


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
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AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT

OF

MR. CANNING'S POLICY

WITH RESPECT TO THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER

OF

PORTUGAL,

IN REPLY TO

"OBSERVATIONS ON THE PAPERS LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT."

LONDON:

J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY.

—
MDCCCXXX.

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HENRY MORSE STEPHENS

LONDON:

PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET.

AN

AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT

OF

MR. CANNING'S POLICY,

&c.

WITHIN these few days a pamphlet has appeared (under the title of "Observations on the Papers lately submitted to Parliament upon the subject of the Affairs of Portugal"), in which there is a great deal to praise, but likewise a great deal to condemn.

From the very accurate information displayed by the Writer, in some parts of his Observations, we should strongly suspect, that he possessed far more knowledge than could be derived from the papers on which he comments. Indeed, the internal evidence which corroborates this suspicion is so strong, that we cannot help entertaining it, notwithstanding the apparently incidental observation in the first page, that to the originals, "the Ministry" have "an *exclusive* access."

If this supposition be correct, it is not creditable to the Author ; for although, if dates are attended to, the Parliamentary Papers do not justify the false colouring which, in the first twenty-three pages, has been given to Mr. Canning's conduct, yet that false colouring is tenfold more culpable, if given by a person who has more knowledge than they afford.

But whatever information he may possess, we have no wish to conceal the fact, that we are acquainted with the whole of the correspondence relative to the negotiations carried on by Sir Charles Stuart, although upon the latter portion of the Parliamentary Papers we, perhaps, have less knowledge than the Writer himself. We have also seen copies of some private letters of Mr. Canning's upon this subject, whereby we are enabled to give to the world a true history of these much-misrepresented transactions.

That history shall be taken up from the death of the King of Portugal, as being the first event in the series connected with the establishment of a constitutional Government in Portugal.

His Most Faithful Majesty died on the 10th of March, 1826. The instant that his demise was ascertained, a packet set sail from Lisbon to announce the event to Don Pedro, at Rio de Janeiro, where the vessel arrived on, or before, the 30th of April. It was not till the 27th of March that the news arrived in London ; and, of course, before any instructions could be framed for the direction of the British Representative at Rio, some days elapsed. The consequence of this unavoidable delay was, that before there was time for Mr. Canning's sentiments to be known at Rio, the measures

adopted by the Emperor, upon the death of his father, were settled, and were put beyond his power to alter, by the departure for Portugal of the individual (Sir Charles Stuart) whom His Imperial Majesty had selected to be the bearer of his decrees. Whatever, therefore, those decrees might be, one thing is quite clear, that they could not have been, by possibility, *suggested* by the British Government; and as far as Sir Charles Stuart is concerned, he asserts, that he gave no such advice, but recommended another, and a different course.

The grant of the charter, therefore, whether for good or for evil, cannot be ascribed either to the counsels of the British Government, or, as far as the Government knew, to those of Sir Charles Stuart.

The Emperor having determined to grant this charter, “stated his wish to Sir Charles Stuart to send” it to Lisbon, “through his hands, as Portuguese Plenipotentiary.” Sir Charles describes himself “as somewhat startled by this mark of confidence, which he *endeavoured to avoid*, by expressing his doubts how far such a course would meet the approbation of his Court”—declaring, “that the request embarrassed him very much, since he was wholly unprepared to take upon himself so heavy a responsibility*.”

Notwithstanding, however, his doubts, his embarrassment, and his dread of responsibility, he consented, without waiting for instructions, to comply with the Emperor’s wishes, and to convey the Constitution to Lisbon.

The news of the abdication of Don Pedro in favour of

* Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. III.

his daughter, and of the grant of the charter, reached Mr. Canning through France on the 25th of June, but it was not till twelve days after that Mr. Canning received Sir Charles Stuart's own report of this proceeding.

On the 12th of July, Mr. Canning communicated to Sir Charles the King's approbation of His Excellency's "having consented (under the *peculiar circumstances of his situation in Brazil*), to be the bearer of the Emperor's decrees." The same dispatch which conveyed this approbation, likewise conveyed to Sir Charles an order to "return home," in order to avoid even the appearance of "interfering with the free agency of Portugal."

In a private letter of Mr. Canning's, to a distinguished diplomatist, dated July 25, 1826, which letter must therefore have been written before Mr. Canning had heard of Sir Charles's arrival at Lisbon, and consequently of what might have been his proceedings there, Mr. Canning's motives for taking this view of the subject are thus explained:—

"It is strictly true," he says, "that Sir Charles had no authority to act in any matter of this kind; and that his having done so is not only without my instructions, but against my wishes. I cannot, however, justly *disapprove* of what he has done (so far as I am yet acquainted with his proceedings, and with the limits he may intend to put to them), although you see how anxiously I labour to cut them short, and to bring him home. I cannot justly disapprove, because I did permit him, advisedly, to become the negotiator of the treaty of Separation and Independence, as *Plenipotentiary of His Most Faithful Majesty*.

"As a counterpart to this undertaking for the behoof of

“ Portugal, Stuart was at liberty to charge himself, on his
 “ return to Europe, with any communication which Don
 “ Pedro might wish to make to his Father or his Government.

“ It is hardly necessary to say, that the present state of
 “ things was not in contemplation when my instructions
 “ were given. It was therefore not included in them ; but
 “ neither was it *excluded*.

“ I have, therefore, thought it best at once to exonerate
 “ him from all blame on this account ; and, doing so, I have
 “ thought it right further to defend what he has done (so
 “ far as I yet know what he has done) to other Govern-
 “ ments. I do not mean to say that I should not have
 “ been much better pleased if he had declined the commis-
 “ sion altogether, but I have nevertheless approved of his
 “ conduct, coupling only that approbation with his imme-
 “ diate recall.

“ The knowledge of these details will enable you to assert
 “ more confidently the fact, that I never authorized, and that
 “ I regret, though I cannot condemn, Sir Charles Stuart’s
 “ agency in this affair.”

It appears, then, that Mr. Canning did not withhold from Sir Charles the approbation of his Government, because he thought that the so doing would be unjust towards Sir Charles. But he did not the less lament the act, because he well knew that it would probably excite the jealousy of the continental Powers, at the same time that it was certain to raise in the minds of the Portuguese constitutionalists exaggerated hopes of British assistance, which it would be extremely difficult fully to realize, but which it would nevertheless be most cruel to disappoint.

The charter being thus granted by Don Pedro, and brought over by Sir Charles Stuart, Mr. Canning at once saw that, since the acceptance by Portugal of the charter was made a condition of Don Pedro's abdication, if the charter were rejected, its rejection would undo all that he had been labouring during the preceding two years to effect, and had at last accomplished, through the agency of Sir Charles Stuart, *viz.*: the settlement of the disputes between Portugal and Brazil, which had been adjusted by the Treaty of Separation and Independence. He likewise considered it better for Portugal that the Government should at once accept Don Pedro's constitution, than for it to convoke the ancient Cortes; these two courses being the only alternatives between which it appears that the Regency had the power to make an option. "I am," he said, in a private letter to Sir William A'Court, "for that one of the two which will preserve peace." And it appears, by the published dispatch, that he was convinced that "the rejection of the charter " in Portugal would revive all the difficulties that had just " been overcome, and would place the crown of Portugal, " and not the crown only but the monarchy itself, of Brazil " in danger."

