


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SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.

LONDON:
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Great New Street, Fetter Lane.

A

SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY

BY

GODFREY WILLIAM VON LEIBNITZ.

TRANSLATED,

With an Introduction and Notes,

BY

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LONDON:

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PREFACE.



THE following translation was made so far back as the spring of 1841. In the hope that the *System of Theology* might contribute to the diffusion of those Catholic views which at that time had begun to make sensible progress in England, and had just received a strong impulse from the publication of the memorable Tract XC., the translation, together with the Latin text of the Paris edition, was actually printed in the early part of that year. But having had an opportunity, during a visit to Rome in the interval before publication, of consulting the autograph manuscript, then in the library of the Church of San Luigi dei Francesi, I found the Paris edition so excessively incorrect, that I resolved to sacrifice my own impression, which, except in some conjectural emendations, had followed the Paris text. An edition in exact accordance with the autograph having been published soon afterwards by the Abbé Lacroix, in whose charge the manuscript had been deposited at Rome, I laid aside the idea altogether. The recurrence of circumstances not very dissimilar to those on which it was originally undertaken, has induced me to resume it after an interval of several years. But the appearance, in the meanwhile, of the correct and beautiful edition of the Latin text, to which I have alluded, has enabled me to dispense with the publication of the original, and to content myself with the English translation.

The notes, with few exceptions, consist almost entirely of extracts from the acknowledged writings of Leibnitz,

illustrating or confirming the opinions expressed in the text. They were compiled, in the first instance, with a view to establish the authenticity of the work, which for some years had been called into question; and although this is now fully recognised, I have retained them, in the hope that, even for their own sake, they may be found not uninteresting.

I have introduced in the Appendix two contemporary documents scarcely less interesting than the work itself: "Private Thoughts on the Method of Re-uniting the Churches," by Molanus, Abbot of Lokkum; and a "Declaration on the Possibility of attaining Salvation in the Church of Rome," issued by Fabricius, Professor of Divinity at Helmstädt, on occasion of the marriage of the Princess Elizabeth Christina of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel with Charles III. of Spain. The former of these had never before been translated into English; the latter is only known by an abridged and very inaccurate translation.

ST. PATRICK'S COLLEGE,
Feast of the Assumption, 1850.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE *Systema Theologicum* of Leibnitz has occasioned so much discussion on the continent, that an editor in these countries, submitting it to the public for the first time, is hardly at liberty to abstain from noticing the leading facts regarding it which have been elicited in the course of the controversy.

It was first published at Paris in 1819; and was reprinted soon after at Maintz, with a German translation. This edition has since been twice reprinted, and seems to have had a very extensive circulation in Germany.

The suppression of the work for more than a century after the death of its author, was of itself sufficient to stimulate the curiosity of the public; and the interest was heightened by the apparent mystery which surrounded its history during the interval. The strong Catholic tendencies of Leibnitz, indeed, had long been known; the tone which runs through his published and acknowledged works presents a striking contrast with that of

the prevailing controversies of his time; his correspondence with Huet, Pelisson, and Bossuet, is extremely liberal in its tone; and even his letters to his Lutheran friend, Fabricius, abound with admissions of the general excellence of the Catholic doctrines. Nevertheless, there was a strong tinge of eclecticism in all that he was known to have written upon the subject of religion; he had displayed the same, or similar, liberality in his judgments upon some of the isolated doctrines of other religious systems; and hence the admissions favourable to Catholicity which were scattered through his published works, unreserved as many of them may appear, had failed to prepare the public mind to receive unhesitatingly as his, a work so thoroughly Catholic as that known under the name of the *Systema Theologicum*.

The first appearance of the work, on the contrary, took the controversial world almost completely by surprise; and it is needless to say that it was received by the opposite parties with very different feelings. If to the Catholics the accession of such a defender as Leibnitz was a subject of triumph and gratulation, the Protestants were naturally unwilling to relinquish without a struggle one of the highest names of modern literature, a profound and universal scholar, who united in his person qualities rarely if ever associated together, and who, while he cultivated poetry and the lighter and more graceful literature, held the very highest

rank at once among the philosophers and the divines, the jurists and the historians of his age.

Scarcely, therefore, was the work announced for publication when a host of champions of every shade of religious belief—Lutherans, Calvinists, and even Rationalists—arose in one united effort to wrest from the hands of the common enemy a weapon which might be wielded with so much effect against them all, especially in Germany.

It would carry me quite beyond my proposed plan to notice in detail the opinions, and much more the arguments, of all those who have written upon the subject; nor, indeed, would the examination of these opinions possess much general interest, for they are scattered through a number of literary and religious journals, most of which are utterly unknown in this country. It will be enough to say, generally, that, though differing widely from each other in the particulars of the argument, they may all be reduced to one or other of two classes.

It would seem, indeed, that but two courses were open to the assailants of the *Systema Theologicum*.

The first was, to deny the authenticity of the work altogether.

The second was, admitting its authenticity, to deny the sincerity of the writer in professing the opinions which are maintained therein.

I. Perhaps the circumstance of its being published anonymously at Paris was calculated to give

colour to the former suspicion. By many of the critical journals of Germany it was received on its first appearance with doubt and distrust;¹ several of them unhesitatingly pronounced it spurious;² and even when it had been for four years before the world, the charge was most offensively repeated in an elaborate criticism published in the *Allgemeiner Anzeiger der Deutschen*, which characterises the publication as “a pious fraud,” intended to buttress up a tottering cause. “Undoubtedly,” says the writer, “it is impossible that he [Leibnitz] could have been the author of such a System. Have not the days yet gone by,” he indignantly continues, “when men by ‘pious fraud’ sought to honour the Church, but in reality dishonoured her? What a disgrace it is to the Church that, from time immemorial, spurious works have been published under the names of eminent men, and genuine works have been interpolated, in order to serve her purposes! What are we to think of a Church which needs such frauds to sustain it? To the honour of the Roman Church we may say, that she has no real need of frauds like these!”³

II. The better-informed writers on the subject, on the other hand, admitted even from the first the

¹ For example, a clever writer named Neumann, in the *Sophronizon*, vol. v. pt. v. p. 58, who, however, leans to the opinion of its genuineness; and another in Pahl's *Zeitschrift* for 1820.

² See *Leibnitzens System der Theologie*, Pref. p. 5.

³ See the *Allgemeiner Anzeiger der Deutschen* for 1823, vol. i. p. 383. The writer is Landmann.

genuineness of the work ; but, in their unwillingness to allow to Catholicity a testimony so honourable as that of the great philosopher, they attempted to throw doubts upon his sincerity in maintaining the opinions which are put forward therein. They are far from unanimous, however, in assigning the motives which led to its composition, and some of their conjectures as to the nature of these motives are frivolous in the last degree. One man attributes the work to Leibnitz's innate love of paradox, and describes it as a "mere exercise of his ingenuity, and a trial of his powers in defending a system which to others appeared hardly defensible."¹ Another suggests that it may, perhaps, have originated in a desire of imitating and rivalling the ingenuity which had been displayed by Bossuet and others in softening down the offensive doctrines of the Catholic Church, and presenting them to Protestants in the most pleasing form of which they are susceptible.² A third is of opinion that it was written for the purpose of gratifying the vanity or quieting the conscience of a German prince (probably Anthony Ulric of Brunswick), who had joined, or was on the point of joining, the communion of Rome. M. Feder, librarian of the Royal Library of Han-

¹ See Schlegel's (J. K. L.) *Neuere Kirchengeschichte der Hannöverschen Staaten*, vol. iii. p. 318.

² For these and several other equally frivolous hypotheses, see

a little brochure by Gottlob Schulze (Protestant) Professor of Divinity at Göttingen, entitled *Ueber die Entdeckung dass Leibnitz ein Katholik gewesen sey*, p. 33 et seq.

over, under whose care it had been for several years, imagines that it was written by Leibnitz to satisfy the importunate zeal for his conversion displayed by his friend the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, by shewing him that in point of fact he was already a Catholic in all but the name.¹ A still more extraordinary conjecture is thrown out by M. Neumann, the author of a paper in the *Sophronizon*, who supposes it to have originated in the negotiations for the establishment of a literary academy at Vienna, in which Leibnitz took an active part, and in which he was to have had a leading share. The Jesuits, and other influential members of the Catholic body in Vienna, Neumann alleges, opposed the projected academy, on the ground of its being under Protestant management, and originating with Leibnitz, whom they believed and represented to be a Protestant. Being apprised of this opposition, and of the grounds on which it was supported, Leibnitz immediately wrote to his friend M. Schmidt: "A friend lately arrived from Vienna," he says, "has been trying to persuade me that those who are zealous for religion are opposed to the *Société des Sciences*; that the new discoveries are regarded by them with suspicion; and that they are particularly dissatisfied with a Protestant mixing himself up in the matter. His Excellency (the Chancellor Linzendorf) and the other ministers are too well informed

¹ See his letter to Emery, *Deutsche Schriften*, vol. ii. App. quoted by Guhrauer in *Leibnitz's* p. 81, note.

to give credence to this suspicion. They know me too intimately, and understand the nature of the project too well, to believe this. However, if they are afraid of giving offence to those who are prejudiced, and if they think it would mitigate the ardour of the opposition which they have exhibited, I should wish to be informed of the matter, although I would not venture to do them the injustice of suspecting that it is so. You may also take this opportunity to inform his Excellency, that he need not have any doubts regarding the work about which you spoke to him, as it is almost complete, and only requires the last correction, on which I am now engaged."¹ Now Neumann's conjecture (for which he alleges no extrinsic evidence whatsoever) is, that the work alluded to in this letter as nearly completed, is no other than the *Systema Theologicum*; and from this arbitrary hypothesis he concludes that it was not intended as a sincere exposition of Leibnitz's real opinions, but was composed at the suggestion of Linzendorf the chancellor, in order that he (Linzendorf) might be able, by exhibiting it in the proper quarters, to represent Leibnitz as a Catholic in all the essentials of faith; and thus, by disarming the hostility of the higher functionaries of the Austrian court, might be enabled to defeat the menaced opposition of the Jesuit party.

But, without proceeding further in what will

¹ Letter to M. Schmidt, Opp. tom. v. p. 529.

doubtless appear an unprofitable enumeration of these various opinions, it will suffice to add, that the view now universally adopted by Protestant critics is, that the *Systema Theologicum* was written by Leibnitz, not in his own character, nor as embodying his own opinions, but in the assumed character of a Catholic, and with the view of explaining the Catholic belief to Protestants in the most favourable sense of which it is susceptible, and of thus promoting the project of Church union, of which he is known to have been one of the prime movers.¹

It will at once be seen that both these lines of argument—the denial of the authority of the work, and the denial of the sincerity of the writer in its composition—belong to that class of negative statements which it is impossible to dismiss summarily and in a few words. A simple denial, or even a doubt, though expressed in a few brief lines, may often require whole pages to controvert it; and this is especially true of a denial, which, as in both the cases under consideration, involves not only the truth of particular facts, but the opinions of a particular individual, and that with reference to a

¹ This opinion, as far as I have been able to trace it, seems to have been first suggested in Pahl's *Zeitschrift*, in the year 1820. It was put forward, several years after, by the late Professor Schulze of Göttingen, in the tract already referred to; and it is defended at

great length by M. Guhrauer, in an elaborate dissertation appended to the second volume of his *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*,—*Anhang*, pp. 44-84; also by Dr. Pertz in an essay *Ueber Leibnitzens Glaubens-bekennniss*, Berlin, 1847.

subject of a most abstruse and delicate character. I trust, therefore, that I shall not be considered unduly tedious, if I enter at some length into both questions: first, the authenticity of the work attributed to Leibnitz under the title of *Systema Theologicum*; and secondly, the motives which led to its composition.

I. The first of these inquiries need not detain us long.

The authenticity of the work, though doubted for a time, is now so fully recognised as to relieve me from the necessity of going into any formal proof. It is freely admitted by all who have written of late years upon the subject. Professor Schulze of Göttingen acknowledges that “no person who had examined the matter with any attention ever entertained a doubt” of the authenticity of the manuscript.¹ Guhrauer² has not even thought it necessary to allude to the suspicions which were expressed upon its first appearance; and the manuscript, while it was at Rome, was repeatedly claimed by the Hanoverian ambassador, under the title of “the Autograph of Leibnitz.”³ I shall content myself, therefore, with a brief history of the manuscript (which is not a

¹ *Ueber die Entdeckung dass Leibnitz ein Katholik gewesen sey*, pp. 4, 5.

² *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, v. ii. Zweite Beilage, pp. 44 and foll. See also Guhrauer's *Leib-*

nitz, eine Biographie, vol. ii. p. 33. And Menzel's *Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen*, vol. ix. pp. 291, 2.

³ See the Preface of the Abbé Lacroix's edition.

little curious and interesting), more indeed for the sake of the history itself, than for the evidence it affords of the genuineness of the work; although this also will be admitted to be perfectly demonstrative.

The earliest allusion to this interesting work which has as yet been discovered, is contained in a letter of Leibnitz to Ernest, Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, written in March 1684. In this letter Leibnitz declares his intention of "writing a work upon certain points controverted between Catholics and Protestants," and expresses a hope that his exposition of these controversies "may meet the approval of reasonable and moderate men." That we have in the so-called *Systema Theologicum* the realisation of the purpose here expressed, it is impossible to doubt for a moment. Too little is known of Leibnitz's correspondence with this prince¹ (which was frequent and confidential), to enable us to say whether the manuscript was afterwards submitted for his examination. The only trace of any such step which I have been able to discern, is an allusion in a letter from the Baron von Blume to the Landgrave. "I perceive," he says, "from Leibnitz's last letter, which your highness communicated to me, that he is still of opinion

¹ Feder has given but a few letters in his *Specimina Commercialium Epistoliarum Leibnitianarum*, Hanover, 1805, though he says the library contains a *fasciculum laud exiguum*. A more extensive collec-

tion appeared in 1846, entitled *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz, Arnauld, und den Landgrafen Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels*; edited by C. L. Grotefend. But even this is evidently incomplete.

that a union could be formed between Catholics and Protestants on the plan which he has sketched out (*entworfen*).¹ But this would not be accepted by either party." It is not impossible that the *sketch* to which the Baron alludes is the *Systema Theologicum*; though it is hard to conceive that, if it had been actually communicated to the Landgrave, it should not have been brought into notice during the negotiations with Spinola and with Bossuet, in which the court of Hanover was so long engaged.

Leibnitz's intention of composing such a work is still more explicitly avowed in a letter, written some years later, and addressed, as has been commonly supposed,² to another prince, Ernest Augustus, duke of Hanover; and the details into which this letter (which will be found in a future page) enters with regard to his plan, make it plain, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the manuscript now under consideration is the first draft of this long-projected summary of controversial theology. But notwithstanding this apparently unreserved declaration of his intention, some circumstances, of which we possess no certain knowledge, interfered to prevent the publication and even the completion of the manuscript. It does not appear ever to have been used, or even to have

¹ Feder's *Specimina Com. Ep. Leibn.*, pp. 33, 4. The letter is in German.

² It is much more probable

that it was written to the Landgrave himself. We shall have occasion to refer to it hereafter at greater length.

been communicated to any of the author's friends, during his lifetime; and upon his death it was transferred, along with his other papers, to the Royal Library of Hanover.

It would not be difficult to suggest a reason why, having once fallen into such hands, a manuscript so thoroughly Catholic should, for more than a century, have been withheld from the public. But, indeed, the similar indifference with which, until the last few years, all the other manuscripts of Leibnitz were treated, would appear to shew that the suppression of the *Systema* did not arise from any religious cause. And in one respect the circumstance cannot but be regarded as fortunate; for it places the work beyond the suspicion of interpolation, at least upon the Catholic side.

During this long interval, however, though no detailed notice of the manuscript transpired, its existence was well known, as well as the extremely Catholic spirit in which it was written. M. Murr, editor of the *Journal zur Kunstgeschichte*,¹ had himself seen and examined the autograph. "It is preserved," he writes, "in the Royal Library of Hanover, but is without title or preface. M. Jung, aulic councillor and librarian, has transcribed, in a hundred and fifty folio pages, this singular work, which will cause a greater sensation than all the rest of the works of Leibnitz. In it he defends the Catholic religion, and even upon the points

¹ Nürnberg, March 11, 1779, p. 129.

which are most warmly debated between Catholics and Protestants, with so much zeal, that it would hardly be possible to believe him to be the author, were not his writing perfectly known by a thousand records." The librarian to whom Murr refers in this passage, M. Jung, has left a similar testimony, which is of course the more satisfactory, because the writer was keeper of the library in which it was preserved. "The *System of Theology*," he says, "which Leibnitz has left behind him, written with his own hand, approaches very closely to the doctrine of Grotius, and on most points is perfectly identical with it; and in many doubtful and controverted questions, I doubt whether an adherent of the Roman Church could find a more powerful and yet more moderate advocate of his cause."¹

From the date of this essay (1783) no further notice of the manuscript is discovered for many years.

At length, the celebrated Abbé Emery, Superior of the Congregation of St. Sulpice, who had compiled, as early as 1772, a very interesting collection of extracts from the works of Leibnitz, embodying his opinions upon many questions controverted between the churches, found a means of rescuing the *Systema Theologicum* from the concealment to which it had so long been condemned. From the moment the French got possession of the Duchy of

¹ *Disquisitio de Reliquiis eorumque Cultu*, p. 33. Hanover, 1783.

Hanover, in 1803, he never lost sight of the prospect which was thus opened of obtaining the manuscript; and on the coronation of Jerome Bonaparte as King of Hanover, in 1808, he had little difficulty in procuring, through the influence of the new king's uncle, Cardinal Fesch, a decree (dated September 17th, 1810) authorising its removal from the Royal Library of Hanover to Paris. The librarian, M. Feder, received an order to that effect, and transmitted it in the October of that year; and, a short time afterwards, he was required to transmit the transcript of the autograph, which, as we have seen, had been made by one of his predecessors,¹ M. Jung, many years before. It would seem, however, that the Abbé Emery was not able to attend in person to the preparation of the work for publication; and, although the long-desired manuscript was in his hands, the design met with many interruptions. It was a difficult and distracting period. The contest of Napoleon with the Holy See was at its height; and the active occupations which devolved upon Emery left him but little time for the labour of love to which he had so long looked forward. He was a member of the memorable ecclesiastical commissions held in 1809-10; and although, as might readily have been anticipated from his principles, he ceased to attend its sessions as soon as he dis-

¹ See a letter of Feder's cited by Guhrauer, *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, ii. 81. App.

covered the nature of the duties which the members were expected by the Emperor to perform, and of the despotic views which they were required to carry out, yet the anxieties consequent on his position, coupled with the infirmities of age, compelled him to transfer to another the care of the publication. Unluckily the preparation of the manuscript for press was entrusted to an unskilful, or at least a careless, hand. Numberless words were mistaken; many were omitted as illegible in the manuscript, which can be deciphered without the slightest difficulty; several Greek words, especially, were strangely confounded,¹ though written in a clear and legible hand; an entire paragraph, which contains the author's opinion on the nature of the intention requisite in the administration of sacraments, is left out altogether; and more than one clause and sentence are unaccountably omitted, either through mere inadvertence on the part of the copyist, or from some other cause which it is difficult to explain.

These imperfections in the first transcript would doubtless have been removed before printing the manuscript, by a second and more careful examination; but unhappily the death of the venerable Abbé deprived the publication of the benefit of his superintendence. His papers were transferred, in the condition in which he left them, into the pos-

¹ So far indeed as to lead to the suspicion that the copyist was not a Greek scholar even in the lowest sense of the word.

session of M. Garnier, his successor in the office of Superior of the Congregation of St. Sulpice. Meanwhile, however, after the restoration, the autograph was carried to Rome by Cardinal Fesch; and thus, when the work at length made its appearance at Paris in 1819, having been printed from this inaccurate and imperfect copy without any further collation with the original, it was found to be filled with errors to an extent hardly credible.¹ Some of these materially affect the sense; and the extreme carelessness of the corrector of the press, and his total disregard of punctuation, materially aggravate the evil.

To return, however, to the history of the autograph. In consequence of the delay of the publication of the Paris edition, Cardinal Fesch had meanwhile resolved to have the work printed in Rome, and entrusted it for this purpose to his secretary, the Abbate Pietro Pistelli. In the year 1818 Pistelli completed a copy of the manuscript with great care, devoting to its preparation (as appears from the short preface of his manuscript) three months without interruption.² It is much to be regretted that this copy, which is extremely

¹ “*Ex apographo sexcentis locis vitiato.*” Preface of M. La Croix’s edition, p. iii.

² This valuable copy is now in the hands of the learned and venerable Abbate del Medico, chaplain of the Prince Borghese. With his kind permission, I col-

lated it with the Paris text before I had had an opportunity of examining the autograph. It is, with one or two trivial exceptions, perfectly accurate. Pistelli had entitled it *Examen Religionis Christianæ, Auctore G. G. Leibnitio.*

accurate, was not selected for publication, rather than that made by order of Emery. But unhappily the latter got the start; and its appearance in Paris (1819) effectually prevented the execution of the Cardinal's design. The manuscript, together with this copy, remained in the hands of Pistelli till his death in March 1839. By his will he directed his executor, the Abbate del Medico, to restore the autograph to Cardinal Fesch; but his Eminence dying in the following month (April 1839), it remained for some time in the executor's hands. The Cardinal bequeathed it, along with the rest of his library, to the city of Bastia, in his native island, Corsica. But the transfer of the manuscript was opposed by the Hanoverian ambassador at Rome, who, on the part of his court, claimed it from the French embassy, still under the title of "the Autograph of Leibnitz," as the property of the Royal Library of Hanover, from which it had been abstracted by the government of Jerome Bonaparte. For a long time the claim was resisted. The manuscript was deposited in the Presbytery of San Luigi dei Francesi, under the care of the commissioners of French charities in the Papal States.¹

¹ Through the kind courtesy of one of these gentlemen, M. l'Abbé La Croix, I had an opportunity, during a short visit to Rome in 1841, of collating the Paris text with the ms. in those passages in which the reading appeared doubtful. M. La Croix

afterwards kindly furnished me with a list of several other discrepancies; but it was not till a second visit, in 1843, that I was enabled to complete the correction. M. La Croix has since, at Paris, published a very beautiful edition of the text, which may be

Hopes were entertained for a considerable time that, by an understanding with the legatees, it would be transferred from Bastia, either to the Vatican Library, or the Bibliothèque Royale at Paris. But in the June of 1843 it was restored to Count de Survilliers, nephew and heir of the late Cardinal; and by him was afterwards presented to M. Kestner, the Hanoverian ambassador at Rome, by whom it was transmitted, in the following October, to the library to which it had originally belonged.

Before I close this portion of the subject, I shall add a brief description of this now-celebrated manuscript. It is a small folio of fifty-seven pages, written in a careless and extremely minute hand. Designed evidently as a mere rough draft, the pages are divided into two columns, one of which is left blank, for the purpose of receiving marginal corrections and additions; and so well has the author followed the Horatian counsel "*sæpe stylum vertas,*" that the additions and alterations (sometimes marginal, sometimes interlinear, sometimes at the top or foot of the page, and sometimes even

almost regarded as a perfect transcript of the original.—Dr. Pertz (*Ueber Leibnitzens Glaubens-bekenntniss*, pp. 6-7) asserts that the text is even still far from perfect, and cites, as examples, two passages, which he represents as incorrect. But as, from my own collation of the manu-

script, I am myself able to state that in both those passages M. Lacroix's text is perfectly accurate, I think it may be safely inferred that Dr. Pertz had not sufficiently examined the matter when he ventured upon this general censure.

upon a different page altogether) generally equal, and often exceed, the original draft in extent. The work, indeed, bears every evidence of incompleteness; and the last sentence not only breaks off abruptly, but even terminates with a comma. The writing, although, as has been said, exceedingly careless and very minute, is recognised without difficulty on comparison with any of the numberless relics of Leibnitz which have been preserved,¹ especially with papers of the same description, the skeletons or rough drafts (in his own German phrase, *Concepten*) which it was his constant practice to prepare, not only of his larger works, but even of his letters, at least those which he thought of any considerable importance.

II. The second question, namely, whether Leibnitz was sincere in professing the opinions which are avowed in the *Systema Theologicum*, involves a much greater variety of considerations, and demands a more careful investigation.

By the early Catholic writers on this subject the work was unhesitatingly, and indeed ostentatiously, received as the only faithful expositor of the sentiments which the author really entertained,

¹ I had an opportunity of comparing the fac-simile which is prefixed to this volume, with several mss. of Leibnitz, especially in the Royal Library of Munich; and I have no hesitation in say-

ing, that if there were no other evidence of the authenticity of the work, it might be decided by the perfect identity of its character with that of the other known manuscript remains of the author.

but which the circumstances of his public position in life compelled him to disguise. It was regarded as in some sense his last “religious testament,”¹—a posthumous confession of faith uninfluenced by those human motives under which he had acted during his public life, and which had forced him to suppress the convictions to which his private researches had led him.

Such, as we have already seen, was the opinion of those, even Protestants, like MM. Murr and Jung, who had seen the manuscript before its publication; and such is the view adopted by the editor of the first Paris edition;² by Tabaraud, in his *Histoire Critique des Projets de Réunion*;³ by Rothensee, in his learned work on the Evidences of the Primacy;⁴ by Father Perrone, in his Treatise on the Eucharist;⁵ and by Drs. Räss and Weiss, the German editors and translators; and it is maintained at great length in an elaborate introduction to the third German edition, by Professor Doller of the University of Heidelberg.⁶

By the Protestant press of Germany, on the contrary, the opposite view was maintained with equal confidence. It was declared to be “impossible” that Leibnitz, who had written so strongly against many of the opinions advanced in the

¹ See Guhrauer's *Leibnitz's Jahrhundert*, vol. iii. pp. 412-413, though with some hesitation.
² 1819. ³ p. 156. ⁴ *Prælectiones Theologicae*, ii. p. 202. Paris edition.

⁴ *Primat des Papstes in allen*

⁶ Published at Maintz, 1825.

Systema, could have been sincere in a work thus thoroughly Roman in its character; and various suppositions were devised in order to explain so strange an anomaly. I have already enumerated the earlier opinions as to the motive with which the work was written. They were founded partly on pure conjecture, partly on some fancied appearance of intrinsic probability derived from a comparison of the work with the known and avowed publications of the author; and, in the absence of all documentary evidence as to his actual motives, the controversy was for a time involved in considerable obscurity. Certain inedited letters of Leibnitz, however, have been brought to light within the last few years,¹ which in a great measure clear up the problem, or at least furnish satisfactory data whereon to proceed in its solution. From these letters it appears certain that the work was written with the view of forwarding the project for the reconciliation of the Catholic and Protestant communions in Germany, in which Leibnitz is known to have taken an active and prominent part.

These letters will speak for themselves; but, in order that the occasion and the circumstances under which they were written may be more fully understood, it may not be uninteresting to premise

¹ By Dr. Guhrauer, whose researches have thrown great light on the public and private history of Leibnitz. See his edition of

Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften, 2 vols. 8vo. Berlin, 1840; and his *Leibnitz, eine Biographie*, 2 vols. 8vo. Breslau, 1842.

a brief sketch of the many attempts which have been made in Germany to bring about a union of the two great religious parties which divided it, and especially of the protracted negotiations for the purpose in which Leibnitz was a principal actor.

Of the earlier projects of re-union, although some of them are in themselves extremely interesting, a very brief notice must suffice: on those in which Leibnitz was personally engaged it will be necessary to dwell at greater length. In their general character, however, they are all alike.

Although the broad principles of the revolution of the sixteenth century were every where substantially the same, yet in the Germanic empire the movement, even from the commencement, appeared under a phase entirely peculiar. Broken up into an infinity of petty states, each with a distinct and independent interest, yet each too feeble to place itself in open opposition to the rest, the very constitution of the Germanic Confederation was unhappily too well calculated to foster and develop the seeds of religious discord. The diversity of political interests inseparable from such a constitution had a natural tendency to give a bias to the religious, no less than the political, opinions of the conflicting parties; and, if we may judge from the results, it would seem as if the outbreak of the Reformation in Germany was in a great measure a mere substitution of religious for political antipathies, or at least was but a new vent for the inter-

national jealousies which before had been displayed only in the social or political relations of the antagonist parties. Hence it is that, with but few exceptions, we find the hereditary political predilections of the several German princes precisely tally with the selections which they made between the two great religious parties: on the one side, Austria, Bavaria, and the ecclesiastical principalities; on the other, the hereditary representatives of the opposition, the Elector of Saxony, the Duke of Luneburg, the Prince of Anhalt, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the Margrave of Brandenburg,¹ and the Free Cities of the Empire. Hence, too, we find the movement in its after history assume in Germany a character almost entirely political, and quite different from that which it bore in the other countries of Europe.

At first sight it might appear that the peace of Augsbourg, in 1555, by establishing freedom of conscience and prohibiting persecution on pretence of religion, should have had the effect of checking the tendency to disunion inseparable from such a state of things, and of putting an end to the confusion of religious and political interests by which it had been so fatally fostered. But, unfortunately for the peace of Germany, the result was very different. It was soon discovered that those articles of the peace which were, in all appearance, the

¹ Joachim I., Margrave of Brandenburg, is an exception; but his son and successor falls into the rule.

most promising, contained the germs of divisions no less dangerous and obstinate than those which they were intended to remove. The clauses which appear to secure to both religions perfect liberty of worship and entire equality of political rights, in reality only regulate the relations of the various estates of the empire towards each other, and contain no solid provision for individual freedom of conscience. On the contrary, they practically assume that the supreme prince in each state has a right, altogether irrespective of the wishes of individuals, to introduce and establish the Protestant religion throughout his dominions whenever he may so think fit, and to make its adoption compulsory; the only security provided for the conscience of the subject, should he object to embrace the new creed thus arbitrarily enforced by his sovereign, being a right to emigrate with all his family and effects to any country which he may select as the place of his exile.¹ Whatever might be in theory the apparent even-handedness of this enactment as regards the rulers, it is plain that in practice it was for the subject a perpetuation of the old evil. By an easy and direct consequence from its very first principle, religion was practically made the creature and slave of the civil power. "It was acknowledged," says an eminent Protestant historian of the Thirty-years' War, "as a

¹ See a summary of the articles of the Peace, in Häberlein, ii. 626.

principle of the Reformation, that the sovereign had a right to regulate the faith and worship of his subjects;"¹ and the history of the petty states of Germany shews that this right was not suffered to remain a dead letter. The same distinguished historian avows that the Protestant princes "regarded it as an inalienable privilege of their crown, and exercised it in its fullest extent;" so that in many of the German principalities we find the successive sovereigns, within the space of a few years, changing and rechanging the religion of the state according to their own private caprice, and compelling, at least in externals, a corresponding change in the religion of their subjects.²

¹ Menzel, *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, ii. p. 101.

² The Palatinate, even within the first thirty years after the peace of Augsburg, furnishes the singular picture of no less than four successive changes of the religion of the country.

In 1556, the year after the peace, Otho Henry abolished the Catholic worship throughout his dominions, suppressed the convents, transferred the ecclesiastical dignities to the Lutheran clergy, and enforced subscription to the confession of Augsburg. (Häberlein's (Protestant) *Neueste Deutsche Reichsgeschichte*, iii. p. 79.)

The brief reign of this prince hardly allowed time to mature the change, when upon his death,

in 1561, his successor Frederic II. undid all that Otho had done, and, by the same "inalienable privilege," introduced the Calvinistic form of Protestantism, swept away the few remnants of Popery which the Lutheran reform had spared, expelled the preachers whom his father had patronised and appointed, and filled the pulpits and professorial chairs with the sternest upholders of rigid Calvinism. (Häberlein, iv. p. 369.)

The triumph of this new state church was hardly more long-lived than that of its predecessor. Frederic's son, Lewis, who succeeded in 1571, went so far as to forbid his father's favourite court preacher, Tossanus, from officiating at his grave. He appointed

This identification of religion with the interests and privileges of the state has left its traces in almost all the details of the ecclesiastical history of Germany since the Reformation. The affairs of Church and State in that country are almost inextricably entangled. The great reaction in favour of Catholicity, which began to shew itself throughout Europe as soon as the sessions of the Council of Trent had been brought to a close, will, in Germany, be found, like the Reformation itself, to have assumed a strongly political character. We find this reaction, as it were, upon a larger scale in Germany than in any of the other European countries—among the rulers rather than among the subjects; and its working is discovered not alone, as in France and the Low Countries, in the return of individuals to the Church, but in a series of efforts upon the part of several Protestant sovereigns to bring back their entire people to the communion of Rome, or at least to smooth down the asperities of the controversy by which the schism had been created, and by which it was likely to be perpetuated.

a Lutheran minister to officiate in his stead, restored all the Lutheran clergy whom his father had dispossessed, and continued till his death to persecute and oppress the professors of Calvinism. (Häberlein, x. p. 435.)

To crown the climax of these alternations, his brother, John Casimir, who became regent in

1583, once more abolished Lutheranism (in defiance of Lewis's will), and with the same strong hand restored the less Popish forms of Calvinism (Häberlein, xiii. p. 496), which he perseveringly maintained to the last. (Ibid. xiv. p. 76.) See also Mosheim's *Ecclesiastical History*, iii. 365. London, 1845.

It was not unnatural that it should be so. The frequent and arbitrary religious changes introduced by the independent Protestant princes,¹ in virtue of the privilege secured by the peace of Augsburg, and still more the violence by which these changes were attended, seem to have had the effect of disposing the temperate members of both parties, and especially the sovereigns, to seek for peace in the removal of the unfailing source of contention. Moderate men on both sides were not without hopes that, when the first ardour of the outbreak should have passed away, the contending parties might find that they were not so far separated from each other as in the first fury of the contest they had been led to imagine; and it was upon the principle of mutual explanation, rather than that of enforcing their respective opinions by argument, that all the negotiations appear to have proceeded. It is well known that this was the policy of Charles V. during his entire reign. The discussions during the Diet of Augsburg (1530), the Conferences of Worms (1541) and Ratisbon (1546), the publication of the Interim (1547)—even the Council of Trent itself—had, in his views of Church policy, no other ultimate object. He pursued it steadily, and in-

¹ The example of the Palatinate has been quoted in a former page: I may here add that of the principality of Anhalt-Dessau, where Prince John George suppressed Lutheranism in 1596, and enforced the adoption of Calvin-

ism in its stead (Häberlein's *Reichsgeschichte*, xx. p. 434). As also that of Hesse-Cassel, where the Landgrave Maurice compelled a similar change of creed. (Möhler's *Symbolik*, p. 25. 4th German edit. 1835.)

deed to undue lengths, for more than thirty years ; and when, upon his final abdication in 1558, his brother, Ferdinand I., succeeded to the imperial throne, it was only to follow up Charles's policy of conciliation with the same zeal and activity. It was by Ferdinand's direction that Cassander and Wicelius undertook the task of explaining away the difficulties commonly alleged by Protestants against the Catholic doctrines ; and probably it is to his too indulgent and over sanguine zeal that we may attribute the undue stretching of many principles that can never consistently be compromised, which we find in their writings, especially those of Cassander. The result proved the inexpediency of this temporising. These concessions, unduly liberal as they were, failed to satisfy the opposing party ; perhaps even, on the contrary, they served to embolden the opposition ; and in the end Ferdinand had the mortification to find his schemes of peace thwarted or rendered nugatory by those very parties whom he had made such sacrifices to conciliate.

His son Maximilian II., who succeeded in 1564, pursued the same course of policy ; but his measures were too weak and temporising to command, or indeed to deserve, much success. Political events during his reign were every day tending to widen the breach between the parties ; and although the semblance of peace was maintained till the end of the century, or at least there was no

public outbreak to mark the progress of distrust and disaffection, yet the feelings of mutual suspicion and hostility, which afterwards developed themselves so fearfully in the horrors of the Thirty-years' War, were rapidly, though silently, making their way. Rodolf II., Maximilian's successor, was an indolent and improvident prince. Engrossed by the studies of his laboratory and observatory, he forgot the duties of the imperial throne, and, by delegating his authority to other hands, hastened the arrival of the crisis. Conciliation was tried once more, but in vain. A discussion on the "Rule of Faith" and the "Judge of Religious Controversies" was held at Ratisbon in 1601, by authority of Maximilian of Bavaria and Philip Lewis, Elector Palatine, between three Jesuits, Gretser, Tanner, and Hunger, and three Lutheran doctors, Heilbrunner, Rungius, and Hunn.¹ But it proved rather a disputation than a conference; and the same may be said of a meeting at Durlach in 1612, and of a discussion which, under the auspices of Wolfgang William, Prince Palatine, took place at Neuburg in 1615, between the learned Jesuit Father James Keller and the Lutheran Professor James Heilbronn. Parties, meanwhile, were gradually more and more estranged. The memorable question of "Ecclesiastical Reservations,"² so famous in German history,

¹ Schröckh, iv. 509.

(Geistlicher Vorbehalt), a provi-

² *Reservatum Ecclesiasticum* sion of the peace of Augsburg,

furnished the occasion of the quarrel. The old ideas of union were utterly forgotten. A "Protestant League," avowedly aggressive, was formed in 1608. Its formation called out the counter-league of the Catholic powers, known as the "Catholic Union;" and the parties soon arrayed themselves against each other in undisguised hostility. A hollow peace, concluded at Munich in 1610, had no other effect than to delay the outbreak. But it came at last in the too famous Thirty-years' War; and there can be little doubt that the struggle owed much of its fierceness to the heart-burnings and jealousies produced by this very delay.

During this sanguinary and protracted war, all idea of religious union was of course abandoned. The first attempt to revive the project was a conference held at Thorn (*Collatio Toruniensis*) in 1645, a few years before the final adjustment of the relations of the conflicting parties in the peace of Westphalia. This assembly was called together by Ladislaus VII., King of Poland, with the consent of the ecclesiastical authorities of his kingdom, and at the suggestion of Bartholomew Nigrinus of Dantzic, a Calvinist divine of some eminence, who had embraced the Catholic faith. He

by which bishops, abbots, and other dignitaries, who might abandon the Catholic religion, forfeited *ipso facto* their benefices, to which a Catholic was to be immediately appointed in their stead. This provision had been

frequently violated, in some instances very flagrantly; and it led to numberless protests, appeals, and even open aggressions and reprisals. See Häberlein's *Reichsgeschichte*, ii. 624.

was sanguine enough to hope that a fusion of the three great parties, Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, might be easily effected: but there were few, even of those that obeyed the summons, who did not, from the very nature of the plan proposed, fully anticipate the failure of the attempt. The council was composed of delegates from each of the three communions. The Catholic representatives were principally Jesuits, none of them of much reputation; the Lutherans were represented by the celebrated professors, Calixtus of Helmstädt, Calovius of Dantzic, and Hülsemann of Wittenberg; and the Calvinists by Bergius, one of the most distinguished controversialists of his time. Even before the opening of the conference, however, a violent dispute had arisen between the Lutheran and Calvinist delegates, which soon ended in hopeless misunderstanding. Far from agreeing in details, therefore, the parties differed as to the very first principles on which the discussion should be conducted; and after five sessions, which could hardly even be called preliminary, the conference was abruptly suspended, and the delegates parted without any attempt at a discussion, much less an adjustment, of their differences.¹

A few years later, Ernest, Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, resumed the work so often unsuccessfully tried. Having been taken prisoner during the Thirty-years' War, he had an opportunity, during

¹ Schröckh's *Kirchengeschichte*, iv. 509-12.

a residence of several months at Vienna, of conferring with Catholics, and examining the doctrines of the Catholic religion. He formed a close intimacy with several ecclesiastics, and especially with the celebrated Capuchin, Father Valeriano Magni, well known by his angry and protracted controversy with the Jesuits. On his return home in 1651, he resolved to investigate for himself the claims of the rival creeds; and with this view invited two of the most eminent professors of his university of Giessen, Habercorn and Münzer, to a conference with Father Magni. It was conducted in presence of the Landgrave at his castle of Rheinfels; and so deep was the interest which he felt in the issue, that he claimed permission to propose the questions which were to form the subject of discussion. The meeting, however, was unattended with any public result. But it produced in the mind of the prince himself a deep conviction of the divinity of the Catholic religion; and, having failed of securing that general union to which he had looked forward, he declared himself a Catholic in the following year.¹

A movement far more important than any of those yet enumerated was set on foot, a few years afterwards, at the court of the Elector Archbishop of Mainz, John Philip von Schönborn. This celebrated prince, one of the most profound politi-

¹ Schröckh, v. 65-6. See also *Walch's Einleitung in die Religions-streitigkeiten, ausser der Evang. Luth. Kirche*, ii. 754.

cians of his day, had long been distinguished by his devotion to the interests of Germany, and his fear of foreign interference. He had been one of the principal instruments in the arrangement of the peace of Westphalia, and had taken a very leading part in the formation of the Rhenish Alliance, in which, for the first time since the Reformation, Catholics and Protestants can be said to have acted in unison,¹ and which, by drawing together more closely the political interests of the Catholic and Protestant states, disposed them the more for that religious union, from which alone a country, torn for so long a time by religious wars, could hope for solid or enduring peace. The circumstances seemed especially favourable. The Archbishop-Elector was equally beloved by both communions.² There had already been some indication of an accommodating disposition in the Protestant party. Hermann Conring, Professor of Divinity at Helmstädt, had published (in 1656) Grotius *De Christianæ Religionis Veritate*, with a commentary of a highly conciliatory tendency; and followed up this publication, in 1659, by a reprint of the works of Cassander and Wicelius, which, as will be remembered, had been written with the express purpose of smoothing down the asperities of Catholic controversy. Accordingly, in the end of the year

¹ Schröckh, vii. 95.

² "Evangelicis æque ac Catholicis dilectus et æstimatus." Puf-

fendorf, *De Rebus Suedicis*, xix. 73.

1660 (December), the Elector's minister, Baron von Boineburg, formally signified to Conring the intentions of his sovereign; and, on March 31st of the following year, proposed to him, in this prince's name, a conference between the Theological Faculty of Helmstädt on the Protestant side, and the Chapter of Maintz upon that of the Catholics, "with the view of uniting the two communions, or at least of narrowing the chasm which separates them."¹ Boineburg, himself a convert to the Catholic faith, promised all his support to the project.

It would appear, however, that, even from the first, success was considered very doubtful. Conring, the principal disputant on the Protestant side, although exceedingly liberal in some of his views, was irrevocably committed against any admission of the Papal supremacy; and yet from the very outset, he expressed his fear that no union, even upon such terms as he was willing to concede, could be effected without creating a schism of his own party.² The negotiation was conducted in writing; and Conring, on the part of the Theological Faculty of Helmstädt, opened a correspondence with the representatives of the Chapter of Maintz, the celebrated brothers, Adrian and Peter von Walenburch.³

¹ Gruber's *Commercium Epistolicum*, i. 499 et seq.

² Menzel's *Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen*, ix. 134.

³ Commonly known by their theological designation, the *Fratres Waldenburgenses*. They were members of a noble family of

There has been a good deal of discussion as to the nature of the conditions proposed upon this occasion. The Lutheran historian so often cited, Schröckh, has given a detailed account of a plan alleged to have been drawn up either by the Archbishop-Elector or his minister Von Boineburg, in eighteen articles, which were to form the basis of the union. These articles, according to the same authority, were communicated to the Pope, Alexander VII., by M. von Wallendorf, the Elector's vicar-general and privy councillor; and the German historians of the last century,¹ with hardly an exception, have discussed the Elector's project for the reconciliation of parties, on the assumption that these articles embodied the conditions on which he was prepared to receive the Lutherans into his communion. Some have even gone so far as to affirm

Rotterdam, but educated for the most part at Paris, where they both received their theological degrees. They lived for some years at Düsseldorf; but in 1647, the elder, Adrian, was appointed canon of Cologne; and in 1661 was made suffragan (or, in the German use of the term, coadjutor) of the Archbishop of that see, with the title of Bishop of Adrianople, *in partibus infidelium*. His brother Peter, about the same time, was named dean of the Chapter of Mainz, and eventually, like Adrian, became coadjutor of the Archbishop-Elec-

tor of Mainz, with the title of Bishop of Mysia. Both brothers took an active part in the controversies of the time; and their joint works have been collected into two volumes folio, *Tractatus Generales de Controversiis Fidei*, and *Tractatus Speciales de Controversiis Fidei*, Cologne, 1669-71; better known, however, in the abridgment published at Cologne in 1682.

¹ See Schröckh's *Kirchengeschichte*, vii. 95 et seq. Moser's *Patriotisches Archiv*. v. 271. Vogt's *Europäische Staatsrelationen*, i. 312.

that they received the formal sanction and authorisation of the Holy See.¹

The substance of the plan is : (1) that a council of twenty-four persons should be chosen, in equal numbers, from the two Churches, all being pledged solemnly to observe due moderation in the discussion of the terms of union ; (2) that a common profession of faith should be drawn up, in accordance with the most ancient formularies and other authorities of both communions, the decision of the majority of the council on each point being obligatory upon the entire ; (3) that the Mass should be celebrated in German, and that, by the mutual agreement of the members of the council, the service should be modified, so as to remove the objections of all ; (4) that the united Lutherans, or Evangelicals, should thenceforth be entitled “ Reformed Catholics ;” (5) that they should recognise the Roman Pontiff as the first Christian priest, and that he, on his part, should acknowledge them to be true members of the Church, and should hold them entitled to receive a share in the offices and dignities of the Roman Church ; (6) that any member of either united Church, treating with contempt or disrespect the members of the other branch of the union, should be punished with excommunication ; (7) that the Lord’s Supper should

¹ For example, the too well known German bishop Von Hontheim [Febronius] : “ Extant et quædam pacis conditiones ab

Electore Moguntino, *jussu et auctoritate summi Pontificis* in aulis Germaniæ propositæ.” *De Statu Ecclesiæ*, Pref. p. xxi.

be administered under both kinds, and that the Catholics, if so disposed, should be permitted to receive it with the Reformed ; (8) that Auricular Confession should be abolished in Germany, but, inasmuch as its usefulness was recognised in Italy and Spain, should be retained in those countries ; (9) that a modified Lent (consisting chiefly in abstinence from meat for a fortnight before Easter) should be introduced ; (10) that Invocation of Saints, as practised in the early Church, should be re-established ; (11) that popular German hymns should be introduced in the public services ; (12) that the doctrine of Purgatory should be left free ; (13) that the law of celibacy should be abolished as regards bishops and priests, but retained for monks and nuns ; (14) that in the "Reformed Catholic" kingdoms the superintendents should hold the place of bishops, presiding over the clergy ; and that in difficult cases they should be at liberty to take counsel with the Pope, but without prejudice of their own authority ; (15) that, without a formal abjuration of their doctrine on predestination, the Lord's Supper, and the Person of Christ, the Calvinists should not be included in the union ; (16) that the Greeks, however, notwithstanding their belief regarding the Procession of the Holy Ghost, should be embraced therein ; (17) that the Holy Scripture should be the basis of all the articles, and that the text should be taken from the Fathers and the Septuagint ; (18) that the Pope should be

regarded not as a judge of controversy, but simply as the supreme head of the hierarchy; that he should be required to choose his advisers from both branches of the united communions; and in all cases of difficulty should pronounce according to the Holy Scripture.¹

I have thought it expedient to be thus minute in detailing the terms of this singular proposal, because it may at least be regarded as an indication of the temper and spirit of the time, and perhaps of the notions popularly entertained in Germany regarding the principles of the Archbishop-Elector. It will be seen that it not only contains a formal and explicit abandonment of almost all that is distinctive in Catholic discipline and practice, but also compromises some of the most important principles of Catholic belief, and in others opens the way to a latitudinarianism and indifference hardly less fatal than positive unbelief. The false impressions created by the circulation of such a plan of union, and the false hopes which it was calculated to produce, will perhaps be found to explain what might, at first sight, appear a strange misapprehension, which arose at a later period, in the negotiations between Bossuet and Leibnitz.

It can hardly be necessary to enter into any formal argument in order to shew that such a plan as this never received the approval of the Holy See.

¹ See Schröckh, *ibid.* pp. 95-7. *tolicum Leibnitii*, i. pp. 411 and
Also Gruber's *Commercium Epis-* foll.

But even though it were in itself open to doubt, this and all similar questions have been set at rest by M. Guhrauer in his edition of Leibnitz's German works.¹ He shews that the articles attributed to the Elector are a pure fabrication. The belief of their genuineness rested chiefly on the discovery of a copy of them among the papers of Leibnitz, and in his own handwriting; from which circumstance it had even been inferred that he himself was a party to the negotiation. Now Guhrauer shews that Leibnitz did not come to Maintz till 1670, ten years after the articles had been put in circulation. He produces, moreover, a letter of Boineburg, the minister, in reply to an inquiry of Conring regarding these articles, in which the story is described as "an idle popular rumour;"² and what is more decisive than all, a letter of Leibnitz himself to his friend Fabricius, January 22, 1700, in which he assures him that the eighteen articles are a mere fabrication, concocted many years before, in the time of the Elector John Philip von Schönborn.³ Indeed, when it is recollected that the learned brothers Von Walenburch, the most unbending, though most moderate, controversialists of their day, were the guiding spirits of the negotiation, it will be readily believed that no proposal compromising to so fatal an extent the

¹ Vol. i. App. I. 23.

² Gruber's *Commercium Epistolicum*, i. 411.

³ Gruber, i. 426.

very first foundations of Catholic belief, and betraying throughout so much general laxity of principle, could have emanated from the Catholic party, or have received a favourable consideration at its hand.

What the plan of union actually put forward was, or whether any terms were formally proposed, it would be difficult to ascertain. The proceeding was for a time conducted with the strictest privacy; but notwithstanding the moderation of the parties engaged, it was attended, from the first, with very little success. The fall of the minister, Boineburg (in 1664), deprived it of its best support. After much unsatisfactory discussion, it at length lost the character of an amicable correspondence, and assumed that of a regular controversy; and in 1665, when all hope of agreement had long been abandoned, Conring published his *Animadversiones in Walenburchicos*, a purely polemical treatise, to which the brothers rejoined in their well-known work, *De Missione Protestantium*. It was in vain that the Elector of Maintz urged on the project. He had secured the support of more than one prince of the Protestant party. Charles Lewis, the Elector Palatine, entered warmly into his views; and from the circumstance of the Walenburchs dedicating their treatise, *De Missione Protestantium*, to Anthony Ulric, Duke of Brunswick, we may infer the same with regard to him also.¹ But

¹ He was from his youth most favourably disposed towards the

notwithstanding the influences by which the scheme was supported, it languished for years, without any approach to a successful termination, and remained in the same unsatisfactory state, neither actively urged forward nor definitively abandoned, in 1670, when Leibnitz, then in his twenty-fourth year, first appeared at the court of the Elector.

It is beyond the purpose of this Introduction to enter upon a formal biography of Leibnitz. Few lives, it is true, possess a greater share of literary and scientific interest, and the subject is still comparatively new in English literature. But I must content myself with a very brief outline of those portions of his history which tend to throw a light upon his religious opinions, and more especially those which illustrate the immediate subject of the present inquiry.

Godfrey William Leibnitz was born at Leipsic on the 21st of June, 1646. His father, Frederic Leibnitz, was professor of moral philosophy in the Leipsic University, and although not known by any considerable literary publication, enjoyed a high academic reputation for ability and erudition. He was a member of the Lutheran Church; and that he was a man of a strongly religious turn of mind may be inferred from an interesting entry in his diary for the day of his son's baptism, preserved

Catholic religion, and eventually, period, became a Catholic, in more than forty years after this 1710.

by Dr. Guhrauer,¹ in which he records the circumstance of the child's "bravely holding up his head and keeping his eyes open" while the baptismal water was poured upon him; and devoutly augurs "that this is to be regarded as an evidence of faith, and an omen that his son will walk throughout life in the path of righteousness, with eyes upraised to God; that he will ever burn with charity, and, under its divine influence, labour strenuously for God's honour, for the welfare of the Christian Church, and his own and his parents' salvation." Leibnitz was educated in the profession of his father's religion, to which the entire family appear to have been steadily attached. His biographer has preserved an exceedingly affecting letter from his only surviving sister, Anne Catherine, written January 12, 1672, on occasion of a report that her brother was about to become a Calvinist. She implores him, in the rude German of the time, but with much simple tenderness and fervour, to beware of such a step; reminds him of the tie of kindred which binds them together, and suggests, with true German prudence, that if he be influenced in this step by the desire of worldly advancement, there are many princely houses of their own faith in which he cannot fail to find ready service, and that "the dear God will not suffer him to starve in a Lutheran land."² It does not appear, however,

¹ *Leibnitz's Leben*, i. 3-4.

² *Leben*, i. App. p. 16.

that there was any reason for her alarm ; Leibnitz continued throughout life, externally at least, attached to the Confession of Augsburg.

His father died in 1652, when he had scarcely completed his sixth year, and the care of his education devolved upon his mother, who appears to have been a woman of no ordinary ability, and who continued to exercise great influence over him till her death in 1664. At the public school in which he was placed, he gave, from the commencement, evident promise of the extraordinary capacity which his after life evinced ; but, like most men of the rare class to which he belonged, he owed much more to private, and indeed undirected, reading, than to the lessons of his public instructors. When he was but eight years old, after having exhausted all the German histories within his reach, he chanced to meet a copy of Livy's Roman History, and one of Calvisius's *Thesaurus Chronologicus*, both in the Latin language, in which he had just begun to receive, in the public school, his first initiation. The latter, from the simplicity of its style, and the similarity of its contents to those of a German Universal History which he had read, he speedily mastered ; but Livy, from its more abstract and philosophical character, and its more elaborately complicated structure, would have been a fatal stumbling-block to him, had not the work chanced to be one of the old pictorial editions, the rude woodcuts of which, however contemptible as

works of art, furnished a most significant running commentary upon the contents, and served as an efficient guide to the steps of the young student. At first he gave himself but little concern about the darker passages; some of them he passed over altogether; but in the end he became so familiar with the more ordinary words and the less complex forms of construction, as to master the entire of the contents of the volume. His answering at school, however, soon betrayed the secret of these private and unauthorised studies. His master, alarmed for the consequences of so precocious an exercise of his talents, advised his mother to prohibit, for the future, all this irregular and desultory reading; and the advice would have been acted on with scrupulous exactness, had not a friend of his father, struck by the boy's singular ripeness of judgment, and satisfied of his extraordinary capacity, not only prevented the contemplated restriction, but advised that his taste should be indulged to the fullest extent; and that for this purpose his father's library, up to this time zealously closed against him, should thenceforth be placed, freely and unreservedly, at his disposal. This liberty the boy used to the fullest extent; but that it did not interfere with the success of his purely scholastic studies may be inferred from an extraordinary circumstance which he mentions in several of his letters, that he once volunteered to take the place of one of his schoolmates, who had been appointed

to prepare a Latin poem for the public academical exercises, but fell sick on the eve of the day; and, in the course of a few hours, produced, entirely unassisted, no less than three hundred unexceptionable Latin hexameters, the first draft of which did not contain one single elision or alteration!¹

Having completed his elementary studies, he was placed in the university of his native city, where the same distinctions attended him. Before he attained his twentieth year he had completed his preparation for the degree of Doctor of Law; but, in consequence of an illiberal and unworthy attempt to exclude him on account of his youth, and to defer his degree to a later period, he resolved to leave Leipsic, and presented himself at the university of Altdorf in Nürnberg, where he was admitted to his degree, with great applause, in the autumn of 1666. The illiberal proceeding which deprived his native university of the honour of so distinguished a name is still a subject of shame and regret in Leipsic.²

This brilliant success at Altdorf was followed by a flattering offer of a professorship in the university, which, however, he declined, and continued for some time to live in a private capacity at Nürnberg. During his residence in this city

¹ "Ego me includens musæo a primo mane usque ad cœnam, scripserim versus 300 hexametros præceptoribus laudatos, et,

quod affectaveram, sine ulla elisione." — Guhrauer's *Leben*, ii. App. 54.

² Guhrauer's *Leben*, i. 40.

he made the acquaintance of the Baron von Boineburg, already frequently mentioned as the minister of the Archbishop-Elector of Maintz, who was at this time in temporary disgrace with his court. Struck by the extraordinary acquirements and still more extraordinary promise of this unknown youth, he induced him to accompany him to Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he soon afterwards attached him to himself in the capacity of secretary, librarian, and general literary assistant. In a letter to his friend Conring, written soon afterwards, Boineburg describes him as a "young man from Leipsic, twenty-four years of age, a Doctor of Laws, and an adept in every department of knowledge which you could name or think of. He is thoroughly conversant," he adds, "with philosophy, and presents a happy example of the union of the old and the new schools. He is a mathematician, a natural philosopher, familiar with the science of medicine, a clever mechanic, and zealously devoted to that pursuit, industrious, and enthusiastic. In religion he is an independent thinker, but he is a member of your (the Lutheran) Church. Of the philosophy of law, and, what is more surprising, its practice, he is thorough master."¹ With such an estimate of him as this, it is not wonderful that Boineburg used all his influence to forward his interests. During the time of his connexion with this nobleman, he received offers

¹ Guhrauer's *Leben*, i. 55.

of employment in the courts of John Frederic of Hanover, and also in that of Darlach. But he declined them both; probably in the hope, suggested by Boineburg, of an appointment in the service of the Elector of Mainz—a hope eventually realised in 1670, by his being named Councillor of the Supreme Court of Revision at Mainz (*Ober-Revisions-Collegiums-Rath*), the highest tribunal of the electoral jurisdiction.

It would be difficult to find a more decisive evidence of the extraordinary estimate which had already been formed of him, than the circumstance of his being appointed at the early age of twenty-four, although a Protestant and a stranger, to an office of so much trust and responsibility in the court of a Catholic Prince-bishop. Nor can it be supposed that it was entirely without influence upon his opinions, or at least his tendencies, on the subject of religion. Thrown for the most part into the society of Catholics, and habituated, from his very position, to identify himself with Catholic objects and Catholic interests, we may easily believe that the favourable views which he already entertained towards the Catholic religion¹ were developed and matured by his connexion with the court of the Elector. The recall of his patron, Boineburg, to power, also, had its share in this result. Like most converts of the time, Boineburg was zealous and

¹ "Calixti scriptis valde delectabar," he says in the frag-

ment of his autobiography.—Guhrauer's *Leben*, ii. App. 57.

active in the interests of Catholicity, and his zeal gave an impulse to the studies of his friend. At his suggestion, and through his interposition, Leibnitz commenced a correspondence with the celebrated Anthony Arnauld, who, notwithstanding the false position which he occupied as leader of the Jansenist party, nevertheless, by his eminent services in the Protestant controversy, had earned the reputation of one of the most distinguished champions of Catholicity. A private mission to Paris in 1672 gave him a still further opportunity of cultivating the acquaintance of Arnauld and his Jansenist friends, as well as many of the most distinguished of their opponents, with whom he continued to associate on familiar terms for several years. For although this mission of 1672 proved unsuccessful,¹ yet he remained in Paris attached to an extraordinary embassy sent by the Elector in the following autumn, at the head of which was the Baron von Schönborn, the Elector's nephew, and son-in-law of Leibnitz's patron, Boineburg. During their stay in Paris, Boineburg died; but Leibnitz continued in the service of his son-in-law, whose embassy he accompanied to London in the beginning of 1673. He was recalled to Paris, however, in a few months, by the unexpected death of

¹ Its object was to explain to Louis XIV. a plan which he had devised for a French expedition into Egypt, resembling in many particulars, both of its object and

its arrangement, the celebrated expedition of 1798 under Buona-parté. For a full account of it, see Guhrauer's *Kur-Mainz in der Epoche von 1672*.

the Elector. From his successor in the Electorate and Archbishopric of Mainz, Leibnitz received a pressing offer of employment at home; but he declined this, as well as several similar invitations, especially to the courts of Denmark and Hanover, and continued to reside in Paris till the October of 1676; when, at the renewed invitation of John Frederic of Hanover, he accepted the office of librarian and privy councillor, and took up his residence in that city in December 1676;—thus a second time attached to the service of a Catholic court, John Frederic being not only a Catholic, but a convert to that religion. On the death of this excellent prince, Leibnitz retained his employments in the service of his brother, Ernest Augustus, who succeeded him in the end of 1679; and notwithstanding many proposals from various other courts, he continued (although occasionally, it would seem, dissatisfied with his position,) in the service of Hanover till his death, November 14, 1716.

It is most probably to his connexion with this court that we are indebted for the *Systema Theologicum*.

His studies from boyhood had been of a theological character. Among the miscellaneous collection of books to which he had unrestricted access in his father's library, he had been early attracted by subjects which, even to advanced students, are commonly the most repulsive. "While I was still a mere child," he writes to Remond de

Montmort, the Duke of Orleans' secretary, "I became familiar with Aristotle, and even the scholastics themselves did not repel me."¹ On the contrary, the study even of the most abstruse among them had such attractions for him, that, if we may believe his autobiography, he "read the works of Suarez with as much facility as others would read a romance;"² and was in the habit of taking books of controversy as his companions upon a journey.³ Hence, at the time of his first connexion with the Elector's court, in addition to the prodigious stores of profane erudition and of practical science which he had laid up, he was already intimately acquainted with all the eminent writers upon the most abstruse questions of scholastic and polemical divinity, especially those which are in any way connected with the evidences of Christianity and the foundations of natural religion. This indeed would seem to have been his favourite study. In a long and interesting letter to Arnauld, written during his first residence in Maintz, he assures him that "he has anxiously sought out, and read with the utmost attention, every distinguished antagonist of Christianity and all its most eminent defenders." The bare enumeration of the authors whom he professes to have read might provoke the incredulity of a person

¹ Guhrauer's *Leben*, i. 25.

² *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, i. 75. "Eousque profeceram ut Suaesium non minore facili-

tate legerem qua Milesias Fabulas solemus, quas vulgo Romanas vocant."

³ See Opp. v. 408.

unacquainted with his writings, and particularly with his correspondence. But his works carry upon their face such evidence of perfect familiarity with the writings of most of those authors, and, when occasion presents itself, with the most abstruse scholastic questions which they have discussed, that we can have no difficulty in crediting, literally and entirely, the assurance which he offers to Arnauld, although his list comprises the names of Vanini, Ochino, Servetus, Pucci, Proclus and Simplicius, Pomponatius, Averroes, Raymond Lully, Valla, Picus, Savonarola, Wesel, Tritheim, Steuchus, Patrizi, Mostelli, Naclante, De Dominis, Fra Paolo Sarpi, Campanella, Jansenius and his disciples, Fabri, Valeriani, Bibliander, Giordano Bruno, Torelli, Arminius, Herbert of Cherbury, Episcopius, Grotius, Hobbes, and many others, including the early Socinian writers.¹

With habits of reading and tendencies of thought such as these, we need not be surprised to find Leibnitz enter warmly into the views of those who desired to promote the project of ecclesiastical union. In the dedication of his dissertation entitled *Methodus Nova Jurisprudentiæ*, to the Elector John Philip (1668), he dwells with pleasure on the prospect of success presented by the Elector's personal and public character, and the

¹ See the entire letter in the *Esprit de Leibnitz*, App. pp. 420-2. He adds, that the study

has only served to strengthen his convictions of the truth of Christianity.

favourable circumstances of the times; and, soon after his establishment at Maintz, we find him engaged in a correspondence with Arnauld on the subject of the Eucharist, with a view to the removal of the philosophical difficulties against the Real Presence and Transubstantiation. The question had occupied his attention for several years. "Baron von Boineburg knows," he writes to Arnauld, "that for four years I have been actively engaged in demonstrating the possibility of the mysteries of the Eucharist, or what comes to the same, in explaining it in such a manner as, by a continued and exact analysis, to arrive at length at first principles, or admitted postulates, regarding the power of God. A geometrician is reputed to have solved a problem, explained a possible mode of its solution, or demonstrated its possibility, when he has either resolved it into other problems already solved, or reduced it to problems which require no solution, that is to postulates, which bear to problems the same relation that axioms do to theorem. Now in this I think I have at last succeeded. For, as I have been the first to discover that the essence of a body does not consist in extension (which Des Cartes, unquestionably eminent as he is, would hold), but in motion;—and hence, that the substance or nature of a body, even according to Aristotle's definition, is the principle of motion (for there is no such thing as absolute rest in bodies), and that this principle

of motion or substance of the body has no extension;—I have made it plain that the substance differs from the accidents; and thus have discovered a mode of explaining how God can be clearly and distinctly understood to cause the substance of the same body to exist in many different places, or, what is the same, under many different species.”¹

Such an expression of opinion might appear, at first sight, decisive evidence of the Catholic tendencies of the writer. Nor is it an isolated sentiment. In an exceedingly interesting correspondence, some years later, with his friend Ernest, the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, he expresses himself with equal distinctness on other points. The Landgrave—himself, as we have seen, a convert to the Roman Church— anxiously desired the conversion of his friend; and, in the end of the year 1683, addressed to him an earnest expostulation on the false position which he occupied, by remaining in the Protestant communion while he held such opinions as he was known to entertain.²

In his reply to this friendly remonstrance, Leibnitz occasionally appears to speak even more unreservedly than in the passage above. He admits, for instance, the infallibility of the visible

¹ *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz, Arnauld, u. Ernst v. Hesse-Rheinfels*, p. 145. See also Guhrauer's *Leben*, i. 76, and App. 15.

² This interesting letter (which is in French) has the following

fanciful Italian heading: “*Svegliarino al mio tanto carissimo, quanto capacissimo, Signore Leibnitz:*” “An alarm-bell for my dearest and most gifted friend, M. Leibnitz.”

Catholic Church in all necessary articles, by special assistance of the Holy Ghost; and the divine origin of the hierarchy, and even, in some sense, of the pre-eminence of the Roman Pontiff. He confesses, too, that if he had been born in the Roman Church, he would never leave it, unless he should be formally driven from its communion;—as, for example, if he should refuse to subscribe to some of its received practices;—although, in another passage, he states that, as far as he is aware, “his opinions are not condemned either by Scripture or tradition, or by the decision of any Council.” And he even adds that he “thinks it a duty to use every exertion in order to belong to the communion of the visible Catholic Church, distinguished by the continued succession of its hierarchy, such as he believes the Roman Church to be.”¹

But, upon a closer examination, it will be discovered that these promising appearances are, to a great extent, illusory. They are all engrafted upon a theory which the author put forward more definitely at a later period—a distinction between the internal and external communion of the Church. In one of the preliminary communications to Madame de Brinon, by which, several years afterwards, the way was opened to the celebrated correspondence with Bossuet, he maintains not only that he is “a Catholic in heart,” as M. de Brinon had ventured to affirm, but that he may be said to

¹ See Gubrauer's *Leben*, i. p. 344.

be such "even outwardly;" inasmuch as, according to his view, nothing but obstinacy (of which, he says, his conscience acquits him,) can constitute a heretic, and "the essence of Catholicity does not consist in external communion with Rome (else those who are unjustly excommunicated would cease to be Catholics), but in charity." Hence he infers that "the real schismatics are those who throw obstacles in the way of unity, and the true Catholics are they who do all in their power to enjoy even external communion." The germ of this principle, and indeed even the principle itself (which is but an undue application of a perfectly sound and orthodox view), is found in his letter to the Landgrave. He declares to him, in language very similar to that afterwards addressed to M. de Brinon, his conviction, that a man may belong to the internal communion of the Church without appertaining to its external body, alleging the same example—that of a wrongful or unjust excommunication; and, although he "most freely admits that he would purchase, at any possible price, the advantage of the communion of the Roman Church, provided he could obtain it with the same quiet of soul, and the same peace of conscience, which, in his present position, he enjoys from his consciousness of leaving nothing undone on his part for the furtherance of this most desirable union;" yet he declares that, "as he has been born and educated outside of its pale, he thinks

it neither upright nor safe to enter into its external communion, without being first assured, that, when he shall have discovered his sentiments, he shall not be exposed to the danger of being rejected ignominiously." He assures him further, that he has "frequently, and for several years," entertained these views; but that, on the one hand, the uncertainty whether some of the opinions which he holds would be admissible in the Roman Church; and, on the other, the conviction which he so often professes, that in conscience he is acquitted of all guilt in remaining in his present position, and using, in this position, the best means at his disposal to forward the work of union, have prevented his taking the course which the Landgrave urged upon him, of embracing the external communion of Rome. He dwells strongly upon the unhappy consequences of being obliged, after having made this step, to retrace it, on discovering that his opinions were inadmissible; reminding his friend that

"Turpius ejicitur, quam non admittitur, hospes:"

and although he believes it probable that the opinions to which he refers might be "admitted, or at least tolerated, by very pious bishops and divines," yet he adds that "it is not safe to trust to a 'perhaps;' and that it is necessary to endeavour to ascertain it before taking the decisive step."¹

This notion of the necessity of a previous effort

¹ *Leben*, i. 348.

to ascertain how far the opinions which he was prepared to hold would be judged admissible within the pale of the Roman communion, appears to have been his guiding principle in all the steps which he took in connexion with the negotiations for the union of the Churches. We meet it not only in the correspondence with Arnould, and that with the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, but also in a letter to the celebrated Huet, Bishop of Avranches, and author of the *Demonstratio Evangelica*;¹ and another still more important document, which shall be quoted in a future page. It was in pursuance of this principle that, chiefly through his instrumentality, the *Cogitationes Privatæ de Methodo Reunionis*² of Molanus were submitted to the consideration of Bossuet; and it will be necessary to bear it carefully in mind, in considering his own essay, the *System of Theology*, which was drawn up about the same time, and with the very same purpose, although, from some unexplained cause, it never was used by the author.

