

THE
ASPIRATIONS
OF
BULGARIA

BY
'BALKANICUS'

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THE ASPIRATIONS OF BULGARIA



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THE ASPIRATIONS OF BULGARIA

TRANSLATED FROM THE SERBIAN OF
BALKANICUS

"The Bulgarian nation has need of three seas."

DR. CHOMAKOV

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PREFACE

IN the early days of April 1913 it became evident to Russian statesmen that the existence of the Balkan Alliance was being seriously endangered by the attitude of Bulgaria. No atmosphere of secrecy surrounded the fact that Austria had strengthened her influence through King Ferdinand, who was now seen to be elaborating a new scheme whereby to establish Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans with the assistance of Austro-Hungarian policy, as a sequel to the *coup d'état* of 1908, when King Ferdinand coupled his own advancement from the position of a vassal prince to the dignity of Tsar of Bulgaria with a proclamation of Bulgarian independence. Incidentally, it may be remarked that the diplomacy of King Ferdinand has always manifested a striking association with Austrian ambitions in the direction of the Morava and Vardar valleys.

King Ferdinand imposed his personality in almost equal degree on Bulgarian home and foreign policy. His Cabinets either blindly followed his lead, or he would create conditions which forced them to take decisions in accordance with his own secret wishes. In either event the Royal policy prevailed.¹

¹ In his pamphlet "Is the Tsar responsible for the Disaster?" Mr. Sofroniyé Nikov defends King Ferdinand from the accusations which have been made against him. A perusal of this pamphlet is of considerable value in assisting us to appreciate

It is in this fact that the explanation must be sought of that change in Bulgarian policy which ultimately led Bulgaria to make war upon her Allies, and which, although it had previously been under consideration for some time, was actually manifested after the signature in London of the protocol of peace between the Balkan States and Turkey. From it issued that

in a correct degree the political circumstances existing in Bulgaria and the strength of the different political factors. At the same time it helps us to set a correct value on the extent to which each of them was responsible for the policy adopted by Bulgaria.

On page 22 of his publication, Mr. Nikov writes as follows :

“ From the fall of Stambulov in 1894 up to the present time, the Tsar (Ferdinand) has been obliged to lead the country along the one pathway which the Constitution opened up to him: namely, to entrust this or that statesman with the formation of a Cabinet, and to allow the Government forthwith to endeavour to obtain the support necessary to it in the country. No other course was possible, and it is not the Tsar who is responsible for the fact that he was unable to adopt the alternative constitutional method of drawing his Ministers from a majority in the Parliament. *It is owing to a deficiency in the political consciousness of the people that during all these thirty-five years the party which held the reins of power has always obtained a majority at the elections.**

“ We have not yet advanced to the political conditions existing in England.† It was therefore natural (I) to presume that a Cabinet would never fall unless the Tsar made use of his right to remove it from office and place the ministerial authority in the hands of others whom he considered more fitted to exercise it. And should we even then have an expression of the will of the nation? In consequence of such a

* The italics are ours.

† In Serbia, the Radical Opposition, which possessed no administrative authority, and was obliged to fight against the very great pressure which was exercised by the existing administration, triumphed at the elections held in the autumn of 1882. This was repeated again in the year 1892, when even a *coup d'état* failed to provide the Government with a majority.

duality in Bulgarian foreign policy which wrecked the Balkan Alliance. On the one hand Russian diplomacy endeavoured to preserve the alliance intact (always, however, on the basis of a satisfactory distribution of the balance of power in the peninsula), but, on the other hand, Austria seconded Bulgarian aspirations with the sole object of securing for herself an hegemony in the Balkans, the realisation of which would necessarily involve a dissolution of the Balkan Alliance.

situation would not the Tsar be acting in opposition to his obligations if he did not make use of his right to place the power in the hands of any of the parties of which we possess so many? . . . Notwithstanding the fact that the Democrats severely criticised the personal régime, they did not hesitate to accept office when it was offered to them in 1908, although at that time they boasted of only seven members in the Narodno Sobranjé, and they did not hesitate to employ all their moral (*sic*) influence to introduce into the Sobranjé 140 of their followers! In 1898 the Nationalists possessed a decisive majority, and if no other factor had existed but the voice of the electorate, that Government might have remained in power till the end of time. But the other parties were attacking the Government, and meetings were being held up and down the country. Now, should the 'hated' Tsar have allowed the Nationalists to organise the elections merely because they held a majority in the Sobranjé? Would they not (notwithstanding all the protests) have again triumphed at the elections?

"In the year 1901, Ratcho Petrov was 'induced' to hold 'free' instead of 'party' elections, and with what result? A coalition was to be formed, but precedent did not permit it. A Cabinet of Zankovists and Karavelovists was then formed, in which the first party endeavoured to cheat the second, and the experiment of forming a truly national administration—in which the people themselves took their destinies into their own hands—was side-tracked until 1908, when Alexander Malinov destroyed the 'block' in order to usurp the power for himself. . . ."

In the course of his defence (based upon an assertion that he was kept in ignorance of the dispatch of the fatal order for the attack on Greece and Serbia on June 16th/29th—at the time when he was Prime Minister) Dr. Danev stated: "The 16th/29th of June was a product of that duality of Government which has existed in our home and foreign policy and which has long enough poisoned the national life of Bulgaria." How important was the influence exercised by that duality of Government upon Bulgarian foreign policy? That it consisted more in its method than in its actual effect is clearly demonstrated by the communications which passed between the Bulgarian Foreign Office and the General Staff, and which are published in the succeeding pages.

It is impossible for Dr. Danev to suggest that he was in ignorance of the course which events were taking, for it was evident to every one that they were clearly leading up to the attack on Serbia and Greece. We shall see, moreover, that he actually played a part himself in their preparation. It is also obvious that Mr. Gheshov, Dr. Danev's predecessor, was likewise fully conscious of the fact that developments were moving towards the destruction of the Balkan Alliance. He was wise enough to stand aside when he found himself unable to divert the current, but even *his* abstention was not complete, for though he personally retired, he handed the influence exercised by his party over to the King for the furtherance of the royal schemes.

Mr. Alexander Malinov, the chief of the Democratic party, has more correctly exposed the causes of the War of the Allies. In the "Zaria" of June 16th/29th, 1914, he accuses, but does not discriminate

between the primary and secondary factors in the case :

“For me,” he says, “the date of June 16th/29th, when the order to attack the Serbian and Greek armies was given, has no greater importance than the dates of all the other orders which were issued by General Headquarters after the fall of Adrianople, and in accordance with which the second war was prepared for and ardently desired and called for even by the men who now either cannot or will not recognise that we were being fatally led up to June 16th/29th by the events which preceded it.”

The Bulgarian disaster on the battlefield did not mark the end of the “insensate crime”—as the war with the Allies was called in the Narodno Sobranjé. The sequel to that criminal policy (which was embodied in the treaties of Bucarest and Constantinople) was, in reality, the most severe shock which Bulgaria has experienced since the commencement of her national life. It constituted, in fact, her first national crisis, because up to that time Bulgaria had been accustomed to nothing but successes ever since she came into existence. And in this first national crisis the application of correct judgment upon the development of events and the action of responsible statesmen was suspended. The protests of the people were quickly suppressed. The criminals of yesterday, each playing for his own interests and striving to defend himself against the just condemnation of the people, set to work to confuse public opinion and lead it astray, with the result that, instead of seeking out those among themselves who were responsible for the “insensate crime,” the Bulgarians rendered Russia responsible and accused Serbia and Greece of having destroyed the Balkan Alliance.

No political system was ever established on such a wide-spread basis of hatred. The apostles of this new political system sought to build up a Bulgarian national egotism on a foundation of unlimited hatred. But hatred is the very inspiration of evil, and the developments of Bulgarian policy which have been manifested since the peace of Bucarest up to the present day have sprung from evil. The results of this policy have thus far been negative. The nation itself has been misled ; it survived a heavy disaster without drawing from it the moral deductions necessary for its future guidance. It was unable to profit from the opportunity given it by the defeat of the personal régime—which was responsible for the “ senseless crime ” of June 16th/29th—in order to inaugurate an era of political and civil liberty. Therefore the personal régime continued to exercise its full power. The opportunity to end it and place the nation in a position to exercise a more powerful influence on the administration had been given, but the occasion was allowed to slip, and the Bulgarian nation continued to remain, so to speak, outside the State, without power, exercising no influence on national affairs—simply a *materia gubernanda*.


The new Bulgarian home and foreign policy would seem to be of a negative character. Association with Austria has involved her in a denial of her own best interests. She has allied herself with the enemies of the Balkan nations and made herself but a pawn in the game of Drang nach Osten. Bulgaria has lost touch with her own moral foundations and has decisively negated the great political principle : “ The Balkans for the Balkan people.” Even at the time of the great successes registered by the Balkan Alliance in its struggle against the Turks, Bulgaria (in opposition

to the principle of solidarity against the common enemy in the north) maintained secret relations with Vienna behind the backs of her Allies, with the purpose of one day turning against those same Allies and against Russia, and establishing an hegemony extending from the Adriatic to the Black and Ægean seas. The scheme failed; but the evil remained, and has proved the guiding star of Bulgaria during recent events. No change in her clearly marked tendency has yet been accomplished through the influence of the European war. Neither her great moral obligation to the Powers of the Triple Entente, nor the debt of blood which she owes to Russia, nor her own national interests, have been able to divert her from the unhappy course upon which she set out before June 16th/29th, 1913.

BALKANICUS.

NISH,

March 1915.



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INTRODUCTION

AFTER the battle of Bunar-Hissar—Lule-Burgas, when the Bulgarians registered their first great victory, the Turks, who on the Thracian battlefield as on that of the Vardar had suffered one misfortune after another from the very beginning, became dejected and desirous of peace. But the Bulgarians, who, despite their victory, had not yet succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat upon the Turks, wished to continue.

They therefore set out for Tchataldja and marched for ten successive days ere they came in sight of the enemy's lines, without having at any time encountered a Turkish force. But there were also among the Bulgarians some who did not wish to proceed, and even within the General Staff opinions were expressed in that sense. The Court, however, was determined to push on. It had already set up Constantinople as its goal, and Dr. Danev was dispatched to Vienna to prepare the diplomatic terrain for a realisation of the royal ambition. Dr. Danev himself stated that it was necessary to win Vienna to the Bulgarian side for the sake of the final liquidation of Turkey-in-Europe.¹

¹ In his speech in the Sobranjé Mr. S. Kosturov spoke as follows :

“As was shown later on, the only purpose was to enter Constantinople. The ambition, the boundless ambition was to place the Cross on the Mosque of St. Sofia, in order that history should some day write : Simeon once came beneath the walls of Constantinople, but the Greek women broke his

Thus it happened that, on October 29th, 1913,¹ when Kiamil Pasha officially approached the King of Bulgaria with a peace proposition, that monarch firmly refused to enter into negotiations and forbade his Government even to inform the Allies of Kiamil Pasha's offer. Dr. Danev returned from Vienna on November 1st² and undoubtedly carried with him a favourable reply, because, on the following day, a new game was commenced. On November 2nd Kiamil Pasha's proposal was communicated to the Allies and negotiations were opened with them concerning the conditions both of an armistice and a definite peace. On the other hand, the Grand Vizier was informed that his proposal had been duly communicated to the Allies; but, in the early morning of November 4th, the Bulgarians commenced their attack on Tchataldja and sanguinary fighting continued for three days. This was obviously an attempt on the part of Bulgaria to cheat both the Allies and the Turks, but—it failed!

The attack on Tchataldja had been decided upon on the spot by King Ferdinand, without a previous conversation with the Chief of the General Staff, General Fitchev. This much was stated by Fitchev in "Kambana," and, after its failure, negotiations with the Turks for the conclusion of an armistice were commenced in very unfavourable circumstances. The

head there. It was Tsar Ferdinand who entered Constantinople as victor!" See the "Stenographic Journals of the National Sobranjé," vol. xvii. O.N.S., 1914, p. 536.

¹ The dates quoted throughout are "old style."—*Translator.*

² In his speech in the Sobranjé Dr. Danev asserted that he *returned* after the attacks on Tchataldja, but Mr. Gheshov declared that Dr. Danev returned on November 1st, and on account of bad roads *reached* Lozengrad after the battle of Tchataldja!

position had been reversed. Prior to the attack on Tchataldja the Turks had desired peace, and, as has already been mentioned, approached King Ferdinand to that end. Now it was the Bulgarians who insisted, and the Turks who hesitated. The Allies were kept in complete ignorance of the situation at Tchataldja and of the general trend of events.

King Ferdinand now desired a definite peace, whereas the Turks sought merely to discuss preliminaries. The Bulgarian Tsar was inclined—as became even more evident at a later date—to conclude peace with Turkey independently of the Allies; but it would appear that Kiamil Pasha would not consent to such an arrangement. For fully fifteen days the Turks, appreciating the difficult situation in which the Bulgarians found themselves, procrastinated, with the result that the Bulgarians finally concluded an armistice on a basis quite contrary to the arrangements which had been made with the Allies. As is well known, the Greeks declined to accept the armistice, but the Serbians (owing to strong pressure by Bulgaria as well as on account of their great distance from the *lieu* of negotiations) agreed to the Bulgarians negotiating and signing the armistice in their name also.

After the delegates of the Allies had left for the peace conference in London, King Ferdinand, thanks to the efforts of General Savov and Nazim Pasha, arranged that his emissary, Kocho Hadji Kaltchev, should be received in Constantinople. The mission of Kaltchev was to negotiate a separate peace with Kiamil Pasha behind the backs of the Allies and their official delegates assembled in London. This was contrary to the treaties with Serbia and Greece. Such an action could not, of course, be kept a secret, and the impression created

on the Allies and on the friendly Great Powers was exceedingly bad. In his pamphlet "The Criminal Madness," Mr. Gheshov writes as follows :

"The Prime Minister of a friendly Great Power of the Triple Entente informed me that Kocho Hadji Kaltchev was in Constantinople, and drew my attention to the unfortunate impression which his mission would make on Sir Edward Grey and the diplomatists in London when they heard that, behind the backs of our official delegates in London, we had sent an unofficial delegate to Constantinople. I replied that I did not know anything about it, and that I would resign my post if the Government were ignored in such a manner. Later on, another representative of a friendly Power spoke to me on the same subject, adding that the mission had so far achieved no result. Therefore I handed in my resignation orally, and consented to withdraw it only after I had been assured that the mission in question was not that of a delegate but one sent merely to obtain information."

That this statement was not correct, and that Kocho Hadji Kaltchev was in reality a delegate sent by King Ferdinand to negotiate terms of peace, is admitted by none other than Gheshov himself when he quotes the interesting and detailed statement of Damad Sheriff Pasha, the Minister of Education in Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet, which was published in the Turkish journal "Ikdam." This highly placed Turkish statesman says that Kiamil Pasha advised Mr. Kaltchev that Turkey was ready to conclude peace on the following basis : Macedonia and Albania to obtain autonomy, Adrianople with its vilayet and the islands to remain in the possession of Turkey, Dedeagatch to become a free port open both to Turkey and Bulgaria. Damad Pasha further declared that Kaltchev accepted these conditions with

the exception of that concerning Adrianople. (See Iv. Ev. Gheshev, "Prestupnoto Bezumiyé," Sofia, 1914, pp. 31-43.)

But when, some twenty days after the armistice, the General Staff reported to King Ferdinand that the Bulgarian army was rested and refreshed, and that further inactivity would result in demoralisation and disorganisation, the King seems to have become himself reinvigorated. His spirits rose, and he returned to his old ideas and plans. On December 28th he wrote to the Council of Ministers as follows :

"The Greeks and Serbs are burning with desire to continue the struggle together with us, and our refreshed and reinvigorated armies are enthusiastically looking forward to new victories which would put an end to their present dangerous inaction. You Ministers have been intimidated by Roumanian threats. I have not. Let Roumania even occupy our frontier if Europe permits her to do so. Such a disgraceful action should not limit our thoughts and intentions at this moment. The only salvation lies in the renewal of the war against Turkey and . . . after that we will consider Roumanian, Greek, and Serbian pretensions. Once again I address a fervent appeal to the Ministerial Council not to look this way and that, but to go bravely forward to the accomplishment of our only duty—to subdue Turkey." ¹

It is interesting to compare the above letter of King Ferdinand, which, as already stated, was dated December 28th, 1912, with his telegram of November 1st of the same year addressed to Mr. Gheshev in connection with Kiamil Pasha's peace proposal :

"Disagreeably surprised and deeply grieved by the

¹ See Iv. Ev. Gheshev, "Prestupnoto Bezumiyé," Sofia, 1914, pp. 31-43.

action of the Grand Vizier, I, as a Bulgarian and as supreme leader of those invincible and fearless armies which are now under the walls of Constantinople, and in the name of the honour of our country, am obliged to forbid you to communicate this demand of the Grand Vizier to our Allies until I have obtained the opinions of my assistants and of the commanders of the three armies—of the five men who are responsible for the issue of the war. I am now leaving for Lozengrad, and from thence shall proceed to Tchataldja by rail in order to consult them, and, until I have done so, I request you not to do anything with reference to the Grand Vizier's dispatch. Think only what it would mean for a man to oppose himself to the wishes of an army of 300,000 men." ¹

Many events had transpired between these two communications of King Ferdinand dated November 1st and December 28th respectively. The battle of Tchataldja on November 4th, 5th, and 6th had been fought, the Bulgarians had been repulsed, and this had been followed by the thirty-eight days' armistice which the Bulgarians had themselves concluded contrary to the arrangements made with their Allies. There had also been the mission of Kocho Hadji Kaltchev to Constantinople to negotiate a direct peace with Kiamil Pasha, behind the backs of the Allies and their delegates in London and contrary to the treaty with Serbia and with Greece.

It is interesting to note that the Bulgarian Supreme Command was itself convinced that, notwithstanding the prolonged armistice, the Bulgarian army was incapable of undertaking further operations against Tchataldja, this despite the fact that King Ferdinand had pressed for a renewal of the war and had suspended

¹ l.c., pp. 45-46.

the peace negotiations. Still, they hoped to be able to take Adrianople, which event would probably decide the final issue of the war, but it was afterwards shown that even that task was impossible until they obtained siege artillery from Serbia.

At last, in view of the pressure exercised by King Ferdinand, Dr. Danev, the first Bulgarian Delegate, broke off the peace negotiations in London with the consent of Mr. Gheshov. That Mr. Gheshov's Cabinet gave its consent unwillingly is shown by the following characteristic dispatches, addressed to Dr. Danev :

January 11th.—"The Council of Ministers thinks that before breaking off negotiations and denouncing the armistice, we should await Turkey's answer as promised. That answer should be first given, and it is only then that we can proceed to the rupture of negotiations and denounce the armistice. In addition, we are under agreement to interrupt negotiations only in accord with the Allies. Advise me by telegram if they are willing to do this before the arrival of the Turkish answer.

"GHESHOV."

To that dispatch Dr. Danev sent the following answer from London :

"In consequence of the events in Constantinople I yesterday had a conversation with the first Delegates of the Allies. The Serbs and Montenegrins were not willing to break off negotiations. The Greeks, being astute, were silent. *I expressed myself decidedly in favour of a rupture.* The Serbians and Montenegrins then advanced the argument that they had no instructions to this effect. As a rupture has become necessary we agreed that they should at once ask for instructions. I hope that I shall be able

to make all the Delegates take the only course which remains to us."

The negotiations were broken off on January 16th. The previous day General Savov had issued the following characteristic telegraphic order :

"The course of the peace negotiations shows that the enemy does not wish to cede a foot of the territory which our victorious armies have won. By a single stroke of the pen he desires to annihilate all that you and your heroic brethren who have fallen have acquired. Will the heroes of Seliolu, Kirk-Kilisse, Bunar-Hissar, Lule-Burgas, and Tchataldja permit this exit of the glorious Bulgarian army to remain without punishment? Certainly not. Prepare for new victories, and with your invincible 'forward' show the enemy and the entire world that the Bulgarian nation demands greater respect."¹

Upon leaving London each group of Delegates of the Allies left a Memorandum with Sir Edward Grey in which they explained their particular views and demands. In his Memorandum, Dr. Danev—as the Serbian Delegates positively ascertained while still in London—claimed for Bulgaria the town of Debra and a frontier joining Albania. This despite the fact that, according to the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria, Debra was to be ceded to Serbia! Here again was a gross act of disloyalty on the part of Bulgaria!

At the end of October 1912, when the Prohaska affair was attracting great attention, Dr. Danev, as confidential agent of King Ferdinand, went to Vienna in order to obtain the assistance and approval of Austria-Hungary to "the final liquidation of Turkey-

¹ Iv. Ev. Gheshov, "Prestupnoto Bezumiyé," pp. 46-54.

in-Europe"—that is to say, for the march on Constantinople. The explanation given to the Allies was that his mission was undertaken in consequence of Bulgaro-Roumanian difficulties, but on his return journey Dr. Danev evaded an interview with any one in Belgrade.

Again, in the middle of January 1913, Dr. Danev wrote a Memorandum claiming Debra and a frontier joining Albania, for and in the name of Bulgaria! All this Dr. Danev calls perfectly correct and perfectly loyal conduct! When, on March 13th, almost two months after the rupture of negotiations in London and with the participation of two Serbian divisions and the Serbian siege artillery, Adrianople fell, then, according to Mr. Gheshov, the idea again arose of attacking Tchataldja and marching into Constantinople.¹

The disregard and undervaluation of the assistance which had been rendered by Serbia in particular and the Allies in general was then even officially manifested. It was officially announced that the Bulgarians could have taken Adrianople unassisted, and that the help rendered by Serbia was only in the nature of a military diversion. This although the Serbians had on March 12th taken the farm Ekmekchikey, together with Hill 171, concerning which the French author Alain de Pennenrun had written: "It is probable that when Ekmekchikey falls we shall not have long to wait for the capitulation of Adrianople." Further, according to the testimony of military authorities, including Immanuel, the north-western sector, against which the Serbians were concentrated, was the most strongly fortified portion of the defences of Adrianople.

¹ l.c., p. 106.

The Bulgarians also denied that the Serbians had taken prisoner Shukri Pasha, the Turkish Commandant, and, in order to bolster up their presumption, invented various stories which they were obliged to change almost daily, because they were not only false, but were contradicted by the Turks themselves, as was subsequently proved by the Russian Colonel von Dreher.

Two currents of opinion developed simultaneously. One was to continue the march and enter Constantinople, the other contemptuously to undervalue the assistance of the Allies.

After the battle of Lule-Burgas the Bulgarians felt themselves capable of anything, and, when Tchataldja at last lowered their pride, King Ferdinand wrote to his Ministers advising them that the Serbians and Greeks were burning with desire to continue the war together with the Bulgarians. After the reduction of Adrianople, which was accomplished with the help of the Serbians, the Allies were again pushed into the background, and the Bulgarians proceeded to think only of themselves and began to transfer the Bulgarian army to the Serbian and Greek frontiers!

They commenced to insult their Allies, every day increasing the torrent of invective. Scarce anybody was inclined to listen, even for a moment, to any contemplation of treaties or suggestion of concessions. The most moderate among them dreamed of a Bulgaria occupying the frontiers mapped out in the Treaty of San Stefano, and consoled themselves for the concessions which the treaty with Serbia imposed upon them by the compensation they would receive in annexing Adrianople and its vilayet—territory which was not allotted to Bulgaria in the Treaty of San

Stefano, but which Russia now agreed should be included in the domains of the new Bulgaria.

On page 65 of his pamphlet, Mr. Ivan Ev. Gheshov writes thus :

“ Our policy was to create the great Bulgaria of San Stefano—not by the cession to Roumania of one of our rich provinces containing 300,000 inhabitants, but only by ceding Salonika to Greece.”

And on page 103 he adds :

“ Our programme was : if we did not thoroughly conquer the Turks, to secure administrative autonomy for European Turkey ; but, in the case of a complete victory, to create the Bulgaria of San Stefano, less the concessions imposed upon us by the treaty with Serbia, for which we should be compensated by annexing Adrianople and its vilayet.”

It never dawned on Mr. Gheshov that this was a much wider programme than that which the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty had in view, and that as such it necessarily involved a revision of that treaty ! No, even he, the most moderate of Bulgarians, refused to enter into any discussion of the treaty when the Serbian Government at first verbally, and then in a written document on February 23rd, 1913, put forward their request.

Nor did the warning expressed by Mr. Sazonov, in his letter dated May 3rd to the Russian Minister in Sofia, assist matters. This warning was, in fact, expressed in a very clear, though mild and friendly manner :

“ If, in view of the military conventions concluded after the war had already commenced,¹ the Bulgarians un-

¹ At the time Mr. Sazonov wrote this letter he was not thoroughly acquainted with the existing situation.

doubtedly seem to have had a right to the unlimited assistance of Serbia, the objects for which the Bulgarian Government requested this assistance (namely, the conquest of Adrianople and the country lying to the south of it) were, from the point of view of the general interests of the alliance, much more disputable, *because neither of the contracting parties could have anticipated their annexation at the time when they were drawing up the treaty and fixing the territorial boundaries indicated therein.*

“Serbia did not enter into any negotiations or discussion on the question. She was guided by a sincere conviction of the solidarity of the interests of both Slav countries. It is impossible not to recognise and to fully appreciate that indication of Serbian policy, and it calls for respect and sympathy towards the Serbian leaders. We anticipate that the Cabinet of Sofia will manifest a similarly wise attitude towards its engagements and tasks.”¹

Instead of listening to the friendly advice of Russia, the minds at the head of affairs in Sofia and in the army became more inflamed. Narrow national egotism spread its roots deeper and deeper, and they became more blind with every succeeding day!

“*In the early days of April,*” writes Mr. Gheshov, “*I was informed by an authoritative source that my peaceful policy was not approved and that I should speedily cede my place to some one else.*”

At that time, *i.e.* the beginning of April, the Bulgarians concluded an armistice themselves, which, as Mr. Gheshov says,² “was several times renewed!”

¹ “Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov,” No. 169, p. 118. The italics are ours.

² See Iv. Ev. Gheshov, “Prestupnoto Bezumiyé,” Sofia, 1914, pp. 58, 103.


*That again was contrary to the treaty with Serbia and Greece.*¹

In the following remarkable sentence Mr. Gheshov describes to us the state of mind prevailing in Sofia and in Bulgaria in the spring of 1913 :

“ History will show who were the impotent and incapable —those who offered a resistance to the patriotic catalepsy and the ‘ amiable ’ enthusiasm of Baya Ganyé which created the disaster, or those who tendered their cheap patriotism in the market-places in the spring of 1913 ! ”²

¹ The italics are ours.

² “ Baya Ganyé ” is the hero of the story of the late Aleco Konstantinov, the gifted Bulgarian writer who paid for his frankness with his life, because the Bulgarians found themselves therein correctly described, and held up to ridicule. He now stands for a Bulgarian national type, in the same respect as Michel stands for the Germans, Jacques Bonhomme for the French, and John Bull for the English.



THE ASPIRATIONS OF BULGARIA

THE HISTORY OF JUNE 16TH, 1913

I

ON April 15th, 1913, the Russian Minister in Sofia, Mr. Neklyudov, delivered, in the name of his Government, the following note to the Bulgarian Premier, Mr. Gheshov :

“ In consequence of reports received from several quarters of the extraordinary tension provoked between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, by the question of delimitation, the Imperial Government has been caused considerable anxiety. The Imperial Government draws the attention of the Bulgarian Government to the manifold consequences in which Bulgaria may become involved on account of her disagreement with her Allies. Roumania might take advantage of the temptation thus provided to put forward new demands, and, in that case, it is not improbable that extreme decisions would be come to in Bucarest. In Turkey itself the idea of the renewal of the war might be effectively revived. Up to the present time, Russia has done everything possible to localise the dispute and to ensure Bulgaria against attack from the rear. But, in the event of fratricidal conflict between the Bulgars, Serbs, and Greeks, even Russian public opinion would go against

Bulgaria, and the Imperial Government would have no other alternative but to remain a distressed spectator of the ruin of the Bulgarian cause, and would be obliged to limit itself to the protection of the Russian interests.

The Bulgars should not lose sight of the fact that, in the case of armed conflict, the treaty of 1912—the very treaty on which the Bulgars establish their claims to territory in Macedonia—would be rendered null and void. Finally, a conflict between the Allies would injure their financial situation in the view of the Great Powers, and would limit the borrowing powers of the belligerent States.

“Considering all these real and critical dangers, I expect Mr. Geshov to increase his efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the present crisis. Beyond everything, it is necessary to restrain the press, which is inflaming hostility among the Allies. This having been done, the next most important and advantageous thing is to arrange a meeting between Mr. Geshov and Mr. Venezelos, and between Mr. Geshov and Mr. Pashitch as soon as possible. We attach a special importance to such meetings, and we request Mr. Geshov not only to give benevolent attention to this suggestion but to communicate his answer to us as soon as possible.”¹

Sofia paid little heed to this warning. Immediately after the fall of Adrianople, Mr. Geshov's Cabinet, together with the King and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, commenced to elaborate plans and make preparations for an armed conflict with Serbia and Greece. On March 22nd a Cabinet Council, under the presidency of the King, was held in Adrianople to discuss the question of military operations, and to consider the existing political situation. According to the statements of General Savov, who was present

¹ “Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov” (August 1912–July 1913, No. 155, pp. 107–8). The italics are ours.

at that meeting, the following resolutions were passed after a prolonged discussion :

" 1. To arrest all further operations against the Turks, and secretly (without the knowledge of the Allies) to enter into negotiations with them, with a view to a temporary armistice.

" 2. Until the conclusion of peace, to leave in Thrace only such armed forces as are absolutely necessary for defence and to transfer the rest of the army, as quickly as possible, against the Serbs and Greeks in Macedonia." ¹

After these decisions had been reached, the President of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Gheshov, sent the following telegram :

"To the Assistant of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Savov

" ADRIANOPLE.

" Lieutenant-General Paprikov arrived here yesterday, and suggested that the army for Ishtib, Kochana, and Strumnitsa should be sent at once. Wire to me when the army could be sent thither, and when the transfer of the other sections of the Tundja division will be complete."

" (Signed) MINISTER-PRESIDENT GHESHOV.

" SOFIA, April 8th, 1913.

" No. 974."

General Savov replied to the Minister-President

¹ General Savov in his polemic "The Truth about the Catastrophe," "Dnevnik," No. 4219, of May 29th, 1914. Mr. T. Angelov, who was himself at Adrianople, asserted in the National Assembly (Narodno Sobranjé), that immediately after the fall of Adrianople the order was given that the army should go to Demir-Hissar, on the Greek frontier, and also to the Serbian frontier.—Stenographic Reports, "Narodno Sobranjé," 1914, xvii. p. 401.

² General Savov in the "Dnevnik," No. 4219, of May 29th, 1914.

Gheshov by a telegram, in which, among other things, he stated :

“ The concentration of our entire army for an action against the Serbs and Greeks will take at least twenty-five to thirty-five days. This delay would permit the Allies to seize the most important geographical points in our State, not excluding the capital. The only way out of this extremely awkward situation is to find means to conclude a *separate peace with Turkey*, as quickly as possible, and then, having arranged matters with her definitely, to immediately undertake the concentration of our troops. Any delay after the conclusion of peace might prove dangerous, and, as regards military operations, irreparable.¹

“ (Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ ADRIANOPLE, *April 10th*, 1913.

“ No. 3779.”

A similar exchange of views had taken place between King Ferdinand and General Savov at a much earlier date. Already, *on February 23rd* (the same day on which the Serbian note suggesting a revision of the treaty of 1912 was delivered to the Bulgarian Government), General Savov communicated the following suggestion to King Ferdinand :

“ 1. Conclude peace with Turkey under favourable conditions as quickly as possible, in order that we may withdraw our army from that front, on which the struggle has not only become objectless and purposeless, but might, in view of what has happened and will happen in Macedonia, become very dangerous to our highest national interests.

“ 2. Transfer the troops into Macedonia, while time yet permits. That which we fail to take from the Turks now, will not be permanently lost to us ; but what we lose now

¹ General Savov in “ Dnevnik,” No. 4219, May 29th, 1914. The italics are ours.

in Macedonia, will be lost without an opportunity for regaining it ever presenting itself. Tmirish and Krdjali once undermined the throne of Prince Alexander. This dynasty will not be undermined if we fail to take Midia-Rodosto. But if, on the other hand, after the heavy and costly sacrifices which we have made in this war, our highest and most vital interests in Macedonia are sacrificed, then will be. . . .¹

“(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“DEMOTICA, February 23rd, 1913.

“No. 3053.”

On the same day General Savov received the following telegram from King Ferdinand :

“To the Assistant of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General Savov

“DEMOTICA.

“Thank you for the telegram, No. 3053. We may ultimately content ourselves with the frontier line Saros-Midia, but on no account with the line Enos-Midia. *Everything depends on the fall of Adrianople, because the Great Powers expect it. After that we will study the question of the occupation of Macedonia by the Serbs and Greeks.*²

“(Signed) TSAR.”

While the Bulgarian leaders in Sofia were earnestly discussing the idea of the attack on the Allies, and were coming to decisions with regard to same, Russian diplomacy in Petrograd was seeking practical means of preventing a conflict between them.

Mr. Sazonov addressed telegrams couched in similar

¹ General Savov, “Dnevnik,” No. 4218, May 27th, 1914. General Savov replaced the last words of his letter to the King by dots, as he dared not publish them.

² Ibid. The italics are ours.

terms to the Russian Ministers in Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens, on April 9th (that is to say, prior to the 15th) *in which he proposed a simultaneous demobilisation to the Allied Governments.*

The Russian Minister in Belgrade, Mr. Hartwig, replied to that demand from Petrograd, by the following telegram :

“ The proposal for a simultaneous demobilisation, coming at a moment when the preliminary conditions of peace are being arranged, met with complete acceptance by Mr. Pashitch. He promised to immediately submit the proposal for decision by the Council of Ministers.

“ Mr. Pashitch now communicates to me that, provided Bulgaria and Greece accept the proposal, Serbia will commence to demobilise, reducing the effective of her army by from 80,000 to 100,000 men. In view of the disturbed condition on the Albanian frontier, he would regard a greater reduction as dangerous.¹

“ (Signed) HARTWIG.”

While the proposal of Mr. Sazonov was immediately followed by a further suggestion that the four Minister-Presidents of the Allies should meet in conference, the Bulgarian Government was devoting its attention to the prospect of armed conflict with Serbia and Greece. In this connection a Ministerial Council was held on the third day of Easter,² when Generals Savov and

¹ “ Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov, Kassayoushchihsya Sobitiei na Balkanskom Poluostrvye ” (August 1912–July 1913, 149, p. 103). As will be observed, the proposal for demobilisation was made by the Russian Government, and it is not the case, as the Bulgars assert, that Serbia arrogantly “ demanded it from Bulgaria.” (Speech of Mr. Todozov, in Sobranjé.)

² April 16th, 1913.

Fitchev were invited to attend. According to the statement of General Savov (in the "Dnevnik") the two Generals advised the Government to agree to and carry out demobilisation and delay the attack upon the Allies until the autumn, thus preventing them (the Allies) from taking advantage of the favourable strategical situation in which they would find themselves during the concentration of the Bulgarian army.

This was the opinion of the Supreme Military Command, wherein the voice of General Fitchev carried more weight than that of General Savov. The Government discussed the plan, but the members were not in unanimous agreement with it. The Ministers belonging to the Nationalist party, with Mr. Gheshov at their head, very largely approved of the scheme, but the other half of the Government's members, belonging to the Progressive-Liberal party of Dr. Danev, expressed a contrary opinion. According to them, demobilisation simply meant "signing the death-warrant of Macedonia." In consequence of the Ministerial disagreement, no decision was arrived at. It was, however, decided to request the King to call a Crown Council, to which the chiefs of the Opposition parties were also to be invited, and Generals Savov and Fitchev were to explain the reasons why the Supreme Command considered that the war with the Allies should be adjourned.

When King Ferdinand was informed of the Government's decision by the Chief of his Secret Cabinet, he ordered Generals Savov and Fitchev to return at once to their posts at Adrianople, at the same time informing them that he did not agree with the proposed Convocation of a Crown Council.

The peace negotiations with Turkey continued without result for a full month following the fall of Adrianople. The Porte resolutely refused to cede Rodosto-Midia as a frontier line, and the Bulgars declined to accept Enos-Midia. It was only towards the end of March that the Bulgarian Government accepted the frontier line of Enos-Midia, a course which provoked an outburst of great dissatisfaction from King Ferdinand, who described it as having been imposed by Russia.¹

The month of May saw no change in the Bulgarian attitude towards the proposals of Mr. Sazonov, either that concerning the demobilisation, or the suggested meeting of the four Premiers, which it was hoped would result in an understanding on the question of delimitation.

It would appear that, at a certain moment, Mr. Gheshov was himself associated with the agitation for an armed conflict with the Allies. Public opinion had become disturbed by disquieting rumours that the capital and the whole western frontier of Bulgaria were dangerously exposed to immediate attack by the Serbian army. These rumours were intentionally circulated in Sofia in order to prepare the people for an armed action against the Serbians. They impressed even Mr. Gheshov himself, for he drew the attention of General Savov to them in his telegram, No. 1314. Furthermore, the Government's organs, "Mir" and "Bulgariya," inaugurated a public campaign against Serbia. The object of that campaign was very clearly to undermine the foundation of the Balkan Alliance and exercise a pressure on Serbia and Greece. At the same time an attempt was made to create a current

¹ Iv. Ev. Gheshov, "Prestupnoto Bezumiyé," pp. 105-6.

of opinion hostile to Russia, both among the general public and the army.

The undue growth of the anti-Russian movement ultimately called forth a sharp warning from the Russian Government. This was embodied in a telegram from Mr. Sazonov, dated April 21st, as follows :

" From the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Sofia

" PETROGRAD,

" April 21st, 1913.

" Reports continue to reach us from various sources concerning demonstrations of dissatisfaction with Russia which are gaining ground in Bulgarian circles.

" We consider that the Bulgarian Government has information at its disposal which should lead it to take a very different view of our attitude towards Bulgarian interests, and we are the more convinced of that by reason of the reply of the Bulgarian Government to our note on the occasion of its misunderstanding with Serbia, which you communicated to us.

" Please inform the Bulgarian Government that we shall expect it to guide public opinion in the right direction, and that we have so much confidence in the statesmanship of the Sofia Cabinet, that we hesitate to attribute too great an importance to the efforts which false friends of Bulgaria are making to separate her from the road along which lie her true interests.¹

" (Signed) SAZONOV."

In contrast to the bitter anti-Serbian campaign which developed in Sofia, the conduct of the Serbian Government towards Bulgaria, as well as of the public opinion in Serbia, remained highly correct. That no change was manifested in the Serbian attitude towards

¹ " Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov " (August 1912-July 1913, No. 164, p. 114.

the Alliance is proved by the following telegram from Mr. Hartwig to his Government :

“ *April 20th, 1913.*”

“ I have spoken with Pashitch on the subject of the contents of your telegram of April 17th.

‘ He replied :

“ ‘ The alliance with Bulgaria is as precious to Serbia now as it was before, and she has never sought to break it. But in view of the events which have occurred, she considers it as most necessary that the treaty should be submitted to friendly revision.’

“ He, Pashitch, has not given up hope that the two countries will be able to arrive at a satisfactory understanding. If this should prove impossible, the Serbian Government is ready, in virtue of the treaty, to submit its aspirations and interpretations to the arbitration of the Imperial Government.¹

“ (Signed) HARTWIG.”

The efforts made by Petrograd to create a basis for a direct understanding between the Allies proved unsuccessful. Bulgaria was drifting deeper into the idea of armed conflict with Serbia and Greece, and it would seem that the Government concentrated its attention upon that method of solution. On this subject several telegrams were exchanged between the Minister-President and the Supreme Command.

Mr. Gheshov reminded General Savov several times that it was necessary to undertake prompt measures for the transport of the army from Thrace to Macedonia, in readiness for action against the Serbs and Greeks. However, the condition of the Bulgarian army

¹ “ Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov,” No. 163, pp. 113-14.

did not permit of so speedy an organisation for the attack as was desired and repeatedly urged from Sofia. General Savov, inspired by his assistant, General Fitchev, realised that he was face to face with a grave responsibility. For this reason he decided to send the following telegram to King Ferdinand :

“ *Very urgent*

“ *To His Majesty, the Supreme Commander*

“ (A copy to the Minister-President)

“ I consider it to be my holy duty to bring to the knowledge of your Majesty that the conditions in the army are becoming worse with each succeeding day. Dissatisfaction increases in proportion to the growth of disapproval in the various sections, in consequence of the helpless position in which they find themselves. According to information which reaches me, there is danger that disorder may break out on a large scale.

“ On the other hand, according to reports from a reliable source, the Turks are actually preparing for an action against us. They are throwing up new fortifications, bringing up guns, replacing losses with recruits, etc. All this, considered as a whole, presents the situation as very serious, and if we do not do all in our power to counteract it, I fear a catastrophe to our State. I earnestly request you to do everything that is necessary, and that without further delay, to come to an understanding with Turkey. A continuation of the existing situation might place our army and State in a dangerous position.¹

“ (Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ ADRIANOPLE, *April 27th*, 1913.

“ No. 4040.”

General Savov's telegram was received with dis-

¹ General Savov, “ *Dnevnik*,” No. 4220, of May 30th, 1914.

approval at Court. Ingenious intrigues were immediately planned against him by the Court camarilla, and rumours of his approaching dismissal began to circulate. News of the development quickly reached the ears of the General at Adrianople, and he did not long hesitate before openly siding with those who were advocating and demanding armed action against the Allies, and that as soon as possible.

The idea that Serbia should be attacked also obtained enthusiastic support in circles outside the Court camarilla, especially among those under the influence of the Austrophile political parties. This became more especially the case from the moment that the Russian Government communicated to the Bulgarian Government its views on the Serbo-Bulgarian question and on the delimitation in Macedonia. The Russian point of view was explained by Mr. Sazonov in a long letter, addressed, at the beginning of May, to the Russian Minister in Sofia, Mr. Neklyudov.

The text of that letter is as follows :

“The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister at Sofia

“ PETROGRAD,
“ May 3rd, 1913.

“ From earlier correspondence you will not fail to have seen that, in our opinion, both parties to the Serbo-Bulgarian difference have obligations under the treaty by which they are bound.

“ If, in the present case, our point of view favours the interests of Bulgaria, we nevertheless recognise that the demands of Serbia cannot be disregarded, in view of the moral and political considerations which the Belgrade Cabinet has raised.

“ If we consider the matter from the standpoint of the

armed assistance which the Allies have rendered to each other, the arguments of Serbia possess only a relative value; but the importance of Serbia's services has been acknowledged by the Sofia Cabinet, which was desirous of making a monetary payment for the assistance rendered by Serbia during the attack on Adrianople. The sincere emotion and repugnance which this proposal provoked in Serbia indicates another aspect of the case, which is possessed of a much greater hidden significance than the above-mentioned arguments. Indeed, if we look deeper into the character of the help given by Serbia to the Bulgarians, it is impossible not to acknowledge that it was rendered not merely in fulfilment of any formal engagements, but with the same enthusiasm with which the Serbs went about the realisation of their own national ideals, in occupying the provinces which shall form indisputably a part of the Serbian Kingdom. If, on the ground of military conventions concluded after the war had already commenced, the right of the Bulgarians to the unlimited assistance of Serbia would appear to be undoubted, nevertheless, from the point of view of mutual interests, the objects for which the Bulgarian Government asked for joint efforts appear much more questionable; viz. the conquest of Adrianople and the country which lies southward from it, *the annexation of which to Bulgaria could not possibly have been taken into consideration by either party when they were concluding the treaty and the delimitation of the frontiers.*

"Serbia, however, did not enter into any discussion of that question. She was prompted by a deep consciousness of the inner solidarity of the interests of both Slav countries. It is impossible not to honour that motive with deserving recognition and appreciation. It is a motive which has always been specially connected with Serbian policy, and calls for respect for and sympathy with its aspirations. In the same manner we expect that the present Cabinet of Sofia will fulfil its engagements and obligations wisely. Narrow national egoism might urge the Bulgarians to

demand a severe and literal interpretation of the treaty. In that case they might secure a little more territory, but they would risk losing what ought to be considered as most precious in their alliance with the Serbians—the consciousness of a fraternal solidarity confirmed by treaty.

“Bulgaria has to play a very important part in the destiny of the Balkan Peninsula. But if she should not realise the necessary importance of accepting, as the foundation of her position, the idea of solidarity with a State of the same race and the same religion, she is risking the loss of her predominance for a bagatelle.

“It is desirable that the Bulgarian Government should hesitate before the danger of thus alienating her Allies and neighbours from her by provoking a common feeling of distrust and doubt. Instead, they should seek to strengthen the ties, and thereby assure to Bulgaria brilliant prospects of future development.

“False friends of Bulgaria urge her to take one course of action, while Russia, in order to prevent her from making a false and suicidal choice, advises her to take another. If, after all, Bulgaria should choose the way of narrow opportunism, such a policy would undoubtedly be attended with great risk, and could only result in disappointment.

“Surrounded by hostile neighbours, and finding no support in Russia, she would seek in vain for support in other countries. She would fail to materialise her great development, to which we are willing now, as before, to lend our co-operation, if only Bulgaria will refuse to allow herself to be led in the wrong direction.

“These general considerations are brought forward on the eve of the settlement of the difference between Bulgaria and Serbia. If the former possess certain literal rights, and the latter merely moral claims, still the latter exercises an influence on the sentiment and psychology of the nation. Bulgaria would act wisely in recognising that a certain alteration of the agreed-upon frontier

delimitation is indispensable, and in consenting to certain small concessions.

"Such concessions, voluntarily made, would create a desirable impression in Belgrade, and would essentially strengthen the alliance of the two States, without which it would be impossible even to speak of the fulfilment of their engagements in the past.

"Please place these views before Mr. Gheshev, together with other political considerations which have an important bearing upon the policy of his State.

"We should very much like to induce the present Cabinet to agree to an exchange of views with Serbia, concerning the more precise definition of the frontier which they would be prepared to accept.¹

" (Signed) SAZONOV."

This letter of Mr. Sazonov was communicated to the Bulgarian Government on May 7th, but it is very probable that they were informed of its tenor at an even earlier date.²

From that moment recommenced the gradual breaking off of all relations between Russia and Bulgaria, and more energetic preparations for an attack on Serbia and Greece were undertaken. On that same day (May 7th), it was stated in official circles in Sofia that the Balkan Alliance had ceased to exist. The question of making territorial concessions to Serbia in proportion to the services which she had rendered and in consequence

¹ "Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov," No. 169, pp. 117-20.

² It seems that at the same time Mr. Romanovski brought to Sofia a confidential letter, containing more detailed particulars as to what concessions Bulgaria could make on her own initiative. Dr. Danev confirmed this in Narodno Sobranje, when Mr. Ghenadiev mentioned the incident. See in the Stenographic Journals (xvii. O.N.S., 1914) the speech of Mr. Ghenadiev.

of the totally changed political situation was not even considered in Sofia.

