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
IN ITS

MODE AND SUBJECTS CONSIDERED.

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BAPTISM
IN ITS
MODE AND SUBJECTS
CONSIDERED;
AND THE
ARGUMENTS
OF MR EWING AND DR WARDLAW
REFUTED.

BY
ALEXANDER CARSON, A. M.
MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL.

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REPORT

OF THE

COMMISSIONERS

OF THE LAND OFFICE

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN 1854

AND

IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN 1855

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN 1856

IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN 1857

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

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IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

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IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN 1860

IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS


IN 1861

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN 1862

IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

IN 1863



P R E F A C E.

NOTHING can be farther from the intention of the following Work, than to widen the breach among Christians of different denominations, or to minister to the increase of a Sectarian spirit. There are two extremes which I wish to avoid—on the one hand, a spirit of liberalism that supposes the Christian his own master, and hesitates not to sacrifice the commandments of God to the courtesies of religious intercourse—on the other, that sort of dogmatism that finds all excellence in its own party, and is reluctant to acknowledge the people of the Lord in any denomination but its own. Liberality of sentiment is not a phrase which I admit into my religious vocabulary; for though I love and acknowledge all who love the Lord Jesus, I hold myself as much under the law of God in embracing all the children of God, as in forming the articles of my creed. My recognition of all Christians I ground on the authority of Jesus. To set at nought the weakest of Christ's little ones, I call not illiberal, but unchristian. To disown those whom Christ acknowledges, is antichristian disobedience to Christ. But while I gladly admit, that many who differ from me with respect to Baptism, are among the excellent of the earth, I cannot, out of compliment to them, abstain from vindicating this ordinance of Christ. This would shew greater deference to man than to God. "Every plant," says Jesus, "that my heavenly Father hath not planted, must be plucked up." To permit the traditions of men to pass for the ordinances of God, is injurious to the edification of Christians, and disrespectful to Christ.

Some are diverted from the examination of this subject, by considering it as a thing of small moment, and that time is better spent in schemes of general usefulness. That Baptism is a thing of small

moment, is an opinion that is not likely to have been suggested by the accounts of it in the Scriptures. It is an ordinance that strikingly represents the truth that saves the soul; and is peremptorily enjoined on all who believe. But were it the very least of all the commandments of Jesus, it demands attention and obedience at the hazard of life itself. Nothing that Christ has appointed, can be innocently neglected. To suppose that schemes of general usefulness ought to take place of the commandments of God, is a direct affront to the wisdom and power of Jehovah. Saul alleged that he had substantially obeyed the word of the Lord, though he spared Agag, the king of Amalek, and a part of the spoil for a burnt-offering; but the answer of the prophet ought for ever to deter from the exercise of a discretionary power, with respect to the commandments of God. "Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice; and to hearken, than the fat of rams. For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry: Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, he hath also rejected thee from being king."

Many seem alarmed at controversy, and shrink from it as opposed to the spirit of the gospel. It is, no doubt, a grievous thing, that controversy should be necessary. But as long as error exists, it is impossible to avoid controversy, except we value peace more than truth. Can we forget that the whole life of Christ and his apostles was a scene of never-ending controversy? He who was love itself, contended constantly against the errors of his time. There is not a truth nor an ordinance of the gospel that Christians can hold without opposition. From the manner of revelation, it seems evidently the design of God to manifest what is in man; and to leave an opening to discover the opposition to his wisdom in the minds even of his own people, as far as it exists. The arguments that are opposed to the truth on any subject of revelation, have their effect on the mind, not from their intrinsic weight, but from their adaptation to the corruptions of the heart. We yield to them, because what they are designed to establish is more agreeable than that to which they are opposed. Of this we have a remarkable example in the disobedient prophet at Bethel. When he was sent to denounce the

judgments of the Lord against Jeroboam's altar, he was forbidden to eat or drink in the place. Yet, after refusing the hospitality of the king, he suffered himself to be deceived by another prophet. "Come home with me, and eat bread. And he said, I may not return with thee, nor go in with thee; neither will I eat bread, nor drink water with thee in this place. For it was said to me, by the word of the Lord, Thou shalt not eat bread, nor drink water there, nor turn again to go by the way that thou camest. He said unto him, I am a prophet also, as thou art, and an angel spoke unto me by the word of the Lord, saying, Bring him back with thee into thine house, that he may eat bread, and drink water. But he lied unto him. So he went back with him, and did eat bread in his house, and drink water."

Many things might be plausibly said to justify or excuse this unhappy man. But the Lord did not excuse him. "Thus saith the Lord, Forasmuch as thou hast disobeyed the mouth of the Lord, and hast not kept the commandment which the Lord thy God commanded thee, but camest back, and hast eaten bread, and drunk water, in the place of the which the Lord did say to thee, Eat no bread, and drink no water; thy carcass shall not come unto the sepulchre of thy fathers." It behoves those who change the mode and the subjects of baptism, to consider this awful example. If Christ has commanded his disciples to be baptized on their belief of the truth, who can change it into the baptism of infants? If he has commanded them to be immersed, who can change it into pouring or sprinkling?

In stating the evidence on my own side, and in refuting the arguments of my opponents, I have from first to last proceeded as if I were on oath. I have never allowed myself to use artifice, or to affect to despise an argument which I found myself unable to answer. This is a resource in many controversialists, that is both disingenuous and mean. I have not used one argument to convince others, that has not with myself all the weight which I wish it to have with them. I am not conscious of forcing one line in the word of God. I have no temporal interest to serve, by establishing my views of baptism. Interest and reputation are both on the other side.

False first principles, and false canons of interpretation, lie at the bottom of most false reasoning and false criticism. This is remarkably verified in the reasonings and criticisms of Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw, which I have examined. The reader will find innumerable instances in which I substantiate this charge. Criticism can never be a science until it founds on canons that are self-evident. When controversy is conducted on both sides in this way, truth will soon be established. My dissertation on the import of the word βαπτίζω, I submit with confidence to the judgment of the really learned. If I have not settled that controversy, there is not truth in axioms.

I earnestly entreat my brethren to consider the subject with patience and impartiality. Though it may injure the temporal interest of many of them, yet there is a hundredfold advantage in following the Lord. It would give me the greatest pleasure in being the means of leading others to correct views on this subject. But I know human nature too well to be sanguine. Something more than the strength of argument is necessary to bring even Christians to understand the will of their Lord. However, should I not make a single convert, I am not disappointed. My first desire is to approve myself to my Lord. If I please him, I hope I shall be enabled to bear not only the enmity of the world, but the disapprobation of Christian brethren. I expect my reward at his appearing. The motto I wish to be engraven on my heart is, "Occupy till I come."



ON BAPTISM.

MEANING OF THE WORD *βαπτω*—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN *βαπτω*
AND *βαπτίζω*.

THE word *βαπτω* from which is formed *βαπτίζω*, signifies primarily to dip; and as a secondary meaning obviously derived from the primary, it denotes to *dye*. Every occurrence of the word may be reduced to one or other of these acceptations. It has been said, that it signifies also to wash, but though this is given by the lexicographers as one of its meanings, and is admitted by many Baptist writers, it is not warranted by a single decisive example, either in the Scriptures, or in classical authors. It has also been said that it is a generic word, and without respect to mode, or inclusive of all modes, denotes any application of water. So far from this, the idea of water is not at all in the word. It is as applicable to every fluid as to water. Nay, it is not confined to liquids, but is applied to every thing that is penetrated. The substance in which the action of the verb is performed, may be oil, or wax, or mire, or any other soft matter, as well as water. Except when it signifies to dye, **IT DENOTES MODE, AND NOTHING BUT MODE.**

βαπτω and *βαπτίζω* are considered by most writers as perfectly identical in their signification. On the other hand, there are writers on this subject, on both sides of the great question, who have assigned a difference of meaning, which is merely fanciful. Some have alleged, that the termination *ζω* makes *βαπτίζω* a diminutive; but utterly without countenance from the practice of the language. Others have erred as far on the other side, and equally without authority make *βαπτίζω* a frequentative. The termination *ζω* has no such effect as either class of these writers suppose; and the history of the word, both in sacred and classical use, justifies no such notion. It is true, indeed, that early church history shews that Bap-

tism was performed by three immersions ; but it is equally true, that this is neither scriptural, nor indicated by the termination of the verb. Even had Christ appointed trine immersion, the frequency could not have been expressed by this word. We should recollect that the word was not formed for this religious ordinance ; but being taken from the language, must be used in the common sense. The termination ζω does not make a frequentative according to the practice of the language in other words ; and the verb βαπτίζω is not used as a frequentative by Greek writers. It could not become such, then, in an ordinance of Christ. When Tertullian translates it by *mergitare*, he might wish to countenance the trine immersion ; but it is strange that he should be followed by Vossius and Stephens. It is strange also to find some Baptists still speaking of βαπτίζω as a frequentative verb, since they cannot suppose that it is such in the ordinance of Baptism. It is a sufficient induction from the actual history of a language, and not speculations from theory, that can settle a question of this kind.

The learned Doctor Gale, in his *Reflections on Mr Wall's History of Infant Baptism*, after giving us a copious list of quotations, in which βαπτω and βαπτίζω are used, says : “ I think it is plain from the instances already mentioned, that they are ἰσοδυναμοῦσι, exactly the same as to signification.” As far as respects an increase or diminution of the action of the verb, I perfectly agree with the writer. That the one is more or less than the other, as to mode or frequency, is a perfectly groundless conceit. Yet there is a very obvious difference in the use of the words ; and a difference that naturally affects the point at issue. This difference is, βαπτω IS NEVER USED TO DENOTE THE ORDINANCE OF BAPTISM, AND βαπτίζω NEVER SIGNIFIES TO DYE. The primitive word βαπτω has two significations, the primary to *dip*, the secondary to *dye*. But the derivative is formed to modify the primary only ; and in all the Greek language, I assert that an instance is not to be found in which it has the secondary meaning of the primitive word. If this assertion is not correct, it will be easy for learned men to produce an example in contradiction. That βαπτω is never applied to the ordinance of Baptism, any one can verify, who is able to look into the passages of the Greek Testament, where the ordinance is spoken of. Now, if this observation is just, it overturns all those speculations that explain the word, as applied to Baptism, by an allusion to dyeing ; for the primitive word that has this secondary meaning is not applied to the ordinance ; and the derivative word, which is appointed

to express it, has not the secondary signification of *dyeing*. *Βαπτω* has two meanings, *βαπτίζω* in the whole history of the Greek language has but one. It not only signifies to dip or immerse, but it never has any other meaning. Each of these words has its specific province into which the other cannot enter; while there is a common province in which either of them may serve. Either of them may signify to dip generally; but the primitive cannot specifically express that ordinance to which the derivative has been appropriated; and the derivative cannot signify to *dye*, which is a part of the province of the primitive. The difference is precise and important. Most of the confusion of ideas on both sides of the question, with respect to the definite meaning of the word Baptism, has arisen from overlooking this difference. Writers, in general, have argued from the one word to the other, as if they perfectly corresponded in meaning.

To shew that derivatives in *ζω* are equivalent to their primitives, Dr Gale gives us a number of examples. *Βλυω, βλυζω. Θυω, θυαζω. Βορβοροω, βορβοριζω. Ορκοω, ορκιζω. Αλεγω, αλεγιζω. Κανοχεω, κανοχιζω. Εθω, εθιζω. Ηθω, ηθιζω.* Now, in every thing essential to his purpose, this is perfectly true; and in innumerable instances, no variation may be capable of being traced. Yet I apprehend that such derivatives were not introduced merely to vary the sound, but that they were originally designed to modify the action of the primitive verbs. The termination *ζω*, when employed to form a derivative, appears to me to have served some such purpose, as the Hebrew causal form, and to denote the making of the action of the verb to be performed. Mere speculation is of no value. The most ingenious theory, not confirmed by the use of the language, ought to have no authority. To ground any thing on conjectures, with respect to a subject that concerns the faith or obedience of the people of God, would be not only unphilosophical but impious. But that my observation is just, may be fully verified by examples. There cannot be the smallest doubt, that the Greeks did form derivatives on this plan. Could I produce no other instance, the following from Ælian's *Varia Historia*, would be sufficient to establish my doctrine. It occurs in the anecdote he relates with respect to the beneficence of Ptolemy Lagides. *Πτολεμαϊον φασι Τον Δογου, καταπλουτιζοντα τους φιλους αυτου, υπερχαιρειν. Ελεγε δε αμεινον ειναι πλουτιζειν, η πλουτειν.* "They say that Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, took great delight in enriching his friends. He said that it is better to enrich others than to be rich," 197. Here *πλουτεω* is to be rich, and *πλουτιζω* to make rich.

We have another instance in Heraclides, ἐξ ὧν πολλοὺς εἰπνιζέει; “of whom he provided many with a supper.” Δειπνεω is to *sup*, δειπνίζω signifies to give a supper.

Such then indubitably was originally the use of derivatives with this termination, though in many cases they and their primitives may be interchangeable; and although in some the distinction cannot at all be traced.

In this view βαπτίζω would signify originally to make an object dip. Its use then, would be to apply to the dipping of things too heavy to be sustained by the dipper. Its use in classical occurrence, I think, will accord with this. Compared with its primitive, its occurrence in profane writers is very rare, and it generally applies to objects that are too heavy to be lifted or borne by the dipper. It applies to ships which are *made to dip* by the weight of the lading. As to the general idea of dipping, the primitive and the derivative are interchangeable. The primitive may be used with respect to the largest body that can be immersed; but it will not express the modification denoted by the derivative. The derivative may be applied to the smallest object that is dipped; for it is evident, that if we dip an object in any way, we cause it to dip or sink. I shall illustrate this observation farther when examples actually come before us. In the mean time I observe, that whatever may originally have been the modification of the termination in question, the difference in the use of βαπτω and βαπτίζω is clearly established. To ascertain a difference, and to account for that difference, are two very different things. In the former our success cannot be doubted, whatever may be thought with respect to the latter.

From some instances in the application of this word, Dr Gale was induced to suppose that it does not so necessarily express the action of putting under water, as that the object is in that state. But this is evidently inconsistent with the essential meaning of the word; and not at all demanded by the examples on which he founds it. “The word βαπτίζω,” says he, “perhaps does not so necessarily express the action of putting under water, as in general a thing being in that condition, no matter how it comes so, whether it is put into the water, or the water comes over it.” Now, were this observation just, every thing lying under water might have this literally applied to it. But every one acquainted with the Greek language must acknowledge that the word has not literally such an application. In any particular instance when this word is applied to an object lying under water, but not actually dipped, the mode

essentially denoted by it is as truly expressed as in any other instance of its occurrence. Indeed the whole beauty of such expressions consists in the expression of a mode not really belonging to the thing expressed. The imagination, for its own gratification, invests the object with a mode that does not truly belong to it; and if that mode were not suggested to the mind, the expression would lose its peculiar beauty. Common conversation exemplifies this mode of expression every day; and mere children understand its import. When a person has been drenched with rain, he will say that he has got a *dipping*. Here *dipping* does not lose its modal import, but immediately suggests it to the mind, and intends to suggest it. But were the English language one of the dead languages, and this expression subjected to learned criticism, it would be alleged that the word *dipping* does not denote mode, but *wetting*, without reference to mode.

The very example alleged by Dr Gale is formed on this principle. It is brought from the works of Aristotle. “The Phenicians who inhabit Cadiz, relate, that sailing beyond Hercules’s Pillars, in four days, with the wind at east, they came to a land uninhabited, whose coast was full of sea-weeds, and is not laid under water, βαπτίζεσθαι, at ebb; but when the tide comes in, it is wholly covered and overwhelmed.” Now, though the water comes over the land, and there is no actual exemplification of the mode expressed by this word, yet it still expresses that mode; and the word has been employed for the very purpose of expressing it. The peculiar beauty of the expression consists in figuring the object, which is successively bare and buried under water, as being dipped when it is covered, and as emerging when it is bare. In the same style we might say, that at the flood, God immersed the mountains in the waters, though the waters came over them.

No example can more clearly disprove the notion, that this word denotes to pour or sprinkle a little water on an object. The thing here supposed to be baptized, was wholly buried under water. The beach is said to be baptized when the tide comes over it. Can any child, then, be at a loss to learn from this, that baptism means to lay under water? Should we say that God baptized the earth at the flood, we would use an expression exactly like the above. Who then can be at a loss to know the meaning of the word baptism?

This example tends to confirm my observation with respect to the peculiar import of derivatives in ζω. This was a large object, that

was not supposed to be taken up and dipped, but to be caused to dip, as it were by sinking.

The distinction which I have observed between the use of βαπτω and βαπτίζω, will enable us to refute the interpretation of the word baptism by Mr Robinson of Cambridge, an Arian Baptist. "The English translators," says he, "did not translate the word baptize, and they acted wisely; for there is no one word in the English language which is an exact counterpart of the Greek word, as the New Testament uses it, containing the precise ideas of the evangelists, neither less nor more. The difficulty, or rather the excellence of the word, is, that it contains two ideas, inclusive of the whole doctrine of baptism. Baptize is a dyer's word, and signifies to dip, so as to colour. Such as render the word dip, give one true idea; but the word stood for two, and one is wanting in this rendering. This defect is in the German Testament, Matt. iii. 1. In those days came John *don Tauffer*, John the Dipper; and the Dutch,—In those days came John *cer Dooper*, John the Dipper. This is the truth, but it is not the whole truth. The Saxon Testament adds another idea, by naming the administrator, John *le Fullubtere*, John the Fuller. The Islandic language translates baptism *skirn*, scouring. These convey two ideas, *cleansing by washing*, but neither do these accurately express the two ideas of the Greek baptize; for though repentance in some cases accompanies baptism, as it does prayer, yet not in every case. Jesus was baptized in Jordan, but he was not cleansed from any moral or ceremonial turpitude by it, nor was any repentance mixed with his baptism. Purification by baptism is an accident, it may be, it may not be,—it is not essential to baptism. The word, then, conveys two ideas, the one literal, *dipping*, the other figurative, *colouring*; a figure, however, expressive of a real fact, meaning that John, by bathing persons in the river Jordan, conferred a character, a moral hue, as dyers, by dipping in a dying vat, set a tinct or colour; John, by baptism, discriminating the disciples of Christ from other men, as dyers, by colouring, distinguish stuffs. Hence John is called, by early Latins, John *Tinctor*, the exact Latin of Joannes Baptistes, John the Baptist."

Mr Robinson was a man of talents and of extensive reading: But whatever other accomplishment he might possess, the above specimen shews that he was no critic. Such a combination of the primary and secondary meaning of a word, is unphilosophical; and I am bold to say, that in no language was it ever really exemplified.

It is a mere speculation, and a speculation that no man at all acquainted with the philosophy of language could indulge. Did Mr Robinson suppose that βαπτίζω had this double import in common and classical use? If he did, he must have paid no attention to the various occurrences of the word; for in no instance is his observation verified. Did he suppose that the word, in its appropriation to the ordinance of baptism, received this new meaning? If he did, he supposes what is absurd, and what cannot be exemplified in any word in the Bible. If words could receive such an arbitrary appropriation in Scripture, the Book of God would not be a revelation. Words must be used in Scripture in the sense in which they are understood by those who speak the language, otherwise the Bible would be a barbarian both to the learned and to the unlearned. "Baptize," he says, "is a dyer's word." Baptize is not a dyer's word. βαπτω, in a secondary sense, signifies to dye; but βαπτίζω never does. It is strictly univocal. What a ridiculous thing to suppose that, by immersion in pure water, Christians received a discriminating hue, like cloth dipped in the dyer's vat! What mark does it impress? What portion of Scripture is it that has suggested this Arian whim? Are we to take the explanation of the import of an ordinance of Christ from the creations of genius, rather than from the explicit declaration of the Apostles? Such a meaning the word in question never has. Such a combination of primary and secondary meaning no word in any language could have. Such a meaning has nothing in the ordinance to verify it. It is the mere arbitrary conceit of this Arian Baptist, who wishes to make baptism any thing rather than an emblem of washing away sin through the blood of Jesus Christ. It is infinitely more important to resist such explanations of baptism, even though their authors should agree with us with respect both to the mode and subjects of that ordinance, than to combat the opinion of our brethren who on these points differ from us. It is the truth itself, and not any ritual ordinance, that our Lord has appointed to be the bond of union among his people. A disproportionate zeal for baptism may sometimes lead to danger of seduction from the gospel,—by fraternizing with its corrupters, from agreement with them in a favourite ordinance. Mr Robinson's History of Baptism is not so valuable to confirm Christians in the Scriptural view of this divine institution, as it may be dangerous to their faith, by a constant endeavour to infuse the poison of Arianism.

Dr Cox has favoured us with the opinion of the celebrated

Greek scholar, Professor Porson, with respect to the difference between βαπτω and βαπτίζω. “My friend Dr Newman has recorded a conversation which he once held with Professor Porson, in company with a much respected friend, and which, as a corroborative testimony of no mean consideration, may properly be inserted in this place. It is with melancholy pleasure I add of that friend, (now, alas, no more!) that he was also dear to my heart, even from the days of early companionship at school; and that he was eminently distinguished for his attainments. Not long before the death of Professor Porson, I went, in company with a much respected friend, to see that celebrated Greek scholar at the London Institution. I was curious to hear in what manner he read Greek. He very condescendingly, at my request, took down a Greek Testament, and read, perhaps, twenty verses in one of the gospels, in which the word βαπτω occurred. I said, ‘Sir, you know there is a controversy among Christians respecting the meaning of that word.’ He smiled and replied, ‘The Baptists have the advantage of us!’ He cited immediately the well-known passage in Pindar, and one or two of those in the gospels, mentioned in this letter; I inquired, whether, in his opinion, βαπτίζω must be considered equal to βαπτω, which, he said, was to tinge, as dyers. He replied to this effect; that if there be a difference, he should take the former to be the strongest. He fully assured me, that it signified a *total immersion*. This conversation took place August 27, 1807.”

I should like to know in what respects this eminent scholar considered βαπτίζω to be a stronger term to denote *immersion*, than its primitive βαπτω. I wish we had his opinion more in detail on this subject. As expressive of mode, the derivative cannot go beyond its primitive. As to *totality of immersion*, the one is perfectly equivalent to the other. But, as I observed before, βαπτω has two senses, and βαπτίζω but one; and therefore, in this respect, the word used, with respect to the ordinance of baptism, is stronger in support of immersion as being univocal. Perhaps this was the meaning of the professor. The additional modifying meaning, which I pointed out in the derivative, adds nothing to the strength of signification as to mode, though it sufficiently accounts for the use of the derivative to the exclusion of the primitive, in every instance, with respect to the ordinance of baptism.

The just and most obvious method of ascertaining the meaning of a word, is to examine its origin and use in the language. It

may wander far from its root, but if that root is known with certainty, the connection may still be traced. The derivative, however, may reject ideas contained in the primitive, or it may receive additional ideas, which can be learned only by being acquainted with its history. That βαπτίζω is formed from βαπτω is a thing beyond dispute. But as I have shewn that they are not perfectly coincident in their application, I shall examine them separately, contrary to the general practice of writers on both sides of the question. I shall give a copious list of examples, as it is from this that my readers will be enabled independently to form their own judgment. This method will doubtless appear tedious and uninteresting to many, but it is the only method entitled to authority. For a writer on controverted subjects, to give merely his own opinion of the import of his documents, accompanied with a few examples as a specimen of proof, would be the same as if an advocate should present a judge and jury with his own views of evidence, instead of giving them all his facts and circumstances in detail, to enable them to decide with knowledge. A work of this kind is not for amusement, but requires patience and industry in the reader, as well as in the writer. If the one has ransacked documents to most readers inaccessible, to collect evidence, the other should not grudge the toil of examining the evidence, seeing it is only by such an examination that he can have the fullest conviction of the truth. Is the meaning of this word to be eternally disputed? If one party says that it has this meaning, and another that, while a third differs from both, and a fourth is confident that all three are wrong, what method can legitimately settle the controversy, but an actual appeal to the passages in which it is to be found? These are the witnesses, whose testimony must decide this question; and consequently the more numerous and definite the examples, the more authoritative will be the decision. And as it is possible to tamper with evidence, the witnesses must be questioned and cross questioned, that the truth may be ascertained without a doubt. Instead therefore of making an apology for the number of my examples, and the length of the observations that ascertain their meaning, the only thing I regret is, that I have not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language. Never was the meaning of a word so much disputed; no word was ever disputed with less real grounds of difficulty.

As it has been supposed by some to be a generic word, signifying every application of water without any respect to mode, I shall

first give a specimen of examples, shewing that it not only signifies mode, but that the idea of water is not in the word at all. The nature of the fluid is not expressed in the verb, but is expressed or understood in its regimen.

Near the end of the Sixth Idyl of Theocritus, the word is applied to the dipping of a vessel in honey.

Ἄ παις ἀνθ' ὕδατος ταν καλπιδα κηρια βαψαι.

“Instead of water, let my maid *dip* her pitcher into honey combs.”

Here such abundance of honey is supposed, that in the morning, the maid servant, instead of going to draw water, will dip her pitcher into honey combs. Not water then, but honey is the substance, with respect to which the verb in question is here applied. And that dipping is the mode, there can be no question. It would be absurd to speak of pouring, or sprinkling, or washing, or wetting, an urn into honey combs.

Aristotle also applies it to the dipping of hay into honey for the curing the flux in elephants. Καὶ τὸν χορστὸν εἰς μέλι βαπτουτες, “Dipping hay into honey, they give it them to eat.” Hist. Animal. Lib. viii. 26. Though it would be possible to sprinkle hay with honey, yet it would be absurd to speak of sprinkling or pouring hay *into* honey. The preposition εἰς, with which the verb is connected, forbids it to be translated by any other word but *dip*, even were it possessed of different significations.

The same author, in his treatise on the soul, applies the word to wax. Εἰ εἰς κηρὸν βαψεῖ τις, μέχρι τούτου ἐκινήθη, εὖς ἐεῶψε. “If one dip any thing into wax, it is moved as far as he dips.” Lib. iii. 12. This surely is not an application of water. Nor can the mode be any other than dipping. Neither pouring nor sprinkling, washing nor wetting, can be imported here.

In the last line of the first Idyl of Moschus, the word is applied to immersion in fire. Speaking of the gifts of Cupid, it is said, τα γὰρ πυρὶ πάντα βεβαπται. “For they are all dipped in fire.” This is a baptism in fire, and beyond dispute dipping was the mode.

Ælian applies the word to ointment: στεφανὸν εἰς μύρον βαψας, Lib. xiv. Cap. xxxix. “Having dipped a crown into ointment.”

The learned friend who writes the Appendix to Mr Ewing's Essay on Baptism, translates this example thus: “having tinged (imbued or impregnated) with precious ointment a crown (or garland),—the crown was woven of roses.” This translation, however, is not made on sound principles of interpretation. It rests on no

basis. The author has not produced one instance in which the word βαπτω incontestibly and confessedly must signify to *imbue*, except in the sense of *dyeing*. To *tinge* a crown of flowers, is not to imbue it with additional fragrance, but to colour it. The author violates both the Greek and the English. When we speak of the *tinge* of a flower, we refer to its colour, not to its perfume. *To tinge with ointment* to give a fragrant smell, is not an English expression. The translation labours under another disease. Εἰς μύρον cannot be translated *with ointment*; but must be rendered *into ointment*. *To tinge into ointment* is a solecism. The verb then cannot here be translated *tinge*, or *imbue*, or *impregnate*, even though it had these significations in other places. The expression cannot bear any other translation than—"He dipped the crown into ointment." The learned writer thinks it improbable that a crown of roses would be dipped in viscid oil in order to improve its fragrance. I admit that it would not be to my taste. But does the gentleman forget that it was the oddity of the thing that induced the historian to mention it? Had it been a common thing, it would not have had a place in Ælian's anecdotes. The person to whom it was presented, observed that he accepted it as a token of the good will of the giver, but that the natural fragrance of the flower was corrupted by art. It is no improvement to gild a statue of exquisite workmanship. Shall we therefore force the words of the historians, that assert this of a certain Roman emperor, to assume another sense? Shall we say, that as it was no improvement to the statue to be gilded, the language must signify merely that it was washed? To proceed on such principles of interpretation, would render the precise meaning of language utterly unattainable. It is absurd and chimerical in the highest degree. In some points of view, I respect this writer very much. But he reasons without first principles, and therefore has no basis for his conclusions. He is extensively acquainted with Greek literature; but had he all the writings of the ancients in his memory, he cannot be a critic, so long as he multiplies the meanings of words in an arbitrary manner, according to his view of particular exigencies. In his very next example, he makes the word βαπτω signify to *purify*, from a different exigency. Jamblichus, in his life of Pythagoras, relates as one of the directions of the philosopher to his disciples,—οὐδὲ εἰς περιρραντηριον ἐμβαπτειν, which the writer of the Appendix translates, "not to *purify* in the perirranterion." Here, again, he proceeds without first principles. He has not alleged one instance in which

the verb must signify to *purify*. He has, then, no ground-work on which to rest this assumption. And the preposition *εις*, occurring here both separately and in conjunction with the verb, determines that the action of the verb was directed *into* the perirranterion, or bason. Besides, as a matter of fact, they did not purify *in* it, but *out* of it. Persons sprinkled at the door of a Roman Catholic church, are not said to be purified *in* the vessel that contains the holy water. But the writer alleges that the perirranterion was too small for *dipping*. Very true, if it is meant that it was too small to dip the body in; but it was not too small to dip the thing that is here understood to be dipped, that is, the sprinkling instrument. Had the writer considered that the phrase is elliptical, as referring to a thing so well known that the regimen of the verb is understood without being expressed, he would have had no necessity for giving a new and an unauthorized meaning to the word *βαπτω*. In the next direction mentioned by Jamblichus, we have a similar ellipsis: *ουδε βαλανειω λουεσθαι*. “Nor to bathe in a bath,” that is, to bathe the body in a bath. We ourselves use the same ellipsis. Pythagoras prohibited these things to his disciples, because it was not certain that all who had fellowship with them in the perirranterion and bath were pure. *Do not dip in the perirranterion*; do not use the perirranterion; do not dip the sprinkling instrument in order to purify. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the conduct of this writer. As often as he meets a difficulty, he gives a new meaning to suit the situation. Now, though I could make no sense of the passage at all, I would resolutely refuse to adopt any meaning but one that the word confessedly has in some other place. It is not enough to say that such a translation will make sense, it must be the sense that the word is known to express.

Another difficulty with respect to a passage in Suidas de Hierocle, induces this writer to translate *βαπτω*, to *wet*. He might as well translate it, to *dry*. A person was scourged before the tribunal, *ρεομενος δε τω αιματι βαψας κοιλην την χειρα, προσβραινει την δικασλημαν*, “and flowing with blood, having wetted the hollow of his hand, he sprinkles it on the judgment seat.” The word, however, never signifies *to wet*; and even this translation does not suit the writer’s own commentary. He explains it as referring to the catching of the blood flowing from his wounds, or letting the pouring blood fill the hollow of his hand. To *wet* is far enough from representing such a process. There can be no doubt that the word *βαπτω* is here to be translated in its usual sense.

“ And having *dipped* the hollow of his hand, he sprinkles the tribunal.” It may be difficult easily to conceive the process, but of the meaning of the expression there can be no doubt. If the blood was flowing down his body, he might strike the palm of his hand on his skin, and gather up the blood in the hollow of his hand. Whatever was the way in which the operation was performed, the writer calls it a *dipping* of the hollow of his hand. There is, no doubt, something hyperbolic in the expression.

In the *Nubes*, Aristophanes represents Socrates as ludicrously dipping the feet of a flea into wax, as an ingenious expedient to measure its leap.

Κηρον διατήξας, ειτα την φυλλαν λάβων,
Ενέβαψεν εις τον κηρον αυτης τω ποδε.

“ Having melted the wax, he took the flea and dipped its feet into the wax.” Here the liquid is wax, and the mode can be nothing but dipping. Such an instance determines the meaning of the word beyond all reasonable controversy.

But, though the word is most usually and properly applied to fluids, it is often applied even to solids that are penetrated. Dionysius of Halicarnassus applies it to the thrusting of a spear, βαψας, between the ribs of a man. In like manner, we might say that a soldier *plunged* his sword into the bowels of his enemy.

In Mat. xxvi. 23, the action of putting down the hand into a dish is expressed by this word, when the hand was not actually immersed in the fluid at the bottom. Εμβάψας την χειρα. “ Who dipped his hand in the dish.” Now, it is true that, according to ancient manners, the fingers were actually dipped in taking up food from the dish; yet it is quite proper to speak thus of the action of putting down the hand in the inside of a bowl or dish. An excise officer might be said to *dip* a vessel even when empty; and we speak of *plunging* into a wood. Miners also speak of *the dip* of a rock as being north or south, by referring to the direction of its *sinking* or *slope*.

Lycophron represents Cassandra, foretelling the death of Clytemnestra by the hand of her own son, as saying, “ with his own hand he shall *dip* his sword into the viper’s bowels.”

Εις σπταλχον' εχιδνης αυτιχειρ βαψει ξιφος.

Here the word is applied to the penetrating of solids, in the sense

of thrusting or piercing. In like manner, we speak of *burying* a weapon in the bowels. *Pouring, sprinkling, washing,* have no countenance here, but are entirely excluded.

Ajax is represented by Sophocles as *dipping* his sword into the army of the Greeks. *Εβαψας εγχος το προς Αργειων στρατω.* In all such instances, there is a figurative stretch of the word, with a fine effect on composition; but the whole beauty of the expression consists in the reference to the proper and modal meaning of the term.

Having proved the application of the word to mode, without respect to the nature of the fluid, I shall now at random produce examples.

In the thirteenth Idyl of Theocritus we have an example of it, in the account of the drowning of the boy Hylas, who went to a fountain to draw water for the supper of Hercules and Telamon. *Ητοι ἰκουρος ἐπιχε ποτω πολυχανδρα κρωσσον, βαψαι ἐπειγομενος.* “The youth held the capacious urn over the water, hasting to *dip* it,” &c. Can any thing be more definite than this? Can any one be at a loss to know how a pitcher is filled with water at a fountain? Can an unprejudiced reader demand a clearer example than this, to shew the modal meaning of *βαπτω*? Even the unlearned reader may judge for himself in this matter. Indeed, from the connection in which the word is found, he may, in almost all the examples, judge whether the translation of the term is natural or forced. I hope, then, the unlearned reader will not pass over even this part of the subject as altogether beyond him.

The word occurs in the Hecuba of Euripides.

Συ δ' αυ λαβουσα τευχος αρχαια λατρη,
Βαψας' ενεργχε δευρο ποντιας αλας.

“Take a vessel, ancient servant, and having *dipped* it in the sea, bring it hither.

Dr Gale informs us, that the explanation of the word in this place, by one of the Greek scholiasts, is,— *βαπτειν εσι το χαλαν τι εις υδωρ, η εις ετερον τι υγρον.* “*Βαπτειν* signifies to let down any thing into water, or any other liquid.” Can we wish for better authority for the meaning of a Greek word?

Aristophanes, in the play entitled *Ειρηνη*, affords us an example of the word.

Φεξε δη το δαδιον τοδ' εμβαψω λαβων.

“Bring the torch, that I may take and dip it.”

Dr Gale observes that the Greek Scholiast and Florent. Christianus, preceptor to Henry IV. of France, refer this to the manner of purifying among the Greeks, by dipping a lighted torch in water, and so sprinkling the persons or things to be purified. This explains the Pythagorean precept, quoted in Mr Ewing's Appendix.

Dr Gale has given us some fragments of this author, preserved by Harpocratian, where the general meaning is more obscure, but in which the peculiar meaning of this word is not at all doubtful. "When I have *dipped*, βαψας, I will cite the strangers before the judges." "This passage would have been very obscure," says he, "and I do not know whether any thing would have given light to it, if Suidas had not attempted it; for I take this to be the passage he refers to, when he says, 'when I have *dipped* the oar,' &c. which helps us to the sense of the word βαψας in this place, though it does not clear up the whole. "Or perhaps," says he, "it may be a metaphor taken from the dyers, who say, for instance, I will dip it, and make it a black." Athenæus has preserved two other fragments of the same author, in which the word occurs; one is, "what a wretch am I, to be thus dipped over head and ears, απελαφθη, in brine, like a pickled herring." We have, therefore, the authority of Suidas, that βαπτειν applies to the dipping of an oar in the water.

Aristotle, speaking of a kind of fish, says: Και τας μεταβολας δ' ουκ υπομνηνουτι τας ισχυρας, οιον και τοις θερουσιν εαν βαπτωσιν εις ψυχρον. "They cannot bear great changes, as the *immersion* of them into cold water, even in summer." Can any thing be more decisive? We could not speak of *sprinkling*, or *pouring*, or *wetting* a fish *into water*.

Speaking of the remedy for the bite of a certain kind of snake in Africa, he says: ου και λεγεται ακος ειναι λιθος τις, σονα λαμβανουσιν απο ταφου βασιλεως των αρχαιων, και εν οινω αποεαφαντες, πινουσι. "Of which the remedy is said to be a certain stone which they take from the sepulchre of a king of ancient times, and having *immersed* it in wine, drink." Here the virtue of the stone is supposed to be extracted by the wine in which it is *dipped*. They do not *sprinkle* the stone with wine, nor *pour* wine upon it, but they *dipped* the stone, and then drank the wine in which it was *dipped*. Even the unlearned reader can be at no loss with respect to the mode imported by the word in this process.

The same author applies the word αποεαφη to the immersion of animals in a pool of Sicily, which had the property of resuscitating

them when put into it after suffocation. What can be more satisfactory than this? If any thing can be more decisive, it is an example from the same author, in which he tells us, that it is the custom of some nations to *dip* their children, ἀποβαπτειν, into cold water, soon after birth, in order to harden them.

Herodotus decisively fixes the meaning of this word, when he applies it to the Scythian ceremony of dipping certain things in a mixture of blood and water, in concluding an alliance. “The Scythians, in concluding a league with any one, make it in the following manner. Having poured wine into an earthen vessel, they mingle with it the blood of the parties, making a slight incision in the body by a knife or a sword. After this, they dip into the vessel a scimiter, and arrows, a hatchet, and a javelin. When they have done this, they utter many imprecations; and they who make the league, with the most distinguished of the company, drink the mixture.” The phrase ἀπόβαψαντες ἐς τὴν κωλικά, can mean nothing but *dipping in the bowl*. *Pouring, sprinkling, washing, wetting*, and all other fancies, are entirely excluded.

The setting of a constellation is termed, by Aratus, *dipping*, βαπτων, *into the sea*. Is there any doubt with respect to mode in this example? When the sun, moon, and stars descend below our horizon, when we stand on the shore, they appear *to dip* in the sea. All nations speak in phraseology that imports this. We have some beautiful examples in Virgil.

The same author applies the word, just in our manner, to the setting sun. “If the sun *dips* himself, without a cloud, into the western sea.”

Again he says,—“If the crow dips, εβαψατο, his head into the river.” Can any one need a commentary to point out the mode imported by the word here?

“Constantine,” says Dr Gale, “observes, from an epigram of Hermolaus, ἐς ὑδατι κρωσσον εβαψε, *He dipped his pitcher in the water*. The mysterious Lycophron affords us an instance parallel to this, in Callimachus; *dipping*, βαψαντες, with strange and foreign buckets.” And again, to this may be added, what Aristotle says in his Mechanical Questions; “*The bucket must be first let down, or dipped, βαψαι, and then be drawn up again, viz. when it is full*.” Can any thing be supposed more specifically to express *dipping*, than βαπτω, in these instances?

Homer employs the word in the Odyssey, in a situation where the meaning cannot be doubted. He compares the hissing of the

eye of Polyphemus, when bored by a red-hot stake, to the hissing of the water when a smith dips his iron in order to temper it.

Ως δ' οτ' ἀνῆρ θάλακρος πέλεκυν μέγαν, ἠε σκεπαρνον,
 Ἐν ὕδατι ψυχρῷ βαπτῆ μεγάλα ἰαχοντα.

“ As when the smith an hatchet or large axe,
 Temp'ring with skill, *plunges* the hissing blade
 Deep in cold water. (Whence the strength of steel.)”

COWPER.

No one who has seen a horse shod, will be at a loss to know the mode of the application of water in this instance. The *immersion* of the newly formed shoe in water, in order to harden the metal, is expressed by the word *βαπτειν*. An instance of the same kind we have in the Apocryphal Book of Ecclesiasticus, where iron heated in the furnace, is said to be tempered, *εὐεαφη*, by immersion in water. The note of Didymus on the place is: το βαψαι ψυχρῷ τον πεπυρωμενον σιδερον ισχυρον γαρ αυτον ποιει. “ The dipping of red-hot iron in cold water hardens it.”

Anacreon, in his Ode on the Arrows of Cupid, represents them as forged by Vulcan, and *dipped* by Venus in honey, into which Cupid put a mixture of gall.

Ακιδας δ' εβαπτε Κυπρις,
 Μελι το γλυκυ λαβουσα·
 Ο δ' Ερωσ χολην εμισγε.

The manner of poisoning arrows by dipping their points in the poisonous matter, sufficiently explains this. Here we see, also, that this word applies to honey, and even to gall, to poisoning as well as to washing.

Herodotus, speaking of a custom of the Egyptians, employs this word in a sense entirely analogous to the use of *βαπτιζειν*, in the ordinance of baptism. He applies it to a ceremonial or religious purification of the person and garments, by immersion in a river after defilement. Ἦν δ' Αιγυπτιοι μιαζον ηγηνται θηριον ειναι και τουτο μεν, ην τις ψαυση αυτων παριων υος, αυτοισι τοισι ιματιοις απιων εβαψε εαυτον, βας ες τον ποταμον. “ The Egyptians consider the swine so polluted a beast, that if any one in passing touch a swine, he will go away and *dip* himself with his very garments, going into the river.” Here is a religious baptism, for the purpose of cleansing from defilement; and it is by immersion, expressed by *βαπτειν*. Can any one require a

more definite example? The person dips himself; therefore it is βαπτω, not βαπτίζω. All the occurrences of the word in the Septuagint, are confirmatory of this view of its meaning.

Ληψθε δε δεσμην υσσωπου, και βαφαντες απο του αιματος του παρα την θυραν. Ex. xii. 22. "And ye shall take a bunch of hyssop, and dipping it in the blood which is at the door," &c. This surely is not *washing*: it is *smearing*. It is not pouring or sprinkling; but dipping.

Lev. iv. 6. Και βαψει ο ιερευς τον δακτυλον εις το αιμα, και προσβανει απο του αιματος. "And the priest shall *dip* his finger in the blood, and *sprinkle* of the blood," &c. Here we have the action both of *dipping* and *sprinkling*; and βαπτω applies to the former, while ρανω applies to the latter. Can any thing be more decisive than this?

Lev. iv. 17. Και βαψει ο ιερευς τον δακτυλον απο του αιματος του μοσχου, και ρανει. "And the priest shall *dip* his finger in the blood of the bullock, and *sprinkle* it," &c.

Lev. ix. 9. Και εβαψε τον δακτυλον εις το αιμα. "And he dipped his finger into the blood." He could not sprinkle or pour his finger *into* the blood.

Lev. xi. 32. Εις υδωρ βαφησεται. "It must be put into water." Literally, "It shall be dipped into water." This cannot admit even of plausible evasion.

Lev. xiv. 6. Και βαψει αυτα και το ορνιθιον το ζων εις το αιμα. "And shall dip them and the living bird in the blood," &c.

Dr Wall has asserted that the word βαψει here, cannot be understood dipping all over; *for the blood of the bird in the bason could not be enough to receive the living bird, and the cedar wood, and the scarlet, and the hyssop, all into it.* To this the answer of Dr Gale is perfectly satisfactory. The blood of the slain bird was received in a vessel of running water, in which mixture, as appears from verse 51, the things were to be dipped. It may be added, that this makes the figure have a beautiful allusion to the double efficacy of the blood of Jesus Christ. It washes as well as atones; and though this might be exhibited by separate dippings, yet the union is seen more clearly in the combination of blood and water. But that the word βαπτειν is employed when only a part of an object is dipped, is most freely admitted; and the same thing may be said of the very word *dip* itself. Thus we speak of dipping a pen in ink, when only the point of the pen is dipped. What would we say of the foreigner who should allege that the English word dip, when applied in the expression, *They dipped the man in the river*, does not necessarily imply that they dipped him all over; because he finds

from the expression, *dip a pen in ink*, it is applied sometimes when only a part is dipped? Yet grave doctors, when they criticize in a dead language, make themselves such fools! and their folly is concealed only by the circumstance, that the language is dead with respect to which they make their silly observations. Every person at all accustomed to philosophize on language, knows that such a figure is quite common; but that it never alters or affects the proper meaning of the word. The figure, in fact, is not in the verb, but in its regimen. In all such expressions, both βαπτω and *dip* have their proper and entire significations, and express mode, as fully as when there is no figure. The expression, *dip a pen*, determines mode as clearly as when the object is sunk to the bottom of the sea, never to arise. A writer must be perverse indeed, who indulges himself in such quibbles; yet some of the gravest and most learned writers have urged this objection. It must be observed, that Dr Wall, though he is a friend to infant baptism, is decidedly in favour of immersion. With respect to all such elliptical phrases, I observe, that they are used only about common operations, when the part to be dipped is so well known as to prevent obscurity. But granting to the authors of this objection all their demands, I hope we shall find them dipping at least a part of the body of the person baptized. It is strange to find Christians arguing that the word, though it signifies to immerse, may be applied when only a part is dipped; yet in their own practice, *dipping* neither in whole nor in part, but substituting *pouring* or *sprinkling* in its place.

Lev. xiv. 16. Και βαψει τον δακτυλον τον δεξιον απο του ελαιου. “That the priest shall dip his right finger in the oil that is in his left hand, and shall sprinkle of the oil with his finger seven times before the Lord.” Here, also, we see the characteristic distinction between *dipping* and *sprinkling*. The action of putting the oil on the finger, is expressed by βαπτω; that of applying it to the object, by ραινω. The word occurs again in the 51st verse, with reference to the same process as that described in verse 6.

Numb. xix. 18. Και ληψεται υσσωπον, και βαψει εις το υδωρ αυνη καθαρος, και περιρρανει επι τον οικον. “And a clean person shall take hyssop, and *dip* it in the water, and sprinkle it upon the house.”

Deut. xxxiii. 24. Βαψει εν ελαιω τον ποδα αυτου. “Let him *dip* his foot in oil.” Here the great abundance of oil is expressed, by representing the possessor as *dipping* his foot in it. The unlearned reader may perceive, that in all these instances the meaning of the word in question is so clear and definite, that even our translators,

who were no practical immersers, render it as we do. Can it then admit a doubt, that this is the proper rendering?

Josh. iii. 15. "And as they that bore the ark were come unto Jordan, and the feet of the priests that bare the ark, *εβαφησαν εις μερος του υδατος του Ιορδανου*, were *dipped* in the brim of the water."

Ruth ii. 14. *Βαψεις τον ψωμιον εν τω οξει*. "*Dip* thy morsel in the vinegar."

1 Sam. xiv. 27. "And Jonathan heard not when his father charged the people with the oath; wherefore he put forth the end of the rod that was in his hand, and *εβαψεν αυτο εις το κηριον του μελιτος*, dipped it in a honey-comb." Here the mode is most determinately fixed. He stretched forth his rod, and *dipping* the point of it, eat the honey off the rod.

2 Kings viii. 15. "And it came to pass, that on the morrow he took a thick cloth, and *dipped it in water*," *εβαψεν εν τω υδατι*.

Job ix. 31. What our translators render, "yet shalt thou plunge me in the ditch," &c. in the Greek is, *Ικανως εν ρυτω με εβαψας*, *Thou hast dipped me deeply in filth*. Here we not only have the mode signified by this word, but evidence that the word is as applicable when the object of *dipping* is to *defile*, as when the object is to *wash*. It denotes the mode only, without any reference to the intention with which it is used.

Psalm lxxviii. 23. *Οπως αν βαφη ο πους σου εν αιματι, η γλωσσα των κυνων σου εξ εχθρων παρ' αυτου*. "That thy feet may be *dipped* in the blood of thine enemies, and the tongue of thy dogs in the same." Here the person is supposed to wade through blood, to denote the greatest slaughter.

In 2 Mac. i. 21, the word is used to signify the drawing of water from a deep pit, (compare verse 19.) "He ordered them to draw," literally, *dip*.

The use of the word in the New Testament, is exactly the same as in the examples which have been quoted from other writers. Mat. xxiv. 23, has already been referred to. The same transaction is related Mark xiv. 20. "It is one of the twelve that dippeth with me in the dish," *ο εμβαπτομενος μετ' εμου εις το τρυβλιον*. John xiii. 26, relates the fact, omitting the circumstance that the betrayer was dipping with him in the dish, and giving a circumstance omitted by Matthew and Mark, namely, that Jesus pointed out the betrayer by giving him a sop, after he had dipped it. *Βαψας το ψωμιον επιδωσω*. *Και εμβαψας το ψωμιον*. The word here refers to the

dipping of the bread in the bitter sauce. Neither pouring nor sprinkling could have any place here.

Luke xvi. 24. "And he cried and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me; and send Lazarus, that he may *dip the tip of his finger in water*, and cool my tongue," *να βαψη το ακρον του δακτυλου αυτου υδατος.*

Rev. xix. 13. "And he was clothed with a vesture dipped in blood," *βεβαμμενον αιματι.*

The glorious Redeemer is here represented as going forth to the destruction of his enemies, and as an emblem of his work, he is figured as clothed with a vesture *dipped in blood*. This gives the most awful image of the approaching slaughter. Dr Gale, indeed, has alleged some reasons, to prove that we have not here the genuine reading. "The authority of Origen," says he, "whose writings are older than any copies of the Old Testament we can boast of, and therefore that he described from more ancient copies, must be more considerable than any we have. Now he, in his commentary on St John's Gospel, cites these words from ver. 11, to ver. 16, inclusively, almost verbatim as they are in our edition; but reads *εξσαντισμενον*, *sprinkled*, instead of *βεβαμμενον*; which makes this passage nothing to our purpose. However, I should not think this single authority of Origen sufficient to justify my altering the word; but I have likewise observed that the Syriac and Æthiopic versions, which, for their antiquity, must be thought almost as valuable and authentic as the original itself, being made from primitive copies, in or very near the times of the Apostles, and rendering the passage by words which signify to sprinkle, must greatly confirm Origen's reading of the place, and very strongly argue, that he has preserved the very same word which was in the autograph." These reasons, however, do not in the least bring the common reading into suspicion in my mind, and I will never adopt a reading to serve a purpose. Misapprehension of the meaning of the passage, it is much more likely, has substituted *εξσαντισμενο* for *βεβαμμενον*. The warrior is represented as going out, and not as returning, and the garment is emblematically dyed to represent his work before it was begun. Dr Cox's reply to Mr Ewing's observations on this verse, is a triumphant refutation of the objection which misconception has founded on this passage, and must silence it for ever. "The following reference," says Dr Cox, "is very triumphantly adduced: 'And he was clothed in a vesture *dipped in blood*,'—properly, it is alleged, 'a vesture *bespattered, sprinkled,*

spotted, or stained with blood. ‘In this case, evidently, the vesture was not *popped* into the blood, but the blood was *popped* upon the garment, and thus it was *bespattered* with blood,’ &c.

“If any thing is *evident* here, it is that Mr Ewing has mistaken the sense, and unwillingly produced a quotation most unequivocally in our favour. The illustrious person described is the WORD, or SON of GOD, under the image of a conqueror seated upon a white horse, *going forth* to a mighty conflict, followed by the armies of heaven! It is not the representation of a conqueror *returned* from battle, with his garments supposed to be *bespattered* or *stained* with the blood of his vanquished foes; but of one *going forth* to the war. A sharp sword issues out of his mouth, that with it he should smite the nations; *ἵνα ἐν αὐτῇ πατασῆ το εἶθνη*. But it may be demanded, is it not incongruous to represent his vesture as *stained* or *bespattered*, as dyed in the blood of his enemies before he has engaged in the conflict? The answer is, it does not in reality, though it is so commonly understood, refer to the blood of foes *splashed* in mortal strife upon the garment of the conqueror; it simply contains an emblematical representation of Christ, under the figure of a general, commencing some great expedition, clothed in the splendid vestment which was usual on such occasions. The name given to it by the Roman writers, is *Paludamentum*. It was the distinguishing robe of the general, and was usually of a purple, or scarlet colour. As the *prætexta*, or white robe, worn by the chief magistrate, constituted the usual domestic badge of honour; so the *Paludamentum* distinguished the hero when he marched to battle. ‘*Quibus erat,*’ says Pliny, ‘*moris paludamento mutare prætextam.*’ A vesture dyed in blood, was, therefore, a vesture of a red or purple colour, to express the military character of the expedition; as, even to the present day, a peculiar dress, of a vivid and sanguinary hue, is worn by those who are devoted to war. What then becomes of our author’s *bepopped* or *besprinkled* vesture? It is found only in his own imagination.”

Before I proceed farther, I shall advert to some examples in which *βαπτω* has been supposed to signify to *wash*; but in all of which it retains its own peculiar meaning.

Aristophanes applies the word to the cleansing of wool in warm water; must not *wash* or *cleanse*, then, be one of its meanings? By no means. Let us examine his words: *πρῶτα μὲν γὰρ τ’ εἰς ἕλαιον βαπτουσι θερμῶν κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον νόμον*. “First they dip the wool in warm water according to ancient custom.” What is asserted, is

that they *dip*, or *immerse*, or *plunge* the wool into warm water. *Washing* is the consequence of the operation, but is not the thing expressed by the verb. It might be rendered by *wash* in a free translation; but this would be to give the sense, not an exact version of the words. Had he used the word *πλυνω*, then the *washing* would have been expressed, and the *dipping* would have been necessarily supposed. Both these words might be used for the same thing in many situations; still each of them would have its peculiar meaning. Accordingly Suidas and Phavorinus interpret βαπτουσι here by πλυνουσι. It argues very shallow philosophy, however, to suppose, that on this account the words are perfectly synonymous. We could, even in our own language, say indifferently, that *sheep are dipped in the river before they are shorn*, or *sheep are washed in the river before they are shorn*, yet this does not make *dip* and *wash* synonymous in our language. Words may be so far equivalent, as in certain situations, to be equally fitted to fill the same place, when each continues even in such situations to have its characteristic meaning. Ignorance of this important principle in the application of words, has led writers into the greatest absurdities, in determining the meaning of terms in a dead language. Whenever they find one word used in explanation of another, or where another would serve the purpose, they think the words are synonymous. This is a false first principle, and all reasonings founded on it must be unsound. Yet this is the most plausible argument that Dr Wall and others can find to prove that βαπτω signifies to *wash*. Suidas and Phavorinus explain it by πλυνω, therefore it must signify to *wash*. To convince the unlearned reader of the fallacy of this principle, let him open an English dictionary, and try if all the words given in explanation are strictly synonymous with those which they are used to explain. Yet on this principle, it is supposed to be irresistibly evident, that βαπτω signifies to *wash*, because baptism is referred to in the expression, “having your bodies washed with pure water,” Heb. x. 22. When a person is *dipped* in pure water, he is *washed*, still *dipping* and *washing* are two different things. Baptism is a *washing*, not from the meaning of the word itself, for as far as that is concerned, it might be a defilement; but because it is *an immersion in pure water*.

The passage from Herodotus, in which he represents swine as an abomination to the Egyptians, coincides entirely with this doctrine. If an Egyptian touches a swine, he runs immediately to the river and dips himself. That he dips himself, is the thing express-

ed; but as the purpose of the dipping is cleansing, or religious washing, the same fact might be substantially reported by saying, that *he washed, or cleansed, or purified, or bathed himself in the river.* Yet βαπτω no more signifies to *wash* or *purify* here, than it does in the translation of the LXX. with respect to Job, when applied to plunging in filth. The word has here its own peculiar meaning, and makes not the smallest intrusion into the province of λουω. Mr Ewing's remark on this passage is truly surprising. The Egyptian, it seems, performed this operation on himself, but the Christian is baptized by another. And can Mr Ewing really think that this is any thing to the purpose? Was it ever supposed that it is from the verb βαπτω that we are to learn whether a believer is to dip himself, or to be dipped by another in the ordinance of baptism? It is enough that the word informs of the mode: other things must be learned from their proper sources. From Herodotus, in the story of the Egyptian, we may learn the meaning of the word; but from Scripture, we must learn whether the operation is to be performed to the believer by himself, or by another. Was ever any thing so unreasonable, as to expect a perfect coincidence between an ordinance of Christ, and a superstitious custom of heathens? The meaning of the word is quite unaffected, whether the person dips himself or is dipped by another. Does Mr Ewing doubt whether βαπτω can apply when the operation respects a thing different from the agent? This cannot be his meaning, for almost all the examples of its use refer to such cases. Does he mean, that among the innumerable things which are said to be dipped, as expressed by βαπτω, a human being is not to be found, except in the case of one performing the operation for himself? If this is his meaning, it is not to the purpose; for though an example could not be found in which one person is said to dip another, the command of Christ warrants the practice, and the word βαπτω will apply to one thing as well as another. But, as Dr Cox has observed, there is an example in the case of the drowning of Aristobulus, which we shall afterwards consider. And we have already seen an example in the Scythian custom of immersing their new-born infants. But I will never consent that any such example is necessary. The demand is founded on a false principle of criticism. A passage from the Hymns of Callimachus, in which this word is misunderstood by some, is set in its proper light by Dr Gale. "My opinion," says he, "is confirmed also by Callimachus, in his hymns, when he says: 'Ye Grecian watermen,

(they furnished private houses with water, as some do among us) dip not your vessels in the river Inachus to-day.' The hymn was made on the solemnizing the festival of washing the statue of Pallas; which ceremony was performed by persons set apart for that purpose, in the river Inachus, a little before day; from this river the inhabitants were usually supplied with water, which makes the poet, in veneration to the goddess, charge the watermen here not to dip their pitchers in the river on that day."

This, however, is of importance, rather for the understanding of the poet, than for ascertaining the meaning of the word in question. For whether the purpose of the watermen was to wash their pitchers by *dipping* them, or to fill them by *dipping* them, *dipping* is the only thing expressed by the word βαπτω.

In Dan. iv. 30, and v. 21, this word is rendered by *wet* in our version, which may seem an insuperable objection to the uniformity of its signification of mode. This instance is thought to support their opinion, who assert that βαπτω is a generic word, denoting the bringing of any thing into a state of wetness. But there is here no exception to the peculiar meaning of the word. The term *wet* gives the general sense of the passage well enough, but is by no means a translation of the word in the original, nor of that employed by the Septuagint. It ought to have been rendered according to the usual modal meaning, which, instead of being harsh, would have found corresponding expressions in all languages. By employing a general word, our translators in this instance have lost the peculiar beauty of the original, without in the least adding to the perspicuity. The words of the Septuagint are, *απο της δεξου του ουρανου το σωμα αυτον εβαφη*. "His body was *immersed* in the dew." In the translation, "His body was *wet* with the dew," the general effect is the same, but the eloquence of expression has evaporated. But a soul-less critic will reply, "there was here no literal immersion; the word cannot then be used in that sense." Were we to pass through the poets, conforming their language to this observation, what havoc should we make of their beauties! How dull and lifeless would become their animated expressions! I have seen no explication of this passage that appears to develop the principle of this application, though the general sense of the passage is well enough understood. As the theory of generic meaning in βαπτω, including every application of water without reference to mode, has no other plausible foundation but the common version of this pas-

sage, it will be of importance to settle the question, though it should occupy some pages.

Dr Gale affords us many materials to prove, that the word has here its ordinary sense ; but I think he fails in his attempt to analyse the expression. His observations on the copiousness of the eastern dews are much to the purpose ; a part of which I shall transcribe. “ Philosophically speaking,” says he, “ the hottest climates and clearest skies naturally abound most with dew, which is also confirmed by constant experience. It is commonly known to be so in her Majesty’s Leeward Islands in America,—where one season of the year, when they have no rains for a considerable time together, the fruits of the earth would be burned up, were it not for the dews that fall plentifully in the night. That incomparable mathematician, Captain Halley, observed, when making some experiments in St Helena, that the dews fell in such abundance as to make his paper too wet to write on, and his glasses unfit for use without frequent wiping. And as to Africa, in particular, where part of Nebuchadnezzar’s dominions lay, Pliny tells us, the nights were very dewy. Egypt has little or no rain ; but is fed by the overflowing of the Nile, and by constant nocturnal dews ; and Nebuchadnezzar kept his court in a country of near the same latitude, and consequently of the like temperament.”

This is very useful as a ground-work for the analysis of the expression ; but it does not in the least give a reason why a *wetting* with a copious fall of dew is called an *immersion*. Had this monarch been wet even by a shower-bath, why is his *wetting* called a *dipping* ? If all the water in the ocean had fallen on him, it would not have been a literal *immersion*. The words would still be wanting. Our opponents, if they know their business, may admit this, and still deny the consequence which this writer draws from it. Nor does this gentleman succeed better in analysing the expression. “ Hence it appears very clear,” says he, “ that both Daniel and his translators designed to express the great dew Nebuchadnezzar should be exposed to, more emphatically, by saying, he should lie in dew, and be covered with it all over, as if he had been dipped ; for that is so much like being dipped, as at most to differ no more than being in, and being put in, so that the metaphor is easy, and not at all strained.” But Daniel does not say that Nebuchadnezzar *should lie in dew, and be covered with it all over*. Had this been his expression, it would have been quite literal. Dr Gale absurdly supposes that βαπτω means to cover with water without reference to

mode, and at the same time metaphorically alludes to *dipping*. Neither Daniel nor his translators say that Nebuchadnezzar should be as wet as if he were dipped; for if that had been the expression, there could have been no dispute about it.

Dr Cox's reply to Mr Ewing, with respect to the analysis of this expression, appears to me not quite satisfactory. "It was," says Mr Ewing, "*popped upon*, not even by *effusion*, but by the gentlest *distillation* that is known in nature." "To this it has been generally replied," says Dr Cox, "and I think satisfactorily, that a body exposed to eastern dews, would be as wet as if plunged into water." Now, this is valid, as proving that the body ought to be completely *wetted* in Baptism; but it leaves the mode unaccounted for. Mr Ewing might grant this, yet still insist from this passage, that mode is not contained in the word. Many persons do plead for a copious effusion of water in Baptism; and they might yield to the above reasoning, still contending that the mode is not essential, or that it is not *immersion*. The most complete wetting by dew or rain is not *dipping* literally. If we will fairly meet this passage, we must shew, not merely that Nebuchadnezzar was completely wetted, but that a wetting in one mode may be figuratively designated by the words that properly denote a wetting in another mode. I will not hide one particle of the strength of our opponent's cause, nor an apparent weakness in our own. Let Christianity itself sink, rather than use one insufficient argument.

Dr Cox continues: "The passage, however, merits a little more detailed explanation. The verb is used in the passive voice, in the second aorist, and the indicative mood, implying consequently that the action was past, and indefinite as to time." It does not seem to me, that the voice, tense, and mood of the verb, have any concern in this debate. In all voices, tenses, and moods, a verb must have its characteristic meaning. "It does not," continues Dr Cox, "imply the *manner* in which the effect was produced, but *the effect itself*; not the mode by which the body of the king was wetted, but its *condition*, as resulting from exposure to the dew of heaven." Without doubt, the verb expresses mode here as well as any where else. To suppose the contrary gives up the point at issue, as far as mode is concerned. This in fact makes βαπτω signify simply *to wet*, without reference to mode.

Dr Cox gives an illustration, but unfortunately it can give no relief, as it fails in an essential point of similarity. "Suppose,"

says he, “ by way of illustration, we select another word, and put it into the same voice and tense ; as ἐβλάσθη ὑπο σου, “ he was heard by you.” It is obvious that this representation might refer to an injury done long ago, and would predicate nothing of the *manner* in which it was inflicted,” &c. Very true. Nothing of *manner* is here expressed, and for an obvious reason, *nothing of manner* is expressed by the verb βλάπτω. But will Dr Cox grant that this is the case with the verb βαπτω ? If he does, about what is he contending ? βαπτω not only necessarily implies mode, but literally expresses nothing but mode. Instead of literally denoting *wetting* in any manner, it does not literally include *wetting* at all. This is as true in this passage, as it is in any other. Mode is as much expressed here, as it is in the commission of our Lord to the Apostles. The difference is, that the thing that is here called an immersion, was so only figuratively. I claim this passage as much as I do the plainest example in the New Testament.

That the word in question ought here, as in all other places, to be rendered *immerse*, is necessary from the following reasons :

1. It is utterly unwarrantable to give a meaning to the word which it cannot be shewn to have in some unquestionable examples. To assign a meaning not so justified, is to reason without first principles—to build without a foundation. This suits the visionary, but can never be the resource of true criticism. Now, the whole history of the word does not afford a single example in which it must signify to *wet*. Whatever, then, may be the principle on which this *wetting* of Nebuchadnezzar is called *immersion*, *immersion* it is called.

2. This is confirmed, as Dr Cox has observed, by the original. The word in the original signifies to *dip* ; if so, why should not the Greek word by which it is translated have its own peculiar meaning ? How can mode be excluded, if it is in both the original and the translation ?

On this point Dr Gale is quite satisfactory. “ The word here used in the original,” says he, “ is יצטבע, which in the Chaldee necessarily implies *dipping*, witness Buxtorf, Castell, &c. and above all, the constant use of the word. It is by this word the Jerusalem Targum renders the Hebrew טבל, Levit. iv. 6,—the only place where that imperfect version translates the Hebrew word ; but had it been complete, we should probably have had more examples.

“ In other places where the word is used, though not to tran-

slate טבל, it is always in the same sense, signifying to *immerse* or *drown*; as Exod. xv. 4, in which place the Jerusalem Targum, Jonathan's Paraphrase, and that called Onkelos, the Syriac version, and the original of Moses, do all use טבע or טמע, to signify *immerse*, *plunge*, or *drown*, as our version renders it; but I suppose it will not be questioned, otherwise I would attempt more largely to prove, this word does always signify *to dip*." Let the philosophy of the application, then, be what it may, the word βαπτω in this passage, must have its own peculiar meaning.

3. The Syriac version, as Dr Gale remarks, renders the original in the same manner as the LXX. "The authors of the ancient and valuable Syriac version," says he, "who were of the neighbourhood of Babylon, and well enough acquainted with the large dews in these parts, and endeavoured to give an exact literal translation, have shunned this error." If, then, the Syriac translators have rendered the original by a term that signifies *to dip*, why should not βαπτω in the translation of the LXX. have the same meaning? To me the reasoning of Dr Gale is entirely satisfactory.

4. The expression is intelligible and beautiful in our own language, and, I have no doubt, might be exemplified in all languages. Alluding to the flood, we might say, that God *immersed the world in water*; or of a rock when covered by the tide, that it is *immersed in the sea*. Do we not every day hear similar phraseology? The man who has been exposed to a summer-plump, will say that he has got a complete *dipping*. This is the very expression of Daniel. One mode of wetting is figured as another mode of wetting, by the liveliness of the imagination. The same figure meets us almost in every page of the poets. Virgil will supply us with instances in abundance:—

"Postquam collapsi cineres, et flamma quievit;
Reliquias vino et bibulam lavêre favillam."

They washed the relics, and the warm spark, in wine.

Who *washes* ashes, and bones, and embers? On the principle of Mr Ewing's criticism, we might, from this passage of Virgil, deny that *lavo* properly signifies to *wash*, and assert that it denotes to *drench*, to *quench*, to *wet*, to *moisten*, &c. What avails it then, to tell us that Nebuchadnezzar was *wet* with the gentlest distillation in nature? The effect of that gentle operation may be so like that of another more violent operation, that the language of the imagination may designate the more gentle by the characteristic denomi-

nation of the more violent. A *wetting* by dew, may, in the language of animation, be called a *dipping*. Language violates the laws of natural philosophy, as well as of logic, without scruple; or rather it does not at all own subjection to them. It owes allegiance only to the laws of mind. Things most absurd, if explained according to the laws of natural philosophy, and most untrue, according to the laws of logic, are true and beautiful when tried by their proper standard. Why did Virgil make such an application of the word *lavo* here? Was it for lack of proper terms to express his ideas? Of these he had abundance. Was it to deceive or puzzle? Neither; for his meaning appears at a glance. He uses *lavo* for the same reason that the Holy Spirit, by Daniel, used the word signifying to immerse, when speaking of the wetting of Nebuchadnezzar by the dew, to enliven the style. Every reader must observe that much of the beauty of this passage in Virgil is owing to the use of the word *lavo* in this figurative catachrestic sense. Literal accuracy would have been comparatively tame. And had not the word βαπτω been a term whose meaning affects religious practice, the above expression of Daniel and the Septuagint, instead of tormenting commentators and controversialists, would have been admired as a beauty in composition. "Wetting by the gentlest distillation in nature," would the critic say, "is here in the most lively and imaginative language, figured as an *immersion*." But what is an elegance in the classics, is a ground of never-ending quibble to theologians, who, instead of seeking the laws of language in the human mind, subject the words of the Spirit to the laws of logical truth. No doubt, were Virgil of authority in religion, and were rites and ceremonies to be determined by his writings, the above expression would have been as variously interpreted as that in Daniel. Many a time we would hear, that *lavo*, from this example, does not signify to wash, but to *wet*, to *moisten*, to *drench*.

Virgil affords us another example in the same word:

Illi alternantes multa vi praelia miscent
Vulneribus crebris: *lavit* ater corpora sanguis.

In the encounter of the two bulls, *the black blood washes their bodies*. Here it might be said, in the spirit of Mr Ewing's criticism, the black blood could not wash; nay, it would defile the bodies of the contending animals. *Lavo*, then, cannot signify to *wash*, but to *smear*. But every one must see that the word *lavo* has here its peculiar signification, and that the whole beauty of the expres-

sion depends on this circumstance. Every man who has a soul at all, knows well that *lavo* is here much more beautiful, than if the poet had chosen a term literally signifying to smear. That which was a real *defilement* is called a *washing*, to express figuratively the copiousness of the blood that flowed from the mutual wounds of the contending bulls. This gives a feast to the imagination, where literal expression would afford no food. *Audire habenas*, to hear the reins, signifying to *obey the bridle*, is an expression of the same kind. Indeed, it is impossible to open the poets without being presented with examples of this phraseology.

Having examined those examples in which this word has been supposed to signify to *wash* or to *wet*, but in each of which it is to be explained according to its characteristic meaning, I shall now proceed with other examples. The word occurs, as might be expected, very frequently in the writings of Hippocrates. And as, in medical use, there is occasion to refer repeatedly to every mode of the application of liquids, in the voluminous writings of this great physician, there can be no doubt but we will find the characteristic meaning of βαπτω. Accordingly, we do find it in numerous instances; and in all these, I do not recollect any but one, in which it has not the sense of *dip*. In that one, it signifies *to dye*, according to its secondary import.

The first occurrence of it which I have observed in this author, is in his treatise *De Superfoet.* p. 50. edit. Basil. Βαπτειν δε τας μηλας, εν ενι των μαλθακτηριων διειμενω. “Dip the probes in some emollient.”

At the bottom of the next page, we have another example. βαψασα δε το ρακος εν μυρω λευκω αιγυπτιω ευωδει. “Dipping the rag in white sweet-smelling Egyptian ointment.”

In the treatise *De Victus Ratione*, p. 104, the following example occurs: εγκρυφιαι, θερμαι ες οινον αυτηρον εμβαπτομενοι. “Let the food be cakes *dipped* hot in sour wine.”

In the treatise *De Usu Humidorum*, we have the following example:

Ειρια δε οσα μεν ψυξις ειδικα, η καταχειται, η ενιεται, η ενβαπτηται ως υδαρ ψυχρωτατον. “But for the sake of cooling the wound, wool is either sprinkled with the sour wine, or put into it, or it may be *dipped* into the coldest water.”

In continuation from the last words, the following immediately succeed: οσα δε ψυξις, ομελας οινος και ειρια καταρῆναι. οινον και φυλλα τευ

τλιων, η οθονια βαπτεται επι τα πλεισα. p. 113. “As a cooler, black wine is sprinkled on wool, whereas beet-leaves and linen are for the most part *dipped*.”

In the treatise De Morbis, we have the following examples : και προς την κεφαλην σπογγους εν υδατι βαπτων θερμω, προστιθεναι, Lib. xi. p. 145. “Dipping sponges in warm water, apply them to the head.”

In the next page, at top, we have the following example : εξωθεν δε σπογγους βαπτων ες υδαρ θερμον, προστιθεσθω προς τας γναθους και τα σιαγονια. “As an external application, dipping sponges into warm water, let them be applied to the cheeks and jaws.” A similar example occurs near the top of the next page ; σπογγον ες υδαρ θερμον εμζαπτων, προστιθεναι. “Dipping a sponge into warm water, apply it.” Page 149. σκοροδα διδου, ες μελι βαπτων. “Give garlic, *dipping* it into honey.”

In page 151, we have the following example : ζωμον δε μη ροφειτω, μη δε βαπτεσθαι. “Let him not sup soup, nor even dip his bread into it.” In the Appendix to Mr Ewing’s Essay on Baptism, written by a friend, we find a very odd view of this passage. I shall quote his observations at large. “Hippocrates (de Morb. lib. ii.) uses βαπτεσθαι to denote the application of a liquid to the skin ; Ζωμος δε μη φορειτω μη δε βαπτεσθαι, “neither sip, nor *pour* (or sprinkle) broth ;” using βαπτεσθαι in this sense, I suppose, from the idea that the application of the liquid would strongly affect the place to which the application was made ; at all events, it would require no small ingenuity to discover in this passage the idea of immersion.” In this criticism there is a complication of errors and false principles. 1. Why does the author translate βαπτεσθαι by *pour* or *sprinkle* ? Is there one instance in which it confessedly must have this meaning in the whole compass of Greek literature ? If not, to apply such a meaning in any particular emergency is to reason without first principles. 2. If the author read the whole of the works of Hippocrates, as I am convinced he did, must he not have found a multitude of examples in which the word βαπτω unquestionably has the meaning *dip* ? He would reply, no doubt, such a meaning could not apply here. But even if he could not find any view in which the usual meaning of the verb could apply in this instance, would it not have been more candid to grant the usual signification of the word, and confess a difficulty, than to assign a meaning altogether at random, without a shadow of authority either from the word or the context ? 3. How

does he bring the *skin* of the patient into requisition in this place? Where does he find this? Neither in the expression, nor in any usual ellipsis. He might as well have supposed the feet or the head.

4. Is it a fact that broth or soup would have such a mischievous effect on the skin? The solution of this surpasses my medical knowledge.

5. It requires no ingenuity to find here the proper meaning of the word βαπτισθαι, as importing to *dip*. It is well known that at table the ancients dipped their bread into the soup, or other liquid which they used as a seasoning. What then can be so natural as to fill up the ellipsis with the bread which was dipped? An ellipsis of the regimen in things so common was quite usual. The evangelist uses the same ellipsis, where he says, "he that dippeth with me in the dish," that is, he that dippeth *his hand* with me in the dish, as another evangelist expresses it; or "he that dippeth *his bread* with me," might, with equal propriety, be supplied as the supplemental matter.

6. The elliptical matter must be supplied by the connection. In an ellipsis we are never left to wander abroad to look for the thing that is wanting. It is always omitted, because it is so obvious that it cannot be missed. This is the principle on which ellipsis is used, and on no other is it justifiable. Were it otherwise, all language would consist of riddles. This is the reason why ellipsis is so common in conversation, and about the most common things. What is omitted, is omitted, because every hearer will instantly supply it. We say of a man, that he is a great *drinker*—drinker of what? Drinker of water? No. Drinker of milk? No. But without the smallest hesitation, we understand it to be *drinker of ardent spirits*. Just so in the present passage. The elliptical matter must be supplied from the connection, and this leaves no doubt what it is. The writer was giving direction about the food of his patient. In the words immediately preceding, he prescribed boiled mutton, fowl, gourd, and beet. In the passage quoted, he forbids him to eat broth, or even to *dip*—dip what? *Dip* his bread in the broth. What else could he mean? In this view, the passage has a natural and a rational meaning. In some cases, a patient might be forbidden to partake freely of broth, when he might be permitted to season his morsel by dipping it in the savoury liquid. But in this case, it seems, even this indulgence was not permitted. But upon what principle could the skin of the patient be supplied as the supplemental matter? It is not in the connection, and is as arbitrary as if we should supply the *coat* of the patient. It may be

added, that in the immediately succeeding connection, the patient is permitted to eat fish. The whole passage speaks of diet. 7.¶ Whatever is forbidden in a medical prescription, must be a thing that is likely to be done, if not forbidden. No physician would act so absurdly as to prohibit what there is no probability his patient would do. Now, there was no probability that the patient here would sprinkle broth on his skin, had the physician been silent on the subject. I never heard of any such custom, and against even accidental sprinkling he was sufficiently guarded, by the circumstance that he was not permitted to use the fluid as food. There was surely no danger of sprinkling his skin with broth, if he was not permitted to eat broth. This gloss is one of the wildest that I ever met.

The word occurs again in the same book, p. 153. βαπτων ες υδαρ, επι τα στεθεα και τον νωτον επιτιθεναι. “*Dipping* linen rags (ρακια ημιτυσειου) into water, apply them to the breast and back.”

Lib. iii. p. 163. πομφολυγος γαρ υποπελιδνου γινομενης επι της γλωσσης, οια σιδηριου βαφεντος εις ελαιον. “A livid blister rising on the tongue, as of iron *dipped* into oil.”

P. 164. ες την ερετριδα γην υγρην, και λιην τετριμμενον και χλιαρην, επιδαφας οθονιον λεπτον περικαλυψαι κυκλω τον θωρηκα. “Having *dipped* a piece of fine linen into moist Eretrian earth, well pounded, and warm, cover the breast round with it.”

In the treatise De Internarum Partium Affectibus, we have the following examples from the same author:—

P. 193. εν υδατι ψυχρω βαπτων σευτλα και τω σωματι επιτιθεις, μαλιζα προς πονον νεον, η ρακια βαπτων εν ψυχρω υδατι και εκθλιζων προσιθεναι. “*Dipping* beet in cold water, apply it to the body, especially to a new pain; or *dipping* rags in cold water, after ringing out the water, apply them.”

In the same page we have another example: τρωγετω δε και της οριγανου της απαλης, ως πλεισον ες μελι αποβαπτων. “Let him eat green marjoram, for the most part *dipping* it into honey.”

P. 199. Having prescribed a variety of things to be eaten by his patient, he adds: ως ξηροτατοι μεν ουτοι μαλιζα εισι. και ες τον ζωμον μη εμβαπτεισθαι. “These are of a very dry nature; and let him not *dip* them into the broth.” This passage is a decisive commentary on the ellipsis which Mr Ewing’s friend has so strangely misunderstood. The different kinds of food here mentioned, are prescribed on account of the quality of dryness, and the patient is expressly forbidden to *dip* them in the soup or broth, as was usual. He is

not forbidden to *sprinkle* his skin with broth, which no man ever thought of doing; but he is forbidden, in the eating of the things prescribed, to *dip* them in the soup, which he was likely to do, had he not been forbidden.

