

Awake!
U.S.A.

WILLIAM FREEMAN

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A W A K E ! U . S . A .

WILLIAM FREEMAN



AWAKE! U.S.A.

ARE WE IN DANGER?
ARE WE PREPARED?

By

WILLIAM FREEMAN

AUTHOR OF
"ARE WE PREPARED?" ETC., ETC.



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DEDICATION

Dedicated to every man and woman who is uplifted and inspired—not by the example of Peter who, as the cock crew, bought 'peace at the price of denying his Master'—but by the spirit and sacrifice of Saint Peter suffering martyrdom under Nero at Rome.

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PART ONE: ARE WE IN DANGER?

The appreciation and thanks of the author are due to the ranking officers in the United States Army and the ranking officers in the United States Navy who have kindly and carefully verified these statements regarding our unpreparedness.

PART ONE: ARE WE IN DANGER?

CHAPTER I

STARVING NATIONS

DOES not the home and family exist for the purpose of protecting and providing for the children?

And does not the nation and government exist for the protection and welfare of its citizens?

Just as a father will steal—even kill—to secure food for his starving children, so a nation will levy indemnities—even make war—to keep its people from industrial starvation.

There are three hungry nations in the world—and only three.

The three hungry nations are: Germany, Japan and Great Britain. They are significantly and remarkably alike in the density of their population, their lack of areal resources, and their needs of international revenue. Each is, from a commercial standpoint, an isolated empire. Great Britain and Japan are isolated by water, while Austria-Germany is completely surrounded by industrial enemies.

The people of Great Britain as well as the people of Germany and Japan are industrially hungry because they have not sufficient materials at home. For centuries their farmers have tilled the meagre soil and eaten the heart out of their lands; their miners have drilled into the earth and have taken away its treasures, the axes of their woodmen have sounded over the land and the virgin forests have vanished.

Their people are hungry for food; their factories are hungry for the raw products of the soil and the minerals of the earth; their ships are hungry for the trade of other nations; their banks are hungry for over-sea tolls. They must have nutriment for their people, materials for their factories, products to fill the holds of their merchant marines and international tolls to fill the coffers of their banks.

Great Britain is hungry, but Germany and Japan are starving—it is necessary to arrest this process of starvation or die.

They are hungry and starving not only for new areal resources, but they are hungry even for lands upon which their people may live. In Germany and Japan the average number of people living on each square mile is ten times the number in the United States and forty times the average in South America. Of the world powers, *Germany, Japan and Great Britain are the three most densely populated countries.*

Density of Population Number of People to Each Square Mile



When we think of a densely populated country our minds turn to China, yet the average number of people to each square mile in Germany is 250 per cent. more than the average number of people to each square mile in China; in Japan 230 per cent. more; in Great Britain 370 per cent. more; and in England alone 620 per cent. more.

Area data are taken from the "Century Atlas," 1914 edition, with exception of the data for Bulgaria and Servia, whose areas are given as they existed at the close of the Second Balkan War. Population data are taken from the "Century Atlas" (1914), from the "World Almanac" (1916), from "Statesman's Year Book" (1915), from "Government Reports of U. S. A.," from "Official Reports of European Governments," and from "Revue Statistique de l'Empire du Japon" (1915).

- (1) Population and area of Continental U. S.
- (2) Including Manchuria, Mongolia.
- (3) Not including Korea, Formosa.


When we think of a densely populated country, we think of China! Yet the number of people per square mile in Japan is 230% greater than in China; the number of people per square mile in Germany is 250% greater; in Great Britain, 370% greater, and in England alone, 620% greater.

Germany and Japan are the only densely populated countries in the world having no considerable colonial territory to which their citizens can migrate. Russia has immense territories to the East; she is not even as densely populated as the United States. All northern Africa—Tripoli, Algiers, Morocco—are open to the people of Italy, France and Spain. Norway and Sweden are not densely populated.

The German nationalities have lived upon their lands for more than ten centuries; the English have depleted English soil for a thousand years; the Japanese have been exhausting their lands for six thousand years.

In one respect Great Britain is essentially different from Germany and Japan. Great Britain has millions of square miles of colonial territory and for that reason has outside resources to draw from and outlying territories to which her people may migrate. Great Britain has millions of square miles of colonial territory and three hundred million colonial population. Great Britain has abundant areal resources in her colonial possessions. Great

Home Areal Resources



1. Areal resources of Continental United States only.

2. Reduced 27 per cent. to make allowance for lands uninhabitable and at present of little commercial value.

Britain has abundant trade with the people of her own colonies. There is little danger, therefore, that Great Britain would ever make war upon us for the purpose of acquiring our territory or securing our trade unless we seriously interfered with her trade with her own colonies.

There are two great storehouses of wealth—North and South America—eleven million square miles of land—grazing meadows, cereal lands, virgin forests, mineral riches—to supply the needs of this century.

These storehouses are filled with everything the starving nations need. The per capita areal resources of the United States alone are eleven times the per capita areal resources of Germany, Japan or Great Britain. Moreover, the areal resources of the three hungry nations have been worked over, dug out, depleted and exhausted for a thousand years.

And if the Americas refuse to allow themselves to be politely robbed by commercial dictation—then the starving nations will fight. They will attempt to compel the Americas by force of arms, if necessary, to give up the wealth of their storehouses—they will attempt by war to force the Americas to pay commercial tribute for generations to come.

They will do so because areal resources are essentially important as the basis of wealth. Banking wealth depends upon commerce; commerce

upon manufacturing; manufacturing upon the materials obtained from animals living upon the products of the land, from vegetation grown upon it, or from chemicals and minerals taken from it.

Individually labour is an equally important basis of wealth, but differences in the riches of different nations depend upon differences in the areal resources. The quality of labour does not vary greatly enough to vitally change national values. The German, the Englishman, the American, the Japanese labourer are each efficient—each has proved it by centuries of existence.

Are there storehouses other than the Americas?

Other lands may have been the storehouses of wealth in other centuries and still other lands may be the storehouses of wealth in centuries to come; but for the twentieth century, North and South America are and will be the areal resources of wealth of the world.

The comparison of the great areal resources of the Americas to those of Great Britain, Germany and Japan, as indicated by the chart—"Areal Resources at Home"—tells respectively but half the story of the differences in value.


Considering the density of population, the real value of areal resources to the hungry nations can be truly judged only by a comparison of their home areal resources *per person* with the "Home Areal Resources of *Each Inhabitant*" in the Americas.

HOME AREAL RESOURCES OF EACH INHABITANT

The true value of the areal wealth of a nation depends upon two factors; first, on whether or not it is largely virgin territory, unexhausted by having supported millions of people for hundreds of thousands of years; and, second, upon the number of people living upon the lands. The home areal resource of each inhabitant of Germany, Japan and Great Britain is infinitely small; first, because there are many millions of people living upon tiny bits of land; and, second, because the land in each case has been exhausted—its minerals mined, its forests cut, its soil depleted by a thousand years of occupancy.

On the other hand, we have just begun to open up the vast areal wealth of the United States; while that of Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia is much of it as yet untouched.

Home Areal Resources to Each Inhabitant.



THE GIGANTIC DEBT


April First, 1916

These figures of the debts of the nations at war indicate only the loans, war credits and treasury bills; they do not indicate the enormous loss of property, the gigantic financial loss due to interference with industries.

On the other hand, the national debts of the American nations indicate a proportionally greater burden than they should. They do not indicate the increasing prosperity, the increase in gold, the increasing international commerce, the increase of new industries, and the increase in ability to meet obligations.

It is seen that the combined debt of the nations at war is nearly 927 per cent. greater than the combined debt of all the American nations and nearly 1661 per cent. greater than the combined debt of all the neutral European nations.

Who Will Pay The Gigantic Debt



A. \$3,225,000,000 debts of U. S.

B. \$2,648,000,000, debt of all nations of Central and South America.

They have used up their natural wealth, yet they are hungry—they are starving! They must have food.

They must induce other nations to pay commercial tolls *or* failing in this, they must take commerce and resources by force of arms. Germany, Japan and Great Britain cannot pay out of their own wealth. Not only have they small natural resources but they are to-day burdened with debts out of all proportion to their national wealth.

Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and their allies were on April 1st, 1916, already burdened with war loans, war credits, etc., to the amount of \$21,435,470,000. The *war loans* and war debts of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey at that date were \$13,992,556,000. The war debts total \$35,428,026,000. This gigantic sum is the amount of the war loans, war credits and imperial treasury bills issued to carry on the war.

Moreover, the countries at war were heavily burdened with national debts *before* the war began. The combined pre-war debts of the nations engaged in the present conflict were, in 1913, \$24,903,817,000.

These combined with the *present* war debt make a grand total—an unimaginable sum—of \$60,335,843,000. This represents the debt of the nations at war at the present time; and *the war is not yet finished.*

And this present war debt of the nations at war is not only equal to the combined national debt of the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and all the other independent nations of North, Central and South America, but it is actually, at the present moment, 927% *greater*.

This combined debt of the nations at war is not only equal to all the debts of all neutral European nations but 1661% greater than all their national debts put together.

This gigantic combined debt, however, does not represent the industrial losses of the war nor represent the decrease in revenue that will be felt for many years after the war is closed.

Besides the enormous debt, Germany and Austria, if defeated, will find themselves cut off from billions of dollars of foreign trade; and England, if defeated, will be placed in a like position.

This war debt is so great that one can conceive of it only in comparison with other great sums.

We gasp at the past expenditures of our government; yet the sum total of every dollar spent by our government during the last 127 years for all its eleven wars; of all the moneys spent by our government for all the pensions that have ever been paid for *all* the wars from the War of the Revolution to the Philippine War; of all the money paid as interest on the national debt from the founding of the government to the present moment; of the

NATIONAL BURDEN OF DEBT TO WEALTH

A comparison of amounts of the debts of two nations is manifestly of little value.

The seriousness of the burden of each nation's debt depends, *first*, upon the relation of its debt to its wealth; second, upon the number of people laboring to pay off that debt.

This chart represents the national burden of debt to wealth.

Japan's national debt is \$1,260,000,000. The national debt of the United States is \$3,225,000,000. Japan's national wealth, however, is less than ten times its national debt. The wealth of the United States is *fifty-five* times its national debt.

The national debts of Great Britain and Germany include the pre-war debts and war debts up to April 1st, 1916.


PER CAPITA BURDEN OF NATIONAL DEBT TO NATIONAL WEALTH

The seriousness of the burden of each nation's debt depends, first, upon the relation of its debt to its wealth; *second*, upon the number of people laboring to pay off that debt.


This chart represents the burden of national debt that must be borne respectively by each person of the United States, Germany, Great Britain and Japan.

The national debts of Germany and Great Britain include the pre-war debts and the war debts up to April 1st, 1916.

**National Burden
of
Debt to Wealth**



**Per Capita Burden
of
National Debt to National Wealth**



money paid for the purchase of Louisiana, for the Gadsden purchase, for Alaska, for Florida, and for Texas; in the assumption of the public debt of Hawaii; for the purchase of perpetual right to the Panama Canal and even the building of the Panama Canal—in fact every dollar ever spent by our government from the time of its foundation to the present day for extraordinary purposes—has been but \$14,999,490,000. The present debt of the nations at war—and more than half of it has been added during the last twenty-one months—is not only equal to these enormous expenditures of ours, but 302% greater.

In this comparison we have included all the interest on the public debt of the United States for 127 years, while the figure representing the debt of the nations at war represents only the *principal existing at the present time*. The great portion of these war loans have been made at 4½%, 5% and 6%. Only one of them was at less than 4%. If, then, the nations at war should pay off this debt in 20 years—a feat absolutely impossible—the interest at 4%, added to the principal, would make a total of \$108,603,000,000.

Inasmuch as the pre-war debts of the nations at war were increasing even in prosperous peace times by leaps and bounds—with the exception of Great Britain—it is recognised that after this war it will be impossible for the nations to pay this debt even

in two generations. And by that time, even though the present bonds should be exchanged for others at lower rates of interest and all the other expenses of the government should be met year by year, the cost of the debt in two generations would rise to the enormous sum of \$156,871,000,000.

This is an overwhelming burden for Europe—a debt it can never pay out of its own wealth!

And the hungry nations! The debt of the three hungry nations—Germany, Japan and Great Britain—is to-day not only equal to the debt of all the American nations, but 311% greater; *it is 607% greater than all the debts of all neutral Europe!*

Moreover, the wealth areas of the three hungry nations is less than one-half of one million square miles, while the wealth areas of the American nations is more than eleven million square miles.

The combined population of Germany, Japan and Great Britain and Ireland is almost equal to that of all South America, of Central America and of the United States. But every hundred people of the three hungry nations are burdened on an average with a national debt mortgage of \$14,816, while every hundred people of the American nations are burdened on an average with but \$3,300. Moreover, the national debt mortgage of the three hungry nations on each square mile of their lands is \$50,314, while the average national debt mortgage

The Overwhelming Burden

Interest Must Also Be Paid

\$60,335,000,000
Debts of
Nations at War (1)
April 1, 1916

\$108,603,000,000
Debts
with Interest
4% - 20 years (2)

1. Pre-war debts, war debts, loans and treasury bills issued to carry on the war.

2. The debt of the nations at war, with interest at 4 per cent. Interest at 4 per cent. is a low estimate. All loans have been made at 4, 5 and 6 per cent., with the exception of one loan—Great Britain's first one.

The Overwhelming Burden

Interest Must Also Be Paid

\$ 156,871,000,000
Debt
with Interest
4% - 40 yrs.

\$ 48,265,000,000 (1)
Interest alone
each 20 years
at 4%

\$ 3,600,000,000
Great Britain's Debt
before the War-(2)

1. The interest per generation is 835 per cent. greater than the entire combined debts of Germany, Japan and Great Britain before the war.

2. This was considered so large before the war that statesmen never expected Great Britain to pay the principal in full.

National Debt Mortgage on Each 100 People

\$14,816 - Germany, Japan and Gr. Britain,



\$3318 - American Nations



The governments of Germany, Japan and Great Britain have placed an *average mortgage* of \$148 on each individual—every man, woman or child; while each man, woman or child of the American nations is burdened with an average governmental debt of but \$33.

The average national debt mortgage of Germany, Japan and Great Britain to each man, woman or child is 348 per cent. greater than that of the American nations.

National Debt Mortgage on Each Square Mile

*\$ 50,314-Germany, Japan
and Gr Britain*

\$525-American Nations

The governments of Germany, Japan and Great Britain have burdened *every acre* of their home lands with an average *debt mortgage* of *78 dollars*.

Each acre of the lands of the American nations is burdened with a national debt mortgage of but *82 cents*.

The average national debt mortgage of Germany, Japan and Great Britain on every square mile of their home lands is *9,485 per cent. greater* than that of the American nations.

of the American nations on each square mile of their lands is but \$525.

Germany may have some portions of central and southern Africa and Japan will have China from which to draw revenue after the war. These countries offer wonderful possibilities for the century to come. They would offer great possibilities for the present, *if* Germany and Japan should have billions of dollars of cash at the close of the war to develop them, build railways, colonise and wait two or three generations for the profits from such enterprises.

But burdened by a debt 607% greater than all the combined debts of all neutral Europe, can they wait a generation for the results?

Can Germany and Japan, especially, turn for ready cash at the close of the present struggle to the other nations at war? Austria in proportion to her wealth will be more heavily burdened than Germany. France even before the war had the largest national debt in the world. It will take a generation for Russia to readjust her finances. In fact, the combined debt of the nations at war, excepting Germany, Japan and Great Britain, is already 149% of the combined debt of Germany, Japan and Great Britain. The three hungry nations cannot turn to other nations now at war for the payment of immediate indemnities.

And evidently no group of the warring European

WHO WILL HAVE THE WEALTH TO PAY THE DEBT?


We gasp at the burden the nations at war have piled up for themselves—billions and billions of dollars of debt. We know they cannot pay it out of their own areal resources. We realize that the wealth free from debt of all neutral European nations is less per million people than that of the nations at war, burdened as they are with great debts.

Before the war England, Germany and Japan might have turned to Africa and China, even though billions of free wealth are required to develop those countries. After the war, however, they will not have the billions of wealth free for investment.

The American nations are the only ones that have *developed wealth immediately available*. Their per capita wealth free from national debt is 304 per cent. of the free per capita wealth of the nations at war, 323 per cent. of the free per capita wealth of the European nations, 2866 per cent. of the free per capita wealth of China.


Who Will Have The Wealth Necessary To Pay The Debt

*National Wealth free
from
National Debt
April 1, 1916
per 1,000,000 people.*



Who Will Have Land To Yield The Wealth

*National Areal Resources
per 1,000,000 people*



nations, even though emerging from the present war successfully, can secure indemnities or find sufficient wealth in neutral European nations to save themselves.

But the treasure nations of the world—having areal riches of 23 units compared to the 1 unit of the hungry nations—are burdened with a debt only 24% of that of the three hungry nations.

Our North and South American home areal resources are 2,200% greater than the home areal resources of the three hungry nations and our North and South American debts are but one-fourth of their debts. And North and South America are the only portions of all the *lightly* burdened treasure lands that are sufficiently developed to be able to furnish international revenue to the hungry nations without the expenditure of billions of dollars.

Can any sane man doubt that the hungry nations—burdened with this debt, living on depleted lands exhausted of their natural resources, supporting the densest populations in the world—will not come to the Americas, the unprotected storehouses of wealth of the Twentieth Century?

Germany, Japan or Great Britain will not—either separate or combined—make an attack upon us because of mere desire to make war. Each German, Japanese or English family is just as adverse to losing its sons and father on the battlefield as is the American family. The governments of Ger-

many and Japan will not attack us because of hatred or because of viciousness but because of absolute necessity. If they come they will come because economic conditions force them to take our treasures in order to keep their people from industrial starvation.


We should not blame them!

We, under similar conditions, would probably go to other nations just as Germany and Japan must come to us.


Because of the commerce of the Americans who had settled in Texas previous to 1846, we supported their declaration of independence and took Texas from Mexico; because of the commercial interests of the American sugar planters who had established themselves in Hawaii we supported their revolution, dethroned the native queen, and annexed the Hawaiian Islands.

It is useless to villify the intentions of Germany and Japan; it will be useless to villify Great Britain if she should later deem it necessary to take means to extend her commerce; but it is wise to prepare for attack if we desire to maintain our commercial independence, especially as the combined debt of these three hungry nations is 245% *of the combined debts of all the neutral nations of the world.*

Who Will Be Able To Pay




The Answer

 *Debts, April 1, 1916*

 *Land Wealth
Areal Resources*

*All Neutral Nations of the World
Excepting Liberia, Persia and Siam*



CHAPTER II

WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US

SUPERFICIAL students of economics talk and write of the great prosperity in Germany. It is true that Germany has no idle class, that practically every man is busy, that every factory is humming, that every railway is burdened with products being shipped from the factories to the seaports, and that every port is a bee-hive where the loading and shipping of the "made in Germany" products go on night and day.

"But it is a false prosperity, based upon a forced system of taxation and an increasing national debt, growing by gigantic additions year by year even during peace times. These conditions cannot continue many months longer. No other nation in Europe is so near bankruptcy. Every known method of taxation has been tried by Germany with the single exception of the capital tax, and the Imperial Government must soon impose that also; and after that,—the deluge for Europe!

"I warn you, to-night, that Germany cannot continue two years longer without an industrial reaction. To save herself from such a reaction she

will seek war with some neighbouring power, hoping thereby to gain a big indemnity sufficient to tide her over the industrial crisis which she is now facing." ¹

Germany was on the point of bankruptcy previous to the war. From 1880 to 1910, the per cent. of increase in the cost of living and in expenditures for the army and for the navy was so much greater than the per cent. of increase in wages that Germany could not have continued another five years without an industrial revolution.

During the thirty years indicated, the *increase* in the imperial debt was 1,223%; in naval expenditures was 1,054%, the *increase* in army expenditures, 127%; the increase in the cost of living 109%, greater than that of any other European nation, excepting Austria-Hungary. But wages in Germany during this thirty years had increased only 31%.

Germany, then, previous to the outbreak of the European war, was financially in a worse condition than even England. The average increase for the four great expenditures for the thirty years was 628%. The increase of wages, out of which this was ultimately to be paid, was but 31%.

Not only was Germany on the point of *industrial* bankruptcy before the war; but, even with all the heavy taxation year after year, Germany was approaching *financial* ruin.

INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF GERMANY
FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR,
1880—1910

The industrial prosperity of Germany during the last forty years has been a paper prosperity.

The increase from 1880 to 1910 of the imperial debt was 1223 per cent., the increase in the expense of the navy was 1054 per cent., of the army, 127 per cent., of the cost of living, 109 per cent.; while the increase in wages was but 31 per cent.

Year by year the three great governmental expenses and the one great individual expense—cost of living—increased out of all proportion to the increase in earning income.

Increases in public expenditures can only be met by increased loans which must some day be paid, increased taxation, or by indemnities levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest.

The prospect was industrial bankruptcy.

The data of the increases in the expenses of the navy and of the army are taken from official reports of the German Imperial Government and from the "Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and 1910.

The data on the increase in the cost of living and the increase of wages are taken from various German writers on political economy and sociology, from "Bliss' Encyclopædia of Social Reform" and from information obtained from the British Museum, the British Institute of Social Science and the Musée Social de France.

Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their living.

The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor decrease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the average increase of all types of labour.

Increasing Industrial Bankruptcy of Germany For Thirty Years Before the War 1880-1910

*1223 % Increase
Imperial Debt*

*1054 % Increase
Naval Expense*

*127 % Increase
Army Expense*

*109 % Increase
Cost of Living*


*31 % Increase
of Wages*

Germany had been at peace for forty years. In peace times nations attempt to reduce the national debts that have accumulated in times of stress and war. Not so with Germany. Her seeming industrial and financial progress was so false that, notwithstanding the colossal taxes she imposed upon her people, Germany's national debt increased year by year by gigantic sums. The average increase in national debt *each year* from 1875 to 1880 was \$17,010,000; the *increase each year* from 1880 to 1890 was \$30,861,000; each year from 1900 to 1908 was \$69,741,000; and the *increase* including—as stated in the Reichstag by the Imperial Treasurer—the deficits to be covered by additional loans was \$148,074,480 *each year* from 1908 to 1913.

The debt of the German Empire previous to the beginning of the war was given as a little more than one billion dollars. The *one-billion-dollar* debt, however, was the indebtedness of the Imperial Government *alone*. It was kept separate from and did not include the debt of Bavaria. The Bavarian debt was listed separately because of her separate army. But as her army is an integral part of the German Imperial armies, a portion of her debt should be included in the actual debt of the Empire. However, in all statements and comparisons given in the work, only the amount of the Imperial debt is employed, unless otherwise stated.

The emptiness of Germany's prosperity during

Yearly Increasing Increases of Debt of Germany 1



Not only has the debt of Germany increased every year of each period as shown, but there has been a great increase of the increase.

(1) The data for the years from 1875 to 1908 are taken from the official reports of the German Empire and from the Annual Registers for the years from 1875 to 1908.

(2) Including the loans necessary to cover the increasing deficits,—as reported on the floor of the Reichstag by the Imperial Treasurer.

INCREASE OF NATIONAL DEBT
GERMANY AND U. S. 1880—1914

The two nations of the world that were renowned for remarkable commercial and industrial prosperity from 1880 to 1910 are Germany and the United States.

Germany was at peace during all those thirty-four years and a real prosperity should have shown on the national balance sheets.

The United States during that period was engaged in two wars—the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War, costing the United States more than 538 millions of dollars. Yet the increase in our national debt during those 34 years was but 37 per cent., while that of Germany was 1408 per cent.

Increase of National Debt Germany and U.S.A. 1880-1914

Germany 1
1408 %

U.S. ← *37 %*

the 33 years of peace, 1880 to 1913, is best indicated by the fact that, notwithstanding her heavy taxation, the imperial debt alone in 1913 was 1,408% greater than it was in 1880. The significance of this is overwhelming, when one compares it with the increase of the national debt of the United States, the other great nation of the world that has been commercially prosperous during this same period of thirty-three years—1880 to 1913. Notwithstanding the fact that the United States carried on a most expensive though short war with Spain, built the Panama Canal at a cost of hundreds of millions, and pacified and redeemed Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines at a great additional expense, *our national debt increased but 37% for the same period* during which Germany's increased 1,408%.

But even this comparison does not tell the entire truth, because a nation's ability to pay its debts depends upon the areal resources, its wealth and the number of people working to pay off that debt. Germany's areal resources were but one-fifteenth our areal resources, Germany's wealth but one-half our wealth. Consequently Germany had during those thirty years infinitely smaller resources to pay her debt.

The more just comparison is obtained by comparing the increases of the per capita national debt of Germany with the changes in the per capita na-

tional debt of the United States. From 1880 to 1910 the per capita national debt of Germany increased 4,400%, our per capita national debt *decreased* 73%.

And now there is the addition of the war debt. Germany's war debt for the first twenty-one months of the war is \$9,817,560,000. She now has a debt—pre-war and war—of \$11,011,560,000.

Germany has lived on her foreign commerce and must have immediate money at the close of the war, whether she emerges from it successful or unsuccessful.


Even if successful, Germany cannot *immediately collect billions of cash indemnity for her immediate needs*, either from England, or France, or Russia, because—*they will not have it*.

Germany has lost and will not be able to regain for some years the greater portion of her trade with Russia, with England and with the British colonies even if she emerges successful from the war. She has also lost a considerable portion of her trade with the United States and will not be able to regain all of it. Factories have already been established here, and many of the products previously imported from Germany will in the future be made within our own country.

Even if she is victorious she cannot regain all of her foreign trade within three years. Her own international merchants have judged that it will

Increase of Germany's Debt per capita 1877-1913

*During same period
U.S. per capita Debt
Decreased 73%*



National Debts Per Capita 1880-1910

Increase per capita
Germany 4,400 %

Japan 227 % →

Decrease per capita
U.S. — 46 %
Gr. Britain — 40 %

take three years to regain even seventy per cent. of it.

As her foreign markets will not be immediately re-established at the close of the war, Germany, even if successful, will have six million men out of work, with nothing to do. Before the war these were employed in factories making goods for foreign trade.

Four million men are now in the army; two million additional men are in training camps and two million more are employed in the factories manufacturing war material.

Women, as before, are in the fields and have proved themselves capable of conducting the agricultural life of Germany without the aid of the eight million men now in the army, in the training camps and in the war factories.

With war over, at least three million of the four million under arms will be discharged.

With war over, there will be no further need of manufacturing products of war and two million men in war factories will be out of employment.

With her foreign trade cut off and at least seventy per cent. of her foreign buyers, not only unwilling but unable to purchase from her, the factories will be unable to reopen for months, except under governmental management.

This governmental supervision of factories in Germany would require enormous capital. They

would have to be kept running at least one or two years before Germany's foreign trade, according to her own commercial experts, could be re-established on the old basis. Even to accomplish this, Germany would have to flood foreign markets with quantities of goods at cheap prices.

This would be more expensive to the German Government than war. At present Germany is manufacturing and consuming her own war materials; consequently the government is paying the government for the products produced. Moreover, the men now employed in battle line—over four million of them—consuming the war products of the factories—are costing Germany not more than \$.25 to \$.50 a day, but in peace times the government would have to pay these men working in factories from \$1.50 to \$2.00 a day. The difference for four millions of men is enormous. Such industrial governmental operation after the war, during the first year at least, would require infinitely more money than a year of war itself.

This governmental nationalisation of factories might be attempted if Germany should have at the close of the war a billion or more in clear cash. But impoverished by the war—without the billion in cash, with at least six million *out of work*—what would happen in Germany?

Nothing could prevent an industrial revolution except another war with the certainty of a big in-

demnity; and the Imperial German Government would prefer another war rather than run the risk of revolution—no matter against whom it might be necessary to wage war.

It is well known among diplomats that Germany has in her secret archives of the Wilhelmstrasse exact charts showing that one-third of our national wealth is located within one hundred miles of the Atlantic seaboard; and Germany has long been envious of American wealth and American commerce.

Prince Radziwill, a former German Ambassador at Paris, said on February 26, 1899: "There is another country against which the continental powers should indeed come to an understanding for the organization of their economic defence. There is the United States, whose pretensions and riches are becoming a danger to us all."

Germany already believes that if we had not supplied the Allies, and England in particular, with enormous quantities of artillery and ammunition, the war would now be over and she would now be victorious.

Germany and Austria both consider that the United States is virtually fighting against them by furnishing money and supplies to the Allies. High officials in Germany have publicly stated that any neutral country which turns itself into an arsenal to supply guns, military stores, or food even, to

the enemies of Germany is in "*active participation*" against her.

Germany believes that such successes as the Allies have had is due, and that whatever successes they may have in the future will be due, to the credit and the ammunitions we have supplied them. The Crown Prince has publicly stated that America is "*already the enemy of Germany*" for having allied herself with the enemies of Germany by providing them with the necessities of war.

But still more, the Imperial Government at Berlin by an official statement of its General Staff notified the world, October 4, 1915, that it considered the United States as its enemy—the ally of Great Britain and France. The statement refers to the successes of the Allies on the western front "*due*" to the help of the munition factories of the whole world, "*including the United States.*" This notification to the world by a statement of the General Staff that the successes of Germany's enemies are *due* to the *help* furnished by the United States is especially significant, being issued, as it was, only twenty-four hours before Count von Bernsdorf made his personal disavowal of the *Arabic* sinking.

If Germany is defeated, it will be most easy for the German mind to conceive that the defeat was due to the ammunition and money which we supplied to Great Britain and France. And what would be more natural than that she should con-

ceive the idea that we, who helped to defeat her, should be also compelled to help put her on her feet again?

But Germany has another excuse for seeking a decisive conflict with the United States. That is the Monroe Doctrine. Germany is fighting at present to establish a so-called freedom of the seas. And for what purpose? So that Germany may extend her colonisation and her trade wherever she wishes without interference from the navies of other powers. No other nation in Europe is in such need of expansion. The English do not breed rapidly; neither do the French. The Russians have immense areas which can yet be utilized, extending from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the Black Sea. But Germany has no room; she has but two hundred thousand square miles for nearly seventy millions of people. While South America has three thousand four hundred per cent. more land and not half as many people.

*“But what we do want and will have is the Argentine. Had you (the English) not given your moral support to the Monroe Doctrine and stood between us and our goal in South America, we should only have required half our fleet to have laughed at the American nation and their dog-in-the-manger policy.”*²

Germany has determined that she must have South America for her rapidly breeding people.

Her population has increased almost beyond belief. In 1870, Germany had a population of but 41,000,000; in 1910, only forty years later, it was 65,000,000, in spite of the fact that hundreds of thousands had gone to the United States, to Canada, to South America, to Africa, to Australia, to Russia and to France.

But the English navy and the Monroe Doctrine have stood in Germany's path to South America.

"England once out of the way, South America will be ours, to be colonised by our flesh and blood, who now have to go under other flags." ³

First to get England out of the way, then to overthrow the Monroe Doctrine! Hence the present war is an "*advance step*" just as *Von Bulow* declared it would be, in bringing about "new political formations," especially on the "*American side of the water.*"

The Imperial Chancellor stated in the Reichstag, when speaking of unrest in Germany and the desire for "*oversea activity,*" on November 10, 1912: "At the root of this feeling is the determination of Germany to make its strength and capability prevail in the *world.*"

Germany has never admitted the right of the American nation to promulgate or uphold the Monroe Doctrine. She has taken every occasion to violate it. At Manila she tried to force her battle-ships into the bay in order that she, as well as the

**WHAT GERMANY WOULD GAIN IN AREAL RESOURCES
FOR COMMERCE**

This depends upon the condition that Germany is victorious in the present war; or that Germany shall make terms of peace with Great Britain such that Germany shall be free to pursue such a policy without interference—a not improbable result in case of deadlock in the great European struggle.


If Germany should for commercial and naval reasons bring about a war with the United States and defeat us in that war, the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine would have to be abandoned by us.

In consequence Germany's millions of people would be free to colonise and cement their control over Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, eastern Colombia, eastern Mexico, eastern Central America and to obtain restrictive commercial control of the international commerce of the United States.

Moreover, Germany would gain in conjunction with Japan actual control of the Panama Canal.

This would give Germany not only the coveted naval bases in the western hemisphere, but the commercial control of the untold wealth of 9,975,000 square miles of virgin and undepleted territory. This is 4480 per cent. greater than that which Germany has at present—a prospective gain worth fighting for.

What Germany Would Gain in Areal Resources for Commerce



United States, might have a claim upon the territory of the Philippines.

Germany hoisted her flag over the custom houses in Venezuela after she had promised not to do so. President Roosevelt mobilized our fleet, England and Italy acquiesced in our demand and the German flag came down.

Even as late as 1912, Germany attempted to secure a naval station on the coast of Colombia at the very door of the Panama Canal.

We may be sure, then, that if Germany comes out of this war victorious, she will not be as considerate of our Monroe Doctrine as she has been in the past.

Germany will be burdened by an enormous debt. She will have need of immediate resources; she will not be able to regain her foreign trade quickly even if successful in this war; her factories will be idle; she will face an industrial revolution, and another foreign war against the nation that aided her enemies will divert the populace and promise a great indemnity of twenty billions of dollars, opening the pathway at the same time to Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia, the combined areal resources of which are more than three thousand per cent. greater than Germany has at present.

And what would Germany gain by a successful attack upon us? First: areal resources in Central America and Colombia, fifty per cent. greater than

all her home areal resources; areal resources in Mexico two hundred per cent. greater; in Venezuela, two hundred per cent.; in Bolivia, three hundred per cent.; in Argentina, six hundred per cent.; in Brazil, 1,500 per cent! Second: the control of the Panama Canal. Third: the Mexican oil fields.

Something worth fighting for!

"We must *at all costs* hope for the formation in southern Brazil, of a state with twenty or thirty million Germans." ⁴

"How unreasonable it is to expect that the combined nations of Europe, with all their military strength, shall remain restricted to one-twelfth of this world's land, burrowed into and hewn over for the last thousand years, while this Republic, without armies, shall maintain dominion over one-half of the unexploited lands of the world!" ⁵

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 41. From address of M. Brown-Landone, given at Sorbonne, Paris, December 18, 1913.

² Page 56. Hildegard von Hilton, from letter to the English from the Palais Augustenberg, June, 1912.

³ Page 57. From an official report of a German Consul in Brazil.

⁴ Page 61. Schmöller, prominent German political writer.

⁵ Page 61. General Homer Lee, in "The Valor of Ignorance."

CHAPTER III

WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US

AND Japan! Putting aside the "agitation of jingoes," is there any real cause for serious concern as to probable trouble with the rising power in the Far East?

There are but three over-populated isolated nations in the world, each of which must control world commerce on its portion of the globe or go down in bankruptcy. Japan is one of them.

The conditions which exist, and which have existed in Japan during the last thirty years, are now culminating financially and industrially.

Japan finds herself commercially and financially in exactly the same condition as Germany. During the thirty years from 1880 to 1910, Japan's naval expenditure in 1910 was 2,292 per cent. greater than it was in 1880; her increase in army expenditures, 933 per cent.; her increase in the Imperial debt, 519 per cent.; and the increase in the cost of living, 87 per cent.

The average increase of the four great expenditures during the thirty years was 957 per cent.; while the increase in wages was but 28 per cent.

While income and business taxes are very much higher in Japan than in any other country, the entire revenue yielded from both income and business taxation is but one-tenth of the national revenue of Japan. Therefore the people out of their wages have paid, or ultimately must pay—either by direct taxation, by higher cost of living, or by lessened wages due to business taxation—90 per cent. of the enormous sums that have been spent on the army and the navy during the last 35 years.

This drain upon the Japanese people cannot go on forever.

Moreover, Japan was burdened before the war by a debt which in proportion to her national wealth was greater than that of any other world-power in Europe, Asia or America. A nation's debt can be paid by the combined use of her wealth and the labour of her citizens, by the opening up of undeveloped resources, by the acquisition of international trade; by the levying of indemnities upon other nations.

In proportion to her area and her wealth, Japan has an enormous population. The labour wealth of her people is of phenomenal value; but labour must have capital and resources to produce the surplus wealth with which to pay a nation's debt.

Japan's national debt in proportion to her population is small. From the labour standpoint, Japan's burden of national debt is much less than

INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF JAPAN
FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR
1880—1910

The increase in the expense of the navy was 2292 per cent. and of the army 993 per cent.; the increase of the Imperial debt was 519 per cent. and of the cost of living, 87 per cent.; while the increase in wages was but 28 per cent.

Year by year the three great governmental expenses and the one great individual expense, the cost of living, had increased out of all proportion to the increase in earned income.

Increases in public expenditures can only be met by increased loans which must some day be paid, increased taxation, or by indemnities levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest.

The prospect was industrial bankruptcy.

The data of the increases in the expenses of the navy and of the army are taken from the "Revue Statistique de l'Empire du Japon" and from the "Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and 1910.

The data of the increase in the cost of living and the increase of wages are taken from "Bliss' Encyclopædia of Social Reform" and from information obtained from the British Museum, the British Institute of Social Science, and the Musée Social de France.

Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life, but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their living.

The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor decrease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the average increase of all types of labour.

Increasing Industrial Bankruptcy of Japan For Thirty Years Before the War 1880-1910

*2292 % Increase
Naval Expense*

*993 % Increase
Army Expense*

*519 % Increase
Imperial Debt*

87 % Cost of Living

28 % Increase of Wages

ours. Our per capita national debt is \$32, while that of Japan is \$23.


There has been much discussion lately and much difference of opinion as to the solvency of Japan. But in all the newspaper and magazine discussion there has been no comprehensive summing up of all the factors that make for national wealth, that make for solvency. Comparing the wealth of the two countries in billions of dollars leads to wrong conceptions. A comparison of the per capita burden of wealth also leads to wrong conceptions. To arrive at any just comparison of the condition of Japan with that of any other country, all the elements of labour, national wealth, national debt, population and resources from which to draw wealth must be considered. Labour is useless without capital, capital and labour are useless without materials to work with; capital and labour and materials are of little commercial value with no markets for the products.

If we consider both our population and our wealth in relation to our national debt and compare the result to the population and wealth of Japan in relation to her national debt, we find that Japan has a burden 800 per cent. greater than the one we bear.


The labour of Japan's fifty-five million people could easily solve Japan's financial problem *if* they had a sufficient surplus of natural resources and

Japan and Four States of U.S.A.

Wealth



Population



The four states chosen are New York, a wealthy and populous state; Pennsylvania, a manufacturing and mining state of comparatively extensive area; Ohio, a manufacturing and farming state not densely populated; and West Virginia, a state noted neither for its dense population nor for its wealth.

A comparison is here made between these four states and Japan.

The area of the four states is equal to that of Japan.

These four states have thirty billions of wealth with which to pay their labourers and to invest in their industries; Japan has but ten.

These four states have but twenty-three millions of people that must be fed, clothed and housed, with wealth of thirty billions.

Japan has, on the same area, fifty-five million people, whose food, clothing and shelter must come out of the profits of ten billions of wealth.

sufficient wealth. While Japan lacks these, the United States as well as other countries of North and South America have limitless undeveloped areal wealth.

The mortgage burden of the national debt of Japan averages \$8,780 for every square mile of territory, while our national debt burdens each square mile with a mortgage averaging but \$1,065.

Not only is Japan's burden of national debt per square mile of territory very much greater than ours, but her national debt to each million of revenue is greater. Each million of our revenue must pay the interest and a portion of the principal of \$3,086,000; each million of Japanese revenue must pay the interest and a portion of the principal of \$4,443,000.

Every billion of the wealth of the United States is mortgaged by but \$17,172,000; every billion of Japan's wealth is mortgaged by a debt of \$126,700,000.

Our free national wealth gives us \$610,000,000 for the development and cultivation of every ten thousand square miles; the national wealth of Japan free from debt gives her people but \$541,000,000 per ten thousand square miles.

Each million Japanese people have but \$158,000,000 capital freed of all national debt; each million Americans have \$1,840,000,000 freed of all national debt.

Every half million of our people have almost a million dollars' worth of capital with which they can work to produce other wealth. Every half million Japanese have but one-twelfth that amount.

Instead of 527,000 people to every billion of wealth, Japan has 6,395,000 people.

Moreover, each million of our people have an average of 320,000 square miles from which to draw their riches, while each million of the Japanese have but 290 square miles.

From all this, it is evident Japan lacks everything except labour. And her labour is useless unless she has more capital, more lands, more undeveloped resources. Not only is labour useless without wealth and resources but millions of people without sufficient natural resources, without sufficient capital, with increasing debt, increasing taxes, increasing cost of living are a source of serious danger.

Japan—with her fifty-five millions of people, crowded upon islands not twice the size of Oregon, possessing wealth of but ten billion dollars, with a debt of \$1,267,000,000—must, to avoid national bankruptcy, draw her revenue from foreign commerce or save herself by levying indemnities on other nations.

Japan must have new lands, undeveloped resources and international commerce.

But new lands and natural resources alone are

not sufficient for Japan. They would be for a nation with an enormous amount of capital to invest. Japan has only surplus labour. Consequently China, which may become a great source of wealth to Japan in another hundred years, is not now able to furnish Japan the revenue she needs at present. Japan must have international commerce. But even ships are not enough for international commerce. There must be in the foreign countries well organised systems of transportation to handle the products Japan exports to them, and thousands of miles of railroad to bring the products of the foreign lands to the ports at which Japanese ships call.

China to each million people has but 13 miles of railway, the United States to each million of its population has 2,460 miles.

China has but 1,290 miles of railways to transport the products of each million square miles of area. The United States has, for the transportation of the products of each million square miles of area, 80,400 miles of railways.

The Japanese would be quite satisfied with China, *if* China had wealth, developed industry and transportation systems comparable with the wealth, industry and railroad systems of the United States. Japan is looking to China for the future—but for the more distant future. For the present and immediate future she must look to the United States.

We alone can meet the present needs—wealth, land and commercial revenue.

To acquire, maintain and increase a nation's commerce, and to prevent other nations from destroying that commerce, a nation must have control of the seas its merchantmen traverse. For these reasons Japan has definitely planned to make herself the England of the Pacific. She has definitely planned to commercially control, and if need be politically control, the lands capable of yielding her the greatest income.

Japan has already established herself in Korea and has assumed control of eastern Manchuria. As she extends her influence over China, she will, little by little, close the ports of China to our trade. This will not be done by open declaration but by practical direction and the operation of her navy until the trade of the four hundred million people passes through her hands. When Manchuria passed under the influence of Japan the "open door" was banged shut and locked and our twenty-million-dollar cotton trade with that province was at once cut off. If we expect to maintain an open door in China we will have to fight for it.

To protect her commercial control of the Pacific she has developed in twenty years a navy second only to the navies of Great Britain, Germany and France. She needs coaling stations for her ships. She has already secured concessions on the west

coast of Mexico within easy distance of the Panama Canal; she is now rapidly fortifying the Marshall Islands, two thousand miles nearer our shores than the Philippines.

She has initiated a Monroe Doctrine for Asia and for the Pacific.

An important Japanese diplomat said a few years ago to one of our patriotic American Lord Roberts—Hudson Maxim—"Mr. Maxim, you have a Monroe Doctrine, America for the Americans; we also have a similar doctrine, Asia for the Asiatics, but we are not ready to enforce ours yet; and you are not ready and are not likely to be ready to enforce yours. A little later, we shall inquire by what logic you can proclaim America for the Americans, and disclaim our right equally to proclaim Asia for the Asiatics."

Prominent Japanese, men in power, have definitely indicated that they intend to seize Alaska, as well as Hawaii and the Philippines, for Japan needs lands as well as commerce and naval bases. Japan has a population equal to one-half of our population. They are crowded on islands which, all together, are not twice the size of Oregon alone. At present each Japanese citizen has an areal resource but one-third of one per cent. of a square mile and this land has been depleted and exhausted by eight thousand years of use. Alaska is about three times as large as Japan. After fifty years of

ownership, we have a population there of but 65,000; yet in ten years, Japan has sent 100,000 Japanese to our coast states, a quarter million to Mexico and thousands to the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands.

“The earth of California is so rich that we, in our thrifty way, can make immense money there. The air is salubrious, and the cost of living so small that we can in twenty-five years defy the rest of the United States.”¹

The war for the trade of Asia, western Mexico and western South America and the war for the control of the Panama and the Pacific must be fought; China in 1895, Russia in 1905, America in 1915 was the plan outlined by the late emperor. The war must be fought! The financial and commercial need is too great, the certainty of success too sure and the prize to be obtained too rich to waver or change.

Japan now commercially controls less than one-third of a million square miles of area resources; if successful in a war with the United States, she would be able to draw commercial revenue from three million six hundred thousand square miles.

If Japan wins, she will in conjunction with England or Germany not only control the Panama Canal, but she will have command of areal resources of Alaska, of all the Pacific Coast, of western Mexico, of Peru, of Ecuador and of Chile, as well as

possession of the Philippines, Guam and the Hawaiian Islands.

If Japan succeeds in making herself master of the Pacific as England has made herself master of the Atlantic, Japan will commercially control areal resources 1,800 per cent. larger than her present home resources.


Japan is a powerful nation with a navy more modern than ours and an army fifty times as great as the army of the United States with additional millions of other trained men in reserve.

“No prouder nation exists on the face of the earth, no nation which has more venerable traditions of which it justly has the right to be proud. Their courtesy and tact in dealing with foreign nations lose nothing by comparison with France.”²

We have signed and ratified an international treaty with Japan, guaranteeing her citizens certain rights in the United States. In accordance with the expressed statement of our United States Constitution, and second only to it, our ratified treaties are the supreme laws of the nation and the United States. We have broken our treaties, insulted Japan by doing so; and we offer no apology.

Not only have we broken faith with Japan as a nation, but we insult her citizens individually. We have treated them and continue to treat them worse than we treat Koreans, Mexicans, Chinamen and negroes. An American Y. M. C. A. (a brother-

What Japan Would Gain in Areal Resources for Commerce



If Japan should for commercial reasons bring about a war with the United States and defeat us in that war, the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine would have to be abandoned by us.