This brief outline of the life of Leibnitz, and of his general views on the subject of the religious controversies of his times, will assist us in forming a judgment of the part which he might be expected to take with reference to the design of the Elector, John Philip, and the other similar negotiations for

¹ Guhrauer's *Leben*, i. 362.

² See this exceedingly interest-

ing document in the Appendix,

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which the Elector prepared the way. His position, as far as it is explained in his correspondence with the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, would seem to have resembled, in many particulars, that occupied by a large section of the Anglican body in our own times. His theory of "internal communion with the Church" is precisely the "branch-theory" on which so many, with far stronger opinions, and far higher Church-principles, now vindicate their remaining in the communion of the English Church; and although even the least Catholic of the Anglican party would shrink with horror from the notion of remaining, upon these principles, in such a society as the Lutheran, to which Leibnitz belonged, yet it is difficult to deny that his proceeding was but a further, and not illegitimate, extension of the branch-theory; that, when once there is engrafted upon the theory of Church authority, the principle of each individual's selecting the particular Church authority which he shall follow, and the particular point to which he shall obey its doctrinal decisions, the whole system of authority degenerates into a subtler and more ingenious form of private judgment; and that, whatever may be the difference as regards external discipline, it possesses hardly any real advantage over private judgment, as a guide of doctrine and a practical expositor of the Rule of Faith.

Before Leibnitz's arrival in the court of the Elector, the discussions on the subject of Church

union had been suspended; nor was there any attempt for some time to renew them upon the same footing. The political differences which were occasioned by the French occupation of Lorraine in 1670, not only interrupted the friendly relations of the several cabinets, but, for a time at least, indisposed them for this or any similar measure. Nevertheless, soon after this, in the autumn of 1671, Leibnitz, through the interposition of Boineburg, commenced the correspondence with Arnauld on the subject of the Eucharist, already referred to. His object in submitting it to Arnauld's judgment, was chiefly to ascertain its admissibility upon Catholic principles. In a letter to John Frederic, Duke of Hanover, alluding to the demonstration of the possibility of the Eucharistic mystery, he reminds him that Des Cartes, Maignan, Digby, Thomas Anglus, Borelli, Bonarti, and many others, had completely failed in the attempt to reconcile this mystery with the modern philosophy; and that, in consequence, Arnauld, though thoroughly versed therein, had never ventured upon the subject, often as Claude had urged the argument of impossibility and contradiction against him. He undertakes, nevertheless, to demonstrate, consistently with the modern philosophy, the possibility of the Eucharist, as it is explained in the Council of Trent. And that this demonstration was intended to subserve the general project of religious union, may be inferred from his dwell-

ing upon the importance of the discovery, “not only to all scientific men, but still more to princes high in authority, who are responsible for the welfare of their people.”¹

But although, during his mission to Paris and subsequent residence in that city, Leibnitz, as we have seen, had frequent communications with Arnauld, and with many members of the Catholic party, no step was taken in furtherance of the design of union; and the death of the Elector, John Philip, in 1673, put an end to all negotiations in that quarter. The court, however, to which Leibnitz afterwards became attached, that of John Frederic of Hanover, took no less warm an interest in the projected union. This prince, himself a convert to the Catholic religion, had guaranteed to his Protestant subjects the fullest securities for their religious liberties and privileges, and adhered most rigorously to the terms of the stipulation. But he felt painfully, nevertheless, the anomaly of his position; and the very isolation in which he was placed—himself a Catholic, at the head of a purely Protestant people—gave him a double interest in every measure which tended to promote the great scheme of reconciliation. Nor is it impossible that the great anxiety which he evinced to secure the services of Leibnitz² had its origin in some such view;

¹ *Deutsche Schriften*, i. 283-4.

² He invited him in very pressing terms on three several occa-

sions: once before his going to Mainz in 1670 (*Leben*, i. 58); again during his residence in

for it is plain from their previous correspondence, not only that the Duke was fully aware of the strongly Catholic tendencies of his friend's mind, but that he entertained considerable hope of his actual conversion to the Catholic religion—a hope which was confirmed by a letter from Arnauld (to a Capuchin at Hanover, who had written to ask information on the subject of the Eucharist), of which Leibnitz was the bearer at his first arrival, and which described him as a man of rare talents and prodigious acquirements, “in whom nothing but the true religion was wanting to render him one of the greatest men of the age.”¹

If the duke's pious hopes, as far as they regarded Leibnitz personally, were doomed to disappointment, an opportunity soon presented itself of employing his services in one of the most important, and certainly the most promising, negotiations for the union of the Churches which had yet occurred.

The immediate author of this movement was a Spanish Franciscan named Christopher Rojas (or Roxas) de Spinola,² who had been employed by

Paris (p. 133); and lastly in 1676, when Leibnitz accepted the offer (p. 169).

¹ *Deutsche Schriften*, ii. App. p. 66.

² He was descended, it would seem, from the celebrated Genoese family of this name. Menzel, in the *Neuere Geschichte der*

Deutschen, ix. 264, imagines, from his familiarity with German, that he was a Fleming; but it is much more probable that he was a Spaniard. Schlegel *Kirchengeschichte der Hannöversischen Staaten*, iii. 297) says that his ancestors were counts of Kollonitz.

Philip IV. of Spain in a diplomatic mission to Vienna, Ratisbon, and other cities of Germany, and eventually settled in Vienna as confessor of the Spanish princess, Margaret Theresa, on her marriage with the Emperor Leopold. This prince soon took him into his fullest confidence, and eventually named him Bishop of Wienerisch-Neustadt, having previously procured his nomination as Bishop of Tina, in Croatia. After a mission to the Emperor's Protestant subjects in Hungary, which appears to have been attended with some success, he visited several of the minor courts of Germany; and at last, in 1679, he came to Hanover in the capacity of accredited agent for ecclesiastical affairs, accompanied by the Emperor's private secretary, Von Hornekgk. The way had been already to some extent prepared for his mission. The zeal and liberality of John Frederic had drawn around him a number of men of both parties eminent not only for learning but for moderation;—on the Catholic side, Nicholas Steno,¹ Bishop of Titiopolis, and Vicar Apostolic, and a

¹ He was a native of Copenhagen, and was born and brought up a Lutheran. He became a physician, and rose to great eminence in his profession, being especially distinguished as an anatomist and physiologist, in both which departments his works still maintain his reputation. He became a Catholic in 1669; and

in 1677 renounced his profession, and entered the ecclesiastical state. Innocent XII. raised him to the episcopate with the title of Bishop of Titiopolis; and, at the invitation of John Frederic, he was sent to Hanover as Vicar Apostolic of the northern kingdoms of Europe. He died in 1686.

learned Capuchin, Father Dionysius, author of the *Via Pacis*, a treatise well known in the history of these times ; and, on the Lutheran side, the celebrated Gerard Molanus,¹ Abbot of Lokkum, and President of the Consistory of Hanover, with whom Leibnitz stood in the friendliest and most confidential relations. The method adopted by Spinola fell in precisely with the views of these men. Avoiding studiously the discussion of controverted details, he sought to bring the parties, by mutual explanations of the peculiarities of their respective creeds, into a close relation to each other ; and, by inducing each to present its doctrines in the least repulsive form consistent with its received formularies, to narrow, as far as possible, even by anticipation, the ground of debate which would remain after every allowable concession. In furtherance of this view, he had used upon his own side, as the most unexceptionable representation of Catholic doctrines, Bossuet's well-known *Exposition of the Catholic Faith*, then recently published (1671), and an effort was made to induce the great controversialist himself to lend his aid to the negotiation. Spinola, at the instance of Leibnitz, wrote to communicate his project to Bossuet ; Leibnitz availed himself of the same opportunity to suggest the expediency of interesting the King, Louis XIV., in its success ; and Bossuet, in his reply,

¹ The Latinized form, according to the usage of the time, of his true name, Van der Meulen.

stated that the King not only was not opposed to the project, but, on the contrary, took a warm interest in it, and would give it all his support. How favourable, indeed, all the preliminaries appeared, we may infer from a letter of Leibnitz to Huet, dated August 1, 1679: "So propitious do the circumstances appear to me," he writes, "that I almost hope to see a union effected, at once honourable for the Roman Church, and not oppressive for the other party. Nor is this hope without foundation. I am acquainted with many excellent men of all parties; and in no part of Germany is religious controversy conducted with so much moderation as in the territory of Brunswick-Luneburg. And, seeing that the princes who at present are at the head of affairs are unsurpassed for wisdom; and especially that my own prince unites with the other gifts of nature and fortune, extraordinary learning and great solidity of judgment, and is most anxious to forward these efforts; I cannot but think, when I reflect upon these great advantages, that if they prove to have been used in vain, we shall have to accuse the indolence, or the want of will, on the part of those who have charge of the government of the Church for the failure. Now, at a time like the present, when I hear the Pope, Innocent XI., praised for his holiness of life and eminent zeal and wisdom, I feel my hopes rise once more. And when to this I add the fervent piety of the Emperor, and the distinguished virtue of the Great

King, I am convinced either that some result must be soon attained, or that, if this opportunity pass away out of our hands, the object to which so many look forward with exultation must be deferred for centuries yet to come.”¹ These hopes, nevertheless, were doomed to disappointment. The negotiations were broken off by the death of the pious and enlightened Duke, John Frederic, which took place in the December of that year.

His brother, Ernest Augustus, although he had not followed John Frederic in embracing the Catholic religion, resumed, soon after, the same conciliatory policy. He was a man of exceedingly moderate opinions, and his interest, as well as his dispositions, led him to give his aid to a project which originated with the Emperor, and enlisted all his sympathies. He was supported too in this course by the warm approval and active co-operation of his wife, the Duchess Sophia. This enlightened princess, through whom the house of Brunswick inherits the crown of England, was the daughter of Frederic Count Palatine, the ill-fated “Winter-King” of Bohemia, and of Elizabeth, daughter of James I. She was educated a Calvinist; but the close relations which she maintained with her sister, Louisa Hollandina, who had become a Catholic in 1657, and soon afterwards was appointed Abbess of Maubuisson, had disposed her favourably towards the Catholic re-

¹ Opp. v. 462.

ligion, to which, indeed, one of her sons, Maximilian, became a convert in 1690; and she was, from the first, a zealous supporter of the proposal for union. With her, too, as well as with her husband, Leibnitz enjoyed the highest favour, and he corresponded frequently and familiarly with her on all the current topics of literature, philosophy, and religion.

It was under such auspices as these that the measure was resumed. Spinola was invited anew to the court of Hanover, and arrived in that city in the beginning of 1683. His efforts at the other courts of Germany during the interval had been very unsuccessful. Spener, the celebrated founder of the Pietist sect, with whom he had a conference at Frankfort-on-the-Main, declared in the most explicit terms against his project.¹ In Saxony he was equally unfortunate; and in Berlin, which he visited in 1682, he received an angry and bitter repulse. "Enlightened men," he was told, "had long since seen that the Pope and his followers had perverted religion, and usurped a tyrannical control over the Church. Every previous attempt at union had failed; and the persecutions which the evangelical party were at that moment suffering from the Catholics in France was an evidence how little reliance could be placed on their written or verbal promises of peace. As long as the Catholics taught and held that the Romish Church could

¹ Menzel, ix. 266.

never err, that the Pope was infallible in the explanation of Scripture and the decision of religious controversies, and that it was competent to him to set aside by a bull all that private divines taught, wrote, and circulated,—so long must all the measures proposed from time to time by the papal theologians be fruitless and ineffective.”¹ Nor, although he endeavoured to explain away the objectionable doctrines of the Roman creed, and to combat the false impressions which they entertained with regard to them, was he able to obtain any mitigation of this declaration.²

The polemical atmosphere of Hanover was much less stormy. In addition to the liberal and enlightened views of the court, and the notoriously favourable dispositions of the chief ecclesiastical functionary, Molanus, the President of the Consistory, and of his friend Leibnitz, Spinola could reckon upon a much more compliant tone in the Theological Faculty of Helmstädt, the principal university of the duchy of Brunswick. Helmstädt had been the cradle of the Syncretistic system, the professed object of which was the extinction of the doctrinal differences which separate the several sects of Christians. One of the conditions annexed to its theological degree was an oath that the candidate will use every legitimate effort to settle, according to his ability, the prevailing controversies.³

¹ Menzel, ix. 268, 9.

² Ibid. 278.

³ Mosheim's *Church History*, iv. 177 (Soames' ed.).

The most distinguished advocate of this system, and indeed its founder, the celebrated George Calixtus, had been professor of divinity in this university for many years. Molanus had been one of his pupils; and his son, Frederic Ulric Calixtus, who inherited his father's principles, at this time held the same theological chair. And it was certainly no ill omen of success that this Calixtus, his fellow-professor at Helmstädt, Meyer, the Abbot Molanus, and Hermann Barchhausen, one of the chaplains of the court, were appointed to confer with the imperial envoy.

The secret history of these negotiations remains yet to be written, and would form one of the most curious chapters in the history of modern polemics. Unfortunately no record of Spinola's proceedings¹ from his own pen has ever been published; and Schlegel, who examined the archives at Hanover, admits that the original of his first proposal is not to be found. It is hardly possible that the imperial archives at Vienna do not contain reports and despatches detailing his successes and his failures; and, a still more important point in the history, the precise extent to which he communicated to the Holy See the details of his project, and the precise amount of sanction and approval which he received therefrom, can only be cleared up from the great treasure-house of the Vatican. But these records, if they exist, are still unknown; and as it is, we

¹ *Kirchengesch. der Hannövr. Staaten*, iii. 300.

are obliged to rely almost entirely upon the reports of the Lutheran party.

If we can accept these statements without distrust, it will appear that Spinola's proposals comprised concessions in doctrine, in discipline, and in Church government, of the largest and most unexampled liberality; and that he probably took as his model the fabricated articles attributed to the Elector, John Philip. In a letter of Calixtus cited by Menzel,¹ he is stated to have engaged that the Pope should permit the use of the chalice to the laity; should explain the doctrine of saint-worship and of good works, so as not to trench on the honour due to God alone, and the merits of Christ; should reprobate all reverence of the saints, which is incompatible with the character of created beings, and disclaim all tyrannical control over men's consciences. The Protestant communities were to be permitted to retain the practices which, in their opinion, tend to edification; the ministers to be at liberty to contract marriages, and even second marriages; the princes to be allowed to retain the episcopal privileges which they had enjoyed in the sees appropriated since the Reformation, under such conditions as might be agreed on by both parties, and as are consistent with the constitution of Christianity; and wherever the union was favourably received, the clergymen of the two parties were alternately to

¹ *Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen*, ix. 263.

preach and catechise the people ; the two sections were to be called “ old Catholics ” and “ new Catholics ; ” and in token of intercommunion, were to receive the Eucharist occasionally at each other’s hands. The Council of Trent and the anathemas which it had fulminated were to be put in abeyance till the meeting of a new general council, and to be submitted anew for consideration therein. In this new council the Protestants were not to appear as parties accused, but to take their seats as judges ; and for this purpose, the Pope was to release them by a formal bull from the name of heretics, and they, on their part, were to profess that they did not regard him as Antichrist, but as the highest and first patriarch of Christendom, and invested, in virtue of the ecclesiastical law, with a primacy, not of jurisdiction, but of order, in the Christian Church. The Pope was to confirm to the Protestant sovereigns, by a formal cession, the ecclesiastical property of which they had become possessed. Lastly, all these stipulations, and several others, were to be received and sanctioned in a special congress, to be holden previous to the general council, and a sufficient guarantee was to be given for their fulfilment.

Upon this basis their deliberations proceeded. In the end of March, Molanus and his associates had drawn up a plan of union, under the title, *Methodus reducendæ Unionis inter Romanenses et Protestantas*. Although on several points it is mani-

festly uncatholic, nevertheless this plan can hardly be said to overstep in its general provisions the terms of Spinola's proposal, as it has been explained above; and, on the contrary, we learn from a letter of Leibnitz to his friend Seckendorf,¹ that Molanus even went beyond the proposal of Spinola, and recognised in the Pope the primacy of jurisdiction, as well as of honour. To this plan Calixtus for a time demurred; but on receiving some further explanations from Spinola, he withdrew his objections; and, by their joint labour, a new document was prepared before the end of the year, entitled *Regulæ circa Christianorum omnium Ecclesiasticam Unionem.*²

These rules are ten in number; some of them, however, comprising several subordinate regulations. They cannot be said to form a plan of union, but are, in fact, little more than preliminary principles, intended rather as a guide in the selection of the controversies to be adjusted, and the course to be followed in adjusting them, than as an attempt to arrange the controversies themselves. This, and all other details, are reserved for the decision of the intended council, which is modelled upon the plan suggested by Spinola, consisting of Catholics and Protestants, judging upon precisely equal terms of honour and of privilege, and re-considering all the controverted questions irre-

¹ Guhrauer's *Leben*, ii. 22.

in Bossuet's Works, xiv. 4-18

² They are printed at length (Liege ed.).

spectively of the decisions of the Council of Trent. In substance they are as follows :

Setting out with a declaration of the feasibility and advantages of a union among Christians, and of the solemn duty of labouring to attain it, they profess, notwithstanding, that it is not lawful to compromise any single truth in order to effect this union, desirable as it is. It by no means follows, however, that it is either necessary, or expedient, or even in all cases lawful, for the parties mutually to bring forward and declare to each other in express terms *all* their doctrines, and exact from one another a mutual or formal renunciation of the opposite errors. Hence they lay down the principles by which this mutual agreement is to be guided. The parties must agree *implicitly* in every thing which has been revealed and defined ; that is to say, they must formally recognise the same rules of faith, and the same ultimate judge of controversy ; and *explicitly* in rejecting idolatry, and all that bears the appearance or suspicion of idolatry ; and in disclaiming the intention of rendering to creatures the worship, confidence, and love which are due to God alone, or of derogating from the merits of Christ and of the sacrifice of the Cross. They must further agree *explicitly* on the use and administration of the ordinary sacraments and offices of the Church, and consequently on the doctrines which regulate their valid and lawful use and administration ; on one general form of ecclesiastical government ; on

the usages and rites which it will be necessary to retain in order to avoid creating confusion and disaffection among the people; and on some common public tribunal for the adjustment of controversies. Lastly, they declare that the union must not interfere with, or disturb, the distribution of ecclesiastical property, or the arrangement of ecclesiastical rights and privileges, introduced since the Reformation; but that the princes, ecclesiastical and secular, the clergy, the nobility, and the commons, shall be allowed to remain in undisturbed possession of all their present rights and properties, in so far as this can be done consistently with the law of God and of conscience.

It will be seen that these rules in reality contain very little of importance as to the particular doctrines or practices which were to form the groundwork of union, and were merely intended, to use the phrase applied to them by Bossuet at a later period, as a *pour parler*¹ between the parties. They recognise very distinctly, however, the principle that a full and complete agreement is not indispensable. On the doctrine of Transubstantiation, for example, it is expressly stated, that, although the Romanists are in error thereupon, nevertheless the error is one which may be tolerated, provided they disclaim all idea of idolatrous worship in the Eucharist; and the same is laid down with a similar restriction for the Roman

¹ *Œuvres*, xiv. 355.

doctrine of Purgatory and of prayers for the dead. But the final adjustment of all such points is reserved for the future council, in which the "Romanists, although they hold as articles of faith, and cherish as the apple of their eye, Transubstantiation, the permanence of Christ's Presence, Communion in one kind, the infallible authority of the Council of Trent, and the Pope's supreme and divinely derived jurisdiction, nevertheless shall be compelled, for the love of peace, to submit to consideration and adjudication these, and all other points, which the Protestants call, or may hereafter call, into question; and the Protestants, in like manner, for the love of peace and union, shall similarly submit themselves in these and all other points."¹

These preliminary rules were put into the hands of the imperial envoy; and he returned to Vienna, having, in the course of his journey, submitted these views of the divines of Hanover to some of the other Protestant courts—Hesse-Darmstadt, Saxony, Durlach, and Wurtemberg, in all which he was coldly received.² From Vienna he proceeded to Rome, in order to refer the project to the consideration of the Holy See. In several of his communications with the German courts he had been challenged as to the authority in virtue of which he proposed to treat with them; and although the commission from the Emperor under

¹ pp. 11, 12.

² Schlegel, pp. 304-7.

which he acted, invested him, according to the principles then recognised in Germany, with the character of an accredited agent even for ecclesiastical affairs, nevertheless it had not only been every where represented to him that, without authority from Rome, his mission was necessarily incomplete, but, moreover, the steps already taken at Hanover appeared to render the interposition of the Holy See necessary for any ulterior proceeding. The only account which the historians of these events have brought to light is contained in a manuscript memoir in the handwriting of Leibnitz, which is preserved in the Library of Hanover, entitled *Leibnitii Relatio de Christophori Rojas Hispani Conatibus, circa uniendam Christianam Religionem*. It is to the effect, that the Pope, Innocent XI., to whom Spinola communicated his project, entertained it most favourably, and appointed a congregation of Cardinals and other ecclesiastics, among whom, if we can rely upon another letter of Leibnitz to Madame de Brinon,¹ were Father Noyelles the General of the Jesuits, and the Master of the Sacred Palace, to confer with him on the best means of bringing it to a favourable issue. The result of their deliberation, according to this statement, was, that “the propositions made to the Protestants, although they would tend to detract from the authority of the Council of Trent, yet were not without precedent; having been already,

¹ Opp. t. i. 519.

indeed, in part (as regards the chalice and the marriage of priests) conceded to the Greeks in the union which took place at Florence. Nevertheless that, considering the present rupture of the Holy See with the French Church and court,¹ and their disposition to represent all the Pope's proceedings in the worst light, it was not advisable as yet to make any actual concessions to the Protestants; that hopes might be held out to them, however; and that, as several Protestant theologians had refused to communicate with Mgr. Spinola, because he had no authority from the Pope, but only from the Emperor, he should be invested with powers to that effect." Menzel adds, that another motive which influenced the Pope was a fear of the Jesuits, who had sided with the court in this contest, and would turn against the Pope any suspicious step which he might chance to make.

In the absence of the original records of this transaction, it is hard to form a positive opinion as to the precise nature of the approval which Spinola received. In order to judge with any thing approaching to accuracy regarding it, it would be necessary to know what was the exact question on which he solicited instructions, and whether and how far he specified the particulars of his project. That he submitted the *Regulæ*

¹ The contest with Louis XIV. about the question of the Regalia. It was in 1682, too, that the celebrated Articles of the French clergy were published.

for consideration, it is natural to suppose; but it is perfectly possible that he may have represented them, like Bossuet, merely as a *pour parler*;¹ and how far he expressed his own views as to the admissibility of the principles therein contained, is entirely involved in mystery. Upon these details Leibnitz's memoir furnishes no information; and it is quite possible, as far as this document is concerned, to understand that the approval and authorization which it represents Spinola as having received, was but a general approval of the efforts which he was making for the reconciliation of the Protestants to the Church, without any distinct reference to the specific terms of the proposal by means of which he had been so far successful. Indeed, there are at best many intrinsic improbabilities in the account, such as it is given by Leibnitz. One of the reasons alleged for the Pope's unwillingness to act more decidedly is his fear of the opposition of the Jesuits. Now, Leibnitz himself expressly tells Madame de Brinon, in a letter written nearly two years afterwards,² that he has actually seen the letter of the General of the Order, Father Noyelles, and that he was most favourable to the project; nor is it possible to conceive that, if such an approval had been given to Spinola's plan in its integrity, it would have been rejected by Bossuet so unceremoniously

¹ Schlegel, iii. 300. See also *Leben*, ii. 24-6.
Menzel, ix. 292, and Gubrauer's ² Opp. i. 519.

as we shall find it rejected in his correspondence with Leibnitz.

The truth would appear to be, that Spinola, who was a man of exceedingly sanguine and ardent temperament, may either have been betrayed into a representation at Rome of the prospect of concessions to be expected from the Protestants much more favourable than the reality would justify, and thus obtained a sanction, not of the project as it really was, but as it was represented by his too sanguine imagination; or that, from similar impetuosity, he may have construed a very vague and general approval of his scheme into a full and complete sanction of all its details. That he did receive some sanction or encouragement there can be no doubt. Even as early as 1679, upon his first visit to Hanover, during the life of John Frederic, he brought with him a letter from Innocent XI. to the Duke¹ (dated April 20, 1678), commending him as having “already experienced great advantage from his [the Duke’s] patronage, in the course of the visits which he has paid, in promoting the Catholic cause, to the several provinces of Germany;” and as “placing his chief hope of success, in the second

¹ This letter appears to have escaped the notice of all the historians of these transactions. It is contained in the Appendix of F. Theiner’s *Geschichte der Zurückkehr der Häusen von Braunschweig und Sachsen in der Kath.*

Kirche, p. 2. Theiner imagines that the object of the letter is to appoint Spinola vicar apostolic of Hanover. But this is a mistake. Nicholas Steno was at this time, and till 1686, vicar apostolic for the North.

visit, which he then proposes with the same object, in him and his authority." There is no reason, therefore, to doubt that the same general approval of the object of his mission should be still continued; but that it extended to all the details of Spinola's plan, and especially to his proposal of placing the decisions of the Council of Trent in abeyance, and subjecting them to re-consideration in a new council composed alike of Catholic and Protestant judges, is utterly irreconcilable with the past and the after history of the Roman See and its well-known principles. Not to speak of the determined opposition which the far less objectionable Interim, backed, as it was, by all the authority of Charles V. in the very zenith of his power, met in Rome, any one who recollects the earnest and repeated efforts fruitlessly made by the imperial ambassadors to procure from the Pope, Pius IV., before the re-opening of the Council of Trent in 1562, after its long suspension, and during the sessions held under him, a re-consideration of the decrees enacted in its early sittings under Paul III.,¹ and, still more, the negotiations for the admission of the Protestant delegates to the Council, and the terms on which alone they were to be received,²—will at once detect the manifest impossibility of the

¹ See the discussion in Pallavicini, *Storia del Concilio di Trento*, lib. xii. c. 15. vol. iii. 258

and foll. (Faenza, 1793).

² Ibid.

Pope's having approved the sweeping proposal of Spinola, to set aside the whole body of the Council's decisions, without the slightest reservation, and to submit them all, as new and untried questions, to a joint council, in which both parties, equally free from the taint of heresy, equally recognised as depositaries of the apostolic faith, were to sit as joint scrutators, with equal rights and equal privileges. We need not hesitate, therefore, to say, that, taken literally, and without some such explanation as is suggested above, the account popularly received is entirely incredible. Nor indeed, as I have already observed, does the memoir of Leibnitz, if fairly examined, furnish any real ground for this supposition. On the contrary, it is by no means unlikely that the statement attributing the Pope's declining to make the required concessions to the embarrassing circumstances in which he was placed by the rupture with France, and not to the intrinsic unfitness and inexpediency of the concessions themselves, was a gloss of the envoy himself, without any foundation, except in his own sanguine and hopeful temperament.

But, whatever may have been the precise nature of the approval which Spinola received in Rome, he resumed his mission with renewed energy upon his return. It does not appear, however, that the supposed sanction of the Holy See added much weight to his solicitations in the eyes of the Pro-

testants. The Theological Faculty of Giessen had declared, in April 1684, that there was little peace to be hoped from these unions, in which each party was left in possession of its own dogmas, but that, on the contrary, they commonly produced the worst consequences; and the feeling of apprehension and distrust now appeared to become general. Spener suggested that all that had been done as yet might readily be undone by a future general council; and it was hinted, with still greater malignity, that, if the Protestants once consented to recognise the Pope's ecclesiastical supremacy, he might, in virtue thereof, revoke by a single act all the concessions which had been guaranteed by Spinola.¹ Nor were these unfavourable anticipations confined to the Protestant party: they were shared by Catholics, even by those who were favourably disposed to the union. Ernest, the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, who had himself taken a part, at least in writing, in the unionist discussions, expresses his astonishment, in a very characteristic letter to Leibnitz, November 11, 1684,² at the account of Spinola's project being sanctioned in Rome. He grounds his disbelief on the history of the Pope's refusal to sanction the Interim, which contained but two articles (the use of the chalice, and the marriage of the clergy); and very significantly intimates his apprehensions that the suspicion of the envoy's

¹ Schlegel, iii. 309.

² Given by Guhrauer, *Leben*, ii. 26.

designs entertained by many Lutherans, and the belief that he is but trifling with them for the purpose of creating division, are not without foundation; "especially," he adds, "as it is perfectly certain that, on the side of Rome, it is impossible to yield even the slightest point in essentials."

Leibnitz himself, notwithstanding the confidence with which he had at first entered into the measure, now began to entertain doubts and apprehensions. In the beginning of 1684 (January 5), he wrote to Molanus, to counsel the utmost caution and forethought upon his part, and assured him that both Catholics and Protestants had come to apprehend great danger from the projected union; and, a few months later, he confessed to his friend Seckendorf, that "neither the circumstances of the time, nor the personal character and qualities of the Bishop Spinola, were such as to give him much confidence; and so many difficulties stood in the way of the proposed council, that it was quite possible that neither of them would live to see it."¹

It is to this year, or perhaps the latter part of the preceding one, that we may, with the greatest degree of probability, refer the *Systema Theologicum*.² Although not officially engaged in

¹ Ibid. p. 27.

² Guhrauer thinks it was written in 1686; and argues that it must have been written in that year, from an allusion in it to

the death of the celebrated chemist, John Joachim Becher, as having occurred in the preceding year. Dr. G. states that it is well known Becher died in Lon-

the theological conferences of Hanover, Leibnitz had, notwithstanding, taken a warm and active interest in every one of the details. By Molanus he was consulted upon every question, nor was any step of importance taken in the matter without his knowledge and approval. He maintained an active correspondence, too, with the most eminent divines of the other states of Germany.¹ Dr. Guhrauer, however, has published two fragments of the first draft of a letter addressed to a prince whose name is not mentioned in the ms., but whom Dr. Guhrauer believes to be the reigning duke, Ernest Augustus,² himself, which throw more

don in 1685. But this is certainly a mistake; Becher died in the latter part of 1682, and was buried in London in the October of that year. Indeed, the terms in which the letter refers to the negotiations then actually pending, would hardly be applicable to the state of affairs at Hanover in 1686, when the hope of union was all but abandoned, and when, as we have already seen, Leibnitz himself had long despaired of its being effected. See Pertz's *Ueber Leibnizens Kirchliches Glaubens-bekennniss*, p. 22.

¹ See Schlegel's *Kirchenge-schichte der Hannövr. Staaten*, iii. 303.

² I cannot bring myself, notwithstanding his authority, which is certainly very great in any question connected with Leib-

nitz, to believe that the letter is addressed to this prince. The terms in which Leibnitz writes to him about the Bishop of Tina appear to me quite decisive against the supposition. He never could have written to the Duke, Ernest Augustus, who had been in close and active communication with the Bishop during his entire residence at Hanover,—*“Je ne sais si V. A. S. a vu l'Evêque de Tina, autrement le Père Royas, qui a été dans nos cours il n'y a pas longtemps.”* It appears very improbable, too, that, if Leibnitz had communicated to the Duke his intention of writing such an Exposition, the Duke, who certainly left no means untried to effect the union, would not have turned it to some practical account dur-

light upon his private views than any portion of his printed correspondence.

This letter is a reply to a communication from this unknown correspondent, the chief object of which would appear to have been to urge on the negotiations, and especially to cut short the discussion of theological details, on the ground that the only really essential subject of discussion was the fundamental question of authority, and that, this point being once determined, all the rest followed as a necessary consequence. Leibnitz's reply is in French. Although the passages given by Guhrauer are detached and independent, yet they very probably both formed parts of the same letter. I shall translate them both at full length. The first is as follows :

“ Your Serene Highness's reply to my observations on Transubstantiation, shews me how difficult it is to satisfy even the most upright and enlightened persons, when one does not enter fully and completely into their sentiments and ideas. Excellent projects have frequently been marred because the parties engaged, although meaning well, and having but one common end in view, counteracted each other, nevertheless, by disagreeing about the means to be employed, though these were both excellent in themselves and perfectly compatible with each

ing these negotiations, or the latter ones with Bossuet. I think it much more probable that the

letter was intended for Ernest of Hesse-Rheinfels.

other. The same thing occurs at this moment in the negotiation about the peace of the Church. Your Serene Highness having conceived the idea of effecting it upon the basis of antiquity, and by the compendious method of the authority of a visible Church, appears to disapprove of our entering into the detail of controversies, and reproaches me with departing thereby from the true principles. For myself, I can say that I have studied antiquity, and that I entertain infinite esteem for a tradition of the Catholic Church; nevertheless I have deemed it of importance, not indeed for every one, but for those who are capable of the inquiry, to unite therewith an exact discussion of the separate subjects, in order *that we may have nothing to reproach ourselves with hereafter, and that we may act throughout with all possible sincerity and precision, without concealment or dissimulation.*"

But it is in the second and longer extract that the allusion to the intended theological essay, which is now known as the *System of Theology*, distinctly occurs.

"I had the honour," it proceeds, "during my residence in Paris, to enjoy the familiar acquaintance of M. Arnauld. He was good enough to entertain some regard for me; and when I left Paris to come to Hanover, he gave me a letter for a Capuchin of that city, who had made some inquiry of him regarding the belief of the Greeks on Transubstantiation, in which he expressed him-

self concerning me in terms of so much praise, as would have prevented me from delivering the letter, had I read it previously; but it was only at Hanover I learned that M. Arnauld had written that 'I wanted only the true religion, to be really one of the great men of this age.' But as I have never affected a great reputation, and, on the contrary, have rather endeavoured to conceal my name when I have published any thing (as, for instance, when the book of *Cæsarinus Furstenerius* was published by order of the late prince), it has not been my fault if I have not been upon the side of truth. And what had alienated me most from the opinions of the Roman Church was principally (for I am not now speaking of practice) the consideration of the difficulties which occur in the dogma of Transubstantiation, and the demonstrations which I think I have discovered in the questions connected with grace. I have always been endeavouring to satisfy myself, and I have almost completely succeeded in so doing. But as these subjects require very exact researches in the most profound department of metaphysics, the facility of committing an error regarding them prevents me from forming a definitive judgment, until I shall have arranged all my reasonings with the same rigorous precision which would be applied in a mathematical calculation. M. Arnauld, who is thoroughly conversant with the modern philosophy, and who appears to be a Cartesian, has never ventured to

touch this chord, or to answer the almost insuperable difficulties which appear to be opposed to Transubstantiation; perhaps because he is afraid that his explanation would be condemned, if it were made public. And hence I think that, *in order to proceed securely in these matters*, it would be necessary to adopt the following plan. It would be necessary that a man of meditative mind, and one whose views are not far removed from the reunion, should draw up an Exposition of Faith, a little more detailed than that of Monseigneur the Bishop of Condom,¹ in which he should endeavour to explain himself with the *utmost exactness and sincerity* on the disputed articles, *avoiding all equivocal phrases* and all the terms of scholastic chicanery, and employing only natural forms of expression. This Exposition he should submit to the judgment of some learned bishops (of the Roman Church), distinguished for moderation; dissembling, however, his own name and party. And, in order to enable them to judge more favourably, the question proposed should be, not whether they themselves agree with the writer in his opinions, but simply whether they hold his opinions to be tolerable in their Church.

¹ Bossuet. He was named Bishop of Condom in 1670, and was translated to Meaux in 1681, but did not take possession till February 8, 1682. His being called Bishop of Condom here,

however, does not prove that the letter was written before his translation, for the same occurs in several letters of *known* date after this period.

“Your Serene Highness will tell me that there is no necessity for all this ceremony, and that it is possible to belong to the communion of Rome without going into all this detail. I reply by a distinction: A person who has not deeply studied these matters, and has no intention of so studying them, is easily satisfied. *But one who has pondered them well should proceed with sincerity*; and if he have a suspicion that it is possible that some of his opinions might be condemned, *it is his duty to explain himself in time*; otherwise he might run the risk of finding himself in a very unpleasant position, *by being some day compelled to profess what he would not be able to approve*; as actually was the case of Galileo, who was forced to abjure the doctrine of the earth’s motion.

“No person could so easily obtain such an approbation in the present case, as your Serene Highness. And in order the better to prepare the proposed Exposition, it would be necessary to draw it up in concert with your Highness yourself. Whether it shall succeed or not, however, the man who does his best in order not to remain in schism, is, in effect, in the Church, at least, to use your Highness’s appropriate phrase, *in foro interno*. At the same time, I think that the approbation of the bishops would be sufficient, and that that of Rome would not be so necessary. And yet perhaps we might hope even for this, if the affair were properly managed; and I know that there are persons at

Rome who could be of use in its arrangement. But one could not well hope for any thing of this nature without a powerful application.

“I do not know whether your Serene Highness has ever seen the Bishop of Tina, otherwise known as Father Royas, who recently visited our courts, for the purpose of proposing a plan of accommodation on religion; nor what opinion you have formed of him.

“Your Highness does not appear to have apprehended my meaning in what I wrote regarding a reasonable exposition of matters of faith, with the view of proving that they do not involve any contradiction. This does not derogate from the authority of a perpetual tradition of the Roman Church. For those who hold that any dogma of the Roman Church involves a contradiction, will also hold that the Church has not really taught this doctrine, and will feel themselves justified in giving to the passages of Scripture and of the holy Fathers, such an explanation as will, in their view, avoid this absurdity; besides that, the Fathers, as, for example, St. Augustine, often speak very obscurely and very variably on those articles which were not controverted in their day.”¹

That the *System of Theology* is the “Exposition” here projected, no reasonable doubt can be entertained. A tolerably explicit intimation of the intention of writing a work of this character, con-

¹ Guhrauer's *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, vol. ii. App. 65-9.

veyed in a letter of Leibnitz to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, in the year 1684, has been referred to in a former page;¹ and a similar idea, including the same studious concealment of the writer's name and religion, appears to be thrown out in a letter to John Frederic of Hanover, written as early as November, 1671;² but, as there is not any known work of Leibnitz in which he refers to the actual accomplishment of the intention, it is only by inference we can arrive at data whereby to determine the time at which the book was actually written. There are some points regarding it, however, which can be fixed with tolerable certainty. That it was not written earlier than 1682, follows clearly from the fact of Bossuet's being called by the title of Bishop of Meaux;³ inasmuch as it was not till the February of that year that he took possession of this see. That it was not written after 1689, may be inferred with some probability from the terms in which it refers, seemingly as if still living, to Pope Innocent XI.,⁴ who died in that year. Perhaps, too, the hope which it appears to express of the downfall of the "Mahometan domination," would go to fix the time of its composition between 1683, or, possibly, 1684, when the twenty years' truce was concluded with the Turks, and 1689, when the hope of a union of all the Christian powers against

¹ p. xviii.

² *Deutsche Schriften*, i. p. 278.

³ p. 80.

⁴ p. 57.

⁴ p. 79.

them was practically abandoned. But beyond this it seems impossible to go with accuracy; and between the years 1683 and 1689, all that can be asserted with any degree of certainty is, that, as the work was obviously prepared with a view to the negotiations for Church union, which occupied the Hanoverian court during these years, and to which it more than once alludes,¹ it is more natural to refer it to the years 1684 or 1685, whilst the project was still somewhat hopeful, than to the later years, when it had begun to languish, and was regarded by Leibnitz himself as indefinitely postponed, if not, indeed, utterly lost.

Among the necessary data for a satisfactory solution of the inquiry into the motives, and especially the sincerity, of Leibnitz in composing the *System of Theology*, there still remains one of exceeding importance,—the history of his connexion with the renewed negotiations for re-union of the Court of Hanover, and especially of his lengthened correspondence on the subject. It will be more convenient, therefore, to defer the consideration of this inquiry till the narrative of these transactions shall have been brought to a conclusion.

¹ For instance, p. 88: “Nor is it possible to doubt that she (the Church) will reform these abuses with greater facility *when unity shall have been restored*, and when, *peace being established*, her entire solicitude shall be concentrated

upon the cure of her domestic evils.” See also pp. 68, 80; and a still more explicit allusion in pp. 69-70, where certain terms are suggested, according to which Protestants may be “received into the bosom of the Church.”

In the year 1686, Spinola was named, by the Emperor Leopold, Bishop of Wienerisch-Neustadt, a city upon the Leita, within a few leagues of Vienna. Whether it is attributable to the cares of his new charge, to his failing health, or to the unfavourable circumstances of the times, he appears to have interrupted his mission for some years afterwards. In 1691, however, the project was resumed. The Emperor again invested him with a commission similar to that which he had previously held, and, on March 20th, issued letters patent, empowering him to treat, in his name, “with all states, communities, or even individuals, of the Protestant religion, in all his kingdoms and territories, but especially with those of Hungary and Transylvania, on the subject of union in matters of faith, and the extinction or diminution of unnecessary controversies.”¹ On this occasion, as upon the former one, Hanover became the centre of the negotiations, and a large share of the labour, as well as of the responsibility, fell upon Leibnitz.

About the years 1686-7 a work had appeared in France which produced an extraordinary sensation in the literary and religious world,—M. Pellisson’s *Réflexions sur les Différends de la Religion*. The author, one of the most distinguished literary men of the age, had become a Catholic some years before, under the direction of Bossuet; and his previous reputation, as well as the undoubted abi-

¹ *Œuvres de Bossuet*, xiv. 2.

lity of the work, and its exceedingly captivating style, fixed upon it, from the moment of its publication, a more than ordinary share of public notice. The Princess Louisa, Abbess of Maubuisson, sent a copy of it to her sister, the Duchess Sophia of Hanover, by whom it was immediately submitted to Leibnitz. The result was a correspondence between Leibnitz and the author, which was eventually published, and which displays, in a very marked manner, those principles of Leibnitz on communion with the Church, to which we have already alluded.¹ For our present purpose, however, it is chiefly important, as having given occasion to the great event of Leibnitz's theological life,—his protracted correspondence with Bossuet.

As far back as the negotiations of 1683, the scheme of union, *Regulæ circa Christianorum omnium Reunionem*, drawn up by Molanus and his colleagues, had been communicated to Bossuet through the Abbess of Maubuisson, or her friend and confidante, Madame de Brinon. Bossuet, however, apparently not regarding the essay as of much practical promise, had contented himself with expressing in general terms his sympathy with the object it was intended to effect. During the progress of the correspondence between Leibnitz and Pelisson, the Duchess Sophia having, in a letter to her sister, referred M. Pelisson to the copy of these articles which had been sent to Bossuet several

¹ See pp. lxiii., lxiv.

years before, and the latter having stated that the paper had been mislaid and could no longer be found, a new copy was transmitted to him. Even before he received it a second time, however, he expressed his conviction of the insufficiency of the plan, however useful it might be as a preliminary step. He frankly stated the impossibility of any sacrifice or compromise of defined doctrines on the part of the Church of Rome; assuring them also that the doctrinal decrees of the Council of Trent were received by the Church of France, and by all Catholics without exception; and that, beyond such favourable explanations of the Protestant objections to the received doctrines, as were compatible with the strict letter of the defined articles of faith, and such relaxations of discipline as the indulgent charity of the sovereign Pontiff might deem expedient, no concessions could be legitimately promised or hoped for. In consequence of the unfavourable opinion thus expressed by Bossuet regarding the *Regulæ*, it was thought expedient to transmit to him, in the end of that year,¹ a fuller explanation of the views of the Lutheran party, drawn up by Molanus, in his own name, and as conveying his own individual opinions on the subject of Church union, without prejudice to those entertained by other members of his communion. A translation of this document will be found in the Appendix

¹ The last part was not sent till Dec. 10, 1691. *Bossuet*, xiv. 360. *Œuvres de*

to this volume.¹ Its purport may be briefly stated as follows :—

As an indispensable preliminary of the proposed negotiation, certain mutual concessions, chiefly explanatory, are to be made by the rival Churches.

On the side of the Roman Pontiff it is proposed that he shall concede to the Protestants :

1. The use of the Communion under both kinds.
2. The non-enforcement of private Masses, in which the priest alone communicates.
3. The right of retaining their principles on the subject of justification ; namely, that the sinner must not rely on his own merit, but upon that of the death and sufferings of Christ.
4. The marriage of the clergy, and even the right of marrying a second time.
5. The ratification of the orders hitherto administered in the Protestant communion.
6. The maintenance of the existing settlement of Church property, and of all ecclesiastical rights, privileges, and immunities established by existing treaties, in so far as this may be found consistent with the law of God.

On the side of the Protestants it is proposed :

1. That they shall recognise the Roman Pontiff as first in order and dignity, by ecclesiastical right, of all bishops, as sovereign Patriarch, and especially Patriarch of the West, and shall yield due obedience to him in spiritual things.
2. That they shall recognise the Roman Catholics as bre-

¹ No. I.

thren, notwithstanding their adhering to Communion in one kind only. 3. That they shall recognise the subordination of priests to bishops, bishops to archbishops, and the other details of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

These preliminary concessions having been made, the Emperor and the other Princes interested in the work of union, are to send delegates of approved learning, moderation, and zeal, to confer upon the adjustment of the ulterior causes of dissension, and especially to discuss the doctrinal differences of the two Churches. These are distributed into three distinct classes, in each of which a different course of proceeding will be necessary.

The first class comprehends those controversies which are purely verbal, and in which, when they are fairly stated, and their terms duly explained, there is no real difference between the parties. Such are, according to the views of Molanus, the questions of the Sacrifice of the Mass; the intention required in administering a sacrament; the number of the sacraments; the nature and effects of justification; the sufficiency of faith thereto; the certainty of justification and of perseverance; the possibility of fulfilling the law; the imputability of involuntary concupiscence and of venial sins; the intrinsic nature of good works, and their agreeableness in the sight of God.

Upon the questions of this class, the writer

maintains, that, between the well-informed of the two Communion, there is no substantial disagreement; and therefore that, in order to a perfect union, there needs but a calm and dispassionate mutual explanation of their respective opinions.

The second class comprises those questions upon which there does exist a real difference between the two parties, but on which, either upon one side or the other, both the opposite opinions are tolerated. To this class belong, on the one side, such questions as prayers for the dead, the necessity of good works, the ubiquity of Christ's Body; on all of which, although the faith of the Catholics is fixed and uniform, yet there exists a difference of opinion among Protestants; and, on the other, the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, the nature and origin of the merit of good works, the adoration of the Host, and the exclusive authority of the Vulgate, on which certain differences of opinion exist among Catholics, while the Protestants are unanimous in rejecting these doctrines altogether.

The plan suggested for the adjustment of such controversies as these is, that, where a doctrine which is unanimously held in one Church, whether the Catholic or the Protestant, is held, or even tolerated, by some members of the other, the latter shall, for peace-sake, consent to receive this doctrine as its own. Thus, upon the one side, while the Catholics, without any exception, hold the

lawfulness and utility of the practice of prayer for the dead, although the majority of Protestants condemn it, yet there are some Protestants who think it laudable, and others who believe it to be at least tolerable. Upon the other hand, while Protestants unanimously reject the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, Catholics are divided regarding it. For peace-sake, therefore, mutual concessions are to be enforced, and each party is to be required to sacrifice a portion of its opinions. In the cases referred to, for example, the Catholics, as a body, are to abandon the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and the Protestants are to submit without reserve to the practice of prayer for the dead.

The third and most formidable class comprises those questions on which there exists a real and substantial difference of opinion, not merely between individual members of both Churches, or between one Church and individual members of the other, but between the two Churches themselves. This class, it is unnecessary to say, presents more difficulty than both the others. It comprises the doctrines of the invocation of saints; image-worship; transubstantiation; the permanence of Christ's Presence in the Eucharist; Purgatory; the carrying of the Host in procession; the enumeration of sins in confession; the canon of Sacred Scripture; tradition; the judge of controversies; the use of the Latin Liturgy; the divine right of

the primacy of the Roman Pontiff; the practice of fasting; monastic vows; the reading of the Bible in the vulgar tongue; indulgences; the presbyterian question; and the authority of the Council of Trent.

Yet even for questions of so much difficulty as these, Molanus does not despair. His plan for their settlement is; either an amicable and dispassionate arbitration, in a private conference of approved divines of both parties; or, if this shall fail of success, an appeal to a public council regularly convoked, and conducted according to the canons; the disputation being carried on by doctors, but the right of voting being reserved exclusively for bishops; to which order the Protestant Superintendents shall be recognised as belonging, and in which they shall have the equal and unrestricted right of sitting, "co-ordinately with Roman Catholic bishops, as competent judges." And notwithstanding the complication of interests involved in such a discussion, and the seeming impossibility of reconciling the conflicting views which it must elicit, Molanus professes his belief, that even without the appeal to a council, most of the existing controversies might thus be satisfactorily adjusted; and, selecting as specimens, several of those which seem to promise least success, as transubstantiation, the invocation of saints, image-worship, purgatory, the divine right of the primacy, monastic vows, and traditions, he endeavours to shew that, even in the points in

which the Churches appear farthest separated from each other, the interval may be diminished, and perhaps entirely removed, by calm and judicious explanation of the real grounds of division and of its precise extent.

Such are the outlines of the plan submitted to Bossuet. It has been thought necessary to be thus precise in its details, both because it was drawn up with the full cognisance and concurrence of Leibnitz,¹ and, not only in its opinions, but even in the expressions which it employs, will often be found to tally very closely with the *Systema*, but also because, in the correspondence with Bossuet which ensued, Leibnitz fully identified himself with it, and appeared to assume all the responsibility of its opinions. The reply of Bossuet, which was transmitted to Leibnitz, August 28, 1692, is one of the most interesting and characteristic of all the works of this extraordinary man. It is in Latin; but was accompanied, as was also the essay of Molanus, by a French translation from the author's own pen, designed chiefly for the use of the Duchess of Hanover, and her sister, the Abbess of Maubuisson, and much more simple and popular in its character than the original. He enters at great length, and with all the frankness and precision which were the leading characteristics of his mind, into the numberless obscure and embarrassing questions which

¹ See his letter to Madame de *de Bossuet*, xiv. 359-60. Brinon, Dec. 17, 1691. *Œuvres*

arose out of Molanus's proposal. The subject was one for which his previous studies had peculiarly prepared him. While his researches for the "History of the Variations of Protestantism" had made him familiar with all the shades of opinion tolerated within its pale, he had learned in his studies for the "Exposition of the Faith" to define the exact limits of Catholic belief, and to mark with ready precision, on every subject, the point beyond which concession can never legitimately go. Hence his strictures upon the various propositions of Molanus are marked by a vigour and decision, which present a very striking contrast with the doubting and hesitating tone that too often characterises every attempt at conciliation. Stripping the controversies in succession of all technicalities; clearing away the ambiguities and obscurity in which dishonest or unskilful disputants had involved them; separating doctrine from discipline, and theory from practice; vindicating principles from the odium which their abuse or false application had entailed, and bringing all back to the simple and rigorous test of the doctrinal formularies, he places in the clearest and plainest light, on the one hand, what the Catholic Church must demand as essential and indispensable conditions of admission to her communion, and on the other, what she may be expected to concede to prejudice, weakness, or necessities of position, on the part of those who seek to be reunited thereto.

But first he objects to the order of proceeding proposed by Molanus and his friends, and especially reprobates the idea of any union of the parties until after the doctrinal differences between them shall have been adjusted. If this settlement be not feasible, all the rest will be of no avail ; if it be, it is plain that to commence with it is the only means of giving hope and stability to the negotiation. Nevertheless, he discusses separately all the propositions of Molanus, and the expositions which he offers on the various questions at issue. He takes exception also against some of Molanus's explanations on the doctrine of justification, and also against the terms in which he expresses himself on the subject of the Primacy, as not sufficiently explicit ; and he distinctly declares the demand for the recognition of the validity of the Lutheran orders, and of their administration of the sacraments, to be entirely inadmissible. And yet those who are accustomed to the acrimony of modern polemics will hardly be prepared to hear how closely the controversy approached to an amicable adjustment in the hands of these distinguished men. If the principles laid down by Molanus were adopted by the other members of his communion, and extended to their natural and legitimate consequences, Bossuet professed not to see any further difficulty in the way of a re-union.¹ Briefly summing up the heads of the discussion, he declares his opinion that on all

¹ p. 226.

essential points the parties were already of one mind, or at least could easily be brought to agreement. Thus, adopting Molanus's explanation on the subject of justification, he regards both sides as agreed in holding that it is gratuitous; that good works performed after justification are meritorious of eternal life in virtue of God's merciful promise; that the fulfilment of the law is possible, at least so far as regards the avoidance of mortal sin; that justice, though not absolutely perfect, is true and real; that this justice and all our merits are but gifts of God and effects of His grace; that the Catholic explanation of justifying faith is perfectly admissible; that it is unjust to represent Catholics as attributing the glory of their sanctification to any other than to God; and that good works are necessary for salvation, and are the objects of the rewards which God bestows. In like manner he holds that, if Molanus's view meet the approval of his Church, the controversies on the subject of the sacraments need not present any further difficulty. The parties, according to this view, agree in believing their efficacy *ex opere operato*, and the necessity of an intention in administering them. On the Eucharist, in particular, they agree in rejecting the notion of the ubiquity of Christ's Body, and in admitting the Real Presence of Christ, whole and entire, in each kind; a real change of the sacramental bread, which contains the principle of transubstantiation in all but the name;

the permanence of Christ's presence ; the adoration of the Host ; the sacrifice of the Mass ; the lawfulness of private Masses ; and the absolute admissibility of communion in one kind. On the subject of Penance, they both admit the efficacy of absolution accompanied by the three acts of the penitent, the practice of confession, and the fundamental principles of satisfaction. Orders, also, they are agreed in holding to be a sacrament ; and Bossuet is of opinion that, after due explanation, the same would be admitted for the remaining three. Nor does their success appear to him less complete as regards worship. The invocation of saints and the worship of images, as they are explained in the Catholic Church, were recognised in Molanus's exposition, as free from all objection, and perfectly reconcilable with the Scriptures. Molanus's explanations on the practice of praying, and even offering the sacrifice for the dead (which necessarily involves the belief of purgatory), were, in Bossuet's judgment, sufficiently satisfactory ; and, from the fact of the Lutherans regarding as saints, men who had observed the monastic vows, practised perpetual celibacy, offered the sacrifice of the Mass, and followed all the other disciplinary observances of Rome, he infers that they look upon the worship of the Roman Church as, in all essentials, identical with their own. Lastly, he discovers, or anticipates that, on due explanation being given, it will be easy to discover, the same substantial agreement regard-

ing the rule of faith and the judge of controversy. The views of both parties on the inspiration of the Scriptures, the authority of the original text and the Vulgate translation, on tradition, the infallibility of the Church, and of general councils, and even on the primacy of the Pope, appear to him not to differ in any material particular, or in such a way as to interfere with their full and free ecclesiastical communion.

Such was the hopeful view taken by Bossuet of the doctrinal explanations proposed by Molanus. On his own part, he declares himself content, accepting these explanations, to dispense with the humiliating and offensive form of a retraction, proposing in its stead a simple declaration or authoritative exposition to be subscribed by the adherents of the union. This doctrinal declaration once agreed on, he holds out a promise of many important disciplinary concessions.

1. That, in the districts in which there are no Catholic bishops, the Lutheran superintendents shall, on subscribing the Declaration, be consecrated as bishops, and the inferior clergy as parish priests and curates, subject to their jurisdiction.
2. That, where there are bishops already, the Lutheran clergy shall be ordained to serve in the ministry under these bishops, according to their several grades of dignity.
3. That a due provision shall be made for the new bishops, parish priests, and curates; and that (except in the case of hos-

pitals, which, as being the property of the poor, should be held inviolable) the existing appropriations of Church property shall be respected and confirmed. 4. That whenever the Lutheran bishops and clergy shall be found to have been duly ordained, and to have maintained the due succession, they shall be recognised as lawful bishops and priests, on their subscribing the Declaration. 5. That the celebration of Mass on solemn festivals shall be rendered as decorous as possible, and shall be accompanied by instruction; that at certain portions of the Office, prayers or hymns in the vernacular language shall be introduced, care being taken to explain to the people all that is expressed in Latin in the public Liturgy, and to disseminate translations and approved explanations thereof. 6. That translations of the Scriptures shall be allowed to the people in the vulgar tongue, and shall be publicly read at stated times, with suitable commentaries; and that, in consideration of its elegance and terseness, even the version of Luther may be permitted, provided it be first subjected to a rigorous revision, and expurgated of all arbitrary additions to the text, such as "faith alone justifies," and of all notes and commentaries which may savour of the schism. 7. That all communicants shall be exhorted to communicate at the public service; but that, nevertheless, the absence of communicants shall not be a reason for abstaining from the celebration of Mass. 8. That communion shall

be administered under both kinds to the adherents of the union, under such precautions as shall secure the due reverence of the Sacrament. 9. That the newly-formed dioceses and parishes shall be left at liberty as to the introduction or non-introduction of monastic establishments within their boundaries. 10. That every thing savouring of avarice or superstition shall be eliminated from the worship of saints and images; and that all shall be regulated in these matters according to the constitutions of the Council of Trent. 11. That the Missal, Breviary, and other Liturgical books, shall be reformed, and every thing doubtful, suspicious, or superstitious, shall be expunged from them. 12. That the members of the Lutheran clergy, who, upon occasion of the union, shall be admitted to the order of priesthood, or even the episcopate, shall be permitted to retain their wives; all those, however, who shall at any future time receive orders in the Church being held subject to the common law of celibacy.¹

So far, therefore, the prospect of agreement appeared sufficiently cheering. And as the propositions of Molanus received the full sanction of

¹ This article was erased by Bossuet from the copy which he retained in his own possession, and which was published in his works. But he appended a note in this copy in which he stated that the article, as it stands above, was transmitted to Leibnitz and Mola-

nus; and, in the memoir upon the subject of Church union, which he sent to Clement XI. in 1702, he embodied this, as one of the concessions to the Protestant party which he proposed for the consideration of the Pope. See Bausset's *Vie de Bossuet*, iv. 150-1.

his friend Leibnitz, it will be of great importance to bear all those particulars in mind, in forming a judgment of the *System of Theology*, which was but another plan drawn up by Leibnitz himself, with the same or a similar object.

There was one point, however, on which the parties were directly opposed, and on which it seemed difficult to hope for conciliation. Spinola, from the very commencement, probably misled by the supposed articles of John Philip, the Elector of Maintz, alluded to in a former page, had not only abstracted from the decrees of the Council of Trent, as doctrinal authorities in the discussion, but had held out a promise that the Council itself should be set aside, its anathemas withdrawn, and its definitions subjected to a new scrutiny, conducted jointly, in a new council, by members of both branches of the union. This understanding formed a leading condition, not only of Molanus's private proposal, but also of the preliminary scheme of union (*Regulæ circa omnium Christianorum Unionem*) which he had drawn up in conjunction with the other divines of Hanover. Bossuet, on the other hand, in his very earliest communication, had declared that all such hopes were groundless; that, although the discipline of the Council of Trent was not adopted in France, its doctrinal decrees were received by all Catholics, in France, as well as elsewhere; and that the very constitution of the Roman Church rendered it impossible

for her either to abandon the authority of her legitimate Councils, or to permit further doubt or discussion of the articles defined therein. And hence, although he abstracts, throughout the discussion, from the authority of the Tridentine decrees, he declares, nevertheless, that this abstraction must be the extreme limit of concession; and that it is absolutely impossible for the Roman Church to receive any candidate for her communion, who shall reject the authority of this Council in matters of faith, even though he were to admit the whole body of doctrine defined therein.¹

Unfortunately for the success of the projected union, as well as for the illustration of the *System of Theology*, this was the point upon which the discussion turned from this time forward. If Leibnitz had entered into the theological details of Molanus's plan, and expressed his opinions on the explanations of the Lutheran doctrines suggested by him, and in great part accepted by Bossuet, we should have had, in this correspondence, a running commentary upon his own unpublished work; and although we may be justified in concluding from his silence on these details, that he was prepared to acquiesce in them all, yet a formal expression of his judgment upon each would have been infinitely more satisfactory. But unfortunately, from the time at which Leibnitz took up the correspondence with Bossuet, he confined himself almost en-

¹ p. 245.

tirely to this single point, to the entire exclusion of all consideration of the particular doctrines controverted between the Churches, which had hitherto formed the main subject of discussion. From the commencement of his correspondence with Bossuet, too, Leibnitz assumed almost the entire management of the negotiation. Although Molanus, in August 1693, sent forward a *Further Explanation of the Method of Reunion*, yet the weight of the discussion fell upon Leibnitz; and Bossuet more than once expressed his regret that he “had entirely lost sight of the Abbot of Lokkum in the affair.”

Hence, as the main purpose of this sketch is to supply materials for an accurate estimate of the known theological opinions of Leibnitz, in so far as they may illustrate the views put forward by him in the *System of Theology*, it will not be necessary to enter into the particulars of his correspondence with Bossuet, which turned almost entirely upon the authority of the Council of Trent, a point never once directly alluded to in that work. It will be interesting, however, to transcribe the impartial and discriminating judgment which Dr. Guhrauer has pronounced upon the result of this correspondence. “It is not,” he writes,¹ “to the principle of the Catholic Church as such, nor to the erudition or acuteness of Bossuet, nor to his mere personal weight as a prelate of the Church, but to the more just ground which he took in his controversy with

¹ *Leben*, ii. 57, and foll.

Leibnitz, that we are to attribute the undeniable moral and logical advantage which he obtained over the latter, who was embarrassed by the difficult, entangled, and inconsequential position which he occupied in the discussion. If Leibnitz attempted to draw the question into the subjective region of theological controversy or of diplomatic negotiation, Bossuet never failed to hold out to him in reply the objective dignity of the Church whose organ he was. If Leibnitz wrote (Jan. 8, 1692): ‘we have approached the banks of the Bidassoa (alluding to the Peace of the Pyrenees), to pass over one day to the island of the conference;’ or, ‘there must be a difference between advocates, who plead, and mediators, who negotiate; the one shut themselves up in distant and studied reserve, while the others evince by their proceedings, that their honest and sincere desire is to facilitate the adjustment of peace;’—the Bishop of Meaux replied (August 12): ‘As regards the advances which you seem to expect on our side with reference to dogmas of faith, I have often answered, that the constitution of the Roman Church permits no other advance than in the way of explanation. The affairs of religion cannot be treated as we treat those of merely secular interest, which are often arranged by the parties mutually abandoning some of the points in dispute. Because these are things which lie within the power of men; but the concerns of faith depend upon revelation; and in these men

may offer each other mutual explanations, in order to bring about a better mutual understanding of their respective views ; but this is the only method available upon our side. It would be idle for me to propose any other method, and would be a very ill-timed moderation ; the true moderation, in such circumstances, consists in explaining one's position candidly ; because every other attempt at complaisance can only tend to the loss of time, and, in the end, to still more fatal consequences.' If Leibnitz accumulated difficulties against the authority of the Council of Trent, with such wonderful erudition and acuteness as to have thereby merited the very highest rank as a Protestant theologian, the question still remained for Bossuet, what did this subterfuge avail him, if we must, nevertheless, believe Transubstantiation, the Sacrifice, the divine right of the primacy, invocation of saints, and prayers for the dead, all of which have been defined in previous Councils, unless we be prepared to cut off, by a single stroke, all the Councils held in Christendom for the seven or eight centuries prior to the Reformation. ' Find a means of averting this deordination and confusion,' he could still insist, ' or hesitate, before you lay hands, as you now propose, upon the means which already exist.' ”

This correspondence extends over a space of nearly three years. It was quietly broken off, in 1694, by Bossuet, who returned no answer to Leibnitz's letter of August 12th in that year. The Em-

peror Leopold, nevertheless, still persisted in his project; and on the death of Spinola, in 1695, invested his successor in the see of Neustadt, Count von Bucheim, with the same commission which Spinola had so long held. It is not unlikely that, for this envoy also, the sanction of Pope Innocent XII. was obtained.¹ In the year 1698, he came to Hanover, accompanied by some Franciscan theologians. The elector, Ernest Augustus, had died in the beginning of that year (January 23d); but his son and successor, George Lewis (afterwards George I. of England), received the Emperor's proposal with equal warmth, and commissioned Molanus to renew the negotiation so long interrupted. Leibnitz also received a similar charge; and, in May 1700, was invited to Vienna by the Emperor, who now resolved to make his own capital the centre of the negotiation. This attempt, however, proved even less felicitous than the former ones. It does not appear to have led to any practical result whatsoever. Molanus was deterred from entering into it with the same warm interest which he had manifested in the Conferences of 1691, by a report, industriously circulated, that his moderation was but a cloak for a design which he had long cherished, of formally apostatising to Popery;²

¹ Schlegel's *Neuere Kirchengeschichte*, iii. 314. See also Menzel, ix. 305.

² Molanus found it necessary

to defend himself against this charge; and this he did in a letter to his friend Engelbrecht, containing a profession of faith

and other motives of a similar character acted as a check upon the zeal of his associates.¹

During the progress of these new conferences, an opportunity was taken by Leibnitz to renew the suspended correspondence with Bossuet. This correspondence, however, like the former one, throws but little light on the *System of Theology*. Leibnitz appears to have commenced it at the instance of Anthony Ulric, Duke of Brunswick. In the early part of 1699, a compendium of Veron's well-known *Rule of Faith* had appeared in Germany,² probably with a view to the conferences then pending. A copy of it had been sent to the Duke by the editor, who was aware of his conciliatory principles. The professed object of Leibnitz's letter to Bossuet (December 11, 1699) was to ascertain, on the Duke's behalf, whether this publication had the Bishop's approval, which, in the opinion of the

which he had introduced into his last will and testament. See Schlegel, iii. 316, and foll.

¹ Menzel, ix. 305.

² It was entitled, "Secretiorum quæ de Fide Catholica ab eis quæ non sunt de Fide, in Controversiis plerisque hoc Sæculo motis; juxta Regulam Fidei ab Ex. D. F. Veronio antehac compilatam; ex ipso Concilio Tridentino et præfata Regula compendiose excerptæ. Anno 1699." The work was published anonymously, but is said to have been compiled by Nicholas von Zizwitz, a Catholic prelate. The ori-

ginal work was written in French, with the title, *Règle Générale de la Foi Catholique*. The author was the celebrated controversialist, Francis Veron, an ex-Jesuit and Curé of Charenton, who died in 1649. The compendium is usually found annexed to the work itself. Both have been frequently reprinted in a separate form; they are also generally printed with the compendium of the Walenburch Controversies, and will be found in Braun's extremely useful collection, *Bibliotheca Regularum Fidei*, vol. i. Bonn, 1536.

Duke, "was equivalent to that of Rome itself." From the principles put forward by Bossuet in the solution of this question, the discussion a second time turned, almost exclusively, upon a point into which, in the *System of Theology*, Leibnitz has not entered at all—viz. the Canon of sacred Scripture, as determined by the Council of Trent. Perhaps there is no part of the works of Leibnitz which exhibits all his powers as a disputant in a more favourable light, than the elaborate essay,¹ in which he contests the authority of the Deutero-canonical books. To this dissertation Bossuet replied in several letters; but especially in a very lengthened one (August 17, 1701).² With this communication, to which Leibnitz returned no answer, the correspondence closed. Bossuet died a few years later, in April 1704.

Other influences, unfavourable to the union, however, had already come into operation. The death of the Pope, Innocent XII., in Sept. 1700; that of Charles II. of Spain, in the following September, which led to the War of the Succession, and interrupted the friendly relations of most of the Cabinets which had been engaged in the Union; most of all, the death (August 20, 1700) of the young Duke of Gloucester, the last of the children of Anne, and the only remaining obstacle to the succession of the house of Hanover to the

¹ In his letters of May 14 and May 24, 1700. *Œuvres de* Bossuet, xiv. 488-531.

² *Œuvres*, xiv. 548-569.

English throne—a succession, the fundamental condition of which was the profession of Protestantism—had the effect of withdrawing from the Emperor Leopold's measures the main support on which they had hitherto rested. He himself died in 1705. His son Joseph I. was too much occupied with other interests, to pursue an object which had now begun to appear all but chimerical; and it may be said that, with Leopold, the project of Church union, to which so many years of his life had been devoted, fell to the ground, hopelessly and for ever.