These being Mr. Canning's opinions, he communicated them to Sir Charles Stuart, and likewise at the same time directed Sir William A'Court "to make the general substance of the instructions to Sir Charles the guide of his " language in communicating with the Portuguese Government and with his diplomatic colleagues."

In the same dispatch which conveyed this instruction to Sir William A'Court, some observations were made to prevent

the possibility of Sir Charles Stuart acting "in the Regency of Portugal," of which body "a foolish notion had got abroad in France," that the Emperor, Don Pedro, had constituted His Excellency a member.

Between the 12th of July and the 17th Mr. Canning addressed dispatches to the British representatives abroad, urging the different Powers of the Continent to abstain from any interference with the "free agency of Portugal," pointing out the inconsistency, if after having "put down the constitutional systems of Naples and Spain, not for their own intrinsic worthlessness, but simply and declaredly because they were not *octroyés* by the Sovereign, the same Powers should combine against the constitutional charter of Portugal, which, whatever else might be its merits, was decidedly and unquestionably the emanation of the grace and free will of the lawful, and *de facto*, Sovereign of Portugal."

On the 17th* Mr. Canning sent copies of all these dispatches to Sir William A'Court, remarking that His Excellency could "not fail to observe with what anxious perseverance His Majesty's Government were labouring to create in other Powers a disposition favourable to the peace and security of Portugal."

At the end of this sentence there is a chasm in the papers laid before Parliament, the consequence of which is, that the following sentence, beginning, "In submitting these considerations," is wholly unintelligible, the considerations submitted being left out.

* Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. VII.

The substance of that part of the dispatch not printed is to this purport. The French Government had expressed their determination to recommend the Portuguese Ministry to convoke the Cortes, that that body might give its sanction to the charter. As Mr. Canning thought that the wisdom of such a course was very dubious, he felt, “although the
 “ British Government would not take upon itself the re-
 “ sponsibility of recommending or dissuading the adoption
 “ of it, yet that it was their duty not to withhold from the
 “ Portuguese Government a statement of the reasons on
 “ which those doubts were founded.” The substance of these reasons has been already published in the dispatch to Sir Charles Stuart of the 12th of July, with the exception of the further difficulty which Mr. Canning thought should be weighed, *viz.*: that the convocation of the ancient Cortes, even if called together for the purpose of sanctioning the adoption of the charter, “would be a departure from the
 “ Emperor’s commands, and *pro tanto* a defiance of his
 “ authority, whereby Portugal and her sovereign would be
 “ placed in opposition to each other, which would almost
 “ inevitably produce civil war.

“ In submitting these considerations” (which are omitted in the published dispatch) “to the Count de Porto-Santo,
 “ your Excellency will take care,” continued Mr. Canning,
 “ not to offer them as the settled opinion, or *peremptory ad-*
 “ *vice* of your Government. We are too conscious of the
 “ imperfectness of our acquaintance with the prevailing
 “ sentiments of the Portuguese nation, and of the inability
 “ of any foreign Government to enter fully into national
 “ feelings, prejudices, or prepossessions, to presume to offer

“ counsel to the Portuguese Ministry, in any other sense, or
 “ with any other view, than that of laying before them the
 “ elements of a decision which *it is for them and them only*
 “ *to form.*

“ It appears to us, upon the whole, that the best chance
 “ of a safe and tranquil issue to the present extraordinary
 “ crisis in Portugal, will be to be found in an acceptance (as
 “ immediate as may be suitable with the importance of the
 “ measure) of the charter of Don Pedro, coupled (as it is)
 “ with his abdication of the throne. Any other course must,
 “ as it appears to us, be full of danger; but if, nevertheless,
 “ another course should be pursued, we shall not be the less
 “ anxious for its peaceable and happy issue than if it were
 “ one on which we had ourselves advised.”

The dispatch from which the above extract is made was written on the 17th of July. On the 22nd of that month Mr. Canning “sent off an extra packet” for the purpose of transmitting a fresh dispatch to Sir Charles Stuart.

The reason of this extraordinary haste is not to be discovered from the imperfect extracts* which the Government have thought proper to lay before Parliament. And, as it is left by the papers, it is quite impossible to comprehend why an extra packet should be sent off on the 22nd for the express purpose of repeating “His Majesty’s pleasure” that “Sir Charles Stuart should return home forthwith,” when an explicit order to the same effect was given but ten days before. The explanation of this is as follows:—Mr. Canning, in his

* Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. X.

first instruction, on the 12th of July, desired Sir Charles to return home “so soon as he should have delivered the decrees of the Emperor into the proper hands, and should have rendered an account to the Portuguese Ministry of the mission with which he had been charged by His Most Faithful Majesty to his Son.” This instruction was written under the idea that the commercial arrangement which Sir Charles had been authorized to negotiate between Portugal and Brazil had been brought to a conclusion at Rio de Janeiro. By a dispatch received from Sir Charles Stuart on the 21st, dated Rio, Mr. Canning learnt that such was not the case,—and fearing, from his experience of Sir Charles’s conduct during his mission to Brazil, that that diplomatist might construe the words “have rendered to the Portuguese Ministry an account of the mission with which he was charged,” &c., into a permission to remain at Lisbon, for the purpose of *rendering that account* for an indefinite period,” Mr. Canning, “to obviate any doubt which might possibly arise in His Excellency’s mind, as to the execution of the instructions contained in the dispatch of the 12th instant,” sent off “an extra packet” to desire Sir Charles to “return home forthwith, after delivering into the hands of the Regency the Decrees of the Emperor Don Pedro, and into the hands of M. de Porto-Santo, or, in case of M. de Porto-Santo’s resignation, into those of his successor, or in default of a new appointment, into Sir William A’Court’s hands, to be delivered by him to the proper minister, at a proper time, the papers relative to the commercial negotiation, between Portugal and Brazil, in whatever state that negotiation might be.”

The dispatch concludes with a peremptory order to return home.

Mr. Canning likewise took advantage of this occasion to send a dispatch to Sir William A'Court, in order to counteract the effects of any active interference on the part of Sir Charles Stuart, the motive for sending which is left by the Parliamentary papers in the same obscurity as that which dictated the dispatch to Sir Charles Stuart. That motive, therefore, must be disclosed.

The exhortation which had been addressed by Mr. Canning to the French and Austrian Governments to "abstain from any interference with the free agency of Portugal," had been received by those Governments in a very friendly manner. France promised not to interfere, and Austria not to let loose Don Miguel to oppose in Portugal the execution of his brother's decrees. These intentions on the part of the two Governments made Mr. Canning feel that it was more incumbent than ever upon him to take care that nothing should be done in Portugal which should rouse the jealousy of the two Powers, which he had just succeeded in allaying. He therefore wrote to Sir William A'Court to say that* "It was the anxious wish of His Majesty's Government that nothing might have been done by Sir Charles Stuart, whether under the commission of the Emperor Don Pedro, or at the solicitation of the Portuguese authorities, which could be liable, either in Portugal or throughout Europe, to be misconstrued as an *authoritative interference* in the internal concerns of Portugal. Should any thing of that sort

* Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. IX.

“ unluckily have occurred, His Majesty’s Government relies
 “ confidently on your Excellency (Sir William A’Court) for
 “ doing away the impression which it would be calculated to
 “ create.”