In consequence, Japan's millions of people would be free to colonise and cement their control over Alaska, California, Oregon, Washington, western Colombia, western Central America, western Mexico, Philippines, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and to retain restrictive control of the international commerce of the United States.

Moreover, Japan would gain, in conjunction with England, actual control of the Panama Canal.

This would give Japan not only the coveted naval bases near the Panama Canal, but commercial control of the untold wealth of 2,895,000 square miles of virgin and undepleted territory. This territory is 1700 per cent. greater than that which Japan has at present—a prospective gain worth fighting for.

hood without restriction as to creed or race) admits Koreans and Chinamen but refuses membership to Japanese. When their navy visited our shores, they invited our naval officers to a ball and showed them every courtesy; our citizens in return invited their officers to a function in their honour but our women refused to dance with the admirals and aristocrats of the oldest and most dignified race in the world.

Japan is an old nation, a proud nation, with an unbroken imperial family six thousand years old; it is an oriental nation that smiles but never forgets nor forgives.

How foolish to imagine—

“ . . . that Japan, possessed of two-thirds the population of this nation and a military organisation fifty fold greater, shall continue to exist on her rocky isles that are, inclusive of Korea, but one-two-hundred-and-fiftieth of the earth's lands, while an undefended one-half lies under the guns of her battleships?”³

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 73. From a book circulated by the National Defense Association of Japan, the present officers of which are reported to be: Count Okuma, premier of Japan, president; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Vice-President.

² Page 74. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in the “Present Military Situation in the United States.”

³ Page 76. General Homer Lee, in “The Valor of Ignorance.”

CHAPTER IV.

WHY ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES MAY BE LED INTO WAR

ENGLAND and the United States have been at peace for a hundred years. The peoples of the two countries speak the same language and the blood tie between the two countries is very strong. But neither blood ties nor similarity of language prevent war when commercial interests are at stake.

In 1763, the English colonists of Massachusetts willingly levied a tax upon themselves of two-thirds their entire yearly income to fight with the British against the French forces in Canada. They thus contributed to the English war chest \$70,000 in twenty months—an enormous sum for those days. They also raised an army of 30,000 men, to fight with their English brothers against the French in Canada.

Yet only twelve years afterwards these same *English* colonists in Massachusetts turned and fought to the bitter end their English brothers of the same blood *because the English brothers attempted to restrict the commerce of the English colonists and to tax them without their consent.*

If the United States and England ever engage in war it will come about because of conflict in world trade. England's life is her commerce. When the Englishman fights for the commerce of Britain, he fights for the nation's life.

Twice in 140 years England and the United States have been at war over commercial matters.

The War of the Revolution was begun because England refused to allow us to freely trade with other nations and taxed us for her own profit even in our trade with her.

We call our War of the Revolution our war for political independence and our War of 1812 our war for commercial independence; but to England both wars were commercial wars.

A little over a hundred years ago England was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with France, whose military head, Napoleon, planned to invade England and destroy forever England's control of the seas. At present England is engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany, whose military head, the Kaiser, has planned to invade England and whose avowed purpose is to destroy for all time English commercial control of the seas.

After this war England, successful or unsuccessful, will be burdened with billions of debt. We are becoming to a certain extent the creditor nation of the world and are taking over at a considerable rate a larger portion of the world's commerce than we

have ever before handled. As England views it, we are beginning to tap her veins; and we are beginning, in a small way, to *drain the life blood* from her body.

England's habitual attitude is well known. For centuries she has waged wars for imperial aggrandisement, for world trade, for British supremacy; *but England has never waged wars for indemnities!* Moreover, the results of her imperial conquests have been so beneficent that her colonists, even though differing in blood and nature from her own sons, have soon become as loyal to the Empire as Englishmen themselves. Witness the large percentage of German-Australians who volunteered and fought for England in South Africa; witness the South Africans of to-day loyal and faithful to the England they fought but a generation ago.

Has England absolute need of retaining her commerce?

In England during the last thirty years, 1880-1910, the increase in naval expenditures was 245 per cent.; the increase of army expenditures was 65 per cent.; and the increase in the cost of living 71 per cent.

The citizens of a nation must pay, by direct or indirect taxes, the nation's army bill and the navy expenditures; and they must pay directly for the things—food, clothing, shelter—with which to support themselves. Whatever a nation pays in the in-

INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF GREAT
BRITAIN FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR
1880—1910

The increase in the expenses of the navy was 245 per cent., of the army 65 per cent., of the cost of living 71 per cent., while the increase in wages was but 27 per cent.

Year by year the two great governmental expenses and the one great individual expense—cost of living—had increased out of all proportion to the increase in earning income.

Increase in public expenditures can only be met by increased loans which must some day be paid, by increased taxation or by indemnities levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest.

The prospect was industrial bankruptcy.

The data of the increases of the navy and of the army are taken from official reports of the British Government and from the "Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and 1910.


The data of the increase in the cost of living and the increase of wages are taken from various British writers on political economy and sociology, from "Bliss' Encyclopædia of Social Reform," and from information obtained from the British Museum, the British Institute of Social Science and the Musée Social de France.

Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life, but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their living.

The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor decrease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the average increase of all types of labour.

The estimates of wage increase in Great Britain, according to the work of the Royal Statistical Society and the report of the English Board of Trade Blue Books, do not give a correct estimate of the increase of *income* of the masses, because of the fact that wage rates are made per day and per week, while for thirty years before the war through middle and northern England men and women were often out of work three days out of six. Consequently the actual income earned was but one-half of the wage scale cited upon which statistical reports are made.

Increasing Industrial Bankruptcy of Great Britain For Thirty Years Before the War 1880-1910



*National Debt
Decreased \$121,000,000
from 1880 to 1910
although Great Britain
carried on the Boer War
during this Period
at a Cost of \$114,000,000*

creased cost of living, army expenditures, and naval expenditures, must come out of what they earn,— unless the nation levies tribute on the commerce of other nations or exacts indemnities from them. The cost of living must be paid out of the wages earned. The army and navy expenditures must be paid by taxes, and 95% of the taxes during the thirty years previous to the war have been paid out of the wages earned.

If the increase in wages over an extended period does not keep pace with the increase in army and naval expenditures and with the *increase* in the cost of living, the national debt grows and grows and a day of reckoning comes sooner or later. The *increase in wages*, in England during the thirty years period, from 1880 to 1910 was only 27%, while the average per cent. of increase of the three great expense items was 127%.

Moreover, the people of Great Britain were burdened before the war by a debt of \$3,600,000,000. The present war debt up to April 1, 1916, is \$9,222,470,000, making a total debt at present of \$12,822,470,000. The per capita debt of Great Britain is \$312, while our per capita debt is \$32. Great Britain's debt is at the present time 15% of her entire national wealth.

Without natural resources, Great Britain's national debt, in proportion to her wealth and in proportion to her population is greater than that of

any other country in the world today. Bankruptcy can be avoided only by tribute on international commerce or by indemnities by conquest.

England is a hungry nation, but she is not a *starving* nation. Her density of population is greater than that of any other great world power. The density of population in Great Britain, including Scotland and Wales, is 370% greater than that of China; and that of England alone is 620% greater than that of China. England's few thousand miles of territory have been dug out, depleted, worked over for a thousand years. The food which she raises on her lands each year is not sufficient to feed her population for six weeks. Therefore for the other forty-six weeks of the year she must obtain food from other nations for forty-three millions of people. England does not produce enough material for clothes on her own land to clothe one hundred out of every hundred thousand of her people. Therefore for each 99,000 out of each hundred thousand she must secure clothing materials from other lands.

England each year must in some way get hold of enough money to pay other nations for the food of forty-three million people for forty-six weeks a year and England must in some way acquire enough money each year to pay for the cloth-material for forty-two million people a year.

But, how can she get this money? She cannot

dig it out of her soil; she cannot secure it from crops raised on her lands. There are but two ways—commercial tribute or indemnities by conquest.

By possessing a gigantic navy and thus being able to control the seas and protect her merchantmen, she can monopolize over sea commerce. Because of this monopoly, England makes the Australians pay for shipping their wool to England in her vessels, makes them pay for its manufacture into cloth in England and makes them pay a third time for the privilege of having it carried back to Australia as cloth. In the same way, by her control of the seas, she has for more than seventy years induced us to pay her to carry our cotton to England in her ships, to pay her for manufacturing it there, and to pay her again for bringing it back to us as cotton cloth. And we have acquiesced in spite of the fact that in many of the southern states as well as the Middle Atlantic States, there is coal and iron and labour, all the essentials for manufacturing cotton cloth.

England's very existence—the very life of her people—depends upon the triple profit which she thus compels other nations to pay her because of her control of the sea. It is not only the profit of the manufacturing, it is the profit of transporting—the revenue of international commerce that is England's life. Every great English manufacturer would become bankrupt in one month if his work

were limited to the use of materials produced on the soil of England.

England, burdened by her great war debt, can save herself from financial bankruptcy only by the levying of great indemnities or by rapidly and enormously increasing her international trade. *It is not England's policy to wage wars for indemnities.* There will be but *one* avenue left to her—that of increased commerce with her colonies and with North and South America. In energetically pushing her trade with the United States and with the countries of South and Central America and with Mexico, England's interests may come in conflict with those of the United States.

England and America will never be drawn into war because of a desire on the part of England to obtain territory.

In this respect England's need is vastly different from that of either Germany or Japan, even assuming that all the colonial territory taken from Germany during the present war should be restored to her. In fact, Great Britain has a surplus instead of a need. Great Britain, with but 88,000 square miles of territory, has colonies, dependencies and dominions of 12,600,000 square miles. Germany with 200,000 square miles had colonies and dependencies before the war of but 1,000,000 square miles. Japan with an area of about 150,000 square miles

has colonial and dependent territory of but 110,000 square miles.

At the present time each million of Great Britain's population have an average colonial territory from which resources can be drawn of 280,000 square miles. If all German territorial possessions should be returned at the close of the war, each million German population would have but 18,000 squares miles of colonial territory from which to draw trade and revenue; while each million of Japan's population has but 2,000 square miles of colonial and dependent territory from which to draw trade.

To her hundred per cent. of home territory, Japan has but 73 per cent. colonial and dependent territory; to her hundred per cent. of home territory, Germany had less than 500 per cent. colonial and dependent territory; to her hundred per cent. of home territory, Great Britain has more than 14,000 per cent. colonial and dependent territory.

It is possible but not probable that England and the United States will ever again be drawn into war because of international trade conflicts.

Japan and Germany have not large enough colonial populations from which to draw trade and revenue sufficient in amount to support the home governments and keep the home empires from industrial starvation. With England conditions are entirely different. Japan's colonial and de-

pendent population is about 16,000,000—about 35 per cent. of her home population. Germany's colonial and dependent population is about 14,000,000—less than 20 per cent. of her home population. Great Britain's colonial and dependent population is over 440,000,000—over 1,100 per cent. of her home population.

Every million of Germany's population can trade with and draw revenue from but 200,000 colonial and dependent peoples. Each million Japanese can trade with and draw revenue from but 300,000 colonial and dependent peoples, but every million of Great Britain's population can trade with and draw revenue from 8,700,000 colonial and dependent peoples.

Great Britain has the opportunity of sufficient trade with her own people to save her from bankruptcy and to feed and clothe her home population.

This is evidenced by the fact that Great Britain is the only great world power that reduced its debt during the thirty-five years before the war.

This war has freed us of one great illusion. Until there is universal disarmament, no nation can continue to carry on an increasing commerce with the colonies of another nation or with its own colonies even in times of peace without armed protection for that commerce. Germany is waging war to-day because she discovered that she could not gain and *hold* international trade in British and

French colonies without political control of those territories and naval control of the seas. England is fighting because she realised that unless she continued her naval control of the seas and her political control of her own colonies, she could not prevent the commercial encroachments of Germany. The nation wishing to control in the world of commerce must also control from a naval, military and political standpoint.

England, successful or unsuccessful in this war, knows that she must prepare for the future. Her navy must be larger than ever before. Just as commerce in the Nineteenth Century centred in the northern hemisphere, so in the Twentieth Century it will centre in the southern hemisphere with its millions of square miles of undeveloped resources.

To protect her trade in the southern hemisphere, England must have ready fuel for her ships and consequently naval stations near the base of operations. Oil will be the fuel of battleships in the future. Mexico will be the source of oil for naval operations near North and South America. In Mexico the struggle for the control of oil lands has been going on for a generation and has lately resulted in years of anarchy. English, German, Japanese and American interests are fighting for supremacy.

It is most improbable that England would ever wage war upon the United States for the purpose

of levying an indemnity. It is possible but not probable that England and the United States would ever be again led into war because of conflicting interests in world trade.

But it is very probable that England and the United States may be led into war if we continue to assert that England has no right to protect her citizens on North and South American continents and at the same time refuse to take the necessary means—means which we now claim as our absolute rights—to insure the safety of her interests and the protection of her citizens.

England is justly world-famed for the protection she gives her citizens, no matter where they may be, no matter how small the injury, no matter how slight the insult offered. Even before the present war, her patience was sorely tried regarding Mexico. If the American oil interests place a man of their choice at the head of the Mexican Government, other rebels will again be supplied with money and arms, just as English and German interests have done in the past; and there will again be trouble.

If England's citizens are killed, it will then be necessary for us to back down regarding the Monroe Doctrine or fight.

May there not be possibility of trouble in the future if we do not recognise our duty in Mexico and

do not live up to our highest conceptions of that duty?

We have practically guaranteed all the Americas from intervention, but if, in pushing her trade, in Mexico for instance, her interests and her citizens should suffer from anarchy and if we should continue to refuse to assume the responsibilities of our Monroe Doctrine, England will intervene, protecting her interests and her citizens—Monroe Doctrine or no Monroe Doctrine.

CHAPTER V

THE GOOD FAITH OF NATIONS

THE prophets plead with us to trust to the “good faith of nations” and to “make universal arbitration treaties.”

It is good to “have faith,” but it is not wise to have too much faith in “gold bricks!”

We are asked to trust to the good promises of nations that have not kept and are not now keeping their agreements.

France, England, Prussia, Austria and Russia, have each at many times both ignored the treaties they have signed and violated the arbitration agreements to which they were parties.

And what of ourselves? Are we willing—have we been willing in the past—to abide by arbitration?

Would *we* have agreed to the decision of an international tribunal regarding any of our five great crises: the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, the Civil War, the War with Spain?

In 1775 we were colonies of Great Britain, inter-

nationally recognised as such, under the government of the King of England, who decided to direct our commerce and to tax us as British subjects. If, at that time, there had been an international tribunal and if we had carried our case to that tribunal, would Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain and royal France, all absolute monarchies and leading nations of the world, have decided in our favour; or would they have held that the English Government had a right to direct the commerce of one of its colonies and to fix import duties?

Certainly in 1848, if we had submitted to an international tribunal, our *legally* unjustified and unreasonable occupation and seizure of Texas, a portion of another nation—the international court could have arrived at but one decision: “The United States has no international right to steal Texas.” Yet if we had not seized it, it would to-day be in the same condition of anarchy as that in which Mexico finds itself.

In 1861 we went to war to compel some of our federated states to remain in the Union. If we had submitted this case to an international tribunal, South Carolina would have admitted that she had agreed to federate; but she would have asserted that she had never agreed to remain in the Union *forever*, unless she wished to do so. She would have pointed out that both Presidents Jefferson and Madison, the two men who created the Constitu-

tion, were themselves of the belief that the Union could not *force* any state to remain a member of it; she would have pointed out that the supreme law of the United States is the Constitution of the United States which gives the Federal Government power to regulate affairs *not allotted* to the sovereign states, but that there is not a single phrase in the Constitution that gives the Federal Government any right to force a state to remain in the Union if she does not wish to do so. It being a point of law, we would have lost our case.

Before our Spanish-American trouble, we *requested* Spain, by a concurrent resolution of the House and the Senate, to recognise the independence of Cuba two years before the explosion of the *Maine*. What would be our attitude to-day if Germany should send us a "request" to recognise Wisconsin's independence as a separate little Germanic nation? Before our declaration of war the united powers of Europe urged President McKinley to maintain peace.

Does any one dream that a concert of European nations would have decided, if the question had been submitted to a Hague Tribunal, that we had a right to demand of a foreign nation that she withdraw all her naval and military forces from a portion of her own territory?

Will we be more likely in the future to submit great questions to the decision of other nations than

we have in the past? Is the American citizen, if attacked and robbed, willing to go to court to submit to arbitration the question of whether a robber has a right to rob or not?

If the great powers of the world, with whom we may soon have trouble, have shown for centuries that they do not keep agreements, even when signed and formally honoured, what cause have we to believe that they will do so in the future, especially when high officials,—men in power in the nation, speaking of arbitration and the inefficiency of diplomacy publically state that:

“No true statesman will ever seriously count on such a possibility (effectiveness of arbitration); he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events.”¹

“No nation should hold to a paper agreement when it is to its interest to take what it wants and has at the same time the power to do so.”²

If Great Britain should buy the Galapagos Islands of Ecuador, fortify them and thus create a naval colony at the western door of the Panama Canal, would we submit to arbitration?

If we presented our case to the International Hague Tribunal, the first question asked would be: “Has the United States any right to prevent Great

Britain's purchase of islands that do not belong to the United States?"

We would answer: "Our Monroe Doctrine prohibits the purchase."

Then the Hague Tribunal (rendering its decision in accordance with *international law*) would ask us:

"What standing has the Monroe Doctrine *as international law*?"

We would be compelled to answer: "No nation has ratified it; and all nations, except ourselves, refuse to recognise it."

As a matter of courtesy, the Hague Tribunal might continue the inquiry; and the next question would be hypothetical:

"Assuming that European nations may be brought to recognise the Monroe Doctrine, is it not a matter of fact that the Monroe Doctrine is an indirect reply to the proclamation of the Holy Alliance; that it definitely states that it applies to governments "distinctly different" from that of the United States—that is, to those nations governed by a king or emperor who believes in his divine right to rule? That being the case, how can the United States hold that the Monroe Doctrine applies to the purchase by Great Britain of the Galapagos Islands; inasmuch as neither the English people nor even the King of England himself believes

that the ruler of the British Empire is divinely appointed?

We would lose our case before any *international* tribunal.

If Japan should occupy the Philippines, Hawaii, Lower California, and the Panama Canal Zone, would we arbitrate the question as to whether she has a right to rob us, or whether she has a right to hold us up for blackmail before vacating any one or all of the territories occupied?

Would we arbitrate or would we fight?

Why pretend that we want universal arbitration when we have not arbitrated and will not arbitrate vital international questions?

Why place our faith in unsupported arbitration—a form of settlement often broken by the nations threatening us and a method of settlement which we would refuse to accept as a means of solving any of our own vital problems?

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 94. Prince von Bulow.

² Page 94. Personal statement of prominent German official to the author.

CHAPTER VI

THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD US

THE diplomats and the government of Great Britain are most polite, doing everything to appeal to us; yet the most common phrases in England to-day are:

“The Americans *boast* of their love of liberty; Englishmen *fight and die for it*.”

“They (the Americans) wish English gold too much to enter the European conflict for liberty.”

“We pity you, living in a land which places the dollar before all else. Here, we fight for honour and the sanctity of neutral nations, when it would have paid us well to keep out of it.”

“Belgium has been violated and France raped of its richest provinces, yet you, sister republic of France at whose birth Lafayette presided, send no word of protest. Has the Statue of Liberty toppled into the sea? Has the land of the free no thought for the brave?”

They think of us principally as:

“Money-chasers, dollar hustlers, intent only on

supplying weapons of death to whosoever will buy, anxious only to haggle over traffic and to protest loudly at dislocation of trade.”

England condemns us.

Because: Our government did not protest against the violation of Belgium's neutrality;

Because: Our government did not protest against the laying of floating mines on the high seas;

Because: Our government did not speak out against the devastation of Belgium;

Because: Our government did not raise its voice against the atrocities of Aerschot and Tongres;

Because: Our government made no objection to the bombardment of undefended towns and the killing of peaceful citizens;

Because: Our government has known of the massacres of five hundred thousand Armenians and has made no *official* protest;

Because: Our government refused to sanction a loan to France at the beginning of the war on the plea that our gold reserve was low; yet attempted at the same time to pass a ship-purchase bill which would have placed millions of credit to Germany's account;

Because: Our government later, when it meant increased trade for us, sanctioned a loan to the Allies;

Because: We made our *first* protest not in the

interest of humanity, but for the benefit of our own trade.

General Wolseley, brother of the late Field Marshal Sir Garnet, writes:

“The question is not now whether America should or should not help the Allies; it is now that the western continent of the world should prove that she is a truly great nation.”

Sir E. Ray Lankaster, a noted biologist and world-famed British scientist, says:

“In my judgment, the American abstention from war with Germany is owing to a mistaken though patriotic desire on the part of many leading Americans to safeguard and increase the material prosperity of their country. . . .

“. . . Material interests can never be permanently and greatly advanced by shutting our eyes to the call of honour and humanity and allowing our devotion to freedom and justice dwindle.”

“. . . I do not hesitate to say that America, having tolerated, submitted to, and sought profit through triumph of German iniquity, would lose her self-respect and her power to oppose and destroy what is vile and injurious.”

And even England's greatest socialist, the lover of men of all nations, the believer in universal brotherhood, H. G. Wells, writes:

“At the outset we believed that the United States

would stand with us in the defence of civilisation and if need be act with us. Nobody now expects the United States to act, whatever outrages may occur. Nobody believes now that President Wilson's last message was a 'virtual ultimatum.' The letters and messages that come to Europe from America attract less and less attention. Britain had expected from the United States the neutrality of the just balance; she gets the neutrality of deliberate ineffectiveness.

". . . We fight not merely for our threatened selves; we fight for the liberty and peace of the whole world. We fight, and you Americans know we fight, for you.

"War is a tragic and terrible business, and those who will not face the blood and dust of it must be content to play only the most secondary of parts in the day of reckoning.

"That is, with the utmost frankness, what I am thinking, and what a very large number of other Englishmen are now thinking, about the United States."

Germans believe that we are wealthy only; that we are unpatriotic; that we are unwilling to provide protection or to fight for our country—and this to them means cowardice!

In Munich, July, 1913, I listened to the address of a prominent German politician. He proclaimed

that there were only Germans, Austrians, Russians, Jews, Italians, Scandinavians, etc., living in America, but no Americans; that our country had been developed and our wealth created by the German people in America; that our enormous wealth was due to German efficiency; that the wealth of America was in reality the wealth of the German people here. Munsterburg in a late article has also suggested that that which is good and great in our development is the result of the industry and idealism of the German-Americans.

Von Bülow emphasised this also in 1906 and hinted that he could control our politics by the balance of power then wielded by the voters of the seven and a half million German descendants in the United States.

Speaking of the American peace movement and our efforts to establish international arbitration, Prince von Bulow writes:

“With a child-like self-consciousness, they (the Americans) appear to believe that public opinion must represent the view which American plutocrats think most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that the widening development of mankind has quite other concerns than material prosperity, commerce and money-making.”¹

“They (the Americans) have a dog-in-the-manger policy. They are only rich but on the whole

not patriotic enough to be able to defend themselves.”²

The German military caste, which is the German Government, has always despised us; now they hate us,

Because: We have not succeeded in inducing Great Britain to abandon her blockade of German ports;

Because: We have pushed our cases (so Germany believes) against her with much more vigour than we have pressed those against her enemies;

Because: We have defeated her efforts to prevent the manufacture of ammunition in this country;

Because: We have refused to prevent the sale of ammunitions to her enemies;

Because: We have loaned half a billion dollars to the Allies;

Because: We have attempted to interfere with her submarine warfare—her only efficient weapon against the British navy;

Because: We have (as Germany believes) allied ourselves with her enemies by allowing our munition factories to be placed under restrictive contracts of the British Government.

Professor Hans Delbrück, former director of Kaiser Wilhelm's education and training; and present Secretary of the Home Office and Representative of the Chancellor of Germany, writes:

“Their momentary proud position need deceive no one. The Americans have not yet stood any really severe test.”

And across the Pacific there is another nation that has “ideas” regarding us!

The following quotations are from a booklet of the National Defence Association of Japan, of which the present officers are reported to be: Count Okuma, Premier of Japan, president; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs, vice-president:

“The Americans are a race of what-nots; crimes among them run rife to a steadily growing greater degree every year; and we Japanese are needed to teach them honour, morals and cleanliness.”

“It must be remembered that the Americans are a crude race that consists of every kind of riff-raff blood—including the negro-white mixture—of foreign nations. We in Japan have a glorious history that antedates by thousands of years even the knowledge that the wild and Indian-infested America ever existed.”

“The United States seems to us like a huge soup pot, into which every kind of thing has been put in the hope of obtaining a savoury mess. The ‘mess’ is there, we grant; but as to its taste, we know that it is bad, and that its smell is worse!”

“And still the Americans say that their ‘Eagle screams with pride.’ Rather, we should say, it had

better squawk with shame—or that the United States should adopt some carrion bird of filthy habits that fills its beak with the flesh of human bodies from which life had—fortunately for them—departed. This sort of a bird would be a better emblem for the United States.”³

This is not jingoism. In no case have I quoted the extremists. The preceding quotations are from men and works of prominence. The wise men in our own country are beginning to realise the disfavour with which we are looked upon by the rest of the world.

Even so conservative a man as Joseph H. Choate, former Ambassador of the United States to Great Britain, has lately stated that “the United States is the most prosperous and hated nation of the world; that two of the warring nations of Europe dislike us more than they do the men they are fighting in the trenches; that even in British dominions beyond the seas the Americans are the most hated people on earth.”

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 101. Prince von Bulow.

² Page 102. Hildegard von Hilton.

³ Page 104. From a book circulated by the National Defense Association of Japan, the present officers of which are reported to be: Count Okuma, premier of Japan, president; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Vice-President.

CHAPTER VII

DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US?

GERMANY and Japan openly state their intentions and publicly inform their people of just how the United States is to be conquered.

In discussing the causes for attacking the United States and Germany's intention of doing so, Freiherr von Edelsheim, in an official work widely circulated in Germany with the approval of the Emperor and the General Staff at Berlin, writes as follows:

"With that country (the United States) political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years and has, until now, *been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. However, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in order to combat the encroachment of the United States upon our interests.*"

It is feasible for us to build strong military forces to secure *by fighting* a feared and esteemed position in the *world* such as we have attained in Europe.

“This shows the advisability of *impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible* to direct attack, with the size and strength of our army.”

“As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great power which is in a position to *CONQUER the United States.*”

“It is certain that after the defeat of the United States fleet, the great extension of unprotected coast line and resources of that country would compel them to make peace.”¹

(The italics and capitals are the author's.)

It would be wise for us to note that the next to the last paragraph of the second Ancona note, sent to our government by Austria, contains this paragraph:

“While the imperial and royal government *may* probably consider the affair of the Ancona as settled with the foregoing statements, it reserves to itself at this time the right *to bring up for discussion at a later period* the difficult questions of international law connected with submarine warfare.”

Also it is well for us to note that the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, a conservative, semi-official, German paper in the Rhine provinces, stated on November 24th, 1915:

“Few events of the war have caused such widespread or deep bitterness in Germany as the attitude of the United States after war was declared.”

“. . . When Germany has recovered from the war, she will undertake a widespread, well-engineered work of education in America as to the relative merits of Germans and Britons. *If necessary the mailed fist will also be applied to American aberrations.*

“Meanwhile Germany will show patience and consideration for certain weak sides of the American national character.”

And what are the intentions of Japan?

It has been previously shown that the lands and areal resources of China will be of great value to Japan in another seventy-five or a hundred years. It has also been shown that lack of capital needed to develop industry and to build the thousands of miles of railway necessary in China, cannot be immediately supplied by Japan. It is therefore evident that Japan cannot at present reap sufficient wealth from China to save her industrially.

That the Japanese statesmen recognise this is indicated by the expenditures for their navy.


During the year 1904-1905, the total appropriations of Japan, both for the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the Japanese navy, was but 20,614,000 yen. This was the year of the Russo-Japanese War. Previous to this, however, when she was preparing for her attack upon Russia—at the very time European and American statesmen

asserted Japan had no intention of attacking Russia—Japan was spending on her navy sums much greater than this. For eight years *previous* to the Russo-Japanese War, the expenditures for the navy averaged yearly 228 per cent. of what they were for the fiscal year ending 1905. But immediately *after* Japan had accomplished the defeat of the Russian squadron in the East, the average yearly expenses, ordinary and extraordinary combined, for the years ending in 1905 and 1906, were only 48 per cent. of what they had been during the years of preparation.

Again, in 1907, the Japanese statesmen began to prepare their navy for another conflict. In 1908, in a time of peace in the Pacific, the ordinary and extraordinary appropriations for the navy were not only equal to the entire appropriations both ordinary and extraordinary of the year of war with Russia, but were actually 293 per cent. greater. Why should the expenses of the Japanese after three years be 393 per cent. of what they were during the year of their naval war with Russia? The only explanation possible is that the Japanese statesmen then began to plan to prepare their navy for some extraordinary conflict in the future.

And these expenses have continued. In 1912, for instance, the ordinary, the extraordinary and transferred funds for the upkeep and building of the Japanese navy were 545 per cent. of what they were

Japanese Naval Preparation Expenditures



In 1895 and 1896 little money was spent by Japan on her navy because there was no special need for it. The Japanese War with China proved that Japan had no need of a navy so far as China was concerned.

But there was need to prepare for the war with Russia.

Consequently during the eight years from 1897 to 1904 the average expenditure per year on the navy was 425 per cent. of the average yearly expenditure during the Japanese War with China. That this money was for a purpose is proven by Japan's victory over Russia.

That conquest having been effected, there was no need at that time for great constructive work on the navy. Consequently during 1905 and 1906 the average expense per year on the navy was *but 48 per cent. of what it had averaged each year during the time Japan was preparing for the conflict with Russia.*

In 1907 Japan began to prepare for another great conflict.

Since that time Japan's naval expenditures on naval preparation have averaged *each year, from 1907 to 1914 inclusive, 392 per cent. of all her naval expenses during the year of the Russo-Japanese War.*

Is it to defeat the Chinese Navy?

The Chinese Navy consists of four tiny ships, all more than nineteen years old. The largest is of four thousand tons displacement.

What navy is Japan expecting to combat?

during the year of the Russo-Japanese War. This data is taken from the *Resume Statistique de l'Empire du Japon*.

In studying the finance report of the Empire of Japan, one needs be careful, however, to search out all the appropriations. The ordinary appropriation is in one place; for 1912, it was 40,208,000 yen. In another place one finds the extraordinary appropriation, which is often not only equal to the ordinary, but 50 per cent. more; in 1912, it was 60,225,000 yen. Then also, in *very small print* under the heading of *finance*, one finds a transfer of funds for submarines and warships totalling, in 1911, 10,689,586 yen, and estimated at 12,000,000 yen for 1912.

A true view of the enormous upbuilding of the Japanese navy can best be understood by comparing this tiny "tucked-away" expense item—the amount transferred—to the entire appropriations of the Japanese navy, ordinary and extraordinary, during the year of war with Russia. *This little "transferred" item for submarines and special craft was, in 1911, 51.8 per cent. of the entire ordinary and extraordinary appropriations of the navy of Japan for the year of the Russo-Japanese War.* Moreover, a late official of the Japanese Government, in speaking to the Diet, urging larger and larger appropriations for navy, said in substance:

“We must work night and day for the upbuilding of our navy. Not one hour must be lost.”

Are Japanese statesmen mere children? Are they expending on their navy these enormous sums in proportion to their wealth, merely for the folly of spending? If not, what other navy do they expect to combat in the near future? Japan has an offensive and defensive treaty with Great Britain. Japan has, practically, an offensive and defensive treaty with Russia. Japan's offensive and defensive treaty with Great Britain makes it necessary for Great Britain to use her navy against Germany if trouble should arise between Japan and Germany.

But there *is* China! I have before me the letter of a venerable American who calmly and sincerely believes that Japan holds only the most altruistic intentions towards America and who also believes that Japan's *entire preparation is for the conquest of China*. But China has no navy. The Chinese navy consists of four tiny ships. The largest—the *Hai Chi*, is of but 4,300 tons displacement. It has a battery of two eight-inch guns. The other three ships are cruisers 25 per cent. smaller. The main armament of each of these cruisers consists of three six-inch guns. All of these ships are more than 19 years old.

If Japan's military and naval appropriations were intended for the conquest of China there would be an upbuilding and equipping of the *army*. Japan

need not build up the transport system of her navy if her intentions are directed against China, for Japan already has a transport system, independent of her passenger ships, capable of carrying 199,000 men. In a few weeks, these, plying back and forth between Japan and China, could carry to China a million men. One warship would protect them in their trips from the Japanese coast to the Chinese coast, and if China were the immediate goal, Japan would need greater extraordinary appropriations for their army—not for their navy.

If Japan by these most extraordinary measures is not preparing her navy to combat the navy of the United States, for what purpose is she making such gigantic efforts? Why this great upbuilding of the navy from 1908 to the present time, corresponding with the same tremendous upbuilding of the navy during the years before the Russo-Japanese war? Can any one doubt that this money is being spent for a definite purpose? And since Japan needs wealth as much as she needs land and areal resources and since China cannot furnish the wealth, since the immediate occupation of China would demand billions of Japanese capital, who can doubt that Japan is preparing her navy to combat the United States rather than China?

Moreover, we have her own testimony in regard to this matter.

A booklet by a member of a Japanese National

Defence Society, circulated with its approval, describes in detail how our Pacific Islands and our Western Coast States are to be taken.

“Our war with the United States will be one whose intention is for the general betterment and benefit of the world.”

“If Washington is not strong enough to enforce its orders on the Pacific Coast, we are! In short, the United States Government is but a foolish childhood game, such as checkers or jack straws.”

“We must seize our standards, unfurl them to the winds and advance without the least fear, as America has no army, and, with the Panama Canal destroyed, its few battleships will be of no use until too late.”

“The Tokyo arsenal is working night and day in making ammunition of all kinds. The Japanese Naval Minister is now occupied in the great work of hastening the building of first-class battleships, transports and submarines. Our army and navy commissariat departments at Futagwa are now working night and day in order that adequate supplies of our own compressed foods may be ready.”

“Sixty million Japanese are eager to begin a war against the United States that shall prove to the boasting Americans that the Japanese people do not know defeat and that their soldiers are invincible.”

“We will conquer them! How can we fail?”

“We ask no clearer vision of them—except that

which we will have over the sights of our rifles and the guns of our battleships.”

“We will of course have only trained men (soldiers) go out, disguised as workmen and even rich merchants. These will slowly be reinforced, with the object always in mind of capturing the Philippines and Honolulu.”

“Capture these islands we must, in order to place our hands firmly and once for all on the Pacific Ocean.”

“Manila being ours, we will divide our navy and army forces. One part will go to take Honolulu and all the Hawaiian Islands; the other, and far greater part, will proceed to the Golden Gate of San Francisco!”

“Then will our able workmen, agriculturists and artisans of all kinds go to their new country! And go with the most glad hearts.”

“The National Manifestation against America that took place last year in Hibiya Park, in our imperial capital, attended by 100,000 people of all ranks, shows how glad we will be when the first shot is fired!

“The Text of the resolution that was then passed is as follows:

“We herewith formally request our government to declare war against the United States without an instant’s delay!

“Let America beware! For our cry On to

Hawaii! On to California! is becoming secondary in our country to our imperial anthem.”²

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 106. From a book outlining Germany's means and method of attacking England and the United States; prepared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, when member of the General Staff at Berlin; book approved by the Kaiser and widely circulated.

² Page 115. From a book circulated by the National Defense Association of Japan, the present officers of which are reported to be: Count Okuma, Premier of Japan, president; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs, vice-president.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NEARNESS OF THE ENEMIES

AFTER this war is over Japan and all the nations of Europe will be too exhausted to start any war against us; and, even if they wished, we are so isolated on the east and on the west by expanses of water from three to five thousand miles wide, that no army could successfully cross to our shores." ¹

Exactly the same idea was expressed by Randolph in 1810 referring to Great Britain and warring Europe.

A citizen who goes from the inactivity of his office into the wilderness to hunt is not so able to bear hardships and endure fatigue the first ten days as he is afterwards. He may be fagged out day after day, he may be scratched and bruised, he may lose thirty or more pounds of fat, but after a few weeks of such life he is more fit, more able to endure, more skilled in using his gun than when he came fresh from the office.

"All history teaches us that a nation never

fights more readily and more valiantly than immediately after the close of a war in which it was involved." ²

We ourselves after a long four-year struggle were well equipped and ready to go immediately into Mexico—compelling France to withdraw the Emperor she had installed in that country. Japan was not exhausted by the war with China, nor by the war with Russia.

“Even the little kingdom of Servia fought first Turkey, then Bulgaria and finally, with scarcely a spell of rest, she waged the most remarkable campaign of her history against a first-class European power.” ³

Some years ago, in Paris, a French diplomat said to me: “We in Europe have learned to put our treasures in bank vaults and to employ guards to watch them. But you, Americans, are a strange people. You have made of your America a great glass house and you have stored within it the greatest treasures of the world. I should think, my dear sir, that your people would understand that there are envious nations on our side of the water, who will some time want your treasure.”

That is what a world known diplomat thought; this is what some of our own people think:

“Only the ridiculous fear of a crying child left alone in the dark can account for the wild stories being spread about of how a foreign nation can suc-

cessfully send an invading army to our shores. Such a thing is impossible.”⁴

But what do military experts think? General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army; Francis V. Greene, Major-General U. S. V.; General Leonard Wood, Commander of the Department of the East; Captain Bristol, Director of Naval Aeronautics; Captain A. W. Grant, Chief of the Submarine Service!

General William Crozier, before the Congressional Committee in 1912, stated:

“So far as transporting troops is concerned, the sea as a highway is not an obstacle but a facility.”

“It is very much easier to get any number of troops across the Atlantic Ocean than it would be to get the same number over anything like the same distance on land. Marine transportation is the very best kind you can have; the easiest, the least expensive, and the most expeditious, if you are considering large bodies of troops and large amounts of material.”

“In smooth water and fine weather, they (the enemy) could land almost any place.”⁵

“The guns in these defences (coast forts) would be no more powerless to oppose a landing beyond their range if they were located on the most remote island of Alaska.”⁶

“Germany by using only 50 per cent. of her mercantile marine, only including vessels of more than

Transport Facilities for Armies

Gr. Britain [REDACTED]

Germany [REDACTED]

Japan [REDACTED]

U.S.A. [REDACTED]

Great Britain's ability to transport large armies has been demonstrated for two hundred years. The transportation of troops in the Boer War was the marvel of military experts.

In the transportation of troops distance is not the important factor. The size of the ships and the number of ships that can be used are essentially important. Great Britain's transportation tonnage is greater than that of any other country in the world.

Germany's transportation and passenger tonnage is next to that of Great Britain. Even in 1901 Freiherr von Edelsheim, then a member of the General Staff at Berlin, worked out a definite plan for the invasion of the United States and demonstrated that Germany could embark 240,000 men for this attack upon the United States in two and a half days. During the fifteen years that have elapsed since 1901 Germany's transportation facilities have greatly increased.

Japan's major and minor transportation fleets can now accommodate 199,000 men. This does not include the use of the enormous passenger ships now under her control.

As to the United States: We have now the problem of protecting lands, interests and wealth beyond the border of the United States. Porto Rico, Panama, the Philippines and the marvellously wealthy though little considered Alaska.

In our Spanish-American War, after ninety days' preparation, we could not obtain transports enough to move more than 17,000 troops from Florida to Cuba, and it took our transports 17 days to do this. Men were left behind because there were no transportation facilities.

In April, 1914, when, after more than two years of trouble with Mexico, President Wilson ordered General Funston to sail from Galveston to Vera Cruz, the transport fleet was able to take less than 4,200 men. A large portion of General Funston's original command, as well as the artillery and cavalry, was left behind at Galveston because there were not sufficient transports.

2,000 tons' registry, could land 450,000 men in this country in from sixteen to seventeen days after domination of the sea had been obtained." ⁷

"Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial intercourse, it is possible to transport our large troop forces in them." ⁸

What are the experiences of history?

"The war between Japan and China, between America and Spain, between England and the Transvaal, and finally the Chinese Expeditions, have largely demonstrated the methods of transporting troops over the sea." ⁹

"Lord Cochran landed 18,000 men on the open coast of America in five hours; in the Crimean War the English accomplished the disembarking of 45,000 men, 83 guns and about 100 horses in less than eleven hours." ¹⁰

"In an operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, including infantry and cavalry, were embarked in eight hours." ¹¹

Our own experience in transporting troops to the Philippines is sufficient.

"We had four transports—improvised from mail steamers, plying on the Pacific—the largest of which had a gross tonnage of 5,000 and the smallest 1,500. The total tonnage was about 12,500." ¹²

Our slowest ship had a speed of but nine knots and of course the transports had to keep together so

that the average speed was not greater than that of the slowest ship. Yet in thirty-two days we covered seven thousand miles from San Francisco to Manila and landed our forces; although, when war began, we were unprepared to conduct a campaign across the Pacific.

When this war is finished, England, whether successful or unsuccessful, will have at least one million men in training camps or in the field ready for service. The carrying capacity of her railways is such that these cannot be dismissed at a moment's notice. For months, perhaps for a year, there will be a standing army of at least five hundred thousand men. England has the greatest transport system in the world and her mariners have been trained for centuries in handling traffic and troops.

"In England, the steamers for transporting troops to Cape Town, which is a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry; and seven days for the cavalry and artillery."¹³

The combined tonnage of the British India, White Star, Peninsular and Oriental lines is nearly two million tons. England could transport to the United States, without even interfering with her other shipping trade, from two hundred and fifty thousand to five hundred thousand men, in two weeks' time.

And Germany!

“When the war is over, Germany will still be the second naval power in the world, stronger than ourselves in battleships, and possessed of an ocean-going commerce with a tonnage nearly five times as great as our own.”¹⁴

“There would be no lack of ships. The fleet of the Hamburg line alone measures 1,168,000 tons, and of the North German Lloyd, 795,000 tons.”¹⁵

Even all the details have been worked out by Germany—by Freiherr von Edelsheim when a member of the German General Staff.

“The expedition corps would require eighteen ships; material and supplies would take five. The greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two large steamship companies, the North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-American Line. The charter of these steamship companies provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this sort.”

“The greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from Bremen to Bremerhaven. The troops can consequently embark at Quai in about four hours.”¹⁶

“Ninety-six thousand men can be embarked in one day, or two hundred and forty thousand men in two and a half days.”¹⁷

“If we, almost ludicrously unready for war in 1898, could do this (take our troops to the Philip-

pires) is it to be supposed that Germany, with her plans studied out long in advance, with her enormous tonnage of fast ships, her troops in instant readiness, with no continent to cross and an ocean of barely 3,000 miles instead of 7,000 separating her from her opponent—is it to be supposed, I say, that Germany could not bring 240,000 infantry with the corresponding numbers of artillery and cavalry to our shores in from twelve to fifteen days? No soldier who has studied the question will deny that Germany can do this.”¹⁸

Japan has a merchant marine whose tonnage almost equals that of the White Star, Cunard, British India, and Peninsular and Oriental lines combined. It is sufficient to handle under great emergency one-half million men. She has practically absolute control of trans-Pacific trade, excepting for the few English ships. England is pledged to Japan as an offensive and defensive ally. It is quite possible that Japan could land within four weeks after she determines to do so, and probably before a declaration of war, from two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand men on our western coast.

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 116. American newspaper editorial.

² Page 117. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in “The Present Military Situation in the United States.”

³ Page 117. (See note 2.)

⁴ Page 118. American newspaper editorial.

⁵ Page 118. Rear-Admiral Frank F. Fletcher.

⁶ Page 118. Report of the Army Committee of the National Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C. Church, editor *Army and Navy Journal*; Captain Matthew Hannah; General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.

⁷ Page 120. Press report of interview with American Army Officer.

⁸ Page 120. From a book outlining Germany's means and method of attacking England and the United States; prepared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, as member of the General Staff at Berlin; approved by Kaiser, and widely circulated.

^{9 10 11} Page 120. (See note 8.)

¹² Page 120. (See note 2.)

¹³ Page 121. (See note 8.)

^{14 15} Page 122. (See note 2.)

¹⁶ Page 122. (See note 8.)

^{17 18} Pages 122-123. (See note 2.)

PART TWO: ARE WE PREPARED?

PART TWO: ARE WE PREPARED?

CHAPTER I

THE GUARDS WITHOUT

IN case of war, all our navy need do is to find the enemy's fleet and sink it." ¹

Easy and simple! Just about as simple as asking a man with arms cut off at the elbows to enter the ring to thrash Willard or Carpentier!

Admiral Fiske gave official testimony that it would take five years to put our navy in shape to meet an efficient enemy. Admiral Knight, president of the naval war college, when urging that we make our navy efficient, stated that everybody who knows anything about the navy knows that it is not now in an efficient condition.

Great speed and guns capable of high elevation are the most important features of the modern dreadnought. Over-thick armour is not of special value to-day.

The most powerful battleships possess very large guns capable of being elevated thirty degrees, have armour plate of but medium thickness, and are able to make from twenty-five to twenty-eight knots per

hour. *We have not one battleship combining these qualities.*

The battle in the North Sea demonstrated how important speed is to a big battleship. A fast ship can move in and out and around its enemy, keeping out of range when it desires to do so, and coming in again unexpectedly. A dreadnought with an advantage of even one knot in speed is fifty per cent. more efficient than a ship of equal size and with like guns, one knot slower. The powerful *Bluecher* was destroyed not because of lack of armour, or lack of big guns, but because she was too slow to get away. Yet the *Bluecher* was able to make three knots more per hour than the fastest, most powerful, best-equipped armoured ship we have in our navy.

“They have no conception of the fact that a ship one-half knot faster, with guns of one-half mile greater range, with practically all other conditions equal, would have at its mercy any ship having lesser speed and guns with the shorter range.”²

England has twenty battleships capable of maintaining from 23 to 29 miles an hour, Germany has fourteen, Japan has four. *We have none!*

Although guns on ships of foreign navies can be elevated twenty, twenty-eight and thirty degrees, we have had none that can be elevated more than fifteen degrees and most of them can be elevated only ten degrees.