P. 202. Καυσαι δε εν πυξινοισιν ατρακτοισι, βαπτων ες ελαιον ζεον. “Burn it with spindles of box-wood, *dipping* them into boiling oil.”

P. 203. ραφανιδι χρεεσθω. και σελινω, ες οξος βαπτων. “Let him use radish and parsley, dipping them into vinegar.”

In the treatise De Natura Muliebri, p. 119. ροδινον μυρον εμβαπτουσα, “*Dipping* (the flies) into the oil of roses.”

P. 226. εν χυτρηδιω, ειριον ως μαλθακαωτατεν εμβαπτων. “*Dipping* the softest wool in a pipkin.”

P. 228. αποβαπτων ες οπον συκης. “*Dipping* the balls (βαλανους) into the juice of the fig-tree.”

P. 231. εμβαψαι ες αλειφα λευκον αιγυπτιον. “*Dipping* (the plaster) into white Egyptian oil.”

In the treatise De Morb. Mul. the following examples occur :

P. 249. λαβων σπογγον, η ειριον μαλθακον βαπτων ες θερμον υδαρ. “Taking a sponge, or *dipping* soft wool into warm water.” And in the next line : ειτα ες οινον ακρητον εμβαπτων παλιν τον σπογγον η το ειριον. “Then *dipping* again the sponge, or the wool, into pure wine.”

P. 250. Speaking of a number of things boiled together, he says : ειτα ειριον εις τουτο βαπτων. “Then *dipping* wool into this.”

P. 254. Speaking of a certain mixture, he says : επειτα βαψας ες αλειφα ροδινον, η αιγυπτιον, προσθεσθω την ημηρην. “After this, having *dipped* it into the oil of roses, or Egyptian oil, let it be applied during the day.” In the same page, we have another example : μετα δε το δειπνον, φαγουσα κρομμυα εμβαπτουσα ες μελι. “After supper, let her eat onions, *dipping* them into honey.”

P. 257. When a blister is too painful to the patient, he orders it to be taken away; and ες ροδινον ειριον αποβαπτουσα προσθεσθω, “*dipping* wool into the oil of roses, let her apply it.”

P. 258. Νιτρον εψησας ζυν ρητινη και ποιησας βαλανον βαπτων ες ορνιθος εσαρ προστιθει. “Having boiled nitre with rosin, and forming them into a ball, *dipping* it into the fat of a fowl, apply it.”

P. 261. εμβαψας ες αλειφα λευκον αιγυπτιον. “*Dipping* the ball (βαλανον) into white Egyptian oil.”

Κικιδα εν μελιτι. η χολην ταυρου, ες αιγυπτιον ελαιον βαψασα προστιθεσθω. “Having *dipped* nut-gall into honey, or the gall of a bull into Egyptian oil, let it be applied.” Ib.

βαλανον ποιειν ευμηκεια, και βαπτων ες ελαιον λευκον. “ Mak^e an oval ball, and *dip* it into white oil.” Ib.

P. 262. επειτα ρακος περιθειναι λεπτον εν ειρω βαψασα αλειφα αιγυπτιον. “ Then put a fine rag about it, in wool, *dipping* it into Egyptian oil.” ες λευκον αλειφα αιγυπτιον βαπτων. “ *Dipping* (the thing prescribed) into white Egyptian oil.” Ib.

P. 263. χαλβανης οσον ελαιην ενελιζας ες οδονιον κεδρινον εμψαψασα. “ Having rolled a bit of galbanum the size of an olive into a piece of linen, and having *dipped* it into cedar-oil.”

P. 264. Having prescribed different kinds of flesh to his patient, he directs, μηδενι πεπερι πεποιημενον ες οξος εμψαπτων. “ Cooked without pepper, *dipping* it into vinegar.”

P. 269. Speaking of wool rolled round a quill: βαψαι, η λευκω, &c. “ *Dip* it either in white oil, or,” &c. And within a few lines: η πτερον οξει βαψαι. “ *Dip* the feather in vinegar.”

P. 273. το μολυεδιον αποψαψαι ες υδωρ ψυχρον. “ *Dip* the leaden instrument into cold water.”

P. 279. ελαφου δε στεαρ προστιθεσθα τηκτον εμψαπτων μαλθακον ειριον. “ Apply the fat of the deer, melted, *dipping* soft wool into it.”

P. 279. ειριον ες μυρον αποψαπτουσα. “ *Dipping* wool into ointment.”

P. 280. τουτο εμπλασαι εις ειριον μαλακον καθαρον, και εμψαψατω εν λευκω ελαιω αιγυπτιω. “ Put this mixture into clean soft wool, and let her *dip* it in white Egyptian oil.”

P. 284. βαπτουσα δε το πινωδες ειριον εν μελιτι. “ *Dipping* the unscoured wool in honey.”

P. 288. βαλανον ποιειν, και εμψαπτειν ες τι των υγρων. “ Form it into a ball, and *dip* it into some liquid.”

χολην ταυρον τριπτην περιπλασσειν πτερω και ες αλειφα εμψαψας αιγυπτιον, προστιθεναι. “ Roll around a quill, the gall of a bull, rubbed; and *dipping* it into Egyptian oil, apply it.”

η κυκλαμνον οσον ασφαγαλον συν χαλκου ανθει, η ανεμωνης κεφαλην, τριψας συν αλητω, πτερω περιπλασσειν ες λευκον ειριον εμψαπτουσαι. “ Or cyclaminus, the size of a die, with the flower of brass; or a head of anemone, bruising it with meal, and putting the mixture into white wool, around a quill, *dip* it,” as directed above. For ειριον, some read ελαιον; *dip it into white oil: oleo albo intingito.*

P. 289. Λινου το σχιστον αυτη τη καλαμη οσον δραχμην κοψας λεπτα, καταερεξαι εν οινω λευκω ως ηδιστω την νυκτα, επειτα απηθησας διαχλαινας τε εν ειρω ως μαλθακωτατω εμψαπτειν. “ Having pounded finely a drachm of the fibres of flax with the stalks, steep them thoroughly for the night in the sweetest white wine; then, having strained and warmed

it, *dip* the softest wool in it." Literally, *dip in it with the softest wool*; just as we might say, *dip the liquor with the wool*, instead of dip the wool in the liquor.

P. 290. *συμυρην και ρητινην ομου μιξας, και διεις εν οινω, οθονιον εμβαπτων, προστιθεναι*: "Mixing myrrh and rosin together, and putting them in wine, dip a piece of linen in the mixture, and apply it."

De Steril. p. 292. *βαπτειν δε και την μηλην εν τω μαλθακτηριω*: "*Dip* the probe in the unguent."

P. 293. *φρησαντα βαλανιον ειρω κατειλιξαι πλην τον ακρου επειτο εις αλειφο βαψαντα ως ηδιστον, προσθειναι*: "Working them into a little ball, roll it in wool, except the top; then having *dipped* it in the sweetest oil, apply it."

P. 297. Speaking of a mixture the size of a nut-gall, he says: *ες ιριγον μυρον βαψασα*: "*Dipping* it in the ointment of fleur-de-luce."

P. 299. *Μολυβδον και λιθον η τον σιδηρον αρπαζει, ταυτα τριψας λεια, ες ρακος αποδησον, και ες γαλα γυναικος εμβαψας, προσθετω χρησθω*: "Taking lead and the magnetic stone, rub them smooth, and tie them in a rag; then having *dipped* them in breast milk, apply them."

Ειριον απλυτον ες μελι βαψας: *ib.* "Dipping unwashed wool into honey."

De Morb. Pass. Grass. p. 339. Speaking of a shoe-maker who was killed by the prick of his awl in the thigh, he says, *εβαψεν ως δακτυλον*, "The instrument *dipped* about a finger's length."

P. 362. *σπογγους βαπτυντα*: "Dipping sponges."

De Ratione Victus Acutorum, p. 383. *θερμους αρτους εξ οινου μελανος και ελαιου αποβαπτων*. "*Dipping* hot cakes in black wine and oil."

Coacæ Præcognitiones, p. 435. *Γομφολογος δε υποπελίου γινομενης επι της γλωσσης εν αρχη, οη σιδηριου βαφεντος ες ελαιον, χαλεπωτερη η απολυσις γινεται*: "If a livid blister rise on the tongue at the beginning, as of iron *dipped* in oil, the cure becomes the more difficult."

De Ulceribus, p. 514. *Τα μεν αλλα, τα αυτα. αντι δε του οινου, οξος οξυτατον εσω λευκον. εμβαψαι δε ες αυτο, ειρια ως οισυπαδεα*. "The other things being the same; but in place of the wine, take the strongest vinegar of white wine. *Dip* into this the most greasy wool." *τα ειρια βαψαι ως εν ολογισω υδατι. επειτα οινον ζυγχεας μερος τριτον, εψειν εως αν καλως εχη το παχος*: *ib.* "*Dip* the wool in the smallest quantity of water possible; then *pouring* into it of wine a third part, boil it to a good thickness."

P. 522. *εν μελιτι βαπτων ηπαρ βοος ωμον*: "Dipping the raw liver of an ox in honey."

Thus we have seen in what a vast multitude of examples Hippocrates uses this word to signify *to dip*; and that quite irrespectively of the nature of the fluid. Indeed, he not only uses it so frequently in this signification, but he uses it in no other signification, except once in the sense of *to dye*; and it is the only word which he employs to denote the mode in question. For I have intentionally omitted no instance in which the word occurs in all his works. Besides, we have in this writer the words which signify every application of water, and other fluids, from the gentle distillation from the nipple, to the bathing of the whole body. He uses *ραινω, αιονεω, &c.* for *sprinkle*; and for *pour* he uses *χεω*, with its compounds, which occurs times innumerable. For *wet, moisten, soak, steep*, he uses *δευω, βρεχω, τεγγω, &c.* The first of which meets us in almost every page; the second is often used; and of the last there are several examples. For bathing the whole body, he constantly uses *λουω*, and he makes a very free use of the bath, both hot and cold: for washing a part of the body, he uses *νιπτω*, with its compounds; and occasionally the compounds of *πλυνω*. If it is possible to settle the meaning of a common word, surely this is sufficient to fix the meaning of *βαπτω* beyond all reasonable controversy. In the words of the father of medicine, in which he has occasion to treat of every mode of the application of liquids, and which consist of no less than five hundred and forty-three closely printed folio pages, all the words of mode are applied, and *βαπτω* invariably is used when he designates immersion.

Having established the meaning of this word, as significant of mode, I shall now show that it signifies also *to dye*. That it has this signification, I believe, is not doubted by any. But while one party contends that this is its primary signification, the other errs as far on the opposite side; contending that this meaning is only by consequence, and that the word, when it relates to *dyeing*, always denotes *dyeing* by dipping, as the mode. Now, while I contend that *dyeing* is the secondary meaning of this word, I contend also that this is a real literal meaning, independent of consequence. Although this meaning arose from the mode of *dyeing* by *dipping*, yet the word has come by appropriation to denote *dyeing*, without reference to mode. Were this a point of mere philological accuracy, I would pursue it no farther; but as it is of material importance in this controversy, I shall establish it by a number of examples, that will put the fact beyond question. One truth can never injure another; and if it has the appearance of doing so, we may depend that there is

something about the matter which we do not understand. The advocates of truth often labour in the proof of what cannot be proved, the proof of which their cause does not require, and which sometimes would be injurious rather than profitable. That βαπτω signifies *to dye in any manner*, is a truth which, instead of being against us, serves to solve difficulties that have been very clumsily got over by some of the ablest writers on this side of the question. Indeed one of the most plausible objections is by this fact removed to a demonstration.

Nothing in the history of words, is more common than to enlarge or diminish their signification. Ideas not originally included in them, are often affixed to some words; while others drop ideas originally asserted in their application. In this way βαπτω, from signifying mere mode, came to be applied to a certain operation usually performed in that mode. From signifying to *dip*, it came to signify to *dye by dipping*, because this was the way in which things were usually dyed. And afterwards from *dyeing by dipping*, it came to denote *dyeing in any manner*. A like process might be shown in the history of a thousand other words. Candlestick originally denoted a *stick* to hold a candle, but now the utensil employed to hold a candle, is called a candlestick, even when it is of gold.

The only instance in which I have observed the word βαπτω in this signification, in the works of Hippocrates, employs it to denote dyeing by *dropping* the dyeing liquid on the thing dyed: *επειδαν επισταξη επιτα ιματια βαπτεται*: “When it *drops* upon the garments, they are dyed.” This surely is not *dyeing* by dipping.

There is a similar instance in Arrian's Expedition of Alexander the Great, the only one in which I have found the word at all in that work. *τους δε πωγωνιας λεγει Νεαρχος οτι βαπτονται Ινδοι*: “Nearchus relates that the Indians *dye* their beards.” It will not be contended that they dyed their beards by immersion.

We meet this word, or its derivatives, several times in Ælian, in the sense of *dyeing*, and sometimes when the process was not by dipping. Speaking of an old coxcomb, who endeavoured to conceal his age by dyeing his hair, he says, *δια τουτα την τριχα πολιαν ουσαν επιρατο βαφη αφανιζειν*: “He endeavoured to conceal the hoariness of his hair by *dyeing* it.” βαφη here denotes *dyeing* in general; for hair on the head is not dyed by dipping. In the title of this anecdote, the old man is styled *την τριχα βαψαμενου*: “The old man with the dyed hair,” lib. vii. c. xx.

Speaking of a lady whose yellow locks were not coloured by art, but by nature, he uses the word βαφαις. Lib. xiii. c. 1.

Nicolas of Damascus, speaking of parasites as obliged to flatter their patrons, says, *Απο των ετων κλεπται τις, η και βαπτεται*: “Does a patron affect to be younger than he is? or does he even *dye* his hair?”

Æschylus, in the *Choephoræ*, p. 85. uses the word in the same way:

————— μαρτυς ειδε μοι
Φαρος τοδε ως εβαψεν Αιγισθου ξιφος :

“This garment, *dyed* by the sword of Ægisthus, is a witness to me.” The garment must have been *dyed* by the blood running down over it.

These examples are sufficient to prove, that the word βαπτω signifies to dye in general, though originally and still usually applied to *dyeing* by *dipping*. Having such evidence before my eyes, I could not deny this to my opponents, even were it a difficulty as to the subject of the mode of Baptism. In a controversialist nothing can compensate for candour; and facts ought to be admitted, even when they appear unfavourable. It is an unhallowed ingenuity that strains to give a deceitful colouring to what cannot be denied, and cannot ultimately serve a good cause. Truth will be sooner made to appear, and will sooner be received, if on all sides there is openness and honest dealing, without any attempt to conceal, or to colour. To force through difficulties, employ insufficient evidence, refuse admissions that integrity cannot deny, and by rhetorical artifice cut down whatever opposes, is the part of a religious gladiator, not of a Christian contending earnestly for divine institutions.

On the subject of this application of the word βαπτω, I cannot but blame some of the most distinguished writers on both sides of the question. On the one side, supposing it to be necessary, or at least serviceable, to prove that, when the word relates to *dyeing*, it is always dyeing by *dipping*, they have evidently strained, and have employed false criticism. With respect to the other side, to say nothing of the straining to squeeze out of the word the several significations of *sprinkling*, *pouring*, *washing*, *wetting*, &c. for which there is not any even plausible ground, the obvious fact that it signifies *dyeing* by any process, has been uncritically pressed to prove, that when it relates to the application of pure water, it denotes all modes equally. There is neither candour nor philosophy in such attempts. It manifests little acquaintance with the history and philosophy of the signification of words. In reality this

admitted fact is nothing in their favour, as it is perfectly agreeable to the history of the meanings of a numerous class of words. Use is always superior to etymology as a witness on this subject. A word may come to enlarge its meaning, so as to lose sight of its origin. This fact must be obvious to every smatterer in philology. Had it been attended to, Baptists would have found no necessity to prove that βαπτω, when it signifies to *dye*, always properly signifies to dye by *dipping*; and their opponents would have seen no advantage from proving, that it signifies *dyeing in any manner*. The word candlestick applies now as well when the material is gold, as when it is timber. He would not, however, be worth reasoning with, who should from this circumstance deny that the name points out the materials of which candlesticks among the Saxons were originally made.

The observations of Dr Gale on this subject, fall in some degree under the above censure. "The Grecians," says he, "very frequently apply the word in all its various forms, to the dyer's art, sometimes perhaps not very properly, but always so as to imply and refer only to its true natural signification *to dip*."

What does this learned writer mean when he expresses a doubt of the propriety of this usage? Does he mean that such an extension of the meaning of words is in some degree a trespass against the laws of language? But such a usage is in strict accordance with the laws of language; and the history of a thousand words sanctions this example. Language has not logical truth for its standard; and therefore against this it cannot trespass. Use is the sole arbiter of language; and whatever is agreeable to this authority, stands justified beyond impeachment. *Candlestick* is as properly applied to gold as to timber; βαπτω signifies *to dye by sprinkling*, as properly as by *dipping*, though originally it was confined to the latter.

Nor is he well founded when he asserts, that the word in such applications always implies and refers to its primary signification only. On the contrary, I have produced some examples, and he himself has produced others, in which candour cannot say that there is any such implication or reference. From such examples it could not be known even that βαπτω has the meaning of *dip*. They relate *to dyeing* wholly without reference to *dipping*; nay, some of them with an expressed reference to another mode. This is a fact, and were it even against me, I could not but admit it.

Nor are such applications of the word to be accounted for by metaphor, as Dr Gale asserts. They are as literal as the primary

meaning. It is by extension of literal meaning, and not by figure of any kind, that words come to depart so far from their original signification. The examples of this kind which Dr Gale produces, cannot be accounted for by his philosophy. *Και λυδιζων, και ψηνιζων, και βαπτομενος βατραχειοις.* “Magnes, an old comic poet of Athens, used the Lydian music, *shaved his face, and smeared it over with tawny washes.*” Now, surely *βαπτομενος* here has no reference to its primary meaning. Nor is it used figuratively. The face of the person was rubbed with the wash. By any thing implied or referred to in this example, it could not be known that *βαπτω* ever signifies *to dip*.

Ορνις βαπτος, a coloured bird. This expression is indeed figurative. But the figure has no reference to *dipping*, the primary meaning of the word, but to *dyeing*. The bird is said to be *dyed*, though its colours were natural. By the same figure we would say a *painted bird*, though its colours were not conferred by the pencil. This example strongly confirms my view of the word in Daniel. Here even in the verbal of the very word *βαπτω*, we have the same figure which I have pointed out in the use of the word in the above contested passage. The colours of a bird are said to be *dyed*, by a beautiful figure founded on likeness; just as in Daniel, Nebuchadnezzar was said to be *immersed in dew*, though literally the dew fell on him. What a Goth should we reckon the critic, who would philosophise on such expressions as *painted bird*, on the principle of the objection to *dipping* as the meaning of the word in the expression used by Daniel! “The plumage of the bird,” says the philologist, “is natural, and not conferred by either painter or dyer. The word *painted*, therefore, and the word *dyed*, when applied to birds, designate properly natural colours. *βαπτος*, therefore, in the expression used by Aristophanes, does not signify *dyed*, but denotes colour, whether artificial or natural.” A foreigner, on the same principle, might shew the depth of his philosophy on the phrase *painted bird*. “Here,” says he, “a bird is said to be *painted*. Now, we know that the colours of a bird are not given by the pencil, but by the Creator. The proper sense then of the English word *painted*, is not *coloured by the pencil*, but coloured in any way.” This might appear to have great depth and justness, to people as little acquainted with the language as himself; and who should not venture to dip into the philosophy of the criticism. But a mere child who speaks English would laugh at it. Yet it is the very criticism employed by celebrated scholars, on the passage in

Daniel. If theologians had as much taste as they have ingenuity and learning, it would save themselves and their readers an immensity of useless labour.

The *pictæ volucres* of Virgil, is a perfectly similar example in the Latin language. Aristophanes speaks of *dyed birds*, Virgil of *painted birds*. Let the criticism on the passage in Daniel, be applied to the phrase of Virgil. "Here," says the critic, "instead of colours laid on by the pencil of the painters, the colour is given by the invisible hand of nature. *Pictæ* then cannot signify *painted*, or have any allusion to *painting*, but must denote properly *natural colouring*. This is the very essence of the criticism on the passage in Daniel. Nebuchadnezzar was not *immersed* in dew,—therefore the word βαπτω must here signify the *distillation of dew*.

Our own Milton uses the same figure, when, speaking of the wings of the angel Raphael, he says, *colours dipped in heaven*, though he does not mean that they were either *dipped* or *dyed*. The foreigner who, from this authority, should argue that the English word *dip* does not signify the mode which we understand by it, would find his justification in the criticism on the above passage in the book of Daniel.

Dr Gale gives us another passage from Aristotle, which is as little to his purpose, namely, to prove that the word, when it signifies *to dye*, has always a reference to dipping, and implies it. ὄλιβομενος δὲ βαπτει καὶ ἀνθίζει τὴν χεῖρα. "If it is pressed, it dyes and colours the hand." Surely there is no reference to dipping here; the hand is dyed by pressing the thing that dyes. Here also the critical eye will see a confirmation of my view of the principle that operates in the application of the word βαπτω in the passage of the book of Daniel. Things are said to be *dyed* by nature, on the same principle that Nebuchadnezzar was said to be immersed in dew.

Having found beyond reasonable doubt, that βαπτω in its secondary sense, is employed *literally and properly* to denote *dyeing*, even when there is no *dipping*; we are now prepared to examine the occurrence of the word in the battle of the frogs and mice, which has been so obstinately contested; and which hitherto has been the most plausible resource of those who have laboured to prove that at least one of the meanings of the word is to pour. The blood was poured into the lake, therefore it is thought βαπτω must signify *to pour*. But in reality, the passage favours neither the one party nor the other. It expresses neither *pouring* nor *dipping*, but *dyeing* without reference to mode. If βαπτω, as we have proved,

signifies to *dye in any mode*, there is no occasion for the advocates of immersion in Baptism, to find immersion in the word as it signifies to *dye*. This simple fact settles the controversy about this passage for ever.

Καππεσε δ' ουδ' ανενευσεν· εξαπτετο δ' αιματι λιμνη
Πορφυρεω.

“ He fell, and breathed no more, and the lake was tinged with blood ;” or, according to the translation of Cowper,

“ So fell Crombophagus, and from that fall
Never arose, but *reddening* with his blood
The wave,” &c.

To suppose that there is here any extravagant allusion to the literal *immersion* or *dipping* of a lake, is a monstrous perversion of taste. The lake is said to be *dyed*, not to be *dipped*, nor *poured*, nor *sprinkled*. There is in the word no reference to mode. Had Baptists entrenched themselves here, they would have saved themselves much useless toil, and much false criticism, without straining to the impeachment of their candour, or their taste. What a monstrous paradox in rhetoric, is the figuring of the dipping of a lake in the blood of a mouse ! Yet Dr Gale supposes the lake dipped by hyperbole. “ The literal sense,” he says, “ is, the lake was *dipped in blood*.” Never was there such a figure. The lake is not said to be *dipped* in blood, but to be *dyed* with blood.

They might have found a better commentary to this passage, in the battles of Homer’s heroes in the Iliad. The expression evidently alludes to one in the beginning of the twenty-first book of the Iliad, with respect to the slaughter of the Trojans by Achilles in the river Xanthus : ερυθαινετο δ' αιματι υδαρ : “ The waters as they ran *reddened* with blood.”—COWPER. In allusion to this, in the burlesque poem, from which the disputed passage is taken, the whole lake is said to be *dyed* with the blood of a mouse, which fell in battle on its edge.

The monthly reviewers, as quoted by Mr Booth, understood the expression in this paradoxical sense. “ In a poem attributed to Homer,” they say, “ called the Battle of the Frogs and Mice, it is said a lake was baptized with the blood of a wounded combatant—a question hath arisen in what sense the word *baptize* can be used in this passage.” This should never have been a question ; for this lake is not said to be *baptized*. The word βαπτω not βαπτίζω is used. Again, the lake was not dipped, as these friends of dipping, or at least of profuse *pouring*, assert. The expression is literal, and has not the smallest difficulty.

The derivatives of this word, both in the primary and secondary meaning, prove that it denotes immersion. *βαμμα*, *sauce* or *soup* into which bread or other food is dipped in eating; also *a dye* into which the thing to be *dyed* is *dipped*, as distinguished from *χρωμα*.

βαφη, *immersion*: *κἀγω γαρ ος τα δειν' εκαρτερον τοτε βαφη σιδηρος ως,* &c. Soph. in Ajace: "I who endured horrible things, as iron *dipped* in water." *βαφη σιδηρου* is also used for the edge of iron; because the edge, or sharpness, is given in the tempering by immersion in water.

βαψις, *the art of dipping*: as *βαψις χαλκου και σιδηρου*, *the tempering of brass and iron*; quoted by Scapula from Pol. ex Antiphonte. Now metal is tempered in water by immersion.

βαπτισις, *a laver, or bathing place*, used by Lucian.

διεαφος, *dyed* by being twice *dipped*; just as dyers with us speak of giving their cloth one *dip*, or two or three *dips*.

οξυβαφος, *οξυβαφον*, and *οξυβαφιον*, quoted by Scapula from Athen. lib. 2. *The small vessel which was used to hold the vinegar with which they seasoned their food.* This the ancients did by dipping. To this doubtless our word *saucer* owes its origin, however differently it is used at present. This is an instance of the process by which words extend their signification beyond the ideas originally contained in them. The word *saucer*, from signifying a small vessel for holding *sauce*, now signifies one for cooling tea. This is a fine illustration of the process by which *βαπτω*, from signifying to *dip*, came to signify *to dye by dipping*; and at last dropping the mode, *to dye in any manner*. The foreigner who should allege that the English word *saucer*, cannot signify a small vessel for tea, but must always denote one for *sauce*, would reason as correctly as those who attempt to force *βαπτω*, when signifying to dye, always to look back to its origin.

This compound mentioned above, is also used as the name of a measure, doubtless because this vessel was at first used as the measure of the quantity so designated. At last, however, it would come by a natural process to denote the measure, without any reference to the vessel.

In medical language, this compound was also applied to the deep cavities or *cups* in which bones turn in the joints—doubtless taking the name from the shape. Here the *socket of a joint* is called a *vinegar cup*.

οψοβαφον, taken also by Scapula from Poll. lib. vii. denotes the small vessel in which these things were served up; which were

eaten with bread, and which were always used by dipping. Xenophon represents the hands of the king of Media, as smeared in this operation.

The verbal βαπτος, *to be dipped*, or *that may be dipped*, we have already seen in the passage quoted from Euripedes in justification of the translation of a passage in Hippocrates. The negative Αβαπτος may also be alleged as confirmatory of the application of the root in the sense of dipping. Αβαπτος σιδηρος is untempered iron, literally *undipped iron*, for iron is tempered by dipping.

Αβαπτιστος also signifies that *cannot be immersed*, and is applied by Pindar, as Scapula observes, to cork. This fact is perfectly decisive. There can be no doubt that the property of cork not to sink in water, is referred to by Pindar.

Αβαπτιστον, a *trepan*, a surgical instrument, so called because it was so formed as not to *sink too deeply*, lest it should injure the membrane of the brain. This shews that the word from which it is derived signifies *to dip*.

In ascertaining the meaning of βαπτω, it may be of assistance to us to examine also some of its compounds, and also the prepositions with which it is construed. In composition, we find it sometimes joined with prepositions that point to the meaning, for which we contend, and which will not suit the meaning attached to it by our opponents. Besides, it admits no preposition in composition or construction with it, which cannot be accounted for on the supposition of this meaning. If this position can be made good, it will afford the strongest confirmation to our doctrines.

We have seen, in the numerous examples quoted, that it admits both the prepositions εις and εν to be compounded with it, as well as to construe with it in regimen. A mere glance at the examples may convince any one that this would not suit either *pour* or *sprinkle*; from the consideration of the things which are the subjects of the operation of the verb. We could not, for instance, say, *pour or sprinkle wool in or into the river*. If then the word signified *pour* or *sprinkle*, it could not admit these prepositions either in composition or in regimen, with respect to many things that are the subject of the operation of the verb.

Both the prepositions εις and εν in composition with this word, have the same form. Εμβαπτω is the compound word with respect to both. The regimen, however, is different. If εμ is put for εις, the verb is construed with the accusative of the thing in which the operation of the verb is performed, either without, or more gene-

rally with the preposition itself repeated before it. *Εμβαπτω εις το υδωρ*. When *εμ* is put for *εν* the verb is construed with the dative of the thing in which the operation of the verb is performed, either with the same preposition repeated before it, or without it.—*Εμβαπτω εν τω ελαιω*.

When *εις* is used either in the compound or before the substantive, there can be no question that all idea of *pouring* or *sprinkling* is excluded. And though *εν* may sometimes be translated *with*, it never has this acceptation in composition. Indeed, this form is so decisive, that the celebrated Dr Owen asserts, that it is this that makes the verb signify to *dip*. “*βαπτίζω*,” says he, “does not signify properly to *dip* or *plunge*, for that in Greek is *εμβαπτω* and *εμβαπτίζω*.” This observation is not worthy of the learning of that great and good man. If the verb *βαπτω* did not of itself signify to dip, the preposition in question could not give it that meaning. Dr Owen’s criticism is well exposed by the cool good sense of Mr Booth. “Besides,” says he, “I appeal to the learned whether Dr Owen might not as well have asserted, that *mergo* does not properly signify to *dip* or *plunge*, for that, in Latin, is *immergo*? Nay, does not the Doctor himself, in the same discourse, acknowledge, that ‘the original and natural signification of the word, imports to *dip*, to *plunge*, to *dye*, to *wash*, to *cleanse*.’”

Εμβαμμα signifies sauce, or any liquid into which food is dipped in order to be eaten—*something to be dipped into*. This compound could not suit either *pouring* or *sprinkling*. *Εμβαφιον*, a saucer, or vessel to hold the liquid for seasoning food, which was used by dipping. It came also to denote a certain measure,—no doubt from the circumstance that this vessel was employed as a measure. In this sense, Hippocrates uses it several times.

Καταβαπτω signifies, literally, to dip *down*, that is, to dip deeply, or thoroughly. The preposition is designed to increase the action of the verb. Accordingly, *καταβαπτων*, signifies a *dyer*.

Επιβαπτω, to dip *upon*. We find this compound once used by Hippocrates, and although it affords us no evidence, it takes none from us.

The use of *Απο* with this word, may appear more strange, but it is explicable. It is used both in composition and following the verb; and sometimes it is used in composition when *εις* follows the verb. *Αποβαπτω* appears to designate to *dip*, as proceeding *from* the dipping power—I dip *from*, intimating that the thing dipped is at some distance from the dipper; or, rather, it marks the departure

of the thing dipped, from the thing in which it is dipped. When *Απο* follows *βαπτω*, it respects the point from which the finished dipping has proceeded. *βαπτω απο του αιματος.* *I dip it from the blood.* The blood is the point from which the *dipping* proceeded.

The preposition *εξ* is also construed with *αποβαπτω*, in one of the examples taken from Hippocrates. This makes it still more evident, that *απο*, in construction with this verb, denotes the point *from* which the dipping was effected. *Εξ*, views the thing dipped, as proceeding *out of* the thing in which it was dipped.

Scapula seems to think that *απο* in composition with this word, is designed to intimate the gentleness of the operation, as he translates it, *immergo leniter, I dip gently*; and refers to Dioscardes, lib. 5. *αποβαψαι εις υδωρ.*

But though it may be used with respect to the gentlest *dipping*, it cannot intimate this. But whatever may be the peculiar effect of this preposition in composition with *βαπτω*, and on whatever principle its use is to be accounted for, the fact that the compounded word is sometimes used in construction with *εις*, removes all appearance of objection to our view of the meaning of the verb.

Let us now take a glance at a few passages in which *βαπτω* is used figuratively, as this also may cast some light back upon its literal meaning. Aristophanes says: *Ινα μη βαψω βαμμα σαζδινιακον.* “*Lest I dip you into a Sardinian dye.*” The figure is but low, and is just the same as if a pugilist with us should say, *I will dip you in vermillion.* It is an allusion to the dyer’s art, and means, *I will beat you, till you shall be covered all over with your own blood.* It would be to no purpose to allege, that, when a man is beaten, he is not literally *dipped* in his blood, but the blood runs over him. This would indicate a total misconception of the figure. The likeness does not consist in the *manner*, but in the *effects*. As the reference is to the art of *dyeing*, so the expression must be suited to the usual mode of dyeing. *I will dip you in vermillion*, is exactly the expression of the poet in English. He would be a sorry critic, who, from this, should allege that the English word *dip*, signifies to *run over*, as blood from the wounded body. In fact, *pour* and *sprinkle* are as little applicable here, in a literal sense, as *dip* itself. When a man is beaten, there is no *pouring* or *sprinkling*, more than *dipping*. The blood is not put on the beaten person by the beater, *in any manner*.

Marcus Antoninus Pius speaks of the man of virtue as *βεβαμμενον*, *dipped* or *dyed* in justice. I would not explain this with Dr Gale,

“dipped as it were in, or swallowed up with justice.” *Justice* is here represented as a colouring liquid, which imbues the person who is dipped in it. It communicates its qualities as in the operation of dyeing. The figure can receive no illustration from the circumstance that “persons given up to their pleasures and vices, are said to be immersed or swallowed up with pleasures.” The last figure has a reference to the primary meaning of the word βαπτω, and points to the *drowning* effects of liquids; the former refers to the secondary meaning of the word, and has its resemblance in the colouring effects of a liquid dye. The virtuous man is dipped to be *dye*d more deeply with justice; the vicious man is drowned or ruined by his immersion. Perfectly similar is the figure in an observation of the same writer, where he asserts that the thoughts, βαπτται, are *tinged* by the mind. We use the word *imbue* in the same way. He uses the same word also when the *dye* injures what it colours. He cautions against bad example, lest (βαφης) you be *infected*.

We see, then, that the use of this word in a figurative sense, is not only always consistent with my view of the meanings of this word, but that it frequently illustrates its primary import.

That βαπτω signifies *to dip* is strongly confirmed by the circumstance, that *dyeing*, which it also imports, was usually performed, both among the Greeks and Romans, by immersion. If the word originally denoted *to dip*, it might by a natural process come to signify *to dye*, which was performed by dipping. But if the word originally signified *to pour* or *to sprinkle*, no process can be supposed by which it would come to denote *to dye*. Upon our view, there is a connecting link which joins these two meanings together, notwithstanding their great diversity. They are seen by our doctrine as parent and child. On the view of our opponents there is no relation. The two meanings cannot have any consanguinity. Now, that *dyeing* anciently was commonly performed by dipping, and that it still is so, admits no reasonable doubt. Dr Gale has well observed this, and has given evidence of the fact, should any be so perverse as to deny it. After producing some passages, he observes, “I will only observe, you will please to consider *dipping* as the only probable and convenient way; and in every respect perfectly agreeable to the nature of the thing, as well as to that sense of the word, which is very considerable. We see it is the only way with us; and which carries the parallel still farther between the ancient Greeks and us, as they used βαπτω, we use the

word *dip*, both among the workmen in the shop, and in ordinary conversation ; for what is more common than to talk of such or such a thing *dipped*, meaning in the dyer's copper, or in some colours." " Besides it is observable, that the Grecians made a difference between *dye*, and other colouring matter. Thus Plutarch distinguishes between χρωματα and βαμματα ; and Pollux does the same ; βαμματα signifying only that sort of colouring-matter into which any thing is dipped, according to the sense of the word, as I see Stephens also has remarked. And there is a passage in Seneca very clear to this purpose. Interest quamdiu macerata est, crassius medicamentum an aquatius traxerit, sæpius mersa est, et excocta, an semel tincta. *There is a difference also, how long it lies infused ; whether the dye be thick and gross, or waterish and faint ; and whether dipped very often and boiled thoroughly, or only once tintured.* And Phavorinus and Pollux use κυταδαπτων, which on all hands is allowed most emphatically to signify *dipping, plunging, immersing*, as a synonymous word for βαπτων and χρωωνυς, in English a *dyer*.

" This makes it necessary to suppose they dyed by *dipping* ; as well as another word used by them in these cases, viz. εψειν, to boil ; *they boiled it in kettles*, says Aristotle ; *and when the flowers are boiled long enough together, at length all becomes of a purple.* Εψωσιν εν ταις χυτραις—και τοτε τελευταιων απαντα γινεται πορφυροειδη των ανθεων ικανως συνεψθεντων."

A most decisive passage to the same purpose, he thus translates from Plato de Republica, lib. iv. p. 636. " *The dyers, when they are about to dip a quantity of wool, to make it of a purple colour, cull out the whitest of the fleece, and prepare and wash it with a world of trouble, that it may the better take the grain ; and then they dip it, βαπτονισι. The dye of things thus dipped is lasting and unchangeable, and cannot be fetched out or tarnished, either by fair water, or any preparations for the discharging of colours. But things which are not dyed after this manner, you know what they are ; no matter what dye they are dipped in, βαπτη, they never look well ; without this preparation they take but a nasty colour, and that is easily washed out too. And thus in like manner our choosing soldiers, and instructing them in music, and those exercises which consist in agility of body, you must imagine our design is only to make them the better receive the laws, which are a kind of dye,—that their temper being formed by a proper discipline, may be fixed and unalterable by terror, &c.*

and (βαπτῆν) their tincture may not be washed out by any medicaments of the most powerfully expelling nature; as pleasure, which is stronger to this effect than any dye, as is likewise grief, fear, or desire, and the like.”

Here is the most complete evidence, that both among the Greeks and Romans *dyeing* was usually performed by *dipping*. Indeed, nothing but perverseness can make a question of this, though there was no evidence of the fact from history. There is no other way in which fluids can be extensively applied in dyeing, but by dipping.

The truth of this fact is not in the least affected by the observation of Mr Ewing, that *dyeing*, *staining*, and *painting*, were originally similar operations, having been first suggested by the accidental bruising of fruits, &c. Though this were a fact recorded, instead of a conjecture, it could be of no service on this subject. Arts are not necessarily conducted in the way in which they were originally suggested. Whatever was the origin of *dyeing*, *dipping* was the common way of performing it as an art. It is the usual mode of performance, and not the accidental mode of discovery, that could give its name to the art. Dr Cox's answer to this objection is quite satisfactory. “ In reply to this,” says he, “ it might be sufficient to say, that in whatever manner the process was primarily discovered, the correct meaning of the term which expresses it, involves the idea of immersion, and did so at the very period when the contested words were in colloquial use. Pliny states, ‘ the Egyptians began by *painting* on white cloths, with certain drugs, which in themselves possessed no colour, but had the property of abstracting or absorbing colouring matters; but these cloths were afterwards *immersed in a diluted dyeing liquor*, of an uniform colour, and yet when removed from it soon after, that they were found to be *stained* with indelible colours, differing from one another, according to the nature of the drugs which had been previously applied to different parts of the stuff.’ In this passage, we are favoured with an intelligible distinction between *painting*, *immersing*, (or the art of dyeing,) and *staining*; yet we are required to admit that they were *one*.”

Agreeably to the above view of the connection between the secondary meaning of this word and the primary, we have a great number of the branches which have the same double import, from the same connection. *Σαμνα*, sauce into which food is *dipped*,—and a *dye* into which things are to be dipped. *βαφῆ*, *dipping*, and *dyeing*

stuff, or the tincture received from dyeing. βαφικος, both *dipping* and *dyeing*,—and βαφικη, the dyer's art. βαπτος, to be *dipped*, and to be *dyed*, &c. &c. In all these, there is no other common idea but mode: this is the link that connects these two things that are altogether different. If the same word has the same double meaning in so many of its branches, there must surely be at the bottom some natural relation between these meanings.

This view of the primary meaning of βαπτω, and the secondary, is greatly confirmed by the analogy of other languages. The same primary and secondary meanings are found in the corresponding word, in many other languages. The Septuagint translation gives παρα-βαπτω, in Ezek. xxiii. 15. The Hebrew, to which this corresponds, is טביל, signifying *dyed raiment*. Here we see that טביל, which, as Dr Gale observes, every one must own, signifies to *dip*, is used also for *dye*. This analogy is complete, and must arise from the same cause, namely, that among the Hebrews, as well as the Greeks and Romans, *dyeing* was commonly performed by *dipping*. The same word, in the Chaldee also, as Dr Cox has observed, signifies both to *dip* and to *dye*.

In the Latin also, the same word, *tingo*, signifies to *dip* and to *dye*. To this Mr Ewing replies, that “*Tingo* is the Greek τεγγω, which is very properly translated in the Lexicons, *madefacio*, *humido*, *mollio*; I *moisten*, *wet*, *soften*, or *mollify*.” That *tingo* is derived from τεγγω is undoubted; but to assert that it has all the significations of its parent, and that it has no other, would be as unphilological in theory as it is inconsistent with fact. Τεγγω does not signify to *dye*; *tingo*, its derivative, has this signification. Where did it find it? τεγγω signifies to *moisten*, &c.; *tingo* has not this signification. I am aware that *wash* is given as one of its meanings in the dictionaries, but I have seen as yet no authority for this from the classical use of the word. Besides, *wash* is not the same as *moisten*, *wet*, &c. I grant, indeed, that the word may be used when *washing*, *wetting*, *moistening*, *softening*, &c. is the consequence of the *dipping*. Still, however, this is not literally contained in the expression. Though any of these words might be given in certain situations as a translation, yet such a translation would not be literal. *Tingo* expresses appropriately *dipping* and *dyeing*, and these only.

Indeed, the meaning of *tingo* is to be learned from its use in the Latin language, and not from the use of its root in the Greek. When this is ascertained, then the philologist may look into its origin, to

discover a correspondence. It may be expected that the root will contain some idea which has been a foundation to its use in the derived language. But a correspondence in all their meanings would often be looked for in vain. The derived word often drops every meaning of the root but one, and takes others that the root never possessed.

Does Mr Ewing deny that *tingo* signifies to *dip*? If he does, the classical use of that word will contradict him. The *dipping* of the sun, moon, and stars, in the ocean, as we would express it, is in the language of the Latin poets expressed by *tingo*. If he does not deny this, his assertion in the above extract is nothing to his purpose.

If there was any need of authority with respect to the meaning of *tingo*, we have it in Tertullian. He understood the Latin language, and he uses *tingo* for *dip*. It is well known that he believed that proper baptism consisted in three immersions; and he translated the Greek verb by *tingo*.

The same analogy is recognized by our own language; and though I would not say with some, that *dip* has *dye* as a secondary signification, yet in certain circumstances it may have this import by consequence,—“*colours dipped in heaven.*” Since, then, the analogy of so many languages connects *dipping* and *dyeing* by expressing them by the same word, why should not the same thing be supposed in the Greek? and βαπτω, as it has the secondary meaning of *dye*, have also the primary meaning of *dip*? It may be added, that we have the authority of the Latin poets, to translate βαπτω by *tingo*, in the sense of *dipping*. As the Greek poets apply βαπτω to the setting of a constellation, or its *dipping* in the ocean, the Latin poets express the same thing by *mergo* and *tingo*.

Having viewed βαπτω in every light in which it can assist us on this subject, I shall now proceed to exhibit the examples of the occurrence of βαπτίζω itself, which, to the utter exclusion of the root, is applied to the Christian rite. βαπτω, the root, I have shewn to possess two meanings, and two only, to *dip* and to *dye*. βαπτίζω, I have asserted, has but one signification. It has been formed on the idea of the primary meaning of the root, and has never admitted the secondary. Now, both these things have been mistaken by writers on both sides of this controversy. It has been generally taken for granted, that the two words are equally applicable to baptism; and that they both equally signify to *dye*. Both of them are supposed, in a secondary sense, to signify to *wash* or *moisten*. I do not admit this with respect to either. I have already proved

this with respect to βαπτω; the proof is equally strong with respect to βαπτίζω. My position is, THAT IT ALWAYS SIGNIFIES TO DIP; NEVER EXPRESSING ANY THING BUT MODE. Now, as I have all the lexicographers and commentators against me in this opinion, it will be necessary to say a word or two with respect to the authority of lexicons. Many may be startled at the idea of refusing to submit to the unanimous authority of lexicons, as an instance of the boldest scepticism. Are lexicons, it may be said, of no authority? Now, I admit that lexicons are an authority, but they are not *an ultimate authority*. Lexicographers have been guided by their own judgment in examining the various passages in which a word occurs; and it is still competent for every man to have recourse to the same sources. The meaning of a word must ultimately be determined by an actual inspection of the passages in which it occurs, as often as any one chooses to dispute the judgment of the lexicographer. The use of a word, as it occurs in the writers of authority in the English language, is an appeal that any man is entitled to make against the decision of Dr Johnson himself. The practice of a language is the House of Lords, which is competent to revise the decisions of all dictionaries.

But though it is always lawful to appeal from lexicons to the language itself, it is seldom that there can be any necessity for this, with respect to the primary meaning of words. Indeed, with respect to the primary meaning of common words, I can think of no instance in which lexicons are to be suspected. This is a feature so marked, that any painter can catch, and faithfully represent. Indeed, I would consider it the most unreasonable scepticism, to deny that a word has a meaning, which all lexicons give as its primary meaning. On this point, I have no quarrel with the lexicons. There is the most complete harmony among them, in representing *dip* as the primary meaning of βαπτίζω and βαπτω. Except they had a turn to serve, it is impossible to mistake the primary meaning of a word commonly used. Accordingly, Baptist writers have always appealed, with the greatest confidence, to the lexicons even of Pædo-Baptist writers. On the contrary, their opponents often take refuge in a supposed sacred or Scriptural use, that they may be screened from the fire of the lexicons.

It is in giving secondary meanings, in which the lines are not so easily discovered, that the vision of the lexicographers is to be suspected. Nor is it with respect to real secondary meanings that they are likely to be mistaken. Their peculiar error is in giving as

secondary meanings, what are not properly meanings at all. The same objection that I have to lexicons, with respect to this word, I have not with respect to it alone, but with respect to almost all words to which they assign a great variety of meanings. I do not exclude Dr Johnson himself from this censure.

It may appear strange to some, that the most learned men can be imposed upon in this matter ; and with respect to words which they find in use in what they read, think that they have meanings which they have not. But a little consideration of the nature of the mistake will explain this matter. I admit that the meaning which they take out of the word, is always implied in the passage where the word occurs. But I deny that this meaning is expressed by the word. It is always made out by implication, or in some other way.

To explain this point more clearly, I shall lay down a canon, and by this I mean a first principle in criticism. That which does not contain its own evidence is not entitled to the name of a critical canon. I do not request my readers to admit my canon. I insist on their submission—let them deny it, if they can. My canon is, that in certain situations two words, OR EVEN SEVERAL WORDS, MAY WITH EQUAL PROPRIETY FILL THE SAME PLACE, THOUGH THEY ARE ALL ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT IN THEIR SIGNIFICATIONS. The physician, for instance, may, with equal propriety and perspicuity, say either “ dip the bread in the wine,” or, “ moisten the bread in the wine.” Yet this does not import that *dip* signifies to *moisten*, or that *moisten* signifies to *dip*. Each of these words has its own peculiar meaning, which the other does not possess. *Dip the bread* does not say *moisten the bread*, yet it is known that the object of the dipping is to *moisten*. Now it is from ignorance of this principle that lexicographers have given meanings to words which they do not possess ; and have thereby laid a foundation for evasive criticism on controverted subjects, with respect to almost all questions. In Greek it might be said with equal propriety $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$ $\epsilon\nu$ $\theta\iota\nu\omega$, or $\beta\alpha\psi\alpha\iota$ $\epsilon\nu$ $\theta\iota\nu\omega$, “ *moisten in wine*, or *dip in wine* ;” and from this circumstance it is rashly and unphilosophically concluded that one of the meanings of $\beta\alpha\psi\omega$ is to *moisten*.

Let it be remembered that my censure lies against the critical exactness of lexicographers, and not against their integrity, or even their general learning and ability. I go farther,—I acquit them of misleading their readers with respect to the general meaning of the passages, on the authority of which they have falsely assigned such

secondary meanings. The ideas which they affix to such words, are implied in the passage, though not the meaning of the words out of which they take them. But this, which is harmless with respect to most cases, is hurtful in all points of controversy, as it gives a foundation for the evasive ingenuity of sophistry in the defence of error. It may be of no importance to correct the lexicographer, who, from finding the expressions *δενσαι εν οινω* and *βαψαι εν οινω* employed for the same thing, asserts that here *βαψαι* signifies to *moisten*. But it is of great importance when the error is brought to apply to an ordinance of Christ. Besides, it introduces confusion into language, and makes the acquisition of it much more difficult to learners. The mind must be stored with a number of different meanings in which there is no real difference. What an insurmountable task would it be to master a language, if, in reality, words had as many different meanings as lexicons represent them! Parkhurst gives six meanings to *βαπτίζω*. I undertake to prove that it has but one; yet he and I do not differ about the primary meaning of this word. I blame him as giving different meanings, when there is no real difference in the meaning of this word. He assigns to it figurative meanings. I maintain, that in figures there is no different meaning of the word. It is only a figurative application. The meaning of the word is always the same. Nor does any one need to have a figurative application explained in any other way, than by giving the proper meaning of the word. When this is known, it must be a bad figure that does not contain its own light. It is useless to load lexicons with figurative applications, except as a concordance.

Polybius, vol. iii. p. 311. ult. applies the word to soldiers passing through water, *immersed* (*βαπτιζομενοι*) *up to the breast*. Here surely the word cannot mean *pouring or sprinkling*. The soldiers in passing through the water were *dipped* as far as the breast. Strabo also applies the word to Alexander's soldiers marching a whole day through the tide, between the mountain Climax and the sea, (Lib. xiv. p. 982.) *βαπτιζομενων*, *baptized up to the middle*. Surely this baptism was *immersion*.

Plutarch, speaking of a Roman general, dying of his wounds, says, that having *dipped* (*βαπτισαε*) his hand in blood, he wrote the inscription for a trophy. Here the mode of the action cannot be questioned. The instrument of writing is *dipped* in the colouring fluid.

Diodorus Siculus, speaking of the sinking of animals in water,

says, that when the water overflows, “many of the land animals, βαπτιζόμενα, immersed in the river, perish.” This baptism also is *immersion*. The whole land was overwhelmed with water. This itself, upon a principle before explained, might be called a baptism or immersion, in perfect consistency with the modal meaning of the word. However, it is not the land, but the land animals, that are here said to be *baptized*. These would at first swim, but they would soon *sink*, and be entirely *immersed*. There is here then no catachrestic extension of the word, as in the cases which I have illustrated in another place. The *sinking* of animals in water is here called *baptism*. What then is *baptism* but *immersion*? Upon the principle of giving secondary meanings to words, which has been resisted by me, *drown* might be given as an additional meaning to βαπτιζω, from the authority of this passage. As the animals were *drowned* by immersion, this immersion might be called *drowning*.

Lucian uses the word in a like case, and with circumstances that explain the former example. Towards the end of the dialogue, he makes Timon, the man-hater, say, that if he saw a man carried down the stream, and crying for help, he would *baptize* him, και ην τινα του χειμωνος ο ποταμος παραφερη, ο δε, τας χειρας ορεγων, αντιλαβεισθαι δεηται, ωθειν και τουτον επι κεφαλην βαπτιζοντα, ως μηδε ανακυψαι δυνηθειη. “If in winter, the river should carry away any one with its stream, and the person with outstretched hands should beg to be taken out, that he would drive him from the bank, and plunge him headlong, so that he would not be able again to lift up his head above water. Here is a *baptism*, the mode of which cannot be mistaken. Timon’s *baptism* was certainly *immersion*. To resist such evidence, requires a hardihood which I do not envy. Having such examples before my eyes, I cannot resist God, to please men. To attempt to throw doubt on the meaning of the word βαπτιζω, is as vain as to question the signification of the word *dip*. The latter is not more definitely expressive of mode in the English, than the former is in Greek. The only circumstance that has enabled men to raise a cloud about βαπτιζω is, that it belongs to a dead language. There never was a word in any language, the meaning of which is more definite, or which is capable of being more clearly ascertained.

The sinner is represented by Porphyry, (p. 282.) as *baptized* up to his head, (βαπτιζεται μεχρι κεφαλης) in Styx, a celebrated river in hell. Is there any question about the mode of this *baptism*?

Dr Gale gives some striking examples from Strabo. "Strabo," says he, "is very plain in several instances: Speaking of the lake near Agrigentum, a town on the south shore of Sicily, now called Gergenti, he says, *things which otherwise will not swim, do not sink* (βαπτίζεσθαι) *in the water of the lake, but float like wood.* And there is a rivulet in the south parts of Cappadocia, he tells us, *whose waters are so buoyant, that if an arrow is thrown in, it will hardly sink or be dipped, βαπτίζεσθαι, into them.*" "In another place, ascribing the fabulous properties of the asphaltites to the lake Sirbon, he says, *the bitumen floats atop, because of the nature of the water, which admits no diving; for if a man goes into it, he cannot sink, or be dipped, βαπτίζεσθαι, but is forcibly kept above.* Now, in these several passages, the modal meaning of the word is confirmed in so clear, express, and decisive a manner, that obstinacy itself cannot find a plausible objection. Things that sink in other water, will not sink or be baptized in the lake near Agrigentum. This is mode, and nothing but mode. It is immersion, and nothing but immersion. *Sprinkling, and pouring, and popping, and dropping, and wetting, and washing, and imbuing, and dedicating, and devoting, and consecrating,* with all the various meanings that have ever been forced on this word, are meanings invented merely to serve a purpose. And if the sinking of an arrow in water is called its baptism, what can baptism mean but immersion? If, when the buoyancy of water will not suffer a person to sink, the idea is expressed by βαπτίζω, what can baptism be but an operation of the same nature with *sinking* or *diving*, which are used here as nearly synonymous terms with that which signifies to baptize? It may as well be said that *sprinkling* or *pouring*, is *sinking* or *diving*, as that it is baptism.

Two Greek critics are quoted by Dr Gale, as applying the word in exhibiting the beauty of Homer's representation of the death of one of his heroes: "*He struck him across the neck with his heavy sword, and the whole sword became warm with blood.*" On this, Pseudo Didymus says, that the sword is represented as *dipped* in blood, εβαπτισθη. And Dionysius says, "*In that phrase, Homer expresses himself with the greatest energy, signifying that the sword was so dipped, βαπτισθεντος, in blood, that it was even heated by it.*"

"Heraclides Ponticus," says Dr Gale, "a disciple of Aristotle, may help us, also, in fixing the sense of the word; for, moralizing the fable of Mars being taken by Vulcan, he says, *Neptune is in-*

geniously supposed to deliver Mars from Vulcan, to signify, that when a piece of iron is taken red hot out of the fire, and put into water, βαπτίζεται, the heat is repelled and extinguished, by the contrary nature of water.” Here we see that the immersion of hot iron in water, for the purpose of cooling it, is denominated a *baptism*.

Themistius, Orat. IV. p. 133, as quoted by Dr Gale, says, “The pilot cannot tell but he may save one in the voyage that had better be drowned, βαπτισαι, sunk into the sea.” Such a baptism, surely, would be immersion.

The word occurs in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, and is faithfully rendered *dip* in our version. 2 Kings v. 14. και κατεβη Ναιμαν και εξαπτισατο εν τω Ιορδανη επτακις. *Naaman went down, and dipped himself seven times in Jordan.* Here bathing in a river is called *baptism*. What more do we want, then, to teach us the mode of this ordinance of Christ? If there was not another passage of Scripture to throw light on the institution, as far as respects mode, is not this, to every teachable mind, perfectly sufficient? But, it seems, we are crying victory before the field is won. This passage, which we think so decisive, has a far different aspect to others. On the contrary, it is made to afford evidence against us. Well, this is strange indeed; but ingenuity has many shifts. Let us see how artifice can involve the passage in a cloud. Nothing is more easy. Does not the prophet command Naaman to *wash*; if, then, he obeyed this command by *baptizing* himself, *baptizing* must signify *washing*. For the sake of argument, I will grant this reasoning, for a moment. If, then, this is so, go, my brethren, and wash the person to be baptized, as you think Naaman washed himself, from head to foot. This will shew that you respect the example. In what manner soever the water was applied to Naaman, he was bathed all over. If the word signifies to wash the whole body, who but the Pope himself, would take on him to substitute the sprinkling of a few drops in the place of this universal washing?

But I do not admit the reasoning, that, from this passage, concludes that βαπτίζω signifies to wash, although no instance can be produced more plausible in favour of that opinion. This passage is a complete illustration of my canon. The two words, λουω and βαπτίζω are here used interchangeably, yet they are not of the same signification. Not of the same signification! it may be asked, with surprise. Elisha commands him to *wash*; he obeys by *bap-*

tizing himself; must not *baptizing*, then, be *washing*? I think none of my opponents will wish a stronger statement of their objection than I have made for them. But my doctrine remains uninjured by the assault. The true philologist will not find the smallest difficulty in reconciling this passage to it. The words *λουω* and *βαπτίζω* have their own peculiar meanings even here, as well as every where else, without the smallest confusion. To *baptize* is not to *wash*; but to baptize *in a river or in any pure water*, implies washing, and may be used for it in certain situations. If Naaman *dipped* himself in Jordan, he was *washed*. It comes to the same thing, whether a physician says, *bathe yourself every morning in the sea*, or, *dip yourself every morning in the sea*, yet the words *bathe* and *dip* do not signify the same thing. We see, then, that we can make the very same use of our modal word *dip*, that the Greeks made of their *βαπτίζω*. No man who understands English, will say that the word *dip* and the word *bathe* signify the same thing, yet, in certain situations, they may be used indifferently. Persons at a bath may ask each other, did you *dip* this morning? or did you *bathe* this morning? *To dip* may apply to the *defiling* of any thing, as well as to *washing*. It expresses no more than the mode. It is the situation in which it stands, and the word with which it is construed, that determine the object of the application of the mode. *To dip* in pure water, is to wash; to dip in colouring matter, is to dye; to dip into mire, is to defile. None of these ideas, however, are in the word *dip* itself. No word could determine mode, according to the principles of criticism employed by writers on this subject.

The error in this criticism is that which I have before exposed. It supposes that, if in any circumstances two words can be used interchangeably, they must signify the same thing; and that controversialists are at liberty to reciprocate their meanings, as often as the necessity of their cause demands it. This is a source of error more fruitful in false criticism, than any other of its numerous resources. There is a speciousness in it that has imposed on lexicographers, critics, and commentators. They have universally, so far as I know, taken as a first principle, that which is a mere figment.

The Sibylline verse concerning the city of Athens, quoted by Plutarch in his Life of Theseus, most exactly determines the meaning of *βαπτίζω*.

Ἀσχος βαπτίζῃ δυναι δε τοι ου θεμις εσι.

“Thou mayest be dipped, O bladder! but thou art not fated to sink.”

The remark of Vossius and Turretine upon this is: “Hence it appears that βαπτίζειν is more than ἐπιπολαζειν, which is to swim lightly *on the surface*, and less than δυνειν, which is to *go down to the bottom*, so as to be destroyed.” In the latter part of this distinction, they are certainly mistaken, as to both verbs. βαπτίζειν may be applied to what goes to the bottom and perishes; and δυνειν very frequently applies to things that sink without destruction. It is the usual word applied to the setting of the sun, or its apparent sinking in the ocean; and it is the word which Homer applies to the sinking of the marine deities who live in the bottom of the sea. Indeed, the word has no more destruction in it than βαπτίζω itself, which is occasionally applied to the sinking of ships. The matter of fact is, that whether the sinking object is destroyed or not, is learned from neither word, but from the circumstances in which it is used. If βαπτίζειν is applied to a ship going to the bottom, its destruction is known without being expressed by this word: if δυνειν is applied to Neptune, Thetis, or a sea nymph, it is in the same way known that there is no destruction. The obvious and characteristic distinction between the words is, that δυνειν is a neuter verb, signifying to *sink*, not to cause something else to sink. But a thing that sinks of itself, will doubtless *sink to the bottom*, if not prevented; and if it is subject to destruction by such sinking, it will perish. It is therefore characteristically applied to things that *sink to the bottom*. But βαπτίζειν signifies merely to dip, without respect to depth or consequence, and is as proper to the immersion of an insect on the surface of the deepest part of the ocean, as to the sinking of a ship or a whale in the same. Both words might in many cases be applied to the same thing indifferently, but in their characteristic meaning, as in the above verse, they are opposed. The expression in this verse is allegorical, literally referring to a bladder or leathern bottle, which, when empty, swims on the surface: if sufficiently filled, will dip, but will not sink. In this view, it asserts that the Athenian state, though it might be occasionally overwhelmed with calamities, yet would never perish. There is another sense which the expression might have, which is very suitable to the ambiguity of an oracle. “You may yourselves destroy “the state, otherwise it is imperishable.” A leathern bottle might be so filled, as to force it to the bottom, though it would never sink of

itself. Nothing can more decisively determine the exact characteristic import of βαπτίζειν than this verse. It is *dip*, and nothing but *dip*.

Mr Ewing's learned friend, in remarking on this word, falls into an error opposite to that of Vossius and Turretine. They make the word denote to *dip*, without going to the bottom: he makes it to *dip*, so as to continue under water. "Our Anti-pædo-baptist friends," says he, "when they contend, that from the examples adduced by them, *immersion* is the only sense in which βαπτίζω, in its literal acceptation, was employed, do not seem aware that almost all of these examples imply, not a mere *dipping*, or immersion immediately followed by an emersion, but a continued and permanent immersion, a continuance under water." Now upon this I remark, first, that if there is one example in which it applies to an immersion, followed by an emersion, it is as good as a thousand to determine that it may apply to such immersions. I observe in the second place, that not one of the examples imply a continuance under water. When the word is applied to a drowning man or a sinking ship, it no more implies the permanence of the immersion than when Plutarch uses it to signify the dipping of the hand in blood. The word has no reference to what follows the immersion; and whether the thing immersed lies at the bottom, or is taken up, cannot be learned from the word, but from the connection and circumstances. It is a childish error to suppose, that we must have a model for Christian Baptism in the meaning of the word that designates it. But if this argument had any foundation, what does the gentleman mean by it? Does he think that baptized persons ought to be drowned? This is surely very perverse. When it cannot be denied that the word denotes to *dip*, they endeavour to make it more than dipping. Then by all means let them have Baptism in their own way. When we have brought them under the water, perhaps they will not make conscience of lying at the bottom.

The example referred to by Hammond is also irresistible. It is said of Eupolis, that being thrown into the sea, εβαπτίζετο, he was *baptized*. This baptism surely was immersion. This example shews us also that the word may be applied when the object is destroyed, as well as when it is raised again out of the water, though in general things dipped are taken immediately up after the dipping. The Baptism spoken of by Plutarch, must also be immersion, βαπτισον σε εις θαλασσαν: *Baptize yourself into the sea.*

The expression quoted by Hedericus from Heliod, b. v. is

equally decisive. βαπτίζειν εἰς τὴν λίμνην, *to baptize into the lake*. And that from Æsop, τῆς νεῶς κινδυνευούσης βαπτίζεσθαι, *the ship being in danger of sinking*. If a ship sinking in the ocean is baptized, baptism must be immersion.

But the language of no writer can have more authority on this subject than that of Josephus. A Jew who wrote in the Greek language in the apostolic age, must be the best judge of the meaning of Greek words employed by Jews in his own time. Now this author uses the word frequently, and always in the sense of immersion. He uses it also sometimes figuratively with the same literal reference. Speaking of the purification from defilement by a dead body, he says, βαπτισάντες τε καὶ τῆς τεφρᾶς ταύτης εἰς πηγὴν ἔρραινον: “and having *dipped* some of the ashes into spring water, they sprinkled,” &c. Here we see the characteristic distinction between βαπτίζω and ραίνω. The one is to *dip*, the other to *sprinkle*. Antiq. l. iv. c. 4. p. 96.

On this example, Mr Ewing's friend remarks:—“Now, upon looking into the Levitical law upon this particular point, (Numb. xix. 17,) we find the direction was, ‘They shall take of the ashes, and running water shall be put thereto.’ Here, then, the *putting running water to ashes*, is expressly termed βαπτισάντες τῆς τεφρᾶς.” Let the gentleman look a little more closely, and he will see that his observation is not correct. It is true that Numb. xix. 17, and the above passage from Josephus, refer to the same thing; but they do not relate it in the same manner. The Septuagint directs, that water shall be poured upon the ashes into a vessel; Josephus relates the fact as if the ashes were thrown into the water. Now, this might make no difference as to the water of purification, but it was a difference as to the mode of preparing it. Nothing, then, can be farther from truth, than that the putting of the water on the ashes, according to Numb. xix. 17, is called by Josephus, *the baptizing of the ashes*. If Josephus speaks of the *baptizing* of the ashes, he represents the ashes as being put into the water, and not the water as being poured on the ashes. He uses the verb ἐνημι as well as βαπτίζω. According to Josephus, then, the ashes were dipped, or put into the water; though, according to the Septuagint, the water was poured out into a vessel on the ashes.

Speaking of the storm that threatened destruction to the ship that carried Jonah, he says, καὶ ὅσον οὐπὼ μελλόντας βαπτίζεσθαι τοῦ σκαφούς, “when the ship was on the point of *sinking*, or just about to be

baptized.” What was the mode of this baptism? l. ix. c. 10, p. 285.

In the history of his own life, Josephus gives an account of a remarkable escape which he had in a voyage to Rome, when the ship itself foundered in the midst of the sea: βαπτισθεντος γαρ ημων του πλοιου κατα μεσον τον αδριαν. “For our ship having been baptized or immersed in the midst of the Adriatic sea,” &c. Is there any doubt about the mode of this baptism? p. 626.

Speaking of the murder of Aristobulus, by command of Herod, he says, “The boy was sent to Jericho by night, εκει δε κατ’ εντολην υπο των γαλατων βαπτιζομενος εν κολυμηθηρα τελευτα, and there by command having been immersed in a pond by the Galatians, he perished.” Jewish War, Book I. p. 696. The same transaction is related in the Antiquities in these words: βαρουντες αι και βαπτιζοντες, ως εν παιδια νηχομενον ουκ ανηκαν εως και παντωτασιν αποπναιζαι. “Pressing him down always, as he was swimming, and *baptizing* him as in sport, they did not give over till they entirely drowned him.” Can any thing be more express and exact than this? Here the baptizers drowned the baptized person in the pool, where they were bathing, p. 453.

Describing the death of one Simon by his own hand, after he had killed his father, mother, wife, and children, lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy, he says, ολον εις την εαυτου σφαγην εβαπτισε το ξιφος. “He baptized or *plunged* his sword up to the hilt into his own bowels.” The mode here is not doubtful; the sword was dipped in his body. We have previously seen βᾶπτω used in like circumstances, and εβαψε would have been equally proper here, according to the observation already made, that words which have a characteristic distinction, may, in certain situations, be interchangeable. Εβαπτισε, *he caused it to dip*, may denote a greater effort than εβαψε, *dipped it*. Jos. Bell. Jud. l. ii. p. 752.

A little afterwards, he applies the word to the sinking of a ship: μετα δε την κεστιου συμφοραν πολλοι των επιφανων Ιουδαιων, ωςπερ βαπτιζομενης νεως απενηχοντο της πολεως. “After this misfortune of Cestius, many of the Jews of distinction left the city, as people swim away from a *sinking* ship.” Here a *sinking* ship is supposed to be baptized by *sinking*, p. 757.

He applies the word to the immersion of the ships which carried the people of Joppa, after being driven out of the city by the Romans: μετewρος υπεραρθεις ο κλυδων εβαπτισεν. “The wave high raised, *baptized* or *sunk* them.” Here is a sublime baptism. The surge, rising like mountains over the ships, immersed and sunk them to

the bottom. The surge is the baptizer, the ships are baptized, and this baptism is the sinking of them to the bottom. Joseph. Jewish War, Book iii. p. 737.

Towards the end of the same book, he thus speaks of those who perished in the lake of Gennesareth, having fled from the city of Taricheæ: *συν αυτοις εξαπτιζοντο σκαφεισι.* "They were *baptized* or *sunk* with the ships themselves," p. 792. Here the Roman soldiers were the baptizers; and in executing this duty, they sunk both ships and men.

Hippocrates uses this word sometimes, and always in the sense for which I contend. We have seen that he uses *βαπτω* very often: I have not found *βαπτίζω* more than four times. This circumstance sufficiently proves, that though the words are so nearly related, they are not perfectly identical in signification. The first occurrence of it is in p. 254. *βαπτίζειν παλιν ες γαλα γυναικος και μυρον αιγυπτιον.* "Dip it again in breast milk and Egyptian ointment." He is speaking of a blister which was first to be dipped in the oil of roses, and if when thus applied, it should be too painful, it was to be dipped again in the manner above stated. The first dipping, as we have seen from a preceding quotation, is expressed by *βαψας*. This shews that, in the radical signification of dipping, these words are perfectly of the same import; and that though they have their characteristic distinction, there are situations in which they are interchangeable, where the characteristic difference may be expressed, but is not necessary.

The same writer gives us the clearest insight into the meaning of this word, by twice comparing a peculiar kind of breathing in patients, to the breathing of a person after being immersed: *ανεπνεεν ως εκ του βεβαπτισθαι αναπνεουσι.* "He breathed as persons breathe after being baptized," p. 340. The same comparison occurs again, p. 357, in the following words: *ανεπνει, οιον εκ του βεβαπτισθαι αναπνεουσι.* Surely unbelief must be obstinate, if this does not remove it. The breathing of persons under the disease referred to, is like the breathing of a person after baptism. Can any thing, then, be more obvious, than that baptism is an immersion in water, even an immersion over head, so as to stop the breath till it is over?

Hippocrates applies the word also to a ship sinking, by being overburthened: *μη γελασω τον την νηα πολλοισι φορτιοισι βαπτισοντα, ειτα μεμφομενον τη θαλαττη οτι κατεβυθισεν αυτην πληρη.* "Shall I not laugh at the man who baptizes or immerses his ship, by overlading it; then complains on the sea, that it ingulphs it with its cargo?" p. 532.

What sort of baptism was this? Is it possible that a mind really thirsting for the knowledge of God's laws, can resist such evidence? Here we see βαπτίζω not only most definitely signifying to immerse, but contrasted with another word, which signifies this with additional circumstances. βαπτίζω is used to denote that immersion that takes place when a ship is weighed down by its burthen, so as to be completely under water: καταβυθίζω signifies to make to go down into the abyss. Yet we have more than once met with instances in which βαπτίζω itself is applied to a ship going to the bottom. But as I observed in such cases, it is not from the word itself that it is known that the ship goes to the bottom, but from the circumstances. It does not, by virtue of its own intrinsic meaning, denote going to the bottom, but to dip or immerse, without reference to depth. It may, then, be applied when the operation is extended to the bottom, as well as when it is confined to the surface. But when it is so applied, it does not definitely distinguish the idea of depth. When this is intended to be expressed, another word, as in the present case, is employed: καταβυθίζω definitely expresses *going down into the abyss*.

This word is found in Polybius, in circumstances that leave no doubt of its signification. He applies it to soldiers wading through deep water, and expressly limits its application to that part of the body which was covered with water: *μολις εως των μαζων οι πεζοι βαπτιζομενοι διεβαινον*. "The foot soldiers passed with difficulty, baptized or *immersed* up to the breast." Polyb. iii. c. 72. Does not this decisively determine the meaning of βαπτίζω? They were not, indeed, plunged over head; but for this reason, a limitation is introduced, confining the application of the word to that part of the body which was under water. That only was baptized which was buried.

The same author gives us another example equally decisive: *Αυτοι υπ' αυτων βαπτιζομενοι και καταδυνοντες εν τοις τελμασιν*. "They are of themselves baptized or immersed, and sunk in the marshes," v. c. 47. Here βαπτίζομαι is coupled with καταδυνω, as a word of similar import, though not exactly synonymous: the former denoting simple immersion; the latter, the sinking of the immersed object to the bottom.

Dio also affords evidence decisive of the same meaning: *παντελως βαπτιζονται*. "They are entirely baptized, sunk, overwhelmed, or immersed," xxxviii. p. 84.

He applies it, as we have seen it employed by others, to the

sinking of ships : χειμων τοιουτος εξαιφνης την χωραν απασαν κατεσκεν ωστε—
τα πλοια τα εν τω Γιβεριδι—βαπτισθηναι. “ So great a storm suddenly
arose through the whole country, that the boats were *baptized* or
sunk in the Tiber,” xxxvii. What then is baptism but immersion?

He applies it in the same way, L. 492: πως μεν αν ουχ’ υπ’ αυτου τοι πλη-
θους των κωπων βαπτισθειη. “How could it escape *sinking*, from the very
multitude of rowers.” We see, then, that the classical writers in
the Greek language, without exception, know nothing of this word
in any other signification than that of *immersing*. They never
apply it to any other mode. They no more apply it to *pouring* or
sprinkling, &c. than to *warming* or *cooling*. Such significations
have been conjured up by profane ingenuity, endeavouring to force
the words of the Spirit of God into agreement with the long estab-
lished practices of men, in perverting the ordinances of God.

Porphyry applies the word to the heathen opinion of the baptism
of the wicked in Styx, the famous lake of hell : οταν δε κατηγορουμενος
επιση, αναμαρτητος μεν ων αδεως διερχεται, αχρι των γονατων εχων το υδαρ, αμαρ-
τωνδε, ολιγον προεας βαπτιζεται μεχρι κεφαλης. “ When the accused per-
son enters the lake, if he is innocent, he passes boldly through,
having the water up to his knees ; but if guilty, having advanced a
little, he is *plunged* or baptized up to the head.” De Styge, p. 282.
The baptism of Styx, then, is an immersion of the body up to the
head. The part not dipped, is expressly excepted.

Diodorus Siculus applies the word to the sinking of beasts carried
away by a river : Των δε χερσαιων θηριων τα πολλα μεν υπο του ποταμου
περιληφθεντα διαφθειρεται βαπτιζομενα, τινα δε εις τους μετεωρους εκφευγοντα τοπους
διαζωσεται. “ The most of the land animals being caught by the
river, *sinking* or *being baptized*, perish ; but some escaping to
the higher grounds, are saved.” I. p. 33. Here, to be *baptized*,
is to sink in water. This example, also, confirms my observa-
tion, that though when *sinking to the bottom*, or *sinking in the
great deep*, is designed to be distinguished from simple immer-
sion, βαπτιζω could not suit the situation ; but another word, such
as καταδυω, καταλευθιζω, καταποντιζω, &c. is used: yet βαπτιζω will apply
to the deepest immersion, and to destruction by immersion, when
there is no contrast, and when the depth and destruction are known
from other words or circumstances in the connection. Βαπτιζω de-
notes simple immersion, yet it may be used in circumstances when
that immersion is certainly known to *be going to the bottom*, and
being destroyed.

There are instances in which the word is by some translated

wash, and in which the general meaning may be thus well enough expressed in a free version. Still, however, the word, even in such situations, does not express the idea of washing, but has its own peculiar meaning of *mode*, the idea of *washing* being only a consequence from the *dipping*. There are some cases in which it is pretended that it must apply to purification by sprinkling, &c. Now, as I am pledged to shew, that the word does not signify to *wash in any manner*, I am still more bound to shew that it does not denote purification by *sprinkling*. I shall therefore now attend to this part of the subject.

In Ecclesiast. xxxiv. 30, it is said, “He that washeth himself because of a dead body, and toucheth it again, what availeth his washing?” Now, as βαπτίζομενος is the word here used, and as from Numb. xix. 18, we learn that such a person was to be purified by sprinkling, does it follow that βαπτίζω must signify to sprinkle, or to purify by sprinkling? He that wishes to see this objection honestly stated in all its strength, and refuted in the most triumphant manner, may consult Dr Gale’s Reflections on Dr Wall’s History of Infant Baptism. But the answer must be obvious to every person who consults Numb. xix. 19, which shews that sprinkling was but a part of that purification, and that the unclean person was also *bathed in water*. It is this *bathing* that is effected by *baptism*. The passage in question ought to be translated,—“He that *dippeth* or *baptizeth* himself because of a dead body, and toucheth it again, what availeth his *dipping* or *baptism*?” The word βαπτίζω has here its appropriate meaning, without the smallest deviation.

Besides, had there been no immersion or bathing of the whole body enjoined in Numbers, I would utterly despise this objection. Though God had not made bathing of the body a part of this purification, might not the traditions of the elders have made the addition? And would not this have been sufficient authority for the author of this Apocryphal book to make a ground of his reasoning? When I have proved the meaning of a Greek word, by the authority of the whole consent of Greek literature, I will not surrender it to the supposition of the strict adherence of the Jewish nation, in the time of the writing of the Apocrypha, to the Mosaic ritual. We know that they made many additions, and that these were esteemed as of equal authority with the rites of Moses.

For a very full and interesting discussion of Luke xi. 38, and Mark vii. 4, let the reader consult Dr Gale, p. 125. Here he will find a triumphant answer to every quibble from Dr Wall.

But as the text itself is perfectly sufficient for my purpose, I shall not swell my volume with quotations from that learned writer. In our version, Luke xi. 38, *εβαπτισθη* is translated wash. "And when the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he had not first washed before dinner." The objection is, does not *βαπτισω*, then, sometimes denote *to wash*? Nay, farther, as the Jews washed the hands by having water poured on them, and as this passage respects the washing of the hands, is there not here evidence that the word in question sometimes signifies *to wash by pouring*? This, surely, is as strong a statement of their objection as our opponents can wish. Yet in all its plausibility, I despise it. Even here, the word signifies *to dip*, and not *to wash*. *Dipping* is the thing expressed; *washing* is the consequence, known by inference. It is dipping, whether it relates to the hands or the whole body. But many examples from the Jews, and also from the Greeks, it is said, prove that the hands were washed by pouring water on them by a servant; and I care not that ten thousand such examples were brought forward. Though this might be the usual mode of washing the hands, it might not be the only mode, which is abundantly sufficient for my purpose. The possibility of this is enough for me; but Dr Gale has proved from Dr Pococke, that the Jews sometimes washed their hands by *dipping*. People of distinction might have water poured on their hands by servants, but it is not likely that this was the common practice of the body of the people, in any nation. The examples from Homer cannot inform us with respect to the practice of the common people.

But I say this without any view to my argument in this place, for it is evident that the word does not here refer to the washing of the hands. It may apply to any part, as well as to the whole; but whenever it is used without its regimen expressed, it applies to the whole body. When a part only is dipped, the part is mentioned, or some part is excepted, as is the case with *λουω*. The passage, then, ought to have been translated,—“And when the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he was not baptized, or dipped, before dinner.” The Pharisees themselves, on some occasions, would not eat till they had used the bath, and this Pharisee might expect still more eminent devotion from Jesus. Indeed, to use the bath before dinner, was a very common practice in eastern countries; and the practice would still be more in vogue with those who considered it a religious purification. But there is no need to refer to the practice of the time, nor to ransack the writings of the Rabbins,

for the practice of the Jews. We have here the authority of the Holy Spirit for the Jewish custom. He uses the word βαπτίζω, and that word signifies *to dip*, and only *to dip*. If I have established the acceptation of this word by the consent of use, even an inexplicable difficulty in this case would not affect the certainty of my conclusions. But the difficulty is not inexplicable. What should hinder the word to have here its usual import?