While Mr. Canning was thus employed in London, it appears that Sir Charles (who had reached Lisbon on the 7th of July, the very day on which his dispatch from Rio, announcing his consent to be the bearer of the charter, arrived in London), was not only executing the commands of Don Pedro, in delivering the Decrees to the proper authorities; but, in the character of Portuguese Plenipotentiary, was contributing very materially, by his exertions, to the establishment of Don Pedro’s constitution.

By the published dispatch from Sir Charles Stuart*, dated July 15th, but not received till August 9th, we find that in placing the Decrees of the Emperor in the hands of the Infanta, His Excellency told her Royal Highness that “ he
 “ must wait until he learnt the sentiments of his Govern-
 “ ment before he could express an opinion upon that part
 “ of their contents which regulated the internal Govern-
 “ ment of Portugal.”

But in this very same dispatch, in which he describes himself as having made this prudent declaration, he takes care to show that he acted entirely in defiance of it. “ *I*
 “ *recommended,*” he says, “ Her Royal Highness to meet
 “ the charge (respecting the illegality of the different acts)
 “ by concerting a legal mode of putting them into execu-
 “ tion the moment that the Government should return to

* Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. XII.

“ the Capital, which we *agreed* should not be delayed beyond the following day.” And by the unpublished dispatch we learn, that Sir Charles “ did his utmost to strengthen the resolution of the Princess, urging her to take upon herself to act alone should her colleagues still hesitate.” Sir Charles then it seems, by his own account, did interfere in the establishment of the constitution; and Sir William A’Court describes that interference “ as very active, and direct.” It is true, that it was done without instructions, and that it went much beyond what Mr. Canning would have wished, but he did not disavow Sir Charles, preferring that the British Government should take upon itself the responsibility of those acts (whatever that responsibility might be) rather than incur the still greater responsibility of producing a convulsion in Portugal, by expressing any public disapprobation of them, which might have been construed into a disapproval of the charter itself. Sir William A’Court, on the other hand, scrupulously abstained from any act whereby he could commit his Government, contenting himself with stating, for the consideration of the Portuguese ministers, Mr. Canning’s opinions respecting the rejection of the charter, as well as his active endeavours “ to give a right direction to the policy of Europe” on that occasion.

Such is the history of Mr. Canning’s connection with the Portuguese constitution, as drawn from all the records, published and unpublished, which relate to it; and we defy any individual, whether in office or not, to dispute the truth of our statement, which, it will be seen, strictly tallies with the account given of these transactions by Mr.

Canning himself, in his speech* on sending troops to Portugal.

The conclusion to be drawn from the whole of this statement is this:—that although the British Government did not suggest the grant of a constitutional charter to Portugal, yet that from the circumstance of Sir Charles Stuart having been the bearer of the grant, from its being known that the opinions of the British ministry were in favour of its acceptance, and, above all, from their having taken upon themselves the responsibility of Sir Charles Stuart's unauthorized activity, that it behoved the British cabinet, in honour and good faith, to give to the Portuguese constitutionalists every moral support and countenance that was possible, consistently with the principles of policy on which the Government had declared that it would act. And further, that since it was impossible to suppose that the advocates of that constitution in Portugal, would nicely discriminate the exact quantum of encouragement given by Great Britain to the establishment of the constitution, and that many, from a confidence in British protection had been induced to declare themselves in its favour, who but for that confidence would have hesitated to do so, it was incumbent on the British Government to stretch a point in favour of the constitutional party, to avoid being taxed with its betrayal.

Such is the conclusion to which all impartial persons must arrive, in perusing the faithful history of these transactions; and such indeed is the conclusion to which the Author of

* Dec. 12, 1826.

the pamphlet mentioned in the beginning of these observations has arrived: but under the false idea, perhaps, of making out a stronger case in favour of Portugal he has perverted the evidence before him, and turned it against Mr. Canning, in a way which is little creditable to his candour.

The first point which we need notice, and which the Author endeavours unfairly to make out, is, that there was no real distinction between Sir Charles Stuart in his character of Portuguese Plenipotentiary, and that of British Ambassador.

This is attempted to be proved, first in page 7; and afterwards the Author again returns to the charge in a triumphant way in pages 17 and 18.

In page 7 he says, "This approbation" (Mr. Canning's of Sir Charles Stuart's conduct) "is an explicit answer to
 " the silly notion which has been attempted to be propa-
 " gated of Sir Charles having acted, in making himself the
 " bearer of the charter, as a Portuguese Plenipotentiary,
 " and not as a British Ambassador. If this separation of
 " characters had been possible, if it had been *recognized at*
 " *the time*, no approbation from the British Government
 " would have been wanted for an act performed by him as
 " the functionary of another State. This after-invention
 " was not then devised."

Here is a mass of real or feigned ignorance, and wilful misrepresentation. The distinction between the two characters is asserted to be an "*after-invention, not then*" (that is, when Mr. Canning gave his approbation) "devised." This is false: as must at once appear to every one who reads

the papers with attention to dates. The distinction was drawn in the very first instance by Don Pedro. "His Imperial Majesty stated his wish to send these Acts through my hands, as *Portuguese Plenipotentiary**," said Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Canning in the first dispatch announcing that he had consented to convey the charter to Portugal.

The distinction is implied likewise in the terms of the approbation. Mr. Canning said, that he "approved" of Sir Charles "having agreed (*under the peculiar circumstances of his situation in Brazil*) to be the bearer of the "charter†," in other words, Mr. Canning consented to Sir Charles Stuart being, as it were, the courier to convey and to deliver it; but at the same time he told him, thus far you may go, but, to prevent your going further, return home without delay.

But what made Sir Charles's "situation in Brazil peculiar," except it was his holding the character of Portuguese Plenipotentiary, with the sanction of Great Britain, for a particular purpose? Had he not held this character, it is obvious that there would have been nothing "*peculiar*" in his situation.

Further, Sir Charles Stuart, in "delivering to Her Royal Highness, the Infanta, the several public Acts which had been entrusted to his care by her brother, the Emperor, told her that, *as Portuguese Plenipotentiary*, he could not refuse to take charge of the papers‡," &c. Sir

* Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. III.

† Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. V.

‡ Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, No. XII.

Charles thus spoke to the Infanta many days before he *could* have received any instructions from Mr. Canning, on the subject of the constitution.

What a gross perversion then it is, even of the published extracts from which the Author professes to form his judgment, to say that this distinction was an “*after-invention, not devised*” when Mr. Canning approved of Sir Charles’s conduct!

Equally absurd is the Author’s attempt, in page 18, to prove that Sir Charles Stuart was not Portuguese Plenipotentiary—for it is singular enough, that the only conclusion to be drawn from his argument is directly the reverse of that which he derives from it. He says, “the device of a Portuguese Plenipotentiary was altogether a fiction, having no real foundation.

“ Sir Charles had indeed been invested with that character to the Emperor of Brazil, but by what process had he, upon his return to Lisbon, undergone a change into a Portuguese Plenipotentiary in Portugal itself? It has hitherto been understood, that an Ambassador having completed a special commission, and being returned to the Court from which it had been received, was thereby divested of the character with which he had been clothed, re-entering at once the walk of private life. At most, if it had so pleased the Regent of Portugal, it lay with Her Royal Highness to continue to Sir Charles the character which he had borne of *Her* Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Brazil, but this was not done.”

