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# Augustine's Psychology during his first period of literary activity with special reference to his relation to Platonism

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## Inaugural-Dissertation


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Thomas Jones Parry

aus Rhuddlan, North Wales, Großbritannien.



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To my Father and Mother.

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## Contents.

	page
Introduction . . . . .	1
Chap. I. The relation of the soul to the body . . . . .	7
Chap. II. The nature of the soul . . . . .	16
Chap. III. The immaterial character of the soul . . . . .	36
Chap. IV. The immortality of the soul . . . . .	47
Chap. V. The Epistemology	
a) The theory of Knowledge through the Senses . . . . .	65
b) The theory of Knowledge through the Reason . . . . .	73

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## Introduction.

The following treatise is a humble contribution to the great field of the Augustiniana. The field has been already well worked, the mountain has been tunelled in every direction; still the present writer believes himself to have found a side of the hill which has been tunelled least; the work of others has not been ignored, and wherever possible and so far as the scope of the treatise allowed, this work has been referred to and utilised.

There is much to indicate that the interest of the English world in the psychology of the ancients is not so great as it might be. Otto Klemm in his *Geschichte der Psychologie* quotes a modern psychologist's remark to the effect that Psychology has a long past, but only a short history.

The English world may possibly, be already penetrated with such a view of the matter; at any rate it is a fact that there is not a single book of any note in English on the history of psychology.<sup>1)</sup>

Saint Augustine is one of our ancient psychologists. It must be allowed that he is in the first place a theologian, a psychologist only in the second. Still, the man looms so great in the history of the world that his opinion on any subject whatever cannot but be of intense interest.

Harnack has traced his wonderful influence coming, on the one side, through Luther and others in a direct line to our own days.<sup>2)</sup> He was one of the greatest thinkers of all time, and succeeded, perhaps, more by a kind of intuition of genius than by slow and painful effort in penetrating far into the mysterious depths of the riddle of the world and of humanity.<sup>3)</sup>

There is doubtless some truth in the view that Augustine was so great as philosopher and psychologist because he was

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<sup>1)</sup> See James Ward's article „Psychology“ in *Encycl: Brit: 11<sup>th</sup> Edition.*

<sup>2)</sup> Harnack A. *Vortrag über die Confessionen Augustins*<sup>2</sup>. Gießen 1895.

<sup>3)</sup> Scipio K., *Des Aurelius Augustinus Metaphysik, im Rahmen seiner Lehre dargestellt.* Leipzig 1886.

so great a theologian. This is Harnack's opinion.<sup>1)</sup> A clue to the meaning of this statement is the further statement that Augustine made so much more progress in psychology than his predecessors for the reason that he was a monotheist, These determining theological and ethical interests place their stamp even upon the earlier writings. The light of eternity shines upon every object of discussion. Even in the field of discussion and debate, God and the soul are not separated. "Deum et animam scire cupio". It follows that Augustine does not regard the soul as Aristotle did from a biological standpoint. For the latter, the soul was the principle of life, but Augustine regarded it rather from the ethical and religious standpoint. For him the soul is preeminently the rational element in man, and so he conceives of man not as an animal but as a rational being. The human soul is the object not only of his investigation but also of his love, and even in a thief, as he himself says, he finds the soul lovable<sup>2)</sup>. This Augustinian method corresponds very closely to the metaphysical and ethical treatment of the soul in Plato.<sup>3)</sup>

J. A. Lange once characterised modern psychology as „Psychologie ohne Seele“.<sup>4)</sup> It may be as true to say that in Augustine we find „Seele ohne Psychologie“. The soul is in no danger of being lost in a forest of pedantic and idle detail. Thimme's remarks are worth repeating.

“With earnestness and determination he confined himself to practical questions of importance, and questions which theory did not despair of answering. There is nothing dreamy and Gnostic-like in his thinking. He is by no means tempted to follow Plotinus in his phantastic and abstract speculations about the Nous, the World-soul &c. His instinct for knowledge springs out of a burning desire to attain to complete certainty on the greatest questions.”

His language is not that of a man who is exclusively philosopher and psychologist. There is little of the abstruse or technical in it; it is such as an ordinary man could understand.

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<sup>1)</sup> So ist Augustin das psychologische Genie der patristischen Periode, weil er das theologische Genie gewesen ist. (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte<sup>4</sup>. Tübingen 1910 Vol. III p. 104.)

<sup>2)</sup> Soliloquia Bk. I ch 2.

<sup>3)</sup> We intend in the course of the treatise to keep the parallels between the Augustinian and the Platonic and the Plotinian psychology constantly in mind.

<sup>4)</sup> i. e. Psychology without the soul.



Doubtless, the reader would not fail to secure the impression that the writer had enjoyed years of rhetorical training.<sup>1)</sup>

Augustine, although a man of the greatest originality, was nevertheless a great reader, and was deeply influenced by all that he had read. In the writings of the early period he names but rarely the authors he had studied most, but their influence is everywhere unmistakeable. He was one of those men who never read a book without betraying the fact subsequently either in their talk or in their writings. Although he has a gift for illustration, and has no need to borrow at all, we cannot but suspect now and again that before us lies a reminiscence of an illustration which he had seen somewhere. The various individual references and the general style of *De Ordine* Ch. 4 remind us of sections in the *De Officiis* of his master Ambrosius.

Plato and Plotinus are reflected from many of his pages, but it is part of our task to show that Augustine has not followed them slavishly. While his dependence on these two authors has been overestimated, we shall point out on the other hand, that his indebtedness to Aristotle has been neglected. We feel indeed, that Augustine is like a great bumble bee, entering into every flower in the garden of philosophy, and tumbling out again covered with the fruitful pollen which he cannot help scattering wherever he goes. But even the borrowed material is the seed of new and varied thoughts full of life, and everything is transformed through the force of his transcendent genius.

This treatise confines itself to the range of the "Jugend-schriften" or those philosophical writings which Augustine wrote during the first few years after his conversion. He gave himself in the *Retractationes* much trouble to explain the chronology of his writings. The student will find the dates and the occasion of writing given with some fulness in the introduction to each work in the Benedictine edition of Augustine's works.

The Abbé Martin has only a bare sketch of the chronology at the end of his book, but Wilhelm Thimme enters into a detailed investigation of these questions. The appended list follows the order of the writings in the Benedictine edition of the works. Paris 1841.

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<sup>1)</sup> „La langue de cette première série d'ouvrages est celle du professeur d'éloquence; elle est aussi celle que les habitudes des premiers siècles chrétienne avaient façonnée. Preface p VIII. *Saint Augustine* par L'abbé Jules Martin. Felix Alcan. Paris 1901.

Soliloquiorum	Libri II.
Contra Academicos	Libri III.
De beata vita	Liber unus.
De Ordine	Libri II.
De immortalitate animae	Liber unus.
De quantitate animae	Liber unus.
De Musica	Libri VI.
De Magistro	Liber unus.
De libero arbitrio.	Libri III.
Epistolae ad Nebridium.	

A number of the writings were written at Cassisiacum, a farm outside Milan, whither Augustine, accompanied by his mother and friends, had retired at the invitation of a friend and disciple to await his baptism at Milan, Easter 387. The atmosphere of the country breathes through many of these dialogues, and they all reflect more or less, the easy circumstances of their composition. We find ourselves sometimes on the way to a favourite tree in the meadows near the house where the discussion is to take place. Quite suddenly a messenger arrives from the house to say it is dinner time and everything is broken off at once. Sometimes it is too cloudy or too wet to go to the fields as usual, and the company adjourn instead to the pleasant baths belonging to the establishment. If it is a birthday or some such festive occasion, the subject for discussion is joyfully tuned to the happiness of the day. The written works faithfully reflect all this freedom; the shorthand writer is not mentioned, but it is only with his help that these intellectual treats could have been preserved for us.

A chronological list of the writings.

Contra Academicos I. II. III.	} Cassisiacum.	Autumn 386.
De beata vita		
De Ordine I. II.		
De beata vita	Ides November 386 (Augustine's birthday).	
Contra Academicos I.	A few days before Ides Nov. 386.	
De ordine I <sup>1</sup> ).	A few days after Ides Nov. 386.	
Contra Academicos II. III.	Immediately following de Ordine I.	
De Ordine II. <sup>1</sup> )	Following Contra Academicos II. III.	
Soliloquia I. II.	Soon after the first three dialogues.	

<sup>1</sup>) As to the dates of De Ord.: I. II. Cf. *Retractationes* Bk. I Ch. 3, also Thimme p. 7.

- De immortalitate animae — Milan. — Awaiting Baptism i. e. immediately before Easter 387.
- De quantitate Animae — Rome — Between Easter 387 and Autumn 388.
- De libero arbitrio I. — Rome — (His mother had meanwhile died at Ostia.)
- De libero arbitrio II. III.<sup>1)</sup> — Hippo. According to *Retractationes* I ch 9. first finished, not written down there after his ordination.
- De musica VI — Hippo. — circa 389/390. (The first five books are earlier than the sixth).
- De magistro — Hippo — circa 389/390.
- Epistula VII (ad Nebridium). Written (according to the Benedictine editors) about the beginning of 389.

Among the numerous modern works consulted by the author of this treatise, special mention should be made of those by Woerter and Thimme, but for different reasons. Dr. Friederich Woerter's treatise goes back to the year 1880.<sup>2)</sup> It is an admirable study, and proves useful when it supplies detailed references, but the book is blemished by the assertion that Augustine extracted his materials, especially the proofs for the immortality of the soul in a wholesale fashion or even entirely (samt und sonders) from Plotinus. Thimme undertook the task of refuting Woerter's statement, and in our opinion successfully. We have endeavoured to support Thimme and wish to pay a tribute to his book.<sup>3)</sup> It is scholarly clear and interesting. We trust, however, that we have succeeded in supplementing this work, especially by the discussion of those subjects lying outside the scope of Thimme's book.

The subject of this treatise, which reviews Augustine's thoughts on the nature of the soul at the time when he was under the full influence of Plato and Neoplatonism must be of interest to students of patristic theology. Augustine never shook

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<sup>1)</sup> Thimme, basing his opinion upon internal evidence, ascribes parts of *de libero arbitrio* II. III. to different periods. Those parts, e. g. which show a strong ecclesiastical interest are brought down to a comparatively late date.

<sup>2)</sup> Woerter, *Die Unsterblichkeitslehre in den philosophischen Schriften Augustins*. Freiburg 1880.

<sup>3)</sup> Thimme, *Augustins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren nach seiner „Bekehrung“ 386—391*. Berlin 1908. (*Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und Kirche*. Stück 3.)

off these influences, although he subsequently repudiated much of what he taught at this early period. His psychology had a direct influence upon his theological teaching, especially his doctrine of the Divine Nature.

It is well known how he conceived of the human spirit as formed according to the image of the Trinity.<sup>1)</sup> He would not, as Harnack observes,<sup>2)</sup> have become the reformer of the Christian church if he had not possessed more than the Neoplatonic idea of God, which was based on Naturalism. Still, the Neoplatonic ideas remained as a back ground for the new colours which he subsequently laid upon it.

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<sup>1)</sup> See Stöckl, *Christliche Philosophie*. Mainz 1891 p. 337.

<sup>2)</sup> Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*<sup>4</sup> Vol. III p. 112/13.

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## Chapter 1.

### The relation of the soul to the body.

Inferiority to the soul of Matter in general, and of the body in particular p. 7. Wrong views of the relation of soul and body are attacked a) Pythagoras p. 8, b) Aristotle p. 9. The ultimate bond of union between soul and body, viz the participation of both in the "Rationes" p. 11. Defence of the view of the soul's non-passive relation to the body in the process of sensation p. 12. The nature of Sleep and Dreams p. 14. The release of the soul from the body p. 15.

In *De libero Arbitrio*, intelligence and matter are contrasted as the highest and lowest extremes of the universe,<sup>1)</sup> and corresponding to this low estimate of Matter, the body is regarded as the meanest part of man.<sup>2)</sup> There is nothing in the world so low as body which is all body, and even a sinful soul is an ornament for it; it lends the body Form, albeit of a low grade. Such a sinful soul suits its earthly residence well; it would not suit a heavenly one.

All body, of whatever kind is inferior to soul. Augustine regards light as a body, but among bodies it holds the first place,<sup>3)</sup> Even light, however, on account of its material nature is inferior to soul.<sup>4)</sup>

The great scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas attacked this view of Augustine, and as a champion of Aristotle against Plato, maintained that Augustine made the statement on the authority of that philosophy (Platonic) to which he had listened as a student (*II Sent: d. 13. qu: 1. 3.*).<sup>5)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Quid enim majus in creaturis quam vita intelligens, aul quid minus potest esse quam corpus? *De lib: arb: II ch 17 § 46.*

<sup>2)</sup> Male facere . . . est, temporalia, et quae per corpus, hominis partem vilissimam sentiuntur, quasi magna et miranda sectari. *De lib: arb. I ch 16.*

<sup>3)</sup> In corporibus autem lux tenet primum locum. *De lib: arb. III 5 § 16.*

<sup>4)</sup> Quamvis enim anima nostra peccatis tabefacta sit, sublimior est, tamen et melior, quam si in hanc lucem visibilem verteretur. *De lib: arb: III ch 5 § 12.* Cf also *De lib: arb: III 5 § 16.*

<sup>5)</sup> See Baeumker, Clemens. "Witelo", ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des 13. Jahrh.: p. 418. Münster 1908.

Even in its degradation the soul does not lose its non-corporeal nature,<sup>1)</sup> and in consequence it is ever able to preserve its superiority.

Such essential superiority is a guarantee of its integrity and force; for superior nature, according to a principle held firmly by Augustine implies superior force also. Consequently in the midst of all bodily changes, the soul continues unchanged.<sup>2)</sup>

Pliny had expressed his wonder at the influence of the body on the soul,<sup>3)</sup> but Augustine expresses his wonder that the soul in spite of all bodily influences should remain unchanged.

Soul and body are, therefore, in their nature essentially disparate. On this principle of the disparity of soul and body, Augustine says that virtues have their seat in the soul, and not in the body, and consequently the soul cannot be defiled by violence done to the body.<sup>4)</sup> Such a statement, we may well imagine, could on occasion be perverted and made an excuse for lewdness.

There are three wrong views of the relation of the soul to the body, and these Augustine attacked viz.

The soul as

1. Harmonia
2. Temperatio
3. Entelecheia

of the body.

The first of these views was that of Pythagoras, and the last was that of Aristotle.

The soul cannot be a Harmony of the body, for a Harmony of the body must needs be inseparably connected with the body; it must be in the body and there can be nothing in this Harmony which is not likewise in the body itself. Now, body is mutable, and therefore Harmony must also be mutable. Ratio however which either is the soul, or is in the same is immutable and therefore Ratio or the soul cannot be such a Harmony; in fact the soul cannot be the Harmony of the body.<sup>5)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Anima, quae ad quantamlibet sui decoris diminutionem defectumque pervenerit, omnium corporum dignitatem sine ulla dubitatione semper superabit. De libero arbitrio Ch. 5 § 16.

<sup>2)</sup> Miramur quippe animi naturam mutabilitate corporis non mutari.

<sup>3)</sup> As quoted by Walter Pater in his book "Marius the Epicurean". Mirum est ut animus agitatione motuque corporis excitetur. Plinius Epist. I. 6. 2.

<sup>4)</sup> De pudicitia, vero, quis dubitaverit, quin ea sit in ipso animo constituta, quandoquidem virtus est, unde a violento stupratore eripi nec ipsa potest. De libero arbitrio Bk I Ch 5.

<sup>5)</sup> De immortalitate animae Ch. 2.

Plotinus also attacks this doctrine of the soul as Harmony, but while he mentions Pythagoras, Augustine does not mention his name, in accordance with his general custom in these early writings. We have seen how Augustine dismisses this Pythagorean theory with the application to it of a single argument.

Plotinus recounts in rapid succession a number of arguments, not one of which is the same as Augustine's, — the soul is the earlier existing, harmony only comes after; the soul is stronger than the body and combats it, which Harmony could not do; the soul is substance, but Harmony is no substance. Again, if the soul is itself Harmony, then a soul must be postulated as existing before it in order to produce it, just as harmony in the strings of the instrument posits a musician.<sup>1)</sup>

## 2. Temperatio.

The question concerning Temperatio is discussed in *de immortalitate animae* Ch. 10.<sup>2)</sup> His arguments against Temperatio are the same as those against the theory of Harmonia, only that the argument is here fuller.<sup>3)</sup> Temperatio is parallel to form and colour, and these are not substances, being inseparably connected with the body. The soul can, however, dissociate itself from the body, and soar upwards independent of it, which it could not do if it were Temperatio of the body. Temperatio is the proportional mixing of the four elements of which the body is composed. Augustine's description of Temperatio is very like Plotinus' description of the Pythagorean Harmony.<sup>4)</sup> Just as out of the multitudinous strings a touch brings forth one Harmony, so out of the mixing (*κράσις*) of various elements there results one soul.

## 3. Entelecheia.

This Aristotelian theory is not directly attacked, but in *De quantitate animae*, one of the arguments and illustrations

<sup>1)</sup> Plotinus *Ennead.* IV Bk. VII § 12.

<sup>2)</sup> Nisi forte vitam temperationem aliquam corporis ut nonnulli opinati sunt debemus credere.

<sup>3)</sup> The present writer is inclined to the opinion that Temperatio and Harmonia are ultimately only different expressions for the same theory. Augustine did not imagine they were the same, and yet in reality they may be so, having reached him from their original source along different channels. Cf. the expression ut nonnulli opinati sunt; On the other hand note the strict definition of Temperatio given in the above passage.

<sup>4)</sup> ὡς γὰρ ἐνιαῦθα ἐπιταμένον τῶν χορδῶν ἐπιγίγνεται τι οἷον πάθημα ἐπ' αὐταῖς ὃ λέγεται ἀρμονία, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου σώματος ἐν κράσει ἀνομοίων γινόμενον, τὴν ποιὰν κράσιν ζωὴν τε ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ψυχὴν οὖσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κράσει πάθημα. Plotinus *Ennead.* IV Bk. VII § 12.

used by Aristotle in demonstrating this theory is brought forward. viz: that based upon the movements of dissected insects.<sup>1)</sup> Augustine finds it hard to neutralise the impression produced by this phenomenon.

Plotinus describes very concisely the Aristotelian view of the soul standing in the same relation to the body as Form to Matter, or as the Form of the statue to the brass within it. He argues that on this hypothesis sleep would be impossible; for in sleep the soul retreats from the body — an impossibility on the supposition of an Entelechy.

Likewise there could be no opposition of spirit to passions; there would be no reaction possible within the organism.<sup>2)</sup>

Augustine is in agreement with Plato and Plotinus in his description of the precise relationship of the soul to the body. The former is the source of life for the latter. The soul occupies in Plato a middle position between the real world of ideas and the world of appearance to which the body belongs, and is the mediator and dispenser of life for the latter.

Augustine follows Plato here.<sup>3)</sup> The soul is not only the source of life for the body, and also that by means of which body becomes for the first time organised body, (*corporei speciem tradit*) but the soul is the continuous support of the body.

Augustine seems to have believed in the Platonic world-soul, as well as the individual soul: this world-soul is for the world of appearance what the individual soul is for the body.<sup>4)</sup> He describes in detail the functions of the soul in relation to the body in recounting the soul's seven stages of development.<sup>5)</sup> The soul vivifies the body, holds it together and keeps it from decay; it governs the process of nutrition, it preserves proportion and form; it is active, besides, in the realm of sensation; also seeks what is advantageous for the body and rejects what is disadvantageous; it brings about, moreover, the union of the sexes, sees also to the care and feeding of the unborn young. At the mention of this latter fact, it is not too naive to remark that he draws no distinction between the soul in man and in woman.

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<sup>1)</sup> See description on another page.

<sup>2)</sup> Plotinus *Ennead*: IV Bk. VII Ch. 13.

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. *De immortalitate animae* Ch. 15. *Hoc autem ordine intelligitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui.*

<sup>4)</sup> *Per animam ergo corpus subsistit, et eo ipso est quo animatur, sive universaliter ut mundus, sive particulariter, ut unumquodque animal intra mundum. De immortalitate animae* Ch: 15.

<sup>5)</sup> *De quantitate animae.* Ch 33.



The soul is superior to the body not because it is its artificer, but because it is rational.<sup>1)</sup>

The diffusion of the soul through the body.

The main relation of the soul to the body depends upon the question of the spatial, or nonspatial character of the former, and Augustine defends its nonspatial character. Nevertheless, he tacitly assumed that the soul is locally held within the body.<sup>2)</sup> It remains, however, to determine the nature of their exact relation.

The nonspatial character of the soul is a source of continual perplexity; if the soul is in the body, how can it hold within itself images of such huge objects? How is such a soul to be conceived of as diffused through the body in every part?<sup>3)</sup>

If the soul is really diffused through the body in every part, then it is logical to expect a growth of the soul corresponding to that of the body, and he discusses at length this question, refuting the notion of growth.

The soul, nonspatial in character is brought through its connection with the body into intimate connection with something spatial; the bond of union, however, is nonspatial.<sup>4)</sup>

It is impossible, therefore, that the light-like element which mediates between soul and body at the last stage in perception and sensation, be the medium of union. Light, albeit so ethereal and seemingly immaterial in nature, is truly material in character. But no material thing shall form the bond of union or meeting point of body and soul; the union is consummated from above, rather than from below. He conceives of this bond as determined by that which binds them both to those supra-corporeal realities, the Rationes. It is by means of these Rationes that body and soul are united together. Here is ground common to both, although they differ greatly in their degree of participation therein.<sup>5)</sup> The difference in participation may be measured by

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<sup>1)</sup> Non unde sum melior hirundine aut apicula; sed his melior quia rationale animal sum. De Ordine II ch 19 § 49.

<sup>2)</sup> Numquidnam putas animam tuam esse nisi in corpore tuo? Ita puto. De quantitate animae Ch 5 § 7.

<sup>3)</sup> Si per spatium sui corporis anima distenditur quomodo nullius quantitatis est? De quan: an ch. 15 § 26.

<sup>4)</sup> Postremo quamvis locum occupanti corpori, anima tamen non localiter jungitur. Cf. Propterea anima corpus fieri non potest, nisi forte loco anima continetur, et localiter corpori jungitur. De immortalitate: an ch. 16.

<sup>5)</sup> Summis illis aeternisque rationibus quae incommutabiliter manent, nec utique loco continentur prior afficitur anima quam corpus.

the superiority of the mind over the body, the mind being essentially of the same nature as the Rationes, viz: eternal and unchangeable.

