed to be able to record vibrations physically recognizable only through the eye or ear, without which battery the mind as limited by its present physical surroundings can, perhaps, be made distinctly conscious of nothing.

These questions, however, concerning the significance of the possibility of exciting to mental processes in other ways than through the senses, pertain to psychology rather than to æsthetics. Whether or not, as some think, this possibility implies the existence of a spirit capable of acting independently of the body though now temporarily connected with it, there is no doubt that, in view of the influence which the vibrations of the nerves undoubtedly have upon mental processes, as well as the mental processes upon the nerves, the supposition is rational that the mental processes themselves, together with whatever may be their organic sources, are in some way subject—just as are heat, magnetism, and electricity, which certainly approach them in subtlety—to the same laws of vibration, the harmony of the effects of which produces the sensation of beauty in the senses. So rational, too, is the supposition, that no system of æsthetics can afford to ignore it. This would be just as injudicious, to use no stronger term, as to treat it, in our present state of uncertainty with reference to it, as the sole determining consideration. In this system nothing will be found inconsistent with the universal applicability of the vibratory theory, though its spiritual aspects will be recognized as resting upon no more infallible foundation than an argument from analogy.

Fortunately, too, the thoughts and feelings as they appear in consciousness are of themselves sufficient for the purposes of æsthetics aside from any question of the conditions, whether vibratory or not, that produce them. With reference to this subject, however, the reader may be interested in some additional suggestions which he will find in the appendix on page 245.

CHAPTER XIII.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS SHOWING BEAUTY TO RESULT FROM MENTAL AS WELL AS FROM PHYSICAL EFFECTS.

End in View in this Discussion—Complexity of Effect can be Recognized only through Mental Analysis—A Form Conjured by Imagination Coincident with Every Form Appealing to the Senses—This Fact Illustrated in the Case of Music—Of Poetry—Of the Arts of Sight—Harmony of Effects as Produced within the Mind Means Likeness of Effects—Between Effects upon the Ear and Mind as in Music and Poetry—Between Effects upon the Eye and Mind as in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture—Between Effects of Different Elements of Significance as Appealing to Recollection, Association, and Suggestion in All the Arts—Additional Methods of Showing the Presence of Mental Effects—Effects Operating Harmoniously upon the Senses, Not Harmonizing with those upon the Mind—Effects not Operating Harmoniously upon the Senses Harmonizing with those upon the Mind—These Facts Necessitate Including Mental Effects with those of Beauty—But Complete Beauty Demands Harmony of both Physical and Mental Effects—Significance as well as Form an Element of Beauty.

TURNING from the theoretical phases of our subject, it is time for us to notice that, in what was said in the last three paragraphs of Chapter XII., the practical end that we have had in view has been not a little furthered. Reasons have been presented furnishing strong presumptive proof, scientific, too, in its nature, that among the complex agencies entering into the harmonious combinations constituting beauty, we must include effects

produced upon the mind. Recalling how often critics and artists go upon the supposition that this is not the case, but that beauty and significance are distinct and separate, let us notice now some further considerations serving to show the accuracy of the view that has here been taken.

Observe, first, that the very complexity which has been shown to be essential to the production of beauty, can be recognized only by the exercise of distinctively mental analysis. Indeed, the range of the appreciation of beauty is invariably limited by the ability of the mind in this direction. Not only in connection with the recognition of the effects of rhythm and proportion, as mentioned on page 141, but even of the notes of a melody or of a series of chords, this fact is shown. If these are made to follow one another too rapidly for the mind to distinguish the differences between them, or—what is the same thing—their different effects, the result is not music but noise. Or take the rim of a wheel covered with harmonious colors. If this be made to revolve too rapidly for the mind to distinguish the different colors, the whole produces only the effect of a mixed color, usually of a dirty white. A similar result is produced in poetry by metaphors or similes, the different effects of which are so complicated as to appear mixed, as well as by hues, outlines, or carvings of a similarly intricate nature in pictures, statues, or buildings.

It may be said, however, and with reason, that this mental analysis is not an effect of beauty *per se*, but merely an effect that necessarily accompanies any appearance perceived by a rational mind. Observe again then, that in connection with any concrete form influencing the senses, there appears immediately in the mind a form that

in a broad sense may be said to be like it and yet not identical with it—a form conjured by imagination from the regions of recollection, association, and suggestion. It is simply a law of the mind that it cannot see one thing without thinking of another. And is not this other thing of which it thinks a necessary part of the effect produced by the thing which it sees? When we study into the subject, however, we find that the form of which the mind thinks in such a case, and which furnishes a standard by which to judge of the object immediately presented to view, is a complex result of many experiences. “We may remark,” says Immanuel Kant, in his “*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*,” as translated by J. H. Bernard, p. i., D. i., § 17, p. 87, “that the imagination can not only recall, on occasion, the signs for concepts long past, but can also reproduce the image of the figure of the object out of an unspeakable number of objects of different kinds, or even of the same kind. Further, if the mind is concerned with comparisons, the imagination can, in all probability, actually though unconsciously, let one image glide into another, and thus by the concurrence of several of the same kind come by an average, which serves as the common measure of all. Every one has seen a thousand full-grown men. Now if you wish to judge of their normal size, estimating it by means of comparison, the imagination, as I think, allows a great number of images (perhaps the whole thousand) to fall on one another. If I am allowed to apply here the analogy of optical presentation, it is the space where most of them are combined, and inside the contour where the place is illuminated with the most vivid colors, that the average size is cognizable, which both in height and breadth is equally far removed from the extreme bounds of the greatest and the smallest stature. And

this is the statue of a beautiful man." In other words, according to Kant, the imagination acts in this matter in precise analogy to the method, discovered since his time, of the composite photograph. So too, Eduard von Hartmann, in his "Philosophie des Umbewussten," as translated by W. C. Coupland, says, vol. i., page 270, that we are compelled "to admit that the beautiful is only possible in the most concrete particularity, because individually intuited (*e. g.*, the human ideal as masculine and feminine; the former again as ideal of the child, boy, youth, man, old man; the ideal of the man again as ideal of a Hercules, Odysseus, Zeus, etc.); that thus the concrete ideal must be no longer a vague unity, but an indefinite plurality of the most definite types."

In accordance with the general principle brought out in these quotations, is it not true that, in connection with almost every phase of beauty recognized merely by the eye or ear, there is another phase recognized not partly, as in the cases of rhythm and proportion (see pages 141, 142), but wholly by the mind? Certain facts with which we are familiar in all the arts will illustrate this; and first in music. Notwithstanding the extreme difficulty of separating any musical effects whatever from such as appeal merely to the outward senses, those accustomed to analyze will become conscious of a degree of æsthetic enjoyment not due to an appeal to these alone, but to certain concrete effects of other well known themes awakened in the mind by way of recollection, association, or suggestion. Even in cases in which these themes are not so recalled, the æsthetic pleasure is often enhanced by a wholly mental recognition of a balancing of phrase with phrase, and of movement with movement, such as we find in the blendings of melodies and their variations;

or of two or more themes or tunes as in the overture of Wagner's "Tannhauser," or in the familiar "Star-Spangled Banner," accompanied by "Yankee Doodle."

But this combination of mental effects with those of form can be recognized more clearly in connection with poetry. In this art, besides the beauty which is due to phraseology, as manifested in the choice and sequence of words, and in various developments of assonance, alliteration, rhythm, and rhyme, everybody acknowledges that there is also a beauty dependent upon the ideas, the proof of which is that it is frequently as great in prose as in poetry. But from what does this beauty spring? Clearly and unmistakably from a combination of the effects of recollection, association, and suggestion, assuming concrete forms in the imagination; in other words, from the harmonious effects of many different forms, some coming from without and some from within the mind, some perceptible to sight, or recalled by memory as once perceptible to sight, and some, according to the laws of the mind, merely conjured by fancy. As a rule, too, the wider apart the spheres are from which these effects are derived, the more comprehensive and inspiring is the beauty resulting from their combination, as where those that are extremely material are united to those that are extremely mental, *e. g.* :

Still as a slave before his lord,
The ocean hath no blast ;
His great bright eye most silently
Up to the moon is cast.

—*The Ancient Mariner* : Coleridge.

A similar fact is true in the arts of sight. We sometimes find, as in the pictures of early Christian art, a degree of beauty which cannot be attributed to any ful-

filment of the laws of line or color, such as meet the physiological requirements of the eye. Yet often these pictures are acknowledged to possess great charm, owing to what is termed, notwithstanding the implication of some that it does not exist, beauty of expression. What is meant by this? Careful analysis will show that it means that there are evidences in them of a blending of separate and very widely different effects, only a few of which are attributable to form as form. The rest are attributable to traits of character, which certain of the depicted faces and figures are supposed to manifest. But is not every trait of character thus indicated conjured by the imagination of the spectator and assigned to the forms only so far as they have effects upon recollections of some like form, or upon associations with it, or else as they in some other way suggest a significance which can have its origin only in his mind?

Possibly, the reader may find himself desiring, just here, a further explanation of the method through which, in connection with an appeal to the senses, harmony of effects can be produced within the mind. What is meant by harmony of mental effects?—Of course, the same thing in principle as when the term is applied to physical effects; otherwise it would not be harmony. It means a combination of effects—either of thoughts with forms, or of thoughts with thoughts—that appeal to the mind as being, for some reason, alike; and every department of art furnishes abundant examples of this condition.

In music or poetry, for instance, harmony of effects between those experienced in the ear and in the mind results when one, in composing a march, a waltz, a comic opera, or a tragic opera, or in writing an elegy, a love song, or an epic, selects for each a representative form of

movement or phraseology of rhythm or verse. The following lines not only enjoin but exemplify this method :

But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,
The hoarse rough verse should like the torrent roar.

Essay on Criticism : Pope.

Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows.

Idem.

In the arts of sight the same likeness in effects between those upon the eye and upon the mind is manifested when, for instance, as in some of Ruysdael's landscapes, or in the sculptured group of "Niobe and her Children" in the Museum degl' Uffizi at Florence, every cloud, wave, leaf, limb, or shred of clothing on human forms augments the suggestions naturally associated with the indications of the pervading fury of a tempest; or when, as in some of Claude Lorraine's landscapes, the light reflected from every tree, rock, stream, and countenance, as well as the character or attitude of the forms which it illumines, augments the suggestions naturally associated with the glow of sunshine that pours from the sky.

Harmony of effects among different elements of significance in form as they appeal to recollection, association, or suggestion, is due mainly to perceiving that the objects made to go together are such as we are accustomed to think of as going together. For instance, this phase of harmony is fulfilled in an opera or poem, when all the scenes or events representing a certain country or period conform strictly to the conditions of each. It was this that was sought to be fulfilled in the old law of criticism ascribed to the Greeks, enjoining that a drama should contain only as much as might be supposed to take place in the *time* given to the representation, or, at most, in one day,

and in one *place*, and with one kind of *action*, by which latter was meant with either tragic or comic situations, but not with both. This "law of the unities" of time, place, and action, as it is called, although it cannot be applied universally, is based at least upon a true principle. Brevity, local color, and directness are always elements of artistic excellence. It is largely the degree in which these are manifested that imparts the peculiar flavor, the pervasive atmosphere, that seems to be the distinctive characteristic of poems like Goethe's "Hermann und Dorothea," Keats' "St. Agnes' Eve," Goldsmith's "Deserted Village," Campbell's "Gertrude of Wyoming," and Tennyson's "Gardener's Daughter" and "Enoch Arden," not to speak of longer poems like the "Faerie Queen" and the "Idyls of the King." In the arts of sight this same phase of harmony is fulfilled when, for instance, Oriental scenery and Moorish architecture, Italian scenery and Renaissance, Northern French and Gothic, are made to go together, as also the costumes or attitudes of certain figures, and the appearances of certain places or periods; as well as certain outlines or colors, and certain delineations of war, peace, fright, sorrow, or merriment. These subjects, however, involve matters of detail not pertinent to the present discussion. They will be found treated in full in the volumes of this series entitled "The Genesis of Art-Form" and "Proportion and Harmony in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture." Let us return now to the line of thought on account of which these references have here been made.

The necessity of including in our conception of beauty effects that are exerted upon the mind may be brought out more forcibly than has yet been done, perhaps, by separating the physiological and psychological factors of

the general result, and showing—somewhat as was done at the opening of the last chapter, but now, owing to the explanations since given, with added significance—first, that a complexity of effects containing all the elements of harmony as far as producible in the eye or ear, may fail of complete beauty because not harmonizing, as a whole, with the requirements of the mind; and, second, that a complexity of effects lacking the elements of harmony so far as producible in the eye or ear, may nevertheless have partial beauty because, as a whole, it does harmonize with the requirements of the mind.

In the first place, there are forms made up of complex effects containing every element of beauty, so far as concerns their appeal to the eye or ear, and yet which, on account of the character of their appeal to the mind, no delicately organized æsthetic, to say nothing of moral, nature could declare to be, in anything like a satisfactory or complete degree, beautiful. Instead of this, their beauty in any degree might be denied. Take a scene of debauchery—a mingling of vice and nakedness—could any amount of faultless music or physique make this seem to a pure mind other than disgusting and revolting? And could the effects of beauty be fully experienced, or consciously experienced at all, in connection with either feeling? Notwithstanding every argument or example of immoral art, there is but one answer to this question. Certainly they could not, and why not? Because the effects which act together harmoniously, so far as concerns their influence upon the ear or eye, are accompanied by other effects produced through the agency of the imagination calling up forms from the realms of recollection, association, and suggestion; and with these latter effects those from without are discordant. For this reason, in most cases and to most per-

sons, the general combination of effects, as made up of those both from without and from within, is discordant.

Now notice, in the second place, that there are forms the inharmonious effects of which upon the senses render them incapable of appearing beautiful, considered merely as forms; and yet on account of other accompanying effects exerted upon the mind, these same forms often manifest, not a little, but a great degree of beauty. Recall, for instance, many a tone expressive of joy, admiration, wonder, surprise, as it is uttered upon the stage, not only in dramas that are spoken, but in operas that are sung; and yet such tones, having all the scientific qualities of noise and not of music, have precisely the thrilling and inspiring effects upon thought and emotion that are ascribed to beauty. It is the same with lines. The rigid straightness and irregularity which, and which alone, are to the mind expressive of passion, either rightly or wrongly impelled, do not in themselves considered, whether used in dramatic representation or in pictures or statues, contain any harmonious elements such as must appeal to the eye before a form can produce upon it the physical effect of beauty. So with colors. In connection with certain scenes or figures the effects which the mind attributes to beauty may often be received from forms depicted in hues that to the eye alone appear to be only dingy, mixed, and sometimes positively inharmonious.

Nor is it true, as applied to all of these cases, that the principle of contrast, as ordinarily understood, accounts for all of the facts; these inharmonious effects do not seem beautiful merely because they offset and throw into greater relief accompanying effects that appeal to the senses as harmonious. The tones, attitudes, colors of the kinds to which reference has been made—take all of them as represented in the character of *Meg Merrilies* as acted

by Charlotte Cushman, or the last two as in the picture of Ellen Terry as *Lady Macbeth*, painted by Sargent—often owe their effect not to the fact that they set off something else that is in the form. They owe it to the fact that they unite and harmonize with something else that is not in the form. The mind receives æsthetic impressions from a form which, as a form, would not produce a harmony of complex effects, because, notwithstanding the general effect produced by the outward appearance upon the senses, this effect is of such a nature that it unites harmoniously with other effects of recollection, association, and suggestion, which are traceable solely to influences at work upon the mind.

It must not be forgotten, however, that objects of the class of which we have been speaking can be considered beautiful to only a limited extent. Beauty is complete and ideal in the degree only in which those results of it attributable to effects upon the ear or eye are combined with those attributable to effects upon the mind. All the Wagner operas are filled with the most exquisitely melodious and harmonic passages appealing, as such, solely to the organs of hearing; and yet these are combined with other effects which, were they unaccompanied by the former, would be beautiful on account of their suggestiveness to the mind. A proof of this is that, while the mere orchestration of these operas is thoroughly enjoyable to musicians, the acting of them is thoroughly enjoyable to many who are not musicians, even in the very limited sense of having what are termed musical ears. So with poetry. A description of a ride on horseback like that in Browning's "How They Brought the Good News from Ghent," can be read by a good elocutionist so that all his audience will imagine that what has affected them is the form in which it is expressed. Yet a poor reader, unable

to bring out the characteristics of the form so as to make them recognized, can hold the attention of his audience by what they will all receive from merely the story that is expressed through the form.

In painting and sculpture the same is true. John G. MacVicar, indeed, in his work "On the Beautiful, the Picturesque, and the Sublime," asserts, as already noticed, "that as objects lose more beauty they acquire more expression, and that the most regularly beautiful countenances are usually the most inexpressive." But this can be affirmed of countenances so far only as the regularity of their beauty is, for some reason, lacking in suggestions of complexity; and in the human countenance especially, these are always somewhat lacking where there is nothing representative of a mental source of joy or seriousness underneath. In any case too, as we shall find in the next chapter, an absence of opposing influences of variety in connection with that which overcomes them, necessarily lessens the charm which is characteristic of the kind of unity that we look for in beauty. Accordingly one can say that the opinion advanced by MacVicar is true only of faces and forms of that placid, unanimated, unspiritualized type of regularity in which all expression, *i. e.*, all effects upon the mind, are subordinated to effects upon the senses. In nature as well as in art, the type is common. But is it universal? Think of the faces—all of them—in Raphael's Sistine Madonna. Are they not beautiful in form? But are they not also much more beautiful in expression?

The truth is that the theory that the highest beauty can exist aside from expression, or irrespective of expression, or of the quality of that expression, which seems to be held by many, especially by certain painters and literary men of the present, is not founded upon any accurate

or comprehensive knowledge of the subject. On the contrary, the essential element of beauty is harmony resulting from complexity of effects, and the greater the number of the effects upon the mind that can be added to effects upon the senses, the greater, at times, is the amount of the beauty. A single note is beautiful, as has been said, because compounded of two or three different tones; but it is usually more beautiful when heard in connection with a melody or chord or series of chords that multiply the complexity many scores of times. The note is still more beautiful when, in addition to this, it resembles, so as clearly to represent, some natural or conventional method of expression, and therefore some effect of emotion, and in connection with this a combination of the effects of many different emotions. So with poems, pictures, statues, and buildings; they are all made more beautiful, the more their harmony results from effects of apparent complexity in the form, and more beautiful still, the more, in addition to this, it results from the mental effects of images recalled in memory or conjured by imagination, as well as of infinite ranges and spheres of these. In fact, this increase of beauty always continues up to the point where confusion begins. This is true even of the blending of effects from different arts, as where to those of melody are added those first of harmony, then of poetry, then of acting, then of dancing, then of painting, then of sculpture, then of architecture, till, finally, we have all the components of a Wagnerian opera. In all such cases, up to the point where confusion begins—but it must be confessed that with some, perhaps with most people, it begins long before the list is completed—there is an apprehensible increase of the distinctly æsthetic influence.

CHAPTER XIV.

BEAUTY DEFINED : TASTE.

Recapitulation—Definition of Beauty—Limitations of the Definition—Relation of the Beautiful to the Sublime, the Brilliant, and the Picturesque—Applies to Appearances in both Nature and Art—In both Time and Space—What the Definition necessarily Leaves Unexplained; and how in this System this is to be Remedied—All Effects of Beauty Developed from the Principle of Putting Like with Like—This Principle as Applied by the Artist in Accordance with the Action of the Mind in Other Analogous Matters—As Exemplified in Art in Accordance with Effects as Manifested in Nature—This Conception of Beauty and its Sources Solves the Question as to whether Art can be merely Imitative or merely Expressive—Taste—Correspondence of its Action to that of Conscience and Judgment—Standards of Taste.

ENOUGH has been said now with reference to this subject to enable the reader to perceive clearly the reasons for the conclusions toward which the whole discussion has been tending, namely, that the highest beauty, in all its different phases, results, as is the case in other departments of excellence, from harmony in effects. Analyzing the elements of these effects, carries with it the additional conclusion that, so far as beauty is physical, it results when sounds, shapes, or colors harmonize together and in such ways that their combinations harmonize with the natural requirements of the physical senses—ears or eyes—that are addressed; that, so far as beauty is psychical, it results when the thoughts and feelings suggested or expressed through forms harmonize together, and also with

the natural requirements of the mind addressed; and that, so far as beauty is both physical and psychical, it results when all the elements entering into both physical and psychical effects harmonize together, and also with the combined requirements of both the senses and the mind. In this latter case, it will be observed that the complete beauty which results necessitates something more than that which is either formal or expressional. It can be obtained in the degree only in which a form beautiful in itself fits a beautiful ideal conjured in the mind by the imagination as a result of a harmonious combination of thoughts and feelings.

To express all this in language as concise as possible, we may say that beauty is a characteristic of any complex form of varied elements producing apprehensible unity (*i. e.*, harmony or likeness) of effects upon the motive organs of sensation in the ear or eye, or upon the emotive sources of imagination in the mind; or upon both the one and the other.

Of course, this definition is a broad one, but so is the subject. The question of the origin of beauty—whether in the appearances of nature together with the inferences that men draw from them, as the materialists claim, or in ideals in the mind of man or of God, to which natural appearances must be conformed, as the idealists claim,—the definition leaves undecided; but a knowledge of sources is not necessary to an apprehension of results.

Nor does this definition say anything about the differences between the beautiful and the sublime or the picturesque, which, since the essay of Burke upon "The Sublime and the Beautiful," almost every English writer has deemed it important to bring to the front. In the appropriate place, it will be shown that, as related to the elements constituting beauty, the sublime, which at times

may be sublimely beautiful, emphasizes in a peculiar way the significance, whereas the brilliant, which, and not the beautiful, contrasts with the sublime, emphasizes thus the form, while the picturesque emphasizes neither significance nor form sufficiently to cause either to predominate.