Another transaction, however, of a somewhat analogous character, took place soon afterwards, in which Leibnitz acted an important, though not prominent, part, and which it would be unpardonable to overlook in estimating his religious character and principles. In seeking an alliance for the new King of Spain, Charles III., political circumstances directed the choice of his brother, the Emperor, among the sovereign houses of Germany, which were for the most part Protestant; and, as an indispensable condition of the Spanish alliance was conformity to the Catholic religion, considerable difficulty was experienced in the selection. This condition was declined by the first princess to whom it was proposed, Wilhelmina Charlotte of Brandenburg-Anspach.¹ Recourse was next had to the house of Brunswick Wolfenbüttel, one

¹ Menzel, ix. 490-1.

of the daughters of which, the Princess Elizabeth Christina, was distinguished by her beauty and accomplishments. The Duke Lewis Rodolf, her father, a strict Lutheran, regarded the alliance with great disfavour, and this feeling was shared by her mother; but her grandfather, Anthony Ulric, who had been long favourably disposed towards Catholicity, not only used all his influence to combat their reluctance, but, in the end, undertook, in his own name, whatever of imputability might attach to the step. With the view of disarming opposition, he endeavoured to obtain a declaration in favour of the lawfulness of the required compliance, from some of the ecclesiastical authorities of the principality. The case was therefore laid before a number of Lutheran divines, among whom, the most remarkable were the Abbot of Lokkum, Molanus, Thomasius of Halle, and Fabricius of Helmstädt.¹ Molanus, with some others, declared definitively against the lawfulness of the step; Thomasius returned an evasive answer, abstaining from a positive condemnation of the course. Fabricius, and some of his friends at Helmstädt, true to the old syncretistic principles of their university, declared that it was perfectly lawful, under the circumstances, on the ground that salvation was attainable in the Catholic Church no less than in the Protestant, both Churches possessing in common "all the

¹ See Menzel, ix. 492-8.

fundamentals of Christian faith and practice, and the essentials of salvation.”¹ Fortified by this decision, the Duke consented to the marriage, upon the terms proposed. The princess was formally received into the Church by the Archbishop of Maintz, at Bamberg, May 1, 1707, and the marriage took place in the following year. The opposition, however, which it met among the more zealous Lutherans, rendered it necessary for the Court to publish, in its own justification, the Declaration of the Helmstädt divines, which was immediately translated into German, and circulated among the people. But whatever may have been its effect in quieting discontent at home, it was attended elsewhere with another consequence, which does not appear to have been anticipated, The “Act of Settlement,” which excluded from the English succession the Duchess of Savoy and her Catholic

¹ The title of the opinion was, “*Declaratio Helmst. Theol. de Discrimine exili Lutheranam inter et Romanam Ecclesiam, transituque ad Romanos Ritus non illicito.*” It will be found in the *Journal de Trevoux* for 1708, pp. 900 et seq.; and a free German translation was printed at Cologne in 1707, entitled “*Erörterte Frage Herrn Fabricii, Theol. Doctoris und Professoris, anfangs zu Altdorf, und jetzt zu Helmstädt, dass zwischen den Augsburgischen Confession und Catholischen Religion kein sonderlicher Unterschied seye, und*

dass man bey dieser, so wohl als jenen, seelig werden könne also statuirte, occasione einer vorgewesenen Vermählung eines Catholischen Königs und Evangelischen Princessin. Anno 1707.” A translation of the latter will be found in the Appendix, No. II. I have translated from this, rather than from the Latin, for a reason which may be inferred from the history of the affair, viz. that it seems to have been this German translation which was the subject of the correspondence between Leibnitz and his friend Fabricius.

descendants, having limited the succession to the younger branch—that of the Electress Sophia of Hanover and her issue—only on the condition of their being Protestants, it began to be felt that a proceeding, exhibiting so much lukewarmness on the subject of Protestantism, not to say absolute tendency towards the religion which it had been one of the great objects of the Revolution to exclude, could hardly fail to peril the popularity of the house of Brunswick in England. And so it proved. The decision of the University of Helmstädt, which was maliciously represented as the national university of Hanover, gave the greatest umbrage to the entire Protestant party; and the discontent was increased by the intrigues of the Jacobites, whose hopes had begun to revive. Earnest remonstrances were addressed from England to the divines of Helmstädt, who, as the decision had not emanated from the whole Faculty, were enabled to disclaim it as a body, Fabricius himself signing this disclaimer. A special letter, however, was addressed to the reputed author of the document, Fabricius, by Dr. Andrew Snape of Cambridge;¹ to which he formally replied, adding, at the same time, an address of the same purport, *Ad Pios et Eruditos Britannos*. His position was an exceedingly embarrassing one. There can be no doubt

¹ He was a fellow, and eventually provost, of King's College, Cambridge, and subsequently distinguished himself very much in

the Hoadly controversy. He had been on familiar terms with Fabricius before the correspondence.

whatever that the decision had emanated from him. But Menzel explains his conduct by supposing, that, as the German translation which had been put in circulation in reality was not his, he took advantage of the circumstance to evade the accusation.¹

Our main concern, however, is with the part taken by Leibnitz in the discussions regarding this disclaimer. He was early apprised of the dissatisfaction occasioned by the decision in England, and entered at once into communication with Fabricius upon the subject. The correspondence continued for two months (Sept. 3 till Nov. 4, 1708). The letters of Leibnitz will be found in the fifth volume of his works. The spirit of them all will be sufficiently understood from the following passages of a letter, dated October 15, 1708, containing the writer's strictures upon Fabricius's proposed form of disclaimer.

“Your letter to Snape I like, but that ‘to the Britons’ is not equally satisfactory. Most of the modern Anglicans are entirely averse to the opinions of Laud and Forbes, which are supposed now-a-days to meet the approval of none but the Jacobites. Parker, in James the Second’s time, was grievously suspected of Popery, and of servility to the crown. To all these, therefore, it would be more injurious than otherwise. I think that some additions and some retrenchments should be made

¹ See Menzel, ix. 498-502.

in the letter to Snape, and that he should be requested to communicate it to his friends. . . . At this very moment, I learn from Holland that 'the Archbishop of Canterbury is not satisfied with the declaration of the divines of Helmstädt, because it does not contain a formal expression of abhorrence of Popery,' and other still more harsh sentiments are added. I must confess that your protestation never appeared to me sufficient; because it contains merely a declaration of what you did not do, but no expression of the opinions which you really entertain. Your letter to Snape is more to the purpose, and after some revisions, I will send it to Basnage. I have taken the liberty of making some alterations and some erasions, leaving them, however, to your own judgment. . . . It would be absurd indeed to draw from your reply an argument against the Hanoverian succession; but you know, that, with the unlearned and the vulgar, who often form a large class of the community, even more absurd things have their weight. *Our sole right to the British crown rests upon the exclusion and detestation of the Roman religion, and therefore we must avoid every thing that savours of lukewarmness on the subject of Popery.* In your letter to Snape I have erased the word *promiscuo*, in the passage in which you repel the calumny, as though you had been accused of deciding that the change to Popery was *in all cases* lawful. For, from a denial so limited as this, it would be inferred, by a

contrary argument, that you had declared it lawful in the case of the princess (now the queen), which I do not think is true, and should not be admitted. For such a change can only be excused on the score of an erroneous conscience; and a statement to that effect is not equivalent to a simple declaration of its lawfulness."¹

The part taken by Leibnitz in this very equivocal transaction has been frequently represented² as a conclusive evidence, not alone that a change took place in the later years of his life in his sentiments with reference to the Catholic religion, but also that this change was the result of interested motives, and of a political servility unworthy of so great a name. This charge may be considered under two different aspects. If we consider very strictly the principles upon the subject of the necessity of communion with the Church which Leibnitz had uniformly avowed, it can hardly be said that, at any period of his life, he would, in conformity with these principles, have held it to be lawful for an individual Protestant, in consideration of mere temporal interest, to desert the communion of his own Church for that of Rome. His letters to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, to Pelisson, and to Madame de Brinon, referred to in a former page, all suppose that the actual communion of Rome, however desirable it may be in itself, not

¹ Opp. v. 288-9.

² Bausset, *Vie de Bossuet*, iv. 197-80.

only is not necessary, but cannot even be lawfully purchased at the sacrifice of existing convictions. The motives, too, upon which the admiration of many of the Catholic doctrines expressed not only in the *System of Theology*, but also in his published and avowed writings, is based, are widely different from the loose, unphilosophical, and latitudinarian principles on which the Declaration of Fabricius is made to rest; nor do I think that it can be fairly inferred from any of the known writings of Leibnitz, that his principles would have led him to give his formal sanction to the Princess Elizabeth's becoming a Catholic, on the moral and doctrinal grounds alleged in this Declaration. Nor can it, therefore, be inferred, that, by the mere fact of urging Fabricius and his friends to disavow this decision, he was violating any of the opinions which he had previously expressed. Hence, if he had confined himself to this precise point, the charge would admit of an easy answer.

But unfortunately the letters go much further than this. In his earlier writings, his first object had uniformly been peace and conciliation. Far from exaggerating the prejudices of either party towards the other, or representing in a strong light the points of dispute between them, he had invariably sought to soften down the asperities of controversy, and to remove, by favourable explanation, the difficulties in the way of a mutual good understanding. But in this unhappy correspondence all

is changed. Not satisfied with Fabricius's disavowal of the Declaration, he requires that, besides declaring what he does not think, he should also formally avow what he does think, and represents to him that his alleged tolerance and indulgence towards the Catholic Church might prove prejudicial to the hope of the Hanoverian succession.¹ In another letter he reminds him of the change which has come over the religious opinions of the English Church since the Revolution,² and of the necessity of accommodating himself thereto. In the following month he renews the caution on the subject of the succession, assuring Fabricius that the unfavourable notice which has been fixed upon the Declaration has been the result of the intrigues of the anti-Hanoverian party.³ And in that from which we have already quoted so largely, he more than intimates the necessity of embodying in the proposed disavowal an expression of *abhorrence of Popery*, and formally declares that, as the "sole ground of the succession of the Hanoverian family is England's detestation and exclusion of the Roman religion," the Declaration must at all events "*avoid every thing which savours of lukewarmness on the subject of Popery.*"

It is impossible to reconcile sentiments such as these with the known and undisguised principles of all his earlier life; and it must be admitted that the blunt and unhesitating tone, in which he pro-

¹ Sept. 17, 1708.

² Sept. 22.

³ Oct. 9.

poses to his correspondent the very discreditable motives for temporising which the above passages disclose, furnishes matter for grave suspicion as to the purity and disinterestedness of his own motives at this period of his life.

At all events, to whatever cause it is to be attributed, certain it is that, from the date of the passing of the English Act of Settlement, the zeal of the court of Hanover for the furtherance of union with the Catholic Church was practically at an end. And, as if to make the contrast more striking, a new project for the union of the Lutheran and Calvinist communions was originated at a later period, and to the furtherance of this project Leibnitz applied himself with scarcely less activity than he had manifested in the most promising days of the mission of Spinola. The history of this scheme, however, does not bear in any way upon the present inquiry; and it will be enough to say of it, that, like all its predecessors, it proved a complete failure.

Such was the end of the numberless plans of Church union set on foot by the sovereigns of Germany during the course of the seventeenth century. For the immediate object for which they were designed by their originators, they proved utterly ineffective. The general result, it is true, was favourable to the cause of the Catholic religion, and the movement occasioned many most

important defections from the ranks of Protestantism. To the spirit of enlightened inquiry which it evoked, the Church was indebted for some of the most brilliant triumphs which she had enjoyed in Germany since the Reformation;—for the accession of many royal and illustrious converts, like Christina of Sweden, Frederic Augustus of Poland, Wolfgang William of the Palatinate, Christian William of Brandenburg, Ernest Augustus of Hesse-Rheinfels, John Frederic of Hanover, and his nephew Maximilian; Anthony Ulric of Brunswick, Christian Augustus and Maurice Adolphus of Saxe-Weitz; of distinguished statesmen, like Boineburg and Ranzov; of divines, like Nigrinus, Blum, Prætorius, Bertius, Fromm, and Nihusius; of jurists, like Besold, Hunnius, and the two Nessels; of men of science, like Steno and Hellwig; and of eminent scholars, like Lambeck, Pfeiffer, and Lucas Holstein. But beyond individual conversions such as these, history does not point to any single memorable result of all these ostentatious preparations. Not one of the magnificent hopes so confidently cherished was realised; no union, even of a preliminary or provisional character, was effected; not a single community, however unimportant, was re-attached to the Church; not a single controversy was adjusted; not a division was healed; nor, except in the case of a few eminent individual disputants, was the asperity of general controversy in the smallest degree

diminished.¹ Since the signal failure of the once-promising union actually consummated at Florence, the history of the Church furnishes no lesson so significant of the hopelessness of all such general movements, and of the folly of an individual member of any Church, when once convinced of the necessity of communion with the great Catholic body, perilling his private and personal happiness on the more than problematical expectation of an approximation of the Churches themselves, and bartering his own yearning desire of peace and rest within the bosom of the common Mother, for the brilliant but illusive prospect of enjoying that happiness in the restoration of his Church to the privileges of Catholic unity.

From this brief historical summary we at length return to the original inquiry into the occasion and the motives of the composition of the *System of Theology*. So much, indeed, has been anticipated in the course of the narrative, that very little remains except to state briefly the conclusions to which it seems to lead.

I. No doubt can any longer be entertained regarding the authenticity of the *System of Theology*. The manuscript is unquestionably from the pen of Leibnitz.

¹ Witness the violent and angry discussions to which, at the very close of a century of aspirations after peace and union, the decision of Helmstädt gave rise throughout all Germany.

II. It is difficult to fix with precision the date of its composition; but I have shewn that there are certain limits within which it must be placed. It cannot have been written before the year 1682; for it speaks of Bossuet under the title of Bishop of Meaux, of which see he did not take possession till February 8th in that year. Nor can it well be supposed later than 1689, the year of the death of Innocent XI., of whom it appears to speak as still living. On a full consideration of all the circumstances, the date may, with much probability, be fixed in the end of the year 1683, or the beginning of 1684.

III. Neither in the letter in which Leibnitz expressly alludes to the *System*, nor in any other of his known works, can there be discovered the slightest confirmation of the various conjectures as to the author's motives, which I enumerated above;¹—neither of its originating in his love of paradox, nor in the ambition of trying his powers upon a difficult subject, nor in the desire of quieting the importunity of a friend who was urging him to become a Catholic, nor in the design of outwitting the Jesuits of Vienna in the affair of the Academy of Science.

IV. Nor again—reluctantly as I must abandon such a testimony in favour of Catholic doctrine as that of the illustrious author of the *System of Theology*—can I discover any ground whatever

¹ pp. xiii. xiv.

for the notion which appears to have been entertained by the Abbé Emery, by the German translators Doctors Räss and Weiss, by Dr. Doller, and even by later Catholic writers;¹ namely, that the work was drawn up as a private record of the creed which the author in his heart believed, but which the circumstances of his position prevented him from rendering public; and that, therefore, it should be regarded in the light of a posthumous confession of faith, and, as such, a conclusive evidence that Leibnitz was only restrained by human motives from formally embracing the Catholic communion.

(1.) Intrinsically, this supposition is very improbable. It is entirely unsupported both by his known and published correspondence, and by the many private and confidential memoranda which have been discovered among his remains. It is, moreover, directly at variance with the principles which he uniformly and consistently professed, on the subject of communion with the Church, and with the conduct which he maintained to the end of his life. At no period were his sentiments so thoroughly Catholic, or his admissions so full and unreserved, as while he was attached to the Catholic courts of the Elector of Mainz and John Frederic of Hanover, and under the influence of his friend and patron, Boineburg. Nevertheless, even in these years, he resisted all the influences by

¹ See the dedication of the Abbé La Croix's edition.

which it was sought to gain him over to the Church. In his most private and confidential correspondence during this period, that addressed to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, he vindicated upon a distinct, and though fallacious, yet not inconsistent, theory, his conduct in remaining attached to the Lutheran communion. There is not a single word, even in his most unreserved communications, which would indicate that he ever entertained the idea of the incompatibility of this public conduct with the opinions which he held. Nor does there seem the slightest reason to doubt his own reiterated statements, that, in the knowledge of the sentiments which he entertained, many most tempting offers were held out to him¹—one in the very year before his death²—for the purpose of securing his adhesion to Catholicity.

(2.) Arguments like these, however, could only

¹ See Guhrauer's *Leben*, ii. 94.

² Guhrauer's *Leben*, ii. 316-17.

I shall translate one of his own letters on this subject. It is addressed to the Abbé Thorel, and was written in January 1699. "As to what you tell me of this father's (Père Verjus) design of carrying me off from Hanover, in order to attach me to the Royal Library, I have never heard a word of it. You know, however, that it would involve *a condition which renders it impossible*. To satisfy you of this, I need only say that I

have already declined the charge of librarian of the Vatican, which is frequently a step to the cardinalate, as it has just proved in the case of Cardinal Noris. This, however, is said in strict confidence; for I am not fond of boasting, although I have in my possession documents which prove the truth of what I assert." Published in the *Neues Hanövrishes Magazin*, April 1810, pp. 495-6, quoted by Guhrauer, *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, ii. App. 79.

furnish a certain degree of probability. But there is extrinsic evidence which places the question of Leibnitz's motives in composing the work beyond all dispute. Very early in the controversy, Professor Schulze of Göttingen conjectured that the object of Leibnitz in the composition of the *System* was "to secure from Protestants a favourable consideration for the proposals then pending for a union with the Catholic Church, by a better representation of its doctrines and its practices."¹ And whatever might then be thought of this conjecture upon its own merits, the letters more recently discovered by Dr. Guhrauer shew that it is perfectly just and well-founded.

It is clear from these letters,² that the *System* was professedly intended as a familiar exposition of the leading doctrines of Christianity, and especially of those which are most controverted among modern Christians, to be used as the basis of a union of the Catholic and Protestant Churches. It was devised by the author as a middle course between the unreserved and uninquiring submission to the Roman Church, and unrestricted acceptance of its creed, proposed by one section of the negotiators, and the detailed discussion of the separate controversies which was required by the less pliant among them. In order to avoid the embarrassments

¹ *Ueber die Entdeckung dass Leibnitz ein Katholik gewesen sey*, p. 44.

² See pp. xcii-xcvii.; also Appendix III.

and difficulties involved in the latter course, and at the same time guard against the insecurity, and perhaps bad faith, inseparable from the former, Leibnitz suggests, in the letter so often referred to, the propriety of submitting to certain "learned and moderate Bishops of the Roman Church," an "Exposition of the Faith a little more detailed than that of M. de Condom," for the purpose of ascertaining by their judgment, whether this exposition "would be deemed admissible in their Church," and thus could be relied upon as a safe basis whereon to enter into its communion, without incurring any risk of being subsequently compelled to retrace the step.

The *System of Theology* is clearly the *Exposition* proposed in this letter.

V. Nevertheless, it would seem as if something had occurred to prevent him from fully carrying out this intention. Not only have we no indication of the manuscript having been submitted to any "moderate and learned Bishops of the Roman Church," but there is no evidence of his having communicated it to his own friends, or even to his partners in the conduct of the negotiation. So far from his having done so, he left the work in a most unfinished state. Thus,

(1.) The MS. is a mere rough draft, full of interlineations, erasures, and alterations.

(2.) It breaks off in the middle of a sentence, and even terminates with a comma.

(3.) It omits many of the most important controversies, and those most intimately connected with the negotiation for union; for example, the rule of faith, the sufficiency of Scripture, the canonical books, tradition, the judge of controversy, and even the authority of the Church itself.

(4.) Questions which, in the work itself, are expressly reserved for after discussion, are left nevertheless unelucidated. For example, the authority of the Roman Pontiff (p. 145).

It is plain, therefore, that we must regard the *System* as a work which, however zealously and sincerely it was undertaken, was, nevertheless, left uncompleted, and eventually abandoned by the author.

VI. It appears, further, that it was intended to be published anonymously, and probably not to be communicated except to the parties immediately interested in the negotiation. The letter even insinuates a proposal to submit the work to the judgment of his correspondent, and to adjust it according to his views.

VII. Not only was the writer's name to be withheld, but it was also proposed to conceal the party to which he belonged. Above all, care was to be taken that no ground should be given to suspect that the writer was a Protestant. This alone, according to Leibnitz's view, would draw suspicion even upon the best and most unexceptionable proposition.¹ The manuscript itself bears evident in-

¹ See Pertz *Ueber Leibnitzens Kirchliches Bekenntniss*, p. 23.

dications of the care which was taken to guard against this suspicion. It commences with a profession of perfect neutrality, as though the writer were "a neophyte from a new world, unattached to any party." This neutral tone is sedulously maintained throughout. It is true there are many indications of a decided tendency towards Catholicism, and there are a few passages which it is hard to understand, except in the mouth of a believing Catholic.¹ But, on the other hand, every thing which would betray the author's own secret is carefully excluded; and the manuscript contains traces of alterations and erasures, the object of which plainly was to correct chance expressions unconsciously employed, which would have argued the writer to be a Protestant. One of these erasures may be cited as an example. In speaking² of the protests made by dissentients from the Church against the abuses which prevail within it, the author had unconsciously identified himself with the protesting party, and written *nec vero irritæ sunt protestationes NOSTRORUM*. On reflection, however, he erased *nostrorum*, and left the question as to the writer's own principles in the same uncertainty. I should

¹ For example, in p. 80; and still more in p. 53, where the reformers of the 16th century are called by the opprobrious name, *venditores reformationis*.

² See p. 80. Dr. Pertz (p. 7) cites this as one of the faulty passages of La Croix's text. I am

at a loss how to account for such an oversight on his part. The passage is printed quite correctly not only in La Croix's edition (p. 77), but even in those of Paris (p. 180), and of Maintz (p. 176). In all three editions *nostrorum* is omitted.

add, however, that, a few lines before, a similar oversight, but of an opposite tendency, had occurred in the original draft. In the passage (page 80) in which he reprobates the idea of “approving what, in our calm mind, we should ourselves reject, solely for the purpose of annoying *our adversaries*,” he had originally written, *ut* PROTESTANTIBUS *ægre faciamus*. This would have seemed to imply that the writer was a professed Catholic; and he accordingly changed it into *adversariis*, as we now read it. With the same view (p. 160), *Calvinianis* has been changed into *heterodoxis*; and other expressions, the strength or bitterness of which might appear to argue a partisan origin, have been softened into phrases of a less acrimonious tendency.

VIII. From this circumstance, and from the consideration of the opinions expressed in his acknowledged writings and his familiar correspondence, Schulze, Guhrauer, Pertz, and others of the same school, infer that, in a work thus anonymously, and indeed furtively, compiled, Leibnitz cannot have had any intention of speaking his own sentiments, but merely meant to put on the mask of a conciliating Catholic, and, under this disguise, to represent the doctrines of the Catholic Church in such a light as might best disarm the prejudices with which they were popularly regarded; that the work was intended purely to serve a purpose,—the advancement of the Church policy of the

Hanoverian court; that the author wrote as a diplomatist, and not as a theologian; and that the views which he put forward are no more to be regarded as the result of his own conscientious convictions, than the theories by which, in the political essay published under a similar disguise—the assumed name of “Cæsarinus Furstenerius”—he had sought, a few years before,¹ to advance the interests of his master, the Duke John Frederic.

Now, even if this view of the author’s sentiments were correct, the work would still have its own interest. But it is plainly impossible to reconcile this opinion with the express avowal of Leibnitz himself, contained in the very letters upon which we are now commenting. I am far, indeed, from saying that every word and every phrase of the *System* should be taken as literally conveying the fixed and deliberate opinions of the writer. On the contrary, I have already made it plain that one of his most special anxieties, in the compilation of the essay, was to guard against the danger of its appearing to come from any other than a Catholic pen; I have shewn how, with this view, he weighed every word and adjusted every epithet; and I have no doubt that, with the same intention of imparting to it the appearance of a Catholic origin, he may have adopted, upon ques-

¹ 1677. *Cæsarini Furstenerii tionum Principum Germaniæ. de Jure Suprematus ac Lega- Amstelodami, 1677.*

tions of minor importance, sentiments, of the truth, or, at all events, of the necessity, of which he was not himself convinced. But, to suppose that he extended this license to doctrines which he deemed of greater importance, and that he merely put on for the occasion the opinions which we find him express on all the great controversies by which the Catholic and Protestant Churches are divided, is not only entirely unwarranted by any explicit evidence, but is directly opposed to the only record of his own views which the author has left.

(1.) The great object of the essay was, to ascertain how far the opinions of the writer, and those who acted with him, would be held tolerable in the Church of Rome. It was intended to be thrown out as a sort of theological feeler on their behalf; and their plan of action was to be regulated by the result of the experiment. It will be remembered that Leibnitz had been urged to adopt the "compendious method of the authority of a visible Church," and to embrace the communion of Rome "without entering into the details of the controversy." This he declined to do, on the ground that a hasty and ill-considered proceeding of this kind might expose him, and all who were similarly circumstanced, to the danger of finding themselves forced, at some future time, either to profess opinions which they could not in conscience approve, or to retrace a step which they had taken without full knowledge of the doctrines held in the com-

munion to which they had unwittingly attached themselves. He declared himself resolved, therefore, to "explain himself in time;" and his plan was to prepare beforehand, "with the utmost possible precision and sincerity," an Exposition of Faith entering minutely into all the controverted questions, and to ascertain whether, in the judgment of men qualified to decide, the explanations contained therein "would be admissible in the Church of Rome." The *System*, therefore, was intended to decide this important preliminary question; and whatever "innocent device" may have been employed in order the better to attain this object, it is plain that the author, if he acted with the sincerity which he professes, must have been prepared to embrace the communion of Rome, if his "Exposition" were deemed satisfactory, or even "were held tolerable in that Church."

(2.) Indeed his letter is almost explicit upon this point. It shews, at least, that, at this period of his life, his opinions coincided in the main with those of the Church of Rome. Abstracting from her practice (on which he expresses no opinion), he declares that the *chief obstacles* to his embracing her doctrines were "the difficulties involved in the belief of transubstantiation and certain demonstrations on the subject of grace." Is not this an equivalent avowal that, in his view, the other points of controversy between the Churches presented no insuperable difficulty? And does it not

follow that the explanations which he offers upon these points in the *System* may be received without hesitation, as expressing, in all sincerity, his own personal convictions?

(3.) This impression is confirmed by the few words of introduction by which the work is prefaced. They contain a very strong and solemn profession of the writer's sincerity, and of the earnestness and maturity of his convictions; and an assurance that, in preparing for his task, he has "invoked the Divine assistance, and as far, perhaps, as possible for man, divested himself of prejudice."

(4.) If it should be alleged, that this profession is liable to the same suspicion which attaches to the entire work, the letter so often quoted—the only authentic expositor of his views which has yet been discovered—is even more decisive. The proposed Exposition was to "enable the parties to proceed securely in the union;" it arose from "a desire of acting sincerely;" it was to contain an exact discussion of all controverted questions; it was to "explain them with the utmost sincerity and precision;" it was to "avoid all equivocal phrases and scholastic chicanery, and to confine itself to natural expressions;" there was not to be any "disguise or dissimulation;" it was not "to leave the writer any thing wherewith to reproach himself," and was "to guard him, by timely explanations, against the danger of finding, when too late, that

his opinions were inadmissible." In a word, in all essential particulars, it was to be such as honestly to fulfil its own purpose, viz. the adjustment of the doctrinal basis of the proposed union.

(5.) A similar anxiety to ascertain beforehand the admissibility, within the communion of Rome, of the opinions which he holds, is manifested throughout his correspondence with the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels. To him, also, he expresses grave doubts, whether certain of these opinions would be regarded by Roman divines as free from censure; but declares, nevertheless, that he feels it his duty not to conceal them; and, "having been born and educated outside of the Roman Church," he thinks it "neither upright nor safe to embrace its communion, with the knowledge that possibly he might not be received, were he to lay his heart open." Can it be doubted, therefore, that the *System*, composed most probably in this very year (1684), and bearing within it intrinsic evidence of the same disposition, was intended "to lay open the heart" of the writer and his party, for the purpose of ascertaining the compatibility or incompatibility of their opinions with the received principles of the Roman Church? And if this were its object, can it be supposed that the writer was not prepared to subscribe, in all essential particulars, to those views of the great doctrines controverted between the Churches which are explained and advocated in the work?

(6.) The support which Leibnitz gave to the project of union put forward by Molanus, goes far to establish his sincerity in the opinions expressed in the *System*. It is true that, in some points, the latter goes beyond the proposals of Molanus. But it must be recollected that, while Molanus wrote in his own name, and as the representative of his own party, and therefore expressed himself according to the received ideas and forms of Lutheran theology, Leibnitz, in the *System*, intended to appear in the character of a disguised Catholic, and was therefore compelled to shrink from every proposition, and to hold back every form of thought or of language, which would not harmonise with this assumed disguise. And although the *Private Thoughts* of Molanus is unquestionably less Catholic than the *System of Theology*, the difference is far less in the matter than in the language; nor can it ever be forgotten that Bossuet, in his judgment upon the *Private Thoughts*, declared that, if its opinions could be regarded as the opinions of the whole Lutheran Church, the work of union might almost be considered as already accomplished.

(7.) The extracts from the known and published writings of Leibnitz, which will be found in the notes of the *System of Theology*, contain, in express terms, many of the most Catholic opinions put forward in the text, and the germ of most of the others. It is true, that the body of doctrine which might be made up of those disjointed frag-

ments, wants the harmony of purpose, and falls far short of the unity and completeness, which distinguish the *System*; but a writer entertaining even such opinions as those which I have extracted, if he undertook to methodise and reduce them to a system, would be prepared to carry them out to all their legitimate consequences; and if we allow for the colouring of tone and language which the assumed disguise of a Catholic rendered necessary, it can hardly be said that the doctrines of the *System* are more than the natural and legitimate consequences of the opinions which Leibnitz professed in his own person at that very period of his life.

(8.) It is no slight confirmation of the belief of his sincerity in the profession of these opinions, that in his correspondence with Bossuet, whereas the discussion would naturally have turned (as it does turn in the *System*) upon the leading questions which are controverted between Catholics and Protestants, Leibnitz nevertheless avoided all these discussions, as though they presented little difficulty in the way of the union. If we except his protestations against superstitions and abuses in practice, he can hardly be said to contradict in this correspondence the main views which are put forward in the *System*; and it is especially remarkable that the subjects on which his whole controversy with Bossuet turned—viz. the authority of the Council of Trent and the canonicity of the deuterocanonical books of Scripture—are never

once directly discussed in the whole work. Does it not seem to follow that he was prepared to receive all the rest, at least in substance, as the basis of the union which was then contemplated?

(9.) The sole ground for doubting the sincerity of the author of the *System*, is the fact of his having in other works expressed opinions at variance with many of its doctrines. But I cannot think that this argument is at all conclusive. The same argument would prove—what no one acquainted with his correspondence could admit—that he was not sincere in his co-operation with the plan of union proposed by Molanus. Passages might be quoted from his works which are just as much opposed to the *Private Thoughts* as they are to the *System of Theology*; and, as Leibnitz survived by nearly thirty years the composition of the work, I would much prefer to suppose that his opinions may have changed, than to believe that assurances so solemnly and so repeatedly given, as we have already seen, were intended for the sole purpose of deceiving.

IX. Without, therefore, contending for the sincerity of Leibnitz in the absolute and literal maintenance of every opinion in the work, I am inclined, after a careful review of all that has been written or collected on the subject, to think that the truth lies between the extreme opinions. In the composition of the work he unquestionably practised a certain degree of dissimulation. He modified

some of his expressions, and probably also some of his views, in order that "the work might not appear to come from a Protestant." On the other hand, the very object which he avowedly proposed to himself in its composition,—the discovery of a basis of union between Protestants and Catholics, which would be held admissible by the latter,—clearly supposes that, on his own part, he must have been prepared to accept, as that basis, in all sincerity and good faith, the terms which he proposed for the consideration of the Catholic party. Nevertheless, as it will be remembered that the point which he proposed to ascertain, as regarded the Catholics, was not, whether those to whom he submitted his work were ready to adopt its opinions as their own, but "whether they believed them to be tolerable in their Church," it appears to me exceedingly probable that he extended to his own party the same principle on which he here supposed the Catholics to act; and that, in proposing this general scheme of belief, he may not have contemplated the absolute truth of every particular doctrine which it comprised, but may have put forward some of them as, if not necessarily to be believed *true* in themselves, at all events of such a nature, that they must be held *tolerable* within the pale of the united Churches. Of this spirit there are many indications in the course of the work,¹ and the principle itself is plainly expressed in one

¹ See pp. 79, 80, 124, 132, &c.

of his letters to Pelisson.¹ “M. de Meaux,” he writes, “has shewn in his Exposition that the doctrine of the Council of Trent is susceptible of a tolerable sense. So far all is well; and it were to be desired that the other divines of his party always spoke as he does. *But it is not every thing which is tolerable that is also true, nor is every thing which is true always necessary.*” It is plain that one who held the doctrines of Bossuet’s *Exposition of the Faith* to be tolerable, would hold the same of the opinions of the *System of Theology*; and supposing this *tolerableness*, rather than *absolute objective truth*, to be the standard which Leibnitz assumed in the latter work, we need not be surprised if, in a few passages of his later writings, he expresses opinions at variance with some of the principles laid down in the *System*. This supposition will enable us to reconcile many seeming contradictions, and will leave the general sincerity and trustworthiness of the *System of Theology* entirely free from suspicion.

Such are the conclusions regarding this curious and interesting work, which the consideration of all the circumstances connected with it appears to suggest.

It remains but to add that, even were it perfectly certain that the author had only acted a part

¹ Opp. i. 703.

in its composition, and that the opinions which he professes in it were merely put on for a political purpose, the work would, nevertheless, for its own sake, be found to possess a greater amount of interest than ordinarily attaches to books of controversy. Many of its views are singularly forcible and original; and although, in a few particulars, it is not free from serious doctrinal inaccuracies, it contains, notwithstanding, on most points, an admirable summary of all those arguments and explanations by which the doctrines and practices of the Church are most recommended to indulgence, if not to acceptance. Of the purely defensive, or apologetic school of controversy, the *System of Theology* may furnish a perfect model.

SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.

SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY.¹

AFTER a long and mature examination of the controversies on the subject of religion, in which I have invoked the Divine assistance, and divested myself, as far, perhaps, as is possible for man, of party-feeling, as though I came from a new world, a neophyte unattached to any party, I have at length fixed in my own mind, and, after full considera-

¹ The autograph manuscript, as it came from the pen of Leibnitz, is without any title or other designation. A much more recent hand, probably that of one of the librarians of the Royal Library of Hanover, has entitled it, *G. G. Leibnitii Systema Theologicum, ipsius Auctoris Manu Scriptum, Constans xv. Plagulis seu Philuris*. The name, however, has since undergone many modifications. The ms. was first published (Paris, 1819) under the title, *Exposition de la Doctrine de Leibnitz sur la Religion, (Ouvrage Latin inédit, et traduit en François)*. Its German editors, Dr. Räss and Dr. Weis, retained the designation, *Systema Theologicum*; — their title being, *Leibnitzens System der Theologie, nach dem Manuscripte von Hannover (den lateinischen Text zur Seite), ins Deutsche übersetzt, von Dr. Räss und Dr. Weis*. The Abate Pistelli, to whose very accurate transcript of the autograph I have had occasion to re-

fer in the Introduction, adopts a different title: *G. G. Leibnitii Examen Religionis Christianæ*. The recent edition of the Abbé Lacroix (Paris, 1845) appeared under the name, *Gulielmi Gottifredi Leibnitii Opusculum, adscititio titulo 'Systema Theologicum' inscriptum*. And Dr. Guhrauer, in the appendix of his edition of Leibnitz's German works, suggests a still further designation: *Expositio Doctrinæ Ecclesiæ Catholicæ, ad restituendam Ecclesiæ Pacem. (Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften, herausgegeben von Dr. G. E. Guhrauer, vol. ii. appendix, p. 70.)* Among all these various titles, I have thought it best to retain the designation originally affixed to the autograph; not only because it is the oldest and the most generally known, but because, without any further qualification, it may be regarded as a sufficiently satisfactory description of the character and contents of the work.

tion, resolved to adopt, the following principles, which, to an unprejudiced man, will appear to carry with them the recommendation of sacred Scripture, of pious antiquity, and even of right reason and the authority of history.

In the first place, then, I believe in the existence of a Most Perfect Substance, one, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty, which we call GOD; by whom all other things have been created in a most beautiful order, and are preserved by a sort of continual production. The doctrine, therefore, of those who conceive God to be corporeal, finite, circumscribed by place, and ignorant of future contingent events, whether absolute or conditional, is utterly intolerable; and hence I strongly reprobate certain Anti-trinitarians and kindred sectaries, who have not spared even this first principle of faith, and who entertain most unworthy conceptions of God.

Now this Supreme Intelligence created, in order to his own glory, other intellectual beings, whom He governs with most perfect justice; insomuch that any one who could understand the whole order of the Divine economy, would find therein a model of the most perfect form of commonwealth, in which it would be impossible for a philosopher to discover a single want, or to supply any thing in desire.¹

¹ This is a favourite sentiment of Leibnitz. He repeats it in almost all his philosophical works. Thus: "And therefore, whenever any thing in the works of God appears censurable, we are to judge that to us it is not sufficiently known; whereas the philosopher who understands it will decide that better could not even be desired." See *Leibnitii Opera Omnia, collecta studio Lud. Dutens* (6 vols. 4to. Geneva, 1768), t. i. p. 482. The references in the following pages, where the contrary is not specified,

are to this edition; but as the collection is by no means complete, I have also frequently referred to the separate editions of particular works. Some very important collections of the author's letters and minor works have been printed since the publication of Dutens's edition. The most remarkable recent ones are: (1) Feder's *Commercii Epistolici Leibnitiani typis nondum vulgati selecta Specimina* (Hanover, 1805). (2) A collection of all his German writings, *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften* (2 vols. 8vo.

Hence we must avoid those opinions which represent God as a certain Supreme Power, from which all things, although they emanate, yet emanate indiscriminately, by a kind of necessary existence, and without any selection of the beautiful or the good; as if these notions were arbitrary, or had no foundation in nature, but only in the imagination of men. For God is not only the supreme Creator of all existing things, but He is also the beneficent Prince of all intellectual beings,¹ and in some sense their Legislator;—a Legislator, however, who requires nothing from his subjects but souls actuated by sincere affection, animated with a right intention, persuaded of

Berlin, 1838-40), edited by Dr. Guhrauer. (3) The *Consilium Aegyptiacum*, and many other exceedingly interesting letters and fragments in the appendix of a work by the same author: *Kur-mainz in der Epoche von 1672* (2 vols. 8vo. Hamburg, 1839). (4) *Animadversiones ad Cartesii Principia Philosophiæ; aus einer noch ungedruckten Handschrift mitgetheilt*, from the same editor (Bonn, 1844); and (5) A collection more interesting, in a religious point of view, than all the rest—his correspondence with Arnauld, with Ernest the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, and others: *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz, Arnauld, und dem Landgrafen Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, herausgegeben von C. L. Grotefend* (Hanover, 1846). I have made use of all these for the purpose of illustrating the text of the present translation; the illustrations being little more than parallel passages collected from the various works of Leibnitz. They are for the most part intended to trace out, in his acknowledged works, opinions identical, or similar to those of the

System of Theology. I am far from thinking that they establish a complete identity. On the contrary, I know that it would not be difficult to produce from his published works a strong array of opposite opinions. But they will be found to contain at least the germs of the most remarkable opinions of the "System;" and in very many cases, and those of great importance, (for example, the Blessed Eucharist,) to present the precise views, and occasionally even the very words, of the present work.

¹ "We must regard God not only as the principle and cause of all substances and all beings, but also as the chief of all persons, or intelligent substances, and as the absolute Monarch of a most perfect city or commonwealth, composed of all intelligent beings taken collectively." See *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz, Arnauld, und Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels*, p. 190. Indeed, the entire of this and the following paragraph will be found almost *verbatim* (in p. 134 of the same volume) in Leibnitz's letter to Arnauld, dated March 23, 1690.

the beneficence, the consummate justice, the beauty, and goodness, of the most amiable of all lords ; and therefore, not merely fearing his power as that of a supreme and all-seeing Monarch, but also confiding in his benevolence, and, in fine, glowing with the love of Him above all things—a sentiment which comprises all the rest.¹

For those who are impressed with such sentiments, who fix them deeply in their souls, and evince in their lives the sincerity of their convictions, never murmur against the Divine will ; being well assured that all things must conduce to the good of those who love God : and, as they are content with the past, so, in what concerns the future, they seek always to act in conformity with that which they presume to be the will of God. Now all that God, in proposing rewards and punishments, requires of each of us, is, that he labour for the fulfilment of his own especial duties ; that, like the first man, he cultivate the garden in which he has been placed, and that, in imitation of the divine goodness, he diffuse his beneficence on every object around him, but especially, within the due proportions which justice requires, on all those with whom he may be thrown into intercourse, as being his neighbours ; because, among the creatures which come within our sphere, there is none more excellent than man, none whose perfection is more grateful to God.²

¹ “ In fine, as God is at once the most just and the kindest of monarchs, and requires nothing from his subjects but good will, provided it be serious and sincere, his subjects could not desire a happier condition ; and, in order to their perfect happiness, it is only necessary that they love Him.”—*Ibid.* p. 192. See also page 157.

² “ I admit that all this is of no avail

without grace, and that God gives grace to those who have never dreamt of these speculations ; but God also wills that we, on our part, should omit no exertion, but that, as opportunity offers, we should employ, each according to his own vocation, the perfections with which He has invested human nature ; and as He has created us to know and to love Him, it is not possible for us to

If, therefore, all intelligent beings always thought and acted in accordance with these principles, they would unquestionably live happily. But as it is certain that this neither always is, nor has been, the case, a question arises, whence it is that sin, and through sin, misery, entered into the world; for it is clear that God, the author of all good, cannot be the cause of sin. It must be borne in mind, therefore, that in all creatures, however exalted, there is, antecedent to all sin, a certain inborn and original finiteness, which renders them liable to fall; and in this sense is to be understood the sentiment which Job appears to have meant to convey,¹ that not even the holiest angels are free from stain, that is, from imperfection. Nor is this incompatible with the existence of original justice in "God's image;" because the rational creature, in so far as it is perfect, derives this perfection from the Divine image; but in so far as it is limited and devoid of certain perfections, so far does it partake of privation, or of nothing. And this is the purport of St. Augustine's opinion,² that the cause of evil arises not from God, but from nothing; that is, not from the positive, but from the privative;—or, in other words, from that finiteness of creatures of which we have already spoken.³

labour too strenuously in order to acquire the love of God; nor can we make a better use of our time and our faculties, unless in labouring for the public advantage, and for the salvation our fellow-men."—Letter to Arnauld, *Briefwechsel*, p. 78.

¹ Job iv. 18. "Behold, they that serve Him are not stedfast, and in his angels He hath found wickedness."

² St. Augustini Opera, x. 922 and following pages. See also ii. 113. (ed. Ben.)

³ "We must say in reply, that

there is no perfection, and no purely positive reality, in creatures, and in their actions, whether they be good or bad, that is not due to God; but that, on the contrary, the imperfection of an act consists in privation, and arises from the original limitation which they have from their own essence, even in the state of pure possibility;—that is to say, in the region of divine truths, or in the ideas which exist in the divine understanding."—Leibnitii *Opera*, t. i. p. 485. The same view is put forward in

And although it would have been possible for God to have created only such intelligences as, though they possessed the power of falling, yet, in point of fact, never would fall, nevertheless it pleased his inscrutable wisdom to create this present order of things, wherein, from among countless others equally possible, certain possible intelligences, which, in the notion of their possibility, or in the idea of them which exists in God, involve a certain series of free actions and divine helps—of faith, charity, eternal happiness, or the contrary—are selected, and admitted to existence, or created:—as, for instance, Adam, who was to be exiled from Paradise; Peter, prince of the apostles, to be a renegade, a confessor, and a martyr; Judas, a traitor,¹ &c. And this, doubtless, because God knew how to convert this

terms more strikingly similar to those of the text, in the following passage:—“For not only is it true, that after the loss of man’s innocence, original sin took possession of the soul; but, even antecedently, there was an original limitedness or imperfection con-natural to all creatures, which makes them peccable, or liable to fall. And, in my opinion, this is the tendency of the opinion of St. Augustine, and of other authors, who hold that the root of evil is in nothing; that is to say, in the privation or limitedness of creatures, which God corrects according to the degree of perfection which He vouchsafes to them.”—*Briefwechsel*, p. 185.

Again: “Evil, therefore, is like darkness; nor is it ignorance alone, but error and malice also, that formally consist in privation.”—*Opera Omnia*, t. i. 143-4.

¹ “But another will ask, whence it comes to pass that this individual man will assuredly commit this sin? The

answer is easy: Because otherwise he would not be this man. For God sees from all eternity that there will exist a certain Judas, the notion or idea of whom, in the Divine mind, contains a certain future free action. The only question then is, why this Judas, the traitor, who is but possible in the idea of God, actually comes into existence? Now we are not to expect here below any answer to this question; except that, in general, we must say, that as God has thought it right; notwithstanding the sin which He foresaw, that he should come into existence, the evil thus induced must be counterbalanced, and counterbalanced with usury, in the general order of the universe; that God will draw from it some greater good; and that, upon the whole, it will be found that this order of things, in which this sinner is comprised, is the most perfect of all possible systems.”—*Briefwechsel*, p. 184. See also pp. 160 and 186.

partial and particular evil, the occurrence of which He foresaw and permitted, into a good far greater than should have existed without this evil; so that in the end, the present order should, as a whole, be more perfect than all others. Thus, for example, the fall of Adam was corrected, with an immeasurable gain of perfection, by the Incarnation of the Word, and the treason of Judas by the Redemption of the human race.

Hence when some of the angels fell, through an impulse, as it appears, of pride; and when afterwards the first man, under the seduction of the evil angel, fell through concupiscence;—for the former is a sin characteristic of the diabolical, the latter of the animal nature;—original sin invaded the human race in the person of our first parent; that is to say, a certain depraved quality was contracted, which, from the darkness of the intellect and the predominance of the senses which it induces,¹ renders men slothful in the performance of good, and prompt in the commission of evil actions. And although the soul, as it emanates from God, (for the notion of a transmission of souls is unintelligible) is pure, yet, through the sin of our parents, it is corrupted by its very union with the body; in other words, by its connexion with external things, original sin, or a disposition to sin, is produced in the soul; although it is not possible to conceive any moment at which it was itself pure from stain, and was doomed to be imprisoned in an infected body. And thus were all made “*children of wrath*,” “*concluded under sin*,”² and doomed to inevitable perdition, unless preserved by a great grace of God. We

¹ “The force of original sin is such as to render men, before regeneration, weak in natural, and dead in spiritual things, the intellect being turned to sensible objects, and the

will to carnal ones; so that we are ‘children of wrath’ by nature.”—*Opera*, t. i. pp. 490-1.

² Gal. iii. 22.

are not, however, to extend the effect of original sin so far as to hold that children who have committed no actual sin will be damned—an opinion which many maintain; for, under God, who is a just judge, no one can be condemned to misery without a fault of his own.¹

Actual sins are of two kinds; some venial, which must be expiated by temporal chastisement, others mortal, which merit eternal perdition. And this division of sin not only is an ancient one, but also appears perfectly consonant with the divine justice; nor can I commend the views of those, who, like the Stoics, regard all sins as almost equal, or all alike worthy of the extreme punishment of eternal damnation. Now those sins appear specially to merit the name of mortal, which are committed with a perverse intention, and against the express dictate of conscience, and the principles of virtue implanted in the mind. For it would seem that those who depart from this life at enmity with God (as they are no longer recalled by external impressions of sense,) persevere in the course which they have commenced, and retain the state of mind in which they were surprised, and that, by this very fact, they are separated from God; whence, by a kind of consequence, they fall into the supreme misery of the soul, and thus become, so to speak, the instrument of their own damnation.²

¹ “ We must not admit that those who, before they have attained the sufficient use of reason, die subject to original, but free from actual, sin (as infants who die outside of the Church before Baptism), are necessarily condemned to eternal flames; for this we must leave to the mercy of the Creator.”—*Opera*, t. i. p. 491. Compare also pp. 33-4.

It will be seen in a future page, that Leibnitz goes farther than in

the above passage, and inclines to the opinion of Catharinus and Cardinal Sfondrati, who hold that infants dying without Baptism are not only exempt from the pain of sense, but enjoy a certain natural happiness.

² “ The time of purgation is extended as long as is necessary, in order that the soul may dwell sufficiently on the contemplation of the malice of its former sin. But the malice of those

Now all men, being born in sin, and not as yet regenerated by the grace of the Holy Ghost, are wont, when they have attained the use of reason, to fall into mortal sins, at least unless they are withheld by some singular favour of God; for, by the voice of conscience, all are admonished of the distinction of good and evil, and yet are occasionally overcome by the passions. And consequently the whole human race would perish, had not God, from eternity, formed a design for its redemption or expiation, worthy of his mercy, as well as his unspeakable wisdom, which He executed in his own season.

For we must hold as a certain principle, that “*God desireth not the death of the sinner,*”¹ but “*will have all men to be saved;*”²—not, it is true, with an absolute and irresistible will, but with a will ordered and limited by certain laws;—and consequently, that He assists each individual as far as is consistent with the order of his wisdom and justice.

who depart at enmity with God is infinite, because the will of injuring is an infinite evil.”—*Opera*, t. vi. pars i. p. 310. As the same principle is repeated more than once in the course of this volume, I think it right to subjoin a few other passages in which he expresses it more distinctly.

“But after this life, though it be supposed that this assistance is no longer continued, yet there always remains in the sinner, even after he has been damned, a certain liberty, which renders him guilty, and a certain (though remote) power of rising again, though it will never be reduced to action.”—*Opera*, t. i. pp. 328-9.

“It must be held as certain, that no one is damned except through

his own fault; and even that no one perseveres in the state of misery except through his own will.”—*Opera*, t. vi. p. 84.

“Although the blessed and the reprobate appear to me to retain a certain degree of liberty (viz. the very contingency or non-necessity, whence the acts of the former are meritorious, and those of the latter culpable), yet there undoubtedly is in those who are still, as it is said, ‘on the way,’ a greater degree of variability, inasmuch as in the blessed the power of reason is greater, and in the damned that of the depraved will is greater, than in those who are upon earth.”—*Opera*, t. vi. p. 184.

¹ Ezech. xxxiii. 11.

² 1 Tim. ii. 4.

The principles hitherto stated are almost all evident from the light of reason itself; but it is only from the revelation of God that we could have learnt what was the hidden economy of the Divine counsel in the restoration of the human race.

We must call to mind, therefore, that God is not only the First Substance, the Author and Preserver of all others, but that He is also the most perfect Intelligence; and that, in this relation, He is invested with a moral quality, and enters into a certain society with other intelligences, over all of whom, collected into a most perfect commonwealth, which we may call "the City of God,"¹ He presides, as a supreme monarch over his subjects.

God, therefore, not only acts by that general and hidden will by which He governs, according to certain fixed rules, the entire machine of the universe, and by which He concurs with all the actions of intelligent beings; but also, in his capacity of legislator, declares, and sanctions by rewards and punishments, his particular and public will with regard to the acts of intelligent beings and the government of his city; and for this purpose He has instituted revelations.

Now, revelation must be invested with certain notes (commonly called motives of credibility), from which it may appear, that what is contained therein and declared to us, is the will of God, not an illusion of the evil genius,

¹ "And hence it is that intelligent beings are capable of entering into a certain society with God; and that, in their regard, He is not only the inventor, as He is with regard to other creatures, but also the Prince and Parent. Hence it is easily inferred that all intelligent beings taken together constitute the 'City of God;' that is, the most perfect of

all kingdoms, under a most perfect monarch."—*Opera*, t. i. p. 30. The concluding paragraph of the *Animadversions on Des Cartes* contains a most beautiful and eloquent exhortation to the study of Nature, founded on the same principle. See *Leibnitzens ungedruckte Anmerkungen zu Des Cartes*, p. 82 (Bonn, 1844).

or a false interpretation of our own; and if any revelation be destitute of these notes, we cannot embrace it with security: with this restriction, however, that sometimes, in a case of doubt, when the mandate in itself is not at variance with reason or with any previous revelation, and is supported by probable reasons, it is better to obey it than to expose ourselves to danger of sin. In this, however, we must be cautious lest fear should degenerate into superstition, and credit be given to every "old wives'" tale. For it would be unworthy the Divine Wisdom to omit a precaution which no prudent legislator neglects, that of notifying sufficiently the will of the lawgiver. Hence faith is not lightly to be given to lots, to visions, or to dreams, and not at all to auguries, omens, and such other trifles, which (under the notion that they are signs of the Divine counsel) we absurdly call divinations.

As right reason, therefore, is the natural interpreter of God, it is necessary that, before any other interpreters of God be recognised, reason should be able to pronounce upon their authority; but when they have once, so to speak, established their legitimate character, reason itself must thenceforward submit to faith. And this may be understood from the example of a governor who commands in a province or garrison as the representative of his prince; he will not lightly, nor without cautious scrutiny of his credentials, yield up his authority to the successor who may be sent to replace him, lest an enemy steal in under this guise. But the moment he recognises his master's will, he will at once, without dispute, submit himself and the entire garrison to the new authority.¹

¹ "Hence, among respectable theologians, it is regarded as beyond all doubt, that the authority of Sacred Scripture must, once for all, be established, before the tribunal of reason, by the ordinary motives of credibility; so that reason may give place to it, as to a new light, and conse-

Nevertheless, in addition to the evidences of human faith, or motives of credibility,¹ there is further required a certain internal operation of the Holy Ghost, which invests it with the title of divine faith, and confirms the mind in the truth; and hence it is that faith may exist where there is not, and perhaps never has been, any advertence to these motives drawn from human reason; for it is not necessary at all times, nor for all persons, to enter into an analysis of faith, nor is every person equal to the difficulty of such an examination. The very nature of true faith, however, necessarily supposes that those who, in the fear of God, attentively examine the truth, should be able, when occasion requires, to institute an analysis of its motives; if it were not so, the Christian religion would have nothing to distinguish it from a false system, speciously adorned.

All the notes of divine revelation, with the exception of one—the excellence of the doctrine itself—may be resolved into that of confirmation by miracle, or by some wondrous and inimitable circumstance, or event, or coincidence, which it is impossible to ascribe to chance. For this is an especial sign that the admonition is from Providence. Now this is peculiarly the effect of prophecy; for to predict future events accurately and circumstantially

crate all its probabilities; in the same way as a new prefect sent by a prince, must, in the first instance, exhibit his credentials to the assembly over which he is to preside.”—*Opera*, t. i. p. 85.

¹ “And I see that not only Protestants, but also Roman Catholics, have recourse to this internal way. For, in addition to the motives of belief, or ‘of credibility,’ as they are called, that is, in addition to the

assignable reasons of faith, which are but a collection of arguments of different degrees of plausibility, and which, taken together, cannot constitute more than human faith, they require a light of grace from heaven, which produces entire conviction, and forms what is called divine faith.”—See Leibnitz’s Letter to M. Pelisson,—*Lettres de Leibnitz et Pelisson* (Leipsic, 1749), p. 239.

exceeds not only all human, but even all created powers.¹ Hence we are bound to give credit both to the prophet himself and to the person whose coming is found to verify the conditions of the prophecy. So, also, if any one perform other wonderful and, humanly speaking, incredible works, we must recognise him as aided by a superhuman power.

Furthermore, if miracles of this character, though performed long since, be attested by those arguments by which, in other cases, the truth of historical facts is legitimately proved, we are bound to believe them, just as well as if they were performed to-day. For, even in the management of our human affairs, how many things do we admit as undoubted (and that with perfect propriety and prudence) which we have neither tested by our senses, nor are able to prove by demonstrative arguments! And, indeed, as St. Augustine well shews in his book *On the Utility of Believing*,² most of our actions, even in the affairs of common life, rest on faith, and yet are not on that account less successful in their issue, or less prudent in their design. Nor can we hesitate to hold as certain, that the Providence which rules the universe will never

¹ "It is true that the devil can counterfeit miracles. But there is one species of miracle, which, enlightened as he is, he cannot imitate; and this is prophecy. For if a person be able to tell me a number of circumstantial details regarding general matters which are to happen a year hence, I shall look upon it as certain that it is God who enlightens him. For it is not possible that any one but God should be able to see the general chain of causes which must concur in order to the production of contingent events." — See Leibnitz's

very curious letter on the case of the celebrated mystic, Mlle. Antoinette de Bourignon, — *Specimina Commercii Epistolici Leibnitiani*, studio G. H. Feder, p. 463.

² See also his book *De Fide Rerum quæ non videntur*. "Nos ergo, ad hos refellendos qui prudenter sibi videntur nolle credere quod videre non possunt, etsi non valemus humanis aspectibus monstrare divina quæ credimus, tamen humanis mentibus etiam illa quæ non videntur credenda esse monstramus." — St. Augustini *Opera*, t. vi. c. 103.

permit falsehood to invest itself with all the distinctive badges of truth, and, so to speak, her official robes.

The brevity which we propose to ourselves does not permit our entering, in this place, into the evidences of the truth of the Christian religion. Many eminent men have already ably executed this task; as, for example, Origen, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Cyril, Theodoret, St. Thomas in his work *Against the Gentiles*; and, more recently, Steuchus, Mornay, Grotius, Huet; and although we might be able to add much to what they have written (for the various evidences of truth are innumerable), yet we are far from seeking to detract from their merit.

The sacred monuments of Christians teach that the Supreme God (whose unity is established by the evidence of reason itself) is nevertheless three in Persons, and consequently (a mystery which surpasses all reason) that, in one only God, there are three Persons of the Divinity; that these, to human comprehension, may very fitly be called the Father, the Son or Word, and the Holy Ghost; and that the Son is born of the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds, according to the Latins, from both the Father and the Son, or, according to the Greeks, from the Father through the Son (and that as from one principle).

This, however, must be understood so as to avoid all suspicion of Tritheism;¹ and therefore, when it is said, “the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, and these three are different from one another” (so that the Father is not the Son or the Holy Ghost, nor the Son the Holy Ghost or the Father, nor the Holy Ghost

¹ “It were to be wished that ill-informed Christians, and even sometimes persons of ability, but of minds a little disposed to the crooked side

of a question, did not fall into a sort of Tritheism.”—*Leibnitii Epistolæ ad Diversos, cura Kortholti*, t. i. p. 382. (Leipsic, 1734.)

the Father or the Son), it must be understood in the sense that nevertheless there are not three Gods, but only one God, though three in Persons.

The Anti-trinitarians, indeed, insist that this is a contradiction, and that the plural number has no other force but to express that the three Beings, distinct from one another, each of whom is God, are three Gods, and that things which are distinct in number cannot be one in number.

But¹ they should reflect that the Church does not assert of the Father, for instance, or of the Son, that He is three in Persons, but that He is one Person of the Divinity; hence the multiplication of Persons does not involve the multiplication of God, three in Persons; nor, therefore, does the Trinity of Persons imply three Gods. Moreover, a person, generally, is a substance numerically one and incommunicable; and, in God, it essentially involves a relation, and, together with its correlates, constitutes an absolute substance numerically one. There are, therefore, three singular substances, and one absolute relation which embraces these, and whose undivided nature is communicated to each. Of this we may discover some faint resemblance in the operations of our own mind, considering and loving itself.

It was by this illustration, adapted to our comprehension, that the ancients were wont, and, in my opinion, judiciously, to explain this mystery, viz. by the analogy of the

¹ This important paragraph is written on the margin of the first page of the autograph ms.; and the Paris editor, not seeing its connexion, did not venture to introduce it into the text, but appended it in a note (page 6). There could be no possible doubt, however, that it properly belonged to the section on the Trinity,

which occurs in the fourth page of the ms., and of course (the ms. being a folio) *in the same sheet with the first page*: and on examination, I discovered a line of reference carried back from the fourth to the first page, which at once determined its place. The Abbé Lacroix has restored it in his edition.

three chief faculties of the mind or requisites of action, namely, Power, Knowledge, and Will; Power being ascribed to the Father, as the source of the Divinity; Wisdom to the Son, as the Word of the mind; and Will or Love to the Holy Ghost: for, from the Virtue or Power of the Divine Essence spring Ideas of things, or Truths; these Wisdom embraces; and thus, in the end, they become, according to their several perfection, objects of the Will: an illustration which also explains the order of the Divine Persons.

As it had been decreed, therefore, in the eternal secrets of the Divine counsel, that one of the Persons of the Divinity should take upon Him the nature of the creature, and, in a peculiar manner, adapted to our comprehension, should govern, like a king, familiarly and openly, the city of God, or the commonwealth of intelligences, it pleased the only-begotten Son of the Father to take this office upon Himself, the Word of the Divine Mind already eminently containing in itself the ideas or natures of creatures.

And He assumed the nature of man, not alone because in man the superior and inferior natures meet, as if upon a common boundary, but also because there is no other more worthy means of attaining the expiation of the human race, which was the first care of God; and it seemed fitting that the Son made Man should Himself exemplify every virtue, and should triumph by perfect humility and patience, before man should be crowned with the incredible glory to which he is thus elevated.

We learn, therefore, from Divine revelation, that, when the pre-ordained time arrived, the Word, or only-begotten Son of God, assumed our entire human nature, consisting of soul and body; and that, while He sojourned on earth, He acted as man, in every thing except sin, from which He was exempt, and miracles, by which He shewed Himself

to be greater than man. And He was called Jesus, surnamed Christ, as being the Anointed of the Lord, or the King or Messiah, the Restorer of the human race long foretold by the oracles of the prophets.

The holy Fathers admirably illustrate the mystery of the Incarnation by the analogy of the union of soul and body: "for as soul and body is one man, so God and Man is one Christ."¹ The illustration, however, is imperfect, for the soul partakes in some things of the imperfections of the body, while the Divine Nature cannot admit imperfection. Still the words 'person' and 'nature' are very fitly applied; for as a plurality of Persons possess the one nature of the Divinity, so, on the other hand, one Person of the Divinity embraces a plurality of natures, the divine and human.

Nor do I see any reason for the abhorrence which many sectaries, both ancient and modern, exhibit for these opinions. For if one weigh the matter fairly, he will find that the doctrines of the Catholic Church on the Trinity and Incarnation are safe, and that those of her adversaries are replete with danger. Because the Church defines that only one absolute substance is to be adored, viz. the supreme, omniscient, and almighty God; and neither in the Word, nor in the Holy Ghost, nor in the man Jesus, does she honour with supreme adoration aught else than this one eternal Being.

The practice of the Church, therefore, is blameless, if it be but duly inculcated upon the people; nor does there appear any reason why we should regard as unworthy of God, either this internal undivided Trinity, or the external assumption of the human nature, which receives perfections from the Godhead, but does not return its own imperfections thereto.

¹ Athanasian Creed.

Now the Arians, on the contrary, regard the Son of God merely as the first of creatures, and some of them under the name of the Holy Ghost understand the angels; and yet they scruple not to worship, with divine honours, what they thus regard as a creature. The Photinians, regarding Christ as a simple man, make Him an adoptive Son of God, and yet adore this factitious and subordinate Deity—a doctrine which certainly appears to coincide with that of the Pagans; and, if their hypothesis be once admitted, Francis Davidis acted more consistently in denying all adoration to one whom he professed to be a mere man; although how slight the interval between this opinion and that of Mahomet himself!¹

With regard to the mode of the union of natures, many subtle questions are raised, which it would have been better to have left untouched; among others, that respecting the “communion² of properties,” namely, whether, and how far, the properties of one nature may be attributed to the other; as though it were necessary to decide this question. It is enough to know that the properties which are attributed to each nature separately may rightly be attributed to the concrete; for it is correct to say, that, in Christ, God suffered, man is omniscient and omnipotent; but to attribute to the humanity, in virtue of the union,

¹ “It is true, they render to Jesus Christ a worship which the Mahometans refuse Him; but the latter would appear to act more consistently than the Socinians; for why should we adore a pure creature? It was not without reason that Francis Davidis rose up against Blandrata and Socinus. We adore, formally and precisely, nothing save the Eternal and Infinite.”—*Opera*, t. v. p. 481. He refers to Davidis in another place.

“One Francis Davidis, in Transyl-

vania, maintained, with reason, against Socinus, that, according to the principles of the Socinians, as well as those of the Arians, Jesus Christ should not be adored, and that to adore Him would be to justify the worship of Paganism.”—*Opera*, t. vi. p. 28.

² The autograph has the words “*de communione idiomatum* :”—the more commonly received form is, *communicatio idiomatum*; and Leibnitz himself, in a later page, uses the latter.

omnipotence, ubiquity, and (what especially follows) eternity, is as incongruous, as to ascribe to the Divinity the having been born and suffered; a form of speech which is either an impropriety or a contradiction.

We must hold, however, that, by the union with the Word, all the perfection, knowledge, and power, which man, as man, is capable of receiving, have been imparted to the humanity in itself; and it is safer to affirm this regarding Christ, even in the state of exinanition; although in that state, as the body remained passible, the hidden glory only appeared, as it were, by a few rays, shining out through the night.

Christ, then, the Son of God and of man, born, without man's agency, of a Virgin Mother, and exempt from all sin, offered Himself to God the Father, a most worthy victim, for the expiation of the guilt of the human race; satisfied, by his perfect humility and his passion, for the sins of men; and therefore, as far as was in Him, died for all.

Nevertheless, it has pleased God to ordain as the law of man's redemption, that its benefit should extend to all who, having been born again in Christ by the grace of the Holy Ghost, should elicit a filial act of faith and love: for although a perpetual purity of mind and fervour of disposition towards God are, in the rigour of justice, always necessary, yet, through the equity of Divine grace, it has been effected by Christ, that, even in a person who falls after regeneration, every past sin shall be effaced by the sincere love of God, and (what is included therein) repentance for the past and a resolution of amendment.

In the course of the last century, certain angry controversies arose on the questions of the conversion of man, of the justification of the sinner, and of the merit of good works, occasioned by the inconvenient expressions of some

of the disputants, and the excesses of others on the opposite side. In my opinion, however, they may easily be adjusted, if one will but discard the sophistry in which they have been involved, and consider the subject on its own merits.

In the first place, therefore, we must hold that, by the fall, human nature has been so thoroughly corrupted, that, without the aid of Divine grace, it is unable not alone to perform, but even to originate, any good work or any act agreeable to God. Without the aid, therefore, of *preventing* and *exciting* grace, we are not capable either of prayer, or of the wish or desire of amending our life or seeking the true faith, or, in general, of any good motion.

But, upon the other hand, we must also hold that man's free will is not destroyed by the fall,¹ even in things divine and necessary for salvation; but that all voluntary acts (although they are excited by grace if they be good, and proceed from our corrupt nature if they be bad,) are, nevertheless, "spontaneous with election," and therefore free:—in the same way as it does not interfere with the liberty of our actions in common life, that we are excited to these actions by rays of light which are transmitted through the agency of the eyes, and though the excitement is sometimes so powerful that, notwithstanding our deliberation, and the power which we still retain of resisting the impressions, it may yet be foreseen that the act will certainly follow;—for the certainty of an act is one thing, and its necessity another. And hence a sinful action is contingent,

¹ "Nevertheless, liberty remains secure, however great human corruption may be; so that a man, though he certainly will sin, yet never *necessarily commits* the sinful act which he commits."—*Opera*, t. i. p. 492.

Again: "Moreover, as our corruption is not entirely insuperable, and

as we do not necessarily sin, even while we are groaning under the slavery of sin, so likewise it must be held that we are never invincibly assisted, but that, however powerful the grace of God may be, still it is in our power to resist it."—*Opera*, t. i. p. 334.

and the act of eliciting good motions is free. And although the impulse under which we act, and the aid which we receive, are from God, yet there is always some co-operation on man's part, else he could not be said to have acted.

The ulterior questions—as, whether, in the unregenerate, these powers of producing good motions are mutilated or only impeded, and what illustrations may best be employed to explain the aid afforded by grace—are very idle and profitless discussions, raised by those who exert all their ingenuity to discover, in the doctrines of the Church, matter at which to cavil, with any shew of reason, however trivial.

To all men God gives *sufficient grace*,¹ in so far that, supposing only a serious will on their part, there is no further requisite for the attainment of salvation which it is not in their own power to secure. And hence many pious men have held it as certain, that “*every man who cometh into this world*” is so “*enlightened*” by the Light of Souls, the eternal Son of God, and by his Holy Spirit, that, at least before his death, provided he himself wills it, he may attain, either by external preaching or by internal enlightenment of the mind, to such knowledge as is sufficient and necessary for salvation; so that if, after this enlightenment, he obstinately resist the call of God, he may at least be rendered inexcusable; for this is necessary for the vindication of the Divine justice. But as to the means by which God effects this, even in the case of those to whom no suspicion of the Gospel of Christ has ever been conveyed by the external preaching of the word;—this is a question

¹ “We must hold, that sufficient grace is never refused to any one who wishes to co-operate with it. It is an old axiom, that ‘to him who does what he is able, the necessary grace is never wanting;’ nor ‘does God desert any but one who deserts Him,’ as St. Augustine, following the more ancient Fathers, has observed.”—*Ibid.* p. 493.

which we may not venture hastily to decide, but must leave to his wisdom and mercy.¹

God, however, does not grant always, and to all men, that *efficacious* or *victorious grace* which actually produces the good-will, overcomes the inclinations of man, and outweighs the opposing solicitations of imperfect or corrupt nature; otherwise all men, without exception, would be saved. But the reason why this is not done,—that is, why, in preference to many others equally possible, certain persons are admitted into existence by God, although the notion or foreknowledge of them involves the idea of impenitence, and of other free actions incompatible with salvation, and of certain degrees of divine grace inferior to the crowning and victorious grace,—belongs to the mysteries of God's government, inaccessible to mortals;² and on such questions we must rest satisfied with this one principle, that whatever has pleased God is best; that in no other order could the perfection of things be better attained; and that, as we have already observed, the evils which God permits are always converted into a much greater good.

