


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PRE-WAR HISTORY

PART I
28. JUNE TO 23. JULY 1914

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PREFACE.

The present publication is intended to serve as an addendum and a supplement to the documents giving the history of the war of 1914 published in the austro-hungarian Red Book.

The documents here published give the exact text of the originals.

The first part (I.) contains the diplomatic documents between the 28th June and the 23rd July 1914; the sequel (II. and III.) will contain a series of documents up to the 27th August 1914.

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1.

Autograph letter from Emperor and King Francis Joseph to Emperor William*).

I regretted sincerely, that you were obliged to give up your intention of coming to Vienna for the funeral ceremony. I should have very much[?] liked to personally express my heartfelt thanks for your sympathy in my great grief.

By your warmhearted condolence you have given me a fresh proof that in you I possess a true and reliable friend whom I can trust in every trying hour.

I should have much wished to speak to you about the political situation, as this has not been possible I take the liberty to send you the enclosed memoir of my Minister of Foreign Affairs, written before the terrible catastrophe of Sarajevo, and more worthy of consideration, now that this tragic event has happened**).

The crime committed against my nephew is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Servian Panslavists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire.

The researches made up to the present have shown that the bloody deed of Sarajevo is not the work of a single individual but the result of a well-organised plot, the threads of which reach to Belgrade, and though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Servian government, there can be no doubt whatever that this governments policy, intent as it is to unite all South-slavs under the servian flag, must encourage such crimes and that if it is not stopped, it will prove a lasting danger to my house and to my countries.

*) From draught dated Vienna, July 2, 1914, of autograph letter presented in Berlin, July 5, 1914 by the Austro-hungarian ambassador; Emperor William's answer will be found No. 18.

***) Vide supplement to No. 1.

This danger is increased by the fact that Roumania, though it is allied to us, entertains intimate bonds of friendship with Serbia and tolerates the same hateful agitation within its realm as Serbia does.

I find it difficult to doubt the faith and the good intentions of such an old friend as King Charles of Roumania; but he has within the two last months twice declared to my minister in Bucharest, that in view of the excited and hostile sentiments of his people he would, if serious events arose, find it impossible to do his duty as an ally.

At the same time the present Roumanian government is openly encouraging the aims of the league of culture; it favours the approachment of Serbia and is trying to found a new Balkan league, which cannot but be directed against my Empire.

In the beginning of the reign of Charles similar political fancies, as those which the Culture League is spreading abroad just now, troubled the healthy minds of roumanian statesmen and the danger threatened, that the kingdom was about to launch on an adventurous course of politics. At that time your late grandfather interfered in an energetic manner and, hitting the mark, through his government showed Roumania the only way in which it could attain a favoured position in Europe, and become a reliable support of order.

Now the kingdom is threatened by the same danger; I fear that merely giving good advice will be of no avail and that Roumania can only be rescued for the Triple Alliance, if we make it impossible for a Balkan league to be founded under the patronage of Russia, by gaining Bulgaria for the Triple Alliance and making Bucharest understand clearly that the friends of Serbia cannot be our friends, and that Roumania must not look to us as allies, if it does not break with Serbia and does not at the same time stop the agitation directed against my Empire in Roumania.

My governments efforts must in future be directed to isolating Serbia and reducing its size. The first step on this road would be the strengthening of the present Bulgarian government, so that Bulgaria, whose real interests tally with ours, would not be tempted to turn to its old love for Russia.

If Bucharest finds out that the Triple Alliance is resolved not to renounce friendship with Bulgaria, but is prepared to cause Bulgaria to make friends with Roumania and guarantee its integrity, it is possible that Roumania will abandon the dangerous road into which the friendship with Servia has led it and the approaching of Russia has tempted it. If we succeed in this, we might make the attempt to reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey. A new Balkan league could then be formed under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, whose aim would be to stop the progress of the panslavist flood and ensure lasting peace for our countries. This will not be otherwise possible, but by pushing aside Servia and preventing it from becoming a factor of power in the Balkans, as it is at present the cornerstone of panslavist politics.

After the recent terrible event in Bosnia, I am certain that you also are convinced, that a conciliation between Servia and us is out of the question and that the peace-loving policy of all European monarchs is threatened, while this centre of criminal agitation continues unpunished in Belgrade.

Supplement.

Memoir.

At the end of the great political convulsions of the last two years, the situation of the Balkans cleared up sufficiently to allow us to judge in some degree of the results of the crisis and to ascertain how much the interests of the Triple Alliance have been involved, especially those of the two central imperial powers and what consequences may be drawn for the European and the Balkan politics of these powers.

If we compare the present situation impartially with the situation before the crisis, we must admit that the total result cannot be judged favorably either from the point of view of Austria-Hungary or of that of the Triple Alliance.

Some favorable points may certainly be observed. It has been possible to balance the advance of Servia by the creation of an independent Albanian state, which will after a number of years, when its internal organisation is completed, serve as a military factor in the accounts of the Triple Alliance. The relations of the Triple Alliance with the Greek kingdom, which

has gained in size and importance, have become such, that Greece, notwithstanding its alliance with Servia need not be regarded in the light of a decided enemy.

What is of more importance is, that the development, which has led to the second Balkan war has caused Bulgaria to awake from its hypnotic Russian dream, and that it need no longer be regarded in the light of an exponent of Russias policy. The Bulgarian government seems on the contrary to be anxious to enter into close relations with the Triple Alliance.

These favorable instances are outweighed by a number of disadvantages. Turkey, whose interests tallied with those of the Triple Alliance, and which weighed heavily in the balance against Russia and the Balkan countries, has been almost entirely driven out of Europe, and has suffered considerably in its *prestige* as a Great Power. Servia, whose policy has for many years been hostile towards Austria-Hungary and stands entirely under Russian influence, has gained both in population and in territory, much more than it ever expected. Its territorial neighbourhood to Montenegro and the visible growth of the idea of a Greater Servia makes an aggrandisement achieved by a union with Montenegro seem a not unlikely event. And last, not least, the relations of Roumania with the Triple Alliance have undergone a considerable change in the course of the crisis.

Whilst the Balkan crisis has brought about results, which are in themselves unfavorable to the Triple Alliance, and which bear the germ of further developments, that must be undesirable to Austria-Hungary, we observe on the other hand that Russian and French diplomacy have launched upon a course, which aims at improving the advantages obtained and modifying the results of what is to their disadvantage.

A brief survey of the european situation will explain why the Triple Entente—or we should rather say the Double Entente, since England has for obvious reasons adopted a reserved attitude—could not be satisfied with the changes brought about in the Balkans in its favour. The policy of the two Empires and to a certain degree that of Italy is conservative and the character of the Triple Alliance is purely defensive. The policy of Russia and also that of France has

a tendency to bring about certain changes, and the alliance between Russia and France, being the result of these parallel tendencies, must in its last consequences be of an offensive nature. If the policy of the Triple Alliance has hitherto triumphed and Europe's peace has not been disturbed by Russia and France, this is entirely due to the military superiority of the armies of the Triple Alliance, especially of those of Austria-Hungary and Germany, when compared to those of Russia and France. The alliance with Roumania being also considered an important factor.

The idea of liberating the christian Balkan peoples from the yoke of Turkey with a view towards using them as a weapon against the Triple Alliance has always been the true reason of the traditional interest shown by Russia towards these peoples. In Russia this idea developed to the wish, appreciated and seconded by France, of reuniting all the Balkan states into a Balkan league, which would have put an end to the military superiority of the Triple Alliance. The first condition for the realisation of this plan was to exclude Turkey from the territory inhabited by the christian Balkan peoples, so as to increase the latter's importance and give them full freedom towards the West. The last war has in a general way realised this condition. But on the other hand the war caused a division of the Balkan states, which now stand against each other in two equally strong opposing groups, Turkey and Bulgaria on one side, the two Servian states, Greece and Roumania on the other.

The next task, which Russia wished to accomplish with the aid of France, was to annul this division, or at least to change its proportions, so as to obtain the greater number of Balkan states when the European forces are measured against each other.

As Servia and Greece had already concluded an alliance and Roumania was in harmony with them, at least as far as the peace of Bucharest was concerned, the two allied powers in the West were anxious to remove the rancour which exists between Bulgaria and Greece and more still between Bulgaria and Servia on account of Macedonia; overmore to find a basis on which it would be possible to draw Roumania over to the

side of the Entente, and if possible to overcome Bulgarias distrustful attitude and enter into some political combination with it, lastly to bring about a peaceful solution of the question of the islands, that would induce Turkey to approach the Balkan states, perhaps even to join them.

There can be no doubt as to the basis upon which Russian and French diplomacy intends bringing about the adjustment of all this opposition and rivalship and forming a new Balkan league. A league of the Balkan states, now that Turkey is no longer in question, must be founded on a programme directed against Austria-Hungary, at the expense of whose territorial integrity the members of the league might be promised an advance of their frontiers toward the West. It is scarcely possible to imagine any other basis for a Balkan league; the basis as above mentioned, is by no means out of question and even on the way to become a fact.

There can be no doubt that Servia, compelled by Russia, would consent to an alliance with Bulgaria, directed against Austria-Hungary, the result of which would be the acquisition of Bosnia and the surrounding country, even if the price that has to be paid were Macedonia.

There are greater difficulties to be overcome in Sofia.

Russia has made propositions to Bulgaria on this basis before the second Balkan war and has repeated them after the peace of Bucharest. Bulgaria, which does not trust agreements with Servia, has refused to comply with the plans of Russia, and is following a course of politics, which promises anything rather than a peaceful understanding with Servia under the patronage of Russia. But in Petersburg the game has not been given up as lost. In the interior of Bulgaria Russian agents are busy undermining the present system, and the diplomacy of the two allied powers is hard at work to bring about the complete isolation of Bulgaria with a view to making it more pliable to the wishes of Russia.

Since Bulgaria after the war sought to approach Turkey and succeeded in doing so, and since the Porte shows an inclination to ally itself to Bulgaria and to approach the Triple Alliance, Russian and French influence is busy on the Bosphorus to oppose this policy of Turkey, with whom it is

trying to make friends, hoping either to isolate Bulgaria completely, or else to induce it to take a different course with the help of Turkey. There are reports from Constantinople, which are to a certain degree confirmed by the journey of Talaat Bey to Livadia, that these efforts have not been without success, at least as far as Turkey is concerned. Russia has succeeded in deviating the historical distrust of Turkey from itself, by calling attention to the alleged intentions of other powers threatening the Turkish possessions in Asia Minor. France has given its support, inasmuch as it drew advantage from Turkey's financial difficulties and the result was, that instead of approaching the Triple Alliance, the Statesmen of Turkey gave serious consideration to joining the opposed set of powers.

Talaat Bey's journey to Bucharest was also the result of the activity of Russian and French diplomats, who brought about Roumanian mediation in the question of the islands and encouraged friendly relations between Bucharest and Constantinople with a view towards furthering the detachment of Bulgaria. Up to the present the policy of isolating Bulgaria has not borne visible fruits, perhaps because there has as yet been no reason why Sofia should distrust the intentions of Turkey. Still Russia is justified in expecting that the complete isolation of Bulgaria in the Balkans and in Europe would make it necessary for Bulgaria to give up its present course of politics and to accept the conditions which Russia would enforce, before it granted Bulgaria its protection and its patronage.

Macedonia plays a prominent part in the home and foreign politics of Bulgaria. If its government finds out that peaceful relations and an alliance with Servia are the only way towards saving at least a portion of Macedonia for Bulgaria, disappointments notwithstanding, no Bulgarian statesman would dare to refuse the offer. It is only by a proceeding which would strengthen Bulgaria, would make it indifferent to Russian temptings and threats, and would preserve the country from isolation, that it could be prevented from ultimately accepting Russia's plan of a Balkan league.

As to Roumania the action of Russia and France became intense before the crisis in the Balkans and with the help of extraordinary distortions and by cleverly encouraging the old

idea of a Greater Roumania, which in this country always smoulders under the fire, had inspired public opinion with hostile feelings against the monarchy and had persuaded Roumania to a military cooperation with Servia, which was scarcely fair, when its duties as an ally of Austria-Hungary are taken into consideration.

This action has not in any way been interrupted; on the contrary it was continued most emphatically with impressive and demonstrative means, such as the Czar's visit to the court of Roumania.

At the same time a complete change took place in Roumanian public opinion and there can be no doubt by this time, that wide circles in the army, among the intelligent classes and among the people are in favour of a new course, and in favour of approaching Russia, of a policy which would have the aim of liberating "our brothers on the other side of the Carpathians". There can be no doubt that the ground has been well prepared for the eventuality of Roumania joining a Balkan league, if it were founded.

Official Roumania has so far resisted the current of popular feeling and the temptations offered by Russia and France, so that it cannot be said that Roumania sides with them or follows a course of politics hostile to Austria-Hungary. But it cannot be denied that a change has come over Roumania's foreign policy, which offers the perspective of future development in the same direction and already has an undeniable effect upon the political and military situation of Austria-Hungary not only, but of the entire Triple Alliance.

Whilst formerly there was no positive reason for doubting Roumanias good will to comply with the duties imposed by the agreement with powers of the Triple Alliance—though it was kept secret — recently competent Roumanian factors have repeatedly and publicly declared that Roumanian policy must be led by the principle of keeping a "free hand". The agreement with Roumania being secret, the Triple Alliance had to refrain from recriminations on this subject. King Carol, with the sincerity that besseems his noble character, declared to the Imp. and Roy. Minister in Bucharest, that as long as he lived, he would always strive to prevent the Roumanian army from taking the

field against Austria-Hungary, but that he could not follow a course of politics contrary to public opinion in Roumania, that therefore in the eventuality of Russia going to war against Austria-Hungary, action on Roumanias part was not to be thought of, notwithstanding the existing alliance. The Roumanian Minister of foreign affairs went one step further—immediately after the Czar's visit to Costanza—and in an interview, admitted without reserve, that an approximation to Russia had taken place and that a community of interests existed between the two countries.

The relations between Austria-Hungary and Roumania are at present such that the Monarchy fully adheres to the alliance and would, if a *casus foederis* happened, support Roumania with all its power, whilst Roumania throws off the alliance and promises no more than a neutral attitude. But even Roumania's neutrality is guaranteed by nothing more than a personal promise of King Carol, which only holds good for the duration of his reign, and which he can only keep, if the management of foreign affairs remains in his hands. The whole country being in a state of national excitement, the Kings power might not suffice, and indeed the King himself refers to the general feeling, when he explains why it will be impossible to come up to the full standard of an ally's duties. Also it must be remembered that already Roumania is attached by ties of friendship and common interests to the Monarchy's bitterest enemy in the Balkans.

The Monarchy has hitherto limited itself to friendly speech on the change in Roumania's politics in Bucharest and has not seen fit to draw serious consequences from Roumania's deviation from its course of politics. The Vienna cabinet was induced to adopt this course, because the German government held the belief that Roumania was subject to transitory vacillations, consequences of misunderstandings at the time of the crisis, which would disappear of themselves, if we remained calm and patient. But we have seen that these tactics of patience and friendly observations did not have the desired effect, that the process of estrangement between Austria-Hungary and Roumania far from stopping, has thereby been accelerated. A proof that these tactics can give no hopes for

the future, lies in the fact that the present situation of a "free hand" is very much to the advantage of Roumania and quite as much to the detriment of Austria-Hungary.

The question now arises whether Austria-Hungary could mend its relations towards Roumania by speaking out and putting the kingdom before the choice of either breaking off relations altogether, or giving sufficient guarantees to prove that it is willing to fulfil in their entirety the duties arising out of the alliance with the Triple Alliance—which could be done by the publication of the secret agreement. This way of solving the question, which would revive the thirty year old tradition, would certainly be after the heart of Austria-Hungary. But in the present circumstances, it is very improbable that King Carol or any Roumanian government would consent to offend public feeling in Roumania by advertising the country as an ally of the Triple Alliance, even if the conditions of the present agreement were improved. A categorical *aut-aut* on the monarchys part might bring about an open rupture. We cannot judge in Vienna whether serious and impressive representations on the part of the German cabinet, combined with the offers above mentioned, might induce Roumania to adopt an attitude, which would guarantee its full and lasting loyalty as an ally—but we very much doubt that this would be the case.

Under these circumstances it is practically impossible that the alliance with Roumania should ever again become so reliable and so trustworthy, that it might be regarded as the pivot for Austria-Hungary's Balkan politics.

The political and military importance of Roumania make it imperative for Austria-Hungary not to continue remaining passive and possibly imperil its own defences, but to commence military preparations and political actions that will dispel or at least attenuate the effects of Roumanias neutrality and eventual hostility.

The military value of the alliance with Roumania consisted in the case of a conflict with Russia, in having from a military point of view an absolutely free hand towards Roumania, whilst a considerable portion of Russian troops would be engaged by an attack of the Roumanian army. The present

relations between Austria-Hungary and Roumania would in the case of an armed conflict with Russia have pretty much the contrary effect. Russia would not have to fear an attack on Roumania's part and would not have to protect its frontier on the Roumanian side, whilst Austria-Hungary would not feel sure of Roumania's neutrality and would have to place its troops in large numbers, where an attack on Roumania's part might be feared.

All Austria-Hungary's past military preparations for the eventuality of a conflict with Russia were based upon the supposition of Roumania's cooperation. If this supposition proves fictitious, if there is not even the certainty that Roumania will not become aggressive, the monarchy must change its dispositions for the eventuality of a war, and must take into consideration that fortifications against Roumania will become necessary.

From a political point of view Roumania must be shown that we are fully able to chose a different point of support for our Balkan policy. While this is being achieved the necessity arises to take effective measures for paralising the efforts made by the Entente powers for the establishment of a new Balkan league. Both actions cannot be otherwise realised, than by accepting the offer of Bulgaria, made a year ago and repeated several times since, the offer of concluding a definite treaty with that state. At the same time the monarchy must direct its policy towards bringing about an alliance between Turkey and Bulgaria, in favour of which both states are so well disposed, that a short time ago a draught for such a treaty has been worked out, though it has not been signed. This is another instance in which the monarchy, if it continued delaying action out of consideration for Roumania, a feeling which is by no means reciprocated, might seriously prejudice its own interest. Further delay and especially indolence on the part of Bulgaria would give France and Russia free scope to promote their plans. Roumanias attitude literally propels Austria-Hungary in the direction of granting Bulgaria what it has long asked for, and what will frustrate Russias policy of isolating Bulgaria. But these things must be done, while the road to Sofia and Constantinople are still open.

The treaty with Bulgaria, the details of which will have to be well considered, must avoid all particulars, which might in any way violate the obligations contracted in the agreement with Roumania. It is overmore not advisable to make a secret of the alliance with Bulgaria, since there is no hostility against Roumania in this step, but a serious warning by which the responsible factors in Bucharest may learn to understand the consequences of a lasting, onesided political dependence upon Russia.

Before Austria-Hungary undertakes the action in question, it is most anxious to establish a full understanding with the German Empire, not only in consideration of old traditions or of what is due to a close ally, but more especially because vital interests of the Triple Alliance and of Germany are at stake and the safety of common interests can only be ensured if the joint action of Russia and France is opposed by a joint action of the Triple Alliance, especially of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

It must be considered that if Russia, sustained by France tries to unite the Balkan states against Austria-Hungary, if it undermines the relations with Roumania, which are already not the best, these hostile actions are not directed against Austria-Hungary alone, but quite as much against the German Empire, whose geographical situation and internal structure make it the more exposed and accessible part of the Central-European block, which stands in the way of the realisation of Russias world-politic plans.

It is the aim of the two allied powers to check the superiority of the two Empires by making sure of helpful troops on the Balkan, but this is by no means the ultimate aim of Russia.

Whilst France hopes to weaken the monarchy, because this would promote its aspirations of *revanche*, the intentions of Russia are much more comprehensive.

If we analyse the development of Russia during the two last centuries, the extension of its territory, the growth of its number of inhabitants, so much more rapid than that of all other Great Powers in Europe, the progress of its economical resources and of its military command of power, and if we

consider that this enormous Empire is still as good as debarred of the sea, partly by its situation and partly by treaties, it is not difficult to understand why Russia's policy has at all times borne an immanently aggressive character.

It is not in reason to assume that Russia harbours territorial plans of conquest at the expense of Germany, still the extraordinary armaments and the extensive preparations of war, the building of strategical railways towards the West certainly point more to Germany than to Austria-Hungary.

Russia has found out that the realisation of its plans in Europe and Asia, arising from internal necessities, would violate Germany's vital interests and would perforce meet resistance.

The policy of Russia is determined by unchangeable circumstances and is therefore constant and far-seeing.

The manifest tendencies of Russia to isolate and detach Austria-Hungary, which is not following a course of world-policy, have the ultimate aim of making it impossible for the German Empire to continue its resistance against final success and against its political and economical supremacy.

* * *

The above memoir had only just been completed, when the terrible events of Sarajevo happened.

The entire signification of the villanous murder cannot be conceived at this time. Most certainly, if a proof was necessary that the gulf between the monarchy and Serbia is beyond bridging over, or that the ambition of Greater Serbia in its intensity and recklessness does not stop before anything, that proof has been given.

Austria-Hungary has shown good-will and friendliness to bring about tolerable relations with Serbia.

We have a fresh opportunity of judging that all these efforts were in vain and that the monarchy must in future look to the tenacious, irreconcilable and aggressive enmity of Serbia.

It is all the more necessary for the monarchy to seize the threads which its enemies are weaving into a net over its head, with a strong hand and tear them once for all.

Relation of the Hungarian Premier Count Tisza.

(July 1, 1914.)

Gracious Majesty,

Much as I am anxious to avoid disturbing Your Majesty in these days, still it is my duty to make the following brief statement in customary devotion.

The first opportunity which offered for speaking to Count Berchtold was after my audience of Your Majesty, and I did not till then learn his intention to make the horrible deed of Sarajevo the occasion for reckoning with Servia.

I have not concealed from Count Berchtold that I should consider this a fatal mistake and would certainly not share the responsibility. In the first place we have not sufficient proofs to be able to put the responsibility of the crime upon Servia and to evoke a war, if the Servian government gave satisfactory explanations. We should have the worst *locus standi* imaginable and would be considered by all the world as the disturbers of peace, besides beginning a great war under the most unfavourable circumstances.

In the second place I consider the present moment, when we have as good as lost Roumania, without having been able to replace it, whilst the only state on which we can rely, to wit Bulgaria, is completely exhausted, as most unpropitious.

The present situation of the Balkans would make it easy to find a *casus belli* if one were wanted. When the right time will have come for declaring war, anyone of the different questions could be used for a pretext. But first we must create a diplomatic constellation, which will change the proportions of military power in our favour.

The definite annexation of Bulgaria, in such a way as not to offend Roumania, and to leave the possibility of an understanding with this state and with Greece, is becoming a more urgent necessity every day. A last attempt must be made to induce Germany to find a way of making Roumania join the Triple Alliance openly. If Germany cannot or will not undertake this mission, it must be satisfied if we make sure of Bulgaria for the Triple Alliance.

If we delay much longer to please Roumania, it will be our fault if Bulgaria—left in the lurch by us—one fine day joins the league founded against us and helps to rob us because it will have been promised a piece of Macedonian territory. As to Roumania I believe that the only chance of getting it back will be our alliance with Bulgaria. With all its mania of aggrandisement, the motive power in the soul of the Roumanian people is fear of Bulgaria. If they see that nothing will keep us from an alliance with Bulgaria, they will perhaps offer to join us, so as to be safe from Bulgarian aggression. These are the principal points of view, which according to my belief, make an energetic action on our part necessary and as the forthcoming visit of Emperor William may offer an opportunity, I considered it my duty to approach Your Majesty with the submissive request to graciously make use of Emperor Williams presence in Vienna, for combating that monarchs preference for Serbia, a thing that should not be difficult in view of the recent, revolting events and to induce him to support us energetically in our intended Balkan policy.

Budapest, July 1, 1914.

(signed) Stefan Count *Tisza*.

3.

**Discourse between Count Berchtold and the German
ambassador.**

Journal No. 3095.

Vienna, July 3, 1914.

In the course of a discourse with the German ambassador on the 2nd July I called his attention to the fact that the drama of Sarajevo was but another proof of the serious consequences of Greater Serbia's systematic intriguing, and added that these dangerous dealings could not be otherwise stopped, than by a regardless action against Serbia itself. Not only our interests demand this, but those of Germany as well. To-days message from, Semlin according to which twelve assassins are on the way with the intention of murdering Emperor William, would perhaps open eyes in Berlin to the dangers that threaten us from Belgrade.

Herr von Tschirschky did not deny this, and assured me that according to his belief only firm and energetic acting could have the desired result. I must surely know that during the crisis Germany had repeatedly declared that in Balkan politics it would always stand on our side, whenever that was necessary.

When I remarked that I had repeatedly been assured of this, but that in practise I had not always been supported by the Berlin cabinet and did not know to what extent I could rely upon it, the ambassador replied that privately he understood the attitude of his government to be due to the fact that we were always expounding ideas, but had never formed a definite plan of action and that Berlin could only make our cause its own, if we came forward with such a plan.

Recently Prince Hohenlohe had explained to him the necessity of closing accounts with Serbia. He had answered the Prince that this was "all very fine, but that it must be clear how far one intended to go, what was to be done with Serbia if it came to serious results and above all things a favourable diplomatic situation must be created, and one must first of all be sure of the attitude which Italy and Roumania would adopt. It would be a serious affair to begin war with Serbia, without being safe beforehand that Italy and Roumania would not attack one at the same time."

I replied to the ambassador that the question how far one ought to go and what was eventually to be done with Serbia must at the critical moment be left for us to decide according to circumstances. What was to be done with Serbia in case of a victory—must be regarded in the light of a *cura posterior*. As to Roumania we cannot stoop to questioning it, at the risk of impossible compensations being demanded. When Roumania, without consulting us, joined Serbia in attacking defenceless Bulgaria, very much against our interests, as it well knew, Germany concurred and gave us to understand that we must keep quiet. This is exactly what we ask of Germany now,—that it should use its influence over Roumania in the same sense, when we, to save the integrity of the monarchy strike a blow against Serbia.

Herr von Tschirschky said he considered this perfectly justified, and was thinking more of Italy, which, considering that we were its allies, should be consulted before we took in hand an action involving war.

To this I replied that if we consulted the cabinet of Rome in this question it would no doubt ask for Valona in compensation and this we could not concede. It would be the Berlin cabinet's affair to explain to Rome that we were fighting for our existence and as no Turkish territory was in question, the stipulations of the Triple Alliance do not justify Italy in demanding any compensation whatever.

4.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 212.

Vienna, July 4, 1914.

Telegram in cypher.—Night-service.—Strictly private.

Count Hoyos is leaving to-night with an autograph letter of His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty to Emperor William in Berlin. He will bring your Excellency copies of this letter and of an enclosed memoir, which you will forward to the Imperial Chancellor.

Should it be impossible for your Excellency to be received personally by the Kaiser, I must ask you to take every precaution so that the letter is in the Emperor's hands in the course of to-morrow, since, according to the papers, Emperor William starts on his Northern voyage on Monday.

I am also very anxious that your Excellency should be received by the Imperial Chancellor to-morrow, and I shall ask your Excellency to visit Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in the country, if he is not in Berlin. I consider it of the utmost importance that the Imperial Chancellor should speak to you and then to the Emperor on these subjects, before the Emperor starts on his voyage.

5.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 237.

Berlin, July 4, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Under-state-secretary to-day casually asked me did I know anything of a step undertaken in Belgrade by the Imp. and Roy. government reported by the papers. I gave an answer in the negative.

Herr Zimmermann assured me that he considered energetic action on the part of the monarchy, with whom the entire civilised world sympathised, perfectly justified, still he would advise great discretion and would not like to see that humiliating conditions were proposed to Servia.

6.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 237.

Berlin, July 5, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

When I had informed Emperor William that I had an autograph letter from His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty, which Count Hoyos had just brought and which I was to give to him, I received an invitation to lunch with Their Majesties at noon in the Neue Palais.

I gave the autograph letter and the enclosed memoir into the hands of His Majesty. In my presence the Kaiser read both with the greatest attention.

The first thing he assured me was, that he had expected some serious step on our part towards Servia, but that at the same time he must confess that the detailed statement of His Majesty made him regard a serious European complication possible and that he could give no definite answer before having taken council with the Imperial chancellor.

After lunch, when I again called attention to the seriousness of the situation, the Emperor authorised me to inform our gracious Majesty that we might in this case, as in all

others rely upon Germany's full support. He must, as he said before, first hear what the Imperial Chancellor has to say, but he did not doubt in the least that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg would agree with him. Especially as far as our action against Serbia was concerned. But it was his (Emperor William's) opinion that this action must not be delayed. Russia's attitude will no doubt be hostile, but to this he has been for years prepared, and should a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia be unavoidable, we might be convinced that Germany our old faithful ally, would stand at our side. Russia at the present time was in no way prepared for war, and would think twice before it appealed to arms. But it will certainly set other powers on to the Triple Alliance and add fuel to the fire in the Balkans.

He understands perfectly well that His Apostolic Majesty in his well-known love of peace, would be reluctant to march into Serbia; but if we had really recognised the necessity of warlike action against Serbia, he (Emperor William) would regret if we did not make use of the present moment, which is all in our favour.

As to Roumania he would take care that King Carol and his councillors would observe a correct attitude.

He cannot sympathise with the idea of concluding an alliance with Bulgaria; he never trusted King Ferdinand and does not trust him now, nor his former or present councillors. Still he would make no objections to a treaty between the monarchy and Bulgaria, but this treaty must contain nothing to offend Roumania and it must—as the memoir proposes, be communicated to Roumania.

Emperor William intends leaving to-morrow morning for Kiel, whence he starts for his northern tour; but before leaving, His Majesty will discourse with the Imperial chancellor on the subject in question. For this purpose he has sent for him to Hohenfinow; and will see him in the Neue Palais this evening.

I shall certainly have an opportunity of discoursing with the Imperial chancellor in the course of to-morrow.

7.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 239.

Berlin, July 6, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

In addition to my telegram No. 237 of yesterday*).

Have just had a long discourse with the Imperial chancellor and the Under-state-secretary, Count Hoyos being present. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg began by saying that Emperor William had instructed him to express his thanks for the autograph letter, which he would answer personally in a few days.

He (the Imperial Chancellor) was also authorised by his Imperial master to give a precise account of the position of the German government towards the imperial letter and the memoir, which he did in these words:

German government perceives all the dangers arising for Austria-Hungary and for the Triple Alliance as well, from Russia's plan of a Balkan league; it perceives also that in this situation we should be desirous to induce Bulgaria to join the Triple Alliance formally, but it must insist that this should be done in a way—as indeed is intended—not to violate our obligations towards Roumania. German Minister in Sofia was authorised to negotiate in this sense with the Bulgarian government, when his Austro-Hungarian colleague will call upon him to do so. At the same time he (the Imperial chancellor) intends instructing the German Minister in Bucharest to speak openly with the king of Roumania, to inform him of the negotiations carried on in Sofia and to call his attention to the fact that he ought to stop the Roumanian agitation against us. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg will also cause the king to be told, that he (chancellor) has in the past always advised us to remain friends with Servia, but that after the late events he perceives that this is as good as impossible; Roumania should also take this into account.

With regard to our relations towards Servia the German government is of opinion that we must judge what is to be

*) Vide No. 6.

done to clear the course; whatever way we decide, we may always be certain that we will find Germany at our side, a faithful ally and friend of our monarchy.

In the further course of conversation I ascertained that the Imperial chancellor like his Imperial master considers immediate action on our part as the best solution of our difficulties in the Balkans. From an international point of view he considers the present moment as more favorable than some later time; he agrees with us that we need inform neither Italy nor Roumania beforehand of an intended action against Servia. On the other hand Italy should even now be informed of the intention to allow Bulgaria to join the Triple Alliance.

Both the Imperial chancellor and the undersecretary of state were of opinion that it would be best to negotiate a treaty with Bulgaria only at present and to leave it to the future whether Turkey and eventually Greece would bind themselves to Bulgaria. Chancellor remarked that in view of the great interests which Germany has in Turkey, this country's accession would be most desirable.

With regard to the step to be undertaken in Bucharest by the representative of Germany, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg thinks it might be useful, when King Carol's answer has reached Berlin, that Count Czernin should shortly afterwards speak with the king on the same subject.

At the conclusion of our discourse, the chancellor asked how matters were going on in Albania and warned earnestly against plans, which might endanger our relations towards Italy or the duration of the Triple Alliance.

Herr von Tschirschky will be informed of our discourse in strict privacy.

8.

Council of ministers for common concerns.

(July 7, 1914.)

K. Z. 58.

G. M. K. P. Z. 512.

Protocol

of the council of ministers for common concerns held in Vienna Juli 7, 1914 with the Minister of the Imp. and Roy. House and Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold in the chair.

Present:

The Imp. Roy. President of the council of ministers
Count Stürgkh.

the Roy. Hungarian Premier Count Tisza.

the Imp. and Roy. Common Finance-minister Dr. Ritter
von Biliński.

the Imp. and Roy. War-minister F. Z. M. Ritter von Kro-
batin.

the Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff G. d. I.
Baron von Conrad.

the Representative of the Naval Commander, Vice-Admiral
von Kailer.

Keeper of the Protocol: Secretary of legation Count
Hoyos.

Subject of Council: Bosnian concerns. The diplomatic
action against Servia.

The President opens the sitting remarking that the council of ministers had been called together to advise on the measures to be taken for meeting the evils which in Bosnia and Herzegovina have resulted from the catastrophe of Sarajevo. According to his view there would be a number of internal measures which the critical state of Bosnia has made desirable; but before deciding in their favour there should be clearness whether the moment has not come when an enunciation of power might put an end to Servia's intrigues once and for all. A decisive stroke of this kind cannot be dealt without previous diplomatic preparation, and for this reason the German government was informed and consulted. The discussions with Germany brought about a most satisfactory result, since Emperor William as well as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg solemnly promised the support and aid of Germany in the eventuality of a warlike complication with Servia. We must still take into account Italy and Roumania, he agreed with the Berlin cabinet that it would be better to act first and wait for eventual claims to compensation afterwards.

He is by no means convinced that an expedition to Servia must necessarily involve us in a war with Russia. Russia's present policy, which is farsighted, is aiming at a league of the Balkan states including Roumania, which it would

at a suitable moment play out against our monarchy. It is his belief that we must take into account that in the face of this policy our situation must become more precarious as time goes on, all the more because if we do not act, our own South-slavs and Roumanians will interpret our attitude as weakness, and would be all the more disposed to lend a willing ear to the persuasions of our neighbours across the frontier.

The logical result of what has been said, would be to get in advance of our foes and by coming to terms with Servia, to stop the development of the process at present going on, a result which we may not be able to attain later on.

The Royal Hungarian Premier agrees with us that during the last days the situation has changed on account of the facts which judicial examination has brought forth and also on account of the attitude of the Servian press, and fully admits that the possibility of a warlike action against Servia seems nearer than he believed just after the crime of Sarajevo. But he would never consent to a surprise attack upon Servia without a previous diplomatic action, such as he is afraid is being intended and he is sorry to hear, has been discoursed about by Count Hoyos in Berlin. We should, he believes in this case play a sorry figure in the eyes of all Europe, and should draw upon ourselves the enmity of all the Balkan states with the exception of Bulgaria, which is too weak just now to be of any effective help.

It is absolutely necessary that we address demands to Servia and if these are rejected we must make out an ultimatum. Our exactions may be hard, but not such that they cannot be complied with. If Servia accepted them, we should have a splendid diplomatic success and our *prestige* in the Balkans would gain immensely. If our demands are refused, he would also vote for a warlike action, but he must call attention to the fact that by a war we could reduce the size of Servia, but we could not completely annihilate it. Russia would fight to the death before allowing this and he, as Hungarian Premier could never consent to the Monarchy's annexing any part of Servia.

It is not for Germany to decide whether we ought to go to war with Serbia just now or not. Personally he holds the belief that it is not absolutely necessary to begin a war at the present moment. We must remember that agitation against us in Roumania is exceedingly busy just now and that in view of the excited feelings of the population we should almost certainly have to look forward to a Roumanian attack and we should doubtless have to protect Transylvania by a strong force to intimidate the Roumanians. Now that Germany has happily opened the way to Bulgaria's joining the Triple Alliance, a promising perspective for successful diplomatic action in the Balkan opens out, since by the accession of Bulgaria and Turkey to the Triple Alliance we may outbalance Roumania and Serbia and perhaps induce Roumania to return to the Triple Alliance. With regard to European countries it must be considered that the forces of France when compared to those of Germany are diminishing on account of the continual reduction of the figures of its births, so that Germany will be in a position to muster more troops against Russia.

All these circumstances must be considered, when a resolution involving such exceedingly heavy responsibility was to be taken, and he must again declare, that notwithstanding the crisis in Bosnia, where a great deal might be done by a reform of the administration, he could not make up his mind in favour of the war, but still thought that a marked diplomatic success, which would cause a deep humiliation of Serbia, would decidedly improve our situation and give us a chance of initiating an advantageous policy in the Balkans.

The presiding Minister (Berchtold) took up this argument and remarked that diplomatic successes against Serbia had increased the Monarchy's *prestige* for the time being, but had in the end also increased the tension in the relations with Serbia. Neither our success in the crisis of the annexion, nor that of creating the Albanian state, nor yet Serbia having had to give way after the ultimatum of the autumn of last year changed any of our circumstances. A radical solution of the question raised by the propaganda for a Greater Serbia, which is systematically set to work in Belgrade and whose

corrupting effects we feel from Agram to Zara, can only be brought about by the exertion of main force.

With regard to the danger of hostilities on the part of Roumania, mentioned by the Hungarian premier, the presiding minister was of opinion that it is less to be feared at the present time than in the future, when the partnership of interests between Roumania and Servia will have developed. King Carol it is true, has expressed doubts whether under present circumstances he would be able to do his whole duty as an ally by giving active help when it was wanted. But we cannot assume that he would consent to a warlike operation against the monarchy, or that he would be unable to oppose public feeling in such an eventuality. Besides it must be remembered that Roumania stands in fear of Bulgaria and would not be free to act at pleasure, even under present circumstances.

As to the Hungarian Premier's remark with regard to the proportion of forces between France and Germany, he thought it right to call attention to the fact that the diminution of the population in France was more than balanced by the increasing number of inhabitants in Russia, so that the assertion that Germany would in time have more troops at its disposition against France cannot be taken into account. The Imp. Roy. Premier (Stürgkh) remarked that the present council of ministers had been called for the purpose of discussing the measures to be taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure the success of the judicial examinations on the assassination and to counteract against the movement in favour of Greater Servia observed in Bosnia. These questions must go to the rear if the greater question arises, whether we might not solve the Bosnian difficulty by exercising force against Servia.

Two reasons make this question very pressing just now; in the first place the chief commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina declares that it is his belief that no successful measures could be applied in the interior of these provinces unless we deal Servia a forcible stroke first. His opinion is founded on his own perceptions and on his thorough knowledge of the country. These perceptions on general Potiorek's part make it imperative to ask, whether we are at all able to stop the decomposing activity which originates in Servia, and whether

we are able to keep the two provinces in question if we do not promptly deal a blow to Servia.

During the last few days the whole situation has changed. It now shows a psychological character and is decidedly more than ever pointing to a solution at the point of the sword. He cannot help agreeing with the Hungarian premier that it is for us and not for the German government to decide whether a war is necessary or not; still he must say that our decision should be influenced strongly by the fact that where we look to for the faithfullest support of our policy in the Triple Alliance, we are promised unreserved loyalty and are advised to act without delay. Count Tisza should consider this circumstance and remember that by a weak and hesitating policy we might risk not being so certain of German support at some future time. This is surely of the highest importance, next to the interest we have in restoring order in Bosnia, and should be well considered.

It is but a question of detail how we are to begin and if the Hungarian government thinks that a surprise attack, *sans crier gare* as Count Tisza expresses it, is not feasible, we will have to find some other way; but what he thinks is absolutely necessary is to act without delay and to spare our national economy a protracted period of suspense. But all this is mere detail considered side by side with the question of principle, whether it is absolutely necessary to have a war or not. Here the *prestige* and the existence of the monarchy must decide, whose South-slav provinces speaker holds to be lost if nothing is done to prevent it.

We should therefore decide in principle to-day that action must and shall follow. He shares the presiding ministers belief that a mere diplomatic success would not improve the situation. If a foregoing diplomatic action is therefore resorted to for international reasons, it should be taken with the firm resolve that this action can only end with the war.

The Common Finance-minister (Biliński) remarks that Count Stürgkh based his opinion upon the fact that the chief commander of Bosnia desires the war. It is two years since General Potiorek holds the belief that we must measure our forces with those of Servia if we wish to keep Bosnia and

Herzegovina. We must keep in mind that the chief commander, who is on the spot, is by far the best judge of things. Herr von Biliński is also convinced that a decisive conflict is unavoidable sooner or later. He never doubted that when matters became serious, Germany would stand on our side and had received binding assurances to this effect from Herr von Tschirschky as long ago as 1912. The recent events in Bosnia had produced a very dangerous state of feeling in Servia. Especially the Servian pogrom in Serajevo excited and embittered all Servians to such a degree that it is impossible to decide, who among our Servians is still loyal and who is for Greater Servia. It will be impossible ever to change this situation by measures taken within our frontiers; the only means will be to bring about an ultimate decision, whether the idea of Greater Servia may be successful in the future or not.

Even if the Royal Hungarian Premier would be satisfied with a diplomatic success, he could not say as much for himself from the point of view of Bosnian interests. The ultimatum, which we sent Servia last autumn made matters worse in Bosnia, and inflamed the hatred against us. The people of Bosnia tell each other everywhere that King Peter is coming to liberate the country. Servians are not amenable to anything but force and a diplomatic success would have no effect whatever in Bosnia, but it might most likely do harm.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) remarked that he had the highest esteem for the military merits of the present chief commander of Bosnia; as to the civil administration no one would deny that it had missed fire absolutely, and that a reform was indispensable. He would refrain from speaking on this subject just now, all the more because this was not the time for making changes, still he would like the fact established that the Bosnian police must be in an indescribable state, if it was possible for six or seven individuals known to the police, to take up their position on the day of the assassination along the intended route of the heir to the throne, armed with bombs and revolvers, whilst the police did not observe or remove even a single one of them. He did not understand why a thorough reform of the administration of Bosnia should not improve the situation there.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) is of opinion that a diplomatic success would be of no use at all. A success of this kind would be interpreted as weakness. From a military point of view he must remark that it would be better to go to war immediately, rather than at some later period, because the proportion of forces must in course of time change to our disadvantage. As to the modality of the beginning of war, he must call attention to the fact that the two big wars of latter years, the war between Russia and Japan, as also the Balkan war began without a foregoing declaration of war. It was his belief that we should at first only carry through the mobilisation as it is prepared against Serbia, and postpone the general mobilisation to such a time when it becomes clear that Russia is acting.

We have already lost two opportunities for solving the Servian question and have postponed the decision each time. If we do this again and allow this provocation to pass unavenged, this will be taken for a proof of weakness in all South-slav provinces and would be an encouragement to agitation against us.

From a military point of view it is desirable that the mobilisation should be carried through immediately and as secretly as possible, and that an ultimatum should be addressed to Serbia when the mobilisation is complete. This would also be in our favour with regard to the Russian forces, because just now the divisions are incomplete on account of the leave given for harvestwork.

After this a discussion began on the aims of a war against Serbia, during which the Royal Hungarian Premier's view, that Serbia might be reduced as to size but not annihilated out of consideration for Russia, was adopted by all. The Imp. Roy. Premier (Stürgkh) said that he should advise that the Kara-georgevich dynasty be removed, and the crown given to a European prince. The reduced kingdom should also be placed in a dependent position towards the monarchy, at least from a military point of view.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) still holds the belief that a successful Balkan policy could be created by the addition of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, and calls attention to

the terrible calamity of a European war under present circumstances. It should not be overlooked that all kinds of eventualities are possible in the near future—Russia might be absorbed by Asian complications, Bulgaria, when it regains its strength might want to revenge itself upon Servia, etc. which would all improve our position towards the problem of Greater Servia, to what it is at present. The presiding Minister (Berchtold) replied to these arguments that certainly one might imagine many possibilities in the future, which would place us in a favourable situation. But he feared that there was no time to wait for such developments. The fact must be taken into account that our enemies are preparing for a decisive conflict with the monarchy and that Roumania is lending a helping hand to the diplomacy of Russia and France. One must not assume that our policy with Bulgaria will be a full equivalent for the loss of Roumania. It is his belief that Roumania cannot be won back as long as Servian agitation continues, because agitation for Greater Roumania follows the Servian and will not meet with opposition until Roumania feels isolated by the annihilation of Servia and sees that its only chance of being supported, is to join the Triple Alliance. We must overmore not forget the fact that with regard to Bulgarias accession to the Triple Alliance the very first step has not been made. All we know is that the present Bulgarian government a few months ago expressed this wish and was then about to conclude an alliance with Turkey. This has not been accomplished, on the contrary Turkey has since allowed Russia and France to gain influence with it. The attitude of the Radoslawoff cabinet is certainly such, that we cannot doubt that Bulgaria is still disposed to lend a willing ear to any positive propositions we might make in the sense referred to. Still we cannot make these assumptions a safe cornerstone of our Balkan politics all the less, because the present Bulgarian government has no sound basis; public opinion, which is always influenced by Russia to a certain degree, might object to joining the Triple Alliance and Radoslawoff's cabinet might be turned out. We must also remember that Germany accepted the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance at the condition only that Roumania should not take offence. This

condition is rather difficult to comply with and might at some future time be the cause of misunderstandings.

A lengthy debate on the question of the war followed. The result of the discussion may be reassumed as follows:

1. That all present wish for a speedy decision of the controversy with Servia, whether it be decided in a warlike or a peaceful manner;

2. that the council of ministers is prepared to adopt the view of the Royal Hungarian Premier according to which the mobilisation is not to take place until after concrete demands have been addressed to Servia and after being refused, an ultimatum has been sent.

All present except the Royal Hungarian Premier hold the belief that a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with a glaring humiliation of Servia, would be worthless and that therefore such stringent demands must be addressed to Servia, that will make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by means of a military action should be opened.

Count Tisza remarked that he was anxious to meet the others halfway and was prepared to concede that the demands addressed to Servia should be hard indeed, but not such as to make our intention of raising unacceptable terms clear to everybody. Otherwise we should not have a lawful basis for our declaration of war. The text of the note must be composed with utmost care and he should very much beg to be allowed to see it before it is sent. He must also clearly state that if his point of view was disregarded, he would draw the unavoidable consequences.

After this the sitting was interrupted to be reopened in the afternoon.

When the council of ministers met again, the Chief of the General Staff and the Representative of the Naval Commander were also present.

The War-minister (Krobatin) at the request of the presiding minister spoke first to ask the Chief of the General Staff three questions as follows:

1. Whether it is possible to mobilise against Servia only at first and against Russia not until necessity arises.

2. Whether it is possible to retain a large body of troops in Transylvania to intimidate Roumania.

3. Where the conflict with Russia could be taken up.

The Chief of the General Staff answered these questions privately and begged that the answers should not appear in the protocol.

A lengthy debate followed these explanations, touching upon the proportion of forces and the probable course of a European war, which being of a private character are not adapted to be taken into the protocol.

Before the debate was closed the Hungarian Premier (Tisza) again explained his point of view on the question of the war and appealed again to all present to consider carefully what they were about to decide.

The points which were to be contained in the note to Servia were then discussed.

With regard to these points the council of ministers did not take a resolution; but they were formed, so as to give a clear idea of what might be asked of Servia.

At this point the Chief of the General Staff and the Representative of the Naval Commander left the council, which discussed the internal situation of Bosnia and the necessary measures to be taken. The Common Finance-minister was the first to speak, saying that in conferences with the party-leaders held a few days ago, he had learnt that it would not be wise to dissolve the diet just now, as political losses would thereby be incurred. It was not possible to hold any sittings just now while everybody was so exceedingly excited; he would therefore close the diet and recall the deputies for a short session in September. He hoped that it would then be possible to get the budget and the *Kmeten*-bill voted. This would depend in the first place upon Dimovich not renouncing the leadership of the government party, as in this case the majority would still be for the government. When the diet is closed, the deputies are not paid and immunity ceases, so that the Chief Commander's and the War-minister's wish could be fulfilled without resorting to the dissolution of the diet. Herr von Biliński then

mentioned a number of other measures, which he thought desirable, among them the dissolution of the great Servian society Prosvjeta.

The Royal Hungarian Premier would not like to propose any great changes just now. He again refers to the state of the police in Sarajevo and declares that the decline of the administrative apparatus in Bosnia is the consequence of the overpowering position of the chief commander, who being a soldier cannot possibly have the experience necessary to the administrator of a large country.

The Common Finance-minister speaks for the Chief Commander's merits as an administrator, but freely admits that it would be desirable that civil administration should be entirely separated from the military and that Bosnia should have a governor besides the chief commander, as is the case in Dalmatia.

Special measures to be taken in Bosnia, proposed by the Imp. and Roy. War-minister are then discussed.

All present agree that some of General Krobotin's propositions should be accepted, whilst others went too far. That it was not possible to decide definitely over measures relating to administration, before the great question whether there was to be war with Servia or not, was decided. The presiding Minister (Berchtold) declares that though there were still differences of opinion between the members of the council and Count Tisza, still an agreement had been arrived at, since the propositions of the Hungarian Premier would in all probability lead to a war with Servia, the necessity of which he and all the other members of the council had understood and admitted.

Count Berchtold then told the council that he intended going to Ischl on the 8th of the month to report to His. Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty. The Royal Hungarian Premier begged that the minister would present to His Majesty a relation in which he (Tisza) would record his view of the situation *).

*) Vide No. 12.

After a communication to the press had been agreed upon, the presiding minister closed the sitting.

I have taken insight into the contents of this protocol.

Vienna, August 16, 1914.

Francis Joseph m. p.

Clerk of the council:

A. Hoyos m. p.

Berchtold m. p.

9.

Direct report of Count Berchtold.

Vienna, July 7, 1914.

In the common conference of ministers held to-day, the question of an eventual warlike action against Serbia was exhaustively discussed.

It was ascertained that a perfect identity of opinion cannot be established. Count Tisza held the view that a warlike action against Serbia should only be resorted to if it was impossible to humiliate Serbia diplomatically. Count Tisza fears that in the eventuality of war we should have to meet Servias friends and allies in the Balkans, and that Bulgaria is at present too weak to render effective aid.

When the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, to which the German government has now consented, will have been accomplished, we shall be in a much better situation.

All the other members of the conference shared the view I hold, that the present opportunity for a warlike action against Serbia should be made use of, because by delay our situation would suffer, and because the Bulgarian arrangement, towards which nothing has as yet been done, even if it fully succeeds, will not entirely compensate the certain deterioration of our relations with Serbia and Roumania and the political conditions in our own country connected with it.

I will take the deferential liberty of reporting by word of mouth to Your Majesty on Thursday morning, having been obliged to postpone my journey to Ischl, because Count Tisza

requested me to present to Your Majesty a lengthy memoir on his view of the case, which cannot be completed before to-morrow night*).

In profoundest deference.

10.

Letter from Count Berchtold to Count Tisza.

Vienna, July 8, 1914.

Tschirschky has just left me, who told me that he had received a telegram from Berlin, by which his Imperial master instructs him to declare emphatically that in Berlin an action of the monarchy against Serbia is fully expected and that Germany would not understand why we should neglect this opportunity of dealing a blow.

My remark that in taking a decisive resolution we should consider it of the greatest importance to know how far we could rely upon Germanys influence being used in Roumania, and what result we might hope for, was answered by the ambassador to the effect that Berlin thinks it is altogether out of question that Roumania would in this case act against the monarchy. Emperor William has already addressed a letter on the subject to King Carol and we might be very sure that it left nothing to be desired in plainness of speech!

The ambassadors further remarks showed me that Germany would consider further negotiating with Serbia a confession of weakness on our part, and this would damage our position in the Triple Alliance and might influence Germanys future policy.

Tschirschkys remarks impressed me so much, that I thought they might in some degree influence your ultimate decisions, and for this reason I am informing you without delay and begging you, if you are of the same mind, to telegraph to me (in cypher) while I am at Ischl, where I stay all to-morrow and shall be glad to be your interpreter with His Majesty.

*) Vide No. 12.

11.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 220.

Vienna, July 8, 1914.

In cypher.—Strictly private.

Herr von Tschirschky, as instructed, repeated to me the declarations which are contained in your Excellencys telegrams No. 237 and 239*).

I shall beg your Excellency to go to the Imperial chancellor and express my warmest thanks for these declarations, dictated by the spirit of purest loyalty. The readiness with which the Imperial government acceded to my propositions, is a fresh proof, that the aims and the marked lines of the policy followed by the two allied powers in the Balkans, are identical.

As soon as ultimate resolutions have been taken (the time depends upon how soon the judicial inquiry in Sarajevo is concluded), I will communicate them without delay to the Imperial government.

With regard to the diplomatic steps of the Triple Alliance in the case of Bulgaria, I should like to say that it would be advisable to delay giving information in Bucharest, because, should we go to war with Servia, the information in question might cause Roumania to adopt a very unfriendly attitude towards us.

12.

Relation of the Hungarian Premier Count Tisza.

(July 8, 1914.)

Gracious Majesty,

The gratifying news from Berlin, combined with the indignation felt over the events in Servia, in yesterdays conference of ministers matured the intention of bringing about a war with Servia and to settle accounts with this arch-enemy of the monarchy, with all the members of the conference except myself.

*) Vide No. 6 and No. 7.

I was not in a position to approve this plan to its full extent. Such an attack upon Serbia, would—if human foresight does not deceive—cause the intervention of Russia and conjure up the worlds war. Notwithstanding Berlins optimism I should consider the neutrality of Roumania very questionable. Public opinion in Roumania would passionately cry out for war with us, and the present government would not be able to resist, King Carol very little. In this war we should therefore have to expect to see the Russian and the Roumanian armies among our foes, and this would make our chances of war very unfavourable.

I could not give my consent to an action, kindling war under such constellations, all the less because Berlin no longer opposes active, consequential policy promising success in the Balkans, so that we now have the means of using decisive influence on the development in the Balkans and bringing about a more favourable constellation for ourselves. This justifies us in hoping that if later on we should be compelled to resort to a decisive war, we should have a better chance of winning it.

When I asked how the proportion of forces among the Great Powers stood, after the armaments of latter years, the Chief of the General Staff answered, after considering a while: "Rather in our disfavour". I drew the conclusion from this answer that there would be no great difference in the present proportions and that the development of conditions in the Balkans would compensate what was in our disfavour.

It is superfluous again to discuss the action which is to bring about an improvement of the conditions in the Balkans. The accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance is the first step, so to say the Archimedian point, at which we must begin to oust Russia from its present position. Next we should have to see to definitely clearing the relations between Bulgaria and Greece. There are some difficulties in the way, but the chances of success are not bad. Jointly with Germany we must exercise some pressure on Roumania. There will no doubt be an outcry when the accession of Bulgaria becomes a fact, but I am certain that the attitude of Roumania will change visibly immediately afterwards. Chances may be in our

favour, but even in the worst case we may suppose that in the course of a few years we shall be sure of the friendly neutrality of Greece. Roumania will be held in check by Bulgaria, which will have regained its force and Servia will be deprived of a good portion of its army, when Bulgaria begins an action in Macedonia.

I will resume what I have thus far stated. A war, which we would provoke, would have to be fought under most unfavourable circumstances, whilst a postponement, if we make good diplomatic use of it, would change the proportions of forces in our favour.

If besides considering the political points of view, I take into account the state of our finances and our economical interests, which a war would burden immensely, and give a thought to the almost unbearable sacrifices and sufferings which a war would impose upon society, I must — after consulting my conscience — refuse to share the responsibility of a military aggression as it is proposed against Servia.

I am far from advising an inactive or unenergetic policy towards Servia. We cannot remain indolent spectators of the intrigues spun against us, we cannot see our own subjects encouraged in high treason, or assassinations plotted. The explanations published by the Servian (even the semi-official) press not only, but by the representatives of Servia in foreign countries, betray so much hatred and such total want of international decency, that out of consideration for our *prestige* and our safety we must act in an energetic way against Servia, if we are not indifferent to what foreign countries and our own think of us.

I am not pleading that we should pocket these provocations and am prepared to take the responsibility for all the consequences, which a rejection of our just demands would entail. But according to my belief Servia must be given the possibility to avoid a war by suffering a heavy diplomatic defeat. If a war is unavoidable, all the world must see that we are acting in defence, not defiance.

A strictly measured, but not a threatening note should therefore be addressed to Servia, in which all our concrete complaints are enumerated and precise demands are formu-

lated. As such I should propose the recalling of the Servian diplomats Spalajkovic in Petersburg and Jovanovic in Berlin: I should demand satisfactory information on the Kragujevac origin of the bombs found in Bosnia and on the fact that compromised subjects of the monarchy have crossed the frontier with forged passports. The Servian authorities must overmore explain the hostile and seditious declarations of Servian officials and officers, which I hope will soon be ascertained. Attention should also be called to the universally known defectiveness of the press, the societies and the schools in Servia, and satisfaction demanded in each case.

If Servia gives an unsatisfactory answer or seems disposed to delay giving an answer, an ultimatum should be sent and when the allowed time is over, hostilities might begin. In this case the war would have been forced upon us—no country that wishes to continue existing as a State—can refuse to fight out such a war; and besides we should have put the blame on Servia, which courted the danger of war by refusing to comply with the duties of a decent neighbour, after such an event as the abomination of Sarajevo.

Such an attitude on Servias part might considerably improve the chances of the German action in Bucharest and might even prevent Russia from participating in the war. It is probable that England would exercise a pressure upon the other powers of the Entente and that the thought would have weight with the Czar, that it cannot be his business to extend a protecting hand over anarchist plots and antidynastic murders.

To avoid complications with Italy and to be sure of the sympathies of England, besides making it possible for Russia to remain an idle spectator of the war, we should find the right time and the right form for declaring that we do not mean to annihilate Servia, and certainly will not annex it. It is my belief that after a successful war it would be best to reduce the size of Servia, by returning its newly acquired territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, and to ask only certain important strategic corrections of the frontierlines. We should be justified in asking an indemnity for our war expenses and this would keep Servia in check for a long while.

These are the aims we should keep in view in the eventuality of war. If Serbia yields to pressure, we must accept this solution of the difficulty *bona fide* and not hinder its retreat. In this case we must be satisfied with the blow to Servias pride, with its diplomatic defeat, and take up a wellaimed, intense action with Bulgaria and the other Balkan states, and we may be sure that the diplomatic victory over Serbia would have a favourable influence upon the negotiations that will become necessary.

I have taken the liberty to give my impression of the situation at length. I am aware of the heavy responsibility which all are obliged to bear in these critical times, who have the honour to possess Your Majestys confidence. Knowing well that the burden of responsibility will be equally heavy, whether we decide for acting or for leaving things alone, I have, after painful consideration of all the arguments, which come in question, the honour to advise a middle road, which does not exclude a peaceful arrangement and to a certain degree improves our chances of war—should war be unavoidable.

It will be my duty in to-morrows council of ministers to cause the Hungarian cabinet to declare itself. In the meantime I can only declare in my own name that notwithstanding my devotion to the service of Your Majesty, or rather on account of my devotion, I could not share the responsibility for an exclusively aggressive solution of our difficulties.

Budapest, July 8, 1914.

(signed) Stephen Count *Tisza*.

13.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 244.

Berlin, July 9, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Received your Excellencys telegram No. 220 of yesterday*).

I have sent your Excellencys warmest thanks to the Imperial chancellor, who is on leave in Hohenfinow, by the state secretary, only just returned from leave.

*) Vide No. 11.

I was able to ascertain that the state secretary perfectly agrees with the attitude the German government has adopted and is most decidedly of opinion that the action proposed against Servia should be taken in hand without delay.

The German minister in Bucharest is instructed to hold back the intended communication to King Carol (vide my telegram of the 6th inst.*) about the negotiations with Bulgaria, which as far as he—Jagow—knows, have not yet begun in any concrete form.

14.

The Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff to Count Berchtold.

Gen. Staff No. 2508 res. *(No date, about July 10, 1914.)*

Your Excellency,

In addition to what I said in the conference which recently took place under the presidency of your Excellency, I should like to send you the following in writing:

In my position as chief of the General Staff it is of utmost importance that the formula be clearly defined, whether we are to exert ourselves to bring about a war with Servia or whether we are merely to take into account the possibility of a war.

In what way either of these possibilities is to be treated diplomatically is outside my sphere of activity, but I must repeat, as I have fully agreed with you, that our diplomatic steps must avoid everything that would delay action by protracted negotiations, so that our antagonists would gain time for military preparations, which would put us at a military disadvantage, always injurious, but very much so, in the case of Servia and Montenegro.

For the same reason everything should be avoided, that might alarm our antagonists and cause them to take counter-measures; on the contrary, peaceful intentions should be feigned.

*) Vide No. 7.

If on the other hand our mind is made up for war, our military interests demand that a single step should be taken, with a short term for the ultimatum, which, if it be answered in the negative, must immediately be followed by the order for mobilisation.

I beg your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest esteem.

(signed) *Conrad*, G. o. I.

15.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Report No. 60/P.

Berlin, July 12, 1914.

Subject:

Germanys attitude in the
present Servian crisis.

To His Excellency the minister of the Imp. and Roy. House and Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold,

My telegraphic reports during the last days and Count Hoyos' personal impressions have informed your Excellency that not only His Majesty Emperor William but all the other persons in authority, not only adhere firmly to the allied monarchy, but are encouraging us emphatically not to neglect the present moment, but to treat Servia with full energy, so as to clear out the conspirators' nest once for all, and are leaving the choice of means for doing so to our judgment.

I never for a moment doubted that Emperor William and all the German Empire would loyally fulfil the duties of an ally, and I have been faithful to this conviction during the whole period of my ambassadorship in Berlin. I was not in the least surprised when in the present moment Germany assured us of its perfect loyalty and assistance.

Still I think that the fact, that His Majesty, Emperor William and with him all persons in authority, urge us to undertake an action against Servia, which may eventually end in war, needs some explanation.

It is clear that after the late deplorable events, the monarchy must use all energy in its dealings with Servia, but the

fact that the German government from its own point of view, considers the present moment for politically opportune, must be set in the right light.

According to the German way of thinking, entirely shared by myself, general political considerations, and special ones, inspired by the murder of Sarajevo, form the conclusive argument.

Germany has recently found its conviction confirmed that Russia is preparing for a war with its western neighbours, and does not regard war as a possibility of the future, but positively includes it in the political calculations of the future. This is important: it intends waging war, it is preparing for it with all its might, but does not propose it for the present, or we should rather say, is not prepared for it at the present time.

It is therefore anything but certain that if Servia is embarked in a war with us, Russia would lend an armed hand; and should the Czars empire resolve for war, it would not be ready from a military point of view, and not by any means so strong, as it will be a few years hence.

Overmore the German government believes that it has proofs that England would not take part in a war, caused by disturbances in the Balkans, even if Russia and France were involved in it. Not only have the relations between England and Germany improved so far, that Germany need no longer fear direct hostilities on Englands part, but England just now desires anything rather than a war, and would certainly not expose itself to danger for Servias or even Russias sake.

When all is said, it must be admitted that the constellation is at present as favourable as it can be.

In the past, a large portion of our population refused to believe in the separatist tendencies of our Servians, hostile to the monarchy and expressed doubts that Servias intrigues reached across the frontier; all are now convinced and there is a general outcry for an energetic treatment of Servia, which will finally suppress all agitation for a Greater Servia.

In a similar manner the eyes of the whole world have been opened and there is no nation that does not condemn the bloody deed of Sarajevo and all admit that we must make Servia responsible for it. If Servias foreign friends for political reasons do not openly blame Servia, still we cannot believe that they will stand up for it at the present moment, at least not with armed forces.

These I believe to be the political reasons why the German Empire with a clear perception of the opportunity offered, unreservedly encourages us to make clear our relations towards Servia, which Germany also feels to be untenable, in such a manner, as to stop panslavist agitation for all time.

In Emperor Williams case these political grounds are, as I learn from a quarter, very much in His Majestys confidence, enhanced by a purely personal circumstance, the infinite enthusiasm for our gracious Majesty, who as his letter to Emperor William proves, is prepared to act with admirable energy, where the vital interests and the *prestige* of the countries, entrusted to his care, are at stake.

The Imp. and Roy. Ambassador:
(signed) *Szögyény*.

16.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 801.

Vienna, July 12, 1914.

Telegram in cypher.—Strictly private.

To be decyphered by the first official of the embassy.

The action, on which your Excellency has been informed by Count Forgách will probably be taken in hand at the end of this month; the details will be settled this week. The German government, with whom we are acting in perfect harmony, is of opinion, shared by me, that the Italian government should not be informed, but placed in a situation that cannot be averted, by our grave attitude in Belgrade. Still I must ask your Excellencys opinion, whether it would not be

advisable to inform Marquis di San Giuliano a day or at least some hours previously, to avoid giving offence, and also that he may be in a position to impress the public and the press in a sense favourable towards the Triple Alliance.

With regard to the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, Count Tarnowsky will in the course of this week commence cautious negotiations with the Bulgarian cabinet. As soon as we have attained the certainty that a treaty can at present be concluded, we will inform the Italian government and ask it to cooperate.

17.

**Councillor von Wiesner to the Imp. and Roy. Department
of Foreign Affairs.**

Telegram without number.

Sarajevo, July 13, 1914.

Cypher.

It is the firm belief of all persons in authority here, that Serbia is busily spreading propaganda for Greater Serbia—not to speak of the press—through societies and other organisations, and that everything is done with the knowledge and sanction of the Servian government.

Civil and military authorities have given me the material upon which they base their belief; it may be classified as follows:

The material of the time before the assassination contains no proofs that the Servian government promoted propaganda. There is not much, but sufficient material to prove that the movement originates in Serbia and is tolerated by the government.

Judicial inquiry on assassination.

There is nothing to prove or even to suppose that the Servian government is accessory to the inducement for the crime, its preparation or the furnishing of weapons. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this is altogether out of question.

From evidence of accused persons, ascertained almost indubitably that the crime was resolved upon in Belgrade and that preparations were made with the coercion of Servian state-officials Ciganovic and Major Tankosic, who jointly provided bombs, Brownings, ammunition and prussic acid. Guilt of Pribicevic not ascertained; reports about him based on regrettable misunderstandings on part of examining police organs.

There can be no doubt that bombs came from army stores in Kragujevac, but there is no proof that they were obtained for the crime, as they might have been in the hands of the Komitadschis since the war.

Evidence of accused persons leaves scarcely a doubt that Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, with bombs and weapons upon them, were secretly smuggled across the frontier to Bosnia by Servian organs, under the direction of Ciganovic. These organised transports were directed by the frontier-captains Schabatz and Loznica and were contrived by frontier guards. Though it is not ascertained that they knew the purpose of the journey, still they must have accepted secrecy of mission.

Other information gives insight into organisation of propaganda carried on by "Narodna odbrana". This is valuable material, which will be useful, but has not yet been sifted; will be delivered without loss of time.

If the demands put forth at the time I left, are still valid, the following might be added to what is demanded of Serbia:

A. Suppression of government organs' coercion in smuggling persons and goods across frontier.

B. Dismissal of Servian frontier-captains Schabatz and Loznica and the implicated frontier-guards.

C. Prosecution of Ciganovic and Tankosic.

I leave for Vienna this evening, arrive on Tuesday evening and go direct to the Foreign Office.

Verbal explanation necessary.

Emperor William to Emperor and King Francis Joseph*).

Bornholm, July 14, 1914.

My dear friend,

I am grateful that in the days when you were visited by tragic events and were called upon to take resolutions of the gravest importance, your thoughts reverted to our friendship and dictated the letter, with which you gave me a proof of your kind feelings. I consider the friendship with you, which I have taken over from my grandfather and my father as a precious inheritance and the fact that you reciprocate these feelings, is to me the best guarantee of the safety of our countries. Knowing my loving devotion for you, I am sure you will understand how hard it was for me to give up my journey to Vienna and to renounce showing to the world the deep sympathy I felt for your grievous affliction.

Your deserving ambassador, whom I esteem highly, must have given you my assurance that in the hour of serious danger you will find me and my Empire in full harmony with our old tried friendship and with our duties as faithful allies at your side. It is a pleasant duty to repeat this assurance in this place.

The horrible crime of Sarajevo has thrown a gruesome light upon the pernicious doings of insane fanatics and panslavist agitation, threatening the structure of our Empires. I must renounce expressing an opinion on the question, which at this moment remains undecided between your government and Servia. Still I consider it a moral duty for all cultured States and a duty towards their own preservation to oppose this practical propaganda which attacks the sound foundation of all monarchies, to the utmost of their power. I do not close my eyes to the grave danger which threatens your countries and at the same time the Triple Alliance from this Russian and panslavist agitation. I perfectly see the necessity of relieving your southern frontier from the heavy burden which oppresses it. I am therefore willing to support the efforts

*) Vide No. 1.

of your government for preventing the establishment of a new Balkan league under the patronage of Russia, hostile to Austria-Hungary, and overmore to bring about the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance. Although I somewhat doubt the reliability of the Bulgarian character, still I have sent instructions to my representative in Sofia to support the steps your representative has undertaken in this direction.

I have overmore given instructions to my minister in Bucharest to inform King Carol in the way you wish him informed, and referring to the new situation, to persuade him that it will be necessary to renounce too great intimacy with Servia, and to stop the agitation hostile to your countries. I have furthermore instructed him to say, that I am exceedingly anxious to maintain the trustworthy relations of an ally towards Roumania, which need not suffer in any way even if the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance becomes a fact.

Allow me to conclude with the hearty wish that after the grievous days you have passed through, you may be benefited in your health by your stay in Ischl.

With the assurance of sincere attachment and friendship
your faithful friend
(signed) *Wilhelm*.

19.

Immediate Report of Count Berchtold.

Vienna, July 14, 1914.

In to-days conference, in which took part both premiers and the Hungarian minister at the court of Vienna, a perfect agreement was established with regard to the demands to be addressed to Servia. The text of the note is at present being settled and will be submitted for approval in a conference of the governments on Sunday 19, inst. When the text of the note has been agreed upon, it will be presented in Belgrade on Saturday 25, inst. and the Servian government will at

the same time be informed, that the term for the answer to the note has been fixed at fortyeight hours, within which space of time our demands must be conceded.

The date was selected out of consideration for the visit of the president of the French Republic to the Czar, which is to last from the 20th to the 25th July. All those present were of the same mind as myself, that if we sent the ultimatum during the meeting in Petersburg, this might be regarded as an affront. Overmore, if the ambitious President of the Republic was to discuss personally the new situation created by the ultimatum with the Czar, there is more probability than otherwise, that France and Russia may interfere.

Count Tisza has given up his objections to an ultimatum with so short a term, because I showed him the military difficulties, which would arise from delayed action. I also argued that even after the mobilisation a peaceful arrangement might be possible if Servia gives way in good time.

Of course if this happened, we should have to make Servia pay the costs of the mobilisations, and until payment is made we should have to ask for a pledge in Servia.

Count Tisza most decidedly declared that he would give his consent to the intended action, if before the ultimatum is sent, a council of the ministers of Austria and Hungary votes the resolution that the monarchy is not striving to acquire territory by the war, except what might accrue from small regulations of the frontierlines.

The text of the note, to be sent to Belgrade, as it was settled to-day, is such, that we must reckon with the probability of war. Should Servia decide for conceding our demands, this incident would signify a downright humiliation for the kingdom, not only, but *pari passu* a blow to Russian *prestige* on the Balkan and it would no doubt procure for us certain guarantees that Servian intrigue and underground work on our territory will be restrained.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 512.

Rome, July 14, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 12th inst. No. 801*).

If we are really forcing Servia to decide for war, I also hold the opinion that it would be idle to enter into previous negotiations with Italy; still to avoid the Marquis di San Giuliano taking personal offence, I must most decidedly advise that he should be informed by me one day before the action is undertaken. I do not think that even in this case he would influence the press in our favour, but the excluding and taking him unawares and by surprise would be slightly modified.

Should I be commissioned with this mandate, I beg you to consider that at this moment the minister of Foreign Affairs is at Fiuggi, and towards the end of next week goes to Vallombrosa near Florence, that I must therefore be informed early enough to undertake the journey.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 234.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

Telegram in cypher.—Strictly private.

To be decyphered by the first official of the embassy.

I have already explained to Herr von Tschirschky the reasons of the delay in our forthcoming explication with Servia, but I am anxious that your Excellency should inform strictly in private the Imperial Chancellor and the Secretary of State of the following:

Although the judicial inquiry in Sarajevo has furnished us with sufficient material, still we believe that we should delay the exceedingly energetic step in Belgrade, until the President of the French Republic, just now on the way to

*) Vide No. 16.

Petersburg shall have left Russian territory. To begin the action we are proposing at the very moment, when the President as the guest of the Czar is being made much of, might naturally be regarded in the light of an intended affront, and this we should like to avoid. Besides, we should consider it unwise to undertake the threatening step in Belgrade at the very time when the peaceloving, reserved Emperor Nicholas and undeniably cautious Herr Sazonow, are under the influence of the two, who are always for war, Iswolsky and Poincaré.

Under these circumstances we do not think that we ought to realise the plans we have already discussed with Herr von Tschirschky.

This delay, which is in itself unwelcome, will explain the attitude of our officious press.

We are obliged to prevent public opinion in the monarchy, which favours our policy, from cooling in its enthusiasm, and yet we cannot allow the press to get up too much steam, so that other powers might think of mediation.

22.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 820.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

Strictly private.

To be decyphered by the first official of the Embassy.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 512 of yesterday*).

Count Ambrósy, whose return to Rome I am hastening and who will bring your Excellency some documents referring to our negotiations with Germany connected with the action in question, has been perfectly well-informed on our intentions and the situation, so that he can give you all necessary information.

Count Ambrósy will most likely arrive in Rome on Saturday.

*) Vide No. 20.

Further instructions, especially the text of a note to be presented to the Italian government will reach your Excellency by a courier, probably on Tuesday.

I agree to your Excellency's proposition to inform the Marquis of San Giuliano of our intended action one day before it takes place.

The dates have not been finally fixed and I will warn you in time, so that you may shortly arrange by telegraph for your visit to Marquis San Giuliano; the note will probably be presented on the 25th or the 26th.

23.

Count Szögyény to Count Berehtold.

Telegram No. 259 bis.

Berlin, July 16, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 234 strictly private of yesterday*).