One characteristic the definition has which is important. It applies equally to all beauty, whether manifested in nature or in art. How important this fact is, may be inferred from a remark made by Hegel, as translated by J. S. Kedney in his "Critical Exposition of Hegel's *Æsthetics*." "It has never entered into the mind of any one," he says, "to develop the point of view of the beautiful in the objects of nature, to give an exposition of these sorts of beauties. We feel ourselves upon too shifting a ground, in a field vague and indeterminate. A criterion is wanting,"—a remark which, among others, leads Dr. Kedney to add (part i, chapter i.) that "both Kant and Hegel, when they think of the beautiful, have in mind the productions of art, and only reluctantly allow place to the beautiful in nature, as though art almost monopolized the beautiful, and in it alone beauty, the highest and purest, was to be found."

Another characteristic of this definition, is that it applies equally well to beauty whether appealing in time or in space, to the ear or to the eye, as manifested in grace of movement or of outline, in richness of tone or of color. This breadth of applicability is essential to comprehensiveness; and it is largely the lack of the latter in many attempted definitions that explains their failure.

It has to be acknowledged, however, that the definition, being broad, leaves much to be explained; but so does any definition, the only difference between a good one and a bad one being that the former clearly indicates exactly

what it is that needs explaining. What needs explaining in this one, is the particular methods through which likeness in effects can be produced in the senses, and in the mind, and in both. These methods, of course, are those that secure beauty; and certain of the remaining volumes of this series will be devoted to explaining them. In "The Genesis of Art-Form," "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music," and "Proportion and Harmony of Line and Color," æsthetics will be considered in its relation to form,—a point of view which, if there be any truth in the theory just advanced, will necessitate an exhaustive examination of the methods to which we have just referred. In these volumes, reversing the process of induction which has been followed here, and using that of deduction, the necessity of unity in mental processes will be treated first, and then the fact of variety together with complexity as characteristic of natural appearances. After that, from these simple germinal conditions, all the elements of natural beauty and of art-composition, as ordinarily taught or logically suggested, will be shown to be naturally developed, as indicated in the table on page 165, taken from "The Genesis of Art-Form."

This table, without further explanations, may suggest a complicated system, difficult to understand and to apply. But any suggestion of this kind will vanish the moment that it comes to be recognized that each of the different methods is merely one more illustration, under slightly different conditions, of a single principle, and this the very simple one, mentioned many times already, namely, putting like with like—so far, at least, as this is possible.

In "The Genesis of Art-Form," moreover, it is shown that the action of the mind when carrying out this principle in art, is in exact accordance with its action in other

METHODS OF ART-COMPOSITION.

Mainly Conditioned upon the Requirements of the Mind.

<i>Mind.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	
<i>conditioned upon</i>		
<i>Mind.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	<i>Mind and Matter.</i>
UNITY.	VARIETY.	} GROUPING.
ORDER.	CONFUSION.	

Mainly Conditioned upon the Requirements of Matter.

<i>Mind.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	
COMPARISON.	CONTRAST.	} ORGANIC FORM.
PRINCIPALITY.	SUBORDINATION.	
COMPLEMENT.	BALANCE.	} DURATION IN TIME. EXTENSION IN SPACE.
<i>Mind.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	<i>ACCENT IN STRESS AND LINE.</i>
" "	" "	" "
<i>Matter.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	<i>QUALITY AND PITCH IN NOTE AND COLOR.</i>
" "	" "	" "

<i>Mainly Conditioned upon the Requirements of the Product.</i>		
<i>Mind.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	<i>SYMMETRY.</i>
" "	" "	" "
<i>Matter.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	<i>CONTINUITY.</i>
" "	" "	" "
<i>Mind and Matter.</i>	<i>Matter.</i>	<i>PROGRESS.</i>
" "	" "	" "

analogous matters. It is pointed out that all knowledge, and not only this, but all understanding and application of the laws of botany, mineralogy, psychology, or theology, depends on the degree in which a man learns to separate certain plants, rocks, mental activities, or religious dogmas from others, and to unite and classify and name them; that without classification to begin with, there can be no knowledge, no understanding, no efficient use of the materials which nature furnishes. The physicist is able to recognize, relate, and reproduce effects only in the degree in which he is able to classify the appearances and laws, the facts and forces of material nature. The metaphysician is able to know, and prove, and guide to right action only in the degree in which he is able to classify feelings, conceptions, and volitions with their motives and tendencies as they arise in mental consciousness and manifest themselves in action. Accordingly, just as the physicist classifies effects conditioned upon laws operating beneath phenomena of a physical nature, and the psychologist classifies effects conditioned upon laws operating underneath phenomena of a psychical nature, so the artist classifies effects conditioned upon laws operating underneath phenomena of an artistic nature. Or, to express the same in other words, science classifies facts; philosophy, theories; and art, forms or appearances; and in all three cases the general process is the same. Like is put with like, if possible; and, if not possible, things are grouped according to principles of mental association, which make them have like effects upon, at least, the mind.

Nor is it difficult to prove that this principle of like effects joined with like, is at the basis of beauty as produced by the natural appearances which art imitates. A man, when classifying rocks, puts together mentally those

that are alike. But so does nature, grouping them in the same mountain ranges, or at the bottoms of the same streams. He puts together leaves, and feathers, and hairs that are alike. But so does nature, clustering them on the same trees, and birds, and animals. He puts together human beings that are alike. But so does nature, giving birth to them in the same families, races, climates, and countries. In fact, a man's mind is a part of nature; and when working naturally, he works as nature does. He combines elements as a result of classification, in accordance with methods analogous to those in which nature, or "the mind in nature," combines them. Indeed, he would never have thought of this process unless in nature itself he had first perceived the beginnings of it. He would never have conceived of grouping all horses in the same class, nor have been able to conceive of it, unless nature had first made horses alike. To put together the factors of an art-product, therefore, in accordance with the methods of classification, does not involve any process inconsistent with representing accurately the forms that appear in the world. These forms themselves are made up of factors apparently put together in the same way, though not to the same extent. In fact, in whatever light we view this subject the strongest possible evidence seems to be afforded of the substantial agreement of the theory of beauty which has been here unfolded with all that can be known of the laws of the mind, or of those of nature as related to it.

The reader may be interested in noticing, too, how it simplifies the question with reference to the artist's aims to get down to this principle underlying his methods. We are, at last, entirely outside of the range of any possibility of conceiving of the work of the artist as anything

that can be accomplished either by mere imitation or by mere expression. Only rarely does nature furnish him with forms that he can imitate as wholes. If he wish to produce effects of beauty as in symphonies, poems, buildings, even, often, as in pictures and statues, he can do this only by so combining elements that he finds separated in nature as to fulfil the principles in accordance with which they are also combined in natural products when beautiful; that is to say, he must group these elements according to such methods that, whether appealing to the senses or to the mind, or to both, they shall seem to have effects of unity notwithstanding variety; in other words, shall seem to be a result of putting like with like, notwithstanding the presence in them of certain features that are not alike.

For a similar reason, the province of art will be recognized to be outside the range of anything that can be accomplished merely by expression. It involves an expression of that alone which accompanies an experience of like effects produced upon the mind; and, not only this, but, so far as beauty is complete, which accompanies another combination of like effects produced upon the senses. It is not necessary, to dwell here upon this fact, nor, to those at all acquainted with the subject, to enlarge upon its importance. "How it is," says James Sully in his essay "On the Possibility of a Science of *Æsthetics*," "that proportion, unity, and all that is included under beauty of form, has come to be so prominent an ingredient in æsthetic impression, is one of the most interesting points in the science." It is; and in this series of essays the basal question that he thus suggests is answered.

Before we close the chapter, mention, perhaps, should

be made of *taste*, a term in common use, indicative of that within the mind enabling one to recognize an artistic effect, and to judge in some way of its quality. The term originated probably in an adaptation of a sensation experienced through one of the lower senses to that which is experienced through all the senses. But it has come now to be equally appropriate for effects that end in none of these, but influence especially the mind. Primarily, again, taste indicates a *passive* state; but secondarily, when referring even to the lower senses, at times, an *active*. A cook whose taste is good can prepare a dish to the taste of others. In a similar way, in art the word may indicate a man's appreciation and also his application of the laws of beauty. Once more, referring to the lower senses, men are said to have a *natural* and a *cultivated* taste; and the same is true with reference to their attitude toward beauty.

As applied to the whole range of artistic effects, the relation of taste to the æsthetic nature seems to be precisely that of conscience to the moral nature, and of judgment to the intellectual. Enlighten a man's soul, his conscience will prompt to better actions; increase his wisdom, his judgment will give better decisions. According to the same analogy, cultivate his æsthetic nature, *i. e.*, improve the accuracy of his ear and eye, his knowledge of the different appearances of life, and modes of each life, and his taste will be cultivated and improved. He may never reach a position where he can know what is absolutely beautiful, any more than what is absolutely right or wise; but he may be constantly approaching nearer such a knowledge. Hence the fallacy of the old adage, *De gustibus non est disputandum*, and the importance of the study now engaging our attention.

It may not be out of place to add here also that just as moral or intellectual character is shown by the way in which the balance is maintained between conflicting material and spiritual motives appealing to the conscience or the judgment, so artistic character is shown by the way in which the balance is preserved between the physiological and psychological requirements of art. To a great extent, as has been shown, the former requirement follows fixed natural laws, as is the case, in fact, with everything merely material; but the latter requirement depends upon the range of thought and feeling characteristic of the mind of the individual artist as a result of his temperament or experience. While therefore two artists may equally preserve the balance of which mention has just been made, they can never do it in exactly the same way. The psychological contribution, in each case, must be different. It seems to be mainly for this reason that some argue that there can be no standard of taste. But the same kind of logic would lead one to conclude that there can be no standard of right for conscience or judgment. It is undoubtedly a fact that moral and intellectual standards are actually accepted to an extent and in a sense that is not true of those of taste. But why is this the fact?—Why but because the decisions of conscience and judgment lead to actions; and actions always have some tendency to become injurious to others. Therefore, for mutual protection, men have agreed to accept conventional codes and creeds, and to abide by them. Artistic taste, on the contrary, does not, as a rule, lead to actions, or at least not directly; and accordingly it is not supposed to be injurious, and is not treated as such. In it the expression of personality, and with this of originality, is left unfettered. Spiritually considered, the artist is almost the

only freeman. But the fact that he is this is due, more than to anything else, to the lucky accident of his not happening to be engaged upon that which has a direct practical, utilitarian bearing. There is nothing in the condition to rid him of the obligation to endeavor, at least, to discover and to fulfil certain artistic principles, any more than the fact of living where no conventional creeds or codes had been framed, would rid one of the obligation to endeavor, at least, to discover and to fulfil the principles of truth and righteousness.

CHAPTER XV.

THE DEFINITION OF BEAUTY TESTED BY ITS ACCORD WITH THE CONCEPTIONS OF OTHERS.

How the Definition of Beauty in the Last Chapter Accords with the Theory Considering Beauty as an Effect, Including the Conceptions of Shine and Splendor—As Harmony—One in the Manifold, or Unity in Variety—Perfection—Utility—The Good, the True—As an Effect of Association—As Symbolic—As Identical with Life or Vital Force—With Emotive Force or Love—With an Appeal to the Sympathies, or of Personality—Truth of these Latter Views, as also of the Theory of Association—The Platonic and Aristotelian Theories again—Limitations of each—Difficulty of Finding a Basis of Agreement upon which to Reconcile them—The Method Pursued in this Discussion will do this—The Play-Impulse Tending to Imitation Indicates Effects from Within and also from Without—Natural Forms Affecting the Mind Indicate Effects both Formal and Mental—In what Regard each of the Theories is True—Each is Defective in so far as it Excludes the Truth in the Other.

A DEFINITION is of value in the degree in which it accords with the undefined conceptions that are in the minds of the largest number of thinkers upon the subject. Let us observe, for a little, how far the definition of beauty given in the preceding chapter will meet this test. Starting with the most superficial phases of agreement, perhaps it is well to notice, first, that the term *effects* as used in the definition is not a new one. It reminds one that, among others, Sir George Stewart Mackenzie, in his "Essay on Some Subjects Connected with Taste," made a point of insisting that beauty did not

reside in the objects of nature or in their qualities, but in the *effects* that they produce. The term reminds one too that there is a strong resemblance in principle though not in phraseology between this conception of the general nature of beauty and the likening of it by J. J. Winckelmann, in his "Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums," to an essence extracted from matter by fire; as also in the application to it by E. von Hartmann, in his "Aesthetik," of the term *shine*; as well as by the Abbé P. Vallet, in his "L'Idée du Beau dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," of the term *splendor*.

The conception of *harmony*, too, as an element of beauty has been emphasized, and this very frequently. For instance, James Sully, in his recent "Sensation and Intuition," holds that harmony of the pleasures of sense, intellect, and feeling is all that we are conscious of in the apprehension of beauty.¹ The Dutch C. W. Opzoomer, in his "Het Wezen der Kennis," says that in beauty we must have harmony of the whole of an object with its different parts, and also harmony between the form, and the thought to which it gives expression; and the German J. Jungmann, in his "Aesthetik," says that beauty is the actual agreement or harmony of things with the rational mind, in so far as they give pleasure. This attributing of beauty to harmony, though without recognizing that the latter is due to "likeness in effects," is, in fact, very common. It was propounded by almost the first of ancient philosophers of whom we now know, Pythagoras, and also by almost the first of modern ones, the astronomer Kepler, in his "Harmonices Mundi." Later it was emphasized by Leibnitz as necessarily connected with the theory of pre-established harmony in his "Principes de la Nature"; by Kant, one of whose tests of beauty, as given

¹ For further opinions of modern authorities, see Appendix, p. 245.

in his "Kritik der Urtheilskraft," is that "our faculties work harmoniously with reference to objects characterized by it": and by K. J. F. Schnaase, who, in his "Geschichte der bildenden Künste," claims that the work of art is to build up a harmony that is not perceptible in nature. J. van Vloten too, in his "Nederlandsche Aesthetik," places the same stress upon harmony, as do also Lord Shaftesbury in his "Miscellaneous Reflections," Henry Fuseli in the "Lectures of the Royal Academicians," and D. R. Hay in his "Science of Beauty as Developed in Nature and Applied in Art."

Many other writers, while apparently not making so much of harmony, hold virtually the same view, and, in so doing, confirm the accuracy of our definition by ascribing beauty—often only vaguely indicating how or why they do it—to a manifestation of the *one in the manifold*, or, as it is usually put, of *unity in variety*. "The one true æsthetic principle recognized by Hellenic antiquity in general," says Bernard Bosanquet, in his recently published and suggestive "History of Æsthetic," Chap. III, § 3, "may be described as the principle that beauty consists in the imaginative or sensuous expression of unity in variety." This opinion is maintained in systems differing as radically in other regards as do those of Plato, Aristotle, Vitruvius, and Augustine in ancient times, and in modern times, before our own century, as those of the Swiss J. P. de Crousaz, as expounded in his "Traité du Beau"; as those of the English Lord Shaftesbury in his "Miscellaneous Reflections"; of Francis Hutcheson in his "Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue"; of William Hogarth in his "Analysis of Beauty"; of Alexander Gerard in his "Essay on Taste"; of William Shenstone in his "Essay on Taste"; of Abraham Tucker

in his "Light of Nature Pursued"; as those of the German J. G. Sulzer in his "Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste"; of F. von Schlegel in his "Aesthetik"; and as those of the Dutch H. van Alphen in his "Theorie van Schoone Kunsten en Wetenschappen"; also in our own century as those of the French A. C. Quatremère de Quincy in his "De l'Universalité du Beau et de la Manière de l'Entendre"; of Victor Cousin in his "Du Vrai du Bien et du Beau"; of G. H. de Coster in his "Éléments de l'Esthétique Générale"; of the Abbé P. Vallet in his "L'Idée du Beau," etc.; as those of the German Moritz Carrière in his "Aesthetik"; of K. C. F. Krause in his "System der Aesthetik," etc.; and as those of the English S. T. Coleridge in his "Biographia Literaria"; of J. G. MacVicar in his essay "On the Beautiful, the Picturesque, and the Sublime"; of W. B. Scott in his "Half-Hour Lectures on the History and Practice of the Fine and Ornamental Arts"; and of Sidney Dobell in his "Thoughts on Art, Philosophy, and Religion."

For other reasons, the definition that has been given, seems also to meet the requirements of those who term beauty *perfection*, as was done by Baumgarten in his "Aesthetica," and by his pupil Friedrich Meier in his "Anfangsgründe der Schönen Wissenschaften," and later by J. G. Sulzer in his "Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste." As all of these accept also the necessity of harmony, *i. e.*, of unity and variety, they evidently mean by perfection such effects as cause external appearances to conform themselves to ideals, or, in other words, cause appearances to have like effects to those excited by the forms conjured by one's own imagination. Granting that the springs of imagination are under the influence of a spiritual and divine source of perfection, anything

external can be recognized as having spiritual effects in the degree only in which it in itself is perfect.

More nearly connected with the conception of perfection than appears upon the surface, are the views of those who maintain, as does Alexander Gerard, in his "Essay on Taste," that at least one element of beauty is "*utility*, or the fitness of things for answering their ends,"—a view that is also advocated by Lord Kames in his "Elements of Criticism," by James Beattie in his "Dissertations," etc. by Sir William Hamilton in his "Lectures on Metaphysics," in which he speaks of relative beauty as being "a beauty utilized," or a "utilized beauty," and by James Fergusson in his "History of Architecture," in which he refers to one phase of art as being that which is "beautifully fitted for its purpose." All these statements are more in apparent than in real antagonism to what is said in Chapter VII. of the present work with reference to an absence in art of an aim of material utility. Probably each of these writers would agree with A. W. Holmes-Forbes, who, in Chapters IV. and V. of his "Science of Beauty," both headed "Beauty attaches only to utility," shows that he means to include in the conception of the *adaptability*¹ of a form to its ends, its ability to give exact expression to certain thoughts and feelings; which is the same as saying—what is amply expressed in the definition that has been given—that both the form and the thought or feeling should have like effects.

There is no radical difference between *perfection* and the *good*, or between the *fitting* and the *true*. For this reason, through the same line of thought already pursued, an agreement can also be perceived between our definition and the theory of those who identify the beautiful with *the good*, as in our own times John Ruskin has done

¹ Which is a better term than *utility* for this general conception.

over and over again in his "Modern Painters" and other works, and also Professor G. T. Ladd in his "Introduction to Philosophy." The same can be said too of the theory identifying it with *the true*, a theory especially emphasized by F. von Schlegel in his "Aesthetik," by Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux in his poem on "L'Art Poétique," and by our American Professor Joseph Torrey in his "Theory of Fine Art."

The assignment of beauty in the definition to like effects produced not only upon the emotive organs of sensation in the ear or eye, but also upon the emotive sources of imagination in the mind, evidently fits it to meet the requirements of those, too, who like Archibald Alison in his "Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste," Lord Jeffrey in his "Essay on Beauty," and Dr. Thomas Brown in his "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind," ascribe it to *association*. To what can beauty springing from association be due, if not to likeness in the effects of forms as they appeal to the eye or ear, and as they are conjured from memory by the imagination?

For a similar reason, the same can be affirmed of the fitness of this definition to meet the requirements of those who dwell much upon the *symbolic* character of art, like U. W. F. Solger, who, in his "Vorlesungen über Aesthetik," declares it to be all symbolic, ancient art objectively so, and modern art subjectively so; or like Thomas Carlyle, who has a whole chapter on "Symbols" in his "Sartor Resartus." The same view is really held also, to some extent, by all who insist that the connection in art between the particular thoughts and feelings to be expressed and the form used in the expression of them is in any sense a necessary one—a view, in fact, which is maintained in the essays of this series entitled "Poetry as

a Representative Art," "Music as a Representative Art," and "Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts."

Again, the attributing of beauty in all cases to effects enables the definition to meet the requirements of those who identify beauty with *life*, *vital force*, or expressions of either, as is done by Hegel in his "Aesthetik; by J. M. Guyau, who, in his "Les Problèmes de l'Esthétique Contemporaine," evidently comes very near to our definition in saying that beauty is "either a perception or an action that stimulates our *life*, whether through the senses, the intellect, or the will"; by J. van Vloten, who, in his "Nederlandsche Aesthetik," says that all beauty is "life in a harmonious form"; by Vincenzo Gioberti, who, in his "Trattato del Bello," ascribes it, as manifested in nature, to the "creative force"; and by John Bascom, who, in his "Æsthetics or Science of Beauty," ascribes it in nature "to the presence of the vital force."

Very closely allied to this view, is that of those who attribute it to "emotive force," like H. Quilter, who, in his "Sententiæ Artis," says that art is the expression of *life* with all its varying *emotions*; from which there is but one step, perhaps, to the opinion of Erasmus Darwin in his "Zoonomia or the Laws of Organic Life," as well as of Charles Darwin, also, in his "Descent of Man," that the characteristic of beauty is that it is an object of *love*; a view also expressed by John Todhunter in a lecture on the "Theory of the Beautiful," and carried to almost a grotesque extreme in a book upon "Robert Burns," by Samuel Tyler, who declares that the beautiful is whatever in the material world produces impressions analogous to those awakened in us by our associations with woman. Théodore Jouffroy expresses a similar principle more

broadly, by saying in his "Cours d'Esthétique" that in proportion as objects appealing to perception resemble man (including, of course, woman!), or in so far as they mirror our humanity, they are deemed beautiful. A like recognition of some general effect produced by beauty upon the sympathetic nature undoubtedly underlies the insistence by Hegel in his "Aesthetik," as well as by F. T. Vischer in his work on the same subject, that the *personality* of the artist must exert an apparent influence in the transference of natural to artistic beauty. It underlies too the representation of personality used as a fundamental principle for a whole system by Eugène Véron in his "L'Esthétique." As pointed out at the end of Chapter XIV., the definition that has been given, by ascribing the effects of beauty to the operation not only of fixed physiological laws, but also of those that are psychological, and which are therefore dependent upon the range of thought and feeling in the mind of the individual artist as a result of his temperament and experience, leaves ample play for the expression of personality, —indeed necessitates it.

