ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS

E. ALEXANDER POWELL

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CROWN PRINCE HIROHITO

He has recently been named Regent of Japan with the approval of the Council of Princes, the Imperial Family and the Privy Councilors. His marriage to a princess of Satsuma will take place this spring.

ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS

JAPAN : KOREA : CHINA : PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

BY

E. ALEXANDER POWELL

AUTHOR OF "THE LAST FRONTIER," "FIGHTING IN FLANDERS," "WHERE THE STRANGE TRAILS GO DOWN," ETC.

ILLUSTRATED

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To the
Honorable
WARREN G. HARDING
President of the United States
who, by his vision and statesmanship
in calling the Washington Conference,
has done more than any man of our time
to preserve the peace of the Pacific
and to further the friendship and
mutual understanding of the peo-
ples dwelling upon its shores

FOREWORD

Most writers on Far Eastern politics make the mistake of crediting their readers with a profounder knowledge of the subject than they in fact possess. They take too much for granted. They talk in terms of algebra instead of arithmetic. On the assumption that those who read their books already understand the meaning of such phrases as "spheres of influence," "extraterritoriality," the Shogunate, the Genro, the *tuchuns,* the Anfu Club, the Consortium, the Gentlemen's Agreement, the Twenty-one Demands, they make repeated use of them without pausing long enough to explain precisely what they mean. As a result, the casual reader, who usually has only a vague idea of the subject to start with, either becomes bewildered and gives up in despair, frankly admitting that he does not understand what it is all about, or he forms conclusions which, being based on misconceptions, do not agree with the facts.

So, though the shelves of the public libraries sag beneath the volumes that have been written on various phases of Oriental politics, it seems to me that there is still a place for a clear, concise, simply written, unprejudiced explanation of the various problems, political, economic, and financial, which, taken together,

form what is commonly referred to as the Far Eastern Question. Therefore, even at the risk of covering ground with which some of my readers are doubtless already familiar, I have endeavored to sketch in outline, using simple, every-day language, the conditions and events which have combined to produce the present complex situation. Those who have the patience to follow me to the end will have gained, I hope, a sound, if rudimentary, understanding of one of the most perplexing subjects in the whole field of international politics.

I am perfectly aware that, so far as the chapters dealing with Japan and China are concerned, this book does not cover much new ground historically, nor is it marked by any special originality of presentation. I am also aware that much of the material has been used repeatedly in recent years by other writers on Japanese and Chinese questions. But, in spite of this, the book has, I believe, the merits of being clear, comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-the-minute. It was written, in the main, while the Washington Conference was still in session—an advantage in that it enabled me to discuss the mooted questions with the very men best qualified to discuss them; a disadvantage, perhaps, in that certain of the conditions which I have described, particularly in China, will necessarily be modified by the conferees' decisions.

A certain number of errors inevitably creep into the pages of any book of this nature, no matter how carefully it may be written and edited, but, in order to keep the errors to a minimum, the proof-sheets of the various chapters were submitted for correction to gentlemen who are universally recognized as among the highest authorities on the subjects treated in them. The proofs of the chapters on Japan and Korea were read and corrected by His Highness Prince Tokugawa, President of the Japanese House of Peers, and by His Excellency Baron Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, both members of the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Conference, and by the Honorable Roland S. Morris, formerly American Ambassador to Japan. The chapters on China were revised by Dr. J. C. Ferguson, Adviser to the President of the Chinese Republic, a distinguished educator and probably the leading foreign authority on Chinese affairs. The chapters on the Philippines were corrected by the Honorable William H. Taft, Chief Justice of the United States and formerly Governor-General of the Philippine Islands; by the Honorable Cameron Forbes, also a former governor-general and a member of the Wood-Forbes Mission, and by Major-General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. It should be clearly understood, however, that the opinions expressed in the following pages do not necessarily

reflect the views, nor in all cases meet with the approval, of the gentlemen in question. The opinions expressed in this book are my own.

Some of the things which I have written will probably give offense to those governments and individuals from whom I received many courtesies. Those who are privileged to speak for governments are fond of asserting that *their* governments have nothing to conceal and that they welcome honest criticism, but long experience has taught me that when they are told unpalatable truths governments are usually as sensitive and resentful as friends. Yet, were I to attempt to retain the good-will of the governments and officials of the countries under discussion by refraining from unfavorable comment, this book would be little more than propaganda. Perhaps it is too much to expect, but I would like those who showed me so many kindnesses in Japan, China, Korea, and the Philippines to believe that I have leaned backward in an effort to keep these pages free from bias and injustice, that I have tried to tell the truth as I understand it and because I believe that it is to the best interests of all the peoples concerned that the unvarnished truth should be told. If those of my country people who honor me by reading this book obtain from it a clearer understanding of the problems and perplexities which confront our trans-Pacific neighbors, if it teaches them to regard the short-

comings of the peoples of Eastern Asia a little more leniently and their national aspirations a little more sympathetically, then I shall feel that my purpose in writing it has been accomplished.

E. ALEXANDER POWELL.

Washington, January, 1922.

AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I welcome this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the innumerable courtesies extended to me by the governments of Japan, Korea, China, and the Philippine Islands, and of the many personal kindnesses shown me by individuals in those countries.

My studies in the Japanese Empire were greatly facilitated by the hearty coöperation of the late Premier Hara, whose tragic death at the hands of an assassin in November, 1921, was a profound shock to all who knew him. For the assistance and hospitality which I received everywhere in Japan and Korea I am also grateful to His Excellency Baron Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador to the United States; to His Highness Prince Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers; to His Excellency Masanao Hanihara, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; to Major-General G. Tanaka, formerly Minister of War; to His Excellency Admiral Baron Saito, Governor-General of Korea, and to Dr. Kentaro Midzuno, the Vice-Governor-General; to Viscount Kaneko; to Dallas McGrew, Esq., and Frederick Moore, Esq., of the Japanese Foreign Office; to Dr. T. Iyenaga, of New York City; to the Hon. Ransford Miller, American Consul-General at Seoul; and in particular to the

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Of the many persons who assisted me in China my thanks are due to Dr. J. C. Ferguson, Adviser to the President of the Chinese Republic; to the Hon. Paul R. Reinsch, formerly American Minister to China; to Ray Atherton, Esq., Secretary of the American Legation at Peking; to I. Tokugawa, Esq., Secretary of the Japanese Legation at Peking; to P. Loureiro, Esq., Assistant Financial Secretary of the Salt Revenue Administration; and to Bertram Lennox-Simpson, Esq. ("Putnam Weale").

For the great trouble to which they put themselves in rendering my visit to the Philippines instructive and enjoyable I am very grateful to the Hon. Francis Burton Harrison, formerly Governor-General of the Philippine Islands; to the Hon. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate; to the Hon. Sergio Osmena, Speaker of the House; to the Hon. Frank C. Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu; to the Hon. P. W. Rogers, formerly Governor of Jolo; to Colonel Ralph W. Jones of the Philippine Constabulary; to Major Edwin C. Bopp, Chief of Police of Manila, and to army, scout, and constabulary officers all the way from northern Luzon to Zamboanga.

This also affords me an opportunity to acknowledge my indebtedness for many suggestions and much

valuable material which I have derived from the following sources: "Modern Japan," by A. S. Hershey; "What Shall I Think of Japan?" by George Gleason; "The Japanese Empire," by Philip Terry; "The Far East Unveiled," by Frederick Coleman; "The New Far East," by T. J. Millard; "The Mastery of the Far East," by Arthur Judson Brown; "China, Japan and Korea," by J. O. P. Bland; "These from the Land of Sinim," by Sir Robert Hart; "China in Transformation," by A. B. Colquhoun; "Peking Dust," by Ellen La Motte; "Modern China," by S. G. Cheng; "Korea," by Angus Hamilton; "In Korea with the Marquis Ito," by George T. Ladd; "Korea's Fight for Freedom," by F. A. McKenzie; "The Passing of Korea," by H. B. Hurlbert; "The Truth About Korea," by C. W. Kendall; "The Rebirth of Korea," by Hugh H. Cynn; "The Case for the Filipinos," by Maximo M. Kalaw; "The Philippine Islands and Their People" and "The Philippines, Past and Present," by Dean C. Worcester, and particularly the extremely able despatches of the *New York Tribune's* Far Eastern correspondent, Mr. Nathaniel Peffer.

E. Alexander Powell.

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PART I

JAPAN

I

IT is too early by many years to assess at their true value the achievements and failures of the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments. We are standing too near the picture to estimate with accuracy its merits and its faults. But, when history has lent it the justice of perspective, the assembly of nations which convened on the banks of the Potomac in November, 1921, will assuredly be recognized as one of the most remarkable episodes of our time. No matter what else it accomplished, or failed to accomplish, it provided the world with a striking object-lesson in the efficacy, as applied to international relations, of the policy of let's-sit-down-and-talk-it-over.

It would be idle to deny that, when the Conference was called by President Harding, Japan was regarded as a potential enemy by a majority of Americans. I, for one, am convinced that, had the

mutual suspicions and misunderstandings of the two peoples been permitted to continue, had their respective governments clung to the policies which they were then pursuing, the situation would have ended in war. Yet their mutual suspicions were so largely allayed, their misunderstandings so successfully composed by the frank discussions which characterized the Conference, that, when it ended, the sentiment of most thoughtful persons, Americans and Japanese, was expressed by Prince Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers, when he said upon his departure from our shores: "The United States has learned that Japan entertains no aggressive designs in the Pacific and Japan has learned that she has nothing to expect from this side of the Pacific except friendly coöperation."

The near-hostility which until recently embittered the relations of the United States and Japan, and which threatened at one time to break into an open sore, was due, I am convinced, not to any inherent ill-will on the part of either people for the other, but to a mutual lack of knowledge and sympathetic understanding. In other words, both Americans and Japanese had shown themselves unable, or unwilling, to think the other's mind. It was not enough for groups of more or less representative Americans and Japanese to gather about banquet tables and indulge in sonorous protestations of mutual friendship and international good-will, or to cable each other hands-

across-the-sea greetings couched in terms of fulsome praise. The possibilities of a cordial relationship and a harmonious coöperation between the two nations are so tremendous, the interests at stake are so vast and far-reaching, the consequences of an armed conflict would be so catastrophic and overwhelming, that it is unthinkable that the two peoples should ever again permit themselves to drift into the frame of mind which existed in both countries prior to the Conference at Washington.

Yet, if such a perilous situation is not again to arise, each people *must* make an earnest endeavor to gain a better understanding of the temperament, traditions, ambitions, limitations, and problems of the other, and to make corresponding allowances for them—in short, to cultivate a more tolerant and sympathetic state of mind. Japan is, and probably always will be, one of the most important countries, if not the most important, on our political horizon. Summoned from obscurity by an American commodore, adopting with avidity the devices of Western civilization, advancing as in seven-league boots to her present position as one of the five greatest military and naval powers in the world, our closest competitor in the race for the trade of Eastern Asia, one of our most profitable customers, the key that can lock the Open Door—it is imperative for every American to learn more about this great Ocean Empire on the other side of the Pacific and to obtain a clearer

understanding of what has taken place in those nine-and-sixty amazing years—less than the span of life which the Scriptures allot to man—since the anchors of Perry's frigates rumbled down in the Bay of Yedo.

The Japanese Question is an extremely complicated one. Its ramifications extend into the realms of politics, industry, commerce, and finance. It stretches across one hundred and fifty degrees of longitude. It affects the lives and destinies of six hundred millions of people. Its roots are to be found as far apart as a Japanese military outpost in Siberia and the headquarters of a labor union in Sacramento, as a Korean village and a Californian farm, as an obscure harbor on the coast of Mexico and a cable-station on a lonely rock in the Pacific, as the offices of a firm of international bankers in Wall Street and the palace of the President of China in the Forbidden City.

To understand algebra, you must have a knowledge of arithmetic. To understand the Japanese Question, you must have at least a rudimentary knowledge of the various factors which have combined to produce it. It grew to its present dimensions so silently, so stealthily, that the average well-informed American has only a vague and frequently erroneous idea of what it is all about. He has read in the newspapers of the anti-Japanese agitation in California, of the Gentlemen's Agreement, of picture-brides,

of mysterious Japanese troop-movements in Siberia, of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria, of Japanese oppression in Korea, of the Shantung controversy, of the dispute over Yap; but to him these isolated episodes usually had about as much significance as so many fragments of a complicated jig-saw puzzle. Moreover, the avalanche of information, near-information, and misinformation about Japan which filled the columns of the daily papers prior to and during the Washington Conference bewildered rather than enlightened him. Therefore, even at the risk of repeating some facts with which you are doubtless already familiar, I will endeavor to piece the puzzle together, so that you may view the picture in its entirety *and in the light of the Conference's decisions.*

But, before I proceed, let me make it amply clear that I hold no brief for Japan. I am an American and, because I wish to see my country morally in the right, I deplore the unjust, intolerant, and provocative attitude toward the Japanese adopted by certain elements of our population. I believe that the politician or publicist who deliberately inflames public opinion against a nation with which we are at peace, and with which we wish to remain at peace, is an enemy to the best interests of his country and should be treated as such by all decent citizens. It is to the great mass of reasoning and fair-minded people in both countries, who, I am convinced, wish to learn the unvarnished truth, no matter how unflattering

it may be to their national pride, how disillusionizing, that I address myself. In order that they may have the clearest possible understanding of a situation which vitally concerns the future well-being of both the United States and Japan, I propose, in the following pages, to discard all euphemism and diplomatic subterfuge and to tell as much as possible of "nothing but the truth."

II

Some truths, more half-truths, many untruths have been said and written in each country about the other. The clear waters of our old-time friendship have been roiled by prejudice and propaganda. Much of our appalling ignorance of Japanese character, aims, and ideals is traceable to our national propensity for generalization—always an inexact and dangerous method of estimating another people, and doubly dangerous in the case of a people as complex as the Japanese. Let us not forget that we were accustomed to think of the French as a volatile, excitable, easy-going, pleasure-obsessed, decadent people until the Marne and Verdun taught us the truth. Such a misconception was deplorable in the case of a people from whom we had nothing to fear; it is inexcusable, and might well prove disastrous, in the case of the Japanese. I have heard Americans who pride themselves on being well-informed, men whose opinions are listened to with respect, betray ignorance of Japan

and of Japanese institutions which would be ludicrous under other conditions.

And the ignorance of many intelligent Japanese in regard to ourselves is no less disheartening. Their way of thinking is not our way of thinking; many of their institutions and ideas and ideals are diametrically different from ours. Believe it or not, as you choose, the great majority of intelligent Japanese are unable to understand our thinly veiled distrust and dislike of them. That many of our people do distrust and dislike the Japanese there can be no gainsaying. Yet the average American usually finds some difficulty in giving for his attitude toward the Japanese a definite and cogent reason. This unreasoning antipathy was illustrated by an educated and charming American woman, who had been traveling in Japan, whom I met on a homeward bound liner.

"How did you like the Japanese?" I asked her.

"I did n't like them," she replied.

"Were you ill-treated in Japan? Did you meet with any discourtesy or injustice?"

"No," she admitted, with some embarrassment. "I have no complaints whatever to make of the treatment I received. I found them universally courteous."

"Then why did n't you like them?" I persisted.

"Well," she explained, "I just made up my mind before I went to Japan that I was n't going to like the Japanese, and I did n't."

That is an extreme case, I admit, but if you will take the trouble to go into the matter you will find that that is about as cogent a reason as many Americans can offer for their dislike of the people of Nippon.

Underlying all the misunderstandings between the two nations is race prejudice. Our racial antipathy for the Japanese is instinctive. It has its source in the white race's attitude of arrogant superiority toward all non-white peoples. We inherited it, along with our Caucasian blood, from our Aryan ancestors. It is as old as the breed. The Japanese do not realize that they are meeting in this an old, old problem; that the American attitude is not dictated by a wish to place a stigma of inferiority on them, but is merely the application to them of the Caucasian's historic attitude toward all peoples with tinted skins. If the Japanese question this, let them observe the attitude of the Americans resident in the Philippines toward the Filipinos, that of the English toward the natives of India and Egypt, that of the French toward their brown-skinned subjects in Indo-China. But this racial prejudice is by no means one-sided. The Japanese consider themselves as superior to us as we consider ourselves superior to them. Make no mistake about that. The Japanese are by no means free from that racial dislike for Occidentals which lies near to the hearts of all Orientals; but they have

the good sense, good manners, and tact to repress their feelings. That is where they differ from Americans.

Another reason for American dislike of the Japanese is the latter's assertion of equality. We don't call it that, of course. We call it conceit—cockiness. The reason that we get along with another yellow race, the Chinese, is because they, by their abject abasement and submissiveness, flatter our sense of racial superiority. Our pride thus catered to, we give them a condescending pat of approval, such as we would give a negro who always "knows his place," holds his hat in his hand when he addresses a white person, says "sir" and "ma'am," and shows no sign of resenting ill-justice or mistreatment. The Japanese, on the contrary, stands up for his rights; he is not at all humble or submissive or in the least awed by threats, and if an irate American attempts to "put him in his place," as he is accustomed to do with a Chinese or a Filipino or a negro, he is more likely than not to find himself on the way to jail in the grasp of a small but extremely efficient and unsympathetic policeman.

I asked an American whom I met in Yokohama if he had enjoyed his stay in Japan.

"Not particularly," he answered. "I don't care for the Japs; give me the Chinese every time."

"Why?" I queried.

He pondered my question for a moment.

"I'll sum it up for you like this," he replied. "The Chinese treat you as a superior; the Japanese treat you as an equal."

Until Commodore Perry opened Japan to western civilization and commerce, we held all Mongolians in contempt, being pleased to consider them as inferior peoples. But in the case of the Japanese this contempt changed in a few years to a patronizing condescension, such as a grown person might have for a precocious and amusing child. We congratulated ourselves on having discovered in the Japanese a sort of infant prodigy; we took in them a proprietary interest. We watched their rapid rise in the world with almost paternal gratification. And the Japanese flattered our self-esteem by their open admiration and imitation of our methods.

I think that our national antipathy for the Japanese had its beginnings in their victory over the Russians. Up to that time we had looked on the Japanese as a brilliant and ambitious little people whom we had brought to the notice of the world and for whose amazing progress we were largely responsible. But when Japan administered a trouncing to the Russians, who are, after all, fellow-Caucasians, American sentiment performed a volte-face almost overnight. We were as pro-Russian at Portsmouth as we had been pro-Japanese at Port Arthur. This sudden change in our attitude toward them has always mystified the

Japanese. Yet there is really nothing mystifying about it. We were merely answering the call of the blood. As long as we believed Japan to be the under dog, we were for her; but when she became the upper dog, the old racial prejudice flamed up anew. A yellow people had humbled and humiliated a Caucasian people, and we, as Caucasians, resented it. It was a blow to our pride of race. (A somewhat similar manifestation of racial prejudice was observable throughout the United States when the negro pugilist, Jack Johnson, defeated Jim Jeffries.) That a yellow race could defeat a white race had never occurred to us, and we were correspondingly startled and alarmed. We abruptly ceased to think of the Japanese as a third-rate nation of polite, well-meaning, and harmless little men, drinkers of tea and wearers of kimonos. They became the Yellow Peril.

Though the Japanese are of Asia, they cannot be treated as we are accustomed to treat other Asiatics. To attempt to belittle or patronize a nation that can put into the field three million fighting men and send to sea a battle fleet not greatly inferior to our own, would be as ridiculous as it would be short-sighted. Japan is a striking example to other Oriental races of the power of the Big Stick. She has never been subjugated by the foreigner. In spite of, rather than by the aid of, the white man, she has become one of the Great Powers, and at Versailles helped to shape the destinies of millions of Europeans. Yet when she

claims racial equality we deny and resent it. Our refusal to treat the Japanese as equals, while at the same time showing a wholesome respect for the armed might that is behind them, reminds me of an American reserve lieutenant, a Southerner, on duty at a cantonment where there was a division of colored troops, who refused to salute a negro captain. He was called before the commanding officer, who gave him his choice between saluting the negro or being tried by court-martial.

"I suppose I 'll have to salute the uniform," he muttered rebelliously, "but damned if I 'll salute the nigger inside it."

III

I have already said that racial prejudice is at the bottom, the very bottom, of the friction between the two countries. Immediately overlying it is our fear of Japanese economic competition. For, if you will look into it, you will find that there has hardly ever been a conflict between nations into which some economic question has not entered as the final and essential factor. Never was this truer than in the American-Japanese situation. In considering the question of Japanese economic competition, it would seem that Americans fail to realize the extent to which Japanese business is aided, controlled, and directed by the Japanese Government.

The Japanese business man does not have to fight

unaided for foreign trade, as does the American. He has his government solidly behind him. Government-subsidized steamship lines and government-owned railways give him every possible advantage. The government's ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and commercial agents lend him encouragement and assistance. Allied industries support him. Virtually all of the industries of the empire belong to trade guilds, which, like their European prototypes of the Middle Ages, are licensed by the government and are granted special privileges and immunities. In short, the Japanese business man is really a part of a gigantic trust, which differs from our American trusts only in that it is a government instead of a corporation.

The Japanese long since realized that their material resources were greatly inferior to those of other first-class powers, and that the realization of their national ambitions required great wealth as much as a great military establishment. They could not obtain this wealth by agriculture, for not only is Japan a comparatively small country territorially, but not more than fifteen per cent. of its area is capable of profitable cultivation. Moreover, there are already three hundred and fifty inhabitants to the square mile, and the birth-rate, like the cost of living, is steadily rising.

In Japan, as in the United States, to quote the words of a popular song: "The rich get richer and

the poor get children." Now the Japanese were fully conscious of the handicap under which they were struggling in their race for wealth and power. So they set about overcoming it by embarking upon a carefully planned campaign of industrial development and commercial expansion which, in its intensity and thoroughness, has no parallel save that which was waged by Germany prior to August, 1914. Perceiving that they could never hope to overtake their Western rivals by wading cautiously into the sea of commercial competition, they resolved to risk everything by plunging boldly into deep water. They risked everything—and they won. By utilizing to the utmost what they already possessed, by taxing themselves until they staggered under the burden, by borrowing from the Occidental nations until their credit was stretched to the breaking-point, by speeding up the industrial machine until it was running twenty-four hours a day and three hundred and sixty-five days a year, by hard work, rigid economy, and self-denial, they succeeded in raising the huge sums which they required for mills, factories, and power-plants, for railway and steamship lines, for docking and terminal facilities, for postal and telegraph systems. To-day, as a result of their courage and amazing energy, the Japanese are running neck-and-neck with the United States and England in the race for the commerce of the world. They are making matches at a price that has virtually closed the Asiatic markets

to their Western competitors. They can deliver sashes, doors, blinds, and woodenware in North and South America at so low a rate that our manufacturers would be driven out of business were it not for the protection afforded by our tariff wall. Though the Japanese do not themselves grow large quantities of cotton, they purchase the poorer and cheaper grades of the raw material in India and Egypt, transport it by their government-subsidized steamers and government-owned railways to their government-assisted factories, where, as the result of low wages and long hours, it is spun into piece goods which are sold to the cotton-clad millions of the East at prices with which American and British manufacturers are finding profitable competition almost out of the question.

In competing with Western nations for the trade of the Orient, Japan possesses several important advantages. Government control of transportation lines by land and sea, government subsidies and bounties, and, in the trade with Asia, short hauls, are vital factors. The Japanese are so near to the great, rich markets of the Asian mainland that they can fill orders from Eastern Siberia, Korea, Manchuria, and Eastern China before the American manufacturer could get his shipment aboard a vessel at San Francisco or Seattle. Furthermore, it is a cardinal principle of Japanese commercial policy to constantly keep in touch with the changing tastes and fashions

of their Asiatic customers and to give them exactly what they want, which American manufacturers, all too frequently, do not. It must also be kept in mind that the Japanese Government and the Japanese manufacturers work hand in hand in furthering their commercial ambitions. Several of the greatest industrial enterprises in Japan, as I shall show further on, are controlled directly or indirectly by the government, large blocks of stock being held by members of the imperial family and by high officials. Struggling enterprises are frequently assisted by government bounties, and money at low rates of interest is often loaned for the same purpose. The principal Japanese steamship lines are so liberally subsidized by the government, and pay their seamen such low wages, that it is impossible for American-owned vessels, with highly-paid white crews and no government subsidies, to compete with them. As a result, the carrying trade of the Pacific is in Japanese hands. Thus it will be seen that, in their struggle for the trade of the Orient, American firms are not merely competing against Japanese firms. In effect, they are competing against the Japanese Government.

And here is another point which should be emphasized. American business men bear no such relation to their government as Japanese business men bear to theirs. Unlike Japan and Germany, in both of which countries foreign politics and foreign commerce are closely interrelated, the United States does

not utilize the commercial ventures of its citizens to advance its foreign policies. Indeed, beyond giving half-hearted and usually inefficient protection in case of menace to their lives and property, the government at Washington does not concern itself at all with the business interests of its citizens oversea. When an American firm makes a foreign loan, or establishes a bank, or leases harbor or shore rights, or secures a contract, or obtains a concession, every one knows that the venture is without political significance, present or prospective. On the other hand, every move made by Japanese commercial interests abroad has some degree of political significance. If a Japanese firm leases harbor or shore rights in a foreign country, that lease is to all intents and purposes a government one, and may be controlled as such whenever the government chooses. Hence the alarm which was felt by well-informed Americans when it was reported that a Japanese business house was negotiating with the Mexican Government for the lease of a harbor on Magdalena Bay—for they recognized how simple a matter it would be for the Japanese Government to take over that lease and transform an innocent commercial harbor into a coaling station or naval base. Again, the Japanese Government has not hesitated to utilize the concessions held by its subjects in China to coerce the government at Peking. In short, every Japanese merchant who establishes himself abroad automatically becomes a listening-post for the Tokio

Foreign Office, a *point d'appui* for Japanese aggression, a picket eternally on the alert to serve the political interests of Nippon.[1]

No one can travel in the Far East without being struck by the bitterness and unanimity with which foreign business men, American and European alike, condemn Japanese business methods. Whether justified or not, this feeling of disapproval and distrust has done more than anything else, save only the racial prejudice to which I have already referred, to embitter the relations between the United States and Japan. Therefore, delicate as the question is, I purpose to discuss it with the utmost frankness. To ignore it in order to avoid offending Japanese susceptibilities would be tantamount to permitting a wound to fester because opening it would cause the patient pain.

I will give the foreigner's side first. Here is the way an American importer, whom I met in Yokohama, expressed himself:

"The Japanese business man has two great faults—conceit and deceit. In his business relations he is overbearing and underdeveloped. In order to make an immediate profit, he will lose a life-long and valuable customer. Though it frequently happens that

[1] A high Japanese official, to whom I submitted the proofs of this chapter for correction, professes to see a parallel to this situation in the Siems-Carey and American International Corporation railway contracts in China. In this I do not agree with him. E. A. P.

he does not understand what the foreign buyer is talking about, his vanity will not permit him to admit his ignorance; instead, he will accept the order and then fill it unsatisfactorily. He will accept an order for anything, whether he can deliver it or not. He would accept an order for the Brooklyn Bridge, f.o.b. next Thursday, Kioto—hoping that something might turn up in the meantime that would enable him to fill it."

An Englishman doing business in Japan said to me:

"The Japanese has his nerve only on a rising market. As soon as the market shows signs of falling, he hesitates at nothing to get from under. When the silk market rose, hundreds of Japanese firms defaulted on orders which they had already accepted from foreign importers, as they would have lost money at the old prices. When, on the other hand, there was a slump in the money market in the spring of 1920, the customs warehouses at Yokohama and Kobe were piled high with goods ordered from abroad for which the consignees refused to accept delivery."

Another American importer, who has made semiannual buying trips to Japan for more than a quarter of a century and who has a genuine liking for the Japanese, told me, with regret in his tone, that, of all the firms with whom he did business, those upon

whom he could rely implicitly to send him goods of the same quality as their samples could be numbered on the fingers of one hand.

I cite these complaints because they are typical of many I heard while I was in the Far East. That does not mean, however, that I consider them entirely justified, for I do not. Their very bitterness reveals the prejudice which gave birth to some of them and added exaggeration to others. But I concluded that where there was so much smoke there must be some flame, so I made it my business to question as many foreign business men as I could, as well as commercial attachés and consuls, both European and American. From their replies I gathered that a trademark, copyright, or patent does not, as a rule, prevent a Japanese manufacturer from appropriating any idea of which he can make use; though I am glad to say that recent legislation, combined with an awakening national conscience, has done much to protect the foreigner from such abuses. For example, "Bentley's Code," which sells in the United States for thirty dollars and which is fully protected by copyright, has been copied by a Japanese publishing house, which sells it for ten dollars. A famous brand of safety razor, which sells in the United States for five dollars, is copied by the Japanese in everything save quality, and is marketed by them, under the originator's name and in a facsimile of the original package, for one-fifth of the price charged for the genuine article.

The same is true of widely advertised brands of soap, tooth paste, talcum powder, perfume, and other toilet preparations. An imitation of Pond's Extract, for instance, is sold in a bottle exactly like that containing the American-made article except that a faint line, scarcely discernible, turns the P into an R. This infringement was fought in the Japanese courts, however, which decided in favor of the plaintiff. A particularly flagrant example of these questionable commercial methods came to light in the spring of 1920 at Tientsin, when the American consul-general made an official protest against the action of the Japanese chamber of commerce of that city, which had sent broadcast thousands of hand-bills intimating that a certain American trading company, which had become a dangerous competitor of Japanese firms, was on the verge of insolvency—a statement which was entirely without foundation in fact. The Japanese chamber of commerce refused to retract its allegations and the American house was nearly ruined.

These are only a few examples of those Japanese business practises to which foreigners object. I heard similar stories from almost every American business man whom I met in the East. Indeed, I cannot recall having talked with a single foreigner (with a solitary exception) doing business with the Japanese, who did not have some complaint to make of their practise of imitating patented or copyrighted articles, of substituting inferior goods, of giving short weight,

and of not keeping their engagements when it suited them to break them. That the Japanese Government recognizes and deplores the methods of certain Japanese business men is shown by the following quotation from the report of the Japanese consul-general at Bombay, as quoted in the *Japan Weekly Chronicle:*

> Although I am confident that the credit of Japanese merchants in general is not so low as is represented by a small section of the foreign merchants, yet it is to be deplored as an indisputable fact that there is one sort of short-sighted dishonest Japanese merchants who are always eager to obtain a temporary profit just before their eyes, who resort to extremely detestable and crafty expedients. They will send samples of goods far superior in quality in comparison with the price quoted, and when they receive orders according to these samples, they never manufacture goods equal to the samples in quality, but manufacture and ship inferior goods suitable to the price.

This commercial unscrupulousness has worked great injury to the friendly relations of Japan and the United States. It has engendered in American business men a distrust and a dislike which it will take years to eradicate. This was strikingly illustrated one evening in the smoking-room of a trans-Pacific liner. While chatting with a group of returning American business men I casually mentioned the case of a fellow-countryman who had recently brought American commercial methods into disrepute by giving "exclusive" agencies for certain widely advertised articles to several firms in the same city. Instead of deploring

such trickery, my auditors applauded it almost to a man. "Fine!" they exclaimed. "Good work! Glad to hear of a Yankee who can beat the Japs at their own game!" They were as jubilant over that dishonest American's success in turning the tables on the Japanese as was the American public when it learned that we had perfected a poison gas more horrible in its effects than any in use by the Germans.

I heard other criticisms, too, which, if they are justified, would indicate that the Japanese Government itself sometimes aids Japanese business by methods which are not generally considered fair. These included charges that the government-owned railways give rebates to Japanese shippers; that Japanese freight is expedited by railway and steamship lines while that shipped by foreign firms is subjected to ruinous delay; that, owing to the South Manchuria Railway being under Japanese control, Japanese merchants shipping their goods into Manchuria have frequently been able to evade the customs, whereas goods of foreign origin are subject to full duties; that important commercial messages sent over Japanese cables have been revealed to the senders' Japanese competitors, the messages in some cases not having been delivered to the addressees at all.[1]

Foreign business men in the East often assert that

[1] I am informed by an official of the Japanese Foreign Office that Japanese business men in the United States are making precisely the same complaints in regard to the handling of messages by American cable companies. E. A. P.

the amazing commercial success of the Japanese is mainly due to such methods. On the contrary, it has been achieved in spite of them. Japan's commercial rise is due, as I have already shown, to the courage, energy, industry, and self-denial of the Japanese nation. It should be added, however, that the tremendous commercial boom which reached its zenith in 1919-20 was largely the result of artificial and temporary conditions. At a period when the rest of the world was engaged in a life-and-death struggle, Japan, far from the battlefields, was free to engage in commerce, and she possessed, moreover, certain articles which other nations must have and for which they had to pay any price she demanded. Nor could the Japanese merchant, any more than the American, realize that this was a purely temporary condition and could not continue indefinitely.

Now, mind you, I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that commercial trickery is characteristic of Japanese business men as a class. There are business houses in Japan—many of them—which meet their obligations as punctiliously, which fill their commitments as scrupulously, which maintain as high a standard of business honor, as the most reputable firms in the United States. But, unfortunately, there are many—altogether too many—which do not. It seems a thousand pities that the honest and far-sighted business men of Japan and the Japanese trade guilds and chambers of commerce do not take ener-

getic steps to stamp out commercial trickery, if for no other reason than the effect it would have on foreign opinion. The series of conferences held in Tokio in 1920 between a self-appointed delegation of American bankers and business men and a number of representative Japanese offered a splendid opportunity for a candid discussion of this delicate and irritating question. If the Americans, instead of confining themselves to hands-across-the-sea sentiments and platitudinous expressions of friendship, had had the courage to tell the high-minded Japanese who were their hosts how objectionable such methods are to Americans and what incalculable harm they are causing to Japanese-American relations, it would have worked wonders in promoting a better understanding between the two peoples.

Despite what I have felt compelled to say about the methods of a section of the Japanese commercial class, I am convinced that the Japanese people, as a race, are honest. Though pocket-picking is said to be on the increase in Japan, burglary and highway robbery are extremely rare, while the murders, shooting affrays, daylight robberies, and hold-ups which have become commonplaces in American cities are virtually unknown. I should feel as safe at midnight in the meanest street of a Japanese city as I should on Commonwealth Avenue in Boston—considerably safer, indeed, than I should on certain New York thoroughfares after nightfall. I asked an American woman

who has lived for many years in Japan if she considered the Japanese honest.

"I never think of locking the doors or windows of my house in Yokohama," she replied, "yet I have never had anything stolen. But when I was staying last winter at a fashionable hotel in New York, I was robbed of money, jewels, and clothing the very night of my arrival."

Nor could I discover any substantiation of the oft-repeated assertion that fiduciary positions in Japanese banks are held by Chinese. Certainly this is not true of Japanese-controlled institutions, such as the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Dai Ichi Ginko, as I can attest from personal observation. It is true that Chinese are employed in considerable numbers in minor positions of trust in the Japanese branches of foreign banks, such as the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Bank of India, Australia & New Zealand, but these have generally come over from China with the banks' European officials, their employment denoting no lack of faith in Japanese integrity. Yet such stories, spread broadcast by superficial and usually prejudiced observers, have helped to give Americans a totally erroneous impression of the Japanese.

My personal opinion is that the commercial trickery practised in Japan is not due to any inherent dishonesty in the Japanese character, but rather to the contempt in which merchants were held in that

country for centuries. Until recent years the position of the merchant in Japan was analogous to that of the Jew in the Europe of the Middle Ages. He was at the bottom of the social scale. At the top was the noble; then came the *samurai,* or professional fighting man; followed in turn by the farmer and the artisan; and last of all came the merchant. The farmer and the artisan have always held a higher place than the merchant because they are producers, whereas the merchant was looked upon as a huckster, a haggler, a bargainer, who made his living by his wits. As a result, business was in the hands of a low class of Japanese. Trading was regarded as beneath the dignity of a gentleman. Furthermore, the Japanese merchant has had less than seventy years in which to learn the rules of the business game as it is played in the West. Coming from a despised and downtrodden class, is it any wonder that in that brief span he has not wholly eradicated his ancient methods, that he has not yet acquired all our Western virtues and ideals? The Jew has been under the influence of the West for two thousand years, yet his business ethics are not always beyond reproach. Let us, then, be charitable in judging the Japanese.

Nor should we forget that barely a score of years have passed since American business houses commonly practised the very methods of which we complain so bitterly when they are practised by the Japanese. It is within the memory of most of us when

rebates, discriminatory freight rates, infringements of copyrights and patents, substitution, adulteration, evasion of customs, and the ruthless crushing of competition by unfair methods were so common in the United States as scarcely to provoke comment. If you question this, read the early history of the Standard Oil Company, of the sugar, beef, and steel trusts, or of certain of our great railway systems. The truth of the matter is that the Japanese to-day are about where we were two decades ago. Not having entered the commercial contest until long after we did, it is not surprising that their commercial ethics are still several laps behind our own. Business ethics in the island empire are at present undergoing the same rehabilitation and purification that were forced upon American business by an outraged public opinion. And, according to most unprejudiced observers, that transformation is being effected with remarkable rapidity. So why not stop throwing stones and give the Japanese a chance? Rome was not built in a day.

There is yet another explanation of the questionable business usages practised by certain Japanese merchants. And that explanation, curiously enough, points straight at ourselves. It remained for the late Premier Hara—himself a business man and the first commoner to hold the position of prime minister—to bring that embarrassing fact to my attention.

"You should not forget that my people learned what they know of modern business methods from

your own countrymen," he reminded me. "It was your Commodore Perry who, in the face of Japanese opposition, opened Japan to American commerce. It was from the American traders who followed him that the Japanese received their first lessons in the business ethics of the West. The early American traders, in the methods they practised, provided the Japanese with anything but a laudable example. If they could cheat a Japanese, they considered it highly creditable; they took advantage of his ignorance by selling him inferior goods and by driving sharp bargains; they constantly bamboozled him. Is it any wonder, then, that the Japanese merchant, patterning his methods on those pursued by the Americans, adopted American commercial trickery along with other things? But mind you," he added, "I am not condoning commercial trickery among my people. I am only explaining it."

IV

In the preceding pages I have endeavored to show how important are the racial and economic elements in their effect on American-Japanese relations. We now come to a consideration of the political factor. In order to estimate this factor at its true importance, it is necessary to envisage the trying political situation in which Japan finds herself.

Since their victory over the Russians in 1904 the Japanese have seen themselves gradually encircled

by a ring of unsympathetic and suspicious, if not openly hostile peoples. Overshadowing the island empire on the north is the great bulk of Bolshevist Russia, still smarting from the memories of the Yalu River and Port Arthur, and bitterly resentful of Japan's military occupation of Eastern Siberia and Northern Sakhalin. Every patriotic Russian feels that Japan, in occupying these territories, has taken unfair advantage of Russia's temporary helplessness; he listens cynically to the protestations of the Japanese Government that it has occupied them merely in order to keep at arm's length the menace of Bolshevism and that it will withdraw its troops as soon as this menace disappears.

To the west, the Koreans, though now officially Japanese subjects, are in a state of incipient revolt, to which they have been driven by the excesses of the Japanese military and the harshness of Japanese rule. To the southeast, China, huge and inert, loathes and fears her island neighbor, their common hatred of Japan being the one tie which binds the diverse elements of the republic together. As a protest against Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Shantung the Chinese have instituted a boycott of Japanese goods, which is gravely affecting Japanese commerce throughout the Farther East. In regions as remote from the seat of the controversy as the Celebes and Borneo, as Siam, the Straits Settlements, and Java, I found Japanese merchants being forced out of busi-

JAPANESE EMPIRE



ness because the Chinese living in those countries refused to trade with them or to purchase goods of any one else who traded with them. In Formosa, taken from China as spoils of war in 1895, the head-hunting savages who inhabit the mountains of the interior remain unsubjugated, only the Guard Line, a series of armed blockhouses connected by electrically charged entanglements, standing between the Japanese settlers and massacre.

In the Philippines there is always present the bogey of Japanese imperialism, both the Filipinos and the American residents being convinced that Japan is looking forward to the day when she can add those rich and tempting islands to her possessions. In far-distant Australia and New Zealand the Japanese are distrusted and disliked, stringent legislative measures having recently been adopted to prevent further Japanese immigration into those commonwealths. On the Pacific coast of the United States and Canada a violent anti-Japanese agitation is in full swing, new and severer legislation being constantly directed against them. In Hawaii, where the Japanese outnumber all the other elements of the population put together, the Americans and Kanakas view the situation with acute apprehension.[1]

Influenced by the frankly hostile attitude of her great overseas dominions, and fearful of its effect on her relations with the United States, England eagerly

[1] There were 109,274 Japanese in Hawaii in 1920.

seized the opportunity, afforded by America's offer at the Washington Conference, of substituting the Four-Power Treaty for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Holland, having ever in the front of her mind her great, rich colonies in the East Indies, looks with a suspicious eye on Japan's steady territorial expansion and on the suggestive augmentation of her naval and military establishments. France, constantly seeking new markets, views with thinly veiled apprehension Japan's attempts to attain political and commercial domination in China. Nor is Germany likely either to forget or forgive the conquest of Tsingtau and her former insular possessions in the Pacific. Not only has Japan aroused the suspicions of the white races, but she has antagonized and alienated the yellow races who are her nearest neighbors. As a result she found herself, at the opening of the Washington Conference, as completely isolated, as universally distrusted, as was Germany at the beginning of 1914.

The Japanese have been hurt and bewildered by this world-wide suspicion. Yet, instead of attempting to win back the good-will of the West, which was theirs until little more than a decade ago, by giving convincing proofs of their peaceable intentions; instead of making an effort to regain the confidence of half a billion Chinese and Russians by a prompt withdrawal from their soil and abstention from further interference in their affairs, the Japanese made

the psychological blunder of adopting an attitude of stubbornness and defiance. They replied to criticisms by embarking on a military program which, had it been adhered to, would have made them the greatest military power on earth. Their naval plans called for a neck-and-neck shipbuilding race with the United States; they had steadily strengthened their occupational forces on the mainland of Asia, instead of showing a disposition to withdraw them. They seemed utterly incapable of realizing that the world has, in its millions of soldier dead and its billions of war debt, the very best of reasons for being suspicious of imperialistic nations; that it is in no mood to tolerate anything savoring of militarism. The peoples of the world had hoped that those dread specters, militarism and imperialism, had passed with the Hohenzollerns, never to return. Is it any wonder, then, that they viewed with distrust a nation which, judged by its actions, seemed bent on recalling them? This distrust of Japanese intentions was largely dispelled, however, by Japan's concurrence in the Hughes program for the limitation of naval armaments.

V

The key to Japanese militarism and imperialism is to be found in the dual government that exists in Japan. It is another case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, but the victim of this dual personality, instead

of being an individual, is a nation. There is the constitutional government, functioning in the open, normal, aboveboard, conciliatory, presumably sincere. But behind it, in the shadows, lurks a cloaked and mysterious government, furtive, untrustworthy, predacious, wholly evil. Unfortunately for Japan and for the world, this invisible government is the more powerful of the two. Times without number the Dr. Jekyll government has adopted some altruistic course of action only to have the Mr. Hyde government step in and, by an exertion of its mysterious power, set it all at naught. It is a most curious and complicated situation, without parallel in any other country in the world. Let me see if I can explain it, for its clear and complete comprehension is absolutely essential to an intelligent understanding of those tortuous and seemingly contradictory policies pursued by Japan in her relations with foreign nations, which have so perplexed and alarmed the world.

To begin with, you must understand that Japan is nominally governed by a constitutional government, consisting of a cabinet, a legislative assembly known as the Diet, and a civil bureaucracy composed of the chiefs of the various administrative departments and their subordinates. This is the government with which the world is familiar. But there is also an invisible government, an unseen empire, composed of a clique of officers holding high rank in the army and navy, certain statesmen with military sympathies and

affiliations, and a few representatives of big business and finance. The constitutional government functions through the cabinet, and, in its relations with foreign nations, through the foreign office, being represented abroad by regularly accredited ambassadors, ministers, and consuls. The invisible government functions through the general staff, its activities abroad being carried on by a great number of secret agents, whose identities can only be guessed at, and by the military attachés attached to the various embassies and legations, who, though ostensibly under the orders of their respective ambassadors and ministers are, in reality, answerable only to the general staff. Japanese policy, particularly in foreign affairs, is invariably shaped by this unseen government, whose wishes are generally translated into action by the constitutional government, on which it is able to exert powerful pressure. The two governments, whose interests are by no means always opposed, are of necessity more or less closely correlated, like interlocking directorates. For example, many of the permanent civil officials of the constitutional government, such as bureau chiefs and the members of their staffs, are drawn from the militaristic clique, which is identical with the unseen government, with which, as might be expected, they work in harmony. Thus it will be seen that, whereas the militarists who compose the invisible government form a bloc bound together by their mutual interests and ambitions and working always in unison, the constitu-

tional government is weakened by the militarists who have insinuated themselves into its organization and who, in the event of a conflict between the constitutional government and the unseen government, invariably lend their power and influence to the latter.

At the head of the Japanese State stands the emperor, generally spoken of by foreigners as the Mikado ("Honorable Gate," a title comparable with Sublime Porte), and by his own subjects as Tennō, or Heavenly King. According to Japanese history, which reckons from 660 B.C., when Jimmu ascended the throne, the present Emperor, Yoshihito, is the one hundred and twenty-second ruler of his line.[1] But as written records do not carry us back further than 712 A.D., the reigns and periods of the early monarchs are more or less apocryphal. Still the fact remains that Japan has been ruled by an unbroken dynasty ever since the dawn of her history, in which respect she is unique among the nations of the world.

The whole scheme of government in Japan is based on the recognition of the divine origin of the emperor. According to popular belief, he is directly descended from the Deity. By the terms of the constitution he combines in himself the rights of sovereignty and exercises the whole of the executive powers, with the advice and assistance of the ten ministers who compose

[1] In December, 1921, owing to the mental condition of the emperor, Crown Prince Hirohito was proclaimed Regent of Japan.

his cabinet. Supplementing the cabinet is the Privy Council, a purely advisory body of thirty-nine members (including the ten cabinet ministers), which is only consulted upon important matters and policies. The emperor is the supreme commander of the army and the navy. He alone can declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties. He convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives. Should a national crisis or an urgent necessity arise when the Diet is not in session, the emperor may issue imperial edicts which take the place of laws, though such edicts must be submitted to the Diet at its next session, when, if not approved, they become invalid. Thus it will be seen that, though Japan is, in theory, a constitutional monarchy, the emperor is vested with virtually absolute power. But it should be added that his absolutism has never degenerated into despotism or tyranny. In fact, he is more or less a figurehead so far as the administration of the government is concerned, dwelling in Olympian aloofness and ruling by proxy. He is regarded by his people not as a temporal ruler, but rather as a patriarch, a demigod, a direct representative of Heaven. In order to strengthen their own position, the militarists who surround the emperor have assiduously encouraged the people in this delusion. They have fostered among the masses the belief that the emperor can do no wrong, that no sacrifice is too great for a son or

daughter of Nippon to make for him, that to so much as question his Heaven-bestowed authority is the apotheosis of sacrilege. From the blind obedience to the sovereign thus created, which involves a curious mixture of religion and patriotism difficult for the Western mind to comprehend, the militarists derive their power.

I have said that, according to the terms of the constitution, the emperor is supposed to exercise the executive power with the advice and assistance of his cabinet. But between the cabinet and the crown stand a rapidly diminishing body of men who are known as the Genro, or Elder Statesmen. This sacred and secret inner circle, as at present constituted, has only two members: Marquis Saionji and Marquis Matsukata. This duumvirate of old men is the mentor and mouthpiece of divinity itself; they, with Field Marshal Uyehara, the chief of the general staff, constitute the occult power which hedges the imperial throne; they are the real rulers of Japan.

Now let me make it clear that the Elder Statesmen are neither appointed nor elected. They have no legal status. They are not recognized by the Japanese constitution or in the laws of Japan. You will find no mention of them in the Japan "Year Book" or other official publications. Indeed, there is no such office as that of Elder Statesman *per se*. Though they control the government, form cabinets, and shape the national policy, they are not officials, save as they are

members of the Privy Council and the House of Peers. They are merely a little group of veteran counselors, representatives of the great clans, who have grown by mere survival and the confidence reposed in them by the emperor to be the most powerful influence in Japan.

Imagine, if you can, a pair of American statesmen —Elihu Root and Henry Cabot Lodge, let us say —attaining such unlimited political power that the President of the United States was their mouthpiece and the heads of the executive departments of the government their obedient instruments, and retaining such power, irrespective of which political party was in the saddle, through administration after administration. That is by no means an exact parallel, but it is the best that I can offer of a situation that is without parallel in any other country.

When the shogunate was abolished in 1868 and the unification of the country under the youthful Emperor Mutsuhito begun, the task of reconstruction was undertaken by the *daimyos,* or feudal nobles. They became the officials of the new government and directed the transformation of Japan into a modern state. The present Genro, then young men, played minor parts in the restoration. But, as the years passed, they gradually ascended the political ladder and, as the older men died or retired from office, they automatically succeeded them, themselves eventually

becoming ministers of the crown. More years slipped by, and they, now old themselves, in turn gave way to younger men. But, in relinquishing office, they did not relinquish their power. Autocrats by training, brought up in an atmosphere of militarism, contemptuously believing with Hegel that "the people is that portion of the state which does not know what it wills," they viewed with deep misgivings the democratic tendencies which were gradually manifesting themselves in the new Japan. They were sincere in their convictions that the safety of the empire was being jeopardized by the growing spirit of democracy among certain elements of the population. They felt that they alone stood between the nation and ruin. Conservatives and reactionaries to the very marrow, they might have said with the French king, *"Après moi le déluge."* So, instead of retiring from public affairs and contenting themselves with an existence of innocuous desuetude, like superannuated European statesmen, they merely shifted their position, withdrawing from the fierce glare that beats upon the front of the throne to the shadows at its rear. From there, themselves unseen, they can see all that happens; they are always at the elbow of the sovereign, who, because he trusts them implicitly, willingly issues as commands the suggestions which they whisper in his ear.