If the mind be what it is by participation in these rationes, the same is true of the body in its own degree: it is from these that it receives its form and its being (*qua est in quantumcumque est*). Here then is the chain which joins both ends of the bridge together, body at the one end, soul at the other — the participation, each in its own degree, in the eternal and immortal Rationes. Is there not an approach to the Aristotelian spirit here (the Aristotelian theory, we know, was repudiated) which sought so to bring body and soul together, as to find the perfection and consummation of the one in the other?

Mass and soul differ in their behaviour as regards space. Mass (moles) can only extend itself by diffusion — parts will be present in parts, but soul can be present in its entirety in the part.

The proof of this is that the whole soul is conscious of an affection in any particular part of the body which it can quite distinctly locate in that part without confusion with the sensations of the whole body: in case of injury to the foot, the other parts of the body are set in motion, the eye moves, the mouth speaks, and the hand makes a movement.

This would not take place unless the soul which is present in those different parts was also present in its entirety in the foot. How is the soul, in its entirety, thus conscious of a sensation at a given point in the body? This does not take place by transmission, the intervening parts acting as message carriers from the one to the other until the terminus is reached, but the whole soul is rather present at each spot.<sup>1)</sup>

In accordance with his fixed principle of the superiority of the soul to the body, Augustine will never allow the soul to assume a passive role. He would never, from a philosopher's standpoint, have approved of that saying of Victor Hugo's "*Vous savez que c'est toujours le corps que perd l'âme*"! In general, it is easy to maintain the active relation of the soul to the body, but there are certain points at which difficulties arise. Augustine strives to overcome even these difficulties. The relation of the soul to the body in sensation, ultimately involves a view of the soul as passive, but he makes a supreme

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<sup>1)</sup> *Sed illud tota sentit anima, quod in particula fit pedis, et ibi tantum sentit ubi fit. Tota, igitur, singulis partibus simul adest quae tota simul sentit in singulis. De immortalitate animae Ch. 16 § 25.*

effort to save the honour of the soul by constructing a special theory of sensation. Sensation is "non latere animam quod corpus patitur". What is implied here is the soul's active participation in sensation; the fact of sensation shows the soul's watchfulness, and that is an active quality.

This is the conception clung to both in *De quantitate animae*, and in *De musica* Bk. VI, but in the latter, the mode in which non latere animam is to be understood is better explained. Augustine supposes a fine material substance to act as mediator between the soul and the body in the processes of sensation and perception. An effect produced upon the body from outside, e. g. a blow, is transmitted to this fine substance where it produces a disturbance. Travelling still further, it reaches the soul; the soul, however, far from being passively affected, takes active notice of it — non latere animam.

Later, he seems definitely to have regarded this finest of material substances as fire.<sup>1)</sup> The notion of light as medium between body and soul was a Plotinian thought, and through Augustine it became known among (Christian philosophers.<sup>2)</sup>

The quality of a sensation, whether it be pleasurable or painful, depends upon the nature of the effect upon the bodily processes. The fine material medium takes a different form, according to the senses with which it be concerned: it is light-like in the eyes, mobile and airlike in the ears, mist-like in the nostrils, damp in the mouth, and for the touch it is earthy. In all this Augustine is convinced that the soul preserves its activity.<sup>3)</sup>

This general description is applied with more detail to explain the nature of Hearing (for he was occupied, for the moment, with the theory of sounds). The ears are a sensitive membrane; (animatum membrum) in that membrane is the airlike element already referred to, and the percussion of the exterior air reacts upon this element in the membrane. The soul is perpetually engaged in imparting its life to the ears, and this it does quietly, unnoticed; but when a sound takes place this same soul sets in motion the air around the organ, the movement of which preceded the entrance of sound into the ears. In all this the soul plays a purely active part.

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<sup>1)</sup> See *De Genesi ad litt.* Bk. VII Ch. 15. It is pointed out elsewhere that light was for Augustine a body, although the finest of bodies, and fire and light are for him the same.

<sup>2)</sup> See Baeumker *Witelo* p. 453.

<sup>3)</sup> *Has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere cum sentit, non easdem passiones accipere.* *De musica* Bk. VI Ch. 5 § 10.

We certainly agree with Thimme when he says that Augustine's arguments lack conviction here exactly at the crucial point. Of course, it is impossible to see how the soul could begin to take cognisance of the changed conditions within the bodily organism, without receiving impressions from the body, either directly or indirectly. The element of passivity cannot be explained away.

The spirit in which Augustine describes the relation of the soul to the body, recalls Plotinus strongly to mind.<sup>1)</sup> The soul, says Plotinus, having entered the body, does not become its absolute property, but in certain respects holds itself outside the body. For this reason, the soul does not suffer on its intellectual side. It is easily observable that Plotinus is more moderate in his views than Augustine here, for he accepts the facts quietly without trying to kick against them. Augustine will not be beaten, and having determined that a passive role cannot be allowed the soul, strives with the courage of despair to carry through such a position.

The question of Sleep and Dreams is related to this part of our subject, for Augustine insists that although the soul, apparently, lies in sleep a helpless prisoner of the body, it is not so in reality. Neither by sleep nor by any other bodily affection is the force of the soul diminished. Sleep comes to us mostly as a welcome and invited guest, but not always.

Sometimes it involuntarily takes the soul captive. Pity the soul, then, at the mercy of this tyrant with heavy eyelids! May it not with its magic rob the soul of its high nature, and turn it into a lower nature — into body? Nay, for sleep is an affection purely of the body and the senses. Sleep shuts up and soothes the senses of the body, and the mind gives way to it with pleasure. Sleep refreshes the body after its labours, but it does not rob the mind of the power of perception or understanding; for even in sleep the mind has present to it images of things of sense, and these are so real, as to be indistinguishable from realities. Sleep places only the body in fetters, not the soul. We may carry on a discussion in a dream, and find on awakening, that we have followed true principles, and learned something in the discussion. All of this will remain, and have as much value, as though it were the experience of waking moments. On the other hand, the circumstantial details, such as the place of the discussion, and the person with whom we disputed, will be wrong. But these things

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<sup>1)</sup> Ennead IV Bk. VII § 18.

at all times are only the husk, which time like a wind carries with it into the oblivion of the past. All of this shows that though the body and its senses succumb to the lethargic influences of sleep, the soul is unconquerable.<sup>1)</sup>

It follows from the fact that body and soul are so incommensurate with one another, the body, moreover, being a burden for the soul, that release from the body is regarded as a blessing.

There is no attempt to analyse this process of dissolution; we gather that a measure of culture by means of the disciplines will be found very advantageous when a man comes to die. A distinction is drawn between such educated persons and those who are followers of tradition. Although by following tradition they may have lived good lives, without the help of the "disciplinae liberales" these persons cannot be termed blessed; yet Augustine firmly believed that when they come to die, even these persons will be released from the body with more or less ease, according to the degree of goodness in their lives.<sup>2)</sup>

Nowhere in these writings does Augustine speculate whether the soul after leaving the body will carry with it memories of its life on earth. We may possibly take for granted that he would have answered in the affirmative. He believed that an eternal existence without knowledge would not be desirable, and we may surmise that this career of knowledge proceeded unbroken through even death's portals themselves.

Augustine would be certainly far from sharing Plotinus' view that the soul after death would have no recollection of its life on earth; such a view brings into jeopardy the belief in the immortality of the soul.<sup>3)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> De immortalitate animae Ch. 14. Contra Academicos Bk. III Ch. 11.

<sup>2)</sup> De ordine Bk. II Ch. 9.

<sup>3)</sup> See Zeller's Grundriß der griechischen Philosophie<sup>10</sup> p. 334.

## Chapter II.

### The nature of the soul.

The spirit of the Augustinian inquiry p. 16. The break with Postaristotelian Materialism p. 17. The soul is defined, and its intensive-dynamical nature is demonstrated: that the soul is a source of movement is correlated to its essential nature as Force p. 18. The origin of the soul — Preexistence — Augustine's belief about the nature of Stars and Angels p. 21. The Faculty-psychology of Augustine; the psychology of Plato is compared p. 22. The Faculties. Reason p. 23. — Sense perception p. 24. — Phantasia p. 24. — Memory p. 25. Feelings and Desire p. 26. — Will p. 30.

Augustine, filled with a consuming desire for knowledge could still limit this intellectual desire to two objects, but these objects comprised the whole of existence, viz: God and the soul. The passage from Soliloquia Bk. 1 Ch. 2. is famous. *Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino.* It is not without significance for our investigation into Augustine's conception of the soul's nature, that God and the soul should be thus bound together in his desire. It was not mere scientific curiosity that urged him on to investigate the soul's nature. Modern psychologists probe into the soul's hidden recesses in the same spirit as the geologist digs into the bowels of the earth, but Augustine's discussions on the soul were fitted with angels' wings; they all soar upwards, and scarcely ever touch the earth at all. The questions of interest were, the immortality of the soul, its incorporeal nature, the nature of blessedness, the question of free will etc.

This loftiness of standpoint may well be the reason why he introduces no names either of authorities or of opponents into these treatises; for he is engaged in no mere scientific exploration into the regions of the unknown. The names even of a Plato or of a Plotinus would in this atmosphere only be profane. Therefore, engaged as students of psychology in searching for Augustine's ideas of the soul's nature, we are compelled to rely on accidental expressions thrown out in the course of the discussions on the great objects of inquiry just mentioned.

The close union of the soul and the deity in the bond of his desire for knowledge in Soliloquia Bk. I was not the whim of an hour. In another connection we find the prayer where this union is faithfully reflected still. — *Noverim me, noverim te.* It was through the one that Augustine hoped to know the other, to the extent such knowledge was possible. Speaking of the wizard Albicerius and his reputed knowledge of things human and divine, he says a man must know himself before presuming to think he may know God.<sup>1)</sup>

Augustine does not confine his attention to the soul in its individual setting; although in contrast e. g. to Plato, our material is so scanty, there are scattered references here and there to the relation of the soul to the universe<sup>2)</sup>? But even here, the interest of our author is bound up with other questions such as that of the effect of sin and the misery which it brings with it, upon the perfection of the universe as the handiwork of God.

The question which governs the whole conception of the soul's nature is that touching its non-corporeal character: Augustine had reached full assurance on this point, which crystallises out in the treatise *De quantitate animae*. It is not the treatise which created the assurance, but the assurance created the treatise. As Thimme says (p. 140) this dialogue gives the impression that he is already sure of his subject; he has not to wrestle with the thoughts, but spins them out with a certain leisureliness. This conviction means much when we reflect upon the character of the pre-Augustinian psychology.

It was determined by a view of the soul which gave its colour to the whole post-Aristotelian psychology — this was the *Pneuma-theory*.<sup>3)</sup> The soul was gradually being released from out the dark cells of Materialism; but the *Pneuma-theory* was only the grey dreariness before the dawn. Only the eye which has seen the light can recognise the darkness, and Augustine who had been enlightened knew that this "*Pneumalehre*" was but rank materialism.

To his collocator Evodius he remarks that to him *Pneuma* (air or wind) was as corporeal as could be. It possessed length, breadth height as truly as any set of walls.

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<sup>1)</sup> Quo pacto ille eas (res divinas) assequi poterat qui quid esset ipse nesciebat? *Contra Academicos* Bk. I Ch. 8 § 22.

<sup>2)</sup> *De libero arbitrio* Bk. III Ch. 9. *De immortalitate animae* Ch. 15.

<sup>3)</sup> See Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie* Vol. I Teil II pp. 132 ff.

So much negatively — we are now at liberty to seek out Augustine's positive conception of the soul's nature, without any further preliminaries.

Happily, he has given us a concise definition of the soul, although we have no lengthy discussion of its nature. "Mihi videtur (sc: anima) esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accomodata".<sup>1)</sup> The soul therefore is a kind of substance which partakes of reason, and is fitted for governing the body. The contents of the definition may be thus arranged.

1. The soul is a substance
2. The soul is rational.
3. The soul demonstrates Force.

### 1. The soul as substance.

There is much to be said about the conception of Substance, but for much of the material we would be obliged to wander further afield than the limits of the "Jugendschriften" allow.

There is e. g. in *De mor: Manich: a notable passage*<sup>2)</sup>, from which it appears that Substance is that which has Being. In Augustine's scale of being, body holds a low place but not the lowest. Body is not "nihil", it is not "inane". Empty space is all "inane", but there is less "inane" where body is; still there is much "inane" in the composition of body, and we can only assign relative being to it. Matter and Form must be distinguished; it is Form which gives body its share in being. Are we to suppose that Augustine thought body was a combination of Form and "inane"? It might well appear that he does so from *De libero arbitrio Bk II Ch. 20* (where he proves God alone to be the source of goodness). The Form which is in all things constitutes that which is good in them; the very least trace of Form is to be reckoned as a good, and when all Form is subtracted, there is nothingness (nihil) left. But even the Form contained in body was no true Form, for if it were true Form, then body would be spirit (animus)<sup>3)</sup>. What are these True Forms? It appears that they are identical with the 'Figures' of geometry, about which Augustine can only say that they are either in the Truth, or the Truth is in them.

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<sup>1)</sup> *De quantitate animae Ch. 13.*

<sup>2)</sup> Itaque ut nos jam nomine ab eo quod est esse, vocamus essentiam quam plerumque substantiam etiam nominamus; ita veteres quae haec nomina non habebant, pro essentia et substantia naturam vocabant *De mor man II Ch. 2. Cf. de im: an Ch. 3.*

<sup>3)</sup> *Soliloquia Bk. II Ch. 18.*



Truth (*veritas*) represents the highest stage of being, for God is *veritas*. And so, as true Form is in the Truth and Truth is in true Form, and the soul is in the Truth it follows that the soul is true Form, and has the same reality of being as *Veritas*, or more correctly, partakes of this reality.

## 2. The soul as rational.

This subject needs no separate treatment here. Throughout these writings is the rational character of the soul implied. For statements concerning the identity of the soul with *Intelligentia* see such passages as *Soliloquia* Bk II Ch. 19. The subject is treated at some length in the latter part of this treatise.

## 3. The soul as Force.

We have the means to arrive at a closer description of the quality of this substance which constitutes the soul. It is a law of thought that where in thinking of Substance the notion of Quantity is denied, the mind must fasten on the notion of Intensity or of Dynamical existence.

Augustine regards the substance of the soul as both Intensive and Dynamic in its nature.

We need not suppose that to speak of a *Defectus* of the soul implies a materialistic idea of Quantity and this term in the Augustinian discussion suggests not a quantitative shrinkage of the soul, but a loss of Intensity or Dynamic. The dynamic nature of the soul is expressed in the statement that it is a "*vis quaedam*".<sup>1)</sup> The notion of growth cannot be applied to the soul, because that implies a purely quantitative conception; with the passing of the years what we find is a ripening of the congenital inherent forces of the soul: the soul-Dynamic is moulded and shaped (to borrow quantitative images); potential energy becomes true energy ready for application.

This conception is strengthened and illustrated in the theory of the soul as Life. It is a Platonic conception, and is found throughout the "*Jugendschriften*".<sup>2)</sup> With Plotinus, Augustine holds that the soul is essentially and indissolubly connected with life; not merely that life is added or imparted to it in some way, but this dynamic principle *Vita* is

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<sup>1)</sup> *Ea vero inter virtutes, quae appellatur animi magnitudo, ad nullum spatium, sed ad vim quamdam, id est ad potestatem potentiamque animi relata, recte intelligitur. De quantitate animae Ch. 17.*

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. Plotinus *Ennead* IV. Bk. VII § 16.

of its very essence. Augustine, as shewn elsewhere cannot rely even on this principle as a proof of immortality. Life is like light; it may impart itself indefinitely, and yet in the end vanish from its theatre of existence or perish altogether.

The soul is also the source of Movement. This idea is essentially connected with the notion of the soul as Force. These properties are founded on "Substantia". There is no motion without substantia, yea, not without living substance. The soul is living substance; it moves the body but is itself unmoved.<sup>1)</sup>

The movement of the body by the soul plays in and out of two different spheres; in the sphere of the soul this movement is active. But having passed over into the body the same is transformed into a passive form; in the latter sphere it is subject to place and time, whereas in the former it partakes of neither. Its independence of Time is demonstrated through the fact that an act of intention embraces in itself past, present and future.

For Plotinus also is the soul the source of movement.<sup>2)</sup> All body is in movement (*ἔει γὰρ*), and would be speedily brought to an end, were there no psychical force supporting it (*ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ οὔσης*). The abolition of time in the sphere of the soul is a proof for Augustine of the resistance of the mind to the influence of bodily changes. The logical conclusion follows certainly quite smoothly from the premise. Mutation can only be measured in terms of time; only as present always changes into past can we think of change. Therefore if the soul is elevated above all time distinctions, there is no longer room for mutation within it.

But Augustine halts considerably at this point, and hesitates to draw the conclusion which the premise seems to warrant. He will not say that the soul is immutable, but simply that its implication in the movement of the body does not make it mutable.

Siebeck asserts that Augustine does not teach the absolute simplicity of the soul.<sup>3)</sup>

Siebeck's reference, however, is only to a late writing.<sup>4)</sup> In the *Jugendschriften* the simplicity of the soul is maintained. Although in *Soliloquia* Book II Ch. 1 in answer to the question *Simplicem te sentis ane multiplicem?* he answers *Nescio*, — in

<sup>1)</sup> De immortalitate animae Ch. 3.

<sup>2)</sup> Plotinus Ennead IV Book VII § 3.

<sup>3)</sup> Auch absolute Einfachheit kommt ihr nicht zu; sie ist eben nur einfacher als der Leib. *Gesch. der Psychologie* Bd. I Teil II p. 385.

<sup>4)</sup> viz De Trinitate Bk. VI. 6, 8.

another passage he defends the simplicity of the soul by saying that we count earth and air as simple elements, much more should we count the soul as simple and not compound. Even in *De Trinitate*, the compound nature of the soul is taught only in a special sense; it is complex in view of the very different moods which it displays, such as desire, fear, joy, sorrow etc. Each of these is something by itself, different from the others.

As to the origin of the soul, and its entrance into the body, we must go outside the *Jugendschriften* for statements to the effect that it is no emanation from the Deity. The Manichaeans had taught the soul to be such an emanation; but if it were, then either it must share all the divine perfections as being one with the Deity, or the Deity must share the soul's imperfections.<sup>1)</sup>

Four ways are enumerated in which the entrance of the soul into the body may be thought of. He will not definitely decide upon anyone of them.<sup>2)</sup> In this discussion appears Augustine the Churchman for he remarks that Church commentators upon holy writ have not decided the question, or if they have he himself is not aware of it. In the previous chapter he considered the possibility of a soul dwelling somewhere in the recesses of the Godhead being sent to inhabit a body to which the sin of Adam clung. This soul will chastise the body for its heritage of sin with the whip of the virtues, subjecting the unruly body to law and temperance.

There is no doubt that Augustine during our period accepted fully the Platonic doctrine of Preexistence. In the letter to Nebridius is expressed his indignation towards those who rejected this doctrine (*illud Socraticum nobilissimum inventum*). The doctrine of Anamnesis, taught so clearly would be unintelligible without the doctrine of Preexistence.<sup>3)</sup> But there came a change. Even within this period of the *Jugendschriften* there are signs of hesitation concerning this Platonic doctrine, and he considers it hazardous to speak of the subject.<sup>4)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Cf. *De moribus Manichaeorum*. *De Gen contra Man*: etc.

<sup>2)</sup> *Harum autem quattuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibusque nascentibus novae fiant, an in corpora nascentium jam alicubi existentes vel mittantur divinitus, vel sua sponte labantur nullam temere affirmare oportebit. De libero Arbitrio Bk. III. Ch. 21.*

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. Thimme p. 119.

<sup>4)</sup> *Ita istuc dicis quasi liquido compertum habeas numquam nos fuisse sapientes; attendis enim tempus ex quo in hanc vitam nati sumus. Sed cum sapientia in animo sit, utrum ante consortium hujus corporis alia quadam vita vixerit animus, et an aliquando sapienter vixerit, magna quaestio est. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 12 § 24.*

The human soul is not inferior to the stars and angels, howsoever exalted their habitation be. and whatsoever the origin of the soul.

The angels are exalted beings who have never sinned. The human soul has sunk through sin to an inferior level, but as to its nature it is not inferior to the angels, though in function unequal.<sup>1)</sup> As to the stars, Plato thought that they were souls of a high order, but Augustine regards them as corporeal in so far as related to their light which bodily eyes can see. De libero arbitrio Bk. III. Ch 9 § 25.

### Parts or Faculties?

A vital point in which Augustine does not follow Plato is his teaching about the parts of the soul. Such a doctrine would have been incompatible with his clear view of the immateriality of the soul. It is not necessary to describe the Platonic teaching, for it is well known; but it is not very easy to arrive at settled convictions about the significance of this teaching.<sup>2)</sup> In the Phaedrus we have the celebrated allegory of the steeds. In the Republic 434—441 the meaning of this allegory is explained, for there the soul is divided into a λογιστικόν and an ἄλογον εἶδος, the latter being further subdivided into θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν.<sup>3)</sup> These parts of the soul have specific parts of the body allotted to them severally. Archer-Hind does not think with Zeller that Plato was unaware of the problem involved in such a division of the soul, and he sees in the Timaeus, which at first sight, seems to plunge deeper into perplexity, a clue to the solution of the problem. Zeller insists that Plato understands real parts, but A.—H. says that the Timaeus, although a profound philosophical speculation is also one of the most fanciful of fairy tales, and thinks we can only accept the conclusion which Zeller rejects, viz that the three divisions are not real parts, but different forms of activity. All soul as such is

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<sup>1)</sup> Et illis superioribus officio quidem impares, sed natura pares. De libero arbitrio Bk. III Ch. 11 § 32.

<sup>2)</sup> Grote had already called attention to discrepancies between the Phaedo and the Philebus (Grote's Plato<sup>3</sup> Vol. II p. 159. Murray London 1875.) Out of these discrepancies arises the oft discussed question, whether the argument for immortality in the Phaedo, applies to all three parts of the soul, or only to the highest. Grote deals with the difficulty by saying that Plato suited his doctrines to meet the need in these various dialogues. Archer-Hind would prefer to attempt a reconciliation of these difficulties. Archer-Hind "Difficulties in the Platonic psychology". Journal of Philology Vol. X, 1882.

<sup>3)</sup> viz Rational, Emotional, and Appetitive parts.

eternal and uniform in its substance, but soul on entering into union with matter is forced more or less to operate through matter and the names given to this combined action of soul and matter are *Θυμός*; and *ἐπιθυμία*, and *Θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* are expressions for the soul in certain material relations.<sup>1)</sup> Be that as it may, whether Plato meant what he seems to say in his doctrine of parts or not, this is not the doctrine found in Augustine.<sup>2)</sup> He teaches a "Faculty" psychology, and by Faculty is not meant a 'locally' separate part. The Faculties may be enumerated as follows.