¹ “Even those, therefore, who are without (*οἱ ἕξω*), to whom external preaching has been denied, are to be left to the mercy and justice of the Creator; though we know not to whom, or how, God will send succour.”—*Opera*, t. i. p. 494. This is still more strongly put forward in the following passage:—“Nevertheless, so great is God's mercy, that, even to those on whom the light of revelation has never beamed, He vouchsafes his assistance through another and a never-failing kind of grace. For, elevated by the contemplation of nature, and internally assisted from on high, they are inspired with a sovereign

love for Him whom they understand to be supremely beautiful and perfect; till at length their minds are prepared, and the light of faith itself is infused.”—*Opera*, t. v. p. 74.

² “Hence our theologians have acknowledged, at least in the external aids to salvation, a remarkable difference of persons, even where the internal grace was equal; and, in explaining the economy of the external circumstances which affect us, they have recourse to the *βάθος* of Paul.”—T. i. p. 496. See also the *Briefwechsel*, &c. p. 157.

In the passage above, and still more in a previous paragraph (p. 2),

Nevertheless, we are not to imagine that the Divine will for men's salvation, or the merits of Christ, or, at least, efficacious grace, are confined solely to the elect—that is, to those to whom the crowning and final grace of blessed perseverance¹ is vouchsafed. For Christ died for all; and efficacious grace, and that true conversion and regeneration through the Spirit of God, whereby we are received into the number of his children, may be granted to many who will not persevere. Nor do I see how certain learned men can have been betrayed into such monstrous paradoxes, revolting both in their intrinsic meaning and in their consequences, as, (fixing a law, as it were, for God, and circumscribing according to their caprice the economy of Divine grace,) to imagine that a person who is not to persevere does not really receive grace, and is not really regenerated by the Holy Ghost, no matter what works he may perform, no matter how pious and well-disposed he may appear to himself and to others; and on the contrary, that a person who is truly elect, and destined to final penitence, never forfeits the grace once received from God, and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, even though he should spend his whole life in a series of adulteries and murders. Indeed, even though it were possible to excuse these novel and offensive dogmas, I do not see on what foundation they rest, or what purpose of edification they can serve. For, if expressions occasionally occur which would appear to favour this revolting

will be observed clear traces of the *optimistic* theory which Leibnitz made the basis of his *Theodicea*.

¹ “Much more grievous is the error of those who attribute grace, faith, justification, and regeneration to none save the elect; so that (which is contrary to all experience) all those whose call is temporary (*πρόσκαιροι*) are to be regarded as hypocrites, and

can derive no fruit either from Baptism, from the Eucharist, or, in general, from the word or the Sacraments; and, on the other hand, that no one who is elect or truly justified can relapse into a crime or a deliberate sin; or, as others prefer to express it, that the elect will not lose the grace of regeneration in the midst of crimes.”—*Opera*, t. i. p. 496.

opinion, it is better to soften them down by comparison with others far more numerous, than to add to their harshness by a rigorous interpretation. And it seems more consonant with the attributes of God to grant a temporary and revocable, but visible, grace, than a grace perpetual and inamissible, but utterly hidden, and compatible with the most depraved habit of soul and the most heinous crimes.

When man, therefore, by God's preventing grace, is aroused from the deadly sleep of sin to a knowledge of his misery, a spirit of self-examination, and a firm resolve of seeking and following the saving truth; and when, rejecting or disregarding all other thoughts and affections, and all worldly or carnal maxims, he devotes his whole energies to the care of salvation; he perceives, even from the light of nature, what is the law and the will of God; and, admonished by memory, he acknowledges with groans and trembling how far he has strayed therefrom, what grievous punishment he has merited, and how heinously he has offended his Creator, to whom he owed supreme honour and love. Pursuing this consideration, he elicits from amid the terrors of conscience the light of returning hope; for he discovers that the same most just Judge, in his infinite mercy, still takes pity upon human weakness, and that He has not laid aside his good-will towards sinners, provided, while there is yet time, they seek a refuge in his mercy. And thus as, to all who seriously turn to God, the Gospel holds forth Christ as the haven of salvation, which all may reach by true penitence—(and penitence, in order to be sufficient, must proceed, not from fear of punishment or hope of reward alone, but from sincere love of God)—whether it be the penitence of those who are received for the first time into the Church of God, as in the baptism of adults, or of those who, having been again imperilled in the gulf

of sin, betake themselves anew to penance, as to a second plank after shipwreck;—and as God promises to those who turn to Him and do penance, not only pardon of past sins, but also new strength for a better life, and the Holy Ghost and regeneration;—hence follows the justification of the sinner; whereby he is not only absolved from guilt, through the satisfaction of Christ laid hold on by faith, but also, by the infusion of the charity of Divine love, is invested with the habit of justice and the new man.¹

Now, as these principles are certain and almost universally admitted, it seems to me very idle to enter into the controversies which have been raised by certain writers concerning the form of justification, viz. whether it consists in the imputation of the merit and satisfaction of Christ, or in habitual infused justice. For as all are compelled to admit that both are necessary, where is the need for further discussion? and where shall we find a dispute about words, if this be not such? If justification be taken, as it is usually taken by jurists, to mean freedom from imputability, it is manifest that the essence of our justification, that is, of our innocence, consists in the imputation

¹ “On the question thus stated, we, in common with the Catholics, adopt the affirmative; and maintain that, in justification, sins, as well actual as habitual, are truly and entirely removed, as to the formality or imputability of the guilt, by remission and pardon, and not by imputation.”—*Cogitationes Privatæ de Methodo Reunionis*. Printed in the *Œuvres de Bossuet*, t. xiv. p. 57. (Liege, 1767.) This most important document, to which reference has been made already, was not drawn up by Leibnitz, but by a committee of the Lutheran divines of Hanover, and especially by his friend Molanus (Van

der Meulen), Abbot of Lokkum. But I have felt myself at liberty to use this report (and also a further explanation of it subsequently prepared by Molanus) for the purpose of illustrating the views of Leibnitz, not only because he was one of the chief promoters of the scheme of reunion, in which the *Cogitationes Privatæ* originated, but also because he formally approved of the views which are put forward in this document, and was himself the medium through which it was submitted to Bossuet for his judgment as to its admissibility in the Catholic Church.

of Christ's satisfaction to us, in virtue whereof pardon is granted to those who believe, and do penance. But if justification be understood, as in ethics, to mean, the being invested with the habit of justice—as it is said in the Apocalypse: "*He that is just, let him be justified still;*"—that is, "let his habit of justice increase;"—it is evident that this habit of justice is infused into us by God in the act of regeneration, when we put on the new man.¹ Whence it may not inaptly be said that the gift of penance and of pardon (not to speak of the other favours, by which God assists and prevents us, even before the work of regeneration is complete,) is a "grace given gratuitously;" whereas the infusion of the new habit is a grace given to penitents in virtue of an institution congruous to the Divine wisdom—"a grace which renders us grateful and pleasing"² to God, which really operates a conversion of our mind, and crowns the whole work of our regeneration. But, however this may be, we must hold, that to the notion of justification, even considered as consisting in the remission of imputability, not faith only, but also penance, and therefore charity, is necessary.

Equally profitless is it to contrast the two divine virtues, faith and charity, with one another, to raise, as it were, a

¹ "For if the term 'justification' be taken in so wide a sense as to comprehend sanctification or renovation, being called from the more important act, namely renovation, the characteristic nature of justification so generally taken, may be formally regarded as consisting in the infusion of sanctifying grace."—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 47. Molanus makes the same distinction between the moral and the forensic use of the word 'justification.'

² *Gratia gratis data—gratia gratos faciens*. Although it is difficult to express, in a brief English translation, the technical meaning of these theological phrases, yet, as in the present instance, the author does not use *gratia gratis data* in its strict technical sense (for he contrasts it with *gratia data ex congruo divinæ sapientie instituto*), I have ventured to translate them according to their meaning in the passage.

question of precedence between them, and to discuss anxiously which of them has the principal share in justification. For in the same way as it is certain that faith without charity is dead, so also is it certain that charity without faith (love without knowledge) is of no effect. And hence faith is an essential of charity, charity a complement of faith.¹

And indeed some of those who attribute justification entirely and exclusively to faith, and maintain that the other virtues will indubitably follow as fruits of justification by faith, seem to adopt a notion of faith different from that which has heretofore been received in the schools; for they refer faith not only to the intellect, but also to the will; nay, they extend their notion of the idea of faith so far as to make it comprise filial confidence in God, which seems to me to involve charity or the love of God. It is not wonderful, therefore, that they hold men to be justified by faith alone, whereas under faith they comprise hope and charity; and therefore, if they think so, the question becomes a mere dispute of words.

It must be admitted, indeed, that, even according to the received notions, faith, or assent, partakes, in a certain sense, of the will; for, were it otherwise, the act could not be commanded by God, nor elicited by men in obedience to the command, though they desired to do so. And, in truth, we often see men hold a thing as true, although they are not able to assign, nay perhaps never have been conscious of, any reason for their opinion; and this is the nature of the faith which, as we have said above, is excited by God in the minds even of simple people who do not

¹ “But if we say that the word *sola* is not taken for *solitaria*, that is, for faith dead, or destitute of good works, or, at least, of a purpose of

performing good works, I think the greater part of the controversy will be arranged.”—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 58.

inquire into the reasons of their belief; so that, in truth, this unreasoning assent consists in that state of mind which produces in those who are under its influence the same dispositions, and prepares them to act and to suffer as efficaciously as the persons who are conscious of motives for their belief, and sometimes more efficaciously. The matter may be understood from an illustration: We know that there are persons who, as far as arguments go, are satisfied that they will never meet ghosts in the dark, and who, nevertheless, will not venture to walk alone at night, or, if they do, are seized with a kind of panic fear. On the contrary, there are others who never even think of arguments against the fear of ghosts, and who, notwithstanding, secured by the firm faith and conviction which they possess, fearlessly spend whole nights alone in the woods and in the dens of wild beasts. Thus, in the case of the former, there seems to be a kind of speculative opinion, in that of the latter, rather a practical assent—a quality which undoubtedly is especially required in faith. And Christ himself has said that there are many degrees of faith;¹ and the highest of these are to be derived, not so much from the mere intellect (otherwise those whose learning was greater would have the greater faith, which certainly was not true of the Canaanite woman, or of the centurion of Capharnaum, though Christ himself attributed great faith to them), as from the affection of the mind, and its readiness to embrace the doctrine when imparted, although reason should appear not only not to favour it, but even to be at variance with it. However, faith, or practical assent to the articles of the Christian religion as a whole, may be

¹ “Amen, I say to you, I have Israel.”—*Luke* vii. 9.
not found as great faith, not even in

altogether distinguished from hope and charity, and from the filial confidence by which we apply general doctrines specially to ourselves.

Nor are we to imagine, as some have done, that, in order to justification, it is required that a man should believe with divine faith that he is justified, much less that he is elect and secure of persevering; for, as there are many who have true faith, and yet will not persevere, it would follow that these persons were bound, by virtue of the faith which is necessary to justification, to believe what is false.¹ But, besides, those who require in the person who is justified a previous belief of his own justification, involve themselves in contradictions. For, if the belief of one's justification is required for justification, and therefore precedes it, it follows that a man who is not yet justified must believe that he is justified, and, therefore, that he must believe what is false. And if they content themselves with requiring from him a belief that he certainly will be justified, they escape these contradictions, it is true, but, on the other hand, they arbitrarily invent conditions of justification which are entirely without any warrant either of reason or of Scripture. For if a man possess faith and charity, he will also have the grace of justification, though he should not even advert to the reflex act, whether he receives it or not. Nor does this filial confidence, or the hope by which we believe and trust that our sins are remitted, and that we are received into favour and made children of God, belong to that divine

¹ “ For our certainty on this point is absolute; whereas our certainty as regards perseverance and salvation is only conditional; viz. on the condition of our using aright and not despising the means of perseverance

in faith; and, lastly, of our praying constantly and devoutly for the assistance of God, which, by virtue of the grace conferred on us, we are enabled to do.”—*Cogitationes Privatæ* p. 59.

faith in the general promises and infallible revelations of God; because this confidence has for its object not alone the contemplation of the Divine goodness, but also individual human things regarding matters of fact; and it springs from the consideration and memory of things which pass in our mind; and consequently does not rise beyond moral certainty. Should any doubts, therefore, arise from the consciousness of our own infirmity, they do not destroy this filial confidence; in the same way as temptations of doubt regarding the articles of religion do not destroy the substance of faith, even though it be languid. It is our duty, however, to struggle against these doubts; for, if we but fix our thoughts firmly upon God's goodness, we must conclude that He will never suffer those who "thirst after truth," and seek grace, to be deceived by falsehood to their own destruction, or to fail of obtaining mercy.

That charity, or love, which is a divine virtue, consists in our loving God above all things, and seeking in Him our sovereign good; and, therefore, we are to love Him, not only for the benefits which He bestows on us, but also for Himself, and as our last end. For, in general, it is of the nature of that true love which is called "the love of friendship,"¹ to place our happiness and perfection in the perfection or happiness of the beloved object; in part, if the

¹ "It is certain that all those things which we desire for themselves, and without any interested view, are of such a nature as to give us pleasure by their excellent qualities, so that the happiness of the beloved object enters into our own."—*Opera*, t. i. p. 27. "The general knowledge of this great truth, that God always acts in the most perfect and the most desirable manner, is, in my opinion, the foundation of the

sovereign love which we owe to God: for one who loves seeks his happiness in the felicity or perfection of the object of his love: *Idem velle et idem nolle vera amicitia est.*"—*Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz und Arnauld*, p. 156. See also a remarkable passage quoted by Feuerbach, *Darstellung, Entwicklung, und Kritik der Leibnitzschen Philosophie*, p. 211. (Ansbach, 1837.)

object be of finite perfection (as when we love children or friends), but entirely, if it be of supreme excellence and goodness.

Hope, as used by theologians, is that love which is called “a love of concupiscence,” or an affection towards God, springing from the consideration, not of God’s excellence and perfection, but of his beneficence towards ourselves, and of the great benefits which He promises to his servants, and especially that of eternal life;—although it may be that the consideration of God’s benefits may also manifest his perfection to us; in which case hope is elevated into charity.

And as the evidence of reason and of Scripture assures us that true and perfect charity is not only prescribed by God, but is moreover the highest service which man can render to his God, and that without it *faith is dead*,¹ therefore has it been justly and congruously ordained that through it our justification, reconciliation, and renovation are completed; although the actual grace of charity is obtained for us, and granted to us, solely through Christ, while we are still separated from God; and although its power of effacing sin springs solely from Christ’s merit, imputed to us through a lively faith. For, as we have already said, in the rigour of Divine justice it would not suffice for the pardon of past sin to love once, but it would be necessary to have always maintained these good dispositions. But, seeing that Christ has satisfied for us, the conditions which God requires in order that we be made sharers of Christ’s merit are easy of fulfilment; for it is not possible, consistently with the order of the Divine justice and wisdom, to understand or imagine any condition more easy of fulfilment, than that of the love of God himself, the most amiable and fairest of all conceiv-

¹ Jam. ii. 20, 26.

able objects, which is the sole condition required of us by Him, after Christ's satisfaction, as the price of the restoration of his friendship,—a price in itself utterly inadequate.

And whereas in those to whom God's abiding grace has been vouchsafed through Christ, there is no longer any sin, any thing hateful to God, "*any condemnation,*"¹ it appears inconsistent with the form of sound words to say that original sin remains after regeneration, though it is weakened or is not imputed; and we shall consult more for the propriety of language if we say, that what constitutes in the original evil the distinctive character of sin, is effaced in regeneration through the merits of Christ and the efficacy of the Holy Spirit; although the flame of corrupt nature is not entirely extinguished; and although, from the infirmity of human nature, even the just are occasionally betrayed into venial errors.

The question then arises, what it is in original sin that possesses the distinctive character of sin? for neither the sole privation of original justice, nor the positive stain of our nature which always clings to us, constitutes the distinctive character of sin. There are some Catholic divines, therefore, who hold that, in original sin, what constitutes the form of sin, is nothing else than the imputation of the crime committed by Adam, or simply the imputability itself; others acknowledge in it nothing, at least nothing positive, in which the nature of sin can be placed, and seek it altogether in the defect of original justice; they conceive, however, that there is something more than this, which they explain by an illustration. It is certain that the intention, like every other act of the mind, is of two kinds—virtual and actual; a virtual intention, such as they contemplate, is sometimes found in a person baptising, or administering any other sacrament;² for the intention, pro-

¹ Rom. viii. 1.

² " Yet in such a way that all are

vided it existed in the beginning, is supposed to endure throughout the entire time of the act, although the mind may not always advert to what it is doing, or, perhaps, may even be carried away by other thoughts, during the entire action, without ever reverting to the act in which it is engaged. Hence it may be said that the condition of those who are affected by original sin is somewhat similar;¹ and we may conceive that all men have, in some hidden way, sinned in Adam, and that, as their will has been depraved by Adam's sin, they have always retained, until the restoration of grace, something analogous to a virtual intention of sinning, which, before regeneration, prevails over even their good motions, or, at least, mingles itself with them. It must be understood, however, at the same time, that this virtual evil intention is removed by true penance along with the guilt; and that the only effect which remains is the concupiscence of the flesh rebelling against the spirit.

We must be careful however, not to underrate the evil influence of original sin, as though the natural powers which existed before the fall are not much lessened and depraved thereby; lest, having been delivered from it, we should detract from the favour which God has thus bestowed on us; nor should we think lightly of the relics of it which still cling to us, as though they were trifling and easily overcome, lest perchance we be betrayed into undue arrogance.

infected (only virtually, however) with the stain of a certain fault, just in the sense in which you attribute a virtual intention to a priest consecrating, though perhaps in the moment of consecration he should be thinking of something else."—*Opera*, t. vi. p. 186.

¹ "Next follows the question as

to the propagation of the contagion which arises from the fall of our first parents, and extends to the souls of their posterity. It does not appear possible to conceive any more fitting explanation of this, than by supposing that, in Adam himself, all the souls of his posterity were infected."

—*Opera*, t. i. p. 488.

But neither should we, on the other hand, so far exaggerate its evil effects, as to say that no good whatever is left, and that every act of the unregenerate is of itself a sin;¹ for St. Augustine (*Ep.* 130)² admits that the continence of Polemon was a gift of God; now, who would assert that to be a sin, which is given by God? Nor, again, are to imagine that original sin has struck its roots so deeply, as not to give way even to Divine grace and to the cleansing and sanctifying blood of the Saviour; as though even that involuntary concupiscence which, from the very composition of the human machine as at present constituted, remains even in the pious, is to be regarded as a sin; whereas no involuntary act can ever be a sin; and it is wrong to pervert the true notions of things, under pretence of a mistaken interpretation of Scripture.

Let us now examine what are the fruits of regeneration, in what manner good works arise therefrom, and what is the efficacy of such works. We have already said that, before regeneration, the love of God is necessary for the performance of that penance which is available for salvation; that from this penance, through the merit of Christ apprehended by faith, follows pardon of sin and renovation of the entire man, or the virtue of Divine charity; and that

¹ "In like manner, I would not think it necessary that all the virtues of the Gentiles should be called spurious and adulterous, or that all their works should be regarded as sins."—*Opera*, t. i. p. 336. Compare also t. i. p. 491, and Feuerbach, *Darstellung der Leibnitzschen Philosophie*, p. 24.

² This letter is numbered cxliv. by the Benedictine editors, and is found t. ii. p. 355.

"Xenocrates Polemonem, ut scri-

bitis, et nos ex illis literis recordamur, de fruge temperantiæ disputantem, non solum ebriosum, verum etiam tunc ebrium ad mores alios repente convertit. Quanquam ergo ille, sicut prudenter et veraciter intelligistis, non Deo fuerit acquisitus, sed tantum a dominatu luxuriæ liberatus, tamen ne idipsum quidem quod melius in eo factum est, humano operi tribuerim, sed divino."—*Ep.* cxliv. (ad Cirtenses), t. ii. col. 355.

(although the habits of the other virtues are acquired only by repeated acts) this virtue, through the mercy of God, is infused on account of a single act of love. Now this habit is essentially active; for by its very nature it is constantly endeavouring to burst forth into action, seeking opportunities of acting, and turning them to a profitable account. It may be safely asserted, therefore, that good works, as far as they consist in a serious will, are necessary to salvation;¹ for a man who does not love God is neither a friend of God nor in the state of grace, because both penance and the renovation of man involve a contradiction, unless they are accompanied by love. Now all good works are, according to the received phrase, virtually contained in this right intention and sincere affection towards God; and this is the “*one thing necessary*,”² which Christ admonished us should be preferred to all else beside.

Whosoever, therefore, loves God above all things, acquiesces, as I have already observed, in his will as regards the past, even though he should seem to be deserted, and should find himself condemned to struggle with many adversities; being firmly persuaded that God is good and faithful, that He tenderly loves “men of good will,” and that He disposes all things so as to turn, in the end, to the good of those who love Him. And, as regards the future, he endeavours with all possible fervour to obey the commands of God, not alone those which are expressly revealed, but also those which are presumed from the consideration

¹ “For Saint Paul expressly says, ‘without holiness,’ that is, without good works, ‘no one shall see God’ (Heb. xii. 14); whence it may be argued: That without which no one shall see God, that is, shall be saved, is certainly in some way necessary in

order to see God, that is, to obtain eternal salvation; but without good works no one shall see God; therefore, &c.”—*Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 57.

² Luke x. 42.

of the Divine glory or of the public good. And in cases of doubt he chooses the part which is safer, more probable, and more advantageous; in the same way as an active, industrious, and zealous minister would act, if entrusted by a great prince with the management of his affairs. For there is no greater or better master than God; none to whose exclusive service all our powers may more rightfully be devoted.

From the love of God springs the love of our brother; that is to say, of every man with whom we may in any way be brought into connexion. And the idleness and insincerity of professions of the love of God in one who loves not his brother, are admirably inculcated by John, of whom it is related by Jerome,¹ that in his extreme old age, when carried in the arms of his disciples to the church, he used to confine himself to one single exhortation, "My little children, love one another!" — and that when, at last, some one, wearied by the unvarying repetition, asked why he always inculcated this precept, and this alone, he replied by a sentiment truly worthy of John: "Because," said he, "it is our Lord's command, and its observance is alone sufficient." Now Christ himself has prescribed an admirable rule of fraternal love, and one which even the Gentiles warmly applauded, viz. "that we love our neighbour as ourselves, and therefore that we do, or refrain from doing, to others, what we would, or would not, that others should do to us." But, although there is no doubt that "charity begins at home," and that, as regards others, this all-embracing and universal benevolence should make us select as its object that person on whom the conferring the benefit will be productive of the greatest advantage to the glory of God and the common good, yet it is right,

¹ St. Hieronymi Opera, t. iii. p. 947. (Paris, 1609.)

notwithstanding, to prefer the salvation, the life, or any other great advantage, even of a stranger, to an inconsiderable inconvenience of ourselves or others.

Good works, then, are those which are undertaken with a right intention for the glory of God and the public good. Under this class, therefore, are comprised the following: that each one should pursue his own calling—that is, apply himself to those duties for the successful discharge of which the talents and opportunities granted him by God appear to qualify him; that, in the next place, he should acquit himself accurately of the obligations of the public office or station in life which he has embraced, and labour to perfect the sphere which has been assigned to him; that, in his other relations, he should discharge towards all men the common offices of humanity; that he should not abandon, unless compelled by necessity, any one who is in peril, and whom it is in his power to assist; and that, even where his assistance is solicited in advancing the mere convenience of another, he should not withhold it, provided the advantage which is sought is not prejudicial to himself or others. And in general he should direct his thoughts so as to procure the greatest amount of good, and for the greatest possible number; and should seek, in all things, to advance the glory of God. The first care of the truly pious man, therefore, will be to be frugal of time, lest he should spend any portion of his life unprofitably; and he will abstain, as far as possible, even from allowable recreations; unless when, from his position in active life, he is drawn into places of public resort, either by the necessary relaxation of mind and the care of health, or by the contingencies of business, or the decorous observances of society. For the austerity¹ which

¹ In a letter to Fabricius, written that “in order not to appear a stoic from Berlin in 1706, he tells him, or an oddity,” he is obliged to take

would perpetually exclude every one from feasts, shows, games, dances, and the other amusements and exercises of courts, is no part of true piety: for these relaxations, in some cases, are not a waste of time, but useful instruments of business. It is right, however, that they should be indulged with discretion. And the virtuous man will shew by his conduct that they are but of secondary interest in his eyes, and that it is only through some necessity he is induced to take part in them.

And as there are various ways, according to the condition and disposition of each individual, of advancing the glory of God and the welfare of men, either by actual service or by example, it is manifestly a source of great advantage that there should be in the Church a class distinct from those who are engaged in the active occupations and duties of every-day life—a class of ascetic and contemplative men, who, discarding the cares, and triumphing over the pleasures, of life, devote themselves entirely to the contemplation of the Deity, and the admiration of his works;¹ or who, divesting themselves of all personal concerns, attend exclusively, and apply all their energies, to the relief of the necessities of others, either by instructing

part in the amusements and festivities of the court; but he complains sadly of the loss of time, the most precious of all earthly things, which it involves. Tom. vi. p. 285. See also Feuerbach's *Darstellung und Entwicklung der Leibnitzschen Philosophie*, p. 15.

¹ See his proposal for a grand and general organisation of philosophical studies and researches through the means of the monastic institute, in his letter to Magliabecchi (Dec. 31, 1689), and again in May 1692:—
“For it is certain that books and

letters were preserved by means of the monasteries. . . . And what is more consonant with piety than the meditation of the admirable works and providence of God, which are displayed no less in the order of nature, than in the course of history and the government of the Church and of the human race? To rob piety of these meditations, is to take from it its most solid nutriment.” —*Opera*, t. v. pp. 98-9. See also Guhrauer's *Leibnitz, eine Biographie*, ii. p. 92.

the ignorant and erring, or by succouring the needy and distressed. Nor is it among the least of the reasons which commend that Church which alone has retained the name and badges of Catholic, that it is in her alone we see universally exhibited and encouraged eminent examples of the exalted virtues and of the ascetic life.

I confess, therefore, that I have always warmly approved of religious orders, of pious confraternities and associations, and similar praiseworthy institutions. For, provided they are purified from corruptions and abuses, governed according to the institutes of their founders,¹ and regulated by the sovereign Pontiff for the interest of the entire Church, they seem to be, as it were, an army of heaven upon earth. For what can be more glorious than to carry the light of truth to distant nations, across the seas, and through fire and sword; to know no traffic but in the salvation of souls alone; to renounce every allurements of pleasure, even the enjoyment of conversation and of society, in order to give oneself to the contemplation of abstract truths, and to meditation on the things of God; to dedicate oneself to the training up of youth to learning and virtue; to carry relief and assistance to the wretched, the despairing, the abandoned, the captive, the condemned, in squalidness, in chains, in distant lands; and not to be deterred, even by the fear of pestilence, from these offices of prodigal charity! The man who knows not, or despises, these things, has but a plebeian and vulgar conception of virtue; he foolishly limits man's obligations to God by the perfunctory discharge of every-day duties, and by that cold habit of life, without zeal, without spirit, by which men's

¹ "This was the object of Moses, and of other good legislators; of the wise founders of religious orders; nay, above all, of Jesus Christ, the

Divine Founder of the purest and most glorious of all religions."—*Opera*, t. i. p. 36.

minds are commonly regulated. Whereas it is not a mere counsel, as some persuade themselves, but a precept, that every man, in every state of life, should strive, with all the powers of soul and body, towards Christian perfection; the practice of which perfection is not incompatible either with wedlock, or with the care of children, or with the occupations of office or of military life, though all these states increase the obstacles to its attainment. But the counsel is, to choose that state of life which is more free from earthly impediments; the choice on which our Lord congratulated Magdalen.¹

From the description of good works, however, let us come to their effect; and in the discussion of this question I find that their meritoriousness is commonly disputed, and that the opinion which for so many ages had been received in the Church is grievously misrepresented, as being full of pharisaical presumption and pride. I think, however, that if the terms be rightly explained, no ground of censure will remain.²

We must bear in mind, therefore, that it is only by a certain analogy that the ideas of obligation and right are applied to us, in relation to God. For all things belong to God, because He created them, He preserves them, and He alone can wisely govern them. By virtue, therefore, of his supreme perfection, or of his supreme wisdom and power, God is naturally the Lord of all; and we are but servants, to whom, in order that we may trade thereon, He has given a certain portion, which Christ called "a talent."³ Now, between the servant and the master there arises, with regard to this portion, merely an imaginary right, drawn from the master's own kindness and conde-

¹ Luke x. 42.

² "It will appear from the very nature of the subject, that, on the question of the merit of works, there

remains scarcely any difference between Catholics and Protestants."—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 65.

³ Matt. xxv. ; Luke xix.

scension. In the same way—to employ another illustration—as while a master plays at chess with his slave, every one knows that whatever is won or lost is the master's; but yet a sensible master will not derange the rules of the game by an ill-timed display of his authority. This explanation being pre-supposed and understood, we may speak securely, and without fear of censure, of an “*as-if-obligation*”¹ on the part of God, and a right, or “*as-if-right*,” on our own part.

Furthermore, as a right taken strictly is twofold; viz. a complete right, which gives an action, such as the right which arises from a contract; and an incomplete right, which produces an obligation, but gives no action of recovery, such as the right of the pauper to the alms which the rich man is bound to give him; so also our “*as-if-right*,” which produces an “*as-if-obligation*” in God, is twofold, viz. either “a right of congruity,” or “a right of condignness;” for it is congruous to God's justice to reward those who love Him with eternal happiness;—not indeed that it is so absolutely, and from the sole consideration of justice (if we abstract from a promise), for a less retribution than this would suffice, but from the further consideration of his wisdom, inasmuch as He has decreed to diffuse throughout his kingdom the greatest amount of happiness of which it may be susceptible; for, this decree of his wisdom once being supposed, it belongs to distributive justice that, of those who love God, not merely some individuals, selected, as it were, with an acception of persons, but all, without any exception, should be admitted to eternal felicity.

¹ The meaning of this passage was completely destroyed by the erroneous reading of the first editions of the *Systema Theologicum*; which instead of “*de quasi-obligatione Dei*” (the correct ms. reading), read *de jure Dei*. I

have ventured to translate the phrases literally, “*as-if-right*,” “*as-if-obligation*,” though perhaps the phrases themselves would be equally intelligible.

God, however, has Himself undertaken a greater obligation, from which it appears to me that we may derive even merit of condignness, and from which, according to the laws of commutative justice, a more complete right arises in our favour. For God has entered into a contract with his Son, and, through the merits of Christ, we have been admitted into the same treaty. Now, the nature of this compact is, that, in virtue of Christ's satisfaction and of our incorporation with Christ, and our reconciliation with God through faith and penance, not only are our sins effaced, but we are moreover made heirs of eternal life, and receive a title, provided we run and fight legitimately, to the crown of justice, and to the many and rich rewards, by which the elect themselves shall be distinguished one from another; for not even "*a draught of cold water*" given to the poor "*shall go without reward*," since God, in virtue of the contract, crowns in us what is purely his own gift. Were it otherwise, we should be but "*unprofitable servants*," who have done only what we were bound to do; nor could we allege any merit, or claim any reward.

A further question has been raised, whether the regenerate can, with the aid of Divine grace, fulfil the law of God so perfectly as not to commit any mortal sin to which, of its own nature, eternal death is due. With reference to this question, as we must firmly hold that no wise legislator will prescribe impossibilities, we must also hold as certain, that to a man who has been reconciled with God, there is never wanting sufficient assistance on God's part, and that he always possesses a power of fulfilling, provided he will it himself, not only each, but all, the precepts of the Divine law. For Christ has declared that "*his yoke is sweet and his burden light*;"¹ and the possibility of fulfilling the law follows clearly from the fact,

¹ Matt. xi. 30.

that the whole law requires on our part nothing more than seriously and sincerely to exert our will, and to love God with all our strength; nor do I see what there is that should render this love impossible to us, whereas even the innate idea which we have of God leads us to acknowledge his infinite loveliness; and the imperfection and unworthiness of all other objects are easily discovered by those who examine them.

It must be confessed, however, that, amid the weakness and rebellion of the flesh and the manifold distractions which surround us, it is difficult always to preserve purity of mind; and that, in consequence, few individuals have lived exempt from mortal, and none¹ from venial, errors. And indeed, were God to enter into judgment even with one who, after regeneration, had lived exempt from mortal sin, even such a man would have no defence against its rigour except in the satisfaction of Christ; for at the least, it was in consideration of this satisfaction that he received pardon of his past sins in the first instance; and if, since that pardon, he has lived a holy life, to what else does he owe it but to the Divine assistance, for which he is indebted to the merits of Christ? Hence no one should "*glory save in the Lord,*"² with whom "*we can do all things,*" and whose power is strong in the weak.

Having explained the reconciliation and renovation of man, and the fruits of the new life (which are the good works prescribed, by the law of God), it remains to consider the positive enactments which Christ has instituted and prescribed, in addition to the common, natural, and perpetual law of God.

¹ He alludes, in a subsequent page, to the special privilege of exemption from venial sin granted to our Blessed Lady.

² 1 Cor. i. 31; 2 Cor. x. 17.

We must recollect, therefore, that Christ is not only our Mediator, who by his merit and his passion has atoned for us and reconciled us to God, but also our Legislator, who, in virtue of the "*all power given to Him in heaven and on earth,*"¹ has prescribed certain laws which cannot be despised without peril of salvation, while their observance will avail very much thereto. To this number, however, do not belong, as some persons imagine, the precept of bearing injuries, of loving our enemies, and other duties of the same kind. For the love of enemies had been long before prescribed by the moral law. Nor does this precept forbid us to repress and punish the wicked, and to take such measures as may either ensure their correction, or, at least, may deprive them of the power of injuring; on the contrary, indeed, even charity to others prescribes this; and though we ought to love all, not even our enemies excepted, yet, in a case of conflicting interests, we should observe a certain proportion in dispensing our benefits. Hence the passage in which it is said² that we should bear with injuries, is to be regarded either as a counsel for those who select a life of seclusion and of special perfection and patience; or it signifies that we are not to resist a magistrate, even though he be a bad one; or it merely prohibits a desire of revenge, so that whatever is done against the wicked may be understood to be done solely from a motive of charity. The principles, therefore, of the Anabaptists, who interdict every pious man from public office and from military service, are grievously erroneous, and calculated to upturn human society; for who does not see that, if this principle were admitted, the service of the state would be deserted by good men, and that the supreme power would

¹ Matt. xxviii. 18.

² Matt. v. 39.

be thrown into the hands of its most abandoned members?

The institutions of Christ in his character of Legislator consist in the mode of Divine worship which is peculiar to Christians, and the Sacraments of the new law. Of the Sacraments we shall speak hereafter.

The distinctive character of Divine worship among Christians consists in our adoring in Christ-Man the almighty and eternal God, in our invoking Christ as the Mediator of salvation, and offering to God himself a perpetual Sacrifice of propitiation, viz. the Body and Blood of the Lord under the appearance of bread and wine, according to the order of Melchisedec, who prefigured Christ, the eternal Priest (the discussion of which subject we shall defer till we shall be considering the question of the Eucharist). To these may be subjoined the ceremonial observances which the Church has added for the sake of order and decency, and the practices connected with the veneration of the images and relics of saints, which partake somewhat of the nature of religious worship, and which, if freed from superstition and abuse, are not without their utility. Of these we shall proceed to speak under distinct heads.

As regards the worship of our Saviour, Paul has expressly declared that "*in the name of Jesus*" all men, and in all places, "*should bend the knee;*"¹ whence all Christians, not even excepting Socinians, agree that Christ is to be adored. Now the Catholic Church rightly teaches that, unless Christ were God, He could not be adored without idolatry; nor are Divine honours due to Him at all, except on account of the Divinity. For the sentence of the all-powerful and jealous God is fixed and unalterable: "*I will not give my glory to another.*"² Hence I cannot assent to the opinion of those who think that the right of Divine

¹ Philip. ii. 20.

² Is. xlii. 8.

honour has been communicated to Christ's Humanity in itself; an opinion defended not only by Socinians, but what is more surprising, by others also, misled by their principles regarding the "communication of properties." Catholic teachers, however, with much more propriety, define that, although the highest perfection and the highest honour of which a creature is susceptible have been communicated to the Humanity by the Divinity, yet to the former, considered in itself, neither the properties nor the honours of the Divinity belong.

And this principle should be carefully observed, even for the sake of its practical bearing, lest, from the consideration of the supreme and eternal Good, men's minds may be withdrawn to the worship of man; and the Jews and Mahometans may thus be confirmed in the false opinion which they have conceived regarding us, as if we adored aught else but the one Almighty God.¹ It was this false belief that gave rise to the fable, that the God of the Christians was given in pledge in the Host to one of the Sultans of Egypt; and to the bitter sarcasm of the Arabian philosopher,² who declared, that "he had seen and heard of many ridiculous religions, but none more silly than the Christian, which commanded that its God should be eaten;"—a calumny which arose either from their hatred, or from the imprudence of members of our own religion.

Nor can we regard the imperfect information of the people on this point, arising from the negligence of their teachers, as free from positive danger. For as the highest

¹ "We adore, formally and precisely, only the Eternal and Infinite."
—*Opera*, t. v. p. 481.

² He alludes, I have no doubt, to a saying attributed to Averroes, a Moorish philosopher of the twelfth century, which bears a striking re-

semblance to a passage in the third book of Cicero *De Natura Deorum*: "Ecquem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud quo vescatur Deum credat esse?"—See Bayle, *Dictionnaire Historique*, art. *Averroes*, t. i. p. 417.

act of piety is that of the love of God above all things, derived from the consideration of the perfection, goodness, and loveliness of his Divinity, in the possession of which the chief happiness of the soul consists, it is necessary to beware, lest, while we think we are eliciting an act of contrition and of Divine love, we stop short of this act, and rest our thoughts in the love and veneration of Christ's Humanity alone; for although, in exciting the soul to increased fervour in acknowledging the Divine wisdom, justice, and goodness, as they are manifested in Christ, the consideration of his Humanity is more efficacious than that of all other creatures beside, yet it should hold the place but of a step, and not the highest and crowning point, in the worship of God. And yet this is a fault into which we commonly see preachers and writers fall, rather labouring in their words or writings to inflame the devotion of the people, by pandering to the imagination and to a certain sensual affection of the carnal mind, than seeking to inculcate the adoration of the invisible Deity, which consists "*in spirit and in truth*,"¹ and is the last and highest object of our worship. However, as the whole Christ, God and Man, is the object of adoration, there is no doubt that both his most holy Soul and his most sacred Body are adored, not in themselves, but in virtue of their union with the Divinity, and in so far as the honour paid to them is resolved into that of the Divinity. And, to sum up in a few words, as it is the person which is thus honoured, the act of adoration is directed to the Person of Christ; nor are we to imagine two adorations, but one only, which is directed to the whole Lord, the ultimate reason of which, however, is to be deduced from the Divine Nature. And hence it was that the Council of Ephesus (chap. 8) decreed that Emmanuel "should be venerated

¹ Joh. iv. 24.

with one supplication, and that one glory should be rendered to Him."¹

Nevertheless, I do not agree with those who, forgetful of human weakness, reject, under pretence of the "*adoration in spirit and in truth*," every thing that strikes the senses and excites the imagination.² For every one who seriously considers the nature of our mind as it exists in this body, will easily admit that, although we can form, within the mind, ideas of things which are outside of the sphere of sense, yet we are unable, notwithstanding, to fix our thoughts upon them, and to dwell on them with attention, unless there be superadded to the internal idea certain sensible signs,³ such as words, characters, representations, likenesses, examples, associations, or effects. The utility of these notes and memorials is proportioned to their greater significancy, and their greater power of representing the properties of the thing which they are intended to denote, especially if they be prominent and striking;—and it is even of advantage if they be of their own nature pleasing. They should be divested, however, of all superfluous ornaments, and of every thing which distracts rather than assists the mind. All these principles may be illustrated by the example of a manuscript, and they are equally

¹ "Una adoratione adorandus cum sua carne." — Labbe, *Concil.* t. iv. p. 30.

² Commenting on the *Arcanum Regium*, a memorial submitted to the king, which advised him to abolish, in the Lutheran Church, auricular confession, and every other usage savouring of Popery, Leibnitz, among other rites, defends exorcism as "a most ancient practice of the Church, and susceptible of an excellent meaning;" and adds, "The suggestion is also gross and intolerable,

because it is thus meant to insinuate that sacred vestments, chasubles, lights, hosts, &c. are a Popish abomination" [ein päpstslicher Greuel]. — *Epist. Leibnit.* (Kortholt's collection), t. i. p. 89. See also Guhrauer's *Leibnitz, eine Biographie*, ii. p. 234.

³ "The imagination is strengthened either by pictures or by sounds; for to the other senses, which are less delicate, things cannot be so well represented." — *Opera*, t. vi. p. i. 307.

applicable to the style of the author, and to the character of the scribe. Thus, in addition to an accurate exposition and delineation of his subject, an author may employ, not without advantage and credit, similes, examples, apothegms, nay even musical construction and harmonious cadence: but, on the contrary, bombastic expressions, pedantic words, elaborate rhythmical arrangement, every species of affectation, and, in a word, every thing that does not soothe with insensible pleasure, but turns the mind away from the consideration of the subject to the examination of these secondary things themselves,—all such things are unworthy of an orator who seeks to persuade the hearers or readers, and are only suited to the unsubstantial rhetorician, who declaims idly in the school to please the ear, and whose praise is not effective speaking, but a skilful display of figures. So also, from a scribe or a printer we look for clean and elegant paper, enduring ink, letters distinct, well turned, and flowing with a certain appearance of ease; but we do not desire figured paper, particoloured inks, and fantastic mazes of idle flourishes, running every where through the page; for all these things disturb and distract the reader. It is the same in sacred things: whatever leads the mind most effectually to the consideration of God's greatness and goodness, whatever excites our attention, produces pious thoughts, nay, whatever renders devotion sweet and grateful,¹ all this is deserving of approval: but if the speaker betray excessive labour; if the hearers be carried away rather to admire his purity of diction, his elegance of gesture, and his erudition, than to love God, to confess their sins, and to amend their life;

¹ “The Sybarites decreed rewards to any one who should discover new species of pleasure. I think that the Christian commonwealth would

be most indebted to him who would contribute most to render piety pleasing.”—*Ibid.* p. 307.

if it be the orator, rather than Christ, that is presented to the mind; if theatrical display take the place of the beauty of holy things; if the sacred music be designed rather to please the ears than to excite pious desires,—all this is to corrupt sincere devotion by profane ornaments.

Hence I am of opinion that God does not disregard, as unworthy of his service, the use of musical instruments, nor vocal harmony, nor beautiful hymns, nor sacred eloquence, nor lights, nor incense, nor precious vestments, jewelled vases, or other offerings; nor statues or graven images of pious objects; nor the laws of architecture and perspective, nor public processions, the chiming of bells, the strewing the streets with carpets, and the other expedients which the overflowing piety of the people has devised for the Divine honour, and which certain people, in their morose simplicity, despise.¹ And this may be proved by arguments, as well as by examples. For the first fruits, and, so to speak, the choicest flowers, of all things and of all arts are due to God. Of old, even in the very infancy of the art, it was believed, as it must even still be acknowledged, that poetry (which is but a more divine species of eloquence, and, as it were, a language of angels,) could not be more nobly employed than in singing hymns, and in celebrating the praises of God with all the elegance of which it was susceptible.² We must admit the same of music—the

¹ “To hold up these rites in general as erroneous, simple, and ridiculous, is both injurious and devoid of foundation.”—*Opera*, t. v. pp. 188-9 (Dutens’s edition). I am inclined, however, to think that this is a false reading of the passage; for I find almost the very same words in a German criticism of Daillé’s work *De Usu Patrum* (Leibnitz’s *Deutsche Schriften*, ii. 482), applied by Leib-

nitz not to the contempt of rites and ceremonies, as here, but to the contempt of the Fathers. “*Die Patres* aber, überhaupt, als irrig, einfältig, und lächerlich vorstehen wollen, ist so schädlich als ungegründet.” It would seem as if *ritus* had been written instead of *Patres*.

² “Wherefore I hold that there is no means by which poets can deserve better of the commonwealth, than by

twin-sister of poetry; nor can the most eminent architects more suitably display their art, or the mightiest princes their magnificence, than in constructing and procuring the construction of temples or basilics, and other works destined to the honour of God and the purposes of piety. In the Holy Scripture we have the example of God himself; for it was in obedience to his commands that Moses constructed the tabernacle, and Solomon the temple; and we read that David employed choirs, hymns, organs, and cymbals, in the praises of God. And although there is no temple more worthy of God than a pure mind, no music sweeter than fervent prayer, no incense more grateful than the odour of sanctity, no offering more noble than alms-deeds; and although "well-ordered justice and righteousness of soul"¹ are commended, even by a profane writer,² as more precious than gold in religious worship; yet we are not to overlook external things, because they are less to be prized than internal; in the same way as our innate reason directs us to respect and honour friends and princes, not only by real service and by acts, but also by words, by gestures, and by every indication of love and honour. And our Lord rebuked those who were indignant because the vessel of precious unguent was poured out in his honour, as though the price had been more fitly turned to the uses of the poor.³ For God has given to mortals abundant means of satisfying both offices; and by the wise discipline of pious antiquity, it was ordained that of that

labouring to depict in the most glowing colours, and to impress deeply on men's minds, the happiness of eternal life."—*Opera*, vi. 307.

¹ "It was the doctrine of the Platonists and Stoics, nay of the poets, that we are bound to imitate the gods, and that we should offer to them

'Compositum jus fasque animi sanetosque recessus
Mentis, et incocto generosum pectus
honesto.'

—*Leibn. Epist.* (Kortholt's Collection), t. ii. p. 150.

² Persius, ii. Sat. 73-4.

³ Matt. xxvi. 10.

portion of the sacred revenues which remained after the support of the clergy, part should be applied to the poor and to works of charity, and part to the erection of basilicas, and other expenses of a similar nature.

The question regarding the worship of images, viz. how far it is lawful to use them in religion, and, through them, to render honour to the prototype, is of greater importance. For it certainly cannot be supposed that God would, without grave reason, have interdicted to his people all use of graven things, and have prohibited the making of images lest they might be used as idols. The ancient Church also, in the first ages, as we learn from the Council of Elvira and from other passages of the ancients, did not admit images into the oratories, or at least not without great difficulty. At a later period, the bishops of Gaul and Germany, in the Council of Frankfort, held under Charlemagne, bitterly inveighed against the image-worshippers of the East and the second Council of Nice.¹ And indeed, this con-

¹ As this supposed decision of the Fathers of Frankfort is one of the popular objections against the Catholic practice regarding images, it may be well to remind the reader, that their condemnation of the Second Council of Nice was founded on the false supposition that that Council had approved of a worship of images *which would amount to positive idolatry*. The only knowledge of the Council of Nice which the Fathers of Frankfort had, was derived from a Latin version of its acts, which, by a strange mistake of the translator, represented one of the bishops at Nice (Constantine, bishop of Cyprus) as declaring that he “rendered to sacred images the *same honour and adoration which is paid to the Holy Trinity itself*.” The Latin translation of his words ran

as follows:—“*Suscipio et amplector honorabiliter sanctas et venerabiles imagines, secundum servitium adorationis quod consubstantiali et vivificatrici Trinitati emitto; et qui sic non sentiunt neque glorificant, a sancta catholica et apostolica ecclesia segrego.*”

This strange and startling sentiment, as it stands in the Latin version of the Acts of the Council, is represented in that version as having been received by the Fathers of Nice without remonstrance, and even without remark; nor is it, therefore, matter of surprise that the bishops of Frankfort should have rejected image-worship, such as they believed it to have been maintained by the Eastern image-worshippers. So far, however, is this version from rendering the true

trovcrsy gave occasion to many wars, tumults, and revolutions in the East, and was not the least among the causes of the loss of Asia. The Jews too, and Saracens, have held the veneration which is paid to images among the other reasons of their hatred against Christians; nor can it be denied that, even at an early period, many abuses in divine worship had gained ground among the people; and that one among the causes of the success of Mahomet and his followers, was their pretended boast of restoring the worship of the one God. The partisans of the Reformation in the last century, also, found a plausible colour for their undertaking, in the very same profession.

On the other hand, the use of images in worship appears clearly to be founded on principles of utility and reason. What object have we in reading or listening to

meaning of the words employed by Constantine, that in fact his words clearly convey exactly the opposite. In delivering his vote, he expresses his concurrence with those who had preceded him, and *explicitly disclaims all adoration of images*. Τούτοις συντίθημι καὶ δρόφρων γίνομαι, δεχόμενος καὶ ἀσπαζόμενος τὰς ἀγίας καὶ σεπτὰς εἰκόνας· καὶ τὴν κατὰ λατρείαν προσκύνησιν μόνῃ τῇ ὑπερουσίῳ καὶ ζωαρχικῇ Τριάδι ἀναπέμπω. (“I concur with these and am of the same opinion, receiving the sacred images, and affectionately saluting them; and I offer the *worship of adoration* to the *supersubstantial and vivifying Trinity ALONE*.”)—See the Acts of the Council, in Labbe, viii. p. 335.

It is only necessary to confront this original with the strange mistranslation which misled the bishops of Frankfort, in order to understand that their condemnation of the Second Council of Nice, and of image-

worship as it seemed to be defended there, did not in reality touch the doctrine as it is held in the Church, and as it was taught by the Fathers of the Council. And indeed this is fully admitted by Molanus, in the exposition of his principles which was submitted by Leibnitz to Bossuet, to which we have already referred:—“I cannot dissemble that this Synod of Frankfort went to undue lengths, and understood in too crude a sense the decision of the Greeks in the Second Council of Nice on the worship of images, which perhaps would have admitted of a favourable interpretation; and that this was occasioned by a so-called Latin version of the acts of this Council, which the most cursory observer, by comparison with the Greek text, will see to be unfaithful.”—*Explicatio Ulterior Methodi Reunionis*. (*Œuvres de Bossuet*, xiv. p. 314.)

histories, but in order that the images which they represent may be painted on our memory?¹ Now as these images are of themselves very fleeting, and are not always sufficiently distinct and clear, we should gratefully acknowledge, as a great gift of God, the arts of painting and sculpture, through whose aid we obtain enduring images, representing the objects with the utmost accuracy, vividness, and beauty; by the sight of which (in the impossibility of referring to the originals) the internal images may be renewed, and, like the impression of a seal on wax, more deeply imprinted upon the mind. And as the use of images possesses such advantages, in what circumstances, I ask, can it be more fitly introduced, than in those in which it is of greatest moment that the images impressed upon our memory should be especially lasting and vivid, that is, in the concerns of piety and of the Divine honour? And this is especially true, because, as I have observed above, the worship of God is, pre-eminently, the most fitting field for the display of all the arts and sciences, and therefore also of painting.

To one who considers these things, it must be clear beyond all doubt, that if the law of God and certain holy men chose to prohibit, at certain times and in certain places, a thing which in itself is harmless, and indeed which, if religiously practised, is eminently useful, it was solely because it might give occasion to grievous abuses, against which it was difficult to guard in those times. We must see, then, in what these abuses chiefly consist.

In the first place, therefore, before the written law was promulgated by God, and while his true worship was pro-

¹ " Pictures are more clear, sounds more striking; because in the one there is rest, in the other motion. Words are but sounds, the chief effect

of which is to excite the memory of pictures or of things which we have seen."—*Opera*, t. vi. p. i. p. 306-7.

pagated solely by the tradition of the elders, many men came to forget the one infinite and invisible Creator of all things, and fell away into the worship of those things which were within reach of their imagination, the sun, the moon, the stars, the heaven, and the elements.¹ By degrees, either through the ambition of tyrants, or, in some cases, through the veneration entertained for men of eminent merit, it came to pass that mortals were elevated into gods. And although there were some who worshipped one particular God as superior to all the rest, yet the superiority which they attributed to Him was not that of a being removed from the others by an infinite interval, but only that of a more excellent man among his fellow-men. Now the use of images and statues tended very much to promote this perverted worship. For in these, men had before their eyes perpetual incentives to the corrupt inclination which had gradually grown inveterate; and, by representing to themselves the dead as living, they fostered this most erroneous conception of the Divinity. And at last, when, by degrees, their superstition began to imagine that there existed, and indeed that there had actually been observed, in the statues, certain mysterious signs of the presence and even of the interposition of the gods, which the interested priests circulated or exaggerated through the desire of gain, they came thence to think that there dwelt in the statues themselves some peculiar virtue of the Divinity.

To these corruptions of the Gentiles, the patriarchs, who remained true to the worship of the invisible Substance, strenuously opposed themselves. One of these, Abraham, bound himself by a peculiar treaty to the true God, and by this religious rite happily secured the fidelity of his posterity. Certainly, it was chiefly through those races which are regarded as descendants of Abraham

¹ Rom. i. 20.

that the worship of the one God was preserved, and was by degrees again diffused among the other nations. And when Israel, who was the grandson of Abraham, was driven by famine to go down into Egypt, and the Israelites had multiplied there, it pleased God, lest their constancy should be gradually undermined by the contagious influence of this most superstitious nation, to lead forth his chosen people with a strong hand from the slavery of Pharaoh, and to give them new laws through the mouth of Moses; one of which¹ interdicted them from all use, or at least all sacred use, of images, in order that they might the better be preserved pure from idol-worship, which was then almost universally received. Perhaps the same reason continued in force among the early Christians; and in the designs of God and of the holy men of that age, it seemed more safe to lean to the opposite side, and to dispense altogether with a matter which in itself is good and useful, but still is unessential, than to expose souls yet tender and ill confirmed in the faith, to danger of idolatry.

And hence, if there existed, even at the present day, great reason for caution, and a fear that their use would lead to idolatry, I doubt not that it might be right to deal with images, as Ezechias did with the brazen serpent,² though this had been set up by the order of God himself. In the same way, also, it would be advisable to abstain from introducing them among a people who would, perhaps, be deterred from embracing Christianity by their detestation of images;—a contingency which may yet arise,³

¹ Exod. xx. 4.

² 4 Kings xviii. 4.

³ Guhrauer (*Leibnitzens Deutsche Schriften*, vol. ii., Appendix, p. 72) founds upon this passage an argument by which to fix the date of the composition of the "Systema." He

concludes, from the hope of the downfall of the Moslem arms which is here expressed, that the work must have been written before the peace of Karlowitz formally established the Porte as a recognised European power; that is, before the year 1699. I must own,

among the Arabs, the Persians, the Scythians, and the other nations of the East, if it shall please God to favour the arms, or rather the preaching, of the Christians, and to bring on the fatal day of the Mahometan domination.

Hence, when all the reasons are carefully balanced, we must come to the conclusion, that the law of God, if any such law existed, against the use of images, and even against such a worship of them as does not trench in any way upon the Divine honour, was merely a ceremonial precept; that it was but temporary in its nature, and perhaps was retained for a while by the first Christians, on account of grave reasons;—in the same way as the law of the Sabbath-day, and that concerning the use of “*blood and things strangled*,”¹ which, though enforced by a much more express passage of the New Testament, nevertheless fell into disuse among the majority of Christians, as soon as the reason for observing them was at an end.

Indeed, there are examples which prove that it admitted of dispensation, even among the Jews; for although the law appears utterly to prohibit images and graven things, yet (not to speak of likenesses of inanimate objects) we read of the golden cherubim and the brazen serpent which were constructed by Moses; and of other cherubim, and oxen, and lions, which were made by Solomon, and, for the most part, were set up even in the holy place, some of which were expressly ordered, and others at least approved. And although it appears more probable that, in the origin of Christianity, there were no images in the oratories, or very few,² (for we find mention in Ter-

however, that the hope expressed appears so vague and distant (*quod ALIQUANDO usu venire posset*) as to be perfectly reconcilable even with the darkened political prospects of Christendom after the peace of 1699.

¹ Acts xv. 20, 29.

² For any person who has visited Rome within the last ten years, it can hardly be necessary to correct this statement. The recent discoveries of the distinguished archæ-

tullian¹ of one image of Christ, under the form of The Good Shepherd seeking the Lost Sheep, graven on the sacred chalices,) yet it cannot be denied that they were gradually received into use; and St. Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa,² describes a picture of the sufferings of a certain martyr, as elaborately painted on the wall of a temple:—to pass over other testimonies for the present.

ologist, Padre Marchi, have brought to light in the Roman catacombs, especially that of S. Agnese, a number of oratories and chapels, the pictorial decorations of which are evidently of a very early date, and in some cases distributed with a profusion which reminds one of the richest of the frescoes of Giotto or Cimabue. The subjects are for the most part scriptural—as, Adam and Eve, the Ark, Jonas, the Good Shepherd, &c.; but there are some which represent our Blessed Lady, and there is one especially in which she is painted with the Divine Infant in her arms. Padre Marchi is at present engaged in an extensive work upon the Catacombs, part of which has appeared in *fascicoli* at Rome. As yet, however, it does not extend beyond the first branch of the subject—the architecture of the Catacombs.

¹ “A parabolis licet incipias; ubi est ovis perdita, a Domino requisita, et humeris ejus revecta? Procedant ipsæ picturæ calicum vestrorum, si vel in illis perlucebit interpretatio pecudis illius, utrumne Christiano an ethnico peccatori de restitutione contineat.”—*De Pudicitia*, c. vii. p. 1199. It is not a little interesting to know that an ancient glass engraved with the very subject alluded to in

this passage of Tertullian, is figured by Padre Marchi in his great work on the Catacombs, “*Monumenti Primitivi delle Arti Cristiane nella Metropoli del Cristianesimo*” (Pittura Tav. ii. fig. 4). The legend which encircles the figure contains the familiar prayer of the inscriptions of the Catacombs, VIVAS CUM TUIS FELICITER; and another figure (engraved in the same plate) presents the same prayer in the still more simple Greek form, ζήσης (mayst thou live!). This, however, is but one amongst the endless variety of Prayers for the Dead which are found in the Christian inscriptions of the Catacombs. See *Dublin Review*, vol. xxi. pp. 440 and following, Art. “Maitland’s Church in the Catacombs.”

² In his Homily on St. Theodorus; a most eloquent, clear, and explicit illustration of the primitive practice of honouring the Saints. Ἐπέχρωσε δὲ καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος τὰ ἄνθη τῆς τέχνης, ἐν εἰκόνι διαγραφάμενος τὰς ἀριστείας τοῦ μάρτυρος, τὰς ἐνστάσεις, τὰς ἀλλογυθόνας . . . πάντα ἡμῖν ὡς ἐν βιβλίῳ τινὶ γλωττοφόρῳ διὰ χρωματῶν τεχνουργησάμενος, σαφῶς διηγόρευσε τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοῦ μάρτυρος.—*Oratio in Laudes magni Martyris Theodori*. *Opp.* tom. ii. 1011 (Paris, 1605).

But as regards the actual veneration of images, it cannot be denied that, through fear of superstition, Christians long abstained therefrom, especially as long as pagans were still intermingled with them in considerable numbers. But when the worship of demons was at last exploded throughout the greatest part of the known and civilised world, and when the gods had ceased to be mentioned except in jest, even grave men no longer saw cause why images, which are the alphabet of the unlearned, and which to the simple people supply a great incentive to piety, should be excluded from worship.

Nevertheless, the iconoclast contests in the East, and the opposition of the fathers of Frankfort, shew that opinion long continued to fluctuate; and even St. Gregory, surnamed the Great, the Pontiff of the Roman Church, who lived still earlier than these, appears to have varied in his sentiments. For, in a letter to Serenus, Bishop of Marseilles, he approves of his having forbidden the adoration of images, and, at the same time, rebukes him for having broken them.¹ And yet, writing to one Secundinus, to whom he had sent an image of the Saviour, he says: "We do not prostrate ourselves before it as before a Divinity, but we adore Him, of whom we are reminded by the image that He was born, or that He suffered, and that now He sitteth upon the throne."² Now

¹ "Et quidem zelum vos, ne quid manufactum adorari possit, habuisse laudamus, sed frangere easdem imagines non debuisse judicamus. Idcirco enim pictura in ecclesiis adhibetur, ut qui literas nesciunt, saltem in parietibus videndo legant, quæ legere in codicibus non valent." [the *alphabetum idiotarum* of Leibnitz]. "Tua ergo fraternitas et illas servare, et ab earum adoratione popu-

lum cohibere, debuit."—*S. Greg. Op.* t. iv. p. 295. Compare also page 439 (Paris, 1640).

² *Ibid.* t. iv. p. 271. The collection also contained images of the Blessed Virgin, and of SS. Peter and Paul; and with it St. Gregory sent "*unam crucem et clavem etiam pro benedictione a sanctissimo corpore Petri Apostolorum Principis.*"—*Ibid.*

this proves, not obscurely, that Gregory was wont to adore Christ in presence of an image, or turned toward an image. And this, as I shall state hereafter, is precisely what others call adoration of images. And thus Gregory appears, in order to avoid scandal, to have accommodated himself to those to whom he wrote, in a matter which he deemed of itself indifferent; for the practice of venerating images came but tardily into use in Gaul, and was much earlier in the East and in Italy. And a priest, named Claudius, who was sent from Gaul into Italy, by Louis the Pious, and was made Bishop of Turin on account of his learning, relates that he incurred danger by resisting the worship of images, as appears from the work of Jonas of Orleans, who wrote a refutation of his doctrine.¹ The reason of this difference, I think, may be deduced from the different genius of the nations; for the inhabitants of the latter countries have always been of a more vivid imagination, and therefore more given to ceremonies. Whence we find that they paid to the statues of Emperors and Kings the same honours as to the prince in person—a thing almost unknown in Gaul and Germany. It is not strange, therefore, that those nations should regard with horror, as a sacrilege, the denial in other countries of that honour which they themselves pay to the images of Christ and the Saints, (though this may sometimes have been from a good and laudable zeal); because they see the prototype present, as it were, in the image; for they pursue the associations to a greater length in their mind, and therefore their imagination is more delicate and exquisite. And yet the same nations, when imbued with the contrary opinion, may fall into excess on the opposite side; as, for instance,

¹ A still more valuable refutation was written by our countryman Dungal, a monk of the monastery of St. Denis. It was published in the *Bi-*

bliotheca Patrum (vol. xiv.), and reprinted separately in 1608. An English translation of this interesting work is at present in preparation.

we find that the Mahometans cannot tolerate pictures of living things even in profane use. By degrees, however, Gaul and Germany, and almost the whole Christian world, followed the example of the East and Italy, and continued so to do until the changes of the last century.

But before we lay down the principles which are to be held regarding the received worship of images, we must see in what it consists; and this we cannot ascertain better than from the words of the Council of Trent, which run thus: "Moreover [let the bishops teach] that the images of Christ, of the Virgin Mother of God, and the other Saints, are to be had and retained, especially in temples, and due honour and veneration paid to them: not that we believe that there is in them any divinity or virtue on account of which they are to be worshipped, or that any thing is to be asked from them, or that trust is to be placed in them, as was done of old by the Gentiles, who '*placed their hope in idols*;'¹ but because the honour which is shewn them is referred to the originals which they represent: so that, through the images which we kiss, and before which we bare the head and prostrate ourselves, we but adore Christ and venerate the Saints, whose likeness they bear."²

The decree subjoins, that "through the histories of the mysteries of our redemption, as expressed by pictures or other representations, the people are instructed, and are strengthened in recalling and assiduously meditating on the articles of faith; and furthermore, that great fruit is derived from all images, not only because they recall to the minds of the people the benefits and gifts which they have received from Christ, but also because by them the

¹ Ps. cxxxiv. 18.

Sacris Imaginibus.—Sess. xxv. pp. 226-7 (ed. Patavii, 1790).

² *Decretum de Invocatione, Veneratione, et Reliquiis Sanctorum et*

wonders of God, wrought through the Saints, and their saving examples, are set before the eyes of the faithful; to the end that they may give thanks to God for them, that they may compose their lives and morals to the imitation of the Saints, and may be excited to adore and love God, and to cherish piety.”¹ In these words of the Council I do not see what it is possible to censure.² And it is afterwards added, that “the holy synod anxiously desires the suppression of the abuses which have crept in.”

But, to discuss the matter more distinctly, we must reflect, that the honour paid to images is of two kinds: the first, the honour which properly belongs to the image itself, as its being set in a prominent and honourable place, adorned, set off with lights, carried in procession;—and this honour, I think, presents but little difficulty, and will easily be tolerated by any one who does not think that images are to be rejected altogether:—the second, which is referred to the original, and which demands more diligent examination; and this is the veneration of images regarding which the controversy arises. Such, for instance, is the act of men kissing an image, bowing the head before it, bending the knee, prostrating, pouring forth prayers, making vows, offering praises, or giving thanks. But indeed, although by the established use of language, the honour is said to be, in such case, paid to the image, yet in reality, in the sense in which the Council explains the honour to be rendered to images, the object to which the honour is referred is not the thing, which is inanimate and incapable of honour, but the original, in the presence of the image, or through the image. And hence it was, I suppose, that

¹ Ibid.

² “Thus it appears that it is rather the dominant abuses, which Protestants think they discover among

those who are in communion with Rome, than the speculative dogmas, that impede the re-union.”—*Opera*, t. v. p. 554.

some scholastics maintained that the adoration paid to the image of Christ is the same supreme worship of *Latria* as that of the Lord Christ himself. For this act which is called adoration of the image, is in reality but adoration of Christ himself, suggested by occasion, and in consideration, of the image, to which the body is turned as to Christ himself, in order that his presence may be presented more forcibly, and the mind may be more sensibly elevated to the contemplation of the Lord.¹ For no man in his senses will intend to say, “*O image, grant my petition!*” “*To thee, O marble!*” or “*O stone, I give thanks!*” but “*Thee, O Lord, I adore! to Thee I sing praises!*” In these times, nevertheless, it would seem to be useful, and conducive to piety, to abstain, for the purpose of avoiding scandal, from all those expressions of the scholastics which convey that an image is to be revered with the Divine honour of *Latria*; phrases which the Council has prudently avoided, and of which it sufficiently conveys its disapproval.

Supposing, therefore, that no other species of veneration of images is admitted than simply the veneration of the original in presence of the image, there will no more be idolatry in this practice, than in the veneration which is shewn to God and to Christ, when his most sacred name is pronounced. For names, too, are signs, and, indeed, far inferior to images in significancy; for they are much less perfect representations of the object. When an image, therefore, is said to be honoured, the act should not be understood in any other sense than when it is said that

¹ “It is plain that these images have no intrinsic virtue, and, therefore, that we should neither adore them nor pray before them, unless in so far as they are employed as a

visible and sensible instrument to excite in us the memory of Christ or of heavenly things.”—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 71.

“*in the name of Jesus the knee is bowed,*” that “*the name of the Lord is blessed,*” that “*glory is given to his name.*” And it is not a whit more censurable to adore before an external image, than it is to adore in presence of the internal image which is painted on our imagination; for the only use of the external image is to render the internal one more vivid.¹

The Council wisely cautions us not to believe that any “virtue or divinity exists and dwells in the image itself:” a superstitious belief similar to that of the Trojans, who thought that the city would fall, if the Palladium were taken away; and of the Romans, who used a set form of words in order to call out the gods from the enemies’ temples, and believed that the god himself was transferred along with the image; and of some among the Gentiles, who were convinced that carrying the statue of a particular god in procession would ensure success: of which superstitions concerning images, the Arabs still retain a trace in certain figures and talismans; and the Jews, in certain written or spoken names; which undoubtedly implies an adoration of the images or of the names.