The prerogatives of the crown, as I have already shown, are very great, and they are exercised as the

Elder Statesmen "advise." Ministers rise and fall, but the Genro abide, independent of cabinet and diet alike and beyond the reach of either. There you find the explanation of why the Japanese cabinet does not wield the power of European ministries and why changes of cabinet seldom result in changes of national policy. For, though parties come and go, the Genro remain forever—and the emperor does as they tell him to do. No further explanation is needed, surely, of why Japan, whose government is under the control of a little group of self-appointed and reactionary dictators, is, though greatly advanced for an Asiatic power, still far behind those Western nations whose governments are in the hands of individuals and bodies chosen by the people.

So closely associated with the Elder Statesmen that he might almost be considered one of them is the chief of the general staff, who, everything considered, is probably the most powerful single individual in the empire to-day. His title is really a misnomer, for, whereas in other countries the chief of the general staff is the executive head of the army alone, in Japan the chief of the general staff exercises as much influence in naval, colonial, and foreign affairs as he does in those of the army. He is the actual head of all the armed forces of the empire on land and sea. He occupies much the same position in the invisible government that the premier does in the constitutional government. The only superior authority recognized

by the premier is the emperor; the only superior authority recognized by the chief of the general staff is the Genro. And, as the emperor accepts without question the decisions of the Genro, it follows that the chief of the general staff occupies a position of altogether extraordinary power. I have heard it asserted, indeed, that he can override the decisions of the premier and even force him and his cabinet to resign, but this is probably an exaggeration.

That the chief of staff might be able, with the concurrence of the Elder Statesmen, to wreck a ministry is due to the curious constitution of the Japanese cabinet. Of the ten members of the cabinet, two—the minister of war, who must always be an army officer of a grade not lower than major-general, and the minister of marine, who must always be a naval officer of a grade not lower than rear-admiral—are not answerable for their actions to the premier and frequently act independently of him, being responsible only to the emperor, which, translated, means the Elder Statesmen and the chief of the general staff. As a result of this anomalous situation, these ministers, taking their orders from the chief of the general staff, who has the support of the Genro, who in turn have the support of the emperor, can, and frequently do, defy the premier and block legislation. Due to the constitutional provision that these posts can be held only by military and naval men of high rank, their incumbents always represent the military party and

can be depended upon to consistently oppose any policy of an anti-militaristic nature.

As the members of the cabinet are appointed by the emperor, instead of, as in most European countries, by the premier, it is self-evident that the ministers of war and marine are always *persona gratissima* to the Elder Statesmen and the chief of the general staff. The remaining members of the cabinet, including the premier, though they may not always be *persona grata,* or even entirely acceptable, to that august and all-powerful quartet, are rarely openly hostile to it, for the very good reason, as the *Jiji Shimpo,* the *Times* of Japan, puts it, that "In this country the work of cabinet-making is at present in the hands of the Elder Statesmen." It is scarcely probable, then, that the Genro, whose advice the sovereign invariably accepts in such matters, would give their approval to the appointment of a minister who was likely to antagonize them. This is not saying, however, that all of the present members of the cabinet meet with the unqualified approval of the Genro, or that they represent the latter's views. Certain of them, indeed, are supposed to be in opposition to the principles for which the Genro stand. But the Genro are fully awake to the growing power of public opinion and are far too shrewd to alienate it by refusing to sanction the appointment as minister of a man possessed of a powerful popular backing, even if his views do not concur with their own. But this

much can be said: If a cabinet minister dared to defy the Elder Statesmen or the chief of the general staff on some really vital question, if he consistently obstructed their policies, he would almost certainly be forced to resign. For, in a contest between the cabinet and the militarists, the latter always win.

The procedure followed by the military party in wrecking a cabinet is as simple as it is effective. If it does not approve of the cabinet's policy, the Genro and the chief of the general staff send for the minister of war and tell him to resign. The premier, who, as I have already explained, is limited by law in his selection of a successor to the retiring minister, offers the portfolio in turn to one after another of the small group of army officers who, by virtue of their rank, are eligible to accept it under the provisions of the constitution. Having been coached in advance by the chief of the general staff, each of them politely declines. Thereupon the prime minister is compelled to admit his inability to complete his cabinet. In Japan such an admission is tantamount to withdrawal from public life, whereupon the emperor offers the vacant premiership to some statesman more willing to accept the dictation of the militarists.

The correspondent of the *New York Herald,* Mr. Louis Seibold, has quoted "one of the most progressive of Japanese leaders" as saying, in this connection:

The general staff of Japan is quite as powerful as was the general staff that induced the German kaiser to make war upon the rest of the world. The Japanese General Staff controls the mental processes of the emperor to an even greater extent than was true in Germany in 1914. It, in turn, controls the cabinet. The minister of war, instead of being the master of the general staff, is its servant. It says to him, "You provide us with the recruits, war material, and supplies, and we will decide what to do with all these things. It is not for you to say." That is precisely what the general staff, with the consent of the emperor, told Premier Hara's cabinet a few weeks ago, when the wisdom of deferring to universal sentiment regarding the military activities of the government in Shantung and Siberia was broached. In other words, the general staff told the government to mind its own business, which it did not consider to be of a military character.

It might be supposed that, when the militarists thus attempt to dictate to the constitutional government, the Diet would promptly bring them to terms by refusing to vote the appropriations necessary for the maintenance of the military establishment. And that is exactly what would happen in most Western countries. But not so in Japan. For the militarists long since foresaw and guarded against just such a contingency by inserting in the constitution an article providing that budgets can be automatically reënacted from year to year. Article 71 of the Japanese Constitution reads as follows: "When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget for the preceding year."

Moreover, as the militarists have direct access to the emperor and to the funds of the imperial household, which is the richest in the world, they never lack for money. Indeed, when all is said and done, it is they who hold the national purse-strings. It will be seen, therefore, that the late progressive premier, Mr. Hara, was in a trying and none too strong position. The military party and the forces of reaction, as typified by the Genro and the chief of the general staff, had too much power for him. Nothing is more indicative of the increasing strength of democracy in Japan than the fact that Premier Hara, himself a progressive and a man of the people, remained in office as long as he did.

The effect on foreign opinion of the constant usurpation of power by the invisible government is clearly recognized by the liberal element in Japan, as witness a recent editorial in the *Yomi-Yuri Shimbun:*

> It is regrettable that the declarations of the Japanese Government are often not taken seriously. The Powers regard Japan as a country that does n't mean what it says. The most important reasons for this will be found in the actions of the militarists, whose utterances are the cause of the Government's attitude being misunderstood abroad. Unless the militarist evil is stamped out, a hundred declarations disavowing territorial ambitions will not be able to convince the Powers.

The repeated failures to keep her agreements, which have cost Japan the confidence of other nations,

FUJIYAMA, THE SACRED MOUNTAIN, AND FUJI RIVER

SUNSET IN SHIBA PARK, TOKYO

A RELIGIOUS PROCESSION IN KIOTO

are not due to hypocrisy or insincerity on the part of the Japanese Government. They are due to the fact that the government is constantly flouted and overridden by the military party. Japan's failure to abide by her promise to evacuate Siberia upon the withdrawal of the American and European troops provides a case in point. This commitment was made to the United States and her European associates by the constitutional government of Japan as represented by Premier Hara. But the militarists wished Japan to remain in Siberia for reasons of their own, so, at the very time the premier was notifying the Western Powers of Japan's intention to withdraw her Siberian garrisons, the general staff, unknown to the premier, was rushing troops north to reënforce them.

The militarists placed the constitutional government in an almost equally embarrassing situation in Korea. Premier Hara, stirred to action by the excesses of the Japanese soldiery, issued orders that the military forces in Korea should be subordinated to the civil authorities, but the military men, secure in a knowledge of their power, virtually refused to obey these orders, doing everything that they dared to obstruct the newly appointed governor-general, Baron Saito, in carrying out the promised reforms.

It is the military party, again, that applies the screws to the distracted government of China, com-

pelling it to grant to Japanese firms concessions of one kind and another which give Japan virtually complete control in the regions where the concessions are operative. It is the military party that buys up the Chinese generals and politicians, hatches the plots, and directs the propaganda that produce the sporadic revolutions which are tearing China to pieces.

This continued exercise of irresponsible authority by the military party is the most important and the most dangerous factor in the whole Japanese Question. Until the invisible government is suppressed in favor of the constitutional government, there can be no real hope of a satisfactory understanding between the United States and Japan. A democracy like ours cannot do business with a government that is masked; we must know with whom we are dealing. The high-minded and progressive statesmen who composed the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Conference were unquestionably sincere when they disavowed for their country any militaristic ambitions. But it remains to be seen whether the militarists will support them. For we can no more trust the militarists of Tokio than we could trust the militarists of Potsdam. We do not speak the same language. Our standards of honor are not the same. If Japan sincerely desires the friendship of the United States, then she must give valid assurances that the promises of her government will henceforward be binding on her military, as well as her civil agents.

Let me resume, now, my explanation of the structure and mechanism of the Japanese Government. The Diet, like the American Congress, consists of two branches—the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. The House of Peers, which, according to the late Marquis Ito, is intended to "represent the higher grades of society," is composed of the members of the imperial family, the nobility, and one hundred and twenty-four imperial nominees, the latter including forty-five representatives of the largest taxpayers. These last, who are mostly rich merchants and wealthy landowners, are elected for seven years, one from each prefecture, by the fifteen male inhabitants thereof who pay the greatest amount of taxes. The balance of the imperial nominees are for the most part government officials appointed by the emperor for life upon the recommendation of the cabinet. As might be expected, they are strongly bureaucratic in their sympathies. Notwithstanding the fact that the moneyed element of the empire is well represented, the House of Peers is not a plutocratic body. Neither is it a stronghold of the landed interests, like the British House of Lords. Essentially aristocratic, it represents the interests of the clans, the nobles, the bureaucrats, and the military classes.

The members of the House of Representatives, which is the lower branch of the Diet, are elected by the people. By the provisions of the election law, as revised in March, 1919, every male Japanese who is

not less than twenty-five years of age and who pays a direct annual tax of not less than three yen ($1.50) —instead of fifteen yen ($7.50), as formerly—can vote for the members of the lower house, who are known as deputies. This law increased the number of possible voters from about half a million to nearly three million; that is, about one out of every nineteen Japanese now possesses voting privileges, instead of one in every eighty-seven, as was the case under the old statute. The astonishing increase in the number of qualified voters effected by a reduction of six dollars in the tax franchise provides a striking illustration of the dire poverty of the Japanese masses. Even more astonishing, from a Western viewpoint, is the utter indifference to the franchise displayed by both the voting and the non-voting population. The truth of the matter is that the great mass of the people are too heavily burdened with taxation, too busily engaged in the struggle for the bare necessities of life, to concern themselves with politics. This explains why there is almost no public opinion, as we understand the term, in Japan. Though, under the provisions of the constitution, the Japanese taxpayer has a voice in the government of the country, he is seldom able to raise it above a whisper.

Again, those of the masses who do take some interest in politics are, generally speaking, quite satisfied with the present situation. Looking back, they compare the Japan of feudal days with the present

powerful empire, and, marking the progress that has been made, they are quite content to let it continue. As a result of this indifference on the part of the masses, there is no check on the ruling classes, which, believing with von Rochow in "the limited intelligence of subjects," find no difficulty in keeping the reins of power in their own hands. It must be admitted, however, that in the main they have ruled in the national interest. Everything considered, the present organization of the state is a great advance from the feudalism which it supplanted, and it gives Japan a remarkably efficient and flexible administration. But, without taking an unpardonable liberty with the truth, present-day Japan cannot be called democratic. It is a government *for* rather than *by* or *of* the people.

VI

I have now sketched in outline the double-barreled administration which rules Japan, where two distinct governments—one constitutional and aboveboard, the other unconstitutional and unseen—exist and function side by side. I have also made it reasonably clear, I hope, that the constitutional government, were it free from outside influences, would be democratic in its tendencies and pacific in its policies, whereas the invisible government is autocratic, militaristic, aggressive, and reactionary. Broadly speak-

ing, one stands for the ballot, the other for the bullet.

It might be supposed that the former, having the constitution behind it, would be in the strongest position. But such is not the case. For the unseen government has behind it the Elder Statesmen, who, through their influence with the emperor, are able to override the constitution. Furthermore, as its moving spirits include the highest officers of the army and the navy, it has complete control of the armed forces of the empire; it has the allegiance of the great captains of industry and finance; and it represents the clans. The position of the unseen government is still further buttressed by the attitude of the proletariate, in whose eyes it stands for military glory and natural expansion—a bulwark against foreign aggression.

This invisible government is not a modern development; it goes back into Japanese history for centuries. It dates from the days of the shogunate, when the emperor was the titular ruler and the shogun the actual ruler of Japan. The power of the shogun was made possible by the support of the great military clans, which were the forerunners of the military party of to-day. When it is remembered that the Elder Statesmen, all the officers of the army and navy, and most of the higher officials of the government are members of these clans, it is not difficult to understand the ascendancy of the militarists in Japanese politics. For example, nearly all the members of the military clique belong to the Chosu clan, while

the navy clique is recruited from the Satsuma clan. Thus it comes about that the policy of the government in fundamental matters is dictated and controlled by men who represent the warrior clans, abetted by a few men who, though not themselves clansmen, are in sympathy with the policies for which they stand.

Though close observers have detected of late a noticeable change in the attitude of the younger generation of Japanese toward the emperor, who is no longer venerated as he was by past generations; and though, with the spread of education and the consequent growth of democratic ideas, the anti-militarist party is steadily—though slowly—gaining ground, to talk glibly, as certain American visitors to Japan have done, of Japanese militarism being on its last legs is to betray profound ignorance of actual conditions. Were the system of unseen government merely transitory, it might easily yield before the pressure of education and enlightened public opinion. But it is not transitory. Its tentacles sink deep into the traditions of the nation. It would be strange, indeed, if the militarists were not dominant in Japan, for the whole history of the country is punctuated by wars, feuds, and rebellions;[1] it climbed to its present position as one of the great powers on the guns of its battleships

[1] It should be noted, however, that for two hundred and fifty years, under the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan had no wars, civil or foreign. Perhaps no other nation of virile character can boast a period of such length entirely free from strife. E. A. P.

and the bayonets of its soldiers; it has always been ruled by military men. Though in the last fifty years the Japanese have reared an imposing governmental structure, apparently built on constitutional lines, you will find upon examination that it is founded on the bed-rock of stern and uncompromising militarism.[1]

In order that you may have a clear comprehension of how this came about, let us take a hasty survey of the events leading up to the Restoration of 1868. Until that time, you will understand, the politico-social conditions prevailing in Japan approximated those which characterized the Europe of the Middle Ages. The emperor was a spiritual rather than a temporal ruler, a sort of high priest, an object of awe and veneration, dwelling in his great moated castle in Kioto in magnificent seclusion. In certain respects his position might be likened to that now occupied by the Pope at Rome. So far as the practical work of government was concerned, he was only an abstraction. The real power was in the hands of a military dictator, known as the shogun. This title originated in 1192, when the Emperor Takahira made one of his generals, Yorimoto, a *Sei-i-tai-shogun* (literally, "barbarian-subjugating generalissimo"), or commander-in-chief, and this office became stereotyped in the persons of successive great military leaders until, in 1603, Iyeyasu Tokugawa became shogun and estab-

[1] A high Japanese official to whom I submitted the proofs of this chapter writes, "Instead, we think it was Western militarism that made us militaristic." E. A. P.

lished the dynasty which bore his name. For more than two centuries and a half the shogunate remained in the Tokugawa family, the shoguns, though in theory subordinate to the emperor, exercising the *de facto* sovereignty in Japan.

Ruling under and with the permission of the shogun, who held them in subjection with an iron hand, were the *daimyos,* the chieftains of the various clans. In the course of centuries these great feudal chieftains had become as powerful as the Norman barons who crossed with William the Conqueror into England. They lived in fortress-like castles in medieval arrogance and splendor; they maintained miniature armies; they made and executed their own laws; they exercised the rights of high justice, the middle, and the low; they grew rich from the labors of an oppressed and exploited peasantry; in their own territories their will was supreme. Each of these feudal lords collected the revenues of his fief and used them as he saw fit, subject to the sole condition that he maintain a body of troops proportionate to his holdings and income. The *daimyos* recruited these military contingents from the *samurai,* or fighting men, of their respective clans. These retainers occupied a position in the social scale somewhat below that of the knights of the Middle Ages but considerably above that of the men-at-arms. Armed, armored, and highly trained for war, each of them was entitled to wear two swords as a symbol of his station, very

much as the European knights were distinguished by their golden spurs. Enjoying innumerable prerogatives, they formed a class by themselves, shaping their conduct in strict accordance with the rules laid down in the celebrated code of *Bushido*—the Ways of the Fighting Man. But for the common people there was no *Bushido*. They had no rights, save the right to work. They were looked upon merely as machines for grinding out wealth for the support of the *daimyos* and the pay of the *samurai*.

Japan has made such amazing progress along modern lines in the last fifty years that it is difficult for us to realize that these medieval conditions persisted until well past the middle of the last century. General William Verbeck, the son of that Dr. Guido Verbeck who was the most celebrated of the early American missionaries sent to Japan, has told me that one of the clearest recollections of his boyhood is of a force of *samurai*, clad in full armor, encamping on his father's grounds. At about the time that the revolver and the repeating rifle were making their appearance in the West, the arms and armor of the Middle Ages were still in use by the fighting men of Nippon.

When the nineteenth century reached the halfway mark, therefore, the actual government of the country was still in the hands of a Tokugawa shogun. Satsuma and Chosu were the two most powerful clans. But the arrival in 1853 of Commodore Perry's

squadron with the demand that Japan open her gates to foreign commerce; followed in 1861 by the bombardment of the Satsuma capital, Kagoshima, by British men-o'war; and by the destruction in 1864 of the Chosu ships and fortifications at Shimonoseki by a fleet of British, French, Dutch, and American warships, brought the great feudal chieftains to an abrupt realization of the nation's weakness and of the shogunate's inability to successfully resist foreign aggression. This unwelcome discovery was accompanied by a recognition of the fact that Japan's only hope of preserving her independence lay in the immediate abolition of the shogunate and the reorganization of the government under the emperor along modern lines. The hopelessness of the situation, if the dual form of government was persisted in, was made clear in a memorial addressed to Yoshinobu, the last of the shoguns, who, on October 14, 1867, gave convincing proof of his patriotism by placing his resignation in the hands of his sovereign, the fifteen-year-old Mutsuhito. The young emperor was brought from Kioto, the old capital, to Tokio, the new capital, where the *daimyos* laid their privileges and possessions at his feet. This act of self-renunciation has been deservedly applauded by the historians, yet, as a matter of fact, it was a sacrifice of form rather than of substance. For the youthful sovereign, thus suddenly restored to power, must have ministers, so, in the very nature of things, the higher offices of the new govern-

ment were allotted to the former *daimyos*—now become, under the new order of things, princes, marquises, counts, and barons—while the less important posts went to their *samurai* retainers. It could hardly have been otherwise, for at that period the *daimyos* and *samurai*—that is, the nobles and the fighting men—were the only classes possessed of the necessary education and training. Thus the leaders of the great clans stepped almost automatically into positions of leadership and power in the reorganized state, while their retainers, now become subordinate officials in the new government, continued to give allegiance to their former chieftains and to obey their commands, just as they did in the old feudal days. But, though the ex-*daimyos* and the former *samurai* laid aside their armor with the dawning of the new era, though they exchanged the pike for the pen, they remained at heart military men. For a leopard cannot change its spots. Thus was born the military autocracy which rules Japan to-day, and the no less military bureaucracy which supports it.

With such training and traditions, it was not surprising that the Japanese of the ruling classes early became convinced that the development of a powerful nation depended upon the development and maintenance of a powerful army and navy. It would have been more surprising had they thought otherwise. Now the militarists realized that they would have no difficulty in carrying out their policies as long as they

could keep the reins of power in their hands, but they also realized that, should the people ever get control of the government, their schemes for building up a great military machine were certain to meet with serious opposition. For the people could be counted on to grudge the vast sums which the militarists deemed necessary for an adequate system of national defense. Let it be clear, however, that in working for the upbuilding of a huge military machine, the militarists were working for what they firmly believed to be the highest interests of the nation. For, whatever else may be said of them, it must be admitted that they are genuinely patriotic men, even if their ideas of what constitutes patriotism are not the same as ours. They are perfectly sincere in their conviction that Japan's safety from foreign aggression requires the maintenance of military and naval establishments second to none. Compared with this question, all other questions, to their way of thinking, are of negligible importance. In order to make certain, therefore, that, in the event of the people gaining control of the government, the nation should always have adequate means of defense, they devised a scheme which has proved as effective as it is ingenious. At the direction of the Elder Statesmen (whose *doyen,* Prince Yamagata, was regarded as the head of the military party) the emperor issued a decree providing that laws relating to certain phases of the national defense need not be submitted to the Diet, but

could become operative upon receiving the approval of the crown. It was likewise provided that regarding such matters the members of the Diet did not even have the right to ask questions. This freed the minister of war and the minister of marine from the necessity of consulting the premier on military and naval matters. Instead, they can carry such matters straight to the emperor, who, guided by the Elder Statesmen, is certain to do as the militarists advise. In other words, the militarists in some degree enjoy a law-making power of their own. Not only that, but they are able to carry out their plans in absolute secrecy, for under such a system not even the premier himself knows what is going on within the inner circle. The militarists guard their secrets from those members of their own government who are not in sympathy with them as zealously as they guard them from the agents of foreign nations. So fearful are they, indeed, lest their plans should become known to the constitutional government that, when the military leaders are received in audience by the emperor, the precaution is taken of substituting a military aide-de-camp for the civilian court chamberlain who is customarily in attendance on the sovereign. Thus the premier, the cabinet, the Diet, and the people are kept in profound ignorance of many important decisions. For example, it is asserted that the Chinese Government has frequently made representations to the foreign office in Tokio relative to the actions of

Japanese officials in China, only to find that the foreign office was totally ignorant of the whole matter.

"The result," as Professor Yoshino, one of the foremost political students and publicists in Japan, has said, "is that the cabinet and people of Japan are held responsible for things done in China, Korea, and other places of which the government and the people have not the slightest knowledge. Because of this dual government, Japan has been greatly misunderstood by America and other foreign nations, as the military, being the most powerful, is the Japan known to the outside world."

Let me see, now, if I can give you a concrete illustration of how this system of dual government works in practice. Let us suppose that the American Government favors the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia, leaving the Russians to work out their own salvation. A note to this effect is despatched by the secretary of state to the American Ambassador at Tokio, who in turn transmits it to the premier, as the responsible head of the Japanese Government. The premier calls a meeting of his cabinet and submits the note for consideration. If the cabinet agrees to the American suggestion the premier directs the minister of war to issue the necessary orders to the chief of the general staff for the withdrawal of the troops in Siberia, at the same time instructing the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to inform the secretary of

state that the suggestion of the American Government has been approved and that the troops will be withdrawn forthwith. Had Japan a normal system of government, like that of England or France or Italy, that would end the matter. But Japan has not a normal system of government. For the invisible government now steps in. The minister of war, who, as I have already explained, is always a general, loses no time in informing the Elder Statesmen and the chief of the general staff of the cabinet's action. They disapprove of what the cabinet has done. Being militarists, they believe that the best interests of Japan will be served by strengthening, rather than relaxing, her grip on Siberia. So the emperor, acting on the advice of the Elder Statesmen, summons the minister of war and directs him to despatch an additional division of troops to Siberia forthwith. The minister of war so directs the chief of the general staff, who promptly issues the necessary orders, and the deed is done. All this is done, mind you, without consulting the premier and without his knowledge. The first intimation that he has that his policy has been reversed by the militarists, and his promise to the American Government broken, is when he reads the news despatches from Washington announcing that the Japanese Government has gone back on its word and that, instead of withdrawing its garrisons in Siberia, as it had solemnly agreed to do, it is secretly pouring more troops into that region. It is obvious that the con-

stitutional government of Japan cannot justly be blamed for this sort of thing. The men who make the promises are not those who break them. It is not Dr. Jekyll who is insincere; it is Mr. Hyde.

To again quote Professor Yoshino:

"Of course this scheme of a double government is not constitutional. It ought to be easily broken up. As a matter of fact, in the government itself, certainly in the present cabinet and among the people, the opposition to this scheme is very strong and very pronounced. But it is very difficult to be undertaken. The stronger the opposition among the people becomes, the stronger the opposition of the militarists. Their whole attitude is that whatever is best for Japan is the thing that is to be done, no matter who or what is sacrificed. Their aim is to make Japan powerful and to insure her influence as a nation. If that means that China or Korea is to be sacrificed, it is unavoidable."

VII

Though the Japanese are gradually becoming more democratic in their tendencies; though the number of young men, mostly students, who realize where the militarists are leading the nation, is steadily increasing; let us not delude ourselves into thinking that the disappearance of militarism is a probability of the near future. That it will eventually dis-

appear is as certain as that dawn follows the dark. But it may take a generation or even longer. At present the militarists are too strongly intrenched for a public opinion as feeble as that of Japan to disturb, much less dislodge them. Certainly there seems to me little justification for the prediction recently made by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, American Minister to China, that Japan will be a democracy in twenty years. That the militarists will remain in the ascendant during the lifetime of the Elder Statesmen there can be but little doubt. Not until the grip of those aged dictators has been relaxed by death is the power of the militarists likely to wane. Nor is there any certainty that it will wane then; for in recent years their power has been immensely strengthened by a force far mightier and more sinister than that of the Genro. I refer to the force of organized capital, of big business. As Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, one of the shrewdest and best-informed students of Far Eastern politics has pointed out, it is big business which has reinforced and is keeping in power the unseen government—the military party.

Only recently has modern industrial Japan awakened to a realization of its own strength. But it is now fully alive to the almost unlimited power, the endless possibilities, to be realized by the great business interests of the country joining hands with the militarists and working with them for a common purpose. One who could trace through the political structure of the

empire the ramifications of the great industrial and trading companies would be in a position to analyze Japanese politics, domestic and foreign. Those actions of the Japanese Government which are usually attributed by foreigners to the ambitions of the militarists are in reality quite as frequently due to the predacity of the capitalists. Here you have the key to the annexation of Korea, to Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Siberia, to the unreasonable demands made on China, to the opposition to the restoration of Shantung. All of those regions are immensely rich in natural resources, they offer unlimited opportunities for profitable exploitation. And it is Japanese big business which proposes to do the exploiting. So, in order that it may obtain control of the territories which it proposes to exploit, it has joined forces with the land-hungry militarists. It is the most sinister combination of high politics and big business that the world has ever seen.

Consider for a moment what similar but far less powerful combinations have achieved in other parts of the world. It was the influence of the Rhodes-Beit-Barnato interests, remember, that was chiefly instrumental in inducing England to embark on her conquest of the Transvaal, thereby bringing under the unchallenged control of British capitalists the diamond mines of Kimberley and the gold-diggings of the Rand. It was the interests of the great Westphalian firm of Mannesmann Brothers in the mines

of Morocco which led to Germany's naval demonstration off Agadir. It was the greed of Muscovite capitalists for further concessions in Manchuria and Korea which precipitated the war between Russia and Japan. It was the avarice of French capitalists, far more than the persecutions of French missionaries, which led to the tricolor being raised over Indo-China. It was American sugar interests which brought about the annexation of Hawaii and American oil interests which have helped to shape our policy toward Mexico. And in the ambition of Japanese big business to control and exploit the mines, forests, grain-fields, railways, and markets of Eastern Asia is found the explanation of Japan's policy of expansion by military force. The expansion may be commercial or territorial, and the force may be used or merely threatened, but the policy, and the influences which shape the policy, are the same.

Dominating Japanese business and finance are a few great corporations—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Okura, Sumimoto, Kuhara, Takata, Furukawa. So much larger than the others that they are in a class by themselves are the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies, owned respectively by the Mitsui and Iwasaki families. Indeed, it is a common saying in Japan that no one knows where Mitsui ends and the government begins. Their tentacles sink deep into every phase of national life—commercial, industrial, financial, political. They own banks. railways, steamship lines, mills, factories,

dockyards, mines, forests, fisheries, plantations, insurance companies, trading corporations. They and the leaders of the unseen government—the military party—are as closely bound together by political, financial, and family ties as were the Chicago packers before the dissolution of their monopoly. They are as intertwined by marriage, mutual interests, and interlocking directorates as President Wilson boasted that the Treaty of Versailles was intertwined with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Each of these great companies, according to Mr. Peffer, has its political, financial, or family alliance with the leaders of the unseen government. For example, the late Marquis Okuma, one of the Elder Statesmen, was related by marriage to the Iwasakis, who, as I have said, own the great house of Mutsubishi. Another of the Elder Statesmen, Marquis Matsukata, is adviser to one of these industrial dynasties, while his third son, Kojiro Matsukata, is the head of the great Kawasaki shipbuilding plant at Kobe, where more than one dreadnought has been built for the government. The late Marquis Inoue, who held in turn the portfolios of agriculture and commerce, home affairs, finance, and foreign affairs, was closely connected with the house of Mitsui. The late Field-Marshal Terauchi, at one time Prime Minister of Japan and one of the foremost leaders of the military party, was equally close to Okura, a relationship which explains that house's success in obtaining

highly profitable army contracts as well as important concessions in the Japanese spheres of influence on the mainland. Baron Shibusawa, whom they call "the Rockefeller of Japan," has long been on the most intimate terms with Prince Tokugawa, the President of the House of Peers, having gone to Europe as the companion of the prince and his brother as long ago as 1868. And so with the highest military men of the empire and the leading statesmen. Each has his relationship to some great financial house, to some captain of industry. Big business uses these affiliations with the militarists to obtain for their schemes the support and coöperation of the unseen government. And by the same token the unseen government is enormously strengthened by the support of big business. It is like a crossruff at bridge.

VIII

"Japan's future lies oversea." In those four words is found the policy of the military-financial combination which rules the empire. The annexation of Formosa and Korea and Sakhalin, the occupation of Manchuria and Siberia and Shantung, are not, as the world supposes, examples of haphazard land-grabbing. They are phases of a vast and carefully-laid scheme which has as its ultimate object the control of all Eastern Asia. Ostensibly to solve the problems with which she has been confronted

by her amazing increase in population and production, but in reality to gratify the greed of big business and the restless ambitions of the military party, Japan has embarked on a campaign of world-expansion and exploitation. Convinced that she requires a colonial empire in her business, she has set out to build one up as she would build a dry-dock or a bridge. The fact that she had nothing, or next to nothing, to start with did not discourage her at all. Having once made up her mind that the realization of her political, economic, and territorial ambitions necessitated the acquirement of overseas dominions, she has permitted nothing to stand in the way of her getting them. Land and trade-hunger and the lust for power have whipped her on. So, wherever a pretext can be provided for raising a flag-staff, whether on an ice-floe in the Arctic or on an atoll in the Pacific, there the Rising Sun flag shall flutter; wherever trade is to be found, there Yokohama cargo-boats shall drop their anchors, there Osaka engines shall thunder over Kobe rails, there Kioto silks and Nagoya cottons shall be sold by merchants speaking the language of Dai Nippon. It is a scheme astounding in its very vastness, as methodically planned and as systematically executed as an American presidential campaign; and already, thanks to Japanese audacity, aggressiveness, and perseverance, backed by Japanese banks, battleships, and bayonets, it is much nearer realization than the world dreams.

In China, Siberia, and the Philippines, in California, Canada, and Mexico, in the East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand, on three continents and on all the islands of the Eastern seas, Japanese merchants and money are working twenty-four hours a day to build up that overseas empire of which the financiers and the militarists dream. The activities of these outposts of trade are as varied as trade itself. Their voices are heard in every Eastern market-place; their footsteps resound in every avenue of Oriental endeavor. Their mines in Siberia and Manchuria and China rival the cave of Al-ed-Din. The railways that converge on Peking from the north and east, the great trunk-line across Manchuria, and the eastern section of the trans-Siberian system are already in their hands. They work tea plantations in China, coffee plantations in Java, rubber plantations in Malaya, cocoanut plantations in Borneo, hemp plantations in the Philippines, spice plantations in the Celebes, sugar plantations in Hawaii, prune orchards in California, apple orchards in Oregon, dairy-farms in British Columbia, coal-mines in Manchuria, gold-mines in Korea, forests in Siberia, fisheries in Kamchatka. Their argosies, flying the house-flags of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha, the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, and a score of other lines, bear Japanese goods to Japanese traders on every seaboard of the world, while Japanese warships are constantly aprowl up and down the Eastern seas, ready to pro-

tect the interests thus created by the menace of their guns.

In regions where Japanese banks have been established and Japanese traders have settled, it is seldom difficult for Japan to find an excuse for aggression. It may be that a Japanese settler is mistreated or a Japanese consul insulted, or that a Japanese bank has difficulty in collecting its loans. So the slim cables flash the complaint to Tokyo; there are secret consultations between the leaders of the military party and the chieftains of big business; a spokesman of the unseen government rises in the Diet to announce that in Siberia or China Japanese interests have been imperilled or Japanese dignity affronted; the newspapers controlled by big business inflame the national resentment; the aged trio behind the throne, speaking in the name of the emperor, issue the necessary orders to the ministers of war and marine and to the chief of the general staff; and before the offending country awakens to a realization of what is happening, Japanese transports are at anchor in her harbors and Japanese troops are disembarking on her shores. Before they are withdrawn,—if they are withdrawn,—Japan usually succeeds in extorting a concession to build a railway, or to work a coal-mine, or to contract a loan, or a ninety-nine year lease of a harbor which can be converted into a naval base, or the cession of a more or less valuable strip of territory—and so the work of building up an overseas empire goes steadily on.

This territorial expansion (or rather, the spirit of aggression which has inspired it and the readiness to advance it by the employment of military force) has naturally aroused foreign suspicion of Japan's intentions. In less than a quarter of a century we have seen the area of the empire increased by nearly eighty per cent.—and every foot of this new territory was won by the sword. We have seen Formosa and the Pescadores filched, as spoils of war, from a helpless China. We have witnessed the annexation of Korea against the wishes of its people. We have seen Manchuria become Japanese in fact, if not in name. We have watched first Southern and then Northern Sakhalin brought under the rule of Tokyo. We have seen Japan, not content with the seizure of the German possessions on the Shantung Peninsula, push her garrisons two hundred and fifty miles into the interior of China. We have noted Japan's reluctance to permit the neutralization of Yap. We have even heard of Japanese agents at work in Outer Mongolia, at the court of the Living Buddha. To-day Japan has a chain of forts, garrisons, naval bases and coaling stations stretching from the mid-Pacific to mid-Asia, from the ice of the Arctic to the fierce heat of the Line. Her guns watch the whole eastern seaboard of the continent. The strategic railways converging on Peking, the Manchurian trunk-line, and the eastern section of the trans-Siberian system are in her hands. Sakhalin and Hokkaido on the north guard

the approaches to Kamchatka and the rich basin of the Amur. Port Arthur, Chemulpo, and Tsing-tau are Japanese watchdogs at the gateways to the vast undeveloped wealth of Northern China. Kyushu and Formosa look out on the populous and fertile littoral which stretches from Shanghai to Canton. Her naval bases in the Pescadores are within easy striking distance of the Philippines. And, a thousand miles out in the Pacific, the Marshall, the Caroline, and the Bonin groups form her eastern skirmish line. Is it a matter for surprise, then, that our suspicions and apprehensions have been aroused by this steady and implacable Japanese advance? The Japanese resent these suspicions and apprehensions as unjustified. My answer to that is: Let them look at the map.

IX

Japan finds herself to-day in a most difficult and perplexing situation. With her population increasing at the rate of nearly three quarters of a million annually, and with less than fifteen per cent. of her soil capable of cultivation, her government finds itself faced by three grave and pressing problems: the first, that of finding sources from which to obtain the raw materials with which to keep her factory-wheels turning; the second, that of finding markets for her manufactured products; the third, that of finding room for

the expansion of her surplus population. Barred by legislation from North America and Australia, she has found on the mainland of Asia—in China proper, in Manchuria, and to a lesser degree in Mongolia and Siberia—suitable fields for colonial, industrial, and commercial expansion. But the energetic, aggressive, and at times unscrupulous methods which she has pursued in these regions have brought her into sharp conflict with American interests, with American moral sentiment, and particularly with the American policy of the Open Door. American opinion appears to be fairly evenly divided as to the attitude which should be adopted by the United States in regard to Japan's claims of preponderant rights and "special interests" on the Asian mainland, one section (which is strongly pro-Chinese) insisting that she must be forced to withdraw unconditionally from Chinese and Russian territory; the other holding that, so long as she makes no attempt to shut us out from the markets of those regions which she considers within her sphere of influence, it would be impractical and impolitic for the United States to interfere with her activities on the mainland. These diametrically opposed views are admirably summed up in the following extracts, the first being taken from an editorial in a well-known periodical:[1]

As long ago as the time of the Paris Conference we urged the necessity of giving the Japanese a reasonable outlet in

[1] *Town and Country,* January 1, 1922.

Northern China and Eastern Siberia. We held that it was manifestly impossible to bar the Japanese from the western coast of the twin American continents and all of Australia and New Zealand and the larger islands of the Pacific which are controlled by the English-speaking peoples, and also to prevent her from overflowing onto the mainland of Asia. At least, it was impossible to do this without eventually going to war. We also disagreed entirely with the outcry against the assigning at Paris of the German leases in Shantung to Japan. Japan had exactly the same right to those German assets, which she seized by process of war, as we had to the German ships which we seized in the North River. When, therefore, the Washington Conference takes a course which gives Japan a fairly clean bill of health in the Far East, tacitly allows her a wide field for expansion there, and, in addition, does away with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which, in our view, was a real stumbling block in the way of peace, we need hardly say that our sympathy is all with the action of the Conference. . . . It is entirely reasonable, to our view, that we should give the Japanese a fairly free hand in Northern China and Siberia; at least, it is the business of China, with her four hundred million population, to stop Japan, and not our business.

This is manifestly the expression of a narrow and selfish point of view, being in striking contrast to the following extract from a letter written me, shortly before the opening of the Washington Conference, by a former American diplomatist, a gentleman of distinguished attainments, and, by reason of his long residence in Japan, a recognized authority on Far Eastern affairs:

For us to acknowledge unreservedly Japan's preponderant rights on the Asian mainland and to recognize that Eastern Asia is her political sphere of influence would mean not only a general recognition by us of the validity of spheres of in-

fluence which would be fatal to our foreign policy, but might involve us in a practical approval of what would amount to a partition of China. Such an approval would mean a reversal of our whole attitude toward China, which would be a tragedy to the people of China and would furthermore be a serious political blunder, as we would thus acquiesce in the practical elimination of all our trade with the Orient. Our choice has always seemed to me reasonably simple. We must either maintain our disapproval of spheres of influence or we must surrender our ideals of an open market and play the game with the other Powers, demanding our particular spheres as they demand theirs. This latter position I am confident our people would never support. I realize that Japanese propaganda has endeavored to find an analogy between the Monroe Doctrine and their claim of a paramount interest on the mainland of Asia, but in my judgment there is no such analogy. There is one final reason why I think that this method of averting a conflict between the United States and Japan is not only impractical and impolitic, but also what I venture to term immoral. In effect, it would be appropriating the rights and property of China and Russia and then using them to complete a bargain in the interest of our own exclusion policy! What right have we to bargain away China's sovereignty in Manchuria in order to solve our own controversy with Japan? It strikes me as a form of international embezzlement. And then, worst of all, it simply wouldn't work. It would not leave peace in Asia. It would create problems in the future in which we would be viewed by the Russian and Chinese peoples as co-conspirators in Japan's aggression. . . . Of course, you realize that such a solution is the one that the Japanese ruling class most earnestly desire.

Now it seems to me that, speaking in the language of practical politics, the only feasible solution lies somewhere between these views. For I do not believe that the majority of Americans are selfish enough to endorse the first view any more than I believe that

they are altruistic enough to insist on the latter. Moreover, we must recognize the existence of certain conditions and be prepared to accept them, whether we approve of them or not. For example, we might as well realize first as last that there is not the slightest probability of Japan evacuating the Kwantung peninsula—that is, the leased territories of Dalny and Port Arthur. She is there to stay—make no mistake about that—at least until the expiration of the ninety-nine-year lease which she took over from Russia. This great stronghold at the entrance to the Gulf of Chihli forms a vital link in Japan's scheme of national defense, it has cost her thousands of lives and millions of yen, and there is no more likelihood of her restoring it to China than there is of Great Britain restoring Gibraltar to Spain.

As regards Shantung, the situation is entirely different. The possession of Kiauchau is not vital to the Japanese scheme of national defense nor are the Japanese people particularly attached to it by sentiment. Ever since the Peace Conference at Paris, Japan has realized that, in remaining on the peninsula, she was defying world opinion. Moreover, her statesmen have proclaimed over and over again, in the most unequivocal of terms, that it was Japan's intention to restore the German leasehold to China, and it is hardly conceivable that the nation intends to break the pledge thus given. The truth of the matter is that the delay in the withdrawal of the Japanese has

been largely due to the obstinacy and excessive pride shown by both parties and to petty bickering over the form and details of the transaction. Prophecy in international affairs is always unwise, but I think it safe to predict that the Japanese evacuation of Shantung will have begun before this book is published.

The greatest obstacle in the path of a friendly understanding between Japan and China is provided by Manchuria, where Japan has extensive, varied, and valuable interests—railways, mines, timber, and other concessions—some of which she took over from Russia by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth and others which she has acquired since. She has expended millions of yen on the development of these concessions and there have settled in Manchuria, moreover, a very considerable number of Japanese subjects. And finally, the borders of Manchuria are conterminous with the borders of Korea for nearly a thousand miles. Now, in view of the notorious weakness and instability of the Peking government, which has shown itself powerless to make its authority felt throughout the Eighteen Provinces of the Chinese homeland, much less in the outlying territories, it seems to me too much to expect Japan to renounce her enormously valuable interests in Manchuria, withdraw the guards from her railways, and abandon her nationals and their properties to Chang Tso-lin and his fellow-bandits, who, once the firm hand of Japanese control was removed, would have the land at

their mercy. No one who has a first-hand knowledge of the conditions which prevail in Manchuria can truthfully assert that the substitution of Chinese for Japanese control in that region at this time would be for the best interests of the inhabitants themselves. But this should not be interpreted as meaning that I believe in perpetuating Japan's claims to "special interests" in Manchuria, for I do not. Let the Chinese give convincing proof of their ability to establish a strong and efficient central government, let them put an end to the civil war which is disrupting the republic, let them suppress the misrule, corruption, and brigandage which prevail throughout the Eighteen Provinces, and then they will have substantial grounds for demanding that Japan's privileged position in Manchuria shall be terminated. Manchuria is indubitably Chinese territory, and its complete control should be restored to her as soon as she is in a position to exercise it.

But Japan has not the same justification for her conduct in the Eighteen Provinces that she has had for her policy in Manchuria. Her behavior in the Chinese homeland has been characterized by inexcusable selfishness, arrogance, discrimination, and greed. If she wishes to convince the world that she is sincere in her protestations that she has no designs on Chinese sovereignty, no desire to shut the Open Door, then she should lose no time in withdrawing her troops (she has a garrison as far inland as Hankow) and

her police, in abandoning her post-offices, and in terminating certain offensive agreements which she has coerced the Chinese into accepting. In short, she must conduct herself henceforward like a guest in a friend's house, rather than like a burglar.

On the other hand, so long as Japan confines herself to strictly legitimate methods I fail to see how exception can be taken by the Chinese, or by any one else, to Japanese commercial expansion in China. By commercial expansion I mean the establishment of banks, the flotation of loans, the construction of railways, the operation of mines, and similar industrial activities, provided always that they meet with the approval of the Chinese Government and are conducted in a fashion which in no way imperils the sovereignty of China or infringes on the rights of other nations. Japan *must* obtain raw materials for her home industries, and I can see no more objection to her obtaining them from China than I can to the United States obtaining oil from Mexico. Japan *must* find markets for her products, and I can see no more objection to her seeking those markets in China than I can to the United States seeking markets in Latin-America. Japan *must* provide for her surplus population, and I can see no more objection to Japanese emigrants settling in China—provided they are willing to abide by Chinese laws—than I can to European emigrants settling in the United States. But Japan must abandon for good and all her old policy

of monopolization and coercion. There must be no further alienation of Chinese territory on any pretext whatsoever. There must be no further attempts to intimidate the Chinese Government into granting concessions, accepting Japanese "advice," or signing obnoxious treaties. If Japan will give convincing proof of her sincerity by putting an immediate end to these abuses, then there is no reason why the two great Oriental nations should not become friends and allies, thereby dispelling for all time the ominous cloud that has so long overshadowed the Farther East.

I am of the opinion that the Japanese policies in China which have caused so much uneasiness abroad are dictated by imperative economic necessity rather than by a spirit of wanton aggression. If you will take the trouble to look into the matter you will find that Japan's territorial expansion on the Asian mainland is not due, as her enemies would have you believe, to greed for military glory, to an insatiable lust for power. It is due, as I have already pointed out, to the necessity of providing food for a population which is already greater than the soil of the homeland can support, and which is debarred by exclusion acts or racial hostility from seeking its livelihood on the American or Australian continents. Consider the facts. With a birth-rate of 32 per 1000, the population of Japan is increasing at the rate of approximately 750,000 a year. Though

much of its surface is so mountainous as to be uninhabitable, or at least unsusceptible to cultivation, Japan already has nearly four hundred inhabitants to the square mile, and this number is steadily rising. Though, during the last decade, the area of land under cultivation has been increased by five per cent. and the production of rice by four per cent., the number of mouths that must be fed have increased by twelve per cent. In the same period the cost of living in Japan has increased nearly four hundred per cent. With emigration to America and Australia out of the question, the nation is faced, then, by three alternatives: (1) a reduction of the birth-rate; (2) an increase in food production; (3) territorial expansion into the thinly populated regions of Eastern Asia. As a reduction of the birth-rate is not to be expected, and as food production in Japan itself has already reached the maximum, Japanese statesmen have been compelled by sheer economic necessity to adopt the third alternative—expansion on the Asian mainland. There you have in tabloid form the true expansion of Japan's political and military activities in Shantung, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Siberia and her claims to "special interests" in all those regions. In short, Japan has reached the point where she must overflow or perish, just as the congested countries of Europe overflowed into the Americas and Africa. But in her case there is no New World, no Dark Continent, in which her surplus millions can

find homes and livelihoods. The waste lands were long ago parceled out among the Western nations. Japan came into the world a century too late. Debarred from expanding to the eastward or the southward, she is expanding westward into the loosely held, thinly peopled, undeveloped fringes of China and Siberia. That her expansion should be at the expense of other and weaker nations is unfortunate but, under the circumstances, unavoidable. As a Japanese writer in "The World's Work" has put it: "The Japanese people must either die a saintly death in righteous starvation, or expand into the neighbor's backyard—and Japan is not that much of a saint."

X

We now come to the most delicate, the most difficult, and the most dangerous of all the questions in dispute between America and Japan—that of Japanese immigration into the United States. Now I have no intention of embarking on a discussion of the pros and cons of this question. But because I have found that most Americans have only an inexact and fragmentary knowledge of it, and because a rudimentary understanding of it is essential to a clear comprehension of the larger question, our relations with Japan, I trust that you will bear with me while I sketch in outline the events which led up to the

present immigration situation. I will compress them into tabloid form.

Under the administrative interpretation of our naturalization laws, Japanese aliens are ineligible to American citizenship. But down to the summer of 1908 there was no restriction on Japanese immigration. Up to that time, in other words, a Japanese could enter and settle in the United States, but he could not become an American citizen. In that year, however, the much-discussed "Gentlemen's Agreement," whereby Japanese laborers are excluded from the United States, went into effect. That agreement is not in the shape of a formal treaty or undertaking. The term applies simply to the substance of a number of informal notes exchanged between the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, and Mr. K. Takahira, at that time the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The terms of this agreement provided that no Japanese could enter our ports from Japan or from Hawaii without a proper passport from his own government, and Japan promised to give no passports to prospective emigrants of the coolie, or laboring class. There has been no charge that Japan has failed to keep both letter and spirit of this agreement with absolute integrity. In fact, the Japanese Foreign Office has at times leaned backward in its endeavor to keep faith. But the labor elements in California, unable to meet Japanese industrial competition and jealous of Japanese success, continued their anti-

Japanese agitation, being aided by politicians seeking the labor vote, and in 1913 laws prohibiting the purchase of land by Japanese in that state were placed on the statute books of California.

But there were certain loopholes left by this law. These loopholes permitted of agricultural land being leased by Japanese for three years; of land being purchased by corporations in which Japanese were interested; and of land being purchased by American-born children of Japanese parents. To block up these loopholes the Oriental Exclusion League circulated a petition to place an initiative act—known as the Alien Land Act—on the ballot in 1920. To bolster up its arguments in favor of this act, the League called attention to the rapid increase in the Japanese birth-rate in California. This increase in the birth-rate was due, it was claimed, to the custom followed by many of the poorer Japanese settlers in California of having sent to them from Japan pictures of eligible girls. In this manner the Japanese in America selected their wives, to whom they were married *in absentia.* These so-called "picture brides," being thus legally married, had the right under our laws to join their husbands in the United States, which they did in considerable numbers. And the more picture brides, the more children. And the more children, the more land passing under Japanese control; for the Japanese circumvented the prohibition against their holding land by purchasing land in the name of their American-born

children, who were automatically American citizens and of whom the parents were the legal guardians. This method of circumventing the law created such an uproar among the anti-Japanese elements in California that in February, 1920, Japan, in order to remove another source of controversy, ceased to issue passports to picture brides. But this did not satisfy the Californian agitators, who succeeded in having the adoption of the Alien Land Act put to a popular vote. This act—perhaps the most stringent measure ever directed against the civil rights of residents in the United States—provides:

1. Prohibition of land-ownership by Japanese.
2. Prohibition of leasing of agricultural lands by Japanese.
3. Prohibition of land-ownership by companies or corporations in which Japanese are interested.
4. Prohibition of land-ownership by Japanese children born in the United States, by removing them from the guardianship of their parents in such cases.