Mark vii. 4. our translators render, “except they wash, they eat not.” Now, my opponents may say, does not βαπτίζω here signify to wash? I answer, no. *Dipping* is the thing expressed; but it is used in such circumstances as to imply *washing*. The *washing* is a consequence from the dipping. It ought to have been translated, “except they dip themselves, they eat not.” In the preceding context, we are told that in ordinary they do not eat without washing their hands. Here we are told that when they come from market, they eat not till they are *dipped or baptized*. Dr Campbell’s notion, that νίπτω and βαπτίζω here both refer to the hands, the one to washing by having water poured on them, and the other by dipping them, I do not approve. For, though βαπτίζω will apply to the dipping of the hands, as well as to the dipping of the whole body, yet when no part is mentioned or excepted, the whole body is always meant. His view of the matter I consider nothing but an ingenious conceit, without any authority from the practice of the language. Νίπτω cannot denote a peculiar mode of washing, in distinction from another mode. Besides, to wash any thing by mere dipping, is not so thorough a washing as may be expressed by νίπτω. Now, if the words both refer to the washing of the hands, the first will be the best washing, which is contrary to Dr Campbell’s supposition. Dr Campbell, indeed, with Pearce and Weitstein, understands πύγμα of a handful of water. But they produce no example in which πύγμα has this signification, and therefore the opinion has no authority. Indeed, there is a self-contradiction in the opinion of these learned writers on this point. Πύγμα, they properly consider as signifying the fist, or shut hand; and from this, suppose that the word here denotes as much water as may be held in the hollow of the hand, with the fingers closed. But a fist will hold no water; and the hand with the fingers closed so as to hold water, is no fist. With as little reason can it be supposed to signify, as Dr Campbell suggests, that πύγμα denotes the manner of washing, with reference to the form of the hands when they wash each other. In such circumstances, neither

of them is a fist, but still less the washing hand. In this operation the hands infold one another, and if there is any thing like a fist, it is the two hands united. Dr Campbell quotes, with approbation, the remark of Wetstein: “βαπτίζεσθαι, est modus aquæ immergere, *νπρεσθαι*, manibus affundere.” But the former does not signify to dip *the hands*, except the regimen is expressed; and though the latter applies to pouring water on the hands, it will equally apply to washing out of a bason. Parkhurst, indeed, translates the phrase, “*to wash the hands with the fist*, that is, by rubbing water on the palm of one hand, with the doubled fist of the other.” This distinguishes the infolded hand as the rubbing hand, but, as a matter of fact, I believe that, though both hands may be said to rub on each other, yet the infolding hand is distinguished as the rubbing hand. *To wash the hand with the fist*, is not an expression which would be likely to be chosen to express the operation of washing the hands. The palm of one hand is applied to the palm of the other; and when the palm of one hand is applied to the back of the other, the intention is to cleanse the latter, and not by the latter to cleanse the former. Besides, the inside hand is seldom closed into a fist. I prefer, therefore, the explanation of Lightfoot, which is both most agreeable to the meaning of *πυγμα*, and to the Jewish traditions. He understands it as denoting *the hand as far as the fist extended*. This is agreeable to the definition of the word by Pollux: “If you shut your hand, the outside is called *πυγμα*.” and it is agreeable to the Jewish traditions, one of which, he shews, enjoins such a washing. The contrast, then, here, is between the washing of the hands up to the wrist, and the immersion of the whole body. Dr Campbell, indeed, remarks, that “it ought to be observed, that *βαπτισωνται* is not in the passive voice, but the middle, and is contrasted with *νψωνται*, also in the middle, so that, by every rule, the latter must be understood actively as well as the former.” But, though I understand *βαπτισωνται* in the middle voice, I do not acknowledge that this is necessarily required from a contrast with *νψωνται*. Let the meaning of this passage be what it will, the active, passive, and middle voices, might be so associated. I know no rule that requires such a conformity as Dr Campbell here demands. It might be said of Christians, *κυριακον δειπνον φαγουσι, και βαπτιζονται*. *They eat the Lord's Supper, and they are baptized*. The contrast between *νψωνται* and *βαπτισωνται* in the passage referred to, does not require the same voice. *Νψωσι*, the active itself, might have been used, and *βαπτισωνται* in the pas-

sive. I understand it in the middle, not because *νιψωνται* is middle, but because in the baptism referred to, every one baptized himself. Had it been as in Christian baptism, I would understand it in the passive.

Mr Ewing translates the passage thus: "For the Pharisees and all the Jews, except they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the tradition of the elders. And *even when they have come from a market, unless they baptize, they eat not,*" &c. But the word *oft*, as a translation of *πυγμα*, is liable to the objections of Dr Campbell, which I need not here repeat. Mr Ewing surely should have obviated them. Besides, neither Mr Ewing, nor any other, so far as I know, has produced one example, in which *πυγμα* confessedly signifies *oft*. Without this the translation has no authority. Mr Ewing translates *και* *and even*, for which there is no authority. That particle often signifies *even*, but never *and even*. Mr Ewing's translation makes their baptism after the market, inferior to the washing before mentioned. But this certainly reverses the true meaning. Defilement certainly was understood to be increased by the market. Mr Ewing indeed endeavours to give a turn to this, but it is a complete failure. "And in order to shew how strictly they hold this tradition," he says, "they observed it, not merely on their more solemn occasions, but even when they had just come from places of public resort, and from the ordinary intercourse of life." But where did Mr Ewing find *their more solemn occasions*? This is apocryphal, and like the Apocrypha, it contradicts the genuine Scriptures. The Evangelist declares, that *except they wash their hands, they eat not*. This implies, that they never sat down to table, even at their ordinary meals, without washing. The baptism after market, then, must have been a greater or more extensive purification. Mr Ewing supposes that the word *baptize* is used here to shew that the washing was not for cleanliness, but was a religious custom. But this is shewn sufficiently, if *baptize* were not used. It is directly stated, that this washing was obedience to the tradition of the elders. I observe farther, that if the washing was not by other circumstances known to be a religious custom, this would not have been known by the word *βαπτίζω* more than by *νιπτω*. Besides *βαπτισωνται* does not here explain or limit *νιψωνται*. If the latter could not, with the words construed with it, be known to designate a religious observance, it can receive no assistance from the former. Mr Ewing understands both words as referring to the same thing, washing the hands by water poured on them. Why

then is *νιπτω* changed for *βαπτίζω*? Surely the change of the word intimates a change of the meaning in such circumstances. “They eat not, except they wash their hands. And after market, they eat not, except they *baptize*.” Surely no person, who has not a purpose to serve, would suppose that *baptize* here meant the very same thing with *wash the hands*. But if it is insisted that *baptize* here is distinguished from *νιπτω* as a religious washing, then how will it determine that *νιπτω* here refers to a religious washing? If it is here so distinguished from *νιπτω*, then the washing denoted by *νιπτω* cannot be a religious washing. This would import, that the washing of the hands first spoken of by *νιπτω* was not a religious washing; and that the latter washing was distinguished from the former by this. The meaning then would be: “Except they wash their hands, they eat not; and when they have come from the market, they eat not, until they have washed their hands religiously.”

But as respects my argument, I care not whether *βαπτισωνται* here refers to the hands or the whole body; it is perfectly sufficient for me, if it here admits its usual meaning. Let it be here observed, and never let it be forgotten, that with respect to the meaning of a word in any passage, the proof that it has such a meaning always lies upon him who uses it in that meaning as an argument or objection; for this obvious reason, that if it is not proved, it is neither argument nor objection. Now if I choose to bring this passage as an argument, or as additional evidence, I must prove its meaning. In this way I have viewed it as having weight. But if I choose to give up its evidence, and stand on the defence, my antagonist is bound to prove his view of it as a ground of his objection, and my cause requires no more of me than to shew that the word in such a situation is capable of the meaning for which I contend. For it is evident, that if it may have such a meaning, it cannot be certain that it has not that signification. Many a passage may contain the disputed word in such circumstances as to afford no definite evidence. It cannot, in such a passage, be used as proof: it is enough, if it admits the meaning contended for. This is a grand law of controversy, attention to which will save the advocates of truth much useless toil; and keep them from attempting to prove what it may not be possible to prove, and what they are not required to prove. It will also assist the inquirer to arrive at truth. Now in the present case, except Mr Ewing proves that *βαπτισωνται* *must* here signify the *pouring of water* upon the hands, or that it cannot refer to the dipping of the hands or the body, he has done

nothing. I bring passages without number, to prove that the word *must* have the meaning for which I contend. No objection then could be valid against my conclusion, except a passage in which it *cannot have* that signification. These observations I state as self-evident truth: The man who does not perceive their justness, cannot be worth reasoning with.

But why should it be thought incredible, that the Pharisees immersed themselves after market? If an Egyptian, on touching a swine, would run to the river and plunge in with his clothes, is it strange that the superstitious Pharisees should *immerse* themselves after the pollution of the market?

Dr Gale, however, on the authority of the Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, and Persic versions, is inclined to understand the passage as relating to the dipping of the things bought in the market. But as I decidedly prefer the other sense, I will not avail myself of this resource. I abhor the practice of catching at any forced meaning that serves a temporary purpose, at the expense of setting loose the meaning of God's word. I do not wish to force a favourite mode of baptism on the Scriptures, but I will implicitly submit my mind to the mode that God has appointed. I have not a wish on the subject, but to know the will of Christ.

What our version, Mark vii. 4. calls the *washing*, &c. the original calls βαπτισμοὺς, *the baptisms* of cups, pots, &c. It may then be asked, does not this imply that this word signifies washing? But I answer as before, that though these things were *dipped* for *washing*, yet *dipping* and *washing* are not the same thing. The *washing* is not expressed, but is a mere consequence of the *dipping*. The passage, then, ought to be translated *dippings*, or *immersions*, or *baptisms*, if the last term is adopted as an English word. The purification of all the things specified, except the last, was appointed by the law, Levit. xi. 32. to be affected by being put under water. But with respect to the κλιναι, or beds, Mr Ewing asserts that the translation *dippings* would be manifestly absurd. Now what is manifestly absurd cannot be true. If this assertion then is well founded, Mr Ewing has opposed a barrier which the boldest cannot pass. But why is this absurd? Let us hear his own words. "The articles specified in ver. 4. are all utensils and accommodations of the Jewish mode of eating, about which the Evangelist was speaking; from the "cups, pots, and brazen vessels" of the cook and the butler, to the "beds" of the *triclinium*, or dining room, for the use of the family and their guests. There were three only

of these beds in one room. Each was commonly occupied by three persons, and sometimes by five, or even more. Three such beds probably accommodated our Lord and his disciples at the last supper. They must have been of such a size, therefore, as to preclude the idea of their being immersed, especially being frequently immersed, as a religious ordinance." Now I will admit this account in every tittle, yet still contend that there is nothing like *an absurdity* in the supposition, that the *couches* were immersed. The thing is quite possible, and who will say that the superstitious Pharisees might not practise it? It would indeed be a very inconvenient thing, but what obstacles will not superstition overcome? It would be a foolish thing; but who would expect any thing but folly in will-worship? Such religious practice was indeed absurd, but it is an abuse of language to assert that it is *an absurdity* to say that the Pharisees immersed their couches. Let Mr Ewing beware of using such language. If the Holy Spirit has asserted that the Pharisees *baptized* their couches, and if this word signifies *to immerse*, Mr Ewing has asserted that the Holy Spirit has asserted an absurdity. This is no light matter. It is an awful charge on the Spirit of Inspiration.

Dr Wardlaw is equally rash on this point. He supposes that it is incredible that they *immersed* their beds. How is it incredible? Is the thing impossible? If not, its credibility depends on the testimony. But whether or not the Holy Spirit gives the testimony, depends on the meaning of the word. If from other passages we learn that it has this meaning, this passage cannot teach the contrary, if the thing is possible. Upon the principle of interpretation here recognized by Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw, we might reject every thing in history not suited to our own conceptions; or explain them away by paring down the meaning of words. This is the very principle of the Neological explanation of the Scripture miracles. The things are thought absurd in the obvious meaning of the words; and therefore the language must submit to accept a meaning suitable to the conceptions of the critics. Mr Robinson thinks the common view of the exploit of Samson in killing such a multitude with the jaw-bone of an ass incredible, and he takes away the incredibility of the Scriptural account, by explaining it of the tooth of a rock which Samson pulled down on his enemies. Dr Wardlaw says, with respect to the immersion of beds, "he who can receive it, let him receive it." I say, he who dare reject it, rejects the testimony of God. This is a most im-

proper way to speak on the subject. If *immersion* is the meaning of the word, it is not optional to receive or reject it. Whether or not this is its meaning, must be learned from its history, not from the abstract probability or improbability of the immersion of beds. If the history of the word declares its meaning to be immersion, *the mere difficulty of immersing beds, in conformity to a religious tradition, cannot imply that it has another meaning here.* The principle, then, of this objection, and the language in which these writers state it, cannot be too strongly reprobated. If adopted on other questions respecting the will of God, it tends to set us loose from the authority of his word.

I will here reduce my observations on this point to the form of a canon. *When a thing is proved by sufficient evidence, no objection from difficulties can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility.* This is self-evident, for otherwise nothing could ever be proved. If every man's view of abstract probability were allowed to outweigh evidence, no truth would stand the test. The existence of God could not be proved. The Scriptures themselves could not abide such a trial. If my canon is not self-evident, let no man receive it. But if it is just, it overturns not only this objection, but almost all [the objections that have been alleged against immersion in Baptism. Besides, there is hardly any point of theological controversy in which it may not be useful. Many who are willing to admit it on the subject of Baptism, may act contrary to it on other subjects. Indeed, there are few who do not in things of small moment overlook this principle.

In tracing the history of Jesus, we will see how much of the opposition to his claims were founded on the principle which my canon reprobates. When he said that he was the bread that came down from heaven, the Jews murmured, and replied, "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? How is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?" John vi. 42. Here was a difficulty that they thought insuperable. "We are sure he was born among us—he could not therefore have come from heaven." But there was a solution to this difficulty, had their prejudices permitted them to find it. It was possible, that though born on earth, as a man, he might come from heaven, as he was God. But they were glad to catch at the apparent inconsistency; and their prejudices would not allow them to attempt to vindicate themselves. This in fact is the very substance of one common objection to the Deity of Christ. The Arians still collect all the passages

that assert the human nature of Christ, and takes it for granted that this is a proof that he is not God. Let our brethren take care that it is not on the same principle they allege this objection to immersion in Baptism. Were there no wish to find evidence on one side only, would it be supposed that it is *absurd* or *incredible* that the superstitious Pharisees *immersed* even their couches?—Another striking instance of objecting on this principle we have, John vii. 41, 42. “ Shall Christ come out of Galilee? Hath not the Scripture said, that Christ cometh of the seed of David, and out of the town of Bethlehem, where David was?” This would appear to them a noose from which he could not extricate himself—a difficulty that he could not solve. *The Scriptures assert, that the Christ will come out of Bethlehem, but this man has come out of Galilee.* Had they been as willing to see evidence in his favour, as evidence against him, they might have perceived that the agreement of these apparent contradictions was not impossible. The knowledge of his real history would have given the solution. But it was not a solution they wanted. In reading the history of Jesus also, it is not uninteresting to remark, that many things which appeared to his enemies decisive evidence against him, had no weight at all with his friends. This discrepancy shews how much our sentiments are under the influence of our feelings, and consequently the guilt of unbelief, with respect to any part of the divine counsel which we reject. Though we have no right to judge one another, we have a right, when God has given a revelation, to ascribe all ignorance of it to sin. I make this observation not merely with respect to the point now in debate, or to criminate my opponents. The observation applies to every error, and as no man has attained in every thing to truth, it applies to us all. I make the observation to incite my brethren on both sides of this subject, to search without prejudice—to inquire under the influence of an impression of great accountability.

I will state farther, that in proving that a thing is not impossible, there is no obligation to prove, that any of the possible ways of solution did actually exist. The bare possibility of existence is enough. This also is self-evident, and may be stated as a canon. Yet from inattention to this, the opponents of immersion are constantly calling on us to prove, that there were in such and such places things necessary for dipping. Mr Ewing gauges the reservoirs and wells of Jerusalem, to shew their insufficiency for immersion. He may then call on me to find a place sufficient to immerse

a couch. But I will go on no such errand. If I have proved the meaning of the word, I will believe the Spirit of God, who tells me that the Pharisees baptized their beds, and leave the superstition and industry of the devotees to find or make such a place. Let the demand which our opponents in this instance make on us, be conceded to the infidel, the Bible must be given up. In replying to difficulties started by the deist, the defender of Christianity thinks he has amply done his duty, when he shews that the solution is possible, without proving that the possible way of solution did actually exist. Indeed, many of the defenders of Christianity undertake too much, and lay too much stress on actual proof, with respect to the way in which difficulties may be removed. When such proof can be got, it is always right to produce it, more clearly to confound the infidel. But it is extremely injudicious to lay such a stress on these solutions, as if they were actually necessary. It ought always to be strongly stated, that such proof is more than the defence of truth requires. When writers think themselves remarkably successful in this way, they are not disinclined to magnify the importance of their discoveries, and are willing to rest a part of the evidence on their own success. This discovers more vanity than judgment, and more desire for the glory of discovery, than for the interests of the truths defended. When this happens, it is not strange that infidels are emboldened to make the unreasonable demand, which their opponents have voluntarily rendered themselves liable to answer. If I could prove that there was at Jerusalem a pond that could immerse the High Church of Glasgow, I would certainly bring forward my proof; but I would as certainly disclaim the necessity. To give an example. In opposition to Dr Campbell's opinion, that in Mark vii. 4. βαπτισονται refers to the dipping of the hands, Mr Ewing, as his proof, alleges, that "as far as he has observed, there is only one way of washing either the hands or the feet in Scripture, and that is, by pouring water upon them, and rubbing them as the water flows." Now, were I of Dr Campbell's opinion on this passage, I would grant Mr Ewing all this, yet abide by my position. It is very possible that all the other instances of washing the hands that are mentioned in Scripture may be such, yet a different way have been in existence on some occasions. And if the expression were βαπτισωσι τας χειρας, this I would suppose not only possible, but undoubtedly true. No number of examples of one mode of washing the hands, can prove that no other mode was ever practised, when the thing does not respect a divine ordinance, but

either the ordinary washing, or the superstitious washing enjoined by the commandments of men. It is of vast importance in every controversy to know what we are obliged to prove, and what is not necessary to our argument. From inattention to this, Mr Ewing thinks he has defeated Dr Campbell, when he has never touched him. His weapons fall quite on this side of the mark. Now, on this last point I differ from Dr Campbell. I do not think that βαπτισματα refers to the dipping of the hands. Yet I would not use Mr Ewing's arguments to disprove this. Indeed, were Dr Campbell alive, he would not be so easily defeated. Mr Ewing discredits his authority on the subject of *immersion* as the Scriptural mode of Baptism, by representing him as resting his opinion on Tertullian among the ancients, and Weitstein among the moderns. Nothing can be more unfair. He merely refers to Tertullian, to shew the sense in which the word βαπτίζω was understood by the Latin fathers, and quotes the opinion of Weitstein, with a general approbation of him as a critic, certainly beyond his deserts, and with respect to a criticism which I believe to be false. But Dr Campbell was not a man to found his views on such authority. When he says, "I have heard a disputant of this stamp, in defiance of *etymology* and *use*, maintain that the word rendered in the New Testament *baptize*, means more properly to sprinkle than to plunge; and in defiance of all *antiquity*, that the former method was the earliest, and for many centuries the most general practice in *baptizing*," does he not found on his own knowledge of *etymology* and *use*—on his own knowledge of *antiquity*? Will Mr Ewing venture to say that Doctor Campbell was not well acquainted with the *etymology* and use of the word in question? From what modern must he receive instruction with respect to the antiquities of church history? It may be true, indeed, that Dr Campbell has not done all for this subject that he might have done. But did he fail in what he attempted? Who would expect that in his situation he could have done more? Nor is his candour in confessing a mode of baptism primitive, which he did not adopt, to be ascribed to a vanity of patronizing what he did not practise. Like many others, he may have thought that the mode was not essential to the ordinance. And I have no hesitation in affirming, that such an opinion is far less injurious to the Scriptures, than the attempt of those who will force their favourite mode out of the Scriptures, while even on the rack they will not make the confession. Such persons are obliged to give a false turn to a great part of Scripture,

totally unconcerned in the controversy. Nay, they are obliged to do violence even to the classics. Popery itself is not obliged, on this point, to make such havoc of the word of God. It has a happy power of changing Scripture ordinances, and, therefore, on this point can confess the truth without injury to its system.

I am led to the defence of Doctor Campbell, not from a wish to have the authority of his name on my side on this question. In that point of view, I do not need him. I consider myself as having produced such a body of evidence on this subject, that I am entitled to disregard the mere authority of names. I have appealed to a tribunal higher than the authority of all critics—to use itself. I do not hold up Dr Campbell as universally successful in his criticisms. Many of them I am convinced are wrong; and those who have in all things made our version of the Gospels conform to his, have done no service to the cause of Christ. His judgment is always to be respected, but often to be rejected. On some points of Christian doctrine, he was evidently but partially enlightened, and against some he has made his translation and criticisms to bear. But as a man of integrity—as a candid adversary—as a philosophic critic, he has few equals. With respect to the philosophy of language, he is immeasurably before all our scripture critics. I bow to the authority of no man in the things of God, yet I cannot but reverence Dr Campbell. I respect him almost as much when I differ from him, as when we are agreed. He looks into language with the eye of a philosopher, and in controversy manifests a candour unknown to most theologians. Mr Ewing's censure of Dr Campbell involves the great body of learned men: It is too notorious to need proof, that the most learned men in Europe, while they practised sprinkling or pouring, have confessed immersion to be the primitive mode.

But with respect to Mark vii. 4, though it were proved that the couches could not be immersed, I would not yield an inch of the ground I have occupied. There is no absolute necessity to suppose that the κλῖνας, or beds, were the couches at table. The word, indeed, both in Scripture and in Greek writers, has this signification: But in both, it also signifies the beds on which they slept. Now, if it were such beds that the Pharisees *baptized*, there is nothing to prevent their immersion. They were such that a man could take up from the street, and carry to his house, Matt. ix. 6.

Besides, as it is not said how often they purified in this manner, we are at liberty to suppose that it was only for particular kinds of

uncleanness, and on occasions that did not often occur. Mr Ewing, indeed, says, "there was, no doubt, a complete observance of the 'baptisms' of cups, and pots, and brazen vessels, and beds, at the feast of the marriage in Cana in Galilee." There is no doubt that at that feast there was a purification of all things, according to the custom of a wedding: But where did Mr Ewing learn that it was *during the feast* that the couches were purified? The water-pots were, no doubt, for the purification usual at a wedding: But this does not indicate all Jewish purifications. The hands and the feet of the guests were washed, and very likely also the vessels used at the feast: But that the couches were purified, is not said, and is not likely. It is not necessary even that all things purified at a feast, should have been purified out of these water-pots. It is enough that they were suitable for the purification of some things. If there was any thing to be purified, which could not be purified in them, it may have been purified elsewhere. It is not said that all things were purified in these water-pots. Besides, it is not said that these water-pots were but once filled during the wedding feast. We may therefore fill them as often as we find necessary. I do not, therefore, find it at all necessary, with Mr Ewing, to gauge these water-pots, in order to settle this question.

Mr Bruce informs us, that in Abyssinia, the sect called Kemmont, "wash themselves *from head to foot*, after coming from the market, or any public place, where they may have touched any one of a different sect from their own, esteeming all such unclean." Is it strange, then, to find the Pharisees, the superstitious Pharisees, immersing their couches for purification, or themselves after market? I may add, that the couches might have been so constructed, that they might be conveniently taken to pieces, for the purpose of purification. This I say only for the sake of those who will not believe God without a voucher. For myself, it is perfectly sufficient that the Holy Spirit testifies that the Pharisees baptized themselves before eating, after market; and that they baptized their couches. It is an axiom in science, that no difficulty can avail against demonstration; and with me it is an axiom, that no difficulty entitles us to give the lie to the Spirit of inspiration.

In Heb. ix. 10, the word βαπτισμοις is translated *washings*. Is not this proof that the word signifies to wash? The reply to this has already been given, in shewing the difference between *dip* and *wash*. The translation ought to be "different baptisms," not "different washings." *Dipping* is the thing expressed, *washing* is

a consequence. But Dr Wardlaw observes, “that amongst the ‘divers washings’ (βαπτισματα, baptisms) of the old dispensation referred to, Heb. ix. 10, must surely be included all the various modes of Jewish purification; and consequently the ραντισματα, or *sprinklings*, which were the most numerous,” p. 172. But how is this certain? Why should it be supposed that the *baptisms* under the law contained all the purifications required by the law? This is not said here, nor any where else in the Scriptures. There is no necessity to suppose that every thing enjoined in the law must be included in the things here mentioned. The apostle designs to illustrate merely by specification, not to give a logical abstract. But even were the *sprinklings* to be included in one or other of the things mentioned, it may be in the *carnal ordinances*. It is a very convenient way of proving any thing, to take it for granted. Dr Wardlaw here takes for granted the thing to be proved. The phrase, “divers baptisms,” must indicate the *sprinklings*; therefore baptism must signify sprinkling, as one of its meanings. But we deny that the “divers baptisms” include the *sprinklings*. The phrase alludes to the *immersion* of the different things that by the law were to be *immersed*. The greatest part of false reasoning depends on false first principles. Dr Wardlaw’s first principle here, is like that of Nathanael with respect to Christ: “Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?” If it is granted that no good thing could come out of Nazareth, the proof was undoubted, that Jesus was not the Christ. To refute such reasoning, we have only to demand the proof of the premises.

Judith xii. 7. is another passage which may be alleged to prove that βαπτίζω sometimes signifies to wash; but from what has frequently been observed on the like use of the word, with how little reason, will appear in a moment: “And she went out in the night, and baptized herself in the camp at a fountain,” και εβαπτισθη εν τη παρεμβολη επι της πηγης του υδατος. Εβαπτισθη ought here to have been translated *she dipped herself*. Washing was the consequence of dipping in pure water. Homer speaks of *stars washed in the sea*, (Il. E. 6.); and Virgil, expressing the same thing, speaks of the constellation of the bear, as fearing to be *dipped* in the ocean, (Georg. I. 245.) Now, though exactly the same thing is referred to, the expressions are not exactly equivalent. By the word *washing*, Homer fixes our attention, not on the mere dipping, but on the effect of it,—the washing of the stars by being dipped. Virgil fixes our attention, not on the washing of the stars, but on

their dipping, with reference to the danger or disagreeableness of the operation. We may say either *fill the pitcher*, or *dip the pitcher*; but this does not imply that *dip* signifies to *fill*. In like manner, the word βαπτίζω is used when persons sink in water, and perish. Whiston, in his version of Josephus, sometimes translates it *drown*. But does this imply that βαπτίζω signifies to *drown*, or to *perish*? The *perishing* or the *drowning*, is the consequence of dipping in certain circumstances. The person, then, who so perishes, may be said to be drowned. But this is not a translation; it is a commentary. I have already pointed out the fallacy of that position, which is a first principle with most critics; namely, the supposition, that words are equivalent, which in any circumstances are interchangeable. It is an error plausible, but mischievous. Yet, on no better foundation does Dr Wall, and innumerable others after him, argue that βαπτίζω must signify to wash in general. The verb λουω is applied to baptism; therefore βαπτίζω, it is thought, must signify to wash as well as λουω.

Mr Ewing, indeed, says, “ In this case, the washing could not have been by immersion, being done at a spring or fountain of water.” But what sort of impossibility is this? Was it utterly impossible to have a conveniency for bathing, near a fountain? On the contrary, is it not very probable that stone troughs, or other vessels, were usually provided at fountains, for bathing, and washing clothes? We find such a provision at two fountains near Troy, mentioned by Homer, lib. xxii. 153.

Ενθα δ' ἐπ' αὐταῶν πλῦνοι εὐρέες ἐγγυς εἶσι
Καλοὶ, λαινοὶ, ὅθι εἴματα, &c.

“ Two fountains, tepid one, from which a smoke
Issues voluminous, as from a fire;
The other, ev'n in summer's heats, like hail
For cold, or snow, or crystal stream frost-bound.
Beside them may be seen the broad canals
Of marble scoop'd, in which the wives of Troy,
And all her daughters fair, were wont to lave
Their costly raiment, while the land had rest,” &c.

COWPER.

We find also a like provision at a river in Phæacia, in the Odyssey, lib. vi. 86.

Ενθ' ἡ τοὶ πλῦνοι ἦσαν ἐπηστάνοι, πολὺ δ' ὕδωρ
Καλὸν ὑπεκπρόρει, &c.

“ At the delightful rivulet arrived,
 Where those perennial cisterns were prepared,
 With purest crystal of the fountain fed
 Profuse,” &c.

COWPER.

Why, then, may not such a provision have been at the fountain referred to, especially as it was in a camp? Is it likely, that in such a place there would be no convenience for bathing? Indeed, nothing is more common in our own country, than where there is no river, to have a vessel, or contrivance of some kind, for bathing, near a well. But I produce this evidence as a mere work of supererogation. Nothing more can be required of me, than to shew that the thing is not impossible. Even were it certain, that at this fountain there was no such provision, might not some person have supplied her with a vessel? To argue as Mr Ewing does here, is to reason without first principles. He takes it for granted, that a thing is impossible, which is so far from being impossible, that it is not improbable. Were this a lawful mode of reasoning, it would be an easy thing to disprove every thing.

I shall now try what evidence can be found to determine the literal meaning of the word βαπτίζω, from its figurative applications. When a word is used figuratively, the figure is founded on the literal meaning; and therefore, by examining the figure, we may discover additional evidence with respect to the literal meaning. And here I would first observe, that some instances of figurative use may not be decisive, as well as some instances of literal use. It is enough that every instance of both literal and figurative use, will explain fairly on the supposition of the meaning for which we contend, when other instances irresistibly and confessedly imply it. Our opponents contend, that in some of its figurative occurrences the allusion is to *pouring*. “ In this sense of *pouring upon*, and *pouring into*,” says Mr Ewing, “ till mind and body are *overwhelmed*, *impregnated*, *intoxicated*, and the circumstances are oppressive, or even destructive, the word is very frequently used in profane writers.” In opposition to this, I assert that not one of all Mr Ewing’s examples necessarily refer to *pouring upon*, or *pouring into*. In many of them, the translation may be *overwhelm*; but in this term, the reference is not to water *poured upon*, or *poured into*, but to water coming over in a current, like the tide overwhelming the beach. This is strictly and characteristically expressed by κλύω. To this, some of the figurative occurrences

of βαπτίζω have a reference; and here there is a real immersion. The *overwhelming* water *baptizes* or *sinks* the person or thing baptized. Some of the instances in which the word is translated *overwhelm*, may well enough be so rendered, as a free translation; yet as there is no allusion to water *coming over*, but to sinking in water, the translation is not literal. I observe again, that whether the water is supposed to come over the object, or the object is supposed to sink in the water, there is not a single figurative occurrence of the word, which does not imply that the object was completely covered with the water. Now, this kind of baptism would be little relief to Mr Ewing. The man who is covered by the tide, while he lies on the shore, by the edge of the sea, is overwhelmed; and he is as completely covered, as if he had gone into the sea, and dipped himself. Even were Mr Ewing to *pour* or *sprinkle* the water in baptism, till the person baptized should be entirely *drenched*, it would afford no relief from immersion. Not one, then, of the examples of figurative use adduced by Mr Ewing, countenances his own favourite mode of baptism.

Let us now take a look at Mr Ewing's examples, in which the word is used figuratively: βεβαπτισθαι τε τω ακρατω. "To have been *drenched* with wine." I have no objection to the translation *drench*, as it may imply that the object is *steeped* or *dipped*, so as to be *soaked* in the fluid. But as a thing may be *drenched* by *pouring* or *sprinkling*, the translation is not definitely exact. Literally, it is *immersed in wine*.

In order to determine whether *pouring* or *immersing* is the ground of the figure, let us examine what is the point of likeness. It must be a bad figure, if the point of resemblance in the objects is not obvious. Now, let it be observed, that there is no likeness between the *action* of drinking, and either the *pouring* of fluids, or *immersion* in them. Were this the point of resemblance, the drinking of one small glass might be designated a *baptism*, as well as the drinking of a cask; for the *mode* is as perfect on the lowest point in the scale, as on the highest. Every act of drinking, whether *wine* or *water*, would be a *baptism*. Mr Ewing, indeed, supposes that there is an *excessive pouring*, but as this cannot be included in mere *mode*, it cannot be included in the word that designates this, but must be expressed by some additional word. Besides, if the word βαπτίζω signifies *excessive pouring*, it must do so in baptism, which condemns Mr Ewing's *popping* a little water on the face. If it is supposed that there is *pouring* in the drinking of a drunkard, which is not

in drinking moderately; and that the design of this application of the word βαπτίζω is to designate this; I reply, that the mode of drinking a small glass is as much *pouring*, as the drinking of the cup of Hercules. Indeed, there may be something of pouring in the action of putting a small quantity of liquid into the mouth, which is not in drinking a large goblet. But if the word βαπτίζω, in expressing drunkenness, refers to the mode of drinking, there is then no figure at all in the expression, for between *pouring* and *pouring* there is no resemblance. This is identity. Indeed, Mr Ewing does not treat these expressions as figurative. He speaks as if he considered that the word βαπτίζω was taken in them literally. He supposes that there is a “*pouring upon, or a pouring into, till mind and body are overwhelmed,*” &c. The wine then is poured into the person till he is intoxicated. This might be true, if the wine was put into him as men administer a drench to a horse. But the drunkard administers the wine to himself. What is the sense of the expression *he is poured with wine*, which on this supposition is the literal meaning?

But when βαπτίζω is applied to drunkenness, it is taken figuratively; and the point of resemblance is between a man so completely under the influence of wine, and an object completely subjected to a liquid in which it is wholly immersed. This is not only obvious from the figure itself, but from the circumstances with which the figure is sometimes conjoined. Clemens Alexandrinus employing the same figure, says, βαπτίζομενοι εἰς ὑπνον, *baptized into sleep*, through drunkenness. Now, *baptized into sleep*, is exactly our figure *buried in sleep*, which is an immersion; and burial is the thing represented by Christian baptism. Is there any likeness between *pouring* and *sleeping*? Is not the likeness between complete subjection to the influence of sleep, and the complete subjection of an object to the influence of a liquid when immersed in it? The same father applies the word βαπτίζουσι to those who give themselves up to fornication. This is just our own figure when we speak of *plunging* headlong into debauchery.

This view is fully confirmed by the same figure in other languages. All figures that are founded on nature, and obvious to the observation of all nations, will be in all languages the same. Figurative language is a universal language. Now, when we examine this figure in the Latin language, our view of it is put beyond all doubt. Virgil says of the Greeks taking Troy,

Invadunt urbem somno vinoque sepultam.

“They invade the city *buried* in sleep and wine.”

Here *burial* is applied both to sleep and wine. *Baptized* therefore into sleep and wine, as used in the Greek language, must be the same as *buried* in sleep and wine in the Latin. Surely if the expression in the Greek needed a commentary, this must be an authoritative one. There can be no pretence for taking *pouring* out of *burial*. This must be immersion.

Lactantius, as Gale remarks, employs the phrase *vitiis immersti*, *immersed* or *plunged in vice*; and Origen, in his commentary on John, uses the same figure. The expression of the former, therefore, must be the best commentary on that of the latter. Vices are not supposed to be *poured upon* the vicious person, but he *sinks in them*. We ourselves speak in this manner. We speak of a man who *sinks in vice*. Martial's figure—*Lana sanguine conchæ ebria*—"wool drunk with the blood of the shell-fish"—also affords a commentary on the Greek figure. Here wool *dipped* in a liquid, is said to be drunk with that liquid from being completely soaked with it. Schwarzius, indeed, supposes that Shakespeare's figure,—“then let the earth be *drunken* with our blood,” countenances the supposition that βαπτίζω, though it primarily signifies to dip, sometimes signifies *pouring* or *sprinkling*. But what is the ground of this opinion? Why, it is this. βαπτίζω sometimes is figuratively applied to *drunkenness*, and *drunkenness* is sometimes figuratively applied to the earth *drenched with blood*. Therefore since the earth is drenched with blood by *pouring* or *sprinkling*, βαπτίζω must sometimes signify *pouring* or *sprinkling*. This states the evidence as fairly as any can desire. But there is a multitude of errors here. If one word may figuratively be applied to an object literally denoted by another word, does it follow that they mark the same mode? Is there any likeness between the mode of drinking, and that of the falling of blood on the earth? The earth is here said to be drunk with blood, not because there is a likeness between the manner of drinking wine, and that of the falling of blood, but from being completely drenched with blood, without any reference to the manner in which it received the blood. Indeed, as there is no likeness between the falling of blood on the earth, and the mode of drinking, the above expression is the clearest proof that the expression *baptized with wine* does not refer to the same mode. It might as well be said, that the expression, Deut. xxxii. 42. “I will make mine arrows drunk with blood,” implies a proof that βαπτίζω signifies to dip; because arrows are besmeared with blood by being dipped in the body. But this would be false criticism.

God's arrows are supposed to be drunk with blood—not from the manner in which arrows are usually covered with blood, but from the abundance of the blood shed by them.

These observations will apply to all the examples in which this word is applied to drunkenness. I need not, therefore, examine them particularly. But I must refer to one or two, to shew how ill Mr Ewing's explication will apply to them. Οἶνω δὲ πολλῶν Ἀλεξάνδρον βαπτισασα, “having made Alexander drunk with much wine.” This, according to Mr Ewing's explication, would be, “having poured Alexander with much wine,”—not “having poured much wine into Alexander.” This would be pouring the man into the wine, instead of pouring the wine into the man. Βεβαπτισμενον εἰς ἀνασθησῖαν καὶ ὑπνον ὑπο τῆς μεθῆς, literally “baptized into insensibility, and sleep under drunkenness.” Now, a *baptism into sleep*, we have already seen, is an *immersion*. *Immersed* or *buried* in sleep is a phrase that is warrantable; but what is the meaning of being *poured* into sleep and insensibility? Here it is not supposed that sleep is poured out on the person, but if βεβαπτισμενον signifies pouring, the person must have been *poured out into sleep*.

The words δυναμὶς βεβαπτισμενη ἐν τῷ βαθεὶ τοῦ σοματος, Mr Ewing translates, “a force *infused into*, (or *diffused in*,) the inward parts of the body.” This translation, however, is not only unwarranted by the original, but is as unsuitable to the supposition that βαπτίζω signifies *to pour*, as that it signifies *to immerse*. *To infuse into* would not be βαπτίζειν ἐν, but βαπτίζειν εἰς. Does Mr Ewing mean to say, that the parenthetical words are explanatory, and that *diffused in*, is equivalent to *infused into*? or does he mean that they are two different meanings, of which the text is equally susceptible? A strange thing, indeed, if the same phrase can equally signify *infused into*, and *diffused in*! In English these things are very different. Greek, it seems, has a wonderful fertility of meaning. When a controversialist indulges himself in a licence of this kind, he may indeed very easily prove or disprove any thing. He has nothing to do but make the text speak what he wants. This gives βαπτίζω a new meaning, *to diffuse*. This is the most wonderful word that was ever found in any language. It can with equal facility in the very same phrase denote *opposite* things. *To diffuse* is surely the opposite of *infuse*. It is very true, that the same word compounded with different prepositions may do so, as is the case with *infuse* and *diffuse*. But let it be observed, that it is the very same phrase that Mr Ewing makes equally susceptible of

these opposite meanings. This surely is philological legerdemain. Let it be observed also, that Mr Ewing supposes that the word βαπτίζω itself in these examples signifies to *pour upon*, or to *pour into*. Now, where does he find the force of these prepositions in the Greek word? If it signifies to *pour*, it does not signify to *pour into*, or to *pour upon*. The additional idea which varies the word so materially, must be got by a preposition prefixed or following: The literal translation of the above example is, “a force or power immersed in the depth of the body.” *To immerse in the depth* is a congruous expression, but to *pour in the depth* is altogether incongruous.

The example from Plutarch will suit my purpose well enough in Mr Ewing’s translation; “for as plants are nourished by moderate, but choked by excessive watering, (literally *waters*,) in like manner, the mind is enlarged by labours suited to its strength, but is *overwhelmed* (Gr. *baptized*) by such as exceed its power.” Mr Ewing says, “The reference here to the nourishment of plants, indicates *pouring* only to be the species of watering alluded to in the term βαπτίζεται.” But in this figure, there is no reference at all to the mode of watering plants. The reference is to the quantity of water. The mode is not mentioned; but even were it mentioned, it would be merely a circumstance to which nothing corresponds in the thing illustrated. What critic would ever think of hunting after such likenesses in figurative language? There is actually no likeness between the mode of watering plants, and the proportioning of labour to the mind of a pupil; and Plutarch is not guilty of such absurdity. To Plutarch’s figure it would be quite the same thing, if a pot of plants was dipped in water, instead of having the water poured into it. The pot itself might be dipped in water without any injury to the plants. The plants are injured when water is suffered to lie about them in too great abundance, in whatever way it has been applied. The *choking* of the plant corresponds to the suffocation in baptism, or immersion. The *choking* of the powers of the mind is elegantly illustrated by the *choking* of the vegetative powers when a plant is covered in water. There is a beautiful allusion to the suffocation of an animal under water. Were Plutarch to rise from the dead, with what indignation would he remonstrate against the criticism that makes him refer to the *mode* of watering plants, in a figure intended to illustrate the bad effects of too much study! How loudly would he disclaim the cold, unnatural thought! Is it not possible figuratively to illustrate something by a reference to the mountains buried under snow, with-

out referring to the *manner* of its falling, and pursuing the resemblance to the *flakes of feathered snow*? So far from this, I assert, that this manner of explaining figures is *universally improper*. No instance could be more beautifully decisive in our favour than the above figure of Plutarch. Mr Ewing makes him compare the *choking* of one thing to the *overwhelming* of another. But the author himself compares the *choking of a plant*, or the extinction of vegetable life, to the *choking or the extinction of the mental powers*; and in both there is an elegant allusion to the choking of an animal under water.

But even on Mr Ewing's own system, his explanation of this example is most fatal to his *popping*. βαπτίζω here, he makes to signify death by too much water, as opposed to the moderate application of water. If this is the distinctive meaning of βαπτίζω, it cannot also denote *the smallest application of water*. It cannot surely designate the opposite extremes.

The word is frequently applied to overwhelming debt, or oppressive taxation, τους δε ιδιωτας, δια την εκ τουτων ευποριαν, ου βαπτιζουσι τοις εισφοραις. This Mr Ewing very well translates, "on account of the abundant supply from these sources, they do not oppress (or overload, Gr. baptize) the common people with taxes." But neither the original nor the translation will bear to be explained by the assertion that they are brought to support, namely, that βαπτίζω sometimes signifies to *pour upon*, or *pour into*. Taxes are not supposed in this figure to be *poured upon*, or *poured into*, the people who pay them; and overwhelming taxes are not supposed to be *poured*, while small taxes are dropped on the people. The people might rather be said to *pour* their taxes into the treasury. If βαπτιζουσι here signifies to *pour upon*, or *pour into*, as Mr Ewing supposes, the translation, when literal, will be, "They do not *pour* the common people with taxes," or rather, "they do not *pour into*, or *pour upon* the common people with taxes." If any man can take sense out of this, he will deserve the praise of invention. But in this figure, the rulers are supposed to immerse the people, through the instrumentality of the oppressive taxes. The literal translation is, "They do not *immerse* the common people with taxes." The people, in the case of oppressive taxation, are not in such figures supposed either to have the taxes *poured upon them*, nor themselves to be *immersed in the taxes*, but to sink by being weighed down with taxes. The taxes are not the element in which they sink, but are the instrumental *baptizers*. They cause the

people to *sink* by their weight. This suits the words: this suits the figure: this suits the sense: this suits every example which refers to debt: this suits the analogy of all other languages. We say ourselves *dipped in debt*, *drowned in debt*, *sunk by debt*, or *sunk in debt*. *To sink in debt*, figures the debt as that in which we sink. It is a deep water in which we sink. *To sink by debt*, figures the debt as a load on our shoulders, while we are in deep water. In this view, it is not the drowning element, but the *baptizer* or *drowner*. To be dipped in debt, supposes that we owe something considerable in proportion to our means. But we may be *dipped* without being *drowned*. The last cannot be adequately represented by βαπτίζω, except when circumstances render the meaning definite. The Latin language recognizes the same analogy. Were we at any loss with respect to the meaning of the figure in Greek, the *Ære alieno demersus* of Livy is a commentary. This supposes that the debtor is *plunged* or *sunk* in debt. A man struggling for his life in the midst of deep water, and at last sinking by exhaustion, is a true picture of an insolvent debtor. When βαπτίζω occurs in such a situation, the meaning is substantially given in English by the word *oppress*, or *overload*; but neither of them is a translation. They convey the meaning under the figure of a *load*; the other gives the idea under the figure of immersion.

The same observation applies to the next example, which Mr Ewing quotes from Josephus, p. 302. οἱ δὲ καὶ διχα τῆς στασεως υστερον εβαπτισαν τὴν πόλιν, translated by Mr Ewing, “those, indeed, even without (engaging in) faction, afterwards *overburthened* or *oppressed* (Gr. baptized) the city.” The original is stronger than the translation. It asserts that the robbers ruined, or *sunk* the city. The passage is translated by Whiston, “although these very men, besides the seditions they raised, were otherwise the direct cause of the city’s destruction also.” The reference is to a ship sinking from being overburdened, and ill managed in the storm, from the dissensions of the crew. In this view, the figure is striking and beautiful. But how can Mr Ewing accommodate even his own translation to his definition of the meaning of the word βαπτίζω in such examples? In them, he says, it is used in the sense of *pouring upon* and *pouring into*. What did the robbers pour *upon* or *into* the city? Besides, there is neither *upon* nor *into* here. If the word βαπτίζω signifies *to pour*, the translation literally will be, “they poured the city.” This will not accommodate to Mr Ewing’s own definition of the meaning of the word, more than to ours. Again, even accord-

ing to Mr Ewing's own translation of this passage, the word βαπτίζω here denotes *something in excess*. What aspect has this towards the popping system? A few drops of water is not an oppressive load.

Josephus uses the same figure on another occasion. Speaking of Herod's sons, he says, *τουτο ωσπερ τελευταια θυελλα χειμαζομενους τους νεανισχους επεβαπτισεν*, p. 704. This is a commentary on the preceding example, and limits the figure to a ship sinking. In the former case, the ship was overburthened, and there was a mutiny among the sailors. Here the ship is attacked by repeated storms, and at last is sunk by a hurricane. The word χειμαζομενους imports, that the young men had a winter voyage, in which they were attacked by many storms, and at last were plunged into the abyss by an overwhelming blast. Whiston, who has no purpose to serve, translates it thus; "and this it was that came as the last storm, and entirely sunk the young men, when they were in great danger before." Where is *popping* now? What has *pouring* to say here? It may be observed, that in the last example, the word is compounded with επι. This must be designed to render the failure more graphic, and represents the storm as pressing *on* them, while they sink under it.

The very next example which Mr Ewing quotes in the sense of *overwhelming* by being *overburthened*, definitely refers to *sinking* in water: *αυτος ειμι των βεβαπτισμενων υπο που μεγαλου κυματος εκεινου*. "I am one of those who have been overwhelmed by that great wave of calamity." Now, what allusion is there here to *pouring upon*, *pouring into*, or *pouring* of any kind? Yet this is one of the examples brought by Mr Ewing, to prove that the word βαπτίζω sometimes signifies to *pour upon*, and *pour into*, till mind and body are overwhelmed. What was *poured upon* or *poured into* this person? Is it supposed that the wave gradually poured on him till it sunk him? Nay, verily. He is said to be baptized *under* the wave. Indeed, a wave does not cover by *pouring*, but by *flowing*, *dash-ing*, or *sweeping* horizontally. In the overwhelming by a wave, there is no likeness to pouring or popping, and the object is as completely covered by the wave, as when it is dipped. Besides, the person is here supposed to be forced down into the water below, by the weight of the superincumbent wave. The wave is the baptizer, not the thing in which he is baptized. He is baptized *under* the wave. And can there be a stronger proof that baptism is immersion? Let Mr Ewing perform baptism according to his

own translation of this passage, and he will act as differently from his own mode as from ours. Let the baptized person be overwhelmed with water, and he will be buried in water.

Another example of this figure from the same author, is entirely decisive in our favour. Ο δε μολις α νυν φερει φερων υπο μικρας αν βαπτισθειη προσθηκης. Liban. Ep. 310. "He who bears with difficulty the burden he already has, would be entirely overwhelmed (or crushed) by a small addition." Is it possible to squeeze the idea of *pouring* out of the word in this occurrence? A burden is not *poured* on the shoulders. Besides, it is not the putting of the burden on the man, that is here called baptism. The baptism is effected by the burden, after it is put on. The burden causes the man to *sink*.

The example which Mr Ewing quotes from Plutarch, is already decided, by the evidence produced with respect to the allusion when the figure respects debt: πενταχισχιλιων μυριαδων οφλημασι βεβαπτισμενοι. "Oppressed by a debt of 5000 myriads." This debt was not *poured upon* him, nor *poured into* him; but, oppressed by it as a load, he *sunk* or became insolvent. The figure does not represent the mode of putting the debt on him, for in this there is no likeness. It represents the debt *when on him*, as *causing him to sink*.

The example from Heliod. Æthiop. lib. 4, can, by no ingenuity, be reconciled to the assertion which Mr Ewing brings it to support: και τη συμφορα βεβαπτισμενον. "And overwhelmed with the calamity." If βαπτίζω is supposed to signify to *pour*, this passage must be translated, "and *poured* by or with the calamity." The calamity is not poured upon him, but the calamity *pours* him. But to be *immersed*, or *to sink*, by calamity, is good sense, and a common form of speech. This also is baptism by immersion, and can be nothing else. What is more common than to speak of *sinking* under misfortunes?

In like manner, Gregory Thaumaturgus, p. 72, speaks of persons as delivered from the difficulties in which they were βαπτίζομενους, *immersed*. But the observation of Schelhornius, renders the reference in this figure entirely definite. After quoting a number of examples in which the word is applied figuratively to calamities, he observes, with great sagacity, that the same sentiment is expressed in the same author by the word βυθίζεσθαι, which determines his meaning when he uses the word βαπτίζω to express the same thing. πλεονι κλυδωνι κακων βεβυθισμενοι. Literally, "Sunk into

the deep by a greater wave or tide of misfortunes. Now, that βυθίζω denotes to *cover*, to *sink in the abyss*, there can be no doubt. It is a verb formed from the appropriate name of the great abyss. βαπτίζω, then, as expressing the same thing, must agree with it in the general idea, though it characteristically differs from it in strength of expression. In some circumstances, they may both refer to the same thing, while in others they have a characteristic difference. No evidence can be more satisfactory in determining the meaning of a word, than this. It is indirect, and would be hid from the ordinary reader ; but when sagacity points it out, no candid mind can reject it. This also confirms an observation which I have made on another example, namely, that to be *baptized by a wave*, does not import that the baptism was *in* the wave, but *under* it ; and that the wave is the baptizer, or power that sinks the baptized person under it. Here the great κλυδων not only covered the person itself, but sunk him *below itself* into the deep.

The Septuagint renders Isaiah xxi. 4, η ανομία με βαπτίζει, translated by Mr Ewing, “iniquity *overwhelms* me.” “Here,” says Mr Ewing, “the idea of *plunging into* is excluded. The subject of baptism is viewed as having something *poured* or *brought upon* him. He is not *popped into* the baptizing substance, but it *pops upon* him.” And pray, Mr Ewing, who *pops* this iniquity upon the baptized person ? Is iniquity itself the popper ? Is not iniquity the thing with which he is *popped* ? Is it both *popper* and *popped* ? But if iniquity *pops* him with itself, does not this represent sin as coming on the sinner of itself ? But Mr Ewing most manifestly mistakes the meaning of this phrase. The expression, “iniquity baptizeth me,” does not mean that iniquity comes on him either by *popping* or *dipping*, either by *pouring* or *sprinkling* ; but that his sin, which originated in himself, and never was *put on him in any mode*, *sunk* him in misery. Our iniquities cause us to *sink* in deep waters. This example is, with all others in which the word occurs, either in its literal or figurative use, completely in our favour. Iniquity is the baptizer, and instead of *popping* the subjects of its baptism, would *sink* them eternally in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, were they not delivered by that which is represented in the baptism of Christians. Upon the whole, there is not one of all the examples of the figurative use of this word, which will not fairly explain in perfect accordance with the literal meaning which we attach to it, while many of them can bear no other meaning. So far from all explaining with an allusion to

pouring, there is not one of them, taking all circumstances together, will fairly explain in that meaning. There is not one instance in which Mr Ewing can shew, that the reference must necessarily be to pouring. All languages employ corresponding words in the same figurative meaning for which we contend in the above examples. No evidence can be more entirely satisfactory.

The figurative baptism of our Lord, is quite in accordance with those examples in which the word is used for afflictions. Mat. xx. 22, Mark x. 37. In accordance with this view, also, he is represented in the prophetic parts of the Old Testament, as *immersed* in deep waters. "Save me, O God, for the waters are come in unto my soul. I sink in deep mire, where is no standing; I am come into deep waters, where the floods overflow me." Ps. lxxix. 1, 2, 14. In like manner, the afflictions of the church are represented by this figure. "Then the waters had overwhelmed us, the stream had gone over our soul: then the proud waters had gone over our soul," Ps. cxxiv. 4, 5, &c. The enemies of the Lord, also, and of his people, are represented as destroyed by immersion in deep waters. "Then will I make their waters deep, and cause their rivers to run like oil, saith the Lord God." Ezek. xxxii. 14.

The baptism of the Spirit, is a figure that has its foundation in immersion, by which the abundance of his gifts and influences, and the sanctification of the whole body and soul, are represented. That which is immersed in a fluid, is completely subjected to its influence, as wool is said to be drunk with the blood of the shell-fish. So the sanctification of the believer by the Holy Spirit, through faith in the atoning blood of Christ, is figuratively called an *immersion* or a *baptism*. But this and the preceding figure I will meet again, in the examination of the theory of Mr Ewing.

EXAMINATION OF MR EWING'S SYSTEM.

Having considered the evidence for the meaning of this word from its occurrences in Greek writers, I shall now examine the new theory proposed by Mr Ewing. This writer pretends to have discovered the signification of βαπτω, by reducing it to its radical letters; and by interchanging labials and vowels, he forms the word *pop* from the sound. For an admirable exposure of this fancy, I refer the reader to Dr Cox. But the very attempt is absurd and ludicrous. It could not succeed on any subject, or with respect to any

word. It is entitled to no more consideration, than an attempt to decide by an appeal to the cry of birds. The thought of settling a religious controversy about the meaning of a word in a particular language, by speculations with respect to its radical letters, as applying to all languages, is certainly one of the wildest conceits that has been broached in criticism since the birth of that art. Upon this theory, I shall do no more than make a few observations.

1. It applies etymology utterly beyond its province. Etymology, as a foundation for argument, can never proceed beyond *the root existing as a word in the language*, whose meaning can be learned from its use. To trace a word to a more remote ancestry, is to relate fable for history.

2. When etymologists go farther, they do not pretend to give a meaning to a word which it is not found to have by use, nor to reject any meaning which use has assigned. They do not pretend to regulate language by assigning meanings from origin, but from a comparison of actually ascertained meanings, to assign a probable root. The value of their discoveries is not from their authority in settling controversies about the meanings that use has actually assigned to the words which they analyze, but from the light which they reflect on the philosophy of language, and the science of mind. So far from having authority in theological controversy, their researches have no authority in criticism, with respect to the use of words in classical writers. Classical writers are an authority to the etymologist, but the etymologist cannot give law to the classics. The etymologist must collect, and from use ascertain the various meanings of a word,—on the authority of which he may venture a conjecture of an origin higher than that of any word now in the language. By a comparison of these meanings, he may discover a common idea, and thereby be enabled to determine the primary meaning. But without this authority, the primary meaning can never be ascertained by the mere sound of radical letters. It may be true that particular radical letters are found in words that designate a common idea, but that this is the case, and how far it is the case, depends on ascertaining from use the actual meaning of the words. If the meaning of words may lawfully be ascertained from the radical letters which they contain, instead of the tedious process of reading the classics, and acquiring the meaning of words from their use, we may at once proceed to reduce them to their radical sounds, and determine their import by this philological chemistry. Mr Ewing not only fails in this instance of analysis,

but utterly mistakes the true object of etymological researches. His attempt is not calculated to throw light on the philosophy of language, nor illustrate the processes and relations of human thought, but converts etymology into a sort of philological alchemy.

3. Were the origin of βαπτω to be traced, even with the utmost certainty, to some other word or words in the language, its meaning in the language must be determined by its use in the language, and not by its origin. Words often depart widely in their use from the meaning of their root. They may drop some idea that was at first essential, or they may embrace ideas not originally implied.

4. In analyzing any word, the etymologist must be guided not merely by the consideration that the letters that compose it have the appearance of indicating a certain origin, but, especially as a ground-work, that such an origin corresponds to its known and acknowledged meaning. And when we have found such an origin to a word, it is of no authority in argument, as it takes the meaning of the word for granted. If *pop* were the ascertained and acknowledged meaning of βαπτω, the etymologist might employ his art to reduce the one word to the other. But even then, the evidence that the one was the parent of the other, would depend on the fact that the meaning was ascertained by use, and could not rest on the coincidence of sounds. That *rain* comes from *ραίνω*, to sprinkle, and plunge from *πλύνω*, &c. depends on the fact that the meaning of the one word is known by use to correspond to the meaning of the other. Were there no such correspondence in known signification, the correspondence in sound would be no foundation for derivation. Many words correspond as nearly in sound, which have no relation. In deriving a word, therefore, by reducing it to its radical letters, the etymologist, if he acts agreeably to the sound principles of his art, must have all the meanings of the derived word previously ascertained, as a ground-work for his conclusions. They are data which in his process must be taken for granted. But if the meanings of a word are taken for granted in this process, the object of the process cannot be to ascertain a doubtful meaning. If the word βαπτω has not from use all the meanings which Mr Ewing assigns to it, no etymological process can give any of these meanings to it, for they must be all taken for granted as a foundation for his deductions.

5. This theory assigns to βαπτω as its primary meaning, a signification which use has not given it in a single instance. Indeed,

though the author endeavours to conform the examples to this primary acceptation, he does not pretend to have derived it from the examples. He concludes that the primary meaning of this word is *pop*, from the sound, and from its correspondence to the other meanings. That βαπτω has such a primary meaning, there is no evidence. If *pop* really embraced all the significations assigned by Mr Ewing to βαπτω, he might allege, that it is probable that the word once signified to *pop*; but this would not be proof that it had any such signification during the period to which the writings now extant in the Greek language belong. This could be proved only by examples from these authors. Whatever is the origin of the word βαπτω, it never signifies *pop*.

6. To prove that any meaning is sanctioned by use, it is not sufficient that there are examples of its occurrence, which will explain on this meaning. There is no word of frequent occurrence, which in some situations might not bear a false translation, or explain in a sense which it really never has, without making nonsense. Nay, a false translation of a word may, in many situations, make good sense, and even express a Scriptural truth, though not the truth of the passage. Before the authority of use therefore can be pleaded for a meaning, a passage must be produced in which the word *must* have the meaning assigned. This is self-evident. I state it therefore as a canon, or first principle of criticism, *that in controversy a word occurring frequently in the language is never to be taken arbitrarily in a sense which it cannot be shewn incontrovertibly to have in some other passage.* An acknowledged sense is necessary as a foundation on which to rest the supposition, that in the contested passage it may have the signification assigned. There is no ground to allege that the word has a signification in the contested passage, which it is not proved to have in some other place. It may have this authority, and fail; but without this it cannot succeed. A meaning not so proved has no right to be heard in controversy. I have limited the canon to controversy, but, in fact, it extends in some measure to matters in which men do not find an inducement to dispute. Many of the beasts and fishes and fowls and plants mentioned in the Old Testament, cannot be now exactly and confidently ascertained by us, for want of this criterion; and although there is now warm controversy about these things, it is because there is no temptation from the subject. If a word occurs so seldom in what remains of any language, and in such circumstances as cannot definitely determine its meaning, nothing can be legiti-

mately rested on it in controversy. Now this canon sweeps away not only Mr Ewing's theory, but all other systems that give a meaning to βαπτίζω, different from that for which we contend. There is not one instance in all the Greek language in which it necessarily signifies to pour, sprinkle, &c. Our opponents have not an acknowledged foundation on which to rest the opinion, that with respect to the ordinance of baptism, the word βαπτίζω may have the meaning for which they contend; for in no instance can it be proved to have such a meaning. On the contrary, even Mr Ewing himself, the boldest of all the critics on that side of the question, does not deny that this word sometimes signifies to dip; nay, he himself gives many examples in which it must have this signification.

7. I will state another canon equally self-evident, and equally fatal to the doctrine of Mr Ewing, and all our opponents. *A word that applies to two modes, can designate neither.* The same word cannot express different modes, though a word not significant of mode may apply to all modes. *Wash*, for instance, may refer to the action designated by it, in whatever mode it may be performed. Whether it is done by dipping, or by pouring, the word *wash* does not assert. It is indifferent as to mode, although even here one mode is more common than another. *Stain*, in like manner, asserts nothing of mode, but applies to all modes. A thing may be stained by sprinkling, by pouring, or by dipping. *Wet* also applies to all modes. A thing may be wetted by *dipping*, by *pouring*, by *sprinkling*, by the insensible distillation of the *dew*, by *damp*. The word expresses the effect only, and says nothing of the mode. But it would be both false and absurd to say that these words signify all these modes. They express nothing of mode. Modes are essentially different from one another, and have nothing in common. One word then cannot possibly distinguish them. The name of a mode is the word which expresses it as distinguished from other modes. But it is impossible for the same word to express the distinction of two modes. It might more reasonably be supposed, that the word *black* may also be employed to signify the idea denoted by *white*, as well as the idea which it is employed to designate, because black and white admit of degrees; but there are no degrees in mode. Without reference then to the practice of the language, on the authority of self-evident truth, I assert that βαπτω cannot signify both *dip*, and *pour* or *sprinkle*. I assert, that *in no language under heaven can one word designate two modes.* Now we have the confession of our opponents themselves, that βαπτίζω signifies to *dip*. If so, it cannot signify also to *pour* or *sprinkle*.

8. The various meanings that Mr Ewing assigns to this word, will not derive from *pop*. His theory, then, has not the merit even of consistency, which a false theory may have. He asserts, indeed, that all the meanings which he admits, may easily be reduced to this word; and that each holds of it, independently of all the rest. But how does he make out this assertion? By making as many compounds of *pop*, as βαπτω is supposed to have meanings. In each of these meanings, it becomes, in fact, a different word. *Pop in*, *pop out*; *pop up*, *pop down*; *pop backward*, *pop forward*, &c. are different compound words, as much as diffuse is different from infuse. Now if the word βαπτω signifies merely to *pop*, it cannot signify to *pop up*, to *pop down*, &c. by its own power. It must have something added to give it such a meaning. It is false then to say that βαπτω has all these significations. But if βαπτω signifies to *pour*, it does so without the aid of any other word: if it signifies to *sprinkle*, it must do so by itself. It signifies to *dip*, without the aid of any other word. It is true, indeed, that βαπτίζω admits composition with prepositions, but this is not to enable it to signify to *dip*; for if this were the case, it could never have that signification without the preposition in composition. But it has this signification where there is no such composition. Indeed, there are but few of its occurrences in which it admits the composition. It was indeed a conceit of the great Dr Owen, that βαπτίζω cannot denote to *dip*, except in composition with εἰς or ἐν. But this is contradicted by use, and by the analogy of other words, as is well remarked by Mr Booth. Besides, if βαπτω signifies to *pop*, and if *pop* can apply to none of the meanings which βαπτω is said to have, without the aid of a preposition, then it cannot be said that βαπτω signifies to *pour* or *sprinkle*. It only signifies a part of that idea.

Again, when the compound is formed, it will not produce the meanings contended for. To *pop upon* does not signify to *sprinkle*, for there may be a *popping upon*, when there is no sprinkling, though *sprinkling* may be performed by *popping upon*. In the very example alleged by Mr Ewing, there is *popping upon* without *sprinkling*.

“A fellow finding somewhat prick him, popped his finger upon the place.” Did he sprinkle his finger upon the place? But if there is *popping upon* without *sprinkling*, then *popping upon* will not signify sprinkling without something to limit it still farther. Granting then that βαπτω signifies to *pop*, for this very reason it cannot signify to *sprinkle*.

In the same manner it may be proved, that if βαπτω signifies to *pop in or into*, it does not signify to *pour*. For there may be *popping in or into* without *pouring*. Mr Ewing's own example proves this.

“He that kill'd my king,

Popt in between the election and my hopes.”

There was no pouring here. But a word that does not necessarily imply *pouring*, cannot signify *pouring*.

Even with the addition of the word *water* itself, the idea is not made out. If we substitute *water* for *finger* in the above example, we will fail in the attempt to express *sprinkling*. The fellow might *pop water* upon the place without *sprinkling*. In like manner, there may even be *popping* into water, without immersion. When a boy *pops* a duck into the water, she does not sink. Mr Ewing then has failed in every point of view. Even the expression, “he popped water into his turned up face,” Mr Ewing's favourite expression for *baptizing*, does not express either *pouring* or *sprinkling*. So far from necessarily implying that the water was *poured* or *sprinkled*, it naturally implies that the water was cast by a *jerk* or *slight dash*, and not by *drops*, or by a *stream*. Instead then of accounting for all the meanings attached by Mr Ewing to the word βαπτω, it does not account for any one of these meanings.

Still less will this derivation account for *dyeing* as a meaning of βαπτω. How is it possible, that if βαπτω primarily signifies to *pop*, it could also receive the signification to *dye*? Mr Ewing answers this, by supposing that a thing may be dyed, by having the colouring liquor popped upon it, and by the supposition, that the art of *dyeing* was suggested by the accidental staining of things by the juice of fruits. But this account is totally unphilosophical. All this may be true, yet be insufficient to account for the fact. Accidental and infrequent union cannot originate a meaning founded on such union. It is not priority of the mode of doing any thing, but the frequency of doing in a mode, that will confer the name of the mode on the thing effected in such mode. This is the voice both of philosophy and of fact*. I have already exemplified the thing in many instances. Βαπτω, to *dip*, comes naturally to signify to *dye*, from the frequency of *dyeing* by dipping. But there never was such a frequency of *dyeing* by *sprinkling*, as would, on philosophical principles, give the name of the mode to the thing effected

* Thus *cano*, to sing, came to signify to foretell, because prophets uttered their predictions in song. This principle operates very extensively in language.

in that mode. Besides, if βαπτω primarily signifies *to pop*, and if it came to signify *to dye*, because *dyeing* was usually performed by *popping*, then *dyeing* must have been performed neither by pouring nor sprinkling, for *popping*, as I have shewn, is different from both. It is impossible philosophically to account for *dyeing* as a meaning of βαπτω on any other principle, than that this word primarily signifies *to dip*.

Again, if βαπτω came to signify *to dye*, because that the art of dyeing was suggested by the accidental stains from the bruising of fruits, why did not *pop* accompany its relative in this signification? Why did not Milton say, “colours *popped* in heaven,” instead of “colours *dipped* in heaven?” There is no end to the absurdity of this fantastic theory: It is a mine of inconsistency that never could be exhausted. This is the necessary condition of all false theories. However plausible they may be made by the ingenuity of their inventors, they must contain inconsistency, that will sometimes *pop* out its head, and shew itself even to the most indolent readers. But truth is consistent; and although many apparent difficulties may at first sight occur, they will gradually disappear, as light is cast on the subject by inquiry. Even when its defenders, by inadvertency, couple it with something extrinsic, that tends to obscure and mar its evidence, the ingenuity of opponents will only have the good effect of separating the chaff from the wheat.

But no absurdity can vie with that of supposing that a word of so peculiar and restricted a meaning as *pop* is represented to be, should be accounted so generic, that it becomes the liege lord of innumerable different significations, that do not arise the one out of the other, but hold immediately of itself. Nay, according to Mr Ewing’s philosophy, it might become the liege lord of half the language. Instead of originally representing a very generic idea, it is supposed primarily to signify a particular sound,—a small smart quick sound. It is said to be a word “formed from the sound.” All its applications agree to this; and *pop* itself never came to have the acceptations that Mr Ewing supposes βαπτω to have. We never find this word applied to any things, but such as are of a trifling or playful nature. We never hear of a shipwreck as a popping of the ship into the deep. This would be ludicrous. *Pop*, instead of being a generic word, is as specific a word as can be imagined; and never was actually extended to serious or important things, except to burlesque them. Indeed, instead of being a liege lord, conferring ample and separate territories on many great vassals, it is so very

confined in its own territory, that it has a domain hardly sufficient for a walk, to give it an airing. To enable it to go a little into the world, it is obliged to take assistance from the prepositions. Mr Ewing himself cannot send it abroad, without escorting it with *up* or *down*, *backwards* or *forwards*, *in* or *into*, *off* or *upon*, &c. A word so limited in its own territories, is ill fitted to become, as liege lord, proprietor of a great part of the language,—nay, of every language; for Mr Ewing's chemistry must extract the same thought from all languages. The author, indeed, while he declares that each of the vassals is independent of all the rest, and holds immediately of the liege lord, inconsistently gives it a process from the particular sound originally denoted by it, to “the noise caused by the *agency of body in motion upon body*, and that *in any direction whatever*.” Here we have a process, that by gradually dropping particularities, and encroaching on territories not originally included in its kingdom, gives it a generic meaning. Here every step in the process is connected with that which precedes and depends on it. But let us look at the generic meaning which we have found by this process. It is so generic, as to disclaim all kindred with *pop*, according to the use of that word in the English language. Mr Ewing's definition assigns this word to express “the noise caused by the agency of body in motion upon body.” Now, has *pop* actually so generic a meaning? If so, we may speak of the *popping of a cart*, when we mean to express the *creaking* of its wheels; for this is “noise caused by the agency of body in motion upon body.” In short, every noise from motion may be called *popping*. But with all the impudence of this little playful word, it has never had the boldness to *pop* itself into such a province.

Again, if βαπτω signifies primarily to *pop*, and if *pop* signifies primarily to make “a small smart quick sound,” and if all the various meanings of βαπτω hold of it in this signification, then they must all be reducible to the primary signification, namely, “a small smart quick sound,” without any relation to one another. The signification *to dye* must be referred immediately to this particular sound, and not to the accidental bruising of fruits. Mr Ewing inconsistently makes the various meanings hold of *pop* in its generic meaning, acquired by process, instead of its primary particular motion. Nay, he absurdly makes the various meanings of βαπτω hold of the English *pop*, and that in a meaning far removed from its primary meaning. No matter that it was as true that *pop* had the generic meaning acquired by process from a particular one, as

it is manifestly false, this would say nothing to the processes of βαπτω. Instead of tracing the progress of *pop* from “a small smart quick sound,” to a “sound caused by the motion of body in motion on body,” let Mr Ewing trace the progress of βαπτω itself. It is with this the controversy is concerned, and not with the mutations in the meaning of an English word. Let him shew such a primary meaning in βαπτω, and then let him trace it through all the rivulets derived from the fountain. Can any thing be more obvious, than that if βαπτω primarily signifies *to pop*, and if *pop* primarily signifies *to make a small smart quick sound*, βαπτω cannot be admitted as proprietor of any other territory, till it is proved by use to possess it? Is the harmony between βαπτω and *pop* like that of the monads of the soul and body, according to the system of Leibnitz, that the one must necessarily accompany the other in all its most fantastic movements? Can any thing be more absurd, than to squeeze *pop* out of βαπτω, on the authority of sound and primary acceptance, yet in the theory founded on this, to reason not from the primary meaning of *pop*, but from a meaning acquired by process? Can any thing be more absurd, than to pretend to determine the different meanings of a Greek word, by the mutations of meaning in the English word derived from it?

9. If *pop* originally denoted “a small smart quick sound,” as is very likely, then there is no reason to extract *pop* out of βαπτω, for βαπτω never denotes such a sound,—nor any sound. Mr Ewing himself, does not pretend to allege one example in which βαπτω has the meaning which *pop* originally implied. On the authority, then, of the coincidence of primary meaning, no relation can be found between them.

10. The construction of the words in connection with βαπτω, in many of its occurrences, contradicts this theory. Mr Ewing says, “a person or thing may be either *popped into* water, or may have water *popped upon* or *into him*.” Very true, but the same syntax will not *pop him* into water, that will *pop water upon* or *into him*. According to Mr Ewing, to *pop into* water, is to dip. If so, the examples of *dipping*, as denoted by this phrase, are innumerable. Let any person examine the number which I have produced. But can Mr Ewing produce out of all Greek literature, a single example of the phrase *popping water upon a person or thing*, when the verb is βαπτω? *Baptizing water upon* a person or thing, is a phrase that never occurs. This would be the baptism of the water, not of the person. *To pop water upon a man*, in Greek would

be βαπτειν υδωρ επ' ανθρωπον, if βαπτειν is the Greek word for *pop* : But such phraseology is not to be found in all the Greek language.

11. The many examples in which βαπτιζω is applied to great, serious, and terrific objects, contradicts this theory. Mr Ewing, indeed, has foreseen this *storm* ; and to prevent his theory from being *overwhelmed* by it, has invented a groundless distinction between what he calls the *proper* and *law* sense of the word. “ It is a word,” he says, “ which properly denotes operations on a small scale, and of a gentle nature : it is in a secondary sense that it comes to be applied to the vast and the terrible.” But can it apply to the vast and the terrible, if it does not either include the vast and the terrible in its primary meaning ; or by forsaking its primary meaning, has, by philosophical procedure, advanced to new territories ? Words often advance to meanings very distant from their roots ; but when they do so, they give up their first acceptation, and take the new meaning as their proper acceptation. *Candlestick*, for instance, at first denoted a utensil of wood ; it now denotes the utensil, without respect to the material of which it is composed : But it has forsaken its ancient meaning altogether. It cannot be said that it properly signifies an implement made of wood, for holding a candle ; and in a secondary sense, the same utensil of any materials. It now as properly signifies the utensil when it is made of metal, as when it is made of wood ; of gold, as when it is made of an osier.

In this every thing is natural, and the philosophy of the progress is intelligible to the child : But let Mr Ewing point out any philosophical principle that would lead βαπτιζω from such a primary sense as he contends for, to the secondary sense which he here assigns. Is there any principle to conduct the operation in extending the word *pop-gum* to signify a cannon ? He does not pretend that this process has been verified in the term *pop*. To employ *pop* in this way, would be ludicrous. The same must be the case with βαπτω, if it signifies *to pop*.

But if there were any principle to lead to this process, when it had taken place, the first meaning must be given up ; for they are utterly irreconcilable. Let Mr Ewing point out any principle in the human mind that would naturally conduct this process. Let him point out any example in any language, in which a word at the same period of its history has such primary and secondary meanings. Can any thing be more extravagant than the supposition, that this word properly denotes operations on a small scale, and as a secondary meaning things of a vast and terrific nature ? If it

has the one meaning, it cannot have the other. There is no philosophy in this distinction. What a wild thought, that the noise of a pop-gun, and destruction by the overwhelming torrents of boiling lava from the crater of a burning mountain, may be expressed by the same word. Mr Ewing, indeed, acknowledges that it is not usual in English to say, "he popped upon me with an overwhelming flood." But he might have added, that this could not be said in any language, employing a word corresponding to *pop*. This word cannot apply to such things, from the inconsistency between them and the ideas which it denotes. And there must be the same inconsistency with respect to the words that correspond to *pop* in all languages.

Mr Ewing calls this *secondary* sense, "a *figurative*, an *exaggerated*, rather than a proper and natural sense." But if it is a *secondary* sense, it is not a *figurative* sense, for a *secondary* sense is a *proper* sense; and a *figurative* acceptance of a word is no sense of the word at all. When a word is used hyperbolically, it still retains its proper sense, and from this circumstance the figure has its beauty. When the Psalmist represents the mountains as *leaping*, the word leaping still retains its proper meaning, but the motion of a mountain in an earthquake is elegantly figured as *leaping*. The word *leap* does not here come by exaggeration to denote the motion of a mountain in an earthquake. In like manner, when a wild Irishman says, that he was *killed* when he had received a severe beating, the word *kill* is not diminished in its meaning, but what is not *killing* is by a lively imagination so called for the sake of energy. It is absurd to speak of the *exaggerated* or diminished meaning of a word. The *exaggeration* or the *diminution* is not in the words at all.

I have already pointed out the true distinction between βαπτω and βαπτίζω. The former signifies to *dip*, the latter to *cause to dip*. Now, these significations equally apply to small objects and to great. But while the latter may be applied to the smallest object, it is peculiarly fitted to denote the immersion of objects greater than can be lifted in the hand. Accordingly we find that βαπτίζω, while it is sometimes applied to the smallest objects, is much more usually than βαπτω applied to large objects. It more exactly applies to the immersion in baptism, because the baptized person is not taken up by the baptizer, but caused to sink into the water by the force impressed. It is βαπτίζω also, as any one may see by a look at the examples which I have quoted, that is applied to the

sinking of ships, and the destruction of things not lifted out of the water. This is a distinction philosophical, intelligible, useful, and agreeable to fact. Mr Ewing's distinction has nothing to recommend it but the necessity of his theory. Josephus speaks as literally when he designates the sinking of a ship by the word βαπτίζω, as when he speaks of the *immersion* of the smallest object.

12. Mr Ewing mistakes the effect that prepositions have in composition with the verbs. He seems to suppose, that they always modify or give direction to the action of the verb as simply as the English prepositions. But a slight examination of this subject will convince any one that they have a variety of power unknown to our language. Let us take one or two examples: εἶτα θερμούς αἰτούς ἐξ οἴνου μέλανος καὶ ἐλαίου ἀποβαπτῶν. Here it is obvious ἀπο does not direct its force in conjunction with the verb, upon the object of the verb; but either marks the distance of the agent from the object in the performance of the action, or rather the departure of the object from the thing in which the action was produced. The latter is without doubt the effect of the preposition after the verb, ἐξ οἴνου, *out of wine*. It is not “dip the loaves into the wine,” but “dip them *out of the wine*.” The point to which our attention is here called by the expression, is the departure of the object out of the thing in which the action of the verb was produced. This implies that it was in the wine, but does not express it. Now, the preposition in composition may unite with the preposition after the verb, as is frequently the case, when the same preposition that is used in composition is also used after the verb, as Εμβαπτίζω εἰς θάλασσην, and our own phrases, *the tyrant was expelled out of the kingdom*, —*he infused courage into the soldiers*, &c. &c.