State Secretary understands perfectly that the intended energetic step in Belgrade cannot be undertaken before the President of the French Republic has left Petersburg, but regrets this delay extremely. Herr von Jagow fears that the sympathetic approval for this step and the interest in it will be debilitated by this delay not only in the Monarchy, but in Germany as well.

Herr von Tschirschky reports that Count Tisza came to see him during his last stay in Vienna and assured him that he had given up the scruples, which he had certainly at first entertained and that he now considered an energetic action necessary; besides Count Tisza had said as much in his declaration in the Hungarian parliament the day before, as Herr von Jagow had learnt to his satisfaction.

*) Vide No. 21.

My Italian colleague since a few days declares the situation to fill him with alarm, but he sees a favourable symptom in the fact that the Imp. and Roy. War-minister and Chief of the General Staff have taken their summer leave.

24.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 523.

Rome, July 18, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Two members of my embassy in conversation with the German Secretary of the Embassy Count Berchem, received the impression, as if the German ambassador, who is also staying in Fiuggi had already told the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs in confidence of our plans with regard to Servia.

This would not be the first instance that in delicate questions between us and Italy, Germany tries to render service to the latter at our expense.

Perhaps this is the reason why the Marquis di San Giuliano, who was to have ended his cure in Fiuggi at the close of next week, to have come to Rome for two days and then gone to Vallombrosa, now writes to me, that he will interrupt his cure on Tuesday 21 inst., and will come to Rome on Tuesday for 24 hours. He will not leave Fiuggi definitely until the 27th inst.

I must therefore be prepared that the minister on Tuesday questions me with regard to our strained relations towards Servia. The Secretary-General de Martino has already attempted to do so. Unless I receive instructions to the contrary, I will show myself absolutely uninformed, although I should be in a painful situation if, from what the minister says, I should see that he has already been taken into the secret (possibly by Germany).

25.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 146.

Petersburg, July 18, 1914.

Cypher.

Herr Sazonow, whom I visited to-day, on his part avoided speaking of our relations towards Servia. I mentioned to him that in our country everybody was still under the sad impression of the recent catastrophe; told him that I considered the beginning of terrorist revolutionary methods in the life of neighbouring people a very serious symptom and a danger for all States, especially for Russia.

The minister did not attempt to deny this, and remarked that he had been somewhat disquieted by the latest news from Vienna. He then expressed his conviction that a proof of the toleration of such doings on the Servian governments part would never be obtained. I answered that I ignored the result obtained up to the present time by the judicial inquiry but that I believed that every government was to a certain degree responsible for what happens on its territory. Overmore the belief is held in Vienna, that, should any demands be adressed to the Servian government on this subject, Servia would meet them halfway.

Though Herr Sazonow had a short time before expressed some anxiety with regard to the form in which these demands might be put, to my German colleague, he did not say anything of the kind to me.

26.

Council of Ministers for Common Affairs.

(July 19, 1914.)

K. Z.

G. M. K. P. Z. 513.

Protocol

of the Council of Ministers for Common Affairs held in Vienna July 19, 1914, the minister of the Imp. and Roy. House and of Foreign Affairs presiding.

Present:

The Imp. Roy. Premier Count Stürgkh.

The Roy. Hung. Premier Count Tisza.

The Imp. and Roy. Common Finance-minister Dr. von Bilinski.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister F. Z. M. von Krobatin.

The Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff G. of I. Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf.

The Representative of the Naval Commander Vice-Admiral von Kailer.

Secretary: Councillor of Legation: Count Hoyos.

Subject under discussion: the forthcoming diplomatic action against Servia.

Before the council of common ministers was constituted and the sitting was opened by the minister in the chair, an informal discussion on the text of the note to be presented to the Servian government, took place and the text was definitely settled.

The Minister in the Chair then opened the council of ministers and proposed that the note should be presented to the Royal Servian government on the 23rd July at five in the afternoon, so that the term of 48 hours would expire on Saturday, 25th inst. at five in the afternoon and the order for mobilisation could be published in the night from Saturday to Sunday. It was Count Berchtolds belief that it is improbable that the news of our step would be publicly known before the President of the French Republic had left Petersburg; but even if this were the case, he did not think that it would do any harm, since we had fully considered the duties of etiquette and had waited until the visit was over. To a prolongation of the delay he must object on diplomatic grounds. Berlin was beginning to get nervous and news of our intentions had already transpired in Rome, so that untoward incidents could not be guarded against, if action were again postponed.

Under the prompting of this declaration, made by the presiding minister, the council voted by common assent that the note should be presented on the 23rd inst. at five in the afternoon.

The Roy. Hungarian Premier (Count Tisza) declares that if the news of the presenting of the ultimatum should reach Budapest from Belgrade on the Thursday, he would speak on

the subject in the Hungarian house of deputies. This was taken into account.

The Chief of the General Staff (Baron Conrad) remarked that for military reasons he was in favour of a speedy beginning of the impending action. The news he had lately received from Servia [showed that three situations had by degrees been created.

First large numbers of troops had been collected along the Bulgarian and Albanian frontiers; next there were reports of great numbers of soldiers having been transported to Old-Servia. Of these he had taken no account, because it was shown that they were merely exchanged for reserves. During the last three days however, he had received more serious news. First he was informed that two regiments, the 6th and the 17th, had been transferred from New-Servia to Old-Servia, and yesterday he heard from a very trustworthy confidential person in Bulgaria, that three divisions had been ordered north. Of course he would have to get these news verified. If they proved true, he must ask to be allowed to take speedy counter-measures.

Next the question of proclaiming the state of siege in all the territory of the monarchy inhabited by South-Slavs was discussed and after a long debate, it was unanimously resolved that the state of siege would not be proclaimed before the mobilisation was [published, not only to avoid a bad impression in foreign countries, but also among our own population. The same was resolved for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the state of siege was also to be put in force at the same time as the mobilisation.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) then communicated the diverse measures for the mobilisation, which he had caused to be prepared. His explanations showed that everything necessary could be completed for the Imperial sanction on Wednesday, 22th inst. and that arrangements had been made with both governments with regard to the measures to be taken by the administrative authorities in both countries.

The Council of Ministers then resolved to send a private letter to the chief commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina

through the common finance-minister, informing him of the intentions of the Imp. and Roy. government with regard to Servia.

At the express desire of the Roy. Hungarian Premier (Tisza) the Chief of the General Staff gives private information on the mobilisation, and answers in the affirmative Count Tizas question whether in the case of a general mobilisation, the garrisons remaining in Transylvania for its safety, were sufficiently strong to ensure order in case of internal disturbances. The garrisons were *Landsturm*-formations, commanded by officers. An experienced general would take the command. These troops would certainly not be sufficiently strong to resist an attack on the part of the Roumanian army, but they could retard the advance of the Roumanian army. These troops were recruited in such a manner, that there were very few Hungarian Roumanians among them.

The Roy. Hungarian Premier was satisfied with this answer and declared that the Roy. Hungarian government would provide reinforcements of the gendarmes in Transylvania and he would, if necessary, send a Royal commissioner there, who would act jointly with the commander of the troops, to maintain order in Transylvania, where immediately after the mobilisation, the state of siege will be proclaimed.

On the proposition of the Imp. Roy. premier (Count Stürgkh) the question is discussed in principle, what should be done, if Italy sent an expedition to Valona.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) explains that he did not think such an action on Italys part at all probable, but that diplomatic measures against such an eventuality were being taken. Should Italy decide otherwise, the Imp. and Roy. government would *pro forma* have to share the undertaking; but it is too early to consider this eventuality seriously just now.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) then begged the council to vote the resolution, of which he had spoken at their last meeting, and from which the Royal Hungarian government made the whole action depend. The council of ministers must express unanimously that the action against Servia was not in any way connected with plans of aggrandisement on the part

of the monarchy, and that not any portion of Servia should be annexed, except slight frontier regulations, imposed by military considerations. He must absolutely insist that such a resolution be voted unanimously by the council.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) declared that he could not accept the Royal Hungarian Premier's point of view without certain reservations. In the present political situation, he was also of opinion that, should it come to war with Servia and we were the victors, we should annex no part of this country, but by making it surrender large portions of its territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, eventually to Roumania, reduce its size so much, that it would cease to be dangerous. The situation in the Balkans might change; it is not impossible that Russia should succeed in overthrowing the present cabinet in Sofia and appointing a government hostile towards us; Albania is no reliable factor as yet; he must, as manager of the foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary reckon with the possibility that after the war there might be circumstances which would make it impossible for us to renounce all annexation, if we are to improve our frontiers.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) declared that he could not accept these reservations of Count Berchtold and must, in consideration of his responsibility as Hungarian Premier ask the conference to vote his point of view unanimously. He asks this not only from reasons basing on our home politics, but more particularly, because he is firmly convinced that Russia would resist *à outrance* if we were to insist upon the complete annihilation of Servia, and because he believes that the best card we hold for improving our international situation is to declare to the powers as early as possible, that we have no intention of annexing any territory whatever.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) declares that even before this discussion he had the intention of declaring as much in Rome.

The Imp. Roy. Premier (Stürgkh) expressed his belief, that even if the annexation of Servian territory remained out of the question, Servia might be made dependent upon the monarchy by the deposition of the dynasty by a military

convention and by other corresponding measures. Certainly the resolution of the council of ministers must not be voted in such a manner that corrections of the frontierlines; which might become necessary from a strategic point of view would have to be renounced.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) declared that he would vote the resolution on the condition, that besides corrections of the frontierlines the occupation of a bridge-head on the other side of the river Save, for instance in the Schabatz district, would be allowed. After this the following resolution was unanimously voted:

The Common Council of Ministers at the proposition of the Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) votes that as soon as the war begins, the monarchy declares to the foreign powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom contemplated. Of course the strategically necessary corrections of the frontierlines, or the reduction of Servias territory to the advantage of other states or the unavoidable temporary occupation of Servian territory is not precluded by this resolution.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) mentions with gratification that on all points the council is perfectly agreed and closes the conference.

I have taken cognisance of
the contents of the protocol.

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

Francis Joseph m. p.

Clerk of the Council:

A. Hoyos m. p.

Berchtold m. p.

27.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesel in Belgrade.

(Timed *demarche* in Belgrade.)

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

You are asked to present the following note to the Royal government on the afternoon of the 23rd July, not later than between four and five o'clock.

“On the 31st March 1909 the Royal Servian Minister at the court of Vienna by order of his government made the following declaration before the Imp. and Roy. government:

‘Servia acknowledges that none of its rights have been touched by the situation created in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it will therefore accomodate itself to the decisions which the powers will resolve with regard to the article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin. Servia, in following the advice of the Great Powers, pledges itself to give up the attitude of protest and resistance which it adopted since last October with regard to the annexation, and it pledges itself furthermore to change the course of its present policy towards Austria-Hungary and to live in future on terms of friendly and neighbourly relations.’

The history of latter years and especially the grievous events of the 28th June have given proofs of a subversive movement in Servia, whose ultimate aim it is to disjoin certain portions from the territory of Austria-Hungary. This movement, which has developed under the eyes of the Servian government, has resulted in acts of terrorism outside the frontier-lines of the kingdom, in a series of attempts at murder and in murders.

Far from keeping the formal promises given in the declaration of the 31st March 1909, the Royal Servian government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It tolerated the criminal doings of the diverse societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the outrageous language of the press, the glorification of the instigators of plots; it allowed officers and officials to take part in subversive plans, tolerated a most unhealthy propaganda in public instruction and gave permission for manifestations, which caused the Servian population to hate the monarchy and despise its organisation.

The toleration, of which the Servian government was guilty, lasted until the very moment when the events of the 28th June showed all the world the horrible consequences of such toleration.

The depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the plot of the 28th June prove, that the murder of Sarajevo was prepared in Belgrade, that the murderers had received the weapons and bombs, with which they were armed,

from officers and officials, belonging to the *Narodna odbrana* and that the conveyance of criminals and weapons to Bosnia had been prepared and carried through by Servian frontier organs.

The above-quoted results of the judicial inquiry do not permit the Imp. and Roy. government to keep up its attitude of patient observation, maintained for years in the face of criminal dealings, which emanate from Belgrade and thence spread to the territory of the monarchy. These results make it the duty of the Imp. and Roy. government to put an end to such doings, which are constantly threatening the peace of the monarchy.

To attain this end, the Imp. and Roy. government find itself obliged to demand from the Servian government an official assurance that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary and in their entirety the dealings whose ultimate aim it is to disjoin parts of the territory belonging to the monarchy and that it pledges itself to suppress with all the means in its power this criminal and terroris propaganda.

With a view to giving these assurances a solemn character, the royal Servian government will publish the following declaration on the first page of its official press-organ of the 26th/13th July:

The Royal Servian government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is the entirety of the ambitions, whose ultimate aim it is to disjoin parts of the territory belonging to the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy and regrets sincerely the horrible consequences of these criminal ambitions.

The Royal Servian government regrets that Servian officers and officials have taken part in the propaganda above-mentioned and thereby imperilled the friendly and neighbourly relations, which the Royal government had solemnly promised to cultivate in its declaration of the 31st March 1909.

The Royal government, which condemns and rejects every thought and every attempt to interfere in behalf of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it a duty to warn officers, officials and indeed all the inhabitants of the

kingdom, that it will in future use great severity against such persons, as will be found guilty of similar doings, which the government will make every effort to suppress.'

This declaration will at the same time be communicated to the Royal army by an order of His Majesty the King, and will besides be published in the official organ of the army.

The Royal Servian government will overmore pledge itself to the following:

1. To suppress every publication likely to inspire hatred and contempt against the monarchy or whose general tendencies are directed against the integrity of the latter;

2. to begin immediately dissolving the society called: *Narodna odbrana*, to seize all its means of propaganda and to act in the same way against all the societies and associations in Servia, which are busy with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal government will take the necessary measures to prevent these societies continuing their efforts under another name or in another form;

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction everything that serves or might serve the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, both where teachers or books are concerned;

4. to remove from military service and from the administration all officers and officials who are guilty of having taken part in the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names and the proofs of whose guilt the Imp. and Roy. government will communicate to the Royal government;

5. to consent that Imp. and Roy. officials assist in Servia in the suppressing of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. to have a judicial inquiry instituted against all those, who took part in the plot of the 28th June, if they are to be found on Servian territory; the Imp. and Roy. government will delegate organs who will take an active part in these inquiries;

7. to arrest without delay major Volja Tankosić and a certain Milan Ciganović, a Servian government official, both compromised by the results of the inquiry;

8. to take effective measures so as to prevent the Servian authorities from taking part in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier;

to dismiss from service and severely punish those organs of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica, who helped the perpetrators of the crime of Sarajevo to reach Bosnia in safety;

9. to give the Imp. and Roy. government an explanation of the unjustified remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia as well as in foreign countries, who, notwithstanding their official positions, did not hesitate to speak in hostile terms of Austria-Hungary in interviews given just after the event of the 28th June;

10. to inform the Imp. and Roy. government without delay that the measures summed up in the above points have been carried out.

The Imp. and Roy. government expects the answer of the Royal government to reach it not later than Saturday, the 25th inst. at five in the afternoon.

A memorandum on the results of the investigation of Sarajevo, inasmuch as they refer to the functionaries mentioned in points 7. and 8. will be found enclosed."

Supplement.

The inquiry set on foot by the court of justice in Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and accomplices, guilty of and accessory to the murder committed on the 28th June, has up to the present time lead to the following conclusions:

1. The plan of murdering Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo, was devised in Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, a certain Milan Ciganović and Trifko Grabež with the assistance of major Volja Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols with their ammunition, which were the tools used by the murderers, were procured in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganović and by major Volja Tankosić and there handed to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež.

3. The bombs are hand-granades, which come from the arms-depôt of the Servian army in Kragujevac.

4. To make sure that the plot would succeed, Čiganović taught Princip, Cabrinović and Grabež the use of the granades

and in a wood near the rifle grounds of Topschider he taught Princip and Grabež the use of the Browning pistols.

5. To make it easy for Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to get their weapons through, Čiganović organised a system of transports.

The frontier-captains of Schabatz (Rade Popovic) and of Loznica, the customs officer Radivoj Grbic of Loznica and several other persons were all implicated in the transport of the criminals and their weapons to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

28.

**Letter from Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in
Belgrade.**

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

I have the honour to send your Excellency a few instructions with regard to the presentation of our demands to the Servian government, which the duties of your office do not comprise.

The demands are the very least we can ask, if our intolerable relations with Servia are to be placed on a better footing. We must overmore insist that the decision of the Servian government be communicated within the term of 48 hours and we could not on any account consent to a prolongation of the term, should the Servian government use the pretext that it wishes to judge the consequences that some of our demands might have.

We cannot enter into negotiations with Servia with regard to our demands, and cannot be satisfied with anything less than their unconditional acceptance within the stated term; otherwise we should be obliged to draw further consequences.

Should your Excellency be asked what further steps the Imp. and Roy. government will undertake after the diplomatic relations have been broken off, you will declare that you have no information on the subject.

On your own initiative and without stating that you have instructions to that effect, you can say that the hostile

attitude of the kingdom has, during the last few years, twice obliged us to incur heavy expenses for military measures and that, should this be again the case, we should certainly make the Servian government responsible for the costs of such measures.

I must beg your Excellency to avoid discussing the contents of the note and the interpretation of the single points and should Herr Pasić insist, you will declare that you have no authority to discuss the subject further, but must demand the acceptance *pure et simple* of the conditions. By word of mouth your Excellency will also ask Herr Pasić to let you have the Servian translation of the declaration, as published in the official gazette and the Servian text of the army-order, so that you may be certain that the translation is correct.

The telegram No. 67 of the 13th inst. and the private decree of November 28th 1912, No. 80,215 mentioned therein, give you the exact instructions of what you are to do in case diplomatic relations are broken off.

As soon as the term of 48 hours from the time of the presentation has expired without the announcement of the acceptance, your Excellency would in a note inform the Servian government that the stipulated term being over, you would, in accordance with your instructions, leave Servia with the members of the legation and would entrust our country-people and our interests in Servia to..... at the same time leaving the secretary of the chancery behind, who would be appointed to the..... in Belgrade.

After this our diplomatic relations might be considered as broken off.

After having carried out all the instructions contained in the decree No. 80,215 of the 28th November 1912, your Excellency will cross to Semlin with all the members of the legation.

I overmore beg your Excellency to inform me by cyphered telegram from Belgrade of the fact that Servia refuses to comply with our demands, or that the stipulated term has expired. At the same time one of your gentlemen must be sent to Semlin, so that he can telegraph a direct message *in claris*.

It might perhaps be arranged that the gentleman in question could go to Semlin some time before, and could send his telegram on telegraphic notice from your Excellency.

29.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petersburg and Constantinople*).

(Timed *demarche* in Belgrade.)

Z. 3401—3406.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

To:

Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 3401,
Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 3402,
Count Szécsén, Paris, No. 3403,
Count Mensdorff, London, No. 3404,
Count Szápáry, Petersburg, No. 3405,
Margrave Pallavicini, Constantinople, No. 3406.

The Imp. and Roy. government found itself in the necessity of addressing the following note to the Royal Servian government through the Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade on Thursday the 23rd inst:

“On the 31st March....” follows the text of Nr. 27 as far as: “.... is enclosed in this note”**).

I have the honour to beg your Excellency to communicate the contents of this note to the government to which you are accredited, and to add the following comments:

On the 31st March 1909 the Royal Servian government made a declaration to Austria-Hungary, the text of which is given in the above***).

But on the very day following this date Servia adopted a course of politics which had no other aim but to call forth subversive ideas in the minds of Austrian-Hungarian subjects

*) Compare the text in the Austrian-Hungarian Redbook No. 8 dated July 22, 1914.

***) Compare Page 59.

****) Compare Page 59.

of Servian nationality and to prepare the disjoining of certain portions of the territory of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy.

Servia became the centre of criminal agitation.

Very soon societies and associations were formed, some of which were openly, some secretly organised to foster disorder and discontent on Austrian-Hungarian territory. These societies have among their members generals, diplomatists, government officials and judges — persons prominent in the official world of the Servian kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely sworn to the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes on which the Servian press-organs do not incite their readers to hatred and contempt for the neighbouring monarchy or encourage plots, which are more or less openly directed against its safety or integrity.

A great number of agents is instructed to keep up agitation against Austria-Hungary and to spread sedition amongst the youth of the frontier districts of both these countries.

The love of plotting, which is peculiar to Servian politicians, and whose bloody results can be traced in the annals of Servias history, has been stimulated by the last Balkan crisis; individuals, who belonged to the bands, hitherto busy in Macedonia, have joined the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the face of these plottings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian government has not thought fit to take a single measure. It has thereby neglected the duty imposed by the solemn declaration of the 31st March 1909 and has placed itself in opposition to the will of Europe and to the engagements taken towards Austria-Hungary.

The Imp. and Roy. government territorially unselfish, used the utmost patience in the face of this provoking attitude of Servia, hoping that the Servian government would at some time find out how valuable the friendship of Austria-Hungary was to its interests. The Austrian-Hungarian government, by observing a friendly attitude towards Servian interests, hoped that the time would come, when Servia would in its turn adopt a similar attitude towards her neighbour. Austria-

Hungary expected this evolution in the political ideas of Servia to take place, when after the events of 1912 the monarchy maintained its unselfish attitude, showing no resentment at the considerable aggrandizement of Servia.

The friendliness shown by Austria-Hungary to its neighbour did not however modify its attitude in the least degree, and Servia continued tolerating propaganda as before. The disastrous effects were seen by all the world on the 28th June, on the day when the heir to the throne of the monarchy and his august wife became the victims of a plot prepared in Belgrade.

In the face of this situation the Imp. and Roy. government finds itself compelled to take fresh and urgent steps in Belgrade, to induce the servian government to stop the incendiary movement, which threatens the safety and integrity of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy.

The Imp. and Roy. government is convinced that in undertaking this step it acts in accordance with the feelings of all civilised nations, which cannot tolerate, that the murder of princes of the blood should become a weapon, which may be used with impunity in political strife, or that the peace of Europe should incessantly be disturbed by the plotting carried on in Belgrade.

The Imp. and Roy. government is prepared to prove these assertions by a collection of documents showing the Servian plottings and proving their connection with the bloody deed of the 28th June, which it holds at the disposition of thegovernment.

The identical communication is being sent to the representatives of Austria-Hungary to the other Signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this instruction with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Le Gouvernement I. et R. s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre I. et R. à Belgrade, la Note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:

«Les 31 mars . . . » follows the text of No. 27 as far as: « . . . annexée à cette Note.»*)

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter Votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette Note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel Vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici:

Le 31 mars 1909 le Gouvernement Royal Serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus**).

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinés à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du Royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont es annales du Royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une rérudescence depuis la dernière crise balcanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque là occupées en Macédoine, sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

*) Vide Page 67—71.

**) Vide No. 27.

En présence de ces agissements auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement Serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement I. et R. à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie, était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement Serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement I. et R. espérait que le Royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie lorsque après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement I. et R. rendit possible par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du Royaume qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 dr., jour, où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement I. et R. a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement Serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement I. et R. est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche, il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix

européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement I. et R. tient à la disposition du Gouvernement..... un dossier elucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux Représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances Signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914*).

30.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petersburg and Constantinople.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Adress:

1. Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 3426,
2. Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 3427,
3. Count Szécsén, Paris, No. 3428,
4. Count Mensdorff, London, No. 3429,
5. Count Szápáry, Petersburg, No. 3430,
6. Margrave Pallavicini, Constantinople, No. 3431.

1. Berlin.

When your Excellency on Friday, the 24th inst. personally informs the government of the enclosed official decree**), you will remark that the perfect political understanding with the German government already achieved, saves you the trouble of a confidential verbal explanation of our step in Belgrade.

*) This date corresponds to the change in the date of presentation of the Note.

**) Vide No. 29.

The reasons why we could not undertake the *demarche* in Belgrade before yesterday have been told Herr von Tschirschky verbally at the time, and your Excellency has communicated them to the German government from my telegram No. 234 of the 15th July*).

2. Rome.

Your Excellency will tender the enclosed official decree to the Royal Italian government; should Marquis di San Giuliano still be absent from Rome, to his representative, on Friday the 24th inst. in the forenoon. Your Excellency will not find verbal explanations necessary, since you will have seen the Marquis shortly before, and will have prepared him. But perhaps your Excellency will think it useful to call attention to the fact that the society *Narodna odbrana*, to which all the persons compromised in the plot of the 28th June belong as members, is a combative organisation spread all over Servia, whose activity, according to the authentic programme in our possession, now that Turkey no longer counts, is exclusively directed against our monarchy.

3. Paris.

The enclosed official decree which is to be communicated to the government, refers to the demands, which we are compelled to adress to the Royal Servian government, to confine the movement in favour of Greater Servia. Your Excellency will tender the document to the government on Friday the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

The exposition of this document is so clear that it saves me the trouble to ask your Excellency to add a verbal explanation of the step we are taking with regard to Servia. Still it will be useful if your Excellency, in tendering this document, reminds the French government, that in all difficulties, which have arisen in European policy during latter years, France has always played the grateful part of a mediator between the discordant groups of powers.

*) That is on the 23rd July — the decree being ante-dated 24.

4. London.

Your Excellency will be good enough to tender the enclosed official decree to the State Secretary or his representative on Friday, the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

Your Excellency might verbally explain upon this occasion that English policy and that of the monarchy in the near East, have during latter years most satisfactorily shown a converging tendency; reciprocal confidence has been reestablished and the British public (after a short period of vacillations, which is over), takes interest in the position of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power and gives its attention to life in the monarchy. The assassination of the Archduke-heir to the throne (of which the *dossier* is at the disposition of the Powers), has shown plainly what may be expected, if Servia is not compelled to break off all relations with political conspirators (such as the *Narodna odbrana*), whose threads reach to all the countries and territories of the monarchy. England, where so much indignation was shown when the Servian King and his queen were murdered, will certainly understand that public opinion in the monarchy is crying out for atonement of the moral complicity and the criminal toleration of the Belgrade authorities. The enunciations of Servian diplomatists and officers prove that Servia does not as yet conceive the degree of abomination of the Sarajevo plot; every line printed on the subject in Belgrade papers proves the same, and more than anything, the fact that the Servian government has not yet moved a finger to seize the accomplices of the crime of the 28th June, who are still on Servian territory.

5. Petersburg.

Your Excellency will forward the enclosed official decree to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or to his representative on Friday, the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

I beg your Excellency to add to the explanations of the document, the following verbal elucidations:

The Imp. and Roy. government feels no ill-will or grudge against Servia; as lately as 1912 the Imp. and Roy. government by its loyal and territorially disinterested attitude gave Servia a chance to become nearly twice the size it was before.

Even now the monarchy is undertaking this serious step in Belgrade only because its selfpreservation and its selfdefense demand as much.

All the Imp. and Roy. government asks, is to preserve its territory from the insurrectional miasm spreading from across the neighbouring kingdom and to put a stop to the indulgent toleration, with which the Royal Servian government has hitherto treated the efforts, which by word, script and deed were in Servia directed against the integrity of the monarchy.

The assassination of the archduke-heir to the throne naturally exhaust the patience of the Imp. and Roy. government with regard to Servian plotting. (The *dossier* on the crime, which is at the disposition of the Imperial government, shows the connection of the criminals with the society *Narodna odbrana*).

The murder of Sarajevo must at the same time strengthen the feeling of solidarity between the great monarchies whose common interest it is to defend themselves against the murder of monarchs, from whatever quarter it may come, or whoever suffers by it.

6. Constantinople.

Your Excellency will tender the enclosed official decree to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or to his representative on Friday the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

31.

**Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ministers in
Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, Cettinje and Durazzo.**

. Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Adress:

1. Count Czernin, Bucharest, No. 3432,
2. Count Tarnowski, Sofia, No. 3433,
3. Herr von Szilassy, Athens, No. 3434,
4. Herr Otto, Cettinje, No. 3435.
5. Herr von Löwenthal, Durazzo, 3436.

Private.

1.

Bucharest.

(Count Czernin takes this with him Monday the 20th July.)

Your Excellency hereby receives enclosed the text of an official decree to the Imp. and Roy. representatives to the Signatory Powers*) who are instructed to tender them to the respective cabinets on Friday, the 24th July in the forenoon.

Your Excellency is authorised to communicate the contents of the decree strictly in private to His Majesty the King and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Friday the 24th inst.

As I have had an opportunity of verbally discussing the entire complex of questions connected with our *demarche* in Belgrade, your Excellency are in a position to give to His Majesty the King any elucidations he might demand on the results of our inquiry in Sarajevo, although the notes to the Great Powers are in themselves very explicit on the subject.

In your Excellency's conversation with His Majesty it will be useful to touch the chord on the many years faithful friendship, which connects the King with our own gracious Majesty, and call attention to the fact that the anarchist movement originating in Servia aims directly at the dynasty and its individual members.

2.

Sofia.

(Monday, July 20, evening by the Constantinople courier.)

You will find enclosed the text of an official decree to the representatives to the Signatory Powers which they are instructed to deliver to the respective cabinets on Friday, the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

You are authorised to communicate the contents of the decree to the government in Sofia on Friday, the 24th inst., and to take the necessary steps, so that His Majesty the King is also informed.

When you were last in Vienna, the Foreign Office informed you fully on our views with regard to the terrorist

*) Vide No. 29.

movement in Serbia, so that I need not add anything to the explanations contained in the enclosed document.

But it will be useful if in your conversations with the Bulgarian statesmen you mention the fact that from Bulgaria we expect sympathetic understanding for the serious step we are compelled to take in Belgrade, and that it certainly lies in Bulgaria's interest to wait in quiet and cold blood for the events which may follow.

3.

Athens.

A.

(Cyphered telegram July 24, a. m.)

The Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade yesterday, Thursday, 23rd inst., presented a note to the Royal Servian government, in which the latter is called upon to comply with a number of demands within 48 hours, which we were compelled to put forth, when the results of the inquiry in Sarajevo came to our knowledge, and we could no longer shut our eyes to the fact that we must put an end to the agitation in our southern frontier provinces, which originates in Belgrade.

This for your information and direction.

You are authorised to communicate the contents of this telegram privately to the Greek Premier and Herr Streit.

The text of our note of information to the Signatory Powers was sent to you in the despatch-box on Monday.

There is no objection to your making use of this document in your informations to the above-named Greek ministers.

B.

(Decree sent on Monday in the despatch-box.)

You will find enclosed a copy of the decree addressed to the Signatory Powers which our representatives are instructed to deliver on Friday, 24th inst. a. m. to the cabinets to which they are accredited.

4.

Cettinje.

(Monday, with despatch-box to Cattaro, arrives in Cattaro on Wednesday.)

You will find enclosed the text of a decree addressed to the Signatory Powers *) which our representatives will deliver to the respective cabinets on Friday 24th inst.

You are authorised to communicate the contents of the decree to His Majesty the King and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Friday the 24th inst.

In your conversation with the King and the Minister you will call attention to the fact that in the matter of the plot of Sarajevo and the revolutionary agitation carried on in the monarchy, we know very well that there is a great difference between Servia and Montenegro, and that we are glad to testify to the fact that the inquiry on the crime of the 28th June has not revealed a single fact pointing to Montenegro.

We are convinced that Montenegro's attitude in the face of the step we are compelled to undertake towards Servia, will be such as to decline all participation in the tendencies which have led to the crime of the 28th June.

5.

Durazzo.

A.

(Cyphered telegram, July 24.

The Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade yesterday, Thursday, 23rd inst., presented a note to the Royal Servian government in which the latter was called upon to accept a number of demands within 48 hours, which we have been compelled to ask on the basis of the results of the Sarajevo inquiry, and also because the agitation in our southern provinces bordering on Servia has for years originated in Belgrade and must at last be stopped.

*) Vide No. 29.

This is for your information as to what can be said to the government in Durazzo. The decree with the text informing the Signatory Powers is on the way to you by Lloyd-steamer.

B.

(Decree by Lloyd July 27 *).

I am enclosing you a copy of the decree sent to the representatives with the Signatory Powers, which they will present to the respective cabinets on Friday, the 24th July so that you should be informed and know what to say from the 24th inst. onward.

32.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome and Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey, Rome. No. 3437.
2. Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 3438.

1.

We must count with the possibility that the Royal Italian government will, in the eventuality of a warlike complication between us and Servia, attempt to interpret article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty**) in a sense favourable to itself and will bring forward the compensation question.

*) Vide No. 29.

**) Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty:

L'Autriche Hongrie et l'Italie, n'ayant en vue que le maintien autant que possible du statu-quo territorial en Orient, s'engagent à user de Leur influence pour prévenir toute modification territoriale qui porterait dommage à l'une ou à l'autre des Puissances signataires du présent Traité. Elles se communiqueront à cet effet tous les renseignements de nature à s'éclairer mutuellement sur Leurs propres dispositions ainsi que sur celles d'autres Puissances. Toutefois dans le cas où, par suite des événements le maintien du statu quo dans les régions des Balcons ou des côtes et îles

You will find enclosed a private notice, which you will use as a line of action in case the Marquis di San Giuliano should in conversation allude to the Italian interpretation of the article above-mentioned.

2.

Your Excellency will find enclosed the copy of a private notice which I am sending to Herr von Mérey. It is to serve the ambassador as a line of action in case the Marquis of San Giuliano should take a warlike complication between us and Servia for a pretext to interpret article VII in a sense favourable to Italy and should bring forward the compensation question.

As it is just possible that the Italian government would ask the Berlin cabinet to support its interpretation of article VII and the German State Secretary might lay the subject before you, I am anxious that you should be in a position to support our point of view in the Wilhelmstrasse with the necessary energy.

Your Excellency is authorised to communicate the contents of the private notice, but only in case the State Secretary first refers to the subject and even then only verbally. In any other case the private notice is reserved for your Excellency's private knowledge only.

Private notice.

The war declaration to Servia, which may eventually become necessary, will not be made by Austria-Hungary with a view to territorial acquisitions. The monarchy has on the contrary no other aim in view, but the one explained in its

ottomanes dans l'Adriatique et dans la mer Egée deviendrait impossible et que, soit en conséquence de l'action d'une Puissance tierce soit autrement l'Autriche-Hongrie ou l'Italie se verraient dans la nécessité de le modifier par une occupation temporaire ou permanente de Leur part, cette occupation n'aura lieu qu'après un accord préalable entre les deux Puissances, basé sur le principe d'une compensation réciproque pour tout avantage, territorial ou autre, que chacune d'Elles obtiendrait en sus du statu quo actuel et donnant satisfaction aux intérêts et aux prétentions bien fondées des deux Parties.

note to the Belgrade government, not to allow the hostile propaganda nourished by the neighbouring kingdom to disturb its normal peaceful development.

Though the monarchy in a war with Servia by no means thinks of the acquisition of land, still the nature of the war would be such as to place the basis of operations on Servian territory; should Servia in the course of mobilisation or soon after operations have begun, decide for yielding and giving way, a provisory occupation of the country would have to be kept up as long as there are no guarantees for peace, or as long as the costs of mobilisation or of war, incurred through Servias refusal to comply with Austria-Hungarys demands, have not been payed by Servia.

It would be mistaking the spirit of the Triple Alliance Treaty to interpret article VII in such a manner that the temporary occupation of territory belonging to a country, with which the monarchy is at war, should be made dependent upon an agreement with Italy, based upon compensation.

In the text of the treaty, article VII, in referring to the necessity in which Austria-Hungary or Italy might find themselves of changing the *status quo*, the expression is used *dans les régions des Balcans* and this might give occasion for the interpretation, that an expressed difference between the territory belonging to Turkey in the Balkans and the territory of the Balkan States not being made, the conditions of the article in question might apply to both.

The text of our agreement proves that this interpretation would be altogether unjustified.

After the words: *dans les Balcans* article VII continues: *des côtes et îles ottomanes dans l'Adriatique et dans la mer Egée*. The explicit enumeration of what belongs to Turkey cannot but signify that the islands and coasts belonging to some other state are not included in the determinations of the article in question, that the words: *dans les régions des Balcans* applies to Turkish territory only. If this were not so, a certainly not intentional differentiation would arise, since the article would provide that islands and coasts of Montenegro or Greece would be excepted, but portions of the interior would be included in the determinations of article VII.

The fact that the determinations of article VII only apply to territory under Ottoman dominion is furthermore proved by the passage in the same article referring to an eventual compensation. It is clear that were the occupation of any part of Turkish territory in question, either of the allied powers must allow the other to take part in the war and after a preliminary agreement consent to its occupying temporarily or permanently some determined object of compensation. This principle cannot be applied to a war between the monarchy and a Balkan state without territory on the coast, as long as some other Balkan state with a coast has not joined the enemy of the monarchy, when Italy might pretend to a compensation territory, which it might reach by sea.

The text of the *Arrangement spécial concernant le Sandjak de Novi Bazar* of the year 1909 also shows plainly what is meant by *les régions des Balcons* in article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. This arrangement, which was made for the express purpose of supplementing and giving preciseness to article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, says: the determinations of article VII apply to the Sandjak of Novi Bazar just as much as to the other parts of Turkey. When in the following sentence, beginning: *Si donc* there is question of the *maintien du statu quo dans les Balcons* there can be no doubt that in this case, and indeed in all the Treaty, *les Balcons* refers to the territory which Turkey owns in the Balkans.

If we wish to speak of the spirit in which the Treaty is written, it will suffice to quote the words on the: *bienfaits que leur garantit, au point de vue politique et social, le maintien de la Triple Alliance*, to make it clear that the monarchy cannot expect Italy to interpret the Treaty in a way, which would make its action against Servia difficult, whereas its principal aim is to stop hostile propaganda, which does not even recoil from murder.

Attention should also be paid to the fact, that according to the spirit of article VII, it was then considered desirable that the *status quo* of that time should be maintained, and all territorial changes avoided, which would be to the disadvantage of either Austria-Hungary or Italy. Since then there have been such changes and all in disfavour of the monarchy.

The aggrandisement of Servia at the expense of Turkey, has encouraged the old idea of a Greater Servia to such a degree that the monarchy's quiet development of its territory is threatened and it must, to defend its most vital interests resort to the use of arms. Though there can be no doubt that if the monarchy, intending to change the *status quo* of Turkey or of the territory which belonged to Turkey when the Treaty was concluded, would have to come to an understanding with Italy before undertaking serious steps,—it is also quite clear that the monarchy must have a free hand to protect its interests, where a change of the *status quo* has taken place without its cooperation.

The right of temporarily occupying territory in neighbouring Servia to ensure peace in its own country, cannot be disputed, and indeed there is no question of an action undertaken with the purpose of changing the *status quo*.

Nor should we understand Italy, if it founded its opposition against our action with regard to Servia, on the words with which article VII concludes and which are: *donnant satisfaction aux intérêts et aux prétensions bien fondées des deux Parties* and chose to speak of an injury to its interests, if we temporarily occupied any part of Servia. We could understand that such arguments might be used by the foes of the Triple Alliance, who are keeping the monarchy busy with the doings of the South-slav propaganda and will see a failure of their own, if Servia is checkmated.

33.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 842.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Strictly private.

(To be decyphered by a councillor of the embassy.)

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 523 *).

From a private reliable source we have learnt that from the German side, probably through your German colleague, our

*) Vide No. 24.

intention of energetic steps against Serbia, previously arranged with Germany, have been communicated to Marquis di San Giuliano. He immediately sent instructions to Italian representatives in Petersburg and Bucharest, instructing them to use by-ways for inducing the respective governments to threaten Berlin and Vienna and prevent the action against Serbia.

I need not say that any attempts at intimidation would be without effect upon us.

Herr von Tschirschky to-day showed himself very depressed on account of news from the *entourage* of San Giuliano, who in consequence of strongly pessimistic reports from the Duke of Avarna is exceedingly anxious about public opinion and cannot promise to continue his policy of true friendship.

The above for your Excellency's exclusively private information.

34.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 843.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Strictly private.

According to your telegram No. 523 you will meet the Marquis di San Giuliano to-morrow. Your Excellency might hold something like the following discourse. You have as yet received no precise information on the results of the inquiry in Sarajevo, nor on the steps we intend taking in Belgrade in consequence. But I had given you to understand that there was sufficient material, and that Servian plotting which had been carried on for years, would compel us to use very serious language in Belgrade. Your Excellency had been instructed to communicate this to the Marquis di San Giuliano and to add that while we were taking these steps in Belgrade, we considered a peaceful solution of the affair as quite possible. That at any rate we were convinced that in obtaining clearness in our relations with Serbia, we might count upon the loyalty of Italy and upon its faith as an ally. Marquis di San Giuliano in just appreciation of the international situation, repeatedly told you that what Italy wanted, was a strong Austria-Hungary and he said as much to me in Abbazia. That

it is absolutely necessary to clear up the dubious circumstances in Servia, if the present situation of the monarchy is to be maintained, as well as the present strength of the Triple Alliance, on whose firmness the peace of Europe and its equilibrium depends. At the present moment Italys interests demand that it should openly side with us. It is therefore most important that the minister should in good time get Italian public opinion inspired to support the Triple Alliance and adhere to it when the news of our *demarche* in Belgrade reaches the Italian government.

In the course of the discussion, which might eventually follow, your Excellency might express the opinion as your own, that should peaceable means fail, the Vienna cabinet was far from thinking of a war with a view to conquest, or the annexation of any part of Servia. Perhaps this is an opportunity for setting right the antagonistic report of the *Temps* that we were about to take the Lovcen by surprise. On the contrary we should be very much obliged to the Italian government, if it would use its influence in Cettinje and induce Montenegro, whose attitude is very different from that of Servia and where bombs, exported from Servia have played a part already, to keep quite quiet, while we hold our converse with Belgrade.

35.

Discourse between Count Berchtold and the German Ambassador.

Daily report No. 3425.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to me on the 20th July and according to instructions received, informed me that Berlin was exceedingly anxious on account of the attitude of Italy in face of the action we were planning against Servia.

Ambassador von Flotow had reported on the 15th inst. that all those, who surrounded Minister di San Giuliano were disquieted because of the pessimistic reports sent by the duke of Avarna. San Giuliano avoided conversing on the subject with Flotow; Luzzatti and others in the confidence of the minister had expressed a belief that if Austria-Hungarys

demands went too far, the monarchy would put itself in the wrong and could not count upon the support of Italy.

On the 16th inst. Flotow had announced that San Giuliano had consulted Fusinato on the subject, who had declared that a foreign state can only be made responsible for common crimes and certainly not for political propaganda. The murder of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary was not committed by Servian subjects and could not therefore be the ground of reclamations.

The Italian minister of foreign affairs therefore declared that Italy could not take active part in a policy suppressing the national idea. There had been repeated differences between Vienna and Rome, ever since Prince Hohenlohe had issued the Trieste decrees, which had caused such painful surprise all over Italy, and had produced a feeling against Austria-Hungary, which it would be vain to combat. He sees so many dark points on the horizon of our reciprocal relations, that he almost despairs of the success of his effort to maintain a friendly understanding. He fears that Italy will not be able to support the Austrian reclamations, without putting itself in direct opposition to the deeprooted principles of the Italian people.

In the face of this information Herr von Jagow comes to the conclusion that not only will the action of Austria-Hungary meet with no sympathy in Italy, but may eventually call forth direct resistance. The German State-Minister therefore urgently advises us to seek an understanding with Italy and at the same time expresses the opinion, that an Italian action against Valona (though Italy has at present no such intentions and would but unwillingly undertake it, if forced thereto *à titre de compensation*) might avert Italys attention from our Servian action.

In my answer to all this, I said first of all that it was much to be regretted that Italy had apparently already obtained knowledge of our plans against Servia. As not the slightest hint had been made to the Italian ambassador, the information had certainly not come to Rome from Vienna.

The assurance of Herr von Tschirschky that no communication on the subject had been made on Germanys part, I parried with the remark that perhaps Flotow might have

said something on his own responsibility. I said overmore that such confidences to Italy, from whichever side they may have been made, were exceedingly objectionable, also that I already had proofs that Italy was at the time busy counteracting against us. I could not therefore make my mind up to an early exchange of ideas with the Italian government on the subject of our action in Servia, and this was what had been agreed upon between Under State-Secretary Zimmermann and Count Hoyos in Berlin. We had agreed to inform the cabinet of Rome one day previously to the tendering of the note in Belgrade and this seemed sufficient courtesy towards so unreliable an ally as Italy.

I then referred to the fact that by a resolution voted in the council of ministers it had been decided that no Servian territory should be annexed, so that Italian demands of compensation, even if they would be put forth on the interpretation of article VII, would become extinct of themselves. As to Valona, public opinion is so very strongly against Italy settling on the coast of the Adriatic opposite to its own, especially near the straits of Otranto, that I could never consent to any transactions on this point.

I also suggested to Herr von Tschirschky to get Berlin to call the Marquis di San Giulianos attention to the contradiction in his assurances, that Italy required a strong Austria-Hungary as a wall of defence against Slavism and in his policy at critical times, which brings him into contact with the chief power of Slavism, Russia, and prevents Austria-Hungary from keeping intact its possessions."

I concluded by saying, that after all we could not allow ourselves to be intimidated by such news from Italy and could not deviate from the path we had begun to tread. We must keep to our purpose all the more, because from the reports of our Ambassador at the Quirinal, I see that in consequence of the Lybian campaign, Italy is by no means eager for battle, and may express its indignation in words, but will scarcely follow them up with deeds.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 76.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

According to the newspapers, Premier Pasič has gone to East-Servia on election business and will not return to Belgrade before the end of the week.

If these news are confirmed it will be necessary that your Excellency on Thursday morning, sends to the first official of the Servian Foreign Office a letter by someone from the Chancellor's office, stating that you are instructed to communicate important news to the Servian government on Thursday afternoon and would call at the Foreign Office between 4 and 5 o'clock. You will write that your communication will probably make a speedy return of Herr Pasič necessary; the temporary Chief of the Foreign Office had better, if he thought it necessary, communicate immediately with the Premier.

To avoid mistakes I should like it to be understood that this letter must be regarded in the light of an act of courtesy on your part, to facilitate the early return and the information of the Premier. But the presentation of the note must under all circumstances take place on Thursday afternoon between four and five o'clock, and should Herr Pasič be absent, the document must be given either to his representative or to the official next in rank in the Servian Foreign Office.

When the note has been delivered, your Excellency will inform me in the most urgent manner, by previously prepared cyphered telegrams *in duplo* from Belgrade and from Semlin by a member of the legation, whom you will send there on receipt of this telegram. I am anxious to have the news here on Thursday before 7 or 8 o'clock, for publication and other measures to be taken.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Report No. 131—P.

Belgrade, July 21, 1914.

Private.

I have been here for some time after the disastrous crime of the 28th June and I believe I can judge the general feeling entertained in this country.

Before the plot and indeed ever since the crisis connected with the annexation, the relations between the monarchy and Servia were on the part of the latter, poisoned by national chauvinism, hatred and a most effective propaganda of the aspirations of Greater Servia in those among our provinces, where Servians live. Since the last two Balkan wars the success of Servia has caused chauvinism to reach a climax, resembling paroxysm, whose mad outbursts may be everywhere observed.

You will spare me proofs and examples, they are to be had everywhere and always, in political society as well as among the low people, whatever party these represent. I assume that it is a well-known axiom, that Servias policy aims first at disjoining the provinces inhabited by South-slavs and later on at the annihilation of the monarchy as a Great Power.

No one, who is constrained to spend one week in this political *milieu* will fail to recognise this truth.

The latest events which have influenced public feeling in this country, — the plot in Sarajevo, the death of Hartwig and the electioneering campaign, — though so different in themselves, in their causes and aims, have all had the same effect, they have deepened the hatred against the monarchy and have increased the contempt felt for it.

The murder of Sarajevo strengthened the belief of the Servians — long entertained — that the Habsburg states would now fall asunder, that the south-slav provinces would be disjoined, that revolution would break out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the Slav regiments could no longer be relied upon. All nationalist madness seemed justified and could be put into a system.

The Servians believe this detested Austria-Hungary to be powerless, and scarcely worth waging a war with — hatred is supplemented by contempt. A disabled body, it will fall to the share of Greater Servia, so soon to be realised.

Newspapers, which are far from being the most radical, in their daily articles comment the impotence and decay of the neighbouring monarchy and sully all its organs and institutions, beginning with the venerable person of the monarch, without fear of being as much as reprimanded. Even the government organ has attributed the crime of Sarajevo to the present conditions of the Empire. Our *prestige* is trodden under feet. There is no longer any fear of being responsible for what one says or does. The Servian people receives its education from the press; and its policy depends entirely on which party-press is uppermost. The propaganda in favour of Greater Servia is the fruit of this education and its latest result is the crime of Sarajevo.

Herr Pasić gave a representative of the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* an interview and some of the remarks it contains, cannot, in the mouth a premier be qualified otherwise than as most impudent. The interview was “partly” denied, but in the meantime it has done its work and its phraseology reproduces the mind and expressions of Pasić so completely as to leave no doubt that the interview was honest.

Pasić has used the same arguments in the electioneering campaign to avoid being suspected of giving way to Austria-Hungary. This proves that all parties are agreed in hating the monarchy and are all equally convinced of its impotency.

I pass over the mad accusations and denunciations after the death of Hartwig which the *Times* calls *insane*, and also over the press campaign, redolent with lies and vulgarity, which however has the effect, that the government and the representatives of Austria-Hungary are considered as outlaws by the public and may with impunity be called murderers, ragamuffins, infamous Austrians etc.

All this vulgarity extends even to the members of the Imperial House, as is proved by the forged letter of the countess Lonyay, published in the *Zcon*.

The political world of Servia, understanding the irreparable loss, which the death of Hartwig has caused, is now devoting itself to a fanatical cult of the deceased, in which not only gratitude for past favours is shown, but the fear for the future. Slavish submission towards Russia is the chief note sounded, to make sure of its goodwill in times to come.

The electioneering campaign unites all parties in one chorus of hostility against Austria-Hungary. Not one of the parties aspiring to power, will allow the suspicion to arise, that it might harbour weakness towards the monarchy. The pass-word of the election campaign is therefore war to the knife with Austria-Hungary.

The present military weakness of Servia, caused by the instability in New-Servia, which demands heavy sacrifices, is, if not overlooked altogether by experienced politicians, still regarded as a *quantité négligeable*, for the reason that Austria-Hungary is regarded as altogether impotent and incapable of energetic action. The serious words of warning, which have been spoken on our side are taken as "bluff", otherwise some measures of preparation would have been taken in the army, and the reserves would not be dismissed in small groups without arms from New-Servia to Old-Servia, or the arrangements for the mobilisation of the second summons, would not be neglected. News of a contrary line of action are not confirmed.

The fact that the Imp. and Roy. War-minister, and the Chief of the Staff have gone on leave, have been taken as a proof that Austria-Hungary's weakness is quite evident.

The fear, felt immediately after the crime of Sarajevo, that the monarchy might raise strong claims, begins to vanish, since the inquiry has taken a prolonged course and the expected step on Austria-Hungary's part has not been taken and will soon be remembered as a bad dream, which disappears on awakening.

I have taken the liberty to appeal to your Excellency's patience at some length, not because in what I had to tell, I imagined giving you news, but because I needed this exposition of facts before I could come to the unavoidable conclusion that a settling of accounts with Servia, a war for the

prestige and position of the monarchy, indeed for its very existence, cannot be avoided for any length of time.

Whether we ought to wage this war now, or whether we ought to wait, until Servia has recovered from its two wars and Russia would be prepared to send not ten, as at present, but twenty army-corps on a war-footing against us, so that we should fight under much more unfavourable circumstances, is not for me to decide, or even to give an opinion upon.

To one, who is far from the centre, where all threads meet, it would seem that the present moment is most favourable and that the situation at home as well as abroad, offers opportunities, such as the epoch may not offer again.

The murder of Sarajevo has thrown the diverging aims of the peoples and countries of the monarchy in the background and has given us a happy moral position, estimated as such all over Europe.

If we neglect this opportunity, we make ourselves guilty of the difficulties and the untoward circumstances, which are sure to arise, when the day comes for the war, which must be fought out sooner or later.

To the local observer and the representative of the interests of Austria-Hungary in Servia, the question — quite apart from the general political situation of the world, which he cannot and may not judge—is clear that we cannot expose ourselves to see our *prestige* lessened and damaged more than it is already. We must—if we have not the power, the opportunity or the will for a general cleaning day on a large scale—not delay showing Servia how patient, how peace-loving, how generous we are. Our excuse will be that we are the stronger of the two. In this case we should have to be content with an apparent success. A lasting improvement of the situation we should not gain in this way, but we might save appearances.

If at some later period we should make peaceful manoeuvres, Servia would take this as a proof of our weakness; the uncertainty of our policy would estrange our allies, our foes would feel more contempt than ever for our forces.

If on the contrary we are resolved to put far-reaching demands in an effective form and under our control—which alone could get over the Servian plotting system—we must overlook all possible consequences and from the very beginning have the strong and firm will to carry out our plans to the end.

The principle of non-interference or of intervention when a perfect understanding had been arrived at between all the Great Powers, was guilty of the Balkan wars. The only thing which can serve is the selfdependent action of the power which alone is threatened, under the motto: “who is not with me, is against me”. It is my belief that this alone could overthrow the enemy who has stood up before us in a threatening attitude, and could give the Empire peace for a number of years.

Half measures, putting forth demands, with long discussions to follow, and a rotten compromise at the end, would be the heaviest blow Austria-Hungary's *prestige* in Servia and its position as a Great Power in Europe could experience.

The Imp. and Roy. minister:
(signed) *Giesl*.

38.

Visit of the German Ambassador in the Foreign Office.

Daily report No. 3444.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

The Imperial German Ambassador according the instructions from Berlin, to-day communicated a telegram from Herr von Jagow, according to which the Royal Servian representative in Berlin, no doubt instructed by a circular to all the Servian representatives, declared to the State-Secretary that Servia intended maintaining the best and most correct relations with the neighbouring monarchy and was prepared to comply with all Austria-Hungary's demands after a strict inquiry in Sarajevo, inasmuch as the kingdom's honour and sovereignty allowed this.

The Royal Servian representative had at the same time requested the German government to use its influence with the Vienna cabinet in a conciliatory sense.

Herr von Tschirschky added that Herr von Jagow had told the Servian representative that according to the opinion of the German government, Servia's attitude towards Austria-Hungary had of latter years lacked correctness and neighbourliness to such a degree that it would be but natural if the Vienna cabinet in putting forth its demands, would use very energetic language.

39.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 271.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

According to the document of yesterday No. 3426 the enclosed decree could not be laid before this government before the morning of the 24th inst. *)

It is my humble opinion that the contents of the decree must absolutely be communicated to this government immediately, that is, before the other governments are informed, strictly in private for the present. I am confirmed in this opinion by a remark which the State-Secretary made during my visit to him to-day, when he asked me whether I had yet received information from Vienna on the contents of the note to be sent to Belgrade. He had been informed by Herr von Tschirschky that the note was to be presented on the 23rd inst. and he thought that he might expect the allied German government to be informed earlier than the other cabinets of the contents of the note and the modalities of the step in Belgrade.

At the same time Herr von Jagow told me that he had reliable information that the President of the French Republic would not leave Kronstadt until Thursday at ten o'clock.

*) Vide No. 30.

40.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 273.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

State-secretary to-day read a telegram to me from the German Ambassador in Rome, containing the following:

Marquis di San Giuliano hat told him, he did not believe that Epirotes would attack Valona; should this however be the case, he, San Giuliano, would try to bring about a common action of Italy and Austria-Hungary against the Epirotes; he would always try to act in accord with Austria-Hungary, but his good intentions might be frustrated by the Servian question.

41.

Letter from Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

Dear Count,

In my telegram of today No. 271*) I had the honour to inform your Excellency that according to my humble opinion it will be absolutely necessary to communicate the note to be presented in Servia on the 23rd inst. earlier, that is as soon as possible to the cabinet of Berlin, and later to the other governments.

Emperor William and all the others in high offices, from the very first promised to support our action in the most loyal manner and I cannot help feeling that it might give offence, if we informed all the cabinets at the same time of what our note to Servia contains, thus placing the German government, our ally on the same footing with the governments of the other Great Powers.

*) Vide No. 39.

I trust firmly that your Excellency will authorise me to give the information in question to this government without further delay (supplement to the decree No. 3425, private, of the 20th inst. *).

The State-Secretary today again began to speak of the attitude of Italy in the eventuality of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

He said that having known the Italians for many years he was afraid that in our conflict with Servia, they might become unreliable (My telegram No. 1273 strictly private, of to-day. **)

Herr von Jagow thinks, though he does not mean it as advice, that if it comes to a warlike complication with Servia, we ought to communicate our intentions in confidential discourse to Italy.

If we explained from the beginning, — Herr von Jagow does not consider this a very desirable plan — that we only planned a temporary occupation of Servian territory, Italy might be satisfied. If we confessed to the contrary the usual compensation demands would immediately be put forward, and on these it would be best to come to an understanding at once.

As Herr von Jagow during this purely academic discourse repeatedly assured me that he had not been spoken to on the subject by Italy and as he did not even mention the interpretation of article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, I refrained from making use of the private decree No. 3438 of the 20th inst. as your Excellency instructed me ***).

Before concluding, I should like to call attention to the fact that the State-Secretary gave me to understand clearly, that of course Germany would stand by us with all its forces, but that for this very reason it is of vital interest to the German government to be informed in good time “where our way leads us”, and most especially whether we planned a temporary occupation of Servian territory or whether, as Count

*) Vide No. 30.

***) Vide No. 40.

***) Vide No. 32.

Hoyos had hinted in his last conversation with the Imperial Chancellor, we considered the distribution of Servia as the *ultima ratio*.

With the expression of my deepest respect for your Excellency

(signed) *Szögyény*.

42.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 848.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Pertains to the decree No. 3437 of the 20th inst, which reaches you by courier*). If your Excellency should be induced by the Marquis di San Giuliano to make use of the arguments defending our interpretation of article VII as exposed in the notice, and the Minister maintains his point of view, it will be desirable that you do not continue the discussion on this subject, and justify yourself to the minister by saying that neither of you would succeed in making the other accept any interpretation but his own. That your Excellency believed that it would be in the interests of both, instead of carrying on a juridical discussion on the interpretation of an article, to discuss the great interests of Austria-Hungary and Italy as friends and allies.

I must add for your Excellency's information that I should take it as a grave symptom if the discussion of article VII led to irritation on either side, which might endanger the existence of the entire treaty.

*) Vide No. 32.

43.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 525.

Rome, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Referring to your Excellency's telegram of the 20th inst. No. 843*). Conversation with Marquis di San Giuliano took place this afternoon.

The Minister showed himself much preoccupied by our *démarche* in Belgrade. I spoke at length in the sense of the first part of the above-quoted telegram. Marquis di San Giuliano listened attentively and made some notes. A lengthy discussion followed, during which I made use of the remarks at the conclusion of the telegram in question.

With regard to our relations with Servia the Minister again explained at length, that we would not obtain any favourable results by humiliation or violence, but much sooner by a conciliatory attitude. For a nationally mixed state like the monarchy, this was the only possible policy, and it had served us well with Germans and Poles. I told him that this reasoning, often discussed between us, was mere theory and false besides. In reality things look quite otherwise. I reminded him of all we had done for Servia since the Berlin Treaty; of our conciliatory attitude during the Balcan war and how the pan-servian offensive regularly grew more violent.

Italy, the Minister continued, wishes for a strong Austria, *but such as it is now*, without territorial aggrandisement. Any change of this sort — he must tell me in all sincerity — would be considered as damaging to Italy, whose policy was one of conciliation and perfect equilibrium. The Minister received my assurances that we intended no territorial annexation with visible satisfaction, the remark with regard to the Lovcen with ill-disguised triumph. He asked whether he might make use of these assurances in the press, and I not only answered in the negative, but told him that in my confidential information I was saying that there was *no intention* of territorial acquisition but not an *engagement*. (As the possibility of war

*) Vide No. 34.

exists and the eventuality of Montenegro making common cause with Serbia, I should consider it dangerous to make further promises.)

Marquis di San Giuliano then declared that it was his determined intention to support us, if our demands of Serbia are such that they can legitimately be complied with. In any other case he would have the whole country against him, which is undeniably liberal, loves to remember its own revolutionary origin and sympathises with irredentist manifestations, wherever they show themselves. He gave me to understand that we could make it much easier for him, if our *démarche* in Belgrade was founded — if not exclusively — still for the most part upon the catastrophe of Sarajevo and not so much on political agitation in general.

I argued against all these reservations, which I called mistaken from a theoretical point of view (since they placed Serbia on the footing of a modern cultured state). From a practical point of view they showed, too little friendship and solidarity.

With regard to the press, the minister promised his support, within the limits of his reservations; but he could certainly not do anything in this direction before he had knowledge of the contents of our note to Belgrade.

He promised to send instructions in the sense we desired, to Montenegro this very day. He had already advised Belgrade in a conciliatory sense, and with a view to giving this advice more weight.....*) had recalled the minister.

Finally the minister remarked that his confidence in our moderation towards Serbia was principally based upon the wisdom of our monarch, to which I replied, that he might for the same reason be convinced, that whatever our note to Serbia contained, it had been carefully considered and found to be absolutely necessary.

The general impression I received from this interview, was that of much friendly phraseology and quite as many

*) Here the cypher is illegible.

mental reservations; that the minister does not for the present apprehend war, but believes that Serbia will give way, founding his belief on the intense diplomatic influence the powers will exercise over Vienna and Belgrade.

44.

**Visit of the German Ambassador in the Imp. and Roy.
Foreign Office.**

Daily report Nr. 3443.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

The Imperial German Ambassador during to-days visit said that his government had been informed that Marquis di San Giuliano was in great excitement with regard to the intended step of Austria-Hungary against Serbia.

But he—Tschirschky—recently had a conversation with the Duke of Avarna, who had expressed his conviction that the Italian government would loyally fulfil its duties as an ally in the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and would stand on Austrias side, even if the public in Italy objected and raised its voice to the contrary.

45.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 148.

Petersburg, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

President Poincaré to-day received the diplomatic corps, every ambassador separately in the presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Viviani and the French Ambassador Paléologue.

To me the President expressed his sympathy regarding the plot of Sarajevo in warm words and then passed on to political subjects, asking after the situation in Albania, on which the conversation dwelt for some time. Then he inquired after the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, remarking that in Serbia disquiet was felt, and asking what were the opinions in our country? I said that we were regarding the

situation with equanimity, because we were convinced that Servia would not refuse what we thought right to ask. The next question was, what were the demands we intended addressing to Servia, and to this I answered that the inquiry was still being carried on, and that I was not informed with regard to the results.

Monsieur Poincaré then delivered a kind of lecture, using all his oratorical powers and explained that to make a government responsible for anything was only admissible when there were concrete proofs against it, otherwise a *démarche* of this kind would be a mere pretext, and this he could not suppose Austria-Hungary to be guilty of, in the case of such a small country. At any rate one must not forget that Servia has friends and that a situation might be created, which might become dangerous to peace. I confined myself to a quiet and precise answer, remarking that up to a certain degree every government is responsible for everything that happens on its territory. The president sought to refute this thesis, by constituting analogous cases between other states, so that I could not but say that all depended upon circumstances and that analogies and generalisations did not serve. In the course of the conversation, Monsieur Poincaré made a concealed allusion to the alleged "Prohaska case" to which I made a fitting reply.

He closed the conversation by expressing the wish that the results of the inquiry might be such as not to give cause for disquiet.

If we consider that this tactless behaviour, which was almost threatening, was observed by the head of a foreign state, staying here on a visit, and if we compare it to the reserved, cautious attitude of Herr Sazonow, we cannot certainly expect that the French president used any calming influence in this country. It is certainly remarkable that the juridical deductions of Monsieur Poincaré bear some similarity to the excursions of Herr Pasič in the "*Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*". Herr Spalajkovic, whom Herr Sazonow quite recently qualified as "déséquilibré" probably had a hand in this.

My colleagues of the Triple Alliance did not mention whether Monsieur Poincaré spoke to them of Servia.

46.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Telegram without a number.

Ischl, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

For Baron Macchio.

His Majesty the Emperor and King has approved the text of the note to Servia and to the powers, without any change. I beg your Excellency to inform the German ambassador that the note cannot be handed to him before to-morrow morning, because some corrections have to be made.

47.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 249.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Your Excellencys telegram No. 271*) received.

The decree of the 20th July No. 3426**) in Germanys case was a mere form: the official delivery of our note was to take place in Berlin under the same modalities as in the case of the other Signatory Powers.

In strict privacy we communicated the note in question (which contains the text of the note to Servia) to Herr von Tschirschky yesterday; the ambassador has no doubt by this time forwarded it to Berlin.

*) Vide No. 39.

**) Vide No. 30.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 250.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Accompanying the decree*) which Herr von Mérey received on the 20th inst. I sent him a private notice to this effect**):

“If your Excellency should be induced by the Marquis di San Giuliano to make use of the arguments defending our interpretation of article VII, as exposed in the notice, and the minister maintains his point of view, it will be desirable that you do not continue the discussion on this subject, and justify yourself to the minister by saying that neither of you would succeed in making the other accept any interpretation but his own. That your Excellency believed that it would be in the interests of both, instead of carrying on a juridical discussion on the interpretation of an article, to discuss the great interests of Austria Hungary and Italy as friends and allies.

I must add for your Excellency's information that I should take it as a grave symptom if the discussion of article VII led to irritation on either side which might endanger the existence of the entire treaty.”

This is for your Excellency's exclusive personal information. Should Herr von Jagow allude to the question of the interpretation you will make use of the same arguments remarking that a discussion between us and Italy on the interpretation of article VII had better be avoided at the present moment. When Italy occupied certain islands in the Aegean Sea, we could, according to our way of seeing, have demanded compensation, but we preferred observing the friendly attitude of an ally and did not hinder Italys action.

*) Vide No. 32.

***) Vide No. 32.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 852.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

With my telegram of the 20th inst. No. 843*).

As a sequel to the communications you have made to the Marquis di San Giuliano I beg you to inform him privately that our *demarche* in Belgrade has now been fixed for Thursday the 23rd inst. in the afternoon.

The note, which Baron Giesl is instructed to present to the Servian government contains a number of demands referring to the restraining of the movement which threatens our territory, which we found upon the results of the inquiry of Sarajevo, feeling that we must put an end to the agitation in our southern frontier countries and which originates in Belgrade. We have allowed the Servian government 48 hours time, to accept our conditions, because we feared Servias usual mode of procrastination. — The Signatory Powers would receive the communication on Friday the 24th inst. and Your Excellency will be in a position on the same day to give the Italian government official information on our *demarche* in Belgrade. The step you are taking to-day is limited to Rome, Berlin and Bucharest, out of special consideration for the Alliance.

I must ask your Excellency to make the communication contained in this telegram personally to the Marquis di San Giuliano (if this is not possible, to his representative) not before Thursday afternoon. We wish absolutely to avoid that the news should reach Petersburg from Rome on the same day.

*) Vide No. 34.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 528.

Rome, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

With telegram of the 15th inst. No. 820*). Your Excellency authorised me to communicate our *demarche* in Belgrade to Marquis di San Giuliano one day earlier and promised to send the dates by telegram. As the fact of the *demarche* was generally known, this instruction could only refer to the *contents* of the note.

This instruction has not been annulled, and now I see to my regret from the decree of the 20th inst. No. 3427**) just arrived by courier, that though our *demarche* in Belgrade will take place on the 23rd inst. I am not to communicate with the minister before the 24th inst. *instead of a day earlier, a day later.*

In the face of this situation, and because according to your instructions by telegram No. 843 of the 20th inst.***) I told the minister in our conversation of yesterday that I was without information on our *demarche* in Belgrade, I ask myself whether I ought not give the information in question to-morrow instead of on the 24th inst.

I must assume that your Excellency has changed your mind—unhappily without informing me of the fact, and that I ought to act according to the instructions of the decree of the 20th inst. No. 3427.

*) Vide No. 22.

**) Vide No. 30.

***) Vide No. 34.

51.

Count Szécsén to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 114.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Referring to the decree of the 20th inst. No. 3428*). I think I ought to mention that from the local point of view here, the coincidence of our *démarche* in Belgrade happening at the same time as the departure of the president from Petersburg, which is fixed for the evening of the 23rd inst. this will be made the subject of much comment and will be regarded in the light of an unfair surprise.

Monsieur Poincaré leaves Kronstadt on the 23rd inst. at ten in the evening, according to the programme, and is to arrive in Stockholm on the 25th inst. at 10 a. m. Telegraphic communication will be difficult during the passage by sea.

52.

Count Szécsén to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 115.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

Private.

Concerning decree of 20th inst. No. 3428**).

I beg an answer by telegram whether when I present a copy of the above decree, I am to request the contents to be treated as private or not.

Some of the demands adressed to Servia are very energetic and will probably be severely judged by this press, so that it might be desirable that the official text should not at once be given to the papers.†

If however the text is published in Vienna, there would be no sense in demanding privacy.

Paris papers are already publishing information concerning the contents of the note.

*) Vide No. 30.

**) Vide No. 30.

53.

Visit of the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office.

Daily report No. 3487.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

The French ambassador came to the foreign office to-day, to inquire with concern on the present state of our relations with Servia. He discussed all the eventualities which might result from an energetic step on our side towards the cabinet of Belgrade, and painted the dangers resulting from a war between Austria-Hungary and Servia with crude colours, calling attention to the fact, that it might become a war of the slav races against the monarchy.

Notwithstanding this warning, Monsieur Dumaine concluded by saying that from a conversation he had recently had on the subject with his Russian colleague, he had obtained the conviction that Russia did not propose standing up much for Servia in the forthcoming dispute with Austria-Hungary and might only be disposed to give its moral support.

In the eventuality of a war between us and Servia—this is the opinion of the French ambassador—Russia would not take an active part, but would do what it could, to keep the war localised.

54.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 106.

London, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Received courier.

Sir Edward Grey has just asked me by telephone to go and see him at three to-morrow.

It is just possible that he has something to say to me on the subject of our forthcoming step in Belgrade.

Would your Excellency authorise me, eventually to communicate the official decree to-morrow, Thursday afternoon, instead of Friday, asking the Secretary of State to consider it as strictly private until Friday?

I beg for an immediate answer by wire.

55.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram Nr. 181.

Cettinje, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Demarche in Belgrade. Decree No. 3435 private, of the 20th inst. *)

I beg for authorisation to leave a copy of the decree with His Majesty the King, if, as is highly probable, he should ask for it.

56.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 531.

Rome, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Received your Excellency's telegram of 22nd inst. No. 852 **) this morning.

I must state first of all:

1. that I did not receive notice in time, for which I begged in my telegram of the 14th inst. No. 512 ***) and which your Excellency promised in your telegram of the 15th inst. No. 820 †), so as to enable me to arrange my visit to the Marquis di San Giuliano at Fuggi by telegram. The instructions did not reach me until to-day, when the *demarche* is being made;

*) Vide No. 31.

**) Vide No. 49.

***) Vide No. 20.

†) Vide No. 22.

2. that an act of courtesy towards Italy is out of question, since contrary to previous arrangement and contrary to the communication made to the German ambassador, the information of our *demarche* in Belgrade cannot be given here a day sooner, but on the same day in the afternoon, as I am instructed.

Another unlucky circumstance is, that my health, which has been bad for some time, has given way altogether and I must keep to my bed to-day.

I must therefore leave the presentation of the decree to Count Ambrósy, who after having telephoned to Marquis di San Giuliano will go to Fuggi by motorcar this afternoon and make the necessary communications to the minister.

57.

Count Berchtold to Count Szécsén in Paris.

Telegram No. 152.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Your Excellency's telegrams of 22nd inst. No. 114 and No. 115 received*).

As to the coincidence of the *demarche* in Belgrad with the departure of Poincaré from Petersburg, it is to be remarked that we always meant to take the *demarche* as soon as the inquiry in Sarajevo had been concluded. This has since been the case.

It would certainly have been much less amiable to interrupt the festivities in Petersburg by acting at an earlier time, and it would not have been in our interest to undertake our step in Belgrade while Emperor Nicholas and the Russian statesmen were under the influence of the two, who are all for war — Poincaré and Iswolsky.

*) Vide No. 51 and 52.

58.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London.

Telegram No. 158.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Received your Excellency's telegram of the 22nd inst. No. 106*).

Your Excellency may in to-days conversation with Sir Edward Grey announce the official presentation of the circular note for tomorrow morning and in strict privacy communicate the contents of the note, asking him to keep what you tell him, strictly private.

59.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 107.

London, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.

I have just spoken with Sir Edward Grey and told him that I would bring the circular note to-morrow. In the meantime I would tell him something of the contents in confidence. He promised to speak to none of my colleagues, indeed to no one, before the note had been officially received, and did not make any notes during our conversation.

He told me on his part that he had not spoken to me on the subject as yet, because he felt that Austria-Hungary must regard the affair as something between itself and Servia, and also because he did not know what proofs of Servias guilt we had obtained. But he had been spoken to on the subject with apprehension, which is not limited to one group of powers alone. He had answered the questions addressed to him, by saying that all depended upon what proofs we had of Servias guilt and what kind of satisfaction we would demand. If our grievances are well-founded and the reparation we demand, in Servias power, we might hope that Russia would advise moderation. The danger lies in the flaring up of slav excitement in Russian public opinion.

*) Vide No. 54.

Though I informed him on the important points of the note, he declined to speak on the contents of it, until he had it in his hands. (Still he looked as if some of our points of view coincided with his own.) I told him I believed that the answer would have to be given within a fixed term, but that I could not tell him its duration until to-morrow. He said he regretted that a term had been fixed for the answer, because it took away the possibility for excitement to abate and for the powers to influence Belgrade in a conciliatory sense. There would have been time for an ultimatum, when an unsatisfactory answer had been given.

I explained our point of view in detail (the necessity of defending ourselves against incessant subversive undertakings, which threatened the territory of the monarchy, protection of our vital interests, the total failure of our conciliatory attitude in the past, the fact that Serbia has had three weeks' time to set about an inquiry of its own accord, showing that it repudiated the thought of participating in the crime etc.).

He admitted the difficulty of our position, spoke seriously of the gravity of the situation. If four great states, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and France were to become involved in a war, a state of things must follow, which would be equal to the bankrupt of Europe. No more credit would be available, all industrial centres would be in uproar, so that in most countries, be they victors or defeated, "many a standing institution would be swept away".