At the elections in November, 1920, this measure was carried by a majority of the registered voters and by a three-to-one vote of those who expressed an opinion on the subject. The vote stood 668,483 in favor and 222,086 opposed.

There you have the Japanese immigration situation up to date.

Right here let me interject the remark that, in resenting the American attitude of racial superiority, the restrictions imposed by the United States on

Japanese immigration, and the prohibition of land-ownership by Japanese in California, the people of Nippon are not consistent. They refuse to see that the American attitude toward the Japanese is almost identical with the Japanese attitude toward the Chinese—but with this difference: we do not hold the Japanese in contempt, as the Japanese hold the Chinese. The Japanese regard the Chinese as an inferior race, considering themselves immeasurably superior to them intellectually in culture and in efficiency. His supreme contempt for the Chinese explains why the Japanese so bitterly resents being placed in the same category with them by our immigration laws. The Japanese see nothing anomalous in the fact that their own laws prohibiting Chinese from settling in Japanese territory are fully as rigid as the restrictions placed on Japanese immigration into the United States. Indeed, they have carried their exclusion policy to far greater lengths than we have ours, for unskilled foreign laborers are not permitted to settle in those regions on the Asian mainland which, though they do not belong to Japan, are under Japanese control. In other words, a Chinese coolie cannot settle in the Chinese province of Shantung, because, forsooth, Japan regards it as within her own sphere of influence. The subjects of the emperor admit of no inconsistency in the fact that, though approximately 27,000 acres are owned by Japanese settlers in California, not a single foot

of Japanese soil can be owned by a foreigner. They fail to recognize anything anomalous in the fact that, though nearly 48,000 acres in California are owned by American corporations controlled by Japanese capital, very few, if any, foreigners are represented in corporations holding land in Japan. There are, it is true, a few foreigners in Japan who hold land under perpetual leases, but these holdings, insignificant in number and extent, have come down from the days when the Western nations exacted extraterritorial privileges. As a people, the Japanese are not blessed with a sense of humor. If they were, they would see the humor of their insistence on being accorded the same rights which they deny to another Oriental race, the Chinese.

But the point I wish to emphasize is this: the Japanese Government is not clamoring for the removal of any of the present restrictions on the immigration of its nationals into the United States. The Japanese consider these restrictions offensive and humiliating,—that goes without saying,—but they concede our right to decide who shall enter our doors and who shall stay out. Not for a moment, however, have the Japanese been blinded by our assertions that our exclusion of them is based purely on economic grounds. They are far too shrewd not to recognize that this explanation was advanced to soothe their wounded vanity, as a sop to their pride. They know, and we know, that the real cause of their exclusion is

racial. No one realizes more clearly than the Japanese themselves that, in excluding them from the United States, we have in effect stigmatized them as an inferior race. I repeat, however, that they concede our right to exclude whom we please. But what they do not concede, what they will not agree to, is the right of the United States, or of any state in the United States, to discriminate against those Japanese who are lawfully resident in this country. To attempt to deprive those Japanese legally dwelling within our borders of those personal and property rights which we grant to all other aliens is so obviously unjust that it scarcely merits discussion. The Japanese have excellent grounds for believing that such discriminatory legislation is unconstitutional; they know that it constitutes an open defiance of equity and justice. They feel—and their feeling is apparently shared by the 222,000 Californians who voted against it—that such legislation makes ridiculous and hypocritical our oft-repeated boast that we stand for the square deal.

The bitterness of Japanese resentment over the immigration question is not entirely due, however, to wounded racial pride, but quite as much, I think, to the rudeness and lack of tact which have characterized the anti-Japanese agitation in California. For it should be remembered that in no country is the code of social courtesy or consideration for foreigners so rigidly observed as in Japan. In dealing with the Japanese, nothing is ever gained by insults or bully-

ing. Politeness is the shibboleth of all classes, and the lowest coolie usually responds to it instantly. Is it to be wondered at, then, that the Japanese are irritated and resentful at the lack of courtesy and ordinary good manners which we have displayed in our handling of so peculiarly delicate a matter as the immigration question?

It may be that local conditions justify the wave of anti-Japanese hysteria which is sweeping the Pacific Coast. It may be that the people of the Western states can offer valid reasons for their constant pin-pricking and irritation of Japan. But I doubt it. I am no stranger to California—I have lived there off and on for years—nor am I ignorant of the relations between labor and politics in that state. That is why I refuse to become excited over the threatened "conquest" of California by a little group of aliens which comprises only two per cent. of the population of the state and which owns or leases only one and six tenths per cent. of its cultivated lands. The last census shows that there are 111,010 Japanese—men, women, and children—in the United States. And no more are coming in. Surely this is not a very serious menace to a nation of 110 millions of people!

The Californians assert that their anti-Japanese legislation is a matter for them to decide and does not concern the rest of the country. Therein they are wrong. For in the unwished-for event of war with Japan, it would not be a war between California and

Japan, but between the United States and Japan. Therefore, in its treatment of the Japanese, it behooves California to take the rights and interests of the rest of the country into careful consideration. So, because we must all share in the responsibility for California's treatment of the Japanese problem, let us make certain beyond doubt or question that that treatment is based on equity and justice. Under no conditions must racial prejudice, economic jealousy, or political expediency be permitted to serve as an excuse for giving the Japanese anything save a square deal.

XI

Just and permanent solutions of the various questions at issue between the United States and Japan have been greatly retarded by trouble-making and dangerous elements in both countries: in Japan, by the arrogant, avaricious, unscrupulous militarists who shape the policies of the government; in America by jingoes with selfish aims to serve, irresponsible gossip-mongers, professional alarmists, and yellow journalists. For example, not a little of the American distrust of Japan is directly traceable to the highly circumstantial stories told by returning tourists, whose opportunities for observation have usually been limited and whose opinions are generally superficial, of Japan's secret designs against the Philip-

pines. In substantiation of these stories they point to Japan's imperative need for an outlet for her excess population, to the temptation offered by the Philippines, which form a prolongation of the Japanese archipelago (Formosa, the southernmost island under the Japanese flag, can be seen from the highlands of Luzon on a clear day), and to the alleged alarming increase in the number of Japanese settlers in the Philippines, most of whom, so the gossips will assure you earnestly, are military reservists disguised as laborers. Before proceeding, let me dispose of the latter assertion by saying that investigations conducted by American intelligence officers have proved conclusively that there are less than ten thousand Japanese in the entire archipelago, and that, though the men have doubtless had military training, they are simple farmers, traders, and artisans, who are in the Philippines for the purpose of making a living.

That the Philippines would be the first objective of Japanese attack in the event of war between the United States and Japan is a foregone conclusion. That the Japanese General Staff is in possession of accurate and detailed information as to our scheme of defense and the strength and disposition of our forces in the islands, goes without saying. Our own general staff is presumably equally well informed about Mexico. That, in the event of war, the Japanese could seize the islands with little difficulty, and hold them indefinitely, is conceded by most military men.

But I am convinced that, as things stand to-day, Japan is as innocent of designs against the Philippines as we are of designs against Mexico. (What her attitude might be were we to withdraw from the islands, leaving the natives to manage their own affairs, is quite another question.) It is true that Japan objects to the fortification of the Philippines, regarding it as an implied threat against herself, but I imagine that we would object to, and probably would prohibit, the establishment of a fortified Japanese naval base on the coast of Mexico. Those persons who talk so loosely of Japan's determination to seize the Philippines at the first opportunity that offers are doubtless unaware that she once had an opportunity to purchase them at a bargain price—and declined it. Viscount Kaneko told me that, some years prior to the Spanish-American War, representatives of the Spanish Government inquired whether Japan would care to purchase the Philippines for the equivalent of eight million dollars gold, and that Japan refused to consider the proposal on the ground that the Philippines were too far away for her to administer easily and that Japanese do not thrive in tropical climates.

It has long been a popular pastime among certain of our people to prophesy an eventual war between the two countries. Let us look at this question from the viewpoint of common sense. Neither the Japanese Government nor the Japanese people want war with the United States. It is possible that some of

the younger and more hot-headed military men might welcome such a conflict because of the opportunities it would afford them for winning promotion, decorations, and glory. But you may be quite certain that the older and wiser men who direct the military policies of the empire have no desire to embark on such an adventure. Confident as they are of Japan's prowess, they do not blind themselves to the fact that such a conflict could have only one conclusion. The lessons taught by America's achievements in the World War have not been lost on them. When the United States in less than eighteen months raised an army of five million men and equipped them, and put nearly half of them down on a battle-line three thousand miles away, it gave the Japanese militarists much food for thought. They were as astounded by this revelation of the republic's military might as were the Germans. Though it is entirely possible that the Japanese might be victorious in the earlier stages of a conflict with the United States, the Japanese strategists know perfectly well that, in view of America's immensely superior man-power, wealth, and natural resources, such a struggle would be hopeless for Japan from the beginning. They have not forgotten how desperate was their plight when President Roosevelt's intervention brought the war with Russia to a close, nor do they shut their eyes to the certainty that, in a war with the United States, the nations of the world, including those of

the Orient, would infallibly give their moral support to America. Even were the militarists mad enough to embark on such an enterprise, which they are not, they could never obtain the support of Japan's captains of finance and industry. These shrewd, far-seeing business men do not forget that America is Japan's largest customer; that more than one third of all the products of the empire go to the United States. Practically all of Japan's exported tea, seventy per cent. of her raw and manufactured silk and large quantities of her other products are sold in American markets. I have heard it declared, indeed, that were the United States to double her import duties on tea and silks it would bring Japan to the verge of ruin. Nor do the Japanese overlook the fact that the United States is now the greatest reservoir of capital in the world. Japan needs money. Europe, impoverished by the war, cannot supply it. America can. I repeat, Japan does not want war with the United States.

And it is equally certain that the United States does not want war with Japan. We want, and expect to get, our fair share of the trade of the Far East, but we have not the remotest desire for territorial expansion in those regions. We shall continue to insist on the Open Door in China remaining open, but we freely concede that the Japanese have as much right to use that door as ourselves. We shall continue to insist that our rights in the Pacific be recognized, but this implies no hostility toward Japan. A suggestion

that any considerable section of the American people cherishes sentiments hostile to the Japanese would be greeted with derision anywhere in the United States, save perhaps in a few local communities on the Pacific Coast, whose sentiments are in no wise indicative of the attitude of the country as a whole.

I do not believe that the majority of fair-minded Americans object to Japanese commercial expansion on the Asian mainland—so long as that expansion is legitimately conducted. But we do object to expansion by intrigue or force. We can sympathize with Japan's undeniable need for more elbow-room, but we cannot countenance the plans of the Tokio militarists for extending Japanese dominion by the sword. Though we conceded, through the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, that Japan possesses "special interests" on the Asian mainland, we cannot see those interests multiplied until they block the Open Door.[1] For sentimental, political, and economic reasons we are averse to the expansion of Japan at the expense of China and Russia, but we have no thought of actively opposing such expansion so long as it takes the form of peaceful penetration of thinly peopled, undeveloped, and misgoverned regions, particularly as we believe that those regions will be improved by scientific development and their peoples benefited by decent government. I am myself of

[1] One of the first acts of Mr. Hughes, upon becoming Secretary of State, was to make it amply clear to the Japanese Government that the United States no longer recognizes these "special interests."

the opinion that the future policy of Japan will tend rather in the direction of economic penetration than of territorial expansion. Several recent events have contributed to bring about this change in policy. To begin with, the sudden collapse of Prussian militarism was a staggering blow to the Japanese militarists. It brought them to an abrupt realization of the fact that the world was heartily sick of militarism and imperialism, and that their dreams of building up a Pan-Asian empire by conquest could never be fulfilled. They realized that America, now the greatest military-naval-financial power on earth, would never consent to the Japanese making themselves masters of the Pacific or overlords of Asia. Again, they recognized the growing strength of public opinion in Japan itself—a public opinion which is beginning to make itself heard and which demands peace and friendship with the rest of the world. And lastly, but by far the most important, came the Washington Conference, with its full, frank, and friendly discussions of all pending questions, its clarification of Japan's and America's position, and the corresponding enlightenment of public opinion in both countries.

From talks that I have recently had with many of the leading men of Japan, including the premier, several members of his cabinet, and the president of the House of Peers, I am convinced that there is not a single question pending between the two countries on which an understanding cannot be reached, pro-

vided we go about it in a courteous manner and a sympathetic frame of mind. My conversations with the Japanese leaders showed me that they have a much clearer understanding of our difficulties and perplexities than I had supposed. It might be well for us to remember that the Japanese Government is itself in an extremely trying position, and that its leaders are extremely apprehensive of the effect on public opinion of any settlement of the questions at issue which might be interpreted as an affront to Japanese national dignity or racial pride. But of this I can assure you: Japan is genuinely, almost pathetically, anxious for American confidence and good-will, and, in order to obtain them, her responsible statesmen are prepared to make almost every concession that self-respect will permit and that a fair-minded American can demand.

PART II

KOREA

1. THE PENINSULA AND ITS PEOPLE

I

KOREA is the Ireland of the East. The more I consider the comparison the better I like it, for between the two countries, one on the eastern edge of the Old World, the other on the western, there is a most singular and striking analogy. Ireland is separated from the nation which is its suzerain by a narrow, landlocked sea. So is Korea. Ireland is a land of surpassing beauty. So is Korea. The Irish are an agricultural people, as are the Koreans, the national industries of both being connected with the tilling of the soil. The peasantry of both countries are ignorant, simple, patient, industrious, good-natured. Both are prone to use intoxicants to excess on occasion. Both are extremely superstitious, with a terrified belief in the existence of spirits, goblins, and demons. Both are desperately poor, dwelling in wretched hovels amid filth and squalor. The Irish are turbulent and fond of intrigue. The same characteristics are found in the Koreans. The histories of both

nations are punctuated by invasions, rebellions, and internecine wars. Both have been the victims of cruelty, injustice, and oppression. Cromwell's invasion of Ireland in 1649, with its accompanying massacres and systematic devastation, had its counterpart in the shocking scenes which marked Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea in the preceding century. The Irish have been held in subjection by a people of alien race and religion. The Koreans still are. Irish distrust and detestation of England is equalled only by Korean distrust and detestation of Japan. Heretofore the Irish have failed to give convincing proof of their ability to maintain a just and stable government. This is likewise true of the Koreans. Most Englishmen are convinced that an independent Ireland would prove a menace to the safety of the British Empire. Most Japanese are equally convinced that an independent Korea would threaten the safety of the Empire of Japan.

Korea, or, to give it its official Japanese name, Chosen, "Land of the Morning Calm," though scarcely larger than the state of Kansas, has a population equal to that of Spain. Its immense importance to Japan will be better realized when I add that it comprises one third of the total land area of the empire and that its seventeen millions of inhabitants form one fourth of the empire's total population. One of the oldest nations in the world, its early history

is lost in the mists of antiquity. But this much we know: it maintained its independence for three thousand years and for nine centuries its frontiers never changed. The ignorance, insularity and intolerance of its peasantry, the degeneracy and corruption of its ruling classes, and its misfortune in lying between two powerful and predatory empires, proved its undoing.

Korea is essentially a mountain land. Rising abruptly from its northern boundary, like a great buttressed wall striving to hold back the flowing Siberian steppes, is a sinuous range of towering peaks. Running south from this chain is a lofty central range which forms the backbone of the country, its lateral spurs corrugating the entire surface of the peninsula. Ancient lava streams and craters of long-extinct volcanoes are constantly met with, the appearance of the country being strongly suggestive of the Rand, with all its mineralogical possibilities. Like the Transvaal, Korea is extremely rich in minerals. There are numerous coal deposits, both anthracite and bituminous, and the natives claim that gold is found in every one of the three hundred and sixty-five prefectures. This is an exaggeration, but it is near enough to the truth to explain why for centuries Korea has aroused the cupidity of her powerful and avaricious neighbors. Indeed, I have been assured by American mining engineers that the peninsula is as highly mineralized as Mexico.

Sandwiched between the rugged range which forms the spine of the country and the eastern coast is a narrow strip, fertile but comparatively inaccessible, which slopes sharply to the Japan Sea. But by far the greater part of the arable land of Korea lies on the western side of this watershed; all the long and navigable rivers are there or in the south; almost all the harbors are on the Yellow Sea. Thus it may be said that Korea has her back to Japan and her face turned toward China, a topographical circumstance which has had no inconsiderable effect on the history of the country. Though the mountains along the northern border are densely wooded —the timber concessions along the Yalu, it will be remembered, were one of the contributing causes of the Russo-Japanese War,—those to the south are so bare and desolate that the Japanese often refer to the peninsula as "the land of treeless mountains." One of the causes of this lack of timber may be found in the history of Korea, which records that during the terrible days of the Hideyoshi invasion the peasants, fleeing to the mountains for their lives, were forced to burn the trees to keep from freezing. As a result of this widespread deforestation, great areas are to-day as bare as a bald man's head or clothed only with low, straggling, discouraged-looking vegetation. But the Japanese Bureau of Forestry has displayed commendable foresight and energy in systematically reforesting the country, and every year sees more

and more of the bare brown slopes covered with young trees.

Though Korea possesses an extensive river system, the country consequently being well watered, the streams are, with but few exceptions, too shallow to permit of navigation. The largest of the rivers, the Yalu, called by Koreans, Am Nok, "Green Duck," from the bluish-green tinge it assumes after the melting of the snow and ice near its mountain birthplace, forms part of the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. It is navigable for sixty miles above its mouth and is much used for rafting the timber cut on its upper reaches down to the Yellow Sea. The cold Tumen, which rises in the Ever White Mountains and empties into the Japan Sea, is likewise a frontier river, being bordered on the south by Korea and on the north by Siberia and Manchuria. But, though upwards of two hundred miles in length, it is of little benefit to the Koreans, for it is frozen solid throughout the fierce Siberian winter, and in the spring, when the snows melt, it becomes a raging and almost unnavigable torrent. By far the finest of the Korean rivers is the stately Han, sometimes referred to, because of the auriferous deposits in its bed, as the River of Golden Sand. It has its nativity in the mile-high fastness of Diamond Mountain, near the eastern coast, swings south and west across the peninsula to Seoul, where it is nearly a thousand feet in width, and forty-five miles farther on joins the

Yellow Sea. It is navigable for small, flat-bottomed craft for nearly nine score miles above its mouth, and up and down its sinuous course, through gorges as wild and imposing as those of the Upper Yangtze, go lumbering junks with towering sterns and huge lug-sails and great goggle eyes painted on their bows. The Han flows through the most fertile portion of Korea, the rich alluvial soil, sometimes ten feet deep, being capable of bearing two bumper crops a year with little or no enriching. Considering the remarkable fertility of the soil, the Korean agriculturist has not obtained the results that might be expected, though this is due not to any lack of industry but rather to his antiquated methods and implements, which are as crude as those used in the Egypt of the Pharaohs. The backward condition of agriculture in the peninsula is being remedied, however, by the Japanese—themselves the most intensive and successful farmers in the world—who are establishing experiment stations, introducing modern methods and machinery, and displaying the same energy and ability which have made them such formidable competitors in California. Mark my words: Korea, under Japanese tutelage, will be one of the most prosperous agricultural countries in the world some day.

Korea is a land where poverty should be unknown, for nature has lavishly endowed it with resources and blessed it with a superb climate. During nine months of the year the climate is delightful—most

nearly comparable, perhaps, to that of northern California. Though the three summer months are characterized by heat, humidity, and heavy rains, they are quite supportable, even for foreigners. Particularly delightful are the bright, beautiful, strangely calm and perfect mornings—clear as crystal and exhilarating as dry champagne—which give Chosen its name. With such a climate, a productive soil, an abundant rainfall, with mountains rich in minerals and coastal waters teeming with every variety of fish, Korea needs only the security and encouragement of a decent and unselfish government to make it one of the most opulent countries in the East.

The condition of any people may be gaged with considerable accuracy by their facilities for intercommunication. Judged by this standard, the Koreans must be set down as an extremely unprogressive people, for by far the greater part of the roads in the peninsula are merely trails, so rough that even the ubiquitous bicyclist sometimes has to pick up his machine and carry it on his back over the worst stretches, often so narrow that laden bulls cannot pass. The constant shuffling of feet through untold centuries has worn these narrow paths down below the level of the ground, so that during the rains they become miniature canals. Indeed, during the rainy season, when the streams have become brawling torrents and the flimsy bridges have been swept away, all traffic save that by junk along the rivers is perforce sus-

pended. Towns of considerable size are sometimes connected only by narrow foot-paths running along the tops of the embankments between the rice-fields. Though the Japanese are steadily expanding and improving the peninsular highway system, it will be some years before motoring in Korea will be practicable outside the immediate vicinity of the larger cities and still longer before it will be enjoyable.

The government-owned Chosen Railway, which now has close to fifteen hundred miles of line in operation, is one of the best built, best equipped, and best run systems in the Farther East. The main line, which makes connections at Antung with the South Manchuria Railway, traverses the entire length of the peninsula to Fusan, whence extremely comfortable steamers maintain a rapid service across the Korea Strait to Shimonoseki, where the Japanese system begins. It is approximately six hundred miles from Fusan to Antung, and the express trains make the journey in about nineteen hours. A first-class ticket costs in the neighborhood of $15.00; the fare for second-class, which is scarcely distinguishable from first, is $10.00; while $5.50 will pay for a third-class ticket from one end of Korea to the other. Branches connect the main line with Mok-po, Kunsan, Jinsen (Chemulpo), and Chinnampo, the four chief ports on the Yellow Sea, and with Gensan, on the east coast of the peninsula, it being only a matter of time before this latter line is pushed north to

Vladivostok. Most of the equipment is American, though the sleeping and dining-cars were built at Dairen or in Japan and mounted on American-made trucks. The aisles in the day-coaches, instead of running down the center, as in the United States, run down the side of the car, thus making the seats almost twice as wide as those in American trains. The sleeping-cars are divided into compartments, after the European fashion, thereby affording foreign travelers a privacy which is highly desirable in an Oriental country. The meals on the dining-cars are well cooked and well served, Korea being one of the few countries where the old "dollar dinner" is still to be had. At every station is a large sign-board in English and Japanese, giving a brief description of the places of historic and scenic interest in the neighborhood, their distance from the station, and how to reach them—an idea which might well be adopted in Western lands.

When the Japanese adopted the standard four-foot eight-inch gage for the Korean system they assimilated it with the Chinese railways, though at the same time rendering it altogether different from their own system in Japan, which is still upon the now inadequate meter gage. In adopting the standard gage they had in mind something far more important, however, than providing Korea with an up-to-date railway system. In shaping her Korean railway policy Japan had three distinct objectives: first, to facilitate

the rapid movement of troops and supplies into Siberia, Manchuria, and China; second, to place the empire in direct railway communication with Europe via Mukden, Harbin, Manchouli, and the Trans-Siberian; third, to bring the South China market for Japanese piece goods and the mid-China ore supply, which is required for the Japanese steel works, into connection with Fusan, whence it is but a short half-day's steam to the great Japanese port of Shimonoseki. As a result of the linking of the Korean and Manchurian systems, Japan is now enabled to send her manufactured goods by rail from Fusan to Peking and Hankow, while the impending completion of the Hankow-Canton Railway will give her vast new markets for her merchandise among the teeming millions of southern China. The Shantung Railway, which connects the seaport of Tsingtau with the Peking-Shanghai system, provides Japan with still another means of access to the Chinese markets—a fact which explains her reluctance to surrender control of that much discussed and highly important line. Thus it will be seen that these railways are something more than twin lines of steel laid down for the convenience of travelers and shippers. They are the instruments which Japan is using to effect her political and commercial penetration of eastern Asia.

Barring the busy port of Chemulpo, where the first shot of the Russo-Japanese War was fired on February 8, 1904, when the Japanese fleet attacked

the Russian cruisers *Variag* and *Korietz;* and Ping-Yang, the ancient and highly picturesque town which was for centuries the capital of Korea, the only city in the peninsula of more than passing interest to the foreigner is the present capital, Seoul (pronounced *sowl,* if you please), or, as the Japanese have renamed it, Keijo. Encircled by a crumbling, crenelated wall, obviously modeled after the Great Wall of China and built a century before Columbus set foot on the beach of San Salvador, it stands on the eastern bank of the broad, swift-flowing Han, nestling in a bowl-shaped valley formed by two semi-circular mountain ranges whose bare brown peaks tower above it in somber grandeur. Arid and forbidding as these mountains look in winter, summer finds them clothed in vivid green relieved here and there by great splashes of heliotrope, honeysuckle and azalea. In springtime the budding orchards of cherry, peach and plum transform the valley into a sea of snowy blossoms.

Seoul, with not far from half a million inhabitants, is the political, commercial and intellectual center of Korea. For upward of eight centuries it was the home of the Korean sovereigns, and few cities have witnessed more cruelty, bloodshed, licentiousness and corruption. It has several picturesque palaces, now falling into decay, a small but exceptionally fine art museum, mediocre botanical and zoölogical gardens, a number of government buildings, erected by the

Japanese, which, though substantial, have small architectural merit, street-cars, electric-light and telephone systems, and a hotel that has only one superior in Eastern Asia. The Chosen Hotel, which is operated by the Korean Railways, stands in the walled compound of an ancient temple amid a garden heavy with the fragrance of many roses. At night, when the paper lanterns on the terrace are reflected in the lotos pools, and the incense from the Temple of Heaven mingles with the perfume of the flowers, it is a place to be marked with a white mile-stone on the road of memory.

Seoul is a city of magnificent distances and of remarkably wide streets—several of them are wider than the Avenue du Bois in Paris—which are in curious contrast to the mean and garish shops of tinder-box construction with which they are lined. One great thoroughfare, the Chon-no, or Big Bell Street, bisects the entire city, running from the East Gate to the West Gate and far into the country in both directions. It is not only the principal artery of the capital but the "Main Street" of all Korea, for along its dusty length flow placid, slow-moving townsmen, dignified despite their absurd topknots and straggling goatees, their enormous, horn-rimmed goggles and transparent fly-trap hats; short, squat women with olive skins and coarse black hair and figures which look like meal sacks with a string tied around the middle, their shapeless garments of white cotton

CHOSEN
(KOREA)

SCALE OF MILES



Principal Railroads

concealing everything save their breasts, which are brazenly exposed; *Yang-bans,* as the native officials are known, lolling somnolently in palanquins borne by sweating coolies; peasants, fresh from the country districts, leading strings of squealing, kicking ponies laden with farm produce or bulls piled high with the twigs which the Koreans use for fuel; Japanese officials in ill-fitting European clothes and Japanese officers in red-banded caps and smart khaki uniforms; school-boys with knapsacks on their backs, speeding by on bicycles, their baggy garments flapping in the breeze; rickshaws, drawn by half-naked coolies, skimming along on silent wheels; creaking carts hauled by lumbering bullocks; clanging street-cars; motors of all makes and sizes, from lordly Rolls-Royces to bustling members of the well known Ford family of Detroit—all these combine to impart to the great thoroughfare a strange blend of the medieval and the modern, of the backward and the progressive, of the Orient and the Occident.

But of all the things I saw in this most picturesque and curious city, there were two which struck me as being of peculiar significance. One is a deserted garden, overgrown by shrubbery and rank with weeds. It is at the back of the North Palace, surrounded by a crumbling and discolored wall. Here, in the cold gray dawn of an autumn morning in 1895, the clever and ambitious queen, the most brilliant and the most cruel Korean woman of her time, was brutally mur-

dered by a band of Japanese and Korean assassins.[1] The other place to which I refer is a long, low, unpretentious cottage in the gardens of the East Palace, screened from observation by shrubbery and high hedges. Here, guarded by Japanese sentries and watched by Japanese spies, dwells in enforced seclusion a pasty-faced, unhealthy-looking youth, who, according to popular report at least, is little better than an imbecile. He is the dethroned emperor, now known as His Imperial Highness Prince Yi Kon, the title which the Japanese have bestowed upon him, the last of that long line of sovereigns who ruled in Korea for upward of two thousand years. In the palace, not a stone's throw distant, is a vast and lofty room, its walls hung with the richest of brocades, its carven woodwork embellished in all the colors of the chromatic scale. On a dais in the center of this magnificent apartment, flanked by the gorgeous trappings of royalty and cushioned in the imperial yellow, is an empty throne.

II

The first impressions of most visitors in Korea are generally unfavorable to the Koreans. This is due, in the first place, to the disgusting filth and squalor amid which the great mass of the people live, which

[1] Though the Japanese Minister, Viscount Miura, appears to have instigated this shocking crime, there is every reason to believe that he acted without the knowledge of his government.

has led some one to describe the country as "a going piggery"; secondly, to the cowed manner and abject servility of the average Korean, which reminds one of a dog that has been beaten and which is probably due to the same cause; and lastly, to the grotesque and unbecoming national costume. Every adult male in Korea wears on the top of his otherwise shaven head what looks for all the world like a twist of navy plug. This is the topknot, which is as distinguishing a mark of the Korean as the queue formerly was of the Chinese. But, whereas the queue was a symbol of subjugation, the topknot is the Korean's badge of legal manhood, and, until he reaches the age when he is permitted to wear it, he is known as "a half-man." It is protected by a transparent hat of woven horsehair, many sizes too small, held in place by broad black ribbons tied beneath the chin, which lend to the wearer's chubby face, with its drooping and attenuated mustaches or straggling chin-whisker, an infantile and comical expression. Should the horsehair hat get wet, it is ruined, so, to prevent this, it is covered in inclement weather with a conical affair of oiled paper, producing an effect as ludicrous as it is bizarre. The rest of the costume consists of a short, shapeless jacket and enormously baggy trousers which are confined at the ankles by means of strings. The garments of the poorer classes are made of a coarse white grasscloth, woven by the peasants themselves, but the upper classes, when they can

afford it, wear thin silks that vie with Joseph's coat in their diversity of colors. In the case of the *Yangbans*—officials and men of leisure—this curious ensemble is completed by the addition of an enormous pair of horn-rimmed spectacles and a pipe with a yard-long stem and a bowl the size of a thimble. Thus arrayed, the Greek gods would have looked like circus clowns.

The garb of the Korean women, though less ludicrous than that of the men, is equally unattractive: an apology for a zouave jacket and exaggerated Turkish trousers, the latter all but concealed, however, by a petticoat as shapeless as a sheet. Between the petticoat and the jacket there is a hiatus of bare skin, the breasts being displayed as fully and unblushingly as the damsels of Mr. Ziegfeld's chorus display their legs. Were the Korean women less faded and of more youthful mold this daring décolletage might be more alluring.

To form a just appreciation of the mental and moral characteristics of an alien race, particularly an Oriental race, is a delicate and difficult matter, even for those who have spent years among the people in question, while a casual observer like myself is in constant danger of indulging in hasty and inaccurate observations based on inadequate knowledge and limited opportunities for observation. In order, therefore, that I may not lay myself open to charges of

superficiality or prejudice, I have drawn the materials for the following sketch of Korean character and characteristics from the statements of Mr. Homer B. Hurlbert,[1] one of the foremost authorities on Korean history, life and customs, and an avowed friend of the Koreans.

Let it be emphasized, in the first place, that the Korean is a man of high intellectual possibilities, his present state of moral and mental stagnation being directly traceable to his unhappy history, his wretched condition, and his discouraging surroundings. Lift him out of this slough of despondency, set him on his feet, give him a chance to develop independently and naturally, and you would have as good a brain as the Far East can produce. It is the experience of those who have had to do with the various peoples of the extreme Orient that it is easier to understand the Korean and to get close to him than it is to understand either the Japanese or the Chinese. While the Japanese inclines toward the idealistic, and the Chinese leans toward the materialistic, the temperament of the Korean lies midway between the two, even as his country lies between Japan and China. In other words, he is the most rational, judged by Western standards, of all the Far Eastern races. I am perfectly aware that those who possess only a superficial acquaintance with the Korean, and those others who, actuated by political motives or racial prejudices,

[1] See Mr. Hurlbert's "The Passing of Korea."

make it their business to belittle and discredit him, will jeer at this appreciation; but those who have had the opportunity and patience to go to the bottom of the Korean character, and are able to distinguish the true Korean from some of the caricatures which have been drawn of him, will confirm the assertion that he possesses certain qualities which, were they developed, would make him a reputable member of the community of nations.

The Korean always looks toward yesterday instead of toward to-morrow. He has a proverb, "If you try to shorten the road by cutting 'cross lots you will fall in with robbers." In other words, he believes in staying in the old ruts instead of making new ones. What was good enough for his great-great-grandfather, he argues, is good enough for him. Yet he can be induced to abandon his conservatism by convincing him that a change would be to his own advantage, as is shown by his enthusiastic adoption of bicycles, phonographs, sewing-machines, and other Western innovations.

Foreigners are unfavorably impressed by the readiness of the impecunious Korean to live on his relatives or friends, but to a large extent this is offset by his willingness, when his finances are in a flourishing condition, to let his relatives and friends live on him. The moment a man attains prosperity he automatically becomes the social head of his clan, and his relatives, no matter how far removed, descend upon him

in droves to live indefinitely upon his bounty. It amounts to a sort of nepotistic communism in which every successful man has to divide his profits with the less prosperous members of his family, many a Korean having been impoverished by the heavy demands thus made upon him. It should be added, however, that this custom is by no means peculiar to the Koreans, for precisely the same practice prevails among the Filipinos and, to a certain extent, among the Malays.

Mr. Hurlbert seems to be of the opinion, however, that the average Korean rather welcomes the burden thus imposed upon him, for it caters to his overwhelming egotism and pride and gives him an excuse for lording it over his less fortunate relatives and friends. For the Korean is a born social climber, and, like social climbers in every country, any accession of importance goes to his head like champagne. Give a Korean a position of even minor responsibility and he will swell up like a toy balloon. The slightest social or business promotion is prone to make him very offensive, his overbearing manners and pronounced self-esteem rendering him quite unfitted for employment in positions where tact and courtesy are required. The medal has another and more pleasing side, however, for there is the best of evidence that a large number of Koreans die annually from starvation because they are too proud to beg or borrow or to sorn upon their friends. In Seoul there is one

whole quarter almost wholly populated by those on whom Fortune has turned a cold shoulder. It lies under the slopes of South Mountain, and you have only to say of a man that he is a "South Ward gentleman" to tell the whole story.

In the matter of veracity the Korean measures well up to the best standards of the Orient, which are none too high at best. Some people lie out of pure maliciousness; others for the fun of the thing. The Korean does not belong in either of these categories; but if he gets into trouble or is faced by a sudden emergency, or if the success of some plan necessitates a lie, he does not hesitate to take a few liberties with the truth. The difference between the Korean and the European is illustrated by their reactions if given the lie direct. Before calling a European a liar it is the part of wisdom to prepare for sudden emergencies, whereas it is as common for Koreans to use the expression "You're a liar!" as it is for an American to remark "What, really?" or "Is it possible?" or "You don't say so!" As Mr. Hurlbert succinctly puts it, a Korean sees about as much moral turpitude in a lie as we see in a split infinitive.

Though nothing in my own experience in Korea led me to believe that the Korean is any more dishonest than his Japanese or Chinese neighbors, I was told that he does not hesitate to appropriate anything which excites his cupidity when he can do so with safety to himself. The Korean costume struck

me as affording a standing inducement to pocket-picking, the capacious sleeves and balloon-like trousers providing ideal places of concealment for purloined articles. Like all Orientals, the Korean is an inveterate gambler, making his appeals to Lady Luck through the medium of dominoes or cards, the latter being made of stiff oiled paper, half an inch wide and eight inches long. There are few harder or more constant drinkers than the Korean. He is as fond of "fire water" as the red man of the West and periodically embarks on drunken and disorderly sprees. On these occasions he is prone to display unusual assertiveness, which he manifests by forcibly abducting some neighboring beauty or emphasizing his opinions by beating in the head of a friend.

As for morality in its narrower sense, the Koreans are as easy as an old shoe. And it would be surprising if they were otherwise, for from the dawn of Korea's history her ruling classes have set an example of depravity and debauchery without parallel save in ancient Greece and Rome. Indeed, the Greek hetæra has her nearest modern equivalent in the Korean *kisang,* or dancing-girl. These "leaves of sunlight," a feature of Korean life, stand apart in a class of their own. In the days of Korea's independence they were attached to a department of the government, were controlled by a special bureau of the court, and were supported from the national treasury. They are trained from earliest childhood with

a view to making them brilliant and entertaining companions, the one sign of their profession, indeed, being their culture, intellectual development, and charm. Korean parents, upon meeting with financial reverses, frequently dedicate their daughters to the career of a *kisang,* just as, in the days of the empire, they apprenticed their sons to that of a eunuch. Besides these privileged and pampered playthings of the rich, Korea has another and far larger class of women of easy virtue of a lower and less attractive grade. But this much must be said for the Koreans: until the Japanese came prostitutes were not recognized by law or advertised by segregation.

The Korean, as both Mr. Hurlbert and Mr. Philip Terry[1] have noted, is devoid of humane instincts where animals are concerned. If a lame dog or a sick cat is seen upon the street, old and young enthusiastically join in the sport of stoning it to death. They take particular delight in catching insects and pulling off their legs and wings, going into gales of laughter at the contortions of the tortured creatures. Their callousness to suffering is exemplified in their methods of slaughtering animals for food. In killing a beef the butcher first cuts the throat of the animal and inserts a peg in the opening, after which he proceeds to beat the frenzied creature on the rump with a heavy mallet until it is dead. The process takes about an

[1] See Terry's "The Japanese Empire."

hour and the poor animal suffers agonies before death intervenes, but, as the Korean will point out, very little blood is lost by this method, the meat is full of it, and its greater weight consequently means more profit for the butcher. Goats are killed by pulling them to and fro in a stream, thus destroying the rank taste of the meat and enabling it to be sold for mutton. Dogs are despatched by twirling them in a noose until they are dead, after which they are bled, dog-meat being a common article of food among the poorer classes.

It would be easier to overlook the Korean's other weaknesses were it not for his incurable aversion to cleanliness. Water he never uses except with his meals, and then only when there is nothing stronger to be had; with soap he does not possess so much as a nodding acquaintance. As might be expected, therefore, his voluminous, dirt-caked clothing is usually alive with vermin. His villages are but one degree removed from pig-sties—mere clusters of hovels opening on narrow, refuse-littered streets from whose open drains assorted stenches rise to high heaven. You do not have to see a Korean village to be made aware of its existence, for when the wind is in the right direction it is as manifest as a fertilizer plant. If the filth and squalor amid which he lives are distasteful to the Korean, he never shows it; he is always complacent. One might say of Korea, as Artemas Ward

once remarked of Spain, that there would be more arable land in the country if the people did not carry so much of it around on their persons.

Though the upper class Koreans are, with few exceptions, slothful, purposeless, and born dawdlers, the peasants, when well trained and competently supervised, make excellent workmen, the success of those who have emigrated to Hawaii testifying to their willingness to work. American and British mine managers have told me that the Korean miner, if tactfully handled, has no superior in the world. Taking him by and large, however, the countryman and the town dweller, the upper class and the lower, the Korean can hardly be characterized as a hard worker. The trouble is that he is without ambition. The thing he does best is nothing; his clothes always wear out first in the seat. Indeed, he might appropriately adopt that favorite doggerel of the American negro, whom, in his distaste for physical exertion, he so greatly resembles:

> Dat's de reason why
> I's as happy as a bee,
> Fur I don't trouble work
> An' work don't trouble me.

Yet there are a fair number of items to be listed on the credit side of the ledger. First of all is the Korean's good nature, for when even passably well treated he is docile and easy to control. Secondly comes his unfailing hospitality, both to utter strangers

and, as I have already shown, to impecunious relatives and friends. Another redeeming trait is a certain sturdiness of character—perhaps stubbornness would be a better word—which has enabled him to preserve his nationality under the sorest trials. The want of courage and self-reliance so frequently commented on by foreigners are not, I am convinced, the result of constitutional cowardice, but are probably due to centuries of servitude and oppression. Koreans have fought well on occasion, the irregular bands who have been conducting a guerilla warfare along the Manchurian border having time and again proved themselves the equals of the best troops that Japan could send against them, while during the suppression of the independence movement many of the Korean prisoners displayed a very high order of moral courage in the face of death. I doubt, indeed, if braver men are to be found anywhere than the tiger-hunters of the hills, who, armed with antiquated, long-barreled, percussion muskets, follow the great Korean tiger into its den, approach to within a few paces, and kill it with a single shot. As there is no time to reload, the man who misses dies; the tiger attends to that.

Now it should be remembered that in my estimate of the Korean character I have been speaking of the average Korean, which means the peasant, for the peasantry form the great mass of the population. But, though the Korean of the old school admittedly

presents a discouraging problem, the country is gradually gaining a considerable class of young men who have been educated abroad and who are intelligent, cultured, progressive, and genuinely patriotic. Another encouraging sign is the growing demand among all classes for education, the number of students registered last year being unprecedented in the history of the country. The Koreans make excellent students, displaying particular aptness for mathematics. They are quick of comprehension, and those who know them well assure me that there is no doubt that they are the intellectual equals of the Japanese. All they need is the opportunity and the incentive.

I, for one, can perfectly well understand how the alert, energetic, industrious, progressive, aggressive Japanese have been exasperated to the limit of their patience by the ignorance, slothfulness, irresolution and squalor of this people whom they have undertaken to reform. I can understand why the Japanese consider them and treat them as inferiors. Yet there are traits of mind and heart in the Korean which, if developed, would prove an enormous asset to the empire. Make no mistake about that. Japan cannot afford to permit the Koreans, who form one quarter of her total population, to be overrun and crushed beneath the wheels of a selfish and short-sighted policy directed by a little group of military men. Were she to do so she would be guilty, in the words of Talleyrand, of something worse than a crime—a mistake.

2. THE JAPANESE IN KOREA

I

On a sultry August afternoon in 1905, four men—two burly, bearded Russians and two slight, suave Japanese—bending over a table in an unimpressive red brick building within the walls of the Navy Yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, scrawled their signatures at the bottom of a closely written parchment, thereby bringing to an end the stupendous struggle between their respective countries for the mastery of the Farther East. But, in thus concluding a peace between their own great empires, the plenipotentiaries were signing the death warrant of a third nation, a nation which had kept its independence for upward of two thousand years, for, by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia recognized Japan's "paramount political, military, and economical interests" in Korea. Thus guaranteed complete freedom of action in the peninsula, Japan proclaimed a protectorate over the ancient little kingdom before the ink on the treaty was fairly dry, and Korea passed into the limbo of subject nations.

The Koreans and their champions have never ceased to denounce the methods employed by Japan in the establishment of the protectorate, asserting, and probably with some degree of truth, that the

Emperor of Korea and his ministers were intimidated into signing away the independence of their country. But, though the methods which Japan employed in effecting this step may be open to criticism, that the step was imperative and inevitable cannot seriously be questioned. Korea's loss of independence was primarily due to her unfortunate geographical position. Her internal condition, bad as it was, was only contributory in bringing about her downfall. Glance at the map and you will see that the peninsula of Korea is a pistol pointed straight at the heart of Japan. As long as that weapon remained, unloaded, on the table, Japan felt tolerably secure. But when she saw an unfriendly hand moving stealthily to grasp it, she was forced to take decisive action in order to insure her own safety. For with nations, as with individuals, self-preservation is the first law of nature.

In 1894 China, which had long claimed a shadowy suzerainty over Korea—a suzerainty not recognized by Japan—despatched a military force to the peninsula for the ostensible purpose of stabilizing the government of the little kingdom and effecting internal reforms. In reality it was a move to bring Korea under the rule of Peking. China's curt refusal to withdraw her troops forced Japan to choose between a permanent Chinese occupation of the peninsula and war. She chose the latter and, by a series of continuous and easy victories, quickly won an over-

KOREAN PEASANT WOMAN AND CHILD

KOREAN PEASANT TAKING FARM-PRODUCTS TO MARKET

The catafalque

The white garments are a sign of mourning for the emperor. The pointed head-coverings are of oiled paper, for the purpose of protecting the hat from the rain

FUNERAL OF THE EX-EMPEROR OF KOREA

whelming triumph. By the terms of the treaty of peace China abandoned her pretensions to the suzerainty of Korea, which remained, in theory at least, an independent kingdom. This was Japan's first modern war and it was fought to keep China from obtaining possession of the Korean pistol.

Scarcely was Japan rid of the Chinese menace, however, than another and far more formidable enemy reached down from the north to snatch the weapon so temptingly displayed. In 1903 the Emperor of Korea granted permission to a Russian lumber company to fell timber on the Korean side of the Yalu River. This seemingly innocent commercial concession provided the land-hungry Muscovites with a pretext for demanding the cession of a Korean harbor—Yongampo—on the Yellow Sea. The Bear was coming down to the Warm Water. Fully awake to her peril, Japan promptly and vigorously protested against this aggression, insisting that Russia should keep out of Korea and demanding that her own special interests in the peninsula should be recognized. Russia, made over-confident by her huge army and enormous resources, contemptuously refused. Thus Japan found herself confronted by the same problem with the Muscovite that she had fought out with the Celestial a decade before. The announcement of her decision came with paralyzing suddenness in the dimness of a February dawn in 1904, when she launched a torpedo attack against the Rus-

sian squadron lying under the guns of Port Arthur. The struggle that followed cost the island empire 135,000 lives and eight hundred million dollars, but in eighteen months the men from the little islands, who in their youth had worn skirts and carried painted fans and drunk their tea from eggshell cups the size of thimbles, whipped to a standstill the Colossus of the North.

Having thus waged two wars on account of Korea, Japan emerged from the second conflict fully convinced that her national security depended upon her preventing the peninsula from again falling under the dominance of a third power. Nor could she permit the little kingdom to drift into a condition of such internal chaos as to imperil foreign interests and thereby provide an excuse for foreign interference. There seemed only one way for Japan to dispel for good and all the threatening cloud which had so long overshadowed her: she must herself assume supervision of Korea's affairs. Instead of permitting the pistol to remain upon the table, a standing invitation to her enemies, she decided to take charge of it herself. It was a case of "safety first."

The establishment of the protectorate placed Korea in much the same relation to Japan that Egypt bore to England when the latter intervened in the Nile country in 1882. There is, indeed, a striking analogy between the two cases. Egypt, its peasantry cruelly oppressed and exploited by a corrupt

and vicious government, occupied a position of immense strategic importance astride the Suez Canal, the gateway to England's eastern possessions. Korea, with an equally wretched population and an even worse government, by virtue of her commanding position on the Straits of Korea lay squarely athwart Japan's road to her sphere of influence in Manchuria. Japan could no more take the risk of another power gaining a foothold in Korea and thereby threatening her causeway to the Asian mainland than England could take the risk of another power gaining a foothold in Egypt and threatening her sea-road to India. England intervened in Egypt in order to avert foreign complications by reforming its government and ameliorating the condition of its people. Japan intervened in Korea for precisely the same reasons. England sent to Egypt as proconsul her greatest administrator, Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer. Japan sent to Korea *her* greatest administrator, Marquis Ito. Each was confronted by the same problem: to reform a government rotten to the core and to effect the regeneration of a people reduced to the lowest depths of misery and degradation by centuries of spoliation and oppression. Had Ito not fallen by the bullet of a Korean assassin at the moment when the patient, tactful, sympathetic administration which he had established was beginning to show results, there is little doubt that he would have met with as astonishing success in rehabilitating

the "Land of the Morning Calm" as Cromer did in the "Land of the Valley of the Nile."

When the Japanese undertook the task of regenerating Korea there were but two classes in that unhappy country—the spoilers and the spoiled. Extortion, bribery, and peculation were the rule in every branch of the government and in every grade; every position was for sale to the highest bidder. The peasantry had neither rights nor privileges, save that of being the ultimate sponge. The court at Seoul was permeated with treachery and intrigue. Foreigners found, as the natives had long known, that no man's life or property was safe from the rapacity of the court party and its henchmen. Political assassinations were so common as scarcely to provoke comment. Never, perhaps, has there existed a weaker government, one more degraded and corrupt, one more utterly incapable of governing. No government more richly deserved its fate.

In June, 1907, the weak, intrigue-loving old emperor, notwithstanding his agreement not to engage in any act of an international character except through the medium of Japan, secretly despatched three emissaries to The Hague, where the Second Peace Conference was sitting, in an attempt to bring about foreign intervention. In order to save their country from the consequences of the emperor's indiscretion, which the Japanese regarded as treachery, the Korean cabinet, composed, for a wonder, of

patriotic and far-seeing men, virtually insisted on the sovereign's abdication. He was succeeded by the crown prince, a youth who, if popular report is to be believed, has been mentally incompetent from birth, but his tenure of the puppetship was destined to be of brief duration.

Meanwhile, political conditions in Seoul were going from bad to worse. Plot and counterplot followed each other in rapid succession. To avert anarchy, the Japanese put down these conspiracies with an iron hand. And to protect the peasantry, who were powerless to protect themselves, they suppressed extortion and oppression with equal firmness. The firm attitude of the government so alarmed and infuriated the corruptionists and conspirators that they had recourse to the Korean's traditional method of political retaliation—assassination. This campaign of terrorism, which culminated in the brutal murder of Prince Ito, Korea's staunchest friend, only served to hasten the end, which came on the twenty-second of August, 1910, when Korea was formally annexed to the Empire of Japan.

The imperial rescript proclaiming the annexation was the signal for the systematic Japanization of Korea to begin. And it was begun with all the method and thoroughness so characteristic of the people of Nippon. The conciliatory policy of Prince Ito gave way to a Bismarckian policy of blood and iron. Those who now shaped Japan's Korean policy

were not content to work toward a genuine amalgamation of the Koreans with the Japanese by a process of education and conciliation. They insisted on forcible denationalization. Instead of being far-sighted enough to grant the Koreans the large measure of autonomy which we have given to the Filipinos and the Porto Ricans, which England has given to the Boers and the Egyptians, they made the mistake of attempting to extirpate the language and the literature of the Koreans, to destroy their national ideals, to root out their ancient manners and customs. In short, they tried to mold these new subjects over again, mistakenly believing that, were sufficient pressure applied, they would emerge from the process as Japanese, though I imagine that it was never intended that they should be anything except an inferior grade of Japanese, subject to restrictions and disabilities from which the islanders themselves were immune. I may be doing those who were responsible for this policy a grave injustice, but, judging their aims by their actions, I am tempted to believe that they dreamed of eventually bringing the Koreans to a status not far removed from that of the American negro, thereby giving to the empire seventeen millions of patient, uncomplaining, and submissive subjects, hewers of wood and drawers of water, who would accept without remonstrance the rôle of social, political, and economic inferiority assigned to them. In adopting this policy they committed the first of the series

of psychological and political blunders which have caused such grave criticism of Japanese rule in Korea and which have provided the enemies of Japan with so much ammunition. Mind you, I am not suggesting that progressive Japanese opinion approved of this policy, for it did not. The Korean program represented the views of the military party alone. Indeed, there was a considerable element in Japan which disapproved of the annexation altogether, holding that a resentful and rebellious Korea, annexed against her will, standing at Japan's door, would prove a source of weakness rather than of strength to the empire.