Whatever is the meaning of the participle in the above example, the preposition in composition with it cannot exert its influence on the object of the verb. We could not say *popping from the loaves out of the wine*. The expression is on the same principle that operates in the phrase βαψεί τον δακτυλον ἀπο τον ελαιου, “shall dip his finger *from* the oil,” Liv. xiv. 16. and ἀπο του αιματος, “from the blood,” Liv. iv. 17.

Εἰς and ἐν occur very frequently in composition with this verb; but their effect is quite obvious; ἀπο is less frequent, because it is only on the above principles that it applies. Ἐπι is still less frequent, and as Κατω denotes a *deep dipping*, so Ἐπι denotes great exertion in producing the effect of the verb. It does not mean that the action of the verb is produced *upon* the object, but that the force of the

agent is exerted in producing the action of the verb. It does not direct the action of the verb to the object, but directs the energy of the agent to the production of the action. *Ες την Ερετριδα γην υγρην, και λιην τετριμμενην και χλιαρην, επιβαψας οθονιον λεπτον*, “dipping a piece of fine linen into moist Eretrian earth,” &c. Here the effect of *επι* is to shew the force necessary to press the object into the moist earth.

Now, this is Mr Ewing’s favourite compound for denoting *pop-tism*. *To pop upon* must mean to pop the water on the person. But let the verb be translated as he will, it cannot comport in this example with this view. The Eretrian earth was not to be *popped upon* the linen, for it was a mass of moist earth; and it is not said that the linen was to be *baptized upon* with the earth, but *into the earth*. Now, Mr Ewing supposes that when the verb is compounded with *επι*, the baptizing substance is preceded by *with*. “He popped upon me with an overwhelming flood.” But this is not the syntax in any of the examples in which this compound word occurs. It is not *baptize with*, but baptize *in* or *into*. This is a capital mistake, and the detection of it leaves him without aid from his favourite compound. *To baptize upon*, in the construction in which it always stands, is as inconsistent with *popping*, as *into* would have been. Indeed, *into* is in this example expressly used before the baptizing substance. If the linen was to be baptized *upon* moist earth, it was also to be baptized *into* the earth.

The expression in Josephus in which this compound is used, to which Mr Ewing seems to refer, is as little in unison with his doctrine: *τουτο ωσπερ τελευταια θυελλα χειμαζομενους τους γεανισκους επεβαπτισεν*. “This, as the last storm, immersed the young men,” &c. Here the storm is not the *baptizing substance*, but *the baptizer*; and it did not *pop itself upon them*, for the verb is in the active voice. If then it signifies to *pop*, the *popper* must *pop* something on them. What is it then that the storm *pops on them different from itself*? To express Mr Ewing’s meaning, the syntax must be quite different. Some *popper* must “pop the young men with a storm,” &c. or it must be, “the young men were popped upon *with* a storm.” But instead of this the storm itself is the *baptizer*, and as their *baptism* was their destruction, it must have been *immersion*. *Επι* then cannot here import, as Mr Ewing’s doctrine supposes, that the baptizing substance was *popped upon* the baptized; for the baptizing substance was the sea in which they perished, and the storm was the baptizer that sunk them. Mr Ewing’s own

translation of the passage cannot give him relief. "This, as the last storm, *epibaptized* or *overwhelmed* the young men, already weather-beaten." Now, what did the storm baptize *upon* them? With what did it *overwhelm* them? With itself, Mr Ewing may say. I answer no. The verb is in the active voice, but to express this meaning would require the middle. If the storm *popped* them, it must have popped them with something different from itself. Besides, the allusion is evidently to a ship *sinking* in the sea by a storm. The sea is the baptizing substance, the storm is the baptizer, and the effect of such a baptism is destruction. *Επι* then is evidently intended to mark the violence of the pressure of the storm on the ship, as the force of the agent in effecting the action of the verb.

Again, if *epibaptize* signifies to *pop upon*, how is it that it here imports to overwhelm? Can any two ideas be more inconsistent than that of *popping upon*, and that of overwhelming? Can two extremes meet? How does *overwhelm* hold of *pop*? I have already shewn that no process can account for two meanings so discordant, and that no figure will justify it. This is contrary to a canon as clear as any in language,—*That which designates one extreme, cannot at the same time designate the other.* As I have observed in another place, many words may apply to both extremes, but this can never happen except when they designate neither. *To dip*, for instance, applies to an *immersed world*, and it applies to an immersed insect. But it designates neither. How ludicrous is the expression, the storm *popped upon* the young men! Even were we to grant for a moment, that *pop* should enlarge its signification so as to apply to the most violent storm, still it would express only the force of the storm, and not its effect. The translation would then be, "the storm rushed on them with tremendous violence;" but this would not import the effect of the storm, as issuing in their destruction. In many ways they might escape from the greatest storm ever known. Jonah was even cast into the sea, and yet escaped. Even when the *whistle* becomes a *tempest*, it will not serve Mr Ewing.

The same observations will apply to the other example from Josephus: *Επιβαπτισειν γαρ αυτον την πολιν*, "That he would *baptize* or *sink* the city." How is it that Mr Ewing has translated this as if the verb was in the passive voice, and as if Josephus himself was not supposed the *baptizer*? "For the city," says Mr Ewing, "must be *epibaptized* or *overwhelmed.*" Do not the people, in

their expostulations with Josephus, in order to dissuade him from leaving them, tell him that if he should depart, he would himself *sink* or epibaptize the city? His desertion of the city would be the means of its ruin. He is then represented as doing the thing that would be the consequence of his departure.

But how is this, as Mr Ewing says, an overwhelming *by rushing or pouring upon*? Did Josephus, by *popping off from* the city, *pop upon it* with such violence as to overwhelm it? This surely implies the mysteries of transubstantiation. Josephus *popped* nothing on the city by leaving it, nor did he rush or pour on it with violence by flying from it. *Επι*, then, in this compound, can afford no countenance to the supposition, that in baptism the water is popped or poured upon the baptized person. To suit the example to this purpose, Josephus must have been represented as pouring the baptizing substance on the city.

Upon the whole, Mr Ewing labours under a capital mistake when he supposes, that the prepositions prefixed to this verb, necessarily relate to the direction of the action of the verb. The Greek prepositions have a much more extensive and varied power in composition than ours have, in such compounds as *pop in*, *pop out*, &c. *Epibaptize*, which he supposes expressly to imply that the water is poured on the baptized, does not in one instance occur in syntax suitable to his interpretation, even although the meaning of the verb were doubtful.

13. In this theory of Mr Ewing, we have the strongest evidence that our opponents are not themselves satisfied with any mode of defence hitherto devised. We have Mr Ewing's own virtual acknowledgement, that the ground on which pouring has till his time been held for baptism, is not firm. Can there be a more certain sign that he himself was dissatisfied with the usual view of the subject, than his having recourse to so extravagant a theory? If he has taken to sea in this bark of bulrushes, must he not have considered the ship which he left as being in the very act of sinking? I call on the unlearned Christian to consider this circumstance. What must be the necessities of a cause, that requires such a method of defence! This theory is not only unsound, and unsupported by the Greek language, but it is ludicrous in the extreme. Since the heavens were stretched over the earth, there has not been such a chimerical scheme embodied under the name of criticism. The thought that the ordinances of Christ could be squeezed out of the radical sounds contained in words, or that the actual

meaning of words may be authoritatively determined by such a species of etymology, is frightfully fanatical. Sober criticism can lend no ear to such dreams. What, then, must be the desperate situation of that cause, that takes aid from such a theory as that of Mr Ewing!

The passages which Mr Ewing brings forward in support of his theory, are already mostly considered. I shall, therefore, only touch on a few of his observations on them. There is one rule of interpretation which Mr Ewing prescribes to us, at which I am beyond measure astonished. Though he does not formally state it as a canon, yet he reasons on the supposition that we are obliged to find an exact parallel for immersion, with all its circumstances, in the purifications of the heathens or of the Jews. Having quoted the passage from Herodotus, which is so decisive in our favour, he endeavours to lessen its value in the following words. "After all," says he, "there is one very manifest point of difference. The person who adopts this summary method of purification, performs the operation for himself. The immersion of one person by another, for any purpose except that of medical treatment, or that of murder, I can discover in no writings whatever, sacred or profane." And does Mr Ewing really think that any such authority is necessary to determine the meaning of this word? Must we seek for a model for Christian baptism, either among Jewish or heathen rites? I care not if there never had been a human being immersed in water since the creation, if the word denotes *immersion*, and if Christ enjoins it, I will contend for it as confidently as if all nations, in all ages, had been daily in the practice of baptizing each other. Whether I am to immerse myself in baptism, or be immersed by another, I am to learn from the Scripture accounts of the ordinance, not either from the meaning of the word or the practice of nations. The demand of Mr Ewing is unreasonable beyond any thing that I recollect to have found in controversy. If it could not be accounted for by the strength of prejudice, it would indicate a want of discernment that no man will impute to Mr Ewing. The man who demands, in order to the proof of immersion in baptism, that a complete model of the ordinance be found in Jewish or heathen purifications, must either labour under the influence of the strongest bias, or be strangely deficient in the powers of discrimination. "*For any purpose except that of medical treatment, or that of murder*"!!! And is not any of these cases as authoritative as an *immersion for purification*? Is not the immersion of a man

for medical purposes, as much an *immersion*, and as authoritative to shew the meaning of the word, as an *immersion* for superstitious purposes. Examples are useful to settle the meaning of the word, not as a model for the ordinance. The dipping of the flea's foot in Aristophanes, is as authoritative as the immersion of a Pharisee for purification. But what heightens the extravagance of this demand is, that while Mr Ewing calls for a complete model for Christian immersion in the purifications of Jews and heathens, he is so easily satisfied with evidence on his own side of the question, that he has found *popping water on the turned up face* to be the baptism of the New Testament. Here he has the eyes of a lynx, for he has seen what I believe no other man ever pretended to see in the Scriptures.

But it seems, that even a complete model in heathen purifications would not serve us. Nay, if we have been condemned for want of a heathen pattern for baptism, we are also condemned for having it. "There is also," says Mr Ewing, "a point, not of difference, but of resemblance, between this example and an Anti-pædo-baptist's baptism, which seems to have very much astonished the historian, namely, the person's plunging himself, *αὐτοῖσι ἡματιοῖσι*, 'with his very clothes on.' It was evidently regarded as a singular and monstrous sort of purification by this heathen writer; and we shall meet with abundant evidence that it was never so seen in Israel." Here we are condemned for observing baptism according to the model, as we were before condemned for coming short of the model. Surely I may answer such reasoning in the language of Christ: "We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; we have mourned unto you, and ye have not lamented." As long as the mind is in a state to make such objections, it would not yield though one should rise from the dead. A heathen thought purification with the clothes on singular and monstrous. Must Christ's ordinance conform to heathen notions of purification? But, Mr Ewing, how can you assert that Herodotus regarded this as monstrous? There is no such thing said, nor implied. The historian does not mention the circumstance as monstrous, or in any degree improper, but as an evidence of the abhorrence that the Egyptians have for swine, and the deep pollution contracted by their touch. The thing that was singular and strange, is, that the person touching the swine, supposed the pollution to affect his very garments, or that it was as necessary to baptize them as himself. The polluted Egyptian baptized himself, with his very clothes, that he might purify

his clothes, which he considered to be defiled as well as himself. The Christian is baptized with his clothes on, not indeed to imitate the example of the Egyptian, but for the sake of decency. Had Christian baptism been like Egyptian baptism, an ordinance in which every believer was to baptize himself, there would have been no need to baptize with the clothes on. The thing then that is strange and singular in the Egyptian baptism, is not strange in Christian baptism. It would be strange if persons bathing alone in a retired place should encumber themselves with a bathing dress; but it would not be strange to find them using a bathing dress on a crowded strand. A little discrimination under the influence of candour would have taken away all monstrosity from this example. There is nothing in the historian that in the remotest degree gives ground for Mr Ewing's assertion. Is this a candid or a Christian way of representing evidence? If men will indulge themselves in such liberties with the documents on which they found their report of antiquity, no credit could be given to history. Mr Ewing here represents Herodotus as regarding this circumstance as *monstrous*, without the smallest authority from his words. Is not this bearing false witness? The intention, I am convinced, is not to misrepresent evidence. Yet evidence is misrepresented, where nothing but bias could discover the supposed meaning. Well may a Roman Catholic see all the doctrines of popery in the Scriptures, when Mr Ewing can find the circumstance of bathing with the *clothes on* designated as monstrous in this language of Herodotus. If, in all the passages which I have considered, I have made one such misrepresentation, let me be put to shame. I may mistake the meaning of my author, but a mistake that indicates a bias, I hope no man will be able to find in my criticism. I would let Baptism and the Bible itself sink, rather than force evidence. What I demand from my antagonist, I will grant him in return. I will not lay down one law for him, and walk by another myself. I will do all in my power to save the Israelitish spies, but if this cannot be done without a falsehood, let them perish.

The same uncandid and unreasonable mode of reasoning is again resorted to in the following language. Formerly he had complained that the examples implying immersion, do not respect cases in which one person baptized another, but each baptized himself. "Here," he says, "it must be confessed, that, in some of the cases, there are *dippers* as well as *dipped*." Now, if there is, in any instance, the model he requires, why does he complain, that in some instances it

is not to be found? Does he suppose that every instance must contain the full model, or that one instance is not sufficient for the purpose, even were it necessary to produce such a model from heathenism? If, in one case, he finds a *dipper*, is it not enough to shew that the word may be applied to the ordinance of Christian immersion? But whether a person *dips* himself or is *dipped* by another, has no more to do with the meaning of this word, than the name of the baptized person has. Nor can an example from heathen or Jewish purification, that would coincide in every particular with the external form of the ordinance, be of more authority as a model, than an example of plunging a pick-pocket in the mire. To speak in the above way, then, is totally to misconceive the nature of the evidence on which a just conclusion can be founded.

Mr Ewing complains, that "the other cases also, are not those of voluntary plunging, but of fatal sinking." But is not immersion *immersion*, whether the immersed person rises or sinks? We want no aid from these examples but what they can give, what they cannot refuse to give, and what our opponents admit that they give. The examples in which the word applies to sinking, prove that the word implies *dipping*. This is all we want from them. That the baptized person is not to lie at the bottom, but to rise up out of the waters, we learn not from the word, but from the accounts of the ordinance. We wish no model in heathenism as an authority for the ordinance of baptism. This we have in the Scriptures. We are indebted to the heathen writers only for the meaning of the word. It is altogether astonishing that a man like Mr Ewing can indulge in such trifling. If all his requirements were necessary, no ordinance of Christ could be proved. But happily his requirements are only for his opponents. They do not regulate his own conduct. He relaxes from his rigour wherever his *popping* scheme comes to the trial. If one instance could be brought, in which this disputed word necessarily signifies to pour or sprinkle, though it related to a person sprinkling himself, what would he say, should I object that this was no authority for one person to sprinkle another? Very true, he would doubtless say, but it proves that the word signifies to sprinkle. I have other ways of learning whether baptism is a sprinkling of one's self, or a sprinkling of one by another. In like manner, the examples of involuntary immersion prove to me the meaning of the word. From Christ and his apostles I learn that

Christian immersion is neither involuntary nor fatal. It is a grievous thing to be obliged to notice such reasoning.

Mr Ewing exclaims, "Is this the pattern of *baptizers* and *baptized*?" No indeed, Mr Ewing, this is not the pattern, and I never heard of any who made this a model. But these examples are authority to shew the meaning of the word. Had Mr Ewing produced one instance in which the disputed word signifies to *sprinkle* or *pour*, and that instance referred to bespattering with filth, what would he say were we to exclaim, "Is this the pattern of baptism by sprinkling?" Would he not pounce upon us with the reply: "This determines the meaning of the word, which is all any examples from heathen writers can do. That pure water is to be used in baptism, we learn from the Scriptures." And why does he not use common sense in his objections?

"Shall we illustrate the office of John the Baptist, and of the apostles and evangelists of Christ," says Mr Ewing, "by the work of providential destruction, or that of murderers?" We shall determine the meaning of the word by such examples. Nothing more can be done by any examples from antiquity. Nothing more do we want. I put it to every candid reader,—I put it to Mr Ewing himself, whether he would make such an objection, if the examples were in his favour. Nay, we have the answer virtually expressed in the authority which he gives to the example of heathen and Jewish purifications. While he complains on us for establishing the meaning of the word by documents that apply the word to involuntary and fatal immersion, his mode of reasoning in other places gives an authority to heathen models of purification that they do not possess.

"These examples imply," says Mr Ewing, "not a mere *dipping*, and *up again*, an *immersion* immediately followed by an *emersion*; but a continued and permanent immersion, a remaining under water." Now, is not this mode of reasoning perverse and unjust? If some examples are found, in which this word is applied to the dipping of things taken immediately up, is not this sufficient to establish the propriety of its application to the ordinance of baptism? Can it be necessary that all the examples refer to things taken up? Will Mr Ewing never learn that we are seeking from these examples, not an authoritative model for baptism, but the meaning of a word? If the disputed word, in some instances, applies to things taken immediately up, and in others to things never taken up, a true critic, nay common sense, will learn that the word itself can designate

neither *taking up* nor *lyeing at the bottom*. One instance in which the word applies when the thing is taken up after dipping, is as good as ten thousand.

But though some examples of the occurrence of this word imply a permanent immersion or destruction, the word βαπτίζω never expresses this. Whether the thing is taken up, or is allowed to remain, is not expressed by the word, but is implied by the circumstances. The word, without one exception, signifies simply *to dip*.

In the following extract, the reasoning is more plausible. The author seems to think that it is demonstration. However, when it is dissected, it has no muscles. "Some may think," says Mr Ewing, "it was not necessary to use a word directly to express the *emersion*, because if *immersion* really was enjoined, the *emersion* must be understood to follow of course, from the necessity of the case. This is a perfectly natural thought, but it cannot help the cause of Anti-pædo-baptists. According to their views, baptism is a *two-fold* symbol, representing *two* things of distinct and equal importance. The *immersion* and the *emersion* are both of them parts of this symbol; the first representing the *death*, and the second the *resurrection* of Christ. Now, if this be the case, the word βαπτίζω is a name for *the one half only* of their ordinance of baptism. It entirely fails them as to *the other half*. A word may have various meanings, but it cannot have two of them at the same time. If, therefore, this word *pops them down*, it certainly cannot give any warrant, or suggest any literal or figurative meaning, for *their popping up again*." Now, how can we deliver ourselves out of this tremendous gulph? Nothing can be more easy. Distinguish the things that are different, and place every thing on its proper evidence, and all difficulty vanishes. The word βαπτίζω, even applied to baptism, expresses *immersion* only. Yet I contend, that in baptism there is a *two-fold* symbol. How is this? I learn the meaning of the word from its use; and I learn the meaning of the ordinance, not from the word, but from the Scripture explanation of the import of the ordinance. If there was nothing said in Scripture about the import of baptism, I would learn nothing on the subject from the word that designates it. I would learn as little of its being a symbol of the death of Christ, as of his resurrection. I learn neither from the word; for it is possible that this word might have been used, without teaching any thing on the subject. I learn both from the Scripture explanations of Christ's institution.

But it may be said, if the word signifies immersion, it may be a symbol of Christ's burial; but it is not fitted to be such a symbol, unless it also signifies to *emerge*.—Now, as far as depends on what is actually expressed by the word, I grant that this is the case. But as in the ordinance of baptism, the *emersion* is as necessary as the *immersion*, there is nothing to prevent the institutor to make the *emersion* symbolical as well as the immersion. If the institutor had not made it symbolical, if it was not explained as pointing to Christ's resurrection and ours, I would as soon anoint with oil and spittle, as deduce it from the meaning of the word, even though the word had expressed both *immersion* and *emersion*. The ordinance is as fit to represent *emersion* as *immersion*, though the word baptism expresses the latter only. The symbol consists in the thing, not in the name. There is no necessity that the name should designate every thing contained in the ordinance. But even granting that this is necessary, what would follow? Not that baptism is not *immersion*, but that baptism is an emblem of burial only. This would do Mr Ewing little service. If we can once persuade him to have himself *popped into the water*, it is not likely that he shall be so obstinate as to reject the half of the edification of the ordinance.

Mr Ewing says, "Now, if this be the case, the word βαπτίζω is a name for *the one half only* of their ordinance of baptism." But why should the name of any ordinance designate every thing that the ordinance is explained by the institutor as containing? This is not necessary; nor do Scripture ordinances at all recognize the authority of such a principle. Is it not strange that Mr Ewing should have forgotten one of the names of the Lord's supper which is liable to the like objection? It is called *the breaking of bread*; yet it includes the drinking of wine. Such are the effects of intemperate zeal. It requires, in one instance, what it overlooks in another. Now, Mr Ewing, is not this battery silenced for ever?

ON THE BAPTISM OF THE SPIRIT.

THE baptism of the Spirit is a figurative expression, explicable on the principle of a reference to immersion. This represents the abundance of the gifts and influences of the Spirit of God in the enlightening and sanctification of believers. That which is immersed in a liquid, is completely subjected to its influence, and imbued with its

virtues ; so *to be immersed in the Spirit*, represents the subjection of soul, body, and spirit, to his influence. The whole man is sanctified. It is objected that the Holy Spirit is said to be *poured out*, and therefore to represent the pouring of the Spirit, baptism must be by *pouring*. This is the grand resource of our opponents, and is more specious to the illiterate, than any thing that has been said. A very considerable part of the language of Scripture, in the representation of the gifts of the Spirit, is founded on the figure of *pouring* ; and readers who have no discrimination, or who are under the influence of bias, at once conclude that this *pouring* is the baptism of the Spirit. This argument is drawn out in formidable array by Mr Ewing ; and is relied on with the utmost confidence by Dr Wardlaw. But it is nothing but a careless confusion of things entirely distinct, and is founded on an egregious blunder. If I do not blow it out of the seas, I will consent to be broiled on Cobbet's grid-iron.

First, The word, in its literal sense, must guide all its figurative applications. The explanation of the figure must conform to the literal meaning, but the literal meaning can never bend to the figurative. The latter, indeed, may assist us in ascertaining the former ; but when the former is ascertained, the latter must be explained in accordance with it. But the literal meaning of this word is ascertained to be that of *immersion*, by a strength of evidence, and a multitude of examples, that cannot be exceeded with respect to any word of the same frequency of occurrence. This is a fixed point ; and in the examination of the reference in the baptism of the Spirit, nothing can be admitted inconsistent with this. *The baptism of the Spirit* must have a reference to *immersion*, because baptism is *immersion*, and in its literal sense never signifies any thing else. When we come to the examination of this figure, or any other of the same word, we must ground on this ascertained fact. As there is not one instance in the literal use of the word, in which it must signify *pouring*, or any thing but *dipping*, the pretensions of *pouring*, as the figurative baptism, do not deserve even a hearing. They cannot legitimately even go before a jury, because true bills are not found. There is no ground of trial, because there is nothing in the allegations that can at all excite a doubt. *Pouring cannot be the figurative baptism, because baptism never literally denotes pouring.*

Secondly, This opinion is founded on the egregious and blasphemous error which teaches that God is material, and that there is a

literal pouring out of his Spirit, which may be represented by the pouring of water. Our opponents understand the baptism of the Spirit to be a literal baptism, and the pouring out of the Spirit to be a literal pouring out of him who is immaterial. But though there is a real communication of the Spirit, there is no real or literal baptism of the Spirit. Let the reference in the baptism of the Spirit be what it may, it cannot be a literal baptism, because God is not material. We cannot be literally either *dipped* into God, or have him *poured* on us. *Pouring*, then, in baptism, even if *baptism* were *pouring*, could not represent the *pouring* of the Spirit, because the Spirit is not literally *poured*. Baptism, whatever be the mode, cannot represent either the manner of conveying the Spirit, or his operations in the soul. These things cannot be represented by natural things. There is no likeness to a Spirit, nor to the mode of his operations. It is blasphemy to attempt a representation. It would be as easy to make a likeness of God creating the world, and attempt to represent by a picture the divine operations in the formation of matter, as to represent by symbols the manner of the communication of the Holy Spirit, and his operations on the soul. If Christians were not infatuated with the desire of establishing a favourite system, so gross conceptions of God could not have so long escaped detection. This error is as dishonourable to God, as that of the Anthropomorphites. It degrades the Godhead, by representing it as a *material* substance.

When the Spirit is said to *be poured*, it is a figurative expression, to which there is nothing resemblant in the manner of the divine operations. What then, it may be asked, is the resemblance? Why is the Spirit said to be *poured*, if the *pouring* of water does not resemble it? The foundation of the figure is the very reverse of what is supposed. The Spirit is said to be *poured out*, not because there is any actual *pouring*, which is represented by *pouring out* water in baptism, but from the *resemblance between the effects of the influences of the Spirit and those of water*. Between the Spirit itself and water there is no resemblance, more than between an eye or a circle and the divine nature. Nor is there any resemblance between the mode of the operations of the Spirit, and that of the influences of water. The Holy Spirit is said to be *poured*, because his influences or effects are like those of water, and because he is supposed to dwell above. The Holy Spirit is represented as poured out, on the same principle on which God is said to have come down from heaven, or to look down from heaven, or to have

hands and arms. It is in accommodation to our ways of thinking and speaking, not as expressive of reality. The Holy Spirit is figured as water, not to represent any likeness in him to water, just as God is figured as a man. If the Anthropomorphites blasphemously perverted this language to degrade God, as supposing that it teaches that he has actually the human form, it is no less a blasphemous perversion of the language in question, to suppose that it imports a real *pouring out* of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is said also to be as *dew*. Does this imply that there is a likeness to the falling of dew and the manner of the communication of the Holy Ghost? Our Lord represents the Spirit as a *well*, the waters of which spring up, John iv. 14. Is there also a likeness in the manner of the communication of the Spirit to water *rising up* out of the ground, as well as to water *poured out* from above? The Holy Spirit is also represented as a river whose streams make glad the city of God. Is there also a likeness between his operations and the *running* of water? In all these figures, the Spirit is represented in accommodation to natural things, and natural things are not accommodated to it. The effects of the one resemble the effects of the other, but as to *manner*, there is no likeness. A particular *manner* is given to the operations of the Spirit, to suit the *manner* of the communication of the natural object. Therefore it is that the Spirit has ascribed to it all the various modes mentioned above. The Spirit, in every figure, takes the *manner* of the resembling object; but the resembling object never takes the *manner* of the Spirit, because nothing is known of his manner. Of this there must not be—cannot be any likeness. If the manner of the communication of the Spirit could be represented, one only of these modes must be employed. If his manner is *pouring*, it cannot be like *dew*, nor like *rain*, nor like a *river*, nor like a spring-well. But if the likeness be merely between the effects of the Spirit and the effects of water, then the Spirit may be represented as *dew*, or *rain*, or a *river*, or a *spring-well*, just as the water is supposed to be applied. It is absurd to suppose an ordinance to be appointed to represent the mode of the Spirit's communication; and as it is spoken of under all these modes, each of them might claim an ordinance as well as pouring. Baptism might as well represent water *rising out of the earth*, *distilling in dew*, *running in a stream*, or *falling in rain*, as *pouring out of a cup*. Each of these represents the blessings of the Spirit, by conforming the language about the operations of the Spirit to a particular state of the water; none

of them represents the mode of these operations. The Holy Spirit is said to fall ; why then should not baptism represent falling ? The Holy Spirit is represented as wind ; why then is there no *blowing* in baptism ? The Holy Spirit is represented by *fire* ; why is there no fire used in this ordinance ? The gift of the Spirit was represented by the *breathing* of Jesus on the Apostles ; why is there no *breathing* in baptism ? The influences of the Spirit are represented by *oil* ; why is not *oil* used in baptism ? The reception of the Holy Spirit is represented by *drinking water* ; why is there no *drinking* in this ordinance ?

In like manner, curses are represented as *poured out* by God on his enemies, or put into their hands as a cup to be drunk. Drinking is equally an emblem of blessings and curses, because it is the one or the other according to the qualities of the liquid. In the judgments of God on the wicked, there is no likeness to the manner of the divine operations. Why, then, should such a likeness be supposed when pouring respects blessings ? Baptism, then, cannot be either *pouring* or *dipping*, for the sake of representing the manner of the conveyance of the Holy Spirit ; for there is no such likeness. *Pouring of the Spirit* is a phrase which is itself a figure, not a reality to be represented by a figure. Baptism is a figure, not of the mode of any divine operation, to which there can be no likeness, but *of the burial and resurrection of Christ*, which may be represented by natural things, because it respects the objects of sense. In this reference it has a real application, a true likeness, and the most important use. Of the *immersion of the Spirit*, I will say the same as of the *pouring of the Spirit*, that it cannot represent the operations of the Spirit, or the mode of his conveyance. Believers are said to be *immersed* into the Spirit, not because there is any thing like *immersion* in the manner of the reception of the Spirit, but from the resemblance between an object soaked in a fluid, and the sanctification of all the members of the body, and faculties of the soul. The common way in which the *pouring* of the Spirit has been explained, is inconsistent both with sound taste and with sound theology. It mistakes the nature of figurative language, and converts the Godhead into matter.

But though the Baptism of the Holy Spirit is a figurative Baptism, to which there cannot be a likeness in literal Baptism ; yet as respects the transaction on the day of Pentecost, there was a real Baptism *in the emblems of the Spirit*. The disciples were immersed into the Holy Spirit by the abundance of his gifts ; but they were literally covered with wind and fire. The place where

they met was filled with a *rushing mighty wind*, and *cloven tongues as of fire* sat over them. They were then completely covered by the emblems of the Spirit. Now, though there was no dipping of them, yet as they were completely surrounded by the wind and fire, by the catachrestic mode of speech which I before explained, they are said to be *immersed*. This is a process exemplified with respect to innumerable words, and the principle is quite obvious, as well as of daily application. The shepherd, when his sheep are covered with snow in a glen, says that they are *buried* in the snow. When a house falls upon the inhabitants, we say that they are *buried* in its ruins. A general will threaten to *bury* the inhabitants in the ruins of their city. The word *bury* with us strictly conveys the notion of digging into the earth, as well as of covering over the dead. Yet here it is extended to a case in which the former does not take place. Burial usually is performed by both operations, but here the thing is performed by one; and therefore the word that designates both is elegantly assigned to that which serves the purpose of both. Just so with respect to being covered with a fluid. *Immersion* denotes that the thing *immersed* is put into the *immersing* substance; yet when the same effect is produced without the manner of the operation, the usual name of the operation is catachrestically given to the result. Virgil's expression, *Pocula sunt fontes liquidi*, Georg. III. p. 529, is an exact parallel. "The liquid fountains are their cups," &c. Now, *fountains* are not *cups*, more than the thing referred to is *immersion*, yet they are called cups, because in the instance referred to they serve the purpose of *cups*. This poet supplies innumerable examples of the operation of the principle here illustrated.

Let it not be supposed that the principle which I have now illustrated is at all akin to that unfounded fancy of Mr Ewing, with respect to the supposed *exaggerated* meaning of βαπτίζω. Mr Ewing in this gives two meanings to a word, at variance with each other, and while he calls it figurative he makes it literal; and agreeably to his doctrine it must, in the hyperbolical meaning, hold directly, and immediately, and independently, of the primary meaning. The principle which I have explained is not of this paradoxical kind. I give but the one meaning to the word, and even when there is no literal *immersion*, I maintain that the word never drops its characteristic meaning. Indeed, the beauty of the figure is that the word suggests its own peculiar meaning, even when it does not literally apply. It professedly calls a thing by a name, which lite-

rally does not in all respects belong to it, to gratify the imagination. Why does Virgil call *fountains* by the name of *cups*? Not because they were really *cups*, nor because *cup* signifies *fountain* literally, but because the human mind by its constitution is delighted in certain circumstances by viewing a thing as being what it is not, but which in some respects it resembles. The process for which I contend, I can vindicate by the soundest philosophy,—I can trace to its origin in the human mind,—I can illustrate by parallels without number. Mr Ewing has not attempted to illustrate his figure, nor is it in his power to shew its foundation in the human mind, or to sanction it by corresponding examples.

Mr Booth, with a truly critical judgment and correct taste, illustrates this mode of speech by alluding to the electrical bath, “so called,” says the writer whom he quotes, “because it surrounds the patient with an atmosphere of electrical fluid, in which he is *plunged*.” Here the writer to whom he refers, scruples not to say that the patient is *plunged* into the fluid which is brought around him. Indeed, the very term electrical bath is an exemplification of the operation of the same principle. *Bath* properly refers to a vessel of water in which persons are *bathed*. But by a catachresis this term is given to a vessel filled with a fluid, which is not for the purpose of bathing.

Thirdly, There is another grand fallacy in this argument. *It confounds things that are different*. Water is *poured* out into a vessel in order to have things put into it. But the *pouring* out of the water, and the application of the water so poured out, are different things. Water is poured into a bath in order to immerse the feet or the body, but the *immersion* is not the *pouring*. Now, our opponents confound these two things. Because the Spirit is said to be poured out in order to the Baptism of the Spirit, they groundlessly conclude that the *pouring* is the Baptism. A foreigner might as well contend that, when it is said in the English language, “Water was *poured into* a bath, and they *immersed* themselves,” it is implied that *pouring* and *immersing* are the same thing.

———— “Then taking the-resplendent vase
Allotted always to that use, she first
Infused cold water largely, then the warm.

She, then, approaching, ministered the bath
To her own king.”

COWPER, *Odys.* xix.

The *pouring* out of the Spirit is as different a figure from the

baptism of the Spirit, as the *infusion* of the water into the bath, is different from the application of the water to the object in the bath.

Now, let us apply these observations to Mr Ewing's reasoning. Dissection is not a pleasant work, either to the operator or the spectators ; but it is impossible to make an anatomist without it. General observations must be applied to the subject in detail, that all may thoroughly understand their application, and perceive their justness. It is tedious, but the business cannot be effectually done without the knife.

Speaking of water, air, and fire, Mr Ewing says, " which are all considered in Scripture as elements of Baptism." Air and fire were elements of the baptism that took place on the day of Pentecost, but they are not elements in the standing ordinance of Christ. In the baptism of the day of Pentecost there was no water at all. They who were baptized on that day in wind and fire had been baptized before. This was not the ordinance of Christian Baptism, nor an ordinance at all. Christ himself was the administrator, and it is called baptism only in an allusive sense. If it was baptism as an ordinance, it would prove that after the baptism of water, there ought to be another baptism into wind and fire.

" And in this connexion," continues Mr Ewing, " these elements are uniformly represented as *poured, inspired, and made to fall from above.*" Very true, but is this *pouring, inspiring, falling from above,* called Baptism ? Never—never.

Mr Ewing asserts, that these emblems of the work of the Spirit, are an allusion to the creation of man. But how does he find the fire in that work ? Why, was there not "*the fire of life* ?" But the *fire of life* is no element. This is only a figurative expression. It is mere fanaticism to take such mysteries out of the Scriptures. Is it not strange that Mr Ewing will allow himself to indulge so wild a fancy in deriving emblematical instruction from his own creations, and that he so obstinately refuses to take that edification from the import of Baptism, which is obviously contained in the apostolical explanations of the ordinance ?

He says that baptism " consists in a representation of all the elements employed in our first creation." I have remarked that there was no fire employed in our first creation ; and Christian baptism has no representation either of fire or air. Nor has the water of baptism any allusion to the water that moistened the clay in the creation of man. These mysteries are akin to those that the Ro-

mish church so piously finds in the oil and spittle used in baptism.

He says that the promise of the baptism with the Holy Spirit and with fire “was given to all the disciples.” Then the promise has not been fulfilled. Wind and fire are not used in the baptism of all disciples. This baptism was peculiar to the day of Pentecost. This promise cannot be supposed as literally applying to all disciples. He says, “it belongs to them, both as it regards gracious influence, and as it regards miraculous inspiration.” But the baptism of the day of Pentecost could not respect the spiritual birth, else there would be two baptisms representing the same thing. The persons baptized on the day of Pentecost, were previously baptized into water as being born again. It could not respect their progressive sanctification, else it might be repeated as often as the Lord’s Supper, and every disciple would equally need the *wind and fire* literally. Nor have all disciples the promise of miraculous gifts. This interpretation might suit Miss Mary Campbell; but I have not heard that Mr Ewing has adopted the Row heresy. Mr Ewing, however, is contented with a diminished sense of the promise. *Miraculous inspiration* he understands as applying to all believers only in the sense of their being “built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, that is, their faith is founded on the authority and energy of that Spirit by which the apostles and prophets were inspired.” What an abuse of words is this! A man is miraculously inspired because he believes the doctrine of an inspired person!!! It would be charitable in Mr Ewing to send this canon to his neighbour Mr Campbell; it might help to skreen him, if ever he comes to trial before the General Assembly. The Row heresy would turn out a very innocent thing, if the claim of miraculous gifts imports no more than faith in the doctrine of Christ. Now, were I to propagate in Ireland that Mr Ewing believes that every Christian has a promise of miraculous inspiration, would he not allege that I had injured him? And why does he misrepresent the language of the Holy Spirit, in a manner that he would judge calumny with respect to himself?

Mr Ewing derives another argument for pouring, from the expression, “*born from above*,” John iii. But *from above*, merely designates that God is the author of this birth, without respect to any emblem appointed to represent it, though baptism is, in ver. 5, referred to as its emblem. *Born from above*, is perfectly synonymous with *born of God*.

As little can be built on the emblem, John xx. 22. The *breathing* on the disciples was not a *baptism*, nor is it called a *baptism*.

Mr Ewing says, that “the mode of the baptism, Acts i. 5, is explained, v. 8.” But ver. 8. says nothing of the mode of that baptism: “But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you.” The *coming* is not the *baptism*. The influence of the Spirit when *come*, not the *coming* of the Spirit, is the baptism.

The author observes, with respect to Acts ii. 2, “that ‘the sound’ of the wind was heard *descending* from heaven, and filling the house.” Yes—but the *descending* is not the *baptism*. The wind *descended* to fill the house, that when the house was filled with the wind, the disciples might be baptized in it. Their baptism consisted in being totally surrounded with the wind, not in the manner in which the wind came. The water must be brought from the river or fountain, to fill the vessel for immersion. Does this say that the conveyance of the water is baptism?

Mr Ewing says, that “distributed flames of fire appeared like tongues, and *sat down* upon every one of them.” Though this translation is warranted by the learned Bishop Pearce, it is by no means justifiable. The common version is perfectly exact. It is not fire cloven, or distributed into tongues, but cloven tongues. There were not only many tongues, to denote many languages; but the tongues were cloven, to denote that the same individual could speak different languages. The fire *sat down* upon each of them. The baptism did not consist, as Mr Ewing supposes, in the *sitting down*, or the mode of the *coming of the flame*, but in their being *under it*. They were surrounded by the wind, and covered by the fire above. They were therefore buried in wind and fire.

It is quite obvious, indeed, that even the mode in which the house is said to have been filled with the wind on the day of Pentecost, is no more *pouring* than it is *dipping*. The wind is not said to be *poured into* the house, but to come *rushing* with a mighty noise; or the sound that filled the house, was like the sound of a *rushing* mighty wind. If literal baptism has any allusion to this, the mode ought to be that of a *rushing wind*. If the manner of the coming of the emblem is the *baptism*, then baptism is neither *pouring* nor *immersion*, but *rushing*.

But even if the Pentecost baptism were, for argument’s sake, allowed to be *pouring*, this would not relieve Mr Ewing. The whole house was filled with the sound of the wind—the emblem of

the Spirit. This was not *popping* a little water with the hand on the turned up face. When Mr Ewing pours water on the baptized person, till the latter is covered completely with it, he will give as much trouble as if he were to immerse at once. In whatever way the water in baptism is to be applied, this passage teaches us that the baptized person must be totally covered.

Speaking of our Lord's baptism, Mr Ewing asserts, "the meaning of the ordinance, and the very mode of its administration, confirmed the truth that the Holy Spirit was about to be given." But how did the meaning and mode of Christ's baptism confirm this truth? Does not this take for granted that Mr Ewing's meaning of the mode and import of this ordinance is just? If the very thing in debate is granted to Mr Ewing, no doubt he will prove it. He refers to John vii. 39, and Acts xix. 2, 3. But neither of these passages asserts what he teaches. He speaks also of the influences of the Holy Spirit, "*visibly descending from on high, and abiding upon him.*" The influence of the Holy Spirit did not *visibly* descend. It was the emblem of the Spirit that descended *visibly*. The appearance of a dove *descended visibly, and abode upon him.* But was this Christ's baptism? The baptism was over before the emblem descended. Besides, the *descending* of the Spirit, could not be the baptism of the Spirit. Jesus is not here said to be baptized with the Spirit. This baptism was literal baptism. This extraordinary communication might indeed have been called a baptism, just as in the case of the disciples, but it is not so called here. And if it were so called, it would not be the *descent* of the Spirit that is the baptism, but the communication of it after its descent. If the baptism consisted in the *descent*, the baptism was over when the dove reached Jesus. Is it possible that there is any one who has so little of the powers of discrimination, as not to be able to distinguish between bringing water from a fountain, and the use of that water when it is brought—between pouring water into a bath, and bathing in the bath? Yet every one who concludes from the *pouring* of the Spirit that baptism must be *pouring*, either wants this discrimination, or is unwilling to use it.

Another passage alleged by Mr Ewing on this subject, is Psal. xlv. 2, "Grace is *poured into thy lips,*" &c. What has this to do with baptism? The Spirit, indeed, is here said to be poured, but did any man ever deny this? But let it never be forgotten, that such language does not imply the blasphemous notion, that there

is any literal pouring in the giving of the Spirit, or that an ordinance is appointed to represent this pouring. It is quite useless, then, to refer to each of the passages which Mr Ewing alleges to prove a descent. The *descent* is not the *baptism*, and cannot represent any real movement in the Spirit. The same answer will serve for all. But Mr Ewing says, that "John supposed Jesus to receive the symbol of the Holy Spirit's descent, and presently he was seen, by miracle, to receive the reality." And is it possible that Mr Ewing can say, that what was seen after the baptism of Christ was the reality!!! The appearance of a dove seen to light on the head of Christ, the reality of the communication of the Spirit!!! Surely, surely, the dove itself was but the emblem, not the reality represented by an emblem of baptism.

But was the dove *poured out* of heaven? Is not the Spirit said to *descend* from heaven, in conformity to the dove, the emblem? This shews that the descent of the Spirit is spoken of in language always suited to the emblem under which he is represented. When water is the emblem, his descent is spoken of as pouring, or as falling like dew, &c. When the dove is the emblem, the descent is spoken of, not as pouring, but as the descent of a bird. Such varied language is suited to the various emblems, and not to any reality in the manner of the communication of the Spirit. Let any Christian attend to this observation, and he will be ashamed of the childish, or rather heathenish explanation of this language, that implies that the Godhead is matter. Pouring is most frequently used for the sending of the gifts of the Spirit; but I have shewn that the same thing is spoken of with reference to a fountain springing up,—a running stream,—the rain that is said to fall,—or the dew that distils. And here the same thing is exhibited as the descent of a bird, in conformity to the dove, which is the emblem employed. Let us hear no more then of baptism as *pouring*, in order to represent the *pouring* of the Spirit. We may as well make baptism a *flying*, to represent the descent of the dove; or a *blowing* and a *blazing*, to represent the wind and fire on the day of Pentecost; or a stream, to represent the river that supplies the city of God; or a jet, to represent the springing of a fountain; or a distillation, to represent the gentle falling of the dew; or a shower-bath, to represent the falling of the rain.

But if we are so obstinate as to resist the passages which Mr Ewing has alleged above, the most incredulous will doubtless surrender to the "view expressly given (Acts ii. 16–21, 33, 38, 39.)

of baptism with water, in consequence of the performance of the promise of baptism with the Spirit." "I will *pour out* of my Spirit," &c. "He hath *poured out* this, which ye now see and hear." "For as yet he was *fallen upon* none of them." "The Holy Ghost *fell upon* them all." The reply I have given will equally apply to this. The *pouring* is not the *baptism*, though the Spirit was *poured out*, that they might be *baptized* in it. The *descent* and the *pouring* are over, before the baptism takes place. But it may be alleged, Is it not said (Acts xi. 15, 16, 17.) that the Spirit's falling on them brought to remembrance the promise of the baptism of the Spirit? Does not this import that the baptism of the Spirit is the same thing with the falling of the Spirit?—It implies, indeed, that the baptism of the Spirit fulfilled the promise; but it does not imply that the baptism was the *falling*. The *falling* preceded the *baptism*. Rain *falls* to *moisten* the earth. The *moistening* of the earth is not the *falling* of the rain, the falling is a previous process. Suppose that in a drought, a man skilled in the signs of the weather should foretel that *on to-morrow the earth will be moistened with water*, would we not consider the prophecy fulfilled when we saw rain falling? Yet *falling* is not expressed by the word *moistening*. Just so with *the pouring* and *the baptism of the Spirit*. Let my opponents bring to the subject a small portion of discrimination, and they will instantly discern that the *falling* of the Spirit on the disciples, fulfilled the promise of the baptism of the Spirit, though *falling* and baptism are two very different things. Is not *falling* itself different from *pouring*? They are modes as different as *pouring* and *dipping*. But every thing will serve Mr Ewing that *pops down*. Yet strange, though he argues with equal confidence from every mode of *descent*, he comes at last to the confident conclusion, that no mode of descent will answer, but that of pouring. Though *falling* and *flying* will serve him in opposing immersion, yet he unceremoniously dismisses them all, when through their means he has gained the victory. Even decent and innocent *sprinkling*, that has held joint and unquestioned possession with its sister *pour* for so long a period, he turns out of doors with every mark of indignity.

But with respect to the *falling* of the Spirit on the disciples in the house of Cornelius, how did Peter and the rest perceive the descent? Was there any thing visible? No; they knew that the Holy Spirit fell on them, because they saw the effect of his influences, Acts x. 46. The influences, then, of the Spirit, and not *the falling*, was the baptism of the Spirit.

Mr Ewing concludes with all the confidence of demonstration. "Is it credible," says he, "that a word which signifies the motion of body upon body, in any direction, should, when applied to represent both the figure and the reality of a DESCENT FROM ABOVE, be meant to be understood of motion in an OPPOSITE DIRECTION," &c. Stop a little, Mr Ewing. You have said that the disputed word signifies the motion of body upon body, but you have not proved this. Nor is this word employed to represent the *descent from above* in any instance which you have brought forward. Why does Mr Ewing substitute the word *baptize* here for the word *descend*? In his premises, the words are *pour, descend, fall, &c.*; in his conclusion, they become *baptize*. This is a trick in slight of hand which we will not admit. It is utterly unlawful to reason from words that denote descent, and then draw the conclusion from βαπτίζω. So far from its being fact that βαπτίζω, in the passages referred to, is applied to represent both the figure and the reality of a descent, the words that are applied for this purpose, do not represent the baptism, but a process previous to the baptism. Whether the water, or the wind, or the fire, descends from above, or ascends from below, is nothing to the baptism. The baptism is the same, in whatever manner the baptizing substance is conveyed to the place of baptizing.

The authority of Milton is utterly valueless on this subject. I notice it merely to shew the boldness and the rashness of Mr Ewing's criticism. "Because Milton speaks of baptism as dispensed in a river," says Mr Ewing, "it has been supposed that he favoured the mode of immersion; but I am inclined to think this is a mistake. He says, indeed, of our Saviour's commission to his disciples,

————— ' To them shall leave in charge
To teach all nations what of him they learn'd,
And his salvation ; them who shall believe
Baptizing in the profluent stream, the sign
Of washing them from guilt of sin to life
Pure ; and in mind prepar'd, if so befall,
For death, like that which the Redeemer died.' "

Well, reader, what do you think of this? What was Milton's view of the mode of baptism? If our Saviour commanded them to baptize disciples in the *profluent stream*, must not baptism be immersion? What hardihood must that man possess, who will dare

to criticise in this manner ! But, says Mr Ewing, “ According to this account, baptism is the sign of, not *immersing*, but *washing* in a river.” What egregious trifling ! *Baptism* is not the sign of *immersing* ! That is, *immersing* is not the sign of *immersing*. Very true ; for how could a thing be the sign of itself ? Well, of what is baptism a sign, according to Milton ?—Of *washing in a river* ! So then Milton makes baptism a sign of washing in a river ! Then the sign and the thing signified are the same. *Washing in a river* is the sign of *washing in a river* ! Alas ! poor Milton ; here thou hast a fool’s cap. Illustrious bard ! thou wast a heretic, but thou wast not a fool. Immersion in a river, thou hast said, is the sign of washing from guilt. Oh, that thou hadst known the reality as well as thou didst know the figure ! Hadst thou known the Saviour as well as thou hast known the mode of this his ordinance, thou wouldst have been great indeed.

Speaking of the baptism of the Spirit, Milton indeed uses the phrase “ on all baptized.” But this may be accounted for by his using the word baptize as it is generally used in English. Using the word in its most common acceptation, I would not scruple to say, *baptized with the Spirit*, when there was no need for accuracy of distinction. Milton, also, from not closely considering the phraseology, might fall into the vulgar error, that the baptism of the Spirit was pouring, because the Spirit is said to be *poured out*, though water baptism was by immersion. This way of explaining the apparent inconsistency, I believe, is not uncommon. I hope I have made it unnecessary to have recourse to this resource.

Mr Ewing quotes a passage from which it has been concluded that Milton was opposed to infant baptism, but from which Mr Ewing himself concludes that the poet was a friend both to pouring and the baptism of infants. I need not quote the whole passage ; the marrow of it is found in the expression, “ When ye had laid the purifying element upon his forehead.” Now, both this and the whole passage may agree with either of the opinions, and consequently can neither prove nor refute either. Mr Ewing is well founded in supposing that the disparagement may not respect the sprinkling ; but he has no authority to conclude that Milton approved either of sprinkling as the mode, or of infants as the subjects of baptism, because he calls the water laid on the foreheads of infants, *a purifying element*. Water is a *purifying element*, even when applied in the holy water of the Church of Rome. The nature of the water is the same, whether it is used superstitiously,

or according to the appointment of God. But Milton might have gone much farther, without giving ground for Mr Ewing's inference. Many Protestants would speak of the baptism of the Church of Rome, with all its trumpery, as true baptism. I am not sure that Mr Ewing himself would re-baptize a convert from Popery. I refer to this note with respect to Milton,—not from any desire to have him on my side, but to manifest the utter unreasonableness of Mr Ewing's criticism. No evidence could withstand the torture of such an inquisitor. I doubt not but Mr Ewing could make Milton as orthodox on the subject of the Trinity as on baptism, if he would as zealously set about the work.

We have a delicious morsel of criticism in Mr Ewing's explanation of the figurative baptism that was fulfilled in the sufferings of Christ. Mr Ewing is at no loss to find edification in his mode of this ordinance. He does not need the apostles as commissaries to find provision for the house of God. He gives us much edification in his explanation of this ordinance, not to be found in the Scriptures. "We are led to conceive of baptism," says Mr Ewing, "as the pouring out of water from a cup on the turned up face of the baptized; and whether he be adult or in infancy, it may thus not only wet the surface as a figure of washing, but be drunk into the mouth, as the emblem of a principle of new life, and of continual support and refreshment,—of a source of spiritual and heavenly consolation, and of a willingness given, or to be given, to the baptized, to receive whatever may be assigned them as their portion." Here surely is a discovery. Here is edification unknown to all former ages. Had the ancients perceived this in the import of *sprinkling* or *pouring*, there would have been no need of the honey and milk at baptism. Mr Ewing can obtain the same thing from the manner of putting the water on the face. Mr Ewing considers the *drinking* of part of the water poured on the turned up face, as an emblem. If so, then this drinking is essential to true baptism; and if any baptized person happen not to receive a part of the water into the mouth, he is not properly baptized. He wants something that belongs to the ordinance. If this is the case, a very great number are not truly baptized. Nay, it is not only essential to receive some of the baptismal water into the mouth, but it is necessary to drink it. If the child by suffocation makes an involuntary effort to throw out the water, it is unbaptized. I think the probability is, that not one of a thousand actually drink any part of the water. I am convinced also, that very many who baptize by pouring water on the

face, so far from being aware of the virtue of drinking a part of the element, endeavour to avoid giving pain to the child by pouring the water into the mouth. If this is a part of the emblem of baptism, the nature of the ordinance is yet unknown to the great body of those who practise infant baptism, and the bulk of those called Christians are unbaptized.

But this *drinking* is not only an emblem, it is an emblem pregnant with mysteries. An emblem of a principle of new life—of continual support and refreshment—of a source of spiritual and heavenly consolation—of a willingness given—aye, and of a willingness to be given, &c. What a striking emblem of this willingness, is a child screaming and coughing to eject the water that falls into its mouth! With what a keen appetite does its thirsty soul drink down this agreeable beverage! What pity that the apostles were ignorant of all these mysteries in baptism! What pity that Mr Ewing's book was not written till the nineteenth century!—Ah, shame! Can it be possible that the minister of an Independent Church, should indulge his fancy in finding mysteries in an ordinance of Christ, which are nowhere explained by the Apostles as included in it! Where is the passage of Scripture that explains baptism as containing these mysteries? Where is this drinking found? The very foundation of these mysteries is not once mentioned in the word of God. Where is the turned up face? For any thing that the Scriptures contain on the subject, it might as well be the turned up foot. Another might find mysteries in the foot, as well as Mr Ewing has found them in the face.

Mr Ewing, however, says, “We are led to this conception of baptism, by various passages of Scripture which it will be found to explain.” But to justify such an explanation, it is not enough that it will illustrate various passages of Scripture. Some passage of Scripture must explain the ordinance in this sense. There is no rite of superstition that might not, by a wild imagination, be alleged to illustrate some passage of Scripture.

We are not yet at the end of the mysteries in the mode of baptism. “The cup,” says Mr Ewing, “which I refer to, is the כּף, the cup of nature, that is, the hollow of the human hand.” Though the word of God says nothing at all about the hand in the administration of this ordinance, Mr Ewing finds it under the designation of a cup. He gives us the full process in the following words: “From this cup, the baptizer so pours it out on the baptized, that it shall run down his face, as the ointment did from the head of

Aaron, and even to the skirts, rather to the upper border or collar, of his garment, Ps. cxxxiii. 2." Not only, then, must some of the water be received into the mouth, some of it must also run down on the garments. What nice adjustment is necessary in the position of the person to be baptized, that all these mysteries may be accomplished! Would it not be an improvement if a little oil was added to the ceremony?

Mr Ewing next proceeds to caution against taking offence at the simplicity of oriental manners, and to justify, by examples, this drinking out of the cup of nature. But all this is unnecessary. Could Mr Ewing shew from Scripture that we are to drink water out of the hollow of the baptizer's hand, we would submit without a murmur. He himself might have a lesson from his own admonition. It is very applicable to his objections to immersion. But because it was customary to drink out of the hollow of the hand, does it follow that baptism must be such a drinking? There is no connexion between the premises and the conclusion.

Let us not, however, be too rash in asserting that Mr Ewing has no Scripture for his mysteries. He alleges several passages. Was ever the Church of Rome at a loss for Scripture allusions to countenance its rites and mysteries? In no instance is it less successful than Mr Ewing. He alleges 1 Cor. xii. 13, "baptized into one body;" and "made to drink into one Spirit." But does this imply that *baptizing* and *drinking* are the same emblem? Does it imply that these two figures are taken from a process in baptism? What reason is there to suppose that the last respects that ordinance? The two figures are totally unconnected,—as unconnected as any two figures that in conjunction are applied to the same object. That the last has a reference to drinking in baptism, is as arbitrary a conceit as any thing in the mysteries of popery.

Mr Ewing adds, "There is perhaps a more intimate connection between a "cup" and a "baptism," as belonging to *one* allusion, than some readers of Scripture have as yet remarked. Mat. xx. 22," &c. These figures both respect *one* object, but they have not, as Mr Ewing asserts, *one* allusion. They are figures as independent and as distinct, as if one of them was found in Genesis, and the other in Revelations. One of them represents the sufferings of Christ as a cup of bitterness or poison, which he must drink; the other represents the same sufferings as an immersion in water. When the Psalmist says, "the Lord God is a *sun and shield*," is there one allusion in the two figures? Both the figures

represent the same object, but they have a separate and altogether independent allusion. The *sun* is one emblem, a *shield* is another. In like manner, when the Psalmist says, “we went through *fire* and through *water*,” have the *fire* and the *water* one allusion? This criticism is founded on a total misconception of the nature of figurative language.

Again, if the *drinking of the cup* and *the baptism* have one allusion, that is, if they both allude to the ordinance of baptism, why are both expressions used? Is not this the same as to say, *are you able to suffer as I suffer, and to be baptized with my baptism?* It gives not two illustrations of the same thing, but merely two names. If drinking the cup is baptism, then there are not two figures. We might as well say, the *son of Philip king of Macedon, and Alexander the Great*. But if the *drinking of the cup* and the *baptism*, conjointly, represent the same object, each exhibiting a part, then it follows that the *baptism* is not *baptism*, but is part of baptism, which is completed by the drinking. Besides, this view places the last part of the figure first; the *drinking* is before the *pouring out of the cup*.

It may be remarked, also, that if sufferings are represented as the drinking of a cup, in allusion to the cup of nature in baptism, then the ordinance of baptism represents *sufferings* as well as *blessings*. The drinking in baptism represents not only the reception of the Spirit, but the suffering of afflictions. The figure of drinking a cup, is equally calculated to represent either. But both cannot be contained in the same cup. Afflictions might be represented by the drinking of a cup, but not by the cup of Christian baptism, which represents the blessings of the gospel.

The expression, “I have a *baptism* to be *baptized* with; and how am I straitened till it be finished,” Luke xii. 50, Mr Ewing explains thus: “I have a cup to drink of, and how am I straitened until it be finished.” But it is utterly without authority to say, that *baptism* is a *cup*. This is a new meaning given to the word, with as little foundation as to say that *baptism* is a *sword*. Mr Ewing refers to Matth. xxvi. 39, for support to this explanation. But this gives him not a shadow of countenance. The cup there spoken of, refers indeed to the sufferings of Christ, but the cup is not called a baptism. These figures respect the same thing, but they do not respect the same likeness. What a wild idea, to suppose that two independent metaphors cannot in conjunction illustrate the same object! A hero is a *lion*, is a *tower*, is a *rock*, is a

thousand things; without supposing any identity or relation between the lion, and the tower, and the rock, and the thousand things that represent him. It is really sickening to dissect such criticism. Proofs and illustrations are brought forward and exhibited with an importance that intimates them quite decisive, which have not the most distant bearing on the point in hand. The passages in which the sufferings of Christ are spoken of, under the figure of *drinking a cup*, are all mustered and paraded, as if the fact that this phrase refers to the same thing with the figurative baptism of Christ, is proof that they are the same figure, or must both refer to baptism. What would we think of the critic who should argue that the phrase *sun* and *shield*, in the eighty-fourth Psalm, is one allusion, because they both refer to God? This is the very criticism of Mr Ewing.

Mr Ewing very justly observes, that in the Old Testament, the punishment of the wicked by God is represented by their being *compelled* to drink a cup. But, surely, there can be nothing corresponding to this in baptism. We are not compelled to drink a cup of poison, when we drink of the influences of the Holy Spirit.

“ This simplicity, and this littleness of the sign,” says Mr Ewing, “ mark its resemblance to all the other symbolical ordinances of God, and distinguish it from those clumsy and unseemly additions, which a superstitious dependence on means, or rather on the show of wisdom in will-worship, has rendered men so prone to adopt.” If any man adopts immersion from a dependence on means, or as an invention of will-worship, I will give him up to Mr Ewing’s most indignant reprobation. It is the commandment of God I am searching after; and if I find this, I will never use any reasoning to make the sign either less or greater than it is. “ I have as little faith,” continues Mr Ewing, “ in the compromise of *copious* pouring, as in the enormity of immersion baptism.” But according to some of the precedents alleged by the author himself, he is not at liberty to have little faith in *copious* pouring. Even granting that the Pentecost baptism was pouring, it was an immensely, it was an *enormously copious* pouring. It was a pouring that filled the whole house. It is Mr Ewing’s business to reconcile this precedent with his *popping*. But Mr Ewing gives us reasons—Scripture reasons, for his having little faith in *copious* pouring. “ A small quantity of blood sprinkled once a year,” says he, “ by the high priest, with one of his fingers, on a little gold plated seat, was, for ages, the sign to Israel, of the acceptance in heaven of the sacrifice

of Christ for the whole church." Very true, because a small quantity was sufficient to perfect the figure. A small quantity of water cannot suffice for the exhibition of the likeness of a burial and resurrection, which are declared by God to be the import of baptism. Had God commanded to sprinkle with a few drops of water, or to pour a little water on the turned up face, for a purpose that such an emblem is calculated to serve, it would have been impious to change this into another ordinance to represent a burial and resurrection. A little blood served the priest for sprinkling; but a little water did not serve him for his bathing. A "little gold plated seat" served to receive the sprinkling of the blood; but a little water did not serve to fill the brazen sea. "A small morsel of bread, and a sip of wine," &c. No doubt of it; but this small quantity is as fit to represent the thing figured, as a baker's shop and a wine cellar would be. "The handful of water," says Mr Ewing, "on the face of the polluted sinner, confirms the good news of the washing of regeneration," &c. If *washing only* were intended to be represented, this would be true: but the Spirit of Inspiration has declared, that this ordinance represents the burial and resurrection of Christ, and our fellowship with him in these, by faith in which we are washed. Had not God instituted immersion, and explained its meaning, man could not do either. I disclaim all ordinances of will-worship, and all human explanations of Scripture ordinances. God only can institute. God only can interpret. If Mr Ewing claims the right of inventing mysteries in the signification of baptism, I believe he will not find a fellow among those on the other side of the question.

The passage of the children of Israel through the Red Sea is figuratively called a baptism, from its external resemblance to that ordinance, and from being appointed to serve a like purpose, as well as to figure the same thing. "Moreover, brethren, I would not that ye should be ignorant, how that all our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea," 1 Cor. x. 1. Here they are said to have been baptized. There can be no doubt, therefore, that there is in their passage through the sea, something that resembles both the external form, and the purpose of Christian Baptism. It was a real *immersion*—the sea stood on each side, and the cloud covered them. But it was not a literal *immersion in water*, in the same way as Christian baptism. It is, therefore, figuratively called by the

name of the Christian ordinance, because of external similarity, and because of serving the like purpose, as well as figuring the same event. The going down of the Israelites into the sea, their being covered by the cloud, and their issuing out on the other side, resembles the baptism of believers, served a like purpose as attesting their faith in Moses as a temporal saviour, and figured the burial and resurrection of Christ and Christians, as well as Christian baptism. If Christian baptism is a representation of burial and resurrection,—and if the passage of the Israelites is called a baptism, we are warranted in supposing that both have the same figurative meaning. It has been argued by some, that the Israelites were baptized by the rain from the cloud, and the spray from the sea. But this is quite arbitrary ; for there is nothing said about rain from the cloud, or spray from the sea. It is not in evidence that any such things existed. On the contrary, as they would have been an annoyance, there is reason to believe that they did not exist. The baptism of the Israelites in ver. 2, is evidently referred to their having been under the cloud, and having passed through the sea, as stated in the first verse.

Dr Wardlaw asks in astonishment, “ Are our brethren not sensible of the straining that is necessary to make out immersion baptism here ?” Not in the least sensible of any straining, I can assure Dr Wardlaw. But we do not strain to make out a literal baptism, as respects an ordinance to be performed as an appointment of God. Surely there is no straining, to see in this fact something that may darkly shadow a burial. There is no straining to find in it something corresponding to Christian baptism, though in all things it does not identify with it. However ridiculous this *conceit* may appear to Dr Wardlaw, it is the very thing asserted by the Holy Ghost. The Israelites, by being *under* the cloud, and passing through the sea, were baptized into Moses. By venturing to enter into the sea, they professed and exhibited full confidence in Moses as sent of God to lead them out of Egypt to Canaan.

“ A dry baptism !” exclaims Dr Wardlaw. Be patient, Dr Wardlaw, was not the Pentecost baptism a dry baptism ? Christian Baptism is not a dry baptism, but the baptism of Pentecost, and of the Israelites in the Red Sea, were dry baptisms. Immersion does not necessarily imply wetting : immersion in water implies this. “ Would our brethren,” says Dr Wardlaw, “ consider a man duly baptized by his being placed between two cisterns of wa-

ter, with a third over his head?" Certainly not. Nothing is Christian baptism—but the immersion of a believer in water, in obedience to the command of Jesus. Every thing that can be called *immersion* is not *baptism* as an ordinance of Christ. Strange, indeed, that Dr Wardlaw should suppose that every thing is Christian baptism, which can be denominated an immersion. To be spotted with blood is a *sprinkling*; would Dr Wardlaw consider this true Christian baptism? In an ordinance of Christ there is something more than mode. Would Dr Wardlaw consider a man duly baptized, when he is sprinkled with rain, or wet with dew? The Spirit of God calls the passage through the Red Sea a baptism; a likeness then it must have to the Christian ordinance of baptism, to which there is an undoubted reference. Surely it requires less straining to find this likeness from the facts stated, than from fancies supposed. The passage through the sea as much resembles baptism, as the manna does the bread in the Lord's Supper. They are figures of the same thing, and therefore, though different, are similar.

Having examined the testimony of the figurative applications of the word βαπτίζω, I shall now try what light can be obtained from its syntax, and the circumstances in which it is found. Mat. iii. 11. βαπτίζω υμᾶς ἐν ὕδατι. "I baptize you *in* water." It may be surprising that, after all that has been said on the subject, I should still lay any stress on the preposition ἐν, *in*. I may be asked, Do you deny that it may be translated *with*? I do not deny this, yet I am still disposed to lay stress on it. A word may be used variously, yet be in each of its applications capable of being definitely ascertained. Were not this the case, language would be incapable of conveying definite meaning. To ascertain its meaning here, I shall submit the following observations: 1. *In* is its primary and most usual signification. Even in the instances in which it is translated otherwise, it may generally be reduced to its primary meaning, although it is more usual with our idiom to employ other prepositions. There are instances, indeed, in which we cannot trace the primary idea. This, however, is nothing but what happens with our own preposition *in*, and with all prepositions. If the Greeks say, ἐν χειρὶ ἰσχυρᾶ, we say, *they went out in arms*. ἐν is so obviously the parent of *in*, that Mr Ewing says, that "it can hardly be called a translation." He considers it merely a change of alphabet. It may be true, that this was the case in the formation of the derived word, but it certainly is a translation in as full

a sense as any one word is a translation of another. It is not like *baptize*, which was not a word of our language. *In* is an English word, as truly as *εν* is a Greek one. It is given as an equivalent to *εν*, not because it was formed from it, but because in meaning it coincides with it. We adopted the word and its meaning also.

2. As the instances in the acceptance of this preposition in which the primary idea cannot be traced are extremely few, so it cannot be admitted in a signification inconsistent with this idea, except when necessity demands it. If the words in connexion admit the primary and usual meaning, it is unwarrantable to look for another. Such a use would render the passage inextricably equivocal. The passages in which it is translated *with*, are without exception of this cast. They would not make sense in our idiom, if *εν* were translated *in*. Without such a necessity, no translator would ever think of rendering *εν* by *with*. What is more usual than to find, when *εν* is translated *among*, &c. critics explaining it as being "*literally on*." Now, in the instance alluded to, all the words in connexion admit the primary and usual meaning of *εν*. Even the most extravagant of our opponents admit that βαπτίζω signifies to *dip*. If then the word also signifies to *pour*, to use *εν* in connexion with it, would render it altogether equivocal. We could not from the passage determine its meaning. I contend, then, that though *εν* may sometimes be translated *with*, yet it cannot be so used here. For if βαπτίζω is allowed to denote *dip*, and not *pour*, *with* is rejected as incongruous: if βαπτίζω is supposed to signify either *dip* or *pour*, then to use a preposition after it, which usually signifies *in*, but here in the sense of *with*, which is rare, would inevitably be equivocal, or would rather lead to a false meaning. It is absurd to suppose, that such an equivocal expression could be used with respect to the performance of a divine ordinance, which is to be a precedent for all ages.

3. I have produced innumerable examples in which *εν* is construed with this verb incontestibly in the sense of *dipping*. If then we have found the disputed phrase in a situation in which our opponents must admit our meaning of it; if the examples of this meaning of the phrase are numerous; and if no example can be produced in which the phrase is used in a situation in which we must confess that it refers to *pouring*, or any other thing but *dipping*,—all the laws of language forbid the supposition of *pouring*. What can forbid the phrase to have its usual meaning? What can authorise

a meaning which the phrase has not necessarily in any other passage?

4. Even Mr Ewing's translation of βαπτίζω will not construe with εἰς in the sense of *with*. He would not say, *I pop you with water*, but *I pop upon you with water*. Now, there is no *upon* in the verb. Mr Ewing, indeed, supposes himself at liberty to vary his word *pop* by any preposition he chooses to subjoin to it. But he cannot do so without something in the original to justify the variation. I have shewn that *to pop*, *to pop upon*, *to pop into*, &c. are all different words. To consider them all as contained in ΒΑΠΤΙΖΩ and in *pop*, is to say that a *half-penny* is a *guinea*, because in a guinea there is a portion of copper,—or that *copper* is *brass*, because brass contains copper as a part of its composition.

5. Any translation that can be given of εἰς is inconsistent with the supposition that βαπτίζω signifies to *pour*. We could not say, “*I pour you with water.*” *Pour* must be immediately followed by the thing *poured*, and not with the person on whom any thing is *poured*. It is not *I pour you with water*, but *I pour water upon you*. The syntax then of the word, as well as its acceptation, forbids *pouring* as the mode of baptism.

What I have further to observe on this passage, will occur in my remarks on Mr Ewing's attack on Dr Campbell's note.

In admitting that εἰς may sometimes signify *with*, Dr Campbell appears to ground the fact on a Hebraism. In this sense Mr Ewing understands him; in which he coincides. “That the phraseology to which the Doctor refers,” says Mr Ewing, “does not restrict the sense to *in*, but absolutely recommends the sense of *with*, appears from the occasional omission of the preposition, (the use of it in such phrases being entirely a Hebraism, corresponding with the Hebrew כִּי, which, as the Doctor owns, signified *with* as well as *in*.” Now, in opposition both to Dr Campbell and Mr Ewing, I maintain that εἰς in this use is not a Hebraism, either in its meaning, or use. It signifies *with* in classical Greek, as well as in the Septuagint or New Testament; and just in the same circumstances. It is also as frequently used with this verb in the heathen authors, as in the Scriptures. To convince any one of this, it is necessary only to look over the examples which I have produced, both with respect to βαπτω and βαπτίζω, which perfectly coincide in their syntax. Was Hippocrates a Hellenistic Jew?

Indeed, to enlarge the meaning of a Greek preposition, that it may correspond with a Hebrew preposition, is a thing, which,

though the conceit has been sanctioned by Dr Campbell, and many great names, is a pure absurdity. To do so, would not be to speak the Greek language. To do so, would be to mislead all the Greek nations. There is not one instance in which such a thing is done in the word of God. If the apostles used the Greek prepositions, not as the Greeks themselves used them, but as the Hebrews used theirs, they have not given a revelation of the will of God. This view of the Hebraism of the New Testament is one of the worst things in Dr Campbell's translation ; and it is evidently employed to hide or destroy the Sovereignty of God. Whatever may be the extent of the Hebraisms of the New Testament, they cannot, consistently with the honour of revelation, be supposed to affect the sense. This supposition is the resource of those who wish to corrupt the gospel of Christ, or, in some way, to modify a disagreeable doctrine.

Equally groundless, and even equally absurd, is Mr Ewing's assertion, that the fact that the preposition is sometimes omitted, recommends the sense of *with*. If that preposition is sometimes written, and sometimes left out, it is as clear as an axiom, that the passages in which it is admitted, must agree with the passages in which it is written, and must be translated just as if it were present. The meaning of the passages, then, in which it is omitted, must be determined by those in which it is written. When it is not expressed it must be understood. Such an omission, then, can cast no light on the subject.

Mr Ewing alleges, that "our English translators, at least, being friends of immersion, would have been led by their system, to have patronized the Doctor's translation." But this is a fallacious argument. It is true, as Mr Ewing says, that on this question our translators were "directly opposed" to him. But what sort of friends were they to *immersion*? Just such as Professor Porson, and the thousands of learned men who have the candour to confess the truth, though, as they think the matter of little importance, they practise the contrary. There was then no temptation to induce them to testify for immersion. There was the strongest temptation to induce them to accommodate their translation to the practice of their church, not to their views of the original mode of baptism. Dr Wall was so far a friend of immersion, that he would have preferred it ; yet how has he laboured to prove that it is not necessary ! Mr Ewing's strictures, then, on Dr R.'s friend, have no weight, for they view the subject in a false light. The authority of our

translators in our favour, is the authority not of friends, but of practical opposers ; and, as Dr Campbell has shewn, real opposers, in every case that could, in their judgment, admit pouring or sprinkling.

Dr Campbell had censured our translators as inconsistent, in rendering *εν υδατι* “with water,” while they rendered *εν τω Ιορδανη* “in Jordan.” How does Mr Ewing vindicate them from inconsistency? Why! by alleging that the former refers to the ACT and ELEMENTS of baptism, and the latter to the PLACE. Now, this might vindicate Mr Ewing, but it does not vindicate our translators. Mr Ewing forgets that the conceit that *Ιορδανη* is not the river, but the district in the neighbourhood of the river, is of his own invention. Our translators evidently understood it of the river itself, as every sober reader must do. Our translators, then, remain under Doctor Campbell’s censure, for any thing that Mr Ewing has done to relieve them.

But let us see if he can justify himself in this business. I admit that “a difference of connection” will justify us in “understanding the same word in a different sense.” But I see no difference of connection here. On the contrary, the word *Jordan*, in the sixth verse, as evidently means the river *Jordan*, as *water* in the eleventh verse means *water*. The *Jordan* never signifies, as Mr Ewing supposes, *the plain of Jordan*, *the valley of Jordan*, or *Jordan-dale*. This is a figment formed for a particular purpose. Can Mr Ewing justify this explanation by a single corresponding example, in which a similar phrase must be so understood? Were we to read in the newspapers, that certain persons in Glasgow were *baptized in the Clyde*, would we understand that it imported merely that they were baptized in *Clydesdale*? This is a daring perversion of the words of the Holy Spirit. It requires a hardihood that every heretic does not possess. An Arian or a Socinian does not require more. No Neological gloss is more extravagant. The Spirit of God tells us that our Lord did many miracles; the Neologist forces him to say that there was nothing miraculous in the Saviour’s works. The Spirit of God tells us that the people of Israel were baptized by John *in the Jordan*; Mr Ewing forces him to say that it was not in *Jordan*, but in *Jordandale*. What a system is it that compels its abettors to take such liberties with the word of God! I view such conduct, not only with disapprobation, but with horror.

But Mr Ewing says that an Evangelist explains the thing in his

sense. This is high authority indeed. I will ask no better. If this is made good, I will bow with submission. "That it was not the *water* of the river, but the *country* on its banks, is evident from the fuller and more particular account of the apostle John. What Matthew calls *εν Ιορδανη*, *in Jordan*, John calls *εν Βεθαβαρα*, and expressly says, it was *παραν του Ιορδανου*, beyond Jordan."

I admit the premises; I deny the conclusion. Let the two Evangelists refer to the same thing, yet what the one calls *Jordan*, the other does not call *Bethabara*. Matthew speaks of the *river* in which John was baptizing; John of the *town* in which he was baptizing. John is more particular as to the part of the river in which the Baptist was baptizing; it was in the town of *Bethabara*. Matthew is more particular with respect to the water in which he was baptizing; it was the *Jordan*. Corresponding to this, with respect to the same person, one writer might say, "he was baptizing in the *Clyde*;" another, "he was baptizing in *Glasgow*." Mr Ewing himself, in asserting that John's account of this matter is more particular than that of Matthew, virtually admits that it is not necessary that *Jordan* should be perfectly equivalent to *Bethabara*; for if one account may be more particular than another, *Bethabara* may express the place or part of the river, while *Jordan* expresses the water in which John baptized.

Let it, however, be supposed that the expression of the one Evangelist exactly corresponds to that of the other—what follows? As *Jordan* signifies *Jordan-dale*, so *Bethabara* must not denote the town, but the whole district supposed to be called *Jordan-dale*. According to Mr Ewing himself, these two words do not correspond. He makes the one to denote the whole country, the other, one town situated in the country.

Still it may be said, if the two accounts refer to the same thing, as John is said to be baptizing in *Bethabara*, and as this town was beyond *Jordan*, so he could not be baptizing in the river, which was on one side of the town. Mr Ewing will let us come to the margin of the stream, but the phrase, he says, will not carry us "one jot further." This is hard enough. I will try to advance a little into the river. This I am enabled to do with the sanction of the usual phraseology in similar cases. The limits of a town, in speaking in a general way, are not confined to the ground occupied by the houses. Suppose, for instance, that a man is charged with having committed a breach of the peace, on a certain day of the month, in *Glasgow*. In proving an *alibi*, he alleges that he was

on that day in the town of Belfast. Opposite counsel cries out, "My Lords, and gentlemen of the jury, he is a perjured rascal, for I can prove that he was the whole of that day in a ship in *Belfast harbour*. He never once entered the town that day." What will the judge and jury think of such a mode of proof? Surely he was in Belfast when he was in the port of Belfast. And is it not the same thing with the town and port of Bethabara? When Mr Ewing changes his views on this subject, and comes over to Belfast to baptize his brethren in that town, it will be asked by some of the people of Glasgow, Where is Mr Ewing? The reply will be, "He is in Belfast, baptizing the Independent Church of that town." This reply will be made without any reference to the situation of the water. Might it not also be said, that the people of Glasgow go down to Gourock or Helensburgh to bathe? Yet the place of bathing is in the sea. Might it not also be said; that such a person was drowned in Port-Glasgow while he was bathing in the Clyde? In like manner, it might have been added to John's account, that the Baptist was baptizing in Jordan. *John was baptizing in Bethabara in the Jordan*. Now, Mr Ewing, say candidly, am I not now entitled to step a little distance from the margin into the river? Have I not demolished this stronghold?

But I have many other resources, had it been necessary to employ them on this point. A small bend in the river, or hollow in the bed on one side, might have formed a basin, so that houses might actually have been nearer to the centre of the river, than some parts of the basin. A bare possibility is all that is necessary to obviate a difficulty. But sober criticism could never dwell on such things. The common forms of speech utterly condemn such a mode of opposition. Indeed, the houses do not generally extend to the margin of the sea or river. If a town was limited by the houses, the quay itself would often be no part of it. The harbour has as good a title to be included in the town as the quay.