I told him that it was my opinion that in this case notwithstanding our well-known love of peace, we would have to remain firm towards Serbia. I told him I trusted his unprejudiced, fair judgment. He declared that a simple remonstrance in Petersburg would not serve in this case. We must be able to prove to Russia that our grievances are well-founded, that a state such as Serbia could well comply with our demands. The best thing he could think of, would be direct exchange of opinions between Vienna and Petersburg. He was as cool and unprejudiced as ever, friendly and not without sympathy for our side. But he is undoubtedly very anxious as to the possible consequences.

I fear that he will have much to say against our *démarche* having the character of an ultimatum and the shortness of the term.

60.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 152.

Petersburg, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

My German colleague judges from the identity of the language used by Herr Sazonow before the arrival of Poincaré, with that used by the President, that the latter had had a lesson from Sazonow, who wished in this way to make a greater impression.

This explains that Sazonow is telling everybody that Poincaré found me very much excited against Servia, whilst I, for reasons that will be easily understood, observed the greatest reserve.

61.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Petersburg and Constantinople and to the Imp. and Roy. minister in Bucharest.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Mensdorff, London, No. 159*),
2. Count Szécsén, Paris, No. 151,
3. Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 251,
4. Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 858,
5. Count Szápáry, Petersburg, No. 163,
6. Count Czernin, Sinaia, No. 162,
7. Margrave Pallavicini, Constantinople, No. 203.

*) Compare the text in the Austrian-Hungarian Redbook No. 9.

Ad 1.

Private.

England being that power of the Entente which is most likely to judge our steps in Belgrade in an unprejudiced manner, I will beg you in the conversation to follow the presentation of the circular note on the 24th inst., to remind the Foreign Office that Serbia could have avoided the severity of our serious *demarche*, which it must necessarily have expected, by taking the measures for instituting an inquiry in Serbia against the Servians who took a part in the crime of the 28th June, and to reveal the connections leading from Belgrade to Sarajevo in the affair of the murderous plot.

The Servian government has to this day, though a number of well-known circumstances point to Belgrade, not only undertaken nothing in this direction, but has even attempted to obliterate some of the important indications.

Thus a telegraphic report of our legation in Belgrade shows that the strongly compromised state-official Ciganović, whom the murderers accuse of complicity, was still in Belgrade on the day of the murder, but three days later, when the newspapers began to publish his name, had already left the city. The chief of the Servian press at the same time declared that Ciganović was absolutely unknown in Belgrade.

The short term given to Serbia for its answer must be attributed to our experience of Servias dilatory ways in treating political questions.

We cannot allow the demands, which we have addressed to Serbia, and which contain nothing that would not be considered natural between two neighbours, living in peace and harmony, to be made the subject of negotiations and compromises and we owe it to our economical interests, not to consent to political methods, which would allow Serbia to prolong the crisis, in which we find ourselves, at its pleasure.

Ad 2—7.

Private.

I telegraph the following text to Count Mensdorff:

(Follows the text ad 1.)

From "As England" to "at its pleasure."

The above for your information and for the regulation of what you say on the 24th inst.

62.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 80.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

You will take the step arranged for, this afternoon, certainly not at four but at the earliest, a few minutes before five.

If you can possibly arrange matters, postpone the *démarche* to six o'clock, in which case the term of the answer must also be changed to six.

I add for your information that we wish, if it were at all possible, to prevent the news of the *démarche* from reaching Petersburg this evening, because President Poincaré remains there until eleven o'clock to-night.

I beg you to telegraph immediately, whether you must deliver note at five o'clock, or whether you can postpone *démarche* until six o'clock.

63.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 81.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

We learn that Herr Pasić intends tendering his resignation at the moment of the presentation of the note. The resignation of the cabinet would change nothing in our

demands nor in the duration of the term for the answer, since a resigning cabinet always carries on the affairs of state until a new ministry has been named, and is fully responsible.

This is for your information and the direction of your speech with Pasić.

64.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 171.

Belgrade, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered.

Ultimatum.

I will deliver the note to Minister Paču at half past four to-day. My hint, that perhaps Minister Pasić ought to be informed, was rejected as superfluous on the grounds that Minister Paču had yesterday been appointed by decree as representative of the premier and of the minister of Foreign Affairs.

65.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 173.

Belgrade-Semlin, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered.

Ultimatum to Servia.

Note in question presented to Herr Paču at six o'clock this evening.

66.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 83.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Referring to telegrams Nr. 171 and 173 *).

The term *ultimatum*, which you use in your telegrams to designate to-days *Demarche* is not correct, inasmuch that if

*) Vide No. 64 and 65.

the term for the answer expires without result, war does not follow, but only the breaking off of diplomatic relations. The war would commence after it had been formally declared, or Servia had attacked us.

67.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 175.

Belgrade, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.

Ultimatum.

Premier *ad interim* Paču after some hesitation conceded a conversation for six o'clock, and received me at the striking of the clock. Secretary-General Gruic was with him, because Paču does not know French.

I gave him the note and added that the term for the answer had been fixed for Saturday at 6 p. m. and that if by that time I had received no answer or an unsatisfactory one, I should leave Belgrade with the entire legation; that at the same time as the answer, I wished to receive the Servian translation of both enunciations, which we were desirous to compare.

Paču, without reading the note, answered that the elections were being carried on and some of the ministers were absent from Belgrade. He feared it would be physically impossible to assemble a complete council of ministers in time for taking, what he must believe to be an important decision.

The council of ministers had been assembled ever since five o'clock. I answered that in our age of railways, telegraphs and telephones and the diminutive size of the country, it could only be a question of a few hours to assemble the ministers, and that in the forenoon I had advised to inform Herr Pasić. But this was an internal Servian concern, that I had no right to judge. Nothing more was discussed.

68.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Schiessl in Ischl.

Telegram.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Most urgent.

I must beg your Excellency to inform His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty in my name that the Imp. and Roy. minister in Belgrade has presented the note concerning the Servian movement to the Servian Finance-minister Paču, who represents the premier, at six o'clock this afternoon.

The term of 48 hours for the answer [therefore expires on Saturday, the 25th inst. at six in the afternoon.

69.

Count Berchtold to Herr Otto in Cettinje.

Telegram No. 133.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

Referring to your telegram of the 22nd inst. No. 131.

You are authorised to give His Majesty the King a copy of the circular note to the powers in strict confidence, if he asks you for it.

At the same time you can tell him that we are glad to assert that the results of the inquiry mentioned in the circular note, does not in any way touch upon Montenegro.

70.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in Madrid, to the Vatican, in Washington and in Tokio.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

Adress:

1. Prince Fürstenberg, Madrid, No. 14,
2. Prince Schönburg, Rome, No. 40,
3. Dr. Dumba, Washington, No. 23,
4. Baron Müller, Tokio, No. 22.

1—3.

The Imp. and Roy. minister in Belgrade to-day, Thursday the 23rd inst. presented a note to the royal Servian government in which the latter is called upon to accept a number of demands within fortyeight hours, which we were forced to address to Servia on the grounds of the inquiry instituted after the crime of Sarajevo with a view of putting an end to the plotting in the southern provinces of the monarchy, that has been traced to Servia and in this case more especially to Belgrade.

ad 1.

The above is for your information and for the regulation of your speech with the government to which you are accredited. The decree containing all information on our *Demarche* in Belgrade, as addressed to the Imp. and Roy. representatives at the courts of the Signatory Powers, will reach you by despatch-box.

ad 2.

The above is for your information and for the regulation of your speech and for communication to the Cardinal-State-Secretary. The decree containing all information on our *Demarche* in Belgrade, as sent to the Imp. and Roy-representatives at the courts of the Signatory Powers will reach you by despatch-box.

ad 3.

The above for your Excellency's information and for the regulation of your speech, as also for communication to the State-Secretary.

ad 4.

As the results of the inquiry instituted in Sarajevo have shown that the assassination of the Archduke-heir to the throne was plotted together with Servian officers and government officials, and that this horrible crime is but the result of Servian agitation carried on for years among the population

of our southern frontier provinces, we have been forced to address a number of demands in Belgrade on the 23rd inst. which are intended to stop the subversive movement directed against Austria-Hungary. We have allowed the Servian government a term of 48 hours for complying with our just demands.

I must ask your Excellency to communicate as much to the Imperial government.

Private.

It is possible that the further development of things will lead to a warlike conflict with Servia, eventually with Russia. I am asking your Excellency to keep this in mind and to telegraph to me whether you think it might answer, to call the Tokio governments attention to the fact that here offers a favorable opportunity.

71.

Count Berchtold to the Signatory Embassies, the Balkan Missions and the Imp. and Roy. Minister in Stockholm.

Prot. No. 5136—5147.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

1. Signatory embassies.
2. Balkan missions.
3. Count Hadik. Stockholm.

1—3.

Presentation of our note in Belgrade did not take place until 6 p. m. to-day, Thursday; the term for the answer therefore expires Saturday afternoon at six o'clock.

I beg you to correct the note accordingly.

72.

Count Berchtold to all Imp. and Roy. Missions except the Signatory Embassies, the Balkan Legations, the Embassies in Madrid, Rome (Vatican), Washington, Tokio and the Imp. and Roy. Embassy in Stockholm.

Prot. No. 5108—5129.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

The Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade to-day, Thursday the 23rd inst. presented a note to the Royal Servian government in which the latter is called upon to accept a number of demands within 48 hours, which we have been forced to address to it on the grounds of the results of the Sarajevo inquiry, hoping thereby to put an end at last to the plotting in our southern frontier provinces, the threads of which undeniably lead to Belgrade.

The above is for your information and for the direction of your speech.

73.

Letter from Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Functionaries in Copenhagen, the Hague, in Brussels, Dresden, Munich, Stuttgart, Berne, Madrid and Lisbon.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Address:

Count Széchény, Copenhagen,
Baron Giskra, Hague,
Count Clary, Brussels,
Baron Braun, Dresden,
Herr von Vélies, Munich,
Count Koziobrodzki, Stuttgart,
Baron Gagern, Berne,
Baron Gudenus, Madrid,
Baron Kuhn, Lisbon.

The propaganda for Greater Servia, which has been busy for a number of years, and whose sole aim was to disjoin from the monarchy its southern frontier provinces, has developed in an alarming manner during the last Balkan wars.

The iniquitous deed of Sarajevo, which has caused horror and indignation all the world over must be regarded as a direct consequence of the agitation spread abroad from Belgrade. The inquiry, which has been instituted, has shown that the crime is not the deed of a single insane individual, but the work of a complicated plot and conspiracy, the origin of which reaches across the frontier to the neighbouring kingdom.

The agitation, which does not shrink from using the most despicable means for effectuating its ends, cannot have been a secret to the leading circles of Belgrade, since it is proved that a great number of well-known functionaries took an active part in it.

The friendly toleration, with which the Servian government regarded this criminal activity, has caused me to address a number of demands to the Servian government, contained in the decree which you receive at the same time as this letter, and which are intended to reestablish normal relations with the neighbouring kingdom.

During latter years the attitude of Servia might repeatedly have given cause to defend our *prestige* with an armed hand. But the monarchy, feeling to be the stronger, and with the sincere wish of maintaining the peace, showed the greatest patience and self-denial. We have found to our misfortune that our love of peace was interpreted in a mistaken way; it created doubts in the strength and unity of the monarchy and increased the conceit of our enemies. By encouraging the belief in the weakness of the monarchy and in the possibility of its dissolution, the Belgrade government and its organs hope to prepare the ground for a favorable moment, when—the Great Powers being perhaps at cross purposes with each other—Servia might succeed in obtaining what it is striving for.

The conservative tendencies of our policy, counsel us to dispel with every means in our power the belief, that the small neighbouring country could at its pleasure conjure up a European war, with a view towards realising its ambitions by disjoining the monarchy. We are therefore convinced that we are doing the interests of Europe a real service, when we

extinguish Servian aspirations by showing a strong hand, if need be, an armed hand, to ensure lasting peace on our southern frontier.

We will not give up hope that the Servian government, by unconditionally accepting our just demands, will lay the foundations for a peaceful development of our reciprocal relations.

I leave it to you to judge, when you have obtained knowledge of the step we are about to take in Belgrade, whether in conversation with the statesmen in your capital you should use the arguments contained in the above.

Accept the assurances etc.

AUSTRIAN RED BOOK

OFFICIAL FILES

PERTAINING TO

PRE-WAR HISTORY

PART II

24. JULY TO 28. JULY 1914



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PREFACE.

The following documents are the second part and sequel of the Addendum and Supplement to the Austro-Hungarian Red-Book published as "Diplomatic documents of the History of the War of 1914" (Part 1. (I.) from 28th June to 23rd July 1914).

The present series of documents goes as far as July 28th 1914 and will be followed by Part III. reaching to August 27th 1914.

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**Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade and to
Count Tisza in Budapest.**

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Address:

1. Baron von Giesl in Belgrade, No. 85,
2. Count Tisza in Budapest, No. 34.

Ciphered telegram.—Private.

1.

Telegram No. 175 dated 23rd July *).

I assume that according to the instructions you have received, you have completed your preparations, so that you can leave Belgrade immediately with the entire legation, should the term of 48 hours have expired without effect. The result of the time allowed for the answer, can only be either the unconditional acceptance or the refusal (any acceptance, which contains conditions or reservations, you are to consider in the light of a refusal). The result is to be sent in a few words from Semlin *in claris* and immediately to the military cabinet of His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty to Ischl; also *in claris* from Semlin and in cipher from Belgrade to the ministry of Foreign Affairs and to Count Tisza in Budapest.

Taking into account the local circumstances, it will be best for you to eventually leave Belgrade by the 6:30 train which arrives in Semlin at 6:40. You can then either continue your journey without stopping, or wait for the Orient-Express in Semlin.

When you arrive in Semlin, you will use the official railway telephone at the station and get a telephonic connection with the Budapest railway directors, who must connect you with Count Tisza, whom you are to inform of your departure from Belgrade.

*) Vide I, No. 66.

We will take the necessary measures, so that you can use the telephone immediately after your arrival in Semlin, and we will ask Count Tisza to give us your message immediately, so that if things go as they ought, we might receive the news of your departure as early as 7 o'clock on Saturday.

If our demands are complied with by Servia, you can send one of your gentlemen to do the telephoning from Semlin to Budapest.

2.

Baron von Giesl is instructed to telegraph the result of the 48 hours term immediately when the term has expired, that is to-morrow, Saturday at six o'clock p. m. to His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty in Ischl *in claris*; and to you as well as to us in cipher from Belgrade and *in claris* from Semlin in a few words only.

Baron von Giesl is overmore instructed in the eventuality of his departure, to use the train that starts from Belgrade at 6:30, and arrives in Semlin at 6:40. In Semlin Baron Giesl will immediately use the official railway telephone and get himself connected with the directors of the Hungarian State-railways and through them with Your Excellency.

I beg you will take the necessary measures, so that Baron Giesl can dispose of the telephone Semlin-Budapest at six o'clock to-morrow; and I beg furthermore that you will immediately forward Baron Giesl's message to me, so that I can send it on to Ischl.

If our demands are accepted by Servia, an official of the Imp. and Roy. legation will send the message under the same conditions.

2.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 180.

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Ad telegram No. 83 of to-day.

I only used the word "Ultimatum" in my message to the ministry of Foreign Affairs for shortness and simplicity.

3.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 180.

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Situation.

Herr Pasič returned here at 5 a. m. Since 10 o'clock the council of ministers is sitting, and has not yet come to a decision.

I hear in diplomatic circles that there is a question of transferring the government to Nisch. The government organ published a short paragraph on the tendering of the Note, which it said contained hard conditions, so that situation is very serious and critical. All the other papers, of which some were confiscated for containing violent attacks, besides vilifying everybody, unanimously expressed the opinion that Servia could only comply with demands which were not detrimental to its independence.

In circles of government officials the highly improbable rumour is circulated, that the government received a telegram from Petersburg last night with the assurance that Servia could entirely rely upon Russias support.

This report is contradicted by the fact that the Servian government was completely taken by surprise, yesterday by the Note, as well as by what it contained.

4.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 181.

Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Situation.

According to information from different sources, the council of ministers with the crownprince in the chair, had taken no binding resolution by this evening, and it was openly declared that an answer would certainly not be given to-day, all ministers not yet being present.

Montenegrin and Greek ministers were received by Pasič and the former was heard to say with emphasis to a colleague, that Montenegro would march with Servia.

The Greek Minister denies the conclusion of an alliance with Servia and also a change of the old arrangement since the last Balkan war. He seems to have doubts with regard to the attitude of his government and does not seem particularly well . . . *).

Except the consignment of the garrison to barracks, no military measures can be observed.

5.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 278.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.—Strictly private.

Count Pourtalès telegraphs from Petersburg that Count Szápáry had communicated to him the matter of his conversation with the President of the French Republic during the reception of the diplomats. Monsieur Poincaré seems to have alluded to the Servian question in an incredibly harsh manner and to have said to the Imp. and Roy. ambassador: "That it would absolutely not do to make the government of a neighbouring State responsible for the crime of a single individual."

Much indignation is felt here against Monsieur Poincarés language and it is assumed that he spoke as Herr Sazonow asked him to speak.

6.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 279.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Servia.

In accordance with decree No. 3426 of the 20th inst. I handed the Note to Servia to the State-secretary yesterday

*) Cipher illegible.

and this morning, obeying Your Excellencys instructions by telegram, I gave notice of the change in the expiration of the term to 6 o'clock.

Herr von Jagow sends his thanks for this information and assured me that the German government agrees entirely with the contents of the Note.

7.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 280.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Servia.

The press of this city—as far as I can judge it—is full of praise on the subject of our Note to Servia. A paragraph of the “Berliner Lokalanzeiger” which is believed to be officially inspired, gives the assurance that the German people is breathing more freely, since steps have been taken for clearing up matters in the Balkan. Germany congratulates her ally on the Danube for taking this resolution, and will not fail to give proofs of true friendship and ready help in the trying times, that may be approaching.

8.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 535.

Rome, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Count Ambrósy has presented the copy of the decree sent to me on the 20th inst. No. 3402*) in which the time of expiration for the term allotted was corrected, together with the enclosed supplement, at 11.30 this morning, to the

*) Vide I, No. 29.

Secretary General, both minister of Foreign Affairs and Under-secretary of State being absent.

The Secretary General when he began to read the document, remarked that it was very clever to begin the Note by citing the Servian note of 1909.

When he had read further on, he made, what he called a purely personal remark,—that we were treating Servia as a Great Power, in considering ourselves endangered by the agitation carried on against us on Servian territory. This gave Count Ambrósy an opportunity for referring to the wide-spread aims of the “Narodna odbrana”.

When he came to the point, in which we ask for the publication of the Note and its answer, the Secretary General said: “to this the Belgrade government must absolutely accede.”

At Point 4 he said, he thought the Servian government would find it hard to accept.

When he read the paragraph referring to the results of the inquiry in Sarajevo, he seemed much surprised.

When he had finished reading, he said that we seemed to have arrived at a turning-point of History. Count Ambrósy answered this by asking whether he, (De Martino) admitted that our action was after all purely defensive, to which the Secretary General replied in the affirmative, adding, in French: “Certainly I could never have believed that it would be possible to assert and prove the guilt of Servian officers and functionaries in the drama of Sarajevo.”

He then assured Count Ambrósy that he would forthwith remit the copy of the Note to the Marquis di San Giuliano.

Just before Count Ambrósy's visit, the Secretary General had received the Russian ambassador. As Ambrósy was being introduced, the ambassador went to the office of a reporter of the Foreign Office and left his hat and stick in the ante-room. It must be assumed that de Martino immediately afterwards communicated the text of the Note to him, which had however in the meantime been published by the Agenzia Stefani.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 119.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Ciphred.

Servia.

Referring to decree No. 3428 of the 20th inst.**).

Have just read the decree No. 3423 to the minister of Justice, representing the absent minister of Foreign Affairs, and have left him a copy. Monsieur Bienvenu Martin, who had learnt part of our *demarche* through the morning papers, seemed rather impressed by my communication. He would not discuss the text, but admitted freely that the events of recent times and the attitude of the Servian government had made energetic action on our part, a matter that could be understood.

The minister seemed most surprised at Point 5 of the Note presented in Belgrade; I had to read it to him twice.

The minister thanked me for my communication, which, he said would be thoroughly considered. I seized this opportunity for saying that here was a question which must find its direct solution between us and Servia, but that it is certainly in the interest of Europe, if the disquiet, which has for many years been kept up in our country by Servian intrigue, is replaced by a normal state of affairs.

All friends of peace and order, and among these I range France in the first place, should seriously advise Servia to alter its attitude and to accede to our justified demands.

The minister admitted that it was Servias duty to take energetic steps against eventual accomplices of the murderer of Sarajevo, a duty from which it could not well shrink. Referring most impressively to the sympathies of France for Austria-Hungary, and to the good relations between the two countries, the minister expressed the hope that the present dispute would end peaceably, in a manner to satisfy our wishes.

*) Compare the text in the Austro-Hungarian Red-Book, No 11.

**) Vide I, No. 30.

The minister visibly avoided to defend or condone the attitude of Servia in any way whatever.

Monsieur Bienvenu Martin has of course no influence whatever on the course of foreign politics in France.

10.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 120.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Servia.

Baron Schoen has been instructed to inform this government that according to the opinion of the cabinet of Berlin, our controversy with Servia is a concern which exclusively regards the two governments implicated.

He is also to give the government to understand, that in case that third States would interfere, Germany would be faithful to its duties as an ally and would place itself on our side.

The German ambassador will make this communication to-day.

11.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold).**

Telegram No. 121.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Servia.

Refers to my telegram No. 120 of to-day***).

Baron Schoen has just acted according to instructions received from Berlin. Monsieur Bienvenu Martin told him that he could not reply definitely to this communication, but that

*) Compare with text in Austro-Hungarian Red-Book, No. 12.

**) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Red-Book, No. 13.

***) Vide II, No. 10.

he could say so much, that the French government shared the opinion that the controversy with Serbia concerned only Belgrade and Vienna and that it hoped the question would be solved in a direct and peaceable way.

The Servian minister in Paris has already been advised that his government should give way as far as possible on all points, but with the reservation that "the rights of sovereignty must not be touched".

Monsieur Berthelot, who was present during the conversation, seemed to fear that public opinion in Russia would be all for interference. If the government in Petersburg can face this public feeling, a peaceable understanding is possible according to his belief.

With regard to our demands it is his opinion, that the Servian government should declare its willingness to accept in principle at once, and demand explanations and details on some points. For instance in what way Austrian organs would be supposed to control judicial inquiries in Serbia.

Baron Schoens manner of speaking appears to have been very energetic. He called attention to the fact that it is a European necessity to do away with the centre of disquiet in Belgrade.

12.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 122.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Servia.

Newspapers of this country have not yet taken a decided attitude towards our *demarche*.

I am busily engaged to act upon the press in a friendly manner and to prevent its taking the part of Servia to our disadvantage. I am calling attention to the fact that Servia has not yet answered and our intentions, which depend entirely on the nature of this answer, are still unknown. The papers must therefore be content with an expectant attitude.

Monsieur Pichon (at present "Petit Parisien") is of the same mind and promised to influence the papers in this sense, through Monsieur Berthelot, with whom he is great friends.

Pichon expressed himself much in the same manner as the minister of Justice did towards Baron Schoen. He asked me with some apprehension whether Berlin was all in favour of a war. I said that so far as I was informed, Berlin fully recognised the justice of our point of view and desired very much that Servia should entirely comply with our wishes. But the question is regarded as an exclusively Austrian-Hungarian-Servian affair, and hopes are entertained, that however events may turn out, the affair might remain strictly localised. Monsieur Pichon remarked that if Germany did not wish war, peace would be most certainly maintained. France is all for peace and the Russian government has absolutely no warlike intentions, notwithstanding the regrettable agitation of the Panslavists.

Pichon still has numerous connections with the ministry of Foreign Affairs, and even a certain influence there.

As far as I have been able to learn, no information has as yet been received on the attitude, which the Russian government intends adopting.

13.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London*).

Telegram No. 161.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Referring to your telegram No. 107 of yesterday**).

I must beg you to explain immediately to Sir Edward Grey that our *Demarche* of yesterday in Belgrade must not be regarded as a formal ultimatum; it is nothing more than a timed *Demarche*, which—this you will tell Sir Edward Grey in confidence—will, when the term has expired, be followed

*) Compare with text of Austro-Hungarian Red-Book No. 17.

**) Vide I, No. 59.

by nothing more than the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and the beginning of the necessary military preparations, since we decidedly resolved to insist upon our justified demands.

You will add that it is your personal conviction, that should Serbia, after allowing the term to expire, see fit to accede to our demands, we should have to make her responsible for the amount of the military costs we should incur. You will call to mind that in 1908 and in 1912 we have had to order two mobilisations on Servias account.

14.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 108.

London, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

In addition to the telegram No. 107 of yesterday*).

Just presented the circular note to Sir Edward Grey, who read it through attentively. Arrived at Point 5 he asked how the following was to be understood? "Organs of our government to be placed in Serbia". This would put an end to Servias independence as a State. I answered that the collaboration of police-organs for instance does not touch a States sovereignty.

The State-secretary repeated the objections he raised yesterday on account of the shortness of the term, which does not allow other States time, to use their influence. He called our Note to Serbia the most formidable document that was ever addressed from one State to another, but at the same time admitted, that what it said on the guilt of Serbia in the crime of Sarajevo and some of our demands were fully justified.

What appear to be his objections are: Point 5, the shortness of the term, and the fact that the Note, so to say, dictates the answer.

*) Vide I, No. 59.

What makes him seriously anxious is the possible effect upon the peace of Europe. If there was no danger to that, he would be quite prepared to consider the affair as solely regarding Austria-Hungary and Servia. But he confesses to being most "apprehensive" that several Great Powers might become involved in a war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he remarked, that he believed the conditions of the alliance between France and Russia were very much the same as those between the Powers of the Triple Alliance.

I laid our point of view before him very explicitly, used all the arguments of telegram No. 159 of the 23rd inst. *) and repeated that we must remain firm, to obtain some guarantees of good faith, since in the past, Servian promises had never been kept. I told him that I perfectly understood that to him the whole question appealed in the light of danger to Europe's peace, but that I must ask him to consider our point of view also and put himself in our place.

He would not continue to discuss this theme, promised to study the Note more closely and to attempt whatever could be done to avert the threatening danger. He began by calling to his presence the German and French ambassadors. He said that he must first of all speak to the allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia, who have no interests of their own in Servia.

He repeated several times in the course of conversation, that he was very anxious about the maintaining of the peace between the Great Powers. *

15.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 109.

London, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Ultimatum to Servia.

My German colleague has spoken with Sir E. Grey and according to instructions, communicated the German point of view.

*) Vide I, No. 61.

The State-secretary showed himself much perplexed and disquieted. Never before had such language been addressed to an independent State. He criticised the form of the Note more than the contents, and repeated that the brevity of time granted for an answer, made every attempt at influencing Serbia impossible. If the German government agreed with him, he would propose a prolongation of the term, and still attempt something.

If it was only a question between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the State-secretary would not be concerned about it. He had not heard from Petersburg as yet, but where the Slavs came in with their sympathies, advice was of no avail.

Private.

The German ambassador condensed the conversation to this: Sir E. Grey is one with us in the wish to localise the conflict between us and Serbia.

Should a conflict arise between us and Russia, he would like to attempt a mediation *à quatre* (England, Germany, France and Italy) to conciliate Vienna and Petersburg.

Tyrrell told Lichnowsky that it was not to be thought of, that Serbia would accept. Austria-Hungary underrates Serbia and will lose much blood there; Roumanias attitude might be expected to become exceedingly hostile.

16.

Count Szápáry to Count Berehtold.

Telegram No. 156.

Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

Ciphred.

Instructions contained in No. 3405 and 3430 carried out this morning*). I take the liberty of stating in few words that the minister from the very first said that he would not take sides with regard to the *demarche* and although he is not generally averse to lively discussion, listened to my reading of the note and to my comments in comparative quiet.

*) Vide I, No. 29, 30.

He avoided saying anything that could be construed into an understanding what Russia would do, but from time to time he said: I know what it is. You want to go to war with Servia! I can see what is going on, the German papers are adding fuel to the fire! You are setting fire to Europe! It is a great responsibility you are assuming, you will see what sort of an impression you will make in London and in Paris and perhaps elsewhere. It will be considered as an unjustified aggression. But he never mentioned Russia directly . . .*)

When we came to the use of arguments, he tried to deny any responsibility on Servias part, called our demands simply unacceptable, and referring to the dissolution of the "Narodna odbrana" said that Servia never would allow this. He found fault with the form of an ultimatum, which prevented Servia from justifying herself, and finally repeated that he was taking nobodys part, and would vouchsafe no answer. As a last word he added that certainly a grave situation had been created. However an inevitable discussion followed, in the course of which, he asserted that it was all Count Forgách's doing, and tried to depreciate our proofs, by saying he doubted them. To my repeated warnings, that all monarchical interests were at stake he lent a deaf ear. The personal impression I received, was that the minister was more saddened and depressed than excited; the tactics he followed were not to inspire any prejudice with regard to Russias future attitude. A detailed telegraphic report will follow.

17.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold).**

Telegram No. 157.

Saint-Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

My telegram of to-day No. 156***) continued.

The minister received me with the words: he knew already what brought me, and he must declare from the very

*) Cipher defaced.

**) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Red-Book, No. 14.

***) Vide II, No. 16.

first that he would take no sides in the *Demarche* I was about to lay before him. I began by reading the decree to him as instructed. He interrupted me the first time, when the series of attempted murders was mentioned, and asked if there were any proofs that these originated in Belgrade? I answered that they were certainly the result of Servian agitation.

In the course of the reading he said, he knew how it was, we wanted to make war with Servia and here was the pretext. I replied rather sharply, that our attitude during the last years was a sufficient proof, that with regard to Servia we neither sought nor required pretexts. Strange to say, the minister had nothing to say against the demanded solemn enunciations, only he repeatedly asserted that Pasić had already said things to the same effect and of course I contradicted this. "He will repeat that twentyfive times if you wish to hear it as often!" he said. When the publications were mentioned, he asked if this would be reciprocal? I told him that in our country no one was doing anything against the Servian integrity or dynasty. To my surprise, Herr Sazonow protested most vividly against the dissolution of the society "Narodna odbrana", a condition Servia would never accept. The minister was also very much against I. and R. functionaries taking an active part in the suppression of the subversive movement. Servia would no longer be its own master in its own house! "You will be always wanting to interfere and what sort of a life will you make Europe lead!" I answered it will be a more quiet life than in the past, if only Servia shows good will.

Herr Sazonow then tried to pull to pieces the appendage with the results of the inquiry, and to throw doubt on the correctness of the conclusions drawn. Why did one not allow the Servians to speak for themselves? Why this form of an ultimatum? Possibly Servia could prove the falseness of the accusations? I protested in fitting form.

The minister listened pretty quietly to the comments accompanying the communication of the Note; but when I came to the words, that we know that our feelings are shared by all civilised nations, he said: that was a mistake. To this I replied, as impressively as I could, that it would be sad indeed, if in what we hold most sacred, and whatever he might say,

was held sacred in Russia as well, we found no sympathy in that country. The minister tried to make little of the monarchical part of the whole affair, saying: "the monarchical idea has nothing to do with this affair at all".

Will be continued.

18.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 159.

Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Continued from telegram No. 157.

As to the *dossier* which the government is prepared to furnish to the Powers, Herr Sazonow remarked that we need not have given ourselves the trouble, when we had sent out an ultimatum. This fact alone proves that we were not anxious for an impartial judgment on our case. I told him that in this affair, which exclusively concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia, the results achieved by our inquiry must be sufficient to justify our action, but that we were prepared to give the Powers fullest explanations, if these interested them, because we had nothing to conceal.

Herr Sazonow said that after the ultimatum he felt no curiosity about the case. "What you want, is war, and you have burnt your bridges behind you."

I answered that we were the most pacific power in the world; what we wanted was to preserve our territory from revolution and our dynasty from bombs.

"One can see how pacific you are, since you are setting fire to Europe!" said Sazonow.

What we wish, I replied, is to be left in peace, and my government has taken the necessary measures for obtaining this result.

The comments I was instructed to give by word of mouth, he listened to without protesting, only refuting the last sentence, that concerned the murder of Royal personages.

A protracted discussion followed the execution of my instructions, during which Herr Sazonow attempted to attribute

our policy entirely to Count Forgách. I seized the opportunity for vindicating the conciliatory part played by that functionary while he was minister at Belgrade. I also tried to convince the minister of the truth, with regard to the Friedjung trial, which has lately been again brought forward here. In the course of conversation Sazonow once more remarked that we had most certainly created a serious situation. He never once mentioned Russia, slavdom, orthodoxy; but he was continually referring to England, France, Europe and the impression, which our step would make in these parts of the world and elsewhere.

Notwithstanding the comparative serenity of the minister, his whole attitude, as was to be expected, was from first to last noncompliant and hostile. The discourse had lasted an hour and a half, when I left the ministers study.

19.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 160.

Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

After a council of ministers, which lasted five hours, Herr Sazonow in the evening received the German ambassador, with whom he had a long conversation, much animated at times, but ending on friendly terms.

The minister defended what was probably the view of the council of ministers, that the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia was not a concern, limited to these two States, but a European affair, since the arrangement of 1909, ending with a declaration by Servia, had been accomplished under the auspices of all Europe. (This absolutely mistaken point of view—since England was the mediator—is, I am sorry to say, indirectly acknowledged in our Note, where Servia is accused of having placed itself in opposition to “la volonté de l’Europe” and where a communication to the “Puissances

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Red-Book, No. 16.

signataires" is mentioned.) The Minister complained most particularly of the offer of examining a *Dossier*, when at the same time an ultimatum had been sent out. Russia would have asked for an international examination of the *Dossier* offered. My German colleague called Herr Sazonow's attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in its. . . .*) to Serbia, and that Germany must also protest against imputations, that would offend its ally's dignity.

In the course of the conversation, the minister declared, that what Russia would not regard with indifference, was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary "to devour Serbia". Count Pourtalès replied that he did not suppose Austria-Hungary had any such intention, all the more because this would be altogether against its own interests. Austria-Hungary was probably merely anxious "to inflict a well-merited punishment upon Serbia". Herr Sazonow expressed doubts that Austria-Hungary would be satisfied with this, even if it gave declarations to this effect.

The conversation concluded with an appeal from Herr Sazonow that Germany might help Russia to preserve the peace. The German ambassador assured the Russian minister that Germany certainly had no desire to bring about war, but that it would naturally stand up for the interests of its ally.

The above conversation seems to me to give a clear idea of the position which Russia will adopt in our conflict with Serbia. Whether I am to make use of the argument of our territorial *désintéressement* and when, is for your Excellency to say. In the case of Italy, it will be unavoidable.

Although I have no reason to suppose that Marquis Carlotti has any doubts on the subject, still I should be very much obliged if you would inform me, whether in conversation with my Italian colleague I may assume territorial disinterestedness to be our principle.

I do not think that Herr Sazonow has spoken to him after the council of ministers and after the conversation with Count Pourtalès. There was no time to do it in. I conclude that the minister had been instructed previously by his Imperial

*) Cipher unreadable.

master, if possible to find a way out of the threatening complications.

20.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 183.

Cetinje, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.

Demarche in Belgrade.

Decree No. 3447 private of the 20th inst. and in cipher No. 133 of the 23rd inst.*).

My conversation of to-day referring to the above decree and telegram, deeply impressed both the king and the minister, and was received with mixed feelings.

In the first place they were greatly satisfied with the praise bestowed upon Montenegro on this occasion, but at the same time it could be seen, that though not expressed in words, anxiety was felt, lest a warlike conflict happening between Servia and the Monarchy, Montenegro might be forced by public opinion, altogether against the kings will, to take part in such a war, or at least come to harm through it.

His Majesty said he hoped the Servian government would have sense enough to give way entirely.

The king said, he thought Servia would have much difficulty in dissolving the "Narodna odbrana", whilst the minister of Foreign Affairs doubted if the Servian government would consent to Points 5 and 6 of the conditions, which meant Austrian collaboration on Servian territory.

As was to be foreseen, the king asked me for a copy of what I had read to him, that is the circular note**) to the Powers, corrected as desired in your telegram. I handed it to him, begging him to keep it strictly private, as I was instructed to do.

*) Vide I, No. 69.

**) Vide I, No. 71.

21.

Count Tisza to Count Berchtold.

Telegram.

Budapest, July 24, 1914.

Ciphered.—Strictly private.

Mobilisation.

I beg Your Excellency to insist in my name also, that in case Servia gives an unsatisfactory answer the mobilisation would become undoubtedly necessary. The slightest hesitation would be followed by fatal consequences.

22.

The Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff to Count Berchtold.

Vienna, July 24, 1914, midnight.

Your Excellency!

I just received a telegram (at 12 p. m.) according to which, the mobilisation was proclaimed in Sabac at four this afternoon. These news came from the Corps-Commander in Zagreb and from the commander of the Gendarme-division in Mitroviča.

Servias answer to the ultimatum appears to be the mobilisation.

This demands a similar measure on our part and I advise that the mobilisation shall be proclaimed immediately, that is on the 25th instead of the 26th.

The first day of the mobilisation would be the 28th I am sending this letter to the war-minister first.

Your Excellency's devoted servant

(signed) *Conrad G. o. I.*

23.

Conversation between Count Berchtold and the Russian Representative.

Daily Report No. 3578.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I received the Russian representative in the forenoon of July 24th and assured him that I was particularly anxious

to inform him as soon as possible of our step in Belgrade and to explain to him how we stand.

While thanking me for this kind intention, Prince Kudacheff did not conceal his apprehension over our categorical way of treating Serbia, remarking that in Petersburg the government was all along preoccupied, whether our *demarche* would not take the form of much humiliation for Serbia, in which case a repercussion would be unavoidable in Russia.

I took great pains to relieve the representatives apprehensions. There was nothing further from our mind than to humiliate Serbia, a proceeding which would be against our interests. It had been my particular care to eliminate everything from the Note, which could have been interpreted in this sense. The only aim we had in view, was 'to clear up the intolerable situation between Serbia and the Monarchy and this we hoped to accomplish by causing the Servian government to deny having anything to do with the tendencies directed against our monarchy and stopping the movement by administrative measures. On the other hand we asked to be allowed to convince ourselves that these measures were being conscientiously applied. I explained fully what a serious danger to the integrity of the monarchy the continuation of the movement in favour of Greater Serbia must become, and that it might even endanger the equilibrium of Europe, its peace and the safety of its dynasties, not excepting the Russian, if the conviction gained ground, that doings which counted murder among their weapons, remained unpunished. I concluded by assuring him that we had no intention of increasing the size of our territory, but wished to maintain it intact, a point of view which Russia must applaud, as much as we think it natural, that Russia would never tolerate an attack upon its own integrity.

Prince Kudacheff said that he was not acquainted with his governments point of view and had no idea what Serbia would say to the different demands addressed to it. His personal impression was, that we were asking the impossible from a constitutionally governed state. He felt as if somebody had been asked to jump out of the window first and come

back over the stairs afterwards. We are prescribing the text of the governments declaration and the army order, and this he thinks Serbia will regard in the light of a deep humiliation. Then he was thinking of the point, in which we asked to be allowed to let our organs help in the repression of propaganda, and this was a violation of the rights of peoples. It is true Russia has made arrangements for establishing Russian organs of safety in France and Germany. But this is regarded as a "Privilege" and not a "Right". Nor does it agree with the rights of peoples that the guilty persons are to undergo punishment in Serbia; their extradition might be demanded (it is not clear what Prince Kudacheff meant by this, and when I contradicted him, he changed the conversation). The short term of the ultimatum also caused anxiety to the Russian representative. He asked: What will happen, if the term expires and no satisfactory answer comes from Serbia?

When I told him that in this case our minister would leave Belgrade with the *personnel* of the legation, he reflected some time and then said: "Alors c'est la guerre!"

Before leaving, the Russian representative said that he would not fail to give his government all the information he had received from me, and most especially the assurance that we did not intend to humiliate Serbia in any way.

24.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 182.

Belgrade-Semlin, July 25, 1914.

Ciphred.

Situation.

Council of ministers met last night and again early this morning. There are several reports, that answer to our Note will be given to me before the term has expired. I hear that a Court-train is being put together. Money from the National Bank and from the Railways, as also the documents of the

*) Vide the text in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 22.

Foreign Affairs' ministry are to be sent to the interior of the country. Some of my diplomatic colleagues are of opinion that they must follow the Servian government. In the Russian legation packing is busily going on.

The garrison has left the city in field equipment. The ammunition depôts of the fortress were evacuated. The sanitary columns have left Belgrade in a southern direction. In accordance with the instructions received, we will, in case of a rupture, leave Belgrade with the 6·30 train and will send instructions to the consulates, as directed.

25.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram without a number.

Semlin, July 25, 1914.

In consequence of an insufficient answer on the part of the royal Servian government to our demands of the 23rd inst. I have declared diplomatic relations to be broken off and have left Belgrade with the *personnel* of the legation.

26.

Baron von Giesl on the Telephone).**

Sent by Secretary of legation Count Kinsky on Saturday, July 25th 1914 at 7·45 in the evening.

Minister Baron Giesl telephones from Semlin to Budapest:

Two minutes before six o'clock the answer was presented; as it is unsatisfactory on several points, Baron Giesl has broken off diplomatic relations and has left Belgrade.

At three o'clock this afternoon the general mobilisation was proclaimed.

The government and the diplomatic Corps have left for Kragujevač.

*) Compare Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 23.

***) Compare Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 23.

27.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Telegram without a number. *Lambach, July 25, 1914.*

Ciphered.—Private.

For Baron Macchio.

Russian representative telegraphs me*) that he has been urgently instructed by his government to demand a prolongation of the term for the ultimatum to Servia. I beg your Excellency to answer him in my name that we cannot concede a prolongation of the term. Your Excellency will add overmore that even after the breaking off of diplomatic relations the unconditional acceptance of our demands could bring about a peaceful solution, but that in this case we should be obliged to demand reimbursement for the expenses incurred by military measures.

I beg your Excellency to inform the German ambassador of the above.

28.

The Russian representative to Count Berchtold.

(Adressed Fast train between Linz and Ischl.)

Telegram. *Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

(In french.) I am urgently instructed to ask the Imp. and Roy. government for a prolongation of the term fixed in the ultimatum to Servia.

Kudacheff, Russian Chargé d'affaires.

29.

Baron von Macchio to Count Berchtold in Ischl.

Protocol No. 5241. *Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

Ciphered telegram.

The Russian representative came to see me in the forenoon, and in the name of his government expressed the wish

*) Compare the following telegram.

that the term of our Note to Servia might be prolonged. This wish was based on the fact, that the Powers had been completely taken by surprise by our step and that the Russian government would consider it but as a natural sign of regard from the Vienna cabinet to the cabinets of the Powers, to give them an opportunity for studying the communication to them and also the *dossier*, the insight into which was offered.

I answered the representative that I would immediately communicate what he had told me, to your Excellency, but that I could already tell him, that there was no chance of our consenting to prolong the term which had been fixed. As to the reasons which the Russian government gave for justifying its demand, they seemed to be based on a mistaken idea, as though the Note to the Powers had been sent out with a view to learning their opinion of the case. All we intended was to inform the Powers on our step and thus comply with a duty of international etiquette. We consider our action as an affair, which regards exclusively us and Servia, and to which we were compelled against our will by the development of circumstances, which are threatening our most vital interests and which the patience and toleration we have shown for years, could not change.

I promised the Russian representative that I would let him have your answer as soon as ever I could, and I therefore beg for telegraphic information whether your Excellency approves the answer I gave.

30.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Macchio in Vienna.

Telegram without a number.

Ischl, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

Received Your Excellencys telegram, which crossed mine from Lambach.

I approve fully the decided answer your Excellency gave the Russian representative, and beg you will tell him as much.

31.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 283.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

State-Secretary told me to day that the Italian ambassador was wondering why your Excellency had not given his government — an allied Power — information of our step in Belgrade sooner.

Herr Jagow answered that Germany had not either been informed any sooner, and that he considered this quite correct, because the conflict, which is now beginning, was an exclusive affair between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

This answer was then telegraphed to the German ambassador in Rome, so that he should know what language to hold, but he will be instructed in addition to say to Marquis San Giuliano, that Italy did not previously inform its allies of the ultimatum of 24 hours to Turkey.

32.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 285.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

With regard to the concluding words in your Excellencys telegram No. 258 of yesterday (Count Mensdorffs answer to Sir Edward Grey*) I should like to remark that here the general belief is, that if Servia gives an unsatisfactory answer our declaration of war and war operations will follow immediately.

Here every delay in the beginning of war operations is regarded as signifying the danger, that foreign powers might interfere. We are urgently advised to proceed without delay and to place the world before a *fait accompli*.

I am completely of the same mind as the German Foreign Office.

*) Vide II, No 14.

33.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 289.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.—Strictly private.

Servia.

Under-State-secretary to-day read to me the telegram of the German ambassador in Paris on his conversation with the French minister of Justice, representing the Foreign Office, in which the French government uses moderate language and hopes that our conflict with Servia will remain localised, but fears Russias possible recriminations.

Impression in the German Foreign Office is, that the French government will try to avoid a general conflict.

34.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 290.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.—Strictly confidential.

Servia.

State-Secretary read to me the ciphered telegram from the German ambassador in Petersburg on his conversation with Sazonow (after the presentation of our Note).

Sazonow expressed himself in outrageous language against Austria-Hungary.

The judicial question, he said, must be absolutely separated from the political; then Servia might eventually give way in the judicial questions, if they were fully proved.

Sazonow did not however think that the results of our judicial inquiry were quite satisfactory.

The whole question must be placed before the Great Powers to be inquired into over again. Servia did not take any engagements towards Austria-Hungary in 1909 but towards the Great Powers, the question is therefore an international one, and not one to be decided between Austria-Hungary and Servia alone. The monarchy is trying to be plaintiff and judge at the same time; this is altogether irregular, etc.

»If Austria-Hungary tries to devour Servia«, Herr Sazonow proceeded, Russia must interfere.

From these expressions — »devour« and the wish to bring the affair before a European Court, Count Pourtalès is inclined to believe, that Russia will not at present decide for warlike action.

According to the telegram read to me, the German ambassador energetically refuted all Sazonows attacks upon our action, and reminded him of the necessity to uphold the monarchical principle, whereupon the Russian minister of Foreign Affairs answered: »this affair has nothing at all to do with the monarchical principle, it is a political question«.

35.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 123.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.

Servia.

The Press here comments our step in Belgrade with much excitement, but cautiously withal. Up to the present the attitude of the papers is not so hostile as might have been expected. Not one of the papers cares to engage itself completely, because as yet no instructions have been given out by either Poincaré or Viviani, who are no doubt consulting Petersburg.

In a general way there is a certain understanding for our demands, as far as the inquiry against the murderers and their accomplices goes. But at the same time conclusions are drawn as to the practical impossibility of complying with some of our demands. This refers especially to points: 1, 3, 5 and 9.

The Russian representative describes the situation in lurid colours, and is anxious to impress France that we want to conjure up a European war at any price. As a war would be most unwelcome, antipathy is roused against us and should complications arise, which can only be brought about by Russia, we would be made responsible. The British ambassador told me yesterday that Russia would not fight.

The fact that our Note to Belgrade and the results of the inquiry in Sarajevo were made known at the same time, somewhat detracted attention from the latter. Perhaps it would be useful to send more information, if possible with details, in an official form.

The statement, that Serbia had sent a warning to Vienna, before the murder of Sarajevo happened, which has already been denied, was again published in some papers, the »*Temps*« among them to-day.

Another denial might be useful.

36.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 110.

London, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.

English Press on the crisis.

Papers most anxious, are considering situation to be exceedingly serious. Majority recognises justice of our demands, but point 5 and the brusque form as also the shortness of the term are criticised severely.

Liberal press is in our favour. "Times" moderate, "Morning Post" hostile.

37.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 161.

Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.

Danish minister learns from perfectly reliable source that last night orders for the mobilisation in the frontier districts against Austria-Hungary and Germany were given. Military attaché begs that these news will be given to the war department, as he will not send them.

I am told that at the present moment the ministers, with the Czar in the chair, are considering the situation in Krasnoje Selo.

In diplomatic circles it is reported that the representative in Vienna was instructed to ask for a prolongation of the term to Serbia, so that the Powers might have time to study the promised *dossier*.

38.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry in Petersburg. *)

Telegram No. 172.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

Your Excellency's telegram No. 157 of the 24. inst. **)

Since the plan of making Imp. and Roy. functionaries assist in the suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia (point 5 of our demands), called forth so much opposition on Herr Sazonow's part, I shall ask your Excellency to explain to him in strict confidence, that in putting forth this demand, we only had practical aims in view, and certainly did not mean in any way to offend Servias sovereignty. In writing point 5 "collaboration" we were thinking of establishing in Belgrade a secret "*bureau de sureté*", similar to the Russian establishments in Paris and Berlin which would cooperate with the Servian police and administrative authority.

39.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry in Petersburg. *)**

Telegram No. 173.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Confidential.

The Russian representative called this morning, while the minister was absent and was received by the chief of the Section, to whom in the name of his government he expressed the wish that the term for the answer to the Note to Serbia might be prolonged.

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 27.

**) Vide II, No. 17.

***) Compare with the text of the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 21.

The wish was justified by the circumstance that the Powers had been completely taken by surprise by our step and that the Russian government would regard the postponement of the term as an act of consideration from the Vienna cabinet to the other cabinets in Europe, by giving them an opportunity of examining the grounds on which our communication to the Powers based, and also of studying the *dossier*, which had been offered.

The chief of the Section answered the representative, that he would immediately inform the minister of what he had been told, but that he could say at once, that there was no probability that the term would be prolonged. As to the grounds on which the wish of the Russian government was based, he could not help thinking, that there was a mistake. Our Note by no means had the purpose of asking the Powers to communicate their objections, but was meant as information, which according to the duty of international politeness had to be given. We regarded the whole action as an affair between us and Servia, which concerned no one else, and which we had to undertake very much against our will, because the patience and endurance we had shown for many years, did not prevent circumstances developing in a way, which made us fear for our most vital interests.

The above is for your Excellency's information and for the regulation of your speech.

40.

**Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. ambassadors in
Petersburg and Berlin.**

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Address:

Count Szápáry in Petersburg, No. 175,
Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 262.

Private.

1.

Referring to your Excellency's telegram No. 160 of the 24. inst. *)

I beg your Excellency for the present not to mention the question of our territorial *désintéressement* either to Herr Sazonow or to your Italian colleagues.

2.

Count Szápáry telegraphs under date 24. inst. as follows:

After a council of ministers, which lasted five hours, Herr Sazonow received the German ambassador, with whom he had a long discourse, part of which in excited tone, but towards the end, with restored harmony. The minister was defending against Count Pourtalès, what must be supposed to be the view taken in the long ministerial council, that the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia was not a concern limited to these two States, but a European affair, since the Servian declaration of 1909 was made under the auspices of all Europe. The minister explained that what had given him a most unpleasant surprise, was that the insight into a *dossier* had been offered at a time when an ultimatum had already been sent out. Russia would ask for an international examination of the *dossier* placed at its disposition. My German colleague called Herr Sazonow's attention to the fact, that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in its **) towards Servia and that Germany could not either tolerate a presumption which was a violation of the dignity of its ally as a Great Power.

In the further course of the conversation the minister declared that what Russia could not accept with indifference, was, that Austria-Hungary might eventually have the intention of devouring Servia. Count Pourtalès answered that he did not suppose that Austria-Hungary had any such intention, as this would be against the monarchy's own interests. All Austria-Hungary cared for, was to inflict the punishment Servia had

*) Vide II, No. 19.

**) Cipher illegible.

so justly merited. Herr Sazonow expressed doubts whether Austria-Hungary would be satisfied with this, even if it made assurances to that effect.

The conversation closed with an appeal on Herr Sazonow's part, that Germany might act together with Russia to maintain the peace. The German ambassador assured the Russian minister that Germany certainly had no desire to bring about a war, but that of course it will fully support the interests of its ally.

The above is for your Excellency's information and for strictly confidential communication to the State-Secretary.

41.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 182.

Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.

My Italian colleague still pretends being without instructions as to the attitude towards the ultimatum. I hear that he has been to see the minister of Foreign Affairs to-day, and from this I suppose that he has received instructions, but must not let the Powers of the Triple Alliance know what they are.

Marquis Carlotti tells his German colleague, that Sazonow no longer insists upon making a European affair out of our conflict with Servia. The Italian ambassador is anxious to produce the impression, as though both England and France did not like the idea of a European action and were insisting upon getting the affair localised.

The Roumanian minister, who has just been to see me, showed himself very anxious and told me that Sazonow says that he had the most peaceable intentions, but feared that in this affair he would be "carried away". I answered that if the Russian government wished for peace, it would certainly know how to maintain it. Monsieur Diamandi seemed most anxious to learn whether I thought a compromise possible.

Both in diplomatic and in Russian circles decided news are given on the military measures of Russia. The news on to-day's council of ministers in Krasnoje-Selo are just as sensational. Even the press this evening looks to me, as if it had been let loose for the first time. Up to the present, public opinion seemed perfectly indifferent. Is it not possible to decide the question whether all this is intended to mask the Russian *démarches*, that are to retard our decisions, or whether there is a serious background behind. This much I can certainly say, the general feeling is not good, and the situation must be judged as having become more serious.

42.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry in Petersburg.

Decree No. 3530.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Private.

At the time when we decided for serious action against Serbia, we were of course aware that the possibility existed, that out of our difference with Serbia might grow a collision with Russia. But we could not allow this eventuality to prevent us from taking the steps against Serbia, which reasons of State had made necessary, nor could we accept the situation, according to which a Russian charter would give Serbia a lasting right to threaten the safety of the monarchy.

Should Russia think that the moment for the great explication with the Central Powers has already come, should it be resolved for war, then the following instructions to your Excellency are indeed superfluous.

But it is still possible that Russia may consider the present occasion as embarrassing, that it is not so much inclined towards war, or even sufficiently prepared for it, as the "Nowoje Wremja" and the "Birschewija Wjedomosti" try to make us believe, and Monsieur Poincaré and Herr Iswolski perhaps desire.

It is just possible that Russia, after the eventual refusal of our demands by Serbia, in the face of the armed action,

to which we should be forced, thinking matters over twice, might not give way to the intoxicating slav feeling of solidarity, and might remain a spectator to what follows.

To such a situation the following exposition is applied, which your Excellency would make use of, at the right moment and in the way most acceptable to you, in your conversations with Herr Sazonow and with the Russian premier.

I have no doubt that under the present circumstances you have established close relations with your German colleague, who has certainly been instructed by his government not to leave the Russian government in doubt, that in case of a conflict with Russia, Austria-Hungary would not stand alone.

It is not probable that your Excellency will succeed in convincing the Russian minister of Foreign Affairs of the necessity and the justice of our step in Belgrade.

But there is one argument, which cannot fail to impress the Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, and that is the fact that Austria-Hungary, firmly adhering to the principles upheld for many years, has no egotistical motive in this crisis or in the armed controversy with Servia, that may follow.

Territorially the monarchy is saturated, and does not wish to possess itself of any portion of Servia. If we are forced to go to war with Servia, it will not be a war for territorial gain, but a means of self-defense and self-preservation.

The contents of the circular decree which is eloquent in itself, will be still better explained by the perusal of the *dossier*, giving the details on the Servian propaganda against the monarchy and explaining the connection between this propaganda and the crime of the 28. June.

The *dossier* will reach you with a special decree (to avoid mistakes, let me repeat that the *dossier* is to be given to the Powers only in the eventuality of Servia declining our demands) and I must beg your Excellency to call the Russian ministers special attention to this document and at the same time to remind him, that there is no example in history that any Great Power has suffered revolutionary agitation from a small neighbouring state for so long a time with unexampled patience as Austria-Hungary has done towards Servia.

The chief reason why we remained inactive so long, was that we did not like to call Serbia to account, during the period of its political development, when it had to resist the old Turkish enemy.

Our policy was not directed against the Christian Balkan States, and although we knew the value of Servian promises, we consented, after the annexion crisis in 1908 to Servias aggrandisement to almost double its size.

Today everything is changed. Serbia has nothing more to ask of Turkey and the monarchy can attend to its rights without having to reproach itself for hindering the free development of the Servian State.

On the other hand, the subversive movement, nourished in Serbia against the monarchy, has grown to such dimensions, that monarchical and dynastic interests are threatened and endangered by it.

We must assume that conservative, imperialist Russia will understand and even find necessary an energetic action on our side, where the tranquillity of our State is threatened.

I have said already that we by no means wish to suppress orthodox slavdom.

Your Excellency might illustrate this argument by the fact that though we are at the present moment engaged in a conflict with Serbia, we are at the same time on normal and even neighbourly terms with Montenegro.

With regard to the agitation for Greater Serbia, spreading persistently to Austria-Hungary, we have nothing whatever to complain of in Montenegros case, and the *dossier* which you placed at the disposition of Herr Sazonow, contains no material concerning Montenegro. When your Excellency in conversation with Herr Sazonow, will have reached this point, the time will have come, for adding to the explanation of our reasons and our intentions, the fact, that though we certainly do not wish for territorial gain and will not in any way touch the sovereignty of the kingdom, still to enforce our demands, we would not shrink from taking extreme measures, even if European complications should arise from our attitude.

The history of the last forty years and the fact that our gracious Majesty has gained for himself the glorious name of

a "Preserver of the Peace" is sufficient proof that we have done all we could, to maintain peace, which we regard as the most precious possession of all peoples.

We should deeply regret a disturbance of the peace for many reasons. We always held the belief that the breaking up of the Turkish Empire and the strengthening of the Balkan States to political independence, must remove the possibility of a conflict between us and Russia. We were always prepared to consider the great political interests of Russia, when our own political plans were made, and we never doubted that the identical conservative, monarchical and dynastic interests of the three Empires would for all times have a beneficial influence on their political relations.

If we had continued to suffer Servian agitation in our country, our existence as a State, our position as a Great Power, and European equilibrium would have suffered. We are convinced, that it is in Russia's own interest, which the peace-loving Russian statesmen understand so well, if the present European equilibrium and the worlds peace is maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it may take, is absolutely conservative, and its only aim is the necessary conservation of our place in Europe.

43.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 186.

Cettinje, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.

The premier who, a few days ago, started for a cure to Italy and the war-minister Vukotic, as well as the adjutant-general of His Majesty, general Mitar Martinovic, who was travelling along the frontier of Montenegro and Serbia, were all*) to Cettinje.

The city is quiet, but there is a depressed feeling. The ministers are pleading in favour of helping Serbia in case of

*) Cipher illegible.

war. It is not possible to say whether the King and his friends will be able to resist the movement in favour of war. Besides the military preparations reported from Antivari sub 5 today, many have been called to arms to reinforce the troops on the Albanian frontier, under the pretext that Serbia must be protected in case the Albanians should attack them.

Up to this hour neither His Majesty nor the government have expressed themselves on the communications made to them yesterday, except in the way I have already reported.

44.

Baron von Müller to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 35.

Tokio, July 25, 1914.

Ciphered.

Ultimatum to Serbia.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 22*).

According to instructions, immediately made communication to Imperial government. Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his thanks and asked, did I know whether anyone would back up Serbia. I answered that it was well known, that during latter years Serbia had had several patrons; in this case, if my informations were correct, there was only question of Serbia. The minister was much interested in the details of the murder of Sarajevo, the success of which after the many previous unsuccessful attempts, was to him incomprehensible.

Private.

With regard to the concluding words of the telegram, I must say that I did not think it politically wise to call the Tokio government's attention to the favourable opportunity offering just now, because the alliance with England, the good relations with Russia, and a general tendency to befriend the

*) Compare I, No. 70.

Entente, do not tally with any such plans, as those alluded to in the telegram. I will telegraph on military matters when I have spoken to military attaché, who has already received notice to start for home.

If an opportunity offers, I will remember secret telegraphic instructions of 30th November, 1912, No. 20.

45.

Circular telegram to the Imp. and Roy. Missions.

Protocol No. 5240.

Telegram *in claris*.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Premier Pasič at 6 o'clock to-day brought our minister an unsatisfactory answer to our Note. On this Baron Giesl declared the diplomatic relations to be broken off, and with the *personnel* of the legation left Belgrade. Servian government reported to have ordered mobilisation of Servian army as early as 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The above for your Excellency's information and for communication to the government to which you are accredited.

46.

Visit of the Italian ambassador to the Vienna Foreign Office.

Daily Report No. 3539.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The Italian ambassador appeared here to-day and referring to the conflict of the monarchy with Servia declared that the Royal Italian government, would, if this conflict lead to war, and to an occupation of Servian territory, even if it were but provisional, make valid its rights of compensation on the ground of Article VII of the Triple Alliance. The Royal Italian government is overmore of opinion that according to the provisions of the same Article VII, we must, before occupying Servian territory, come to an understanding with our ally.

The Royal Italian government begs to say that it will adopt a friendly attitude, concordant with the duties of an ally, in the eventuality of an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

47.

Note of the Royal Servian Government of the 12/25th July 1914*).

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a reçu la communication du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuadé que sa réponse éloignera tout malentendu qui menace de gêner les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal est conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant à la tribune de la Skoupchtina Nationale que dans les déclarations et les actes des représentants responsables de l'Etat, protestations qui furent coupées court par la déclaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 18 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelées vis-à-vis la grande Monarchie voisine. en aucune occasion, et que depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succédés, que de la part de leurs organes aucune tentative n'a été faite dans le but de changer l'état de chose politique et juridique créé en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal n'a fait aucune représentation sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement I. et R. a reçu une explication entièrement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donné des preuves de sa politique pacifiste et modérée pendant la durée de la crise balcanique et c'est grâce à la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'intérêt exclusif de la paix européenne que cette paix a été préservée.

Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas être rendu responsable pour des manifestations d'un caractère privé tel que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des sociétés,

*) Vide Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 25.

manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui échappent en règle générale au contrôle officiel. D'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une série de questions qui se sont présentées entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie a montré une grande prévenance et a réussi de cette façon à en régler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrès des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a été péniblement surpris par les affirmations d'après lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participé à la préparation de l'attentat commis à Sarajevo. Il s'attendait à ce qu'il soit invité à collaborer à la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte à ce crime et il était prêt, pour prouver par des actes son entière correction, à agir contre toutes les personnes à l'égard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant donc au désir du Gouvernement I. et R., le Gouvernement Royal est disposé à remettre au tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans égard à sa situation et à son rang pour la complicité duquel dans le crime de Sarajevo des preuves lui seraient fournies et spécialement il s'engage à faire publier à la première page du Journal Officiel en date du 13/26 juillet l'énonciation suivante :

«Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie c'est à dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu à détacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il déplore sincèrement les conséquences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participé, d'après la communication du Gouvernement I. et R., à la propagande susmentionnée et compromis par là les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal s'était solennellement engagé par sa déclaration du 31 mars 1909.

Le Gouvernement, qui désapprouve et répudie toute idée ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinées des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considère de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que

dorénavant il procédera avec la dernière rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts à prévenir et à réprimer.»

Cette énonciation sera portée à la connaissance de l'Armée Royale par un ordre du jour au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi, par son Altesse Royale le Prince Héritier Alexandre et sera publiée dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'Armée.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1° d'introduire à sa première convocation régulière de la Skoupchtina, une disposition dans la loi de la Presse par laquelle sera punie de la manière la plus sévère la provocation à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance générale serait dirigée contre l'intégrité territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il se charge lors de la révision de la Constitution qui est prochaine, à faire introduire dans l'article XXII de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent être confisquées, ce qui actuellement aux termes catégoriques de l'article XII de la Constitution est impossible.

2° Le Gouvernement ne possède aucune preuve — et la note du Gouvernement I. et R. ne lui en fournit non plus aucune — que la société «Narodna odbrana» et autres sociétés similaires aient commis jusqu'à ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Néanmoins le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement I. et R. et dissoudra la société «Narodna odbrana» et toute autre société qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

3° Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage à éliminer sans délai de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir à fermenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement I. et R. lui fournira des faits et des preuves, de cette propagande.

4° Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de même à éloigner du service militaire et de l'administration les officiers et fonctionnaires pour lesquels l'enquête judiciaire aura prouvé qu'ils sont coupables d'actes dirigés contre l'intégrité du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et il attend que le Gouvernement I. et R. lui communique ultérieurement les

noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procédure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5° Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portée de la demande du Gouvernement I. et R. que la Serbie s'engage à accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement I. et R., mais il déclare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui répondrait aux principes du droit international et à la procédure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6° Le Gouvernement Royal — cela va de soi — considère de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquête contre qui sont ou qui éventuellement auraient été mêlés au complot du 15/28 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du Royaume. Quant à la participation de cette enquête des organes des autorités austro-hongroises, qui seraient délégués à cet effet par le Gouvernement I. et R. le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procédure criminelle. Cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les résultats de l'instruction en question pourraient être données aux organes austro-hongrois.

7° Le Gouvernement Royal a fait procéder dès le soir même de la remise de la note à l'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankositch.

Quant à Milan Ziganovitch qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin était employé (comme aspirant) à la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore être découvert et un mandat d'amener a été lancé contre lui. Le Gouvernement I. et R. est prié de vouloir bien dans la forme accoutumée faire connaître le plus tôt possible les présomptions de culpabilité ainsi que les preuves éventuelles de leur culpabilité qui ont été recueillies jusqu'à ce jour par l'instruction à Sarajevo aux fins d'enquête ultérieure.

8° Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et étendra les mesures prises pour empêcher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs à travers la frontière.

Il va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquête et punira sévèrement les fonctionnaires des frontières sur la ligne

Šabać—Ložnica, qui ont manqué leurs devoirs et laissé passer les auteurs du crime di Saraïevo.

9° Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires tant en Serbie qu'à l'étranger ont tenus après l'attentat dans des interviews et qui, d'après l'affirmation du Gouvernement I. et R., ont été hostiles envers la Monarchie dès que le Gouvernement I. et R. lui aura indiqué les passages en question de ces propos et dès qu'il aura démontré que les propos employés ont en effet été tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, au sujet de quoi le Gouvernement Royal lui-même aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions.

10° Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'exécution des mesures comprises dans les points précédents, en tant que cela n'a pas été déjà fait par la présente note, aussitôt que chaque mesure aura été ordonnée et exécutée.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement I. et R. ne serait pas satisfait de cette réponse, le Gouvernement Royal serbe, considérant qu'il est de l'intérêt commun de ne pas précipiter la solution de cette question, est prêt comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question à la décision du Tribunal International de la Haye soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part à l'élaboration de la déclaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18/31 mars 1909.

Translation.

The Royal Servian government has received the communication of the Imp. and Roy. government of the 10. inst. and is convinced that by its answer it will remove every misunderstanding, that threatens to disturb the friendly and neighbourly relations, that exist between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.

The Royal government is fully conscious that upon no occasion was the protest against the great neighbouring monarchy repeated, which had been expressed in the Skupstschina, in declarations and actions of responsible Servian representatives and which found an end by the declaration of the Servian government on the 18. March 1909. Overmore,

since that time not one the different governments which followed each other, nor any of their organs, have ever made the slightest attempt to bring about a change in the political and lawful condition of either Bosnia or Herzegovina.

The Royal government hereby affirms that the Imp. and Roy. government has never raised any objections in this direction, except once in the case of a schoolbook, when the Imp. and Roy. government was perfectly satisfied with the explanation given. In the course of the Balkan crisis, Serbia has in numerous cases given proofs of its pacific and moderated policy, and it is to Serbia and the sacrifices it has made in the interest of European peace, that the preservation of the peace must be thanked.

The Royal government cannot be made responsible for enunciations of a private character, such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies; enunciations, such as are made in every country and are absolutely beyond the control of the governments. The Royal government should all the less be made responsible, because it has shown great complaisance in quite a number of questions, which have arisen between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, so that it was possible to arrange most of them in the interest of progress in the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal government was painfully surprised, when the assertion was made, that Servian subjects were supposed to have taken part in the preparations for the crime of Sarajevo. The government had expected to be asked to collaborate in the researches after the criminals and was prepared to give proofs of the correctness of its attitude by proceeding against all persons about whom it would have received information from Austria-Hungary.

In accord with the wishes of the Imp. and Roy. government the Royal government is ready to place before a law-court any Servian subject, regardless of position or rank, of whom proofs are given, that he has participated in the crime of Sarajevo; it is prepared to publish on the first page of the official Gazette of the 13./26. July the following enunciation:

“The Royal government of Serbia condemns all propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is, it condemns

all efforts leading to the ultimate result of disjoining parts of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it deeply regrets the sad consequences of such criminal dealings.”

“The Royal government regrets that, as it has been informed by the Imp. and Roy. government, certain Servian officers and functionaries have been actively engaged in the above-named propaganda and have thereby endangered the duration of the friendly and neighbourly relations, to which the Royal government had promised to adhere by the solemn declaration of 31. March 1909.”

“The government.....”, the following is the text demanded*).

The Royal government overmore takes the following engagements:

1. When the Skuptschina meets next time in the ordinary way, a paragraph will be inserted in the Press-law, threatening severe punishment to whoever incites to hatred or contempt against the monarchy, and to all publications whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

When the forthcoming revision of the constitution takes place, an addition will be made to Article XXII of the constitutional law, by which it will be possible to confiscate such publications, a thing that cannot be done according to the present determinations of the Article.

2. The government has no proofs, nor does the Note of the Imp. and Roy. government give any such proofs, according to which the “Narodna odbrana” and similar societies have up to this time committed criminal actions, such as are here in question, through any of their members. Still the Royal government will comply with the demand of the Imp. and Roy. government and dissolve the “Narodna odbrana” and every other society, which shows itself hostile to Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian government promises to remove without delay from public instruction in Servia, all propaganda, that might be considered as directed against Austria-Hungary,

*) Compare I No. 27, Translation.

if the Imp. and Roy. government will demonstrate such propaganda.

4. The Royal government is also prepared to dismiss from military and civil service all officers and officials of whom judicial inquiry will affirm that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; the government expects that to make inquiry possible the Imp. and Roy. government will without delay communicate the names of these officers and officials and the deeds they are accused of.

5. The Royal government confesses that it does not quite understand the sense and the extent of the Imp. and Roy. governments demand, according to which the Royal Servian government is to approve on its own territory the collaboration of organs of the Imp. and Roy. government, but it declares that it would consent to such collaboration, inasmuch as it was based upon the principle of nations rights and penal procedure and would not violate friendly and neighbourly relations.

6. The Royal government considers it a duty to order judicial proceedings against all those persons, who were or were supposed to be, implicated in the crime of the 15./28. June and who would be found on Servian territory. But the government cannot consent to the collaboration of organs of the Imp. and Roy. government, delegated for this express purpose, as this would be a violation of the constitution and of the law of penal procedure.

But the Austro-Hungarian organs might in some cases be informed of the results of the inquiry.

7. The Royal government ordered the arrestation of Major Voislav Tankosič on the very evening, when it received the Note.

As to Milan Ciganovič, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who up to the 15. June was employed in the Railways Direction (as aspirant), the authorities have not been able to find him and a warrant was issued against him.

The Imp. and Roy. government is requested to communicate the grounds, on which these persons are suspected

and the results of the inquiry of Sarajevo that regard them, with as little delay as possible, so that an inquiry can be instituted.

8. The Royal government will extend the measures, which already exist against the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier.

It need not be said that the Royal government will immediately institute an inquiry and will use the severity of the law against those officials of the frontier service on the line Sabač—Ložnica who have neglected their duty and have allowed the criminals to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal government will very willingly give explanations on the enunciations of its officials in Serbia and in foreign countries, made in interviews after the crime of Sarajevo, which the Imp. and Roy. government declares to be hostile, if the Imp. and Roy. government will show up these speeches and give us the proofs that they were really held by the functionaries in question.

The Royal government will cause the material for this research to be collected.

10. The Royal government will inform the Imp. and Roy. government of the execution of the measures promised in this Note, and will communicate the ordering and carrying out of every point, except where this Note already brings things to a close.

The Royal Servian government thinks that it will be in the interest of both States not to hurry affairs, and if the Imp. and Roy. government does not consider this answer satisfactory, the Royal government is willing to accept any peaceable solution that might be brought about by submitting the question to the Arbitration Court of the Hague, or by submitting it to the decision of the Great Powers, which took an active part in the composition of the declaration made by the Servian government on the 18./31. March 1909.

48.

Circular Decree*).

(Presentation of the *Dossier*).

No. 3540 to 3560—3569—3570. *Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

Address:

I.

1. Count Szögyény, Berlin (No. 3540).
2. Herr von Mérey, Rome (No. 3541).
3. Count Szécsen, Paris (No. 3542).
4. Count Mensdorff, London (No. 3543).
5. Count Szápáry, Petersburg (No. 3544).
6. Margrave Pallavicini, Constantinople
(No. 3545).

I. and II.

with the decree of July 20.

1. No. 3426.
2. No. 3427.
3. No. 3428.
4. No. 3429.
5. No. 3430.
6. No. 3431.**)

II.

1. Count Czernin, Bucharest (No. 3546).
2. Count Tarnowski, Sofia (No. 3547).
3. Herr von Szilassy, Athens (3548).
4. Herr von Löwenthal, Durazzo (3549).
5. Herr Otto, Cetinje (No. 3550).

1. No. 3432.
2. No. 3433.
3. No. 3434.
4. No. 3436.
5. No. 3435.***)

III.

All missions, with the exception of those accredited with the Signatory Powers and the Balkan States, as also the missions in Stockholm, Washington, Tokio, Buenos Ayres, Rio, St. Jago, Peking, Tanager, Mexico, Teheran and Bangkok.

1. von Velics, Munich (No. 3551).
2. Count Clary, Brussels (No. 3552).
3. Count Széchény, Copenhagen (No. 3553).
4. Baron Giskra, The Hague (No. 3554).
5. Baron Kuhn, Lisbon (No. 3555).
6. Count Hoyos, Dresden (No. 3556).
7. Baron Gagern, Berne (No. 3557).
8. Count Koziębrodski, Stuttgart (No. 3558).

*) Compare Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 19.

***) Vide I, No. 30.

***) Vide I, No. 31.

9. Count Széchény, Cairo (No. 3559).
10. Baron Gagern, Madrid (No. 3569).
11. Prince Schönburg, Rome, Vat. (No. 3570).

IV.

Count Hadik, Stockholm (No. 3560).

ad I—III.

Enclosed you will find the *dossier*, announced to the Powers in the Circular Note, which shows the connection between the propaganda for Greater Serbia and the crime of Sarajevo.

ad I, 1.—6.

You will communicate this *dossier* to the government to which you are accredited.

ad II, 1.—4.

You are authorised to communicate the contents of the enclosed *dossier* to the government, to which you are accredited.

ad II, 5.