Now the best way of exposing the fallacy of this reasoning is, to explain the exact position in which Sir Charles was

placed. His Excellency, when he left England, was accredited to the King of Portugal; and he, likewise, was furnished with full powers to act as the King of England's Plenipotentiary, and Mediator for the adjustment of the differences between the King of Portugal, and Brazil. When "that negotiation had been brought to a happy conclusion, "the British part of Sir Charles Stuart's mission terminated; but Sir Charles, having been invested by the "King of Portugal with the character of His Most Faithful "Majesty's Plenipotentiary, remained at Rio in that situation, for the purpose of negotiating commercial arrangements between Portugal and Brazil." The death of His Most Faithful Majesty at once put an end to that character in Sir Charles Stuart, while it invested Don Pedro with a new one—that of King of Portugal. Sir Charles could not go on, as the representative of a person who had ceased to exist. The demise, therefore, of his principal, reduced Sir Charles to the rank of a private gentleman; and from that rank he was raised by Don Pedro, the new King of Portugal, to that of Portuguese Plenipotentiary, as appears by No. 4 of the published papers, by which Don Pedro, as *King of Portugal*, constitutes Sir Charles Stuart his Plenipotentiary, to carry his decrees to his own kingdom. The said full powers commencing, not "I, the Emperor," but "I, the King."

In the face, then, of this document, what perversity is it in the Author to ask, "by what process Sir Charles had become Portuguese Plenipotentiary?" Could he be so ignorantly blind, as not to see that by this instrument the acknowledged and lawful King of Portugal constituted Sir

Charles his Plenipotentiary to carry his commands to Portugal? This, indeed, was the only public character in which he appeared at Lisbon. But the Author goes on to say, “that it lay with Her Royal Highness to continue to Sir Charles Stuart the character *which he had borne* of Her Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Brazil; but this was not done.”

“*Which he had borne!*” When? where? how invested? from whom to be continued? when “not done?” If he ever bore the character of Her Royal Highness’s Plenipotentiary, he must have had it conferred upon him by her after the death of her father; but this, it is said, was “not done.” How, therefore, could “it lay with Her Royal Highness to continue to Sir Charles a character with which he had never been invested?” All this reasoning, therefore, is sheer nonsense and idle talk, and is only on a par with the Author’s insidious assertion, that “the character of Ambassador from the Emperor of Brazil had not been conferred upon Sir Charles.” A proposition which is, indeed, quite true, but is evidently so stated for the purpose of misleading.

Sir Charles was not made Ambassador from Don Pedro, *Emperor of Brazil*, but he was made Plenipotentiary from Don Pedro, *King of Portugal*; so that the Author seeks to have it both ways, first saying, that Sir Charles was not Portuguese Plenipotentiary; and, then, that he was not Ambassador from the Emperor of Brazil. But, in the name of common sense, with what character was he invested by the full power given to him by Don Pedro, if he were neither Brazilian Ambassador nor Portuguese Plenipoten-

tiary? Really, there never was such a juggle of argument attempted to be palmed upon the public as close reasoning.

Here, then, this "shallow attempt" at misrepresentation may "be dismissed."

The remaining misrepresentations of this pamphlet are not so concentrated as the one which has just been exposed. But the drift of the argument, which is contained in the pages between 8 and 15, may be succinctly stated as follows: The British Government made itself parties to the charter, because they approved of Sir Charles Stuart conveying it, and because they "recommended its adoption;" and that having thus committed themselves, they began, after a time, to "evinced an uncalled-for anxiety to shield themselves from reproach."

Now the truth of the first part of this argument we are quite ready to admit. But that Mr. Canning, by any act of his, commenced the "system of shifting and tergiversation," we utterly deny; for it would be difficult to invent a system of foreign policy (if system it can be called) more directly opposed to Mr. Canning's than the one pursued by the present Government.

There can be no doubt, that the exhortations to foreign Powers to abstain from interference, coupled with the undisguised desire of Great Britain, that the Portuguese should of their own free will adopt the charter, did morally contribute to secure its adoption. And Mr. Canning was, certainly, always ready, to the very last moment of his existence, to give to the constitution the same moral countenance for its support, which he had not hesitated to give to its establishment.

The Author pretends to discover a disposition on the part of Mr. Canning “to shield himself from reproach;” because, after he had countenanced the charter by his dispatches of the 12th and 17th of July, he took advantage of an “extra packet, which was sent off to Sir Charles Stuart,” to express to Sir William A’Court “his anxious wish that nothing should have been done at Lisbon which could be liable to be construed into an authoritative interference with the internal concerns of Portugal.” This term, “authoritative interference,” says the pamphlet, “is evidently intended to afford a *loop-hole* for escape from the responsibility attached to the part we had been playing.” But from the very beginning Mr. Canning disclaimed “*authoritative interference* ;” that is, interference by advice given with an intimation or threat that its rejection would be resented—and so scrupulously careful is he to mark the distinction, that when he does direct his opinions to be declared in favour of a particular course, he says, that, “if another course should be pursued, we should not be the less anxious for its peaceable and happy issue than if it were one which we had ourselves advised.” What *loop-hole* for escape, then, the term “*authoritative interference*” affords, which the terms used in the first dispatches do not equally afford, can only be discerned by a perverted imagination. And yet, upon the use of this “term,” the Author charges Mr. Canning with having “invented” it, to enable him to shrink from responsibility.

Before dismissing the first division of this pamphlet, we will just call the attention of the reader to the singular inconsistency of its Author. He charges Mr. Canning with

endeavouring to “*retract*” the encouragement which he had given to the Portuguese constitutionalists, and then in a subsequent part of the pamphlet he makes a quotation from Mr. Canning’s speech in Parliament, delivered five months afterwards, on the sending troops to Portugal, as a proof of his persevering and unceasing encouragements. Here end our remarks on that portion of the pamphlet, which relates to Mr. Canning’s conduct in regard to the Portuguese constitutional charter, and upon which it has been endeavoured so unwarrantably to throw the charges of retractation and vacillation.

What could have been the object of the Writer in thus attempting to vilify and degrade the conduct of the man, whose principles and system of policy he so eloquently applauds, and so ably contrasts with the course now pursued, it would be difficult to determine ; as we cannot give him credit for having been in ignorance of the falseness of the colouring which he has given to these transactions.

To the second part of the pamphlet we should give our cordial concurrence and unqualified approbation, were it not for the following paragraph, of which it is not easy to understand the precise meaning or tendency.

“ Each successive Secretary of State,” says the Author, “ has made it his first object to overturn the measures of his predecessor, and thus there has been imprinted upon our counsels a character of vacillation, as fatal to our honour as to our interests. For this misfortune, resulting from the violence of our party-spirit, no remedy can be found, unless in the greater *fixity* of opinions in the Parliament.”

We freely admit, that a change of measures in our

foreign relations was marked and decisive, when, on the death of Lord Londonderry, the management of them devolved on Mr. Canning; while we indignantly deny that the change resulted from the unworthy motives ascribed. We also readily admit the fact, that the present Government have abandoned Mr. Canning's system of policy, and, with the same attachment to arbitrary principles which Lord Londonderry entertained, have re-adopted his system of policy. But we are bound in candour to avow our belief, that the change has not resulted so much from party-spirit as from their real sentiments and opinions, being in direct opposition to those which guided the policy of Mr. Canning; and we are the more confirmed in this belief, from the knowledge we have of the thwarting and opposition which Mr. Canning experienced in the development of his system of foreign policy, from the most influential minister of the present day, when that minister was his colleague in the Government.