Even the two ships just about to go in service—

Modern Dreadnaughts 1

U.S. 0

Jap. [REDACTED]

GERM. [REDACTED]

GBR [REDACTED]

Japan has finished four modern dreadnaughts in the last two years, three of which have a displacement of 27,500 tons and the other a displacement of 30,600 tons.

The first three have a speed of 27 knots and the fourth a speed of 23 knots.

Two more ships of this last type are practically ready for service and will probably be in service by the time this paragraph is read.

We have no ships of this type whatever.

Our two best ships—the *Nevada* and the *Oklahoma*—have a maximum speed of 22 knots.

The engine efficiency of our best dreadnaughts is 26,000 and 25,000 horsepower respectively. Japan's dreadnaughts have an engine efficiency of 60,000 horsepower.

During the past eighteen months German naval construction has been pushed at an enormous rate.

Our own Secretary of the Navy has just admitted that Great Britain has probably added to her navy sixteen great fighting ships since the present war began.

the *Oklahoma* and the *Nevada*—are, in comparison with foreign ships, plodders. The *Oklahoma* and the *Nevada* in their speed tests some months ago were able to make an extreme record of about 21 knots per hour. These are our best ships, but they are not yet in service.

Japan has three new ships of 68,000 horse-power that have a speed of 27 knots, one great super-dreadnought of 40,000 horse-power that has a speed of 23 knots. These ships are already *finished* and *in service*. Two more ships of the super-dreadnought type of the same speed are to be finished this year.

Ships like the *Minnesota*, *Connecticut*, *Vermont* and *New Hampshire* cannot *maintain* a speed of even 12 or 15 knots.

Moreover, the guns on many of our ships have shorter range than the guns of the ships of foreign navies. All the ships of the *Alabama* class have an extreme range of only $7\frac{1}{4}$ miles. The two great battles of the present war have been fought at a distance greater than 10 miles.

After witnessing a review of *ten of our best* battleships a short time ago, John Hays Hammond, Jr., remarked, "As we watched these massive structures pass, some of us wondered how long they could contest with the superior range gun-power and speed of the modern battle cruisers of other nations. To those interested in naval development,

it was obvious that only *four* out of the ten would make a real showing under modern battle conditions.”³

All of our battleships are supposed to be equipped with useable torpedo tubes, yet Rear-Admiral Strauss, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy, admitted in testifying that *all* ships of our navy, previous to the *Nevada* and the *Oklahoma*, have torpedo tubes, *which are useless for modern torpedoes*. As the *Nevada* and *Oklahoma* are not yet in commission, his admission means that we have now not one single torpedo tube in any battleship afloat that is of any value. Even when the *Nevada* and *Oklahoma* are commissioned, there will be but eight torpedo tubes adapted to the use of modern torpedoes in our entire navy, while every single modern German battleship has six tubes each.

Our torpedo boats are out of date and are inefficient. All of them are more than fifteen years old and about as useful as an automobile of an 1899 model.

Fast light cruisers are most important, not only in protecting other ships of the fleet, *but above all, in protecting coast lines*. Yet we have but three up-to-date ones to aid us in protecting thousands of miles of the Atlantic Coast, thousands of miles of the Pacific Coast and both entrances of the Panama Canal.

“This leaves our fleet peculiarly lacking in this

Big Guns on Ships¹

U.S.	████████████████████
Japan	████████████████████
Germany	████████████████████
Great Britain	████████████████████

(1) Keels laid since 1905.

The guns, larger than 10-inch, on ships the keels of which have been laid since 1905 are as follows:

United States	172
Japan	186
Germany	232
Great Britain	330

United States ships of this class have no 13-inch gun and almost one-half of all the guns are 12-inch.

Germany has twenty-four 15-inch guns, and Great Britain eighty 15.5 guns on ships of this class.

Average Horse Power per Ship ¹

U.S.	████████████████████
Germany	██
Japan	██
• Gr. Britain	██

(1) Keels laid since 1905.

This represents the average horsepower of each ship of the first line ships.

Japan has three ships finished of 68,000 horsepower each, one finished of 40,000 horsepower, two more almost ready for service of 40,000 horsepower.

In our entire navy we have but *four ships* the engines of which have *more than 30,000 horsepower* each, and the engines of three of these are just over the 30,000 horsepower mark.

element so necessary for information in a naval campaign, and of such great value in opening and protecting routes of trade for our own commerce, and prohibiting such routes to the commerce of the enemy." 4

"Leading the torpedo flotilla came the *Birmingham*, a sad reminder that we have only three light cruisers of considerable speed, and these vessels, compared to the numerous craft of this type in the British and German navies, would present a sorry contrast in their relatively low speed and weak armament." 5

We have not a single fast scout boat built or even authorised since 1904. The three we have are not armed adequately and are too slow for use. None of them has ever made more than twenty-six knots. Up to the present time, we have not been able to secure firemen able to live before their furnaces, for whenever there is a little wind they draw into the faces of the firemen, instead of upward into the stacks.

England and Germany have been adding scout cruisers at the rate of from three to eight each year. Each is able to make thirty knots or more an hour. Before the war Germany had fourteen and Great Britain thirty-one.

We have less than seventy *destroyers*. We should have at least three hundred.

The less said about our submarines, the better.

Nearly a year ago Commander Sterling testified that *one* out of the twelve on the Atlantic Coast could efficiently take part in the manœuvres at sea.

In the spring manœuvres this year, all of our *good* submarines, excepting one, were again unable to continue their operation because of some accident or other. In the October manœuvres, *all, except one*, were again conveyed to the navy yards, because "something" happened to their engines or other machinery.

But a new submarine has just been launched! Assuming that this one *will* work, we have evidently but two submarines, on the Atlantic coast north of Panama, able to manœuvre for a few days at least—without having to be convoyed to port.

Even those of the L type, which in the past we have considered about as perfect as any of our submarines, are now found to be defective.

We have two mine layers, one to cover the thousands of miles of the Atlantic Coast-line and one for the thousands of miles of the Pacific. Each mine-layer has but a few hundred mines. Germany had about 19,500 mines when the war began, and evidently laid about 14,000 or more in the North Sea for the purpose of destroying British commerce.

The American nation wishes no navy for the purpose of waging a war of aggression against any nation. We wish a navy for the purpose of supporting our policy and defending ourselves. Such

Average Speed of Ships ¹

U.S.	████████████████████
Germany	██
Gr. Britain	██
Japan	██

1. Speed of ships whose keels have been laid in the last six years, showing the increasing tendency for great speed in the construction of battleships of Germany, Great Britain and Japan.

Average Tonnage Displacement per Gun¹

Japan	████████████████████
Germany	████████████████████
Gr. Britain	████████████████████
U.S.	████████████████████

Not only are our ships slower than the ships of Japan, Germany and Great Britain, not only is the average horsepower of each of our first line ships less—in most cases less than half that of the ships of Japan—but *the average tonnage displacement per gun of our ships is greater.*

Our weaker engines propelling ships at less speed *must carry around greater weight per gun* than the stronger engines of the ships of Japan, Germany, and Great Britain. To carry each gun on the first line ships, our engines *must pull a bulk 16 per cent. heavier* than that which the higher-powered engines of Japan's first line ships have to propel.

defence must prevent other nations from bombarding our cities or landing troops on our coasts. As the nature of our shores permits landing of troops practically anywhere along our coast-line, the primal purpose of our navy is to defend our coast. "We have 21,000 miles of coast-line and a rapidly increasing commerce to defend." ⁶

Our coast-line now includes that of Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico, as well as that of the continental United States.

German submarines are certainly as efficient as ours. With one-half of their submarine fleet and fourteen thousand mines, they attempted to blockade 2,600 miles of the coast-line of Great Britain. Yet with all these means, they were able to stop or destroy only two per cent. of the ships entering British ports.

We have an idea that our present fleet of submarines and our present supply of mines will be of great value in defending our coasts against an invading fleet. At least, we have hoped that the number of mines we have, strewn along our coast, and the activity of our submarines might be able to prevent a considerable portion of an attacking fleet from landing men on our shore.

We will *assume* that our submarines *are* just as powerful, just as fleet, just as perfect in construction, just as well manned as the German submarines which operated against the English coast for eight-

een months—and the German submarines are the marvels of the world.

We will *assume* that the mines we have *can* be laid just as efficiently and that they are just as powerful as the mines Germany planted on the seas in her attempt to prevent ships entering British ports.

Germany's effort in preventing ships entering English ports was confined to a coast-line one-tenth as extensive as the coast-line we would have to guard. Her chances, compared to what ours would be, were consequently ten to one. The number of German submarines, compared to those we have, indicates that Germany's chances, compared to what ours would be, were five to one. The number of mines the Germans used compares to all the mines we have as twenty-five to one. Taking all these factors into consideration, the chances Germany had of preventing ships entering British harbours compares to the chance we would have of preventing foreign vessels entering our harbours as 1250 to 1.

Our present Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, takes great pride in comparing our navy to other navies of the world by showing its relative *tonnage*. In *tonnage* the navy of Great Britain is 183 per cent. greater than ours, while Germany's, according to the Navy Year Book of 1914, was 24 per cent. greater than ours. By this same method our navy

is ranked greater than the navy of France and greater than that of Japan.

No method of judging the *fighting* qualities of a navy can be more misleading and ridiculous than to determine those qualities by the tonnage of the navy. *One might as well judge the fighting qualities of a man by his bulk.* On the *tonnage basis* the greatest pugilist in the world would be the fattest man. If a man has a gouty foot and a wrenched back, if his wrists are swollen with rheumatism; and his shoulders suffering from neuritis, he isn't of much value in the fighting ring, even though he may weigh 470 pounds.

All naval authorities of Europe consider a battleship as a *fighting instrument*, not a *boat*. As a fighting instrument, either for offensive or defensive purposes, a battleship loses much of its value in twelve years, and is completely superannuated in twenty years. For this reason, a navy rapidly deteriorates in value if new ships are not constantly added. Consequently the plans of construction for the European navies are based upon retiring ships as soon as they reach a certain age, replacing them with modern up-to-date ships. *A merchant vessel* is an efficient carrier of commerce when it is twenty or even thirty years old, but a carrier of commerce is not a fighting instrument.

Our navy department, however, counts as fighting instruments anything and everything that floats

Battleships and Battle Cruisers 1

Gr. Britain 

42

Germany 

22

Japan 

19

U.S.A. 

12

1. This represents the number of battleships and battle cruisers authorized and laid down from December 31st, 1904, to January 1st, 1914.

And since January 1st, 1914, Germany, Japan and Great Britain have been rushing construction of ships of this type at a tremendous rate.

It is admitted even by Secretary Daniels that Great Britain has probably completed sixteen large ships since this date. It is known that Germany and Japan have been rushing construction of new ships night and day.

A member of the Japanese Cabinet, in presenting the new budget, urged that "not a single hour should be lost in Japanese Naval construction."

The United States has lagged woefully behind; at this writing, April 1st, 1916, the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* are not yet in service, although they were authorized more than five years ago.

in a seaworthy condition. No other method of making the apparent strength of our navy *more* misleading could possibly be evolved.

Our navy has greatly decreased in value relatively to other great navies during the last six years because new fighting instruments have not been built to take the place of those that have lost the value they once had. Because the American people fail to recognise the difference between the fighting value of a ship and its seaworthiness, they are still under the impression that they now have as strong a navy compared to the navies of other nations as they had under President Roosevelt. A battleship fifteen years old may be a very efficient and seaworthy craft, but almost useless as a fighting factor. Our Navy Department not only lists ships fifteen years old, but those twenty years old, thirty years old, and even forty years old.

Only four months ago the government at last assigned to the junk-man a warship *built just seventy-three years ago*. This ship was used in the war with Mexico in 1846 and went to Japan with Perry in 1853.

By listing anything and everything and ignoring our shortage in enlisted men and reserves, we have greatly over-rated our naval efficiency. If we include personnel and count only ships less than twenty years old, we fall to fourth place, finding France's navy better than ours.

Other nations of the world do not list their ships in this way. Japan, for instance, discarded most of her torpedo boats more than seven or eight years old. In 1904 the navy list of the official report of the Empire of Japan showed 85 torpedo boats; in 1913 she lists but 33. Her old torpedo boats have become useless as fighting factors and Japan does not try to deceive herself by counting her useless units. Also note that the official report of the Empire of Japan shows that she has *added* 47 new war vessels to her navy, exclusive of her torpedo boats and submarines in the last twelve years.

According to our naval lists, we have, of all types of fighting ships—battleships, armoured cruisers, first, second and third class cruisers—only 27 ships whose keels have been laid in the last twelve years, even counting ships almost completed, but not yet in commission.

Other navies of the world do not count their ships until they are finished. We count them as units of our navy as soon as they are voted and the Navy Department counts them the moment the keels are laid. But oftentimes two years elapse between the voting and the laying of the keel. And three years more elapse between the laying of the keel and the commissioning of the ship. The *Nevada* and the *Oklahoma* at the present moment, April 1, 1916, are not yet in service, although they were voted early in 1911, *five years ago*.

Battle Cruisers 1

Gr. Britain [REDACTED]

Germany [REDACTED]

Japan [REDACTED]




U. S. A. 0

1. This represents the number of battleships and battle cruisers authorised and laid down from December 31, 1904, to January 1, 1914.

During this period Great Britain authorized and laid down 10, Germany 7, Japan 6, U. S. A. none.

And since January 1, 1914, Great Britain, Germany and Japan have rushed construction of battle cruisers at an enormous rate. We have no battle cruisers in our navy, and none is authorised.

Scout Cruisers ¹

Gr. Britain	 <small>41</small>
Germany	 <small>19</small>
Japan	 <small>4</small>
U.S.A.	0

1. This represents the number of battleships and scout cruisers authorised and laid down from December 31, 1904, to January 1, 1914.

And since January 1, 1914, Great Britain, Germany and Japan have rushed construction of scout cruisers at an enormous rate. We have neither authorised nor laid down a single scout cruiser since December 31, 1904, and we have only three defective ones in our entire navy.

If you glance over the reports of the Secretary of the Navy, you will arrive at the conclusion that we have thirty-three first-class battleships capable of defending our shores. But the ordinary reader does not understand that when a ship is "out of commission" or "in ordinary" or "in reserve," it is temporarily or permanently useless.

"A battleship 'in ordinary,' as it is called, with less than a hundred men on board might as well be eliminated from the lists of ships available for any service within reasonable length of time."⁷

And when a ship is "out of commission" it takes months to repair it. The overhauling and repairing of the engines and machinery of a fifteen to eighteen million dollar fighting machine cannot be done in a few short weeks.

At the present day a navy is of value for defensive purposes only if it is *ready* in both material and personnel for immediate action. If Winston Churchill had not kept the British Navy in such a state of preparation that it could sail to sea on twelve hours' notice, England would now be a conquered province of the German Empire. If England had found it necessary to take even sixty days to put her fleet in order, the German fleet could have bombarded the towns of northern France, the Germans would have reached Paris and, the German fleet controlling the channel, the Germans could have landed an army of five hundred thousand men

in England before England could have mobilised more than 200,000 soldiers. England's existence to-day is due not only to the fact that she had a great navy, but that she *had it ready to move at once*.

As Rear Admiral Knight has stated, "A ship which is laid up for repairs is, for all practical purposes of defence, practically non-existent." The rest of a fleet will be defeated before the ships "in ordinary" or "in reserve" can be made ready to be of any value to the fleet.

Of our 33 battleships, 12 are already in one or another of the three useless classes; and all of the 21 remaining are not by any means in first-class condition. Many of them are continuously in naval hospitals. Of those in actual commission, ten only are ships of the first line and eleven of the second line. Of the ten of the first line, two are so out of date that they are to be relegated to the second line within three months. So by *June 1916 we shall have only eight first-class battleships in the entire American navy; and not one of these battleships can maintain a speed of more than 22½ knots, not one has a gun that can be elevated more than fifteen degrees and every one is weighted down with over-heavy armour.*

To man our ships in time of war with the smallest possible crews would require 72,500 men. We


have 53,000. Our torpedo boats have but two officers each. They should have six.

As previously stated, our only purpose in desiring an efficient navy is to protect ourselves from battle fleets coming to our shores with the intention of inflicting damage upon us or of demanding concessions and indemnities from us. We want a fleet that can prevent the landing of foreign troops on our coast.


The great navy of England has been developed for defensive purposes; first to reach out and defend its colonies and its commerce with them and other countries; and second, to defend Great Britain itself from invasion. The German Navy has been built up to defend German commerce and to defend Germany's commercial ports, in case Great Britain should ever attempt to bombard Hamburg and Bremen, as she bombarded Copenhagen and Amsterdam to destroy their commerce when they were ports of world importance.

From the defensive standpoint, therefore, a navy is of value proportionately to the length of its coastline; a navy is of value in proportion to the population of the country it has to defend—if the commerce of that country is destroyed *all* of the people will suffer; and a navy is of value in proportion to the area of the country it has to defend, inasmuch as the value of areal products will decrease in proportion to interference with the country's interna-


Comparative Naval Protection Given Each Citizen



Naval Protection per Mile of Coast Line



Naval Protection Given Home Lands



tional trade. This is the only true way of valuing a navy.

Germany has a coast-line of 1,000 miles; Great Britain and Ireland have a coast-line of 3,700 miles, Japan has a coast-line of 6,600 miles. From the defensive standpoint (as we have an enemy in the Orient) our coast-line stretches from Maine to Florida, from Florida to Mexico, from Mexico to Porto Rico, and from Porto Rico to Panama; on the west it stretches from Panama to Lower California, from Lower California to British Columbia, along the shores of Alaska; and then there are the Hawaiian Islands, Guam and the Philippine Islands. The Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War, states that the coast-line we must defend equals 21,000 miles. Comparing the greater population of the United States with that of other countries, its greater territory with theirs, its greater coast-line with theirs, our navy is pitiably small and inefficient.

Even though our battleships outnumbered and outclassed those of the enemy; even though we had a sufficient number of high-speed cruisers; even though our coast forts had guns of fifteen-mile range, instead of seven and a half—of what value will our guards be to us if we leave them as now with ammunition enough for only thirty minutes' fighting?

“The amount actually available for the guns

in some of our most important batteries is sufficient for only thirty or forty minutes' firing." ⁸

But lack of sufficient trained personnel is even more serious than lack of ammunition—because ammunition can be more easily obtained.

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 127. Editorial, Indiana newspaper.

² Page 128. National Defense, Vol I, No. 2.

³ Page 131. Associated Press report.

⁴ Page 134. Press report of an interview with an American naval officer.

⁵ Page 134. Associated Press report of interview with John Hays Hammond, Jr.

⁶ Page 138. The Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War.

⁷ Page 146. Rear-Admiral Austin Knight.

⁸ Page 151. Report of the Army Committee of the National Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C. Church, editor *Army and Navy Journal*; Captain Matthew Hannah; General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.

CHAPTER II

THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR

THE ordinary American citizen believes that the guns of our harbour defence would be able to prevent a landing of troops on our shores; but the layman does not make a distinction between *harbour* defences and land *coast* defences. The guns of our harbour forts may be of value in opposing an attack upon our cities and may be of value in preventing ships entering the harbour, but of land coast defences, we have none! There are 1,000 miles of good beach on our Atlantic coast on which an enemy's fleet could land without the least opposition any number of troops they might transport to our shores.

We have no guns there; we have no railroad tracks capable of carrying guns to those points; we have not a single armoured train in this country for the transportation of troops, guns and ammunition—the ordinary freight car under fire of an enemy would be almost useless. So far as preventing armed *invasion* of our country, the guns *at our harbour defences* are absolutely useless.

We have forts at Boston, New York, at the mouth of the Chesapeake and on the Pacific coast. The gun range of these forts is less than seven and a half miles—four and a half miles short of the range of the guns of the battleships which would be sent to attack us. The main entrance of the Chesapeake, leading to Washington, is one and a half miles beyond the extreme range of the guns at Fort Monroe. So that an entire fleet of the enemy could steam through, more than a mile beyond the reach of Fort Henry's guns.

The largest guns we have mounted on our Atlantic coast defences are twelve-inch. They carry $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles. General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, who has been in the army twenty years, states that if we remount these guns so as to make greater elevation and consequently longer range possible, we must reduce the bursting charge or weaken the penetrating power of the shell.

These guns might be so mounted as to have a range of fifteen miles. At such a distance the "angle of fall" is so great that the principal effect is obtained by the shell falling on the *deck*. If these guns were remounted so as to have a range of even fifteen miles, the penetrating power of their shells would become practically nil. The penetrating power of the shell, reduced in size from 1,000 pounds to 700 pounds, would be but *six* inches. Six-inch penetration power against modern battleships

renders a shell practically useless so far as penetration is concerned. The explosion of a shell which penetrates battleship armour but six inches takes place in the air outside the ship. The real value of an explosive shell is in exploding within the ship, either after penetrating the armour or falling on the deck. In other words, for adequate long-distance defence our harbour guns are useless because of their short length. They would be relatively weak if remounted, for either armour or deck attack.

We are, however, soon to mount two new gigantic guns of long range at Sandy Hook. These two guns are to operate in a single turret, hence it will be possible to aim them at but one point at a time. If a fleet of thirty dreadnoughts and battle cruisers attacked New York, each of the thirty ships could move about at will, changing its location as often as desired, so that the turret to be placed at Sandy Hook, to be effective against such a fleet, would be compelled to get thirty different aim ranges at the same time for thirty different battleships. But the ships, moving themselves about as much as they pleased, could centre their *one hundred and fifty guns at the same moment on the one fixed turret at Sandy Hook*. Thirty different battleships from thirty different locations could concentrate the shot of one hundred fifty guns on the single turret at

Sandy Hook; yet it could fire at but one single battleship at a time.

While these two long-range guns could fire twenty shots at thirty different moving ships, the battleships could hurl 2,000 huge explosive shells upon that fixed turret. And all other coast defence guns would be useless in such a conflict because of their short range.

“Most of the guns that are mounted on our coast fortifications, that is—all those of the 8-inch, 10-inch, and 12-inch calibre—date back to a design that was made in the early nineties and late eighties.”¹

The good 12-inch guns made for the defences of Panama, after having rested for months and even years on the Cristobel Docks, are at last mounted; but our one big gun there, the 16-inch gun, which we have been told was so powerful a defence for the canal, was still unmounted last January. *It was tested in 1903* and then it rested *ten years* on the beach. When General Wood took charge he immediately called for blue prints of the carriage of this gun, but was astonished to find that the War Department had never even made a design for the carriage. In spite of his urging, it took the department just two years to get the designs ready, and the carriage was not finished in January 1916, though the gun was finished and tested thirteen years ago. This, in itself, is an adequate answer to Secretary Daniels' proposal to have the United


States Government make its own armour, manufacture its large guns, shells and ammunitions.

Panama is better fortified than any other portion of our coast or any other harbour, yet we have on hand such an insufficient amount of ammunition that after two hours' fire there would not be one single shell for the Panama guns within a thousand miles of the Canal. In fact, for the sixteen-inch gun, no shells are yet made. Congress has extravagantly ordered 35 *rounds* for this gun, and this is under manufacture but not yet ready to ship. For the twelve-inch guns at Panama, *only 2,500 rounds* have been shipped.

"It must be borne in mind that an hour and forty-six minutes would suffice to exhaust the last round of ammunition if the guns were fired at their maximum rate." ²

It is assumed by the American people that if war broke out, we could manufacture ammunition quickly. We are misled as to our ability to quickly produce sufficient ammunition by what seems to us the enormous war orders which we are filling for Europe. That war has been going on for sixteen months. Every manufacturer in the United States can sell two and three and four hundred per cent. more shells a day than it is possible for us to manufacture. The big industrial arms and steel factories of the United States have turned their forces to filling these orders because they can obtain almost

Production of Artillery Ammunition in U.S.



A. Rounds of artillery ammunition now used every day by France. The figures are given on the authority of a Major-General of the United States Army.

B. The number of rounds of artillery ammunition used every day by the British forces in France. The figures are given by the same authority as the above.

C. The number of rounds of artillery ammunition which all the United States Government factories and all the private ammunition plants are able to produce daily, after twenty months of intense effort on the part of our greatest industrial corporations, backed by our greatest financiers, both endeavouring to turn out the largest possible number of shells.

England and France alone are now using every twenty-four hours not only as many shells as all the U. S. Government and private manufacturers in the United States can turn out, *but 873 per cent. more.*

any price asked, yet with all the push of big business, knowing that enormous profits await them, after sixteen months' effort, all the industrial resources, governmental and private, are turning out only 19,000 a day. One of the highest officials of the United States Army states that *France alone is using 125,000 shells a day and England 60,000.*

But let no layman think that the factories of the United States can turn out nineteen thousand shells a day *for American guns!*

Some of our factories are turning out guns for European nations; other factories are making shells for Russia. These guns are made to inch measure. The shells are made to the millimetre measure. Even though the shells and the bore of the guns are *almost* the same size, the shell made to the millimetre measure cannot be used in the gun made to the inch measure. The shell must exactly fit the gun—not “almost” fit it.

A change of machinery would be necessary to make shells to fit American guns and it takes months to make the machines that make the shells. It takes months to make the machines that in turn make the ammunition-making machines.

It is also urged that we could, if war were declared, run our factories night and day, and turn out enormous amounts of ammunition, thus equipping ourselves in a short time. Such an assumption or such an argument is due to ignorance.

At present almost all of the ferro-manganese which our steel factories depend upon as the alloy, comes from India and Brazil. We can make ferro-manganese in the United States; but if our munition manufacturers should be forced to make it out of our ore, the manganese content would be much lower. The product would also cost more; and there would be trouble in the factories before our chemists became adjusted to the use of the American product.

If we were at war, any foreign navy could easily cut off our supply. Two or three *Emdens* near the coast of Brazil, or near the ports of India, could completely bar this material from importation into the United States.

Gun cotton is one of the principal ingredients of smokeless powder. But to make gun cotton, it is necessary to have nitric acid. Nitric acid is made from nitrates. By far the largest source of our supply comes from Chile. This supply could also be cut off. Our principal sulphur mines are along the coast and a foreign navy could easily take possession of them.

The time to prepare for war is before the war begins. The great English drive, which Kitchener prophesied would take place last May, failed to materialise because General French had shells only for one day's fighting out of seven.

All our forts are but half manned. Those about

Boston have an average of less than 240 men each. Fort Wadsworth, protecting New York, has a garrison of about four hundred men, and Fort Hamilton about one-third more.

“Unless provision is made in the near future for additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker detachments at some of the defences of lesser importance, including Portsmouth, Delaware, Charleston, Savannah, Key West, New Bedford, Potomac, Tampa, Columbia, Baltimore, Cape Fear and Mobile.”³

A short time ago one of the two forts at Key West, the true key to the Gulf of Mexico, was manned by a sergeant and his family. After the death of the Sergeant, the widow and her daughter for months formed the garrison of defence.

General Weaver, Chief of the Coast Artillery Division, stated in the Senate that we have 252 twelve-inch guns already mounted without a single person to man them, two fourteen-inch guns mounted without a single man to operate them and 37 eight-inch guns mounted and useless with no crew, 71 ten-inch guns mounted without a single man to operate them. Modern guns are not simple catapults but complicated machineries. One has to be trained and skilled to handle them. No matter how intelligent the American citizen, he cannot step in and at once operate one of these guns off-hand, as

men could jump in and operate the guns of a hundred years ago.

A century ago the guns used were short-range guns. One could look at the object he aimed at and by sighting over the gun with his eye, bring the gun into line.

But at the present time gunners manipulating even the seven-mile range guns of our harbour defences are unable to aim by eye. As the gunner looks seven miles out at sea, he sees only the mast of the ship, very little of the hull. If the ship is ten miles away he sees no hull at all. But even if he sees the entire deck of a great dreadnought—one, six hundred feet long—by holding a cigarette in front of his eye at arm's length, the entire ship is completely shut off from his vision. The mark to be aimed at, so far as the eye is concerned, is less than the size of a cigarette.

For instance, a few years ago large mortars were considered practically useless—the aim was so bad. However, since the installation of base stations, range finding and direction finding instruments, these guns are valuable again. The use of these instruments for determining lateral deviation, elevation, and the handling of complicated machinery of the guns is work for skillfully trained men.

Aiming to-day is the result of the co-operation of three corps of men at three different places. The man down in the pit firing the gun is unable to see

anything, except the sky above him. To argue that an untrained man, even though skilled in other lines of mechanics, could step in and efficiently handle these guns is as ridiculous as to argue that a man who has never touched an automobile could enter as a race-driver merely because he knew how to run a typewriter.

But even if more men could be quickly trained, large numbers of the guns, in fact, a very large number, could not be used because we have not sufficient range-finders. Direction and fire control have been installed only at the most important harbour forts along our coasts. They have not been installed in other places, not only because Congress has not provided for them, but because we cannot import the necessary lenses at the present time. Not only are many of the guns of our coast defence absolutely blind, but many of the guns of our army and of our navy could not be used, because we neither have glasses, nor can we buy them. And, moreover, we cannot manufacture them. Our manufacturers are dependent upon Germany for the glass for the lenses. At present we cannot get that glass. If Germany were to attack us, she would not kindly send us 50,000 or 100,000 lenses in advance. If we were at peace with Germany, and Japan or Great Britain should attack us, the navy of Japan or the navy of Great Britain is efficient enough to interfere with our imports.

In this case, as in the case of munitions, the question is asked: Why can't we get to work and manufacture them? Chemists and workmen who are specialists in this line are rare. We have very few in this country. We have not a sufficient number of chemists and workmen specialised in these lines to meet the *present* demand. It takes time for the ordinary chemists to become specialists, just as it takes time for the ordinary physician to acquire the knowledge and technique necessary to make him a specialist.

Our coast fortifications manned with from 160 to 600 men can easily be taken from the rear by five thousand men, landed eight miles away, beyond the range of the guns of the fort. None of the guns protecting Boston, New York and the entrance to Washington could be used to repel a land attack.

"Fortified harbours from the days of the Romans to our own have usually fallen to a land attack rendered possible by naval superiority." ⁴

All along the Atlantic coast there are excellent strips of beach from fifty to two hundred miles in length. Speaking of the possibility of landing an army on these, General Francis Greene says:

"From Portland to Portsmouth there is a stretch of about fifty miles in which there are no fortifications, from Portsmouth to Boston a similar stretch, from Boston around to Newport a still longer piece of unfortified coast; from Montauk Point to Coney

Island and from Sandy Hook to Cape May, similar stretches of sandy beach, each more than a hundred miles in length.”⁵

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 155. General Weaver, testifying before Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives.

² Page 156. Huidekoper, in “The Military Unpreparedness of the United States.”

³ Page 160. Brigadier-General E. M. Weaver.

⁴ Page 163. National Defense, Vol. I, No. 2.

⁵ Page 164. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in “The Present Military Situation in the United States.”

CHAPTER III


THE GUARDS WITHIN

AFTER the mud dikes have been washed away, what will there be to stop the flood?


When the enemy attacks our eastern or our western coast, it will be done without warning. It will be executed just as Great Britain bombarded Copenhagen in 1807, just as Japan attacked China in 1894, just as she unexpectedly attacked the Russian navy two days before declaring war against Russia, just as Austria sent her soldiers to France in 1914 three days before she withdrew her ambassador from Paris, just as Germany marched into Belgium but *four hours* after the German Ambassador at Brussels indignantly intimated to the Belgian foreign office that the latter should not even question Germany's honourable intentions respecting Belgium's neutrality.

High officials of both Germany and Japan have informed their people *even in print* that when they attack the United States it will be done quickly and without warning. No time to prepare will be given us.

**Our Treasure Lands Which We Must Protect
and Those of Fifth Rate Powers**



Our Means of Protecting our Treasure Lands Compared with those of Fifth Rate Powers



Although the treasure lands which we have to protect are from 420 per cent. to 308,330 per cent. greater than the lands of any one of the fifth-rate powers, yet the mobile army which we have in the United States to protect our lands is but 5.6 per cent. of the army of Sweden, and but 30 per cent. of that of Uruguay.

1. Entire United States Army scattered throughout United States, in Porto Rico, in the Philippines, in Hawaii, in Alaska.

2. The mobile army in continental United States.

To defend our *eastern* coast against a quick attack we have an army of 6,600 men, stretched from Maine to Florida. This army, in number, equals one-fifteenth of the army of Paraguay, one-sixteenth of the army of Siam, one-seventeenth that of Guatemala, one-thirtieth that of Liberia.

The soldiers of one thousand one hundred and nine armies, each equal in size to our entire army of the East, have been killed, wounded or taken prisoners during the last twenty-one months in Europe.

Even the mobile entire army in the United States, which General Wood says might possibly be mobilised in thirty days by taking all of our troops from the Mexican border and the Pacific coast, numbers only 34,000 men and they are scattered about in forty-nine different ports.

Of course, in extreme necessity, this regular army could be reinforced by our reserve army of sixteen men!

The English and French have lost in killed and wounded *five times as many men as our entire mobile army in the United States* on a battle front not twenty miles long in Gallipoli alone!

And the militia! It also is scattered from Boston to Charleston, from Seattle to Los Angeles. On paper, our militia numbers 119,000 men. More than 60,000 of these men have had no rifle practice and only one-third of them have been able to pass the test of second-class marksmanship. Thirty

Comparative
Army Equipment Protection Given Each Citizen

By
U.S.A. ■

Japan ■■■■

U.K. Britain ■■■■■■

Germany ■■■■■■■■

Army-Police Protection Given Each Citizen

U.S.A. ■

Australia

Old System ■■■■■■

New System ■■■■■■■■■■

Switzerland ■■■■■■■■■■■■

thousand have never tried to qualify as third-class marksmen. Forty-four thousand seldom appear on the rifle ranges from year to year.


“In no state is the prescribed minimum peace strength of all organisations of the organised militia maintained, and in many instances the deficiency has reached such a figure as to leave the corresponding organisations such in name only, organisations of no value as military assets to the Federal Government.”¹

“It is believed to be a safe conclusion that not a single unit at its maximum strength marched a distance of 10 miles fully equipped.”²

In times of war large cities have to be garrisoned. If we were to bunch together all of our mobile army and all of our trained militia, we would not have a garrison equal to that which Paris requires at the present time, and Paris is only about one-half the size of New York, and about a third larger than Chicago.

If our entire army and every man of our militia were to be thinly stretched out in trenches, they would cover but two-thirds of the circumference of Greater New York alone. If then the entire mobile army of the United States and every man of the militia of our forty-eight states could be made, as by magic, to instantly appear in New York City, they could establish one single trench but two-thirds the way around Greater New York, leaving for the

U.S. Army Protection per 1,000,000 Citizens



In 1810, 1840 and 1890 we found ourselves well along in great peace periods.

The year 1810 was twenty-eight years after the close of the War of the Revolution; the year 1840 was twenty-five years after the close of the War of 1812; and the year 1890 was twenty-five years after the close of the Civil War.

During such long peace periods without any danger looming up before a nation, the people become indifferent to the army and the protection it may be called upon to give them.

Yet to-day, after five years of anarchy to the south of us, with half of the entire world at war, with ourselves in greater danger than at any time since the Civil War, we find that in proportion to each million of population, the number of soldiers we have in the United States to protect us is only about 25 per cent. of what it was in 1810.

enemy a free open pathway into our interior thirty miles wide.


In proportion to our citizens, in proportion to our area, and in proportion to our wealth, we have a smaller army than we have had even during the great peace periods of the United States.

In 1810, twenty-eight years after the close of the War of the Revolution, Senators and Representatives in Washington held that the United States would never again be involved in war. It was during this time that many public men even advocated the abolition of the army, believing that it would never be employed again.

By 1840, twenty-six years after the War of 1812-14, we had been at peace with all Europe for a quarter of a century. Europe seemed disposed to let us alone. There seemed to be no reason why we should ever go to war again. And once more prominent public men at our capital suggested not only the abolition of our army, but even the abolition of our navy, hinting that the world was so civilised that no great war would ever again occur.

By 1890, twenty-five years after the close of our Civil War, we had again had a generation of peace and the men in power were of a different age than those who had been leaders during the War of the Rebellion. These are three great peace periods of our national history—periods during which there was the least thought of war.

U.S. Army Protection per 100,000 Square Miles



In 1810, 1840 and 1890 we found ourselves well along in great peace periods.

The year 1810 was twenty-eight years after the close of the War of the Revolution, the year 1840 was twenty-five years after the close of the War of 1812; the year 1890 was twenty-five years after the close of the Civil War.

During such long peace periods without any danger looming before a nation, the people become indifferent to the army and the protection it may be called upon to give them.

Because of the great increase of our territory out of all proportion to the increase of our army, the number of soldiers we have to protect every thousand square miles from invasion is, to-day, but one-half of what it was in 1810.

In a democracy like that of the United States, the one purpose of the army is to protect the nation from rebellion, to protect the nation from outside attack. It is the idea and duty of the army to protect its citizens, to protect its land, to protect its wealth. But in times of peace, especially after a whole generation of peace, there is a tendency to forget the value of any army—to forget that a nation's citizens, that a nation's wealth needs a standing army for its protection. Hence we might expect that in 1810, 1840, 1890 the army of the United States would have been smaller in proportion to the number of its citizens, in proportion to its area and in proportion to its wealth than to-day when nations and colonies of four of the five continents are at war.

But in proportion to our population our mobile army in the United States furnishes us to-day but 397 soldiers per million population against 436 in 1890, 621 in 1840 and 1417 in 1810.

In proportion to each hundred thousand square miles of our territory, the mobile army in the United States to-day furnishes, for the protection of that unit of area, but 1034 soldiers, as against 1041 in 1890, 1174 in 1840, 1984 in 1810.

That which will most tempt foreign nations, however, is not the number of our people nor the amount of land we have—each of the hungry nations can secure undeveloped lands in South Amer-

U.S. Army Protection per Billion of U.S. Wealth



Our wealth tempts foreign nations more than our population, more even than our land.

One week's bombardment of New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, San Francisco and Seattle might win for a foreign power indemnities of fifteen billions of dollars.

To-day more than any other time in our national history we need an army to protect our wealth.

The army we now have to protect each billion of wealth is ridiculously small compared with that which we had in 1810, 1840, and 1890, when we appeared to be in no danger.

Per billion of wealth, our army in 1890 was nearly 100 per cent. greater than it is to-day; in 1840 it was nearly 550 per cent. greater; and in 1810 it was 2,100 per cent. greater.

ica—but our *wealth* tempts them! In proportion to each billion of wealth our mobile army in the United States at the present time furnishes us but 245 soldiers against 451 in 1890, 1761 in 1840, 4960 in 1810. Yet there are those who fear that we are becoming militaristic!

We have grown so rapidly in population, we have added to our territory so greatly and we have grown in wealth so enormously that our army to-day is but a handful, so far as its ability to protect, compared to the army we supported in the peaceful days of 1810. And in 1810 there had not been, during the years previous to that time, any great change in the matter of guns and equipment; but to-day things *have* changed.

If we to-day had an army proportionate in numbers to our present wealth, as the army of 1810 was to the wealth of the nation at that time, it would give us to-day a mobile force in the United States of 702,697 fighting men.

Neither Thomas Jefferson nor President Madison thought the army in their day too large, although both were opponents of a big standing army. But if our wealth in 1810 had been as great as it is to-day the peace-loving Jefferson and the pacifically-inclined Madison would probably have had an army of at least 700,000 men, especially if the population of the United States had then been ninety-seven millions. If the army of 1810 had

been reduced so that the number of men stood to their wealth as the number of men in our army to-day stands to our present wealth, the United States would have had an army in 1810 of just *491 men*.

Our little army has practically no field guns.

“We now have less than 800 guns and ammunition to serve them less than one and one-half days!”

“To send our modern infantry without the protection of field guns against an enemy armed with them is simply murder.”

“After war breaks out, field guns cannot be purchased abroad, nor can they be extemporised at home. From the date of giving the order for the manufacture of such guns to the date of delivery of the first gun, an interval of at least five months must necessarily elapse.”³

In Europe they are using 12½ and 16½ inch howitzers. Although by June 1, 1915, the war in Europe had been in progress five months, the United States did not then have a single field howitzer greater than the six-inch; and the United States had only thirty-two of these in all the United States, Philippines and Hawaii combined. Of the remaining, 85 per cent. are less than 4 inch and, moreover, 80 of these are old mountain guns absolutely obsolete.

“We own little over half the guns which Russia had at the battle of Mukden. Yet any ordinary

engagement of the European war makes the battle of Mukden look like a peace conference.”⁴


The equipment of the militia is worse than that of the regular army. It has no siege artillery at all, no large field mortars nor howitzers; and both the batteries of the regular army and the militia are without sufficient horses to draw them.

“The militia needs 316 of these guns to complete its equipment.”⁵

For the guns which the army has and for the guns which the militia have there is not half enough ammunition.

For years Congress has been urged to appropriate enough money to provide our field guns with an ammunition reserve of 1856 rounds per gun. This to Congress seemed enormous, although it is 66 per cent. of the minimum number of rounds that Germany kept on hand in peace times. Year after year Congress has failed to provide for this ammunition reserve. And at the rate of its past appropriations, it will take five years to bring it up to this 34 to 40 per cent. deficiency, compared with the number of rounds other nations kept on hand when at peace. At present, for the guns actually made, we have only 27 per cent. of the ammunition asked for—27 per cent. of the estimate which is infinitely lower than the minimum supply kept on hand by other nations during peace times. At present Ger-

Artillery Equipment



This chart represents only the number of guns.

It is almost needless to reiterate that the guns of our army are toy pistols compared to the great guns of other powers.

Germany has gigantic fourteen-, fifteen- and sixteen-inch guns.

England has hundreds of nine- and twelve-inch guns.

The United States, on the 1st of January, 1915, as admitted by the Secretary of War, had but 634 guns completed.

It is now rumoured that we have 850, and this chart takes advantage of the rumour.

Of the actual number of guns on hand January 1, 1915, 85 per cent. were *less* than 4-inch and eighty of these were old 3-inch mountain guns, absolutely obsolete.

1. This estimate of the number of German guns is very conservative, as is also the estimate as to the English guns. A former officer of staff of the United States Army personally informed the author in January, 1916, that Germany had at least 21,000 guns.

many and France are using *three hundred per cent. more than their pre-war maximum estimate.* The number of rounds now allotted to each gun in the German army is more than 3,000 per cent. greater than the number of rounds we have on hand per gun in the United States.

For the guns which the army has and for the guns which the militia have, there is not half enough ammunition.


“And we have ammunition to serve those guns, at the rate ammunition is now used, rather less than one day and a half of fighting.”⁶

Sixty years ago cavalry scouts acted as eyes for the army, reconnoitring and reporting the location of the enemy. To-day they are about as efficient as blind men. Reconnoitring is now done by aeroplane.

“An army without aerial scouts and aerial auxiliary can be coralled and slaughtered like a herd of sheep; a harbour or naval station without aerial defence is at the mercy of every puny submarine and cruiser.”⁷

At the beginning of the war, England had four hundred aeroplanes and she now finds it necessary to manufacture about five hundred a week to meet her needs and those of her allies. Germany at the beginning of the war had about one thousand aeroplanes and is now manufacturing at least four

Rounds of Artillery Ammunition



A. Daily rate at which ammunition has been used on present European battlefields as actually observed by an American military authority, from the fire of two German guns.

B. Actual daily rate of fire per gun of the First Battery of the Ninth Artillery Brigade at the Battle of Mudken, March 3, 1905.

C. Actual *daily* amount of ammunition per gun, including all the reserve ammunition in the United States, if pieced out to last forty-eight hours. *This amount was actually used in two and a half hours* by a German gun, as witnessed by an American military observer.

We have on hand in the army and in reserve but 27 per cent. of the minimum peace estimate of the War Department. But our minimum estimate for times of peace is 34 per cent. less than the minimum estimate made by Germany for each gun in times of peace.

This means that—in all our reserves—we have on hand for each gun but 10 per cent. of the minimum per gun peace estimate of Germany.

Germany is now using three times her maximum estimate. Hence we have on hand for each gun but 2.5 per cent. of the ammunition Germany can use per gun each twenty-four hours.

hundred weekly. The United States Government has about thirty useless ones. We have fewer aeroplanes than has Chile, Greece, Spain or Brazil. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifying, stated that the aeroplanes of the navy were of the oldest makes and that none of them were armoured.


“On the day President Wilson’s note was transmitted to Germany, the United States Navy had only *three aeroplanes in commission and the Army barely twice as many*. Of the 150 licensed civil aviators in the United States, only half have made flights of more than fifty miles, and none have experience in cross-country flying or know even the rudiments of military aeronautical requirements. Our Army, Navy, National Guard and Naval Militia have had practically no experience in handling air craft.”⁸

The Chief of the Department of Aerial Defence estimates that if every aeroplane factory in the entire United States were run to its full capacity, night and day, we could turn out only three hundred weekly.

One of our greatest military authorities, however—Mr. Carnegie—believes that we do not need guns, ammunition, aeroplanes or other equipment, not even rifles, so long as we have in the United States sixteen million men willing to die for their native land:

“I have always said that if at any time any

Third Fourth and Fifth Rate Powers Surpassing us in Aeronautic Equipment



The number of aeroplanes respectively possessed by Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland is greater than represented here because of the fact that these nations have been adding aeroplanes to their service since the beginning of the war—and full details of these additions have not been given out.

1. Of the aeroplanes of the United States, no two are like any other two; twenty-three are absolutely obsolete and useless; and none are armoured.

2. Number of aeroplanes supposedly capable of service which the United States was able to get together to aid in the punitive expedition into Mexico.

3. The number of aeroplanes that could actually aid in this punitive expedition, all others being unfit for service or breaking down on first trial.

On the day President Wilson's first note was sent to Germany *the United States had eight unarmoured aeroplanes in commission; three in the navy and five in the army.*

country was foolish enough to attempt invasion, the best possible plan would be to make their landing as easy as possible, point out to them the best possible roads, and allow them to go as far as they desired to go, inland. Then warn them to look out, and turn a million of our 16,000,000 militia upon them.”⁹

But what would the invading enemy be doing while we were arming a million men? Arming them with rifles alone would be useless against the shrapnel-throwers and rapid-fire machine guns of an invading army. But how are we going to instantly get a million rifles even, not to say anything of the larger guns!