You are requested to communicate the contents of the enclosed *dossier* to the Royal Montenegrin government and at the same time to express the great satisfaction of the Imp. and Roy. government that Montenegro plays no part whatever in this document.

ad III.

This *dossier* is for your information and to make use of in your relations with the government to which you are accredited.

ad IV.

With the private letter of the 22. inst.

You will find enclosed the *dossier*, announced in the Circular Note to the Powers, which contains details on the propaganda for Greater Serbia, and its connection with the crime of Sarajevo.

This *dossier* is for your information and for communication to the government to which you are accredited.

Memoir.

The movement, which has its origin in Serbia, and aims at disjoining the South-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy and incorporating them in the Servian State, was to be observed many years ago.

Its aims were always the same, only the means used by this propaganda and its intensity have changed, and its most active time was on Servian territory when the annexation crisis broke out. It was then that the veil was withdrawn from its secret doings and its tendencies were openly confessed, whilst at the same time attempts were made with all the means at its disposition, to realize the ambitions entertained for so long.

Whilst the entire Servian press was inciting the population to show its hatred against Austria-Hungary, whilst facts were distorted and the necessity to combat Austria-Hungary was proclaimed, associations were founded which were to prepare for the war, that must be fought out sooner or later.

The most important of these associations was the "Narodna odbrana". Originally a revolutionary committee, this society was founded by Servian military and civil functionaries as a private association, which was however entirely dependent upon the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Among their founders we mention General Bozo Jankovic, the exministers Ljuba Jovanovič, Ljuba Davidovič, and Velislav Vulevič; the Director of the States Printing Office, Živojin Dačić and the captains in the army, who are now majors, Voja Tankosič and Milan Pribičević. This society had undertaken the recruiting and equipment of volunteer companies for the expected war against Austria-Hungary. (Vide supplement 2.)

A lively picture of the activity of the "Narodna odbrana" of those days is given by a witness, examined in the District court of Sarajevo, one Trifko Krstanović, a Bosnian-Herzegovinian, who was in Belgrade at the time, and had, with other Austrian-Hungarian subjects, been enlisted in the "Narodna odbrana" as a Komitatschi. Krstanović had been taken with 140 members of the band, to a military school in Čuprija (district of Jagedina), which had been founded for the military education of the bands and which was directed by the captains

Voja Tankesić and Dušan Putnik. The teachers in this school were all Servian officers. General Bozo Jankovic and captain Mila Pribičević inspected the course of instruction, which lasted three months, at regular intervals.

In this school the volunteer Komitatschis were taught shooting and throwing bombs, laying mines, blowing up railways, tunnels and bridges, as also destroying telegraphic connections. They were told that they would have to make practical use of what they had been taught, by order of the commanders in Bosnia and Herzegowina.

By this activity, which was not carried on in secret and was promoted by the Servian government the "Narodna odbrana" was preparing the war of the bands against Austria-Hungary. Subjects of the monarchy were induced to commit treason against their country, and were systematically taught to be Servian emissaries, whose duty it was to treacherously attack the means of defense of their home.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended, when the Servian government on the 31. March 1909 declared that it approved of the new lawful order of things, created by the annexion of Bosnia and Herzegowina, and solemnly promised, that it would in future live on friendly and neighbourly terms with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

This declaration in fact seemed to have put an end to the movement, which was a continual source of disquiet for Austria-Hungary and a really friendly *rapprochement* to Servia seemed to be on the way. If the support of the Servian government had been withdrawn, and the movement combated, as the declaration promised, the propaganda could not have been kept up and must in time have ceased to exist. At the same time the points of contact between the South-Slav parts of the monarchy and Servia, which exist with regard to language, customs and culture, must, if friendship and parallel interests were cultivated, have led to mutual progress.

These justified hopes and expectations were not fulfilled.

The aspirations, hostile to the monarchy, remained what they were before, and under the very eyes of the Servian government, which did not move a hand to suppress the movement, propaganda against Austria-Hungary increased and

extended. The hatred against the monarchy was kept alive and through continuous incitement has become irreconcilable. New means and new methods adapted to the changed situation, were called into action and the people of Serbia were summoned to take part in "the inevitable war of annihilation" against Austria-Hungary. Secret threads were spun between Serbia and the South-Slav districts of the monarchy, and Austrian subjects were tempted to betray their country.

The Servian press especially never ceased its work in this direction.

No less than 81 Servian newspapers had to be excluded from transmission by the post, on account of their violating paragraphs of the Austro-Hungarian Press-laws.

The Servian papers may be said to have violated all the ordinances, by which the exalted person of our monarch and the members of his House are protected. In Supplement 1 we have given a few examples of this rich material, collected at different periods.

Though we will refrain from detailed comments on these enunciations of public opinion in Serbia, still we must remark, that notwithstanding the declaration of 1909 the annexion of Bosnia and Herzegowina was continued being regarded as a theft committed against Serbia, which called for reparation. This idea is not only conceived and propounded by newspapers of a radical tendency and always repeated in most objectionable language, but even the "Samouprava", a paper which is intimately connected with the Foreign Office in Belgrade, speaks of it in scarcely disguised form. (Lit. *b* of Supplement 1.)

Nor can we neglect to call attention to the fact that the Servian press made use of the attempt of Bogdan Žerajic to murder the chief commander of Bosnia and Herzegowina, F. Z. M. von Varešanin in Sarajevo on the 15. June 1910.

It will be remembered that Žerajic committed suicide immediately after the deed and had destroyed all his papers. Under these circumstances the motive of the crime was never quite cleared up. But an emblem which he carried on his body, was a proof that he followed the principles of Krapotkine

and the results of the examination seemed to show that the crime was inspired by anarchist notions.

This did not prevent the Servian press from making a national hero of Žerajic and praising his deed. "Politica" even protested loudly against the supposition that Žerajic could have been an anarchist, and claimed him for a heroic Servian, whose name every Servian will ever mention with reverence and grief.

On the 18. August*) of the same year the "Politica" seized the opportunity of writing about Žerajic and his crime, saying that Žerajics name was sacred among the Servians, and publishing a poem in honour of the deed. (Lit. *a* of Supplement 1.)

In this manner, a crime, which had nothing whatever to do with the aspirations to parts of the monarchys territory, was made use of, for promoting these and by glorifying Zerajic, murder was proclaimed as a means of realising these aspirations, which should be admired and imitated. This sanctioning of murder, as a fully justified method in combating the monarchy is later on repeated in the Servian newspapers, when the attempt to murder the Royal Commissioner in Cuvay was made by Jukic. (Lit. *c* of Supplement 1.)

These newspapers, which were not only circulated in Servia, but by organised smuggling were introduced into the monarchy, produced that feeling among the masses, which later on made it easy for the associations, hostile to the monarchy, to sow their evil seed.

The centre of all this agitation was the "Narodna obrana". The same persons, who had founded the society at the time of the annexion, were still its leaders; again the most energetic organisers were the bitterest enemies of the monarchy: General Božo Jankovič, the director of the State Printing Office, Zivojin Dačić and the majors Milan Pribičević and Voja Tankosić. The Association was placed on a broad basis, well-organised and divided into hierarchies, commanding no less than 400 committees, all busy with violent agitation.

The "Narodna odbrana" is overmore closely connected with the Sharp-Shooters League (762 Societies), with the Sokol-

*) Birthday of His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty.

League "Dušan Silni" (2500 members), the Olympian Club, the Riders Society "Knez Mihajlo", the Hunters League and the League of Culture, besides many other societies, which all recognize the leadership of the "Narodna odbrana". In the course of time, all these different societies have amalgamated, so that at present they really form only one great association: the "Narodna odbrana".

The "Narodna odbrana" has succeeded in spreading one great net over all Serbia, inside which, all those who are amenable to its ideas are busy organs of agitation.

The work, which the "Narodna odbrana" has undertaken to perform, can be appreciated by all those who take an insight into its official publications.

In its statutes the Society pretends to serve culture, and has the spiritual and bodily development of the Servian population at heart, as also the material welfare of the country. But in its Society organ (Vide Supplement 2) it reveals the true and only reason of its being, its so-called "reorganised Programme", that is:

To preach to the Servian people "in fanatical incessant work" under the pretext that the monarchy is attempting to rob it of freedom and speech, and to crush it altogether, the "sacred truth", that it is an absolute necessity to wage a war of annihilation with rifle and gun against the first and greatest enemy, Austria-Hungary, and that the people must be prepared for this war with all means obtainable. The "subjugated territory on which 7 million brothers are sighing in captivity, must be freed from this yoke".

The cultural aims and efforts of the "Narodna odbrana" for the organisation and education of the Servian people are dictated by the long-desired war of annihilation against the monarchy.

All the affiliated societies act in exactly the same spirit as the "Narodna odbrana"; the Sokol Society in Kragujevac may serve as an example. (Vide Supplement 3.)

The founders and leaders of this Society are also officers, professors and government officials.

In the speech, with which the president of the Society, Major Kovačević opened the Annual Meeting for 1914, he

completely forgot to mention Gymnastics, which are the ostensible element of a Sokol Society, and only spoke of preparation for battle with the “dangerous, heartless, wanton, cumbersome, greedy enemy in the north”, who “robs millions of our brothers of freedom and right, and keeps them in slavery and in chains”.

The administrative report of the society scarcely alludes to business, but confesses that the true aim and ambition of the management, is to prepare for the national development and the strengthening of a suppressed nation, so that it may be able to fulfil its incomplete programme and do the work that is still waiting for it, the great deed at the end, which it will be called upon to achieve in a very short time, “the liberation of the brothers across the Drina, who are enduring the sufferings of the Crucified One”. Even the cashier embellishes his work-a-day report with the remark: “we must bring up falcons” who will be capable of giving freedom to our brothers in slavery.

Just as the “Narodna odbrana” does not consider culture the aim of its being, so do the Sokols consider Gymnastics as merely a means in the service of propaganda, of which both Societies speak in the same way and nearly in the same words.

The “Narodna odbrana”, in addressing the people and calling them to the battle of annihilation against the monarchy, does not only mean the Servian people, but all the South-Slav peoples. In the eyes of the “Narodna odbrana” the South-Slav territory of the monarchy is “our subjugated Servian territory.” (Vide Supplement 4.) The South-Slav subjects of the monarchy were called upon to participate in the “national work”, “this healthy and necessary piece of work” was to be achieved with the help of those across the Servian frontier. On the territory of the monarchy the “Narodna odbrana” seeks “the heroes for the Sacred War”, for whom Obilić, the murderer of Murad is to serve as an example of national devotion to be striven after and imitated.

The “Narodna odbrana”, to encourage the “brothers outside Servia” in taking part in this “work due to private initiative”, kept up lively relations with the “brothers across the

frontier". How these relations are brought about, the Society organ does not say, probably because this forms part of the "total work" which "for diverse reasons must not and cannot be communicated".

We may suppose that this branch of the Societys activity is rather extensive, from the fact that not only the Central Committee of the "Narodna odbrana" itself, but also several district Committees have special sections for "foreign concerns".

This foreign activity of the "Narodna odbrana" and its affiliated societies is very complicated.

The least dangerous means of agitation, on which the authorities can keep a watchful eye is the lecture *tournée*, undertaken by distinguished members of the "Narodna odbrana" in the South-eastern parts of the monarchy, where cultural and national subjects are discussed. These occasions give the lecturer a chance of introducing words and sentences revealing to the initiated the true aim of what is said at so much pains.

Among these emissaries, an important part is played by the director of the Servian State Printing Office, who has been mentioned before, Zivojin Dačić; the same Zivojin Dačić, who on the 18th of August 1909 addressed an appeal to the Servian people in which he designated Austria-Hungary as the arch-enemy of Servia and admonished everyone to prepare for the war against the monarchy. Dačić undertook several journeys to the South-eastern portions of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. On one occasion, during a lecture in Karlovci (1912) he was less cautious than usually and spoke up for a "union of all Servians against the common enemy", and he did not fail to make it understood, that thereby he meant Austria-Hungary.

More dangerous than these lectures are the relations which the "Narodna odbrana" entertains with corporations and societies in the monarchy under the pretext of promoting common interests and culture, because when the deputations and corporations exchange visits, they cannot be controlled by the authorities and the occasions for Servian intrigue abound.

Thus a member of the "Narodna odbrana" sent as delegate to the anniversary of the Prosvjeta-Society in Sarajevo (1912), was shameless enough to secretly enlist Bosnian

members for his Society. The sending of a member of the Kragujevac Sokol Society to this celebration was a message to the "Brothers in Bosnia" meaning; We have not forgotten you; the wings of the Sumadja falcon are still powerful, a thought, which in the intimate circle may have been otherwise expressed, and certainly in the sense of the tendencies followed by this Society. (Vide Supplement 3.) What is spoken in meetings of this kind in Serbia, cannot be reported with perfect certainty, since what we know is based upon more or less reliable confidential communications. We will only mention the visit of the students of Agram in Serbia in April 1912, when an official military reception took place, and a parade of the troops was held in honour of these students, giving their visit the character of a suggestive demonstration. The consequence was, that the administrative report of the Sokol Society of Kragujevac, alluded to this visit as "an event which meant the beginning and the germ of a great deed which will be accomplished in the near future", a "germ which will ripen when the soul of the people rises so high that there are no obstacles that it will not pull down."

The authorities of the monarchy have only recently learnt that the Sokol Societies of Serbia have designated some analogous corporations in the monarchy to join them in a secret Association, the intended character of which is not yet clear, the researches on the subject not being completed. But it may already be assumed from what is known to this hour, that one of the secret means has been discovered by which the Servian Sokols and their friends are tampering with groups of Austro-Hungarian subjects, to whom they are giving the infection of their subversive tendencies.

This kind of propaganda, which is built up on a broad basis and works for a distant future, is as nothing compared to the "foreign work" of the "Narodna odbrana" and its friends, which deals in agitation from man to man. It is this kind which has been most successful.

Through its confidential agents and emissaries, the poison of revolt is injected to grown-up persons and to irrational youths at the same time.

Thus Milan Pribičević has succeeded in making the ex-officers of Honveds V. B., D. K., and V. N. as also the croatian-slavonian lieutenant of gendarmes V. K. leave the service in the army of the monarchy under suspicious circumstances, and take themselves to Serbia, where they are reported to have been bitterly disappointed and whence they are anxious to return to their homes.

The agitation, which from Serbia spreads to the grammar schools of Bosnia and Croatia, is so generally known, that it need not here be exemplified. Perhaps it is not so well known, that the youths who are expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools for serious offences, are received with open arms in Serbia, are in some cases supported by the State and brought up as enemies of the monarchy. The Servian schools, where hatred against the monarchy is taught by teachers and professors, who are members of the "Narodna odbrana", are certainly well adapted for pupils of this kind. One particularly noteworthy case must here be quoted as an example. In March 1914 several pupils of the Teachers Seminary in Pakrac (Croatia) were relegated on account of a strike. They left for Serbia, where some were immediately appointed as teachers, whilst those, who were too young, were placed in a Servian Teachers Seminary. Well received by circles hostile to Austria-Hungary, one of these relegated students declared publicly that he and his friends would, when the Archduke-Heir to the Throne would come to Bosnia, show to the world that Bosnia was a Servian country. It is certainly very extraordinary that the prefect of Krajna gave three of these seriously compromised young men passports to Bosnia, just at the time when Archduke Francis Ferdinand travelled in Bosnia. In the passports the youths were described as Servian subjects, which was not true, and the prefect must have known where they belonged to, from their papers. With these passports the three pupils of the Seminary succeeded in crossing the frontier. They were however recognised and arrested.

But this is not sufficient to characterise the "foreign" activity of the "Narodna odbrana".

It was some time since the Imp. and Roy. government had received confidential information, that the "Narodna

odbrana" was acting in favour of a war with the monarchy in a military sense, by keeping a number of emissaries in the Monarchy, who in the usual way observed by bands, would, if hostilities once broke out, help in the destruction of the means of transportation and the institutions connected with them, cause revolts and panics to break out etc. (Supplement 7.)

In the course of the trial against Jovo Jagličić and accomplices, accused of espionage (Supplement 6) before the district court of Sarajevo in 1913, the private informations were confirmed. The preparation for the war of bands to this day is still contained in the Programme of the "Narodna odbrana" as it was from the beginning, but a system of espionage has been added later.

What the "Narodna odbrana" calls a "reorganised Programme" is in truth an "extended Programme": to prepare for the war of annihilation against the monarchy, indeed to bring it about, and afterwards to display again the Red Flag of the "Narodna odbrana".

It was inevitable that in this atmosphere of openly and secretly incited hatred against the monarchy, and in the midst of an irresponsible agitation, which in combating Austria-Hungary considered all means allowed and advised murder as the most effective means of all, terrorism must be born, even if the official Servians who were hostile to Austria-Hungary did not cooperate.

On the 8th of June 1912 Lukas Jukić fired a shot against the Royal commissioner in Agram, von Cuvaj, by which the Banal councillor von Hervoicé was mortally wounded. During his flight, Jukić killed a pursuing policeman and wounded two others.

The public trial has shown that the ideas, on which Jukić acted, were those developed in the propaganda of the „Narodna odbrana". Though Jukić entertained plans of political murder, still his plans did not take a determined form until he had been one of the party of Agram students, who on the 18th of August undertook the excursion to Belgrade. During the festivities held in honour of the visitors, Jukić made friends with several persons, who belonged to the

“Narodna odbrana” and with these he conversed on politics. A few days afterwards Jukić returned to Belgrade and received a bomb from a Servian major and a Browning from a comrade, and with these weapons he committed the crime.

The bomb, which was afterwards found in Agram, was declared by experts to come from an arsenal and to have been fabricated for military purposes.

The murder of Jukić was not forgotten, when on the 18th of August 1913 Stephen Doićić, who came from America, attempted to murder the Royal Commissioner Baron Skerlec in Agram. This deed, inspired by the agitation among the South-Slavs living in America, is also the work of the “foreign” propaganda of the “Narodna odbrana” and its partisans.

The pamphlet of the Servian T. Dimitrijević, “Natrag u staro ognjiste vaše” printed in Chicago, with its outrageous attacks upon His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty and its summons to the Servians of the monarchy to return home, as the moment of their liberation was near at hand, shows that a parallel movement was carried on in full freedom in America and at the same time on the territory of the monarchy, and that both had their origin in Servia.

Another year passed and Agram was again the scene of a murderous attempt, which this time proved unsuccessful.

On the 20th of May 1914 Jacob Schäfer tried to murder the Banus, Baron Skerlec in the theatre of Agram, but a police-agent prevented the deed at the last moment. The inquiry showed that there had been a plot, the soul of which was Rudolf Hercigonja. The confessions of Hercigonja and his five accomplices proved that this plot also had been construed in Servia.

Hercigonja had been implicated in a fruitless attempt to liberate Jukić and fled to Servia (October 1912) where with his accomplice Majoran Jakšić he sought the company of Komitatschis and members of the “Narodna odbrana”. As is very often the case, when young, excitable people occupy themselves with politics, the result was disastrous. Hercigonja returned home from Belgrade with the dogma proclaimed there, that the South-Slav countries must be wrenched from the monarchy and united to the kingdom. He had also

been persuaded that this ultimate aim could only be attained by doing away with highstanding persons, and that this was the only means of realising such plans.

In Agram he spread this dogma among his friends, and persuaded some of them to his way of thinking. The first and greatest of his plans was to attempt to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Austrian heir to the throne.

A few months previously researches with regard to treasonable propaganda had been instituted on Luka Aljinovicz's account. In the course of these investigations three witnesses had testified against Aljinovicz, who, they said had in 1913 received 100 Dinar from the "Narodna odbrana" for purposes of propaganda, but more especially for an attempt upon the life of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and a secret student-society had given him the same sum.

This shows how the criminal agitation of the "Narodna odbrana" was recently concentrated upon the person of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

All these facts lead to the conclusion that the „Narodna odbrana" and the elements hostile to Austria-Hungary grouped round it, had recently considered the time come, for putting their theories into practice.

It is however remarkable that in this the Society was satisfied, if it gave the inspiration of the deed, and where the seed had fallen on fertile ground, the material means for realising the idea, but that it never undertook the only dangerous rôle in this propaganda, but made the youths of the monarchy, after tempting and inciting them to some deed, bear the entire responsibility of the sad heroism inspired.

All the traits of this kind of intrigue are found in the history of how the grievous crime of the 28th of June came about. (Supplement 8.)

Princip and Grabež are both of the type of youths, who from their schoolboy days have been poisoned by the ideas of the "Narodna odbrana".

Living in Belgrade among a score of students full of these ideas, Princip was planning the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, whose widely announced journey to the

annexed countries, pointed him out most especially to all the enemies of the monarchy in Servia.

Gabrinovič, who lived in the same circle, made friends with him. This young man's radical, revolutionary views were subject to changes, but by his own confession the influence of his Belgrade surroundings and much reading of Servian papers made him turn to the propaganda of deeds, directed against the monarchy.

Grabež's previous dispositions made him an easy victim to the seductions about him.

Though the plot may have been far advanced, and though the intentions of the conspirators may have been quite serious, the deed would no doubt have remained undone, if, as in the case of Jukić, there had not been persons, ready to give the accomplices the means wherewith to realise their plans. Both Princip and Gabrinovič affirm implicitly that neither possessed the necessary weapons nor the money to buy them with.

It is interesting to learn how the accomplices sought to procure these necessary weapons. Milan Pribičević and Zivojin Dačić, the leading men of the "Narodna odbrana" were the first they thought of, who might help them in their need. No doubt because there was already a tradition among those who planned political murder, that the "Narodna odbrana" was the right place to go to. But this plan came to nothing, because the two were not at that time in Belgrade. Princip and Gabrinovič remembered that there was another member of the "Narodna odbrana" whom they could apply to, Milan Ciganović, once a Komitatschi, now an employee of the Railways Direction in Belgrade, who in 1909 had played a part as one of the pupils of the Bands school in Čuprija. (Supplement 5.) Princip and Gabrinovič were not disappointed in their expectations, for Ciganović gave them what they required.

Ciganović and through his intercession, his friend, the Royal Servian major Voja Tankosić, also a leader of the "Narodna odbrana" and in 1908 director of the Bands-school in Čuprija (Supplement 5), now became the moral managers and promoters of the plot, which they fully approved, in a revolting way characteristic of the whole movement, as a matter of course. They had a slight doubt at first, whether

the three conspirators were firmly enough resolved to perform the deed to the very end. When this doubt was removed, their suggestive arguments helping, they were ready to give their full aid. Tankosič contributed four Browning revolvers with their ammunition and money for the journey; six hand-granades from the Servian army stores completed the equipment, the nature and origin of which calls up reminiscences of the Jukić case. Anxious that the action should be fully successful, Tankosić arranged for the instruction of the conspirators in rifle practice, and Ciganović was the man who successfully carried out this part of the plan. Tankosić and Ciganović took another precaution, for which the conspirators had not asked; they provided prussic acid and gave instructions that it was to be taken immediately after the deed had been perpetrated. This precaution was taken in their own interest in the first place, since by ensuring the secrecy of the plot, it removed the slight danger to which they had exposed themselves in this enterprise. Certain death for the victims of their seduction, entire safety for themselves, that is the well-known motto of the members of the "Narodna odbrana".

If the plot was to be successfully carried out, the bombs and firearms had to be smuggled across the frontier to Bosnia. This is where Ciganović again helps. The conspirators must travel by a prescribed route, and he makes sure of the frontier authorities, who will help them to cross into Bosnia. The way in which this journey was organised and achieved, which even Princip admits to have been mysterious, leaves no doubt that it was well thought out, and often made use of, by the "Narodna odbrana". As a matter of course, which cannot have been applied for the first time, the frontier captains in Sabač and Ložnica gave their assistance. Without a hitch, the mysterious journey with its ever-varying guides, who appeared as in obedience to a magic signal, was accomplished. Without questioning the purpose of the journey of a couple of beardless students, the Servian authorities and only because a former Komitatschi and a subordinate railway official (Ciganović) gave the order, allowed this complicated apparatus to be used. There was indeed no reason why questions should be asked, since the instructions they had received, made it

clear, that a "mission" of the "Narodna odbrana" was about to be fulfilled. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers made the frontier captains smile complacently, a sufficient proof that on this "road" one was well accustomed to such contraband goods.

The Servian government made itself guilty of a serious offence, when it tolerated such doings.

Bound by its promise to cultivate friendly and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, it allowed its press to preach hatred against the monarchy. It allowed associations to open a public campaign against Austria-Hungary under the leadership of superior officers, government officials, teachers and judges, a campaign which was intended to revolutionise the monarchy's citizens; it did not prevent men without a vestige of moral feeling, who are nevertheless employed in its military and civil administration, to poison the public mind to such a degree, that common murder was considered the best and most effective weapon in this unequal war.

Supplement 1.

Quoted from the Servian Press.

a) On the 18th of August 1910, when His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty celebrated his 80th birthday, the "Politica" published a large picture of Bogdan Zerajić, who two months previously had committed an attempt upon the life of the governor of Bosnia, Baron von Varešanin. The article, which accompanied the picture said: "Two months ago, on the 2nd June (old style) on the very day when the Bosnian-Herzegowinian Diet was opened, a young Servian, the student Bogdan Zerajić in Sarajevo tried to kill the governor of Bosnia and the Herzegowina, general Marian Varešanin. Zerajić fired five shots at this renegade, who ensured his career by shedding the blood of his brothers in the famous revolt of Rakoviča, but strange to say, not one of the five shots took aim. Thereupon the brave and selfconscious Zerajić blew out his brains with the sixth and last shot, and fell dead to the ground. They know very well in Vienna that Zerajić did not

attempt this deed, because he had read Russian and revolutionary writings, but because as a noble scion of his people, he wished to testify in a bloody manner, that foreign dominion should not be tolerated. It was for this reason that the affair was hushed up as quickly as possible, to prevent things being talked about, that would have still more compromised the Austrian government in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. It was the wish in Vienna that Zerajić should not be remembered, and the plot treated as something without significance. But it is just the fear of dead Zerajić and the order that his name shall not be pronounced in all Bosnia and Herzegovina, that keeps his memory alive, and causes the people to revere him as a saint, this day — 18th of August — more than at any other time. Today we also will light a candle on his grave and cry out: “Honour to Zerajić!” After the article a poem followed, of which this is the literal translation:

“Bosnia lives, it is not dead,
It is in vain that you have buried its body;
Fire still glows in the fettered captive,
The time has not come for singing its dirge.
With the hands of Satan you are digging the grave;
But the living dead refuse to enter the vault;
Emperor! do you hear? when the revolvers flare up
The leaden balls hiss against your throne!
They are not slaves, but splendid freedom,
In the brave hand of one who rebels against defeat!
Why is this terrible Golgatha trembling so?
Peter drew his sword to defend Christ.
His hand sank down, but from his blood
Thousands of brave hands will arise;
This shot was but the messenger
Of the glorious Eastertide
That will follow the passion of Golgatha.”

b) On the 8th of October 1910, the anniversary of the annexion of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, “Politica” and “Mali Journal”, the latter appearing with a broad black edge, published articles in which they attacked Austria-Hungary most vehemently. Europe must be brought to believe that the Servian people

are still bent upon *Revanche*. The day of *Revanche* must come, Serbia's strenuous efforts to organise a fine army prove as much; and also the bitter hatred that the Servian people nurture against the neighbouring monarchy.

The same occasion made the "Samouprava" write on the 9th of October 1910: "Foul words and boisterous scenes are not the means to express true patriotism. Quiet and dignified work will make us reach our goal!"

c) On the 18th of April 1911 the "Politika" said: "Except a few cynics, no one in Serbia would like to see King Peter go to Vienna or to Budapest. The annexion of Bosnia and the Herzegovina have made it impossible for all times that friendship could exist between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Every Servian feels as much."

d) The "Beogradske Novine" write on the 18th of April 1911: "The majority of our statesmen disapprove the plan of King Peter's journey to Emperor Francis Joseph. The storm of indignation, which invades all Servians over this plan may easily be conceived."

e) The "Mali Jornal" of the 19th of April 1911 writes: "A visit from King Peter to the monarch of Austria-Hungary would be an outrage to all Servians. This visit would deprive Serbia of the right of playing the part of Piedmont. The interests of Serbia can never tally with the interests of Austria-Hungary".

f) On the 23rd of April 1911 "Politica", "Mali Journal", "Tribuna", "Beogradske Novine" and "Vecerne Novosti" commented the plan of a visit from King Peter to the court of Vienna in the following manner: Between Serbia and Austria-Hungary there can be no friendship. The intended visit was for Serbia "a shameful capitulation", "a humiliation for Serbia", "a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary had committed against the Servian people."

g) On the 18th of April 1912 the "Trgovinski Glasnik" in an article, called: "The Downfall of Austria" writes — "In Austria-Hungary a downfall announces itself on all sides. What is happening beyond the Danube and the Save, is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, but a general Austrian crisis, a crisis even of the dynasty. We Servians may

look on with satisfaction while things are developing in this way in Austria.”

h) In an article called “The Frontiers of Albania” the “Balkan” attacks Austria-Hungary in the following words: “If Europe is too weak to cry: Stop! to Austria, Montenegro and Servia will do so, and will say: Stop! you shall go no further! A war between Austria-Hungary and Servia is unavoidable. We have broken up the Turkish Empire, we will break up Austria. We have done with one war, we are now on the threshold of another.”

i) “Vecerje Novosti” on the 22nd of April 1913 addresses an appeal to the Servian travelling public and to the Servian merchants to boycott the Danube-Navigation-Company. No one was to travel with the ships of this Company or send goods by them. A committee would raise a fine from all who acted to the contrary and the sums resulting from the fines, would be added to the funds of the Komitatschis for the benefit of the forthcoming war with Austria.

k) The “Tribuna” of the 26th of May 1913 commenting on Austrias taking possession of the Danube island Ada Kaleh, writes: “Black and yellow criminal Austria has played a fresh bandits trick. It is a thief who, when he is unable to steal a bag of money is content to take a dinar.”

l) On the 10th of June 1913 on the anniversary of the attempt to kill the Royal commissioner in Agram, made by the student Luka Jukić, the Servian papers published articles “in memoriam.” In one of these articles the “Pravda” says: “From our deepest soul we regret that not everyone acts like our Jukić. We have no Jukić, but we have our hatred, we have our hot anger, we have ten million Jukićs; we are firmly convinced that he will soon from the window of his prison, hear the guns of liberty fired.”

m) “Mali Journal” of the 7th of October 1913 published a leading article, in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right to exist and the slav nationalities are bidden to support the war of aggression, which Servia intends waging against Austria-Hungary.

n) The “Piemont” of the 8th of October 1913, commemorating the day of the annexion, writes: “It is five years today that

an Imperial decree extended the sovereignty of the sceptre of Habsburg over Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The pain inflicted on that day upon Serbia, the Servian people will continue to feel for many decades. Ashamed and annihilated, the Servian people groans in its despair. The nation has made a vow, that it will avenge its wrongs and by a heroic effort regain its freedom. This day has called awake its energy which had relaxed, and the hero recalled to life, will one day seek his freedom. Today, when Servian tombs grace the old country, when Servian cavalry treads the battle-fields of Macedonia and Old-Servia, the Servian people, having accomplished their task in the South, turn to the opposite side, whence the groaning and the crying of Servian brothers is heard, from a country where the gallows thrive. Servian soldiers, who in Dusans kingdom are fighting the same Albanians, whom the State incited against us, which has taken Bosnia and the Herzegovina from us, these soldiers have taken the vow, that they will treat "second Turkey" with Gods help no better than they treated Balkan Turkey. They are taking this vow and hope that the day of reckoning is near at hand. One Turkey has disappeared. Our good Servian God will help us to make the "second Turkey" disappear also."

o) The "Mali Journal" of the 4th of November 1913 writes: "Any attempt to approach Austria-Hungary is treason against the Servian people. Servia must look facts in the face and never forget that Austria-Hungary is its worst enemy, whom to combat with all energy is the most sacred duty of every Servian government."

p) On the 14th of January 1914 the "Pravda" says: "Our first wishes for the New Year are of course for our unredeemed brothers, sighing under a foreign yoke. Let them keep heart; after Kossowo followed Kumanovo and our victorious march has not reached its end."

q) "Novosti" of the 18th of January 1914 published a picture of the Benediction of water in Bosnia with the following text: "Even under foreign yoke the Servians keep up their old customs until the day, when freedom will reward their enthusiam."

r) The "Zastava" confesses in January 1914: "Serbia is urging on the Austro-Hungarian Servians to a revolution."

s) "Mali Journal" of the 9th of March 1914 writes: "Serbia will never forget how Francis Ferdinand rattled his sword, when the Skutari-affair was on."

t) On the 4th of April 1914 the "Zastava" wrote: "The Austrian statesmen, whose policy is hatred and bureaucratism and who cannot look into the far future, are preparing for the downfall of Austria-Hungary."

u) "Pravda" of the 8th of April 1914 says: "This day Austria-Hungary has forfeited its right to existence."

v) In their Easter numbers of 1914 all the Servian papers express the hope that the unredeemed, subjugated, hard-pressed brothers will soon celebrate a happy resurrection.

w) The "Tribuna" of the 23rd of April 1914 says: "The pacifists have invented a new pass-word, — the patriotism of Europe —. The programme contained in this word can only be realised, if Austria is first divided up."

x) "Mali Journal" of the 12th of May writes: "What in private life goes by the name of crime, is called by the name of politics in Austria. History can tell of a monster, and this monster is Austria".

Supplement 2.

Extract from the Society Organ of the "Narodna odbrana", which bears the same name and is published by the Central Committee of the Society. "Narodna odbrana", izdanje stredisnog odbora narodne odbrane, Beograd, 1911. Nova Stamperija "Davidovic", Decanska ulice br. 14, Ljub. Davidovica.

In a short preface it is stated, that this pamphlet is not "a complete or exhausting account of the total work of the "Narodna odbrana", since for many reasons it may not and cannot be that".

This publication is divided into three parts, the first of which comprises XIV chapters and is a kind of programme in itself; the second part contains the report on the activity of

the Society and the third part gives examples for the organisation of similar foreign societies.

In the I. chapter "Origin and activity of the first 'Narodna odbrana'" we learn that the society was founded in consequence of the movement which was called forth by the annexion of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and had the following aims:

1. The promoting, encouraging and strengthening of national sentiment;
2. The collecting and enlisting of volunteers;
3. Forming the volunteers into companies and drilling them for armed action;
4. Collecting money and other contributions for the realisation of the above purpose;
5. Organisation, equipment and drilling of a particular revolutionary troop (Committee), intended for special, independent warfare;
6. Development of an action comprising every kind of defense of the Servian People.

This programme was supplemented by the remark that the Great Powers having recognised the annexion, the work of the society had been stopped, a reorganisation of the programme had been necessary, although it was possible to retain the old statutes. Work was begun on a new line, so that, should a similar occasion present itself, "the old red war-banner of the "Narodna odbrana" might again be unfolded."

In the II. chapter of "The new 'Narodna odbrana' of to-day" we are told: "At the time of the annexion it was shown that Serbia was not prepared for the conflict, which circumstances forced upon it, and that this conflict was much more serious and more difficult than had ever been foreseen; the annexion was but one of the blows, dealt against Serbia by Serbia's foes, which will be followed by many more. A similar attack must not find Serbia as unprepared as the first time, and to prevent this we must prepare for the scuffle, we must work. "The aim of this work, in which all classes of the population must take part, is the preparation of the people for war in every direction, such as modern times demand". As the means towards this end, the strengthening of national pride, bodily

exercise, material welfare, promotion of culture etc. are recommended. „The work of the State is to be supported as much as is possible by individual effort and by society.”

Chapter III “The three essential lessons” begins by saying that the annexion has taught those who know how to learn, that national pride is not so strong in Serbia, as it ought to be in a country which has a population of three millions only and is the hope and sole support of seven millions of Servians subjugated and held in slavery elsewhere. For this reason the first labour of the Society is to strengthen national pride. The second task is to promote bodily exercise, the third to show the population where the value lies of the forces gained by sporting exercises.

Chapter IV treats of “Rifle Exercise”, and explains how important thorough rifle drill is for Serbia, where military drill only lasts six months. These admonitions conclude with the words:

“A fresh blow, resembling the annexion of Bosnia, must be met by a new Serbia, where every Servian, from the child to the tottering old man must be an accomplished rifleman.”

Chapter V explains the “Relations between the ‘Narodna odbrana’ and the Sokol societies” and refers to the culture and the conditions in other countries. The downfall of Turkey is mentioned and the following conclusions are drawn:

“The old Turks of the South are gradually disappearing, now only a fraction of our people suffers from their dominion. But new Turks are coming from the North, more dreadful and more formidable than the old ones. Their higher cultural and economical development enables these foes from the North to attack us successfully. They are trying to rob us of our liberty, of our language, they are trying to smash us up. The first signs of the conflict, which is approaching can be felt already. The Servian people have come to the question: To be or not to be?”

The superscription of the VII. Chapter is: “What do we intend by our lectures?” The following is the answer to this question.

“The ‘Narodna odbrana’ organised lectures, which are more or less agitation-lectures. We developed our new pro-

gramme in them. In everyone of the lectures the annexion was discussed, also the work of the old "Narodna odbrana" and the duties undertaken by the new Society. These lectures will never cease to be lessons in agitation, but they will be developed in a way to serve the single branches of our work and will exhaust all the questions of our social and national life".

In Chapters VIII "The women's work in the "Narodna odbrana", IX "Detail and Small Work", and X "Renaissance of Society", the Societys work is given in full detail, and the necessity of extending and "deepening" this work, of regenerating the Servian individual and the Servian State is explained.

Chapter XI refers to "New Obilice and Sinjelice"*) and says: "It is a mistake to assert that Kossowo is over and of the past. We are still in the very midst of Kossowo. Our Kossowo of to-day is the darkness and the ignorance in which our people lives. The rest of this new Kossowo is alive along our Northern and Western frontiers: the Germans, Austrians and Schwabas pressing forward towards our Servian and Slav South." The heroism of Obilic and Singjelic is praised and the necessity of devoting oneself to the service of the Nation is explained in these words: „National work demands sacrifices, especially in Turkey and in Austria, where those who do this kind of work are persecuted by the authorities, are put to prison, are led to the gallows. But heroes must arise to fight against this kind of darkness and ignorance. The "Narodna odbrana" does not for a moment doubt that in the war with rifle and gun against the Schwabas and all our other foes, which is approaching, a number of heroes will rise from among our people. But "Narodna odbrana" is not satisfied with this prospect, it regards the present circumstances, which are con-

*) Milos Obilic (perhaps Kobilic) according to Servian tradition, after the battle of the Amselfeld, crept into the Turkish camp and there murdered Sultan Murad (from Kallay's "History of the Servians I. vol.). Stephen Singjelic, Knez of Resara, played a part in the Servian Revolt of 1807—1810. In 1809 Singjelic defended the fort of Tschagar against the Turks, and as his forces were too weak to resist the enemy, he is supposed to have blown up himself, his friends and a great number of Turks. (From Kallay's "History of the Servian Revolt".)

sidered peaceful ones. as actual war, and calls for heroes in the conflict of to-day, which is going on in Serbia and over the frontier.”

“Connection with Brothers and Friends” Chapter XII is called, the contents of which are explained by the following sentences:

“Perhaps the most important work of the “Narodna odbrana” is the care of maintaining relations with our near and distant brothers over the frontier and the rest of our friends in the world. When the “Narodna odbrana” speaks of “our people” not only those who live in Serbia are meant.

The Society hopes that the work it is doing in Serbia will be a spurn to the brothers outside Serbia to extend the work of private initiative, so that all may partake in the making of a new and effective “Narodna odbrana” wherever Servians live.”

“Two important tasks” is the title of the XIII. Chapter, which explains: “Since we accept the belief, that the annexion of Bosnia and the Herzegowina clearly shows how there is an advance upon our country from the North, the “Narodna odbrana” considers Austria our worst foe and calls him such to our people. The Society calls it one of its foremost duties to convince the people that Austria is its greatest enemy and expresses this in the following words:

“Just as the Turks came upon us from the South, so does Austria pitch into us from the North. If the “Narodna odbrana” preaches war with Austria as a necessity, it preaches nothing but the sacred truth of our situation.”

“The hatred against Austria, which is the result of this propaganda is not the aim, but only the natural consequence of the work, which is being done for the self-preservation and the freedom of Serbia. If this work cannot be done without increasing hatred against Austria, this is all Austria’s fault, which acts in a way, to make it necessary that the war should end by extermination.

“The modern conception of the national idea is praised, but when liberation and union are spoken of, there is too much hollow talk. This is how the people should be spoken to:

“The liberation of our subjugated Servian territory and its union with Serbia is indispensable for our landlords, our merchants and our peasants, on account of the fundamental requirements of culture, of commerce, of our bread and of room to move in. When it understands this, the people will make every sacrifice to participate in our work. Our people must be told that the liberation of Bosnia is necessary, not only because of the sympathy with our brothers, who are captives there, but because of commerce and the connection with the Sea.”

The “two tasks” of the “Narodna odbrana” are then resumed in the following sentence: “The “Narodna odbrana” not only has the duty to explain to the people the dangers, which threaten it and the country, but it must also fulfil the important task of imbuing the people with this new, healthy, profitable understanding for Nationalism and for the work of liberation and union; at the same time the people must be encouraged to maintain intact its sacred memories and national traditions.”

The concluding Chapter XIV begins with an appeal to the government and the people of Serbia, to prepare themselves with all practicable means for the conflict, “of which the annexion is the announcement”.

The following sentence is a recapitulation of the whole work of the “Narodna odbrana”:

“The “Narodna odbrana” adapts itself to the changed circumstances, at the same time upholds all the connections cultivated at the time of the annexion, and is to this day the same, that it was, when the annexion took place. The Society is to this day still the “Odbrana” (Defence), it is to this day “Narodna” (the peoples). It still assembles under its banner all the subjects of Serbia, as it assembled them at the time of the annexion. Then the cry was for war, to-day the cry is for work; then meetings, demonstrations, volunteer committees, rifles and bombs were asked for, to-day it is quiet, fanatical, incessant work we want, work of the kind we have enumerated and explained, as being the preparation for the battle with rifle and gun, which is coming”.

The pamphlet and the Annual Report contain the following information on the organisation of the "Narodna odbrana".

A Central Committee, which has its seat in Belgrade, manages all the affairs of the "Narodna odbrana". All the other committees of the Society are subject to the Central committee, which is divided into four sections: one for Culture, another for Bodily Education, a third for Financial concerns and the fourth for Foreign affairs.

District committees with their seat in the places, where there are political district authorities, conduct the business of the Society in these districts. Each district committee has a section for Culture (of which the president is the first man of the branch office of the League of Culture), a section for bodily exercises, which a member of the Riflemen's, the Sokol-, the Huntsmen's, or Rider's Society will be president of, and a section for financial affairs. Only in a few district committees there is a section for Foreign affairs.

Local committees in the smaller towns, where there are political authorities, conduct the business of the Society in these places.

In the villages there are village committees, to attend to the business of the Society.

In the interior of the country, where the necessity of having a committee does not arise, the Society has its trusted members to watch its interests.

The societies, which are closely connected with the "Narodna odbrana" and are promoted by it in every way, are the following: the Riflemen's Union with 762 societies, the Sokol-Union "Dušan silni" with 2500 members, the Olympian Club, the Rider's Society "Knez Mihajlo", the Hunter's Union and the League of Culture.

All these Societies are organised in the same way as the "Narodna odbrana", meet and do their work in the same localities (in many cases Society buildings), libraries etc.; the distinguished members of these societies are the chiefs of sections of the "Narodna odbrana".

Supplement 3.

Extract from the "Report on the activity of the Sokol-Society 'Dušan Silni' in Kragujevac during the years 1912 and 1913" (Kragujevac. Printing Offices "Buducnost" Tih. Lekic 1914).

The report begins with the publication of the speech delivered by the President of the Society, the Royal Servian major Kovacevic at the opening of the Annual Meeting for 1914:

"You all well know" he began by saying, "that the Sokols which are a means of combating Germanism, are a purely, Slav institution, whose aim it is to unite all Slav brothers, to inspire them and with the assistance of culture and force to prepare them for the war against the foes of Slavdom.

We Servians are a part of the great Slav Community, and as such have taken up the Sokol-idea and cooperate in the common work for our and our brothers welfare and happiness.

We Servians also wish to live and work in the spirit of the Sokols, we wish to give life to those who are fatigued and weak, forces to the feeble and crippled, liberty to the prisoners and those smarting in chains. We are doing this now and have done so in the past wars. We have liberated a portion of our brothers from the overbearing enemy in the South. We have broken their chains, put an end to their martyrdom and given them back their freedom, so that they can feel the happiness of equality and brotherhood."

After devoting more words of praise to this "noble work", which realises a part of the great Sokol-idea, major Kovacevic continued:

"But, oh brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more formidable and more heartless, because he is culturally and economically so much superior.

This enemy's appetite is insatiable, he keeps millions of our brothers in slavery and in chains. He robbed them of their liberty and of their rights and pressed them into his service. Our brothers are groaning, they are calling to us and begging for our speedy help.

We cannot leave them to the tender mercies of this terrible, insatiable enemy, we must help as soon as ever we can, because this is our duty. Could we ever be happy when so many of our brothers, live, suffer and groan in slavery?

Brothers and Sisters!

The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us be on our guard always!

Let us work with still more ardour and devotion. Let us firmly adhere to our sacred Sokol duty, true and persevering.

Let us prepare for the combat and for the true Sokol idea.

Let us join the untold Sokol swarms and let us remember always the truth which the Servian Sokols have inscribed on their flag: that only a healthy, strong, well-organised people, with a pride in its nationality, is able to defend itself, to fight and to win."

This speech by the President is followed by the report of the managing committee. The victories of the last war are enumerated, which prevented the Society from accomplishing its usual amount of work; this is what follows: "The day dawns, when we are able to return to our work, for our programme is not yet realised, our tasks are not completed. A large proportion of our people is still suffering the tortures of Christ on the Cross: we must visit our brothers on the other side of the Drina: we must undertake a pilgrimage to the city of Sarajevo and the bequest of Saint Sava*): we have still to journey to the home of Marina Novak; of Deli Radivoj and of old Vujadin; we have to cross the Romanija mountains and to find out why Travnik is enveloped in hazy fogs, the song must cease to be sung: Aoj, Bosnia, orphan before God Almighty, Hast thou nowhere people of thy race"

Several undertakings of the Society were explained, and the relations with the "Sister-Societies beyond the Save and Drina" were described, special weight being laid upon the

*) Saint Sava is the patron saint of the Servians (died 1236). *Ducatus sancti Savae* means Herzegovina. The bequest of Saint Sava signifies as much as Herzegovina.

Society's participation in the celebration of the jubilee of the "Prosvijeta". The report says on this subject: "By sending representatives to our brothers in Bosnia, the committee meant to tell them: "We have not forgotten you; the wings of the Sumadija falcon are still powerful."

After a detailed description of the visit of students from Agram in Servia*) and of the blessing of the banner dedicated to the society of "Sober Youths", the report of the managing committee concludes:

"The administration of the Society knows how to estimate these incidents at their proper value—the arrival of the Croatian brothers in the Sumadija and the meeting of the "Sober Youths" from all parts of Servia,—and we are not exaggerating, if we say that these events are the beginning and the germ of a very great deed, which will happen at a very near time.

These events are the signs of the awakening of the national pride and the strength of a suppressed nation which is not allowed to become great or united. It will take a little more time, and this germ will ripen. When the soul of the people rises still higher, it will know no bounds and will do away with all obstacles, that might hinder it. It has always been the ambition of this Society's administration to work for the development of this power, to give help and speed to the course of this national development, to prepare for and promote this great idea."

The report of the cashier gives a list of all those, who gave the Society their support. Besides a number of members of the District Commission of Kragujevac, which are mentioned by name, thanks are returned to the following patrons of the Society:

The District committee of the "Narodna odbrana" in Kragujevac, especially its "Cavalier Section", which repeatedly

*) This visit of the Agram students (April 1912) in Belgrade, Nish, Semendria and other places, was interpreted in Servia as an important anti-monarchical demonstration. Military honours were shown to the excursionists, in the military Academy and in the Officers Casino, dinners and balls were given. In Nish even a military Parade was held in honour of the visitors.

helped the Sokol societies with noble gifts; the Director of the grammar-school in Kragujevac, who always extended a paternal protection to the Sokols; the Division Commander of the Sumadija, who was most generous to the Society; the President of the District Court of Kragujevac, the chief of the District authorities and the head of the municipality in Kragujevac.

When the cashier had remembered the Sokols, who had fallen victims to the war, he concluded his report with the following words:

“After the brilliant victory over a portion of our enemies, the leaders of the Society expect of you, that you will devote yourselves more lovingly and more firmly than ever to the work of the Sokols, so that in our nest you may bring up falcons, who will, when the right time comes, be able to fly high and with their powerful wings will bring our unredeemed brothers love, freedom and brotherhood.”

The Annual Report is signed by major M. J. Kovacevic as President, the secretary of the District Court D. V. Brzakovic as secretary, and ten members of the committee among whom, two professors, (Emil Lukic and Milan Jankovic) and another officer (major of infantry Michael Vasic).

This report and a schedule of the Sokol Societies of Kragujevac, sent to the “Srpski Soko” in Tuzla to be filled out, and also signed by major Kovacevic and secretary Brzakovic prove beyond a doubt that the Sokol Societies in Serbia were in much closer connection with similar societies in the monarchy than was known to anyone.

Supplement 4.

The Servian Official Gazette in the Service of the “Narodna odbrana”.

On the 28th of June 1914 (new style) the Servian official gazette “Srpski novine” contained a supplement with an address from the “Narodna odbrana” to the readers of the paper, which all the subscribers received. This address contains the following phrases:

“Brothers and Sisters! Only a part of Kossowo has been vindicated, only a part of the day of Saint Vitus (Vidovdan) has been avenged. The significance of the day of Saint Vitus and of Kossowo spreads as far and wide as the territory in which our people’s language is spoken—the Servian, the Croatian and the Slovenian—from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Solo. The quantity of the work we still have to do, the sacrifices we still have to make, they are measured by the number of national souls who weep on this territory, by the number of chains which our brothers shake in their despair. In past days the day of Saint Vitus might signify a day of mourning to us, but now, that we look back upon great and glorious doings, and look forward to still greater and more glorious ones, when we have advanced in the history of our people and are in the midst of the work for establishing this great national State, to-day the day of Sanct Vitus must be a day of great joy and pride for what has happened, and more still for what will happen. Servian men and women! Millions of our brothers, Slovenes, Croatians and Servians living beyond our frontiers, are looking towards us, as the children of the kingdom and their hearts swell with pride and hope, when they view the majestic manifestation for our national cause. God helps the brave! Forward all of you! That part of our sacred duty, which is still unfulfilled, is calling. On the day of Sanct Vitus 1914 in Belgrade.”

Supplement 5.

Deposition of the Witness Trifko Krstanovic concerning the “Narodna odbrana”.

The journeyman-baker Trifko Krstanovic of Zavidovici was arrested by a patrol of gendarmes in the night between the 6th and 7th July 1914, because shortly after the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, he had been heard to make the remark, that this event was to be expected, so that he was suspected of having known about the crime beforehand.

He was delivered up to the District Court of Sarajevo. His examination proved that the suspicion against him was

not justified, as the remark he had made, was solely based upon his earlier observations of the "Narodna odbrana's" doings. He had had opportunities of observing the violent agitation against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and specially against the Archduke in Serbia and had thereby been convinced that something of the kind would happen. There being no facts to justify an action against him, the judicial steps taken were retracted, but because during his examination Krstanovic had revealed important facts concerning the doings of the "Narodna odbrana" he was detained as a witness.

The following is an extract from the protocol (July 19, 1914) of the examination inasmuch as it concerns the affair in question:

"In the autumn of 1908 I was crossing the frontier of Serbia by the Mokra Gora near Višegrad, hoping to find a job. The first place I reached was Bajina Basta in the district of Uzice and as there was no work to be had there, I went on to Belgrade, which I reached at the very time when the annexion of Bosnia and the Herzegowina was proclaimed. I saw that the entire population was in great excitement and could not hope to find employment under such circumstances, so I went to the Imp. and Roy. consulate and begged to be sent home. I was told to come back in the afternoon, when I should get my papers. As I was leaving the consulate, a gendarme caught me up and asked me who I was; as he suspected me of being a spy, he led me to a Karaula. Here I was examined and when I told them that I should very much like to return home, a sub-officer began to insult me, saying what I wanted to leave Serbia for, just at this time when there was need of men, since it might soon come to a war with Austria. When I told him, that I had no means to live on, he said I should be provided for, if I inscribed myself as a Komitatschi. I was destitute at the time and consented. Another gendarme took me to an inn, "Zelenom Vijencu" (The Green Garland) and introduced me to Voja Tankosič, who was the chief of the committees and a captain in the regular army. In the "Green Garland" I was provided with food and lodging and I saw that others belonging to the committee were staying there. Voja Tankosič told me that the committee

aimed at learning to throw bombs and to practice destroying bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways. because a war might soon break out between Servia and Austria. I was conducted to a small house near the department of finances, where the offices of the committee were established, and in one of these offices I met Milan Pribicevic, who inscribed me for the committee. While he was writing, Milan Pribicevic asked me if Voja Tankosič had told me what duties I should have to perform as a Komitatschi, to which question I answered "Yes!" He told me that all who got themselves inscribed, must be industrious, strong and prepared for sacrifices. About 70 of us were inscribed at the time. In Belgrade we had nothing to do. After about six weeks our chief Tankosič told us that the Great Powers did not allow the committee and that we must leave Belgrade and hide in some remote place, where no strangers ever come. They sent us to the town Cuprija. Here we received instruction from the officers Voja Tankosič, Dušan Putnik, Zivko Gvosic, and Mitar Dinovic, who was afterwards involved in the Montenegro bomb-affair, and was shot in Montenegro.

We were not allowed to speak to anyone, so as not to betray our business, and no one learnt to know even how many of us there were. We practised throwing bombs, laying mines and destroying telegraphs, tunnels and bridges. Once in a fortnight came Milan Pribicevic, General Božo Jankovic, apothecary Skaric, deputy Zivko Rafailovic, a certain Glisic Milutin, an official in the department of finances, and all these watched us as we exercised and each time they paid for our board. Our teachers told us, that when the war broke out, we Komitatschis should go first, the volunteers directly behind us and behind them the regular army. In Cuprija we were about 140. Besides food, lodging and clothing we got 65 para per day for tobacco. The school lasted three months, that is up to March 1909. Then the members of the committee told us we were dismissed, each could go wherever he chose, the annexion of Bosnia and Herzegowina had been recognised by the Great Powers, there would be no work for our committee.

When the committee was dissolved, General Božo Jankovic told me I should be taken into the service of Božo

Milanovic in Sabač and paid 50 dinar a month. He did not say what sort of service this would be. I accepted, because I thought that as a Komitatschi I must obey General Jankovic's orders and also because I had to earn my bread somehow. So in March 1909 I went to Sabač and presented myself at Božo Milanovic, who is a merchant in Sabač. General Jankovic had told me that Božo Milanovic was the chief of the "Narodna odbrana" in Sabač, and that I should serve the "Narodna odbrana" at Milanovic's. When Božo Milanovic had read the letter I brought him from the General, he said that I should have to serve him faithfully and obey his orders. My principal duty would be to carry letters to the addresses on them. If I did not carry a letter to where it was directed, or if the letter came into other hands, this would cost me my life. On the very next day Božo Milanovic gave me a sealed letter, which I was to take to Čedo Lukic, a customs officer in Servian-Rača. On the way to Rača, in Bogatič, the captain of the District stopped me, took the letter, opened it and read it. The letter contained the instruction to Lukič to buy three boats immediately, that they might be ready, if wanted. Enclosed were onehundred dinars. The captain told me that he had strict orders not to allow the Komitatschis to undertake anything on their own account, as international diplomatic intervention might be the consequence. I went back to Sabač and reported to Božo Milanovic what had happened. Božo Milanovic complained to the District Prefect, who gave orders that the revolver, which the captain had confiscated, was to be returned to me. He also gave orders that the letter to Čedo Lukic was to be sent to its address. Letters of this kind I have carried from March 1909 to October 1910; 43 letters to Servian-Rača, 55 to Ložnica, 5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I do not know how many to Koviljaca. I remember how often I was in each place, because they are very far indeed from Sabač. The letters were addressed to the chiefs of the custom-houses in these places, and I got letters from them as answers, which I brought back to Božo Milanovic. I recollect having carried some few letters to Sepacka Ada. I had an assistant in the letter carrying, one Vaso Eric, a native of Srebenica. Once a

week I carried letters from Božo Milanovic to Belgrade, where I delivered them to Milan Pribicevic and Božo Jan-kovic. I did not know what was in the letters and no one ever told me what they were about. As far as I know, the letters, which Božo Milanovic sent away were not ciphered, but the letters sent back by the chiefs of the custom-houses, were written in signs, as I could see when Milanovic opened them. Once I brought Božo Milanovic a ciphered letter—I think from Zvornik—and with this Milanovic sent me to Mika Atanasijevic, a professor in Sabač, for him to put in plain writing. The professor did this, as he had done before, but he forgot to close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter said that money was being coined with the portrait of the Archduke, heir to the throne, and that this signified that Emperor Francis Joseph would abdicate. I had been eight months in the service of Božo Milanovic, when he gave me his card, on which there was a death-head and on which was written that I had been named a “confident” (povjerenik) of the “Narodna odbrana”. He told me that from now I should be used for *espionage*

From an officer, who was a member of the “Narodna odbrana” Dusan Opterkic, I learnt that the “Narodna odbrana” had 23 members in Bosnia and the Herzegowina. But I know nothing about the “Narodna odbrana” having an organisation in Bosnia. Milan Pribicevic from time to time gave me a revolver, or money to buy a revolver with, and these I had to give to the custom-house people on the frontier, who served as Komitatschis, because they had no revolvers and no money to buy them with. I think the gift of the revolver was a kind of distinction towards those, who were Komitatschi. This is all I ever had to do with weapons.

Once during my time of service with Božo Milanovic, I was told to go with a man to a peasant in Lijesnica on the Drina; we should hear from this peasant all that was necessary, and he was to show us how to get at a Servian officer of Reserves, Ljubo Stanaricic, who had fled from Bijeljina and whom we two were to kill. The committee of the “Narodna odbrana” had been informed, that this Ljubo

Stanaricic was a danger to the Servian State and had therefore decided that he must be killed.

Božo Milanovic gave me and this man the order to go to a certain place on the other side of the Drina, and there to kill Ljubo Stanaricic, who lived on the Bosnian side of the river, in the Bijeljina district. The man and I had stepped into the Drina, but finding the water deep, and seeing Ljubo walk round his house with a rifle over his shoulder, we turned back and went to the house of the peasant, who had showed us where to find Ljubo. I saw plainly that we could not kill the man with a knife, so I sent my companion back to Sabač, to tell Milanovic that it was impossible to kill Stanaricic in the way he wanted, that is with a knife. Božo Milanovic sent word that we were to kill him in any case. Then we decided that we would shoot him with a rifle. The orders were that the man with me was to fire at Stanaricic and kill him, and I was to look on and see that the thing was done. In the meantime a mounted gendarme came with instructions from the Prefect of the District in Sabač, according to which we were to return home and not carry out the orders we had received. And so we returned to Sabač.

In October 1910 I asked Božo Milanovic to raise my wages and when he refused to do this, I thanked for my job and left him. I went from Sabač to Belgrade where I met General Jankovic, who had me arrested, because I refused obedience. I was dragged through several prisons, during two months, for no other reason but because I had given notice and because they feared that I should betray their secrets. At last the authorities decided that I was to be sent to Bosnia. In Sabač a prisoner told me that it was my life they wanted. The gendarmes accompanied me as far as Zvornik, where they gave me up to Bosnian gendarmes. That is how I came to Bosnia in 1910.

I know nothing definite about a Black Hand, except what I have read in Servian papers. At this time I cannot remember what the papers said about the Black Hand. Nor do I know anything about a Black List. After the annexion there was in Servia a very general spite and dislike against

the person of the Austrian heir to the throne, who was universally regarded as the blood-enemy of the Servians.”

Krstanovic declared that what he had said, was all he knew. The following statements explain some of his depositions.

The committee into which Krstanovic was inscribed by Pribicevic was formed entirely by the “Narodna odbrana”. In the school of Cuprija there were from 20 to 22 subjects of the monarchy. Among the pupils was Ciganovic.

The school of Cuprija taught its pupils that all committees must be prepared to go to Bosnia by order of the “Narodna odbrana” and there act according to the instructions given by their superiors.

Supplement 6.

Extract from the documents of the District Court in Sarajevo concerning the judicial proceeding against Jovo Jaglicic and accomplices, accused of *espionage*.

In the year 1913 a system of *espionage*, carried on in favour of Serbia by Jovo Jaglicic and several accomplices in Bosnia, was discovered. The inquiry set on foot in Sarajevo brought to light among other things, the methods by which the propaganda for Greater Serbia is managed by the “Narodna odbrana”.

Jovo Jaglicic deposed that he met the ex-cattle-revisor in Foca, Petar Klarič, called Pešut—who in the autumn of 1912 fled to Montenegro and became a Komitatschi—for the first time in August or September 1912.

During the first meeting Klaric asked Jaglicic whether he knew Rade Milosevic from Kalinovic and when Jaglicic told him that Milosevic lay in hospital very ill, Klaric said: “It’s a pity if he dies, we have spoken wonderful things together. Did not he tell you about them?” When Jaglicic answered in the negative, Klaric said: “I have something

important to tell you. We are Servians and we must do something great for Servia. Come into my office."

In the office the following conversation took place:

"Jovan, I will tell you something. I do not know you and cannot tell if you will betray me. I will tell you all the same, and if you have the heart to do so, betray me!"

When Jaglicic asked what it was about, Klaric answered: "Brother, in Servia there is a Society, the 'Narodna odbrana'. A great many people should become members of this Society; many have been engaged to do so in the monarchy, especially in Bosnia and the Herzegowina; there are intelligent and well-to-do people among them, there are big heads too, and if they can do it, why should not we contribute something towards this cause also."

Jaglicic asked what kind of aims the Society had in view. To this Klaric answered: "The Society has this in view: Suppose you are in Kalinovic. You send me word what is going on there, how many soldiers and guns there are, how much ammunition, what sort of rifles, who has come, who is leaving and so forth. We have a secret writing, called "cipher" and correspond in that. If you are faithful I shall let you have it too."

Jaglicic was afraid that Klaric was only trying him, to betray him afterwards, and asked him to name some of the members. Klaric thought a while and then gave a name, which inspired Jaglicic with confidence.

Klaric then asked: "Shall I give you the cipher?" Jaglicic agreed and Klaric, who knew the signs by heart, wrote them down and gave them to Jaglicic.

Another time Klaric spoke of his stay in Banja-Koviljaca (near Ložnica) where he had been taught to throw bombs by the Servian captain Todorovic*) and when Jaglicic asked him what he had learnt that for, he answered: "If it comes to anything, such as I told you about, it will be necessary that I should know how to handle bombs, so that I can teach

*) Captain Kosta Todorovic was at that time frontier-commissioner and chief of the Servian *espionage* service for the frontier-line Rača-Ljubojja.

you, and you can learn to teach the others. Powder magazines and other important objects must be blown up, and for this we will get bombs from Servia.”

Then Klaric told him what the bombs were like, and added that he had already engaged people, who in case of a war would have to cut all the telegraph and telephone wires.

During these meetings Jaglicic also learnt from Klaric that it was among the duties of the members of the “Narodna odbrana” to induce Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert from the army in which they served, to enlist volunteers (Komitatschi), to organise bands, and to blow up military buildings and storehouses etc. Klaric told him that not even ciphered letters were sent through the post, when they were exchanged between Servian and Bosnian members, but were sent across the frontier by trustworthy messengers.

Klaric also told Jaglicic that at the time of the celebration of the Prosvjeta (September 1912) the deputation from Servia comprised a Servian major, who stayed in the Hotel Europe in Sarajevo*) and received the Bosnian members of the “Narodna odbrana” whom Klaric introduced to him, and who then took the oath.

Jaglicic learnt from a spy, that bombs had been delivered in Sarajevo or were about to be delivered, which came from Servia. They were made to look exactly like pieces of soap**). The spy, who told him this, had been promised some of these bombs, which would be either sent to him, or which he would have to fetch for himself.

*) Among the Servian delegates to the Prosvjeta celebration numbered the Servian Major Mika Jankovic.

***) The bombs used in the plot against the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and those found in the Save near Breka in 1913, which came from the Servian Arsenal in Kragujevac, may in fact be taken for pieces of soap.

Supplement 7.

Confidential Information on the "Narodna odbrana".

The chiefs and managers of the "Narodna odbrana" are taken from all political parties, and in this manner the progressists and even those, who hold conspiracies in abhorrence are wooed and won. The real *spiritus rector* of the Society is Major Pribicevic. The post of secretary is always occupied by an officer on leave.

It is the duty of the "Narodna odbrana" to organise and develop an effective propaganda among the military and civil elements of the South-Slav part of Austria-Hungary; to prepare for a revolution, to disturb eventual mobilisations, to cause, if possible, panics and revolts.

The organisation has a number of trusted men and emissaries in the monarchy, who are busy with a quiet propaganda from man to man; some have special missions, bribe and engage useful persons near bridges, railway junctions etc. if possible, railway officials and servants, who are in a position to carry out precise orders at a given moment. All relations between members of the "Narodna odbrana" are maintained as much as possible through personal contact.

The Society always tries to get its members from among the young, by preference workmen and railway people.

Supplement 8.

Extract from the Documents of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian District Court in Sarajewo concerning the inquiry against Gavrilo Princip and accomplices, accused of having assassinated on the 28th June 1914 His Imp. and Roy. Highness the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Este and Her Highness, the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg.

I. The Crime and the Criminals.

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubrilovic and Cetres Popovic confess to having together with the fugitive Mehemed Mehmedbasi organised a plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand and, provided with bombs and

Browning pistols had laid in wait for him on the 28th June 1914 with the intention of accomplishing the plotted murder during his drive through Sarajevo.

Nedeljko Cabrinovic confesses to having been the first to throw a bomb at the carriage of the Archduke, which however did not take aim and only wounded the occupants of the automobile, which followed the vehicle of the Archduke.

Gavrilo Princip confesses having fired two shots from a Browning pistol at the Archduke's automobile, by which Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg were mortally wounded.

Both criminals confess that they had the intention of murdering their victims.

These two confessions have been fully confirmed by the inquiry and it has been ascertained that the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the late Duchess of Hohenberg died in consequence of the shots fired at them by Gavrilo Princip.

II. Origin of the plot.

The accused made the following statements—which on the whole tally—before the examining judge:

In April 1914 Princip, during his stay in Belgrade, where he spent most of his time in coffee-houses with Servian students, conceived the plan of murdering the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. He discussed this plan with his acquaintance Cabrinovic who was also in Belgrade at the time, and had intentions similar to those of Princip, so that he was immediately ready to take part in Princip's plot. The idea of murdering the Archduke was often ventilated in the circle, in which Princip and Cabrilovic moved, the Archduke being considered a dangerous enemy of the Servian people.

The bombs and weapons required for such an attempt had to be obtained in some surreptitious way, as neither of the conspirators had money to buy them with. First they would try and obtain them from the "Narodna odbrana" or from Major Milan Pribicevic. But Major Milan Pribicevic and his representative in the Society, Zivojin Dacic were away on a journey; so they resolved to try and get the weapons from a former Komitatschi of their acquaintance, the State-Railways

official Milan Ciganovic. Princip found an intimate friend of Ciganovic, who induced the latter to call upon Princip, and to discuss the plan of the plot with him, of which he fully approved. After Cabrinovic had also spoken to him about the weapons, he said he must take time to think, before he consented to furnish the weapons for this deed.

At Easter Princip took into his confidence Trifko Grabez, who was also in Belgrade at the time and who, as he confesses, also declared he would take part in the assassination.

During the time which followed, Princip repeatedly spoke with Ciganovic about the execution of the plot.

In the meantime Ciganovic had come to an understanding on the subject of the plot with his friend, the Servian major Voja Tankosic, who subsequently offered to furnish the Browning pistols.

Grabez confirms the statements of Princip and Cabrinovic and confesses having accompanied Ciganovic to the dwelling of major Tankosic, at whose express wish this visit came about on the 24th May. When Grabez had been introduced Tankosic said: "Are you the one? Are you resolved?" Grabez answered: "I am!" When Tankosic asked: "Can you shoot with a revolver?" and Grabez answered in the negative, Tankosic said to Ciganovic: "I will give you a revolver. Go, and teach them to shoot."

After this Ciganovic conducted Princip and Grabez to the military shooting-stand in Topčider and in a neighbouring wood taught them to shoot with Browning pistols at a target. Princip proved the better marksman of the two. It was Ciganovic who later on taught Princip, Grabez and Cabrinovic the use of the bombs.

Conformable with the confessions of all three, Ciganovic on the 27th May 1914 gave Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez 6 bombs, 4 Browning revolvers, a sufficient quantity of ammunition and a glass tube of prussic acid, to enable them to preserve the secret by committing suicide after the deed. Ciganovic also gave them money.

At Eastertide Princip had already communicated the plan of the plot to Danilo Ilic. When he returned to Sarajevo he asked this Ilic to engage some more persons who were pre-

pared to take part in the deed, so that success might be ensured. Ilic according to his confession then engaged Vaso Cubrilovic, Cetres Popovic and Mehemed Mehmedbasic.

III. Origin of the bombs.

In the accomplishment of the assassination only one of the bombs was used. The other five bombs were discovered by the police in Sarajevo afterwards.

The experts declare these bombs to be Servian hand-grenades, manufactured wholesale and intended for military purposes. They were identified with the 21 bombs found in the river Save near Breka in 1913, some of which were still in their original packing, so that it could be proved that they came from the Servian arms depôt in Kragujevac.

It has thus been ascertained that the bombs used in the plot against the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, also came from the stores in the army-depôt of Kragujevac.

Grabez in speaking of the bombs handed to him and his accomplices, quite spontaneously calls them "Kragujevac bombs".

IV. Transport of the three conspirators and the weapons from Serbia to Bosnia.

It is Princip who makes the following statement:

Ciganovic told Cabrinovic, Grabez and Princip that they were to take their way by Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla and to leave the weapons with Misko Jovanovic in Tuzla. They were then to go to Sabac and report themselves to the Frontier Captain, Major Rade Popovic, for whom they had a paper, which Princip undertook to deliver. On the 28th May the three accomplices left Belgrade with their weapons. In Sabac Princip gave the paper he had received from Ciganovic to Major Popovic, who conducted the three to the Commander, where they received a passport, which asserted that one of them was a customs guard and the other two his comrades. The passport contained the name of the alleged customs guard, but this name Princip had forgotten. At the same time Major Popovic gave them a closed letter, for the

frontier captain in Loznica, whose name was either Pravanovic, Prdanovic or Predojevic.

Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez spent the night in Sabac and on the following morning took the railway to Loznica, and with the help of the passport procured for them by Major Popovic, they only paid half the price of the fare. At noon they arrived at Loznica, where they gave Popovic's letter to the frontier captain. The letter said: "Look to these people and take them across where you can." The frontier captain said he would call his guards from the frontier and would trust them to the safest man among them. He then telephoned and told the three accomplices to come to his office next morning at seven.

Next morning the three accomplices agreed that Cabrinovic should take the road to Zvornik openly with the passport of Grabez, whilst Princip and Grabez would cross the frontier on the sly. This plan was communicated to the frontier captain, and it was decided that a customs guard from Ljesnica, named Grbic should take Princip and Grabez to his Karaula and conduct them across the frontier. Cabrinovic went on foot to Banja Koviljaca in the direction of Zvornik. Princip and Grabez drove with the customs guard Grbic to Ljesnica where they deposited the bombs and revolvers in a room in the hotel. The customs guard saw the weapons as they were put away. Princip in describing this journey calls it mysterious.

In all things important Grabez made statements conform to those of Princip; only he added that Grbic had laughed when he saw the weapons and asked where they were going to in Bosnia with these bombs. The customs guard no doubt thought that Princip and Grabez must have been sent on a mission.

Grbic and a second customs guard took Princip and Grabez in a boat to an island in the Drina. Grbic told them to wait for a peasant, who would fetch them. They spent the night on the island, in a small cottage that Grbic had shown them. On the following day came a peasant, who in the next night led them, first through a bog and then over the mountains close to Priboj, where he delivered them to

the schoolmaster Cubrilovic, who seemed to have expected them, and who was to be their guide for the rest of the way.

He went with them to Tuzla and conducted them to Misko Jovanovic. Cabrinovic made much the same statements about the journey as Princip, up to the time when he separated from Princip and Grabez, only he added that Major Popovic had told them that he had arrived at Sabac from Belgrade a day previous to themselves.

He told the story of how they separated at Loznica, because it was too dangerous to travel all three together. The frontier captain praised them for their precaution when they told him, and gave Cabrinovic a letter for the schoolmaster M. Jaklojevic in Mali-Zvornik. Cabrinovic, before starting gave the bomb, the Browning and ammunition he carried, to Princip and Grabez and left in the company of a customs guard who was to take him to Mali-Zvornik.

Here he found Jaklojevic, to whom he gave the letter from the frontier captain. The schoolmaster sent word to the Servian frontier guard, and when later on Cabrinovic and Jaklojevic came to the frontier, there was already a man waiting with a boat to take him across the Drina to Great-Zvornik in Bosnia. From here Cabrinovic went to Tuzla to find Misko Jovanovic.

Additional Note.

At the moment when this memoir was completed, the District Court in Sarajevo presented the protocol of an examination, which shows that a few days before the 28th June 1914 a subject of the monarchy had been anxious to inform the Imp. and Roy. consulate in Belgrade that he had reasons to suppose, that there was a plan to assassinate Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his journey to Bosnia. This man was arrested on fictitious grounds by the Belgrade police, just as he was about to enter the consulate, and appears to have been subsequently prevented from giving his information. It must be concluded from the statement of the protocol that the Servian police organs in question must have known of the plan to assassinate the Archduke, and that the unknown man was arrested to prevent him from giving information.

Proofs of the correctness of this statement have not yet been obtained, so that its importance cannot at the present moment be judged. The inquiry on the subject has been instituted, and for this reason the details of the protocol cannot be repeated.

Supplement 9.

The Servian Press on the Outrage.