The Knowledgefaculties (including Reason and sense perception)  
"Phantasia".

Memory.

Feelings and Desire.

Will.

#### The rational faculties.

Augustine has no such well differentiated use of the terms "anima" and "animus" as Siebeck would lead us to suppose.<sup>3)</sup> It is true that the term "animus" is always used of the soul in its higher relations and functions, but "anima" is frequently used in the same sense.<sup>4)</sup>

The meaning of Ratio in the *Jugend-Schriften* is worthy of a few remarks. Such a notice will serve as an introduction to Augustine's theory of knowledge, for Ratio is the organ of this highest faculty.

The uncertainty over the meaning of this term comes to light in a passage from *De libero arbitrio*.<sup>5)</sup> Ratio or mens is

<sup>1)</sup> See also Natorp, *Platons Ideenlehre, eine Einführung in den Idealismus*, Leipzig 1903.

<sup>2)</sup> cf. Siebeck. Die verschiedenen Vermögen sind nicht Teile im alten Sinne, sondern verschiedene Wirkungsweisen der einen Seele. *Gesch. der Psychologie* Bd. I Teil 2 S. 386. On this point see also K. Werner in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte* (Phil.-hist.-Kl. LXIII pp. 267 ff.).

<sup>3)</sup> Says Siebeck. — "In relation to the body it is called soul, in relation to its immateriality Spirit."

<sup>4)</sup> *Quid ergo anima inquam? nullane habet alimenta propria? Plane, inquit mater; nulla re alia, credo, ali animam quam intellectu rerum atque scientia. De beata vita Ch. 2 § 8. Sensum ipsum considerans corporis, nam et isto ipso anima utitur, et ipsa sola est cum intellectu qualiscumque collatio. De Ordine Bk. II Ch. 3 § 10 etc. etc.*

<sup>5)</sup> "Hoc quidquid est quo pecoribus homo praeponitur, sive mens, sive spiritus, sive utrumque rectius appellatur (nam utrumque in divinis libris invenimus) si dominetur atque imperet caeteris quibuscumque homo constat, tunc esse hominem ordinatissimum." *De libero arbitrio* Bk. I Ch. 8 § 18. So also "Sed si aliud ratio, aliud mens, constat certe nonnisi mentem uti posse ratione". Again "Ratio profecto aut animus est aut in animo". *De immortalitate animae* Ch. 2. Cf. also *Soliloquia* Bk. I Ch. 1.

the best part of man, which the whole man has to respect and obey.<sup>1)</sup> Obedience is the foundation of good order in society and so is Ratio, which claims obedience in man's "mikrokosmos", the principle of order both in the universe and in the individual life. Upon it is founded the eternal law, for Ratio is itself eternal, unchangeable, and therefore to be always implicitly obeyed.<sup>2)</sup>

Ratio is that endowment of man which raises him above not only the whole world around him but also above invisible powers mysterious and ineffable, dwelling we know not where.<sup>3)</sup> But man may be liable to treat this valuable dower with too little care; by too much haste and too little deliberation we run the risk of losing confidence in the trustworthiness even of Ratio.<sup>4)</sup>

There are intermediate links between Ratio and the organs of sense perception, viz Phantasia, and the Interior sensus; the latter is part of the machinery of sense perception and belongs even to the animal soul; Phantasia links on to the higher functions and is exclusively human.<sup>5)</sup> Our author is conscious of this word Phantasia as a foreign name, and it is hardly naturalised in his vocabulary; he uses also the Latin term "imaginatio". He is inclined, on the one hand, to regard the "imaginatio" as an illegitimate element in the soul, a disturber of the pure vision of Ratio; for imaginatio draws its images from the perceptions, introduces them into the holy of holies of the mind, where they are liable to cause confusion with the real ideas, the only true source of the highest Knowledge; these false images are the "imaginationes" magna cautione vitandae. Soliloquia Bk. II Ch. 20.

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<sup>1)</sup> Quis, inquam, dubitaverit nihil aliud esse hominis optimum, quam eam partem animi, cui dominanti obtemperare convenit caetera quaeque in homine sunt. Contra Academicos Bk. I Ch. 2 § 5.

<sup>2)</sup> Illa lex quae summa ratio nominatur, cui semper obtemperandum est. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 6. Ea est qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 6 § 15.

<sup>3)</sup> These are the demons, of which the ancient world dreamt so much. They might be superior to man in a sort of low cunning; their senses might be more subtle, but such superiority is allowed the animals also, e. g. A bee would know better than a man how to get at honey. These demons in spite of their aerial abode are more contemptible than the beasts (ab hujus aeris animalibus quibusdam vilissimis). In intellect the demons are not comparable with man. Contra Academicos Bk. I Ch. 7.

<sup>4)</sup> Metus est enim ne quum saepe subruntur quae firmissima statura et mansura praesumimus, in tantum odium vel timorem rationis incidamus, ut ne ipsi quidem perspicuae veritati fides habenda videatur. De Magistro Ch. 10 § 31.

<sup>5)</sup> There is but little concerning Phantasia in the Jugendschriften and no developed theory.

Phantasia is a creative faculty, but it cannot rise as high as Ratio. By its means we call up images in the mind.<sup>1)</sup> With regard to its creative, image-forming character it is also called "Cogitatio imaginaria". There is a limit beyond which its creative power cannot go. Having e. g. conjured up two lines in a circle between which not even a finest point could be thrust, Phantasia declares it could introduce no more lines between, but Ratio cries out immediately that innumerable lines could be drawn there.

In classifying Phantasia we might make it a part of the Memory of Perceptions, though not of the Memory associated with Anamnesis.

### Memory.

Memory stores up the images of Perception. In the process of perception we receive imprints of the objects, much as wax receives the impress of the seal.<sup>2)</sup> These images are stored up in the memory; in the chambers of memory they are carefully arranged as documents of past things and events.<sup>3)</sup>

The higher objects perceived by the mind, as contrasted with the contents of sense perception which Memory serves, are ever present, and there is no past for them.<sup>4)</sup> The images of Memory are not to be thought of in terms of quantitative measurements, and the fact that memory can hold in itself such huge images is a proof of the soul's noncorporeal nature.<sup>5)</sup>

The doctrine of Anamnesis involves the existence of a Memory different from the Memory of sense perceptions.<sup>6)</sup> This doctrine posits such a Memory as a receptacle for the Innate Ideas.

In Epistula VII, (ad Nebridium) the question (raised by Nebridius) whether memory involved images of the Phantasia is noticed. Augustine's reason for thinking that it does not, is that we remember not only past things, but also things which have

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<sup>1)</sup> Cum etiam minimum circulum imaginando animo describimus. Soliloquia Bk. II Ch. 20 § 35.

<sup>2)</sup> Non jam res ipsas, sed imagines ab ipsis impressas memoriaeque mandatas loquimur De magistro Ch. 12 § 39.

<sup>3)</sup> Ita illas imagines in memoriae penetralibus rerum ante sensarum quaedam documenta gestamus. De Magistro Ch. 12 § 39.

<sup>4)</sup> cf De Magistro Ch. 12: De Ordine Bk. II Ch. 2 § 7 etc. etc.

<sup>5)</sup> An element in Memory is Recordatio, or the power of recollection. By its means the mind recalls to consciousness what at the moment was not there. Discretio is that power of distinguishing between the false and the true among the various elements which offer themselves to the mind at Recordatio's call. Soliloquia Bk. II Ch. 20 § 34.

<sup>6)</sup> Perhaps we have to do here only with psychological distinctions, So in Aristotle we have the distinction of *μνήμη* and *ἀνάμνησις*.

no past at all. Nebridius thought that Memory invariably involved Phantasy, which recalled things to mind through images of them. Sufficient answer to this is the reference to the recollection of those eternal verities which have no past and no images. By proving that Memory is not exclusively concerned with things in the past, Augustine scores a point over his adversaries who rejected the Socratic doctrine of Anamnesis. This doctrine taught that what we learn is really not new, but only recalled from unconsciousness into consciousness. i. e. everything which we learn is really eternal. Their argument was that memory recalled only past things, hence Augustine refutes this argument with his proof that Memory can act independent of Phantasia, and has to do not with past things alone.

We must allow with Thimme (p. 142) that Plotinus' treatment of Memory is superior to that of Augustine. Plotinus rejects the notion of Memory images altogether.<sup>1)</sup> Augustine emphasises the fact that these images are not quantitative, but it would have been simpler and better if he too had formed his theory without them.

#### The Senses.

These are noticed under the heading "Knowledge by means of the senses".

#### Feelings and Desires.

We may presume to find in Augustine a division of the feelings into

- (a) Organic
- (b) Intellectual.

#### (a) Organic

Animals as well as men experience those feelings of pleasure or pain which arise from different states of the organism, Their occasion is some change in the organism caused by a change in the surroundings. Analysis of the feelings we do not find. Even Plato is deficient here, but in Augustine it fails altogether. There are plentiful references to animal psychology in the *Jugend-schriften*, but as a rule, only in order to supply comparisons and illustrations; where even the human feelings are not analysed, we should hardly expect to find such analysis on the lower plane of animal life. A case occurs to our mind where the author might possibly have demonstrated his theory of Feelings if he possessed one. The movement of the parts of certain insects

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<sup>1)</sup> Plotinus. *Ennead IV. Bk. VI Ch. 1 ff.*



Will, but inherently it is free. Freedom is the Will's essence, and it is by the doctrine of a Fall that Augustine reconciles together the metaphysical freedom, and the experimental determinedness of the Will.

The Pelagians quoted this early work of Augustine against him in the course of the dispute, and maintained that he himself taught fully the doctrine of Freedom, saying also that he did not mention Divine grace in the whole work. He warmly repudiated the assertion in *Retractationes* Bk. I Ch. 9 and says that although he was then engaged in advocating free will against the Manichaeans, still he taught also the necessity of the Grace of God to release the Will which through the Fall was made a servant of sin.<sup>1)</sup>

#### General remarks.

The doctrine of "Parts" of the Soul made it impossible for Plato to realise adequately the problem of the Unity. Aristotle, doubtless, saw clearly the defect of the Platonic psychology, but there is no inner Unity in his own psychology. There are indications that Augustine was not unaware of the necessity of a real inner Unity. This question is essentially connected with that of Consciousness and Siebeck notes that Augustine possessed increased insight into the nature of Consciousness. The necessity of an Ego as subject was realised. The problem certainly had dawned upon him as we can see from *Confessiones* Bk. XIII Ch. 11. He has seen that the Faculties although several, are but one life, one soul, one substance. Perceiving other objects they also perceive themselves. The soul as an Unity can also through its own peculiar activity comprehend in one, both present, past and future. This posits a unity, a consciousness as background in which they can be united.<sup>2)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> cf. *De libero arbitrio* Bk. II Ch. 19 § 50.

<sup>2)</sup> *De immortalitate Animae* Ch. 3. And also Storz. *Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustins* pp. 116ff. 1882.

### Chapter III.

## The immaterial nature of the soul.

Why a special treatise on this subject should have been written p. 36. Woerter's view of the relation of *De quantitate animae* and *De immortalitate animae* p. 37. The arguments in *De quantitate animae* p. 40. An examination of the objections to the doctrine. a) The Epicurian argument, based upon a notion of the growth of the soul p. 41. b) The argument based upon the diffusion of Sensation over the whole body p. 43.

In view of the attacks on the originality of Augustine's psychological discussions, we may observe that Plato has no discussion on the question of the soul's immateriality; in fact it is one of the subjects he has said least about. The references to the subject here and there in Plato are not quite free from unclearness.<sup>1)</sup> Augustine's opinion on the subject is beyond dispute, especially as he has devoted a special treatise to it.

As Thimme points out (p. 139) he had believed in the soul's incorporeal nature ever since he read the writings of Plato; and since he heard from Ambrosius that this was also the doctrine of the church. In this treatise, however, faith is exchanged for scientific certainty.

If we ask why Augustine devoted a special treatise to the consideration of this subject, it is probably enough to answer that this would be a subject about which he was specially desirous of attaining to scientific certainty. Besides, there were plenty of false views on this subject, the direct refutation of which would have been an excellent reason for taking up the work of writing this treatise.

Just as in the time of Plato, the popular belief was that the soul was a material, windlike body,<sup>2)</sup> so there were plenty of centres of false doctrine about him on which Augustine's eye might have painfully descended.

He does not mention the Manichaeans in the *Jugend-*

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<sup>1)</sup> See Grote's "Plato"<sup>3</sup> Vol. II p. 166.

<sup>2)</sup> Phaedo 70 A. C. See also Rohde „Psyche“ Bd. II p. 264.

schriften, but we know with what joy he regarded his release from the fetters of their materialism. He would, doubtless, be glad to rescue others from the influence of a sect which taught a double soul, one of which came from the evil principle of the world, and whose nature, doubtless, was sufficiently low.<sup>1)</sup>

Although he refrains, as a rule, in these early writings from mentioning names, whether of sources drawn upon, authorities followed, or enemies attacked,<sup>2)</sup> it is easy to see that there were particular philosophical schools, which he had in mind. In *Contra Academicos* lies a precedent for an attack on such a school at this early period, and in the same way he may have attacked in our treatise, and in fact did attack the Stoic and Epicurian Materialism, although these Schools are not named.

Augustine did not refrain from using occasionally the facts of Immortality and Immateriality as mutual proofs. Woerter asserts that Augustine intended his treatise on the Immateriality as a proof for the Immortality. Eager to disprove Woerter, Thimme goes too far in saying that these facts are never used as mutual supports.

Plotinus had brought these doctrines together in a very close logical relation within the same treatise, and Woerter evidently thinks that because Plotinus used the Immateriality as proof of the Immortality, Augustine's object, in writing this treatise was to do the same — in spite of the fact that the treatise *De quantitate Animae* is later than the other! So presumptuous is Woerter in this matter, that he takes Augustine's treatises in the order of Plotinus' subject matter, and gives no reason for taking this liberty.<sup>3)</sup>

The introductory chapter of *De quantitate animae* helps to disprove Woerter's statement that Augustine wrote this treatise in order to supply what would have been "the proof after the event" for the Immortality.

Heinzelmann<sup>4)</sup> observes that in this first chapter of the treatise he throws out as many as five questions which might serve as materials for discussion, viz the origin of the soul, its constitution, the question of quantity, the soul after its entrance

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<sup>1)</sup> Überweg-Heinz, *Geschichte der Philosophie* 9 Bd. II p. 48.

<sup>2)</sup> This was a peculiarity which he dropped later, as we can see by comparing the *Jugendschriften* with *De Civitate Dei*. See Woerter p. 14 also Angus "Augustine's sources in *De civitate Dei*". Princeton 1906.

<sup>3)</sup> See Woerter pp. 16/17.

<sup>4)</sup> Heinzelmann *Augustin's Ansichten vom Wesen der menschlichen Seele in den Jahrbüchern der königl. Akademie zu Erfurt*. Erfurt-Villaret 1894.

into the body, and the condition of the soul after death. He chooses to dwell upon the question of Quantity, after making a few cursory remarks on the others. Now, if Augustine intended from the first to write this treatise as a necessary introduction to *De immortalitate animae*, it is certainly curious that five possible subjects for discussion should have been put forward ostentatiously at the beginning of the book.

Thimme, having observed that the treatise contains no new thoughts, but, doubtless, useful expansions and explanations, says he will be content with reproducing the chief thoughts. It is our aim to give Augustine's arguments as far as possible in their logical connection.

The treatise which sets out to discuss the question of Quantity, begins with the assertion that the category of Quantity cannot be applied to the soul, for Quantity can only be applied to bodies. It cannot, of course, escape us that the question whether the soul is quantitative is the "quod demonstrandum".

The soul has no dimensions, but nevertheless it has real being. This link in the argument is well expressed by Woerter "It is true that body has length, breadth and height, but it is not true that nothing exists, which has not length breadth, height". Evodius, who carries on this Socratic dialogue with Augustine allows this principle and is ready to admit that Justice which does not possess these dimensions is a much nobler thing than e. g. a tree, which possesses them.

Evodius serves to bring forward the views of the opponents and to express their possible dissension from Augustine's views and he now remarks that the way he thinks of the dimensionless soul is as windlike, and if the wind is a body, then is the soul a body too.

Let it be observed that the view of the soul as *Pneuma* or wind was very popular in the Postaristotelian period, and the Stoics with their Materialism were representatives of the *Pneuma* doctrine.<sup>1)</sup>

Replying to Evodius, Augustine says that he thinks as readily of the wind as a body, as he would of a stream. The soul is, therefore, not even a-windlike body and Augustine gets

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<sup>1)</sup> cf. Thimme p. 141. Er teilt also die alte stoische und neuerdings manichäische Ansicht, die auch Cicero vertritt, und deren Anhänger Augustin selbst einst gewesen war. Cf. also Siebeck *Gesch. der Psychologie* Bd. I Teil II. Die Psychologie des späteren Alterthums nach Aristoteles pp. 130 bis 160.

his collocutor to acknowledge the fact that wind has the chief characteristics of body viz length, breadth, height.<sup>1)</sup> The dialogue form of the discussion enables him to pass lightly from one argument to the other without troubling overmuch whether they are closely interconnected, still, one finds on attending closely a thread of connection where a too rapid survey might have overlooked it. Let us seek the thread at this point.

Evodius says that Augustine has convinced him that wind has length, breadth, height. If the soul has dimensions, they are not limitless like those of the wind. He acknowledges, in fact, that he associates the soul with the body in an essential manner, and the soul, consequently, will have the dimensions of the body. The soul must be of the same size as the body, for it pervades the body; it is the source of sensations within, and also wraps the whole body around; for otherwise there would be no sensation on the surface of the body. This is not a view of the matter arrived at accidentally, but was a view extensively held. Thimme calls it the usual supposition of the old Materialism.

As Woerter observes (p. 18) the Stoics regarded the soul as spatially diffused through the body and occupying the same geometrical dimensions as the body itself.

To disprove this widely held view, Augustine appeals to the fact of Memory.

By means of Memory the mind holds in itself images of great cities such as Milan.

These memory images are images of things corporeal, for cities and lands are such, but the images themselves are not corporeal. As proof, an illustration is borrowed from the science of Optics, which Woerter says is found in Plotinus. An optical law decrees that a mirrored image of an object should have its size proportioned to that of the mirroring surface.<sup>2)</sup> Following this parallel, it stands to reason that the memory image can be no greater than the body. But the Memory images can be those of huge tracts of country, and therefore the soul containing them cannot be corporeal with the same dimensions as the body.

The proof that the soul has no dimensions is brought a

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<sup>1)</sup> Quid hoc aere longius et latius et altius facile inveniri potest, quem commotum, ventum esse nunc abs te mihi persuasum est. Ch. 4.

<sup>2)</sup> See also Plato Alcibiades I, 133 A for an illustration from the image in the retina, but all we find in Plato is a bare reference to the image of an object, appearing in the eye as in a mirror.

step further with an investigation into the nature of Geometrical Dimensions.

Everything corporeal possesses these dimensions; even the thread of a spider's web has length and breadth and height, but we observe at the same time that the mind is thus able to discriminate these three dimensions, regarding separately the dimensions which in objects do not exist apart. Mind can think out and contain in itself an ideal line which is pure length, but such a line does not exist outside the mind. Thimme regards this as Augustine's chief proof — Because the soul can contain presentations of the figures of Geometry which are incorporeal, it must be itself incorporeal<sup>1)</sup>

Hitherto the argument has taken a negative form; from this point onwards we have the positive arguments. If the soul is not corporeal what is it? A clean clearcut definition is given.

Mihi videtur esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps regendo corpore accomodata. Ch. 13.

The emphasis is upon Substantia; the soul is an ultimate element which cannot be resolved into simpler elements. The soul is moreover rational and this rational character is the source of its power.

The argument prepares itself now for a farther advance. On the Platonic principle that like is known through like, the assertion is made first of all in a negative form, that if the soul were not incorporeal, it could not comprehend anything incorporeal. In the next place, it is asserted from a positive standpoint that the soul can comprehend and contain incorporeal entities, — therefore is itself incorporeal, with an intensive (nonquantitative) quality.

Such an entity is, —

#### The Geometrical point.

The point is that among the geometrical figures which can least of all be cut. Bodies require all three dimensions for their existence, but the soul can conceive these dimensions apart, and is not only better than bodies, but better than these geometrical elements of which they are built. The soul is com-

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<sup>1)</sup> Woerter is unable to refrain from saying that Augustine has borrowed analogies from Plotinus, but does not say what he has borrowed; his assertion must be, therefore, ignored.

parable to the Point, for it is without dimensions, and cannot be cut, in fact it is incorporeal.<sup>1)</sup>

The geometrical point, having no magnitude, has nevertheless a certain Force.<sup>2)</sup> Now, the more ordinary objects approximate to the point, i. e. the freer they are from bulk,<sup>3)</sup> the more Force they exhibit. The eye serves as an illustration.

The pupil of the eye is a kind of point, but of great power when we compare it with the relatively inert mass of the body. From a hilltop the eye can survey the skyline at one sweep. Yea, the smaller the eye, the more powerful it is. So experience teaches us. The small round eye of the eagle, as the bird soars aloft, already lost to our gaze, can perceive a hare lying among the bushes, or a fish in the stream below.

The lesson drawn is, that the power of the organs of sense perception does not depend on magnitude. Is there any room for fear then, that the soul has no reality, no substance, because it has no magnitude, remembering besides that it is the seat of Ratio?

#### Objections examined.

No. 1. Epicurus supported his materialistic view of the soul and of its connection with the body, through the belief that the soul grew with the body. Evodius says nothing about the Epicurian origin of the argument as he brings it forward.

Its refutation — Growth in skill and knowledge does not imply a growth of the soul. The phenomena of growth must be rightly interpreted. — Quality and Quantity are two different things.<sup>4)</sup> A circle is superior to a square not because it is bigger, but because it is better by reason of its configuration. It possesses the particular quality that all lines drawn from a certain point within it, to the circumference are equal. This quality is called *Aequalitas*, and virtue is a kind of *aequalitas* in human life — a desirable harmony at every point with reason. Thus the change in a man's soul as he grows older, might be illustrated as a progress from the condition of a square into that of a circle, the conditions becoming ever more favourable for the increase of 'aequalitas' therein. If it were true that a

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<sup>1)</sup> Woerter refers to Plotinus Ennead IV Bk. VII. § 6. Plotinus only compares the soul as focus for the various perceptions to the point in the centre of the circle.

<sup>2)</sup> See Ch. 12 *Puncti potentia*.