On the whole, however, this fact that men attribute beauty to that which makes an appeal to the sympathies, has not been sufficiently emphasized. Yet nine people out of ten, especially among those not educated in particular schools of art, whose minds therefore act according to first principles rather than according to derived ones, in reading poetry, in looking at pictures, or in entering houses, judge of their beauty precisely as the poet Coleridge said that he did of the inspiration of the Bible —namely, by the feeling that it *found* him. In this fact with reference to the influence of art, lies the degree of truth that there is, when not made universally applicable,

in the theory of "association." We all take delight in songs and choruses like those of which we have pleasant reminiscences ; in passages of poetry that express thoughts or feelings like those to which we have been led by our own experiences ; in landscapes like those by which we have been surrounded in hours of pleasure ; in figures like those which we have loved or should wish to love could we only find them ; in buildings like those which we have possessed or should like to possess as homes. In all these cases, with a possibility of a breadth of applicability in other directions not possible to the theory of *association*, as held exclusively, the principle of ascribing beauty to the influence of like effects exerted by the forms from without and by those conjured by the imagination within, covers all the facts. But notice, too, that among these like effects, in cases where beauty emanates from a work of art, are included not merely effects traceable to the thought, feelings, will, in short the whole character of the artist, all of which have been manifested by him in his art-form, but also effects conjured by the imagination from the thought, feelings, will, in short the whole character, of the one to whom the beauty appeals.

Before drawing to a close this discussion concerning beauty, it may prove interesting to return to our starting-point in the two general theories termed respectively Aristotelian and Platonic, and show the exact bearing upon each of them of what has been said. The different tendencies of these theories, as better stated by E. von Hartmann in his "Philosophy of the Unconscious" (as translated by W. L. Coupland) than by E. S. Dallas in "The Gay Science," as quoted on page 34, is as follows : "One party, taking its rise from Plato, relies on this, that in Art the human mind *transcends* the beauty revealed in

nature, and hold this to be impossible, unless there indwell in the soul an idea of the beautiful, a certain aspect of which is termed an ideal, and which serves as a criterion of what is and is not beautiful in nature, so that the æsthetic judgment is *a priori* and synthetic. The other party points out that in those creations of art which approximate most closely to the alleged ideals there are contained no elements which nature herself does not offer to the view; that the idealizing activity of the artist only consists in an elimination of the ugly, and in the collecting and combining of those elements of beauty which nature exhibits apart, and that æsthetic science has in its progress more and more demonstrated the psychogenesis of the æsthetic judgment from given psychological and physiological conditions, so that we may confidently expect a complete illumination of this province and its purification from all *a priori* and supernatural conceptions."

These words of von Hartmann have been quoted mainly because of the clear language in which he states the opinions of the two opposing schools. In the light of what has been said here, the reader will notice that the arguments of neither school are in themselves pre-eminently convincing. The mere fact that the beauty of effect in orchestras or dramas transcends that of the songs of birds or the talk of counting-rooms, is no more proof of the existence of a typical form in the mind of man, or of God behind the phenomena of nature, than is the fact that the power of the steam-engine and the dynamo transcends that of the cloud and lightning. If the apparatus used for steam and for electricity be developed in a natural way from man's mental powers, the same may be true of the forms that are used in art. But, on the

other hand, the mere fact that orchestras and dramas have a general resemblance to natural music and to conversation is not, any more than the fact that the steam-engine and the dynamo are adaptations of natural forces, a proof that man is destitute of intuitional powers, spirit-born, and God-given.

The truth is that extreme materialists will always hold that everything in thought is a result of sensations excited from without, and that therefore even an ideal or typical form is a concept resulting from a development of experience, and traceable ultimately to appearances in nature; and, on the other hand, extreme idealists will always hold that the ideal or typical form is in the soul, and that therefore the recognition in external forms of something approximating this is that which causes them to be beautiful. For this reason, probably, any one attempting to dispute either position with an advocate of either theory will be unable to answer this advocate's objections, unless able, first, to change his premise.

One peculiarity of the method adopted in this volume, is that the definition reached can be accepted by adherents of both schools; and this, for the reason that the subject is approached from the practical side, leaving each one free to attach to it whichever theory most commends itself to him. In order to recognize this, notice to what an extent the existence of a degree of truth in the theories of both materialists and idealists is indicated by the line of thought that has just been brought to a close. Going back to what was said on page 75 of the play-impulse or the art-impulse, which is distinctively manifested, as explained there, in an excess of psychical or spiritual life, let us observe more carefully than was then done the sources of the manifestations of this

excess, which, of course, will be the same thing as to trace the sources of beauty; for it is in beauty that the manifestations culminate. Where, then, are the sources of this? Are they wholly in the mind, the soul, the spiritual being of the subject of it? If so, why does the impulse characteristically express itself, as shown on page 73, in imitation? It certainly would not do this were it not under the influence of natural appearances that could be imitated. Yet again, would any number of natural appearances that could be imitated account for the excess of vitality carrying on the imitation? Must not this vitality come from within? It certainly seems so. Yet if it be so indeed, we have clearly indicated effects both from without and from within.

But again, are the effects that come from nature traceable to the forms in themselves, or to causes behind the forms? Hardly to the forms in themselves, because, practically considered, as has been shown, neither music, poetry, painting, sculpture, nor architecture involves an exact imitation of forms. At best, art merely reproduces, as will be brought out in Chapter XVI., their effects; and again, because, theoretically considered, in reproducing effects, a stream cannot rise higher than its source. How can powerful influences such as, presumably, stir thought or feeling in the presence of beauty, owe their origin to forms that have no force of any kind—at any rate, no mental or spiritual force behind them?

If now, as we bear in mind these conceptions of the exact conditions accompanying beauty, the so-termed Aristotelian tell us that all art not merely employs the method of imitation, which is all that Aristotle himself claimed or meant, but that it owes its origin to the imitation, direct or indirect, of the forms of nature, we can

accept his statement, provided he include in his conception of the forms of nature their psychic effects upon the artist's psychic nature, which he embodies as psychic influences in the art that he produces. And if the so-called Platonist tell us that all art—and not merely beauty, the most legitimate subject of art, which is all to which Plato himself meant to refer—has its origin in the expression of an idea, existing as an absolute spiritual essence behind the forms of nature, which, wherever it is expressed, is intuitively recognized by the mind, we can accept his statement, provided he include in his conception of the idea expressed the physical effects of the expressional form upon the artist's physical nature, which he embodies as physical influences in the art that he produces.

We can hold, therefore, that the theories called Aristotelian and Platonic are alike in principle, so far as both necessitate, as it has been shown in this essay that they should do, the attributing of beauty to effects, and of works of art to the reproduction of these effects. But we must hold also that, inasmuch as the former theory emphasizes only the effects of nature as operating upon the mind, and the latter theory the effects of mind as operating upon nature, the truth underlying both theories is needed before we can have a full conception of all the sources of beauty. This in its completeness, as was stated on page 56 of Chapter V., is always a result of the reciprocal effects of nature upon the mind, and of the mind upon nature.

As all possible art theories are often traced, as on page 180, either to Plato or to Aristotle, an account of the theory of each, respectively, has been attempted in Appendix II., page 249, and in the following Appendix III.

CHAPTER XVI.

REPRESENTATION IN ART AS DEVELOPED BY MENTAL CONDITIONS; CONSIDERED HISTORICALLY.

Introduction—Effects of Appearances upon the Mind are Inclusive both of Forms and of Principles of Formation—And are Produced both upon the Senses and upon the Thoughts and Feelings—The Three Inseparable Objects of Consideration in the Present Inquiry—Order of Development in the Modes of Expression—As Surmised from Prehistoric Records Rationally Interpreted—As Shown from Historic Records—In the Lives of Individuals among Animals—Among Men—Also in the Influence upon Expression of Some One Event or Series of Events in the Individual's Experience—Physical Thrill, and Vocal Expression Leading to Music—Definite Opinions, and Verbal Expression Leading to Poetry—Conflicting Opinions Leading to Oratory—Contemplation of Facts as they Appear Leading to Painting and Sculpture—Planning and Re-arranging Leading to Architecture.

THE discussion of the nature of beauty which has just been brought to a close was necessitated by an attempt to show how effects upon the mind are represented in circumstances in which they are chiefly considered as coming from natural appearances. We have still to discuss, in accordance with the intention stated on page 64, how effects of natural appearances are represented in circumstances in which they are chiefly emphasized as being exerted upon or within the mind.

It is best to begin our treatment of this part of our subject by observing that the effects thus produced upon the mind are not confined to those attributable to mere forms as forms. The mind, in accordance with what has

been indicated in Chapter VIII., is influenced by the general principles also upon which in nature the forms perceived are conditioned. As W. W. Story observes in the article mentioned once before, entitled "Recent Conversations in a Studio," and published in "Blackwood's Magazine": "Nature is not an aggregation of facts—it is an idea in the mind derived from a long series of varying impressions and experiences. When we say a work of art is natural, it is because it answers to this ideal, not because it is true to some particular fact." We have noticed that nature does not furnish complete models for art to copy accurately—no symphonies, poems, cathedrals; not even paintings or statues. It furnishes merely certain potential elements of artistic form, which art selects, separates from former connections, and combines anew. No one can make products thus brought together appear natural—make them really represent what has been observed in the external world, unless he understands, and, because of understanding, is able to apply the principles which in nature condition the arrangements of these same elements.

Nor are the effects of nature upon the *mind* confined to those exerted upon the senses; *i. e.*, to any exact sounds, or images, or any influences immediately associated with these as they have been impressed upon the organs of the ears or eyes, and transformed from them to it. The mind itself is a source of thoughts and feelings. These are constantly at work, and the influence of them may often change completely the specific form in which an effect has come from nature. This is a fact, a discussion of which would have greatly enhanced the value of Lessing's celebrated criticism upon the "Laocoön." What is involved in the fact may be made clear by an illustration. Suppose a man to have listened to the story

of a battle. It might be presumed that a representation of what he has heard would also assume the form of a story, and therefore be artistically expressed in a poem. But often the effect of the story upon his imagination, as also of his imagination upon it, is such that what is experienced can be represented truthfully only through a picture. Again, it happens sometimes that the forms through which the effects have been exerted, have lingered so long in his mind, and experienced so many modifications there that, though critical analysis may detect, as in architecture and music, that the effects produced have been suggested by forms in nature, the artist himself is unconscious of what these forms were.

In our present discussion, the three elements thus indirectly indicated as entering into what may be termed the *effects of nature upon the mind*—namely, natural appearances, the thoughts and feelings awakened by them, and the combined results in the art-product both of natural appearances and of the awakened thoughts and feelings—cannot well be separated. For our purpose, each is of interest so far only as it may be connected with the other two. Any given effect important to notice as springing from forms of nature would better, therefore, be traced at once through the mind and into the form of expression by means of which the mind represents it.

Pursuing this course, let us notice, as preparatory to interpreting the phases of thought represented in each art, the order of the methods of expression natural to the mind at different stages of the development of any influence exerted from without; and that we may start where these methods seem most unmistakably indicated, let us go back to the earliest modes of representation resembling those of art that we can detect in human ex-

pression. To ascertain these, we naturally turn first to what is called history, by which is meant the story of the experiences of life as shown in that of each of its different races. We ask what does history teach with reference to the order of the development of forms of expression? Men are born into the world surrounded by certain natural influences, all of which, so far as concerns effects that influence production in art, may be divided, as has been stated before, into those of sound and of sight. Which of these exerts the earliest effect upon expression, and what is the form of this expression? If we are to derive an answer from actual records, it will have to be confessed, at once, that the most primitive of these seems to controvert rather than to confirm the theory which accords with that which is to be presented in this volume. As a fact, the most ancient forms in existence which resemble those of art are rude carvings on bone, produced in the Madeleine period of the early Stone age, representing the outlines of the mammoth, cave bear, reindeer, ibex, saiga, fish, calves' heads, horses, and men. See "Musée Préhistorique," par Gabriel et Adam De Mortillet, pl. xxviii., etc. So much for the records. But, in a case like this, have we not a right to appeal from the records to reason? These figures are found carved on implements—some of them implements of war. Is it conceivable that those who carried them did not have, and had not hæd, before they employed them vocal forms of expression, like cries and speech, allied to music and poetry as these are to painting and sculpture?

But besides appealing to reason, we can appeal to later records. When we leave the prehistoric period, and reach one where we can obtain a measurably comprehensive view of all the facts, there seems to be no difficulty

in showing that, as among the aboriginal Americans and Africans of to-day, the earliest forms offering any satisfactory resemblance to representative art are certain rude chants, which, in some cases, have all the characteristics of successful melodies. Nevertheless it needs to be acknowledged that, beyond the production of these melodies, music does not progress until a very late period. It can only be said therefore that the embryonic conditions of music develop early. In connection with them, however, and largely because of them, language, which itself, in its earlier stages, is always poetic, passes from its primitive condition into forms not only of oratory but of verse, which, as among the Hebrews, Greeks, Persians, Hindoos, Teutons, etc., is usually brought to a high degree of perfection long before any of the arts of sight. Almost unexceptionable specimens of musical melody—not harmony—and poetry are produced in very primitive stages of civilization. Painting, sculpture, and architecture, in anything like faultless form, always appear later. Nevertheless, very early, but subsequent to the first attempts at expression through the use of sounds, we find men trying to draw pictures, and, as suggested in connection with these, to record experiences in methods which lead, after a while, to the use of hieroglyphics and to the full development of arts like painting and sculpture. Only later than the attainment of excellence in these, do we, as a rule, find the more complicated manifestations of taste and skill in the same general direction applied to house-building to such a degree as to lift it into the sphere of the art of architecture. Of course, the human being puts up certain kinds of huts earlier than he draws pictures. He is obliged to do so in order to provide means of shelter. But he is not influenced to construct his huts in

such a way as to give expression to his thoughts and feelings, which is essential for an artistic effect, as early as he is influenced to draw pictures for the same purpose. A boy, or a boy-like savage, using a pencil or anything else, will enjoy expressing his thoughts and feelings by way of imitation for its own sake, long before he will enjoy doing the same for the sake of ornamenting what would be just as useful without ornamentation. In the former case, his mind begins by being at play; in the latter, by being at work; and its first desire always is to be rid of work.

This last illustration suggests that to learn about the order of the development of the modes of expression natural to the different arts, we need not confine ourselves to what can be obtained from history in the sense in which that term is most used. We can learn something from the lives of individuals as well as of races. Here we can begin, too, lower down than with individuals of the human species. The ears for appreciation as well as the throats for expression in pups and kittens are always opened before their eyes, to say nothing of their claws; and while few, if any, animals have ever been known to appreciate painting, Shakespeare says:

“ For do but note a wild and wanton herd,
Or race of youthful and unhandled colts,
Fetching mad bounds, bellowing and neighing loud,
Which is the hot condition of their blood,
If they but hear, perchance, a trumpet sound,
Or any air of music touch their ears,
You shall perceive them make a mutual stand,
Their savage eyes turned to a modest gaze
By the sweet power of music.”

—*Merchant of Venice*, v., i. : *Shakespeare*.

Passing up to the human species, we find in it the same

capacities developed in exactly the same order. The first mental influence that a babe can appreciate is his nurse's lullaby; and the first thing that he does at birth, when he comes into contact with the world, is to cry. The cry may not be music, but it is uttered with cadences and inflections that need only an artistic adaptation in order to become such. Moreover, he enjoys and repeats the jingle of Mother Goose's and other rhymes long before he learns to argue, write, draw, whittle, or hammer, and thus to develop the possibilities of oratory, painting, sculpture, and architecture. Childhood is essentially the age of inarticulate sound or of noise, and youth that of poetry. As a rule, only a further experience of the world and of character enables a man rightly to appreciate the representations of these in painting and sculpture, or to decide successfully upon the location or plan of that house which every one is said to build before he dies.

The earlier and later forms of expression in the history of the race and in the life of the individual have thus been briefly indicated on account of their bearing upon what is to follow. All thinkers have come to recognize that the order of development of any phase of effects in the life of the race is not out of analogy with that which is true of the same phase as developed in one individual's life, whether considered as a whole, which has just been done; or as made up of separate parts, each the result of a specific event or series of events. In agreement with this principle, we shall find now that the order of the different successive modes in which a man represents the different successive effects upon his mind of any specific event or series of events corresponds to the order of development already noticed in the other cases. In other words, exactly as this princi-

ple might lead us to infer, we shall find that, as related to the processes of representative art, the mind or the imagination, which is the faculty of the mind principally engaged in the work, acts, as it were, like a mirror. At different stages, as the trains of influence pass by, it flashes back that which necessarily takes a form analogous either to music, poetry (oratory), painting, sculpture, or architecture. We shall find, in short, that all these arts are elaborations of instinctive modes of expression which, in certain circumstances, the mind is forced to adopt, all representative art being, as Opie says of painting in the first of his "Lectures" upon that subject, "a language that must exist, in some greater or less degree, whenever the human intellect approaches a certain, and that by no means elevated, standard." To make this fact clear is evidently to bring to light principles that lie at the very bottom of our subject, and which, when seen in their true proportions and relations, will reveal a sure foundation on which to base all that is to follow.

Let us consider, then, at first briefly and superficially, which is all that is necessary at this stage, the general order of development of representative modes of expression in the case of an individual influenced by some specific event or series of events. Suppose a man to be in a crowd composed of persons of conflicting opinions with reference to some subject mentioned. Suppose that a statement be suddenly made there—as was done in so many places in our country in 1861, when Fort Sumter fell—that some flag has been fired upon, or some fortress captured. Of course, the effect of the news will differ in the cases of different individuals; but let us observe its influence on the average man strongly interested in what

is thus brought to his notice. Is it not true that this man will first experience a thrill or shock, as if his nervous system had been physically shaken? At the same instant, from him, or at least from some parts of the crowd, will arise sounds of approbation or of disapprobation, cheers or hisses, followed by exclamations more or less inarticulate or incoherent, according to the degree in which the one uttering them is more or less excited. This condition evidently can have no artistic expression unless it be in music. In fact; have not many of us been in assemblies under similar states of suddenly awakened excitement, in which the most natural prompting of every instinct, as well as the only possible expression in a manner at once orderly and adequate, was literally to burst into a musical chorus. This is precisely what the crowds on Wall Street, New York, invariably did during the American civil war, when receiving news from the army, especially, of course, when receiving news of victories; but they kept up their courage in the same way, also, when receiving news of defeats.

But let us pass on. Immediately after the period of indefinite sounds, will come definite expressions of opinion. Now notice that the more excited the men uttering these, or listening to these, happen to be, the more figurative, as a rule, will be their language. This or that must be done "like this or that," will be the formula upon every lip. There is no need of stopping to argue that such figurative language is the mode of representation naturally developed into poetry.

At the stage next after this, expressions of opinion uttered freely in a crowd mixed like the one that we are considering, will lead necessarily to altercation, disputation, and, if practical interests be involved, to efforts at

persuasion. Here evidently, as it is well enough for us to observe in passing, are the modes of representation natural to oratory.

If, after a time, efforts at persuasion are recognized to be of no avail, talking will necessarily give way to other methods. Besides employing the powers of voice and gesture men will begin to consider and to use something else, something involving force exerted upon that which is outside of themselves. Before turning to this, however, the majority of a crowd, like the one of which we are thinking, will take the measure of those before them. For a brief moment, at least, they will gaze at one another, intent to see exactly what it is that they have to face. That which at this moment absorbs the attention, if it is to be represented at all, evidently requires a picture. A photographer, did he happen to be a witness of the scene, who, so long as he was sufficiently excited to argue, would not think of the mere appearance of those surrounding him, might, at this stage, in case his interest did not carry him on to the next stage, bring out his camera. We have here, then, conditions which are at the basis of representation according to the modes of painting and sculpture.

After this momentary facing of the situation, however, any one not willing to accept conditions as they present themselves to view, will evidently be prompted to take measures for changing them. If surrounded by foes exciting his physical nature, he will plan to fight them; if by friends, too, whom he desires to lead to battle, he will do what he can toward marshalling them into companies and battalions, thus changing their confusion to order. This mood, in the effect that it has in rearranging the appearances of nature, is evidently analogous to that which finds expression in the modes of representation

exemplified partly in sculpture and wholly in architecture. In the latter art, the mind no longer accepts, as in painting, the appearances of nature as they are; it asserts its supremacy over the influences from without, and, while accepting certain details, attempts to change the conditions under which they are presented. The moment, however, that this supremacy becomes actual, the moment that a man becomes really free from the influences from without, the possibility of art as a representation of the effects of nature ceases. The occupation of the artist is gone as completely as that of a soldier who has no foes. The influence that first prompted to expression in the forms allied to music, has exhausted itself. We have traced it to a point beyond which it can be traced no farther.

CHAPTER XVII.

REPRESENTATION IN ART AS DEVELOPED BY MENTAL CONDITIONS; CONSIDERED PHYSIOLOGICALLY.

Conditions of Natural Influence and States of Consciousness as Represented in each Art—Ideas in the Mind and the Influence from Without Compared to Ice and to Currents Flowing into an Inlet—The Condition Corresponding to Music, Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture—This Comparison Corresponds to Physical Facts, Large Vibrations of the Nerves Causing Sounds, Small Vibrations Causing Colors—Largest Nerve Movement Exerted in Connection with Music, Less with Poetry, Less with the Colors of Painting, and Least with the less Brilliant Colors of Sculpture and Architecture—Our Nerves are directly Conscious of the Vibrations of Sounds, as in Thunder, but not of those of Color—This Fact as Applied Mythologically and Medicinally.