Even if we could raise a million men in a day, even if we could arm every man with the best rifle in the world and supply them with an abundance of ammunition for that rifle; what would happen if we tried to oppose the advance of 250,000 soldiers, or 100,000 or even 10,000 men well equipped with fan-sweeping mitrailleuses and shrapnel guns? Our men would be compelled to advance over a strip of land four miles wide before they could get within rifle range of the foe. During every step of that four-mile march, our men would be swept by shrapnel!

If a million men in any army of Europe should be so foolhardy as to attempt, without the aid of successive trenches and the protection of heavy

artillery, to advance against 250,000 men equipped with mitrailleuses the *entire* million men *could be wiped out in an hour*.

Armies of Europe are provided with one or more mitrailleuses for every hundred men. The mitrailleuse is a fan-sweeping rapid-fire rifle. It swings in a fan movement from left to right and from right to left, firing from three to seven hundred bullets at terrific speed every minute.

The only protection against them is digging into trenches; the only machines to combat them are heavy artillery and shrapnel-throwers. To send a million rifle-armed citizen soldiery against such guns would result, just as General Wood and Henry L. Stimson have said it would result, in nothing less than *murder*.

A land force of two hundred thousand invading men would bring with them at least two thousand five hundred mitrailleuses, for immediate use, besides those which they would keep in reserve. These guns can be carried on a soldier's back, pulled by trained dogs, attached to motorcycles, or even bicycles. Such an invading army could easily bring 75,000 such guns if it should be deemed necessary.

But even two thousand five hundred of these guns could fire in three hours, allowing for changes of belts, cooling time and so forth, 900,000,000 shots.

Modern warfare is a contest of trained brains directing delicate, complicated, high-speed, death-dealing machines! No matter how strong the men, how brave the heart, how noble the soul, citizen soldiery unequipped with like instruments and undirected by like brains are but food for Moloch!

But we would not even be allowed to arm. Two hundred thousand equipped troops landed at Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Washington could almost immediately seize all our eastern arsenals, our gun factories, our ammunition, explosive and powder works; so that we could arm our million men only with golf clubs, walking sticks, and pocket knives.

Many of the large government ammunition works, gun factories, naval stations, arsenals and submarine bases are *on the coast* and could be easily destroyed by bombardment from enemy's ships standing off ten miles completely out of range of our coast guns. The enemy, if they so wished, could destroy the five big gun and ammunition works at Bridgeport; the Winchester Arms Company and the Modern Firearms Company at New Haven, the U. S. Naval Magazine at Hingham, Mass., the United States Submarine Station at Newport, the Bliss Torpedo Works at Brooklyn, the United States Navy Yards at Portsmouth, Boston, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Washington and Charleston, the United States Arsenal at Gov-

ernor's Island, the Proving Grounds at Indian Head, the Marine Barracks at Washington and Port Royal, the Naval Stations at Key West and Guantanamo, the new Du Pont factories at City Point, Virginia.

The location of these works is exactly known to the navies of all foreign nations. Unlike the guns of our harbour defences, they are not hidden in pits from the sight of the enemy. While there is a dumb hope among us that by some miraculous means we may be able to prevent the guns of foreign fleets destroying these factories, that hope is indeed vain.

Every man knows that a difference of even an inch in the reach of a prize fighter gives him a great advantage over an opponent whose reach is one inch less. But what chance would a prize fighter have with arms 32 inches long if he were to attempt to combat with a man with *arms 64 inches long*? Even if it were possible to install guns to protect these works their effective range compared with the range of the guns of foreign battleships would be as 32 to 64.

The largest United States arsenal for the manufacture and storage of rifles is at Springfield, Massachusetts, three hours by train from Boston and three and a half hours from New York. At Dover, New Jersey—less than two hours from New

York—are located the big naval depots for explosives and ammunition for the Atlantic fleet and the United States Army arsenal, at which practically all the high explosives and smokeless powder of the United States Government are kept.

Nine-tenths of all the large *private* manufactories of rifles, rapid-fire guns, heavy artillery, shrapnel, smokeless gunpowder, torpedoes and high explosives are within three and a half hours by train from Boston, New York or Philadelphia.

The principal private gun, ammunition, powder, shrapnel and explosive factories are located as follows:

At Hartford, Connecticut, which is but three hours by train from New York and three hours from Boston, are the Colt Patent Fire Arms Company and Pratt and Whitney Works;

At New Haven, three hours from Boston and three and a half hours from New York, is the Smith & Wesson Revolver Co.;

At Bridgeport, one hour and a half from New York, are the Bridgeport Arms Company (which is of such magnitude that it has been able to take many enormous European war order contracts—one order alone amounting to 168 millions of dollars), the Union Metallic Cartridge Company, the American-British Manufacturing Company, which makes rapid-fire guns, and the Locomobile Company;

At Troy, New York, four hours from New

York, are big gun factories and one of the most important high explosive works in the United States;

At Schenectady, four hours from New York, is the General Electric Co., which has already contracted for \$100,000,000 European war orders;

At Utica, which is distant from New York but nine and ten hours by two different routes, is the Savage Arms Company;

At Ilion, nine hours from New York, is the Remington Small Arms Company;

At Carney's Point, Parlin Lakes and Pompton Lakes, each not more than two hours from New York, are the Du Pont Smokeless Powder Works;

At Dover, New Jersey, but one hour and a half from New York, is the Picatinny Arsenal;

At Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, only three hours from New York, is the Bethlehem Steel Works, with its big gun factories, shrapnel and torpedo works;

At Philadelphia, two hours from New York and on the Atlantic Coast, is the Baldwin Locomotive Company;

At City Point, Virginia, is the new mammoth Du Pont Powder Works.

And there are also the Westinghouse Company, the American Car & Foundry Company, the American Locomotive Company, the Ætna Explosive Company, the Pressed Steel Car Company, the New

York Air Brake Company, the Crucible Steel Company, the Hercules Powder Company, and the Studebaker Corporation—all fitted to make supplies of war.

But with the exception of a very few establishments, *all* of the foregoing are within ten hours by rail of New York. Even Pittsburg, the centre of the steel industry of the United States, is, for a military train making no stops except for change of engines, but ten hours either from New York or Washington.

Before a foreign army landed, *patriotic citizens of foreign governments* naturally loyal to their fatherlands, yet living in the United States, could cut all telegraphic and telephonic cables between New York and the West, and five hundred of these men by quick and unexpected attacks could seize and control the wireless stations.

They could establish themselves in accordance to previous instructions along the principal railways leading out of New York City, protecting the railways from damage, and easily keeping them clear for the movement of foreign troops.

I am well aware that not one out of ten thousand Americans will believe that there is, within the United States, any military supervision of the citizens of foreign governments. The sun shines, however, even though blind men fail to see it. And if we do not wake up to the fact that there

are in the United States at present semi-organised military units of at least four different foreign governments, and if we do not immediately prepare to interfere with the plans of those foreign governments, we shall see enacted here in our own land exactly what happened less than twenty-two months ago in France, in Austria and in eastern Prussia.

When in 1912 and 1913 I made statements to Germans of Russia's activity in East Prussia, when I informed French friends in the *Ministere de la Marine* as to German war preparation in northern and eastern France, each and all shrugged their shoulders, smiled patiently and indulgently, thinking me obsessed.

The Russians *had* prepared the way into Eastern Prussia and into Austria. The movement into Austria failed because of the activities of the secret agents of the Austrian government; but even the *Wilhelmstrasse* was not awake to what the Russians had been doing in Eastern Prussia. General von Hindenburg for more than half a generation had been fortifying East Prussia until its defences against Russian invasion were, according to all European military critics, the strongest in the world. Yet Cossacks, unequipped with heavy artillery, made an advance of scores of miles past these "strongest and heaviest fortifications." They were able to do so only because the gates were opened to them

by Teutonic-Russians living in Eastern Prussia and because mines were sprung, opening up passageways.

And the Germans' advance to the very gates of Paris was due, partially at least, to two gates opened to them, one on either side of Lille. Six months after the war began it was found that a private assistant of one of the most important military men in France was of foreign parentage, although he possessed the birth certificate and military training papers of a young French lad who had died in a foreign country and whose death had not been reported at home. Even nine months after the beginning of the war a way was again opened—the entire aerial defences of Paris were misdirected—permitting a Zeppelin raid on that city in March, 1915.

In New York City, during the last few months, I have heard discussed by citizens of *three different foreign countries* the methods by which a majority of the taxies and private automobiles of the city of New York could be mobilised within five hours after the general order was given to chauffeurs of foreign citizenship; I have heard explanations of the intelligence system by which foreigners employed as drivers of large trucks can be given their instructions as to what they are to do and how they are to do it; I have heard described the method of withholding food supplies from the pop-

ulation of New York and the subsequent delivery of these supplies to the invading army; I have heard explanations of the system by which patrols can be established on an hour's notice on all roads leading out of New York, Jersey City and Hoboken; preventing the passage of any automobile that has not a permit; the arrangement for cutting off the light and the power, if that should be deemed necessary; the organisation of foreign engineers, repairmen, and railroad workmen for the repairing of any damage to railroads occasioned by American citizens wishing to stop the advance of a foreign foe.

I am not writing of the agents and officers of any *one* country; these things have been planned by citizens of at least *four different foreign nations*.

And why should they not do so? If foreign governments are planning to seize our cities and hold them for ransom, it would be foolish not to prepare the way for the advance of their invading forces to our ammunition works, gun factories and arsenals?

There are living in the United States one million British subjects; at least seventy thousand trained Japanese soldiers; and two hundred thousand loyal German and Austrian men, not German-Americans, but Germans and Austrians who have no desire to become citizens, who have never declared their intentions of doing so and who are now reservists of the German and Austrian arm-

ies, under the command of their respective Emperors.

Within an hour after the landing of a hostile army in New York every railroad station could be seized.

Dover, where practically all the high explosives of the United States are stored and where the great naval depot is located, is but one hour and a half from New York, even by slow train. Three trains of ten cars each running fifteen minutes apart could easily convey to Dover one thousand trained soldiers with all their light equipment, including one hundred motorcycles, with rapid-fire fan-sweeping mitrailleuses. If they could not at once take possession of the factories and arsenals they could absolutely control the situation until reinforcements and heavy guns arrived.

I saw a French lad of twenty-three, wounded in the arm and in the head, brought into one of the hospitals after the battle of the Marne. He and his companion had operated one mitrailleuse. This they had placed in a small opening between two rocks, so that they were fairly well sheltered. These two boys effectively worked their one machine-gun for three hours. When the enemy was finally driven back *it was found that 1963 dead bodies had been left in the fan-sweep of this one gun.*

Bridgeport at the east—the Essen of the United

States—is but one and one-half hours from New York. This could be taken and held, with the aid of bombardment from the sea, more easily even than Dover. With gatling guns once established, the factories could be held by five hundred men. Other divisions could then move on to New Haven and later to Hartford. Another division could move to Springfield from Boston, only three hours by rail. From the Pennsylvania Station alone, trains of ten cars could be run to the west every fifteen minutes, if necessary. A hundred thousand troops could be moved in seventy-two hours to capture all the plants in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania.

Pompton Lake, Carney's Point, Parlin Lake and all the important ammunition, powder and explosive factories in New Jersey could be reached from New York in less than *four hours*. Bethlehem itself and the eastern coal fields are but *three* hours away.

From the New York Central an equal number of trains could carry an equal number of troops to capture the arms and ammunition factories in Eastern New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island.

But could a foreign army accomplish all this in the face of the opposition of individual American citizens?

At the beginning of the European war France mobilised one million men in the first six days; Belgium had two hundred thousand regulars, reserves and garde civique, and England within fifteen days had at least forty-five thousand men on the continent. Yet three hundred and fifty thousand Germans (an army no larger than that which could be easily landed at New York either by Great Britain or Germany) although opposed by a stubborn resistance of the Belgians, forty-five thousand British and at least one-third of the million the French had mobilised, ploughed their way through Belgium, passed through the open gates at either side of Lille and advanced 200 miles in the face of that opposition, to the very suburbs of Paris.

Every official of importance in the United States army and every military authority of the United States who has expressed his opinion regarding this matter has asserted that a small foreign army equipped, as European armies are equipped to-day, could easily land on our coast, take our port fortifications by rear action and advance into the country, taking possession of practically all our ammunition supplies, our gun factories, our explosive and torpedo works, our arsenals and our depots of military and naval supplies.

Of course, if we should kindly be given *six days' notice*, we could mobilise our twelve little field guns east of the Mississippi. We could send one toward

Boston to stop the movement of foreign troops advancing upon the United States Arsenal at Springfield. Two more guns could be sent up the Hudson to prevent the advancing hosts moving on toward Troy, where most important high explosive works are located. Three might be sent to stop the advance through New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania; two to Philadelphia and two to Washington. The other two would probably be kept to equip our Army of the East in line of defence. Thus we might arrest the invading armies.

But if these guns should not stop or annihilate the enemy, the only opposition possible (if we do not at once prepare) would be an avalanche of men and our only victory—"a flood of blood."

"The president knows that if this country needed a million men, and needed them in a day, the call could go out at sunrise and the sun would go down on a million men *in arms*." ¹⁰

"American daring and patriotism will drive back with terrible blows any foe that dares put his foot upon the land of the free." ¹¹

Before the present European war, the forts of Liège, Namur and Antwerp were considered the strongest in the world. Military experts agreed that they could never be taken nor destroyed. Yet the great German howitzers (which the French-English-American experts asserted existed "only

in imagination") cracked open the Belgian forts as though they were egg shells.

War to-day is a matter of machinery—howitzers, shrapnel-throwers and rapid-fire machine guns. Any army, not fully equipped with all of these, must bow to defeat, no matter how courageous and stubborn the individual fighting of its soldiers. If any army lacks but one element of such equipment, that lack will in all probability lead to at least temporary defeat.

At the beginning of the war the French were not as well armed with rifles as were the Germans; they were not as well supplied with rapid-fire guns; they were not as well equipped with shrapnel-throwing guns, nor with heavy artillery. Consequently the Germans forced their way from the western boundary of Belgium and Luxembourg to the suburbs of Paris in four weeks.

The English in retreat were mown down and slaughtered, not by individuals, but by German war-machines. In one little spot in southwestern Belgium two thousand three hundred nine British soldiers lay in one place as a result of two hours' work of German shrapnel and rapid-fire guns. It was the price paid for non-equipment!

In November, a year ago, General von Hindenburg made a statement that his field and machine guns had filled in the swamps of eastern Prussia with the dead bodies of the Russian Cossacks, who

had been armed only with rifles and lances. The Germans themselves have never spoken disparagingly of the courage, bravery and stubborn resistance of the Russian soldiers; time and again they have justly praised their fighting qualities. Yet Russia, with a reserve of 13,000,000 men of military age, has been driven back two hundred thirty miles because her armies were not efficiently equipped with guns and ammunition.

Since France has acquired a supply of 75's and 155's and a plentitude of rapid-fire machine guns she has been able to hold in check and to drive back little by little the well-equipped Germans.

A small army, not numbering more than fifty thousand, if well equipped with field artillery, shrapnel-throwers, and rapid-fire machine guns drawn by dogs or carried on bicycles, can wipe an army of half a million men equipped as we are equipped to-day.

Remember, two French boys, with *one* machine gun held thousands of equipped Germans at bay; and as a result of only three hours' fighting the one gun garnered a toll of 1963 dead bodies. There would be no possible means of preventing the investment and capture of all the arms and ammunition works, arsenals and naval depots of Dover.

No more striking remark was made at Platts-

burg than that of the instructor in artillery practice, who said in substance:

“General Longstreet and General Hill in the Battle of Gettysburg had in their corps, in service, only nine fewer field guns than there are in the regular army in the United States to-day. We have nine less guns than were used by two corps at the Battle of Gettysburg—a sad reminder of the fact that the regular army has to-day, east of the Mississippi, only three batteries (12 guns) of field artillery.”

Twelve guns to hold back an army advancing from Portland, or Boston, or New York, or Philadelphia, or Washington, or Charleston or Savannah.

“The fire of modern field-artillery is so deadly that troops cannot advance over terrain swept by these guns without prohibitive losses. It is therefore necessary to neutralise the fire of hostile guns before our troops can advance, and the only way to neutralise the fire of this hostile field-artillery is by field-artillery guns, for troops armed with the small arms are about as effectual against this fire, until they arrive at 2000 yards, as though they were armed with knives.¹²

No enemy would attempt to land on our shores with less than two hundred thousand men, completely armed and perfectly equipped. Our entire army of the East is but 6,600 men and they are

scattered over a strip three thousand miles long. They have but twelve pieces and but 44% of the ammunition necessary for immediate use.

“The Secretary of War (Mr. Garrison) has stated on several occasions, although not in public utterance, that we have on hand but one round of ammunition for our field artillery.”¹³

I have before me a personal letter from one of the aides attached to the staff of General Joffre, in which he writes me of the value of the motorcycle mitrailleuse and its destructiveness as demonstrated in the present war. I quote a portion of that letter.

“The motorcyclette armed with a small mitrailleuse such as we now employ is much more useful than the armoured motor-car. It is very small; one can come very near to the enemy without being seen; one can hide behind trees, bordering the road, make an attack upon an advance guard and get away quickly and safely. If the road is bad, one can take the muddy sides and avoid the big holes which are disastrous for heavy carriage; *one* clever rider and skillful operator can do great harm in a few minutes. As soon as he arrives at the place from which he wishes to attack, he can put his mitrailleuse in position and destroy a patrol, or a convoy, or even an advance guard and speed back to his own lines at eighty kilometres an hour. He can change his position so often and so quickly that

the enemy's detachment cannot find his firing position. In the country he offers only a very small target compared with the big side of a steel-covered motor-car.

"Three of our cycle-mitrailleuse accomplished here yesterday a wonderful raid. They heard that a German regiment was going to enter, music ahead, a village. They arrived in front of the column and hid behind bushes. As the first ranks of the Germans entered, our three men fanned them with the three motor-cycle guns. Every man in the German regiment was not only wounded, but killed." ¹⁴

If a million of our noblest men 'sprang to arms' providing themselves with clubs, knives, crowbars, revolvers, shot guns and rifles, they would be murdered as they advanced under the range of the enemy's shrapnel-shell throwers and rapid-fire fan-sweeping guns. If we remain unprepared, a half of our "million men" will be slaughtered in this way: and then those who now advocate such a system of defence should be held as "guilty of murder in the second degree."

We *can* raise a million in a day!

And we can send forward a million men, undrilled, untrained and only partially armed to meet the field artillery, the shrapnel and the rapid-fire machine guns of the present-day warfare! But if

we do so, we shall form lakes in our fields, our lowlands and our meadows—out of their blood!

Let us not go into the darkness again with unfilled lamps!

We have listened before to the Randolphs and the Buchanans! We have listened to those who preferred peace-at-any-price; we have in the past heeded those who wished us to prepare only after the calamity was upon us; we have followed those who feared that sane preparation would turn us into a military camp! And each time, because of our stupidity, we paid a tragic price ten-fold too great!

It is sad for a nation to lose its men on the battlefield, even when fighting for that which is righteous; but it is vicious to live cowardly in the face of the evils which threaten us. Let us be as willing to pay the *just* price as were the Christian martyrs at Rome; but let us not, by listening to false prophets, permit ourselves to be once more forced to pay a tragically vain, needlessly wasteful, wanton toll of blood again!

Yet even this would not be the full price, however. Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Washington would be bombarded if we refused to guarantee gigantic indemnities, refused to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, refused to turn over the trade of South America and the control of the Panama Canal to our foreign foe.

Then we would be compelled to take a new position in the world of affairs! It might correspond to our present position as Persia's status to-day corresponds to the station she occupied before she was conquered by Alexander; it might correspond to our present position as Spain's present international status compares with her seventeenth century prosperity and world power; it might correspond to our present world status as little Holland of to-day compares with the mighty Netherlands of less than three centuries ago; and it might correspond to our present supremacy as the condition of Poland divided into Austrian, German and Russian provinces corresponds to the position occupied by that renowned kingdom before she was apportioned among the three hungry nations of her day.

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 170. Brigadier-General Miles, Chief of the Militia Division of the War Department, United States Government.

² Page 170. Report of General Wotherspoon, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

³ Page 177. From address to Merchants' Association by the Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War.

⁴ Page 178. The Hon. Augustus P. Gardner, Congressman from Massachusetts.

⁵ Page 178. Report of the Army Committee of the National Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stim-

son, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C. Church, editor *Army and Navy Journal*; Captain Matthew Hannah; General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.

⁶ Page 180. (See note 4.)

⁷ Page 180. Alan R. Hawley, President Aero Club of America.

⁸ Page 182. (See note 7.)

⁹ Page 184. Interview of Andrew Carnegie, as reported by the Associated Press.

¹⁰ Page 197. Hon. William Jennings Bryan, in address to the Baltimore Bar Association.

¹¹ Page 197. American newspaper editorial.

¹² Page 200. General Leonard Wood, Commander of the Army of the East.

¹³ Page 201. George Lauferti, in "United States and the Next War."

¹⁴ Page 202. From personal letter from a member of the staff of General Joffre.

**PART THREE: WHAT ARE OUR
CHANCES?**

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CHAPTER I

WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES

THE German Navy is practically twice as strong as ours, even if we accept the official figures of Berlin and Washington as the standards of comparison. But most of the German ships have been built during the last twenty years. German ships are of the most modern construction, while many of our listed ships are out of commission, "grey-bearded" or in their "second childhood"—one 72 years old has just this year been disposed of by the Navy Department.

How misleading comparisons, made by listing anything and everything, really are, can be judged from the official statement of *Naval Intelligence*, United States Navy Department, issued *only thirty days* previous to the beginning of the present European War. It assured us in figures that we had three more submarines than Germany had and that we were building more than Germany.

Very few of our ships have guns that can be ele-


vated more than 10 degrees; a few can be elevated 15 degrees. Most of the German ships have guns that can be elevated from 20 to 28 degrees. This is of supreme importance! Even the eleven-inch guns of the Germans because of this advantage can throw explosives fourteen miles.

“Germany can oppose twenty dreadnoughts to our ten, and, judging from such naval actions as were fought in the late war, in which both the gunnery and the seamanship of the Germans was excellent, there can be little doubt that with such great odds against us we should be defeated.”¹

Germany could send against us nearly twice as many dreadnoughts and battleships as we could to oppose their attack. And the German dreadnoughts have greater speed; their guns have longer range and can be elevated twice as high as the guns on our ships. Germany can send against us six times as many swift cruisers as we have. Germany could send against us more than twice as many destroyers as we could employ in opposition; Germany could easily send fifty of the most modern submarines. On the Atlantic coast we have eighteen. Five of these are located at Panama. Two, north of Panama, are capable of operation *under* water.

If they wished they could easily transport to our shores five hundred thousand men, but the General Staff at Berlin knows that 250,000 veterans are sufficient. Consequently their definite plans are

Our Chances at Sea against a German Attack ¹



N. B. Lines representing the *same* United States factors of defence may vary on different charts because they represent proportional values.

1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers and destroyers authorised and laid down by Germany and the United States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These modern boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards, ships in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder the speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern ships; hence, their detrimental value in modern battle.

Since January 1, 1914, Germany has been building modern battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines at a tremendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind.

2. Torpedo tubes for modern torpedoes which we *will* have after the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* are in service.

3. The three scout cruisers we have are of doubtful value, because of their defective furnaces.

4. Representing the proportion of all our useless submarines to the submarines Germany could spare from European waters.

5. Representing the proportion of submarines able to submerge, to those Germany could send to attack us.

made for the transportation of but a quarter million well-equipped perfectly armed men.

“Germany has the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a first-class transport fleet, not surpassed even by England’s.”

“Germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is more efficient than any other country.”

“In our loading of East Asia transports, it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. The speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general.”

“For long-distance transportation our large harbours on the North and East Seas can be utilised equally well for embarkation. *Speed is the chief requisite.*”

“Especially suitable harbours on the North Sea are Emden, Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven in connection with Bremen, and Cuxhaven with Hamburg and Gluckstadt.”

“Bremerhaven is by far the best. From this point *two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty.* Cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with Hamburg is important. If it were brought up to full development it could take care of *two divisions a day*, which Hamburg could well supply.”

“The United States at this time is *not* in a posi-

tion to oppose our troops with an army of equal rank. Its regular army actually totals 65,000 men, of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend the home country.”²

Certainly the Germans would not land an invading army without thoroughly equipping them. Their 250,000 men would bring with them 148 batteries of six guns each—888 guns. It is reported by several different military authorities that we have twelve field guns east of the Mississippi; even should this number be tripled, we would have but one field gun to every 24 of the Germans. Germany, according to the present minimum armament of the men she has in the field (and her men must be well equipped or they could not hold their trenches) has now a reserve of 19,400 field guns, while we have but 850. The average size of the German guns is twice the size of ours.

The German army would be amply supplied with ammunition. Germany has shown for twenty-two months that she does not start a campaign until she is able to furnish sufficient supplies.

“It is almost a certainty that a victorious assault on the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that the government (U. S. A.) would be willing to treat for peace.”

“To accomplish this end, *the invaders would have*

to *INFLICT REAL MATERIAL DAMAGE* by *injuring the whole country* through the successful seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which the threads of the entire wealth of the nation meet." ³

(The italics and capitals are the author's.)

Only peace-at-any-price insanity can prevent us from realising that once the Germans have crossed the Atlantic, they will, unless we agree to their demands, carry on a campaign of destructiveness (*real material damage*).

On the chart "Our Chances on Land Against German Invasion," as well as on the chart, "Our Chances on Land Against British Invasion," every fighting factor of the United States is not only given at its full value, but oftentimes greatly exaggerated. This is done not to mislead, but because of my desire not to underestimate any factor of our resources. For instance, the line representing the guns with our Army of the East (the only army together with the Eastern Militia that could be gathered quickly enough to meet a rapid invasion) *is 900% longer than it ought really to be!* It is made thus because it is hoped that, by some miraculous means, a few of the guns west of the Mississippi might be rushed to the Eastern coast in time to be of some value. The most sanguine optimist, however, can hardly expect me to give greater leeway than an exaggerated estimate of 900%.

Our Chances on Land against German Invasion Comparative Values

Invading Army	Ger. [REDACTED]
Opposing Army	U.S. [REDACTED] 1
Guns with Army	Ger. [REDACTED]
	U.S. [REDACTED] 2
Guns in Reserve	Ger. [REDACTED] 3
	U.S. [REDACTED] 4
Size of Guns	Ger. [REDACTED]
	U.S. [REDACTED]

Ammunition Supply:

1st 18 hours	Ger. [REDACTED]
	U.S. [REDACTED]
Afterwards	Ger. [REDACTED]
	U.S. [REDACTED] ?

N. B. Lines representing the *same* U. S. factors of defence may vary on different charts because they represent proportional values.

(1) Representing the entire army which can be mobilised in thirty days, men in our Atlantic Coast defences, and the militia of the Eastern States.

(2) Representing 900 per cent. more field guns than we now have with our entire army east of the Mississippi River.

(3) And in addition, a line 500 per cent. longer.

(4) Representing all of the field guns in the United States.

All lines representing supplies are of course greater than the actual amount on hand.

At the same time the invader could without doubt have the aid of warring factions in Mexico whose attempted invasion of the United States from the south would compel us to keep on the Texan border the eighteen thousand troops we already have stationed there.

To meet the Atlantic invasion we would then have an army of 6,600 men, supplied with enough ammunition, stored in many different arsenals in various parts of the United States, to fight for thirty-six hours. Besides these regular troops, we might oppose them with unarmed volunteers.

“Two real defenders of the country that must not be forgotten are Major-General Frederick Funston, and Major-General Leonard Wood. General Funston has 11,000 men under his command in the Department of the South, including Texas, through which hostile forces might seek to come from Mexico. He is a veteran and knows how to handle troops. General Wood commands the Eastern Division and has 6,600 men under his command.”⁴

No one doubts for a moment the ability, the saneness and the justly honoured efficiency of General Wood; and for that very reason we ought to accept his opinion as to what he *could* do with the army in its *present* condition. He has definitely

stated that it would take at least thirty days to mobilise our present army of 34,000 men, to say nothing of enlisting, organising and equipping a citizen soldiery.

Does the newspaper editor above quoted expect that a quarter-million German veterans, who have performed deeds of valour in Belgium, would, if General Wood should mount the base of the Statue of Liberty and wave his arms in the air, take fright and drown themselves by plunging in terror into the sea?

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 210. J. Bernard Walker, Chairman of the Navy Committee, National Security League, and editor *Scientific American*.

² Page 213. From book outlining Germany's means and method of attacking England and the United States; prepared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, when member of the General Staff at Berlin; book approved by the Kaiser and widely circulated.

³ Page 214. (See note 2.)

⁴ Page 216. Indiana newspaper editorial.

CHAPTER II

WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES

THE Japanese cannot afford another war; their national debt is now one-eighth their national wealth."

"The Japanese might attack the Philippines, but they would not attempt to bring an army across the Pacific; they could not do so if they wished—such a feat is impossible!"

"Besides the fleet on the Pacific, the United States has eight submarines here and coast forts that are declared impregnable. Certainly an enemy would find itself as hard put in attempting to invade our west coast as the Allies are in attempting to storm the Dardanelles."

"If the Japanese ever come to attack us, we'll drown them like rats in the Pacific." ¹

Our greatest danger in connection with the Japanese is that we stupidly laugh at the idea that they may attack us and refuse to see things as they are.

It is possible for Japan, if she wishes, to send three hundred thousand or half a million troops to

our shores. With the exception of one British steamship line, all the traffic between America and Japan is now in the hands of the Japanese. The Nippon Yusen line alone has a tonnage of three hundred thousand tons. The Toyo Kisen Kaisha has an enormous tonnage. To-day Japan controls all but about 70,000 tonnage of the Pacific trade. But Japan would not even need these.

“Japan has a major transport fleet, as shown by the figures in 1909, of forty steamers, with a troop capacity of 114,235, and a minor transport fleet of fifty-five steamers, with a troop capacity of 85,292; or 199,526 in all. These are army transports alone, and do not include passenger ships which could be utilised. ‘Compared with this the United States has a transport fleet of ten ships, with a troop capacity of 15,758. There are only four transport ships on the Pacific coast.’”²

The marvellous transportation system of the Japanese makes us understand why they laugh at ours. When General Funston was ordered in April, 1914, to take his command from Galveston to Vera Cruz a major portion of the troops had to be left behind *because there were not sufficient transports to carry them*. Consequently he could take to Vera Cruz less than 4,200 men. Moreover, much of the field artillery and cavalry had to be left behind.

Compare the inefficiency of our transportation system, which, after months of strain with Mexico,

was unable to handle four thousand men with the efficient Japanese transportation system, which has a troop capacity of 199,000 independent of her passenger ships.

But to land Japanese troops and to furnish supplies for those already in the United States, their navy must meet our navy in the Pacific.

Our navy has more ships than the Japanese. But we could not run the risk of sending our complete navy to the Pacific in time to decide a naval battle even were it possible to do so.

The Japanese have four super-dreadnoughts of high speed with guns capable of higher elevation than ours. We have not a single dreadnought of this class. Japan will have two more finished this year. If Congress orders one or one-and-a-half or two, they cannot be finished within three or four years.

As fighting ships we include everything, no matter what the size, the age, or the uselessness of the craft. A very few of our ships of our Pacific fleet have four eight-inch guns each. Most of them are equipped with only six-, five- and three-inch guns. These compare to the mammoth guns on the Japanese ships about as a boy's Fourth of July toy pistol compares to a .38 Smith and Wesson. Our largest ship in the Pacific has a displacement of a little over 13,000 tons, while the Japanese have battleships with displacements of from 25,000 to 31,-

000 tons. One can judge best of their real value by their cost. A good battleship to-day costs from \$15,000,000 to \$18,000,000. We have three in the Pacific which cost a little over five million; a few others are one-and-a-half- and two-million-dollar ships; some cost less than one-quarter of one million dollars. Japan has twenty-five fighting ships each of which cost from five to fifteen million dollars.

More striking still than the difference in number and differences of grade, stated separately, is a comparison of the number of Japanese battleships that surpasses the best we have in the Pacific. *Japan has twenty ships, every one of which is superior to the very best we have in the Pacific.* What chance, then, would our tug boats and our gun boats and our old light-armoured cruisers have against the Japanese navy?

We have in the Pacific less than twenty ships. Japan has a navy of *modern* battleships.

The *Fuso* has *twelve* 14-inch guns, as well as more smaller ones than we have on any one ship in the Pacific. The *Haruna*, *Hiyei*, *Kirishima*, and *Kongo* each have *eight* 14-inch guns. The *Kawaychi* has *twelve* 12-inch guns. There are three more battleships of the *Fuso* class which are almost finished. These ships alone have 64 torpedo tubes. Our ships on the Pacific have a *total of*

eighteen torpedo tubes and all of them are admitted to be useless.

Some of Japan's ships have a speed of 27 knots. We have not a single battleship in our navy that can maintain a speed of more than 22 knots.


All of our F type submarines which were lately accepted and stationed at Honolulu are now admitted to be useless because of faulty construction. They are reported out of commission.

Our Pacific fleet, besides being inefficient, is without sufficient ammunition and often has *not had coal enough to steam from our Pacific ports to Honolulu and back again!* Even though governments at Washington have known—twice in the last five years—that a Japanese attack might be made at any hour.

We have naval stations in the Pacific and on our Pacific Coast; but the nearest *naval magazine* from which our tiny supplies might be drawn is Mifflin, Pennsylvania. This, however, is not a very important magazine and, next to it, the nearest one to the Pacific coast is Dover, New Jersey,—some three thousand miles overland from the Pacific coast and some ten thousand miles overland from the Philippines.

When Japan moves she will do so suddenly and without warning. It will be an attack in the night and we will not be allowed one moment's preparation.

Our Chances at Sea against a Japanese Attack ¹



N. B. Lines representing the *same* United States factors of defence may vary on different charts, because they represent proportional values.

1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers and destroyers authorised and laid down by Japan and the United States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These modern boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards, ships in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder the speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern ships; hence their detrimental value in modern battle.

Since January 1, 1914, Japan has been building modern battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers and submarines at a tremendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind.

2. Torpedo tubes for modern torpedoes which we *will* have *after* the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* are in service.

3. Representing the proportion of all our useless submarines to the submarines Japan has.

4. Representing the proportion of our submarines able to submerge, to those Japan could send to attack us.

Manila is well fortified but each fort can be easily taken from the rear. All the military authorities agree that landing would be comparatively easy.

“There are no fortifications on Lingayen Bay on the North, Balayan Bay on the South, or Lamon Bay on the east. A landing at either of these points presents no difficulties, and once landed it is but a few days’ march to the rear of Manila.”³

“Little does the United States know that we (the Japanese) have many plans arranged for the destruction of the Manila forts and guns.”⁴

“There will leave our great naval base at Yokosuka 50,000 of our men in a suitable number of transports, that will be amply protected by fast cruisers. This flotilla will land part of the troops at Lingayan and part near Polillo, at the rear of Manila. They will take but a short time to disembark and will advance, converging toward one another, having all plans laid to attack the port of Manila from the rear—which is its weakest part.”⁵

At Honolulu we have spent millions fortifying Pearl Harbour, but there is not enough ammunition to fight twenty-four hours.

“Our first move will be to seize Honolulu! This can very simply be done by a fleet of transports carrying 30,000 men and protected by our fast cruiser-class ships. . . .

“The Hawaiian Islands are only distant from

San Francisco a few hours by our fast warships and cruisers, and in the islands are at present 80,000 Japanese—all of them have received army instruction and they know their duty!"⁶

Experience at the Panama Canal has amply convinced us that slides are at least possible.

"The Americans boast of their Panama Canal, but it is only too ridiculously simple for us to dynamite it effectually—at the cost of an old steamship loaded with explosives.

"Or the canal can be instantly dynamited by our people, who are living quite near it, and before anything can be done by the United States Navy our ships will be in full possession of the important points. . . .

"And before the United States warships can come all the way around South America we will have seized the islands! These lie much nearer to our shores than they do to the United States coast, and it will be a very difficult matter to oust us,—our navy is much stronger than the American, better equipped and better officered. . . .

"The Honolulu group of islands, however, is not large enough to adequately support our countrymen. We can seize the port and fortifications (such as they are) with the greatest of ease, thus permitting about 60 per cent. of our people already there to help in breaking California's shut door."⁷

The only thing the United States could do to

prevent a landing on the Pacific would be to send our fleet around South America or our soldiers over the mountains.

Seven-tenths or more of our soldiers are east of the Rocky Mountains; while the Japanese have already on our soil, or in Mexico and British Columbia, adjoining our territory, trained troops which number 251,000 men—seven times as many as our entire mobile army in the United States.

There are already 35,000 trained Japanese troops in Hawaii, 55,000 in the Philippines, 100,000 in Mexico, 61,000 in California, Oregon and Washington. And these troops are where they can be instantly used the moment the transports land machine guns on our coast. Every Japanese in California reports to his consul once every week to receive instructions.

“We have tricked California, however, by sending our men as residents to the Hawaiian Islands. There they become ‘citizens’ and from there, after a certain time, proceed to California. . . .

“We have sent both army and navy officers in the clever disguise of workmen; and they, having been thoroughly taught in Japan how to swim, have quietly slipped overboard and gained a landing in California and Oregon ports, under the very eyes of the asinine United States customs and immigration officials.”⁸

The Japanese now have a new base from which

they can direct their operations. The Marshall Islands form an important naval station 2600 miles nearer our Pacific coast than Tokyo! Her engineers and army officials are working night and day constructing new concrete fortifications. Our Pacific forts are of little value in protecting our ports. They are old. For years the War Department has not sent sufficient ammunition to the Pacific coast to give the garrison two hours' practice per month.

The Japanese, when they sent their fleet on its tour of the Pacific, demonstrated that they could enter our ports, with lights out, without local pilots. From the Japanese who already live in the western states they would have ample aid in landing anywhere along the Pacific coast.

"There are officers of ours scattered everywhere on the Pacific coast to-day. We do not need to explain why they are there!"⁹

And what could not happen in twenty-four hours? Most of our army and practically all of our ammunition is east of the Rocky Mountains. *These mountains form the greatest natural barrier in the world.*

We have six railway lines crossing them—the Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, Western Pacific, Union Pacific, Northern Pacific, Great Northern, and Milwaukee, Chicago and St. Paul. These railroads climb, in traversing the mountains, to great heights, pass through many tunnels and creep over

long dizzy trestles. It took years to construct these bridges and tunnels. *At every strategic point along these railroads there are colonies of Japanese labourers, who are in reality Japanese soldiers and engineers.*

In every group there are several who are in the secret service of Japan. They would be informed of any premeditated attack, even of the exact hour, long before any American had knowledge of it.

All our transcontinental telephone and telegraph wires follow the lines of the railroads. Upon receiving code instructions by telegraph or wireless they could, in one hour, cut every telephonic and telegraphic wire connecting the east with the west. In one night the railway guards could be overpowered and every tunnel blown up and every trestle ruined.

The coast states would be cut off from their meat supply and California from her grain and wheat supply; the vegetable farms and markets are already in the hands of the Japanese.

Within twenty-four hours after landing, trains could be seized by trained Japanese now working as common labourers along the railroads, and twenty thousand trained Japanese already living in California could be hurried to the mountain fastnesses where the railroads cross the summits. In each of these places a thousand men with the ma-

chine guns brought by their transports could hold at bay our entire mobile army in the United States.

But they need not wait for mitrailleuses from their transport ships. There are scores of secret Japanese stores of arms on the Pacific; and no one can compute the ammunition and equipment stored in Southern California. Only lately four warships were there two weeks (to fish) before our Navy Department investigated. In that dry land, guns and ammunition can be stored without elaborate preparation. The twenty thousand Japanese soldiers in British Columbia, ready to invade from the north, are well equipped.

Recently in a police raid of a Japanese boarding house, it was found that the basement, the attic, every cupboard, every cubic foot of space in the house was filled with mitrailleuses, other guns and ammunition. These guns were of the type that could be mounted on bicycles or carried on the back. Even the space under the beds was occupied by boxes containing ammunition.

Hence without any supplies or men even from Japan, all of the railroads reaching the Pacific in the north and all those reaching it in the south, could be seized and mountain passes held.

We could not march an army over the Rocky Mountains in ten years with the Japanese controlling the passes with rapid-fire machine guns. We could march army after army *to* the mountains,

but they would never get over and they would never come back.

Even if we gained the summits we could not reconstruct the tunnels within twelve months.


Meanwhile 100,000 of the 200,000 Japanese in Mexico could move on Texas and engage most of our mobile army. They could be supplied not only by arms already stored in Mexico, but by transports sent to the Magdalena and to the Turtle Bays. Mexico has had an understanding with Japan for years. Six years ago Mexican silver was passing current in the streets and bazaars of Tokyo.

If the Japanese, in accordance with their intentions, were to send an army of two hundred thousand to our shores, together with the three hundred fifty thousand already on our territory and in Mexico and British Columbia, they would have then an attacking force of over half a million men.

West of the Rocky Mountains, at our Pacific coast forts and in Alaska, we have about 3,538 army men and 6,751 paper militia in the coast states. But the armies are in five different places and the largest group in any one place consists of but 1,260 men. The different groups are separated by distances of from two hundred to two thousand miles. The Japanese, then, would have to combat less than two thousand troops at any one place.

The Japanese army would be equipped with at

Trained Japanese Men Now on U.S. Soil, in Mexico, and British Columbia



1. This number is considered very conservative. An officer of the United States Army who made an investigation of this matter in western Mexico, five years ago, estimates that the number of trained Japanese men in western Mexico is 100 per cent. greater than the number here stated.

2. The entire mobile army of the United States is scattered throughout the forty-eight States of the Union, and over Alaska, Porto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, Philippines, and some are stationed in China.

The largest number of United States trained troops that the Japanese would have to meet at any one place at the present time is but 8,000.

least eight hundred field guns, their minimum regular equipment, and in addition at least two thousand mitrailleuses. We have on the other side of the Rocky Mountains such a small number of guns that one hesitates to mention them.

As a reserve, Japan has two thousand eight hundred field guns to draw from, while we have but eight hundred fifty for our entire army. The average size of the Japanese field guns is greater than ours. Japan's army would certainly be equipped with sufficient ammunition; for ten years we have not had enough on the Pacific coast to fight thirty minutes.

There is little chance that our Pacific and Asiatic fleets could render effective resistance to the Japanese fleet, which contains twenty battleships and cruisers, every one of which is better than the best ship we have on the Pacific.

The two flagships in our Asiatic and Pacific fleet have a displacement of only 13,000 and 8,000 tons, respectively; cost but five and four million dollars, respectively, and have main armament which consists of but four eight-inch guns each. What chance would these have against the great ships of the Japanese Navy, having from 27,000 to 30,000 tons displacement, having engines of 40,000 and 68,000 horse-power, having batteries of enormous fourteen-inch guns?

It is common knowledge to the world that the

Our Chances on Land against Japanese Invasion Comparative Values

Invading Army Jap. [REDACTED]

Opposing Army U.S. ■ 2

U.S. 1¹

Guns with Army Jap. [REDACTED]

U.S. [REDACTED] 3

Guns in Reserve Jap. [REDACTED]

U.S. [REDACTED]

Size of Guns Jap. [REDACTED]

U.S. [REDACTED]

Ammunition Supply

Pacific Islands Jap. [REDACTED]

1st two days U.S. [REDACTED]

Pacific Coast Jap. [REDACTED]

1st two hours U.S. [REDACTED]

After 48 hours Jap. [REDACTED]

U.S. ?

1. The largest group of United States troops west of the Rocky Mountains that the Japanese would be compelled to meet at any one place.

2. Representing all of the regular army in the Philippines, in Hawaii, in Alaska, at Panama, in Washington, Oregon and California; men in the Pacific Coast forts; and the militia of the Pacific Coast States.

3. Representing the guns on the Pacific Coast west of the Rocky Mountains.

policy of Japan is always to strike quickly and without warning. Without doubt her warships will be brought together in such a way as to allay suspicion, ostensibly for a manoeuvre; and that they will be half way across the Pacific before we shall have the slightest inkling of the fact that Japan is planning an immediate attack.

It is assumed that we could send our Atlantic fleet or a portion of it through the Panama Canal or around South America in time to decide a naval war with Japan. It is very questionable if the patriotic Japanese living in the Panama Canal Zone would allow our ships to pass through the canal when it is possible to prevent them doing so. A small amount of dynamite could create such a slide—even before we would have knowledge of the contemplated innocent Japanese naval manoeuvre—that the canal would be blocked for months.

If we attempt to send our Atlantic fleet around Cape Horn, those battleships must be accompanied by supply ships. Even though we have fighting vessels that can make 21 knots an hour, the fleet would have to be held together. It could travel no faster than the slowest ship. To separate it, that is, to allow a few ships to enter the Pacific at a time, would be the height of folly. Even if all were kept together, the fleetier ships of the Japanese Navy could speed in to the advance column, destroy the vanguard and retreat again; and our

ships would be unable to follow, because of their slower speed. This could be done over and over again—the fleetier Japanese ships each time centering their fire on one or two of our slower ships and getting away again with little risk of damage to themselves.

What chances have we, in our present state of preparation?

With wonderful business sagacity we assert that they cannot afford another war. This is the greatest of all fallacies. The Balkan States are probably the poorest states in the world. Only a few years ago, when a rich merchant of Montenegro purchased an automobile—the first owned by a native Montenegrin—the King sent the merchant a polite note calling attention to the man's extravagance and hinting that he, the King of Montenegro, could not afford one. Yet Montenegro and Serbia, though two of the poorest little nations in the world, have been able to play a remarkable part in three wars within five years.

It is true that the Japanese national debt is one-eighth their entire wealth, but their national debt per capita is less than the per capita debt of the United States. The national debt per capita of Japan is twenty-three dollars; and that of the United States, thirty-two dollars. Per person, we have a greater burden to bear in the payment

of our national debt than have the Japanese in the payment of their debt.