<sup>3)</sup> *Sine tumoribus*. Thimme observes (after Woerter) that tumor is equivalent to the Plotinian *ἄγκος*.

<sup>4)</sup> *Aluid esse quod majus, aluid quod melius* Ch. 16 § 27.

boy's inner progress were due to bodily growth, or comparable with it in kind, then we should expect to find him wiser in proportion to the tallness of his body or his physical strength. Ch. 16.

In spite of Woerter's reference to Plotinus, what strikes us here is the absence of Plotinus' illustrations in Augustine. The latter has his own individual treatment of the subject.

Plotinus illustrates the difference between Quality and Quantity with an illustration showing that a single drop of honey tastes just as sweet as the whole jarful. Of this, there is no mention in Augustine's pages.

The soul develops also, says Augustine, not only in the order and arrangement of its component elements but also in power. It can only grow in this sense, however, when the knowledge it acquires is of the highest and most useful kind.<sup>1)</sup> A wine taster's knowledge, or that of a connoisseur in foods will not foster a healthy growth.

Evodius as representing the Epicurians will not readily leave the field. "If", says he, "as the body grows with age, the soul at the same time gathers more and more power, does not this argue that the soul grows in proportion to the body?"<sup>2)</sup> Plausible reasons for this view are given but they are rejected. In his reply, Augustine applies exactly the same principle, as when refuting the idea that growth of the soul was implied in learning. The increase in physical powers does not solely, or principally consist in accession to the amount of strength, but in a certain conformation of the bodily members. Augustine remembers, that when a boy he could walk and run without fatigue much better than he could now, although older. Athletes are strong and active not in proportion to their girth and height, but to the quality and condition of their muscles. In fact the illustration from the geometrical figures might be applied to Augustine's description, —

The circle is superior to the square; accession of strength is in proportion to the increased measure of harmony introduced into the midst of the body and its various muscles and members.

Consider a dead object, moreover, a thing which has only mass. Such an object has force solely in proportion to its mass.

He sees the law of gravitation at work in the case of stones

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<sup>1)</sup> Cum (sc: anima) honestis et ad bene vivendum accomodatis disciplinis augeri dicitur. Ch. 19.

<sup>2)</sup> Ch. 21.



when dissected caused him great difficulty. We might have expected a statement here whether feeling was involved at all in these movements. His explanation of these movements is so mechanical that it shows at any rate how far he regarded the insect organism as bound up with feeling. The dissection of such an insect was no more than the destruction of a piece of mechanism. The soul of the insect held together in a harmony in the body of the living creature the same four elements of which the universe is composed. After dissection the soul escapes, and the air and fire rush through the wound made by dissection, in their flight upward. It is this rush of the disengaged elements which causes the movements of the parts. On this low plane of life, at any rate, the question of feelings is not even considered.

The Animal world stands higher than the insect world. The animal is governed by its feelings in regard to its behaviour towards the outer world.

Attraction and repulsion have a part to play in the animal economy, and Augustine seems little conscious of the possibility of mere reflex action.

We come nearest to an analysis of the nature of Pain in the later writings of this period.<sup>1)</sup> Pain serves to show us the noble unity imposed upon the universe by the Creator, for pain has the same significance in the animal soul as it has in the human, and thus the whole creation is a source of knowledge of the Creator, and is an exhortation to know him.

What is pain? and what is its significance? It is a danger signal of division in the organism and a shrinking away from it.<sup>2)</sup> The soul strives instinctively to preserve the unity and the integrity of the organs in all their parts, and pain is the alarm signal at the sign of any threatened division. The pain which animals suffer shows a certain sensibility in the animal soul and to that extent it is ennobling. It demonstrates at the same time a certain force (*vim*) in this animal soul.<sup>3)</sup> Bodily pain, in man is of all things the worst, for it hinders the pursuit of knowledge.<sup>4)</sup>

While in *De libero arbitrio*, pain is regarded from a teleo-

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<sup>1)</sup> *De libero arbitrio*.

<sup>2)</sup> *Quid enim est dolor nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens*, *De libero arbitrio* Bk. III Ch. 23.

<sup>3)</sup> *Dolor autem quem bestiae sentiunt, animarum etiam bestialium vim quamdam in suo genere mirabilem, laudabilemque commendat*. *De libero arbitrio* Bk. III Ch. 23 § 69.

<sup>4)</sup> *Cogor interdum Cornelio Celso assentiri qui ait summum bonum esse sapientiam, summum autem malum, dolorem corporis*. *Soliloquia* Bk. I Ch. 12. *Et ipsum (dolorem) non ob aliud vehementer formido, nisi quia me impedit a quaerendo*. *Sol: I Ch. 12 § 21*.

logical standpoint as a good, inasmuch as it warns of division and destruction, in *De Ordine*, on the other hand, it is regarded as the agent of division itself; from this point of view, it must be an unmixed evil. The principle of Oneness is essential to all real existence, and therefore the disintegrating nature of pain lies at the root of its evil character.<sup>1)</sup>

Pleasure, as the opposite of pain, is the delight in the unity of elements which strive towards closer and closer unity with one another. As we see from *De beata vita*, joy belongs preeminently to the nature of the soul. This joy is greater in proportion as the soul disentangles itself from the body. Augustine distinguishes between joy and mirth.<sup>2)</sup> Mirth has no place in the animal psychology, but it occupies the lowest levels in man.<sup>3)</sup>

Augustine has no developed theory of the connection between the feelings, on the one hand, and the desires and the will on the other. It is questionable whether he, any more than Plato, has developed this field far enough to distinguish with any great clearness between desire and will. In the expression "amor omnis";<sup>4)</sup> Augustine would probably include desires, and impulses arising from the direction of the body. From this point of view, desire is motived impulse, its aim being to draw the subject and the object of desire both within the bounds of Unity conceived of as the characteristic of the Universe.

That desire whose roots strike deepest is doubtless the desire, the love of existence; it conduces to the unity of the universe. Augustine describes it as commendable for the reason that it is directed towards Veritas. Veritas is that which really is, so that the desire for Being, is the desire for Veritas.

The more one possesses the love of existence, the more he approximates to the fountain of existence which is God.<sup>5)</sup>

As love of existence is commendable, so the taking of one's own life is hateful.<sup>6)</sup> Suicides take their own lives, either

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<sup>1)</sup> Dolor unde perniciosus est? quia id quod unum erat dissicere (or discindere) nititur. De ordine Bk. II Ch. 18 § 48.

<sup>2)</sup> Mirth seems to correspond to that pain in the production of which the body has a share.

<sup>3)</sup> Sunt alia quaedam, quae jam cadere in feras non videntur, nec tamen in homine ipso summa sunt. ut jocari et ridere, quod humanum quidem sed infimum hominis judicat, quisquis de natura humana, rectissime judicat. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 8.

<sup>4)</sup> Quid amor omnis? nonne unum vult fieri cum eo quod amat, et si ei contingat, unum cum eo fit? De Ordine Bk. II Ch. 18 § 48.

<sup>5)</sup> Si enim magis magisque esse volueris, ei quod summe est propinquabis. De libero arbitrio Bk. III Ch. 7 § 21.

<sup>6)</sup> De libero arbitrio Bk. III Ch. 8 § 22.

because they think they will thus be going to a better place, or that they will thus cease to exist. In the latter case, they make an impossible choice, for everyone chooses a better, but not-to-be is nothing and nothing cannot be a better. He does not believe that any suicide contemplating the act has non-existence before his eyes.

Bodily desires or lusts rob men of freedom. Just as Plato teaches that a man is not free when the will is determined by pleasure and pain and fear and expectations,<sup>1)</sup> comparing such a man to a puppet worked by strings, so Augustine teaches that an individual is liable to be governed by the lusts. Man's world becomes a Cosmos, only when these are all subordinated to the Reason.<sup>2)</sup> He shows a courageous independence of Plato when he asserts that the possession of Reason does not guarantee power over oneself. A person may conquer lions and tigers, but he is powerless to subdue himself.<sup>3)</sup> Fools are fools not because they are devoid of reason, but because they do not submit to its rule.

Elsewhere, Augustine argues that Ratio is stronger than Desire. For Ratio is intrinsically better than Cupiditas. It is in no wise part of good order that the inferior should lord over the superior, hence it follows that Ratio must be stronger than Passion.

Let us observe that Augustine has duly acknowledged the strength of the appetites, and thus escapes the criticism passed by Siebeck on Plato. For the latter does not see that even where knowledge is present it has the task of conquering the impulses present in desire. Plato pays too little attention generally to the impulses.<sup>4)</sup>

The higher intellectual desires occupy greatly the attention of our author. He himself was consumed with the desire of knowing the soul and God. In *De beata vita*, the relation between the mere search after God, and Blessedness is discussed. Does the desire to find God, as expressed in the search for Him, bring happiness, or only the finding of Him. If we say that the man who seeks and has not yet found is unhappy we must allow, on the other hand that the man who seeks Him has God already propitious to him. He who has God propitious to him is blessed; therefore blessed is he who

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<sup>1)</sup> *Laws*. 644,

<sup>2)</sup> *Hiscæ igitur motis animæ cum ratio dominatur, ordinatus homo dicendus est. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 8. Cf. Soliloquia Bk. I Ch. 9.*

<sup>3)</sup> *Mansuetari (beast tamers) agunt enim talia quæ agi sine mente non possent; non tamen regnat mens; nam stulti sunt neque regnum mentis nisi sapientium esse percognitum est. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 9.*

<sup>4)</sup> *Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie Bd. I Teil 1 pp. 223 f.*

seeks Him. He who seeks, however, is as yet without that which he wishes, and so blessed will be he who has not what he seeks. This goes against the principle of happiness already acknowledged, and the investigation must be broadened. The needy man, we know is miserable, but is everyone who is miserable needy? If all misery is neediness, blessed will he be, who has no need.<sup>1)</sup> The wise man will never be in need, and therefore never miserable (and here we come back to the real subject) for he will only set his mind and his wishes on things which he can get, and on things which will not deceive him and leave him. In the manner of the Stoic wise man he raises himself above need by the exercise of his Will.

The freedom from need is ultimately accepted as the essence of happiness, and is identified moreover with *Sapientia*.<sup>2)</sup>

Wonder bears a kind of relationship to Desire, and it has been said that knowledge begins with wonder.<sup>3)</sup> Augustine throws out a question as to its source.<sup>4)</sup> He regards it apparently as an evil (*hujus vitii*). Hardly was Augustine in earnest, when he called it an evil. Its nature, he cannot explain, at any rate, no further than that it arises on the occasion of something unusual in nature.<sup>5)</sup>

### The Will.

In these early writings, Augustine has given us no scientific theory of the will, and we must be content with describing the activities of the Will as revealed in these same writings. We believe that where Augustine discusses "*intentio peragendi*"<sup>6)</sup> he is speaking of the Will in action. This intention of acting or will to act is contrasted with the act which it brings forth. Augustine labours to show that while the latter is conditioned by time, the former is not. The act of will is as a free bodiless spirit which time cannot imprison.

An act, while taking place in time, has past, present, and future in succession. Each moment of the act glides from future into present, and from present into past, but in the act of will

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<sup>1)</sup> In the course of the discussion, the subject of discussion has been forgotten — the search after God. The debate has come to the point of acknowledging that to need God and search for him is an evil!

<sup>2)</sup> *Beatum esse, nihil aliud esse quam non egere, hoc est esse sapientem.* De beata vita Ch. 4 § 33.

<sup>3)</sup> Aristotle. *Metaph* I. 2 p. 982 b. 12—13.

<sup>4)</sup> *Unde enim solet, inquam, oboriri admiratio?* De Ordine Bk. I Ch. 3. § 8.

<sup>5)</sup> *Res insolita praeter manifestum causarum ordinem.*

<sup>6)</sup> De immortalitate animae Ch. 3.

they are all present together at once. There is no act of will in which the different moments are not already presented to consciousness as moments of the one act. An act of will cannot occupy the present without containing in itself at the same moment a presentation of the end of the act, or (from the point of view of succession) the future.<sup>1)</sup> There are thus two sides to every act, the timeless side, and the time side, into which the former passes over.

Augustine teaches, in effect, that without Will, no knowledge is possible; and on the other hand, without knowledge can we not will to act. It is thus, through the portals of the will we enter the field of knowledge and the will likewise leads us out into the field of action.

No knowledge without an act of will, is implied in the doctrine of Assent. The followers of Carneades, viz the Middle Academy taught a complete scepticism and the word "Assent" is banished out of their vocabulary.<sup>2)</sup> This, of course, makes all knowledge impossible, and in his work *Contra Academicos*, Augustine attacked the Academy. This scepticism had a paralysing effect on activity and Augustine himself felt this influence.<sup>3)</sup>

The function of the will in Knowledge is involved in the doctrine that Ratio precedes Scientia. The latter is visio, and the former is aspectus. Aspectus is active, visio is contemplative.

Do we look in order to see, or see in order to look? Obviously we look in order to see, in other words Aspectus must precede Visio. But looking necessitates a preceding act of will, and thus by analogy knowledge involves the same, for Ratio precedes Scientia. Ratio is active implying an act of will, scientia is the passive result.

The question of Assent, directly involving an act of will, is involved in the nature of Deception. A person may regard an object falsely, and yet that person is not deceived if he himself is unaware that the object is not in reality what it seems to him to be. The conclusion from this is, that it is not the

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<sup>1)</sup> Rursus intentio peragendi quae praesens est, sine expectatione finis qui futurus est, non potest esse, nec est quidquam quod aut nondum est aut jam non est. De imm: animae. Ch. 3. § 3.

<sup>2)</sup> Das Endergebnis seiner skeptischen Ausführungen war natürlich das längst ausgesprochene, die absolute Unmöglichkeit des Wissens, die Forderung einer unbedingten Zurückhaltung des Urteils. See Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*<sup>4</sup> III. Teil 1. Hälfte S. 507 ff. Leipzig 1909.

<sup>3)</sup> Nescio enim quomodo fecerunt in animo quandam probabilitatem, quod homo verum invenire non possit unde piger et prorsus segnus effectus eram. *Contra Academicos* Bk. II Ch. 9. § 23.

person who sees falsely who is deceived, but he who assents to false conditions.<sup>1)</sup>

The whole of the higher activity of the mind depends upon the activity of the will. The mind, through its bodily dwelling is continually subject to the influences of the body. It must be raised above these in order to exercise its true intellectual activity.

It is the Will which liberates it and sets it working; and so, in the higher activities of the mind, e. g. in Thought the mind abstracts itself consciously from the body. "Who is there", asks our author, "having well examined himself, has not found that to think well he has to remove the mind by abstraction, as it were, from the existence of the bodily senses"?

There is something more here than demonstration of the abstract superiority of the mind over the body, namely practical superiority exerted through the Will.<sup>2)</sup>

There is nothing more striking in the contents of these early writings than the frequency with which Augustine speaks of the Power (*vis*) of the soul. True, the soul in its abstract nature is Force, but the main channel through which the psychic force flows is surely the Will. It is not too much to say that the soul without the Will were nothing. The Will is not merely one element among many composing the soul. But the soul is itself Will. Outside the *Jugendschriften* this fact is definitely expressed.<sup>3)</sup>

The mind, thus regarded from the standpoint of Force (or Will) is the strongest thing in the world. All else which is not soul, is body and is inferior, therefore weaker. It is only God who could compel the mind, for every one will allow that he who is superior to the rational Soul is God.<sup>4)</sup>

We are disposed at this point to enquire into the metaphysical ground of the statement that the foolish mind is in a state of *Defectus*, for we believe it is rooted in a condition of the Will. Does not this state into which the foolish mind is brought imply the conception that through *stultitia*, the fibres of the soul become loosened, the soul as Force, or Will is deteriorated? The Will which gave way to Folly is brought into danger of dissolution. Because Will and desire lie close toge-

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<sup>1)</sup> *Confitendum est igitur, non eum falli qui false videt, sed eum qui assentitur falsis.* *Soliloquia* Bk. II Ch. 3. § 3.

<sup>2)</sup> *De immortalitate animæ* Ch. 10.

<sup>3)</sup> *Voluntas est in omnibus, immo omnes nihil aliud nisi voluntates sant.* *De civitate dei* Bk. XIV Ch. 6.

<sup>4)</sup> *De immortalitate animæ* Ch. 13.

ther, the soul in which the Will is stricken can lose desire and refuse its ambrosial food — Truth.<sup>1)</sup> That is the fatal and guilty process which the remissness of the Will can originate! The guilty will brings with it its own punishment: if it omits to do the right when it is open to it to do so it gradually loses its power.<sup>2)</sup> A depth of practical experience lies here!

The foolish soul in a state of "defectus" conjures up before our mind the picture, not of a tree branch fixed, passive, inert and covered with fungus, slowly withering under its parasitical green crust; not of an apple laid on the store room floor by the house wife and like a dead thing in the grip of decay, but rather of a man once strong and active, but now laid up on a sickbed paying the penalty of the sins of his youth. Stultitia is not a fungoid parasite fastening on the inert and helpless, but an enemy which engages the powers of the soul; the Will must take the field against it; to refuse is fatal. This view of Defectus is implied in the statement that falsehood can only deceive the living. Deception implies consent and consent implies the power of a living Will able to accept or reject.

If we turn for a moment to the grades or stages of the soul's life in *De quantitate animae* Ch. 33 we find that the Will comes into prominence at Stage IV.

Already in Stage III have we touched the sphere of the exclusively human, and this Stage is adorned with noble products of the arts and letters, evidences of the genius of the human mind; but the sphere of the Will — that Will which makes of the World a Moral world marks a higher Stage. The products of the intellect are truly noble; but if they belong only to men, they are also the heritage of all men, both the good and the bad.<sup>3)</sup> But in the next higher Stage enter goodness and true praise which can be bestowed upon the good will alone. Thus has Augustine almost verbally anticipated Kant with his dictum that the only good in the world is the good will.<sup>4)</sup> The soul now sets herself consciously above the body, and above the whole Universe as well, and thinks

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<sup>1)</sup> *De beata vita* Ch. 2.

<sup>2)</sup> *Id est autem ut qui sciens recte, non facit, amittat scire quod rectum sit; et qui recte facere cum posset noluit, amittat posse cum velit. Nani sunt revera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia ignorantia et difficultas. De libero arbitrio* Bk. III Ch. 18 § 52.

<sup>3)</sup> *Magna haec et omnino humana, sed est adhuc ista partim doctis atque indoctis, partim bonis ac malis animis copia communis. De quantitate animae* Ch. 33 § 72.

<sup>4)</sup> *Suspice igitur et insili quarto gradui ex quo bonitas incipit atque omnis vera laudatio. De quantitate animae* Ch. 33 § 73.

the world's goods not comparable to her own goodness and beauty.

The more the soul is pleased with herself, the more she withdraws from the vileness of earth.

At the seventh and last grade the Will reposes in the complete attainment of its fullest desires. The soul now rests in the vision of and in the contemplation of the Truth itself. No longer is the arm outstretched; no longer does the eye range outwards: all is a present of fulness and joy.

It is not merely a stage at which the soul arrives here, but a home, a mansion, it is the place of highest bliss, of enjoyment of the highest good.

### The freedom of the Will.

This question involved Augustine later in his dispute with the Pelagians, but at this early period the discussion of the subject<sup>1)</sup> is free from these theological entanglements. Even here he is contending with opponents viz the Manichaeans who explained the evil in the world by saying that God was the author of evil. Augustine will save the honour of God by finding the origin of evil in the Will. The will is free and undetermined, i. e. the responsibility of its liberty must be brought home to it. The sinful soul is not easily excused, for there is nothing in the world that could coerce the soul, because everything else is material. God would not coerce the Will, for he is good: the soul is therefore itself responsible.

The Source of sin is found in man's turning away from the disciplines i. e. from Truth: in other words, — Sin is stultitia, and thus we find the Augustinian notion of Stultitia brought into direct relation with the question of the Will.<sup>2)</sup> The Will is free, and thus Freedom is the root of sin.<sup>3)</sup>

The Will having thus fallen is unable to rise any more; the resulting process of Defectus introduces intellectual weakness and deficiencies, which Augustine thus regards as the punishment of sin, which the Will has committed by entering the service of the lusts.<sup>4)</sup> That is the actual condition of the

<sup>1)</sup> In De libero arbitrio I. II. III.

<sup>2)</sup> De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 1.

<sup>3)</sup> Nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem facit quam propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 11 § 21.

<sup>4)</sup> Mentem nunc falsa pro veris approbantem, nunc etiam defensitantem, nunc improbantem quae antea probavisset, nihilominus in alia falsa irruentem etc etc. De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 11 § 22.



of different sizes thrown from a height. But other considerations come into play in the case of living bodies.

The mind, which wills the movement in living bodies, has a force different from that of the mere weight of the mass in a dead body. This means, that if the soul grew, its increased dimensions would not affect its force. The mind uses the nerves as a sort of catapult<sup>1)</sup> and thus creates force.

After several such illustrations Augustine feels he has shown conclusively that increase of force with increase of years is due to such factors as these, and does not demand the supposition of an actual growth of the mind.

No. 2. The second objection is, that the diffusion of sensation throughout the whole body presupposes the equal extension in space of soul and body alike.

Augustine must have regarded this objection as important, for in order to answer it, he enters at great length into the nature of sensation. Reserving the detail of this discussion for application elsewhere, we content ourselves with bringing forward at once Evodius' impatient request "*Ipsum fructum tanti operis jam ostende, si placet!*" Throughout the long discussion the object was to show that bodily sensation does by no means demand the presence of the soul throughout the body in every part. He is enabled to demonstrate this fact by means of the special theory which he holds as to the relation of soul and body. The proof in *De quantitate animae* becomes much clearer when we turn to *De musica* Bk. VI Ch. 8.<sup>2)</sup>

The principle which Augustine holds fast, but does not demonstrate successfully is that the soul is never passive but always takes an active part in sensation and perception, for it allows nothing to escape it (*latere animam*). In *De musica* Bk. VI Ch. 8 we see that *non latere animam* is equivalent to "*sentire*", and "*sentire*" (perception) is an active process, and therein is the mind nowise passive. Perception (and sensation) means simply that the mind becomes conscious of certain changes in the bodily condition, and it is not necessary for this purpose that the soul should be in the body, present in all its extremities.

In fact we may see from the process of sight that the contrary is the case.

The eye when it sees an object, is active at that point where the object is; in other words the eyes receive impressions

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<sup>1)</sup> *Nervis quasi tormentis utitur* Ch. 22.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. *Thimme* pp. 145—47.

outside of themselves.<sup>1)</sup> If this is true of the eyes, is it not much more true of the soul?