IN Chapter XVI. we considered certain suggestions with reference to the order of the development of the modes of representative expression which seemed to be indicated in the lives of races, and of individuals, and in expression itself, as naturally determined by the effects upon the mind, at different successive stages, of the same experience. Let us turn now to that for the sake of which this order was noticed, and try to ascertain what we can infer from it with reference to the conditions of consciousness naturally represented in each art. In order to do this, let us use another illustration. At first it may seem fanciful. Later on good reasons for using it will be given. The illustration is suggested by words that we apply to ordinary experiences, whose extraordinary devel-

opments alone lead to representative art. Words are like wrinkles, external marks of internal moods. Sometimes by tracing back the derivation of a word, one may find out the mental condition that originated it.

To apply this principle in the present instance. When we say that the mind is *moved* or *affected* by an *influence* exerted from without, so far as we convey any meaning it is this: that the mind possesses certain thought-stores or ideas, and that these, which otherwise would be stationary, are set in motion when something from without, by an *influx* or *influence*, *flows* into it. In order to comprehend fully the comparison thus indicated by the words that we use, let us do something that shall enable us in imagination to magnify its factors. Let us represent the ideas in the mind by the floating but, except for outside influence, stationary ice in some bay or inlet, and at the same time represent that which flows into the mind by the waves and current of storm and tide entering this from an ocean. Let us observe now what is the natural order of development of the relations sustained between the waters thus forced inward and the ice? Is it not something like this? At the point nearest the ocean, the waves sweeping over the ice break off and bear up and down small portions of it but with such force that the ice forms but an insignificant, perhaps an indistinguishable, part of the effect of the waves as a whole. A little further inward, the floating ice covers the waves. We see mainly the ice, but it is moving, and its movement indicates that of the water under it. Still further inward, the portions of broken ice, crowded together by the force of the waves, begin to offer manifest resistance. Up to this point one could hardly distinguish from a distance the ice from the waves. Here it becomes almost impos-

sible to confound the two ; for at one place the weight on the surface is seen crushing down the surf, and at another the surf is seen breaking through and above the surface. Last of all, at places nearest the shore, the force of the waves seems to be crushed out completely, yet the effects produced by it are abundantly apparent in the great moveless heaps of ice resting against the water line.

This order of development in the relations of two physical elements, one moving in upon another, which last, till moved, is stationary, may illustrate the successive relations existing in the mind between an influence entering from without, and the ideas which are moved within. The first stage, in which the influence is more powerful than the ideas, which, as definite ideas, existing apart from it, are scarcely recognizable, is represented in music. A melody, unaccompanied by words, represents a *movement* imparted to the mind, and yet it is a movement or tendency, not particular ideas, that the melody definitely represents.

The second stage, in which the influence from without or its tendency is recognized mainly by the movement of the *ideas* which offer no apparent resistance to the influence, is represented in poetry. A lyric represents a movement imparted to the thoughts, but, unlike the condition in a melody, the thoughts of the lyric appear in definite form. It is these thoughts that, according to their order of sequence, reveal the tendency which impels them.

The third stage, in which the influence from without is clearly perceived to be different from the ideas within, which ideas, while still moved, manifest some resistance, is represented in painting and sculpture. These arts reveal much more plainly than either music or poetry that the mind has been moved by some outward form

which they imitate. But they necessitate, and, in a sense not true of either of the arts of sound, they show that they necessitate, great conscious effort on the part of the intellect in arranging outlines, in coloring canvases, or in shaping marbles, so as to make the forms which are imitated embody the mind's ideas. If the influence be strong enough, musical melodies and poetic passages seem to spring to the lips instinctively. However strong it be, pictures and statues do not fall into shape except as a result of thoughtful work, which is due to the mind and not to that which affects it from without; work, in other words, in connection with which the ideas within the mind emphasize their own separate existence.

The last stage, in which the influence seems to have almost spent its force, yet not before it has left the ideas so disposed as clearly to show its effects, is represented in architecture. This reveals that the mind has been influenced by many specific forms in nature as well as by general laws conditioning them. Yet buildings seldom imitate nature in the same sense as a picture or a statue. They merely accept suggestions from nature. Their main effects spring from the general disposition of the ideas in the mind in view of what has been observed in general. Architects reconstruct the forms about them on the lines of previous construction, but always in such a way that mentality seems to have been very extensively exercised in offering resistance to nature, which has furnished man with pillars so far only as they may appear in trees, and with walls so far only as they may be found in valleys.

These illustrations, as was said, may appear fanciful. They have been suggested by merely the ordinary terms through which we designate those processes of mind which we are now considering. Let us go on to see

whether this order of development in the relations existing between the influence and the ideas, has any basis in facts; first in physical facts, and then in mental facts, so far as we can ascertain them. To begin with, are there any physical facts which justify us in comparing the action of outer effects upon the mind to that of waves upon something stationary; and if so, is there any reason why these waves, at their greatest, can be represented in music, and, at their least, in architecture? To both of these questions we can give an affirmative answer. Physicists tell us that the acoustic nerve floats in a fluid back of the drum of the ear, also that the optic nerve rests against a corresponding humor back of the crystalline lens of the eye. They tell us that whenever sounds or sights reach intelligence, they are conveyed to it because, as a fact, these nerves are physically shaken through the influence of vibrations or waves in the air, which strike the ear drum or crystalline lens. So much for the first question; now for the second. Physicists tell us also that the waves vibrating to shake the acoustic nerve are so large that, at the least, sixteen, and, at the most, forty thousand, can move in a second of time; but that, on the other hand, the waves shaking the retina are so minute that, at the least, four hundred and eighty-three trillions, and, at the most, seven hundred and twenty-seven trillions, can move in a second. If these assertions indicate anything, they indicate that the sensation of being most shaken, shaken by the largest waves, or when the influence has most force, can be represented or communicated better—and any nervous mother with half a dozen small boys will confirm the statement from her own experience—through sound than through sight.

Whether we consider quantity or quality, there is more

of sound represented in music than in poetry. By consequence, of the two arts, the former represents better the first effect of a motive *per se*; *i. e.*, the most powerful, the least exhausted effect of any influence from without, considered merely as an influence. Oratory appeals to sight as well as to hearing. For this reason it represents a later effect than poetry. Of those arts which, because they appeal to sight alone, represent effects in sight still later than oratory, painting evidently comes first. It uses more brilliancy and variety of color, necessitating larger vibrations—the largest of all for instance, producing extreme red—and also greater dependence upon everything conditioned directly by influence of this kind than is the case in either sculpture or architecture.

There are other physical facts which confirm what has just been said. Consider the degrees of force accompanying the influences which affect respectively the ear and the eye. Thunder, which one hears, can make the foundations of one's house shake literally. Nothing similar can be affirmed of effects that one can only see.

So powerful too is the mere physical influence of sound that sober arguments have been used to prove that one blast of the trumpets of united Israel might, of itself, have been strong enough to topple over the walls of Jericho. The Greeks, whose myths with reference to other matters are so significant, represented their conceptions of the influence of music in the story of Orpheus and Amphion, who, with their harps, drew around them not only wild beasts, but trees and stones, causing all to dance to their melodies, and finally bringing the latter together to form the walls of a mighty city. Nor are these conceptions of the physical influence of sound expressed in myths alone. Both ancients and moderns have used music

medicinally. Plato, Plutarch, and Cicero all speak of its supposed remedial powers. We are told that Zenocrates employed it, like David before Saul, for mental disorders; Asclepiades, for deafness; Thales, for pestilence; and the Thebans, for other diseases. In modern times, eminent physicians in England, France, and Germany have insisted upon its efficacy in cases not only of insanity, but of hemorrhage, fever, and of almost all kinds of spasmodic troubles. In our own country it is used more or less in insane asylums. Some in charge of these have asserted that when Quaker patients, who refused to listen to music in their normal moods, became irrational, it was one of the few agencies that seemed to be effective in calming them. One cannot help thinking that perhaps a little more of something to appease certain instinctive cravings, even if only of the nerves,—a little more of irrationality distributed through their previous years,—might have brought the lives and faculties of such people into greater harmony. However, the question of the medicinal properties of sound or of music is not the one with which we are here concerned. The fact has been mentioned merely to show how general has been the belief that the elements entering into this art, as distinguished from those entering into other arts,—though, in a limited way, the same has been affirmed of colors too,—are fitted to move the nerves, even to the extent of producing upon them an alterative physical effect.

CHAPTER XVIII.

REPRESENTATION IN ART AS DEVELOPED BY MENTAL CONDITIONS, CONSIDERED PSYCHOLOGICALLY.

Mental Facts are in Accord with what has Preceded—Inarticulate Cries Representative of Suddenly Excited Emotions—Why these Cries are Intelligible—Association and Comparison—Emotion Co-extensive with Consciousness—Music the Language of the Emotions—The Indefiniteness of its Effect—Its Degree of Definiteness—Gives Direction to Sentiment with the Least Limitation to Freedom—Musical Ideas—Observation of Natural Forms and Experience of Human Sentiments are both Conditions Underlying Musical Composition—Influence from Without and Ideas Within in Poetry—The Function of Intelligence—Influences and Ideas Made One by an Exercise of Comparison—Association and Comparison at the Basis of Words and of the Forms of Language and Poetry.

IN the illustration given in Chapter XVI. of a man in a crowd, excited by sudden news, it was said that his nervous system first experienced a thrill or shock, as if there had been a literal movement involving a decided shaking of his physical nature. In Chapter XVII., certain facts were mentioned as justifying one in supposing that what seemed to be true in this case actually might be true. Nevertheless some may doubt it. But even if so, none can doubt that whatever in such circumstances may be affirmed of a man's physical nature, it is a fact that at least his mental nature is moved. Mental experiences, appealing to consciousness under the form of mere movement, are termed emotions or feelings. The first experience of a

man, when strongly influenced from without, makes him mainly, though not wholly, unless he have wholly lost his mind, conscious of these. His first and always an instinctive expression simultaneous with such an experience is an inarticulate cry. If we startle a person—come upon him suddenly, for instance, in the dark—in nine cases out of ten we hear this cry, its intensity being in direct proportion to his lack of control over those powers of his mind which give rise to definiteness in thought. The child is more likely to scream than the man.

These facts suggest, at once, their reason. One utters inarticulate sounds, because he has not had time enough, either absolutely, or relatively to the intensity of his feelings, to collect and formulate them into words; often, indeed, not even into thoughts that are definite to himself. If they were so, he would use the only form capable of representing definite thought, which is language. "Ever since the time of Wilhelm von Humboldt," says Max Müller, who develops this theory, at length, in the first two chapters of his "Science of Thought"—"all who have seriously grappled with the highest problems of the science of language have come to the conviction that thought and language are inseparable, that language is as impossible without thought as thought is without language; that they stand to each other like soul and body, like power and function, like substance and form." In the instance which we have been considering, we have noticed that the man does not use language. He simply cries out, with little more articulation than the brute, whose ideas, for the very reason that he cannot articulate, as suggested in Chapter II., probably never become very clear, even to himself, and therefore need no clear form of expression.

Human utterances, however, even when inarticulate,

are more intelligible to us than are those of the brutes ; and mainly for two reasons—their variety and their consecutiveness. In the first place a man can produce many different sounds, each of which represents a different meaning. That which enables these to represent this is seldom, in the case of inarticulate utterance, any actual or suggested likeness between the sound and its significance. As a rule, a sound suggesting significance is imitative, and as a rule too an imitative sound is a result of articulation. Besides this, it requires also a certain degree of reflection, and at this stage of the cry a man has not had time for reflection (see “ Poetry as a Representative Art,” Chapter I). The earlier instinctive or ejaculatory utterances usually mean what they do, because whenever they are uttered in like circumstances, as in the cases of crying and laughter for instance, they are alike in sound. For this reason men come to associate them with these circumstances. Notice, however, that, in a case like this, to associate the effects is very much the same in principle as to compare them, as would be done if there were imitation. Association involves a likeness or comparison in the relations to the same period or place of at least two effects otherwise different. Association and comparison, therefore, though not the same, are subtly allied. It is the former that chiefly underlies the use of inarticulate exclamations ; and it is hardly necessary to recall for the reader that, through using these alone, the smallest babe can make known its wants, and a foreigner in any part of the globe can communicate, if not his thoughts, at least his more important feelings, like those of surprise, fright, contempt, and joy. But, in the second place, inarticulate sounds, as produced by men, in a degree not true of those produced by mere animals, may be

uttered consecutively,—a fact suggesting that they may represent mental movements, not only by way of association, but also of comparison, inasmuch as both sounds and emotions are alike at least in being consecutive. The relevancy of this remark will appear upon recalling again the experience of the man in the crowd. He is conscious, when he calls out, not of one feeling, but of many. These come flooding through his mind consecutively, recognized at first only as feelings. But after a time they begin to sway his thought as the tides do the ice which they undermine, and then heave up and down in their own current. Long before this, however, his feelings must have been moving in the same directions as the thoughts of which he suddenly becomes conscious. Therefore, if inarticulate sounds can represent, though only in a general way, the consecutive nature of these feelings, they can represent also the general tendency or direction of the thoughts and, up to the point where these thoughts assume definiteness, nothing except such sounds can represent them. After this, words begin to be used, but the feelings still continue to be represented in the emphasis, *i. e.*, in the intonation of the words as distinguished from their mere articulation. Later on, when the feelings subside, the variations of intonation become less obvious.

As a fact, however, the feelings never do subside entirely. So long as thoughts move at all, emotions operate behind them; just as men, so long as, without exertions of their own, they move forward in a crowd, are pushed, although not directly conscious that this is so. "What most people are alive to," says an anonymous musical critic in the "London Times," "is the existence of emotions in their more intense forms. Once in the course of the day, or two or three times during the month, they

have been greatly moved or excited, pleasurably or otherwise. But what few people realize, is that emotion is co-extensive with consciousness. Physically this is the case, for there is no pause in the incessant disturbance and rearrangement of the cerebral molecules which are inseparably connected with the phenomena of human consciousness, and human consciousness itself is nothing but an uninterrupted concatenation of emotions, most of them so unimportant, so involved, and succeeding each other with such intense rapidity that we take no note of them." We can all recognize, without explanation, the bearing of this upon our subject. Inarticulate sound is representative of emotion. And emotion, as the same writer says, "is the very breath and life-blood of thought, without which it would remain but a pale and powerless shadow. As the sun brings light and warmth to the visible world, as without it the whole life of the physical world would lie forlorn in one long midnight of cold paralysis, even so the solar orb of our emotions kindles each thought and endows each conception with fertile activity."

The art, therefore, that is developed from the possibility of sound, irrespective of articulation, is the one that is fittest to represent emotion as emotion alone. This art is music. "Music," says the writer just quoted, "is the language of the emotions." "Its business," says J. S. Dwight, in an essay on "The Intellectual Influence of Music," published in the "Atlantic Monthly" for 1870, "is directly with the motive principles in human life, and not with thoughts, perceptions, memories."

The truth of this lies on the surface. In music, there are no words to inspire as in poetry, no movements to animate, as in oratory, no forms, or colors to attract, as in sculpture or painting, nothing whatever to indicate defin-

itely that of which one should think. Music addresses itself directly to the feelings and, when it has stirred these, leaves them to suggest whatever thoughts of joy or of sadness may lie nearest to the heart of the man who is under its control. The same strains may affect differently, so far as regards merely the form of thought, the experience of every one who listens to them. It may make a child think of his nursery, a youth of his school, a merchant of his counting-room. Yet with all this, it would be an error to think that the mental influence of the art is slight. The story of the men hired to assassinate Stradella, who, after listening to his oratorio in Rome, dropped their weapons and became the saviors of his life, is only one of a thousand evincing the contrary. To those who can appreciate this art it can bring joy or sadness, smiles or tears, long after every other purely æsthetic influence has ceased to affect them. In fact, there is

—nought so stockish, hard and full of rage,
But music for the time doth change his nature.

Merchant of Venice, v., 1 : Shakespeare.

Nor does the effect of the art seem slight, even when we consider its ability to influence one in merely definite directions. We have noticed already the tendency which the feelings have, and so, of course, anything that represents them, to sweep thought and action along in their own current. Writers upon music in all ages have shown by examples that this is its peculiar effect. Timotheus with his flute, they have told us, could stir the passions of Alexander either to bloodshed or to mercy, and Tyrtæus so roused the Spartans simply by singing, that they gained a victory over foes to whom they had before submitted. On the contrary, through the agency of this art

Pythagoras is said to have restrained one from arson, and Empedocles another from murder. A musician is declared to have influenced the Sultan Amurath so as to save the lives of thirty thousand Persians previously condemned to death; and another musician is known to have been himself so affected when listening to an overture of Handel, as, from sheer ecstasy, to have lost his life.

Music furnishes perhaps the best possible illustration of a fact noticed to be true universally whenever, rising above purely physical conditions, we come to consider forces fitted to affect the mind and soul,—the fact, that it is of more importance to influence the substance of thought than the form of thought; of more importance to aim for something giving direction to sentiment than definiteness to statement; in short, that the most profound and lasting effect upon experience is exerted in connection with that which, at the same time, allows the greatest freedom to expression. This principle is illustrated more or less in all the arts. Otherwise they would not merely represent what they have to express; in direct form they would present it. But the principle is especially noticeable in music; and for this reason, probably, the production of it is mentioned so often in the Bible in order to describe symbolically the employment of heaven. Other arts, by words, shapes, or colors, confine thought to some extent; indicating, as they do in no unmistakable way, that of which one should think. Not so with music. It may hold the feelings of a multitude in absolute control; yet, at the same time, it may leave each individual absolutely free to think the thought and to do the deed that is prompted by his individual instincts.

Enough has been said, however, whether we consider the

sources of music or what it can represent, to show its general nature. "It is," as Mr. Dwight in the essay just quoted says, "the most fluid, free expression of form in the becoming—what the Germans call *das werden*—form developing according to intrinsic and divine necessity. It does not express ideas, except of the kind technically known as musical ideas, pregnant little gems of melody capable of logical development in a way analogous"—and we have seen in what sense analogous—"to the development of thought." These musical ideas, as we have noticed, are expressed through inarticulate sounds. Such alone can represent emotions pure and simple. These sounds, moreover, are consecutive. Such alone, changing from one phase to another, can represent the consecutive processes that are always characteristic of mental movements.

We can apprehend now what is to be done by the musical composer. Startled by circumstances, the child of nature utters inarticulate cries. These are instinctive in their origin; but are always alike when the mind is influenced by like motives. Therefore men associate the cries with the motives, for which reason the cries may be said to be representative of the motives. Availing himself of this fact the artist endeavors to portray in music the effect not of a single feeling, but of an entire current of feelings as set in motion by outside influences. Notice too that all the developments of the art continue as it begins. Notwithstanding the very limited amount of imitation and, in this sense, of comparison that we find in music, nevertheless, a great composer, through introducing only a few imitative notes, may force the mind to connect two things as radically different as, say, a symphony and a landscape. That he may accomplish

this end, two conditions are necessary: he must have observed the particular character of the sounds through which the child of nature, and, in some cases, through which the irrational creature, represents particular feelings; and again, he must have been conscious within himself of feelings similarly excited—similar in kind, that is, not in degree—and hence capable of being represented similarly. The two conditions go together. Unless he has observed the forms of expression in natural life, the forms at his command, to be used in his art-product, will be few in number. Unless he himself has experienced feelings that naturally lead to such expressions, the few forms that he does use will not be used appropriately. They will have little meaning. They will not speak to the universal human heart with the authority of a veritable language of the emotions. In short, we notice what is in exact analogy with the line of thought in the chapters preceding this, namely, that the same conditions which make music representative of human nature or of natural feeling, render it representative also of the artist or of the artist's feeling; in other words that to be truly representative of nature, this art must be representative of man also. So much for the phase of natural influence, which, working upon the experience of men in general and through them upon artists in particular, leads to music.

Let us go on now to consider that which leads to poetry. This results, as we have found, when the motive which previously has influenced the thought indefinitely, and which therefore could be represented appropriately in only indefinite or inarticulate sounds, reaches the region of definite thought. Our question now concerns the form that will first be assumed by this thought. To go back to the men in the crowd—all are supposed to

have received through words the same information; to have heard the same thing. Will any two of them think or say the same thing? A moment's consideration will show that they will not. The form of the thoughts or words that appear in consciousness will depend altogether upon the character of the ideas with which the particular mind to which information has been given is already stocked. Suppose that a man be prompted to enlist. If his mind be stored with facts of history, he may think about Wellington at Waterloo, or Grant at Vicksburg. If he be accustomed to views of external nature, he may think about thunder and lightning felling the forests, or hail and flood sweeping through mountain passes. Like such persons or things, he will conceive of himself as warring against opposition. And not only will he conceive of this, he will express in words the substance of his conceptions. Nine persons out of ten, speaking in such circumstances, will say, or at least imply in what they say, "We must fight like this person or thing, or like that person or thing," which they mention.

Notice particularly now the condition of mind that this fact indicates. Thoughts and words are moving in accordance with the direction given them by the influence from without. The thoughts themselves, however, are not this influence, but something different from it. The effect, therefore, as it reveals itself, both in consciousness and in outward expression, is one mainly of *intelligence* (*inter* and *lego*) *i. e.*, of *reading between* two things, or, as we might say, of considering two elements so similar that they can be compared, yet so dissimilar that they cannot but be separated. This result might be explained as follows: Vibratory waves breaking against the nerves of the outward senses have produced, so far as we can judge from

analogy, vibrations among what we term the emotions. But the mind subjected to these vibrations is already filled with certain conceptions in the forms of sounds that are words, or of sights that are visions of external nature, which words and visions are to it symbols of ideas. These symbols, therefore, the moment that the influence from without, passing through the nerves and emotions, reaches them, are necessarily set in motion.