But there is another awkward situation in which our view, it seems, places John the Baptist, out of which I must endeavour to deliver him. Mr Ewing asserts, that if John the Baptist baptized in Bethabara, standing in the water of the river, then he must have been in that situation when he bore his testimony to the priests and Levites. Now, it is a hard thing to keep the poor man in the water during this discourse. I will endeavour, then, to put him on dry ground. The argument is, that in John i. 23, all the things previously mentioned, are said to have been done *in Bethabara*,

when John was baptizing. Therefore, if he was standing in the water when he spoke to the priests, all the things are said to be done in the same place. The answer is, all the things were indeed done in the same place, that is, in Bethabara, but this does not imply that they were done in the same part of Bethabara. When Mr Ewing comes to baptize his brethren in Belfast, it is likely he may have a fierce encounter with the Arians. The Glasgow Newspapers will say, "these things happened in Belfast, where Mr Ewing was baptizing." Will the people of Glasgow understand that the engagement with the Arians was when Mr Ewing was actually baptizing? Ah! Mr Ewing, what shall I call such a mode of opposing immersion? Shall I call it childish? Or shall I call it perverse? Were it in reality asserted, that John gave his testimony to the priests while he was baptizing, I would implicitly believe it. The thing is not impossible. There is not, however, the smallest appearance of such an assertion.

That Jordan denotes the river, and not the country in the neighbourhood of Jordan, is not only obvious from the word of God, it is expressly asserted to be the river by Mark i. 5, where the word river is joined to it. "And there went out unto him all the land of Judea, and they of Jerusalem, and were all baptized of him in the river of Jordan, confessing their sins." Nothing can limit the word more clearly than this, ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ποταμῷ, *in the river Jordan*. As if the Holy Spirit had anticipated Mr Ewing's perversion of the word Jordan, by converting it, without any authority, into Jordan-dale, the word ποταμῷ is added to it by Mark. Mr Ewing, indeed, says, that if John i. 28. Matth. iii. 6—13. John x. 40, are considered, they will explain Mark i. 5, in his sense. But I hope I have shewn that these passages have no bearing on the point. It would be a strange explanation that would explain the *river Jordan* not to be the *river Jordan*, but something else. This would be a Neological explanation. There is in the passage under consideration, other evidence that baptism was performed by immersion. It is said that Jesus, when he was baptized, went *up* straightway *from* the water. I admit the proper translation of ἀπο is *from* and not *out of*; and that the argument from the former is not of the same nature with that which is founded on *ex out of*. I perfectly agree with Mr Ewing, that ἀπο would have its meaning fully verified, if they had only gone down to the edge of the water. I shall not take a jot more from a passage than it contains. The Bible is orthodox enough for me as it is. How then can I deduce *dipping* from

the phrases *going down*, and *coming up from*? My argument is this. If baptism had not been by immersion, there can be no adequate cause alleged for going to the river. Can sober judgment, can candour suppose, that if a handful of water would have sufficed for baptism, they would have gone to the river? Many evasions have been alleged to get rid of this argument, but it never will be fairly answered. I have strong suspicions that these evasions are scarcely satisfactory, even to those who make them. I am much mistaken if they are not perplexed with the circumstance of John the Baptist's great predilection for the neighbourhood of Jordan, and other places, where the water is the very reason assigned for the preference. There is no spot on the earth in which a human being can be found, that without any inconvenience will not afford a handful of water. Even in a besieged town, with a scarcity of water, what would sprinkle the whole inhabitants, would not be felt as a sensible loss.

Mr Ewing attempts to account for the above phraseology, by the fact that fountains and rivers are generally in hollow places. This, indeed, accounts for the phraseology, but does it account for this fact? Whether the river was in a hill or in a valley, why did they go to it, when a handful of water would have sufficed? Mr Ewing himself says, "I believe, indeed, that John frequented the banks of the Jordan, as the most convenient place of the wilderness, not only for multitudes to attend him, but also for having water at hand with which to baptize them." But was there any place in Judea in which he could not find a supply of water for *popping* or *sprinkling*? The greatest crowd that ever assembled might be *popped* at a small fountain. Besides, however many the persons were who went to his baptism, there is no foundation to suppose that immense crowds were always with him. The account itself does not imply that there ever was at any time an immense crowd. All Judea and Jerusalem are said to be baptized by him; but they are not said to have been with him at once, or even in crowds at any one time. Why should they be supposed to have staid with him any considerable time?

But our argument from this passage is not only that they frequented the banks of Jordan; but that, being there for the performance of baptism, they went down to the water. Now, if an army encamped on Glasgow Green in a time of war, were all to be baptized by *popping*, would they bring the water from the river, or would they all go to the very edge of the water? Why did Jesus

go down to the water, when the water might as well have been brought up to him? Does Mr Ewing take the infants to the edge of the Clyde when he is *popping* them? This answer, then, is but an evasion. No reason has ever been given, or ever will be given, to account for this fact, on the hypothesis of baptizing with a handful of water.

Mr Ewing observes that this phraseology is confined to baptisms out of doors. Very true, but in Mr Ewing's baptism, why were there any baptisms out of doors? If they are *popped upon* with a handful of water, any number might successively be *popped* in the same house with equal convenience as out of doors. When a conveniency for baptism was found within doors, there was no recourse to a river; and then there could be no *going down* nor *coming up*. When a person was baptized in a bath, the baptizer was not in the water at all.

Mr Ewing says, "Rebekah went down to the well—and came up." "Does this imply that she immersed herself? No. She went down to the well, and filled her pitcher, and came up." Very true. But are the cases parallel? Do they not differ in the very point in which it is essential for Mr Ewing's argument that they should agree? This illustration favours us, and refutes Mr Ewing himself. If Rebekah went down to the well, she had a good errand to the well—an errand that is not left to be supplied by conjecture, but is expressly specified, namely, to fill her pitcher. Can Mr Ewing shew such an errand in going to the edge of the river *for popping*? Even the idiot that followed the Armagh coach to Dublin, to see if the great wheels would overtake the little ones, had an errand. But if popping is baptism, there could be no errand to the river for the performance of the ordinance. "Gideon," says Mr Ewing, "brought down the people unto the water." "Was it to immerse them. No; it was to give them an opportunity of drinking." And could there be a better refutation of Mr Ewing than what he gives himself? Gideon did not lead the people to the river for no purpose. The object is expressed. Let us have such a reason for John's baptizing at Jordan, and it will suffice us. Mr Ewing entirely mistakes the jet of this argument. I observe also, that Mat. iii. 6. Mark i. 5, cannot admit *pouring* as the sense of βαπτίζω. Εβαπτισαντο εν τω Ιορδανη cannot be rendered *they were poured in Jordan*, nor *with Jordan*, nor *in Jordandale*. The water is poured, not the people. If the clumsy expression *poured upon* could be admitted, it is not to be found. The

upon is wanting. *The people were poured upon in Jordan-dale*, would be a very awkward expression. Yet shabby as such an auxiliary would be, even that is not to be found.

Let us next examine the baptism of the eunuch, Acts viii. 36. "And as they went on their way, they came to a certain water: and the eunuch said, See, here is water; what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. And he commanded the chariot to stand still: and they went down both into the water, both Philip and the eunuch; and he baptized him. And when they were come up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip," &c. This is as correct and as literal a translation of the words as can possibly be made; and surely it is so plain that the most illiterate man can be at no loss to discover from it the mind of the Lord on the subject. I have written some hundred pages on the mode of this ordinance, yet to a mind thirsting to know the will of God, and uninfluenced by prejudice, this passage without comment, is in my view amply sufficient. The man who can read it, and not see *immersion* in it, must have something in his mind unfavourable to the investigation of truth. As long as I fear God, I cannot, for all the kingdoms of the world, resist the evidence of this single document. Nay, had I no more conscience than Satan himself, I could not as a scholar attempt to expel *immersion* from this account. All the ingenuity of all the critics in Europe could not silence the evidence of this passage. Amidst the most violent perversion that it can sustain on the rack, it will still cry out, *immersion, immersion!*

Philip, in preaching, had shewn that believers were to be baptized immediately, yet the eunuch never speaks of being baptized till he came to water. Now, this implies immersion. Had a handful of water been sufficient, this might have been found any place. Had it been even a desert without water, there can be no doubt that the eunuch would have a supply of water with him.

When they came to the water, instead of sending down one of the retinue to bring up a little water, they went down to the water. Mr Ewing supposes that our argument is founded on the mere *going down* and *coming up*. But it is upon the circumstance that no reason can be given for the *going down*, but the *immersion*. What would take them to the water, when the water could be more conveniently brought to them?

But they not only went down to the water; they went *into* the

water. What would take them *into* the water, if a handful of water would suffice ?

Let it be observed, also, that there is something very peculiar in the account of their going into the water. It is not only said, “*they* went into the water ;” our attention is fixed on the fact that they *both* went into the water. This, we might think, would suffice. Yet the Holy Spirit marks the circumstance still more precisely. He adds, *both Philip and the eunuch*. Can any one imagine that such a precision, such an apparent redundancy of expression, is not designed to teach something that the Spirit of Inspiration foresaw would be denied ? Had the water been deep enough at the edge, the eunuch only might have been in the water. But in this case, both the baptizer and the baptized went *into* the water. Now, this determines that the preposition “*εἰς*” must be rendered *into*, and not *unto*, as Mr Ewing would have it. Had the account related merely to the going down to the edge of the water, there would be no use in saying that they went both down. Could it be necessary to inform us that Philip, the baptizer, went to the place of baptism as well as the person to be baptized ? What would take the one down without the other ? There is good reason, however, to inform us that *they both* went *into* the water ; because, in certain circumstances, it would have been necessary only for one of them to be in the water ; and the relation of the fact, takes away the ground of perversion.

It is not only said that they went into the water, but their return is called a coming up *out of* the water. They could not come *out of* the water, if they had not been *in* it. This is more precise than the account of our Lord’s baptism. There it is said that he came up *from* the water. Here it is *out of the* water.

Let us now see how Mr Ewing attempts to evade the evidence of this passage. Let my readers put their invention to work, and try what they can think of to darken this evidence. Mr Ewing, I engage, will go beyond them. His ingenuity is unparalleled. He destroys our doctrine even by demonstration. Demonstration ? Aye, demonstration. Jesus is said, Matth. iii. 16, to have gone up *from* the water, not *out of* the water, as our version renders it. “*Now,*” says Mr Ewing, “*it surely will not be said that Philip had any occasion to go farther with the Ethiopian nobleman than John did with our Saviour, in order to the administration of baptism. It is reasonable, then, to understand the “*εἰς*” and the “*ἐκ*” of Acts viii. 38, 39, as signifying precisely what is indicated by the*

απο of Matth. iii. 16." Now, is not this demonstration? I may as well think to pierce the divine shield of Achilles as this argument. But I will strike. Truth is stronger than sophistry. The helmit of Goliah could not resist the pebble from a sling. I deny the first principle on which this argument is founded. It is taken for granted that απο can reach no farther than the edge of the water. Now, while I admit that this is all that is necessarily imported in this preposition, I contend that it can apply to the centre of the water, or even the farther edge of the water, as well as the edge on this side. Απο signifies the point of departure from an object, but that point may be in any part of the object to which there is access. Whether the point of departure be the edge or the centre, or the nearer or the farther edge, depends not on the word, but on the circumstances, or other information. If the point of departure be an impenetrable object, it must be from the edge; but if the object be penetrable, the departure may be from any part in it. If a fowl on the opposite side of the river, or in the middle of it, takes wing, and, flying across, alights on a hill, we say, *it flew from the river*, just the same as if it had commenced its flight on this side. This is the distinction between απο and εκ. The former denotes the point of departure, in whatever part of the object that point is found; the latter always supposes that the point of departure is within the object. Of course, απο cannot serve us in Matth. iii. 16, but as little can it injure us. It is indefinite as to the situation of the point of departure. In this case, then, it is not necessary to suppose that Philip and the eunuch went farther than John and our Saviour. Though απο does not imply that the latter were *in* the water, it is not inconsistent with this, if other evidence demands it. Besides, it might be on some occasions necessary to go farther into the water than on this. At some places, baptism may be performed at the edge; in others, it may be necessary to advance to the centre.

But if απο could not reach one inch into the water, I would find no difficulty in refuting Mr Ewing's argument. If our Lord and John were *in* the water, in returning they must have come from the edge of the water. They would then have come from the edge of the water, and from beyond. Though the account commences with the edge, it does not deny that there was a previous point of departure. When I say, *this friend has come from Edinburgh*, all I assert is, that the point of his departure was Edinburgh. It

might be the very edge ; but it might be also from the very centre. On the other hand, when I say, My friend is *out of* Edinburgh, it expresses that he was within the city. We might also fix a point of departure, which will apply only to a certain point, and reach no farther. Yet this will not deny a previous point of commencement of departure. *We started at such an hour from Prince's Street, and at such an hour we arrived in Glasgow.* Now, this point of departure cannot be extended an inch, yet it is quite consistent that we might have had a previous point of departure from Duke Street.

Though I have thus proved, that for any thing to be found in $\alpha\pi\omicron$, our Lord might have been baptized in the middle of Jordan, yet since $\alpha\pi\omicron$ necessarily implies no more than the edge as the point of departure ; since we are not otherwise informed that John and he went into the water previously to baptizing, as we are informed with respect to Philip and the eunuch, I think there is no reason to believe that John the Baptist usually went into the water in baptizing. The striking difference between the accounts of these two baptisms, leads me to conclude that John chose some place on the edge of the Jordan that admitted the immersion of the person baptized, while the baptizer remained on the margin. The place of baptizing the eunuch did not admit this,—most providentially, indeed, because it affords an example that cannot be plausibly perverted. If the above distinction is well founded, there is no ground for the jest, that John the Baptist was an amphibious animal. There is no necessity at all to suppose that $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ and $\epsilon\kappa$ are limited in Acts viii. 38, 39, by $\alpha\pi\omicron$ in Matth. iii. 16.

“ I am far from saying,” says Mr Ewing, “ that $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ does not often signify *into*, and $\epsilon\kappa$ *out of*.” And I am as far from denying that $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ sometimes signifies *unto*. Its most usual signification, however, is *into* ; and in general applies when the thing in motion enters within the object to which it refers. There are instances, however, in which the motion ends at the object. It is therefore not of itself definite. But it is evident that there must be some way of rendering it definite in each of its occurrences, else language would be unintelligible. We are not to suppose that when a word is in itself indefinite, we are at liberty, in every occurrence of it, to understand it as we will. The sound critic is able, on all occasions, to limit it by the connection, or by circumstances. I observe, then, that as this word usually signifies motion to a place ending within the place, so it is always to be understood in this sense, ex-

cept circumstances forbid it. I believe the few examples in which the motion does not end within the object towards which the thing in motion is directed, are all of this kind. They are such as cannot cause a moment's hesitation. But if it had such a meaning here, it would evidently be equivocal. It would as readily lead astray as inform. Agreeably to this, in the very examples produced by Mr Ewing, from Gen. xxiv. 16, Judges vii. 5, where the motion ended at the margin of the river, this preposition is not used. It is not *εις*, but *επι την πηγην*; not *εις*, but *προς το υδωρ*. Let us also compare the passages in which *εις* is used with respect to baptism in Jordan, with the immersion of Judith xii. 7. In this latter place, it is not *εις την πηγην*, but *επι της πηγης*, denoting that she was not bathed *in* the fountain, but *at it*, in something provided for the purpose. Had *εις* been used, it would have denoted that she went into the fountain. In the case of the baptism of the eunuch, I have shewn a circumstance that fixes the meaning of *εις*.

This observation is confirmed by the circumstance that *εις* is applied to the river Jordan, when the motion ceases on the banks, in an instance that can create no doubt. 2 Kings vi. 4, "And when they came to Jordan," is in the Septuagint, *ηλθον εις τον Ιορδανην*. Here the object of the journey determines the extent of the meaning of the preposition.

But I utterly deny such an indefiniteness in the meaning of *εκ*. In opposition to Mr Ewing's assertion, I say that it always signifies *out of*. I say this while my eye is upon all the examples alleged by him and his learned friend.

"Now," says Mr Ewing, "wherever *εις* and *εκ* correspond to each other, the extent of the one must measure the extent of the other. The point of departure to return, cannot be different from the point of arrival in going. In other words, if *εις* signify *to*, then *εκ* must, in the same connection, signify nothing more than *from*." What can be more mathematical than this? It is as clear as that twelve inches and a foot denote the same measure. The demonstration is perfect, if the axiom on which it is founded be granted. The demonstration is drawn from the hypothetical preposition, "if *εις* signify *to*." But I deny that in this instance it signifies *to*. Mr Ewing himself admits that it often signifies *into*. Why, then, is it taken for granted that it cannot so signify here? To do Mr Ewing any service, *εις* must always signify *to*. It cannot be employed to measure *εκ*, if it is itself indefinite. It is very true that the progress *into* the water cannot be less than the progress *out*. All de-

pends on the distance advanced. Now, though $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ might be used, if the advance was only to the margin; yet as it can be used, if the advance were to the centre, it cannot restrain $\epsilon\kappa$ to its own lowest extent. On the other hand, I will reverse the demonstration, on the principle that $\epsilon\kappa$ always signifies *out of*, which I will prove. If $\epsilon\kappa$ always signifies *out of*, as one of these prepositions, when they correspond to each other, must measure the other, then, though $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ is in itself indefinite, $\epsilon\kappa$ renders it definite in this instance. As $\epsilon\kappa$ signifies *out of*, $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ must here signify *into*. Now, I defy ingenuity to refute my demonstration. If an elastic chain is twelve inches at the stretch, but only ten when relaxed; and if the same measure is called a foot, in the same connexion, then we are to make the *foot* determine the extent of the chain, in the instance referred to, and not the chain to determine the number of inches in the *foot*. The definite must limit the indefinite.

Dr Wardlaw concurs with Mr Ewing, in thinking that nothing can be learned from $\epsilon\nu$, and $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, and $\epsilon\kappa$, the prepositions usually construed with $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\zeta\omega$. "It is truly surprising," says he, "that so much stress should be laid on the frequently vague import of a Greek preposition." I ask Dr Wardlaw, what preposition in any language is perfectly univocal? Are there many words of any part of speech, except those expressive of mode, which are perfectly univocal? Are the above prepositions more vague than the prepositions that correspond to them in our language? Does it follow, from a word's having two significations, that no stress can be laid on itself, in determining on the evidence of its meaning in any particular situation? If a word is sometimes used in a sense different from its usual one, are we at liberty to understand it in such unusual signification at random, as often as it may suit our argument? Were this the case, every sentence we utter would be a riddle. Every time we open our lips, we use words which are as vague as any Greek prepositions, yet the most ignorant are not misled by the circumstance. It is only when the observation applies to dead languages, that it imposes on those who do not trace arguments to first principles. $\epsilon\nu$ may sometimes be translated *with*; but there must be laws that regulate this matter, else human language could not be sufficient for testimony. $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, in rare cases, may be translated *at* or *in*; but if this will justify us in assigning these meanings to them when it suits our purpose, nothing could be definitely expressed in human speech. Yet this is the resource of Dr Wardlaw, in evading the evidence of immersion;—a resource which, if used with respect

to English, would expose the critic to derision. I have pointed out some of the laws that determine in such cases; and whether I have been successful or not, such laws must exist, if human language is an adequate evidence of human thought. This I hold as an axiom.

But I will venture to appeal still farther to the common sense of my readers. Admitting all that is demanded for this supposed vagueness, is it not utterly incredible that, with respect to this ordinance, each of these three prepositions should assume, as it were in concert to deceive us, its most unusual signification? Can we ascribe such a miracle of delusion to the Spirit of truth? Now, that *in* is the most usual signification of *en*; *into*, the most usual signification of *eis*; and *out of*, the most usual signification of *ex*, I suppose no one will be hardy enough to deny. I could easily prove that the exceptions to this, with respect to the two former, are much fewer than they are generally supposed; and when I come to Mr Ewing's appendix, I will shew that, with respect to *ex*, there is no exception at all. But I am here taking for granted all that our opponents demand; and allowing the vagueness to be as great as they suppose, is it not absurd to suppose that the Holy Spirit would use the three prepositions all in an unusual sense, when there were other prepositions better suited to the purpose? The absurdity is still heightened by the consideration that these prepositions are used in connexion with a verb, which the hardest of our opponents cannot deny as importing, at least in one of its senses, *to immerse*. The usual sense of the whole three prepositions is in our favour: the verb admits our meaning, even according to Mr Ewing; but according to the great bulk of the most learned of our opponents, this is its primary meaning: judging, then, even from their own admissions, is it credible that the Holy Spirit would use language so calculated to mislead? Could there be any reason to pitch upon such phraseology, except to deceive? If *pouring* or *sprinkling* had been appointed, there were words which univocally denote these meanings. Why then would the Holy Spirit pass by these words, and pitch upon a word that, according to our opponents, has perhaps a dozen of significations? If there are prepositions that would, in their usual acceptation, express the meaning our opponents attach to the three prepositions in question, why would the latter be employed in an unusual sense? There never was a greater specimen of Jesuitism, than that which Dr Wardlaw here charges on the Holy Spirit.

But this mode of reasoning carries its condemnation in its very

face. If the controversy was in a language of which we are entirely ignorant, and on a subject to which we are utterly strangers, we may hold it as a self-evident truth, that the man who screens himself under the vagueness of words, and argues at random, on the supposition that on any emergency it is fair to take a word in any signification that in any situation he may find attached to it, has either a bad cause, or does not know how to defend a good one. As no one will charge our opponents with the latter, the cause which they defend must be incapable of a sound defence.

But after we have beaten them down the hill, and pushed them to the very verge of the stream; nay, after we have driven them into Jordan up to the chin, these obstinate enemies of immersion will not *pop down* their heads *into the water*, but will *pop* the water upon the head. Both of these writers declare resolutely that they would not surrender, even in the midst of the river. "Let it be supposed," says Mr Ewing, "that the baptizer led the person to be baptized, not only to the water, but into it; the question returns, what did he do with him there?" Dr Wardlaw also expressly refuses to submit, even were it granted "that the parties were *in Jordan* when the ceremony was performed." What shall I do now? Of what service is all my criticism? Can I put them under the water either by the verb or by its syntax? I will first try to discipline them a little with common sense; for if I cannot succeed on this point, it is in vain to appeal to the laws of language. I admit that it is possible to sprinkle or pour water upon a person in a river, as well as in a church or parlour. But in the awful presence of the living God, I ask Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw, if they think it credible that John the Baptist would take into the water the multitudes whom he baptized, for the purpose of pouring a little on their face? If they can answer this in the affirmative, I have no more to say on that point. I must appeal to the common sense of mankind. What other purpose could there be in going *into the water*, but to be *immersed*? Turks, Jews, and Infidels, declare your judgment. Every other mode might have been observed, with much greater convenience, out of the water than in it. I know it is possible for Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw, to take every infant baptized by them, with all the nurses and attendants, *down into* the river Clyde, and *pop* them there; but verily, if I read in the newspapers, that they did this, I would be convinced that they were deranged. Madness or fanaticism would universally be supposed to be the cause. Upon such evidence, could the Lord

Chancellor refuse an act of lunacy against them? And shall they ascribe to John the Baptist and the Saviour, conduct that in Great Britain would prove lunacy? It is useless to reason with persons so obstinate. Neither argument nor criticism can reach such extravagance. As Dr Campbell, in reference to the class of first principles which he ascribes to common sense, says, that to deny them, does not imply a contradiction,—it implies only lunacy; so to assert that John the Baptist led the multitudes into the river Jordan, in order to pour a little water into their faces, does not imply an impossibility,—it only implies that they were all mad.

However, as I have now, by their own admission, got them into the water, I will try to force them under it, before I let them out. Dr Wardlaw asserts that εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην may be translated *at* or *in* Jordan. To this I reply, 1. *At* and *in* are very unusual senses of εἰς, and never are given to it by any sober critic, except when the usual signification will not apply. When they have such signification, the meaning is so obvious, that it cannot be doubted. It never takes place when it could cause confusion or ambiguity. If the same phrase could optionally be interpreted *at* a river, *in* a river, and *into* a river, human language would be as dark as the enigmas of the Sphinx. 2. There is no reason to bring them to the water, or place them *in* the water, but the intention of immersing them into the water. 3. A multitude of examples might be produced, in which εἰς is construed with βαπτίζω, in which the signification is without doubt *immersion*. I appeal to those I have given. No one example can be produced in which εἰς, in construction with the verb, signifies either *at* or *in*. The phrase, then, cannot be supposed to have a signification here different from its usual signification; and which there is no single proof that it ever has. I will force them down, then, by the verb and the preposition separately, and by both united as a phrase. I defy them to produce, out of Greek literature, one instance in which the phrase has the meaning contended for by them.

Dr Wardlaw partakes with Mr Ewing in his astonishment, that an argument should be drawn from *going down* and *coming up*. If my astonishment had not been entirely exhausted with the Jordan scene, I should be mightily astonished that both these writers so far mistake the jet of the argument. The *going down* and the *coming up*, is not supposed to refer to the act of immersion. As pouring water into a bath, is necessary in order to immersion in the bath; so going down to the river, is necessary in order to dipping

in the river. We do not confound the going into the water with the immersion in the water. This would show the same want of discrimination that confounds *pouring* with baptism.

But Mr Ewing overturns all our arguments and criticisms with a difficulty. "If the *act* of baptizing," says he, "had consisted of immersing the subject in water, there would surely have been some allusion to the lowering of his body in that supine direction, which is, I believe, commonly observed for the purpose of bringing it under the surface: some allusion, also, to that stooping attitude, which is at the same time necessary on the part of the immerser? But there is nothing of this kind to be found in all the Scriptures, either in the accompanying phraseology, or, as we have seen, in the name of the ordinance itself." Now, if the *surely* was a real *surely*, the conclusion would be undeniable; for I do not know a single reference of the kind demanded. But what makes this *surely* necessary? Why, it is necessary to keep Mr Ewing's theory from *sinking*, but this is its only necessity. If no information is given about the way of putting the body under water, then no part of the meaning of the ordinance depends on one way more than another. We are then at liberty to do it in the most convenient way. But this requirement is very strange in one who maintains baptism to be a popping of a handful of water out of the cup of nature, or the hollow of the hand, upon the turned up face of the person baptized. Each of these things is a necessary part of baptism, yet I am so stupid as to be unable to see a glimpse of any of them in the Scriptures.

I shall now examine the example in Mr Ewing's Appendix, alleged to prove that *εκ* sometimes signifies merely *from*, as perfectly synonymous with *απο*. I have admitted that *εἰς* may, in certain circumstances, be translated *with*, and that *εἰς* sometimes denotes motion to a place, that ends on this side of the object, without occasioning any confusion or ambiguity. But I have denied that *εκ* is ever used when the object *departing* is not supposed to have commenced its departure *within* the object from which it departs. Now, Mr Ewing's very learned friend, who writes the Appendix, in reply to some observations by Dr Ryland, steadily abides by his first position; and by a number of instances alleges, with the utmost confidence, that the use of the Greek language proves the supposed laxity in the use of *εκ*. The general acquaintance of this gentleman with Greek literature, entitles his opinion to the highest respect; and I am willing to allow him to be in all respects what Mr Ewing represents. I take the utmost liberty in exposing false reasoning and false criticism, even

in those whom I respect. God's truth is a paramount object, and whatever tends to pervert it must be cut down. The extensive reading in Greek writers, which this gentleman possesses, is a qualification of indispensable importance to a critic; and that he is conversant in the philosophy of language, is obvious at a glance. I stand upon ground too firm to make me fear the talents of my antagonist, and I would feel ashamed were I conscious of underrating these talents through dread of them. No man unjustly disparages the abilities of his opponent, who is not conscious either of having a bad cause, or of his inability to defend a good one.

The learned writer of the Appendix says: "The truth is, that though $\alpha\pi\omicron$ and $\epsilon\kappa$ were originally distinct, in the progress of the language they came to be used indiscriminately, and while $\alpha\pi\omicron$ encroached on the province of $\epsilon\kappa$, $\epsilon\kappa$ in return usurped part of the territories of $\alpha\pi\omicron$. Now, on the very face of this observation, I pronounce it unphilosophical; and I would confidently do so, had the assertion respected a language of which I do not know the letters. It is contrary to the first principles of language, that prepositions appointed to express different relations, should be used to express the same relation. Were this the case, the prepositions would be two only in sound; one of them would cumber rather than enrich the language. There is a sense in which one word may be said to encroach on the territories of another; that is, it may be used in a situation which another usually fills. But this is not properly an encroachment. So far as it properly goes, the territories are its own. The territory occupied by both, belongs exclusively to neither. It is common, and either may be used at pleasure. But consistently with this joint reign, each may have a peculiar territory, into which it is usurpation in the other to enter. Were it true, according to the learned writer, that $\alpha\pi\omicron$ and $\epsilon\kappa$ at random usurp each other's territories, it would be impossible for criticism to ascertain any thing from their use. Language would be incapable of definite meaning. From my account of them, it is clear that in a vast multitude of instances, they may be used in the same place, optionally. But even here, it is impossible to discriminate them. Each of them has in every instance its own distinctive meaning. I may say in English, this friend is *out of* Glasgow, or *from* Glasgow, yet *out of* and *from* are not the same. The one expression denotes that the point of departure was *in* the city; the other may have its point of departure either *in* or *at* the city. There are cases also in which the English preposition could not be used in the same situation. In a

besieged city, the expression "this soldier has come *out of* the city," is very different from "this soldier has come *from* the city." I assert, then, that the fact that these prepositions may be used often in the same situation, is no evidence that they have not their characteristic meaning; and far less is it evidence that they are in all things indiscriminate. While they have a common territory, each has a province of its own. Even when *απο* is used where *εκ* might be used, there is this difference, that the former is not definite, and does not mark the idea which the use of the other would have marked. I call the attention of critics to this distinction as one of vast importance, and one which has been universally overlooked. It has been hitherto taken for granted, that if two words are interchangeable in any situation, they may, at the pleasure of the critic, be supposed interchangeable. I maintain that two words with meanings characteristically distinct, may have in other things a common province, while there are laws to ascertain the extent of the common province, and to limit each within its peculiar boundary. I maintain even farther, that in the common province each expresses its own meaning. They reign without interference even over the common territory. Now, if I am well founded in these observations, they will be of vast advantage in ascertaining definitely the import of language. Instead of being a nose-of-wax, as critics in general have made the Scriptures, temerity will not be able to deface their features.

With respect to the prepositions *απο* and *εκ*, though they may often be used interchangeably, yet the latter always implies *intusposition*; the former the point of departure in general. But the writer of the Appendix has alleged a number of examples to prove, "that *εκ* may be, and often is, made use of to express removal, distance, or separation, merely where previous *intusposition* neither was nor could be in view." Now, if his examples prove this, let him have it. That none of them do so, I am quite confident.

His first example is from Thucydides. Speaking of a promontory, he says, *ο ην εκ τε θαλασσης αποκρημνον και εκ της γης ηκιστα επιμαχον*, "which was steep *from* the sea, and not easily attacked *from* the land." The example has not the colour of opposition to our doctrine. Were I lecturing on the passage to students, I would remark as a beauty, the distinctive import of *εκ*, which this writer's criticism teaches him to overlook. The promontory is supposed to rise *out of* the sea below, as a tree grows *out of* the ground. The imagination views the object *commencing* at the bottom of the sea, and rising

a vast height above its surface. Do we not ourselves speak of a rock rising *out* of the ocean? There is nothing here said in Greek, but what we ourselves say in English, yet *out of* with us is never *from*. As to the example alleged, there is no real motion, or point of departure, whether $\alpha\pi\omicron$ or $\epsilon\kappa$ is used. The point of departure is merely in the view of the imagination. While examples of this kind still preserve the original distinction, yet examples most decisively to the point must be taken from real motion, and a real point of departure. It is with these that $\alpha\pi\omicron$ and $\epsilon\kappa$ are connected on the subject of Baptism. The writer remarks: "The historian surely never meant to convey the idea, that the steep part of the rock had formerly been within the rock." This *surely* is granted, but the observation is *surely* so absurd as to need no answer. When we say that "a rock rises boldly *out of* the sea," do we mean that the top of it rose from the bottom? But there is here an *intusposition*: the rock commences below the water.

But if we are able to manage the first $\epsilon\kappa$, he asks us what we will do with the second. This he thinks altogether refractory. However, it costs me no more trouble than the first. A glance discovers its bearing. "Would Dr R. maintain," says the writer, "that Thucydides meant that the promontory, if attacked on the land side, must then be understood as having come *out* of the land?" No, indeed, Dr R. could not make such an assertion,—nor is any such assertion needed. It is not the promontory that comes out of the land; it is the assault that comes out of the land. When attacked on the land side, does not the assault come from the interior of the land? I am surprised at such an observation from such a writer. What is most strange is, that the same question might as well be asked if $\alpha\pi\omicron$ had been used. In that case, would the writer suppose that the promontory was represented as coming *from* the *land*? The promontory is not, as this writer absurdly supposes, here represented as the point of departure, whether $\alpha\pi\omicron$ or $\epsilon\kappa$ is used. The promontory is the point of arrival. The assailants come out of the country on the land side, and direct their assault, not *from* the promontory, but *upon* it. Never were witnesses farther from serving the cause of the party who summoned them.

The next example is,— $\omicron\delta\omega$ — $\epsilon\zeta$ $\text{Αζδνηων εις Ιστρον}$. "The road *from* Abdera to Ister." I say, literally, "the road *out of* Abdera to Ister." The road is supposed to commence *within* Abdera. Does the road *out of* Edinburgh to Leith commence at the extremity of

the city? There might be as much of the road within the city as without it. This example is clearly on my side.

But what shall I do with Alexander's mound? Surely, I cannot bring it *out of* the continent. Yes, I will bring a machine that will force it *out of* the land. Let us see the words of the author, *χωμα εγνω χωνυυσαι εκ της ηπειρου ως επι την πολιν*, "he resolved to carry up a mound *from* the continent to the city." I say, literally, "*out of* the continent." But says the writer, "the rampart never had been within the continent, but merely commenced at it." I say the rampart, according to Arian, commenced *within* the continent. The point of commencement was not without the land, but within it. As the foundation of a house is more secure when it commences underground, so a mound is more secure when it commences within the land. I was not, it is true, present on the occasion when Alexander commenced this work; but I know where Arrian fixes the commencement. We could say that the mound of Edinburgh runs out of Bank Street into Prince's Street. The point of commencement is *within* the street above, and ends *within* the street below. Now, has not my machine taken Tyre without a mound? *

The next example is,—“a line is said to be drawn *εκ του πολου*, “*from* the pole of a circle.” “It is impossible,” says our author, “for a line to be within a point.” Very true; and did not the writer see that it was equally impossible for the whole line to be at a point? And if its point of commencement could be at the edge of a point, might it not also be within the point? This is the thing said. The line is supposed to commence within the pole. The author adds: “in other prepositions of the same book, *απο* is made use of to denote precisely the same idea.” Say, is made to fill the same situation. This is quite in accordance with my doctrine. We ourselves do the same thing with *from* and *out of*, yet they do not signify precisely the same idea.

Another example is—

————— “*εκ δε θυραων*
Ηγαγε ——— *μυχους επι.*

“She led him *from* the gate to the inner apartment.”

“Though he came *from* the gate,” says the writer, “he could never be supposed to have come *out of* it.” Certainly not *out of*

* Mr Locke, in one of his Letters to Mr Molyneux, speaks of his letters written *out of* Holland. The letters were written *in* Holland. What sort of a critic would he be, who should say that this implies that Mr Locke was not in Holland when he wrote the letters? Yet this is the principle on which many criticise on dead languages. My opponents are in error in their canons of criticism.

the wood or metal of the gates, but as certainly *out of* the gates. Who is so ignorant as not to know that *gates* denote, not merely the gates strictly, but the place in which they stand, and that whole assemblies are said to meet and sit in the gates? We speak in like manner of a door. *He stood in the door*—he came *out of* the door—he came *from* the door. But *out of* the door is not perfectly the same as *from* the door. There is not the shadow of difficulty in such examples.

Another example brought by this writer is—

Ος ζωπλατων ανδρας

Εξ ακρου ποδος αγαλματωσης.

“Who forming men *from* the extremity of the foot, making a statue.” The writer remarks, “forming *out of* the extremity of the foot, would convey either no meaning at all, or a very absurd one; *εκ* in this passage is completely synonymous with *απο*.” To suppose that the upper parts of the statue proceeded out of the foot, would indeed be absurd. And to suppose that they proceeded *from* the foot, would be no less absurd. But if the meaning is, as without doubt it is, that the foot was the point of commencement in the making of the statue, it may as well be said that this point was *within* the foot as *at* the foot, and that the work commenced *out of* the foot as *from* the foot. Nay, it seems to be the very intention of the expression to include the foot; for if he made the statue only *from* the foot, he did not make the foot. The expression is not only intelligible on the supposition of the peculiar meaning of *εκ*, but is more definite than it would have been, had *απο* been used.

The next example alleged is from the Penegeris of Dionysius, Lin. 109.

Εκ δ' ορειων Σικελων Κρητης ανατεπταται οιδμα

Μακρον ες αντολιην.—

“From the Sicilian mountains the sea is extended far to the east.” “No one,” says the writer, “I think will contend that *εκ* here implies any thing but the point of departure,—certainly it was not meant to denote, that the sea was ever *within* the mountains.” Nothing, indeed, but the point of departure, or rather the point of commencement. But that point is within the mountains, either really or in the imagination. Is not the sea *within* the mountains in every bay formed by mountains? What is meant by *ποντος εσω Λιβυης*. “The sea *within* Lybia,”—an expression used by Dionysius, a few lines above the passage quoted by this writer? But in this place I do not understand the point of commencement, as respecting the place where the sea touches Sicily, but the place of the

spectator. When viewed *out of* the Sicilian mountains, the sea of Crete extends far to the east. On no supposition, however, has the expression any appearance of opposition to my doctrine, with respect to the distinctive meaning of *εξ*.

Another example is ——— *αναστασ' εξ θρονων*. “Rising from her seat.” “Not out of it certainly,” says the writer. Yes, *out of it certainly*, say I. Thrones or chairs of state were of such a construction, that persons were said to sit down *into* them, and to come *out of* them,—just as we would say that a gentleman comes *out of* his gig. Indeed, we might say ourselves, that the old man rose *out of* his arm chair. This is a most unfortunate example for our author. The phrase *εξ δεξιων και εξ ενωνυμων*, Matth. xx. 21. are elliptical, and their explication depends on a knowledge of ancient customs, which may not now be attainable. Literally, it is no more right hand and left, than it is *on* the right hand and *on* the left. The word thrones, or seats, or places, may be understood, and from their construction and situation above the assembly, the application of *εξ* might have arisen. But of this I am bound to say nothing. What I say is, that in some way the idea of *out of* must have been implied, because *εξ* is used. Every Professor of Greek, in speaking on these phrases to his pupils, if he was not a disgrace to his chair, would say, “literally, *out of* right hand (seats,) and *out of* left hand (seats,)—*on* my right hand, *on* my left hand, are our phrases, but they are not a translation.” But did not the gentleman perceive that these phrases are as hard to be accounted for, on the supposition that *εξ* signifies *from*, as on the supposition that it signifies *out of*? Could we say, “to sit *from* my right hand, more than to sit *out of* my right hand? If it is said, that the point of the sitting commences *at* the right hand, I reply, that it may also commence *within* the *δεξιων τοπων*, *right hand places*. We are at liberty to supply any word we please, for it is evident that the substantive to which *δεξιων* is related, is not *hand*. It is possible to sit *within* right hand places, or right hand seats.

The phrase *εξ νεοτητος*, *from* my youth, has no difficulty. The commencing point is *within* his youth. It did not commence in the outer verge of youth, or at the very edge of youth, but within it, far within it. Philosophically, then, as well as literally, it is *out of* my youth. In like manner, *εξ αρχης*, from the beginning, is literally *out of* the beginning. The commencing point is supposed to be *within* the beginning, not where the beginning ended. He knew it *in* the beginning. The distinctive meaning of *εξ* is visible even in these phrases. It is no proof of the contrary, that in some

of them we have no idioms to correspond to them. If all languages had corresponding phrases perfectly alike, what would be meant by idiom? There is not one of the phrases alleged by this writer, in explaining which, a Greek scholar would not say, “*literally out of.*” In some of them, our idioms may be *from*; the Greek idiom is not *from* in any of them.

I have followed the writer through all his examples, and have wrested them out of his hands. But this was more than my cause required. There is not one of the examples that corresponds to the subject of our debate. Our contest respects a case in which there is *real motion*, and a change of position from one point to another. It respects departure and arrival. Now there is no example to the purpose in which there is not a change of place. The preposition *εκ* might be used with respect to other things in which the primary idea could not be discovered; while, with respect to real change of place, the distinction might be universally preserved. But there is not one of the author’s examples that respects cases similar to the case to be illustrated. Not one of them relates to real motion, either *from* or *out of*. These are the examples that must decide the matter. Though I could not analyze one of the examples brought by this writer, I would still contend that *εκ*, as signifying point of departure, or motion *from* one point to another, is more definite than *απο*, since it always implies that the point of departure is *within* the object, and not *without it*. From this there not only is no exception, but there is no colour of exception.

I conclude then, with all the authority of demonstration, that Philip and the eunuch were *within* the water, because they came *out of it*. I have already observed, with respect to other examples in which βαπτίζω occurs, that it will not construe with the signification *pour*. I observe the same thing with respect to Acts viii. 38. “What doth hinder me to be baptized, βαπτισθηναι.” It could not be translated, “what doth hinder me to be poured?” It is not the baptized person, but the water, that is *poured* in the observance of this ordinance by pouring.—Philip βάπτισεν, baptized the eunuch. If the word then signifies to pour, it was the eunuch he poured, and not the water on the eunuch. Now, the same thing may be observed, with respect to all the passages in which this word occurs. Not one of them will construe on the supposition, that it signifies to *pour*. The same thing is true to a certain extent, with respect to *sprinkle*, and every other meaning that has been given to this word. Some of the passages may construe on that supposition; but many

of them will not. I need not waste time in going over all the examples, and applying to them all the meanings that have been given to the word in question. This has been done by many, and must, at a glance, be obvious to all. It merely may be stated as a canon, that *whatever this word signifies with respect to the ordinance of Baptism, will translate it in every passage in which it refers to Baptism.* There can be no exception to this, even though it should be supposed to admit a different syntax in other meanings; yet, as referred to the same ordinance, it must, without doubt, have the same meaning. This canon, then, excludes the pretensions of *pour* and *sprinkle*, and every other meaning that invention has given to it. *Immerse* or *dip* is the only word that can stand this ordeal. This I have shewn can bear the test, not only with respect to this ordinance, but with respect to every instance in which the word is used. Can there be any rational doubt, then, in determining on the pretensions of the different claimants?

The reason alleged, John iii. 23, for baptizing, in a particular place, implies, that baptism is immersion. "And John also was baptizing in Ænon near to Salim, because there was much water there; and they came, and were baptized." But when Mr Ewing reads this, he "can see nothing concerning immersion." Strange, indeed, that the same object should have an appearance so different to different eyes. Mr Ewing sees here, with every one else, that the Holy Spirit assigns a reason for John's baptizing in Ænon, and that this reason is, the circumstance of the convenience of water. As to my purpose, I care not whether it is translated "much water," or "many waters." Does not this imply, that the water was for the purpose of baptizing? The people came there, and were baptized, because of the suitableness of the place for baptizing. This is the meaning that undoubtedly will present itself to every candid reader, who has no system in his mind as to the mode of baptism. Let the language be submitted to persons utterly unacquainted with Christianity, and among a thousand there will be but one judgment. Instead of being difficult to be discovered here, I venture to say, that there is scarcely any mind that has not some difficulty in keeping itself from seeing it. This is the labour: this is the difficulty. A person having made up his mind on the mode of Baptism, when he comes to this passage, may succeed in satisfying himself with some view of the matter which has been created by his own fancy; but I am much mistaken, if it is not always with some difficulty. That the water was for the purpose of bap-

tism, is to my mind the very testimony of the Holy Spirit. When I say, that in such a district, there are *many bleach-greens*, or *many grist mills*, because there is there a fine river, would not every person understand that the water was necessary for the bleaching, and for turning the wheels of the mills? What would be thought of the critic who should deny this, and argue that the water was not necessary for the mills, or for the bleaching, but for the accommodation of the persons who are employed about them? Just such criticism is it, that denies that this passage makes the water here mentioned, necessary for baptism; and finds out some other use for the water.

But if Mr Ewing will not see what these words so evidently imply, he makes ample amends by his quicksightedness in seeing here what is not here at all. He sees here “a plain reason why two large companies, which it was not the intention of God ever to unite together, except in the way of gradual transference, should nevertheless have been attracted to the neighbourhood of each other, where they might act without interference, while separately engaged in making the same religious use of water.” Here Mr Ewing can see very clearly, that the water referred to, was not for baptism, but for the Jewish purifications. He sees then what is neither said nor suggested. It is not in evidence at all, that Jewish purification was an object of this water. Mr Ewing sees two large companies. I cannot see one large company in the passage, nor in all the history of John the Baptist. Mr Ewing sees two companies not uniting. I can see no such thing among the Jews. Nor can I see such a separation between the disciples of John or of Christ, and other Jews. But that this reason exists only in Mr Ewing’s imaginations, is clear from the fact, that Jesus went everywhere, and everywhere was attended with crowds immensely great. I care not what were the crowds attending John; much water was not necessary for the purpose of accommodating hearers. This invention of Mr Ewing is nothing better than that of his predecessors, who employed the water in giving drink to the camels.

Mr Ewing thinks that the expression refers not to Ænon only, but also to the land of Judah. If there were such a plenty of water in all the land of Judah, it would be no loss to us. But it is as plain as language can be, that the *many waters* spoken of were in Ænon only.

Mr Ewing informs us that Dr R. understands the *πολλα υδατα* as not applying to small streams, while he himself contends that in this

place it must be small streams. I agree with Mr Ewing, that the phrase may signify *small streams*, or small collections of water; and that it refers to separate collections, and not to one vast collection. But I maintain that he fails in proving that it here denotes *springs* or *fountains*: $\nu\delta\omega\rho$ may apply to any collection of water, from a well to a lake, or the greatest river. The phrase $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha \nu\delta\alpha\tau\alpha$, is not a Hebraism; for it is found, times innumerable, in the Greek writers. The phrase, in the singular, $\pi\omicron\lambda\upsilon \nu\delta\omega\rho$, might apply to the sea, if viewed as one collection; while the plural, $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\alpha \nu\delta\alpha\tau\alpha$, might apply to a number of ponds viewed separately.

Baptist writers, to prove that the phrase signifies one collection of water, have sometimes appealed to passages where it is undoubtedly so applied. But in all such passages, though the waters are really in one collection, they are viewed by the imagination separately. There is no instance in which the phrase, in the plural, should not be translated *many waters*. Even Rev. xvii. 8. is no exception to this. The waters of the Euphrates are here, in some point of view, considered separately, which is evident, not only from the expression, but from the symbolical import of it. The *many waters* were a symbol of the many nations or people. The river ran through Babylon, and the part of it opposite every gate might be viewed separately in this figure, as separately serving the city. The circumstance, also, that the bed of the Euphrates was as high as the countries on the banks, and in many places higher, made it practicable to water all the country of Babylon, by cuts through the banks of the river. In this way, the whole country might be watered, and all around the city might be encompassed with water. The observation is warranted by Arrian's account of the difference between the Tigris and the Euphrates. The bed of the former was low, and therefore the river was continually enriched by tributary streams; but the bed of the latter was high, and was constantly supplying the countries through which it passed, so that it became shallow at the mouth. This is the only passage in which the application of the phrase has any difficulty; for the *sound of many waters*, like the sound of many voices, is composed of separate parts; and the many waters of the sea, though one collection, are viewed separately by the imagination.

But Mr Ewing is quite unguarded, when he argues that the phrase here refers to the springs. I agree with him, that the account which he gives of the origin of the name *Ænon* is the most probable. But I say with Dr Cox, that a small spring may give

rise to a large stream. Every one knows that lakes are sometimes formed from springs. The piece of water in which baptism was performed, would not be the spring itself, but formed out of the spring. And indeed there is no spring which would not afford the formation of a conveniency for baptism. Nor is there a Hebraism in the word *Ænon*, more than there is in the name of the city *Wells*. The *many waters* are not the *many springs*, but the *many springs* may feed the *many waters*. There is no reason to think that there were any great rivers or lakes in *Ænon*; but the Holy Spirit tells us that there were in it many collections of water fit for baptism, which is all we want to learn from it.

I must now justify my observations with respect to the use of *υδατα* in classic use. “*These waters* are said to be good for bathing,” *Æl.* p. 48. Hippocrates uses this word in the plural, and frequently this very phrase, as signifying *rains*. He uses the phrase *πολυ υδωρ*, referring to drinking. The phrase occurs in his writings, both in the singular number, and in the plural, and in every instance with the distinction which I have pointed out. It is needless to transcribe them: But he uses the phrase *πολλα υδατα* with respect to the waters of a city, as distinguished into several separate kinds, p. 75. Arrian also uses the word *υδωρ* for a collection of waters, for a river, &c. He uses the plural also very frequently. He uses the phrase *υδατα αρυσσας* for *digging wells*, p. 137. Here we see the distinction between a spring and a mere receptacle of water. This was a small collection of water, but it was not a spring. A spring is not dug. *Κατεστρατοπεδευσε προς ου πολλω υδατι*. “He encamped at a small river,” p. 138. I shall merely refer to the following pages: 140, 141, 150, 162, 163, 164, 165, 170, 171, 172, 175, 186, 187, 191. In these, and very many other passages of the same writers, the distinction between the use of the singular and plural of this word would be seen. No invention can turn aside the testimony of this passage, in favour of immersion. It obviously assigns the conveniency of baptizing, as the reason why John resided at this time in *Ænon*.

Having considered the syntax and connexion of the word *βαπτιζω*, I shall next proceed to ascertain how far any light can be obtained from the Scripture explanations of the ordinance, and the occasional allusions to it. It is a most providential circumstance, that the mode of this ordinance is determined not only by the word that designates it,—by its syntax, and words in construction with it,—but also by direct explanations.

EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF ROM. vi. 3.

THE Apostle Paul, having strongly and fully stated salvation to the guiltiest of men, through grace reigning through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord, anticipates, in the beginning of the sixth chapter of his epistle to the Romans, the objection that, in every age, has been made to his doctrine: "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" He refutes this objection by the fact, that from our union with Christ by faith, we have died along with him. And that we have died along with Christ, he proves from our baptism. "Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death?" Something is here supposed to be implied in baptism, of which no Christian should be ignorant; and that thing is, that all who are baptized, are by that ordinance exhibited as dead along with Christ. To be baptized into Christ's death, is not merely to be baptized into the faith of his death, but of our own death with him. For if our death along with him is not implied in being baptized into his death, then this would be no proof at all of our own death. But it is our own death with Christ, that the apostle is proving by our baptism into Christ's death. The third verse would be no proof of what is asserted in the second verse, if our baptism into Christ does not imply our death in his death.

"Therefore we are buried with him, by baptism, into death." As in Christ's death, we have died with him; so in baptism, we are figuratively put into the grave along with him. Words cannot more plainly teach any thing, than these words declare, that *in baptism we are buried with Christ*. Baptism, then, must not only contain a likeness to burial, but that likeness is emblematical. There may be resemblance between two objects, and to exhibit that likeness in words, is a beauty in language. But if the likeness is merely accidental, it is only a figure of speech, and can teach nothing. To found an argument on such ground, would be the extravagance of fanaticism. Homer often compares the falling of his heroes headlong from their chariots, to the diving of water-fowl. But this resemblance is merely accidental, and the victor had no intention of giving an emblem of *diving*; nor could any argument be grounded on the likeness. When a person *dips* in bathing, he might be said to be *buried* in the water; and there would be as good

a likeness in this to Christ's burial, even as in baptism. But the likeness is only accidental, not emblematical. No argument could be drawn from this, to prove a dying with Christ. This would be a metaphor. But baptism is not a figure of speech ; it is an emblematical action. The likeness is intentional, and the action performed is symbolical. Were it not so, the apostle might as legitimately argue from the *bath* as from *baptism*. This distinction is self-evident, and we shall find that it is of decisive importance. From not understanding it, some have said that we have as good a right to find in the meaning of baptism, something corresponding to planting, as to burial. *Planting* is a metaphor ; there must then be a likeness, but no emblematical import.

“ That like as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.” Here we see that baptism is an emblem also of the new life of the Christian. He dies with Christ to sin, he rises with him to a new life of holiness. There must, then, be something in baptism, that is calculated to be an emblem of a resurrection, as well as of a burial. Immersion is a mode that answers both ; and immersion is the only mode that can do so.

“ For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall also be in the likeness of his resurrection.” In our baptism, then, we are emblematically laid in the grave with Christ, and we also emblematically rise with him. It is designed to point to our own resurrection, as well as the resurrection of Christ. In baptism, we profess our faith in the one as past, and in the other as future. What simplicity, what beauty, what edification, is contained in this ordinance ! How have all these been overwhelmed by the traditions of men ! How clearly does this ordinance present the truth that saves the soul ! How admirably is it calculated to recall the mind to a view of the ground of hope, that is calculated to silence unbelief ! How is it that a vile sinner can escape the wrath of God, and obtain eternal life ? How is it that Christ's work is available for him ? Why, when Christ paid our debt, we ourselves have paid our debt, for we are one with Christ. We have died with Christ, and have risen with Christ ; Christ's death is our death ; Christ's burial is our burial ; Christ's resurrection is our resurrection ; Christ's sitting in heavenly places, is our sitting in heavenly places.

This clear testimony of the Holy Spirit, Mr Ewing endeavours to set aside, by a mode of criticism certainly the boldest and most

violent that I recollect ever to have seen from the pen of a man of God. The grossness of the perversions of those who know not God, is not astonishing. The extravagance even of Neologists, may be accounted for. But that one who knows and fears God, should take such liberties with his word, is more than I was prepared to expect. Indeed, there is nothing more extravagant in Neologism, than in the manner in which Mr Ewing explains the burial of Christ. Had I been informed merely of the result, without knowing any thing of the author, I would have at once concluded that it was the offspring of Neology. But the character of Mr Ewing, as well as the document itself, gives full evidence that it is the work of sincerity. Indeed, while I must say that it is one of the most mischievous perversions of Scripture that I have ever met from the hand of a Christian, I am fully convinced that the author considers that he has conferred an important benefit on the world, by his discovery in criticism. His wild conclusions are speciously drawn from premises hastily adopted, and utterly unsound.

He begins by saying, that “the great, and, as it appears to me, the only original reason why baptism has been thought to imply immersion, is the expression which occurs in Rom. vi. 4, and Col. ii. 12.” I shall not answer for the dead, but for my own part, the word by which the ordinance is designated, is perfectly sufficient for me, without a particle of evidence from any other quarter. Yet I am disposed to set as great a value upon the evidence of these passages, as any writer can do. I value the evidence of these passages so highly, that I look on them as perfectly decisive. They contain God’s own explanation of his own ordinance. And in this, I call upon my unlearned brethren to admire the divine wisdom. They do not understand the original, and the adoption of the words *baptize* and *baptism* can teach them nothing. Translators by adopting the Greek word, have contrived to hide the meaning from the unlearned. But the evidence of the passages in question, cannot be hid, and it is obvious to the most unlearned. The Spirit of God has, by this explanation, enabled them to judge for themselves in this matter. While the learned are fighting about βαπτίζω, and certain Greek prepositions, let the unlearned turn to Rom. vi. 4, and Col. ii. 12, &c.

Mr Ewing, speaking of the reasoning of the Apostle in this passage, says: “He then infers, that since baptism has so immediate a reference to the death of Christ, it must, by consequence,

be connected also with his resurrection ; and that, as in the former view, it teaches the regenerated the abandoning of the old life of sin, so, in the latter, it equally teaches them the habitual, increasing, and permanent pursuit and progress of the new life of righteousness." By no means, Mr Ewing. This inference is not legitimate. Baptism might have a reference to burial, without being by consequence connected with his resurrection. Has not the Lord's Supper an immediate emblematical reference to Christ's death, without any emblematical reference to his resurrection ? These two things are quite distinct ; and it is possible for an ordinance to represent the one, without representing the other. The Lord's day is a memorial of Christ's resurrection, but is no emblem of his burial. If there was nothing in baptism that is fitted to be an emblem of resurrection, baptism does not become an emblem of resurrection by consequence from being an emblem of burial. But baptism is here explained as an emblem of resurrection, as well as of burial ; there must, therefore, be something in the emblem, that will correspond to resurrection as well as to burial. There is such a thing in *immersion*, but there is no such thing in *pouring* ; nor is there any such thing in applying water as an emblem of sepulchral rites. This, then, overturns Mr Ewing's system altogether. He confesses virtually in this quotation, that the Apostle infers that baptism is connected with the resurrection. If so, as there is nothing in sepulchral rites, that is, in washing and embalming the dead, that corresponds to resurrection, washing and embalming the dead cannot be the burial referred to,—and pouring water as an emblem of washing and embalming the dead, cannot be baptism. Nothing can be more decisive than this. Indeed, so far from arguing that resurrection must be implied in baptism, because that baptism represents Christ as dead, we could not know that either death or resurrection was referred to in that ordinance, had not inspiration given the information. It is possible that an ordinance, performed either by *immersion* or *pouring*, might have had no instruction in mode. The instruction might have been all in the water. That there is any meaning in the mode, we learn merely from the inspired explanation. Here Mr Ewing takes the half of his edification in this ordinance, from a source that does not contain any thing on the subject. There is nothing in the emblem, according to his view of it, that corresponds to a new life, or resurrection. Has washing the dead any likeness to resurrection ? Have sepulchral rites, or embalming, any likeness to resurrection ? Mr

Ewing was so tender in the conscience, that he scrupled to give the name to this ordinance from *immersion*, if it also denoted *emersion*, though these two things are necessarily connected, and both explained as belonging to the ordinance. He does not scruple to make the emblem of death, an emblem of life by consequence.

“It is a common remark,” says Mr Ewing, “that the Apostle is treating in this passage, not of the form of baptism, but of its object, its design, and its actual effects.” Let its form be what it may, this passage treats of its object as known from its form. “On this account,” says he, “many are of opinion that no inference can be drawn from his language, concerning the form of baptism at all.” No inference is necessary. The Apostle has drawn the inference himself. We could not have drawn the inference which the Apostle has drawn. Had not the Apostle explained this ordinance, we would have had no right to do so. But even if baptism had not here been explained as a symbolical burial,—had it been alluded to as a burial merely in metaphorical language, it would have been equally decisive of form, though not of meaning. If baptism is a burial merely by a figure of speech, there must be a likeness between baptism and burial, to justify that figure.

“Perhaps,” says Mr Ewing, “it would be more correct to say, that he is here treating of the connexion between the justification and the sanctification of Christians.” True—but he is treating of these things as they are implied in baptism. He is treating also of more. He incidentally treats of the resurrection of believers as implied in their baptism. “And that in doing so,” says Mr Ewing, “he makes three distinct allusions, to baptism, to grafting, to crucifixion.” He makes no allusion to *grafting* at all; and whatever is the meaning of the phrase *planted together*, it refers to baptism. Crucifixion does not allude to baptism.

We come now to the examination of Mr Ewing’s account of “the scriptural meaning of ‘being buried.’” Here we will find the mysteries of the critical art. By a learned and laborious process, Mr Ewing endeavours to prove that Christ was not *perfectly* buried at all; and that *burial* in Scripture is not burial, but *washing* or *embalming* the dead. Now, on the very face of this allegation it contains its own condemnation. *Burying*, in the Scripture meaning, must be the same as *burying* in the common meaning, otherwise the Scriptures are not a revelation. This is a canon—a canon which is self-evident. If the Scriptures do not use words in the sense in which they will be understood by those who speak the

language, they do not instruct, but mislead. I overturn the whole system, then, by taking away the foundation on which it rests. It assumes what is not true in any instance.

“By burying,” says Mr Ewing, “we commonly mean the lowering of the dead body into the grave, covering it with earth, and so leaving it under ground.” This, indeed, is in general our way of burying. But we would apply the term to burying in any way. We would say that a person *was buried in a vault*, where he would lie exactly as Christ lay,—without lowering, without a covering of mould, &c. If a person was deposited in all respects as Christ was deposited in the tomb, we would say that he was *buried*. The difference is merely in circumstances; the things are essentially the same. Besides, the immersion of a believer, is equally suited to all kinds of burial. No part of the figure depends on any peculiarity in age or nation.

“In Scripture,” says Mr Ewing, “*to bury*, not only includes all the preparations of the body for interment, but is the expression used in cases where our method of interment was not practised, where no interment followed at the time, and where no final interment followed at all.” Neither in Scripture nor any where else, is the word used for preparatory rites alone, or where the body was not truly and properly interred.

What does Mr Ewing mean by final interment? Does he mean that Christ was not finally interred, because he rose on the third day? Then none of us shall be finally interred; for we shall all rise again. Does he mean that the disciples did not consider him as truly interred, and that they designed to bury him better? They had no such design. They intended to cover him with more spices, but not to take him from the place where he was buried. He was as truly buried as if he had been in the ground till the resurrection. What does Mr Ewing mean? Does he deny that Christ was truly buried? If he was not buried, the Scriptures are false. And if he was truly buried, though he had lain but a moment, our baptism may be an emblem of his burial. We lie in the water, as Dr Cox has remarked, a still shorter time than he lay in the grave. Was he not in the sepulchre? Does not prophecy speak of his grave?

But it seems Mr Ewing has Scripture proofs for the meaning that he assigns to *burial*. Let us then take a look at these. In Gen. i. 26. where the Hebrew says, *they embalmed Joseph*, “the Septuagint,” says Mr Ewing, “has $\epsilon\theta\alpha\psi\alpha\nu$, *they buried him*.” Very true. But does this imply, that by $\epsilon\theta\alpha\psi\alpha\nu$ the translators under-

stood embalming? No such thing. Had they used the word in this sense, they could not have been understood by those who spoke the Greek language. This translation is not a proof either that the Septuagint understood *embalming* to be the meaning of *burial*, or that they did not understand the true meaning of the original. It is only proof of what occurs in this translation a thousand times, and what occasionally occurs in every translation, namely, careless and loose rendering. Their text, said he, was *embalmed*: they content themselves with saying, he was buried.

“The rites of burial were,” says Mr Ewing, “from the very commencement, a proof that the attending friends had ascertained the fact of the decease.” Indeed, it is obvious enough, that they would not commence these rites till after the death of the person; but these rites never were designed as proof of this. Above all, the Scriptures do not require such a mode of ascertaining the fact of decease. He adds, “and that among all believers of revelation, the zeal and the solemnity with which these rites have ever been performed, ought to be considered as the effect, not merely of personal attachment, but of religious principle, and particularly of the hope that God will raise the dead.” Whatever may have been the origin of these rites, nothing can be more certain than that they were used by persons who had no notion of resurrection,—nay, by many who denied it. Above all, these rites were not a divine appointment for reminding of the resurrection. Nothing can be built on this.

“It is our happiness to know,” says Mr Ewing, “that our blessed Saviour never was finally interred.” By *finally interred* here, Mr Ewing must mean that he was raised again, and did not lie like the other dead. For, as far as concerns our salvation and comfort, he might as well have been kept in a common grave for the period of three days, as have been buried in a rock. But may he not have been truly buried, though he had risen in a moment after being deposited?

“Preparations of his body for burial were made,” says Mr Ewing, “both by anticipation, and after the event of his death had taken place. In both cases, they are called ‘his burial.’” How can Mr Ewing say so? The preparatory rites are never called *burial*. The passages referred to, have not the smallest appearance of confounding *embalming* with *burying*. John xii. 3. represents Mary not as burying our Lord by the act of anointing him, but as having anointed him as preparatory for burial. She *anointed* him by anticipation; but she did not *bury* him by anticipation. Is it said that she buried him? The woman, Mat. xxvi. 12, is repre-

sented as doing what she did, not to bury him, but to *embalm* him, or prepare him for burial. She did to him, when alive, what is usually done to persons after death. She embalmed him by anticipation. *Ἐνταφιάζω* is used for embalming, but *θαπτω* never.

“After our Lord had given up the Ghost,” says Mr Ewing, “the rites of burial were renewed by Joseph of Arimathea, and Nicodemus.” This was strictly and properly the embalming. But is this called a burial? Had they done nothing but this, Jesus would not have been buried; and the Scriptures would not have been fulfilled. He adds, “and were intended to have been finished by the women which came up with our Lord,” &c. These rites, then, were not *finished*; and if they are *burial*, *Jesus was not buried*.

Mr Ewing, then, has utterly failed in his attempt to prove, that in Scripture, preparatory rites are called burial. Not one of his examples have a shadow of proof. I will now make some general remarks on this strange opinion.

First, The word *θαπτω* signifies *to bury*, and is never applied exclusively to preparatory rites. This is as true, with respect to Scripture use, as it is with respect to the use of the classics. Mr Ewing gives a meaning to this word, not confirmed by use, but merely to suit his purpose. In like manner *συνθαπτω*, the word here used, signifies *to bury one thing or person with another*,—never to embalm one thing with another. The opinion, then, does not deserve even a hearing.

Secondly, *θαπτω* applies to all kinds of burial. No doubt, originally, in all countries, burial was by digging a pit, and covering the dead with the mould. But when repositories were built for the dead, or were scooped out of rocks, the same word was still used. This, in fact, is the case with our own word *bury*. We apply it to the depositing of a body in a vault, as well as the common burial. This process, in enlarging the meaning of words, may be exemplified in a thousand words. The idea that is common to all *burying*, is that of covering the dead, or surrounding them with something to keep them from violation. It is quite a waste of time, then, for Mr Ewing to discuss the situation and peculiarities of our Lord's sepulchre. He was buried as many others are buried, and to this burial there is a likeness in our baptism, when we are buried in water.

Thirdly, Burial and embalming are often distinguished as quite different things. Josephus, speaking of the magnificent manner in

which Herod buried Aristobulus, says, “And as for his funeral, that he took care should be very magnificent, by making great preparation of a sepulchre to lay his body in, and providing a great quantity of spices, and *burying* many ornaments with him,” &c. Here the *embalming* and the *burying* are distinguished. It was the laying of him in the sepulchre (θηκας) that was the burial. It may be noted, also, that here is a magnificent sepulchre, built as a house for the dead, in which the corpse lay on a bier or couch, (κλινη); yet the person is said to be buried. If Christ was not truly buried, Aristobulus was not truly buried. We have here, also, not only συνθαπτω, but συγκαταθαπτω. The ornaments that were *buried together* with Aristobulus, were deposited in the tomb with him,—not washed along with him by preparatory rites. These ornaments were *buried down with* him, although he was laid, like Christ, in a sepulchre above ground. Yet this is as truly burying as the common way of burying; though the sepulchre should have been on the top of the highest mountain in the world, the corpse is buried under a covering, as truly as if it were deposited in the centre of the earth.

Moschus, describing a funeral, represents the burial, κατεθαψαν, as taking place after all the rites were finished, Meg. l. 35.

Patroclus, notwithstanding all the embalming he received, appears to his friend Achilles, and calls for *burial*. Θαπτε με, “bury me.”

The dead body of Hector was washed regularly by the maids of Achilles, yet it was not *buried* till long after.

The passage produced by Dr Cox from Herodotus, is most decisive. The *embalming* is designated by ταριχευω, the *burying* by θαπτω. But it is useless to be particular in disproving a thing that has not even the colour of plausibility to support it. No two things can be more distinct than *washing* or *embalming* the dead, and *burying* the dead. Indeed, in the burial of Jesus itself, these two things are distinguished. They first rolled him in spices, which was the *embalming*; then they laid him in the sepulchre, which is the *burying*. What is laying in a sepulchre, but *burying*? But Mr Ewing says, that the body of Christ “was never finally deposited in the tomb; but, after being wound up with about an hundred pounds weight of spices,” &c. No matter how short a time it was in the tomb; in the tomb, it was buried like any other dead body. The disciples had no intention of ever removing it from the tomb. The women who came with more spices, had no intention to unbury it, or take it elsewhere. To give more spices, was not to complete

the burying, but to complete the embalming. Were a person in Edinburgh to visit the grave of a friend every day, and even open both grave and coffin, to ascertain whether the body was removed, this would not affect the burying. Why should preparatory rites be called the *burying* of Jesus, seeing he was actually laid in the sepulchre? No fancy can be wilder than this.

Fourthly, The representations of Scripture suppose Jesus to have been truly buried. "For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly; so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth," Matt. xii. 40. Mr Ewing himself allows that this was fulfilled by his being laid in a sepulchre. And what is laying in a sepulchre, but burying? Besides, this removes all Mr Ewing's objections with respect to the situation of the tomb of Jesus. In this sepulchre, Jesus was in the heart of the earth. It is usual for a ridge of rocks to have earth on the top. The Saviour was under the earth here as well as if he had been buried in a pit at the bottom of a valley. Again, Christ's being buried, is taught as a part of the gospel, 1 Cor. xv. 1. To allege, then, that he was not truly buried, is to call in question the truth of the gospel. "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. For I declared unto you first of all, that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures." Here, what was in the evangelist called *three days in the heart of the earth*, the apostle calls being *buried*, for he is said to have risen on the *third* day. The third day from what? The third day from his being buried. He is here considered as being three days buried, for he rose on the third day from his being buried. His resurrection here, is also opposed to his being buried; it must then be burying, in the proper sense of the word.

Fifthly, The very basis of this doctrine is a mere assumption, namely, that the dead body of Jesus was washed. It is not in evidence that he was washed at all; and nothing can be deduced from a mere supposition. Mr Ewing, indeed, endeavours to supply what is wanting in the history. He alleges, what no one will deny, that it was usual to wash the dead. But does it follow from this, that Jesus must have been washed? We would not have known that he was embalmed, had not the history given us the information.

It is not necessary that the dead body of Jesus should receive all the usual rites, nor any of them, except those that prophecy foretold. The proof, then, that it was usual to wash the dead, is no proof that Jesus was washed. Indeed, I perfectly agree with Dr Cox, that it is probable Jesus was not washed at all. So far as the history goes, this is the obvious conclusion. I acknowledge, indeed, that many things might have taken place, that are not mentioned in the history. If any other part of Scripture said, or implied that Jesus was washed, as well as embalmed, I would argue that the omission of the fact in the history, is no evidence to the contrary. But if the washing is not recorded, nothing can be built on it; because it might not have taken place. The washing of Jesus is an apocryphal washing, of no more authority than the story of Tobit and his dog, or of Bel and the Dragon. I admit no argument but what is founded either on Scripture, or self-evident truth. Had Mr Ewing been obviating a difficulty,—had he been proving that some part of Scripture asserts that the dead body of Jesus was washed, and had any one alleged the silence of the history as evidence of the contrary, I would take part with Mr Ewing. The silence of history is not to be alleged against proof. To remove a difficulty, it is sufficient that the thing alleged is possible; to be an argument, the thing alleged must be in evidence. This distinction is self-evidently obvious, when it is considered; yet it is a thing that lies hid from most controversial writers.

But Mr Ewing says, “as far as the preliminary process went, we are told it was conducted, as the manner of the Jews was to bury.” No, Mr Ewing, we are not told this. Had this been said, it would settle the question; for, undoubtedly, it was the manner of the Jews to wash the dead. But we are not told that, as far as the preliminary process went, all the usual rites were observed. It is the winding in the linen cloth with the spices, that is said to have been, “as the manner of the Jews is to bury.”

Mr Ewing alleges the state of the body, covered with blood, &c. as making washing necessary. All this, however, is no evidence that it was done. Had it been necessary to fulfil any thing in Scripture, there is no doubt it would have been done. But there is no necessity to fulfil national customs. The burying of Jesus with his blood unwashed, marred not his sacrifice, nor left any prophecy unfulfilled. It was customary for all friends to escort the body to the grave; it was customary to keep the corpse some time after

death, yet Jesus was carried immediately to the grave without any funeral pomp.

Sixthly, Is it not above all things absurd to suppose, that an ordinance in the Church of Christ should be instituted as an emblem of a thing that is never once mentioned in his history? If the washing of the dead body of the Saviour was a thing of so much importance, is it credible that it would not have been mentioned? How is it that the spices are mentioned, yet the washing, which was the principal thing, omitted?

Seventhly, Mr Ewing supposes, that the washing, as a part of the embalming, is put for the whole. Why does he make such a supposition? Was there not a word to signify embalming? Why then use a word that denotes only a part of the thing? Can he produce any instance to give authority to such a supposition? Was it usual to denote the whole process of embalming by the word *wash*? If not, why does Mr Ewing make the arbitrary supposition? Again, the *washing* was no part of the embalming. It was a part of the rites of burying, and as such, when embalming was used, washing of course first took place. But it is evident, that the washing and the embalming were different things. Besides, many were washed who were not embalmed. If so, it was impossible to designate embalming by washing. This would have implied, that all who were washed were embalmed; whereas multitudes were washed who were not embalmed. This theory, then, is not only founded on an arbitrary supposition; but that supposition may be proved to be false. It is an axiom, that washing cannot stand for embalming, if many who were washed were not embalmed.

Eighthly, This theory makes baptism an emblem of the embalming of Christ. This is a new view of the import of baptism, that must be as unexpected to those who baptize by pouring, as to the friends of immersion. From the days of John the Baptist to the present hour, was ever such a thing heard of, but from Mr Ewing? If this is true, there has not been one properly baptized till the time of the author. For this discovery, Mr Ewing is undoubtedly entitled to a patent. Till his time, the baptized person was never embalmed. This is a new mystery in baptism. But how does this consist with the other mysteries that the author has found in the same ordinance? The baptized person drinks from the cup of nature as emblematical of a host of blessings; and from the same cup he is washed and embalmed for funeral. No popish ordinance can vie with this ordinance of Mr Ewing, in fertility of mysteries.

The mystery of the five wounds has as good a foundation ; but it is not so pregnant in multifarious meaning. If all these things are contained in baptism, it is a most heterogeneous ordinance ; and I am sure, that of all the millions who practise it, there is not one in every thousand that understands it. The Roman Catholic church has done much better. She has a multitude of mysteries in baptism, but she has a corresponding multitude of emblems. The oil, and the spittle, and the breathing, &c. &c. entitle her to enlarge the meaning of her ordinance. But Mr Ewing, by the management of one handful of water, contrives to couch the most discordant meanings.

But if washing stands for embalming as a part for the whole, then it cannot, in this situation, stand simply for itself, without the other parts of the process of embalming. In baptism, the water must signify not washing only, nor chiefly, but also and especially the spices, &c. The principal part of the mystery must be in the anointing with oil, and the use of the spices, for these were the principal things in the embalming. Now, Mr Ewing overlooks all but the washing ; which is only the previous step to the embalming. He first makes the embalming the principal thing, that he may have some plausible foundation for getting rid of true burying, by substituting the embalming in its place. Then, when this is effected, as he has no need of embalming, but finds it rather cumbersome, he contrives to dismiss it, retaining only the part that fits him. *Washing* is brought in only in the right of *embalming*, but whenever it *pops* its head into this situation, it takes care to displace its principal. Accordingly, washing is the only thing that is made emblematical. The oil and spices have no mystery. Is not this unjust to the chief parts of the embalming ? Surely the anointing ought to have a place in baptism, if baptism is an emblem of embalming. Spices also cannot be dispensed with. Even if they are not used, as they are the chief thing in embalming, they must be chiefly considered in baptism, which is an emblem of embalming. The Church of Rome will thank Mr Ewing for the oil, which he does not seem forward to use, but the spices, by a very little ingenuity, might serve his system effectually. As embalming preserves the body from putrefaction, so baptism may not only be an emblem of the washing of a corpse, but of the resurrection.

Ninthly, Mr Ewing complains of the want of likeness between Christ's funeral and immersion ; yet he makes a handful of water an emblem, not only of washing a corpse, but of the whole rites of

embalming. Surely there can be nothing more unlike burial rites, than the *popping* of a handful of water into the face of an infant. But the complaint of want of likeness in immersion to the burial and resurrection of Christ is quite unreasonable. It is as striking as any emblem can be. It ought, however, to be remarked, that the ordinance is merely emblematical—not dramatic. In the former, there is no need of that exact and minute likeness that the latter requires. The former could not be known to be a likeness of something else, if it were not explained to be such. The latter is, by its very appearance, known to be an emblem. The sacrifices of the Jewish law, could not, from mere external appearance, have been known to represent the death of Christ. But the dramatic burying of Charles V. declared its own object.

Let it be considered also, that in the emblem of a burial, there is no need of a likeness in the laying down of the body of the person baptized. The emblem is in the actual state of the body as being covered with the water. The likeness to the resurrection consists not in the very manner of being taken up out of the water, but in the rising itself. Nothing could afford a resemblance of the way of the raising of the dead. There was no likeness between the way of killing the sacrifice and the manner of Christ's death. There was no likeness between the manner in which Jonah was swallowed by the whale, and again thrown out, to the way in which Christ was carried into the tomb, and in which he came out of the tomb; yet Jonah in the whale's belly was an emblem of Christ as being three days in the heart of the earth. Surely Mr Ewing should have attended more to the nature of an emblem, and have distinguished what is the point of resemblance, before he ventured to question the likeness between the baptism of believers and the burial of Christ, which is asserted by the Holy Spirit. If the Baptists set any value on the manner of putting the body of the baptized person under water, in my opinion they come under the same censure. Mr Ewing's whole dissertation on the Jewish manner of burying the distinguished dead, has no bearing on the subject. Between immersion and burying in any manner, there is a likeness. It is nothing to our purpose to make that likeness dramatic.

Mr Ewing is of opinion, that ver. 5. does not refer to baptism. But whatever is the true meaning of the word translated, "planted together," it is evident, that it must have its reference to baptism. It might be a new figure, but the manner of introducing it, evidently shews that it, equally with *burying*, refers to baptism. "For

if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection." The conditional statement is here evidently founded on what precedes. "If we have been planted," &c. He does not pass on to a new argument, to shew that we are dead with Christ, leaving the subject of baptism. But having shewn the burial of the Christian in baptism, he goes on to shew that resurrection is equally important. If we have been buried with Christ, so shall we rise with him. Had he quitted the subject of baptism, and introduced a new argument, which had no reference to baptism, he would not have stated it conditionally. When he says, "For if we have been planted," it is implied that he had been saying something expressing or implying that *they had been planted*. Whatever is the meaning of *συμφυτοι*, it must have a reference to baptism.