From that moment the conduct of General Savov entirely changed ; he became more aggressive. In addition to this, the last communication from the Imperial Government forced the partisans of the principle of armed conflict with Serbia to insist more energetically that the concentration of the Bulgarian army on the western frontier should be executed at once. Up to the eve of that communication, General Savov had not been able to transport more troops against Serbia.

In his telegram of May 3rd, No. 4116, dispatched to the Minister-President, General Savov attempted to justify himself by stating that, for the time being, only one brigade could be sent to the western frontier against Serbia, "and even that would expose our operations against Turkey to the greatest risk. The Supreme Command cannot, therefore, take the responsibility for the transport of a larger body of troops."

In the same telegram General Savov availed himself of the opportunity to make the following suggestion to the Minister-President :

"At such a critical time the political and military task cannot be settled by half-measures, but only by rapid and clear decisions which must be completely defined and established, viz. : what are the sacrifices which must be made, and what are the other considerations on which one must concentrate the entire armed force ?

"The question which has arisen is this: Ought we to withdraw the army from Tchataldja and Boulair and concentrate it entirely against Serbia, even if, in consequence of that withdrawal, we lose Adrianople and let fall again into Turkish hands those provinces which we have taken from them ? Or, shall we defend those countries

by there maintaining ourselves in strength, leaving the capital and the western frontier to any fate which may befall them? This question must be decided, not by the Supreme Command, but by the Council of Ministers, who ought to bring a clear decision to bear on it and communicate the same to the Supreme Command, who would then simply have to conform its arrangements to the decision of the Government. The Supreme Command cannot, on her own responsibility, leave the gates of the Adrianople forts open to their previous masters.

“A similar situation arose in the year 1885. The Ministerial Council in Sofia at that time, under the presidency of the Prince, decided that the southern frontier should be protected by a weak covering force, while the whole remaining army was concentrated against Serbia. That decision was communicated to the Supreme Command, which took all steps to concentrate the army at Slivnitza and other points. It is now evident that the Council of Ministers should again occupy itself with the question as soon as possible, inasmuch as the Supreme Command cannot decide on its own responsibility.

“As the measure which I have explained above is attended with great risk and should be undertaken only in an extreme emergency, I again express the opinion upon which I have more than once insisted—that, in order to be free to concentrate our army against Serbia, we should conclude peace with Turkey without any further delay, and exact guarantees from her that we shall not be exposed to attack from her side.

“I beg the Council to bear in mind that my earlier telegram of April 16th, relating to the concentration of all kinds of provisions and war material in Sofia, Radomir, Djumaya, Ferdinandovo, and Demir-Hissar, has not yet been attended to by the Ministry of War, in consequence of which we have not a grain of food in these places. From whence and how is the army to be fed if we should suddenly have to concentrate on that side?

“I am not aware that our relations with Roumania have yet been arranged. From whence, therefore, are we to supply the army with all the necessary provisions in case of a conflict with Serbia and Greece, when all the ports in the Ægean Sea will be closed to us? Furthermore, who will guarantee us a Roumanian base?¹

“(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ADRIANOPLE, *May 3rd*, 1913.

“No. 4116.”

According to another dispatch, General Savov, on the same day, sent a brigade, together with its artillery, to Sofia. At the same time two battalions of the fifth division were sent through Varna.

On informing the Government that the transportation of the troops against Serbia had commenced, General Savov, in contradiction to the spirit of his telegram of May 3rd, No. 4116, encouraged the Government in its policy by a telegram dated May 5th.²

“*To the Minister-President*

“SOFIA.

“I advise you to have courage and be unyielding in negotiations with the Allies, and to bear in mind that our armies are able to defeat and annihilate them easily. And in order to do that, there is no more favourable moment than the present one when they are provoking us. Only one thing is necessary for us, viz.: to make peace with the Turks and reconcentrate as soon as possible. We shall undoubtedly be more powerful than the Allies. The

¹ General Savov, “Dnevnik,” No. 4221, May 31st, 1914.

² As will be seen further on, General Savov often made contradictory reports. This was pointed out in the “So-branjé” by J. Sakazov. Was that merely his own fault, or was King Ferdinand also responsible?

moral of our army is very high, when considered from the standpoint of a war against the Serbs and Greeks. The whole army is burning with the desire for revenge. Only, I pray that all measures will be taken to replenish the supply of horses, and that different supplies will be ordered in time and delivered as indicated from here. Otherwise the Command will be unable to do its work satisfactorily, and it will be impossible to carry out the necessary operations.¹

“(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ADRIANOPLE, *May 5th*, 1913.

“No. 4228.”

General Savov followed up this telegram by another dispatched the next day (May 6th) to Mr. Gheshov, in which he emphasised his opinions :

“*To the Minister-President*

“SOFIA.

“War between us and the Serbs and Greeks is inevitable. . . . Any concession to our weak-kneed Allies will provoke tremendous dissatisfaction in the army—dissatisfaction which we should be unable afterwards to suppress. On the other hand, the question of the future of our fatherland has now to be decided—the question as to who is to obtain predominance in the Balkan Peninsula. The moment has now arrived in that struggle when we should take advantage of the state of affairs created by our Allies ; now is the time when we ought to devote all our efforts to that object. *A victorious war will definitely decide the question of supremacy in our favour.* After a year or two it will be impossible to do this, because Europe itself would not permit it. Therefore, in my opinion, we ought to use all our skill and cunning (without ourselves undertaking the responsibility for the war) to bring about

¹ General Savov, “*Dnevnik*,” No. 4222, June 1st, 1914.

an armed conflict with the Allies. Then we shall, by inflicting on them a decisive defeat, remove from our enemies the possibility of hindering us in the future realisation of our national aims. To my mind it would be an irremediable mistake to let this favourable moment pass us.

"According to military information which I have received concerning our future operations, *the Greeks will find themselves separated from the Serbs within four days, and will be obliged to ask for a separate peace to save themselves from defeat.* After that all our army will act against the Serbian army, which will nowhere be able to hold out against the vigorous attacks of our powerful columns.¹

"(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

"ADRIANOPLE, May 6th, 1913.

"No. 4242."

As this remarkable dispatch shows, General Savov has now become a statesman. He gives the Government political advice, he unfolds a complete political programme, and, as a military expert, expresses his opinion and conviction that that programme can very easily and very quickly be executed.

Remarkable and significant is the fact that his opinion and programme were subsequently adopted and put into execution in their entirety.

II

The condition of the Bulgarian army in the Thracian theatre of the war became critical. Reports that the troops were to be transported and concentrated with a view to waging war against the Allies had a disturbing effect on the whole army, although General Savov asserted quite the contrary. Suddenly many of the

¹ General Savov, "Dnevnik," No. 4223, June 2nd, 1914. The italics are ours.

troops mutinied. Twenty-eight regiments out of the fifty-four were in a state of revolt, but even the critical condition of the army did not prevent the Government and the high powers in the State from continuing to press matters forward towards an armed conflict with the Allies.

While the Bulgarian troops were being transported against Serbia, the Bulgarian Government simultaneously ordered its Minister in Petrograd to draw the attention of the Russian Government to the fact that the moment had arrived for the word of the high Arbiter to be heard.

Mr. Sazonov, in reply to Mr. Gheshov, wired to Mr. Neklyudov on May 7th as follows :

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Sofia

" PETROGRAD,

" May 7th, 1913.

(Telegram.)

" If we were convinced that Bulgaria would submit to our decision, which in this case would be favourable to her interests, we should be convinced that Serbia would also comply with that decision. Meanwhile, the chief difficulty at the present time seems to arise from the pressure which the armies and their commanders are exercising upon the Ruling Powers of the Allies. For this reason we attach special importance to our proposal for a simultaneous partial and equal demobilisation. The most acceptable method of procedure would be an agreement to reduce the allied armies of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to about a third or a quarter of their present contingent. *We have submitted a similar proposal to Belgrade and Athens.*¹

" (Signed) SAZONOV."

¹ "Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov," No. 171, p. 121. The italics are ours.

The Russian proposal to reduce the mobile strength of the army was in complete contrast to the general tendency towards a war with the Allies, and the opportunity of profiting by the existing situation. In military circles the conviction was general that Bulgaria would run no political or military risk in attacking Serbia and Greece. They were confident in their expectations of complete success both on the field of battle and in the domain of politics. The following characteristic and significant dispatch of General Savov is a confirmation of this :

“ To the Minister-President of Sofia

“ Kindly allow me to express my opinion on the questions which are now occupying the attention both of the nation and of the army.¹

“ Considering our superiority to the united Serbian and Greek armies, and our certain success in the event of armed conflict with them, if we maintain our stubborn and unyielding attitude towards them, we shall force them to accept our proposals in order to escape inevitable defeat at our hands. Should the Allies fail to fall in with our proposals, we shall be ready to declare war, and this readiness on our part will create a favourable impression with the powers of the Triple Entente, through whose support the Allies hope to substantiate their claims. These hopes will not, however, be realised.

“ Taking all things into consideration, we may be certain that Russia and France will ultimately prefer to agree with Bulgaria rather than Serbia and Greece (even if it be merely from fear of losing her from their sphere of

¹ It is interesting to note that General Savov infringed to an increasing degree on the political aspect of the question, and did not allow the Government to deal with these matters, as he himself had previously recommended.

influence) notwithstanding the fact that they are, at the present time, energetically supporting their claims in the name of the so-called 'balance of power' in the Balkans. *The Triple Entente will be obliged to step in, because, when the armed forces of the Great Powers are divided into two groups—the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente—that group will be the more powerful to which Bulgaria will have allied itself.* The new Bulgaria will be able to place fourteen to fifteen armed corps of tried and famed repute on the battlefield. The Serbs and Greeks, on the other hand, will never be able, either now or in future, to supply an army equal to that of Bulgaria, either in quantity or quality. Therefore, it is perfectly clear that superiority will rest with that side to which Bulgaria has allied herself—superiority not only from a military, but from a political point of view. At present the Powers of the Triple Alliance are stronger, because France is not in a position to increase her army, which is weaker in numbers than the German army, and it is to be doubted whether the law with regard to three years' service with the colours will be of much help in that respect, inasmuch as this law has met with great opposition from the masses. If Bulgaria, with her vast army, openly joins the Triple Entente, the balance of superiority will be changed in favour of the Triple Entente. In truth, that superiority will necessarily be greater if the Serbs and Greeks also joined the Triple Entente.

“Of the two conflicting parties—Bulgaria on the one hand, Serbia and Greece on the other—the weight of Bulgaria will tell most in the long run. Bulgaria, as an armed power, is of first importance in European politics. Her position thus gives her irrefutable reasons why her rights with regard to delimitation should be respected. The Russians and French must be made to appreciate thoroughly—both by word and deed—that we are determined to go to any extreme if our rights are ignored.

“In view of the foregoing, I must most urgently request you

*once again to insist that the signature of the separate peace with Turkey shall take place on Friday, if by that time it is not also signed by the Allies. This will, no doubt, be unfavourably regarded by some of the Powers, but you may be sure they become more modest for fear of losing us from their orbit. And, when once that peace has been declared, and we succeed in placing another division in Macedonia against the Serbs, they and the Greeks will hide themselves in 'mouseholes,' and their protectors, wishing neither to plunge Serbia into war, nor to lose us, will advise her to comply with our demands. That is the surest means of completely realising our pretensions. Any other way will only lead to an infringement of our rights in Macedonia, and that, after demobilisation, will produce great dissatisfaction in the nation—a dissatisfaction which will gradually assume a much more serious form. I make this assertion bearing well in mind the opinion of the rank and file of the army, which—and this fact must not be forgotten—of itself represents at the present time the entire Bulgarian nation. If we fail to pay full attention to this, it may happen later on that, instead of peacefully following the pathway of strong and peaceful development, the State will find itself beset by difficulties which will, perhaps, bring about its ruin—a contingency which will give great satisfaction to our enemies.*¹

“ (Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ ADRIANOPLE, *May 14th, 1913.*

“ No. 4463.”

Notwithstanding the ardent desire for war with the Allies (Greece and Serbia) on the part of Bulgaria, conversations with regard to the reduction of the armies were continued between Sofia and Petrograd. On May 13th, the Russian Minister at Sofia telegraphic-

¹ General Savov, “ Dnevnik,” No. 4227, June 6th, 1914. The italics are ours.

ally advised Mr. Sazonov that the Bulgarian Government had accepted his proposal for a reduction of the army to one-third or even one-fourth of its actual strength. Yet, two days later, King Ferdinand ordered the Supreme Command to accelerate as far as possible the concentration of the troops on the western frontier towards Serbia and Greece, and to make arrangements for the transport of the entire Bulgarian army from the Thracian theatre.¹

It is clear that the proceeding was enacted while Mr. Greshov was in power, for he did not resign until May 17th. The day following the receipt of the King's new order (*i.e.* May 16th), General Savov dispatched the following telegram :

"To the Minister-President

"I see that matters are being precipitated in Sofia. That is a bad sign and bodes ill. For, although war be inevitable, the army should be allowed time to make full preparation; namely, to get together supplies and provisions, to procure horses and have other things in reserve. In short, time should be allowed to complete the concentration, which, on account of the existing deficiencies and poor facilities, is by no means an easy task. *The necessary time should be provided for by diplomatic negotiation and should at least be sufficient to enable us to remove the IVth army from the Bulair front to Macedonia; i.e. at least twenty-five or thirty-five days.* If that is accomplished the danger of a Serbian attack may be considered as dispensed with, but, as already stated, in order to effect this we must have firstly time, and secondly, political circumstances which shall permit the withdrawal of our army from Thrace.

¹ General Savov, "Dnevnik," No. 4226 and 4227, June 5th and 6th, 1914.

“It seems to me that, in spite of the extreme chaos in the political situation, our military movements should be executed coolly and quietly. This, in my opinion, is the only way of extricating ourselves from this situation with honour.¹

“ (Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.”

This telegram was sent on May 16th, and between that date and June 16th midnight, when the attack on the Serbs and Greeks was carried out, the delay which General Savov demanded from the Bulgarian Government (namely thirty days) had elapsed. During that month it had been considered desirable to preserve unchanged the state of affairs existing between the Allies by diplomatic means, at the same time entering into no agreement with Russia, especially with reference to the proposed reduction of the army. This is set out in the following telegrams :

“ *To the Minister-President*

“ SOFIA.

“It is necessary to maintain the present situation in suspense until June 10th, as the crisis will be reached on May 31st. On that latter date we shall be in a position to take aggressive action on a certain front.²

“ (Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ ADRIANOPLE, *May 19th, 1913.*

“ No. 4683.”

On the same day General Savov also sent the following telegram :

“ *To the Minister-President*

“ SOFIA.

“The situation has been changed on account of the point

¹ General Savov, “ Dnevnik,” No. 4228, June 9th, 1914.

² Ibid., No. 4230, June 9th, 1914.

of view which Serbia has adopted concerning the treaty, and I regret, in consequence, that no steps can be taken for demobilisation. We shall soon be in a position to concentrate all our power upon obtaining our rights.¹

“(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ADRIANOPLE, *May* 19th, 1913.

“No. 4681.”

Mr. Gheshov resigned the Premiership on May 17th. The fact of his resignation was, however, at his own request, kept secret until Dr. Danev returned from London to Sofia, and was not made public until May 27th, until which date it follows that the burden of the responsibility rested on the shoulders of Mr. Gheshov and his Cabinet.

In the meantime, on May 15th, Mr. Pashitch had already made a statement, well supported by documentary evidence, explaining the reasons which rendered necessary a revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. Mr. Sazonov himself had also advised the Bulgarian Government of the justice of Serbia's point of view in a letter dated May 3rd, which we have already quoted in full.

The Bulgarian Government resolutely declared itself against any revision of the treaty after February 23rd, when Dr. Spalaikovitch, the Serbian Minister at Sofia, personally brought to Mr. Gheshov a declaration from Mr. Pashitch in which the Serbian Premier communicated the point of view of the Serbian Government on the revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. Mr. Pashitch emphasised in his letter that in the case where this point of view was not admitted, Serbia and

¹ General Savov, “Dnevnik,” No. 4230, of June 9th, 1914. The italics are ours.

Bulgaria had always arbitration as the last means of solution of the difference apropos of the delimitation of territory in Macedonia. Government and High Commanders were equal and resolutely against revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. General Savov demanded by an urgent dispatch, No. 4534 of May 16th, information from the Government of Bulgaria concerning its proposed action in view of the declaration of Mr. Pashitch on the revision of the treaty. In reply to this demand the Prime Minister sent him the following telegram :

*"To the Assistant of the Commander-in-Chief, Adrianople
" No. 4534*

"The Council of Ministers has definitely decided not to withdraw from the treaty made with Serbia, and as the Serbs persist in demanding a revision of the treaty (to which we can in no wise agree), the situation remains very serious.¹

"(Signed) MINISTER-PRESIDENT GHESHOV.

"SOFIA, May 17th, 1913."

After this telegram had been dispatched, those in command hurried on with their task of making every preparation for the concentration of the Bulgarian troops for an immediate attack. With that object in view several telegrams were sent on May 17th and 18th from Adrianople to the Minister-President and even to King Ferdinand in person, all concerning the acceleration of the transport of the troops and preparations for concentration. The most characteristic were the following :

"To the Minister-President, Sofia

"In view of the seriousness of the situation, I request

¹ General Savov, "Dnevnik," No. 4229, June 8th, 1914. The italics are ours.

the War Minister urgently to expedite the collection of provisions at those places already designated by the Military Authorities.¹

“(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ADRIANOPLE, *May 17th*, 1913.

“No. 4559.”

“*Very Urgent*

“*To the Minister-President, Sofia*

“I urgently request you to accelerate the reception and expedition of artillery ammunition. If there is any deficiency of this material, which is of first importance, the army will be placed in a very difficult position.²

“(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ADRIANOPLE, *May 17th*, 1913.

“No. 4561.”

“*To His Majesty the Commander-in-Chief, Sofia*

“(Copy sent to the Minister-President)

“I beg that the Minister of Roads and Communications will do his utmost (as far as lies in his power) to secure the necessary amount of coal for the railways, also to ensure that the Sofia-Kiustendil line be left absolutely clear and placed at the disposal of the army—otherwise I shall not be able to concentrate the army in time and all calculations for the expedition of the forces will be upset, as we have counted on the Sofia-Kiustendil line being clear. In spite of the fact that two months ago I urged the securing of as much coal as possible, this work is not yet complete, and the railway lines have to be used exclusively for the trans-

¹ General Savov, “Dnevnik,” No. 4230, June 9th, 1913.

² Ibid.

port of coal, with the result that the army will have to go on foot.¹

“(Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ADRIANOPLE, *May 18th, 1913.*

“No. 4562.”

Notwithstanding these evident preparations for an attack on Serbia, attempts were made in Sofia to accuse Serbia of aggressive intentions towards Bulgaria. Again, the Bulgarian Government informed the Imperial Government at Petrograd (through the Russian Minister in Sofia) that Serbia was preparing to attack Bulgaria in a day or two! Bulgaria endeavoured in that manner to conceal her own real intentions, and pretended that she was in danger of and feared an attack from Serbia. Mr. Sazonov thought it expedient to inform Mr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade, of Bulgaria's alarm and to invite him to make representations to and ask an explanation from the Serbian Government. To that telegram the Russian Minister in Belgrade replied to Mr. Sazonov as follows :

“*May 17th, 1913.*

“I have discussed the contents of your telegram of May 14th with Mr. Pashitch, and he positively denies that Serbia has any intention of attacking Bulgaria, and adds that he, in accordance with the advance of Russia, incessantly continues to invite Bulgaria to friendly conference.²

“(Signed) HARTWIG.”

Mr. Sazonov's proposal *re* demobilisation brought

¹ General Savov, “*Dnevnik*,” No. 4230, June 9th, 1913.

² “*Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov*,” No. 187, p. 131.

about a critical state of affairs in Sofia. Although Bulgaria had already—on May 3rd—promised Russia that she (together with the other Balkan States) would reduce her army to a third or even a quarter of its then existing strength, Mr. Gheshov had no real intention of reducing the army. Mr. Sazonov therefore deemed it necessary to repeat his proposal to Serbia, and at the same time to urge upon Bulgaria the necessity for a general conference of the Prime Ministers of the respective States at an early date, in order to bring about a direct understanding with regard to the question of delimitation in Macedonia.

The Bulgarian Government forthwith communicated to General Savov Mr. Sazonov's second proposition :

“Neklyudov read the following dispatch to me to-day from Sazonov, and I request you to let me have your opinion on it.¹

“(Signed) MINISTER-PRESIDENT GHESHOV.

“SOFIA, *May 18th*, 1913.

“No. 1603.”

Here follows Mr. Sazonov's dispatch, which was sent to Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens :

“Our suggestion that on the signature of the preliminary treaty the Allies should reduce the numbers of their respective armies met with the Allies' approval in principle. Bulgaria has consented to reduce her army to a third or

¹ It is not at all clear why Mr. Gheshov should have asked the advice of General Savov upon a matter which it behoved the Government to settle, unless the object was to shelve the Russian proposition. The Supreme Command could only reasonably be expected to give its opinion on the extent to which the Bulgarian army should be reduced.

even a quarter of its present number. Serbia is willing to reduce hers to 100,000 men—in other words, to a third of its present standing. The Greek Minister, promising to arrange accordingly with the King, has, in principle, also agreed to reduce the Greek army in proportion to that of the Serbs; and he has requested us to inform him of the total number of men which will remain in the Bulgarian army when it has been reduced to a third of its present size. It is desirable that now, after the preliminary peace has been signed, our proposition should be put into force. Therefore, it is the duty of the Allies to come to a definite understanding upon the matter, as it is very closely bound up with the question of the delimitation of their respective zones. As negotiations between the Bulgars and the Greeks on this matter are carried out in Salonika, do not the Allies think it would be possible to come to an understanding with regard to partial demobilisation there also? Serbia could send a representative to Salonika for this purpose.

“Please make representations to the Government to which you are accredited to the effect that we wish to settle this preliminary matter satisfactorily for all concerned as soon as possible. If the Allies can come to an agreement among themselves without the necessity of our sending a representative, we should be immensely pleased; but if, in the other case, any difficulties crop up, we shall be willing to help them.”

The Bulgarian Supreme Command now took advantage of the opportunity presented it, to frustrate the demobilisation proposition of Mr. Sazonov. General Savov had already conceived a plan of evasion. Although the question of demobilisation was plainly a political matter and, in fact, out of the sphere of the Military Command, he put forward conditions which, in general, could not be accepted. General Savov

had foreseen this and drawn the attention of the Bulgarian Government to it. The said conditions are stated in detail in the following telegram, by which General Savov replied to Mr. Gheshov and his telegram of May 18th :

“To the Minister-President, Sofia

“Owing to the view which Serbia now takes concerning the treaty¹ and to the fact that in Petrograd they are inclined to recognise Serbia's right to compensations outside the contested zone, the situation is changed. In my humble opinion we should certainly not agree to demobilisation except upon the following conditions :

“1. The Serbs, before demobilisation, must evacuate the land which belongs to us.

“2. If that should be impossible, then we should commence to demobilise only when the *Great Powers* have given their guarantee that Serbia will fulfil every obligation entailed by the treaty.

“3. If these conditions cannot be obtained, then demobilisation shall take place only on condition that *Bulgaria shall send into Macedonia as great a number of armed men as Serbia and Greece together have at present in Macedonia.*”²

In his estimate of the number of soldiers each of the Allied States should be allowed to retain, General Savov goes to such extremes that he proposes that Bulgaria should retain two and a half times as many men as Serbia and Greece put together! In his telegram General Savov gives the following details :

“Bulgaria ought to retain 240,000 men, Serbia 66,000,

¹The Serbian view was well known at Sofia in February, and General Savov here undoubtedly alludes to Mr. Pashitch's declaration of May 15th.

General Savov, “Dnevnik,” No. 4232, June 11th, 1914.

and Greece 27,000." He adds, " But to this the Serbs and Greeks will never agree."

Russia could not accept such terms either. The second of these conditions denied the Tsar of Russia the right, to which he was entitled by the treaty, to act as High Arbitrator in questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. In addition to the High Arbitrator, Bulgaria demanded that the European Concert also should guarantee her that the treaty would be executed in its entirety. In that way the sense of Russian arbitration would have been contradicted in advance.

That General Savov had no intention of demobilising, and that, on the contrary, he was pressing towards an armed conflict, is clearly proved by the conclusion of his telegram, which is in a characteristic vein :

" In order that the Government may rightly direct their policy, I consider it my duty to inform them that our military position is excellent at the present time, thanks to the extraordinary measures taken prior to the signature of peace. In addition to this it seems that, after all, Turkey will fulfil the conditions regarding demobilisation, as she has already begun to withdraw her army from Tchataldja. This leaves us free to withdraw a great part of our army from that front, leaving there only sufficient numbers to keep order and watch the frontier. Thanks to the rapid transport of our troops, by to-morrow our capital will be safe against attack. By May 31st our position in Macedonia will be so strong that the Serbs will find it absolutely necessary to be more amenable. And by the middle of June our position on all fronts will be such that her protectors will hasten to force Serbia to agree to execute the treaty in its entirety in order to save herself from inevitable ruin.

“ No attention must be paid to the exaggerated rumours of a feeble moral in the army. The uncertainty of events and the long-delayed attack have, to a certain extent, exercised a bad influence, but now that peace has been signed, spirits are high, and all are eager to avenge the insult paid to our national honour. Thanks to those high spirits the army (when called upon to take in hand their national aims at the bidding of the Tsar, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Government) will fight with the same readiness and self-sacrifice as it did on the battlefields of Thrace and Macedonia, and will again cover the Bulgarian nation with glory. Therefore, in so far as the development of our policy depends upon the strength of our army, the Government will be free to take an energetic line of action in ten to fifteen days from now.”¹

It seems that no one in Bulgaria had seriously thought of demobilisation, and King Ferdinand in less degree than the others. The best proof of that is to be found in the conditions subsequently put forward. Meanwhile the Bulgarian troops were being speedily transported against Serbia and Greece in accordance with plans drawn up at Adrianople by General Savov the previous February, and approved by King Ferdinand before the fall of the fortress.

All Bulgaria's energies were now concentrated on the execution of these plans, and negotiations with Mr. Sazonov were carried on merely to gain time.

As we shall see later, the first part of the proposal put forward by Mr. Sazonov, concerning demobilisation, had been evaded by Bulgaria when (acting on the advice of General Savov) she demanded that before the

¹ This telegram sent by General Savov was also quoted by Mr. Gheshov in his pamphlet “ Prestupnoto Bezumiyé,” Sofia, 1914, pp. 88-9.

dispute was settled, Bulgaria should occupy Macedonia conjointly with Serbia and Greece. Therefore, all thought of demobilisation had to be given up. It only remained to evade also his second proposal: namely that the four Prime-Ministers should hold a conference to settle the question of delimitation in Macedonia between themselves. Before the date of this conference could be fixed, however, it was urgent that a meeting should be arranged between Mr. Pashitch and Mr. Gheshov. This meeting was advised by Petrograd, and was to take place on May 19th at Tsaribrod.

At that time, Mr. Gheshov had received an assurance that Bulgaria was in no danger of an attack from Serbia. In a private telegram sent to General Savov on May 13th recommending him to avoid any incident with the Greeks, Mr. Gheshov adds :

“ One of the most well-informed diplomats here advises me that Serbia will not attack us unless we provoke war with the Greeks.”

Mr. Neklyudov, the Russian Minister in Sofia, warned Gheshov of the danger in which Bulgaria would place herself if she made war on the Allies, and also alluded to his own responsibility in these matters in the following words :

*“ The Minister in Sofia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
in Petrograd*

“ May 17th, 1913.

“ In my conversations with Mr. Gheshov I have repeatedly advised him of our conviction that Bulgaria should make some concessions to the Serbs, and that she should speedily enter into negotiations with Greece re delimitation. I warned him of the dangers involved in

further persistence and continued hesitation, dangers consequent upon the financial, moral, and nervous exhaustion of Bulgaria, as well as the cruelty of demanding renewed sacrifices and efforts from the people and the army, who have already given and suffered so much. Mr. Gheshov has promised me that he will not delay a definite reply.¹

“ (Signed) NEKLYUDOV.”

Mr. Gheshov, who through the months of March and April had not the moral courage to stand out in opposition to the events which were leading up to war with the Allies, and who, by his indecisive and hesitating conduct, had to a certain extent aided the preparations for war, now, at the last moment, began to express himself more definitely in favour of a pacific settlement of the dispute, although still with some reserve. In the aforementioned telegram of May 13th, Mr. Gheshov makes his first firm announcement that a pacific policy should be adopted. The telegram runs as follows :

“ To the Assistant Commander-in-Chief, Adrianople

“ Lieutenant-General Ivanov’s statement that he awaits your order to attack certain positions has made a deep impression here. I once more draw your serious attention to the dangerous consequences that would result for this country in the event of such aggression in our present unprepared condition. I must warn you that the Government most decidedly refuses to be drawn into a second war *unless preparations are completed and we are as well equipped as we were in the first war.* It would be criminal to act in any other manner.”²

¹ “ Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov,” No. 189, p. 132.

² Iv. Ev. Gheshov, “ Prestupnoto Bezumiyé,” Sofia, 1914, p. 108.

When Mr. Gheshov began to define a policy in favour of a peaceful understanding between the Allies, many intrigues against him were set afoot, more especially by General Savov and the Court camarilla. King Ferdinand began seriously to contemplate and make preparation for the dissolution of Mr. Gheshov's Cabinet. To this Mr. Gheshov refers in his book "Prestupnoto Bezumiyé" ("The Criminal Madness") as follows:

"From a source which is deserving of confidence I heard that the Supreme Command had received a report that my pacific policy was not approved and that I should soon have to cede my place to some one else. . . . Forthwith the agitation against me assumed a more concrete shape."¹

This was more clearly demonstrated when, on May 16th, King Ferdinand called to a Crown Council all the heads of the political parties except Mr. Gheshov, *who was kept in the dark and knew nothing of the summoning of the Council*. In his book Mr. Gheshov makes allusion to this:

"*The following day, Mr. Dobrovitch, Chief of the Secret Cabinet of King Ferdinand, told me that all the political leaders had declared themselves in favour of a warlike policy, and that I alone now favoured a pacific policy in the settlement of the dispute between the Allies. Whereupon I informed Mr. Dobrovitch that once and for all there must be an end of this sort of thing, and that, as I had already informed him and my colleagues, I should resign.*"²

About that time—according to Mr. Gheshov's book—the rupture between King Ferdinand and himself became very apparent, while the influence of all-power-

¹ Iv. Ev. Gheshov, "Prestupnoto Bezumiyé," Sofia, 1914, p. 107.

² In the same book, p. 108. The italics are ours.

ful though irresponsible factors was becoming stronger both in the army and in the world of politics. Mr. Gheshov writes :

“ I told Mr. Neklyudov that I was powerless to struggle on any longer in my endeavours to obtain a peaceful solution of the dispute between the Allies against my many opponents, and considered it my duty to speak thus because it was in the interests of Bulgaria to point out to the Russian representative the grave seriousness of the situation.” ¹

At last, on the night of May 17th, the report having been received that peace had been signed in London, Mr. Gheshov sent in to the King the resignation of his Cabinet drawn up as follows :

“ YOUR MAJESTY,

“ A telegram has just come through stating that peace with Turkey has been signed to-day. By that treaty a war which glorified the name of Bulgaria and gained for her an extension of territory, has been brought to a close. But with its signature commences the liquidation of the results of the struggle of the Allies against the Turks. Your Majesty may think it advisable to form a new Cabinet to cope with this situation, and in order to render this possible the present Cabinet, of which I am the head, respectfully requests Your Majesty to accept its resignation.

“ Both I and my colleagues beg to thank Your Majesty, etc.

“ (Signed) I. E. GHESHOV.

“ SOFIA, *May 17th*, 1913.”

This resignation was sent in on the night of May 17th,

¹ Iv. Ev. Gheshov, “ Prestupnoto Bezumiyé,” Sofia, 1914, p. 106.

but remained unaccepted for a week, that is up to May 24th, because Mr. Gheshov wished that it should be kept secret until the arrival of Dr. Danev from London. Meanwhile the time had arrived for the projected meeting of Mr. Gheshov and Mr. Pashitch and also of Mr. Venezelos and Mr. Gheshov. The Russian Government, however, now that things were coming to a head, foresaw that new and perhaps greater difficulties might arise, and reminded the Governments in Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens of their respective responsibility and invited them all three to meet at Petrograd. The following telegram was dispatched by Mr. Sazonov :

*"The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ministers in Sofia,
Belgrade, and Athens*

"(Communicated to Cetinge)

" PETROGRAD,

" May 17th, 1913.

" . . . If, after all, the meeting of the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian Ministers should not lead to a successful outcome to the direct negotiations, Russia (although she does not admit the possibility of an internecine war and will hold responsible the nation which fails to manifest a conciliatory spirit) invites these three Ministers to meet in Petrograd to fix, with the assistance of Russia, the general principles upon which peace can be re-established in the Balkans, and which will lead to a strengthening of the Balkan Alliance.¹

"(Signed) SAZONOV."

Although Mr. Gheshov had already sent in his resignation, he nevertheless went as arranged on

¹ "Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov," No. 176, p. 131.

May 19th to meet Mr. Pashitch at Tsaribrod. We deem that to have been an action politically incorrect towards both Serbia and Russia. However, at Tsaribrod it was decided to hold a meeting later on of all three Prime Ministers. When Mr. Gheshev returned from Tsaribrod to Sofia it was announced that his resignation had been accepted by the King.

This announcement was made on May 24th.¹

III

The formation of a new Cabinet was entrusted by King Ferdinand to Dr. Danev, whose party had been represented in Mr. Gheshev's Cabinet. This was characteristic, and only what might have been expected.

We have seen that Mr. Gheshev was, so to speak, driven from power. On several occasions he had been told that his pacific policy was not approved. Then, finally, on May 16th, he was affronted by the calling together of a Crown Council without his knowledge, after which he was informed by the King's Secretary that all the party leaders had disapproved of his attitude.

Seeing that after Mr. Gheshev's resignation had been so provoked, Dr. Danev was entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet, it is natural at least to presume that his views more closely coincided with those of

¹ The manner in which Mr. Gheshev was forced to dissolve his Cabinet and resign from power after he had pursued so successful a policy in the war with Turkey, now at an end, was a brutal stroke and made a very bitter impression upon him. A year later Gheshev wrote in his aforementioned book that the King had rejected him like a Moor who had finished his job (*der Moor hat seine Pflicht getan, der Moor kann gehn*).

the party leaders who had been present at the Crown Council than with those of Mr. Gheshev. On many points this surmise was correct. In effect, Dr. Danev and his friends in Mr. Gheshev's Cabinet were in many respects in disagreement with their Prime Minister. Mr. D. Christov, a friend of Dr. Danev and Minister of Justice in Mr. Gheshev's Cabinet, had held very pronounced views in favour of a warlike policy. Also, since October 16th, Dr. Danev had shared King Ferdinand's ideas, and his conduct throughout was very different from that of Mr. Gheshev.¹

Therefore, as Mr. S. Kosturkov said in the *Narodno Sobranjé* during the discussion on the events of June 16th, "he was more adaptable than the wise Gheshev."

The evening before Mr. Gheshev resigned, the "Bulgaria," Dr. Danev's organ, wrote, in a leading article entitled "The Treaty," as follows :

"We wish it to be clearly understood that not one word must be said about any sort of revision of the treaty, and that we shall insist to the end upon the treaty being fully carried out. By her energetic action Bulgaria will quash all such intentions, and demonstrate that in future it will be impossible to regard questions affecting her interests with childish lightheartedness.

"Bulgaria will summon all her strength and moral, of which she has great treasure stored up in her soul, and by a general move, such as she has executed more than once

¹ From the same period dates a conversation which he had with a representative of the "Temps" and which was published in the "Vetchernjé Vreme." Dr. Danev therein stated that it was necessary to face the facts of the situation, and not try to evade a radical solution of the question in circumstances which involved a conflict of races and interests ; for such could be the only true solution.

before, will demand the complete fulfilment of the treaty: *fiat justitia!* Any hope that Serbia or the *friends of the Balkan Alliance*¹ may hold that concessions will be made by us will only make war the more inevitable.”

Dr. Danev (maybe on the advice of Mr. Gheshov) first tried to form a coalition Cabinet. That effort, however, was unsuccessful, probably on account of the refusal of the Liberals—a result which possibly did not displease King Ferdinand. There was nothing left but for Dr. Danev to form a Cabinet of Nationalists and Zankovists. The Nationalists, Mr. Gheshov's party, agreed to become members of Dr. Danev's Cabinet, on condition that the new Cabinet should continue the policy of Mr. Gheshov, *i.e.* a pacific policy. To this Dr. Danev consented. Dr. B. Vazov asserts that he did so only after long consultations and after having insisted in return that the Nationalists should forego their demand that Mr. D. Christov should not become a member of the new Cabinet. Dr. Danev was willing to be responsible for him. It is incomprehensible how, after all that had previously happened, Mr. Gheshov and his friends could have been led to think that the new Cabinet would follow a peaceful policy. Indeed, on his arrival in Sofia, Dr. Danev's first move was to decline the proposal that the four Prime Ministers should meet at Salonika. This was the first public characteristic act of the new Cabinet! Characteristic also (though perhaps not quite so apparent) was the fact that during the crisis (after Mr. Gheshov had resigned, but prior to the formation of the Danev Cabinet), the following two important telegrams were dispatched—one from the Tsar to King

¹ These words were directly addressed to Russia.

Ferdinand, dated May 26th, and the other the reply of King Ferdinand three days later.

The desire for war was steadily growing in Sofia. Mr. Gheshov's resignation added fuel to the fire, and was interpreted in Petrograd and Belgrade, as in Sofia, as a victory for the war party. This, in connection with Mr. Pashitch's declaration, induced the Tsar of Russia to send the following telegram on May 26th to the King of Serbia and the Tsar of Bulgaria :

“To Their Majesties the King of Serbia and the King of Bulgaria

“ Moscow,
“ May 26th, 1913.

“ The news that the Prime Ministers of the four allied countries proposed to meet together in Salonika, after which they might have met in Petrograd, gave me great satisfaction, because such a disposition demonstrated the unanimous wish of the Balkan States to come to a satisfactory settlement with each other, and to strengthen the alliance which has given such brilliant results. I am now grieved to hear that this intention has not been carried out, and that the Balkan States are reported to be making preparations for a fratricidal war which would eclipse the victories they have gloriously achieved together. At such a serious time, I make a direct appeal to Your Majesty in accordance with my right and my duty. In their Treaty of Alliance, Bulgaria and Serbia transferred to Russia the right of deciding all disputes concerning the application of the stipulations of the treaty and the conventions connected with it. I therefore ask Your Majesty to remain true to the engagements you took in connection with the treaty, and to address yourself to Russia to settle the difference which has arisen between Bulgaria and Serbia.

“ Accepting the function of Arbitrator not as a preroga-

tive but as a painful engagement of which I am unable to relieve myself, I consider that I should remind Your Majesty that a war between the Allies would not find me indifferent. In fact, I should like to make it clear that the State which commences that war will be held responsible before the Slav cause, and that I reserve to myself full liberty concerning the attitude which Russia will adopt at the end of such a criminal war." ¹

Three days later, on May 29th, King Ferdinand sent the following reply to the Tsar's telegram :

"I have received the telegram in which Your Majesty, in your anxiety for peace and for the Slav cause, appeals to me in consequence of the serious crisis which has arisen in our relations with the Allies and which, unfortunately, they themselves have provoked.

"It is my duty to truth to point out to Your Majesty that my Government—being deeply conscious of the responsibility which would fall upon it should it follow a course not in accordance with Your Majesty's sentiments—on April 13th last made a request to Mr. Sazonov to put an end at once to the excitement on both sides of the frontier by inviting both States to submit to the arbitration provided for in the Treaty of Alliance. That invitation was made and my Government accepted it immediately.

"With regard to Serbia, she has continued the policy of which Mr. Pashitch's declaration in the Skupshtina was the last manifestation, and has provoked great emotion in my country, the more so as it happened at the very time when the meeting of the four Prime Ministers was about to take place.

"Your Majesty will not, therefore, decline to acknowledge that Bulgaria has been faithful to her word ; that she continues to expect that Serbia, following her example,

¹ "Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov," No. 209, pp. 144-5.

will agree to the arbitration, and that it is really the Serbian Government which—in that they try to evade arbitration and support manifestations against Bulgaria—continues to provoke the danger of a fratricidal struggle. I and my Government would regret such a struggle more than any one else. We wish to avoid it, but we cannot go against the unanimous feelings of anger which are provoked in our entire nation by the attempts of our Allies—on the morrow of our unheard-of and glorious victories—who, in unheeding their given word, wish to snatch from us the fruits of those efforts and victories. Bulgaria not only has a rightful claim to Macedonia, but she has unavoidable duties towards its inhabitants, who always were, and at any price will remain Bulgarians,¹ and Your Majesty will remember that those duties were, during many years, recognised by Russia herself.”

This strange dispatch already demonstrated the new orientation and loftier tone adopted by the new régime. The pretended desire for peace and the friendly disposition towards arbitration were modified by the tone and contents of the dispatch as well as by the fact that, by June 1st, it had been circulated throughout Bulgaria and sent to all the newspapers in the world!

Now when King Ferdinand dispatched the above telegram Mr. Gheshov's Cabinet had resigned, and Dr. Danev's Cabinet had not yet been formed. The question therefore arises as to who was politically responsible for it. In his newspaper "Retch," during October 1913 (if we are not mistaken), Mr. P. N. Milyukov stated, in his defence of King Ferdinand and

¹ King Ferdinand has evidently forgotten at the moment his secret treaty with Austria in 1898 by which he renounced Macedonia.

the Bulgars, that it was written in the Russian Legation and therefore the whole responsibility rested on—the Russian Legation in Sofia ! The Vice-President of the National Sobranjé, however, Dr. T. Momchilov (a Stambulovist in his political convictions) was much more impartial. In his speech to the Sobranjé he said :

“ How is it possible that you, a governing body composed of Russophiles, could send such a bold and insulting telegram to the Tsar of Russia ? I am not a Russophile, but I ask you that question. Even Stambulov himself would not have sent such a telegram. Do you know, Dr. Danev, who this Tsar of Russia is ? He is the commander of 180,000,000 men. . . .”¹

To this question neither Dr. Danev nor any of his Cabinet made reply.

The first representation which Dr. Danev received from Mr. Neklyudov was made on the basis of the following communication from Petrograd :

“ The Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Sofia

“ May 25th, 1913.

(Telegram.)

“ Please inform the Bulgarian Government of the decision of the Ambassadors in London on the question of the reduction of the armies, and demand an explanation of the present hesitation on the part of Bulgaria.

“ This proposal was made to us at Bulgaria’s request, but it appears that she now refuses to put it into execu-

¹ Stenographic Journals xvii. of the War, Sobranjé, May 3rd, 1914, pp. 618–9.

tion, and also withdraws from the projected meeting of the four Prime Ministers in Salonika, concerning which Mr. Gheshov had already come to an agreement with Mr. Pashitch.

“ You will direct the attention of the Bulgarian Government to the unfortunate impression created by its withdrawal.¹

“ (Signed) NERATOV.”

In distinct opposition to the efforts of Russia to preserve the Balkan Alliance and to prevent an armed conflict between the Allies, Sofia, under the influence of Vienna, had already decided upon rupture with Russia and was preparing a surprise attack on the Allies. Dr. Danev's rôle had already been determined, and a realisation of the part which it was intended that he should play could not have subjected his intelligence to any extraordinary strain. So far as King Ferdinand's scheme was concerned, he was but a pawn in the game, and it was intended that his action should both complete the preparations for the attack and act as a cover to the attack when made. This much was clearly demonstrated in the first days of the existence of Dr. Danev's Cabinet, and in relation thereto the following illustration is in many ways strange and inexplicable.

At the same time as General Kovatchev entered Danev's Cabinet as Minister of War, he was appointed to the command of the 4th army—the strongest of the five Bulgarian armies and, curiously enough, that which had been concentrated on the Serbian front. There would have been no breach of constitutional principle had the War Minister been appointed to the

¹ “ Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov,” No. 206, P. 143.

command of the entire army, but that he should be at one and the same time Chief of the Ministry of War and a subordinate commanding only one of the armies constituted a constitutional and parliamentary absurdity.¹

If we proceed further we meet with a continuance of this extraordinary method :

On June 4th General Kovatchev, commander of the 4th army and War Minister in Dr. Danev's Cabinet, issued the following order to his army at Radovishte :

“ Within six or seven days the last detachments of our army will have arrived on the *lieu* of their new concentration, and it is then that the nature of our real relations with our neighbours, until now our Allies, will be finally decided.

“ From the date of the arrival of our first detachments the moral of the Serbian army began to weaken and it is now at the lowest possible ebb. The fact that the various sections of our army were permitted to execute their new concentration without any interference in front of the Serbian army proves better than can anything else that the Serbians² are possessed of fear, and demonstrates the

¹ The Bulgarian records, however, instance many similar absurdities. For example, at the commencement of mobilisation, King Ferdinand issued the following decree : “ 1. We assume the supreme command of the entire active army in confirmation of Article 11 of the Constitution. 2. We appoint Lieutenant-General Michael Savov, General of the Reserve of Officers, to be our assistant. 3. We appoint as Chief of Staff of the Army Major-General Ivan Fitchev, to be Chief of Staff of the active army. 4. We charge the Chief of Staff of the active army with the issuing of this decree.” Contrary to Article 18 of the Constitution, this decree was unsigned by the Minister of War. Stenographic Journals of the War, *Sobranjé*, xvii. 1914, pp. 534-5.

² In order to complete its concentration, the Bulgarian army had to pass through the territories which were held by the Serbian army.

truth of their assertion that they are devoid of the courage necessary for a struggle with us. Had it been otherwise, Serbia would never have permitted us to carry out our concentration with a freedom unparalleled in history.

“GENERAL KOVATCHEV,

“*Commander of the Army.*

“No. 29.”

Can it be reasonably assumed that Dr. Danev was unaware that his Minister of War had issued this order, and is it possible to reconcile the issue of such an order with a loyal desire to regulate the disagreement of the Allies without an armed conflict?