- a) The Belgrade paper "Balkan" on the 29th June writes about the two assassins:

Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a typographer by trade, was full of anarchist ideas and known as an unruly spirit. He was in Belgrade until 20 days ago, having come here after the war and found employment in the government printing offices. Before he left, he said that he was going to Trieste where he hoped to find work in a new printing firm. Gavrilo Princip was also in Belgrade until quite lately. During the war he had offered himself as a volunteer, but was not accepted and for this reason he left Belgrade. But he returned last year at Christmas, for some time visited the "Gymnasium" and left Belgrade about the same time as Cabrinovic, but by a different route. Princip was silent, nervous, learnt easily and kept company with students of a grammar school, who were also natives of Bosnia and Herzegowina. Lately he saw much of Cabrinovic. He inclined towards socialist ideas, although originally he numbered among the progressist youth. Like Cabrinovic he grew up in Sarajevo; since their childhood they had been inseparable friends.

- b) The paper "Piemont" of the 1st July reminds its readers that on the farsounding protest of the conspirator Zerajic, the protest of Princip has followed. The Bosnian government system explains both plots. The fact that Princip selected the sacred national day of Vidovdan for his vengeance, which had been chosen for the

manoeuvres, makes the desperate deed of the young martyr natural and easy to understand.

(The police confiscated the paper for this article, but on the very next day the Court of Belgrade annulled the confiscation.)

- c) The young-radical "Odjek" of the 3rd July says: Archduke Francis Ferdinand was sent to Sarajevo on the day of national enthusiasm, to celebrate a brutal manifestation of power and subjection. Such a brutal action must perforce provoke brutal feelings, resistance, hatred and revenge.
- d) The nationalist party-organ "Srpska Zastava" of the 3rd July in an article bearing the title: "Accusations and Threats" says: The assassination appears more and more a result of the unhealthy circumstances in the monarchy. On the other hand the outrageous persecution of the Servian people in Bosnia and the Herzegowina fills the entire civilised world with loathing."
- e) The progressist paper "Pravda" of the 31st July writes: "The Vienna politicians are cynics. They are making use of the death of the unfortunate couple for their despicable intentions against the Servian people."
- f) The "Agence des Balcons" of the 3rd July asserts: "The crimes committed against the Servians in Bosnia and the Herzegowina were committed under the auspices and by the direct orders of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities."
- g) The paper "Pravda" of the 4th July says: "All the murders and attempts to murder, committed up to the present in Austria, had the same origin. The suppressed peoples of the monarchy were obliged to resort to this kind of protest, because no other road was open to them. In the midst of chaotic tyranny, it is perfectly conceivable that an era of murderous attempts must follow."
- h) The paper "Balkan" of the 5th July remarks that Austria-Hungary "ought to be placed under international control for persecuting innocent people;" for Austria-Hungary is less consolidated than Turkey.

- i) The "Mali Journal" of the 7th July writes: "A descendant of the Middle Ages was murdered in Sarajevo these days. The one who murdered him was a boy, who felt the sufferings of his enslaved fatherland as a paroxysm, the sufferings which were inflicted by those, who had robbed the country of his fathers. What did official Austria do in return? Its answer was a general massacre, pillage and destruction of Servian life and property. This is the heroism practised by the worthless. Cowards are always great heroes when they know that they are safe. We need only compare Princip and Cabrinovic with these heroes and we will see a great difference. Civilisation and justice are great big lies in Austria-Hungary."
- j) The "Tribuna" of the 7th July says: "We entertain the belief that the murder of Sarajevo was arranged to make possible the total extirpation of the Servians at one blow."
- k) The "Piemont" of the 8th July learns from Bajina Baska that the Austrian authorities in Bosnia are preparing for a massacre of Christians.
- l) The "Balkan" of the 8th July publishes a report from Bosnia, with the title "A Bartholomeus-night in Sarajevo" and suggests that a boycott is to be organised against all Austrians living in Servia.
- m) "Mali Journal" of the 8th calls for a boycott against the Danube Steam-navigation-Company.
- n) "Nothing from Austria-Hungary" is the title of an article, in which the "Tribuna" of the 8th declares it would be best not to buy anything from Austria-Hungary, not to visit the Austrian and Hungarian health resorts, not to summon physicians from Austria-Hungary. If this advice were followed by private initiative, it might do a great deal of good. The State and the authorities need not interfere. All that is needed, is to appeal to the citizens.
- o) The "Stampa" of the 8th asserts that the police of Sarajevo subjects the arrested conspirators to the most shameless and inhuman torture, to force untrue con-

fessions from them, which will serve as accusations against the whole Servian people.

- p) The "Agence des Balcons" of the 9th July learns from Belgrade: "Absolutely reliable private information states that in Bosnia and the Herzegovina a general massacre of Servians is close at hand."
- q) The "Balkan" of the 9th July after quoting the British premier, Asquith's words: that he feared for the fate of humanity, spoken when he communicated the death of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, — gives a historical retrospect of the last 40 years events, from which it deduces, that during all this time the Servian people had to suffer a horrible martyrdom from Austria-Hungary's jesuitical policy. At last Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who like all the disciples of Loyola waded in human blood and followed the principle that the aim sanctions the means, suffered a just fate and fell a victim to jesuitism, just as all Austria will be some day. The ruin of Austria-Hungary will be what will procure peace and quiet to all the world. If all these truths be resumed into a few words, we may come to the conclusion, that Asquith might have listened to the news of the Archduke's death in comfort, and might have said: "I no longer fear for the fate of humanity!"
- r) The "Politica" of the 9th July publishes a leading article, called: "Impudent Lies" in which it says: "The way in which the Inquiry on the Sarajevo murder is conducted, shows plainly what aims Austria has in view in this matter. As the conspirators, notwithstanding the tortures, to which they are exposed, will not say what is asked of them, other individuals were found, who under certain conditions were prepared to admit a partial complicity in the deed, and at the same time accused all those, whom Austria wishes to see guilty. This method has been successful so far, since these bribed individuals make all the statements that are required of them and the Austrian police takes good care to spread these lies in all directions. Austria feels no shame and believes

firmly that people will be found, who will set value upon these lies."

- s) The "Stampa" of the 9th says that many of the things, which happened in Bosnia and in the Herzegowina have not yet been discovered and made public. Some things are kept a profound secret. But the truth will come out sooner or later. Bloodthirsty Austria wants to get enough Servian blood and will not stop until it is satiated. There is a report that at present there are about 10.000 dead and wounded in Bosnia.
- t) The "Politica" of the 10th July addresses the vilest insults to the members of the Imperial House.
- u) The commercial paper "Trgovinski Glasnik" of the 10th of July speaks of the improbity and disloyalty of Austria-Hungary's, policy which it calls jesuitical, regardless of the interests of others and dishonourable. This policy is a permanent warning to the Servians in Austria-Hungary, reminding them that they are not living in a cultured State, where life and property are guaranteed, but that each Servian must always be prepared and well-armed, to defend himself against the robberies of the authorities and the government. After the latest events, the Servian people must cease to wait like a lamb which may be slaughtered any day, but must become a lion, who defends himself in blood.
- v) In the "Stampa" of the 10th July is said: Nothing lasts for ever and Austria-Hungary will certainly not remain for ever in Bosnia and the Herzegowina. The time is not far, when the Servians, who broke the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will patrol round the Ivan Planina on the Trebevic.
- w) The "Pravda" of the 10th July calls an article: "Boycott against the Reprobates" and demands that all Austrian firms in Belgrade and all Austrian goods be boycotted. It is the duty of the "Narodna odbrana" to provide that the boycott should be strictly carried through.
- x) The "Zvono" of the 16th July asserts that Princip is the son of Countess Lonyay, whose mission it was to avenge

the death of Crownprince Rudolph upon his murderer Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

- y) "Mali Journal" of the 19th July publishes a report, which says: Princip was bribed by an Austro-Hungarian agent to commit the murder. It is reported in Vienna that the real originator of the crime must be sought in the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Belgrade.
- z) The leading young-radical paper "Odjek" of the 20th July writes: Austria-Hungary gives onehundred proofs that it deserves the name of the Sick Man in Europe. Whilst in Servia not a single Austrian subject suffered the least annoyance, villages and cities were pillaged in Bosnia and in the Herzegowina. This fact is but a fresh proof of how much higher stand the culture and morals of Servia than those of Austria-Hungary.
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Supplement 10.

The Local Committee of the "Narodna odbrana" in Nish on the plot against the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

The Imp. and Roy. Foreign Office has received confidential information from a perfectly reliable agent, whose name may eventually be given, according to which the local committee of the "Narodna odbrana" in Nish has recently held a meeting, in which the member in the chair, director of the prison, Jaša Nenadovic spoke of the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the following terms:

It was absolutely necessary that Servia should at last make use of such means, because of the aggressive and excentric character of this prince, which would have become an eminent and fatal danger for Servia, possibly for the Slav world beyond Servia. Had he lived, he would shortly have declared war to Servia, or attacked Servia in some other way, in which case Servia, being weak just now, and not ready with the reorganisation of its army, would have been lost. The murder of Sarajevo has saved Servia and has removed one of those, who would have been a danger to Servia. Servia will have peace for some years and the new heir to the

throne will think twice, before he takes to the ways of his predecessor.

Although he knew, the speaker said, that the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand would be a heavy blow to Austria-Hungary and a painful surprise, on which would follow tortures for our people living there, still he could not have believed that his expectations would be surpassed in such a degree and that the Croatsians would behave as they did. All his friends in Bosnia and Herzegowina had assured him, that the Austro-Hungarian authorities were cowardly and not allowed to act with any exaggeration; but unfortunately these friends deceived themselves and us besides. If things go on as they are going on at present, bombs and revolvers will have to play their part more than ever. Whatever our Servian God sends us, we cannot let things go on like this.

This speech was fully approved and much applauded by all present.

Supplement 11.

Additional Notes after Print.

1. With Supplement 8.

Schoolmaster Čubrilo^{vi}ć, who undertook to guide Princip and Grabež from Priboj, has made a full confession, in which the following facts are important:

In 1911, when the Sokol-excursion to Sabac took place, Čubrinovic was initiated into the aims of the "Narodna odbrana" by Božo Fovic, a prominent member of the Society, and was soon afterwards made commissioner of the Society in Zvornik (Bosnia). By his suggestion Misko Jovanovic was named commissioner of the "Narodna odbrana" in Tuzla.

Communication with the "Narodna odbrana" was kept up by a peasant, the same peasant, who had conducted Princip and Grabez to Čubrilo^{vi}ć with the message that he was bringing him two Servian students with weapons. From this message he knew that he was receiving instructions from the "Narodna odbrana". Princip and Grabez told him that they

carried weapons, with which they would attempt to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

2. Pictures hostile to the monarchy in the War-department in Belgrade.

In the Reception-room of the Royal Servian War Office hang four allegorical pictures of which three are Servian victories in war, and the fourth a representation of Servian ambitions, hostile to the monarchy.

Over a landscape, partly mountainous (Bosnia), partly flat (South-Hungary), the “*zora*” is rising, this being supposed to signify the dawn of Servian hope. In the foreground of the picture stands a female figure in armour, on whose shield are inscribed the names of “the provinces, which have yet to be liberated”: Bosnia, Herzegowina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia etc.

49.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 297.

Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

Russian armaments.

German military attaché in Petersburg reports that Gardes-du-Corps have received orders to return to Krasnojesele, also that all regiments must return to their garrisons, and manoeuvres are interrupted.

At the same time the German General Staff has received news, which are not considered certain, but according to which four years of Russian reserves have been called to arms. If this should be confirmed, the German General Staff thinks that it means, that the general mobilisation has been ordered in Russia.

Besides this there are news, also not quite reliable, that the military districts of Moscow, Warsaw, Kiew and Odessa have been mobilised.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 541.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.—Confidential.

The secretary of the minister of Foreign Affairs paid me a visit in the sick-room to-day, to enquire after my health in the name of the minister.

An unofficial discussion on our conflict with Servia followed. My visitor, who no doubt did but reflect the opinion of his chief, harped on the tone of our note, which would have been unacceptable to every State; on the fact that the note was not sooner communicated to the Powers, so that they had no obligations, and that it was subsequently communicated to give them an opportunity of interfering, which was a contradiction of the assertion, that the whole affair concerned no one but Servia and us. If that was so, what was the communication to the Signatory Powers for? We could surely not expect Italy, who had been neither asked nor informed, to draw its sword for us in the eventuality that the conflict became serious. If we should decide for temporary or permanent occupation in Servia, there could not be any doubt, that Italy had a right to compensations.

I disputed all these arguments seriously, and in the course of the discussion made the regrettable discovery, which did not however surprise me, that Signor Biancheri founded his arguments on a perfect understanding between Rome and Berlin, on all three points, the criticisms on the form of our note, the delay in sending it to the Powers and above all the question of compensations. (Vide the Daily report of the 20th inst. of the conversation between your Excellency and Herr von Tschirschky.*)

I am convinced that Italy will approach us with propositions of mediation or compensation. It is my belief that we should decline all such offers, take no engagements and let government and press raise whatever cry they like. The

*) Vide I, No. 35.

more resolved and inexorable we show ourselves, the more we will gain in the eyes of Italy.

51.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. ambassadors in Rome and in Berlin.

Address: *Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

1. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 887,
2. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 272.

Private.

1.—2.

The Italian ambassador came to the Foreign Office to-day and referring to the conflict between the monarchy and Servia, declared that the Royal Italian government would, in case this conflict brought about a warlike complication, and would lead to the occupation of Servian territory, even if it were but temporary, claim its right of compensation, based upon Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. The Royal Italian government overmore believes that the same article of the treaty compels us to come to an understanding previous to occupying any portion of Servian territory.

In every other respect the Royal Italian government will in an eventual war between Austria-Hungary and Servia observe a friendly attitude in perfect accord with its duties as an ally.

ad 1.

The above is for your Excellency's strictly private information. I must add that I have not yet had an opportunity for explaining to the duke of Avarna our point of view with regard to the declaration contained in the above.

As it is uncertain up to the present, whether we will decide for a temporary occupation and to what extent, I consider it unnecessary to open a discussion on the subject just now, and will do my best to postpone it.

Your Excellency will seek an opportunity for expressing my pleasure and satisfaction that he should at this early period have announced the friendly attitude of Italy in the eventuality of a war.

ad 2.

Your Excellency will communicate the above in strict privacy to Herr von Jagow and will remark to him that the early announcement, that Italy will observe a friendly attitude, conform with its duties as an ally, has given me sincere satisfaction.

Your Excellency will overmore remark that I have not as yet had an opportunity of communicating our point of view with regard to Article VII in its Italian interpretation to the duke of Avarna. The German government already knows that in a certain sense we differ from the Italian interpretation. We should not like to bring about a controversy on this subject just now, but will avoid useless explanations, which might lead to disagreement. We will on the contrary call the Italian government's attention to the fact, that as we do not plan the occupation of Servian territory—transitory war operations cannot be regarded in the light of even temporary occupation—the compensation question need not be taken into consideration even from the Italian point of view.

As it is uncertain up to the present, whether we will decide for a temporary occupation and to what extent, I consider it unnecessary to open a discussion on the subject just now and will do my best to postpone it.

52.

**Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. ambassadors in
Rome and Berlin.**

Address: *Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

1. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 3567,
2. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 3568.

Private.

A decree of the 20th inst. *) No. 3437 communicated to your Excellency the arguments, which we should make use of, if on the Italian side an attempt would be made to raise difficulties against our action in Servia, by an arbitrary interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty.

Your Excellency has also been informed, that I think it undesirable that a discussion, which could scarcely lead to satisfactory results, should be the cause of even the slightest irritation between the governments in Vienna and Rome.

But we must reckon with the possibility of Italy's insisting, and it is not altogether improbable that the Marchese di San Giuliano will attempt to describe our attitude during the Lybian war, as having been a hindrance to Italy's action and will use the argument, that we then referred him to Article VII.

The question of the interpretation of Article VII in the case of the territory of the Balkan States has nothing whatever to do with the application of the article to the fact of Italy's occupation of islands in the Aegean Sea. What I am anxious about, is that we should succeed in refuting a reproach from Italy, that we had at that time acted in an unfriendly manner, not conform with the duties of an ally.

For this end I think it desirable that your Excellency should receive a short summary of the attitude we observed during the Lybian war.

Although the duke of Avarna on the 26th September 1911 declared, in the name of his government, that Italy's action would be circumscribed by the Mediterranean and that nothing would be undertaken, that could collide with Italy's present policy of maintaining the *status quo* on the Balkan, the Marchese di San Giuliano one month later had changed to this point of view: "*nous nous sommes toujours réservé la liberté des opérations militaires en dehors des côtes ottomanes de l'Adriatique et de la Mer Jonienne*" (we always reserved for

*) Vide I, No. 32.

ourselves the liberty of military operations outside the Ottoman coast of the Adriatic and of the Ionian Sea).

All that Count Aehrenthal did in view of this situation marking at the same time the exceedingly friendly attitude of Austria-Hungary, was to call attention to dangers that might arise in the Balkans if Italy decided for a military action on the coast of the Aegean Sea and to explain, that even a temporary occupation of the coast of the Aegean Sea by Italy would not be conform with the provisions of Article VII.

Our reserved attitude in the face of Italy's subsequent plans of action, were explained by the fact, that had Austria-Hungary given its consent, it would have had to bear the responsibility, if Italy acted in opposition to the declarations made at the beginning of the war, or if it departed in any way from its duties as an ally.

Our friendly attitude and our honest efforts to avoid any disturbing discussion between the allies, while Italy was involved in war, is plainly shown by what Count Aehrenthal said to the German ambassador (end of November 1911). Herr von Tschirschky was told, that we should endeavour to avoid entering into the details of how far the Italian operations would extend to the Asian coast. We had no intention to make difficulties for the Italian government, or even to let the government suppose that we could have made such difficulties.

We gave a further proof of our friendly attitude when in February 1912 England proposed demanding the assurance from Italy, that it would renounce every kind of action against the Dardanelles. It was our declining attitude—assumed at the instances of the Marchese di San Giuliano—that prevented the English proposition from being accepted. The monarchy did more; it denied the rumours that Austria-Hungary had received promises with regard to the Dardanelles from Italy, both in London and in Constantinople.

When Herr von Tschirschky on the 6th April 1912 again spoke of Italy's intentions to extend the scene of its operations, he was told, that we must adhere to our belief that we should

bear a portion of Italy's responsibility, if we consented to its action, but at the same time we admitted, that Italy might, if it planned a temporary action on territory which excluded danger to the Balkans, count upon our silent, passive attitude. It would however be better to avoid the discussion of special operations.

In the conversations, held with the duke of Avarna on the 13th and the 15th April 1912 we declared that, to show our complaisance towards the allied government, we would take exception to the islands at the Southern end of the Aegean Sea, which might be considered as lying in the Mediterranean, that is Rhodos and Karpathos, as also the reef Stampalia (Astropalia) and would not protest against their occupation. The only condition we made, was that the Italian government should guarantee the temporary character of the occupation.

We have a report from Count Szögyény, dated 21st May 1912, stating that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter acknowledged our conciliatory attitude in the Italian action of the Archipelagus with thanks. On the day following, in a conversation with the duke of Avarna, referring to the meanwhile accomplished occupation of Kos and a number of small neighbouring islands, the ambassador reproached us for protesting against the occupation of the islands. Of course we did not admit this reproach as justified and declared there had been no "protest" but that we had merely mentioned our legitimate rights, deducted from Article VII, but would for the present not make use of them.

Then followed negotiations with Italy to obtain in writing the promise given in April, that the character of the occupation should be temporary, but these had no chance of leading to a satisfactory result, on the contrary, so many points of differing had arisen in the course of discussion, that a real dissension seemed about to arise. To avoid this, we withdrew our demand for a declaration in writing; this was towards the end of June 1912. Our friendly attitude was acknowledged in a letter from the duke of Avarna, dated 5th July 1912, in which he said that his government would in future exert itself

to make the ties of friendship and of the alliance closer than ever.

From all this it may be clearly seen, that though we took care of the right conferred by the treaty in an unequivocal manner, still we did not in any way hinder Italy's actions. We refused our expressed consent to actions, from which we apprehended dangerous consequences for the Balkans, and because we would not share the responsibility for these, but all we did, was to warn Italy with regard to the threatening consequences. Subsequent events proved that we were right. What has here been said, proves that we acted according to our duties as an ally and showed all possible courtesy, but avoided discussions, which might have had a perturbing effect upon the intimate relations between Vienna and Rome.

The above is for the present to the exclusive personal information of your Excellency, and only in case the Marchese di San Giuliano should reproach us with having neglected the duties of friendship and of an ally, you will use the arguments, that will seem most likely to convince him of the contrary.

2.

Conform with the contents of my telegram of the 22nd inst.*), I am sending Your Excellency a copy of a private decree, written for Herr von Mérey, of which you will only make use, if Herr von Jagow attempts to show that our attitude towards Italy during the Lybian campaign was otherwise than perfectly friendly and conform with the duties of an ally.

53.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 886.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered telegram.

Count Szögyény telegraphs on the 25th inst.**).

“Strictly private.”

*) Vide I, Nr. 48.

**) Vide II, Nr. 31.

State-secretary told me to-day Italian ambassador showed some surprise that your Excellency had not informed his government—as an allied Power—of our step in Belgrade at an earlier date.

Herr von Jagow answered him that Germany had not been communicated with any earlier and he (Jagow) considered this quite correct, because the conflict must be regarded as an affair, which exclusively concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia.

The above would be telegraphed to the German ambassador in Rome, so that he should know what to say, and he was overmore requested to add, if the Marquis di San Giuliano gave him the opportunity, that Italy had not either informed its ally before sending an ultimatum of 24 hours to Turkey."

The above for your Excellency's information and as a guide to your speech.

54.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 125.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.

Servia.

In the Foreign Office I was shown in strictest confidence a telegram from the French representative in Belgrade, with the condensed Servian answer to our Note, which had been shown to him before it was sent.

According to this extract, Servia accepts all our points unconditionally, declares that it will modify the Press laws and merely begs detailed information on the participation of our organs in the judicial inquiry in Servia, to which it does not object in principle.

Monsieur Berthelot expressed much surprise that this answer, which is equal to a capitulation, was not accepted. I answered that I did not know the text of the Servian answer and must suppose that it contains reservations, which modify the apparent conciliatory character of the answer and make it unacceptable.

If Serbia has in truth unconditionally accepted our demands, I am afraid that our intransigent attitude will make a very bad impression here.

Monsieur Berthelots speech was in all other things very conciliatory; he expressed the hope that Servias submissive yielding would form a basis for further negotiations.

Above-mentioned telegram appears to have been 20 hours on the road; a fact Berthelot mentioned without however commenting on it.

55.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 128.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.

Baron Schoen has, as instructed, communicated the fact, that Count Szápáry communicated in Petersburg, that we are resolved not to touch the territorial integrity of Serbia. The representative of the minister of Foreign Affairs received this assurance with manifest pleasure.

The German ambassador added the request that France would—as Germany had already done—use its influence in Petersburg to make Russia advise submission to Serbia.

The minister declared that France was most anxious to see the conflict end by conciliation, but expressed surprise, that the Servian note, which seemed to comply with all our wishes, should have been found unacceptable.

He also spoke of Herr Sazonows idea, that as the Servian declaration of 1909 had been notified to the Powers, so should these be invited to examine the attitude of Serbia, and for this purpose the *dossier* offered by Austria-Hungary should be asked for, and looked into. Baron Schoen explained the impracticability of this idea, and the minister admitted that in this case we could not submit to a European Areopagus.

56.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 129.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.

The circumstance, that according to all Paris newspaper reports the Servian government accepted all our demands and only asked particulars on some points which it accepts also, but that all the same we declared the answer to be unacceptable, has made a very bad impression here, and is interpreted in this way: that we want war at any cost.

I am telling everybody that the official text has not yet been published and that it probably contains reservations which make the concessions illusory.

Objections against possibility of war are still very strong, but public opinion is beginning to get accustomed to the idea.

57.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London*).

Telegram No. 170.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered telegram.

Herr von Tschirschky, as instructed, informed me to-day that a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky sent from London on the 25th inst. at 3 p. m. contains a sketch of Servia's answer, communicated by Sir E. Grey. The accompanying letter remarks that he (Sir E. Grey) hopes the cabinet of Berlin will advise the acceptance of the answer, seeing it is truly conciliatory.

I think it advisable that your Excellency should speak on the subject with the State-secretary and call his attention to the fact, that at the same time, when he addressed his letter to Prince Lichnowsky, that is at 3 p. m. yesterday, Servia had already given orders for a general mobilisation of the army. This proves that in Belgrade there appears to have been no disposition for a conciliatory ending to our con-

*) Compare the text in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 29.

flict. The answer, which was by no means satisfactory and which appears to have been previously telegraphed to London, was not presented to our minister in Belgrade until 6 p. m., after the orders for the mobilisation had been given.

58.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 112.

London, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.

Communicated, as instructed, the cessation of diplomatic relations in Servia to this government. Sir Edward Grey being absent, I spoke to Sir A. Nicolson, who confessed to being much disquieted, but still hopes that some means will be found to prevent hostilities from breaking out.

He has heard as good as nothing from Paris, from Petersburg only that there is much excitement.

In to-day's Sunday-paper "Observer" an excellent, unprejudiced leading article.

59.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry in Petersburg.

Telegram No. 185.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.

I request Your Excellency to find an opportunity of speaking to Herr Sazonow in the sense of the ciphered decree (No. 3530 of the 25th inst.) which arrives in Petersburg to-morrow morning*).

As to the question of a prolongation of the term of the ultimatum, which, as you know from my telegram of yesterday

*) Vide II, No. 42.

No. 173*) Prince Kudacheff proposed here, my telegram of the 24th inst. No. 169**) gives you all necessary information.

60.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 163.

Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

Ciphered.

Military attaché asks me to communicate the following to the Chief of the General Staff***):

News reach here from different sides, that the military districts, Kiew, Warsaw, Odessa and Moscow have received orders to mobilise and to call up the reserves, the districts Petersburg and Wilna and probably also Kasan are to prepare for mobilisation, without reserves.

All over European Russia the troops have orders to return to their garrisons.

These dispositions will be followed by extensive movements of troops and it will be difficult to discern, which movements are due to the mobilisation and which to the troops returning from leave to their garrisons.

Surprise was caused yesterday when the military cadets were made officers and it is supposed that this was the case in all military schools.

Camping in Krasnoje-Selo was broken up yesterday.

The first Guards-cavalry-division was summoned to Petersburg a few days ago, to suppress the strike, which is much less discernible in consequence.

35 Servian officers, who were doing service here, left for home via Roumania.

During the Parade in' camp on the 12th inst., general feeling seemed much excited and aggressive, contrasting with what one could observe on the 11th, but in military circles a belief prevails that Austria-Hungary is only bluffing.

*) Vide II, No. 39.

**) Vide communication of Count Mensdorff's telegram from London, dated July 23, No. 107; compare I, No. 59.

***) Was communicated direct.

My Turkish colleague told me in strict confidence to-day, that between Turkey and Bulgaria an alliance exists, a fact which up to the present he had always denied.

My Roumanian colleague tries to please both sides; he appears to be instructed to betray something of Russia's intentions and mobilisation movement.

Bulgarian colleague refuses to believe that Russia is disposed to interfere actively.

It is difficult to judge things correctly, but the excessively aggressive war party is working hard, "to excite public feeling, which might then carry along the government".

61.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 168.

Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

Cipher.—Private.

I intentionally refrained from mentioning the rumours of Russian mobilisation measures to Herr Sazonow to-day, to allow my German colleague to be the first to do so. Immediately after my visit, Count Pourtalès very gravely called the Russian minister's attention to the fact, that in our times mobilisation measures were a very dangerous diplomatic weapon. In such cases the purely military reasons of the General Staffs prevail and if for instance Germany takes offence, there is no stopping things. Herr Sazonow gave his word of honour to the German ambassador, that the rumours of a mobilisation were false, that up to that moment not a horse and not a reserve had been called to service, that what was going on were preparatory measures in the military districts, Kiew and Odessa, perhaps in Kasan and Moscow also.

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German military attaché received an invitation through a courier, from the War minister Suchomlinow, who had heard that Count Pourtalès

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Redbook Nr. 28.

had spoken to the minister of Foreign Affairs on the Russian armaments, and as he might have misunderstood some military details, the Warminister was anxious to give detailed information. Major von Eggeling compiled this information and the impressions he received, in a telegram to Berlin, of which he allowed me to take a copy.

Military attaché reports on his conversation with the War minister: Herr Sazonow requested him to explain the military situation to me. The War minister gave me his word of honour, that no order for the mobilisation had as yet been given, At present preparatory measures were being taken; not a horse and not a reserve had been called to service. If Austria crosses the Servian frontier, the military districts in the direction of Austria—Kiew, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan—will be mobilised. But under no circumstances any of those along the German front—Warsaw, Wilna, Petersburg. It is the urgent desire of Russia to remain at peace with Germany. My question what the mobilisation against Austria was for, was answered by a shrug of the shoulders and some words about diplomatists. I explained to the minister that the friendly intentions towards us would certainly be highly valued, but that even the mobilisation against Austria would be regarded as seriously threatening. The minister several times repeated in the most impressive way, Russia's wish and also its necessity to maintain the peace. He impressed me as being excessively nervous and disquieted. I believe the wish for peace to be sincere, the military information so far true, that a complete mobilisation has not as yet been ordered, but that very extensive measures are in course of preparation. Efforts are being made to gain time for further negotiations and for completing armaments. There can be no doubt that the interior situation is a source of grave apprehension, and probably the cause of general feeling. Hopes are placed in Germany and in His Majesty as mediator. Although the speedy information of the German military attaché proves the excessive nervousness of Sazonow, and the mobilisation against Austria alone, if it crosses the Servian frontier, may be due to diplomatic influence, still the want of sincerity in Russian assurances, the absence of a perfect understanding between Russian diplomatic and military

persons, and above all, the importance of gaining time for the mobilisation, must be taken into account.

The character of the military measures, which are being taken, is especially well-suited to the dissembler. Emperor Nicholas, since warlike measures, which he detests, are avoided and at the same time, eventualities are prepared for. On the other hand, future military passivity is counted upon, a game which should in good time be spoiled by Germany's consistent attitude.

62.

**Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. ambassadors in
Berlin, Rome, London and Paris.**

Vienna, July 16, 1914.

Ciphred telegram.

Address:

1. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 270,
2. Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 884,
3. Count Mensdorff, London, No. 172,
4. Count Szécsen, Paris, No. 163*).

1.—4.

Servia having refused to accept the demands we have addressed to it, we have broken off the diplomatic relations with this country.

I request your Excellency to visit

ad 1.

the Imperial Chancellor or State minister von Jagow

ad 2.

the Marchese di San Giuliano or his representative

ad 3.

Sir Edward Grey or his representative

ad 4.

the minister of Foreign Affairs or his representative

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 28.

ad 1.—4.

and to address him in something like these words:

The Royal Servian government has refused to comply with the demands we have found necessary to address to it, to protect our threatened vital interests and thereby given us notice that it will not give up the subversive movement and the aims by which it causes incessant disturbance in some of our frontier countries, which it might ultimately disjoin from the body of the monarchy.

To our sincere regret and much against our will, we have been placed before the necessity to compel Serbia by the strongest measures to completely alter its past hostile attitude.

Ad 1.

The Imperial German government is well aware, that we are not entertaining aggressive tendencies, but that after many years of patient toleration, we have at last decided for an act of self-defense, if in the face of the intrigues for a Greater Serbia we are compelled to draw our sword.

We are sincerely gratified, to find that the Imperial German government and indeed all German people, fully agree with us that, now the inquiry has shown that the assassination of Sarajevo was plotted in Belgrade and accomplished by persons sent from there, our patience must be exhausted, and we must now strive with all means in our power to obtain a guarantee, that things will not go on as they do at present along our South-Eastern frontier. We hope that our disagreement with Serbia will not lead to further complications; should this be the case, we acknowledge with gratitude that Germany, in its faithful loyalty, remembers its duty as our ally and will support us in a war forced upon us by a new enemy.

ad 2.

The Royal Italian government is well aware that we are not entertaining aggressive tendencies, and that it is an act of self-defence, if, after years of patient toleration we at last decide to meet the intrigues of Greater Serbia with the sword. Rome will not refuse to give testimony, that we have for many years used great patience towards Serbia under undue provocation, although the development of Servian propaganda

filled us with increasing anxiety. Now that the inquiry has brought forth results, which prove beyond a doubt that the assassination in Sarajevo has been prepared in Belgrade and accomplished by agents sent from there, now that we know that Serbia does not shrink from the most violent means of promoting its aims, we are at last convinced that it is high time for us to obtain the certainty that the activity of Serbia on our South-Eastern frontier will be stopped for all times.

The peaceable means of inducing Serbia to change its attitude towards us, being completely exhausted, it is to be feared, that the question will have to be decided by the force of arms.

When Italy, a short time ago, was compelled to resort to war to assert its position in the Mediterranean, and to protect its economical interests, we showed our friendly dispositions as an ally, rejoiced in the success of Italian arms and readily recognised the extension of the Italian sphere of influence.

In conformity with these our friendly feelings, the duke of Avarna has now declared in the name of his government, that in case an armed conflict should break out between us and Serbia, Italy will be faithful to its duties as an ally, a declaration, which we acknowledge with grateful gratification.

ad 3.—4.

We have, as the

ad 3.

Royal British

ad 4.

French

ad 3.—4.

government well knows during quite a number of years, done all in our power to live on good terms with our unruly neighbour, although his provocations increased in such a manner, as to render this more difficult every year. Our patience necessarily found its end when the bloody plot of Sarajevo, planned in Belgrade and carried out by agents sent from there, showed all the world what terrible fruits had ripened under Servian propaganda; how it constantly threatened

the integrity of the monarchy, and what despicable means and tools Servia is not too proud to use, to promote its aims.

The

ad 3.

Royal British

ad 4.

French

ad 3.—4.

government will understand that we think the moment has come, when with the greatest energy we must obtain the certitude that Servian aspirations are indeed being suppressed, so that we may trust that quiet and order are being reestablished in our South-Eastern countries.

As all the peaceable means to attain this end, have been exhausted, the ultimate decision will eventually have to be left to our arms. The Austro-Hungarian government has not decided lightly in this sense and only because whilst it harbours no aggressive tendencies whatever, the step it takes, is an act of self-defense, which can no longer be delayed. The government believes that it is serving the interests of Europe, if it deprives Servia of the possibility of remaining a disturbing element in Europe in the future, as it has been during the last ten years.

ad 3.

The highly developed love of justice of the British people and of its leading Statesmen, cannot consider us to be in the wrong, if we should have to resort to the sword to defend what is ours, if at last we come to an explanation with a people, whose hostile policy has compelled us to contrive costly measures, deprecatory to the well-being of our nation. Trusting to the happily reestablished, traditionally friendly relations with England, we may rely upon the sympathies of the Royal British government in a war, which has been forced upon us, and may hope that it will support the efforts, which are being made to localise the conflict.

ad 4.

During the crisis of the annexion, France gave us valuable proofs of a just valuation of our political aims at that time;

we hope that France will not refuse its sympathies in a war which has been forced upon us and will support the efforts which are being made to localise the war, if it cannot be avoided.

63.

Conversation between Count Berchtold and the German ambassador.

Daily report No. 3577.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

The German ambassador came to visit me on the 26th July, as he had been instructed to communicate the contents of a telegram of the German ambassador in Rome, which refers to a conversation with the Marchese di San Giuliano on the crisis between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

The Italian minister of Foreign Affairs is reported to have spoken in an excessively irritated tone of our step in Belgrade, and to have declared that it is nothing less than an aggressive act, for the consequences of which, the Italian government cannot certainly allow itself to be made responsible. The Triple Alliance Treaty is of a purely defensive nature, our advance into Serbia is decidedly offensive, and if Russia should be involved in the conflict, there would be no *casus foederis* for Italy and Italy would remain passive.

Baron Flotow tried in the course of the conversation, which lasted several hours, to convince the minister and persuade him that our action was a case of necessary defence and self-preservation, overmore that, should Austria-Hungary and Germany be obliged to meet Russia on military ground, this also would be but a defensive action, so that according to the conditions of the Treaty Italy's duty would be to fight on our side.

Marchese di San Giuliano, who defended his views with much perseverance, spoke of the enormous difficulties, which public opinion would create for him in the face of this conflict, in which public sympathies were not on our side, but entirely with our enemy. Before concluding, he declared that according to Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty,—even if there

was but a temporary occupation of Balkan territory,—we should be compelled to admit compensation and Italy would certainly insist upon the fulfilment of these stipulations.

Herr von Tschirschky, in communicating these facts, informed me, that on this point the German government was of the way of thinking of the Italian government, since—inconvenient as it was in the present case—every occupation, temporary or otherwise, of territory “*dans les régions des Balcons*” whether on Austria-Hungary’s or on Italy’s part, gave the other party the right of compensation, after a previous arrangement.

My remark, that we held a different view on this subject, because according to the meaning of the Triple Alliance Treaty and specially of its Article VII, the rights of compensation here in question could only apply to Turkish territory, was answered by Herr von Tschirschky with the remark that “unfortunately” the text of Article VII perfectly justified the claim of Italy, so that the German government must in this question side with the Italian government; two votes would stand against one.

I did not conceal my surprise that the Roman cabinet should in this question, assume such an inflexible attitude. During the Lybian campaign, the Italian troops had occupied quite a number of Ottoman islands in the Aegean Sea, and we could have claimed the right of compensation. I had consented to the occupation of Rhodos, Karpathos and Stambalia, because they are situated where the Aegean Sea joins the Mediterranean, only remarking that the rest of the islands decidedly belonged to the Aegean Sea, and we had undoubtedly a right to compensation. I did not make good our right at the time, but if Italy will give the Article in question such a wide and inflexible interpretation, we should certainly put forth our claims in our turn. It was moreover my opinion that, since we had no intention of occupying Servian territory, temporarily or otherwise—transitory operations of war could not be counted as temporary occupation—this was not the time to take the question into serious consideration.

64.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegramm No. 301.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

In addition to my telegramm No. 297 of yesterday, private*).

In the Foreign Office I have just been informed in strict privacy that according to the latest news, the report that four years of reserves had been called up and orders for the mobilisation of the Russian military districts had been given, is not confirmed.

Sazonow declared to the German ambassador, that he would guarantee that in Russia no mobilisation was taking place, though certainly necessary military precautions were being taken.

The Russian minister of Foreign Affairs overmore told Count Pourtalès, that Russia would not mobilise, unless Austria-Hungary adopted a hostile attitude towards Russia. Russia wished to see peace maintained and hoped Germany would support it in this endeavour.

The German military attaché in Petersburg reports that "the Russian War minister had given him his word of honour, that not a man and not a horse has been mobilised; but that certainly military measures have been taken"; measures, the German military attaché adds, "are probably rather comprehensive".

I beg your Excellency not to mention the report of the German military attaché to Herr von Tschirschky.

65.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 302.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

Italy.

State-secretary agrees perfectly with the answer, your Excellency gave the Italian ambassador (your Excellency's

*) Vide II, No. 49.

telegram No. 272 of yesterday) and approves that you did not at present consent to discuss the interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. At the same time Herr von Jagow believes that the Italian government should be clearly told, that if we find it absolutely necessary to occupy some portion of Servian territory otherwise than in a transitory manner, your Excellency would not raise any objections to a compensation on Italys part, without however even mentioning the question of its extent.

Both Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann think that such a declaration would satisfy Italy, which is continually harping on the subject here.

66.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 303.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

Servia.

Herr von Tschirschky has received telegraphic instructions to request your Excellency to communicate the text of the Servian Note answering our *demarche* in Belgrade at an early opportunity.

The State-secretary told me that this was all the more desirable, as we wished to convince England, when it asserts, that the Servian answer complied with the chief points of our wishes.

The Servian representative at noon to-day communicated to Herr von Jagow the alleged contents of Pasics answer.

67.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 305.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.—Strictly private.

State-minister tells me, Herr von Tschirschky telegraphs: General Conrad von Hötzen Dorf informed him privately, that

to be effective against Servia from a military point of view, our mobilisation could not be accomplished before the 12th August.

At the same time the State-secretary said that he regretted that the term of the beginning of our military action should have to be postponed so far.

68.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 307*).

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.—Strictly private.

State-secretary in strictest privacy informed me that very shortly eventual English propositions of mediation would be communicated to your Excellency through the German government.

The German government assures in the most *decided way that it does not identify itself* with these propositions, that on the contrary it advises to disregard them, but that it must pass them on, to satisfy the English government.

The German government holds the belief that it is just now of the very highest importance that England should not side with Russia and France. Therefore everything must be done to prevent the wire still working between Germany and England from being broken. If Germany candidly told Sir E. Grey that it refused to communicate England's wishes to Austria-Hungary, which it thinks will be more regarded, if they pass through Germany's hands, the above-mentioned eventuality might occur.

The German government will, whenever England has such a request to make, declare with decision that it cannot support such proposals of intervention and only passes them on to please England.

The British government has through the German ambassador in London yesterday, and through the British am-

*) Vide II, No. 32.

bassador in Berlin requested Herr von Jagow to support Englands wishes with regard to a modification of the note to Servia. Jagow had answered that he would act according to Sir E. Grey's wish and would send his proposals on to you, but that he could not support them, because the conflict with Servia was a question of *prestige* for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which Germany shares to a certain extent.

He, the State-secretary had therefore sent Sir Edward Grey's note on to Herr von Tschirschky, but without instructing him to present the note to your Excellency; it was thus possible to inform the English cabinet that far from refusing to comply with Sir E. Gray's wish, he had sent the note on to Vienna. Before concluding our conversation the State-secretary repeated his view of the case, and begged me assure your Excellency, that there might be no mistake, that though he had acted as middleman in this affair, he, by no means wished to support the propositions for a mediation.

69.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 274. Vienna, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 285 of the 25th inst.*).

Declaration of war within a few days.

Beginning of war operations must however be delayed until marching up of troops has been completed, so that decisive blow can be dealt with full force. A certain time will be necessary for this, because experience has taught us not to hurry on military measures on a large scale, before we are certain that there will really be war.

Your Excellency will inform Herr von Jagow accordingly, begging for strict privacy at the same time.

*) Vide II, No. 32.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 131.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.

Received ciphered telegram No. 163*).

Have spoken in the sense of the telegram to Monsieur Bienvenu Martin. He showed himself painfully surprised and said that the Servian government had met our wishes in such a degree, the slight differences left, were so unimportant, that no one could understand how they could give cause for a rupture or for applying the very severest measures.

Without saying it in so many words, he seems to assume that the beginning of hostilities against Servia must necessarily be followed by a general war. He said Austria-Hungary was taking upon itself a tremendous responsibility, if, now that Servia has given way on so many points, on account of small differences it caused the World-War to break out. Of course I answered that Austria-Hungary's efforts were all directed to localise the war between Servia and us; the danger of further complications would arise if a third power interfered in this conflict; a danger which France could do much to avoid.

The minister assured me that France had not ceased to advise Belgrade to give way entirely. He had not given up hope that Servia would still find means to satisfy us. If Servia now agreed to accept our Note without reservations surely that must suffice. He asked how your Excellency's expression "with severest measures" was to be understood, but I had to say that I did not know precisely. The minister hopes that only a fresh ultimatum was meant, which would give Servia a chance of altering its answer to our satisfaction.

Servia's acquiescence to our demands, which here no one could have believed possible, impressed greatly. Our attitude in the face of Servia's answer causes the belief to

*) Vide II, No. 62.

become general, that we want war at any price, and this turns public opinion very much against us.

Monsieur Poincaré has given up his visits to Copenhagen and Christiania and will no doubt be very much put out in consequence. He is to arrive here on Wednesday, Monsieur Iswolsky to-day or to-morrow. We must expect to hear sharper words in the near future.

71.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 113.

London, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.

Prince Lichnowsky spoke with Sir E. Grey this morning, and found him much depressed and convinced that Servian answer accepted everything, except one point on which an understanding might be arrived at. If Austria-Hungary is not satisfied with this unexampled humiliation on Serbia's part, it proves beyond a doubt, that it was seeking a pretext and that its one aim is to do away with Serbia and with Russian influence. If Austria takes the rash step and occupies Belgrade, it will cause a great European conflagration.

Sir E. Grey is about to make a declaration in the House of Commons, will propose mediation and a conference between England, Germany, France and Italy to be held in London.

Sir E. Grey was very much determined and declared that he was always being asked to pacify Petersburg; now was the moment when Germany should set about calming Vienna.

The German ambassador in grave apprehension, is convinced that if we march into Serbia, England will completely change to the other side.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 114.

London, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 172 of to-day have just communicated contents to Sir Edward Grey**).

I explained to him most explicitly that our***)..... was not aggressive but merely self-defence and self-preservation and that we did not aim at territorial conquest, nor wish to destroy Servian independence. What we wanted, was a certain satisfaction for the past and guarantees for the future.

I used some of your Excellency's arguments in the decree to Count Szápáry, giving them as my personal opinion.

Sir E. Grey told me that he was very much disappointed, that we treated the Servian answer as if it had been a decided refusal to comply with our wishes, whereas it is really the greatest humiliation, an independent State has ever been submitted to and in fact accepts all the points demanded. I insisted that the objection to our organs taking part in the inquiry, was what made all the other assurances illusory.

State-secretary told me that the German ambassador had asked him two days ago, to use his influence with Petersburg in favour of Servian moderation. He had answered, that it was not possible to expect Russia to advise Servia to yield still more than it had already done in its answer to the Note.

He had thought that this answer would form a basis on which the four not implicated governments could build up a satisfactory arrangement.

This was his idea when he proposed a conference.

The conference would assemble under the assumption, that Austria-Hungary would refrain from all military opera-

*) Vide Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 38.

***) Vide II, No. 62.

***) Cipher missing.

tions while the other powers would attempt to find a satisfactory way out of the difficulty.

(Sir E. Greys declaration in the House of Commons of to-day, gave a detailed programme of the conference).

When he spoke of the necessity to refrain from military operations, I remarked that I feared it was too late for that. The State-secretary then said, if we were resolved to have a war with Servia under all circumstances, under the assumption that Russia would keep quiet, we were taking a very great risk. If we could indeed persuade Russia to keep quiet, it was well and good and he had nothing more to say. If not, the possibilities and dangers were incalculable.

If I wanted a symptom of the general anxiety felt, he would tell me, that the great British fleet, which had been concentrated in Portsmouth after the manoeuvres and was to have dispersed to-day, has received orders to remain where it is. "We should not have called any reserves, but as they are collected in one place, we cannot afford to send them home at such a moment."

The State-secretary was grieved and anxious, but not irritated, as my German colleague said he was this morning.

His idea of a conference is intended to prevent a collision between the Great Powers, and he would be sure to act in favour of isolating the conflict. But if Russia mobilises and Germany decides for action, there will be no question of the conference.

73.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 165.

Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.—Private.

Have just had a long conversation with Herr Sazonow. German ambassador had told me before noon that he had found the minister much more quiet and amenable, when

*) Compare with the text of the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 31.

he visited him in the morning. He had advised him to speak with me, whom he knew to be well-disposed towards Russia and filled with regret that our action against Serbia met with so little sympathy in Petersburg. Herr Sazonow's reception of me contrasted vastly with his reserved manner last Friday. He told me what Count Pourtalès had said to him and added, that if I had not come of my own accord, he would have asked me to visit him, as he was desirous to have open speech with me. Last Friday he had been somewhat surprised and had not quite mastered his temper, besides our conversation was then a purely official one.

I answered that I also wished to be able to speak sincerely with him, as I had the impression, that in Russia a mistaken idea prevailed on the character of our action in Serbia. We seemed to be suspected of wanting to get an advance on the Balkans, with a view to marching to Salonica or perhaps even to Constantinople. There were others who regarded our action as a kind of preface to a preventive war against Russia, which Germany was planning. All these suppositions were partly mistaken and partly altogether unreasonable. The aim of our action was self-preservation and defence against a hostile propaganda of word, script and deed, which threatened our integrity. Nobody in all Austria-Hungary was thinking of threatening Russia's interests or seeking a quarrel with that country. We are however firmly resolved to attain the end we have proposed to ourselves and we consider the way we have chosen, the most practicable. As an action of self-defence is in question, I would not conceal from him that every consequence which might arise, had been considered. I was quite clear upon the point, that if a conflict with the Great Powers became unavoidable, the consequences might be tremendous, and the religious, moral and social order of the world might be at stake. In glaring colours I propounded the thought, which also appears to alarm Sir E. Grey of what might follow, if a European war broke out.

Herr Sazonow agreed fully and seemed rejoiced that I entertained such thoughts. He repeatedly assured me that in Russia not only he, but all the ministers, and what was still more important, the sovereign himself — all felt the same for

Austria-Hungary. He could not deny that in Russia there were some old grudges rankling against Austria-Hungary, he sometimes felt them himself, but these were things of the past, and must not interfere with practical politics. As to the Slavs—he ought not to say as much to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador—he had no heart for the Balkan Slavs. They are a heavy burden for Russia, and we had no conception what Russia has already suffered through them. Our aims, such as I have described them, are perfectly legitimate, but in his opinion the way we were taking for attaining them, was not the safe way. The Note we had presented was not happy in its form. He had studied it since my visit and if I could find time, he would like to look it through with me again. I replied that I held myself at his disposition, but that I was not authorised to discuss the Note or to interpret it. His remarks would of course be full of interest. The minister then one by one discussed all the points of the Note and declared that of the ten points, seven were acceptable without great difficulties, but that the two points referring to the collaboration of Imp. and Roy. functionaries in Servia, and the point in which we demand *ad libitum* the dismissal of officers and officials, which we name, are in their present form altogether unacceptable. With regard to the 5th point I was able to give a full interpretation, having been instructed by your Excellency's telegram No. 172 of the 25th July*). With regard to the other two points I said I did not know how my government interpreted them, but that both were absolutely necessary. Herr Sazonow suggested that a consular intervention might have been proposed and as to the dismissal, proofs of the guilt of the persons in question should have been given.

Otherwise King Peter would risk being killed directly. I answered that the minister's view of the case was the best justification of our action in Servia. Herr Sazonow said that we should always remember, that the Karageorgevic dynasty was without any doubt the last Servian dynasty. We surely did not desire the neighbourhood of an anarchist witches

*) Vide II, Nr. 38.

cauldron. I answered that we certainly took an interest in the monarchical form of the Servian State, but the last remark of the minister had again proved, how very necessary a firm attitude was in Servia's case. While recapitulating what had been said, the minister declared that he could not help feeling, that the whole affair was an affair of words, and that it might surely be possible to get over the difficulties as they stood at present. Would we be prepared to accept the mediation of our ally, the King of Italy? Or would we accept the King of England? I answered that I was not in a position to reply to these questions, that I did not know what dispositions my government had already taken, that certain matters were on the move, and that certain things could not be retracted, when once they had been started. Overmore the Servians had ordered their mobilisation for yesterday and what might have happened since then, was unknown to me.

Herr Sazonow. at the conclusion of the conversation, again in warm words expressed his pleasure at what I had explained to him and declared himself much comforted. He would report to Emperor Nicholas about it, whom he was to see the day after to-morrow, on the day of reception.

Russian politics have travelled over a long distance in two days,—from the discourteous rejection of our plans with regard to Servia, and the hard judgment on our *dossier*, to the proposition of making a European question out of the whole affair, and the search for a mediator. Still we must not overlook the fact, that side by side with this retrograde diplomatic movement, there is energetic military influence at work, which threatens to change the Russian situation in our disfavour.

P. S.

In the course of conversation Herr Sazonow asked me if I could not give him our *dossier* and when I answered, that I was not in possession of a copy, he said would it not be possible for Herr Schebeko to obtain one in Vienna?

74.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 170.

Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.

Military attaché to Chief of General Staff*).

Disposition of General Staff most complicated this evening, some not being prepared to trust to Austro-Hungarian energy, whilst others believe that European mediation might at the last hour assuage conflict.

Preparatory measures for mobilisation in European Russia, are admitted much in the same words the War minister used towards my colleague yesterday, only without the exception for the frontier towards Germany. I called attention to the perilousness of such measures, which would be sure to provoke similar "preparations" on our side and in Germany.

Several officers of the General Staff said to my Turkish colleague that Austria-Hungary was after all probably bluffing, since war operations had not yet begun.

75.

**Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. ambassadors in
Petersburg, Rome, Paris, London and Berlin.**

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szápáry in Petersburg, No. 187,
2. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 889,
3. Count Szécsen in Paris, No. 167,
4. Count Mensdorff in London, No. 176,
5. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 277.

1.

Add to my telegram of the 26th inst., No. 185**).

I authorise your Excellency to tell Herr Sazonow and your Italian colleagues, though not in a binding form, that as

*) Was communicated direct.

**) Vide II, No. 59.

long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Servia remains localised, the monarchy will refrain from all territorial acquisitions.

2.—5.

I am telegraphing to Count Szápáry:

(Follows the text sub 1.)

From "I authorise . . ." as far as "acquisitions."

This is for your Excellency's information, and to direct your speech.

ad 3.

Received your telegram No. 128*).

The first paragraph must be founded upon a mistake, which I do not think opportune to correct just now.

76.

Count Berchtold to Herr Otto in Cetinje.

Telegram No. 139.

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered telegram.—Private.

Servia having refused to comply with our demands, we have broken off diplomatic relations with this country.

I request you to inform His Majesty the King personally of the above, and at the same time remark that the endurance and love of peace, we had shown in our past policy, must be considered an argument in our favour and must prove that we had no other alternative.

You will also say that the Servian government having refused to comply with the demands we were forced to address to Servia to safeguard our most vital interests, it proves that it will not give up the subversive aims, by which it threatens some of our frontier provinces and would ultimately disjoin them from the body of the monarchy. To our sincere regret and very much against our will, we are com-

*) Vide II, No. 55.

pelled to take the severest measures to make Servia thoroughly change its past hostile attitude towards us.

We hope that His Majesty the King will understand that after the results of the inquiry, which showed that the assassination of Sarajevo was plotted in Belgrade and accomplished by agents sent from there, our patience was exhausted and we must now use every means in our power to put a stop to the continuance of the unbearable doings on our frontier bordering on Servia.

We fully acknowledge that His Majesty is in a delicate position on account of the similarity of the races which inhabit his kingdom and that of Servia. But as we have no intention whatever of acquiring Servian territory and are only defending the integrity of our monarchy against Servia, we trust that we may expect from the wisdom of King Nicholas, that His Majesty will not by a rash deed imperil the friendly feelings nurtured by us towards his country and hinder our action which is, after all, only undertaken in defence against aggression and will ultimately serve his country and his dynasty. One cannot foresee how events will develop, but His Majesty may be very sure, that at the right moment we should guard the interests of Montenegro, whose existence and progress as an independent State we have very much at heart.

In a similar way we beg you to express yourself towards the minister of Foreign Affairs.

If in the meantime a hostile action on the part of Montenegro has been observed, you will change some of the above and adapt it to circumstances.

77.

Herr von Panmgartner to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 8544.

Odessa, July 27, 1914.

Ciphered.

Mobilisation orders for military districts Odessa, Kiew and Warsaw given, but not yet published. Officers of reserve,

who were to be dismissed to-day, detained; cadets advanced to officers, have already been distributed over army. From Odessa alone 390. Great excitement among officers.

Ambassade 9.

78.

Immediate Report of Count Berchtold.

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I take the deferential liberty to lay before Your Majesty the enclosed draught for a telegram to the Servian minister of Foreign Affairs, which contains the declaration of war, and also take the liberty to suggest that Your Majesty will authorise me to send it off to-morrow morning, and to cause the official announcement of the declaration of war to be published in Vienna and in Budapest at the same time.

The Note, which Herr Pasic presented to the Imp. and Roy. minister, Baron Giesl being cleverly composed, so that, although its contents are valueless, the form is most courteous, does not let it seem improbable, that the Powers of the Triple Entente will make one more effort to bring about a peaceful solution of the conflict, unless by an early declaration of war we make the situation clear.

According to a report of the 4th Corps-command, Servian troops on Danube steamers near Temes-Kubin, fired at our troops, who also gave fire, so that the encounter lasted some time. Hostilities have therefore begun and it is advisable that we should give our army that freedom of motion, to which it has a right, when the state of war has been proclaimed.

The notification of the state of war would, if Your Majesty approves, be sent to the neutral Powers through their representatives here at the same time as the declaration of war.

I take the liberty to mention that His Imp. and Roy. Highness Chief commander of the Balkan forces, Archduke

Friedrich, and also the Chief of the General Staff make no objection to the declaration of war being sent off to-morrow morning.

I approve of the enclosed draught of a telegram to the Servian Foreign Office, containing the declaration of war to Servia, and authorise you to do as you propose.

Ischl, July 28, 1914.

(signed) **Francis Joseph.**

In profound reverence

Berchtold.

Draught of Declaration of war.

Telegram in claris to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade eventually in Kragujevac.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas répondu d'une manière satisfaisante à la Note qui lui avait été remise par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade à la date du 23 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se trouve dans la nécessité de pourvoir lui-même à la sauvegarde de ses droits et intérêts et de recourir à cet effet à la force des armes, et cela d'autant plus que des troupes serbes ont déjà attaqué près de Temes-Kubin un détachement de l'armée Impériale et Royale. L'Autriche-Hongrie se considère donc de ce moment en état de guerre avec la Serbie.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche-Hongrie.

Comte Berchtold.

Vidi:

(signed) **Franz Joseph.**

(Translation.)

The Royal government of Servia not having answered in a satisfactory manner to the Note, which had been presented to it on the 23rd July 1914, the Imperial and Royal government finds itself in the necessity to ensure for itself its rights and interests and for this purpose to have recourse

to the force of arms, all the more because the Servian troops have already attacked a detachment of the Imperial and Royal army near Temes-Kubin. Austria-Hungary therefore, from this moment considers itself on a footing of war with Servia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary

Count Berchtold.

Vidi:

(signed) **Francis Joseph.**

79.

Circular Decree.

(Despatch of the Communiqué).

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

Protocol No. 5428—5438.

Address:

1. Count Szögyény in Berlin,
2. Count Szécsen in Paris,
3. Count Szápáry in Petersburg,
4. Herr von Mérey in Rome,
5. Count Mensdorff in London,
6. Margrave Pallavicini in Constantinople,
7. Count Czernin in Bucharest,
8. Count Tarnowski in Sofia,
9. Herr von Szilassy in Athens,
10. Herr Otto in Cetinje,
11. Herr von Loewenthal in Durazzo.

Ciphered telegram.

1.—11.

The evening papers of to-day publish the following Communiqué:

The Imp. and Roy. minister, Baron von Giesl, on arriving in Vienna on the 26th inst. has presented the Servian answer to our demands to the ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In this Note the Servian government endeavours to give the false impression as though it was in a great measure prepared to comply with our demands.

In reality however the Note is dictated by a spirit of insincerity, which makes it clear, that the Servian government does not seriously intend to put an end to the reprehensible toleration which it has hitherto shown towards the intrigues directed against the monarchy.

The Servian note contains a number of comprehensive restrictions and reservations, with regard to the principle, by which our *demarche* is inspired and also with regard to the different demands, so that the concessions which are made, are of no value at all.

In particular a meaningless pretext was used for absolutely refusing to comply with our demand, that Imp. and Roy. organs should be allowed to take part in discovering those participators in the plot of the 28th June, who are still on Servian territory.

The concessions made for dealing with the publications directed against the monarchy are also equal to a refusal of our demand.

Our wish that the Royal government should take the necessary measures to prevent the dissolved hostile Societies from existing under another name and in another form, has not been taken into consideration at all.

As the demands contained in the Note of the Imp. and Roy. government, dated 23rd inst. are the last modicum with which we could be content, if we hoped to establish lasting peace on our South-eastern frontier, we must consider the Servian answer as altogether unsatisfactory.

The Servian government must have been fully aware that its answer was absolutely unacceptable, otherwise it would not, at the conclusion of the Note have proposed, that we should submit our controversy to arbitration, a proposition, which appears in a strange light, when we learn that three hours before the answer to our Note was presented—a few minutes before the term had expired — the mobilisation of the Servian army was ordered.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin*).

Telegram No. 282.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered telegram.—Strictly private.

Received your Excellency's telegram of the 26th inst. No. 297**).

I have had analogous reports on the Russian armaments from the Imp. and Roy. military attaché in Petersburg.

I beg your Excellency to go immediately to the Imperial Chancellor or the State-secretary and inform him in my name of the following:

Concurrent news from Petersburg, Kiew, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, show that Russia is making extensive military preparations. Herr Sazonow and the Russian War minister both gave their word of honour, that a mobilisation had not up to the present been ordered, but the latter told the German military attaché, that the military districts, which come in question where Austria-Hungary is concerned, Kiew, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, would be mobilised as soon as ever our troops crossed the Servian frontier.

Under these circumstances, the Chief of the General Staff considers it *positively* necessary to obtain certainty, whether we can march against Servia with strong forces, or whether we must reserve our chief army, to use it against Russia. From this question depends our entire plan of campaign against Servia. If Russia is really mobilising the military districts in question, the time it is gaining, makes it absolutely imperative that Austria-Hungary, and under present circumstances Germany also, should *immediately* take comprehensive counter-measures.

I consider this view of Baron Conrad *most worthy of consideration* and I request the Berlin cabinet to reflect, whether Russia should, in a friendly manner be reminded that the mobilisation of the above-mentioned districts is equal to threatening Austria-Hungary and would have to be answered

*) Compare the text in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 42.

**) Vide II, No. 49.

by counter-measures of a military character not alone by the monarchy, but by the allied German Empire also.

To facilitate a withdrawal on Russia's part, we think that such a step should be undertaken by Germany alone to begin with; but of course we are prepared to take our share in it.

I think that plain language would at this moment be the most effective means for showing Russia the consequences of a threatening attitude adopted in the present situation.

It might also be taken into consideration, whether the favourable dispositions reported from Bucharest to Berlin, should not be made use of, to influence Russia through Roumania.

With this aim in view, I think the German minister in Bucharest might without loss of time, be instructed to approach King Carol with the request to consider, that in the case of a European conflagration Roumania would stand on the side of the Triple Alliance. This could be done either by a solemn *demarche* in Petersburg (eventually through a private telegram from King Carol to Emperor Nicholas) or simply through the publication of the fact that Roumania has joined the Triple Alliance.

This explanation should, to be effective, be made at the *latest* on the 1. August.

Your Excellency will conclude by saying that I trust the German factor in authority will, in view of the threatening attitude of Russia against both Empires, agree with my propositions.

81.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin*).

Telegram No. 283.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

Count Mensdorff telegraphs as follows on the 27th inst.**):

"I had an opportunity to-day of explaining fully to Sir E. Grey that our action in Servia is not aggression but self-

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38.

***) Vide II, No. 72.

defence and self-preservation, and that we are not intent upon territorial acquisition, nor do we attempt to annihilate Servian independence. We wished to get a certain amount of satisfaction for the past and guarantees for the future.

I used some of the arguments in your Excellency's decree to Count Szápáry.

Sir E. Grey said he was much disappointed that we treated the Servian answer as though it were a decided refusal.

He had believed that this answer would at least form the basis for the other four governments to build some satisfactory arrangement upon.

This was the idea that made him propose a conference.

The conference would meet under the assumption, that both Austria-Hungary and Russia would refrain from all military operations while the other powers were trying to find a way out of the difficulty.

(The declaration Sir E. Grey made in the House of Commons to-day gave details of the plan for this conference.) When he spoke of the necessity that we should refrain from military operations in Servia, I remarked that it was perhaps too late for this, whereupon the State-secretary said, if we wanted to have war with Servia at any price, and imagined Russia would in this case keep quiet, we were running a great risk. If we succeeded in keeping Russia quiet, all was well and good, and he had nothing more to say, if not, the possibilities and dangers were incalculable.

As a symptom of the anxious feeling prevalent, he told me that the great British fleet, which after the manœuvres had been concentrated in Portsmouth and was to have been dispersed to-day, received orders to stay where it was. "We should not have called in the Reserves", he said "but since they are assembled, we cannot afford to send them home at this moment". The State-secretary was grieved and disquieted, but not irritated, as my German colleague had described him in the morning.

His idea of a conference aims at preventing a collision between the Great Powers, and it is probable that he will try

for the isolation of the conflict. If Russia mobilises, and Germany resolves for action, the conference will die of itself.

I do not think that it will be necessary to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that the British proposal of a conference comes too late, seeing that we already find ourselves in a state of war."

The above is for your information and for communication to the State-secretary.

82.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin*).

Telegram No. 284.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered telegram.—Private.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 307 of the 27th July 1914**).

I beg your Excellency to thank the State-secretary in my name for having kindly communicated the reasons for which the German government thinks it imperative to send on the English proposals of mediation and to add, that I fully understand the motives which actuate the German cabinet.

In the meantime Herr von Tschirschky has informed me of the English propositions and to-morrow I will give the German ambassador our reasons for not accepting them.

The above for your information and for communication to the State-secretary.

83.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. ambassadors in Berlin, London and Rome.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 287,
2. Count Mensdorff in London, No. 180,
3. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 895.

*) Compare Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 43.

**) Vide II, Nr. 68.

Ciphered telegram.

1.—3.

Private.

Count Szécsen telegraphs on the 28th inst. as follows:

“M. Bertie tells me that the active interference of Russia would be followed by Germany and France taking part in the war.

England would be an idle spectator and only interfere if France was threatened by utter ruin.”

The above for your Excellency's information and for communication to the State-secretary or his representative.

84.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 314.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

The British proposition of mediation, according to which Germany, Italy, England and France were to meet at a conference in London, to find a way of getting out of the present difficulties, has been rejected by Germany on the grounds that a conference was not a suitable means for attaining this kind of success.

85.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 546.

Rome, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

Italy's attitude.

As I am still confined to my bed, I have caused the instructions contained in your Excellency's telegram No. 887 of the 26th inst.***) to be carried out by Count Ambrozy and, in the face of Italy's by no means irreproachable attitude in

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 35.

***) Vide II, No. 51.

the compensation question, to avoid speaking the thanks which Italy has not yet deserved. I have overmore instructed Count Ambrozy to declare that your Excellency will discuss the question of the compensation at a time, when there is no danger in touching upon such a theme.

The minister of Foreign Affairs, who received Ambrozy, was very busy and begged the Count should repeat his message to one of his secretaries who, on being told, took a note. Count Ambrozy was then informed that he would eventually answer to-morrow.

86.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 547.

Rome, July 28, 1914.

Cipher.—Private.

From what I know of the situation in this country and from what Herr Biancheri told me yesterday (vide my telegram No. 541 of the 26th inst.*). I feel compelled to warn your Excellency against a mistaken or too optimistic interpretation of the Italian ambassador's *demarche*, which is mentioned in the telegram of the 26th inst. Nr. 887**).

The *demarche* was, if not exclusively, certainly principally made on account of the claims to compensation and the vague and by no means binding phrase added afterwards, was no doubt only a *captatio benevolentiae*.

I consider the somewhat overdone reception of Italy's assurances, coupled with the avoidance of discussing the subject, as dangerous, because Italy might take it for silent acquiescence, or it might interpret our attitude, as if we did not believe in any military conflict and did not therefore think it worth while to discuss the compensation question.

It is characteristic that the news of the friendly assurances of Italy, came to the Roman newspapers from Vienna only, whereas the Consulta has not informed the press on this subject at all.

*) Vide II, No. 50.

**) Vide II, Nr. 51.

My *ceterum censeo* would be to deny all rights to compensation and certainly not to enter into delicate discussions or to take any engagements. If we act otherwise we should allow Italy to play the part of the man, who says to a friend struggling in the Danube: "I wont fetch you out. But if you get out by your own efforts, you will have to pay me an indemnity".

87.

**Count Bертold to the Imp. and Roy. ambassadors in
Rome and Berlin.**

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 892,
2. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 280.

Ciphered telegram.—Private.

1.—2.

Added to décret No.

ad 1.

3567

ad 2.

3568

ad 1.—2.

of yesterday.

ad 1.

The German ambassador yesterday and to-day paid me urgent visits in consequence of personal orders from His Majesty Emperor William, the Imperial Chancellor and the State-secretary, to beg me, in view of the grave situation and the threatening dangers, "for Gods sake" to come to an understanding with Italy on the interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. Italy regards our action against Servia as an aggressive measure not only towards Servia but towards Russia also, and it has adopted the point of view that, the Triple Alliance being of a purely defensive character, Italy did not see its way to siding with us in the eventuality

of a war between us and Russia. Overmore it has been declared in two places, by Bolatti in Berlin and by San Giuliano and Salandra in Rome, that Italy would not adopt a friendly attitude, unless we agreed to the Italian interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty.

Herr von Tschirschky, who was instructed to declare to me that the German government interprets Article VII in the same way as the Italians, appealed to me in the most solemn and emphatic manner to make the situation clear as soon as possible, because we were risking the entire military action of our German ally, if Italy refused to recognise the *casus foederis*.

The duke of Avarna, who also visited me to-day, had been instructed by his government to make a declaration, analogous to the one made towards Baron Macchio on the 25th inst. that in Rome it had been expected, that we would in a case like the present one (a *demarche* in Belgrade), which surely came under the stipulations of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty (*“dans les Balcons”*), have begun by consulting our allies; that overmore the Italian government would in case the threatening conflict ended with a war, which would lead to an occupation of Servian territory, even if it should be but temporary, adhere to the reservation that it would make use of its right to compensation, as stipulated by Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, after having established an agreement on the subject; and lastly that the Italian government would in the eventual war between Austria-Hungary and Servia, observe a friendly attitude, such as beseems the ally of the monarchy.

I answered the Italian ambassador that our dispute with Servia concerned only us and Servia, that we were not thinking of making any territorial acquisition whatever, that therefore an occupation of Servian territory need not be discussed.

When Avarna remarked, that it would be of advantage to us if we made a binding declaration to the Powers on this point, I said that this was not possible, because no one could foresee at this moment, whether in the course of the war, we might not be obliged to occupy Servian territory

much against our will. If the war takes a normal course, this need not be apprehended, since we really had no cause whatever to wish to augment the number of our Servian subjects.

I beg your Excellency to communicate to the Marchese di San Giuliano, the duke of Avarna's declaration and my answer to it, and with regard to the claims of compensation founded on Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty to make the following remarks:

As we have already declared to the Italian ambassador here, we intend to make no territorial acquisitions. Should we, against our previsions be forced to occupy Servian territory more than temporarily, we are prepared to enter into negotiations on the compensation question with Italy. On the other hand we expect from Italy that the kingdom will in no wise hinder its ally in the action necessary to attain its ends and will maintain the friendly attitude of an ally, which it has promised.

Private.

I have decided for these advances towards the point of view of Italy, because we are playing a great game, in which there are serious difficulties to overcome, and in which we might fail, unless the Powers of the Triple Alliance hold firmly together.

The above might on occasion be communicated to your Triple Alliance colleague.

ad 2.

I am telegraphing to Herr von Mérey as follows:

(Here follows text sub 1.)

From "The German ambassador "until " your Triple Alliance colleague".

Your Excellency will speak to Herr von Jagow in the above sense, and add that we are under the impression that Italy is thinking of compensation at our expense, of territory with Italian populations, perhaps the Trentino. In this case we must beg to declare in the most explicit manner, that the question of disjoining any portion of land from the monarchy must not for a moment be taken into consideration.

ad 1.

I add for your Excellency's purely personal information, that I am instructing Count Szögyény to speak in the above sense to Herr von Jagow and to add that we were under the impression, that in diverse Italian quarters compensations at our expense were being thought of, especially in parts of the country where the population is Italian, as for instance in the Trentino. My instructions are, that where the disjoining of any part of our territory is in question, the subject cannot even be discussed.

88.

Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen in Paris.

Telegram No. 169.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

Your Excellency's telegram No. 129 of the 26th inst. received*).

Your Excellency will make the best use you can of the *dossier* (sent by post on the 25. VII.) and of the critical remarks to Servias answer**) which also leave by post and from which the reasons of our non-acceptance will be seen; remitting both to the French statesmen and letting the public know of them also. You will lay special stress on the fact, that Servia, to captivate Europe, gives its Note the appearance of great compliance, whereas it gives absolutely no guarantees of the future. Almost everyone of its promises is made worthless by equivocations and reservations. It has betrayed its real sentiments by ordering its mobilisation before vouchsafing an answer, whilst we did not take a single military measure until the term for the answer was expired.

*) Vide II, No. 56.

**) Vide II, No. 96.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London*).

Telegram No. 178.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered telegram.

Your Excellency's telegram No. 113 of the 27th inst. received**).

As we place the greatest weight upon Sir Edward Grey's impartial view of our *demarche* against Servia in general and particularly of our non-acceptance of the Servian answer, I request your Excellency to seek an opportunity for communicating to the State-secretary the details of the *dossier*, which reaches you by post, and to call his attention to the most important parts.

The text of the Servian answer with our critical remarks***) has left by post yesterday. This we beg your Excellency to discuss with Sir Edward Grey and to explain to him that the Servian advances are but apparent, made to captivate Europe, and that the Note contains no guarantees whatever with regard to the future.

As the Servian government knew very well that we could only be satisfied by an *unconditional* acceptance of our demands, it adopted the transparent plan of accepting our conditions to make a good impression upon Europe, adding so many reservations, that it did not run the danger of having to act up to its words. In your conversation with Sir Edward Grey, please lay the greatest stress upon the fact, that the general mobilisation of the Servian army was ordered on the 25th in the afternoon at three, whereas the answer to our Note was presented at the very last moment before the term expired, that is, a few minutes before six. We had not made any military preparations up to that time, but in consequence of the Servian mobilisation, we have been obliged to provide in a very large measure since.

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 39.

***) Vide II, No. 71.

***) Vide II, No. 96.

90.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London*).

Telegram No. 179.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

The English ambassador came to see me this morning and according to instructions explained the point of view Sir Edward Grey holds with regard to our conflict with Serbia, which is the following:

The British government has followed the course of the crisis with the greatest interest; it sympathises with our way of seeing things and perfectly understands our grievances against Serbia. It did not mind saying that it had no love to spare for Serbia and knows very well that Serbia has committed a number of misdeeds in the past.

England is therefore not disposed to consider our conflict with Serbia as a subject of special preoccupation, but the London cabinet must nevertheless give its full attention to it, because this conflict might draw wider circles and might endanger the peace of Europe.