Mr Ewing thinks that *συμφυτοι* here signifies *grafted*, and of course can have no likeness to baptism. On the contrary, for this very reason I say that it cannot signify *grafting*, because it is expressly said, that we have been *συμφυτοι* in the likeness of Christ's death. If, then, there is in *grafting* no likeness to death, the word *συμφυτοι* cannot mean *grafting*. Whatever is the meaning of *συμφυτοι*, it must suit the supposition of a likeness to death. Even if this word had no reference to baptism, it must refer to a likeness of death. We have been made *συμφυτοι* in the likeness of his death.

But independently of the connexion altogether, I maintain that the word *συμφυτοι* does not signify *grafted*. Mr Ewing produces no authority from use to establish this meaning. When it refers to trees, it does not designate the operation of *grafting*, or of inserting a part of one into another; but to the planting of trees in the same bed. The trees of a grove are *συμφυτα*. *Grafting* is, indeed, one of the figures employed to represent the union of Christ and his people, and some excellent observations on this subject are contained in Mr Ewing's dissertation on this verse. But they have no application to this subject. A house, a temple, the human body, the husband and wife, are all figures of this union. But they are not the figures used here. No more is *grafting*. It is a fine figure in its own place; but it is no likeness to death, and therefore has nothing to do with baptism. If the allusion is here to planting, as it is expressly said to have a likeness to death, and refers to baptism, the resemblance must be found in the burying of the roots of the plants. The likeness is sufficiently obvious to justify a metaphor. I have no objection to the supposition of this figure in this place, from the

weakness of likeness. Yet I am of opinion on other ground, that neither *planting* nor *grafting* are implied here. In grafting there is no likeness, either to burial or resurrection; and though planting has a likeness to the former, it has not to the latter. But it is evident, that the passage connects *συμφυτοι*, as well with the resurrection, as with the burial. Now, in classical use the word *συμφυτοι* signifies the closest union of any kind—*incorporated, growing together, united, joined with, &c.* Hippocrates uses it with respect to the healing of a wound, when the lips of the wound again *coalesce*. He says also, that a nerve when cut, or a bone broken, &c. *οὐ συμφυεται*, “do not coalesce.” Here we see it denotes the most intimate union, so as to be denied to the union that takes place between the different parts of a broken bone. A glutinous plant, also, that causes things to adhere as one body, takes its name from this word. It might, I think, be applied to express the growing together of the graft and the tree, but this would be the effect or consequence of grafting, and not the operation itself. It denotes, in short, the closest union with respect to things indiscriminately. There is no need, then, to bring either planting or grafting out of the passage; and as neither of them resembles a resurrection, they should be rejected. When we translate the passage, “For if we have become one *with him*, or have been *joined with him* in the likeness of his death,” we not only suit the connexion to both death and resurrection, but we take the word *συμφυτοι* in its most common acceptation.

Mr Ewing’s attempt, then, to find in pouring a handful of water on the face, a likeness to the burial of Christ, has utterly failed. It is as forced as any thing that the wildest imagination ever conceived. Nothing but the necessity of a favourite system could send a man on such a perilous expedition. It is most astonishing, that any man who allows that Jesus Christ lay three days in the tomb, should attempt to find his burial in the washing or embalming of his body.

This attempt of Mr Ewing to force a likeness between baptism and the rites of embalming, and to make the burial of Christ, not his being laid in the sepulchre, but his being washed as a corpse, is of great importance as a document on this subject. It testifies in the strongest manner, that in Mr Ewing’s judgment, the evidence from Rom. vi. 3, and Col. ii. 12, that baptism contains a likeness to burial, is so obvious, that he could see no way to explain these passages otherwise. Had any other explanation seemed to him pos-

sible, certainly he would not have had recourse to so wild a thought, as that Christ's burial was not his interment, and that *bury* in the Scriptures relates to rites preparatory to interment. It is self-evident, that no man would have fled to such a refuge, who could have found any other. I appeal to common sense for the truth of this observation. Mr Ewing not only had no temptation to find a likeness to burial in these passages, but his cause would have been much better served, could he have proved that these passages contain no such likeness. Since, then, in such circumstances he has confessed a likeness, and since to divert this likeness to another object, he was obliged to have recourse to so violent an expedient, we have a right to say, not only that his judgment is in favour of likeness, but that all his ingenuity could not explain the passages in a manner satisfactory to himself, without the supposition of likeness.

But what Mr Ewing's intrepidity and ingenuity did not attempt, Dr Wardlaw has undertaken. He explains the passages on the supposition that baptism has no likeness to burial in any sense. Now, in this we have Dr Wardlaw's judgment virtually but clearly pronounced, that Mr Ewing's attempt is a failure. We have a right then to say, that Mr Ewing's explanation of these passages is unsatisfactory to the most sagacious of his own party. But Dr Wardlaw's opinion of the insufficiency of Mr Ewing's explanation has the more value, when it is considered, that by refusing to adopt it, he is obliged to have recourse to an expedient as violent, and as wild, as that of Mr Ewing itself. To assert, that there is here no likeness implied between baptism and burial, does as great violence to language as can easily be conceived. If, therefore, Dr Wardlaw is so convinced of the insufficiency of Mr Ewing's explanation, that he ventures on one so extravagant, his opinion of Mr Ewing's failure is entitled to the greater weight. It was his interest to coincide with Mr Ewing's explanation, had he conceived that it was at all tenable. He would not have ventured to come ashore upon a plank, had he not found Mr Ewing's leaky boat sinking under him. Dr Wardlaw complains of the mode of controversy that argues from discrepancies between those on the same side. I admit that the argument may be abused. But if he complain of my argument on this point, he does not see its bearing. Persons on the same side of a controversy, may differ with respect to the explanation of many passages, without any detriment to their common cause. But the difference here is about a thing which must in itself be obvious,

namely, whether a certain phrase implies the likeness of one thing to another. About this there cannot in reality be a ground for controversy among those who understand the words.

The difference, also, is of such a nature, that each must look on the other as giving up the common cause. As Mr Ewing is so fully convinced that it is impossible to deface the likeness, he must look upon those who do not agree with him in finding it in preparatory rites, as giving up the passage to his opponents. As Dr Wardlaw cannot explain the passages on the supposition of likeness without admitting immersion, he must look upon those who admit likeness, as yielding the doctrine in debate. On the other hand, we may differ about the meaning of *συμφυτοι*, without the least danger to our common cause. One may say it is "*planted together*," another, that it is "*joined together*," without overturning the common doctrine. My argument is founded, also, on the extravagancies to which each of these writers is obliged to have recourse, in order to defend his opinion. Each of them must have strong reason of dissatisfaction with the opinion of the other, when, rather than embrace it, he has recourse to an opposite point of extravagance. One sees likeness so clearly, that rather than deny it, he endeavours to find it where sobriety of judgment never could look for it. The other sees the extravagance of this attempt so clearly, that, rather than adopt it, he will deny that the passages contain any likeness.

But let us now take a glance at the process of ejection by which Dr Wardlaw has dispossessed likeness out of these passages. "To be 'baptized into Christ,'" says he, "is to be baptized into the faith of him as the Messiah," &c. And again, "The simple meaning of the expression evidently is, that by being baptized into the faith of his death, as the death of our surety and substitute, we become *partakers with him in it*." Now, what is here said to be evidently the simple meaning of this expression, is evidently not its meaning at all. We do not become partakers in the death of Christ, by being baptized into the faith of his death. We become partakers in the death of Christ, by faith, before baptism, and without baptism; and would have been equally so, had baptism never been instituted. In baptism, this participation with Christ is exhibited in figure, just as we are said to *wash away our sins* in baptism. Sins are washed away by faith in the blood of Christ, but they are symbolically washed away in baptism. Just so we become par-

takers in the death of Christ the moment we believe; in baptism, this participation is exhibited by a symbol.

Dr Wardlaw, by this mode of interpretation, considers *faith in Christ's death*, and *baptism into his death*, as equivalent expressions. But to be "baptized into his death," is more than to "believe in his death." Baptism into his death, not only imports that we believe in him as our substitute, but *marks* our death in his death. To be *baptized into his death*, is the same as to be *buried into death*. In reality, we die with Christ the moment we believe; but this is not expressed by the phrase, *faith in Christ's death*. It is learned from other parts of the Scriptures. Now, herein lies the importance of the mode of baptism. It marks, in a figure, the way in which we become partakers in the benefits of Christ's death. This is by our being, by a divine constitution, one with him. His death is a proper atonement for us, because we die with him, so that in reality his death is ours. This is not necessary in all cases of substitution. To have a debt discharged by another, there is no necessity to become one with him. But it is not so in crime. Justice is not satisfied, except the criminal himself suffers. And by the divine constitution, that makes all believers one with Christ, they are all considered as having died with him. The criminals have suffered, since he who suffered was one with them. Baptism, then, marks this circumstance. It shews, in a figure, that union with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection, which we have by faith.

According to Dr Wardlaw's way of explaining these passages, there was no occasion to mention baptism at all. If the Apostle is speaking of the real oneness with Christ, without considering it as exhibited in a figure, he might as well have said, "Know ye not, that as many as have believed in Christ's death, have died along with him?" This would express all that Dr Wardlaw takes out of the passage; and it would express it definitely. Why, then, does the Apostle bring in baptism at all? Again, if baptism implies burial only as implying faith in Christ's death, then the Lord's Supper, or any thing that implies faith, might have been referred to on this occasion, as well as baptism. We might as well say that we are buried by the Lord's Supper as buried by baptism. We might as well say that we are crucified by baptism. But such phraseology is never used in the Scriptures. The only reason, then, that baptism is here brought forward at all, must be that it is a figure of burial.

That baptism has a likeness to death, is put beyond question in this passage, from the phrase, *buried with him through baptism into death*. Here is a burial *by or through the means* of baptism. What buries us into death? It is baptism. But the death into which baptism buries us, must be a figurative death. It is faith that buries us truly into Christ's death. But the death and burial here spoken of, are effected, not by faith, but by baptism. This phrase refutes Dr Wardlaw's assertion, that though a likeness might be fancied between immersion and burial, no likeness to death can be found in it. The phrase, *buried by baptism into death*, imports that we die with Christ in baptism, as well as we are buried with him. Nay, it is by burial we die. We are supposed to be *buried into death*. And the figure is well fitted for this purpose. To immerse a living man, affords an emblem of death as well as of burial. The baptized person dies under the water, and for a moment lies buried with Christ. Christ's own death was spoken of under the figure of a baptism.

Dr Wardlaw, indeed, asserts that the phrase, *buried with him by baptism into his death*, merely directs the attention *to that into which they were baptized*. But the passage says nothing of the doctrine into which they were baptized, in any other way than as it is contained in the figure. As I observed before, it is by baptism, and not by faith, they are here said to be buried; and, therefore, the burial must be a figurative burial. The phrase in Col. ii. 12, is different, but equally express. It is buried with him *in* baptism. This burial, then, takes place, not in believing, but in baptism. We are buried with him when we are baptized, and *by* the act of baptizing. The two expressions, when taken together, make the thing more definite. One of them expresses that it is *in* baptism that we are buried; the other, that it is *by* baptism that we are buried.

Dr Wardlaw speaks of this passage, as containing "a beautiful illustration of the spiritual connexion of believers with Christ." Now, how is this an illustration, if it is not by containing a likeness to the thing illustrated? Is it not absurd to speak of illustrating by things in which there is no resemblance to the principal object? Dr Wardlaw cannot consistently look on this as an illustration. He sets out with supposing, that the passage refers merely to the participation that believers have in Christ's death, burial, and resurrection, by faith, without any likeness to these things in baptism. Now, if this is the case, death, burial, and resurrection,

are here not an *illustration* of connexion, but an *exemplification* of connexion. By calling these things an illustration, the author gives up his doctrine. Indeed, these things are so obviously an illustration—the passage so evidently considers death, burial, and resurrection, as figurative, that it is not easy even for the most determined enemy of immersion to speak much about the passage, without using language that admits this.

“To be *dead with Christ*,” says Dr Wardlaw, “and *to be buried with Christ*, are the same thing.” Certainly not. Death is different from burial, though burial includes death. Were they not different, they would not both have been mentioned here. It is a distinct part of the gospel testimony, that Christ was buried. His burial was as distinct from his death, as his resurrection was.

“The latter of the two phrases,” says Dr Wardlaw, “appears to be used in the fourth verse, chiefly for the sake of *completing the Apostle’s figure*.” This assertion is most injurious to the language of the Holy Spirit, and totally unfounded in the lawful use of figures. I am bold to assert, that there cannot be an instance of what the author asserts, without a serious trespass of the laws of figurative language. It is true, indeed, that in allegory there may be some points in the figure which have nothing to correspond to them in the thing illustrated, because the unity of the resembling object cannot be broken. But to add burial to death, is to add one figure to another without any necessity. If, then, there is no distinct meaning in burial, to add it to death is vicious in taste, and childish in argument. The only reason why burial is mentioned, must be that it has a distinct meaning. To suppose that the Apostle would bring it in merely for the purpose of stringing one figure to another, is not only an affront to the Holy Spirit, but would be an impeachment of the good sense of the Apostle if he had written without inspiration. Plato, indeed, goes over the whole human body, and brings out of it a chain of metaphors. He makes the head a citadel, the neck an isthmus, &c. This is sufficiently childish, but it is manly compared with what the Apostle is supposed to do. Plato gives some meaning to each of his figures; but the Apostle strings one figure to another, not for the sake of additional illustration, but out of the puerile conceit of completing his series of figures. It would have been an improvement, had he inserted the embalming between death and the burial, and added the funeral procession to the series.

But what shall we say of *the Apostle's figure*? Is there, then, a figure in the Apostle's language? Is this death, burial, and resurrection, figurative? If the death, burial, and resurrection in baptism are figurative, they must have a likeness. Is there any figurative death without a likeness? There is a common proverb, that murder will never lie. The murderer will sometimes discover himself even by talking in his sleep. Dr Wardlaw has murdered this passage most barbarously, and it is no wonder if he informs against himself. While he has assassinated the likeness in baptism to death, burial, and resurrection, he speaks of *illustration, figure, and resemblance*.

“As it was necessary,” says Dr Wardlaw, “in order to Christ's rising, that he should be *laid in the grave*; so in *the figure*, it is necessary that we should be viewed as *buried with him*, in order to our *rising with him* to newness of life.” Certainly, it is necessary that we should be viewed in the figure of baptism as *buried with Christ*. But if the author means that we are buried with Christ by faith in him as a substitute merely by a mode of speaking, it is a most serious error. Does the author say that it is in a figurative way of speaking that the believer dies with Christ? If he does, he has a very inadequate view of the believer's oneness with Christ. The believer is one with Christ, not by a peculiar mode of speaking, or a particular way of viewing the subject, but by a real union. He is one with Christ as truly as he is one with Adam. He dies with Christ as truly as he fell with Adam. Christ's work is his, as truly as Adam's sin is his. By a divine constitution all Adam's posterity are one in him, and so his first sin is really and truly theirs. By a similar divine constitution all Christ's people are one with him, and his work is as really theirs, as if they had themselves performed it. When it is said that Christians have died with Christ by faith, there is no more figure than when it is said that they have died in Adam, or that they shall die themselves.

But this view of the subject overturns the apostle's reasoning altogether. Dr Wardlaw understands the apostle as speaking of the connexion that believers have with Christ by faith; and that they are here said to be dead with him, buried with him, and to be risen with him, not by a likeness to these things in baptism, but merely by faith. Now, if he ascribes to them this death, burial, and resurrection, as a mode of viewing them, or as a figurative way of speaking, he wrests the apostle's argument out of his hands. If

this death is the death by faith, and yet nothing but a figure, then our security against living in sin, according to the Apostle, is nothing but a figure. A figurative death is no security against sin. An actor will die on the stage to-night, and act to-morrow. If it is only in a certain way of speaking that we rise with Christ by faith, then there is from that figurative resurrection no security of a holy life. The spirit of the Apostle's reasoning on this verse would be, "How can they, who are said by a figure to be dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not, that as many of us as have believed on Christ, are figuratively viewed as having died with him?" This figure would be a weak security against living in sin. It must be a real death that will secure against sin. Now, how different is the Apostle's argument, on our view? "How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?" This must be real death, otherwise there is no argument. How then are we dead? By faith in Christ we are dead. But in baptism this truth is exhibited in figure. "Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death?" To be *baptized into Jesus Christ* imports the being baptized into the faith of his death as our substitute; but to be baptized into his death imports, that by baptism we are exhibited as dying along with him. The death in baptism is a figurative death, founded on the real death by faith. If *baptized into his death*, does not import our death with Christ, this verse is not proof of what is asserted in the former. And if baptism is no figurative burial, it is no proof of death, and therefore would be only an incumbrance in this place. The Christian has a real death, burial, and resurrection with Christ by faith. He has all these also in baptism by figure. Baptism is a proof of death, because it has no meaning otherwise. Hence it is used as an argument here: and hence the great importance of understanding the import of baptism. It gives, by a striking figure, a conception of the union of believers with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection, that has escaped, we see, the most sagacious Christians who are ignorant of the ordinance.

"The simple meaning," says Dr Wardlaw, is this: "Since, in our being baptized into Jesus Christ, we were baptized into his death,—into the faith of his death as the death of a surety; we may be considered as, by faith, partaking with him in his death." I reply, This partaking is a real—not a figurative partaking. If baptism is not a figure of this, there was no occasion to allude to it at all. The

author continues: “ as *buried with him* ; and that with the special end of our rising with him, in a spiritual resemblance of his resurrection, and ‘ walking in newness of life.’ ” But does not Dr Wardlaw see that we are not here said to be *buried with him by faith*, but *buried with him by baptism into death*? This burial is not merely a burial by faith, but a burial by baptism. The language imports, also, that baptism has a reference both to Christ’s resurrection, and our new life. “ We are buried with him by baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.” This is stated as the end of baptism—not as the end of faith. As baptism does not effect these things, it must be viewed as a figure. Baptism makes us die, buries us, raises us, only in figure ; therefore as we are said to die, to be buried, and to rise in baptism, baptism must contain a likeness to these things. It is not said that we are *buried by faith, that we may rise, &c.* ; but that we are buried by baptism into death, that we may rise, &c. All these things are connected with baptism. But except as a likeness or figure, it has no connexion with them at all. Any other ordinance might have been equally mentioned. Rather there was no need for the mention of any ordinance, on the supposition that there is no likeness.

But that baptism contains a likeness to death, is in this passage expressly asserted: For if we have been *συμφυτοι*, “ joined with him *in the likeness* of his death.” Here we see that this death is a symbolical death. It is a *likeness* to death. Now, the participation in Christ’s death, that the believer has by faith, is not a likeness to death, but a real death. It is, by the divine constitution of the union that subsists between Christ and his people, his own death. How, then, is there in baptism a likeness to death, if that ordinance is not by immersion? Our future resurrection is also figured in baptism: “ we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection.” In Col. ii. 12, also, we are said to be risen with Christ: “ Buried with him *in baptism* ; wherein, or *in which*, also ye are risen with him.” Dr Wardlaw asks, How is it we are said to be “ risen with him?” Undoubtedly through faith. Without this there is no rising to new life, nor will there be to glory. But this resurrection is notwithstanding said here to be *in baptism*. It must then be in figure. Dr Wardlaw supposes that these things are ascribed to baptism; “ because it was the first public declaration of the faith of the converts.” But baptism is not necessarily a *public*

declaration of faith. Nor is it necessarily the first public declaration. There may be many instances in which a public declaration of faith is made, before there is any opportunity of being baptized. Besides, this is an apocryphal reason. The Scriptures do not assign it. And as a matter of fact, it is no more connected with salvation than the Lord's Supper. It is not in baptism, nor by means of baptism, that we die with Christ really, or are made spiritually alive. This death and this life takes place before baptism. Baptism, then, can have these things ascribed to it only in figure. "It is on the same principle," says Dr Wardlaw, "that they are spoken of as in *baptism* 'washing away their sins.'" All these things are doubtless spoken on the same principle. But that principle is, that baptism is a figure. Baptism washes away sins, not because it is the first ordinance, but because it is an emblematical washing of the body with water. Does not Dr Wardlaw hold, that baptism is an emblem of washing away sin? How then does he explain the phrase, *washing away sin in baptism*, on the principle of baptism being the first ordinance? We wash away sins in baptism, just as we eat the flesh of Jesus in the Lord's Supper. "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" How is the cup the communion of Christ's blood? How is the bread the communion of his body? In figure. And when the figure is observed in faith, the real communion is effected. Just so baptism washes away sin. Just so in baptism we die, we are buried, and we rise. But the truth of the emblem is effected, not by baptism in any sense, but by faith of the operation of God. It is absurd and ridiculous to suppose, that an ordinance can wash away sin in any other than a figurative sense. Was it not in this way that Jewish rites were said to make an atonement and to cleanse from sin? The first ordinance observed, has no more to do with these things than the last. The death, burial, and resurrection, which are ascribed to baptism, take place *in baptism*, and *by means of* baptism. The washing away of sins, ascribed to baptism, is effected by baptism. This washing, this death, this burial, and this resurrection, then, cannot be the washing, death, burial, and resurrection, which are effected by faith, and which take place before baptism. If the washing away of sins, the death, burial, and resurrection, ascribed to baptism, were effected previously, and by other means, the Scriptures are not true, that speak of them as effected in baptism, and by baptism. The reality has already taken

place, but it is represented in figure as taking place in the ordinance, and by means of the ordinance.

“ In Rom. vi.” says Dr Wardlaw, “ the language of the whole passage is figurative.” And what suppose it were figurative? Would this imply that there is no likeness? When death, burial, and resurrection, are used figuratively, they must of necessity have a likeness. Will Dr Wardlaw shew what kind of figure he supposes to exist here? Will he shew any figure that will justify the ascription of the washing away of sin, of death, burial, and resurrection to an ordinance, because it is the first ordinance observed? This figure he will look for in vain, either in the writings of rhetoricians, or the practice of any language. The principle on which I hold that these things are ascribed to baptism, I have verified by example, and justified on principle. But will Dr Wardlaw recollect, that this death, burial, and resurrection, he has, in setting out, considered as effected by faith? He cannot, then, speak consistently of this language as figurative. But though he talks of the *simple meaning* of the passage, there is evidently a jumble in his own conceptions of this meaning. There never was a paragraph farther from simplicity, than that which he has employed to shew the simple meaning of Rom. vi. 1.

The fact, however, is, that in the expression, *wash away sin by baptism, death, burial, and resurrection in baptism*, there is no figure. It is a figurative action, not a figurative expression. A symbol is not a figure of speech. And I have shewn, that as Dr Wardlaw has in the commencement explained death, burial, and resurrection, as the death, burial, and resurrection which we have by faith in Christ, dying as our surety, to speak of these things now as figurative language, is to overturn the Apostle’s argument, and to deny real union with Christ in his work. We are not one with him by a divine constitution, as we are one with Adam, but merely one with him in a figurative way of speaking. Dr Wardlaw, then, ejects immersion out of Rom. vi. only by virtually overturning the gospel, or denying real oneness with Christ.

“ The same principle of interpretation,” says Dr Wardlaw, “ according to which the expression ‘ *buried with Christ*’ is explained, ‘ as referring to the representation of interment by the immersion of the body under water, should lead us also to understand the phrase ‘ which immediately follows, ‘ *planted together in the likeness of his death,*’ as referring to an emblematic representation of *planting*, ‘ which, accordingly, some have stretched their fancy to make out.”

If the word *συμφυτοι* is to be translated *planted together*, there must indeed be a likeness between baptism and planting. And it requires no stretch of fancy to discover a likeness between the burying of the roots of plants and immersion in water. But even on this supposition, the word is metaphorical, and while it equally with a symbolical action requires likeness, it does not imply that baptism is an emblem of planting. Let Dr Wardlaw consider the difference between a figurative word and a figurative action, and he will withdraw this objection. Baptism is here explained as a symbolical action, representing death, burial, and resurrection. The likeness to planting is illustrative, not symbolical. The phrase, *planting together*, proves the mode of baptism; but it does not imply that there is in it any thing emblematic of planting. Dr Wardlaw continues, “or the phrase, *crucified with him*, to some similar exhibition of crucifixion.” But does not Dr Wardlaw perceive that we are not said to be crucified with Christ in baptism? We are indeed crucified with him—really and truly crucified with him—not in baptism, but by faith in his cross. We were nailed to the tree, when he was nailed, because by the divine constitution we are one with him. But, according to Dr Wardlaw’s explanation of this passage, we might as well be said to be crucified in baptism as buried in baptism. If there is no allusion to burial in baptism, more than to crucifixion, why are we not said to be crucified in baptism? If we are really crucified with him by faith in his cross, why might we not, on Dr Wardlaw’s principle, be said to be crucified in baptism, and by means of baptism, because it is the first ordinance in which we profess faith in the cross of Christ? But there is no such absurdity of expression in the Scriptures.

After all the labours of Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw on this passage, I could safely rest my cause on a candid reading of it by the most unlettered good sense. To a reflecting mind, nothing can more strongly prove the impossibility of diverting these words from giving their testimony in favour of immersion, than that one of these learned and ingenious writers could find no other way to effect his purpose, but by forcing burial to denote embalming or washing the dead; and the other by denying that the passage implies any likeness between baptism and burial. These extravagances are so enormous, that every sober mind may see that the cause that requires them is desperate. I ask any man who fears God and trembles at his word, is Christ’s burial merely the washing of his corpse, and not his being laid in the sepulchre? I ask, does the phrase

“*buried with baptism by death*” import no likeness between baptism and burial?

Dr Wardlaw observes, “according to our Baptist brethren, *washing* or *cleansing*, so far from being the exclusive, is not even the principal, but only a secondary meaning of the rite.” In this he is mistaken. Death, burial, and resurrection, we do not consider as the primary meaning of baptism; and washing away sin, as a secondary meaning. It takes both together to make one meaning. The ordinance has one meaning only. It not only signifies washing away sin through faith in the blood of Christ, but denotes that such sins are washed away by our fellowship with him in his death. Washing away of sin is the thing which it always signifies; but this is not the whole of its meaning. It is then to no purpose that Dr Wardlaw insists that *sprinkling* and *pouring* may be an emblem of cleansing. They are no emblem of death, burial, and resurrection, which are figured in baptism.

Another passage that favours our view of the mode and import of baptism is, 1 Cor. xv. 29. “Else what shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptized for the dead?” There must be an argument here, and this object of baptism must be a scriptural object, otherwise it could not be an argument. Indeed, though to us the passage may be difficult from difference of circumstances with respect to those immediately addressed, yet it is evident that the apostle considers the argument as very obvious and convincing. Now, to consider the expression to be a reference to the mode and import of baptism, as implying an emblem of the resurrection of believers, will afford a natural meaning to the words, and an important argument to the apostle. Baptism is an ordinance that represents our burial and resurrection with Christ. We are baptized, in the hope that our dead bodies shall rise from the grave. Now, if there is no resurrection, why are we baptized? On that supposition, there is no meaning in baptism. It is absurd for any to be baptized, baptism being a figure of a resurrection, if they do not believe in a resurrection. Heb. x. 22, is on both sides allowed to have a reference to baptism; and to me it appears evident, that the whole body was covered with the water. “Let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our bodies washed with pure water.” Here the heart is said to be sprinkled in allusion to the application of the blood of the sacrifices; and the body is said to be washed in pure water, referring to the

ordinance of baptism. Now, the pouring of a little water in the face is not a washing of the body. I admit, that sprinkling a little water on any part of the body might be an emblem of purification ; but this would not be called a washing of the body. The passage which Mr Ewing brings to justify his view of this verse, is not parallel. "For, in that she hath poured this ointment on my body, she did it for my burial," Mat. xxvi. 12. "This instance," says Mr Ewing, "of calling what was poured on the head, a pouring on the body, illustrates what is said of baptism, which is in itself a pouring on the face only, but which, being a figure of washing, is called a washing of the body." Our Lord's expression is quite literal, and has no emblem. The smallest quantity of water poured on any part of the body, is as truly poured on the body as if the whole body was covered. Water is literally poured on the body, if poured on any part of the body. But when the body is said to be washed, it implies that the whole body is washed. Washing a part of the body, is not washing the body. Let us have an example in which the pouring of a little water on a part of an object, is called the washing of the object. The bodies of the priests were washed on entering on their office. Shall we say that this may have been the pouring of a little water on their head? Though I do not agree with Dr Campbell, that *λουω* cannot be applied to a part, yet it is so generally appropriated to the bathing or the whole body, that in medical use it is employed without a regimen in that sense. If any part is not to be bathed, it must be expressly excepted, as *πλην κεφαλῆς*, *except the head*.

"Except a man be born of water and the Spirit," John iii. 5. is another expression which is admitted to refer to baptism ; and has its explanation most intelligibly in emersion out of the water in that ordinance. To emerge out of the water, is like a birth ; and to be *born of water*, as distinguished from being *born of the Spirit*, is to be born of the truth represented by the water. We are regenerated both by the word and Spirit. We are born into the kingdom of God by the agency of his Spirit, through the belief of the word that testifies the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, and our death, burial, and resurrection with him. Christ, therefore, is said to have given himself for his church, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the *washing of water by the word*, Ephes. v. 26. The washing of water is by the word, which is figuratively done in baptism. In like manner, we are said to be saved "by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost," Tit. iii. 5. We are

also said to be “washed and sanctified,” 1 Cor. vi. 11, in reference to the cleansing from sin by faith in the blood of Christ, as well as to the renewing of our hearts by the Holy Spirit.

BRIEF STRICTURES ON MR EWING'S MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS ON
THE HYPOTHESIS OF IMMERSION.

I HAVE, in a great measure, anticipated any thing that I judge necessary on Mr Ewing's Miscellaneous Remarks on the Hypothesis of Immersion. I cannot, however, dismiss the subject without more expressly entering my protest against the grounds of his reasoning in this part of his work. They appear to me both false and dangerous. Immersion he considers as indecent and indelicate, and in several cases he attempts to prove its impracticability. “The immersion of one person by another,” says Mr Ewing, “except in cases of necessity or mercy, seems to be contrary to decency, and to the respect which we owe to one another.” Mr Ewing commences very properly, by saying, “I feel it incumbent on me to enforce my conviction on others, by every consideration which the examination of the Scriptures on the subject has suggested to my mind.” By all means, let us have every thing that the Scriptures suggest on this subject. Pray now, Mr Ewing, was it the Scriptures that suggested this objection? This is an appeal to our pride against the law of Christ,—an appeal, however, that is likely to have more weight with some, than an appeal to the word of God. But is there more dignity and delicacy in pouring water into a person's face, out of the hand, so that some of the water must be swallowed? Had Mr Ewing, however, established this from the Scriptures, he would have heard no objection from me on this ground. I would not take the responsibility of this argument for all the wealth of the city of Glasgow. Let Mr Ewing take care that he is not enlisting the corruption of the Christian's heart against the appointment of Jesus. Does not Mr Ewing see that the respect we owe to one another has no concern in the question? If it suits the wisdom of Christ's appointments, that one person should be immersed by another, even were it a real humiliation, it is to Christ we stoop. That God's institutions cannot foster any of the corruptions of our nature, is self-evident; but that they should consult our sentiments of dignity and delicacy, is a thing that no one acquainted with the Scriptures ought to assert. Has Mr Ewing never read the Old Testament?

Did he never hear of such a thing as circumcision? Has he forgotten the transaction in Abraham's house on the institution of that ordinance? Was there more dignity in that operation, with respect to the Father of the Faithful, and the males of his house, than there is in immersion in water? What shall we say of the transaction at the Hill of Foreskins? What shall we say of many parts of the law of Moses? What shall we say of many parts both of the Old Testament and the New? Try them by Mr Ewing's test, and they must be expunged from the book of God. Infidelity here may have a plausible handle, though no just ground of objection. But in immersion, with respect both to males and females, there is none. Mr Ewing's caricature of the immersion of females, is so much in the spirit of the means by which the Church of Rome keeps the higher ranks from reading the Scriptures, that I have no language strong enough to express my feelings of abhorrence. "Shall you permit your wives and daughters," say the enemies of the Scriptures, "to read the indelicate statements of the Bible?"* And shall the man of God blow the trumpet of Satan in the camp of Israel? If immersion is an ordinance of Christ, it is a fearful thing to oppose it by such an engine. It is not the first time, however, that Jesus has been rebuked as a sinner. In the estimation of the Pharisees, he broke the Sabbath; he was charged as a wine-bibber and a glutton; and it is not strange that the wisdom of this world should find indelicacy in his ordinances.

Mr Ewing thinks himself very strong, with respect to the argument from the scarcity of water; and no doubt he will appear so to a numerous class of his readers. But the argument, instead of having weight, cannot be admitted to a hearing by any one who understands the nature of evidence. All the information that can be collected at this distance of time, cannot assure us that there were not other resources of water, of which we have no account. Mr Ewing may say, that the pool of Bethesda may have been sufficient only for one person to go down at a time. Well, if my cause obliged me to prove that it admitted two, I grant that I could not prove it. But I am not bound to prove. I may say that it may have admitted a hundred to go down at once, and the bare possibility is enough to remove the objection. Neither of us can prove the dimensions of it. If, then, there had been no water in Jerusalem but this pool,

* It is said that there is no more usual argument to dissuade the higher classes in France from reading the Scriptures, than their indelicacy. They are told that the Bible, on this account, is the very worst of books that can be put into the hands of youth.

I am at liberty to suppose that it might have sufficed. The pool of Siloam may have been only sufficient to wash the eyes, but it may have been sufficient to float a ship. This is quite enough for me. If immersion is not impossible in some of the places where baptism was performed, no man who understands reasoning will object on this ground.

Were I engaged with Mr Ewing, even in an historical controversy, with respect to the supply of water in Jerusalem in the days of the apostles, I could easily shew that his conclusions are unwarranted. He depends on the accounts of modern travellers. I would admit their statements, and deny the consequence. Must the supply of water be the same now as it was then? Aqueducts and reservoirs may have then existed, of which there are no remains. Herod, at great expense, brought water to the city by aqueducts, from a considerable distance; and the pools, and fountains, and rivers, cannot now be estimated. The supply of water to the city of God, could not be inadequate to the wants of the inhabitants, and to the use of it in legal purifications, which required abundant resources. Shall we judge of the supply of water in the days of the apostles, by that of the present time, when Jerusalem is suffering under the curse? How much depended at that time upon rain? Is there reason to think that the supply is equal at present? Earthquakes alter the course of rivers, and often seal up fountains. In the year 1182, as Goldsmith relates, most of the cities of Syria, and the kingdom of Jerusalem, were destroyed by an earthquake.* Must the brook Kedron have been as scanty as it is now? Mr Ewing tells us that, like other brooks in cities, it was contaminated. Did the filth run up the stream? and could they not baptize where it entered the city, or upwards? The very attempt to prove, at this distance of time, that there could not be water in or near Jerusalem for immersion, is absurd. I would hold this, were the question merely an historical one. But if the Holy Spirit testifies that the disciples were baptized on believing the gospel, and if I have proved

* Mr Gibbon makes a like objection to the Scripture account of the fertility of Judea. The present barrenness of that country, he considers as proof of the falsehood of the accounts of its ancient fertility. This, which may appear to many very sage, is in reality very shallow. There are many possible ways in which the fertility of a country may differ at different times. The peasants of Switzerland draw walls of stone across their declivities, to keep up the mould which industry has brought to the nourishment of their vines. If these were for a few years neglected, the rains would sweep away all their labours, and there would be nothing in the place of luxuriance, but barrenness and naked rocks.

that this word signifies to *immerse*, then, though there were real difficulties on the subject, I am entitled to suppose that there must have been in some place a supply of water.

John the Baptist had enough of water in the Jordan; but if there is enough of water, there are, it seems, other wants. "In the course of his ministry," says Mr Ewing, "he drew his illustrations, like his Master, who came after him, from the objects surrounding him at the time. But he says nothing of the stream, of its depth, of its rapidity, of its strength, of its overflowings, of its billows, of its qualities of purification." Was ever any thing so childish put upon paper? Can any mind suppose that there is argument in this? Did ever John the Baptist illustrate his subject by allusions to popping? Is the absence of any such allusions, to be received as evidence that there was not immersion in baptism?

"As a teacher," says Mr Ewing, "you never find him in the river." Does this say that, as a baptizer, he might not have been in the river? Such arguments are not only unsound, but absurd. Whenever they have any weight, there must be an indistinctness of vision, as to the nature of evidence.

I will not go out of my way to look for water to immerse the disciples of Sychar in Samaria. If Mr Ewing knows that they were baptized, from the usual practice, I know they were immersed, from the meaning of the word. Had I no other resource, I would make Jacob's well supply me. But as it is not said where they were baptized, I will make them conduct Christ and the Apostles on their way, till they come to water. I care not where the water is to be found; if they were baptized, they were immersed.

Mr Ewing, as well as Dr Wardlaw, learns from Peter's phraseology, "can any man forbid water?" that the water was to be brought to the place. And if this were certain, it affects not the question. Must the observance of the ordinances of Christ never put us to trouble? But the expression imports no more, than "who can forbid baptism to the persons who have already received the Holy Spirit?" without any respect to mode.

The phraseology of Ananias, it seems, forbids immersion:—"Arise, and be baptized." Where is the proof here? Why, there is no going down to the water, nor coming up from it. Is there any man so frantic as to suppose, that this phraseology must apply to every baptism? Baptism in a bath, is as good as baptism in the Jordan.

But Paul was baptized after a three days fast, before he had received either meat or strength. "Would this have been done," we are asked, "had his baptism been immersion?" It was done, yet his baptism was immersion. From this, let us learn that baptism is not a thing to be trifled with, but ought to be performed as soon as possible after the belief of the truth. It would give me great pleasure, if Mr Ewing would make this use of the circumstance. He has certainly delayed his baptism much too long.

But the jailor—How shall we find water to immerse the jailor? "The argument," says Mr Ewing, "that there was a bath in the jail at Philippi, because there is a very fine tank at Calcutta, and always is one to be found in an eastern jail, may be illustrated in this manner: There was a stove in the jail at Philippi, because there is a very fine one in the jail at St Petersburg, and always is one to be found in a northern jail." Does Mr Ewing suppose that his opponents are bound to prove that there must have been a bath in the jail at Philippi? That there may have been one, is quite sufficient for our purpose. Even this is not necessary. Any vessel that will hold a sufficient quantity of water, will serve us equally well. Besides, for any thing in the narrative, the baptism might have taken place in any part of the town. It is madness to suppose that immersion was here impossible; and if it was not impossible, the objection is not valid. There might have been a thousand ways of obtaining water of which we are ignorant. To suppose that it is necessary to produce, from the history, an actual supply of water, in the case of every baptism, implies a radical error, with respect to the first principles of evidence. The jailor and his household were baptized, therefore they were immersed. What sober mind will go in quest of the water, in a foreign country, at the distance of nearly two thousand years!

SUBJECTS OF BAPTISM.

HAVING ascertained the mode and the meaning of this ordinance, I shall now inquire who are the subjects of it. If our minds were uninfluenced by prejudice, this inquiry would not be tedious. We have the answer obviously in the words of the apostolical commission. “Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen.” Matth. xxviii. 19.

It is well known that the word corresponding to teach, in the first instance in which it occurs in this passage, signifies to *disciple*, or *make scholars*. To disciple all nations, is to bring them by faith into the school of Christ, in which they are to learn his will. The persons, then, whom this commission warrants to be baptized, are scholars of Christ, having believed in him for salvation. If this needed confirmation, it has it in the record of the commission by Mark. “Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned.” Here the persons whom Matthew calls disciples, Mark calls believers. According to this commission, then, none are warranted to be baptized but disciples or believers. But our opponents affect to treat this passage as not at all to the purpose; alleging, that though it commands believers to be baptized, it does not exclude the infants of believers. They consider this as common ground, and as teaching a doctrine which they do not deny, without opposing the peculiar doctrine which they hold. Accordingly, they run over this commission with the greatest apparent ease, and are amazed at the want of perspicacity in their opponents, who see in it any thing unfavourable to the baptism of infants. Now, this evidence strikes

me in so very different a light, that I am willing to hang the whole controversy on this passage. If I had not another passage in the word of God, I will engage to refute my opponents from the words of this commission alone. Dr Wardlaw thinks he has shewn as clear as a sun-beam, that the words of this commission have no bearing on the subject. I will risk the credit of my understanding, on my success in shewing that, *according to this commission, believers only are to be baptized*. It is impossible that a command to baptize believers, can be extended to include any but believers. We need not say that this cannot be done by inference; I say it cannot be done by the most express command or explanation. No command, no explanation, can bring unbelievers into the commission that enjoins the baptism of believers. Even if I found another command, enjoining the baptism of the infants of believers, I would not move an inch from my position. I would still say, this is not included in the apostolical commission. This is another commission, and cannot interfere with the former. This would establish the baptism of infants, indeed, but it would not be according to this commission, nor included in it. It would be another baptism, far more different from the baptism of this commission, than the baptism of John was from that of the Apostles. This command to baptize the infants of believers, would not be according to the command to baptize believers. There would then be two baptisms, on quite different grounds; the one on the ground of faith, the other on the ground of descent. Talk not, then, of the Abrahamic covenant, and of circumcision; if a baptism, or any other New Testament ordinance, must be found to correspond to these, it cannot be forced into the baptism commanded in this commission. I would gainsay an angel from heaven, who would say that this commission may extend to the baptism of any but believers. His assertion would imply a contradiction. It would imply that the same persons may be, at the same time, both believers and unbelievers. Here, then, I stand entrenched, and I defy the ingenuity of earth and hell to drive me from my position. *This commission to baptize believers, does not indeed imply that it is impossible that another commission might have been given to baptize infants, but, by necessity, it excludes them for ever from being included in this command. If infants are baptized, it is from another commission; and it is another baptism, founded on another principle.*

But not only does this commission exclude infants from the bap-

tism it enjoins: if there were even another commission enjoining the baptism of infants; when these infants, who have been baptized in infancy, according to this supposed second commission, believe the gospel, they must be baptized according to the commission, Mat. xxviii. 19. without any regard to their baptism in infancy. The commission commands all men to be baptized on believing the gospel. Had there been even a divinely appointed baptism for them in infancy, it cannot interfere with this baptism, nor excuse from obedience to the command that enjoins believers to be baptized. The command of Jesus to every believer to be baptized stands engraven in indelible characters in this commission. Till the trumpet sounds for judgment, it cannot be effaced. I call on all believers, on their allegiance to the Son of God, to submit to this ordinance of his kingdom. Heaven and earth will pass away, before it shall cease to be a duty for believers to be baptized. I maintain that it is impossible for any explanation, or any express command for another baptism, to excuse them from this. Is there any power on earth to abrogate this command? Who can alter it, or substitute another baptism for it? Till the end of the world, it will remain a duty for all believers to be baptized. Who is he that dares to substitute infant baptism for the baptism of believers? Whoever he is, he is the man who, by his tradition, makes void the law of God. Our Lord charged the traditions of the Pharisees, not only as the commandments of men in the things of God, but also as making void the commandments of God. He alleged one instance in which the command of God was made void by the traditions of the Pharisees. God has commanded the children to support their parents if they need it; but the Pharisees, by an invention of their own, eluded this command. Just so with infant baptism. It has usurped the place of believer baptism; and, as far as it is received, sets the ordinance of God aside altogether. So it happens, that this great law of the kingdom, that Jesus has connected so prominently with the truth itself; this ordinance, that, in so lively a manner, exhibits that truth in a figure to be observed immediately after its reception, is now generally set aside. Believer baptism is virtually abolished, and expressly explained as fit only for the first reception of Christianity in every country. Why, my brethren, do ye make void the law of God by your traditions?

But Dr Wardlaw will say, "the reply to this is simple and satisfactory." "Suppose," says he, "the ordinance of *circumcision* had been to continue, and the command had run in these terms:—

‘Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations, *circumcising* them in the name of the Father,’ &c. Had such language been used, we should have known that children were to be the subjects of the prescribed rite, as well as their parents: the previously existing practice would have ascertained this.” I deny it, Dr Wardlaw. I will not be driven from my position by *circumcision* more than by *baptism*. Had such a commission been given to *circumcise*, it would have excluded infants utterly. Could a command to circumcise believers, include a command to circumcise any but believers? This is impossible. No matter what was the former practice with respect to circumcision. If the apostles are commanded to circumcise believers, they cannot, in virtue of that commission, circumcise any but believers. I will say, also, that if we met in another part of Scripture, a command to circumcise the infants of believers, it would not be included in the apostolical commission. A command to circumcise believers, can extend to none but believers. But Dr Wardlaw will say, we know that the Jews did circumcise infants. We do indeed know this; but are we to do every thing that was enjoined on the Jews? This commission to circumcise believers, would exclude the circumcision of infants; because it extends to none but believers. The Jewish practice as to circumcision, could not shew what must be the Christian practice as to this rite, had it been appointed as a Christian ordinance. And no practice could reduce infant circumcision to a commission enjoining believer circumcision. I stand then to my position as well if a Jewish ordinance is adopted, as if a new ordinance is introduced. A command to believers to observe any ordinance whatever, can never imply any but believers. This is as clear as the light of heaven. It is a first truth. The denial of it implies a contradiction. “Would they,” (the apostles) says Dr Wardlaw, “certainly have inferred from it, that, although the *same rite* was to continue, there was to be a change in the *subjects* of it?” There is no need of any *inference* on the subject. That believers, in such a supposed commission, are the only subjects of the rite enjoined on believers, would be self-evident to all who are capable of understanding the terms. What inconsistency would they see in the continuation of the same rite, while the subjects of it were changed? Had the Paschal Lamb been continued instead of the Lord’s Supper, would it imply that all who among the Jews eat the passover, should eat it among Christians?

Suppose the government gives orders to the colonel of a regiment,

to fill up a certain company with men six feet high. The colonel sends out his recruiting officers with instructions accordingly. When the recruits are brought to the standard, they are found in general to measure only five feet eight inches. Have the recruiting officers fulfilled their commission? Did not the instructions that mentioned six feet high as the standard, forbid all under that measure to be enlisted? It is not possible to bring into the commission any who came short of that measure. What can justify those who have been guilty of such a neglect of orders? What can screen them from the displeasure of their colonel? They have wasted the king's money, they have suffered the time appointed to elapse, and what is worst of all, they have disobeyed orders. But a flippant recruiting sergeant, instructed by Dr Wardlaw, stands forward in his defence. "Stop a little, Colonel, I will prove to you that our conduct is entirely justifiable. Nay, except you had positively forbidden us to enlist any under six feet, we were warranted to conclude that we were not limited. It is true, that our commission mentions six feet as the standard, but did we not know that in the company for which we were enlisting, there have hitherto always been many men not more than five feet eight. Now, good colonel, were we not bound, in interpreting your instructions, to avail ourselves of our previous knowledge of the practice in the company? I can assure you also, colonel, that we have the sanction of the Independent churches for this way of reasoning, though they profess the strictest adherence to the Scriptures. Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw explain their Lord's commission to baptize, in the very way in which we have explained our commission to enlist. If they treat the commission of the Lord of heaven in that way, it surely cannot be blameable in us to treat your commission in a similar manner. We reasoned from the former practice, and thought from this, that we were not bound to what was specified in our orders." "You thought, Sir," says the colonel, "you reasoned! Who authorised you to reason on the subject? Your business, Sir, was to obey. Your orders were so plain that they could not be mistaken. You had no right to reason, whether you would obey them or neglect them. Your conduct is unsoldierly, and would subvert all discipline. Drop your swords, take up your muskets, and return to the ranks." And does Dr Wardlaw expect a "well done, good and faithful servant," for conduct that would degrade a recruiting sergeant? Cease, Dr Wardlaw, to pervert the word of the Lord: cease to teach his children how to evade his injunctions: cease to

justify as an institution of Christ, the inventions of men: cease to force a commission enjoining the baptism of believers, to sanction the baptism of infants: cease to loose the subjects of Jesus from the first law of his kingdom.

With reference to Mark xvi. 16, Mr Ewing says, "From this text some infer, that a person must actually believe, else he cannot be baptized. With as much reason they might infer, that a person must actually believe, else he cannot be saved." Certainly; if there were no way of saving children but by the gospel, this conclusion would be inevitable. The gospel saves none but by faith. But the gospel has nothing to do with infants, nor have gospel ordinances any respect to them. The gospel has to do with those who hear it. It is good news; but to infants it is not news at all. They know nothing of it. The salvation of the gospel is as much confined to believers, as the baptism of the gospel is. None shall ever be saved by the gospel who do not believe it. Consequently, by the gospel no infant can be saved. It is expressly, with respect to such as hear it, that the gospel is here said to be salvation by faith, and condemnation by unbelief. "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." Here the salvation and the condemnation respect those to whom the gospel comes. Infants are saved by the death of Christ, but not by the gospel—not by faith. Adults are saved by faith, not from the virtue of faith, but it is of faith that it might be by grace. Infants who enter heaven must be regenerated, but not by the gospel. Infants must be sanctified for heaven, but not through the truth as revealed to man. We know nothing of the means by which God receives saved infants: nor have we any business with it. The salvation that the gospel proclaims to the world, is a salvation through the belief of the truth, and none have this salvation without faith. The nations who have not heard the gospel, cannot be saved by the gospel, because the gospel is salvation only through faith in it. They are not condemned by the gospel; for it is condemnation only to those who do not believe it. To them it is neither a benefit, nor an injury. They will be judged, as we are assured in the Scriptures, according to the law written on the heart. I admit, then, that the salvation of the Apostolic commission, is as much confined to believers, as the baptism of that commission is confined to such. The man who would preach infant salvation out of the Apostolic commission, or attempt to prove, that the commission

may be explained so as to include it, I would gainsay, on the same ground on which I resist the attempts to include in it infant baptism. None can be saved by the gospel, but such as believe the gospel: none can be baptized with the baptism of the gospel, but such as believe the gospel. There is no exception to either.

But that believers only can be baptized by this commission, is clear from that *into* which they are said to be baptized: "Baptizing them *into* the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." It is into the faith and subjection of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that men are to be baptized. Surely none can be baptized into the faith and subjection of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but adults. Infants cannot believe, nor express subjection. About the glorious doctrine imported in these words, we have no dispute. On this all important point, we have one mind. And I joyfully profess that I embrace as brethren in Christ all who are united with me in that doctrine, and the truths imported in it. While, therefore, I use the surgical knife with an unsparing hand, to remove the morbid parts of the reasoning of my brethren, I love them for their love to that truth; and I cut only to heal. The agreement, as to the mode and subjects of this ordinance, that I have with the Arian Baptists, I esteem as nothing. My brethren love the thing imported by baptism, while I lament that they spend so much zeal in endeavouring to establish a baptism not instituted by Christ. In doing so, they injure thousands and thousands of their brethren, and cannot but injure themselves. It is impossible to fight against God on any point, without being wounded. I acknowledge I was long in the same transgression. Many infants have I sprinkled; but if I know my own heart, I would not now pour water into a child's face in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, for the globe on which I stand. Ah! my brethren, it is an awful thing to do in the Lord's name, that which the Lord has not appointed. Who has required this at your hands? You may explain, and reason, and suppose, but, till the trumpet sounds, you will never force this commission to include your baptism of infants. You may conjure up difficulties to perplex the weak: your ingenuity may invent subterfuges that may cover error. But you will never find an inch of solid ground on which to rest the sole of your foot. Your work will never be done. You are rolling the stone of Sisyphus, and the farther you push it up hill, with the greater force will it rebound on your own heads. The labours of Hercules are but an

amusement compared with your task. Ingenuity may put a false system plausibly together. But no ingenuity can give it the solidity and life of the truth. It may satisfy as long as persons do not inquire deeply and earnestly into the question. But it will not satisfy when the mind begins to say, "Lord, what wouldst thou have me to do?"

That believers only are included in the baptism of this commission, is clear also from the command to teach the baptized: "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." Here the persons baptized are supposed to be capable of being taught the other ordinances enjoined by Christ. Children then cannot be included.

Never was a commission more definite. Never was a commission violated with less excuse of ambiguity. Yet the arrogance of human wisdom has totally reversed the ordinance here enjoined. It has ordered infants to be baptized, who, by the very terms of this commission, are excluded from this baptism: and it leaves unbaptized, believers whom only Jesus hath commanded to be baptized. Is not this the very Spirit of Antichrist? Christians, how long will ye suffer yourselves to be deluded by the inventions of the mother of harlots? How long will you observe the inventions of men as the institutions of God? Will the antichristian leaven never be purged out of the churches of Christ? Why will ye deprive yourselves of the edification and comfort to be derived from the true ordinances of your Lord? Why will ye continue to seek evasions with respect to a law that is designed to enrich you? Why tarry ye, my brethren? arise and be baptized, and wash away your sins, calling on the name of the Lord. As long as ye remain ignorant of this ordinance, much of the treasures of divine knowledge are locked up from you.

The baptism of John was in two points essentially different from the baptism of the Apostolic commission. But in mode and subjects it was perfectly coincident. John did not baptize into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: he did not baptize into the faith of Christ as come, but as about to be made manifest. As far, however, as concerns our subject, the two baptisms corresponded. Let us then examine the evidence to be derived from the baptism of John. "John did baptize in the wilderness, and preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins. And there went out unto him all the land of Judea, and they of Jerusalem, and were all baptized of him in the river of Jordan,

confessing their sins," Mark i. 4. Here we see John's baptism was a baptism of repentance, in order to remission of sins. It could not, then, include infants who cannot repent, and whose sins, when they die in infancy, are not remitted on repentance, arising from the belief of the truth, but through the blood of Christ, applied in a way of which we can learn nothing from the Scriptures; and with which we have no concern. Some, indeed, reply, that it is not impossible for God to give faith to infants. Dr Dwight himself says, that John the Baptist had faith from the womb. If John the Baptist was a man when he was a child, Dr Dwight in this is a child when he is a man. It is astonishing how silly wise men will become, when they attempt to force the word of God. It must be a divine judgment, that when his servants use his word as an instrument to lead his people astray, the Lord gives them up to speak foolishly, so as to put them to shame. Infants have faith! Where does their faith go, when they begin to speak? Can they have faith without knowledge? And did any one ever hear of the knowledge of infants? But this observation is founded on deep ignorance. It proceeds on the supposition, that as faith is necessary to the salvation of adults, it is necessary in infants also. The necessity of faith to salvation, they must consider as a necessity of nature, and not a necessity of divine appointment. They suppose that God himself cannot save infants, without giving them that faith that he requires of all who hear the gospel. Now, there is no such necessity. Faith is necessary to those who hear the gospel, because God has absolutely required it. But it is not at all necessary to infants, because he hath not required it in infants. The atonement through the blood of Christ is the same to infants as to believers; but it is not applied to them in the same way. John the Baptist is not said to have had faith when an infant. He is said indeed to be sanctified from the womb, but this was not a sanctification through belief of the truth. Adults are sanctified by faith, but infants are not sanctified by faith. If infants believe, we would hear them, as soon as they begin to speak, talking of the things of God, without any teaching from the parents, or the Scriptures. Was ever any such thing heard? Can there be any surer evidence, on the very face of the question, that the Scriptures know nothing of infant baptism, than that the wisest of its defenders should utter absurdities so monstrous in order to prove it? But were we even to grant that John the Baptist had this infant faith, does it follow that all the children of believers have it also? Is it

not mentioned as a thing extraordinary, that John was sanctified from the womb? Let them baptize none in infancy, but such as they have reason to believe are sanctified from the womb. I will go farther. Had God made faith necessary to the salvation of infants, and had he appointed to give faith to dying infants, this would not imply that he gives faith to those who live. Were this the case, they would all be believers before they hear the gospel. I am sure Christian parents cannot receive such doctrine. They know that their children are ignorant of God, till, by the hearing of the gospel, he shines into their heart to give them the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. Can any absurdity exceed that of the opinion that infants are baptized on the supposition that they have faith? If it can be fairly made out that the circumstance of being born of Christian parents is evidence that infants have faith from the womb, I have no objection to baptize them. To defend infant baptism on this ground, is virtually to give it up. It acknowledges the necessity of faith in order to baptism; but outrages common sense, in order to find it in infants, when they are born. Christians, is the man worthy of a hearing, who tells you that infants have faith as soon as they come into this world; yea, and before they come into the world? Can such nonsense be worthy of refutation? No, were it not that the names under which such absurdities are ushered into the world, have a weight with the public, these arguments would be unworthy even of being mentioned.

The baptism of John was not only a baptism on repentance for remission of sins, it was also a baptism in which sins were confessed. He baptized them in the river of Jordan, *confessing* their sins. Now infant faith will not do without infant confession. Can infants confess their sins? If not, they were not baptized by John. It was the perception of this difficulty that first appointed sponsors, who believe, and repent, and confess for the infant. Unhappily our Independent brethren have not this resource.

The points in which John's baptism differed from that of Christ, may be seen, Acts xix. 1. "And it ^acame to pass, that, while Apollos was at Corinth, Paul having passed through the upper coasts, came to Ephesus; and finding certain disciples, he said unto them, Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed? And they said unto him, We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost. And he said unto them, Unto what then were ye baptized? And they said, Unto John's baptism. Then said

Paul, John verily baptized with the baptism of repentance, saying unto the people, that they should believe on him which should come after him, that is, on Christ Jesus. When they heard this, they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus." Here we see that John did not baptize into the name of the Holy Ghost, for they did not know that this distinction in the Godhead exists. Besides, John baptized into the faith of the Messiah about to be manifested: Christ's baptism must confess that Jesus is the Christ. This is an essential difference. Accordingly, "when they heard this, they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus." John's baptism did not serve for Christ's baptism. Human wisdom will correct the Scriptures here, and because it cannot see why John's baptism will not serve for Christ's, the words have been tortured to make them say, that they were baptized into Christ by being baptized by John. No ground, however, can be found in the passage for this conceit. No force can extract it from the words. It is man's scripture—not God's.

John's baptism, then, did not serve for Christ's. If so, infant baptism, even if such a thing had been instituted by Christ, would not serve for the baptism in Christ's commission, which is believer baptism. Paul baptized the disciples of John the Baptist, because they had not been baptized into the faith of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and because they had been baptized only in the faith of the Messiah to come. Surely then, they who are baptized in infancy upon any pretence whatever, must be baptized when they come to the faith of the gospel.

But if John's baptism implied repentance and confession of sin, how could Jesus submit to it? This apparent inconsistency struck John himself so forcibly, that he even presumed to forbid him. "But John forbade him, saying, I have need to be baptized of thee; and comest thou to me?" Jesus did not deny this personally, he had no sins to confess; yet still there was a propriety in his submitting to the baptism of repentance. "And Jesus answering, said unto him, Suffer it to be so now: for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness." It was necessary for Jesus to observe all the divine institutions incumbent on his people. But if this was necessary, there must be a propriety in the thing itself. It must not be to Christ an unmeaning ceremony. If he submits to the baptism of repentance, there must be a point of view in which it suits him. And what is that point of view? Evidently that, though he is himself holy, harmless, and undefiled; yet, as one with us, he

is defiled. Just as, by our oneness with him, we can say, "who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect?" by his being one with us, he can confess himself a sinner. The oneness of Christ and his people, then, is not a figurative way of speaking. It is a solid and consoling truth. By it we die in Christ's death, and are acquitted as innocent; by it Christ is made sin for us, who, in his own person, knew no sin. Christ's baptism, then, is no exception from what is implied in John's baptism. It has the same meaning, as well as the same figure to him as to us. In Christ's being buried in the waters of Jordan, we have a figure of the way in which he was acquitted from the debt he took on him. It represented his death, burial, and resurrection. If we are guilty by being one with Adam, Christ was in like manner guilty by becoming one with us. The object of John's baptism was exhibited in the immersion of Jesus.

It is odd, however, in what a different light the same evidence strikes different people. In the account of the baptism of John, I can see nothing but the immersing of persons professing repentance: Mr Ewing sees with equal clearness, that the business was done by pouring water on the turned up face; and that infants were *popped* as well as their parents. Really it is strange, if the words of the Spirit are like an oracle of Delphi, that can be interpreted in two opposite senses.

Upon what ground can Mr Ewing conclude, from this account, that John baptized infants? Here is the proof, and surely it is demonstration itself. "Consider," says Mr Ewing, "the very general and comprehensive terms in which the people are said to have come to be baptized, Matt. iii. 5, 6; 'Then went out to him Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, and were baptized of him in Jordan, confessing their sins.' This account," says he, "most naturally admits the supposition, that the inhabitants of those places came, usually at least, with their families." The account does not import even this. If the whole question depended on the presence of a child, the history could not prove it. But what if it could be proved that children accompanied their parents? Would this prove their baptism? "*The general and comprehensive terms.*" How are the terms general and comprehensive? Are they so general and comprehensive, as to include infants? They are not so, Mr Ewing. However numerous they were, they all confessed their sins. "The disciples," says Mr Ewing, "there went out to meet John, as the disciples at Tyre did to take farewell

of Paul." Who told you so, Mr Ewing? This is apocryphal. Even this you cannot learn from the history. And if it were expressly stated, it would not serve you. How easily is Mr Ewing satisfied with proof, when it is on a certain side of the question! The whole Greek language could not produce a phrase that his criticism would admit as conclusive evidence of *immersion*. But that infants were present with their parents at John's baptism, and baptized along with them, he admits without evidence, with the docility of a child. If his obstinacy is invincible on some points, he makes ample amends by his pliancy in others. No man was ever more easily satisfied with proof of his own opinions.

"The same latitude of language," says Mr Ewing, "is always used respecting the administration of baptism by the disciples of Christ, John iii. 25, 26, 'There arose a question between some of John's disciples and the Jews about purifying. And they came unto John, and said unto him, Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou barest witness, behold the same baptizeth, and all come to him.' John iv. 1-3, 'When therefore the Lord knew how the Pharisees had heard that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John, (though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples,) he left Judea, and departed again into Galilee.'" Now, reader, is there any thing here about the subject of infant baptism? Is it not mere dreaming, to quote these passages in proof that Jesus baptized infants? Yet, in Mr Ewing's estimation, this is proof. "The two foregoing passages," says he, "evidently imply that baptism was dispensed in the same extensive manner, by the disciples of Christ, as it was by John the Baptist." There is no doubt but John's baptism and Christ's were equally extensive. But is this proof that either of them extended to infants? The passages import, that a great multitude came for baptism both to John and to Christ; but that infants were brought for baptism, is not hinted. On the contrary, those baptized by John, are baptized on a confession of sin; and it is said that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John. The disciples of Jesus, then, baptized while he was with them, *disciples* only.

But not only does Mr Ewing find infants baptized by John; he also makes provision for them in the apostolical commission itself. Now, really if he can do this, I will not despair of proof for transubstantiation. Well, let us hear him. "We have to add," says Mr Ewing, "that there is ample room for supposing family baptism to be included in the comprehensive terms of our Saviour's final

commission, Matt. xxviii. 18." *Room*, aye, "ample room." I have measured it, and I maintain, that, if there is truth in axioms, there is not room for infants in this commission. How is the language of this commission comprehensive? Does Mr Ewing find a place for the infants in the *all nations*? I cannot persuade myself that this is the refuge which he has provided for them. Does he deny that it is *disciples* that the commission enjoins to be baptized? Does he make infants *disciples*? Does he deny that the commission, as recorded by Mark, makes the disciples in Matthew xxviii. believers? Why did not Mr Ewing shew how this commission comprehends infants? Why did he pass over this with a mere assertion? If he could do this, he certainly would not have concealed the process by which he has come to the conclusion. That commission commands believers to be baptized; and except both sides of a contradiction may be true, it can never include unbelievers. "When we consider," says Mr Ewing, "how many things there are which Jesus himself did, which are not written in the gospel histories, (John xx. 30, and xxi. 25,) we cannot wonder at the brevity of the accounts of the subordinate *practice* of the disciples in dispensing baptism to believers and their houses." But does Mr Ewing suppose that we are so unreasonable, as to look for long histories of all instances of infant baptism, on the supposition that it was practised? We look for no such thing. Were they included in the commission, we would not look for a single example in practice. And if there was an instance of the baptism of but one newly born child, we would esteem it as valid as a million; valid, however, not to prove that infants are included in the commission,—for nothing could prove this,—but valid to prove another baptism, not interfering with the baptism of believers. Were a thousand baptisms found in the New Testament, they could not all serve for the baptism of the commission; nor relieve the believer from his obligation of being baptized on the belief of the truth. John's baptism, we have seen, could not serve for the baptism of the apostolical commission.

Though, therefore, no evidence could convince me that it is possible to reduce infant baptism to the commission, I am willing to examine the practice of the apostles, to find whether they used another baptism with respect to the infants of believers. I have no hope that we shall find any such thing; for the apostle tells us that there is but one baptism, as well as one faith. Let us try, then, whether the apostle has told the truth in this matter; and whether his practice give the lie to his assertion.

How did the apostle Peter preach baptism on the day of Pentecost? Did he preach infant baptism? No, he preached a baptism connected with repentance for the remission of sins. Let us hear the account given of his doctrine on this subject by the Holy Spirit, Acts ii. 38; "Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." Here baptism is connected with repentance and remission of sins. This baptism, then, cannot extend to infants. If infants have a baptism, it must be essentially different from this,—more different than John's baptism is from Christ's. Well, a number of them did repent, and were baptized. But were any infants baptized with them? Not a word of this. "Then they that gladly received his word were baptized." This does not express infants, nor can it include them. No explanation could make this account extend to infants. It may be said, that it is possible that infants were baptized at the same time. This is possible, just in the same way that it is possible that the apostles administered honey and milk to the baptized persons. It is not in evidence, either expressly, or by implication. Infants are excluded out of the number who are said to be baptized; because they only are said to have been baptized, who received the word gladly.

The next account of baptism occurs in Acts viii. 12, "But when they believed Philip preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God, and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women." Here, also, only they who believed are said to have been baptized. But it is remarkable, that the account specifies *women*.

Had the account said nothing of women, yet it would have included them as believers; and the commission would have extended to them. But to make the thing palpably clear, women are not only included, but expressly included. Now, is it not remarkable that the Holy Spirit should be so precise as to women, yet not say a word of infants? This is unaccountable, if they were baptized. How many volumes of controversy would the addition of a word have prevented! How liberal was the Spirit of Inspiration as to the information about the baptism of women! But on the supposition that infants were baptized, how parsimonious with respect to the baptism of infants!

The baptism of Simon proceeded on the supposition of his faith; and though he was not renewed in the spirit of his mind, he was

baptized on the same ground with all others. "Then Simon himself believed also: and when he was baptized," &c. The baptism of the eunuch was on the same principle. These examples illustrate the commission, as requiring baptism on the belief of the truth. True, indeed, it is possible that faith might be required in adults and not in infants. But the former is the only baptism included in the commission, and the only baptism that these examples illustrate.

The baptism of Paul, Acts xxii. 16, shews that baptism is a figure, applicable only to those who are washed from their sins. "Be baptized, and wash away thy sins." Paul's sins were already washed away, by faith in the blood of Christ. Yet he is commanded here to wash them away in baptism. This shews that baptism is a figure of washing away sins, with respect to those who are already washed. To infants, it can be no such figure. Even if all the infants of all believers, were assuredly to be brought to the knowledge of the truth, yet this is not done in infancy. Infant baptism, then, and believer baptism, are not the same ordinance. To the former, it would be a sign that their sins would hereafter be washed away; to the latter, that their sins were already, by faith, washed away. But who will say that there is any evidence that all the children of all believers will ever come to the knowledge of the truth?

But surely the households will settle the business. Here is a word comprehensive enough for including infants. This battery, then, we cannot take. Well, I once talked of the households myself, and sheltered myself here as long as I could fire a gun. But my own conscience obliged me to give up the battery at last. I maintain that it is impossible to defend the cause of infant baptism by this battery. It cannot point one gun on the enemy. Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw have made the best of it, yet their fire is quite harmless. The noise of their guns may startle the inexperienced soldier; but if he can command as much nerve as will enable him to examine the direction of their fire, he will soon get under it. I shall begin with Dr Wardlaw.

"In the first place, then," says Dr Wardlaw, "there is one point of fact undeniably clear, namely, that the Apostles baptized *households* or *families*." Granted; but it is as clear that these were *believing households*. This fact signifies nothing. A household may include infants, and it may not include them. It cannot, then, give evidence on this point. In such a case, the extent of

the baptism must be determined by the commission. Nay, if I were assured that there were infants in every one of the households, I would with equal confidence deny that they were baptized. According to the commission, they could not be baptized. And such phraseology always admits exceptions, with respect to those known to be excluded from the thing spoken of. When I say that such a man and his family dined with me, I am known not to include infants. In like manner, as the baptism of the commission cannot possibly extend to infants, even if they had been present in the families, they are not included among the baptized. I will go a step farther. I will suppose, for sake of argument, that the Apostles did baptize infants; even then, I will deny that the infants were baptized according to the commission. It must have been a different baptism, and would not prevent the same infants from being baptized with believer baptism, as soon as they should believe. Now, try, Dr Wardlaw, to make your guns bear upon me. *If you prove one instance of infant baptism, I will baptize infants; but a million of such examples, would not set aside believer baptism.*

“It should be noticed too,” says Dr Wardlaw, “that a man’s house, (*οικος*,) most properly means his children, his offspring, his descendants,—and is generally used to denote these even exclusively.” This word as properly, both from its origin and use, includes all domestics as children. It properly signifies all the residents in a house. It is capable, indeed, of being limited to descendants, when the connexion or known circumstances require it. It is therefore very often used with respect to them exclusively. It is also often used to denote, not only descendants, but ancestors and collateral relations. But in all these instances, it does not mean residents at all. The passages to which Dr Wardlaw refers, respect descendants without respect to abode, 1 Kings xiv. 10, &c. That it also with equal propriety includes all domestics, is clear from its use, 1 Kings iv. 7, v. 9, &c. It must then be the connexion or circumstances, that, in each occurrence of the word, will declare its extent. I will allow Dr Wardlaw to limit it, when, from the connexion or circumstances, he proves his limitation. He must likewise allow me to limit it by the same principles. If it may, by the connexion or circumstances, be limited to descendants, it may also be limited to adults, by the necessity arising from the commission.

Dr Wardlaw, in reasoning on these households, seems to forget

the difference between answering an objection and founding an argument. *It may be so*, is enough to establish any thing as an answer to an objection; *it may not be so*, is enough to overturn it as an argument. When I attempt to prove believer baptism, I must produce arguments to establish it, and my opponent will succeed, if he can shew that these arguments do not establish my point. In obviating an objection, I succeed, if I can shew that there is any way of understanding it consistently with my doctrine. Now, with respect to the households, we merely stand on the defensive. It is our business to reply to the objection grounded on this fact. As our opponents use the fact as an argument, they must prove that their doctrine is in it. It is enough for us to prove, that this fact is consistent with our doctrine. If they do not prove that infant baptism is necessarily here, the passage is useless to them. If we prove that infant baptism is not necessarily here, we have all we wish. Now, with respect to οἶκος, *house*, it is enough for our purpose, that the word may include all domestics. But it is not enough for them, to shew that the word may signify descendants exclusively, unless they shew a necessary limitation, from the connexion or circumstances.

But as concerns the point in debate, I care not that it was established that οἶκος applies to descendants only. I will still limit it farther by the commission to adults. Even one of the passages referred to by Dr Wardlaw himself, might have taught him this. "One that ruleth well his own house," 1 Tim. iii. 4. The nature of the thing asserted, determines it to apply to adults only, or at least to children capable of government. Newly born infants are excluded. I require no more, in repelling the objection from the households. As the ruling of a house cannot apply to infants newly born, so the baptizing of a house cannot refer to any in the house, but such as come under the commission. Common sense every day makes the necessary limitations in such indefinite forms of speech. It is only the perverse spirit of controversy, that finds any difficulty in them.

"*Secondly*," says Dr Wardlaw, "To an unprejudiced reader of the New Testament, it must, I think, be equally clear, that the baptism of families is mentioned in a way that indicates its being no *extraordinary* occurrence,—but a *thing of course*." The baptism of households was just as common a thing as the faith of households, and nothing more so. Both were evidently, in the days of the Apostles, very common. That the baptism of a household was as

a matter of course on the faith of the head of it, without the faith of the family, there is not the slightest appearance. We are, indeed, informed of the baptism of Lydia's house, without being informed of their faith. But that they had faith, the commission leaves no doubt. The narrative tells us that the house of Crispus believed, but it does not tell us that they were baptized, Acts xviii. 8. We know, however, that they were baptized, because the commission enjoins it. In like manner, when we are told that Lydia's house were baptized, we know that they believed, because the commission warrants the baptism of none but believers.

Instead of stating that the baptism of Lydia's house was a thing of course on her faith, without theirs, the narrative states, as a piece of important information, that ought to be a lesson to every age, that baptism is so closely connected with the belief of the truth, that not only Lydia herself, but her whole family, were baptized, before she invited the Apostle to partake of her hospitality. "And when she was baptized, and her household, she besought us, saying, If ye have judged me to be faithful to the Lord, come into my house, and abide there. And she constrained us." The work of the Lord was first attended to, and then attention to the Apostle.

That Lydia had any children, either infants or adults, is not in evidence; and therefore, as her house may have exclusively consisted of servants, the fact can never serve the cause of infant baptism. Indeed, from the way in which she speaks of *her* house, and from her being a stranger on business in that place, there is reason to believe that her family consisted solely of servants. But I will not build any thing on even the highest probabilities. I will lay no stone in my building, that time will corrode. I care not that she had no servants; her baptized house must be believers, because the Apostle had no authority to baptize others. I care not that she had infants of a week old; they could not be included, and the form of the expression does not require that they should be included. When it is said that a certain nobleman "believed himself, and his whole house," John iv. 53, does it imply that there were no infants in his house? Does it not evidently refer to those in his house who were capable of believing, and to all such in his house? When it is said that Cornelius "feared God, with all his house," is it necessary to assert that there could have been no infants under his roof? Surely not. Why, then, is it supposed that

the baptism of households should imply the baptism of infants, who, by the commission, are excluded ?

“*Thirdly,*” says Dr Wardlaw, “Having thus the unquestionable fact of the *baptism of families*,—a fact according with the ancient practice of the circumcision of families, and supported by the use of a word that properly denotes a man’s children or offspring; we are warranted to assume, that such was the usual practice.”

Here Dr Wardlaw shifts the ground of his argument, and very conveniently takes for granted the thing to be proved. What is the unquestionable fact in his past observations? *The baptism of families*. This is unquestionable, because it is expressly said. But what is the thing that is unquestionable? Why, that the word household is so applied. Is it unquestionable that the household were baptized, not on account of their own faith, but on account of the faith of the head of the family? No; this is not unquestionable. This is the point in debate. But this is what Dr Wardlaw’s third observation takes as unquestionable. If it is not unquestionable in this sense, it is nothing to his purpose. It does not accord with the ancient practice of the circumcision of families. If the household believed and were baptized, it does not accord with the circumcision of a family without any regard to faith. Dr Wardlaw must take for granted his own sense of the phrase; and when this is granted to him, he will very easily prove his point. If it is granted as a thing unquestionable, that unbelieving families were baptized, as unbelieving families might be circumcised, the debate is at an end. But Dr Wardlaw must prove his meaning of the phrase, before he takes it for granted.

We are indeed warranted to assume, that it was the usual practice to baptize every family that believed. But from the baptism of a thousand families, we are not warranted to conclude the baptism of every family when the head of it believed. The baptism of one family will prove that all families in the same circumstances ought to be baptized. This is the turning point of the argument. If we read that a man and his whole family were hanged for murder, this will prove that every family that joins with the head of it in committing murder, ought to be hanged. But it will not prove that every family ought to be hanged with the father, when he is guilty of murder. If Lydia’s family were baptized on account of her faith, having none of their own, it would prove what Dr Wardlaw wants; but if this is not in evidence, he cannot take it

for granted. Dr Wardlaw, you must prove that these households were baptized, not on account of their own faith, but on account of that of the head of the family. This is what you can never do. All the apparent strength of your reasoning depends on the assumption of false principles. No man is more convincing than Dr Wardlaw, if it is lawful to take for granted the thing to be proved.

Dr Wardlaw, *in the fourth place*, examines “the principles on which they endeavour to set aside the inference from the examples in question.” He thinks that they have not proved that Lydia had no children. And does Dr Wardlaw think that this proof lies upon us? He is a man of war from his youth; and has he yet to learn the laws of the combat? The proof of the fact that Lydia had children, lies on those who need the assistance of the infants. I maintain that it is not in evidence that she was ever married; and you cannot found an argument on what is not in evidence. That she may not have had a child is consistent with all that is said here. This is sufficient for my purpose. Before you can deduce an argument from this fact, you must prove not only that she had children, but infants. You must do more. I care not that she had infants, the form of the expression does not require that they were baptized, and the commission makes it certain that they were not baptized.

Dr Wardlaw has a very long, and certainly a very satisfactory discussion, shewing that the term *brethren*, in verse 40, may not refer to Lydia’s household, but all the believers of the place. Now, if our argument required us to prove, that the *brethren* here must be only Lydia’s household, we never could prove it. But our argument requires no such thing. This term can be a proof on neither side, for it is consistent with both.

“Equally futile,” says Dr Wardlaw, “are the proofs adduced, that there were no infant children in the households of the jailor, and of Stephanas.” Now, if there are any on my side of the question who think that it is necessary to prove this, I refer them to Dr Wardlaw for a most triumphant refutation of their sentiment. But did not Dr Wardlaw perceive that he was here cutting his own carotid artery? Did he not perceive that the very same arguments which prove that the language, with respect to the faith of the households of the jailor and of Stephanas, is consistent with the supposition that there might have been infants in them, equally prove that there might have been infants in them, without being baptized? When it is said with respect to the jailor, that Paul “spake the word of the Lord to all that were in his house,” I admit that there

might have been infants. And when it is said that a family were baptized, infants might have been in the house, without being included in the baptism. The commission as effectually excludes them from baptism, as their infancy excludes them from the number of those to whom the gospel is preached.

Dr Wardlaw evidently does not understand the argument that we draw from the above source. We do not attempt to prove that such phraseology is inconsistent with the supposition, that infants were in the families. But we allege these facts, to shew that if there were *baptized families*, there were also *believing families*; and that if, in a *believing house*, there may be unbelieving infants, so in a *baptized house*, there may be unbaptized infants. By the very same arguments that our opponents shew that there might have been unbelieving infants in *believing houses*, we will shew that there might have been unbaptized infants in *baptized houses*. But the facts alluded to are especially important, because they apply to the very houses that are said to be baptized. This not only shews that it was possible that there might be believing houses, but it shews that there were such houses. Two of the three baptized households are expressly shewn to be believing households. If this is not said of the house of Lydia, it may have been the same; and the commission requires that it should be so. And if we are informed of the baptism of Lydia's house, and not of their faith, we are told of the faith of the house of Crispus, and not of their baptism. When we are informed of the one, the other is necessarily understood. Why do our opponents speak of their households at all? If the jailor had a baptized house, had he not a believing house? If Stephanas had a baptized house, had he not a believing house? And why may not Lydia have had a believing house? Our cause requires no more than that the baptized houses may have been believing houses. We found here no argument; we merely reply to an objection. But that two of the three baptized houses were believing houses, is actually in evidence. There is here no cover for infant baptism.