This persuasion, however, only tends to confirm the opinion, that to such acknowledged and inherent accordance of feeling and policy, in opposition to the system of their predecessor, the remedy proposed must prove totally inadequate; or, if it has any effect at all, can only increase that inconsistency and vacillation which it is the object to cure.

But unless the Author is really more ignorant of diplomacy than we believe him to be, we would ask him, if he is not aware that there is a moral support given to any measure of foreign policy, by the known and acknowledged "fixity" of sentiment of the director of that policy in unison with the spirit of the measure proposed, and which has more

influence in making it adequate to its purpose than a more authoritative enforcement of the same measure could have, if supposed to have been adopted by the Government proposing it against their own wishes and opinions.

Does he not believe that the sentence he quotes from Mr. Canning's speech in Parliament, " May God prosper " this attempt at the establishment of constitutional liberty " in Portugal ! " had as much influence in preventing any attempt at its subversion from foreign Powers and domestic intrigue as a more direct interference could have had ; and, supposing such a declaration had been wrung by the " fixity " of opinion in Parliament, from the disciple of Metternich, under the guidance of the Duke of Wellington, does he believe it would have had any such effect on foreign Powers, or would have afforded any moral aid against anti-constitutional cabal and rebellion in Portugal.

And further, whether it may not be asserted, that Lord Aberdeen's declaration in Parliament, " He was much " mistaken, if those persons who supported Don Miguel " were not the friends of this country," gave stability to Don Miguel's usurpation, while it sounded like the knell of departed hope to those whom we had formerly protected, and foretold the atrocities of Terceira, which has left to all those who remained true to their king and constitution, nothing but despair, submission, dungeons, and the rack.

Away then with the cant, that measures not men ought to be the object of solicitude to a British Parliament ; in foreign policy, we might almost say the reverse of that maxim would be nearer the truth.

But had the remedy proposed been confined to the counteracting erroneous measures in domestic policy, the proposition might have appeared more plausible; indeed its efficacy has been proved by the miraculous and sudden conversion of many of the existing Government on that great measure of domestic policy which had so long divided and perplexed the counsels of kings and ministers—the only measure, too, upon which the present leading ministers stood solemnly pledged to their king and country, to resist with all their might—that, such was their horror of being considered in the remotest degree accessory to its ultimate success, they would not consent to remain members of a Government at the head of which it had pleased His Majesty to place an individual whose opinions were favourable to that question. Undoubtedly this great and salutary measure was triumphantly carried by their obedience to the voice of public opinion, when that opinion was so decidedly pronounced that “fixity” of principle against it became incompatible with “fixity” of power.

But while we give the present ministers full credit for having been the means, the only immediate means, of conferring this boon on their country, we were never among the number who, in the enthusiasm of their gratitude for this benefit, were ready to place all their confidence in those who had conferred it, without examining how far it had been accompanied by want of principle, of good faith, and of treachery to others.

We were, and still are, of opinion that great as the good was that has been gained, its having been acquired by

such means was not only discreditable in the highest degree to those whose inconsistency of principle had procured it, but that it did, temporarily at least, set at nought all idea of principle and good faith among public men, who

“ Were to no principle true,
Not fixed to old friends or to new.”

That it was a beacon lighted in the face of the world to warn foreign nations, and all those in this country who valued their own consistency and character, not to trust to the present rulers of the policy of Great Britain, or to identify their opinions with the professed principles of the Government, lest, on some occasion of unlooked-for expediency, what had been proclaimed as their settled opinion one day, might be totally forgotten or wilfully abandoned the next.

We have now done with the pamphlet; but before we conclude, we will submit a few general observations to the reader, on the policy pursued by the present Government towards Portugal.

At the time when Sir Charles Stuart brought over the constitution from Brazil the Duke of Wellington was a member of the Administration; whatever, therefore, the policy and conduct of the British Government may have been on that occasion, His Grace was as much committed to it as any other member of the cabinet. If, therefore, he has turned suddenly round, and acted in defiance of that policy, he has disappointed hopes which he had been party to exciting.

It has been already shown, that, owing to circumstances over which Mr. Canning had no control, it became a duty incumbent upon the British Government to deal generously with the constitutional party in Portugal, by giving them the aid of its moral countenance. This obligation Mr. Canning would have fearlessly discharged, after having once contracted it, because it was an invariable principle of his policy to act with good faith, whatever might be the consequence; but it must not be supposed that he consented inadvertently to these acts which imposed those obligations upon him. Such was not the case: his policy towards Portugal had invariably been to maintain an influence with her Government, and to cement a close union between the two countries, because he considered it advantageous to both. When, therefore, he encouraged the establishment of the constitution, he did so as well because he felt convinced that its rejection would entail the greatest evil upon Portugal, as because he knew that the party which was friendly to free institutions were, for the most part, likewise friendly to connection with England; while the party which was attached to absolute monarchy were hostile to that connection. The treaties which bind us to Portugal are of so onerous a nature, that it is of the utmost consequence to this country that we should have established there an amicable Government; Mr. Canning, therefore, advisedly gave the moral support of this country to that party which was favourably disposed towards Great Britain.

The same policy then which induced Mr. Canning originally to give this moral support to the constitutionalists, ought alone to have been sufficient to have induced his suc-

cessors to continue it. But this support, which it might in the first instance have been a mere matter of expediency to grant, it became a breach of faith to discontinue, after individuals had been by it betrayed into committing themselves to the constitution by overt acts of theirs in its support. If, then, the withdrawal of this moral countenance would have been a breach of faith, in what terms ought we to describe not only its withdrawal from the constitutionalists but its undisguised transfer to their adversaries?

If it were so transferred (and we are prepared to show by a chain of evidence that it was), we appeal to those feelings of honour which we trust still warm the hearts of a majority of the people of this country, whether the ministers who have so acted have not given cause to all nations to mistrust us for the future?

But "we have not betrayed them," cry the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen: "we have not betrayed them," re-echoes the *consistent* leader of the House of Commons.

To this we answer, "facts are stubborn things," and those which the Government admits are amply sufficient to show that the destruction of the Constitution is owing to the encouragement given by the Government to the party by whom it was overthrown.

The question, which had been much agitated, respecting Don Miguel's right to the Regency under that charter, was set at rest by the Decree of Don Pedro, dated July 30, 1827, constituting the Infant his Lieutenant for governing the Kingdom of Portugal: Don Pedro, however, accompanied this decree with letters to the Emperor of Austria

and our King, requesting that their majesties would watch over the preservation of the constitutional charter, the acceptance of which was an essential condition of his abdication. It is to be presumed that it was in consequence of this request that Sir Henry Wellesley, our Ambassador at Vienna, was authorized by Lord Dudley (in the spirit of Mr. Canning's policy) to take part in the conferences which were held in that capital respecting His Royal Highness's return to assume the government of the kingdom.