Inasmuch as England is involved in this danger, Sir Edward Grey has seen fit to invite the governments of those States, which are not immediately interested in the conflict (Germany, Italy and France), to examine and discuss the possibilities of appeasing the differences between the conflicting countries. The British State-secretary's idea was to follow the *modus* employed at the conference of the last Balkan crisis, when the London ambassadors of the different States kept up a continued intercourse with Sir Edward Grey. The governments here in question had already sent him very friendly answers, in which they approved his idea. At present it is the ardent wish of the States-secretary to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary at the eleventh hour, if this were possible, if not, to prevent a bloody encounter, perhaps by inducing the Servians to withdraw. The answer, which Serbia had given to our demands seems to imply the possibility of yet coming to an understanding.

*) Compare the text of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 41.

England will willingly mediate in our sense and use its influence in favour of our wishes.

I thanked the ambassador for the expressions of sympathy which Sir Edward Grey had used in referring to us, and answered that I valued the State-secretary's point of view at its full worth. His point of view is very naturally different from mine, England having no immediate interest in the dispute between us and Servia, and the State-secretary himself being scarcely thoroughly enough informed on the gravity of the questions which have to be solved in the interest of the monarchy. Sir Edward Grey speaks of the possibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, but for this it is too late, since Servian frontier soldiers fired at ours yesterday, and to-day our declaration of war has been sent. The idea of a temporary arrangement, based upon the answer of the Servian government I must decidedly reject. We had asked for an integral acceptance of our demands; Servia concealed its embarrassment by prevaricating. These Servian methods are an old tradition. The Servians must not be taken as if they were a cultivated nation, and we cannot forget how often they have deceived us.

Sir Maurice Bunsen had no doubt acquired sufficient insight into local circumstances and would be best able to draw a truthful picture on the subject for Sir Edward Grey.

Sir Edward Grey is anxious to serve European peace, and he will certainly not find us oppose him in this, but he must consider that the peace of Europe would not be saved if the Great Powers backed up Servia and procured for it exemption from punishment. If we were to accept an attempt at mediation Servia would feel itself encouraged to go on doing what it has done in the past, and the question of war would crop up again in a very short time.

The British ambassador ended by assuring me that he understood our point of view perfectly, but that he must regret that under such circumstances the wish of the English government to achieve a friendly arrangement, must be given up for the time being. He hoped that he would be allowed to remain in close contact with me, a circumstance, which

might be of special value in view of the great danger of a European conflagration.

After I had assured him that the ambassador would always find me at his disposition, he took his leave.

91.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 115.

London, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

To be added to my telegram No. 114 of yesterday*).

Sir Edward Grey told both me and the German ambassador yesterday that he has been reproached on Russia's part for siding too much with us.

I think Grey wishes to work for peace together with Germany. If he should become distrustful and suppose that Germany was putting us in the foreground, because it wants to provoke Russia to go to war, he would soon turn from us and would place himself on Russia's side.

92.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 116.

London, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

I have just spoken to Mr. Tyrrell.

He considers it as a most hopeful symptom that there is a direct exchange of opinions between Vienna and Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey would be very glad if this led to an amicable arrangement.

With regard to Grey's proposal, Tyrrell said that the State-secretary regretted having used the word "conference"; what he was really thinking of, was a constant exchange of ideas between him and the three ambassadors.

*) Vide II, No. 72.

I got my visitor to confirm again, that from the beginning Sir Edward Grey held the opinion that our difference with Serbia was a concern of our own; that only if Russia interfered, would there be a necessity for the Powers to mediate, to prevent great calamities.

When I remarked, that even if the hostilities between us and Serbia had broken out, it must still be possible to keep Russia from interfering, he said: "Serbia has no doubt given way as much as it has, under the pressure of Russia; if the Powers are to interfere, to make Russia keep quiet, we must give them material with which they can impress Petersburg."

I have spoken to my Russian, German and Italian colleagues, who all place their hopes in direct relations between Vienna and Petersburg; it must be hoped, they say, that nothing irreparable will happen, such as Austria marching into Serbia, because in this case the Russian government would be forced to act according to the will of public opinion.

93.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 172.

Petersburg, July 28, 1914

Ciphered.

Your Excellency's cyphered instructions No. 3530*) did not arrive until late this afternoon and the *decree* with the *dossier* has not arrived at all. Will speak to Herr Sazonow in the sense of above instructions to-morrow.

German colleague, who saw Sazonow to-day, told me that the minister still adheres to his optimistic views, the grounds of which neither I nor my German colleague can guess. The serious language used by Count Pourtalès to-day had no effect.

To-day's press is full of news that the language of German diplomatists has changed, that Germany does not reject mediation, that a friendly understanding is probable and so forth.

*) Vide II, No. 42.

Emissaries, for instance Schelking and politicians are busy denouncing the attitude of Germany in the embassy. As the truth of*) must be precluded, the only supposition possible is the attempt to make mischief between Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Erroneous interpretation is given to fact that there are as yet no news of military operations, which were expected to have immediately followed the expiration of the term for Servia's answer. They think that Austria-Hungary's resolve is not determined, perhaps on account of Germany's attitude, and that there is still a chance of negotiations.

94.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram. No. 175

Petersburg, July 28, 1914.

Cipher.—Strictly confidential.

My German colleague, who again visited Sazonow, in the most energetic way called his attention to the danger of Russian armaments, which might any time call forth German counter-measures. Sazonow tried to deny the facts mentioned by Count Pourtalès, whereupon the ambassador urgently recommended a better supervision of the military factors, so that they should not be able to act behind his back.

Portalès spoke with the same energy of the attempts made by the Russian press to sow distrust between Austria-Hungary and Germany. Not that the press had any chance of success, this kind of work needed more delicate fingers than those employed in these clumsy manoeuvres. The minister declared not being responsible for what was going on in this line, but Pourtalès asked him why, if he disapproved of such doings, did he not stop them.

*) Cipher illegible.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry in Petersburg*).

Telegram No. 191.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Ciphered.

The Russian ambassador came to me on the 28th July, to inform me that he had returned from his short leave of absence in Russia, and at the same time in obedience to a telegram from Herr Sazonow. The latter told him that he had had a long and very friendly interview with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram No. 165 of the 27th inst.**), in the course of which you had with great kindness discussed the single points of Servia's answer to our Note. It is Herr Sazonow's opinion that Servia had in a very great measure agreed to our demands, but that some of the demands seemed to him quite unacceptable, and that he had made no secret of this to you. All circumstances considered, he thought that the Servian answer might well be used as a basis on which one might come to an understanding, the Russian government offering to act as mediator. Herr Sazonow therefore proposed that the exchange of ideas and opinions, so happily begun, might be continued through your Excellency, and that instructions should be forthwith sent to your Excellency.

In my answer I explained that I could not accede to such a proposal. There could be no negotiations on the text of an answer, which we had found unacceptable. No one in our country would understand or approve. There can be no question of negotiations, when as the ambassador must be aware, public opinion was already a prey to terrible excitement in Hungary as well as in Austria—and besides we had to-day declared war to Servia.

The ambassador spent considerable eloquence to persuade me that Servia's hostile feelings towards us, which he did not attempt to deny, would not be improved by a war, but grow worse than ever. After this I gave him some details of our relations with Servia, which make it absolutely imperative, though much against our will, and with no egotism on our part, that we should show Servia that we are in earnest and will stop the movement which is directed against the future

existence of the monarchy. Servia's attitude after receiving our Note was not such, that a peaceful arrangement could be hoped for. Before it presented its unsatisfactory answer, it gave orders for the mobilisation, which is a hostile act directed against us. Notwithstanding this we should have waited three more days, before beginning hostilities. But yesterday the Servians began firing at our soldiers on the Hungarian frontier. This necessarily put an end to the patience we have shown so long. It is impossible from this moment to bring about a lasting peaceful arrangement and we are forced to meet Servian provocations in the only form, which under these circumstances is respondent to the dignity of the monarchy.

The above is for your information and to guide you, in what you have to say.

96.

(Circular Decree to all the Missions.)

(Translation of the Servian Note together with the critical remarks of the Vienna cabinet.)

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|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Athens. | 17. Munich. |
| 2. Bangkok. | 18. Paris. |
| 3. Berlin. | 19. Peking. |
| 4. Berne. | 20. Rio de Janeiro. |
| 5. Brussels. | 21. Rome I. |
| 6. Buenos-Ayres. | 22. Rome Vat. |
| 7. Bucharest. | 23. Petersburg. |
| 8. Cetinje. | 24. Santiago. |
| 9. Dresden. | 25. Sofia. |
| 10. The Hague. | 26. Stockholm. |
| 11. Constantinople. | 27. Stuttgart. |
| 12. Copenhagen. | 28. Teheran. |
| 13. Lisbon. | 29. Tokio. |
| 14. London. | 30. Washington. |
| 15. Madrid. | 31. Durazzo. |
| 16. Mexico. | 32. Cairo. |

Protocol No. 3581—3612, 3612a.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I am enclosing the exact text-translation of the Servian answer of the 25th inst. to our Note of the 23rd inst. as also our critical remarks to the same.

From the latter, which we beg you will use in your discourse, you will find the reasons which make us consider the Servian Note as unsatisfactory.

Enclosed supplement.

Note of the Royal Servian government to the Imp. and Roy. Government of the 12th 25th July 1914.

Translation.

The Royal Servian government has received the communication of the Imp. and Roy. government of the 10th inst. and is convinced that its answer will clear up every misunderstanding which might threaten to disturb the friendly and neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.

The Royal government is conscious that in no single instance were the protestations against the great neighbouring monarchy renewed, which in former times were pronounced in the Skuptschina and in declarations and deeds of the responsible representatives of the State and which the declaration of the Servian government put an end to, on the 18th March 1909. Also that, since that time neither the

Remarks.

The Royal Servian government limits its justification to the fact that since the declaration of 18th March 1909 no attempt to change the situation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina has been made on the part of the Servian government or its organs.

This is taking away the very ground under our feet in the *demarche* we are making, since we never maintained that the Servian government or its

governments succeeding each other nor their organs have made the slightest attempt to bring about any changes in the political and legal conditions of Bosnia and the Herzegowina. The Royal government hereby affirms that the Imp. and Roy. government has never raised any objections in this direction, except once in the case of a schoolbook, when the Imp. and Roy. government was perfectly satisfied with the explanation given. In the course of the Balkan crisis, Servia has in numerous cases given proofs of its pacific and moderated policy, and it is to Servia and the sacrifices it has made in the interest of European peace, that the preservation of the peace must be thanked.

The Royal government cannot be made responsible for enunciations of a private character, such as newspaper articles and the peaceful work of societies; enunciations, such as are made in every country and are absolutely beyond the control of the governments. The Royal government should all the less be made responsible, because it has shown great complaisance in quite a number of questions, which have arisen between Austria-Hungary and Servia, so that it was possible

organs had undertaken anything officially in this direction.

Our grievance is, that notwithstanding the quoted declaration and the obligations it imposed, the Royal government had not stopped the movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

The government had taken the obligation to change the tenour of its policy and to cultivate friendly and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, not merely to respect the position of Bosnia in the monarchy.

The assertion of the Royal Servian government that enunciations of the press and the doings of societies are private concerns and cannot be controlled by governments, runs counter to the institutions of modern States, even the most liberal ones, which have laws for the press and for societies, and place them under government supervision. The Servian law is no exception to the rule. What we reproach the Servian government for, is that it neglected the super-

to arrange most of them in the interest of progress in the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal government was painfully surprised, when the assertion was made, that Servian subjects were supposed to have taken part in the preparations for the crime of Sarajevo. The government had expected to be asked to collaborate in the researches after the criminals and was prepared to give proofs of the correctness of its attitude by proceeding against all persons about whom it would have received information from Austria-Hungary.

In accord with the wishes of the Imp. and Roy. government, the Royal government is ready to place before a lawcourt any Servian subject, regardless of position or rank, of whom proofs are given, that he has participated in the crime of Sarajevo; it is prepared to publish on the first page of the official gazette of the 13th/26th July the following enunciation:

The Royal government of Servia condemns all propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, it condemns all efforts leading to the ultimate result of disjoining parts of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and it deeply re-

vision of its press and its societies, whose hostility towards the monarchy must have been well-known to it.

This assertion is incorrect the Servian government was perfectly well informed that certain persons were suspected and would even according to its own laws have been obliged to investigate on its own account. But it did not make the slightest movement in this direction.

This is what we demanded:

“The Royal Servian government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary.”

The change, which the Royal Servian government has made in the text of the declaration

grets the sad consequences of such criminal dealings.

[Faint, illegible text]

The Royal government regrets that, as it has been informed by the Imp. and Roy. government, certain Servian officers and functionaries have been actively engaged in the above-named propaganda and have thereby endangered the duration of the friendly and neighbourly relations, to which the Royal government had promised to adhere by the solemn declaration of 31st March 1909.

“The government” word for word the text as it was demanded.

The Royal Servian government overmore binds itself to the following engagements:

1. When the Skuptschina meets next time in the ordinary way, a paragraph will be

we demand, is intended to signify that there is no propaganda specially directed against the monarchy and that the government knows of none such. The formula is insincere and deceitful. It contains the reservation for later on, that the Servian government did not recognise the present propaganda as being directed against the monarchy, from which might be deducted that the government could not be asked to suppress a propaganda which would be like the one we have now.

What we asked the Servian government to say was this:

“The Royal government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated”

In this as in the above, and in the insertion “according to information from the Imp. and Roy. government”, the Servian government is aiming at keeping a free hand for the future.

What we asked was:

“1. To suppress every publication which might incite to hatred or contempt against the monarchy, or whose general tendency was directed against

inserted in the Press-law, threatening severe punishment to whoever incites to hatred or contempt against the monarchy, and to all publications, whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

When the forthcoming revision of the constitution takes place, an addition will be made to Article XII of the constitutional law, by which it will be possible to confiscate such publications, a thing that cannot be done according to the present determinations of the Article.

2. The government has no proofs, nor does the Note of the Imp. and Roy. government give any such proofs, according to which the 'Narodna odbrana' and similar societies have up to this time committed criminal actions, such as are here in question, through any of their members. Still the Royal government will comply with the demand of the Imp. and Roy. government and dissolve the 'Narodna odbrana' and every other society, which shows itself hostile to Austria-Hungary.

the territorial integrity of the monarchy".

We wished Serbia to undertake the obligation of preventing similar attacks on the part of the press in future; we were anxious to ensure success in this matter.

Instead of this, Serbia offers to propose certain laws, which may serve as a means for attaining the desired end, that is;

a) a law, by which the hostile enunciations of the press might be punished in a subjective way, a thing to which we are altogether indifferent, all the more because we know by experience that it is rarely possible to obtain punishment for an offence committed through the press; our demand in this case is therefore not complied with, since there is no guarantee that we shall be successful in what we are striving after.

b) an additional law to Article XII of the Constitution, which would make confiscation possible; a proposition which again cannot satisfy us, because the government does not promise to apply the law, when it has been decreed and we have no means of compelling the government to apply it.

These propositions are therefore absolutely unsatisfactory and they are overmore evasive, since we are not to know when the laws would be decreed, nor what the government would do, if the Skuptschina refused to vote them, in which case we have no doubt, everything will remain as it is.

The propaganda of the "Narodna odbrana" and its hostility to the monarchy dominates public life in all Servia, it cannot therefore be taken seriously when the government declares to know nothing about it.

Besides our demand is not fully complied with, for to our demand for the societys dissolution we have added: that the means used for propaganda by these societies must be confiscated; the re-organisation of the societies under another name must be prevented.

On both these points the Belgrade cabinet is silent, so that the half-promise given, offers us no guarantee that the hostile dealings of the societies, especially the "Narodna odbrana" will end definitely, when the society is dissolved.

3. The Royal Servian government promises to eliminate without delay everything from public instruction in Servia, which might serve the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary if the Imp. and Roy. government shows effective proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal government is prepared to dismiss from military and civil service those officers and functionaries, who will be proved by judicial inquiry to have been guilty of actions directed against the integrity of the monarchy; the government expects to receive from the Imp. and Roy. government the names of these officers and functionaries and the facts of which they are accused, so that an inquiry can be set on foot.

In this case again the Servian government asks for proofs that hostile propaganda is taught in the public schools, whereas it certainly knows that in all the schoolbooks used in Servia under the eyes of the government, material of the kind objected to, is contained, and that a great part of the Servian teachers are members of the "Narodna odbrana" or of kindred societies.

In the fulfilment of this demand, the Servian government has also left out a part. We had asked for a revision of "the body of teachers as well as the means with which they taught". Of this sentence no notice was taken, though it showed clearly where hostile propaganda is to be found in Servian schools.

The Royal Servian government promises to dismiss from military and civil service the officers and functionaries in question only when they have been found guilty by a judicial proceeding, and hereby limits its promise to such cases where an offence, subject to penal law has been committed. What we demand, is that those officers and functionaries should be removed, who were busy with hostile propaganda, which in Servia is generally

5. The Royal government confesses that it does not quite understand the sense and the extent of the Imp. and Roy. governments demand, according to which the Royal Servian government is to approve on its own territory the collaboration of organs of the Imp. and Roy. government, but it declares that it would consent to such collaboration, inasmuch as it was based upon the principle of nations rights and penal procedure and would not violate friendly and neighbourly relations.

6. The Royal government considers it a duty to order judicial proceedings against all those persons, who were, or were supposed to be implicated in the crime of the 15th/28th June and who would be found on Servian territory. But the government, cannot consent to the collaboration of organs of the Imp. and Roy. government, delegated for this express purpose, as this would be a violation of the constitution and of the law of penal procedure. But the Austro-Hungarian organs might in some cases be informed of the results of the inquiry.

speaking, not punishable, so that our demand remains unfulfilled.

Our demand was clear and not to be mistaken. What we asked, was:

1. To institute a judicial inquiry against those who participated in the plot.

2. To allow the collaboration of Imp. and Roy. organs in the researches to be made for the inquiry (the word "recherches" was used as contrasting with "enquête judiciaire").

We never for a moment meant to let the Imp. and Roy. organs take any part in the Servian judicial proceedings; they were to help in the police researches, which were to furnish the material for the judicial inquiry.

If the Servian government does not understand us, it is that it will not understand, for it cannot be ignorant of the difference between "enquête judiciaire" and simple "recherches".

No doubt the Servian government wishes to avoid control of any kind during the institution of the judicial inquiry, when most unwelcome results might come to light, and having no other pretext for declining our participation in the police-researches (we might

7. The Royal government ordered the arrestation of Major Voislav Tankosič on the very evening when it received the Note.

As to Milan Čiganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and who up to the 15th June was employed in the Railways direction (as aspirant), the authorities have not been able to find him and a warrant was issued against him.

The Imp. and Roy. government is requested to communicate the grounds on which these persons are suspected and the results of the inquiry of Sarajevo that regard them; with as little delay as possible, so that an inquiry can be instituted.

8. The Royal government will extend the measures, which already exist against the smuggling of weapons and explosives.

It need not be said that the Royal government will immediately institute an inquiry

quote numerous analogous cases of intervention of the police), the government adopted a point of view which had the appearance of justification and made our demand look unacceptable.

This answer is deceitful. Our researches show that Čiganovic left Belgrade on leave three days after the assassination, when it came out that he had participated in the plot. He went with an order from the prefect of police from Belgrade to Ribari. It is certainly false, that Čiganovic left the Servian government service as early as June 15th/28th. To this we must add, that the prefect of police in Belgrade, by whose orders Čiganovic had left, and who knew where he was, in an interview declared that there was no man in Belgrade of the name of Milan Čiganovic.

and will apply the severity of the law towards those officials of the frontier service on the line Sabac-Loznica, who have neglected their duty and have allowed the criminals to cross the frontier.

9. The Royal government promises very willingly to give explanations on the enunciations of its officials in Servia and in foreign countries, made in interviews after the crime of Sarajevo, which the Imp. and Roy. government declares to be hostile, if the Imp. and Roy. government will show up these speeches and give us the proofs that they were really held by the functionaries in question. The Royal government will cause the material for this research to be collected.

10. The Royal government will inform the Imp. and Roy. government of the execution of the measures promised in this note, and will communicate the ordering and carrying out of every point, except where the Note already brings things to a close.

The Royal Servian government thinks that it will be in the interest of both States, not to hurry affairs, and if the Imp. and Roy. government does not consider this answer satisfactory, the Royal govern-

The interviews which are here in question must be perfectly well known to the Royal Servian government. When it asks the Imp. and Roy. government to furnish all sorts of details and assumes the right of formally examining them, it merely proves that it has no intention of seriously complying with this demand.

ment is willing to accept any peaceable solution, that might be brought about by submitting the question to the Arbitration Court of The Hague, or by submitting it to the decision of the Great Powers, which took an active part in the composition of the declaration made by the Servian government on the 18th/31st March 1909.

97.

**Count Berchtold to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Belgrade.**

(Declaration of War.*)

Telegram.

Vienna, July 28, a. m. 1914.

(Translation.)

The Royal government of Servia not having answered in a satisfactory manner to the Note, which had been presented to it on the 23rd July 1914, the Imperial and Royal government finds itself in the necessity to ensure for itself its rights and interests and for this purpose to have recourse to the force of arms, all the more because the Servian troops have already attacked a detachment of the Imperial and Royal army near Temes-Kubin. Austria-Hungary therefore from this moment considers itself on a footing of war with Servia.

The minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary
Count Berchtold.

Vidi:

(signed) **Francis Joseph.**

*) Compare II, No. 78 and III, No. 26.

AUSTRIAN RED BOOK

OFFICIAL FILES

PERTAINING TO

PRE-WAR HISTORY

PART III

29. JULY TO 27. AUGUST 1914



LONDON · GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.

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PREFACE.

The present volume—containing the respective records bearing date 29th July to 27th August 1914—concludes as III. Volume the “Diplomatic Files pertaining to the History leading up to the War of 1914”, so far published as Supplements and Addenda to the Austro-Hungarian Red-Book. (Volume I. deals with records of the period from the 28th of June to the 23rd of July, Volume II. with those from the 24th to the 28th of July 1914.)

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1.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors
at Berlin and Rome*).**

Telegram.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szögyény at Berlin, No. 291,
2. Herr von Mérey at Rome, No. 904.

In ciphers.

1.

Herr von Tschirschky has just informed me, that the Russian Ambassador tells him he has received a communication from his Government to the effect, that the military districts of Kiew, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised. Russia thinks that its honour as a great power has been touched and that it must take measures accordingly. The fact of the Russian mobilisation is confirmed by our military commanders in Galicia and according to a report of the Imperial and Royal military attachè, Mr. Sazonow did not deny the fact to the German Ambassador.

I beg Your Excellency to bring this information to the knowledge of the German Government and to lay particular stress on the fact, that if the Russian mobilisation measures are not stayed without delay, our general mobilisation must for military reasons immediately ensue.

As a last effort to prevent a European war, I would deem it advisable, that our representative and the representative of Germany in St. Petersburg, perhaps, also our representative in Paris, should be advised to declare to the respective Governments of those countries in a friendly manner, that the continuation of the Russian mobilisation would entail counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary which might have serious consequences.

*) Compare the wording in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook, Part. III. No. 48.

I beg of Your Excellency kindly to add to this that of course we will not allow anything to stop our warlike operations in Servia.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Petersburg and Paris are being advised simultaneously to make the above mentioned declaration, as soon as their German colleagues receive similar instructions*).

We leave it to the German Government to decide whether Italy is to be informed of the measures taken. Herr von Mérey in any case receives a copy of this telegram with instructions to inform the Italian Government as soon as the German Ambassador has been instructed to do so.

2.

I am telegraphing the following to Count Szögyény:

Here follows telegram sub I.

The above quoted for the information of Your Excellency and for communication to the Marquis di San Giuliano as soon as the German Ambassador has received similar instructions.

2.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 317.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Have informed Under Secretary of State of contents of Your Excellency's telegram No. 280 of yesterday's, date**) as State Secretary could not see me. The first part of the information of Herr von Tschirschky viz. that Italy might consider warlike measures on our part against Servia as an aggressive act towards Russia and might in consequence feel released from her obligations as member of the Triple Alliance in case of a conflict with Russia, would seem, as the Under Secretary of State informs me, to point to some misunderstanding. Words to this effect were uttered by Italy at the beginning of our controversy, but have not been repeated since.

*) See III, No. 15.

**) See Part II, No 87.

My Italian colleague also, to whom I mentioned the aforesaid point of view of the Italian Government, as having reached my ears by way of a rumour, declared to me that this had, it is true, once been declared by one of the Italian representatives abroad, but, that the person in question had immediately received an admonition from Rome and this point of view, as he assured me "quite categorically", was absolutely not that of the Italian Government.

With regard to the declaration made by Your Excellency through Herr von Mérey to the Italian Government, the Under Secretary of State agrees with it and believes that the Italian Government will be satisfied with it as Your Excellency has declared that we had no intention to make any territorial acquisitions but that should Austria-Hungary nevertheless be obliged to resort to an occupation of Servian territory of more than a passing character, Your Excellency in this case would enter into negotiations with Italy concerning a compensation.

News to the effect that in certain Italian circles Austro-Hungarian territories would come into consideration as compensation, has reached here also; but that the separation of any part of the territories of the Monarchy may not even constitute a subject for discussion, is also the opinion here.

3.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 318.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Have informed the State Secretary and the State Chancellor of the contents of Your Excellency's telegram No. 282 of yesterday's date*) and according to your wish transmitted to them a memorandum on the subject.

Concerning the military questions formulated in this telegram by Baron Conrad, a timely reply has been promised me.

*) See Part II, N° 80.

The Under Secretary of State does not doubt that the *démarche* desired by Your Excellency in Bucarest (an appeal to King Carol) will at once be undertaken from here, but he fears that the King will not consent to the proposals made by Your Excellency (Roumanian *démarche* in Petersburg, eventually a confidential telegram from King Carol to the Emperor Nicholas or publication of the treaty).

According to a telegram from German representative in Bucarest, King Carol declared to him yesterday, that he could be counted upon not to side against the Triple Alliance; and that at the same time he declared to the Austro-Hungarian Minister with tears in his eyes that "in consequence of the feelings towards the Monarchy at the moment he would not be able to fulfil his obligations as an ally in case of a conflict with Russia".

It is confidently hoped here that Roumania will remain on the side of the Triple Alliance, but it is not believed that there is a chance of our treaty of alliance being published at this juncture.

4.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 319.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Russia.

Already on Sunday the German Government had declared in Petersburg that the Russian mobilisation would entail the mobilisation of the German army.

Thereupon followed on the part of Russia the answer reported by me with telegram No. 301 (secret) of 27th inst.**). A further telegram was thereupon despatched to Petersburg, declaring that even the continuation of the present military preparations might induce Germany to mobilise.

*) Compare text in Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 46.

***) See Part II, No. 64.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 320.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Russia.

Telegram has just arrived at Foreign Office from Count Pourtalès from Petersburg containing the following information:

Mr. Sazonow has complained bitterly to Pourtalès of the fact that the Imperial and Royal Government are not seeking an exchange of views with Russia. Count Szápáry is continually declaring that he has no instructions and Mr. Schébéko has reported from Vienna, that on the occasion of his visit to Your Excellency no exchange of views either had taken place.

Mr. Sazonow further declared, that the circumstance of Austria-Hungary mobilising eight entire corps, is a proof that these measures are not only directed against Serbia, but are also aimed against Russia. For this reason, to-night still, the Russian order of mobilisation would be given for the military conscriptions situated on the south-western border of Austria-Hungary.

Mr. Sazonow added that in Russia a mobilisation did not, as in other European countries, signify war; the Russian soldier might stand armed and ready for action for months at the frontier. He had not as yet any intention of recalling Mr. Schébéko from Vienna.

Count Pourtalès replied that in that case Germany would also have to enter into a state of "preparedness for war". (Kriegsvorbereitungszustand.)

This was not meant in any way as a threat against Russia, but Germany would fulfil its obligations as ally of Austria-Hungary.

6.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 321.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

The Under-Secretary of State informs me that a telegram arrived for Emperor William to-day from Emperor Nicholas crossing one of the former. Emperor William had wired to the Czar requesting him not to side with the Servians who in the present instance did not deserve it, Austria-Hungary being completely in the right in taking energetic measures against them. He wound up by making a warm appeal for peace to Emperor Nicholas.

The Czar on his part had telegraphed to Emperor William, declaring that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was entirely in the wrong to attack Servia. "Russia intends backing Servia"; he therefore appealed to Emperor William's love of peace, asking him to endeavour to calm Austria.

I could not find out whether the two Imperial telegrams contained any further information, as the Under-Secretary of State did not tell me more.

7.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram Nr. 322.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed to-day Sir William Tyrell had told him that Germany can be convinced, that in spite of all protestations to the contrary, Italy would, in case a general war resulted from the present conflict with Servia, not take the part of Germany or Austria-Hungary. Lichnowsky added, that Tyrell's communication did not appear to him to be of the nature of premeditated bluff, but that he had the impression that this was the conviction of Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, founded on reports from the English Ambassador at Rome.

8.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 324.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

As the Under-Secretary of State tells me, the French Ambassador here declared to-day that England without any doubt would side “dès le premier coup de notre côté” (that is with France and Russia).

The Italian Ambassador has expressed the same opinion to Herr von Jagow.

The Under-Secretary of State, who up to the present was convinced that England would—at least at first—remain neutral, seemed to take a pessimistic view on the subject this evening.

9.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey.

Telegram No. 896.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Telegram in figures.—Secret.

Supplement to yesterday's telegram No. 892*).

I consider that it goes without saying but beg of you notwithstanding to inform the Marquis di San Giuliano expressly, that the communications which you were instructed to impart to him in accordance with above quoted telegram, are to be considered as strictly confidential; and that because of public opinion here, the publication of this information was, in view of its extremely serious nature, to be absolutely refrained from.

10.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 552.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

The reply of the Italian Government announced at the end of my telegram No. 546 of July 28th**)) was forwarded to

*) See Part II, No. 87.

***) See Part II, No. 85.

me to-day in writing by the chief of the cabinet, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, however with the remark, that it was to be looked upon as a verbal answer.

I communicate text of this reply in separate telegram (in less secret cipher *).

This reply absolutely confirms my impression, that the Italian Government is above all interested in the question of compensation and intends to force the issue now; that it will refer to Germany, which in view of our difference of opinion evidently would feel it incumbent upon itself to decide**) viz. according to Italy's wishes (see last paragraph but one of the reply) that the reply even takes on a tone akin to black-mailing and what is most characteristic, wants to carry on the relative conversations in Vienna and Berlin.

The more obliging, contented and grateful we show ourselves in regard to Italy's attitude, the more far-reaching and insisting will her demands grow.

11.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 553.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

Text of Italian reply:

“Le Gouvernement italien animé par les sentiments les plus amicaux pour l'Autriche-Hongrie a fait et continuera de faire tous les efforts possibles pour persuader la Serbie à accepter les demandes contenues dans la note du Gouvernement I. et R. du 24 juillet 1914 et lui a toujours conseillé à plusieurs reprises de suivre une politique correcte et de bon voisinage envers l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le Gouvernement italien a gardé le meilleur souvenir de l'attitude amicale de l'Autriche-Hongrie envers l'Italie dans la dernière période de la guerre italo-turques.

*) See the following number.

**) Cipher wanting.

Cette guerre avait pour objet une province située bien loin de la sphère *) des intérêts de l'Autriche-Hongrie, tandis que le conflit actuel entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie se déroule dans des territoires voisins de l'Italie et peut avoir des conséquences sérieuses pour nos intérêts vitaux.

En effet une des bases de raison d'être de la Triple Alliance est pour nous l'article VII qui s'applique à toute la péninsule des Balkans et qui est complété par l'accord de 1909 sur le Sandjak de Novibazar, accord confirmé lors du renouvellement de la Triplé Alliance.

C'est sur la base de l'article VII et des accords sur le Sandjak de Novibazar et sur l'Albanie que la collaboration cordiale de la diplomatie italienne et de la diplomatie austro-hongroise doit être fondée et sans cette base il est à craindre qu'elle ne serait pas possible; c'est sur cette base que l'amitié et la confiance réciproque entre les deux puissances alliées doivent reposer.

L'Allemagne partage notre interprétation de l'article VII.

Quant à l'intention du Comte Berchtold de discuter au moment donnée le thème des compensations, il est évident qu'un accord sur ce point est urgent, car tant qu'il ne sera pas fait et qu'un doute peut subsister sur l'interprétation que l'Autriche donne à l'article VII, l'Italie ne peut pas suivre une politique de nature à faciliter actuellement ou plus tard des occupations temporaires ou définitives de la part de l'Autriche-Hongrie et doit au contraire favoriser tout ce qui diminue la probabilité de telles occupations, tout en tâchant de concilier autant que possible cette ligne de conduite imposée par la sauve-garde d'intérêts vitaux avec son vif désir de resserrer de plus en plus les rapports intimes entre les deux puissances alliées, qui ont fait tant de progrès dans ces dernières années et qui doivent en faire encore d'autres sur la base de l'harmonie et de la conciliation des intérêts réciproques pour le bien des deux pays.

Nous espérons par conséquent que les conversations amicales sincères et loyales qui ont lieu en ce moment entre les trois puissances alliées à Vienne et à Berlin aboutissent aussitôt que possible à un résultat permettant leur collaboration dans une politique commune."

12.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 136.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

There seems to be no doubt that France is making certain military preparations, as announced merely by the papers but with a certain amount of exaggeration.

I have heard in strict confidence that Baron Schoen will to-day mention these preparations at Mr. Viviani's and point out that Germany might in consequence of these circumstances be forced to adopt similar measures, which of course could not remain secret and their transpiring would cause great consternation. Thus both countries, though they are aiming at peace, might be forced into at least a partial mobilisation, which might prove dangerous.

Baron Schoen is further said to have declared, that Germany greatly desired to see the conflict between us and Servia localised and counted on the assistance of France in this matter.

13.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

Telegram No. 184.

Vienna, July 29 1914.

Telegram in figures—Secret.

Received telegram No. 115 of 28th inst.**).

I beg of you to make it clear to Sir Edward Grey by dint of all the arguments at your disposal, that in our action against Servia we are being pushed on by nobody, but are solely counselled by the vital interests of our Monarchy, which demand that we put a stop to the undermining work carried on by Greater Servia in our border territories in an energetic manner.

*) Compare the drafting in Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 45.

***) See Part II, No. 91.

It is our wish, as well as that of Germany, that the good relations between the Great European Powers should remain undisturbed and peace maintained.

The bad feeling towards Servia produced by long years of provocations on the part of that country has under the impression of the terrible murder at Sarajevo grown to such a state of indignation that especially our own southern Slav population, loyal to the Emperor, would not have understood it if we had continued to allowed matters to drift as hitherto.

14.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 119.

London, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

I have just spoken to Sir Edward Grey who declared that the situation had grown far more serious and that he was very anxious to-day. Berlin reports Russian mobilisation, from Vienna the refusal of the Imperial and Royal Government to treat directly with Russia. Thus the danger of a great European complication is hourly increasing.

He repeatedly said that we should probably have the support and the sympathy of all the Powers if we were satisfied by Servia's acceptance of all our demands and that moreover all the Powers would guarantee to us the keeping of these promises.

I pointed out that after the declaration of war and the beginning of hostilities this might be too late.

"Then it is perhaps also too late for the prevention of the general war" he exclaimed.

I insisted that it was necessary to separate the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict from the question of a European war and that Russia needed to be influenced not to provoke it by its intervention.

Hereupon Grey remarked: "If the Powers are only to intervene in Russia in order that it remains passive, this would

be equal to giving you a free hand, a thing that Russia will not accept. You must give us something however small that we could make use of in St. Petersburg."

He refused to discuss the pros and cons of our point of view and said that what concerned him were facts and the most important matter: how can a European war be yet prevented? Also without any territorial acquisitions we might bring Servia into a state of vassalage and thus eliminate Russia completely from the Balkans.

I replied that according to our former arrangements with Russia (of which we had spoken the day before yesterday) Servia had advanced into our sphere of influence. It would be absurd to think that Russian influence could be eliminated from the Balkans if Belgrad ceased to be the pivot of Russia's Balkan policy. It was we rather, who were in the position of legitimate defence; the attempts to turn all our small neighbouring states into enemies and the whole of the agitation directed against us, was threatening our position as a Great Power and also the balance of Power in Europe for which he had always stood, etc.

The State Secretary was very pessimistic. "To-day St. Petersburg is still on speaking terms with Berlin, how will it be to-morrow?" He told me that he was in constant touch with the State Chancellor, who was also seeking means to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Afterwards I spoke to Tyrell, who confirmed that Sir Edward Grey was very anxious and continually endeavouring to find a way to prevent a conflagration.

Tyrell wholly confirms the view I hold gained of the attitude here, which I would sum up as follows: Great Britain seems to be trying by all means possible to keep out of a European complication; Russian interests leave England cool; but should it effect a vital interest of France's or what is more a question of the position of France as a Power, no English Government would be capable of preventing a participation of Great Britain on the side of France.

15.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors
at St. Petersburg and Paris.**

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, No. 196,
2. Count Szécsen at Paris, No. 175.

Secret.

1 and 2.

The Russian Ambassador here to-day informed the German Ambassador that he had heard from his Government that the military districts of Kiew, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan that is about 12 army corps are being mobilised. The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by our Galician Corps-Commanders and Mr. Sazonow did not deny it to the German Ambassador. As we—if this mobilisation is not at once stopped—will be forced for military reasons to order a general mobilisation, I propose to the German Government that both our representatives in St. Petersburg, eventually also those in Paris, should be instructed to declare to the cabinets there in a friendly manner, that if Russia continues mobilisation Austria-Hungary and Germany would be forced to order immediate counter-measures which might have immeasurable consequences. I beg of Your Excellency to speak to this effect to

ad 1.

Mr. Sazonow

ad 2

Mr. Viviani

ad 1 and 2

as soon as your German colleague will have received similar instructions.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 173.

Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

Have spoken to Mr. Sazonow to-day in accordance with Your Excellency's dispatch No. 3530 of the 25th inst. *).

Having already the day before yesterday of my own accord enunciated the views contained in the above instructions I repeated them still more precisely, pointing out that I was now able to speak in this same sense on the strength of instructions received. The minister seemed disappointed, as he had expected me to assume some attitude with regard to the mediation suggested by him the day before yesterday. He asked whether I had received any answer to my report, which I denied. Sazonow then said that this did not augur well and that the situation was in any case serious. The Servian answer had been so conciliatory, that he was astonished that it had been considered unsatisfactory. I criticised Mr. Pašić's note in the sense of the respective Vienna *communiqué* and dwelt on the fact that the most important point, viz. Servia's participation in the investigation of the crime had—strange to say—been flatly refused.

If only the Servian Government had also in this case at least limited itself to a demand for an interpretation! Thereupon the Minister declared that we consequently only disagreed on that single point! I corrected him by saying that the Servian Government had on many other points also only formally met our wishes, but that the refusal to agree to this demand must necessarily create the worst impression. Mr. Sazonow then once more most urgently requested to have the *dossier* transmitted to him which had been promised to the Powers and which was not yet forthcoming. There was a desire to see it before the war with Servia actually began. If once the war had broken out it would be too late to examine *dossiers*. All these points were discussed by the Minister in

*) See Part II, No. 42.

spite of his visible disappointment in a more or less calm and friendly manner, and I had the impression that he still had hopes of finding something in the *dossier* which would enable him to withdraw his support from Serbia. Our territorial disinterestment, the announcement of which he seemed in any case to have expected, did not make much of an impression on him.

Pointing to the nature of our demands he did not seem quite willing to admit that we had meant to respect Serbia's sovereignty. My remark that we had no intention of directing our Balkan policy against Russia, led to a somewhat lengthy academical and historial discussion about the Reformara, Sandjak-railway etc. in the course of which old grievancés came to light. But all this was said in a perfectly friendly manner. I then took my leave as the Minister had been bidden to his Imperial Master at Peterhof.

My impression was, that the Minister, in view of the general disinclination to engage in a conflict with us, is clinging to straws, in the hope of yet escaping from the present situation. I must especially note here, that contrary to his attitude during former periods of tension, he this time does not speak of public opinion, Slavdom and Orthodoxy and that his discussions are political and to the point, especially insisting on the fact of Russia's interest in the prevention of Serbia's infeodation: The declaration of war against Serbia which has now been made will soon reveal Russia's real intentions.

Public opinion has hitherto been strangely calm, so that any reference to it would as yet have been difficult. Declaration of war will however probably call forth strong repercussion.

In diplomatic circles the general feeling is very pessimistic. My Japanese colleague who is very well informed of English conditions and those of this country, thinks Russia's intervention unavoidable.

Italian Ambassador will as yet not believe it possible. Mr. Spaljkoivić who up to the present seems to have had hopes of English proposal of mediation, is said to have become very dejected on receiving news of declaration of war. In commercial circles tremendous fall of the rate of exchange of the rouble has created consternation.

17.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 176.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

In order to avoid any froissement of Sazonow who expects some sort of reply to his proposal of mediation and in order that it should not look as if declaration of war was so to say the reply to his proposal, I would beg to inquire whether I might tell the Russian Minister that the declaration of war had already been decided upon, when my telegram arrived and when Mr. Schébéko made similar proposals.

Should Schébéko have received any sort of answer to Russian proposal I should feel obliged for information to that effect.

18.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 178.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

At the request of our military attaché for our Chief of General Staff:*)

Mr. Sazonow this morning admitted to German Ambassador, that order of mobilisation, such as foreseen by Minister of war in case of crossing of Servian frontier had been given and seeks to justify this by the fact that Austria had mobilised eight corps, which is too much against Servia; there was as yet no cause for alarm.

General Staff continues to deny fact of order of mobilisation and still speaks of preparations against Monarchy to the extent mentioned by Minister of war, which is in contradiction to reports coming in from all parts of the State.

According to my opinion, so much is happening, that though calling in of reserves has not yet been established, this may be expected at any moment.

Hohenlohe.

*) Was communicated directly.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 180.

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Having learnt from the German Ambassador, that Mr. Sazonow seems very agitated in consequence of Your Excellency's refusal to continue exchange of views with Russia and of the supposed mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which exceeds the necessary limits and seems therefore directed against Russia, I called on the Minister in order to clear up some apparent misunderstanding and at the same time to obtain closer insight into Russian plans.

The Minister started by claiming that Austria-Hungary had categorically refused a further exchange of views. On the strength of Your Excellency's telegram No. 191 of 28th instant I argued that Your Excellency had, it is true, after all that had happened altogether refused to discuss the texts of notes and the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, but that I could announce that I was in a position to propose a far broader basis for the exchange of views, by declaring that we did not wish to hurt Russian interests, that we had no intention of acquiring Servian territory nor were we thinking of questioning Servian sovereignty. I further felt convinced: I declared, that Your Excellency would always be ready to exchange views with St. Petersburg concerning Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

Mr. Sazonow thought that he would allow himself to be convinced with regard to the territorial question, but that he would insist on his view as regards the Sovereignty-question seeing that the enforcing of our condition meant Servian vassalage. The latter is calculated to upset the balance of power on the Balkan peninsula, while the former constitutes an interference with Russian interests. He then returned to a discussion of the Note, Sir E. Grey's action, etc. and assured me once more that our legitimate demands would be recognised and fully satisfied, but that this would need to be done in a

*) Compare the wording in Austro-Hungarian Redbook II, No. 47.

form acceptable to Servia. It was merely a case of quarelling over words. I remarked that this was not a Russian, but a Servian question, whereupon Sazonow claimed that in this case Russian interests were identical with the Servian, so that I put an end to this futile discussion by changing the subject.

I mentioned having heard that Russia was alarmed at our having mobilised eight corps for the...*) against Servia. Mr. Sazonow asserted to me, that not he, who had known nothing of all this, but Emperor Nicholas, on the strength of informations received from the chief of the General Staff had expressed alarm. I tried to explain to the Minister that even a mere child in military matters could easily convince itself that our southern corps constituted no threat to Russia. I likewise drew attention to our experience in the Bosnian campaign. At the same time I also mentioned the uncertain attitude of Montenegro, concerning which Mr. Sazonow remarked that Herr von Giers had telegraphed, that the King had openly proclaimed his dislike of Servia and his Austrophile sentiments. I replied that for all our confidence in King Nicholas and his utterances we could not discover any military guarantees in them. I hinted to the Minister that it were well if his Imperial Master were informed of the real situation, all the more so as it appeared urgently necessary, if peace were desired, promptly to end the military competition which threatened to establish itself on the strength of false informations. Mr. Sazonow said very enlighteningly that he could communicate this to the Chief of the General Staff who saw the Emperor every day. The Minister for his part, at a time like the present, went but to the usual Tuesday reception and was only informed by his Majesty himself what the military functionaries reported to him.

The Minister further told me that to-day an Ukase was being signed, ordering a mobilisation on a considerable scale. He could however assure me in the most official manner possible, that these troops were not destined to sweep down on us; they would only be kept in readiness in case Russia's interests in the Balkans were threatened. A "note explica-

*) Cipher wanting.

tive" would establish this, for it was only a precautionary measure which Emperor Nicholas considered justified, seeing that we not only possessed the advantage of easier mobilisation, but had also gained a great start on Russia.

I drew Mr. Sazonow's attention most earnestly to the impression that a measure of this kind will make in Austria-Hungary. I could only....*) that the note explicative might be calculated to moderate this impression, whereupon the Minister repeated his assurances concerning the *harmlessness* of these orders.

Whilst we were thus exchanging our views confidentially the Minister received a telephonic report of our having bombarded Belgrade. He appeared as if transformed, tried to dish up all his former arguments again in a manner contrary to all logic and said that he now saw how right Emperor Nicholas had been. "You are only wanting to gain time by negotiations and are meanwhile advancing and bombarding an unprotected city. "What else do you want to conquer when you are in possession of the capital" and other childish utterances to this effect. The argument that an attitude of this kind towards Servia constituted the reverse of a move against Russia did not weigh with the Minister. "What is the good of our continuing our conversation if you act in this manner" said he. I left him in a state of great agitation; and also my German colleague, who renewed his call had — at least for to-day — to renounce all hope of a calm interview.

To be continued**).

20.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg.

Telegram No. 194.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

Your Excellency's telegram No. 176 of 29th inst.***).

*) Cipher wanting.

**) See Part III, No. 46.

***) See Part III, No. 17.

Your Excellenz can in any case truthfully point out to Mr. Sazonow that when your report concerning his proposal of mediation arrived here, the declaration of war had already been finally decided upon.

21.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 194.

Cetinje, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.

A "Special" of the "Amtsblatt" appeared last night announcing with regard to the general situation and our concentration of troops on the Montenegrine frontier, the general order of mobilisation.

Skuptschina to meet on August 1st, Prime Minister arrived here yesterday.

Your Excellency's telegram No. 140 of 28th inst. was brought up late last night by Director of Chancellory, Colombani, from Cattaro. I am unceasingly trying to obtain a neutral attitude from the Montenegrine Government and shall of course continue these my efforts.

22.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 199.

Cetinje, July 29, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Montenegrine wishes. Telegram from Your Excellency No. 140 of 28th inst.

Yesterday and to-day I had interviews lasting an hour and a half with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the course of to-day's interview he mentioned, that he had been instructed, concerning my wish to speak with His Majesty the King, to tell me that His Majesty would be pleased to receive me, but

that this was at this moment impossible owing to the absence of His Majesty. To-day, when the first news had been received that hostilities had commenced and as a result Servian blood had been spilt, His Majesty hoped that I would not insist on my above mentioned wish as he might thereby, as a Servian sovereign, be placed in a delicate position with regard to certain elements here.

I replied that I understood this up to a certain degree and insisted all the less as I had expressed the wish for an interview with His Majesty the King not in accordance with instructions but of my own initiative.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then continued: "His Majesty and His Government are now as ever determined to observe strict neutrality 'à moins que nous ne soyons débordés par l'opinion publique.'"

"The position of the King and the Government would be considerably strengthened if we here declared that the war against Servia was not a war of conquest. A declaration of this kind, as he has heard from my Italian colleague and from the German chargé d'affaires in strictest confidence, had been presented in Rome and in Berlin.

King of Montenegro had during his reign of nearly fifty years increased his territory to about four times its size, Montenegro was however in its present size not yet in a position to stand on its own legs, depended on foreign support,—a situation which in view of the great territorial changes in the Balkans in the course of the last two years and in which Montenegro had received so small a share,—was untenable.

We had greatly injured Montenegro by impeding its efforts to extend its territories towards the south and this all the more, as we had previously repeatedly left it to be understood that we were agreeable to such an extension.

Montenegro, it is true, had in several instances acted against the interests of the Monarchy, but on the whole its attitude had always shown that we might easily have won—in our own interests—a good, devoted and grateful friend."

His Majesty the King and the Government are still counting upon us and have fullest confidence in Your Excellency; but on the other hand both are full of distrust towards

our military circles and especially towards Fieldmarshal Potiorek, against the latter especially because of the Metalka incident, that is because of the manner in which this incident had been staged.

His Majesty and the Government inquire of Your Excellency whether the Imperial and Royal Government was inclined and in a position to offer Montenegro a guarantee for its further independent existence; as a guarantee of this kind Montenegro would regard such an enlargement of its territory as would enable it to exist by the side of the other Balkan States, primarily Servia, in perfect independence, without the support required hitherto by it from without.

The above summarised communications of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, are the result of lengthy discussions which he had with His Majesty the King and the Prime Minister.

He begged that they be treated strictly confidential secret and for a prompt though provisional reply whereby he hinted at the Skuptschina which meets the day after to-morrow.

23.

Interview of Count Berchtold with the Imperial Russian Ambassador.

Daily report No. 3631.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

In the course of my conversation with the Imperial Russian Ambassador on the 28th inst. *) communicated to the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in St. Petersburg by wire, Mr. Schébéko remarked that it might not be unlikely that a conversation started between the cabinets of Vienna und St. Petersburg on the Servian question might also lead to a discussion of those affairs which directly touch upon the relationship between Russia and Austria-Hungary, which would only be of advantage to the same.

In my reply to the Russian Ambassador I did designate a further conversation concerning our quarrel with Servia as impracticable, but did not reject Mr. Schébéko's

*) Compare Part II, No. 95.

further proposals with regard to a discussion of questions directly touching the two cabinets, as I thought it opportune to leave this question open so as to have the possibility to continue the conversation on this subject if an opportunity should arise.

24.

Call of the German Ambassador at the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office.

Daily report No. 3632.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The Imperial German Ambassador has just brought a telegram received by him from the German State Chancellor which discusses the idea as to whether it would not be opportune for the Imperial and Royal Government to repeat its declaration in St. Petersburg, that they have no intention to obtain any territorial aggrandisements and that its military measures solely aim at a temporary occupation of Belgrade and certain other points of Servian territory, in order to force Servia to fully satisfy the Austro-Hungarian demands and to secure guarantees for its future good behaviour towards the Monarchy, guarantees to which Austria-Hungary has in consequence of past experiences with Servia an absolute right. The military occupation is planned after the manner of the German occupation in France after the peace of Francfort for the purpose of ensuring the payment of the war indemnity. As soon as this demand was complied with, the evacuation would be effected.

The Chancellor of State considered such proceedings towards Russia as serving the purpose, if the necessity arose of saddling Russia alone with the odium of having caused a world war which might otherwise in view of the present feeling, be placed at our door. The Chancellor does not wish his proposal of the afore mentioned *démarche* at St. Petersburg to be understood as a desire of his to bring any pressure to bear on us, or as if he wished to restrain us from our action. He is only moved by a wish to obtain for us an improvement of the conditions under which we should have to fight a world war and to secure for our standpoint

the sympathies of the world Principally, with regard to public opinion in England, it would be of great value, if it became clearly manifest, that in case of an extension of our war against Servia to the Great Powers, not we, but Russia alone was to blame.

25.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors
at St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.**

Telegram in figures.

Address:

1. Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, No. 193,
2. Count Mensdorff at London, No. 182
3. Count Szécsen at Paris, No. 172
4. Herr von Mérey at Rome, No. 900*).

I have to-day sent the following memorandum to the Imperial German Ambassador in reply to one addressed by him to me**).

*) Compare wording in Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 44.

**) Imperial German Embassy in Vienna.

On file—for reference.

The Imperial Ambassador in London reports: "Sir Edward Grey has just sent for me and asked me to inform Your Excellency as follows: The Servian chargé d'affaires has just transmitted to him the wording of the Servian answer to the Austro-Hungarian note. From this document it appears that Servia meets the demands of Austria to an extent that he would never have thought possible; excepting on one point, viz the participation of Austrian officials in the legal proceedings, Servia has in fact agreed to everything that was demanded of it. It is clear that this yielding on the part of Servia is solely due to the pressure brought to bear by St. Petersburg.

If Austria is not satisfied with this answer, that is, if this answer should not be thought sufficient by the Vienna cabinet as a basis for peaceful negotiations, or if Austria should even undertake to occupy Belgrade, which is completely defenceless, it would be perfectly clear, that Austria was only seeking a pretext to crush Servia. In striking at Servia Austria-Hungary would be striking at Russia and at Russian influence in the Balkans. It is clear that Russia cannot watch these proceedings with indifference and must consider them as a direct provocation. The most terrible

Memorandum.

The Imperial and Royal Government have with the most sincere thanks received the communication from the Imperial German Ambassador of the 28th inst. concerning the request of the English cabinet that the Imperial German Government use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet in order to induce the latter to consider Belgrade's reply as sufficient or accept it as a basis for discussions. With regard to the assertion made by the English State Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky the Imperial and Royal Government should like war that Europe has ever seen would result therefrom and nobody could tell what such a war might lead to.

Germany had, as the Minister admitted, repeatedly and even as late as yesterday, approached him with the request to make representations at St. Petersburg with a view to moderation. He had always been glad to fulfil these wishes and during the last crisis he had been reproached by Russia that he sided too much with Germany and too little with Russia. He now addressed himself to the German Government with the request to use its influence with the Vienna cabinet in order that Belgrade's reply be considered sufficient, or a basis for discussions. He felt convinced that it lay in the power of the Imperial Government to settle the matter through appropriate representations and he considered it as a good omen for the future if we again succeeded in ensuring the peace of Europe through our joint influence with our allies. For the first time I found Sir Edward Grey depressed. He spoke very seriously and positively seemed to expect the German Government to succeed, through its influence, in settling the question amicably. He will still to-day make a statement in the House of Commons in which he will express his point of view. I am in any case convinced that if war should after all ensue, we could not count on English sympathy and support, as Austria's manner of action would be interpreted as a sign of bad will. As we have already declined an English proposal of a conference, it is impossible for us to also refuse this English proposition *a limine*. By declining every offer of mediation we would be held responsible for the conflagration by the whole world and be considered the real instigators of the war. This would also make our position in our own country untenable, where we must appear as having been forced into the war. Our situation is all the more difficult, as Servia has apparently yielded considerably.

We therefore cannot refuse to accept the rôle of mediator and must submit the English proposal to the Vienna Cabinet for consideration, the more as London and Paris are continually bringing pressure to bear on St. Petersburg.

I beg you to let me know Count Berchtold's opinion about English proposal as well as about Mr. Sazonow's wish to negotiate direct with Vienna.

Signed: *Bethmann Holweg.*

in the first instance to draw attention to the fact that the Servian reply in no way—as Sir Edward Grey seems to suppose—implies an acceptance of all our demands with one single exception, but rather that in most of the points reservations are formulated which considerably reduce the value of the concessions made. The refusal however concerns just those points which contain some guaranty for the attainment of the object really aimed at.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot help expressing its surprise at the supposition that its action against Servia aims at Russia and Russian influence on the Balkans, for this would pre-suppose that the campaign directed against the Monarchy was not only of Servian but also of Russian origin. We have hitherto assumed that official Russia is in no way connected with these hostile tendencies towards the Monarchy and our present action is exclusively directed against Servia, whilst our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir Edward Grey, are of the most friendly nature.

Moreover the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that to its greatest regret it is no longer in a position to consider the Servian reply in the sense proposed by England, as at the moment the German step was taken here, the state of war between the Monarchy and Servia had already begun and the Servian reply has therefore been forestalled by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government takes the liberty on this occasion to draw attention to the fact that the Royal Servian Government started to mobilise before replying and that it also afterwards allowed three days to elapse without showing any inclination to give up the point of view expressed in its note of reply whereupon we, on our part, declared war.

If however the English cabinet is ready to use its influence with the Russian Government with a view to the preservation of peace between the Great Powers and the localising of the war which has been forced upon us by the Servian agitation and intrigues of many years standing, the Imperial and Royal Government will only be too pleased.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The above for the information of Y. E.

26.

Count Berchtold's direct report to His Majesty*).

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Most gracious Sire!

Since the news of fighting near Temes Kubin has not been confirmed, and on the other hand only an isolated communication about a small skirmish near Gradiste is forthcoming which did not seem to justify a far-reaching action I have, hoping to obtain Your Majesty's subsequent gracious sanction, taken it upon myself to eliminate from the declaration of war directed against Servia, the sentence concerning the attack of Servian troops near Temes Kubin.

With deepest respect
signed: *Berchtold.*

27.

**Edict to the Signatories of the Triple Alliance and the
Balkan Missions.**

Register No. 5814—5822.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Telegram in cipher.

Count Szögyény telegraphs under date Berlin, July 28, 1914: The English proposal of mediation, according to which Germany, Italy, England and France should meet at a conference in London in order to devise ways and means to circumvent the present difficulties, has been declined by Germany, the reason given being, that a conference was not a suitable means to obtain a successful result.

The above for /. information.

*) Compare with Vol II, No. 78 & 97.

28.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Embassies
and Balkan Missions, further to the Legations at the
Hague, at Brussels, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Berne.**

Register No. 5839—5857.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

European public opinion in many cases inclines to the view, that the Servian reply shows great compliance with our demands. This false impression is to be traced to the fact, that the Servian Government in order to hoodwink the European press first published a purposely incomplete extract from its reply. Yesterday only, the full text appeared in the "Times" and the "Temps", after we had, the day before yesterday already, informed the Correspondence-Bureau of the complete text of the Servian reply, together with critical remarks.

I beg of your v/. to take all necessary measures, so that our commentary to the Servian note should become known and set opinion right. (Postal instruction of 28th inst.*).

29.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors
at Berlin and St. Petersburg.**

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szögyény at Berlin, No. 293,
2. Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, No. 199.

Telegram in figures.

1.

Received your v/. telegram No. 320**).

It would seem necessary to me that Count Pourtales should be told to point out to Mr. Sazanow, that Count Szápáry has received detailed instructions for his guidance

*) Compare with Vol II, No. 78 & 97.

**) See Part III, No. 5.

at an interview with the Russian Minister, which may be summed up thus: that in our action against Servia we have no intention of acquiring territory and in no way want to touch the independence of the kingdom.

Our action is not at all directed against the Servians as such, but against the subversive agitation threatening us, which has its roots in Belgrade. With regard to Mr. Sazonow's remark about the mobilisation of a comparative large number of corps, we must here insist on the fact that it was ordered without any hostile intentions towards Russia and was perfectly natural with an adversary who could raise 400.000 men.

I shall speak to-day to this effect also to Mr. Schébéko.

2.

• Count Szögyény telegraphs under date the 29th inst. as follows: (Telegram from Berlin No. 320 of 29th inst. *) I am replying as follows:

(Telegram as per 1.)

The foregoing for Your Excellency's information and guidance; please only make use of the remark about the mobilisation of our corps against Servia if Mr. Sazanow should direct the same speech to you that he did to Count Pourtalès.

30.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 325.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Servia.

Late last night I was informed by the Foreign Office that the Servian Government had declared in Rome and in London, that it would comply with the two "last points" also.

Herr von Tschirschky received telegraphic instructions this evening to speak to Your Excellency about this proposal mindful of course of the declaration of war already launched.

*) See III, No. 5.

31.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 327.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

As State Secretary tells me he has instructed Herr von Tschirschky to inform Your Excellency that according to a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey has requested the German Government, to suggest to Your Excellency to stop actions eventually after occupying Belgrade and other important strategic points and then to enter into negotiations with Servia*).

Herr von Jagow understands perfectly that after our declaration of war and the mobilisation of our army we must have that military satisfaction which would be viewed in the occupation of Servia, so that we might then, according to his opinion, enter into *pourparlers*.

32.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 328.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Whilst hitherto I had been able to observe the greatest calm in all influential circles, concerning the eventuality of a European conflict, I must own, that I now have the feeling that in the last few days a state of nervousness has seized them which is not wholly only due to the greater imminence of the question of Peace or War.

The reason for this change of feeling here is the fear I already reported in my telegrams, that Italy, in case of a general conflict, would not fulfil its duty as an ally of the Triple Alliance; but rather that its general attitude towards us might become downright doubtful.

If however the Triple Alliance, so runs the further argument of the German Government, cannot be considered

*) Compare III, No. 33.

as an integral whole, our chances in the great conflict must be considerably worse. Italy must therefore, absolutely, remain in the Triple Alliance and what is more, as an active factor.

Your Excellency is therefore most emphatically advised to interpret most liberally Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance and to meet Italy's wishes as concerns the question of compensation as much as possible and to declare as soon as possible that our readiness at once to enter upon negotiations regarding the interpretation of Article VII (with a view to the most far-reaching concessions) admitting at the same time our liability to grant compensation. (Whereby according to opinion prevalent here the Trentino is of course out of question.)

This wish of Germany's is not, according to my opinion due to a diminution of its fidelity as an ally towards Austria-Hungary, but solely based on the conviction that Austria-Hungary and Germany absolutely need Italy in order to enter the general conflict with safety.

The concessions to Italy communicated in Your Excellency's telegram No. 280 secret of the 28th inst. *) are according to report of the German Ambassador in Rome not considered sufficient by the Italian Cabinet.

As the Imperial and Royal military attaché reports, the Chief of General Staff Count Moltke, has spoken to him in the same sense concerning the absolute necessity of an immediate understanding with Italy.

I cannot help, in view of the gravity of the situation absolutely agreeing with the above reported conviction of the German Government.

33.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 330.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

With reference to my telegram No. 327 of to-day **) after the first paragraph read: "enter into negotiations with the Powers" instead of "to enter into negotiations with Servia".

*) See II, No. 87.

**) Compare III, No. 31.

34.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 331.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Imperial and Royal Military Attaché has just sent telegram to Baron Conrad regarding an important interview with chief of German General Staff, according to which Count Moltke urgently advised us to immediately order general mobilisation.

35.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey at Rome.

Telegram No. 908.

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

Count Szögyény telegraphs on July 30th as follows: Telegram from Berlin of July 30th 1914, No. 328.*)

“Whereas I...” till “... Government”.

I beg Your Excellency to inform me of your opinion regarding Italy's attitude in the compensation question, described above and of her duty as an ally and to state whether, or in which manner, you consider a solution of this highly important question possible.

36.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 554.

Rome, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Compensation.

Emphasizing secret character of my communication, I to-day exactly informed the Marquis di San Giuliano of the Duke of Avarna's declaration, Your Excellency's reply concerning the question of territorial aggrandisements and your standpoint with regard to question of compensation, mentioning also the expectations attached thereto.

*) Compare Part. III, No. 32.

The Minister who made notes of the matter by jotting down words, said, that as it was a question of a very important and delicate kind, he must first consider and discuss it with Prime Minister, before replying.

He again suggested (on the pretext of not feeling very strong after his cure) that the question ought to be negotiated in Vienna.

37.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 557.

Rome, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly confidential.

German Ambassador who had to-day returned from Fiuggi called on me; in the course of our conversation two critical remarks struck me particularly:

1. That we were late in everything: with our investigation, with the handing over of the note at Belgrade, with the communication of this note to Rome and now with the mobilisation and with the striking of our first blow.

2. Then he did not see clearly the object of our action in Berlin. As long as we did not annex Servia completely or partially, it would, though weakened by defeat, still be able to intrigue, to found secret societies, and to instigate murders, etc.

38.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 560.

Rome, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Minister for Foreign affairs to-day spontaneously discussed the attitude of Italy in case of a European war.

As the Triple Alliance was supposed to have a purely defensive character, we had by our violent proceedings against Servia, provoked the European conflagration and had moreover failed previously to come to an understanding with the Italian Government; Italy was therefore under no obligation to take part in

the war. But this did not mean, that Italy in case of such an eventuality would not ask itself whether it was more in accordance with its interests, to side with us armed, or else to remain neutral. He personally inclined more to the former alternative and also thought it the more probable one, provided Italy's interests in the Balkans were thus safe-guarded and that we did not strive to bring about changes there, which would secure for us a prominent position—to the detriment of Italy.

39.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 137.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

Referring to Your Excellency's telegram No. 167 of the 28th inst.*).

I can only repeat that Baron Schoen has in accordance with instructions, stated here that we had declared in St. Petersburg that we had no intentions of conquest in Servia.

German Ambassador has since repeatedly made use of this argument. The news, though not officially, has got into the papers, which point to our reiterated former declarations that the Monarchy was already saturated.

A departure from this point of view would certainly make the worst impression possible here as well as in England.

40.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 139.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

Servia.

Had long interview to-day with Mr. Viviani, who expressed himself in a conciliatory and pacific manner and very attentively listened to my detailed statements regarding the attitude of Servia and the reasons which prevented us from accepting Mr. Pašić' reply.

*) See Part II, No. 75.

His principal thesis was, that at present it was not known what we wanted and thus every sort of mediation was made impossible.

I replied that we had communicated our demands to Servia very clearly; as they had not been complied with a state of war (Kriegszustand) had ensued.

I added, as my personal opinion, that if Servia was inclined to yield, it could easily find ways and means to inquire of Vienna what conditions we would now impose on her.

“But what of Russia?” asked the Prime Minister. I said we had demanded nothing of Russia and only desired that it should not interfere.

Minister said a solution would have to be found which would save Russia a humiliation. He then again referred to English proposition of conference of four Ambassadors. I answered that the same had so far not been clearly enunciated. Minister decidedly denies press notices of this country, concerning French mobilisation. I pointed out Russia's example in this regard, the possible consequences of which the Minister thought very dangerous.

I said it were better if Russia did not continue mobilisation and made re-assuring statements on this point. Minister said that Russia would first have to be re-assured that we did not mean to crush Servia.

41.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 141.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

Servia.

The opinion is prevalent here, that we are trying to reconquer the Sanjak. This would, so it is said, signify war to Russia.

I am being worried by Government circles and other politicians to make some sort of re-assuring declaration, concerning our intentions, which might be made use of to effect the Russian alarm news.

Chief fear here is: Sanjak, annexation of certain Servian districts, attack on Servian independence, protectorate over Servia.

Many people here also such in Government circles, wish for peace and would like to have arguments which they could advance against Russian and French agitations.

42.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 121.

London, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

I have just spoken to Sir Edward Grey and have again drawn his attention to the unsatisfactory character of Servian note and also emphasized the fact that we, as well as Germany, have the sincere wish not to see our good relations to the great Powers in any way disturbed. Also that no one had pushed us on, a fact he recognised. His judgement of the situation is a very pessimistic one and he thinks that we are all steering for a general war. My assurances, that we were obliged to thresh out the question with Servia, but that we had no quarrel with any of the great Powers, he always answered by saying, that in that case it was incomprehensible why Vienna should have declined to continue conversation favourably begun between Mr. Sazonow and Count Szápáry, which had been as a ray of hope to the whole of Europe. Now Russia was mobilising; to-morrow it might be the turn of Germany and France. The conversation between Berlin and St. Petersburg did not seem to take a favourable course either.

On my remarking, that I counted on him to influence St. Petersburg re-assuringly, he replied that two opposite points of view had been advised to him: to side on all accounts with Russia and France as thereby the war might be prevented (I interposed that that might in the best of cases cause the contrary effect, or to declare that England would on no con-

dition take part in the war of France or Russia. The latter decision he assured me would not in any case prevent the war.

He was continually in touch with Berlin and was further endeavouring to maintain peace. In order to achieve something in St. Petersburg he must however have something or other to offer; if he came with empty hands and only demanded of Russia that it should stand aside until we had finished our reckoning with Servia, he would not be able to obtain anything.

I again pointed out specifically that for us the settling of our differences with Servia was a vital question, for all others, at the most, a question of prestige. He said he must reckon with facts and if we believed Russia would quietly permit the crushing of Servia, this was a mistake; England was less interested in our struggle with Servia than in its reaction on the relations between the great Powers. We had however broken off conversation with St. Petersburg and moreover, we offered nothing to the other Powers that they might make use of in St. Petersburg.

To the latter point I replied, that now, that the war had begun it was difficult for us to say anything. What could we put in his hands to trade with? He replied, he would rather not make any suggestions, since they might be considered by us as an un-called for interference. I remarked that everything coming from him would always be received by us with respect and friendly sympathy. I did not however labor the point, as a suggestion might not be desirable just now. In the course of the conversation I could however ascertain that according to his view some sort of declaration on our part that after occupying the capital and part of the country as a pledge we should abstain from further action if Servia were willing to satisfy our demands (perhaps with guarantee of the Powers that Servia keep its promises) seemed to him to be the only means of preventing the great conflict. He however absolutely refused to make any sort of suggestion. State Secretary as well as Tyrrell judge situation as very serious. The latter also principally regrets the breaking off of our conversation with Sazonow. He said, Germany had

not begun its conversations with St. Petersburg very happily. Sazonow was decided, on no condition to play Iswolsky's rôle of the year 1909. Emperor Nicholas is said also this time to be very much angered.

Concerning the attitude here Tyrrell repeated to me, that if France entered into action, the position of the British Government would be a very difficult one.

My impression is, that there is a desire here, to maintain peace and to give greatest support to any effort tending towards that end; also to give us very far-reaching satisfaction and guarantees for the future against Servia, if—a matter perhaps too late to undertake now — we made some sort of declaration regarding future existence of Servia as an independent State, would be acceptable to Russia.

43.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 122.

London, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

My German colleague, very much alarmed and agitated told me, that he saw the last hope of preventing the general war in the Imperial and Royal Government accepting the suggestion to treat with St. Petersburg via Berlin. Austria-Hungary should content itself with occupation of Servian territories effected hitherto as a pledge and make its conditions, on the basis of which one could negotiate with Russia. It would be best to make new conditions and not to renew ultimatum, as that would only cause irritating recriminations. This time Berlin and Vienna had gone on the wrong assumption that Russia would not intervene. There only remained one last ray of hope, to save Europe from catastrophe of general war. Sir Edward Grey had given him to understand in the most friendly manner but quite clearly, that if France should be drawn into the war, the English fleet would at once intervene.

44.

Count Berehtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg*).

Telegram No. 198.

Vienna, July 30, 1914

In cipher.

From your Excellency's telegram No. 176 of July 29th**)) I gather that Mr. Sazonow may possibly have misunderstood my answer concerning his proposal for the continuation of the conversation entered upon by your Excellency.

I am of course, as always, ready to explain to Mr. Sazonow the different points of our Note to Servia, which however have since been forestalled by events. At the same time I should also very much like to talk over amicably and confidentially questions directly concerning our relations with Russia according to the suggestion of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, which Mr. Schébéko interpreted to me and which might clear up many matters which, I regret to say, are not quite clear and which might assure the so much desired peaceful development of neighbourly relations.

Will your Excellency please ask Mr. Sazonow, as though the question came from you, what subjects the Minister would like this conversation, to embrace eventually do you also in a non-compromising manner proceed to enter upon a discussion of matters in general, eliminating of course from the outset everything running counter to Russian interests, and express your readiness to report to me on the subject.

Please to act at once—perhaps in connection with the communications for Mr. Sazonow forwarded to you in the instructions contained in telegram No. 199 of the 30th instant***)) in the above indicated sense—, and report the result to me immediately.

*) Compare the wording in Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 49.

**)) See Part III, No. 17.

***)) See Part III, No. 29, 2.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg*).

Telegram No. 202.

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

I sent for Mr. Schébéko to-day, in order to explain to him that—to all appearances—a misunderstanding must have occurred concerning our last conversation (July 28th), in that I had had reports, to the effect that Mr. Sazonow was unpleasantly impressed by my flat refusal of his proposal of an exchange of views with your Excellency, as also by the fact that no interchange of views should have taken place between me and Schébéko.

As concerns the former point, I had already by telegram left it to your Excellency to continue to give any informations desired by Mr. Sazonow, concerning the note, — though this appears forestalled by the outbreak of war. These informations would, it is true, only consist in supplementary explanations, as it has never been our intention, to yield on any of the points contained in the note.

Also that I had authorised your Excellency, to discuss our special relations to Russia with Mr. Sazonow in a friendly manner. (As I could ascertain on this occasion, the suggestion did not come from Mr. Sazonow, but was an idea of Mr. Schébéko's who had dropped a remark to that effect in the course of conversation.

That Mr. Sazonow should complain, that no exchange of ideas had taken place between Mr. Schébéko and me, must be due to some misunderstanding, as we—Schébéko and I—two days ago discussed the questions at issue for nearly three quarters of an hour, a fact the Ambassador confirmed to me with the remark, that he had informed Mr. Sazonow in the most detailed manner of this interview.

Mr. Schébéko then went on to say why St. Petersburg viewed our attitude towards Servia with much anxiety. We were a Great Power attacking the small Servian state, without St. Petersburg knowing what our intentions were, whether we deprive it of its sovereignty, overthrow or even crush it altogether.

*) Compare the wording in Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 50.

Attached to Russia by historical and other links, the latter could not consider the further fate of Servia with indifference. St. Petersburg had brought all the pressure possible to bear upon Belgrade, in order to cause it to accede to all our demands, at a moment, it is true, when it was not yet known, what demands we had subsequently made. But even concerning all these demands everything would be done to obtain at least what was possible.

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly laid stress on the fact, that we did not desire to pursue a policy of conquest in Servia, nor attack its sovereignty, but merely establish a state of things, which would give us guarantees against the Servian agitations. To this I added a lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Servia. I also made Mr. Schébéko clearly understand, in what great a measure Russian diplomacy was responsible for this state of things, a fact he in no way denied, but took the part of his Minister, declaring him to be an enemy of such a policy.

In the further course of our conversation I mentioned, the fact of the Russian mobilisation which had now come to my knowledge. As it was restricted to the military districts of Odessa, Kiew, Moscow and Kasan, it bore a character of hostility towards this Monarchy. The reason of this I did not know, as no dispute existed between Russia and us. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively against Servia, and not against Russia, which was proved already by the fact, that the 1st, Xth and XIth corps*) had been mobilised. Considering the circumstance however, that Russia was evidently mobilising against us, we too had to extend our mobilisation, while I expressly mentioned, that these measures, it goes without saying, constituted no hostile move against Russia and were merely to be considered as the necessary counter-move to the Russian mobilisation.

I begged Mr. Schébéko to report this to St. Petersburg, which he promised to do.

The above for your Excellency's information and as a guide for your utterances.

*) That is the Galician Corps.

Count Szápáry to Count Berehtold.

Telegram No. 181.

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

In cipher.