* * *

According to the calculations of General Savov, May 31st was the last date upon which the Bulgarian army could be considered in a critical position in the case of an attack by Serbia and Greece, and by the same estimate June 15th would see it ready for an energetic attack on the whole front held by the two Allies. The condition of the army was nevertheless causing considerable anxiety. This led King Ferdinand to summon General Savov to Sofia by the dispatch of the following telegram:

“*To the Assistant Commander-in-Chief, Adrianople*

“In view of the horrible position in which the State finds itself, I wish to see you. Leave at once for Sofia.¹

“*(Signed) TSAR.*

“*SOFIA, May 31st, 1913.*”

Upon his arrival in Sofia, General Savov did not visit the positions held by the army, but, having been well informed of the existing conditions, he considered

¹ General Savov, “*Dnevnik*,” No. 4233, June 12th, 1914.

it necessary to convey his impressions to the Prime Minister :

"To the Prime Minister, Sofia

" . . . I consider it my duty to inform you that I cannot guarantee that I shall be able to retain the troops under the colours after ten days from to-day's date.

" (Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

" SOFIA, June 5th, 1913."

The next day General Savov addressed the following circular to the commanders of the five armies and of the Cavalry Division :

"To the Commanders of the Five Armies and the Commander of the Cavalry Division

" The dissatisfaction which has lately been manifested in certain sections of the army leads us to think that a serious agitation against the war exists among the troops. It is necessary to draw the attention of the armies to the fact that they will be incapable of action if dissension springs up. . . . In view of the possibility that we may have to undertake operations immediately, I suggest that you, as the person in closest touch with all sections of your army, should investigate the existing conditions, and report to me as quickly as possible if we can rely upon the troops successfully to execute renewed operations.¹

" (Signed) LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

" SOFIA, June 6th, 1913.

" No. 5410."

Notwithstanding the actual situation in the army, King Ferdinand, with Dr. Danev, was decided that Bulgaria should break her engagement with the Tsar of Russia as Supreme Arbitrator as quickly as possible.

¹ General Savov, " Dnevnik," No. 4234, June 13th, 1914.

The fashion in which that was accomplished was crude rather than clever, and constituted an obvious insult to Russia and her ruler.

Describing the contemporary situation within Dr. Danev's Cabinet, Mr. Dimitriye Rizov, the Bulgarian Minister at Rome, wrote in the Bulgarian magazine "The Free Opinion" as follows :

"No solidarity of opinion as to the course to be followed had until then been manifested by the Danev Cabinet. Fruitless discussions of the question ran through more than twenty sittings of the Council of Ministers. The Nationalists within the Cabinet (Mr. Geshov's party), together with Mr. Todorov, opposed war, while the Zankovists (Dr. Danev's party) were themselves divided—some declaring for war, others being undecided. Danev himself repeatedly expressed different views. It should not be overlooked that several prominent members of the Zankovist party arrived in Sofia from the provinces and daily insisted to their representatives in the Cabinet that a war with the Allies inaugurated for the defence of Bulgarian rights (which had been acquired by the display of such great heroism and the expenditure of so much blood) should not be feared. These Zankovist leaders exerted such a powerful influence upon their Ministers that even the peace-loving Lyudskanov delivered a speech in favour of the war at the Ministerial Council."¹

Impressed by the growing discontent in the army, and probably also by the reports which arrived from Petrograd, King Ferdinand invited the Prime Minister, Dr. Danev, together with the Minister of Finance, Mr. T. Todorov, to visit him at Vrana on June 9th.

¹ "Svobodno Mnyeniye," No. 4, 1914. Mr. Lyudskanov, who is well known in Bulgaria as a pacifist and as one of the most devoted friends of Russia in Bulgaria, has, as far as we know, never contradicted this statement of Mr. Rizov.

The Crown Council at Vrana was an important and one might say fateful event. Then commenced the series of developments which led up to "the 16th of June," on which date at midnight the Serbian and Greek armies were subjected to a surprise attack.

On the eve of that day and during the day itself telegrams of unusual importance and significance, and which exercised a considerable influence upon subsequent events, were exchanged between Petrograd and Sofia.

These messages were abstracted from the Archives of the Bulgarian Foreign Office and made public by Dr. T. Ghenadiev, the Stambulovist leader and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs in Dr. V. Radoslavov's Cabinet, on the occasion of his demanding an inquiry into the events of June 16th, Narodno Sobranjé.

Prior to the division taken at the meeting held on June 9th, Dr. Danev received the following telegram from the Bulgarian Minister in Petrograd :

"To the Minister-President Danev, Sofia

"Have communicated to Neratov the contents of your dispatch. The Ministry hopes we will carefully consider all the consequences, before we venture upon an extreme action. If the Bulgarian Government desires a peaceful solution of the conflict with the Allies, the only means of attaining that object is to arrange a meeting of the Balkan Minister-Presidents, who have been invited to Petrograd. The invitation has been accepted by all parties excepting Bulgaria. The arbitration will be carried out here, after the questions of demobilisation and other matters have been settled.

"BOBCEV

"PETROGRAD, June 8th, 1913.

"No. 1865."

Dr. Danev replied the following day, June 9th—the day of the fateful Crown Council at Vrana—by the following characteristic and important telegram :

“ To the Bulgarian Minister Bobchev, Petrograd

“ Does the Imperial Government realise that the arbitration stipulated for, and which is desired, may *not* be carried out, and that the decisions arrived at may not be put into execution, and that the Russian policy may be exposed to a fatal failure ?

“ In this connection, and considering the case from the Russian point of view, *is it not absolutely necessary to obtain from the Serbs a preliminary guarantee that they will accept the arbitration and the joint occupation of Macedonia ?* If that is not understood on the Pevchiski Most,¹ then it follows that the Russian policy is either lighthearted in the highest degree or unpardonably weak. In both cases our line of conduct is obvious, as I have already wired to you. Let the Imperial Government entertain no illusion on that subject.

“ MINISTER-PRESIDENT DANEV.²

“ SOFIA, June 9th, 1913.”

That was the state of mind in which the Chief of the Bulgarian Government, Dr. Danev, set out for Vrana on the very same day in order to attend the Crown Council to which King Ferdinand had invited him and his colleague Mr. T. Todorov, and to which General Savov had also been summoned. The intentions of Mr. Todorov cannot be definitely ascertained, but judging from his own exposé of his attitude in the Narodno Sobranjé, and judging from his conduct

¹ “ Pevchiski Most ” is the Downing Street of Petrograd.

² For both telegrams *vide* the Speech of the Strumnitsa National Representative, Dr. N. Ghenadiev, Sofia, 1914, 234-5.

then and before and after that day, it may be asserted that he was not in agreement with his Chief. It therefore follows that he could scarcely have been in agreement either with the telegram which Dr. Danev dispatched before the Vrana meeting, or with that sent to Petrograd afterwards, even if, which is doubtful, he was permitted any knowledge of their contents.

When he left for the Crown Council at Vrana Dr. Danev had in his possession yet another telegram, which was sent to him by General Savov at the express order of King Ferdinand. That telegram ran as follows :

“ Very Urgent

“ To the Minister-President, Sofia

“ I consider it to be my duty to remind the Council of Ministers that on Monday next the delay of ten days, which I have accorded them to decide in favour of war or the disbanding of the army, will expire. I most energetically request the Government to give a clear and definite decision on that question as speedily as possible, in order that the prolongation of the negotiations may not distract and demoralise the army and thus render it unfitted for any action whatever.”¹

Thus prepared, the work of the Crown Council began at 3 p.m. on June 9th, under the presidency of King Ferdinand himself.

The task before the Council was to decide upon the future action. There were two opinions. One was for the war and its immediate declaration, following an ultimatum which should be addressed to Serbia on the same day ; the other opinion, supported rather by Mr.

¹ General Savov, “ Dnevnik,” No. 4235, June 14th, 1914.

Todorov than by Dr. Danev, was to proceed to arbitration at Petrograd. Under the influence of King Ferdinand a middle course between the two extremes was decided upon : to give the Russian Tsar a delay of seven days in which to give his decision in the case between Bulgaria and Serbia, under the conditions which had been already stated. The suggestion of this seven days' delay came from King Ferdinand himself. He understood how to cleverly and imperceptibly impose it on the Government. Mr. Todorov, at that time the most influential Minister in Dr. Danev's Cabinet, thus explained what happened, in the National Sobranjé :

"I ought to explain to you how the delay of seven days came to be suggested. At Vrana the Tsar put this question to me :

" 'How long do you, Mr. Todorov, think it would take the Russians to arrive at a decision ?¹ Would it not be delayed for a long time ? ' I answered : ' Your Majesty, I am convinced that the Russians, if we so request them, would not delay their decision ; their minds are already made up ! ' "

" 'Do you think that the decision could be given within a week ? ' "

" 'I do believe so ! ' "

" 'Well then, ask them to finish it within a week ! That would do very well ! ' "

"And in that way we settled upon a delay of seven days." ²

The result of the deliberations at Vrana was expressed in the dispatch which Dr. Danev, on his

¹ The question was about the arbitration.

² The Speech of the National Representative of Sofia, Mr. J. Todorov, Sofia, 1914, p. 143.

return to Sofia, sent to the Bulgarian Minister in Petrograd on the same day (June 9th) at 11 o'clock p.m. The dispatch was as follows :

“To the Bulgarian Minister Bobchev, Petrograd

“To-day, at the Council under the presidency of the Tsar, and at which, in addition to myself, there were present Minister Todorov and General Savov, it was decided that the Supreme Arbitrator should be requested to give his decision, *which should be based upon the conditions of the treaty, within seven days from to-day.* If the Imperial Government informs us *by Tuesday evening*¹ that they accept this, our proposal, *I could come to Petrograd to be present at the reading of that decision and to discuss other questions.* When I communicated this point of view to Mr. Neklyudov, he read to me his instructions, according to which the rôle of the arbitrator is somewhat differently defined. But I hope that our formula will be accepted. With reference to the delay, *that delay is indispensable in view of the massing of our army on the frontier. . . . If the question is not decided speedily a conflict may easily be precipitated.* Those two conditions—the delay and the occupation of Macedonia—are conditions *sine qua non, conditions which we cannot forego.*

“Concerning my arrival in Petrograd, as the communication of the Imperial Government does not mention it at all, I may say that my immediate arrival is unnecessary. *Please be particular to explain that on account of important political events at home my departure for Petrograd must be adjourned from Wednesday to Sunday.*²

“Public opinion in Bulgaria is so excited that an earlier start for Petrograd might be the signal for an outburst of troubles in the country, which, in the general interest, must be avoided.

¹ That is to say : till June 11th, in the evening.

² *i.e.* on the 16th instead of the 12th of June.

“ Please wire the result of your *démarche* at once.¹

“ (Signed) MINISTER-PRESIDENT DANEV.

“ SOFIA, June 9th, 1913.

“ No. 1869.”

* * *

The venture was thus set afoot and events then took a clearly defined course! The only remarkable thing is that Mr. Geshov and Mr. Todorov could think and afterwards assert that their pacific policy had gained the day at Vrana! The anti-arbitration policy—the policy of military activity—had been successful. Public opinion was being submerged under it to an ever-increasing extent. In his speech in the Narodno Sobranjé Mr. Todorov mentioned that at that time a great distrust of Russia had been powerfully manifested. He said :

“ At that time the cry was: ‘ Do not go to Russia, because you will be robbed there! It would be a flagrant crime to go to Russia for arbitration!’ The meetings were arranged to protest against the journey to Russia, and it should be acknowledged that the numbers who protested against the arbitration became very great. Distrust was widespread—I cannot deny that!”²

Dr. Danev’s Cabinet was confronted by overwhelming manifestations of public opinion against Russia.

“ In the beginning of June”—said Mr. Todorov in the Sobranjé—“ after my entry into the Cabinet, listening to those expressions of warlike sentiments, to the condemnation of the Government’s Russophile policy, to those entreaties, alike in the press and at public meetings, not to

¹ The Speech of Strumnitsa’s National Representative, Dr. N. Ghenadiev, Sofia, 1914, pp. 235-6.

² The Speech of Sofia’s Representative, Mr. J. Todorov, Sofia, 1914, p. 129.

go to Petrograd, because there lay our grave, because there Macedonia would be partitioned and crucified, and to those suggestions that we ourselves should assert our rights by force of arms—listening, I say, to all this, I said to myself: ‘*There is something rotten in this State!*’ On my return from Paris, not once, but many times, in the presence of intimate friends have I said: ‘Gentlemen, I have an impression that the mass of the people here is not merely mad, but raving mad.’ And of that have I often spoken to men, and not merely to one or two, but to hundreds!”¹

The key to the solution of the mystery which envelops the date of June 16th, when Serbia and Greece were attacked at midnight, is to be found in the decision of the Crown Council at Vrana and the telegrams above cited. The Supreme Arbitrator had been given seven days in which to announce his decision, and when that term expired—about midnight on June 16th—the attack on the quondam Allies on the entire Macedonian front was executed.

The events of June 16th were not, therefore, unexpectedly precipitated. They had been slowly and cleverly foreseen and prepared. In no case could that fatal date—fatal alike for Bulgaria and for the Balkan Alliance—have been a surprise for those who were in consultation at Vrana on June 9th: neither for Mr. Todorov, nor, even in less degree, for Dr. Danev!²

¹ The Speech of Sofia’s National Representative, Mr. Todorov, p. 154.

² Correctly to appreciate the events of June 16th and all that preceded it, the opinion of the Bulgars on the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of February 29th, 1912, should be taken into consideration. We will quote the expression of opinion voiced by Mr. Dim. Mishev, for many years secretary of the Bulgarian Exarchate and afterwards member of the National Sobranjé:

“The secret of the treaty ought to be divulged. To-day

Leaving aside all the preceding developments, it is obvious that preparations for June 16th were afoot on June 9th. All that remained was to put into execution the decision arrived at on June 9th in the Castle of Vrana the moment the opinion of Russia was ascertained on the question at issue. And that was ascertained in good time, for already on June 9th a dispatch was sent from Petrograd to the Russian Ministers in Belgrade and Sofia, declaring :

“We have categorically refused not only to support, but even to communicate to Belgrade the demand for demobilisation, subject to the joint occupation of the

it is publicly shown that the idea and the conception of that treaty are not, nor could be, Bulgarian. The idea is Slav, and in the first line takes into account the principle of Slavdom. In order to be sincere towards ourselves and towards Slavdom, and in order at least to rid the future of fatal illusions and errors, I believe we ought to call the policy which was embodied in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty by its proper name and to correctly designate the men who inspired this scheme, so unfortunate for Bulgaria in its effect. *The policy is a Slav policy, but not the Bulgarian one; the inspirers of the same are not, nor could be, Bulgarians.* Therefore, the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty does not represent a true Bulgarian policy and does not express the ideas of the workers for Bulgarian Nationalism, either as manifested before or after the liberation. On the contrary, the treaty expresses only the ideas of Belgrade and Petrograd. Let the facts speak, those facts which now, for the first time, receive their correct interpretation. After the Union (of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria) and after the dethronement of the first Bulgarian prince, a policy was inaugurated which deviated from that of the policy aimed at by the War of Liberation and which was expressed in the San-Stefano treaty of 1878. With the inauguration of a changed policy, the Bulgarians of Macedonia began to be called Slavs or Serbs. That was accomplished by the official representatives of Russia in Macedonia, such

contested provinces, *because we find that the demand was as much unfounded as it was practically inconvenient.*

“Unless we receive an assurance that the Greek and Bulgarian conflict will be submitted to arbitration, we will not give the decision of the Arbitration Court.

“SAZONOV.”¹

On June 12th (instead of on the 11th as Dr. Danev wished) the Bulgarian Minister, Mr. Bobchev, reported to Dr. Danev the conversation which he had with Mr. Sazonov, which was really an answer to Dr. Danev's dispatch of June 9th on the decision at Vrana :

“To the Minister-President, Sofia

“Mr. Sazonov said: ‘Your communication does not surprise me. I was informed, a few days ago, of this

as Yastrebov, Rostovski, and others. The efforts of the Bulgarian Exarchate to obtain the official recognition of the Bulgarian Church in the dioceses of Uskub, Ochrida, Veles, Nevrocop, Debra, Monastir, and Strumnitsa achieved success without any assistance from Russia. After the appointment of the Crown-Prince Boris, a policy of the ‘spheres of influence’ in Macedonia was inaugurated. It is not quite clear that that policy of ‘spheres’ has found greater expression in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. By that treaty Macedonia was divided into ‘contested’ and ‘uncontested’ zones, that is to say, into the spheres of the Bulgarian and Serbian influence, and into the ‘neutral’ spheres. These zones mean that Macedonia was broken and partitioned in order that a Great Serbia could be created. It is difficult to admit that that could be the idea of Bulgarian statesmen.” (“Svobodno Mnyeniye,” No. 6 of October 3rd, 1913.)

¹ “Sbornik diplomatsicheskikh dokumentov,” No. 242, p. 165. The italics are ours. Only the over-zealous Mr. P. N. Milyukov could imagine that this demand of Dr. Danev could be founded on the treaty. Up to that time Bulgaria had never formulated such a demand, nor did Russia accept

decision of your Government. You are acting on the advice of Austria. You are free. Russia and Slavdom are rejected. We have done our duty. The Russian Emperor did not expect an ultimatum with a fixed delay within which to declare his decision concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian difference. Meanwhile he was willing to fulfil his difficult mission with expedition. Now, after your declaration, I communicate ours to you! Do not expect anything from us, and forget the existence of any of our engagements from 1902 until to-day.

“BOBCEV.¹”

“PETROGRAD, *June 12th*, 1913.

“No. 3402.”

After this, and in consequence of the point of view taken by the Bulgarian Government on June 9th in the Castle of Vrana, it was quite natural that Mr. Danev should not start for Petrograd on Sunday, June 16th, as he had promised. Instead of his departure for Russia an order was issued on Saturday evening, June 15th, to attack the Serbs and Greeks.²

it, and she certainly knew the contents of the treaty. Besides, there existed between Serbia and Bulgaria an understanding that each party should keep the occupied territory until the question of delimitations should be decided.

¹ The Speech of the National Deputy of Strumnitsa, Dr. N. Ghenadiev, pp. 237-8.

² It is interesting to note that Dr. Danev, on June 9th, communicated the decision come to at Vrana, to the Russian Minister in Sofia, Mr. Neklyudov, as very urgent, but in somewhat different words than those in which he communicated it to Mr. Bobchev. The communication to Mr. Neklyudov was made in these terms :

“With a view to the extreme danger, which has been specially increased since the reception of yesterday’s Serbian note, and with a view to the impossibility of arriving at a direct understanding concerning demobilisation, the Bulgarian

Yet another development must be noted: On the same day (June 15th) Count Tarnovski, the Austrian Minister at Sofia, wired to Count Berchtold the following:

“Bulgaria wants to know if she will have her hands ready for an attack on Serbia and Greece if she cedes to Roumania the line of Tutrakan—Balchik?”

To this the answer was:

“*Danev* has been informed under what conditions Bulgaria can secure her rear in the case of an attack on Serbia and Greece.”¹

IV

The Supreme Command was, of course, well prepared for all that had to be done at midnight on June 16th.

We have already quoted the order issued by the War Minister, General Kovatchev, on June 4th. It shows Government, wishing to exhaust the means for a peaceful solution of the dispute between Serbia and Bulgaria, addresses itself with the most polite petitions to the Supreme Arbiter to be pleased to declare his decision within as short a delay as possible, that is to say, not later than within eight days; at the same time Bulgaria expects that the arbitration would be made on the basis and within the limits of the treaty and its annexes. Further, the Bulgarian Government requests the Russian Government to inform it by Tuesday evening that its request has been accepted. If that request should be accepted, the Minister-President will leave on Wednesday for Petrograd to hear the arbitration decisions and after that to enter into negotiations for the regulation of all other questions.” (See “*Sbornik diplomatscheskih dokumentov*,” p. 116.)

¹ See the Stenographic Journals of the Narodno Sobranjé, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, pp. 481 and 558.

clearly what was in preparation, and what was the object.

The Russian General E. T. Martinov, in his little work, "The Serbians in War with Tsar Ferdinand," thus characterises that order :

"This interesting document shows that the intention to commence a war with Serbia and Greece had been a settled policy with the Bulgarian Government as early as in the beginning of June. Exaggerating their own strength, the Bulgarian commanders hoped to finish with the Serbs and Greeks in a few days. *From that order it is clearly evident that if the Bulgarians had been in the place of the Serbians, they would not have allowed their former Ally to concentrate, but would have attacked him while half of his army was still in Thrace.*"

After June 9th that work was feverishly prosecuted.

As soon as the Russian Government, on June 12th, answered Dr. Danev's dispatch of June 9th, the Supreme Command, in conformity with the same, set to work, with the result that the next day (June 13th) definite orders for action were sent to the commanders of all five Bulgarian armies. Those instructions conformed to the plan of attack which had been elaborated previously.

We now publish the full contents of that remarkable document :

"The Directions for the Acting Armies for June 13th, 1913

"Issued at 11.30 o'clock p.m.

"No. 23

"Map 1 : 210,000

"From Saturday, June 15th, the armies shall commence to take their positions for the eventual war against Serbia as hereafter set out :

" 1. The 2nd army to concentrate itself with its principal force on the line Kukush—Hill 665—road Seres-Negovan. The Commander of the Army to undertake measures to secure his right wing towards Vardar (Ghevghelli). The rear of that army will be protected by the 4th army.

" 2. The 4th army remains on the position which it now occupies (Bregalnitzza).

" 3. The 5th army to be concentrated against Greece, after it sends the advanced posts to the important points against the adversary, and undertakes measures for protection.

" 4. The 3rd army to concentrate on the line Vrapcha—Dragoman—Konshtitsa, and to take measures for defence.

" 5. The 1st army to concentrate on the line Belogradchik—Chuprene. To send a special part of the Vidin garrison towards Koula and to take measures for defence.

" 6. The 4th division to concentrate between the river Struma and Koniova.

" 7. The cavalry division remains in its present position.¹

" The Assistant of the Commander-in-Chief,
" LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV."

At the same time another order, numbered 24, was prepared giving more detailed directions for the attack against the Serbs and Greeks, and the explanation of which confirms the extensive plan of the Bulgarian operations.² But that order was sent by very urgent telegram to the commanders of the armies *only on the first day after the night attack on the Serbs and Greeks.*

Prior to that, on the evening of June 15th at eight

¹ General Savov, "Dnevnik," No. 4236, June 15th, 1914.

² General Savov has not published the text of the instruction No. 24, but only the explanations which were annexed to it.

o'clock, the Telegraph Office received for transmission to General Kovatchev the following ciphered and very urgent dispatch concerning the attack :¹

"To the Commander of the 4th Army, Radovishte

"I order that you should attack the enemy most energetically on the whole line, without fully divulging our force and without entering into continued battle, and work in order to fortify yourself well on Krivolak, on the right Bregalnitzza, height 550, near the village Shtahovo (Ovche Polye), height near the village Dobrev. I recommend that you commence the fight during the night, and that before the dawn you should execute a storming assault on the

¹ Dr. K. D. Spissarevski, in his pamphlet "Koi opropasti Blgaria" ("Who ruined Bulgaria?") asserts that on the afternoon of June 15th there was again a consultation at the Castle Vrana, with the same persons as before, and that the King on that day, and earlier, had several conversations with Mr. Rizov and Mr. Joshev. But Mr. Todorov in his speech at the Sobranjé does not mention anything about a consultation on that day at Vrana. He spoke of Mr. Rizov only, and as follows: "Mr. Rizov came and said to me: 'I have heard that only you have remained averse to the war; all others are in favour of war, though such a mind as yours, etc. . . .' After many flatteries he tried, in the name of the Fatherland, to convince me that my way of thinking was wrong. I answered him: 'My opinion is far removed from your own. . . .' When I went to the Cabinet Council I said to Dr. Danev: 'You ought to send this Mr. Rizov away to Rome at once because he is a dangerous man, and if he does not leave within twenty-four hours, ask him to resign.'" (See the Speech of Mr. Todorov, p. 156.) Dr. Danev did order Mr. Rizov to go at once to his post, but he remained quietly in Sofia until the fatal June 16th, and later, and continued to work for the war with the Allies, although himself a high organ of the Government!

entire front. That operation to be undertaken to-morrow, June 16th, during the night.¹

“(Signed) The Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief,
“ LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ SOFIA, *June 15th*, 1913.
“ No. 5597.”

At the same time another very urgent ciphered dispatch was sent to General Ivanov :

“ *To the Commander of the 2nd Army, Serres*

“ Before you undertake the concentration of the army attack most energetically the adversary at Leftera and Tsaigesi, and fortify yourself well in those positions.

“ The 4th army attacks the entire Serbian line facing it to-morrow the 16th inst. during the night.

“ The regiment in Valandovo ought to remain until it is replaced by the parts of the 7th division, which is now in Strumnitsa.

“ LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“ SOFIA, *June 15th*, 1913.
“ No. 5596.”

The cannon was now charged and trained. It remained but to fire it. And it was fired punctually at the hour fixed. On June 16th during the night the attack on the Serbs and Greeks on the centre line was executed.

The next day, on June 17th, the already mentioned order, No. 24, was sent from Sofia, with the following explanations :

“ *Re* the order No. 24. By the order No. 24, I have given the order to the 4th army to continue its forward march, and I have ordered the 2nd army to undertake

¹ General Savov, “ Dnevnik,” No. 4240, June 19th, 1914.

at once—after executing its operations in the direction of Tsaigesi—the concentration on the line indicated to it, having for its object an attack on Salonika. The commanders of the armies will have in view that our actions against the Serbs and Greeks are undertaken without a formal declaration of war, principally according to these ideas: to raise up to a certain degree the spirit of our army, and to bring it to regard our late Allies as our enemies; to force our former Allies to give way after we inflict on them powerful blows, and, inasmuch as they are now holding our territories, we ought, by the force of arms, to occupy new territories also, as many as we can, until the European Powers interfere to stop the armed action.

“As such an intervention may be expected at any moment, I order you to act quickly and energetically.

“The 4th army should try to take Veles at any price, as that would have great political importance. Of course, the line Sultan—Tepe—Kratovo—Klisseli (St. Nichola) ought first to be taken.

“The 2nd army, the moment it is ready with its concentration, will receive the order to attack Salonika if the action of the 4th army so permits; and if it should receive such an order, it will be strengthened by two or three brigades.

“If our army takes a part of the railway line Krivolak—Udovo—Ghevghelli, a bridgehead should be established and fortified by strong detachments.

“In that way the possession of both banks of the Vardar will be secured.¹

“(Signed) The Assistant of the Commander-in-Chief,

“LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SAVOV.

“SOFIA, *June 17th*, 1913.

“No. 5647.”

The treacherous attack on the Serbs and Greeks was executed after midnight on June 16th with the utmost

¹ General Savov, “Dnevnik,” No. 4241, June 20th, 1914.

violence and along the entire front, and it was continued the next day. The surprised Serbian and Greek armies were, by that violent attack, thrown back from their positions a considerable distance. From the Bulgarian official side the attempt was made not only to shield themselves from responsibility for the armed conflict, but to place it on others.¹ The press organ of the Bulgarian Government, the "Mir," conforming to the opinions of Mr. Todorov, the most influential member of the Cabinet after the President, published on June 18th, the second day after the attack, the following erroneous communication :

"This very moment the staff of the active army has received the following report :

"To-day the Serbs opened fire on our advanced posts near Ishtip and Zletovo. A mighty movement of great infantry bodies towards the front lines was observed. To this bold provocation on the part of the Serbs our army answered by fire. The results of the struggle are not yet known.

"The Greek troops also have to-day opened a terrible fire on our army, which was going to replace the advanced posts at Shemalatos and Juzla Chifik, north of Leftera. A bitter fight was commenced, but the results are not yet known."

And all that happens on the same day on which

¹ Mr. Todorov acknowledges this in his already-mentioned speech in the "Narodno Sobranjé." He said: "We dared not acknowledge our decision to attack before the world; we had to conceal it in the interests of Bulgaria and to try to throw the responsibility for the same on others, to save ourselves and Bulgaria." (See the Speech, p. 159.) That is the way a responsible Bulgarian Minister speaks a year after the event.

Dr. Danev makes an apparently earnest effort to stop the hostilities! And Mr. Milyukov expresses in his paper, "Retch," his astonishment that the Serbs would not believe the Bulgarian emissaries, but considered them as deceivers and retained them as such!

The Bulgarian Government continued to deny that the Bulgars had attacked Serbs and Greeks after June 18th. Their organ, "Mir," announced on June 23rd as follows:

"One of the Serb calumnies which ought to be refuted is that one concerning the so-called captured telegraphic order No. 26 of June 16th, by which, they allege, the general attack on the Allies has been ordered.

"We are in a position to declare most categorically that no such order has ever been given by our Supreme Command. And therefore the order of which the Serbs speak is either apocryphal or invented."¹

In the same number of the "Mir," the Government, supporting that lie, encourages the Bulgarian public opinion in this way:

"Bulgaria is powerful to punish as they deserve, and without mercy, her Allies of yesterday. That punishment has already commenced. The Bulgarian arms are winning victory after victory. The whole world, and more especially the Slav world, follows our victories with enthusiasm."

* * *

While the Supreme Command and the Government press played their part in this manner, let us see what Dr. Danev and his Cabinet were doing during those critical and fateful days.

¹ "Mir," No. 3922, 1913.

As we know already, Dr. Danev had promised to start for Petrograd on Sunday, June 16th—if the Russian Government should give him a favourable reply to his dispatch of June 9th, which he sent after that historical decision at Vrana! We also know already the answer of the Russian Government, and that it was not favourable, as was naturally to be expected. Dr. Danev knew that answer on June 12th. It was natural to expect that after such an answer Dr. Danev would not go to Petrograd. But he wished still to keep up some sort of form and appearance towards Petrograd. It seemed to him to be rather inconvenient simply to refuse to go to Petrograd after such an answer as Mr. Sazonov gave to Mr. Bobchev in reply to the dispatch of June 9th. He looked for a plausible excuse for not leaving for Petrograd on the 16th, and imagined that he found same in the fact that Mr. Pashitch had not yet answered a certain interpellation by the 16th, and that on that day the Serbian National Assembly had not yet brought in its formal resolution concerning the arbitration!

And, indeed, Dr. Danev tried, then and afterwards in the Narodno Sobranjé, in that way to justify his failure to depart for Petrograd, although he knew, and acknowledged in the Sobranjé that he knew, that Serbia had accepted the arbitration! When his attention was drawn to that circumstance, he then produced another reason, which certainly could not be considered as serious, namely: that there would be no sense in his starting for Petrograd considering that Mr. Pashitch and Mr. Venezelos had not yet gone there!

But the true reason why Dr. Danev did not go to Petrograd on June 16th is to be found in the answer of Mr. Sazonov to Dr. Danev's dispatch of June 9th.

Let us now proceed.

By noon on June 17th all Sofia knew that the Bulgarian army had attacked the Serbs and Greeks on the entire Macedonian front. That was pointed out in the Sobranjé by Mr. Yanko Sakazov amidst the applause of the "Right."¹

But it is very remarkable that all the Ministers did not come together, and that there was no Ministerial Council!

Mr. A. Burov, a member of Dr. Danev's Cabinet, told the Narodno Sobranjé that he heard about that event of such great importance only at 9.30 p.m. on June 17th. And Mr. Todorov, another Minister of his Cabinet, stated in the Sobranjé that even so late as that he was ignorant of the great news!

The Ministerial Council was convoked for the forenoon of June 18th, and only then did Dr. Danev inform his colleagues of what had happened.²

Now the question arises: did Dr. Danev himself know on the 17th, and if so, at what time, about what had happened? And if he did, as must naturally be assumed, why did he not convoke the Ministerial Council at once instead of leaving it over until the next day?

This circumstance presents an enigma, which reflects disadvantageously on Dr. Danev.

We have seen that on June 17th Order no. 24 was sent to the commanders of the armies *to continue the forward movement!*

What then happened on June 18th?

On that day the Ministerial Council came to a decision that the armed conflict on the frontier should be stopped. General Savov was called to the Council,

¹ See the Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, p. 606.

² *l.c.*, p. 605-8.

his explanations were heard, and he was ordered to stop any further military activity on the frontier. General Savov received that order, and executed it, but naturally in a manner not to injure the Bulgarian army, as was, indeed, the wish of the Government.

According to Mr. Todorov, that order was sent to the army on the same day at noon, although Mr. Sakazov assured the Narodno Sobranje that the order reached the army only twenty-four hours later.

Meantime, King Ferdinand had disappeared from view! The Ministerial Council did not hold its important sitting under his presidency. The Government did not communicate with him concerning what was to be done. It communicated only with his assistant, General Savov, who received from the Government the order to stop every further military activity, and executed it. Had he an understanding with King Ferdinand? Or did he act without the King's knowledge?

Of all that we are left in ignorance. It is an enigma.

We only know that on June 20th General Savov had ceased to be the assistant of the Commander-in-Chief and that he was replaced by General Ratko Dimitriev!

Why? That is not known positively. Several explanations are offered for the change. According to one, General Savov was replaced because he gave the order of June 15th for the attack on the Serbs and Greeks. According to another version he was dismissed because he gave the other order to stop hostilities in compliance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of June 18th. A third version asserts that he was replaced because it was already evident that the enterprise was on the high road to failure.

The only fact positively known was *that Dr. Danev's Government was deliberately concealing the existence of the order of June 15th!*

But the puzzles of June 18th do not end with this. On the same day, Dr. Danev, the Prime Minister of the Government, met Mr. Ghika, the Roumanian Minister, and addressed him as follows :

*" You, Mr. Ghika, try to frighten me by your threats of the invasion of Bulgaria. Very well, invade it ; what will you gain ? You will take Tutrakan—Balchik ; that is what you are demanding from us. You will enter Dobrudja, and it will be yours. Further you cannot go, because you cannot so quickly mobilise your army, for in ten days I will finish with the Serbs ! "*¹

And what is more significant, this statement of Dr. Danev's to Mr. Ghika on June 18th is a complete explanation of his subsequent conduct. Notwithstanding his offer of resignation on June 19th and on the subsequent days, he still remained in the Government, and he and his colleagues hid the deed of June 16th, up to June 30th ! Really he seems to have expected that he would finish with the Serbs in ten days ! No doubt that was what all the Bulgarian Generals told him, as they gave the same assurance to King Ferdinand and Mr. Rizov. We say all the Bulgarian Generals, with the sole exception of General Fitchov, who alone was against the war.

Only after June 24th, when General Kovatchev reported the catastrophe which had befallen his army,²

¹ See Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, p. 481.

² The disaster to Kovatchev's army was not complete, owing to a fault committed by the Serbs. Although Ishtip had been evacuated on June 24th they did not enter the town until

and when all his efforts to stop the onward march of the Allies by the help of Russia had failed, or, more correctly, when he had ascertained in what manner and at what price the Allies would stop and conclude the peace, did Dr. Danev definitely offer his resignation, which was then accepted.¹ He definitely resigned when he had ascertained that his entire policy had thoroughly failed. Before that, nothing could move him to resign, not even the remarkable letter which Dr. V. Radoslavov, Mr. Tonchev, and Dr. N. Ghenadiev addressed to him on June 23rd!

We think that the opponents of Dr. Danev's Government are quite right when they tell him: He who did not wish for June 16th, that is to say, for the war with the Allies, would not, in the first place, have dared to reject the demobilisation which Bulgaria had herself proposed when it appeared advantageous only to her (*i.e.* before she was in a position to execute the concentration of her troops on the Macedonian front); secondly, he ought to have resigned immediately after the event of June 16th, he ought not to have concealed that "criminal madness," even less should he have taken upon himself the unworthy and hideous task of saddling that "criminal madness" upon his Allies of yesterday!

Yet that is what Dr. Danev and his colleagues did, and, with them, he has proved what he has done, by documentary evidence.

Dr. Danev—like almost all the Bulgars—thought that it is possible to have two policies at the same time: the policy which leans on Austria and the Triple the following day. This circumstance undoubtedly saved Kovatchev and his army from a total catastrophe.

¹ See Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, pp. 823-6.

Alliance, and the policy which leans on the Triple Entente!

He, together with King Ferdinand, wished to sit on two stools, and naturally fell between them! And he fell so badly that, it seems, he broke his political backbone.

For the rest, no one has uttered a stronger condemnation of Dr. Danev than he himself in his speech in the Narodno Sobranjé on May 5th, 1914, on the occasion of the discussion on the investigation into the events of June 16th. In that speech he openly describes and explains the duplicity of his own policy in particular and Bulgarian policy in general during the Balkan War and during the litigation with the Allies for the liquidation of the spoils of war.

It seems as if duplicity was, more or less, the characteristic attribute of all the Bulgarian statesmen and politicians. And that attribute appears to have been welcomed by King Ferdinand himself. Apparently he not only fails to combat it, but—he develops it!

In the first days of July the Roumanians crossed the Danube, and the Turks moved towards Adrianople. The Bulgars did not defend themselves against either of them. King Ferdinand, with the help of Austria and Russia, arranged with King Carol to stop the march of his army on Sofia, and left the railway line Varna—Rushchuk—Sofia free for the provisioning of the Bulgarian army. In the same manner the Turks were stopped on the old Bulgarian frontier!

On July 4th Bulgaria obtained a new Government under the presidency of Dr. V. Radoslavov, composed of two fractions of the Liberal party and of the Stambulovists, the chief of whom, *i.e.* Dr. Ghenadiev, became Minister for Foreign Affairs.

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND BULGARIA, AND BETWEEN BULGARIA AND GREECE

AFTER the war with the Allies the Bulgarians published first in the Paris journal "Le Matin"—if we are not mistaken, while King Ferdinand was on a visit to Vienna—the treaties between Serbia and Bulgaria, and between Bulgaria and Greece, with a special tendency directed against Russia. Lately they were published, with the military conventions attached to them, in Sofia by Mr. At. Shopov in his pamphlet: "Kak ni se nalozi balkanskata vojna" (How the Balkan War was imposed on us). All these publications were contrary to the Art. F of the treaty, to the Art. 5 of the secret annex to the treaty with Serbia, and to the Art. 4 of the treaty with Greece.

We will give them here according to Mr. Shopov's publication. In addition to that we give also the text of the protocol of September 16th, 1912, which was published by Mr. Ivan E. Gheshov, and in which the Bulgarian Generals, on the invitation of King Ferdinand, expressed their opinion as to the conditions under which Bulgaria would enter into war with Turkey.¹ That protocol throws some light on the treaty with Serbia and Greece.²

¹ Iv. Ev. Gheshov, "Prestupnoto Bezumiyé," pp. 20-22.

² Mr. P. N. Milyukov published in his paper "Retch," of November 6th, 1914, the treaty between Bulgaria and Serbia,

For the better understanding of these treaties we think it may be useful to make a few general observations, and to draw the attention to some facts which are connected with them.

1. The first, and therefore the oldest treaty, is that made between Serbia and Bulgaria. It was signed on February 29th, 1912. At the time of its negotiation the position of the two countries was, internationally, quite different. In the autumn of 1908, on October 6th, Austria-Hungary had declared the annexation of Bosnia and Hertzegovina with the co-operation of Bulgaria. We mention that, because Bulgaria, under the leadership of Mr. Malinov's Cabinet, rendered Austria-Hungary a service by proclaiming, a day before, her own independence, and raising up her country to the dignity of a Tsardom. As must be self-evident, this was a doubly heavy blow for Serbia. On the one side it was a heavy attack on the part of Austria-Hungary on the international position and the future of Serbia; on the other side, it was an act of real treachery and unfaithfulness on the part of her Ally Bulgaria. Bulgaria's own action, and her co-operation with Austria-Hungary in the annexation of Bosnia and Hertzegovina—an act clearly directed against Serbia and the Serbian nation—was contrary to the express stipulations of the Treaty of Nish (concluded between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1904), and which at the time of annexation was fully valid.

2. At the time when the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria was being arranged, and during the period immediately preceding it (*viz.* in 1911), two important with a map, and also with a malicious leading article (in answer to Mr. Jsemovitch) which was full of inexactitudes and untruths.

political events took place in their immediate neighbourhood: Turkey was at war with Italy in Tripoli, and with the Albanians at home, because of their demands and their aspirations towards autonomy. While the first political event was favourable for an action against Turkey, the second event was replete with danger for Serbia. Austria had long had pretensions to Albania, and she now made use of the Albanians for her own ends in Turkey and for her action towards Salonika. It can easily be imagined what prospects were opened to the eyes of the Serbian statesmen by those events, coming so soon after the annexation of Bosnia and Hertzegovina in 1908. How widespread was the general belief that Austria was preparing for herself a terrain in Turkey through the Albanians, may be deduced from the following quotation from the pamphlet of Mr. Shopov, who certainly could not be suspected of accusing Austria without any foundation.

“Austria,” writes Mr. Shopov, “was very much interested in the Albanian question. She was anxious to give it an orientation favourable to the development of her own policy in the Balkans. The Young Turks had proofs in their hands that the Austrian emissaries had instigated the Albanian insurrection, and therefore they, without hesitation, called the Albanian insurgents the ‘outposts of Austria.’ The Turkish Government considered the proposal of Count Berchtold to be connected with the Albanian insurrection, and therefore did not show great willingness to accept it.”

The annexation of Bosnia and Hertzegovina on one side, the creation of a Great Albania, as the instrument of Austria, on the other—what a terrible prospect for Serbia and the Serbian nation!

3. Up to that time, Bulgaria would not agree to entering into an understanding with Serbia concerning Macedonia. She considered that Macedonia was Bulgarian, and therefore would not have any arrangement with Serbia concerning it. She considered Macedonia to be already her own, seeing that the Turks—even before Bulgaria was born as a national State—had sold that province to the Bulgarians by the firman of the Sultan of February 28th, 1870, which established the Bulgarian Exarchate on an entirely uncanonical and revolutionary basis! And on this occasion, in the year 1911, Bulgaria came to an arrangement with Serbia for war with Turkey only because—according to the protocol of September 16th, 1911—she could not and dared not make war on Turkey, not only without Serbia, but without Greece and Montenegro as well! The question is: Did Bulgaria, even then, accept the basis for an understanding with Serbia loyally and sincerely? Did she really intend to execute all the engagements which she took upon herself? It may, at least, be doubted. Certainly the fact that Bulgaria had already entered into two treaties with Serbia, and by her failure to fulfil her engagements had severely injured Serbian interests, lends support to this suggestion. But let us look at the facts:

(a) On the very eve of the war Bulgaria—after the military conventions had been signed, and after the understanding between the chiefs of both the General Staffs had been arrived at, desired that the convention and the understanding should be modified! She made that request first on August 23rd, and again on September 15th! Even during the war she demanded different changes, first on October 10th, 1912, and again in February 1913!

(b) In the second half of October 1912 Dr. Danev went to Budapest at the request of King Ferdinand, in order, as he himself has said,

“ To try to win over Austria in a certain manner and in the interests of Bulgaria. With the object of ascertaining to what extent we could rely on the second group (the Triple Alliance), I desired to go to Austria, and, indeed, I went to Budapest when the battle of Lule-Burgas was nearing its conclusion.”¹

Mr. Gheshov, on p. 54 of his already-mentioned pamphlet, says :

“ On October 16th Dr. Danev informed us that at the Supreme Command the question of his eventual departure for Vienna was discussed . . . to try to win Austria for us, as Vienna was raising the principal opposition to the definite liquidation of Turkey-in-Europe ! ”

It is clear that the initiative for the departure for Vienna did not come from Mr. Gheshov, but from the Supreme Command, from King Ferdinand ! And Dr. Danev agreed with that initiative and recommended it to Mr. Gheshov.

And, as he said himself, a few days later, Mr. Gheshov, together with his colleagues, approved that suggestion.

To the Allies it was explained that the journey to Budapest was undertaken with the view to some difficulties with Roumania ! Yet, on Dr. Danev's return from Budapest, the Allies were ignored ; he passed through Belgrade without seeing any one of the Serbian statesmen !

¹ Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S., the speech of Dr. Danev, May 5th, 1914, p. 642.

It is worth while mentioning that this journey of Dr. Danev took place while the Prohaska affair was making great noise in the Austrian press, and while Austria was contesting Serbia's desire to obtain an outlet on the Adriatic Sea.

(c) When the delegates of the Allies went to London to negotiate peace, Bulgaria, through Mr. Kocho Hadji Kaltchev, was conducting separate secret negotiations for peace with Kiamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier, although such a proceeding was expressly forbidden by the treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria. The fact that that was done behind the back of Mr. Gheshov's Cabinet, and on the order of the Supreme Command, does not diminish the importance of such disloyal conduct. On the contrary, that conduct becomes increasingly dangerous, and it proved—in connection with what happened at Tchataldja when Turkey proposed peace—that the situation in Sofia was such that the Allies had to deal, not only with the responsible Government, but also with irresponsible factors, who were themselves more powerful than the Government!

(d) Contrary to the wishes of the Allies and to the advice of the Great Powers, the Bulgars insisted that the peace negotiations should be broken off, the armistice denounced, and the war resumed and continued. The Allies responded to their wishes, although somewhat unwillingly, and the peace negotiations were interrupted on January 16th.

After which Dr. Danev left a memorandum by which he claimed for Bulgaria Debra and a common frontier with Albania, although by the treaty Debra was allotted to Serbia!

(e) When, with the aid of two Serbian divisions (50,000 men) and the Serbian siege artillery, Adrianople

fell, the first step taken by the Bulgarians was to disregard and undervalue the Serbian help in the success of the Allies. That help was qualified as only a military demonstration, and General Savov—who had previously delayed the attack on Adrianople—having received the report of its fall on March 13th, sent to General Ivanov the following dispatch: "Demand that Shukri Pasha shall not surrender to the Serbians!"¹ How this order was executed is well known. All sorts of stories were made with a view to concealing the truth, viz. that Shukri Pasha surrendered to the Serbians.

(f) Concerning that part of the treaty which stipulates that Bulgaria should render Serbia military assistance in the case of an attack by Austria, or if the Austrian army entered the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, or if Serbia otherwise should be obliged to declare war on Austria, Mr. Nachevitch has told us how little Bulgaria intended to fulfil that engagement. On the occasion of one of his missions to Austria-Hungary, he openly declared in an interview given in Vienna that in Bulgaria there existed no statesman who would have dared to execute that engagement, and that, according to his opinion, the engagement itself was made only to facilitate the acceptance by Serbia of the treaty of February 29th, 1912.²

But it is not only Mr. Nachevitch who has informed us of the Bulgarian view of this part of the treaty,

¹ Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S., April 29th, 1914: the Speech of Mr. Greg, Vassilyev, p. 495.

² The quotation is from memory, as the Austrian journals of that epoch are not available to the writer at Nish at the time of writing. It will be found, however, to be substantively correct.

for we have a still more important witness, indeed, a "classical" witness, in Dr. Danev himself.

Let us quote what he, in his speech to the Narodno Sobranjé of May 5th of last year, said about it :

"There are, here and abroad, some opinions that our treaty was directed against a certain group of Great Powers, more precisely against Austria. I believe your common sense will tell you how unfounded is such an assertion. We, who were preparing to fight an Empire of many million inhabitants like Turkey, which possesses an inexhaustible reserve of men, could we—for God's sake!—seriously think of turning the edge of our sword at the same time against some other Great Power? The question supplies its own answer.