It would be unworthy of the soul to suppose that it must be present at the very spot where sensation takes place, especially when we see that the bodily eyes receive impressions independent of such presence.

The arguments lead onward, and we are in danger of being led into dangerous ground, inextricable swamps from which return is impossible. If it is true that the soul experiences sensation there where it is not, then it follows that the mind is above all spatial considerations, yea, the soul need not be in the body at all.<sup>2)</sup> If that is so, then Evodius declares he has no idea where he stands. Augustine cannot bring much light, but tries to comfort Evodius. He remarks that many learned men have really believed that there was no soul in a living body. The problem is a very subtle one indeed, and the mind has to be trained and its edge sharpened in order to approach the question. Augustine would rather avoid following the argument right in to the swamp. He will stop short. The argument has taken them over fair ground, and he feels satisfied that Evodius' objection has been met.

He invites his friend to bring forward some other objection to the immaterial nature of the soul. The invitation is accepted, and Evodius promptly brings forward the third objection.

No. 3. This objection refers to the fact that when certain insects are divided, the parts shew life and movement. It seems to him that this proves the soul to be in each part of the body, and also to be divisible i. e. corporeal.<sup>3)</sup>

In defending his theory of the soul as the *Entelechy* of the body, Aristotle remarks that plants are found to live after they are cut, as also some kinds of insects. His explanation is that these different parts possess a soul which if not numerically one, is still specifically the same. We find elsewhere that Augustine attacks the Pythagorean notion of the soul as

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<sup>1)</sup> It is remarkable that this is Plotinus' main reason against the view of Memory as dependent on images impressed on the soul. Augustine in his theory of "Memory images" must have taken a definite stand against the Plotinian theory, but it is noteworthy that he does not announce himself as refuting the Plotinian view.

<sup>2)</sup> *Nonne istis rationibus confici potest animas nostras non esse in corporibus? De quantitate animae Ch. 30 § 61.*

<sup>3)</sup> It is rather remarkable that both Thimme and Woerter do not refer to the passage in Aristotle from where this seems to be taken. See Aristotle *De anima* I Ch. 5. II Ch. 2.

"Harmony"; here, in effect he rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul as *Entelechy*.

He is at his wits' ends to explain this insect phenomenon. Anyhow we should not come to the sad conclusion that the soul is in every particle of the body i. e. that it is corporeal, because we find a difficulty at some single point, especially as we have succeeded so far, in giving good reasons in support of its immateriality. Suppose, that by accident we caught a friend among robbers, whom we surprised at a banquet, and the man died before he could give us an explanation of his presence, we ought to avoid the conclusion that he was there of his own free will, although no explanation was forthcoming.

So, we ought not, because of the difficulty of the counter argument, to give up the position we have won in support of the immateriality of the soul.

He finds help in this difficulty through an analogy which Woerter (p. 52) regards as taken from Plato.<sup>1)</sup> Words are composed of two elements, viz sound and meaning, and these two are quite different things. The sound we may term the body, and the meaning, the soul residing in it. Now, we may divide the word into letters, and in this way the sound of the word is lost but the meaning is unaffected. If we divide e. g. the word SUN into its component elements, the word is destroyed, but the sun itself, the meaning of the word, is not affected. That is the case with soul and body.

The conclusion of the whole argument is drawn in a short phrase at the end of Ch. 32. "Nunc accipe a me, si voles, vel potius recognosce per me, quanta sit anima, non spatio loci ac temporis sed vi ac potentia." The conclusion therefore, is, that if we speak of the soul as having quantity, the expression is to be understood in a dynamic sense.

The treatise does not end in the most effective manner. The discussion is prolonged unnecessarily; the treatise does not end with the argument, but goes on until it has brought the soul not only face to face with God, but absorbed in the vision and contemplation of Him who is the Truth itself. The latter part of this treatise reminds us of the Nile river, and the way it divides into many arms and mouths as it reaches the sea.

So we are almost embarrassed in trying to keep in sight the real subject in the closing chapter of this treatise. The

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<sup>1)</sup> Theaetetus p. 203. A. ff.

description of the seven grades of the soul is the last thing in it, and it may be regarded as a demonstration of the dynamic greatness of the soul. Augustine is contemplating this dynamic character in its various relations, firstly, in so far as the soul is in the body, secondly, in regard to its existence in and for itself, and thirdly in relation to God as the highest Good of the soul.

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## Chapter IV.

### The immortality of the soul.

The proof is contained in two separate treatises. Soliloquia I. II. De immortalitate animae. 1. Soliloquia I. II. The central proof, viz: the connection of the soul with Veritas; this necessitates investigation into the nature of Veritas and of its opposite Falsitas. Between these and the mind, the connecting link are the "Disciplinae". The "Disciplinae" are regarded from a double standpoint p. 51. (a) They are essentially connected with the mind, and only through them as the mind's instruments can Veritas and Falsitas exist for us — the latter are eternal, and therefore the thinking mind is eternal. (b) The "Disciplinae" as standard of Truth are themselves essentially true; hence like Truth immortal and the mind containing them is immortal. A sure proof of immortality is the fact that the Real Ideas have their home in the mind p. 53. 2. De immortalitate animae. Minor proofs are introduced p. 54. Difficulties and objections. (a) Mutatio animi p. 55. (b) Defectus animi p. 56. Woerter and his Criticisms p. 59. Augustine's proof in comparison with those of Plotinus and Plato p. 61.

We are not left to gather Augustine's teaching on this point from sundry remarks scattered here and there in his writings, but there is more than one treatise specially devoted to the discussion of the question.

He was far from being a mere theorist, but was urged to the discussion of great problems like the present one, through their intense practical interest and importance.

Attention is called elsewhere to the distinction he drew between questions of mere historical interest as belonging to the past, and those problems the answer to which determined our conception of the future.<sup>1)</sup> From this point of view, there could be no question of more absorbing interest than this concerning the immortality of the soul.

The treatise bearing the title "De immortalitate animae" is a continuation of the discussion on the matter already begun in the last chapter of Soliloquia Bk. I. The Soliloquia were written in the stillness of Cassisiacum. Augustine was baptised at Milan Easter 387 and wrote De immortalitate animae in that city while awaiting Baptism. He intended to continue

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<sup>1)</sup> De libero arbitrio Bk. III Ch. 21 § 61.

the Soliloquia still further, and De immortalitate animae was meant to keep the unfinished task in mind.<sup>1)</sup>

The central pillar upon which the whole burden of the proof rests is Truth, and its essential connection with the soul.

Desirable, therefore, is a knowledge of the nature of Veritas, and of its opposite Falsitas as conditioning further knowledge of God, the soul, and immortality.

Firstly, a distinction is drawn between Veritas and Verum and it is pointed out, that nothing can be true (verum) except in and through the Truth itself. As veritas is immortal, that in which Veritas exists, i. e. a true thing (verum) is immortal.

The inference therefore is, that only immortal things are true, and no perishable object has true existence. In this way Augustine has been led along the path of Logic to the purest Platonism.

A fresh start is made in Sol. Bk. II, and the point of departure is Augustine's own personal experience, elicited through the questions of Ratio (personified for the sake of the discussion.).

Thimme suggests that Augustine has failed to connect this experience with the conclusions already obtained. "To the assertion that I am sure of my own true thinking existence, I need only add the conclusion already reached viz that all true being i. e. intellectual being is immortal, in order to finish the matter at one step".<sup>2)</sup> But the argument proceeds.

The question is put whether anything true can exist if Truth does not exist. Impossible! It follows, therefore, that even if the world perished, Truth would still exist, for it would be true that the world perished. Even if Truth itself perished, it would be still true that it perished; this is absurd, therefore Truth cannot perish.

To obtain a fuller knowledge of Truth, the nature of its opposite — Falsitas, is now investigated. Augustine's very persis-

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<sup>1)</sup> Quod mihi quasi commonitorium esse volueram propter Soliloquia terminanda. Retractationes Bk. I Ch. 5.

<sup>2)</sup> Thimme forgets that Augustine has not advanced so far; he is not yet sure of his own true thinking existence. Cogitare te scis? asks Ratio. Scio, is the answer. Scis esse te? Scio. Unde scis? Nescio. This dialogue shows that he has not yet joined together the ideas of thought and life so as to arrive at the idea of intellectual being. In a word he has not arrived at the Cartesian principle Cogito ergo sum. This passage has been under the consideration of several writers. Woerter does not agree with Ritter, when he says that the Cartesian principle lies clearly before us here. The French writer Matinée also does not agree with Ritter.

teney in the investigation of Veritas shews its fundamental position in the proof. The bird's nest is sure to be found somewhere on that spot round which the bird hovers so persistently and thus Augustine and Plotinus<sup>1)</sup> alike both hover round those pet truths which are to serve as the supports of the doctrine which they were to present to the world. Augustine will prove the immortality of the soul from the fact of Veritas, while Plotinus depends on the incorporeal character of the soul; around these doctrines respectively, they keep, therefore, continually circling.

From the fact that Deception depends upon wrong assent, the source of error is concluded to be in the mind, not in the object. It is important, then, to know what error is. What is Falsitas, and why is a thing false?

The question is difficult, for several answers are given, and in turn rejected.

The first answer is "Quod aliter sese habet quam videtur". From what has already been said about the nature of Deception, as well as from the definition, it follows that Falseness depends upon the existence of a person to whom it should appear false. What appears, appears to the senses, therefore 'falseness' depends upon the Senses. The senses imply a soul behind them, therefore Falseness posits the Soul.

But if we are in any way to draw our proof from Falsitas, we must see whether Falseness necessarily exists. Can we think of it as not existing? Nay, the difficulty of finding truth shews this. Falseness then exists, and the soul consequently exists, nay lives, for it is only the living which can perceive.

Here, then, is a proof of the continued existence of the soul. "Confectum est animam semper vivere".

We are obliged to seek a new proof, for the above does not prove convincing. At best it is no proof of immortality; it only shews that the soul exists as long as falseness exists. The assumed immortality of Falsitas upon which the above proof was based, seems to be carried over from its opposite principle Veritas. In any case Falseness is a negative conception, and moreover an unworthy, disreputable foundation on which to think of supporting the immortality of the soul.

This proof seems to be complete in itself, and it refuses to

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<sup>1)</sup> We compare in this chapter Plotinus' proof of the immortality of the soul with that of Augustine.

lead any further. We are at the end of a blind lane, and are obliged to seek a new path, a new proof.<sup>1)</sup>

We move a step forward with a new definition of truth. "Verum est id quod est." This definition denies to Falsitas its existence; this is absurd, for Augustine has already said that truth is much harder to find.

The problem is really difficult, and he now offers up a prayer, and having plucked up new courage begins afresh. What is Falsitas? Essential to it is resemblance to the True; for a man we see in a dream we call false, and compare him not with a dog, but with a real man, and in the comparison the false character appears. So then, the resemblance between things, which appeals to the senses is the mother of Falsitas. Suffice it to say that this is found unsatisfactory, and we find ourselves discussing once more the source of both the true and the false (Ch. 8).

The investigation is fruitless enough, for we come back to the old definition. "False is that which is different from what it appears to be, and true is that which is what it appears to be". Every possibility in the way of definition has been tried, says Ratio, and now only one other possible definition remains. "False is that which 'imagines' itself to be what it is not, or being nonexistent strives to be".<sup>2)</sup>

Thimme says that the whole process of defining Falsitas, has been in vain. We venture to think that there are results, capable of application. According to the last definition False is that which strives to be that which it is not in reality. The next passages in the treatise may be regarded as an attempt to discuss and illustrate this. Attention is directed to a class of objects which at first sight falls simply within this category, the actor who impersonates Hecuba, the portrait figure which is not the person figured.

There is no attempt at deception here, while Falsitas does aim at deception. The actor does not wish to impose upon us, and make us believe that he really is Hecuba, and the portrait figure is wrongly regarded as soon as we forget that it is a

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<sup>1)</sup> It should be mentioned that Augustine sees the insufficiency of the argument; that it does not prove immortality, but only succession. There will be someone to whom the false will appear false, even if a soul perish, provided it be succeeded by others. Ch. 4 (Sol: II).

<sup>2)</sup> Falsum est quod aut se fingit esse quod non est, aut omnino tendit esse et non est. Sol: II Ch. 9 § 16.



picture and no more. Only as the actor is a false Hecuba, can he be a true actor and only as the figure is a false person, can it be a true picture.

Evidently we need to draw fine distinctions in speaking about the False; there are subtle variations of it, and Augustine explains the difference between *falsum*, *fallax*, *mendax*. We may conclude that the existence of the false makes necessary a continued mental activity in order to distinguish it rightly. From different points of view, as we have seen, "the false can be true, and the true false" We can never dispense with the activity of the mind in this region, and the continued activity of the mind implies the perpetual existence of the mind itself.

Thus another proof has been delivered. This proof is a link in a further proof. *Imitatio* is a fact in the world. *Falsitas* it is, which lies at the base of *Imitatio*, if they are not both the same. *Imitatio* is ever trying to enter into the region of Truth, and must be carefully watched and detected. Here lies the function of the "Disciplinae" as special sciences. In them the mind is at work detecting *Falsitas*, and putting it under its own proper label.

The discipline of Grammar is representative. This science treats of myths and fables, such as the story of Daedalus, which is obviously untrue, but Grammar will not have us think the story a true one. Rather, it will teach us what fables and myths mean, and according to the principle illustrated in the case of the actor and the picture, so here; only in proportion as the story itself is false can the myth be a true myth.

The definition of the False, as that which strives to be that which it is not, leads us to recognise the necessary function of the *Disciplinae* as guardians and revealers of Truth.

The *Disciplinae* derive their value and reality from *Veritas*; these two being thus connected together, the next task is to find an essential connection between the *Disciplinae* and the Mind, for thus will *Veritas* be connected with the Mind. *Veritas* is immortal, so the Mind will be immortal. Q. E. D.!

The connection must be an essential one. Not all connections are essential. The sun as it stands in the East, has no essential connection with the East, nor a clump of trees with the spot on which it stands, but the connection is essential between the sun and its warmth, or between Fire and Light, and also between a Discipline and the Mind. The connection we

seek exists, and must exist, for it is obvious and selfnecessary.<sup>1)</sup> The proof is applied by means of a further principle "Omne quod in subjecto est, si semper manet, ipsum etiam subjectum maneat semper necesse est" Soliloquia Bk. II, § 24.

From this it follows that as Truth is immortal, and through the "Disciplinae" is essentially connected with the mind, therefore is the mind immortal.

The "Disciplinae" essentially connected with the mind! "Yes", says Augustine, as he soliloquises, "there is a difficulty there after all!" how are the disciplines essentially connected with the mind when there are so many, obviously unacquainted with them?

Either, the minds of the unlearned are not to be called minds, or a "Disciplina" may exist unconsciously in the mind. Instead of answering the question, he goes over old ground once more, and Thimme asserts that he would in the planned Soliloquia Bk. III have subjected the problem to a thorough investigation.

Whether Augustine feels that there is strength in repetition, or believes that he is adding something to the arguments, — there is a repetition of the chief arguments for Immortality in the closing chapters of the treatise.

In Ch. 17 is found such a restatement, — the disciplines are pure unalloyed truth.

Can we shew the unique character of the Disciplinae as pure Truth, and not like the stage-actor or the picture — true on the one hand, false on the other? Yes we can, for True Form is demonstrated in the Disciplinae whereas material bodies partake only in a second grade Form. These True Forms either reside in the Truth or the Truth in them; in any case they reside in the mind, and as Truth is immortal, therefore the Mind is immortal.

At this point there seems, to be no longer any doubt about the stability of the proof. The jubilant shout is raised "Jamque crede rationibus tuis, crede veritati. Clamat et in te esse, habitare et immortalem esse, nec sibi suam sedem quacumque corporis morte posse subduci!"

There is a problematical discussion in the last chapter about the difference between true and invented figures, the object of which may be to show that the disciplines, in furnishing us with knowledge, serve to recall ideas already in the mind,

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<sup>1)</sup> Thimme says that Augustine has not delivered his proof for this assertion, but axiomatic truths are incapable of proof.

brought with it from elsewhere into this life. Educated persons, trained in the *Disciplinae* are not content with knowledge which is only derived from *Veritas*, but they strive in a mystic fashion to see the face of *Veritas* itself. *Cogitatio* or *Phantasia*, is the source of the invented figures; it is a kaleidoscope (*speculum variatum*) and brings forth varieties and variations. Examples of the multitudinous productions of this faculty are the squares of all sizes which fancy, brings up at will. The *Mens Interior* seeks to direct its gaze towards the standard Square, that true figure according to which it judges those other multitudinous figures, squares, circles or whatever they may be.

The application of this appendix-like material to the subject which has been under discussion is not easy. Thimme refers to the "puzzling" question about the figures!

It becomes apposite to the discussion when we assume that Augustine, do what he will, could not quiet his doubts about the validity of his proof. The proof from the "*Disciplinae*" has suddenly appeared unreliable, if only for the moment. The *Disciplinae* provide knowledge, but he saw on reflection that they shewed but images of Truth, and these images were liable in the mind to get buried and lost. But this does not cause him embarrassment, for in the above mentioned considerations he has a further line of defence. He can thereby shew the mind in essential and perpetual contact with that ultimate norm — the Real Idea which did not get lost or misplaced.

We pass over to *De immortalitate animae*. Thimme says that there is in this treatise an advance on *Soliloquia*, because in the former Augustine knows how to distinguish sharply between *Veritas* and *Disciplina-Ars*, placing *Ratio* in the middle between them.

There is too much dogmatism in this assertion; already in *Soliloquia* are they distinguished. It will be quite clear from the last chapter of *Soliloquia* Bk. II that Augustine in that treatise too, distinguished *Veritas* from the *Disciplinae*, although he does not always shew consistency. Thimme is anxious to prove a definite development, which it is the object of his book to describe.

Augustine gives the impression in *De immortalitate animae*, that he is conscious of having delivered the main proof for the immortality of the soul in *Soliloquia* Bk. II.

That proof centred around *Veritas*; in *De immortalitate animae*, he fortifies that proof with minor proofs, and examines sundry objections. The proof depends everywhere upon the

essential connection of the Mind, directly or indirectly with Veritas.

Augustine begins, in the first chapter of *De immortalitate animae* without introduction, to deliver his series of minor proofs.

1. The soul is immortal because it is the subject of a "Disciplina", which has continued existence.

A "Disciplina" exists perpetually, and can only exist in that which has life. Consequently that in which a "Disciplina" exists lives in perpetuity. The rational process of thought cannot take place without a "Disciplina", and this belongs to the mind; therefore the mind is the home of a "Disciplina" which is immutable.

2. The soul is immortal because it is the subject of Ratio which is changeless.

Thimme is hardly justified in dogmatising about the position of Ratio between Veritas and Disciplina-Ars. Disciplina is ever living; Disciplina is unchangeable; Disciplina is indispensable to the process of thought; Animus cannot exist without it, and Ratio is either the Animus itself or is in animo. There is no question raised concerning the relative superiority of Ratio and Disciplina, as Thimme seems to imply, but the superiority of Ratio over the body is the question discussed.<sup>1)</sup>

Ratio is real substance and thus superior to corpus. Corpus is not Emptiness and mere Nothing.<sup>2)</sup> Because Ratio is superior to the body, it is no Harmony of the body, and although the body perish, animus will not perish, which either is Ratio or has Ratio contained therein.

3. Another proof rests upon the relation of the soul and body, respectively, to Movement.

The relation between the two is one of moving and being moved. That which is being moved is liable to perish, but the soul, as the moving agent is above such danger. The activity of the mind, although taking place in time and place as regards its effects, is itself above time and place; its acts involve past, present and future in the one movement, and thus its real independent nature is demonstrated.

The mind which thus in a moment of activity combines past, present, and future, is eternal in its nature, and thus above change.

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<sup>1)</sup> Cf. *De libero arbitrio* Bk. I Ch. 1.

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. *Soliloquia* Bk. II Ch. 17.

The idea of those people who could calmly think of the soul perishing and yet believe that death was not to be feared.<sup>1)</sup> had scared Augustine, and he is at pains to show repeatedly that the soul will not only continue to exist, but will have perpetual life.<sup>2)</sup>

The proof depends on the connection of the mind with *Ars* and *Ratio numerorum*. The witness of the text goes against Thimme in his assertion that *Ars* is inferior to *Ratio*.<sup>3)</sup>

Augustine will establish the essential connection of *Ars* and *Animus*, but in doing so will discuss the various alternatives; he shows it is absurd not, to think that *ars* is in the mind.

But someone may say that *Ars* is sometimes in the mind, and sometimes not there, and cite as proof the phenomena of Forgetfulness &c. But, to be unconscious of a thing's presence is no proof of its absence, and thus *Ars* is present in the mind even when it is not present in consciousness.

This leads naturally to a fresh enunciation of the doctrine of innate ideas. When, in answer to questions, we find the answers, these we find in the mind itself, and they were there unconsciously until elicited by the questioner, and have ever been there. This is itself a proof that the mind is immortal, and holds all truths in its recesses.<sup>4)</sup>

### The difficulties.

1. *Mutatio*.
2. *Defectus*.
3. Forces definitely hostile to the soul.
4. Possible reduction of the soul to a lower stage of being.

#### 1. *Mutatio*.

To what degree could we admit change (*mutatio*) without imperilling the mind's nature and existence? He is led to the consideration of this question by the existence of Folly (*Stultitia*).

These changes may be occasioned by different causes, viz changes from the side of the body, such as age, diseases, pain, and changes from the side of the mind itself such as desire, joy, and fear. Now, the whole question turns on whether these changes are fatal for the soul.

<sup>1)</sup> Soliloquia Bk. II Ch. 13.

<sup>2)</sup> *Animo etiam vita sempiterna maneat necesse est.*

<sup>3)</sup> *Quis enim audeat dicere aliud esse artem, aliud rationem? Quamvis enim ars una multarum quasi quidam coetus rationum esse dicatur tamen ars etiam una ratio dici verissime atque intelligi potest. De immortalitate animae Ch. 4. § 5.*

<sup>4)</sup> *Immortalem esse animum humanum, et omnes veras rationes in secretis ejus esse. De immortalitate animae Ch. 4 § 6.*

The question is clearly put, but it is not so clearly answered. Here is an illustration which is introduced. — Wax is subject to changes of colour and form, but throughout these changes it still remains wax. Wax is wax, whether it be white or yellow; but let it be overheated and it will melt away in smoke and steam; thus it is destroyed, and we cannot speak any more of wax. We may rest assured that the changes considered in the case of the soul, do not affect it fatally (Ch. 5).

It is obvious that Augustine has here nothing better than analogy for his proof.