Continuation of telegram No. 180 of 29th instant*).

The accumulating evidence of a diplomatic and military nature make it now possible, to express a surmise concerning Mr. Sazanow's intended tactics. The Minister dreads war as much as his Imperial Master and seems to be attempting to deprive us of the fruits of our Servian campaign without going to Servia's aid if possible. Should it however be obliged to enter the war, to enter upon it better prepared than now. Accompanied by the most pacific asseverations the Russian mobilisation is to proceed as if directed wholly against Austria-Hungary. Whilst effecting, as far as possible, the elimination of Germany, the mobilisation is so to be ordered as to cover Roumania's rear, Servia's deliverance being undertaken by Russia at a moment when Austria somewhat spent by her campaign, was in a position to announce a success. Should the other Balkan states show any signs of activity and try to profit by our proceedings, Roumania would be pushed to the fore for the protection of the Peace of Bucarest. If Austria-Hungary protested she would have to enter the war with Roumania on the side of Russia. But if Austria-Hungary and Germany attempted already at this juncture to challenge Russia on the score of her mobilisation and so prevented her gaining an advantage by her dilatory tactics peaceful Russia would appear to be the attacked country and would thus have more chance to draw France and perhaps England also with her; and our favourable moral and military situation in Europe would thereby be injured. Russia is seeking to save herself out of the dilemma into which she has been forced from our being justified to proceed against Servia, and might thus succeed, even without going to war to safe-guard her interests in the Balkans.

*) See Part III, No. 19.

By quoting considerations of this kind Emperor Nicholas was no doubt won for the idea of mobilisation, personally not a sympathetic one to him. That the military circles are probably hard at work to reduce this complicated political calculation if in any way possible, to a simpler formula, and are trying to influence public feeling and imparting false news to the Emperor; and as soon as a certain preparedness for war has been reached, will then precipitate matters as much as possible, is certainly not unlikely.

47.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 199.

Cetinje, July 30, 1914.

My telegram No. 199 of to-day—secret).*

In a note just received and being forwarded from Cattaro to-morrow, the Government here formally asks whether we have any intention of conquest with regard to the war in Servia.

48.

Count Berchtold to Herr Otto at Cetinje.

Telegram No. 148.

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

Telegram in figures.—Strictly confidential.

Received your telegram No. 194 of 29th instant **).

The already effected mobilisation of the Montenegrines makes it imperative for us, to be quite clear concerning the attitude of Montenegro.

Will you please telegraph to me at once whether, according to your opinion a clear attitude of Montenegro could be obtained, by again promising it certain advantages, or by insisting on knowing what it means to do as proposed by our military attaché.

*) Compare Part III, No. 22.

***) See Part III, No. 21.

49.

**Exchange of telegrams between the Emperor William and
the Emperor Francis Joseph I.**

A.

Berlin, New Palace, July 30, 1914.

To His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.

The personal request of the Emperor of Russia to undertake an effort of mediation in order to prevent the universal conflagration and to maintain the peace of the world, could not be refused by me and I submitted proposals to your Government through my Ambassador yesterday and to-day. Among other things it is proposed that Austria state its conditions after occupying Belgrade or other points.

I should be most sincerely grateful to you if you would let me know your decision as soon as possible.

In truest friendship

signed: *Wilhelm.*

B.

Schönbrunn, July 31, 1914.

To His Majesty Emperor William.

I hasten to send you my warmest and best thanks for your friendly telegram.

Immediately after your Ambassador had submitted to my Government Sir Edward Grey's proposal of mediation, I received the official report of my Ambassador at St. Petersburg, according to which the Emperor of Russia has ordered the mobilisation of all the military districts on my frontiers.

Count Szögyény reports to me that you had already told Emperor Nicholas, in the best possible manner that the Russian preparations for war were to cease, because otherwise the whole responsibility of an universal war would rest on his shoulders.

Conscious of my serious duties for the future of my Realm, I have ordered the mobilisation of my whole army and navy.

The action my army is involved in at this moment against Serbia cannot be interrupted by the threatening and insolent attitude of Russia.

A renewed rescue of Serbia by Russian intervention would have the most serious consequences for my countries and I can therefore in no case admit of such an intervention.

I am fully aware of the importance of my decisions and have made them, confiding in the justice of God, with the absolute certainty that your army, as an unfailingly true ally will stand by my country and the Triple Alliance.

50.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény at Berlin.

Telegram No. 302.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Baron Conrad telegraphs me and simultaneously to the Chief of the German General Staff in answer to a question: "According to the decision of His Majesty the resolution is: War against Serbia. Mobilisation of the rest of the army which is to be assembled together in Galicia. First day of Mobilisation August 4th. Order of mobilisation given to-day July 31st. Let me know date of first day of mobilisation in Germany".

Will your Excellency please at once bring the above to the knowledge of the State Chancellor.

51.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 332.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Démarche in Petersburg.

Answer to telegram No. 291 of yesterday *).

After a talk with the State Chancellor, the State Secretary asked me to report to your Excellency, that the German Government, to its greatest regret, could not act on of your Excellency's suggestion, as it had only recently instructed its representatives at St. Petersburg and Paris to declare to the respective Governments, that the continuation of the Russian mobili-

*) See Part III, No. 1.

sation would entail counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which might lead to serious consequences.

Moreover the Emperor William had "agreed" to the wish of the Emperor Nicholas, contained in the telegram reported by me (see my telegram No. 321 of yesterday*) to try to mediate.

A direct understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia must be established. But Russia must stop its military preparations, as this might otherwise on our part (on the part of Austria-Hungary) have the same consequences, and would then make the Emperor Nicholas impossible as a mediator.

The Emperor Nicholas thereupon replied that the language of Emperor William was very different to that of his Ambassador Count Pourtalès; he begged for explanations on this point and proposed that the Austro-Hungarian-Servian quarrel should be brought before the tribunal at the Hague.

In his reply, the Emperor William again drew the Czar's attention to the fact that the Russian preparations for war must cease, as otherwise the whole responsibility of a universal war "would rest on his — the Czar's shoulders".

In the exchange of telegrams between the two monarchs which were in English, and which Under Secretary of State read to me, every single one of the wires contains an appeal to their personal friendship and for the maintenance of peace, in the most emphatic words.

The Emperor William, in every one of his telegrams, laid stress on the fact, that Austria-Hungary was absolutely justified in the proceedings against "murderer" Servia.

52.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 333.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

England.

As Under Secretary of State assured me this evening, the German Government is, on the strength of reliable news received, contrary to its recent conviction, now unfortunately

*) See Part III, No. 6.

quite sure that England would unquestionably at once attack Germany and Austria-Hungary if an armed conflict with France and Russia should break out.

The German fleet in the meantime already been ordered to the North sea ports.

53.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 334.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher. — Strictly secret.

Italy.

Under Secretary of State has read to me a telegram just received from German Ambassador in Rome, according to which Marquis di San Giuliano has now after all declared to him that Italy considers our warlike proceedings against Servia as an aggressive act towards Russia and therefore considers itself released from its duty to render assistance, (as foreseen by the Triple Alliance) in the general conflict that might eventually result. "Also, Italy must insist on compensations on the strength of article VII."

To the strong objections of Herr von Flotow, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied, that he was not saying that Italy would not eventually support us, but that he was only stating, that in this case it had no obligation to do so on the strength of the Triple Alliance.

German Ambassador ends his telegram with the remark that Austria-Hungary should, in any case, promise compensations to Italy for the eventual occupation of Servian territories.

54.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 335.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Russia.

I transmitted a memorandum relative to the contents of your Excellency's telegram No. 293 of to-day *).

*) See III, No. 29.

Under Secretary of State who expressed his pleasure at the declarations contained in it, destined for Russia, promised me to inform Count Pourtalès of the same.

55.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 336.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Have informed State Chancellor of contents of your Excellency's telegram of yesterday (only received this morning)*).

To-day an "imminent state" of war is declared in Germany, and probably already to-morrow the mobilisation of the whole German army will be ordered.

56.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 340.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

German Ambassador in St. Petersburg reports, that the general mobilisation of the whole Russian army and fleet has been ordered to-day.

State Secretary begged me to report to your Excellency, that he hoped, that, of course without slackening our efforts against Servia, we would make Russia bear the brunt of our military operations.

*) Compare Part III, No. 29.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 344.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

The military attaché was called to His Majesty the Emperor William at 5 p. m. to-day. The Emperor sketched the following general ideas: His Majesty began by saying, that he had exchanged telegrams with Emperor Nicholas concerning the maintainance of universal peace.

The Czar had laid stress on his love of peace, though already on 24th inst. the first measures for a partial mobilisation had been taken in Russia. Emperor Nicholas had in yesterday's telegram again insisted on his love of peace, though already a general mobilisation had been ordered. In to-day's telegram the Czar declared positively, that though his army was indeed mobilised he would "pledge his word" that nevertheless everything would be stopped*).

Reply telegrams of Emperor William emphasised readiness to mediate and in most decisive terms showed that the Czar, in consequence of the Russian measures, took upon himself the responsibility for the outbreak of the European war. Also that he found it incomprehensible that he—Emperor Nicholas—made the cause of the murderous Servians his own.

Parallel to this exchange of telegrams there ran another between Emperor William and the King of England, in which Emperor William declared his readiness to mediate and urgently impressed on King George the necessity to bring pressure to bear on his allies.

To a telegram to our most gracious Emperor from Emperor William, relative to Sir Edward Grey's proposal of mediation he had to-day received a reply, which had, especially by the warmth of its expression, pleased him; the offer of mediation, having of course been declined in this telegram.

Further the Emperor William explained in detail his efforts towards the gaining of allies.

*) Compare Part III, No. 49B.

He had telegraphed to King Carol of Roumania, that he, as chief of the House of Hohenzollern, absolutely counted on his active support by his fulfillment of the written treaty.

Count Hutten-Czapski, just returned from Roumania, had assured Emperor William of his absolute conviction that Roumania would actively intervene on the side of the Triple Alliance.

The Emperor William added: Austria-Hungary ought to promise Bessarabia to Roumania.

To be continued.

58.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 345.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Continuation of telegram No. 344 of to-day*).

Further he had also, in decisive terms, invited the King of Bulgaria to side with Austria-Hungary in case of a general conflict.

Upon a remark of the Imperial and Royal military attaché concerning the favourable dispositions of Turkey, His Majesty said, that he could, with the most earnest request for strictest secrecy, communicate that he was in the act of signing a treaty with Turkey, which would oblige the Turks to actually advance against Russia with five army corps under the Chief Command of Liman von Sanders and the leadership of the military mission, already increased to sixty officers. Only a few small formalities had to be complied with, before the treaty should become final (such as settling of the date etc.). General Liman had reported military practicability of the project.

Concerning Greece, he—Emperor William—had telegraphed to the King that he “would break off all relations with him if Greece went with Russia”. Further he had had it suggested to the King of Greece, that in consequence of the

*) Compare III, No. 57.

superiority of the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleet his country would remain completely unprotected, because the Greek army was as yet only in the making. But if he—King Constantine wanted on all accounts to interfere, he would have to side against Russia.

His former personal attaché, Oberstleutnant von Kleist, who formerly had been German attaché in Rome, was on his way to the King of Italy with a letter, in which Emperor William urgently called upon King Victor Emanuel to keep to the treaty agreed upon, by mobilising his complete army and navy and by sending the promised army across the Alps.

The appearance of Italian troops on German territory against France would, so he expected, principally have a strong moral effect.

Through this exposition of facts he, Emperor William, hoped to do his part in helping to give the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the most numerous reinforcements possible for their fight against Russia.

Germany must first turn on France with its principal forces and could only after having crushed France, take the offensive against Russia, therefore Austria-Hungary must resist the first storms of the Russian attack and reckon with at least fourteen corps on the enemy's side, as according to news received, only six Russian corps were to be directed against Germany for the present.

His Majesty the Emperor William charged the Imperial and Royal military attaché "to transmit the most urgent request to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and to the Chief of the General Staff Baron Conrad, to turn against Russia with all available means in order to be able to master their superior numbers. According to his opinion Germany must reckon with England's active intervention against the Triple Alliance; how the German fleet should hold its own against the four times more powerful English-French fleet, God alone knew."

Finally Emperor William told Baron Bienerth, that all his sons would start with him, Emperor William, for the front: the Crownprince as leader of the 5th army, in place

of General Eichhorn, who was dangerously ill, Prince Eitel as Commander of the 1st Regiment of the Footguards, Prince Oscar as Commander of a Cuirassier regiment, Prince Joachim on the staff of the 10th army corps and Prince Adalbert with the fleet.

Finally he hoped to obtain authorisation to attach military attaché Baron Bienerth to his person and his military attaché in Vienna: Oberstleutnant Count Kageneck to our headquarters.

His Majesty asked Baron Bienerth to transmit to me his most friendly greetings.

Baron Bienerth asked me further to report to your Excellency, that Emperor William had given him the impression of being very decided and calm.

I beg of you, according to the request of the military attaché, to transmit the above information as promptly as possible to the Chief of the I. and R. General Staff also.

59.

Count Berchtold to the I. & R. Embassies at Rome and Berlin.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey at Rome, No. 914.
2. Count Szögyény at Berlin, No. 307.

Telegram in figures.—Secret.

ad 1:

To-day I had a long interview with the Duke of Avarna concerning the question of compensations, in which we came to a complete agreement. The German and Italian Ambassadors thereupon elaborated, on the basis of our interview, a wording completely satisfactory to the Duke of Avarna, which to-morrow is to be telegraphed to Rome.

I hope, that the question can now be considered as solved in the interest of all the powers of the Triple Alliance.

Will your Excellency please at once communicate the above to the Marquis di San Giuliano adding that we now count with certainty—a fact of which I never had

doubted—that Italy would fulfil its duties as an ally fully and completely.

ad 2:

I telegraph as follows to Herr von Mérey:

(text of telegram ad 1)

The above for communication to Herr von Jagow.

60.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 559.

Rome, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

According to his information the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day characterises the actual situation to me thus: that we had broken off the conversation with St. Petersburg, that Russia, in case that our action against Servia should not pass certain limits, would remain inactive, in the contrary case however attack us and that England then would certainly take part in the war.

As according to the assumption of Government here, the difference between our and the Russian point of view is really a slight one, Italy together with England, Germany and France was endeavouring to bridge over this difference and thus to prevent the general war. As the Marquis di San Giuliano had on this occasion mentioned, that we had declared our intention (I interposed: but without any official engagement) not to annex any Servian territory, and to respect the integrity and independence of Servia, I stated in any case that the communication which I had made to him had simply treated of the exclusion of territorial aggrandisement.

61.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 569.

Rome, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Reply to your Excellency's telegram No. 908 of 30th inst.*).

*) See III, No. 35.

My opinion on the question of compensation was stated in my telegrams of 26th inst. No. 541, 28th inst. No. 547 and 29th inst. No. 352 *) in my report and the private letter of 29th inst. and in my last but one and last letter to Sectionchef Count Forgách.

Contrary to my advice your Excellency, under the pressure of the German Government, met the wishes of the cabinet here on this question more than half way by the declaration contained in the telegrams of the 28th inst. No. 892. More or less successful blackmailing is of course being started concerning the rest. As a matter of fact the Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to me to-day, that he had, in answer to this declaration, informed Vienna, that it was vague and insufficient. It is therefore at the present moment an especially difficult task for me, to give any advice in a situation in which we have entered against my opinions and against my repeated warnings. According to my opinion the question whether Italy is to intervene in the war or whether it is to remain neutral, does not really depend on the compensation, but principally on the opinion here concerning the general situation of Europe and military considerations. We might therefore run the risk of binding ourselves considerably in compensation question, without however attaining the aim desired viz the military cooperation of Italy.

As we further are not agreed upon the object of the compensation, and cannot well settle a compensation in advance, as long as we ourselves do not know what we are going to get, we can according to my opinion, in the extreme case, only go one step further and declare that we, after the end of the localised or general war, will be ready to give to Italy compensation in terms of article VII, should we ourselves occupy territories on the Balkans—be it definitely, or for a period of time surpassing the Italian occupation of the Dodekan—provided that Italy exactly fulfils its duties as an ally.

*) See telegrams II, No. 50, 87, and III, No. 20.

**Count Berchtold to the I. & R. Ambassadors at Berlin,
London, St. Petersburg, Paris and Rome.**

Telegram.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 305,
2. Count Mensdorff in London, No. 191.
3. Count Szápáry in Petersburg, No. 205.
4. Count Szécsen in Paris, No. 181.
5. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 911.

1. 2. 3. und 5.

Count Szécsen telegraphs to me under date the 30th inst.:
Servia.

To-day had long interview with Mr. Viviani, who spoke in a pacific and conciliatory manner and listened attentively to my detailed explanations concerning the attitude of Servia, the causes why we could not accept the reply of Mr. Pašić.

His principal thesis was, that it was not known now what we wanted and that thus the way was blocked for every mediation. I replied, that we had very clearly formulated our demands to Servia, as they had not been accepted, the state of war ("Kriegszustand") had begun.

As my personal opinion I added, that if Servia were inclined to yield, it would easily find ways and means to find out in Vienna what conditions we would now make.

But what is to happen with Russia? asked the Prime Minister. I said that we had asked nothing of Russia and only desired that it should not interfere.

The Minister said that we must try to find a solution which might save Russia a humiliation. He again spoke of English proposal of the conference of four Ambassadors. I replied that this was hitherto not very clear.

Minister decidedly denied press notices here about French mobilisation. I pointed out example given by Russia in this regard, the possible consequences of which the Minister describes as very dangerous.

I said it would be very useful if Russia would not continue mobilisation but give reassuring declarations on this subject.

Minister said: Russia must first be reassured that we do not want to crush Servia.

The opinion is prevalent here, that we are striving to reconquer the Sanjak. This would, so they say, mean war for Russia.

I am pressed by Government circles and other politicians, to give reassuring declarations of some kind or other about our intentions, which might be made use of against the Russian alarm news.

The principal fear here is: Sanjak, annexation of certain Servian districts, endangering of Servia's independence, and protectorate over that country.

Many people here, also in Government circles, wish for peace and would like to have arguments with which they might meet Russian and French agitations.

I am replying to the I. & R. Ambassador in Paris as follows:

4

Received your Excellency's telegrams No. 139 and 141 of 30th inst. *).

ad 1—5.

I quite agree with the way your Excellency spoke to the French Prime Minister.

With regard to the Ministers fear, that we want to crush Servia, I beg of your Excellency to at once draw Mr. Viviani's attention to the fact, that we officially informed St. Petersburg, that in our action against Servia we were not entertaining any idea of territorial aggrandisement and would in no way question the sovereignty of the kingdom.

I at the same time, authorise your Excellency, energetically, to deny the view taken, that we are supposed to intend re-occupying the Sanjak and beg of you to impart this officially to the French statesmen.

Of course all declarations made concerning our disinterestedness, are only valid if the war be allowed to remain localised between us and Servia.

*) See III, No. 40 & 41.

Ad 1.—3. and 5.

The above for the information of your Excellency,
ad 1.
and for communication to the State Chancellor.

63.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold *).

Telegram No. 143.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

German Ambassador has declared here according to instructions, that, if ordered Russian mobilisation does not cease within 12 hours, Germany would equally mobilise. Baron Schoen simultaneously asked whether France would remain neutral in case of a German-Russian war. Reply to this requested within 18 hours. Term expires to-morrow Saturday at 1 p. m.

German Ambassador supposes that he will have to leave Paris to-morrow.

“Agence Havas” reports regarding to-day’s council of Ministers, that Government whilst awaiting the course of events is taking measures for the protection of frontiers.

Should I also receive my passports and no instructions, I shall try to induce Swiss Minister to undertake protection of our co-nationalists.

64.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 144.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Received your Excellency’s telegram No. 181 of 31st inst.***) and at once informed Mr. Berthelot of contents, as Prime Minister was occupied.

Mr. Berthelot received my information and expressed personal opinion that the Servian question in view of to-day’s German *démarche* ***) had been completely pushed into the back-ground.

*) Compare the wording in Austro-Hungarian Redbook, No. 45.

**) See III, No. 62.

***) See III, No. 63.

Shall try to make our conciliatory attitude (which Russia has apparently passed over in complete silence) known here as much as possible.

Deputy Jaurès has just been murdered, they say by a Royalist.

65.

**Count Berehtold to the I. & R. Ambassadors at London,
Berlin and St. Petersburg.**

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Mensdorff in London, No. 194,
2. Count Szogyény in Berlin, No. 308,
3. Count Szápáry in Petersburg, Nr. 208.

Secret.

1.—3.

Herr von Tschirschky yesterday communicated an interview between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky in the name of the State Chancellor in which the English Secretary of State informed the German Ambassador of the following facts:

“Sazonow had informed the English Government that after Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Servia he was no longer in a position to treat directly with Austria-Hungary and therefore expressed the request that England should again take up its mediation. The Russian Government presupposed a temporary ceasing of hostilities.”

Concerning this Russian announcement, Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, that England was thinking of a mediation *à quatre* and considered the same most urgent, if a European conflict was to be avoided.

Privately Sir Edward Grey had made the German Ambassador understand, that England might, if it was only a case of Russia’s intervention, remain neutral, but that if Germany and France also entered into the action, it could not remain inactive; but would be forced to immediate decisions and

acts. The English Cabinet had to reckon with public opinion, which, because of the stubborn attitude of Austria-Hungary, was beginning to veer round.

To the Italian Ambassador, whom Sir Edward Grey received shortly after Prince Lichnowsky, the State Secretary said, that he thought he would be able to procure Austria-Hungary every possible sort of satisfaction. There was no question of a humiliating withdrawal of Austria-Hungary, as the Servians were in any case punished and with the approval of Russia would be obliged to submit to the Austro-Hungarian demands. Austria-Hungary could therefore without starting a European war, obtain guarantees for the future.

Herr von Tschirschky was instructed to add to the above repeated words of Sir Edward Grey the following considerations of the German State Chancellor:

If Austria-Hungary declined every mediation, Austria-Hungary and Germany would find themselves opposed by a coalition of the whole of Europe, as neither Italy nor Roumania would go with them, Austria-Hungary's political prestige, the honour of its army and its justified claims against Serbia could be satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade and other points. Also the position of Austria-Hungary on the Balkans as far as Russia was concerned would through the humiliation of Serbia become a stronger one. Under these circumstances the German Cabinet most pressingly begs the I. & R. Government to consider and to accept the mediation of England on the stated honourable conditions. It would be very difficult for Austria-Hungary and Germany to take upon themselves the responsibility for the consequences of a negative attitude.

Ad 1. and 3.

I am informing Count Szögyény of the aforesaid communication and add.:

Ad 1. and 3.

I beg your Excellency to thank the State Chancellor very much for the information forwarded to us through Herr von Tschirschky and to declare to him that we, in spite of the change of the situation occasioned by the mobilisation of Russia, and fully appreciating the efforts of England for the

maintainance of the world's peace, are ready to approach the proposal of Sir Edward Grey of a mediation *between us and Servia*.

We pre-suppose of course that our military action against the kingdom shall meanwhile continue and that the English Cabinet shall make the Russian Government stop the mobilisation directed against us, in which case we would of course also stop the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which the Russian mobilisation has forced us to undertake.

Ad 1. and 3.

The above for your Excellency's personal information.

66.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

Telegram No. 195.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Your Excellency's telegram No. 121 of 30th inst.*). Concerning the last paragraph of your telegram I can only refer you to my telegrams of to-day No. 191**), 192***), from which you will again see that we have officially declared to Russia and to all other powers that we are not thinking of threatening Servia's existence as an independent state and that our action is in no way directed towards territorial aggrandisement.

In spite of this Russia several days ago ordered the mobilisation which is threatening us.

*) See III, No. 42.

**) See III, No. 62.

***) Communication of instructions to St. Petersburg of July 30, No. 202, see III, No. 45.

67.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 123.

London, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Count Benkendorff, who is very pessimistic, told me that he put his last hope for the prevention of a general war in the direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

68.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 124.

London, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Military measures in England consist in armament of fortifications, the first right of purchase of Welsh coal reserves; state of preparation of regular and of part of territorial army without any pronounced mobilisation.

69.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 125.

London, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

German Ambassador has to-day spoken to Sir Edward Grey. State Secretary again insisted, that if general conflagration could in any way still be prevented, something had to be offered by us to St. Petersburg "which would put him who refused it in the wrong". This would make it possible for him to influence St. Petersburg and Paris as well as public opinion, which is betraying no sort of animosity against Germany.

The above words are very significant and are absolutely in accord with the character of the State Secretary. I am convinced that he would also in the eleventh hour make use of anything one could put within his reach.

Sir Edward Grey is said to have very little hope; German Ambassador is quite discouraged.

70.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 26.

London, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

At the Foreign Office the situation is considered as being nearly hopeless, especially in consequence of Reuter news about German mobilisation.

The news, brought this morning by Prince Lichnowsky, that direct conversations are again taking place between Vienna and St. Petersburg, had again given a little hope to Sir Edward Grey.

71.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 182.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

As I have had no instructions for Mr. Sazonow to-day and our yesterday's conversation had had a purely negative result, I had no cause to call at the Foreign Office to-day.

The situation to-day is still less clear than hitherto. The Italian Ambassador had an interview with Prince Troubetzkoi as Mr. Sazonow and Mr. Meratow were assisting at a council of the Crown at Peterhof; Prince Troubetzkoi declared to him that the situation was completely changed by the fact that we had bombarded Belgrade, an "open city", on the very day on which we had announced that we would proceed according to the regulations of the Hague conference, which apparently forbids such a proceeding. This argument seems to be a pre-meditated one, because Mr. Sazonow at the moment in which he received the news of our bombardment of Belgrade (my telegram of yesterday No. 180*) had made a similar remark to me.

The German Ambassador, who had seen the Russian Minister to-day before the Council of the Crown and who had spoken to him again most earnestly, again met him after his return from Peterhof, without the conversation showing anything new. The conclusion to be drawnt herefrom, seems

*) See III, No. 19.

to be, that also in to-days' council at Peterhof a definite attitude had not been decided upon.

What strikes one is, that whilst until now one could every day for hours hear the howling of the demonstrating mob (hooligans paid by Mr. Maklakow it is said) nearly complete calm reigns round the Embassy to-day. The Journalist Bogacki, correspondent of the "Ruskoje Slowo", who is in close touch with the Foreign Office, in the evening appeared personally at the Embassy and inquired in an agitated manner, whether the rumours circulating in the town, were true, that Austria-Hungary had, because of the Russian mobilisation, issued an ultimatum.

This would surely be a pity as it meant an irremediable step. Also the paper "Rietch" inquired in a conspicuous manner whether news from Vienna had arrived.

The feeling amongst the calm bourgeois classes, especially in industrial and financial circles, is said to show a reaction since to-day, as the fear of the economic consequences of a war is spreading.

In the Cabinet Council Sazonow, and the very influential Kriwoschein, are it is said, using their influence against war, also the Minister of Commerce Timaschow is supposed to be under the impression of the discouragement of economic circles. At the head of the war party, apart from the military men, stands the Minister for Home Affairs Maklakow, who also is said to arrange the—incredibly feeble—demonstrations by distributions of 1—3 rubles. Strange to say also the Prime Minister Goremkin is said to have spoken in the Cabinet Council in favour of the utility of a war.

A clearing up of the situation, which it is true might also occur almost immediately, must for the present be waited for.

Should the state of indecision still endure I shall try to influence the Prime Minister by showing him the publication concerning the Servian note.

Of the *note explicative* announced, and which purposes to explain the Russian mobilisation, we have as yet heard nothing in St. Petersburg.

72.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 183.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

To-day the orders for the general mobilisation of the whole army and fleet were placarded in the town; the first days of mobilisation.**).

73.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 185.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Emperor Nicholas has in all probability been pressed to order general mobilisation by means of false news concerning German and Austro-Hungarian mobilisation. It was pointed out yesterday to the military attaché in his office that the German fleet was ready for action in the Baltic in order to undertake a raid à la Japan. To-day a telegram came from Herr von Jagow saying that this news was pure invention.

Mobilisation orders are being received in the town in moody silence.

74.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold*).**

Telegram No. 186.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 198 of 30th inst.†) Your Excellency will have seen from my telegram No. 180 of 29th inst.††) that, without waiting for instructions, I have again taken up the conversation with Sazonow nearly on the

*) Compare the wording in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 52.

**) Cipher wanting.

***) Compare the wording in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook Nr. 55.

†) See III, No. 44.

††) See III, No. 19.

same basis as that now recommended to me, and that this interview without our points of view having essentially come nearer was abruptly broken off by him as meanwhile he had received the news of our bombardment of Belgrade which he considered as proof of the actual outbreak of hostilities.

In view of the fact that it had meanwhile become clear from the conversation between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Russia would not be satisfied even with a formal declaration that Austria-Hungary would neither attempt to reduce the size of Servia (!) nor touch its sovereignty, nor yet injure Russian interests in the Balkan or elsewhere, and with regard to the fact that the Russian mobilisation has since been ordered, I believe it best, without further special instructions from your Excellency to abstain from the requested *demarche*.

75.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 189.

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Emperor William addressed himself to Emperor Nicholas in a telegram the contents of which, though I could not ascertain them exactly, must have pointed out the danger of a Russian mobilisation at a moment when Austria-Hungary was still disposed to negotiate, and in which the necessity of staying the Russian mobilisation was probably insisted upon.

Pourtalès decided at noon to-day—as he declares, without instructions—to ask for an audience in Peterhof where he wants to make use of the same arguments to the Emperor. I think that he was simply instructed to transmit the telegram. Emperor Nicholas seems to have replied to Emperor William that the stopping of the ordered mobilisation is impossible for technical reasons, but that he pledged his word that the army would undertake nothing if Austria-Hungary were disposed to enter into negotiations with Russia.

Meanwhile I had received your Excellency's telegram No. 198 of the 3rd inst., and 202 of 3rd inst.*) and decided without regard to the orders for general mobilisation since issued in Russia and the breaking-off of our exchange of views, which on the part of Russia was effected in an unfriendly manner, nevertheless to act according to these telegrams, because on the one hand I did not want to disavow the assertion of Emperor William, that we were willing to continue the conversation and on the other hand it seemed opportune to me for the establishing of our tactical situation, to appear as the ones attacked and yet to have given an ultimate proof of good will and thus to put Russia in the wrong as much as possible.

To be continued**).

76.

Count Berchtold to Minister Otto at Cetinje.

Telegram No. 152.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

In cipher.

According to telegram from military attaché in Cetinje, the Montenegrine Government thinks it will be able to influence the Skuptschina to decide on remaining neutral, in case Austria-Hungary should give the following assurance:

No Austrian territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Servia, protection of the independence of Montenegro, sufficient financial support, besides territorial aggrandisement for Montenegro.

As a neutral attitude of Montenegro would be of great importance to us, I beg of you, on the strength of the above report, to try to influence Montenegrine Government that neutrality be decided upon in Skuptschina.

You can again point out that we are not undertaking a war of conquest against Servia. In the course of the Balkan war we gave proof that all aspirations towards territorial aggrandisement lay quite outside our intentions and to-day

*) See III, No. 44 & 45.

***) See III, No. 97.

we are still not thinking of any lasting occupation of Servian territory. We had a frank interest in the independence of Montenegro; in conserving a correct neutral attitude it might therefore safely count on our standing up for its independence, also in the future. Will you at the same time remark that we believe to be able to count on the support of Italy in defending the Montenegrine independence.

After the termination of the present conflict, Montenegro might for its neutral attitude, count not only on adequate financial support from the Monarchy, but also on our not putting any obstacles in the way of territorial aggrandisement of Montenegro in the direction of the Sanjak of Novi-bazar and that eventual wishes of Montenegro in Albania—within the limits of our agreement with Italy—would find most favourable consideration here.

77.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 208. *Cetinje, July 31, 1914.*

In cipher.

Neutrality of Montenegro.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 152 of 3rd inst.*) which I consider as reply to my telegram of 3rd inst.**)

The above telegram was transmitted to me from Cattaro this morning at 11 o'clock by automobile courier. When after having of course, instantly deciphered the same, I went to call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Skuptschina, which had only met for one sitting, had already, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me, accepted a resolution proposed by opposition, according to which Montenegro was to go to war viz. to come to the aid of its Servian brethren. Further the Skuptschina had given the Government the vote of confidence and a „free hand”. I then expressed myself in the sense of the telegram quoted. Minister for Foreign Affairs making notes.

*) See II, No. 76.

**) See III, No. 47.

He replied that he would instantly report my communications to His Majesty the King and give me a reply to-morrow.

I on my part drew his particular attention to the fact, that I expected an absolutely clear answer as to whether Montenegro, in view of the communications just now made to him—the Minister—and without regard to to-day's vote of the Skuptschina, would keep strict neutrality in our conflict with Servia also in case of Russia's active intervention in the war.

As soon as I shall have the promised reply, I shall be in a position to telegraph my opinion to your Excellency whether a clear attitude of Montenegro can be obtained, thanks to promised or other advantages or whether it is a case of aut-aut.

Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned in the course of the conversation that he had received information from two reliable sources, that we would begin the hostilities against Montenegro within the next 24 hours.

I replied, that I hoped he would not believe such nonsense. If we had any intention of the kind I should no longer be sitting here and making him communications such as the above.

78.

**Circular Manifesto to the I. & R. Signatory Embassies,
Balkan Missions and Missions in Stockholm and Tokio.**

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szögyeny at Berlin, No. 304,
2. Count Szécsén at Paris, No. 180,
3. Count Mensdorff at London, No. 189.
4. Herr von Mérey at Rome, No. 910,
5. Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, No. 203,
6. Marquis Pallavicini at Constantinople, No. 237,
7. Herr von Szilassy at Athens, No. 311,
8. Count Ottocar Czernin at Bucarest (Sinaia), No. 197,
9. Count Tarnowski at Sofia, No. 194,

10. Herr Otto at Cetinje, No. 151,
11. Chevalier von Löwenthal at Durazzo, No. 543.
12. Count Hadik at Stockholm, No. 17,
13. Baron Müller at Tokio, No. 24 *).

1.—13.

As the Russian Government has ordered mobilisation on our frontiers, we are forced to take military measures in Galicia.

These measures have a purely defensive character and are solely due to the pressure caused by the Russian preparations, which we greatly regret, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions against Russia and wish for the continuance of the good neighbourly relations existing hitherto.

The discussion between the Vienna and St. Petersburg cabinets, arising from the situation of which we expect a general re-assurance, are meanwhile continuing in a friendly manner.

The above for ∴ information and for use with the Government you are accredited to.

79.

Cabinet Council for Mutual Affairs.

July, 31, 1914.

Record,

of the Cabinet Council for mutual affairs held in Vienna on July 31th 1914 under the presidency of the Minister of the I. & R. House and for Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold.

Present:

The I. & R. Prime Minister Count Stürgkh.

The Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza.

The I. & R. joint Minister for Finances Chevalier Bilinski.

The I. & R. Minister of War Feldzeugmeister Chevalier Krobotin.

The Royal Hungarian Minister a latere Baron Burian.

The Representative of the I. & R. Naval Commander Rear-Admiral von Kailer.

*) Compare the wording in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 53.

Recorder: Councillor of Legation Count Hoyos.

Subject: Consultation regarding the English proposal of mediation and compensations to be granted to Italy.

The president opens the session by reading a daily report of 30th inst. of the following tenor:*)

Herr von Tschirschky has yesterday in the name of the State Chancellor transmitted a communication regarding an interview between Sir E. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky in which the English State Secretary informed the German Ambassador of the following facts:

“Sazonow has informed the English Government that after Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Servia he was no longer in a position to negotiate directly with Austria-Hungary and therefore expressed the wish, that England again take up its mediation. The Russian Government pre-supposes the temporary ceasing of hostilities.”

Regarding this Russian statement Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince Lichnowsky, that England was thinking of a mediation *à quatre* and thought the same urgently necessary if a general war was not to ensue.

Privately Sir E. Grey had given the German Ambassador to understand that England might remain neutral if it were only a case of Russia’s intervention, but that if Germany and France should also enter into action, it could not remain inactive but would be forced to make immediate decisions and act thereon. The English Cabinet must reckon with public opinion, which on account of the stubborn attitude of Austria was beginning to veer round.

To the Italian Ambassador, whom Sir E. Grey received shortly after Prince Lichnowsky, the English State Secretary said he believed he could procure Austria-Hungary every possible sort of satisfaction. A humiliating withdrawal of Austria-Hungary was out of the question as the Servians were at any rate to be punished and would—with the approval of Russia be obliged to submit to the Austro-Hungarian demands. Austria Hungary could therefore, also without starting a general war, obtain guarantees for the future.

*) Compare III, No. 65.

Herr von Tschirschky was instructed to add to the above mentioned statements of Sir E. Grey the following considerations of the German State Chancellor:

If Austria-Hungary declined every sort of mediation, Austria-Hungary and Germany would find themselves opposed by a coalition of the whole of Europe, as neither Italy and nor Roumania would go with them. Austria-Hungary's political prestige, the honour of its army and its justified claims on Servia could be satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade and other points. Its relation to the Balkans—position in Russia—would by the humiliation of Servia be a stronger one. Under these circumstances the German Cabinet must urgently and earnestly request the I. & R. Government to take into consideration the mediation of England under the said honourable conditions. It would be very difficult for Austria-Hungary and Germany to bear the responsibility of a negative attitude.

Continuing, Count Berchtold declares that he had, when the German Ambassador presented this English proposal to him, at once declared that a cessation of our hostilities against Servia was impossible. He could not alone decide about the proposal of mediation but must await His Majesty's orders on the subject and discuss the affair in the Cabinet Council.

He had then reported to His I. & R. Majesty on the contents of the *démarche* of the German Ambassador. His Majesty had instantly declared that the cessation of hostilities against Servia was impossible and had approved of the proposal to carefully avoid accepting the English offer on its merits, but agreed that we should in the form of our reply show, that we desired to meet England's wishes and thus also meet the wishes of the German State Chancellor by not offending the Government.

The reply to the German Government had not yet been elaborated, but he could already say now, that three fundamental principles had been observed in its wording viz:

1. The warlike operations against Servia must continue.
2. We cannot negotiate concerning the English offer as long as the Russian mobilisation has not been stopped.
3. Our demands must be accepted integrally and we cannot negotiate about them in any way.

As is known from experience, the Powers in such cases always try to make reductions when passing on the demands made by one power and it is very probable, that this would now also be tried, as the present constellation would make France, England and also Italy take Russia's part and we had a very doubtful support in the German representative in London. Anything might sooner be expected from Prince Lichnowsky than that he would warmly represent our interests. If this whole action ended in nothing else than a gain of prestige, it would, according to his opinion, have been undertaken altogether in vain. A mere occupation of Belgrade would be of no good to us; even if Russia would allow it. All this was moonshine. Russia would pose as the saviour of Serbia and especially of the Servian army; the latter would remain intact and in two or three years we could expect a renewed attack of Serbia under far more unfavourable conditions. He therefore had the intention of replying most courteously to the English offer making at the same time the aforementioned conditions and avoiding to discuss facts.

The Minister for joint Finances points out that through our mobilisation a completely new situation has been created. Proposals which might have been acceptable at an earlier date, are no longer acceptable now.

The Royal Hungarian Prime Minister declares that, he is entirely of the opinion of the president and likewise thinks it would be dangerous to go into the facts of the English proposal. Our warlike operations in Serbia must certainly continue. He asked himself however, whether it was necessary already now to inform the Powers of our new demands on Serbia and would propose to reply to the English suggestion, by stating that we were ready to approach it in principle but only on the condition that our operations in Serbia be continued and the Russian mobilisation stopped.

The I. & R. Prime Minister explains that the idea of a conference is so odious to him that he would not even like to appear to accept it. He therefore finds Count Tisza's proposal the best. We must continue the war with Serbia and declare ourselves ready to continue negotiating with the Powers as soon as Russia stopped its mobilisation.

Chevalier von Bilinski finds Count Tisza's suggestion extremely clever and by making the two conditions mentioned we would gain time. He too could not feel kindly towards the idea of a conference. The course of the London conference was so terrible a memory, that public opinion would revolt against the repetition of such a performance. He too was of opinion that the English offer must not be refused brusquely.

After Baron Burián had also expressed agreement, the proposal of Count Tisza was unanimously accepted and the fact established that the inclination was to accept the English proposal on the conditions formulated by Count Tisza.

The president then lays stress upon the importance of Italy's remaining in the Triple Alliance. Now however Italy had taken the standpoint that we had provoked the conflict and that our proceedings against Serbia were likewise aimed against Russia. From everything the Marquis di San Giuliano had said it was clear, that the Italian attitude was inspired by a desire for compensation. Italy bases its wishes upon the wording of article VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. Our interpretation is, that a right of compensation according to this article only then exists, if we occupy Turkish territories on the Balkans temporarily or for a longer time; as according to the spirit of the treaty there could only be a question of territories of the Ottoman Empire. Italy however insists that as in one part of the text the words "dans les Balkans" are mentioned, the whole Balkan peninsula is meant. Though the Italian conception might be refuted by a series of reasons, he must point out, that the German Government had also adopted the Italian point of view. In the course of the last week *démarches* had daily been made, in order to induce the I. & R. Government to join the two other allied countries in its acceptance of the question of compensation.

The I. & R. Minister for War mentions, that the I. & R. military attaché in Berlin had reported to him about interviews which he had had with the Emperor William and the Chief of the General Staff Count Moltke and in which both had most urgently pointed out how important an active

intervention of Italy in the coming conflict was, and that it would therefore be most desirable that the I. & R. Government meet the wishes of Italy in the compensation question.

The President declares that word had been sent to him from Rome that the coming war was against Italian interests, as its successful ending would strengthen our position in the Balkans. Under these circumstances Italy could only then intervene actively, if its claims were recognised. He had until now instructed the I. & R. Ambassador in Rome, to reply to the demands concerning the compensation by vague phrases and continue insisting on the fact that all idea of territorial aggrandisement was quite beyond our intentions. If however we should be forced against our will to undertake a non-temporary occupation, there would then still be time to approach the question of compensation.

He only saw two ways that could be followed here. Either insist on our own interpretation of article VII, or to promise Italy compensation with a "beau geste", or else still to accept the Italian interpretation of article VII, whereby stress was to be laid on the fact that Italy would only then have any right to demand compensation, if we ourselves took lasting possession of any Balkan territories. Finally he wanted to point out that during the Lybian campaign we had most rigorously interpreted article VII.

Baron Burian and Count Tisza insist that not only could the Italian interpretation of article VII of the treaty be refuted but also the view of the Italian Government, that the *casus foederis* was not established for it. Therefore we should decide on concessions only on condition that the Italian Government's co-operation in case of a general war should really be forthcoming.

Chevalier von Bilinski points out that the great struggle which is imminent meant a struggle for the existence of the Monarchy. If Italy's active help was of such importance in this struggle, we should have to make sacrifices in order to purchase this assistance.

Count Stürgkh takes the point of view that Italy cannot insist on compensation if after the outbreak of the great war it does not fulfil its engagements as an ally.

The Cabinet Council thereupon authorises the President on principle to promise Italy a compensation in the eventuality of a lasting occupation of Servian territories on our part, and to speak of the relinquishment of Valona to Italy, if circumstances should demand it and Italy actually fulfil its duties as an ally; in which case Austria-Hungary would assure itself the decisive influence in North Albania.

The President then declares the discussion closed.

I have taken cognisance
of the contents
of this record.

(signed) *Berchtold.*

The recorder;

Vienna, August 21, 1914.

(signed) *A. Hoyos.*

(signed) **Francis Joseph.**

80.

Report submitted direct to His Majesty the Emperor.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I take the respectful liberty to report to Your most gracious Majesty, that the Imperial German Ambassador has just informed me in the name of the German Government, that His Majesty the German Emperor has this forenoon pronounced the German Army and Fleet as in a "state of threatening war" („drohenden Kriegszustand“).

This is, as the German Ambassador adds the preparation known with us as "Alarm", for the general mobilisation which will begin in two days.

As the German Ambassador remarks, the German General Staff reckons, that the army of Your Majesty, though continuing the action against Servia, will also as soon as possible begin the warlike operations against Russia.

Also Herr von Tschirschky has this morning, on the strength of a telephonic message from Berlin, informed me that the State Chancellor intends instantly to address an ultimatum to Russia concerning a cessation of its mobilisation

In a cabinet council which took place this morning, the resolution was adopted, to reply in a very courteous manner to the English offer of mediation, which the German Ambassador yesterday submitted here; that we were not averse to consider the English offer of mediation, but that our warlike operations in Servia could not however be interrupted thereby and that we must moreover make it a condition of our entertaining Sir E. Grey's offer of mediation, that Russia should instantly cease all mobilisation measures and dismiss its reserves.

The conference moreover debated on a compensation to be granted to Italy in the event of our being forced to take permanent possessions in the Balkans. It was decided that in view of the threatening situation, it was absolutely necessary to assure ourselves of the loyal co-operation of Italy and to this end, though article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, according to our interpretation does not apply to the case of war with Servia, to take into account the diverging opinion of Italy—which point of view has also been taken by Germany.

The principal question discussed was the relinquishment of the Albanese port of Valona, to which Admiral Kailer present at the conference, did not object, always supposing that this port would not be transformed into a naval port.

Baron Conrad hopes to induce Italy to put some troops at our disposal for Galicia besides helping us as an ally against France. Of course the compensations for Italy can only be taken into consideration if it shows a friendly attitude towards us in the event of the war remaining localised, and does its duty as an ally in the event of a European war.

With deepest respect.

81.

**Exchange of telegrams between Emperor William and
the Emperor-King Francis Joseph.**

(July 31st and August 1st.)

Imperial German Embassy in Vienna.

A.

To His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

The preparations for the mobilisation of my whole army and fleet ordered by me to-day, will within the shortest time be followed by a definite mobilisation. I am counting upon the 2nd of August being the first day of mobilisation and am ready in the fulfilment of my duties as an ally at once to start with the war against Russia and France. In this hard struggle it is of the greatest importance that Austria send its principal armies against Russia and not divide its forces by simultaneous offensive movements against Servia. This is all the more important as a greater part of my army will be tied up by France. Servia, in this immense struggle, upon which we are entering side by side, will play quite a secondary role, only demanding the most necessary defensive measures. A successful war and the existence of our Monarchies can only be hoped for if we both meet the new powerful adversaries with our full forces. I further beg of you to do all in your power to induce Italy, by meeting its wishes, to take part. All other considerations must be dropped in order that the Triple Alliance may enter the war together.

(signed) *William.*

B.

**Reply telegram of Emperor-King Francis Joseph to
Emperor William.**

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

I thank you my dearest friend for your heart-rejoicing communication and am united with you in this grave hour and pray to God, that he may let our allied armies be victorious in their fight for a just cause.

As soon as my General Staff was informed of the fact that you were decided to begin the war against Russia at once, the resolution was taken here also to gather the preponderating forces against Russia.

My General Staff has entered into negotiations with Italy aiming at a further participation of Italian troops in the Triple Alliance: An encouraging influence on your part

in that direction would be urgently desired. You may rest assured that the utmost will be done on the part of my army in order to bring the great struggle to a successful end.

My military attaché in Berlin to-day reports on his yesterday's interview with you*). I am exceedingly glad and enthusiastic about your thorough-going preparations tending towards gaining new allies for our arms.

In view of the gravity of the situation my Ambassador in Rome has already received instructions to declare to the Italian Government, that we are ready to accept their interpretation of article VII, if Italy will now fully take up its duties as an ally. I myself am also telegraphing to the King of Italy**) in order to tell him, that after thirty years of peaceful work we count on the three allies uniting their armies for this decisive struggle.

(signed) *Francis Joseph.*

82.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 346.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

The German Ambassador in Paris was instructed to transmit a note to the French Government to-day in which the same was requested to reply within 18 hours whether it was going to remain neutral.

The German Ambassador in St. Petersburg likewise transmitted a note to the Russian Government in which twelve hours are granted to the same within which the declaration of the withdrawal of the mobilisation must be made.

The German Minister in Athens, who was on leave, since a short time received instructions from Emperor William, to return to his post by the shortest route possible. He is immediately starting for Brindisi where a Greek torpedo boat will meet him and take him to Athens.

*) Compare III, No. 57 and 58.

**) Compare III, No. 100A.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 348.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

The State Secretary just told me (11 a. m.), that the German Ambassador in Rome had telegraphed (despatched at 6 a. m.) that Marquis di San Giuliano had declared to him that, as Austria-Hungary had not acceded to the granting of compensation, Italy too felt freed from its duty as an ally.

Italy, so Marquis San Giuliano thinks, will not take an active part in the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but will certainly remain neutral.

When I read your Excellency's telegram No. 307 of yesterday (arrived last night) concerning an agreement in the question of compensation*) to the State Secretary, Herr von Jagow begged me most urgently, to tell your Excellency, that according to corresponding news received from Herr von Flotow at Rome and from Mr. Bolatti here, Herr von Mérey had also not transmitted the proposal of your Excellency about compensation to the Italian Government (your Excellency's telegram No. 280 of 28th ult.**): that he therefore had reason to fear, that Herr von Mérey would also not transmit this last information regarding the compensation question, which would have most disastrous consequences.

Herr von Mérey was against the granting of compensations and therefore did not conform to instructions on this point.

Of course I contradicted this accusation.

After a telephonic conversation which I have just had with Count Forgách, I am now going to the State Secretary, in order to acquaint him with your Excellency's promise, regarding the carrying out of your Excellency's instructions through our Embassy in Rome.

*) See III, No. 59.

**) See II, No. 88.

84.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 350.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Emperor William to-day drew the Councillor of Legation Count Larisch into a lengthy political conversation during a ride in the "Tiergarten".

The Emperor's words were on the whole a repetition of his yesterday's talk with the I. & R. military attaché (see my telegrams of yesterday*), Emperor William repeatedly laying special stress on the fact, that Austria-Hungary must absolutely direct its principal forces with all means at its disposal against Russia, as according to news he had received the assembling of troops at the Russo-Austrian frontiers was taking colossal dimensions.

Further the German Emperor mentioned, that the fact of the general mobilisation of Russia had completely taken him by surprise.

As regards the attitude of England, King George himself had assured Prince Henry, when he had a short time ago visited England, that England would in case of a conflict of the four continental Powers, not intervene actively; this royal assurance had however been disavowed by Sir E. Grey, 24 hours later, when he declared to the German Ambassador in London, that England could not remain quiet and that it must absolutely support its "allies".

85.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 355.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Italy.

I have as yet this evening informed the State Secretary of the contents of your Excellency's telegram No. 313 of to-day**).

*) See III, No. 57 and 58.

***) See III, No. 85.

At the Foreign Office the text of a draft of a reply to Italy, transmitted to your Excellency by Herr von Tschirschky, regarding the interpretation of article VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance was read to me.

Though this text—as far as I could see in a hurry—corresponds in its sense with the contents of the reply to Rome, transmitted to me by your Excellency, yet the wording is a very different one.

At the Foreign Office I was told that a declaration of the Italian Government to the effect that Italy would join us actively (according to the alliance) in case of a conflict, had not yet arrived.

On the other hand the “Tribuna” has brought a notice to the effect, that Italy would remain neutral.

86.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 916.

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

I beg of your Excellency, to immediately call upon Marquis di San Giuliano and tell him, that I have arranged with the Duke of Avarna and Herr von Tschirschky, to accept the Italian interpretation of article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty on the presumption that Italy will fully do its duty as an ally in the present conflict.

87.

Count Berchtold to the I. & R. Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin.

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 917.
2. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 313.

1.

I have made the following declaration to the Duke of Avarna:

“Je considère qu’une divergence de vue sur l’interprétation de l’article VII forme un élément d’incertitude pour nos relations du présent et de l’avenir qui pourrait être préjudiciable aux rapports intimes entre les deux Puissances. J’accepte l’interprétation donnée à l’article VII par l’Italie et l’Allemagne à condition que l’Italie observe une attitude amicale par rapport aux opérations de guerre engagées actuellement par l’Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie et remplira ses devoirs d’allié dans le cas où le conflit actuel pourrait amener une conflagration générale.”

Will your Excellency immediately bring the foregoing to the knowledge of Marquis di San Giuliano.

For the personal information of your Excellency I add, that I felt induced to make this declaration, because the German Government had given me to understand in the most earnest manner, that San Giuliano had yesterday declared, he did not feel bound by our treaty because of our refusal to accept the Italian-German interpretation of article VII.

2.

I am telegraphing as follows to Herr von Mérey:
(here follows text sub 1).

The foregoing for communication to Herr von Jagow.

88.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 570.

Rome, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

At a Cabinet Council which took place to-day the tendency became apparent, as Minister for Foreign Affairs told me, that Italy would remain neutral in the event of a European war. The decisive consideration being, that Italy had neither the obligation nor any interest which might induce it

to take part in the war. The Triple Alliance was purely defensive, but the war had been provoked by us, without our having previously communicated with Italian Government regarding our action. How could one expect Italy to sacrifice the blood and property of its people, and run the greatest risk of all in consequence of its long coast line, only, in order to reach a goal which was directly opposed to its own interests, that is: a change in the Status quo on the Balkan in favour of a material or moral advantage of Austria-Hungary. After having debated on this point animatedly for nearly an hour on which occasion Marquis San Giuliano amongst other things also mentioned our "quibbling" policy in Albania as well as the treatment of the Italians in the Monarchy, he finally said, that it was not yet settled—as a formal decision had not been taken that Italy would not after all—eventually perhaps later on—take part in the war. The word compensation was here again dropped.

My impression still is as heretofore, that it is a case of black-mailing which has already succeeded for the greatest part. Italy wishes to have its attitude paid for in advance and to discount the result of the war beforehand whether the war remains localised or whether it becomes general.

89.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 572.

Rome, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

German Ambassador has until now received no instructions to inform the Italian Government of the communication, contained in your Excellency's telegram No. 904 of 29th ult. *) But Herr von Flotow has made known the declarations directed by Germany to St. Petersburg (concerning the staying of the Russian mobilisation) and to Paris (question regarding neutrality of France).

*) See III, No. 1.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 575.

Rome, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Though I and my German colleague (for Germany the question has far greater practical significance) are doing all in our power to influence Government in the direction of co-operation, the balance is for the present strongly in favour of neutrality.

For this tendency which has only manifested itself within the last few days the circumstance has been decisive—this is my firm conviction—that England, contrary to opinion here, (and in Berlin) will not remain neutral, but will intervene. To expose its extensive and insufficiently protected coasts to the bombardment of English ships and to let the Italian fleet, which together with ours is inferior to the English and French Mediterranean fleets, take up the struggle, appears here as a terrible outlook.

The state of disorganisation of the army in consequence of the Lybian campaign (60.000 men are still in Lybia) and as I hear from certain sources, the fear of inner trouble, are further reasons for this tendency.

The final word has not yet been spoken, but for the present the pass-word is neutrality.

Emperor William has appealed to King Victor Emmanuel by telegram, and a personal adjutant is to arrive here on a special mission.

Perhaps the thought could be entertained of Germany and we declaring to Italy, that we should—in case Italy did not loyally fulfil its duties as an ally to the last man but remained neutral—consider ourselves also freed from our duties as allies and Italy as having with-drawn from the Triple Alliance.

91.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 145.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

Received Your Excellency's telegram No. 183*).

In a conversation I have just had with Mr. Iswolsky, I acquainted him with the communication which in accordance with instructions of your Excellency's telegram No. 181**) I had made to Mr. Viviani yesterday. Ambassador showed greatest interest and declared to have heard nothing of a communication on our part in St. Petersburg that we would not question the sovereign rights of the kingdom. He mentioned pourparlers in St. Petersburg, that did not seem to exclude the possibility of coming to an agreement. The German ultimatum, so he said, had made the situation very critical. He still denies Russian mobilisation, except that of 13 coros on our frontier and ended with the remark, that he knew that Mr. Sazanow was still ready for a conversation.

92.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 146.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

German Ambassador to his question***), which I communicated with my yesterday's telegram No. 143, as to whether Germany in the eventuality of a war with Russia could count on the neutrality of France, received the reply: France would in that event do what its interests demanded.

This evasive answer Mr. Viviani explained by saying that a new proposal of Sir E. Grey's had come, to the effect that all Powers should simultaneously stop warlike preparations. Russia had, if other Powers did the same, accepted proposal;

*) Communication of instructions to St. Petersburg of July 30, No. 202, see III, No. 45.

**) See III, No. 62.

***) See III, No. 63.

as moreover our declaration to the effect that we had no intention of infringing Servia's sovereign rights had been forthcoming, Viviani did not seem to think an agreement impossible.

Baron Schoen's departure not yet decided.

93.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 148.

Paris, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

France has to-day ordered general mobilisation. Mr. Margerie who informed me of this fact, told me at the same time that French Government has agreed to Sir E. Grey's proposal concerning simultaneous stopping of all military measures.

French mobilisation was of a purely defensive character and only a reply to German measures. As soon as Germany would accept Grey's proposal and stop military measures, France would do likewise.

It was a long way from mobilisation to a declaration of war, especially here, where the consent of Parliament was necessary—which had not yet even met.

Between Germany and France there were no questions at issue; and one could only explain the German attitude and language of German Ambassador by the wish of Germany to bring on war.

I objected to this point of view.

Mr. Margerie mentioned with satisfaction our conversations with St. Petersburg, and laid particular stress on the wish of France to bring about a *détente*.

94.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 131.

London, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

Received your Excellency's telegrams No. 191 and 192*) and have made use of contents this forenoon in interview

*) See III, No. 61 and 66.

with Sir E. Grey. State Secretary assured me that he was continuing his efforts unceasingly and trying to make use of everything that one put within his reach.

Telegram No. 194 received this afternoon*) and as German colleague was still without instructions have at once with his knowledge spoken to Sir E. Grey informingly and confidentially.

State Secretary promised me, without considering this as information of the I. & R. Government transmitted through me, to make use of contents as "coming from reliable sources".

He repeated, that even at the eleventh hour, he was ready to do all in his power in order to maintain peace.

95.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 132.

London, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

Sir E. Grey seems to have mentioned to German Ambassador that England would be disposed, to remain neutral; in case however of a violation of Belgian neutrality, public opinion here would entirely veer round to the side of France.

State Secretary asked whether Germany would make a declaration promising to respect Belgian neutrality, as France is doing. German answer evasive.

Sir E. Grey further suggested a mutual promise that German and French troops collected at frontiers would not attack each other.

96.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London.

Telegram No. 199.

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

I leave it to your Excellency's judgment to make use of the following argument in your next conversation with Sir Edward Grey or other English politicians:

*) See III, No. 65.

During a century English politics were dominated by divergencies from Russia. Only after the Boer War and the defeat of Russia in the Far East, did England change its course and aim at the diplomatic curtailment of German influence. Since then Russia has not only entirely recovered but to-day even occupies a dominant position from a military as well as from an economic point of view. Is it in conformity with English interests, that England should under these circumstances actively take part in an action the eventual success of which could only end in enormously improving the power of Russia and in rendering acute the question of Asia Minor and the Straits? Would it not, from England's point of view, be dangerous to encourage a development, which in its ultimate consequences would lead to a threatening of English predominance in India?

By waiting and taking up a neutral attitude in case of a European conflict, England could retain a completely free hand to act according to result of the struggle without being in any way bound by former partisanship. Thus England would keep the way open to continue its role of mediation at the ultimate peace negotiations in the interests of European balance of power, a role in which it acted so meritoriously during the Balcan crisis.

97.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 190.

Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Continuation of my telegram of 31st ult. No. 189**).

I therefore called upon Mr. Sazanow who received me immediately. I explained to the Minister that I had received instructions in cipher but that I had first of all to remark that the present situation in Vienna, created by the Russian general mobilisation, was wholly unknown to me, so that in interpreting my instruction, which had been sent me before the

*) Compare the wording in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 56.

***) See III, No. 75.

new situation had developed there, I should have to make allowances for the fact.

The Minister interrupted me excitedly, by saying, that the mobilisation had no significance; and that Emperor Nicholas had pledged his word to Emperor William, that the army would not budge, so long as a conversation tending towards an agreement was still going on with Vienna. Moreover we had first mobilised, an assertion which I distinctly denied, so that the Minister said: "let us leave this Chronology aside". There was no fear that the guns would go off by themselves and as concerned the Russian army, it was so well disciplined, that the Emperor with one word could make it retire from the frontier. I continued by saying that Your Excellency's two instructions started from the misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. This was, as I had already informed him without instructions, (my telegram No. 180 of 29th ult.*) a mistake. Your Excellency was not only ready to negotiate with Russia on a broad basis, but especially inclined to discuss the text of our Note as far as its interpretation was concerned.

I knew, of course, that the Russian point of view was that the form of the Note should be modified, whilst your Excellency were of opinion that its meaning could be explained.

This resulted in a discrepancy, which could not be overlooked, though on the whole it seemed to me that it came to the same thing.

Mr. Sazonow said that this was good news, for he still hoped that in this way the matter might be directed into that channel which he had from the first imagined the best.

I insisted on the fact, that Your Excellency's instructions to me were a proof of good will, though I had again to remind him that the situation created since by the general mobilisation was unknown to me. I could only hope that the course of events had not gone too far already. In any case I had thought it my duty again to insist on the good will of the I. & R. Government at the present most serious moment.

*) See III, No. 19.

Mr. Sazonow replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of good will; also, he would like to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations in St. Petersburg would seem, for reasons easily understood, to promise less hope of success than those on the neutral ground of London. I answered, that Your Excellency, as I had already explained, started from the point of view of direct contact with St. Petersburg, so that I was not in a position to give any opinion concerning his suggestion about London, but that I would report to Your Excellency on the subject.

Mr. Sazonow seemed greatly relieved by my informations and to consider them of exaggerated importance so that I always again had to point out the modified situation, the discrepancy of our initial views and so forth. Moreover, during the conversation two principal points were completely avoided. On my part the purely retrospective and theoretical character of a conversation — about the text of the Note as I gathered it from Your Excellency's telegram, on his part, the question what should become of the military operations during the eventual negotiations?

With regard to the reservation which I made concerning the general Russian mobilisation, Your Excellency is absolutely free to declare my explanations as no longer having any bearing. On the other hand it seemed to me from the point of view of the distribution of parts, exceedingly important to have undertaken another step, which might well be described as extremely conciliatory. Should however Your Excellency to-day still think diplomatic negotiations practicable or opportune, a basis would seem to present itself here. For these reasons I hope, that my proceedings will meet with Your Excellency's approval.

98.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 192.

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

In cipher.

German Ambassador has just received instructions from Berlin to draw Mr. Sazonow's most earnest attention to the

danger of the Russian mobilisation and to inform him, that on the part of Germany mobilisation had not been effected but only "Protection against war" had been ordered (Schutz vor Kriegsgefahr).

Russian Minister whom Count Pourtalès had awakened at midnight, pointed out, that cessation of mobilisation was to his regret impossible, but that Emperor Nicholas had already given such binding promises that surely there was no cause for alarm (!).

99.

Interview between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador.

Daily report No. 3737.

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

The Imperial Russian Ambassador to-day called on me in the most friendly manner in order, as he said, to inquire for any news that might have come. He still hoped that it would be possible to settle the question at issue by direct negotiations. Considering the actual situation it would certainly be better to do this on neutral ground, London being especially suitable for the purpose. It was to be regretted that Germany evidently wanted to force on the war. Russia had already given the most binding assurances in Berlin that its military measures bore no hostile character towards the Monarchy or Germany. Of course Petersburg would have to insist as hitherto, that we did not solve the conflict with Servia without consulting Russia, whose interests were engaged in this question.

I did not enter any further into these explanations of Mr. Schébéko's, but began a friendly unofficial conversation in the course of which I drew the attention of the Russian Ambassador to the manifold follies of the Russian Balkan policy. There was a far broader basis for discussions with Russia if she could only once make up her mind not always and entirely to make the fate of the Balkan States the touchstone of her attitude towards us.

Mr. Schébéko replied likewise in a very friendly manner, discussed in a purely academical fashion the many obligations

of Russia as an orthodox and Slav State, pointed out certain sentimental characteristics of the Russian people and took his leave with the remark that between us and Russia there was really only a great misunderstanding.

Immediately after this interview I received the visit of Monsieur Dumaine who spoke in just as peaceful a strain as his Russian colleague, lamented the warlike proceedings of Emperor William and expressed his conviction that a way must be found, to satisfy our just claims as well as Russia's interest in Servia and open the way to peace.

100.

Exchange of telegrams between Emperor-King Francis Joseph and King Victor Emanuel.

(1st and 2nd of August).

A.

Emperor-King Francis Joseph to King Victor Emanuel.

Vienna, August 1, 1914.

La Russie qui s'arrogé le droit de s'immiscer dans notre conflit avec la Serbie, a mobilisé son armée et sa flotte et menace la paix de l'Europe.

D'accord avec l'Allemagne je suis décidé de défendre les droits de la Triple Alliance et j'ai ordonné la mobilisation de toutes mes forces militaires et navales. Nous devons trente années de paix et de prospérité au traité qui nous unit et dont je constate avec satisfaction l'interprétation identique par nos gouvernements.

Je suis heureux en ce moment solennel de pouvoir compter sur le concours de mes Alliés et de leurs vaillantes armées et je forme les vœux les plus chèreux pour le succès de nos armes et pour un glorieux avenir de nos pays.

B.

Reply telegram of King Victor Emanuel.

Rome, August 2, 1914.

J'ai reçu le télégramme de Votre Majesté. Je n'ai pas besoin d'assurer Votre Majesté que l'Italie qui a fait tous les efforts possibles pour assurer le maintien de la paix et qui

fera tout ce qu'elle pourra pour contribuer à la rétablir aussitôt que possible gardera une attitude cordialement amicale envers ses alliés conformément au traité de la Triple-Alliance, à ses sentiments sincères et aux grands intérêts qu'elle doit sauvegarder.

(signé) *Vittorio Emanuele.*

101.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 354.

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.

In accordance with His Majesty's orders (Your Excellency's telegram without number of to-day) I have just now (10 p. m.) personally handed message to Emperor William.

His Majesty charges me to lay his warmest thanks for the gracious telegram of our gracious master*) at His Majesty's feet.

In the course of our interview, on which I will report in detail to-morrow, Emperor William mentioned, that up to the present no answer had come from St. Petersburg (my yesterday's telegram No. 346)**). Emperor Nicholas had moreover to-day telegraphed to him (Emperor William) that (without regard to Germany's demand) "the mobilisation of the Russian army in no way signified war!"

A reply came from Paris, but its contents are very vague.

On the other hand Sir E. Grey has sent a telegram in which the English State Secretary with the approval of King George offers to use his influence with France so that the latter may remain neutral in the event of a war between Russia and Germany.

Emperor William told me he would reply to London that Germany would make very precise and hard conditions regarding neutrality.

*) See III, No. 81 B.

**) See III, No. 82.

102.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 357.

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.

State Secretary just declared to me: No answer to German request (my telegram No. 346 of 31st ult.**) has come from Russia.

Russian troops have crossed the German frontier near Schwidden (south east of Bialla).

Russia has therefore attacked Germany.

Germany therefore considers itself at war with Russia.

No further declaration of war will be made by Germany.

Russian Ambassador has received his passports this forenoon and will probably depart this evening.†

103.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 359.

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Italy.

As [Under Secretary of State tells me, to-day's telegrams from the German Ambassador in Rome, dating from yesterday, are very unfavourable.

It would seem according to them, that Italy only wants to remain neutral.

Also, the Italian Government has sent a reply to the Roumanian enquiry to Bucarest (Your Excellency's telegram No. 306 of 31st ult.) to the effect that it did not find that the *casus foederis* applied to it (Italy), as our warlike proceedings against Servia signify a hostile act against Russia. The same also applied to Roumania wherefore the latter should remain neutral.

*.) Compare the wording in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 57.

**.) See III, No. 82.

Emperor William has again to-day expressed by telegram his certain hopes to King Victor Emanuel, and the German Government to the Italian Government, that Italy would stand actively on our side.

104.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 360.

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.

England.

English Ambassador was to-day at Foreign Office in the name of his Government with various offers of mediation regarding our conflict with Servia.

Under Secretary of State replied to him that now was not the moment for proposals of this kind.

To Sir Edward Goschen's remark that the general war might still be avoided if Austria-Hungary would demobilise against Russia, Mr. Zimmermann gave him clearly to understand that such a proposal was "childish". Only the general demobilisation of Russia might eventually still have the desired effect.

Under Secretary of State sees, in this proposal of Grey's, the disinclination of England, to take part in the continental conflict.

105.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 362.

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.

In continuation of my telegram No. 354 of last night*).

After I had had His Majesty the Emperor William informed that I had to hand him a telegram from His I. and R. apostolic Majesty, the Emperor sent for me late that very night.

Emperor William was surrounded by his family in a little garden of the castle here. During our long interview the

*) See III, No. 101.

Emperor first of all stated that he was continually exchanging telegrams with the Czar, but that to his deepest regret he had to own, that he absolutely could not understand the present mental state of Emperor Nicholas. Nor did he know whether the Russian Emperor sent his telegrams to him, Emperor William, in agreement with his advisers; the present principal adviser of the Czar was probably the Minister for War, but a decided influence seemed still to be wielded by the prayer-healer Rasputin. The Czar's telegram contained perpetual contradictions and he could to his regret use no other term for them than the word "lies". No reply had yet arrived from St. Petersburg to the timed enquiry of Germany. A telegram had arrived from the Emperor of Russia—in English as usual—in which His Majesty had assured the Emperor William, that the general mobilisation ordered in Russia, did not aim at Germany. The reply from Paris contained only empty phrases; but Sir E. Grey had, with the approval of his Royal master, offered by telegram to guarantee the neutrality of France in the event of war between Germany and Russia. Of course he (Emperor William) would demand a "dead-pledge" of France. He had the impression that France was scared by the mobilisation of Germany to a very high degree; under these circumstances it would be a question of persevering calmly but decidedly in the direction hitherto taken, above all he was decided to come to a reckoning with France and he hoped he would succeed in doing so.

As regards his unceasing efforts to win new and to assure himself of the old allies, he had already yesterday spoken to the I. and R. Military Attaché and he only wanted to repeat to me that he was continuing in every way to use his influence with Italy, that he had addressed very decisive letters to the Kings of Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece; and as he could in strictest confidence add, was on the point of signing an agreement with Turkey.

Finally, Emperor William asked me to report to our most gracious master, that he had received His Majesty's telegram with warmest thanks and would at once reply to it himself*).

*) See III, No. 118.

Concerning the virile attitude of the State Chancellor, as well as the correct carrying out of his intentions, the Emperor expressed himself full of praise, as also about his Ambassador in St. Petersburg, who was not only safe-guarding Germany's but also Austria-Hungary's interests very cleverly.

106.

**Count Berchtold to the I. and R. Ambassadors in Rome
and Berlin.**

Vienna, August 2, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 925,
2. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 323.

Telegram in figures.

1.

From your Excellency's telegram No. 575 of 1st inst. I gather*) that the Italian Government eventually intends, to intervene actively at a later date of the expected European war.

In view of this circumstance I begged the Duke of Avarna to call on me to-day and have expressed myself to him in the following sense:

Afin d'éviter tout malentendu je tiens à constater que les ouvertures faites le 1. c. au Duc d'Avarna au sujet de l'interprétation de l'article VII de notre Traité d'Alliance ont été faites sur la base de notre ferme conviction que l'Italie remplira dès le début ses devoirs d'alliée conformément à l'article III du Traité d'Alliance.

The fact of the unmotivated mobilisation of Russia against us and against Germany, and especially the now reported crossing of the frontier by Russian patrols at several points of the German-Russian border, seem to be a sufficient reason for the *Casus foederis*.

Will your Excellency speak to the above effect to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*) See III, No. 90.

For your Excellency's personal guidance I add, that the Duke of Avarna expressed to me in warm words his conviction that Italy, even if the strict wording of the treaty of the Triple Alliance did not constitute the *Casus foederis*, had the moral obligation to side with its allies. He had most pressingly urged this in his reports, but did not know whether any decisive importance would be attached to his opinion.

2.

I am telegraphing to Herr von Mérey as follows:
(Text sub 1.)

The above for communication to Herr von Jagow.

107.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 574.

Rome, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Received your Excellency's telegram of 31st ult. No. 914 and of 1st inst. No. 916 and 917, concerning interpretation of article VII of the Triple Alliance and the question of compensation*).

Until 5 p. m. Minister for Foreign Affairs had not yet received any telegram from the Duke of Avarna with the text agreed upon, but on the contrary a report dated yesterday according to which Your Excellency does not accept the Italian interpretation.

Marquis San Giuliano did not therefore want to enter into any discussion as to whether Italy on the strength of this promise could revise its intention of neutrality before knowing the text.

I have of course insisted that the integral fulfilment of its duties as an ally on the part of Italy (meaning these duties as we understood them) was assumed by us in making any concessions.

In the evening when I had received telegram No. 917**) I again saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, so he alleged, had also only just received text of explanation from Vienna.

*) See III, No. 59, 87 and 85.

**) See III, No. 85.

Marquis San Giuliano was however in spite of all the pressure I used, not to be persuaded to express any opinion. He must first study this serious matter, discuss it to-morrow with the Prime Minister and hoped to be able to give me a reply by to-morrow afternoon.

On my pressing him still further he remarked that his first impression was not a favourable one because of the formulating of the conditions. Also in the best of cases this explanation was only one element in the whole situation and the question, whether Italy would take part in the war or would remain neutral did not depend on the settling of this matter alone.

108.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 579.

Rome, August 20, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent me answer concerning article VII of Triple Alliance in the form of a letter. This reply is unfavourable throughout and its contents are the following:

We were making conditions regarding the acceptance of the Italian interpretation. That might be done in case of a change of treaty but not in interpreting it, that is, in ascertaining the intention existing at the moment of the signing of the treaty.

Present crisis was a passing one. The Triple Alliance still in force for 12 years. Italy must therefore be re-assured on this point, that the interpretation also held good in times of peace and in case that it should not take part in the war.

Moreover the acceptance of the Italian interpretation alone would not suffice to eliminate all important reasons which were in favour of neutrality. Our general formula did not constitute an agreement regarding the nature and value of the eventual compensations and their proportion to the great dangers and sacrifices of Italy's participation in the war.

In spite of all these serious considerations Italy would do its duty if this duty existed. The *casus foederis* did not however apply to this war.

Cabinet Council therefore yesterday decided on neutrality, pending decisions more conform to the wishes of the Allies, in case the duty or the interests of Italy should favour this.

Balance of power in Europe, Balkans and the Adriatic was a vital interest of Italy's and the latter would shirk no sacrifice in order to protect its existence and its future (evidently a threat concerning Sanjak and Lovčen).