The cost of feeding a Japanese soldier is one-twelfth the cost of feeding an American. The feeding cost of an American soldier is \$.24 per day, that of a Japanese \$.02. Moreover, the Japanese sacrifice everything for their country. Japanese merchants and men of wealth willingly and gladly pay large income taxes for the support of the army and navy of Japan.

The Japanese are a marvellous, courageous, ambitious, proud people. They may be slightly smaller in body than we are; but equipment, ability and endurance count to-day in war, not stature.

We laugh at these little Japanese and talk about "drowning them in the Pacific like rats!"

In Hong Kong, many years ago, it was my horrible misfortune to be forced to witness a life-and-death struggle between a six-foot-four Chinaman and an infuriated rat which the Chinaman had been torturing to amuse himself. The rat was so small and so quick in its assaults that it easily avoided the hands that sought to grip it. It was so agile, so slippery, so terrific in biting and ripping the throat of the Chinaman—running up and down the man's back, over his shoulders, under his arms, over and over again to the Chinaman's throat, without being caught—that the powerful six-foot Chinaman, blood spurting from the ripped-open veins, soon fell

to the floor and died before aid could reach him.
The rat scampered away unhurt.

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 218. Extracts from American newspapers.

² Page 219. Henry Litchfield West, Executive Secretary National Security League.

³ Page 224. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., from "The Present Military Situation in the United States."

⁴ ⁵ Page 224; ⁶ ⁷ page 225; ⁸ page 226; ⁹ page 227. From a book circulated by the National Defence Association of Japan, the present officers of which are reported to be Count Okuma, Premier of Japan, president; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, vice-president.

CHAPTER III


IF THE LION COMES

IF the Allies are successful in Europe, Great Britain could send twenty-eight dreadnoughts and battleships to make an attack on our Atlantic coast and still keep a sufficient number at home to guard her interests there. In case of an attack by Great Britain or any one else on our Atlantic coast, we would not dare to take all the ships of our Pacific fleet from the Pacific; but were we to do so, Great Britain's attacking fleet would outnumber our entire defensive fleet, three to one.

Great Britain could send against us nine battle cruisers, we have none; thirty swift cruisers, we have three, and it is even questionable if our three could operate for any length of time, because of their furnaces. She could send one hundred destroyers to combat our sixty-two, even if we were to bring all of ours from the Pacific.

Her ships have an average speed of from two and a half to three knots an hour greater than ours and the average range of her battleship guns is greater.

Our Chances at Sea against a British Attack 1



N. B. Lines representing the *same* United States factors of defence may vary on different charts, because they represent proportional values.

1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers and destroyers authorised and laid down by Great Britain and the United States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These modern boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards, ships in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder the speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern ships; hence, their detrimental value in modern battle.

Since January 1, 1914, Great Britain has been building modern battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines at a tremendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind. Secretary Daniels admits that Great Britain has probably added to her navy sixteen new modern fighting ships since the beginning of the war.

2. Comparative number of torpedo tubes we *will* have when the *Oklahoma* and the *Nevada* are in service. All other torpedo tubes are useless for modern torpedoes.

3. The three scout cruisers we have would be doubtful factors, because of their defective furnaces.

4. Representing the actual number of all our useless submarines.

5. Representing the submarines at Panama and on the Atlantic Coast, that have been able to submerge during the last three manœuvres without being convoyed to port.

Great Britain's battleships would be equipped with 112 modern torpedo tubes. We will soon have two ships with four torpedo tubes each that are of *use* for modern torpedoes—no more.

Great Britain has eighty submarines; she could spare forty to send here; we have two on the Atlantic coast, north of Panama, that have been able to navigate *under* water without being conveyed to port immediately afterwards; we have five more at the canal.

On the chart, "Our Chance at Sea against British Attack," every questionable estimate as to the numbers and efficiency of naval factors is charted in favour of the United States. All the three swift cruisers are represented at full value although they are old, slow and their furnaces are inefficient in the least wind. If a true comparison of the differences were given, the line representing Great Britain's equipment in swift cruisers would be forty times as long as the line representing ours. She has built two, four, six or even eight cruisers of the finest speediest type every year during the last ten years.

This chart estimates only the ships that Great Britain could spare to send against us during times of peace in Europe; while everything we have in the Atlantic, in the Caribbean Sea, in our navy yards, in our dry docks, even everything laid up for repairs, is counted in our favour.

And yet what chance would we have?

Japan is bound to England by an offensive and defensive treaty, and in case of war with England it might be necessary to divide our fleets and fight the navies of the two countries.

Great Britain would not attempt an invasion with less than 250,000 trained men. Our entire opposition to resist an attack would consist of 46,000 men, including the Army of the East, ten thousand men now manning our coast forts, and all the available eastern militia—thirty thousand! These could not be mobilised even in thirty days.

Prepared for a quick attack, the English army of invasion of 250,000 men would be equipped with 900 field guns, not counting two or three thousand mitrailleuses. Her field guns in size are nearly twice as large as ours. More than this, supply-ships, arriving later, could bring from her reserve of 5,500 guns any number of guns she might desire.

Heavy guns can be moved across the water more easily than they can be moved on land. England has found it possible to transport 9½-inch howitzers across the English Channel. It is infinitely more difficult to do this than to send them across the Atlantic Ocean. The difficulty in transporting large guns is in loading and landing, and the harbours of the Channel are so shallow that large ships cannot enter them.

As a reserve, Great Britain has now 5,500 guns—we have 850 guns, counting every field gun in the United States, even those just now completed and soon to be completed.

Great Britain's ammunition supply can be estimated at one hundred per cent. sufficient. Ours, counting all the ammunition stored in the United States, is 44 per cent. The amount would feed our guns for about a day and a half. Supply-ships continuously arriving from Great Britain and supplies arriving from Canada would maintain her 100 per cent. sufficiency even after our supply was completely exhausted.

The coast forts near New York City could be easily destroyed by explosive shells from British battleships, firing from a distance of twelve miles and upward, while our antedated guns, even the new modern ones just installed at Fort Totten, could playfully drop their shells in the water four and a half miles short of the ships of the British fleet. We have but two coast guns from Panama to Maine with a range equal to those of foreign battleships—but these are not yet mounted.


The British navy could also destroy the forts at Boston and Philadelphia, without even coming in range of the guns there.

Another division of British dreadnoughts could steam past Fort Monroe at the mouth of the Chesapeake, without coming within a mile and a half of

**Our Chances on Land against British Invasion.
Comparative Values**

Invading Army G.B. 

Opposing Army U.S.  1

Guns with Army G.B. 

U.S.  2

Guns in Reserve G.B.  4

U.S.  3

Size of Guns G.B. 

U.S. 

Ammunition Supply

1st 18 hours G.B. 

U.S. 

Afterwards G.B. 

U.S. ?

N. B. Lines representing the *same* United States factors of defence may vary on different charts, because they represent proportional values.

1. Representing the entire army which can be mobilised in thirty days, men in our Atlantic Coast defences, and the militia of all the Eastern States.

2. Representing 900 per cent. more field guns than we now have with our entire army east of the Mississippi River.

3. Representing the entire equipment of field guns *in* the United States.

4. And a line 260 per cent. longer.

the extreme limit of the guns of Fort Monroe, and destroy Washington or hold it up for ransom or treaty concessions. Without even landing a single man in New York, the British fleet could with a few explosive shells blow up the power stations of our subways at Fifty-ninth Street, of our elevated lines at Seventy-sixth Street, and of our New York Street Railways system at Ninety-first Street.

The British ability to transport an army to our shores is unquestioned. The merchant marine of Great Britain has a tonnage of 19,000,000 tons.

If after the invasion we tried to oppose the advance of their army, we would necessarily be forced into battle line.

“An army of a million men, consisting of infantry, armed with modern shoulder-arms, would be completely overmatched and easily defeated by an army of 25,000 men amply equipped with modern field artillery. The infantry would be wholly unable to get within musket range, because they would all be destroyed by the shrapnel of the enemy before they could get near enough to fire a single effective shot.”¹

Great Britain in an attack upon us would not only have the aid of Japan's navy on our Pacific coast, but might also be supported by a Mexican invasion, as well as a Japanese advance from Mexico. If Great Britain and Japan should furnish Mexico with money, ammunition and supplies to fight the

Gringos whom the Mexicans so much hate, the Mexicans would do so.

Japan has now at least 100,000 Japanese in Mexico, and about 20,000 in British Columbia, all of whom have had military training.

On the north we would have to prepare against invasion from Canada. Canadians themselves might not fight us, but English troops could make an invasion through Canada. And if it ever came to a draw between the United States and England, even the Canadians would certainly join with England. No matter what the blood tie between the Canadians and the people of the United States, the blood tie between Canada and England is stronger. But blood ties do not prevent war when commercial interests are at stake.

“No nation can be trusted farther than it is bound by its interests.”²

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 244. Hiram Maxim, in “Defenceless America.”

² Page 245. George Washington.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY CAMPS OR CEMETERIES

THERE is a story of foolish virgins and of wise ones. The wise ones prepared; the foolish ones went out into the darkness with their lamps empty.

Preparation may not always prevent war, *but it gives a nation a fighting chance to prevent defeat, vassalage and annihilation.*

Judea did not harken to the prophet Isaiah who called upon her to prepare herself for defence; and was overthrown by the hosts of Mesopotamia.

Greece, unprepared, was made a vassal of Rome; and only fragments of her law, her literature, her art, her philosophy have come down to us.

The peace campaign of Hanno prevented men and supplies being sent to Hannibal; and Carthage fell!

One hundred years ago Europe was not prepared; Napoleon conquered Italy, Egypt, Flanders, Holland, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria and Prussia. One lesson, however, was enough for the Prussian king. When the treaty was signed Napoleon permitted him a small army of but a few thousand men

—only to preserve order at home! The King of Prussia immediately enrolled the allowed number. These men were trained, prepared and dismissed; another group was enrolled, trained, prepared and dismissed; and then another, and another and another, until every man was trained and fit. Then Prussia added the balance to the measure that finally overthrew the great Corsican.

France lost Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 because the Republicans, for political reasons, obstructed the efforts of the government to prepare for the coming conflict.

In August, 1914, three weeks after mobilisation, 600,000 French soldiers were without rifles. Many others had old rifles unfit for service; they could not then combat the well-equipped Germans who advanced to the very gates of Paris.

England was warned by Lord Roberts, the military genius; by Winston Churchill, the prophet of naval preparedness; and by Robert Blatchford, the peace-loving socialist: Blatchford was not stupid merely because he believed in the ultimate realisation of the brotherhood of man.

Lord Haldane sent England's army out into the night with no oil in its lamps. When England should have been enlisting and training a million men, Lord Haldane dismissed 80,000 and publically threatened to abolish Lord Roberts's pension if the

grand old man continued his agitation for preparation.

England lost one man out of four, from Mons to Marne, because she did not have sufficient up-to-date artillery to protect her soldiers.

When a nation does not fill its lamps with oil it fills them with the blood of its heroes.

When Marshal Niel was pleading in the French Chamber in 1868 in favour of a bill of defence, Jules Favre replied: "You, militarists, wish to turn France into an armed camp."

"And you, pacifists," replied Marshal Neil, "are taking care to make of it a cemetery."

**PART FOUR: WHY WE ARE NOT
PREPARED**

PART FOUR: WHY WE ARE NOT PREPARED

CHAPTER I

PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS

WE are unprepared because we have been burdened by a particular form of militarism—*pacifistic militarism for politics*.

There is militarism and militarism. There is militarism for *conquest*, militarism for *protection*, and militarism for *politics* of pacifism and pork.

The last is by far the worst type of militarism. It is the type Congress and the people have made existent in the United States of America. It has come about as a reaction against militarism for conquest. It places incompetent men—incompetent because they have had no experience in the work for which they are appointed—at the head of the army and navy departments.

It results to-day—and the history of the United States proves that it has always resulted—in blunders, in negligence, in suppression of the truth, in deception of the public, in creation of false ideals as to the safety of the nation, and in enormous

waste of moneys—a gigantic system of graft, the most gigantic and wasteful in the world.

But these results have not been and are not due to the military or the navy. They have grown out of the political system which is dominated by the ideas of the pacifists—a system which has controlled and controls the military and naval organisations—thanks to the indifference of the public.

With very few exceptions, the pacifists do not believe in peace at any price; they do not believe that we should give up our sovereignty—tamely submitting to conquest rather than fighting for independence. But they do believe that an adequate trained army in times of peace is a danger; they do believe that one should never prepare for war until war is upon us—that when the danger arises the mass of people, because of their patriotism and loyalty, will spring to arms and adequately defend the country.

The principle and theory of the pacifists is ideal; the practice abominable and criminal.

The waste of billions of dollars, the prolongation of months of struggle into years of suffering and anguish, the loss of tens of thousands of men by sickness and the loss of scores of thousands by death have been due above all else to the pacific ideas of President Jefferson, President Polk and President Buchanan.

If it had not been for the ultra-pacific ideas of Thomas Jefferson and his coterie of followers, we

would have had in 1812 a trained army of 20,000 men and the war with England would have been ended in one campaign. If it had not been for the pacific ideas of Polk and his followers in Congress, the Mexican War would not have lasted six months, and fifteen thousand instead of a hundred four thousand men would have been necessary. If it had not been for the pacific ideas of Buchanan and his followers, the Civil War would certainly have been ended in two years at most and we would have required but 300,000 men instead of nearly 3,000,000.

The military has always opposed the pacifists' idea of a voluntary army springing to arms after war has been declared. The military consequently has always opposed and the leaders of the army and navy, have always lamented the enormous political waste in men and money due to the political system which grows out of the pacifists' idea of militarism.

We were prepared but once in our history and that preparation saved us from what might have been the greatest war in which we would have been engaged—a war with France, England, Austria and Mexico combined. At the close of our Civil War we had more than a million trained men. Austria had violated the Monroe Doctrine by placing Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. England was our bitter enemy all through the Civil War and would readily have joined the forces of Austria and

France; but, being prepared at the moment, we had but to request the withdrawal of the Emperor of Mexico. Then France and Austria backed down. If we had been unprepared would they have done so so readily? And what would have been the result of a war between an unprepared nation on this side of the water and England, Austria, France and Mexico combined against us?

Because of the fact that we have never met a single first-class power using its full forces in any war in which we have been engaged, we have continued to shut our eyes to all the waste of the past and have continued to allow the system to persist up to the present time.

Primarily, the people have been and are at fault for permitting such a system to exist; secondly, Congress has been and is to blame for pandering to this pacific political militarism, thus wasting billions of dollars; thirdly, the political administrations have been and are to blame for conferring the offices of Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as "plum puddings" to *good friends* and former *political helpers*. This policy results from the pacifists' fear that efficient military and naval heads of the departments would put our people in danger of military oppression.

The preparation for protecting against all foreign aggression—the safety of our nation—rests, by the appointment of the President, in the hands

of two men—the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

No man should be appointed to either of these positions merely because he is a “friend” or a “successful business man” or a “social reformer.” A man should be picked for his fitness for the work to be done.

This is not a criticism of the present administration alone; it is a criticism of the general policy of our government. No business corporation would tolerate such a policy. The Directors of the United States Steel Corporation or any other large business organisation would never choose a man as manager merely because he came from Georgia instead of Michigan or because he had been a successful attorney or a successful manufacturer of silk skirts; neither would a banking institution choose a man as bank president merely because of his taste for bon-bons or diluted raspberry juice.

A political Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy spends his first year in attempting to find out what the reports of his subordinates mean; his second year in ascertaining what he is expected to do; his third in getting a glimpse of the needs of the department; his fourth in discussion and investigation. Then he goes out of office, and another begins the circle!

The first step in our campaign for adequate preparation must be insistence upon a change of policy

at Washington. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy should be chosen from the ranks of men who have worked in the army and navy for years; from the group of men who have proved their knowledge of the subject, who have demonstrated their efficiency; and who have shown that they know how to handle men.

Moreover, each should have a seat in the House and in the Senate so that each can come in contact with Congressmen and Senators and inform these men as to the real needs of the Army and the Navy. Our world to-day is a very busy one; Americans are especially busy. It does not reflect upon the intelligence of Congressmen from the Kansas cornfields, from the Nevada mining towns, from the bluegrass meadows of Kentucky, the brewery districts of Milwaukee, the oil-fields of Oklahoma, or the logging districts of northern Michigan to state that they do not know the real needs of the Army and Navy.

Each is intelligent, but each has had little time to specialize in army and navy matters previous to his election. Each, without doubt, has been previously occupied by personal business and by the affairs of his district. Hence the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy should have seats in the Congress and in the Senate, so that they may enter into discussion, elaborating in detail, when advisable, the reasons for their recommendations to Congress. This would make it possible for Representatives and

Senators to find out exactly what the needs of the army and navy are; and in this way Congressmen and Senators may become convinced of the necessity of appropriating the moneys asked.

A political secretary of the Navy or a political Secretary of War, previously uninformed of the actual needs, is never qualified to speak to Congress with authority.

And another change is vitally needed.

Congressmen now have the power of determining how army and navy appropriations should be spent; their knowledge of the real needs of the army and navy depends upon the reports of the Secretaries of War and the Navy. As these officials seldom are sure enough of themselves to *convince* Congress that they *know* what they are asking money for, Congress naturally concludes that the matter cannot be of great consequence. As a result certain Congressional leaders follow their own inclinations and interests and "sluice to the barrels."

We should do away with the present system of appropriation and adopt the budget system. All other nations in the world have adopted this policy. Even the South American republics are far in advance of us in this matter.

Our present system is a violation of the very principles of our government. According to those principles Congress is the law-making body, the President and the cabinet are the executives of the

nation, and the Supreme Court exercises the judicial function.

Congress as the law-making body has the supreme right in determining the appropriations but it has assumed the executive function of the government in determining in detail how the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, members of the executive department of the government, shall spend the money, even to the number of dollars to be paid a scrub woman.

It seems reasonable that among our one hundred million people an efficient Secretary of the Navy might hire a departmental assistant at \$200 or less per month who would be able to hire and discharge at reasonable prices, scrub women, ice men and laundresses. How ridiculous and wasteful to engage 536 Senators and Representatives, each at a yearly salary of \$7,500—a total of four million dollars—not including railway expenses and all the expenses of upkeep of the House of Representatives and the Senate, to discuss in detail an act to appropriate \$360 a year for a common labourer, to employ four scrub women at \$192, or to engage a chief laundress at \$240. Would any business corporation engage a Board of Directors at a salary of \$4,220,000 a year—almost \$3,000 per working hour, to discuss whether they should pay a scrub woman \$184 a year or \$192 a year, and, moreover, not only hours, but days and even weeks in such discussions?

Think of a Congressional act that requires but 270 words to appropriate \$33,000,000 for ships of the navy, and 400 words to determine how ice, religious books and stationery shall be purchased, and 100 words to determine the manner in which an enlisted man shall be given his shoes, hat, coat, belts and so forth. Monumental work for men commanding a salary of \$4,220,000 a year!

We are the only nation in the world, even among the third-rate powers, that has not adopted the budget system.

First, then, let us urge and insist upon a change in our government's policy so that *trained* and *informed* men shall be appointed to direct our departments of the army and the navy.

Second, let us urge and insist that these men be given seats in the House of Representatives and in the Senate.

Third, let us urge and insist upon the adoption of the budget system of appropriating money for the army and navy.

Let us do away with militarism for pork!

The only righteous military system is that which is based upon the ideal that all citizens owe a duty to their government in return for the protection which the government gives to all. This is militarism for protection—the service of all for the good of all. It is the system of Switzerland and Australia. Let us adopt it.

CHAPTER II

INEFFICIENCY, NEGLIGENCE AND SUPPRESSION OF FACTS

WE are unprepared because of past inefficiency—due to political mismanagement.

The political head of a military or naval system must necessarily be more influenced by the political factors than would a *permanent* naval or military board having full executive power and being quite independent of politics.

When there is a difference of opinion as to what the military experts believe is needed and that which supporters of the administration believe is necessary, the political secretary, having been trained in the art of listening to the voice of political supporters, is at least more inclined to listen to their plea than to that of the military experts. The heroic music of the military is strange to him and he does not understand it; but the rag-time approval of his political constituents—supporters of the administration—is not only familiar to his ear, but pleasing to his temperament.

Moreover, a temporary political head is not well enough informed regarding naval and military or-

ganisation nor well enough trained in the handling of naval or military units to reorganise or build up a better organisation when one is needed.

Our naval promotion system is a burlesque of those of Europe; it seems that everything has been done that could have been done to keep able ambitious young men out of the navy.

No young man, desiring a future, wishes to grow gray-haired under a system which holds him in the two lowest ranks of the navy until he is two-score and ten. There is no efficient arrangement for promotion even of trained college men.

“. . . the promotion of officers is so completely blocked that a young man graduating from the Naval Academy must look forward to spending all the best years of his life in the two lowest grades of the service; to performing, as a gray-headed man, the same duties he has performed as a boy; and to receiving but a very small increase in salary.”

“I ask you to picture the effect of a condition where a young officer, graduating from the Naval Academy, full of spirit and enthusiasm, finds himself confronted with a prospect of promotion to the grade of Lieutenant at the age of 52 years.”¹

Also in the organisation of our army efficiency seems to be the last thing thought about.

Our army is a badly balanced organisation, and for this Congress *is* to blame.

Were it not necessary to increase our army in time of war, the number of officers we have in the United States Army would be a fair proportion to the number of enlisted men. Our standing army, however, will be but the nucleus for hundreds of thousands of volunteers. Certainly we cannot expect to effectively oppose an invading army of 250,000 *trained* men with less than *one* million volunteers in addition to our present army, inasmuch as it took nearly three million Union volunteers to defeat the volunteer armies of the South in the Civil War.

Every company of a hundred men needs at least four officers. It is better to have six—at least two in reserve for each company in time of war. The officers in our army are but a little more than 5.3 per cent. of the enlisted men. Assuming that the officers of our militia, each and every one of them, should turn out to be efficient officers, which is very doubtful, then we should have just 5,015 officers of the United States Army to captain our army of 93,610 men and to train the 1,000,000 volunteers; that is, one officer to every 2,012 men. This would mean just one-eightieth of the minimum number of officers absolutely necessary; and not a single officer in reserve. If our entire mobile army in all the United States to-day were officered at this rate, we would now have but 17 officers of all ranks.

Officers promoted from the ranks without pre-

vious training, are seldom of value; there are exceptions, of course, which stand out in history, but they are few. In our Civil War more than 25,000 men made officers by promotion had to be returned to the ranks because of their inefficiency.

Our campaign against Mexico was probably the most creditable campaign the United States Army ever conducted. General Scott has asserted that its success would have been doubtful except for the percentage of trained men and *especially the large percentage of trained officers.*

“The magnitude of the task in training volunteer officers is apparent when it is realized that it will be necessary to develop not less than 25,000 in case we should have to mobilise enough additional volunteers to bring our total force up to 1,000,000 men.”²

The more trained officers we can have on hand, in case it becomes necessary to quickly enroll and train volunteers, the better our chance of success will be.

Not only is there lack of proper organisation, but there is actual *blundering!*

Mere lack of knowledge on the part of a political Secretary of the Navy or an untrained Secretary of War has led to serious mistakes.

Our F submarines were authorized in 1908. They were accepted as satisfactory in May, 1913,

by Secretary Daniels. They are now out of commission because of faulty construction. Five years to build four defective submarines; and 22 men sent to their death!

The G-2 was authorized in May, 1908, and is yet but nine-tenths complete—a seven-year profitable job.

For the same reason we are still building great battleships, costing from fifteen to seventeen million dollars, vitally deficient in one great essential—speed.

The keel of the *California* has just been laid. We are told of the wonderful armor it will have, of the twelve mighty guns it will carry, of the engines we are going to experiment with; yet we are not so vividly informed that *its speed is to be but twenty-one knots an hour*—a deficiency which would have outclassed it even three years ago.

Of course, no intelligent man holding so responsible a position as that of Secretary of War or that of Secretary of the Navy wishes to make an important decision upon any vital, gigantic question until he has informed himself regarding it. This is to *his credit*, but the result of the system is no less detrimental to the army or the navy. While he seeks information, talks, discusses and investigates, opportunities pass. He is unable to judge of the true value of new devices. Hence, because of ignorance on the part of secretaries of the Navy and

of War, because of negligence on the part of Congress, we have lost opportunities of first equipping our army and navy with the most modern means of defence.

Our people have invented the greatest instruments in modern warfare; yet we have practically none of them. While our political secretaries have been investigating other nations have taken them up and developed them.

A citizen of the United States made the first aeroplane that would fly. Our Army and Navy departments have been testing, experimenting, investigating and talking ever since—but not building. When the war opened we had twenty-three obsolete aeroplanes, although Germany had a thousand one hundred perfected modern aeroplanes and France one thousand five hundred.

An American invented the Audion Amplifier, which is used by the French and English armies to detect the far approaching aeroplanes and Zeppelins. We have none for this purpose.

It was a citizen of the United States who perfected the submarine; and we have only a few that can safely operate under water, although foreign nations have scores of submarines capable of making three and four days' trips, even two weeks' voyages away from the bases of supply.

An American invented the microphone, which is now used by the British Navy to detect approaching

submarines under water. We have none for this purpose.

A citizen of the United States invented the greatest explosive known yet, when it was first adopted we were so doubtful of its value that instead of ordering thirty million dollars' worth Congress appropriated thirty thousand dollars to be divided among *seven* different factories.

When the government concentrated its forces at Manila and a portion of our army at San Diego, the Pacific fleet did not have enough coal to steam to Honolulu and back. Lack of fuel for the Pacific fleet at this time was wholly due to *neglect!*

In August, 1915, when the government felt it might be compelled to again order ships to Mexico, the *Tennessee* which was close to New York Harbor could not leave for the south because she could not get enough coal to steam even as far as Newport News.

The *Tennessee* asked the Brooklyn Navy Yard for coal and begged for fifty tons only if the Yard could not spare more. *But the Brooklyn Navy Yard did not have fifty tons on hand and did not have that amount twenty-four hours later.* And this shamefully neglectful condition existed after four years' tension with Mexico, after an entire year of war in Europe, and after four months' diplomatic strain with Germany.

The Brooklyn Navy Yard is one of the great sup-

ply stations for the Atlantic fleets, with Boston hundreds of miles to the north and Philadelphia far to the south. *And this great naval station could not supply FIFTY TONS OF COAL when needed, even though the department at Washington had known for weeks that it might be called upon at any time to send ships to the south!*

There are 152 twelve-inch guns mounted without a single person to man them; there are two fourteen-inch guns mounted to protect our coasts without a single man trained to operate them; there are 71 ten-inch guns and 37 seven-inch, and no one trained to handle them in case of need.

The great 16-inch gun for the defence of the Panama Canal was finished and fire-tested in 1903. Through neglect it lay on the beach *for ten years*. At the end of that time it was found that not even a design had been made for a carriage! And in January, 1916, thirteen years after the gun was finished and tested, the carriage was not even ready to be sent to Panama. Similar facts as to neglect in supplying ammunition and supplying men for our harbor defences, brought out at the Senate investigation a year ago, caused one Senator to exclaim:

“This is nothing less than *criminal* negligence.”

Perhaps one of the most serious results of our policy of placing politicians at the head of the army

and navy is the friction that develops between the generals of the army and the admirals of the navy who have had from 35 to 40 years' practical experience on the one hand and the political head with no naval or military experience on the other.

At present we have such a flagrant example of a Secretary of the Navy, unwilling and refusing to take advice of experienced admirals or the General Board, that the weakness, danger and viciousness of the political system of appointment is most strikingly brought home to us. This is not a criticism of Secretary Daniels personally, it is a criticism of the system that makes such an appointment possible.

At best it is most embarrassing for a man with only a country newspaper experience to step into a department of which he knows nothing and at once become the *superior* of hundreds of men who have had years of practical and scientific training in the navy and in the department.

Any man placed in such a position feels that (for the good of the service—a service whose efficiency depends upon obedience) he must make it known that he *is* the "head." Consequently, if mistakes are made or if defects—not due to him at all—are exposed, he is tempted to justify his political appointment and to justify his chief at the head of the Administration, by covering up those mistakes, by shifting the blame upon a previous administration or by

suppressing the truth about the defects which exist.

Perhaps never in the history of the United States has there been a time, excepting during the times when we were at war, when publicity as to our unpreparedness is so much needed as at present, and there probably has never been a time in all our history, excepting times when we were at war, during which the Secretary of the Navy has attempted to suppress the truth as to our real condition so autocratically as at present.

In the United States knowledge of facts regarding our unpreparedness need not be withheld because of the fear that foreign governments may learn of them. Every man of sense knows that the secret agents of Germany, Russia, England and Japan know about our unpreparedness. Their agents have been at the business of finding out a long time and they were well qualified for their task in the beginning. Every fact that has been given us during that last two years, every astonishing revelation made as to our unpreparedness, everything that has helped to open our eyes, has been and is well known to every foreign government.

Any man in the service who attempts to give the public information as to the actual conditions of the army or of the navy, for the support of which the people are contributing two hundred million dollars a year, is promptly reprimanded or transferred.

Anyone outside of the service who attempts to tell the people the truth is subjected to the displeasure and ridicule of the heads of the departments.

No loyal American citizen desires the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy to make public one single fact, the suppression of which might be for the interests of the United States.

During the present administration, however, officers both in the army and navy have been reprimanded, even major-generals and admirals not excepted, because they have stated the most general truths of our unpreparedness—truths already well known to every layman who has made a study of the subject.

The Secretary of War reprimanded a Captain for stating:

“It will take the United States about three years to put an army of one million trained men in the field, and in that time an enemy could take and hold our American seaboard.”

If a similar statement had been made in peace times in militaristic Germany or Russia, members of the staff would have engaged in open debate on the subject.

Admiral Fiske stated that it would take five years to put our navy in condition to fight a first-class power. This is truth which any one who knows anything about the navy already knows. But it convinced Secretary of the Navy Daniels, who had

been in the navy *twenty-four months*, that Admiral Fiske, who had been in the navy *forty-four years*, was either ignorant or careless in his statements; hence Admiral Fiske was "transferred."

This same Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, furnishes us an amusing and at the same time tragic illustration of the inability of a man who has had no previous knowledge of naval affairs to know of what he has approved and of what he has disapproved. Less than four months ago Admiral Fiske was again called to the office of Secretary Daniels. Admiral Fiske was told that, had he been a younger officer, Secretary Daniels would have court-martialled him for publishing an article without first referring it to the Secretary of the Navy.

The amusing side of this incident is that the article of which Secretary Daniels disapproved *was* an article which Admiral Fiske had previously submitted to Secretary Daniels and which *Mr. Daniels* had *himself* previously *approved*. Secretary Daniels is not to be blamed; with his previous experience only as a small town newspaper editor and state printer, how could he be expected to have sufficient knowledge of naval affairs to determine whether an article should be approved or disapproved until it had been made public and he had found out from the politicians that its publication was unwise *politically*?

Who is Admiral Fiske? He is one of the great-

est naval experts—he has been in the navy forty years, he has won two gold medals for navy institute work, he has had command of three different divisions of the Atlantic fleet, he has invented a naval telephone sight which is now adopted by all the navies of the world, he has been president of the Naval Institute.

The *serious* and *tragic* side of the incident is that Admiral Fiske—a man with such a record—should be absolutely forbidden by Secretary Daniels to write for any publication or to speak anywhere on national defence. Secretary Daniels' words, as creditably reported by Admiral Fiske himself, were in substance these: "You cannot write or speak on any subject connected with national defence. If the people really want to know anything about the navy they can come to its *Head*. *You* cannot even say two and two make four."

This is one of the results of our political military system. It makes it possible for any president, no matter of what party, to appoint a politician who is so ignorant—no matter what his native capacity in his own line may be—of naval affairs and naval science that he cannot tell whether he has approved or disapproved of an article of military affairs. It is regrettable that such a secretary can maintain his assumption of superiority only by depriving the most noted expert in the navy department of his freedom of speech even in *private* life.

Moreover, the public is misled by the statements officially given out as to the real condition of the navy.

In May, 1915, the Secretary of the Navy publicly proclaimed that nine of our submarines had made an extraordinary trip from Key West to New York; but he did *not* inform us that three out of the nine submarines never joined the fleet until they reached a position off Delaware; nor were we told that one of the K boats and the E-2 had to be towed; nor were we told that *the fleet was accompanied by a tender all the way*.

Moreover, in comparing the broadside-fire of our best ships with those of the British Navy, the Secretary of the Navy compared the broadside fire of British ships which have been *finished* with ships which we are *going to have some day*.

And again, Secretary Daniels in his late announcement has classified the *Michigan* and the *South Carolina* as *dreadnoughts*—although all naval experts, our navy department, and even Secretary Daniels himself, have not previously so classified them. These ships have a speed of but $18\frac{3}{4}$ knots and a propelling power of but 16,000 and 18,000 horsepower respectively.

His announcement that the United States navy keeps a larger percentage of men on its ships in time of peace than any other navy in the world, is but a portion of the truth. We keep practically all the

trained men we have *on* our ships, because we haven't enough. Other navies have thousands of trained men in reserve. They are not *on* the ships in peace time, but they are ready to go on at a moment's notice.

What the American citizen wishes is frankness and freedom! He is not afraid of the truth; if there are dangers, he wants to know of them; if there are defects in his tools of defence, he wants to remedy those defects!

But how could the American public ever have become informed of our present condition if laymen and students and former government officials and statesmen had not, in opposition to the wishes of this administration, revealed to us the present defects of our army and navy? All thanks are due them. The important point, however, is that these same conditions may arise again and again—no matter what party is in power, no matter what man is in the White House—so long as we tolerate the “political-plum” method of placing the safety of our nation in the hands of untrained men.

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 261. Rear-Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. Navy.

² Page 263. Major-General Leonard Wood.

CHAPTER III


WASTING BILLIONS

WE are unprepared because we have wasted hundreds of millions of dollars through political mismanagement. We have been paying, on an average, for the last ten years at the rate of *one hundred million dollars a year* to maintain an army of less than 100,000 men. This little army, because of the waste and extravagance due to the "pork-barrelling-method" of appropriating moneys, and to the inefficiency of the political Secretaries of War, has cost us *in ten years one billion dollars*.

Yet after all this expenditure we have but thirty-four thousand men in the United States that can be mobilised, and those are so scattered that they cannot be mobilised inside of thirty days.

Switzerland has an army much more efficient and better equipped. At the beginning of the war Switzerland mobilised an army equal in number to seven armies of the size of the entire mobile army in the United States. This was done in forty-eight hours. And these men were fully equipped. If it had been necessary she could have mobilised in ten


Our Militarism for Pork



A - Our Army and Navy Expenditures from 1790-1910
\$16,500,000,000

B - All Other Government Expenditures from 1790-1910
\$4,900,000,000

- A. \$16,500,000,000—Our Army and Navy Expenditures—including pensions and interest on public debts caused by war—from 1790 to 1910.
- B. 4,900,000,000—All other Government Expenditures from 1790 to 1910.

Our Militarism for Pork

A - All Expenditures of
U.S. from foundation
of Government to 1910
\$ 21,500,000,000

B - Portion of Above
Expended for Army
and Navy during
same period
\$ 16,500,000,000

- A. \$21,500,000,000—All expenditures of U. S. from foundation of Government to 1910.
- B. 16,500,000,000—Portion of above—including pensions and interest on public debts caused by wars—expended for Army and Navy during same period.

days eight more additional armies, each equalling in number and surpassing in equipment the entire mobile army in the United States.

Switzerland has maintained her army, and one of the very best small armies in the world, out of a population about equal to that of Massachusetts. Switzerland has done this without interrupting the industry of the country and without altering the peace-loving nature of the people nor the peace-policy of the Swiss Government. No nation in Europe has for its size a more efficient army and no nation is more *anti-militaristic*.

For every \$1 Switzerland spends to train, equip and keep a soldier in training, we spend \$80.69. If we had been during the last ten years as economically efficient as Switzerland, our army would have cost us less than twelve million dollars instead of one thousand million dollars.

But this is a comparison with Switzerland only.

Mr. Bryan, Mr. Ford, Mr. Kitchin and others wail that we do not wish to burden our people with the excessive cost of a militaristic system similar to that of Russia, Germany or France.

The truth is this: we could have maintained an adequately trained army of half a million men each year since the Civil War and have saved the United States several hundred millions of dollars each generation, had we adopted the system of Russia, Germany and France.

What is the annual soldier cost of each man of the United States Army compared with the annual soldier cost of each man in the armies of the most militaristic countries in the world?


We pay from 400 to 600 per cent. more for the training and equipment of each soldier than other nations pay and get almost nothing in return. The per soldier cost in times of peace in Switzerland is \$13, in Germany, \$209, in France, \$249, in Austria, \$256, in Russia, \$293, and in the United States, \$1,049.

Again objection is made that there is a vast difference between sustaining an army as it is sustained in the United States, with men at a salary of \$16 per month each, and sustaining peace armies in Europe where the allowance as salary is but a few pennies a day per soldier. The objection is also made that there is a vast difference between the cost of food furnished to our soldiers and that furnished to the soldier of Russia, Germany and France respectively.

Both objections are granted. It is true that the food furnished each man of the United States Army costs more than the food furnished each man of the Russian, German or French armies; but the excessive cost is due more to *waste* and *inefficiency* in management than to a difference in the quality or amount of food.

But this waste and this inefficiency in manage-


Militarism for Protection vs Militarism for Pork
Annual Peace Soldiery per \$ 5,000,000



A - Switzerland 384,615.

B - U.S.A. 5000

Militarism for Pork vs Militarism for Protection
Cost per Soldier per year



A - U.S.A \$1000

B - France \$240


C - Switzerland \$15

ment have not been due to inefficient men in the Subsistence Department but *to the small number of men allowed by Congress for that work*. At the beginning of our war with Spain there were but twenty-two trained heads in our Subsistence Department and these men were compelled to direct, even after partially trained men were given as aides, the buying of materials and the supplying of these foods to nearly 300,000 men in different camps in the United States, and to the armies in Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines and in China. Is there any wonder that there was waste?

But to go back to the comparative cost of the soldier of different nations in peace times.

After we have deducted respective amounts paid for salaries and food from the respective total cost of each soldier of the armies of Germany and the United States, we find that the annual cost for equipment and training of a soldier in the United States is 631 per cent. greater than it is in militaristic-burdened Germany. And in Germany the soldier *is* equipped and he is *trained*. Not only is he taken care of in the most perfect manner, from his toe-nails to his scalp, but he is provided with the most modern and costly equipment and is furnished with sufficient ammunition for practice. Although we pay 631 per cent. more per soldier per year than Germany pays, the United States Army has practically no equipment at all. In other words, elimi-

Our Army-What Might Have Been




A - Army We Now Have 92,000

*B - Army We Might Have Had
Every Year from 1879-10-
1914 for our Money, Had It
Been Spent as wisely as
in Switzerland.*

6,504,000

Our Militarism for Pork



*A - Cost of Our Army
for last 35 years*
\$ 2,963,000,000

*B - What it should have
cost us, if money had
been spent as econom-
ically as in Switzerland*
\$ 27,000,000

nating the differences in the costs in food and salaries, the United States spends 631 per cent. more per year for the equipment and management of each soldier than Germany does. Germany spends 100 per cent. for equipment and gets the best in the world. We waste 631 per cent. and get little or nothing. Which is the burdened country?

We scoff at the bureaucratic-grafting government of Russia and we pity the poor Russians burdened by militarism; but even eliminating the differences in the costs of food and salaries, we annually spend for equipment 374 per cent. more per soldier than Russia does. Russia, at the beginning of the present war, equipped and mobilised 2,000,000 men in 30 days; we cannot mobilise 34,000 even partially equipped men in 30 days!

Why is America so inefficient? Because there has been flagrant administrative inefficiency and ignorance and because there has been congressional waste and lack of co-operation.

One of the great causes of waste is the continuance of 49 different army posts for 34,000 men. Most of these were established a hundred years ago. They were then necessary to protect the pioneers from the Indians. Five hundred men are still kept at Oswego, New York—evidently to protect the people from the Red Skins that overrun the surrounding country. Congress has not yet recognised that we are living in 1916 instead of 1814.

President Roosevelt's Secretaries of War over and over again urged Congress to abolish most of these army posts, insisting that they were useless and the cause of great waste. But Congressmen were appealed to by their constituents, who begged that their sources of revenue be not cut off. Hence Congress turned a deaf ear to the repeated demands of the Secretaries of War.

Corresponding to the useless army posts, there are useless navy yards.

Great Britain in first-class fighting ships has a navy almost four times as large as our own, yet we have twice as many first-class navy yards. In other words we have spent enough money to adequately accommodate a navy 800 per cent. greater than that we now have. Yet many of our yards are useless. Germany has a much more powerful and efficient navy than we have and Germany has adequate navy yards to accommodate her entire fleet, yet all her yards combined do not equal one-third of the accommodations we have provided for ships we have not. Navy yards have been established hit-and-miss along the coast. Whenever a Senator or a Congressman could bring enough pressure to bear to secure an appropriation for his state or district a navy yard was established.

As an instance of this, some years ago a southern Senator insisted that a navy yard be established at Port Royal, South Carolina. There was a site


for sale for five thousand dollars. This was purchased and nearly half a million appropriated to be distributed among the bankers, constructors, newspapers and politicians in the Senator's district. Of course, subsequent appropriations were necessary and the station was not abandoned until nearly three million dollars had been wasted there. Later this same Senator insisted on another navy yard at Charleston and five million dollars was squandered. This Charleston yard was built especially for big battleships, but is so badly constructed that it can be used only for destroyers and gun boats.

Nine million dollars have been spent at Mare Island, California. Yet the water is so shallow that it has not an adequate dock and none of the larger battleships built in the last thirteen years can berth there.

If up to 1910 we had spent our appropriations for navy yards as efficiently as Great Britain or Germany have spent their appropriations, we should have saved enough money to build two hundred submarines at one million dollars each, or four hundred submarines at half a million dollars each, or fourteen of the finest dreadnoughts afloat.

And now, although former secretaries of the navy have insisted on the abandonment of half a score or more of these wasteful enterprises, the present Secretary of the Navy announces that he will not abandon a single one of them.

War Expenses and Peace Waste



A. The sum—including pensions and interest on public debts caused by war—we have spent on our army and navy from 1790 to 1915.

B. The total actual cost of all our wars from 1790 to 1914, showing that we have spent in peace times 10,779 millions of dollars, while the cost of the wars of the United States has been but \$6,121,000,000.

Since 1900 we have spent in round numbers a billion and a half dollars on our navy. *Germany has a navy almost twice as powerful as that of the United States, yet she has spent \$500,000,000 less than we have.* We have wasted and allowed ourselves to be pork-barrelled out of five hundred million dollars in fifteen years. This would have built five hundred of the best, most up-to-date coast submarines, and in addition to that we could have added sixteen first-class modern dreadnoughts of great speed, mediumly light armour and high-elevation guns. Sixteen dreadnoughts of this type and five hundred coast submarines would have given us one of the greatest navies in the world. This amount our Congresses have wasted in a little over fifteen years.

This is the result of political militarism—of untrained Secretaries of War, of pork-barrelling Congresses and of ninety million American citizens “criminally indifferent” to the welfare of their country!

**PART FIVE: HOW POLITICAL
MILITARISM FAILS**

PART FIVE: HOW POLITICAL MILITARISM FAILS

CHAPTER I

THE MINUTE MEN

THE minute men have won!"

This was the cry heard in every American colony after the Battle of Bunker Hill.

The minute men—our noble Revolutionary ancestors—were each day struggling with nature for a living and holding the Indians at bay. They were courageous and physically fit. Moreover, every one of them knew from boyhood how to use firearms and how to hit the mark.

Not only they, but their fathers and their grandfathers had been so trained. A gun was taken with them when they went to work in the fields; a gun was ever ready for the use of the wife and the mother at the house; a gun was taken to the town meeting; even to church.

And that gun, in relation to the armament of those days, stood as the rapid-fire machine gun does in relation to the armament of to-day. "The minute men" in those days designated men physically

fit; men trained from boyhood up in the expert use of the efficient fire-arm of that time; men armed with and owning the firearm; men *ready* at a moment's notice.

To-day the citizen soldiery means: men physically unfit, coming from behind the counter, from the office desk, or from the club; men untrained in the use of the rapid-fire machine gun, the efficient infantry weapon of to-day; men—not one in a thousand—having expert knowledge of the machine gun; men—not one in a million—being the owner of such a gun; men absolutely unready to fight on a month's notice.

To believe that citizen soldiery to-day can spring to arms and accomplish even what was accomplished at Bunker Hill is a vain hope. We might accomplish a similar feat if every male citizen were physically fit, if every male citizen from childhood up had possessed a rapid-fire machine gun and had had years of practice in using it. But in our country to-day there is not one man in each half million of our unorganised militia that knows anything about the expert use of a rapid-fire machine gun.

But did the *minute men* alone win the Battle of Bunker Hill? They were entrenched on a hill—a natural fort—behind breastworks, thrown up under the direction of trained generals. The British were compelled to march up the hill unprotected, to face men behind intrenchments! The selection of the

hill and the breastworks were due to the wisdom of the expert officers who had been trained in the earlier colonial wars. The minute men inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy, yet their loss was 42 per cent. of the British loss. Students of military matters are all unified in believing that the victory of Bunker Hill was due not only to the minute men, but to the trained officers who chose the position, planned the breast works, and *restrained the impulsive men, so that they did not waste their small supply of ammunition.*

They won at Bunker Hill, but what is the true story of the minute men, the militia men, the citizen soldiery, during the remainder of the War of the Revolution, during the War of 1812, during the Civil War?

The minute men *won* at Bunker Hill! But the minute men, or militia, or citizen soldiery, no matter by what name they are designated, have won but two battles in all the history of the United States—that of Bunker Hill and that of New Orleans, and even at the Battle of New Orleans the division under General Morgan deserted and fled battle when attacked.