In the course of these conferences at Vienna, the Infant bound himself by the most solemn promises to maintain the charter; and the British Ambassador, by taking part in those conferences, and affixing his signature to the protocol, pledged his country, if not to enforce their fulfilment, at any rate not to help their violation. Further, as if still more openly to connect this country with the affairs of Portugal, the Infant was, as it were, compelled to pass through England on his way to Lisbon. All this occurred under the administration of Lord Goderich. But before the Infant had quitted the shores of this country, the Duke of Wellington became prime minister. Some of the members of Mr. Canning's Government, still, however, retained their offices, and his course of policy towards Portugal was not by any means wholly abandoned, although it must be admitted that there was no great wisdom displayed in the omission of all precautionary measures to induce the Infant to adhere to his engagements. If, for instance, the Infant had been told that England expected him to fulfil them; and if orders had been sent to the commanders of the British troops to withdraw them from Lisbon on the very first indications of a

design on the part of Don Miguel to play false, it is more than probable that he would never have been able to have effected his usurpation—for his attempts would have been put down in the first instance by the constitutionalists, had it not been for the protection which the British troops afforded to his person. These, however, were faults of omission occasioned through want of foresight, and not through design; for Sir Frederick Lamb's conduct was approved when he sent back the loan for Don Miguel which Great Britain had guaranteed, and orders were sent by Lord Dudley to Sir Frederick Lamb to depart in the event of Don Miguel's assuming the title of king; facts which show that there was a party in the Government which had no disposition to aid in the destruction of the constitution. In the month of May, all those individuals who, having belonged to the administration of Lord Goderich, had remained with the Duke of Wellington, quitted the Government, and the Earl of Aberdeen was appointed the successor of Lord Dudley. From this period the anti-liberals were wholly free from restraint; and accordingly we find, before the year expired, not only that our whole moral support (which would have been more than sufficient to have turned the scale) was given to Don Miguel, but that we actually forcibly interfered against the lawful Queen of Portugal in behalf of the usurper of her throne!!

The first proof of the moral support being given to Don Miguel is to be found in Lord Beresford's correspondence with certain influential persons who surrounded the Queen mother. His lordship's connection with Portugal had given him considerable influence in that country. He had

been invited by the Infanta Regent to assume the command of the army shortly after the constitution was established, and he went to Lisbon accordingly; but he was so hostile to the new order of things, that he placed difficulties in the way of his acceptance of the offers which were made to him; and the declarations of his intimate friends, made, as they asserted, by his authority, that England would not send any troops when the invasion from Spain took place, did very considerable injury to the constitutional cause.

He at last left Lisbon discontented, and little more than a year afterwards was appointed to the high post of Master-General of the Ordnance, by the Duke of Wellington. His lordship carried on a correspondence with Lisbon, which it is confidently asserted went to urge Don Miguel to persevere in his treacherous course; Lord Beresford, indeed, denies this assertion. But can he deny that he distinctly expressed his opinion that Don Miguel had a right to the throne; and was not such an opinion encouragement? Can the Government deny that Sir Frederick Lamb complained in his public dispatches of the injury which the constitutional cause sustained by the tendency of his lordship's letters? If this were so, was it not the bounden duty of the head of the Government to dismiss Lord Beresford from his situation, in order that his correspondence might be deprived of that authority which is unavoidably attached to that of a man holding so high a post in the Government? Was it not the bounden duty of the head of the Government to have required Lord Beresford to show all the letters which he had written to Lisbon upon political subjects? But the Premier carefully abstains

from saying that he had seen these letters, confining himself to the assertion, that he had seen those which Lord Beresford had received ; as if the mischief which had been done at Lisbon was occasioned by the letters received by Lord Beresford in London, instead of by the letters sent by Lord Beresford to Lisbon. The only explanation of this lenity towards his lordship is to be found in the fact, that his letters were in accordance with the secret wishes of the Government. The next proof is to be found in the appointment of Sir Henry Chamberlain (who had been British Consul at Rio de Janeiro, and who was well known to have refused to accept any consular employment) to be British Consul at Lisbon, a selection almost amounting to the renewal of diplomatic relations. Lastly, by way of putting the finish to this series of moral support, Lord Aberdeen declared, last year, in his place in Parliament, that the Miguelites were the friends of England. But the Government, not content with this unauthoritative encouragement, although professing neutrality, violated that neutrality in favour of Don Miguel.

A body of Portuguese troops had fled for refuge to Spain, after an ineffectual attempt to support the constitution at Oporto ; and having been driven from Spain, sought, and were allowed to find, an asylum at Plymouth. After some time the Government, finding that their presence there kept Don Miguel in alarm, told the Marquis of Palmella that they must be dispersed in the interior, and separated from their officers, or else they must quit the country.

This order was certainly dealing out hard measure to these unfortunate refugees. Neutrality would have been as strictly preserved, by a notification that they would not be

allowed to sail in hostile array from this country, without reducing them to the equally disastrous alternatives of either being dispersed in the interior, or transported to the other side of the Atlantic.

The Duke of Wellington defends* this proceeding from the bitter complaints made against it by the Marquis of Palmella, by reference to the “discussion and transactions “with Spain, respecting a *similar* body of Portuguese troops, “not prisoners;” and taunts the Marquis of Palmella in no very generous way, even if the two cases had been “similar,” with “two years having effaced them from his recollection.” But these two cases were not “similar.”

Without entering into the distinctions between deserters and refugees, there was one difference between them which it is indeed extraordinary that the duke should have forgotten, at the very moment when he reproaches the Marquis of Palmella for his want of memory.

It is quite true, as the Duke said, that the British Government “insisted that the King of Spain should not only separate officers from soldiers, placing a certain number of the “latter only in the same town, but that the whole should be “removed far into the interior of the country;”—but on what grounds did the British Government insist on this being done? not on the general principles of the law of nations, but on the specific ground of the fulfilment of treaties. Spain was bound, by treaty to Portugal, to deliver up all deserters; and the refusal, on the part of Spain, to fulfil the obligations of treaty, would have justified the Portuguese

* Vide *Parliamentary Papers*, p. 101.

Government in issuing a declaration of war. At our instigation that Government consented to moderate their demands, and to require only the dispersion of the deserters in the interior, and the surrender of their arms and accoutrements.

The British Government therefore rested its demand on the stipulations of treaty. And since there are no treaties between this country and Portugal, which bind us to deliver up Portuguese deserters, much less refugees, the two cases are not "similar."

The next assertion of His Grace is equally erroneous: he says, that "a detachment of His Majesty's troops was sent to Portugal because the King of Spain had not performed the duties of neutrality, as was required from His Catholic Majesty, and had suffered the Portuguese troops in Spain to commit the *very act* which he had repeatedly assured Count Palmella that the King of England would not permit those in England to commit." Now it is really astonishing, that two years should have effaced from His Grace's recollection these transactions with Portugal.

The troops were not sent to Portugal because Spain suffered the *Portuguese deserters* to attack Portugal, they were sent on the express plea of those deserters being Spanish mercenaries, because they had "been armed, clothed, and regimented by Spain." If, therefore, England had allowed a hostile expedition to set sail from Plymouth which had *not* been "armed, clothed, and regimented by her Government," it would not have been the "*very act*" to oppose which England had two years before sent troops to Portugal.

The two cases therefore are not "similar," and the assertion that they were so betrays the weakness of his cause.

But this unfriendly treatment of these unfortunate refugees did not end here.

Shortly after the decision had been taken by the Marquis of Palmella and his friends, that the troops should quit this country, accounts arrived from Terceira that that island had preserved its fidelity to the young queen.