“ I add,” says Dr Wardlaw, “ as a *sixth* observation, the extreme improbability, that a change, which must have been felt so important by those whose minds had been all along habituated to the connexion of their children with themselves in the covenant of promise, should have taken place without the slightest recorded symptom of opposition or demurring.” This is a mode of reasoning utterly unwarrantable, and deserves no attention. We learn what God has enjoined from what is written. Even if the fact here

stated could not at all be accounted for, it could not be admitted as evidence. A thousand things might account for it, of which we are ignorant. Is every thing recorded that took place in the apostolic labours? Their adult children in unbelief were admitted to all Jewish ordinances; is there any recorded complaint of their exclusion from Christian ordinances? Why should they not complain, that, as all their offspring were admitted to the passover, and all the privileges of the Jewish church, they should be kept from the Lord's table? But, in fact, their zeal was for the law, and nothing would satisfy them in the room of it. Their prejudices were not at all concerned about the extent of Christian ordinances. What offended them, was the giving up of old customs. Of the extent of baptism, whatever it was, they could not be ignorant. Why then should they murmur against the known will of God? Upon the principle of this observation, there were a thousand things of which they might have complained, but of which no complaint is recorded. This takes for granted, also, that there was a spiritual connexion between the Jews and their offspring, which is the thing to be proved,—a thing which is not only not admitted to be true, but which I will prove to be false. This observation proceeds, from first to last, on false principles. It takes for granted, that every disagreeable change must have been a cause of murmuring; and if there was murmuring, it must have been recorded. There might have been a disagreeable change, the principle of which might be so well understood, as to prevent murmuring; and there might have been great murmuring without any record.

“Another remarkable circumstance,” says Dr Wardlaw, “akin to the preceding, is, that when the Judaizing teachers insisted on the Gentile converts submitting to circumcision,—although there can be no doubt that this was done, in every case, *in connexion with their children*; yet, when the doctrine and practice of these perverters of the gospel came to be discussed in the assembly of the apostles, and elders, and brethren at Jerusalem, no notice whatsoever is taken of the inconsistency with the spirituality of the new dispensation, of administering *any* sign to *children*, on the admission of their parents into the Christian commonwealth.” This is egregious trifling. Are all things recorded that were said on that occasion? Was there any need in that assembly to discuss every error connected with the circumcision of the Gentiles? By cutting off the circumcision of the Gentiles, was not the circumcision of their infants, and every error connected with it, cut off also? But such

observations, so far from deserving an answer, deserve no mention. Must the apostles give a whole body of divinity, when they denounce a particular error? Dr Wardlaw, we are willing to listen to any thing you can allege from the Scripture in support of your opinion. But such arguments merit no consideration. This observation takes it for granted, that the apostles could not condemn one error, without expressly denouncing every other error connected with it; and that we have, in the records of the Acts, every thing that was said in the celebrated meeting at Jerusalem.

“ Let it be further considered,” says Dr Wardlaw, “ that we have no recorded instance of the baptism of any person, grown to manhood, that had been born of Jewish converts, or of Gentile proselytes to the faith of Christ.” This would try the patience of Job. Is there any need of such an example, in order to shew that the children of such persons should be baptized when they believe? What difference is there between such and others? Is not the law of the commission sufficient to reach them? Is it not sufficiently clear? “ He that believeth and is baptized.” “ Nor have we,” continues Dr Wardlaw, “ in any of the apostolic epistles to the churches, the remotest allusion, in the form of direction, or of warning, to the reception of such children by baptism into the Christian church, upon their professing the faith in which they had been brought up.” A very good reason for this. The same law applies to all. There is not the smallest difference between the ground of receiving the child of a heathen, and the child of the most devoted saint. When they believe, they are received equally to every thing.

“ This supposition,” says Dr Wardlaw, “ let it be further noticed, is in coincidence with the fact of children being addressed in the apostolic epistles to the churches of Christ. Thus, in Eph. vi. 1, ‘ Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right.’ Col. iii. 20, ‘ Children, obey your parents in all things; for this is well pleasing unto the Lord.’” Now, this argument is deduced from Scripture; and it merits an answer. That answer, however, is easily found. The children here addressed, were believing members of the churches. That they may have been so, is sufficient for my purpose. This will refute an objection. But that they must have been such, is beyond question, from the address itself. Their obedience to their parents, is to be “ *in the Lord*,” which applies to believers only. The reasons of their obedience, also, shew that they were such children as were capable of faith. “ *This is right.*”—“ *This is well pleasing unto the Lord.*” These are motives quite

suitable to believers. As soon as children can evidence that they act from these principles, they ought to be baptized, and to walk in all the ordinances of the Lord.

But Dr Wardlaw thinks that the children here addressed cannot merely be such adult children as were members of the churches ; because it is immediately added, “ And ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath ; but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.”—“ Fathers, provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged.” Now, as the duty of fathers extends to all their children, Dr Wardlaw thinks that the children addressed, must be all the children capable of receiving instruction. But if he were not eager in the pursuit of something to defend his system, his powers of discrimination would discern, that in these injunctions, neither the children nor the fathers of the one injunction, correspond to the children nor the fathers of the other. In fact, it might happen that not one of either might correspond. When the apostle addresses the children, he addresses all the members of the church who had fathers ; but not one of these fathers might be in the church. When he addresses fathers, he addresses all the members of the church who had children ; but not one of those children might be in the church. So far from being necessary to suppose, that all the children of the one address are the same as the children of the other address, it is not necessary to suppose that one of them was the same. When the children are commanded to obey their parents, their obedience is not to be confined to such fathers as were believers and members of the church ; but to fathers, whatever they might be. And when fathers are commanded not to provoke their children, &c. the injunction extends to all their children. The fathers addressed may not be the fathers of the children addressed ; and the children addressed may not be the children of the fathers addressed. Surely Dr Wardlaw must be in the habit of teaching according to this distinction. I would not be so much surprised to find this indistinctness of conception in those who make no distinction between the church and the world. In the church in which I labour, there are very many children whose parents do not belong to us ; and there are some parents whose children belong to other denominations. Yet these apostolical injunctions are constantly inculcated. Children are to obey their parents in the Lord, even if these parents were infidels ; and parents are to train up their children in the nurture of the Lord, though they are not in the church.

“ Do our Baptist brethren,” says Dr Wardlaw, “ wait till their children are members of churches, before they venture to put their finger on the passages we have quoted, and say, ‘ This is addressed to you ?’ ” No man who speaks correctly, can say that Ephes. vi. 1, Col. iii. 20, are expressly directed to any but believers. But we can teach the most disobedient children their duty from these passages. Though we cannot tell unbelieving children that these exhortations were originally addressed to such as they are, but to believing children ; yet the duty inculcated is equally incumbent on all. The moral duties inculcated on believers, are equally the duty of unbelievers. The duty of obedience to parents is not a new duty, that results from connexion with a church, or with receiving the gospel. What, then, in this respect, is inculcated on believing children, equally shews the duty of unbelieving children. Dr Wardlaw will not say, that unbelieving fathers are directly addressed in the above injunctions ; yet could he not apply the injunctions, so as to make them bear upon unbelieving fathers ? Could he not urge on unbelieving fathers, their guilt in not training up their children in the nurture of the Lord ? Children, from the first dawn of reason, may be taught their duty from such passages, without falsely telling them that they were originally addressed to children as young as themselves. Now, Dr Wardlaw, of your eleven observations, this is the only one that has even a show of argument ; yet I am sure your good sense will admit that it is answered.

“ X. The circumstances of the early history of the church, after the apostolic age, are unaccountable on Anti-pædo-baptist principles.” So, Dr Wardlaw, you are returning to your old mode of reasoning from difficulties. Well, then, I will admit, for sake of argument, that the thing is unaccountable. It may be true, notwithstanding. Many things that would cast light upon this point, may be buried in the ruins of antiquity. I am not obliged to account for it. I will not neglect an ordinance of Christ, I will not adopt an ordinance not founded by Christ, from any difficulty arising from Church History. My Bible, like that of Mr Ewing, ends with the Book of Revelation.

But there is nothing more obvious to a candid mind, than the origin of the early introduction of infant baptism. As soon as baptism was looked on as essential to salvation, infant baptism would naturally follow. Dr Wardlaw, indeed, says, that we may as well suppose that the *opinion arose from the practice*, as that *the practice arose from the opinion*. It would be easy to shew that this is not the

case. But that the opinion may have given rise to the practice, is enough for my purpose. I am answering an objection, and any thing that will account for the difficulty, is sufficient. *It may have been so*, is quite enough for me. Even this much I am not bound to give. Infant communion was practised as well as infant baptism. No matter what was the origin of either of them ; if one of them is allowed to be an error, the early practice of the other cannot be alleged as proof of its truth. Even were it granted that infant communion was grafted on infant baptism, still, as it was universally received so early without having been from the Apostles, infant baptism may have been grafted on some similar stock. It is impossible to argue consistently for infant baptism from the argument of antiquity, and reject the same argument for infant communion. If infant communion was a thing not instituted by the Apostles, yet universally adopted so early, why may not any other practice have been adopted universally without apostolic institution ? The practice of the earliest antiquity, with respect to the ordinances of Christ, is a matter of much interest ; and I am convinced that the subject has never been set in that light, which the remains of antiquity would afford to candour and industry. If God spares me life and leisure, I may yet endeavour to exhibit its testimony. But an ordinance of Christ I will never ground on any thing but the word of God. Many things true, may be wholly unaccountable.

“ XI. I have only one other particular,” says Dr Wardlaw, “ to add to this series. It is the remarkable fact, of the entire absence, so far as my recollection serves me, of any thing resembling the baptism of *households* or *families*, in the accounts of the propagation of the gospel by our Baptist brethren.” Now, at first sight, this has an imposing appearance, but, on reflection, it vanishes into air. There are not now any examples of the abundant success that the gospel had in the Apostles’ days. We do not find that men now believe by households, more than that they are baptized by households. I suppose that the Baptist missionaries have a *baptized household*, as often as they have a *believing household*. They will baptize Krishnoo and his family, if Krishnoo and his family believe. I have never seen three thousand baptized on one day, yet I have no doubt that three thousand believed on the day of Pentecost.

In fact, I have never examined a series of arguments more flimsy than these. The whole chain is no better than a web of gossamer across the high-road. It cannot stop the passage of a

child. Josephus, on one occasion, took a town, by presenting a fleet before it, in which each ship had only four mariners. If any man surrenders to Dr Wardlaw's fleet, it must be from want of knowing what is in the ships. The man who can satisfy himself with such arguments as these, need never want proof of any thing which he wishes to be true.

Let us now take a look at Mr Ewing's generalship, with respect to the households. "Family baptism," says Mr Ewing, "as mentioned in the New Testament, is the more remarkable, that no other ordinance, and no privilege of any kind, is mentioned in the New Testament, as given to families." The reason is obvious. Baptism belongs to individuals, and when a household believed, it was baptized on the same footing as an individual. The Lord's Supper belongs to Christians, not as individuals, but as a church. It might as well be asked, why is baptism given to an individual, seeing the other ordinances are observed socially? Mr Ewing gives the answer to himself, in the next sentence. "Mention," says he, "is made of churches in the house of some; but it is not said that these churches consisted of a believer and his house." To this the reply is obvious. If a believer and his family were not a church, why is it strange that they had not the ordinances that belong to a church? "Neither is a believer and his house," says Mr Ewing, "ever said to have received the Lord's Supper." I reply, If they were only a part of a church, why should they have the Lord's Supper? If they were a church, they had the Lord's Supper, whether it is recorded or not. There is no necessity for any such record.

"I shall now be asked," says Mr Ewing, "if all or any of the families of believers, where the family baptism is said to have been practised, can be proved to have contained infants?" Yes, Mr Ewing, we will ask this question, and notwithstanding all you have said, we will continue to insist on this question. "I answer," says Mr Ewing, "that 'a house' or family is a term which includes, in its meaning, infants as properly as adult children; and that, in not one of these families mentioned in connexion with baptism, is any exception made, for the purpose of excluding infants." This is granted fully. But it is more difficult to conceive how such arguments can impose on a sound understanding, than it is to answer them. *House* or *family* includes infants as well as adults—if infants are in them. But from the term itself, this cannot be learned. This is the point, Mr Ewing. A house may have infants, or it

may not have infants ; therefore from the term we can learn nothing on this subject. The eunuch, no doubt, had a house ; and if his house had been said to be baptized, Mr Ewing would not contend, that his infants were of necessity baptized. We would know, without any intimation, that the term house did not include his children. Just so from the commission, we know that infants are not included among those who were baptized in the households. The commission is as sure a commentary on the households of Lydia, Stephanas, and the jailor, as the state of the eunuch would have been in a like case. But Mr Ewing says, infants are not excepted in these households. Nor are they excepted in the supposed case of the eunuch. There is no need for the history to except them. They are excepted by that commission that must guide all practice. It is a matter of the highest astonishment to me, that Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw can see the necessity of an exception in so many other cases to such indefinite phrases, and yet not have the candour to admit the possibility of a like exception here. If the commission does not include infants, are they not of necessity excluded with respect to the households ? Can any thing be more obvious to common sense, than that as a house or family may or may not have infants, the baptism of a house is no proof that infants were baptized ? Can any thing be more obvious, than that as we every day use such phraseology with the supposed exceptions, there may be such exceptions as to the households ? Even if infants were proved to have been in those houses, it would signify nothing. The phraseology admits the exception of them, and the commission demands it. The pertinacity with which our opponents continue to rest on the households, is a discredit to their good sense, as well as their candour. There is no axiom in mathematics more clear, than that the households are nothing to the purpose of infant baptism. *If the term household does not necessarily imply infants, then there is no evidence from the term that there were infants in those households.* Again, *as such phraseology is, in daily conversation, used with exceptions ; so, though infants had been in those households, the known limitations of the commission would except them.* This is as obvious as that two and two make four. It is useless to reason with any who are so perverse as to deny what is self-evident. Their disease cannot be cured by argument. When Mr Ewing says, that in the narrative of the households there is no “exception made for the purpose of excluding infants,” it is virtually admitted, that such phraseology admits exceptions. If so,

may not the exception in the commission be as valid as an exception in the history? Nay, the exception of the commission makes an exception in the history perfectly unnecessary. The commission enjoins the baptism of believers, and from that baptism all others are therefore for ever excluded. When a household were baptized according to this commission, they must have been believers. The commission cannot be extended farther. Nay, if a commission had afterwards been given to baptize infants, it could never be reduced to this commission. It could not have been explained as included in it, nor a part of it. It would be a perfectly distinct commission, containing a quite different ordinance. Till infants are believers, they can never be baptized according to a commission that enjoins the baptism of believers. If there is a commission to enlist recruits six feet high, when we afterwards read that a family were enlisted, without specifying their height, we know that none of them were under the standard. Were it not for the strength of prejudice, this form of expression could not for a moment embarrass the weakest of the children of God.

“If a man and his family are degraded,” says Mr Ewing, “does not the degradation include infants? If a man and his family are ennobled, does not the nobility include infants?” It does so, not from the necessity of the phraseology, but from what is known of the laws. Were it said that a man and his family were hanged for murder, his infants would be excluded. Were it said that after a rebellion a man and his family received the thanks of his Majesty for their loyalty, it would not be supposed that the infants had carried arms. “If a man and his family,” says Mr Ewing, “are baptized, does not the language convey a similar meaning, namely, that the baptism includes infants?” No, Mr Ewing, because it is known from the commission that infants are not included: whereas in the other cases, it is known that infants are included. In neither case can we learn the extent of the application of the phrase from the phrase itself. It is indefinite, and may include all, or may admit exceptions.

“In calculating,” says Mr Ewing, “as some do, the probability of the case, many confine their attention to the four families mentioned in Acts x. Acts xvi. and 1 Cor. i.” Calculating probability! Is a law of God to depend on a calculation of probabilities? I would as soon calculate nativities by the stars. “But these,” he continues, “are only a specimen of the hundreds and thousands of families, which, in the propagation of the gospel, were treated in the

same way." Who told this to Mr Ewing? Has he got it in a dream, or in a vision? If Mr Ewing has not facts enough from which he may reason, he can make them. There may have been many other households of the same kind; but that there were so, is not in evidence, and I will not admit it. But I reject it not for the sake of this question; because, if there were a million of such families, for every one that is mentioned, they were all believing families. The commission leaves no doubt of this. Of the three families mentioned, two of them are expressly represented as believing families. Why might not the other be so? I do not profess to have the gift of second sight. I do not know how many hundred families resembled these in their baptism. But I can judge of the evidence before me; and what number of families soever were baptized, the same number believed.

But it seems there is one baptized household at least, in which it is even certain that there were no believers but the head of the family. "When Lydia was baptized with her house," says Mr Ewing, "we are made certain that they were none of them believers excepting herself." Whence, reader, can come this certainty? You will say, I suppose, that Mr Ewing has received some secret revelation on this point. No, no, I assure you, Mr Ewing professes to get this evidence out of the narrative itself. The evidence is this: "For she urged Christian character, as the argument for prevailing with Paul and Silas to accept her hospitality. Unquestionably she put her argument as strongly as she could; yet as it was *her* heart only which the Lord opened, ver. 14. so she could not include so much as one in the family, along with herself, as a believer; but was obliged to use the singular number, saying, "If ye have judged *me* to be faithful to the Lord, come into *my* house and abide.'" Now, this is so shadowy an argument, that it is as difficult to get at it, as it was for Fingal to strike the Ghosts. It is as thin as vapour. Had she possessed a thousand servants all believers, would she have spoken in a different manner? Had there been a thousand, the house was *hers*, the hospitality was *hers*, and the ground of the Apostle's receiving it must be *her* faithfulness. The household had nothing to do with this invitation. Their faithfulness had no concern in it. At what a loss must the cause of infant baptism be, when such a man as Mr Ewing is obliged to make such a defence? Must Lydia have been schooled by Sir Roger de Coverley's old butler, that she must say, *our house, our faithfulness?* &c. The man who can take this for evidence, will

never want evidence for any thing to his taste. I never met any writer more intrepid than Mr Ewing, in cutting down opposing evidence ; nor more easily pleased with evidence on his own side.

Alexander himself would not more rashly draw his sword to cut a Gordian knot ; and in other things popish credulity itself cannot be more easily satisfied with the proof of the obedience of the Church. What Mr Ewing here considers certain evidence, I maintain is not even the shadow of evidence. If the Scriptures did not furnish me with better arguments for my sentiments, I would let them sink to the bottom of the ocean. Mr Ewing is right in not surrendering a battery, while it is capable of defence. But why will he keep his flag flying, while it is evident, from his fire, that the ammunition is expended ? Mr Ewing is not at all startled at the consequence of this opinion, namely, that the unbelieving adults of Lydia were baptized on her faith. His boldness is not to be frightened. It requires a more than ordinary audacity to say, in the face of the commission of Jesus Christ, that unbelieving adults should be baptized, if they happen to be in the house of a believer. Jesus Christ has commanded believers to be baptized. Mr Ewing commands all the unbelievers in every believer's house to be baptized. Christians, whether will ye obey your Lord and Saviour, or Mr Ewing ? How long, Mr Ewing, how long will you make void the commandment of God by your inventions ? Hath not Jesus said, "he that breaketh the least of these my commandments, and teacheth men so, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven ?" The language of Lydia is consistent with the supposition that there was not an unbeliever in her house. So far is it from implying that her family were all unbelievers.

"The house of Stephanas," says Mr Ewing, "addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints," 1 Cor. xvi. 15. "Were this a proof that they had among them no infants, we might find a proof that the house of the Rechabites had among them no infants, because, in Jer. xxxv. 2—11, they addicted themselves to perform the commandment of their father." Now, this is true : and this is the very argument by which we prove, that, even if the households had contained infants, there is no necessity that they should be supposed to have been baptized. We do not argue, that, because the baptized households were believing households, there could not be any infants in the houses. But we argue, that if there were baptized households, these households were believing households ; and that in the household of the jailor and of Stephanas we have direct evi-

dence. We could have known this by the commission, had the narrative been silent. But when the narrative itself shews that they had *believing households*, what difficulty is in the expression *baptized households*? Is not the one commensurate with the other? The importance of the fact of the believing households is, not to shew that there could be no infants in those houses, but to shew that it is an historical fact that there were in those houses believers to be called a baptized household; and to shew that if there were infants in those houses, they may not be included among the baptized, as they certainly are not included among the believing. The fact is very important, for in replying to it, our opponents are obliged to refute themselves. If there may have been infants where a house is said to believe, without supposing that infants are believers, so where a house is said to be baptized, there may have been in it infants, who were not baptized. If any man cannot understand the weight of this argument, it is not argument can convince him.

Mr Ewing asks his opponents, "if they admit the general fact of family baptism, why they do not practice accordingly?" And do they not practice according to the view in which they admit this fact? Is there any inconsistency between their practice and their admission? Are they inconsistent with themselves, because they practice according to their own views, and not according to the views of Mr Ewing? Mr Ewing and Dr Wardlaw strangely take it for granted that the households were baptized, not on their own faith, but on that of the head of the family, which is not hinted in the narrative, and is contrary to the commission. "To say they baptize whole families, when whole families believe," says he, "appears to me to be treating the historical Scripture as nugatory." But why, Mr Ewing, does this treat the historical Scripture as nugatory? "Any view of this subject," says Mr Ewing, "would lead us to baptize whole families, or whole nations, if they all believed." Doubtless. And may we not say the same thing of individual baptism? Is the history of the baptism of the eunuch and that of Paul nugatory; because, if neither of them had been recorded, we would have known from the commission that believers ought to be baptized; and that faith is necessary to baptism? There may be much use in recording these facts, though they do not bear Mr Ewing's inference. It is not warrantable to say, that a portion of Scripture must have a certain meaning, because we can see no use in it, if it has not that meaning. "It would not have made the slightest difference in the practice," continues Mr Ewing, "had

no mention been made of family baptism at all." Not the slightest difference. Nor would it have made the slightest difference with respect to the baptizing of individuals, had no example of baptism been recorded. Yet none of the examples is nugatory. The perverseness of Christians requires them all. The family baptisms recorded, can warrant no family baptisms but *such* as are recorded; and two of these are expressly stated as believers, and the remaining third must be according to the commission. "Unless, therefore," says Mr Ewing, "we admit some peculiar connexion between the extent of a family, and the extent of the administration of baptism, I apprehend that family baptism is a Scripture fact which we do not yet understand." Does not Mr Ewing perceive that the same thing might be said with as good reason with respect to the house of the Rechabites, and all the examples quoted by Dr Wardlaw of similar phraseology? On Mr Ewing's principles, might I not say, unless every infant of the house of the Rechabites was brought into the house of the Lord, and a command given to him to drink wine, the statement of Jer. xxxv. 2—11, is absurd? Suppose the government issues a commission to raise a number of regiments, and to enlist all men fit for service. In the course of the execution of this commission, we read that they enlisted A and his family, B and his family, C and his family. Would we not know, without a word on the subject, that the enlisted families were men fit for service? There might be infants in the houses, but they were no part of the enlisted families. We would not require to be informed that two of these families were active and brave, in order to convince us that they were not infants or women, but men. It is only the perverseness of Christians in the things of God that requires such illustrations. What shall we say of the person who would observe, that, unless it is admitted, that whenever the head of a family is enlisted, every member of his family, man, woman, and child, are enlisted also; he can see no meaning in the statement of the enlistment of the three families? The fact that three families are enlisted with the heads of the families, does not imply that all families are enlisted with the heads, nor that men, women, and children are enlisted. It is strange that our acute opponents cannot see so obvious a truth. It is only in the things of God that men are children.

Mr Ewing here takes it for granted, that it is an admitted fact, that all families were baptized with the head, and on the faith of the head, without any faith of their own; nay, except they contradict-

ed and blasphemed. This is not in evidence. The three examples of baptized households state nothing of the baptism of the household on the faith of the head, and the commission forbids the thought. There might be many such families, but how many is not known; nor can the number at all influence the question. How many soever they might be, they must all have been believing households. To justify Mr Ewing's observation, the commission must have been, *baptize believers and their households*.

“I wished,” says Mr Ewing, “to induce my friends, who have no experience on the subject, to compare their feelings with the feelings of those who have such experience.” Feelings have nothing to do with this question, more than with a demonstration in Euclid. This consulting of our feelings is the ground of a great part of our opposition to the word of God. Peter consulted his feelings, and when God said, “Rise, Peter, kill and eat;” he arrogantly replied, “Not so, Lord, for I have never eaten any thing common or unclean.” Shame, Peter, is there any thing unclean that God commands to be eaten? What made certain meats unclean to Israel but God's command?

“You keep aloof,” says Mr Ewing, “from this practice, from your apprehension of difficulty with the case of infants.” Not so, Mr Ewing; had the command been to baptize the households of believers on the faith of their heads, we would find no difficulty with infants. We would baptize them, if the command included them, as soon as we would baptize the Apostles. “Now, I frankly confess,” says Mr Ewing, “that were any thing, after getting a divine warrant, to deter me from the practice, it would be rather the case of adults.” Strange language, indeed! This sounds harshly in my ears. Deter from a practice for which there is a divine warrant! He must have a scrupulous conscience indeed, who will speak of being deterred from executing a divine warrant. I would baptize Satan himself, without the smallest scruple, had I a divine warrant. Give us a divine warrant, and we have no objection, from our feelings, to baptize infants. But it appears that Mr Ewing finds some difficulty in the case of baptizing unbelieving adults on the faith of the head of a family. I am glad of it. He may yet be led to see that it is an awful thing to allege a warrant from Jesus to baptize unbelievers, when the apostolical commission includes believers only. “But the truth is,” says Mr Ewing, “infants and adults are precisely on a footing, in regard to the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, of which baptism is a figure.”

But are adult unbelievers to have the figure of regeneration which they have not yet experienced? This contradicts every thing exhibited in the figure of baptism, which always supposes that the person baptized is already regenerated. Mr Ewing says, that “in the original propagation of the gospel, when the head of a family believes, ‘salvation is come to his house,’ Luke xix. 9; and consequently the whole house may be, nay, ought to be, baptized along with him, (with no exception because some of them may be young, but) except they have grown so old, and so rebellious against both their Father in heaven and their parents on earth, as to refuse the ordinance, and to contradict and blaspheme the truth which it accompanies.” This is a most astonishing avowal. Mr Ewing saw where his doctrine would lead, and he has boldly avowed the consequences. Every unbeliever in the house may be baptized, on the faith of the head, except he refuses. I do not envy the conscience that can receive this without qualms. I think it will be swallowed with difficulty by many of the Independents. But when Mr Ewing has avowed this monstrous doctrine, where will he find a warrant? Not in Luke xix. 9. This cannot imply that the moment the head of a family believes, all the members of the family also believe, or are actually made partakers of salvation. If not, it is no warrant to baptize them. But if it does imply that they all actually believe with the heart, then it is believer baptism. Nor does this passage imply that all the members of a believer’s house will at last believe,—though even this would be no warrant for their baptism, which implies faith at the time of baptism. Is it a fact that all the slaves, and servants, and children of a believer, will certainly be saved? Let us hear the passage itself. “And Jesus entered and passed through Jericho. And, behold, there was a man named Zaccheus, which was the chief among the publicans, and he was rich. And he sought to see Jesus, who he was; and could not for the press, because he was little of stature. And he ran before, and climbed up into a sycamore tree to see him, for he was to pass that way. And when Jesus came to the place, he looked up, and saw him, and said unto him, Zaccheus, make haste and come down, for to-day I must abide at thy house. And he made haste and came down, and received him joyfully. And when they saw it, they all murmured, saying, That he was gone to be guest with a man that is a sinner. And Zaccheus stood, and said unto the Lord, Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor: and if I have taken any thing from any man by false

accusation, I restore him four-fold. And Jesus said unto him, This day is salvation come to this house, forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham. For the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost." Now, the salvation that came to his house, appears to me to be evidently his own salvation. Zaccheus had been a man notoriously a sinner. The people all murmured, even when Jesus proposed to be his guest. The Lord touched the heart of Zaccheus, and enabled him to give in his confession—the clearest evidence of his conversion. The Lord, therefore, recognises him publicly before the people, who murmured, and declared that Zaccheus was not only worthy of being his host, but that he who was among the chief of sinners, was now a member of his kingdom: Salvation was now come to that house, which the crowd looked upon as so unworthy to receive the Messiah. It was now the house of a saved sinner. Jesus next gave the reason for saying that salvation was come to that house: "He also is a son of Abraham." That he was a natural descendant of Abraham, there was no question. But now he is a son of Abraham's faith. The Lord Jesus closes with a reason that confirms this view: "For the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which is lost." As if he had said, "Think it not strange that Zaccheus is saved, and that I have called him a son of Abraham. He was a notorious sinner, indeed, but I have come to save such."

Many suppose that the phrase, "Salvation is come to this house," means that others in the house had believed; or that it was an intimation that they would believe. As far as concerns the question of baptism, I have not the smallest objection to either of these views. My objection is, that they are not the import of the passage. I am quite willing to admit, I am joyful in believing, that when the gospel comes to a house, it generally spreads. But this is no foundation for baptizing an unbelieving family, and does not seem to be contained in this passage. If salvation comes to a house, let the house be baptized as far as the salvation is known to reach.

But by what authority does Mr Ewing make the exception, with respect to those who refuse the ordinance and blaspheme? Children have no right to refuse; and slaves may be forced to submit. Those must all be baptized with the household. Ah! Mr Ewing, is such a household as you represent to be entitled to baptism, at all like the house of the jailor, and the house of Stephanas? How unlike to your commission to baptize, is the commission of Christ! Christ says, "believe and be baptized:" Mr Ewing says, "bap-

tize all the unbelievers of a believer's house, except they refuse." Is it not a fearful thing to have on record before heaven and earth, a document at such variance with the commission of Christ? I know Christ will forgive the ignorance of his people; but to teach his children to err from his commandments, is not the way to gain ten cities in the day of judgment.

Was there ever any thing so absurd as to stretch the commission to baptize, by the use of an indefinite word in the history of the execution of the commission? Must not the commission limit this indefinite word? Does not Mr Ewing, does not Dr Wardlaw, shew examples that justify such limitation of indefinite or general language? Why do they contend, that there may be infants in a believing house, though they do not believe, when they will not allow that there may have been infants in a baptized house, without being baptized? None can be baptized, according to the commission, but believers: the phraseology about the households is perfectly consistent with this, according to daily use in all nations: why then conjure up a difficulty, when not a shadow of difficulty exists? An infidel, who should read the Scriptures, just to learn what was actually the practice on the subject, in the Apostles' days, would not find a moment's delay from these households. He would at once see that the word household may extend to every inhabitant of the family, or admit of certain exceptions, according to known limitations. The limitation of the households he would find in the commission. He would never dream that the Apostles would baptize any but such as are commanded to be baptized.

Let it be recollected, that we stand on the defensive in this matter; and that it is perfectly sufficient for our purpose, if the term household will admit the limitation for which we contend. To serve our opponents, it must be proved, that infants were in the families. Even this will not serve them. They might have been in the households, yet not have been baptized. But was it even proved that infants were baptized, it would be a baptism different from that of the commission, and could not stand in its room. Even in such a case, I would call on all who believe to be baptized with the baptism of the commission.

"The case of the little children," says Mr Ewing, "brought to Jesus, as narrated, Matth. xix. 13—15, entirely agrees with this view," namely, that the disciples of our Lord baptized infants. There must truly be a great scarcity of proof when it is sought in such a passage as this. No view of which this transaction is ca-

pable, has any bearing on the subject. We might as well seek a warrant for infant baptism in Magna Charta, or the Bill of Rights. Infant salvation does not imply infant baptism. Baptism is an exhibition of the faith of the gospel; and of course cannot belong to any but those who appear to believe the gospel. But infants are saved without the gospel. These infants are not brought to Jesus for baptism, nor for any ordinance of the gospel, but to be blessed by him. Can they not be blessed by Jesus without baptism? This passage, then, can have no concern with the subject.* “True,” says Mr Ewing, “baptism is not mentioned in the passage, but our Saviour’s condescension, which the passage does mention, and which he so beautifully displays both to children and to parents, is by no means EXCLUSIVE of the baptism of the former, but apparently in addition to it.” *Our Saviour’s condescension, here mentioned, not exclusive of the baptism of infants!* What an argument! Does our Saviour’s condescension to children, suppose that they must have been baptized? It is a shame for human understanding to urge such arguments as these. The children taken up into the arms of Christ could speak nothing more childish. Divine truths we must receive like children, but if we receive infant baptism on the authority of such arguments, we must receive it as simpletons. Christ commands us to be like little children, but he never commands us to be idiots. “In malice be ye children, but in understanding be men.” The gospel itself must have evidence; and we are required to believe nothing without evidence. Is our Saviour’s condescension in blessing children any evidence that they ought to be baptized? This passage does not, indeed, EXCLUDE children from baptism. And many a thousand passages might be quoted, that do not EXCLUDE infants from baptism. But is every passage that does not forbid infant baptism, a proof that infants ought to be baptized? It seems, however, that this passage does more than not exclude infants from baptism, though, in such a lack of evidence, that itself is a great deal. The blessing is apparently in ADDITION to the baptism. Now, how this is apparent, is what I cannot see; and though I should wear out my eyes in the search, I am afraid I can never discover it here. The man who can see infant baptism here, may descry the inhabitants of the moon with his naked eye.

Mr Ewing quotes a passage in his note, that is subtile without

* To this day, Jewish children are brought to the Rabbi, who lays his hand on them, and prays.

penetration. *Of such is the kingdom of heaven*, “that is to say,” says Mr Hallet, “the kingdom of God *belongs to*, or *comprehends* such infants as these.” No, Mr Hallet, to say this is to say what the passage does not say. It is not said, that the kingdom of God *belongs to* such, or *comprehends* such; but that the kingdom of God *is* of such, that is, such persons constitute this kingdom. If we are not pleased with this paraphrase, Mr Hallet gives us another, which must be abundantly edifying; “or,” says he, “if any one would have the words so stiffly rendered, *Such’s is the kingdom of God*, like, *Theirs is the kingdom of heaven*, Matth. v. 3.” But the latter passage ought to be translated, “of them is the kingdom of heaven.” The kingdom of heaven consists of the poor in spirit, and of the poor in spirit only. There is not another in the kingdom. The meaning is not that the poor in spirit will obtain heaven as their inheritance; but that there is none in the kingdom of heaven but the poor in spirit. Neither of these passages import, that the kingdom of heaven is the property of such persons, but that such persons constitute the whole kingdom. There is not one in heaven but the poor in spirit; nor is there one in heaven who is not such as the children. However, were it even supposed that the expression was, “the kingdom of heaven belongs to such,” the import of the term *such* is not altered. Even *such’s is the kingdom*, makes no difference. Every way in which the words can be understood, imports that the heirs of the kingdom are *such as children*—not that they are children. Observe the difference between the expression, Mat. v. 3, from the expression in this place. In the former it is *αυτων* “of them,” in the latter it is *τοιουτων* “of such.” The kingdom of heaven is of the poor in spirit, and of them only: but it is not of children only, but of those who *are such* as children. They resemble children in their character. Had *αυτων* been here used instead of *τοιουτων*, it would have imported, that none but children are members of Christ’s kingdom. It would have said, that all children are members of Christ’s kingdom; and that none but children were included in that kingdom.

Mr Hallet says, that if we understand the term *such* to refer not to the infants, but to persons resembling them, it will be impossible to make out the force of our Saviour’s argument. But let what will be the consequence, this is actually what our Saviour has said; and nothing else can the words import. “The kingdom of heaven *is of such*,” cannot possibly mean that the kingdom of heaven *is of them*. The term *such* does not signify identity—cannot sig-

nify identity, but likeness. Besides, to understand it so, would imply, that none but children could be saved. For if the kingdom of God is *of children*, by consequence none but children are of the kingdom. I am not bound, then, to satisfy Mr Hallet with a view of the passage that will make out the force of our Saviour's argument. I will shew him what concerns this argument, and I will insist that so far the meaning must be what I contend for. After ascertaining what can be definitely and certainly ascertained, let us then endeavour to see the force of the argument. But to see this is not necessary to know the other with the utmost assurance.

“According to these men,” says Mr Hallet, “our Saviour would have said the same thing, if men had brought him *lambs* or *doves*.” But if Mr Hallet would exercise a little discrimination, he would see a difference. The things in which the disciples of Christ are here supposed to resemble children, are not to be found in *lambs* or *doves*. *Lambs* and *doves* are, to a certain extent, fit emblems of the people of God. But for the purpose of our Lord on this occasion, they were totally unsuitable. Children are of the human race, and therefore it is important to know whether they are capable of being blessed by Christ. Now, that they are capable of being brought to Christ, and of being blessed by him, is known from Christ's conduct towards them; though it is not expressed, nor necessarily implied in the term *such*. That term implies only that there is a likeness between his disciples and children. But this likeness is a likeness in rational and moral properties. It is a likeness of temper, disposition, or character of mind. This could not be found in *lambs* or *doves*. In mere harmlessness doves may afford a likeness. Therefore it is said, “Be ye harmless as doves.” But the moral qualities here referred to, are not to be found in *lambs* or *doves*. These are teachableness, humility, &c. That this is the reference, is clear from the fact as recorded by Mark x. 15. “And they brought young children to him, that he should touch them: and his disciples rebuked those that brought them. But when Jesus saw it, he was displeased, and said unto them, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God. Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein.” Is it not evident, that the point of likeness between children and the disciples of Christ, is in their teachableness? Here also it is evident, that the term *such* refers to likeness—not identity. They who receive the kingdom of God must receive

it *as* children, but they are not all children. So, then, Mr Hallet, your *lambs* and your *doves* will not suit this passage. I will receive as a little child any thing the Lord teaches; but your explanation of the term *such*, even a child cannot receive. I must renounce my understanding altogether, before I can admit *such* to import identity, instead of likeness.

The same thing is evident from Matt. xviii. 1.—“At the same time came the disciples unto Jesus, saying, Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? And Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them: And said, Verily, I say unto you, except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name, receiveth me. But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea.” Here we see that the disciples must be like children in humility. In this sense, the disciples are children. But in humility, lambs and doves could be no figures. That they were capable of being blessed, depends on their being human persons.

“The meaning seems to be,” says Mr Hallet, “of *such* kind of infants *as these is the kingdom of God*, that is, of such infants as have been partakers of the seal of the covenant, of such infants as have been baptized, or, at least, circumcised like these.” No, Mr Hallet, this is a forgery. This is a vile and a wicked forgery. Thousands have been hanged for forgery, who have not made such alterations on writings as this makes on the book of God. There is nothing either expressed or implied with respect to the baptism or the circumcision of the infants brought to Jesus. Nor does what our Lord says apply to those children more than any other children. It is not, Suffer *these little baptized or circumcised children to come*, but suffer *little children*, any little children, to come to me. Does not the parallel passage, Mark x. 15. apply to children in general? It is the temper of children to which our Lord gives his approbation, and the things referred to are found in all children. Does not the illustration shew this? Does not Matt. xviii. 1. confirm this? Why does Mr Hallet look for a reason of approbation, not only not mentioned by Jesus himself, but different from that which Jesus has mentioned? All children possess what Jesus

here approves. But while these dispositions of children are such as to afford a proper figure to represent the teachableness, humility, &c. of the disciples of Jesus, there is no reason to suppose that they are such as are entirely conformable to the law of God. There may be something in them that will need the atonement of the blood of Christ, while they afford a likeness to the character of the disciples. Indeed, the dispositions of children are not considered here in reference to God, but in reference to men. Children believe their parents implicitly; and they are comparatively unambitious. But they are no more ready to believe God than adults are. The approbation therefore of infants contained in our Lord's words, does not imply that they are teachable and humble in the things of God. Our Lord may approve of children here, just as he loved the rich young man in unbelief. The young man had lived in such a manner, that in his own view he had kept the law of God from his youth up. To live so, was commendable, though he was in error. Accordingly, "Jesus beholding him, loved him."

But in whatever way the thing may be explained, the ground of our Lord's approbation of children, is their teachableness, humility, &c. and this as it respects all children equally. If Mr Hallet will not take edification in my way of understanding the force of our Lord's argument, let him look for something to please himself. That the term *such* has the reference for which I contend, does not admit doubt.

That children are capable of being brought to Christ and blessed by him, is clearly established by this passage; and in this light it is of inestimable value. Let every Christian, then, bring his children to Christ. Let him bring them to Christ in his prayers night and day; for their salvation is beyond every earthly consideration. Let him bring them to Christ in his word, and in every thing in which Christ has appointed them to be brought to him. But let not Christians think, that to practise on their infants a religious ordinance of human invention, is to bring them to Christ, but to increase their own sin. Had man appointed an ordinance of imposition of hands on children, from the authority of this passage, it would not have been so strange. But to argue that children must be baptized, because they may be blessed by Jesus, has no colour of plausibility. The whole argument may be reduced to a single sentence. *Children may be blessed without being baptized, therefore the blessing of the children by Jesus is no argument for infant baptism.*

In short, whether our Lord's expression imports that the kingdom of God *consists* of such, or is the *property* of such, the term *such* must necessarily mean not *them*, but persons *like them*—of such as children, not of children such as these. The ground of our Lord's approbation of children is their resemblance to his disciples in certain characteristics of mind, which are to be found only in rational creatures ; and they are permitted to come to Christ, because they are capable of being blessed by him.

The fact here recorded, however, instead of affording evidence for infant baptism, affords a presumption against it. If infants were every day brought to be baptized, why did the apostles object to their being brought to be blessed ? Mr Ewing has been aware of this difficulty, and has obviated it by a resource worthy of Ulysses, “for wiles renowned.” “The disciple of Christ,” says he, “never thought of forbidding the children to be brought to THEM, which they would be, (John iv. 2.) in order to be baptized. They only objected to their being brought also to their Master, “that he should put his hands on them and pray.” Now, is this a thought that would ever occur to any simple mind in reading the passage ? Is there any thing that intimates a double purpose in bringing the children,—first for their baptism to the apostles, and next to Jesus for his blessing ? What an eagle eye must he have that can discover these things ? But there is here a distinction never once made in the history of Jesus,—a distinction between coming to him and to his attending disciples. There is no instance of coming to his apostles for any thing in his presence. Jesus indeed did not personally baptize ; but he baptized by his disciples. All things were done by his directions, and whoever came for baptism came to Jesus, as much as for any thing else. This distinction, however, if admitted, will not serve. Still, it is asked, if children were baptized, why did the apostles object to their coming to Christ to be blessed ? Jesus vindicates the propriety of bringing children to him, by arguments that equally apply, whether it is to himself personally, or to his apostles acting for him.

But let this passage be ever so finely wiredrawn, it cannot include infant baptism. It applies to children in general, and not merely to the children of believers ; and though the children of believers only were included, they may be brought to Christ for his blessing without being baptized.

“The language of the Acts of the Apostles,” says Mr Ewing, “on the subject of baptism, previously to the history of the propa-

gation of the gospel among the Gentiles, in which family baptism is first mentioned, is always equally comprehensive with that of the gospels, Acts ii. 38, 39." *On the subject of baptism!* Does the baptism, enforced in the passage referred to, at all include any but those who repent? "Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call." Does this imply the baptism of any but of those who repent? They who repent, and they only, are to be baptized. "Repent, and be baptized." Can language be more clear? Are they not to be baptized into the remission of sins? Does not this shew, that in baptism, repentance and remission of sins are supposed with respect to the baptized? They are not to be baptized, that repentance and remission of sins may follow. Instead of proving infant baptism, this passage proves that none ought to be baptized, but such as repent, and have their sins forgiven. Is it not expressly said, that all who are thus baptized shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost? The promise is indeed said to be to *your* children; but is it not also said, that it is to all that are afar off? And is it not, with respect to both, confined to those whom the Lord shall call? Children denotes posterity, and not merely infant children, and the promise of the Spirit is to them and to their posterity, and to all that are afar off, only on their repentance. It is not said, that when a man repents, his children shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, whether they repent or not; for this is false. His children, and all that are afar off, shall receive this gift, just as he himself received it, when they repent and are baptized. Does Mr Ewing believe, that when a man believes the gospel, his infants, and all the unbelievers of his house, receive remission of sins, and the gift of the Holy Ghost? If not, there is no ground to give them that baptism that implies both remission of sins, and the gift of the Holy Ghost. This promise is to the children, just as it is to the parents; and it is to all that are afar off, just as it is to parents and children, on their repentance. And it is actually communicated only to those whom the Lord calls. Mr Ewing says, "that when the apostle added, 'To all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call,' the meaning plainly is, that the promise which was to the Jews first, and to their children, should be to the Gentiles also, and to their children." No, Mr Ewing, this is not the plain

meaning. This is a very forced and unnatural meaning. There is no doubt that the promise here spoken of, is to the children of the Gentiles, just as it was to the children of the Jews; that is, on their repentance, they shall be made partakers of the gift of the Spirit. But the words referred to have nothing to do with this. The last clause is a limitation of the promise with respect to the three classes mentioned, restricting it to such of each as the Lord shall call. This is as clear as language can make it; and nothing but perverseness can mistake it. The promise is unto you; the promise is likewise to your children; the promise is likewise to all that are afar off. But it is to none of any class, but such as the Lord shall call. The three distinct classes are coupled by *and*—you *and* your children, *and* all afar off. The last clause is not coupled with the rest by *and*, but added to the whole, as a limitation. And does not the whole word of God confirm this view? Do any receive the gift of the Spirit, but such as are called? Do the unbelieving children and servants of a believer receive this gift? It is strange that any Christian should contend for a view of this passage, so unfounded and so forced.

But if Mr Ewing will be so perverse as to hold to this view, it will profit him nothing as to infant baptism. Whatever the promise here may import, to whomsoever it is made, the baptism here spoken of, is to such only as repent. Besides, even according to his own explanation of the passage, he must view all the infants and unbelievers of a believer's house, as possessing the gift of the Spirit. This is a species of unbelievers unknown to the word of God,—unbelievers possessing the Holy Spirit!

Nothing but perverseness, and an obstinate attachment to a system, could make our opponents rely on an argument founded on the indefinite phrase, *your children*. Does not God promise to “pour out his Spirit upon all flesh?” Might it not be as plausibly argued from this, that the Spirit must be given to every individual of the human race, or that *children* here must mean either all children, or infant children? Even if no explanatory and limiting phrase had been added, the indefinite term must be limited by other known truth. But our opponents are so perverse, as to contend for the unlimited sense of an indefinite term, after it has been expressly limited in the passage itself by the Holy Spirit.

Dr Wardlaw asks, How would a Jew understand the term children in this passage? I answer, no man of common sense can mistake its meaning, if he takes the meaning from the words. The

apostle explains himself, so as not to be innocently mistaken by either Jew or Gentile. Paul says, "Men and brethren, children of the stock of Abraham, and whosoever among you feareth God, to you is the word of this salvation sent." Did not the Jews believe that the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom would be confined to themselves? How then, I might ask, would they understand this language? Would they not have much greater reason to conclude from this, that Paul confined salvation to the Jews, than that Peter extended the gift of the Spirit to the whole offspring of believers, without any respect to their faith? He says nothing here to guard them from this conception. But Peter expressly limits the term children, as applicable only to those called by the Lord. Is the gospel sent only to the Jews, and such as feared God? Is it not sent to all? Yet Paul, on this occasion, speaks of it as sent to the stock of Abraham, and such among them as feared God. Just so Peter speaks of the promise to them and their children, but he explicitly limits the blessing to those whom God shall call. The most prejudiced Jew could not innocently mistake this language.

"Are we, then, to suppose," says Dr Wardlaw, "that this 'holy man of God, speaking as he was moved by the Holy Ghost,' would, without explanation or restriction," &c. *Without explanation or restriction!* How can Dr Wardlaw use this language? Is not the last clause an express limitation?—"as many as the Lord our God shall call." But even had there been no limitation, it is rash in Dr Wardlaw to use such language. Jesus himself used expressions that were capable of being misunderstood. Prejudices are no excuse for perverting the word of God. If the Jews took less or more out of the words of the apostles than they express, they were blameable.

Does Dr Wardlaw believe, that when the head of a family receives the gospel, all his infants receive the Spirit? If not, why does he baptize them on account of this promise? Even if they did receive the Spirit, they are not to be baptized by this passage, except they repent. Does he say that the promise implies that they will repent? But the promise is, that penitents shall receive the Spirit, and not that the children of such shall repent in time to come. Besides, if there was a promise that all the children of all believers would repent, this would not entitle them to that baptism that supposes repentance.

But if *your children* respects children, without limitation from the concluding clause, then the promise is, that all the children of

a believer will receive the gift of the Spirit on his believing. Does this imply that all the children of a believer believe also at the same time? If not, does the promise import that unbelieving adult children will receive the Spirit? According to our opponents, this promise secures the gift of the Spirit to the children of believers, as well as to themselves. If so, except it is a false promise, such children will receive the Spirit. Unless, then, all the children of a believer receive the gift of the Spirit, as well as himself, the gift of the Spirit cannot here be promised to his children, except they believe.

Let it be observed, that the gift of the Spirit, as respected his miraculous operations, was given to their children with the limitation for which we contend. Some of them, indeed, might be children under age, but none of them were unbelieving children. They were old enough to prophesy: "And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh: and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy." This is the promise to which Peter refers, and it was fulfilled, as far as concerned miraculous gifts, in the gift of prophecy conferred on their sons and daughters. Surely these prophesying sons and daughters, were believing sons and daughters,—not unbelieving sons and daughters, nor infant sons and daughters. Now, does not the very nature of the gift promised to their sons and daughters, limit the gift to believing sons and daughters? Nothing can be more clear. But why do we waste time in ascertaining the nature and extent of this promise, or of any other promise? Neither this promise, nor any other promise, respects baptism. For argument's sake, let it be granted that the Spirit is promised to all the seed of all believers; this does not imply their baptism, except it implies faith. The commission limits baptism to believers; and the baptism that Peter here preaches, is limited to those who repent. Whatever a wild fancy may extort from the promise mentioned, it has no concern with baptism. That the promise of the gift of the Spirit is limited to those whom the Lord shall call, with respect to them, their children, and those afar off, is as clear as the light of heaven; but let it be extended as it may, baptism is not attached to it. The passage has no possible bearing on the subject. Our opponents have a popish perverseness in clinging to arguments that have a thousand and a thousand times been shewn to be inefficient, and which they cannot themselves say bear the weight of their conclusion, but have merely some favourable aspect toward it. It is a most

vexatious thing, that, in the dispute about infant baptism, the greatest part of the arguments brought to support it, have no concern with baptism at all. Is it not evident, on the very face of the business, that infant baptism is not in the Scriptures, when its advocates are obliged to shelter it under such subterfuges? Had they real evidence, they have talents to exhibit it. Had they only one sound argument, they would not degrade their understanding by resting on arguments that have no reference to the subject.

“Precisely in the same strain,” says Mr Ewing, “and almost in the same words, the Apostle Paul asserts the interest which believers from among the Gentiles have, in the family promise made to the Jews; and in the same way as Peter does, he connects this family promise with family baptism, Gal. iii. 13, 14, 26–29.” *Family promise, family baptism?* How are such things to be found in the passage referred to? Is not the blessing of Abraham, that comes on the Gentiles, justification by the faith of Abraham, in the seed of Abraham? Is it not such only who receive “the promise of the Spirit?” Do any but believers receive the promise of the Spirit? Is it not here expressly said, that the “promise of the Spirit” is “through faith?” Is it not expressly said, that the blessing of Abraham has come on the Gentiles, that “we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith?” Can this blessing, then, extend farther than the promise of the Spirit connected with it, and to be given through it? This promise is confined to faith, which clearly determines what the blessing is, and strongly confirms our view of the parallel passage from Acts ii. 39.

But Mr Ewing says that Paul here, as Peter does, connects this promise with family baptism. No, Mr Ewing, neither of them connects this promise with family baptism. There is not a shadow of foundation for such an assertion. Peter says nothing of the baptism of the children to whom the promise is made. There is no doubt that such children would be baptized as well as their parents, because they were believers, and had received the gift of the Spirit through faith. But this is not said in the passage, nor implied any other way than, as their parents, they repented, and through faith received the gift of the Spirit. In Gal. iii. 14, even believer baptism is not spoken of as connected with the blessing of Abraham, though it is truly connected with it. In ver. 26, 27, the Apostle speaks of the import of baptism, but not as connected with ver. 14. But where is family baptism? How can it be extorted from ver. 27? Mr Ewing, you might as well assert that family

baptism is connected with the breach of the sixth commandment. Shall any man suffer his understanding to be imposed on, by submitting to believe that family baptism is spoken of in such passages as this? Can a righteous cause require the aid of such support? Give me Scripture for infant baptism, and I will receive it. Give me any reasoning that is founded on a basis of truth, and I will weigh it. But I can have no respect for a mode of reasoning that founds on nothing, or on untrue assumption. A man would read himself blind, before he would find any thing like family baptism in Gal. iii. It cannot be truth that requires learned and ingenious men to adopt such a mode of defence. Mr Ewing, either yield, or give us argument. Do not continue to force and misrepresent the word of God, to sanction the traditions of men. You are floundering in a quagmire,—every plunge to relieve yourself, will only sink you more deeply.

“ Unless we admit,” says Mr Ewing, “ that infants, nay, every relation, both of affinity and descent, which can be considered as his property, are interested in the privileges of a believer’s house, I see not a satisfactory meaning of 1 Cor. vii. 12–14.” This is an astonishing avowal. Mr Ewing believes that all the unbelieving children of a believer, and his unbelieving wife, have from him a right to all the ordinances of Christ. Well, this is extravagant, but it is only consistent. Others have founded an argument for infant baptism on this passage, but they inconsistently refused to admit the argument with respect to the unbelieving wife. Mr Ewing has perceived that the passage cannot be consistently quoted for the one and not for the other, and that it applies equally to the Lord’s Supper; he therefore, instead of giving up the argument, as proving too much, boldly adopts all its consequences. The unbelieving wife, then, is to be baptized, and to be admitted to all the privileges of a believer’s house. This privilege, it seems, is granted on the right of *property*. The unbelieving wife is to be baptized as the property of her husband. Slaves have a similar claim. To refute so monstrous a position, is any thing necessary but to state it? Is this like the kingdom of Christ? Can any thing be more contrary to the Scripture accounts of baptism and the Lord’s Supper? Faith is necessary to entitle to admission into a church; faith is necessary to eat the Lord’s Supper without condemnation; faith is necessary for baptism. How, then, can an unbelieving wife, or unbelieving children, be admitted to such privileges by this passage? Can any passage in the word of God give

a warrant to persons to eat and drink condemnation to themselves? Can any passage warrant the admission of unbelievers into a church from which the Lord has excluded them? Can any passage sanction the baptism of unbelievers, when all the accounts of baptism require faith? Can any passage give countenance to persons evidently in their sins, to be admitted to an ordinance that figuratively exhibits their sins as, by faith in the blood of Christ, already washed away? This is an extravagance that, in a person who has any notion of Christian fellowship, and the nature of a church, can never be exceeded.

With respect to the passage referred to, it is usually and sufficiently explained, by an allusion to Ezra x. 3, 44; Neh. xiii. 23, 24. The sanctification referred to, must be *legitimacy according to the law of God*. Such marriages were not lawful to the Jews, and both the wives and their children were put away. It is the duty of the disciples to marry in the Lord; but even if they transgress that law, or are converted after marriage, they are not, like the Jews, to put away their wives and children on repentance. The marriage is to continue, and the relation is sanctified, just as their food is sanctified or blessed to their use. Now this is an important, a most important thing. As Jesus commands his disciples to marry in the Lord, had no provision been made, every marriage contrary to this, must be given up on repentance, just as fornication and adultery; and the offspring of such marriages could not be considered as the children of marriage, according to God's institution. It is said in reply to this, that even the marriages of unbelievers are lawful, and the offspring legitimate. Certainly—because they are according to the law both of God and man. But as Christ commands his people to marry in the Lord, to marry otherwise is contrary to God's law. Neither such marriage, then, nor the offspring of it, would be legitimate according to the law of God, except by this provision. The marriage might be legitimate according to the law of man, and the children legitimate according to the law of man, but neither would be legitimate according to the law of God. This provision, then, is most bountiful and kind. The believer, by remaining in his marriage with the unbeliever, does not continue in sin, as he would by continuing in fornication. His marriage is sanctified to him. I can see no difficulty in the passage. But if any will choose to understand it otherwise, let them have it their own way. In no view of it, can it countenance the baptism of infants or unbelievers. This sanctification, what-

ever it is, is a marriage sanctification, and not the sanctification of the Spirit through the belief of the truth, which is the only sanctification that entitles to any Christian privilege. If such infants were even as holy as the infant John the Baptist, it would not imply their baptism. They may possess the holiness that will fit them for heaven, without entitling them to baptism. Baptism is for believers, and only for believers.

So, then, Mr Ewing can see no meaning in this passage, unless it is a warrant to give to unbelievers those ordinances that Jesus has provided for believers, and from which he has excluded unbelievers. If this passage will give a right to introduce the unbelieving wife and children of a believer into a church, and to give them the ordinance appointed for believers,—if it will enable such unbelieving wife and children to eat the Lord's supper without eating and drinking condemnation; may it not also introduce them into heaven on the same ground? It is said, "he that believeth not shall be condemned;" but if faith can be dispensed with in the ordinance of Christ, in which it is required, may it not also be dispensed with in this threatening? The same explanation that will baptize an unbeliever, or admit him to the Lord's Supper, will introduce him into heaven, in defiance of the damnation pronounced against him by the Saviour himself. What a wretched thing it is for a Christian to be given up by God to justify the traditions of men, and to fight against the ordinance of Christ! How wide is the range of this error! How much of the word of God does its defence oblige its advocates to pervert!

But this is a new, and a strange ground of baptism—baptism on the ground of property! The unbelieving wife is baptized, not, it seems, in virtue of the promises of the Abrahamic covenant, but because she is the property of her believing husband. The promises of the Abrahamic covenant are to his seed, but the wife is included only as property. Can any idea be more abhorrent to the nature of Christ's kingdom? Would not this baptize the whole dominions of an absolute king? I call upon all Christians to reflect on this monstrous avowal. Is it not self-evident that the cause that demands this defence, is not the cause of God and truth? That the baptism of the unbelieving wife is the necessary consequence of the argument for infant baptism brought from this passage, Mr Ewing sees to be inevitable; and therefore avows the consequence rather than forego the argument. It is then utterly vain for more timid minds to attempt to hold the argument and refuse the conse-

quence. Mr Ewing being judge, the baptism of the infant must be accompanied with that of the unbelieving wife, and the unbelieving adults of the family. Let them, then, choose which they will. They must take all or nothing.

Well, suppose they are all determined to adopt the shocking consequences avowed by Mr Ewing, their hardihood will shew only their disposition. It will not save their cause. This holiness of the unbelieving wife and children, is a holiness not of the *truth* nor of the *Spirit*; and therefore cannot entitle to any ordinance of Christ's kingdom. It is a *holiness of marriage*, which is an ordinance of God for his people, in common with all men. It is a holiness which is here expressly said to belong to *unbelievers*; and therefore can have nothing to do with ordinances that were intended for *believers*. It is a holiness that demands the believing husband or wife to live with the unbelieving, not to baptize such. The question treated of is solely this. There is no reference to any ordinance of the kingdom of Christ. Why then should this unbelieving holiness admit to the ordinance of Christ's kingdom, more than it will admit to heaven? All the ordinances of Christ imply, that the partakers of them have the holiness of the truth by the Spirit. If this can be dispensed with as to an avowed unbeliever, the declaration "without holiness no man shall see the Lord," may equally be dispensed with for his salvation. The same reasoning that will baptize the unbelieving wife, will introduce her into heaven as an unbeliever.

But why are unbelievers of this description baptized rather than any other unbelievers? Because, says Mr Ewing, salvation is come to the house. *Salvation come to the house!* But it seems it has not yet reached the wife, or the husband; and though it has reached one of them, it may not have reached the children. The wife is here said to be sanctified while an unbeliever. Then salvation has not come to her, except the Gospel is false, and she can be saved as an unbeliever. Why, then, should she be baptized, or receive the Lord's Supper, which supposes that she has been already made a partaker of salvation? But it may be said, she will yet believe. I reply, although this were certain, it would be no reason to give her an ordinance that implies faith and sanctification of the Spirit through the truth. This, however, is not certain, for the reason by which the husband is urged to live with her as an unbeliever, is, not the certainty that she will yet believe, but the mere possibility of this. "For what knowest thou, O wife, whe-

ther thou shalt save thy husband? or, how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?" Here the mere possibility of the future salvation of the unbelieving husband, or wife, through the means of the other party, is urged as a reason to continue in the marriage relation. Nothing can be a clearer confutation of the opinion of our opponents with respect to the meaning of the expression, "salvation is come to this house," than this passage. The utmost that the apostle states as a ground of not forsaking the unbelieving partner, is, that it may turn out to the salvation of such. There is not a single promise pleaded. If this is a ground for baptism, we might baptize any person; for we do not know but he may yet receive the truth. Taylor or Carlile might be baptized on this ground. What a monstrous prostitution of an ordinance of Christ does this vindicate? It gives the ordinances of Christ to avowed unbelievers, if they will submit to receive them! Am I reasoning with Mr Ewing? Have I understood him? Will he hold infant baptism at so immense a price? This determined obstinacy reminds one of the desperate perseverance of the Jews in the destruction of Jerusalem. Is Mr Ewing resolved to overturn the whole spiritual nature of Christ's kingdom, rather than surrender this fortress of the man of sin?

But I appeal to the common sense of all my readers. If it had been the custom to baptize the unbelieving husband or wife on the faith of the believing partner, would there ever have been a question with respect to the propriety of living with such! If the unbelieving husband or wife was admitted to baptism, would it ever be thought that it was contrary to the holiness of marriage to dwell with such a husband or wife? Would they suppose, that a holiness that admitted to the ordinances of Christ's kingdom, was not sufficient for the sanctification of marriage?

Mr Ewing has had the boldness to carry the principles that justify infant baptism to their proper extent. But he has done no more. Many persons who hold the argument from this passage, will be shocked with his sentiment. It is impossible to vindicate the baptism of infants from this holiness, without affording equal ground for the baptism of the unbelieving husband or wife. Mr Ewing has the perspicacity to see this, and he has the hardihood to adopt it. He is just like Mr Hume with respect to the philosophy of his time. Mr Hume, in rearing a system of universal scepticism, did no more than carry the acknowledged principles of philosophy to their just consequences. Granting him his first principles, which

were universally taken for granted, he, with the greatest ease, overturned heaven and earth, matter and spirit. He shocked the world by his conclusions; and thus led, by an examination of his first principles, to the overthrow of his doctrine. Specious or popular error will never be abandoned, till it is driven into extravagance. I hope Christians, who have any regard for the ordinances of Christ's house, and the spirituality of his kingdom, will be led to examine, with more attention, the foundations of a practice that requires such a justification. If the whole ordinances of the house of God must be profaned; if the spiritual fabric of his kingdom must be pulled down, in order to make room for infant baptism, surely enlightened Christians may be expected to renounce it. What an awful sentiment has Mr Ewing avowed! *Baptism into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, may—must be given to a professed worshipper of Jupiter, Neptune, and Apollo, with the thousands of inferior gods, if the person is the husband, or the wife, or the slave of a believer, and will condescend to submit to this Christian institution!!!* To refute this, is it not enough to state it?

Having considered the evidence arising from the commission given to the apostles, and from the practice recorded in the New Testament, I shall now exhibit the evidence that is derived from such allusions to baptism, as may ascertain who were its subjects. In general, it is quite apparent that baptism is not only a figure of the washing away of sin, but that it is always supposed that the sins of those who are baptized are already washed away. Now this can be supposed of none but believers. Infants dying in infancy, if saved, have their sins washed away. But millions of persons who have their sins washed away, have not had them washed away in infancy. With respect to such, then, baptism, that supposes sins already washed away, could have no proper application in their infancy.

From John iii. 5. we see that baptism is a figure of regeneration. They who are baptized are represented as born again. Now this is peculiar to believers. Even if there was a certainty that an infant would believe in future time, it would be no ground to baptize it. The ordinance exhibits the baptized person as at the time born again.

The same thing appears from Titus iii. 5. "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, *by the washing of regeneration*, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." Here baptism is called the bath or laver of regene-

ration. In the figure, it is the place of birth. The baptized person is represented as born in the ordinance, and is supposed to be already born, or renewed by the Spirit. Now, this cannot belong to infants; because infants dying in infancy are not born of the truth, although they are saved by the blood of Christ; and if they were, how can they be known? The multitude of saved adults were not born again in infancy. To say that it may represent that infants will be born again, is absurd. For the ordinance supposes, that they are born again. Besides, it is not certain that they will be born again. Their new birth is not a matter of course. It would not be the same ordinance, if, when applied to infants, it represented what might take place in futurity, and when applied to adults, it represented what had taken place. None are represented in Scripture as born again, except through the belief of the truth. "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever," 1 Pet. i. 23.

Agreeably to this Ananias says to Paul, "And now, why tarriest thou? arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord," Acts xxii. 16. Here we see baptism figuratively washes away sins, and supposes that they are previously truly washed away. Could our opponents say to the parents of the infant about to be baptized, "Arise, and wash away the sins of thy infant?" The figure supposes that they are washed away, not that they may, in future time, be washed away.

Rom. vi. 3—5, and Col. ii. 12. explain baptism in a sense that suits believers only. They who are baptized, are baptized into Christ's death, as dying with him, and as rising with him to a new life. They are viewed as already risen with him *through faith*. Can any thing be more express than this? Are infants risen with Christ through faith of the operation of God? If not, they are not among the number of those that were baptized.

In like manner, 1 Cor. xv. 29, all who are baptized are supposed, by submitting to that ordinance, to profess faith in the resurrection. Of this faith, infants are incapable.

In 1 Pet. iii. 21, they who are baptized are represented as having a good conscience, which cannot apply to infants.

In Heb. x. 22, 23, baptism is supposed to proceed on a confession of the faith or hope of the baptized persons, which being confessed in baptism, they are exhorted to hold fast without wavering.

That the external washing, or figurative bath, belongs only to believers, is seen in Ephes. v. 26; "That he might sanctify and

cleanse it by *the washing of water*, or the laver of the water; *by the word.*" Here the bath of baptism is only the figure of that which is done by the word. Believers are washed in baptism only in figure, but the reality of this figure they have had in the belief of the word. Infants are not sanctified by the word, and therefore have nothing to do with that *laver of water* that is appointed for those who receive the word, to their salvation and sanctification.

In 1 Cor. vi. 11, they who were baptized are supposed to be washed,—to be sanctified and justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.

We learn from Ephes. iv. 5, that there is but one baptism. Now, as the baptism of the commission cannot possibly extend to infants, if there is such a thing as infant baptism, there must be two baptisms. If, then, there is but one baptism, there can be no infant baptism.

In 1 Cor. xii. 13, it is taken for granted, all who are baptized belong to the body of Christ. "For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit." They who are baptized, are supposed already to belong to the body of Christ; and for this reason, they are baptized into it. They are, by baptism, externally united to that body, to which they are internally united by faith. None are here supposed to be baptized upon the expectation, or probability, or possibility, that they may yet belong to that body. They are baptized into the body.

Nothing can be more express to this purpose than Gal. iii. 27, "For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ." Here, baptism is represented as implying a *putting on* of Christ: Surely this is peculiar to believers. Infants cannot put on Christ. Dr Wardlaw thinks he has entirely overturned this argument, but his reply to it has no just application. He quotes Gal. v. 2—6, as a parallel to the above phraseology. "Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law; ye are fallen from grace." "In the 27th verse of the third chapter of the same epistle, the apostle says, 'For as many of you as have been baptized unto Jesus Christ, (or, 'ye whosoever have been baptized unto Jesus Christ,') have put on Christ.' From this expression,"

says he, "it has been very confidently argued, that *adults only were baptized* ; because of ' putting on Christ,' adults only were capable. Now, let the principle of interpretation, or of inference, be applied to the passage quoted from the *fifth* chapter. It is an address to *adults* ; it expresses things of which *adults only were capable*. Are we, then, to infer from this, that *adults only were circumcised* ? We certainly ought, on the same principle on which we infer from the other, that adults alone were *baptized*. There is precisely the same ground in the former case as there is in the latter." No, Dr Wardlaw, the cases, instead of being parallel, are entirely dissimilar. In the one case, the apostle states the import of an ordinance of God ; in the other, he is not stating the import of an ordinance of God. He does not allege that their submission to baptism was an evidence of putting on Christ, for it is not such ; but it is a figure of putting on Christ. Some of them might not turn out to be real believers, but in their baptism they were taken for such ; and without this, baptism had to them no application. It is taken for granted, that all who are baptized have put on Christ. But it is not from the import of circumcision, that the apostle alleges that they were unbelievers who submitted to it. Their receiving of circumcision, as necessary to salvation, was evidence that they were not in the faith, Gal. v. 3. This was decided evidence with respect to every one of them individually, that he was yet in his sins. On the other hand, their baptism was no evidence of their being in the faith ; but this was its import. No two cases, then, can be more dissimilar than the two which Dr Wardlaw here pronounces to be precisely similar. Let Dr Wardlaw bring an example of similar phraseology, with respect to the import of any ordinance of God, which yet is divinely appointed for those who are not supposed to " put on Christ," and he will do something to his purpose. Were the Jews ever addressed with such language as this ? Was it ever said, " whosoever of you have been circumcised in your flesh, have been renewed in your hearts by the Spirit of God ?" No, this could not have been said ; for circumcision never imported this.

THE ABRAHAMIC COVENANT.

As infant baptism cannot be found in the New Testament, its advocates have endeavoured to find a cover for it in the Old. They think they have discovered this in the covenant that God made with

Abraham. Of course, that covenant has been much discussed on this subject, and variously explained, to suit the respective sentiments of the different parties. It is lamentable, that the people of God should allow their sentiments on one subject, to influence their decisions, so as to perplex the plainest things. Nothing but the supposed connexion of the Abrahamic covenant with the subject of infant baptism, could produce such a diversity of opinion in explaining that covenant. I have read much that I cannot approve, on both sides of this question; and I cannot but think, that, in many instances, both parties have been more guided by their view of its bearing on the subject of baptism, than by an intense desire to ascertain the import of the documents before them. As I am convinced that truth must be consistent with itself, I have no fear that any real evidence can ever be deduced from the Abrahamic covenant, in opposition to what the Lord has so plainly established in the New Testament. The covenant with Abraham, I am convinced, is, like every other part of the Old Testament, full of instruction to us, and is worthy of the most careful study. But as no view of this subject can have the most distant bearing on infant baptism, I do not think it necessary fully to examine that covenant.

I entirely agree with those who consider this covenant as having a letter and a spirit. For the accomplishment of the grand promise, that all nations should be blessed in Abraham, three promises were given to him. First, a numerous posterity, which was fulfilled in the letter, in the nation of Israel. It was fulfilled in the spirit, by the divine constitution, that makes all believers the children of Abraham. The unbelieving Jews were Abraham's children as to the flesh, yet there is a sense in which Jesus denies that they were the children of Abraham. The second promise was to be a God to him and his seed, which was fulfilled in the letter by his protection of Israel in Egypt,—his delivering of them from bondage,—his taking them into covenant at Sinai,—and all his subsequent dealings with them in their generations, till they were cast off by their rejection of Christ. This promise is fulfilled in the Spirit, by God's being a God to all believers, and to them alone, Rom. iv. 11, 12, in a higher sense than he was to Israel, Jer. xxxi. 33. The third promise was of the land of Canaan, fulfilled in the letter to Israel, and in the spirit fulfilled to the true Israel in the possession of the heavenly inheritance. In accordance with this double sense of the promises of this covenant, the kingdom of God in Israel, with its officers, laws, worship, &c. is a visible model of the invisible king-

dom of Christ. The typical ordinances, which exhibited the truths of the gospel in figure, form one of the most conclusive evidences of Christianity ; and present spiritual things to the mind in so definite and striking a manner, that they add the greatest lustre to the doctrines of grace. What a striking emblem of the incarnation have we in God's dwelling in the tabernacle and temple ! How clearly do we see substitution and imputation in the laying on of hands on the victim ! How blind must they be, who do not see the atonement by the blood of Christ, in the sacrifices of Israel !

This appears to me to be the only view of the covenant of Abraham, that will suit every thing said of it in the word of God. That it has a letter and a spirit, is true, and analogous to every part of the Old Testament. But as long as Christians look at this covenant, on the one side to make it a foundation for a New Testament ordinance, and, on the other, to make it as unfit as possible for such a purpose, it need not be expected that the mind of the Spirit will be understood. It will be easy for a little perverse ingenuity on either side, to set it in a light that will perplex the simple. If any one can say with the Psalmist, " I opened my mouth, and panted ; for I longed for thy commandments," let him come with me beyond the cloud that has been raised around the Abrahamic covenant, and try what we can discover in the sun-shine on the other side. Let them make what they will of that covenant, I maintain that it affords no foundation for infant baptism. They tell us that the covenant of Abraham was the New Covenant. Now, for argument's sake, let it be the New Covenant, and I deny the result that they wish to draw. **INFANTS ARE NOT SAVED BY THE NEW COVENANT,** and therefore they cannot be connected with it, in any view that represents them as interested in it. It is a vulgar mistake of theologians to consider, that if infants are saved, they must be saved by the New Covenant. There is no such doctrine exhibited in any part of the book of God. Infants must be saved as sinners, and saved through the blood of Christ ; but there was no necessity to give a covenant to man to ratify this. Whether all infants dying in infancy are saved, or only some infants, they are saved just as adults, as to the price of redemption, and as to the sanctification of their nature. But they are not saved as adults, by the truth believed. That sacrifice which is the ground of the New Covenant, is the salvation of saved infants. But there is no part of the word of God, that intimates that it is through faith in that sacrifice. God, who applies that sacrifice to adults only through faith, can apply it to dying

infants without faith,—for faith has no merit more than works. It is only the divinely appointed medium. Theologians have manifested a great want of discrimination on this subject. That necessity of faith which the Scriptures apply to adults, and adults only, theologians have applied to infants, without warrant, as if God was bound to proceed towards them as he does towards adults. Therefore it is that, even in Dr Dwight, we find that frightful fanaticism, that speaks of the infant faith of John the Baptist; as if God could not save or sanctify an infant without faith, because none who hear the gospel can be sanctified without faith. Surely it ought to make every sober mind suspect that there must be something wrong at the bottom of these views, that must consider an unconscious infant as possessing faith. Did ever Joanna Southcote say any thing more extravagant?

But this view not only leads to absurdity, it takes its origin in that principle of self-righteousness that is so prone, even in Christians, to work itself into every subject of divine revelation of which they are ignorant. It supposes that it is so necessary for man to do something as to his acceptance with God, that even the infant who cannot comply with the terms itself, must do it by its substitute. It has its name put into the covenant, or put into the gospel grant. And who is he that will undertake to put a name into God's covenant? What Antichrist will dare to take the throne of Jesus, and put a name into the gospel grant? Even the most pious men, when ignorant of God's ordinances, will attempt to establish the ordinances of man. Even the pious Henry speaks in this anti-christian style. So true it is, that we cannot oppose any part of the divine counsel, without loss. Every error is in some way injurious to the grand truth of the gospel itself.

Theologians, justly considering that infants have sinned in Adam, have also justly considered that they must be washed in the blood of the Saviour. But they have, without warrant, and without discrimination, considered that they must be saved by that covenant that was given for the salvation of believers. But they can have nothing to do with a covenant that requires faith for salvation. Were it true that infants could not be saved but by this covenant, none of them would be saved. This would denounce to condemnation all who die before the belief of the gospel. The New Covenant knows nothing of any salvation but through faith. "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not, shall be damned," is the testimony from which it never for a moment swerves. Such a

covenant cannot save an infant, who believes nothing. But there is a covenant in which they are included, and which will save as many of them as are included in it,—the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son, in which he engaged to lay down his life as a ransom for his chosen, whether infants or adults. Though infants are not saved by faith, they can join in the song of the Lamb in heaven, “Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation.”

But let us ask Jeremiah, xxxi. 31,—let us ask the Apostle Paul, Heb. viii. 10, 11, who they are that are included in the New Covenant. “For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts.” “And they shall not teach every one his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least to the greatest.” Here we see that all who are included in this covenant, have the laws of God put into their mind, and written on their heart, by himself. Can this be said of infants? The subjects of this covenant, know the Lord—all of them—even the least of them. This surely cannot include infants, who know nothing. Is there not a necessity to teach children, as soon as they are capable of instruction, to know the Lord? Are any children found who need not this instruction? If not, there are no infants in this covenant. The sacrifice of the Son of God, was as necessary for infants as for adults. But had it pleased God that all the elect should die in infancy, there would have been no need of the New Covenant at all. The gospel would then have never been preached. To keep in mind this distinction, would preserve theologians free from many of their embarrassments. The necessity of faith, and the necessity of atonement, are not of the same kind. Ignorance of this, has led to the most frantic extravagance. In order to save infants, some have been led to assert that they have faith; others, that they have *imputative* faith; and others, that they have *habitual* faith. Now, all these opinions are grounded on ignorance of the difference between the necessity of faith, and the necessity of redemption or atonement. The *infant* faith of Luther, the *imputative* infant faith of Calvin, and the *habitual* infant faith of the Church of Rome, have a common foundation in ignorance of this distinction, and are all opposed to sound views of the truth. Even Dr Williams, an English Independent, and a writer of celebrity, makes the most

doleful lamentation about cutting off infants from the church *militant*, by refusing to include them in the commission of the Apostles. *Militant infants!* What an idea! Might we not as well attempt to cure bedlam with syllogisms, as reason with persons who speak of believing militant infants? If any general would talk of raising an army of infants to oppose an invading enemy, he would at once be deemed insane, and his sovereign would not one moment longer entrust him to command—no, not though he were the Duke of Wellington. But when Doctors of Divinity speak like madmen, it is only the depth of their theological learning, and they are only the more admired.

2. My second observation is, that the infants even of Abraham himself, were not saved, when they died in infancy, by Abraham's covenant. He was not the spiritual father of his own infant seed. It is a common opinion, that Abraham, by that covenant, was constituted the head of all the redeemed. But this is a grand mistake. He was the head of believers only. By that covenant he was constituted the father of believers in all ages, but of none else. He was made the father of all them that believe out of every nation; and to his own descendants he was "the father of circumcision to them who are not of the circumcision only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith" which Abraham had. So then he was the spiritual father of none among his own descendants, but of such as believed. There was, then, by this covenant, no spiritual connexion between Abraham and his infant seed. His justification was not the pattern of theirs. He was justified by faith: his infants dying in infancy were not justified by faith. They were saved, as all saved infants were saved from the beginning of the world, and will to the end of the world, through the *bruising of the heel* of the seed of the woman.