Korea was now an integral part of the Japanese Empire. But though the instrument which brought the two peoples together specifically and by implication provides that Koreans shall share in the public affairs of Japan, the Japanese proceeded to treat Korea as a conquered nation. It was at once placed under military rule, General Count Terauchi, a grim soldier of the old samurai school, being appointed resident-general and clothed with almost sovereign powers. Soldiery, gendarmerie, and police were poured into the new province until it assumed the appearance of a great armed camp. Then, with the stage set, the curtain rose on the tragic spectacle of the denationalization of a people.

II

What I now have to say cannot but prove distasteful reading for the Japanese and their friends. Yet to minimize, or apologize for, or ignore the deplorable blunders which marred Japan's administrative record in Korea during the decade immediately following the annexation, as certain American champions of Japan have done, would only impair the value of this book in the eyes of thoughtful and impartially-minded men, without rendering any corresponding service either to the Japanese or the Koreans. Were I to attempt to make the picture more flattering to Japanese pride by leaving out the blemishes, I should be failing in that duty which every self-respecting author owes to his readers and to himself. On the other hand, I shall not permit myself to be influenced by the usually exaggerated and frequently untruthful charges made against the Japanese administration by the Koreans and their champions. I believe that every statement contained in the succeeding pages can be fully substantiated, in many cases by the "Annual Report" of the Government-General of Korea itself.

One of the first steps taken by the Japanese in their organized campaign of denationalization was the enactment of legislation denying freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly to the Koreans. In

pursuance of this policy all the papers and periodicals owned or managed by Koreans were suppressed. "At the end of the fiscal year 1916 there were twenty newspapers published in Chosen, of which eighteen were in Japanese, one in Korean, and one in English," says the "Annual Report," which might have added that they were all Japanese, and that three of them, including the last two, were government organs. During the reign of repression the only non-Japanese publications in Korea were certain newspapers printed secretly, while their publishers were "on the run," and distributed from hand to hand, like the famous Belgian journals issued during the German occupation. The hand-presses and type were conveyed from hiding-place to hiding-place under cover of night, the lives of the editors being as thrilling as the Japanese police and spies could make them.

It having been determined that the Korean language, like Korean literature, should die, an attempt was made to destroy it by making Japanese the official tongue not only in public documents and court proceedings, but wherever possible in the schools. It is instructive to compare this with our own policy in the Philippines, where Spanish is taught as freely and as widely as English. The text-books used in the schools were printed in Japanese under the supervision of Japanese censors; the teachers were either Japanese or Japanese-speaking Koreans. And, as though to impress the children with the military might

of Japan, the teachers wore sabers. Imagine the effect on a class of little girls when their teacher emphasized his authority by rattling his sword!

Though Korea has a history reaching back into the past for two thousand years, its teaching in the schools was forbidden. Nor, with the exception of certain specially favored individuals, were Koreans permitted to go abroad for study, except to Japan, and those who had been studying abroad were not permitted to return. Moreover, those who succeeded in obtaining permission to attend the Imperial University at Tokyo were discouraged, if not actually forbidden, from specializing in such subjects as law, constitutional government, history, or economics, it being the Japanese policy to encourage industrial education along practical lines for their new subjects to the exclusion of everything else. The Japanese have always held that England, by encouraging a purely academic education for the higher class Hindus in India, was breeding discontent and agitation, and they had no intention of trying a similar experiment in Korea.

"The holding of public meetings in connection with political affairs, or the gathering of crowds out of doors, was also prohibited, except open-air religious gatherings or school excursion parties, permission for which might be obtained of the police authorities." Thus reads a passage in the "Annual Report," which further states that "most of the political associations

and similar bodies were ordered to dissolve themselves at the time of annexation. . . . Since then there has been no political party or association, as such, among the Koreans." This regulation was even more comprehensive than its wording would suggest. For example, a Y. M. C. A. had to submit to the police the date, hour, speaker, and topic of discussion of a proposed meeting before it could obtain permission to hold it; the same prohibitive principle applied to interscholastic field-meets in which two or more schools proposed to participate.

Another source of Korean resentment was provided by the Japanese attitude toward religion. Broadly speaking, religious instruction was forbidden in Korean schools. Religious gatherings of more than five persons were required to obtain a permit from the police and native Christians had to obtain special authorization to hold religious services. This interference with religious liberty was, in itself, the height of political unwisdom, but the over-zealous police, by their harsh and unintelligent methods of enforcement, turned it into something perilously close to religious persecution. For example, such hymns as "Onward, Christian Soldiers" were forbidden on the ground that they tended to develop a militaristic spirit among the Koreans—an inhibition only equaled in recent times, in its patent absurdity, by Abdul Hamid's famous dictum against the importation into Turkey of dynamos "because they sound too much

like dynamite!" Prominent churchmen, leaders in Korean thought and education, were arrested and sometimes thrown into prison on charges so ridiculous that they sounded more like a passage from a Gilbert and Sullivan opera than a serious court proceeding. For example, the pastor of one of the native churches was arrested for having referred in his sermon to the Kingdom of Heaven. He was freed with an admonition not to repeat the offense, the police magistrate warning him that the only kingdom in which the Koreans should display an interest was the Kingdom of Japan! Mr. C. W. Kendall, in "The Truth About Korea," cites the case of Pastor Kil of Ping-Yang, who, for preaching against the evils of cigarette-smoking by boys, was charged by the Japanese authorities with treason. The argument of the Japanese prosecutor, according to Mr. Kendall, ran something after this fashion:

> Pastor Kil preached against the use of cigarettes.
> The manufacture of cigarettes is a government monopoly.
> To speak against their use is to injure a government institution.
> To injure a government institution is to work against the government.
> To work against the government is treason.
> Ergo, Pastor Kil is guilty of treason.

Though upon annexation Korea became, in theory at least, a province of the empire, the Koreans were permitted neither a national assembly nor representation in the Japanese Diet, thus giving them justifica-

tion for adopting the slogan, "Taxation without representation is tyranny." Had the Japanese been more familiar with American history they would have realized that the same slogan cost England her American colonies. Though in principle the Koreans were to be accorded the same treatment as other subjects of the emperor, discrimination of the most flagrant character was practised against them everywhere. Koreans and Japanese were subject to two entirely different codes of legal procedure. The codes applying to Koreans were severer, on the assumption that they needed heavier penalties to bring about a desired result. For example, corporal punishment could be legally administered only to Koreans. Hence, if a Japanese was convicted of a misdemeanor, he was imprisoned or fined. If a Korean was convicted of the same offense, he was flogged—sometimes into insensibility. If a Japanese was killed by the Seoul street-railways, his family was paid two hundred yen. If the victim was a Korean, the indemnity was half that sum. A Japanese common laborer received over half again as much pay as a Korean laborer engaged in the same task, and the same rule applied to skilled workmen and, for that matter, to government officials. While eleven years are allotted to Japanese youths for primary and secondary education, only eight years were allowed the Koreans. It has been suggested, incidentally, that this discrimination in the curricula was the highest unintentional

compliment the Japanese could pay the exceptional intellectual ability of the sons and daughters of Korea.

Even more humiliating and degrading were the various forms of social discrimination practised against the Koreans. As staunch a defender of Japan's policy in Korea as Dr. George Gleason admits this in his book, "What Shall I Think of Japan?" "Nearly all Japanese assume an air of superiority toward the Koreans," he says. I can assert from personal observation that the great majority of Japanese treat the Koreans in personal intercourse as the dirt beneath their feet. A Japanese always takes his place, as by right, at the head of a waiting line at a post-office, bank, or railway-station. The Japanese coolie kicks or punches the Korean who chances to stand in his way. The Japanese petty functionaries assume an air of hauteur and disdain in their dealings with the Koreans. Even the Korean nobles and princes of the royal house are treated with studied condescension. It is only fair to add, however, that this disregard of Korean susceptibilities is confined in the main to Japanese of the lower and middle classes. Every nation has its gentlemen.

Immediately upon annexation the peninsula was flooded with gendarmes, police, spies, and informers, who promptly proceeded to inaugurate a reign of terrorism. On the pretext of searching for arms or seditious literature the police entered private residences

without search-warrants, still further irritating the Koreans by invading the apartments of the women. Spies, usually low-class Koreans, were everywhere, adding to the general demoralization. No one knew when, or in what form, the most harmless acts or words might be reported to the authorities. Yet the Koreans had no appeal from these oppressions, because, with no newspapers, they had no way of making themselves heard.

"In the peninsula," to quote again from the official "Annual Report," "minor offenses relating to gambling, bodily harm, etc., or to a violation of administrative ordinances, which would ordinarily come under the jurisdiction of the lowest courts, are adjudicated by the police, instead of by ordinary judicial procedure." Thus it will be seen that the police, in addition to their regular functions of crime prevention and the apprehension of criminals, were given judicial power. They could sentence prisoners to fines, flogging, imprisonment, or exile. The extreme unwisdom of granting such wide powers to the police, who were totally incompetent to exercise them with discretion and who, to make matters worse, were for the most part men of petty minds and narrow sympathies, requires no comment. Add to this the fact, of which there exists indubitable proof, that the police frequently tortured innocent persons in order to extract testimony from them, and it will be seen that the Koreans had abundant ground for complaint.

That the police had gendarmes and soldiers associated with them in the enforcement of the law led the Koreans to regard the police not as civil servants and protectors, but as oppressors. This feeling was intensified by the multitude of petty and vexatious regulations, many of which the people could not understand, and by the harsh and indiscriminate manner in which they were administered. The records of the summary courts—which correspond to our police courts—for 1915 show a total of 59,483 persons brought to trial and only seven acquitted. Dr. Gleason, who is strongly pro-Japanese in his sympathies, asserts that in the four years, 1913-16, 221,000 persons were tried and only 496 acquitted. In the report issued by the government-general for the year 1916-17 it is stated that out of 82,121 offenders dealt with "in police summary judgment," 81,139 were sentenced, 952 were pardoned, and only 30 were able to prove their innocence. Dr. Hugh C. Cynn, in his dispassionate and, on the whole, remarkably just book, "The Rebirth of Korea," dryly remarks that "either the Japanese police in Korea are so superior to those of all other nations in detecting crime that they almost never run down any but the actual criminals, or the Koreans, when they get into the meshes of the police and gendarme-interpreted ordinances, find it next to impossible to prove their innocence."

Instead of putting Korean interests first, Japan made the mistake of ruling the peninsula primarily

for her own glory and the benefit of her own people. The Japanese settler, the Japanese trader, the Japanese concessionaire, were the men whose needs the government-general at Seoul studied and whose demands it heeded. The Koreans, without influence and without protection and hampered by serious political disabilities and restrictions, could be exploited with impunity, provided the methods used were not too outrageous. Under the old Korean Government the land was divided into four classes:[1]

1. Private lands, owned by individuals.

2. Crown lands, belonging to the emperor but leased in perpetuity to private individuals.

3. Municipal lands, the titles to which were vested in the various municipalities, but the practical ownership of which was in the hands of private individuals.

4. Lands belonging to the Buddhist temples.

Owners of private lands paid taxes to the government. Tenants of crown lands paid rental to the royal household. Those occupying municipal lands paid fees to the respective municipalities. The temple lands, which were held under a communistic arrangement by the Buddhists, were exempt from taxation. In many cases the leasehold of these lands had acquired a value almost equal to that of land held in full possession. One of the first acts of the Japanese administration was to survey the country and expropriate all crown, municipal, and temple lands,

[1] "The Truth About Korea," by C. W. Kendall.

on the ground that, as they did not belong to private individuals, they must be the property of the government. They were then turned over to a concern known as the Oriental Development Company, which was a government-fostered organization for encouraging the immigration of Japanese into Korea. This company, by demanding greatly increased rentals from the Korean tenants, forced them to abandon the lands which they had tilled for generations in favor of government-assisted Japanese settlers. The economic unwisdom of this policy is shown by the fact that, though some 400,000 Japanese have settled in the peninsula since the annexation, upward of 1,500,000 Koreans have gone into voluntary exile in Manchuria and Siberia because they could not stand the pressure thus brought to bear upon them. The repeated assertions of the Japanese that they went into Korea for the benefit of the Koreans reminds me of an anecdote about one of the rulers of the House of Hanover—I think it was George the First—who, addressing his new subjects upon his arrival in England, assured them in his broken English, "I am here for your own good—for all your goods."

By virtue of Article V of the Treaty of Annexation, which bound "the Emperor of Japan to confer peerages and monetary grants upon Koreans who, on account of meritorious services, are regarded as deserving such special recognition," some seventy-two

Koreans were made counts, viscounts, and barons. Had Japan chosen for the new nobility those men who, by reason of their integrity, ability, and patriotism, held the respect of the Korean people, this measure would have met with popular approval. But instead she chose to honor the corruptionists and conspirators who had ruined the country, most of the more upright and respected statesmen being conspicuous by their omission from the honors list. On the other hand, the leaders of the former progressive party, who were the real brains of the country, were proscribed and persecuted. As a result, many of them were forced to leave the country and the lives of those who remained were made miserable by espionage and bullying. Had these men, the real leaders of Korean public opinion, been treated in a tactful and friendly manner by the Japanese, had they been consulted on Korean problems, as England consulted and honored her great Boer adversaries, Botha and Smuts, I am convinced that it would have done more than anything else to have won the confidence of the Korean people and to have brought peace and contentment to the new province, for the Koreans were heartily sick of the follies and extravagances of the old régime. Instead of availing herself of their knowledge of Korea's needs and profiting by their advice, Japan made the mistake of driving them into exile or imprisoning them. In so doing she

made martyrs of them in the eyes of their own people. What a pity that the Japanese, in their treatment of these men, could not have been blessed with the shrewd common sense of that English sovereign who, speaking of the leader of a rebellious faction, said, "I won't let him make a martyr of himself."

In the foregoing pages I have sketched in brief outline the methods by which Japan sought to assimilate the Korean people during the ten years following the annexation. In doing this I have tried to be absolutely fair. All of the abuses which I have cited are fully substantiated by the official reports of the government-general itself. Of certain other charges, which I have not been able to verify to my own satisfaction, I have made no mention. Viewing the question impartially, it appears to me that at the beginning of 1920, when Japan inaugurated a milder and more sympathetic rule in the peninsula, the Koreans had no less than a dozen distinct and justifiable grounds for complaint against the Japanese administration. These might be summed up as follows:

1. Taxation without representation.

2. Denial of freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly.

3. Measures tending to the eventual extirpation of the Korean language.

4. Educational discrimination.

5. Interference with the religious activities of the people.

6. Abuse of power by the police.

7. Multiplicity of irritating laws and lack of judgment in their enforcement.

8. Expropriation of public lands.

9. Economic pressure against Koreans.

10. Persecution of Korean leaders.

11. Lack of tact, sympathy, and understanding on the part of Japanese officials.

12. Social discrimination.

By these methods the Japanese sought to remold their new subjects in their own image. But, much to their surprise and perturbation, they discovered in the Korean a character as hard, as obstinate, and as unyielding as their own. At every turn they found themselves confronted by that most baffling of all obstacles—passive resistance. Had the Japanese been far-sighted enough to treat the Koreans, who are not a conquered race, as England treated the conquered Boers, there would have been a genuine amalgamation of the two peoples. And it is not a long step from amalgamation to assimilation. But the Japanese ignored this golden opportunity to win the loyalty and friendship of their new subjects. They entered on their task in a wrong spirit; they were hampered by mistaken ideas. Failing utterly to understand the Korean's psychology, they assumed an attitude of contempt instead of sympathy. And without sympathy on the part of the governors for

the governed, good government is impossible.[1] Imagine the upheaval in the British Empire if England should suppress the vernacular newspapers of the Hindus, if she should forbid the use of Arabic in the courts of Egypt, if she should expropriate the lands of the Indian princes, if she should prohibit the teaching of the Koran in the schools of her Mohammedan possessions. Yet that is a fair parallel to the policy of the Japanese in Korea. They insisted that the Koreans should speak their language, read their newspapers, follow their customs, lead their lives, even wear their clothing; in short, permit themselves to be remade mentally, spiritually, and outwardly. That the complete breakdown of this policy has been clearly recognized by the more progressive and discerning of the Japanese themselves is shown by the report of Mr. Kenosuke Morya, whom the Japanese constitutional party sent to Korea to investigate conditions on the spot. In it he says, "It is a great mistake of colonial policy to enforce upon the Koreans, with their two-thousand-year history, the same spiritual and mental training as the Japanese people."

III

Yet during this same discouraging decade the Japanese made amazing material progress in Korea. The

[1] "Korea's Fight for Freedom," by F. A. McKenzie.

old, effete, corrupt administration was swept away. A cabinet was formed on the model of that in Japan. An elaborate system of local government was adopted. The judiciary was reformed. A sound monetary system was established and maintained. Prisons were cleansed and modernized. The mileage of the railways was doubled. The inadequate Korean harbors were transformed into spacious ports equipped with all modern appliances. Remarkable improvements in the public health were effected by government hospitals and systems of sanitation. New waterworks were built in fourteen cities and towns. The 500 miles of road which existed in 1910 were increased to 8000, it being proposed to eventually cover the peninsula with a network of highways. New industries were introduced, nearly 800 factories, something hitherto unknown in the land, being established, thereby providing occupation for thousands of Koreans. Handsome and substantial public buildings were erected. Streets were extended and paved and charming parks laid out. Primary, secondary, technical, agricultural, forestry, and other schools, as well as model farms and experimental stations, were opened. Agriculture—the mainstay of the country—was enormously developed, the Korean farmer being taught new and profitable side-lines—fruit, cotton, sugar-beet, hemp, tobacco, and silk-worm culture, and sheep-breeding. Afforestation was pushed forward on a truly astounding scale, no less than half a bil-

lion young trees being set out by the Japanese forestry service on the bare, brown hillsides. The area of cultivated land was doubled. Fruit production was more than doubled. The output of the Korean coal mines was trebled. Cotton acreage increased by more than 4500 per cent. and salt production by more than 7000 per cent. There were increases of several hundred per cent. in the acreages of wheat, beans, and barley. By the introduction of modern appliances the value of the fishery products doubled. The foreign trade of Korea went up from 59,000,000 yen to 131,000,000 yen in seven years. In less than a decade after the annexation there were a million depositors in the postal savings-banks—and this in a country with a notoriously shiftless and improvident population. In short, more public improvements were made, civic reforms instituted, and economic progress effected in these ten years than the Koreans had so much as thought of since their history began.

For this great work Japan deserves the highest commendation. It is a striking testimonial to her efficiency in effecting material reforms. And it is likewise a testimonial to the capacity for making progress of the Koreans themselves. If successful colonial administration consisted only in effecting material benefits, Japan's record in Korea would entitle her to be regarded as one of the most successful colonizing nations in the world. The curious fact remains that few, if any, of the writers on Korea have

appraised this record of achievement at its true valuation.[1] Their perspective is distorted by their prejudices. The pro-Korean writers, almost without exception, have either minimized Japan's accomplishments in the peninsula or have denied their benefit to the Koreans themselves. On the other hand, such pro-Japanese writers as Messrs. Sherrill, Gleason, and Hershey have magnified the chronicle of progress until it all but obscures everything else. It can no more benefit the Koreans for their champions to shut their eyes to the undeniable good that the Japanese have accomplished than it can serve Japan to have her partisans ignore those evils which cry for redress.

IV

Following the annexation many of the Korean leaders who had tried to save their dying country in its last desperate moments, recognizing the futility of attempting to do anything further at that time, fled to foreign countries. Some settled across the frontier in Siberia and Manchuria; others established themselves in the Treaty Ports, in Manila, Honolulu, San Francisco. A number of these political refugees con-

[1] In "The Truth About Korea" Mr. C. W. Kendall devotes only four lines to what Japan has done for the good of the Koreans. In his "Modern Japan" Dr. A. S. Hershey devotes scarcely more space to discussing the shortcomings of the Japanese administration. The only fearless and non-partisan account I have been able to find is that contained in Mr. J. O. P. Bland's "Japan, China and Korea."

stituted themselves into a "Provisional Government of Korea," with headquarters at Shanghai, it being claimed that the self-appointed members of this "government" are supported by funds voluntarily paid as taxes by the Korean people. It is very doubtful, however, whether these enthusiastic young patriots are as truly representative of the great mass of the Korean people as the Korean National Association, a society which claims to have a membership of over a million Koreans living in exile throughout the Farther East. At the same time, despite the activity of the Japanese police, other secret societies, likewise dedicated to freeing Korea from Japanese rule, were organized in the peninsula itself. From all I have been able to learn these associations are not composed of dangerous radicals, disgruntled politicians, and bolshevist terrorists, as charged by the Japanese authorities, but, on the contrary, consist for the most part of Korean scholars and progressives, many of them graduates of American and European universities, who have the best interests of their country sincerely at heart. They are agitators, it is true, in that they are agitating for their country's independence, but what, pray, were Patrick Henry and Bolívar, Kosciuszko and Juarez and Gomez?

Throughout the four years of the World War there were manifest to keen observers many evidences that a new spirit was gradually taking possession of the Koreans. It would be stating only a part of the

truth, however, to assert that the Japanese administration was the sole cause of this national unrest. Obnoxious though that administration was, it was only contributory; the real cause was to be found in the innate and irresistible desire of the Koreans to govern themselves. They were hungry for freedom. Now that the world had been made safe for democracy; now that the Poles and the Croats and the Czechs and the Lithuanians were about to achieve their independence, is it any wonder that the Koreans felt that the hour when they should strike for liberty was likewise at hand? It was Woodrow Wilson's pronunciamento on the right of small nations to self-determination which gave them their text and battle-cry. It was the assembling of the peacemakers at Versailles which gave them their opportunity. The Korean leaders, believing, no doubt, that they could ride to success on the wave of political freedom which was sweeping the world, chose the time set for the opening of the Peace Conference to launch their "passive revolution." For the most part impractical visionaries, there is something of the pathetic in their failure to realize how hopeless was their attempt to interest a distracted Europe in the fortunes of an obscure little nation half the world away.

It was planned that the "revolution" should be unique in the history of political uprising in that there should be neither bloodshed nor violence. The participants were explicitly warned that no one was to

be harmed. No property was to be destroyed or damaged. No rowdyism, no bolshevism, no terrorism was to be tolerated. Orders were given that under no circumstances were the demonstrators to resist the Japanese police. If they were beaten, imprisoned, or even killed they were to take their punishment without complaint. Nothing must be done which would bring reproach upon the name of Korea or their movement. It was arranged that these passive demonstrations should break out simultaneously in all the larger towns and cities of the peninsula, while in Seoul itself the demonstrators were to divide themselves into groups of three thousand, each under a leader, and march to the various foreign consulates and government offices, singing the Korean national anthem and shouting *"Mansei!"*, which is the Korean equivalent of "Hurrah!" In short, it was to be a nation-wide demonstration in which seventeen million Koreans were to impress on their Japanese rulers by strictly peaceable methods that they would no longer submit to misgovernment and oppression. When it is remembered that for every Japanese in the peninsula there are fifty Koreans, it is not hard to guess what would have happened if the demonstration had not been a passive one.

How the great number of country people who were to participate in the demonstration were to gain access to the capital without arousing the suspicions of the Japanese police was a question which caused some

perplexity to the leaders of the movement, but it was suddenly solved in the latter part of January, 1919, when the old ex-Emperor Yi passed away in his palace in Seoul. Though he had been of no service to his countrymen when alive, it seemed that he might aid them unwittingly now that he was dead, for his funeral, set for March 4, provided the excuse the Korean leaders had been seeking for a sudden influx of peasantry into the capital. In some way, however, the carefully guarded secret reached the ears of the police, whereupon the resourceful leaders suddenly changed the date for the demonstration to March 1,—the day set for the rehearsal of the funeral. Now the rehearsal of a Korean funeral is almost as magnificent as the event itself, so the authorities saw nothing to cause alarm in the great numbers of Koreans who came pouring into the capital by train and road, afoot, and in lumbering carts and astride of horses.

The morning of March 1 found upward of two hundred thousand people assembled in the streets of Seoul. The whole city was tense with anxiety, mingled with some vague expectancy. In the meantime thirty-three men, representing all religions, sects, and classes, had drawn up and signed what was virtually a declaration of independence. These men thoroughly believed that President Wilson's declaration that the civilized world was determined henceforth to protect the rights of weaker nations proclaimed the end of Korea's vassaldom. "A new era,"

they declared, "wakes before our eyes; the old world of force is gone, and the new world of righteousness and truth is here." As an English writer, Mr. J. O. P. Bland, has put it, "Of practical politics, of the great world beyond the Hermit Kingdom, these simple old-world scholars and guileless enthusiasts knew little or nothing; they only knew that under the rule of Japan they were humiliated and unhappy, and that after the agony of ten years of foreign oppression the clarion call had sounded which was to give them unfettered liberty." Copies of the proclamation, together with instructions as to what was expected of the people, were sent to local leaders all over Korea through the aid of little school-girls, who hid the incriminating documents in their capacious sleeves and trudged from town to town, bearing the message of freedom.

Shortly before noon on March 1 twenty-nine of the thirty-three signers of the declaration met in the Tai-wha Kwan, where the independence of Korea had been signed away nearly a decade before. It is said that all the higher officials of the Japanese administration had been invited to attend the meeting, but that only one had come, the others having official duties which took them elsewhere. After the momentous document had been read to the assemblage a messenger was despatched to communicate its contents to the great crowd which had gathered in Pagoda Park. Then, after drinking success to the

movement thus initiated, one of the signers went to the telephone, called up the chief of police, told him what they had done, and informed him that they were ready to go to prison. The suggestion was promptly complied with.

The demonstration, taken as a whole, followed the instructions of the leaders to the letter. The demonstrators were unarmed, and among them were as many old men and women as young people. Foreigners who witnessed the affair told me that it was one of the most curious and impressive sights they had ever seen. The masses of white-clad people, pulsating with the new spirit of freedom, surged through the streets in human billows, waving little Korean flags, of which thousands had been distributed secretly, singing the Korean national anthem, which is set to the tune of "Auld Lang Syne," and shouting "*Mansei! Mansei! Mansei!* Ten thousand years for Korea!"[1]

So skilfully had the demonstration been planned and executed that the authorities were taken completely by surprise. The Japanese secret service, which had boasted that it had its fingers constantly on the pulse of Korean public opinion, had been outwitted and out-manœuvered at every turn. Because of the magnitude of the movement the police were help-

[1] This sketch of the independence agitation has been drawn, in the main, from Korean sources—"The Truth About Korea," by C. W. Kendall and "The Rebirth of Korea," by Hugh Heung-wo Cynn—in so far as they agree with the testimony of unprejudiced witnesses.

less, but as soon as the seriousness of the situation was realized the troops were called out and the paraders were dispersed by force, hundreds being wounded or trampled upon. By nightfall of "Independence Day" the prisons of Korea were filled to overflowing.

It was here, in my opinion, that the authorities were guilty of a serious blunder. It must be patent to every fair-minded person that they could not tolerate disorders and revolutionary acts, however patriotically intended, and that in adopting stern measures for their suppression they only did what all governments are likely to do under similar circumstances. The question is whether, in view of the eminently passive character of the demonstration, they chose the wisest course. So long as there was no violence it would have been the part of wisdom, it seems to me, to have let the pent-up emotions of the people escape through the safety-valve provided by the demonstration, instead of attempting forcibly to suppress them. Much bloodshed might have been averted if the authorities had possessed the psychology of one village policeman, who permitted the people in his district to celebrate for three days without molestation. Then he told them that if they wanted independence they should build up an army and navy; this would require much money, so they had better return to their work and accumulate the wealth necessary to develop the nation. They agreed with him that it was sound

DEVIL-POSTS OUTSIDE KOREAN VILLAGE TO KEEP AWAY EVIL SPIRITS

TRANSPORTING FODDER ON THE BACKS OF BULLS IN KOREA

ANCIENT KOREAN TEMPLE IN SEOUL

PALANQUIN OF PRINCE LI
(Former Emperor of Korea)

advice and dispersed peaceably without any harm having been done.[1]

Notwithstanding official attempts to minimize the extent and significance of the agitation, there seems to be little doubt that it was a genuine national movement. When I went to Korea I was quite prepared to find certain classes of the population, particularly the students and intellectuals and those having political aspirations, permeated by the spirit of nationalism. But I expected to find the farmers, who compose the great mass of the people and are the backbone of the country, largely ignorant of and indifferent to the new movement. I found, however, that the emotions aroused—which might be described as a new national consciousness—have gone deep and broad into the lives of the people as a whole. When Yi Sang-Chai, who has been called "the Tolstoy of Korea," was interrogated by a secret service man as to who were the persons behind the movement, he replied: "All the Korean people, from Fusan to the Ever White Mountains. They are all in it. They are the committee back of the agitation."

Now it is not my intention to enter into any detailed account or discussion of the excesses which marked the suppression of the independence movement. That the Japanese police and gendarmes were guilty of many brutalities and some horrible reprisals is not open to question. Not only have they been

[1] "What Shall I Think of Japan?" by George Gleason.

confirmed by a host of reputable witnesses, foreigners as well as natives, but the Japanese Government itself has virtually admitted them by punishing the perpetrators. In certain of the provincial towns, if the testimony of trustworthy witnesses is to be believed, unarmed and unresisting Koreans, both men and women, were bayoneted or shot down in cold blood. Houses were looted and burned. In order to extort confessions or to obtain evidence, many of the prisoners were subjected to torture. Women and young girls were stripped, beaten, and subjected to shameful indignities, though I might add that I found no evidence of a single case of assault on Korean women by Japanese police or soldiers. Yet, brutal and cruel though they undeniably were, that is no excuse for the grossly exaggerated accounts that have been spread broadcast. For example, Mr. C. W. Kendall in "The Truth About Korea" is authority for the statement that in the first three months of the agitation over 50,000 Koreans were killed or wounded. In December, 1919, *The World Outlook* published a report placing the killed at between 30,000 and 40,000. According to official reports, 631 Koreans were killed and 1409 wounded. This is perhaps an understatement, but none of the foreigners with whom I discussed the question when I was in Korea estimated the killed at over one thousand.

Mr. George Gleason, who certainly cannot be accused of any anti-Japanese leanings, has summed up

the results of the rising as follows, drawing his figures, it is to be assumed, from official reports:

"Of the 2500 village districts in Korea, there were uprisings in 577, the total number of demonstrations being 779, with demonstrators numbering 452,868. [Heaven only knows how such exact figures were obtained!] Riots took place in 236 places. The police and gendarmes numbered 8000 Koreans and 6000 Japanese located in 1800 villages. There were, besides these, about 25,000 Japanese soldiers, all of whom at one time were engaged in suppressing the demonstrations. In 185 places guns were fired at the demonstrators; 631 Koreans were killed and 1409 wounded. Nine Japanese policemen were killed and 186 wounded. In 87 places public buildings were destroyed and in 88 places private houses were burned. Up to July 20, 1919, 28,934 Koreans were arrested. While there is some duplication in the reports, the following treatment was given those arrested: 7111 were set free without trial; 8993 were committed to trial; 5156 were sent to prison; 10,592 were flogged and released. In only two out of the nearly 600 villages where demonstrations took place did the Koreans use firearms. That such a peaceful movement resulted in the killing and wounding of 2000, the arrest of 29,000, and the flogging of 10,000 is a fact which calls for meditation more than for comment. No Japanese can be surprised at the widespread wave of protest."

In considering the methods which the Japanese

authorities used in suppressing the independence movement, it should be kept in mind that they were by no means indicative of the sentiments of the Japanese people as a whole, who, on the contrary, disapproved and deplored them. They were indicative of the sentiment of only a small, though powerful, section of the Japanese people—the military party. These men, brought up in the stern school of the soldier, steeped in military traditions, believing in inflexible discipline and unquestioning obedience to authority as a Mohammedan believes in the Koran, took the position that Korea and the Koreans were the absolute property of Japan, that the subjugation and Japanization of the Koreans was a military necessity, and that the independence movement constituted a defiance of the imperial power which must be stamped out with fire and sword. I am not excusing the Japanese, mind you, when I remind my readers of the massacre ordered by the British general, Dwyer, at Amritsar; of Captain-General Weyler's treatment of the Cubans; of the behavior of the "Black and Tans" in Ireland; of the excesses perpetrated by the Greeks in Albania and Asia Minor. The Japanese excesses in Korea should not be condoned because other people have committed them. I am merely calling attention to the fact that history has repeatedly shown that enlightened and humane nations have frequently been disgraced by the action of their military men.

It is due to historical accuracy and to the Japanese army to emphasize the fact that three bodies of men have been sent by the Japanese Government to Korea to restore order. One is the regular army. Another is the gendarmerie—a police force organized on military lines. The third is the police, or rather, those contingents of police recruited in Japan. These forces are distinct and should not be confused. Nor should their deeds. In organization, discipline, temper, and ideals the police and gendarmerie are several degrees removed from the regular army. Unlike the regular army, their discipline, training, and temper could not withstand the trials and temptations to which they were subjected in Korea. Neither their discipline nor methods could compare with army discipline, so it is scarcely a matter for surprise that at certain times and places they broke loose—that they burned, destroyed, killed, tortured, intimidated. In the vast majority of cases the excesses in Korea were committed by police and gendarmes; not by Japanese soldiers.

Now here is the most significant and discouraging feature of the whole deplorable business. When the news of what had happened in the peninsula became known in Japan there was no public, and very little political, reaction. The wave of indignation which swept England when the conduct of the "Black and Tans" in Ireland became known, had no parallel in Japan. Scarcely more than a ripple disturbed the

political waters, while the public remained as profoundly apathetic as though the excesses had occurred in Central Africa instead of in a province of the empire, six score miles away. It is true that the Japanese Constitutional Party despatched an independent investigator to Korea to examine the situation on the spot, and that his report ascribed the movement to discriminatory treatment of the Koreans, complicated and impracticable administrative measures, and extreme oppression, but I have the feeling that in this the constitutionalists were inspired by a desire to embarrass the government as much as by humanitarian motives. It is also true that the resident-general, Count Hasegawa, the director of political affairs, Mr. Yamagata, and the chief of gendarmerie were recalled, though the government "saved the face" of the militarists by making General Hasegawa a field-marshal. There is no doubt that the government was gravely concerned over the excesses, though not so much on moral grounds as because of its fear of the effect on Western opinion. And this concern was shared by a small group of men who had had long associations with Western life and were familiar with Western thought. In discussing the excesses some months later with Viscount Kaneko, who is a graduate of Harvard and one of the most advanced Japanese statesmen, he said with great earnestness: "Unfortunately they are only too true. I do not pretend to deny them; I can only deplore them, the more

so because they were committed by my own people. I only hope that they will not be interpreted abroad as indicative of the real attitude of the Japanese people toward the Koreans." I do not wish to do the Japanese Government or people an injustice, but in my opinion the reforms which were promptly instituted in Korea were inspired not by public opinion in Japan, but almost wholly by public opinion outside of Japan. For the Peace Conference was then sitting in Paris, and Japan, with enormous interests at stake in the ante-bellum settlements, could ill afford to have her case prejudiced by criticism of her conduct in Korea.

The government thus found itself in a difficult and trying situation. Premier Hara was quick to recognize that something must be done, and done at once, to convince America and the European nations that Japan was sincere in her desire to ameliorate conditions in the peninsula. But he likewise realized that he could not afford to do anything which would arouse the animosity of the military party. He steered a middle course, therefore, by designating Admiral Baron Saito, a retired naval officer, as the new governor-general of Korea, this appointment being in the nature of a compromise between the militarists, who demanded that the independence movement be suppressed with an iron hand, and those statesmen of broader vision, who, recognizing the danger of flouting foreign opinion, insisted on a new deal for the

Koreans. I might add, parenthetically, that as a captain in command of a Japanese warship Baron Saito was present when the American squadron under Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, and that he unreservedly sided with the American commodore when the commander of a German warship attempted to interfere in behalf of the Spaniards. The portfolio of political affairs in Baron Saito's cabinet is held by Dr. Kentaro Midzuno, formerly minister of the interior of Japan, an enlightened and progressive statesman of the highest type. Though I believe that Baron Saito's administration has the best interests of the Koreans genuinely at heart, its freedom of action has been hampered by the military party. Men like Baron Saito and Dr. Midzuno could and would accomplish far-reaching reforms in Korea if they were not discouraged in their efforts by the apathetic state of public opinion at home.

I had a long conference with Baron Saito when I was in Seoul. He spoke fair English and answered my queries as to Japan's future course in Korea with every appearance of candor. He freely admitted that many mistakes had been made; he deplored the harshness which had characterized the preceding administration; and he expressed his intention of making Japanese rule in Korea of real benefit to the Koreans, who, he felt, had never been given a fair chance. He impressed me as being sincere, deeply in earnest, and possessed of a large measure of sym-

pathy for the Koreans, and this despite the fact that upon the very day of his arrival in Seoul to take over his new duties, before he had an opportunity to make his policy known, an attempt was made by a Korean to assassinate him.

V

More than two years have passed since the Imperial Rescript of August 20, 1919, in which the emperor called upon his officials "to rush reforms," which was followed by Premier Hara's proclamation announcing that "it is the government's fixed determination to forward the progress of the country in order that all differences between Korea and Japan proper in matters of education, industry, and the civil service may be finally obliterated. . . . It is the ultimate purpose of the Japanese Government in due course to treat Korea as in all respects on the same footing with Japan proper." In that period a creditable number of reforms have been effected. The objectionable gendarmerie system has largely been done away with and the police system, improved, enlarged, and under the direct control of the civil instead of the military authorities, has been substituted. The much criticized custom of flogging was definitely abolished on April 1, 1920—about the time, incidentally, that American newspapers were carrying reports of the movement to abolish the public

flogging of women in Georgia. The prisons have been enlarged and improved. New school regulations have been adopted, lengthening the courses of study, granting wider options in the curricula, permitting religious instruction in private schools, and relaxing the requirements as to the use of the Japanese language in certain subjects. The regulations governing religious activities have been revised, simplifying the requirements as to reports concerning the opening of new churches, the number of adherents, and the like. The so-called "Company Law," restricting the establishment of commercial companies, has been repealed. Newspapers in the Korean language, owned and edited by Koreans, have again appeared, and freedom of the press, at least in some degree, has been restored, though the newspapers are still frequently suppressed by the authorities. The spies and informers who so long swarmed in the peninsula have largely disappeared. The salaries of Japanese and Koreans in government employ have been equalized in the various grades. Koreans have been appointed to high posts in the government, including those of provincial governor, judge, and public procurator. The custom of wearing swords by civil officials has been abolished. The Advisory Council, composed of Korean statesmen, which had fallen into innocuous desuetude, has been revived, it being convened regularly once a week, and by the infusion of new blood has been made more representative of all classes of

Korean opinion—including the anti-Japanese—thus providing at least the germ of representative government in Korea. Though admittedly much remains to be done, this, as most fair-minded persons will admit, is a creditable showing for two years.

The Korean leaders with whom I discussed the situation, though guarded in their comments, were dissatisfied—as might have been expected—with the extent of the reforms and frankly skeptical of Japanese sincerity. Their chief criticisms appeared to be (1) that the new administration is supporting the leaders of the old, corrupt, discredited régime, rather than the leaders of the progressive party; (2) that it is keeping the Korean standard of education fully two years behind that of Japan; (3) that the police still have altogether too much authority, particularly in the rural districts, where an ignorant constable is often vested with almost autocratic powers; (4) that the treatment of prisoners is not yet in accordance with enlightened standards, those charged with political offenses being confined in overcrowded cells and permitted insufficient exercise.

Though I am myself convinced that substantial progress is really being made, and though I am satisfied of the sincerity of the new administration, it is my opinion that no program of reform can be expected in the immediate future that will satisfy a large section of the Korean people and their friends. They expect and will continue to demand more than

the Japanese Government will feel able to grant. A complete reversal of Japanese policy in Korea will come only when military autocracy definitely has been subordinated to democracy in Japan itself. It should be remembered that the late Premier Hara was in none too strong a position, for the forces of reaction, as personified by the militarists, had too much power for him to do as he would perhaps have liked to do if left to his own devices. And if the prime minister of the empire is not his own master in this respect, the governor-general of Korea is still less so.

Notwithstanding the reforms, the independence movement, though at the moment in abeyance, has by no means dissolved, being carried steadily forward despite the vigilance of the police. I was given to understand that there are two factions among the Korean leaders; one which favors advancing their cause by forcible methods, the other favoring peaceable means, and that the latter is at present in control of the situation. The prevailing belief in Korea is that the continuance in power of the peace party will largely depend upon the sincerity and energy displayed by the new administration in prosecuting the promised reforms. "All that is now asked," a well-informed foreign official in Seoul told me, "is that the Korean people be treated with respect, be given justice, and be permitted to develop along various lines." Should the promises of the government and the expectations of the people remain unfulfilled, however,

there is every likelihood of an outbreak of a more serious nature than has yet occurred. For the sake of peace in the peninsula it is sincerely to be hoped that the new administration will prove itself so enlightened that the peace party may remain in the ascendant. I was told by a foreign official in whom I have confidence that the leaders of the secret organization which has been directing the independence movement were rapidly becoming convinced of the futility of open resistance on the part of the Koreans at present, and were counseling the people to attend to their business, and the students to their studies, until such time as they are better able to make their strength felt. If that is true—and it is borne out by the fact that the student registration for last year (1921) was unprecedented—it explains the present lull and is an indication of what may be expected in the future, provided the reforms proceed at a reasonable pace. If, on the other hand, the Japanese Government fails to keep its promises, if it makes the blunder of returning to the old, short-sighted policy of repression and oppression, then I fear that the next chapter in Korea's troubled history will be written in blood.

VI

No account of existing conditions in Korea would be complete without at least passing reference to the work and influence of the missionaries, of whom there

are in the peninsula at present nearly five hundred, about three quarters of these being Americans. They, with their native assistants, shepherd churches which have not far from 100,000 regular members, these native Christians constituting the most enlightened and reputable element of the indigenous population. It has long been the fashion for a certain brand of tourist to sneer at the missionary. Usually these are persons who have never traveled beyond the treaty ports, whose knowledge of Oriental conditions is largely confined to irresponsible gossip picked up on hotel verandas or over hotel bars in Yokohama and Hong Kong and Shanghai. I imagine that most thoughtful people will prefer to accept the testimony of such a man as Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, who said, in speaking of the American missionaries in China, that they are giving their lives to develop a people into a nation. And that is even truer of the American missionaries in Korea. For they are something more than proselytizers; they are educators, sanitary experts, agricultural advisers, physicians, statesmen. The statistics of their conversions by no means represent the sum total of their activities or give an adequate idea of the enormous service they are performing in carrying civilization, as well as Christianity, into the world's dark corners.

Though there is no disguising the fact that the independence movement in Korea owed its inspiration originally to the influence and teaching of American

missionaries, the attitude of the missionary body has been, as a whole, formally correct. When the reform program was first announced the attitude of the missionary body in Korea was distinctly one of benevolent neutrality, but as time passed and the reforms were slow in coming, while many of the worst abuses of the old régime remained, this attitude was largely replaced by one of skepticism and a neutrality confined to speech and action alone—and in some cases not to speech. But there is no word of truth in the charges made in certain sections of the Japanese press that the disorders in Korea were instigated by the missionaries. The falsity of such assertions is convincingly shown by an interview with Mr. Yamagata, formerly director of political affairs in Korea, which appeared in *The Japanese Advertiser:* "No missionary in Korea, directly or indirectly, took part in the Korean demonstrations, although it is quite probable that some missionaries have shown their sympathy with the Koreans." Everything considered, the American missionaries have succeeded to a remarkable degree in maintaining a discreet and neutral attitude in a most difficult situation, the factors of which have tended to draw their hearts and their heads in opposite directions.

I cannot let pass this opportunity to deprecate and deplore the short-sighted and injudicious methods which the Japanese authorities are using in an attempt to convince foreign visitors to Korea of the

justice of their policy and to prejudice them against the Koreans. Indeed, foreign travelers in the peninsula have been misinformed and blinded by a propaganda against the Koreans, a manipulation of the press, which has seldom been equaled in audacity of untruth and dexterity of misrepresentation. Piled high on the desks of the admirably run Japanese hotels in Seoul, Fusan, and Mukden are pamphlets, written by an American, Frank Herron Smith, in which the Koreans are painted in the most unflattering colors, while in the same breath the author not only defends Japan's policy but lauds it to the skies. Another American, T. Philip Terry, has apparently attempted to earn Japanese gratitude by the savage and intemperate attacks on the Koreans, in which he has exhausted the unflattering adjectives in his vocabulary, which he has introduced into his otherwise admirable guide-book to the Japanese Empire. The tone of *The Seoul Press,* a daily newspaper in English owned and edited by Japanese, is far more temperate and sympathetic than the writings of these Americans. The Koreans are now as much subjects of the emperor as the Japanese themselves, and as deserving of consideration. By lending its approval to such attacks on a section of its people the government is as guilty of bad judgment as their American authors are of bad taste. It is a form of propaganda which is discreditable to those who are responsible for it and should be discontinued forthwith.

VII

I have now sketched for you the conditions which prevailed in Korea before the Japanese came and those which obtain there to-day. What the future of the peninsula is to be depends wholly upon whether the Koreans and the Japanese adopt an attitude of mutual sympathy and understanding. Were Japan to evacuate the country now, or in the near future—as there is not the slightest prospect of her doing—she would leave it under conditions which would soon result in chaos, and the good that she has done would be largely lost. The extensive schemes for agricultural and industrial development upon which she has entered, and upon which the prosperity of the peninsula largely depends, could never be financed by an independent Korea, and the same is true of her plans for improving the means of communication, which are at the bottom of all the problems of economic development in Korea.

However critical we may be of the methods by which it was accomplished, the annexation of Korea seems to me to have been justified. For the fact must not be lost sight of that the country was doomed to become either Japanese or Russian. The Japanese occupied it to forestall a Russian occupation, which would have menaced their independence as a nation.

And they have remained in the peninsula for reasons similar to those which, in the opinions of reasonable men, justify Great Britain in retaining control of Egypt and of Ireland.

The Koreans insist that they are themselves perfectly capable of establishing and maintaining a just and stable government. But their ability to do this is, I believe, open to grave question. Certainly there is nothing in the twenty centuries of their history as an independent nation to justify such confidence, for the old government of Korea was perhaps the worst on which the sun ever shone. Though they are now making encouraging progress, it is being made under Japanese guidance and tuition. The leaders of the independence movement are, for the most part, young men, students, intellectuals, idealists, who, no matter how able individually, are wholly without experience in practical government. To turn a nation of seventeen millions of ignorant, simple-minded people over to their guidance would be to invite disaster.

Mind you, I do not think that the Japanese administration of Korea has been all, or nearly all, that it should have been. I cannot agree with Dr. Hershey, who asserts that "the government of Chosen must be pronounced a great success," any more than I can agree with Mr. Kendall, who claims that "the nine years following the egregious annexation has been one of the most shameful pages in the history of the Japanese Empire." The truth lies somewhere be-

tween these extremes. As a matter of fact, the Japanese officials have worked hard and in many instances effectively for the amelioration of the Korean people and the improvement of Korean conditions, but their method has been lacking in tact, sympathy, and understanding. But criticism of Japan's stern militaristic policy and of the harsh methods she has permitted in its execution should not blind us to her integrity, her large administrative ability, and to the energy she has displayed in carrying out material reforms. From personal observation on the spot, I am convinced that the general condition of the Korean peasantry is appreciably higher than it ever was, or could have been, under Korean administration. This is not to be interpreted as meaning that I do not sympathize with the Koreans, for I do. They have been the victims of cruelty, injustice, and oppression. Nor would they be worthy of respect if they did not prefer to rule themselves. But I can also sympathize with Japan. During one of the most trying periods in the world's history—disliked, distrusted, and opposed by Koreans, Chinese, Russians, and most of the foreigners living in the Far East—she has jerked a nation out of the depths of poverty, degradation, and despair, as though by its collar, set it on its feet, and is teaching it to "play the game." And, as Count Terauchi once remarked, "It is no easy task to uplift a decayed people."

Viewing the question from an unbiased standpoint,

I believe that the balance inclines heavily in favor of Japan. I will go further than that and assert that Korea could suffer no greater calamity than to have Japan go. Not that there is the slightest probability of her doing so, for the unrest in China, combined with the uncertainty in Russia, is likely to cause her to tighten, rather than relax her grip on the peninsula. For, when all is said and done, Korea is the key to the whole Far Eastern situation. Upon her control of it depends Japan's entire scheme for the economic penetration of Siberia, Manchuria, and China. For her to withdraw from Korea would be tantamount to leaving the gateway to these great, rich markets unguarded, and that, I am convinced, she will never do. The sooner the Koreans realize that Japan's determination to remain in the peninsula is adamantine, and the sooner the Japanese realize that the Koreans will resist further attempts at forcible denationalization to the bitter end, the better it will be for both peoples. If the Japanese will adopt a conciliatory and unselfish policy toward the Koreans with a view to granting them a very large measure of autonomy as soon as they are prepared for it, and if the Koreans, on their part, will drop their demands for complete independence, which it is obviously impossible for Japan to accede to, and set to work to fit themselves for self-government under the empire, it will set forward the hands of progress in the Farther East and there will no longer be a Korean Question.