"We could not even think of a war with any Power whatever, because our strength was hardly sufficient for the adversary with whom we had to measure ourselves. *And to show that we were really far from such a thought, I must tell you that in the political conventions with Serbia there was nothing like it!* In the military conventions there is a stipulation—and let me confess that I did not know about it, but afterwards it was proved that it did exist—according to which the Serbs and Bulgars would assist each other if a third Power were to attack them. *I must tell you that for me the political convention was of importance, and that political convention stipulated in what manner both States were to act against the common adversary.* After that, in my absence, and when I was not in Bulgaria, the military convention was concluded, and in the same the above-mentioned clause was introduced. *It is in the interest of Bulgaria to show herself before the world in her real guise, that she be not considered as a State which does not take foreign interests into account.* On several occasions in the course of the Balkan crisis the interests of other States which were not mixed up in the struggle became involved, but the question of our turning our arms against

that other State was never raised by either side. I repeat, never. In general, no State is mentioned by name in the military convention, but only 'a third State,' which would intervene against us, was taken into consideration. And, indeed, there were some third States which did intervene in the conflict, but we, being occupied otherwise, together with our Allies, *did not think of availing ourselves of that clause*. . . . The clause itself was included in the military convention merely to demonstrate to all and sundry the complete solidarity of interests existing between the Allies. But in essence, neither of the Allies, either then or at a later date, ever thought that the execution of the clause would be undertaken (dissent from the Right and Right Centre).

"In order to dispel even the slightest doubt in that respect, I should explain to you that, during the crisis of 1912, the most important question for the future of Serbia was her outlet on the Adriatic Sea. Austria was opposed to that. If her Allies ever meant to execute the clause of which we speak, no better opportunity could have been presented. But no one, much less Serbia herself, thought of it. That is important. . . . Those who were representing Bulgaria wished in that way to give proof of their clear conscience. But neither the Serbs nor we ourselves have seriously thought that we could also fight against a third State!"

Mr. N. Harlakov asked the question: "Why then, Dr. Danev, was it necessary for you to definitely fix the number of fighting men who were sent to help Serbia against a third State?" Dr. Danev answered the question quite laconically and enigmatically. "I have explained the matter to you. I leave it to you to think it over!"¹

¹ It is now common knowledge that in the military convention *Austria is expressly referred to*, and there is no longer

As explaining the Bulgarian point of view and her conduct, the following two dispatches are characteristic :

On January 4th, 1913, Mr. Gheshov wired to Dr. Danev :

“ If the Porte categorically rejects the collective note of the Great Powers, and if the delegates of all the Allies decide to interrupt the peace negotiations, we have no objection, and we have already instructed General Savov to await from you the announcement that you have broken off the pourparlers, and at once to denounce the armistice. It is advisable that we should not separate ourselves from the Allies in that matter, as otherwise we might supply them with a cause of complaint, *as they do complain that we have not sufficiently supported them in the question of the Adriatic port—although we really supported them more than the Great Powers, our friends, advised us to do.* Of course I categorically deny that, but the Serbs are looking for an excuse to justify their efforts to obtain places outside the boundary line, which are known to you, and more especially Prilep. Therefore we must be very cautious.”

On the same day Dr. Danev wired from London :

“ Last night I dined with the Austrian Ambassador. I spoke with him and with the French and Italian Ambassadors, and with Sir A. Nicholson. They were all pleased any ignorance as to the text of the third article of the military convention. It is beyond doubt that the military convention was part and parcel of the political convention. The text of the second and of the fourth articles of that convention are public property, and everybody knows also the text of the third article of the secret annex to the treaty. The individual reader can therefrom form his own opinion as to how much truth there is in what Dr. Danev said, and whether such conduct is correct and loyal !

that the Allies have not broken off the negotiations. . . . With reference to the Roumanian question, they were not satisfied when I told them that Mr. Jonescu is not pleased with my yesterday's proposal. . . . *I especially tried to prove to the Austrian Ambassador that all our concessions were dictated by a wish to satisfy Austria, but that we have reached the limit of our concessions.*" (The Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, pp. 792-3.)

(g) The treaty between Bulgaria and Greece was signed on May 16th, 1912, and the military convention on September 22nd of the same year.

The treaty and the convention were concluded by Bulgaria with Greece after signature of the treaty with Serbia, but without any understanding with Serbia, despite the fact that the Greco-Bulgarian treaty affected Serbia and referred to the use of joint action. The Greco-Bulgarian treaty was not shown by Bulgaria to Serbia even when the Serbian Government so requested, *because*—explained the Bulgars—" *it was stipulated that it should not be shown to a third State.*"

(h) After the arrangement come to between General Putnik and General Fitchev, signed on June 19th in Varna, a protocol was concluded between the Serbian Colonel Z. Mishitch (representing General Putnik) and General Fitchev. That protocol, signed on August 23rd, 1912, set out certain military questions upon which Colonel Mishitch and General Fitchev had failed to agree. Then, for the first time, General Fitchev advanced the opinion that the Thracian theatre was more important, and desired that Bulgaria should be released from her engagement to send three divisions to the Vardar, where they were destined to form the left wing of the Allied army in Macedonia. Colonel Mishitch did not agree with General Fitchev's opinion

that the Eastern theatre was more important, but, on the insistence of General Fitchev, finally agreed that Bulgaria should send only one division instead of three to the Vardar battleground.

It is for this reason that the convention, signed on September 15th in Sofia, mentions only one division. But it was even then expressly stated that the arrangement, made in Varna on June 19th of the same year, 1912, otherwise remained in force. (See the Art. 6 of the Sofia Convention of September 15th, 1912.)

(i) During the battle of Kumanovo, the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, Mr. Todorov, accompanied by Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, the Serbian Minister in Sofia, arrived in Nish, to meet the Serbian Prime Minister Pashitch. Mr. Todorov requested Serbia to consent not only to Bulgaria withdrawing even her one division from the Vardar, but that Serbia should herself send two divisions to the Maritsa. Although she was under no obligation to do so, Serbia agreed to the proposal immediately after the battle of Kumanovo. Why Bulgaria already required these two Serbian divisions is still an open question. Had Bulgaria found that she had not sufficient soldiers? Had it by chance been discovered that Turkey had a much larger army than had been anticipated? It has been positively established that in the battle of Lule-Burgas Turkey had barely 90,000 men in action, and up to that time Bulgaria had not fought a single serious engagement.

(j) In February 1913 the Bulgarian Government again turned to Serbia and requested the loan of siege artillery, in order to force the capitulation of Adrianople, inasmuch as neither at Tchataldja nor at Adrianople had anything thus far been done to overcome the Turkish resistance, although the war had been renewed

in the middle of January. On that occasion also Serbia willingly complied with the wish of her Ally, and gave Bulgaria twenty-eight siege guns and heavy howitzers, with the necessary number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, and the ammunition. It is interesting to note that the Bulgars desired to pay in cash for these guns and ammunition, to which she had limited her demand. She had asked for neither officers nor men. Serbia naturally refused a cash payment, and sent guns, ammunition, officers, and gunners.

(k) The treaty, the Secret Annex to the treaty, and the military conventions between Serbia and Bulgaria which are the integral parts of the treaty, were signed by both sovereigns and by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The military convention was also signed by the Chiefs of the General Staffs of both countries.

(l) In order thoroughly to understand the treaty and the military convention between Serbia and Bulgaria, and to form a correct judgment on the conduct of Serbia and Bulgaria in the contest concerning the application and execution of the treaty, it is necessary to bear in mind the text of Art. 4 of the Secret Annex to the treaty. This is of great importance, and we draw attention to it, reproducing here a faithful translation. Art. 4 of the Secret Annex reads as follows :

“ Every difference which may be manifested concerning the interpretation and execution of any of the stipulations of the treaty, its Secret Annex and military conventions, is to be submitted to the final decision of Russia as soon as one or other party declares that it is impossible to reach an agreement with the other party by direct negotiation.”

In Sofia they refused to recognise the existence of

that article. If their attention were drawn to it, they would simply reply that the article in question referred to quite different matters. They wished to apply only Art. 2 of the Secret Annex to the question of delimitations. The Serbs demanded the revision of the second article of the Secret Annex, basing their desire on Art. 4 of the Annex. This is the explanation of the Serbian point of view concerning the revision of the treaty, and the meaning of the "wider arbitration." It is interesting to note what Dr. Danev said on that subject in his speech in the Narodno Sobranjé.

"My memorandum," he said, "which I prepared prior to the events of June 17th, clearly proves that we had in view both arbitrations. But when we came to consider the Serbian point of view, we arrived at the conclusion that all the pretensions made by them on the basis of Art. 4, can give no other result than this: *that the arbitration must move inside the limits of the contested zone.* That was our point of view. Concerning the principle on which the Serbians based their pretensions, we have said to them: 'If you have any pretensions explain them to the Arbitrator, but it must be understood that the Arbitrator must act in virtue of the treaty and declare his decision within the bounds of the treaty!'"

We may well ask what necessity existed for all this pleading if arbitration was sincerely desired, and when Art. 4 clearly set forth everything. That article foresaw the revision of the treaty; that is to say, the right of the Arbitrator to give his judgment within the limits of the entire zone between Rodope and the Shar mountains. But that is exactly what Dr. Danev and the others would not have! ¹

(m) While Serbia and Bulgaria alone negotiated the

¹ Mr. D. R zov was more straightforward: without any

treaty of February 29th, they made war together with Greece and Montenegro, and during the war all four acted together and kept in close and harmonious contact with one another. Together they negotiated for peace in London, and together they concluded peace with Turkey. Europe looked on them as constituting one block, and officially they always appeared before Europe as an entity.

Was it then possible that the results of the war should not be liquidated at the same time and in the same manner? Was it possible that the condominium created by the diplomacy and by the armies of all four Allies could be broken and separately and differently partitioned?

(n) It cannot be denied that the attitude of Serbia during this time was perfectly loyal. It is true that Mr. P. N. Milyukov endeavoured, together with his friends at Sofia, to dispute this fact in the journal "Retch," but all attempts were in vain, and we propose now, in confirmation of our statement, to adduce only two or three facts:

According to Dr. Ghenadiev's statement,¹ when, in the second half of November (1912) he advised Dr. Danev to conclude a separate peace, independently of the Allies, because he foresaw that otherwise many difficulties would arise for Bulgaria, he added that Dr. Danev's answer was: "*Yes, but the Serbians conduct themselves with much loyalty!*"²

beating about the bush, he said that what Bulgaria wanted was simply arbitration within the limits of the "contested zone" according to Art. 2 of the Secret Annex. See "Svobodno Mnyeniye," No. 4, 1914.

¹ Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S. May 8th, 1914, p. 775.

² Mr. P. N. Milyukov, in the "Retch" of November 6th,

The Serbs demanded the revision of the treaty in a loyal and straightforward manner, supporting that demand by the treaty itself and by totally changed circumstances. As early as the end of December 1912, or the beginning of January 1913, they orally ac-
1914, tried to question the loyalty of Serbia, quoting, in proof of his statements, an alleged circular, dated September 15th, 1912, sent to the diplomatic representatives of Serbia abroad on the occasion of Count Berchtold's proposal. In that circular (it is further alleged) the name of "Old Serbia" was explained as often meaning "Macedonia," and the extent of that province is represented as being covered by the name of Old Serbia. At the same time, it is interesting to note that Mr. Milyukov himself acknowledges that neither the Bulgarian who gave him that circular in Salonika, nor the Serbian who distributed it, and who in conversation with Mr. Milyukov did not deny its contents, thought much of it! It is still more strange that Mr. Milyukov in November 1914 could write: "There is the beginning of the fratricidal war of 1913," and that after all the Bulgarians had themselves published concerning that war, and after the discussion in the Bulgarian Narodno Sobranjé on the proposal to hold an inquiry into the events of June 16th!

Like the Bulgarian and the Serbian in Salonika in January, the Bulgarians in Sofia and the Serbians in Belgrade attached no importance to the circular. Otherwise it is strange that during the entire Balkan War, and later, during the contest between Serbia and Bulgaria, no trace of it was to be found. No one mentioned it, and no one sought to incriminate Serbia by it. If we are not mistaken, Dr. Ghenadiev mentioned it once in his speech at the Narodno Sobranjé. He did not dwell on it, but endeavoured to prove a lack of loyalty on the part of the Serbians by the fact that Mr. Novakovitch said to Mr. Izvolski in Paris that it was absolutely necessary to make certain changes in the boundaries!

The argument of Mr. P. N. Milyukov looks very much like the argument of King Ferdinand in his dispatch to the Tsar of Russia, viz.: "The declaration of Mr. Pashitch has provoked great excitement in Bulgaria, and interferes with his own

quainted the Bulgarian Government with that desire in a most friendly manner. And when the Bulgarians not only would not listen to the suggestion, but began to openly oppose it, then the Serbians addressed, on February 23rd, 1913, their written demand to the Bulgarian Government.¹

' pacific ' policy ! " It seems as if Mr. Milyukov had " accidentally " forgotten the well-known letter of His Beatitude Exarch Joseph, who in 1912 recommended the Bishop of Uskub to try and bring some Serbian villages of the Skopika Cerna Gora back to the Exarchate, placing at his disposal money with which to bribe the Turkish authorities. (See " Samouprava," of 1913-4, and " Novoe Zzono," Petrograd, 1914.)

¹ How well founded was the Serbian demand for revision can also be proved by the two following Bulgarian confessions :

Dr. Ghenadiev, speaking in the Narodno Sobranjé on May 9th, 1914, said : " We had opportunities to conclude peace under favourable conditions. Now when, in the month of May, after the concluded peace in London, we have got an enviable part of Thrace, *which we did not hope to get*, the Serbians and the Greeks will plunder us in Macedonia."

D. Rizov, the Bulgarian Minister in Rome, in his open letter to the editor of the " Svobodno Mnyeniye," No. 4, 1914, under the title " *How the Catastrophe came,*" writes as follows : " Our third mistake was the changing of the character of the war from a war of liberation to the war of conquest by demanding the frontier Rodosto-Midia. That mistake on our part was not only contrary to the note of the Allies, which forced Turkey to declare war against us, not only to the Tsar's (King Ferdinand's) manifesto by which we declared war, but the mistake gave birth to the malicious legend that we were aiming at a hegemony in the Balkans, which legend was cleverly exploited by the Serbs and Greeks. The world began to wonder why we were not making some concessions to the Serbs and Greeks in Macedonia when we were snatching the whole of Thrace and stretching our boundary up to the very gates of Constantinople. Such demands and such tendencies on our part served to cool off the sym-

But all that—and all that happened earlier—did not prevent the Serbians from continuing to fulfil their duties as an Ally most loyally and generously, without limiting themselves to the strictly written engagements. They broke off the negotiations for peace in London in order to satisfy the Bulgarians; they waited patiently for several months; they gave their heavy siege artillery to crush the resistance of Adrianople, and with their two divisions they, together with the Bulgarians, stormed the great fortress and, at great sacrifice, captured it!

When after all that the Bulgarians commenced to send their army to the Serbian and Greek frontiers, and when they were putting all sorts of difficulties in the way of the return of the Serbian army from Adrianople to Serbia, the Serbians, suspecting the true meaning of such acts, began themselves to prepare for an eventual struggle, in order that they should not be taken unawares.

To what great extent they were even then loyal and generous is demonstrated by two facts: *they did not interfere in the slightest way with the concentration of the pathies of the Russians, who began to look on our pretensions with suspicion, and estranged from us the liberal-minded men of Europe, who began to look on us as on a people who say one thing and do another, and who had become intoxicated by their victories in such measure that they lost every sense of proportion in their pursuit of conquests. . . .*"

How could Mr. Rizov, after such a statement, himself assist to make such a great mistake? How could he himself oppose the revision of the treaty, demand a special arbitration based only on Art. 2 of the Secret Annex, and agitate for war against the Allies merely because they demanded arbitration according to Art. 4 of the treaty?—that is indeed a mystery of his own mentality in particular and of the Bulgarian mentality in general.

Bulgarian army, even through the territories which they, the Serbians, had in their occupation, and they did not allow any frontier incident to take place on their side until June 16th/17th, when the Bulgarians, in full force, unexpectedly attacked the Serbians and Greeks on the entire Macedonian front!

(o) In order to give final proof of their sincere desire to avoid armed conflict, the Serbians at once accepted the invitation of the Russian Government to carry out a demobilisation simultaneously with the Bulgarians and Greeks by reducing their army to only the fourth part of its war strength upon the conclusion of peace. But what really happened? The Bulgarians, who in the beginning agreed to the Russian proposal, withdrew their consent to it the moment that their army had finished its concentration on the Macedonian frontier! Dr. Danev, having formed a new Government under his presidency, withdrew the official consent which had been formerly given by the Bulgarian Government, and formulated a new condition to the previous agreement and declared that Bulgaria accepted the demobilisation only on the condition of a joint occupation of Macedonia! We have already noted what was thought and written in the Bulgarian Supreme Command on that subject.

That it was not true that such a condition was based on the treaty (as they tried afterwards to explain) can be proved by the following facts: (1) Bulgaria had previously agreed to demobilise without the said condition; (2) the Russian Government immediately rejected the said condition as unfounded; (3) the text of the telegrams of General Savov on the subject which we have previously quoted.

I

THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE
BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BULGARIA AND
THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

HIS Majesty, Ferdinand I, King of the Bulgars, and His Majesty Peter I, King of Serbia, animated by the conviction of the community of the interests and of the identity of the destinies of their countries and of both brother-nations, the Bulgarian and the Serbian, and determined to defend their interests solidly and with united forces and to safeguard their full progress, hereby agree as follows :

Article 1.—The Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia guarantee each other their mutual independence and the inviolability of their respective territories, and for that object they engage, absolutely and without limit, to succour each other with their entire forces, in the case that one of them should be attacked by one or several foreign States.

Article 2.—Both contracting parties engage themselves to proceed to the help of the other with their entire forces should any Great Power whatever attempt to annex, or militarily occupy, even if only temporarily, any portion of Balkan territory which is now under the Turkish rule, if one of the contracting parties should consider that action as opposed to her vital interests and as a *casus belli*.

Article 3.—Both contracting parties engage themselves not to conclude peace otherwise than together and after a previous understanding between them.

Article 4.—With a view to the most complete and expeditious fulfilment of this Treaty, a Military Convention shall be concluded in which everything for which each contracting party shall have to prepare in the case of war shall be provided for, as well as everything which—with respect to military organisation, dislocation, mobilisation

of the armies, and the mutual relations of the Supreme Commands—should be fixed in the time of peace in order to prepare for conditions of war and for the successful prosecution of the war. The Military Convention shall be considered as an integral part of this Treaty. The elaboration of the Military Convention must be commenced within twenty-five days after the signature of this Treaty, and for its elaboration a term of not longer than two months is allowed.

Article 5.—The Treaty and the Military Convention shall be considered as valid from the date of their signature until December 31st, 1920, inclusive. Their duration can be prolonged beyond that term, but only after a supplementary agreement shall have been concluded between the contracting parties. But should the contracting parties find themselves still in the state of war, or should the liquidation of results of such a war be uncompleted on the date fixed for the expiration of this Treaty and its annexed Military Convention, this Treaty and the Convention shall continue valid until the conclusion of peace and until the liquidation of the situation created by the war shall have been completed.

Article 6.—The Treaty shall be signed in two copies in both the Bulgarian and Serbian languages. It shall be signed by the Sovereigns and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Similarly the Military Convention shall be drawn up in two copies in the Serbian and Bulgarian languages and signed by the Sovereigns and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and special military representatives endowed with full powers.

Article 7.—The Treaty and Convention may be announced or communicated to other States only after previous agreement between the contracting parties, and then together and at the same time.

Similarly, another State may be received into alliance only after a previous agreement.

Given at Sofia, February 29th, 1912.

II

THE SECRET ANNEX TO THE TREATY OF
FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE
KINGDOM OF BULGARIA AND THE KINGDOM
OF SERBIA

Article 1.—In the case that internal disorder should break out in Turkey, of a nature calculated to endanger the national and State interests of the contracting parties, or of one of them, or in the case that, in consequence of the internal or external difficulties of Turkey, the question of maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkan Peninsula should be opened, the contracting party which first arrives at the conviction that armed action should, in consequence, be taken, must address itself to the other contracting party with a proposal to that effect which must be supported by reasons and a statement of motive. The other contracting party shall be obliged to enter at once into exchange of ideas, and—if she does not agree with her Ally—to give an answer explaining her reasons for disagreement.

If an agreement for joint action should be made, Russia is to be informed thereof, and if she be not thereto opposed, action shall be commenced on the basis of the agreement concluded, being guided in everything by the sentiment of solidarity and community of interests. In the contrary event, if an agreement is not reached, the Allies will ask Russia for her opinion, which opinion, if and so far as Russia gives it, shall be binding on both parties.

If Russia does not wish to give an opinion, and if the contracting parties afterwards fail to reach an agreement, and if that party which favours an armed action should take such action against Turkey on her own responsibility, then the other party should be bound to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards her Ally, and mobilise her army in the manner foreseen by the Military

Convention, and to proceed with all her forces to the assistance of her Ally if some other State should help Turkey.

Article 2.—All the territory won by a joint action in the sense of Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty and Art. 1 of this Convention, will become the joint possession (condominium) of both the Allies, and the liquidation shall be executed immediately and within a term of three months from the conclusion of peace, on the following basis :

Serbia recognises Bulgaria's right to the country lying to the east of Rodopes and the river Struma, and Bulgaria that of Serbia to the country to the north and to the west of the Shar mountain.

With respect to the territory lying between the Shar mountain and the Rodopes, the Archipelago and the lake of Ochrida, if both contracting parties arrive at the conclusion that it is impossible to organise it into an autonomous province out of consideration for the general interests of the Bulgarian and Serbian nations, or for whatever interior or exterior reasons, then that territory shall be treated in the following manner : Serbia engages herself not to demand anything across the line marked on the annexed map, and which starts from the point Golemi Vrh on the Turko-Bulgarian frontier (to the north of Kriva Palanka) and runs generally in a south-westerly direction to the lake of Ochrida, passing across the hill Kitka, between the villages Metechovo and Podrzikon, across the height of the village Nerava, by the watershed up to height 1,000, northwards of the village Bashchevo, between the villages Lyubenatz and Potrlitsa, across the hill Ostrich—the height 1,000 (the mountain Lissatz), the height 1,050, between the villages Drach and Opilo, across the village Tamishmanatz and Zivalyevo, the heights 1,050 and 1,000, across the village Kushalo, following the main watershed of the mountain Gradishte up to the hill Gorich, by the height 1,023, by the watershed between the villages Ivankovtse and Loguintsi and by the Voterski and Sopot to

Vardar, crosses the Vardar and continues by the mountain top across the height 2,550 up to the mountains Perepole, following its watershed between the villages Krap and Barbaress up to the height 1,200, then between the villages Erkenovo and Drenovo up to the hill Tchesma (height 1,254) by the watershed of the mountains Baba and Krushka—Tepessi, between the villages Seltse and Tsarsko, up to the hill on the mountain Protiska eastwards of the village Belitsa, across Brezane, by the height 1,200 (Ilinska Planina), by its watershed across the heights 1,330 and 1,277, between the villages Livoishte and Goreltsi till the monastery Gubavatz on the lake of Ochrida: and Bulgaria likewise engages to accept that boundary, if His Majesty the Tsar of Russia—who will be requested to decide the question by arbitration—declares himself in favour of same. It is understood that both sides bind themselves to accept as the definite boundary that line which His Majesty the Russian Tsar shall decide, within the above-mentioned limits, as answering to the best interests of both contracting parties.

Article 3.—The two contracting parties will together communicate the stipulations of the Treaty, the Secret Annex, and the Military Convention, to the Imperial Russian Government, which will then be requested to retain a copy of them and to agree to the purpose for which they have been concluded, and H.M. the Tsar of Russia will be requested to be graciously pleased to accept and to approve the rôle which is thereby offered to him and to his Government.

Article 4.—Every dispute which might arise concerning the interpretation or execution of whatever stipulation of the Treaty, Secret Annex, and Military Convention, will be submitted to the definitive decision of Russia, as soon as one of the contracting parties declares that she considers it impossible to arrive at an understanding by direct negotiations.

Article 5.—No stipulation of this Secret Annex can be

published or communicated to another State without a previous understanding between the contracting parties and without the consent of Russia.

Given in Sofia, February 29th, 1912.

III

THE MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF BULGARIA AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

IN the spirit and on the basis of Art. 3 of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria, and with the view to the full realisation of the intentions which that Treaty contemplated, the two contracting parties fix the following conditions, which will possess the same vigour and duration as the stipulations of the Treaty themselves.

Article 1.—The Kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia engage themselves mutually to co-operate in the eventualities foreseen by Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Alliance, and by Art. 1 of the Secret Annex, namely: Bulgaria to co-operate with an armed force, which shall not be smaller than 200,000 soldiers, and Serbia with a force which shall not be smaller than 150,000 soldiers, for action on the frontier as well as for operations beyond the national territories.

Complementary units, the Serbian third ban or the Bulgarian Opolcheniye, are not included in the stipulated effective.

The army must be directed to the frontier, or without the frontier to places where, according to the circumstances and object of the war, military operations have to be undertaken, at the latest on the twenty-first day after the

declaration of war, or after a notification by one of the Allies that a *casus fœderis* exists.

In any case, and before the expiration of that term, both sides will consider it their duty as an Ally to send their armies to the battlefield on the seventh day following the declaration of war, or after the declaration of the existence of a *casus fœderis*, if necessary in small parties and in accordance with the progress of the mobilisation and concentration, if that action should be in harmony with the spirit of military operations, and could favourably influence the issue of the war.

Article 2.—If Roumania should attack Bulgaria, Serbia is bound to declare war on her immediately, and to send against her a force which shall not be smaller than 100,000 soldiers, either to the middle of the Danube, or to the battlefield of the Dobrudja.

If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, Serbia engages herself to cross into Turkey, and to allot a part of her mobilised army, which shall not be smaller than 100,000 soldiers, to the battlefield of the Vardar.

Should Serbia be either herself or conjointly with Bulgaria engaged in war with some third Power, she will employ against Roumania or Turkey all her free army.

Article 3.—If Austria-Hungary attacks Serbia, Bulgaria engages herself to declare war upon Austria at once, and to send into Serbia an army which shall not be less than 200,000 soldiers strong, and which, in association with the Serbian army, shall engage in offensive and defensive operations against Austria-Hungary.

Bulgaria is under the same engagement towards Serbia should Austria-Hungary, under any pretext whatever, and with the consent or without the consent of Turkey, send her army into the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, and by such action oblige Serbia either to declare war upon her or to dispatch an army into the Sandjak to protect her interests, thereby provoking an armed conflict with Austria-Hungary.

Again, if Turkey should attack Serbia, Bulgaria engages herself to cross at once the Turkish frontier, and to detach from her army, mobilised in virtue of Art. 1 of this Convention, at least 100,000 men, who will be sent to the Vardar theatre of war.

If Roumania attacks Serbia, Bulgaria binds herself to attack the Roumanian army as soon as it crosses the Danube and enters the Serbian territory.

If, in the eventualities with which this Article treats, Bulgaria, either alone or conjointly with Serbia, should be at war with a third State, she (Bulgaria) engages herself to come to the aid of Serbia with such part of her army as at that moment is disengaged.

Article 4.—Should Bulgaria and Serbia come to a preliminary understanding between themselves to attack Turkey, they engage themselves—unless other arrangements are made by a special agreement—to detach from their armies, mobilised in virtue of Art. 1 of this Convention, at least 100,000 men, which shall be directed to the Vardar battlefield.

Article 5.—In case one of the contracting parties should declare war upon a third State without a preliminary understanding with and the consent of the other contracting party, this latter is hereby relieved from every engagement of Art. 1 of this Convention, but she is bound to preserve an attitude of friendly neutrality towards her Ally during the duration of the war, and at the same time to mobilise immediately an army, which shall not be smaller than 50,000 men, and which will be so concentrated as to most efficiently ensure freedom of movement to her Ally.

Article 6.—In the case of a joint war neither contracting party shall have the right to conclude an armistice for longer than twenty-four hours without previously coming to an agreement with and obtaining the consent of the other contracting party thereto.

Similarly it is necessary to obtain a previous and written

agreement in order that the negotiations for peace may be inaugurated, and that the Treaty of Peace may be signed.

Article 7.—During the war, the armies of each contracting party shall be commanded and all its operations conducted by the respective commanders of those armies.

Should several corps drawn from the armies of both States be operating together against the same objective, the chief command shall be given to that commander who is senior in rank if the armies are of equal strength, and by the elder commander (due consideration being given to the number of years during which he has exercised a command) if the armies are of unequal strength.

If one or more armies of one contracting party should be placed at the disposal of the other party, they will remain under the command of their own commanders, who will, with reference to the direction of strategical operations, receive orders from the Supreme Command of the army at whose disposal they have been placed.

In the event of a joint war against Turkey, the Supreme Command on the Vardar field of operations shall belong to Serbia, provided that the principal Serbian army shall be concentrated in that theatre and provided that that army be superior in numbers to the Bulgarian army operating in the same theatre in accordance with Art. 4 of this Convention. Nevertheless, if the principal Serbian army is not concentrated in that theatre, and if it is numerically weaker than the Bulgarian army, then the Supreme Command in that theatre of operations shall belong to the Bulgarians.

Article 8.—Should the armies of both contracting parties find themselves under the command of the same commander, all the directions and orders concerning the strategical execution of general tactical operations shall be issued in both languages, viz. in Serbian and in Bulgarian.

Article 9.—With respect to clothing, provisioning, and billeting of the troops, the sanitary service, transport of wounded and sick, or burying of the dead, and the transport

of war material and other similar objects, the army of one of the contracting parties acting on the territory of the other contracting party shall have the same rights and facilities for transport as the army of the said contracting party, in accordance with the local laws and regulations. For that purpose all the local authorities shall be obliged to give their assistance to the Allied army.

The payment for all supplies of food shall be made by each party for its own account according to local prices, regularly and by cash, and in exceptional cases by the issue of special receipts.

The transport by railway of the army and all war material, provisions, and other objects, and all the expenses for such transport, shall be borne by the party through whose territory the transport was effected.

Article 10.—Booty of war shall belong to the army which captures it. If the booty is won by joint action on the same battlefield, both armies will divide it between them in proportion to the forces engaged in the battle.

Article 11.—During the war each contracting party shall have a delegate on the staff of the Supreme Command of the other, or on the staff of the armies, and such delegates will maintain the connection between both armies in all matters.

Article 12.—Both Supreme Commands will decide upon strategical operations and any other unforeseen questions which may arise together and in mutual agreement.

Article 13.—The Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Allied armies will, immediately after the conclusion of this Convention, together arrange the disposition of the army, its mobilisation on the basis of Art. 1 of this Convention, and its expedition to the zone of concentration in the cases hereunder stated. They will also come to an understanding concerning the roads which ought to be improved or which ought to be constructed for the purpose of the quicker expedition of the army to the frontier, and for subsequent operations.

Article 14.—This Convention enters into operation from the date of the signature and will be binding as long as the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, to which it is annexed as a constitutive part.¹

GENERAL R. PUTNIK.
GENERAL FITCHEV.

VARNA, *June 19th, 1912.*

IV

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SERBIAN AND BULGARIAN GENERAL STAFFS

IN accordance with Art. 13 of the Military Convention between the Kingdoms of Serbia and Bulgaria, the special delegates of those States have arrived at the following agreement with a view to joint operations :

In case of a War between Serbia and Bulgaria and Turkey

Upon the supposition that the principal Turkish army will be concentrated in the region Skoplje, Kumanovo, Kratovo, Kochane, Veles, the Allied armies shall be, for their actions on the Vardar field of operation, disposed as follows :

1. A Serbian army of two divisions will march across the Skopska Tsrna Gora towards Skoplje, Uskub forming the right wing of the Allied army.

2. A Serbian army of five infantry divisions and one cavalry division will march by the valley of Moravitsa and Pchinya towards the front Kumanovo, Kratovo. This army will form the centre of the Allied army with the object of attacking the front of the enemy.

3. A Bulgarian army of three divisions will form the

¹ As we have already stated, this Convention was also signed by both sovereigns and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

left wing of the Allied army with the object of attacking the right wing and rear of the enemy in the direction of Kiustendil, Kriva Palanka, Skoplje, Kumanovo, Tsarevo Selo, Kochane.

4. The Chiefs of both the General Staffs will together examine the district between Kiustendil and Vranja, and if that examination shows that large forces can be employed on the line Kiustendil, Kriva Palanka, Skoplje, then the two Serbian divisions before detailed to operate across the Skopska Tsrna Gora towards Skoplje will, if the general situation permits, be used to strengthen the left wing of the Allied army. In that case they will be concentrated near Kiustendil.

5. The Chief of the Staff of the Serbian army will use the other three divisions of the II Ban according to his own judgment, and with a view to protecting the right wing of the Allied army.

6. The Chief of the Staff of the Bulgarian army undertakes to expedite the work of improving the road leading from Bosily-Grad to Vlassina.

Should the situation demand that the Bulgarian army on the Maritsa field of operations should be reinforced, and if it should not be necessary to retain all the forces as outlined in the Treaty in the various theatres, then the necessary forces shall be transferred from the Vardar to the Maritsa field of operations. But if the situation should necessitate a strengthening of the Allied army in the Vardar theatre, and it shall not be necessary to retain at the Maritsa theatre all the forces there concentrated, then the necessary army shall be transferred from the Maritsa to the Vardar field of operations.

THE ANNEX

The Staffs of the two armies engage :

(a) To send to each other all the information concerning the neighbouring armies.

(b) To give to each other the necessary number of copies of all the laws, instructions, maps, etc., both official and secret documents.

(c) To send to the Allied army a certain number of officers in order that they may become acquainted with the army and the language, according to Art. 11 of the Military Convention.

(d) The Chiefs of the Serbian and Bulgarian army will meet in the autumn of each year in order to examine the general situation together and eventually to make the alterations in their arrangements which may be required by the altered circumstances.

(Signed) GENERAL PUTNIK.
GENERAL FITCHEV.

VARNA, June 19th, 1912.

Observation.—The disposition of the Allied army and the fundamental scheme for the proposed operations comes from the Serbian General Staff, and for this I do not accept any responsibility.

(Signed) GENERAL FITCHEV.

V

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SERBIAN AND BULGARIAN GENERAL STAFFS

ON the basis of Art. 4 of the Military Convention between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia, the delegates of these two States, the Chiefs of the General Staffs, have discussed the plan of the prospective war with Turkey and have mutually decided upon the following :

1. The entire Serbian army shall operate on the Macedonian field of operations, binding itself at the same time to protect the strategic line Kriva Palanka—Kiustendil.

2. The entire Bulgarian army shall operate by the valley of Maritsa, less a division which shall remain on the line Kiustendil—Dupnitza. For the defence of the town Dupnitza a special garrison shall be left.

3. One Serbian division of the first ban shall be transported by railway to Kiustendil, and shall at first form, together with the said Bulgarian division, one army which will co-operate with the principal Serbian army. If the principal Serbian army succeeds in throwing back the Turks from the line Skoplje—Veles—Ishtip and in progressing towards the south, the Bulgarians may use their division to reinforce their army on the Maritsa field of operations, after having left the Opopchentsi on the Macedonian frontier.

4. The transportation shall be organised in this way: the line Pirot—Tsaribrod—Sofia—Kiustendil is placed at the disposal of the Serbian General Staff on the fifth day after the mobilisation. The transportation shall be carried out by the Serbian trains, inasmuch as the Bulgarian trains will at that time be otherwise occupied.

5. The provisioning of the Serbian divisions shall at first be undertaken by the Bulgarian Ministry of War.

The Serbian Ministry of War will return, in kind, the food used by the Serbian divisions.

6. The arrangement come to between the Chief of the General Staffs on June 19th, 1912 (signed in Varna), will also remain in force for this combination.

(Signed) The Chief of the Staff of the Bulgarian Army,
MAJOR-GENERAL FITCHEV.

(Signed) GENERAL R. PUTNIK.

SOFIA, *September 15th*, 1912.

VI

THE TREATY OF ALLIANCE FOR DEFENCE
BETWEEN BULGARIA AND GREECE

CONSIDERING that both States sincerely desire the preservation of peace in the Balkan Peninsula, and that the desire can best be satisfied by a solid defensive Treaty ;

Considering, in the same order of ideas, that an indispensable condition of political stability in the East consists in the assurance of a mutually peaceful life based on a real and true political equality to the Christian nations in Turkey, and in due respect being paid to the rights which have been granted by Treaties or otherwise to the Christian nationalities in the Empire ;

Considering, lastly, that the joint action of these States in that direction would facilitate and strengthen the concord between the Bulgarian and Greek elements in Turkey, in view of the good relations existing between these two States and the Turkish Empire :

The Government of H.M. the King of the Bulgars and the Government of H.M. the King of the Hellenes—having first promised to each other that they will not endow the purely defensive Alliance with any offensive character, and having decided to conclude a peaceable and mutually defensive agreement—have designated fully authorised representatives . . . who, having mutually exchanged their credentials, have decided the following :

Article 1.—If, against the sincere wish of both high contracting parties, and notwithstanding the efforts of their Governments to evade every attack and every provocation of the Turkish Empire, Turkey attacks one of those two States, either on its territory, or by systematically offending its rights arising from Treaties, or by transgressions against the fundamental principles of International Law, the high contracting parties engage themselves to co-operate with their entire armed forces, and, following

that, not to conclude peace otherwise than together and after a previous understanding between themselves.

Article 2.—Both high contracting parties promise to each other: firstly, that they will make use of all their moral influence over their co-nationals in Turkey to work for a peaceful life with the different elements which compose the Turkish Empire; and secondly, that they will act together, and appear as a *bloc* always before the Turkish Government, or before the Great Powers, in everything that may help to attain or to secure the realisation of the rights granted them by Treaties or otherwise recognised as appertaining to Greek and Bulgarian nationality, as well as the application of the principle of political equality and constitutional guarantee.

Article 3.—This Treaty will remain in force for three years from the date of signature, and shall be automatically prolonged for an additional year if it is not denounced. Notice of denunciation must be given six months before the expiration of the third year from the date of signature.

Article 4.—This Treaty will be kept secret. It may not be communicated to a third State, either in its entirety or partially, or published, excepting after previous agreement has been come to between the high contracting parties.

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible. The ratifications shall be exchanged either in Sofia or in Athens.

In confirmation of which the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and placed their seals thereon.

Drawn up at Sofia in two copies, May 16th, 1912.

IV. EV. GHESHOV.

D. PANAS.

THE DECLARATION

The first article is not binding upon Bulgaria should war between Greece and Turkey follow the admission of Cretan

Deputies into the Greek Chamber in defiance of the wishes of the Turkish Government. In that case Bulgaria is engaged only to observe a benevolent neutrality towards Greece. As the liquidation of the Eastern crisis which was opened by the events of 1908, and likewise the Cretan question, is in accordance with the general interest and can, without destroying the balance in the Balkan Peninsula, strengthen the international position in the interests of peace, Bulgaria promises (independently of the agreement foreseen by the Special Treaty) in no way to hinder any eventual action by Greece which would have for its object the solution of that question.

IV. EV. GHESHOV.
D. PANAS.

THE MILITARY CONVENTION

His Majesty the King of the Bulgars and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, desiring to complete the Defensive Alliance concluded in Sofia on May 16th, 1912, between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Greece by a Military Convention, have for that purpose appointed as their delegates:

H.M. the King of the Bulgars: His Excellency Mr. Iv. Ev. Gheshov, etc., etc.

H.M. the King of the Hellenes: His Excellency Mr. D. Panas, etc., etc. :

Who—having exchanged their credentials and having found them in good order, have agreed to what here follows :

Article 1.—In the case that—in accordance with the engagements entered into in the Defensive Alliance, concluded in Sofia on May 16th, 1912, between Bulgaria and Greece—Greece intervenes militarily against Turkey in a Bulgaro-Turkish war, or that Bulgaria intervenes against Turkey in a Greco-Turkish war, both States (Bulgaria and Greece) bind themselves to render material assistance,

namely: Greece by an army which shall not be smaller than 120,000 men, and Bulgaria by an army which shall not be smaller than 300,000 men. These armies must be prepared to participate either in the operations on the frontier or in an action taken outside the frontiers of their national territories.

These armies shall be concentrated on the frontier, and ready to cross the same, at the latest twenty days after mobilisation, or after a declaration by one of the contracting parties that a *casus fœderis* exists.

Article 2.—In case Turkey should attack Greece, Bulgaria engages herself to declare war on Turkey and to move against her all her forces, which, according to Art. 1, shall consist of at least 300,000 men, conforming her military operations to the plan elaborated by the Bulgarian General Staff.

In case Turkey should attack Bulgaria, Greece engages herself to declare war on Turkey, and to move against her all her forces, which, according to Art. 1, shall consist of at least 120,000 men, conforming her military operations to the plan elaborated by the Greek General Staff. In each case, the principal object of the Greek fleet ought to be to obtain the mastery of the Ægean Sea, and to interrupt communications between Asia Minor and European Turkey.

In the cases foreseen by the two preceding paragraphs, Bulgaria engages herself to undertake the offensive with a larger part of her army against the Turkish force concentrated in the provinces of the Vilayets of Kossovo, Bitolya, and Salonika. If Serbia, according to her Treaty with Bulgaria, participates in the war, Bulgaria could then employ her entire force in Thrace, but in that case, and in virtue of this Treaty, she will make an engagement with Greece to the effect that the Serbian army, which shall not be smaller than 120,000 men, shall take the offensive against the Turkish force concentrated in the above-mentioned three Vilayets.

Article 3.—If Bulgaria and Greece, on the basis of a previous agreement, declare war on Turkey, they engage—unless it shall be arranged differently by a special agreement—to put into the field armies as laid out in Art. 1 of this Convention. In that case the stipulations contained in the last two paragraphs of Art. 2 must also be fulfilled.

Article 4.—If one of the contracting parties declares war on a third State, and not to Turkey, without a previous understanding with, and without the consent of, the other party, the latter is thereby freed from the engagements of Art. 1. She is, however, bound to retain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards her Ally during the duration of the war.

Article 5.—In the case of the joint war, neither contracting party shall conclude an armistice of longer than twenty-four hours without previous understanding with, and the consent of, the other contracting party.

Similarly a written agreement between the contracting parties will be necessary before one of them can open negotiations for peace, or conclude peace.

Article 6.—In case Greece—after she and Bulgaria have mobilised their armies, or entered into war—finds it necessary to solve the Cretan questions according to the wish of the Cretan population, and in consequence of that she is attacked by Turkey, Bulgaria binds herself to come to her assistance, conformably to Art. 1 of this Convention.

Article 7.—The Chiefs of the Bulgarian and Greek General Staffs engage themselves, in the event of war, mutually and in defined cases to inform each other of their plans of campaign. And they further engage to communicate to each other every year any changes which may be introduced into such plans in consequence of altered circumstances.

Article 8.—This Convention will be binding upon both parties as from the date of signature. It will remain in vigour concurrently with the Treaty of the Defensive

Alliance of May 16th, 1912, to which it is annexed as a constituent part.

Composed in Sofia, in two copies, September 22nd, 1912.

IV. EV. GHESHOV.
GENERAL FITCHEV.
D. PANAS.
Z. G. METAXAS, CAPTAIN.

VII

PROTOCOL

TO-DAY, September 16th, 1912, at the order of His Majesty the King, there has been called together a special military council consisting of Generals Nikiforov, Ivanov, Fitchev, Kutinchev, and Ratko Dimitriev.

After the question as to whether Bulgaria, with her existing military equipment and in the present political circumstances, could decide to enter into an armed conflict with Turkey herself, had been discussed, the Minister of War then made the following statement :

(a) *That arrangements have been made with the Kingdoms of Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro to participate in the war with their entire military forces as Allies.*¹

(b) That there exist certain deficiencies in the material equipment of the army which, *generally speaking*, are represented by the annexed comparative table.¹

(c) That in consequence of the deficiencies therein shown to be existing, the following orders have been placed for gradual delivery up to the end of this year : overcoats 100,000, tunics 50,000, trousers 50,000, boots 89,500, tent wings 100,000. (See annexed table.)

¹ The italics are ours.

(d) That there is no need to consider an eventual intervention of some other European Power in favour of Turkey.

(e) That the decision concerning the entry into armed conflict with Turkey should be based on the knowledge which we possess as to the present equipment of the Turkish army.

Secondly, the Council received a communication from the Chief of the General Staff concerning :

(a) The information and reports which the General Staff possesses as to the numbers and quality of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Montenegrin armies, on the one side, and the Turkish army on the other.

(b) The reports relative to the conditions drawn up for joint action by the allied armies of the four Balkan States.

Having received the above information, the Military Council most earnestly considered the situation, and taking into account all the existing circumstances which have a bearing on the war, unanimously arrived at the following decision :

Bulgaria can decide to enter into the armed conflict with Turkey under the following conditions :¹

(A) If the mobilisation is immediately announced and if similar action is taken by the other three Balkan States, viz. Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro.

(B) If, simultaneously with the mobilisation, the Government takes all other necessary measures to acquire the material, which the annexed list shows to be wanting, as well as to provide for the replacement of material which is used up. This latter stipulation is particularly important because the coming war may be stubborn, long, and very difficult.

(Signed) GENERALS NIKIFOROV,
IVANOV,
KUTINCHEV,
DIMITRIEV,
FITCHEV.

¹ The italics are ours.

The annexed table :

1. Infantry rifles (deficiency)	. . .	30,000
2. Ammunition for same (deficiency)	. . .	150,000,000
3. Artillery projectiles (deficiency)	. . .	100,000
4. Overcoats (deficiency)	. . .	135,000
5. Tunics (deficiency)	. . .	130,000
6. Trousers	. . .	145,000
7. Caps	. . .	85,000
8. Tent wings	. . .	165,000
9. Different engineering materials, telegraphs, telephones, aeroplanes, reflectors, auto- mobiles, etc. Approximately for the sum of 800,000 francs		
10. Boots	. . .	233,000

A RETROSPECT ON JUNE 16TH

THE war between the Allies was a triumph for Austrian policy in Sofia. Her intrigues were of long standing, and were noticeable for some time, even when the Serbian army, together with the Bulgarians, were fighting before the forts of Adrianople. For that purpose, in addition to King Ferdinand and Dr. Danev, three parties worked, at first secretly and then openly, and their leaders, Dr. Radoslavov, Dr. Tonchev, and Dr. N. Ghenadiev, ultimately formed the actual Government, which came into power in order to liquidate the catastrophe and proclaim the victory of Austrian policy over the ruined Balkan Alliance.