A man cries out concerning a fortress and its defenders, "We must storm it, we must give them thunder and lightning!" If storms, thunder and lightning, and other definite conceptions were not already in his mind to be influenced by the motive from without, this motive could not represent itself to him through them. But inasmuch as they are there, and his mind is filled with them, it must represent itself thus. If the ice on a sheet of water fill all the surface, an observer cannot know that the water is moving, unless he see the ice moving. It is important to notice also—what is equally true—that he cannot see the ice moving unless, as a fact, the water under it moves. So a man cannot think of storms, thunder and lightning, unless, according to the law of association, something influences him to think of them.

It seems to be a necessary condition of definite thought, therefore, that there should be, in the first place, conceptions already in the mind, and, in the second place, a motive owing to the influence of which they are revealed to consciousness. Ordinarily a man conceives of both the conceptions and the motive as one. He does so, however, according to the same principle that leads him, when he sees ice moving in the river, to say that the water is moving. The two things, ice and water, are different. It is the mind that unites them. At the same time, thought

is conscious, all the while, that they are two things, and not one. The motive in poetry, as in music, sweeps the emotions onward to instinctive action. But in poetry, the ideas, caught up in the tide, clearly repeat, or, as we may say, reinforce the motive ; and that which causes the mind to consider both motive and idea as one thing and not two is the fact that, with, of course, some contrasts, they compare together, and also the fact that the mind is conscious that they do this. Conscious comparison, therefore, rather than the unconscious phases of it and of association that lead to the developments of music, lies at the basis of poetry.

There are evidences of this comparison all the way, from the very beginnings of definite thought to its most mature developments. This fact with its bearings upon language, and especially upon the language of poetry, will be found brought out fully in the volume of this series of essays entitled "Poetry as a Representative Art," Chapters I., XIV.-XVII., and XXVII. In order to suggest, however, what is meant by the assertion just made, it may be well here, by way of illustration, to recall for a moment one or two of the conditions of language which are pointed out there, and which are universally acknowledged. Reference has been made already, in speaking of music, to ejaculations. These come to have definite meanings and to be used as words, because of the principle of association. But besides words of this kind there are certain other words, and usually, as will be noticed, words that are definite in the sense of being articulated, that in their primitive forms are sounds used by way of imitation. Something passes by with a whizzing noise. In order to represent it, a man says it *whizzes*—an utterance which, when used in the same sense by others who have heard it

so used by him, became a word; and it becomes so through an effort to express comparison. All men, whatever may be their theories with reference to the origin of language, are ready to admit that very many words, like *whiz*, *buzz*, *rustle*, *crackle*, *roar*, may be attributed to a similar cause. In fact, as was intimated a moment ago, even the words that owe their origin to the principle of association have a source subtly allied to comparison; they involve a comparison between the relations which two effects otherwise different bear to the same period or place. Similar associative and comparative methods of originating words are manifested in the way also in which their primary meanings pass into their secondary meanings. The villagers of the old Roman Empire were called *pagani*; and they were the last in the Empire to accept Christianity. Therefore, by way of association, all who did not accept Christianity came to be called *pagans*. Again, when men had begun to use a sound like *whiz*, as a word, something would pass quickly making a very different sound, possibly none at all. Still they would say that it *whizzed*, and this because they would compare the motion of a noiseless body when passing to that of one which when passing did *whiz*. Such words as this are at first used figuratively, and later with no thought of the figure in them. The writer once heard a Doctor of Divinity open the public exercises of a literary institution with a prayer beginning thus: "Not with a rush"—and here there was a rush, for everybody moved and opened his eyes as well as ears to note what, after a pause, was to follow—"do we come into thy presence, O Lord." The Doctor had a reputation for originality, especially in the use of figures. But while he was influenced by the principle of comparison, the people were influenced by that

of association, and, on their part, did go into the prayer with a rush, as if for the express purpose of proving the peril of applying the one principle in a case where it had become conventional to apply the other. But enough. The illustrations used are sufficient for our purpose here, which is simply to suggest to what an extent the meanings of words, whether primary or secondary, are developed according to the very closely allied methods of association and comparison.

Isolated words, however, do not constitute language. Before they can become such, they must be put into phrases and sentences. But what are these phrases and sentences, again, except words uttered consecutively in such a way that the order of their utterance or dependence upon one another shall compare with the order, *i. e.*, the direction or tendency, of the different phases of the mental motive which prompts to them? Through the whole extent of language, therefore, which furnishes the material or medium for the expression of poetry, we find in constant operation this process of comparison. The same thing is true, but need not be argued, with reference to metaphors, similes, and representations of characters and events, which all acknowledge to be necessary to the further development of poetic language and thought.

CHAPTER XIX.

REPRESENTATION IN ART AS DEVELOPED BY MENTAL CONDITIONS, CONSIDERED PSYCHOLOGICALLY.

(Continued.)

Definite Conceptions in Opposition to the Influence from Without, Lead to the Distinguishing of the One from the Other—Persuasion and Oratory—How Differing from Poetry and Fine Art—In the latter, the Influences from Without and from the Ideas suggest Contrast—Rendering Necessary an External Medium of Representation—Bearing of this subject upon Poetic Descriptions—Rendering necessary also a Stationary Medium—Landscape Gardening—Painting—Sculpture, Representing less of Nature and more of Ideas within the Mind—Therefore Offering more Resistance to the Motive from Without—Architecture Represents the Will, in that it is still less Influenced by Natural Forms—In the Latter Regard Architecture Resembles Music—For an Opposite Reason, Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture are between these Extremes—Completeness of this Analysis of the Arts in Accordance with their Development from Representative Effects.

LET us go back now to the illustration used in Chapter XVII. The man in the crowd, after words have given expression to his sentiments, and others have begun to express their opinions, will discover invariably, that in some regards others differ from him. As his ideas are still influenced by that which flows in from without, he will still be conscious of a comparison between them and it. But he will be more conscious than before of an outside world, and of a contrast between that which comes from it and that which pertains to himself.

At first, however, this feeling is overbalanced by another. The man imagines that if he can only represent clearly and forcibly his own notions, he will be able to persuade others to agree with him, *i. e.*, that their views and his may be made to compare. You will recognize this to be the motive prompting to oratory, which, though not purely a fine or an æsthetic art, needs to be mentioned here, because it forms a connecting link between poetry and the next æsthetic art in order most nearly allied to it, namely painting.

Oratory is composed of elements underlying elocution, rhetoric, and pantomime. Of these, elocution is allied to music, rhetoric to poetry, and pantomime to figure-painting and sculpture. Oratory, therefore, is related both to the arts already considered and to those that are to follow. Its distinguishing feature, however, without which it could not exist, is not the combination in it of elocution, rhetoric, and pantomime; but the use of all these for the purposes of persuasion. But persuasion comes later in the order of nature than does mere language. Besides this, while poetry represents comparison between the motive and the language, oratory represents comparison between language and delivery. The former two are much more subtly connected than are the latter two. In the former, while the mind actually compares motives and language, it virtually considers both as one. The result, whether natural or artistic, is largely instinctive. The poet is born a poet. In the latter, the mind likens factors that are further apart. Its comparisons are often far from instinctive, being very clearly the results of conscious reflection. The orator always needs some culture before his tones and gestures can be conformed in every case to speech. In a sense not true of the poet, the orator is

made. We see, at once, how different are the conditions of oratory from those of the arts previously considered. Emotion influencing mainly the feelings, leads to music; influencing the thoughts to poetry; influencing the will to oratory. The orator strives to give expression to feelings or thoughts not for the sake of their own intrinsic worth or beauty, but for their influence upon others. As already pointed out in Chapter IX., oratory is not so much an æsthetic as a practical art. As soon as the speaker loses all hope of causing others to agree with him, he ceases to harangue them.

Now we have reached a stage where we must pass on to consider another experience and mode of expression. As shown in the illustration of the man in the crowd, one may check himself just where he ceases to declaim, and, before he assumes the physically offensive, stand gazing at that which is passing,—a mood which, if represented at all, necessitates some sort of a picture. Let us look at the facts here carefully. To check oneself implies that one is no longer moved so strongly, is no longer under such subjection to the emotions, as is implied in the moods represented in music, poetry, and oratory. It implies that the ideas are related to the influence coming from without in the same way as the ice to the water, when, in the illustration given, the former begins to manifest resistance. The ideas, no longer now in the condition in which one uses poetic language,—no longer swept along by the current of influence in such a way that the movement of the current may be perceived in their movements—are recognized in consciousness as factors foreign to the influence from without; therefore as factors which, while they compare with it, may be contrasted with it. Comparison, such as is expressed in poetic language, we have found to

be a result of intellect when under the control of the emotions. Contrast in addition to comparison is a result of intellect—*inter lego*—in those critical moods in which observation and judgment are able, partially at least, to hold the emotions in check.

Let us notice the bearings upon representation of this difference between the two moods. In the phase of consciousness represented in poetry, the man thinks of certain scenes in the external world because they are suggested, not by anything that he is actually, at the time, perceiving there, but by his own recollections of them as they exist in thought. To one likening his actions in a battle to that of Wellington at Waterloo and of Grant at Vicksburg, these men are not really present, only ideally so. As objects of thought they are not outside of his mind, they are in it. In the mood represented in painting, however, the man thinks of external scenes because they are actually before him. He is more clearly conscious therefore of two different sources of thought—one within, the other without. The objective world is really present. If he wish to represent this fact, therefore, he cannot use merely words. Words can contain only what is in the mind, or ideally present. In order to represent in any true sense what is really present he must use what is really before him, *i. e.*, an indisputably external medium, as in painting, sculpture, and architecture.

A few words ought to be inserted just here, because so distinctly suggested, with reference to the applicability of what has just been said, to poetry. The subject was first discussed, though differently grounded, by Lessing in his "Laocoön"; and will be found treated in Chapters XXII. and XXIII. of "Poetry as a Representative Art." Here it will suffice to point out that, according to the dis-

tinctions just made, any descriptive details are out of place in poetry other than those of such prominence that a man observing them may reasonably be supposed to be able to retain them in memory ;—other than those, to state it differently, which are illustrative in their nature, and truly representative, therefore, of ideas within the mind as excited to conscious activity by influences from without. There is, of course, a certain interest, though sometimes not above that which is merely botanic and topographic, awakened by minute descriptions of flowers and fields such as a painter on the spot would be able to give while scrutinizing them in order to depict them. But this interest may be just as different from that which, in the circumstances, is æsthetic, as it would be were it merely didactic or dogmatic ; and a poet with sensibilities keen enough to feel the differences between essentially different motives will be loath to yield to the promptings of that which is essentially not poetic. He will refrain from indulging in the kind of writing just indicated, not because it is too difficult for him to master ; not because though living at the present time he is unaware that the prevailing taste approves of it, or that, if he fail to follow its whims, he will be accused of having too little love of nature or sympathy with it ; but because he wishes to be true to his art, as he recognizes that all the greatest masters have been ; and because he knows that, when the present fashion passes away, as it surely will, only that poetry will live which is poetic in the most distinctive sense.

But to return to the subject more immediately under consideration, we have noticed that in the moods represented in music and poetry, the mind is prompted to conceive of the influence as if it were the same thing as its own ideas :

that, in fact, the influence from without is recognized in consciousness mainly because the thoughts move with it. This movement, therefore, is appropriately represented in musical tones and poetic words that follow one another in time. In the moods represented in painting, sculpture, and architecture, however, the mind is prompted to conceive of the influence as separate and different from the ideas; frequently, indeed, as offering a contrast to them. The influence from without is recognized in consciousness mainly because, as contrasted with the influence, the thoughts are relatively, though not absolutely, stationary. Consider now how these facts must be represented. If one wish to give expression to a consciousness of an external source of influence which is separate and different from the ideas within his mind, he can do this effectively only through using an external medium which alone is clearly separate and different from them. Again, a contrast is always revealed most clearly when objects are viewed not one at a time, but two or more at a time. If one wish, therefore, to represent a consciousness of contrast, especially in connection with that of a continuation of a difference between the external world and his own ideas of it, he can best do this, too, through using a medium that presents objects not in succession, like the words of a poem, but side by side in space like the forms on the canvas of a picture. And if he wish, again, to represent the fact that his own ideas, though affected by the influence, are not swept away or onward by it; but that whatever effects are produced are confined to suggestions prompted by the objects in nature that continue to stand immediately before him, he can best represent this fact too through using a medium that will stay thought like a scene rather than hurry it on like a story.

The art representing the earliest phase assumed by the consciousness of an external world as contrasted with one's own ideas, is evidently the partly useful and seldom wholly ideal or æsthetic art of landscape gardening. In this, fidelity to the exact appearances of external nature, *i. e.*, to the influence from without, is a controlling principle to a degree that cannot be asserted of painting, sculpture, or architecture. In a logical order of sequence, moreover, this art stands next to poetry and oratory. These are developed from a man's power over himself, over his own voice and limbs. The next mode of exerting power, logically considered, is to touch something outside of self, and in doing this to begin by handling nature in a crude form, as it is used in landscape gardening. Only later can one come to the canvas, pigments, marbles, and woods used in the plastic arts. It is hardly necessary to point out that, with all the fidelity to nature that must be manifest in successful gardening, every feature revealing that it is an art, is derived from a contrast, in spite of very much also that manifests comparison, between a field as presented in nature and a park as planned, arranged, and cultivated. It is in this contrast between nature as it is and as it is made to be, that the ideas of the artist assert their presence.

An analogous fact becomes more apparent as we pass on to painting. "If we suppose a view of nature," says Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his thirteenth "Discourse on Painting," "represented with all the truth of the camera obscura, and the same scene represented by a great artist, how little and mean will the one appear in comparison with the other?" And again: "A higher and a lower style . . . take their rank and degree in proportion as the artist departs more or less from common nature,

and makes it an object of his attention to strike the imagination of the spectator by ways belonging especially to art." Evidently, according to the view of this writer, the difference in painting between high and ordinary art, is the difference between what is idealized and what is merely imitated. But this difference is revealed in the contrast between the picture and nature. In passing through the mediumship of the man, that which came from nature has been changed. Each change has been wrought by an idea, and all the changes together indicate a contrast between what nature really is and the artist's idea of what it might be. This principle of contrast as an offset to that which in the main compares with nature, underlies, in fact, all the idealistic effects of painting. For instance, there are many unattractive scenes and subjects in nature, and these often lie side by side with attractive ones. "The Greek artist," says Lessing in his "Laocoön," "represented nothing that was not beautiful. . . . The perfection of the subject must charm in his work." When the modern artist, like the Greek, selects for representation a certain part of nature, he does so because he has contrasted it, and wishes others to contrast it, with the whole of nature. When, again, in certain parts of his picture, he wishes to bring some objects into the foreground and to keep others in the background, his attempt is successful in the degree in which light and shade and color are arranged, according to scientific principles controlling contrasts, so that the objects, as they appear side by side, shall be not only separated with the distinctness found in nature, but shall also produce other distinctively complementary effects such as art seems to require. Moreover, it is worth noticing too, as according with this principle, that the excellence of

subjects as manifestations of ideality is measured by the degree in which they admit of originality in the arrangement of contrasts. Hence a fruit-piece, in which the forms and colors admit of little variation, ranks below a landscape; a landscape, for the same reason, below one representing human figures; which latter, in the details both of line and color in posture, countenance, and dress, admits of variations almost infinite.

The psychological difference between painting and sculpture, considered as modes of representation, is one of degree rather than of kind. Almost everything, therefore, that has been said of the former art, is true of the latter. This difference in degree, however, needs to be emphasized. A statue is chiselled out of a medium furnishing more to resist than do the canvas and pigments used in paintings; and when completed, it resembles nature—at least this is true of the modern statue—only in form, and not nearly so exactly as if, like paintings or the ancient Greek statues, it could have the addition of color. Both facts show that in sculpture, to go back to the illustration drawn from the ice and the water, the ideas within the mind are offering more resistance to the influence flowing from without. In other words, this art represents less imitation of nature than the former art and more exercise of individuality and, in this sense, of ideality on the part of the artist. This is one reason why paintings may rank high, as is exemplified in fruit-pieces and landscapes, in which the imitative element overbalances the ideal; whereas in sculpture this is seldom the case.

There is another thing to be noticed here. The emphasis given to ideality in sculpture indicates that the ideas are not only resisting the influences of nature so far as to

afford a contrast to them, but are also getting the better of nature. The ice is beginning to stand disposed in heaps above the water. Sculpture represents, therefore, the indirect as well as the direct effects of nature. To illustrate what is meant by saying this, a picture and a statue may both imitate the same model. When we look at the former, we instinctively think of the model. When we look at the latter, we often think only of the effects that human nature in general has had upon form in the abstract. While painting may represent only a person, sculpture is more likely to represent a personage. "Its object," says Reynolds, referring to sculpture in his tenth "Discourse," "may be compressed into two words, form and character." This is the same as to say that a statue represents some general inference that the artist has drawn from nature, *i. e.*, some inference to which his ideas, like the ice in the illustration, have been disposed by outside influences. Just here, therefore, we are getting away from the representation of pure intellect, whether impelled by emotion, as in poetry, or impeding it, as in painting. We are where one must represent rather the disposition of the ideas by the artist's own *will* in connection with that condition in which the mind, while still subject to the influence that stirs the emotions, is least subject to it.

The works of the landscape gardener resemble nature in almost every feature; those of the painter, in color and outline; those of the sculptor, in outline only. One step beyond this evidently must carry us to architecture. Here the products resemble nature, not even in outline, except as it may be broken up and arranged anew. The painter and the sculptor observe nature for the purpose of copying its forms; the architect, for the purpose of com-

pounding a new and different form, for which, as a whole, nature furnishes no copy. In his work the contrast between the product and nature is often so complete that the one no longer, as in the case of painting, necessarily suggests the other. Although the shapes of the foundations, pillars, capitals, arches, roofs, chimneys, or towers of a building may suggest reminiscences of nature, they are constructed almost invariably as if the architect had forgotten what was the particular appearance of anything that had inspired his forms. He is influenced somewhat by nature, but much more by his own mind, which works with the least possible artistic regard for nature's dispositions of the forms that he uses. If these forms are beautiful, it is less because they are the same in detail as those found in nature, than because they are the same in principle, because they are controlled by the same general laws that underlie all appearances and combinations of them that are naturally pleasing.

In this regard, in its lack of the imitative element, and therefore in having forms that recall nature more by way of association than of comparison, architecture resembles music. Madame de Staël termed it "frozen music"; and with our present view of the subject, we may perceive the appropriateness of her metaphor. In music, the influence coming from without moves so rapidly and freely that, as contrasted with it, the mind is hardly conscious of its own ideas. In architecture, on the contrary, this influence seems so slight that of it the mind is hardly conscious. That which flows in the one art may be said to be congealed in the other, and the artistic representation of each state of consciousness evinces this. The medium of music moves; that of architecture stands. Because of the lack of balance in both arts between the

consciousness of the influence from without and that of the ideas within, the connection between influence and ideas is not, in either art, always apparent. Many, in fact, fancy that music represents no ideas, and architecture no influences derived from the forms of nature. But the truth is that, without both arts, the representations of the different phases of consciousness, developing, one after another, as has been shown, would be incomplete. The two arts are expressive respectively of the two extremes of this,—of those misty border lands of apprehension where external influence appears and where it disappears.

Between these two extremes, the motive from without and the ideas within are more evenly balanced. The effect in the intellect (*inter* and *lego*) as jointly influenced by both, leads, when the consciousness of the motive swaying ideas through emotion is the stronger, to comparison, tending, as in poetry and oratory, to identifying the two; and, when the consciousness of possessing ideas foreign to that which is swaying them is the stronger, to comparison also, but with more realization of a contrast between the two, as is the case in landscape gardening, painting, and sculpture.

Taken together, the arts that have been mentioned represent every possible effect produced in the mind as emotions, intellect, and will successively receive and modify the influence that the audible or visible forms of nature exert upon it. The expressional series is complete all the way from where, in music, we heed the roaring of the waves of influence as they dash upon apprehension, to where, in architecture, we perceive the spray that congeals in fairy shapes above the place where their force has been spent.

CHAPTER XX.

FURTHER CONDITIONS UNDERLYING THE REPRESENTATION OF THOUGHT IN EACH OF THE ARTS.

Further Conditions from which to Draw Inferences with Reference to the Particular Form of the Mode of Representation—Recapitulation—Association—Comparison and Contrast as Related to the Work of Imagination—Audible Expression as Representative of the Instinctive Tendency—Development of this in Music and Poetry—Visible Expression as Developed in Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture Representative of the Reflective Tendency—Methods in Art-Composition Confirming these Statements—Instinctive and Reflective Tendencies both Present together in all Art that is Emotive, or Manifests Soul—Something both of the Instinctive and Reflective must be Represented in each Art—Music as Subjective, Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture as Relative, and Architecture as Subjective—All the Highest Art is both Subjective and Relative, *i. e.*, Objective—Bearing of what has been Said upon Form in each Art—Sustained Sounds are Instinctively Subjective and Spontaneous; Unsustained Sounds are Instinctively Relative and Responsive—Both Forms of Sound as Developed respectively in Music and Poetry—No other Fundamental Difference between these Forms—Order and Relation of the Development of these Forms of Sound—Same Principles Applied to the Arts of Sight—Sustained Action is reflectively Subjective and Spontaneous; Unsustained Action is reflectively Relative and Responsive—Each Method of Action as Developed respectively in Architecture and in Painting and Sculpture—Analogies between Architecture and Music—Between Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture—Recapitulation and Summary—Conclusion.

A FEW more considerations in addition to those mentioned in Chapter XIX. may enable us to draw inferences, not only, as has been done already, with reference to the general character of the thought represented in each art, but also with reference to the particular form of its mode of representation.