SIBERIA
SAKHALIN
MONGOLIA
Kobdo
Ulyasutai
Urga
MANCHURIA
Khalar
Aigun
Tsitsikar
Harbin
Ninguta
Kirin
Changtu
Mukden
Vladivostok
HOKUSHU
Hakodate
Akita
SEA OF JAPAN
JAPAN
Tokyo
Yokohama
Kioto
Osaka
SHIKOKU
KIUSHU
Nagasaki
Kagoshima
CHOSEN (KOREA)
Port Arthur
Dairen
Wei-hai-wei
Kiauchau
YELLOW SEA
Kuldja
Kucha
Yarkand
SINKIANG
Khotan
INNER MONGOLIA
Dolonnor
CHI-LI
Peking
Tientsin
Ninghia
Taiyuan
SHAN-SI
SHAN-TUNG
Sining
KAN-SU
SHEN-SI
Singan
HO-NAN
KIANG-SU
Chinkiang
NGAN-HUI
Shanghai
HU-PEH
Ningpo
CHE-KIANG
EAST CHINA SEA
LIU-KIU IS.
Rudok
Gartok
CHINA
TIBET
NEPAL
Lassa
BHUTAN
SZE-CHUAN
Chungking
Suchau
Changsha
KIANG-SI
Nanchang
FU-KIEN
Fuchau
Taipeh
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
KUI-CHAU
HU-NAN
Yunnan
Shunning
YUN-NAN
KWANG-SI
KWANG-TUNG
Amoy
Canton
Hongkong
INDIA
BURMA
BAY OF BENGAL
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
SIAM
HAINAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
CHINA
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300 400
Principal Railroads
C.S.Hammond & Co., N.Y.

PART III

CHINA

I

WE have witnessed one of the most brazen examples of international brigandage in the history of the world. In less than four-score years we have seen China, a country as large as Europe, with a civilization extending back into the mists of antiquity, rifled of territory and resources by a handful of predatory nations with as little compunction as a gang of lawless boys would raid a farmer's orchard. We have seen this vast, rich, peaceable, defenceless country bullied, intimidated, reduced to a state of virtual vassalage, and parceled out in spheres of influence, leases obtained under duress, and enforced concessions by methods which, in their effrontery and callousness, are reminiscent of the freebooters of the Spanish Main. The story of the pillage of China is saturated with intrigue and corruption, deceit and trickery, selfishness and greed. It forms one of the most shameful and depressing chapters in the history of our times and makes a mockery of Europe's sanctimonious championship of justice and fair-dealing.

The bewilderment and discouragement which usually reward those foreigners who attempt to acquire a clear-cut understanding of the Chinese situation are primarily due, in my opinion, to their failure to comprehend the peculiar geographic divisions of the country and the ethnologic distinctions of its inhabitants. Opening the atlas to the map of Asia, they see an enormous wedge-shaped territory, nearly one third larger than the United States, driven so deeply into the continent that its point impinges on the Afghan border. Because this wedge is tinted yellow and labeled "China," they naturally assume that it is a compact nation, like Italy or France, and that its three hundred million inhabitants are one homogeneous race, like the Italians or the French. Strictly speaking, however, the term "China" is applicable only to a single section of this vast territory, and the term "Chinese" only to the natives of that section.

The territory which comprised the Chinese Empire, and which was inherited, at least in theory, by the Chinese Republic, consists of five[1] great racio-political divisions: Manchuria in the northeast, Mongolia in the north, Sinkiang[2] in the west, Tibet in the southwest, and China proper in the southeast. Though the design adopted by the republic for its

[1] The Chinese assert that the republic consists of only four political divisions, China, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet, claiming that Manchuria should be considered a part of China proper.

[2] Sinkiang, or the New Dominion, consists of Kulja, Kashgaria, and Chinese Turkestan.

new flag, on which the old yellow dragon has been replaced by five latitudinal stripes—crimson, yellow, blue, white, and black—to denote the five races—Mongol, Chinese, Manchu, Turki,[1] and Tibetan—which comprise the Chinese people, might be interpreted as symbolic of national solidarity, the very reverse is the truth, for these five divisions, as a matter of fact, are bound together by the loosest and weakest of ties. This lack of homogeneity is due to the fact that the various elements of the population have little in common, being wholly distinct in origin, history, characteristics, traditions, and language. For example, the speech of a Tibetan is as unintelligible to a Mongol, a Manchu, or a Chinese as Gaelic is to an Englishman.

Now it should be clearly understood that of these five great divisions three—Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet—are little more than outlying dependencies over which the central government exercises the vaguest and most shadowy control. Tibet, for instance, is nominally a territory of the Chinese Republic, yet the Peking government may not appoint or dismiss a single Tibetan official without the sanction of the government of British India. In fact, Tibet may be said to be far more under the rule of Calcutta than of Peking. The vast and ill-defined tract of country known as Mongolia, a region five times the size of Texas, is likewise considered a part

[1] The Turkis are the Mohammedan inhabitants of Sinkiang.

of the republic, yet the central government has seen fit to raise a tariff wall between this border territory and the homeland by imposing a duty of ten per cent. ad valorem on goods imported from Mongolia into China, or vice versa, whereas Mongolian products are permitted to enter Russian territory duty free.

Though the three outlying dependencies have a combined area of nearly two and one half million square miles, or about two thirds of the total area of the republic, they are very sparsely settled, their inhabitants comprising not more than seven per cent. of the total population. They are, moreover, remotely situated and are entirely destitute of modern means of communication, being accessible only by the ancient caravan routes. Hence, notwithstanding their enormous extent and their immense wealth in undeveloped resources, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet play no greater part in Chinese politics than Alaska, Porto Rico, and the Philippines play in American politics, if as much. But, politically and economically unimportant though they are at present, I would stake my life that these remote and little-known regions will be great countries some day.

Manchuria, owing to its greater population (about twenty millions), its extensive railway system, and its strategic position athwart the routes from Siberia and Korea to China proper, has a status quite different from that of the dependencies just mentioned. Though most foreign authorities regard Manchuria

as an outlying territory of the republic, the Chinese themselves—for reasons of political expediency, I imagine—assert that its correct designation is not "Manchuria," which is not a Chinese term, but "The Three Eastern Provinces,"[1] and that it forms an integral part of China proper. This region is now colonized almost entirely by immigrants from the northern provinces of China and the immigration continues steadily by road and sea. As a result, the Manchu population has been almost completely absorbed by the Chinese, a few scattered Manchu communities alone remaining. Manchuria's position as a debated borderland, its unsettled political condition, the prevalence of brigandage, the great tide of immigration, the high-handed and often lawless methods pursued both by the local governors and the Japanese military authorities—all these find striking parallels in the conditions which prevailed along the Rio Grande during the first half of the nineteenth century, when Texas was a bone of contention between Mexico and the United States.

When all is said and done, the only one of the five divisions of the republic that counts politically is China proper. This is the great apple-shaped territory in the southeast, consisting of the eighteen provinces—Chihli, Shansi, Shantung, Kangsi, Shensi, Honan, Anhwei, Kiangsu, Szechwan, Hupeh, Che-

[1] The region commonly referred to as Manchuria consists of the provinces of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungchiang.

kiang, Kwaichow, Hunan, Kiangsi, Fukien, Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwantung—which bulges out, like a huge bay-window, into the China Sea. Though China comprises only about one third of the country's total area, it contains nearly nine tenths of the total population, together with virtually the whole of the seaboard and nearly all of the larger cities, which explains its dominancy in national affairs.

As I have already pointed out, the inhabitants of the various divisions of the republic speak entirely different tongues. Hence, intercommunication is slow and uncertain. And history has repeatedly shown that a country handicapped by inadequate means of communication rarely is well governed. The difficulty of welding these various races into a homogeneous nation is still further increased by the fact that even in China proper we find not one spoken language, but a number of dialects, all clearly of a common stock, yet differing from one another as widely as the various Romance languages of Europe—say, French, Spanish, and Italian. It is a common occurrence, indeed, when a man from Chihli meets a man from Kwantung for them to fall back on Pidgin English as a medium of communication. In the South, Cantonese is generally spoken on the coast and Hakka in the interior. Proceeding northward, we find in succession the Swatow, Foochow, Wenchow, and Ningpo dialects. Still farther north we come into the range of the great dialect popularly

known as Mandarin, which sweeps around behind the narrow coastal strip where the various dialects just mentioned are spoken and dominates a hinterland constituting nearly four fifths of China proper. Of all these tongues, Mandarin is by far the most important. Not only can it claim to be the native speech of the majority of Chinese, but it is the recognized medium of oral communication between all Chinese officials, even when they come from the same part of the country and speak the same patois. In the dependencies, though the officials usually are familiar with Mandarin, the natives speak only their own outlandish tongues. Hence, a Chinaman traveling in Mongolia, Sinkiang, or Tibet has almost as much difficulty in making himself understood as would a European, while the services of interpreters are frequently required at official conclaves in Peking.

By glancing at the map you will see that China proper is bisected latitudinally by Asia's greatest river, the three-thousand-mile-long Yangtze. It might naturally be supposed that this mighty waterway would form the dividing line between "the North" and "the South"—a sort of Chinese Mason and Dixon's line, as it were—but this is not the case. The real line of demarcation is ethnologic rather than geographic. "The North," speaking broadly, may be said to embrace those regions inhabited by the descendants of those Mongol-Tartar tribes who settled in the basin of the Yellow River in the dim dawn

of history, at least forty centuries ago, and who, as the years passed, gradually spread in all directions, forming the race known to ethnologists as the "continental" Chinese. "The South," on the other hand, consists of those districts along the Chinese littoral, from the frontiers of Indo-China nearly to the Yangtze, together with their immediate hinterlands, which were colonized by immigrants of Malay origin early in the Christian era. Though these two races have lived side by side, under the same rule, for close on two thousand years, they have never become completely amalgamated, still being distinguished by many of their ancient characteristics. The "continental" Chinese, for example, speak the Mandarin tongue, while the "coastal" Chinese cling to the various dialects spoken along the littoral. Thus it will be seen that the existing differences between the North and the South are not wholly political. Racial characteristics also enter into the question. Surely it is no matter for surprise that the children of those fierce Tartar tribesmen who swept out of Inner Asia should not always see eye to eye with the descendants of those daring sea-rovers who came sailing up in their fragile *prahus* from the islands and jungles of Malaysia.

II

The last of the thirty-odd dynasties that ruled China was the Ta Tsing ("Great Bright") or

THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA
It stretches from the sea to the borders of Turkestan

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE GREAT WALL
It runs for 2500 miles across China

CAMELS UNDER THE WALLS OF PEKING

THE TARTAR WALL AND A PORTION OF THE TARTAR CITY IN PEKING

Manchu, whose fierce Tartar chieftains began to make their power felt in Manchuria about the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Mings, a Chinese house, sat on the Dragon Throne. Early in the following century the Ming emperors appealed to the Manchus for aid in putting down a rebellion, whereupon these men of the horse and the tent came riding into China like a whirlwind, just as another Tartar tribe, the Osmanlis, poured into Europe behind the horse-tail standards. Once over the Great Wall, they quickly secured victory for those who had called upon them. But, recognizing at once the wealth of the land and the weakness of its rulers, they decided to remain. Establishing themselves in the rich and populous provinces below the Wall, they quickly succeeded in making themselves masters of the country, monopolizing the military and most of the civil offices and revenues. In 1644 the Ming dynasty came to an end and the Manchus assumed the reins of power. Holding themselves aloof from the Chinese, whom they regarded as an inferior race, they compelled them to shave the fore-skull and to adopt the queue as a mark of submission. But in time they too succumbed to luxury, their moral fiber disintegrated, and they gradually lost their language and their customs, virtually being conquered by the people on whom they had imposed their rule.

Centuries passed. The Chinese slowly yielded to the spirit of progress, but the Manchus appeared for

the most part incapable of responding to the exigencies of the modern world. Reformers and thinking men began to realize that the continuance in power of the Manchus boded disaster and spelled the ultimate partition of the country by foreigners. Young men educated abroad, on coming home, found the situation intolerable. Every branch of the government was paralyzed by incompetence, injustice, and corruption. And while the great mass of Chinese toiled and starved, thousands of indolent Manchu officials battened on the bounty that flowed from the Dragon Throne. The death in 1908 of the feeble-minded young emperor, shortly followed by that of the empress dowager, "the old Buddha," and the appointment of Prince Chun, a reactionary of the reactionaries, as regent for the infant named to fill the throne, hastened the inevitable. Though the government at Peking, reading the signs of the times, reluctantly promised a modern constitution and a representative government, it postponed the promulgation of the one and the convocation of the other, thereby irritating the discontented elements and provoking open rebellion.

Now appeared a leader, a Cantonese named Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a Christian, a man of science, and a physician. Educated in the British colony of Hong Kong, converted to Christianity in Honolulu, long a resident in San Francisco and London, he is one of the most picturesque and interesting figures ever

produced in the East. The story of his life would provide material for a dozen novels. Unsuccessful in his attempts to enter official life, he turned against the government, being compelled to flee from China while still a young man because of his seditious activities. Establishing himself in London, he quickly became the leading spirit in a revolutionary junta which aimed to rid China of Manchu rule. Brought to a tardy realization of the rapidity with which the movement led by Sun Yat-sen was spreading, the court at Peking offered a reward of fifty thousand dollars for his death or capture. His escapes from assassination partook of the miraculous. While staying in London he was kidnapped by agents of the imperial government and conveyed to the Chinese Legation, preparatory to smuggling him aboard a ship bound for China. Had not the British Government insisted on his release, he would have met his end beneath the sword of a Manchu executioner, and the revolutionary movement might well have perished with him.

In the North the man of destiny was Yuan Shih-kai, a pupil of and a worthy successor to that great statesman, Li Hung-chang. A native of Honan, a mandarin, and a devout Confucian, he had served in turn as Chinese Resident in Korea, as Viceroy of the metropolitan district of Chihli, in which Peking is situated, as head of the *Waiwupu,* or foreign office, and, at the very end of the Manchu reign, as prime

minister of the empire. A past-master in all the arts of mandarin intrigue, an expert in opportunism, an adherent of the corrupt traditions which have characterized the government of China for centuries, a staunch supporter of the imperial dynasty, he was nevertheless sufficiently shrewd and far-sighted to realize that the Manchu government as it had hitherto existed, incompetent and rotten to the core, could not endure.

Thus the country became divided into two camps: the party of the North, composed in the main of reactionary office-holders and militarists, some of whom were foreign-trained, headed by Yuan Shih-kai; and the party of the South, consisting of students, intellectuals, men of progressive tendencies, many of whom had been educated abroad, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. It was autocracy versus democracy, the "stand-patters" against the progressives, the old order of things as opposed to the new.

By 1910 the revolutionary movement, starting in Canton and Hunan, had spread over all of the southern provinces. The men of the reorganized army, well armed and ably led, had early thrown in their lot with the insurgents, and against them the troops of the imperial household could make little headway. There was desultory fighting throughout 1911, but on the whole the revolution was comparatively bloodless, far fewer lives being sacrificed than has been the case in far less important political upheavals in West-

ern countries. Toward the close of 1911 the revolutionary committee, which had been joined by Wu Ting-fang, at one time Chinese Minister to the United States and one of the ablest men in China, met at Nanking, organized a provisional government, drafted a provisional constitution, and proclaimed a republic. The presidency of the new government was offered to Yuan Shih-kai, then prime minister of the tottering empire, but he declined, presumably because he questioned the strength of the movement. Sun Yat-sen, the father of the revolution, thereupon consented to become the first provisional president of the Chinese Republic. But when the monarchists acknowledged the *fait accompli,* in February, 1912, by announcing the abdication of the boy-emperor, Suan-t'ung, Sun Yat-sen, anxious to bring to the support of the republic the powerful northern element represented by Yuan Shih-kai, offered to resign the presidency in his favor. This time Yuan accepted and was duly elected by the provisional government the second provisional president of China.

The constitution drafted by the revolutionists in Nanking provided for a provisional president and vice-president, and a national council, which was to exercise legislative powers until such time as a regular parliament could be convened in accordance with laws which the National Council was to enact. These laws were enacted and a parliament, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, was duly elected.

The members of the Lower House were to serve for three years, the members of the Senate for six years, one third retiring every two years. This parliament was opened in Peking early in 1913, the world being treated to the curious spectacle of elected representatives from every province of China proper and from the outlying dependencies, most of them wearing frock-coats and top-hats, assembling in the ancient stronghold of the Manchu power, within the walls of the Forbidden City, for the purpose of giving China, which for four thousand years had been the most absolute of monarchies, a democratic form of government.

Parliament, in addition to being the national legislative body of the republic, was to draft and promulgate a permanent constitution and to elect the president and vice-president, it being obviously unwise, in view of the ignorance and political inexperience of the great mass of the people, to have the head of the nation elected by popular vote. A presidential election law, dealing with the election and term of office of the president, was accordingly passed, and on October 6, 1913, at a joint session of the two Houses, Yuan Shih-kai, already provisional president, was elected as the first (regular) president of the Chinese Republic. The vice-presidency went to Li Yuan-hung, a graduate of the Peiyang Naval College, who served on a cruiser during the Chino-Japanese War, afterward entering the army, in which he rose to the

grade of general, eventually being appointed Chief of the General Staff.

The Parliament of 1913 was dominated by the Kuo-min-tang, or People's Party, which was the original revolutionary organization and which, broadly speaking, represented the views of southern China. As might have been expected, the new parliament was extremely jealous of its constitutional rights, particularly the control of the cabinet and the treasury. But, from the very beginning, President Yuan Shih-Kai, steeped in the traditions of autocracy and accustomed to exact unquestioning obedience to his commands, refused to submit to parliamentary dictation. He had been in office only a few weeks before he defied parliament by placing his personal friends, men of the North, in cabinet positions and by contracting a loan without parliamentary authorization. These high-handed and unconstitutional proceedings instantly aroused the violent opposition of the Kuo-min-tang, whose members, led by Sun Yat-sen, foresaw that, were they to be permitted to continue, the republican structure which they had so painstakingly reared would quickly be undermined. Sun Yat-sen and his adherents demanded government by the people through their representatives in parliament, while President Yuan Shih-kai soon made it clear that he proposed to reign without a parliament rather than be hampered by systematic opposition. But the opposition, instead of declining, steadily

gained in strength, whereupon President Yuan decided to rid himself of it for good and all. Accordingly, on the night of November 4, 1913, he issued orders for the immediate dissolution of the Kuo-min-tang on the ground that it was a seditious organization and that its members were rebels. It was as though President Wilson had dissolved the Republican party and driven its members from the Senate and the House in order to rid himself of Republican opposition. The effect of this coup d'état was to unseat more than half of the members of Parliament, thereby depriving it of the quorum necessary for the transaction of business. As the Kuo-min-tang represented the South, this arbitrary procedure left all southern China without parliamentary representation, the government now being completely dominated by Yuan Shih-kai and his northern adherents.

The unseated legislators, threatened with arrest, fled to Canton, where they established a schismatic government under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. A southern army was organized for the purpose of marching on Peking and restoring the constitutional government, but Yuan Shih-kai, possessing a superiority of force, had no difficulty in crushing the constitutionalists, or, to put it more accurately, in confining their activities to the south of the Yangtze. This was the second revolution, or, if you prefer, the first civil war, and it resulted in dividing China into

THE JADE PAGODA NEAR PEKING

THE TEMPLE OF HEAVEN, PEKING

A PAGODA OF THE SUMMER PALACE

two armed camps—"the North" under Yuan Shih-kai, and "the South" under Sun Yat-sen.

Emboldened by the success of his coup d'état, Yuan Shih-kai became more autocratic than ever. In order to strengthen his grip on the northern provinces, he appointed his military satellites as *tuchuns,* or provincial military governors, who, supported by large forces of soldiery and vested with dictatorial powers, proceeded to enforce Yuan's dictates in their respective provinces. Early in January, 1914, President Yuan formally dissolved the rump parliament in Peking, thereby ridding himself of the last vestige of constitutional control. He then set about taking measures to strengthen and consolidate his power. The first of these measures was the creation of a political council, composed of members appointed by himself. This body, which was nothing more than Yuan's instrument and mouthpiece, recommended that the president call into being an elected assembly—the idea being, no doubt, that it would give to his unconstitutional actions at least a flavor of legality. Within six weeks the political council, acting under Yuan's dictation, had drawn up an "amended provisional constitution" which provided for a single-chambered legislature, whose members were to be elected by popular vote, and a council of state, whose members, appointed by the president, were to advise him on those matters on which he might consult them.

The legislature was never elected, but the council of state sat in the capacity of the legislature during 1914 and 1915. All this was but camouflage, however, designed to cloak the wholesale usurpation of power by Yuan Shih-kai.

In the summer of 1915 a movement began in favor of the reëstablishment of the monarchy—a movement secretly inspired by Yuan, who, though yielding lip-service to the republican form of government, harbored the secret ambition of himself ascending the Dragon Throne. In October the political council made a show of constitutional procedure by referring the question of reëstablishing the monarchy to a vote of the provinces, or rather to a number of Yuan's political henchmen. The issue, of which there never was the slightest doubt, was a practically unanimous "vote" in favor of Yuan's accession to the throne as emperor of a constitutional monarchy. On December 12, 1915, the monarchy was formally proclaimed, the coronation ceremony being set for the February following. But it was not to be. For within a week the storm, long brewing, which was to put an end to the dictator and his ambitions, suddenly burst in the distant province of Yunnan, which declared its independence and emphasized its opposition to the restoration of the monarchy by despatching a rabble army against the imperial forces which had been hurried to the adjacent province of Szechwan. The insurrectionary movement spread with surprising rapidity

and Yuan's star quickly began to decline. Other provinces followed the example of Yunnan in renouncing their allegiance to the Peking government and bodies of imperial troops began to make common cause with the rebels. Late in January Yuan's friends persuaded him to issue a proclamation announcing that the establishment of the monarchy had been indefinitely postponed. But the announcement came too late. The débâcle had begun. In April, 1916, Yuan, in a last desperate attempt to retrieve something from the wreck of his ambitions, agreed to surrender all civil authority to the cabinet, which had been reconstructed under the premiership of Yuan's former minister of war, Tuan Chi-ju, an able diplomatist and a professional harmonizer, who, despite his monarchical sympathies, was popular with the southern faction. Upon coming into power, Premier Tuan Chi-ju attempted to placate the South by promising that parliamentary government would be reëstablished at an early date. But meantime the members of the Kuo-min-tang, who had been expelled from Peking, had organized a government of their own at Canton and had proclaimed Vice-President Li Yuan-hung president of the republic. Thus China found itself with two presidents and two governments at the same time. But on June 5, 1916, Yuan Shih-kai simplified the complicated situation by dying. The physicians who attended him announced that his death was due to kidney trouble and

nervous prostration. The man in the street was probably nearer the mark when he said that he died from disappointment and humiliation—from "loss of face."

The parliament which had been dissolved by Yuan in 1913 was reconvened in August, 1916, under the presidency of Li Yuan-hung, and the provisional constitution of 1912 was again recognized as the fundamental law of the republic. The reëstablished parliament at once began consideration of a draft of a permanent constitution, but friction quickly developed between the militarists of the North and the republicans of the South. After some months of bickering, the military governors of several of the northern provinces declared their independence of Peking and proceeded to establish a provisional government at Tientsin. President Li's position had now become difficult and dangerous. In the hope of gaining support in his struggle with the military governors, who, backed by armies of mercenaries, had become all-powerful in their respective provinces, the president invited to Peking as a mediator General Chang Hsun, a swashbuckling soldier and a former pillar of the Manchu dynasty, who since 1911 had maintained himself as virtual dictator of southern Shantung. General Chang Hsun came promptly, bringing with him a "bodyguard" of several thousand men, who proceeded to occupy railway junctions and other strategic positions about the capital. The day

after Chang Hsun's arrival in the capital President Li issued a mandate dissolving parliament.

Though summoned to Peking as a mediator, Chang Hsun did not accept the rôle assigned to him. He had been a dictator and a dictator he intended to remain. He dreamed, as had Yuan Shih-kai, of attaining supreme power, but, remembering the disaster that had overtaken his predecessor, he did not plan to himself assume the imperial yellow. He decided that it was safer, and equally satisfactory, to be the power behind the throne, his plans calling for the restoration of the Manchu dynasty in the form of a regency administered by himself as viceroy of Chihli—the province in which the capital is situated. For Chinese history has repeatedly shown that he who holds Chihli holds Peking. Accordingly, before daybreak of July 1, 1917, General Chang Hsun summoned from his bed the boy-emperor, who for five years had been living in enforced but luxurious seclusion in the Forbidden City, and informed the bewildered and frightened lad that he was to reascend the Dragon Throne. But the restored monarchy found itself confronted with opposition on every hand. Even the military governors, on whose support Chang Hsun had confidently counted, refused to support the new régime—not because they were opposed to the monarchy, but because they were afraid that Chang Hsun, as regent, might succeed in undermining their own power. An army under the former

premier, Tuan Chi-ju, advanced on the capital from Tientsin, while another force threatened to move up from the South under the command of Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang. On July 7, after less than a week's reign, the emperor announced his abdication. Chang Hsun's troops attempted a feeble defense of the imperial city, but capitulated after a few days of comic-opera warfare, the would-be dictator seeking refuge in the Dutch legation.

President Li Yuan-hung, who, upon the restoration of the monarchy, had fled to the Japanese legation, declined to resume a post for which he had no liking and for which he was not adapted, and resigned in favor of his vice-president, General Feng Kuo-chang, who had been in command of the South's military forces. The accepted theory in Peking at this time was that the situation had now reverted to the one which had existed in 1912, immediately after the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution; that all that had transpired during the interim was illegal; and that everything must be done over again. President Feng Kuo-chang accordingly convened a council for the purpose of drafting new laws for the election of a new parliament, which was duly opened in August, 1918. A few days later, by 425 out of 436 votes, Hsu Shih-chang, a native of Hunan, who had held in turn the posts of Viceroy of Manchuria, Grand Secretary, Grand Councillor, Vice-Premier, Chief of the General Staff, and Grand Guardian of the Em-

peror, was elected President of the republic. His term of office will expire in 1923.

But the Peking reading of the situation did not satisfy South China or the members of the old parliament, who had been unseated a second time. These were summoned to meet at Canton and to constitute the real representative legislature of the republic. During the summer of 1918 a quorum of the old parliament was obtained, and for about a year China had two parliaments—the one sitting at Peking, the other at Canton—each subscribing to the Provisional Constitution of 1912 and each claiming to be the sole legislative body of the republic. The Canton Parliament finally broke up, however, in 1919.

Throughout the whole of 1918 there was desultory fighting between the North and the South, the provinces chiefly affected being those along the Yangtze River. But the inability of the North to make any headway in the campaign, the financial embarrassments of both sides, and the growing dissatisfaction with a state of affairs that disrupted the country and promised to lead nowhere resulted in the president proclaiming an armistice when the news of the armistice in Europe reached China. At about the time the Peace Conference was assembling at Versailles, another peace conference, composed of representatives of the North and the South, was assembling on the neutral ground provided by the Foreign Settlement of Shanghai. But after months

of parleying the two factions appear to be no nearer an agreement than before the conference began. At the moment of writing, President Hsu Shih-chang is still nominally in power in the North, while Dr. Sun Yat-sen, with the title of Administrative Director, appears to be in control of affairs in South China.

To add to the existing confusion, were such a thing possible, both the North and the South proceeded to split into opposing factions, so that the already distracted country, instead of being divided into two camps, found itself broken up into four clearly defined groups, each plotting against and checkmating the others. The North split into the Anfu Club and the Chihli factions. The Anfu Club was a political organization composed of military men who were pro-Japanese in their sympathies and most of whom were popularly credited with being in the pay of Japan. The Chihli group took its name from the metropolitan province in which Peking is situated.

Upon the death of Yuan Shih-kai, the leadership of the North passed, as I have already explained, to General Tuan Chi-ju, a native of Anhwei Province and a pillar of the Anfu Club, who became premier in the cabinet of President Feng Kuo-chang, who was a native of Chihli. In making his appointments, President Feng naturally favored men from his own province of Chihli, whereas Premier Tuan insisted on filling the positions with men from Anhwei. This was the beginning of a schism which split the North

DR. SUN YAT-SEN
President of the independent Canton government of the Republic of China

HSU SHIH-CHANG
President of the Republic of China (at Peking)

The official residence of the President of China

The Throne Hall
IN THE FORBIDDEN CITY

wide open. The president and his premier intrigued against each other in every possible way and on every possible occasion. Premier Tuan and his fellow-members of the Anfu Club, bought with Japanese gold, advocated a rapprochement with Japan. President Feng and his Chihli adherents, on the contrary, recognizing the popular hostility toward Japan, steadfastly opposed everything which threatened to strengthen Japan's grip on China. The military men of the Anfu Club insisted on bringing the South to terms by force of arms, whereas the Chihli group believed in conciliatory measures. When Premier Tuan despatched a military expedition against the southern insurgents, the provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Hupeh, all controlled by President Feng and the Chihli faction and all occupying strategic positions along the Yangtze River, not only refused to assist the enterprise, but even adopted toward the South a policy of friendly neutrality. In the summer of 1920 the smoldering enmity between the Anfu and Chihli factions flamed into open warfare. There was a skirmish in the imperial city in which a few lives were lost, whereupon the Anfu troops either fled or surrendered, leaving the Chihli faction in undisputed control of the North. By this time public opinion had become so inflamed against those officials who were believed to be intriguing with Japan that Tuan Chi-ju, sensing the rising storm, hastily resigned the premiership and withdrew from

public life, his fellow-Anfuites seeking safety in the Japanese legation. Thus collapsed the notorious Anfu Club, one of the most potent agencies for evil in China.

The story of the dissensions which resulted in splitting the South into two factions is equally saturated with jealousy, intrigue, and corruption. Here, as in the North, personal greed and ambition were the principal factors. In Canton, as in Peking, it was a case of the "outs" versus the "ins." The southern government originally consisted of those members of the first Chinese Parliament who had been unseated by Yuan Shih-kai, and who, fleeing to Canton, had there organized the provisional government. This government had no president, but was headed by a board of seven men, known as Administrative Directors. For a time things went smoothly enough, but friction eventually developed and the directorate split into two factions. One faction came to be known as the Sun-Wu-Tang group from the first names of its principal leaders—Sun Yat-sen, Wu Ting-fang, and Tang Shao-yi. The other faction, headed by two other directors, Chen Chun-hsien and Lu Yung-ting, in like manner took the appellation of the Chen-Lu group. The split came because Chen and Lu persisted in ignoring the decisions of the majority of the directorate, because they used funds appropriated to pay members of parliament for the payment of their own troops, and because it was discovered that they were carrying on

secret negotiations with the Chihli group in the North. The Chen-Lu faction replied to these accusations by charging the Sun-Wu-Tang party with intriguing with the Anfu Club. The existing relations between the two southern factions are ill-defined. Though both maintain armed forces in the field, they fight but rarely, and, to add to the Gilbert and Sullivan atmosphere, their leaders are in constant telegraphic communication with each other and with Peking.

Nor should you get the idea that the North and the South are seriously at war. More than that, there is no longer any serious pretense of vital difference between them. The only real warfare now being waged in China is the interminable struggle for place, power, patronage, and pelf between the "ins" and the "outs," which has gone on, almost without interruption, since the dawn of Chinese history. Despite all the talk about patriotic ideals, constitutional government, and parliamentary reform, it is, in the last analysis, a sordid and purely mercenary conflict. The "governments" at Peking and Canton ("misgovernments" would be a more fitting term) consist of groups of predatory, self-seeking officials who are far more concerned in strengthening their own positions and, incidentally, in filling their own pockets than they are in pulling China out of the slough of despond, setting her on her feet, and giving her an honest and efficient administration.

Overshadowing both the northern and the southern governments, and still further complicating a political situation already confused almost past understanding, is the tuchunate—the system of *tuchuns,* or provincial military governors, who are the real rulers of China. In theory, each *tuchun* represents the central government in his respective province, being responsible to Peking for the entire local administration—political, judicial, fiscal, and military. *In theory,* I have said. For in practice he is accountable to no one but himself and obeys the orders of Peking or Canton—depending upon whether he is a supporter of the North or the South—only when it suits him to do so. Each *tuchun* exercises autocratic power within the limits of his own province. Though he is supposed to govern with the assistance and advice of a civil governor and a provincial assembly, he always overshadows them and usually ignores them completely, making and administering his own laws, imposing his own taxes, collecting his own revenues, and using them for his own purposes. As a result of this anomalous situation, conditions in China are comparable in many respects to those which prevailed in Mexico when Villa was dictator of the North and Zapata held sway in the South, both of them completely ignoring the mandates issued by the central government from the City of Mexico.

Perhaps the closest parallel to the *tuchuns,* however, is to be found in those leaders of mercenaries,

known as *condottieri,* who for nearly three hundred years held medieval Italy in their grasp. As the great mass of the Italian peasantry took no part in the wars of that period, contenting themselves with the rôle of onlookers, war was not merely the trade of the *condottiere,* but also his monopoly, and he was thus able to obtain whatever terms he demanded, whether money payments or political concessions. Precisely the same holds true of the *tuchun.* The *condottieri* were always ready to change sides at the prospect of higher pay. So are the *tuchuns.* As the *condottieri* were to a certain extent bound together by the bonds of a common profession and by a common contempt for the civilian population, and as they realized that the enemy of to-day might well be the ally of to-morrow, their battles were often as bloodless as they were theatrical. A similar lack of bloodshed usually characterizes the clashes between the forces of the *tuchuns.* Just as the great *condottiere,* Francisco Sforza, the son of a Neapolitan peasant, climbed on the lances of his mercenaries to the dukedom of Milan and the overlordship of northern Italy, so Chang Tso-lin, a one-time bandit, has climbed on the bayonets of his mercenaries to the tuchunate of Mukden and to-day holds the whole of Manchuria in the hollow of his hand.

The *tuchuns* keep themselves in power by means of personal armies—usually little more than uniformed bandits—which vary in size from the few battalions

maintained by the less important governors to the well-organized force of one hundred thousand men maintained by the great super-*tuchun,* Chang Tso-lin. There are to-day more than a score of such private armies, totaling, it is estimated, not far from 1,200,000 men. Thus is presented the astonishing paradox of China, the weakest of all nations, having under arms more soldiers than any other nation in the world. Though these armies are supported from the public revenues, the *tuchuns* brazenly use them for private purposes. They will always sell their services to the party or faction that will pay the highest price, and they use the threat of their military power to strengthen their own position. As a result, the more powerful *tuchuns* wield a power more arbitrary and absolute than was ever dreamed of by the dictators of Latin-America. For example, when Chang Tso-lin wishes to move troops he seizes a sufficient number of railway cars and moves them whither he will. If his army requires aircraft, he sends troops to Peking with orders to help themselves from the government supply, puts the planes on flat-cars, and without so much as a by-your-leave transports them to his stronghold at Mukden. When he needs money to pay his troops, or for the purpose of raising more men, or for investment in some new business enterprise, he sends a telegram to Peking—and gets it. The government does not dare to oppose or refuse him, for it is perfectly aware that it exists only

on his sufferance. And what is true of Chang Tso-lin is equally true of Tsao Kun, *tuchun* of the metropolitan province of Chihli, and in a lesser degree of all the other *tuchuns*. As a result of their strangle-hold on the country, these military dictators have succeeded in amassing far greater fortunes under the republic than the viceroys ever did under the empire. Indeed, the most pressing question in China to-day is how to limit the power and rapacity of the *tuchuns*, how to bring them under the authority of the central government. If China is to escape complete disruption, the *tuchuns* must cease being each a law unto himself. And this will come about only when their so-called armies have been disbanded under some scheme which will insure their disappearance for good and all. As Mr. J. O. P. Bland concisely puts it: "Nobody doubts for a moment that the whole Chinese army would be delighted to return to its ancestral homes with all arrears of pay and a three months' bonus. The question is, however, who is going to prevent the *tuchuns* from replacing them next morning by a new set of loot-hungry coolies?"

The whole deplorable situation has been set forth with admirable fairness by a supporter of the southern faction, Mr. S. G. Cheng, in his book, "Modern China." One passage is so illuminating that it deserves quoting in full:

"For military operations against the North, the South depends on governors who are just as selfish

as their northern colleagues. It also receives, as its allies, brigands or military leaders who have some personal grievance against the North and who desire to gratify their greed and ambition by taking advantage of the quarrel between the constitutionalists and the militarists. Among the army commanders of the South, many have no sympathy at all with the democratic aspirations of the constitutionalists, but fight their own battle under the cloak of a good cause. This hopeless state of affairs is acknowledged and deplored by the southern leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who summarizes the situation by saying that the struggle of military leaders for supremacy is equally rampant in the South and in the North, and that he has almost exhausted his voice, with no effect, in calling attention to the incoherent situation."

III

In works of reference and official publications China is referred to—at least by implication—as a sovereign state, an independent nation. As a matter of fact, however, her independence is largely fictitious, the fiction being maintained because an official admission of her true status would be as embarrassing to those foreign nations which really control the country as it would be humiliating to the Chinese themselves. Doubtless there are those who will attempt to ques-

tion my assertion that China is not an independent nation by pointing out that she has her own government, her own army, her own diplomatic service, her own postal system, and her own flag. Let me answer such critics by asking if a nation can truthfully be called independent, in the generally accepted sense of the term, which (1) does not control its own fiscal affairs; which (2) is not permitted to revise its own tariff; which (3) is not permitted to collect its own revenues; which (4) is not permitted to appoint or recall its officials in certain portions of its own territory without the consent of a foreign power; which (5) cannot negotiate foreign loans or grant concessions to foreigners without the permission of other powers; which (6) is not permitted to control its own inland waterways; which (7) cannot sell, cede, or lease its own territory as it sees fit; which (8) does not possess jurisdiction over foreigners dwelling within its borders; which (9) is forced to agree to the maintenance on its soil of foreign courts, foreign police forces, foreign prisons, and foreign post-offices; (10) within whose borders four foreign powers maintain armed forces; and (11) whose territory is seized and held by foreign nations without provocation or excuse? With foreign armies on her soil, with foreign flags flying over her seaports, with foreign courts functioning in her cities, with foreign gunboats patrolling her rivers, with foreign officials collecting her customs and her salt-duties, and with other foreigners supervising

her fiscal affairs, China might be described, without taking undue liberties with the truth, as a country under foreign occupation. It is a curious commentary on international standards of morality and justice that China should receive less consideration from her late allies, so far as their refraining from interference with her domestic affairs is concerned, than is accorded to unregenerate and resentful Germany.

The position of virtual vassalage in which China finds herself to-day is not due to centuries of persistent nibbling by land-hungry nations, as in the case of Africa; it is the result of barely four score years of foreign aggression and spoliation. Until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century the regions directly under the sway of the Chinese emperors extended from the borders of Siberia on the north to Annam and Burmah on the south, and from the Pacific Ocean on the east to Russian Turkestan on the west. There was also a fringe of tributary states—Korea, Annam, Burmah, and Nepaul—which still kept up the ancient forms of allegiance and which acknowledged in greater or less degrees the suzerainty of Peking.

The dismemberment of China may be said to have been initiated by Great Britain in 1840, when, as the result of her ignoble victory in the so-called "Opium War"—a war waged to impose a poisonous drug on China against her will—the Chinese Gov-

ernment was forced to cede to the victors the island of Hong Kong, occupying a position of immense strategic and commercial importance in that it commands the approaches to the great port of Canton; to pay an indemnity of twenty-one million dollars; and to consent to the importation of opium.

In 1849 the Portuguese, who some three centuries earlier had established a trading-post at Macao, a small island at the mouth of the Canton River for which they had long paid a trifling annual rental to the government at Peking, emulated the high-handed methods pursued by the Great Powers in their treatment of China by suddenly expelling the Chinese garrison and declaring the island a Portuguese possession. For nearly forty years there was a state of quasi-war between Portugal and China over Macao, but a treaty was finally concluded in 1887 whereby the Chinese Government ceded the island to Portugal in perpetuity. Though, by the terms of this treaty, Portugal agreed to coöperate with the Chinese Government in the suppression of the opium trade, she has never adhered to her promise. On the contrary, she has steadily developed her lucrative opium and gambling monopolies in Macao, free rein being given in this European-owned territory to those vices of which the Chinese have honestly endeavored to rid themselves. As a result, Macao is the most notorious sink of iniquity in the China Seas, vice in every form

flaunting itself, naked and unashamed, where the banished poet, Camoens, wrote the immortal epic of his native land.

Sixteen years after the "Opium War" Great Britain again went to war with China, this time because Chinese authorities had seized a Chinese vessel flying the British flag on the ground that it was manned by Chinese pirates. By way of punishment for this affront to British dignity, Canton was bombarded and occupied and its viceroy exiled to Calcutta, where he died in prison. Before the menace of the guns of an Anglo-French squadron the Chinese Government agreed to sign treaties with Great Britain and France granting their nationals extraterritorial rights and opening the Yangtze River to British and French commerce. But before the treaty could be ratified an incident occurred which overshadowed the war in the seriousness of its consequences. The Pei-ho River, which connects Tientsin with Peking, was closed to foreign vessels, but the warships bearing the British and French envoys, who were on their way to the capital to obtain the ratification of the treaty, attempted to force the river defenses and were repulsed. Thereupon a second allied expedition was hurried from Europe, Peking was occupied and looted of priceless treasures in jewels, jade, bronze, and porcelain, and, as a crowning act of vandalism, the Summer Palace was burned. As this was not deemed sufficient punishment, China

was forced to pay large indemnities to France and Great Britain and to cede to the latter a strip of territory along the Kowloon peninsula, on the mainland opposite Hong Kong.

The next nation to exert pressure on China was Russia, which, during the middle years of the nineteenth century, had begun to colonize the territory along the lower reaches of the Amur as a step in her advance toward the Pacific. This was a remote region, undeveloped and sparsely settled, and, as the Russians pointed out, it had only been a part of the Chinese Empire for a few hundred years. In 1860, China, yielding to Muscovite coercion, ceded to Russia all the Chinese territory lying north of the Amur and between the Ussuri and the Pacific. On the coast of this territory, which comprises the present Amur and Maritime Provinces, Russia founded the port of Vladivostok, thereby obtaining her long-desired outlet on the ice-free waters of the Japan Sea. So easily was this vast territory acquired—taking land from China was like taking candy from a child—that in 1881 the Tsar's government tried its luck again, this time obtaining the cession of a portion of the fertile province of Kulja, in westernmost China, bordering on Russian Turkestan. I almost forgot to mention that, in addition to her loss of territory, China had to pay Russia an indemnity of nine million rubles.

In 1883 it was France's turn again. The French Government, having decided to round out its pos-

sessions in Indo-China, despatched an expedition for the conquest of Annam, which had always been regarded as tributary to China. The Peking government protested, and there was a frontier skirmish in which both French and Chinese troops were killed, whereupon France promptly declared war. The French were victorious at sea and the Chinese on land, but, as the former had political troubles of their own at home, they consented to a compromise, which consisted in China recognizing the French protectorate over Annam. This time, thanks to the diplomacy of Li Hung-chang, France did not succeed in extracting an indemnity.

While China had been engaged in her controversy with France over Annam, Great Britain had invaded Burmah, occupied its capital, and deposed King Thebaw. Hitherto Burmah had been considered a vassal state of China and had paid her tribute annually, so, merely to satisfy diplomatic etiquette and to make the title clear, China was asked to give her formal assent to the incorporation of Burmah in the Indian Empire. She gave her assent—there was nothing else for her to do—and, for a wonder, no indemnity was demanded by Great Britain.

In 1894-95 came China's brief but disastrous war with Japan, to which, as the price of defeat, she was forced to cede the great, rich island of Formosa and the Liao-tung Peninsula, on which were the towns of Dalny and Port Arthur. But it did not suit the

policies of certain European powers, particularly Russia, to see the Island Empire obtain a foothold on the Asian mainland, so Russia, France, and Germany presented a joint note to Japan suggesting that the Liao-tung Peninsula be restored to China. As Japan was in no position to resist the pressure thus brought to bear, she sullenly obeyed, retaining only Formosa. But though China retrieved the Liao-tung Peninsula, thanks to European intervention, a huge indemnity (230 million taels) was exacted by Japan and she was also forced to renounce her claims of suzerainty over Korea, thus losing the third of her great tributary states.

Evidence was soon forthcoming, however, that Russia and France had not been disinterested in rescuing Chinese territory from the grasp of Japan, for Russia now demanded from Peking and obtained the right to carry the trans-Siberian Railway straight across Manchuria to Vladivostok, thus avoiding a long and costly detour. The syndicate which was to build the railway was also granted enormous timber and mining concessions in the regions through which the line was to pass and was authorized to maintain its own gendarmerie. This was the first step in the alienation of Manchuria. As payment for the part she had played in resisting the Japanese demands, France asked for and obtained a rectification of the frontier between China and Indo-China, as well as certain mining rights in Kiangsi and Yunnan. Both

powers also obtained territorial concessions in Hankow for French and Russian settlements in that city. But as a result of the rectification of the Indo-China frontier England claimed that her interests had been injured and demanded compensation in the form of considerable modifications in the boundaries of Burmah, thereby adding several thousand square miles to the British Empire.

While Russia and France were profiting by what they were pleased to call the generosity of China, Germany alone had so far received no reward for her share in compelling the restitution of Liao-tung, but in 1897 she proceeded to help herself by suddenly seizing the Bay of Kiauchau, on the eastern side of the Shantung Peninsula. The seizure was made ostensibly in order to obtain redress for the murder of two German missionaries, but in reality because Germany's scheme of naval expansion demanded a harbor and naval base in the Far East. The following year Germany succeeded in extracting from China a ninety-nine-year lease of Kiauchau Bay, together with the city of Tsing-tau and a considerable area of adjacent territory, with liberty to build docks, erect fortifications, and exercise all the rights of sovereignty. In the same year Russia, which only a short time before had forced Japan to restore Port Arthur and Dalny to China, demanded from the Chinese Government a twenty-five-year lease of those ports on the ground that her interests in Manchuria must be pro-

tected against German penetration. This was the cue for England and France to again appear upon the scene, both of them demanding further concessions from China in order, as they explained, to preserve the balance of power in Eastern Asia. France demanded and obtained a ninety-nine-year lease of Kwang-chou-wan, on the mainland, opposite the island of Hainan, while England took Weihaiwei, at the extremity of the Shantung Peninsula, for as long as Russia remained in Port Arthur. (Though Russia surrendered Port Arthur to Japan in 1905, the Union Jack still flies over Weihaiwei.) France, finding that fruit could be had for the picking, then demanded and obtained some valuable mining concessions in South China, England responding to this move by exacting from the government at Peking a pledge that the Yangtze Valley would not be alienated to a third power. Thereupon France came back with a demand that China agree not to alienate to a third power the three southern provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. This left France slightly in the lead, so, to make matters even, England demanded a ninety-nine-year lease of the Kowloon Peninsula, comprising nearly four hundred square miles on the mainland opposite Hong Kong, a portion of which, it will be remembered, had been ceded to her forty years before. And by way of getting good measure she also obtained from China an undertaking to throw open the whole of her inland

waterways to steam traffic, at the same time exacting a promise that the post of Inspector-General of Customs (then held by Sir Robert Hart) should always be held by an Englishman as long as the trade of Great Britain with China was greater than that of any other nation.

The territorial concessions thus exacted from China by the European nations marked the beginning of the "spheres of influence" policy and would have inevitably resulted in the complete partition of the country had not the United States stepped in, in 1899, and enunciated its policy of "the open door," meaning equal opportunity for all. By her insistence that the customs duties in the leased territories and spheres of influence should be made no higher than those prevailing in other parts of the empire, the United States secured an equal opportunity for the commerce of all nations, large and small, and minimized the chances of a conflict between the powers which might have led to an extension of their territory at the expense of China. Great Britain, to her credit, was the first to endorse this policy of "the open door," and the other powers, though somewhat reluctantly, followed her example.

As was only to have been expected, the long series of aggressions by the foreign powers eventually resulted in arousing among the patient and long-suffering Chinese people a feeling of bitter resentment and

a desire for revenge. This smoldering resentment was fanned into flame by a secret society, known as "Harmonious and Peaceful Fists," which organized an agitation with the avowed object of killing all the foreigners in China in order to save the country from further territorial encroachments and humiliations. In June, 1900, the movement, which came to be known as the Boxer Rebellion, burst over northeastern China with the fury of a hurricane. Hundreds of foreign traders and missionaries were murdered in the outlying provinces. In Peking the Europeans sought refuge in the legations, which, though besieged by thousands of Boxers, aided by imperial troops, succeeded in holding out until the arrival of an allied relief expedition. The reparations demanded by the Allies for this affair were calculated to discourage the Chinese Government from ever again countenancing an attack on foreigners within its borders. China was forced to execute certain of the officials responsible for the outbreak and to degrade others; to send special envoys to Berlin and Tokio to formally apologize for the murder of the German minister and the secretary of the Japanese legation; to raze the Taku forts at the mouth of the Pei-ho River; to permit a foreign military occupation of the strategic points between the capital and the coast, thereby insuring communication with the sea; to permit the fortification of the legation quarter in Peking and the maintenance of permanent

legation guards therein; and to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels, equivalent to about 337 million dollars.

This staggering indemnity, which is now generally admitted to have been excessive and unjust, was secured (1) on the balance of the maritime customs revenue not already mortgaged for previous loans, the Powers permitting the Chinese Government to raise its tariff on imported articles to an effective five per cent. ad valorem; (2) on the revenue of the "native" customs in the treaty ports; and (3) on the total revenues of the Salt Gabelle, salt being a government monopoly. The collection of these revenues was insured by the establishment of effective foreign control of both the customs and salt administrations. The Boxer indemnity was converted into a loan which was to be repaid in annual installments extending over a period of thirty-nine years, so that, had events followed a normal course, China would not have regained control of her own finances until 1940. But in 1908 the American Government, desiring to set China on her feet financially, informed the government at Peking that the United States was prepared to refund the shares of the indemnity that it had already received and to remit the balance, on condition that the money should be used for the purpose of sending Chinese youths to the United States to be educated. By this altruistic action the United States won the confidence and friendship of the Chinese for

all time. When, following the advice of the United States and the pleading of the Allies, China declared war against Germany in 1917, she promptly ceased payment of the German share of the indemnity, and a few months later also ceased payment to Russia. Her financial burden was still further relieved, at least temporarily, when, upon her entry into the war, the Allies agreed to suspend the payment of their shares of the indemnity for five years, or until 1922. In view of the great assistance which China rendered the Allies during the war by supplying them with laborers and her extinction of German competition in Chinese markets, it would seem that the least the Allies could have done by way of showing their gratitude was to follow the example of the United States and write off the payments of the indemnity still due them. More selfish, more short-sighted than the United States, however, they contented themselves with a five-year suspension. If the Powers concerned are sincerely desirous of rehabilitating China, their first step should be to completely remit, or at least materially reduce, the intolerable burden imposed by the Boxer indemnities.