Yet in spite of the fact that during the seven long years of the Revolutionary War the minute men suffered defeat after defeat, never again winning a single battle in that war, the reputation of that one victory has been allowed to modify all our mili-

tary history—has resulted in years of unnecessary struggle, suffering and devastation, needless waste of hundreds of millions of dollars, and wanton waste not only of thousands, but of hundreds of thousands of men.

Citizen soldiery—half-trained volunteers have failed. They have failed at the most vital crises to enlist in sufficient numbers; they have failed during their training—refusing to obey orders, mutinying and deserting; they have failed, surprising as it may seem, in the ideal of volunteer service; they have always failed in battle.

First: they have failed to enlist at vital crises. Within thirty-five days after the Battle of Bunker Hill Congress issued commissions and provided for a continental army (July 21, 1775) not to exceed 22,000 men. During the four months from July 21 to November 19, 1775, only 966 enlisted. So slow was the recruiting that Washington had to issue a special call for five thousand men to replace the minute men who were then insisting upon going back to their homes.


And this was at a time when the colonies were preparing to fight for their very existence.

Later, out of the 20,000 troops called for by Congress during the last three months of 1775, less than 10,000 enlisted; and even after enlisting many of them refused to join the army.

During the year 1776 Congress and the colonies

Citizen Soldiery against Trained Troops


*Revolutionary
War*



A-Colonial Forces
395,000

B-British Armies
150,000

War of 1812



C-U.S. Forces
527,000

D-Actual British Army
16,000

Mexican War



E-U.S. Forces
104,000

F-Mexican Army
46,000

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

A. So inefficient was the volunteer system, that Washington was never able to bring into battle line a force larger than one-seventieth part of the forces enlisted.

B. Largest actual British force which our army had to meet at any time, was about 36,000 men, even including all the British ineffectives.

WAR OF 1812

C. So inefficient were the volunteer forces that the largest number that could ever be assembled for battle was only one-hundred-thirty-second part of the forces enlisted.

D. The aggregate force we had to meet in any one place at any one time was not more than one-half of this number.

MEXICAN WAR

E. The volunteer forces were so inefficient that the Generals, after working for eighteen months to get them in shape, finally invaded Mexico with but little more than ten thousand men.

F. The Mexican Army was not composed of well-trained troops.

authorised more than 90,000 troops. Yet the year 1777 opened with Washington going into winter quarters at Morristown with an army which was reduced during his stay to less than 3,000 men, although there were more than 20,000 trained British veterans less than thirty-five miles away.

Even during the last year of the war, when the fate of the colonies hung in the balance, the colonies called for more than 50,000 men, yet Washington was unable to get more than 5,000 effective troops.

And this failure of the nation's citizens to volunteer during times of great stress has not been confined to the Revolutionary War.

During the first year of the Civil War volunteers exceeded the call, but as soon as they saw that there was real fighting to be done many seized the first opportunity and went home at the expiration of their short enlistments, or deserted. In the Civil War, as in the Revolutionary War, when the real crisis came, the citizens did not volunteer in sufficient number to meet the needs. The draft had to be enforced.


During the Spanish-American War the nation passed through no crisis. The war was over in 109 days. We do not know what the results of volunteer system would have been had the men enlisting deemed the campaign more than a great lark.

Not only have the militia failed to enlist in suf-


Citizen Soldiery Against Indians

*Creek Indian
War 1812-1813*

*Florida War
1835 - 1842*



Seminole War 1817 - 1818 *Black Hawk
War 1832*



*A-U.S. 44,521
B-Ind-1950*

*C-U.S.-6911
D-Ind-1000*

*E-U.S.-5989
F-Ind-1000*

*G-U.S.-60,691
H-Ind-1800*

- A. The number of men called out for the purpose.
 B. Many authorities estimate the Indian forces as low as 1,100.
 D. Estimated by some authorities as low as seven or eight hundred instead of one thousand.
 F. Indian forces probably not more than eight hundred, according to conservative estimate.
 G. The 60,000 militia and volunteers were so inefficient that General Scott begged Congress to disband them and give him 3,000 regulars instead.
 H. Indian forces are estimated by various authorities at from 1,100 to 1,900.

ficient numbers whenever there was a real crisis to be met and real fighting to be done, but they have failed during training.

They have mutinied and deserted in unbelievable numbers. Innumerable instances of mutinying and desertion—so many they cannot here be mentioned—occurred among the militia of the various colonies before they were incorporated into the army of Congress. And even in the army under Washington within five months after its organisation, desertion of troops became a serious matter. In writing of his failure to hold them, Washington stated:

“Notwithstanding this (my explanation and plea) yesterday morning most of them resolved to leave the camp. Many went off and the utmost vigilance was used to apprehend them.”

In the beginning of the War of 1812 General Hopkins, commanding 4,000 Kentucky mountain militia, started to invade Canada. But in five days all the troops mutinied, deserted and went home. Another large force under William Henry Harrison, organised for the same purpose, also decided to return to their homes. One month later practically all of the troops under General Dearborn, organised to invade Canada by the Lake Champlain route, marched up to the very border and then decided they did not wish to go to Canada. As a result they mutinied, absolutely refusing to cross the border, and thus the expedition ended.

During the fall of the year of 1813 first one group and then another of the troops employed under General Jackson in the Creek War, mutinied respectively. In the Second Florida War against the Seminoles, the Missouri volunteers ran away and hid in a swamp; all the pleading of General Taylor could not induce them to return to the fighting.

The militia mutinied:

At Morristown in January, 1781;

At Pompton, New Jersey, the same month;

At Lancaster, in June, 1783;

On the march to Detroit in June, 1812;

At Detroit, Michigan, in July, 1812;

On the march to the Wabash River in August, 1812;

On the march to the Maumee River, the same month;

Before the Battle of Queenstown in August;

En route from Plattsburg in November, 1812;

At Fort Strother, Florida, in November, 1813;

In the retreat to Buffalo in December, 1813;

At the Withlacoochee River, December 13, 1835;

At Charlestown, West Virginia, in 1861!

The official record states that the desertions from the armies of the United States during the Civil War were 199,000. But this is not the full truth. This number includes only the desertions after men were in the formal authorised armies of the United

CITIZEN SOLDIERY AGAINST TRAINED TROOPS

CIVIL WAR

During the first year of the war, the Confederacy, because of their initiative in beginning to prepare at an earlier date, had better trained troops. During the last two years of the war, the Union because of its greater supply of men had more trained troops than the Confederates.

The First Battle of Bull Run was described by the Count von Moltke, the Prussian military observer, as a "contest of two armed mobs."

A. Because of the inefficiency of the volunteer system, less than half of these ever became effective troops. One out of ten were discharged because they were unfit to serve; one out of every five deserted. We have paid as a result of this system \$9,800,000,000, while it would have cost us less than \$500,000,000 if it had been conducted on a military instead of a political basis, even at the rate of expense of the present European War.

B. The largest estimate made of all the enlistments of the Confederate army. Many good authorities place the number at from seven to eight hundred thousand.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR


C. But 52,000 of these were ever out of the United States, and only about 26,000 ever saw a gun fired at the enemy.

In addition to our 281,000 men, we had the service of several thousand Cuban revolutionists, who rendered aid to our forces at a critical time.

D. The Spanish forces were 200,000, but very poorly commanded. An efficient general at the head of the Spanish forces in Cuba, acting energetically, could have annihilated our little invading force of 17,000 men with but little trouble.


Citizen Soldiery against Trained Troops

Civil War



A - U.S. Army - 2,670,000
 B - Confederate - 1,000,000

Spanish American War



C - U.S.A. Army - 281,000
 D - Spanish Army - 200,000
Chart LL

States. It does not include desertions from militia groups training for entrance into the Union Armies.


In reality the number of desertions totalled 526,000 men. This statement is made on the authority of a man who has been chief of staff of the Army of the United States and commander of one of the large divisions. It has been stated on the floor of the Senate that the number of desertions was even greater than this—that the true number, though suppressed by the War Department, probably reached the shameful figure of seven or eight hundred thousand men. This is no doubt an exaggerated estimate. Nevertheless, compare this 526,000 with the number of desertions from the Prussian army during the Franco-Prussian War. Their war records show that during the entire campaign of 1870 and 1871 but 17 men deserted.

The volunteer system—as a system—has failed in that which we have held most dear—the ideal of service.

This does not refer to the individual volunteer who stays with the army. *After eighteen months' or two years' training the American becomes the finest soldier in the world!*

Volunteers are composed of three classes: First, those who enlist because of patriotism, of a real desire to serve their country. How small this number is can be wisely estimated from the number who remain to become real effectives. Experience

Citizen Militia per Million Population



A-Switzerland

*B-Australia
new System*

*C-Australia
old System*

D-Canada

E-British Isles

F- U.S.A.

Switzerland is the most protected country in the world, because of its obligatory military system, in proportion to its area and population.

Australia's new system is based upon the system of Switzerland. Australia's old system was a volunteer system similar in that respect to our State Militia.

Canada's national citizen soldiery and England's Territorial force are based upon the volunteer system.

In all cases these militia are trained without pay.

Our past experiences prove that all efforts to secure a satisfactory army of defence by the volunteer system have failed in times of peace.

All our past experiences prove that a volunteer army enlisted after a war begins is unfit, even harmful, during the first year of war. Our citizens more than those of any other country now employing the volunteer system fail to recognise the fact that they owe a duty to their government.

Every million Australians furnishes 19,000 soldiers; every million Canadians furnishes 9,000; every million British furnishes 7,000. Every million Americans furnish but 1,000.

It is useless to attempt any plan of preparation in times of peace, so as to be able to defend ourselves should war come, by the volunteer system.

shows that our greatest proportion of effectives ever attained was 19.6 per cent. and our smallest proportion, one per cent. Second, those who enlist because they believe there will be little or no fighting, that the campaign will be a joyful lark, that the war will soon be over, that they can return as the heroes of their respective communities. These desert at the first opportunity. Third, those who enlist for the sake of bounties—desert and re-enlist, and those who hold off for ever increasing bounties. In every war the United States has waged we have been compelled at each succeeding call for volunteers to increase the bounties.

We began in 1776 with a bounty of \$20; soon it was increased to \$20 and a hundred acres of land. But as this failed to bring sufficient troops and as those volunteering were so inefficient, Congress authorised Washington in 1779 to give a bounty of \$200 to each veteran who would re-enlist. The states did still better—or worse. New Jersey added \$250 to the Congressional bounty and Virginia made the bounty \$750 and a hundred acres of land. The following year New Jersey actually paid \$1,000 in addition to the \$200 of the continental allowance. The system of bounties means but one thing, that, even during that time which we hold above all other times to have been the most patriotic in the history of our people, volunteers could not be induced to enlist unless they could secure from \$200 to \$1,000, a

portion of it down in cash—always with the opportunity of deserting 20 or 30 days later and re-enlisting and securing another bounty. This was so well understood that Congress in authorising Washington to increase a certain bounty advised that he should use *his discretion in keeping the matter secret as long as he deemed it necessary.*

And the bounty system of the Revolutionary War did not extend to the militia only. To secure a sufficient number of officers Congress was finally forced in 1779 to advocate that each officer continuing in command of troops to the end of the war should receive a bounty of *half pay for his entire life.*

This same folly of giving bounties was repeated at the beginning of the Civil War. Hundreds of men, thousands of men enlisted, received their cash bounty, deserted, re-enlisted again in another community or under another name, received another cash bounty and deserted. The process was repeated again and again. In fact, there is an official confession of one man who enlisted 32 times, received 32 different bounties, and evidently deserted at least 31 times.

And in 1862 President Lincoln discovered that, although the United States Government was paying daily for 140,000 men in Pope's army, Pope could find only 60,000.

There is an ideal of service! There is such a

thing as patriotism! But the patriotism of volunteers is not greater, nor as great, as that of regular troops.

“Men may speculate as they will; they may talk of patriotism; they may draw a few examples from ancient history, of great achievements performed by its influence, but whoever builds upon them, as a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody war, will find himself deceived in the end. . . . I do not mean to exclude altogether the idea of patriotism. I know it exists. . . . *But I will venture to assert that a great and lasting war can never be supported on this principle alone.*” Washington to John Bannister, 1778.

Volunteers have failed in efficiency in battle!

In the hundreds of battles and engagements of our various wars, the untrained militia have mutinied, deserted, or failed in every single engagement, except that of Bunker Hill.

The first campaign of the Revolutionary War—the movement on Canada—came to nought, although Arnold had finally taken 750 men, out of the two divisions of 4,100 men which began the campaign, up the steep ascent and demanded the surrender of Quebec. He was forced to make the attack without a day's delay—without waiting for reinforcements—because *three of his captains and many of his men refused to stay* and gave him no-

tice that they would leave after the expiration of their terms of enlistment. The term of enlistment was to end in three days. And they made this refusal after having struggled through the Maine woods to get to Quebec. Of the 750 men, 486 were killed, wounded or captured.

During that year there had been under the pay of Congress and in the militia of the southern colonies 37,600 half-trained volunteers. Yet the only result was a disastrous expedition to Canada.

Although 89,600 volunteers were trained during the second year of the Revolutionary War, they were so inefficient they could take no effective action against the enemy, although there were less than 30,000 British. Because of desertion, mutiny and inefficiency, the army, at the close of the year, had again dwindled to but a few thousand men.

During the third year of the war there were employed a total of 68,700 men. The only victory was that of General Gates, when a large percentage of regular troops were used; otherwise the 68,700 men were absolutely unable to take any effective step against the 33,000 Britishers. The year ended in the retreat of a dwindling army to Valley Forge.

During 1779 more than 44,000 men were under training, as against 34,000 British, yet nothing was accomplished.

In 1780 General Gates was defeated at Camden even though his army was much greater than that

of Cornwallis. The militia again ran away in a most disgraceful manner. Though 43,000 men had been under arms during 1780, little of consequence had been accomplished, and Washington's effectives had dwindled to 5,000 by the end of the year.

The actual war closed in 1781, not through the efficiency of the American army reduced to less than 5,000 effective troops under the command of Washington, but to the French troops under Lafayette, the French fleet and the arrival of Rochambeau with 6,000 additional veteran French troops. It was without doubt the assistance of the Comte de Grasse, of de Barasse, of Rochambeau, and of Lafayette, together with their fleets, their thousands of trained veterans, which finally effected the surrender of Cornwallis's men. Such is the actual record of half-trained volunteers during the seven years of the life-and-death struggle of the American colonies for independence.

As a result of our inefficient militia 395,000 men were required in the War of the Revolution, yet the largest number ever concentrated for battle was 5,763 men under General Gates at Saratoga; and when the fate of the colonies hung in the balance, Washington's army at Trenton and Princeton was less than 4,000 men.

Washington in his letter to Congress pointing out the evils and danger of the volunteer system, asserted that Canada would have been won to the

colonies, except for the action of the militia. Writing to the President of Congress, September 2, 1776, he said that

“. . . no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence is left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean one to exist during the war.”

On the 24th of September, 1776, he wrote:

“To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff.”

And later on, August 20, 1780, after five years of failures, Washington again wrote Congress:

“It may be easily shown that *all the misfortunes* we have met with in the military line *are to be attributed to this cause (failure of the militia).*”

And again during the same year, writing of Gates's defeat at Camden, Washington stated:

“This event, however, adds itself to many others, to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well as for defence as offence; and whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire

the habits necessary to resist a regular force . . . the firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. *I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion*; and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence."

Morgan, explaining why he placed his militia in a certain position at the Battle of Cowpens, asserted:

"I would not have a swamp in view of militia on any consideration; they would have made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it. . . . Had I crossed the river, one-half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me."

The War of 1812 opened with the surrender at Detroit of the American garrison of 1,800 men, mostly volunteers and militia to 300 *British regulars* and 400 *militia*, without so much as firing a single shot in defence of the garrison.

The Hopkins expedition of 4,000 volunteers, the General Dearborn expedition of 5,700, the General Smith expedition of 4,500, the forces under General Harrison, and the 3,100 men under General Wadsworth all came to naught because of mutiny, desertion and inefficiency—in fact, during 1812, the American forces of a little more than

64,000 men accomplished nothing in face of the active British force which did not exceed 1,400 men—one-third of whom were boys and old men fit only for garrison duty.

This is the record of the inefficiency of our militia for the first year of the War of 1812.

In the year 1813, the forces under General Harrison, which had been limited by Congress to 7,000 men and the forces under Winchester of 3,000 men won victories at the Thames; and immediately following the success the usual blunder was made—the army disbanded and the campaign was given up. Though 50,000 militia had been called out within 16 months to defeat Proctor's little force, the entire result was nothing.

Though a large American force of militia was stationed in northern New York to defend Buffalo and the surrounding country, a British force of less than 650 men, regulars, Indians and militia combined, absolutely put to route 3,000 militia. General Cass, in writing to the Secretary of War, stated that all except a very few of them behaved in the most cowardly manner. They fled without discharging their muskets.

In the Champlain region, General Hampton, with 5,000 volunteers, was defeated by 800 Canadian militia and Indians.

The army of General Wilkinson, an advance guard of 1,700 men with 6,300 reinforcements,

ran back to their boats, abandoning their campaign on Montreal, after having been attacked by 800 British regulars at Chrystler's Fields. In fact, 13,000 American volunteers were absolutely driven back by an enemy less than 2,000.

During the same year there were on the Chesapeake 66,000 enlisted militia. The British Admiral Warren with but 1,500 men destroyed Hampton after previously capturing and destroying Frenchtown, Havre de Grace, Georgetown and Fredericktown, and the 66,000 militia offered no aid at all to the citizens who tried to protect their property.

The year 1813 ended with the United States having employed 130,000 men, having not more than 14,000 or 15,000 British to oppose them, yet leaving a record of nothing but defeats.

The year 1814 opened by General Wilkinson making another effort to invade Canada with 4,000 men. They were repulsed by a force of 180 Britishers. The attempted invasion accomplished nothing except added disgrace for the American forces.

At Bladensburg, a short distance from Washington, more than 5,000 American militia deserted and ran before 1,500 British troops poorly equipped with but four little guns which they were compelled to drag up the incline themselves because they had no horses. The mass of militia fled at this battle without ever firing a shot. The American loss was but 8 killed and 11 wounded. Thus

ended the disgraceful record of our militia during the actual War of 1812 and 1814.

The Indian War against the Seminoles shows that it required 60,000 militia and seven years of mutiny, desertion and fighting to defeat 1,200 Indians.

The militia deserted and ran away:

On Long Island in August, 1776;

At the evacuation of New York one month later;

At the Battle of Brandywine in 1777;

At Guilford Court House, 1781;

At the Battle of Burwell's Ferry in April, the same year;

At Williamsburg a day later;

Near Fort Wayne in October, 1790;

In Dart County, Ohio, in 1791;

En route to the Racine River in 1813;

At Sackett's Harbour three months later;

At French Creek seven months later;

At Chrystler's Fields ten days later;

At the burning of Buffalo, December 30, 1812;

At the burning of Lewiston, the same month;

At the Battle of Bladensburg and the burning of the capitol in 1814;

At the Battle of New Orleans, 1815;

At the Battle of Bull Run, 1861.

"Our Civil War is often erroneously cited as illustrating the might of the citizen soldier suddenly called to the defence of his country. On

the contrary, it well illustrated the weakness of the untrained citizen soldier, and the length of time required to train him. In the first months of the war, untrained citizens of the North met the untrained citizens of the South, and both were armed mobs as easily disorganised by victory as by defeat. During the second year of the war training began to tell on both sides, as can be seen in the character of the campaigns and battles. *In the final years of the war these volunteers were as good soldiers as ever marched to war.*"¹

The first year of the Civil War Congress and the President trusted to volunteers and militia. Although during 1861 we enlisted, trained and paid for 669,000 men, we were able to bring together at Bull Run but 28,500 men, all of whom excepting 800 were volunteers and militia. Many of the militia ran away in panic and could not be stopped until they had reached the Potomac, some twenty-five miles away.

The second year of the Civil War showed almost as great inefficiency of the militia as the first. Summing up the results of the first and second periods of 1862, Upton states:

"The withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the James River to Washington and Alexandria, the invasion of Maryland and the retreat of the Army of the Ohio to Louisville produced a

depression in the public mind nearly as great as that which succeeded the Battle of Bull Run." ²

In every war, in which half-trained militia and volunteers have been put to the test, they have mutinied, deserted, and run away from battle.

Moreover, during the seventy years from the beginning of the War of 1812 to the second year of our Civil War, one-fourth of all the states then forming the Union actually defied the authority of the United States, defied the authority of the President as commander-in-chief of the army, refusing to aid the United States with their militia, even when its armies were in danger.

"If I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter." ³

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 314. Report of the Army Committee of the National Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C. Church, editor *Army and Navy Journal*; Captain Matthew Hannah; General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others.

² Page 315. Upton, "Military Policy of the United States."

³ Page 315. George Washington.

CHAPTER II

THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID

ALL the blunders of our wars—the enormous percentage of useless men, the extraordinary cost, the wasteful prolongation of each war, the wholesale murder of half-trained soldiers—have been due: first, to our ridiculous political military system; and second, to our mistake and vain belief in the value of citizen soldiers.

Upton says: “The same mistake in statesmanship, which in time of peace gives us a nonexpansive military establishment, is certain to bring about in time of war *useless sacrifice of human life, unlimited waste of money, and national humiliation.*”

During the Revolutionary War the colonies were subjected to seven years' struggle, suffering and devastation. But one year would have been necessary had Congress allowed Washington to actually command the armies under him. In July, 1775, there were 17,000 men under Washington; the British effectives were less than 6,500. During the next five months 37,500 American troops

were enlisted. If these had been under military instead of Congressional control and if they had been properly trained and equipped, they could have defeated the British forces—could have captured them or driven them off the continent within six months; and we would have had time to prepare before England could have sent more troops.

We would have been spared six years of struggle and waste; we would have been spared the terrible winter at Morristown and the sufferings at Valley Forge; we would have saved millions and millions of dollars!

Washington in 1780 said: "Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since."

At the beginning of the War of 1812 the British had but 4,500 effectives on the entire North American continent. We then had an army of 6,700 men. If Congress had kept our men in condition—properly organised and officered and properly supplied with ammunition—they could have defeated the British within six months. We provided 65,000 untrained men the first six months, but these were unable to gain a single victory over the 1,450 men they had to oppose. The war would have been over in six months instead of two years later; and we would have been spared the shame

of Detroit, the dishonour of the Lake Champlain campaigns, and the disgrace at Bladensburg and the burning of Washington.

If we had had but 10,000 trained troops the war could have ended victoriously in six months.


Huidekoper, referring to the War of 1812, writes:

“Had Congress at the beginning of the year declared that all men owed their country military service and raised the army to 35,000, by volunteering or by drafting for service ‘during the war,’ such a force after six months’ training *could easily have occupied Canada and terminated the war in one campaign.*”

If, when South Carolina seceded, Congress had acted immediately—had at once put our little regular army into condition and had immediately called for two hundred fifty thousand volunteers—our 276,000 men could have had seven months’ training by July 30, 1861, at which time the Confederacy had less than 60,000 troops with from two to four months’ training. These 276,000 trained troops, well equipped, could have put down the Rebellion in one year. But Congress did *nothing* until *five months* after the Confederacy elected their president, nothing until *four months* after the Confederacy issued its call for a hundred thousand volunteers, nothing until 35,000 of these had already had three months’ training.

Excessive Prolongation and Devastation

due to
Political Militarism



The Revolutionary War lasted seven years, the War of 1812 lasted two years six months, the Mexican War two years four months, the First Seminole War three months, Second Seminole War seven years, the Black Hawk War five months, Civil War four years, Spanish-American War three months, Philippine War two years four months.

We have been at war, *twenty-six full years of twelve months each* out of 140 years.

If we include a few of the campaigns against the Indians, we find that we have been at war one entire year of twelve months out of every five years from 1775 to 1915.

If we had adopted and maintained a rational and efficient military system, we could have—according to Washington, Upton and Huidekoper—successfully terminated the Revolutionary War in one year, the War of 1812 in six months, the Mexican War in one year, the Second Seminole War in six months, the Civil War in two years or less, and the Philippine War in six months.

This shows: that George Washington, who is the most trustworthy authority on the Revolutionary War, and that Upton, who is the greatest authority on our Civil War, believed, and that Huidekoper, the greatest military authority of our day, now believes that we have wasted just *nineteen years and one month* out of the *twenty-six years* we have been at war.

Upton, writing of the body of national volunteers that had been organised to take the place of the militia in the War of 1812, states that, had that system come down to us—each regiment with a professional soldier at its head—*our Civil War would have been finished in half the time, with the employment of but 300,000 men.*

Almost one-fifth of the 140 years from 1775 to 1915 have seen us engaged in actual warfare. In fact, if we include a few of the small campaigns against the Indians, we find that we have been at war one entire year of twelve months out of every five years.

The Revolutionary War lasted seven years, the War of 1812 two years six months, the Mexican War two years four months, the First Seminole War three months, Second Seminole War seven years, the Black Hawk War five months, Civil War four years, Spanish-American War three months, Philippine War two years four months. Thus we have been at war *26 full years of twelve months each out of 140 years.*

If we had adopted and maintained a rational and efficient military system, we could have—according to Washington, Upton and Huidekoper—successfully terminated the Revolutionary War in one year, the War of 1812 in six months, the Mexican War in one year, the Second Seminole War in six months, the Civil War in two years or

less, and the Philippine War in six months. This shows that George Washington, who was the most practical and trustworthy authority on the Revolutionary War, and that Upton, who was the greatest authority on our Civil War, believed, and that Huidekoper, the greatest military authority of our day, now believes that *we have wasted just 19 years and one month out of the 26 years we have been at war*. What folly to waste, because of a ludicrous military system, one whole generation of peace, burdening the nation for 19 years and one month, by years of suffering, untold hardships, *unnecessary* waste of moneys, of business, of prosperity and of the lives of hundreds of thousands of men.

Huidekoper states: our wars have been "*outrageous extravagances*" in men and in money.

And what have we paid in waste of money?

A voluntary system is based on the immoral idea that no citizen owes a duty to the government which protects his property, his business, himself and his family. It is based on the vicious idea that no man is by honour *bound* to pay his just obligations unless it suits his frame of mind or unless he can be bribed to do so. From this basis arises the political system which induces *the few*—by calls to patriotism, by bounty bribes, and by promises of pensions—to *bear the burden of all*.

Because volunteers are unfit when most needed, there is the enormous waste in training, in feeding and in drilling men, who must later be discharged because of physical inability. Under the universal training system, these men would not be taken into the army in the first place. The nation would thus be saved the extra time of their officers, the waste of money in feeding, the waste of time and effort and money in training.

“Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 to 100,000 in constant pay than to depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy, which you could establish among fixed and settled troops.” . . .


“We have had, a great part of the time, two sets of men to feed and pay—the discharged men going home, and the levies coming in.”¹

What is the record of the money wasted?

The Revolutionary War has cost us 440 million dollars. During the first year the 37,000 continental soldiers comprised a force 469% greater than the total British effectives then here,—a force


Our Losses of Citizen Soldiery

Civil War



A = 1,383,532 - U.S. Losses
B = 1,000,000 - All Confederates
Ever Enlisted

Spanish-American War



C = 26,591 - U.S. Soldiers
actually engaged
D = 6,500 - Dead from fighting
and sickness

CIVIL WAR

A. Our losses—due to a great extent to the volunteer system of half-trained soldiery were:

Total losses from dead of all causes.....	359,528 (1)
Total desertions	526,000
Men discharged for disability	250,000
Number wounded	248,014 (2)
Total losses	1,383,582

1. From Heitman, Volume II, Page 286.

2. Estimated at the rate of 3.7 men to each man killed in action. This is the lowest rate ever known in any great war. Our wounded were probably 4.5 men wounded to each man killed, which would give an increase of more than 25 per cent. of 248,014.

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

D. Total number of dead from fighting and sickness, about 6,500, although the Adjutant-General for 1898 and 1899 gives the total of 7,043. These reports, however, duplicate the few deaths of volunteers in Cuba.

221% more than the entire British force, sick and well. If they had been properly trained and equipped, the war would have been ended in twelve months and the *cost* of that war—even at the *per soldier rate of Germany's stupendous expense in the present war*—would have been only a little over 30 million dollars instead of the 440 millions the war has cost us. In other words, we would have saved 410 millions out of 440 millions.

The War of 1812 has cost us \$132,000,000. If, when the war began, we had a force of but ten thousand trained soldiers, that force would have been 598% greater than all the British effectives we were compelled to meet during that first year. The war would have been closed in one year—probably in six months—and, *even at the present per soldier rate of the European expense*, it would have *cost* but \$8,280,000. We would have saved 124 millions out of the expenditure of 132 millions.

The Second Florida War cost us \$69,000,000. General Scott begged Congress for 3,000 *efficient troops* instead of the 60,000 *militia and volunteers*. The three thousand troops asked for by General Scott would have been 250% of the Indian force. They could have defeated the twelve hundred Indians in six months at least, and the war would have cost less than 3 millions, even at the present European rate of expense, instead of nearly 70

millions. Out of the 70 millions spent we could have saved 67 millions.

The Mexican War has cost us 137 millions. The total force that invaded Mexico was less than 11,000 men. If at the beginning of the war General Scott had had 22,000 trained soldiers—a force twice as great as the number that actually decided the war—the war would have ended in one year and would have *cost*, even at the present European rate of expense, but 16 million dollars instead of 137 millions. We could have saved 125 millions out of the 137 millions that have been spent.

The Civil War cost us \$9,800,000,000. Upton states: that *the war could have been closed in two years with three hundred thousand trained men*. And this force would have been 400% greater than the Confederacy could have mustered, had we had a trained army of but fifty thousand men to interfere with their preparations at the beginning of the war. The cost of this army of three hundred thousand men for two years, at the rate of *present* expenditures in Europe would have been but 496 millions. Up to the present day, we would have saved \$9,332,000,000 on the Civil War alone.

The Spanish-American War has cost us to date \$367,000,000. If we had had a trained army of one hundred thousand men in 1898, there would have been no necessity of calling out 250,000 volunteers and militia. One hundred thousand men are al-

most 200% of all the forces we ever had on foreign soil during the war. The cost of the war, at the rate of present European expenditures, would have been but 27 million dollars instead of 367 millions—a saving of 340 million dollars.

The total cost of our wars up to the present time—including pensions—has been nearly 10,976 millions. If we had had an obligatory system and if our wars had been conducted even as expensively as the present European War, it is estimated that the cost would have been 582 million dollars instead of 10 *billion* 976 million. We would have saved the entire 10 billion dollars, and out of 976 millions we would have saved 494 millions.

What folly to waste \$10,393,000,000 out of expenditures of \$10,976,000,000.

And because of our ludicrous military system, we have paid in billions of dollars of waste during peace times as well as during war times.

The peace expenses of our military system from 1791 to 1914 have been \$8,718,000,000. The reports of the Secretaries of War show that we have had but 2,488,000 annual soldiers during these periods. Hence the yearly soldier cost during peace times has been \$3,504 per soldier. And more than half of this is for pensions. During peace times, before the outbreak of the present war, the annual soldier cost of each man and the proportionate soldier cost of each French soldier was \$249 annually.


Excessive Cost of Wars with Citizen Soldierly

Total Money Spent on Our Wars

\$ 10,976,501,000

Total Waste

\$ 10,393,000,000



These figures seem so small as to make one doubt the value of the estimate.

The estimate is secured by multiplying the number of men as estimated by George Washington, Upton and Huidekoper, that would have been required under an efficient military system by the number of years which these same authorities estimate would have been necessary to terminate these wars. This gives the total number of annual soldiers for each war, respectively.

The cost of each annual soldier is estimated, including the proportionate cost of transportation and ammunition, at the *extraordinary rate at which Germany spends money on her soldiers during the present war.*

Certainly this is an *overestimate* rather than an underestimate. Ammunition and the means of transportation in the Civil War, the Mexican War, and the War of the Revolution were not as expensive as they are in Germany to-day, nor was ammunition then used at the rate at which ammunition is used to-day.

We have paid on an average \$3,504 per year per peace soldier from 1791 to 1914—an unbelievable figure, did not the facts bear it out.

That France has received something for what she has spent is proven by the conduct of her soldiers during the present war.

If we had based our military system upon the highest ideal—the ideal that every citizen *owes* a duty to the government which protects him—we could have maintained each year an army twice as large as the army we actually had during that year and we could have maintained the larger army at 17.6% of the cost we actually paid for the smaller force.

We could have maintained during the first twenty years of our national existence, 1789-1809, an annual army of 15,000 men—twice as large as the force we actually had; for the next fifty years, 1809 to 1859, we could have had an annual army of 25,000 trained men, a force 225% of what we actually averaged during those years; for the next twenty years, 1859 to 1879, we could have maintained an army of 50,000—a force 250% greater than we had; and for the last 35 years, 1880 to 1915, we could have maintained 100,000 trained men each year—202% of what we have actually averaged for those years—and all these would have cost us—at the rate France and other European nations have paid for

soldiery during peace times—*17.6% of the money we have actually paid for very inferior forces.*

In other words, under the obligatory system, we could have had from 1791 to the present day, a trained army twice as great as that which we have had each year, and it would have cost us for all those years but *one* and a half billion instead of *eight* and a half billion dollars. And moreover, *if we had had such a force, 75% of the expenses of the War of 1812, of the Second Seminole War, of the Mexican War, of the Civil War, of the Spanish-American War, and of the Philippine War, would have been saved. In fact, it is more than probable that there never would have been a War of 1812, nor a Mexican War, nor a Spanish-American War if we had a military system and armies similar to those just indicated.*

Our own history furnishes us with a sufficient basis for such a conclusion.

At the close of the Civil War, we were in as great danger of going to war with France and Austria over the imperial occupation of Mexico as we had been in danger of going to war with England in 1811, or in danger of going to war with Mexico in 1845. *But because we had a regular army, and a million additional men who had become veterans because of their two and three years' training in the Civil War, both France and Austria backed*

down, withdrew from Mexico, and there was no war.

There is no doubt that the yearly living cost of each soldier was less during our War of the Revolution, less during our War of 1812, less during the Mexican War and even less during the Civil War, than it is to-day. It is also certain that a soldier of to-day uses more ammunition than did a soldier even a generation ago, to say nothing of the soldier of 140 years ago. It is certain that the average per soldier cost of the present day's ammunition is a thousand times greater than it was during the Revolutionary War or during the War of 1812, and perhaps 200 times as expensive as it was during our Civil War.

We gasp at the tens of millions of dollars thrown away every day in Europe through the use of gigantic and expensive explosive shells; we stand aghast at what we consider the extravagant cost of the transportation systems of the present armies fighting in Europe.

But—including the proportionate per soldier cost of all the expensive ammunition used to-day and the proportionate per soldier cost of the expensive transportation system needed at the present time—the annual soldier cost of each Russian soldier in the present war is but \$661, of each French soldier \$774, of each German soldier \$828, and of each English soldier \$921, while the average annual

soldier cost of every soldier who *ever enlisted in the Civil War has been \$3,677*. Under our voluntary system—with its enormous waste in the training hundreds of thousands of men and then discharging them, with its enormous and vicious bounties paid over and over again to men who enlist, desert, and re-enlist and desert again,—our annual soldier costs have always been “outrageous.”

The average annual soldier cost of *every man ever enlisted for the Spanish-American War was \$4,354*, at the rate money has been spent for the 109 days of that war.

In the Civil War expensive ammunition such as is used to-day was not used, and in the Spanish-American War there were not more than 26,000 men out of the 280,000, who were ever employed in using ammunition against the enemy.


But even these gigantic annual soldier extravagances are small compared to the *actual cost of each effective man*. These figures just quoted give the average annual soldier cost of every man who ever enlisted during *the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, respectively*. The annual soldier cost of the largest number of effectives we have been able to get together at any one time during each war is quite a different matter.

The lowest annual soldier cost of an effective *soldier in the War of 1812 was \$9,320*; at the rate money was spent during the Spanish-American

**EXCESSIVE COST OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY—ANNUAL
SOLDIER COST****NOTES TO CHART.**

1. The sum total of each nation's yearly war expenses divided by the sum total of the annual soldiers called by that nation to the battle front or put into training camps. Consequently this includes the proportionate soldier cost of the excessively expensive transportation system of the present day and proportionate soldier cost of enormously expensive ammunition.
2. The total war cost up to the present day of each war respectively apportioned among the total number of men ever enlisted. This shows the excessive costs, due to training men for months and then being forced to discharge them because of disability, or due to bounties, desertions and pensions.
3. The annual soldier cost (at the rate money has been spent for the 109 days of the war), as apportioned among the 52,000 men who were outside of the United States. Only about half of these ever were in a position to see a gun fired at the enemy.
4. Total Union war expenses apportioned among the soldiers under General Pierce's command at Big Bethel, those engaged at Rich Mountain, Carrick's Ford; those under General Patterson, near Harper's Ferry, and those who were finally gathered under General McDowell's command at the Battle of Bull Run—a total force of about 40,000 men. Only 28,500 Union troops were finally concentrated at the First Battle of Bull Run.

**Excessive Cost Citizen Soldiery
Annual Soldier Cost**



CITIZEN SOLDIERY DESERTIONS

CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865

Total Union enlistments.....	2,673,341
Total Union desertions, according to suppressed reports...	526,000
It has been claimed on the floor of the Senate that even this number is below the actual number.	
Record of desertions made public.....	199,000

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, 1870-1871

Prussian Army mobilized.....	640,000
Number of desertions.....	17

Citizen Soldiery Desertions

Civil War 1861-1865

*Desertions 19.4% of All Enlistments
Report Suppressed by War Dept.*

*Desertions 7.4%
of All Enlistments*

*Public
Records*

*Prussian Army
Franco-Prussian
War
1870-1871
Desertions:
 $\frac{1}{376}$ of 1%*

War, the annual per soldier *cost of each effective* was \$23,584. And during the *first year* of the Civil War, the annual soldier cost of each effective—even including those who ran away from battle—was \$32,997!

Compare this \$33,000 with \$920, the highest average annual soldier cost of any soldier of any nation at present engaged in war—and the \$920 includes the proportionate per soldier expense of the most costly ammunition ever used.

And what have we paid in men?

Because of the voluntary system the government must try out millions of men, discharging hundreds of thousands because of physical disability. More than 250,000 men were discharged for this cause in the Civil War alone. Under the voluntary system, with no registration of citizens, thousands, even hundreds of thousands accept bounties, desert and cannot be found until they apply for pensions. In the Civil War our desertions were 526,000 men—19.7% of all the men who ever enlisted.

By long, tedious, wastefully costly processes, we have enlisted and employed during our 26 years of wars *only* 604,000 annual regulars. If we had in the beginning adopted a sensible military policy and maintained a small and efficient army, such as has been previously indicated, not only would we have saved billions of dollars in war time and billions

of dollars in peace time, but we would not have been compelled to employ at enormous waste of time and money 3,490,000 extra militia and volunteers—men who are more harmful than beneficial up to the time that they have become veteran soldiers by a year or more of training.

Our waste in feeding and training useless men in the Spanish-American War was 81.4%; in the Mexican War, 89.8%; in the War of the Revolution, 91.4%; in the first year of the Civil War, 94.1%; and in the War of 1812, 99%.

What business house would conduct its business in such a way as to make it necessary to keep on its pay roll 1,000 men for the sake of securing the labour of 186 men? Yet this is the best record we have ever shown in any war in obtaining effectives.

Because of the voluntary system, unprepared men are taken into camps, concentrated in close unprepared quarters, and as no adequate hospital and sanitary corps are ready to take charge of these volunteers, sickness breaks out and thousands die unnecessarily.

During the Mexican War 17% to 27% of all enlisted men were ill; General Scott, writing of 6,000 soldiers at Chapultepec, stated that 2,000 out of the 6,000 were too ill to be of service.

In the Spanish-American War those who died from sickness and disease were 710% of the entire number killed in battle and of those who died

CITIZEN SOLDIERY: EXCESSIVE COST IN MEN

The value of an army is not in having its soldiers or its companies separated by hundreds of miles, but in having them at one place at one time.

FIRST YEAR CIVIL WAR

Out of 669,000 enlisted during 1861, only about 40,000 were ever engaged in battle or even in skirmishes.

The rest were pure waste.

Of the 28,000 at the Battle of Bull Run, many *had been in training but thirty days.*

WAR OF 1812

Though the United States Government enlisted 527,000 men, it was able to obtain but 55,000 of these during any one year.

The largest number of effectives ever concentrated in battle was a little over 3,000, at the Battle of Lundy's Lane.

Enlisted, 527,000; greatest effective army, 3,000.

WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

Though the Colonies enlisted 395,000 men in seven years, the greatest total effective during any one year was 34,000, but these were never together at any one place at one time. The largest number of effectives ever concentrated for battle was at Saratoga, where between five thousand and six thousand men, under General Gates, defeated Burgoyne.

This demonstrated what five thousand men could do when brought together.

The entire war demonstrated what *395,000 men could not do when serving at different times and at different places.*

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR


Only 52,000—of the 279,000 men enlisted—ever left the United States, or set foot on foreign soil during this war.

If we had had a military system upon which we could have depended without fear, the enlistment and consequent waste of the other 207,000 men would have been saved.

MEXICAN WAR

Though the United States enlisted 104,000 men, there were never more than 21,000 under training together at the same time, and less than half of these were effective.

Citizen Soldierry Excessive Cost in Men



A - Largest total Effectives at any one time

DEATH OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY DUE TO SICKNESS

"Large bodies of men who are not soldiers, under officers who have had little or no military training, cannot be brought together and held for many weeks in camp and remain healthy. If the water supply is not abundant or is not good, if the thoroughly well-established rules of sanitation are not observed; if the discipline of the camp puts little restriction on drunkenness and immorality; if the soldier does not know how to live, and his officers do not watch him and teach him; if his food is poorly cared for and badly cooked, and he is permitted to eat and drink anything and everything he can find, sickness will certainly prevail. If, as at Camp Thomas, a regiment can go for ten days without digging sinks; if the sinks dug are not used or they quickly overflow and pollute the ground; if practically no protection is afforded against the liquor sellers and prostitutes of neighboring places; if commands are crowded together and tents seldom struck, or even never during the occupation of the camp; if no one is called to account for repeated violation of sanitary orders, it cannot be but that typhoid fever, once introduced will spread, rapidly, widely."—Report of the Commission appointed by the President to Investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain. "What the country needs to know now is that in actual warfare the volunteer is a nuisance, that it always takes one regular to offset his mistakes, to help him cook his rations, and to teach him to shelter himself and to keep himself clean."—Richard Harding Davis.


NOTES TO CHART.

1 and 2. *Though their proportions are essentially true*, the figures here are not exact, due to the fact that the report of the Adjutant-General for 1898 lists only the deaths which occurred between May 1st and September 30th, while the Statistical Exhibit issued by the Adjutant-General on December 13, 1899, gives the total deaths of volunteers, thus twice listing the small number of deaths of volunteers who were in actual service.

The first report gives the total deaths from May 1st to September 30th as 2,910, only 345 of which resulted from being killed in action or from wounds received in action. The Exhibit gives the total deaths of volunteers as 4,137, only 279 of which were killed in action or fatally wounded. Total deaths from all causes not making allowance for small number listed twice, 7,043.

Death of Citizen Soldiery due to Sickness

Civil War



*Mexican
War*



*Spanish
War*



1

2

from wounds received in battle. In the Civil War 200,000 men died of sickness and disease and 49,000 more died from causes other than being killed in battle or from wounds received in battle. There were in the Civil War more than 6,000,000 recorded cases of sickness.

And what have we paid in blood?

Saddest and most costly of all is the great slaughter of untrained and poorly equipped men when opposed by a trained and well-equipped enemy. In our war with Mexico, we lost by death in battle or death by sickness one man out of eight. In the Spanish-American War, although not more than 26,000 of the two hundred eighty thousand enlisted ever saw a gun fired at the enemy, yet 2,910 were lost in that war—almost one-seventh of the number engaged in actually fighting the enemy. Much of this loss was due to the fact that our small hospital corps, perhaps sufficient for our regular army of 26,000, was absolutely unable to care for an army of nearly three hundred thousand.

Our losses in men discharged because of disability, our losses in captured, our losses in wounded, our losses in battle and losses by death from sickness in the Civil War were 1,300,000 men—a number not only equal to all the Confederate soldiers ever under arms but 30% greater than their entire army.

Armies composed of regiments of regulars and volunteers do not work in harmony in battle; the number of killed and wounded are infinitely greater than they are in a trained army of similar size. Veteran soldiers remain calm—attempt no rash feats and consequently sustain comparatively small losses.

In the Civil War we lost 110,070 men killed in action or dead as a result of wounds received in action and 249,458 from disease and causes other than wounds in battle: *a total Union loss of 359,528 dead.*

The present war in Europe is a bloody war. We gasp at the British losses of August, 1914. During the terrific battle at Mons and during the retreat to the Marne the *British lost 22.8% of their men.*

History, literature and painting have made memorable for all time the terrible slaughter during the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava. *The Light Brigade lost 37% of its men!* Yet in the Civil War at the Battle of Gettysburg, the One Hundred Fifty-seventh New York lost 61% of its men; Seventy-sixth New York 62%, One Hundred Sixty-second Pennsylvania 62%, Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania 63%, One Hundred Seventh Pennsylvania 65%, One Hundred Fiftieth Pennsylvania 65%, One Hundred Seventh New York 70%, One Hundred Forty-seventh New York 70%, One Hun-

EXCESSIVE COST OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY IN MEN KILLED

History, literature and painting have made memorable for all time the terrible slaughter at the *Charge of the Light Brigade*.


The Light Brigade lost *37 per cent.* of its men!

At the Battle of Gettysburg the *per cent. of the men lost was:*

157th New York.....	61
76th New York.....	62
162d Pennsylvania	62
75th Pennsylvania.....	63
107th Pennsylvania	65
150th Pennsylvania.....	65
107th New York.....	70
147th New York.....	70
151st Pennsylvania.....	71
24th Michigan.....	73
149th Pennsylvania	74
2d Wisconsin.....	77
16th Maine	84

The Battle of Chickamauga, in which 120,000 men were engaged on both sides, and the Battle of Chancellorsville, in which 120,000 men were engaged on both sides, were almost as bloody as the battle of Gettysburg. In fact, one authority called Chickamauga the "bloodiest battle of history."