We have found that the inarticulate sounds used in

music express ideas indistinctly mainly by way of association; that the articulated sounds of poetry express ideas distinctly mainly by way of comparison; that the exact reproduction of natural forms in painting and sculpture express ideas distinctly—ideas, notice, as distinguished from that which they imitate—mainly by way of contrast, and that the vague reproductions of natural forms in architecture, just as in the case of music, express ideas indistinctly mainly by way of association.

It may be well, here, to repeat what, as it was said in Chapter XIX., need not again be explained, namely, that, in principle, association is closely allied to comparison; and also to elaborate a little what was said there with reference to the connection between comparison and contrast. The fact is that we do not know that contrast exists, except so far as we have thought, at least, of comparison. It is the effort of what we term the imagination—the effort to find in one phenomenon the image of another, or to find one like another—that leads the mind to compare, and then, if it cannot do this, to contrast the two. In such cases, therefore, the imagination is the underlying faculty of mind called into exercise, comparison the primary method in which it exercises itself, and contrast the secondary. As applied to art, the primary position of comparison is still further augmented by the fact that art-products always spring from efforts to connect motives and ideas, and to embody both in a single form. The result is that while the phases of consciousness represented in the arts of sound begin, as it were, with comparison, the forms that are produced in these arts, including, as they necessarily do, many things that are not alike, involve also a consciousness and a representation of contrast. The converse is also true, that while the phases of consciousness

represented in the arts of sight begin with contrast, the production of a form which shall be true to the appearances, or, as in architecture, to the formative principles of nature, necessarily involves, also, the consciousness and representation of comparison. Only in the exercise of comparison and contrast together is the work of imagination, which is the faculty underlying all the developments of art, complete.

It was intimated in the last chapter also, that the primitive method of representing in inarticulate sounds those early effects upon consciousness in which the ideas within the mind and the influences from without are not clearly distinguishable, is analogous to that instinctive, as distinguished from reflective, action which characterizes the lower animals. A child, when frightened, or any one before he has time for definite thought or reflection, utters an inarticulate cry; and this method of expression is clearly analogous to the inarticulate growling, barking, howling, chirping, singing, of beasts and birds. If these had clearly defined thoughts like those of men, would they not use articulated words? They do not use words, and accordingly we attribute their expressions to what we term instinct as distinguished from reason. Similar modes of expression on the part of men may be termed instinctive, rather than reflective.

According to this explanation, music, being a development of inarticulate and indefinitely representative sounds, is almost wholly instinctive. Poetry, however, deals with words having a definite significance; and so far as it does this, it represents not instinct, but a clear conception of what is experienced from the outside, and is therefore the result of reflection. But poetic effects are also due in part to the same causes as effects in music. This is true of

the intonations and inflections resulting from metre and versification which together produce what are called the tunes of verse. So far as these are concerned, poetry is also instinctive.

When we pass on to the methods of representing effects in the arrangements of visible forms, we find results of reflection as awakened by external scenes which, if possible, are still further removed from the instinctive actions of the animals than are words. What is there produced by an animal showing the same kind of thought and discrimination, and in this sense reflection with reference to them, which characterizes the reproduction of forms in painting and sculpture? There is a kind of visible imitation, indeed, which is almost exclusively instinctive. We find it in dramatic pantomime, and there is an analogue to this in the mimicry of the ape. We find visible imitation in external products, also, like implements, dresses, and dwellings, and there are analogues to this too in the dens and nests constructed by beasts and birds. But, in general, all must acknowledge that the purely æsthetic part of building, that which renders it a fine art, is due to an amount of reflection that is clearly above and beyond the mere end of utility reached by the instinctive processes of the lower animals.

In order to show the truth of what has been said, we may put it in another form. Instinctive processes on the part of men are those which are conducted according to unconscious methods, and are analogous, for this reason, to the results of the promptings of instinct in the lower animals. Applying this test to music and poetry, we can perceive in what sense they may be attributed to the instinctive tendency. The best melodies and verses sing themselves into existence. The musician or poet hardly

knows how or whence they come. In producing paintings, statues, and buildings, however, the mind is more successful when it works reflectively, by which is meant according to the conscious and calculating methods of reason. A statue and a building are produced slowly and with a clear conception of design.

At the same time it is important to remember that neither the instinctive nor the reflective tendency alone is sufficient to bring all that there is in a man to bear upon his product. As is shown in Chapter I., page 12, of "Poetry as a Representative Art," it is when the results of reflection are added to those of instinct, or of instinct to those of reflection; when, therefore, neither one of these elements alone is present, but both together,—it is then that we have in the product an illustration of what, in distinction from either *instinctive* or *reflective*, we may term an *emotive* influence. A man, for instance, may eat and sleep like an animal, instinctively, or he may think and talk reflectively, without giving any expression to what we mean by emotion. But as soon as he thinks and talks in connection with eating and sleeping, as is the case with a caterer or upholsterer, an hotel keeper or a house-wife; or as soon as his instincts prompt and accentuate his thinking and talking, as is the case with an actor or a good story-teller, then, as a result of instinct made thoughtful, or of thought made instinctive, he begins to manifest his emotive nature; and the character of his emotion is represented by the degree in which the one or the other of the two tendencies—instinct or thought—is in excess. It may be interesting to point out also that, according to ordinary conceptions, the power which blends or balances the instinctive or physical and the reflective or mental, is the soul, holding body and mind together, influencing and

influenced by both; and also that, according to ordinary conceptions, it is the same thing to put *emotion* into expressions and to put *soul* into them. Neither can be manifested in them unless they represent a blended result both of nerve and of thought, of instinct and of reflection.

In accordance with this, it is evident that music and poetry, which are naturally instinctive, come to manifest soul in the degree in which they embody also, kept of course in due subordination, something of the reflective; and that the naturally reflective products of the other arts acquire the same effect in the degree in which, in the same way, they embody something of the instinctive.

In preparation for what is to follow, it needs to be pointed out also that, while the influence from without is so strong in the musician and occasionally in the poet, as sometimes to seem to carry one out of himself, it is wholly experienced within. Being for this reason consciously attributable to an internal cause, it may be termed subjective. Almost always, however, in poetry, as in the case of a story that one has heard, and wishes to tell; and in painting and sculpture, as in the case of a landscape or human figure that one has seen and wishes to reproduce, the influence is clearly recognized as coming from something without the artist and distinct from him, yet, at the same time, as something with which ideas, attributable only to himself as their source, are busied. This is the same as to say that he is affected by something not exclusively subjective nor objective, but what we may term relative. He is thinking his own thoughts with reference to objects to which he is related. When we come to architecture, however, the consciousness of the influence exerted from without is lessened. In the absence in it of direct imitations of nature, and in the presence of

a desire to construct something exclusively of one's own devising, it resembles music, and, like it, may be termed subjective.

The most successful art, however, is that which produces the most effect, and nothing can be effective unless it is to some extent objective,—in other words, unless it is constructed in such a way as to influence those outside of oneself. In the degree in which an artist's motive is purely subjective, he will neglect what is necessary for producing an effect upon others. And the same is true in the degree in which his motive is purely relative. He will merely copy his surroundings without putting enough of himself into his work. It is when the subjective passes out to objectify itself in the relative, because the relative is recognized as something not merely existing, but exciting thought to activity, that we have the most favorable conditions for artistic success.

A very important bearing of what has occupied us thus far in this chapter has yet to be indicated. Music and poetry have been said to be, in whole or in part, expressions of the instinctive tendency,—music the subjective form of this, and poetry the relative. Now if we will consider for a moment the different circumstances in which each of these arts is developed, we shall find facts which confirm these statements. When a man, or any living creature, gives vocal expression to that which actuates him, there are two distinct forms which this may assume, both of which, however, all creatures cannot always produce. The sounds may be either sustained or unsustained. A dog, for instance, howls, and also barks; a cat purrs and also mews—the latter in both a sustained and an unsustained way; a bird warbles and also chirps; a man sings and also talks. If these forms be at all representative, the

sustained sounds must represent something sustained, and the others something not sustained. As a rule, an internal process is continued or sustained because it is not interrupted. As a rule, too, that which interrupts is external to the thoughts and feelings in which this process is going on. Interrupt the creature producing the sustained sounds,—go out at night and speak to your howling dog, take the milk from a purring cat, the nest from a warbling bird, or the plaything from a singing child, and at once you will hear sounds of the other form,—barking, mewling, chirping, and scolding in words. We may say, therefore, that the sustained form is mainly subjective, or spontaneous, and that the unsustained form is mainly relative or responsive. Birds and men instinctively sing to meet demands that come from within; they instinctively chirp and talk to meet those that come from without. The sounds of the first continue as long as their producer wishes to have them, those of the second are checked as soon as they have accomplished their outside purpose, and are continued only by way of reiteration or change, in order to suit the changing effects that they are perceived to have upon the creatures or persons toward whom they are directed. The first form need not convey any definite intelligence, because there is no intrinsic necessity that anybody should understand it; the second must convey definite intelligence, because this is its object.

These two conditions respectively correspond exactly, as will be observed, to those underlying effects in music and in poetry. Music is often said to represent the feelings. It really represents only certain classes of sustained and subjective feelings, joyous or sad, to which there is no outside or objective reason for giving definite or intelli-

gible expression. The moment feelings need to be definitely communicated, as in cases of outside emergency of an ordinary character, or of those exciting one to extraordinary petulance or rage, then the dog barks, the bird chirps, and the man, in order to make himself distinctly understood, uses his throat, tongue, and lips in the various ways that cause the distinct articulation which characterizes words.

Here then, in the lowest and most elementary forms of vocal representation, we find that which separates musical notes from talking tones. And the difference indicated is the only one that does separate them. All the other distinctions that can be made between sounds, characterize alike those of song and of speech. Sounds differ in time, force, pitch, and quality. According to the first, one sound may have more duration than another. Artistically developed, in connection with force, this difference leads to rhythm. But there is rhythm in poetry as well as in music. According to the second, one sound may be louder than another. But this kind of emphasis is as common in conversation as in chanting. According to the third, one sound may be higher in the musical scale than another. Artistically developed, this leads to tune. But the voice rises and falls in speaking as well as in singing. According to the fourth, one sound is more sweet and resonant than another. But the differences between pure, rotund, guttural, pectoral, and aspirated tones, are as decided as are those between the tones in different parts in singing and between the characters of the sounds produced by different musical instruments.

When we come to use the word sustained, however, we can say that in music a tone is sustained in time with a

degree of force at one pitch and with one kind of quality, in a sense that is not true as applied to speaking. We may use articulated words in a song, yet there is a radical difference between singing them and talking them. By noticing this difference we may get rid of the necessity of discussing the question whether the methods of singing were developed from those of speech or *vice versa*. At the same time there is much truth back of the theories of writers like Herbert Spencer in his "Essay on the Origin and Functions of Music," and the Abbé Du Bos in his "Réflexions Critiques sur la Poésie et la Peinture," who maintain that the forms of music are merely modifications of the forms of speech. Undoubtedly the greater definiteness and utility of the unsustained tones would lead to their development into speech earlier in the order of time than sustained tones would be developed into anything resembling an art of music. Not only so, but the intonations of speech, because used earlier in the order of time, would naturally exert, as these writers maintain, a very marked influence upon the tones used in singing. (See "Poetry as a Representative Art," Chapter II.)

Now let us pass on to consider the bearings of similar distinctions upon the forms of painting, sculpture, and architecture. These have been said to be, in whole or in part, expressive of the reflective tendency, architecture—to change for a little the order of our consideration of the arts, so as to make what is to be said conform to the order of thought followed in the last paragraph—being the subjective form of this tendency, and painting and sculpture the relative forms. These statements too we shall now find to be confirmed by acknowledged facts.

As of audible so of visible expression, there are two distinct types; and, as in the case of the former, these

two may be described, in a general way, as those which are sustained or spontaneous, and those which are unsustained or responsive. We see the former when a man is working persistently, unconscious, for the time being, of anything but a desire to carry out designs of his own. We see the latter when he is conscious of the presence of persons or objects surrounding him which cause him to accommodate his own desires and designs to them. His actions, in the spontaneous form, represent in an indefinite way that which is going on in his mind; in the responsive form, they represent the same in a definite way; but in both there is a true sense in which they represent it. A deaf man can learn something about others whom he watches working absent-mindedly by themselves; but he can learn more about them when he sees them talking or working in connection with a conscious and practical application of their actions to outside emergencies.

If, now, we look for external products embodying these two kinds of mental processes, as expressed through these two kinds of bodily movements,—in other words, if we eliminate the presence of the man from these movements, just as we do from sounds and words after they have passed into music and poetry, what do we have left? Certain products so constructed that they reveal the occasioning processes, in the one case, of thought or design springing from the man's own mind; and in the other, of those awakened in his mind in view of persons or objects surrounding him. The first class of products, in their ultimate development, lead to architecture; the second to sculpture and painting. A moment's thought will make this plain. Working in such a way that the product will reveal mainly the occasioning processes of thought or design, a man may have merely plowed a field or constructed

a box. But the way in which he has done this, to some extent, represents him. If, in addition to what is useful, he has produced what is ornamental, if he has laid out a flower garden or carved the lid of a box, then his product represents him still more,—shows something about his nature, tastes, feelings, and susceptibilities for sentiment.

In fact, at times the product definitely reveals just what his thoughts and feelings have been. In revealing these it does precisely what is required in fine art. But, as we have seen, it cannot enter this sphere of art unless it represent both man and nature. Implements and machines, and, in general, all the products of the technic arts, as was shown in Chapter II., represent man; and many inferior products of the ornamental arts represent nature. Landscape gardening undoubtedly does both; but its forms are so easy comparatively to produce, and their ability to express thought is so limited, as to render doubtful (see Chapter IX.) whether they should be classed with the higher arts. But all the conditions necessary for these seem to be present in architecture.

It may be interesting to notice here, again, the analogy between the latter and music. Both arts, as will be recalled, are developed from that subjective or spontaneous state in which a man's consciousness of the two sources of influence—the one from without and the other from within—is reduced to its minimum. From this, two facts follow; in both arts there is, to begin with, less conscious imitation of sounds or sights than in other arts, and in both, the forms, after being developed in part, continue to be developed, to a degree not true in the other arts, according to an inward law of their own. Given a few notes of music representing a mood of mind as indicated by a song of nature, and using them as a

theme, the musician will go on to compose a whole symphony to correspond with them. So, given a few outlines of windows, doors, or roofs, and the architect will go on to construct a whole building to correspond with these.

The arts of sight which reveal the processes of thought or design awakened in the mind in view of persons or objects surrounding one are, of course, painting and sculpture. These sometimes reproduce the forms of single men, expressing ideas in countenance and posture, sometimes of groups of men exerting certain effects upon one another, sometimes of men in connection with the forms of birds, or animals, or fishes, or inanimate nature, and sometimes of only one of the latter of these. But whatever is reproduced, it is as evident as an axiom that there is no possible way of a man's representing the fact that he is definitely conscious of the influence which certain outside objects have had upon his mind except by his referring to them. In poetry he would do so through means of sounds—articulating words. In the arts appealing to sight, he must portray them as in pictures or statues.

Before bringing this volume to a close, it may be well to make a brief summary of some of its conclusions, with special reference to those of the last five chapters. In doing so, in order to indicate the relations of our subject to the whole domain of thought it may be best—without entering upon explanations appropriate only in another place—to start, as do most of our philosophers, with certain acknowledged propositions like the following: That *time* and *space* are conditions enabling us to apprehend the general phenomena of *existence*; that of the latter we recognize *movement* in time and *matter* in space,

and that *movement* and *matter* when together enable us to apprehend *force*; that *force* applied to the *movement* enables us to apprehend *operation*, and, applied to the *matter*, to apprehend *arrangement*; that *operation* and *arrangement* together suggest *methods of operation*, and that *methods* in which *operation* is chiefly manifested suggest *life*, and in which *arrangement* is chiefly manifested suggest *organism*; that *life* and *organism* together suggest *import*, which *import*, if conveyed through *time*, *movement*, *operation*, and *life*, finds vent chiefly in *audible expression*, and if conveyed through *space*, *matter*, *arrangement*, and *organism*, finds vent chiefly in *visible expression*, and that *audible* and *visible expression* together complete the possibilities of what may be termed *significant expression*. These propositions may be summarized thus:

Time.	Movement.	Operation.	Life.	Audible Expression.
Space.	Matter.	Arrangement.	Organism.	Visible Expression.
Existence.	Force.	Method of Operation.	Import.	Significant Expression

The following need no further explanations than have already been given, mainly in Chapters II., IX., and XVI. to XX.

THE ARTS AS DEVELOPED IN FORM.

Audible expression.	{	Singing.	Elocution.	Music.	{	Oratory.
		Talking.				Poetry.
Visible expression.	{	Gesturing.	Pantomime, dancing, etc.	Painting.	{	Penmanship.
		Drawing.				Personal adornment, Decoration, furnishing, etc. Landscape gardening.
		Carving.	Sculpture.	Transport, ships, cars, etc.		
		Constructing	Architecture.	Civil Engineering.		
Significant expression.		Art.	Dramatic representation.	Higher Representative Arts.		Higher Arts applied.

THE ARTS AS DEVELOPED IN EXPRESSION.

FORM.	SOURCE.	PROCESS.	MOTIVE, METHOD, AND MANNER.	EFFECT.
Music.	{ Association passing into	{ Instinctive passing into	{ Subjective, Spontaneous, Sustained.	{ Suggestive more than Imitative.
Poetry.	{ Comparison.	{ Reflective.	{ Relative.	{ Imitative more than Suggestive.
Painting.	{ Comparison passing into	{ Reflective	{ Responsive.	
Sculpture.	{ Contrast.	{ passing into	{ Unsustained.	{ Suggestive more than Imitative.
Architecture.	{ Association passing into Comparison.	{ Instinctive.	{ Subjective. Spontaneous. Sustained.	
The Higher Arts.	Imagination.	Emotive.	Objective.	Representa- tive.

Our discussion has now reached a point from which we can advance further only by taking up the different arts, one after another, and showing how the principles that have been unfolded apply to the details of each. This work must be left for subsequent volumes.

APPENDIX I.

BEAUTY ACCORDING TO PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

THE following criticism on a paper read before the Princeton Philosophic Club was made by my colleague, Prof. J. Mark Baldwin, and afterwards, at my request, put into writing. Coming, as it does, from one who has made a special study of physiological psychology, and who has no interest in maintaining the particular theory of beauty advocated in this volume, the reader will recognize that it is a better confirmation of the essential agreement between this theory and the results of modern investigations than it would be possible for me to present in my own language.

“ Psychology seems to be tending to a view of art which emphasizes the subjective or emotional side of what we call æsthetic. Considering pleasure the most general element in æsthetic experience, we may bring the topic under the head of Hedonics, and ask what are the marks of objects, situations, ideas, which make them suitable for arousing in us the particular kind of hedonic experience called æsthetic, *i. e.*, what constitutes beauty ?

“ Experiments on sensation-states—especially on the apprehension of visual forms—result in showing that wherever there is union of elements readily and easily brought about, wherever integration is affected without strain to the organ stimulated, at the same time that the elements preserve their individuality in a measure, we experience pleasure. In perception, a similar principle is found, known as *assimilation*—to which current psychological analysis is reducing the old laws of association. When a new experience is assimilated readily to old categories—fits into the ready moulds of experience, thought, or conception, then we invariably experience pleasure—not the pleasure of pure identity, but of progressive identity—of a *process* in consciousness. In the higher spheres we find the same fundamental movement. Conception is a process by which detached elements are arranged, brought to unity, sorted out, assimilated ; an argument is such a scheme of notions, which go together without strain or conflict ; and a beautiful character is one whose acts of will are consistent with one another and get assimilated readily in an ideal of duty.

“ Now I think the essential thing in it all—in sensational ease, in assimilation, in logical consistency—is this : does the attention with both its

intellectual and its nervous processes move easily?—that is, is the psycho-physical process impeded or advanced? If the latter, then pleasure; and æsthetic pleasure—just in proportion as the processes to which the attention ministers all tend together to give the best sense or emotion of accommodation.

“The older criteria of beauty can be accounted for on this view: unity in variety, adaptation, association, meaning or expressiveness. And it tends to put an end to the lasting controversy between ‘form’ and ‘meaning.’ For Wundt’s facts showing that visual beauty of form is due to ease of eye-movements, and Zeising’s ‘golden section,’ and Bain’s ‘associations of utility,’ and the ‘teleological judgments’ of the intellectualists, and the ‘moral worths’ of the ethical idealists, as well as the ‘real beauty in objects’ of the realists—all these get their due, as far as their psychology is concerned, in some such formula as this: the sense of beauty is an emotional state arising from progressive psycho-physical accommodation to mental objects. Of course the metaphysics of beauty and art is not touched by this; and it does not prejudice full metaphysical treatment.”—(Wundt, “*Physiologische Psychologie*,” 4th ed.; Ward, art. “Psychology,” in “*Encyc. Brittan.*,” 9th ed.; Lotze, “*Outlines of Æsthetics*”; Marshall, arts. on “*The Field of Æsthetics Psychologically Considered*” in “*Mind*,” 1892; Baldwin, “*Handbook of Psychology*,” vol. ii., chaps. on “*Pleasure and Pain*” and “*Emotions of Relation*,” also arts. on “*Psychology*” and “*Sentiment*,” in preparation for “*Johnson’s Universal Cyclopædia*,” new edition, 1893.)

With reference to this subject, it will be noticed that, while there is a general accord, and no conflict whatever, between the opinions thus briefly epitomized and the view of beauty presented in this volume, nevertheless the two are not identical; although there is a sense in which the latter may be supposed to be merely supplementary of the former, and not outside the range of that for which provision is made as by Professor Baldwin in the last sentences of each of his last two paragraphs. The differences of view, so far as they exist, can be brought out best, perhaps, by means of an illustration.