Those three parties, which are still governing Bulgaria, commenced a struggle against Russia as early as January 1913. A Bulgarian publicist and politician, Dr. K. D. Spisarevski, in his book "Who has Ruined Bulgaria?" writes thus concerning it:

"Under the very nose of the Censor in Sofia, the Liberal organ 'Vechernya Poshta' published more than twenty articles, signed by the well-known Liberal P. N. Daskalov, in which Russia was attacked for preventing us from entering Constantinople. . . . The agitation was carried out on a systematic plan."

With the assistance of the Court camarilla, this agitation was extended, particularly in the army. An

enormous number of copies of the " Vechernya Poshta " were, according to Mr. Spisarevski, sent to the battlefield.¹

The anti-Russian agitation consistently gained ground, until in the minds of the public the following opinion became deeply rooted : " We must not go to Russia ! Our contest with Serbia must be decided by war ! "

" When, after the fall of Adrianople, the Serbian army returned home, it passed through Sofia without being seen and without being greeted, because the Supreme Command did not order that any attention should be shown to the Serbian Ally, although our relations with Serbia at that time were most correct."

Thus writes Mr. Spisarevski on page 33 of his above-mentioned pamphlet.

In number 108 (year 1913) of the journal " Narodni Prava," which is the organ of Dr. Radoslavov, who, together with Dr. Ghenadiev, was all the time in contact with the Court, it was written :

" And therefore no arbitration for any contested zone, even if such arbitration had been stipulated for in the treaty ! Now, or never, we want complete union. The whole of Macedonia is ours. No arbitration either with the Serbians or the Greeks ! "

And further on :

" The Government has entirely lost its head ! The Tsar must take the destiny of the country into his own hands ! "

¹ " I do not merely insinuate," said Mr. S. Kosturkov, " when I say to you, even though it may be distasteful to many on that side (indicating the Right), that the Supreme Command was, in fact, in the hands of the National-Liberal party ! " Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, p. 535.

We have already observed that the higher organs of the Government and of King Ferdinand, of Mr. Rizov, the Bulgarian Minister in Rome, and of Dr. Joshev, the Bulgarian Minister in Belgrade, were thinking and acting in the same way.

The organ of Dr. Radoslavov, "Narodni Prava," in its number 117 of May 24th (1913) made the following statement in a leading article :

"To continue any longer this lightheartedness towards the Allies would be a crime. The Bulgarian Government must get rid of it, and concentrate the entire strength of the Bulgarian army against the enemy. Our army has nothing to wait for at Bulair and Tchataldja. We ought to begin to transfer the troops at once, and that quickly, because the slowness of our railways is well known to us."

Five days later, on the very eve of the formation of Dr. Danev's Government, the "Narodni Prava" made a still more direct appeal to King Ferdinand :

"The King of the Bulgars is now expected to act boldly and quickly. He should send away from him the authors of the national yoke and take all the measures necessary for the protection of the honour and existence of the Bulgarian State."

Early in the month of June Mr. Bourchier sent to the "Times" the following telegram, which was reproduced by all the Bulgarian press :

"Bulgaria gave up her intention to force Tchataldja because Russia promised to compel Serbia to cede the whole undisputed zone. Only after such a solemnly given promise did Bulgaria consent to give up the attack on Tchataldja. After that followed the conclusion of the armis-

tice. But just before the signature of peace in London, the Russian Government, not taking into account their given word, to the great astonishment of Bulgaria, made her new proposal, in advising her that Russia is ready, in order to preserve the Balkan Alliance, to cede to Serbia the entire contested zone, and the zone which was not contested—the districts of Kratovo, Veles, and Kichevo ! ”

In that manner, by the circulation of false information through the Balkan Correspondent of the “ Times,” and before the eyes of Dr. Danev, the Court was cultivating a public opinion against arbitration, both in Bulgaria and in Europe.¹

Even the members of the Narodno Sobranjé who belonged to Mr. Gheshov’s party, and who were his nearest and direct advisers, used the press to circulate their warlike views. One of them, the most expressive *idéologue* of the National party, on the very eve of King Ferdinand’s answer to the dispatch of the Russian Tsar, and seventeen days before the war with the Allies, wrote in the journal “ Mir ” (May 28th) as follows :

“ The Bulgarian nation, united around its wise Tsar,

¹ If it had not been so, then the only alternative is that the idea was conceived in Dr. Danev’s own office ! Mr. Bouchier certainly would not accept reports of such great importance from a mere nobody. Yet we must confess that we cannot imagine how Mr. Bouchier, an Englishman and for so many years the “ Times ” Correspondent in Sofia, could allow himself to be humbugged in such a manner. It is true that Mr. Kabakchiyev, speaking in the Sobranjé of this dispatch, saw in it only “ an intrigue of the Russian despotism,” but we are not astonished at that, because his colleagues in Germany do just the same ! See Stenographic Journals, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, p. 626.

awaits the decisive word. *Ought we to blind ourselves to the fact that the alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria has already become impossible? Let us confess, while yet there remains time, that the alliance has been buried.* All those of our politicians who still wish to preserve that alliance will be buried together with it. Let us stop talking of that dangerous mistake—of the alliance! Macedonia must be Bulgarian. Greece and Serbia cannot have a common frontier.

“We ought not to recede from our demands in anything, nor is there any reason why we should go to Petrograd to be treated there as children.”

The indecision of Mr. Gheshov, and his wabbling between war and arbitration, have enabled the warlike ideas, which preached the war and the breaking up of the alliance, to infect his own party and create a general opinion in that sense among the entire public. The Bulgarian Minister in Vienna, Mr. Salabashev, on May 16th, sent to Mr. Gheshov, just prior to his fall, the following characteristic telegram :

“To the Minister-President, Sofia

“Count Berchtold thinks that it is necessary to act very quickly and energetically in order to come to an immediate understanding with Roumania, so that her co-operation, or at least her benevolent neutrality, may be secured in the case of war against Serbia.

“Roumania has received alluring proposals from Serbia and Greece, but she would prefer to go with Bulgaria. Before everything else it would be desirable to conclude a Convention for friendly neutrality between Bulgaria and Roumania ; at the same time one could conclude an arrangement by which Roumania would bind herself to assist Bulgaria, etc., in the case of war with Serbia. But to attain that object Bulgaria should herself make a friendly offer

to Roumania of a territorial reward, for instance the sea shore at Mangalia.¹

“ (Signed) SALABASHEV.

“ VIENNA, *May 16th, 1913.*”

Dr. Danev, being himself the partisan of extreme measures, gave a fresh impetus to that agitation. He at once “raised his voice,” alleging that he could thereby force the Serbians to accept arbitration. This Mr. Todorov asserted in his speech in the Narodno Sobranjé. Two days before the war the “*Blgaria*,” the organ of Dr. Danev, openly threatened war and declared that Bulgaria would have to put aside all the considerations which so far restrained her from war, and added : “No talk about brotherhood and Slavdom will prevent us from shedding blood !”² Such a threat seems very strange, especially when the same number of that paper reports the success of Mr. Pashitch in his struggle with the Opposition in favour of a pacific policy, and prints the following official communiqué :

“However strong the Serbian Opposition may be, the general impression in Bulgaria and abroad is that in Belgrade the tendency towards peace will triumph, and that a vote of confidence will be accorded to Mr. Pashitch in order that he may immediately leave for Petrograd.”

When the political rôle played by Dr. Danev during the epoch preceding the fatal June 16th comes to be written up in history, his action will either be described as a series of inconsistencies and confusions concerning events which he was not able to control, or else it will,

¹ The Speech of the Struma National Representative, Dr. N. Ghenadiev, Sofia, 1914, p. 193.

² “*Blgaria*,” No. 217, June 15th, 1913.

of necessity, be admitted that he played a double game. Throughout the entire period, his political personality was used to assist the events which were leading up to fratricidal war and the destruction of the Balkan Alliance.

Mr. Gheshev's indecision prevented Bulgarian policy from deciding either in favour of war or arbitration. The inconsistencies of Dr. Danev, and his loud talking, had a more fatal effect, for they have led up to June 16th! However, both Mr. Gheshev and Dr. Danev—the first by his indecision, the second by his inconsistencies and his playing with fire—contributed to the maintenance of Austrian influence in Sofia, even during the greatest successes registered by the Allied arms, and enabled it to exercise a fatal influence upon the decision of events.

Austrian influence had shown itself to be very powerful even in the very beginning of the war, after the occupation of Lozengrad and Lule-Burgas. A friend of Mr. Gheshev, Mr. Atanas Shopov, former Bulgarian Consul-General in Salonika, who is well known in political literature under the name of "Ofeykov," wrote as follows concerning the maintenance and extension of Austrian influence:

"From the very beginning of the Allies' war in the Balkan Peninsula, two political tendencies were struggling with each other: the influence of the Triple Entente and the influence of the Triple Alliance. The Triple Entente favoured the Balkan Alliance, while the Triple Alliance sought to compromise it and to destroy it, considering it to be against its interests. *The policy and influence of the Triple Alliance obtained most importance in Bulgaria, where in the course of the winter and spring months of the year 1913, a very lively and clever agitation was carried on,*

not only among the parties in the Opposition, but also in the Supreme Command and in general in the army on the battlefield." ¹

The Triple Alliance began its intrigue against Russia by encouraging Bulgaria to march to Constantinople. And in that object it succeeded completely. In Sofia the Powers ceased to listen to the advices of the Russian Government. From different sides it had been put to the Bulgarian Government that an attack on Tchataldja or any attempt to enter Constantinople would be opposed to the interests of Russia and to the general interests of the Triple Entente. Dr. N. Ghenadiev, using the confidential diplomatic correspondence of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, brought forward the following authentic documents. Speaking in the Narodno Sobranjé, he said :

"A person who had a right to speak in the name of Russia gave one of our representatives abroad his advice with the request to forward it to the Bulgarian Government. That advice was embodied in his telegram No. 606 of October 23rd: 'I consider it necessary to communicate to you that the entry of your army into Constantinople may provoke complications with Russia. Act very carefully, and if you find it indispensable to march on Constantinople try to come to a previous understanding with Petrograd, because otherwise great complications may arise. Our proved friends in Government and Opposition circles advise us in the same sense.'" ²

Dr. Ghenadiev also relates the following declaration

¹ "Mir," No. 4121, January 21st, 1914. The italics are ours.

² Dr. Ghenadiev's speech in the Sobranjé, p. 69.

made by Mr. Bobchev, Bulgarian Minister at Petrograd :

“ It follows from the declarations of Mr. Sazonov and of Prince Troubetzkoi, Chief of the Near Eastern department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that we must not advance on Constantinople, in order not to conflict with the vital interests of Russia. It appears to me that every step which we make towards Constantinople will serve only to create serious dangers and complications.”¹

And Mr. Shopov wrote in the “ Mir ” (No. 4122) the following :

“ Concerning the entry into Constantinople the Supreme Command made use of a stratagem by sending the popular General R. Dimitriev to try to obtain from the Russian Tsar permission for the Bulgarian army to attack Tchataldja, occupy Constantinople, and then deliver it to the Russians. . . . The Russian Government understood that proposal to be only an attempt on the part of the Triple Alliance to drag Russia into a war in which she would be defeated.”

Bulgaria wished to carry out the plan of marching on Constantinople independently of the Allies. She desired to keep them in ignorance of her intentions. Therefore she never entered into any communications with them concerning her intentions. That is a proof that the Bulgarians had something else in view besides inflicting a definite defeat on the enemy.

The Bulgarian Minister in Rome, Mr. D. Rizov, examining the mistakes committed by Bulgarian policy which led up to the war with the Allies (which he himself helped to precipitate), writes in his

¹ Dr. Ghenadiev's speech in the Sobranjé, p. 75.

pamphlet "How It Came to the Catastrophe" that the following two mistakes exercised a decisive influence :

" 1. The failure to conclude peace with Turkey in the beginning of November when Kiamil Pasha sent his telegram to King Ferdinand asking for peace.

" 2. The attack on Tchataldja and the demand for the frontier Midia-Rodosto, by which demand the character of the war was changed, transforming it from a war of liberation, which it was in the beginning, into a war of conquest.

" This last mistake (Mr. Rizov says, as we have already seen) was contradictory not only to the note of the Allies, which forced Turkey to declare war, and to the royal proclamation by which we declared the war, but it created the malicious legend of our desire to establish a hegemony in the Balkans. People began to wonder how it was that we did not wish to make any concessions in Macedonia to the Serbians and Greeks when we ourselves grabbed the whole of Thrace and extended our boundary to the very walls of Constantinople. That 'grabbing' of territory made also the Russians cool towards us, and they began to look with suspicion on our pretensions. Finally, it estranged from us the other liberal-minded people in Europe, who began to consider us as a nation which speaks one thing and does another, and which had become intoxicated by its victories in such measure as to lose all sense of proportion in its desire for conquest."

By the irony of destiny this criticism comes precisely from Mr. Rizov, who had written to Mr. Gheshov the following lines concerning the march on Constantinople:

" All Europe has been impressed by our epic victories. But the *romantiques* remain everywhere deceived in observing that this great act—the entry into Constantinople—has not been executed. I do not wish to hide from you

the fact that I myself am among their number, not only for 'romantic reasons,' but also for political reasons of a profound nature."¹

This desire to arrive at Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora involved a change in the general plan of the military action of the Allies. With the object of securing the greatest possible extension of territory in Thrace and occupying as large a coastline as possible on the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora, Bulgaria, having demanded the assistance of Serbia for the capture of Adrianople, sent her entire army to Tchataldja and Bulair in the hope of conquering Constantinople itself. Having thus engaged all her army for the operations in Thrace and in obedience to her separatist and egotistical desires, Bulgaria found herself unable (or deliberately rendered herself unable) to fulfil her obligations towards Serbia which were foreseen in the treaty concerning Macedonia and also concerning a possible conflict with Austria-Hungary, which in effect coincided with that epoch at Sofia during which it was ardently desired to attack Tchataldja and march to Constantinople.

During the time in which this expedition to Constantinople was in preparation, the Government of Mr. Gheshov, on its part, did not take much trouble to oppose the effort. On the contrary, on one side they turned a deaf ear to the advice of Petrograd, and on the other side they showed a desire, or at least they permitted its expression, to enter into negotiations with Austria about it. Dr. Danev, in agreement with the Supreme Command, to which he was attached as the Government's delegate, had already proposed the journey to Vienna on October 16th, and the Govern-

¹ "Svobodno Mnyeniye," 1914, No. 4, pp. 58-59.

ment of Mr. Gheshov, although perhaps against their own better thoughts, agreed to the proposal and sent Dr. Danev to Vienna.

In these tendencies of the Bulgarian policy, and in those insincere relations with Russia which were already manifested by the second half of October 1912, must be sought the explanation of that active and successful agitation against the Balkan Alliance and Russia. It made it possible for the irresponsible factors associated with the so-called Liberals to come forward as the real and active agents of the anti-alliance policy in Bulgaria. They (with Messrs. Radoslavov, Tonchev, and Ghenadiev at their head, and together with General Savov, who was openly known as an Austrophile), although not in the Government, influenced the course of events during the most fateful days. Supported by King Ferdinand and the Supreme Command, and as representatives of the Austrophile policy in Bulgaria, they placed themselves openly at the service of Austria.

The chief of the Radical party, Mr. Naycho Tsanov, in his pamphlet "The Tsar of the Bulgars and the Catastrophe," writes as follows of the extension of the Austrian influence :

"A great cry was raised against Russia and an open agitation was started which declared that the Government, which was alleged to be in the toils of Russian diplomacy, would compromise all the results won by our military successes. In all directions reports were spread that Russia was impeding our every progress and that the salvation of Bulgaria was only to be found in Austria-Hungary. In that sense an agitation was started also in the army. . . . *I found that two Governments existed in Bulgaria : one the titular Government, composed of Nationalists and Zankovists, and one existing de facto, composed of King*

*Ferdinand, the Supreme Command, and all sorts of Liberals who were around them."*¹

In that section of the press which was controlled by these irresponsible factors, to which reference has already been made, everything that was in preparation and that was about to happen was announced in advance.

Dr. Radoslavov, at present the Premier of Bulgaria, in his organ "Narodni Prava" (No. 108) wrote, as already mentioned :

"No arbitration for any contested zone, even if such arbitration had been stipulated for by the treaty. Now or never, we want the complete union. No arbitration, either with the Serbs or the Greeks. The Government has entirely lost its head. The Tsar must take the destiny of the country into his own hands."

And so it happened. King Ferdinand indeed took the destiny of the State and the nation into his own hands, and—refusing to go with the Allies to Petrograd—took them to Bucarest and Constantinople!²

¹ Naycho Tsanov, "Tsar na Blgaritye i pogrom," Sofia, 1914, p. 12. The italics are ours.

² That King Ferdinand had at his service, for his own political purposes, all the parties and the entire press, can be in great measure explained by a fact very characteristic of the political life of Bulgaria to-day. Bulgaria has no fewer than ten political parties: (1) The Nationalists with Mr. Geshov at their head; (2) Progressive Liberals, Zankovists, with Dr. Danev for chief; (3) the Democrats, led by Mr. A. Malinov; (4) Stambulovists, led by Dr. Ghenadiev; (5) the Liberals, under Dr. V. Radoslavov; (6) Young Liberals, with Mr. Tonchev as chief; (7) the Radicals, with Mr. Tsanov at the head; (8) the Agricultural party, with Mr. Stamboliski at the head; (9) the Broad Socialists, with Mr. Yanko Sakazov; and

Then arrived the triumph of the personal régime—having in its service all the irresponsible factors. The most active of them were to be found in the comitadji, or revolutionary circles. The “Odrinsko-Macedonski” Committee in Sofia was, in reality, nothing but an organisation of the irresponsible factors who were all in the service of King Ferdinand. Although outside of the responsible Government, this organisation had the first word in all national questions, even though its action was often contrary to the views of the Government. It created a condition of moral anarchy in the State, and its strength lay entirely in terrorism. Between King Ferdinand and the Committee an intimate connection existed, and the link between the two and the Committee was formed by Dr. N. Ghena-diev, the present chief of the Stambulovists, who by their political traditions are bound to Austria. The revolutionary circles, by reason of Austrophile policy and their close connection with the Court, played the most active part in the preparation and execution of the fatal adventure of June 16th.

The journal “Mir,” asking itself the question: “*Who was responsible for June 16th?*” points to the revolutionary committee circles in Sofia, and says:

“Guilty are those who, without plan and programme, for more than ten years have engaged the bands, employed them, exploited them, and made a commerce of their work of devastation. Guilty are those who encouraged and created risky adventures, not for the purpose of liberation

(10) the Narrow Socialists, under Mr. Blagoyev. To what extent that fact by itself abnormally increases the power of the Crown is well known to all constitutional authorities and to the practical politicians.

(because everybody well knows the bands cannot achieve much) but to further *internal* political and party schemes with selfish purpose. Guilty are those who have often from the public places and from the addresses of the most prominent persons uttered threats that their heads shall be severed from their bodies if their words be not listened to and fulfilled, or if the revolutionary propaganda and the action of the bands be not assisted—and many of them made use of the propaganda to obtain riches or an advancement in their career. Guilty are those who have created in Bulgaria extreme elements and measures of violence, who use dynamite, knife, and fire, who intimidate, terrorise, and murder.”¹

We would also add, equally guilty are those who, like the friend of the “*Mir*,” Dr. Boris Vazov, added their voice to the clamour of the turbulent elements which the journal so scathingly condemns!

The first official expression of the policy of June 16th, which we find after the attack had been executed, was contained in a remarkable letter written by Messrs. V. Radoslavov, Ghenadiev, and Tonchev, of June 23rd, which we reproduce here :

“ YOUR MAJESTY,

“ When we were invited to the consultation at the Palace, we declared to you that in order to secure an advantageous solution of our conflict with Greece and Serbia by war, it would be absolutely necessary to secure ourselves against attack by Turkey and Roumania, *and to obtain the support of Austria-Hungary*. All the conditions necessary for the success of such a policy were within our grasp, but no attention was given to our advice. The complete subservience to Russian policy was continued, notwithstanding the obvious evils (which every day became greater)

¹ “*Mir*,” No. 4025, October 10th, 1914.

of such a course, and in that way Bulgaria was brought to this present critical moment. We think to-day, as we thought then, that the salvation of our State can only be found in a policy of intimate friendship with Austria-Hungary. That policy should be adopted at once and without hesitation, because every hour is fateful. We invite Your Majesty to act immediately and to-day in order to save Bulgaria from further misfortune and the dynasty from fresh responsibility.

“ Your Majesty’s devoted subjects,

“ DR. V. RADOSLAVOV,

“ DR. N. GHENADIEV,

“ D. TONCHEV.

“ SOFIA, *June 23rd*, 1913.”

This letter, written at King Ferdinand’s order, announced the passage of the Bulgarian to the side of Austria. That letter also made a strong appeal to Vienna, and King Ferdinand there placed his last hope.

It was believed and expected in Bulgaria that Austria-Hungary would interfere in the armed conflict between the Allies, and attack Serbia from the north. That such belief was not unfounded has been proved by the recent revelations of the Roumanian statesman, Mr. Take Jonescu, who in his paper “ *La Roumanie* ” of December 2nd (n.s.), 1914, stated for the first time that in the month of May 1913 the Austrian Minister in Bucarest, Prince Fuerstenberg, communicated to him, at a meeting in the Austro-Hungarian Legation, a long telegram in German, which he had received from Count Berchtold, and by which he (Fuerstenberg) was instructed to inform the Roumanian Government that *Austria-Hungary was ready to defend Bulgaria by force of arms*, translating to him that passage from the German into French. Mr. Take Jonescu adds that

he at once informed King Carol and the Prime Minister, Mr. Majorescu, of what he had learned, and that Prince Fuerstenberg, after what he (Jonescu) said to him on that occasion, did not make any official communication to Mr. Majorescu.¹

There can be little doubt that the statements made to Mr. Jonescu in Bucarest in May 1913 by the Austrians, with the idea of intimidating Roumania and restraining her from adopting a determined attitude towards Bulgaria, were repeated—possibly with added emphasis—in Sofia in order to encourage Bulgaria to risk an armed conflict with Serbia and Greece.

¹ This important communication of Mr. Jonescu was contradicted by the Vienna Correspondenz Bureau, after some considerable delay, and Prince Fuerstenberg, after a still longer delay (more than a month), contradicted it too. But Mr. Jonescu stood by his assertion, saying that all he stated on December 2nd of the last year was absolutely true, and adding that before the present war commenced, he told the German Minister what he had heard from Fuerstenberg. See "Journal des Balkans" of December 19th, 1914, and of January 16th of this year. The statement of Mr. T. Jonescu has been confirmed, in a somewhat indirect way, by Dr. Kalinkov, who was at that time Bulgarian Minister in Bucarest. He says that one day, in the month of May, he met, in the Rue Calea Victoreli, a high military personage of the Austrian Legation in Bucarest, who was "the right-hand man of Prince Fuerstenberg," and who, speaking of the "excessive pretensions of Serbia," continued: "Why is Bulgaria so scrupulous towards the Serbians, when she, with her brave army, could easily drive them out of Macedonia? Bulgaria will not remain alone. If it should come to a conflict Austria will not remain with her arms folded: she will help Bulgaria diplomatically and militarily, and Serbia, pressed from the west and from the east, will not be able even to think of an inch of territory in Macedonia."—"Svobodno Mnyeniye," No. 2, 1915.

Proof of this was supplied by the revelations made by the former Italian Prime Minister Giolitti, who, shortly before Mr. Jonescu's statement was made, read two telegrams in the Italian Chamber which shed a great light upon the causes of the present great European War. On August 9th, n.s. (July 27th, o.s.), Mr. Giolitti received from the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, the following telegram :

“ Austria has notified us and Germany of her intention to attack Serbia, describing such an action as defensive in the hope that she will be able to invoke the *casus fœderis*—which I do not think can be applied. I am in communication with Germany, endeavouring to arrange the proposed Austrian action shall be prevented, but it may become necessary for us to declare openly that we cannot consider the proposed action as defensive, and therefore cannot admit that a *casus fœderis* exists. I beg you wire to me to Rome if you approve.”

After reading this dispatch Giolitti continued :

“ I at once replied to San Giuliano as follows: ‘ If Austria attacks Serbia it is clear that there will be no *casus fœderis*. It would be an action executed on her own account. When no one thinks of attacking her she is not in a position of defence. It is necessary to declare that in the most formal manner to Austria, and it is desirable that Germany should dissuade Austria from persisting in this very dangerous adventure.’ ”

The importance of this revelation becomes at once self-evident, when we remember that the Austrian proposal to Italy was made on the eve of the signature of the Treaty of Bucarest, which treaty, as is well known, Austria objected to and refused to acknowledge.¹

¹ The later revelations of Mr. Take Jonescu, which were

This information explains many things. We are able to appreciate in its real significance the answer of King Ferdinand to the Tsar of Russia of May 29th, the aggressive attitude of Dr. Danev, the decision arrived at in the Castle of Vrana on June 9th, and the dispatch sent to Mr. Bobchev, the Bulgarian Minister in Petrograd, when Dr. Danev laid down his well-known conditions *sine qua non*, the events of June 16th, and the afore-quoted remarkable letter sent by Messrs. Radoslavov, Ghenadiev, and Tonchev to King Ferdinand.

But it should be noted that King Ferdinand did not immediately follow the advice given by Radoslavov, Ghenadiev, and Tonchev. More than ten days elapsed between the date of that letter (June 23rd) and the formation of Dr. Radoslavov's Cabinet (July 4th). To what cause must be attributed that hesitation? Probably to the seriousness of the proposed step and the difficulty of the moment. Moreover, the ill-starred Prime Minister, Danev, who surely had now begun to see more clearly, had shown signs of wavering. Although since June 19th he had thrice sent in his resignation, he still remained in the Government. He assuredly had some slight hope that he could finish off the Allies before Roumania and Turkey could effect that intervention which both he and the Supreme Command had believed would never arise!

made at the end of January this year to one of the editors of the "Giornale d'Italia"—namely, that Marquis Palavicini, the Austrian Ambassador in Constantinople, when passing through Bucarest in April of this year, asked him if Austria could count on Roumania's support in the case of need and mentioned the Serbian danger—belong more correctly to the history of the present great war, although it is connected also with Bulgaria and with the situation created by the War of the Allies.

Indeed, on June 18th, Dr. Danev informed the Roumanian Minister, Prince Ghica, that the Bulgarians would be finished with the Allies before the Roumanians could enter the Dobrudja.

But as early as June 30th the Bulgarians had not only not finished with the Allies, but General Kovatchev's army was defeated, and Kochane, Ishtip, and Radovishte were in Serbian hands, and Salonika, Drama, and Seres in the possession of the Greeks! And but for the fact that the Allies (after the occupation of the Raychanski Rid on the 20th, and of Kochane on June 23rd) had committed a mistake in neglecting entirely to destroy the already defeated army of General Kovatchev, they would probably have been in Sofia before July 4th. This much was foreseen by the new Bulgarian Generalissimo, General Ratko Dimitriev. By June 30th the danger from Roumania and Turkey was clearly evident.

On that date Dr. Danev's Government requested Russia to intervene as immediate assistance was necessary. The request was embodied in the following significant and characteristic dispatch :

“ We agree to stop the operations, retaining the troops on their present positions. We accept the conference in Petrograd and the general demobilisation. If this should not be considered suitable we leave it to the Government of Petrograd to settle all questions, including that of delimitation, by arbitration, under conditions which the Government shall consider suitable. We beg also for prompt intervention against the Turkish and Roumanian aggression which has commenced.”

This dispatch is marked No. 2168, and was made

public in the speech of Dr. Ghenadiev in the Narodno Sobranjé on the occasion of the demand for an inquiry.

On July 1st Dr. Danev, through Mr. Neklyudov, again requested Russia to intervene against Roumania. The Bulgarian Government concentrated all its activity on that point. It appears that the object of the first part of the dispatch was to engage Russia to stay the march of the Roumanian army, which had only then begun to cross the Danube.

And Russia—as is shown in the Orange Book published by the Government—did indeed make energetic efforts in that sense. She did everything possible in the circumstances. She obtained from Roumania an undertaking that she would not occupy the line Rushchuk-Varna, thereby insuring the provisioning of the Bulgarian army, without which, as the Bulgarians admit privately and among themselves, the Bulgarian army would have been compelled to capitulate. Russia also obtained an undertaking from Roumania that her army should stop, so to speak, within sight of Sofia. The first undertaking was carried out at once; the second on July 7th.

When the Russians had secured the inviolability of the line Rushchuk-Varna for the Bulgarians, and when it became almost certain that Sofia was safe from occupation by the Roumanian army, then, when Bulgaria heard from Russia on what conditions the peace with the Allies could be concluded, Dr. Danev was able to withdraw, and Russia became no longer necessary, since she had been unable to stop the Serbians and Greeks and secure Macedonia for Bulgaria!

The Bulgarians now began to proclaim that, after all, very little, if any, thanks were due to Russia. It was asserted that it was thanks to Austria and the

Emperor Francis Joseph that the Rushchuk-Varna line had remained open and that Sofia had been saved from Roumanian occupation. There is no doubt, of course, that Austria had been working along the same lines in Bucarest, and that that diplomatic action represented all that she did towards her promised defence of Bulgaria "with arms in hand!"

It is of interest to note how Mr. D. Mishev, former Secretary of the Bulgarian Exarchate, and now a national representative in the Sobranjé, probably inspired by the revelations of Mr. T. Jonsescu and Mr. Giolitti, refers to this by-play of King Ferdinand and Austria-Hungary, in his magazine "Svobodno Mnyeniye" (1915, No. 23):

"It cannot any longer be denied," he writes, "that Austria-Hungary drew Bulgaria into the war with the Allies. That war was a vital question for Austria. And in order to provoke an armed conflict, Austria-Hungary had, in all likelihood, promised that she would support Bulgaria not only diplomatically, but also by other and more efficacious means—by war! By the first promise the rear of Bulgaria on the Roumanian and Turkish frontiers was guaranteed. Without such a guarantee the negotiations with Roumania surely would not have been carried on in so superficial a manner, nor would the Bulgarian troops have been withdrawn from Tchataldja. Is it admissible that without such a guarantee our Supreme Command could have decided to enter into the war with the Allies? That our Supreme Command must have received such a guarantee may be inferred from the negligent and light-hearted manner in which our High Commanders declared war. They were absolutely convinced that neither Roumania nor Turkey would cross our open frontiers.

"The negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Italy took place in August. Prior to that period a series of

events had occurred in Bulgaria which have an organic connection with Austro-Hungarian policy. The secret political Cabinet made use of every means to change the old and create a new course in the Bulgarian policy. Time will show who was working in that secret Cabinet, who were the men to whom Bulgaria owes her catastrophe, and who were *au fait* in all its secrets. But even now it is well known what was going on, or, to put it more clearly, it is well known how the destiny of Bulgaria was played with in the most critical moments! The game commenced with the attempt to form a Coalition Cabinet. Mr. Malinov was entrusted with its formation, and he, the chief of the Democratic party, succeeded in forming such a Cabinet, and the decree announcing its formation was published. But that was merely by-play for the amusement of the gallery, for an entirely different Cabinet had been decided upon at an early date, and the new political programme had been already decided upon, as was evidenced in the famous letter of the united chiefs of the Liberal parties. The actual commencement of that policy is to be found much earlier than June 16th. It appeared first in the agitation against Russia carried on in the army while the troops were still in the trenches before Tchataldja. At that time the terrain for the new policy was being prepared. It is an indisputable fact that the new political programme led Bulgaria to Bucarest and to Constantinople, left her alone and isolated, and led her to disaster.

“Meanwhile Austria-Hungary did not attack Serbia in the month of August, nor did she decisively support Bulgaria at Bucarest. Rome and Berlin refused her their co-operation. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent that refusal had been previously decided upon in Berlin!

“Austria, following a real policy, does not care for any scruples, for any correctness, or for any engagements. Events would have happened otherwise if Austria's attitude had been correct, for then, even against the will of her

Allies, she would enter into war against Serbia, as she did last summer when she declared war on her. The two situations are identical: in the one as in the other case she should have attacked Serbia. In the year 1913 Austria sheltered herself behind the refusal of Italy and Germany, and in 1914 she attacked Serbia without asking Italy, or even informing her, as her Ally, of her intention. . . ."

The Government of Bulgaria was entrusted to the Cabinet of Radoslavov, Tonchev, Ghenadiev. Their earlier solidarity in the action against the Balkan Alliance and against Russia completely succeeded at last, and allowed Austrian policy to triumph in Sofia in a self-evident manner.

When the decree by which King Ferdinand declared the formation of the new Government was published, the Vienna "Reichspost," the organ of the Austrian National party and of the military party, at the head of which stood the Austrian Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand, enthusiastically announced as follows:

"The world was prepared to deliver the Balkans as booty to Pan-Slavism. But all that has been changed by one stroke. The Pan-Slavonic triumph, notwithstanding the results of the Balkan War, was unable to minimise the enormous meaning of the fact that the events in the Balkans brought on the scene the brilliant future of a non-Slavonic State—Latin Roumania—at the same time as the roads of the Serbian expansion were blocked by the granite barrier of Albania, and the Slavonised Bulgars, because of their non-Slavonic stubbornness, were rewarded by the loss of hegemony. . . . The results of the Balkan War have no disagreeable features either for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or for the German nation. The last war in the Balkans was more disastrous for Pan-Slavism than the first one was for Turkey. The limits of the

Pan-Slavonic dream have now been set for ever. . . . Pan-Slavism in the Balkans has defeated itself, and Europe is freed from a great danger, which more especially menaced the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy."

This complete victory of the Austrophile policy in Bulgaria was explained and characterised by General Vasov (in the paper "Zarya" of June 17th, 1914) in the following words :

"The disaster of June 16th was caused by the Court camarilla. That is a well-organised net, which has its meshes in the army and in all social institutions. It is an old wound in our national organism. Accustomed to govern practically without control and without responsibility, she on June 16th, with the help of a *coup d'état*, executed an act of criminal madness with the one object of evading the arbitration in Petrograd. Thereby came the destruction of the Balkan Alliance, and Austria evaded the four-headed hydra by mercilessly sacrificing Bulgaria. The misfortunes which followed for our nation in consequence are numberless, and the future of our State is seriously compromised. God alone knows how the nation will leave the wrong pathway along which it has been led by men without conscience and without honour."

AFTER THE DISASTER

I

THE political programme of the new period, which began with June 16th and was officially marked by the letter of Messrs. Radoslavov, Tonchev, and Ghenadiev, of June 23rd, 1913, was as follows :

“ 1. Break entirely with Russia and with the policy of gratitude towards her. It is by the policy of ingratitude towards Russia that Bulgaria has obtained the best results (in the years 1877, 1886, 1903, and 1908).

“ 2. Give up all idea of solidity with Slavdom. ‘ There is no Slavdom where there are no Bulgarian interests ’— that axiom was proclaimed by Dr. Ghenadiev in the Narodno Sobranjé. Over all and above all was set the national egotism of Bulgaria.

“ 3. Plot against Serbia and Greece—with Austria and Albania against Serbia ; with Turkey against Greece. Keep friendly with Roumania and through Bucarest undo the Treaty of Bucarest ! ”

These three short formulæ encompass the policy followed by the Bulgarian nation to-day. That system has been worked out in all its details. It was quickly and easily created, and very successfully instilled into public opinion. It is from that standpoint that Bulgaria considers the great European War. Up to this day the basis of that policy has not been changed.

No policy in the political history of Bulgaria has ever been so persistent. Even after the defeat on the battlefield, the policy which, prior to the defeat, separated Bulgaria from her Allies and the Powers of the Triple Entente, was not relinquished. It led Bulgaria to disaster. Nor was the direction of the Bulgarian policy changed after the peace of Bucarest and of Constantinople. King Ferdinand continued unwavering in his idea of the community of Bulgarian and Austrian interests in the Balkans. The chief of the Radical party, Mr. Naycho Tsanov, in his already mentioned book, writes :

“The policy of King Ferdinand is the partition of Macedonia with Austria-Hungary. That policy accords with the ambitions of King Ferdinand. But it can never be realised, because its realisation could be effected only in consequence of a general European conflagration, from which Austria-Hungary would issue as victor and so powerful that she could dictate the conditions of the new relationship.”

After the disaster which overcame Bulgaria, that policy predecided her relations to all eventualities. She foresaw the general European War and, with that in view, decided what her position ought to be.

Immediately after the declaration of war upon Serbia by Austria, a *Bulgarian Major*, Atanasov, wrote the following :

“Let us suppose that the Allies of Serbia and her ‘unselfish’ protectress Russia will make war on Austria.

“What will follow? The intervention of Russia into the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia will be a signal for the preparation of the general European War. Two great alliances and two small groups in the Balkans

will come into conflict. The action of England will be decisive. According to certain declarations of great importance, which the English Minister of Foreign Affairs has recently made, it appears evident that England does not side with Russia in Balkan questions. Even in European questions, England is only partially in accord with Russia and France. Sir Edward Grey has expressly declared in the English Parliament that England will preserve her independence of the Dual Alliance and will not bind herself to follow it in support of the general Franco-Russian aspirations.

“ Anyhow, we can positively assert that England, in the case of a conflict, will remain neutral, and will not assist Russian objects in the Balkans. In that case the battlefields will see Russia, France, Serbia, Roumania, Greece on one side, and the Triple Alliance with Bulgaria, Turkey, Sweden, and Norway on the other.

“ In the present condition of the rival armed forces every one who knows how matters stand can see in advance that the second group will emerge victorious from the struggle. Turkey, with her principal army, will march across the Caucasus, and will gather around her all the Turkestan tribes for an attack on Southern Russia. Against that Turkish attack Russia will be obliged to detach one million soldiers from her army. Sweden and Norway will invade Finland, and, together with the people of that province, will march on Petrograd. Against that attack Russia will have to detach half a million soldiers.

“ One part of the Bulgarian army will be directed to Macedonia against the Greeks, and the other part will march on Nish against the Serbs. The Bosnian and Hertzegovinian Corps, together with the Magyars, will break into Serbia across the Drina and Save. Thus within ten days Serbia will be suppressed. As for the Montenegrins, the Albanians alone can finish them.

“ When Serbia has once been destroyed the Austro-Hungarians with our army will march from Serbia against

Roumania should the latter State side with the Triple Entente. After that, we, all together and united, shall form the right wing of the principal German and Austrian forces, which will be already marching into Russia. Somewhere near Odessa or Kieff the allied armies will meet the Turkish army coming from the Caucasus, and, thus united, will continue the pursuit of the Russian army.

“The Western German army alone, or together with the Italian army, will execute a victorious march through France.

“The united fleets of Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey will attack the French fleet, which should be found in the Mediterranean, and the Greek fleet. After their destruction the Turks will send about 100,000 men against Greece and will occupy her central part and some parts of Peloponnesus. Somewhere in Thessaly our own army will unite with the Turkish army.

“The united fleets of Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, will pass through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, enter the Black Sea, where the Russian fleet will be destroyed as it was in 1854 at the battle of Sevastopol. The powerful German fleet, coming from the Baltic, will attack the French fleet in the Atlantic, will destroy it, and then occupy the shores of France. The Russian fleet, too small and much too feeble, which is locked up in the Gulf of Finland, will fare as it fared at Tsushima in 1904.”¹

This forecast has not proved correct. The entrance of England into the action has considerably disturbed the plan which the Bulgarian strategist thought so favourable to Bulgaria. But in his forecast the part which Bulgaria was to take in a general European War is plainly indicated. Bulgaria, although she has so far not manifested herself actively, remains spiritually, so to speak, in the situation indicated—in a state of

¹ “Kambana,” July 21st, 1914.

friendly neutrality towards Austria and Germany. So much is proved by the fact that she has allowed the passage of arms, ammunition, and officers for Turkey on the one hand, while on the other she has thrown bands furnished with arms from the State arsenals into Serbian Macedonia, and decorated them with medallions of the Prime Minister. The object of these bands was to raise an insurrection in Macedonia against Serbia, and to cut her supplies and connection with Europe by destroying the Nish-Salonika railway.¹

¹ This object was systematically executed by the Bulgars with the aid of the Austrian military attaché, Mr. Lachs, during the entire duration of the war. As we shall see later on they were aided by the Turks in that matter. These attempts to interrupt the communications between Nish and Salonika, and consequently those of Serbia and Russia with Europe, totalled five in all. The last and most important was that made during the night of March 19th, v.s., when the aggressors were 3,000 in number. It is interesting to note that this aggression, which came from Bulgaria, took place ten days after the fall of Przemysl, and that the Bulgarian Government immediately afterwards received an advance of four millions in gold on account of the Bulgarian Loan made a little while previously at Berlin!

The Bulgarian Government denies that it participated in this affair and lays it to the charge of the population of the invaded district, which they pretend revolted against the Serbian authorities. But it is significant (1) that these so-called revolts happened all and only along the Bulgarian frontier, (2) that the aggressors were armed with Bulgarian State rifles and equipped with Bulgarian material (see "Samouprava," September 15th, 1914, leading article), (3) that fifteen to twenty thousand Macedonians came into Serbia from Bulgaria after the War of the Allies.

It is therefore untrue that the aggressions can be attributed to the Macedonians for the so-called object of delivering their brethren from Serbian rule. The Macedonian emigrants were in this matter only a means to an end. They were even

During the six months from July 1914 to the beginning of 1915, many of the Bulgarian predictions remained unfulfilled. On the contrary, events were developed quite contrary to the malicious desires of the Bulgarians. The orientation of the Bulgarian policy, however, remained unchanged even after Turkey entered into the action as ally of Austria and Germany. It is true that a brighter and more correct appreciation of the situation began to appear here and there, but without any definite result, as it was hoped that perhaps, after all, Austria would smash Serbia in good time to provide Bulgarian policy with its desired opportunities.

“Mir,” the organ of Mr. Gheshov and his National party, expressed the hopes and opinions of the Bulgars in the beginning of September 1914 as follows :

“1. The Government thought that the conflict between Austria and Serbia would be localised. Russia was not ready, and therefore Russia dared not make war, and would not take up the gauntlet. That opinion was general in our country. As a matter of fact everything contrary to these views took place.

“2. Everybody in our country thought England would remain outside the conflict, awaiting a proper occasion to artificially recruited by the Bulgarians by fraudulent methods and by a forced emigration.

In very truth these raids were organised by the Court camarilla in collusion with the Austrian military attaché at Sofia. The Bulgarian Court has for some time given itself up to this “sport.” This assertion was publicly supported by the Bulgarian deputy, Mr. S. Kosturkov, in the Sobranjé last year when referring to the famous “insurrection” of 1903, and to the succeeding events which happened at Ishtip and Kochane, all of which were provoked by raids from Bulgaria undertaken at the desire of the Bulgarian Court. See Stenographic Journal, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, pp. 527-9).

act as the arbiter of the situation. The unexpected happened!

" 3. Japan declared war on Germany. There also we see the finger of England. We had with us Russophobes who were more than certain that Japan would invade Siberia and draw a large part of the Russian army to the East.

" 4. *Italy, the ally of Germany and Austria, declared her neutrality.* In fact she abandoned the Triple Alliance. In Bulgaria, however, all believed that Italy would declare war on France, Russia, and England. But the contrary happened. The consequences of Italy's neutrality are the following: the Germans were unable to crush France with their first blow, as France threw all her army against them, leaving not a single soldier on the Italian frontier. It is obvious that had Italy taken the field against her, France would have been under the Kaiser's heel.

" 5. *Austria is unable to defeat the Serbian army.* On the contrary, the Serbian army defeated the Austrians. That fact speaks much for itself. Let us think for a moment what difference it would make if the Austrian army crushed Serbia.

" 6. According to some strategists, the unprepared Russian army, which is slow and without good generalship, should have been defeated by now and reduced to ashes by the modern and well-equipped Austro-German armies. The contrary happened.

" 7. With Roumania—as we are told by our Government—we are almost in alliance, for there is a rumour about our mutual guarantee of our rears and of free action. Roumania gives now to all to know that she is guarding the world against an adventure on the part of Bulgaria and Turkey.

" 8. The Government's policy was based upon a powerful alliance with the Turks. Vain efforts!"¹

¹ "Mir," No. 4338 (September 8th, 1914).

II

Despite all the negative results which have followed her secret connection with Austria, Bulgaria has consistently remained on Austria's side. For that policy special theories have been created.

One of those theories liquidates her relations with Russia in the following manner :

“ The struggle which has existed for thirty-five years between Russia and Bulgaria was ended at Bucarest on July 27th, 1913. Russia then took from Bulgaria what she once gave her. In 1878 Russia liberated 3,000,000 of our population after having shed the blood of 150,000 of her sons. In the year 1913 Bulgaria liberated, at great sacrifices, also 3,000,000 of her population in Macedonia and Thrace, which Russia took and distributed among her new protégées, Roumania, Serbia, and Greece. And to-day Bulgaria and Russia are quits. We have paid all our debt to Russia. To-day we can say: We have secured our own liberty by our own arms. There lay the *great historical importance* of the last war.

“ July 27th, 1913, was the real day of our political liberation. That date should be substituted for February 19th. Liberated on February 19th, Bulgaria remained under a twofold obligation: the Turkish sovereignty, and gratitude to Russia. From the former we freed ourselves with money on September 22nd, 1908, and from the latter on July 27th, 1913.”¹

The idea of Slavism and Slav solidarity has been banished from Bulgarian policy.² The rupture with Russia was at the same time the rupture with Slavism,

¹ S. Nikov: “ Istoritchesko znatchenie na progrma ” (*i.e.* “ The historical importance of the Pogrom ”), Sofia, 1913, p. 23.

² “ Narodni Savez,” a patriotic organisation created and supported by Dr. Radoslavov's Government, held two stormy

concerning which, however, the Bulgarians were never enthusiastic.¹ Bulgarian national egotism, as manifested in meetings on November 3rd and November 10th, 1913, on which occasions a resolution was passed "that the Bulgarian people should do away with everything that is reminiscent of 'the false, and for us fatal, Slav brotherhood.'" "

¹ Even before, they never concealed these feelings. On all occasions, when they deemed it to be useful to them, they went so far as to assert that they were not Slavs, but Tartars. This they are now doing in greater degree, and they are apparently proud of it. We shall remark later on that their poet, Kyril Christov, signs himself "Tartaro-Blgarin!" Their Slav origin is paraded only before the Russians—whenever profitable for them!

History, like the present, confirms the truth of this assertion. The Bulgarians are indeed less Slav than they are believed to be in Russia and in the West. Serious observers and men of science, who have studied the question, are well aware of it. The well-known friend of the Bulgarians, *Dr. Louis Leger*, himself states that Obedenar's and Kopernitsky's investigations have established that the Bulgarians are even to-day anthropologically akin to the *Finno-Hungarians*, i.e. the Finno-Hungarian type is predominant in them. ("La Grande Encyclopédie," Tome 8, p. 401.)