No less wisely did the Council add, that “neither is trust to be placed in images;” as if, for example, devotion would be less grateful to God, or prayers less efficacious, if the image chanced to be removed, or lost, or changed; which is certainly a superstitious belief. And we must maintain in like manner regarding relics, that their loss or even their spuriousness, would not prejudice the prayer of the suppliants, provided their piety continued the same. For we must also hold, that visits undertaken, either voluntarily or from vow, to certain places of especial sanctity, and other similar works, are sometimes profitable to piety; for

¹ The germ of this interesting and ingenious argument will be found in the passage already cited in the note, page 53.

even the very journey and the other details of the undertaking form part of the honour; and the discipline of soul, the penance and obligation voluntarily undertaken, the peculiar manifestation of fervour and zeal, and the union of our private tribute to God's honour with the public expression of the piety of the assembled people, are all acts worthy of commendation;—and the very place itself, signalised by divine favours, moves the mind more forcibly by its memories and associations, and strikes it with a kind of holy awe; as I remember even Protestants, who had had the happy privilege of visiting our Lord's sepulchre, to have admitted.¹

The same grace, nevertheless, will be obtained in any other place where the same lively faith and the same devotion of soul are found, even though the images, relics, and similar external helps be wanting; for such things have not their efficacy, so to speak, from the rite itself (*ex opere operato*), like the Sacraments, but from the disposition of the subject (*ex opere operantis*), as the schoolmen say. And therefore, as the observance of certain times as peculiarly holy, is profitable solely because it excites to piety by a kind of special admonition, it is the same with the reverence of particular places, and the rites performed, or

¹ The feeling of Leibnitz himself on this subject may be collected from the following anecdote in the life recently published by Guhrauer:

“The celebrated antiquarian, Raphael Fabretti, secretary of Pope Alexander VIII., took a pleasure not only in shewing Leibnitz his own valuable private museum, but also in conducting him to all the public collections of antiquities. Among others, he brought him to the catacombs; and when Leibnitz expressed

a doubt whether ‘a certain reddish substance which one sees in the phials and cups at many of the tombs, was blood dried up from length of years, and was rather inclined to think that it was earth or dust of this reddish colour,—Fabretti, in order to satisfy him, mixed a little warm water in one of the phials, and in a short time the contents proved to be real blood; so that Leibnitz was almost perfectly satisfied, and retired from the graves of the martyrs with

the objects preserved, therein. No person, therefore, who approves of the distinction of seasons and of the observances peculiar to them, is justified in condemning the distinction of places, and of the sacred objects preserved in them; nor is there any greater reason, therefore, for rejecting sacred pilgrimages, than festival-days.

Besides, I do not see what evil there can be in bowing down before an image of the crucifix, and, while we look upon it, honouring Him it represents; whereas, on the other hand, its advantages are manifest, inasmuch as it is certain that it has a wondrous effect in exciting the affections. We have already seen that such was the practice of Saint Gregory the Great; nor are the followers of the Augsburg Confession entirely averse to it.¹ And indeed, if it were not certain that there existed in former times grievous abuses of images, which have cast suspicion on a practice excellent in itself, and if we did not actually know what contests, both in ancient and modern times, have arisen concerning it, perhaps it would not be easy for any one to suspect any hidden evil or danger, or even any cause of scruple, in the practice of worshipping in presence of an

great respect and reverence.' Such is the account of the Italian biographer whom we here follow. What is more than this, Fabretti himself, many years after, in the preface of his great work on Inscriptions, cited Leibnitz, the Protestant philosopher, as an authority against those who denied that the red substance found in the phials in the tombs of the martyrs was blood; and quotes a passage from a letter of the celebrated German on the subject of a chemical analysis which Leibnitz had made in Rome, in the presence of several persons, with a fragment of one of these phials, and in which he ex-

pressed the opinion that the red substance was blood, rather than of a mineral nature, inasmuch as it dissolved more easily than any mineral substance; which, however, could not, in his own eyes, have been conclusive."—*Guhrauer's Leibnitz, eine Biographie*, ii. p. 90-1.

¹ "It will be easy to come to an agreement with regard to image-worship also, provided, for the future, they abstain from that excess which the more moderate Catholics themselves observe in the practice of some members of their own communion."—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 71.

image;—so innocent, nay so correct and laudable does this practice in itself appear.

It is commonly objected, indeed, that the pagans used the same qualification; professing that it was not the marble or wood, but the gods, that they worshipped. But in addition to their attributing a virtue to the images, and reposing confidence in them, we have already anticipated this objection by shewing, that the reason why image-worship is bad, and why it was prohibited of old, is not because of its own intrinsic evil, but because it inclined to the worship of false gods; for (from the received use of the word) that only is really idolatrous, which transfers to another the honour due to God. Now in the Church at the present day, all the honour paid to images is referred solely to those originals, through which we venerate that one and eternal Deity, to whom alone we have been taught to pay divine honours, and whose benefits we contemplate in others, in order that, admonished the more thereby, we may terminate our worship in Himself.

I see one plausible objection; namely, that it is safer to abstain from a practice which is at all doubtful. Now to this I say, that if the doubt be trivial, the conscience which is thereby troubled is a scrupulous one. I admit, indeed, that in the present dispositions of many among Protestants, (to say nothing of Jews and Mahometans,) much offence arises from the use of images; but, on the other hand, it must be considered what tumults and scandals, what rivers of blood, would be necessary, in order to eliminate from the Church this usage, which in itself, and apart from abuses and scandals on both sides, is a most excellent and praiseworthy one. Justly, therefore, has it been decreed that it should be retained. Nor can its retention afford to any one a just cause of separation. Nor is it to be believed that “*the gates of hell*” have so far “*prevailed against the Church*”

and against the assistance which Christ promised to her, that, for so many ages, a damnable form of idolatry should have been established over the entire Christian world.

All things considered, therefore, seeing that in the practice of venerating images, as it is approved by the Fathers of Trent, there is nothing opposed to the divine honour;¹ that there does not appear to be, in these times, when all are sufficiently aware that the Omnipotent Deity alone is worshipped with divine honour, any fear of idolatry, which might pervert the honour due to God; that, moreover, there exists in the Church a usage of so many centuries, which cannot be abolished without the greatest revolutions; that, in fine, if the abuses be removed, it is productive of signal advantage to piety; I conclude that the retention of the practice of venerating the original in the presence of the image (in which alone image-worship consists) is a judicious and pious measure, provided it is confined strictly within its own limits, and the utmost caution is observed in its use.² Care, however, must be taken to teach the people to think and speak correctly on a matter which is connected with the divine honour; and to avoid every thing which may be productive of scandal, and may have the effect of alienating men's minds more and more from the unity of the Church, or of deterring those who are disposed to return.

¹ "The honour paid to creatures, as it is explained in theory, conformably to the Council of Trent, appears very tolerable."—*Opera*, v. 554. "It is therefore that I am not one of those who rise up against the Council of Trent."—v. 553. "I do not say all this through contempt for this council [Trent], whose decisions have for the most part been made with much wisdom."—*Letter*

to the Duchess of Brunswick,—*Œuvres de Bossuet*, t. xiv. p. 461.

² "If any one, therefore, should desire to adore or invoke God in presence of any image, let him use this restriction which was used by the Israelites of old, who looked with a certain reverence upon the brazen serpent, their faith being directed, not to it, but to God."—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 72.

I will mention an instance which I myself remember. A soldier, who had deserted from the ranks, was condemned to be hanged; and when he was brought in sight of the gallows, and was in momentary expectation of the final sentence of pardon or of death from the Protestant prince in whose service he was, fluctuating as he was between fear and hope, he bathed with his tears a little silver image of the crucifix. But, on the arrival of the happy news, he exulted with joy, and, printing kisses on the image, exclaimed, "'Tis to thee I owe my safety! 'Tis thou that hast snatched me from the jaws of death! 'Tis thou that hast delivered me!" So far, his language was correct. But when one of the bystanders, a man of rank, (and they were almost all Protestants,) added, as if calling his attention to what he had said, "Surely you do not mean this figure of Christ which you hold in your hand, but the Christ who suffered for us?" "Yes," said he, redoubling his kisses; "it was this one also;"—" *Et cettuy-cy aussi,*" for he was a Frenchman. These words were heard with great horror by the bystanders; as if there were two Saviours, one the living Christ, the other the silver one; and one of them assured me that the hideousness of the papistic idolomania (for thus they speak in their unhappy misconception) had never appeared more clear to him. For my part, I think that this poor wretch, in his agitation of mind, did not sufficiently reflect on the words which he was using; and that the crime was in his language, rather than in his mind. Still, it is of great importance that these expressions should be carefully examined, in order that the people may be duly instructed.

And as there are Protestants who do not find in image-worship any just cause for severing the unity of the Church, so there are, on the other hand, learned Catholics who are of opinion, that if Protestants, and, in general, the nations

which know not, or reject, this worship, should persist, through some inveterate repugnance, in declining to adopt it, they might, nevertheless, be received into the bosom of the Church; provided they manifested good dispositions in every other respect, evinced a readiness to receive instruction, and admitted, meanwhile, that Catholics are not to be condemned on account of the practice.¹ For in such things as these, which are neither necessary in themselves, nor expressly prescribed by Divine law, some allowance must be

¹ In Leibnitz's third letter to Mad. de Brinon a similar proposal is contained.

"It remains to examine whether the schism might be removed by the three following measures taken collectively.

"1. By conceding to Protestants certain points of discipline, such as communion in both kinds, the marriage of the clergy, the use of the vernacular language in the service, &c.

"2. By giving them explanations of the points of controversy and of faith, such as those which have been published by the Bishop of Meaux, which shew, at least in the opinion of several able and moderate Protestants, that the doctrines taken in this sense, although they do not all appear to them perfectly true, nevertheless do not, on the other hand, appear deserving of condemnation.

"3. By remedying certain practical scandals and abuses which may be made a subject of complaint, and which the Church herself, and persons of learning and piety in the Roman communion, disapprove; so that, after this adjustment, the two parties may commune with one an-

other, according to their several rites, and the hierarchy may be re-established. Nor will the difference of opinions on the points still undecided present any more of impediment to this union, than do the disputes on grace, on probabilism, on the necessity of perfect charity, and other points; or than the difference which subsists between Rome and France on the four articles of the French Clergy presents to the ecclesiastical union of the disputants; although perhaps some of these points are, at least, as important as those which would remain in dispute between Rome and Augsburg. All this, however, must be on the condition that the parties should submit to the decisions which may at some future day emanate from a new œcumenical council, conducted according to the authorised forms,—the Protestant nations which should have been reconciled being represented therein by their prelates and superintendents in the capacity of bishops,—and confirmed by his Holiness, as well as by the other Catholic nations."—*Leibnitz's Letter to Mad. de Brinon*,—in *Bossuet's Works*, t. xiv. pp. 356-7.

made for men's inclination and for custom, in order to avoid the scandal of weak brethren.

The question of Saints and of Relics is connected with that of images; and much of what we have said concerning images is equally applicable to this subject. And, as a general principle, we must hold, that neither the act of adoring in presence of an image, nor the worship of Saints or of relics, is approved, except in so far as they are referred to God; and that no act of religion is allowable, which may not be resolved into the honour of the one Almighty God, and does not terminate therein. When the Saints are honoured, therefore, the honour should be understood in the sense in which it is said in Scripture, "*Thy friends are honoured, O God!*"¹ and "*Praise ye the Lord in his Saints.*"² And when the Saints are invoked, and their aid implored, their aid must always be understood to consist in the prayers which they pour forth with great efficacy in our behalf; as Bellarmine has observed, that "*Help me, O Peter, or O Paul!*" is to be regarded as signifying nothing more than "*Pray for me!*" or "*Help me by interceding for me!*"³

It is certain, indeed, that Angel-guardians are assigned to us by God. Now the Scripture compares the Saints to Angels, and calls them "equal to Angels" (*ἰσαγγέλους*).⁴

¹ Ps. cxxxvii. 17.

² Ps. xl. 1.

³ Bellarmini Controv. De Sanctor. Beatit. lib. i. c. xvii. t. i. p. 889. Precisely the same condition is required by Molanus. "On the subject of the invocation of Saints also, the danger which Protestants apprehend will be removed, if the Romanists publicly protest that they understand each and every prayer addressed to the

Saints, no matter in what words or what forms it may be conceived, exclusively in the intercessional sense: *i. e.* that when, for example, they say, 'Holy Mary, deliver me in the hour of my death!' the meaning is, 'Holy Mary, intercede with thy Son for me, that He may deliver me in the hour of my death.'"—*Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 70.

⁴ "It is known from Holy Scripture

That the Saints have some concern in human affairs, appears to be conveyed by the "*talking of Moses and Elias with Christ*;"¹ and that even particular events come to the knowledge of the Saints and Angels, (whether it be in the mirror of the Divine vision, or by the natural clearness and wide-ranging powers of vision possessed by the glorified mind,) is insinuated in Christ's declaration, that there is "*joy in heaven upon one sinner that doth penance.*"² Further, that God, in consideration of the Saints, even after their death, grants favours to men (although it is only through Christ that the Saints, whether of the Old or of the New Testament, possess their dignity), is indicated by the prayers found in the Scripture: "*Remember, O Lord, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, thy servants!*"³ a form not very different from that which the Church commonly employs: "Grant, O Lord, that we may be assisted by the merits and intercession of thy Saints!" that is, "Regard their labours, which, by thy gift, they have borne for thy name; hear their prayers, to which thy only-begotten Son hath given efficacy and value!"

Some persons raise a question as to the manner in which the Saints can have a knowledge of human affairs; and St. Augustine himself seems to have hesitated and entertained some doubt regarding it.⁴ But, for my part, I do not think it consistent with truth to suppose that these

that we shall be like to Angels (*ἰσαγγέλους*), that is, embodied spirits."—*Miscellanea Leibnitiana*, a compilation of miscellaneous fragments from the remains of Leibnitz, collected by Joachim Feller, p. 411 (Lipsiæ, 1479).

¹ Matt. xiii. 3.

² Luke xiv. 17.

³ Exod. xxxiii. 13.

⁴ De Cura pro Mortuis gerenda. t. vi. col. 386. (ed. Bened.) His uncertainty, however, regards *the mode*

in which they assist us, and *the medium through which they obtain their knowledge*; but the *fact of their assisting us* he pronounces to be CERTAIN. For this passage, and many other evidences of the primitive belief as to the knowledge of the affairs of earth possessed by the Saints, and the interest which they take therein, see an article in the *Dublin Review*, vol. xvi. pp. 74 et seq.

most holy souls are shut up in a place where, it is true, they are in the enjoyment of delights, but are ignorant of the events which are passing, or if they obtain some casual knowledge of them, obtain it solely through the intervention of the angels. Because knowledge is the source of the highest pleasures of the mind; and as the souls of the Blessed contemplate more closely the Divine wisdom and perfection, it is reasonable to suppose that they are now admitted more intimately to the secrets of Providence, which, while in the flesh, they admired from afar; and that they now know the infinite justice of God's government, which heretofore they but believed; and this, I think, cannot be conceived without supposing them to be cognisant of the particular events that pass among men. Many are inclined to think that it is in the mirror of the Divine vision the Angels and Saints see all things. However, if you consider the matter accurately, it will be seen that, even now, God is the sole immediate object of the mind, outside of the mind itself; and that it is only through the medium of God our ideas represent to us what passes in the world; for on no other supposition can it be conceived how the body can act on the soul, or how different created substances can communicate with one another. Nay, we should be aware that, in every state of existence, our mind is a mirror of God and of the universe; with this difference, that, in the present state, our view is clouded, and our knowledge confused. When, therefore, this cloud shall be withdrawn, and when God shall manifest Himself more clearly, we shall see God face to face, and we shall see all other things (as we do even now) in Him as the medium; but we shall see them far more clearly, distinctly, and comprehensively, than we see them now; partly by the very nature of the mind in its glorified state, partly by an especial grace of God.

Nor should any one wonder at the possibility of an Angel or Blessed Soul's seeing at a single view the affairs of Asia and of Europe, and, while he embraces so vast a range, penetrating, nevertheless, even into its minutest parts.¹ Let us but reflect how many objects the general of an army, placed on an eminence, reviewing his forces or disposing his line, sees at the same time. Now, if it be considered that the glorified mind's powers of vision are enlarged in the same proportion as our universe is greater than the plain, all wonder will be at an end. If the vision is extended more than a thousand-fold by the use of telescopes and microscopes, shall we doubt that God can grant to the Blessed much more than Galileo or Drebel has given to us? You will tell me, indeed, that these instruments do not admit of our seeing many things distinctly together, and that in proportion as the field of the tube is increased, its power is diminished. It is so, I confess; because in this case the assistance is given to the eyes, which are restricted within certain dimensions; but in the other case God increases the power of the mind, which has no defined and immovable limits. We know that a tribune, or, at all events, a centurion, can have his soldiers drawn out and disposed so perfectly under his view, that not a motion of theirs escapes him. And to how many objects does the chess-player apply his mind by one glance! As the mind, therefore, is capable of considering many objects distinctly at the same time, there is nothing to prevent the number of objects being increased in many thousand ways, without affecting the distinctness of the knowledge. And perhaps

¹ "The Saints will behold the Divinity in eternal life; but there will be different perfections and degrees in beholding."

"If we were placed in the sun, or if we shall ever reach the place ($\pi\omicron\upsilon$) of

the Blessed, the whole universe will be visible to us, as in the true centre, to our great delight as we contemplate it."—*Miscellanea Leibnitiana*, pp. 410-11.

the ratio of the number of the remarkable occurrences among the entire human race, to that of the variations which a scientific chess-player has to consider together, is much less than the ratio which the glorified mind bears to ours. For, even here on earth, we see what a vast difference, in applying the mind to many different things together, there is between an unskilled and a practised man; and we might almost consider miraculous (though we, nevertheless, find it true,) the readiness with which some persons can perform the longest calculations by a purely mental act, so as to appear to read them from a manuscript; and can retain innumerable images of the fancy so perfectly under view, as to be able to select in an instant the particular one which may be required.

From reasons, however, let us come to examples and authority. It is certain that, even in the second age of the Christian Church, the natal days of the martyrs were celebrated; that religious meetings at their monuments were instituted; and that the prayers of Saints were believed to be profitable. For Origen, a writer of the third century (*Num. c. xxxi.*), asks, "Who doubts that the Saints assist us by their prayers, and confirm and exhort us by the example of their actions?"¹ He speaks of the opinion, therefore, as a thing thoroughly ascertained and received in his times. And Origen himself (in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*²) seems, in his own private judgment, to have inclined to the opinion, that the Blessed

¹ Origenis Opera, t. ii. p. 273. Hom. xxvi. in Num. cap. xxxi.

² "Jam vero si, etiam extra corpus positi, vel sancti qui cum Christo sunt, agunt aliquid et laborant pro nobis, ad similitudinem angelorum, qui salutis nostræ ministeria procurant; vel rursus peccatores, etiam ipsi extra corpus positi, agunt aliquid

secundum propositum mentis suæ, ad angelorum nihilominus similitudinem cum quibus et in ignem æternum mittendi sunt; habeatur et hoc inter occulta Dei, nec chartulæ committenda." *Comment. in Epist. ad Romanos*, lib. ii., *Opera*, t. iv. p. 479. (Bened. ed.)

assist us, not only, as is the received belief of the Church, by intercession, but also by actual interposition, like the Angels. However, he speaks doubtingly, and says, that, if the opinion be true, "it must be numbered among the hidden mysteries which may not be committed to paper;"—a caution, perhaps, which he thought necessary in order to avoid superstition. St. Cyprian commended himself to the living, praying them to remember him after their death (B. i. Epist. 1).¹ And if, as some persons think, no examples of the invocation of Saints, in the same way as of image-worship, can be found in those times, the answer must be, that, previous to the extirpation of idolatry by Constantine, the Church carefully avoided every thing which, even though in itself harmless, could, by any means, be distorted into a confirmation of the Gentile superstitions. At all events, it appears from St. Basil the Great² and St. Gregory Nazianzen,³ that, in the fourth century, the invocation of martyrs by name, and the belief of their power to assist us, was already received. St. Gregory of Nyssa says, that "supplications are offered to a martyr, to become, as it were, our ambassador with God."⁴ And St. Ambrose, in the book *On Widows*, after observing that Peter and Andrew prayed our Lord for Simon's mother-in-law, who was sick of fever, says, that "one

¹ Leibnitz cites from the edition of Erasmus; in that of Manutius this letter is numbered 57; in Dodwell's it is marked 60.

² Ὁ θλιβόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς τεσσαράκοντα καταφεύγει, ὁ εὐφραϊνόμενος ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἀποτρέχει· ὁ μὲν, ἵνα λύσιν εὕρῃ τῶν δυσχερῶν· ὁ δὲ, ἵνα φυλαχθῆ αὐτῷ τὰ χρηστότερα.—*S. Basil. Hom. in Quad. Martyres, Opp.* ii. 155.

³ Πείθομαι δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῇ πρεσβείᾳ ἡν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ,

ἄσφ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγγίζει θεῷ, τὰς σωματικὰς πέδας ἀποσεισάμενος, τῆς τε ἐπιθολούσης τὸν νοῦν ἰλῦος ἀππληγμένος, καὶ γυμνῷ γυμνὸς ἐντυγχάνων, τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ καθαρωτάτῳ νοῦ τάξεως καὶ παρρησίας ἀγγελικῆς, εἰ μὴ τολμηρὸν τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἀξιούμενος.—*S. Greg. Naz. Orat.* xix. t. i. p. 288 (Paris. 1609).

⁴ Πρέσβευσον ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βασιλέα. *T.* ii. p. 1017 (Paris. 1605).

who is subject to great sins, acts wisely in employing others to intercede with the physician in his behalf;"¹ and that "Angels and martyrs are to be invoked."

Now, if it be an act of idolatry, or, at all events, a damnable worship, to address Angels and Saints, and solicit their intercession in our behalf with God, I do not see how Basil, and Nazianzen, and Ambrose, and others, who have hitherto been accounted Saints, can be excused from idolatry, or, at least, from the foulest abomination. For these practices will not be what are commonly called blemishes of the Fathers, but great and manifest crimes. And there is reason to dread lest views like these may open a way for the subversion of the whole Christian faith.² For if it be true that, even from this early period, such horrible errors prevailed in the Church, the fact will furnish a strong argument for the cause of the Arians and Samosatians, who date the origin of error from these very times, and insinuate that the mystery of the Trinity and the practice of idolatry were simultaneously introduced. Thus

¹ "Videtur enim quod magno peccato obnoxia minus idonea sit quæ pro se precetur, certe quæ pro se impetret. Adhibeat igitur ad medicum alios peccatores. Ægri enim nisi ad eos aliorum precibus medicus fuerit invitatus, pro se rogare non possunt. Infirma est caro, mens ægra est, et peccatorum vinculis impedita, ad medici illius sedem debile non potest explicare vestigium. Obsecrandi sunt Angeli pro nobis, qui nobis ad præsidium dati sunt; martyres obsecrandi, quorum videmur nobis quodam corporis pignore patrocinium vindicare. Possunt pro peccatis rogare nostris, qui proprio sanguine, etiam si quæ habuerint, peccata laverunt."—*De Viduis*, c. ix. t. ii. col. 200. (Ben. ed.)

² "The contempt of the Fathers, carried to excess, recoils upon the Christian Religion: and if it has never had truly pious and enlightened propagators, what opinion are we to form regarding it?"—*Opera*, t. v. p. 480. And in his critique of Daille's work on the Fathers, he says, "The author who does this (depreciate the Fathers) proposes to himself to cry up thereby the study of the Holy Scriptures; on the other hand, another will endeavour, by representing the difficulties presented by the reading of the Bible, to assert the authority of the Fathers and tradition. Both go too far."—Leibnitz's *Deutsche Schriften*, t. i. p. 482.

the authority of the early Councils is destroyed ; and, as we must admit that the most Holy Trinity is not so clearly proved from Sacred Scripture, as that we can satisfy every doubt if we set the authority of the Church aside, I leave each one to form his judgment as to where the matter will end. Nay, more daring spirits will carry suspicion farther ; for they will wonder how Christ, who was so prodigal of promises to His Church, should have, nevertheless, indulged the enemy of the human race, so far as to permit that, after one species of idolatry had been exploded, another should take its place ; and that, while we see the Jewish and Mahometan religions continue, for so many ages, to maintain incorrupt in a sufficient degree the original constitution of their founders, yet, out of the sixteen centuries of Christianity, there are scarcely one or two during which the true faith was in any degree preserved among Christians. What then will become of the counsel of Gamaliel, who advised that the Christian religion, and the will of Providence in its regard, should be judged by the issue ?¹ or what estimate are we to form of Christianity itself, if it withstand this test so badly ?

Nevertheless, I do not therefore deny that there had crept in commonly in the Church abuses, and these too of a sufficiently grievous nature, which in after times degenerated into dangerous superstition. Thus St. Epiphanius (whom we also find removing from a temple an image which was painted upon the veil, lest it should lead to abuse,) inveighs vehemently against the Collyridians and others, who paid excessive honours to the Mother of God and the other Saints. In our own times too, grave complaints have

¹ Acts v. 37-8 : "And now, therefore, I say to you, Refrain from these men, and let them alone : for if this counsel or this work be of men, it

will come to nought ; but if it be of God, you cannot overthrow it : lest perhaps you be found even to fight against God."

emanated from bishops, not only of France and Belgium, but also of Spain and Italy, and from other eminent men. And even the Council of Trent prudently ordained that the abuses should be checked; and that not merely for form-sake, as some writers maliciously assert, but seriously, and not without success. For many salutary measures have been passed in the congregations of the Cardinals, with the view of restraining the levity and superstition of certain individuals; and several admirable bulls have been issued by the Popes—as, for instance, Urban VIII. and Innocent XI., the former eminently distinguished for his learning, the latter for his piety,—by which many abuses have actually been abolished, or at least repressed.

Nor do I doubt that, by the zeal of the Pontiffs, the sovereign princes, and the learned and pious prelates of the Church, the greatest part of this cockle may gradually be rooted out of the field of God; for he who would seek to remove it all by one effort, should beware lest he disturb the Church and injure the wheat. In all those things which are more tolerable, we should follow the counsel of St. Augustine, who, in a letter to Januarius,¹ complainingly avows, that “there are many things which, to avoid the scandal of some pious or turbulent persons, he does not dare to censure too freely:” and, in his work against Faustus the Manichee, he observes that, “what we teach is one thing, what we bear another; one thing, what we are ordered to prescribe, another what we are instructed to correct, and are compelled to tolerate until we shall be able to correct.” Such is the opinion of this man, no less distinguished by his prudence than by his sanctity. This, however, must be understood to mean, that we are to pay due regard to the interest and peace of the Church; and we are neither to flatter men by shameful indulgence, nor

¹ Augustini Opera, t. ii. p. 107. (ed. Ben.)

are we, on the contrary, under the influence of anger, love of contradiction, or impatience of correction, to strive after what is forbidden, and to approve what in our calm mind we should ourselves reject, solely for the purpose of annoying our adversaries, or expressing our abhorrence of them the more strongly. And, in like manner, Protestants should reflect that the truth is sacrificed by excessive altercation; that by mutual hatred men are carried into excesses; and that the Church is not to be accused solely because she is unable to remove, by a single stroke, every thing that she seriously and severely condemns.¹

Nor, however, are the protestations fruitless, as the adversaries of the Church assert; for they will discover in the writings of Catholics, cautions, which, if observed, will remove all the chief causes of complaint; as, for example, where Cardinal Bellarmine writes,² that whenever the aid of the Saints is asked, it must be understood "that they assist us, not of themselves, but by their intercession with God;"³ a qualification which should be diligently inculcated, and which, generally speaking, should be added in express words, especially in more solemn prayers. And the Bishop of Meaux,⁴ author of that golden treatise, *The Exposition*

¹ "Abuses and superstitions have been the principal cause of it. I admit that even the doctrine of your Church condemns a great part of them."—Leibnitz's *Letter to Madame de Brinon*, *Œuvres de Bossuet*, t. xiv. p. 449.

² Bell. Controv. de SS. Beat. lib. i. xvii. t. i. p. 888.

³ "Let it be enough for Protestants, that these formulas, however conceived, are to be understood only INTERCESSIONALLY." — *Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 71.

⁴ "However, we must do this justice to the Bishop of Neustadt,

that, were it in his power, he would gladly induce the Protestants and all others to hold the Council of Trent, what he believes it to be, universal; and to convince them that they should be satisfied with the expositions of it, so beautiful and so moderate, which, with the approval of Rome itself, the Bishop of Meaux has given."—Leibnitz's *Letter to Madame de Brinon*, ib. p. 355. "Many Protestants have thought that the Bishop of Meaux' *Exposition* sufficiently agreed with them." — *Opera*, v. 554. Compare also i. 517, and ii. 705.

of the Faith, has given this excellent admonition, that all religious worship should terminate ultimately in God. Similar cautions may be found in the writings of others, which, for brevity-sake, I abstain from citing. I shall only advert to some which are of greater importance; as, for example, that when we pray to the Saints, we should be careful not to detract thereby from the Divine mercy. For the Psalmist says, “*I will sing*” not only “*the justice,*” but also “*the mercy, of the Lord:*”¹ in one single psalm,² he has repeated twenty-seven times, that “*his mercy and goodness endure for ever;*” and we are most severely forbidden to place our confidence (that is, ultimately) in men.³ Moreover, as mercy is among those attributes of God by which men’s affections are most conciliated, it seems inconsistent with a right love of God to deny Him mercy; nor should we tolerate, therefore, such language as that “*God has reserved justice to Himself, and has given up mercy to the Blessed Virgin;*”⁴ and that this was pre-

¹ Ps. lxxxviii.

² Ps. cxxxv.

³ Ps. cxvii. 8. “It is good to confide in the Lord, rather than to have confidence in men.”

⁴ He appears to allude in this passage to a sentiment which is found in the Prologue of the *Commentary on the Canonical Epistles*, which is attributed to St. Thomas, and is found appended to the early editions of his *Commentary on St. Paul*. “Summitatem ejus virgæ beata Virgo tetigit, quando Filium Dei in utero concepit, et postmodum peperit, et sic dimidiam partem regni Dei impetravit, ut ipsa sit Regina Misericordiæ, cujus Filius est Rex Justitiæ.”—*Prolog. in Comment. in Epp. Canonicas*, appended to the *Comment. in Epp. B. Pauli*, p. 297

(Paris, 1549). It is hardly necessary, however, to observe, that the *Commentary on the Canonical Epistles* is now universally regarded as spurious, though attributed to him by Sixtus Senensis, Nazarius, Castilius, Possevinus, and even, at least probably, by Bellarmine. The contrary is held as certain by Raynaldi, Labbe, Richard Simon, Echard, and many others; and Bernard de Rubeis, in the dissertation prefixed to the seventh volume of St. Thomas’ works (ed. Venice, 1775), not only satisfactorily shews that the work is falsely attributed to St. Thomas, but also proves the real author to have been Nicholas de Gorrano, a distinguished Dominican preacher of the thirteenth century.

This question, however, is of very

figured in the history of Esther, to whom Assuerus promises half his kingdom; for it is only by virtue of the Lord's own mercy that the prayers of the Saints possess their power of profiting us. These cautions, therefore, should be carefully impressed on men's minds; for there may be danger lest, if an erroneous impression be allowed to be formed, the simple faithful may fall away from the love of God, and from true penance and contrition.

Moreover, though we may use the intercession of Saints as a slender supplement of our devotion, yet it is necessary, at the same time, to address ourselves directly to God.¹ For the Saints, however great they may be, are all our fellow-slaves; and the only true "*Mediator of God and man*" is Christ,² who is raised as high towards the Father as the Saints are depressed to us: for they stand, as it were, at our side, or in our company, as if praying conjointly with us. And therefore their intercessions can no more come at all into comparison with the mediatorial office of Christ, than can the prayers of living Saints when united with ours; and although the prayers which are offered by the Blessed in many ways surpass those of holy persons on earth, yet, relatively to the mediation of Christ, they can no more bear any proportion, than a man, by leaping up towards the sun from the ground, can be said to have gone nearer to it.

little importance except as a matter of criticism. The sentiment is one which, in the mind of the writer, whoever he may have been, was not meant to detract from the infinite mercy of God, but to represent the Blessed Virgin as having been selected by Him as the medium through which it is bestowed upon men. If any one be disposed to doubt the orthodoxy of St. Thomas on the question of the mercy of Almighty God,

I shall refer him to the *Summa*, p. i. qq. 21, 22, 25, &c. In the mere index of his works, the words *Misericordia Dei* occupy no less than three closely printed columns.

¹ "That, for the rest, prayer directed to God is far more efficacious than those prayers which are directed to the departed Saints."—*Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 70.

² 1 Tim. ii. 5.

But, in addition to this, God expressly commands, both by threats and by promises, that He should be Himself invoked. He is Himself called "*our hope,*" "*our trust,*" "*the way,*" "*the door,*" "*our strength,*" "*our aid,*" "*beside whom there is no salvation,*" "*no other helper ;*" that is, none who can anywise come into account, if compared with God or with Christ. Nor should any consciousness of unworthiness on our part be deemed sufficient to repel us from the throne of grace, when our repentance is sincere. He himself invites us, when He says, "*Come to me, all you that labour, and are heavy burdened, and I will refresh you.*"¹ And, "*If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ, who is the propitiation for our sins.*"² And although it is a laudable act of reverence to account oneself unworthy the sight of God, and to employ every sign of a humble mind (among which signs the employing pious men on earth, and still more the blessed in heaven, to pray with us, is one which not only should not be despised, but should be warmly commended), yet, since He himself invites us, it is our duty to obey and approach to Him ; lest, instead of filial humility, there grow up a spirit of servile estrangement and distrust. Hence the admirable sentiment of Chrysostom regarding the Canaanite woman : "Behold the prudence of the woman ! she asketh not James, neither entreateth she John ; she goeth not to Peter, she addresseth herself not to the choir of the Apostles :"—that is to say, she goes not to them (for we are bound, from other passages,³ to put this interpretation upon Chrysostom) in such a way as to rest finally upon them, or to place her hopes in them alone ; for it appears elsewhere that she was importunate with the dis-

¹ Matt. xi. 28.

² 1 John ii. 1.

³ See, among many other passages,

volumes i. p. 683, ii. 523, iv. 449, vi. 273, vii. 81, x. 434 (Ben. ed.).

ciples also, as even they themselves declare.¹ Chrysostom continues: "She sought not a mediator; but, instead of all these, she took as her companion, Penance, which filled the place of an advocate, and thus went to the fountain-head."²

It is necessary, therefore, always to bear these things in mind, in order that, if the intercession of Saints be employed, it may be regarded in the light of a supplementary devotion, and of a simple mark of our reverence and humility towards God, and love for God's friends; and that the substance of the worship may always be addressed directly to God himself.

Hence pious and prudent men are of opinion that all pains should be taken, not only to impress, by every means, upon the minds of hearers and learners, the infinite and unmeasurable difference which exists between the honour due to God and that which is shewn to the Saints (the former of which, divines, after Augustine, call *λατρεία*, the latter, *δουλεία*); but also to exhibit it, as far as possible, by external signs.³ For although there is no

¹ Matt. xv. 23. "And his disciples came and besought Him, saying, Send her away, for she crieth after us."

² Chrys. Opera, t. iii. p. 435.—This passage is the stronghold of the opponents of invocation of Saints. But the commentary of Leibnitz in the passage before us is a perfectly just one. St. Chrysostom's object in referring to the history of the Canaanite woman is to enforce the necessity of putting our trust upon God. But that he does not mean to exclude prayers to the Saints also, but, on the contrary, recognises their advantage, may be collected with perfect certainty from the conclusion which, in another homily on the same sub-

ject, he himself draws *from the history of the same Canaanite woman*. "Knowing this, my beloved," says he, "*let us fly for refuge to the intercessions of the Saints (καταφεύγωμεν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἁγίων πρεσβείας)*, and entreat them to intercede for us. Let us not, however, *rely upon their prayers alone*, but let us dispose our own affairs right, as is our duty, and endeavour always to turn to what is better, in order that we *may give an opportunity for the intercession which is offered for us (ἵνα χάραν δῶμεν τῇ πρεσβείᾳ τῇ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν γιωμένη)*."—T. iv. p. 449.

³ It is difficult, nevertheless, to carry out this precaution, necessary as it is, into all its details; and to

proportion between the infinite and the finite, and although it is, for this reason, impossible to find proportionate signs of both—a thing which cannot be done even in finite things, where they differ widely from each other (as we see that, in a picture, it is impossible to represent properly the true proportion of the system of the world, because the distance of the fixed stars is immeasurable),—yet, at least, we should not omit those signs which, as far as it can be done, may at least signify that the difference is the greatest that exists; and it is better to omit altogether that which, being finite, is unworthy of comparison, than so to equalise it with the Infinite and Divine, as to incur grievous danger of creating a most fatal confusion of them. And although we may not be able to be perfectly exact and scrupulous in observing this caution, yet the more secure course will be to neglect it as little as possible. It is advisable, therefore, that we should reserve certain determinate external signs for

those who would hastily condemn Catholics for excess in this particular, it may not be inexpedient to submit the following considerations, from the pen of an Anglican writer: “He [a person “professing Church principles” in the Anglican Church] is justified *e. g.* in saying that any such honour to Saints as encroaches on the supreme and undivided allegiance due to God, is anti-Christian; but then he would have St. Bernard or St. Bonaventura as zealous as himself in asserting this great and essential truth. The question at issue, of course, is, was the mediæval honour to Saints such? And this, as we say in the text, is a matter wholly foreign to his own experience. Again, he may believe that in *him* such language as they are known to have used would encroach

upon God’s honour. Well, no one wishes him to use it; but how does it therefore follow that it did so in them? What inconceivable boldness to decide peremptorily on such a question, when the objects of criticism are God’s Saints! Is it not quite a conceivable hypothesis, to say the very least, that holy and mortified men, whose conversation was in heaven, may have entertained feelings of devotion and love, *e. g.* towards the Blessed Virgin, which no human language can at all express; and yet that their feeling to our Lord should be altogether different in kind, and indefinitely stronger in degree? Yet, what *words* could they *find* stronger than those already applied to the Blessed Virgin? What *words* can be stronger than the strongest?” —*British Critic*, xxxii. p. 411.

God alone; that we should not mix up indiscriminately the honour of the Saints with that of God, but should distinguish them, as far as is conveniently possible, if not in place, at least in time; and lastly, that, when it is necessary to unite them, we should frequently add words which may indicate the immense difference that subsists between them, and may declare that whatever of dignity and power the Saints possess, is all from the Divine grace and the merit of Christ, and that the mercy and goodness of God himself superabound in an endless variety of ways.

If these precautions for the security of the essentials of worship and the maintenance of the Divine honour be observed, we shall be able, with St. Augustine,¹ to tolerate many things in the Church, which, could it prudently be done, it were better to reform hereafter; and hence the charge which imputes to the Church the idolatry of the Gentiles, is neither just nor charitable. It is true, they assert that the Gentiles also rendered to their gods a worship inferior to that of the Supreme God; and therefore, that these gods only differ from the Saints of Christians in name—the former being called *Dii*, and the latter *Divi*. But this accusation is undoubtedly unjust. For, omitting the consideration, that (whereas it is certain that the Saints are friends of God) the *Dii* or *Indigetes* of the Gentiles were men unworthy of that honour; and that, whereas the gods of the Gentiles were worshipped not as the ministers but as the associates of Jupiter, all our worship of Angels and Saints is terminated in God, who “*hath given his Angels charge over us*,”² and is moved in our favour by the prayers of the Saints; omitting, I say, these considerations, the entire matter comes to this, that the Gentiles did not sufficiently acknowledge, either in their Jupiter, or in any other of their gods, the Infinite

¹ S. Augustini Opera, t. ii. p. 107.

² Ps. xc. 11.

and supremely Perfect Being ; and that therefore, at least as far as appears from their public worship, all their gods, not even excepting the highest, were idols ; whereas Christians, who worship with Divine honour, or *latria*, the supreme, eternal, and infinitely perfect Being, do not commit idolatry, no matter what degree of finite perfection, not trenching on the supreme honour of God, they may attribute to others ; since they confess that these perfections themselves flow gratuitously from the fountain of the Divine goodness.

Seeing, therefore, that the blessed souls, in their present state, are much more intimately present in all our affairs, and see all things much more nearly, than while they lived on earth (for men are acquainted only with the few things which occur in their sight, or are reported to them by others) ; seeing that their charity, or desire of aiding us, is far more ardent ; seeing, in fine, that their prayers are far more efficacious than those which they offered formerly in this life, that it is certain that God has granted many favours even to the intercessions of the living, and that we look for great advantage from the union of the prayers of our brethren with our own ; I do not perceive how it can be made a crime to invoke a blessed soul or a holy Angel, and to beg his intercession or his assistance, according as the life and history of the martyr, or other circumstances, appear to suggest : especially if this worship is considered but as a slender accessory of that supreme worship which is immediately directed to God alone ; and if, whatever may be its character, it is offered for the sake of testifying our reverence and humility towards God, and our affection for God's servants, and springs from that pious solicitude which prompts us, in proportion to the lowly sense we entertain of our own unworthiness, to desire to unite the prayers of other pious persons, and, above

all, those of the Blessed, with our own.¹ And thus, when it is analysed, this very accessory of worship terminates in God Himself; to whose gift alone the Saints are indebted for all that they are or can do, and to whom is due a sovereign honour and love incomparably transcending all other love. For if the veneration and invocation of Saints be circumscribed within these limits, it is, though not of necessity, not alone tolerable, but praiseworthy. At all events, it cannot be regarded as idolatrous or damnable, unless we be willing to affirm, at the imminent hazard of the faith, that the promises of Christ have been frustrated, and that the true Church fell, from her very origin, into a horrible apostasy.² And if, on the other hand, we admit that she has until now subsisted incorrupt against the gates of hell, we should not tear ourselves away from her communion, because she is unable, by a single stroke, to cut off abuses which she herself reprobates; nor is it possible to doubt that she will reform these abuses with greater facility when unity shall have been restored, and when, peace being established, and her attention no longer distracted by the variety of objects, her entire solicitude shall be concentrated upon the cure of her domestic evils.

It is not necessary to add much on the subject of relics.³ From the example of the bones of Eliseus, it is certain that God has performed miracles through their instrumentality. As we have proved, therefore, that, pro-

¹ "But [the Saints are to be invoked] then especially, when, through terror of God's anger on account of some heinous crime, we do not dare, in our humility, to raise our eyes or address ourselves directly to God."—*Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 70.

² See the passages already cited, page 76 (note). He expresses himself still more unequivocally on the infal-

libility of the Church in his letters to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, Jan. 1, 1684. "I will further add," he says, "that the visible Catholic Church, through the special and promised assistance of the Holy Ghost, is infallible in all articles of faith which are necessary for salvation."—*Guhrauer's Leibnitz*, i. 345.

³ See *Guhrauer's Leibnitz*, ii. 90-1.

vided certain limits be observed, the Saints may lawfully be venerated, it follows that it must be lawful to esteem relics also, and to take occasion from their presence, no less than from that of images, to venerate the person to whom they belong. And as it is an affair which alone depends upon pious affection, it does not matter, although the relics which are believed to be real should happen, in point of fact, to be supposititious. We must be cautious, however, lest, by imprudent devotion, we expose ourselves to ridicule, and the Church to contempt, with "*them that are without ;*" and we should always remember, that it is our duty to act in such a way as to shew that these accessories of piety do not unduly occupy our mind, nor divert it from the worship of the one omnipotent God, which alone is of primary and supreme importance, and in comparison of which it is better to neglect all the rest than to depart from it in any particular whatsoever.

Having completed, as far as our brief limits permitted, all that appertains to general worship, (for we shall consider, under the head of the Eucharist, the question of the Unbloody Sacrifice and the adoration of Christ's Body under the appearances of bread and wine,) we must now come to the Sacraments, which constitute a peculiar kind of worship, and consist of certain sacred rites instituted by Christ, to which a promise of grace is superadded. To this class, however, the promise made to those "*who are gathered together in the name of the Lord*"¹ does not belong; for, as every religion involves the duty of publicly worshipping God, this promise would be understood of itself, even though it had not been expressly made. Under the name of Sacraments, we comprise certain determinate institutions.

¹ Matt. xviii. 20.

And though it is idle to dispute much about names, yet, as the appellation ‘Sacrament’ has been received in the Church, its meaning should be estimated, not from private caprice, but from public usage. By the name of Sacrament, therefore, is now-a-days understood in the Church, a rite to which a special promise of grace is annexed by God. Some require, in addition, that the rite should be expressly contained and sufficiently described in Sacred Scripture; but it is certain that what is wanting in the written, can, and should be, supplied by the traditional word of God. Some require, also, that there should be a corporeal and visible element, but this also equally seems to be unnecessary. And some restrict the grace which is conferred to justification and the remission of sins; however, this condition also is arbitrary.

The sacred rites, such as we here define, are seven in number: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, Orders, Matrimony.¹ In Baptism, the rite is ablution with water “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:” the grace is the purification of the soul, the bestowing of faith and penance, and, consequently, the remission of sins and renovation. In Confirmation, the rite is unction: the effect of the grace conferred is indicated by the word Confirmation itself. In the Eucharist, the rite is the ministering of the symbols, according to the prescribed form: the grace is the nourishment of the soul, or the increase of charity. In Penance, the rite is confession and absolution: the grace, the remission of sins. In the Unction of the Sick, the rite is indi-

¹ See *Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 55. —Although Molanus does not expressly admit the seven Sacraments, yet it is curious that the reasons of his objection to consider the latter

five as Sacraments in the same scriptural sense in which Baptism and the Eucharist are so regarded, are the very ones which Leibnitz disproves in the passage above.

cated by the name : the grace is the support of the vital powers in sickness, chiefly in order that, while life is in peril, the soul may be strengthened against temptations. In Orders, the rite is imposition of hands, and whatever else appertains thereto : the grace is the spiritual power conferred on the ordained, which consists in celebrating the perpetual Sacrifice, and in remitting and retaining sins. Lastly, in Matrimony, the rite is the legitimate declaration of consent : the grace is the Divine benediction, to which, as a kind of spiritual effect, is annexed the bond of Matrimony.

No rite has hitherto been discovered which could, even with any shew of reason, be added to these seven ; except the "Washing of Feet," which has been, by some, referred to the number. But, although the words of Scripture seem to favour it somewhat,¹ this rite has not received the testimony of the Church ; for if this condition had been added, it also should have been admitted as a Sacrament.

Some of the Sacraments are necessary to salvation, so that without receiving them, or a desire, express or virtual, of receiving them, no one can be saved ; for one who contemns them, by the very fact, commits a mortal sin. Let us suppose that a person elicits an act of contrition ; such a man will certainly obtain remission of sin without receiving the Sacrament,² although he may not expressly think of going to a priest as soon as he can, and although, therefore, his desire of the Sacrament is only virtual : because obedience, and the will of doing all that God has ordered and instituted, are virtually con-

¹ John xiii. 8.

² "But it is argued in reply, that these same theologians are further agreed, that, when one has sinned, contrition, that is, repentance arising

from sincere love, effaces sins, without any intervention of the keys of the Church or of the Sacrament."—*Miscel. Leibnit.* p. 243.

tained in the act of the love of God. But, on the contrary, if a person, at the time when he is said to make an act of contrition, has not an intention, although he adverts to the necessity of confession, of going to a priest as soon as he shall be able, such a man has not really elicited an act of contrition. And, after the act of contrition is completed, if, when the thought of the priest presents itself, he does not form an intention of going to him, he falls into a new mortal sin, and loses the fruit of contrition.

The minister of a Sacrament is sometimes a Bishop, as in the Sacraments of Orders and Confirmation : sometimes a priest, as in the Sacraments of the Eucharist, Penance, and Extreme Unction : sometimes any one of the faithful, as in the Sacraments of Baptism¹ and of Matrimony. And we must hold that, by the Divine law itself, these are constituted the ordinary ministers, insomuch that without them the act is null. In certain circumstances, however, it appears that the Divine law itself permits a departure from the ordinary minister, either at the dispensation of the Church, or from the very necessity of the case. For many things which appertain to Divine positive law admit of dispensation, and may be suspended by the disposition of the Church, or by other circumstances ; as appears from the impediments of Matrimony, from the administration of the Eucharist under one kind, from the permission freely accorded in the Old Testament for divorce and polygamy, and other things of the same kind. And thus, not only was this distinction recognised among the ancients, but the Council of Trent also, in some cases, distinguishes between the ordinary and another minister. However, it is safest not to depart too easily from the ordinary minister.

In the ministers is required “an intention of doing what the Church² does ;” for, if it be certain that they act

¹ See Opera, t. vi. p. 287.

² “From these principles the Jesuit

but in jest or mimicry, it would appear that, by such an act, they do not really baptise or absolve from sins. And thus, although the person baptising or absolving should be an Atheist, who believed that Baptism was of no effect, his intention of baptising may, notwithstanding, be serious, and this is sufficient. Were it actually to happen, however, that a bad priest should withhold the required intention, even in such a case, although there would be no Sacrament conferred, yet St. Thomas well suggests, that the Supreme Priest will supply its fruit, and St. Augustine¹ favours this opinion in his book *On Baptism*. But the impiety of the minister is no obstacle to the valid celebration of the Sacrament, provided the other essentials be present.

However, it may also be defended, and not without probability, that if a person acts in such a manner that the act does not appear to others to be done in mimicry, he may be regarded as having an intention, or what is equivalent thereto; and therefore, that such a person, even though he internally resolve the contrary, would seem to have baptised, absolved, and consecrated validly; just as he who knowingly does all that has the effect of conveying to the external senses what is required for an oath, appears, by the very fact, to have taken the oath; as otherwise, it will

cited [Becanus] rightly concludes, that, for the validity of a Sacrament, an habitual intention is not sufficient, nor is an actual one necessarily required; but that, at the least, on the part of the minister, there is required and suffices, a virtual intention, not only of performing the external act, but also of celebrating a Sacrament; or at least, a confused intention of doing what the Church does, or what Christ instituted."—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 54.

¹ "Et si quis per hominem perversum id accipiens, non accipiat ministri perversitatem, sed solam mysterii sanctitatem, in bona fide et spe et caritate, unitate compaginatus ecclesie, remissionem accipit peccatorum; non per verba sicut cancer serpentia, sed per evangelica sacramenta de cœlesti fonte manantia."—*S. Aug. De Baptismo*, lib. iv. cap. 18; ix. col. 89. See also his 98th letter (to Boniface), 5, ii. col. 201.

be in the power of a villain to secure himself from being a perjurer, and all oaths may in effect be eluded. In like manner, then, I think that it is more safe, that it is more in accordance with the Divine institutions, and consults better for the comfort of the weak, to lay down that it is not in the power of the minister to withdraw the will or intention of the mind by a mere internal protest, when that protest appears at variance with the fact. Nor do I think the words of the Council irreconcilable with this.¹

Some of the scholastics raise a number of discussions concerning the character, or the indelible sign which is impressed on the soul of those who receive the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation, or Orders. The question, however, presents no difficulty, if it be only considered that there is acquired, in receiving this Sacrament, a certain permanent quality, the reiteration of which is invalid and

¹ "Protestants are in the habit of crying out loudly against this Council, in consequence of its making the validity of the Sacrament dependent on the intention of the minister. For in this system, say they, you must always be in uncertainty as to whether or not you have been baptised or absolved. Nevertheless, I recollect to have seen Roman Catholic authors, who understood it quite differently; and when a person of their communion, in a letter which I had the honour to receive from him, enumerated the intention of the minister among the points of difference between us, I told him my opinion on the matter. He could hardly believe it: but, having consulted a celebrated theologian in the Low Countries, he was informed that I was right; that many Catholics were of that opinion; that it had been defended in the Sorbonne, and that it even was the most

commonly received in that university; that a mimic baptism, indeed, was not valid, but that when every thing prescribed by the Church was observed, the mere internal withdrawal of consent did not prejudice the intention, and that it was a mere protestation contradicted by the very fact itself."—*Leibnitz's Réponse à M. Pirot* (printed in Bossuet's Works, vol. xiv. p. 424).

The entire of the above interesting paragraph was omitted by the Parisian editor, under the impression that it had been erased by the author. It is written in the margin, but the line which the transcriber conceived to indicate its erasure, is in reality the line of reference, determining the part of the text into which it is to be inserted. It is given at full length in the beautiful edition of the Abbé Lacroix (Paris, 1845).

unlawful. Even in the civil law, we find examples of similar qualities. For no one can acquire what is already his own; or, in other words, a man who has entire dominion of a thing cannot further acquire dominion of it; and if—by virtue, perhaps, of some prohibitory law—he had no power whatever of alienating it, whether entirely or in part—as the right of the crown, and, in some countries, that of domain, is known to be inalienable—we should, in that case, have something which resembles the character, that is, which could not be validly reiterated. And since the act of administering the Sacrament—I mean, administering it a second time—is void or null, it is also, by the very fact, unlawful or prohibited; for knowingly to administer a Sacrament invalidly, is a sacrilege, or at least a grievous crime. Now, by Baptism, men are made Christians, by Confirmation they are attached to the Christian soldiery by a new and, as it were, a closer sacramental bond; by receiving Orders they become ministers of the Church. And these, unquestionably, are permanent qualities.

It remains that we explain our opinions regarding the efficacy of the Sacraments in the sense which divines describe by the phrase, *ex opere operato*. And in this question, as in that of the character, I find that the introduction of a new name on the part of the scholastics has laid open to cavil, and exposed to the suspicion of novelty, an opinion which, considered in itself, is plain and intelligible. For indeed, if the Sacraments availed only by the disposition of the recipient, and not by the efficacy of the rite, there would really be no special grace attached to these rites; they would be mere ceremonies, the observance of which, perhaps, is prescribed, and cannot be omitted without crime, but which possess no intrinsic efficacy; because (were it not for the prohibition) whatever good these rites contain, would, with equal certainty, be obtained without

the performance of them, by virtue of the general promises which have been made to those who possess faith and charity. In the same way, therefore, as in the Roman law no obligation arose from verbal declarations, and no action could be founded upon a contract, unless a certain form of interrogation and answer were observed (insomuch that the efficacy of this rite might be said to consist *in opere operato*, and not *in opere operantis*), so also may the same be said of Baptism, the entire effect of which is not impressed, unless the essentials of the rite are observed. In order, however, to receive the grace of the Sacrament, the soul of the recipient must be well disposed, so as that no obstacle may be placed in the way; and thus a certain *opus operantis* (that is, a certain state of the recipient) is indispensable for the *opus operatum* (the efficacy of the rite.)

Let us now speak of the Sacraments in detail, and first of Baptism;—briefly, however, for the controversies agitated concerning it at the present day are neither very important nor numerous. It must be confessed, indeed, that, were the authority of the Church wanting, the practice of Infant Baptism could not be satisfactorily maintained; for there is no precedent for it in Sacred Scriptures: for the Scriptures, besides baptism with water, appear also to require faith in the recipient; and to ascribe faith, as some do, to those who do not possess reason, appears to be excessively precarious and illusory, and to revolt all probability. For, as St. Augustine says in the letter to Dardanus, “If we were to waste words in proving that infants, who know not even human things, have a knowledge of things divine, I fear we should but insult our senses by trying to prove by language a fact in which the evidence of truth passes all the powers and office of language.”¹ And hence it

¹ Augustini Opera, t. ii. p. 522
(Ben. ed.). There is an alteration

of the words, which are, “*Nescire divina parvulos qui nec humana ad-*

seems to me, that those who reject the authority of the Church cannot withstand the force of the arguments of the Anabaptists. In like manner, it cannot be satisfactorily proved from Scripture that Baptism administered by any Christian, even by a heretic, is valid; for the power of baptising seems to have been given solely to the Apostles, and those sent by them, and there is no allusion to any others. And we see that the members of the so-called Reformed Religion have a difficulty in permitting its exercise to any but those who are ministers of the Church.¹ Now it would not be competent to us, it is true, to extend the institution of God further than He has himself signified; but, seeing that the Church, which, by virtue of the Scripture promises, is "*the pillar and ground of truth*,"² has delivered God's will to us, we may rest secure.

Concerning the Sacrament of Confirmation, the existence of which is by some called into question altogether, we find, besides the brief allusions in Sacred Scripture to the rite of imposition of hands, an Apostolic tradition, attested by Cornelius, Bishop of Rome, as cited in Eusebius,³ by Cyprian the Martyr,⁴ by the Council of Laodicea,⁵ by Basil,⁶ by Cyril of Jerusalem,⁷ and by many others of the ancients. The learned are of opinion that it was sometimes administered along with Baptism; nevertheless they were distinct Sacraments. For, after a sufficiently protracted discussion, the Church thought fit to

huc noverint," &c., but the argument is the same.

¹ "Those who hold that it is necessary that Baptism should be administered by a priest who has been ordained by a Bishop, go further than the Papists themselves, who admit that every Christian can baptise."—*Opera*, t. vi. p. 287.

² 1 Tim. iii. 15.

³ Euseb. *Histor.* l. vi. c. 35, p. 313.

⁴ Ep. 73, p. 167 (Antwerp. 1589).

⁵ Can. 7 and 48. Harduini *Acta Conciliorum*, i. col. 781, 790.

⁶ De Spiritu Sancto, c. 27. t. ii. p. 314 (Paris, 1637).

⁷ Cat. xxi. pp. 267-9 (Oxford, 1838).

define that Baptism might be administered by heretics and to heretics, but that Confirmation should be administered by a legitimate minister. It was determined, too, that Baptism should be administered to infants as soon as possible; whereas Confirmation might be deferred till the years of discretion. From which it appears, that Baptism, inasmuch as it lays the foundation, is of greater necessity; but that Confirmation crowns the work which Baptism commenced. And hence some of the ancients, alluding to the name of chrism or unguent, are of opinion that it is only on being anointed after Baptism, that a person, by receiving the gifts of the Holy Ghost, becomes fully entitled to the name of Christian, being, as it were, in the language of the Apostle, made a king and priest.¹

I come to the Sacrament of the Eucharist, upon which the greater weight of the controversy has turned. For there are some persons who, reasoning too freely in judging of the Divine mysteries, and perverting certain words of Chrysostom, Augustine, and others among the ancients, maintain that the Body and Blood of Christ are not really present in the Lord's Supper, but are only represented or signified; because they are as far removed from us as heaven is from earth, and a thing which possesses the true nature of a body cannot be in more than one place simultaneously. Some, with greater liberality, appear to admit (though not without ambiguity) that we really receive the Body of Christ, but receive it through the medium of the mind, which is raised up to heaven by faith; and that, consequently, as faith alone is the instrument of receiving, the Sacrament is not received by the unworthy — a doctrine which seems entirely opposed to the words of the Apostle. However, this opinion, when its supporters are driven to an explanation, seems, in the end, simply to amount to this,

¹ Apoc. i. 6.

that the mind flies up to heaven, to receive the Body of Christ, only in the same way as we are said to be, in thought, at Rome or Constantinople; for, if they adopt any other explanation, they will be compelled to ascribe to our mind a power which they deny to Christ's Body, viz. that of being in heaven and on earth at the same time. We shall be more secure, however, in adhering closely to the words of the Saviour, who, "*when He had taken bread and wine, said, THIS IS MY BODY.*"¹ Pious antiquity always recognised in this Sacrament a great mystery which was beyond the comprehension of the human mind; now, if it be a sign that is given instead of the reality, there is no mystery in it whatsoever. And indeed, that every existing Church in the entire world, with the exception of the Reformed Churches, and those which have sunk lower than the Reformers in innovation, admit the real presence of Christ's Body, certain recent writers of eminence² have demonstrated with such overwhelming evidence, that we must either admit this to be proven, or abandon all hope that any thing shall ever be proved regarding the opinions of distant nations.

It is true, that if it could be proved by irresistible arguments involving a metaphysical necessity, that the whole essence of a body consists in extension, or the filling a determinate space,—in that case, as truth can never be opposed to truth, it would follow as a necessary consequence, that, even by Divine power, one body could no more be in

¹ "And Protestants also (to whom, perhaps, the proposal would appear new) must be requested to follow the example of their first leaders in the Reformation, and not to shrink from those propositions: '*Panis est Corpus Christi;*' '*Vinum est Sanguis Christi;*' but, on the contrary, to reflect, that of old they were so univer-

sally held to be true, that it is scarcely possible to find one of the early doctors of the Church who did not delight in these or similar forms of speech regarding the Eucharist." —*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 70.

² The authors of the *Perpétuité de la Foi* (Paris, 1669).

many places simultaneously, than the diagonal can be commensurable with the side of a square. And if this were ascertained, it would, unquestionably, be necessary to recur to an allegorical interpretation of the Divine word, whether written or traditionary. But so far is it from being true, that any of the philosophers has perfected this vaunted demonstration,¹ that, on the contrary, it rather appears capable of solid proof, that, though the nature of a body requires that it should be extended, unless an obstacle to its extension be interposed by God, nevertheless the essence of a body consists in matter and substantial form, that is, in the principle of action and passion; for it is the essence of a substance to be capable of acting and suffering. Matter, therefore, is the first passive power, and substantial form is the first act, or the first active power;² and though it is true that the natural order of things requires these to be defined by a place of determinate magnitude, yet there is no absolute necessity which requires it.

There are some, who, while they admit the Real Presence, maintain, so to speak, a sort of impanation. They say that the Body of Christ is given in, with, and under the bread. Hence, when Christ said, "This is my Body,"

¹ "That extension constitutes the common nature of corporeal substances, I have seen very confidently asserted by many, but I have never seen it proved."—*Leibnitzens ungedruckte Anmerkungen zu Des Cartes*, p. 39. And again: "Des Cartes endeavours to shew that a body consists in extension alone, by enumerating all the other attributes, and shewing that it does not consist in any of them: but it still remains to be proved that his enumeration is complete; and besides, he does not dis-

prove it satisfactorily for them all."—*Ibidem*, p. 45.

² "It seems that a corporeal substance has two powers, the *passive power*, that is, resistance, with regard to its matter, which is common to all, and *active power* with regard to its specific form, which is variable for the different species."—*Miscell. Leibnitz*, p. 353. See also Feuerbach's *Darstellung der Leibnitz. Philosophie*, p. 278. He resumes this subject more fully in page 111.

they understand it in the same sense as if a person were to exhibit a purse, and to say, "This is money." The records of pious antiquity, however, plainly enough demonstrate that the bread is changed into the Body, and the wine into the Blood of Christ: the ancients,¹ too, univer-

¹ "This, too, shall be demonstrated (what no one has ever imagined), that Transubstantiation and the Real Presence in many places simultaneously, do not differ from each other in their ultimate analysis; and that it is impossible to conceive a body present in several separate places at the same time, in any other way than by conceiving its substance to exist under different species. For the substance alone is not subject to its extension, and therefore (as will be distinctly shewn when the nature of the substance of a body, as far as regards this point, shall be explained,) neither is it subject to the conditions of place. Hence, Transubstantiation, as it is called, in well-considered phrase, by the Council of Trent, and as I have illustrated it from St. Thomas, is not opposed to the Confession of Augsburg, but, on the contrary, follows from it. And, in fine, the only question which remains between these two parties is, whether the Real Presence (or Transubstantiation, for I shall shew them to be mutually contained in each other) is instantaneous, and continues only in the moment of use or of communion, as the Augsburg Confession teaches, or whether it commences at the time of consecration, and endures till the corruption of the species, as is taught by the Church of Rome." — *Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz, &c.* pp. 145-6.

It will be seen from this interesting passage, that Leibnitz fully adopted the term Transubstantiation as applicable to the Blessed Eucharist. The assertion in the text, however, — that the ancients designated by the words μετασχηματισμόν, μετουσιασμόν, the change of substance which they universally recognised, — is only true in part. There are many examples of the use of the former word, μετασχηματισμός: but the term μετουσιασμός, like its Latin representative, *Transubstantiation*, is of comparatively recent origin. Much stress has been laid on this circumstance by the antagonists of Transubstantiation; and in the recent Anglican controversies on the Real Presence, it has been confidently asserted, over and over again, that the *language of the Fathers*, with regard to the Eucharist, though it fully establishes *the reality* of our Lord's presence, nevertheless does not furnish the slightest evidence that *the mode* of his presence, is that of a *Transubstantiation* of the elements. The subject is one of such importance, and has received so little attention, that I trust I shall be pardoned if I transcribe, with some slight alteration, a few observations which I had occasion to introduce, some time since, in another publication.

"We now come to examine the words which the Fathers use when speaking of the effect produced by

sally acknowledged therein a change of substance (μετασχηματισμόν, μετουσιωσμόν), which the Latins have aptly

consecration upon the material elements of the eucharistic oblation, in order that we may see whether (as Dr. Pusey asserts) they represent the elements of bread and wine 'as unchanged in material substance,' and merely 'changed in their use, their efficacy, and their dignity, mystically and spiritually;' or whether they do not, on the contrary, recognise a 'change of substance,' in the strictest sense of the words. We have been at some pains to examine and classify the various forms of expression which the leading Fathers employ in speaking of the Eucharist; and we shall proceed to submit a few specimens of each class, commencing with those forms of expression which may appear least decisive, and proceeding, successively, to others which convey the change of substance more clearly and distinctly, till we shall come to what we need not hesitate to pronounce the last degree of evidence which human language could afford.

CLASS I.—As we are addressing ourselves to those who, with Dr. Pusey, maintain the reality of Christ's Presence, it cannot be necessary to give examples of the numberless passages in which (as in our Lord's own words) the eucharistic symbols are said to be [εἶναι, esse] his Body and Blood. The natural inference from this form of expression, of course, is, that they are not bread or wine any longer, and, therefore, that their substance has been changed. However, we shall not insist upon this deduction, but leave to the antagonists of Transubstantiation the benefit of whatever doubt they can discover therein.

CLASS II.—We proceed, therefore, at once to those passages in which the bread and wine are said to *become*, to be made [γενέσθαι, ποιείσθαι, fieri,] the Body and Blood of Christ. In the natural use of language, one thing cannot be said to *become*, or to *be made*, another, without *ceasing to be what it was*. The water of Cana did not become wine, without ceasing to be water; Moses's rod did not become a serpent, till it ceased to be a rod; a layman does not become a priest without ceasing to be a layman. Now we need not tell any one who possesses even a moderate acquaintance with the Greek and Latin Fathers, that, on the subject of the Blessed Eucharist, no language is more familiar with them than this. Thus,—

1. St. Irenæus says: 'When the mingled cup and broken bread perceiveth the word of God, it *becometh* [γίγεται] the Eucharist of the body of the Lord.'—*Adversus Hæreses*, l. v. c. 2, p. 293.

2. St. Ambrose employs the corresponding Latin word, *fit*. 'The consecration is added, and of the bread *is made* [*fit*] the flesh of Christ.'—*De Sacramentis*, l. iv. c. 4, ii. c. 368.

3. So also St. Chrysostom: 'It is not man that causeth the oblations to *become* [γενέσθαι] the Body and Blood of Christ . . . but it is the grace and power of God which worketh all things.'—*Hom. de Perdit. Judæ*, t. ii. p. 394.

4. The familiar prayer of consecration in all the liturgies is to the same effect. Thus, the Liturgy of Jerusalem prays that 'the Holy Spi-

rendered 'Transubstantiation;' and it has been defined that the whole substance of the bread and wine is changed into

rit may descend, with his holy, good, and glorious presence, and may sanctify and *make* [ἁγιάσῃ καὶ ποιήσῃ] this bread the holy Body of thy Christ.—In Waterworth's *Faith of Catholics*, ii. p. 181.

5. The Alexandrian Liturgy prays in like manner: 'Send down also upon us, and upon these loaves and these cups, thy Holy Spirit, that He may sanctify and perfect them, as an Omnipotent God, and *may make* the bread indeed the Body.' [ἵνα αὐτὰ ἁγιάσῃ καὶ τελειώσῃ, ὡς παντοδύναμος θεός, καὶ ποιήσῃ τὸν μὲν ἄρτον σῶμα]. *Renaudot*, t. i. p. 157. The same form occurs in the Liturgy of Constantinople, in the Coptic Liturgy, the Syriac Liturgy, that of St. Gregory the Illuminator, the Ethiopian, the Ambrosian, and that of the Nestorians. See the extracts given at length in *The Faith of Catholics*, Waterworth's edition, ii. 180 and following.

6. We are tempted to add one other passage, as it is from a source not easily accessible to most readers. It is from a lost homily of St. Athanasius, *To the Baptised*, part of which is preserved in a discourse of St. Sophronius, which has been published by Cardinal Mai in his *Vaticana Collectio*. The passages from St. Athanasius, we may observe, are quoted by Sophronius, for the purpose of proving that it is not lawful to adore the mysteries, *till after consecration*.

'Thou wilt see the Levites,' says Athanasius, 'carrying bread and a cup of wine, and preparing the table; and as long as the prayers and supplications are not yet put forth, it is

common bread and a common cup. But as soon as the sublime and wonderful prayers are completed, then the bread *becometh* [γίνεται] the Body, and the cup, the Blood, of our Lord Jesus Christ.' And again: 'Let us come to the celebration of the mysteries. As long as the prayers and supplications have not been made, then they are ordinary bread and wine; but when the sublime prayers and holy supplications are sent up, then the Word cometh down upon the bread and wine, and they *become* [γίνεται] His Body.'—*Scriptor. Vet. Vat. Collectio*, t. ix. p. 625.

CLASS III.—Advancing a step further, we find an express and distinct recognition of a *change* in the elements. The Fathers constantly declare that the bread and wine are *changed* [μεταβάλλονται, *mutantur*, *convertuntur*] into the Body and Blood of Christ.

1. St. Justin Martyr writes in his *Apology*: 'For we take them, not as common bread and common drink, but as, by the word of God, our incarnate Saviour, Jesus Christ, took flesh and blood for our salvation, so are we taught that the aliment blessed through the prayer of his word whereby our flesh and blood are nourished *by change* [κατὰ μεταβολήν] is the Flesh and Blood of that Incarnate Jesus.'—*Opp.* p. 98, ed. Col.