If we drop a perfectly round stone into a perfectly quiet pool, all the commotion that is caused, from the large waves immediately encircling the point of contact off to the minutest waves upon the most distant circumference, will be moved as by one effect or kind of effect; in other words, they will sustain a certain proportion to one another and, relatively considered, each to its nearest neighbor, the same proportion; or if we strike a perfectly constructed bell, the same will be true of the sound-waves encircling it. This condition represents a kind of assimilation that can be rightly compared to that which takes place in connection with effects conveying the

impression of beauty. But if the stone or the bell be very irregularly shaped, the ensuing waves, in either case, will appear to be moved by more than one effect or kind of effect ; and, as a result, their influence upon the eye or ear will be inharmonious. The same result will follow still more decidedly if, near the first stone, a second, causing opposing effects upon the eye, be dropped into the pool ; or if, at the same time with the first bell, a second causing opposing effects upon the ear be struck. This condition, in a way to be indicated presently, represents the possibility of a kind of assimilation which can take place without likeness to that which distinguishes beauty.

In nature, opposing effects, like differently produced waves on a pool, can often be seen to assimilate ; and we have a certain interest in watching the result. So with the sense of accommodation, the one to the other, and, by consequence, of progressive identity of the different stages of logical processes. But notice that in these it is necessary only that two or more very nearly connected conceptions should assimilate, whereas in beauty—as will be recognized upon recalling the conditions underlying rhythm, versification, musical harmony, proportion, collected outlines of columns, arches, windows, roofs, even the tones of a single scale or the colors of a single painting,—it is necessary that whole series and accumulations of effects should assimilate ; that, so far as possible, everything presented should seem to be the result of putting like effects (not necessarily like forms—see page 153) with like. This requirement of beauty appears to be met by saying that, in it, the amount of assimilation is increased,—that it results in the degree in which the processes to which attention ministers all tend together to give this sense of accommodation. But even this statement seems insufficient. In the degree in which pleasure of any kind whatever predominates, the consciousness of opposing effects must be subordinated to that of assimilation. Distinctively æsthetic pleasures differ from those afforded by logical connection, or by mere sensational ease or assimilation not only in the relative amount of likeness in them, but also in the relative comprehensiveness of this. There may be physical pleasure in which there is little or no complexity, and therefore no assimilation between effects from sources essentially different, such, for instance, as those that appeal to the senses and those that appeal to the mind ; and the same is true of mental pleasure ; and in both forms of pleasure, because of greater narrowness of excitation, there may be more intensity—more, that is, which induces to thrill and rapture, tears and laughter—than in æsthetic pleasure. A person is more apt to become hilarious when being tickled or when hearing good news from the stock market, than when reading Shakespeare. But the peculiarity of æsthetic pleasures is that while they lose in intensity they gain, as a rule,

in breadth. The latter effect follows not only from the relative amount of likeness in them ; but still more from the range and different qualities of the sources of this. In their most complete phases, as has been shown, æsthetic pleasures blend the results of that which is most important in both physical and mental stimulus, widening one's outlook and sympathies especially in the direction—for this is distinctive in them—of enabling imagination to perceive subtle correspondences between things material and spiritual which otherwise might not reveal their essential unity. The fact is, as pointed out on page 160, that the effects of beauty are satisfactory in the degree in which they are felt to accord with every possible influence exerted at the time when they are experienced. It is not too much to say that so far as they result from vibrations, or in connection with vibrations, some of these are beyond the circumference of conscious experience ; but all of them, nevertheless, like the minutest and most distant waves upon a pool, moved as in our first illustration, seem at the time to be proportional parts of a universal rhythm. Often, in fact, they seem to be, and possibly, to an extent, they always are, parts of that larger rhythm which, coming down through life and death, winter and summer, waking and sleeping, inhalation and exhalation, pulse-throb and stillness, extend back through the alternating effects of metre and proportion, tone and hue, to others of a nature almost infinitely subtle, but which are just as necessary to the life of the spirit as the beat of the heart to that of the body. To this conception of beauty the idea of sensational ease or assimilation is necessary as an accompanying effect ; but it is a question whether, considered even as a point of departure for development, it is inclusive of all that is in the germ, or of that part of it which most clearly reveals the originating cause. One could not be conscious of the thrills of pleasure connected with doing a deed of disinterested kindness, were it not for unimpeded processes in the circulatory systems of his physical organism. But these do not account for all the effects entering into such an experience or possible to it, even if, as at times in the presence of beauty, it awaken a sense of nothing not distinctly physical. A cause to be satisfying must be capable of accounting for all the facts. Can this be affirmed of the processes that have been mentioned ? Are they not rather effects accompanying others which, in connection with these, are attributable to something deeper in essence and more comprehensive in applicability ?

APPENDIX II.

THE ÆSTHETICS OF PLATO.¹

PLATO'S æsthetic theories are most fully brought out in "The Republic." In the opening chapters of Book III of this work, it is said that the guardian—by whom is meant the one who guards the interests of the republic, or the one whom, had we limited suffrage, as in Plato's time, we should term the ruling citizen,—must be courageous and not have the fear of death in him; therefore he must not believe that the world below is real and terrible; he must not become accustomed to the appalling names which describe this world and its inhabitants,—names like Styx, ghost, and sapless shades; nor must he read about the weepings and wailings of famous men like Achilles and Priam, especially in their sorrows for departed friends, as if these were suffering; lamentations of this kind should be attributed to women, or to men of only a baser sort, so that those who read of them shall scorn to imitate them. In addition to this, it is said that the guardian should not be given to laughter, for this always produces a violent reaction; therefore neither worthy men nor the gods should be represented as hilarious.

Again we are told that the guardian should value truth, except if he be a ruler or a physician, with whom dissimulation is sometimes necessary; he should also be temperate, and, therefore, should not become accustomed to the representations of the gods or men as deceiving, or indulging in drunkenness or lust; representations should be confined to those of truthful and noble deeds; finally, the guardian should not be a miser or a receiver of bribes, as when Hesiod speaks of

Gifts persuading gods, or persuading reverend kings.

But, adds Plato, these conditions, the representation of which is fitted to do harm, are exactly those which artists and especially poets seem always depicting. From this statement he passes on to discuss the general principle

¹Being a paper read in 1902 at Washington, D. C., before the Society for Philosophic Inquiry.

involved. All poetry, he says (III; 6), is a narration of events either past, present, or to come; and narration is either a simple narrative or an imitation, or a union of the two, which statement he explains by saying that the poet may either, in his own person, say that others did or said so and so, using his own language in describing the general effect of their language; or he may represent the others as speaking; and, in doing this, he may imitate their language; or he may adopt both methods. The dithyram—*i. e.*, the hymn descriptive of the gods—affords, he says, the best example of the pure narrative, the drama of pure imitation, and the epic of the two in combination. In what follows, it is the drama and the epic to which Plato seems most to object. He says that no man can do many things well—or not as well as he can do a single thing; so he cannot play a serious part, and also an imitated part; or be an imitator, as must be the poet. Therefore the guardian, who should be courageous, temperate, righteous, free, and the like, should not depict, nor be skilful in imitating, any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from imitation he come to be what he imitates; therefore we should not allow those for whom we profess a care to imitate a woman quarrelling with her husband, or striving or vaunting against the gods, or sorrowing or weeping, or in sickness or love; nor allow them to imitate slaves or bad men, who scold, mock, or revile one another in drink, or sin against their neighbors in word or deed, because persons who do these things are either mad or bad; nor should men imitate smiths or other artificers or oarsmen, nor the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers, or the roar of the ocean or of thunder: they may imitate, indeed, the sayings or actions of a good and just man, but not of a character unworthy of themselves. Plato's general conclusion is that the state is to employ for the soul's health, not the pantomimic versatile artist who depicts all life, but "the rougher and severer poet or story-teller who will imitate the style of the virtuous only."

From a discussion of poetry, Plato passes on, in III; 10, to that of music; and here his conclusions are much the same. It must not give expression to lamentation, sorrow, intemperance, or softness, he says, but to that which is bold and warlike; therefore he objects to the milder notes of the flute, preferring the harp, the lyre, and the pipe. He also objects to instruments producing complex harmonies interfering with the expression of sentiment or ideas,—a subject which will be mentioned again in a moment. Of the plastic arts, he says that artists in sculpture building and the other creative arts are to be prohibited from exhibiting forms of vice, intemperance and indecency. He who cannot conform to this rule, he declares, must be prevented from practising his art in our state, lest the taste of the guardian be corrupted by him. Everything must be done, he affirms, in

order that "our youth dwelling, as it were, in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, may receive the good in everything; while beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and imperceptibly draw the soul from earliest years to likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason" (III; 12).

In order to secure this general result, he especially commends a cultivation of music in connection with gymnastics. The former, he says, cultivates softness, and the latter strength. But in III; 10, 11, 13, 17, and 18, he commends simplicity in both. He speaks against music composed in what some translate as the "pan-harmonic" style, composed, *i. e.*, in "all sorts of harmonies and rhythms." "Complexity," he says in III; 13, "engenders license and hence disease, whereas simplicity in music is the parent of temperance in the soul, and simplicity in gymnastics of health in the body." The contrasting, in this passage, of complexity with simplicity, as applied to both music and gymnastics, is interesting. It throws light both upon the degree of the development of music among the Greeks, and also upon their exalting of that principle of *moderation* which influenced all their judgments, whether in ethics or in æsthetics. With reference to the Greek music, certain passages in Aristotle, especially Problem XIX; 18, in which he asks "Why is only the consonance of the octave sung?" and Problem XIX; 39, in which he says "This singing occurs when young boys and men sing together, and their tones differ as the highest from the lowest of the scale," have been taken, as by Helmholtz, in his "Sensations of Tone" (Part III, chap. 13), to indicate an exceedingly limited use of harmonic chords. But Aristotle is referring to only singing; and it is a fact, that, in many of our own churches, to-day, choirs still sing in the same way, *i. e.*, in what we term unison. If one of our writers were to mention this fact, it would not prove that we do not use harmony. Moreover, the construction of the Greek instruments accompanying the voice was such that they would often sound chords, if for no other reason, by accident. A chord, once heard, would be repeated. So long, too, as these chords among the Greeks were determined by the pitch of the note of the melody that they accompanied, they would be agreeable to all ears, even to our own, acquainted, as we are, with our modern system of harmony. But the moment that the Greeks sounded chords in succession without regard to the requirements of a distinct melody, these chords would produce disconnected and consecutively discordant effects, just as is the case to-day with chords produced in succession by one ignorant of the laws of harmonic sequence. Was it not against effects of this kind that Plato was protesting when, insisting, as in III; 11, that in music the melody must express the sentiment, and that rhythm and harmony must be subservient to this melody and sentiment,

and not *vice versa*. This protest against lawless, and what we to-day should recognize to be discordant harmony, is just what one would expect from a critic of good taste in the times before the laws of harmonic sequence were formulated, and, so far as one could imagine, incapable of being formulated. Now let us add another consideration. It is well known (see "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music," page 190) that in the eleventh century the effects of what has developed into modern harmony were first begun in what is termed polyphonic music, *i. e.*, music caused by singing or playing together, at the same time, two or more separate melodies. After a little, this form of music was forbidden in the churches, because, as we are told, it led choirs not only to suggest, but to repeat the tunes of the streets. But might not another reason have been because the music itself was devoid of suggestions of any single sentiment, and, in connection with this, in accordance with what has just been said of Greek music in "all sorts of harmonies and rhythms," because it sounded more like discord than concord, and so more hilarious than holy, Though forbidden in churches, however, music in this form survived, and from it ultimately was developed the elaborate system of harmony making possible the compositions of our own times. Now when Plato speaks of "complex" music, "in all sorts of harmonies" not "subservient to the melody," may he not be referring to polyphonic music? Is it possible that a development of harmony was begun in ancient Greece in precisely the same way as in modern Europe? and that just as the priests opposed it in the latter, so the philosophers opposed it in the former? Moreover, when Aristotle, in the passage quoted, is speaking of singing in simple consonances, is he referring to any other than to conventional and legitimate effects appropriate to dignified performances? Would not he, as well as Plato, ignore, as not worthy of a philosophical critic's notice, the complex Bacchanalian effects of "pan-harmonic" singing in "all sorts of rhythms?" If we can answer this question in the affirmative, we can infer that the Greeks had much more harmony in their music than has ordinarily been supposed, though they considered of high rank such music alone as might be compared to our present Gregorian chants, or, at least, to our simple and single melodies with appropriate accompaniments. The same affirmative answer, moreover, will enable us to recognize how closely—not only in architecture, sculpture, and drama, but also in music, the Greeks associated the effects of simplicity, as obtained from unity, with enjoyment distinctly ethical in its character. They argued that simple, as distinguished from complex, effects of form can be understood, and therefore do not tend to a confusing of thought and feeling, and thus to excitation beyond the limits of rational *moderation*. By complexity in gymnastics, especially in view of what is said, in III; 13, of

diet in connection with gymnastics, it is probable that Plato refers to trick-gymnastics, and the customary training for them, as distinguished from exercises designed merely to increase physical health and strength.

In Book X. of "The Republic," Plato again discusses the subject of imitation, declaring it to be ruinous to the understanding. He refers to it now, too, as manifested not chiefly in poetry, but also in painting and sculpture. To illustrate what he means, he says (X.; 1 and 2) that there may be three sources of a bed, namely, God who is the source of the idea, the man who makes it, and the artist who imitates what the man has made. The latter, therefore, is thrice removed, as he puts it, "from the king," and so from the truth. A like condition, he declares, in every case characterizes the poet and the writer of tragedy. Moreover, while the maker of the bed, or the original human source of action, gives expression to the idea as it is in reality, the artistic imitator reproduces alone the appearance, not the reality; he is therefore a long distance away from the truth, and can do "all things," as some say, for the reason that he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image; so when we hear a person declaring that the dramatists and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, he may have come upon imitators, producing what could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because appearances only and not realities. A real artist, or, as he means, a real thinker, "would be interested in realities, not in imitations; and prefer, instead of being the author of encomiums, to be the theme of them." We cannot, says Plato (X.; 3), study medicine or military science or statescraft from Homer. Nothing in the way of legislation, or war, or invention, or any public service, can be attributed to him. "Is it conceivable," he asks, "that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either to go about as rhapsodists if they had really been able to make mankind virtuous?" and where were their disciples who followed them to obtain education from them? Therefore, declares Plato, "we must infer that all these poetical individuals are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach"; so with the painter (X.; 4). He will paint reins, and he will paint a bit, but "the worker in leather and brass will make them." Does the painter know even "the right from the wrong of the bit and reins?—Nay, hardly the worker in brass and leather,—only the horseman who knows how to use them." "The excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate," says Plato, "of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended it." "Of an instrument, the maker only will attain to a correct belief, and this he will gain from him who knows; the user will have knowledge; the imitator will have neither, and will

have no more true conception than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations"; so he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, and may be expected, therefore, to imitate only that which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude.

Now, as to the effect of imitation on him to whom it is addressed. A body, declares Plato (X.; 5), may be large when seen near, and be small when seen at a distance, straight when looked at out of water, and crooked when seen in water; and these conditions are represented in art; but in nature the apparently greater or less, straight or crooked, no longer have the mastery over us, but give way before calculation and measure. Now, the part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure, as in art, is not the same as that which has an opinion in accordance with measure. The better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure and calculation. Therefore painting and imitation, when doing their proper work, are far removed from truth, and are the companions, friends, and associates of a principle within us which is equally removed from reason; they have no true or healthy aim. Imitative art is an inferior, who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

Besides this, argues Plato, the things chosen for imitation are those usually which a wise and good man does not reveal. In times of trouble (X.; 6) he does not act like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck, and wasting time in setting up a howl. The imitative poet who aims at being popular in order to please the crowd, will prefer the passionate and fitful temper which is easily imitated, and is recognized by people in general to be very common.

In his own conception, the heaviest accusation which Plato brings against poetry (X.; 7), is the harm which it does when it represents "some pitiful hero who is drawing out his sorrows"; at such times, he says, the best of us delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most; but when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then we pride ourselves on the opposite quality; we would fain be patient and quiet. Can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of, if manifested in his own person? The same principle, Plato adds, applies to the ridiculous, or to lust or to anger, when we see and admire the representation of it.

Finally, Plato (X.; 8), apparently, in the end, distrustful of the conclusions to which his logic has seemed to have forced him, says of poetry, "that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of politeness, let me tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry, of which there are many proofs. I dare say, Glaucus, that you are as much

charmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer." "Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile" (he had previously proposed to banish her); "but upon this condition only;—that she make a defense of herself in lyrical or some other metre. If it can be proved that she is not only pleasant, but also useful to state and to human life, we shall surely be the gainers."

So much for Plato. As for the last words quoted, we may be certain that any influence, originated and patronized by the best people in all times and countries, is, as a fact, not only pleasant, but also useful to state and to human life. But if so, the reason for this must evidently be based upon a different conception of poetry and of all art and its aims than that which was held by Plato.

It is a singular fact in the history of art, that the theories termed, in this day, Platonic and Aristotelian, are respectively exactly the opposite of the theories concerning the subject which can be rightly attributed to Plato and to Aristotle themselves. The present so-called Platonists hold that art is not imitation but the expression of ideas. As we have just found, Plato opposed art because he thought it *was* imitation as manifested in even Homer and the foremost dramatists, painters, and sculptors. On the other hand, as will be shown in Appendix III., Aristotle argued that art, while involving imitation, included also a representation of that which "appears to be or ought to be."

Of course, however, there must be some reason why those are supposed to be Platonists who hold that art is the expression of ideas. This reason will be found in Plato's conception, not of art, but of beauty. In his own mind, he never considered the two as, in any sense, necessarily connected. He never would have termed the arts, as the French do, "the beautiful arts." To him beauty was one thing, and imitative art, which might or might not deal with beauty, was another thing. His conception of beauty, too, was, in the highest sense, idealistic. Here is what he says of it in III.; 11: "Ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the twin-sisters of goodness and virtue, and bear their likeness"; and in III.; 12: "When a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has the eye to see it." This is all very well, so far as it goes; but it reminds one of the general criticism that, in the "De Anima," III.; 8, Aristotle makes upon Plato's conception of the ideas, namely, that the ideas have to be perceived in a formal setting. We can apprehend what Plato means by a beautiful soul. But what does he mean by a beautiful form? Whence could one get a conception of this but from nature? and if he got it from nature, how could he

use it, except by way of imitation? Professor Agassiz thought it could be proved that no form has ever been originated by a man, the parts of which, at least, were not reproductions of things already existing in the visible or audible world. (See page 4 of this volume.) This fact Plato overlooked. But Aristotle did not, as shown, among other places, in the reference just given from the "De Anima," III.; 8. In order to surmise, if we can, why Plato overlooked the fact, let us try to go back, for a moment, if possible, to his view-point. This seems to have been, primarily, religious. Plato believed in spirit as a motive-influence in the individual man and in the material universe. But the Greek's conception of spirit was, primarily, polytheistic. To him a spirit, in a man or a god, was something with a body; a spirit in nature was something embodied in a particular natural object. This belief was necessarily associated with the form of religion which, at that time, was exerting the most influence over the best men of Plato's country. It was a religion that looked to the guidance of the spirits of those who had departed from this world, some of whom had been exalted in popular imagination to the position of demi-gods and gods. The memory and influence of these spirits were perpetuated through many ceremonials and mysteries like the Eleusinian, and through oracles like those of Delphi, as well as through the ministrations of a large number of less responsible sooth-sayers and wonder-workers. It is the general result of this form of religion, and its supposed revelations, that seems to be at the basis of Platonism, just as clearly as the general result of the Christian religion is at the basis of almost all the ethics and philosophy of our country and period. This being so—and some of the finest passages in Plato seem to prove it—what phase of thought existing in his time would seem the most opposed to his own? Would it not be that kind of interest in nature which to him would seem to lead to an unwarranted regard for the merely material factors of the universe? In many passages, Plato attributes influences not to that which is material, but to something spiritual at work behind it. There is reason to suppose, too, that with him this was a very deeply settled method of thought. For instance, it seems clear that, if he had considered the clairvoyant glimpses into the spiritual realm to which he often refers as mere fabrications of imagination, he would not have used them, as he frequently does, at the ends of his discourses, apparently to cap the climax of his arguments. At the end of "The Republic," for instance, he quotes an account of Erus, who, when laid on the funeral pile, revived, and, being revived, told what he had seen in the other state. This account Plato details with fully as much reverence and expectation of being believed as a writer of our own time would quote a passage from the Bible. In fact, it would probably not have been possible

for any thoughtful inquirer like Plato, surrounded by the apparent miracles and mysteries of the Greeks of his time, to have failed to have had individual psychical experiences justifying to his own mind a belief such as was then prevalent. Dr. J. L. Nevius, with whom I was personally acquainted, a man of intellectual grasp and plenty of Christian bias, for thirty years or more a Presbyterian missionary in China, with only limited means of becoming acquainted with Chinese beliefs and the reasons for them, expresses, in his work on "Demonology," the opinion that there are real psychologic facts behind what we term the Chinese superstitions, and he ascribes the existence of these facts to the influence of demons. So did Socrates, according to Plato, although both applied to the word *demon* a different signification from that intended by Dr. Nevius. We also, in view of the characters of some of the Greek gods—for instance, Venus or Bacchus,—might be inclined to agree with Dr. Nevius. But this is a question merely of explanation. The facts are what concern us now; and the facts are these: that, in Plato's time, there were manifestations—words and deeds—which intelligent men, rightly or wrongly, considered to be sufficient to justify the spiritualistic theory. According to this theory, spirits exist inside of human and of other material forms. Besides this, while not living on the earth, through using, after death, the forms of those who are living, some with spirit-bodies can talk through human voices and work through human frames. They can talk, too, without using human voices, and move material objects without using human frames; but only because, though not having bodies usually visible to man, they can materialize these. This was a theory commonly accepted by the religious people of ancient Greece, and probably apparently exemplified in the earlier mysteries, until the time when the observances of these came to be a ritualistic commemoration of what was once—as seems to be evinced by the dark rooms, especially in the Egyptian temples—a purely psychical exhibition.