The Russian savant *F. T. Uspensky*, in his "History of the Byzantine Empire," thus expresses himself about the Bulgarians: "Having mixed themselves with the Slavs and having given them a military discipline and organisation, the Bulgarians formed a strong State, and by accepting the Christian faith joined the Christian European culture. In the future State organisation of the first, second, and, let us say, even the third Bulgarian Tsardom, many of the fundamental traits of the Bulgarian character have been polished, regenerated, and even made to disappear altogether under the influence of the Slavonic national character. But a careful observer cannot deny that the Bulgarians of to-day are not quite destitute of such national traits, the explanation of which lay not in the Slav but in the Turkish national character" ("Istoria Vysantiiskoi Imperii," vol. i., St. Petersburg, 1912, p. 788).

fested, involves a forced rupture with the Slav race and an absolute denial of any solidarity with any part of the Slav race.

Dr. Ghenadiev in his organ "Volia" pronounces the following anathema against Slavism :

"Slavism is a fatal barrier to our national power and enthusiasm. It is high time that we emerge from that error and discontinue preaching that falsehood."

Bulgarian national egotism, trampling underfoot all sentiment, rejects every feeling of gratitude towards Russia for her liberation.

"Russia had her own interests in view when she was liberating Bulgaria, and Bulgaria, thanks to her manifold efforts, succeeded in emancipating herself from that new slavery which was imposed upon her by the alleged liberty which was brought by the Russian army!"

That is how the men who nowadays represent the Bulgarian State policy are speaking and writing. There is a whole series of arguments in Dr. Ghenadiev's organ, "As Regards our Liberation from Secular Slavery." We read there :

The well-known Russian publicist, N. Menshikov, describes the Bulgarians as being a semi-Slav people ("Novoe Vremia," March 21st, 1915), and *Ludovic Naudeau* goes even further. He says: "An Englishman, a Slavologue with a high culture, *Morris Berring*, said to me: 'There are indeed the same differences between the Russians and the Finns as those existing between the Russians and the Bulgarians. Helsingfors and Sofia, by the same right and for the same reasons, are profoundly different from the Russian world. . . .' Those words are very correct and they briefly confirm the results of my method of investigation." ("Revue Hebdomadaire," July 1913—*Delo*, volumes for July and August, Belgrade, 1913.)

“No one can convince us that we should submit ourselves to Russian policy out of mere gratitude. If our national duty demands that we should join ourselves to the enemies of the Russian policy, it would be criminal and treasonable were we to hesitate to do so because of a souvenir of our liberation, or if, following the example of the Bohemians, Poles, Croatsians, and other pure-blooded Slavs, we delayed too long before turning our arms against the Russians.

“It is high time for us to suppress the exploitation of those feelings. Animated with the desire to prove to Russia our gratitude, we have done everything in our power. May an end be finally put to the question of Bulgarian gratitude to Russia!”¹

The entire history of the Bulgarian people since the liberation is represented as an incessant struggle for the protection of their independence against the aggressive ambitions of Russia. One of the Government's organs explains the matter in this wise :

“Our life during the last thirty years is full of proofs which confirm that the Russian policy has at all times been directed against our national independence. Why did Russia oppose our annexation of East Roumelia? By recalling her officers she thought she would render us unable to do so. Was that not a proof that Russia is opposed to our independence? Did Russia not dethrone our Prince Battenberg only because he emancipated himself from the Russian yoke and became a good Bulgar? Did Stambulov not fall victim to his successful liberation from Russian despotism? . . . When Russia realised that the Bulgar is an obstinate patriot and thinks of his fatherland before everything else,² then her policy planned her

¹ “Volia,” August 22nd, 1914.

² As he did from 1393 to 1878!

ruin, for it was clear to her that Bulgaria would constitute a powerful obstacle to the Russian sovereignty in the Balkans. The Balkan War broke out against the wish of Russia, who had created the Balkan Alliance in the hope of directing it against Austria when the moment for a declaration of war with Germany should arrive. The Russians were surprised at the first Bulgarian successes and were very confused when they heard that the Bulgarians were resolved to attack Tchataldja. The Russian diplomats were enraged when Bulgaria demanded the Rodosto-Midia line for her frontier! The appearance of a Great Bulgaria with all her unquestionable attributes of a powerful State, the determination of the Bulgarian armies in the movement towards the gates of Constantinople, upset the Russian diplomatists and confused them mightily. Then Russia prepared the bloody tragedy in which Bulgaria fought against her three Allies.

“Our heroic successes and our immense sacrifices vanished! Bulgaria suffered a disaster, for such was required in the interests of the Russian Balkan policy and its device to reach the open sea.

“If there remains anybody who believes in the sincerity of Russia’s protection of Bulgaria, may he take as a counter-proof the general mourning of the entire Serbian nation for the deceased Hartwig. That mourning had as general a character as if the greatest Serbian had died.”¹

In their blind hatred of Slavism, the Bulgarians have often gone so far as to assert that it is not Russia who represents Slavism and that her present struggle is opposed to the interests and existence of the Slav peoples. The Government newspapers develop this theory, proving that Russia has come into conflict with Austria chiefly because Austria is a semi-Slav State in which the Slav population is more civilised

¹ “Volia,” August 22nd, 1914.

than in Russia, and is living under better conditions. Russia dared not permit the continuation of Austria's evolution, which proposed to promote the Slavs to the same position in the State, and to give them the same rights as are enjoyed by the Germans and the Magyars. Austria was making rapid preparations to solve the Southern-Slav problem by means of Trialism, *i.e.* by adding to Austria-Hungary a third and Slavonic State. By the policy of Trialism all the Serbian aspirations would be cut off, as also their Piedmontese rôle. On the other hand, by uniting the Slavs in one State, Austria would obtain the respect of the Poles and Little-Russians, who nationally suffer too much within the frontiers of the Russian Empire. That evolution was on the point of being completed and Russia was—as the Government newspapers assert—determined to stop it as soon as possible. Serbia was a mere pretext, for, with the triumph of Trialism, the continued existence of Serbia would be nonsensical. By defending Serbia, Russia defended herself and her “unjustly spread Slav reputation.” It was, consequently, only a question of the position of Russia as a Slav State. Russia, in fact, is nothing of the kind, and the entire struggle to-day is not directed against Pan-Germanism but against Austrian Slavism.

Such conceptions and thoughts are current in the country in which men of the best social classes, poets, historians, and publicists demonstratively style themselves “Tartar-Bulgarians !”

In their hatred of Russia and her Allies, the Bulgars have gone a step farther. They have sought to prove that in the struggle between the races of Europe Russia, with her Allies, represents barbarism and an attack on culture. *A professor of the Bulgarian*

University, Dr. N. Petkov, thinks about it in the following manner :

“ Indeed, a heroic struggle is being played out before us : the healthy and mighty German ‘Kultur’ is fighting the rotten French culture which, being sentenced to death, endeavours to induce all the other nations of Europe to join her. The present France personifies a stinking cloak which infects the air of Europe. And the healthy German ‘Kultur’ has attacked her in order to ensure to herself a field for a free development. On the other side German ‘Kultur’ has to struggle hard against the Russian barbarism which, in the course of the last ten centuries, has had only one tendency, viz. to become a powerful despot and the oppressor of the progressive development of others. At this moment the ‘culturally’ degenerated and outcast France, in her struggle against the powerful German ‘Kultur,’ has barbaric and idiotic Russia for her ally.”¹

The well-known Bulgarian poet, Kyril Christov, sang the following vengeance song to France in the “Kambana” of August 26th of last year (No. 2006) :

A LA GRANDE NATION

*Mnie hotchetsa skazat velikomu narodu :
Ti zalkii i pustoi narod !*

M. N. LERMONTOV.

(i.e. I wish to say to the Grand Nation :
“ O thou miserable and desolate people ! ”)

When the small Bulgarian people
Took the field against their secular enemies
And fought for life or death,
When sublime victories

¹ “ Bulgaria and the Russian Intrigues,” Sofia, 1914, p. 32.

Overwhelmed and flew over the world,
 Thou, France, didst bemoan,
 Through thy Pierre Lotists,
 Of the bloody tyrant the empire of Darkness.

When—after our deeds—envy gathered
 Five enemies before our doors ;
 When, one after the other, the enemies plundered us,
 And the sacred deed was reduced to ashes—
 Soulless and sold, thou, O France, wast the first
 To calumniate our martyred people !
 Before our pain thy heart was not moved—
 But thou didst spit in the face of the Crucifix !

O, sleep in peace, ye great sons
 Of France-of-once-upon-a-time ! Ye Titans,
 Rise not from your graves !
 Your descendants—the dirty *misérables*,
 A heap of outcasts ! A man of honour
 Among them is to-day but a lamentable clown !
 Their corruption is so great
 That wouldst thou only pay them—they will profane all.

But there is Providence ! O, Justice is awake,
 One high Justice above the Land !
 She is sending to France to-day
 Miseries unheard of ! And may this be
 Our vengeance too ! We glorify
 Thy victorious enemy !
 O, ye noble knights, strike,
 Ye are in God's hand, the scourge of vengeance !

KYRIL CHRISTOV,
Tartaro-Bulgar.

* * *

The treaties with Serbia and Greece, and especially that with Serbia, were proclaimed by the Russophiles and the Austrophiles alike as being foreign, non-Bulgarian acts, which had been imposed on Bulgaria.

It was to these treaties that the Bulgars attributed the catastrophe.

In this connection it is interesting and instructive to note what Mr. Mishev, already quoted, writes in his pamphlet "The Author of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty." Mr. Mishev was formerly a Secretary to the Bulgarian Exarchate and is now a national deputy and a member of the Democratic party, which is attached to the so-called Russophile party.

"However hard Mr. Rizov may strive to demonstrate that the idea and the initiative of the Bulgaro-Serbian Treaty are his own, there are certain circumstances which show that in this particular case he played the part of a modest follower of a planet and not of the sun. The very sudden appearance in Vienna of Dr. Stantchev, the Bulgarian Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris, and his presence at Mr. Rizov's reporting to Mr. Geshov about the results of his soundings in Belgrade, and more especially his participation in the preparation of the fateful *Pro-memoria*, show that he was not present there accidentally."

And after also showing that the idea of an agreement with the Serbians had been cultivated by certain other Bulgarian statesmen, Mr. Mishev touches on the negotiations with the Serbians in 1904, when the idea of a division of Macedonia was excluded by the Bulgarians, and passes on to the negotiations with the Russians which were conducted by Mr. A. Malinov's Government in regard to the convention of 1902 between Bulgaria and Russia, which convention had expired and had not been applied. It was desired to supplement it by a political convention.

Those negotiations of 1910, and to a certain extent

also those of 1911, which were conducted between Bulgaria and Russia, are very important both for an understanding of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912 and the tendencies of the Bulgarian policy in general. They are touched upon also by Mr. Gheshov in his well-known pamphlet, and he, like Mr. Mishev, states that it was "Bulgaria's fault that they were interrupted, although they had been almost concluded." Why was it so? Mr. Gheshov says nothing about it, and Mr. Mishev, although he himself does not mention the reason, yet by showing the course of those negotiations, in a manner which has been admitted as correct by Mr. Malinov's organ "Preporetz," he gives certain data which assist a solution of the enigma. According to Mr. Mishev, the partition of Macedonia had been eliminated from those negotiations. Russia remained in favour of the Bulgaria of San Stefano (Mr. Shopov says that Russia had agreed to the Bulgarian aspirations to extend to the limits of the Bulgaria of San Stefano), and the north-western and south-western frontiers were roughly drawn up, *but a misunderstanding arose about the south-eastern frontier in Thrace*: Bulgaria insisted upon the elimination of the line which had been established by the Treaty of San Stefano and demanded that it should run a little farther to the south! The negotiations were then to be continued, when, shortly afterwards, Mr. Malinov's Government resigned. "The impression which was left upon us by those negotiations," says Mr. Mishev, "was that the Russian Government and the Russian Tsar were not opposed to the re-creation of the Bulgaria of San Stefano, for an agreement had been reached on almost all points."

The negotiations stopped at that point also during Mr. Gheshov's term of office until the autumn, when

(in September) feelers for a new treaty were put out in Belgrade.

As is well known, the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, apart from the principle of Macedonian autonomy, adopted not only the principle of partition of Macedonia, which, according to Mr. Mishev, lost Macedonia for Bulgaria, but also established the frontier line between Serbia and Bulgaria. However, the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty formally stipulated for the western frontier of Bulgaria, *i.e.* that Serbia has no objection to Bulgaria's possessing everything to the east of Struma river and the Rodopes!

Comparing the negotiations of 1910 between Bulgaria and Russia with the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of February 29th, 1912, it seems to us comprehensible why King Ferdinand preferred the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty to the projected treaty with Russia in 1910. The former offered an opportunity for the Bulgarian entry to Constantinople, and an outlet on the Sea of Marmora, whereas the latter prevented that expansion. Macedonia, together with Serbia and Greece, served only as a means to an end!

Taking into consideration also the hostility of Austria-Hungary towards Serbia, of which King Ferdinand was well aware and which he made use of in driving his political bargains, it can be clearly seen what his plan was, and what he expected to attain by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. This more satisfactorily explains everything which occurred during the Balkan War, and it becomes clear why Bulgaria incessantly demanded Serbia's military help beyond the provisions of the treaty.

When the plan failed and when, finally, the disaster came which found its culmination in the Treaties of

Bucarest and Constantinople, then everybody tried to get rid of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, and nobody would accept responsibility for it.

"Nobody wishes," says Mr. Mishev, "to take the responsibility for that treaty, nobody wishes to be considered as its author. I know that one of the Premiers of a Coalition Cabinet, which had concluded the alliance and began the war, bitterly complained, before a person well known to me, that the treaty was *imposed* upon his Government. . . . The Government was placed in a dilemma: either to sign the treaty, or in the other event Austria and Russia would arrange matters between themselves."

After the catastrophe they went so far as to invent the legend that King Ferdinand was ignorant of the "soundings" which had been made at Belgrade, and that the idea of this treaty, according to Mr. Mishev,¹ was far from being his own.

III

The rupture between Bulgaria and Russia and her Allies was a consequence of her (Bulgaria's) secret relations with Austria—relations which are often noticeable in the history of modern Bulgaria. They were evidenced in 1898 in the conclusion of a secret treaty between Stoilov and Austria; in 1908, at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Hertzegovina; and in 1905, on the occasion of the attempted conclusion of a Serbo-Bulgarian Customs Union. In them lay the cause of the fatal development which during the Balkan War placed Bulgaria in opposition to Russian interests. These relations were created by Bulgaria

¹ "Svobodno Mnyeniye," 1914, No. 4, 5, 6.

herself: they were the result of a prearranged policy which neither Russian diplomacy nor her Allies were able to change, and which has been perpetuated to the present day. Neither the Treaty of Constantinople nor that of Bucarest in any way modified Bulgaria's policy. On the contrary, the negative results of these two treaties have been exploited to the utmost in Bulgaria to the detriment of the Triple Entente, and not against the criminal policy which wrecked the Balkan Alliance, and, after the catastrophe, linked Sofia and Vienna together more closely than before. The instigators of June 16th spread abroad a conviction of the necessity of a policy of Austro-Bulgarian solidarity in the Balkans, and there was created a general belief that Bulgaria could only obtain the satisfaction of her aspirations by means of friendship with Austria. This was termed the "Realpolitik" of the Kingdom of Bulgaria.

The argument upon which this so-called "Realpolitik" was based is thus exposed in "Obnovlenie," 1914, No. 2, p. 6:

"Bulgaria's northern frontier lies on the Danube, a river providing a magnificent artery for the exportation of her produce. To the east lies the Black Sea, which places us within reach of both Russia and Turkey. With Russia we have no interests in common, either economical or political, but in both respects our common interests with Turkey are enormous. While the Black Sea provides Bulgaria with an isolated means of communication with Turkey, it secures her no link with Central Europe. That link is provided by the Ægean Sea, and, by securing an outlet to the Adriatic, we would succeed in carrying through not only a lesser part of our political task—the unification of the Bulgars—but we would also be brought

into contact with the whole of Europe in addition to other continents: although that might involve some conflict with Austria in regard to economic relations. Since Austria's natural outlet to the Ægean lies through the Vardar Valley, she might appear to be a political rival of Bulgaria. Nevertheless, an accord could be arranged to the advantage of both Powers. Economic harmony would be substituted for economic rivalry when the two States were linked together by a customs union and each of them provided with most extensive commercial routes: Austria with a route through Bulgaria to Salonika, and Bulgaria with a route through Austria to Central Europe. The interests of both States would demand mutual concessions and guarantees in the matter of their commercial relations.

“When the geographical situation of the two States is taken into consideration, it is found that the threatened political rivalry could in like manner be changed into a political solidarity. It must be borne in mind that the abandonment of Bulgarian territory in the Vardar Valley would not accord with Bulgarian policy, for the act of ceding parts of one's own country for reasons of political expediency nearly always lays the foundation of trouble in the near future. This argument is equally applicable to the act of annexing the territory of others, for any friendship based on such action would be fictitious and liable to develop into open hostility at any moment. But between Bulgaria and Austria there should exist a sincere friendship. This would be possible only in the case of Austria giving up the idea of a territorial conquest of the Vardar Valley. Once in possession of the Vardar, however, Bulgaria could ensure Austria's commercial route to Salonika. By virtue of mutual concessions, the national policies of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary could be rendered completely harmonious.

“Bulgaria and Austria have a common enemy—Serbia. Bulgaria must liberate the Bulgarian element under Serbian

rule both in old and new Serbia, and unite it into one national entity. Austria should free herself once and for all of the agitation of the Chauvinistic and enraged Serbian people, who incessantly strive to draw her co-nationalists from Austrian sway, and who will, in the case of war against Russia, threaten the Austrian rear. The same thing can be said of Roumania, who, under the influence of Russia, not only betrayed the Triple Alliance, but even made an alliance with Serbia, with whom she has identical political interests vis-à-vis Austria."

The above statement of "Realpolitik" concludes with the following argument:

"The policy of an Entente with Austria very completely fits in with the idea of a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans. By reason of the new situation created by the Treaty of Bucarest, which has confirmed the principle of an equilibrium in the Balkans, Bulgaria has been placed in a position of irreconcilable conflict with all her neighbours with the exception of Turkey. In the struggle against these neighbours Bulgaria finds her only Ally in Austria, with whom her aims are identical."

Dr. Arnaudov, commenting on the relations which existed between Bulgaria and Austria prior to and after the rupture of the Balkan Alliance, makes use of the following characteristic argument, which sheds a new light on the causes which led up to the second Balkan War:

"Despite our incorrect attitude towards Austria, as demonstrated by the conclusion of the Balkan Alliance, it is nevertheless in Austria's own interests to support us just now, when we have been disappointed in Russia. The mind of even the most illiterate citizen of the Danubian Monarchy is permeated by the thought that the future

of his country depends very largely on the final settlement of the Balkan question: he realises that unless Austria succeeds in making greater headway in the Balkans, and thus securing the eastern shore of the Adriatic and doing away with the Serbian peril, she runs the risk of exposure to a powerful eruption which would not only upset the equilibrium amongst her various nationalities, but would even impair her international position. There lies the difference between Austria and her rival, Russia. The latent conflict between Austria and Russia is well known: it will finally develop into an armed struggle, and the attitude of the Balkan States towards them will no longer be unimportant to either. Austria and Russia are striving for mutual annihilation or to paralyse one another for some time, and while Austria is attempting to interpose a barrier in the shape of a Little-Russian State between herself and the Northern Colossus, Russia wishes to stay German aggression to the Mediterranean by the formation of a Jugoslav block. That block has been demolished even before its construction was seriously commenced. *There* lay our guilt in Russia's eyes, and while she sees that she can no longer make use of us for the furtherance of her own ends, Austria is becoming more and more convinced that she has no reason to suspect Bulgaria of willingness to again pick her chestnuts out of the fire. Without acting in a manner unwholesome to Russia, Bulgaria can admirably harmonise her aspirations with the tendency of Austro-Hungarian politics. The latter would be well content should Bulgaria decline to enter into any international combination which might strengthen Russia's position, and strive only to create an independent and strong organisation of her own. Quite contrary to Russia, who regarded our expansion towards the Sea of Marmora with displeasure and incessantly advised us to grant concessions to Serbia, *Austria did not conceal her satisfaction at the prospect of the materialisation of a great Bulgaria, to whom she awarded Salonika and, furthermore, a route*

to Valona. The territory which Austria wished to give us was that for which a Bulgarian Government, wedded to the idea of cultivating Slavophile phantasies, demonstrated a strange tendency to submit to Russia and concluded the Balkan Alliance, which Russia utilised to deceive us in our ideals, and at the same time to detach us from Austria. . . .

“ Alas, it is now too late to speak of that great mistake in the conduct of our foreign policy ! It is too late to try to explain away the legend that Austria endeavoured to secure Salonika for herself ; *but the truth is that at the Conference of London it had been decided that Debra should be left outside the frontiers of Albania, thanks only to the insistence of Austria on this point, and that this had been done with the idea of subsequently annexing it to Bulgaria.*¹

“ Salonika would have been taken by Austria in an extreme emergency only : that is to say, if Bulgaria were shown to be absolutely unable to retain it herself, by her own or somebody else’s fault. Not only did Austria desire that the whole of Macedonia should belong to Bulgaria, but she was further prepared to recognise our sovereignty over the whole of Southern Albania, which had long been coveted by Italy.”

Drawing attention to the agreement of Austro-Bulgarian political aims, Dr. Arnaudov thus concludes :

“ In opposition to Russian ideas, Austria sought a powerful and great Bulgaria, and a weak Serbia, or even a partition of the latter ! In opposition to Italy she desired an autonomous or Austrian Albania. Her plans were checked and frustrated by the war which broke out prema-

¹ It appears certain that the memorandum which Dr. Danev presented to Sir Edward Grey (in January in London), claiming Debra for Bulgaria, was in relation to this.

turely in the Balkans, and by the course of its development. Count Berchtold was unready to intervene either diplomatically or by force of arms; he was held in check by Germany, who at that time feared a general European War: he was also discouraged by Austria's own military lack of preparation."¹

IV

Bulgaria, linking up her political aims to a faithful co-operation with Austria, could rely only on Turkey as her Ally in the Balkans. Apart from this, since 1868 there has existed in Bulgaria a strong political current tending towards mutual co-operation with Turkey, and her connection with the Turks has never been interrupted, even during the times of greatest tension in Turco-Bulgarian relations.²

The reconciliation between Turkey and Bulgaria was effected on the occasion of the confirmation of the Treaty of Constantinople. At that time an unusually friendly exchange of telegrams took place between King Ferdinand and Sultan Mehmed V. In those telegrams special stress was laid on mutual co-operation and the identity of Turco-Bulgarian interests. The Bulgarian press welcomed the royal greetings which were exchanged between Sofia and Constantinople, and there soon developed a lively propaganda in favour of a Turco-Bulgarian *rapprochement*. "Volia," the organ

¹ "Svobodno Mnyeniye," 1913, No. 7, pp. 8, 9.

² See A. Shopov, "Kak ni se nalozi balkanskata voina," Sofia, 1915, also the article that appeared in connection with this in "Samoupravã" of February 8th, 1915, No. 49.

of Dr. Ghenadiev, at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs, seized on the occasion to remark as follows :

“ After a fierce war in which two States, both worthy opponents, measured their respective strength, and when the cause of further hostility has disappeared, it is quite natural that a tendency towards mutual *rapprochement* and understanding should manifest itself. That tendency is not affected but spontaneous, as it is motived by the mutual interests of both States—interests against which many dangers are directed simultaneously, and from the same source. The identity of those interests and the *common danger*, which threatens both alike, calls for mutual co-operation, which is happily developing to-day with the support of Governmental circles.”¹

Another journal, the “ Kambana,” referring to the solidarity of interest between Bulgaria and Turkey, said :

“ It really seems that there exists between us and the Turks a *rapprochement* founded on a very solid basis : a *rapprochement* resulting from common interests and one which can survive the greatest tests. But it may happen that we shall be faced with such difficult tests as, for example, if we were told, ‘ Take Enos-Midia ! ’ Our reply would be, ‘ Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes ! ’ We have no national interests on that side. If we have there any higher political interests they may be thus expressed : that Eastern Thrace with the Straits should be and remain in Turkish hands. We should not forget that he who attacks Constantinople attacks also Varna and Burgas. Thus intimately are our destinies allied. Therefore, if the Bulgarian Government should declare for neutrality in the case of a war between Turkey and Russia, that neutrality should be benevolent towards Turkey.”²

¹ “ Volia ” of June 11th, 1914.

² “ Kambana ” of August 23rd, 1914.

For the sake of this Turcophile policy, Turkey has been granted various concessions. The policy of the Government has succeeded in effacing the Bulgarian victories in Thrace from the national tradition. The Government would, in effect, seek to promulgate the idea that there is nobody in Bulgaria who thinks of Adrianople. On the occasion of the anniversary of the fall of Adrianople the Bulgarian Government abstained from any noisy celebration, and, furthermore, *not one of the Cabinet Ministers was present at the Memorial Service which was held in memory of the Bulgarian soldiers who perished before the forts of Adrianople.* To what an extent the propaganda in favour of a Turco-Bulgarian *rapprochement* has been developed is proved by the following words of one of the well-known publicists (Gadganov) in the pay of the Government :

“ The *rapprochement* between the Bulgarians and the Turks neither is nor could be a mere policy of this or that party or Government ; it should be a national policy of all parties.”¹

Apart from the “ moral ” concession made to Turkey, Bulgaria has been lenient even in questions of serious political import. *Amongst these mention should be made of the failure on the part of the Turks to comply with the terms of the Treaty of Constantinople.* It is not generally known that to this day Turkey has failed to yield to Bulgaria all the territory which was allotted to her by the Treaty of Constantinople. According to that treaty the frontier between the two States runs to the east of the River Razvala, extends along its course, and continues by the water-

¹ “ Kambana,” March 18th, 1914.

shed along the mountain Strandja, thus leaving to Bulgaria half the village of Derokjoj, which is situated midway between Malko Trnovo-Lozengrad. In retreating, the Turks halted at a point ten kilometres in advance of the frontier allotted to Bulgaria. In this manner many villages situated in the districts of Malko Trnovo and Lozengrad—which belonged to Bulgaria in virtue of the treaty—such as Derokjoj, Ediga, Tchaglank, Kula, Kovtchaz, Dolna Kanara, Gornja Kanara, Ahmatlar, Tass Tepe, Krusha, etc., remain under Ottoman rule. The Bulgarian Government in vain requested Turkey to withdraw her authorities from Bulgarian territory until she finally acquiesced in the *fait accompli*. *Moreover, the Bulgarian Government remained inactive when frequent conflicts took place between the Ottoman authorities and the Bulgarian population, who, regarding the territory as Bulgarian, refused to obey the Ottoman administrative authorities. These conflicts invariably ended at the expense of the Bulgarian population, who, by reason of the brutal pressure and persecution of the Ottoman authorities, were obliged to emigrate.*

Having once restored friendship with Turkey, Bulgaria hastened to hatch plots against Serbia, and Greece with her. The methods of terrorism which Bulgaria had for many years employed against the Turks in Macedonia she now wished to use in company with the Turks against the Serbians and Greeks in Macedonia. The former *Adrianople-Macedonian Revolutionary Committee* changed its name into the *Macedonian Revolutionary Committee*, renouncing, in accord with the Bulgarian Government, all claims for the vilayet of Adrianople. Thanks to this act of self-abnegation the *Macedonian Committee* at Sofia es-

tablished relations with the Young Turkish Committee at Constantinople. The representatives of the *Macedonian Committee* commenced to pay visits to Constantinople, which the Young Turks returned at Sofia. Several joint conferences took place, and finally, on March 24th, 1914, a definite agreement for co-operation in terrorist action against Serbia and Greece was arrived at and signed. A special statute was created providing for a joint Bulgaro-Turkish comitadji organisation. In all of the more important frontier places special committees were appointed, and to each of these places one or two Turkish officers were delegated. In the first half of the month of April two Turkish Staff Officers of superior rank, accompanied by several Bulgarian Staff Officers and members of the Central Macedonian Committee, inspected the whole of the Bulgarian frontier, beginning with the Danube and following the borders of Serbian and Greek territory. Later on in April the Bulgarian Government permitted five Turkish officers to inspect the Bulgarian arsenal and to remove from the stock of Turkish weapons which had been previously taken as booty by the Bulgarians the necessary number of rifles and munitions for the Turkish comitadji organisation. Partly from Constantinople and partly from Sofia, 60,000 rifles were collected and distributed amongst the Turkish population which had remained in compact masses on Bulgarian territory, viz. 40,000 rifles in Thrace and about 20,000 amongst the Turkish population inhabiting the Western Bulgarian frontier in the districts of Djumaja, Petritch, and Nevrokop.¹

¹ The Mussulman population in Bulgaria (old and new) comprises, in addition to the dense masses settled in Thrace, also populations which are chiefly distributed along the

Since the beginning of last summer—and more particularly after the outbreak of war between Serbia and Austria—the Turco-Bulgarian comitadji organisation has shown great activity. Turkish and Bulgarian bands, acting in concert, early began to make raids on the villages adjacent to the frontier, where the terrain had already been prepared by individuals coming from Turkey and Bulgaria respectively. The aim was, as we have already indicated, to provoke an insurrection in Serbian Macedonia, and to sever the railway connections between Salonika and Nish. The “*Samoprava*” of October 23rd, 1914, No. 287, published several documents demonstrating that these were the objects of the joint comitadji action.

The following documents had, however, been previously made public :

- I. *An extract from a letter written to Sadulah-Bey by the Ottoman Consul at Skoplje (Uskub) through the Ottoman Legation at Nish*

“ DEAR SAID,

“ . . . Here I interrupted my previous letter. . . . After frontiers. According to information given in an exhaustive treatise which has been published in a Sofia magazine called “*Blgarska Sbirka*” (vol. v., p. 323), the Mussulman population inhabits the mountain region of Rodope and, with slight exception, all the southern fields of Rilo and the eastern lowlands of Perin. To the east of the river Mesta it spreads over the Central Rodope and extends over the upper course of the rivers Arda and Sjutla, as well as the other rivers which empty themselves into the Ægean Sea and reach as far as Djumuldgi and the district of Sofia. Among this mass there are a few villages to the west of the river Mesta which belong to the districts of Nevrokop, Razlog, Gornja Djumaja, and Melnik. Some of these Mussulmans are of Slav origin : they are the so-called “*Pomaks*” who speak Bulgarian and are most numerous in Razlog and Rodope.

writing to you I went out to find Suad-Bey. I explained the matter to him, and he replied: 'In view of the subtleness of the existing situation we expect Sadulah-Bey to send us important news concerning the actual state of affairs. It is not enough to attend merely to the routine work of the Consulate and matters concerning passports. That this must be done, goes without saying. We have appointed him to so important a place believing that he will be able to render us great service.

" 'In the execution of his duties he should disregard everything. He should pay no attention to any disapproval of his actions which the local authorities may express, and he should, if needs be, go to such lengths as would necessitate his transfer.

" 'We shall always appreciate him and will appoint him elsewhere, so he has nothing whatever to lose.' . . .

" (Signed) MEMDUH.

" *October 18th, 1914,*

" SKOPLJE."

2. *An extract from a letter addressed to His Excellency Ismail Djambulad, the Director of the Sécurité Publique, Constantinople*

" DOIRAN (Serbian Territory), 18/9/1133,

" *Friday, September 18th, 1914.*

" DEAR ISMAIL-BEY,

" Although we have remained here in the Caza of Doiran for a full month with a view to bringing about the autonomy of Macedonia, we have as yet received no information either in the way of an explanation of the opinions of the army, or from the Central Committee. The Central Committee has not replied to our letter, and in consequence we are now merely wandering about in the dark.

" A complete organisation has been established in the Serbian villages situated in the region of Doiran. The

citizen forces consist of 900 armed Mussulmans and 1,500 armed non-Mussulmans, making a total of 2,400 men.

“ When we first arrived here the Central Committee informed us that our army would declare war on Serbia and Greece, and would liberate this district within twenty days at the latest. But the days have passed and the peasants are justly wondering why our action should be postponed.

“ A great responsibility falls upon both you and us, as we are shedding the blood of thousands of our men.

“ We do not know what the attitude of the Bulgarian Government is, but they make no declaration, and their silence provokes uneasiness. What surprises us most is the return of those who should have gone to the Monastir district on revolutionary business. It may be possible that this is due to fear, but it is also probable that it is connected with some political development.

“ Explain the situation to Talaat-Bey. In the name of the Mussulmans of this district we request you to inform us categorically how long we must still wait before we can explain matters to the people in order to diminish the existing confusion, because, as I have previously told you, if we are to lose their confidence it will be better for us to return to Constantinople. Although I have made numerous applications to the Bulgarian Committee for arms and ammunition we have thus far only obtained 1 per cent.

“ Revolutions and wars are carried through by arms! If we were to provoke an insurrection to-morrow and threaten the Greek army, how could we lead the people against machine and quick-firing guns? Can we do it with sticks? Definite arrangements must, therefore, be made with the Bulgarian Government. Please call the attention of Talaat-Bey to this. Captain Jaja is at present in the Ghevgheli district, where he is working. In that region the Bulgarians have a band of two men! In all the other parts of Macedonia they have practically no national force.

“ Pray send me a reply to this as soon as possible. The channels are known to Atif, Mitad, and Shukry Beys.

“ I do not know where our army is. All my comrades kiss Talaat-Bey's hands, and they greet you.

“ May Allah help us in this national and State affair !

“ (Signed) The Chief of the Doiran District,

“ MEHMED ALI of Bosnia,

“ Cadet of the Military Academy.

“ The ex-Director of the Political Department,

“ AKIF-BEY, *Deputy.*

“ P.S.—An organisation has been partly established in a certain number of Greek villages. It is now three months since we began fortifying our defences at eight miles from Lake Doiran in a north-eastern direction—about Ham-Dova Ilete Nanishe—where the Greeks have twelve cannons, four of which are siege guns.

“ We have received information with regard to other details, but in accordance with an order received from the military authorities we have communicated same to Dr. Nazim and the Envoy Atif.

“ N.B.—You will please send your reply in cipher through the Legation, from whom the Central Committee will communicate it to the delegate in Strumnitsa. This must be done in such a manner that we shall receive the reply within three days, as else, if it is embodied in a letter, we should have to wait for a month.”

Both Bulgarian and Turkish bands have been driven over the Serbian frontier. The “ Samouprava,” the organ of Mr. Pashitch, in its issue of December 21st, proved that the band of Mehmed Ali-Bey and Akif-Bey had been operating in the district of Doiran and in the department of Tikve, with Bulgarian aid. This statement is corroborated by the letters above quoted, which were found upon the bodies of comitadjis and

which incontestably point to the existence of joint Turco-Bulgarian comitadji action, officially supported by Bulgaria. Further confirmation has been provided by the arms, ammunition, and clothing found upon the bodies of the comitadjis.

V

Bulgarian policy has, for the past twenty years or more, been governed by the idea of common Austro-Bulgarian aims. Not only has it been the basis of the most active political life of Bulgaria since King Ferdinand's advent to the throne, but the Austrophile tendency was initiated by Stambulov—also a great Turcophile—and has continued to the present day, almost without interruption. This policy has served to persuade the Bulgarian people that all evil springs from Russia and that their only salvation lies in the cultivation of a state of political solidarity with Austria.

During the last ten years a new generation, born and brought up in this Austrophile atmosphere, has made its influence felt, and the sentiment of racial relationship with the Slavs, at no time strong, has disappeared altogether. This generation, so carefully coached in Russophobe thought, unconditionally accepted every anti-Slav movement, and even lent itself actively to its propaganda. On every occasion when Bulgarian egotism has been offended even in the slightest degree, the anti-Slav spirit has been markedly apparent. It manifested itself in 1885, 1886, 1905, and 1908, and it reached its zenith in 1913, immediately prior to and after the War of the Allies.

Upon his return to Sofia a month after the con-

clusion of the Treaty of Bucarest, Mr. Bobchev, the Bulgarian Envoy at Petrograd, who was considered to idealise Slavdom in Bulgaria, wrote "that the ideas hitherto prevalent in the Bulgarian community have been profoundly disturbed. . . ." The question which presents itself for answer is: "Since Slavism has not helped us, would it not be advisable to renounce it entirely?" There was a prevalent desire to dissolve the Slavonic Society and to abolish the "Slavjanska Bessedna,"¹ and to inter everything suggesting racial affinity to the Slavs.

Among other expressions of opinions may be quoted the following: "Do not tell us anything more about Slavism or the Slav idea and our unity with the Slavs. These are but empty words."²

The most renowned Bulgarian poet, Kyril Christov, a typical disciple of Stambulov's school, designated himself as the *Tartar-Bulgarian* and preached a doctrine to the effect that Bulgaria's strength lay in the Tartar atavism and not in Slavism.

Anti-Slav theories became prevalent everywhere. Mr. Bobchev, influenced by same, and having heard them "from the lips of sincere and old friends of the principle of Slav co-operation," concludes one of his statements as follows:

"It was hard for me, firstly, because on first superficial examination it seemed to me that the Slav situation was as depicted and that it was not easy to defend Slavism against the attacks made upon it.

"My second difficulty was that in view of the peculiar mental conditions existing at that time and the political

¹ The Club and the Reading Room of the Bulgarian Russo-philés.

² "Blgarska Sbirka," 1914, vol. vi., p. 374.

life which we were leading in Bulgaria, I saw that we had been surprised at the cross-roads and were unable to decide which direction we should take in order to find a new road. . . . To-day we are still wandering and continuing along the same way, and we shall find ourselves before an impasse." ¹

These people, who were confused and overwhelmed by the calamity which had befallen them, were treated with a series of accusations against Russia and against the Allies, which were offered as reasons for the catastrophe. This continued to such an extent that the well-known Russian supporter of Bulgaria, P. N. Milyukov, was forced to express himself in his journal, the "Retch," as follows:

"Not Russia, but the Bulgarians themselves are to blame for the catastrophe. Bulgaria has suffered because of her mistrust and not because of her confidence in Russia."

Neither the great European War nor Russia's action in defence of the small States and of Slavism have succeeded in lifting Bulgaria out of the political-moral morass into which she has fallen. Neither the debt which Bulgaria owes to Russia for her liberation, nor the friendship of Russia which was manifested in the demonstrations in favour of Slavism and Slav solidarity, neither the fervent appeals of Bulgaria's friends in Russia, nor anything else that could be said or done, were sufficient to induce the Bulgarians to change their attitude. All the Slavist societies in Russia addressed proclamations to the Bulgarian people inviting them to take their place by the side of Russia

¹ "Blgarska Sbirka," 1914, vol. vi., p. 375.

in the fateful struggle for Slavism ; but to all Bulgaria remained unresponsive.

A few persons in Bulgaria, who had a higher conception of the Slav principle, were somewhat influenced by the reproaches and accusations which were levelled at their country. But even they were neither sufficiently free from the error which had borne down upon Bulgarian public life, nor sufficiently strong to rise up and fight for their principles. In the arena of public opinion and in the National Sobranjé alike it was found impossible to create a current sufficiently strong to resist to any successful extent the anti-Slav and pro-Austrian tendency.

On the contrary, the Russophiles in Bulgaria were forced to admit their helplessness in the struggle against the firmly-established anti-Slavism which, with easy resignation, they termed "Bulgarian tragicalness." Mr. Gheshov's organ, the "Mir," commented on this subject as follows :

"The Bulgarian people are experiencing profound unhappiness *because circumstances have placed them in a position* which prevents them joining Russia in the field. The healthiest minds among the Bulgarian people, realising that they were freed by Russia in the name of the same idea which at this moment is creating a great Slav Empire, are conscious of the existence of a bond of blood : but they are unable to act in accordance with it." ¹

What are the obstacles which prevent Bulgaria from redeeming her bonds to Russia? The Bulgarian "Slav Society," replying to the proclamation and invitation issued in Petrograd by the "Slav Beneficent Society," sets them out as follows :

"The Slav Society of Sofia has on several occasions

¹ "Mir," 1914, No. 4312 (August 12th).

explained that Bulgaria has not renounced the Slav idea, but no one can demand that they should join hands with the Serbians, who, although Slavs last year, *made an alliance with the enemies of Slavdom against Bulgaria.*"¹

Mr. A. D. Burov, an ex-Minister and a well-known member of Mr. Gheshov's party, takes us nearer to the truth in an account of the political situation in Bulgaria, in the course of which he explains the "tragicalness" in Bulgaria.

In the "Almanac of the National Party" for the present year he wrote an article entitled "Russophobia with Us" (pp. 111-16), in the course of which he expressed himself as follows:

"Since 1894, the relations between Russia and Bulgaria have been quite regular, and neither in Russian official circles nor in Russian society has there been anything to attract the attention of the most ardent Russophobe. Notwithstanding this, Russophobia has its agents, particularly in political and military circles and among the educated classes. The questions before us are: Where is its secret power? What are the conditions working in its favour, to the detriment of truth, national interests, and national feeling?"

"First of all, we must recall the German origin of the Bulgarian Dynasties. . . . Hence the systematic propagation of Russophobia in the country, to further which the Dynasty has employed the divers and great forces at its disposal. One of the strongest of these forces is

¹ The reference is to Greece. By Slavdom's enemies Greece is implied. The Sofia Slav Society overlooked their alliance with Austria and the fact that Bulgaria made an alliance with Greece, just as did Serbia. They have also forgotten that it was the Bulgarians who attacked the Serbs and the Greeks, and not vice versa.

the increased authority which is given by the Bulgarian Court as a reward for Russophobia. The parties which adhere to it are artificially strengthened; their existence is maintained by a constant expectation of power, and although they may be in a dying condition they are resuscitated by invitations to positions of authority. Meanwhile, the other parties are persecuted and their position secretly or publicly undermined. Although more influential with the people, they are called to power only in cases of extreme emergency, when the Court has to be assisted, and when they actually form a Government they are constantly interfered with. Their policy is undermined, and when they resist this pressure they are blown up, as was the case on June 16th.

“The other agent making for the cultivation of Russophobia is the propaganda among the army officers. This propaganda is particularly active in the Military College. The officers there learn that their career depends in a large measure on the degree of their devotion to the Russophobe policy which is professed by their superior officers. The higher the rank reached by a commissioned officer, the more dependent is he on Russophobia. It is the road paved with good intentions which leads to incapacity and dishonesty. It is the means by which officers may secure the dignity of Generalship.

“In the second place, it is to the interests of Austria and Germany to create a current of Russophobia in the country. The agents of these Powers ceaselessly work in that direction, both through newspapers which they own and others which they hire, thus exercising a direct influence for *corruption* upon Bulgarian Governmental circles.

“In the third place, there must be taken into consideration the low level of Bulgarian political life. . . .

“But the most powerful agent for the propagation of Russophobia in certain circles lies, in our opinion, in the low level of our intellectual life, especially in its depend-

ence on the State. . . . *It is interesting to recall that the great Dostoyevski foreshadowed and described this future malady of Bulgarian intellectuals as early as 1877 in his 'Author's Diary.'*

"To all this must be added the influence which has been exercised, especially of late, by the Macedonian Groups. . . .

"Sofia is the centre where the above-mentioned causes of the development of Russophobia in Bulgaria are most active, and the focus of this centre is obviously the Bulgarian Court. There lie the wires which are pulled to such effect, and it is from thence that the poison spreads as if by some mysterious agency. The poison, however, has not as yet reached the people. . . . But Sofia is infected, and Sofia represents Bulgaria and rules her."

All the arguments that have been put forth in Bulgaria's justification fell to the ground the moment Turkey declared war on Russia. Bulgaria had no longer any pretext for failure to pay her racial debt. There was no longer any reason for insisting on the impossibility of Bulgaria's "marching hand in hand with Serbia," but every reason for her acting in accordance with her higher moral duty, and joining Russia against the Turks, from whose yoke Bulgaria was freed by Russian blood. Bulgaria stood face to face with a new moral obligation. The whole of Russia awaited her decision. There was no question of her choice. The "Novoe Vremia" of October 17th, in an article entitled "A New Enemy," thus questions Bulgaria:

"Now in these fateful moments, not only for Turkey, but also for the Balkan States, we turn our eyes towards those people who began to live and breathe freely upon the day when Russia by her mighty hand freed them from the chains of slavery. Have they perchance so soon

forgotten their past—slavery, humiliation for centuries, lawlessness, violations? The moment has come now for the mask to be pulled off. There is no longer room for duplicity, empty quibbling, and indecision. There is only one alternative at the present moment: 'Who is not with us is against us!' Bulgaria, whom we have liberated and brought up, cannot remain a passive onlooker in this great World War, and in a moment of fiercest struggle between her magnanimous liberator and her secular enemy. Every agreement that she may come to with Russia's sworn enemy, with whom she is fighting the last and mortal round, will amount to the gravest treachery to the entire Slav world, and will cover Bulgaria with everlasting shame. Bulgaria cannot forget that the Turkish yatagan, which is now unsheathed against Russia, has for centuries been shedding Bulgarian blood. With Russia or with Turkey, now or never—there is no other choice."

Again, Mr. P. Milyukov, the most notable advocate of the Bulgarians in Russia, thus addressed them in his organ, the "Retch," of October 18th:

"The first thing that interests Russian society is to know what attitude towards the Russo-Turkish War will be adopted by those people whom we liberated from Turkish slavery. The Russian press, from all quarters, without any previous mutual arrangement, yesterday uttered one and the same warning: 'Who is not with us is against us.' Bulgaria should understand and realise the importance of this unanimous declaration.

"The Bulgarian press, making use of sophistry to deceive its own conscience, consoles itself by supposing that it is possible to be at once the friend of Russia and the enemy of Serbia and Greece, and that compensation might be expected from Russia even though Bulgaria should oppose the creation of conditions necessary to the realisation of such compensation or fail to aid their achievement.

The intervention of Turkey has put an end to all such speculation. Turkey has closed the fairy ring and brought Bulgaria face to face with the necessity for decision.

“From to-day Turkey is an enemy of Russia. Greece, like Serbia, may to-day or to-morrow become an ally of Russia. If Bulgaria is henceforth to be considered as the friend of Turkey and the enemy of Greece and Serbia, what can she be to Russia ?

“There are situations which, while possible from the point of view of jurisprudence, are psychologically *impossible*. The neutrality of Bulgaria *during a war between Turkey and Russia is one such psychological impossibility*.

“Will Bulgaria understand the change which has taken place in the situation while there is yet time? Will she be wise enough to bow to the inevitable and to remember the Latin proverb: *Volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt*? On the answer to that question—or, better still, on a speedy answer to it—depends at the present moment the future of the national aspirations of the Bulgarian Kingdom.”

Even to this friendly advice Bulgaria remained indifferent. Her sword remained unsheathed, while her railways continued to transport munitions and gold from Germany to Turkey, and Bulgarian coal was sent to Turkish warships! Higher views and common sense were subordinated to the advice of minor and false prophets, who argued the situation as follows :

“Should Russia win, the existence of Bulgaria would be compromised. Russia seeks Constantinople with Bulgaria as its hinterland. It is immaterial when this should take place, and having in view the fact that the Bulgarian people are easily susceptible to outside influence, it follows that in the course of ten years of Russian occupation the individuality of the Bulgar race would cease to exist.