2. St. Cyril of Jerusalem frequently employs this form, and in the following passage it is impossible to mistake its meaning. We use the words of the Oxford translation. 'He once *turned* [μετέβαλε] water into wine in Cana of Galilee, at his own will;

the whole substance of the Body and Blood of Christ. And therefore, here as elsewhere, the Scripture is to be ex-

and is it impossible that He should have *turned* [the same word] wine into blood?—P. 272.

3. And a few pages afterwards he writes: ‘Then having sanctified ourselves by these spiritual hymns, we call upon the merciful God to send forth his Holy Spirit upon the gifts lying before Him, that He may *make* [see Class II.] the bread the Body of Christ, and the wine the Blood of Christ; for whatsoever the Holy Ghost has touched is sanctified, and *changed*’ [μεταβέβληται].—*Ib.* p. 275.

4. As a representative of the Latin Church, we shall take St. Ambrose. ‘If the words of Elias could call down fire from heaven,’ he asks, ‘shall not Christ’s word avail to *change* [mutet] the species of the elements? You have read concerning the creation of the world: ‘He spoke, and it was made;’ He gave command, and it was formed. Shall not the word of Christ, then, which could draw out of nothing what was not, be able to *change* [mutare] that which was into what it was not?’—*De Mysteriis*, c. ix. t. ii. p. 338. What would be the meaning of this appeal to the creative power, unless to shew that the power exercised in the eucharistic consecration was of an analogous character? It will be remembered that these appeals are constantly in the mouth of the Fathers. Thus, St. Cyril compares the eucharistic change to the conversion of water into wine at Cana. (*Oxford Translation*, p. 271.) St. Ambrose to the change of Moses’ rod into a serpent (t. ii. p. 337); to the change

of the water of the Nile into blood (*ibid.*); and to the sweetening of the waters of Marah. (*ibid.*) St. Justin (*Opp.* p. 98, ed. Cologne), and St. Gregory of Nyssa (*Opp.* ii. 337), to the natural conversion of the food we eat into the substance of our body; and St. Chrysostom (*Opp.* v. 269), to the liquefaction of wax before the fire, and the change of the rain and dew of heaven into the substance of the plants which they fertilise and support. These changes are, for the most part, expressed by the word μεταβολή, as in the passages cited above.

5. The following passage from Theophylact is too remarkable to be overlooked: ‘Observe,’ he says, ‘that the bread eaten by us is not merely a figuring of the flesh of the Lord, but the Lord’s flesh itself. For He did not say, ‘The bread which I shall give is a figure of flesh,’ but ‘it is my flesh.’ For this bread *is transformed* by the hidden words, through the mystic benediction, and the coming of the Holy Ghost, into the flesh of the Lord. Nor let it disturb any one that the bread must be believed to be flesh. For even while the Lord walked in the flesh, and received aliment from bread, this bread which he ate *was changed* [μετεβάλλετο] into his Body, and became like his sacred Flesh, and contributed, after a human manner, to the increase and support thereof. Therefore now also the bread *is changed* [the same word] into the flesh of the Lord. And how is it, you ask, that it is not flesh but bread that appeareth to us? In order that we may not feel an abhor-

plained from the tradition which the Church, its keeper, has transmitted to us.

rence to the use thereof.'—*Com. in Johann.* cap. vi. p. 594. (Venice, 1754.)

CLASS IV.—The idea conveyed by the phrases exemplified in the passage just quoted, is in the main the same with that frequently found, with a slight variation, in St. Gregory of Nyssa, and other Fathers; when the bread is said to *pass into*, or to *be converted into* [μεθίστασθαι, μετασκευάζεσθαι], the Body of Christ. One or two short examples may suffice.

1. St. Gregory of Nyssa. 'But it [the bread eaten by our Lord during his life on earth] was sanctified by the indwelling of the Word, and who had his tabernacle in the Flesh. As, therefore, the bread being *transmuted* [μεταπιούμενος] in that body, *passed into* [μετέστη] divine power, in like manner, the *same taketh place here* also.'—*Catechet. Oratio. Opp.* t. ii. p. 536.

2. St. Cyril of Alexandria. The following passage is from his long-lost commentary on St. Luke, of which Cardinal Mai has published, in the tenth volume of his *Classici Auctores*, the greater part of the Greek original. The sentiment is precisely that already cited from the more modern Theophylact. 'For, in order that we may not hold back in horror at the sight of flesh and blood lying on the holy tables of our churches, God, condescending to our weakness, infuseth into the oblations the power of life, and *converteth them* [μεθίστησι] into the energy of his flesh.'—*Classici Auctores*, t. x. p. 375.

3. St. Chrysostom. 'These are not works of human power. He who did these things in that supper, the same worketh even now. We hold the rank of ministers; but it is He that sanctifieth and converteth them.' [μετασκευάζων].—*Opp.* t. ii. p. 789.

CLASS V.—There is another expression slightly varying the same idea, of which we may as well add one or two examples. We have never met it except in St. John Chrysostom, nor do we know of its being used by any other Father. It may be expressed by the English word *transformation* [μεταρρυθμιζεσθαι, transfigurari].

1. St. Chrysostom. 'It is not man that causeth the oblations to *become* [see Class II.] the Body of Christ; but it is the grace and power of God. 'This is my Body,' he saith. This word *transformeth* [μεταρρυθμιζει] the oblation.'—*Opp.* ii. 394. He uses the same word, in precisely similar context, in another homily on the same subject.—(*Opp.* t. ii. 384.)

2. St. Ambrose. 'As often as we receive the sacraments, which, through the mystery of the sacred prayer, are *transformed* [transfigurantur] into the Body and Blood of Christ, so often do we announce the memory of his death.'—*De Fide*, iv. c. 4, t. ii. p. 544.

3. St. Ambrose uses the same word in another passage, to which we shall have occasion to refer again.—(Tom. ii. p. 709.)

CLASS VI.—It is not easy to follow out in English the minute shades of

Oftentimes, however, as they are not distinguishable by the senses, the name of bread and wine is applied to the

varied meaning which the more delicate organisation of the Greek language easily distinguishes from one another. Perhaps the phrase we are about to cite is less equivocal than any of those hitherto produced. It is one for which we have no legitimate English representative, but it will be equivalently expressed by saying, that the sacred symbols are *trans-elemented* [μεταστοιχειούνται], that is, *their elements* [στοιχεῖα] *are changed* into the Body and Blood of Christ.

As an example of its meaning in the language of the Fathers, we need but instance a passage in which St. Cyril of Alexandria employs it to express the re-transmutation of the serpent into Moses's rod: μεταστοιχειούτο ὀλοκλήρως εἰς ῥάβδον ὁ ὄφης (*De Adorat.* lib. ii. p. 70). And another equally unequivocal from St. Isidore of Pelusium: Ὅρα τὰς μεταβολὰς τὰς ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ πρὸς τὰναντία τὰ πράγματα μεταστοιχειῶσαι δυναμένας. Isid. Pelusiot. Ep. 43, l. v. p. v. p. 687. (In Suicer's *Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus*, sub voce Μεταστοιχειῶω.)

1. St. Gregory of Nyssa. 'And therefore hath the Divine Word commingled Himself with the weak nature of man, in order that, by partaking of the Divinity, our humanity may be deified. For this reason, by the dispensation of his grace, He entereth by his Flesh into the breasts of the faithful, commingled and con-tempered with their bodies, that, by being united to that which is immortal, man may participate in incorruption. And this He granteth by the

power of the benediction, *trans-elementing* [μεταστοιχειῶσας] the nature [φύσιν] of the visible symbols.'—*Magna Catechetica Oratio*, Opp. t. ii. p. 537.

2. This remarkable word is used by Theophylact in circumstances yet more unequivocal. In reconciling the reality of Christ's presence with the appearances which the symbols present, he proceeds (in a strain very similar to that of which we have already given an example) to assign our natural loathing of flesh and blood as the reason; tracing it to 'the most merciful dispensation of God, whereby He preserveth the appearance [εἶδος] of bread, but *trans-elementeth* it [μεταστοιχειῶῖ] into the virtue of flesh and blood.'—*Com. in Marc.* cap. xiv. p. 249.

CLASS VII.—There remains yet another phrase, which we have reserved for the last place, to complete the climax of evidence. It is one which well displays the copiousness and strength of the Greek language, and which cannot be rendered faithfully but by the word now consecrated to Catholic use, *transubstantiation*.* We have already seen that the Fathers familiarly speak of the bread and wine *being made* the Body and Blood of Christ. They go still further, and declare that they are *transmuted*, or—to coin a word, for we have none to supply its place—*TRANS-MADE* [μεταποιούνται], or *made*

* See the declarations of the Greek schismatical bishops on 'the subject of Transubstantiation, appended to the *Perpétuité de la Foi*, vol. i. p. 1199 and foll. (Paris, 1814.)

remaining species. Thus St. Ambrose declares the word of the Lord to be so efficacious, that “they at once are

into a new substance, or transubstantiated. Perhaps there is none of the other forms of expression more common than this.

1. St. Gregory of Nyssa. ‘The Body of Christ, by the indwelling of the word of God, was changed into a divine dignity; and so also I believe that the bread, made holy by God’s word, is *transmuted* [*μεταποιεῖσθαι*] into the Body of Christ.’—*Opp.* t. ii. p. 536.

2. A few sentences after, he goes on: ‘For there also the grace of the Word made holy the Body which had its substance from bread, and after a certain manner was bread; so here, also, this bread, as the Apostle saith, is sanctified by the word of God and prayer; not that it passeth into the Body of the Word, in the way of eating and drinking, but that it is instantly *transmuted* [*μεταποιούμενος*] into the body of Christ, according to what He said, ‘This is my Body.’—*Ibid.*

3. The same word is found in Theodoret; and it is the more remarkable inasmuch he uses it in translating a passage which he quotes from St. Ambrose. ‘For although thou believest,’ says he, ‘that Christ’s Body is real, and bringest it to the altar *to be transmuted* [*πρὸς μεταποίησιν*], but distinguishest not the nature of the body and that of the divinity, we will ask you,’ &c.—*Tom.* iv. p. 147 (Halle ed. 1772). The word used by St. Ambrose, and which Theodoret considered synonymous with *μεταποιεῖσθαι*, was *transfigurari*. We have already referred to the passage.

4. St. John Damascene. ‘Thus,

the bread of the oblation and the wine and water, through the invocation and the coming of the Holy Ghost, are *supernaturally transmuted* [*ὑπερφυῶς μεταποιούνται*] into the Body and Blood of Christ.’—*De Fide Orthodoxa*, lib. iv. p. 317.

With this remarkable class we close our case. It would be very easy to have multiplied the examples both in this and other classes; but we shall not proceed further, because we think it impossible for any one who really respects the Fathers, to resist the evidence in favour of Transubstantiation already produced; and still more impossible for any student of antiquity, whether he respect them or not, to entertain a doubt as to what were their true sentiments upon this mysterious topic. It is idle to say, while we have such a mass of evidence before us, that they contented themselves with believing that Christ *was* really present, and abstracted from *the mode in which* He was present in the blessed Eucharist. We defy any man, who calmly considers their language, not to see not only that they defined Christ to be present after a certain mode (and not merely in the abstract), but also that the mode so defined by them is not, and cannot be, any other than Transubstantiation; that is, that the elements of bread and wine cease to exist after consecration, and that, under the appearances thereof which remain, his Body and Blood, together with his Soul and Divinity, truly, really, and substantially exist, and are received by the communicant. It is hardly possible to devise, even in the rich and

what they were, and are changed into another thing;” that is, the accidents are what they were, the substance is changed;—for the same Father says, that after consecration they are not to be believed any thing else “but the Body and Blood of Christ.” And the Roman Pontiff Gelasius insinuates that “the bread is changed into the Body, while the nature of the bread remains,” that is to say, its qualities or accidents; for in those times the forms of speech were not measured in strict accordance with metaphysical notions. And it was in this sense also that Theodoret said, that in this conversion, which he himself calls a change (*μεταβολήν*), “the mystic symbols are not divested of their proper nature.”² These expressions may be worthy of notice, as bearing against those writers of the present day, who hold that even the accidents of the bread

copious vocabulary of Greece, a variety of phrase which they have not employed to convey this meaning. To recapitulate the singularly varied and expressive forms of language which they use, they declare, not only that the sacramental symbols *are* (Class I.) the Body and Blood of Christ, and that what *was* bread *has been made* (Class II.) his Body; but they further define the mode in which this has taken place, insisting (against all the apparent evidence of sense, on which, be it remembered, they never fail to dwell), and proving by illustrations and examples (which have no meaning except in the hypothesis of Transubstantiation), that the symbols *are changed and converted* (Classes III. IV.) into the Body and Blood; that by this change they are not only *transformed* (Class V.), or transfigured, but that these *elements or constituent parts* are (Class VI.)

changed; and, finally, to remove all possibility of doubt, that they are, as it were (Class VII.), *transmade, made into a new thing*, or, in the apt language of the Catholic dogma, TRANSUBSTANTIATED.”—*Dublin Review*, vol. xvi. pp. 85 and foll.

¹ Ambrosii Opera, t. ii, p. 369. (Ben. ed.)

² The well-known difficulty against Transubstantiation, from the dialogue of Orthodoxus and Eranistes; for a very full examination of which, see Natalis Alexander, *Hist. Ecc.* t. ix. pp. 307 and foll. Theodoret’s use of the word *μεταβολή* is, in itself, almost decisive. He invariably employs this word to express a real and substantial change, as, for example, the change of the rods into serpents; of the Nile into blood; of the water into wine; of one colour into another, &c. See a number of passages in Waterworth’s *Faith of Catholics*, ii. 366.

do not really remain, but only the appearance of them, or an empty and dream-like apparition.

Nor do the accidents of the symbols subsist in the Body of Christ as a subject; they are not sustained in any subject, and the mass itself (which certainly is different from the matter) seems, by the Divine power, to discharge the office of subject for the other accidents. And these principles are wisely laid down by theologians, in order to avoid any thing incongruous in the worship. For if the accidents which belonged to the bread could be predicated of Christ's Body, it would follow that Christ's Body was a fragile, round, slender, white thing; it would follow too, that this small, white, round thing—in a word, this thing which has all the sensible properties of bread—was the object of adoration, and that all the indignities which may be offered to the species, or may accidentally befall it, occur to the Body of Christ itself.

It is certain, moreover, that it was the doctrine of the ancients, as appears from the words of Ambrose just cited, that the conversion is wrought by the very act of consecration; nor did any of the ancients ever hear of the novel opinion held by some now-a-days, that the Body of Christ becomes present only in the moment of communion; for there are well-ascertained instances of persons not consuming this sacred food immediately on receiving it, but sending it to others, and carrying it to their houses, nay even upon journeys and into deserts; and this custom, though it was afterwards abolished for greater reverence, was at one time approved. And indeed, either we must hold (which Heaven forbid!) that the words of institution, as pronounced by the priest, are false, or we are compelled to admit that what is blessed by him is the Body of Christ, even before it is eaten. Not to speak of the difficulties in which the defenders of this opinion embarrass them-

selves, as to whether the conversion first commences on the lips, or in the mouth, or in the throat, or in the stomach; or, indeed, whether it take place even there, if, through any defect of the organs, the symbols are not consumed.

However, as there are, especially among the members of the Reformed Church, some eminent and acute-minded men, who, deeply imbued with the principles of a certain new and captivating philosophy, imagine, to use their own language, that they understand clearly and distinctly that the essence of a body consists in extension; that accidents are but modes of a substance; and therefore that they can no more subsist without a subject, or be separated from a substance, than uniformity of circumference can be separated from a circle; and as it is from this fancied evidence that their deplorable and almost insuperable aversion for the doctrines of the Catholic Church arises,¹ I think

¹ "In revealed theology I undertake to demonstrate, against the insults of infidels and atheists, not indeed the truth of mysteries (since that comes from revelation), but their possibility; so as to vindicate them from all contradictions; viz. the possibility of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, and of the Eucharist. And, to advert specially to the real presence in the Eucharist, against those who hold that it is but a sign, it is true that M. Arnauld has sufficiently established the reality of the presence, against M. Claude, from the perpetual tradition of the ancients; but all will be in vain, unless their single weapon of 'impossibility' and contradiction' be wrested from the hands of these Hercules. For they persist that it is a thing impossible, contradictory, and revolting all

reason, which must necessarily be understood figuratively, as well as the propositions 'Herod is a wolf;' the lamb is the passover;' and, though a thousand passages of Fathers and Scripture were produced, this reply will still remain free to them. And they are confirmed in this by the philosophy of the day, as amended by Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Des Cartes, Hobbes, &c. For this philosophy is received with universal applause by all the *curiosi*, because it explains all the properties of bodies mechanically, by the notions of magnitude, figure, and motion, without supposing imaginary beings. In proportion, however, as this philosophy is loved by politicians, in the same proportion is it feared by zealous Catholic divines; because all the wondrous and mysterious notions by

that it is our duty to consult for their malady; and that Catholic philosophers should labour (as the Council of Lateran directed to be done against those who erred regarding the nature of the soul),¹ not only to satisfy the objections clearly and lucidly, but even to establish accurately the contrary doctrine. For they loudly declare, that it is not in the power of any decree of the Church,² of any law, in fine, of any authority whatever, to force an individual, even though he be ready to obey, to believe truly and sincerely a doctrine which is impossible, and which implies, or at least evidently appears to imply, a contradiction. And therefore they protest that the sepa-

which the scholastics used to support the Eucharist at once fall to the ground; and Des Cartes, Maignan, Digby, Thomas Anglus, Borelli, Bonarti, and some others, who have attempted to reconcile the mysteries of the Eucharist with the improved philosophy, have been unsuccessful. Hence Arnauld, though he is deeply versed in the improved philosophy, has not yet, often as Claude has objected the impossibility and contradiction, ventured to enter upon it. Now, by profound examination, I have at last so far succeeded, that I am confident I can demonstrate, consistently with the improved philosophy, the possibility of the Eucharist as it is explained in the Council of Trent;—a thing which many will deem incredible.”—*Brief an den Herzog von Hannover, Johann Friedrich.*—*Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften, herausgegeben von Guhrauer*, b. i. p. 282-3. He had alluded to this demonstration (or a similar one) in a letter to the same prince two years before.—*Ibidem*, p. 271.

¹ He alludes to the Fifth Council of Lateran (1512), in the Eighth Session of which the immortality and unity of the human soul are defined against Averroes; and professors of philosophy and other public teachers are directed to apply themselves to the refutation of the prevailing errors on this and other kindred philosophical subjects. See the acts of the Council in Labbe, t. xix. p. 842.

² “For the persons who, through a false philosophy, are persuaded that what is proposed to them is impossible, will never be able to submit to texts or authorities without being abused with regard to this pretended philosophy.”—*Miscell. Leibnitz*, p. 326. And again: “If this obstacle [the alleged repugnance of Transubstantiation on philosophical principles], which alarmed so many men of genius, be removed, a great gate will be opened for the return to unity.”—*Briefwechsel*, p. 146. See also the same letter, p. 140; and a similar passage in a letter quoted by Guhrauer, t. i. p. 346.

ration from the Church is not to be imputed to themselves, but to them who refuse to receive back those who are separated, save on a condition which to them is impossible.

Our brief limits, it is true, do not permit us to enter at much length into philosophical discussions; but it will be enough for us to observe, in passing, that we too have applied, and that not merely in a perfunctory manner, to the study of mathematics, mechanics, and experimental philosophy; and though it must be confessed that in the beginning we inclined to the very opinions to which we have just alluded, yet we have been compelled, by the progress of study, to return to the principles of the old philosophy. And perhaps, were it permitted to explain the course of our researches, there is no one, except those who are pre-engaged by the prejudices of their imagination, who would not admit that these views are not of that confused and absurd character which is commonly attributed to them by those who despise the received doctrines, and who scoff at Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, and other illustrious men, as though they were but children in philosophy.¹

Certainly, if place is different from the thing placed, or

¹ "I see that many young persons run after the 'subtle matter,' and the 'sphericles' of Des Cartes, in order to have something about which to speak, and to entitle themselves to despise the ancients."—*Miscell. Leibnitz.* p. 350. He repeats, over and over again, this expression of respect and reverence for the ancients. Thus, in a letter to Ernest of Hesse-Rheinfels, he says, "I am anxious, too, that M. Arnauld should be informed that I by no means pretend to the fame of being an innovator, as he

seems to have supposed. On the contrary, I ordinarily find that the oldest and most received opinions are the best."—*Briefwechsel*, p. 11. The most remarkable coincidence, however, both as regards language and sentiment, with the above passage, is found in his *Discours de Métaphysique*.—[*Briefwechsel*, p. 163.] The passage in the text is almost a verbal translation of the eleventh section of this most interesting Discourse. See also his *Ungedruckte Anmerkungen zu Des Cartes*, p. 41.

space from a body, so also will matter be different from extension. Now in the case of the former, we are all led by a natural impulse to acknowledge the distinction; and in matter, over and above its dimensions, we conceive a something which the ancients called *ἀντιτυπία* (*resistance*),¹ and which we may denominate 'mass,' from which thing it arises that bodies do not mutually compenetrates each other, as if they were empty; but, on the contrary, have the capacity of coming in collision, and of being mutually acted upon by one another; and from which it also arises that, in a body of greater mass, the impetus or force will be greater, though the velocity be the same;—effects which certainly cannot be derived from extension alone. It is also of the nature of a body to act continually by a kind of vibration, to repel other bodies, and to maintain its own place; though this action takes place in the minute particles, and cannot be observed in the greater; for I do not think there exists any substance which is devoid of all ordinary action.² And it is from this internal motion that the greater or less connexion of the parts arises, according as their motions harmonise with one another and the external motions in a greater or less degree.³

¹ "I fully agree with Huygens (to whose opinion on subjects of natural philosophy and mathematics I attach great importance), that the notions of vacuum and of extension are identical; nor, in my opinion, is it possible to understand the mobility of a thing, or its *ἀντιτυπία*, from its extension alone, but from the subject of the extension, whereby the place is not merely constituted, but is also filled."—*Leibnitzens ungedruckte Anmerkungen zu Des Cartes*, pp. 39-40.

² "For in my opinion a substance

(at least naturally) cannot exist without action."—*Ibid.* 353. See also a number of passages collected by Feuerbach, *Darstellung der Leibn. Philos.* p. 279. Not to multiply citations, I may refer, once for all, to the whole letter of Leibnitz to Pellisson, pp. 348-54.

³ "I have explained the true reason why, among different things, one is easily separated, and another consists of closely adhering parts. I ascribe it to an internal subtle motion, and to a circulation, which, as it were, causes the body to revolve

This resistance or mass, and this effort to act, or motive power, are distinct from matter, or the primary power of suffering or resisting, and from substantial form, or the primary power¹ of acting, which others call the first act; because the secondary powers may be limited or increased, while the primary powers remain unchanged; for there is nothing to prevent God from being able to increase the mass or density of the matter without increasing its dimension; as when, for example, He increases the force, its velocity remaining the same. Thus we see that a blow struck by iron is greater than that of wood of the same dimension; and although, in these substances, the difference naturally arises from another cause,—namely, from there being interspersed in the wood a greater quantity of heterogeneous fluid, which is not moved simultaneously,² in consequence of which the blow is not struck by all the matter comprised under the dimensions of the wood,—yet I do not see what there can be to prevent God from being able to cause the blow to be greater, though the matter and velocity really remain the same, and to make the bodies differ in specific mass or density, not merely in appearance, but also in reality. Now it certainly is clear that, even naturally, the effort of continuing motion, or the motive power, may be changed without affecting the substance of the

on its own centre, by which means each part presses upon the contiguous one.”—*Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, b. i. 267-8.

¹ “They who place the essence of a body in ἀντιρροπία, or impenetrability, do not derive the notion from our hands or senses, but from the fact that it will not give place to another homogeneous body, unless it can itself move to another place.”—*Ungedruckte Anmerkungen*, p. 46.

² The same explanation of the fluidity and solidity of bodies will be found in the treatise to which I have so often referred, p. 70; and it is not a little interesting to know that St. Ambrose, in explaining the Eucharist, employs a very similar illustration, that of the axe of Elishaeus' servant floating like wood in the Jordan.—*De Mysteriis*, cap. ix. tom. ii. p. 338. (Ben. ed.)

body. Here, then, we have two absolute qualities, or real accidents—mass or power of resisting, and effort or power of acting; and these qualities certainly are not modes of a corporeal substance, but something absolute and real super-added to it; for, when they are changed, a real change takes place, while the substance remains. And, in general, either there must exist real or absolute accidents, which are distinguished from the substance by some other distinctions besides modal ones (as those which we call relations ordinarily are); or every real change must also be essential or substantial—an alternative which will not be admitted even by those who deny the existence of real accidents.¹

The individual essence of a thing, therefore, or that “which causes it to be that thing, and to remain one and the same through manifold changes,” consists in a certain power, or actual faculty or capacity of action²—and this a primitive one—which requires certain secondary powers and certain acts, but which may be divested of some of them by

¹ “I will shew that, by virtue of the principles of the improved philosophy, there must be in every body an ultimate, incorporeal, substantial principle, distinct from mass; and that it was this the ancients and the scholastics called *substance*, though they were not able to explain distinctly, much less to demonstrate, their opinion.”—*Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften, herausg. von Guhrauer*, i. p. 283. The same opinion is still more clearly conveyed in the following passage:—“Whence also it is evident that a substance is really distinguished from its modifications or accidents; contrary to what is held by certain recent writers, and especially the late Duke of Buckingham,

who discusses this question in his lately printed pamphlet on Religion.”—*Opera*, t. i. 145.

² *Entelecheia*. This I suppose to be its meaning in the above passage; although I am aware that Leibnitz uses it elsewhere in a different sense. See, for example, the *Briefwechsel*, p. 121, and again, p. 117. It is a word, however, with regard to which a mistake may be held excusable, when it is recollected that (if we may believe the story) even the celebrated Hermolaus Barbarus was compelled to have recourse to the Devil for its true meaning, as it is used by Aristotle. See *Bayle's Dictionnaire Critique*, tom. i. p. 473.

nature, and of them all by God, others being substituted in their stead. Now, if the essence of a thing consists in that property, in virtue of which it remains the same, though under different dimensions and qualities, and in consequence of which the essence is not divisible or variable along with its dimensions, or changeable along with its qualities, it follows that it is really distinct from them. Now, regularly speaking, things which are really distinct may be separated by the absolute power of God, and that in such a way as that either the one may subsist, the other being destroyed, or both may subsist, but separately.¹ And indeed, Nature herself, without destroying the essence, takes away dimensions and qualities, and substitutes others in their stead; but there is nothing to prevent God from changing, or even completely intercepting or impeding, this natural substitution, so that the essence may remain, entirely divested of dimensions and qualities. He may also cause the same thing to have different dimensions and qualities simultaneously; or the same real accident to appertain to different substances; and lastly, He may sustain the dimensions and qualities, the thing or essence being entirely taken away. Nor is it possible to conceive any contradiction in these suppositions; for, if the real distinction be

¹ See the *Ungedruckte Anmerkungen*, p. 39. The letter to Arnauld, besides the two in the text suggests a further supposition.

“Lastly, it has appeared very plainly in what the substance differs from the species; and a reason has been discovered which makes it perfectly comprehensible, that God can cause the substance of the same body to be at one time in several places distant from each other, or, what comes to the same, to exist under several species.”—*Letter to Arnauld*,

Briefwechsel, p. 145.

The same principle is put forward in the letter to the Duke of Hanover, already cited.

“I will further shew that this principle may exist in many places at the same time, nay, under far distant and distinct species. Thus the possibility, not only of the real presence, but also of transubstantiation, of which Arnauld is afraid to speak, is made evident.”—*Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, b. i. p. 283-4.

once admitted, the reason is the same for them all ; and the existence of substance and of real accidents, and their union, are equally dependent on God's will. And since the nature of things is nothing else than God's ordinary mode of action, it is equally easy for Him to follow the ordinary mode, or to adopt an extraordinary one, according as his wisdom requires. On the contrary, to change modal accidents—those which result by a necessary or metaphysical consequence from real ones—involves a contradiction or an absurdity, and therefore cannot be attributed to God. Of this class are the modes which—as, for instance, relations—arise without any real change, merely from connexion ; and therefore such accidents cannot be conceived without absolute subjects to sustain them.¹

¹ From the foregoing extracts, (which I could easily have extended,) it will be seen that Leibnitz had devised several solutions of the philosophical difficulties against the Catholic doctrine upon the Eucharist. The text combines the principles of more than one of these solutions ; but perhaps, as a whole, the following approaches most closely to it.

“ We must first know . . . whether it is not reasonable to follow the literal interpretation (if it is possible), in order not to open the door to the Socinians ; especially as the Church has always believed in a real receiving, as all the Oriental Churches believe at this day. The only thing which could exempt us from the obligation of adhering to the letter of the Testament of Jesus Christ, would be an absurdity or impossibility in the literal sense ; and this it remains to examine.

“ Let us, therefore, examine the nature of a body. Many persons

lay down that they know but two attributes, thought and extension ; and assert that thought constitutes a spirit, and that extension constitutes a body. If this were the case, it would be quite certain that it implied a contradiction to say that a body, or its substance, was united immediately to any other distant substance. But it would also follow that God could not cause bodies to act *in distans*, nor to pass through another body ;—which appears a bold assertion ; the more especially as it rests on a purely precarious or arbitrary hypothesis. For it is not true, it has not been proved, it is even directly at issue with the opinions of the ancient philosophy, that the nature of a body consists in extension.

“ M. Huygens well said that the idea which some conceive of a body is exactly that which he has of a vacuum. On the contrary, it is easy to shew, that by the notion of extension alone we could not explain, either

Having explained the mystery of the Eucharist, as far as our powers of comprehension permit, and as far as appeared necessary for the purpose of removing contradictions, it remains for us to speak of the Eucharistic Communion; and in this matter, the first question that presents itself for consideration is one which is known to have occasioned great commotions—that of communion under one or both kinds. There is no doubt, indeed, that Christ instituted the consecration of the bread and wine together, and that He gave his Body and Blood to the Apostles under both species; Paul delivered the same usage to the Corinthians; and the primitive Church, as the Oriental Church does even still, continued to observe it, until by degrees—chiefly through a feeling of reverence, founded, not to speak of

impetus, or the laws of motion, or the natural *inertia* of a body, or several other phenomena. Far from extension's being any thing primitive in a body, we see clearly that the notion of it is resolvable into others, and includes those of multitude, continuity, diffusion; that thus it is a relation, and supposes something which might be multiplied, resolved, diffused, or extended, as the extension of the colour, of the weight, of the resistance. Thus, it is in this that the essence or primitive constitution of a body consists. Now that which is continued and repeated in a body is, properly speaking, the resistance, without which there would not be a body, but merely a vacant space, incapable of change. Thus, to return to the ancient and true opinion, the essence of a body consists in the primitive power of suffering and acting, in passiveness and activeness, in one word, in resistance. Primitive passiveness is what I call 'form,' or what

Aristotle calls *Entelecheia prima*. Experience shews that bodies possess activity and resistance; and hence those who make them consist in extension alone, are driven to deprive them of all action, and to say that it is God alone who acts—a strange opinion, and one which clearly shews the defect of the hypothesis.

“As the essence of a body consists in power, the application of power to dimensions follows naturally, according to the intention of God, who has willed that all should be done according to certain mathematical rules—*pondere, numero, mensura*. And it is in consequence of this, that bodies ordinarily do not act *in distans*, that they occupy at one time a greater, at another a less space, &c. However, the laws which God has ordained for the maintenance of the good order of things do not bind Himself, and do not prevent Him from changing for reasons of a higher order.”—*Opera*, t. i. pp. 30, 31.

other reasons, on the greater liability of the liquid element to perish or to be destroyed—it was ordained, especially in the West, that the species of bread only should be given to the faithful when they communicate, and that the species of wine should be received only by the priest consecrating. This ordinance, however, was not made without the implied sanction of Sacred Scripture, nor was it without a precedent in the usage of the ancient Church. For there are many Fathers who interpret, as referring to the Eucharist, the supper of Emmaus, in which “*the breaking of bread*”¹ alone is mentioned; and it was customary for Bishops who were in communion with each other, in testimony of fraternal charity, to send one another, even so far as from Rome to Asia, the Eucharistic food, as a pledge of unity of faith and communion; not to speak of the practice of giving the sacred element into the hands of the communicants, to carry with them on journeys, or into the deserts, or to preserve for some other use. And when a practice was introduced, I suppose with the view of preserving both kinds, of taking the species of bread dipped in the wine, Julius, Bishop of Rome about the middle of the fourth century,² censured this usage. That it was free, in the fifth century, for individuals to abstain from the chalice, and that many persons did abstain from it, appears from the fact that such was the uniform practice of the Manichees, who were mixed up and concealed among the rest of the faithful; and the Roman Pontiff Leo, with a view to their detection, commanded that both kinds should be received by communicants. In the same see, a short time afterwards, Gelasius re-

¹ Luke xxiv. 30. See SS. Jerome, Chrysostom, Augustine, Theophylact, and Bede, cited by Maldonatus in his commentary on the passage, p. 362 (Maintz, 1596).

² A.D. 337-352. The decretal is cited by Gratian, part iii. *Dist. de Consecratione*, canon *Cum omne*.—*Corpus Juris*, i. 454 (ed. Pithou).

pelled from his communion all those persons (a remnant, I suppose, of the Manichees) who received only the Sacred Body, and abstained, through some superstition, from the chalice of the hallowed Blood. In the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, the custom of dipping the bread began to come into use again, as Cassander¹ shews from the Institutes of the monks of Clugny, from the Council of Tours, and from Yvo; but this arose from reverence, for the Institutes of Clugny allege the awkwardness of the novices as the reason. In some places, in order to prevent the danger of effusion, a sucking instrument was used, as may be proved by authorities; and some of these tubes are preserved even to this day.² There were some places, however, in which the chalice was not given to the people; for St. Thomas testifies that such was the custom of some churches in his time. Cassander, to whom we have already referred, also cites³ Peter De la Palu and William of Mont le Dun, who testify that communion in both kinds was retained only in some churches, and that in these great caution was used; as also Richard Middleton,⁴ who attests that in his age the chalice was given only to the higher among the people, among whom the danger of spilling was less apprehended; as was also done in the time of Thomas Waldensis—a little before the Council of Constance—who tells us that this privilege was granted to kings, prelates,

¹ See the passages cited: "De Articulis Religionis inter Catholicos et Protestantos controversis, auctore Georgio Cassandro." Lugduni, 1612, pp. 215 et seq.

² "In process of time it was forbidden to consecrate in a wooden chalice; and when caution increased, it began to be feared lest any drops should be spilt by those who drank; whence the use of tubes was intro-

duced in churches where communion was given to the people."—*Opera*, t. vi. pars i. p. 322.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ An eminent English Franciscan, who lived in the end of the thirteenth century, surnamed *Doctor Solidus*. Like the other scholastics of the time, he wrote a commentary on the Master of the Sentences.

distinguished persons, and the elders among the people ; and it is probable that this is the origin of the custom of giving both species to the kings of France, at least at their coronation. At last communion in one kind came universally into use ; and in the acts of the Council of Constance,¹ the procurators of the Synod demand that salutary measures be taken for the welfare of the Church, inasmuch as certain priests continue to give both species to the laity.

Nor, indeed, can it be denied, that by virtue of concomitance, as divines say, Christ is received entire under either kind, since his Body is not separated from his Blood. The only question is, whether we may, without sin, depart from the form which appears to be prescribed in Sacred Scripture. And I confess, that if this had been done by private individuals, it would be impossible to acquit them of the charge of grievous temerity ; but the usage of the Church, continued for so many ages, proves that, even from the earliest times, it was believed to be allowable to dispense with the use of the chalice, for approved reasons. And there are some Protestants who admit that, if a person have a natural abhorrence of wine, he may be content with the communion of the bread alone. Now, I ask, what more pressing cause can there be than the desire of avoiding schism and of preserving the unity of the Church and public charity ? I hold it to be certain, therefore, that the withdrawal of the chalice cannot supply any one with a just cause of seceding from the Church.

And what the rulers of the Church have done, they have done with a good intention and for a grave reason ; for it is certain that, as a liquid is divisible into very minute parts, portions of it may more easily be destroyed, being exposed to the various dangers of being spilled, or of

¹ Session xiii. See Harduin's *Acta Conciliorum*, viii. col. 382.

adhering to other objects. And it is for this reason that the form of the bread also has been changed,¹ and, instead of crumbling bread, from which fragments might easily fall off, a different kind has been substituted. But you will ask, why should men fear now-a-days, what neither Christ, nor the Apostles, nor the holy Fathers apprehended during so long a course of centuries? We must hold, in reply, that, as I have repeatedly said, offence and scandal depend in part on the opinions of men. Now it is certain that, of old, men were less shocked by such accidents than they would be at the present day.² We are perfectly cer-

¹ "At last it appeared more reverent to restrict public communion to the dry part of the symbols, and to withdraw the chalice entirely from the people, when the doctrine of concomitance, as it is called in the schools, gained ground."—*Opera*, t. vi. pars i. p. 322.

² "At the present day it would almost be deemed sacrilegious to consecrate in a wooden chalice; for the wood, from its porous nature, would be supposed to absorb a portion of the most sacred Blood. But the primitive Christians entertained no such fear."—*Ibid.* This statement, however, as well as that in the text, not only is entirely without foundation, but is at variance with the evidence of several early Fathers. The fear of exposing the Sacred Elements to indignity appears to have been to the full as strong then as it is now. "We are filled with painful anxiety" (*anxie patimur*), says Tertullian, "if any portion of our Cup, or even of our Bread, fall upon the earth."—*De Cor. Militis*, c. iii. p. 341 (ed. Pamel). "Give heed," says St. Cyril of Jerusalem, "lest thou lose any of it; for

what thou lovest is as a loss to thee as it were from one of thy own members [*ὅπερ γὰρ ἔαν ἀπολέσης τούτῳ ὡς ἀπὸ οἰκείου δηλονότι ἐζημιώθης μέλους*]. For tell me, if any one gave thee gold-dust, wouldest thou not, with all precaution, keep it fast, being on thy guard against losing any of it and suffering loss? How much more cautiously, then, wilt thou observe that not a crumb fall from thee of what is more precious than gold and precious stones!"—*St. Cyrilli Hieros. Catech. Mystag.* p. 301 (Oxf. ed.). Origen is even stronger, and distinctly declares that any negligence in this respect is regarded, and justly regarded, as a sin: "Volo vos admonere religionis vestrae exemplo. Nōstis, qui divinis mysteriis interesse consuēstis, quomodo cum suscipitis Corpus Domini, cum omni cautela et veneratione servatis ne ex eo *parum quid decadat*, ne consecrati muneris aliquid dilabatur. *Reos enim vos esse creditis, et recte creditis, si quid inde per negligentiam decadat.*"—*Hom. in Exodum*, xii. 3, tom. ii. p. 176. I may add one other passage from St. Augustine, which is cited in the note on the extract from

tain, it is true, that no indignity can occur to Christ and his most sacred Body; and that whatever befalls, reaches only the visible symbols. But now-a-days a much higher degree of outward reverence is shewn even to these elements; especially since the piety of the people has sanctioned the usage of rendering public honours to Christ under the symbols of his Body,—an observance which formerly was less practised; for it is certain that, in sacred rites and in divine worship, some things, which are not essential, vary with time.

Whether it would be better, however, at the present day, to restore the chalice to the people; that is, whether the reasons alleged by so many princes and nations do not outweigh these alleged inconveniences;—to define this, pertains not to private persons, but to the rulers of the Church, and especially to the Sovereign Pontiff, to whom the Council of Trent has left the regulation of this entire matter. Some centuries ago, indeed, several entire nations demanded, and in part obtained, the restoration of the use of the chalice; as the Bohemians, and the Catholic Greeks in the territory of the Venetians, nay, in the city of Rome itself. And every one knows the solicitations which were addressed to the Sovereign Pontiff and the Council of Trent by the ambassadors of the Emperor, of the King of France, and the Duke of Bavaria, all strictly Catholic princes,¹ as also the concession which the Pope at last made to the prayers of the Emperor; on which Cassander may be consulted.² And I should think that if, at the present day, it would be possible, by a similar indulgence, to bring back some nation, or to obtain some great advantage for the Church, it would not be difficult to induce the Pontiff to accede. Meanwhile, though it should happen that the

Tertullian quoted above: “Quanta sollicitudine observamus, quando nobis Corpus Christi ministratur, ut nihil ex ipso de nostris manibus in

terram cadat!”

¹ See the Acts in Harduin, x. 135.

² De Articulis Religionis, p. 218.

rulers of the Church were perchance to fall into the error of excessive severity, this error would be at their own peril; nor would the crime be imputable to the subjects, whose duty it is to obey in all those things which fall within the legislative authority of their rulers, as it is the duty of the rulers to take care that they use their authority aright. Now, I have no doubt that those who are in authority have power to make laws in such matters as these; and that the faithful are bound rather to obey them, than to give rise to a schism, which St. Augustine shews to be almost the greatest of all evils. Indeed, the Church's power of defining is very extensive, even (though this is only in a certain way) in things which belong to positive Divine law; as appears from the transfer of the Sabbath to the Lord's day, the permission of "*blood and things strangled*," the canon of the sacred books, the abrogation of immersion in Baptism, and the impediments of matrimony; some of which Protestants themselves securely follow, solely on the authority of the Church, which they despise in other things.

The practice of adoring the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, though it was not equally in use in every age, has with laudable piety been established in the Church. In every thing appertaining to the external display of worship, the early Christians observed the utmost simplicity;¹ nor indeed is it possible to censure them in this, for they burned within with true piety of soul. But by degrees, as they began to grow cool, it became necessary to employ external signs, and to institute solemn rites which might serve to remind men of their duty, and to

¹ "But the earliest Christians affected nothing exquisite, whether in opinions and dogmas, or in worship or ceremonies, even with regard to

holy things themselves; and they entertained notions much more simple than ours, and of a very different kind."—*Opera*, t. vi. p. 322.

revive the ardour of devotion ; especially where there was any great reason or occasion. Now it is difficult to supply to a Christian a greater occasion than is presented in this Divine Sacrament, wherein God Himself renders present to us the Body which He has assumed. For although He is equally present at all times and in all places, as well by his substance as by his aid, yet, as it is impossible for us, at all times and in all places, to direct our mind expressly to Him, and to render to Him perpetual signs of honour, prudence will point out the propriety, in ordering the details of Divine worship, of marking off certain times, places, causes, and occasions. And God Himself, in assuming a human body into the unity of his Person, has given us a peculiar and most signal occasion of adoring Him ; for no one will doubt the justice and congruity of adoring God while He appears in the visible form of Christ ; and the same must be admitted wherever it is certain that Christ is corporally present (for the Divinity is present in all places and times), even though it be after an invisible manner ; now it is perfectly certain that this condition is fulfilled in the most holy Sacrament. Hence, if there be any case in which the practice of adoring may congruously be introduced, it is the case of this Sacrament.¹ And thus it has been justly ordained that the highest solemnity of external Christian worship should be devoted to the Sacrament of the Eucharist ; because the object proposed by our Saviour in its institution was to enkindle the love of God, which is the highest act of internal Christian worship, and to testify and nourish charity. For when our Lord, at the last supper, delivered the supreme commands of his last will, He wished that we should remember Him (like all who love and are beloved in turn), and that we should love

¹ See Letter to Arnauld, *Briefwechsel*, p. 146. Compare also the *Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 66.

one another as members of his one Body, whereof He has made us all partakers. And hence the Church has always employed the Eucharist as the test of unity; and has been careful not to admit to its mysteries, which may be regarded as the inmost recesses of Christianity, any except the proven and purified. To no others, indeed, was it permitted even to be present at the mysteries. It is certain, moreover, that the ancients also adored the Eucharist; and indeed Ambrose and Augustine expressly apply to the adoration of Christ's Body in the mysteries the words of the Psalm, "*Adore ye his footstool.*"¹

And in the end, since the necessity has ceased for deferring to Pagan prejudices, either by concealing the mysteries, or by abstaining from certain external signs, which might offend the weak, or wear the semblance of Paganism, it has gradually come to pass that the most exquisite rites of our external worship have been devoted to this venerable Sacrament;—especially in the West, where there has not been any necessity to consult for the prejudices of the Saracens. Hence it has been ordained, not only that the people prostrate themselves at the elevation of the Sacrament after

¹ Ps. xcviii. 5. See St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, iii. c. xii. p. 205 (Ben. ed.); and St. Augustine, *Hom. in Psalm.* xcviii. t. iv. col. 1521. I cannot refrain from adding a passage which I lately met in St. Cyril of Alexandria. It is probably new to most readers, but it conveys very distinctly his belief in the presence of Christ in the Blessed Eucharist when reserved after consecration. It is one of the many valuable passages of this great Father recovered by Cardinal Mai. Μαίνονται γε μήν οί λέγοντες άπρακτείν εις άγιασμον την μυστικην ευλογίαν, ει άπομείναι λείψανον εις

έτέραν ήμέραν· ού γάρ αλλοιούται ό Χριστός, ούδδ τδ άγιον αύτου σωμα μεταβληθήσεται· άλλ' ή τής ευλογίας δύναμις και ή ζωοποιδς χάρις διηνεκής έστιν εν αύτφ. [“They are mad who say that the mystic blessing availeth not to sanctification, if the remnant of it be reserved to a second day: for Christ is not changed, neither is his sacred Body transformed; but the power of the benediction and the life-giving grace remains enduringly in it.”]—*Classicorum Auctorum, e Vaticanis Codicibus editorum, a Card. Angelo Maio*, tom. x. p. 375.

consecration, but also that when borne to the sick, or otherwise carried in procession, it shall be attended with every demonstration of honour; that from time to time, whether on occasions of a public necessity, or for some other cause, it shall be exposed for adoration; and that, as the pledge of God's presence upon earth, it shall be celebrated yearly by a special festival, with the utmost joy, and, as it were, triumph, of the Church. And indeed the wisdom of these usages is so manifest, that even the Lutherans adore in the moment of receiving the Eucharist,¹ although they go no further, not believing the Body of Christ to be present sacramentally, except in the actual eating thereof: but this we have already shewn to be a novel and incongruous invention.

And when they condemn the institution of the Church, the things which they assail are, in reality, only abuses reprobated by the Church herself, or some unfounded imaginations of their own.² For they charge Catholics with adoring the earthly symbols; and although they admit that the substance of the bread, the absence of which the Church distinctly teaches, is expressly excluded from the object of adoration, they fear, nevertheless, that the species may be adored; and, in addition to this, they allege the uncertainty of the transubstantiation's taking place, either because they believe the doctrine itself to be ill-grounded, or because a bad or invalidly ordained minister may either withhold the intention of consecrating, or may omit the act of consecration altogether. Now, they should be aware that

¹ See the Letter to Arnauld so often cited, *Briefwechsel*, p. 146.

² "The greater part of the objections which may be made against Rome, are rather against the practice of the people than against the dogmas; and this practice being pub-

licly disavowed, these objections will be at an end."—*Letter to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels*, quoted in the preface of the *Esprit de Leibnitz*. Compare also t. v. p. 554; and also the *Briefwechsel*, p. 126.

it is not to the species that the adoration is directed; for the whiteness, the taste, the figure, and the other accidents of the bread, do not subsist in the Body of Christ as a subject, nor can they be predicated of it. And therefore, as it is to Christ the adoration is directed, it does not by any means regard this small, round, thin, white thing which has the qualities of bread, much less the whiteness or roundness themselves. Nor, even although it should happen that, in point of fact, the consecration did not take place, would it therefore follow that any idolatry was committed; because nothing else is adored; or, in other words, Christ God is adored, whether his Body be present or not;¹ and as no act of adoration rendered to Christ can be superfluous, it will not matter, even though it should occur that the occasion of adoring Him offered by the supposed presence of his Body should prove unfounded. Hence there is no need for the protest which some persons make, "If thou art Christ, I adore thee; if thou art not, I do not adore thee;" for, besides that some such qualification is understood of itself, and would be understood even though Christ appeared visibly, it should also be recollected that this white, small, and bread-like object, neither is Christ, nor is believed to be Christ, nor is made an object of adoration. And if it does occasionally occur that the people are not rightly instructed as to the true object of adoration in this Sacrament, there is no doubt that this is a subject of deep concern to the Church, and that she desires to use every means for its correction.²

¹ "In the Roman Church some teach that the adoration in the Eucharist is directed to Christ as present; others, to the host which is present. In the conference, therefore, the Catholics should be requested not to object to teach, in

unison with us, that the adoration should only be directed to Christ present."—*Cogitationes Privatae*, 66.

² The twenty-second leaf of the ms., which is written, for the most part, on single leaves terminating here. The leaf which stands twenty-fourth in

It remains for us to explain the Sacrifice of the Mass, which the Church has always taught to be contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. In every sacrifice there may be distinguished the person offering, the thing offered, and the cause of offering. In this Sacrament of the Altar, the person offering is the priest. The Chief Priest is Christ Himself, who not only offered Himself once on the cross, when He suffered thereon for us, but also perpetually exercises his priestly office, even to the consummation of time, and even now offers Himself for us to God the Father, through the ministry of the priest or presbyter. Hence it is that He is called in Scripture "*a Priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedec*;"¹ for nothing appears to be clearer than that in him, when, according to the prophetic allegory of the Scripture, he is said to "*have offered bread and wine*," the Eucharistic Sacrifice is prefigured. The thing offered, or the Victim or Host, is Christ Himself, whose Body and Blood undergo immolation and oblation under the appearance of the symbols. Nor do I see what there is wanting here to the true character of a sacrifice.² For what is there to

order, contains the sequel of the doctrine of the Blessed Eucharist; namely, the Sacrifice of the Mass. But, by a mistake of the binder of the ms., the leaf which contains the Sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction has been placed before it; so that, by a strange perversion of order, the Sacrifice of the Mass comes between the Sacraments of Extreme Unction and Holy Orders. The editions of Paris and Mentz both adhere to the order of the ms. But it is so evidently faulty, that I have thought it right to restore the natural arrangement, which has also been followed

by the Abbé Lacroix in his edition, p. 113.

¹ Ps. cix. 5.

² "When the Romanists term the Eucharist a Sacrifice, properly so called, they understand the phrase to mean . . . that, in the Eucharist, the very same Sacrifice which was delivered for us, the very same Blood which was poured out for us on the altar of the cross, is really, yea most really, presented, and is given and drunk by the receivers; not alone by faith, but also with the mouth of the body (not, it is true, in a carnal manner, and in the sense of the Ca-

prevent that which is present under the symbols from being offered to God, seeing that the species of bread and wine are fit matter for oblation; that the oblation of Melchisedec consisted therein; and that what is contained under them in the Eucharist is the most precious of all things, and the most worthy offering which can be presented to God? Coming to the aid of our poverty, therefore, by this admirable device of mercy, the Divine goodness has enabled us to present to God an offering which He cannot despise. And as He is infinite in Himself, and as nothing else can emanate from us which would bear any proportion to his infinite perfection, no offering could be found capable of appeasing God but one which should itself be of infinite perfection. And in this wondrous manner it comes to pass, that Christ, ever giving Himself back to us anew in this Sacrament as often as the consecration is repeated, can always be offered anew to God, and thus represent and confirm the perpetual efficacy of his first oblation on the cross. Not that by this propitiatory Sacrifice, repeated for the remission of sins, any new efficacy is superadded to the efficacy of the passion; its virtue consists in the representation and application of that first bloody Sacrifice, which "*perfected all things once;*" and its fruit is the Divine grace which accrues to those who assist at this tremendous Sacrifice, and who worthily celebrate the oblation in unison with the priest. And hence, as besides the remission of eternal punishment, and the gift of Christ's merit unto the hope of eternal life, there are many other saving gifts which we may ask of God, both for ourselves and for others, whether pharisees, but yet properly); and that thus, even under this title, it deserves to be styled a Sacrifice, properly so called. According to this definition of the Romanists,

therefore, Protestants would admit that the Eucharist is a Sacrifice, properly so called."—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 52.

they be living or dead—especially the mitigation of that paternal chastisement which remains due to every sin, even though the penitent has been received back into favour,—it evidently follows that, in the entire range of our worship, there is nothing more precious, or more efficacious in obtaining what we ask, than the Sacrifice of this divine Sacrament, in which the Body of the Lord itself is present.¹ For, provided we come with clean heart to this altar, there is nothing which we can immolate more grateful to God, or of sweeter odour in his sight. And St. Bernard well says: “All that I can give is this wretched body; and if that is too little, I add his own Body also.”

Now the Sacred Scripture itself, as we have already observed, clearly alludes to this sacrifice in the comparison of Christ with Melchisedec, in the hundred and tenth Psalm, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews; not to speak of the *perpetual Sacrifice* mentioned in Daniel² and other places. And indeed, it was meet that the Christian religion should not be without a sacrifice; and that as our oblation, which was only prefigured by the sacrifices of the Old Testament, is the most perfect and most worthy of all sacrifices, it should also be permanent and perpetual, as it is insinuated in the Psalm cited above that the priestly office of our High Priest is perpetual. Indeed, this is the common interpretation of the ancients; and even the early Fathers, Justin Martyr³ and Irenæus,⁴ to say nothing of Augustine and

¹ “Perhaps it might also be further granted, that the Eucharist is not only a Sacrifice commemorative of that bloody Sacrifice by which Christ once offered Himself for us to his Father, on the altar of the cross, . . . but also a certain incomprehensible oblation of the Body of Christ, which was once delivered to death for us; and, in this sense, a true

Sacrifice, or, if you prefer the phrase, a Sacrifice properly so called.”—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 53.

² Dan. viii. 11-13; also xi. 31, and xii. 11.

³ Justin Opera, Dial. cum Tryph. p. 209.

⁴ Irenæi Opera, Adv. Hær. lib. iv. c. xvii. p. 249.

the later ones, applied to the Eucharist the "clean oblation" of which Malachy¹ speaks. Lastly, there are numberless passages of the holy Fathers in which it is declared that Christ is daily immolated in the Sacrament for the people. Thus Augustine² calls it "an unbloody Sacrifice;" Cyril declares that we call "that which is consecrated the Body and Blood of Christ;"³ and Cyprian, that "in the supersubstantial bread there is both a holocaust and a medicine;"⁴ and other passages of similar import are every where to be met with.

When it is said that Masses are celebrated in honour of the Saints, this must not be understood in a cavilling spirit, but according to the mind of those who use the expression. For it is to God alone that the Sacrifice is offered, God's honour alone is principally sought; nor are the Saints honoured save as friends of God. It is true, at the same time, that, in honour of particular Saints, the Sacrifice is especially and peculiarly celebrated at the time and in the place where we commemorate the praises of the Saint, and implore his prayers and intercession, which derive all of dignity that they possess from Christ's merit and oblation. But it can no more be inferred from this, that the Divine

¹ Mal. i. 11.

² "Cujus rei Sacramentum quotidianum voluit Ecclesie esse sacrificium."—*De Civit. Dei*, x. 20, t. vii. p. 195. Compare t. x. 302 and 274.

³ "Sanctum ac vivificum incruentumque in ecclesiis celebramus sacrificium; non hominis alicujus nobis similis et communis corpus, consimiliter autem et pretiosum sanguinem esse quod proponitur, credentes, sed magis tanquam proprium vivificantis Verbi corpus et sanguinem accipimus."—*S. Cyrilli Alex.* t. iv. p. 140 (Basil. 1546). The quotation in the

text is obscure, and possibly imperfect. I have translated it according to the sense of this passage. I can hardly think it a reference to St. Cyril of Jerusalem (*Cat.* xxii. 8, p. 275), though this passage is equally clear in favour of the Sacrifice.

⁴ Opera, p. 418 (Antwerp, 1589), *De Cæna Domini*, a book now not reputed genuine. If any one, however, should desire abundant proofs from St. Cyprian's genuine writings of his doctrine on the sacrifice, I would refer him to Letters xv. xxxiv. lxiii. lxvi. and lxix.

Sacrifice is offered to the Saint on his festival, or at the altar, or in the basilica which bears his name, than it can be said that the divine office which is celebrated at an election or coronation is dedicated to the king, though it cannot be denied to form part of the honour which is paid him.

Moreover, as the dignity and utility of the perpetual Sacrifice are so great, the usage of offering it very frequently to God for the necessities of the faithful, even though it was not always accompanied by public communion, at last became universal. Of old, indeed, it was the usage that all who were present at the Sacrifice should also partake of the communion; but, by degrees, the number of communicants was reduced to a few, when the fervour of early piety declined, and well-grounded fears began to be entertained, that too frequent communion and a promiscuous admission of communicants, might lead to a diminution of reverence, and be an occasion of sin to many. For if the faithful, in our own days, were all to approach the table of the Lord after the celebration of the mysteries, who can doubt that numbers of them would eat unworthily? On the contrary, by allowing intervals between the occasions of communion, time is given to those who come to the feast, to prepare, so that they may not be found without the nuptial garment. It would have been wrong, nevertheless, that, because communicants were not always found, the Divine honour should therefore suffer any diminution. Hence, when the laudable and pious practice of daily celebrating the most holy Sacrifice in every church was established, it followed as a consequence, that the communion of the priest who offered was regarded as sufficient. This is the origin of what they call Private Masses; and it is not right that the Church should be deprived of their fruit, which undoubtedly is very great, and that the honour

of God should be curtailed by their suppression.¹ For it is not a sufficient reason for requiring the abolition (which would cause the greatest offence to the faithful) of institutions which in themselves are excellent, to allege that the Church existed for a long time without them; neither are we to return entirely to the ancient simplicity in externals; save, perhaps, those among us who may prudently trust that they are able to offer within their hearts the pious fervour which distinguished the first Christians. And would that there were many who could entertain this confidence!

I need not enter at much length into the subject of the admixture of water, of leavened or unleavened bread, of the language in which the Divine office is celebrated, or of the sacred ceremonies which have been piously introduced. For it is certain that the Church has power of legislating on these matters, provided only that due decorum is observed, and that the people are supplied with means of knowing and understanding all that is said in a low voice and in the sacred language; and in these days there certainly can be no want in this respect, considering the number of books in the vernacular languages, containing a full explanation of the canon of the Mass, and of all that appertains to Divine worship, which have been published.

Having now explained the principal controversies which

¹ “The *Judicium Hominis Romanæ Ecclesiæ addicti in Polonia*, in which he maintains the impossibility of reconciliation with Protestants, appears to me to be directed against the conference of Thorn [Toruniense]. He thinks there are three things which render this reconciliation impossible; the form of ecclesiastical government, the practice of *solitary Masses*, and the worship

of Saints and images. Now the monarchical form of government, moderated as is done by the Pontificians themselves, may be admitted; *solitary Masses may be tolerated*; it is the worship alone that needs reform most, and this the more prudent of the Pontificians themselves desire.” —*Opera*, t. v. p. 259. Compare also *Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 46.

have been raised regarding the most holy Eucharist, we shall be able to discuss the remaining Sacraments with much less prolixity. Indeed, as regards the Sacrament of Penance, we have already, while treating of the remission of sins and of man's justification, adverted to most of the principles connected with it. For in an adult, when he is reconciled to God, penance is always necessary, whether this reconciliation take place at his first admission into the Church by initiation in the sacred laver, or at his second cleansing from the stains which he afterwards contracted, through the Sacrament of Absolution, to which the name of Penance has been peculiarly attached. And, assuredly, it is a great mercy on the part of God, that He has given to his Church that power of remitting and retaining sins, which she exercises through her priests, whose ministry cannot be despised without grievous sin. In this manner God at once confirms and strengthens the jurisdiction of the Church, and arms it against the refractory, by promising to give effect to her judgments;¹ and hence, unhappily for schismatics, while they despise the authority of the Church, they are compelled also to forfeit her advantages.

Both kinds of remission, that which takes place in Baptism, and that which is received in Confession, are equally gratuitous, equally rest on faith in Christ, equally require penance in adults; but there is this difference between them;—that in the former nothing is specially prescribed by God beyond the rite of ablution, but in the latter it is commanded, that he who would be cleansed, shall shew himself to the priest, confess his sins, and afterwards, at the judgment of the priest, undergo a certain chastisement, which may serve as an admonition for the future. And as God has appointed priests to be the

¹ “And it is God who charges [the Church's] sentences.”—*Letters* Himself with the execution of her *to Pelisson*, p. 293.

physicians of souls, He has ordained that the ills of the patient shall be exposed, and his conscience laid bare before them;—whence the wise declaration which the penitent Theodosius is recorded to have made to Ambrose: “ ’Tis thine to prescribe and compound the medicines, mine to receive them.” Now the “ medicines” are the laws which the priest imposes on the penitent, as well to render him sensible of past sin, as to make him avoid it for the future; and they are called by the name of satisfaction, because, on the part of the penitent, this obedience and self-chastisement are grateful to God, and mitigate or remove the temporal punishment which should otherwise be expected at his hands. Nor can it be denied that this is an ordinance in every respect worthy of the divine wisdom; and if there be, in the Christian religion, anything admirable and deserving of praise, assuredly it is this institution, which won the admiration even of the people of China and Japan; for, by the necessity of confessing, many, especially those who are not yet hardened, are deterred from sin, and, to those who have actually fallen, it affords great consolation; insomuch that I regard a pious, grave, and prudent confessor as a great instrument of God for the salvation of souls; for his counsel assists us in governing our passions, in discovering our vices, in avoiding occasions of sin, in making restitution, in repairing injuries, in dissipating doubts, in overcoming despondency, and, in fine, in removing or mitigating all the ills of the soul. And if, in the ordinary concerns of life, there is scarce anything more precious than a faithful friend, what must it be to have a friend who is bound, even by the inviolable obligation of a Divine Sacrament, to hold faith with us and assist us in our need?

And although of old, while the fervour of piety was greater than it is now, public confession and penance were

in use among Christians, nevertheless, in consideration of our weakness, it has pleased God to make known to the faithful, through the Church, the sufficiency of a private confession made to a priest; and on this communication the seal of silence is imposed, in order that the confession thus made to God may be placed more completely beyond the reach of human respect. And yet, although it is certain that changes have taken place as to the mode of confession at different times, it does not follow that confession, such as the Church has ordered and prescribed it, is on this account less to be regarded as an ordinance of divine law. For there are many things regarding the dispensation of his Sacraments which God has left to be defined and ordained by his Church;—not that the Church can directly cause a thing to be of Divine law, but that God Himself leaves dependent on the disposition of the Church some of the conditions and circumstances of those things which are of Divine law; as we have already explained by the example of the impediments of Matrimony. The same principles, therefore, may properly be applied to the form of that judiciary process which Christ, in granting the keys, has empowered the Church to exercise. For this, at least, is expressly of Divine law, that no one can obtain absolution who contemns the judgment of the Church, and dares to neglect the conditions which she either exacts in confessing, or imposes after confession.

Hence also the Sovereign Pontiff and the Bishops have a power of instituting “reserved cases,” which cannot be remitted by an ordinary priest except in danger of death; and of prescribing penitential canons; and of defining how far the enumeration of the particular circumstances of sins is necessary for the sufficiency of confession; and the culpable neglect of these laws on the part of the penitent would certainly invalidate the absolution, if it were only on ac-

count of the new mortal sin, and therefore impenitence, which is induced thereby.

There still remains this important question, whether, for the Sacrament of Penance, perfect contrition, or the love of God above all things, is necessary, or whether attrition is sufficient. It is admitted, indeed, by all, as we have already observed, that a person who elicits an act of this supreme love, or, at least, an act of contrition founded on a motive of divine love, in which act the desire of the Sacrament is contained either expressly or virtually, is absolved even before confession. Now it must also be admitted that the actual reception of the Sacrament should supply some greater facility to the faithful; and it is in this increased facility that the virtue of this Sacrament principally consists. Hence, all things considered, it appears that, even according to the view of the Council of Trent,¹ it may be said most correctly, that although attrition—or that imperfect penitence which springs not from the pure love of God, but from the fear of punishment or the hope of eternal life, and such other motives—cannot, of itself, lead to justification; yet, that when the Sacrament supervenes, this very grace, that is, an infused ray of the grace of Divine charity, which is equivalent to contrition, and which by virtue of Christ's merit effaces sin, follows in its train; so that the principle remains certain, that Divine love is essential for the justification of the penitent, whether it be obtained by the fervour of the penitent himself, excited and assisted by God, or by the peculiar virtue of the Sacrament.

The works of satisfaction for sin undertaken by individuals, whether by order of a priest or through voluntary piety, have a two-fold virtue;—one of healing the soul and protecting it against relapse; the other, of mitigating the

¹ Sess. xiv. cap. 4, de Contritione.

Divine chastisement which, from reasons of justice, is inflicted, either in this life or in the next. Of the latter we shall speak more fully under the head of Purgatory. And of these satisfactory works St. Gregory the Great wisely says, "Let him who is conscious of having done things unlawful, study to abstain from some lawful things, that he may thereby satisfy his Creator."¹ To this head also, from affinity of subject, may be referred those chastisements, mortifications of the flesh, and other useful exercises, or works attended with a degree of pain, which are undertaken, not for the expiation of past, but simply for the prevention of future sin, and for the amendment of the soul. Such works are not to be censured, but, on the contrary, are praiseworthy and commendable; for they produce great fruit, and it is clear from the testimony of Scripture that they are pleasing to God. Nor, indeed, was it without reason that the wise men of the ancient Hebrews said, that "we should draw a hedge or mound, as it were, around the law;" that is to say, that it is useful to abstain from lawful things, in order to remove ourselves the farther from the confines of things unlawful: and that every man will act wisely in becoming his own lawgiver, and prescribing for himself, as it were, certain forms and observances, or cautions, as ramparts for the defence of his innocence. However, we must avoid all pharisaical notions of sanctity, and place all our trust, not in our own works, but in the grace and mercy of the Lord. For whatever of good we have done was all the gift of the Lord, and a duty which we were bound to render; and however great our payment may be, it will always be imperfect; for whatever remains to us still belongs to God. These observations may suffice upon the Sacrament of Penance.

¹ S. Gregorii Opera, t. ii. p. 997.

It is not necessary, for the present, to dwell at much length upon the Unction of the Sick. It is established by the testimony of sacred Scripture,¹ and by the interpretation of the Church, on which pious and Catholic minds will rely with security; nor do I see what there is in the usage, as it is received by the Church, which any one can censure. Though we grant that, of old, it was often accompanied by the gift of cure, and that the recurrence of this, as of other extraordinary favours, has become less frequent, now that the Church is established; yet we are not to believe that, even of old, the Unction was always attended by a cure. Even still, therefore, there remains at least that perpetual and unfailing efficacy of cure—the cure of the soul itself when duly disposed—to which the Apostle James further alludes in describing the use of this Sacrament, and which consists in the remission of sins and the confirmation of faith and virtue;—graces which are never needed more than amid the peril of life and the terrors of death, in order to repel the fiery darts of Satan which then assail us with their greatest violence.

The Sacrament of Orders, or of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, is that by which the ecclesiastical or spiritual office or power, distinguished into its several grades, is conferred on certain individuals, whose ministry God uses for the purpose of dispensing the grace of his Sacraments, and of instructing, ruling, and retaining others in the unity of faith and the obedience of charity, superadding thereto a certain power of jurisdiction, which is comprehended chiefly in the use of the keys. To the hierarchy of pastors of the Church belong, not only Priesthood and its preparatory grades, but also Episcopacy, and even the Pri-

¹ St. James, v. 14, 15.

macy of the Sovereign Pontiff;¹ all of which we must believe to be of Divine right. As priests are ordained by a Bishop, the Bishop, and especially that Bishop to whom the care of the entire Church is committed, has power to moderate and limit the office of the priest, so that in certain cases he is restrained from exercising the power of the keys, not alone lawfully, but even validly. Moreover, the Bishop, and especially the Bishop who is called Œcumenical, and who represents the entire Church, has the power of excommunicating and depriving of the grace of the Sacraments, of binding and retaining sins, and of loosing and restoring again. For it is not merely that voluntary jurisdiction which belongs to a priest in the confessional that is contained under the power of the keys; but the Church, moreover, has power to proceed even against the unwilling; and he “*who does not hear the Church,*” and does not, as far as is consistent with the salvation of his soul, keep her commandments, “*should be held as the heathen and the publican;*” and as the sentence on earth is regularly

¹ “Abbot Molanus (as far as I understood from our conferences) agrees with me; I also acknowledge that the prerogatives of the Roman See are of human right; although *the directive power in the Church*, which, on account of human relations, was attached to it, *is of Divine right.*”—*Opera*, t. v. p. 352. He expresses himself still more clearly in a letter to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels (Jan. 1, 1684): “But in order that your Highness may see more clearly that I am not far removed from your views, *quemadmodum non privatio, sed contentus sacramenti damnat*, I hold that any one who wishes to be a member of the Church through this interior communion must make every

possible exertion to be also in the external communion of the visible Catholic Church, which is discoverable by the continual succession of her hierarchy; and this Church, which is called the Roman Church, appears to me to be such. I say furthermore, that the hierarchy which is seen in that Church, *i. e.* the distinction of the Sovereign Pontiff appertains to the general divine law, inasmuch as there must necessarily be a director of the bishops and the priests. I will further add, that the visible Catholic Church, through the special and promised assistance of the Holy Ghost, is infallible in all articles of faith which are necessary to salvation.”—*Guhrauer's Leibnitz, eine Biographie*, i. 344-5.

confirmed by that of heaven, such a man draws on himself, at the peril of his own soul, the weight of ecclesiastical authority, to which God Himself lends that which is last and highest in all jurisdiction, execution.¹

In order, however, that the power of the hierarchy may be better understood, we must recollect that every state and commonwealth, and therefore the commonwealth of the Church, should be considered as a civil body, or one moral person. For there is this difference between an assembly of many and one body,—that an assembly, of itself, does not form a single person out of many individuals; whereas a body constitutes a person, to which person may belong various properties and rights, distinct from the rights of the individuals: whence it is that the right of a body or college is vested in one individual, while that of an assembly is necessarily in the hands of many. Now it is of the nature of a person, whether natural or moral, to have a will, in order that its wishes may be known. Hence, if the form of government is a monarchy, the will of the monarch is the will of the state; but if it be a poly-cracy, we regard as the will of the state the will of some college or council,—whether this consist of a certain number of the citizens, or of them all,—ascertained either by the number of votes, or by certain other conditions.²

¹ “I acknowledge, then, that the Church, which is a kind of republic, possesses the advantages of other republics, and even in an eminent degree: she must therefore possess not only power, but also executive authority, which is the last step in jurisdiction.”—*Letters to Pelisson*, p. 293.