Upon this the Marquis of Palmella acquainted the duke with the intention of the Portuguese troops to proceed to Terceira instead of to Brazil. His Grace, however, answered that the British Government, having determined to be neutral, would not permit the troops to go to Terceira, although they were unarmed. And the reason which he gives for this resolution is, that he knows arms have been sent from this country to Terceira.

It appears, from His Grace's statement, that the Brazilian minister applied to Lord Aberdeen for permission to embark 1180 stand of arms, and 150 barrels of gunpowder, on board a Brazilian frigate; and that Lord Aberdeen, in consenting to their embarkation, "expressed his confidence that the Brazilian minister would give his assurance that these arms and stores were not intended to be employed in the civil dissensions in Portugal and its dependencies."

Now here is as strong a proof as well could be required, of the bias of the Government in favour of the Usurper.

Neutrality would have been as completely observed by permitting export to both belligerents, as by prohibiting it to both. Prohibition was peculiarly hurtful to the consti-

tutionalists, and prohibition was the mode adopted for the enforcement of neutrality.

In answer to Lord Aberdeen, the Brazilian minister gave a somewhat equivocal reply, and the arms were conveyed to Terceira.

Without justifying the language of the Brazilian minister, we yet maintain that it is no justification of the refusal of the English minister to permit the landing of the Portuguese refugees at Terceira. Even supposing that the arms had been shipped by the Marquis of Palmella, and sent to Terceira, that refusal would not have been justified: on this point we have Mr. Canning's authority.

In discussing the possibility of the Government preventing Lord Cochrane's expedition to Greece against the Turks, he makes use of words which in every respect apply to this affair.

"Yachts," he says, "may sail from this country, and so
 " may steam-boats, if unarmed, without any question; and
 " so may arms, as matter of merchandise; and, however
 " strong the *moral* credence of their destination, the law
 " cannot interfere to stop them. It is only when these ele-
 " ments of armament are combined that they come within
 " the purview of the law; and if that combination does not
 " take place till they have left this country, the law is power-
 " less against them." In Mr. Canning's opinion, therefore, the fact of the arms having preceded these refugees did not give the Government any authority over the expedition after its departure. If, however, its being partly composed of troops gave it the character of a hostile armament, why did not the ministers interfere with it where alone they had juris-

diction; *viz.* in the port of its equipment. “The Atlantic is not the dominion of the King of England,” the Duke of Wellington correctly observed: and Lord Aberdeen, in his speech on the 18th of February last, asserts, that “we had no right to protect the Portuguese Refugees from Portugal, *except in England.*” If, then, we had no right to protect them against Portugal *except in England*, what right had we to aid Portugal against them *out* of England? We had none; and, by Lord Aberdeen’s own showing, so soon as the transports reached a place out of the king’s dominions they were out of his jurisdiction, and the Government, having permitted their departure, had no control over their destination.

Why, then, did the Government prefer the illegal course of assailing them at Terceira, to the legal method of seizing the transports in harbour? Why, according to the Duke of Wellington’s own account, because the latter mode would have “excited more noise, objection, and opposition, than had been occasioned by the measures which he adopted.”

But how would it have excited this “noise, objection, and opposition,” which His Grace appears so much to have dreaded? Simply, because the question, whether the expedition was an *armament* or not, must have been submitted to a jury; and since an expedition without arms is destitute of the one thing essential to constitute it an *armament*, His Grace would without doubt have been defeated in the prosecution. To such a tribunal therefore it appears that the Government feared to appeal. The military habit of our ruler could not brook the thought of having his wishes restrained by civil process; and he knew, that while he

could peremptorily command a British officer to fire upon a body of unarmed men, he could not dictate a verdict to an English jury.

The duke indeed seems to have no desire to conceal that he did all in his power to support Don Miguel. For at the very moment that he declines discussing the chief point in dispute, *viz.*: whether the firing on the Portuguese refugees in the waters belonging to their own sovereign was or was not a breach of the law of nations, all that he attempts to make out is, that, "according to the best opinions he could obtain," it was not a violation of that law. Now, if the duke's bias was not in favour of Don Miguel, it behoved him distinctly to show, not merely that the law of nations justified his act, but that the laws of neutrality peremptorily prescribed this harsh and rigorous treatment of unfortunate men, whom we had inhospitably driven from our shores.

But, in order that there may be no doubt as to the dislike of the Government towards the constitutionalists, His Grace does not hesitate to read a very severe lecture of condemnation and reproof to the other Powers of Europe, because they had put a different interpretation upon the principles of international law, and had not prevented these unhappy exiles from landing on the only spot in the world which still acknowledged the authority of their lawful sovereign.

How the high-spirited nation, to whom this rebuke is addressed, will bear to be so tutored, yet remains to be seen. But we will venture to say, that such language was never before addressed by a prime minister of England to friendly Powers.

The subject of Terceira has been so much discussed both in and out of Parliament that we will not detain our readers by any further arguments respecting it. We are content to rest our case on the declaration of the ministers themselves, and on Mr. Canning's recorded opinion.

The whole indeed of our late behaviour towards unhappy Portugal has been shown to have been at variance with that which Mr. Canning adopted. And it is unjust of the ministers to endeavour to make that statesman responsible for the disastrous consequences resulting from their own mismanagement, by pretending that they are only following his example, in seeking to "disconnect themselves*" and the country from "every thing belonging to the Portuguese constitution." The history which we have already given demonstrates that this is misrepresentation. Mr. Canning had no such wish; his single object being confined to showing, that he was neither the suggestor of the constitution at Rio, or the imposer of it at Lisbon.

But, supposing it were true, that Mr. Canning had manifested an "extraordinary anxiety" to disconnect himself from the charter, that would not justify the "extraordinary anxiety" of the Government to connect itself with Don Miguel, whereby we are now involved in difficulties from which extrication can only be purchased by dishonour. Already, in the Speech from the Throne, the Government complains of the numerous embarrassments arising from the continued "interruption of our diplomatic relations" with

* Vide LORD ABERDEEN'S *Speech*, Feb. 19, 1830.

Portugal; which embarrassments, it is said, “increase His Majesty’s desire to effect the termination of so serious an evil.”

But what is the mode by which it is intended to cure this evil, of their own creation? Why, by recognising as King of Portugal, a man whom the ministry admit to be an usurper;—whom in defending they are content to brand as “heartless and incorrigible;”—and whose “cruelty” they take for granted, because they know him to be a “coward!”

We are far from maintaining that the time may not come, when, upon certain conditions, it may be necessary for Great Britain to acknowledge the *de facto* Government of Portugal; but we do maintain, that since the existence of that *de facto* Government owes its origin to the favour of Great Britain, it cannot be recognised without sullyng our fame, and degrading our character. Whenever, however, we do recognise Don Miguel, let us not be deceived into supposing, that we shall thereby regain our influence in Portugal. That prince still hates England, notwithstanding the partiality which her Government has shown towards him. He hates her, because he well knows that her free press will never cease to hold up his “heartless cruelty” and “incorrigible cowardice” to the scorn and abhorrence of mankind. While Miguel reigns as absolute king, British influence will never revive in Portugal; influence which, during a series of long and difficult transactions, spread over a period of upwards of four years, Mr. Canning had laboured so successfully to preserve, the present Government have lost in not quite as many months! The Tagus is no longer a friendly harbour

for a British squadron, and our transactions with Portugal are reduced to tame remonstrances for injuries, which, in no one instance, have been effectually redressed.