## 2. Defectus.

Augustine cannot overlook the fact of Stultitia, otherwise, he would much rather have left on one side these problems of Mutatio and Defectus. Our author is least satisfactory at these points, and does not avoid falling into contradictions. "A ratiōne separari non potest ut supra ratiocinati sumus", but having just made the statement he proceeds to speak of an "aversio a ratiōne", which is the cause of Stultitia, and unavoidably brings "defectus animi" along with it!

Perhaps this contradiction could be largely smoothed out with the explanation that the emphasis is to be laid on the difference between "a ratiōne separari", and "a ratiōne aversio", in the sense that the mind could turn away, look away from Ratio without being absolutely separated from it.

The fact is, that Augustine had to face stern facts, and to offer the best explanation possible of them. He could not close his eyes to the fact of Stultitia, and the only way to explain it was that the mind turned away from Ratio (*liberum arbitrium!*), even although he has been at such pains to show their indissoluble connection.

This danger from the side of Defectus is more serious than even that connected with Mutatio, for Defectus is "tendere ad nihilum" and "tendere ad nihilum" is *ad interitum tendere*.

The soul can be saved from these consequences only by an elaborate and somewhat artificial argumentation.

(a) It does not follow because a thing tends towards nothing, that it becomes nothing.

This is exemplified in the case of a material body; to cut a part away, means that a part is left, and this part, as well as the whole is body. A body can be divided an infinite number of times and thus its bulk infinitely lessened, but for this very reason it will never be reduced to absolute nothingness, for there will ever be a remainder.

We observe that this depends on the principle that matter is infinitely, divisible, a principle that Leibnitz too might have taught.<sup>1)</sup>

The same, says Augustine, is true of Space; there will always be a half left to divide into halves.

The conclusion is drawn that if we need not fear annihilation in the case of "Corpus" much less need we be afraid of it as regards Mind, for it is better and more living than body, and indeed is for the body the source of life. Ch. 7.

We are disposed to criticise Augustine's foundations here. He draws a parallel between incommensurates. Between that which has quantity and that which has none, can no parallel be drawn.

(b) It is Form not mass which makes a body. It is proposed to show that the body cannot by diminution be so deprived of Form as to cease to be. Much less can the mind, through the incursion of Folly, so lose its inherent Form as to endanger its essential existence.

(c) The Mind is itself Life.

So essential is the idea of Life to the Mind, that if we supposed the mind to perish, and life to have deserted it, that life separated from it, would itself be the mind. The mind is not a *Temperatio* of the body, as some have thought, for it is superior to the body. A further proof of superiority is that the objects which the mind regards are spiritual, incorporeal, and the mind which regards them is incorporeal.

While the body has only a derived life, the mind is life itself; it will not abandon itself and therefore remaining life cannot perish.

Even corpus, the life of which is but derived has a guarantee against falling out of existence in the creative force existing throughout the Universe. Having brought its creatures into being, it will not desert them. If the corporeal, thus in dependence upon another, has a guarantee of continued existence there is nothing to fear about the perpetual existence of the soul which has life in itself.

### 3. Forces hostile to the soul.

(a) The danger from the side of 'Falsitas'.

There are foolish minds, and the foolish mind is in a state of "Defectus". This is a ground for fear lest the soul should

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<sup>1)</sup> cf. Falckenberg, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, Leipzig 1908, p. 245. "Alles materielle, und wäre es noch so klein, ist ins unendliche teilbar &c."

perish through Defectus. Now, the opposite of Stultitia is Sapientia, and the mind is wisest and therefore most assured of existence when it regards Truth. To Truth the mind is inseparably joined by divine love. Truth (veritas) is that Essentia from which all things which in any degree partake of being derive their existence.

The mind has either derived its being from Truth, or it is its own original "Cause" (*ipsa sibi causa existendi est*). In the latter case the proof of immortality is therein contained, but if the former is the case, then as Veritas is the cause of existence, so may its opposite Falsitas, take it away. This supposition is to be disproved. — Falsitas works by deception, and it can deceive only the living, therefore, in order that Falsitas might have effect upon the mind, the mind must be ever living. — *Non igitur Falsitas interimere animum potest.*

(b) Veritas is regarded from a different standpoint viz as the highest form of being.

Objects have Being to the degree in which they partake of Veritas. Now, what is the opposite or contrary of Veritas from this point of view? for here also Veritas is the source of existence for the mind, and its Opposite may spoil mind of existence. Evidently this Opposite is Not-being, Nothing, Nihil. But Nihil is powerless, therefore there is no danger to the mind's existence from that quarter.

#### 4. May not the soul be reduced to a lower stage of being?

(a) If the soul were converted into an inferior essence or substance e. g. body, the mind would not lose all existence, for we have seen that body is not without a certain grade of existence.

The different alternatives are discussed. Mind will not itself wish to be changed into an inferior substance, nor can it be coerced.

Who or what would coerce the mind? A stronger than the mind must be found. Body is not stronger, for what is inferior, according to an argument found elsewhere, is not stronger.<sup>1)</sup> Mind will not compel, for mind is good. God, who is superior to the rational soul is a friend of the soul, and He will not compel it to be transmuted into body (Ch. 13).

Further, soul could only become body through the instrumentality of soul, for that is the usual way. That this would be

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<sup>1)</sup> cf. *De libero arbitrio*. Bk. I Ch. 10. *De immortalitate animae*. Ch. 16.



absurd is obvious from the fact that through soul all body is created.

(b) We know by experience that sleep, in the way of nature, subdues the soul. Through sleep, then, or some such agent could the soul be converted into body? Sleep, however, is an affection purely of the body and of the senses, and sleep has no power to overcome the mind.

(c) The possibility is considered of soul being converted, if not into body, then into an inferior soul, viz an animal soul.

This could not be, for inferior beings derive their existence from those superior to them. The latter bestow Form upon them, and in order that the superior might be degraded into inferior existences, there would have to take place a reversal of the natural process; instead of bestowal of Form, there would be loss of Form. Augustine at this point seems to forget his subject, and instead of treating of rational soul turned into irrational, speaks of soul turned into body, a matter already discussed at length.

The treatise ends with a description of the pervading of the body by the soul, and this does not seem to have any special bearing upon the subject of the treatise. The closing chapter, therefore is but an ineffectual conclusion.

We have thus sought to bring out the sequence and significance of the thoughts and individual proofs in these treatises on the immortality of the soul. Subsequent ages might be pardoned for expressing their sense of the obscurity of the argument, for the author himself in after years, complained that he found his own work difficult.<sup>1)</sup>

There is, however, we venture to think, more method in the argument, as brought out in the way we have sought to do, than Augustine, reading his work many years after its first composition, gave himself credit for.

#### Woerter's criticism.

Woerter rightly regards Augustine as supporting his doctrine of the immortality of the soul, principally, upon the eternal nature of Veritas and its essential indwelling in the soul. He asserts, however, that this conclusion is but a copy from

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<sup>1)</sup> Qui primo, ratiocinationum contortione atque brevitate sic obscurus est ut fatiget, cum legitur, etiam intentionem meam, vixque intelligatur a me ipso. *Retractationes* Bk. I Ch. 5.

Plato and Plotinus.<sup>1)</sup> Referring to passages in these two authors,<sup>2)</sup> he observes "The more sure Augustine is of the premises of his argument, the more impregnable does the conclusion appear to him to be". This is not logical. If it be acknowledged that Augustine draws his conclusions in strict accordance with his premises, it is absurd to say that the conclusion is a copy from Plato and Plotinus.

The conclusion can only be a copy, when the premises also are absolutely (samt und sonders) a copy of theirs. This is not the case.

### Some criticisms by Woerter.

1. Augustine in dependence upon Plato regards the universal, the genus only, as having true being and only what has true being can be immortal. It follows therefore that the universal soul only has true being, and consequently immortality. Augustine is, therefore, inconsequent in attributing these qualities to the individual soul.

Let us observe that Rohde argues, against Teichmüller, that Plato teaches the immortality of the individual soul in Rep. 10. 611 A., although allowing the difficulty of bringing this teaching into relation with his theory of Ideas. He holds that Plato derived his belief in immortality from others to whom he refers occasionally. Rohde thinks he was much indebted to the teaching of the Orphic and other mysteries.<sup>3)</sup>

It is not amiss to observe that Plato does not subject the soul to an Idea of the soul, an exception to the otherwise universal rule. The soul is brought rather into relation with the Idea of Life and, therefore, is the soul itself Life.

2. Augustine says rightly that the existence of Truth is bound up with a seat of existence, and its seat is the soul. But Woerter asks if the soul is its only seat, for if not, then the argument fails. The Divine mind alone, says he, is the fount of Veritas. Augustine teaches that God is immortal because Veritas dwells in God, and the human soul is for the same reason immortal. Augustine overlooks the difference between the absolute Divine spirit, and the created human soul.

We answer that Augustine's argument is not proved invalid. Woerter's remarks about the divine home of Truth does not

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<sup>1)</sup> Bei einer auch nur flüchtigen Vergleichung erweist sich dieser Schluß als eine Copie aus Plato and Plotin p. 70.

<sup>2)</sup> Plato Menon p. 86 a. Plotinus Ennead IV. Bk. 7. Chs. 10. 12.

<sup>3)</sup> Rohde Psyche Band II pp. 278 ff.

shut off the soul's indissoluble connection with Veritas. Augustine would assert that wherever Truth is found in essential and not merely accidental connection with its object, there is Immortality.

3. Woerter finds reminiscences of Plato and Plotinus in Augustine's attacks upon the objections to the theory of immortality.

Doubtless, this treatise has reminiscences of these authors in plenty, but everything is transformed in its passage through Augustine's original mind. We have also noted already a notable example of Augustine's independence of mind in his treatment of Memory. At one point, Woerter must needs express surprise that Augustine has not followed Plato.<sup>1)</sup> See Woerter, Footnote on p. 96.

Augustine's proof for the immortality of the soul in relation to those of Plato and Plotinus.

Augustine has one great argument, viz the indissoluble and necessary connection between *Disciplina* — *Ratio* — *Veritas* and the Soul. *Disciplina* — *Veritas* is immortal, therefore the soul is immortal.

The whole argument is concisely summed up at the end of Soliloquia Bk. II Ch. 13. "Omne quod in subjecto est, si semper manet, ipsum etiam subjectum maneat semper necesse est. Et omnis in subjecto est animo disciplina. Necesse est igitur semper ut animus maneat, si semper manet disciplina. Est autem disciplina veritas, et semper ut in initio libri hujus ratio persuasit veritas manet. Semper igitur animus manet, nec animus mortuus dicitur."

There are two sections in the Augustinian proof.

(a) Directly, with Veritas as basis.

(b) Indirectly, with *Disciplina* as Basis.

The fundamental truth is the eternal nature of Veritas, and the great problem is to bring Veritas and Anima into essential relation. This, Augustine strives to do through the medium of *Disciplina*. In the quotation given above Veritas and *Disciplina* are identified.

Arguments lay near at hand for the existence of *Disciplinae* in the soul; the principles of Geometry and Arithmetic can be

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<sup>1)</sup> At the point where he proves that Folly does not bring about the destruction of the soul, he does not introduce Plato's argument that every thing has its own special evil to which it is liable to succumb; that this evil for the soul is Vice, but that vice does not destroy the soul although causing degeneration. See Siebeck Band I. I. p. 200.

easily demonstrated to lie there. Granted that they have real existence, the soul as their subject or seat of existence will have real eternal existence likewise.

Thimme sees here a fatal weakness, that Real (eternal) existence should be attributed to the *Disciplinae* — that they should be put on the same plane as the Real Ideas of Plato.

The restless and prolonged movements of the argument may be taken as an indication that Augustine is hardly satisfied with the certainty of his proof.

Therefore, we find what we may term secondary arguments e. g. the argument for Immortality from the nature of the soul as Life. He could, nevertheless, attribute to the soul only a derived existence, and therefore it does not exist *causa sui*. The soul has had its being from *Veritas* which is *Summa vita*; the soul itself, although it is a source of life, is only *vita quaedam*.

Consequently he could not rely on such an argument. His great proof is the essential connection of the mind with *Veritas*, demonstrated through the more evident connection with *Ratio* and *Disciplina*.

#### Plotinus' argument.

One may confidently deny Woerter's statement that Augustine has derived his proof from Plotinus. The latter's great argument is that the soul is divine and eternal, and it is divine and eternal, because it is of incorporeal nature.<sup>1)</sup> Obviously, with its divine and eternal nature is the immortality proved. In this light we can see why Plotinus devotes the first half of this Book to the proof of the soul's incorporeal nature, and he considers his proof satisfactory, and relies upon it.

Further, on the basis of the divine nature of the soul, he declares that the soul is good and intellectual in its nature. This is one of his final conclusions.<sup>2)</sup> While Plotinus, therefore, on the basis of the foregoing proofs argues to the intellectual character of the soul, Augustine, on the other hand, argues from it. For him, the intellectual character of the soul is of the nature of a postulate, and upon this he builds his proof.

<sup>1)</sup> *ὅτι δε τῆ θειοτέρῃ φύσει συγγενῆς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆ αἰδίῳ, δῆλον μὲν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ μὴ σῶμα αὐτὴν δεδειχθαι* Ennead IV Bk. VII. 15.

<sup>2)</sup> *ὁμολογουμένου δὴ ἡμῖν παντός τοῦ Θείου καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ζωῆ ἀγαθῆ κεκρησθαι, καὶ ἔμφροσι, σκοπεῖν δε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς οἷόν ἐστι τὴν φύσιν* Ennead IV Bk. VII. 15.

### Plato's proof.

Plato's argument in the *Phaedo* is concise and clear. He does not go backwards and forwards as Augustine does. His proof is based absolutely upon the theory of Ideas. True, this great argument is introduced by a less important one, viz the argument from the passage of opposites into one another; as we constantly see life passing over into death, so we may expect that death will pass over into life.

The chief proof is the connection of the soul with the world of the Real Ideas. The soul is confused in the midst of the world of sense perceptions; this is not its real sphere. In the world of Real Ideas, it attains to peace and clearness. This is a proof of kinship between the soul and this Real world. Like the eternal Ideas, the soul is also eternal and changeless.

This view implies the theory of the Preexistence of the Soul. We may remark once more, that for Plato, the soul is not one of the eternal Ideas themselves! it exists on a lower plane. Augustine and Plato, both attribute the same grade of Being to the soul. In both philosophers, the soul does not take the highest position.

In the theory of Ideas, an Idea corresponds to each class of objects of sense perception, by sharing in which Idea, they participate in Being. While only the Ideas have true and real being, it follows that the objects of the sense world, which form the correlatives of the Ideas do not possess it. Consequently if there were an "Idea of the Soul" the soul itself would not possess real being.

Plato obviates this result, because corresponding to the soul, we find in the world of Ideas not an Idea of the soul, but an Idea of Life. The soul, consequently will be Life, which by its very nature has real existence.

In Augustine, likewise, soul is not *summa vita*, for this is reserved for Veritas, but the Soul nevertheless is Life, albeit *vita quaedam*.

Thimme has a comparison of the separate proofs for the Immortality and the Immateriality of the soul in Augustine, with those in Plotinus, and finds that while there are resemblances, there are also differences. The present writer has been at much pains to compare the two writers, but the compass of this treatise will not allow a reproduction of the detailed results. Thimme enumerates the individual proofs, comparing the series of single proofs in Augustine with the series in Plotinus; we

have supplemented his procedure by seeking a general comparison, and have come to the conclusion that on every hand Augustine has reminiscences of Plotinus, but is by no means guilty of having reproduced him.

Differences of manner and style were also noted which bear out the same conclusion.

We may support Thimme's statement that Augustine draws out of the fulness of a well stored mind.<sup>1)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Er schöpft aus dem Vollen.

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## Chapter V.

### The Epistemology of Augustine.

a) The theory of Knowledge through the Senses. The external character of Perception is emphasised, and the sense organs are described as instruments of the mind p. 65. Perception and Sensation — their nature p. 67. The alleged superiority of sense perception in beasts is explained p. 68. Augustine's departure from Plato, with his adoption of the Aristotelian "Interior sensus" p. 70. b) The theory of knowledge through the Reason. Ratio, Ratiocinatio and Scientia are distinguished p. 73. The immediate, intuitive character of Knowledge; the subject-object relation in Knowledge etc. p. 74. The theory of Innate Ideas involving the doctrine of Anamnesis p. 76. Veritas as Norm is superior to the mind p. 78. Knowledge as leading through the various grades of the Disciplinae to the Truth itself p. 79. Number as the framework of Knowledge — also a Knowledge above Number p. 81. Sapientia and Sapiens p. 82. The source of our ideas generally p. 84. The indebtedness of Augustine to Aristotle is noticed p. 86.

#### a) The theory of Knowledge through the Senses.

Augustine contemplates human activity in the field of Knowledge under two heads. viz Sensus, Intellectus.<sup>1)</sup> All we know is derived either from the senses or from the mind. The senses are called the "Interpreters" of the mind which it uses for its Knowledge of the outer world.<sup>2)</sup> We may gather from terms applied to these powers that Augustine's interest was perhaps more ethical and religious than scientific.<sup>3)</sup>

The senses are five in number,<sup>4)</sup> and a characteristic of sense knowledge is that those things which we know by its means are recognised as lying outside of us. On account of this out-

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<sup>1)</sup> Nam omne quod contemplamur, sive cogitatione capimus, aut sensu aut intellectu capimus. De immortalitate animae Ch. 6 § 10.

<sup>2)</sup> Sensusque ipsos, quibus tamquam interpretibus ad talia noscenda mens utitur; de his autem quae intelliguntur, interiorum veritatem ratione consulimus. Namque omnia quae percipimus, aut sensu corporis aut mente percipimus. De Magistro Ch. 12 § 39.

<sup>3)</sup> Illa sensibilia, haec intelligibilia; sive, ut more auctorum nostrum loquar, illa carnalia haec spiritualia nominamus.

<sup>4)</sup> Illos vulgatissimos corporis sensus . . . videndi et audiendi et olfaciendi et gustandi et tangendi. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 3 § 8. De quantitate animae Ch. 23.

wardness, no full union between the object and the perceiving agent is given, and this is no true Knowledge. This characteristic is further marked in that the objects are bound within space relations.<sup>1)</sup>

The senses are no source of Knowledge in the true and higher sense; they do not discover for us absolute or universal Truth; nevertheless this does not prove the senses to be worthless. To borrow an Augustinian form of expression they provide us with a *Scientia quaedam* — relative or subjective Knowledge do they afford, so far as we can speak of Knowledge on the plane of perception. What a person sees or believes he sees is true for him, though it may not be so for others.<sup>2)</sup>

The senses are the mere handmaids of the intellect; it is the mind which perceives, not the senses; it is not the eyes which see or the ears which hear but the mind perceives by means of them.<sup>3)</sup>

The ears have no more to do when they have gathered up the sounds; comprehension of their meaning is the function of the mind. This teaching is Platonic.<sup>4)</sup>

That "nescio quid aliud" at the back of the senses and whose instrument they are is the soul, and the Intellect as special part or function thereof.<sup>5)</sup>

Although the senses are recognised as the source of a secondary kind of Knowledge, Augustine is often occupied in using depreciative language about them. They appear mean when compared with the nobler nature of the Intellect. Indeed the senses may prove dangerous because they are the ultimate source of the "Imaginés" which hinder true Knowledge. Their products are liable to confusion with the latter, and this when it happens is a great misfortune.<sup>6)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> *Ea quae sensu capiuntur, extra etiam nos esse capiuntur. Locis continentur unde ne percipi quidem posse affirmantur. De immortalitate animae Ch. 6 § 10.*

<sup>2)</sup> *Noli plus assentiri quam ut ita tibi apparere persuadeas; et nulla deceptio est. Non enim video quomodo refellat Academicus eum qui dicit: Hoc mihi candidum videri scio, hoc auditum meum delectari scio. Contra Academicos Bk. III Ch. 11 § 26.*

<sup>3)</sup> *Non enim ipsi oculi vel aures, sed nescio quid aliud per oculos sentit. De ordine Bk. II Ch. 2 § 6.*

<sup>4)</sup> *Cf Plato Theaetetus §§ 184 b—d.*

<sup>5)</sup> *Ipsum autem sentire, si non damus intellectui non damus alicui parti animae. Restat ut corpori tribuatur quo absurdius dici nihil mihi interim videtur. De Ordine Bk. II Ch. 2 § 6.*

<sup>6)</sup> *Sunt enim istae imagines quae consuetudine rerum corporalium per istos quibus ad necessaria hujus vitae utimur sensus, nos etiam cum veritas*



Augustine will not blame the senses for all that martyrdom suffered by poor humanity on account of false images.<sup>1)</sup>

### The nature of Sense perception.

Woerter points out that Sensation and sense perception are not clearly distinguished in Augustine's writings and elsewhere we note instances where this is illustrated. It is noted, too, by Eisler that the ancients in general did not sharply distinguish between them.<sup>2)</sup>

In the course of a long discussion on Sense perception,<sup>3)</sup> Augustine only arrives by a slow, tentative process at a definition. According to the first formulation, Sensus is defined as "Non latere animam quod patitur corpus."

It is soon recognised that this phrase is too wide, for there are cases where the mind becomes aware of processes in the body in which the senses have no part.<sup>4)</sup> The mind is aware of the fact that the hair or the fingernails grow, but it does not become aware of these matters through perception or sensation, but through a kind of deduction on the part of the mind. Our formula must be made more definite. Perception is that which through itself (*per se ipsam*) does not escape the mind. Let it be clearly understood that "non latere animam" does not mean Knowledge, for otherwise we would have to ascribe knowledge to the animals, for they possess perception in accordance with our definition, but Knowledge they do not possess, not even that wonderful dog of Ulysses who recognised his master the long lost wanderer even after so many years.

Although *Scientia* and *Sensus* are so different, "non latere animam" is common to both. The difference between them is clear when we say that what does not escape the mind *per Rationem* is Knowledge. *Per rationem* is our distinguishing mark. The animal has no *Ratio*, no *Mens*, he is sunken in the body, the animal has only the *vis sentiendi*: to man belongs the *vis Sciendi* also. The "knowledge" which comes to the animal through the former is only a shadow of true Knowledge. Sense per-

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tenetur et quasi habetur in manibus, decipere atque illudere moluntur. *Contra academicos* Bk. III Ch. 6.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. *Credo enim sensus non accusari, vel quod imaginationes falsas furentes patiuntur, vel quod falsa in somnis videmus . . . nihil ad eos quid sibi animus dormientis insanientisque confingat.* *Contra Acad.* Bk. III Ch. 11 § 25.

<sup>2)</sup> Eisler *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe.* Berlin 1910.