² “For his most serene Highness [Antony Ulric of Brunswick] especially insisted that mention should be made of the supreme spiritual

magistrate; and indeed with justice. For in every republic, and *therefore in the Church, it is provided by the law itself, that there should be a supreme magistracy*, whether it be in the hands of one, or of more persons. And nevertheless, if the college consist of more than one, it is necessary that the right of director, or supreme magistrate (restrained, however, by its own limits,) *should be in the hands of one individual.*”—*Opera*, t. v. pp. 229-30.

Since, therefore, our merciful and sovereign God has established his Church on earth, as a sacred "*city placed upon a mountain*,"¹—his immaculate spouse and the interpreter of his will—and has so earnestly commended the universal maintenance of her unity in the bond of love, and has commanded that she should be heard by all who would not be esteemed "*as the heathens and the publicans*;" it follows that He must have appointed some mode by which the will of the Church, the interpreter of the Divine will, could be known. What this mode is, was pointed out by the Apostles, who in the beginning represented the body of the Church. For at the Council which was held in Jerusalem, in explaining their opinion, they use the words, "*It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us.*"² Nor did this privilege of the assistance of the Holy Ghost cease in the Church with the death of the Apostles; it is to endure "*to the consummation of the world*," and has been propagated throughout the whole body of the Church by the Bishops, as successors of the Apostles.

Now, as, from the impossibility of the Bishops frequently leaving the people over whom they are placed, it is not possible to hold a council continually or even frequently, while at the same time the person of the Church must always live and subsist, in order that its will may be ascertained, it was a necessary consequence, by the Divine law itself, insinuated in Christ's most memorable words to Peter,³ (when He committed to him specially the keys of the kingdom of heaven, as well as when He thrice emphatically commanded him to "*feed his sheep*,") and uniformly believed in the Church, that one among the Apostles, and the successor of this one among the Bishops, was

¹ Matt. v. 14.

² Acts xv. 28.

³ Matt. xvi. 19, and John xxi. 15, 16, 17.

invested with pre-eminent power;¹ in order that by him, as the visible centre of unity, the body of the Church might be bound together; the common necessities be provided for; a council, if necessary, be convoked, and when convoked, directed; and that, in the interval between councils, provision might be made lest the commonwealth of the faithful sustain any injury. And as the ancients unanimously attest that the Apostle Peter governed the Church, suffered martyrdom, and appointed his successor, in the city of Rome, the capital of the world; and as no other Bishop has ever been recognised under this relation, we justly acknowledge the Bishop of Rome to be chief of all the rest.² This at least, therefore, must be held as certain; that in all things which do not admit the delay necessary for the convocation of a general council, or which are not important enough to deserve a general council, the power of the chief of the Bishops, or Sovereign Pontiff,³ is,

¹ "As God is a God of order, and as it is of divine right that the body of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church should be bound together by one government and one universal hierarchy, it follows that, *by the same right*, there should be within it a *supreme spiritual office*, confined within due limits (these words I now add), *armed with a directorial authority, and provided with power of doing all that is necessary for the fulfilment of this office for the safety of the Church*; though it may have been through human motives that Rome, the metropolis of the Christian world, has been chosen as the place and seat of this power."—*Opera*, t. v. p. 228-9. The divine right of the Primacy is still more satisfactorily recognised in the following: "I signified to M. Schmid, that

Abbot Molanus had written to apprise me that he strongly approved of that distinction of divine right which is now under discussion; and probably M. Schmid has already communicated this to you."—*Letter to Fabricius*, 19th April, 1698, tom. iv. part iii. p. 301.

² "In the letter which I wrote to M. Alberti, professor of theology at Leipsic, I have given it, in express terms, as my opinion, that if we could remedy the ills which afflict the Church, by recognising the primacy of the Pope, we should be wrong not to do so."—*Letter to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, Esprit de Leibnitz*, preface. Compare also *Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 49.

³ Having written the sentence as it stands, the author threw it into another form, in which (without,

during the interval, the same as that of the whole Church ; that he can excommunicate any individual, or restore him to communion; and that all the faithful owe him true obedience ; and this obedience extends so far that, in the same way as an oath is to be kept in all things in which it can be done consistently with the salvation of the soul, so also we are to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, as the only visible Vicar of God upon earth, in all things which, after due self-examination, we think can be done without sin and with a safe conscience ; insomuch that, in doubt, when all the other circumstances are the same, we must regard obedience as the more safe course ; and this we are bound to do for the love of the unity of the Church, and with the intention of obeying God in the person of those whom He has sent. For we should submit to suffer any thing whatsoever, even with grievous personal sacrifice, rather than be separated from the communion of the Church, and give occasion to schism. However, we shall have to speak more fully hereafter upon the primacy and authority of the Roman Pontiff.¹

All this, however, is to be understood with reservation of the right of earthly powers, which Christ did not abolish ; for though Christian princes owe obedience to the Church, no less than the very humblest of the faithful, yet, unless where the law of the realm appears to have provided and ordained otherwise,² the ecclesiastical power should not be

however, erasing the original one) he has placed it above the line. It stands thus in the ms. :

succedere

“ Interim [eamdem esse] episcoporum Principis sive Pontificis Maximi, potestati totius Ecclesiæ. [potestatem, quæ totius Ecclesiæ.]”

¹ Unhappily this promise is not fulfilled: though he incidentally

touches on the powers of the Pontiff with regard to marriage, he does not return to treat professedly the subject of the primacy in any subsequent part of the ms.

² “ It appears that at last, in consequence of the intimate connexion between sacred and profane things, *even over kings themselves a certain authority was granted to the*

stretched so far as to arm subjects against their true lords; for the arms of the Church are tears and prayers. And the best and safest line of demarcation between the secular and ecclesiastical power is that drawn by the example of the primitive Church;—viz. that we are bound to obey God and his ministers in preference to the secular power; nevertheless, that we must not resist earthly powers, but that, should

Roman Pontiffs; and the extent of this authority, even in early times, may be estimated from the fact, that when Pope Zacharias, on being consulted by the estates of the kingdom of the Franks, pronounced King Childeric unworthy of the sceptre, and ordered Pepin to succeed him, the decision was received with the most unanimous applause." He proceeds to refer to the cases of Clothaire's excommunication by Pope Agapetus; of the deposition of King John by Innocent III.; of Peter III. of Aragon by Martin IV.; and after enumerating various other instances of papal interference in the kingdoms of Hungary, Naples, and Sicily, he continues: "It has often been discussed whether the Pope has a right to depose kings, and to absolve subjects from their allegiance; and Bellarmine's arguments, founded on the hypothesis that the spiritual jurisdiction involves, at least indirectly, a temporal jurisdiction also, are not considered even by Hobbes himself as deserving of contempt; for it is certain that one who has full power from God to provide for the salvation of souls, should also be able to repress the tyranny and ambition of princes, by which so many souls are destroyed. It may be doubted, I admit, whether this power has been granted by God to the Roman Pon-

tiffs; but it cannot be denied, at least by those of the Roman communion, that this power is vested in the universal Church to which the consciences of all are subject."—*De Jure Suprematus*, cap. xxi. *Opera*, tom. iv. par. iii. pp. 402-4. In the preceding chapter he says: "The Roman Pontiff, not long ago, enjoyed the same power (a recognised supremacy) among the Christians of Europe; and a right of appeal to him was acknowledged: nor did this trench upon the supremacy of the sovereigns."—P. 401. M. Gosselin regards it as not improbable, that these principles of Leibnitz may have suggested to Fencelon his theory regarding the origin of the power exercised by the Popes of the middle age—namely, that it was founded upon the maxims of mediæval jurisprudence which were generally recognised by the nations of Europe during these ages, and which were formally embodied in several of the national codes of law. (*Pouvoir du Pape au Moyen Age*, p. 334.) It is true that the book *De Jure Suprematus*, in which these principles are most explicitly put forward, was published by Leibnitz, not in his own person, but under the assumed name of *Cesarinus Furstenerius*. But the following extracts from his letters, and from the introduction to his *Codex Diplomaticus*, embody very nearly

they command what is unlawful, we must submit to any amount of suffering rather than obey the command, provided this can be done without certain injury of the faith. At the same time I do not deny that Christian princes and nations are bound to bestow some, and indeed very great, care upon sacred things; but it must be in such a way as not to put their hand to the ark, or, like Osias, to take the censer, but to content themselves with assisting the Church in more effectually preserving her purity and unity, and in using the right which she herself possesses. If these principles be observed, empire will subsist and flourish within empire—the sacred empire within the earthly—without mixture or confusion. Nor can it be denied that this is a consideration intimately connected

the same principles. Thus, in one of his letters to M. Grimarest, he writes: “I do not know whether the Abbé St. Pierre has a work, published about thirty years since, entitled *Nouveau Cyneas*; the anonymous author of which offers to the princes of our days the same counsel which Cyneas gave to Pyrrhus, namely, to prefer their repose and convenience to their ambition; proposing at the same time a common tribunal, such as that alluded to. I recollect a learned prince of my acquaintance, who formerly proposed a similar project, and suggested Lucerne as the seat of this tribunal. For my own part, I would advise that it should be established at Rome itself, and that the Pope should be made the President of it; as, in former times, he actually was the arbiter between Christian princes. For this, however, it would be necessary that ecclesiastics should regain their ancient authority; and that an interdict and

an excommunication should make kings and kingdoms tremble, as they did in the times of Nicholas I. and Gregory VII.”—*Second Letter to M. Grimarest*, t. v. p. 66. And in the Introduction: “Hence we have regarded as belonging to our code some things which owe their origin to the Pope and the Councils. Their jurisdiction appeared to extend to all, in such a way that those who refused the Pope’s judgment, yet appealed to a Council. And it must be confessed that the Roman Pontiffs’ care for the canons and for Christian discipline was sometimes serviceable; inasmuch as they, by urging it upon kings, in season and out of season, prevented many evils, both by the authority of their office, and by the force of ecclesiastical censure. And there was nothing more usual than for kings to submit themselves in their treaties to the censure and correction ‘of the Pope.’”—iv. par. iii. p. 299.

with the security of the prince and the loyalty of the subjects, which the discipline of the Christian religion has but served to confirm.

With regard to the distinction between the bishop and the priest, whether, and how far it arises from Divine law, there is but little uncertainty or obscurity in the Church; but Protestants are at variance not only with the Church, but with one another. The Episcopalians in England and Scotland, as we know, defend the prerogative of Divine privilege against the Presbyterians, by the authority of Scripture as well as that of the ancient Church. Indeed, Christ Himself instituted a distinction between the Apostles and the rest of the disciples; after his ascension into heaven, the common consent of Christians retained it, in conformity with the discipline of the Master, and the Church has always held that the Apostles constituted the bishops their successors. Hence Aerius was regarded as a heretic, because he confounded the office of bishop and priest. Jerome, however, appears somewhere¹ to say, that the difference between bishop and priest is of ecclesiastical institution,—“more from custom, than from the truth of the Lord’s disposition;” and in another place he writes, that “what the priest does, the bishop also does.” In another passage, however, he subjoins a limitation: “What is there,” says he, “that the bishop does, with the exception of ordination, which the priest also does not do?”² Perhaps, therefore, Jerome may be explained to mean, that the authority or government of bishops, in the form in which it existed in his time, and in which it exists even at this day, has been received from the Church; but that the ordinary spiritual power, which consists chiefly in the right of ordaining, has, by the institution of Christ, been

¹ Comm. in cap. i. ad Tit. t. iii. p.

² T. i. p. 932.

reserved to the bishops, as it was also reserved to the Apostles. For it is certain that, at a later period, the faculty of administering Confirmation was more easily granted to priests. Because, though we were to suppose that there is nothing expressly contained in Apostolic tradition regarding any power on the part of bishops to excommunicate priests, and to bind, even independently of the concurrence of other priests, those whom priests had loosed; yet, since at least the power of the Church over priests must be admitted to be of Divine right, it would be competent to her to exercise this power through the hands of the bishops; and perhaps it would be her duty to do so, for there does not appear any other fitting medium for its exercise. However, if we suppose that Jerome admitted certain degrees in Divine institution, and that, whenever he regarded the authority of the Church as necessary in order to complete the Divine tradition, he called this by the name of human institution, it would be a liberty which might be pardoned in so great a man, but which is not lightly to be imitated;¹ and it is more simple to say that the bishop and the priest are really distinguished in their functions by the ordinary Divine law. Some things which appertain to election and nomination, however, may be regulated by human authority, provided it be done in accordance with reason and the usage of the Church.

But though the Divine right, in ordinary cases, be held as certain, yet there are many who dispute as to what might be done in circumstances of extreme necessity. They suppose the case of a Christian, whether he be a simple priest or even a mere layman, being cast by tempest on the shore of a remote island, and converting numbers to

¹ For a very full discussion of this difficulty from St. Jerome, see Petau, *De Eccles. Hierar.* l. ii. 5, pp. 51 et seq.

Christ, but destitute of all means of communicating with the rest of the Christian world. A question arises, whether this priest can ordain other priests, in order that, upon his death, the new Christians may not be deprived of the benefit of the Sacraments, which are very necessary for salvation. And indeed it is related of Frumentius, that during his mission among the Ethiopians, while he was still a layman, and before he received episcopal ordination, he did some things which were only excused by the necessity. Let it be supposed, then, that the apostle of this nation has not even been ordained a priest, the question is, whether, through the prayers of the new Church to God, he may promise, from on high, for himself and others, the grace of priesthood, and of the Sacraments connected therewith. For it is probable that some of the ancients were of opinion that, in a case of necessity, any Christian whatever had power not only to baptise, but even to sacrifice, as a passage of Tertullian seems to imply.¹ For my part, however, I do not think it either necessary or safe to define these questions by private authority. It is better to leave the supreme care of the Church, and of the souls of the people, to God, whose mercy, confined by no limits, will always do what, under all the circumstances, is best to be done. The safest course, however, is not to depart from the line of ordination, which, through the successors of the Apostles, has

¹ The ordinary reading of this passage (*De Exhortatione Castitatis*, cap. vii.) is, "Ubi ecclesiastici ordinis non est consessus, et offers et tinguis, et sacerdos es tibi solus" (Ed. Rigault, p. 522). Pamelius suggests an ingenious and simple emendation of the passage, which removes all the difficulty: "Ubi

ecclesiastici ordinis non est consessus, et tinguit et offert sacerdos qui est ibi solus" (p. 1126). The passage, no matter which of the readings is adopted, must be admitted to be obscure; and, at all events, the work from which it is taken is one of those in which Tertullian directly advocates the Montanist doctrines.

carried down the grace of the ministry to us, by uninterrupted propagation.¹

Last of all, remains the Sacrament of Matrimony, which Christ, the best interpreter of the Divine law, has explained to be, as well by its primitive institution as by the destination both of God and of the contracting parties, the inseparable union of one man and one woman. It is true, nevertheless, that in the Old Testament, polygamy, or the privilege of one man's having more than one wife at the same time, was permitted by Divine dispensation ; as was also the power of divorce, entitling married persons to separate and contract a new marriage : but Christ admonished us that this indulgence was granted only because of "*the hardness of men's hearts,*"² and therefore that its abolition is more in accordance with the Divine law. With justice, therefore, has polygamy, which it is no longer possible to excuse on the plea of necessity, been abolished in the Church. But what are we to say of the case of infidel nations, which it might be possible to convert to Christ by the toleration of a long-established usage of polygamy, and among whom it appeared that the refusal of this indulgence was the only impediment in the way of so great a good? For myself, the safer course appears to be to leave this matter to the decision of the Sovereign Pontiff. This, however, I may venture to pronounce, that should the Pontiff deem it expedient to permit the practice of polygamy to the Chinese nation, if it were true that they could be brought to the faith by this means (and it is certain that the Christian law of marriage, which is at variance with the oldest institutions of this people, is regarded by them as one of the chief impediments to Christianity), he

¹ See Guhrauer's *Leibnitz*, i. p. 345.

² Matt. xix. 8.

would not, in so doing, contravene in any respect the doctrine of Christ. For, as it would be vain to look now for a new revelation, it is fit that he should consult, in the name of God, for the salvation of nations. Hence, considering the precedent of the Divine example, and taking into account the nature of the human heart, I do not think that he would err in tolerating, for the sake of so great a good, an imperfection which God did not regard as intolerable in the Saints themselves; since it is certain that, in this matter, Christ did not so much enact a new law, as propose the true interpretation of the old one.

Difficulties more frequently arise among Christians on the subject of divorce. For oftentimes the parties are necessitated to separate from each other on account of adultery, or other serious causes; and as it is difficult to make them remain continent, it may be asked whether, in order to avoid a greater evil, the Church can permit a new marriage. Some, considering human weakness, and that "*it is better to marry than to be burnt*,"¹ are more disposed to be indulgent, fearing lest men, if too strictly prohibited the use of marriage, should perhaps peril their eternal salvation. Others admit at least two causes of divorce, properly so called, viz. adultery and desertion; especially as the words of Christ appear to favour it in the case of adultery. But the majority hold that it is not possible to recognise, as sufficiently approved by the Divine law, any ground for dissolving the tie of a marriage which has been ratified and consummated by cohabitation, in such a way that the parties may have full liberty, without any fear of censure, to enter into a new marriage. And the weight of authority at the present day is in favour of this opinion. The opinions of pious antiquity, however, are not uniform as to the amount of indulgence in the observance of his

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 9.

precepts, which God has reserved to Himself and to his Church. For we know that divorce was permitted by the laws of Christian emperors, even by the excellent emperor Theodosius the Great, and others. And yet it is clear from the Council of Milevis,¹ that the Bishops sometimes desired that it should be prohibited by an imperial law. Nevertheless, the Church herself, through fear of incontinence, oftentimes relaxed to some extent in this matter. To pass over the Councils of Elvira,² Tribur,³ and others, which are cited by Gratian, even the great Saint Ambrose says, "It is lawful for a man, if he have divorced a guilty wife, to marry another;"⁴ and the decisions of the Roman Pontiffs, Zachary⁵ and Gregory,⁶ are well known.

The rigid opinion of Augustine,⁷ however, which leaned to the more correct and better view, at last prevailed; and the doctrine which had been already expressed in the Council of Milevis, and enforced by the practice of the Church, was confirmed by the Council of Trent, which even retained some of the words. Its canon runs thus:⁸ "If any one shall say that the Church errs, when she taught and teaches (according to the evangelical and apostolic doctrine) that the bond of marriage cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of either of the parties; let him be anathema." In this decree, however,

¹ Cap. xvii. Harduin, i. col. 1220.

² Can. ix. *Ibid.* col. 251.

³ Can. xlvi. *Ibid.* vi. 454.

⁴ Comment. i. Cor. append. p. 133.

This work, however, is universally regarded as spurious, and is commonly ascribed to a deacon named Hilary. See Dissertation of the Benedictine Editors, pp. 21 et seq.

⁵ *Decretum Gratiani*, part ii. 32, quaest. 7. *Concubuiti. Corpus Juris*, i. p. 391.

⁶ *Ibid.* *Quod proposuisti.* This rescript, however, regards a peculiar case, and does not affect the general question of divorce.

⁷ "Hoc enim custoditur in Christo et ecclesia, ut vivens cum vivente nullo in æternum divortio separatur."—S. Aug. *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, lib. i. c. 10, tom. x. col. 191.

⁸ Sess. xxiv. can. vii. p. 190

the Council used a modification, in order not to condemn those who held the opposite opinion, which is held by several great men, but those only who said that the Church erred therein, and whose pertinacity is deservedly visited with anathema. I do not think, however, that this is to be understood to mean that the Church, which, if very great reasons arose, might tolerate even polygamy, cannot tolerate divorce: but the meaning of the decree is, that, according to the express doctrine of Christ, divorce, no less than polygamy, is contrary to the end of the primitive Divine law, which unites but two into one flesh, and forbids that "*what God hath joined, man should put asunder;*"¹ in such a way, however, that, as Christ Himself testifies, on account of man's hardness of heart or infirmity, a dispensation, in imitation of the Divine example, may be granted for a grave reason, or in a case of necessity;—in the same way as a dispensation may be given in a vow. For, seeing that God has granted much greater things to the Church of Christ, it is not to be supposed that, in this matter, He has denied her any power which is useful or necessary for the salvation of souls, or that He has left her less authority than He granted to the ancients before the coming of Christ;—though He wished that the Church of the New Testament should use this authority of hers with greater caution, and that she should employ all her efforts to recall the faithful from pharisaical observances of the letter and from external justice, to greater purity both of the interior and exterior man, and to the true sense of the Divine law as it has been explained by Himself, not alone on the nature of marriage, but also

¹ "Nevertheless, there are certain things in the Council of Trent, which are not, however, of great importance, to the truth of which I should not wish to swear; for example, the

indissolubility of marriage under all possible circumstances."—See his letter, cited by Guhrauer, *Leibnitz, eine Biographie*, i. p. 355.

upon other points. For the faithful should bear in mind that, if they wish to lead a life worthy of Christian holiness, they must, as far as possible, abstain even from certain things which are tolerable in themselves.

In all these things, therefore, it is better to follow the judgment of the Church, and to recognise her power,—a power which is also clear as regards the impediments of matrimony. Hence if the Sovereign Pontiff had granted liberty of divorce to Henry VIII. king of England, and had sanctioned his contracting a new marriage with Anne, even though it were certain that the first marriage with Catherine had been valid by his predecessor's dispensation; and if, by this compliance, he had preserved Henry's kingdom to the Church; or if the Pope were now to receive the Chinese empire into the faith, by permitting them to retain the usage of polygamy,¹ which, in so vast a nation, it would be impossible to abolish suddenly without the greatest revolutions; or even if the Pope, for a great cause, grants a dispensation in the degrees which, regularly speaking, are prohibited by the law of God and of the Church;—in none of these cases do I think his power of dispensing can be denied, or his prudence censured, without rashness. For although Protestants question the power of the Church in the interpretation of the Divine law, and the dispensation of the Sacraments; and though they especially contend, that marriages in all those degrees which are forbidden in the eighteenth and twentieth chapters of Leviticus, and the twenty-seventh of Deuteronomy, are contrary to a Divine law which does not admit of dispensation, because God pronounces that He punishes the Gentiles for these incestuous connex-

¹ See his Letter to Bianchini, in *Leibnitianum*, p. 342. Feder's *Commercium Epistolicum*

ions;¹ nevertheless, as God has Himself shewn that some of these degrees, or equivalent ones, admit a dispensation (as when He even commands the same woman to be married to two brothers successively,² not to speak of his permitting Jacob to marry two sisters at the same time), the Church has, with reason, decided that, at the present day, all the degrees except the first may admit a dispensation where there is a sufficient cause; and the greatness of this cause it is left to the conscience of the rulers of the Church, and of those who seek the dispensation, to determine. The Church can also institute new impediments which invalidate the marriage-contract—a power which the secular authority also claims in some countries; whence, by a law enacted in France, the marriages of children, if contracted against their parents' will, are regarded as null by the law itself; because the legitimate consent of the contracting parties is the “as-if-matter” of the Sacrament; and it seems to rest with the civil law to determine what shall be a legitimate consent. However, there is no evidence that the consent of parents is required by Divine law for the validity of marriage, though it cannot be disregarded without a grievous sin.

But although marriage is a Sacrament, and although we are bound to consider it as irreprehensible, yet the manifest reasons alleged in favour of celibacy, the consent of nations, and the express words of sacred Scripture,³ compel us to admit that celibacy, when chastely observed, is more meritorious. For by the observance of celibacy,⁴ the mind is at once more free for the contemplation of the things of heaven, and, from the chastity both of soul and

¹ Lev. xviii. 24.

² Deut. xxv. 5.

³ 1 Cor. vii. 1, 7, 38.

⁴ “A saying has been attributed

to Leibnitz,” says Guhrauer: “Marriage is good, but a wise man should think about it his whole life long.” —*Leibnitz, eine Biographie*, ii. 363.

body, and their exemption from lust and carnal affection, the offices of religion are performed with greater purity and worthiness. The Church therefore, especially in the West, gradually tended towards, and eventually attained, the establishment of priestly celibacy. The Eastern Church has been more indulgent in this particular. Even in the West, indeed, the matter has involved great difficulty, especially as there are many who shew by their conduct that they really possess not the gift of continence; and hence arose innumerable complaints, partly from the clergy themselves, and partly from the people. And several pious Catholic princes earnestly pressed upon the Sovereign Pontiff and the Council of Trent the expediency of permitting the marriage of priests. Hitherto, however, there have been reasons of great moment which have prevented the desire of indulging from taking effect: and these reasons must be left to Divine Providence, who, sooner than we suppose, can point out more efficacious ways and means for restoring the peace of the Church, and removing the cause of complaint. Meanwhile it is fair that Protestants should consider how many things there are, even in human affairs, which we are compelled to endure, and to which no immediate remedy can be applied; nor are the rulers of the Church to be accused, because of the wickedness of men or the difficulty of the times. And for the clergy and religious themselves, they should be assured that, in order to the preservation of chastity, scarce any thing else, ordinarily speaking, is necessary but to avoid idleness and evil occasions, and to desire it seriously themselves—a grace which God refuses to no one who asks it devoutly.

Regarding vows of continence, poverty, or obedience, the same is to be said, viz.—that, for the observance of the promise made to God, a good intention alone is re-

quired; and therefore the vow of religion cannot be violated without a most grievous sin.¹ The Church, nevertheless, where important reasons intervene, has full power to dispense, or remit, or commute the obligation, in the name of God Himself. However, as the human mind is liable to many infirmities, there is need of the utmost prudence in governing on the part of superiors in religious communities, and of great charity on that of the brethren, in order that discontents may be checked by grateful remedies, and temptations dispelled by pious and agreeable occupations. And as it frequently happens that abuses creep in through the negligence of those to whom this duty belongs; that simple, immature, inexperienced persons are entrapped, through error and fraud, without a Divine vocation; that the superiors are wayward, negligent, proud; the brethren unyielding, harsh, morose, envious, ambitious; and both, sometimes, dissolute, corrupt, and disedifying; it is not strange that, even in religious communities, where they had reason to hope for peace of spirit, so many souls should be involved in the greatest anxieties and miseries, often deprived of consolation, and the very instruments of salvation turned to their perdition—the most miserable fate which it is possible to conceive. It is our duty, therefore, to pray that God may grant good and prudent rulers to his Church, and may preserve long, and strengthen with virtue from on high, those whom He has granted to her, worthy of their office and trust; as well, that they may know the evils under

¹ “Neither can the vow of obedience be justly censured by any of our party.”—*Cogitationes Privatae*, p. 73.

He admits the same for that of poverty; and though he objects to *perpetual* promises of chastity, proposes that “any one who wishes to

be a monk or a member of a convent, should be bound to live in celibacy; but if he be unable or unwilling to observe it longer, should be permitted to depart as he pleases, and return to the world at his own peril.”—*Ibid.*

which the Church most labours, and the remedies which are most required, as that they may have strength and firmness to overcome the obstacles which are thrown in the way of reform by the licentiousness and corruption of the carnal, or the imprudence of the indiscreetly zealous. At the same time, the position which we have already laid down on a former occasion¹ remains undeniable, that if the forces of what may be called the army of the Church be duly marshalled—if the duties, cares, and occupations of clerics and religious be defined, and the laws of their institutes be observed, it is not easy to imagine any thing more beautiful, any thing more excellent, any thing, in fine, more conducive to the Divine glory, the profit of souls, and the exercise of charity.

Having now completed the explanation of the duties of Christians, of the Divine worship, and of the Sacraments, it remains for us briefly to advert to the Last Things, or the future life. Some persons (especially among Antitrinitarians) entertain this most objectionable opinion, that the human soul, of its own nature, is mortal, that it subsists only through grace,² and that, after man's death, it sleeps, devoid of all perception and thought, to be resuscitated only on the day of judgment. But true philosophy, as well as revelation, demonstrates the contrary. For our soul is a substance: now no substance can entirely perish, except by a miracle of annihilation;³ and as the soul has

¹ *Supra*, page 39.

² “And as to the soul, they (the Socinians) believe that it should naturally perish with the body, but is preserved by grace.”—*Letter to the Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels, Esprit de Leibnitz*, p. 427.

³ “It is as impossible that it (the

soul) should perish without its being annihilated, as it is impossible that the world (of which it is a living and perpetual expression) should destroy itself; in like manner it is impossible that the changes of this extended mass which is called our body, should affect the soul, or that the

no parts, it is not possible that it should be dissolved into several separate substances; therefore the soul is naturally immortal.¹ Besides, the soul always actually thinks; for it must be held as certain that there is no substance in nature which, even for one moment, is entirely inactive, and devoid either of action or of passion. Now every action and passion of the soul involves thought.² The only property which comes from the peculiar ordination of God, and belongs to the economy of his supreme Providence, is, that the soul, in its separated state, retains a memory and consciousness of the events of the past life, so as to be capable of reward and punishment.³ But very little, however, can be positively asserted regarding the place, the nature, and the functions, of souls when separate from the body, beyond what God has revealed to us through the sacred Scripture or his Church.

dissipation of this body should destroy a thing which is indivisible."—*Discours de Métaphysique, Briefwechsel*, p. 138.

¹ "The 'I,' or the principle of unity, is a thing which cannot perish, either in us or in brutes. For to perish always implies dissolution; now the principle of unity, being without composition, is incapable of dissolution."—*Letter to M. de Boineburg, Feder's Commercii Epistolici Leibnitiani Specimina*, p. 399.

² "A substance cannot exist without action; which again destroys the inaction attributed by the Socinians to souls separated from the body."—*Miscell. Leibnit.* p. 353. See this argument several times repeated in extracts collected by Feuerbach, *Darstellung*, p. 281. There is an allusion to it in the letter to the Duke of Hanover. — *Leibnitz's Deutsche*

Schriften, i, p. 282; and more at length in a letter of 1671, *ibid.* p. 270. See also the *Briefwechsel*, p. 142.

³ "Hence, as, in order that the city of God should not lose any of its members, it is necessary that souls shall retain their personality and their moral qualities, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that they must especially preserve a species of recollection or conscience, or a power of self-recognition, on which their entire moral relations, their sufferings and their chastisements, depend; and consequently that they must be exempt from those revolutions of the universe which would prevent the possibility of their recognising themselves, and would destroy their moral identity."—*Letter to Arnauld, Briefwechsel*, pp. 122-3. See also another letter to Arnauld, July 14, 1686, *ibid.* p. 49.

The soul, when, at its parting from the body, it is in a state of mortal sin, and thus ill affected towards God, falls headlong into the gulf of perdition, as if of its own accord, like a weight which has once been detached, and is not afterwards arrested or stayed by an external cause; and being thus alienated from God, it becomes, as we have already observed, the instrument of its own damnation. Insomuch that there are some pious men who believe the hatred of the damned for God to be so intense, that they voluntarily decline to throw themselves upon his mercy, and thus, by their own acts, induce, or prolong, their own eternal misery.¹ And hence we should the less wonder at the severity of the just Judge; nor is there any necessity to recur to the merciful theory devised by Origen, who, affixing his own capricious interpretation to that mysterious passage of Paul, in which it is said that “*all Israel should be saved*,”² extends the Divine mercy eventually to every creature. Nor can it be denied that there were other holy men not entirely averse to this opinion, especially Gregory of Nyssa.³ Jerome himself, even when he is, as it were, forced to contradict it, speaks very moderately, and inclines to it at least so far as to say that “the works of the wicked (he is speaking only of Christians, however,) will be proven and purged by fire, the judge’s sentence being tempered with clemency;”⁴ as if he

¹ “It must therefore be held as certain, that as one is damned but by himself, so no one perseveres in the state of misery except by his own will.”—*Opera*, t. iv. p. 84. This singular opinion, which attributes a certain liberty to the damned after death, is put forward (both for the just and the reprobate) in other works of the author. Compare t. vi. p. 184; also the same volume, p. 84.

² Rom. xi. 26.

³ Greg. Nyss. *Oper.* t. ii. p. 517, (Paris, 1615,) where his words appear to include in the redemption even the author of evil himself. τὸν τε ἄνθρωπον τῆς κακίας ἐλευθερῶν, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς κακίας ὑπηρέτην ἰωμένον. However, for an examination of his opinion, see Petau, t. iii. p. 113 et seq.

⁴ “Peccatorum atque impiorum, ut

thought that at least no Christian could perish eternally. But, in men so eminent as these, we must either pardon such opinions, or put a favourable interpretation on them.

But, on the other hand, it is manifest from sacred Scripture, that eternal happiness, which consists chiefly in the enjoyment of the Divine beauty, awaits all who die in the friendship of God. I know that there are some heterodox writers who call in question the beatific vision of God; but their doubts have no foundation; for even in the present state, God is the light of our soul, and the only immediate external object of our intellect; in the present state, however, we see all things as "*in a glass,*" the ray of thought being, as it were, reflected or refracted by corporeal qualities; whence our thoughts are confused. But in heaven, where our knowledge will be distinct, we shall drink of the fountain of light, and shall see God "*face to face.*" For, as God is the ultimate reason of all things, it follows, as a consequence, that when our knowledge will be *à priori*, through the cause of causes, we shall certainly see God; inasmuch as our demonstrations will then require neither hypotheses nor experiments, and we shall be able to give reasons, even to the primitive truths themselves.¹

Many have found a difficulty in the question whether souls arrive at eternal happiness, or even eternal misery, before the day of judgment. Not to speak of more ancient writers, it is known that Pope John XXII. inclined to the negative. And indeed, were it admitted that they do, it

tamen Christianorum, quorum opera igne probanda sunt et purganda, moderatam arbitramur et mistam elementie sententiam judicis."—*Comment. in Isaiam, Op. v. 116.* Nothing, however, can be clearer on the other side, than the language of St. Jerome, in Epist. lxxv. and Com. in Matt. xxv.

46, t. iii. p. 712; compare also Petau, as cited above.

¹ The same idea will be found, almost in these very words, in the *Discours de Métaphysique, Briefwechsel*, p. 182. See also p. 4 of the same volume.

might seem that the judgment, the form of which is described by Christ,¹ would be superfluous; nor would it be possible for those who are to be damned to allege any thing in self-justification, if the whole matter were already concluded beyond hope of reversal. However, it is plain, from the very nature of the parable, that Christ there expressed his meaning according to human ideas [*ἀνθρωπολογικῶς*], and that on that last day, when the bodies shall be reunited to the souls, each one's conscience will speak, as well for the accuser and Judge as for the culprit. I confess, however, that in order definitively to determine this and many other similar questions, it is necessary to assume, in addition to the passages of Scripture, that interpretation which is more in accordance with the tradition of the Church.

I cannot venture to impugn the doctrine of a Limbo of Infants, or a place where souls suffer a pain of loss alone, but not a pain of sense; for it is maintained commonly in the Church, by men of the highest piety and learning, and appears to be sufficiently consonant with the divine justice.² Nor can I commend those who, because they themselves know nothing but extremes, imagine that it is so also with God.

There are some who regard the Resurrection of the Body as among the most difficult articles of the Christian faith; and certain cases have been imagined which it is thought impossible to explain upon this supposition. Suppose the case of a cannibal who has lived on human flesh all

¹ Matt. xxv. 34, et seq.

² "The cardinal's [Sfondrati] opinion, however, regarding infants who die without Baptism and without actual sin, may, I think, more easily

be defended or excused; for many celebrated doctors, before him, have attributed a certain natural happiness to them."—*Opera*, tom. i. pp. 33-4.

his life; what, it is asked, will remain to him, when, like the flock of birds to the jackdaw in the fable, the victims shall come to him to claim their feathers; that is, when each one's flesh will return to its first owner? In order to understand this, however, we must be aware that it is false to say that every thing which was ever united to a man's body belongs to its essence; for it is certain that our body is constantly in a state of change, constantly receiving and losing particles, and that, were all the particles that ever belonged to us to be restored, we should be swelled to a thousandfold our actual bulk, and far more. It might be said, therefore, that, in every man there is, so to speak, a certain "flower of substance," the nature of which may be illustrated from the principles of chemists;¹ that this is preserved throughout these numerous changes; and that, although it is contracted in infants, and in adults is expanded by the greater mass of assumed and variable matter

¹ "We shall put off the body, it is true, but not entirely; and we shall retain the most subtle part of its substance (quintessence), in the same way as chemists are able to sublimate a body or mass, the defecated part alone remaining."—*Miscell. Leibnit.* p. 411.

"At the suggestion of the Baron von Boineburg, who gave me to understand that your serene highness might perhaps graciously deign to be pleased with it, I have appended to the aforesaid discourse an 'Appendix on the Resurrection of Bodies.' For I am almost of the opinion that all bodies, as well those of men as those of beasts, vegetables, and minerals, have a seminal principle (*Kern*) of substance, distinct from the *caput mortuum*, which, in the language of chemists, consists 'ex terra damnata et

phlegmate.' This seminal principle is so subtle, that it remains even in the ashes of the substance when consumed by fire, and has the power, as it were, of collecting itself in an invisible centre: as the ashes of vegetables may, in a certain way, be used as seed; and, in the fœtus or fruit of animals, the *punctum saliens* comprises in itself the seminal principle of the whole body. I believe, further, that this seminal principle of the whole body neither increases nor diminishes, though its clothing or covering is in constant fluctuation, and at one time is evaporated, at another is again enlarged by the air or by food."—*Guhrauer's Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, b. i. 271.

This *Appendix de Resurrectione Corporum* is preserved in ms. in the Royal Library of Hanover. *Guh-*

which is put on, yet it always subsists, such as it was assigned to each at his birth, neither increased by aliments nor decreased by transpiration; and even though it be granted that this too is dissipated, yet as its value consists in its efficacy, and, as it were, its seminal virtue, and not in its bulk, it may be restored to each individual without loss to the rest. The cannibal, in the case supposed, therefore, will retain his own only, as will those also whom he devoured, without any confusion of the things which God assigned peculiar to each, which are diffused through the entire mass of the body, and remain distinct from what is superadded and held in constant fluctuation.¹ The case might be solved, too, even without any such hypothesis, if we understand the cannibal who lived on human flesh alone to retain as his own some portion of each of his victims, without any detriment to them; for we have sufficiently refuted the supposition that every thing which at any time belonged to a man's body is restored to him in the resurrection.

Let us dismiss these inquiries, however, and come to the much-agitated question of Purgatory, or temporal punishment after this life. Protestants hold that the souls² of

rauer, *Kritisch-historische Einleitung*, s. 30.

¹ "Hence, if one man be eaten by another, the seminal principle of each remains the same, and in the same condition; and thus the substance of one is never nourished by the substance of the other. * * * If, then, this seminal principle of substance remains at all times, it is of little importance whether all the gross matter which pertains to us (but which, nevertheless, is constantly changing, and is either daily evaporated, or, if it adheres, is coagulated in filth,

which we must purge away) shall remain; since it is clear that these *exuvia* are renewed almost every year, especially if we carefully examine the experiment of Sanctorius, described in the *Medicina Statica*. If, therefore, we can change it even in this life, without affecting the identity of the body, much less will the glorified bodies be bound to retain it."—*Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, *ibid.* 271-2.

² On this point the first declaration of the Hanoverian Divines (*Regulæ circa Christianorum omnium*

the departed are consigned at once either to eternal happiness, or eternal misery. Hence they reject prayers for the dead as superfluous, or reduce them to the condition of idle wishes, such as, rather through human custom than any idea of their utility, we conceive regarding things already past and decided. On the contrary, it is a most ancient belief of the Church, that prayers are to be offered for the dead; that the dead are assisted thereby;¹ and that, although those who have departed from this life may, through the merits of Christ, have been received into favour by God, and, by the remission of the eternal punishment, have been made heirs of eternal life, they continue, notwithstanding, to suffer a certain paternal chastisement or purgation, especially if they have not sufficiently washed out the stain during life. And to this purgatorial punishment some have applied Christ's words about "*paying the last farthing*,"² and that "*all flesh shall be salted with fire*;"³ others the passage of Paul,⁴ regarding those "*who have built upon the foundation, wood, hay, stubble*," and "*shall be saved, yet so as by fire*;" others, the passage on "*baptism for the dead*."⁵ It is true that

Ecclesiasticam Communionem) admits, "We tolerate the ancient Fathers, the modern Greeks, and other orthodox persons, who, as is elsewhere shewn, prayed for the dead, and even worshipped departed Saints. Wherefore? Because, in the doctrine of purgatory, they removed this poisonous principle, that the sacrifice of the cross had not fully satisfied for sin; and, with regard to the Saints, they protested against all supreme worship and confidence in them. Do thou the same, and thou shalt be excused."—*Œuvres de Bossuet*, t. xiv. p. 8; see also *Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 72.

¹ "The entire Roman Church approves prayers for the dead: part of the Protestant Church, following the Confession of Augsburg, holds that these prayers are lawful; some of them actually do pray for the dead; and there are some of them by whom this intercession for the dead is not yet approved. For the restoration of peace, therefore, the Protestants are to be requested in the aforesaid conference, that their entire Church shall agree to approve prayer for the dead."—*Cogitationes Privatæ*, p. 63.

² Matt. v. 26.

³ Mark ix. 48.

⁴ 1 Cor. iii. 12, 15.

⁵ 1 Cor. xv. 29.

the holy Fathers differ as to the mode of purgation.¹ For some were of opinion that the souls are detained for a determinate time (which some extended to the day of judgment, and some even further,) in a certain place, where they undergo a temporary purification. Some held that the mode of chastisement consisted in corporeal fire; some, in the fire of tribulation—an opinion to which Saint Augustine at one time leaned, and which some Greeks hold even at this day. Some thought the purifying fire was the same, others that it was distinct from the fire of hell. And there were even some who restricted purgatory peculiarly to the time of the resurrection, wherein all, even the Saints, shall have to pass through fire; but those only shall be burnt, or shall suffer loss, whose work is so ill executed as to be liable to injury by fire. However this may be, almost all agreed as to the existence—whatever might be its nature—of a paternal chastisement or purga-

“A large number [of the ancients] hold, that, except in the case of martyrs and other privileged persons, neither eternal happiness nor eternal damnation takes place before the day of judgment. The Origenists regarded hell itself as a purgatory; and some approved authors appear to have held this, at least as regards Christians. Some of the ancient Greeks taught a singular species of purgatory, which I have been in the habit of calling the ‘Purgatory of the Resurrection,’ namely, that men, when ‘taken up to meet Christ,’ shall pass through fire, and shall lay aside the dross therein. But a purgatory similar to that of this day seems to have prevailed chiefly among the Latins.”—*Letter to Fabricius*. [*Opera*, t. v. p. 251.] He goes on to argue from this

diversity of opinion among the Fathers with reference to purgatory, that there was not sufficient consent among them to constitute it a dogma of faith. In a subsequent letter, however, [t. v. p. 252,] he “will not venture to swear that there is not something analogous to purgatory.” The passage above, it will be seen, draws the true distinction between the *existence* and the *mode* of purgation, and while it limits the want of consent upon the latter, holds the unanimity of “*plerique omnes*” with regard to the former. I have already cited (p. 107) a passage, in which Leibnitz expresses his belief, that “the time of purgation is extended to as long a period as may be necessary, in order that the soul may dwell sufficiently on the malice of its sin.”—*Opera*, t. vi. p. i. p. 310.

tion after this life, to which the soul, enlightened at its parting from the body, and touched with extreme sorrow for the imperfection of its past life, and for the hideousness of sin, of which it then for the first time becomes fully sensible, voluntarily subjects itself, insomuch that it would not desire to attain to supreme happiness on any other condition. For many writers have well observed, that this affliction of the soul when it reviews its actions is a voluntary purgatory; and, among others, there is a remarkable passage of Lewis of Granada,¹ which afforded great consolation to Philip II. in his last sickness.²

¹ I have no doubt that he alludes to a work *De felici Excessu Philippii II. Hispaniarum Regis, Libri Tres.* [4to, Friburg, 1609.] I have not been able to find a copy of this book, nor of an English memoir on the same subject (possibly a translation of the above), "*A Brief Declaration of the Sickness, Last Words, and Death of Philip II. King of Spain,*" by Bollifant. However, there can be little question that the passage in Lewis of Granada, to which he refers as having consoled the dying king, is the following:

"Pues de esta tan grande y tan temerosa pena nos redimen los ayunos y temerezas corporales, aunque sean sin comparacion menores; porque como Dios, en estas cosas, no mira tanto a la grandeza del trabajo quanto a la voluntad del sacrificio;

porque lo que en este mundo se padece es voluntario, y lo otro necesario; de aqui es que una pena voluntaria de esta vida sin comparacion vale mas, y satisface mas, que muchas necessarias de la otra."—*Tratado de la Virtud del Ayuno y Asperezas Corporales: Obras de Luis de Granada*, ii. p. 404.

The same sentiment is more concisely stated in another of his works: "Mejor es ahora purgar los pecados y vicias, que dixerlos para el purgatorio."—*Obras*, vol. xviii. p. 41.

² It is hardly necessary to direct attention to the abruptness with which this part of the subject is broken off. The closing sentence, as I have already observed, terminates in the ms. with a comma, and is in other respects evidently unfinished.

A P P E N D I X .

APPENDIX.

I.

PRIVATE THOUGHTS

UPON THE METHOD OF RE-UNITING THE PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCHES; COMMITTED TO PAPER, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO INDIVIDUAL OPINION, BY A THEOLOGIAN SINCERELY ATTACHED TO THE CONFESSION OF AUGSBURG, AND, BY CONSENT OF HIS SUPERIORS, PRIVATELY COMMUNICATED TO THE ILLUSTRICUS AND REVEREND LORD JAMES BENIGNE, BISHOP OF MEAUX, A PRELATE OF DISTINGUISHED WORTH, NOT LESS EMINENT FOR LEARNING THAN MODERATION, TO THE END THAT THEY BE EXAMINED IN THE FEAR OF THE LORD, BUT WITHOUT BEING FOR THE PRESENT MADE PUBLIC.

PROPOSITION.

The re-union of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches is not only possible, but further, is so recommended to each and every Christian by its advantages, both temporal and spiritual, that they are bound upon every fitting occasion, and in every suitable place and time, to contribute, each according to his ability, his own portion to the same, prescribed as it is by divine, natural law, and by express decree in the councils of the empire.

EXPLANATION.

I speak of such a re-union as may take place without violence to the conscience, or prejudice to the reputation, of either party, and so as to leave untouched the principles and hypotheses of both Churches. For since we are commanded in the Scriptures to love and cultivate peace and truth, that is to say, such peace as may not be repugnant to the truth, far be it from us that, for the sake of obtaining peace and concord in the Church, either party should determine or admit any thing in opposition to

conscience, and thus call "light darkness, or darkness light;" but rather let each contend for truth in all things, and in every way reject whatever may be judged to border upon error. But this profession of truth or acknowledgment of error, as the case may be, must so be regulated that no scandal, much less contempt of religion, ensue for the infirm, and that the authority, reputation, and honour of the bishops and doctors of either Church shall suffer no prejudice therefrom; which would be the case if either party were obliged to recant its alleged errors, or, in the method of reconciliation, to admit any thing contrary to the received hypotheses of its Church. Indeed it is plain from the very nature of the case that nothing should be assumed as granted upon both sides which is denied by either, and that the domineering claim for retraction of errors is not even entitled to a thought; but that, on the contrary, the attention of the parties should be exclusively devoted to a lucid exposition, a suitable declaration, or a temperate softening down of the controverted dogmas; and that, should all these fail, or should they be out of place in any particular controversy, they should abstain from recrimination and invective, and reserve the controverted matters for the judgment of a legitimate council. We may hence infer it to be not only expedient, but in its own way lawful, that such errors as do not directly go to subvert the foundations of faith, if they cannot be conveniently and quietly removed, should in the beginning be connived at, and mutually tolerated in weak brethren, according to the laws of Christian charity. In this we are fortified by the example of the Apostles, who, notwithstanding that they knew it to be erroneous in the newly-converted Jews to insist, even under the New Law, upon abstinence from blood and things strangled, nevertheless, because they felt that there was nothing the Jewish neophytes would not do rather than abandon the practice, not only wisely abstained from denouncing the error, but, for the sake of introducing uniformity as far as possible, by a law passed in the Council of Jerusalem, ordained that the Gentiles should observe the same rule as the Jews. Neither is it to be required from the parties, that, even although a preliminary re-union in the substantial articles should have taken place, either of them should at once subscribe to the opinions of the other in every particular. For perhaps it is not possible, nor is it even strictly necessary,

that the general body, whether of our own brethren or of the Catholics, should be hurried from one extreme to the other suddenly and, as it were, in a moment, since Christ and the Apostles, as is manifest from the Gospel history and the Acts of the Apostles, delivered their doctrines not altogether and at once, but by successive degrees.

POSTULATES.

To the attaining the end, therefore, which we have in view, we need only premise six conditions, no one of which is of such a nature that the Roman Church may not, as a tender mother, graciously allow it to her ancient children.

FIRST POSTULATE.

The first is, "That the Supreme Pontiff should consent to hold as true members of the Christian Church, such Protestants as, under fair conditions, to be explained more at large below, are prepared to submit to the ecclesiastical hierarchy and to a legitimate Council, notwithstanding their persuasion that, henceforth and for ever, Communion must be celebrated under both species by their adherents."

In order that the extreme and indispensable necessity of this condition may be presented more clearly, and that Roman Catholics may see that the demand of Communion under both kinds is not groundlessly put forward by Protestants, as well as that this demand is reconcilable with the possibility of union, we have to prove—

First. By what an insuperable argument we are convinced that we cannot, with safe conscience, communicate under one kind.

Secondly. How, notwithstanding this opinion of Protestants, it is competent for the Supreme Pontiff, without disturbing any of the hypotheses of his own Church, to receive them into the bosom of the Roman Church, and allow them to retain their custom of communicating under both kinds.

The first is thus proved. Whoever are convinced that the use of the cup as well as of the bread is enjoined by Christ, such persons, if they do not wish to communicate against their conscience, are unquestionably bound to communicate under both

kinds. But Protestants are convinced that the use of the cup as well as of the bread was enjoined by Christ. Therefore Protestants, if they do not wish to communicate against their consciences, are bound to communicate under both kinds.

Before we approach the proof of the minor, in order to put the question on a proper footing, we must premise that the word *precept* is understood in a twofold sense :

First, in so far as it commands a thing “*in itself and in its own substance,*” by prescribing how the thing commanded, that is to say, the act which is the object of the law or precept, is to be done when it is reduced to action. The schoolmen say that such precepts regard *the specification of the act*. Under these may be classed, for instance, the law of marriage-contracts, by virtue of which two persons are indissolubly united into one flesh. This law does not simply command matrimony, otherwise no one could live in celibacy without sin ; but it commands matrimony “*in itself and in its own substance,*” by prescribing how the man and woman are to be joined when they wish to enter into matrimony. To take a woman to wife, therefore, is matter of free will ; nor does the law of matrimony oblige every man ; but if a man wish to marry, it prescribes that he proceed in this way and in no other, namely, that he take one wife and no more, or, in the words of the Scripture, that “*they be two in one flesh ;*” that, once married, he shall continue bound to his wife by an indissoluble tie, and shall remain “*one flesh*” with her ; and therefore shall not be at liberty to repudiate her and to marry another, except in the case of adultery, &c. Such also is the provision of the civil law about the seven witnesses and the other solemnities required for the validity of a will—whereby no one is commanded to make a will, but the form is prescribed according to which a will must be framed in order to its being considered valid and lawful.

Secondly, in so far as it commands that a certain act be done, or prohibits that it be done, and in this way has for its object, not the act itself, but the exercise of the act, in which sense the schoolmen say that precepts regard not the *specification* of the act, but its *exercise*.

Suarez insists upon this distinction of precepts in the following words : “*It must be borne in mind that in some cases laws*

regard the performance of an action, and that such laws oblige to the particular act which they prescribe; such, for example, is the law of almsgiving: and that in other cases the law has reference only to the 'specification of the act,' or the manner thereof, in which case, although the law does not oblige to the performance of the act, nevertheless it obliges that, if the act take place, such or such a method be observed; of this character, for instance, is the law of prayer, which, although it does not oblige us to pray at every time, obliges, nevertheless, that if we pray, the act of prayer shall be performed with attention." (De Legibus, b. i. c. 1.)

From which principles it is manifest, that when it is disputed between ourselves and the Romanists, whether communion under both kinds was commanded by Christ, the question is to be understood of the precept, not as it regards *the exercise*, but as it regards *the specification* of the act.

It is to be remarked, moreover, that as regards the specification of the act, two things are requisite for the precept: first, the determination or sanction of the thing itself considered in itself and in its substance. Thus, in the civil code, for the law which regards the framing of a valid and lawful will, it is requisite to determine the number of witnesses and the other solemnities which belong to the substance of a valid will.

Secondly. It is required that this determination emanate from the will of the superior, which obliges the agent, if he wish to reduce to action the thing regulated by law, and if he mean it to be valid, to do it in conformity with the law made by his superior. Thus, when any one has a mind to make a will, he is obliged to observe the determinate number of witnesses and the other prescribed solemnities, and if these be not observed, or be overlooked or neglected, the will is invalid. Another reason inducing this obligation is the will of the superior by whom the observance of these solemnities has been prescribed.

Beyond these two things, none of the schoolmen have ever noticed any thing as requisite to the precept which regards "the specification of an act."

So much being premised, Protestants, in proof of the minor proposition above mentioned, urge the imperative words of Christ: "*Take ye and eat, this is my Body which is given for you; take ye and drink, this is my Blood which is shed for you.*"

Roman Catholics maintain the negative, and, against our proof of the minor proposition, allege that Communion under both kinds was *instituted*, but was not *commanded* by Christ. And here we cannot deny that there is some difference between a precept regarding *the exercise of an act*, and institution. But the case is different with the precept regarding *the specification of an act*. It is for us, therefore, to prove that between the *precept regarding the specification of an act*—that, namely, which prescribes merely in what way the thing is to be done—and *institution*, there is no difference. Which is thus proved :

Whatsoever has all the requisites of a precept considered in relation to the specification of an act, either is such a precept or is equivalent to such a precept. But institution has all the essential requisites of a precept considered in relation to the specification of an act. Therefore institution is either such a precept or equivalent to it.

The major proposition is evident from the terms.

The minor is proved from the definition, and the requisites of the precept considered in relation to the specification of an act.

For according to the definition adduced above, such a precept prescribes the thing in itself and its own substance, by prescribing how the thing commanded should be done, if it be reduced to action. Now to every institution the same is required.

To such a precept it is requisite—

1. That there be a determination or sanction of the thing itself, considered in itself and in its own substance.

2. That this determination emanate from the will of the superior, obliging the agent, if he wish to reduce to action the thing regulated by law, and mean that it should be valid, to do it in conformity with the law made by his superior. Now the like is required in every institution.

This is plain from the induction of all the examples, insomuch that no other example exists or can exist in nature ; that is to say, such is the nature of every institution, that when the thing instituted is to be reduced to action, that act must be in conformity with the institution ; or if it be not so, even should there be no other precept affecting the same thing, the act in question, by the very fact of its non-conformity to the institution,

is to be considered faulty and culpable ; which can be proved even by the example of Christ himself, who, in his reply to the question of the Pharisees, whether a man should be allowed to repudiate his wife for any cause whatever, appeals to the institution of marriage, and proves that such a proceeding is nowise lawful, from the fact of God's so instituting marriage that husband and wife shall be *two in one flesh*. And he thence infers, that the Jewish custom of repudiating wives at will was not only unlawful, but that a man committed adultery who repudiated his wife and married another, except in case of adultery. Now this argument of Christ would have been inconclusive, if institution had not the force of precept, considered in relation to the specification of the act, and did not entail an obligation of such nature, that, when the thing has once been instituted, whosoever, for instance, wishes to enter into matrimony, must do so conformably to the nature of its institution ; and, once married, must be and continue "one flesh" with his wife in a bond indissoluble unless by death or adultery.

Thus, also, if any one wishes to take on himself the office of pastor and to teach the word of God in the Church, and undertake the administration of sacraments, he is bound to accept and discharge that office agreeably to the institution of our Saviour. Whoever, in like manner, wishes to undertake and perform the office of a magistrate, must do so conformably to its institution : and the same holds in every institution whatsoever ; so that no example to the contrary has ever been alleged, nor, from the nature of things, can any exist.

It follows, therefore, that every institution imports, or is in fact of equal effect with, or equivalent to, a precept *of the specification of the act* by which the thing instituted is reduced to action or to use. And such is the force of this truth, that it has won the assent of the learned Jesuit, Francis Suarez, who elaborately proves that "every institution of Christ has the force, not merely of an affirmative precept, in the sense that any one wishing to do the thing instituted must do it conformably to the institution, but furthermore of a negative precept ; so that, if the thing cannot be done as it is prescribed, it had better be omitted than done in any other way." (*Tert. Pars S. Thom. Disp. xliiii. § iv. Conclus. iv.*)

Whence we argue as follows for Communion under both kinds :—

To whomsoever it is commanded by Christ that they partake of the sacrament of his Supper according to his institution, to the same is it commanded that they communicate under both kinds. But a precept is given to each and all Christians that they partake of the sacrament of his Supper according to his institution. Therefore command is given to each and all Christians that they communicate under both kinds.

Having now proved the necessity of this postulate, it remains to be proved, in the second place, that it is compatible with the possibility of union, and that in demanding it, nothing is required of the Apostolic See which it is beyond its authority and power to concede ; that is to say, the Supreme Pontiff can, without derogating from the principles and hypotheses of his Church, allow Protestants to retain their custom of communicating under both kinds.

Now it is admitted on both sides, that the Pope can, out of the authority reserved to him by the Council of Trent, grant to whomsoever he thinks fit the perpetual and irrevocable use of the cup, provided only this dispensation tends to the advantage of the Christian religion. And the thing, in point of fact, has been already granted by the Roman Pontiff, when, without much difficulty, he allowed the use of the cup to the Bohemians, who were in rebellion upon this subject.

SECOND POSTULATE.

The second condition is, that the Pontiff should be satisfied not to force upon Protestant Churches what are called private Masses, or those Masses in which the priest alone communicates. This condition is sought, not because Protestants conceive such a mode of communicating to be simply unlawful, since, even in their own churches, their pastors sometimes, in cases of necessity, themselves receive the Lord's Supper without any one else being present ; nor because, after the preliminary union, they would forbid their brethren to assist at the private Masses of the Catholics ; but for the following reasons :—

1. Because they are convinced that the Eucharist should

ordinarily, as far as possible (always excepting cases of necessity), be celebrated after the form which Christ has instituted, and which is described in the Gospel ; namely, that, besides the priest, there be present others to whom the Body and Blood of Christ can be distributed with the blessed bread and wine.

2. Because it is notorious that great abuses were introduced into the Church by means of those private Masses, of which abuses, about the beginning of the Reformation, not only the Protestants of Germany, but many of the Roman Catholics also complained, in the *Centum Gravamina* ; and that by no means as a matter of form.

3. Because in most Protestant churches there remains not a vestige of the numberless altars intended for such private use ; much less have the foundations or trusts devoted by the pious faithful of Christ to such purposes been able to escape the hands of the harpies : all those properties being at present either wasted or applied to other purposes, in part sacred, in part profane.

THIRD POSTULATE.

That the Pope should consent to leave unproscribed and free from all censure, to the aforementioned Churches, their doctrines touching the justification of the sinner before God ; viz. that the adult who wishes to become a partaker of Divine Grace, and to obtain remission of sin, and eternal salvation, should acknowledge his sins, repent sincerely of them, and rely, not upon any merits of his own, but solely upon the death and merits of Christ, with a hope and confidence of obtaining the forgiveness of his sins and life everlasting ; and should thenceforth abstain from sin and devote himself to holiness, that is to say, to good works, “ *without which no man shall see God.*”

There appears to be no reason why the Roman Pontiff should not leave this doctrine free to members of our profession ; especially since, after half a century of contest, the more acute on both sides have discovered that hitherto the dispute has been like the olden contests of the *Andabatae* ;¹ that between both opinions there is no real difference, but that the contest is purely one of words ; and that the controversy, like a saw, has been drawn hither and thither, the quarrel regarding not the matter

¹ Gladiators who fought with their eyes shut.

itself, but the various acceptations of the terms employed. It is true the Catholics usually place the formal notion of justification in the infusion of sanctifying grace, whereas the Protestants maintain that the word 'justification' should be understood in a forensic sense, and as signifying nothing more than the non-imputation of sin in consideration of the merits of Christ. The storms which this difference of opinion has excited in the Church are too well known to require mention; but Calixtus and Horneius, on the side of the Helmstadt theologians, and subsequently, the brothers Adrian and Peter von Walenburch, the *Fratres Wallenburgenses*, as they are called, and more lately the Capuchin Denis of Werle, in his *Via Pacis*, published some five years ago with the consent and approbation of his superiors, have all observed that this controversy could be brought to an end by a favourable explanation of the terms.

For, if the term *justification* be understood in so wide a sense as to embrace the idea of sanctification or renovation, and the denomination be thus borrowed from the more noble act of renovation, they hold that the notion of justification in this extended sense may properly be placed in the infusion of sanctifying grace; but that, if *justification* be strictly interpreted—that is to say, in the sense of *justification* in so far as it is distinguished in its formal essence from the act of renovation (with which it is nevertheless simultaneous)—under such circumstances it does not consist in the aforesaid infusion, but in the sole non-imputation of sin.

FOURTH POSTULATE.

The fourth condition is, that the Pope be pleased to permit to the Protestant pastors the right of marriage, and even of a second marriage upon the death of their wives, until a council shall have decided upon the latter case. In which instance, again, nothing is asked of the Sovereign Pontiff which it is not in his power to grant. For, according to the common opinion, the celibacy of the clergy is not enjoined by positive Divine law, but by human, and is therefore, so to speak, liable to abrogation at the hands of those who made the law. We have in addition the authority of the Council of Florence, by which permission to marry is given among the united Greeks even to priests.

FIFTH POSTULATE.

The fifth is, that the Pope be pleased to confirm and hold for valid the ordinations hitherto performed by Protestants; and to do this in a way which will be acceptable on both sides, will not prejudice either party, and will be calculated to set the faithful at rest, as far as can be done, touching the administration of the sacraments. For as to the future ordinations, which after the preliminary union must be performed according to the Roman rite, there shall be no question. And here we would have it distinctly understood that we are anxious about the sanction of these ordinations, not for the sake of our own brethren, none of whom entertain a doubt upon the subject, but solely on account of the Roman Catholics, who, without such confirmation, would call into doubt the validity of the sacraments received at our hands after the preliminary union. Whence it is plain that the decision of this article could not be postponed to the meeting of the future Council.

SIXTH POSTULATE.

The sixth is, that the Sovereign Pontiff shall so deal with the Protestant Electors, Princes, Counts, and other States of the Roman Empire, agreeably to the right and authority which in virtue of the Treaty of Passau and the Peace of Westphalia they have, or claim to have, over the clergy and the affairs of religion, that the said temporal lords may not oppose themselves to these religious efforts for union, but may rather be gently induced to promote a design so salutary. And that the Sovereign Pontiff can effect such, and even greater things, is sufficiently apparent from the concordats between the Roman and the French Churches, and from the principles now maintained by the doctors of the Sorbonne, and amongst them by M. Lewis Elias Dupin, in his historical Dissertations upon the Ancient Discipline of the Church, which are no less remarkable for their learning than for their candour.

Should the Roman Pontiff deign to concede these demands, the Protestants who think with us promise on their part :

1. That as the Bishop of Rome holds the first place or primary rank and dignity amongst all the bishops of the Christian world, and consequently in the Universal Church, and possesses besides by ecclesiastical law, in the Western or Latin Church, the primacy and patriarchal privileges, they will, therefore, esteem and reverence the Sovereign Pontiff as Supreme Patriarch or First Bishop of the entire Church, and will pay him due homage in spiritual matters.

2. That they will treat the Roman Catholics as brethren in Christ, notwithstanding their adherence to Communion under one kind and other hitherto controverted articles, until the decision of a *legitimate council*.

3. That the priests will be subject to their bishops, and the bishops to their archbishops, and so on, according to the established hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

Now that Catholics, though communicating under one kind, may be considered as brethren by Protestants who hold Communion under both kinds to be enjoined by Christ, is shewn by two arguments.

1. Because the error of Roman Catholics concerning this article is supposed to be, up to the present, involuntary and invincible. Now such an error, when it concerns a non-fundamental article of faith, can nowise be considered damnable: as is thus proved.

When involuntary deprivation of the whole does not entail damnation, neither does an involuntary and invincible error about a part. But the involuntary deprivation of the Sacrament of the Eucharist does not entail damnation; therefore neither does an involuntary and hitherto invincible error about a part of the Sacrament of the Eucharist cause damnation. Now, an error which is not damnable cannot have for object a fundamental article of faith. But, &c. Therefore, &c.

2. Because, in every case where two divine precepts clash, so that the one cannot be observed without the violation of the other, it is sufficient if that one be observed which is more excellent in itself, and whose observance is more necessary. The celebration of the Sabbath, for instance, which, under the New Testament, has given way to the Sunday, is prescribed in the decalogue, and its violation prohibited. Now it is certain

that the works of charity towards one's neighbour are prescribed not only by the divine, but also by the natural law. Supposing, therefore, that my neighbour is in some extreme calamity, and that he must be freed by me upon the Lord's day, and that, by the consequent journey and neglect of religious duties, the Sabbath must be violated,—I say that, in such a case, the violation of this first precept is not sinful, because charity to one's neighbour is the more excellent work, and the law enjoining it the more necessary. To apply this to the matter in hand. It is supposed, according to the opinion of Protestants, that Communion under both kinds is commanded by Christ; but, in the opinion of both sides, unity of faith and concord in the Church are commanded, and schism is forbidden as the most grievous evil against Christian charity. The Pope, therefore, according to the supposition that Communion, under one kind, or under both, is left to the decision of the Church, can indulge Protestants with Communion under both kinds; he can also extend to Catholics inhabiting the same country with us the privilege of communicating under both kinds: and thus the actual union of the churches might be commenced. But, on the contrary, in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, for instance, by reason of the exceeding difficulties and the disturbance of the whole religion of Christ which it would occasion, the Pope cannot introduce Communion under both kinds.

It is asked, therefore, what are Protestants to do in this matter? Are they so to act that schism is to be caused, or to be perpetuated? or are the Roman Catholics to be considered as brethren in Christ, although they deny Communion under both kinds to be commanded by him, and although the Roman Pontiff be unable to introduce it into all the provinces of Christendom? I say they must take the latter alternative; because the preservation of unity in the Church and the removal of schism is enjoined by Christ: and this it has, even in our opinion, in common with Communion under both kinds. Now it cannot be denied that the precept of maintaining unity is the more excellent of the two, and that, if both cannot be observed together, the more necessary one should be followed, and toleration should be extended to the error regarding the other. Now the paramount necessity of observing Christian charity, to which schism

is diametrically opposed, is clearly taught by St. Paul (1 Cor. xiii.) throughout almost an entire chapter.

ON THE COURSE TO BE PURSUED.

A secret and honourable understanding being come to on both sides, the Electors, Dukes, Princes, and other States of the Germanic Empire, Romanists as well as Protestants, shall be invited by the Roman Emperor each to send to the Congress one or two doctors equally respectable for learning and moderation, to confer upon the union of the churches. And in this matter it is self-evident that no deputy should be sent by the temporal lords to this congress, unless such as shall have been privately agreed upon this method of acting, or shall be of like sentiments with those who are so agreed.

In this congress, or conference, setting aside the aforesaid preliminary postulates and private stipulations, they shall proceed to examine the questions, concerning which the opposite parties are not clearly or fully agreed. These, it will appear, are by no means of one kind, much less are they all of equal importance. They may, however, be conveniently distributed into three classes.