Excessive Cost of Citizen Soldiery in Men Killed



1-Nine Other Regiments Lost from 61% to 71% Killed

EXCESSIVE COST OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY IN DEATH CASUALTIES

Up to the outbreak of the European War the Russo-Japanese War was considered the most costly war in history. Japan then lost both in battle and by sickness but *3.8 per cent. of her men.*


The entire number of British dead in the present war, up to December 1, 1915, was but 4 per cent. of the armies she had organised up to that time.

Russia's dead up to December 1, 1915, were but 6.4 per cent. of her armies.

Germany, by the use of trained soldiers, has accomplished a greater invasion of Belgium, France, Poland and the Balkans than we accomplished during our Civil War in invading the South. Yet to accomplish these invasions in three different directions, it has cost her a *loss in dead of but 8 per cent. of her men.*

It may be objected that all of these armies have not been in battle; neither were all of our soldiers of the Civil War ever in battle. Of the 660,000 men of 1861, not over 40,000 ever took part in battle. To accomplish in 1864-1865 a lesser invasion of the South—an invasion in one direction only—*cost us 13.4 per cent. of all the men ever enlisted in the Union armies*, even including the half million who deserted and the quarter million who were discharged for disability, *19.9 per cent. of all the actual Union forces*, and *25.6 per cent. of the armies we had in 1864 and 1865*, the two years during which the invasion was executed.

Excessive Cost of Citizen Soldiery in Death Casualties



dred Fifty-first Pennsylvania 71%, Twenty-fourth Michigan 73%, One Hundred Forty-ninth Pennsylvania 74%, Second Wisconsin 77%, Sixteenth Maine 84%.

And the Battle of Chickamauga where 128,000 men were engaged on both sides and the Battle of Chancellorsville where 120,000 men were engaged on both sides, were almost as bloody as the Battle of Gettysburg. In fact one authority calls Chickamauga the "bloodiest battle of history."

Even when we compare the death losses of entire wars or entire campaigns, we find the percentage of death of citizen soldiery to be far greater than the percentage of death of regulars.

Up to the outbreak of the European War the Russo-Japanese War was considered the bloodiest of history. Yet in per cent. of men actually lost it does not compare with our losses in the Civil War.

Japan lost in the Russo-Japanese War, both in battle and by sickness, but 3.8% of her men.

The entire number of British dead up to December 1st, 1915, was but 4% of the armies she had organised at that time.

It may be objected that all the British armies were not in battle; but neither were all of our soldiers of the Civil War ever in battle. Of the 660,000 men of 1861, not over 40,000 ever took part in battle.

Russia's dead up to December 1st, 1915, were but 6.4% of her armies.

Germany, by the use of trained soldiers, has accomplished a greater invasion of Belgium, France, Poland and the Balkans than we accomplished during our Civil War in invading the South. Yet to accomplish these invasions in three different directions has cost her a *loss in dead of but 8% of her men.*

To accomplish in 1864 a smaller invasion of the South—an invasion in one direction only—cost us *25.6% of the armies we had in 1863 and 1864—the years during which the invasion was executed.*

In the number of men required to win victory, in the unnecessary years of suffering and devastation, in the excessive annual soldier cost, in the total money waste, in losses by disability and desertion and capture, in losses by death in battle, in losses by death from sickness, the volunteer army system is the most useless, the most wasteful, the most costly, the most bloody!

All history proves it.

Why propose to continue the folly?

¹ Page 322. George Washington.

CHAPTER III

TRAGIC COMEDY

THE comic-tragedy of it all—the comedy of our military blunders and the tragedy of our waste of money and men—has been due to political militarism. Congress has never been able to realise, except when forced to do so under great stress and after months and even years of disaster, that the military is an executive function and not a legislative one.

The folly began when Washington first took command at the beginning of the Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress then recommended that the officers of each company should be elected by the rest of the company. Washington, the Commander-in-Chief, had not the power to choose the officers to govern the companies of which he was the head. Moreover, Congress sitting in Philadelphia—a two weeks' journey in those days from Boston where Washington had his command—refused to accept Washington's advice as to the term of enlistment or the size of the army. In fact, Congress actually forbade Wash-

ington organising an army larger than 22,000 men; and forbade the New York division being made larger than 5,000.

As Washington was about to move to defend New York, Congress ordered him, in spite of his protests, to send nearly half of his army to re-inforce the Canadian expedition, which had already failed—*compelled him* to do this, reducing his army to about 5,300, though he had to confront an enemy numbering from 27,000 to 30,000. When Congress finally realised what it had done, it called out 6,000 militia in *June*, who were supposed to train, arm, prepare for battle, win the war, and be back home again by the last of November.

Even after five years of fighting—after defeat after defeat—Congress decided to reduce the size of the army, though we then had no efficient means of combating the English forces which had won success after success for five years.

To cap the climax, Congress authorised armies, but declared it had no power to provide men with food and clothing. Consequently Connecticut regiments and Pennsylvania regiments mutinied and 1,300 men threatened to march on Congress. Then the political debaters, seized with fear, capitulated not to the military power, but to a mob of men who had become desperate *because* they were starving.

During the War of 1812, Congress again failed

in every way to understand the needs of the army. There was no forethought—there was not even afterthought.

During the latter part of 1813 and for six months during 1814 there had been a British force of three thousand men and a British fleet in Chesapeake Bay within a few hours' march of Washington. Yet neither Congress nor President Madison did a single thing to strengthen the defence of the capital during the entire twelve months; in reality no real appeal was made for new militia to defend the capital until two days before they were expected to fight. The general in command, reporting to Congress on the mob assembled, described them as without officers, devoid of discipline, and without any knowledge of service. Another general, reporting on the Battle of Bladensburg, wrote that he could not call it a *battle*, it was merely a *disgrace*.

In the campaign against the Creeks in 1813, Jackson was just on the point of success when he was compelled to withdraw because Congress had not and would not furnish supplies and food to his soldiers. Even after a crushing defeat of the Indians he was compelled to remain ten days at Fort Strother debating with his troops. They acted almost as badly as the men in Congress. First, the militia mutinied and the volunteers had to bring them to order with their guns. Then the volun-

teers mutinied and the militia had to do the same for the volunteers. The debating being over and the militia and volunteers each having proven to the other that each in turn could quell the other, the army disbanded and went home. The Creeks warred on.

In the Seminole War—the second war—60,000 volunteers were enlisted to defeat less than 1,200 Indians. Becoming disgusted with the volunteers, General Scott asked Congress to get rid of the 60,000 and give him 3,000 trained troops. Congress, adhering to its belief that untrained, unfed troops were always better fighters than trained troops well fed, became very indignant and relieved General Scott of his command. Marvel of political militarism—a nation of 17,000,000 inhabitants sending forth 60,000 troops, warring seven years at a cost of \$69,000,000 to defeat 1,200 Indians!

Our Mexican War, from the military standpoint, was more successful than any other war we have ever waged up to the Spanish-American War. But it was due to the fact that the President and the Congress were so far away from the army that their meddling did not interfere as much as usual. Even at that time, after all the failures of the past, President Polk in his message to Congress said that:

“A volunteer force is beyond question more efficient than any other description of citizen sol-

diers; and it is not to be doubted that a number far beyond that required would readily rush to the field upon the call of their country."

When General Taylor made his advance upon Monterey, he was compelled to leave 6,000 volunteers behind because not a single wagon had reached him. General Scott, after getting his troops in shape, found that many of them had decided to go home, and because of the idiocy of Congress, nothing could be done to prevent them from going. Consequently on May 4th, 1847, seven of his volunteer regiments were sent back to New Orleans without having been of any use to the army. Although Scott drilled and trained some 104,000 men, when he advanced into Mexico to do fighting, his army was reduced to less than 10,000 men.

No loyal American can look back upon the follies of Congress during the early part of 1861 without a blush of shame.

By February 1st, 1861, seven states had seceded—one of them—South Carolina—had seceded 42 days previously. By February 4th, they had elected a president and a vice president; by the 28th they had authorized the president of the Confederate States to issue a call for a hundred thousand men; by the eighth of April, they had equipped 35,000 men; a week later they had seized all the arsenals within their reach and all forts in the southern states.

And what has Congress done? Nothing!

What did President Lincoln do? Even he did not issue a call for a single volunteer until Jefferson Davis had 35,000 men enlisted and under training. And even then, though the armed forces of the Confederacy were almost in sight of Washington, though the outbreak in Baltimore had made the capture of the capitol possible, Lincoln did not call out the militia to *defend* the capitol, but to serve only in *offensive* warfare—to “repossess forts, places and property which had seceded from the Union.”

Congress knew on the first day of January, 1861, that we had an army of but 16,000 men. By the 5th of April no material increase had been made in the size of the Union army, although the rebel government had an army twice the size of the Union army, and the rebellion had covered 560,000 square miles of territory. The Union army at that time could have furnished but one soldier to reconquer each 33 square miles of rebel territory.

The Confederate army was enlisted for twelve months, but because of a law over 60 years old, which Congress had failed to repeal, President Lincoln could not call volunteers or militia for a longer period than ninety days. Hence the 75,000 volunteers called by President Lincoln on April 15th, were to be permitted to go home at the very moment at which the Confederate army of 100,000

would be trained, equipped and ready for eight months' additional service.

Congress convened July 4th, and as soon as Congress began to act it began to blunder. Two hundred fifty thousand men were again enlisted under a system which permitted the men to elect their own officers. Later, in authorising the larger army of volunteers, Congress gave the governor of each state the right to appoint the officers for the companies of his state. Congress thus prohibited the President of the United States, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Union, from even designating a single field officer of a single volunteer regiment.

When Congress met, the 75,000 men, called out by President Lincoln, had had at least a few days' training and, within a few weeks, their terms of enlistment would end and they would go home. Consequently Congress insisted that these men *must* fight at once before leaving. It did not matter whether the nation was ready to open a campaign or not. Those soldiers had been trained for thirty days or more, they had been fed for a longer time. They should fight before the ninety days was up. Hence Congress was compelled to provide a battle for them. The result was the disastrous defeat at the Battle of Bull Run.

By the end of 1861, Congress had paid out \$238,000,000 for 670,000 troops; Congress had got to-

gether 28,000 men at the Battle of Bull Run—many of whom had had but thirty days of training, and most of whom—with the exception of 800 of the regular army—ran away in panic.

Even so wise a man as President Lincoln proved himself incapable of directing armed forces. In 1862, because of President Lincoln's interference with McClellan's plan of uniting his forces with those of General McDowell, the best chance of success was thrown away. Only in 1863, when President Lincoln and Congress turned matters over to General Grant to do absolutely as he pleased, did matters mend.

When the Spanish-American War began it was found that regiments which should have had ten companies had only eight and that these companies had only six out of each ten men they should have had.

“There were no brigades, no divisions, and worst of all, no plans, nor could any be formulated for the very excellent reason that Congress, with its usual short-sightedness, had restricted its appropriation to national defence and to that one object alone. No money was available for offensive operations, the only kind which could possibly be used against the Spanish possessions in both hemispheres.”¹

On *March 2, 1896*, Congress requested Spain to recognise the independence of Cuba. But Con-

gress took *no action whatever to prepare* for war until March 9, 1898, just two years and eleven days later. Two years and eleven days!—even then Congress did *nothing* toward the organisation of the army. Fifty-five days after the appropriation was voted, Congress awoke to the fact that an army as well as money was needed. Naturally at that late hour, Congress re-committed the old blunders. Again it took the power of the appointment of officers of volunteer companies out of the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United States and turned it over to the governors of the various states.

So inefficient was the training that General Miles telegraphed to the Secretary of War that 30 to 40 per cent. of the fourteen regiments of volunteers which he commanded were absolutely un-drilled, that there were 300 men in one regiment, each of whom had *never in all his life even fired a gun*. These men might have had at least ninety days of shooting practice but for lack of officers; and Congress had failed over and over again to respond to the recommendations of the Secretary of War for more officers.

This lack resulted also in great confusion when troops assembled in Florida for embarkation. A few sentences from the account of then Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt indicates the scramble of the troops for the transports.

“As the number and capacity of the transports were known, or ought to have been known, and as the number and size of the regiments to go were also known, the task of allotting each regiment or fraction of a regiment to its proper transport, and arranging that the regiments and transports should meet in due order on the dock, ought not to have been difficult. However, no arrangements were made in advance; and we were allowed to shove and hustle for ourselves as best we could, on much the same principles that had governed our preparations hitherto. . . .

“We were ordered to be at a certain track with all our baggage at midnight, there to take a train for Port Tampa. At the appointed time we turned up, but the train did not. The men slept heavily, while Wood and I and various other officers wandered about in search of information which no one could give. We now and then came across a brigadier-general or even a major-general; but nobody knew anything. Some regiments got aboard the trains and some did not, but as none of the trains started, this made little difference. At three o'clock, we received orders to march to an entirely different track, and away we went. No train appeared on this track either; but at six o'clock some coal-cars came by, and these were seized. . . .

“Finally, after hours of search, the first Volun-

teen Cavalry were allotted to the transport *Yucatan*. . . .

“At the same time I happened to find out that she had previously been allotted to two other regiments—the Second Regular Infantry, and the Seventy-first New York Volunteers, which latter regiment alone contained more men than could be put aboard her. Accordingly, I ran at full speed to our train, leaving a strong rear guard with the baggage, I double-quickened the rest of the regiment up to the boat, just in time to board her as she came into the quay, and then to hold her against the Second Regulars and the Seventy-first, who had arrived a little too late, being a shade less ready than we were in the matter of individual initiative. There was a good deal of expostulation, but we had possession, and as the ship could not contain half of the men who had been told to go aboard her, the Seventy-first went away, as did all but four companies of the Second.”

Compare this with the fact that Napoleon had his army so trained that he could embark *133,000 troops in three hours*.

Much of the confusion and mismanagement of the volunteer troops of the Spanish-American War was due to the lack of efficient officers. State governors often appointed, merely because of friendship or political influence, many men, who were absolutely unqualified to lead troops, as company and

regimental officers. When the War Department begged Congress for authority to issue commissions to retired army officers of experience so that they might again enter active service, Congress emphatically denied the petition, believing that inexperienced, untried political friends of state governors would render better service. The results were deplorable. Men went for days without food, while food at the same time lay decaying and spoiling within a few miles of them.

There was great disorganisation of the commissary department, due to the fact that men who had been trained to handle supplies for the small army of 30,000 were absolutely at sea in attempting to handle supplies for 270,000. Food could not be taken from the storehouses, even though in sight of starving soldiers, without military authority—unless one wished to run the risk of court martial.

One young captain at Chickamauga did run this risk. Assuming command of wagons and teams of mules, he drove to the station, brought back food which had been lying for days on the platform in the sun, and consequently gained the everlasting thanks of the entire company.

Merely because there were not a sufficient number of officers to train the men, to lay out and provide sanitary camps, 77,000 men were crowded at Camp Thomas, which could not suitably accommodate more than 19,000 troops. And the conditions

at Camp Alger were so bad that they caused a scandal. As a result of the mismanagement due to Congress's lack of understanding of army conditions, trouble among the men broke out. It is impossible to bring together thirty or sixty thousand men whose life habits are different, concentrate them in a camp without sufficient officers trained in handling men, subject them to regular rules, to discipline, to diet, to duties, without trouble and without sickness.

Congress's action in the Philippine War was no more commendable. The refusal of Congress in the first place to enlist men until such a time as the commander-in-chief of the army deemed it wise to discharge them, left General Otis for ten months with 3,722 men—whom he was entitled to command—to face some 35,000 Philippine revolutionists.

Even in late years Congress by not giving heed to the pleas of the War Department for a larger commissary staff has left men on duty in the Philippines three and four days without food and often under the hot sun without even water, as a result of which the tongues and lips of the men have been so swollen they could not speak or eat for forty-eight hours.

“Congress is chiefly responsible for the bad administration of the army and its organisation. They have often been appealed to to reconstruct

the army on modern principles, and they have failed to do so; and until this is done the evils we have encountered will recur again, and we will never be able to take our place beside other military nations until we do that.”²

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 357. Huidekoper, in “The Military Unpreparedness of the United States.”

² Page 363. General Sanger, in report of Investigating Committee appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain.

**PART SIX: WILL THE PROPOSED
PLANS PROTECT?**

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CHAPTER I

DEALING IN FUTURES—DANIELS

INASMUCH as the administration had, by December 1915, been face to face with *six international crises in thirty-one months* one marvels that the Secretary of the Navy's recommendation to Congress did not sound a stronger note for *immediate* defence. Three of these crises actually required *naval action* and each of the others might have led our nation into war. All had occurred during the time Mr. Daniels had been Secretary of the Navy.

The present administration in May, 1913, actually expected at any hour an attack upon Manila by Japan, and feverishly prepared for it; the administration, on April 22, 1914, sent a fleet to Mexico and occupied Vera Cruz; in April, 1915, Secretary Daniels had to order a battleship to the Gulf of California to get four Japanese warships out of Turtle Bay where Japanese marines were surveying the country; in 1915, Secretary Daniels

sent an expedition to Hayti; moreover, during the last few months, the administration has had to *twice* request the recall of the ambassador of one world power, has had to request the recall of the naval and military attaches of one of the greatest naval powers of the world, and was for several months almost on the diplomatic breaking-point with that power, and is now engaged in a dangerous punitive invasion of Mexico.

It is indeed remarkable that the Secretary of the Navy should seemingly forget his eventful experiences all crowded into thirty-one short months, and propose a plan which makes little provision for the immediate future, indicating that we should not prepare for 1917 or 1918, but for 1922 and 1923.

The scheme of Secretary Daniels proposes a so-called *increasingly progressive upbuilding* of the navy; that is, less to be done in 1917 than in 1918, less in 1918 than 1919, and so on. The entire plan of Secretary Daniels lays stress on preparing to defend ourselves against attack five years *after 1923*—thus *after 1928*.

And why 1928? Because Secretary Daniels' program is not a *building* program but a *voting* program. Not one of the ships that Secretary Daniels proposes will be finished before 1921 or 1922 if constructed at the rate our ships have been constructed during the past ten years. We are often told that a ship can be built in three years. It can;

but two years often elapse between the voting of a ship and the laying of the keel. One of Secretary Daniels' excuses for not recommending more battleships at present is that we have not yards in which to build them. The General Board, however, shows that two or three other yards, especially the one at Mare Island, California, could be put into condition to build large battleships in from seven to nine months. Nine months seems a long time when we think of our immediate needs but nine months is less than five years.

As Secretary Daniels presents his plan to the public he leads us to believe that his plan will provide ten new battleships by 1923. The real truth is that, according to his voting program, the strength of the navy will not be increased at all by 1923. The ten ships he proposes will not be finished until 1928 and by that time many of the ships which are now efficient will be out of date. So that by 1928 our navy will be just as inefficient as it is to-day.

Secretary Daniels has publicly announced that the program of his reforms has been greatly hindered because of the inefficiency of the Secretaries of the Navy preceding him. This announcement led us to expect that, in this time of world struggle and national danger, Secretary Daniels would have proposed; first, to eliminate the two great existing causes of inefficiency; and secondly, to put our pres-

ent equipment and personnel in fit condition for service as quickly as possible.

The two great causes of past and present inefficiency have been and are; first, the criminal waste of funds due to political mis-management and to pork-barrelling in favour of useless navy yards; and, second, the ridiculous organisation of the navy, under which no young man can expect any considerable advancement before he has reached the age of ninety-seven.

Secretary Daniels proposes no plan for remedying the latter, and emphatically asserts that he will insist on keeping open every one of the useless, wasteful navy yards—he even asserts that those which previous Secretaries of the Navy have closed will be reopened.

To put the present navy, its equipment, and its personnel in fit condition to be of service, we should: first increase the personnel to meet at least the *present* needs, even if we do not provide for men to be trained to man the ships we shall soon have ready to put into commission; secondly, provide a sufficient store of reserve ammunition; thirdly, order the construction of a sufficient number of ammunition ships and repair ships, so that our present fleet may fight, if called upon to do so, as efficiently as possible.

What does Secretary Daniels wish to have done in the next eighteen months to meet these needs?

Every one who knows anything about our navy knows that we are woefully short of men; short, even for the ships we have at present. Secretary Daniels' Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Roosevelt, a short time ago, stated officially that we were eighteen thousand men short of what we should have. Admiral Fiske testifies that we need 20,000 men to man all the ships.

These men cannot be trained in a day, a month, or in two months, or even two years. Moreover, in case of war we ought not to take a single officer from the navy to train them. Of course, we are *not* at war; but a navy is of real value to-day only if it is ready for war!

If, when war broke out in 1914, it had taken England sixty days to get her navy ready not only the whole history of this war but the whole history of the world would have been different. During those sixty days Germany could have occupied the Channel; bombarded the northern coast of France; captured Paris; prevented England ever sending a single soldier to the continent and landed 500,000 men in England before England could have equipped 150,000 men.

To advise that we spend millions upon millions for ships and to refuse to recommend sufficient men to handle those ships in time of war is folly. According to the opinion of many experts we are now 20,000 men short. The ships to be commis-

sioned in the next six months will require 3,949 additional men and those ships to be commissioned early in 1917 will require 3,809 more men. Consequently before another act of Congress becomes effective we shall need to make our navy of fighting value, 27,758 more men than we have at present. And what is the use of having a navy if it cannot be manned so as to defend us in case of need?

To meet these needs, Secretary Daniels, absolutely ignoring the suggestions and advice of experts, asks for but 7,500 additional men up to July 1, 1917, a year and a half in the future. The suggestions of the General Board on this matter were most modest and reasonable. They were made by men who have commanded ships in action,—officers who know how many men are needed and what the results are in case of war if there are not a sufficient number of trained men. The General Board asked for 15,000 men only. Yet Secretary Daniels cut this number down to 7,500.

Considering that new men should be in training so as to be ready for the new ships under construction, we realise that Secretary Daniels has asked for only about one-fourth the number of men *absolutely necessary!*

Now as to ammunition supply!

There is a request for but eight million dollars for reserve ammunition. That amount has been

used on the battlefields of Europe in a few hours.

Eight million dollars for reserve ammunition is to the layman an enormous sum. How far will it go? If we choose only the ten best ships that may be called upon to use this ammunition and determine the amount of ammunition the twelve and fourteen inch guns of those ten ships would require, making no allowance at all for all other guns on those ships or for any of the guns on all the other ships of our entire navy, this eight million dollars reserve ammunition would last—if these ships were engaged in battle firing by salvos, the only effective method of firing at present, firing at long range, at much slower rate than admirals of the navy state would be necessary for those ships to hold their own against foreign battleships—this reserve ammunition, this eight million dollars' worth, would last just *four hours fifty-two minutes*.

Every shell of the reserve ammunition could be used at slow fire at long range in that time! If the guns were fired a little faster— $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. more rapidly, not equal to their maximum rapidity of fire by any means—the entire eight million dollars' worth of ammunition would be used up in *three hours and fourteen minutes!*

But if the opposing fleet outnumbered our *ten* ships and should force us into battle at short range, the fire to be effective would have to be

much more rapid. If, then, the number of shells fired per minute is estimated at the normal rate of fire at short range, making all allowances for possible delays, this eight million dollars' ammunition for the big guns of these ten ships only, would last just *ninety-six* minutes.

When attacked our only chance of saving ourselves would rest with our navy. Yet Secretary Daniels, in direct opposition to the advice of the General Board, proposes but two new battleships a year; and such ships as he proposes will be inefficient because of their slowness.

The *Bluecher* was lost in the North Sea battle only because she was too slow—the other German ships were saved by their speed. Yet Secretary Daniels proposes that our new \$18,000,000 battleships shall have a maximum speed two and a half miles an hour less than the *Bluecher*.

Colonel Roosevelt, when president, did more to build up our navy than any president we ever had. And under him it accomplished feats which naval experts of all nations declared could not be accomplished. Because of the fact that a battleship as a fighting machine is of little value after its twelfth year, he realised that the standard then attained could not be maintained unless new ships were added each year. Consequently he fought for a construction plan providing four battleships

a year for several years. Congress compromised on two battleships per year; but even this plan was dropped, so that for five years we have been lagging woefully behind in our construction programme, and our navy as a result has rapidly deteriorated.

The proposed plan of Secretary Daniels advocates nothing to aid us in catching up with what we should have had, had previous plans not been discontinued.

When we are so far behind, how can a Secretary of the Navy presume to assert that adding two battleships a year to our navy for the next five years will put us in fit condition to defend ourselves from other powers which have added and are adding three and four each year.

According to the present proposed programme, we shall merely waste millions on battleships which when finished will be outclassed in speed and outnumbered two to one by the new ships which other nations are now building—even though we do not count the ships they built while we were idle.

Here again Secretary Daniels does not follow the wise suggestion of the General Board—of men of experience in naval matters who recognised the pressing need of quickly constructing great battleships and battle cruisers to immediately build up the navy so that we might have an adequate defence as soon as possible. As previously stated,

Secretary Daniels' recommendations for ships are increasingly progressive. In his five years' plan less is to be done the first two years than afterwards. The General Board even in their October report, which Secretary Daniels requested should be made to conform to *his* ideas, advises that more ships be authorised the first two years and less during the following years.

The board, in their original report advised *four* battle cruisers, *four* dreadnoughts and *six* scouts for immediate construction. Secretary Daniels on the other hand recommends but *two* dreadnoughts, *two* battle cruisers and *three* scouts the first year. Even the "fettered" report of the Board made in October, even when limited to the same amount of money that Secretary Daniels recommended should be spent, recommends *four* battleships, *three* dreadnoughts, and *four* scouts the first year! The General Board saw the wisdom of recommending the construction of almost double the number of capital ships the first year and of limiting the construction during the fourth and fifth years. The most dominant feature of Secretary Daniels' plan is the policy of doing as little as possible at present and of promising as much as possible for the indefinite future.

The Secretary of the Navy asks but two million dollars for aviation. An amount equal to this is

spent every week in England and France producing new aeroplanes for the western battle line only.

Perhaps the average American citizen does not realise that our present battle fleet would go into combat with a foreign power absolutely blind. Every Admiral of the navy has emphasised the fact that our battleships could not successfully combat an enemy's fleet of the same size, because we have no aeroplanes to determine the advances and location of the attacking fleet. Senator Fletcher, who has thoroughly studied this phase of the Navy's needs, insists that we should have 676 aeroplanes to properly equip our present navy. Every navy manœuvre we have had in the last five years has been conducted as it would have been conducted *twelve* years ago. For the purposes of immediate defence, and by immediate defence, we mean within the next two years, the proposed aeroplane equipment of Secretary Daniels is ridiculously small.

Russia appropriated twenty-two millions for aeroplanes and dirigibles even in 1913 when no one in Europe expected that war would come for five or ten years.

Another essential need of the Navy is the provision of fast coal and oil-fuel supply ships. Dreadnoughts and battle cruisers cannot be spared from the battle line in the midst of a combat to run home to naval stations for their fuel.

“To send a fleet thus blind and crippled into hostile waters would be to invite destruction. We have an altogether insufficient number of fuel-ships, and practically no scouts.”¹

Yet Secretary Daniels provides for no fuel ships until 1918; and then the plan proposes the construction of only *one* fuel ship *during the entire period of five years*.

We are woefully lacking in ammunition supply ships. The General Board advised the immediate construction of ammunition ships and repair ships as these are essentially necessary to a fleet in action. Yet no additional ammunition ships to carry and transfer ammunition to battle cruisers and dreadnoughts at sea are to be provided, according to the Secretary's plan, until 1920.

But most astounding of all is the proposal in Secretary Daniels' plan to build new battleships which will not have a speed of more than 21 knots. One can only guess at the cause of this policy. The European War has proven that a battleship of twenty-one knots is 80% inefficient. It is too slow, if outnumbered, to get away from the enemy; and it is too slow to keep up with an enemy if the enemy tries to get away. It is too slow to move in and out adjusting its range to the enemy's moving battleships—in fact, it is almost useless. The *Nevada* has just been tested; it has a speed *less than twenty-two knots per hour*.

While speed is vital to both sides in a running fight, it has marked advantages in any engagement. The faster fleet can bombard or seize a strategic point with impunity; it can fight or run, as its commander may will; when fleets engage in parallel lines it can steam away from the enemy's slower ships and concentrate its fire on the head of his column, thus destroying it in detail.

More amazing still is Secretary Daniels' explanation of this recommendation. The engines are to be planned *for endurance rather than for speed*. We have always supposed we were creating a navy for *defence*; but this explanation contains a subtle suggestion that Secretary Daniels thinks our new battleships are to make long cruises—evidently offensive warfare. For *defensive* warfare we need battleships of great speed, capable of moving quickly from one portion of our coast to another to meet an attack wherever it may be planned.

The policy of Secretary Daniels in reopening the unused and useless navy yards which have been closed by previous Secretaries of the Navy, is open to censure as a useless waste. His additional proposal now, to keep *all* these navy yards open and to establish armour and projectile factories there, is certainly open to severe criticism.

First, whether unintentionally or not, this *is* an appeal to the pork-barrel men. This is evidenced by the fact that within five days after Congress

convened, Senator Tillman—idol of the pork barrellers—the same man who secured millions for the useless navy yards at Port Royal and Charleston—who comes from the South from a state adjoining that from which Secretary Daniels comes—states that do not believe in a navy but in navy yards—proposed to introduce a bill asking Congress to appropriate eleven million dollars for a factory and site to make armour and ammunition. It was this enthusiastic advocate of navy yards who led Congress to purchase a dear little navy yard site in his native state and to spend nearly three millions upon it; it was the same enthusiast who induced Congress to create another navy yard for large battleships only a few miles away from the first and to waste another five millions on it. Yet, after all this expenditure, it is so poorly constructed that it is of little value—only for torpedo boat destroyers and gun-boats.

Secondly, in the present great emergency, it is unwise to *postpone the purchase of large projectiles*—the most essential ammunition in modern combat—until they can be manufactured by government factories, which do not as yet exist.

From what we already know of the construction by the government of factories already built, we can judge that the building of these new factories will not take months but years. Many a citizen of the United States has grown grey during

the construction of a government post office, requiring only ordinary building materials. In constructing ammunition plants, not only will time be consumed in building the factories; but factories for the manufacture of large projectiles require great, complex, delicate machines to make the projectiles.

Certainly we should establish government factories and establish them as soon as possible. In the future we must be independent of private manufacture. But it is one thing to propose to build government ammunition factories, and quite another matter to propose that we are to *postpone supplying ourselves with an adequate reserve of ammunition until those factories are completed!* In our present condition we need the products of both governmental and private factories. Both combined cannot supply us with enough ammunition!

Private factories in the United States manufacturing large projectiles could now obtain European contracts for 200% or 300% their present output. *If they could only get the materials, the chemists and the machines, to make them.* Will they, while making a good profit, sell their machines to the government? Will they manufacture these machines for the government when they cannot now turn out half enough for their own use? The manufacturer, the engineer, the expert mechanic, readily understands the folly of the proposal.

The argument of Secretary Daniels and of Senator Tillman in favour of government-owned ammunition plants is that "We are now at the *mercy* of the private manufacturers." We've had experience in the past. It's bad enough to be at the mercy of the private manufacturers; but there's no hope at all, if left to the mercy of the pork barrellers.

In naval appropriations alone, during the last thirty years, the pork barrellers have sluiced \$500,000,000. We may pay high, when at the mercy of the private manufacturers, *but we get something!* At the mercy of the pork barrellers, *we have got little or nothing!*

Even the peace-loving socialist and hater of rich men, Charles Edward Russell, after a trip to Europe, realises that the essential thing is to prepare and prepare quickly; no matter what the cost, no matter how many millions private manufacturing concerns may make out of legitimate manufacturing work.

After all, is it not better—allowing, let us say, one hundred million dollars' profit—to have private manufacturing concerns already equipped make the big guns and big ammunition we need and actually *get something* for money spent, rather than be "porkbarrelled" out of *five* hundred million dollars and get *nothing* for it, except unpreparedness and the risk of having to pay some foreign power an

indemnity of five thousand million dollars to save our coast cities from bombardment?

Thirdly, nothing could be more convenient to an attacking force than to locate our proposed great armour plants and large projectile factories in navy yards *on the coast*, as Secretary Daniels proposes to do, where they can be conveniently bombarded, destroyed or captured by an attacking fleet.

Certainly, this last proposition is most unwise and impractical, though perhaps politic.

QUOTATION REFERENCE

¹ Page 378. Rear-Admiral Austin M. Knight.

CHAPTER II

THE WILSON-GARRISON BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN

FORMER Secretary of War Garrison stands in distinct contrast to Secretary of the Navy Daniels. He has rendered one great service to his country by emphasising the fact that the United States should not depend for its protection upon 48 different little armies under the control of 48 different governments, but upon one army under the direct control of the United States. It is to be regretted, however, that former Secretary Garrison was not permitted to submit a plan in accordance with his ideas.

It is still more regrettable that the head of an administration should oppose a plan which his Secretary of War, after two years of conscientious study, found necessary.

However, as American citizens, seeking above all else to provide adequate defence for ourselves, we must consider former Secretary Garrison's *plan* from the standpoint of what *it* proposed, and not from the standpoint of what former *Secretary Garrison* desired to propose. Although Mr. Garrison

has resigned, his plan is here considered because, without doubt, it is *stronger* than any plan which will be approved by the present Congress.

The Chamberlain Senate bill, while stronger in some features than the Garrison plan, is weak in that it opens the way for and establishes another precedent in favor of political grafting in connection with the supervision of the militia. The Hay House Bill is of course, not worthy of *serious* consideration except as an aid to the enemies of defence and a "good thing for the pork barrellers."

Mr. Garrison proposed a plan which outlines a five-year policy for *progressively increasing* the military forces of the United States.

But, as in the case of the naval plans, the most essential question is: What is proposed to eliminate the present weaknesses and what additions are proposed for the first and second years?

The present weaknesses are: (1) inability to quickly mobilise, (2) extravagant waste of funds, and (3) unbalanced organisation. Former Secretary Garrison's proposed plans, if carried into effect, would augment each of these weaknesses.

First, every one who knows anything about mobilisation from General Wood down to the least important officer, has agreed that it will take at least thirty days to mobilise our little army of thirty thousand men.

"Our army needs complete reorganisation—not

merely enlarging—and the reorganisation can only come as the result of legislation. A proper general staff should be established. Above all, the army must be given the chance to exercise in large bodies. Never again should we see, as we saw in the Spanish War, major-generals in command of divisions who had never before commanded three companies together in the field.”¹

According to the present organisation, the soldiers are distributed in tiny little camps all over the United States. Secretary Garrison is to continue the use of all these useless army posts. The thirty thousand men, instead of being concentrated in a few main camps, as advised by all army experts, are to be kept in just as divided and separated a condition as possible, thus preventing any improvement toward a more rapid, more efficient method of mobilisation.

Second, former Secretary Garrison’s plan, by continuing these expensive army posts, continues the wasteful expenditure on these posts. This is one of the reasons why the United States pays \$1,000 a year per soldier while Switzerland gets a better-trained and better-equipped soldier for \$13.

Thirdly, former Secretary Garrison’s plan makes no satisfactory proposal for reorganisation. He urges the enlistment of 400,000 men in a volunteer army but makes no proposal that will give us a sufficient number of trained officers.

Not only does former Secretary Garrison's plan propose to continue the three great evils of our present army organisation and present criminal waste, but his plan neglects to propose, or at least to lay emphasis upon, the needs and the means of remedying our greatest deficiencies in equipment and men.

We hope for preparation that will enable us to defend ourselves in 1917, as well as in 1919 and 1920. No foreign nation liable to attack us will stand sweetly by, patiently waiting five or six years, until we are more efficiently equipped to resist them. Austria did not wait until the Russian munition factories were completed; Germany did not wait until France had recovered from the military crisis of 1913.

We must first efficiently organise and make ready for *defence such means and forces as we already have*, before dreaming of untried and questionable plans of defence to be worked out two or three years hence.

We need a sufficient number of men to man the 262 coast defence guns which we now have mounted but without a single man trained to use them.

We need aeroplanes to give eyes to the army.

We need concentration of our regular army of thirty-four thousand mobile troops so that rapid mobilisation may be possible.

We need big howitzers and rapid-fire guns as

good as those employed in Europe and a sufficient number of them to equip our present army.

We need ammunition for the guns we now have and ammunition for the new guns to be provided.

What does former Secretary Garrison's plan propose to do to meet these immediate needs?

The first land resistance we could make against an attacking force would be from our coast forts and our coast defences. As already stated, we have 262 guns mounted, ready for use, without sufficient ammunition and without a single individual trained to man them. Three-fifths of these 262 guns are gigantic twelve- and fourteen-inch monsters. Senator Thomas at the time of the Senate Investigation stated that he deemed it "*criminal*" to provide no men for these guns.

General Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery Division, admitted in testifying that the coast artillery was 13,671 men short in 1914. It is estimated that we are now seventeen thousand men short for coast defence operations, to say nothing of the men who will be needed to man the new guns about to be placed in position.

"If at this minute every one of the 90,000 regular soldiers in the United States cavalry, infantry, coast and field artillery were assembled in New York City, there would not be enough men to man the guns there on a war footing." ²

The Garrison plan, to meet this present "*criminal*

lack" of men and to provide men for the new guns to be installed during the next year, asks for *but 5,720 men.*

The next resistance our land forces might offer to invaders would have to be directed in accordance with information furnished our army by aeroplane scouts. England and France together now use on the western battle line 2,700 aeroplanes. Ex-Secretary Garrison asked for *48 aeroplanes for the next year and a half*,—almost enough to poorly equip the army of Uruguay.

Our coast forts are without *ammunition*, both on the Pacific and on the Atlantic.

The army is absolutely unequipped so far as up-to-date field guns are concerned.

The great strain of former Secretary Garrison's proposal is: *increase* the number of untrained men,—not more trained men and better equipment.

The recruits are to be divided into three classes: the regular army; the state militia; and the new national militia, designated as the Continental Army.

According to reported plans of the former Secretary of War, it appears in big black-faced type that we are to have a regular army of 140,000 men to defend us. Of the ten new infantry regiments seven are to be kept *in* the United States. These are to be organised on a "peace-basis," which means 820

men to a regiment. Seven of these skeletonised regiments will give us 5,470 men.

If one carefully reads the proposal one soon realises that the increase advocated for the regular mobile army in the United States is but 10,540 men,—both infantry and artillery. Our present mobile army in the United States is but 34,798 men. The addition, then, of 10,540 men will give us exactly 45,338 men in the mobile army of the United States for home defence, not quite the 140,000 men talked about. Thus under the plans for an “enormously” increased army, we shall have, in a year and a half, 45,338 men in the mobile army—one-half the army of Chile.

The General Staff and the War College is composed of the greatest army experts of this country,—men who have had practical experiences of from twenty to fifty years. They proposed a trained army of 240,000 men.

Former Secretary Garrison asked that only nine thousand additional militia be recruited during the next year and a half from the forty-eight states of the Union.

The *pièce de résistance* of former Secretary Garrison’s plan is the proposal to recruit a Continental Army of four hundred thousand men in three years. These men are to sign for six years’ service, and are to be trained for the first three years only—two months’ training each year.

Every sane-thinking man who was in the Plattsburg training camp went home convinced that he had been greatly benefited by the training but that, even after six months' training, he would still be unfit to stand any severe military service. What we need is an *army of defence*, not an untrained excuse of one that will be useful only in deceiving us as to our state of preparedness and security, and valuable only in eating up appropriations.

The idea of the Continental Army is superb, if it would only work.

All history proves such an army is always useless; and that the only efficient feature about half-trained men opposing regulars is the ease with which the opposing regulars "murder" the citizen army. England is proving it for us again to-day—one man dead out of every four. George Washington, Light Horse Harry Lee, General Grant, General Lee, Lord Roberts, General Francis Greene, have all advised over and over again against the use of citizen soldiery.

Not only is there a question as to the efficiency of men trained for two months, but there is a question as to whether they can even be enrolled.

A few years ago a certain plan was launched for the creation of a reserve army of the United States. Its men were also to be obtained by the volunteer system. The Secretary of War at the end of two years announced that a reserve army of the United

States had been created—numbering sixteen men!

The idea of the Continental Army is to form a volunteer army with limited training, under the supervision of the United States instead of under the direction of the individual states, as are the militia. After many years, the militia of the forty-eight states have been able to enlist less than 120,000 men and able to half-prepare 60,000 men for service. None of the inducements that have been offered by the State Militia can be offered in enlisting young men in a Continental Army.

The militia have the inducement of a club house without expense. Many of them have gymnasia, swimming tanks, shower baths, and recreations and card rooms. A man entering the militia can choose any regiment he pleases. A company can be formed of intimate chums and friends. The militia training almost never interferes with business duties. The militia are organised so that promotion from the ranks is very rapid. Every man has a chance of becoming an officer.

Ex-Secretary Garrison's own testimony before the Investigating Committee indicates that he himself did not believe his proposed volunteer system would furnish the men he had asked for.

The question, then, arises as to how we can possibly enlist, by a voluntary system, without any special inducements, 133,000 men each year, whether for a Continental or for any other kind of an army.

It has been difficult to enlist even a few thousand or a few hundred in the regular army each year.

And even the number enlisted has been reduced by death, by desertion and by disability. Experience, even in the regular army of the United States, has shown that often twenty-five per cent. of new recruits desert during the first year, that fifteen per cent. of the entire mobile army are sometimes lost annually by disability.

In 1909 our army numbered 76,049 men. The mobile forces were about 51,000. But there were almost 5,000 desertions from the mobile army during that year. There were, in exact number, just 4,993 desertions—nearly ten per cent. of the entire mobile army.

On the other hand, during the same year, there were 7,174 men discharged because of disability, so that the mobile army of the United States lost, during the year by desertion and disability, 24 per cent. of the entire force. And this after those who were supposed to be unfit for service had been eliminated by rejection at the time of enlistment. In 1910, for example, of all those who made application to enlist, 81% were rejected because of physical disability. In 1911 more than 72% were rejected.

After thirty years the state militia with all their inducements have now enrolled less than 120,000 men.

Two and a half years' experience in organising

a reserve army and thirty years' experience in enlisting militia in forty-eight different states indicate that the system of voluntary enlistment proposed by former Secretary Garrison will not work!

The plan as a whole proposed a Garrison-Bryanized army—"citizenry springing to arms and fighting after two to six months' training."

Ex-Secretary Garrison's plan ignores the advice of experts and proposes a plan for a citizen soldiery when all history proves that such armies are useless and costly in money and blood.

"The War Department has closed its ears to all advice which does not consort with the political policy it has adopted. Facts were presented to the department by experts from the Army College and members of the General Staff. Facts have been ignored in the Continental Army scheme."³

The Continental Army, even if the War Department is able to enlist the soldiers, will be inefficient because improperly trained.

"The fallacy of this Continental Army scheme is not in its numbers so much as in its disregard of the need of adequate training.

"Physical endurance becomes a paramount virtue. An army ill-equipped and unseasoned in practice exposes its vital weakness the moment it is submitted to attack. Such an army is worse than useless; it is criminal.

"Those who understand army matters can hardly

refrain from smiling at the notion of conferring an adequate military training upon men in two months, this period being followed by ten months of entire suspension from service. Would such a system work anywhere else? Go into any profession. Would it be possible for a man to become a lawyer by applying himself to law two months a year? Would he be esteemed competent? Would clients put any confidence in him? Quite the same thing applies in the army. The plan is devoid of sense.”⁴

The one great lesson of the war in Europe is that modern war is a war of machines and science; and not a war of men, only in so far as they are equipped with modern machines of war and trained to use them. This fact former Secretary Garrison failed to grasp. His plan proposed a maximum of poorly trained men with the least emphasis possible on the equipment and supplies. The most efficient army of to-morrow will be the one that is supplied with the greatest machines and instruments of war manipulated by the smallest possible number of trained, experienced, skilful men.

“Maintain a potential preparedness for war in which fighting is done by machines, not men.”⁵

This does not mean that our present army is sufficient in numbers; it is pitifully small, ridiculously small. We must increase it. We should have an

infinitely larger army, even though we were not in danger of foreign attack.

Our republic is but 127 years old. Yet it has been necessary to employ our regular army one hundred different times to put down rebellion, insurrection and riots and to repel foreign invasion. Our trained army must be composed of the best-trained bodies and the best-trained minds of America. It should be an honour to qualify for it. No mother wants to rear a son to be a soldier and a cad; but every mother should be proud to rear a son to be a soldier and a *man*—able to protect her and his sisters if attacked!

“All we want is peace; and toward this end we wish to be able to secure the same respect for our rights from others which we are eager and anxious to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the safety of the American people.”⁶

And there is still need for armed protection, and there will be for many a generation.

Historians tell us that if we patch together the days and hours during which no nation has been at war with any other nation, we will find that this earth of ours in the last three thousand years has had just two hundred three years of peace and 2,797 years of war.

Neither is to-day a time of peace; as one may note by glancing at Hayti, Mexico, Japan, Great

Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Belgium, India, Canada, Australia and half of Africa—in all of which eight hundred millions of people live, directly or indirectly, affected by war.

Moreover, universal peace will not be ushered in by July, 1917.

We should have an army equal in size, at least, to that of Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru or Liberia. In this enormous country of ours, with its population of 100,000,000, even the pacifists should not oppose a regular army of five hundred thousand men. Even an army of that size would be but twice as large as that of Holland, whose territory is the size of Maryland only, and a little larger than the standing and reserve army of Switzerland which is about half the size of Maine.

Neither little Holland, with one of the best-trained small armies in Europe, nor Switzerland where every school boy is compelled to take military training and every man of military age is an active member of the reserve, have been made militaristic and bloodthirsty, even by generations of military training.

“In this country there is not the slightest danger of an over-development of the warlike spirit, and there never has been any such danger. In all our history there has never been a time when preparedness for war was any menace to peace.”⁷

Sane military preparation does not, has not and will not lead to militarism. It is not the *training* that gives a nation war lust; it is *false ambition, national conceit* and the *spirit of conquest*—thriving on an international scale—that degrades a people.