As your Excellency sees, neutrality has been decided upon and the mathematical proof has been given; that—as I have always declared—the compliance advised to us by Germany in the question of compensation was only exposing us to blackmail and that the hoped-for goal was not reached.

I shall telegraph within the next few hours text of Marquis San Giuliano's letter.

109.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 580.

Rome, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day No. 579*).

Text of Italian reply:

«Nous avons examiné hier au soir, Salandra et moi, la réponse du Comte Berchtold au sujet de l'article VII et je m'empresse de communiquer le résultat de notre conversation.

Le comte Berchtold subordonne l'acceptation de notre interprétation de l'article VII à l'attitude que l'Italie prendrait dans la crise actuelle. Or, on peut subordonner à cette condition ou à une autre condition quelconque, toute modification d'un traité, mais on ne peut subordonner à aucune condition son interprétation, car il ne s'agit pas d'exprimer la volonté actuelle des Parties contractantes, mais de constater leur intention au moment où elles ont contracté le pacte.

En effet, l'Allemagne ne subordonne à aucune condition son interprétation conforme à la notre, et c'est logique.

*) See III, No. 108.

En second lieu, il faut considérer que la crise actuelle est transitoire, tandis que la Triple Alliance est destinée à durer 12 ans et peut être renouvelée, et il est désirable je puis même dire qu'il est nécessaire, que pendant cette longue période la politique de l'Italie et celle de l'Autriche-Hongrie soit identique dans les questions balkaniques; il est désirable et même nécessaire que leur activité diplomatique puisse se développer dans le plus parfait accord et avec la plus entière confiance et cordiale réciprocité. Pour atteindre ce but, il est indispensable, que nous soyons parfaitement rassurés sur l'interprétation de l'article VII. Cette nécessité est encore plus évidente dans la crise actuelle, même si nous ne prenons pas part à la guerre, car c'est surtout dans les moments plus difficiles et dans lesquels les occasions d'appliquer l'article VII semblent plus probables, que, pour pouvoir appuyer d'une manière constante, claire et résolue par notre attitude diplomatique l'action militaire de nos alliés, nous avons besoin d'être entièrement rassurés sur l'interprétation par l'Autriche-Hongrie de l'article VII.

D'autre part son acceptation de notre interprétation de l'article VII qui est d'une grande importance pour notre attitude diplomatique, ne peut pas suffire à elle seule pour éliminer toutes les raisons très graves qui nous empêchent, au moins en ce moment, de prendre part à la guerre.

En effet, cette formule générale n'établit pas un accord clair et précis sur la nature et la valeur des compensations éventuelles, et sur leur proportion avec les dangers et les sacrifices énormes, supérieures à ceux auxquels s'exposent nos alliés. Cette différence immense entre les dangers et les sacrifices d'une part et les avantages d'autre part, est justement la raison qui explique pourquoi l'Autriche-Hongrie a voulu une guerre qu'elle aurait pu facilement éviter, tandis que nous avons fait tout ce qui était en notre pouvoir pour épargner à l'Europe cette terrible calamité. Nous espérons toutefois que même sans prendre part à la guerre, des occasions se présenteront pour prouver à nos alliés nos sentiments sincèrement amicaux et nous comptons par conséquent sur un accord de nature à concilier nos intérêts respectifs.

Toutés ces considérations si graves qu'elles soient, ne nous empêcheraient pas de remplir notre devoir, si ce devoir existait, mais, comme le «casus foederis» n'est pas applicable à la guerre actuelle, le conseil des ministres a, hier au soir, décidé la neutralité, sauf à prendre plus tard des décisions plus conformes aux désirs de nos alliés, si tel sera notre devoir ou si nos intérêts le conseilleront.

L'équilibre de l'Europe, de la Peninsule des Balkans et de la mer qui entoure l'Italie est pour notre pays un intérêt vital, et il ne recule devant aucun des sacrifices, devant aucune des décisions que la sauve-garde de son . . . *) et de son existence même pourrait lui imposer.

Dès le jour où j'ai pris la direction de la politique étrangère de mon pays, un des buts principaux de mon activité a été de reserrer de plus en plus les liens d'amitié réciproques entre l'Italie et l'Autriche-Hongrie. C'est dans ce but que je continuerai à diriger tous mes efforts, car je le crois essentiel dans l'intérêt de nos deux pays; pour l'atteindre il faut que leurs intérêts soient mis en harmonie et que ceux de l'un puissent prouver satisfaction sans que ceux de l'autre soient lésés.

Je compte sur le Comte Berchtold et sur vous mon cher Ambassadeur, pour m'aider à remplir cette tâche.»

110.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 149.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.

Mobilisation greeted with enthusiasm. Draconic expulsion decreed against all strangers, especially against Austrians, Hungarians and Germans. Railway traffic nearly completely interrupted. All efforts to obtain trains for transport of our co-nationalists so far in vain.

*) Cipher wanting.

I am retaining here those officials and servants of the Embassy who have to join the army; I hope they will be able to depart with me. Every attempt to send them off singly would be fruitless.

Communication as to which Power is to represent us urgently requested.

111.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 134.

London, August 2, 1914.

In cipher.

News has arrived at Foreign Office that German troops have penetrated French territory at two points, viz. at Longueville and near Delle.

Great excitement because Germany has without declaration of war violated neutrality of Luxembourg and is penetrating into France.

Have suggested to German Ambassador to try and approach Sir E. Grey before the Cabinet Council to-day, so that he may not be influenced by some uncontrollable French news.

112.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London.

Telegram No. 204.

Vienna, August 2, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday*).

Your Excellency could still mention the following to Sir E. Grey:

Through an active intervention on the side of the dual Alliance, England would not only be entering into a state of war with Germany but, I regret to say, also with Austria-Hungary. We cannot believe that England desired at the very moment when Austria-Hungary was entering upon this decisive struggle

*) See III, No. 96.

for its existence as a great Power, to light-heartily destroy the traditions of two centuries of relations to the Monarchy based on the many joint interests and cordial sympathies of the people and thus eliminate for some time to come from European politics a factor which may, under certain circumstances, prove of great importance for England.

113.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 364.

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.

Italian Government has this morning formally declared through the German Ambassador in Rome and the Italian Ambassador here, that it does not consider the *casus foederis* applicable to the situation and therefore will remain neutral.

114.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 365.

Berlin, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Belgium.

The German Army has decided, on a plan that admits of no interference, to push into France by way of Belgium. In consequence, within the next few days, perhaps already to-day, or to-morrow, German troops will march into Belgium.

On my observing that in such a case England, still more enraged at this violation of neutrality, would side with our adversaries, it was explained to me at the Foreign Office "that now the military authorities had the deciding and that nobody could interfere".

Moreover, the German Government has already officially informed the Belgian Government this morning of the intended entry of German troops into Belgian territory, and has simultaneously declared, that it would otherwise fully respect the neutrality of Belgium and guarantee that during and after the war the territory of Belgium would remain intact; also

that every kind of damage caused by the German troops, marching through the country would be made good.

Foreign Office hopes that Belgium will under these circumstances give an answer permitting the passing through of the German troops. But even if its answer be an unfavourable one, it would not modify the above-mentioned decision.

Parts of the German VIII. Army corps have yesterday forenoon for strategical reasons crossed the border of Luxembourg in order to occupy the railway line.

115.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 370. *Berlin, August 3, 1914.*
In cipher.

German Ambassador in St. Petersburg is already on his way home.

116.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No, 588. *Rome, August 3, 1914.*
In cipher.—Secret.

Question of Compensation.

I have spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as indicated in first part of your Excellency's telegram Nr. 952 of the 2nd inst.*).

Marquis San Giuliano, with the arguments already known to your Excellency, disputes a casus foederis.

117.

Count Berchtold to the I. and R. Ambassadors at Berlin and Rome.

Address: *Vienna, August 3, 1914.*

1. Count Szögyény in Berlin, No. 338.
2. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 936.

*) See III, No. 106.

Secret.

1.

Herr von Mérey telegraphs under the 2nd inst. as follows: "Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent...." until "aim was not reached". (Compare III, No. 108.)

Will Your Excellency please inform Herr von Jagow of the above and remark that it seemed superfluous to me to add any comment to this Italian enunciation; under these circumstances it seemed to me to be of the greatest importance that we should content ourselves with Italy's neutrality, *de faire bonne mine au mauvais jeu* and to avoid anything, by which Italy might be induced to veer round into the adversary's camp. Starting from this point of view we must strive to let Italy believe that in consideration of the other important reasons which are decisive for its neutrality, we are satisfied. Should Italy further insist on the compensation question, we would point out that we have as yet not occupied any territory in a Balkan State and evade the conversation in a friendly manner.

If we should succeed in inducing Turkey and Roumania to consider the *casus foederis* as applying and to intervene actively, Italy may then perhaps also feel induced to adapt itself to our interpretation of article III. Wherefore it would seem advisable for us to use the possible intervention of Turkey as a means of pressure on Rome for the moment, as we might risk that Italy in the eleventh hour could work against our action in Bucarest and Constantinople.

2.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 579*).

(Follows text from 1.)

"Under these circumstances...." until "in a friendly manner."

The above for the form of your language.

*) See III, No. 108.

118.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 939.

Vienna, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Supplementing my telegram of to-day No. 936 and with regard to Your Excellency's telegram No. 580 of yesterday*).

For the moment I don't think it opportune that your Excellency should answer in writing to San Giuliano's note and beg of Your Excellency immediately to let me know by telegram your view of the *modus procedendi* to be employed towards Italy.

119.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 153.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.

Situation is beginning to grow very serious, the mob is looting and destroying German and Austro-Hungarian shops, our co-nationalists are turned out of their apartments into the streets without shelter or means, and cannot leave.

Even staff of Embassy hardly dares show itself in the streets or visit a restaurant.

German Embassy is comparatively even worse off and begs to have the above transmitted to Berlin, not knowing whether its telegrams arrive.

Have energetically protested to Prime Minister against this state of things.

He began by lamenting supposed rupture of peace by Germany whereupon I replied that peace was still existing between the Monarchy and France at any rate but even in the not desired case of war, diplomatic staff, non-combattants, women and children had a right to protection on the strength of the right of nations and pointed out that Monsieur Dumaine and French colony were far more generously treated in Vienna than we here.

*) See III, No. 109.

Prime Minister expressed his regret at the occurrences and promised, that order would be maintained.

Conversation took place in the most friendly manner, Minister invited me to address myself to him also in small matters such as if for instance tradesmen made difficulties from considerations of patriotism.

I again spoke of the question of sending our citizens home, Minister promised to remedy matters as soon as possible.

I beg your Excellency to continue telegraphing to me regularly every day in order to be sure that communications are not interrupted, I must reckon with the possibility, that should telegraphic communications be no longer possible, I shall have to act on my own responsibility.

120.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 154.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.

In accordance with his instructions Baron Schoen declared to Mr. Viviani at 6 o'clock in the evening that the diplomatic relations with France were broken off and in consequence of hostile acts of French air-ships, state of war had begun. He and his staff leave Paris to-night by a special train.

Long hesitation of German Government in recalling its Ambassador, though hostilities had on both sides begun, made a bad impression here.

A prompt decision concerning our attitude would appear most desirable.

121.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 142.

London, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.

Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons that he had given French Government assurance that English

Fleet would at once intervene if German fleet undertook operations against French coast, and that Germany was ready to accept this. If Germany penetrates into Belgium, England would oppose this with all its force. King of Belgium has appealed to England.

Fleet and Army are mobilised but no decision has as yet been taken whether and where they are to enter into action. Enthusiastic reception in Parliament. Agreement of opposition including Irishmen of both parties.

122.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 143.

London, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.

I draw attention to the fact that the possibility or rather the probability must be reckoned with that should England declare war on Germany, it will at the same time declare war on Austria-Hungary.

Reuter reports that English fleet has left Malta.

Please report above to chief of General Staff*).

123.

Count Hadik to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 32.

Stockholm, August 3, 1914.

In cipher.

Comte Szápáry me télégraphie par intermédiaire Ministère des Affaires Etrangères ce qui suit: „Je suis sans aucune instruction concernant ma conduite par rapport à la déclaration allemande de la guerre à la Russie. Ne pouvant quitter mon poste sur ma propre responsabilité je vous prie de vouloir me procurer des informations de Vienne.”

*) Was transmitted direct.

124.

Count Berchtold's direct report to His Majesty.

A.

Vienna, August 3, 1914.

Most gracious Sire,

I take the most respectful liberty of submitting here to Your Majesty the draft of a telegram to Your Majesty's Ambassador in St. Petersburg in which Count Szápáry is instructed to notify to the Russian Government that the Monarchy, in accordance with its treaty of alliance with Germany, considers itself as being in a state of war with Russia.

In case of Your Majesty's most graciously agreeing to the enclosed draft, I take the liberty to beg Your Majesty's authorisation to send the telegram to Count Szápáry, according to the political and military situation, perhaps to-morrow already, or on one of the following days.

With deepest respect.

B.

Draft of a telegram to Count Szápáry*).

I beg of Your Excellency to transmit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg a note of the following contents:

D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie ce qui suit:

Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait, qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'après une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec le dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre avec la Russie.

*) Compare wording in Austro-Hungarian Redbook Nr. 59.

125.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 377.

Berlin, August 4, 1914.

In cipher. Strictly confidential.

England.

At the Foreign Office here, hopes are no longer entertained of the neutrality of England; and even aggressive undertakings of English Fleet within the next few days (perhaps to-morrow already) are expected.

126.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Order No. 3788.

Vienna, August 4, 1914.

Secret.

Your Excellency receives herewith a copy of a telegram of Herr von Mérey of 2nd inst., in which the wording of reply note of Marquis di San Giuliano is given*).

You have already received by telegram the wording of a telegram from Herr von Mérey, regarding this note.

According to what Herr von Tschirschky says, the I. & R. Government seems to be reproached in Berlin for not having met Italy's wishes regarding the interpretation of article VII and of the claims of compensation derived therefrom, in time.

I would especially beg Your Excellency, on the strength of the documents at your disposal, to oppose this conception emphatically.

For this purpose I draw Your Excellency's attention to the following:

On July 26th the Duke of Avarna made the first *démarche* on the subject at the Foreign Office here and as is known to Your Excellency from telegram No. 272 of the same date**), in the most vague form.

*) See III, No. 109.

**) See II, No. 51.

Here I should at once add—with regard to a phrase in the letter of San Giuliano to Herr von Mérey, that our last formula does not contain anything clear and precise about the nature and value of eventual compensations—that the Italian Government up to this date has not addressed itself to us with any proposals or wishes on the subject of compensation.

Also on the 26th ult. Herr von Tschirschky took steps and informed me, that the Berlin Cabinet had not adopted our interpretation of article VII but the Italian one, and advised us to come to an understanding with Italy.

Only on July 28th, the day on which the Duke of Avarna repeated his declaration to me in an identical and in no way more precise or urgent manner, the German Ambassador again called on me in order to most urgently advise an understanding with Rome. On that day I gave an explanation to the Duke of Avarna, which Your Excellency knows from my telegram No. 280 of July 28th *) and which also met with the approval of Herr von Tschirschky. At the same time, as, Your Excellency knows from the same telegram, Herr von Mérey was also instructed to transmit a declaration in Rome.

As Your Excellency already knows from telegram No. 307 of 31st ult. **), I had an interview with the Duke of Avarna on the same day, in which a perfect agreement was reached, but in which the nature and extent of the compensation were not discussed by him.

On the next day I arranged with Herr von Tschirschky and the Duke of Avarna that we should accept the Italian interpretation of article VII, provided that Italy would entirely fulfil its duties as an ally in the present conflict.

My declaration, given the same day to the Duke of Avarna, is known to Your Excellency from my telegram No. 313 of 1st inst. ***).

*) See II, No. 88.

***) See III, No. 59.

****) See III, No. 85.

127.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 597. Rome, August 4, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

In yesterday's interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs, he again dwelt on . . . *) reasons which force Italy to observe neutrality. He, on this occasion, amongst other things, insisted that the enormous sacrifices and dangers for Italy were in no proportion to its gain. Nice was not only French, but had been given up by Italy herself at that time. Tunis was a fine colony, but of these Italy had rather more than enough. Albanian territories could join a State of mixed nationalities like the Monarchy, but for a nationally united State they would be a burden. He ended by saying that the matter was a different one in the case of the Trentino. That could be the only compensation to be thought of. I broke off the conversation at this point with the remark, that if I had in the course of years sometimes been undiplomatically severe in my expressions in our many and often violent discussions, I was at this present moment making up for it, in not replying by some impertinence to his inadmissible proposals.

That the Marquis di San Giuliano dares, now already, to speak of the Trentino is characteristic and a bad sign.

128.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey at Rome.

Telegram No. 944. Vienna, August 4, 1914.

In cipher.

The Chief of General Staff has to-day informed me, that the request addressed to the Italian Chief of General Staff Cadorna, concerning the arrangements made between the Allies in case of war, had been answered in the following terms:

*) Cipher illegible.

“Conferences have no object as Cabinet Council has decided on neutrality of Italy.

‘Light’ mobilisation ordered. If Austria-Hungary does not occupy Lovčen and does not disturb the balance in the Adriatic, Italy will ‘never’ go against Austria-Hungary.”

As Your Excellency can see from the above communications of the Italian General Staff, the policy of black-mailing is being continued.

As we would have to expose the Tyrol in case of a conflict on our northern and southern borders, it seemed to me a very grave matter to break off all threads leading to the Italian Government, and I therefore to-day asked the Duke of Avarna, who was leaving, to tell the Marquis di San Giuliano that his letter addressed to Your Excellency shows, that our attitude had been somewhat misunderstood. I also made the reservation to again refer to the letter in question.

129.

**Count Berchtold to the I. & R. Ambassadors in Rome
and Berlin.**

Vienna, August 4, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey at Rome No. 946,
2. Count Szögyény at Berlin No. 347.

Telegram in figures.

1.

The I. & R. Military Attaché at Rome reports having gathered from a conversation with the Italian Chief of General Staff, that Italy’s fears concerning the disturbance of the balance on the Balkans are to be traced to the possibility of an occupation of the Lovčen.

I have, in order to show Italy how much we desire to meet its wishes, obtained from the I. & R. Chief of General Staff the publication of an order, that an occupation of the Lovčen is to be eliminated from the plans of operation.

Will Your Excellency please make use of the above when treating with Marquis di San Giuliano and add, that it is in no case our intention to proceed against Montenegro. As long as the little neighbouring state does not attempt any action against the Monarchy a penetration on our part into Montenegrine territory will not take place. Should Montenegro however attack us, our military authorities would, out of consideration for the fears of Italy, not undertake the taking of the Lovćen. Will Your Excellency at the same time again ask the Marquis di San Giuliano to consider whether he would not repeat his advice to remain neutral, in Cetinje.

2.

I am telegraphing to Herr von Mérey as follows:
(telegram sub 1).

The above for transmission to Herr von Jagow.

130.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 155.

Paris, August 4, 1914.

In cipher.

Mr. Margerie to-day sent for Count Somsich in order to ask him if the news which had reached the French Government was true, which declared that Austro-Hungarian troops had received orders to move to the French frontier.

Prime Minister requested me to find out about this from Your Excellency.

Count Somsich, surprised by this unexpected question, replied that he knew nothing of such measures, but promised that we would inquire in Vienna.

I have again sent Count Somsich to Mr. Margerie to tell him that I would accede to Mr. Viviani's request but that, however, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I begged that Viviani should transmit his request through the French Ambassador in Vienna, which he agreed to. I suppose the*) request is only meant to serve as a pretext for the rupture of relations with us.

*) Cipher illegible.

131.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold*).

Telegram No. 147.

London, August 4, 1914.

In cipher.

Have just seen Sir E. Grey. English Government has addressed ultimatum to Germany concerning Belgium and expects reply by midnight.

Grey, deeply moved, told me that for the present he did not see any reason for addressing a communication to the I & R. Government and no cause to enter into conflict with us, as long as we were not in a state of war with France. In any case, he hoped, that we would not begin hostilities without observing the formality of first declaring war. He would not recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

In case we should be at war with France, it would of course be difficult for England as an ally of France, to cooperate with it in the Atlantic and not in the Mediterranean.

His whole information was given in the most friendly manner and I believe dictated by the frank wish to avoid any conflict with us.

Tyrell afterwards replied to a remark of mine, confidentially, that in any case for the present, French Mediterranean fleet was not moving in the direction of the Adriatic.

(I suppose it is meant to protect the transport of troops from Africa.)

Please to inform the Chief of General Staff and of Naval Section of the above**).

132.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 148.

London, August 4, 1914.

In cipher.

Sir E. Grey told me he was in despair at the necessity of having to go to war, but that the Belgian question was of most vital interest to England.

*) Compare the wording in Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 58.

**) Was transmitted direct.

When in the course of the conversation I again pointed out how incomprehensible a conflict between the Monarchy and England seemed to me, and that it could not possibly be in the interest of England to strengthen the preponderance of Russia and to favour a Russian predominance in the East, he declared that the struggle between us and Servia and even that between us and Russia, had moved into the background for England, and that it was now a question of predominance in the West. The neutrality of Belgium was to France equivalent to an army of 150.000 men. If Belgium were overpowered by Germany, it would mean the end of Belgian independence as well as that of Holland, Denmark, perhaps also of that of Sweden and Norway, the most vital interests of England. Besides, one could not allow treaties to be ignored in European policy; and Germany had established its whole plan of campaign on the violation of a treaty, which it had also signed.

Sir Edward Grey, who is essentially peaceful and hates war, was quite broken down.

Ultimatum to Germany demands withdrawal of German request to Belgium.

133.

Count Berchtold to Count Hadik in Stockholm.

Telegram No. 19.

Vienna, August 4, 1914.

In cipher.

Received telegram No. 32 of 3rd inst.*)

I beg of Your Excellency to transmit the information to the I. & R. Ambassador in St. Petersburg by way of the Royal Swedish Legation there, that he will within a very short time (also through Your Excellency's mediation and that of the Swedish Legation in St. Petersburg) receive the necessary instructions.

Will Your Excellency meanwhile please inform Count Szápáry that the American Ambassador is authorised to undertake the protection of our co-nationalists.

*) See III, No. 123.

Interview of Count Berchtold with the Duke of Avarna.

Daily report No. 3787.

Vienna, August 4, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador called on me on August 3rd in order to explain, according to instructions and on the strength of a circular telegram, that the Italian Government had decided to remain neutral in the present conflict.

I replied to the Duke of Avarna, that this meant an unfriendly attitude on the part of Italy, an attitude moreover which was not in accordance with the Triple Alliance, since Germany had now been attacked by Russia, and France had followed suit, and thus the *casus foederis* was established.

Quite apart from these reasons, I must also call Italy's policy a very unwise one to separate itself from its Allies in an historical moment like the present. It is the first time since the existence of the Treaty, that a big aim was at stake. If Italy remained by the side of its Allies, an opportunity offered itself to satisfy very far-reaching aspirations, such as Tunis, Savoy, etc. But if it swerved from us it would not gain any of the profits. It was an absolutely unreasonable trend of ideas to fear an aggrandisement of Austria-Hungary's power in the Balkan and to play on this fear. We were not striving after any aggrandisement but were only anxious to maintain what we owned. Italy on the other hand might obtain expansion and be strengthened. Nothing was further from our minds than the wish, to modify the actually existing relations of equilibrium. If such a conception really existed the Ambassador should see that such suspicions were met by the arguments which were at his disposal in the light of our proceedings during the whole thirty years of the existence of the treaty. I could not believe that Marchese San Giuliano wanted to deceive me when in Abbazia he had most earnestly and repeatedly assured me that Italy wanted, that Italy needed, a powerful Austria-Hungary. How would this rhyme with the policy he was about to adopt and which in its last consequences was directed against the existence of the Monarchy in its present state? This must strike us in a particularly painful manner, as a moment has been chosen when a change of feeling in favour of Italy,

a wave of warm sympathy for the allied kingdom had made itself particularly felt with us. It will not have escaped him, what friendly enthusiasm for and acclamation of the *Marcia Reale* and even of the *Garibaldi* song, had shown itself here within the last few days. This improved feeling was to be made use of by the Government in favour of the Italian element and thus within the very last few days the establishment of an institution for Italian students at the Vienna University had been decided upon in the Cabinet Council, which is a near approach to the creation of an Italian faculty. And now just at this very moment comes the refusal of the Italian Government to fulfill its duty as an ally!

When I finally pointed out the loyalty towards Italy with which His Majesty our most gracious Emperor had always acted in all moments of crisis, since the existence of the alliance, the Ambassador could no longer hide his dissatisfaction at the direction his Government had taken. He owned to me—*entre nous* soit dit—that he had sent a report to his Minister, which certainly belonged to the most energetic of its kind ever sent from an Ambassador to his Minister, and to digest which would not be an easy matter. Also he had begged the *Marchese di San Giuliano* for a short personal interview which if the Minister agrees to, would call him to Rome for a couple of days.

Though in other cases the Duke of Avarna tries most conscientiously to support the point of view of his Government with all imaginable arguments, the Ambassador was in this case at no great pains to shield his Government. He restricted himself to the remark, that our proceedings against *Servia* had been considered a provocation of *Russia*.

135.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 350.

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

Count Mensdorff telegraphs on the 4th inst. as follows: "Have just seen Sir Edward Grey. English Government has

addressed Ultimatum to Germany, relative to Belgium and expects reply by midnight.

Grey, deeply moved, told me that for the present he did not see any reason for addressing a communication to the I. & R. Government and no cause to enter into conflict with us as long as we were not at war with France. In any case he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without first observing the formality of declaring war. He would not recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

In case we should be at war with France it would of course be difficult for England as an ally of France to cooperate with it in the Atlantic and not in the Mediterranean. The entire information was given in the most friendly manner and I believe was dictated by the frank wish to avoid any conflict with us. Tyrell afterwards replied to a remark of mine confidentially that in any case, for the present, the French Mediterranean Fleet was not moving in the direction of the Adriatic.

I suppose it is meant to protect the transportation of the troops from Africa."

Will your Excellency please inform the Foreign Office of the above and add: Austria-Hungary has to be careful not to expose its fleet uselessly to destruction and to avoid that English or French landings should take place on the Dalmatian coast, as such would not only disturb the course of operations of war on the southern fronts but might also create an undesirable impression on our Southern Slav population.

In spite of all these reasons we were however ready to put our alliance with Germany before everything else; and if Germany desired it, to go to war with England also, as soon as our navy would have completed its armament.

In any case our Admiralty would lay great store by an effort to be made in conjunction with Germany in Rome which would assure the maintenance of our above mentioned interests, in the following sense:

"Italy ought to be induced to supplement its observation of strict neutrality by water and by land towards England, by the stipulation that her fleet should not cross the latitude of Otranto as long as this was not done on the part of the Austro-Hungarian naval forces.

Arguments in favour of Italy: Austria-Hungary to keep its fleet, which, after the relation of forces has been modified after the war, might be of great value in securing Italian predominance in the Mediterranean. If our fleet is destroyed Italy would after the war be inevitably exposed to Franco-English superior forces.”

I beg most urgently for telephonic communication of German point of view.

Secret.

I remark in strictest confidence that the suggestion of the Admiralty, which I am sure will have no result, has principally for its object to gain time, because a part of our fleet is still in the making.

136.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 379.

Berlin, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.

England.

The British Ambassador demanded his passports at 8 o'clock this evening. It will be given to him to-morrow at 11 o'clock a. m.

The news spread through Berlin like wildfire and by 9 o'clock the windows of the English Embassy had already been smashed.

The spontaneous excitement of the people is far greater against England than it was against Russia and France.

English Ambassador questioned by Under Secretary of State as to whether his proceedings only meant rupture of diplomatic relations or war answered: "War".

137.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 382.

Berlin, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.

Have informed State Secretary of contents of Your Excellency's telegram No. 338*) of 3rd inst. who absolutely

*) Compare III, No. 117.

shares Your Excellency's opinion to "faire bonne mine au mauvais jeu" towards Italy and to explain to Marquis di San Giuliano that we are, in view of the circumstances, satisfied with Italy's declaration of neutrality.

As regards the question of compensation, the State Secretary and the Under Secretary of State both thought, that it was not right that if this question should be still further pursued by Italy, it be answered evasively.

Italy not only was tending to remain *) but to go hand in hand with the adversaries.

138.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 383.

Berlin, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.

State Chancellor and Secretary of State beg me urgently to request of Your Excellency that the declaration of war be not only made immediately to Russia and France, but also to England.

139.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 596.

Rome, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Our attitude towards Italy.

I refer to Your Excellency's telegram of 3rd inst. No. 936 and 939**).

The reply of Marquis di San Giuliano, which as I remarked in my telegram No. 579 of 2nd inst.***) is not a Note but a letter, does not demand a written answer. Also in the interviews I tried to evade any discussion relative to neutrality and compensations.

Through the fact that we, contrary to my urgent advice and warnings, entered upon discussions of the question of

*) Cipher wanting.

***) See III, No. 117 and 118.

***) See III, No. 108.

compensation (as I immediately foretold without results) our situation towards Italy has become worse. Italy can try to force us to continue the discussion and thus by the exclusion of other compensations claim the Trentino. It evidently takes for granted, that in taking up the discussion we already had the latter eventuality in view.

Sooner or later Italy will probably give up her neutrality. Should our group achieve prompt and decisive successes, Italy will probably incline towards it and perhaps be more modest in her demands of reparation. In the contrary case it might however be tempted to increase the moral black-mailing by military threats or measures against us.

Concrete proofs of this I have none as yet. From different sides, also from circles belonging to the German Embassy, I however hear rumours of such intentions on the part of Italy.

It may be that the neutrality is intended as a means to escape from her obligations towards us and might signify the transition to a hostile attitude.

The unveiled mention of the Trentino as compensation, the withdrawal of troops from Genoa and Naples (reported by the consulates) the refusal of export licences for grain and flour purchased by us, the news from Milan about occurrences in Trient and the arrival of the Duke of Avarna (in case it should be a question of him here as a preliminary of recalling him) are indications.

According to my opinion, we should leave Italy coolly aside as long as neutrality lasts and no decisions take place in the great theatre of war; we should not take her into our confidence and be reserved and mysterious concerning future relations and let her understand, that we hardly consider her as an ally.

In the first of the two remaining cases, that is, if Italy should after successes on our side try to again approach us, we should behave coldly and, concerning its military co-operation, meet her wishes.

Should the event go against us, viz. an action on the part of Italy follow, we may be obliged to let things take

their course (as for Bulgaria*) Roumania), but without approval or voluntary giving up of territories. We must reserve to ourselves the right to undo the Italian successes after the termination of operations and, it is to be hoped do so, if possible, together with Germany.

140.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 614.

Rome, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.—Secret.

Lovčen.

Have acted according to instructions of Your Excellency's telegram No. 946 of 5th inst.**).

Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed satisfied and remarked that this acceptance made many things easier for him. He only regretted that it had to remain secret. This is, as I insisted, necessary already for the reason, that we would otherwise be giving Montenegro a free hand for an action from the Lovčen against us.

Marquis di San Giuliano declared himself most willing again to advise neutrality in Cetinje.

141.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 941.

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.

The Duke of Avarna leaves for Rome to-night where he will consult with San Giuliano on the morning of the 6th. He intends to return after a sojourn of about two days in Rome. I beg of Your Excellency to notify us in good time on which day Avarna returns, so that we may make the necessary arrangements for his unimpeded journey.

*) Cipher wanting.

**) See III, No. 129.

The Ambassador told me in strictest confidence that he had the intention to explain to his Minister, that if another course should be adopted now in the policy towards us, he did not think he was the personage suited to represent Italy here.

142.

Count Berchtold to the I. & R. Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin.

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey in Rome, No. 954,
2. Count Szögény in Berlin, No. 358.

Secret.

1.

Received Your Excellency's telegram No. 597 of 4th inst.*). I quite approve of Your Excellency's attitude towards the remark of Marquis di San Giuliano concerning the Trentino.

Should the Marquis di San Giuliano again refer to the Trentino in speaking to Your Excellency, please decline any conversation on this point and restrict yourself to remarking that article VII foresees an understanding about compensation and that it was strange that Italy should name a territory as only possible compensation, which the Monarchy would have to cut from its own flesh.

2.

Supplementing my telegram No. 357 of to-day.

Herr von Mérey telegraphs yesterday as follows:*)

"In yesterday's interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs he again explained the reasons which obliged Italy to observe neutrality. On this occasion he, amongst other things, said that the enormous sacrifices and dangers to Italy were quite out of proportion to the gain. Nice was not only French but had

*) See III, No. 127.

been given up by Italy at the time; Tunis was a fine colony, but Italy had rather more than enough of these. Albanian territories might join a State of mixed nations like the Monarchy, but for a nationally united State they were a burden. It would be a different matter, he finally said, if it were a question of the Trentino. This would be the only compensation possible. I broke off the conversation at this point with the remark that if in the course of years in our many and often violent discussions I had sometimes used expressions that were undiplomatically keen, I was making up for it now by not replying to his inadmissible arguments by an impertinence.

It is characteristic and a bad sign that Marquis di San Giuliano should already now dare to speak of the Trentino."

I replied to Herr von Mérey as follows:

(Here follows text sub 1.)

"I quite approve. . . . : until "its own flesh."

Will Your Excellency please inform Herr von Jagow of the above and add that this our attitude is not only based on the regards we have to observe for the sake of our prestige. But that we also dared not lose sight of the impression that a voluntary relinquishment of a territory, inhabited by Italians, would make on other neighbouring states of the Monarchy, who would see therein a case of precedence for their national ambitions and would come forward with similar efforts at black-mailing.

143.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 158.

Paris, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.

Received Your Excellency's telegram No. 195 of yesterday. Have spoken to American Ambassador.

Many, probably false, reports circulating here.

Germany is said to have violated neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland.

Italian declaration of neutrality and England's declaration promising to protect French coast, have evoked enthusiasm.

In Parliament Prime Minister yesterday declared that France would defend herself against Germany and against every Power which had hitherto not communicated its intentions and would fight at the side of Germany.

Mr. Hannotaux writes in the "Figaro" that Austria-Hungary had not yet recalled Ambassador from Paris in order to force France to declare war, a fact which might then be used as an argument in Italy.

France had seen through this manoeuvre.

I don't think that drawing out of present situation can do much good.

144.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 159.

Paris, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.

Foreign Office informs me that France, in consequence of German declaration of war, is since evening of the 3rd inst. in a state of war with Germany, further protests against the violation of respective treaties by Germany and declares that pre-supposing reciprocity, France both as regards war on land and at sea, will act in accordance with international treaties.

Same communication will probably also have been made in Vienna. As no confirmation was demanded I did not reply.

Please wire news in claris whether your Excellency has received this and previous telegram.

Newspapers are criticising my remaining in Paris with growing severity and suggest that I am only remaining on as a German spy.

As I have no instructions whatever I avoid conversations at Foreign Office.

145.

Count Hadik to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 34.

Stockholm, August 5, 1914.

In cipher.

Comte Szápáry me télégraphie par intermédiaire du Gouvernement suédois ce qui suit: »Communication avec Vienne paraît de nouveau interrompue. Prière de tâcher me mettre en rapport avec Gouvernement par l'entremise du Gouvernement suédois. Dernier télégramme arrivé de Vienne 216·2 3 à 20.821 faux 215 ne me sont pas parvenus.«

This unintelligible sentence and improbable figures were on my demand confirmed by the Government here.

146.

A Report by Count Berchtold direct to His Majesty.

Offer of mediation of the President of the United States of America.

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

A.

Most gracious Sire!

The American Ambassador has to-day asked me to beg of Your Majesty graciously to grant him an audience, as he was instructed to submit to Your Majesty a message from the President of the United States. Confidentially Mr. Penfield added that Mr. Wilson intended to offer to Your Majesty on the strength of the regulations of the Hague convention, the mediation of the United States of North America, in order to bring about peace as soon as a favourable moment offers. Will Your Majesty graciously deign to receive the Ambassador and to take cognisance of President Wilson's message.

I take the respectful liberty of begging Your Majesty to inform me of the decision taken on this point.

With deepest respect

Berchtold m. p.

B.

Embassy of the United States of America.

Vienna, August 7, 1914.

(Communicated by cable through the American Embassy and delivered in person by the Ambassador 7th August 1914.)

To His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty Francis Joseph I. Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, Apostolic King of Hungary etc. etc.

Great and Good Friend!

As official head of one of the Powers signatory to The Hague Convention, I feel it to be my privilege and my duty under article III of that convention to say to Your Majesty, in a spirit of most earnest friendship, that I should welcome an opportunity to act in the interests of European peace, either now or at any other time that might be thought more suitable as an occasion to serve Your Majesty and all concerned in a way that would afford me lasting cause for gratitude and a period of happiness.

(signed) *Woodrow Wilson.*

Washington, U. S. A. August 4, 1914.

X. B. as enclosure.

C.

His Majesty thanks the President for his friendly message which corresponds to the peaceful feelings which have directed His I. & R. Majesty during the whole period of his reign. Austria-Hungary will, together with its allies, certainly gratefully accept the American mediation in the moment that the honour of our arms permits to do so and that the immediate object of the war will have been achieved.

147.

Direct report from Count Berchtold to His Majesty.

(Declaration of war against France and England.)

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

Since the war between Germany and France and England has already commenced, it does no longer seem practicable

for the Monarchy to keep up the diplomatic relations with the French and British Governments and not at the same time also to declare war against them.

I therefore venture to beg of Your Majesty, graciously to grant me the permission on principle, after consultation with the Supreme Command of the Army, to direct to the French Government the enclosed declaration of war*) and to transmit a declaration to the same effect to the British Government, as soon as this will seem advisable to the Supreme Command of the Army.

With regard to the fact that hostilities have already begun in the Adriatic between German and English ships—“Goeben” is blockaded at Messina by 4 big English cruisers—a fight might ensue between our and English ships even without declaration of war.

The German State Chancellor has requested me most urgently to-day, through Count Szögyény, to send off the declarations of war to France and England as soon as possible. With a view to maintaining the friendly feelings of our allies in Germany, I consider it very necessary that we should, in every way possible, act simultaneously with the German Government and not permit public opinion in Germany to think that we are retarding the fulfilment of our duties as allies.

With deepest respect.

148.

**Count Berchtold to the I. & R. Ambassadors in Berlin
and Rome.**

Address:

1. Count Szögyény in Berlin No. 357,
2. Herr von Mérey in Rome No. 953.

Secret.

1.

Herr von Tschirschky (in accordance to his instructions) has informed me of the telegrams of the German personal adjutant von Kleist, from Rome.

*) Not enclosed.

I see from them that King Victor Emanuel makes us responsible for the present attitude of Italy, as we have not hitherto made any certain promise for the future. What sort of promise Italy wishes is not indicated.

Further, the King declares that his people would consider an active assistance as being a support of our plans of aggrandisement on the Balkans.

Herr von Kleist sums up his impressions as follows:

“Italy is irritated at Austria and thinks the latter is aiming at aggrandisement on the Balkan, which Austria-Hungary has as yet not emphatically repudiated. If this distrust of Italy’s is strengthened by evasion on the part of Austria or if it is confirmed, Italy will consider such a violation of its interests and is preparing not to stand it.”

Will your Excellency declare to Herr von Jagow that we consider the unequivocal and well founded declarations given on this point to the Italian Government as binding; and that there is no reason why the German Government in Rome should not in our name give the assurance that Austria-Hungary does not aim at any territorial aggrandisement on the Balkan peninsula. The object of our war against Servia is well enough known there; we want to put an end to Servian propaganda, aiming at the dissolution of the Monarchy and make sure—without any territorial aggrandisement at the cost of Servia—that Servia in future will have to give up its attacks on us. The operations of war will oblige us to transport the theatre of action onto Servian territory; but we are to-day already decided to evacuate it again after the war is over. We have no intention of proceeding actively against Montenegro; and only the fact of Montenegro also going to war might force us to enter upon Montenegrine territory; but in this regard also we can give Italy the most solemn assurances that we do not aim at any territorial aggrandisement in Montenegro.

The above clear and precise assurances should suffice to re-assure Italy if it really is *de bonne foi* as to our intentions. I certainly could not undertake to give any further explanations, as this would mean going in for systematic black-mailing, which finally might lead to a conflict.

2.

I am telegraphing as follows to Count Szoegyény:

(Here follows text sub 1.)

The above for the information of Your Excellency and as a guide for the choice of your language.

149.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Un-numbered, telegram.

Cetinje, August 5, 1914.

Have just received note by which, in the name of His Majesty the King, my mission here is declared as ended. Depart to-morrow with whole staff of Legation via Cattaro. Cattaro is being notified simultaneously by Consulate Antivari.

150.

Count Berchtold to the I. & R. Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome.

Vienna, August 6, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Szögyény in Berlin No. 360,
2. Herr von Mérey in Rome No. 956.

Telegram in figures.—Secret.

1.

In supplementation of my telegram of yesterday No. 357. the transmission of which had been stopped by telephone*). It is as clear as daylight that Italy, to whom we have promised a compensation *en toutes lettres* in case we should not keep to our assurance of territorial disinterestedness, and to whom further, when this did not suffice, and it demanded the right of recognition in the sense of article VII, we also conceded this (pre-supposing as a matter of course that it would fulfil its duties as an ally)—is absolutely *de mauvaise foi*, if anybody in Rome declares that we have not given any binding declarations.

*) See III, No. 148.

Notwithstanding, I had — in consideration of Herr von Kleist's report — expressed myself to Herr von Tschirschky that I would instruct Your Excellency to explain our interpretation to Herr von Jagow to the effect that we considered the assurances given to Italy concerning the territorial disinterestedness as binding and, that there was no reason why the Berlin Cabinet should not speak to this effect in our name in Rome.

I beg of Your Excellency to inform Herr von Jagow hereof, and to add that the report of Herr von Mérey received since, that San Giuliano, in the course of an inofficial conversation, had said that he could consider only the giving up of the Trentino to Italy as an acceptable compensation, makes the giving of the above declaration, especially because of the very evidently untruthful and hostile attitude of the Italian Cabinet within the last few days, appear a very grave matter.

Through the differentiation of the binding character of the assurance in question, it is most probably to be expected that the Italians will reply that already now an indemnification is to be assured them in case it were not possible to keep to the engagement. This forfeit could however, as we now have gathered from the words of San Giuliano, only be the Trentino. The unavoidable refusal on our part must lead to a conflict. Under these circumstances the making of the declaration in question would not only be without object but might be positively dangerous:

2.

In continuation of my telegram of yesterday*).

I am telegraphing as follows to Count Szögyény:

(Text as sub 1.)

"It is 'until' dangerous".

The above for the information of your Excellency and choice of your language.

*) See III, No. 148.

151.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 361.

Vienna, August 6, 1914.

In cipher.

I beg of Your Excellency to give the following information to the State Chancellor:

It is a matter of course that we shall in every way fulfil our duties as an ally and also declare war on France and England.

At the present moment our fleet is still in a state of preparation. The third and fourth division, manned by reserves, will only be fully manned by to-morrow and will require at least 4 to 5 days in order to be ready for action.

Our Supreme Command fears that a declaration of war against France will automatically mean the appearance of the French and English Fleets in the Adriatic and their establishing themselves in Cattaro. Montenegro would then certainly turn against us.

But our fleet would be sacrificed if it had to fight before being completely armed.

There are therefore very serious considerations of a military nature which speak against an immediate declaration of war, and though I am perfectly aware that the impression which our hesitation will create, is very regrettable, yet I am of the opinion of the military authorities, that an untimely declaration of war would be of far greater positive detriments to us.

His Majesty the Emperor-King has this morning virtually authorised me to declare war on France and England. I should in spite of all the preceding arguments, and in opposition to all our military authorities declare war to-morrow on France and England, if the State Chancellor still insists on it, but should like Herr von Bethmann to re-consider, that a success of our fleet, though only a partial one, is far sooner to be expected in a few days, than to-day and that for us and Germany it is far more important that this success be obtained, rather than that we should at once declare war.

152.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 387.

Berlin, August 6, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Italy.

Reply to telegram No. 350 of yesterday*).

State Secretary must, as he told me, before all, communicate with the Naval staff and will then give me his reply.

According to Herr von Jagow's personal opinion suggestion of the I. & R. Naval section would have no result.

153.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 391.

Berlin, August 6, 1914.

In cipher.

State Chancellor asks me to report to Your Excellency that after consultation with the Chiefs of General and Admiral ty Staff, he, agrees to our putting off the declaration of war against France and England, but that he positively counts upon these declarations of war being made five days after the navy has reached the state of efficiency for war, that is on the 12th instant at the latest.

154.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 398.

Berlin, August 6, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

Have just now, at 10 p. m., acted according to telephonic instructions and transmitted these, including arguments of Count Forgách, to Herr von Stumm (as State Secretary and Under-Secretary of State were not present at Foreign Office). Stumm promised to transmit my communications to-night as yet to Herr von Jagow and Herr von Zimmermann.

*) See III, No. 135.

Herr von Stumm accepted my explanations concerning the putting off of our declarations of war against France and England without enthusiasm of course, but recognising of our point of view.

155.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London.

Telegram No. 223.

Vienna, August 6, 1914.

In cipher.

Received telegram of 4th instant No. 147*).

Will Your Excellency assure Sir E. Grey that we should in no case start hostilities against England without preliminary declaration of war but also expected that England would proceed in the same manner towards us and not undertake any acts of hostility against us before the formal state of war has commenced.

156.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Report No. 37, A—B.

London, August 6, 1914.

A.

The day before yesterday, that is a few hours before the declaration of war against Germany, I spoke to Sir Edward Grey (my telegrams No. 147 and 148 of 4th instant**) who told me: "We have no quarrel with Austria I am not recalling Bunsen. If you went to war with France, it would be different. We could not well collaborate with France in the Atlantic and not in the Mediterranean. But anyhow, we shall not begin if you do not attack us; I trust you will do nothing without observing the formality of declaration of war." The conversation was throughout friendly and I had the impression that he was sincerely striving to prevent a conflict with us.

I telegraphed to this effect to Vienna, but begged Grey *pour plus de sureté* also to telegraph to Bunsen.

*) See III, No. 131.

**) See III, No. 131, 132.

Yesterday and this morning I received no telegram and at noon I received the enclosed notification of the Foreign Office according to which we may no longer receive nor send ciphered telegrams*).

I at once telephoned to the Foreign Office in order to say that I would like to see Grey. He was at the Cabinet Council and sent Tyrell to me who told me, that the measure had been taken for military reasons, because of the wishes of the Admiralty, which could not be refused.

He spoke of the German Dreadnought "Goeben" which was cruising in the Mediterranean and which was being "shadowed"! What if this ship should enter an Austrian port? If it should enter an Italian port which is neutral it would for instance have to leave it again within 24 hours or would be interned for the space of the war!

Tyrell further spoke of the fact that the Russian Ambassador in Vienna had received his passports and that in consequence we were already more or less in a state of war with Russia.

I repeatedly asked: "But do the friendly declarations of Sir Edward Grey of the day before yesterday still hold good?" a matter to which he still replied in the affirmative — "But things are moving so rapidly".

I well noticed that the feeling was not as favourable as the day before yesterday. I told Tyrell that I should under all circumstances like to see Grey and we arranged that I should come to the Foreign Office at 3 o'clock.

When I arrived there, Tyrell received me with the news that Grey was in the house of Parliament. I proposed driving there whereupon he replied: "No, Grey has to be in the house itself the whole time and take part in the debates, and then assist at a meeting of the defense committee. He has not a moment to spare to-day and begged me to talk to Nicolson." I replied: "That is not the same thing", and went to see Nicolson. I could not make any sense out of his talk. Regarding the telegrams, he told me that he would make inquiries whether any had arrived and if so the censor would consider whether they could still be transmitted to me.

*) See B.

I asked him: "But how do we stand? what instructions has Bunsen got? Are you recalling him?"

"No; anyhow not yet!"

To my repeated allusions to Grey's friendly words of the day before yesterday, Nicolson replied: "We are the Allies of France and of Russia, so we form one block—with Belgium."

But he told me that the re-calling of an Ambassador was the business of the Cabinet and not of the Foreign Office. Besides even after breaking off diplomatic relations there was no state of war yet. There was a shade of difference.

I felt that he did not want to show his cards, but to draw me out.

I then still wrote to Grey at the Foreign Office: "I have just seen Nicolson, but I ask you as a favour to see me for a moment whenever and wherever you choose."

Thereupon I received a letter from Tyrell putting me off until to-morrow.

This is the actual situation. I think that the end is imminent. What they are still waiting for and what they want is hard to tell! At present I am in the ridiculous situation of still being Ambassador here and at the same time cut off from my Government in-consequence of this cipher prohibition. Bunsen is also still in Vienna and can as it seems still send ciphered telegrams.

I am reporting the prohibition of the use of the cipher to Vienna in an opentelegram wherein I repeat the communication in question of the Foreign Office and add: "This measure is explained by the fact of the military authorities insisting on it". I hope to see Sir Edward Grey to-day still.

The I. and R. Ambassador:

(signed) *A. Mensdorff*.

B.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador and has the honour with reference to the circular note despatched from this Office on the 3rd instant, to inform his Excellency that, having regard to the position of the Dual Monarchy as the

Ally of the German Empire with which this country is now at war, it is no longer possible for His Majesty's Government to extend to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy the privilege of sending or receiving telegrams in code or cipher.

Foreign Office, August 5th, 1914.

157.

Count Ottocar Czernin to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 327.

Sinaia, August 6, 1914.

In cipher.

Have just received via Jassy and Bucarest the following telegram from St. Petersburg:

"Embassy without connection with Vienna. Please to inform Foreign Office in case a larger number of telegrams should not have arrived. Please transmit instructions *in claris* to me via Bucarest. All well here Count Szápáry."

158.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram without Number.

Gravosa, August 6, 1914.

Montenegrine Note despatched to Your Excellency on the 6th instant from Castelnuovo and which was handed to me on the 5th instant at 5.30 p. m. states in short that proceedings of Austria-Hungary against Servia which has yielded, as far as an independent state possibly can in connection with various measures mentioned in the note and encroachments of the Monarchy towards Montenegro, has induced the Kingdom on its part to take up arms in defence of Servia. Added to this is the declaration of the King that my mission in Cetinje is at an end.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Report Z. 38/P.

London, August 7, 1914, Evening.

Saw Grey this afternoon. I expected the announcement of the breaking-off of our diplomatic relations. But he told me that he had not sent any instructions to Bunsen; the latter therefore remains in Vienna for the present and I here "unless you want to precipitate matters", against which I protested.

I said that I had nothing more from Vienna which was natural, as no cipher telegrams were allowed to pass through. I should however go on waiting.

I again asked as well as I could, whether it was indispensable that we and England should enter into a state of war. "Would it not be better to limit the area of hostilities? Would it not be useful, if two Powers—one of each group—remained in touch etc." He did not seem to want to go into all this. "I cannot speak of the future only of the present". I have the positive impression, that if we enter into a state of war with France, we will also be at war with England. I can for the present only wait et ronger mon frein.

My two officers Accurti and Horváth are pressing me to let them go, that is, to telegraph to Vienna in order to inquire. As we are without cipher I cannot do it. I cannot take the responsibility on myself for it to become known and spread about here that our military and naval attachés had left in order to join the forces. This might precipitate decisions whilst it may be in our interest that these decisions should not be made or at least not yet be made.

Long conversation with Grey. He speaks bitterly about attack on Belgium and laments the way in which everything in Berlin has passed under military rule so that he could absolutely not find out during his negotiations, where authority in Berlin really lay.

Grey is in despair that his efforts to maintain peace have failed. About the war he repeatedly said to me: "I hate it, I hate it." He again referred to all our mutual efforts last year during the Balkan Conferences. He seriously hoped that when the present grave danger had also been

overcome, owe peace could be assured for years to come. "I was quite ready if ever Russia had been aggressive—in the case of France it was not likely that she should—to stand by Germany and that we might come to some sort of understanding between the Powers." But now all this had come to nothing and the general war with its horrible and odious consequences had broken out.

I think the attack on the neutrality of Belgium has spoilt everything, as well as the offer of England's neutrality which he has published in his Bluebook and about which he was very indignant.

For the rest, he again spoke of the immeasurable consequences of this World War. "It is the greatest step towards Socialism that could possibly have been made. We shall have Labour Governments in every country after this."

I should like to submit this very interesting Bluebook as enclosure to this report. It is in every way from beginning to end very remarkable from an historical point of view.

For the characterisation of Grey and his earnest efforts to maintain peace, I should like to point to a passage in No. 111, Telegram to Goschen of 31st July in which he says he had told Lichnowsky that if it became clear, that Germany and Austria-Hungary made efforts to maintain peace, and made "reasonable" proposals, he would support them in St. Petersburg and Paris and even go so far as to declare, that in case Russia and France did not accept them, the British Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences (i. e. would leave the Entente Powers to their fate). But otherwise, so he stated, England would, if France were involved, be drawn in too.

Everybody very friendly to me personally.

Everybody assured me, that there was absolutely no feeling against Austria-Hungary here.

Lord Roseberry came to see me to-day. Full of sympathy and understanding for our cause as ever. He finds quite rightly that in this crisis Russia is above all to be blamed. "We fight for a balance of power without seeming to see that we are going to establish the supremacy of Russia all over the world."

I gave him messages to King George in the event that I should have to leave without seeing His Majesty.

In some of the papers, "The Times", Daily Mail" that is in Lord Northcliffe's press, there were some not very friendly remarks as to how it was that I was still here after we were in a state of war with Russia and England with Germany.

I touched on this point at the Foreign Office by saying to Grey and Tyrell: "I see the papers are beginning to jeer at me", whereupon Grey said: "I hope you will not mind it" and I insisted in no way, because I am convinced that the less importance I attach to it, the more the Foreign Office will try to prevent manifestations of this kind.

The I. & R. Ambassador:
(signed) *A. Mensdorff*.

160.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram without Number. *St. Petersburg, August 7, 1914.*

Am starting with whole staff of Embassy to-day Friday 8:30 a. m. via Tornea for Sweden.

161.

Count Hadik to Count Berchtold.

Telegram without number. *Stockholm, August 7, 1914.*

In cipher.

Comte Szápáry télégraphie: J'ai présenté note jeudi six heures et quitte Pétersbourg avec Ambassade vendredi matin pour la Suède.

162.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 399. *Berlin, August 8, 1914.*

Strictly secret.

In continuation of my telegram No. 391 of 6th instant*).

*) Compare III, No. 153.

State Secretary to-day asked me to transmit to Your Excellency the warmest thanks of the German Government for communication that the I. & R. Cabinet would in spite of grave considerations of the I. & R. Navy at once be ready to declare war on France and England if the State Chancellor insisted.

After a renewed consultation with General and Admiral ty Staff here, the State Chancellor and the State Secretary now beg you to wait with the declaration of war until negotiations on the subject take place between Vienna and Berlin.

Our immediate declaration of war had been asked for by Germany under the impression of the disaster which seemed to threaten the German man-of-war "Goeben". This danger seems now however to be averted.

163.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram N° 164.

Paris, August 8, 1914.

In cipher.

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères m'a fait appeler pour me dire que selon des renseignements positifs qui lui seraient parvenus, le corps d'armée d'Innsbruck serait transporté à la frontière française. Monsieur Doumergue désire savoir d'urgence si cette nouvelle est exacte et au cas affirmatif quelles sont les intentions du Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, La France se trouvant en guerre avec l'Allemagne, envoi de nos troupes à la frontière française n'est pas compatible selon l'avis du Ministre avec état de paix existant entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et France. Monsieur Dumaine est chargé d'une démarche semblable auprès de Votre Excellence. Mes télégrammes en chiffres ne sont pas expédiés mais on m'assure que télégrammes chiffrés à mon adresse me seront remis. Le dernier télégramme chiffré de Votre Excellence qui m'est parvenu portait numéro 201 du 7 août.

164.

Count Ambrózy to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 640*).

Rome, August 9, 1914.

In cipher.

In the Italian press the report of to-day's "Tribuna" according to which it could be gathered from German Whitebook, that we had discussed our action against Servia long beforehand and in all details with Germany, whilst we only informed Italy of it at the beginning of the action, is creating a sensation.

The press of the Triple Entente will see to it that this fact is used against us in this country to the full.

165.

Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen in Paris.

Vienna, August 9, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

Received your Excellency's telegram in claris No. 164 of 8th inst.**).

After consultation with General Staff I authorise your Excellency to declare to French Government that news concerning participation of our troops in Franco-German War is a pure invention. Have spoken to the same effect to Monsieur Dumaine.

166.

Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen in Paris.

Vienna, August 9, 1914.

Telegram in claris.

Réponse au télégramme N° 164 en clair**).

Nouvelles sur participation de nos troupes à la guerre franco-allemande sont absolument controuvées. J'ai donné la même réponse à Monsieur Dumaine.

*) Compare III, No. 167.

**) See III, Nr. 163.

167.

Count Berchtold to Count Ambrózy in Rome.

Telegram No. 990.

Vienna, August 10, 1914.

Telegram in figures.

Received your telegram No. 640 of 9th inst.*).

The wording of German Whitebook is, it is true, such as to create the impression that our action against Serbia had long beforehand and in all details been discussed with Germany.

This is just as exaggerated as on the other hand it is not quite correct, that Italy was only informed of our action after it had commenced.

I should very much like you to speak in this sense to Marquis di San Giuliano. The Minister must know the informations on this subject which I had given the Duke of Avarna, to whom I repeatedly spoke of our enquête in Sarajevo and of the intended steps in Belgrade for the purpose of securing guarantees for the future, the exact formula of which being however only fixed upon shortly before its transmission and it had therefore only been communicated to the German as well as to the Roman Cabinet in the last hour.

The fact that we only began to mobilise partially after the refusal on the part of Serbia to accede to our demands and that no measures for the mobilisation had before that been taken proves sufficiently, that we reckoned with the probability of the acceptance of our demands, and that we had made no detailed arrangements, still less prepared them with the agreement of Germany.

168.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

Telegram without Number.

Paris, 10 août 1914.

Je quitte Paris avec personnel Ambassade et Consulat et serviteurs aujourd'hui lundi soir par Ventimiglia. Un employé du Consulat reste à Paris pour garder archives de l'Ambassade. Train mis à notre disposition par Gouvernement.

*) See III, No. 164.

169.

Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*Paris, 10 août 1914.*

Reçu télégrammes No. 202 du 9 août et télégramme en clair même date*), Ai immédiatement communiqué contenu à Doumergue. Ministre qui avait reçu rapport télégraphique analogue de Monsieur Dumaine sur sa conversation avec Votre Excellence a reconnu que nos troupes ne se trouvaient pas à la frontière française mais il dit avoir renseignements positifs qu'un corps d'armée Austro-Hongrois a été transporté en Allemagne ce qui permet à celle-ci de retirer ses troupes des territoires allemands occupés par nos soldats et constitue, selon avis du Ministre, facilitation des opérations de guerre allemande. J'ai à différentes reprises attiré attention du Ministre sur le texte de la réponse de Votre Excellence, il a reconnu, qu'on ne pouvait pas parler de participation effective de nos troupes à la guerre franco-allemande, mais il insista sur ce que présence de nos troupes sur territoire allemand était incontestable et que ceci constituait aide militaire prêtée à l'Allemagne. Dans ces conditions, il a chargé Ambassadeur de France à Vienne de demander immédiatement ses passeports et de quitter Vienne aujourd'hui avec tout le personnel de l'Ambassade. Le Ministre m'a-dit que dans ces circonstances ma présence ici ne saurait être d'aucune utilité, mais que, vu excitation populaire, elle pourrait donner lieu à des incidents regrettables qu'il désirait éviter. Il m'a offert de mettre dès ce soir un train à ma disposition pour quitter la France. J'ai répondu, qu'il me serait impossible d'avoir instruction de Votre Excellence jusqu'au soir, mais que, vu le rappel de Mr. Dumaine, je le priai de me faire délivrer mes passeports. J'ai constaté que le rappel de Monsieur Dumaine et mon départ constituaient interruption des relations diplomatiques. Le Ministre m'a assuré que serais traité avec tous les égards et que toutes facilitations possibles seraient accordées pour voyage. Il espère que M. Dumaine sera traité de même façon.

*) Compare III, No. 165 and 166.

En constatant parfaite courtoisie du Gouvernement de la République envers ma personne je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir provoquer mesures analogues pour Ambassadeur de France. Je télégraphierai heure et direction de mon départ.

170.

**Exchange of letters between Count Berchtold and the
French Ambassador in Vienna.**

A.

Vienna, 10 août, 1914.

Monsieur le Comte!

La réponse que Votre Excellence a bien voulu faire hier à ma question, relative à l'envoi de troupes austro-hongroises en Alsace-Lorraine, n'a pas paru de nature, pour mon Gouvernement, à exclure la possibilité que des contingents de l'armée I. et R. se trouvent, sinon à la frontière française du moins dans une région voisine, où l'on est autorisé à considérer qu'ils sont en soutien des troupes allemandes, agissant contre les forces de mon pays.

En conséquence Monsieur Gaston Doumergue, Ministre des affaires étrangères, serait très desirieux d'obtenir de vous l'assurance qu'aucune troupe austro-hongroise n'a été transportée vers l'Ouest hors du territoire autrichien.

Ce sont des précisions sur lesquelles je me reproche de n'avoir pas de moi-même, attiré votre attention, mais que avec votre obligeance habituelle, vous ne vous refuserez pas à me donner aujourd'hui. Par égard pour vos absorbantes occupations je m'abstiens de me présenter de nouveau chez Votre Excellence mais je La prie instamment de me mettre en mesure de renseigner mon Gouvernement dans le plus bref délai possible.

Veillez agréer Monsieur le Comte, les assurances de ma haute considération.

(signé) *Alfr. Dumaine.*

B.

Vienna, 10 août, 1914.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur!

En réponse à la lettre que Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser aujourd'hui, je n'hésite pas à compléter mes informations de hier en constatant le fait qu'aucune troupe austro-hongroise n'a été transportée vers l'Ouest hors du territoire autrichien.

Veuillez etc.

171.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 407.

Berlin, August 11, 1914.

In cipher.—Strictly secret.

State Secretary repeated to me his interpretation already reported by me in my telegram No. 399*) that it is now left completely to the judgement of the I. & R. Government and to the consideration of the two General Staffs, when Your Excellency is to dispatch the formal declarations of war to France and England respectively.

172.

Visit of the German Ambassador to the I. & R. Foreign Office.

Daily report No. 3903.

Vienna, August 11, 1914.

The German Ambassador has, in the name of the German Government, communicated to me that the German Government leaves it entirely to us whether and when we declare war on France and England, provided that the situation should in no way change. Under a "change of situation" the Berlin Cabinet understood the possibility that 1.) of an on the part of the French Mediterranean fleet in the North sea, in which event the I. & R. fleet could actively intervene in the Mediterranean and against Algiers and 2.) the case of the German cruiser "Goeben" having to take refuge in Pola. In these two eventualities Germany counted upon our declaring war.

This communication of Herr von Tschirschky's was accepted with thanks and the remark that we would act according to the German wishes if the occasion arose. It was added that it would be of great importance for Germany as well as for us, that our fleets should as long as possible remain intact and this especially with regard to Italy; if the latter should want to undertake warlike operations together with us, it would be of greatest importance for it to be supported by our fleet; but should Italy be thinking of an action against us, it were most important that the I. & R. Navy should be able to attack with undiminished force.

173.

Interview of Count Berchtold with the French Ambassador in Vienna.

Daily report No. 3911.

Vienna, August 11, 1914.

When the French Ambassador to-day called upon me I informed him of the contents of Count Szécsen's telegram in which the latter informs me that he has had his passports transmitted to him by the French Government and that he had been told that Monsieur Dumaine has also received instructions to demand his passports*).

The Ambassador received this information with the remark, that the instructions in question from his Government had brought him to me. These instructions bore the date of the day before yesterday but had only reached him to-day. They say that the assurances which have been given by us to the French Government, that no Austro-Hungarian troops had been directed to Alsace were contradicted by the indubitable fact that Austro-Hungarian troops were really already in Alsace. If even these troops were perhaps not meant to attack France actually, these measures could not be considered otherwise than as relief for the German Allies in their struggle with France. Under these circumstances there remained nothing for the French Government to do but to break off diplomatic relations with the Monarchy.

*) Compare III, No. 169.

In taking note of this communication I did not fail to assure the Ambassador again, that the informations on the strength of which his Government was breaking off relations were pure invention and that there was no question of our troops having been directed in the manner in question.

Monsieur Dumaine declared his readiness to leave Vienna to-morrow evening.

In taking his leave the Ambassador assured me that it was the sincere wish of his Government, when once the present terrible crisis should be passed, again to take up the former good relations to the Monarchy.

174.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Report No. 40/P.

London, August 12, 1914.

Since the day before yesterday the diplomaic relations between France and us are broken off and I expected that this would influence our relations to the Government here.

Up to the present, when ever there was a question of the maintainance of peace it was said to me: "You are still at peace with France," and Grey had told me from the beginning that should we be in a state of war with France it would be difficult for England not to be it likewise.

Now they say, as Tyrrell tells me, that this question is simply to be decided by "naval considerations".

Sir E. Crowe the second Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office told Trauttmansdorff a few days ago that it was illogical and unthinkable, that the fiction of peace between England and the Monarchy should be kept up any further.

In spite of that I am still here and Bunsen is still in Vienna.

According to all I hear, the unanimous opinion here is that this is now a fight of life or death for the existence of England as a Great Power, as it was at the time of the Napoleonic wars, to which epoch the present one is frequently being compared.

The intention here is to strike at once and forcibly—with all means calculated to weaken the adversary—and if possible not to draw out the war to a great length.

How the war is ever to end before all the States are ruined and exhausted is not to be foreseen to day, as through the participation of England the proper mediator is wanting.

It is true that in taking leave, Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky that he would always be ready to mediate and that he hoped that when the moment had come, he might count on his—Lichnowsky's—support.

According to what Marquis Imperiali told me yesterday, Grey, however, told him that whatever happened the first and foremost condition for any negotiations would be that the future of Belgium be assured and that it be fully indemnified for the terrible losses which it had suffered through Germany's attack.

The guaranteeing of the existence and of the neutrality of Belgium is one of the fundamental principles of English policy, based on history, feeling and State necessity.

It was a fatal mistake to lose sight of this and to believe that one could circumvent it by a few promises.

(signed) *Mensdorff*.

175.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold*).

(Declaration of war of France and England to the Monarchy.)

Telegram without Number. *London, August 12, 1914.*

Je viens de recevoir de la part de Sir Edward Grey la communication suivante:

«Sur la demande du Gouvernement français qui n'est pas à même de communiquer directement avec votre Gouvernement j'ai à Vous faire la communication suivante:

Après avoir déclaré la guerre à la Serbie et pris ainsi la première initiative des hostilités en Europe, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois s'est mis sans aucune provocation du Gouvernement de la République française en état de guerre avec la France:

*) Compare Austro Hungaryen Redbook No. 65.

1. Après que l'Allemagne avait successivement déclaré la guerre à la Russie et à la France, il est intervenu dans ce conflit en déclarant la guerre à la Russie qui combattait déjà aux côtes de la France.

2. D'après de nombreuses informations dignes de foi l'Autriche a envoyé des troupes sur la frontière allemande dans des conditions qui constituent une menace directe à l'égard de la France.

En présence de cet ensemble de faits le Gouvernement français se voit obligé de déclarer au Gouvernement austro-hongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les mesures qui lui permettront de répondre à ces actes et à ces menaces.«

Sir Edward Grey ajoute: Rupture avec la France ayant été amenée de cette manière, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique se voit obligé d'annoncer que l'état de guerre existe entre la Grande Bretagne et l'Autriche Hongrie à partir de minuit.

176.

Interview of Count Berchtold with the English Ambassador.

Daily report No. 3941.

Vienna, August 12, 1914.

The English Ambassador called on me to day at 12 o'clock noon in order to inform me, according to his instructions, that in view of the circumstance that we had already, a few days ago, declared war on Russia and now also were in a state of war with France, the English Government was obliged on its part to declare war on us and to notify us that it considers itself as at war with the Monarchy since 12 o'clock noon.

A communication of the same kind had been made by Sir Edward Grey to Count Mensdorff*).

On my remarking, that though our diplomatic relations with France were broken off we were not yet in a state of war with the Republic, the Ambassador replied that he had transmitted the instructions such as he had received them from his Government tel quel, that he would not fail to draw the attention of his Government to the circumstance mentioned, which however in merito would not change anything.

*) Compare III, No. 175.

With a voice trembling with emotion the Ambassador then explained to me that it was with a heavy heart that he discharged himself of his duty as he had always met with the warmest sympathy for himself and his country during his stay here and was convinced that there was no opposition between England and the Monarchy which would in the slightest justify the conflict.

Sir Maurice requested me to express to His Majesty our most gracious Master his most respectful thanks for the graciousness and favour which His Majesty had shown him and to tell His Majesty, with what great reverence and admiration King George looked up to the Emperor and how deeply he was pained that the events had taken such a course.

Finally the Ambassador expressed the hope, that the deeply regrettable state of war between England and the Monarchy would not be of long duration.

In accepting the assurances of friendship of the Ambassador with many thanks, I, on my part, assured him that I too was painfully impressed by the thought, that we were in conflict with England as the two States were not only not separated by any differences but had politically and morally been drawn together by traditional sympathies, as well as by mutual interests. I could only repeat the wish of the Ambassador that the unnatural state of things would not be of long duration.

The Ambassador intends to leave Vienna probably tomorrow 14th of August, and recommended to our protection his countrymen residing partly in Vienna and partly in the Bohemian watering places.

177.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London.

Telegram.

Vienna, 13 août 1914.

Reçu télégramme de Votre Excellence concernant état de guerre*).

Ambassadeur d'Angleterre quitte Vienne demain vendredi soir. Attends nouvelles sur date et route de votre départ.

*) See III, No. 175.

178.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram without a number.

London, 13 août 1914.

Reçu passeports hier soir, je remets aujourd'hui l'Ambassade à l'Ambassadeur des Etats Unis.

179.

Letter of the Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.

Vienna, August 20, 1914.

A.

Monsieur le Comte!

No doubt Your Excellency have already been informed by His Excellency Baron Müller of the nature of the communication made to German Government by my Government on the 15th instant; but for Your Excellency's personal information I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram I have received from Tokio on the subject, although I have no instruction to do so.

Yours sincerely

(signed) *Aimaro Sato.*

B.

The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the present situation, and as the result of full communication with the British Government for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining the general peace in the regions of Easter Asia which forms one of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, have come to the decision of taking the necessary measures therefore in common with Great Britain: but before taking such measures, the Japanese Government thought it proper to once approach the German Government with a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following effect on the 15th of August 1914.

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels which cannot be so withdrawn to be disarmed.

2. The German Government to deliver unconditionally and without compensation to the (Japanese) authorities the

entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau before the 16th of September 1914, for the purpose of returning it to China.

The Japanese Government have declared to the German Government that unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above advice be received before noon of Sunday the 23rd instant, the Japanese Government shall take such action as they deem necessary.

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allowance of time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government; but should unfortunately the German Government not accept the advice of the Japanese Government, the latter will be obliged to take the necessary measures in order to accomplish their object.

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to safeguard the common interests of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the Anglo-Japanese alliance by consolidating the foundation of permanent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, and the Japanese Government have no intention whatever of embarking on a policy of territorial expansion or any other design of selfinterest. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, with the utmost care the interests of third powers in Eastern Asia and not in the least to injure them.

180.

Count Berchtold to Baron Müller in Tokio*).

No. $\frac{67120}{7}$

Vienna, August 24, 1914.

In consideration of Japan's action towards the German Empire, our ally, I request your Excellency to demand your passports, to order our Consulates immediately to cease their activity and to depart with the Embassy's and Consulate's personnel and colony to America.

Confide protection and interest of our subjects to American Ambassador.

Passports are being transmitted to Japanese Ambassador here.

*) Compare Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 69.

181.

Count Berehtold reports direct to His Majesty the Emperor.

Vienna, August 26, 1914.

Though by the Treaty of the Triple Alliance we should have been obliged to declare war on Belgium, as soon as Germany was in a state of war with that country, we have not broken off diplomatic relations with Belgium, in spite of the great difficulties under which our representatives have to suffer, because this has not been demanded by Germany and also because with regard to the great demand of our forces in Servia and Russia we are not in a position to send troops to the western frontier.

Meanwhile the complete co-operation of the French army with the French and English forces has commenced, so that Belgium is now, not only safeguarding the neutrality of its territories but has actively joined our enemies.

Moreover detailed news has arrived concerning the heavy financial losses which Austro-Hungarian business men have suffered in Belgium through the unparalleled plundering of the Belgian population. The reports I have received, show the subjects of the Monarchy were treated with the same brutal violence by Belgium as those of Germany.

Quite apart from the feeling of great bitterness which these unjustified proceedings have called forth in the whole Monarchy, the circumstance must also be taken into consideration, that it will not be possible for us after the end of the European war to demand any damages from the Belgian Government for the losses incurred by our citizens, if we have not been in a state of war with Belgium and thus cannot take part in the peace negotiations with Belgium.

For this reason, I take the respectful liberty of begging Your Majesty to deign to authorise me to send the enclosed telegraphic instructions to the I. & R. Minister in Brussels*) in which Count Clary is told to inform the Belgian Government that in view of the participation of Belgium in the war on the side of our enemies and with regard, to the injuries inflicted on Austro-Hungarian citizens, we are breaking off the diplomatic

*) Compare III, No. 182.

relations with the Belgian Government and consider ourselves as being in a state of war with Belgium.

I approve of these proposals.
(signed) **Franz Joseph.**

With deepest respect.
(signed) *Berchtold.*

182.

Count Berchtold to Count Clary in Brussels*).

No. $\frac{68798}{7}$

Vienna, August 27, 1914.

Telegram in clavis.

I beg of Your Excellency at once to telegraph to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows:

«D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai l'honneur de notifier à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:

Vu que la Belgique après avoir refusé d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient été adressées à plusieurs reprises par l'Allemagne, prête sa co-opération militaire à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux, ont déclaré la guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en présence du fait que, comme il vient d'être constaté, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorités Royales; dû subir un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de l'humanité et inadmissible même vis-à-vis des sujets d'un état ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la nécessité de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considère dès ce moment en état de guerre avec la Belgique.

Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la Légation et confie la protection de mes administrés au Ministre des Etats Unis d'Amérique en Belgique.

De la part du Gouvernement I. & R. les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.»

Clary.

*) Compare the wording in the Austro-Hungarian Redbook No. 67 (under date August 22, 1914).



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