Were these, however, the only effects resulting from our policy towards our "oldest ally," we might, perhaps, submit in patience to endure them. But the evil, though commencing with Portugal, does not end there, and affects, most materially, our position towards the other Powers of the continent.

The world judged of Mr. Canning's sentiments by his political measures, and particularly by his treatment of Portugal. It was seen that his actions accorded with his professions, and England was beloved, because the genuine feelings of her leading minister were truly believed to be favourable to the just and regulated liberties of the people.

In like manner the sentiments of the present Government have been estimated by their conduct towards Portugal, the affairs of which country were those which first arrested the attention of the Duke of Wellington after the formation of this Government. We have already shown how those affairs were treated: that, notwithstanding the sacred rights of legitimate succession were arrayed on the side of the constitution, and on the other side there was only a "heartless," "incorrigible," and "cruel" usurper, with nothing to recommend him but a desire to act the tyrant, as absolute king, yet, on this polluted cause was bestowed the countenance and encouragement of Great Britain. The universal cry of foreign nations then was, that the British Government was hostile to freedom, and a new Holy Alliance was expected to grow up under its fostering protection. The con-

cessions to the Catholics (the test of liberalism in domestic policy) were not considered as any proof of liberality, but were looked upon rather as an expedient to retain power than as evidence of a real change of sentiment; while the opposition to Greek freedom, and the setting up of the Polignac administration in France, for which, whether justly or unjustly, our Government enjoys either the credit or the odium, are considered but additional proofs of its strong apostolical predilection.

This change in the character of our foreign policy has produced a corresponding change in the feelings of the continental nations,—an ill-omened alteration, which few people perceive, and of which fewer still understand the importance. It was Mr. Canning's policy to obtain for Great Britain the confidence and good-will of the people of other nations, not, however, by flattering their prejudices, or encouraging their discontent, but by showing a fixed determination to act with impartial justice towards them. While he was at the helm, there was not one of the European governments which dared to provoke the vengeance of England, because they well knew that war with England would be a measure too unpopular to hazard. Thus, Mr. Canning was enabled to hold language, and to carry measures in defiance of the principles and prejudices of some, and contrary to the wishes of the governments of all the great Continental Powers. By this means he obtained over these governments an influence which he employed not only to promote the interests of England, but the general prosperity of the world.

Alas! how different is our present position! Go to the North, and hear the terms of bitterness and contempt with

which England is assailed by the Russian Government, for our vacillation—by the Russian people, for our illiberality. Go to Germany, and you may listen in vain for the praises which the name of England used to call forth when Canning ruled her destinies. Turkey complains of being betrayed. Greece considers us her enemy. Cross the Channel, and you will find in France the feelings of ancient rivalry, which Mr. Canning's policy had well nigh extinguished, revived with almost incredible virulence. Sail to Portugal, and there you will see that we are hated by all parties, and trusted by none. While the thousands exiled from their homes, in consequence of our change of policy, imprecate curses on British perfidy, and serve as a warning to all, not to place reliance on British protection.

This universal consent of the people of the Continent to load this country with opprobrium, is a danger of no common magnitude.

“ There is no readier source of war than national ill-will,” wisely observes the Author of the pamphlet on which we have been commenting. Are not the great majority of the inhabitants of Europe friendly to liberal institutions? If so, can it be doubted that those who compose that majority must feel ill-will towards a country, whose ministers do not even attempt to disguise their leaning towards arbitrary power, since they openly avow, in the British Senate, their regret at the success at Terceira of the brave constitutionalists who feared not to confront all dangers, and to withstand usurpation and tyranny, in defence of a free constitution and a lawful sovereign. To justify this expression of regret, so uncongenial to British feelings, it is hinted, that the resis-

tance at Terceira, to Don Miguel, may endanger the peace of Europe; but let not the country be deceived. If the peace of Europe is broken, it will be because Great Britain has abdicated the "Umpire's" throne, and has converted herself into an "adversary" of constitutional freedom. It was because "the professors of violent doctrines on both sides" dreaded England's taking part against them that their mutual excesses were restrained. But now that Great Britain is ranged on the side of absolutism, the friends of liberal institutions, feeling that they know the worst, are preparing for action.

The conflict of principles, which Mr. Canning predicted, is on the eve of its commencement; the establishment of an apostolical Government in France has roused the passions of that people; they look not to measures, but to men; they argue, that even if liberal laws shall be proposed by the ministers, it will be only to enable them to consolidate their power, till the opportunity shall offer for effecting a counter-revolution. Distrusting the dispositions of their rulers, they feel that they have no safety but in victory. And if they become victorious, who can venture to predict, with their present feelings towards the Government of this country, how long it may be before we are driven into a war, by insults, or injuries, too offensive to be tolerated. And if we are so driven, where are we to look for allies? The British ministers have been too ready to abandon their professed principles, and have shown themselves too vacillating in their diplomatic transactions, to allow the absolute monarchies of the continent to place any reliance upon their consistency; and it is to be feared that Great Britain, instead of

being able to act the part of umpire, will serve but as the object of a common attack.

Let it not be supposed, that this commercial country can shut itself up within itself, and survey in tranquil security the struggles and commotions of its neighbours.

We have played too distinguished a part in latter times to be able to find a "refuge in littleness." If we do nothing to maintain our high character we shall speedily lose it, as well as what is far worse—the power of regaining it.

Let us not be deluded with the idea that our maritime preponderance does not excite the envy of other states. It is witnessed with the utmost jealousy,—and if we once let the world see that we prefer a base submission to vengeance of our own insults, while we evince a heartless disregard of the oppression and the wrongs inflicted on our adherents, we shall be valueless as an ally; and every petty state will follow the example of Don Miguel, in treating British subjects with injustice, and the remonstrances of their Government with contempt.

We cannot then withdraw from continental politics—the attempt, if long persevered in, would infallibly end in the ruin of our vital interests and the destruction of our commerce.

No one felt more entirely convinced of this than Mr. Canning; and therefore the leading object of his foreign policy was, to preserve the peace of the world, holding high the balance, and grasping, but not unsheathing the sword. It was for this end that he sought to place this country in the position of an umpire; in order that, by restraining the passions of both parties, he might prevent their dreaded

collision. He entirely succeeded in his endeavours, and at the period of his death, the bright aspect of the political horizon indicated no approaching storm.

Can any one look at that horizon now, and say that no threatening clouds are to be seen? Can any one now say that we are in as favourable a position to effect the dispersion of such clouds as we were when Mr. Canning died? Can any one assert that they are not of our own collecting?

———— “ I have heard,

“ And from men learned, that before the touch

“ (The common, coarser touch) of good, or ill,—

“ That oftentimes a subtler sense informs


“ Some spirits of the approach of ‘ things to be.’ ”

While Mr. Canning's expiring energies were exerting themselves, as they had so long been, in anxious toil for his country's welfare, and only a few hours before the perfect brightness of his mental faculties was obscured by the acuteness of his bodily sufferings, the last words which he uttered on political affairs, were these:—

“ I have laboured hard for the last few years to place the
 “ country in the high station which she now holds.—Two
 “ years of the Duke of Wellington's Government will undo
 “ all that I have done.”

The two years are now expired. Has the prophecy been falsified by the event?

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