<sup>3)</sup> *De Quantitate animae* Ch. 23 ff.

<sup>4)</sup> Cf. Plato *Philebus* 43 A.

ception the animal has; his senses are five in number, and some of these are superior to what they are in the human being.

Sight is that sense which Augustine regarded as noblest.<sup>1)</sup> Vision proceeds out of the eye, and shines out upon that which is perceived, and so it is obvious that vision takes place there where the object is, and not where vision seems to proceed from. The object is outside of me, yet I perceive that object, and 'tis I who experience and suffer the perception, although I am not there where the object is. Just as when I touch a person with the end of a stick, it is I who would be touching and I would feel the touch too, but would not be at the point where touching took place, so it is correct to say that in the act of vision I see a person although I am not there where the person is. Vision coming out of my eye is like the rod which proceeds from my hand to touch a person. If the eye saw just where the eye itself is, it would see only itself, and we come to the conclusion that it is impossible for the eye to see except where it is not, and likewise it suffers, or is sensitive there where it is not (*ibi eos pati ubi non sunt*).

That sense perception is to be reckoned to the bodily part of the constitution, and not to the higher intellectual part like e. g. Phantasia, is shown by the fact that its organs are entangled in the diseases and suffering, to which the body itself is liable. Bodily humours often befog the senses<sup>2)</sup> This in itself would be sufficient to make a sense organ all the more effective in proportion to the smallness of its bulk. The eye of the eagle is more effective than the human eye for the very reason that it is smaller. For Augustine, that which has no bulk at all, let alone, no flesh (with the diseases to which it is heir) is the ideal. The eagle's eye approximates to the geometrical point which is described as so full of virtues.

Augustine is not ready to give the reason why beasts are often so superior to man in Sense perception. The suggestion is thrown out that it may be so, because the soul of the beast is so much closer attached to the body!<sup>3)</sup> A phase of the Platonic theory of perception fits on to this naive conception quite well. Jowett mentions that Plato thought of the senses not as

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<sup>1)</sup> So also Plato and Plotinus. Plato Phaedrus 250D. Plotinus Ennead IV Bk. VI Ch. 1. To both these authors Sight is *ἐναργεστάτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων*.

<sup>2)</sup> *Quas istis oculis videmus cum pituita semper bellum gerentibus*. De quantitate animae Ch. 15 § 25.

<sup>3)</sup> *Eo facilius quod anima belluarum magis corpori affixa est*. De Quantitate animae Ch. 28.

instruments but as passages through which external objects strike upon the mind. The ancients never dreamt but that the optic nerves were hollow channels through which Pneuma flowed. Augustine probably lay under such a conception; when the soul lies nearer the body the "passages" to the interior are shorter, and the perception-process quicker and better.<sup>1)</sup>

The more men sink themselves in the world of the senses, the more like the animal they become. Young children, in proportion as they share less in reason, have all the keener sense perception; they are sharp to distinguish their nurse by touch and smell.<sup>2)</sup> Augustine seems to deny to sense perception in animals any more than a sensation value. Knowledge is denied to animals certainly, even the "Sense-Knowledge" of human beings. Animal perception is sentire not scire, and sentire is the verb applied to mere sensation diffused over the whole body.<sup>3)</sup>

Sense perception can enter as an element into the higher intellectual processes. Deduction is a process in which both sense-perception and the Intellect have a part. One sees smoke arising but sees no fire, yet the presence of fire is deduced. The activity in this process is the mind's, but the material worked upon is that of sense perception and therefore this particular kind of activity is termed Knowledge through the senses.<sup>4)</sup>

The activity of the senses often insinuates itself in an illegitimate fashion into the sphere of the higher intellectual processes; then arises Imaginatio, and Opinio.

Augustine has not discussed the metaphysical foundations of Perception as Plato has done. The latter created a real foundation for his objective world, with his theory of Space as real, and movement in space as equally real.

That which moved in space was a multiplicity of mathematical forms of smallest dimensions, to which he attributed the power of creating impressions upon the organism. Sensation is produced through the transmission of the movements created by these impressions within into the soul. We may presume

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<sup>1)</sup> Plato's theory of Vision is so well known that it need not be described here. See Timaeus 45 B. C.

<sup>2)</sup> De quantitate animae Ch. 28 § 54. In this passage we have an example of the way in which Perception and Sensation merge into one another in Augustine. From the description, it is evident that infants employ mere sensation not perception.

<sup>3)</sup> Si (anima) non distenditur quomodo sentit ubique pungentem? De quantitate animae Ch. 15 § 26.

<sup>4)</sup> Cognitio per sensum vocatur. De quantitate animae Ch. 24 § 45.

that Augustine followed Plato so far, but he follows Aristotle with his theory of the Interior Sensus.

### The Interior Sensus.

It is somewhat remarkable that none of the writers on the philosophy of Augustine call attention to his theory of the Interior Sensus as Aristotelian. Aristotle shews a decided departure from the Platonic psychology here.

Plato was careful to observe that the organs of sense perception could not be isolated, merely mechanical and disconnected members of our body; in the words of the Theaetetus "We are not Trojan horses, in whom are several unconnected senses not meeting in some one nature of which they are the instruments, whether you term this Soul or not with which through these we perceive objects of sense".<sup>1)</sup>

In Aristotle we find little direct mention of the soul or mind in such a connection, but he has his own special contrivance by which this deficiency is made up, and through which the sense organs become related to one another and perform their part in the function of Knowledge. This is the doctrine of a Common or Central sense. (*κοινή αἰσθησις*).<sup>2)</sup> Wallace thinks, it was not improbably in a simple spirit of antagonism to Plato that Aristotle referred the common categories which enter into our perceptions to the sensitive faculty itself and not to the soul or mind directly, as Plato does.

Augustine pays quite a good deal of attention to this doctrine of the "Interior Sensus",<sup>3)</sup> and it is rather remarkable that he makes a show of working out the conception there for himself, as though it had never originated with Aristotle, and the latter's name is not once mentioned. The reason probably is that the doctrine was already familiarised through the Stoic and the Neoplatonic schools of philosophy.

It is interesting to note that Augustine, as though in sworn allegiance to Plato, is engaged, even while handling this piece of Aristotelism, in proving the central importance of Ratio, and to Ratio he may well attribute some of the functions which belong in Aristotle to the *κοινή αἰσθησις*.

By means of this special doctrine, Aristotle tries to solve some great problems connected with sensation. He saw that the

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<sup>1)</sup> Plato Theaetetus 184 D.

<sup>2)</sup> See Wallace Aristotle's Psychology Cambridge Univ: Press 1882. Introduction pp. LXXV ff.

<sup>3)</sup> De libero arbitrio Bk. II Chs. 3. 4. 5.

sense organ in its isolation could not explain perception; for this, was required {the coordination and the meeting together of the several senses in a common central faculty. This Central sense as a Perceptive Faculty, stands to each one of the separate senses, as the mind stands to each of its Faculties. It has two chief functions to perform, the distinction and comparison of the reports of the single senses, and also the supplying of the Consciousness which accompanies the act of perception.<sup>1)</sup> Aristotle is at pains to shew that it must be Sensus and not Ratio which does this work, for the qualities to be compared are objects of the senses.<sup>2)</sup> The Interior Sensus gives also the Consciousness of sensation, i. e. by means of it we know a sensation as ours.<sup>3)</sup> The seat of the Interior sense was not the brain, for Aristotle believed that the brain was not capable of sensation; the brain of animals on being touched gave no response, therefore he placed the seat of the Interior Sensus in the heart.

#### Augustine's description of the Interior Sensus.

Some Senses have sensations peculiar to them, others have Sensations common to themselves and others. It is not by any one of these senses themselves we can judge (dijudicare) what belongs exclusively to one sense, or what is common to some of them, or all of them, but by some Inner Sense. (quodam interiore) It is not reason which performs this function; reason, rather, comprehends all these relations and by means of the latter we understand there is an Interior Sense to which everything is referred by the five senses. It is not the same faculty by which the beast sees, and either avoids or desires the things of which he has a sensation through sight; the one is in the eye, the other is in the soul. This latter is a sense which presides over all the other senses. This is not Ratio, for by Ratio we comprehend this faculty, and it is also obvious that beasts possess this faculty, whereas Ratio they do not possess.<sup>4)</sup>

<sup>1)</sup> See De Anima Bk. III Ch. 2 § 10. De Somno 2.

<sup>2)</sup> We ought expressly to call attention to the fact that the *κοινή αἴσθησις* compares together not general ideas, for that is the function of Thought, but individual impressions.

<sup>3)</sup> ἔστι δε τις και κοινή δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις (αἰσθεσι), ἥ και ὅτι ὁρᾷ και ἀκουεῖ αἰσθάνεται· οὐ γάρ δή τῆ γ' ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ . . . ἀλλά τινι κοινῶ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθανητηρίων ἀπάντων· Aristotle De Somno Ch. 2.

<sup>4)</sup> Agnosco istud quidquid est, et eum interiorem sensum appellare non dubito . . . hoc ipsum tamen rationem vocare non possum quoniam et bestiis inesse manifestum est. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 3 §§ 8, 9.

This Interior Sensus cannot attain to the stage of Knowledge,\* without leaving behind it the sphere of Sense perception.

All that we know, we know by Ratio. We know e. g. that we have no sensation of colour by means of the hearing, nor of sound by means of sight. As this is a matter of Knowledge it does not belong to the Interior Sensus; — this latter the beasts possess. We cannot believe that the beasts know that light is not perceived by the ears, or sound by the eyes, for that is a matter for rational observation and reflection.

Augustine will distinguish three things for the sake of this discussion viz. Colour, Seeing that colour, and (when colour is not present) to have a sense which could perceive it, were it present.

Colour is perceived by the eye, but how do we perceive or become aware of the other two? Is it through something else? We know this much at any rate that only reason can define. Whatever else there is, is a sort of handmaid to reason and standing beneath it (*ministerium rationis*). This agent transfers what it receives on to the reason, in order there to be transformed into knowledge.

Again, a Sense does not perceive itself.<sup>1)</sup> We hear a sound, but do not hear the hearing; we smell a rose, but do not smell the smelling etc. The Interior Sensus perceives not only the sensations but the very sensational activities themselves. Otherwise, we cannot explain the voluntary movements of beasts under the influence of attraction or repulsion; this is sufficient to bring about movement, but this is not knowledge. To clarify the matter we take up a particular sense viz Sight. The beast could not open his eye and turn it towards the object he wanted to see, if he had not perceived that with closed eyes, and those eyes turned away, he could not see it. If therefore the beast perceives (*sentit*) that it does not see when it does not see, it must of necessity perceive that it sees, when it does see. We are not sure whether the Interior Sensus has a presentation of itself or not. Augustine attempts a conclusion on this point by reasoning that every life shuns death. As Interior Sensus is Life (*haec vita*) it must likewise have a presentation of itself.

We conclude that what Augustine attributes to the Interior Sensus is Consciousness on the plane of perception. This is the second of the two elements which according to Wallace characterises the Interior Sensus in Aristotle.

The Interior Sensus not only shares in Sensation, but has

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<sup>1)</sup> Augustine is in agreement with Plato in this statement.

a consciousness of its existence for the organism, and also of its non-existence when not present. This Consciousness creates impulses, movements; the consciousness of a present unpleasant sensation, calls forth a movement away from it; a pleasant sensation not yet present excites a movement towards it. The Interior Sensus passes judgments (*judicare*) over the senses, but Augustine weakens the force of this impressive word in applying it to the ordinary Senses in a loose way.<sup>1)</sup>

The whole of this discussion in Augustine's pages serves as an argument to shew the supremacy of Ratio in the human constitution,

We have seen how Aristotle located the Interior Sensus in the heart; Augustine's conception of it as Interior *vita* is nobler, and indicates his zeal for the incorporeal nature of the soul.

### b) Theory of Knowledge through the Reason.

Our first business is to ascertain whether Augustine has himself given us a definition of knowledge, and we find that in *De quantitate animae* he is engaged in fixing the difference between Ratio and Ratiocinatio.<sup>2)</sup>

Ratio is that inseparable, essential, and characteristic function of the mind, by means of which it is capable of attaining to Knowledge.

Ratiocinatio is the process itself in which the mind is actually engaged searching for Knowledge. The wise man is not always engaged in the search for wisdom, but he is never without the power to search and to find — this is Ratio.<sup>3)</sup>

Potentially, then, Ratio is Ratiocinatio. Ratio is the mind's power of vision, so to speak, (*Ratio quidam mentis aspectus*) and Ratiocinatio is the sweep of the horizon in the eye's search for its object.<sup>4)</sup>

Knowledge is vision, and ignorance is a lack of it.<sup>5)</sup> The mind directs its gaze but that gaze results in no vision for the

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<sup>1)</sup> *Ipsi corporis sensus de corporibus judicant.*

<sup>2)</sup> Woerter mentions that Plotinus also defines Ratio and Ratiocinatio as Augustine does, and probably concludes that Augustine borrowed from Plotinus here. *Ennead III Bk. 8 Ch. 11* (Woerter p. 45).

<sup>3)</sup> *Hoc enim (namely the search for wisdom) non semper, ut jam consensus, inest menti sanæ, ratio autem semper. De quantitate animæ C. 27 § 52.*

<sup>4)</sup> Cf. with Woerter, Plotinus' definition of *Nous* as sight. *Aenead III Bk. VIII 11* etc., also Plato. *Rep Bk. VI Ch. 19.*

<sup>5)</sup> *Cum autem non videt mens quamvis intendat aspectum, inscitia vel ignorantia dicitur. De quantitate animæ. Ch. 27.*

mind is in darkness.<sup>1)</sup> The illustration presupposes not a blind man, but one who does not use his eyes. A blind man, in his despair, never does direct his gaze, for he knows he could not see; the ignorant however may direct his gaze, but that gaze is fruitless. Such fruitless gaze, therefore can only be paralleled by the case of a seeing person who gazes in the dark.

Led on by his thoughts, Augustine arrives at a remarkable definition of knowledge as Life.<sup>2)</sup> In fact to know is to live with more reality, zest and vigour.

Here, then, we find placed side by side two remarkable conceptions of knowledge viz as Vision, and as Life. This latter figure shews that he regarded knowledge preeminently as a moral function. It is a truly Platonic view!

In regarding Ratio as the eye of the soul, and Scientia as vision, Augustine seems to be under direct Platonic influences. For Plato, the source of all Being, and of Truth, and of knowledge is the Good. He draws a parallel between it and the sun. The sun, on the one hand, gives all objects their existence, and on the other hand, provides the eye with light, by means of which the objects are known. So is the Idea of Good (God himself) the source both of Being, and of Truth or knowledge.<sup>3)</sup> Augustine does not, like Plato, give expression to a full theory, but he seems to stand under the influence of such a Theory.



Augustine in various ways emphasises the direct, immediate character of knowledge. Because our ideas are innate in the mind, all learning is Anamnesis or Recollection. Consequently all instruction implies previous knowledge, and words, in themselves, are signs, not means of fresh illumination. They do not teach (*discere*). An illustration used here would be inapplicable in our own days with the air

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<sup>1)</sup> Non enim et his corporalibus oculis, omnis qui aspicit videt; quod in tenebris facillime advertimus. De quantitate animae. Ch. 27.

<sup>2)</sup> Meliorne tibi videtur vitae scientia quam ipsa vita? an forte intelligis superiorem quandam et sincerio rem vitam esse scientiam, quam scire nemo potest nisi qui intelligit . . . Intelligere autem, quod est nisi, ipsa luce mentis illustrius perfectiusque vivere? De libero arbitrio Bk. I Ch. 7. § 17.

<sup>3)</sup> Siebeck (I. I. p. 226) illustrates by means of a diagram, which we reproduce.





full of flying machines. He supposes himself to have told a person he had seen a man flying, and also to have remarked to the same person that wise men were better than fools. His first statement would not be believed, or if believed, the belief would mean nothing, whereas the other statement would be received with ready assent. The speaker used but words in the one case and the other, but with different effect, hence the effect was not due to those words.

Moreover, as concerning Perception, our knowledge of nature is intuitive. We may presume that Augustine saw in this intuitive character a corroboration of the theory of Innate Ideas; his explanation of our intuitive knowledge of nature, perhaps, was that we possessed already the ideas of the objects which we saw, and thus immediately recognised them.

Immediate observation suffices to the knowledge of nature. Man recognises the meaning of sun, and moon, and stars instinctively.<sup>1)</sup>

Not only nature, but everything else is known immediately. The name of a thing is meaningless to us until we have seen the thing itself; the name then becomes a sign. But if this is so, how can we ever know the facts of history, for we cannot come into contact with those facts; we have only the words in which the history is set forth.

The story of the three young men in Babylon is a case in point. It is true, we know furnace, fire, king, and other such individual elements in the story, but Ananias, Azariah and Mizaël are unknown to us, and the names in themselves tell us nothing. Evidently Faith must precede knowledge, and in fact displace it.<sup>2)</sup>

Knowledge is based on the Platonic principle of like being known through like. This theory goes back in its crudest form to Empedocles, who held that each objective element in nature is known by a corresponding element in mind. Plato's construction of the world-soul is determined by this governing principle of his theory of knowledge. One of Augustine's chief proofs of the incorporeal nature of the soul was that it could recognise the incorporeal; the soul possessed that power on

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<sup>1)</sup> Solem certo istum, lucemque haec omnia perfundentem atque vestigentem, lunam et caetera sidera, terras et maria, quaeque in his innumerabiliter gignuntur, nonne per se ipsa exhibet atque ostendit deus et natura? De *mCria*tgos.h. 10 § 32.

<sup>2)</sup> Haec autem omnia quae in illa leguntur historia ita illo tempore esse ut scripta sunt, credere me potius quam scire fateor. De *Magistro*. Ch. 11. § 37.

the ground of this principle that like is known through like. Body, for the very reason that it was so unlike the objects of the higher knowledge could never attain to this knowledge.

A chapter in *De quantitate animae* has the title "Animus incorporeus cernit incorporea", (Ch. 13) and in this chapter this principle is expressly stated.<sup>1)</sup>

We have also in Augustine an echo of the deeper metaphysics of knowledge which Plato held. The essential nature of this process of knowledge lay in the ability to be able to say what a thing was in itself, and also what it was not in itself i. e. to say what it was both in its self identity and in its difference from other things. Therefore, Plato described the world-soul as receiving into its composition, in addition to the original elements of which it was composed, the elements also of "the Identical and the different".

These elements in the world-soul, as perceiving subject, corresponded to the elements which were to determine the knowledge of things. Each several element in the world-soul recognised its corresponding element in the object of knowledge.<sup>2)</sup>

In *De ordine* the Soul holds a soliloquy with itself, and gives expression to its proud consciousness of its capacity for knowledge.

It is here we find an echo of the Platonic metaphysics above described, and it would not be strange to find that the phrase "motu interiore et occulto" covers the detailed and subtle metaphysical theory of Plato to which reference has been made.<sup>3)</sup> We do not expect full details of purely scientific theories in Augustine, except when the subject matter necessitates them. Such a passing reference in this quiet manner is quite characteristic of these early writings.

### The doctrine of Anamnesis.

The things perceived by the mind are perceived as ever present in the light of that eternal, inner light of the mind. It is the inner eye of the mind which sees and illumines those truths which already lie in the mind.<sup>4)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Si corporea corporeis oculis mira quadam rerum cognatione cernuntur, oportet animum quo videmus illa incorporalia, corporeum, corpusve non esse.

<sup>2)</sup> See Siebeck *Bd. I Div. 1. p. 191.*

<sup>3)</sup> (Anima loquitur) Quodem meo motu interiore et occulto ea quae discenda sunt possum discernere et connectere, et haec vis mea ratio vocatur. *De Ordine II Ch. 18 § 48.*

<sup>4)</sup> Ipse illa secreto ac simplici oculo videt.

Ignorance is no proof that these truths are not already there. The ignorant person suffers from some inherent weakness (imbecillitate) which disables him from using that inner light of the mind, and turning it on, as it were, in the direction of these innate truths.<sup>1)</sup>

That Augustine held firmly this doctrine of Anamnesis becomes evident as we gather together the references to the subject in these early works.

In the course of a discussion with Evodius reported in *De quantitate animae*, he expresses his belief in the doctrine of Innate ideas with decision.<sup>2)</sup> The statement is a sweeping one; the mind has brought everything with it from the preexistent state.

It is true we are not always conscious of this knowledge stored in the mind's repository, and are tempted to believe, through this *Oblivio* that it is not there. When we reflect upon the fact that all that we know must be brought up out of the mind itself, then the function of the mind by which it is able to do it assumes a very important aspect. *Recordatio* has a place in it. It does not bring anything and everything into consciousness, but it sifts and distinguishes between those elements which offer themselves for entrance.

In the process of Recollection, one thing after the other is rejected till at last we find the thing required. This faculty within *Recordatio* is *Discretio*.<sup>3)</sup>

There was a great deal of misapprehension among ordinary people about the meaning and application of these Platonic doctrines.

Because they thought memory had to do exclusively with past things, they ridiculed Plato's teaching of the mind's power to recollect and bring into consciousness those eternal verities, the real Ideas. Augustine defends the doctrine by saying that the mistake these people do is not to see that it is the vision of those eternal objects, not the objects themselves which slips into the past, as we glide away (*defluere*) from them into a new state of existence where we see differently.<sup>4)</sup>

We find in Augustine, stated with sufficient clearness, the

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<sup>1)</sup> Qui de re tota illam lucem consulere non potest.

<sup>2)</sup> Nostrae sibi ment opiniones adversantur, ut tibi animo nullam, mihi contra omnes artes secum attulisse se videatur, nec aliud quidquam esse id quod dicitur discere quam reminisci et recordari. *De quant an* Ch. 20.

<sup>3)</sup> Nam ipsa discretio qua non admittitur quod falso admoneris, pars quaedam recordationis est. *Soliloquia* Bk. II Ch. 20 § 34.

<sup>4)</sup> *Epistula VII (ad Nebridium)*

great question as to the Subject-Object relation in Knowledge.

The problem here is, how different minds can comprehend the same object which has but one objective existence.<sup>1)</sup> We can all hear a particular sound, although my hearing and another's hearing are different, and yet the sound is not differently mine and the other person's i. e. it is not divided between the individuals who hear it, but is the same sound in each case. It is not so with the air we breathe or the food we eat. I breathe my own portion of air, and although honey tastes the same to me as to another person, still my portion of honey is a different portion from his. As to touch, I may touch an object which my friend before me has touched; the fact that he has touched the object before me, does not affect my power of doing the same, only not at the same time. In this way we arrive at a distinction between two classes of objects, one "proprium et quasi privatum", and the other "commune et quasi publicum". Augustine does not follow up the problem of Knowledge, thus clearly stated.<sup>2)</sup>

#### The mutual relation of mind and Truth.

Augustine has a principle which he follows consistently, that the object of thought is inferior to thought itself. Truth is not inferior to the mind that thinks it, for it is always the norm not the object of judgment.<sup>3)</sup> Truth will not submit to standing at the bar. We do not say that  $7 + 3$  ought to be 10, but acknowledge that this is so.