The next assault against Chinese sovereignty was made by Great Britain in 1904, when the British Government despatched an expedition to Lhassa, the capital of Tibet, under Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband. Yielding to the pressure thus brought to

bear, the Dalai Lama was forced to sign a treaty which provides (1) "that no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, or mortgaged to any other Power without the previous consent of the British Government"; (2) "that no representative of any other country may be admitted"; (3) "that no concession for railways, telegraphs, mining, or other rights shall be granted to another Power"; and (4) "that no Tibetan revenues shall be pledged or assigned to any other government." This treaty, which the Tibetans were forced to sign literally at the mouths of British guns, constituted a flagrant infringement of Chinese sovereignty, for from time beyond reckoning Tibet had formed an integral part of the Chinese Empire and its rulers had acknowledged the suzerainty of Peking. Under the circumstances, however, there was nothing for Peking to do but submit with the best grace possible, the Chinese Government confirming the treaty in exchange for Great Britain's pledge not to annex Tibet or to encroach on its internal autonomy. Since then Great Britain has steadily strengthened her position in Tibet, demanding and obtaining new privileges and pursuing a policy which has for its object, apparently, the eventual alienation of Tibetan territory. For example, a recent agreement provides that China may not dismiss officials in Tibet, or appoint new ones, without first obtaining British permission. In short, the Chinese Government was warned by Great Britain

that the acknowledged sovereignty of China in Tibet must not be allowed to lead to the exercise of actual sovereignty. Yet Tibet is represented by five deputies in the Chinese parliament.

In the same year that England invaded Tibet came the war between Japan and Russia, a war fought almost wholly on Chinese soil in cynical disregard of Chinese rights or neutrality. The result of this conflict did not greatly alter China's position in Manchuria. In South Manchuria Japan fell heir to the special privileges which Russia had wrung from China, taking over the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now known as Dairen) and the South Manchuria Railway as far north as Changchun. This includes seventy square miles in the railway zone about the fifty-five stations along the line. Over this zone and the 1300 square miles of leased land surrounding Port Arthur and Dairen Japan rules as absolutely as in her own island realm. Japan also retained possession of the light military railway which she built during the war from Antung, on the Korean frontier, to Mukden, and which she later converted into a standard-gauge line. This line connects at Antung with the Korean system, which, in August, 1917, passed under the control of the South Manchuria Railway, thus giving the Japanese a through line, under their own management, from Fusan, the Korean port nearest Japan, to Changchun, where connection with the railway system to Harbin, on

the main line of the Trans-Siberian, is effected. The section from Changchun to Harbin, and that portion of the Trans-Siberian which traverses Manchuria, are at present under Japanese control and guarded by Japanese troops. As these railways traverse the central and most fertile areas of a province larger than our three Pacific Coast states put together, capable of supporting a population of 100 millions, their value to Japan is obvious, and, unless I am greatly mistaken, she will not readily relax her grip on them. Though at Portsmouth both Russia and Japan solemnly agreed to evacuate Manchuria and restore it to China, it remains an *imperium in imperio,* theoretically an integral part of the Chinese Republic but to all intents and purposes a territory of the Japanese Empire.

We now come to the question of Shantung—a question as easy of explanation as it should be of solution. In 1898, as I have already mentioned, Germany coerced China into granting her a ninety-nine-year lease of Kiauchau Bay, on the coast of Shantung Province, together with the territory in a fifty kilometer radius of the bay, including the seaport of Tsingtau. On the coast of one of the richest and most populous provinces of China, midway between Peking and Shanghai, within a few hours' steam of Weihaiwei, Tientsin, and Port Arthur, it occupies a position of immense strategic importance. Here the Germans proceeded to intrench themselves,

CANAL SCENE IN CANTON

THE PAWNSHOPS OF CANTON
These are the only fireproof buildings in the city

VIEW FROM THE TERRACE OF THE SUMMER PALACE

BRIDGE IN THE GARDENS OF THE SUMMER PALACE, PEKING

pouring out money like water in the construction of an elaborate system of fortifications, a spacious harbor, dockyards, machine-shops, warehouses, and all the other appurtenances of a great naval base. At the same time that the Germans obtained the lease of Kiauchau they extracted from the Chinese Government a concession to build a railway across the province from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu, a station on the trunk-line from Shanghai to Peking. The Germans proved themselves rapid workers, transforming the squalid Chinese seaport of Tsingtau into a modern city, with paved streets and electric-lights and substantial buildings, and constructing the railway to Tsinanfu, a distance of 256 miles, in a surprisingly short time. By 1914, therefore, the whole peninsula of Shantung was pretty thoroughly under German domination.

Within a fortnight after the outbreak of the World War Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the unconditional surrender of the entire leased territory of Kiauchau, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." No reply being received from the German Government, Japan declared war on August 23, 1914, and the harbor of Kiauchau was blockaded by a Japanese squadron. A few days later a Japanese expeditionary force landed on the coast of Shantung and, with the coöperation of a contingent of British and Indian troops from Weihaiwei, captured the forts defending the harbor and

the city on November 6, 1914. After the triumphal entry of the allied forces into Tsingtau, Great Britain, having done her part in aiding Japan to oust the Germans, withdrew her troops and abstained from interfering with the administration of the leased territory, which was now completely occupied by the Japanese, who also proceeded to take over and operate the railway from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu.

Now it should be kept in mind, in considering the Shantung controversy, that at this time China was neutral, for she did not enter the war until three years later. According to international law, "the territory of neutral powers is inviolable." And Kiauchau was indisputably Chinese territory, having only been leased to Germany. A nation may lease a portion of its territory, just as an individual may lease a building, but the territory, like the building, remains the property of the lessor. Hence, when Japan and Great Britain attacked and captured Kiauchau they were, strictly speaking, violating Chinese neutrality. As it was common knowledge, however, that Germany was fitting out raiders in Kiauchau harbor for the purpose of preying on allied commerce, and it was obvious that China did not herself possess sufficient strength to reoccupy Kiauchau and intern the German garrison,[1] in the judgment of most fair-minded

[1] I am informed by Dr. J. C. Ferguson, the Adviser to the President of China, that the Chinese Government would have taken steps to reoccupy Kiauchau and intern the German garrison had Japan not objected. E. A. P.

men, Japan was fully justified in capturing the German forts on the ground of self-protection. If, after the capitulation of the garrison, Japan had contented herself with dismantling the forts and had then restored the leased territory to China, there would have been no Shantung question. Japan, however, took the position that by her capture of Kiauchau she automatically succeeded Germany as lessee and that she need not restore the territory to China, unless she saw fit to do so, until the expiration of the original lease in 1997. As though to still further show their contempt for Chinese neutrality, a Japanese army pushed inland as far as Tsinanfu, the terminus of the railway from Tsingtau and two hundred miles beyond the limits of the leased territory, requisitioning without compensation cattle, horses, carts, boats, grain, and provisions from the peaceful Chinese inhabitants of the country through which it passed and threatening with severe punishment any one who disobeyed the orders of the Japanese high command. All this, mark you, in a region which had never been leased to or occupied by the Germans and which was as essentially Chinese as Peking itself.

The Chinese Government protested against Japan's actions with unexpected vigor, demanding the restoration of Kiauchau on the ground that the lease was not transferable and the immediate evacuation of the portion of Shantung occupied by Japanese troops on the ground that such occupation constituted an unjusti-

fiable invasion of a neutral country. Japan replied that the territory along the line of the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu railway had been occupied as "a military necessity," but that it was her intention eventually to withdraw her troops from this region and to restore Kiauchau to China—*under certain conditions.*

These conditions were made known to China in a Japanese note presented to the government at Peking in May, 1915:

"When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiauchau Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore said leased territory to China under the following conditions:

"1. The whole of Kiauchau Bay to be opened as a commercial port.

"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.

"3. If the foreign powers desire it, an international settlement may be established.

"4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and properties of Germany, and the conditions and procedure relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration."

This constituted Japan's idea of keeping the pledge, as made in her ultimatum to Germany, to restore

Kiauchau to China, but it is obvious that the operation of the four conditions attached to the offer would at the same time transfer to her, in effect, all the rights, privileges, interests, and advantages formerly enjoyed by the Germans. China's acceptance of these conditions not only would have given Japan effective control of the Kiauchau territory, even though the Rising Sun flag did not actually fly over it, but of the railways of the province and the rich iron and coal districts through which they pass. Under such circumstances it would be an easy matter for Japan to bring the whole province of Shantung within her sphere of influence, thence penetrating the adjacent provinces and finally realizing her ambition of dominating the whole of that rich and populous littoral which stretches from Port Arthur to Canton. It was not the transfer of a few concessions or a few square miles of territory which aroused the apprehension and the resentment of China. It required no great discernment on the part of the Chinese to recognize that, with Japan already impregnably intrenched in Korea, in Manchuria, and on the Kwantung peninsula, the establishment of Japanese domination in Shantung would complete a slip-noose about the capital itself, enabling Japan to choke the republic into submission whenever she saw fit.

When, therefore, the representatives of China, one of the Allies since 1917, took their seats at the Peace Conference at the close of the war, they demanded di-

rect and unconditional restoration of Kiauchau *by Germany,* instead of through the agency of Japan, basing their argument on the ground that China should enjoy the same rights as the other Allies, and that, moreover, there was nothing to be gained by taking two steps to make the transfer, when it could be effected by one. It is not my intention to enter into an account of the furious controversy precipitated at Paris by China's resolute stand on the Shantung question, a controversy which came perilously near to wrecking the Peace Conference. The Japanese delegates not only refused to accept the arguments of the Chinese, but were infuriated that the case should have been brought before the Conference at all, strong pressure being brought by Tokio upon the government at Peking to recall its representatives at Paris forthwith. When, late in April, 1919, the question of Kiauchau was brought before the Council of Four for final decision the Italian delegation had withdrawn from the Conference, owing to the dispute over Fiume, and Japan, taking advantage of the delicate situation which had thus been created, threatened to follow Italy's example should the matter of Kiauchau not be decided to her satisfaction. In all likelihood Japan's withdrawal would have resulted in the break-up of the Conference, a catastrophe which even a man so iron-willed as President Wilson did not dare to risk. Persuaded, therefore, by the verbal assurances of the Japanese, that Kiauchau and the rest of the Shantung

peninsula would be voluntarily restored in full sovereignty to China, he reluctantly agreed to the insertion in the Treaty of Peace of the much-criticized Articles 156 and 157. They read:

Article 156. Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title, and privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines, and submarine cables—which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all her rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges, and properties attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

Article 157. The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her directly or indirectly in connexion with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances.

In order to defend their country's rights and at the same time obviate an open breach with the Allies, the Chinese delegates, while protesting these articles, offered to sign the treaty provided they were permitted to make a reservation regarding the clause relating to Shantung. Informed that no reservation would be permitted, the Chinese delegation reluctantly with-

drew from the Conference. It has been held by some that they would have placed their country in a stronger position had they signed the treaty, trusting to Japan to redeem her promises to restore Shantung. But the truth of the matter was that the Chinese did not trust Japan—and with good reason. For Japan had made promises to China on other occasions—notably in the case of Manchuria—and those promises had not been kept. With nations, as with individuals, promises count for little if sincerity is lacking.

This outline of the systematic spoliation of China would be incomplete without some mention of the Lao Hsi Kai incident, which, though it involved a comparatively insignificant amount of territory, provides a glaring example of the rapacity, cynicism, and injustice which have characterized certain European nations in their treatment of China. Lao Hsi Kai is the name of a district in the heart of Tientsin, the greatest seaport of North China. Tientsin is only about two hours by rail from Peking and is a trade center of immense importance, with about one million inhabitants. In it Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan have concessions.

On the night of October 19, 1916, a force of French soldiery, led by the French chargé d'affaires, who had come down from Peking for the purpose, without the slightest warning suddenly took possession of the Lao

Hsi Kai district, consisting of 333 acres of wharfage, streets, warehouses, shops, and dwellings in one of the busiest parts of Tientsin. They arrested and imprisoned the Chinese soldiers on duty in the district, substituted the tricolor for the flag of China, and in the name of France formally annexed this territory to the overseas dominions of the republic. And this, mark you, at a time when France was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany, which had done precisely the same thing, only on a larger scale, in Belgium. The French did not seize Lao Hsi Kai as a punitive measure, or for strategic purposes, or from military necessity, or in payment of unsatisfied claims. They seized it because they wanted it and because they knew that China was powerless to resist them. They could not even offer the excuse that they took it in order to obtain the same advantages as other nations, for they already possessed one of the most valuable and extensive concessions in the city. When I questioned an official of the French Legation as to the reason for the seizure he naïvely explained that France had been asking for Lao Hsi Kai for fifteen years, but that the Chinese authorities had met her demands with procrastination and evasion, whereupon she had decided to help herself to the territory in question. To my way of thinking, France's theft of Lao Hsi Kai was on the same moral plane as stealing pennies from a cripple.

As things stand to-day, fully three quarters of all the territory nominally included within the Chinese Republic is under foreign influence, if not actually under foreign control. Tibet is to all intents and purposes a British protectorate, the government at Peking exercising over it only a vicarious rule, and Britain likewise considers the teeming valley of the Yangtze, potentially the greatest market in all Asia, as within her recognized sphere of interest. Hong Kong, Kowloon, and Weihaiwei bristle with British bayonets and British guns. France has appropriated for her sphere of interest the great, rich province of Yunnan and on the coast of Kwantung Province has intrenched herself at Kwang-chau-wan. The flag of Japan flies over the former German leasehold of Kiauchau and over the former Russian territory on the Kwantung peninsula, while Japanese influence, in the form of Japanese railways, banks, traders, and gendarmes, has been extended over the whole of Manchuria and the fringes of Mongolia. Small wonder that the American concession-hunter, studying a map of the republic to discover some region where he could operate without encroaching on territory preëmpted by other nations, finally exclaimed, "But where in hell is China?"

IV

At the opening of the year 1915 Europe found itself in unparalleled turmoil. The triumphant

legions of Germany had overrun Belgium and had pushed deep into France and Russia. The Allies were fighting with their backs to the wall. Paris was in imminent danger, the Channel ports were threatened, the sea-borne commerce of Britain was being slowly throttled by the submarine campaign. America, huge, inert, unprepared, was apathetically looking on. China, with her incalculable wealth in trade and natural resources, was isolated, forgotten, helpless, without a friend on whom she could count for assistance or support. In this situation Japan, whose settled policy had long had as its object the domination of China and the hegemony of Eastern Asia,[1] saw her golden opportunity. And that opportunity she was quick to seize. On the eighteenth of January, then, when Western ears were deaf to everything save the cannon-roll in Flanders, the Japanese minister at Peking presented to the Chinese Government the famous Twenty-One Demands.

Because they afford concrete, indisputable evidence of the sinister and predatory character of Japanese policy at that time; because they so clearly explain the universal hatred and distrust which the people of China have for Japan; and because they constitute the most colossal blunder ever committed by the

[1] This is not the policy of the present government of Japan. One of the highest officials of the Empire said to me in December, 1921, "The greatest blessing that could come to Japan would be a prosperous and well-governed China." E. A. P.

Tokyo government, I feel justified, despite the many times they have been quoted, in reproducing them in full:

THE ORIGINAL TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, AS PRESENTED TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT JANUARY 18, 1915

I

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighborhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article I. The Chinese government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese government may hereafter agree with the German government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the province of Shantung.

Article II. The Chinese government engages that within the province of Shantung, and along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third power under any pretext.

Article III. The Chinese government consents to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkou to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway.

Article IV. The Chinese government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in the province of Shantung as commercial ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.

II

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, since the Chinese government has always acknowledged the

A FUNERAL PROCESSION IN PEKING

FUNERAL PROCESSION OF A HIGH OFFICIAL
The catafalque

TIBETAN PRIESTS
AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE LAMA TEMPLE, PEKING

AN ITINERANT MENDICANT
OF THE NORTHERN HILLS

special position enjoyed by Japan in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

Article I. The two contracting parties mutually agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of ninety-nine years.

Article II. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

Article III. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article IV. The Chinese government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines in south Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly.

Article V. The Chinese government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese government's consent shall be first obtained before such action is taken:

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third power for the purpose of building a railway in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia.

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third power pledging the local taxes of south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia.

Article VI. The Chinese government agrees that if the Chinese government employs political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in south Manchuria or eastern Mongolia, the Japanese government shall first be consulted.

Article VII. The Chinese government agrees that the control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway [1] shall be handed over to the Japanese government for a term

[1] This relates to a branch line running from Changchun, the terminus of the South Manchuria Railway, to Kirin, capital of the province of the same name. The line is important because it taps the Manchurian coal-fields.

of ninety-nine years dating from the signing of this agreement.

III

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company [1] have close relations with each other at present, and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:

Article I. The two contracting parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that, without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said company nor cause the said company to dispose freely of the same.

Article II. The Chinese government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said company, to be worked by other persons outside of

[1] The Hanyehping Company is a combination of three concerns—the Hang Yang Steel & Iron Works, the Tayeh Mines, and the Pinghsiang Collieries. Its mills are at Hang Yang, one of the most important commercial centers in the upper Yangtze valley. The company was originally purely a Chinese property, but in 1912 the whole property was mortgaged to the Yokohama Specie Bank as security for a loan. As a condition of the loan it is provided that the auditor and certain technical experts employed by the company shall be Japanese and that the total output of the Tayeh mines must be sold to the Japanese Government Iron Works at rates to be fixed biennially, but much below market prices. The bank has also acquired the preferential right to advance further loans. The mines in Tayeh, according to a Japanese official report, are almost inexhaustible and will produce 1,000,000 tons annually for 700 years, the quality of the ore being as good as that produced in Germany or the United States. In the districts surrounding the Tayeh mines there are many other mines—copper, lead, and zinc—which are not the property of the Hanyehping Company. It will be noted that in Article II Japan demands that these mines shall not be exploited without the consent of the company, which, being controlled by the Yokohama Specie Bank, really means that they shall not be exploited without the consent of Japan. This group of demands is significant in that it illustrates Japan's intention to enter and control a region in the valley of the Yangtze which Great Britain has always considered within her own sphere of interest.

the said company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking, which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said company, the consent of the said company shall first be obtained.

IV

The Japanese government and the Chinese government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following special article:

The Chinese government engages not to cede or lease to a third power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of China.

V

Article I. The Chinese central government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

Article II. Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

Article III. Inasmuch as the Japanese government and the Chinese government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service.

Article IV. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of the munitions of war (say, 50 per cent or more) that are needed by the Chinese government, or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

Article V. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of

constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochou.[1]

Article VI. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways, and construct harbor-works (including dockyards) in the province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

Article VII. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in Buddhist China.

It requires no profound knowledge of diplomacy to recognize the sweeping and peculiarly sinister nature of these demands. Their acceptance in their original form would have been tantamount to an admission by the Peking government that China was a Japanese protectorate. The article demanding that the police departments of important cities in China be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese was as humiliating to Chinese pride, as flagrant an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, as the clause in the ultimatum presented by Austro-Hungary to Serbia in the spring of 1914 demanding that Austria be given joint control of the Serbian police system. China's acceptance of the original Twenty-One Demands would have given Japan paramount influence in many branches of the Chinese Government; it would have placed the Chinese army and its matériel under the control of the Japanese General Staff; it would have transformed the occupied territory of

[1] These cities are in the provinces of Hupeh and Kiangsi. Such a railway would have enabled Japan to obtain control of one of the most populous and important districts in all China.

Kiauchau into a wedge which would eventually have opened the whole of Shantung to Japanese penetration; it would have added the maritime province of Fukien to the Japanese spheres of interest; and it would have permitted a small army of Japanese secret agents, under the guise of missionaries and school-teachers, to penetrate far into the hinterland of China, where it would have been a simple matter for them to have created "incidents" which would provide Japan with excuses for still further aggression.

The publication of the Demands aroused a storm of indignation and protest which swept China from Yunnan to the Great Wall. Mass-meetings and demonstrations were held everywhere. Even the warring cliques and factions were unanimous in insisting that the Demands must be rejected. Thus bolstered up, the feeble and vacillating administration at Peking became so obstinate in its refusal to consider the Fifth Group of the Demands that the Japanese Government, apparently realizing that by its greed it had outreached itself, caused them to be withdrawn. It is worthy of remark in this connection that when Japan notified the Western Powers of her demands on China, Japanese diplomacy executed a characteristic manœuver by omitting all mention of the obnoxious Fifth Group, and when the Powers were presented by China with a complete copy of the Demands, as they had been presented to President Yuan Shih-kai, the authenticity of the

Fifth Group was denied by the Japanese Foreign Office. Concerning this unblushing attempt at deception as eminent a Japanese as Baron Hayashi, later Japanese Ambassador to England, is quoted as having said:

"When Viscount Kato sent China a note containing five groups, and then sent to England what purported to be a copy of his note to China, and that copy only contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably foolish." [1]

As the Peking government remained obdurate even after the withdrawal of Group V, being particularly opposed to acceptance of the articles confirming Japan in her possession of Kiauchau, Japan, on May 7, 1915, presented China with an ultimatum. The attitude of Tokio in regard to the restoration of the territory captured from Germany was unequivocally expressed in the paragraph which read: *"The Imperial Japanese Government, in taking Kiauchau, made immense sacrifices in blood and money. Therefore, after taking the place, there is not the least obligation . . . to return the place to China."*

For four months China had held off Japan by delay and evasion, hoping against hope that aid would

[1] "The Far East Unveiled," by Frederick Coleman.

be forthcoming from Europe or America. But no help came, and Japan having consented to withdraw the obnoxious Fifth Group (or, more accurately, to treat its provisions in "Notes to be Exchanged") and having somewhat modified the other four groups, Peking finally gave way and on May 9 the agreement was signed.

Two days later, however, tardy help arrived from the United States in the form of identical notes addressed by the United States Government to China and to Japan. The note to Japan read:

> In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place and which are now pending between the Government of Japan and the Government of China and of the agreements which have been reached as a result thereof, the Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Government of the Japanese Empire that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the International policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy.

The firm tone of the American note served to temporarily check Japanese aggression, but its salutary effect was largely undone by a note which was exchanged on November 15, 1917, between Viscount Ishii, who had been sent by his government on a special mission to the United States, and the American Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing. This note con-

stitutes what is commonly known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. It says:

> The Governments of Japan and of the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous.
>
> The territorial sovereignty of China nevertheless remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurance of the Imperial Japanese Government that, while geographical position gives Japan such special interests, it has no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in the treaties with other nations.
>
> The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose of infringing in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare furthermore that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door," or equal opportunity of commerce and industry in China.
>
> Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

Though the Lansing-Ishii Agreement reiterated the principle of the Open Door, it was in one point substantially different from preceding notes exchanged between the United States and Japan (particularly, the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1909) in that it recognized that Japan possessed "special

interests" in China. Whatever may have been President Wilson's intentions in the matter, whatever mental reservations Mr. Lansing may have made in discussing the wording with Viscount Ishii, the effect of the agreement, once it was published, was to reverse America's traditional policy toward China. By recognizing special rights for one country, Mr. Lansing abandoned the principle of equal rights for all. The commitment was an evil one, and no one has ever explained why it was made. It was virtually repudiated, however, by Mr. Hughes shortly after he became secretary of state in 1921, when he reaffirmed the policy of the Open Door.

V

China, as you will see by referring to the map, is crisscrossed by a network of railways, completed, under construction, or in contemplation. Sentimental persons have referred to these railways as "paths of progress," but they might more fittingly be described as bonds of servitude. For it should be understood that railways in China, unlike those in other countries, are not purely commercial enterprises. In most countries the construction of a railway means the acquirement of a right-of-way, the laying of rails, the building of stations and workshops, and the operation of trains—nothing more. But not so in China.

There, at least until very recently, railway building has been primarily a political enterprise, the railways themselves having been utilized by the foreign nations which supplied the funds for their construction as instruments for military aggression and political coercion. In the majority of cases the railways of China are financed by foreign or other institutions with the approval and support of their respective governments and subject to their control. Chinese railway concessions, moreover, have frequently carried with them extraordinary commercial and political privileges, and monopolies such as the right of exploiting the mines and forests in the territory traversed by the railway; maintaining armed forces along the line, ostensibly for its protection against bandits; and in some cases (notably, in Shantung) the establishment of civil administrative centers. Such railways, it will be realized, are far more of a liability than an asset to a country as weak and disorganized as China.

The most important of these "political" railways are:

1. The Chinese Eastern Railway, with a total mileage, including branches, of 1275 miles, which runs from Manchouli (Manchuria), on the Siberian-Chinese frontier, straight across Manchuria, via Harbin (whence a section runs southward to Changchun) to Suifenho (Pogranitchnaia), on the border of the Rus-

sian Maritime Province. This line is of immense commercial and strategic importance in that it forms a "cut-off" for the Trans-Siberian system, shortening the distance between Moscow and Vladivostok by several hundred miles. It effects junctions at Manchouli with the Trans-Siberian to Europe, at Suifenho with the continuation of the Trans-Siberian to Vladivostok, and at Changchun with the South Manchuria Railway to Mukden. It forms, in short, a Chinese section of the Trans-Siberian route from Europe to the Pacific. Built by a Russian syndicate, with the full power of control originally vested in the Russian minister of finance, it has been occupied by Japanese troops since the collapse of the Russian constitutional government, and is to-day under the control of Japan.

2. The South Manchuria Railway, with a total mileage of 697 miles, which runs from Changchun (the southern terminus of the Chinese Eastern Railway) to Mukden, where it splits into three sections: one running southwest to Newchwang, where it connects with the Chinese Government Railways for Peking; another section running in a southerly direction, down the Kwantung peninsula, to Dalny, where it connects with the short branch line to Port Arthur; and the third section running southeast to Antung, where it links up with the Korean system. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War it was part of the Chinese Eastern Railway and was controlled by Russia, but by the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth the

section running from Mukden to Changchun, as well as the branches from Mukden to Antung and Mukden to Port Arthur, was transferred by Russia to Japan. Under the terms of the agreement between Russia and China the latter had the right to redeem this line thirty-six years after it was opened to traffic, but after its transfer to Japan the Japanese Government forced Peking to extend the term for redemption to ninety-nine years, so that China cannot obtain possession of the property until 2002.

3. The Shantung (Tsingtau-Tsinanfu) Railway. This line, of which about 300 miles has been opened to traffic, was built by German capitalists upon Germany's acquirement of the lease of Kiauchau Bay, at the extremity of the Shantung peninsula. Starting from Tsingtau, it runs westward across the province of Shantung to Tsinanfu, on the Yellow River, where it effects a junction with the Pukow-Tientsin Railway, which forms a section of the trunk-line from Shanghai to Peking. This railway, together with the accompanying concessions to exploit the mines within ten miles of the line and to prospect for minerals in certain specified areas outside the railway zone, was transferred by Germany to Japan under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.

4. The Yunnan Railway. This line, which is an extension of France's system in Indo-China, runs on French territory from Haiphong to Laokay, and

on Chinese territory from Laokay to Yunnanfu, the capital and chief city of Yunnan, the southernmost and one of the richest provinces of the republic. Its total mileage is 533 miles, of which slightly more than half is within the borders of China. This concession, like those for the Manchurian and the Shantung systems, carries with it mining and other valuable privileges.

All the above-mentioned railway concessions are immune from any interference by the Chinese Government until the dates fixed for their redemption, and all of them were granted under pressure from the powers concerned, who demanded them not with the motive of developing the country, but for the purpose of strengthening their positions in certain parts of it, so that they might the more readily transform their spheres of influence into colonial possessions in the event of China being partitioned.

Thanks to these railway holdings and the concessions which accompany them, Japan is to-day to all intents and purposes, mistress of Manchuria and of Shantung. In Yunnan French influence is predominant, though it is only fair to say that they have not utilized their railway concession to undermine Chinese sovereignty in the south as the Japanese have done in the north. The railways of Middle China, particularly those in the valley of the Yangtze, are, generally speaking, under British financial control,

though here again it must be admitted that Great Britain has rarely utilized them to advance her political designs.

In the railway loans signed prior to 1908 China consented to the lending banks exercising a large measure of supervision in regard to construction and expenditure. In every case the lending banks insisted on selecting the chief engineer, who was charged not only with the construction of the line but with its operation after it was built. Hence, though these lines are nominally the property of the Chinese Government, China is not in full control of them and, if she wishes to take any measures not provided for in the original agreements, she has first to obtain the permission of the corporations representing the investors. In the railway loans floated since 1908, however, foreign control, though by no means eliminated, is greatly diminished, though even in the later agreements it is stipulated that the chief engineers shall be foreigners and that expenditures shall be controlled by auditors appointed by the lending banks.

Ever since China floated her first foreign loan she has been a happy hunting-ground for "the powers that prey." English, French, Russian, German, Austrian, Dutch, Swiss, Belgian, and Japanese investors and concession-hunters jostled and snarled at each other in their attempts to reach the Chinese trough. At one period there was such a scramble among the Treaty Powers to lend money to China that there

were not enough loans to go round, The almost incredible selfishness which characterized the attitude of the European nations toward China is strikingly set forth by Miss Ellen LaMotte in "Peking Dust":

> When a European Power finds a piece of rich, juicy territory which has not already been appropriated by some one else, it simply proclaims it a sphere of influence, notifies the Chinese government to that effect, and forces it—as often as not by threats of one kind and another—to ratify the transaction by a treaty. After that China cannot even build a railway in that sphere without the permission of the ruling Power; she cannot dismiss or appoint officials; even the police are, as likely as not, officered by Europeans. Do you appreciate that in 1916, when the European war was at its height, England, France, and Russia lodged protests with the Chinese Government on the ground that the railway loan which it had recently contracted with American bankers for the construction of a railway from Fengchen to Ninghsi trespassed upon the preferential rights of those Powers to build railways? In this affair France also acted for Belgium. Think of it! China needing a railway, an American firm willing to build it, and England, France, Russia, and even poor little Belgium forbidding her to build it, although they were themselves unable to help her financially! Such incidents would be ludicrous, were they not so tragic.

Now if China is to be saved, such conditions cannot be permitted to continue. A stop must be put to the jealous rivalries of those foreign nations who, through the instrumentality of loans, have been callously exploiting the country for their own selfish ends. The realization by the foreign banking groups that if China was not to be irretrievably

wrecked these abuses must be abolished and international coöperation substituted for international competition resulted in the signing of the Consortium on October 15, 1920. The Consortium is an agreement to which the banking groups of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan are parties, whose declared purpose is to assist China in developing her railways and public utilities. As each banking group signed with the approval of its government, the Consortium, though in some respects a private contract, is, in effect, an international agreement.

The framers of the Consortium recognized the obstacles in the path of rehabilitating China. First of all, there was China's deep-seated distrust of the foreigner—the result of years of coercion, intrigue, injustice, and oppression—coupled with the fear that the Consortium would prove to be only a stepping-stone to some form of international control of China's finances. Then there was the fact that every politician in China, irrespective of party, violently opposed the Consortium because he saw in it a curtailment of lucrative opportunities for graft. And finally, it was necessary to overcome the mutual jealousies and suspicions of the foreign capitalists themselves. The Consortium became, therefore, an ordinance of mutual self-denial. Unselfishness and coöperation are at the bottom of the agreement. There is to be no further crowding or jostling at the Chinese trough. There is to be a

common holding company, as it were, with each set of shareholders represented on the board of directors. In short, the Consortium applies the Open Door principle to the financial problems of the republic. China is to be loaned money for her legitimate needs, but henceforth it is to be loaned wisely and discriminatingly, and steps will be taken to see that it is used for the purposes intended, instead of being diverted, as heretofore, into the pockets of the politicians and military chieftains. The Consortium has been described as a financial league of nations whose decisions, based on justice and forbearance, are expected to prevent China from being in the future a bone of warlike contention and which will at the same time guarantee her fair treatment from all. I might add, however, that the Chinese themselves are by no means as optimistic about the Consortium as are its American promoters. Nor is this at all surprising. Their previous experiences with foreign financiers have made them "gun-shy."

If the foreign powers are really sincere in their protestations that they wish to set China upon her feet financially, if they are genuinely desirous of restoring her self-respect, their first step is plain. She should be permitted to regulate her own customs duties. Do you realize, I wonder, that under existing conditions if China wishes to raise or lower the duty on a single imported article, she must first obtain the permission of thirteen nations? And if those nations

that do not produce the article in question consent to having the duty raised on that item, those nations that do produce that article may be counted upon to refuse their consent. The United States and Great Britain, for example, would probably interpose no objections to the Chinese Government raising the duties on imported wines, for the reason that they are not wine-producing countries and therefore their exports would not be affected, whereas France and Italy, both of which export great quantities of wine, might be expected to offer the most strenuous objections. On the other hand, if China desired to raise the duty on breadstuffs, France and Italy, not being grain-growing countries, might give their assent, while the United States and Great Britain, with their vast grain-fields, would almost certainly oppose such a change in the tariff.

As a result of this selfish attitude on the part of the treaty states, China, with its three hundred millions of people, rich as she is or as she might become, enjoys a wholly inadequate revenue, for she is permitted to levy only a nominal tariff—five per cent. ad valorem. She has no encouragement, therefore, to develop her industries, for the treaty states will not permit her to erect a tariff wall for their protection. Instead, they allow her just enough revenue to return to them in the form of Boxer indemnities and interest on their loans. When all is said and done, the financial regeneration of China is not due

nearly so much to the corruption and incompetency of her own officials as it is to the supreme selfishness of those foreign nations which have her in their power.

The principal sources of revenue of the Chinese Government are the land tax, excise, *li-kin,* the salt duty, and the maritime customs. In order that you may understand why they do not produce sufficient revenue, it is necessary for me to briefly sketch the curious, and in some instances archaic, methods employed in their collection. Let us take the land taxes first. These are usually collected by the magistrates, who, however, sometimes delegate their collection to the village elders. They are then forwarded to the provincial governors, or *tuchuns,* who, instead of passing them on to the central government in Peking, invariably retain them to defray the expenses of the provincial administration, the chief item in which is usually the upkeep of the large "personal" armies to which I have already made reference. Thus, though the land taxes of the republic produce a very considerable sum, only an insignificant part of it reaches Peking for the use of the state. This is likewise true of the collection of the excise duties and of *li-kin,* a sort of inland customs duty assessed on goods in transit and comparable in certain respects to the *octroi* charges levied by various European municipalities. From time to time the Peking government has made attempts to collect the internal revenues direct, but

owing to its weakness in dealing with the provincial governors its tax-gatherers have usually returned to the capital empty-handed. To tell the truth, the officials sent out from Peking usually receive about as much consideration in the provinces as United States internal revenue agents are accorded in the "moonshine" districts of the South.

The trade in salt is a government monopoly. Only licensed merchants are permitted to deal in it, and the importation of foreign salt is forbidden by the treaties with foreign nations. For the purpose of salt administration China is divided into some seven or eight zones, each of which has its own source of production. The boundaries of these zones are carefully defined and salt produced in one cannot be consigned to or sold in another. There are great variations in price between the various zones, but the customer is not permitted to buy his salt in the cheapest market. He can only buy from the licensed merchants in his own zone, who in turn are debarred from procuring supplies except at the depots in their respective districts. Conveyance from one zone to another is considered as smuggling, and salt thus transported is liable to confiscation. Duty is levied under two heads, the first being a duty proper, payable on the issue of salt from the depot, the second being *li-kin* levied in transit or at the place of destination. As the total consumption of salt for all China is estimated at nearly 1,500,000 tons a year, it will be seen that

the salt duties form a very important source of revenue.[1] When China floated the Currency Reform, Crisp, and Reorganization Loans in 1911-12-13, she pledged as security the revenues from the salt tax, the administration of which—known as the Salt Gabelle—was placed under a Chinese chief inspector and a foreign associate chief inspector (British), who are assisted by a numerous staff of foreigners.

The Chinese Maritime Customs was organized at Shanghai in 1854. The Taiping rebels, who had overrun nearly the whole of China, then being in possession of the native city, the collection of customs dues was placed in the hands of foreigners. This developed into a permanent institution, the European staff being mainly British. But upon the proclamation of the republic a decree was issued, in conformity with the new national sentiment, appointing Chinese commissioners to administer the customs. As, however, the whole of the customs revenue was (and still is) pledged to foreign bondholders and absorbed in the service of the several loans, the foreign powers interested felt that to take the customs administration out of the hands of Sir Robert Hart, who had been inspector-general since 1863, would seriously imperil the efficiency and integrity for which the service had become famous. The British Government promptly protested against the decree placing the customs under native supervision, pointing out that

[1] The revenue from the salt tax in 1916 was about $38,000,000.

the continuation of the established system had been stipulated in the loan agreements of 1896 and 1898. The original understanding, which provided that China should employ a Briton at the head of the service as long as the trade of Great Britain exceeds in aggregate that of any other treaty state, was thereupon reaffirmed.[1]

The staff of the maritime customs now numbers about 7200, of whom nearly one fourth are foreigners. It should be added that the foreign members of the customs service have served China with the utmost loyalty, having shown no bias in favor of their own countries. All the posts in the service, save only that of inspector-general, are open to candidates from all the treaty states, ranging in commercial importance from Great Britain to Peru. Barring the Salt Gabelle, the maritime customs is the one department of finance in China which is managed with honesty and efficiency, this being due to the fact that it is under foreign control. It collects all the duties leviable under the treaties on the foreign trade of China, as well as all the duties on the coasting trade so far as carried on by vessels of foreign build, whether Chinese or foreign-owned. But it does not control the trade in native craft, the so-called junk trade, the duties on which are still collected by the officials of the native customs houses.

[1] Sir Robert Hart died in 1911. He was succeeded as inspector-general by Sir Francis Aglen.

So long as the loans and indemnities secured by mortgages on customs receipts remain unredeemed by China it will prove exceedingly difficult to induce the foreign powers, who are frankly distrustful of the Chinese in financial matters, to consent to restoring the administration of the customs to the Chinese themselves. During recent years, indeed, when the country has been almost constantly in turmoil, the customs receipts have not even been remitted to the Chinese Government, but have been deposited by the inspector-general in foreign banks in Shanghai, Canton, and Tientsin in order to meet the annual loan charges, the surplus then being remitted to Peking. Long and costly experience with sticky-fingered Chinese officials has taught the foreigner to take no chances.

In concluding this brief survey of the curious and anomalous tariff arrangements which obtain in China, I repeat that, in my judgment, the prompt restoration to China of the right to fix her own tariffs is dictated by wisdom no less than by justice.[1] The only argument that has been advanced in favor of retaining the existing five per cent. tariff is that, since the customs receipts have been mortgaged for indemnities and loans, an alteration in the schedules might conceivably result in diminishing the yield, instead of augmenting it, thereby endangering the

[1] Measures to this effect were agreed to by the Powers represented at the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

security of the foreign investors. But it seems to me that by permitting China to fix her own tariff she could be required to give a guarantee that the total revenues from the customs would not fall below the amount required to pay the principal and interest on the debts and loans thus secured. What I have said above should not be interpreted as meaning that I believe in doing away, at least for the present, with the existing customs administration. If China is well advised, she will pocket her pride and permit the direction of her customs to remain in the honest and efficient hands of the present administration until she has had time to build up an equally honest and efficient organization of her own.

VI

China is at present passing through a period of reconstruction not dissimilar to that experienced by the United States during the decade succeeding the close of the Civil War. Just as we struggled to free ourselves from the intrigue, corruption, and political chaos that so nearly overwhelmed the republic in the years that followed Appomattox, so China is struggling to-day. There is the same embittered, unreconciled South and the same politically dominant North. The "carpet-bag" rulers of the post-bellum South have their Chinese counterparts in the corrupt

and tyrannical *tuchuns;* the brigands and demobilized soldiery who are terrorizing portions of China to-day correspond to the "bad men" and gun-fighters who terrorized our own West during reconstruction days. And the ruthless exploitation of China's natural resources by foreign financial groups finds a fairly close parallel in the exploitation of the Pacific Coast states by American railway interests. We, however, were permitted to manage our own affairs, to bring order out of chaos, harmony out of strife, without interference by foreign nations who sought to prolong the period of internal dissension in order to serve their own selfish ends. But not so in the case of China. She has not been left free to work out her own salvation. She has been systematically hampered by unjust restrictions and limitations; she has been forced to accept from foreign nations so-called "advice" which in reality has been dictation. Though in theory she is a sovereign state, an independent nation, she does not control her own finances, her own railways, her own tariff, her own customs, her own army, her own seaports, or large areas of her own territory. When all is said and done, China is, like Charles of Austria, an international prisoner.

I have already explained how by means of concessions, leases, and other privileges extracted from China under duress Japan has made herself the virtual mistress of Manchuria and Shantung. I have traced the steps whereby Great Britain has attained

commercial supremacy in the Valley of the Yangtze and political supremacy in Tibet. I have shown how France has brought within her sphere of influence the great province of Yunnan. I have made it clear how all three of these powers, by intrenching themselves in the leased territories of Kwantung, Weihaiwei, Kiauchau, Kowloon, and Kwang-chau-wan, have subjected to the menace of their guns and fleets the whole coast of China. And I have outlined the procedure whereby the Great Powers, through indemnities and loans, have obtained control of China's finances. But these, though the most important, are by no means the only infringements on the republic's sovereignty. Were you aware, for example, that a foreigner living in China is as much under the law of his own country as though he were within its borders? By virtue of the extraterritorial rights enjoyed by the treaty powers, he is beyond the reach of the Chinese law. The treaty with the United States explicitly states:

> Citizens of the United States (in China), either on shore or in any merchant vessel, who may insult, trouble, or wound the persons, or injure the property, of Chinese, or commit any improper act in China, shall be punished by the Consul or other public functionary thereto authorized, according to the laws of the United States.

And there are other rights, powers, and privileges which the foreign nations have arrogated to them-

selves for which there is now little justification. The foreign legations in Peking, for example, are surrounded by ramparts, defended by artillery and machine-guns, and garrisoned by troops—miniature fortresses, in fact, set down in the heart of China's capital. No Chinese may walk on that portion of the Tartar Wall which commands the legation quarter, and a somewhat similar prohibition is enforced on Shameen, the island on which is Canton's European settlement. Japan has introduced the pillar-boxes and postmen of the Imperial Japanese Post into every district of Peking, as well as in numerous other Chinese cities, and even the United States maintains at Tientsin and Shanghai its extraterritorialized post-offices which compete with the and underbid the Chinese postal service. For upward of one thousand miles China's greatest waterway, the Yangtze River, is patrolled by American and British gunboats; a battalion of American infantry is stationed in Tientsin; the Japanese maintain a garrison as far inland as Hankow; and a considerable part of the province of Shantung is under Japanese civil administration. In short, China is to-day a country under foreign occupation.

Now it is obviously impracticable to abruptly abolish all of these powers and privileges, even if the consent of the foreign nations which are directly interested could be obtained. Such a proceeding would not be in the best interest of the Chinese themselves.

But there are certain things which should and must be done if the foreign powers are sincere in their protestations that they wish to rehabilitate China. If they are really desirous of making the Chinese Republic an independent nation in fact as well as in name, one of their first steps should be the restoration of the territories which they have leased, or have otherwise alienated, *in China proper*[1]—the Japanese withdrawing from Shantung, the British from Weihaiwei and the Kowloon peninsula (opposite Hong Kong), the Portuguese from Macao, and the French from Kwang-chau-wan. Though abstract justice doubtless also demands the evacuation of Port Arthur and Dalny by Japan, and the evacuation of Hong Kong by Great Britain, I do not think that such action is likely to be realized for many years to come, if at all. The two powers in question have expended vast sums on these great strongholds, they play highly important parts in their respective schemes of national defense, and I can no more conceive of their consenting to abandon them than I can of the United States consenting to withdraw from the Canal Zone.

The restoration of the leased territories should be followed by the abolition of all "spheres of influence" in China proper, and eventually, when political conditions justify it, in the outlying territories—Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet. But it will be time enough to discuss the renunciation by Great Britain

[1] That is, the China of the Eighteen Provinces. See Appendix.

of her political predominancy in Tibet, and the surrender by Japan of her "special interests" in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, when China has shown herself capable of establishing and maintaining a stable and efficient central government, strong enough to properly administer those troubled regions. For Japan to withdraw her troops from Manchuria under existing conditions would merely add to the power of Chang Tso-lin and his fellow-bandits and increase the prevailing unrest and disorder.

The next step should be the unification of all railway concessions in the republic under a Chinese board patterned on the lines of the board of the United States Steel Corporation, but with the necessary foreign financial control. A large measure of fiscal independence should be restored to China by permitting her to fix her own tariffs, though, as I have already remarked, I should question the advisability, from the standpoint of China's own best interests, in doing away with the present international customs administration, at least for some years to come.

The extraterritorial rights at present enjoyed by the treaty powers should be abolished as soon as China has modernized her prisons, reformed her civil and criminal codes, and organized a judiciary capable of enforcing those codes with impartiality and justice.[1]

[1] The nations represented at the Washington Conference agreed, in December, 1921, to send a commission to China for the purpose of drawing up a plan for judicial reform as a preliminary to the abolition of extraterritorial privileges.

Nor, in view of the development of aircraft and means of communication and of the fact that the capital is less than one hundred miles from the sea coast, does there appear to be any further necessity for the maintenance of foreign troops in Peking. The postal services maintained in China by the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan should also come to an end. And finally, there should be complete abolition of all the shadowy claims, advisorships, and other petty but irritating encroachments on Chinese sovereignty which have grown out of concessions, leased territories, and railway rights. Thus reëstablished in possession of her own house, China should be given an opportunity to set it in order without being hampered by foreign interference.

Now I am perfectly aware that certain of the measures which I have outlined above for the restoration of China to the status of a sovereign state would fall far short of satisfying the Chinese and their friends. They insist that the powers must betake themselves from Chinese soil forthwith, bag and baggage. They strenuously object to any form of foreign political or financial control. They demand the restoration not only of the foreign-occupied territories in China proper, but likewise of Port Arthur, Dalny, and Hong Kong. Considering the question purely from the ethical viewpoint, there can be no denying that the Chinese are fully justified in these demands. The difficulty lies in the fact that they are not possible of

realization, while those which I have outlined, in all probability, are. And, when all is said and done, it is a question of practical politics that we are discussing. Everything considered, it seems to me that for a hungry person even three quarters of a loaf is considerably better than none.

But if China is to obtain even a portion of her demands, she must herself be prepared to initiate and carry through wide reforms, to make many changes in the conduct of her national affairs. Though she possesses to an altogether extraordinary degree the sympathy and liking of other peoples, she does not possess their confidence. She has disappointed and irritated them too often. Her interminable internal dissensions, the weakness, inefficiency, and corruption which have characterized her various administrations, her dilatoriness in meeting her financial obligations, her failure to put down tyranny and brigandage—all these have weakened her position among the nations. So she must begin by wiping the slate clean. The North and South must sink their differences and wholeheartedly unite in the establishment of an honest, efficient, and stable central government. The corrupt and tyrannical *tuchuns* must be stripped of their power and their armies disbanded, the great sums required for their upkeep being devoted to the construction of roads throughout the country, the completion of the trunk-lines, and the amelioration of the peasantry. And lastly, the

whole of China must be opened to foreigners for purposes of travel, residence, and commerce.

If China will do these things, and if she and the foreign powers will exercise mutual tolerance, forbearance, unselfishness, and charity in dealing with one another, I am convinced that the republic will become a respected and prosperous member of the family of nations in a much nearer future than most people suppose. If these things are not done, China will continue in a state of chaos, a bone of international contention, a perpetual menace to the peace of the world. But she will never be conquered, her people will never be assimilated by those of some other nation. Make no mistake about that. For, when all is said and done, China is an anvil which, by mere passive resistance, will eventually wear out every hammer that beats upon it.[1]

[1] See Appendix for text of Chinese treaties approved by the Powers at the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

CHINESE RAILWAY GUARDS
South Manchuria

JAPANESE RAILWAY GUARD
Shantung

A FEAST GIVEN BY A BOY OF 13 YEARS AND HIS 12-YEAR-OLD WIFE ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF THEIR SON

PART IV

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

I

WE are an inconsistent and contradictory people. Though we boast of being a world power, in reality our national horizons are Sandy Hook and the Golden Gate, the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande. Though the most altruistic motives which ever inspired a nation have led us to assume the white man's burden for fifteen millions of people in the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, Hawaii, Alaska, the Canal Zone, Haiti, Santo Domingo, the Virgin Islands, and Porto Rico, we know and care far less about their needs and their problems then we do about those of many countries in which we have only the most vicarious interest. Though our colonial responsibilities have gradually increased until they stretch from the Caribbean to the China Seas; though we are steadily expanding, for the protection of our position at Panama, over all the smaller states of the Central American seaboard, we have neither a colonial office nor a colonial policy. To paraphrase the lines of Kipling:

We think our country still
Is Broadway and Beacon Hill.