“If Austria and Germany are victorious, the Austrians—let us admit what is the least possible—will occupy not only a large part of Macedonia, but likewise the whole of Bulgaria of to-day. What political danger does this hold for us? We should simply form a Hungary, and the Bulgarian King would hold a similar position to that which the King of Saxony occupies to-day. In that case, would the people sacrifice any part of their individual nationality? Absolutely nothing. The Bulgarian would remain Bulgarian: and this prospect is, as we have said, the least possible.

“However, should Austria occupy the whole of Macedonia, or only part of it, then there would be no political unity, but in exchange we would rescue the Macedonian population from assimilation by Serbia—and *that population would be favoured by Austria to the detriment of other elements.*

“But there is another and most probable future for Macedonia: an autonomous Macedonia or else her annexation to Bulgaria, together with the Bulgarian lands of Eastern Serbia.

“According to an official declaration by Austria, this idea is at the present moment entertained by the world’s authorities, viz. the German Professors.

“The unification of Bulgaria is not contrary to Austrian interests. If the Vardar line be Austro-Hungarian, or only Austrian, and the port of Salonika open, then all her aspirations will be gratified. We would in no way interfere with Austria and the commerce of Central Europe, but we would open a free avenue for them. There lies the guarantee for our future. Therefore we should engage all our energy in the world struggle.”¹

The organ of Dr. Radoslavov’s Government, the “Narodni Prava,” in an article entitled “Whom

¹ “Kambana” of September 23rd, 1914.

Shall we Join?" reasons thus in the name of the Government and of the Russophile Opposition:

"Even if there be any difference of opinion as to which of the belligerent groups Bulgaria should support, there exists no difference between the parties as to the conditions under which this support could be given.

"These conditions are the following:

"A complete guarantee to Bulgaria of the realisation of her national aspirations.

"That guarantee would have to comprise not only a promise, but also a permit authorising Bulgaria to occupy those territories for which she fought in 1912, and the right to which she can never renounce.

*"When all possibilities of a peaceful understanding have been exhausted, then, if it is necessary for Bulgaria to enter into action, she should only join that belligerent group which is prepared to support the real unification of the Bulgarian people."*¹

How this attitude of Bulgaria distressed the soul of Russia is shown in an article entitled "To the Merchants in God's Temple," by the Russian poet, Leonid Andréef, in which he writes:

"I am neither a politician nor a diplomat, nor even a member of any political party. I am simply a man of letters who values, above all, the interests of honesty and goodness. If I were a politician I would endeavour to adopt a conciliatory tone free from tactlessness; as for emotions, I would reduce them to obedience. If I were a diplomat I would shape phrases and laud the spirit of bargaining to those realistic politicians of the kingdom of Bulgaria. But, being a writer, I speak sincerely and honestly. Do not interpret this article as coming from an 'authoritative source' or a mere exhibition of rhetoric,

¹ "Narodni Prava," No. 248, October 30th, 1914.

for I have behind me no authority save a deep feeling of discontent and grave pain.

“ What have you Bulgarians done or what do you intend to do ? The Slav world is stricken with shame and turns its eyes earthward whenever the name Bulgarian is uttered, in the same manner as an honourable family is ashamed of its unworthy member. You Bulgars have a Slav heart but German brains, and your tongue, like that of the snake, is split in twain. What was your Slav heart doing when your German brains and hands permitted the transit of cannon and bombs for the Turks through your country ? Your heart remains silent, but the tongue of your diplomats has nevertheless been wagging. Your heart is silent even now, when those German guns and bombs have been used and while they are still killing and drowning Russians. How much money have you earned by this traffic ? Tell us that, O ye Bulgarians !

“ In the hour when the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa are in the flames of deadly conflict, you stifle the cries of those in agony with your complaints of certain treatment ; above the groans of wounded heroes and over the graves of your brethren there re-echoes the mercenary clamour of your leaders. When in the parental home—which is also your hearth, O Bulgarians !—death is stalking about, and the lamentations of the orphaned are directed to the heavens, you hurry to present certain ‘ accounts rendered ’ and are ready to search and pilfer the pockets of your brother ‘ debtor.’ You have a Slav heart, but German brains which paralyse your action, you ‘ realistic politicians ’ ! Yours is the name which shall hereafter be given to the gipsies in the market-places. As the horse-dealer examines the teeth of the horses, so you examine victory and kick its belly in order, forsooth, to make sure that the honest Bulgarian shall not be cheated, or, in other words, to make it certain that the sacred current of brotherly love shall not be loosed until the chosen moment has arrived.

“ Succumbing with pain and shedding the last drops of her life-blood, poor little Serbia fights for liberty, the while other nations, deafened by the thunder of mighty battles, blinded by the flash of German cannon, think little of her. But in that little theatre the same warm blood is being spilled, the same death is slaying heroes, the same tears are being shed by sorrowing mothers, and it seems to me that no State has suffered greater ill-chance or misfortune than that modest, martyred, and half-forgotten people. You, Bulgaria, are her sister and her neighbour. You have not forgotten this people, for you have lifted aloft one hand with outstretched fingers while your other lay on the hilt of your dagger ready to cut already your sister's throat! Is it time for you to strike? As once before you played a bloody part for the glory of your German brains and pocket, why should you not do it again?

“ The moment is opportune! ‘ Stupid ’ Serbia is already exhausted and ‘ wise ’ Austro-Germany is marshalling her iron corps to march on to her frontiers, anticipating a feast which shall eclipse all the horrors of Antwerp and Louvain, for it is upon children that every deceived ultra-brigand pours forth his evil. And if you, Bulgaria, were to strike stealthily with your dagger from the rear (you at least know where lies the heart of Serbia) that would be a fine piece of strategy and a unique exhibition of German ‘ Realpolitik.’ But hurry! kiss the lips of your brothers. O you Bulgars, you are very proficient at that! Our Lord Jesus had twelve apostles, but only one of them kissed His lips. But, of course, you know how to do it, and also the name of the twelfth. But if perchance you have forgotten, or have a bad memory for what is written in the Gospel, then ask William Hohenzollern. He, at least, has read over and over again the Holy Scripture, and has recently so proficiently kissed the lips of the virgin Belgium. Ah, how that traitor's kiss is burning even now!

“Hurry, Bulgarians, make haste! But do not afterwards exculpate yourselves as the Turks have done. Do not lie and prick yourself with that snake-like tongue of yours, under which lies deadly poison. Do not hold up your Slav heart and complain of your misfortunes and proclaim that your people are but a flock of sheep which are shepherded by the Germans. I do not believe it. If you are really unfortunate and innocent, and if your Slav soul suffers under the yoke of German brains—rise up then in dignity as peoples rise, do not fear the difficulty or danger of this course. What you suppose to be German brains are but as hats on your heads which will be blown off by the gentlest gust of the wind of liberty and sent home to their German fatherland or made to bow in reverence before Russia. Only when you do this will I trust you.

“But if the Germans keep you fastened like sheep within the fold while your brother’s blood is being spilled, or if your shepherds lead you along the pathway of treachery and you, like other belligerents, commence to banish the Russians from Bulgaria, then, first of all, take from your midst the monument of Alexander’s tomb—he who created you—for he also was a Russian.”

But this, the voice of the apostle of Russian thought, scarce touched the Bulgarian mind. Among the answers which they addressed to Leonid Andréef there were even some which alleged that his “anathematising” of Bulgaria had been bought with Serbian gold. One of Bulgaria’s men of letters, Anton Strashimirov, attacking Andréef, thus expressed his indignation against Russian *intelligentia*:

“Absolutism, a conquering absolutism—one of the most bloody pages in humanity’s contemporary history—is deeply rooted in the souls of the Russian people. The most acute manifestation of this absolutism, and the outcome of its extreme cruelty, is the Russian *intelligentia*.

Whilst it preaches to the contemporary world an idea of intransigent individualism, it is at bottom the representative of this dark and bleeding absolutism.

“ This *intelligentia* breeds in its spirit racial romanticism, tribal discord, and conquering absolutism. Even its universal representative, Tolstoi, cannot be excepted.

“ All of us now see what is this Russian plethoric *intelligentia*, headed by its chosen creator. Can one admit that Leonid Andréef is not sincere? No, certainly not. It is by his mouth that the Russian soul speaks, whose dominant sentiment is this bloody despotism to which we have referred above. Leonid Andréef, the chosen one of the Russian *intelligentia*, has remained true to himself in all his works, the son of this savage absolutism.

“ ‘ Russia is at war.’ She is the chosen race, the only representative of the entire Slav race, she is the whole world, all must follow her, and those who are not with her must perish.

“ Rhetoric is not necessary to depict the tragic side of the Russian soul considered in its essence. (One example only, Leonid Andréef, put himself at the head of the Tartars, Tcherkess, Turkomans, Tougouzes, to fight the Poles, Tchecs, Ruthenes, Croats, Bulgars—and this in the name of Slavism.)

“ When the news of Russian victories is brought to us, we shudder with fear, not only for ourselves, but for the fate of the progressive followers of Jaurès in France! And when we hear of the defeat of whole Russian army corps, we rush under our roofs and hide ourselves from the sun itself; we are ashamed of our real race, which, living in darkness, provokes monstrous massacres unexampled in history and so unjustified that the whole of humanity might blush with shame.”¹

Through the mouth of Anton Strashimirov—a middle-aged man—spoke the whole Bulgarian genera-

¹ “ Dnevnik,” No. 4404 (November 30th, 1914).

tion of the last twenty-five years—a generation educated in the spirit of the Stambulovists, who preached hatred against Russia and love and concord towards Turkey.

This anti-Slav mentality, manifested at a moment when Russia is at war with Turkey as well as with Austria and Germany, was also voiced by Dr. Momtchilov, actually vice-Speaker in the Bulgarian Sobranjé, and a man of great importance in Bulgarian political and national life. In the Christmas number of the Vienna "Reichspost" Dr. Momtchilov, in sending the season's greetings to the Austrian and German armies, wrote as follows:

"The opinion that Bulgaria will ally herself with Russian policy is still being spread abroad. Those who think so are misinformed. There are, indeed, still some Russophiles among us, but, in times of acute crisis, there have always been some wise men who have observed the direction in which Bulgaria has been led when she has acknowledged Russia as her friend. Our foremost statesmen, led by a strong instinct, have feared Russian policy. Such an one was our great statesman Karavelo,¹ who, as early as 1880, openly adopted a policy which was contrary to that of Russia. The following trait is characteristic of the man: After the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, Karavelov extended wholehearted hospitality to the

¹ Karavelov created the Bulgarian Democratic party, whose present leader is Mr. Alexander Malinov, *persona grata* at King Ferdinand's Court since 1908, when the King entrusted him with the formation of a Cabinet, despite the fact that in the National Sobranjé he had only seven deputies. It was with him that the King, secretly co-operating with Austria, brought about the proclamation of the Tsardom and the independence of Eastern Roumelia at the time of the annexation of Bosnia!

Russian revolutionists and gave a solemn banquet in their honour. Karavelov always knew how to value the dangerous Russian policy. In 1885 the Russians carried out a *coup d'état* in order to abolish our Constitution and make themselves masters in our country, employing to that end most repugnant methods. When, in 1885, the unification of northern and southern Bulgaria was proclaimed, Russia opposed the movement, for it was not in her interests to permit the enlargement of our country. The dethronement of Prince Battenberg was one of Russia's deeds. That monarch, who fought heroically for Bulgaria and who enjoyed great popularity with the people, was considered to be a most dangerous man by the Russians, and it was for that reason they displaced him. At that time Russia was making preparations to occupy our country. This move would have been successful had not Austria and Italy opposed their veto. Then followed an epoch of hatred, let it be understood, together with the powerful régime of Stambulov which put an end to Russian influence. This statesman was sufficiently strong to crush every Russian movement.

“He was, at the same time, an ingenious exponent of the ‘Great Bulgaria’ idea, in the pursuance of which a link between Bulgaria and Austria was a necessity if our State were to continue its existence.

“Since then the general outlook has improved. Our thankful men know that Austria has never undertaken any action hostile to us. After the political blunder of 1885, when Khevenhüller arrested our progress to Piroto, we have always enjoyed benevolent treatment from Austria. She has always supported Bulgaria's interests. *The proclamation of Independence and the Tsardom of Bulgaria were carried out in agreement with Austria-Hungary, much against Russia's desire.* And even later on, when our ill-fated Balkan politicians made an alliance which was directed against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, she still remained our true friend and at Bucarest supported our

interests with the same determination as before, although the whole world was then unfriendly to us. We well know that this policy of Austria-Hungary is not purely benevolent. If the Monarchy protects us, she simultaneously defends herself too, *for a strong Bulgaria is indispensable to Austria-Hungary. Every Bulgarian knows that Russia, striving to occupy the Dardanelles, is thereby becoming an enemy of Bulgaria.*

“In the present critical hour the Bulgarian Government is being strongly supported by the people, *who welcome the Austrian and German victories with enthusiasm*, and see in them hopes for their own existence. The Bulgarian people to-day unconditionally desire a *rapprochement* to the Central European Great Powers; they are thirsting for their high ‘Kultur’ and sincerely wish that their political and economical interests may be brought into harmony. Russia’s efforts to win us with her roubles will result in failure. The Pan-Slav comedy may henceforth be employed by those gentlemen in Petrograd as a motive for sumptuous banquets; but for us it is out of date. If, however, Russian policy should dare to offend the integrity of our State, then the Russians will meet with our bayonets.

“Russia has done great harm to our young people; many a sad Christmas have we received from our ‘liberators,’ and this year the whole world is suffering from Russia’s infidelity. Many European peoples are celebrating this solemn day of our Saviour’s birth amidst profound sadness. If it be true that those who suffer are consoled by the sympathy of others, *then we address our friendly greetings to the peoples of Austria and Germany, stating openly that Bulgaria’s sympathies are with them.*”

That is what the Bulgaria of to-day thinks! That is how she interprets her neutrality!

* * *

All these facts and phenomena, which could be multiplied at will from the present and past records

of either of the Bulgarian political camps, are instructive, and we cannot but think that it will be useful to examine more closely the description of Bulgarian character which is given by Mr. Ludovic Naudeau in his treatise entitled "The Bulgarian Soldier," which was written after the first Balkan War, during which he acted as a war correspondent on the Bulgarian front, and before the War of the Allies :

"A careful examination of the Bulgarians shows them to possess very little psychological similarity with any other Slav people. The Slavs are recognised as possessing a common character. They are attracted more by a 'splendid inspiration' than by order and method, they are sentimental and magnanimous. On the other hand the Bulgarians always reason coldly and with calculation and exercise strong control over a heart which is sensitive in a very small degree. The Bulgarians have no mysticism, and they lack the warm and noble idealism and changeful plasticity of the Russians. They lack the enthusiastic cordiality of the Tchecs and have an entirely different mentality to the Poles. As far as concerns the Serbians, the Bulgars themselves consider them as beings whose impulsive and emotional nature is something absolutely different from their own.

" 'The Serbians are more poetic than we are,' say the Bulgars with the irony of a Norman farmer referring to some scribbler, and add :

" 'The Serbians are a bellicose people ; we Bulgarians are a military nation.'

"The Bulgarian is—this we have seen and must emphasise—materialistic, incredulous, a 'man of common sense' who does not look further than the immediate present. He does not work to deserve heaven, but to reorganise the exploitation of the earth. . . . The Bulgarians possess a clearly defined mentality, obstinacy and a craving for benefit. . . . They are not afraid to appear

cynical when they explain that they are always ready to avail themselves of any opportunity without being perturbed by principles or scruples. Always ready to surrender or to lend to him who bids the highest, they are ever prepared to sacrifice to the interest of the morrow the love which they still exhibit for the benevolent protector on its eve. There is no shadow of sentimentality about them, either religious or historical, and gratitude is to them a kind of luggage with which they are unlikely to overload their transports. The great Pan-Slav idea, in fact, amuses them. They long for one thing only—the aggrandisement of Bulgaria. . . .

“And the mass of coarse and obstinate peasants who constitute the Bulgarian army is led by a corps of officers who themselves own to the same origin.”

THE BULGARIANS AND MACEDONIA ¹

IN their tendency towards the establishment of a hegemony in the Balkans the Bulgarian pretensions extend over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula

¹ The name Macedonia is an elastic term. The ancient Byzantines counted Roumelia also as a part of Macedonia, but its frontiers have never extended very far to the north. The Romans included Central Albania with Durazzo in the province of Macedonia, and its frontiers reached in the north the border of Stobi (now Gradsko), where the Tserna or Black river empties itself into the Vardar (Dr. K. Yairetshek, "Serbian History," 1911, vol. i., chap. iii., p. 30), beyond which point all the best contemporary French and English geographers never extend the northern frontier of Macedonia. They establish it as the province and territory situated between the Rodope mountain and the Thessalian Olympus and Gramos.

The Bulgarian habit, however, is to include in Macedonia all the territory which they wish to annex west of the Rodope and Rilo. In their conception the whole of Old Serbia is included in Macedonia. Strangely enough, they now seek to reduce this conception by the exclusion of that part of Macedonia which they obtained after the Balkan wars. They write and speak as though the Serbians and Greeks have divided the whole of Macedonia between them, although they themselves obtained as their share the valleys of the Struma and the Strumnitsa (from whence they are at present raiding the Serbian liberated territory), together with the mountains of Raslog and Perin, Mehomia, Melnik, and Nevrokop (see also "Novoe Zveno," No. 12, 1915).

and comprise the entire waterways of the Maritsa, Struma, Vardar, and the Black Drin rivers. They are not content with the Black and Ægean Seas. They cast longing eyes over to the Adriatic.

We have already noted the interesting and characteristic explanations given by Professor Arnaudov.

If we searched for reasons and causes for this megalomania of a Balkan tribe and people, whose ethnical population hardly amounts to five millions, we might find them partly, but in a small degree, in their memories of their remote past, when Bulgaria, during the short reign of Tsar Simeon, occupied the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula, and partly, and mainly, in the circumstances of the Bulgarian renaissance which took place in the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century.

In the Bulgarian renaissance two elements played an important part, as C. Radev used to say: the "tchorbadjis" and the "revolutionist." The revolutionary element had its headquarters in Bucarest and Constantinople. There dwelt also the "tchorbadji" (or feudal) element, but it is beyond doubt that the greater and more important part was played by the revolutionary element, which, despite its revolutionary feature, worked freely in Constantinople and enjoyed the support of the Ottoman Government in a high degree! The struggle was directed not against the Turks but against the Greeks, and consequently fitted in with Turkish ideas.

"The main characteristic trait of our renaissance," says C. Radev, "was educational. While the Serbians and the Greeks appeared on the political platform in the nineteenth century with rifles in their hands, the Bulgarian people

began their new existence by printing books and opening schools.¹ The Serbians and Greeks were already revolutionary in their attitude towards the Turks and in the eyes of the Turks. The Bulgarian revolutionists, on the contrary, were indeed revolutionists also, but against the Serbians and the Greeks and in co-operation and alliance with the Turks. The Bulgarian attitude towards the Turks was that of a true 'Raya.' . . ."

Indeed, the Bulgarians have never rebelled against the Ottoman dominion! From 1393 until as late as 1876 we find no evidence of the least serious insurrection on the part of the Bulgarians. And in 1876 the Serbians and the Russians again reappeared in the field against the Turks. And what of the Bulgarians? . . . We had better not relate that here. The Russians and the Serbians remember it too well.²

¹ C. Radev, "Stroitelite na svremena Blgaria," Sofia, 1911, vol. i., p. viii.

² For the purpose of characterising the Bulgarians it may be of some interest, however, to here recall the sort of memoirs which the Bulgarian delegates brought forward at the Congress of Berlin. The Bulgarian delegates, says G. Hanotaux in his "Histoire illustrée de la Guerre de 1914," fascicule 9, pp. 178-9), drew up the following programme of their future action in the Balkan Peninsula provided they were allowed to emancipate and organise themselves, viz.: "The Bulgarian people demand their own autonomy with a national Government which will be guaranteed by the Great Powers protecting the Christians in the East, as being the only means of ensuring a peaceful life and a gradual development. (At San Stefano they demanded from the Russians that Bulgaria should be made as large as possible, and requested only Russian protection.) Under such conditions the autonomy of the Bulgarian people would permit them to become, owing to their laws and their strength, one of the most active and persevering factors of progress and civilisation in Western Europe. The

In the "sixties," when the Bulgarian Exarchate was established, only to be soon transformed into a mere political organisation, despite its ostensibly ecclesiastic and religious functions, the Turks again had trouble with both Serbs and Greeks. In Serbia Prince Michael instituted the National Militia with Russian instructors; in 1867 he took several fortresses, and expelled the remnants of the Turkish army from Serbia. Simultaneously in Greece the Cretan question had become the order of the day and gave the Turks much uneasiness.

Both Serbs and Greeks fighting against the Turks! Truly a unique opportunity for the conclusion of an alliance between the Turks and the Bulgarian revolutionists—and both parties promptly took advantage of the situation.

Bulgarian megalomania and Bulgarian Turcophilism both owe their origin to this atmosphere, as also did the Bulgarian Exarchate with Serbian eparchies, with ill-defined territory and political aims, and this was the atmosphere in which Dr. S. Chomakov lived and laboured when in Constantinople he told those who dreamt of a small Bulgaria extending from the Danube to the Balkan mountains: "The Bulgarian nation has need of three seas."¹

Bulgarian people would be at the same time the most reliable guarantee of a lasting peace in the largest part of the Balkan Peninsula. And they are the only people who could in the future prevent the recurrence of cruelties which have justly provoked the condemnation of the civilised world. They have arrived at the conviction that, after the terrible sufferings that have been imposed on them by the usurpers, Europe will not again place them in a position which would drive them to acts of desperation and to the sacrifice even of their existence."

¹ Cf. Radev, i., p. viii.

Herein also lies the explanation of the systematic Bulgarisation of Macedonia and the Bulgarian claims to Macedonia.¹

To what an extent the megalomaniac ambitions of the Bulgarians have grown may be seen from the instance furnished by M. Menshikov in the "Novoe Vremia" of February 11th, 1915, No. 13, p. 988.

There, in his article, X C. "Dolzni Pobjeditj" ("We must be victorious") M. Menshikov makes the following comment upon the action of the fleets of the Allies in the Dardanelles:

"I have received an extraordinary letter from a Bulgarian, in which he proves that it would be death to his country if Russia were to occupy Constantinople; wherefore Bulgaria cannot agree to this at any price, or under any conditions whatsoever."

Still more important in this connection is an interview between a Bulgarian Stambulovist ex-Minister (Dr. Ghenadiev?) and the editor of the "Preussische Zeitung" (No. 112), in the course of which the Bulgarian said:

"Sazonov's declarations regarding the Straits and Constantinople have excited the feelings of every Bulgarian patriot; every one of us would rather give his life than allow Russia to seize Constantinople. This plan of the Russian Chauvinists would be resisted by the whole of Bulgaria; indeed, we should consider it our duty to range ourselves beside the Turks in the defence of Con-

¹ The tendency of the Bulgarians to lay claim to everything showed itself very early. Stambulov claimed that the Serbian Empress Mara, Consort of the despot Djuradj Brankovitch, was really a Bulgarian! (Cf. p. 631, "Stefan Stambulov," by Dr. Marinov, Sofia, 1909.)

stantinople against Russian Expansionist ambitions." ("Novoe Vremia," No. 1399, February 26th, 1915.)

* * *

In the meantime there was, as we have seen above, another current of opinion almost parallel to this, but of a more moderate tendency, and content with the idea of a "small Bulgaria." There was a time when the Bulgarians, struggling for their liberation from the Turks, were glad to co-operate with the Serbians, and welcomed the idea of an alliance with Serbia. In those days another and very different Treaty of Bucarest was concluded between Prince Michael and the Bulgarian emigrants at Bucarest on January 14th, 1867. According to this treaty Prince Michael was to rule over both Serbs and Bulgars, with identical laws for both nations, these laws to be proclaimed in "both dialects."

This current of opinion did not cease altogether even after the establishment of the Exarchate. In some quarters it still persisted in 1873, when the well-known Bulgarian leader, Lyuben Karavelov, wrote as follows in the Bulgarian newspaper "Nezavisimost" ("Indépendance"), then published in Bucarest: "The Tchecs, Moravians, Slovaks, Ruthenes, and Poles ought to form one political unit, the Serbs and Bulgars ought to form a second, and the Russians a third."¹ Karavelov omitted to expressly mention the Croats and Slovenes, including them with Serbs as a matter of course.

Recent data have disclosed the fact that the Bul-

¹ Cf. the leading article of the "Nezavisimost," No. 144, 1873, which was quoted in its entirety by A. K. Kermektchiev in his book "Kak zabluzdavav Narod" (How to Deceive the People"), p. 122, Sofia, 1915.

garians are quite capable of trafficking in politics, and exchanging Macedonia for Constantinople to the advantage of Austria.

Twice since their emancipation, at two different dates, have they concluded treaties according to which both Macedonia and Salonika were outside their political aspirations.

Both these treaties have been concluded during the reign of King Ferdinand, whose agents, according to the words uttered by Mr. C. Kosturkov in the Sobranjé, used to organise raids and provoke insurrections in Macedonia, and invariably make use of the Macedonian question to distract the attention of the Bulgarian people from internal scandals and troubles,¹ and, we might add, for other political reasons also.

In 1898 King Ferdinand concluded a secret treaty with Austria-Hungary, by which Austria promised to uphold the dynasty of King (at that time still Prince) Ferdinand and Bulgaria undertook, in the case of an eventual partition of the Balkans, not to claim any territories further west than Struma and Rodope. That this treaty really exists and contains the above passage has been publicly corroborated in the National Sobranjé by the present Prime Minister, Dr. V. Radoslavov, whose answer to the question of J. Popov as to who had concluded such a treaty, consisted of the one word: "*Stoilov!*"²

Similarly, and in an analogous treaty with Russia, in September 1907—just a year before the annexa-

¹ Cf. p. 527 and following pages of Stenographic Diaries, xvii. O.N.S., April 30th.

² According to this treaty Bulgaria further stipulated that Austria should recognise her claims to part of Eastern Serbia and help her to obtain it.

tion of Bosnia-Hertzegovina—Bulgaria stipulated that Russia should help her to secure merely one outlet on the Ægean, *such outlet not to lie further west than Struma and Rodope.*

It is not to be overlooked that these two treaties were *not* concluded while the same party was in power. On the contrary, both Russophiles and Austrophiles were responsible for them. The first treaty was concluded by the Government of the late Mr. Stoilov, formerly leader of the National party, now represented by Gheshov's party, and the second treaty, that of 1907, was concluded by a Liberal Nationalist Government.

It is specially interesting to note that the first secret treaty with Austria was concluded by Stoilov, the very Prime Minister who brought about the reconciliation with Russia and secured the recognition of King Ferdinand on the part of Russia—after Stambulov had been removed both from the Government and from the world!

According to the statement made by Mr. Kabaktchiev in the Sobranjé, just before the outbreak of the Balkan War in February 1912, both these treaties were published in Bulgaria; and it is of considerable importance to note that when Mr. Kabaktchiev mentioned them and drew attention to their characteristic points, neither Austrophiles nor Russophiles denied their existence, although both parties in succession spoke after Mr. Kabaktchiev at the Parliamentary sitting.¹

* * *

A short historical retrospect may at this point be of some assistance to the reader.

¹ Vide the Stenographic Diaries, xvii. O.N.S. 1914, pp. 623-4, etc.

According to Constantine Porphyrogenitus¹ towards 950 the town of τὰ Σέρβλια on the river Bistritsa, in the district of Salonika, received its name from the Serbians, who were the first to inhabit that country. Subsequently this town is frequently mentioned as being the seat of their Bishops, and in the Old Slav translation of Jovan Zonara the town is alluded to as Serbchishte (cf. Dr. V. Djeritch, "Concerning Serbian Names in Old Serbian Macedonia," page 9).

Western travellers and explorers of the sixteenth century also found Salonika and the surrounding districts occupied by Serbians, which fact is confirmed by the well-known explorer of the Balkans, Jakob Falmerieier, in his "Fragmente."²

In his book "Archæological Travels in Macedonia" (Petrograd, 1909), the well-known Russian historian and archæologist, N. P. Kondakov, Fellow of the Russian Academy of Science, who, with several of his Russian colleagues, undertook a scientific journey through Macedonia in 1907, remarks as follows upon the characters of the earliest Slav invaders of Macedonia:

"In the fifth century the Trans-Danubian Slavs in their search for a new home, and retiring before the onslaughts of the Nomad tribes dwelling beyond the Danube, made regular incursions into Illyria, as it was then called, *i.e.* the northern and central parts of Macedonia. . . . *The first Slav influx into Macedonia was, in contrast to the*

¹ Constantine Porphyrogenitus: "De administrando imperio," caput 32 (p. 99), p. 152 of the Bohn edition (quoted by Dr. V. Djeritch in his book, "Serbian Names in Macedonia and Old Serbia").

² We are unfortunately unable to quote verbatim from Falmerieier, as we have not his "Fragmente" by us.

Bulgarian hordes, *pre-eminently, if not exclusively, Serb in character.*"¹

In case it may seem strange to any reader that the Serbians should be mentioned so early in the history of the Balkan Peninsula, when Constantine Porphyrogenitus places the immigration of the Serbs and Croats into the Balkans as late as the seventh century, it might be as well to add at once that modern research has discredited the statement of Porphyrogenitus. Already in 1894 V. Jagitch proved conclusively that the Serbs and Croats came to the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century (together with other Slav tribes), albeit their names are not mentioned.

"Beyond all doubt," says Jagitch, "those particular Slavs who from the days of Constantine (Porphyrogenitus) to the present time have been known as Serbs and Croats, formed part of that great tide of immigration which rolled over the Danube in the second half of the sixth century, swept over the Balkans, the Adriatic and Alpine countries, and gave to all this tract an entirely new ethical character. . . . The truth of this statement," continues Jagitch, "is borne out by the direction of the Great Migration. Already in 548 the Slavs had laid waste Illyria as far south as Durazzo."

The legendary character of Constantine's statement concerning the date of the Serb and Croat immigration into the Balkans has also been demonstrated by F. I. Uspensky in his "History of the Byzantine Empire." In further proof of his assertion Dr. Jagitch adduces the important facts that the language of the Serbs and Croats is closely related to that of the Slovenes and

¹ "Macedonia," pp. 6, 7.

Bulgarians ; that, in fact, from a linguistic standpoint, all Southern Slavs form a complete chain, whose individual links are indissolubly and almost imperceptibly welded together. Neither at the time of the Great Migration, nor for some time later, were there any "national" languages, but that the links at that period were still more closely connected, and that the divergencies between the spoken dialects were even smaller and more insignificant than at present, is proved by a great historical fact. In the years between 855 and 863 Cyril (Constantine) and Method, sons of the Byzantine officer Leon, translated the Holy Scriptures, and compiled the first Slav alphabet, the Glagolitza, for the use of the Pannonian and Moravian Slav princes Rostislav and Svetopluk, to whom they also preached the Christian faith until 885, in which year Method died. They naturally wrote their translation of the Sacred Writings in the dialect of Southern Macedonia or, in other words, in the language of the Slavs who lived between Rodope and the Pindus, the country where (according to Dr. Jiretchek) the first Slav bishoprics were founded ; but evidently this language presented no difficulties to the Pannonian Slavs. It is an interesting fact that one of the earliest bishoprics was called Serbia (*ὄρων Σερβίων*)! ¹ In Bulgaria, on the other hand, Christianity was preached by Greeks and Latins until the advent of the disciples of Cyril and Method, after the death of Method, and more than twenty years after Cyril and Method had

¹ V. Jagitch, "Archiv für Slavische Philologie, XVII. Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte der Südslavischen Sprachen," S. 54, 55, 72, and Dr. Jiretchek, "History of Serbia" (published in Serbian and German, 1911), vol. iii., chap. ii., Paganism and Christianity.

translated the Holy Scriptures into the Old Slav tongue."

It is also an interesting fact that Method's disciple Clement and his coadjutors did not settle in Bulgaria, but were at once sent westward into Macedonia. At that time the reaction among the Bulgarian "boljars" (noblemen) who had reverted to Paganism had only just been overcome.

"It is not unlikely," says Dr. Murko, "that Clement returned to Macedonia by his own wish; being himself a Macedonian who from his youth upward had been accustomed to be near Method, when the latter was ruling as vicar. . . . It is there that we must seek for the Episcopal See of Velika or Drembitsa, where Clement ruled as the first *Slav Bishop*, for in all probability it was situated, not in the Strumnitsa district, but in the adjacent Albano-Macedonian territory."

The most ancient literary records in the Old Slav tongue originated in Macedonia, where the oldest of the Slav alphabets, the "Glagolitza," remained in actual use until the end of the twelfth century. These ancient MSS. are written in a language which differs from that of the Danubian Bulgarians. The well-known writer Hrabr, himself a Macedonian, wrote his books in the Glagolitic script. In Bulgaria, however, the Cyrilline alphabet, as being nearer to the Greek, predominated already in the tenth century.

The language into which the Slav Apostles Cyril and Method translated the Holy Scriptures was called *Slovenski* (Slavonic) until the end of the thirteenth century, and it was only during the course of that century that the term "Bulgarian" was first applied to the language of the original MSS.

It is a mistake to apply the term "Bulgarian" to the ancient ecclesiastical Slav tongue, as has been done by several German and Russian Slav scholars. According to Dr. M. Murko this would be contrary to historic evidence, for *the ancient language of the Bulgarians was Turkish*, which the Bulgarian aristocracy had not relinquished even in the tenth century.¹

* * *

According to recent scientific research the Bulgarians originally were an Asiatic horde who crossed the Danube and entered the Balkans in A.D. 659-660. Their first camp (hring) was pitched near Isakcha at the mouth of the Danube, and then moved to the north-east of Shumen, near Abobe-Pliskova. Subsequently, but much later (about A.D. 821) the Bulgarians removed their centre to Preslav at the foot of the northern slopes of the Balkan Range, and south of Shumen.

The recent scientific investigations of Dr. J. D. Shishmanov clearly prove that the Bulgarians were a southern *Turkish* tribe and not of Finno-Hungarian stock, as has been hitherto assumed. From their original home in the Volga basin they came first to the shores of the Black Sea, and then to the Lower Danube.

For a long time the Bulgarians remained north of the Balkan Range. They did not occupy Sofia until 809. Their inroads into Thrace and Macedonia were only occasional and of short duration until the reign of Michael Boris (852-88).

"The Bulgarians," says N. P. Kondakov, "spread into Macedonia and even to Thessaly, but the Byzantines drove

¹ Vide Dr. M. Murko: "Geschichte der älteren süd-slavischen Literaturen," Leipzig, 1908, pp. 25, 57-60, 69-70.

them out of those districts, and they settled in *Bulgaria*, between the Danube and the *Serbian lands*.”¹

“The western migrations,” Kondakov further says, “were purely Slav, and among the Slav tribes the purely Slavo-Serbian nationality took a separate place as early as in the first half of the seventh century.”²

After they had established themselves in Sofia in 809, the Bulgarians directed their energies to the north-west and towards Pannonia, and also towards the countries lying to the south-west of Sofia, where they subjugated the Macedonian Slav tribes, down to the Byzantine sea-coast, near Salonika. The dates of these south-western conquests are not known, and all that can be accepted as certain, from the traditions of St. Clement and the Martyrs of Tiveriople, is that under the rule of Boris the Bulgarians held the interior of Macedonia.³

When Simeon, the younger son of Boris (893?–927) ascended the throne, the Bulgarians extended their empire still further, but already in 971 the Bulgarian Empire came to an end. Jovan Tzimiski conquered Bulgaria and carried the Royal Crown away to Constantinople. It appears that the Greeks were not able to subjugate the whole of the Bulgarian State, for they warred with the Bulgarians in Macedonia for another forty years, until the Emperor Basil II, surnamed the Bulgar-slayer, inflicted a disastrous defeat upon them and, as we are told by the Greek historian Grigora, “exterminated them completely.” After 1018 all trace of the ancient Bulgarian Empire disappeared,

¹ N. P. Kondakov, “Macedonia,” p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 289.

³ Dr. K. Jiretchek, *l. c.*, vol. iii., chap. ii., p. 168.

till after 1186, when two Bulgarian "boljars" (nobles), Peter and Asen, organised an insurrection which, typically enough, originated in the Podunavlie (the plain of the Danube).

But only after the death of Peter and Asen (who fell victims to domestic feuds), and when the Empire of Byzance was plunged into disorder and confusion owing to the siege of Constantinople by the Latin Crusaders, did Bulgaria, under a third brother, *Kalojan*, succeed in reoccupying the Byzantine territories west of Sofia and as far as Thessaly. Kalojan himself, however, perished mysteriously in the autumn of 1207, and the Bulgarian State was once more disorganised. Two independent chieftains—Slav and Strez—made themselves masters of Rodope and Prosek (Demir-Kapu) respectively.

The *second* Bulgarian Empire dates from the accession of Asen II (1218), the son of Asen I, and Macedonia then again fell under Bulgarian sway. But the Greeks reoccupied Eastern Macedonia in 1242, and in 1254 even Western Macedonia as far as Ochrida.

According to Kondakov, these temporary unions of Macedonia with native Bulgarian or kindred tribes are of slight importance, seeing that the Greeks re-occupied the eastern territory in 1242, and Western Macedonia as far as Ochrida in 1254. After three years of further bloodshed, all attempts at retaking Macedonia by the Bulgarians ended in its permanent loss to Bulgaria in 1257. In no sense of the word can this period be considered a period of unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria. On the other hand, and dating from the year 1267, the rise of Serbian power made itself felt in the Balkan Peninsula, together with a strong movement from Western Europe; and very

soon afterwards (in 1281) the whole of Macedonia passed under Serbian rule.¹

After the latter half of the thirteenth century the Bulgarians never possessed Macedonia until it was handed over to them in virtue of the Turkish firman of February 28th, 1870, whereby the Bulgarian Exarchate was established.

The contest over Macedonia, between Bulgaria on the one hand and the Serbs and Greeks on the other, was therefore virtually decided in the Middle Ages and during the latter half of the thirteenth century.

In this controversy it is important to quote the words of Dr. Murko, taken from his above-named book (p. 121), and referring to the language and Slav literary records of that epoch.

“In examining these literary relics,” says Dr. Murko, “one receives the clear impression—which possesses an interest not merely philological—that the great majority of them have been written in Macedonia, and that their linguistic features and distinctive peculiarities of style, etc., extend as far as the Zoographos Monastery of the Holy Mountain (Mount Athos) and the Bulgarian territory on the Danube. . . . Some other factors are likewise important. The Ochridian school of scribes leads us gradually to the Serbian redaction of ecclesiastical Slavonic MSS.; of these, the Zletovo and Kratovo MSS. are, from a philological point of view, almost entirely Serbian. The reaction of Serbian and Bulgarian influences upon each other dates from the latter half of the thirteenth century, *before the Serbian conquest of Macedonia*; with the advent of the Serbian rule, the Serbian influence began to predominate also in literature, and maintained its supremacy longer than any other. This also explains the curious

¹ Dr. K. Jiretschek, l. c., pp. 22, 24, 62.

numerical disproportion between Bulgarian and Serbian mediæval redactions of ancient MSS. in the Bulgarian libraries, this disproportion being especially noticeable in the Synod Library of Sofia, which contains 107 MSS. in Serbian mediæval redactions, 28 in Bulgarian, and 19 in Russian ; it also shows how difficult—in fact, how almost impossible it is to classify these transcriptions, or even the translations, as being either Serbian or Bulgarian, especially wherever the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier districts come under consideration. Any attempt at classifying MSS. belonging to a period prior to this would be futile, as such literary productions have come to be considered the common property of the two nations.”

This contention on the part of Dr. Murko is all the more valuable as his work is in other respects not altogether free from the faults of the older school of Slav philologists, and he rather tends to minimise Serbia's share in Old Slav literature.

From that epoch (1281) to the very end of the fourteenth century, Macedonia remained Serbian territory ; it is full of Serbian mediæval monuments, both architectural and literary.

Prior to the thirteenth century, as we have seen, there are no original Slav literary records in which the term Bulgarian would be applied to the language of the Macedonian Slavs. During the course of the thirteenth century the term occurs twice ; once in a Serbian MS., and once in a Bulgarian.

Similarly, prior to the beginning of the nineteenth century, there is no reliable record of any instance in which the Macedonian Slavs refer to themselves as Bulgarians. In former times this term has only been applied to them by certain foreign writers, and that merely because on two occasions Macedonia for a short

time formed part of the mediæval Bulgarian Empire. *Consequently, the term "Bulgarian," as applied to Macedonia in ancient documents, possesses a purely political significance.*

When, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Napoleon's officers traversed Macedonia on their way to Dalmatia, and visited Ochrida, Bitolj, Strumnitsa, Ishtip, and Kiustendil, they never made any reference to Bulgarians, but they met with Serbians, and mention both them and their language. Their statements are borne out and their impressions corroborated by Dr. Joseph Müller, who was for many years physician in the vilayet of Bitolj (Monastir).¹

Even Shafarik, who is frequently and readily quoted by Bulgarians, maintains (on the strength of the scanty material available in his day) that the language spoken in lower Mœsia, between the Danube and the Balkans, differs from that spoken in Macedonia.

Since the insurrection of Karageorge, however, the situation became less advantageous to the Serbs, and the Serbian name, especially after the peace of Bucarest in 1812, which was a godsend to both Turks and Austrians.

In consequence of the insurrection of Milosh (Obrenovitch) in 1815, the position of the Serbs in Macedonia was also changed for the worse. They were everywhere reviled and persecuted as revolutionists; the head of Karageorge was exhibited in Constantinople as a trophy of victory, and the name of Bulgarian became more than ever a synonym for docility in the

¹ Vide Dr. V. Djeritch, l. c., pp. 37, 42-6; "La Politique étrangère," No. 2, February, 1913, p. 7, Un Document inédit par G. Jaksitch; Dr. Joseph Müller: "Albanien, Rumelien, und die oesterreichisch-montenegrinische Grenze," Prag, 1841.

eyes of the Turks. This is, indeed, instanced in the words of the Bulgarian poet :

O nation, whose heart has grown slavish,
Lament not, thine own is the blame ;
And nevermore shalt thou awaken
From the " death-in-life " of thy shame.

Such was the situation when Ami Boué and others introduced an element of confusion into the books of travel and the maps dealing with the country. This confusion was intensified by the mistakes committed by the Serbians in the sixties and seventies of last century, and especially by the notorious forger Verkovitch. This disadvantageous situation was made still worse when the Bulgarian Exarchate was created. Serbia's somewhat unsuccessful wars of 1876 and 1877 also injured the prestige of Serbia and the Serbian name in Old Serbia and Macedonia, which were then still under Turkish rule. Conversely, Bulgaria profited by the propaganda of her Exarchate, and other concomitant circumstances, and also from the scheme for the creation of the " Greater Bulgaria " of the Treaty of San Stefano.

* * *

Throughout the Middle Ages the Serbian name has been linked with Macedonia ; her knights and heroes are sung in the Serbian epics ; throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the world knew more of the Serbians and Serbian literature than about any other nationality in the Balkans.¹

In this connection we will now adduce a few proofs,

¹ To this day the topography of the country attests the fact of this connection and close affinity. It is interesting to note that in his map " die Zentralen Balkanländer, V. Auflage, Wien," Dr. Karl Peucker records on the river Struma, south

collected from historical documents and the writings of foreign travellers who, in writing about Macedonia during past centuries, invariably refer to the country as being *Serbian*.

In 1401, the Venetian State records relate that there came to Venice "the ambassadors of Constantine, Lord of Serbia, the country which surrounds our own territory of Durazzo." (Constantini domini Serviaë territoriaë, quod est circa territorium nostrum Durachii.)¹

"Bulgarian Annals" date from the beginning of the fifteenth century. In the words of the Bulgarian chronicler: "Seeing this, Cantacouzene became very sorrowful, and asked the Serbian despots Urosh and Uglesha and King Vukashin for help. . . ." (The despots Urosh and Uglesha and King Vukashin ruled over Southern and Western Macedonia, south of Veles and east and west of Prilep.) A little further on the same Bulgarian Annals mention that Sultan Amurat prepared an attack against "either the Bulgarians or against Uglesha. On hearing this, Uglesha and King Vukashin gathered together a numerous army of *Serbian* warriors."²

In 1466 Dmtitar, a scrivener of Kratovo, records that by order of the Archbishop of Ochrida he had undertaken to compile a *legal code in Serbian* for the *Archbishopric of Ochrida*. And he adds that when Archbishop Dorotheus visited his diocese, he also

of Djumaja and south-west of Mehomia, the names of *Serbian* and *Serbian Mount*.

¹ Dr. V. Djeritch, "Serbian Names in Macedonia and Old Serbia" (p. 13).

² "Archiv für slavische Philol. xiii" (1891), pp. 481 and 493, quoted in the above-mentioned book by Dr. Djeritch.

came "to our God-fearing town of Kratovo."¹ This merely corroborates the fact that the archiepiscopal see of Ochrida was considered Serbian territory during the time of the Turkish dominion, and that, to include Kratovo, it must have occupied the greater part of Macedonia.

It was probably at some time during the fifteenth century that the two monks Komenus and Proklos compiled their history of the various rulers of Epirus, in which it is stated that after the death of the Serbian Emperor Dushan, Nicephore dethroned Dushan's brother Simeon and sent him to *Kostur*; and that when Simeon came to *Kostur*, he at once took possession of it and settled there, and seized several fortresses, many cities, and much territory besides. "And when he had been joined by many Greeks, *Serbs*, and Albanians (Bulgarians are not mentioned, as there were none), he gathered together about four or five thousand soldiers, who proclaimed him Emperor." (*Πολλῶν δι τούτο προσχωρησάτων Πωμαίων Σέρβων και Ἀλβανίων . . .*)

Towards the end of the fifteenth century the Hungarian historian Ant. Bonfini (who was born in Italy) alludes to *Macedonia*, "which is now called Serbia." ("Macedoniam, quam Serviam nunc appellant.")²

In 1625 Sergius, Metropolitan of Greven, travelled to Russia to collect charitable donations. Being questioned, he said, amongst other things, that he "had been consecrated Metropolitan of Greven by

¹ Ljubomir Stojanovitch, "Ancient Serbian Inscriptions and Epigraphs," i., 1902, No. 328, pp. 98-100. (Quoted by Dr. Djeritch in his book, p. 14.)

² "Ant. Bonfinii rerum Hungaricarum," dec. ii., lib. ix. (Viennæ, 1744), p. 248a. (Quoted by Dr. Djeritch in his book, pp. 15-16.)