But while truth is thus immutable, our minds are mutable, for sometimes they see more or less than at other times; truth, however, is the same whether we see it the more or less. The conclusion arrived at is that Veritas is superior to mens.<sup>4)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Possumus ergo videre unum aliquid, multi simul. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 7 § 16.

<sup>2)</sup> Siebeck passes the same verdict over Plato. He is of opinion that Plato has done little more than state the problem i. e. how can that what seems to be an independent existence cross over, as it were, into my Consciousness; how it can be in me as knowledge, and at the same time outside of me as an object having independent existence. He does certainly place the two sides of the problem clearly opposite one another, and they are both brought together in the conception of the Highest Idea as the source both of Truth and Being. Subjective or mental activity runs parallel to objective or metaphysical Being.

<sup>3)</sup> Si esset inferior, non secundum illam, sed de illa judicarem, sicut judicamus de corporibus quia infra sunt. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 12.

<sup>4)</sup> Mens is here, as elsewhere, much the equivalent of Ratio.

### The Disciplinae.

The sober-rational process of Knowledge as contrasted with the supra-rational and Neoplatonic idea of contemplation is illustrated in the *Disciplinae*. The term seems to be used in different senses. As a rule a *Disciplina* in the Augustinian sense is what we would call a "Special Science".

The subject matter of the *Disciplinae* vary, but Knowledge remains the same in them all.<sup>1)</sup>

On the other hand, a discipline, although always representing a systematised body of Knowledge, is often clearly conceived of, not as lying outside the mind, but within it; it implies moreover, conscious Knowledge and therefore, can be said to be only in the mind of one who is learning, by which is meant a person who has already learnt something.<sup>2)</sup>

The *Disciplinae* have the source of their intelligibility in God. God himself is intelligible, and the contents of the *Disciplinae* are likewise intelligible, but these latter are intelligible in the light of the divine reason shed upon them. The earth is visible, and the sun is visible, but the earth were not visible, were it not illuminated by the light of the sun. So, the contents of the *Disciplinae* are indubitably true, but their truth is rooted outside of themselves in God. He is the Sun, himself visible, by whose light they are illuminated.<sup>3)</sup>

True knowledge aims everywhere at the discovery of Truth, but there are different stages of Knowledge, according to the object in which Truth is present. These stages shew the continuity of all Knowledge, from that of the humblest object to the knowledge of God. In the final stage the beholder gazes upon *Veritas* itself.

The *Disciplinae*, accordingly form an ascending series, and train and lead the mind upwards.<sup>4)</sup>

Augustine is at first unready to believe that the Knowledge afforded in the *Disciplinae* is of the same kind as the knowledge of God in his majesty. Ratio, which in a personified form, takes part in the discussion with Augustine, assures him

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<sup>1)</sup> Si aequè illud atque hoc nosti, et tamen inter se, ut fateris, plurimum differunt, est ergo differentium rerum scientia indifferens? Quis enim negerit? *Soliloquia* Bk. I Ch. 4 § 10.

<sup>2)</sup> Nemo habere disciplinam potest in animo, qui nihil discit, nihil autem didicit qui nihil novit. *De immortalitate animae* Ch. 1. *Contra Academicos* Bk. III. Ch. 3.

<sup>3)</sup> *Soliloquia* Bk. I Ch. 8.

<sup>4)</sup> Nam ordines quodam ad eam (sc. sapientiam) pervenire bonae disciplinae officium est.

that God may be known, and that the knowledge in both cases is of the same kind, viz a knowledge by means of the intellect, although the objects of knowledge in both cases differ vastly, just as the knowledge of the heaven above is of the same kind as that of the earth beneath, but the heavens are a much sublimer and elevated object of knowledge.<sup>1)</sup> Here, in spite of Neoplatonic influences Augustine is far removed from the ecstatic vision of the Neoplatonists in which alone God could be known, for he teaches that God is known in the same way as other objects of knowledge.

The *Disciplinae* embrace the ordinary spheres of art and culture. Music e. g. is a *Disciplina*, but by reason of its double sided nature, contemplating ideas on the one hand, and sounds on the other, it partakes both of the senses and of the intellect.<sup>2)</sup>

The highest of the *Disciplinae* is the Science of Dialectics, and it provides us with ground of absolute certainty in the realm of Knowledge. The wise man knows that in the science of Dialectics, he stands on absolutely firm ground, for no false knowledge is possible here.<sup>3)</sup>

Our author says he himself knows more about Dialectics than any other branch of philosophy. This *Disciplina* is a touchstone of Truth, and by means of it, he knows that the propositions he has been putting forward here are true, and through it he knows many other things also to be true, e. g. if there are four elements in the world, there are not five, if there is but one sun, there cannot be two. Through dialectics he is assured that whatever be the state of our bodily senses, these things are true. By this science, he knows also that logical processes give true results.<sup>4)</sup>

*Disciplinae* not only dwell in the mind, but dwell there constantly. A *Disciplina* is not always in consciousness, but, even then, it is in the mind nevertheless.<sup>5)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Soliloquia Bk. I Ch. 8.

<sup>2)</sup> Unde ista disciplina sensus intellectusque particeps musicae nomen invenit. De ordine Bk. II Ch. 14 § 41.

<sup>3)</sup> Contra Academicos Bk. III Ch. 13.

<sup>4)</sup> Contra Academicos Bk. III Ch. 13. Ratio is identified with geometrical truth in *De immortalitate animae* Ch. 2. This is a proof of the exalted sense which Augustine had of the worth of geometrical *disciplina*, but it does not conduce to clearness as to the meaning of Ratio. Ratio has been identified with *Animus*, and *Disciplina* has been identified with Ratio.

<sup>5)</sup> Potest aliquid esse in animo quod esse in se animus ipse non sentiat. *De immortalitate animae* Ch. 4 § 6.

### Numbers.

Through the medium of a *Disciplina*, the mind contemplates numbers. Numbers are eternal and immutable in their nature<sup>1)</sup> and on account of their eternal nature, they form the framework of the structure of Knowledge.<sup>2)</sup>

There is a knowledge which is not built upon such framework, and consequently it is very hard to grasp viz the Knowledge of God himself and of the soul. Such higher knowledge is only for those who have passed through the other.

The *Disciplinae*, although built upon Numbers, are only to be truly known by a person fired with a student's zeal, and who has plenty of leisure.

They have partly a practical, partly a theoretical purpose.<sup>3)</sup> Practical application of them is possible only after very long acquaintance, and only to men of natural genius.<sup>4)</sup>

The very pinnacle of Knowledge, is the knowledge of *Veritas* in its purity. To know *Veritas* is to know God himself, for God is *Veritas*. Augustine is consistent when he says that the knowledge of God is of the same kind as the knowledge gained in the *Disciplinae*. We must note, however, that he has passages where the knowledge of God is treated otherwise, for it is stated that God is unknowable.<sup>5)</sup>

True knowledge is a privilege of the wise man, viz the truly wise man. That magician *Albicerius* passed among men as a wise man, and professed to know divine things, but he was not truly wise, and his knowledge of things was counterfeit.

The comprehension of the unity of the world, viz of the world as *Universe* is only possible to a mind which refuses to dissipate itself upon the multitudinous objects around.<sup>6)</sup>

The mind must be cultivated through education to receive the divine seed of Knowledge.<sup>7)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Quoniam illud quod mens videt semper est praesens Iet immortale approbatur, cujus generis numeri apparebant. De Ordine Bk. I Ch. 14 § 41.

<sup>2)</sup> Plato was so smitten with the charm and power of number, that towards his later period, he abandoned himself largely to Pythagorean influence and let the Ideas appear as ideal Numbers. See Siebeck Teil I Div. 1 p. 184.

<sup>3)</sup> Ad cognitionem rerum contemplationemque discantur. De Ord. Bk. II Ch. 16.

<sup>4)</sup> De ordine Bk. II Ch. 16.

<sup>5)</sup> Qui scitur melius nesciendo. De Ordine Bk. II Ch. 16.

<sup>6)</sup> Illam videre non licet animae, quae in multa procedit. De Ordine Bk. I Ch. 2 § 3 (Dedication to Zenobius).

<sup>7)</sup> Assequeris ergo ista, mihi crede, cum eruditioni operam dederis, qua purgatur et excolitur animus nullo modo ante idoneus cui divina semina committantur. De Ordine Bk. I Ch. 2 § 4.

This is only another way of saying that all systematised knowledge is stored in the *Disciplinae*.

These, however, must be taught, and therefore the mind which contains them, which possesses Knowledge, will be a trained mind. This view of the matter brought Augustine at times into difficulties, and they remained unsolved. The presence of truth in the mind was his proof of immortality. The form under which truth appears is the *Disciplinae*, but how can they be present in the minds of the ignorant!

### The Criterion of Knowledge.

In the second book of *De libero arbitrio*, Evodius complains that different classes of men hold different notions about *Sapientia*. Each class thinks its own notion the correct notion, hence he thinks that the idea of *Sapientia* ought first of all to be clearly and authoritatively defined; he seeks in other words a true criterion of Wisdom.

Augustine will answer by asking a question, whether his friend thinks Wisdom to be anything other than the truth, in which the *summum bonum* is perceived and attained. Truth, thus, determines Wisdom, and all who have not truth err, and consequently follow wrong ideals. Augustine asks another question, whether *Sapientia* belongs to all rational minds, as a common notion, just as *Ratio numerorum* and *Veritas* do.

Evodius answers, that if the *summum bonum* is the same for all, then the truth in which it is discerned must be the same for all. But he has his doubts, for he sees so many different notions about the *summum bonum* among men. The *summum bonum*, replies Augustine, may indeed be different for different people, but *Sapientia*, in the light of which it is seen, is the same for all. There is only one sun, but in its light, each individual chooses for himself the objects which he will regard with most pleasure. In the same way, there is but one *Sapientia*, in the light of which men strive after different ideals of happiness. *Sapientia*, therefore is not the *summum bonum* itself, but the norm in relation to which it is chosen and measured. Augustine's teaching agrees with the Stoic doctrine of the Criterion, and perhaps we may say that it was derived from it.<sup>1)</sup>

*Sapientia* is, evidently, *Veritas* regarded from a practical point of view. As *Veritas*, it is the norm for thought;

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<sup>1)</sup> See Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*.<sup>4</sup> III. Teil. 1. Abt. p. 82.



as Sapiëntia, it is the norm for action. It is the Criterion, which determines the right line of life.<sup>1)</sup>

Augustine gave special attention to the question of a Criterion both for Knowledge and action. Siebeck,<sup>2)</sup> while observing that the foundation of Augustine's theory of Knowledge is Plato's theory of Ideas, both on its objective and subjective side, says that this is supplemented and deepened by the discussion of a problem raised by the later Platonic school as to the Criterion. For Augustine, he says, the activity of the soul itself determines and contains the Standard, for the soul on account of its elevated nature is to him infallible.<sup>3)</sup> The criterion, however, is not a subjective one, though we are at no loss for passages to show that Augustine was conscious of the infallibility of his own consciousness of the truth.

The ultimate Criterion is the universal mind; that which is regarded as true by all men alike must be true.<sup>4)</sup> Had Augustine rested in the Subjective individual consciousness, that would have been insufficient, but he does not do so, and proceeds thus to lay a safe and sure basis in the universal consciousness.

In this point also, Augustine follows the Stoic philosophy, which laid great emphasis on the necessary truth of those notions common to mankind, the *κοινὰ ἔννοια*. The Stoics were fond of appealing to the common verdicts of humanity — the consensus gentium. The Sceptics, certainly, did not find it hard to neutralise such an argument with their reference to cases of non-agreement.<sup>5)</sup>

Judged by every norm Opinion does not represent a true stage in the process of Knowledge. Opinion is rather a confusion of the rational sphere with that of the senses. The senses are trustworthy as far as they can bring us, but Opinion is baneful; it is a troubled state of the spring of Knowledge, so that its clear waters become turbid. The man who lives in the world of Opinion must get rid of his blue spectacles; his vision is quite false.

This arises from regarding the real world of Knowledge

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<sup>1)</sup> Contra Academicos Bk. I Ch. 5. Non falso, recta via vitæ Sapiëntia nominatur.

<sup>2)</sup> Geschichte der Psychologie Bd. I Teil I p. 388.

<sup>3)</sup> See also Huber, Philosophie der Kirchenväter p. 246 München 1859.

<sup>4)</sup> Ergo et illa quæ (in disciplinis traduntur) quæquis quis intelligit verissima esse, nulla dubitatione concedit. Soliloquia Bk. I Ch. 8. De libero arb Bk. II Ch. 12 etc.

<sup>5)</sup> See Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, Tübingen 1907 p. 169.

through the world of appearance. We are so used to the world of the senses, that we are in danger of mistaking it for the true world of reality, and of regarding this real world from their standpoint.<sup>1)</sup> It is through the liberales disciplinae, that we shall be best delivered from such bondage.

What is Sapiencia? Once more is this burning question brought forward,<sup>2)</sup> and once more out of the kaleidoscopic variety and wealth of his mind another view appears. Sapiencia is a concentration round the ideal. In striving towards Wisdom, we strive to comprehend with our whole soul, that which the mind has already touched. It is an effort to escape from the temporal into the changeless and eternal.<sup>3)</sup> In close connection with this idea of escape from the temporal, he introduces a scriptural quotation. In viis ostendet se hilariter, et omni providentia occurrit illis. Sap: VI. 17. This is explained as meaning that God will call us back unto Himself, when we lose ourselves in external things; this he will do by means of the Forms impressed upon them. The perception of the figures and proportions of the things of sense saves us from the corporeal.

The Forms of Nature arise from the property of Number<sup>4)</sup> Number is the guide of human productive activity; number is the source of beauty of rhythmical movements. Beyond the mind of the craftsman, the home of Number, the fount of Proportion in his productions, we perceive the eternal numbers themselves.

It is Form which saves an object possessing it from perishing.<sup>5)</sup>

#### The source of our Ideas.

- a) The source of our ideas of Number.
- b) " " " " " generally.

#### a) Number.

Do we know numbers through themselves, or simply as derived from material things, from which the numbers in the

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<sup>1)</sup> Plagas quasdam Opinionum, quas vitae cotidianae cursus infligit. De ordine Bk. I Ch. 1.

<sup>2)</sup> De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 16 § 41.

<sup>3)</sup> (Sc: Ut anima) exuta omnibus temporum et locorum affectionibus apprehendat id quod unum atque idem semper est. De libero arbitrio Bk. II. Ch. 16 § 41.

<sup>4)</sup> Formas habent quia numeros habent. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 16 § 42.

<sup>5)</sup> Quidquid autem formae cuiquam rei deficienti remanet, ex illa forma est quae nescit deficere. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 17 § 46.

form of images are impressed upon our minds? "The bodily senses", says Evodius, "could not give me my knowledge of numbers, for I not only perceive them in themselves, but can also add and subtract them, and detect mistakes in the work of others. This is a task for the reason".

Numbers are immutable:  $7 + 3 = 10$  always without exception, and for this reason, number in its unchangeable truth will be the same for every individual. Augustine remarks that we think of no number so often as the unit, and this is not given us by the senses. The senses regard the material objects, and material objects remind us of what is multitudinous, rather than unique; for an object is made up of particles, it has a right and a left side etc. Number, therefore, as resting on the idea of Unity, must be the product of Thought.<sup>1)</sup> From the number One all numbers are derived, and after it are named.<sup>2)</sup> It follows that all numbers are products of the Mind, not of the senses.

b) The source of Ideas generally.

Where do our ideas come from? In other words, how can we solve the problem of Suggestion? The problem occurs in the course of the discussion on the nature of moral temptation. An essential element in such temptations is Suggestion. Two possible courses of action must have been present vividly before the mind.

Where do thoughts come from into the mind?<sup>3)</sup> There are only two ways open to consideration. Either from outwards by means of the senses, or in some hidden way (*occultis modis*) from within. As occupied with the special question of Temptation Augustine grants the power of the devil to suggest to the mind. Suggestions enter from the direction of anything which lies subject to, that is, within the sphere of the mind or senses, Subject to the mind's observation are all things except the Trinity itself; the mind itself is its own subject, and this is the source of our knowledge of our own existence.<sup>4)</sup> In the opening paragraph of *Soliloquia* Bk. II, Augustine had not yet reached

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<sup>1)</sup> Ubique autem unum noverim, non utique per corporis sensum novi. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 8 § 22.

<sup>2)</sup> Nullus enim est ex iis (numeris) qui non tot vocetur, quoties habet unum. De libero arbitrio Bk. II Ch. 8 § 22.

<sup>3)</sup> Unde igitur venit in mentem quidquid illud est, quod venit in mentem? De libero arbitrio Bk. III Ch. 25 § 75.

<sup>4)</sup> Subiacet ergo intentioni animi, prius ipse animus, unde nos etiam vivere sentimus. De libero arbitrio Bk. III Ch. 25 § 75.

this point, where the Cartesian proof "Cogito, ergo sum" had occurred to him. Subject to the senses, proceeds Augustine, are everything corporeal.

The mind is capable of conscious reflection upon itself, and perceives on regarding its own self, that it is but that difference by which it is not God.<sup>1)</sup> In comparison with the Deity, a mere negation! Yet this same soul is capable of making itself a source of Pleasure for itself next to God himself! It is when this soul, rises up in self regard, and oblivious of God, that pride arises which is the beginning of all sin.

Augustine here and there displays surprising devotion to the mind and its interests. We call to mind his assertion that eternal existence, much as he yearned after immortality were not desirable, were it existence without progressive knowledge.

And yet, on another occasion he seems to confess for himself and others a lack of particular interest in a theoretical knowledge of the past as dissociated from the interest of the present.<sup>2)</sup> Nevertheless this does not mean that he knew what mental "ennui" was; it means rather that he had his eye open for relative worth.

#### General remarks.

While ample notice has been taken by different writers of the influence of Plato on Augustine's philosophy, there is hardly a reference to Aristotle in this connection. This is true even of Storz, and even the name of Aristotle does not appear in his index.<sup>3)</sup>

The Interior Sensus of which Augustine makes so much, shews us that he realised the need of demonstrating the unity of the soul — even the animal soul — for the function of the Interior Sensus is to supply a focus for the various organs of Sense perception. This Interior sensus, although found in Augustine's pages is a purely Aristotelian device.

No one can read the later dialogues without seeing that he was much engrossed with the conception of Form. This also

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<sup>1)</sup> Etiam seipsum animus intueatur et sibi ipse quodammodo veniat in mentem, non fit nisi differentia qua non est quod Deus. De libero arbitrio Bk. III Ch. 25 § 76.

<sup>2)</sup> Quid igitur mihi obest, si esse quando coeperim nescio, cum esse me noverim nec futurum esse desperem . . . non emin in praeterita me attendo ut tanquam errorem perniciosissimum verear, si aliter de iis sensero quam fuerunt; sed in id quod futurus sum cursum dirigo, duce misericordia creatoris mei. De libero arbitrio Bk. III. Ch. 21 § 61.

<sup>3)</sup> Storz, Die Philosophie des heiligen Augustinus. Freiburg i. S. 1882.

is an Aristotelian conception. We do not contend that Augustine borrowed these directly from Aristotle, although, on the other hand there is his own evidence to shew that he was well acquainted with some of Aristotle's writings. In *Confessiones* Bk. IV. Ch. 15 he recollects the paths on which his mind wandered with pleasure when he was a young man, and the "formae corporeae" then occupied much of his attention. In the following chapter he speaks of the *Categories* of Aristotle coming into his hands when he was but a youth of twenty years.<sup>1)</sup>

It is probable, however, that the main channels of Aristotelian influence were the Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophy.

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<sup>1)</sup> Et quid mihi proderat quod annos natus ferme viginti cum in manus meas venissent Aristotelica quaedam, quas appellant decem *Categorias* etc.



## Vita.

My father and mother, Joseph and Anne Parry, Farmers, live at Rhuddlan, North Wales, England, where I was born April 10<sup>th</sup> 1877. From the Rhuddlan National Schools I went to the Grammar School (W. Easterby Ll. D) at St. Asaph. At the age of 15 years, I passed the Preliminary Examination of the Pharmaceutical Society, and was apprenticed for 4 years to Peter Roberts Esq J. P. Chemist and Druggist of St Asaph. After a period of service as Chemist's assistant at Maidstone and Swansea, I began to preach at the latter town, and in order to learn Greek, proceeded to the Preparatory School at Bala. (Rev J. Owen Jones B. A.). I next gained an entrance Scholarship to the University College of North Wales at Bangor in the year 1901, having previously passed the Matriculation Examination of the Welsh University in the first Division. In the summer of 1905 I graduated B. A. with Honours in Greek of the University of Wales, and in the Autumn entered the Theological College at Bala, where in 1908 I passed the Final B. D. examination of the University of Wales. 1908—1909 I spent in the Universities of Berlin and Marburg, as Pierce Scholar of Bala College. During 1909—11 I acted as Assistant to the late Rev. Hugh Williams M.A. D.D. Professor of Church History in Bala College.

The Summer Semesters of 1910 and 1911, also the Winter and Summer Semesters 1911—1912 I spent in the University of Strassburg, as Research Scholar of the Dr. Williams Divinity Institute, Gordon Square London.

My teachers, in England, were the Professors Gibson, Arnold, Morris Jones, Witton Davies, Hudson Williams, Rhys Roberts in Bangor: Stevenson, Davies, Richards, Williams, Ellis Edwards, in Bala: in Germany, Strack, Seeberg, Deissmann, Harnack in Berlin: Thumb, Westphal, Budde, Jülicher, Rade, Hermann in Marburg: Thumb, v. Dobschütz, Ficker, Baeumker in Straßburg. To all my teachers I offer my sincerest thanks.

In regard to this Dissertation I wish to express my warmest thanks to Prof. Clemens Baeumker, without whose suggestions and assistance, the work would not have been successfully completed.

Augustine whose psychology I investigated, is a great figure in Church History, and to two of my teachers in this branch of learning I wish to express my deepest obligations, viz. the late Prof. Hugh Williams of Bala, and Prof. Johannes Ficker of Straßburg.

I also thank most heartily the Trustees, and especially the Rev. Francis H Jones B. A. the Secretary of the Dr. Williams' Library in London for their unflinching courtesy and generosity.

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