Now, given this theory, we can understand Plato's view of beauty. A beautiful soul, the essential life of which is purely spiritual, has but to materialize itself, either through birth or apparition, and it necessarily takes on a beautiful form. A beautiful idea has but to exert its appropriate influence upon that which gives it visible or audible embodiment or expression, and according to a law of its own inward nature, it necessarily takes on a beautiful aspect. All the outward results of beauty depend upon the inward cause. They are attributable to some spirit, as a Creative Source, manifesting its influence in laws of formation. It is because of this influence impelling to outward expression that a tree, a crystal, or the wintry frost on a window-pane, assumes a beautiful shape. This is a fascinating theory, and, from Plato's time to the present, many have

thought that it could solve not some, as is true, but all the requirements of art. In thinking this, however, they have overlooked certain other essential considerations. Even if the theory could solve the problem of spiritual creation or influence, it would not follow that it could solve the problem of art, because art is not wholly spiritual or creative. (See page 3 of this volume.) Art is a form produced by a man, and a man is not yet a spirit. He may have spiritual instincts tending, in a vague way, toward a recognition and production of the beautiful; but, as a man, with a human mind working in a consciously rational way, he knows nothing about form except as he may perceive it in the external world, of the appearances of which alone he is conscious. Nor can he produce form, except so far as he recombines those factors of it which have already been created for him in this external world. One hears a man talk to himself, and he imitates the general form of the talk in a lyric. He hears men talk together, and he imitates the general effect in a drama. He hears them hum, and he imitates the general effect in a melody. He looks at scenery and a human figure, and he imitates the general effect in a painting or a statue. He notices the methods in nature of protection, support, and shelter, and he imitates the general effect in a building. So far as a man is an artist, *i. e.*, a being who works by intellection as well as by inspiration, it is always nature that furnishes his model. Especially is this true of that which, in art, is beautiful. There is no beauty without form. There is no form except in visible or audible nature. There is no beauty of form that is not suggested in connection with an observation of nature. This applies not only to the general outlines of art-form, but to the details of its elaboration—to rhythm, proportion, tone, color, and the harmony of tone and color. All these, in their perfected phases, are developments of certain great laws of appearance which have to do with the pleasurable or disagreeable effects produced upon the nervous organization of the eye or ear, or, through suggestion, of the mind itself. There are many physical and psychical elements which, in certain circumstances, enter into the requirements of beauty; but of all these a man knows with certainty only so far as he may study their effects in material nature.

What then?—Is beauty merely an attribute of matter?—a superficial quality? Is Plato wholly wrong? Has the idea, the spiritual force which he supposes to be the cause of the expression, no influence? Just the contrary may be true. But so far as the idea appeals to the mind, it can become an object of conscious thought only when embodied in material nature. Plato's mistake lay partly in overlooking this fact, but mainly in having too narrow a conception of the way in which, if it be a fact, the idea can be embodied. Like the Greeks whom Paul addressed at Mars Hill,

Plato, to adopt the translation of modern scholars, was, in his own way, "too religious." Consciously or unconsciously, his conception of spiritual influence as exerted mainly in and through a spirit-body, seems to have narrowed his conception of spiritual influence exerted outside of such a body. His opposition to anything resembling materialism seems to have carried him so far—at any rate, when discussing art—as to prevent him from recognizing, as is commonly done in our own age, the revelation which the One Creative Spirit can make of methods and purposes, through the arrangements and movements of material nature, which, in themselves, have, apparently, no bodily relations to such a Spirit.¹ If Plato had recognized this revelation, he would have had no difficulty in perceiving in what sense the mere imitation of external appearances may be justified on the ground that it involves a profound study of divine thought. He would have perceived, too, that if these appearances can be used by the Creator to illustrate truths originated in the Creative mind, the same can be used by a man to illustrate other truths that are suggested to his human mind. Besides this, Plato would have perceived that, in the degree in which the ideas of the Creative Spirit, as illustrated in material nature, are to be communicated in unmodified form, the imitation of appearances in nature must be exact; and, in connection with this, a little thought would have enabled him to perceive that form of any kind, whether in nature or in art, influences the mind in a very different way from that which he supposes when he talks about the evil effects of comedy or tragedy, and suggests confining poetry to hymns in praise of the gods and to encomiums upon famous men (X.; 7). Anything taught through the forms of material nature, whether through pictures drawn from experience, observation, biography, or history, addresses the mind in such a way as to leave it free to form its own conclusions; and any one who has faith in the Creative Spirit has faith to believe that the arrangements of nature are such that a thoughtful mind will not fail to find illustrated in them exactly those principles and laws which are suited for one's highest mental and spiritual requirements. Art in re-

¹ Students of Plato may object to this statement, and refer to *The Timæus* as controverting it. But, notwithstanding much in that book which, apparently, sustains their view, here, in Plato's own words, are evidences of the subtle workings, which are all that I wish to indicate, of the conception that I have attributed to him. "The deity, indeed, desirous of making it"—*i. e.*, the universe—"in all respects resemble the most beautiful and entirely perfect of intelligible objects, formed it into *one visible animal*, containing within itself *all the other animals*, with which it is naturally allied."—*Timæus*, XI., tr. by Henry Davis.

producing the appearances and methods of nature continues and develops their mental and spiritual effects. In the lyric, the play, the novel, the picture, the statue,—and always in the degree in which the imitation of nature is exact,—art widens the experience of men with the same influence upon the mind that would be produced by actual experience, making them wiser, more sympathetic, more charitable; in short, more humane. If heroes weep and great men grow hilarious, we are not led, as Plato supposes, to imitate them, unless the sequel, when it has been worked out by the author or thought out by ourselves, leads us to think it wise to do both. Notice, too, that the accuracy of nature's appearances and processes must be, in all cases, the measure of the moral as well as the æsthetic value of the product. Upon certain minds, a Sunday-School story distorting the truth in order to point a moral may be just as injurious as a sensational play that distorts the truth in order to avoid pointing a moral. It will be perceived that this is a view of the influence of art of which Plato had no conception. As already indicated in this volume, art is the expression of human thought and feeling in the terms of nature. This expression is never merely communicative, nor merely imitative. It is always both. It is representative. Art embodies truth, not dogmatically but imaginatively, and its influence is exerted not by way of dictation, but of suggestion. Therefore, art does not, cannot, and should not take the place—as Plato seems to suppose that it may—of either philosophy, ethics, or theology. All these together cannot produce upon conception or emotion the broadening effects of æsthetics. It is well, therefore, to let the latter do its own work, as also to acknowledge the value of this work when it is done well.

APPENDIX III.

THE ÆSTHETICS OF ARISTOTLE.¹

ARISTOTLE was the first of writers whose works are still extant, to analyze art in the spirit of modern criticism, and, from his deductions, to build up a consistent, and, so far as it went, a scientific system of æsthetics. Many of his methods accord strictly with those of modern times, and some of his conclusions reach as far as any that have yet been advanced. To get a clear conception of what these conclusions were, it seems best to begin with a brief survey of the line of thought in his "Rhetoric." This course will show the general range of his conceptions of art, and how closely he connected—just as Plato did, but as most modern so-called Aristotelians do not—the effects of, at least, literary art with those of intellection and morality. The "Rhetoric" is very comprehensive, touching not alone upon the subject indicated in the title, but also upon logic and ethics. The first book opens with definitions of the different kinds of orations, but quickly passes to a consideration of the themes treated in these, and of the attitudes of mind of those to whom they are to be addressed. This turn of the thought leads to discussions of good and evil, of the forms of government regulating these, of the honorable and the dishonorable, of injury and pleasure, of the just and the unjust, and of proof artificial and not artificial. In the second book, beliefs are discussed, and the influence upon them of anger, and how this can be appeased or removed. The same subject is continued by showing the influence upon beliefs of love, friends, enmity, hatred, fear, assurance, shame, grace, favor, pity, compassion, indignation, envy, and emulation. After this, it is shown how beliefs can be modified by youth, age, middle-life, noble station, riches, power; and, in conclusion, what are the effects upon methods of presentation of facts, examples, similitudes, fables, propositions, principles, arguments, amplifications, and extensions.

In reading these chapters one can scarcely fail to be impressed by the

¹ Being a part of a paper read in 1903, at Washington, D. C., before the Society for Philosophic Inquiry.

practical turn of Aristotle's mind. As an associate and teacher, it is possible that to many he was much more interesting than Plato, though, as is likely, less inspiring. Aristotle shows, in many places, that if he wished, he too, like the great idealist, could soar, but he always remains somewhat nearer the ground, near enough to suggest that he could walk to his goal if only he had time to do so. He is no absent-minded philosopher, but seems constantly to have his eyes open. Nor could any modern essayist, trained in the office of a newspaper, furnish more shrewd observations than he, when describing, for instance, the peculiarities and foibles of youth as contrasted with those of middle or old age; e. g., the optimistic rashness and generosity of the first of these, and the pessimistic conservatism and penuriousness of the last of them, as character has been gradually developed by the experience of life, especially of its disappointments. It is particularly interesting to notice what he says of the indifference to the opinions and wishes of others—of the snobbishness, as we term it in our day—that begins to manifest itself in individuals and classes when they acquire wealth and cease to be dependent upon others. His portrayal reveals a condition of society in Greece, proving that human nature then and there was precisely what it is now and here. We are accustomed to ascribe to Athens in its prime an aristocracy of intelligence. But if this had ever existed it had already begun, before the time of Aristotle, to give place, just as it seems to do everywhere, to class-distinctions founded upon the degrees in which men are able to exert the most influence in material and practical directions.

In the third book of the "Rhetoric," Aristotle treats of what is termed elocution or pronunciation. But of this, in the parts of the book that are extant, very little is said. The discussion centres mainly about such subjects as the choice of words, epithets and metaphors, the use of purity and decency of language, and attention to style, arrangement, narratives, questions, answers, jests, and to the climax of all as given in the peroration.

It is from the "Poetics," however, that we derive the clearest indications of Aristotle's æsthetic position. Turning to this essay we find that it opens with the statement, as translated, that all the arts are "entirely imitations"; and a distinction is drawn between imitation in poetry, music, and painting, the differences being attributed to the use in each of these arts of different means with different objects, and in a different manner. The author then, in Chapter 4, traces the causes and progress of poetry. He points out that imitation is natural to children. As they grow older, men of a more venerable character imitate beautiful actions, while the more ignoble imitate their opposite. The latter come to compose vituperative verses according to the same method in which the former come to compose hymns and

encomiums. These two different forms of expression, when developed, lead respectively, he says, to comedy and tragedy, both of which originated in extemporaneous efforts—comedy from those who sang the phallic verses, which, as he observes, with a very decided suggestion of disapproval, “even now remain in use in many cities,” and tragedy from those who led the dithyram or sacred hymn. Comedy, he says again, differs from tragedy in having a simple metre, in being a narration, and in being of a different length. Of tragedy, he remarks in Chapter 5, that “he who knows what is good or bad tragedy, knows the same in respect to epic poetry; for those things which the epic possesses are to be found in tragedy; but everything which tragedy contains is not in the epic.”

From Aristotle's definition of tragedy, in Chapter 6, we begin to get a conception of his understanding of “imitation” as applied to all art as well as to poetry. “Tragedy,” he says, “is an imitation of a worthy or illustrious and perfect action, possessing magnitude, in pleasing language, using separately the several species of imitation in its parts, by men acting and not through narration, and through pity and fear effecting a purification of such like passions.” What Aristotle means in claiming that the influence of tragedy is to effect a “purification” etc., has been much discussed; but in view of his opinions upon other like subjects, it ought not to be difficult to determine. He holds, for instance, that punishment is justified not because giving a man what he deserves, and thus satisfying, as some Christian theologians maintain, an individual, corporate, or divine sense of justice; but because giving him an experience fitted to reform his character. Notice, among other passages, a reference to the curative agency of punishment in the “Rhetoric,” I; 14. So in this definition, the conception seems to be that tragedy gives a man an experience having the same reforming or purifying tendency. What he means we may infer, perhaps, from a modern example of reform wrought through literature. When we recall the Puritanism, the bigotry, and the sectarianism of the last century, we cannot fail to contrast them with the humaneness and the liberality of thought and feeling prevailing in our own times; and, if we ask what has wrought the change, we are forced to ascribe it, very largely, to the influence of the modern novel. Through portrayals of people entirely different in motives, manners, customs, and characters from those with whom the novel's readers have associated, these readers have been enabled to become well acquainted with conditions of thought and of life foreign to their own. The effect has been to broaden their knowledge of the world and of human nature, and to increase almost infinitely their sympathies with men of “all sorts and conditions.” In other words the novel has given millions of people whose real experience, perhaps, has been necessarily confined

to the narrow limits of a single village, a substitute in the way of an imaginative experience almost as effective as anything obtained by actual travel. That one normal result of such an imaginative experience is to purify mind and heart through developing wisdom and charity, has been proved by the effects which can unmistakably be traced to this form of literature. Aristotle's conception seems to have been that a similar result could be produced by tragedy. This conception, as will be noticed, was based upon a far more accurate, not to say modern, view of the legitimate influence of art than was held by Plato. Notice what is said on pages 254 to 259.

After defining tragedy, as just indicated, Aristotle goes on in Chapters 6 to 12, to speak of its form and end, of its parts and plot, of its length and action, and of the unity of its fable, or as we should say, its story. He shows the difference between history and poetry, and distinguishes a story that is simple from one that is compound, *i. e.*, he distinguishes the development of one series of events from that of a complicated series of events. After this, as far as to chapter 22, he discusses the essentials of a tragic theme, the characteristics that cause terror and pity, the demeanour of the persons in the play, and how their actions should appeal to the knowledge, memory and reasoning of the audience, as well as how the poet should compose by feeling and seeing what he writes, and should express himself suitably and tersely. In addition, he argues that the poet should pay regard to sentiment and diction; and to the latter as manifested not only in individual syllables, but in words, and in these, whether conjunctions, articles, nouns, or verbs, and whether native or foreign, derived, invented or changed, as well as whether used metaphorically or plainly, or whether singly or combined in phrases and sentences. Diction, he says, should be characterized by clearness and freedom from meanness, *i. e.*, by dignity.

In the chapters following 22, epic poetry is discussed—its character, parts, power of extension, metre, etc. "Homer," he says, "appears divine when compared with other poets, excelling them all in diction and sentiment." The "Iliad" is simple and pathetic, the "Odessey" is complex for through the whole of it there is discovery and moral. The twenty-fifth chapter of the Poetics is devoted to removing certain objections to Homer; and the twenty-sixth chapter to weighing the respective merits of tragic and epic poetry. His general conclusion is that tragic poetry is the superior of the two, because it possesses everything that the epic has and more. It may use metre and may also use music and scenery; and yet it has perspicuity, both when read and when acted, and has more unity than the epic. The end of the tragic form of imitation too—and here we may notice the influence of the Hellenic regard for simplicity and unity—is confined within a narrow compass. This causes the result to be more

pleasing than if the course of the action were diffused through a longer period.

Such, in brief, is the general line of thought unfolded by Aristotle in his "Rhetoric" and "Poetics"; and it accords with his references to art in his other works. Our chief interest in these works, at present, lies in determining the difference between what he really said in them, and what he has been represented as saying. There is no doubt that if we consider only his words, we shall find him affirming that "all art is imitation." But if we interpret these words in the light which his own explanations have thrown upon them, it is possible that we may discover that what he meant was very different from that which superficial reading has led many to infer. The remark supposed to have originated with Coleridge, that all men must be either Platonists or Aristotelians, has come to be accepted almost as a truism; but it is only true as applied to the mental characteristics of the two men—not to the opinions held by them. While Plato undoubtedly represents extreme idealism, Aristotle by no means represents the opposite, either in his general philosophic system, or in his æsthetics. Only with the latter, however, are we concerned at present. The attempt to make him the father of materialism in art was not due to the earlier writers either in or out of the Christian Church. These usually recognized his idealism. The attempt began in the middle of the eighteenth century with the Abbé Charles Batteau. In his two books, one the "Cour de Belles-Lettres" and the other "Les Beaux-Arts Réduit à un Même Principe," books in which he claimed to be a follower of Aristotle, he emphasized much more than, as we shall find, Aristotle himself did, the imitative character of art. In doing this, he was followed by Voltaire, Diderot, and Éméric David, and, as already indicated on pages 111 and 112, by writers like Hazlitt and Sir Charles Bell, in England. But only in recent times does the influence of this conception of art seem to have had its "perfect work." What certain modern views are, both in Europe and our own country, and what are their effects, have been already brought out in other volumes of this series and need not be repeated here. See pages xli-xlviii of this volume, pages vi. and vii. of "Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as Representative Arts," and pages xvi.-xxii. and 235-237 of "Rhythm and Harmony in Poetry and Music." In this place, it is sufficient to say—what might be inferred without reading the extravagant statements that prove it—that the general result of emphasizing unduly the imitative side of æsthetics is to lead men to consider art merely a reproduction of reality as manifested in form, and not to consider it, in any important sense, a representation of ideality, or an expression of human thought and feeling. Is there anything in Aristotle's conception of art as *imitation* to justify a deduction that he did not

consider it to be an expression of human thought and feeling?—Strange as it may appear to some, nothing whatever. His own explanation of what he meant by *imitation* or *mimicry* (*μιμησις*) includes all that most idealists would desire to have included in the conception of that which art should do. “Homer,” says Aristotle (Chap. 2.), “imitates better men than exist,” and again, in Chap. 25., “the poet,” he says, “being an imitator, like the painter or any other artist, must, of necessity, always imitate one of three things,—either such as they were or are ; or such as they are said to be or appear to be ; or such as they ought to be ” (Thomas Taylor's translation). If the conception of imitating “better things than exist,” or things “as they ought to be,” do not include the conception of ideal representation, it is difficult to understand how this conception could be expressed in any words whatever. But Aristotle was not content with this explanation of what he meant by *imitation*. The larger part of his “Poetics” is devoted to discussing the representation of ideas through poetic form, and very much of it to the representation of the subject, fable, or story—the very thing the importance of which those who, to-day, claim to be his followers are accustomed to depreciate. Chapter 7, for instance, treats of the unity of the fable ; Chapter 9 of the differences between history and poetry, and how historic matter should be used in poetry. Chapters 10 and 11 consider the fable as either simple or compound. Chapter 12 discusses the parts of a tragedy ; Chapter 13 the essentials of a tragic plot ; and Chapters 14 to 19 the methods of representing terror, pity, etc. All these applications of the principle which Aristotle is made, in modern translations, to term *imitation*, show that the Greek word which he used did not mean exactly the same as the modern word through which we translate it. One cannot *imitate* things which appear to be, without a greater use of his imaginative powers ; nor *imitate* things as they ought to be without a greater use of his moral powers, than is implied in our word *imitate*. In what sense then did Aristotle use the word ? There may be two answers to this : He may have used it in a similar sense to our own ; but have given the word a broader application than we do. He may have used it to indicate the copying not merely of a whole product, to which we refer when we use the term, but to indicate the copying of any small part of a whole product, and therefore of different parts of different whole products, from which parts, when combined together, the artist could secure an entirely new product—a product representing, not that which was, but that which appeared to be or ought to be. But this is exactly the work of the constructive imagination attributed to the artist by the idealist. See pages 3, 4, 90–95 of this volume. Again, however, we may suppose that Aristotle in using the term *imitation* meant to express the thought which we should express by using

the term *imaging*. Either supposition of his meaning would involve the same interpretation of his theory. It is this: in art, *imitation* or *imaging* is a means not an end,—a means of representing through accurate imitations or images of external objects that which is, or appears to be, or ought to be. This seems to be the only fair interpretation to be put upon Aristotle's word; and this interpretation reveals at once the depth and the comprehensiveness of his æsthetic insight. It would be difficult in a single term to describe art, especially poetic art, which Aristotle in this treatise was discussing, more accurately. When we get to the bottom of the subject, that which distinguishes prose from poetry is that the latter influences us through the use of *imitation* or through *imaging*. As shown on pages 208 to 212 of "Poetry as a Representative Art," we can present the thoughts and feelings which an appearance of nature suggest, in plain language, *i. e.*, in prose, if we choose. But if so, we do not present them artistically, or poetically. We do the latter only when we repeat the methods of nature, and re-present that which nature presents. Just as we re-present the natural inflections of the voice in musical melody, the figures and scenes of nature in painting and sculpture, so in poetry, we re-present through descriptive or figurative language. In one sense it is true, as the modern so-called Aristotelians tell us, that the effects of art, even in poetry, do not depend upon the subject. They depend upon the appeal which the subject makes to the imagination, and this depends upon the *imaging*, or upon what Aristotle terms the *imitation*. At times, but only at times, the subject itself is such that necessarily, the moment it is presented, the imagination thinks of a picture. At other times this is not the case. When it is not, the poet, through the use of *imitative* or *imaging* language, or, as we say, of figurative language, must make the different parts of the subject seem picturesque. But all this is discussed and explained in Chapters XVIII. and XIX. of "Poetry as a Representative Art." At present, it is necessary merely to direct attention to the general fact. It remains to be observed only that if what has been said be true of poetry, it must be much more true of painting and sculpture, in which *imaging* through the use of natural appearances is much more unmistakable.

But if, in this paper, the right interpretation have been given to the term *imitation* as used by Aristotle, it follows that there is nothing in his theory to justify the inferences of modern so-called Aristotelians; nor, in view of what is advanced on pages 257 to 259, is there anything in this theory to which a Platonist, without sacrificing anything really essential to the consistency of his own system, might not fully subscribe.

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