There are plans of defence and plans of defence.

There are plans of defence which aim to benefit all the people by protecting all their resources.

There are plans of defence which aim to benefit a few people by pork-barrelling appropriations.

And there are plans of defence which aim to benefit the government by leading the people to believe that they are to have that which they demand.

“Congress is going to be made the recipient of a military recommendation, not such as it should receive, but such as it is deemed likely Congress will feel like adopting.

“Based upon the number of troops which the different great powers can land on our shores in the event we lose control of the sea, we should have a regular army, or troops of the first line of a certain strength. This strength has been determined by the War College, and this is the programme that the Secretary should submit to Congress and let Congress take the responsibility of either providing for it or refusing to do so. Instead of this he has to formulate a policy which is intended to cover up

the deficiencies of Congress. It is a political report, not a military report.”⁸

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 386. From speech of Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, delivered in Chicago sixteen years ago.

² Page 388. Colonel H. O. S. Heistand, Adjutant-General, U. S. Army.

³ Page 394; ⁴ page 395. Colonel William C. Church, member Army Committee of the National Security League, and editor *Army and Navy Journal*.

⁵ Page 395. Report of interview with Thomas Edison.

⁶ Page 396. From ex-President Roosevelt's message to Congress, December, 1901—fifteen years ago.

⁷ Page 397. From address of Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, delivered eighteen years ago.

⁸ Page 399. (See note 3.)

CHAPTER III

BELGIUM AND BELGIUM

THERE is a Belgium of Europe and there is a "Belgium" of the United States.

The Belgium of Europe stood in relation to continental Europe in 1914 as the Belgium of the United States stands in relation to continental United States to-day.

Perhaps no more vivid and concrete illustration of our unpreparedness can be presented than a comparison of the forces which the Belgium of Europe *had* for defence in August, 1914, with those which the "Belgium" of the United States *may have by July, 1917*.

The Belgium of the United States embraces the eastern third of Massachusetts, southern Rhode Island, southern and middle Connecticut, reaching up to and including Springfield, Mass., northern New Jersey. This "Belgium" of the United States includes the cities of Boston, Cambridge, Lowell, Providence, New York, Bridgeport, New London, Jersey City and Hoboken.

There are many astounding, even amazing simi-

larities between the 1914 Belgium of Europe and the present "Belgium" of the United States.

First—The Belgium of Europe had the most representative government of any nation of Continental Europe, not excepting Switzerland; we have the most representative government of the American continent.

Second—The area of the Belgium of Europe is 11,300 square miles; that of the "Belgium" of the United States, 10,900 square miles.

Third—the population of European Belgium in 1914 was 8,060,000; the population of our American "Belgium" is 8,005,000.

Fourth—The Belgium of Europe was the most densely populated portion of Continental Europe; our American "Belgium" is the most densely populated portion of Continental America.

Fifth—The per capita wealth of European Belgium was greater than that of any other country of Continental Europe. The per capita wealth of our American "Belgium" is greater than that of any other section of Continental America.

Sixth—The countries—large producers of manufactured and agricultural products, Germany especially—bordering upon and beyond the Belgium of Europe—depended upon Antwerp for the exportation of their goods; the states of the United States—large producers of manufactured and agricultural products—bordering upon and beyond our

THE BELGIUM OF EUROPE AND THE BELGIUM OF THE UNITED STATES


A. The Belgium of Europe had in 1914 a population of 8,060,000. The Belgium of the United States has a population of 8,050,000.

B. The Belgium of the United States embraces the eastern third of Massachusetts, southern Rhode Island, southern and middle Connecticut, reaching up to and including Springfield, Mass., northern New Jersey. This Belgium of the United States includes the cities of Boston, Cambridge, Lowell, Providence, New York, Bridgeport, New London, Jersey City and Hoboken.

C. In 1914, Belgium, to protect herself against invasion, had an army totalling 371,000—40 per cent. trained men and 60 per cent. partially trained men.

In 1917, we may have 308,000 men—17 per cent. trained, 83 per cent. untrained—if every man proposed by *Former Secretary Garrison's plan enlists and trains*; and Mr. Garrison's plan provides for more men than either the Chamberlain Senate Bill or the Hay House Bill.

Belgium of Europe and Belgium of The United States



American "Belgium"—depend upon New York as a port of export.

Seventh—Just beyond the Belgium of Europe, were the greatest steel works of Europe; just beyond the borders of the "Belgium" of the United States—in Pennsylvania—are the greatest steel works of America.

Eighth—In the Belgium of Europe—in Ghent and others cities—were located the greatest cotton and spinning factories of Continental Europe; in the "Belgium" of the United States—in eastern Massachusetts—are located the greatest cotton and weaving factories of Continental United States.

Ninth—Antwerp was the biggest near-Atlantic port of Continental Europe; New York is the biggest Atlantic port of Continental America.

There is no need to rehearse what happened to Belgium *in 22 days* in 1914. What *did* happen, however, has made us think. It started a campaign for adequate defence which has in one year secured the general approval of our citizens. This approval has become so widespread and so strong that President Wilson and Secretary Daniels have been forced to absolutely reverse their positions of twelve months ago.

We now wish to know what *adequate* defence means. We now wish to know what would probably happen if an attack, similar to that launched against the Belgium of Europe in 1914, should be

made upon our American "Belgium," to-day, or a year or two hence, say in 1917 or 1918. We now wish to determine whether or not the plans proposed by Secretary Daniels and former Secretary Garrison will *adequately* protect our "Belgium" by 1917—provided, each and every *recommendation of Secretary Daniels and former Secretary Garrison should be at once adopted by Congress*—provided each and every recommendation should be carried out with amazing quickness. Although Secretary Garrison has resigned, his plan is considered because, without doubt, it is *stronger* than any plan which will be approved by the present Congress.

The invasion, defence, and devastation of Belgium of Europe *are facts*. By this comparison, we will have as a basis of judgment, the facts of that which *did* occur—not the *supposition* of that which *might* have occurred.

Compare the forces Belgium had in 1914 to defend her area and population with the forces we may have in 1917—if all our proposed plans carry—to defend an equal area and an equal population.

Compare the number of trained and partially trained soldiers Belgium had with the number of trained and partially trained soldiers we may have by 1917.

Compare the preparation of Belgian forces with the preparation of our forces.

Compare the areas from which the Belgian forces

had to be mobilised with the areas from which our forces will have to be mobilised.

Compare the greatest distance Belgian soldiers had to be transported to the distances our soldiers will have to be transported.

Compare the efficiency and quickness of the mobilisation of the forces that defended Belgium, with our last three efforts at mobilisation.

Then ask: if, to defend an equal area with an equal population, we will have by July, 1917, even if all our hopes as to proposed plans should come true, a chance of victory against an invading army similar to that which invaded Belgium.

This is the only concrete practical way of determining whether or not the plans of former Secretary Garrison and Secretary Daniels will give us *adequate* protection even if carried out to the letter with amazing celerity.

First, as to the size of armies: Belgium had a regular and reserve army and a *Garde Civique*, the soldiers of which had had about the same training as that which our National Guard has had. In addition, however, Belgium had the aid of at least 45,000 English soldiers. These totalled 371,000 men.

As comparisons are here made between the forces Belgium had in 1914 and those we hope to have within the next fifteen months and as neither the Chamberlain Bill nor the Hay Bill provides for as

many men as does the plan of former Secretary Garrison, we shall, with a certainty, *overestimate*—by employing as a basis of comparison the number of men former Secretary Garrison hoped to enrol—rather than *underestimate* the forces we may have by July 1st, 1917.

If the full number of men asked for for the regular army immediately enlist, if the 9,000 extra militia at once enrol as members of the National Guard, if in the next four months 133,000 men enlist to form the Continental Army so as to have two months' training during the present summer—if all this is accomplished without a hitch, we shall be able to muster by July, 1917, an aggregate force of 308,000—provided, of course, that every man of our regular army, every man in our reserve army, every member of the state militia, every volunteer of the Continental Army answers the call. If all these conditions are met, we shall have, by July 1, 1917, an army which in numbers alone will be 83% of the army Belgium had for its defence in 1914.

We must remember, however, that of our proposed ten regiments of infantry—20,000 men—only seven are to be kept *in* the United States and *that these seven are to be formed on a peace basis*, which means but 820 men in each company. Consequently the 20,000 men, so far as the defence of Continental United States is concerned, *dwindles to 5,740*. The figure 308,942 men is based upon the supposition

that not a single man will be lost out of our present mobile army of 36,787 men, that every one of the 5,740 men called for by Mr. Garrison for the United States will enlist, that every one of the 4,800 men called for by the plan for the field artillery will not only enlist but will enlist in time to be trained by July 1, 1917, that every man now in the militia of the states will answer the call of the United States, that the 9,000 additional militia asked for will enlist, that the 133,000 called for by the Continental Army plan will not only have enlisted but will also have had two months' training this present summer.

Second, as to the training of the soldiers: Of Belgium's army of 371,000 men, 96,000 were trained Belgian soldiers, and 45,000 were trained English soldiers, many of whom had seen active service in South Africa and other parts of the British Empire—in all 151,000 trained equipped men. The balance of 230,000 were partially trained. By July 1, 1917, if every factor of Mr. Garrison's plans should be worked out perfectly, we would have in the mobile army in the United States but 45,338 trained men, in the reserve army perhaps 24 men, a total of only 45,362 trained men. The balance would be composed of our militia, 50 per cent. of whom have never qualified as second-class marksmen, and of the Continental Army the members of which will have had but two months' training.

Belgium, to defend herself in 1914, had 371,000 men—40 per cent. trained and 60 per cent. partially trained men. We, to defend our American "Belgium," may have an army of 308,000 men—17 per cent. trained and 83 per cent. partially trained men.

Third, as to aids and equipment: Belgium of Europe had, to aid her army in holding its battle lines, the greatest forts in the world. The forts about Liège, Namur and Antwerp were large, new, strong forts. They were extraordinarily strong, built in the three years previous to the war. Military experts of all countries, excepting Germany and Austria, had asserted that they could never be taken. The Belgian regular army was in fine condition. It was well supplied with ammunition. It was fully equipped with armoured cars, armoured automobiles, transport and ammunition trains. Its infantry was well equipped with tripod-machine guns, with bicycle machine guns, and with machine guns drawn by dogs. Its signal corps was in excellent condition.

Some Americans assume that Belgium was unprepared. *Belgium was well prepared. She had been preparing for three years.* She had been preparing ever since the Kaiser and the Kaiserine paid that official visit to Belgium, during which occurred that memorable after-dinner scene in King Albert's private study. The Kaiser and King Albert were alone; and the Kaiser, absorbed in the study of a

new relief map of Belgium, unconsciously allowed his hand to trace the line of march from the German border down over the Belgian valleys into France. This caused King Albert to build the new forts, equip the Belgian army anew, and provide a large reserve of ammunition.

We on the other hand have no armoured trains, no sufficient transportation system, and practically no reserve ammunition. Our army is lacking in large guns. We have not a sufficient number of machine guns, even for 34,000 men—our present mobile force in the United States. We have no bicycle machine guns, no dogs trained to take machine guns quickly from one point of a battle line to another—trained to lie down quietly during fire. We have no armoured automobiles. In fact, our equipment lacks in every factor. And, if we do not do more than former Secretary Garrison recommended to remedy our present deficiencies—it will be three or four years before our present army is equipped with even the minimum number of guns it should have.

Fourth, as to mobilisation areas: Belgium's entire army was resident on the 11,300 square miles of Belgium; the English army began landing within three days after the invasion and within eleven days 45,000 English soldiers had landed. Our army is and will be scattered over a territory of 3,027,000 square miles. Because of

Mobilization Areas

A. United States 3,027,000 sq. miles

B. Belgium 11,300 sq. miles

A. Our prospective army of 308,000 (under the proposed Garrison plan) will be distributed over area A.

B. Belgium's army—regulars, reserves and Garde Civique—were all concentrated on area B.

this our mobilisation problem is vastly different from that which Belgium had to face.

Fifth, as to mobilisation distances: It was necessary to transport 90% of the soldiers of the Belgian army less than 75 miles to perfect their mobilisation. No Belgian soldier was moved more than 130 miles. To protect the same amount of territory and the same number of people, our soldiers from the west would have to be transported three thousand miles, even those of Texas would have to be transported at least 1,900 miles.

Sixth, as to time and efficiency of mobilisation: Belgium mobilised her standing army in 72 hours. The English soldiers that fought in Belgium against the German invasion—not those that fought later in France—were all on Belgian soil within eleven days.

It is worth while noting from our past experience just how inefficient we have been in mobilising less than 13,000 men of our regular army, whose only duty in peace times is to keep in training and to remain at the army posts ready for mobilisation. These experiences will indicate what difficulty we would meet in mobilising 300,000 men.

The war with Spain was *not* an unexpected war. Two years before, in 1896, the Congress and the Senate had requested Spain to recognise the independence of Cuba. It was two years later that the *Maine* was sunk. Nearly a month more passed be-

Mobilization Distances

Belgium:

A ■
15 miles

B ■
130 miles

United States:

C ■
1930 miles

D ■
3000 miles

Belgium: Belgium mobilised her regulars and reserves in seventy-two hours. No soldier was moved a greater distance than 130 miles.

United States: Our best military authorities state that it would take nine months to mobilise the prospective half-trained army of Secretary Garrison's plan.

Our experiences in mobilisation show this to be a very conservative estimate.

Major-General Wood, who is a most energetic officer in securing quick action, estimates that it would take thirty days even to mobilise our little continental mobile army of 34,000 men.

fore Congress took action. Therefore there had been plenty of time for preparation.

On March 11, 1898, the War Department began its mobilisation for an invasion of Cuba. Yet it took us 102 days to land but 16,800 officers and men in Cuba; and the transports crowded to full capacity—men sleeping on decks, packed in anywhere—were compelled to leave ten thousand more men behind at Tampa because the War Department in three and a half months, after two years' warning, was unable to provide enough ships to carry more than 16,000 men from Florida to Cuba.

Moreover, it was *two weeks more* before our War Department could get enough food from Florida to Cuba to supply our men for three days in advance. Even then the quality of the food was so bad that hundreds died from eating it.

The War Department was not able to mobilise a single full regiment in Cuba. At San Juan the regiments averaged 566 men each, though each regiment should have had 1,272 men. With two years' warning and three months' preparation the War Department was able to provide each regiment at San Juan with but 44% of the men they should have had.

Compare this with Germany's invasion of Belgium or with Japan's landing in Chemulpo Bay in February, 1904. The tide at Chemulpo Bay rises and falls 30 feet. Four times a day the waters

rush in and out like a mill race. At low tide there are mud flats for miles around.

The Japanese landing was at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. Its success was not the result of having learned by previous failures. *The Japanese accomplished the entire landing in a few days.*

First, they sent over corps of carpenters and corps of blacksmiths. The blacksmiths set up their forges near the landing place. The carpenters built cleated wooden roadways to cover the mud at low tide and to float on the water at high tide. The wooden roadways were covered with rice bags to deaden the noise of landing.

After this the medical corps landed. Then the horses, being let down from the sides of the boats in slings, were put ashore at a minimum rate of one per minute, many at the rate of two per minute.

Under the most extraordinary conditions with water rushing in and out in a torrent, the Japanese in a few days landed 20,000 men, 2,500 horses and 200,000,000 pounds of food and military stores.


On March 6, 1911, the Secretary of War under President Taft, ordered the mobilisation of a manœuvre division at the Texas border. This manœuvre division should have had at its full strength, *19,200 men*. After *86 days of effort*, the War Department was finally able to get together

just *12,809 men*. That was the largest number of men the manœuvre division ever attained.

Again in 1913, orders were issued from the War Department on February 21st and February 24th for the mobilisation on the Texas border of the Second Division under Major-General Carter. This division should have had at its full strength *22,565 men*. After *126 days*, the War Department was finally able to get *11,287 men* together. This was only 52% of the number the division should have had. And during this mobilisation, 3.4 men out of every hundred deserted, were court-martialled or were discharged without honour. What a glorious feat for a nation of a hundred million people—unable to mobilise more than *11,287 men* in *126 days out of a division that should have had 22,565 men!* Moreover, this division brought with it no proper supply trains, no proper ammunition trains; it was short three companies of engineers; it was short one full regiment of field artillery; it was short field hospitals; it lacked a field signal corps; it lacked ambulance companies!

And again on April 23, 1914, the War Department under President Wilson ordered General Funston to sail from Galveston—to take four infantry regiments to the coast of Mexico. These four regiments should have had 7,956 officers and men. They actually had 2,830—only 36% of what they should have had. And a large portion of

Protection to Lands and Citizens Belgium and U.S.A.



A-Belgium: 482 soldiers per 10000 population

B-Belgium: 3415 soldiers per 100 square miles

C- U.S.A : 31 soldiers per 10000 population

D- U.S.A : 10 soldiers per 100 square miles

To protect each million population in 1914, Belgium had 1454 per cent. more soldiers than we might have under Garrison's plan to protect each million of our population.

What happened to Belgium is a fact.

There is no supposition about it.

Belgium was over-run in *twenty-two days* by a force not greater in number than that which could easily be transported to the shores of the United States *in twelve days*.

General Funston's original command as well as the artillery, cavalry and transportation service was necessarily left behind at Galveston because there were not sufficient transports.

Major-General Wood, commander of the Division of the East, has definitely stated that it would take thirty days to mobilise our standing mobile army of 34,000 men. How many months would it take to mobilise the 308,000 regulars, militia and raw continental troops from all portions of the United States?

Belgium had an army of 371,000 men to protect her 11,000 square miles of territory. She had 3,415 soldiers to protect every hundred square miles. Our army, even if Mr. Garrison's plans should be realised, would furnish us but 10 soldiers per hundred square miles.

Belgium had 371,000 soldiers to protect 8,060,000 people—482 soldiers to each ten thousand of the population; the army Mr. Garrison hoped to have in 1917 would give us but 31 soldiers to each ten thousand people.

Belgium had in 1914 an army of 120% of what Mr. Garrison hoped to have in 1917. Her proportion of trained soldiers was 235% of what he hoped we would have. Her army was better equipped than ours will be in 1917. Her soldiers were mobilised from an area of but 11,000 square miles; ours will have to be mobilised from an area of three million

square miles; we will have to move many of our soldiers from 1,000 to 3,000 miles. Belgium mobilised her standing army in 72 hours; the two partial mobilisations which we have attempted in the last five years have required 86 days to get 12,000 men together and 126 days to mobilise 11,000.

What happened to Belgium?

In 22 days, 350,000 Germans over-ran three-fourths of all Belgium. Many thousands more, during that time and after that time, marched *across* Belgium to fight in France, but the number that over-ran Belgium was never more than 350,000. They were victorious because they were better trained, better equipped, better organised, better supplied—not because they were braver or more heroic than the Belgians. They subdued in 22 days a territory nearly the size of the “Belgium” of America, subdued and levied indemnities upon a population equal to the population of the cities of New York, Boston, Providence, New London, Bridgeport, and Jersey City and all the country districts of the eastern third of Massachusetts, southern Rhode Island, southern Connecticut and northern New Jersey.

Since Belgium in Europe, defended by an army concentrated on 11,000 square miles of territory—practically on the field of battle—was over-run in 22 days, could we, with an army less in size, with an army having a greater proportion of raw

troops, with an army scattered over forty-eight different states, over 3,000,000 square miles of territory, with an army many regiments of which would be 1,000, 1,200 and 3,000 miles distant from the land and people they would be called upon to protect, with an army only partially equipped with guns and ammunition—expect success where Belgium failed—expect victory so long as the present inefficient organisation of our army is maintained?

But would a foreign nation desiring to attack the Atlantic coast of the United States direct its forces against the “Belgium” of America?

Undoubtedly they would attack where—on the smallest area possible—they could quickly seize our largest ammunition plants, strike at our greatest cities, levy the greatest indemnities, subject to military control our greatest financial institutions, and subdue the greatest proportion of the population. They would land their armies in the “Belgium” of the United States and their navies would threaten to bombard Boston, New York and Philadelphia unless indemnities were immediately paid. To choose instead the beaches of Florida, or North Carolina, or the shores of Maine would be idiocy.

But could not the United States navy prevent such invasion?

Many of our military authorities and many of our naval authorities, those actually knowing what the navy can do, have stated that the navy in its

present condition would be unable to prevent invasion. Moreover, the report of Admiral Fletcher, commander of the Atlantic fleet, just submitted to the Senate, so emphatically points out the inability of our navy to protect our Atlantic coast, that the Senate of the United States hesitated to allow it to be printed as a public document.

In its *present deteriorated condition* our navy—with its lack of men, lack of sufficient ammunition supply, lack of sufficient ammunition-ships; lack of fuel-ships, lack of aeroplanes, lack of fast scouts—could not meet the naval forces of any one of the great naval powers of Europe.

We have now 21 ships of the first and second line in service. We have 12 more of these ships but they are “out of commission,” or “in repair,” or “in ordinary.” Of these 21 ships 10 are of the first line and 11 of the second line. Two of the first-line ships are so old as fighting machines that they are to be transferred to the second line some time in March. By May, 1917, six others will be more than 12 years old, the age at which foreign nations consider a battleship almost useless as a *fighting* machine; three additional ships will be 11 years old. The ships already authorised and already under construction are not sufficient in number to replace these. This is due to the failure of Congress during the past few years to maintain the 1903 programme. Consequently we shall be in

worse condition by May, 1917, than we are at present, unless something extraordinary is done.

But how about the ships Secretary Daniels has recommended? Even if these are *voted* immediately, it is very probable that their keels will not even be laid by July 1, 1917. The fact is that the keels of most of our battleships are not laid until eighteen months or two years after they are voted. The *Nevada* and *Oklahoma*, voted five years ago, are not yet in service. Not one of the ships which Secretary Daniels recommends will be finished before 1920 or 1921, unless extraordinary haste is made. Hence, because of the *voting* programme of Secretary Daniels and the few ships already authorised to take the place of those that will year by year lose their fighting value, our navy will remain in its present weakened condition until 1920 at the earliest.

Furthermore, the action of Secretary Daniels in reducing the amount of the recommendation of the General Board for ammunition and aviation will compel our ships to enter a contest, if the case should arise, without eyes and without sufficient shells with which to fight. Hence the coast-line of our American "Belgium" will be open to an invasion just as the border line of the Belgium of Europe was open to invasion in 1914.

Neither the naval programme of Secretary Daniels nor the army programme of former Secretary

Garrison nor the provisions of the Chamberlin Bill or the Hay Bill will provide adequate defence either in 1917 or 1918 even if carried out to the letter and with astounding quickness.

**PART SEVEN: WHAT EACH CITIZEN
CAN DO**



PART SEVEN: WHAT EACH CITIZEN CAN DO

CHAPTER I.

AS TO EXPERTS

THE American citizen is not a technical expert in army and navy matters; he does not pretend to be. He has not and will not presume to give advice to men who have been trained for twenty years in naval construction and in army and navy organisation and management.

But the American citizen has common sense—a goodly amount of it—and the revelations of the last year are making him realise that we ought to have at the head of our army and navy, men who have had years of experience in army and navy affairs,—men thoroughly, practically and technically trained in those lines.

Moreover, the American citizen now knows that billions have been wasted and that millions are being wasted every month; that innumerable blunders have been made in the past and that proposals, which would result in still worse blunders if carried out, are now submitted to Congress; that

there has been and is lack of organisation, lack of a sensible system of promotion, lack of officers, lack of men, lack of equipment, lack of ammunition in both the army and in the navy; that there has been flagrant negligence, in fact criminal negligence; and the American citizen is now determined to remedy these things.

Primarily they have been due to the indifference of the citizens of the United States as a whole, but that indifference is passing! Secondly, they have been due to pork-barrelling in Congress; and thirdly, to the appointment of politicians ignorant of the needs of the army and navy as the heads of those departments.

Political secretaries may plead that they have urged over and over again certain recommendations to Congress and that Congress has again and again turned a deaf ear. But why? Because of the indifference of the people; and, more than all else, because the men as heads of the Army and Navy Departments, the Secretaries of the Navy and the Secretaries of War, have not been well enough acquainted with their work to make a popular fight for that which they recommended.

Just as in England in times of peace, one sentence from Lord Kitchener aroused the English people more than all the appeals of politicians; so in America a vigorous presentation of the needs of the navy by an admiral as Secretary of the Navy

and a strong presentation of the needs of the army by a major-general as Secretary of War would have done much in the past and would now do much to arouse the people.

If, in the past, their recommendations had been ridiculed by indifferent men or sugar-coated by "pork-barrelling" Congressmen and Senators, their long acquaintance with vital facts and their decades of experience would have made it possible for them to speak to the people with such concreteness and authority that the people would not have remained indifferent and Congress would not have dared to "pork-barrel."

Let us look at the business side of it. We are a hundred millions of people. We own more than three and a half million square miles of the richest land on the globe. Our wealth is a hundred and eighty billions of dollars—a hundred eighty thousand millions.

Our army and navy exists for the purpose of protecting the honour and lives of these hundred million people; they exist for the purpose of protecting three and a half million square miles; they exist for the purpose of protecting one hundred eighty billion dollars of wealth. *Never was wealth so undefended; and never in the history of the world have other nations been so perfectly armed and in such great need of levying foreign indemnities.*

As managers, then, of the army and navy, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have a more monumental task before them than any other two men in the world. It is their duty to see to it that the army and navy efficiently protect our people, our lands, our wealth.

The army and navy are specialised organisations. The mass of people know very little about their methods of operation, their direction, their equipment, or their needs. Therefore they require specially trained men to direct them.

There is being established in the United States at the present time a new industry, the dye industry. It is also a *specialty* in commerce. The mass of people know very little about the chemistry of these dyes nor about choosing men as chemists. Would you, if you were about to invest a hundred thousand dollars in one of these industries, choose a man whose sole qualification was his ability to write good "editorial stuff" or good fiction, or his ability to secure a certain number of votes in a certain ward or district, or his ability to write good law briefs or to plead well in court, or his ability to orate passionately for temperance reform? All these qualifications might efficiently fit a man to follow any one of the respective professions, as newspaper editor, ward politician, lawyer, or temperance orator; but those qualifications in themselves would not in any way guarantee that the

man would be a good chemist or a good executive to handle your dye-manufacturing plant.

If, then, you would not place such a man, recommended solely by such qualifications, at the head of a business in which you are about to invest a hundred thousand dollars, why should we, American citizens, permit such a man to be placed at the head of our army or navy, the most technical and executive departments of our government? *Upon them rest the safety of one hundred million people, the security of our home lands, and the security of a hundred eighty billion dollars wealth.*

It has often been argued that it is possible for a great statesman to become a good Secretary of the Navy or an efficient Secretary of War. Argument is of little value, because the nature of the two types of men and the nature of the service required is absolutely different.

The armies and navies of the present day are half machinery and half men, and the machines are the most complicated in the world. A man to efficiently understand and direct the entire naval policy, naval construction, and navy organisation of a country should be both an expert engineer and a man capable of handling men in action. The same applies to the organisation and direction of the army, the construction of fortifications, the selection and manufacture of guns and explosives. A great statesman is an administrator—not an

engineer, tactician, or general. No politician, however great, is able to handle these matters efficiently unless he is also an expert engineer, a tactician of experience, and a general by nature and training.

Probably no greater statesman existed than Abraham Lincoln. During the first two years of the Civil War practically all of our military operations were directed by Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton, and the Confederate forces were on the whole successful. Referring to his direction of the military, President Lincoln is reported by General Grant to have stated that "he *did* know that many of his military orders were wrong, and that perhaps *all* of them were wrong." It was not until President Lincoln put the military entirely in the hands of General Grant to be handled exactly as General Grant pleased, that the North succeeded in winning battle after battle and in bringing the war to a successful close.

"If Abraham Lincoln, great genius that he was, proved himself incompetent to direct armies in warfare, what would happen to us in case of conflict if our defences had to be organised by the petty politicians of to-day?"¹

It is time we recognised that a shoemaker should be employed to make shoes, a butcher to cut meat, a temperance reformer to conduct temperance meetings, a journalist to write and talk for publicity;

but that a naval authority should be appointed Secretary of the Navy and a war authority Secretary of War!

In the past there has been inefficiency, lack of organisation, blundering and negligence. Would such inefficiency, such waste, such blundering, such neglect long continue if Admiral Fiske, Admiral Fletcher, Admiral Badger, Admiral Benson, or Admiral Dewey were Secretary of the Navy for any length of time? Would all our useless, wasteful army posts—obstacles to the rapid mobilisation of our army, and the present deficiency in guns and ammunition continue long to exist if General Barnett, General Funston or General Leonard Wood were Secretary of War?

England is learning her lesson; France has learned hers. The first *Ministre de la Guerre* during the present war was forced out of office by General Joffre; the second one also. Now France has an army general as *Ministre de la Guerre*, and an admiral as *Ministre de la Marine*.

We shall not lag behind if each citizen makes his demands for experts strong enough to make each Congressman realise that the vote of that individual will be cast for or against him according to his Congressional record on the subject.

¹ Page 432. Eric Fisher Wood.

CHAPTER II

AS TO APPROPRIATIONS

IF a blundering, ignorant nurse has carelessly thrown out of the window the costly medicine which you have drained your pocketbook to buy for your sick child, do you smilingly free the nurse of all blame, rage about spending money on medicine and refuse to spend another cent to purchase more, even though you know that your sick child is in greater danger than ever before? Or do you rid yourself of the criminally negligent nurse, engage a trained one, and spend as much as you have already spent, even more if necessary, to save the life of your child?

Adequate means for necessary protection must be provided, no matter what the cost—and provided as soon as possible! No matter how great the waste has been in the past, the present danger is so great that we cannot wait “to be prepared by 1928.”

Our danger *is* immediate. In 1913 France thought her danger lay ten years in the future; England thought the same; Russia thought she

could finish her munition factories before the conflict came. Leaders who attempted to disturb these sweet dreams were ridiculed. But England and France were awakened—and rudely too.

The greatest national danger we have faced since the Civil War is not many years ahead. Few people at present believe this, any more than the people of France or England believed it two years ago.

We must insist upon an appropriation not of four hundred million, but of a billion! A billion is a small sum, a very small sum, with which to immediately prepare ourselves so that no nation shall be tempted to attack us.

The nations at war have spent this sum every two weeks since the war began.

If our present Congress should appropriate one billion dollars for defence and authorise the issuing of this amount of twenty-year United States bonds, it would impose upon the people of the United States a debt (including interest) of only *fifty-two* cents per person each year for twenty years.

The war in Europe is a little less than two years old, yet every person in England—man, woman and child—is already burdened with a per capita war debt of *two hundred dollars*. The war is not yet over. And this is but a portion of the burden thrown upon the English people! Already thou-

sands of families have been ruined financially. England at first lost twenty per cent. of the men that went into battle; five hundred thousand homes have been made desolate.

A billion-dollar appropriation (fifty-two cents per capita for twenty years) to prevent being attacked by a foreign power is worth a hundred times that amount!

Are we so poor we cannot spend a billion dollars, the payment of which can be distributed over a period of twenty years? Because England and France refused to prepare they are now forced to spend *this same sum every four weeks*; and they are suffering ruin, losing thousands of lives and bearing back to their firesides hundreds of thousands of maimed men.

Let us vote a billion-dollar insurance upon our country. Of course it may not prevent us going to war, but it will at least save us from indemnity or devastation. And war *may* come. When you insure your house against fire, you know the insurance will not *prevent* fire; but you know it will save the value of your house if there is a fire.

Let each American urge an appropriation of a billion dollars. Let each American express his willingness to pay fifty-two cents a year (\$10.40 in twenty years) to insure our safety against a possible bombardment of our cities with the millions and millions of property, against the possibility of

being forced to pay billions in indemnities, against the slaughter of a quarter million men! Why should Americans gasp at the loss of a half dollar per year when the safety of a hundred million people and a hundred eighty billion dollars of wealth is at stake?

But the duty of each American does not end in urging Congress to make a large appropriation. He must also awaken from his indifference and watch Congress carefully to see that the most essential needs are the ones for which provision is made. Every citizen of the United States must keep his eye on his Senator and his Representative to see that there is no more sluicing to the "pork-barrel."

And every citizen must let his Representative know that he is watching, patriotically watching.

CHAPTER III

AS TO CITIZENSHIP OBLIGATIONS

THE military is the tool of the nation. It may be used to oppress and it may be used to graft; but it may also be used to protect and to liberate.

The tool is neither good nor bad. It is the motive which animates its use and the method of using it that is right or wrong.

A workman in the city light and power plant falls against a dynamo and is killed. Should the city government abolish the light and power plant and leave its citizens in darkness and without transportation?

A man goes mad—uses his razor to cut his throat. Should the city authorities brand all razors as evils and forbid all men ever shaving again?

America persists in condemning militarism as an evil tool, although her military forces won her her independence; although her military forces freed the black man; although her military forces redeemed Cuba!

Militarism for *conquest* is based upon the prin-

ple that in the conquest of lands and wealth, *a nation has the right to demand that all its men fight for the benefit of all its people.*

Militarism for *protection* is based upon the principle that a nation, because of the service it renders *all its citizens has the right to demand* in return the service of *all* of them for the purpose of protecting its home lands, its citizens and its honour.

These two forms of militarism differ widely in certain respects, yet both are based upon the ideal that the government, *because of the good it renders all its people, has the right to demand the aid of all for the good of all.*

Militarism for politics is based upon the false assumption that the people of a nation are so unpatriotic that the protection of its home lands, its citizens and its honour must depend upon the special *few* who are altruistic enough to give their lives for their less courageous fellow citizens, or upon those who can be bribed by large bounties and by promises of pensions to serve their country. It is the worst form of class legislation.

The American people have been too jealous of their individual freedom—and rightly so—to allow the United States ever to become subject to a military organisation existing for the purpose of conquest. But in reacting against militarism for conquest, the people of the United States have become indifferent—reacted in the wrong direction

—allowing a military system to develop for the financial benefit of the few, to *the financial and moral detriment of the many*.

This system has been established under the plea that the citizen is free to volunteer or withhold his services from the government which protects him. Such a system implies that men who are not patriotic enough to volunteer their services to their government in exchange for the protection which their government gives them, can basely pay in money for the services of the others who are patriotic enough not only to give their services but their lives, if necessary.

It is vicious: it sets up false ideals; it makes a people as a whole selfish, unpatriotic and cowardly; it teaches them that they are not bound by duty to give anything except money in return for the protection their government gives their lands, their property, their lives and their honour; it teaches the people of the nation that they may hire a special few for a few dollars in gold to protect them. In times of peace it is dishonest and wasteful; in times of war it sacrifices the life of the manly, courageous patriot; while the coward, the sluggard and the polycule remain at home to perpetuate the race.

It is based upon the idea that a gentleman should never protect a woman who is being insulted or assaulted unless a group of his fellows offer him

a bounty or pension for doing so. It creates a false ideal of action for the man who is to protect the woman, in that it implies that it is not his duty to protect her unless his cowardly associates offer him a bounty. It creates a false ideal of inaction for his fellows in that it implies that they are released of all gentlemanly duty to protect the woman because they offer a bounty or pension to one of their number to do that which each one of them, as a gentleman and as a man, ought honourably to do himself without thought of reward.

In national life they who are chosen to protect the lives of the citizens of a nation come to demand larger and larger bounties and greater and greater pensions, while the mass of people cowardly agree to pay more and more so that it may be exempt from doing its duty.

The only righteous military system is that which is based upon the ideal that all citizens owe a duty to their government in return for the protection which the government gives to all.

Certainly Thomas Jefferson can never be accused of leaning toward militarism. During the Revolutionary War and throughout his entire public career up to 1814, he was one of the most strenuous advocates of citizen soldiery, but the experience of the first two years of the War of 1812 so disgusted him with the voluntary system that he wrote to President Madison as follows:

“It proves more forcibly the *necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier*. This was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and *must be that of every free state*. Where there is no oppression there will be no *pauper hirelings*. *We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done.*”

This is the only true ideal of national duty. This is militarism for protection—the service of all for the good of all. It is the system of Switzerland and Australia.

Let each American citizen urge its adoption!

CHAPTER IV

AS TO NATIONAL FITNESS

AS a nation, we have grown so rapidly, we have been so busy developing our resources and making money, we have been so revitalised year by year and generation by generation by the enormous influx of healthy peasant blood of Europe, that we have failed to appreciate the increasing physical unfitness of the mass of our citizens.

We have drifted so completely to the "*star system*" of athletics, we have been so able to draw a few *exceptional* physical types from our hundred million people, that the great mass of American youths, enthusing in their worship of these selected athletic heroes, have gradually given up individual effort to excel even in the common sports.

We have specialised in physical fitness, encouraging a system which produces a few men who have been able because of their natural physique to gain national fame in our sports and world renown in Olympic contests; but the masses of our people have gradually deteriorated.

Those who seek to join either the army or the

navy are boys who have a stronger physique and a greater abundance of physical energy than those who do not apply. It is this superabundance of physical energy that urges them to seek the military life. The youth without a strong physique has no inclination even to make the attempt to enter the army or the navy. Applicants, then, are men who, in physical fitness, are far above the great mass of American youths.

To be accepted a man must have good eyes, healthy lungs, a sound heart and good arms and legs. Yet out of the to-be-expected-fit youths impelled by their superabundance of energy and their love of physical action to make application to enter our regular army, from 70% to 90% are *rejected* because *they are physically unfit* to merely march, drill and learn to use a gun. Even out of the small number accepted, often 25 per cent. are discharged later because of physical inability to stand the marches and drill.

The record of the Recruiting Bureau of the United States Marine Corps for the present year illustrates most vividly the physical unfitness of our men. It is astounding to learn that out of 41,100 who made application to enlist during the year 1915, only 3,800 men were accepted—*that the 37,300 were rejected, not because they were not needed, but because they were absolutely unfit.* The record of the largest recruiting bureau, that of

New York, shows a still larger per centum of physical unfitness. The application list of this bureau was 611% of the average of all other bureaus in the United States. Of the 11,012 who applied for enlistment, 10,696 were rejected. Even of the 316 accepted, perhaps 25% or more will be discharged during the year because of inability to continue the physical training required.

Our sociologists have been aware of the increasing effeminacy of the American man; but this has not become so apparent to the layman. The fact that our men, as a nation, have the best shoulders in the world has blinded us to our other physical weakness. Because of the bearing this shoulder gives us, we have not recognised that we are becoming effeminate in other ways. The legs, the thighs, the hips and the back of the American is far below par—far below those of peasant *women* in foreign countries. The woman of the peasant and middle classes of Russia, Germany, Austria, Italy or France is able to swing along at a pace that, with the exception of a few of our star athletes, should put a blush of shame on the face of every American.

There is ample cause for our self-deception. No matter where an American travels, he is recognised by the swing of his shoulders. Our shoulders are due to our national sport—baseball. No other nation has a national game—common to practically

every boy and youth—that so efficiently develops the shoulders. Almost every American boy from nine years of age to manhood, every season and many months each season, plays some type of baseball—if it is only pitching and catching. This has given the American race a shoulder stronger, freer in its action, more quick to respond to demand than that possessed by any other people.

But as our youth are not compelled to take a system of training for all-round development of the body, we have degenerated in other ways.

Physical degeneracy in a nation always begins to manifest in a decreasing strength of the stride of the man. One has only to watch the ankle walking of most of our American men to realise that this degeneracy toward effeminacy has already begun.

The Boy Scout Movement is offsetting this tendency toward effeminacy. The long marches—the necessity which compels the small boy to swing his leg so as to keep in step with the longer pace of the leader, is effecting a beneficial change, the value of which cannot be over-estimated.

Much has been praised in the Boy Scout Movement—its ideal of honour and patriotism, its development of a love of nature, its awakening of a consciousness of comradeship and duty—but *the one greatest good resulting from the Boy Scout Movement* is the development of the thighs, the

strengthening of the muscles of the hips, and the consequent permanent habit of long vital, manly strides.

But baseball and boy scout marching are not enough. We need universal training to bring about real national fitness.

Incidentally it will prepare our men so that they will be able to defend our nation in case of war. War danger, however, is but periodic and temporary, while the greater danger, the danger that ever increases year by year—the danger of our national unfitness, is always with us.

To remedy this we need universal military training.

There is a vast difference between universal military *service* and universal military *training*. The French nation has universal military service, the Swiss have universal military *training*.

The military *service* scheme takes the young man away from home, away from his studies, interrupting his profession or his business for from one to three years. It aims to do by one dose after a man is twenty that which should have been done year by year during boyhood and youth.

The universal military *training* scheme begins with the boy at ten years of age. It develops him physically, trains him to long marches, teaches him the topography of the country, imbues him with an ideal of comradeship and service at an early age.

This is done without interrupting his schooling in any way. In fact it is done in connection with his schooling—a half hour a day in training—a half day a week in marching and excursions. As he grows older a few hours a week are given to training him to shoot, to care for a gun, to know its mechanism, to be able to take it apart and put it together, to repair it if it is out of order. This goes on until he has finished the secondary school. Then as he nears manhood, being physically fit, he is required to take part in but two or three months' military manœuvres. This teaches him to live hygienically with other men, to suppress individualistic tendencies harmful to the group, to learn obedience, and above all to idealise democracy by the recognition of the good qualities of all the youths of a nation brought together on the same level.

This results in unity of action; and unity of action is essentially necessary to the self-preservation of the group. If Harvard, or Yale, or Princeton, were able to choose an eleven of the best football players in America, no matter how efficient each individual of that team, it would make a very poor showing—if the men had never trained together—against a well-trained team composed of individuals each respectively less able than the men of the unorganised team.

The one would be a tiny football mob of eleven

leaders, the other a football *team* under one leadership!

Universal military training for every boy in the United States would remedy our physical unfitness, would inhibit the increasing tendency toward effeminacy, would teach our youths unity of action and obedience and would develop a deeper patriotism.

Moreover, it would teach us democracy, real democracy. Perhaps in no other country in the world, excepting only the distinction of class demanded by the Prussian Junker, is there such separation of classes as in the United States.

In principle we are the greatest democracy in the world; we have a great ideal of liberty, we have a great ideal of freedom, and a greater manifestation of these two qualities than any other people of any other nation. But our practice of equality is ludicrously hypocritical, compared to that of France.

No greater benefit could come to our democracy than universal military training. Can any one estimate the value of bringing together the farmer boy, the city boy, the village boy, and the sons of wealth, who have never in their lives done a single day's work—compelling each and all to share alike and to serve alike?

At Plattsburg, Robert Bacon, Jr., son of a member of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Son, was appointed to clean utensils and serve hash. It was

his duty to wait upon his captain at the table and the captain happened to be a clerk of the firm of which his father was a member. But Robert Bacon, Jr., and a score of other Robert Bacon, Jrs.—*by their willing service*—did more for *true democracy* in that period than thousands of Fourth of July orations and scores of thousands of lectures by pacifists and advocates of volunteer citizen soldiery teaching that we should be divided into two classes—those who are manly and courageous enough to serve us in time of struggle and those who are to be allowed to buy with their money the bodies of other citizens to serve in their stead. One is a process of making democracy, the other an assumption that the life of hero should be sacrificed to save the life of the coward.

Each and every American citizen by demanding universal military *training* can make its adoption certain. Thus each citizen can aid in bringing about a change that will save our nation from its increasing physical tendency toward effeminacy, from its increasing physical disability, from its increasing separation of the classes. Then America will realise a higher manhood, a greater unity of action, and a truer democracy.

CHAPTER V

AS TO THE IDEAL OF THE CHRIST

WE need a true ideal of the Prince of Peace! Certain present-day prophets are teaching that "fast faith" is superior to "wisdom and truth;" that sentimentalism is more to be sought than virtue; that foolishness is more noble than fitness; that good intentions and weakness are more holy than righteousness and strength.

These same prophets have utterly failed us in the past. For a decade before the great storm came they called to us from their intellectual heights, assuring us that the sky was clear; that there never could be another storm.

"There will be no war in the future. It has become impossible." ¹

"It (European War) will never come. Humanly speaking, it is impossible." ²

Now that it has come they ask us to be gentle as doves and stupid as donkeys.

This they hold up as the teaching of the Peace Christ.

And worse still, they attempt to convince us that

the early martyrs who suffered to give an ideal to the world, taught what they are teaching. But why should we accept their interpretation?

The interpretation is false; it is debasing! It strikes at the very root of our higher nature, at the very foundation of our Christian idealism. It embodies the essence of all that is lowest and basest in materialism!

Mr. Carnegie's advice to welcome conquest-mad soldiers with sweet smiles would lead to-day—just as it did when Judea went out with incense and myrrh and gold to welcome the conquest-mad soldiers of Alexander—to spoliation, debauchery, and rape. The nature of men crazed with conquest-lust has not changed with the centuries. The crying of the women of Galicia suffering from the Russians, the moaning of the women of Poland suffering from the Austrians, the wailing of the women of Belgium suffering from the Germans are sufficient evidence. Soldiers of an invading host are not all high-minded officers. *Men impelled by the ideal of conquest take what they want when able to do so!* Sweet smiles and mild entreaty do not move them. The only safeguard is a courageous manhood that knows its duty, and does it even though it encounter death in doing so. When did the Christ teach that it is best to save the body and stain the soul with cowardice and dishonour!

There is no greater evidence of spiritual degen-

eracy than a materialistic appeal that urges us to save the body and sacrifice the soul. Logically carried to its ultimate it teaches a woman to tamely submit to criminal assault; because—if she does not—the brute may scratch her face.

The spiritual heroes of the world—Peter, Paul and the martyrs of their day—are lights to the soul of the race because they willingly sacrificed the body in maintaining their ideal of spiritual duty. Peter denying his Master as the cock crew is despicable; Peter suffering martyrdom is heroically divine!

The Great Master Himself, when the money vendors desecrated the temple, did not smile upon them. He grabbed the whips and lashed them and drove them out of the temple. Later, He willingly suffered the most ignominious physical death rather than accept the “peace-at-any-price” *easier way* of Roman materialism.

Is not His example a fit one to follow?

QUOTATION REFERENCES

¹ Page 451. I. S. Block, in “The Future of War.”

² Page 451. Dr. David Starr Jordan, in “War and Waste,” 1913.