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since George Dewey, his commodore's pennant flaunting from the *Olympia's* masthead, blazed his way into Manila Bay, sunk the Spanish fleet, and gave to the United States a colonial empire. It would seem that that was ample time for the American people to become tolerably familiar with the politics, problems, and potentialities of the great archipelago of which, through the fortunes of war, we unexpectedly found ourselves the guardians, yet the discouraging fact remains that, despite all that has been said and written on the subject, the average American knows far less about the Philippine Islands, over which floats the American flag, than he does about Mexico or Ireland or Germany or Russia. It is to be presumed that you who read these pages possess intelligence and information above the average, yet how many of you, I wonder, have other than the haziest conception of what the Philippines are like? You conceive them, no doubt,—when you think of them at all,—as jungle-covered, palm-fringed islands set down in a turquoise sea beneath a merciless sun. You think of the natives as reformed head-hunters dwelling in huts of bamboo thatched with *nipa* and living on dog-meat, for such was the impression you obtained from the Igorot villages at the St. Louis and San Francisco expositions. You know, of course,

that Manila is in certain respects an up-to-date city —you have gathered this from the pictures in the Sunday supplements and the magazines—but you also assume that it is cursed with almost unendurable heat, because the people in the pictures are wearing white suits and straw hats. You are aware that the chief products of the islands are Manila hemp, popularly associated with executions, and cocoanut-oil, which is used for beautifying the complexion, and you have heard stories to the effect that the Sultan of Sulu presents pearls of great price to those who visit him. Were you asked to enumerate a few well-known Filipinos, you would almost certainly name Emilio Aguinaldo and you might add Manuel Quezon. That, with a few other odds and ends of information, constitute the sum total of the average American's knowledge of the Philippine Islands.

Perhaps you did not realize, however, that the land area of the archipelago is considerably greater than that of England, Scotland, and Ireland put together and that its population is larger than that of the state of New York. Were you aware that the distance from Cape Bojeador, in northern Luzon, to Tawi Tawi, in the Sulu group, is equal to the entire width of the United States from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico? Your imagination doubtless pictures a group of low-lying islands, like those you have read of in South Sea stories, covered with dense and steaming jungles, so it may be something of a revelation

to learn that the Philippines have no less than half a dozen mountains which are higher than any peaks in the United States east of the Rockies, that they have at least three rivers which are as long as the Hudson, and that two thirds of their surface is covered not with steaming jungle, but with splendid forests in which hard woods abound, some of the mountains being clothed with pines. You think of the Philippines being in the tropics, as they are, yet I imagine that you will be surprised to learn that the average maximum summer heat of Manila is considerably lower than that of New York. If you have read the accounts of the voyages of the early explorers you are aware that Cebu was a flourishing city when the only settlement on Manhattan Island was an Indian village, and that Manila had been founded for half a century when the Pilgrims set foot on the Plymouth shore. Nor do I need to remind you that the Filipinos are the only Christian race in Asia. And finally, did you ever pause to think that the nation which holds the Philippines is the traffic policeman at the Broadway and Forty-Second Street of the world's commerce, for the archipelago lies squarely athwart every trade route of the Farther East, our great naval base at Cavite being only sixteen hours by a fast destroyer from Hong Kong, fifty hours from Singapore, and about the same from Nagasaki?

The average American's lack of knowledge about the largest and richest of our insular possessions is

THE 1911 ERUPTION OF TAAL VOLCANO

A BIT OF ZAMBOANGA

THE LITTLE RIVER THAT FLOWS THROUGH THE TOWN

due to two causes—indifference and misinformation. Each year thousands of American tourists visit Japan and the China Coast, yet comparatively few of them take the time or trouble to visit Manila, which can be reached from Hong Kong as quickly and as easily as New Orleans can be reached from New York, in order to see for themselves the miracles that have been wrought in those islands by their countrymen. The president of a great motion-picture corporation, in whose interests I recently went to the Far East, urged me to waste no time in the Philippines. "The American public is not interested in them," he assured me, "and there isn't much to see there, anyway." Some months ago an American weekly whose circulation runs into the millions published an article on the political situation in the islands by a journalist who based his statements on the superficial information gathered during the brief period the vessel on which he was traveling remained at Manila. And a high official of the insular administration told me that his aunt—by no means an unintelligent or uneducated woman—asked him during one of his periodical visits home how often he ran over to Havana!

I am perfectly well aware that certain of the American, and probably all of the Filipino officials who by their hospitality and thoughtfulness made my journey through the archipelago almost a triumphal progress so far as entertainments, comforts, and traveling arrangements were concerned will accuse me of ingrati-

tude when they read this book. They entertained me with a lavishness which I have seen equalled in few countries and surpassed in none; they provided me with motor cars and launches and canoes and saddle-horses and military escorts. Over their railways I was permitted to travel only by special train, and, thanks to the courtesy of the then governor-general, Francis Burton Harrison, and of the Honorable Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippine Senate, there was placed at my disposal a government vessel, the coastguard cutter *Negros,* on which I made a cruise of nearly six thousand miles. Not for one instant do I think that these exceptional facilities for observation were afforded me in an attempt to purchase my opinion, but rather because the insular government desired me to see the islands under the most comfortable conditions, hoping, no doubt, that I would form a favorable impression of what it had accomplished and would pass on my opinions to my readers in the United States. But it seems to me that a writer's first duty is to keep faith with those who read his writings and whose opinions are presumably molded to a considerable extent by what he tells them. So if in the following pages I do not always agree with the opinions or approve of the policies of those who so lavishly entertained me; if I do not indorse all of the claims that are made by the Filipinos and the American officials of the recent Democratic administration, it is not because I am un-

grateful or unappreciative, but because I am trying to paint for you a truthful picture, uncolored by political partisanship or racial prejudice or personal bias, of conditions as I found them in the Philippines.

II

You will pardon me, I trust, if I recall to your minds certain geographic facts in order that you may have a substantial foundation on which to build an intelligent opinion of the problem which confronts us in the Philippines. To begin with, the Philippine Archipelago, which consists of something over three thousand islands, large and small, could be enclosed, roughly speaking, in an isosceles triangle with a base line of six hundred miles and the other two sides of twelve hundred miles each. This triangle lies between the Pacific Ocean and the China Sea in the same latitude as Central America. Forming the apex of the triangle is the island of Luzon, which is about the size of Ohio. The lower right-hand corner of the triangle is formed by another great island, Mindanao, whose area corresponds to that of Indiana. Sprinkled about between these dominating islands are the lesser islands of Samar, Negros, Panay, Palawan, and Mindoro, each about the size of Connecticut, and Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, and Masbata, each of which is somewhat larger than Rhode Island.

Outside the southern boundary of the triangle—outside it in more senses than one—is the Sulu Archipelago, of which Jolo, on the island of Sulu, is the provincial capital and the principal town.

Now in considering the question of the Philippines one should never lose sight of the fact that the Filipinos are not a people. This assertion, I might add, directly contradicts Mr. Maximo M. Kalaw, a brilliant young Filipino writer, who says in one of his books, "One fact must be conceded in studying the Philippine question: the Filipinos are *a people*, like the Cubans or the Irish or the French—a distinct political entity, with a consciousness of kind and with national feelings and aspirations." With this contention most ethnologists flatly disagree. The Filipinos belong, it is true, to the great Malay race, as do the natives of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo; just as the Irish belong to the Celtic race, the French to the Latin race, and the Cubans to the Latin and African races. But that does not make them a people in the generally accepted sense of the word. As Mr. A. R. Colquhoun in "The Mastery of the Pacific" says: "No Malay nation has ever emerged from the hordes of that race, which is spread over the islands of the Pacific. Wherever they are found they have certain marked characteristics and of these the most remarkable is their lack of that spirit which goes to form a homogeneous people, to weld them to-

gether. The Malay is always a provincial; more, he rarely rises outside the interests of his own town or village." The truth is that the Filipinos, instead of being a people, are a congeries of peoples which have come to the Philippines at various periods in successive waves of immigration. Although, as the result of four centuries of white man's rule, they have gradually come to resemble one another more and more and to have more and more in common, they are still as distinct in their genealogies, their languages, and their characteristics as the Chinooks, the Zuñis, the Iroquois, and the Sioux. That they possess certain national characteristics and a certain homogeneity of population which may eventually weld them into a people I do not attempt to deny, but that day has not yet arrived.

There are many methods of classifying the races of mankind and their subdivisions, but that which measures them by their speech is sanctioned by long usage and by logic. Now one of the first things that impressed the early explorers, as well as the missionaries who came after them, was the amazing multiplicity of languages among the inhabitants of the Philippines. And what was true in Magellan's time is equally true to-day, the only common medium of communication between the various peoples being the alien tongues which they have learned from their Spanish and American rulers, there being, in fact,

more sharply distinct dialects than there are tribes in the islands.[1] Though English is the official language, being a compulsory subject in the schools, the proceedings of both the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives are conducted in Spanish. Ability to read and write English or Spanish or a native language entitles a male citizen of the Philippines who is twenty-one or more years of age to vote. Yet out of the total of more than two million Filipinos of voting age in the islands in 1919, barely one third possessed this qualification. Though the Philippines were ruled from Madrid for more than three hundred and seventy-five years, the use of Spanish never became common, a knowledge of that tongue being limited to the educated minority. This was probably due in considerable measure, however, to the fact that the Spaniards rather discouraged the natives from learning Spanish, doubtless because they feared that a common medium of communication would tend to unite the Filipinos against them. That fear never troubled the Americans, however, for they began teaching English to the natives from the beginning of the occupation. It is a striking commentary on the efficacy of our educational methods that after less than a quarter of a century of American rule English is far more widely spoken than Spanish ever was. When it comes into comparatively general

[1] There are forty-three ethnographic groups or tribes in the archipelago and eighty-seven distinct dialects are spoken.

use, as it will if the politicians in Washington and Manila permit the present educational system to be adhered to, one of the chief obstacles in the way of welding the Filipinos into a homogeneous people will have disappeared.

The practical difficulties resulting from this multiplicity of tongues are legion. Here is a typical example. When, during the Aguinaldo revolt of 1898, a number of insurrectionary leaders met at Gerona, in Tarlac Province, Luzon, to elect municipal officers, the revolutionary decrees had to be read in Tagalog, in Ilocano, in Pampanga, and in Pangasinan, all of which languages were spoken in the town. And Justice Johnson of the Philippine Supreme Court tells of the trial of seven men charged with a murder, at which it was necessary to read the complaint in four different dialects. Imagine, if you please, what would be the obstacle to self-government in the British Isles, which in area very nearly correspond to the Philippines, if the English could not make themselves understood by the Welsh, if the Welsh were unable to converse with the Scotch, if the Scotch spoke a different tongue from the Irish, and if the languages of all four were wholly unintelligible to the inhabitants of the Isle of Man, the only common medium of communication being French or German, with which only the educated classes were familiar.

There is another reason than the lingual one why the inhabitants of the Philippines cannot truthfully be

called a people. I refer to the barriers of mutual dislike and prejudice which have separated the various island races ever since the dawn of their recorded history. Political power in the Philippines is at present about equally divided between the Visayans, most of whom live in the Visaya group, in the center of the archipelago, and comprise more than forty per cent. of the total population, and the Tagalogs, who dwell mainly in central Luzon and have less than half the numerical strength of their southern neighbors. The only other element which really counts politically is the Ilocanos, also from Luzon, who, though they form only about twenty per cent. of the total population, are quite capable of holding their own. Though the Tagalogs, who are preëminently politicians, in which respect they might aptly be compared to the French-Canadians, have heretofore been the dominating Filipino people of the islands, their political supremacy has been successfully challenged in recent years by the Visayans. The differences of the two chief racio-political groups have been successfully harmonized of late, however, through the tact, ability, and vision of their respective leaders—the Honorable Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, who is a Tagalog, and Señor Osmeña, Speaker of the House of Representatives, who is a Visayan.

Of all the Christian races, the Tagalogs are the most intelligent, the most progressive, and, it is usually conceded, the least reliable. The Visayans, though in

A KALINGA MAN AND WOMAN

The Kalingas are pagans who inhabit the Mountain Province, Island of Luzon

A KALINGA FAMILY
Mountain Province, Luzon

A KALINGA DANCING-GIRL
Mountain Province, Luzon

many respects less capable, are generally more docile and law-abiding. The Ilocanos have a well-deserved reputation for industry and for real ability which both of the others lack. These three peoples, which between them control the governmental machinery of the islands, are at heart about as mutually friendly as the South Irish and the Ulstermen, though it must be admitted, in all fairness, that they have to a great extent buried their animosities for political reasons. But whether these mutual animosities would be permitted to remain buried, were the islanders granted complete independence, is quite another question.

The Visayans, the Tagalogs, and the Ilocanos, together with the Bicols, the Pangasinans, the Cagayans, and the Zambalans, comprise the seven principal Christian tribes commonly referred to as Filipinos and form approximately seven eighths of the total population of the islands. In addition to the racial divisions just enumerated, there are some twenty-seven non-Christian or pagan tribes, such as the Igorots, the Ifugaos, and the Kalingas, all from the mountainous districts of northern Luzon and all, until quite recently, addicted to the exciting pastime of head-hunting; and the Mandayas and Monobos, two large tribes inhabiting Mindanao. Another of the pagan tribes is the Negritos, black dwarfs, numbering only some twenty-five thousand, who are the aborigines and the original owners of the Philippines. The Negritos had been in undisturbed possession of the

islands for centuries when there came a stronger and more advanced race, the Igorots, who conquered the aborigines and appropriated their lands, precisely as we appropriated the lands of the Indians. Later came the wave of Malays we now know as Filipinos and took from the Igorots what they had gained. Though several of the pagan tribes have attained the same level of civilization as the Christians, the latter, nevertheless, treat them socially and politically with undisguised contempt, superciliously referring to them as "wild men." Finally we find, far to the south in the Sulu Archipelago, something over a quarter of a million Moros, intensely warlike and fanatical Mohammedans whom the Christian Filipinos profess to despise, but of whose fighting qualities they have in reality an inherited and well-grounded fear.

Even more significant, however, than the differences which separate the Christians, the Mohammedans, and the pagans, or the dissensions which disunite the Tagalogs, the Ilocanos, and the Visayans, are those which divide the individuals themselves. I refer to the covert but none the less existent antagonism of the great brown mass of the people for the *mestizos,* or half-castes. For it must be kept in mind that very few of the political leaders are of pure, or anywhere near pure, Malayan blood. One has only to trace their ancestry back a little way to find indubitable evidence of the admixture of European or Mongolian blood. Of the three men who are generally conceded

to be the ablest politicians in the islands and who hold the most responsible positions open to Filipinos, one is reputed to be at least half Spanish, another three fourths Spanish, and a third half Chinese. The dominance of the *mestizos* in insular affairs is undoubtedly due in part to the advantages of education and travel which they owe to the wealth and influence of their fathers, but I am convinced that an even greater factor in gaining their present ascendancy is the alien blood—particularly the European blood—which courses in their veins. Whatever may be the cause, nothing is more certain than that until the natives put aside their petty rivalries and dissensions and develop a national consciousness, until they supplant indolence by energy, until they acquire the courage to assert themselves, the *mestizos* will remain in the saddle. As things stand at present the *mestizos,* some of whom are men of undeniable ability, are the only element in the islands to whom we could conceivably turn over the reins of power. What most Americans fail to understand is this: Were we, upon evacuating the islands, to intrust the machinery of government to the little group of professional politicians who at present control it (and who are the only natives in any degree qualified by education and experience to control it), the Filipinos themselves would be no nearer independence than they are to-day, for we merely would be supplanting the present form of government by an oligarchy.

III

Nothing is more unwise, generally speaking, than to indulge in generalizations about a people. Yet the Filipinos, taken as a whole, possess certain characteristics which are so outstanding that they are admitted by their enemies and their friends. Were I asked to enumerate their desirable qualities which most impressed me I should name without hesitation their boundless hospitality, their personal cleanliness, their dignity and self-respect, their good nature, their innate courtesy and their consideration for strangers, their love of children, their mental activity, their devotion to their country, and their consuming passion for education. No matter how poor a Filipino may be, no matter how scanty his food and how wretched his dwelling, he may always be relied upon to offer a stranger the best that his house affords. American soldiers repeatedly have told me of the hospitality shown them in remote Filipino villages in which they chanced to find themselves at nightfall, the natives frequently sleeping out of doors in order that their guests might have shelter. In no country which I know—and I can claim familiarity with something over a hundred—have I met with such universal courtesy as in the Philippines, the native character combining the politeness of the Latin with the easy complaisance of the Malay. They are passionately de-


PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
SCALE OF MILES
Principal Railroads
Steamship Routes
CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
SULU SEA
CELEBES SEA
BATAN IS.
BABUYAN IS.
LUZON ISLAND
Laoag
Vigan
Bangued
Tuguegarao
Ilagan
S. Fernando
La Trinidad
Bayombong
NUEVA VIZCAYA
PANGASINAN
ZAMBALES
Tarlac
Cabanatuan
Iba
BATAAN
Manila
Pasig
Cavite
Sta Cruz
POLILLO I.
CALAGUA IS
CATANDUANES I.
Nagh
Albay
Sorsogon
Lucena
Batangas
LUBANG I
Calapan
MARINDUQUE I
MINDORO I.
BURIAS I
TICAO I
SIBUYAN I
MASBATE I
TABLAS I
CALAMIANES GROUP
BUSUANGA I
SAMAR I.
Catbalogan
Batan
Capiz
PANAY I.
CUYO IS
S. Jose de Buenavista
Iloilo
Bacolod
Tacloban
LEYTE I.
CEBU I
Cebu
DINAGAT I
SIARGAO I
Surigao
BOHOL I
Tagbilaran
Dumaguete
SIQUIJOR I
NEGROS I.
CAGAYANES IS
DUMARAN I
Puerto Princesa
PALAWAN ISLAND
CAMIGUIN I
Butuan
Cagayan
Malaybalay
MINDANAO ISLAND
Caraga
Cotabato
Davao
COTABATO
Zamboanga
BASILAN GROUP
PANGUTARANG I
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
TAWI
BALABAC I
CAGAYAN SULU GROUP
SARANGANI IS
C. S. Hammond & Co., N.Y.

voted to their children and will make any sacrifice in order to educate them, a quality which offers great encouragement for their future. The family bonds among the Filipinos are much closer than with us. In fact, a Filipino will make no decision without first consulting with his family. This love of family is carried to an extreme, however, in the so-called *pariente* system, which is almost universal in the islands; that is, when a man begins to make money, or when he obtains an even moderately profitable position, he is expected as a matter of course to support all those members of his family and of his wife's family who cannot support themselves, even to first and second cousins. It is no infrequent occurrence, indeed, for his poorer relatives to move to his home, bag and baggage, and proceed to make it their own, a burden which he assumes without complaint. This is family affection carried to the *n*th degree, but it has the obvious disadvantage of inflicting a penalty on any effort to better one's condition. "Why should I work any harder than I do?" argues the Filipino peasant. "Were I to make any more money, I should be expected to support my mother-in-law and my cousins and my uncles and my aunts."

Though the Filipinos still suffer among foreigners from the evil reputation which they gained as a result of their cruel and inhuman treatment of Spanish and American captives, and though they certainly are callous of the pain suffered by others, they are not

treacherous under ordinary circumstances. If they are jealous and eager for revenge, it is because these qualities are inherent in the Malay character. If they are prone to settle their differences with knives instead of with their fists, it is because they have been for centuries under the rule of Latins instead of Anglo-Saxons. When well disciplined and under the leadership of American officers, they make faithful and dependable soldiers, as has been proved on a hundred occasions by the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary.

Notwithstanding the assertion often made by foreigners that the Filipinos are indolent, fond of ease, and dislike toil exceedingly, those who know them best assure me that under proper hygienic conditions they make willing, industrious, and faithful laborers. In those cases where they have displayed a lack of energy and industry it has usually been found upon investigation that their apparent indolence was due to the fact that their vitality had been sapped by the unhygienic conditions under which they were living —a statement which applies with equal force to many of the "poor whites" of our South. Moreover the Filipinos are almost invariably courteous and cheerful, qualities which are not characteristic of all Oriental races.

Like all Malay peoples, they are much addicted to gambling and cock-fighting, which are their national pastimes, though it is a healthy sign that they are now

rivaled in the popular esteem by baseball and boxing, which were introduced by our soldiers in the early days of the American occupation and which have grown steadily in popularity ever since. Indeed, there is scarcely a *barrio* in the islands which does not have its baseball team and its local boxing talent, the townspeople "rooting" for their representatives with all the enthusiasm shown by "fans" in the United States. The Olympic Stadium in Manila, where the important boxing contests are held, can accommodate thirty-five hundred persons and is invariably packed to the point of suffocation when matches between well-known fighters are pulled off. The fighters are usually recruited from the *cochero* class, though news-boys and even golf caddies have at times won honors in the ring. The better boxers possess ample courage and considerable science, usually being well able to hold their own against pugilists of their own weight from the Pacific Coast and Australia. Filipinos being almost universally of slight stature, the native boxers are classified as welter-weights, feather-weights, bantam-weights, fly-weights, paper-weights, and vacuum-weights, the last class comprising boxers weighing less than sixty pounds, though the sporting press occasionally refers, perhaps facetiously, to mosquito-weights.

Cock-fighting is as popular in the Philippines as baseball is in the United States, every town and hamlet having its cockpits and its fighting birds. The chief feature of cock-fighting is the gambling con-

nected with it, for as the birds are armed with four-inch spurs of razor sharpness, very little sport attaches to the contest, one or both birds usually being killed within a few minutes after they enter the pit. The townspeople are inordinately proud of their local fighting-cocks, boasting of their prowess as a Bostonian brags of the "Braves" or a New Yorker of the "Giants" and always being ready to back them to the limit of their pocketbooks.

An overwhelming majority of the Filipinos are farmers. But though the American Government has made every effort to improve agricultural conditions in the islands by sending out experts and machinery, by the establishment of agricultural schools and farm bureaus, and by the free distribution of seeds, the Filipino peasant farmer has not made the progress which might be looked for in nearly four centuries of white man's rule. Though rice is the bread of the people and is grown in great quantities, the peasants still prepare the land for planting with an implement which can be called a plow only by courtesy—a sort of pointed wooden snag, sometimes tipped with iron and sometimes not, drawn by a carabao whose movements are as leisurely as those of its owner. In order to give it a start over the weeds which would otherwise strangle it, rice is first planted in seed-beds and, when partly grown, is transplanted by hand, it being by no means uncom-

A vast series of terraces, as steep as a church roof, which in places ascend the mountain-sides for more than 3000 feet.

These are among the most extraordinary examples of hydraulic engineering in existence, being far more remarkable than the celebrated "hanging gardens" of Babylon.

RICE TERRACES BUILT BY THE IFUGAOES IN THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, LUZON

FILIPINOS THRESHING RICE WITH THEIR FEET
Bulacan Province

PLOWING AND HARROWING THE ZACATE FIELDS

mon to see scores of women and children squatting on their heels in the shallow water of the paddy-fields and working to the music of a small string band with which they keep time, so that the faster the music plays the faster they work. Mr. Dean C. Worcester, acknowledgedly one of the foremost authorities on the Philippines, states that orchestras which have the reputation of maintaining a rapid tempo are in great demand during the planting season because of the increased amount of rice set. Imagine the agricultural prodigies that might be performed with the coöperation of an American jazz band! When harvest time comes around the grain is usually separated from the chaff by the family and the neighbors of the rice-growers, who put in several pleasant and not over-strenuous days leaning against a long rail, set loosely in supports so that it will revolve, smoking, gossiping, and singing as they thresh out the grain with their feet.

What I have said above refers, of course, only to the small peasant farmers who form the bulk of the agricultural population. The larger landowners, on the contrary, have eagerly availed themselves of the agricultural devices introduced by the Americans, the primitive Malay methods having been entirely supplanted on the large plantations by steel plows, tractors, and threshing-machines. The fact remains, however, that modern agricultural methods are still the

exception instead of the rule, so that the Philippines, which should be one of the great rice-exporting countries of the world, are compelled to import it.

To see rice-growing in its most picturesque and interesting form one must journey to the country of the Ifugaos in Central Luzon. These people, who up to the time of the American occupation were inveterate head-hunters, are under a heavy agricultural handicap by reason of living in a region as mountainous as Switzerland. Yet on slopes as steep as a church roof they cultivate their rice on a vast series of terraces, which are held in position by stone retaining walls laid without mortar or cement of any kind and which in places ascend the mountainsides for more than three thousand feet. It will give you some idea of the sort of masonry required to withstand the weather conditions when I mention that in this region thirty-eight inches of rain has fallen in twenty-four hours and seventy-two inches in five days. The rice terraces of the Ifugaos are among the most extraordinary examples of primitive hydraulic engineering in existence, being, when the climatic and physical conditions are taken into consideration, far more remarkable than the celebrated "hanging gardens" of Babylon.

IV

Now that the trail of our narrative has led us into the mountains, suppose that we pause long enough

for me to tell you something about those singular and little-known peoples—the Igorots, the Kalingas, and the Ifugaos—who inhabit them. There are many degrees of civilization among these peoples, perhaps their distinguishing difference being that in their personal habits the Igorots are disgustingly filthy, while the Kalingas and Ifugaos are, everything considered, surprisingly clean. Comparatively speaking, the Igorots living in the vicinity of Baguio, the beautiful summer capital of the Philippines, are highly civilized, often dwelling in substantially built houses and eagerly availing themselves of the educational opportunities afforded by the provincial government. One of the battalions of Philippine Scouts stationed at Camp John Hay when I was there was composed entirely of Igorots, and they were as smart and well-disciplined a body of native soldiery as I have ever seen. Officers who have served with them are loud in their praises of their courage, discipline, and loyalty. But an hour's ride on horseback into the surrounding mountains brings you into the country of the real wild man. Here the men wear nothing except a rag, known as a "gee-string," twisted about their loins; the women cover a portion of their nakedness with an apron of cloth made from the bark of a tree. Though head-hunting has been "officially" abolished these dozen years, the wilder spirits still surreptitiously indulge in this savage sport when a safe opportunity offers, their success in the pursuit being evi-

denced by the number of lines tattooed on their faces, which have precisely the same significance as the notches which the "bad men" of the old West were wont to file on their revolver barrels.

The Igorots live in flimsy huts thatched with *nipa* leaves, many of which contain a trophy room for skulls. They are extremely superstitious and live in constant fear of the spirits of the dead. Their favorite food is dog-meat, it being no uncommon thing for an Igorot to walk a hundred miles in order to attend the dog-market which is held at Baguio every Sunday morning. Here are brought hundreds of dogs—usually underfed and mangy mongrels—which are bought or stolen by the dealers in the villages of the plain. A dog will bring anywhere from three to eight pesos, according to his size and condition, and the prospective purchasers inspect them as critically as an American housewife inspects the turkey which she is buying for the Thanksgiving dinner. The process of buying a dog often takes the better part of a day, the Igorot raising his offer and the dealer dropping his price centavo by centavo. I was told by constabulary officers—I cannot personally vouch for the accuracy of this statement—that the Igorot, after leading his purchase back to his home in the mountains, starves the wretched animal for a week or more. When it is sufficiently famished to devour anything that is offered it, the Igorot feeds it to repletion with great quantities of rice, together with plenty of water,

and then slowly beats it to death with a bamboo club for the purpose of making the meat more tender.

Once while on a riding trip through the mountain country my attention was attracted by the deep, low roll of tom-toms, coming, I discovered, from an Igorot village whose huts clung precariously to the precipitous slope half a mile below. Descending the steep and narrow trail which led to the village, I came upon a *caniau,* or feast, in full blast. Two husky Igorots, naked except for their gee-strings, were swinging the carcass of what evidently had been a large yellow dog over a fire, while at one side women were cutting up the body of another animal which had already been roasted. Squatting in the doorway of a hut were two musicians, one of whom was beating monotonously on a drum made from a hollow log with a skin stretched across the end, the other now and again striking a resounding blow upon a large metal tom-tom. Lying about in a drunken stupor on the grass were several members of the tribe who had been overcome by the enormous quantities of fiery rice liquor, called *tapuy,* which they had consumed. It was a scene which would have satisfied the most avid sensation-seeker. Yet the educated Filipinos who entertained me so delightfully in Manila assured me over and over again that the Igorots had been completely civilized and were no longer a problem. It is the barest justice to add, however, that the problem presented by the wild tribes is being rapidly

solved by the steady spread of education. The young Igorots whom I saw attending an agricultural school in the Trinidad Valley impressed me as being fully as intelligent and alert as most American youngsters of the same age.

The Igorots practice the curious custom of smoking their dead, though I gathered that this mummifying process is confined, as a rule, to the wealthy. The body of the dead man is lashed in a sitting position in a sort of skeleton armchair beneath which is kindled a fire, or rather a smudge, of green branches, the procedure being much the same as that employed by an American farmer in smoking a ham. The body is generally smoked for about four weeks, at the end of which period it is as dry and shriveled as the Pharaohs who sleep under the glass cases in the Cairo Museum. It is then conveyed by relatives and friends to the tribal burial cave, usually hidden away in the recesses of the mountains, where it is set against the wall in a sitting posture at the end of a long line of other departed Igorots. Though the Bureau of Science in Manila is said to possess a remarkable collection of photographs of this curious custom, its officials would neither sell me copies nor permit me to see them. The picture of the burial cave which is reproduced herewith I obtained, though not without some difficulty, from an enterprising Japanese photographer in Baguio.

The Filipinos assert with considerable truth that

the publication of such photographs gives the foreigner an exaggerated notion of the importance of the wild tribes, which, they contend, play as insignificant a rôle in the Philippines as the Indians do in the United States. This statement is hardly exact, however, as there are about four times as many non-Christians in the islands as there are Indians in this country.

"But you have pictures of the Igorots?" I asked the courteous Filipino official who was in charge of the photographic section of the Bureau of Science.

"Certainly we have them," was the answer. "In fact, we have the largest and finest collection in existence. But some months ago we received orders that no more prints from them were to be sold to foreigners, and last week the album containing the Igorot pictures was removed from this bureau to the office of the Secretary of the Interior."

Now I can entirely sympathize with the sensitiveness of the civilized and cultured Filipinos, who naturally resent being confused by strangers with the savage hillmen, but I believe that in attempting to prevent the publication of photographs of their uncivilized countrymen they are pursuing an unwise and short-sighted policy. When you tell a traveler who is of an inquiring turn of mind that there is something hidden in the mountains which it is thought wise for him not to see, something of which he must not even be shown pictures, his curiosity is immediately aroused

and he determines to find out what it is that is being so sedulously concealed from him. Imagine the fantastic rumors that would quickly gain currency among foreigners were the American Government to forbid the publication of the official photographs, taken by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, of the Hopi snake dances, which are fully as revolting as many of the Igorot customs. The Filipinos are a young and sensitive people; they are sincerely endeavoring to gain the respect of the world, and they are making remarkable progress, but their task would be lighter if they would approach it with the sense of humor possessed by a quick-witted young woman from Sioux City who was visiting at an English country house.

"So you 're from Sioux City?" remarked the Englishman who was her dinner-partner, screwing a monocle into his eye and surveying her with undisguised curiosity. "I say, though, you speak jolly good English, you know. Hardly a trace of Indian accent—yes, really."

"That 's easily explained," she replied dryly, though with a twinkle of amusement in her eyes. "You see, we had an English missionary in our tribe."

Now in justice to the Filipinos I ought to explain before proceeding that some of the pictures I have chosen to illustrate this chapter are not characteristic of present-day conditions in the Philippines. But they are unusual and they are interesting; that is why I have used them. Had I so desired, I could have

ROASTING A DOG AT AN IGOROT *CANIAU*
IN THE MOUNTAINS OF LUZON

AN IGOROT BURIAL-CAVE

FRUIT-BATS IN FLIGHT, LAGANGILANG

BOOBIES ON TUBBATAJA REEF
Sulu Archipelago

used a picture of a Manila hotel which would attract attention in Atlantic City; a club which would do credit to any city in the United States; a town in Mindanao which is the most beautifully kept municipality, bar none, that I have ever seen; a cocoanut-oil factory which is said to be paying its stockholders one hundred per cent. annually on their investments; a mountain highway in Luzon which for sheer audacity of engineering has no equal, even in the Alps; and schools, hospitals, and other public buildings *ad infinitum.* Of course the Filipinos will deprecate my choice of illustrations. When I was writing a book on the Far West some years ago I experienced great difficulty in obtaining pictures of cow-punchers, pack-trains, and Indians. The citizens of that bustling region, filled with civic pride, insisted that I confine myself to pictures of apple orchards, alfalfa fields, and artesian wells. So the Filipinos cannot be blamed so much, after all.

V

We now come to one of the gravest, if not indeed, the gravest of the numerous problems which go to make up the Philippine Question—the Moro. Though these warlike Mohammedans of the south embrace five distinct tribes—Sulu, Yankan, Samal, Magindanao, and Tarao—they may be considered, for the purpose of this article, as one people.

They were the last of the Malays to migrate to the Philippines, having at one period overrun the islands as far north as Manila, just as the Moors—from whom, by the way, the Moros derive their name—overran Spain. Like the Moors, too, they have never been completely subjugated. Though they comprise less than one third of the total non-Christian population—there are only about three hundred thousand of them—their relative numerical insignificance is far from being a criterion of their military strength and ability. Not only have the Filipinos been unable to protect themselves against these bloodthirsty fanatics, but the Spaniards for nearly two centuries and a half were unable to give them adequate protection, the shores of northern Luzon being dotted to-day with the forts which were built for defence against them.

The bulk of the Moro population is found within the boundaries of the recently created Department of Mindanao and Sulu, though a few thousand of them inhabit the southern districts of Palawan. Until very recently their chief pursuits were piracy, brigandage, murder, and arson, in which they still indulge when a safe and favorable opportunity offers, though of late, thanks to the patience and tact of the American officials, they have made surprising progress in agriculture. An official of the Philippine Bureau of Education named Warner, who spent seven years on Siasi, one of the islands of the Sulu group, where he was the only white man, teaching its Moro inhabitants modern

methods of agriculture, told me that the Moros possess a much higher type of intelligence than the Filipinos and assimilate new ideas far more quickly. As he had spent four years among the Visayans before going to Moroland, he was eminently qualified to compare the two races. He added that they have a highly developed sense of humor; that they are quick to appreciate subtle stories, which the Tagalogs and Visayans are not, and that they are much readier to accept advice on agricultural and economic matters than the Christian Filipinos. In this he is corroborated by Mr. Dean C. Worcester, who says, "The Moros exemplify what may be considered the highest stage of civilization to which Malays have ever attained unaided."

Though the Moros are cruel, haughty, and often treacherous, they are at the same time exceedingly courteous, observing their own code of manners rigidly. They are inordinately fond of brilliant colors, blacken their lips and teeth with betel-nut, and are justly proud of their skill with their characteristic weapons—the serpentine-bladed Malay *kris* and the terrible Moro *barong*. The latter is a knife with an exceptionally broad and heavy blade which the Moro carries slung over his left shoulder in a scabbard consisting of two thin pieces of board held together with string. When he goes into action he wastes no time in freeing the weapon from his sheath, but sweeps it down, sheath and all, on the head of his enemy, the razor-sharp blade cutting the strings of the scabbard

as it whistles through the air. The Moros are fine horsemen and fearless sailors. Mounted on their wiry island ponies, they hunt the native stags over incredibly rough country, down mountainsides, through jungles, and across swamps, tiring them out and killing them with spears. Those who have ridden in the first flight of the Quorn and the Pytchley would find themselves hard put to it to keep pace with the field in a hunt in Moroland. In their slim *vintas,* dugouts equipped with double outriggers, they jeer at the roughest seas, it being for this reason virtually impossible to suppress the opium-smuggling and gun-running which are being carried on unceasingly by the Moros, as much, I imagine, from love of danger and excitement as for gain.

Though they proudly profess themselves followers of the prophet, theirs is not the Mohammedanism one finds in Turkey or North Africa, but a brand of religion peculiarly their own. They neither pray five times a day nor observe the fasting month of Ramadan, duties enjoined on all true believers. The Koran is read to them in Arabic, a language of which they know nothing, and occasionally the priests and chiefs, who are often identical, assemble in the flimsy, gaudily painted wooden structures which are the Moro equivalents of mosques and pray for the entire community. Yet many of the wealthy Moros have made the long *hadj* to the holy places, half the world away,

MOROS OF ZAMBOANGA

On week-days this gentleman is the foreman at a coal-wharf. His wife's face is painted white, as is sometimes the fashion among the Moros.

A NEGRITO

The Negritos are uncivilized black dwarfs who live in trees and were the original settlers of the Philippines.

A BAGOBO YOUTH
Mindanao

A MONOBO-MANGUANGAN FROM THE UPPER AGUSAN, MINDANAO.

The hat, made of bark and ornamented with cock-feathers, is characteristic of the tribe

and wear about their turbans the white scarf which is the emblem of a *hadji* from one end of Islam to the other. It was curious to see how quickly the demeanor of the datos with whom I talked changed from sullenness to eagerness when they learned that I had recently been in Constantinople and had seen the Commander of the Faithful. The Sultan of Sulu, who dined with me aboard the *Negros* at Sandakan—where he had gone to collect his monthly subsidy from the British North Borneo Company—told me that he still regarded the Sultan of Turkey as the head of Islam; but the Dato of Dansalan, the most powerful chieftain in the Lake Lanao district of Mindanao, asserted that he and his followers had accepted the spiritual leadership of the King of Hedjaz, who fulfills the most important of the koranic qualifications for the khalifate by being in actual possession of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. It struck me, however, that their knowledge of Islamic political and theological questions was no more profound than the average Roman Catholic's comprehension of the policy of the Holy See. Though the datos and priests doubtless keep in touch to a certain extent with the affairs of Islam, I am convinced that to the rank and file of the Moros Mohammedanism is a meaningless shibboleth about which they know little and care less.

The Filipinos are afraid of the Moros and they have the best of reasons to be, for the Moro is not only a

desperate fighter, a dangerous and resourceful enemy, but he goes into battle with the conviction that he is assured of gaining Paradise if he kills a Christian. The Filipino, on the contrary, is not inspired by any such fanatic willingness to sacrifice himself; he much prefers the comfort and safety of his native village to a martyr's crown. The fighting record of the Moros is written large in the history of the Philippines. Not only did they successfully defy for two centuries and a half the best troops that Spain could bring against them, but it was only by turning Moroland into an armed camp that we ourselves were able to subjugate them. Let me add, parenthetically, that the Moros took no part in the Filipino insurrection against the United States, being deaf to the appeals made to them by Aguinaldo. The guerrilla warfare which they waged against us for several years was due to much the same reasons which inspired the various outbreaks among the Indians. Though the Filipinos are not lacking in courage under ordinary circumstances, those of our army officers who are familiar with both peoples are unanimous in asserting their conviction that they could never impose their rule on the Moros or that they could even keep them at home. A striking example of what can be accomplished with these savage warriors when properly disciplined and well led is provided by the Moro battalions of the Philippine Scouts, which compare very favorably with the Pathans and Ghurkas, the best native troops in

Britain's Indian army, and are greatly superior, in my estimation, to Egyptian or Senegalese soldiery.

Let the Moro be ruled with justice and unyielding firmness, and, though he will still be far from making an ideal citizen, he will not be a troublesome one. I can see no reason, indeed, why he should not become as amenable to law and order as has the American Indian. But I am convinced from what I have seen and heard of both races that Filipino rule in Moroland would be neither just nor firm, first, because the Filipinos hate the Moros too bitterly to give them a square deal; and secondly, because they are in too great fear of them to rule them with the necessary firmness. Despite the fact that the Moros fought us desperately for years, they have become, of all the peoples in the archipelago except the Igorots and the Maccabebes, our staunchest friends. They still occasionally indulge in outbursts of lawlessness, it is true, just as a party of cow-punchers occasionally shoots up a cattle town, but such affairs are wholly without political significance. That their suspicion and distrust of Americans has been replaced by confidence and liking is largely due to the extraordinary tact and ability in handling them displayed by two men: Mr. Frank Carpenter, Governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and Mr. P. W. Rogers, formerly Governor of Jolo. As long as the Moros are permitted to continue under American rule they will remain as peaceable as their naturally turbulent natures permit, but

once attempt to replace the American troops and officials with Filipinos and there will be an outburst that will shake the archipelago.

The Filipino officials at Manila complacently assert that the Moros are now completely disarmed, and therefore powerless. In order that this assertion might not be open to question they cabled Governor Rogers that the magnificent collection of blade weapons which he had borrowed from the local chieftains must not be included in the Moro exhibit at the 1920 Manila Exposition. As a matter of fact, the Moros are very far from being disarmed, and no one knows it better than the Filipino officials. British officials with whom I talked in North Borneo told me that arms and ammunition in small quantities are constantly being run across the Sulu Sea from the Dutch islands, and that there is scarcely a Moro warrior in the archipelago who does not have a rifle and a store of cartridges cachéd in some secret hiding-place against the day when the hated Filipinos attempt to assert their authority over them. I discussed the question of disarmament with Governor Rogers, who told me that there were blade weapons in every house and probably considerable quantities of firearms concealed in the jungle, and that the official who attempted to deprive the Moros of them would precipitate an insurrection which would threaten the peace of the entire archipelago. Several of the datos and panglimas with whom I talked frankly asserted that, though the

Moros are intensely loyal to the United States, they will resist any attempt to impose Filipino rule upon them as long as they have any powers of resistance left. I cannot be too emphatic in asserting that, in the event of our eventually granting independence to the Filipinos, were we to withdraw our protection from the Moros and hand them over against their wills to the tender mercies of their northern neighbors, we would be guilty of a most shameful breach of faith and would almost certainly precipitate a bloody and interminable civil war. The specious arguments of the *independistas* to the contrary, *the Moros are not Filipinos.* They are a different breed, speaking a different tongue, following different customs, practising a different faith. The Sulu Archipelago, in which the bulk of them dwell, is a geographical entity, as distinct from the Philippine Islands as the Bahamas are from the Greater Antilles. And they distrust and detest the Filipinos with a vehemence which I have never seen equalled. For us to attempt to coerce the Moros into submission to Filipino rule would be as unjustifiable as for the British Government to coerce the people of Ulster into accepting the rule of the Dail Eireann.

VI

Since the American occupation in 1898 the Philippines have had four distinct forms of govern-

ment. The first was the military government, which lasted from August, 1898 until February, 1900—"the days of the Empire," as this period is proudly referred to by the older Americans. Next came the government of the Philippine Commission, which ruled the archipelago for upward of seven years. This was followed by a dual government, composed of the Philippine Commission and a Philippine assembly elected by popular vote, the two bodies bearing much the same relation to each other as the upper and lower houses of Congress. This was supplanted in 1916, under the provisions of the so-called Jones Bill, by a form of government that is to all intents and purposes completely autonomous, since when American sovereignty has meant little more to the Filipinos than the governor-general and the flag.

Though the present Philippine Government is patterned in the main on that of the United States, it is characterized by a distinct tendency toward paternalism and the English system of parliamentary responsibility. The governor-general, who is the chief executive; the vice-governor, who is also the secretary of public instruction; the auditor, and the deputy auditor are appointed by the President of the United States and are always Americans. The governor-general exercises control through the secretaries of the six executive departments—Public Instruction, Interior, Justice, Commerce and Communications, Fi-

nance, Agriculture and Natural Resources—who form his cabinet and all of whom, except the first, are Filipinos. Through the auditor the government at Washington keeps, or is supposed to keep, a guiding and restraining hand on the finances of the islands, though recent events, about which I shall speak further on, suggest that neither guidance nor restraint was exercised to any appreciable extent during the last administration.

The legislative functions of the insular government are vested in the Philippine Legislature, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, their members being elected by those Christian Filipinos who can qualify as voters. The non-Christian tribes, being regarded as "backward" peoples, remain unenfranchised, but the governor-general appoints, without confirmation, senators and representatives for the district which includes all the non-Christian peoples, including the Moros. The legislature exercises complete legislative powers, though the power of veto inheres to the governor-general and, of course, to the government at Washington. The Christian provinces are governed by provincial governors and provincial boards, the members of which are elected by the qualified voters of their respective provinces. The Mountain Province, in which the bulk of the Igorots dwell, and the recently created Department of Mindanao and Sulu, which contains most of the Moro popula-

tion, are governed under special acts of the Philippine Legislature in accordance with the specific provisions of the Jones Bill.

The judiciary consists of justice of the peace courts in the various municipalities, courts of first instance in the various provinces, and the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, the decisions of the latter being subject to review in certain cases by the Supreme Court of the United States. The justices of the peace and of the courts of first instance are appointed by the governor-general with the approval of the Philippine Senate. The nine members of the supreme court are appointed by the President of the United States, five of them being Americans and four, including the chief justice, Filipinos. It will be seen, therefore, that, though the Filipinos enjoy virtually complete autonomy so far as their domestic affairs are concerned, the government at Washington, through the American governor-general, the American auditor, and the American majority on the supreme bench, retains control of the executive, financial, and judicial branches of the insular government. In short, the government at Washington occupies much the same position toward the Manila government that a guardian occupies toward a minor ward. As long as the ward behaves himself the guardian is content to let him run his own affairs, but he is in a position to make his authority felt if the youth shows a disposition to kick over the traces.

Though the Filipinos were granted a steadily increasing measure of autonomy during the Roosevelt and Taft administrations, certain departments of the insular government, particularly those concerned with public health, public security, and public instruction, were kept under American control by retaining Americans in most of the higher positions. But the return to power of the Democratic party in 1913 was the signal for a complete reversal of American policy toward the Philippines. When Francis Burton Harrison arrived at Manila in that year he apparently bore a mandate from President Wilson to lose no time in taking the reins of government out of American hands. This he proceeded to do with a thoroughness and despatch which filled the Americans in the islands with dismay and the Filipinos with exultation. Those best acquainted with the character and limitations of the Filipino viewed the wholesale dismissal of trained and tried American officials with grave misgivings, believing it to be unwise, premature, and as inimical to the best interests of the United States as to those of the Filipinos themselves.

The impression appears to prevail that the "Filipinization" of the Philippine Government — by which is meant the replacement of American officials by natives—began with the Harrison administration. As a matter of fact, it began with the establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1900 and made

steady progress under the administrations of Taft and Forbes. But whereas Messrs. Taft and Forbes did their Filipinizing from the bottom up, cautiously feeling their way and at first putting natives only in the lower positions, the Democratic administration recklessly jumped in and proceeded to Filipinize the highest and most responsible positions in the government, appointing Filipinos with little or no experience as judges, bureau chiefs, and secretaries of departments, many of these appointments being based on the political influence of the appointees instead of on merit, as had been the invariable rule theretofore. That, together with the substitution of a popularly elected senate for the appointed commission which had hitherto taken the place of an upper house, may be said to comprise the principal measures of Filipinization under the administration of Woodrow Wilson. When the Democratic party came into power in 1913 it was generally admitted by experienced foreign observers that the Philippines had the best colonial government in the world. The Democrats had eight years in which to put their theories to the test. What has been the result? Owing to improper financial transactions the credit of the insular government has been seriously impaired; the gold reserve has been almost wiped out, so that to-day the currency of the islands is practically a fiat currency; the rate of taxation has been sharply advanced; standards of efficiency in every branch have declined; the foreign

trade of the islands has fallen off;[1] uncertainty and discontent exist everywhere. It is only fair to say, however, that whatever mistakes have been made, they have not been sufficient to arrest the steady rate of progress in the islands.

Now in justice to Mr. Harrison it should be said that the partisan policy which he executed did not originate with him. Nor, for that matter, did it originate with President Wilson. It originated in the early days of the American occupation, when the politicians in Washington used the Philippine Question for purely partisan purposes instead of attempting to solve it according to the best traditions of American statesmanship. From the very outset, it is true, the Democratic party has advocated eventual independence for the Filipinos, but it was a Republican president, William McKinley, who stole the Democratic thunder by specifically declaring, "The Philippines are not ours to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government." It was the first phrase of that sentence, "The Philippines are not ours," which, by raising false hopes in Filipino breasts, started the uncertainty and discontent which have prevailed in the islands to this day. I believe that we would have saved ourselves much embarrassment and anxiety, and that the

[1] Compared to the peak of prosperity attained during the period immediately following the war, there is, of course, a marked falling off in Philippine trade, but it is an encouraging sign that there is less business depression in the Philippines than in any other tropical country.

Filipinos would now be a contented and prosperous people, had we had the moral courage to adopt and unfalteringly follow the declaration of policy issued by General Otis, the commander of the American forces during the Filipino insurrection: "Honor, justice, and friendship forbid the exploitation of the islands. The purpose of the American Government is the welfare and advancement of the Filipino people." What a pity that the politicians did not let it go at that.

In the opinion of competent and unprejudiced observers, vehement denials of the Filipinos to the contrary, the dismissal en masse of Americans under the Harrison régime has seriously lowered the standards of efficiency which formerly prevailed in the various branches of the insular government. Though the portfolio of public instruction could not be transferred under the law to native hands, the American vice-governor who held it conscientiously followed the orders of his superiors to Filipinize his department as thoroughly as possible. As a result, American teachers have been almost entirely supplanted by natives in the lower and intermediate grades and higher education was rapidly being turned over to the latter when the Democratic administration came to an end. There are now upward of eleven thousand Filipino teachers and less than four hundred American ones in the islands, though truth compels me to add that in its dying days the Harrison régime, presumably alarmed

at the steady deterioration of the educational system, attempted to obtain additional teachers from the United States. One of the regrettable results of the Filipinization of the schools—regrettable from the American point of view, at least—is the movement which has as its object the substitution of Spanish for English in their curricula. This tendency may be checked, however, when the young Filipinos, who are being sent in steadily increasing numbers to the United States to be educated, begin to make themselves felt in the public life of the Philippines. I am not sufficiently familiar with educational conditions in the islands to discuss them intelligently, but my observations convinced me that, though the wholesale elimination of American teachers has unquestionably resulted in a marked lowering of educational standards, the native teachers, considering their limitations, are doing exceedingly well.

One of the most important accomplishments of the Philippine Commission was the establishment in Manila of the great Bureau of Science for the purpose of coördinating in one building and under one head all the agencies of scientific research, such as geology, zoölogy, botany, mineralogy, ethnology, forestry, and medicine. Upon its completion its founders were able to say with justifiable pride that the opportunities for tropical research offered at Manila were unequaled anywhere in the world. Yet this remarkable institution, at one time the best staffed, the most completely

equipped, and the most efficient of its kind in existence, is now a veritable morgue, its once busy corridors being almost deserted and much of its delicate and costly apparatus remaining unused and covered with dust. Before the policy of Filipinization assumed its later dimensions the Bureau of Science boasted a staff of truly remarkable men, many of them with world-wide reputations, who were employed solely on the strength of their scientific qualifications and regardless of their nationality. But to-day, as a result of the policy of filling every lucrative post with a Filipino, only two foreigners remain—an American and an Austrian.