FIRST CLASS.

To the first class shall belong those controversies which regard equivocal expressions or diversely received terms—as for instance, *Whether the Sacrament of the Altar, or the Eucharist, be a Sacrifice?* In deciding which, it is to be observed that there exists no dispute between us and the Roman Catholics as to whether the Eucharist can be *called* a sacrifice, which is admitted on both sides; but whether it *be* a sacrifice, properly or improperly so called. Now this, as is plain from the terms, is a controversy about the mode of speaking; since each party takes its peculiar definition of sacrifice for the foundation of its own opinion. By the Protestants, and even by Cardinal Bellarmine, the term ‘sacrifice,’ *conformably to the phraseology of the Old Testament, from which the doctrine of sacrifices is to be drawn, is properly applied to a living thing when, by God’s precept, the animal or animated substance is destroyed by slaying in honour of God.* In this sense, the Roman Church denies the Eucharist to be strictly a sacrifice; holding, in common with us, very properly,

that the sacrifice in question is completed without a new shedding of blood and a new slaying of the victim,—in one word, and that an ecclesiastical one, that it is an unbloody sacrifice. So far is she from affirming that the Eucharist is a sacrifice in the proper and rigorous sense, according to our definition and that of Bellarmine. On the other hand, when the Romans style the Eucharist a sacrifice properly so called, they adopt that expression either to distinguish it from sacrifices still more improperly so termed, as, for instance, sacrifices of the lips, of the heart, “sacrifices of jubilation,”¹ &c. ; or else with reference to the matter of a sacrifice properly so called ; for, in the Eucharist, numerically the same sacrifice which was delivered up for us, and numerically the same blood which was shed for us, are really, nay most really, present, and are given and drunk by the communicants ; not in faith merely, but by the mouth of the body, though not in a carnal or Capharnaïtic way, but still truly ; and thus under this title also the Eucharist merits the name of a sacrifice properly so called. Now, according to this definition of the Romanists, Protestants might allow the Eucharist to be a sacrifice properly so called. From which it is plainer than the noon-day that the debate does not regard the matter itself, but merely the words ; and that both parties are agreed in this—namely, that Christ is not slain anew in the Eucharist, but that He is present therein notwithstanding, and that his Body is truly eaten ; that thus there is instituted a commemoration or representation of the sacrifice which was once offered for us on the Cross, but which cannot be again offered in the same manner ; and that, according to the different acceptations of the word, it may be said to be a “sacrifice properly so called,” or a “sacrifice improperly so called.” Matthew Galen, a Catholic writer, in his 13th Catechesis (page 422, Lyons edition), well observes : “*We can thus admit that our sacrifice is not a sacrifice properly and rigorously so called, but is notwithstanding perfectly entitled to the name of sacrifice, as being an imitation or representation of that first sacrifice which Jesus Christ offered to his Father.*” I shall add, *ex abundantia*, a further motive, but without prejudice to the sentiments of others, and always deferring to the decisions of the more learned, that the holy Fathers, in various places, and amongst

¹ Ps. xxvi. 6.

them Cyril of Jerusalem¹ and St. Cyprian,² have not hesitated to call the Eucharist, the one, *a most true and singular sacrifice*, the other, *a sacrifice full of God, to be revered, tremendous, and most sacred*.

It might, perhaps, further be granted, that the Eucharist is not only a sacrifice commemorative of that bloody sacrifice in which Christ once offered Himself for us upon the cross to God the Father, and in this sense, according to the definition of the Protestants, a sacrifice "improperly so called;" but that it is moreover a certain incomprehensible offering of the Body of Christ once delivered for us to death: and, in this sense, a true sacrifice, or if you wish so to speak, a "sacrifice properly so called." St. Gregory of Nyssa says expressly, in his first Sermon upon the Resurrection of Christ: "*By a mysterious kind of sacrifice, which cannot be discerned by man, He offers himself a host for us and immolates the victim, being at once, in his own person, the Priest and that Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world. But when did He perform this? When He gave his Body to be eaten and his Blood to be drunk by the assembled disciples, then He openly declared that the sacrifice of the Lamb was accomplished; for the body of the victim is not yet to be eaten if it have life in it. Wherefore, when He gave his Body to be eaten and his Blood to be drunk by his disciples, the body was immolated in a secret and invisible way, as it pleased the power of Him who was accomplishing sacrifices upon the mystery of himself.*"³ St. Jerome says: "*The oblation of the Church, which the Lord taught should be offered over the universal world, has been reputed a pure sacrifice by God, and is acceptable to Him. There are offerings in the Old Covenant, and offerings in the New,—sacrifices amongst the people—sacrifices in the church; but the kind only is changed, since it is offered now, not by slaves but by free men.*"⁴ St. Augustine: "*Instead of all the sacrifices and oblations,*" (meaning of the Old Testament,) "*now, in the New Testament, his Body is offered and administered to those partaking of it.*"

The second Council of Nice⁵ says: "*Nowhere has the Lord,*

¹ Cat. xxiii. p. 327-8. ed. Bened.

⁴ Lib. iv. 34, p. 362. Paris, 1575.

² Ep. lxxiii. p. 192 Oxford Transl.

In the Benedictine edition it is found in chap. xviii. p. 250.

³ Orat. i. de Resurrectione Christi, t. ii. p. 321-2. Paris, 1615.

⁵ Act. vi. Harduin's *Concilia*, iv. 323.

nowhere have the Apostles, called the unbloody sacrifice an image, but the Body itself, and the Blood itself."

Nicholas Cabasilas, in the explanation of the Liturgy (c. xxxii.), writes: "*It is not the figure of a sacrifice, nor the image of blood, but real immolation and sacrifice.*"

If Protestants were satisfied henceforward to speak thus, in unison with the holy Fathers, I do not see any thing remaining which should retard peace, as far as this point is concerned.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

There is a dispute between Roman Catholics and Protestants, *Whether an intention is requisite to the validity of a sacrament.* The Fathers of Trent maintain the affirmative under pain of anathema, and this anathema, from the beginning of the Reformation to the present time, has met with vigorous opposition on the part of the Protestants. In my humble judgment, the controversy will at once be decided if the terms be honestly explained and the matter set in its proper light. I say therefore, with Becanus, that the minister's intention regarding the sacrament may be threefold:

First, an intention of pronouncing the words of institution and performing the external act.

Secondly, an intention of celebrating the sacrament, or, at least, a confused intention of doing that which the Church does or intends. And this intention, as Becanus rightly teaches, may be either, first, *actual*; that is to say, when any one celebrating a sacrament at the same time actually thinks of celebrating the sacrament: or, secondly, *habitual*; that is, when one has acquired by repeated acts a readiness for celebrating the sacrament, such as might be found in those asleep: or, thirdly, *virtual*; when, from absence of mind, the actual intention is not present at the moment, but had been present, and the operation takes place in virtue thereof.

Thirdly, an intention of communicating the fruit or effect of the sacrament. Becanus concludes, that between us and the Romanists there is no difference concerning the third kind of *intention*, namely, that of imparting the fruit and effect, but merely about the first two.

From these premisses the Jesuit whom I have cited infers:

1. That a *habitual* intention is not sufficient for the validity of the sacrament ; that, however, an *actual* intention is not necessarily required ; and that a *virtual* intention—not only of performing the external act, but of completing the sacrament itself, or, at least, a confused intention of doing that which the Church does, or Christ instituted, is required and insufficient.

2. That an express intention of imparting the fruit of the sacrament is not indispensable to its validity.

Now according to this explanation, it is manifest that the dispute does not regard the matter itself, but merely the word ; and that when Protestants deny that the intention of the minister is required for the validity of the sacrament, they refer to the intention of conferring the fruit and effect, which, according to the doctrine of Becanus, the Roman Catholics, as well as we, deny to be requisite ; whereas, the latter, who insist upon the intention of the minister for the validity of the sacrament, speak simply of an actual, or at least virtual intention, of performing the external act, or doing what the Church does in such a case. That such an intention is required for the validity of the sacrament, Protestants are perfectly free to grant to the Roman Church.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

There is a question between us, *Whether the sacraments of the New Testament are two or seven in number ?* I say, that this also is a dispute about a word, arising from the different definitions of a sacrament in general.

If we understand by the word ‘sacrament’ any thing sacred, instituted in honour of God, according to the idea of St. Augustine, we shall have not seven, but, possibly, six hundred sacraments. If we take the term ‘sacrament’ in a somewhat more limited sense, but not quite so rigorously as when it is applied to Baptism and the Eucharist, there is no question that the remaining five may properly be called sacraments. The question is not, therefore, whether the five which the Roman Catholics add to our two can be called sacraments. For who can deny this in the various senses which are attached to the word by those who variously define it ? But the question is, whether they are sacraments in the most rigorous sense of the term ; that

is, whether they are such sacraments as Baptism and the Eucharist; or, to speak more clearly, whether every thing essentially necessary to Baptism and the Eucharist be found in the sacraments of Matrimony, Holy Orders, Extreme Unction, and the others. Now, in Baptism and the Sacrament of the Altar are required: 1. The word of institution; namely, that it should have been instituted by Christ in the time of the New Testament. 2. The word of promise; namely, that it should have annexed to it a promise of sanctifying grace. 3. That it should have a symbol, or external element; which conditions no Catholic will say are required in Matrimony, for instance; inasmuch as it neither was established during the time of the New Testament, but commenced from the beginning of the world; nor was instituted (taking the word in its essential signification) specially by Christ, the second Person of the Divinity, but by God; nor has any external element, and far less any accompanying promise of justifying grace.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

Another question between the parties is, *Whether sins are truly taken away by justification.* The dispute is easily determined, once the case is properly stated, and the terms employed in discussing the subject duly explained. For it will appear that, on the one hand, there is something in sin which is taken away through justification, according to the admission of the Catholics, and that, on the other, Protestants by no means believe the opposite doctrine, which they are said to maintain.

In order that we may understand this the more clearly, it is to be observed that sins are of two kinds, *actual* and *habitual*; and that in each two things are to be considered, the *material* and the *formal*.

The *material* of actual sins consists in the past act of sinning or the past omission of some act prescribed by the law; the *formal* of actual sins is the guilt and liability to punishment, resulting from the past act of sinning or omission of an act prescribed by the law, rendering man a sinner, and causing him to incur the guilt and punishment resulting from the same before God.

Habitual sins are original sin and the vicious habit con-

tracted by evil doing : the *material* of which is the habitual propensity to evil ; the *formal*, as before, the guilt of the sin, and the liability to punishment resulting therefrom.

The question, then, as to whether sins are truly taken away by justification, may be understood as referring either to the *formal* or to the *material* of sin. If it be understood of the *material*, Protestants take the negative side of the question. And, as far as actual sins are concerned, it is plain that the *material* of these sins is not removed by justification. For this *material* consists, as we have said, in the act of sinning which is past, or the past omission of an act prescribed by the law ; in which two things are to be considered : first, the act itself committed in opposition to the law ; and, secondly, its relation to the sinner, which causes it to be said that he has sinned. If, therefore, actual sins are removed, as to their *material*, by justification, either the previous act is taken away, or the relation of this act to the sinner ; so that it will be true to say of him who sinned that he has not sinned. But neither can be said. Not the first ; because the previous act, by the bare circumstance of being passed, has ceased to be, and therefore can no longer have any real existence capable of being taken away by justification. The past omission of an act is no real being, but a negation, whose existence cannot be taken away by justification, inasmuch as it has none. Nor can the second be said ; for, if the relation of the sinful act to the sinner be taken away by justification, it would follow, that he who had sinned should be considered not to have sinned, and what had been done not to have been done. Thus, for instance, the same man should have fornicated and not fornicated, which is a manifest contradiction. And in this the Roman Catholics, I think, will agree with us.

With regard to habitual sin, its *material*, namely, the habitual propensity to evil, is broken, crucified, mortified, and subdued in the man justified, so that sin cannot reign any longer in his mortal body. However, during this mortal life it is not thoroughly removed, it is not extirpated, but, to a certain extent, remains after justification ; for which reason it was St. Paul, although justified, complains so much of sin “ that dwelleth in him.”¹

¹ Rom. vii. 17.

And when this propensity to evil is broken and lessened in man, this takes place in consequence not of justification, but of regeneration and renovation.

So far, therefore, Catholic and Protestant manifestly agree as to the *material* of sin. If we consider the formal of sin, that is, the guilt and liability to punishment, the state of the question here is, whether the guilt of sin and liability to punishment are removed from the man justified; or whether, in justification, he ceases to be guilty or subject to punishment before God?

The question being so stated, we unite with the Catholics in adopting the affirmative; and hold that sins, whether actual or habitual, as far as regards the *formal*, or guilt and liability to punishment, are truly and entirely removed in justification by remission, condonation, and non-imputation. To this extent again, therefore, parties are agreed. But, as to expressions used by some Protestant theologians, namely, that sin is not taken away in justification, but remains; these are to be understood of original sin, and especially of evil concupiscence, which, they maintain, continues in the regenerated, not formally but materially; that is, so far as regards the habitual propensity to evil, but without dominion.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

It is well known what tragedies have been excited in the Church by the proposition which our Luther introduced into the Sacred Scriptures, viz. that "*faith alone justifies*;" although the proposition is not his own, and the doctrine might even be drawn from many other phrases found in Scripture, and admitted by the Church. We are justified, according to the Scripture, "*by faith*," "*through faith*."¹ Properly speaking, however, it is not faith, but God, that justifies us. Now He has one internal impelling cause of this his justification; namely, his own grace and mercy; one principal external impelling cause, namely, the merits of Christ; and one secondary external impelling cause, namely, faith. When, therefore, it is said *faith justifies*, the meaning of the proposition is this: on the part of man, faith is the secondary external impelling cause, moving God to our justification. Whether faith in this sense alone justifies, is the

¹ Rom. iii. 30.

matter in dispute between the parties. Now I think, that if by the word 'alone' the other impelling causes of justification be not excluded—as, for instance, the grace of God and merits of Christ—if we say that the word *alone* (*sola*) is not to be confounded with *solitary* (*solitaria*), that is to say, dead faith, or faith destitute of good works, or at least of the purpose of doing good,—I think, I say, that in this case the dispute is wellnigh ended. For the meaning will then resolve itself into this : on the part of God, grace and the merits of Christ are the impelling cause of our justification ; but, on the part of man, neither hope nor charity, nor any other good work, confer justification proximately and immediately : but in this sense faith *alone* (not, however, *solitary*), that is to say, such faith as worketh by charity, is the external impelling cause of our justification ;—that faith, namely, in virtue of which man believes that Christ, by suffering and dying, paid the most ample satisfaction for the sins of the whole world, with an assurance that he shall obtain grace and the forgiveness of his sins from God on account of that satisfaction ; a faith, moreover, which is not dead but living, and which works by charity, and manifests itself in action whenever the occasion arises.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

Another question is, *Whether a man can be sure of his justification and of his final perseverance?* Protestants assert both ; nor do I think Roman Catholics will dissent from them, if the questions receive due explanation. It is admitted on both sides, that we are justified by faith. A man, therefore, who believes, and knows that he believes, can be absolutely certain of his faith, and consequently of his salvation. None of our divines, however, teach that a man can be as sure of his salvation and perseverance, as of his justification. For of the latter he can have an absolute certainty, but of his perseverance and salvation, a conditional certainty only ;—that is to say, if a man make right use of the means of persevering in faith, does not reject them, and assiduously begs the assistance of God by devout prayers—which he is able to do in virtue of the grace conferred upon him—then he is conditionally certain of his salvation. If this perseverance endure to the end

of his life, he is then sure of his salvation also. About an hundred and twenty years ago, Martin Eisengrein, licentiate in theology and president of Ingolstadt, a moderate Catholic writer, endeavoured to soften down the thirteenth canon of the sixth session of the Council of Trent, in reference to this matter, in his curious and comprehensive German work, entitled, "A moderate Declaration of the Articles of the Christian Faith, necessary in the present state of things," printed at Ingolstadt in the year 1568; where, amongst other things, he speaks thus in the fifth paragraph: "*I say it in plain German—I also know what I say to be true and built upon good foundations—however the thirteenth canon of the sixth session of the Council of Trent may sound in your ears, this is not its meaning; this is not the decision of the Council; this is not the doctrine of the Church, and never was, that a 'Christian never can be sure of his salvation and justification,' &c.*"

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

It has long been sharply canvassed, *Whether it be possible to fulfil the law contained in the Decalogue?* The question, however, has not been argued upon the merits, but has turned upon the manner of speaking; and therefore it may be decided without any difficulty. The Protestant opinion, if rightly explained, is this: Of the compacts entered into by God with man, one is legal, and the other evangelical: in virtue of the legal covenant, our first parents, being endowed with the Divine image, were obliged to fulfil the law with the utmost exactness; that is, they were obliged not only to abstain from all sins directly against conscience, but to guard against any concupiscence whatsoever, even indeliberate (*in actu primo*), or against all those indeliberate evil motions which the schoolmen call *primo-primi*. By virtue of the Gospel covenant, since man, deprived by his fall of the Divine image, cannot fulfil the law in this way, God requires of him nothing more than that he shall believe in Christ with true and living faith, and shall abstain from mortal sins, or from all that is contrary to conscience. But with regard to venial sins, or concupiscence considered *in actu primo*, or other indeliberate evil motions, God, in virtue of the evangelical compact, promised that He would not hold the regenerated man guilty of them, provided he begged forgiveness daily and took other similar pre-

cautions. When, therefore, it is asked, "whether the regenerated man can and ought to fulfil the law?" I answer, that no one, after the fall of man, is bound to fulfil, or is capable of fulfilling, the law, in the same degree of perfection as the first men were bound to do in virtue of the legal covenant; and if the Decalogue be enforced to the rigour of this legal covenant, I say that no one is bound to its observance, as being a thing impossible. But every regenerated man is obliged to observe the law, in so far as it is exacted of him by the Gospel covenant; and to such extent also has the regenerated man the power to observe the law of the Decalogue by the aid of grace, provided only he use his utmost diligence. If the question be so explained, it does not appear what more the Roman Church need look for in the Protestant declaration. Father Dionysius, in his *Way of Peace*,¹ truly says: "*With regard to the possibility of fulfilling the law, there exists in fact and in truth no difference of opinion (between the Protestants and Catholics). Since Protestants teach that man, justified by inherent justice, and possessing the aid of Divine grace, can so far observe and perform the commands of God as not to lose his grace and friendship, or consummate the sin to which he is inclined by concupiscence; but that he is not so perfectly and strictly free from all sin as to avoid every venial sin. Catholics acknowledge likewise that it is our duty to keep the commandments of God and avoid all sin; but they say it is impossible to do so during one's entire life, or for any long time, without a special privilege. (See St. Thomas, 1^a 2^{ae} quest. xix. art. 8.) Nay more, the Council of Trent, Sess. vi. can. 23, visits with anathema any one who says that the justified man can, during his whole life, avoid all sins, even venial, without special privilege from God. Protestants should therefore be satisfied when Catholics teach that the just man cannot so perfectly keep the commandments as not to transgress them somewhat by sinning venially from time to time; and it should be enough for Catholics that it is only in this sense Protestants say the just man cannot keep the commandments of God.*"

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

There is a question, *Whether indeliberate motions (primo-*

¹ P. 377.

primi), concupiscence “in actu primo” and other sins esteemed venial by us, are against the law of God? The aforesaid Capuchin, whose words we quote, has put an end to this controversy. “Some Catholics say that venial sins are not against the law, in the sense that they are not against the intention of the law; for they are not against the law, in so far as it obliges under pain of losing the grace and friendship of God and incurring His exterminating wrath. This is the first and largest extension of the law. But they are against the law, in so far as it obliges to avoid the smallest offence of God and his chastening wrath, which is its second extension; and they are also against the law so far as it requires to be observed with such exactness as to please God by doing and suffering even out of pure love for him, which is its third extension. Considered in the first extension, the just man can walk in the law without offence by the grace of God; considered in the second and third, no one, how just soever, can walk therein save by the special privilege of Almighty God, without transgressing by turning aside, although continuing to walk within its limits, as explained in the first sense, and therefore not simply walking and acting against the law, but only under a certain respect. Those, then, who deny that venial sins are against the law, keep in view the first extension of the law; and those who affirm it, the second. And since we are agreed upon the substance, as Gerson says, in his *Treatise on the Spiritual Life of the Soul* (Lect. v.), it is idle to dispute about words with obstinate animosity.”¹

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

There is another question, *Whether the good works of the just are in themselves perfectly good and free from all taint of sin?* Protestants deny this; and perhaps so do Catholics, if the thing be rightly explained: for the good works of the justified are said to be imperfect in relation to their imperfect fulfilment of the law. Because, inasmuch as, after the fall of man, no one can fulfil the law as perfectly as he was bound to do by virtue of the legal compact, it is self-evident that the good works of the just must be of such a character as always to fall short of perfection. But, as for those who thence infer that Protestants

¹ P. 379.

consider the good works of the just to be mere iniquity and sins; let them know that Protestants consider any such propositions utterly false, although some Protestants, who thought upon these matters more correctly than they expressed themselves, may have adopted those propositions.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

It is also asked, *Whether the works of the regenerated are pleasing to God?* And here again there is no substantial difference between us. In order to shew this, it is to be observed that the proposed question admits of a twofold sense; first, whether the good works of the regenerated, considered in themselves, are pleasing to God? Secondly, whether, taken in conjunction with the faith of the doers, or regard being had to all the circumstances, they are pleasing to God? To the question understood in the first sense, answer is to be made, that the good works of the regenerated are not simply and absolutely pleasing to God, because they are not simply or absolutely good, and have their imperfections annexed to them; but that they are pleasing to God notwithstanding, inasmuch as they are conformable to the law; and whatever is conformable to the Divine law is good, and whatever is good pleases God. But if the question be understood in the latter sense, the answer is, that the works of the regenerated are pleasing to God absolutely and simply. For although, considered in themselves, they are imperfect, and although these inherent imperfections cannot be pleasing to God, nevertheless, because they proceed from faith in Christ, and are performed by those who are in Christ Jesus and "*in whom there is no condemnation,*" these inherent imperfections are excused in the agents, in consideration of Christ and of his merit which they lay hold on by faith; and therefore their works are pleasing to God simply and absolutely, in the same way as if they were altogether and in every respect perfect, on account of the merit of Christ laid hold on by true faith.

Many other such controversies might be adduced; but these few will suffice as a specimen. For the adjustment of questions of this class there is no need of a new council, general or provincial, but merely that they be discussed by a few unprejudiced,

learned, and moderate divines of both sides ; and the different acceptation of the terms being seen, the matter can be brought to a conclusion without much trouble in the proposed conference.

SECOND CLASS.

To the second class belong questions, controverted, indeed, but of such a character that the opposite opinions are tolerated in either of the Churches. In such instances, for peace-sake, that opinion should be adopted on both sides which the entire body of one of the Churches and a portion of the other maintain.

FIRST EXAMPLE.

The entire Roman Church approves of prayers for the dead ; a part of the Protestant Churches, following the guidance of the Apology of the Confession of Augsburg, has determined them to be lawful ; a portion actually does pray for the dead. There are some Protestants, however, by whom this intercession for the dead is not approved. For the sake, therefore, of restoring peace, the Protestants in the proposed congress shall be solicited to consent that their entire Church approve of prayers for the dead.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

A portion of the Roman Church holds the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary ; a portion disallows it. The entire Church of the Protestants, while admitting the blessed Mary to be most holy and full of grace, has decided that she was conceived in original sin ; therefore, for the sake of peace and concord, the Catholics in the aforesaid meeting shall be invited to give the suffrage of their entire Church to the latter opinion.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

Concerning the merit of good works, there are two celebrated opinions in the Roman Church ; one of Vasquez and his followers, the other of Scotus and all the Scotists. Scotus, the "subtle doctor," teaches, that the works of the regenerated are not meritorious of themselves, nor intrinsically, but that whatever merit they have is derived from God's acceptance, and their ordination to reward. Vasquez and his adherents maintain, that the good works of the just do of themselves, without any compact or favour of

acceptance, condignly merit eternal life, and that no additional dignity accrues to them from the merits or person of Christ, which they should not otherwise have from the fact of their being done by the grace of God ; and further that, although there be a Divine promise attached to the works of the just, yet neither it, nor any other compact or favour, appertains in any way to the principle of the merit. In order to the establishment of peace between the parties, the Roman Catholics must be invited to embrace the opinion of the Scotists—(and how eminent are their schools, how numerous, how celebrated!)—which opinion substantially agrees with that of the Protestants. For Scotus and his companions deny that good works are properly and condignly meritorious ; and decide, on the other hand, that they can be called meritorious, only in that loose and extended sense in which one is said to merit who receives any thing from another, although it be gratuitously, and from the mere liberality or free remission of the other. And in this sense the holy Fathers taught that good works are meritorious, and Protestants are perfectly prepared to grant the same ;—as Vasquez well observes, when he writes, *that Scotus and the others who adopt his opinion agree with the Lutherans in holding, that before the divine promise and acceptance our good works give no title to life everlasting ; because the Scotists and Lutherans alike, in reference to works good in themselves, ascribe all the worth of our works to the favour of God and acceptance through the merits of Christ, and also because they take from works the true and perfect principle of our merit, and ascribe the entire virtue of merit to the works of Christ only.*” Let this be compared with what the Capuchin Father, Dionysius, teaches in the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of the second chapter of his *Way of Peace*,¹ which I have already more than once quoted with honour, and it will appear manifest that, in the controversy regarding the merits of works, there is almost no difference between Catholics and Protestants. The second article of the above-cited author has this title : “*Protestants say that good works merit the aid of actual grace and the increase of habitual grace ;*” the third article, “*Protestants teach that good works truly merit degrees of heavenly glory ;*” the fourth article, that “*Protestants teach that we may entertain some confidence from*

¹ Pp. 328, and foll.

good works;" the fifth article, "*It is not improbable that the first degree of glory does not fall within the compass of merit;*" the sixth article, "*The good works of the just, in themselves and on account of themselves, are not strictly and condignly meritorious.*" In fine, the doctrine of the brothers von Walenburch, on the merit of works, is of the same tenor: *That although, as regards the grace of justification and the substance of celestial glory, there is no merit, yet there is as regards the accident or increase, or, as they say, as regards the second degree of this glory; giving the name of merit in its broadest sense to every act which, through the grace of the Holy Ghost, is produced by man justified, and to which, although it has no intrinsic worth and no proportion to the reward or to eternal glory, such reward is nevertheless mercifully promised, and is truly and properly attained.*

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

The entire Roman Church teaches *that good works are necessary to salvation.* This some Protestants maintain, others deny. Those who deny it, entertain a concealed fear lest too much should be attributed to good works on the score of justification. But the meaning of those who affirm it amounts to this — that *good works* are necessary to salvation, *not in virtue of their efficacy,* but because their presence is indispensable to salvation; not as a cause, strictly speaking, of salvation, either principal or instrumental, but as a condition *sine quâ non.* For St. Paul expressly says, *Without holiness,* that is, without good works, *no one shall see God.* Whence it may be argued,

That without which no one shall see God,—in other words, without which no one shall be saved,—is necessary in some way to serving God, or obtaining everlasting salvation; but without good works no one shall see God; therefore, &c.

Compare with this the doctrine of the Capuchin in the passage¹ already quoted.

The Protestants are therefore to be invited to unite in adopting the Catholic view upon this point.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

The entire Protestant Church is averse to the *adoration of the*

¹ *Via Pacis*, Art. 1, p. 321.

Host, through fear of idolatry, not indeed formal, but at all events material. In the Roman Church, some teach that the adoration in the Eucharist has for its object the presence of Christ; some, the presence of the Host. The Catholics, therefore, in the imperial congress, must be invited to make no difficulty of consenting that the object of adoration shall be determined to be, Christ present in the Eucharist.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

The dogma of the Ubiquity of the Body of Christ is denied by the Roman Church and several Protestants. Some Protestants maintain it. Such Protestants, therefore, are to be invited in the assembly to give up the ubiquity, and to consent to adopt the opinion of many brethren of their own confession and of the entire Roman Church.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

The Churches of the Protestants *objected to have the Vulgate Version forced upon them for authority*. They likewise condemn the canon of the Council of Trent upon the subject. Andrada, the celebrated commentator on that Council, Salmeron, Serrarius, Simeon de Muis, Conti, Giulio Ruggieri, and others, have given it a mild interpretation of the canon.

Simeon de Muis, in his work upon the Hebrew Editions [p. 41], says, “*The holy Council of Trent does not disparage the Hebrew edition, when, in its fourth session, it decrees that the old and Vulgate edition is to be considered authentic; for in that place it compares the Vulgate with other Latin editions, not with the Hebrew.*”

Andrada, in the fourth book of his *Defensio Fidei*, holds, “*That the Fathers of the Council, in pronouncing the Vulgate edition authentic, meant nothing more than that it was without any taint of error from which a dogma pernicious to faith or morals might be inferred; but that they did not so approve the Vulgate in every particular, as to exclude any hesitation or doubt as to whether the translator may have rightly rendered the Scripture.*” And he further declares, that he “*was so informed by Andrew Vega, Cardinal of Santa Croce, who was afterwards Pope, under the name of Marcellus, and took part in the Council.*”¹

¹ This is a mistake, or perhaps never was Cardinal of Santa Croce, there is an error of the press. Vega but lived and died a friar of the Fran-

Conti (lib. v. Polit. cap. xxiv. prop. 13,) says, quoting from Serrarius, that “ *the Latin Version was approved in such a sense, as not to interfere with the authority of the Greek and Hebrew ; and that the authority adjudged by the Council of Trent to the Vulgate was restricted to it as a translation, and with these modifications, that it was correct, or rather, most correct, and that it has, at least, nothing repugnant to truth, faith, and good morals.*”

Serrarius, in his *Prolegomena* (chap. xix. quæst. 12), says, “ *It is sufficiently plain, that a pure fountain must have some advantage over any stream issuing therefrom, how pure soever it may be ; for a version is said to be authentic when it is considered to agree with the original.*”

Giulio Ruggieri, Secretary Apostolic, in the 14th chap. of his Book upon the Canonical Scriptures, asks, “ *What pious man is there whose ears could endure to hear that the Hebrew edition, dictated by the Holy Ghost in the very words we read, written by the Prophets, restored by Esdras, cited and explained by Christ, from which all other editions have emanated, as from their parent and fountain, according to which corrections are made, and discrepancies occurring through the fault of editors removed, was now discarded ?*”

Many more such writers might be quoted, and especially Simon, in several passages of his *Critical History of the Old Testament* ; and if the rest of Catholics agree with these, the controversy as to the authenticity of the Vulgate is entirely decided.

So much for the controversies of the second class, in the discussion of which we are surely warranted in expecting, as we earnestly desire, condescension such as we ask from the theologians of both sides, provided they be men of moderation and zealous for ecclesiastical union.

THIRD CLASS.

To the third class belong those questions at issue between us and the Catholics, which cannot be decided either by the explana-

ciscan order. The Cardinal of Santa Croce, who became Pope under the name of Marcellus, was Marcello Cer-

vini, one of the legates of Paul III. at the Council.

tion of equivocal terms, or by the condescension applicable to questions of the second class, inasmuch as the opinions of the parties appear to be diametrically opposite. As for example—

The Invocation of Saints.

The Worship of Images and Relics.

Transubstantiation.

The Permanence of the Sacrament of the Eucharist beyond the time of actual use.

Purgatory.

The Carrying about of the Host.

The Enumeration of Sins in Auricular Confession.

The Number of the Canonical Books.

The Integrity of the Sacred Scriptures, and the dogma concerning Oral Tradition thereon depending.

The Judge of Controversies.

The Celebration of Mass in the Latin tongue.

The Primacy of the Roman Pontiff by Divine Right.

The Marks of the Church.

The Weekly and Lenten Fasts.

Monastic vows.

The reading of the Holy Scriptures in the vulgar tongues.

Indulgences.

The Difference between Bishops and Priests as of Divine right.

And, what should have held the first place, the Council of Trent itself, and the anathemas pronounced by it, the examination of which, once the preliminary union shall have been secured, may, after the example of the Council of Basil and others, be again referred to the renewed decision of a general council.

The decision of these and such other articles, and especially of such as cannot be allowed to remain undecided without scandal to either party or injury to the Christian commonwealth, and without which a firm and enduring ecclesiastical union cannot be obtained, and certainly cannot be maintained, should either be entrusted to certain arbitrators chosen upon both sides, men conspicuous for learning, judgment, piety, and moderation, or referred to a council. This method of conference by arbitrators met the approval of both parties after the publication of the Confession of Augsburg, and was commenced at Augsburg in the thirtieth year

of the last century ; and the result was a considerable degree of unanimity upon no small number of subjects, and those not amongst the least important. So much so, that, in writing of this discussion or conference, David Chytræus says, in his *Saxon Chronicle* [book xiii.], that “ never from the beginning of these contests in Germany did the opposite religious parties seem to approximate so closely, or do they ever seem likely, till the end of time, to approach more near.” And whatever authority attaches to the judgment or the prediction of the historian on this point, one thing is certain, that out of twenty-one articles of the Confession of Augsburg, fifteen were in a short time settled, the decision of three reserved to a general council, and there were but three upon which a manifest disagreement continued.

If any one have a mind to try what decision can be come to in one or two articles of the third class, to me it is nowise doubtful that a great many of them may be set at rest by an accommodating explanation. Let us now see whether the case be really so.

The main dispute will, as it appears to me, include the dogmas of purgatory, invocation of the saints, worship of images, monastic vows, sacred traditions, unwritten word of God, transubstantiation, the primacy of the Pope, so far as he claims such jurisdiction as of divine right, and his infallibility.

We shall therefore try whether, without prejudice to the opinions of any individual, a portion of the aforesaid controversies may not be brought to a close without the aid of a council, by accommodating explanations. I say, therefore,

OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION,

That this question of the mode of the Presence, as far as those Protestants are concerned who admit the real presence and the oral eating of Christ in the Lord's Supper, is of very little importance ; and that by Luther at least, provided there were no danger of idolatry, the error was considered trivial, and the subject was regarded as belonging to the class of sophistical questions. As regards the question itself, Protestants allow that by consecration some change takes place in the elements of the Eucharist ; but they usually maintain that this change is merely accidental, so that the substance of the bread is not changed ; but, from common and ordinary bread, it becomes a sacred bread, bread devoted

to this most sacred use, a bread which, in its actual use, is the communication of the body of Christ. Amongst Protestants, M. Drejer, Professor of Königsburg, admits, in a certain sense, a substantial change. I do not myself adopt this opinion; but I think I should say nothing against the analogy of faith in supposing that, by virtue of the words of institution, some mysterious change takes place in the Lord's Supper, by which, in a manner inscrutable to us, this proposition, so frequently affirmed by the holy Fathers, becomes true, namely, "*The Bread is the Body of Christ.*" Roman Catholics are therefore to be invited, for peace-sake, in the proposed convention, to abstract from the mode of transubstantiation in the Eucharist, and to be satisfied to say with us, that this mode is incomprehensible and inexplicable, but of such a character that, by means of some hidden and wonderful change, the bread becomes the Body of Christ; and on the other hand, those Protestants to whom this may appear new, must be invited to imitate the first Reformers in waiving all objection to such propositions as, *the Bread is the Body of Christ, the Wine is the Blood of Christ*; and to reflect besides, that these propositions were of old so universally considered true, that scarce one of the early doctors of the Church is to be found who has not taken delight in these or similar expressions concerning the Eucharist.

OF THE INVOCATION OF SAINTS.

With regard to the invocation of saints also, the danger alleged by Protestants will disappear, if the Romanists publicly protest that they put no trust in departed saints beyond what they repose in those living friends whose intercession they implore; and that their prayers, all and each, in whatsoever words or form conceived, are to be taken in no other than an intercessional sense. So that, for instance, when they say, "*Holy Mary, free me in the hour of death!*" they mean, "*Holy Mary, intercede for me with your Son, that He may free me in the hour of death!*" If, in addition, the Romanists would teach their brethren, that the invocation of saints is not strictly prescribed by the Council of Trent, but that it is left to each one's discretion whether he address his prayers direct to God or through the saints; that we need not invoke the saints at random and without necessity; but

that it is to be done especially on those occasions when, on account of some grievous sin, a man, in his apprehension of the wrath of God and his sense of humility, dares not raise his eyes or direct his prayers immediately to God; that moreover, prayer directly addressed to God is far more efficacious than any to departed saints; and that the most perfect prayer of all is that which, as far as can be, leaves every creature out of view, and dwells in the depth of the divine attributes.

Indeed, if the thing be so explained, I do not see what more need be required in those prayers, unless perhaps this; that, since we are uncertain whether every saint in particular is acquainted with our special need, the assurance of our being heard must always be doubtful. Whether the doubt can be removed by adopting the form, "*Holy Mary, if thou knowest my misery, pray for me,*" let others decide: I suspend my judgment. We venture meanwhile to anticipate with earnestness that the stronger forms of addressing the saints, which are as displeasing to moderate Catholics as to us, will be given up; we mean such as are to be found in the "Psalter of Mary," the "Novena of St. Anthony," and other monastic formularies. It should be enough for Protestants, however, that these forms, in whatever way they are expressed, are understood to imply intercession merely. And should this interpretation chance to appear to any of our brethren to be somewhat forced, I pray them to reflect that such methods of speaking and such explanations are not unusual in common life. Suppose, for instance, a thief or robber thrown into prison should address the prime minister of the king or prince in these words: "Free me from the misery of this dungeon;" "Remove from me the sentence of death;" the thief or robber in question knows very well that the prime minister of the king or prince has no such power, but that it rests with the king or prince alone to do so; and therefore his prayer is, in effect, no other than that the minister should intercede with the king to liberate him from prison or save him from death.

OF THE WORSHIP OF IMAGES.

With regard to the worship of images, we shall also come to an understanding easily enough, if those excesses which even more moderate Catholics condemn in their fellows be moderated. In

truth, it is plain that images have no intrinsic virtues, and that therefore they are neither to be adored, nor ought men to pray before them, unless in so far as they be considered visible and striking methods of bringing to mind the recollection of Christ or heavenly things. That some Roman Catholics, chiefly in Italy, Bavaria, and the hereditary provinces of the Roman Emperor, do pay to images, especially those which are considered miraculous, a sinful worship, is too notorious to appear to admit of contradiction. Should any one, therefore, be anxious to worship or invoke God in presence of an image, let him observe the same moderation as did the Israelites of old, who contemplated the brazen serpent with a certain reverence, yet so as to make God, and not the image, the object of their faith. And let all such excess of ceremonies be avoided, as is calculated to suggest, if not to the learned and prudent, at least to the more simple people, an idolatrous idea, or one akin to idolatry, as though some divine virtue existed in the image.

OF PURGATORY.

I can discover nothing which can or should be said on the part of the Protestants in congress on this subject. However, if the question be allowed, as St. Augustine treated it, to stand a problem in the schools, and if no one be obliged to adopt the affirmative or negative, I cannot perceive what injury should result to the Church. For my own part, I should have no objection to any one wishing this doctrine to be received as a problem.

OF THE PRIMACY OF THE POPE AS OF DIVINE RIGHT.

That, after the preliminary reconciliation, the primacy may and can be allowed by Protestants to the Roman Pontiff, so far as he is entitled to it by the canons or of ecclesiastical right, we have shewn above. But whether the Pope be head of the Church by divine right, and, moreover, infallible, either in council or out of council, are questions of a higher range. Indeed, if the doctrine which the writer already quoted, Lewis Elias Dupin, Doctor of the Sorbonne, has most learnedly advanced in the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh dissertations of the work above cited, could meet the approval of ultramontane Catholics, as it does of Protestants, I should say that the whole affair was settled, or at least, that the Protestants fully agree with the French Church.

OF THE MONASTIC STATE AND VOWS.

Concerning the monastic state and vows, in the proposed conference, it will be easy to come to an agreement, as there still remain monasteries among the Protestants, in which the canonical hours may be sung, and the Breviary read, just as is done, for instance, among the Cistercians, with the exception of the collects or little prayers addressed to deceased saints; and in which the fasts and distinction of meat can be observed, and celibacy, hospitality, the rule of St. Benedict, and other things savouring of the ancient institution, may be practised. Nor can any Protestant, with reason, condemn even the vow of obedience. As to the vow of poverty, whereby monks, who are entirely their own masters, renounce their property without prejudice to the right of any third person, it is plain that such a matter is indifferent in itself, and therefore cannot be unlawful. The only question is in reference to the vow of chastity, inasmuch as no one can bind himself by vow to what is impossible. Celibacy may indeed (as it is faithfully practised in some Protestant monasteries) be promised, not by vow but by oath. That, however, must be in what is called a "composite sense;" so that, as long as one means to continue a monk or member of a monastery, he shall be bound to live in celibacy; but if he either cannot, or will not, do so, he may withdraw, should he think fit, and return to the world at his own peril.

OF TRADITION.

Concerning traditions, or the unwritten word of God, how many contests have we not had in the Church! Yet it is, notwithstanding, a matter easily settled, provided we say that the controversy between us and the Catholics is, not whether there be traditions, but whether the Church has thence received any new article of faith necessary to be believed under pain of forfeiting eternal happiness, which article is not to be found in Scripture, either in so many words or by fair deduction. Protestants deny the latter, not the former; and the more moderate amongst them allow, not only that we owe the Holy Scriptures to tradition, but that the genuine and orthodox meaning of Scripture in the fundamental articles—not to speak of many other things enumerated by Calixtus, for instance, and Horneius, and Chemnitz, of our own

religion—are only to be known from tradition. In sooth, those Protestants who, besides the Apostles' creed and that of St. Athanasius, admit the first five general councils, together with the synods of Orange and Milevis, and the consent of the primitive Church, at least during the first five centuries, if not longer, as secondary principles in theology—in such sort that the fundamental articles are not to be explained otherwise than they were by the unanimous consent of the learned in those ages,—such Protestants will have very little matter of dispute with the Roman Church on the score of tradition.

So much on these questions by way of specimen, in order that it may appear how easily many controversies might be adjusted by explanations or moderate views, provided neither party should make the opinion of his Church a point of honour, or place an obstacle in the way of such pious efforts by a zeal not according to knowledge.

OF THE COUNCIL.

Should any thing remain undetermined by the arbitrators, recourse must be had to a Council, which

1. Should be legitimately convened by the Sovereign Pontiff, and should be of as general a character as circumstances will permit.

2. The said Council should not appeal to the decrees of the Council of Trent, or of other Councils in which the dogmas of the Protestants have been condemned under anathema ; neither

3. Should this Council be convened without certain previous stipulations, and the previous fulfilment of every thing which, in this or any similar plan, may be laid down as necessary to be fulfilled and agreed upon ; as for example,

i. The acceptance of the postulates by a laudable condescension [*συγκατάβασις*] on the part of the Sovereign Pontiff ; in which consists the removal of the six most important obstacles by which the peace of the Church has been hitherto impeded, and by which, unless they be removed in this or some similar way, it will be impeded to the end of time.

ii. A previous congress, to be appointed by the Emperor, and a successful termination of its sessions.

iii. The admission of Protestants into the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church, notwithstanding the difference which may still subsist respecting Communion under both kinds, and the questions which may be left to be determined in the future Council.

iv. In the said Council every thing should be done according to the canons, and especially no one should be suffered to vote except a Bishop. Whence it is plain that, before its celebration and immediately after the preliminary union, for the sake of perfect uniformity with the Romanists and full assurance of the reconciliation which has taken place, it is necessary that his Holiness should confirm, and recognise as true Bishops, all Protestant Superintendents, who shall be summoned, together with the Roman Catholic Bishops, to this General Council, and shall sit and vote freely in the same, not as a party, but co-ordinately with the Roman Catholic Bishops, as competent judges.

v. Such a Council should have for basis and rule the sacred canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, the consensus of the ancient and primitive Church during at least the first five centuries, and also the consensus of the present patriarchal sees, as far as the circumstances of the times will allow its being ascertained.

vi. In such a Council the disputation should be carried on by doctors, and the bishops should decide by plurality of votes ; attending, however, beyond all things, to the excellent admonition of St. Augustine, in his book *Contra Epistolam Fundamenti*, c. 1 : "Let every kind of arrogance be laid aside by both parties ; let no one say he has already discovered the truth ; let it be sought in the same way as if it were unknown to both. For thus the inquiry shall be made with concord and diligence, if the truth be not, with rash presumption, believed to be discovered and known."

vii. After the close of the Council and the publication of the canons, both parties shall be bound to acquiesce in the decisions therein adopted : he who shall do otherwise, must suffer the penalties adjudged by the canons.

CONCLUSION.

From these premises follows the demonstration of the proposition with which we commenced,—

If the Sovereign Pontiff be willing and able to grant to the Protestants these six preliminary postulates :

If, in the imperial Congress, the controversies of the first class, which regard the mode of speech, be decided :

If in this Congress, in all controversies of the second class, each Church will embrace that doctrine which is held by a portion of its own members, and by all the members of the other :

If questions of the third class can be brought to a close either by modifications on the part of the arbitrators, or by the decision of a general Council :

It follows that a re-union of the Protestant and Catholic Churches is possible, without prejudice to the principles, hypotheses, and reputation of either.

Now, from what we have already proved, the antecedent is true ;

Therefore the consequence is true. Which was to be proved.

“ Now the God of patience and of comfort grant you to be of one mind towards one another according to Jesus Christ, that with one mind and with one mouth we may glorify God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.” (Rom. xv. 6, 7.)

“ May the same sanctify us in His truth by His Holy Spirit. His speech is truth. Amen.”

Written at Hanover, in the months of November and December 1691.

II.

THE DECLARATION OF M. FABRICIUS,

DOCTOR AND PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, FORMERLY AT ALTDORF, AND
NOW AT HELMSTADT,

THAT THERE IS NO ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CON-
FESSION OF AUGSBURG AND THE CATHOLIC RELIGION, AND
THAT SALVATION IS ATTAINABLE IN THE LATTER AS WELL AS
IN THE FORMER. PUT FORTH ON OCCASION OF A PROJECTED
MARRIAGE BETWEEN A CATHOLIC KING AND AN EVANGELICAL
PRINCESS. A.D. 1707.

THE question, "Whether a princess professing the Evangelical-Protestant religion can, with a safe conscience, in consideration of intermarriage with a Catholic king, embrace the Roman Catholic faith?" cannot be well and solidly resolved without first satisfactorily resolving the question, whether Roman Catholics are in error upon the fundamentals of faith and the essentials of salvation; or, what is the same thing, "whether the creed of the Roman Catholic Church be so constituted as to render it possible to hold therein the true faith and to attain salvation."

To the latter question it is impossible to return a negative answer, and that for three reasons.

I. First, because the Roman Catholics are agreed with us in the fundamental grounds of faith and practice, or hold the doctrines which are essential to the Christian profession.

For, in our view, the fundamental grounds of Christian faith and practice consist in the belief in God the Father who created us; in God the Son, the Saviour and promised Messiah, who has redeemed us from sin, death, the devil, and hell; and in the Holy Ghost, who enlightens and sanctifies us; in the Ten Commandments, which teach us our duty to God, to our neighbours, and to ourselves; in the knowledge of the Lord's Prayer, or Our Father, which teaches us how to pray; in the use of the Sacra-

ments of holy Baptism and the Lord's Supper, conformably to the institution and precept of Christ; to which is added the Office of the Keys, which we believe to have been entrusted to the Apostles and their successors; that is to say, we believe that power has been granted by Christ to the ministers of the Church to declare to the penitent the merciful remission of their sins, and to the impenitent the wrath and vengeance of God, and thus to loose the sins of the former, and to retain those of the latter; and, in accordance with this institution, we occasionally approach the confessional and confess our sins, in order to be absolved therefrom.

Whosoever believes and practises this, possesses the fundamentals of faith and of salvation, and thus may obtain eternal happiness. Upon this foundation must the learned, as well as the unlearned, live and die, if he would be a Christian and child of God, and an heir of the kingdom of heaven.

Now all this is found in the Lesser Catechism; for it is an abridgment of the Christian doctrine as laid down in the books of the prophets and apostles, and consists of six parts, viz. the Ten Commandments, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the words of Christ our Lord on Baptism, on the holy Supper of our Lord Jesus Christ, and on the calling and office of the keys. Now this Catechism, or abridgment of Christian doctrine, is not confined to us Protestants alone: the Roman Catholics have it also, and in common with us; and if they wish to instruct any one in Christian faith and practice, they impress upon him these very articles, and teach him, in precisely the same way, what he must believe and practise, if he would be a Christian and attain to salvation; as may be seen in the Roman Catechism, and in those of Canisius, Volusius, and others, as well as in the recent reprint of the Hildesheim Catechism.

Whence it is that the authors of the Confession of Augsburg declare in their preface, that "all Roman Catholics and Protestants live and strive under one Christ;" and in the end of the twenty-first article, that "our (the Protestant) doctrine (as may be seen from the works of the Fathers) is not opposed to the common faith of the Christian Church, nay, even of the Roman Church." The *Apology for the Confession*, in the article on justification, says, that it should not readily be believed that the Ro-

man Church holds every thing that the Pope, Cardinals, Bishops, or individual theologians and monks have held, maintained, and taught; "that the knowledge of Christ has, at all times, been preserved by some pious persons in the Roman Church;" that "we do not accuse all (Roman Catholics), for we hold that there have always been in the monasteries pious and upright individuals, who have kept aloof from the traditions of men, and refused to assent to the creed of the hypocrites who were among their number." Luther, too, confesses¹ "that there is under the papacy much Christian goodness, yea, all Christian goodness." He has a similar admission also in the sixth volume;² and in the seventh³ he declares that he "holds as dear brethren and members of the Christian Church, all those who confess with him (as do the Roman Catholics) that Christ was sent by the Father, that He has reconciled us to Him by His death, and has purchased salvation for us." And Philip Melancthon⁴ confesses, that "those who hold the fundamentals of faith have been, are, and will be, the Church of God, although some of them may have had more, and others, less, light."

II. Secondly, because under the papacy there has been a true Church; that is to say, a certain assembly of men who hear the word of God and use the sacraments established by Christ. For if there were not, or had not been, under the papacy, a true Church, it would follow that all who are, or at any time have been, attached to the Roman Catholic Church, must be hopelessly damned; a conclusion which none of our divines has ever advanced in speaking or in writing. Nay further, Luther argues, from the very fact that the true Church did subsist under the papacy, that the Pope is Antichrist—a position which is nevertheless highly questionable;—writing in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*, that where the essentials of the word of God and the sacraments dwell, there is a holy Church, even though Antichrist should rule therein.

So also in the *Epitome Examinis Philipp. Melancthonis*, the question "Whether there was a true Church under the papacy?" is answered, "Yes, most assuredly. For it is notorious, that under the papal rule there still were preserved the word of

¹ Vol. iv. p. 320, Jena edition.

² p. 92.

³ p. 171.

⁴ Repub. August. Confess. cap. de Ecclesia.

God and the articles derived therefrom,—the doctrine of the Catechism: viz. the Ten Commandments, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the doctrine of Baptism, the portions of the gospels and epistles for Sundays, from which the elect learned the fundamentals of Christian truth, and either despised human traditions, or were struck down in the contest with corruption and death."

The author of this *Epitome* is John Saubert, formerly chief preacher at Nürnberg, and highly esteemed by Duke Augustus, of glorious memory. It is compiled from the *De Locis Theologicis* of Hafen-Refler, the celebrated divine of Tübingen, a book of approved orthodoxy, and in common use throughout Sweden, both in the schools and the universities.

III. Thirdly, because the Roman Catholics, as well as we, believe and confess, both with the heart and with the lips, in their public writings and their teaching from the pulpit, that in no other is there salvation, no other name is there given to men, whereby they may be saved, but the name of Jesus; and that man is justified in God's sight, not by the works of the law, nor by the merit of works, but by the grace and mercy of God, and the satisfaction of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, of whom the Catholic Church (as the late pious and upright Abbot of Gytzburg writes in the preface of his *Compendium Regulæ Fidei Catholicæ*) teaches, and has always taught, that, from the beginning of the world, no one has been, or can be, saved, but through Jesus Christ, the only Mediator between God and men; and that no other name under heaven has been given to men whereby they can be saved.¹ And on the feast of the Nativity of our Lord the entire Church sings—

"This ever-blest recurring day
Its witness bears, that all alone,
From Thy own Father's bosom, forth,
To save the world, Thou camest down."

The Council of Trent calls Him "our only Redeemer and Saviour;" and, in another place, declares that God has appointed Him the "Propitiator, through faith in His Blood, for our sins; and not only for ours, but for those of the whole world" (Sess. vi. ch. 2, *On Justification*). And again, "if men born of Adam

¹ Art. iv. 12.

be not born again in Christ, they never can obtain justification; because this regeneration is gratuitously imparted to them through the merits of His Passion, whereby they are justified: for which benefit the Apostle directs us always to give thanks to God the Father, who has made us capable of the inheritance of the saints in light, and rescued us from the power of darkness, and established us in the kingdom of His beloved Son, in whom we have redemption and the forgiveness of sins."

The Christian Assembly of Trier, moreover, teaches that the "beginning of justification in adults flows by a purely gratuitous mercy from God in Christ;" that is "from his vocation, whereby they are called without consideration of any merit of their own;"¹ that "none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification;"² and that "we must hold, as of faith, that sin neither is forgiven, nor was ever forgiven, except through the gratuitous mercy of God and for Christ's sake."³

Our own Doctors also, as Flavius, Hunnius, J. Gerhard, G. Calixtus, and many others, are compelled to admit that in the book entitled *Hortulus Animæ*, and in the Rituals of Maintz, Trier, Cologne, and other Churches, the dying Christian is exhorted and sustained, not by the consideration of his own merits, nor of any other false means of salvation, but solely by trust in Christ, partly through prayers and instructions, partly through special questions addressed to this end. I shall give but a single example from the Ritual of Maintz, printed in 1599. In this ritual there is an instruction for the dying, and for those who have received Extreme Unction, in which, among other things, it is said, "Thy own merits, nay, even the merits of the whole human race, are insufficient to form a title to eternal happiness; and since our own works and our own merits are inadequate, we must throw ourselves upon the merits of Christ our common Saviour, whom God, out of His divine charity, has given to the world. On this gracious and merciful God must thou place thy reliance; be of good heart and fear not, but keep a firm hope and undoubting confidence."⁴ And, after the Unction has been received, "If thou wilt place thy

¹ Cap. v.² Cap. viii.³ Cap. ix.⁴ p. 159-60.

trust in the good God, who is merciful and full of clemency, and in His grace, and wilt strive and fight bravely against all the assaults of sin and the devil, and wilt discard all temptation of doubt, the Almighty God will easily hide thy sins in the many and precious merits of Jesus Christ; in Him, thy Saviour, thou shalt be delivered from sin and damnation, and thy soul shall be securely established in happiness.”¹ And in the Hildesheim Catechism, the sick and dying man says in his prayer, “Even though I were to lead a better life for the future, yet if Thou, O Lord, hast ordained that I am to die now, I prefer rather to die now, in accordance with Thy holy will, and forego all the good works, than live longer.”² Among the questions, too, which are addressed to the dying man, are the following: “Dost thou desire that our Lord should shew thee mercy, and not justice; and that, above all things, He should deal with thee, not according to thy merits, but according to His own infinite justice?” Answer: “Yes.” “Dost thou believe that for thee there is no hope of happiness, save through His holy, precious, and bitter death alone?” Answer: “Yes.”³

Hence, having now shewn that the fundamentals of faith exist in the Roman Catholic Church, and that it is possible within its pale to maintain the true Faith, to lead a Christian life, and to die happily, we are enabled with propriety to reply in the affirmative to the main question, “Whether an Evangelical-Protestant princess, in consideration of intermarriage with a Catholic king, may with a safe conscience embrace the Catholic religion?” She may do so: especially when it is considered:

(1.) That she neither herself sought this alliance, nor caused it to be sought on her behalf, but that it has unquestionably been offered to her in the designs of God’s holy providence.

(2.) That the alliance may be beneficial and salutary, not alone to her native duchy, but also to the Protestant religion, and perhaps to the project of Church union so long and anxiously desired.

It must be stipulated, however, that she shall not be required to abjure her former religion, and that no wide range of controversies or disputes shall be proposed to her as articles

¹ p. 175.

² p. 134.

³ p. 153, 4.

of faith; but that she shall be instructed with all possible brevity and simplicity, and most especially in those principles which are of indispensable necessity and connected with salvation—viz. renunciation of self, daily repentance, humility towards God, condescension and tenderness for the poor, imitation of the example of Christ, and the love of God and of her neighbour. Regarding which the pious J. Streder, in the first book of his *True Christianity*, writes with great discernment:¹ “That purity of doctrine, and the light of the knowledge of God, never dwells with those who live in the devil, in darkness, pride, avarice, and sensuality.” “For how,” he asks, “could pure and divine faith subsist where the manner of life is so impure and ungodly? Purity of doctrine and impurity of life never can be associated together, and have no community with each other; and, if we would maintain purity of faith, we must change our habits, abandon the unchristian life, follow the Lord Christ, and awake from sin. So will Christ enlighten us with the light of true faith. Wherefore, he who walketh not in Christ’s footsteps, in His love, in humility, meekness, patience, and the fear of God, must necessarily be led astray. If we but lived in Christ, if we walked in charity and humility, and directed all our diligence and all our theological lore to the learning how we shall mortify the flesh and live in Christ, how Adam shall die and Christ live in us, how we shall subdue ourselves and the demon of the flesh, and overcome the world, there would no longer be so many angry controversies regarding faith, and all heresies would fall to the ground of their own accord.”

And this doctrine certainly accords with that of Thomas à Kempis, of Taulerus, of Ruspröck, of the author of the *German Theology*, and other pious and divinely enlightened men among the Roman Catholics.

However, against the answer which we have given, various objections may be proposed and urged. For example, the following:

FIRST OBJECTION.

“The Roman Catholic doctrine contains errors subversive of the foundations of faith.”

¹ Chap. xxxviii.

ANSWER.

Yes, in the minds of those who believe them to be such, and subscribe to them against the dictates of conscience. But we hold with Hust, that every error is not heretical.

SECOND OBJECTION.

“They receive human traditions, and require the people to admit them.”

ANSWER.

They teach that divine apostolic traditions, that is to say, doctrines which are not contained in Scripture, but which Christ propounded to the Apostles, are to be received with the same respect as the written word of God. And we ourselves admit the same; so that there only remains the question, whether this or that particular doctrine is a divine or apostolic tradition. But on the subject of human traditions, they teach nothing but what we ourselves hold.

THIRD OBJECTION.

“They require the invocation of the Saints, whereas God alone is to be invoked.”

ANSWER.

In the Council of Trent there is not a word which implies obligation; but simply a declaration that “it is good and useful.” And hence no individual Roman Catholic is bound to invoke the saints, unless he attends a procession, or takes a part in the public church in the litany of the Saints. And these invocations do not imply any thing more than a prayer for their intercession on our behalf—a practice received by both the Greek and the Latin Churches for fourteen hundred years, without being thought to trench upon the honour due to God.

FOURTH OBJECTION.

“They enjoin a belief in purgatory, which is entirely without warrant in the word of God.”

ANSWER.

In so far as purgatory signifies a purgation of departed souls from the sins which still cling to them, many of the ancient doctors of the Church have held that doctrine.

FIFTH OBJECTION.

“The celebration of the Mass, from the multiplication of strange ceremonies, has become ridiculous and offensive.”

ANSWER.

To those who do not understand the signification of those rites and ceremonies; but there is not one of them which has not a good signification. On this subject, the Hildesheim Catechism,¹ as well as many other works, may be consulted. Besides, the Mass, according to their view, is a commemoration of the bitter Passion and Death of Jesus Christ.

SIXTH OBJECTION.

“They deprive the laity of the consecrated chalice.”

ANSWER.

Just as man's unbelief does not destroy the faith and promise of God, so neither can the withdrawal of the consecrated chalice from the laity, in which they have themselves no share, be imputed to them; on the contrary, we must hold that if they approach the Holy Supper with penitent and believing hearts, they receive the Body and Blood of Christ no less than ourselves.²

SEVENTH OBJECTION.

“It is required that one should believe in seven Sacraments, whereas there are but two.”

ANSWER.

According to the acceptance of the word “Sacrament” (which it should be remembered is not found in Holy Scripture), there are numbered in the *Apology of the Confession of Augsburg*, in one place two, and in another three; that is, if absolution be reckoned in the number. And, at all events, the Roman Catholics themselves allow that Baptism and the Lord's Supper are the two most excellent and principal.

Should any other objections be proposed, we are prepared, with all due respect, to reply to them either verbally or in writing, as well as to supply any such further explanations of the above,

¹ p. 45, and foll.

² Chyträus, *Historia Confess. Augustanæ*, pp. 261-70.

as may chance to be desired. Nevertheless, it must be confessed, that the discussion of the controversies between us and Roman Catholics is but ill adapted for a princess, whose duty it is to adhere to the simple principles of faith, which are also the best ; and that it belongs rather to theologians, among whom there have been found several on both sides, whose eyes God, in His saving grace, has opened to see that the difference between the two religions is not so great as it is commonly represented. And it is well worthy of observation that the upright and learned Philip Melancthon, in his *Judicium de Moderandis Controversiis*, addressed to King Francis in the sixth year after publication of the Confession of Augsburg, admits that it is so. “ Finally,” says he, “ the adjustment of all controversies between the Papists and us is easy ; and I hope that all pious and God-fearing hearts may be able to agree in them all.”

Pray God that it be so ; and that the present work tend to the glory of His Name, and to the temporal and eternal welfare of both the high personages and their royal and princely houses, for the sake of Christ our common Saviour. Amen.

Monseigneur

j'aurois fait mes gratulations, si
j'aurois sçu avant vostre depart que Vostre
Altesse Electorale vous a confié l'im-
portante charge de secretaire d'Etat, car
j'aurois crû, que vous estiez seulement
M. de Dankelman il est vray qu'un
employ comme le vostre supris de ce grand
Ministre, estoit le vray moyen d'y parvenir
je vous en felicite de tout mon coeur.....

Au reste vous estant obligé comme
je suis, et mieux informé que je n'étois
j'auray soin de mon devoir, et je suis
avec zele

Monseigneur

votre tres humble et
tres obéissant serviteur

Hanover le 20 Janvier 1695

Leibnitz

Fac-simile of a Letter, written in 1695.

III.

[As the original of these very important documents has never been published in England, I think it right to subjoin the extracts from them which Dr. Gubrauer has inserted in the Appendix of his edition of Leibnitz's German Works. There are two distinct drafts. The first is very short.]

Ce que V. A. S. réplique dans sa lettre à ce que j'avais écrit touchant la Transsubstantiation, me fait connoître combien il est difficile de satisfaire même les personnes les plus équitables et les plus éclaircies, quand on n'entre pas tout à fait à point nommé dans leurs sentimens et pensées. Souvent de très bonnes pensées ont été empêchées, parceque des personnes bien intentionnées, et qui avaient un même but, se sentirent contraires en ce qu'ils n'étaient pas d'accord sur les moyens dont il se fallait servir, quoique ces moyens en effet fussent bons et compatibles entre eux. La même chose arrive ici touchant le point de la paix de l'Eglise. V. A. S. s'étant appliquée à l'établir sur l'antiquité et sur la méthode compendieuse de l'autorité d'une église visible, ne semble point approuver qu'on entre dans le détail des controverses, et me reproche que je m'éloigne par-la des vrais principes. Pour moi, je peux dire d'avoir étudié l'antiquité, et d'estimer infiniment une tradition de l'Eglise Catholique. J'ai cru néanmoins qu'il serait important, non pas en effet pour tout le monde, mais pour ceux qui y semblent propres, d'y joindre une discussion exacte des matières, *pour n'avoir rien à se reprocher, et pour agir avec toute la sincérité et toute l'exactitude possibles, sans déguisement et sans dissimulation.*

[The second enters more into the motives of the writer. It contains a distinct allusion to the contemplated work.]

J'ai eu l'honneur de connoître particulièrement ce Monsieur Arnaud quand j'étais à Paris ; il avait aussi la bonté de faire

quelque estime de moi, et quand je partis de Paris pour me rendre à Hanovre, il me donna une lettre pour un Capucin d'ici, qui lui avait demandé quelque chose touchant la créance des Grecs en matière de Transsubstantiation, où il avait mis à mon louange des expressions qui m'auraient empêché de porter ces lettres, si je les avais lues ; mais je ne l'appris qu'à Hanovre que Monsieur Arnaud avait écrit qu'il ne me manquait que la vraie religion pour être véritablement un des grands hommes de ce siècle. Mais comme je n'ai jamais affecté une grande réputation, et que j'ai plutôt tâché de couvrir mon nom quand j'ai publié quelque chose (comme lorsque le livre de *Cæsarinus Furstenerius* fut imprimé par ordre du feu Prince), il n'a aussi jamais tenu à moi d'être du côté de la vérité. Et ce qui m'avait le plus détourné des sentimens de l'Eglise Romaine, c'était (car à présent je ne parle pas de la pratique) principalement les difficultés qui se trouvaient dans la Transsubstantiation, et les démonstrations que je crois d'avoir sur les matières approchantes de la grâce, j'ai toujours tâché de me satisfaire, et peu s'en faut, que je n'aie pas réussi entièrement. Mais ces matières demandant des méditations exactes sur la partie la plus profonde des métaphysiques, la facilité, qu'il y a de se tromper là dessus, avant que d'avoir rangé ses raisonnemens d'une manière rigoureuse à la façon d'un calcul, m'en empêche de former un jugement définitif. Monsieur Arnaud, qui entend parfaitement la philosophie moderne, et qui paraît Cartésien, n'a jamais osé toucher cette corde, ou répondre aux difficultés presque invincibles qui semblent combattre la Transsubstantiation ; peut-être parce qu'il croyait que son explication serait condamnée quand elle paroîtrait. De sorte que voici comme je crois qu'il faudrait faire pour aller sûrement en ces matières : savoir, *il faudrait qu'un homme méditatif, qui n'est pas éloigné de la réunion, composât une Exposition de la Foi, un peu plus particularisée que celle de Monsieur de Condom, où il tâcherait de s'expliquer, le plus exactement et le plus sincèrement possibles, sur les articles disputés, évitant les équivoques et les termes de la chicane scolastique, et ne parlant que par des expressions naturelles. Et il soumettrait cette explication au jugement de quelques savans évêques des plus modérés (du parti de l'Eglise Romaine), dissimulant et son nom et son parti. Et pour les faire juger*

d'autant plus favorablement, il ne demanderait point s'ils sont de son sentiment, mais seulement s'ils tiennent son sentiment pour tolérable dans leur Eglise.

V. A. S. me dira qu'il ne faut pas tant de façons, et on peut être de la communion de Rome sans entrer dans ce détail. Je répons distinguendo: une personne qui n'a pas approfondi ces matières, et n'a pas dessein de les approfondir, est aisée à satisfaire. *Mais celui qui a médité sur les choses doit aller sincèrement, et s'il soupçonne que certains de ses sentimens pourraient être condamnés, il se doit expliquer de bonne heure.* Autrement il se pourrait exposer à des conjonctures fâcheuses, si quelque jour on le voulait faire avouer des choses qu'il ne saurait approuver. Ce qu'il arriva à Galileo, qu'on força à abjurer le mouvement de la terre.

Personne ne pourrait en ce cas faire obtenir sous mains une approbation de cette nature que V. A. S. Et pour mieux dresser une telle exposition, il faudrait la concilier avec V. A. même. Mais sois que cela réussisse ou non, celui qui fait le sien pour n'être point dans le schisme, est en effet dans l'Eglise, au moins *in foro interno*, suivant l'expression de V. A. S., que je trouve excellente. Je crois cependant que l'approbation des évêques suffirait, et que celle de Rome ne serait point si nécessaire. Peut-être pourtant qu'on le pourrait espérer, si on s'y prenait comme il faut, et je sais qu'il y a des personnes à Rome qui y pourraient servir. Mais on ne saurait bien espérer quelque chose de cette nature sans une grande application.

Je ne sais si V. A. S. a vû M. l'Evêque de Tina, autrement ce Père Royan, qui a été dans nos cours il n'y a pas long-temps, pour proposer des voies d'accommodement en matière de religion, et ce qu'elle en juge.

Il me semble que V. A. S. n'a pas pris mon sens touchant ce que j'avais écrit à l'égard d'une exposition raisonnable des matières de foi, qui fisse voir qu'il n'y a pas de contradiction. Cela ne déroge point à l'autorité d'une tradition perpetuelle de l'Eglise Romaine. Car ceux qui tiennent que quelque dogme de l'Eglise Romaine implique contradiction, tiendront aussi que l'Eglise ne les a pas enseignés, et se croiront en droit de donner aux passages de la Sainte Ecriture et de SS. Pères une ex-

plication, qui selon eux évité l'absurdité, outre que les Pères parlent souvent assez obscurément et assez variablement sur les articles qui n'étaient pas agités de leur temps, par exemple St. Augustin.¹

¹ Guhrauer's *Leibnitz's Deutsche Schriften*, ii. App. pp. 65-9

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