Nektarius, Archbishop of Ochrida, of the Serbian lands." ¹ This, too, is a proof that the whole of the Bishopric of Ochrida has constantly been designated as Serbian.

In 1584, Alexander Komunovitch and his friend, writing about the Catholic Churches in Serbia and their surroundings, state that "Skoplje is the principal town" in *Serbia* ("Scopia principale città").²

In the seventeenth century (1641) the Metropolitan of Skoplje addressed an appeal for charity to Michael, Emperor of Russia, in which he styled himself "Simeon, Metropolitan of the Serbian lands," and the letter of the Russian Emperor contains the following phrase: "To the Metropolitan Simeon, head of the Monastery of John the Precursor (St. John the Baptist) in the Serbian lands."

In 1651 Michael, Metropolitan of Kratovo, wrote to the Emperor of Russia a letter containing the following sentence: "My fathers and my forefathers have been princes of the city of Kratovo in Serbian lands."³

In 1667 the Emperor Leopold of Austria granted certain concessions in Upper Hungary to the Serbian immigrants, who had come principally *from Macedonia* ("præsertim autem e Macedonia advenientium").⁴

In the numerous official maps of V. Coronelli, the celebrated "Geographer of the Venetian Republic" (1692, in *Corso Geografico*), Serbia is shown extending

¹ "Snoshenia Rossii s Vostokom po djelam tzerkovnim," ii. (1860), p. 19. (Quoted by Dr. Djeritch, p. 17.)

² E. Fermendjin, "Acta Bonæ" (*Monumenta Slav. mer.* xxiii. (1892), p. 339. (Quoted in his book by Dr. Djeritch, p. 17.)

³ St. Dimitrievitch, "Glas Srpske Kralj, Akademije," 58 (1900), pp. 233-4. (Quoted by Dr. Djeritch, p. 18.)

⁴ "Glasnik" of the Serbian Scientific Association, 67 (1887).

southwards beyond the Shar Mountains and Skopljan Montenegro in Macedonia, and whenever Skoplje is mentioned it is always alluded to as the "Metropoli della Servia" (the capital of Serbia).

In the eighteenth century (1744), the Empress Elizabeth addressed a letter "to the noble and esteemed Rulers of the Serbian lands in Macedonia."¹

From the numerous records and documents of the past we have quoted only a few—for many more might have been added; but the instances quoted are sufficient proof of the fact that the name of Serbia has been linked with Macedonia for centuries.

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Such *monuments of civilisation* as have survived the Ottoman dominion also give Macedonia an entirely Serbian character.

We quote the views of Mr. Kondakov, who is to-day in Russia considered the highest authority on Slav archæology, as being the most competent opinion available on this point. Mr. Kondakov says:

"It is well known that the most brilliant epoch of Serbian architecture falls into the latter half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century. The distinctive feature of this group of Serbian churches is the trace of Byzantine influence upon their architecture. The same may be said of the paintings with which the churches of this period are so lavishly decorated, and which are obviously modelled on the Greek style. But if we take into consideration the great extent of territory over which these paintings are distributed, in Serbia as well as in Macedonia, we naturally come to the conclusion that *purely Serbian studios* must also have

¹ Sima Milutinovitch, "History of Montenegro" (1835), No. 76.

existed, whose output, irrespective of the fact that they imitated the Greek models, was nevertheless to a certain degree original." ¹

And Macedonia is full of such monuments of Serbian culture.

Serbian national culture has set its mark upon the whole of Macedonia. It welcomed Byzantine culture, and herein lay the special importance of the Serbian rule in Macedonia from the standpoint of civilisation and intellectual development.

"In contrast with this, the short Bulgarian rule in Macedonia has left no such traces or monuments of culture," says Kondakov. "Serbian culture was widely developed, and the art created by the Serbians ranks as the most important branch of Byzantine art after the Russian." ²

In virtue of her art and civilisation Serbia came to be regarded as the natural heir to Byzance in the Balkans; but her political career and mission of civilisation were cut short by the Turkish invasion.

During the time of the Turkish dominion many churches and monasteries were destroyed; yet a considerable number have been preserved to this day. In modern times, *i.e.* during the latter half of the nineteenth century and in our own days of sanguinary campaigns by comitadjis, everything that could link any church or monastery with the Serbian name has been jealously demolished under the direction of fanatical Bulgarian priests and schoolmasters.

As an instance of Bulgarian barbarism Mr. Kondakov quotes what has been done in *Marko's monastery*, the

¹ "Macedonia," p. 66.

² *Ibid.*, 290. The italics are ours.

shrine raised after the death of the Emperor Dushan by the son of King Vukashin, Marko Kraljevitch, the well-known hero of the Serbian national poems. Lamenting the destruction of the paintings, Mr. Kondakov says:

“ Alas! there are now no frescoes, no inscriptions. . . . All has been obliterated by a coat of oil-paint. The hideousness of this painted expanse of imitation-marble is all the more repulsive in the garishness of its colouring, when one sees, from that which remains, how in the past everything had been elaborately decorated in most perfect taste. All the pillars were of marble; every detail excels in the exquisite style and taste of the fourteenth century, which marked the zenith of Serbian culture and political power. *Such mutilation of an ancient building fills one with a still keener regret, when one realises that this has been done mainly out of hatred on the part of the Bulgarian priesthood for the remains of Serbian culture. It appears that the admirably preserved fresco of the donor has also been obliterated as being a monument of Serbian rule in this province, and this in the name of Bulgarian patriotism.*”¹

* * *

The Slav language spoken in Macedonia, which the Bulgarians claim to be Bulgarian, does not really provide them with a good argument in favour of their claims to Macedonia. Any reader desirous of studying this question more closely from a philological point of view, can find the necessary information in the book “Serbi i Bolgari” (Petrograd, 1913), by Dr. A. Belitch, professor at the University of Belgrade. We shall not quote the opinions of Serbians or Serbian scientific men here, but rather those of foreign investigators and the Macedonians themselves. We have already quoted the opinion of Dr. Jagitch. Both Professor Ilia Barbu-

¹ “Macedonia,” pp. 183-4. The italics are ours.

lescu and Professor Kotchubinski aver that the language of the Macedonian Slavs is a dialect midway between the Serbian and Bulgarian languages—a transition dialect. The Bohemian professor Niederle is of the same opinion, and although he still erroneously classes the Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarian, he remarks upon their language as follows :

“From the philological point of view the language of the Macedonian Slavs represents a group of local dialects, differing a good deal one from the other. They form a kind of cross-dialect between the Stokav Serbian and the real Bulgarian.”¹

The Macedonian Draganov, agrees with this view, and also protests against the language of the Macedonian Slavs being classed as Bulgarian (“*Slavianskia Izvestia*,” 1888).

In his book “*Les Relations des Roumains*” (Jasi, 1912, p. 52), Mr. Barbulescu, professor of Slav research at the university of Jasi, writes upon the question as follows :

“All we have said clearly shows that the Serbians have as much reason to claim that the Macedonian language is Serbian as the Bulgarians have to say that it is not ; and consequently the Serbians have as good a right to assert that the 1,200,000 odd Macedonian Slavs are Serbians as the Bulgarians have in maintaining that they are not.”

The language of the Macedonian Slavs has remained undeveloped, a fact which is due to the political fate of Macedonia. The development of a national language is bound up with that of the nation itself. If

¹ Vide “*Archiv für slavische Philologie*,” xx., 35 : *Slovanske Starozhitnosti*.

the development of the nation is arrested, the development of the language must likewise cease. Hence the forms and phonetic laws of Mediæval Serbian and other ancient Slav tongues persist in the language of the Macedonian Slavs. The Turkish invasion, which oppressed Macedonia and cut short Serbian culture and political authority in the country, likewise arrested the development of the language. For this reason the language of the Macedonian Slavs to-day contains an element which strikes one as being foreign to the Serbian, as being in some degree Bulgarian, or genuinely Macedonian, *but which is, in fact, merely a mode of expression belonging to the earlier and older Mediæval Serbian language, which has been arrested in its development.* Frequently, in discussing the language of the Macedonian Slavs, insufficient attention is paid to this circumstance, which is nevertheless an important factor as regards the investigation and discovery of the true state of things. Not infrequently this error arises from failing to compare the language of the Macedonian Slavs with that of the Eastern, Ressavian, or Kossov, dialects of the Serbian tongue, instead of with the Bosnian and Hertzegovinian, which are Western dialects and geographically more remote.

In the same way certain peculiarities common to both the Macedonian dialect and the Bulgarian language, and which have been acquired through their geographical proximity to the Roumanians, Greeks, and Albanians, are often mistaken for characteristic features of the Bulgarian language. Among such features the most important are the post-position of the article and the decay or complete lack of the infinitive; this latter feature is also characteristic of the eastern dialects of Serbian, and for the same reason.

The cause of many erroneous conceptions and much confusion in this respect lies in the present insufficient investigation of the Macedonian dialects. As an example may be cited the Macedonian $k' = tj$ and $g' = dj$, both of which Jagitch, in his above-quoted treatise, declares himself unable to account for, as apparently the above sounds occur throughout Macedonia side by side with the consonantal groups sht and zhd . Moreover, Jagitch ingeniously adds :

“ Both the Macedonian $k'=tj$ and the $g'=dj$ clearly show how neighbouring dialects constantly exhibit similar points. In the same way the Macedonian $shtj$ (or $shtch$) bears a certain resemblance to the western Serbian or Croatian $shtch$, while the modern Serbo-Croatian sht , which predominates in the eastern district, is identical with the ordinary Bulgarian sht .”

It is perhaps not impossible that some day investigation will prove that the Macedonian k' and g' , which so trouble Mr. Jagitch, are completely independent sounds still in process of formation, by which the history of the Yugoslav languages will be further enriched, and which will provide a closer link between the Old Slav sht and zhd on the one hand and the Serbo-Croatian tj and dj on the other.

* * *

Apart from the language and visible records and remains of former culture, Macedonia possesses a national custom, which is typically Serbian and belongs to no other Slav people. It is the custom known as the “ *Slava* ” or “ *Krsno Ime*.” Mr. J. S. Jastrebov, Russian consul and one of the greatest authorities on Macedonian research, writes as follows regarding the

importance of the "Slava" among the Macedonian population:

"The 'Slava' or 'Krsno Ime,' as the day of their patron saint is called, is celebrated by all Serbians, not only in Serbia but wherever Serbians live, whether in Austria, Hungary, Bosnia, Montenegro, Kossovo, Morava, and the Prizren district, and also in the districts of Skoplje, Veles, Prilep, Bitolj (Monastir), and Ochrida, no less than in Debra and the Tetovo country. The entire Slavo-Serb-speaking population of the above-named countries reverently observes this which is practically regarded as a religious rite. If it is true that a custom may furnish a clue to the identification of a people, then the custom I have just alluded to is surely the best proof that all those who observe it form one ethnical unit, and belong to the same nationality." ¹

This national custom, which is recognised and observed only among the Serbians, is one of the most characteristic features of the Serb nationality. J. S. Jastrebov goes on to say that—

"The observance of the 'Slava' is so deeply-rooted in the Serbian people that even the Greek bishops failed in their efforts to exterminate it, when in their excessive zeal for proselytising they endeavoured, directly after the abolition of the Serbian Patriarchate of Petch, to replace the *Slava* by the observance of the 'name day' as a national custom. At present the Bulgarian agents are engaged upon the same task." ²

* * *

¹ J. S. Jastrebov, "Obitchai i piesni Turetzkih Serbov," St. Petersburg, 1886, p. 2.

² J. S. Jastrebov, "Obitchai i piesni Turetzkih Serbov," p. 2. This custom is also characteristic of the Bulgarian peoples living on the old Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, and around Kiustendil. Through their bishops the Bulgarians are every-

The question of nationality in Macedonia has never come under discussion till the latter half of the nineteenth century. It began with the agitation for the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate. Concerning this the well-known Russian publicist Alexander Amphytheatrov wrote as follows :

“ The national question in Macedonia is of recent date. In former years, prior to 1859, and even up to the last Serbo-Turkish War, the population was simply divided into two groups, viz. the Turkish oppressors, and the oppressed Christians or *Raya*, the ‘ Rumi-milet.’

“ The Turks were not in the least interested in the national structure of the ‘ *Raya*.’ United by the common profession of Islam the Turks themselves never troubled to distinguish their own nationality from that of the generality of Moslems ; and by analogy they preferred to assume a similar unity among the *Raya*, and classified the population exclusively according to the difference of religion. It was a case of either Islam or Orthodox Christianity. The Turks look upon Orthodox Christianity as being ‘ Roman,’ *i.e.* the same as the Greco-Byzantine faith. Hence for them a Byzantine is a Greek or ‘ Rumi,’ and this suffices to stamp him as a Christian subject of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of his real nationality. Greek or *Rumi* simply means ‘ non-Mussulman.’ The entire Christian zone within the Balkan Peninsula has been termed ‘ Rumi vilayets,’ *i.e.* Greek districts, by the Turks. Rather tolerant than otherwise in religious questions, the Turks, in accordance with ancient tradition, recognised

where trying to suppress the observance of the Slava as being “ opposed to the Orthodox Church and religion.” There is, however, a deeper significance underlying this fact. We will only mention what Count Ignatiev has to say on the subject in his memoirs, which have recently been published in the “ *Istoritcheski Vesnik*,” viz. “ The Vidin district is inhabited by Serbians and Roumanians ! ”

the Patriarch of Constantinople as the head of all the Christians. By this circumstance the control of all the churches and Christian schools in the Balkan Peninsula was given into the hands of the Greek priests.

“This union of the entire Christian population under one strong anti-nationalistic Church proved a powerful obstacle in the Balkan Peninsula to the wave of national awakening which looms so large in the annals of the nineteenth century. The Bulgarians thoroughly grasped the importance of this obstacle. Having convinced themselves that it was impossible to obtain recognition for a separate nationality in the Turkish Empire without the previous recognition of a separate Church, the Bulgarians strove so hard to realise the independence of their Church from the Patriarchate that in 1859 Dragan Tsankov (a Bulgarian political leader and subsequently head of the Liberal Progressive party) very nearly drove his countrymen into the arms of Roman Catholicism!”¹

* * *

The question of separating the Bulgarian Church from the anti-nationalistic Church of the Patriarchate soon assumed a political and nationalist character. It may be of special interest to give a short synopsis of the history of the whole movement which ended in the creation of an independent Bulgarian Church, under the name of the Bulgarian Exarchate. It is especially necessary to do this, as it is clearly shown by authentic documents taken from the Archives of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and published by Prince Troubetzkoi,² present Russian Minister in Serbia, that

¹ Alexander Amphitheatrov, “Slaianskoe Gore, Moskva,” 1912, pp. 244-5.

² “Revue d’Histoire diplomatique—La Politique russe en Orient, par Gr. Trubetzkoi,” 1907; *Delo*, vol. February to June, Belgrade, 1914.

the Bulgarian Exarchate, such as it is, owes its existence to the Turkish Government.

In the publication alluded to, Prince G. Troubetzkoi writes as follows :

“ The year 1868 was an auspicious one for the Bulgarians. The Cretan question was worrying the Turks. The Ottoman Government was on the verge of war against the Greeks. True to the traditional policy of the Turk, the Porte sought for some power within her Empire which might counterbalance the hostile Greek element. At this critical moment the Porte naturally did not hesitate to grant support and promise concessions to the Slavs. *At one moment the Porte became alarmed on perceiving that efforts were being made to secure an agreement between the Bulgarians and the Great Church.* She immediately set herself to counteract this tendency, which was so contrary to her own interests. *Above all things, she strove to incite the national feeling of the Bulgarians against the concessions offered by the Patriarchate, declaring them to be of minor importance and quite unsubstantial.* A rumour was circulated to the effect that the Government was prepared to grant real advantages to the Bulgarians. *The Grand Vizier received a Bulgarian deputation, to whom he announced that the Porte was inclined to recognise the Bulgarians as a nation (‘milet’), but that he would abstain from all interference in religious affairs.* The concessions promised by the Grand Vizier to the Bulgarians were not calculated to disappoint them. On the contrary, the Bulgarians saw the opportunity of receiving an autonomous organisation, which was the very thing it was so greatly to their interest to obtain.”¹

This *rapprochement* between the Bulgarians and

¹ Telegrams of De Stal, Russian Chargé d’Affaires, Pera, February 13th and March 5th, 1868, No. 42 and 64 (quoted by Prince Troubetzkoi). The italics are ours.

the Porte is further commented upon by Prince Troubetzkoi in the following words :

“ Taking advantage of the favourable attitude of the Turkish Ministry, the Bulgarians sought to interest directly the Porte in their negotiations with the Great Church. Various schemes and propositions were submitted to the Turks, whereby they were persuaded that the whole question was one of politics rather than of religion, and that consequently the Government of the Padishah was competent to deal with the problem. This was exactly what the Turks desired ; they took an active part in the internal affairs of the various ecclesiastic bodies, so as to obtain a measure of control over them. *Fearing a possible agreement between the Patriarchate and the Bulgarians, the Porte intervened and dictated the basis of an adjustment of the controversy.* This adjustment was to contain the following terms :

“ 1. The Bulgarians to be free to elect their spiritual authorities.

“ 2. Such churches as had been built by the Bulgarians to remain national property, and the people to have the right of building additional churches.

“ 3. In each eparchy the Bulgarian metropolitans and bishops to choose their own place of residence, such place of residence to be other than that of the Greek bishops.

“ 4. A special Bulgarian Synod to be established at Constantinople, presided over by a dignitary of the Bulgarian Church.

“ 5. Such Bulgarians as wish to remain under the authority of the Greek bishops to be at liberty to do so.

“ 6. The spiritual precedence of the Patriarch to be recognised and his name to be mentioned in the Divine Service.”

This scheme was communicated to the Bulgarians by Fuad Pasha himself, then Minister for Foreign

Affairs, in contradiction to the promise he had given to the Patriarch Gregory VI, that he would not submit it to them. The ill-will of the Turks was more than increasingly apparent, and General Ignatiev, who was then Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, did not fail to indicate this to Fuad Pasha.

When Gregory VI became aware of Fuad Pasha's scheme, he decided to convoke the "Vasseljenski Sabor" as the only body competent to decide upon the religious controversy between the Bulgarians and the Patriarchate. The Turks opposed the convocation of the "Vasseljenski Sabor" and incited the Bulgarians to rebel against its authority. Simultaneously, the Porte advised the Bulgarians to establish their own independent Church, to elect their own bishops, and appoint their own Synod. And they were promised that when this was done a firman would be published, by which the new order of things would be officially recognised. The Bulgarians lost no time in following the advice of the Turks. The Metropolitans of Plovdiv, Sofia, and Lovtchana, all three Bulgarians by birth, at once submitted their resignations to the Patriarch. They then appointed a Synod, in the hope that it would be recognised by the Holy Synod of Petrograd. Upon this occasion General Ignatiev sent the following telegram to the Chancellor, Prince Gortchakov :

"Our position is becoming very delicate: we cannot admit that a Synod should be established at Constantinople. Still less can we enter into communication with a Church that has independently appointed its own head, so long as it has not been recognised by the Patriarchate. By so doing we should not only alienate the "Vasseljenski Patriarch," but all the other Patriarchs of the East and the Greeks as well. If, on the other hand, we refuse to

recognise the Bulgarian hierarchy, the Slavs will look upon us as their enemies. Apart from this, the Bulgarians may be seduced, and under this temptation succumb to the influence of the Western Powers and Turkey, or even turn towards Rome and 'unite' with her."¹

The question of the Bulgarian Exarchate affected the interests of Serbia. Therefore the Serbian Government, in order to safeguard the national rights of Serbia in Old Serbia and Macedonia, *even at this early date at once advanced her claims to the districts of the ancient archiepiscopal see of Ochrida and the Patriarchate of Petch.*

The Serbian Government decided to make their diplomatic move all the sooner as the mixed Commission entrusted with the task proceeded to incorporate the eparchies of Nish, Kiustendil, Pirost, Samokov, and Veles with the future Exarchate, although up to 1766 these eparchies had belonged to the Serbian Patriarchate of Petch.

Although the diplomatic action of the Serbian Government was, for several reasons, unsuccessful at the time, and although it lacked strength, it is important as a proof that even at that date Serbia considered the Serbian national claims in Old Serbia and Macedonia, and watched over them, and that she at once took diplomatic action to safeguard Serbian interests.

Judging by what has been said already concerning the political situation at that time, and considering the attitude of Turkey towards the Serbs and Greeks, it is only natural that the Serbian action should have

¹ Telegram of General Ignatiev, Pera, October 29th, 1868, No. 271 (quoted by Prince G. Troubetzkoi in his book). The italics are ours.

been unsuccessful. It must, however, be admitted that part of the responsibility for this failure must be attributed to Count Ignatiev, then Russian Envoy at Constantinople, who impressed upon the Serbian Government, through their diplomatic agent, that they should not insist too strongly upon their protest, in order not to increase the difficulties attending the settlement of the question.

One of the chief reasons that led General Ignatiev to recommend the Serbian Government to withdraw their claims was that the Serbian name suggested the idea of a rebellious element. Of all nations in the Balkans the Serbians had offered the stoutest resistance to the Turkish invasion in the fourteenth century. They were, further, the first to rise against the Turkish dominion at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and remained in a state of war with the Turks to the very end.

From a canonical point of view it was perfectly reasonable that the Patriarchate should demand that the frontier of the Bulgarian eparchies should be clearly defined. In this justifiable demand the Patriarchate was supported by Russia, *and according to the first scheme accepted by the Bulgarians, the spiritual authority of the Bulgarian Exarchate did not include any of the Macedonian eparchies. The Porte, however, in her desire to make the Bulgarians her instrument for provoking mutual strife between the Slavs and Greeks in the Balkans, strove energetically to decide the question of a frontier for the Bulgarian Exarchate.* In this policy the Bulgarians were quick to see their opportunity for including non-Bulgarian districts, especially Serbian districts, within the scope of their propaganda.

At last, on February 28th, 1870, the Grand Vizier,

Ali Pasha, presented the Bulgarian ecclesiastic representatives with a firman, by which the Bulgarian autonomous Church was established and recognised. *This firman in so far differed from the scheme drawn up by the mixed Commission that it contained four new points favourable to the Bulgarians, and which were inserted without the knowledge of either the Patriarchate or even General Ignatiev.* Of these four points the two following are the most important :

1. The spiritual connection between the New Church and the Great Church, upon which the Patriarch had laid special stress, was now made so slender as to be all but non-existent, and

2. The territorial area of the Exarchate had become practically unlimited, owing to the admission of the principle that if two-thirds of the population of any given eparchy wished to come under the Exarchate, they might be included under its authority.

We append the actual text of the supplement to Article 10, *in which the eparchies of the new Church are enumerated.* In accordance with the aim of the Commission as a body, it runs as follows :

“ If the Orthodox population of any place over and above those already enumerated should express an unanimous desire, or if at least two-thirds of the population of such a place should express a desire to come under the authority of the Exarchate, and their desire be approved as legitimate, it shall be fulfilled.”

Thus the Turks, by their firman of February 28th, 1870, established a Bulgarian propaganda throughout their Empire in Europe, in Old Serbia and Macedonia, reserving to themselves the right of giving formal sanction to the results obtained by this propaganda. Nearly all the eparchies of the Bulgarian Exarchate in

Old Serbia and Macedonia are the result of Bulgarian propaganda, which was sanctioned by the Porte and the Sultan in virtue of the Supplement to Article 10 of the firman of February 28th, 1870.

It is extraordinary, though perfectly characteristic, that the Turkish firman of February 28th, 1870, incorporated not only Bulgarian eparchies with the Bulgarian Exarchate, but also the eparchies of Nish, Kiustendil, Pirot, Samokov, and Veles, which had up to 1766 belonged to the Serbian Patriarchate of Petch. On this point the Turks, the Bulgarians, and the Patriarch found themselves in agreement.

Commenting upon this, Prince Troubetzkoi thus explains the relations between the Bulgarians and General Ignatiev :

"It appears that the Bulgarians, who took such advantage of the moral support afforded them by the Russian Envoy in their negotiations with the Porte, only communicated part of their scheme to their protector, and that when the Envoy was acquainted with the text of the firman, as approved by the Sultan, he came to the conclusion that he had been made a tool of by those whom he had protected."

General Ignatiev did not conceal his disapproval of the disloyal attitude so long maintained by the Bulgarians. In one of his telegrams to the Chancellor at Petrograd, he declares :

*"I do not wish to expand any illusions concerning the future of a hierarchy containing elements like those we have seen at work. Bishops as unworthy as these will not succeed in establishing an Orthodox Church deserving of the name."*¹

¹ General Ignatiev's telegram of January 23rd, 1872 (quoted by Prince Troubetzkoi). The italics are ours.

Thus established by the good-will and diplomatic calculation of Turkey, the Bulgarian Exarchate has always enjoyed the support of the Turkish authorities, whom it has never hesitated to bribe, when necessary.

It was all the more easy for the Bulgarians to do this, as not only the tchorbadjis (feudals), but also the revolutionists began to cultivate a pro-Turkish attitude with growing enthusiasm. It is well known that even Mr. Rakovski became a Turcophile in his old age, and that Stefan Stambulov based his entire policy upon a close friendship with Turkey. This tradition was maintained after his death, and was adhered to even during the reign of the Young Turks, when the Bulgarian revolutionists and the Turks were both pulling in the same boat.¹

Supported by Turkey, the Bulgarian Exarchate at once began to persecute the Serbian schools in the above-mentioned Serbian eparchies, and to discontinue the use of the Serbian books which had been in vogue for nearly a century. Against this, and other similar machinations of the new Bulgarian Exarchate, Serbia at once lodged her protests at Constantinople through her diplomatic representative—protests which were frequently but always unsuccessfully repeated. Even at that date the Serbian protests were supported by the Russian Jastrebov, who by his straightforwardness rendered himself so odious to the Bulgarians that to this day they cannot mention his name without anger. The Serbians were never in favour with the Sublime Porte. They were always looked upon as a rebellious and bellicose element. The Turks took Macedonia

¹ See Dr. Marinov, "Stefan Stambulov," Sofia, 1909, p. 672, etc. At. Shopov, "Kak ni se naloji Balkanskata Voina," Sofia, 1915.

from the Serbians, but before the province succumbed to the Turkish yoke three great battles had to be fought. The greatest of these was the battle of Kossovo in 1389, when the Turkish Sultan Amurat¹ fell by the hand of a Serbian. Even after the battle of Kossovo Macedonia was not entirely conquered, but remained for another five years in Serbian hands (until 1394). Moreover, Macedonia was staunchly defended in many a battle against the Turkish invasion. All Serbia north of the Shar Mountains was completely subjugated by the Turks in 1458; but even then the Serbs still went on fighting in defence of Bosnia—which they lost in 1463—and of Hertzegovina, which was not taken from them till 1483. Finally, the Serbs still maintained the contest in certain districts of the present kingdom of Montenegro, part of which fell under Turkish rule in 1496, while the rest of Montenegro remained unconquered. For a hundred years after the subjugation of Bulgaria the Serbian people maintained an incessant warfare against the tide of Turkish aggression, and arrested it on the banks of the Save, the Danube, and beyond. After five centuries of slavery, the Serbs once more made headway against the Turks, *and the Serbians were the first among the Balkan peoples to declare a war of liberation.* This they waged with desperate courage from 1804 till 1813, when they were overpowered, but not crushed, by superior Turkish forces. Supported by Russia, they were the first among the Balkan nations to win their liberty by force of arms. The part played by the

¹ M. Hanotaux quite wrongly asserts in his "Histoire illustrée de la Guerre de 1914" (p. 174) that Bulgarians also took part in the battle of Kossovo. *Bulgaria had become a vassal of Turkey long before that date.*

Serbianism made a deep impression upon the Turks, and a hostile attitude towards them has been a tradition with the Porte from one generation to another. The Bulgarians well knew how to utilise this attitude in their own struggle against the Serbians.

It must be remembered that the Serbians possessed no autonomous Church, but were dependent upon the Patriarchate—from whom they could only with difficulty, and very occasionally, obtain permits to build new churches and schools—and that they possessed neither Serbian bishops nor priests in Macedonia, nor even a single eparchy. Under these circumstances they were quite defenceless in Macedonia against the energetic Bulgarian propaganda, *which obtained a strong legal footing by the establishment of the Exarchate*. It is really remarkable that in spite of its exclusiveness, recklessness, and ruthlessness, the Bulgarian propaganda has not yet succeeded in imposing the Bulgarian nationality upon the Macedonian population.¹

The Slav "nature" in the Macedonian population has persisted as obstinately as it withstood the aggression of the Bulgaro-Turkish hordes in the Middle Ages. In fact, the chief characteristic of the Macedonian population is that it is *Slav*. Even the name of "Bulgarian," which there have been so many attempts to impose upon the Slav population of Macedonia during the course of the nineteenth century, *does not there exist even to-day in its Bulgarian linguistic form*, which should be "Blgarin." Instead of this the form employed is "Bugarin," which accords with the purest Serbian linguistic tradition.

Even the Bulgarian academician and philologist, Dr. A. Shishmanov, is compelled to state that "Bu-

¹ This has been admitted even by Professor Niederle.

garin" is a Serbian and not a Bulgarian form of the word, as in Bulgarian, as above stated, it would be "Blgarin." In the words of Dr. Shishmanov, "the influence of Serbian has been so strong that the Serbian form 'Bugarin' is heard instead of the 'Blgarin' in dialects which are free from Serbian idiom!"¹

Just as in the Middle Ages the Bulgaro-Turkish hordes imposed their name upon the Slav population, so in our day the Exarchate is trying to do the same with the Bulgarian name in Macedonia. In this the Exarchate has had the support of the Turks, to whom the Bulgarians have always been the submissive *Raya*, while the Serbians have always been regarded as malcontents and revolutionists.²

¹ "Blgarski Sbornik," 1900, xvi., p. 727.

² In order to show to what extent the Bulgarians have been striving to Bulgarise the Macedonians and coerce them to come under the Exarchate (for the Exarchists call themselves *Bugarashi*), we will here give but one instance out of many.

Constantine Georgevitch, priest of the village of Konjska, tells the following story of how he became a Bulgarian schoolmaster and his parishioners a Bulgarian community. "Until the year 1898 or 1899—I do not remember which—we were Patriarchists or, as we were generally called, Grecomans. Then, however, a Bulgarian comitadji-leader, Jovan, a native of Karasula (now in Greece), came to me, and ordered me to leave the Greek school and become a Bulgarian schoolmaster; otherwise he would kill me. He furthermore ordered me to invite all the peasants to submit themselves to the Exarchate, lest they should be killed. He then commanded us to send in our applications to the Exarchate at Constantinople and to the Kaimakam at Ghevgheli, declaring that as we were Bulgarians, we wished to come under the Exarchate. And we did so. Some time afterwards came a Turkish police officer from Ghevgheli, who convoked us to a meeting, and when our people, out of fear of the comitadji-leader Jovan, confirmed their written petitions, he registered us all as Bulgarians!"

But the efforts made by the Bulgarian Exarchate to cause the Bulgarian national idea to penetrate into the population have not succeeded. The entire work of the Bulgarian propaganda has failed to penetrate beyond the surface.

A well-known German savant, the Swiss Byzantist Hans Gelzer, who is well acquainted with prevailing conditions in the Balkans, writes in his work "Geistliches und Weltliches aus dem Türkisch-Griechischen Orient, Selbsterlebtes und Selbstgesehenes" (Leipzig, 1910, p. 251):

"It is amusing to see the Slav savants discussing with warmth the question as to whether certain regions of Eastern Macedonia are Serbian or Bulgarian. The people themselves do not know it."

Commenting upon the Bulgarisation of the Slav population of Macedonia, the Russian publicist, Alexander Amphitheatrov, to whom we have already made allusion, writes as follows in his book "Slavjanske Gore," pp. 246-7:

"... In order to make Macedonia Bulgarian, it was necessary to Bulgarise it. And, immediately after the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 the main strength and chief efforts of the Bulgarian State organisation were directed towards the Bulgarisation of the Macedonian Slavs. The Bulgarian agents—priests, schoolmasters, comitadjis—composed the secret Government of Macedonia, in fact, her political soul.

"At first this propaganda progressed most favourably. Milyukov, who visited Macedonia towards the end of the nineties, saw it through Bulgarian glasses and put down all Macedonians as purely Bulgarian. But he erred in good faith. He found Macedonia so thoroughly and

brilliantly Bulgarised, that it is no wonder that he mistook the garment for the body and culture for nationality.

“ They are neither Serbians nor Bulgarians, but an originally Slav people with a simple language that is in a high degree susceptible to modification by the influence of any of the more advanced types of Slav culture. The Macedonians are Bulgarians only where Bulgarian schools and churches have been established, and Serbians wherever education and letters are in Serbian hands. Similarly they could, by religious and commercial influence, be changed into Little Russians, Big Russians, or Poles. Their language is like heated metal which can easily be moulded into a kindred form. But the form must be of kindred nature. It is just this racial affinity that has been the main cause of the contention over Macedonia among the Slavs, and of the elimination of the Greek influence.”

* * *

It may be permissible at the end of this chapter on Macedonia to call the reader's attention to yet another argument which is not unimportant in its relation to the Bulgarian claim to Macedonia.

In their eagerness to prove that the Macedonians are Bulgarians, the latter frequently quote as evidence the fact that many Macedonians emigrate to Bulgaria in order to establish connections with that country and to settle there; in further proof of this they publish the names of business and professional men who are domiciled in Bulgaria, although natives of Macedonia.

It is little to be wondered at that there are such people, when we take into consideration all that has been said about Macedonia. On the contrary, it would be most remarkable if there were none. But this fact does not in the least prove the truth of the Bulgarian assertions.

Serbia has similar connections with Macedonia, and

we are prepared to say that these connections speak greatly in favour of Serbian claims and assertions. Serbia has always been considered revolutionary and rebellious. She has had neither a Patriarchate nor an Exarchate to work for her in Turkey and win Macedonians for her. In spite of all this, a large number of natives of Macedonia, belonging to all classes of society, are at present living in Serbia. But the Serbians have not made political capital out of this, nor, after the manner of the Bulgarians, have they published the fact abroad; neither have the Macedonians, who came to Serbia to establish connections there, done so. Both Serbians and Macedonians have simply taken the matter for granted.

Conditions are rather different in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians have not made the Macedonians very welcome, and the Macedonians have not taken kindly to the Bulgarians. In fact they have not at all taken to each other, and apparently they are not nearly so akin to one another as Sofia represents them, or wishes to represent them to be.

We here quote a few instances of Macedonian connections with Serbia, together with the necessary data.

In the first place we have to refer to His Grace Bishop Methodius (Kusevitch) of Prilep, who is a Bulgarised Macedonian, that he may bear witness for us.

In his pamphlet "Pogrom na Blgarias" (published in Stara Zagora, 1914), he styles himself "a true Russophile," although he contends that Russia was responsible for the Bulgarian collapse; we quote the following sentence, which occurs on p. 25:

"Every autumn several thousand Bulgarians go from the district of Prilep to Serbia for work and return in the

spring. Similarly, many go also from the towns into Serbia."

Nearly all the bakers in Belgrade come from Kitchevatch, and both in Belgrade and in the interior of Serbia many hotel-keepers and café-proprietors are Macedonians. The Macedonians from Debra are known in Serbia chiefly as masons and bricklayers, and those from Krushevo as building contractors. In the same way the *Rekalias* (*i.e.* the men from Reka in Macedonia) are known throughout Serbia.

Let us cite several names as examples of the Macedonians residing in Serbia.

Philip Christitch, the well-known Serbian Cabinet Minister, was born in the neighbourhood of Sofia; the distinguished Serbian statesman, Milan Pirotnatz, is a native of the district of Pirot on the frontier between Serbia and Macedonia; Nikola P. Pashitch, the present Serbian Premier and leader of the Radical party, belongs to a family which hails from Tetovo in Macedonia; Dr. Lazare Patchou, the present Minister of Finance, is also a member of a Macedonian family from the Bitolj (Monastir) district; General Lazar Lazarevitch, whose family belonged to Moskopolje, near Bitolj (Monastir), in Macedonia; General Lazar Petrovitch, first aide-de-camp to the late King Alexander, was born in Bashino Selo, near Veles; Nikola Stefanovitch, retired Cabinet Minister, comes from Mavrovo, in the district of Gostivar; Kosta Stojanovitch, ex-Minister of Commerce, is a native of Malovishte, near Bitolj; Mihailo Ristitch, Serbian Minister in Rome, is of Macedonian descent; Cincar-Marko, the well-known Vojvode and hero of the first Serbian insurrection, the father of General Dimitrije Cincar Markovitch, was born in Ochrida (in the Serbian

ballads he is celebrated as "Cincar Marko of Ochrid town"); Dr. Vladan Georgevitch, formerly Serbian Premier, and a well-known man of letters, is also of Macedonian descent.

The Serbian poet and author Branislav Nushitch was born in Macedonia; the writer, Dr. Jovan Vassiljevitch, was born in Kumanovo; Stefan Simitch, professor and man of letters, in Kratovo; Professor Dimitriye Lazarevitch in Ghevgheli; Professor Jovan Alexitch in Kumanovo.

Major Kosta Georgevitch was born in Malovishte, in the district of Bitolj (Monastir); Captain Rista Jancitch was born in Stojkovo in the district of Ghevgheli.

Svetolik Popovitch, ex-Under-Secretary of State for Public Works, is a native of Ljubanatz, in the district of Skoplje (Uskub); Petar J. Popovitch, head of the Buildings Department in the Office of Public Works, was born in Prilep; the engineer Stojan Veljkovitch was born in Krushevo; the engineer Thomas Christitch in Bitolj (Monastir); the architect of the Serbian Home Office, Simon Pechinovitch, in Orlanatz; the engineer Leonida Zisitch in Krushevo; Isailo Fidano-vitch, architect in Belgrade, was born in Dolnji Melchani, near Debra; the late Dr. Alexander S. Christitch, physician in Ochrida, was born in Struga; Nikola Vanitch, prefect of the department of Tikve, was born in Poretch; Vasa Lazarevitch, secretary in the Serbian Home Office, was born in Moskopolje, near Bitolj; ex-Vice-Consul Trojan Zivkovitch in Tetovo, and Spira Ristitch, the present mayor of Skoplje, is also a native of Tetovo.

Here we ought also to mention the various members of the well-known Shumenkovitch family from Drinkolo: Costa Shumenkovitch (retired merchant),

Tanasie Shumenkovitch (State Comptroller), and the late Spasa Shumenkovitch (retired vice-prefect).

Golub Janitch, a retired merchant in Belgrade, is a native of Mavrovo, near Gostivar; Milan Dimitch, brick manufacturer in Belgrade, was also born in Mavrovo. Petar Cristitch, retired hotel-keeper in Belgrade and father of Dr. Nikola Cristitch, physician in Belgrade, was born in Ochrida; Vandjel Karanflovitch, retired hotel-keeper in Belgrade, was a native of Krushevo; Trajko Bogojevitch Chadina, retired hotel-keeper, was born in Orlanatz; Lazar Drashkovitch, hotel-proprietor, was born in Veles; Arsa Popovitch, express agent and broker, was born in Prilep; Messrs. Cibarevitch Bros., booksellers in Leskovac, were born in Veles; Stojan Antonovitch, retired merchant and ex-deputy for Obrenovatz, was born in Krushevo, etc., etc., etc. By consulting the register of the Serbian electorate, it is easy to arrive at the conviction that the Macedonian immigrants of all social grades in Serbia are as numerous as they are in Bulgaria.

Consequently, the argument of the Bulgars founded on the number of Macedonian immigrants in Serbia and Bulgaria respectively is as weak as the others which are advanced.

* * *

Finally, the Bulgarians, in order to discredit the Serbians, and to substantiate their own claims to Macedonia, frequently declare through the press, and occasionally in the *Sobranjé*, that the Serbian régime in Macedonia is intolerable—worse even than the Turkish régime used to be.¹

¹ It is interesting to note that the Bulgarians include the philologist, Professor Ljubomir Miletitch, among the number

Instead of offering to explain or refute these Bulgarian allegations, we will merely quote what has been said about the Serbian régime in Old Serbia and Macedonia by the well-known Russian publicist V. V. Vodovozov, who travelled through these parts of the Balkans during this year, and is therefore a direct witness of the results of the Serbian administration.

Speaking in the lecture-hall of the Petrovska School in Petrograd on March 15th, and reporting on what he had seen and heard in Old Serbia and Macedonia, he made the following statement, *inter alia*, concerning the Serbian régime :

“ The Serbians have done a great deal to raise the standard of culture and education in the part of Macedonia annexed by their country. At every step and in every direction one meets with the result of their efforts. In spite of the war the Serbian Government has most admirably organised the educational system of the country, and provided elementary, secondary, and other schools. Roads have been constructed, telephones and other appliances of civilisation have been introduced.” (“ Novoe Zveno,” No. 12, 1915, p. 16.)

of Bulgarian Macedonians. To any one anxious to know the true nationality of Professor Miletitch, we reply that he is the nephew of the late Svetozar Miletitch, leader of the Serbians in the Hungarian Voivodina. His father was a Serbian school-master in Veles and Ishtip, where Mr. Ljubomir Miletitch was born. He was sent to Russia with Mr. Georgov by the Bulgarians, so that the Russians might be convinced by a “ Macedonian ” that the Macedonians are indeed Bulgarians.

APPENDIX

THE IMPERIAL OTTOMAN FIRMAN (DATED FEBRUARY 28TH, 1870) RELATIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BULGARIAN EX- ARCHATE

It has at all times been My Imperial desire that all faithful peoples and subjects dwelling in My Empire should enjoy to the full extent such order and security as are necessary to them for the professing of their religions, as also in all their social relations ; that they should live in peace and friendship with one another as required by patriotism and humanity, in order that they may by so doing aid Us to the utmost of their ability in Our incessant efforts for the furtherance of Our Empire and of civilisation.

But inasmuch as there have of late arisen—contrary to Our Imperial wish—certain misunderstandings and misinterpretations as to how far the Bulgarian metropolitans, bishops, priests, and churches be dependent upon the Patriarchate—which misunderstandings and misinterpretations have greatly grieved Us—it has been found necessary to institute an investigation into the causes which have led up to the said misunderstandings and misinterpretations, and to submit them to a thorough examination. The results of this investigation are embodied in the following articles, which have been adopted and approved as being the definite solution of the controversy.

Article I

A separate ecclesiastic district shall be established under the official name of “ the *Bulgarian Exarchate*,” the same

to include certain districts over and above the Metropolitanates and Bishoprics hereafter to be mentioned. The administration of the spiritual and religious matters in these districts to be entirely vested in this Exarchate.

Article 2

The chief Metropolitan of these districts shall bear the title of "*exarch.*" He shall also be the canonical president of the *Bulgarian Synod.*

Article 3

The internal spiritual administration of this Exarchate shall be established by a supplementary law, which must be in accordance with the fundamental canonic and religious regulations of the Orthodox Church, and which must be previously subjected to the approval of My Imperial Government.

This supplementary law must preclude the possibility of any interference, either direct or indirect, on the part of the Patriarch, with religious matters, or with the elections of bishops and exarchs. As soon as the exarch is elected, the Bulgarian Synod shall inform the Patriarch of the fact ; and the Patriarch, on his part, shall immediately grant his approval, in accordance with religious law.

Article 4

The exarch, having been appointed through Our sublime firman, shall mention the name of the Patriarch in the prayers in accordance with the rubric of the Church ; but previous to his election, the person considered worthy of the office of exarch must be personally presented to My Government.

Article 5

In matters pertaining to his jurisdiction, the exarch will have the right to negotiate directly with the local authorities and, if need be, even with Our Sublime Porte. The approval must be obtained, before Berats may be granted to such persons in holy orders as come under his jurisdiction.

Article 6

All matters concerning the Orthodox faith and necessitating mutual consultation must be referred by the Bulgarian Synod to *Vasseljenski* Patriarchate and Synod ; and these shall be bound to render assistance without delay, and to answer without hesitation such questions as may be put to them.

Article 7

The Bulgarian Synod shall receive the Holy Oil from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

Article 8

Such bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans as are subject to the *Vasseljenski* Patriarchate shall be at liberty to approach the Bulgarian Exarchate, in the same manner as the Bulgarian bishops and archbishops holding office in Greek eparchies ; they will also be permitted to sojourn in the capitals of vilayets and other centres of administration : but they must not convoke Synods outside the limits of their own diocese, nor interfere in the affairs of such Christians as are not subject to them, nor officiate without the permission of the bishop of the diocese in which they happen to be.

Article 9

Even as the metoch of Jerusalem, which is situated in Phanar, is dependent upon the Patriarch of Jerusalem, so the Bulgarian metoch and church situated in the same suburb shall belong to the Bulgarian Exarchate. And whenever the exarch shall require to come to Constantinople, he shall be allowed to reside in his metoch ; as to such Divine Service as he may have to celebrate during his sojourn in the capital, he shall be subject to the same ecclesiastic rules as apply in similar cases to the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Drenopolje, and Jerusalem.

Article 10

The jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate shall extend over the eparchies of Sofia, Vratsch, Tultcha, Vidin, Nish, Pirot, Kiustendil, Samokov, Veles, Plovdiv, Mute-Sariflik Islimne, and the " *casa* " of Sosopolie, with the exception of about twelve villages on the shores of the Black Sea, between Varna and Kistendje, which are inhabited by a non-Bulgarian population. The following towns shall also be excepted : Varna, Anhial, Mesembri, Plovdiv, and Stanimak, together with the villages of Kuklen, Voden, Arnaut-Key, Panagia, Novo Selo, Leskov, Ahman, Batchovo, Belashtitza, and the monasteries of St. Anargirius, St. Paraskeva, and St. George. The monastery of St. Panagia and the interior of the Plovdiv district shall belong to the Exarchate, but such inhabitants of the eparchy as may not wish to be under the Exarchate shall be free. The details in this matter shall be arranged between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate in accordance with canonic and ecclesiastic law.¹

¹ Of the eparchies enumerated above, the following used to belong (before 1766) to the Serbian Patriarchate of Petch—Sofia, Vidin, Nish, Pirot, Kiustendil, Samokov, and Veles. However, the Patriarch and the Greeks were less interested in these than in the Macedonian eparchies.

If the population of any other places beside those enumerated above, and professing the Orthodox faith, should wish unanimously, or if at least two-thirds of them should wish to be subject to the Bulgarian Exarchate, and if subsequent investigation should prove this to be so, their desire ought to be gratified ; but as such desire must be expressed either by the whole of the population, or at least by two-thirds thereof, such persons as would attempt to spread discord among the population shall be held responsible to the law.¹

Article II

Such monasteries as are situated in the Exarchate and which are, by canonic law, subject to the control of the Patriarchate, shall continue to be governed as they have been hitherto.

Zilhidje 8th, 1286.

¹ This last passage was inserted by the Turks and Bulgarians at the last moment, without the knowledge of either the Patriarch or Count Ignatiev.

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
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