Far-reaching in its ultimate effect on the progress of the islanders as the Filipinization of the educational system is bound to prove, equally serious and far more immediate developments are certain to result from the Filipinization of the Health Service. Its director, Dr. J. B. Long, resigned in January, 1919, despite the remonstrances of the governor-general, because he asserted that his organization was falling to pieces as a result of the wholesale replacement of experienced Americans by unqualified Filipinos, so that he could no longer assure responsibility for the maintenance of public health in the archipelago. When the Americans landed in the Philippines in 1898, smallpox and cholera stalked almost unchecked throughout the islands, and that scourge of the East, bubonic plague, was always hovering at the gate.

But with the establishment of the Health Service, followed by the rigid enforcement of sanitary and preventive measures, all three of these diseases were stamped out, making the Philippines the healthiest tropical country in the world. But within the past three years, due, so it was claimed by those American medical men with whom I talked, to the impaired efficiency of the Filipinized Health Service, both cholera and smallpox have again made their appearance. The statistics also show that there has been a steady increase in recent years in preventable diseases, especially malaria, beriberi, tuberculosis, and typhoid. As the Quarantine Service fortunately remains under American control, there has been no plague in the islands for upward of fifteen years.

Much the same state of affairs exists (October, 1921) in the Bureau of Public Lands. Due to the inefficiency of this bureau the land-title situation in the Philippines is a serious one, and, if the abuses are not corrected, will inevitably lead to dangerous discontent. When I was in the Lake Lanao district of Mindanao the local government land agent was on the eve of returning to the United States with his wife and three children, after nearly a decade of faithful and meritorious service, because his place was wanted for a Filipino. Yet that man, by the exercise of unremitting patience, tact, energy, and courage, had brought the savage and predatory Moros of his district from the hunting stage of existence, where he had found

them, through the grazing stage and well into the agricultural stage. And he realized, just as all the other Americans in his district realized, that much, if not all, of the progress which he had made during those years of bitter struggle would be lost because of the hostility of the Moros for any Filipino who might succeed him.

Public order is maintained throughout the archipelago by the police forces of the various municipalities and by the Philippine Constabulary, an organization which has long had an enviable reputation for discipline and efficiency. The constabulary, which was raised and trained by officers of the American army, consists at present of about three hundred and sixty officers and nearly six thousand men. At the height of its efficiency the force had three hundred and seventy-five American officers, most of whom had gone to the islands with volunteer regiments in 1898, but as a result of the Filipinization of the commissioned personnel only twenty Americans remain. Though the present chief of constabulary, Brigadier-General Crame, is for political purposes a Filipino, he is by blood and training far more European than Asiatic, being three quarters Spanish and having received his military education in Spain. He has displayed such marked energy in the pursuit and punishment of malefactors, and is said to have in his secret files so much information which might prove highly embarrassing to certain powerful *politicos,* that he is

A MORO DATO
Jolo, Sulu Archipelago

A MORO ENLISTED MAN
Philippine Constabulary

AN IFUGAO SOLDIER
Philippine Constabulary
(Note gee-string and anklets)



THE FAMOUS "ZIGZAG" ON THE BENGUET ROAD

This leads from Manila to Baguio, the summer capital. This road, which cost upward of three million dollars, is unequaled for sheer audacity of engineering, even in the Alps.

THE PASIG RIVER, MANILA

credited with having remarked that he would leave the islands the day the American flag was hauled down, because it would not be safe for him to remain.

I might mention in this connection that an American general who has seen many years of service in the Philippines recently remarked to me that, in the event of the United States withdrawing from the islands, it would be little short of criminal for us not to take some measures which would insure the safety and well-being of the little tribe of Maccabebes, only a few thousand strong, who have so faithfully served us as native scouts from the very beginning of our occupation. He led me to believe that, were satisfactory guarantees for their safety not exacted, the Maccabebes would be in danger of meeting the same fate which befell the leading Moro *dato,* of the Lake Lanao district, who was assassinated in the summer of 1921 because, according to rumor, he had urged upon the Wood-Forbes Mission the necessity of keeping the Moro islands under American rule, thereby arousing the deadly enmity of the Filipinos. But this is a digression.

No nation was ever more faithfully served by its public servants than the Philippines have been served by the American officers of the constabulary. They have given their best years and the best that was in them to the service of the Filipinos. Most of the handful of Americans remaining in the force have worn its scarlet-trimmed khaki for close on two decades;

several of them bear on their breasts the bit of star-spangled crimson ribbon—"the red badge of courage"—which signifies that the wearer has won the Philippine Medal of Honor; one of them irretrievably ruined his health while caring for native refugees during the eruption of Taal Volcano; others carry on their bodies the scars of bullet, spear, and knife wounds which they received while making safe for the Filipinos the savage-infested islands of Mindanao and "dark and bloody Samar."

Yet, though the Filipinos owe to these men a debt which they can never hope to repay, injustice and ingratitude have been their portion. For the politicians in Manila, quick to recognize how effective a weapon the constabulary might prove in partisan hands, eagerly seized upon the policy of universal Filipinization as a pretext for getting rid of the American officers. The politicians succeeded in forcing out most of the American officers in the lower grades by the enactment of a bill cutting off their fogies, that is, their progressive increases in pay for long service. The officers of the constabulary have never been highly paid, and thus deprived of their fogies there was small incentive for young and ambitious men to remain in the service. But when all except a score of senior officers who were too old to embark on new careers had been forced out of the service, the fogies were restored in order that the Filipino officers might have the benefit of them. Just as

military men of experience predicted, the Filipinization of the constabulary, combined with the demoralizing effect of political influence, has resulted in a considerable lowering of the force's discipline, efficiency, and morale, for the enlisted men, particularly those recruited from the non-Christian tribes, will not accord to their Filipino officers the same measure of respect, the same unquestioning obedience, which they gave to their American superiors.

VII

But by far the most serious consequence of the policy pursued by the Wilson administration has been the complete breakdown of the insular finances and the resulting impairment of Philippine credit. Though the story of the financial disaster which has overtaken the insular government is a long and complicated one, involving many technical details, I will endeavor to compress it into tabloid dimensions.

The currency of the Philippines consists of silver and paper, the latter comprising treasury certificates and notes of the Philippine National Bank. Until recently this paper currency was kept at par by a gold reserve, which amounted to $41,500,000 at the beginning of 1919. This reserve, which represented about 97 per cent. of the outstanding paper currency, was deposited in fifteen different banks in the United

States. But in 1916 the Philippine Legislature passed an act establishing the Philippine National Bank and not long thereafter, and without legal authority, this reserve fund was transferred from the fifteen depositories to the New York agency of the new bank, to be kept there to the credit of the bank instead of the government. In other words, the Filipino politicians wanted the money where they could get at it with the greatest possible ease. Exactly what happened after that transfer took place has not yet been satisfactorily explained, but the indisputable fact remains that the reserve fund which in 1919 amounted to $41,500,000 had by 1921 dwindled to about $2,000,000. In short, approximately 95 per cent. of the gold reserve which secured the currency of the islands disappeared in two years. In consequence, there being virtually no funds in New York with which to honor Philippine drafts, the Philippine Government was forced to issue an order suspending the sale of bills of exchange on New York. As was to be expected this resulted in tying up the import trade of the islands and demoralizing business generally.

The first question that is asked, naturally, is what has become of the $39,000,000 which are missing? Where has this great sum gone? A large part of it appears to have gone in what may be described, for want of a better term, as political investments. It is known that the Philippine National Bank made

large loans to both Filipinos and Americans in sums running into millions of pesos without security of any kind except the borrowers' political affiliations. Some of these loans are good; most of them are not. In other cases money was loaned to an individual to finance a private enterprise, the enterprise itself being accepted as security for the loan. The enterprise failed, and the bank was left with some handsomely engraved stock certificates and a sheaf of notes. In these and other ways not yet disclosed many millions have disappeared.[1] But whatever the methods employed by the looters, the fact remains that the currency reserve has been all but wiped out and that now there is nothing behind the paper money of the islands except the credit of the Philippine Government, or, to be exact, the credit of the Government of the United States. No matter, therefore, how loudly the Filipinos may proclaim their success in administering certain other departments of the government—claims which, as I have already shown, are by no means substantiated by the facts—they are compelled to admit their failure in the field of national finance. This being so, it might be profitable for the Filipinos to ponder the fact that, had the independence which they have so insistently demanded been given them, their country would be

[1] The insular auditor estimates that the losses will reach the total of $22,500,000.

facing bankruptcy to-day. And there would be no rich and indulgent Uncle Sam standing in the background, hand in pocket, ready to help them out.

The propaganda so zealously disseminated by the bureau which the Philippine Government maintains in Washington at a cost of one million pesos a year has given many foreigners the impression that the business of the islands is mainly in Filipino hands. Nothing could be further from the truth. The facts are that fully 85 per cent. of the local trade is in the hands of the Chinese, while the wholesale and foreign business is nearly all in American and British hands, though the Japanese interests in certain sections of the archipelago are increasing at a rate which is causing the government some apprehension.

Americans living in the Philippines will tell you that the insular government is rotten to the core with corruption. They will tell you that the treasury and the national bank have been looted—which would appear to be true—and that the *politicos* and their friends have suddenly and mysteriously come into possession of great fortunes. They will assure you that the government pay-rolls have been padded, that government labor and vast quantities of government materials have been used for private purposes, that it is impossible to obtain a building permit or to pass goods through the customs without having recourse to bribery, that graft and chicanery are to be found everywhere, that nepotism and political favoritism

are universal. Of the truth of these accusations I do not feel that I am competent to judge. That much corruption and more incompetency exist is hardly open to question. That certain of the political leaders have scandalously abused their power is admitted by every one who will tell the truth and who has real knowledge of the situation. But I do not think that conditions are as black as the Americans have painted them, any more than I believe that they are as rosy as the Filipinos claim. The truth lies somewhere between these extremes. Viewing the experiment of Filipino self-government as it has been essayed under the provisions of the Jones Bill as impartially as I am able, I think that the scales incline more to the side of failure than of success.

During the eight years of the Wilson administration the government at Washington took the view that Americans who engaged in business outside the United States, whether in Mexico, or Central America, or the Philippines, did so at their own risk. It assumed by some inexplicable process of reasoning that these men were adventurers, commercial filibusters, and it took the attitude that in case of trouble, they need not look to their own government for support or protection. Contrast this attitude, if you please, with that of the British Government, which regards those of its nationals engaged in legitimate business overseas as outposts of trade, as commercial empire-builders, and recognizes their services to the

nation with honors and rewards. Perhaps that explains why after more than two decades of American sovereignty the British investment in the Philippines is nearly double the American investment. For the Englishman can invest his capital in the Philippines with the comforting knowledge that as long as he behaves himself he has his government solidly behind him—and the Filipino knows it, too, and treats him accordingly. Is it too much to expect, then, that the American residing and doing business in a land which was freed from tyranny by the sacrifice of American lives, which was purchased with American dollars, which is guarded by the American navy, which has been made safe by the American army, whose credit is guaranteed by the American treasury, whose schools and hospitals and railways are due to American initiative and enterprise, whose seagates are guarded against disease by American quarantine surgeons, whose industries have been developed by American capital, and over which flies the American flag—is it too much to expect, I repeat, that the American resident should be accorded the same measure of representation and protection enjoyed by an Englishman or a Mexican or a Japanese?

It was to obtain for Americans the same rights enjoyed by citizens of other countries that two-and-twenty years after Commodore Dewey took possession of the archipelago in the name of the United

States there was organized in Manila the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippine Islands. This organization, to quote its own words, "represents every phase of American business and interest in the Philippines and is taking the place of a legation to the citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine territory, irrespective of whether they are members of the organization or not. It purposes to be heard on every subject affecting the business or political life of the community. It purposes in all matters: first, to suggest a remedy; second, to ask for its application; third, to demand its application; and fourth, to fight for its application if other processes are not successful." There you have the Bill of Rights of the Americans in the Philippines.

VIII

Though the bitterest opponents of American rule in the Philippines cannot charge us with having exploited the natives for our own profit—and we are the only nation having colonial possessions of which this can truthfully be said—in our social relations with the natives we are no whit different from other ruling white races. The Englishman in India is no more supercilious or condescending in his attitude toward the brown-skinned peoples of the peninsula than the Americans in the Philippines are toward

the Filipinos. In the islands the white men and the brown are separated by a social chasm as deep and impassable as that which separates army officers and enlisted men. In certain respects we have carried this social discrimination to even greater lengths than have the English, for whereas the Khedivial Club, Cairo's most exclusive organization, has as many Egyptian as European members, no Filipino can be elected to a Manila club, no matter how high his official position. It did not take our various governor-generals long to learn that it was the part of wisdom not to mix Americans and Filipinos, except at large official functions when entertaining at the Palace of Malacañan. The American who marries a Filipina is promptly ostracized. She may be a graduate of Bryn Mawr or Vassar or Wellesley, she may be beautiful and cultured and charming, but no matter—she is not white.

As the result of many years spent in Oriental countries I can understand, even if I do not entirely sympathize with, the white man's point of view on this question. I must confess, however, that it amuses me to see the wives and daughters of men who were originally small-town merchants or mechanics, or who first went out to the islands as enlisted men in the army of occupation, treating with condescension Filipinos who have in their veins the proudest blood of Spain. But, mind you, I do not subscribe to the social creed of former Governor-General Harrison,

who said in his farewell address, "I want you to remember that in all but face and race I am a Filipino," any more than I approve of the American soldier's sentiment toward "the little brown brother" as inelegantly expressed in the once-famous army song: "He may be a brother of William H. Taft, but he ain't no brother of mine." Viewing this delicate and difficult question purely from the political angle, it seems to me that were the Americans in the Philippines to lower in some degree the social barrier which they have raised between themselves and the natives, were they to draw the color line a shade less sharply, it would go far toward soothing the wounded pride of the Filipinos and reconciling them to American rule without entailing any sacrifice of that prestige which is the fetich of the colonizing white man.

Another source of Filipino resentment is to be found in the lack of ordinary tact which characterizes the attitude of American residents toward the natives. Mr. Nathaniel Peffer, himself a keen observer and for many years a resident in the East, quotes a Filipino educated in the United States as saying: "Don't give us independence if you don't want to. The decision is yours to make and we must resign ourselves to it if it is unfavorable. We can even sympathize with some of the reasons why independence would be unwise now. But stop harping on our 'unfitness.' It is that we hear all the time, and not

some of the other reasons. We have come to hate that word. All its associations are rasping to us. It suggests a savage people come up for judgment before supermen." With that attitude most fair-minded Americans will heartily sympathize. For an educated and self-respecting Filipino to be told over and over again that he is "unfitted" for self-government (no matter how true the statement may be) is as exasperating and as difficult to refute as the charge that a man is "temperamentally unsuited" to hold a certain position. Until we can school ourselves to exercise greater tact and courtesy in our relations with the Filipinos, until we can broaden our horizons sufficiently to look at things from their viewpoint as well as our own, until we can forget whether a man is born east or west of Suez and gage our attitude toward him by his brains instead of his blood, by his character instead of his complexion, we shall never win from the Filipinos that confidence and liking which are indispensable to successful colonial administration.

IX

The Philippine Question naturally resolves itself into two distinct problems. First, how would the granting of independence to the Philippines affect our own constantly increasing interest in the Far East? And second, would independence be best for

the Filipinos themselves? The Filipinos assert, and with truth, that the former is a purely selfish consideration, but the lessons of the World War have taught us that national considerations, selfish though they may be, cannot safely be disregarded. England has not remained in military occupation of Egypt for forty years through any desire to exploit the Egyptians or because she has been financially benefited by her hold on the Valley of the Nile—on the contrary, the occupation of Egypt has added enormously to the burdens borne by the British taxpayer—but because in controlling Egypt she insures the safety of the Suez Canal, which is the gateway through which passes Britain's enormous commerce with the Farther East. Our own position in the Philippines is somewhat analogous to England's position in Egypt. Within fifteen hours of the China Coast, within fifty hours of Japan and of the Straits of Malacca, the archipelago forms a commercial gateway to the whole of eastern Asia and to the great, rich islands of Malaysia. Glance for a moment at the map and note the amazing strategic value of the Philippines from the point of view of American world commerce. Just across the China Sea lie the great ports of Haiphong, Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Tsingtau, Cheefoo, Tientsin, through which pour the imports of the four hundred millions of people in Indo-China and China. And as surely as darkness follows the day, as smoke goes upward, our commerce with the Orient, now

growing by leaps and bounds, in a considerable measure at least, will be won away from us by those nations which are better situated geographically to push their commercial interests—England through Hong Kong and Tientsin, France through Haiphong and her concessions in Yunnan, Japan through Korea, Siberia, Manchuria, and the Shantung Peninsula—if our flag comes down in the Philippines.

I consider it unlikely in the extreme that we will ever be forced to resort to arms in defense of our interests in the Pacific, but that does not mean that there is no possibility of such a contingency arising. As this possibility, however remote it may seem, always exists, let me direct your attention to the immense strategic advantages afforded us by the Philippines, which are within easy striking distance of every Asiatic port between Yokohama and Singapore and lie squarely athwart every trade route between the Far East and Europe, Australia, South America, and Mexico. With a powerful fleet having its base in Subic Bay, we could not only guarantee the Pacific Coast, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Canal against enemy attack, but we would hold the commerce of the Pacific at our mercy. Deprived of the Philippines as a base of operations in any struggle in which we might become involved in the Pacific, we would be forced to fight on the defensive, which, as most naval experts agree, is usually doubtful strategy.

X

"The Philippines are more trouble than they are worth. Let's get rid of them" has long been the slogan of many uninformed Americans. Permit me to call the attention of those who hold this view to the fact that the Philippines are not costing the American taxpayer a single penny, the insular finances for several years past having shown a surplus instead of a deficit. In making this statement I do not consider, of course, the cost of maintaining our naval and military forces in the islands, for it is to be assumed that, should we grant the Filipinos independence, these forces would not be disbanded, but would merely be ordered to other stations, so that the expense of their maintenance, if anything, would be increased. The Philippines, as I have attempted to show you, constitute America's military and commercial outpost in the Orient. In view of the present condition of world affairs, whether it would be high patriotism, good business, sound strategy, to abandon such an outpost, with the possibility that it might fall into unfriendly hands, is a question which the American people must decide for themselves.

In considering the question of whether independence would be best for the Filipinos themselves, it must be kept in mind that very few educated Filipinos

expect, or really want, *complete* autonomy. What they seek, rather, is a form of independence which will insure them unrestricted freedom of action and absolute security without anxiety or expense, in short, a protectorate. While vociferously demanding the profits of the business, they are unwilling to assume the risks; yet there is a general failure to appreciate the fact that independence under the protection of another nation is not true independence. The fact that their legislative measures are subject to the veto of the American governor-general, that their finances are under the supervision of an American auditor, that a few, a very few positions in the Constabulary, the Health Service, and the Department of Public Instruction are still held by Americans, makes the Filipinos—or, to be precise, the native politicians and office-seekers—almost childishly resentful, yet they instantly would become panic-stricken were we to announce that we proposed to cut them adrift and to withdraw immediately from the islands, taking our troops, our warships, and our financial credit with us. Though I am convinced from my conversations with a large number of intelligent and thoughtful Filipinos, who appeared to have the best interests of their country genuinely at heart, that they would view with the gravest misgivings a complete severance of relations with the United States, the political leaders have harped so long on the theme of *"la independencia"* that the great ignorant mass of

the people have come to believe that only in absolute independence will they find happiness and national salvation.

In order to understand the political situation in the Philippines it should be kept in mind that the Filipinos have no political parties as we have in the United States, because there is no question of sufficient importance to divide public opinion. As a result, the only political factions are the "ins" and the "outs," and both of them, lacking any other issue, such as taxation, or the tariff, or the League of Nations, clamor for independence, though not one Filipino in a hundred has other than the haziest ideas of what independence, with all that it implies, would mean. The average Filipino's conception of independence is well illustrated by a story which was told me in Manila. A provincial political boss who had been a candidate for the governorship of a province, but had met with overwhelming defeat at the polls, burst into his party headquarters shortly after the results of the election had been announced, livid with rage.

"I'm for independence!" he bellowed. "I'm for independence instantly! If only these cursed *Americanos* were out of here, I'd come into town with a thousand of my bolo men and wipe out the gang that defeated me and make myself governor, votes or no votes. It's all the fault of these damned interfering *Americanos.* They're always insisting on law and

order—always talking about the decision of the ballot-box. If we could get rid of them, we'd decide things with the bolo instead of the ballot. To hell with *Americano* rule! *¡Viva la independencia!*"

Now that man, opera bouffé as he may seem, represents the sentiments of a by no means inconsiderable number of Filipino politicians. These men, in order to attain their selfish ends, would prefer to see the Philippines saddled with the brand of "independence" that Mexico knew under the rule of Carranza, or that Russia is enjoying under Lenine and Trotsky, to the reign of decency, security, and justice which Lord Cromer gave to the Egyptians. As a matter of fact, the Filipinos are already as free as the peoples of Canada, South Africa, and Australia, enjoying what unprejudiced foreign observers have declared to be the most just and advanced system of government in the world. But to these facts they wilfully close their eyes, stubbornly insisting that they must have independence in name as well as in substance.

The American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines has advocated that the archipelago be given a territorial form of government, such as was enjoyed for many years by Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, and that under the name of the "Territory of Malaya" it be added to the Union. This would doubtless solve many of the present problems, but it is a solution which the leaders of the independence agita-

tion would almost certainly reject. What they demand is an absolute severance of every tie which binds the Philippines to the United States. They insist on being turned loose, a free and sovereign people, to lead their own lives and to work out their own destiny. With this demand I can sympathize. The love of freedom is inherent in every human being. Yet it would involve several questions requiring earnest consideration. To begin with, the United States paid Spain twenty million dollars for the Philippines. Do the Filipinos propose, in the event of being given their independence, to refund this sum? A sordid suggestion, perhaps, but it is to be assumed that the pride of the Filipinos would scarcely permit them to ignore such an obligation. Again, the Filipinos are the only people on earth who enjoy the privilege of absolute free trade with the United States. Certain authorities claim that the surest way of strangling them would be to withdraw that privilege from them. But as a free and sovereign nation could the Filipinos advance any sound reason why their products should not be subject to the same duties, upon entering the United States, as those of other foreign nations? The Filipinos bitterly resent the suggestion of an American protectorate, so, in the event of their becoming involved in hostilities with another power, what excuse would they have for turning to us for protection? Let me remark here, for the benefit of such Filipinos as may read this book, that if they seriously believe

that the American people, once our troops have been withdrawn and our flag hauled down, would ever consent to despatch a fleet or raise an army to defend the Philippines againt foreign aggression, then they are only deceiving themselves. I believe that I am expressing the sentiments of the great majority of the American people when I assert that if the Filipinos insist on cutting themselves adrift, then they must be prepared to paddle their own canoe and need not look to the United States for assistance, either military or financial, if a storm comes.

It is a deplorable fact that much of the unrest, uncertainty, and discontent which exist in the Philippines to-day are directly traceable to certain American politicians who, eager to obtain cheap publicity and to make political capital, or obsessed with altruistic but utterly impracticable ideas, have espoused the cause of Filipino independence, regarding which few of them possess first-hand knowledge and which still fewer are qualified intelligently to discuss. What we need for a just and intelligent solution of the Philippine Question are not the philippics of politicians or the appeals of impractical sentimentalists, but the reasoned advice of men with long experience in colonial administration, men of the stamp of Cromer and Milner, Smuts and Curzon, men who serve neither personal nor party interests. Until we raise the Philippine Question from the slough of partisan politics

to the plane of a great national problem, until we abolish our present system of selecting our colonial officials on the strength of their political records and affiliations instead of for their actual qualifications for the duties to be performed, until we adopt and adhere to a definite colonial policy, regardless of the political party which may be in power, until the government at Washington will give heed to the disinterested men who, through long experience, know whereof they speak, the Philippines will not know enduring tranquillity or prosperity. The despatch of the Wood-Forbes Mission to investigate conditions on the spot and the appointment of General Wood as governor-general are steps in the right direction. If the Washington Government will heed the suggestions made by this mission, if it will back up the new insular administration, much will be done toward dissipating the cloudiness and uncertainty which have enveloped the future of the islands.[1]

The conclusions and recommendations of the Wood-Forbes Mission are so clear, concise, and enlightening that I quote them here:

If the Filipinos could present more convincing proofs than they have yet done that they are really fitted for the independence which they covet; if they could show beyond all peradventure that they are prepared to take care of themselves without further

[1] See Appendix.

assistance or protection from the United States, then I believe the majority of the American people would say: "Here is your independence. Take it, and God be with you." But before that happy state of affairs can be realized we must ask ourselves in all seriousness certain questions. If we are to grant the Filipinos their independence, to which of the various races shall we intrust the machinery of government —to the Tagalogs, the Ilocanos, or the Visayans, to name only three of them? Then again, shall we hand over the reins of power to the great brown mass of people who are the real natives of the islands, or shall we give them to the little group of half-caste politicians and agitators who are at present in the saddle? Shall we deliver the pagan tribes—the Igorots, Ifugaos, Kalingas, Mandayas, Monobos, and the rest —to the Christian Filipinos, and if we do, what satisfactory guaranty can we obtain that their rights will be respected, that they will not be oppressed and exploited as they were before the American occupation? Shall we attempt to coerce the Moros into submission to the rule of the Filipinos whom they despise and hate, and if we do coerce them and they revolt, as they almost certainly would do, shall we send troops to the islands to aid the Filipinos in subjugating them? If the "Republic of the Philippines" should become, as the result of internal jealousies and dissensions, another Haiti, shall we intervene, as we did in Haiti, and restore order? Should Japan, or

China, or both, insist on the unrestricted admission of their nationals to the rich lands of the Philippines,—as the Japanese, at least, are reasonably certain to do, once American protection is withdrawn—and should the Filipinos refuse them such admission, shall we be prepared to back up the Filipinos in their refusal with fleets and armies, or shall we stand aloof and see the archipelago overrun by yellow men? And finally, if the independence of the young republic were menaced by a covetous and warlike neighbor, would we be prepared to spend thousands of lives and billions of dollars in rescuing the Filipinos and setting them on their feet and starting them in business all over again?

In asking these hypothetical questions nothing is further from my purpose than to embarrass the Filipinos, whom I like, or to belittle their very real abilities, or to prejudice my readers against them. But whether embarrassing to the Filipinos or not, they are questions which the American people must answer, and answer satisfactorily, before they can conscientiously turn adrift the ten million "little brown brothers" whom they so light-heartedly adopted nearly a quarter of a century ago.

APPENDIX A

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

We find the people happy, peaceful, and in the main prosperous, and keenly appreciative of the benefits of American rule.

We find everywhere among the Christian Filipinos the desire for independence, generally under the protection of the United States. The non-Christians and Americans are for continuance of American control.

We find a general failure to appreciate the fact that independence under the protection of another nation is not true independence.

We find that the Government is not reasonably free from those underlying causes which result in the destruction of government.

We find that a reasonable proportion of officials and employees are men of good character and ability, and reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them; but that the efficiency of the public services has fallen off, and that they are now relatively inefficient, due to lack of inspection and to the too rapid transfer of control to officials who have not had the necessary time for proper training.

We find that many Filipinos have shown marked capacity for government service and that the young generation is full of promise; that the civil service laws have in the main been honestly administered, but there is a marked deterioration due to the injection of politics.

We find there is a disquieting lack of confidence in the administration of justice, to an extent which constitutes a menace to the stability of the government.

We find that the people are not organized economically

nor from the standpoint of national defense to maintain an independent government.

We find that the legislative chambers are conducted with dignity and decorum and are composed of representative men.

We feel that the lack of success in certain departments should not be considered as proof of essential incapacity on the part of Filipinos, but rather as indicating lack of experience and opportunity, and especially lack of inspection.

We find that questions in regard to confirmation of appointments might at any time arise which would make a deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine Senate.

We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the experience of the past eight years, during which they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States relinquishing supervision of the Government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their army and navy, and leaving the islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages.

In conclusion we are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty were we to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.

2. We recommend that the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor General, have authority

commensurate with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted the Governor General under Act No. 240 of the Sixty-fourth Congress, known as the Jones bill.

3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments that the President of the United States be authorized to make and render the final decision.

4. We recommend that under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.

LEONARD WOOD, *Chairman.*
W. CAMERON FORBES.

OCTOBER 8, 1921.

APPENDIX B

The text of the two treaties regarding China, approved at Washington, Feb. 4, 1922, by the Conference for the Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, follows. The one embodying the Root four points for the integrity of China and the open door reads:

TREATY ON CHINESE INTEGRITY

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal:

Desiring to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity;

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose and to that end have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries:

[Here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries.]

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The contracting powers, other than China, agree:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed oppor-

tunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.

ARTICLE II

The contracting powers agree not to enter into any treaty, agreement, arrangement, or understanding, either with one another or individually or collectively with any power or powers which would infringe or impair the principles stated in Article I.

ARTICLE III

With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the open door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations, the contracting powers, other than China, agree they will not seek, nor support their respective nations in seeking:

(A)—Any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region in China;

(B)—Any such monopoly or preference as would deprive the nationals of any other power of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China, or of participating with the Chinese Government, or with any local

authority, in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

It is understood that the foregoing stipulations of this article are not to be so construed as to prohibit the acquisition of such properties or rights as may be necessary to the conduct of a particular commercial, industrial or financial undertaking or to the encouragement of invention and research.

China undertakes to be guided by the principles stated in the foregoing stipulations of this article in dealing with applications for economic rights and privileges from Governments and nationals of all foreign countries, whether parties to the present treaty or not.

ARTICLE IV

The contracting powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other, designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory.

ARTICLE V

China agrees that, throughout the whole of the railways in China, she will not exercise or permit unfair discriminations of any kind. In particular there shall be no discrimination whatever, direct or indirect, in respect of charges or of facilities on the ground of the nationality of passengers or the countries from which or to which they are proceeding, or the origin or ownership of goods or the country from which or to which they are consigned, or the nationality or ownership of the ship or other means of con-

veying such passengers or goods before or after their transport on the Chinese railways.

The contracting powers, other than China, assume a corresponding obligation in respect of any of the aforesaid railways over which they or their nationals are in a position to exercise any control in virtue of any concession, special agreement or otherwise.

ARTICLE VI

The contracting parties, other than China, agree fully to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party; and China declares that when she is a neutral she will observe the obligations of neutrality.

ARTICLE VII

The contracting powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which, in the opinion of any one of them, involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned.

ARTICLE VIII

Powers not signatory to the present treaty which have governments recognized by the signatory powers and which have treaty relations with China shall be invited to adhere to the present treaty. To this end the Government of the United States will make the necessary communications to non-signatory powers and will inform the contracting powers of the replies received. Adherence by any power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE IX

The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other contracting powers a certified copy of the process verbed of the deposit of ratifications.

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other contracting powers.

In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

TREATY ON CHINESE TARIFF

The treaty relative to the Chinese tariff and cognate matters reads:

The United States of America, Belgium, British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Portugal:

With a view to increasing the revenues of the Chinese Government, have resolved to conclude a treaty relating to the revision of the Chinese customs tariff and cognate matters, and to that end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

[Here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries.]

Who, having communicated to each other their full

powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The representatives of the contracting powers having adopted, on the 4th day of February, 1922, in the City of Washington, a resolution, which is appended as an annex to this article, with respect to the revision of Chinese customs duties, for the purpose of making such duties equivalent to an effective 5 per centum ad valorem, in accordance with existing treaties, concluded by China with other nations, the contracting powers hereby confirm the said resolution and undertake to accept the tariff rates fixed as a result of such revision. The said tariff rates shall become effective as soon as possible, but not earlier than two months after publication thereof.

ANNEX

With a view to providing additional revenue to meet the needs of the Chinese Government, the powers represented at this conference, namely, the United States of America, Belgium, The British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal, agree:

That the customs schedule of duties on imports into China, adopted by the Tariff Revision Commission at Shanghai on Dec. 19, 1918, shall forthwith be revised so that rates of duty shall be equivalent to 5 per cent. effective, as provided for in the several commercial treaties to which China is a part.

A revision commission shall meet at Shanghai, at the earliest practicable date, to effect this revision forthwith and on the general lines of the last revision.

This commission shall be composed of representatives of the powers above named and of representatives of any addi-

tional powers having governments at present recognized by the powers represented at this conference and who have treaties with China providing for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per cent. ad valorem and who desire to participate therein.

The revision shall proceed as rapidly as possible, with a view to its completion within four months from the date of the adoption of this resolution by the Conference on Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions.

The revised tariff shall become effective as soon as possible, but not earlier than two months after its publication by the Revision Commission.

The Government of the United States, as convener of the present conference, is requested forthwith to communicate the terms of this resolution to the Governments of powers not represented at this conference, but who participated in the revision of 1918 aforesaid.

ARTICLE II

Immediate steps shall be taken through a special conference to prepare the way for the speedy abolition of likin and for the fulfillment of the other conditions laid down in Article VIII of the treaty of Sept. 5, 1902, between Great Britain and China; in Articles IV and V of the treaty of Oct. 8, 1903, between the United States and China, and in Article I of the supplementary treaty of Oct. 8, 1903, between Japan and China, with a view to levying the surtaxes provided for in these articles.

The special conference shall be composed of representatives of the signatory powers, and of such other powers as may desire to participate and may adhere to the present treaty, in accord with the provisions of Article VIII, in sufficient time to allow their representatives to take part. It

shall meet in China within three months after the coming into force of the present treaty on a day and at a place to be designated by the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE III

The special conference provided for in Article II shall consider the interim provisions to be applied prior to the abolition of likin and the fulfillment of the other conditions laid down in the articles of the treaties mentioned in Article II; and it shall authorize the levying of a surtax on dutiable imports as from such date, for such purposes and subject to such conditions as it may determine.

The surtax shall be at a uniform rate of 2½ per centum ad valorem, provided that in case of certain articles of luxury which, in the opinion of the special conference, can bear a greater increase without unduly impeding trade, the total surtax may be increased, but may not exceed 5 per centum ad valorem.

ARTICLE IV

Following the immediate revision of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China, mentioned in Article I, there shall be a further revision thereof, to take effect at the expiration of four years following the completion of the aforesaid immediate revision, in order to insure that the customs duties shall correspond to the ad valorem rates fixed by the special conference provided in Article II.

Following this further revision there shall be, for the same purpose, periodical revisions of the customs schedule of duties on imports into China every seven years, in lieu of the decennial revision authorized by existing treaties with China.

In order to prevent delay, any revision made in pursuance of this article shall be effected in accord with rules to be

prescribed by the special conference provided for in Article II.

ARTICLE V

In all matters relating to customs duties there shall be effective equality of treatment and of opportunity for all the contracting powers.

ARTICLE VI

The principle of uniformity in the rates of customs duties levied at all the land and maritime frontiers of China is hereby recognized. The special conference provided for in Article II shall make arrangements to give practical effect to this principle, and it is authorized to make equitable adjustments in those cases in which a customs privilege to be abolished was granted in return for some local economic advantage.

In the meantime, any increase in the rates of customs duties resulting from tariff revision or any surtax hereafter imposed in pursuance of the present treaty, shall be levied at a uniform rate ad valorem at all land and maritime frontiers of China.

ARTICLE VII

The charge for transit passes shall be at the rate of 2½ per centum ad valorem until the arrangements provided for by Article II come into force.

ARTICLE VIII

Powers not signatory to the present treaty, whose Governments are at present recognized by the signatory powers and whose present treaties with China provide for a tariff on imports and exports not to exceed 5 per centum ad valorem, shall be invited to adhere to the present treaty.

The Government of the United States undertakes to make the necessary communications for this purpose and to inform the Governments of the contracting powers of the replies received. Adherence by any power shall become effective on receipt of notice thereof by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE IX

The provisions of the present treaty shall override all stipulations of treaties between China and the respective contracting powers, which are inconsistent therewith, other than stipulations according most favored nation treatment.

ARTICLE X

The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting powers in accord with their respective constitutional methods and shall take effect on the date of the deposit of all the ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible. The Government of the United States will transmit to the other contracting powers a certified copy of the *procès verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present treaty, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the other contracting powers.

In faith whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

SUPPLEMENT TO FAR EAST TREATY

This resolution was adopted as a supplement to the general Far Eastern treaty:

The United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal,

Desiring to provide a procedure for dealing with questions that may arise in connection with the execution of the provisions of Articles III and V of the treaty to be signed at Washington on Feb. 6, 1922, with reference to their general policy, designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity,

Resolve, That there shall be established in China a board of reference to which any questions arising in connection with the execution of the aforesaid articles may be referred for investigation and report.

The special conference, provided in Article II of the treaty to be signed at Washington on Feb. 6, 1922, with reference to the Chinese customs tariff, shall formulate for the approval of the powers concerned a detailed plan for the constitution of the board.

DECLARATIONS BY AND ON CHINA

The Chinese declaration regarding alienation of territory, also added to the Far Eastern treaty, was stated thus:

China upon her part is prepared to give an undertaking not to alienate or lease any portion of her territory or littoral to any power.

The Chinese delegation also announced an "undertaking" in connection with the tariff treaty, which stated that "the Chinese Government have no intention to effect any change which may disturb the present administration of the Chinese maritime customs."

The resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railroad reads:

Resolved, that the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for those in interest requires that better protection be given the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use, a more careful selection of personnel to secure efficiency of service, and a more economical use of funds to prevent waste of the property; that the subject should be dealt with through the proper diplomatic channels.

The powers in the Far Eastern Committee, other than China, added to this a supplementary resolution as follows:

The powers other than China, in agreeing to the resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, reserve the right to insist hereafter upon the responsibility of China for performance or non-performance of the obligations toward the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which the powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built, and the action of China thereunder, and the obligations which they deem to be in the nature of a trust, resulting from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government over the possession and administration of the railroad.

TEXT OF SHANTUNG AGREEMENT

The terms of settlement as agreed upon, Feb. 1, 1922, by the representatives of the Governments of Japan and China follow:

I. THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAO-CHAU

1. Japan shall restore to China the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau.

2. The Governments of Japan and China shall each appoint a commission with powers to make and carry out detailed arrangements relating to the transfer of the adminis-

tration and of public property in the said territory and to settle other matters equally requiring adjustment. For such purposes the Japanese and Chinese commissions shall meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present agreement.

3. The said transfer and adjustment shall be completed as soon as possible, and in any case not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of this agreement.

4. The Japanese Government agrees to hand over to the Chinese Government, upon the transfer to China of the administration of the former German-leased territory of Kiao-Chau such archives, registers, plans, title-deeds and other documents, in the possession of Japan or certified copies thereof, as may be necessary for the said transfer, as well as those that may be useful for the administration by China, after such transfer, of that territory, and of the 50-kilometer zone around Kiao-Chau Bay.

II. PUBLIC PROPERTIES

1. The Government of Japan undertakes to transfer to the Government of China all public properties, including land, buildings, works or establishments in the leased territory of Kiao-Chau, whether formerly possessed by the German authorities or purchased or constructed by the Japanese authorities during the Japanese administration of the said territory, save those indicated in this article (Paragraph 3) of this treaty.

2. In the transfer of such public properties no compensation will be claimed from the Government of China except (1) for those purchased or constructed by the Japanese authorities and also (2) for the improvement on or additions to those formerly possessed by the German authorities.

With regard to cases under these two categories, the Government of China shall refund a fair and equitable proportion of the expenses actually incurred by the Government of Japan for such properties specified in (1) or such improvements or additions specified in (2), having regard to the principle of depreciation.

3. It is agreed that such public properties in the leased territory of Kiao-Chau as are required for the Japanese Consulate to be established in Tsing-tao shall be retained by the Government of Japan, and that those required more especially for the benefit of the Japanese community, including public schools, shrines and cemeteries, shall be left in the hands of the said community.

Details of such matters shall be arranged by the joint commission provided for in an article of this treaty.

III. JAPANESE TROOPS

The Japanese troops, including gendarmes now stationed along the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, shall be withdrawn as soon as the Chinese police or military force shall have been sent to take over the protection of the railway.

The disposition of the Chinese police or military force and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops under the foregoing provisions may be effected in sections. The date of the completion of such process for each section shall be arranged in advance between the competent authorities of Japan and China. The entire withdrawal of such Japanese troops shall be effected if possible within three months, and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the signature of the present agreement.

The Japanese garrison at Tsing-tao shall be completely withdrawn, simultaneously, if possible, with the transfer of

the administration of the leased territory of Kiao-Chau to China, and in any case not later than thirty days from the date of such transfer.

IV. THE MARITIME CUSTOMS

1. It is agreed that upon the coming into force of the present treaty, the Customs House of Tsing-tao shall be made an integral part of the Chinese maritime customs.

2. It is understood that the provisional agreement of Aug. 6, 1915, between Japan and China relative to the maritime customs office at Tsing-tao will cease to be effective upon the coming into force of the present treaty.

V. THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY

1. Japan shall transfer to China the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway and its branches, together with all the properties appurtenant thereto, including wharves, warehouses and other similar properties.

China, on her part, undertakes to reimburse to Japan the actual value of the railway properties mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The actual value to be so reimbursed shall consist of the sum of 53,406,141 gold marks (which is the assessed value of such portion of the said properties as was left behind by the Germans) or its equivalent, plus the amount which Japan, during her administration of the railway has actually expended for permanent improvements on or additions to the said properties, less a suitable allowance for depreciation. It is understood that no charge will be made with respect to the wharves, warehouses and other similar properties mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this article, except for such permanent improvements on or additions to them as may have been made by Japan during her administration of the railway, less a suitable allowance for depreciation.

The Government of Japan and the Government of China shall each appoint three Commissioners to form a joint railway commission, with powers to appraise the actual value of the railway properties on the basis defined in the preceding paragraph, and to arrange the transfer of the said properties.

Such transfer shall be completed as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than nine months from the date of the coming into force of the present agreement.

To effect the reimbursement under Paragraph 2 of this article, China shall, simultaneously with the completion of the transfer of the railway properties, deliver to Japan Chinese Government Treasury notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the railway, and running for a period of fifteen years, but redeemable at the option of China at the end of five years from the date of the delivery of the Treasury notes, or at any time thereafter upon six months' previous notice.

Pending the redemption of the said Treasury notes, the Chinese Government will select and appoint, for so long a period as the said notes remain unredeemed, a Japanese subject to the post of traffic manager and another Japanese subject to the chief accountant jointly with the Chinese chief accountant with co-ordinate functions. These officials shall all be under the direction, control and supervision of the Chinese managing director, and removable for cause.

Financial details of a technical character relating to the said Treasury notes, not provided for in this article, shall be determined in mutual accord between the Japanese and China authorities as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than six months from the date of the coming into force of the present agreement.

VI. THE EXTENSIONS OF THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY

It is agreed that the concessions relating to the two extensions of the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway, namely, the Tsinanfu-Shunteh and the Kaomi-Hsuchowfu lines, will be thrown open for the common activity of an international financial group, on terms to be arranged between the Chinese Government and the said group.

VII. MINES

The mines of Tsechuan, Fangtse and Chinlingchen, for which the mining rights were formerly granted by China to Germany, shall be handed to a company to be formed by a special charter of the Chinese Government, in which the Japanese commissions which are to be amount of the Chinese capital. The mode and terms of such arrangement shall be determined by the Chinese and Japanese commissions which are to be appointed for that purpose and which shall meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present agreement.

VIII. OPENING OF THE FORMER GERMAN LEASED TERRITORY

The Japanese Government declares that it has no intention of seeking the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement or of an international settlement in Tsing-tao.

The Chinese Government, on its part, declares that the entire area of the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau will be opened to foreign trade, and that foreigners will be permitted freely to reside and to carry on commerce, industry and other lawful pursuits within such area.

The vested rights lawfully and equitably acquired by foreign nationals in said area, whether under the German régime or during the Japanese military occupation, will be respected.

All questions relating to the status or validity of such vested rights acquired by Japanese nationals shall be arranged by the Sino-Japanese Joint Commission.

IX. SALT INDUSTRY

Whereas, the salt industry is a Government monopoly in China, it is agreed that the interests of Japanese companies of Japanese nationals actually engaged in the said industry along the coast of Kiao-Chau Bay are to be purchased by the Chinese Government on payment of fair compensation, and that exportation to Japan of a quantity of salt produced by the said industry along the said coast is to be permitted on reasonable terms. Arrangements for the above purposes, including the transfer of said interests to the Chinese Government, shall be completed by the Chinese and Japanese commissions as soon as possible, and in any case not later than six months from date of the coming into force of the present agreement.

X. SUBMARINE CABLES

Japan declares that all the rights, title and privileges concerning former German submarine cable between Tsing-tao and Chefoo, and between Tsing-tao and Shanghai, are vested in China, with the exception of those portions of the said two cables which have been utilized by the Japanese Government for the laying of a cable between Tsing-tao and Sasebo—it being understood that the question relating to the landing and operation at Tsing-tao and the said Tsing-tao-Sasebo cable shall be arranged by the Chinese and Japanese commissions as subject to the terms of the existing contracts to which China is a party.

XI. WIRELESS STATIONS

The Japanese wireless stations at Tsing-tao and Tsinanfu shall be transferred to China upon the withdrawal of the

Japanese troops at those two places, respectively, with fair compensation for the value of these stations.

The details of such transfer and compensation shall be arranged by the Chinese and Japanese commissions.

ANNEXES

I. PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS

Japan declares that she renounces all preferential rights with regard to foreign assistance in persons, capital and material, stipulated in the Sino-German Treaty of March 6, 1898.

II. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

Enterprises relating to electric light, telephone, stock yards, &c., shall be handed over to the Chinese Government, with the understanding that the stock yard, electric light and laundry enterprises are, in turn, to be handed over to the municipal government of Tsing-tao, which will form Chinese corporations in conformity with the Chinese company law to manage them under municipal supervision and regulations.

III. TELEPHONES

1. The Japanese Government agrees to turn over to the Chinese Government the telephone enterprise in the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau.

2. As regards such telephone enterprise, the Chinese Government will give due consideration to requests from the foreign community at Tsing-tao for such extensions and improvements as may be reasonably required by the general interests of the public.

IV. PUBLIC WORKS

The Chinese Government declares that in the management and maintenance of the public works in Tsing-tao, such as

roads, waterworks, parks, drainage, sanitary equipment, &c., handed over to the Chinese Government by the Japanese Government, the foreign community in Tsing-tao shall have fair representation.

V. MARITIME CUSTOMS

The Chinese Government declares that it will move the Inspector General of the Chinese maritime customs to permit the Japanese traders at Tsing-tao to communicate with the said customs in the Japanese language, and, in the selection of a suitable staff for the Tsing-tao customs, to give consideration within the limits of its established service regulations to the diverse needs of the trade of Tsing-tao.

VI. THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY

Should the joint railway commission fail to reach an agreement on any of the matter entrusted to its charge, the points at issue shall be taken up by the two Governments for discussion and adjustment by means of diplomacy. In the determination of such points the two Governments shall, if necessary, obtain recommendations of an expert or experts of a third power or powers who shall be designated in mutual agreement with each other.

VII. EXTENSION OF THE TSING-TAO-TSINANFU RAILWAY

The Japanese Government has no intention of claiming that the option for the construction of the Chefoo-Weihsien Railway should be thrown open for the common activity of the International Financial Consortium if that railway is to be constructed with Chinese capital.

VIII. OPENING OF THE FORMER LEASED TERRITORY

The Chinese Government declares that, pending the enactment and general application of laws regulating the system

of local self-government in China, the Chinese local authorities will ascertain the views of the foreign residents in the former German leased territory of Kiao-Chau in such municipal matters as may directly affect their welfare and interests.

WEI-HAI-WEI RESTORED TO CHINA

On February 1, 1922, the Hon. Arthur J. Balfour, senior British delegate, announced to the fifth plenary session of the Conference on Limitation of Armaments at Washington, D. C., that Great Britain proposed to hand back Wei-hai-wei to China. He spoke, in part, as follows:

The second reason is one in which I speak for the British Empire delegation and for them alone. The result of the termination of this Shantung dispute is to hand back to the sovereignty of China a great port and a most important railway, the port giving access to and the railway giving communications within what I believe is the most thickly populated province of China. But there is another leased territory, other than those we have been discussing to-day, which is under lease to the British Government. I refer to Wei-hai-wei.

Those who have followed the course of events in China during the last generation are aware that a most critical position arose when Russia and Germany began to attempt to dominate more and more the Chinese Empire. It was when Russia seized Port Arthur that in order to bring some foreign equipoise to the assistance of China, to prevent the increase of such operations, the arrangement was come to between the Chinese Government and the British Government by which Wei-hai-wei was leased to Great Britain for a term of years under arrangements which left it possible to use that port as a defense against Russia,

though impossible to use it as any great commercial center or as a rival to any existing commercial interests.

The circumstances under which Wei-hai-wei thus came under the control of British have now not only provisionally changed, but they have altogether disappeared. The rest of Shantung province is now handed back under suitable conditions to the complete sovereignty of China. Under like suitable conditions I have to announce that Great Britain proposes to hand back Wei-hai-wei to the country within whose frontier it lies. I doubt not it has been used so far merely as a sanatorium or summer resort for the ships of war coming up from the tropical or more southern portions of the China station. I doubt not that it will be available for that innocent and healthful purpose in time to come.

But the sovereignty will now be restored, as the sovereignty of China has been restored in other parts of the province, and we shall be largely guided in the arrangements that we will have to make and that we propose at once to initiate—we shall be largely guided in those arrangements by the course that the arrangement in regard to the Japanese lease in Shantung has come to this so happy and so satisfactory conclusion—a conclusion which has met with your universal approbation in this hall.

When that is accomplished, this great province of China will again be what every Chinese citizen must desire that it should be, in the fullest sense an integral part of that great empire, and I rejoice to think that I am in a position to-day to add, if I may say so, this crowning word to the statement of policy made by your Chairman on behalf of the country, and responded to in such felicitous terms by our Japanese and our Chinese colleagues.

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
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