Dr Wardlaw calls on his opponents to shew where the spiritual connexion between believers and their infant seed, established by this covenant, is cut off. I cut it off by shewing that it never existed.

Abraham himself had no such spiritual connexion with his infant seed. The covenant with Abraham made no new relation between him and his infant seed; and much less did it constitute a spiritual relation between every believer and his infant seed.

But even had this covenant constituted a new relation between Abraham and his infant seed, Dr Wardlaw is wrong in throwing the burthen of proof on his opponents, with respect to the supposed

similar relation between every believer and his infant seed. There might have been such a connexion in the case of Abraham and his seed, without involving the necessity of a similar connexion between other believers and their seed. Dr Wardlaw contends, that if such a connexion existed in the case of Abraham, it lies on his opponents to prove that it was discontinued. But surely it is a self-evident truth, that the burthen of proof lies on him who needs as an argument the thing to be proved. For if nothing is proved about it on either side, it cannot be used as an argument. Before any thing can be legitimately built on it, it must be proved, if it is not self-evident. To prove such a connexion, then, between Abraham and his seed by this covenant, is not proof that such a connexion exists between other believers and their seed. The latter must be proved before it is admitted. Granting, then, that there was a spiritual connexion constituted between Abraham and his infant seed by this covenant, that such a connexion exists between every believer and his infant seed, is a thing that must be proved. This proof is sometimes rested on Gal. iii. where the blessing of Abraham is said to come on the Gentiles. But that blessing is not the blessing of a spiritual connexion between believers and their seed, but the blessing of having faith counted for righteousness, or of being justified as Abraham was justified. What that blessing is, we see in verse 9. "So then they which be of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham." None, then, are blessed with faithful Abraham, but "they which be of faith." In verse 7, it is said, "Know ye, therefore, that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham." Abraham, then, has no children spiritually, but such as are of faith. Between him and his infants there was no spiritual connexion.

3. My third observation is, that the covenant of Abraham is not made with all believers. Indeed, it is strange that there should be a necessity to make such an observation. The Abrahamic covenant is so evidently peculiar, that it is the most extravagant absurdity to suppose, that it is made with every believer in every age. Let us take a look at this covenant, as it is recorded in Gen. xii. 1. "Now, the Lord had said unto Abram, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will shew thee: And I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great; and thou shalt be a blessing. And I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee, and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed." Is

it not absolute lunacy to suppose, that this covenant is made with all believers? Has God promised to every believer that he will make of him a great nation? Has God promised to every believer that he will make his name great? Is every believer to become as celebrated as Abraham? Has God promised to every believer, that the Messiah shall descend from him, or that in him all families of the earth shall be blessed? Every believer, indeed, is to be blessed according to that covenant; but it is by having his faith, like Abraham's, counted for righteousness, not by becoming, like Abraham, the father of any of the faithful.

Let us look again at Gen. xv. 5. "Look now toward heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to number them: and he said unto him, So shall thy seed be. And he believed in the Lord, and he counted it to him for righteousness. And he said unto him, I am the Lord, that brought thee out of Ur of the Chaldees, to give thee this land to inherit it." Is every believer to have a posterity as numerous as the stars of heaven? Is every believer to have the land of Canaan for his posterity? It is said that every believer has a provision from God. This is granted, but is that a fulfilling of this promise? This is Canaan; and the whole earth, with the exception of that land, would not fulfil this promise. Every believer has a provision from God, but not in virtue of this covenant, nor at all suitable to the inheritance here promised. Abraham's posterity must have that land. No other believer has this promise, nor a promise at all corresponding to it. The most of the Lord's people have no Canaan on earth, though every one of them, with Abraham, is by faith heir of that better country typified by Canaan.

Let us read again Gen. xvii. 5. "Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham; for a father of many nations have I made thee. And I will make thee exceeding fruitful, and I will make nations of thee, and kings shall come out of thee. And I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God." Now, can any one think that this covenant is made with every believer? Has every believer a promise that kings shall descend from him? This covenant is indeed everlasting. It is everlasting to the carnal seed, first, as the covenant of royalty was everlasting to the seed of David, and as the covenant of the priesthood was everlasting to the seed

of Phinehas. But in all such promises there is a spirit and a letter. The covenant of Abraham is everlasting in the full sense of the word, for by it all Abraham's spiritual seed are blessed with him, by having their faith counted for righteousness to the end of the world. All believers in every age are blessed by this covenant; but to them it is not promised, as it was to Abraham, that God would be the God of their seed, for it does not secure that they shall have any offspring at all. This covenant secured to Abraham that he should have a seed,—that God would be the God of that seed. Had not God provided a seed both carnal and spiritual for Abraham, he would have broken this covenant. When God promised to Phinehas, “And he shall have it, and his seed after him, even the covenant of an everlasting priesthood,” Numb. xxv. 13, a posterity is secured by this promise. But believers often have no posterity, therefore they cannot have the covenant of Abraham. Believers have their own place in that covenant, but that is to be blessed in the seed of Abraham, and like him, to have their faith counted for righteousness. The promise to the seed is to Abraham's seed only—not to the seed of all believers. That Abraham's covenant is given to all believers, is not said here, nor any where else. Abraham's covenant is as peculiar to himself, as the covenant of royalty was to David, or the covenant of the priesthood to Phinehas. Even if the covenant of Abraham had promised, that every one of Abraham's posterity, by all his wives, to the end of the world, should be heirs of heaven, other believers have no concern in it. What was promised to Abraham's seed, was not promised to their seed. That covenant constitutes all believers Abraham's seed, and secures to them an inheritance as such. But of their seed it says nothing.

4. My fourth observation is, that the covenant of Abraham is not the new covenant, or the gospel. Dr Wardlaw supposes that Gal. iii. 8, establishes the identity of the Abrahamic covenant and the new covenant so clearly, that is a matter of surprise that any should doubt it. “And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed.” But this does not make Abraham's covenant the gospel. It preached the gospel by promising, that all nations should be blessed in Abraham. It might be said also of the Sinai covenant, that it preached the gospel, because the giving of the law through a mediator was a figure of Christ. Every part of the legal dispensation preached the gospel, and still preaches the gospel, Rom. x. 4. Will Dr Wardlaw

say, that there was nothing in the covenant of Abraham but the gospel? And that all its promises are promises of the gospel, to be fulfilled to every believer? Is it a part of the gospel, that God will be a God to the seed of believers, as he was to the seed of Abraham? Is this contained in the promise, "In thee shall all nations be blessed?" This is the declaration that is said to have preached the gospel to Abraham prophetically. But it says nothing to Dr Wardlaw's purpose. Many things essential to Abraham's covenant, are not promised by the gospel to all believers. It is, then, only an abuse of words to call Abraham's covenant the gospel.

5. My fifth observation is, that the promises of the covenant of Abraham, were not to his seed, either carnal or spiritual, exactly the same as to himself. God promised a numerous seed to Abraham. But this is not promised to his seed, either spiritual or carnal, individually. So far from this, the covenant of Abraham did not secure to any individual of his race, that he should have any descendants, except to Isaac and Jacob, to whom the covenant was expressly given. It would have been quite consistent with all the promises of that covenant, that any other individual should be childless; nay, that the most righteous man of his race might either have no children, or reprobate children. By the covenant, Abraham must have a succession of carnal and spiritual seed; but this is not promised to his descendants. The race of any other righteous descendant of Abraham, except Isaac and Jacob, might have been totally cut off for their sins, without any violation of Abraham's covenant. No Israelite, then, except Isaac and Jacob, had Abraham's covenant. This is a grand mistake in Dr Wardlaw. He supposes that every believer has Abraham's covenant, whereas no other man ever had it in all respects. Even Isaac and Jacob had it not in all respects. They were not the fathers of all who believe, while in some respects the whole Jewish nation had the covenant of Abraham. Granting, then, that believers now have the covenant of Abraham, even as his own believing descendants had it till the coming of Christ, this does not give them any promise to their seed. If any man is a believer, God will be his God, according to the covenant of Abraham, or he is by faith one of the seed of Abraham; but that he shall have a spiritual or a carnal seed, is not promised by that covenant. The covenant secures this to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob only; for to these it was individually given. It is as absurd for a believer to claim the promises to Abraham, as to claim the crown of Great Britain. This is a point as clear as the light of

heaven, and it overturns all the elaborate deductions that have been drawn from the Abrahamic covenant.

6. My sixth observation is, that the promise, "I will be a God to thy seed," has a letter and a spirit. It is said, that in this promise God must be a God to Abraham's seed; in the same sense in which he was a God to himself. I acknowledge, that from the words of the promise we could learn no distinction. But this is not absolutely necessary, and other Scriptures demand a distinction. Whether it has not an inferior sense in the letter, must be determined by the history of Abraham's descendants. Now, that it has an inferior sense in the letter, is one of the clearest things in the Old Testament. God is every where considered as the God of the whole Jewish nation, even in the worst periods of their history. This cannot imply that he was their God, in the full sense in which he was the God of Abraham.

Let us take a glance at a few passages that establish this distinction. Exod. xxix. 45, "And I will dwell among the children of Israel, and will be their God." This is spoken of the whole Jewish nation, who never were, as a nation, the true people of God. It might be said that this is spoken with respect to them, as all in the New Testament churches are addressed as saints, though there might be some who were not really such. But this is not an answer. All in the New Testament churches had given evidence that they were believers, though afterwards some of them turned out not to be such. But no such thing was ever supposed with respect to the Jews. They had their privileges, not by evidence of saintship, but by their birth. They were not only born into the kingdom of Israel, but were not afterwards put away for unbelief. There never was a law given them, as it was to the churches of Christ, that none but saints should belong to the nation or church of Israel. In Exod. xxxii. 11, we read, "And Moses besought the Lord his God, and said, Lord, why doth thy wrath wax hot against *thy people*?"—"Turn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of this evil against *thy people*."—"And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do against *his people*." Here the worshippers of the golden calf are called God's people; and the ground on which Moses pleads that God would not execute vengeance, is, that his promise of their inheriting the land might not be violated.

The same thing is evident from Lev. xxvi. 44, "And yet for all that, when they be in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them away, neither will abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and

to break my covenant with them: *for I am the Lord their God.*" Even in Babylon he fulfilled his promise of being unto them the Lord their God.

Agreeably to this, God is every where in the Old Testament considered as the husband of Israel; and this relation is acknowledged even in her adulteries. Isaiah iii. 14, "Turn, O backsliding children, saith the Lord; for I am married unto you." But it would be endless to quote passages. Now, God was the husband of Israel only in the letter, which was accomplished in Jesus becoming the husband of his Church.

That the covenant of Abraham has a letter and a spirit, is not a theory formed to serve a purpose, but is consonant to every part of the Old dispensation, and is the only thing that can harmonize it with the New. The temple was the house of God in the letter; believers are so in the spirit. To call any house the house of God, is as much below the sense which the same phrase has when it is applied to the Church of Christ, as to call the nation of Israel the people of God, is below the sense which that phrase has when applied to the spiritual Israel. Besides, there are many things spoken about the house of God in the letter, in terms that can only fully suit the spirit. "I have surely built thee an house to dwell in, a settled place for thee to abide in for ever," 1 Kings viii. 13. The incongruity of supposing him, whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain, to dwell in a house as a settled habitation, is removed only by referring it to the spirit, or God as dwelling in the flesh. Christ's body is the only temple of which this is fully true. God did not dwell in the temple built by Solomon for ever. But in the spirit, it is accomplished in its utmost extent. God will dwell in the temple of Christ's body for ever. In like manner, in answer to Solomon, God declares, "I have hallowed this house, which thou hast built, to put my name there for ever; and mine eyes and mine heart shall be there perpetually," 1 Kings ix. 3. It is only in Christ the Spirit that this is fully accomplished. In him the name of God is put for ever; and in him is he propitious to his people for ever. His eyes are long ago turned from the house at Jerusalem. The nation of Israel was the kingdom of God as the letter: the church of Christ is the kingdom of God as the spirit. The nation of Israel was a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation: the church of Christ is the spirit of which the other was but the letter. Israel was an elected people; but they were only types of the true election. They were all Jews in the letter; but it is said, not-

withstanding, that he is not a Jew who is one outwardly, Rom. ii. 28. There was an Israel after the flesh, and an Israel after the Spirit. "For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel; neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children: but, In Isaac shall thy seed be called. That is, they which are the children of the flesh, those are not the children of God: but the children of the promise are counted for the seed," Rom. ix. 6. Here we are furnished with an inspired commentary on this covenant. God was the God of the nation of Israel in the letter; and as such, he gave them an inheritance and laws, and ordinances of worship, &c. Even in that sense, he was not ashamed to be called their God; for he prepared for them a city. But to those who, with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, desired a better country, that is, an heavenly, he prepared a city fully answerable to the magnificence of the title, PEOPLE OF GOD. Of all the innumerable things which have a letter and a spirit with respect to Christ and his people, there is not one instance in which a magnificence is not given to the letter, which can be fully found only in the spirit. So little reason have we to think it strange, that God should call himself the God of a whole nation in a typical sense, when the body of that nation were not his true people.

7. My seventh observation is, that when a promise has a letter and a spirit, it is fulfilled when it is accomplished in either the letter or the spirit. It has two distinct accomplishments, and may be fulfilled in either, or in both. The Scriptures afford many examples to justify this observation. When, then, it is said that both the temporal promises and the spiritual in the covenant of Abraham are to the same seed, all that can be admitted is, that the words of the covenant do not make the distinction. But the distinction is seen in the history of the fulfilment of the promises, and in the explanation of these promises. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, clearly shews the distinction between the two seeds; and the history shews us that the nation in general enjoyed the temporal promises, but only few of them enjoyed the spiritual. Nothing can be clearer than this, and it is useless to reason with any who have so little spiritual discernment, as to think that all who enjoyed the earthly Canaan, were also heirs of the heavenly. The Pharisees and Sadducees enjoyed the earthly rest, while Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were strangers in Canaan, and died not having received the promises.

8. My eighth observation is, that circumcision neither signed

nor sealed the blessings of the covenant of Abraham, to the individuals to whom it was by divine appointment administered. It did not imply that they who were circumcised were accounted the heirs of the promises, either temporal or spiritual. It was not applied to mark them individually as heirs of the promises. It did not imply this even to Isaac and Jacob, who are by name designated heirs with Abraham. Their interest in the promises was secured to them, by God's expressly giving them the covenant, but was not represented in their circumcision. Circumcision marked no character, and had an individual application to no man but Abraham himself. It was the token of this covenant; and as a token or sign, no doubt applied to every promise in the covenant, but it did not designate the individuals circumcised as having a personal interest in these promises. The covenant promised a numerous seed to Abraham; circumcision, as the token of that covenant, must have been a sign of this. But it did not sign this to any other. Any other circumcised individual, except Isaac and Jacob, to whom the covenant was given by name, might have been childless. Circumcision did not import to any individual, that any portion of the numerous seed of Abraham should descend through him. The covenant promised that all nations should be blessed in Abraham, or that the Messiah should be his descendant. But circumcision was no sign to any other that the Messiah should descend from him,—even to Isaac and Jacob this promise was peculiarly given, and not implied in their circumcision. From some of Abraham's race, the Messiah, according to the covenant, must descend, and circumcision was a sign of this; but this was not signed by circumcision to any one of all his race. Much less could circumcision sign this to the strangers and slaves who were not of Abraham's posterity. The covenant promised Canaan to Abraham's descendants, but circumcision could be no sign of this to the strangers and slaves who enjoyed no inheritance in it. Indeed, even to Abraham's seed, it could not sign Canaan individually. For upwards of four hundred years from the institution of circumcision, Abraham's posterity did not enjoy Canaan, and millions of infants died without having enjoyed it. To these, then, circumcision could not be a sign of their enjoyment of that land. If it is said, that though they did not possess it, they had a right to it, I reply, that they had no right to it more than possession, for God would not do wrong in depriving them of their right. What was the ground of their right? Had they a promise or grant? They had not. The land was promised

to the seed of Abraham by Jacob, but not to all of them. Had it been promised to them all, they must have all enjoyed it, for God does not break his promises. To Abraham, it was individually promised, as also to Isaac and Jacob; and to them the promise was fulfilled in the spirit, as it was to many in the letter, who enjoyed not the promise in the spirit. They obtained the better country denoted by the promise of Canaan, and so, though they died not having received the promises, they died that they might receive them. When a prediction, or promise, has a letter and a spirit, it is fulfilled when it is accomplished either in the letter or the spirit. What sort of a right is a right to possess what is never designed to be given? A man may have a right to possess what he never possesses, but assuredly he will have no such right from God. God will not withhold any right: Abraham must have enjoyed what was promised. The promise of the land, then, must in the letter have respected Abraham's posterity, while it was accomplished to himself in a higher sense. He died, not disappointed, but looking for the promise. As the promises in the Abrahamic covenant were all unconditional, they must have been fulfilled to every individual interested in them.

But whatever may be said about the right of possessing Canaan, with respect to those who did not possess it, the reply of Mr Innes is abundantly sufficient. "Even this right to Canaan only belonged to one branch of Abraham's family, while circumcision was to be administered to all. To those who were subjected to it, then, it did not, as individuals, seal temporal blessings. Again, no one will allege it sealed spiritual blessings to every one to whom it was applied, as it was manifest, that many of those commanded to receive it, had no interest in such blessings."

Much stress has been laid on Rom. iv. 11, in which circumcision is called "a seal of the righteousness of the faith which Abraham had, yet being uncircumcised." It is said that it was a seal of spiritual blessings. Undoubtedly it was a seal of spiritual blessings, but not a seal to the individuals who were circumcised, that they were personally interested in these blessings. It seals the truth of the gospel, namely, that there is righteousness in the faith of Abraham, or that all who have Abraham's faith have righteousness. This is what it sealed when applied to Abraham; this is what it sealed in every instance of its application. But it did not seal, even to Isaac and Jacob, that they had this righteousness. It sealed the same truth when applied to Ishmael or Esau, or the slaves bought with money, as it did when

applied to those who walked in the steps of Abraham's faith. It had no individual application to any man but Abraham himself. Words cannot more expressly assert, that the thing of which circumcision is a seal, is *the righteousness of the faith of Abraham*. It was not a seal to others that they possessed the faith of Abraham. Dr Wardlaw supposes that such a marked reference to Abraham, would be inconsistent with farther trial. But this is a strange observation from an experienced Christian, deeply conversant with the Bible and his own heart. Were we in the morning assured, by a voice from heaven, that God had accepted us, were Satan to be let loose upon us, and we left to ourselves, it would not secure us till the evening from all the horrors of despair. Had God forsaken Abraham for a moment, he might have doubted whether it was God who had spoken to him in these transactions. Trial is not inconsistent with the utmost assurance that the Christian receives in this world. He may hold the truth this moment with the utmost assurance; let him be given into the hands of Satan to sift him, and he may doubt it the next. Christ himself received his Father's testimony by a voice from heaven, before he entered on his temptations, yet they were not less a trial on that account.

That circumcision was not intended to seal any thing personally to those who received it, is clear from its being applied to those who have no interest in the covenant to which it was attached. For a full, clear, and satisfactory view of this argument, I refer to Mr Innes, in his work entitled *Eugenio and Epinetus*. Dr Wardlaw alludes to it, but he cannot be said even to have assailed it. Every position of Mr Innes remains unshaken. Ishmael was circumcised, who was expressly excluded from the covenant. Abraham's slaves were commanded to be circumcised, without any reference to faith. "He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised," Gen. xvii. 13. "And Abraham took Ishmael his son, and all that were born in his house, and all that were bought with his money, every male among the men of Abraham's house; and circumcised the flesh of their foreskin in the self-same day, as God had said unto him," 23. Dr Wardlaw supposes that submission on the part of the adult slaves must have been voluntary. But this is not necessary. As a master, he had power to enforce obedience, and this commission authorised him. Abraham would have been justified in circumcising his slaves, had every one of them submitted with reluctance, or had endeavoured to resist. If, then, this is the law of baptism, it will justify the Spaniards in compelling the American Indians to be baptized. Nay, it

will make it the duty of every master of slaves to have them baptized, whether they have faith or not; for Abraham was bound to circumcise every slave and every person in his house. Dr Wardlaw speaks of force as being a profanation of a divine ordinance. To this Mr Haldane's reply is quite in point. "If in Israel a beautiful woman was taken captive, and an Israelite chose to marry her, it was the *divine ordinance* that her hair and nails should be cut. Now, why should there be greater profaneness in cutting off the foreskin?" But this objection is founded on an entire mistake, as to the nature of the profanation of a divine ordinance. How is a divine ordinance profaned? When it is not in all respects applied according to institution. It cannot be a profanation of the ordinance of circumcision, to apply it to those to whom it is expressly enjoined. Had murderers and adulterers been included in the command to baptize, and to eat the Lord's Supper, it would have been no profanation of divine ordinances more than to preach the gospel to such persons, profanes the gospel. Does Dr Wardlaw mean, that to force compliance to his appointments would be profane in God? Man has no right to use force with respect to divine appointments, because God has not given that authority. But God is a sovereign in all respects, and may in justice enforce obedience. Accordingly, he commanded the Canaanites to be cut off, and all idolators to be destroyed out of Israel. This is a grand distinction between the Jewish dispensation and the Christian. The subjects of Christ's kingdom are all voluntary. To baptize infants is to profane baptism, because it applies the ordinance to those not appointed to receive it. But to force slaves to receive circumcision is not a profanation, for Abraham's commission warranted force.

But even although the submission to circumcision had not been voluntary on the part of the slaves; is a voluntary submission all that is required for baptism? Is any man to be baptized who is willing to submit to the ordinance? Dr Wardlaw endeavours to obtain some relief from the faithfulness of Abraham, in teaching his family. But whatever may be supposed as to his faithfulness and success in teaching his slaves, their circumcision is not grounded on this, but on their being his property, and in his house. The command will apply to one that had been bought on that day, or to the most profane scoffer, as well as to Eliezer of Damascus. But what an extravagant supposition, that every slave in Abraham's house had Abraham's faith! And if they had not Abraham's faith, they were not such as had a right to baptism. If all Abraham's

household were so well taught, Abraham was much more successful with his slaves than Jacob was with his sons. But we need not waste time in refuting a supposition that is altogether apocryphal. There is nothing said about the knowledge or faith of Abraham's slaves; and they were commanded to be circumcised, not on account of their faith or knowledge, but on account of being the property of Abraham.

The circumcision of the slaves, which destroys the system of our opponents, is not only consonant to our views, but appears as suitable as the circumcision of the natural seed of Abraham by Isaac and Jacob. It is one of the patterns of heavenly things. As natural birth gives a title to circumcision and the earthly inheritance, which was a figure of the title of all who are born of the Spirit, to enjoy the heavenly inheritance; so the circumcision of the slaves bought with money, represented that all who enter into Christ's kingdom are bought with his blood. The circumcision of the slaves is as instructive as the circumcision of Isaac. He had a typical holiness, perfectly the same with the natural posterity of Abraham. The purpose of God in the circumcision of both Abraham's posterity and of their slaves, was totally independent of personal character.

Such a circumcision, then, could not imply, that the individuals had an interest in the spiritual promises of the covenant. Indeed, the circumcision of slaves did not make them partakers even of the temporal promises. "Servants," says Mr Haldane, "although circumcised, did not possess the privileges of the children of Abraham, nor were looked upon as the people of God. They had no share of the land, and there was no precept against selling them to another nation, when they would lose all privileges of Israel. This also manifestly appears from many considerations. In many of the laws, the distinction between Israel, who were the Lord's servants, and the stranger, is stated. Thus they might lend on usury to a stranger, but not to their brother, Deut. xxiii. 20. They were not to eat what died of itself. They were to give it unto the stranger that was in their gates, that he might eat it, or they might sell it to an alien, and the reason given is, "For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God," Deut. xiv. 21. They might also buy bondmen and bondmaids, not only of the heathen round about them, but of the children of the stranger that sojourned among them, but they could not keep an Israelite a bondman, Lev. xxv. 39—46. Thus it appears, that a person being circumcised, did not

thereby become entitled to the privileges of the children of Abraham, or of God's peculiar people." The Shechemites also, as Mr Haldane observes, were circumcised not only without evidence of faith, but even without a profession of it, which could not have been done with the approbation of Jacob, had it been unlawful. Here, then, persons are circumcised not only who had no evidence of being interested in the promises of the covenant, but who were shut out from its temporal promises most expressly. From the spiritual promises they were excluded as long as they continued unbelievers, but from the temporal promises they were excluded for ever. Persons, then, were circumcised who never could obtain an interest in some of the blessings of the covenant of which circumcision was the token. How absurd, then, to make this the law of baptism !

But that circumcision as a seal, had a personal reference to infants, is impossible. Our opponents generally say, that circumcision was a seal of spiritual blessings ; but the spiritual blessing of which it is said to be the seal, is *the righteousness of the faith of Abraham*. Now, of this spiritual blessing infants do not partake. They do not possess the faith of Abraham. Circumcision, then, cannot seal what is not true. TO ALL INFANTS IT IS EQUALLY UNSUITABLE AS A SEAL. None of them possess the faith of the righteousness of which circumcision was the seal. The argument, then, from circumcision for the baptism of infants, is utterly groundless. The former was applied to those who were manifestly destitute of an interest in the blessings of the covenant of Abraham.

The spiritual or emblematical meaning of circumcision, the change of the heart by the Holy Spirit, is also without personal reference to the circumcised infants. Infants are circumcised in the flesh, but were not circumcised in the heart. Fanaticism itself cannot suppose, that all the male infants of Israel, and of the slaves of Israel, were renewed by the Holy Spirit before the eighth day. The thing, therefore, that is shadowed by circumcision, is not to be found in the infants who were circumcised. In this it differs by the distance of heaven and earth from baptism.

That circumcision had no personal reference to the individuals circumcised, is also evident from the fact, that when a stranger desired to eat the passover, all the males of his family must be circumcised. " And when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the passover to the Lord, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it," Ex. xii. 43. Here there is no faith required in the person who desires to eat the passover, nor in

his adult males, whether children or slaves, who are to be circumcised as the condition of his eating the passover. The circumcision of his whole male family takes place as a matter of course. There is then no law that requires even a profession of faith in the God of Israel, in order to entitle a stranger to eat the passover. There is no condition of either faith or character. And had he a thousand unbelieving children and slaves, he has a divine warrant to circumcise them.

Our opponents are in the habit of insisting that baptism has come in the room of circumcision, or that it is the Christian circumcision. But this is the most groundless figment, for which there is no plausible foundation in the word of God. Yet the thing is so generally received, that it is taken for granted as a first principle. To overturn it, nothing more is necessary than to call for its proof. Col. ii. 11, 12, is usually appealed to as giving some countenance to the idea; and Mr Ewing is confident that, on any other principle, the apostle's reasoning is inconclusive, and even his language unintelligible. Now, it is very strange how this passage can be made to speak so decisively on this point. Let us hear it speak for itself: "In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ: Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead." This passage says not a word about the subject, either expressly or by implication. How, then, does Mr Ewing extract his notion from it? Why, by the help of a little management. He represents the apostle as saying, "Being buried with Christ by the washing of baptism, they are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands." Ah, Mr Ewing, can your conscience allow you to put so profane a hand on the word of God? He that can take this liberty with the Scriptures, may prove or disprove any thing. Does the apostle say, "Being buried, ye are circumcised?" This makes the apostle assert, that they were circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, by baptism. But this is not the apostle's assertion. He asserts, that they were circumcised with the circumcision of Christ, in or by the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ. What is said of baptism is something additional. By no torture are the words capable of Mr Ewing's gloss. The apostle himself minutely explains how they were circumcised in Christ. It is a circumcision made without hands. It cannot, then, be baptism; for it is not

without hands. This circumcision consists in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh. The external circumcision cut off a part of the flesh ; the circumcision without hands puts off the body of the sins of the flesh. This is the circumcision of Christ, the other was the circumcision of the law. It is the circumcision made without hands, the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh, that is here expressly called the circumcision of Christ. It is called the circumcision made without hands, to distinguish it from its type, the circumcision of the flesh : it is called the circumcision in which is put off the body of the sins of the flesh, to distinguish it from the typical circumcision, which did not cut off sin, but flesh : it is called the circumcision of Christ, to distinguish it from the circumcision of Moses. No language can be more express, or less capable of perversion. The circumcision here spoken of, could not possibly be baptism ; because it is a circumcision which Christians are not only said to have without any external operation, but which they have in Christ : “ *In whom ye are circumcised.*” Christ himself performs this circumcision, and we have it in him.

This passage clearly shews us what came in the room of circumcision. The circumcision made without hands, came in the room of the circumcision made with hands ; the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh, came in the room of the cutting off the foreskin ; the circumcision of Christ came in the room of the circumcision of Moses. All Christians are circumcised in heart, as all Jewish males were circumcised in the flesh. The Christian ordinances do not come in the room of the Jewish ordinances. Were this the case, every Jewish ordinance is equally entitled to a substitute or successor. Circumcision has no peculiar right to a preference. Every Jewish ordinance signified spiritual things, as well as circumcision. They are all fulfilled in their emblematical meaning, not in corresponding ordinances. For any thing which we could learn from the Old Testament, there might not have been any ritual ordinance in the New.

Circumcision and baptism correspond in meaning. They both relate to the renewal of the heart. The Lord's Supper and the Passover have a resemblance still more close ; yet the one is not said to come in the room of the other. Christ himself has come in the room of the Passover ; for it is said, “ Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us.” The Lord's Supper is a feast of like nature, but with this fundamental difference, which equally applies to baptism and circumcision, it does not belong to the same persons. The

Lord's Supper, as well as baptism, belongs solely to the true Israel of God; the Passover belonged to the carnal Israel, without respect to their faith or character. The persons whom John drove from his baptism, had as good a right to all the Jewish ordinances as John the Baptist himself. The Scribes, and Pharisees, and Sadducees, with the whole unbelieving body of the Jewish nation, enjoyed all the ordinances of the Jewish dispensation, by as valid a title as the apostles of Christ. Neither Jesus nor his apostles ever forbade this, nor made any observations on it as an impropriety. The ministrations of the priests were never objected to; because they were carnal men, and rejected the Messiah when he manifested himself to Israel. This is the grand distinction between the Jewish ordinances, and the ordinances of the church of Christ. The former shadowed good things to come, and were appointed for the nation in general, which had only a typical holiness; the latter are appointed only for the true holy people, and take it for granted, that all who partake of them, enjoy the thing figured by them.

If baptism came in the room of circumcision, it would not have commenced till the other had ceased; nor would it have been applied to circumcised persons. Why did John baptize the circumcised Jews before the manifestation of Christ? Why did Jesus baptize till after the end of the Jewish dispensation? But why shall we labour to overturn a mere figment? There is no need to establish, by arguments, that baptism did not come in the room of circumcision. Our opponents must prove that it did; and for this they have not the shadow of proof. They have the saying of divines, but this is the highest authority. It rests on no better evidence than the doctrine of the Pharisees for the washing of hands before meat. It is a tradition of the elders. Even if it did come in the room of circumcision, this does not import that it must have the same subjects, or be regulated by the same laws. How far they agree, and how far they differ, must be learned from what is said of them respectively. It is impossible to ascertain, from general principles, how far likeness extends.

Our opponents found the right in the child on the faith of the immediate ancestor. But if the law of circumcision is to regulate baptism, the posterity of a believer have a right to baptism, to the remotest generations, if all their intermediate progenitors were atheists. The child of a Jew must be circumcised without any respect to the faith of the parent. If, then, none but believers have a right to obtain baptism for their children, the law of circumcision

does not apply to it. Why then should it apply in any thing else?

It is said, that if the children of believers are not baptized, the privileges of the Jewish Church are greater than those of the Christian Church. As reasonably may this be said, if slaves are not baptized with their masters, and if we have not all an earthly Canaan. "We have no earthly inheritance like Israel," says Mr Haldane, "nor are Christian servants entirely exempted from work one day in seven, nor have we a sabbatic year, nor a jubilee when our debts are discharged." As to parents and children, circumcision was no privilege at all. Had circumcision made the children of the Jews heirs either of Canaan or of heaven, it might be considered as a privilege, but it did neither. It was not enjoined, nor ever explained as a privilege to individuals. It was enjoined by the most severe penalty, even death. The females had no loss by the want of it. They enjoyed every spiritual privilege equally with the males; and the want of circumcision did not deprive them even of any temporal privilege, which they would have enjoyed. It is true, indeed, that Paul says that there was much profit in circumcision, Rom. iii. 1, 2. But it is evident that this includes females, and refers to Israel as the circumcised nation. Circumcision is here taken for the whole legal dispensation to which it was attached. For the chief of these privileges was, "that to them were committed the oracles of God." Now the females had this privilege equally with the males. It was then rather a privilege to the females to be freed from this painful rite. Indeed, nothing can more clearly prove that circumcision could not be a spiritual privilege, than that the females were excluded. There never was a spiritual distinction between male and female. Circumcision was a part of that yoke, from which the spiritual Israelites were delivered by Christ. It is strange, then, to hear Christians speaking of it as a spiritual privilege. It arises from the same spirit that in the apostolic age made both Jews and Gentiles so prone to return to the weak and beggarly elements. He must be a babe in Christ, who cannot see how much the privileges of the new dispensation exceed those of the old, without taking into the account any ordinance in the room of circumcision. The Church of Israel had the circumcision of the flesh,—the church of the New Testament have the circumcision of the heart. Is not this an immeasurable enlargement of privileges? The child of the Christian is perfectly, as to spiritual things, on the footing of the children of the Jews, for circumcision implied nothing to them individually. It did not mark them as the children of

God. The children of believers may be said, in one point of view, to have better privileges, for they have a clearer revelation. They possess the oracles of God in a much greater proportion than the Jews did. *Circumcision secured to the circumcised person no blessing either temporal or spiritual: it was enforced by the penalty of death: it was not enjoined on all Jewish children: it was not enjoined on believers in other nations: it could not then be a spiritual privilege to individuals.* The edification that it contained was as available to females, who were excluded from it, as to the males on whom it was enjoined.

Nothing can more clearly prove that circumcision had no personal application to the circumcised individual, than the circumstance that this ordinance was inapplicable to females,—the one half of the seed of Israel. Had it been of any spiritual advantage, or had it been appointed to mark the character of those to whom it was applied, would females have been excluded? Were they not heirs of heaven equally with the males? Had circumcision then been appointed to designate the heirs of the everlasting inheritance, it must have been extended to females. It is said, the Abrahamic covenant contained spiritual blessings: infants had its seal; why, then, shall not infants have baptism? I reply, the one half of Jewish infants had not the seal, which demonstrates that the seal had no personal application to the individual.

It is said, that there is no better evidence that women should eat the Lord's Supper, than there is that infants should be baptized. Now, were this true, what is the consequence? Not that we should baptize infants to be consistent in admitting females to eat the Lord's Supper; but that females should be excluded from the Lord's Supper, as well as infants from baptism. This is the Popish argument to induce Protestants to receive the traditions of the Romish Church. They tell us, "Ye have changed dipping into sprinkling by the authority of the church; ye have no better authority for infant baptism itself: why then do ye not receive transubstantiation on the same authority?" I always reply, that my brethren, who practise infant baptism, do not ground their practice on the authority of the church, but on their view of Scripture; and that the argument is false, because it justifies one tradition by another. They tell us also, that we have no authority for the change of the Sabbath, but the authority of the church; and some pædobaptists tell us, that we have no better authority for the Lord's day than for infant baptism. I give the same reply to both. As soon

as I am convinced that this is the case, I will give up the Lord's day. Much as I value that day, I will not receive a cargo of Romish trumpery in order to license me to retain it. If the Lord's day has no better authority than the tradition of the church, or the arguments that support infant baptism, let it fall. But this is not the case. The Sabbath rests on pillars as firm as those of creation, being appointed before the entrance of sin, and grounded on reasons that are as lasting as the world. And the particular day is ascertained in the New Testament, as the first day of the week, and the Lord's day. But I will not here enter into proof, because it has nothing to do with this controversy. Even granting that it has no better proof than infant baptism, the latter is not relieved. In like manner, if there is no better authority for the eating of the Lord's Supper by females, than there is for infant baptism, both must fall together.

But they who make this objection, must have read the Scriptures with little reflection. That women did eat the Lord's Supper, there is the fullest and most direct evidence. "And upon the first day of the week, when the *disciples* came together to break bread," Acts xx. 7. Here it is said of the *disciples* without any exception, that they came together to eat the Lord's Supper. If then, women are disciples as well as men, there is here the most direct evidence that they ate the Lord's Supper. Paul delivered the Lord's Supper with the rest of the ordinances to the church at Corinth, without exception, 1 Cor. ii. 23; if then there were females in the church, they are included equally with the males. That females were members of the churches, is clear from the same chapter: for Paul speaks of a regulation with respect to them. Besides, from the whole account, it is evident that all in the church are equally concerned in eating the supper: "When ye come together, therefore, into one place, this is not to eat the Lord's Supper." This shews that the primary intention of their meetings was to eat the supper; and that they partook of it without exception. The word translated *man* also in the directions, verses 28—34, includes both male and female. Besides, it is expressly said, that under this dispensation, there is neither male nor female.

But though I have shewn that there is direct proof that women ate the Lord's Supper, I do not consider that this is necessary. Had I no other evidence than that they were baptized, I would consider this perfectly sufficient, if no restriction were given in any other part of Scripture. I do not object to inference. On the

contrary, I receive what is made out by inference, just as I receive the most direct statement. But an inference is not a guess, or conjecture, or probability, or conceit, drawn at random. It must be the necessary result of the principle from which it is deduced. If it is not, it should not be dignified with the name of inference. The person who is admitted to one ordinance of a church, is admitted to all, if there is no limitation. Indeed, the person who is admitted into a church, must have all the ordinances of the church, if there is no limitation. Is it not for these ordinances that a church exists? But are we for this reason to infer, that as infants under the Jewish dispensation received circumcision, a rite that supposed no character in the person circumcised, they should under the Christian dispensation receive baptism, which supposes that all baptized persons are washed from sin through the belief of the truth? In giving the Lord's Supper, had any directions been added that confined it to males, as the commission confines baptism to believers, then no inference could establish the right of females. There is not the smallest similarity between the cases.

It is often said that the Jewish Church was the same with the Christian. There is just such a portion of truth in this assertion, as to enable it to impose on the ignorant. But with respect to every thing which can concern this argument, it is manifestly false. Is the church that rejected the great body of the Jewish church, the same with the church which, by God's own appointment, contained those that were rejected? Was the church into which its members were born, the same with the church whose members must be born from above,—born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God? Was the church that admitted any stranger to its passover, without any condition of faith or character, merely on complying with a certain regulation that gave circumcision to their males, without any condition of faith or character, the same with the church that requires faith and true holiness in all who enjoy its ordinances? Was the church that contained the Scribes, and Pharisees, and Sadducees,—the most cruel, determined, open, and malignant enemies of Christ,—the same with that church into which such persons could not enter without a spiritual birth? The church of Israel was the nation of Israel, and as a whole could no more be called the church of Christ, in the sense of that phrase in the New Testament, than the nation of England can be called the church of Christ. It is said that a similar corruption has taken place in the church of Christ. But this observation

proceeds on a fundamental mistake. The very constitution of the Jewish church recognized the membership of carnal persons. It did not make the distinction between those born after the flesh, and those born after the Spirit. There was no law to exclude the Pharisees, or even the Sadducees, from the Jewish Church. Their doctrines and practices were condemned by the Old Testament; but it was no corruption of the constitution of the Church to contain them. On the other hand, the constitution of the churches of Christ rejects such persons, and provides for their expulsion. It is a corruption of the church that receives or retains them. The distinction between the two cases is as wide as the distance between earth and heaven.

As to the ordinances of the Jewish Church, they are all abolished. Christ himself, when on earth, could not be a priest in it, but he is the only priest of the Christian Church. "For the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of the law." Whatever unity may be supposed to be in the Jewish Church and the church of the New Testament, it does not consist in sameness of members, or of ordinances. The one, by its constitution, included carnal members; the other, by its constitution, admits spiritual members only. This, then, is the only point of view in which the subject can have any reference to the controversy on baptism. This difference existing, no number of points of coincidence can avail our opponents.

The church of Israel was the type of the church of the New Testament, containing no doubt the body of the people of God at that time on the earth, and in this point of view, may be called the same. Both are called the kingdom of God, and both were such, but in a different sense. The one was a kingdom of this world; the other is a kingdom not of this world. God's kingdom of Israel contained many who did not belong to his spiritual kingdom; and some belonged to his spiritual kingdom, who did not belong to the typical kingdom. All the believers belong to the church of Christ, but all believers did not belong to the church of Israel.

As the church of Israel was the church of God, typical of his true church, and containing in every successive age a remnant of the spiritual seed of Abraham, according to the election of grace, the New Testament Church is spoken of in the Old under the figure of Israel, Zion, Jerusalem, God's holy mountain, the tabernacle of David, &c. &c. This cannot possibly apply literally, and is explained by the apostles as referring to the calling of the Gentiles. In like manner, the book of Revelation speaks of measuring the

temple. The reality is spoken of under the name of that which was its type. The restoration of the Jews, also, is spoken of as a re-union into their own olive-tree. A correct view of this peculiarity is of great importance, and I perceive that it is very much misunderstood by our opponents; but as it has no concern with this controversy, I will not enter on any discussion foreign to my subject. As to this controversy, I care not what sameness our opponents may pretend to find between the church of Israel and the church of Christ, as long as they are different in members and ordinances.

9. My ninth observation is, that baptism is not the seal of the New Covenant. That baptism and the Lord's Supper are seals of the covenant, is a doctrine so common, and a phraseology so established, that it is received without question as a first principle. They who measure truth by the attainments of our ancestors, look upon the questioning of this dogma as a kind of impiety and heresy; and even the modern Independents, who have professed to be guided solely by the Bible, have very generally continued to speak in the same language. While I highly respect and value the ancient writers who speak in this manner, I strongly protest against it as unscriptural, and as laying a foundation for receiving other things on the authority of man. Let our ancestors have all the esteem and gratitude to which they are entitled,—but that esteem is much misplaced, if it leads us to follow them in any thing in which they have not followed Christ. In many things their attainments were great, and their writings are worthy of the most careful study. But in some things they were mistaken, and reverence for them ought not to induce us to receive their errors. It is disgraceful to Christians, that they continue to hold the errors of their worthy ancestors, and to feel a reverence for the unscriptural phraseology of ancient divines, similar to that of the Pharisees for the traditions of the Elders. Is there any Jewish tradition more void of scriptural authority, than that which designates baptism and the Lord's Supper *seals of the New Covenant*? There is not in the New Testament any single portion that can bear such a meaning. And what can the wisest of men know about these things, but what God has told us? He has not said that baptism is a seal. Circumcision was a seal of the righteousness of the faith of Abraham. This was God's seal to that truth, till the letter was abolished. The spirit of the truth is the seal, and the circumcision of the heart by him is the thing signified by circumcision in the flesh. The circumcised nation was typical of the church of Christ, for the Apos-

He says, "we are the circumcision, which worship God in the spirit;" and "circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter." The circumcision of the Jews was the letter, of which the circumcision of the heart in Christians is the spirit. The Christian, then, has a more exalted seal than circumcision. He has the Spirit of God, "whereby he is sealed unto the day of redemption," Ephes. iv. 30. When sinners believe in Christ, they are sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise, which is "the earnest of their inheritance until the redemption of the purchased possession," Eph. i. 13. The seal, then, that comes in the room of circumcision, is the seal of the Spirit. Circumcision sealed God's truth to Abraham, and all who ever shall have the faith of Abraham. It was applied to the typical nation without respect to character, but the seal of the Spirit is applied to none but believers, and to believers of all nations as well as Jews. When the Holy Spirit himself, in the heart of the believer, is the seal of God's truth, there is no need of any other seal. Baptism represents the belief of the truth in a figure, and takes it for granted that they are believers to whom it is applied—but it is no seal of this. They may appear to be Christians to-day, and therefore ought to be baptized; to-morrow they may prove the contrary, and therefore they cannot have been sealed by baptism. He that is once sealed by the Spirit, is secured to eternity.

10. My last observation is, that to place the grounds of infant baptism on the Abrahamic covenant, is to make intelligent obedience impossible to the most of Christians. If no believer can know what the Lord requires in this matter, till he understands the covenant of Abraham, very many could not act at all. Can any man think that God would leave the grounds of this duty so enveloped in darkness? When the most illiterate heathen, the most ignorant savage, believes the gospel, five minutes will be enough to prove to him the duty of being baptized as a believer. But if he has children, when will he be able to baptize them by his knowledge of the covenant of Abraham? The most acute writers, who have been all their lives engaged in the study of it, and in defence of infant baptism from it, are not able to keep themselves from speaking in many things like children. And after all their striving, they have not been able to make out a consistent scheme. It is only the prejudices of the public, which are universally and strongly in their favour, that screen them from the ridicule of the most childish trifling. Many of themselves, after wasting perhaps a quarter of a

century in adjusting a scheme, are obliged to tear it down with their own hands. In my ignorance, I made the attempt, as well as others; but I must either give up the Bible, or give up infant baptism. If, then, it is so difficult a thing, to make out a plausible case in defence of infant baptism from the Abrahamic covenant, even with all the advantages that constant study affords, what must be the situation of the newly converted pagan? Has God left him in such a condition that he cannot know whether he ought to baptize his children, till he can penetrate the deep recesses of the covenant of Abraham? Mr Ewing complains that many persons go over from the Independent churches to the Baptists, before they are thoroughly acquainted with the subject. Now this may be true, if he means that they are not able to discuss with him the popping system, or the Abrahamic covenant. But it is not true, as respects the knowledge of the scriptural grounds for that ordinance. Five minutes are sufficient to convince any man, who is open to conviction, and who comes to the Scriptures like a little child. I have written a large book to prove what I believe might be clearly pointed out in a few minutes, if all the disciples of Christ had in all things the teachableness of a little child. Every believer must be as a little child; he cannot receive the truth but as a little child. But it is only with respect to the truth itself, that all Christians are of this character. With respect to any thing in which we are not taught by the Spirit, we are as unteachable and perverse as the world. Christ's institutions, therefore, it is much to be lamented, are despised and corrupted, even by his own children. How soon was the Lord's Supper corrupted by the church at Corinth! And by our long sojourning in Babylon, we have been so accustomed to speak her language, that we have in a great measure corrupted our own. Babylonish words, Babylonish accent, Babylonish rites, may still be discovered in the School of Christ. It is well if ever we fully recover the language of Jerusalem.

There is not one of all the ordinances of the Lord Jesus Christ, that has been left untouched by the wisdom of man. Some of them have been abandoned as worn out by time: others of them have been entirely new-modelled, so that not a feature of them remains as it came from his Lord: and many things have been added, of which no vestige is found in the word of God. Baptism has been changed both in its form, and in its subjects; and it is lamentable to observe, with what perverseness even Christians cling to the innovations. In this we see remarkably fulfilled what our Lord

charges on the Pharisees. The commandment of God requires children to support their parents when destitute, but the Pharisees delivered men from this commandment by substituting something for it. "Thus," says Christ, "have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition," Matth. xv. 6. Now, the like has taken place with respect to baptism. The ordinance that Jesus appointed was an immersion in water, as a figure of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, and of the believer with him. The wisdom of man has changed immersion into pouring or sprinkling a little water on the face, without any reference to death, burial, and resurrection. This is the substitute for the Lord's commandment. Is not this the very thing that Christ charges on the Pharisees? The Pharisees told their disciples that the *corban* or gift would be a substitute for obeying the commandment of God; and we are told, that though *immersion* was the original mode of baptism, yet *pouring* or *sprinkling* will answer the same end, and be sufficient for baptism. Others whose principles will not allow them the use of this antichristian liberty, do still greater violence to the Scriptures, by forcing them to speak what they wish. Ah, my fellow Christians, why will ye follow the Pharisees in making void the commandment of God?

In like manner, the invention of man in baptizing infants has totally set aside the ordinance of God. Jesus commands believers to be baptized; but since the Pharisees have introduced infant baptism, Christ's baptism is not known, so far as the other extends. The baptizing of persons in infancy is made to stand as a substitute for the baptism of believers, which Christ appointed. Christ's ordinance, then, has been totally abolished, and a human invention both in mode and subjects has taken its name. So true it is that every invention of man in the things of God, has a tendency to supplant some part of divine truth.

Thus have we seen, from the most impartial examination, that infant baptism has not in the word of God an inch of solid ground on which to stand. The apostolic commission commands the baptism of believers, and of believers only. No lawful interpretation can introduce infants into that commission, or give authority to dispense with the baptizing of believers. No instance of the baptism of an infant is to be found among the documents of the apostolic practice. A child may perceive the insufficiency of the argument from the households. The Abrahamic covenant has no bear-

ing on this subject. Baptism, I have shewn to be immersion, by a strength of evidence, that no true scholar—no sound critic—will ever attempt to overturn. Let the children of God renounce the traditions of men; let them submit with humility and with gratitude to the ordinance of Christ. In the keeping of his commandments, there is a great reward. “He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me, and I will love him, and will manifest myself unto him. This is the love of God, that ye keep his commandments.—Why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say?”

FINIS.

ERRATA.

- Page 159, line 35, *before impossible read not.*
 — 210, — 39, *for Sicyphus read Sisyphus.*
 — 213, — 35, *for come read came.*

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REPLY TO REMARKS

ON

MR. CARSON'S TREATISE ON BAPTISM,

CONTAINED IN A NOTE IN

MR. BICKERSTETH'S LATE WORK

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

BY

ALEXANDER CARSON, A. M.

IPSWICH:

J. M. BURTON. LONDON: SIMPKIN AND MARSHALL; AND
G. WIGHTMAN. EDINBURGH: W. WHYTE AND CO.
DUBLIN: W. CARSON.

1840.

THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTY OF IPSWICH

The history of the county of Ipswich, from the earliest times to the present, is a subject of great interest and importance. It is a subject which has attracted the attention of many of our countrymen, and which has been the subject of many valuable works. The history of the county of Ipswich is a subject which has attracted the attention of many of our countrymen, and which has been the subject of many valuable works.

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REPLY TO REMARKS,

&c.

IN religious controversy it is a great advantage to have an opponent who is under the influence of the fear of God, and who can be viewed as writing with a paramount regard to the authority of scripture. With many controversialists the object evidently is, not to ascertain, with exactness and certainty, the testimony of God; but with all licentiousness to exert ingenuity to defend the cause they have espoused, and evade the conclusions of their antagonists. The aim is to defend a favourite cause and put down opposition, not to search for truth, and exhibit it with evidence. To avoid reprehending such writers with severity, is neither possible nor warrantable. The artifices of sophistry are as dishonest as those of pickpockets or swindlers, and they are much more injurious to the interests of mankind. The delinquents ought not only to be obliged to restore what they have unjustly taken away; but to suffer exemplary punishment as a warning to others.

On the present occasion I am peculiarly favoured, in having an opponent whom I respect and love for the truth's sake that dwelleth in him; and it is my resolution not to sink the probe a hair's breadth more deeply than the cure of the wound requires. Mr. Bickersteth I believe to be eminently a man of God. But I must defend truth at every expense. I shall know no man who opposes it. The word of God is my only standard. It would be much more agreeable to my feelings, and more advantageous to my interest, to write only on such subjects as would meet the approbation of the great body of christians. Yet with the full foresight of all the unpopularity that attends opposition to popular errors, I have often come forward to the support of injured truth. It is in itself a grievous thing, that the time and talents of God's people, instead of being wholly employed against the common enemy, for the advancement of the common faith, should be employed

in opposing each other; but while error is to be found among them, the thing is unavoidable. It may be afflictive to us, but the God of wisdom must have some wise purpose to serve by it.

The remarks on my Treatise on Baptism, which are contained in a note* in a work on the same subject by Mr. Bickersteth, he tells us are from the pen of a friend. But as Mr. Bickersteth has identified himself with his friend, by publishing the remarks in his book, I shall make him accountable for everything in them. As I have not yet read a line of Mr. Bickersteth's work, except the appendix, I shall confine my observations to the remarks of his friend.

"Mr. C. treats in his work," says the writer, "first of the mode, and next of the subjects of baptism. The choice of this order is itself instructive. The main topic is made secondary to one quite subordinate." I am the most successful author that ever wrote a book. Most authors are very well contented if they yield instruction in the things in which they intend to instruct. But it is my privilege, it seems, to yield instruction utterly beyond the bounds of my contemplation. To express an opinion, with respect to the comparative importance of the mode and of the subjects of baptism, by the order of treating them, never once crossed my mind. I chose this order merely as the most natural. It is surely natural to treat of the meaning of a word, before treating of the persons to whom the thing meant is applicable. I believe it is not unusual for writers on both sides of the question to follow this order. But if any one chooses to follow a different order, I have not the slightest objection. I am just like the preacher, who, in expounding Peter's address to the lame man whom he was about to heal, said, "my friends, this may with equal propriety be translated either silver and gold, or gold and silver." Indeed, many would choose to handle the most important part of the subject last, that it might leave the stronger impression. In oratory, some choose to urge the strongest grounds first, while others prefer placing them last. Had I thought it useful to express an opinion as to the comparative importance of the mode and of the subjects of baptism, I would not have accomplished the thing by insinuation, or indirectly; I have confidence enough to state my meaning in direct terms. Instead of designing to draw peculiar attention to the importance of the mode, I consider both mode and subjects altogether essential to the very existence of this ordinance. If the thing signified by the word,

* The note may be seen in a Review of Mr. Bickersteth's Work in the Evangelical Magazine for May.

whatever that may be, is not performed on the subjects, it cannot be baptism; for what is baptism but the thing signified by the word? If the persons baptized are not the persons appointed to be baptized, it cannot be christian baptism, although in mode it may be perfectly correct; for christian baptism is not every immersion of persons, but an immersion of certain persons for a certain purpose.

In my turn I shall say, and for the truth of the observation I appeal to every impartial reader, that this assertion of the writer is very instructive. It shows most clearly that he is deeply prejudiced, and that he looks at evidence through a perverted medium. He sees goblins which have no existence, but in his own disordered imagination. Is it to be wondered that such a person should see infant-sprinkling in scripture, when he sees in my work an opinion expressed which never occurred to myself. Had I lived in former times, and had the writer been giving an account of my sentiments on baptism, he would have represented me as holding the opinion referred to. I can believe he is sincere in taking such a meaning from the order of treating the subject; but verily it is only at the expense of his judgment that I am able to exert so much charity.

“This,” continues the writer, “is the common tendency in the vehement advocates of his views.” Not only, it seems, is the opinion of comparative importance expressed by the order of treatment, but it is vehemence that originates this opinion. Is this assertion founded on evidence? May not such an opinion be both entertained and expressed by the coolest advocate of the doctrine? The writer has expressed an opinion of the comparative importance of the subjects. Is this to be ascribed to vehemence?

I have on the subject of baptism, the strongest and most decided views; but I have no disproportionate zeal for the mode over that of the subjects, nor for both mode and subjects over other things. I never make them the standard for estimating a man’s christianity, nor even for his advancement in the divine life. I am sure that Mr. Bickersteth and I are more united in the things which we both believe to be of the greatest importance, than we are with many who may agree with us respectively as to the mode and subjects of baptism. The faith of the gospel, and that only, I recognise as the bond of union among christians. Is it then in the spirit of a christian to insinuate that with respect to my views of baptism, “the ritual prevails over the personal, the tone of the Jew replaces the spirit of the christian?” Can there be a more groundless calumny?

I set no value on a rite separate from the import of it. Is it wise in the Church of England to tax its neighbours with too great attention to rites? The rites of God's appointment I value most highly: but I value them only as they are applied to the persons for whom God appointed them, and for the purpose for which God appointed them. Were all the people of England to ask me to baptize them, I would not baptize an individual but those appointed by Christ to be baptized. The mere rite could profit them nothing. In urging compliance with the appointments of Christ, I never distinguish between things of a ritual nature and other things. All things commanded by Christ demand equal obedience. It is enough for me to know that Christ has commanded immersion. Were it the very least of all his commandments, it is to me better than life. This is the spirit with which I read the scriptures. I never balance the importance of different things, with a view to keep the one and violate the other. Everything that God commands is important, and bonds and death ought to be endured rather than disobey.

Here, then, Mr. Bickersteth, I charge your conscience as a christian. You have identified yourself with your friend, by adopting his remarks. I ask you before God, whether you think that the order of handling the subject of baptism, with respect to mode and subjects indicates an opinion of superiority of importance—whether you believe that such an opinion indicates vehemence, and whether you think it indicates a jewish tone, and the absence of a christian spirit. You must give an account of these reckless insinuations. It is a very inauspicious commencement to begin with calumny. "In the former part," says Mr. Bickersteth's friend, "Mr. C. replies to Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw, two Independent ministers, advocates of Paedobaptism, and the latter of them well known by other works. Mr. Ewing had advanced a strange theory of the derivation of the Greek word βαπτω, from which he inferred that both the word itself and its derivative βαπτίζω, apply in their native meaning, alike to dipping, pouring, or sprinkling, or any application of water. He maintained further, that immersion was not commonly, if at all, used in the baptisms mentioned in scripture. This no sound critic would maintain, and no consistent churchman is called upon to believe. Mr. C. refutes effectively these positions of Mr. Ewing; but the conclusions he establishes, so far from proving his point, that immersion is essential to christian baptism, really prove the exact reverse. A few words will briefly explain this." However wild and extravagant are Mr. Ewing's criticisms on the origin and use of the

word in dispute, they were at the time lauded as triumphant and unanswerable by the reviews and the periodical press. The reviewers now, I am told, are boasting of the exploits performed in this note. If I have refuted effectively the positions of Mr. Ewing, I pledge myself to refute as effectively the positions of this writer. He says, that the conclusions which I have established, so far from proving my point, that immersion is essential to christian baptism, really prove the exact reverse. Here now my antagonist and I are fairly at issue. If I do not without stressing a muscle put him under my feet, I will consent to forfeit all pretensions to critical acumen.

In the mean time, I call on the reader to observe an expression in the above extract. The writer tells us that no consistent churchman is bound to believe Mr. Ewing's doctrine. In their deviations from truth on this subject, there is a great difference among the different sects, and every one is careful to admit no more truth than what is consistent with his sect. It reminds me of the reply of the chief priests and the elders to the question of Christ with respect to the baptism of John. "The baptism of John, whence was it? from heaven, or from men? And they reasoned among themselves, saying, if we shall say, from heaven, he will say unto us, why did you not then believe him? But if we should say of men; we fear the people; for all hold John as a prophet. And they answered Jesus, and said, we cannot tell." Now about the meaning of the word baptism, ask the Roman Catholic authorities, and they will at once without hesitation on this matter, freely confess the truth; because their church has power to enact and annul. Ask the Church of England the same question, and it comes very near the truth; for it has sufficient power to effect such a change for wise and pious purposes. Ask others whose principles bind them to scripture authority exclusively, and they will force the word to signify *pour*, or *sprinkle*, or *pop*, or *purify*, or *wash*, or *make a wash upon*, or *perform a water ceremony*, or something that will bring the usual mode of practice within the meaning of the word. But ask the bible society, which must reconcile the jarring claims of all parties, and they will boldly answer with the chief priests, we cannot tell what it means. It is utterly impossible to translate it. Transference is the only means of union.

The numerous and conflicting meanings assigned to this word by persons who in practice are all identified, afford a self-evidence that they are all in error. As their practice is the same, it is evidently their interest to rest it on the same ground; and there is nothing to lead any of them to

reject a sufficient foundation, if any such could be found. With all their differences, they are willing enough to avail themselves of common ground, as far as they think it possible. What is the reason, then, that, with a common interest, they cannot agree in a common meaning? The reason obviously is, that no meaning has ever been given by any of them, which is really and perfectly satisfactory even to themselves. They are then constantly on the look-out for something new, and something that will answer more effectually than anything hitherto alleged. Sprinkle and pour have been obliged to retire, and various new meanings successively take their place, and maintain authority for a time. Mr. Ewing's *pop*, however ridiculous it may appear to Mr. Bickersteth's friend and to me, was lauded with loudest acclamations at the time. But poor *pop* has now been obliged to retire in disgrace, branded with reprobation even by the friends of sprinkling. It looked very handsome when it came into life; but Dr. Cox and I applied the dissecting knife, and the skeleton, as it may be seen in the museum, is very hideous. President Beecher, an American writer, has lately found that *purify* is the proper meaning of the term, and I am told that this is looked on as absolute demonstration. Well, God willing, I shall, when convenient, try my knife upon it. When I shall have dissected it, I hope I will be able to discover its disease.

Now, I ask philosophy, what can be the reason of the never-ending variation in assigning meaning to this word? Can it be anything else, but that no meaning can be given which is at once true and suitable? Let it be observed, that it is not variation in the medium of proof, but variation in the very meaning of the term. The sprinklers are evidently like the infidel jews, who, rejecting the true Messiah, are ever looking out for one, and are deceived with every impostor. *Pop* rises in the secret chamber in Glasgow, and for a time leads away the world: *purify* has spoken from the wilderness in America, and harbingers are found to usher it into Britain. Will the time never come when God's people will submit to his commandments with the docility of little children?

"First," says the writer, "let us state the exact question in dispute. The Baptist maintains that the word βαπτίζω, in its proper classic usage, means to dip or immerse only. He further asserts, that when applied to the ordinance of Christ, this idea of a specific mode remains so essential, that without it the ordinance is void." This is a very circuitous statement of the question at issue. The simple question is, what is the meaning of the word? When this is ascertained, the question is settled. But I

will follow the author in his statement. He tells us that the baptist asserts, that when the word is applied to an ordinance of Christ, the idea of a specific mode remains so essential, that without it the ordinance is void. He should have stated the thing still more strongly. I would not say that without immersion the ordinance of baptism is void. Without immersion it is not the ordinance at all. It may be a very solemn ceremony; but it is a ceremony of human invention. It may be believed by the Lord's people to be an ordinance of Christ; but this does not make it an ordinance of Christ. If the word signifies immersion, can there be baptism where there is no immersion? This would be immersion without immersion. Grant, as the writer does, that the meaning of the word, when first applied, was immersion, that nothing but immersion is baptism is a self-evident truth. The contrary is a contradiction. Whatever is the meaning of the word at the time of its first application to the ordinance, must be essential to the ordinance; for the ordinance is expressed by the word. If a specific mode was contained in the word when first applied to the ordinance, a specific mode must for ever remain in it; for whatever change may take place afterwards in the meaning of the word, it can have no change with reference to Christ's ordinance. What he enjoined must remain as he enjoined it. Now the word when first applied to this ordinance, not only contained a specific mode, but it expressed nothing but a specific mode. Mode was its very essence.

I may be told, that on my own principles it is possible, that the word in the progress of its use might change its meaning. I admit this. I have proved the fact with respect to other words; and what has been effected with respect to others, is possible with this. I do not recede a tittle from what I have taught on the philology of this question. This surely is granting my present antagonist all he can demand. But this question has no concern with any change in the meaning of the word, either possible or actual, after its application to the ordinance. As a matter of fact, it never underwent the change for which my antagonist contends. But had it actually undergone such a change it would not relieve him. Whatever was the meaning of the word, when first applied to the ordinance of Christ, is the thing enjoined by Christ. If at first the command was to *immerse*, the command must still be to *immerse*.

But in the view of this writer, the belief of the baptist is still more extravagant and paradoxical; for "he believes, that though the minister designs solemnly to administer Christ's ordinance,

though the believer designs to receive it, though the name of the Father, Son, and Spirit be invoked, though the element of water be used—unless the whole body be immersed beneath the element, the whole is vain and nugatory, and the party remains unbaptized.” All true, perfectly true; and no axiom is more evident. However sincere we may believe our opponents to be, still we cannot believe that a person is immersed when he is sprinkled. The minister may design solemnly to administer Christ’s ordinance, yet if he sprinkles, we cannot believe that he baptizes, because baptism is immersion. He may be truly washed in the blood of Christ, when, out of ignorance of the will of his master, he is sprinkled instead of being immersed. Sincerity cannot convert one thing into another, and cannot cause sprinkling to be immersion. Intention to fulfil a command does not fulfil it, if the nature of the command is mistaken. God will forgive the ignorance of his people, but he will not reckon that a person has fulfilled his command, who has mistaken his command. The church at Corinth designed, no doubt, to observe the Lord’s Supper; yet the apostle Paul would not give their observance the name of Christ’s ordinance. A Roman Catholic priest may sincerely design to transubstantiate the wafer into Christ, but notwithstanding his sincerity, he fails. I have no objection to admit, that persons mistaken about the mode and subjects of baptism, may be among the most eminent and the most useful of the servants of God; but to admit that any one is baptized who is not immersed, is self-contradiction. Immersion is the very thing enjoined in the ordinance. The design of both the administrator and the receiver of any rite, can have no effect whatever on the meaning of this word, and cannot at all change into an ordinance of Christ what is not an ordinance of Christ. Neither can the use of the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, convert sprinkling into baptism. Chivalry creates its knights with this solemnity; but does it thereby make the ceremony a divine appointment? Is it not a fearful thing, to do in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, that which the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit have not enjoined? Men may endeavour, by adding a load of ceremonies, to compensate for what they omit, but all is vain. Nor does the use of water make the rite baptism. All use of water is not baptism. It is only as water is used according to Christ’s commandment, that it is baptism. The sprinkling of the holy water of the church of Rome is not baptism. To all the things mentioned by the writer, may be added the cross and the oil and the spittle, with exorcism, and

the honey, and the white garments, yet where there is no immersion there is no baptism.

Having given us the creed of the baptist, the writer of the note next gives us that of the churchman. He does well to restrict it to the churchman; for other denominations of Paedobaptists would reject it with abhorrence. Here we have the testimony of churchmen, that the meaning of the word when first applied to the ordinance, is that for which we contend, and that the burden of the change must rest on the shoulders of the church; while we have the testimony of the other denominations, that the authority of the church is not a valid foundation. But let us hear the author. "The churchman," says he, "on the other hand, allows that to dip is the primary and almost constant meaning of the word in classic authors. He further admits, that probably, if not certainly, in some of the scripture instances, and possibly in all, immersion was practised. But he believes that when once the word was regularly applied to the ordinance of Christ, it received a new and more important element of meaning, and that thenceforward the idea of one specific mode was no longer essential. He sees that in scripture, dipping, pouring, and sprinkling are all variously used as signs of spiritual cleansing. He knows that in ceremonial observances, Christ has enjoined regard to decency, comeliness, order, and convenience. He is aware that total immersion, in colder climates and tender age, is less convenient. He believes that Christ has given to his church authority in precisely such points of outward order, to appoint, under varying circumstances, as the spirit of wisdom shall teach and suggest. He therefore concurs fully in the arrangement of the church in this land, by which dipping is proposed as the standard mode, the more primitive and fully significant, but in which, for seemliness or safety, pouring is expressly appointed in certain cases, and sprinkling practically allowed in all." This churchman must know that other churchmen have gone further. They have not only admitted that immersion is the ordinance of Christ, and that nothing but necessity can justify a departure; many of them have wished that the original practice should be revived. Dr. Johnson, in referring to the change in the Eucharist, says, "I think they (Roman Catholics) are as well warranted to make this alteration, as we are to substitute sprinkling in the room of the ancient baptism." Petavius, the celebrated Jesuit, speaking of the power of the church to alter, or impose, says, "And indeed immersion is properly βαπτισμος, though at present we content ourselves with pouring water on the head." It is expressly not only on this

principle, but on the authority of the very example of changing immersion into sprinkling, that Bossuet vindicates the change in the Lord's supper. Admissions of opponents, however, I entirely disregard on this subject. I can prove the point with evidence sufficient to satisfy any rational creature. If any man will be obstinately ignorant, let him be ignorant. The Lord Jesus Christ will come.

Guarded, however, as this churchman is in his admissions, they are quite sufficient for my purpose. If, as he admits, immersion was the meaning of the word at the time of its appropriation to the ordinance; and if possibly all scripture instances of baptism conformed to this, I need nothing else to establish my point. The word must be used in reference to the ordinance, in the sense which it possessed at the time that it was first applied to the ordinance. The laws of language absolutely require this. And, according to the testimony of this candid churchman, there is no insurmountable difficulty in supposing that every instance of baptism mentioned in scripture, was performed by immersion. The difficulties, then, which some have pretended to find on this supposition, the churchman agrees with me, are all surmountable.

“But,” says the writer, “he believes that when once the word was regularly applied to the ordinance of Christ, it received a new and more important element of meaning, and that thenceforward the idea of one specific mode was no longer essential.” This is a most marvellous doctrine. If the word at the time Christ appointed the ordinance signified immersion, will it lose that signification the moment that Christ enjoins immersion? Does a command to use a specific mode imply that no specific mode is to be observed, but that all modes are equally legitimate? Whatever element it may be supposed is added to the signification of a word on its appropriation, it surely does not lose any element, much less its very essence. The appropriation of a word restricts its application on certain subjects, but it does not divest it of its meaning. The appropriation of this word confines it to the ordinance in question, but it is to that ordinance only as it exists when it is so appropriated. Men may change the ordinance, and change the meaning of the word, but such change has no effect on the meaning of the word as used in scripture for this ordinance. The writer here entirely mistakes the principle of appropriation which I have explained, and which he thinks he can use against myself. Appropriation gave the word a particular direction to a particular subject, but did not divest the word of its meaning. This may be illustrated

from every instance of appropriation. When words are appropriated, they are indeed liable to change their meaning with every corresponding change in the thing to which they are appropriated; but as respects the scriptures there can be a change in neither. The ordinance remains the same there, and the meaning of its name can never, as to scripture use, be less or more. I care not if it were in actual proof, that pouring or sprinkling was substituted for immersion by those who used the Greek language; and that those modes were actually called by the name of immersion. These facts could avail nothing with respect to the meaning of the word in the ordinance of Christ. It is here that the perspicacity of the writer of the note utterly fails. The possible or actual use of a word in after times, he alleges as its meaning in the ordinance of Christ. "Arise, and be baptized," says Ananias to Paul. Now, if at the time the word signified immersion, is not immersion the thing enjoined? Can this command be fulfilled by being sprinkled? Should the word afterwards change its meaning, does such change avail anything in relieving from obedience to the command.

"The churchman," the writer tells us, "sees that in scripture, dipping, pouring, and sprinkling, are all variously used as signs of spiritual cleansing." And did not Christ see this as clearly as the churchman? If dipping, pouring, and sprinkling are all equally applicable to this ordinance, why did Christ enjoin one of them only? The churchman's practice is a censure on the Son of God. If the churchman has good reasons, as he says he has, for changing the mode of this ordinance, Christ could not have good reasons for adopting it. Was it not as easy in the time of Christ to pour or sprinkle, as it was to immerse? If he foresaw that there would in future times, and in certain countries, be reasons for a change, why did he not himself provide for this? The churchman makes himself more keen-sighted than the institutor of the ordinance. The baptist sees as clearly as the churchman, that pouring and sprinkling are in scripture used for cleansing as well as dipping, and he has no objection to them in any ordinance, if Christ had appointed them. The baptist cannot presume to use any discretion in altering the commandments of God. Besides, he sees that burial and resurrection, as well as cleansing, are figured in the ordinance of baptism. The churchman himself admits the same thing. Dipping, pouring, and sprinkling, were indeed all used under the law; but had the Jews a right to substitute the one for the other? When they were commanded to dip, did they fulfil by sprinkling? When commanded to sprinkle did they dip? If indeed the mode in

baptism is emblematical, and my opponent admits that it is emblematical, it cannot be changed; to change it would be to destroy the emblem.

The churchman, it seems, knows that in "ceremonial observances, Christ has enjoined regard to decency, comeliness, order, and convenience." Here the churchman has undoubtedly the advantage; for he knows what nobody knows but himself and the pope. He knows that he can annul what Christ has commanded, and substitute something more decent, comely, orderly, and convenient, in its stead. On this ground, then, let sprinkling rest, along with all the other trumpery of human invention. But if the writer refers to 1 Cor. xiv. 40, as his sanction for this authority, it will not serve him. This refers not to ceremonial observances, more than other things, and the thing directly spoken of, is not of a ceremonial nature at all. The passage gives no authority to appoint or alter observances of any kind; but directs that all the ordinances or observances of a church, should be attended to in order. This was violated in the church at Corinth, where one had a psalm, and another a doctrine, &c. at the same time. It is the very essence of popery to claim a right to annul or alter the commandments of Christ. A rite appointed by Christ is no more to be tampered with, than any commandment in the decalogue. But with this subject I have nothing to do here. My present business is to prove the meaning of the word baptism in the commandment of Christ. Whether Christ has given any power to men to annul this commandment, and substitute another rite, is a question to be argued on other grounds. In the mean time, I am very well pleased that I have driven sprinkling and pouring out of the scriptures, and obliged them to take shelter with the figments of popery, in church authority.

The churchman is also "aware, that total immersion in colder climates and tender age is less convenient." All churchmen are not aware of this. With respect to tender age, the baptist is not concerned to convince his opponents that it is safe to immerse newly-born infants. This he will undertake to prove, when it is proved that newly-born infants are commanded to be baptized. Were it really true, that in any circumstances immersion would be dangerous to health, what would follow? Not that sprinkling should be substituted for immersion; but that the person could not be baptized at all. If the ordinance of Christ is impossible, except at the hazard of life, the law of God does not require it.

The churchman "believes that Christ has given to his church

authority, in precisely such points of outward order, to appoint, under varying circumstances, as the spirit of wisdom shall teach or suggest." Can anything be more provokingly intolerable than this way of reasoning? Way of reasoning! Such a pretence for avoiding reasoning. Is the churchman to foist on us his creed instead of giving us his arguments? But there is inconsistency in the author's own management of this business. If the church has authority from Christ to alter things of a ritual nature according to its own wisdom, why does the writer strain to sanction the change with the meaning of the word? The writer, then, finds himself in a quagmire, and still as he begins to sink in one spot he shifts with all speed to another. Here we have an express avowal of authority from Christ to change his ritual appointments. If this is not popery, I do not know where popery is to be found. Alas, alas, and is this Mr. Bickersteth? But my work is done. When I have driven my antagonist to take refuge among the mummery of the man of sin, my triumph is complete. All I engaged to do, was to prove that the word in question signifies to immerse. This writer instead of fairly meeting me on this, alleges that his church has power to alter the mode, and in certain cases to substitute pouring, or sprinkling, for immersion. This has nothing to do with the question. This might be true without in the least affecting my doctrine, with respect to the meaning of the word in dispute. Whether it is true or not must be argued on other ground. No wonder that Puseyism spreads in the church of England, when such a sentiment as this can be avowed by such a man as Mr. Bickersteth.

Now I appeal to every impartial reader, whether there can be a doubt as to my victory, when my antagonist is obliged to shelter his practice under the authority of his church? If reasoning on the meaning of the word could have established his point, would he have recourse to church authority? If church authority has changed the mode, why seek a sanction in the meaning of the word? If the meaning of the word sanctions the practice, why admit a change by church authority? This is self-contradiction. Other denominations of paedobaptists will reject this mode of defence; but ought it not to excite in them a suspicion, that their reliance on the meaning of the word is not well founded. The church of England, by its present practice, is as much concerned as the other denominations of paedobaptists to vindicate pouring or sprinkling as being baptism. Now, if it was in their opinion possible to do this by an appeal to the word, would they have recourse to the authority

of the church, to change the mode? The very claim admits a change. Is not this a tacit confession that, in their opinion, there is no relief for sprinkling, or pouring, in criticism? Does any one doubt, that if criticism could do anything, the church of England is not as able as other denominations to avail itself of its aid? Is all the learning of paedobaptists confined to other denominations, that they alone attempt to find their practice in the word? If learning could prove that pouring and sprinkling could be brought under the meaning of the word in dispute, would the church of England fail to prove it? I maintain that the church of England is substantially on my side of the question. By resting on the authority of the church to substitute pouring or sprinkling for immersion, they have decided the question of criticism against themselves. This certainly ought to bring those denominations of paedobaptists to reflection, who have no pretensions to church power.

The error of the church of England in its defence of pouring, or sprinkling, is much less hurtful, as regards all passages of scripture which concern the ordinance itself, than that of other paedobaptists; but in another point of view it is much worse. It is worse, because it lays a foundation for the alteration of other ordinances, and for piles of mummery to an indefinite extent; but it does comparatively little injury, in explaining passages of scripture that refer to baptism. The churchman is not obliged to force any of them, or avoid their true import. He can explain them according to their true meaning, and take edification from the mode, as an emblem of the union of believers with Christ, in his death, burial, and resurrection. This is an incalculable advantage, which the church of England possesses over other denominations of paedobaptists. It contributes much to the production of clear, accurate, and extensive views of the gospel. On the other hand, other denominations that cannot claim the authority of the church for altering the institutions of Christ, are obliged to find pouring or sprinkling in the meaning of the word; and consequently to torture language with the utmost violence. In this way also, some of the finest features of the gospel, which are beautifully displayed in the emblem of baptism, are entirely kept out of view.

It is often thought strange that there should be such a difference, for such a length of time, among good men, on so simple a question as the meaning of a common word. But with respect to persons who hold the views of my present antagonist, the thing is not at all strange. How can there be agreement

when the parties do not judge by the same standard. My antagonist builds on the authority of his church, to alter the mode of ritual ordinances: I utterly reject this foundation, and seek authority only in the meaning of the word. The saints in heaven could not agree on any subject, should they adopt different standards of judgment. If Mr. Bickersteth, and his friends, have authority to alter the mode of a ritual ordinance, they may undoubtedly pour or sprinkle in defiance of the meaning of any word. If I do not chose to claim a like authority, I must be contented to observe the ordinance as Christ enjoined it.

‘Let us now,’ says the writer, ‘produce Mr. C’s own conclusions, and examine which of these views his critical inquiries confirm. They shall, to avoid all error, be stated in his own words.’ “1st. βαπτω, except when it signifies to dye, denotes *mode*, and nothing but mode. 2dly. βαπτω and βαπτίζω are exactly the same in meaning, as to increase or diminution of the action. That the one is more or less than the other, as to mode or frequency, is a groundless conceit. 3dly. There is one important difference. βαπτω is never used to denote the ordinance of baptism, and βαπτίζω never signifies to dye. The primitive word has two meanings,—the primary, to dip; the secondary, to dye. But the derivative is formed to modify the primary only. 4thly. βαπτω means also to dye. And although this meaning arose from the mode of dyeing by dipping, yet the word has come by appropriation to denote *dyeing* without reference to mode. As this point is of material consequence in this controversy, I shall establish it by examples that put it beyond question. Nothing in the history of words is more common than to enlarge or diminish their signification. Ideas not originally included are often affixed, while others drop ideas originally asserted. In this way βαπτω, from signifying mere mode, came to be applied to a certain operation usually performed in that mode. From signifying to dip, it came to signify to dye by dipping, because this was the way in which things were usually dyed. And afterwards, from dyeing by dipping, it came to denote dyeing in any manner. A like process may be shown in the history of a thousand other words.” On this the writer makes the following observations:—‘These remarks are distinct and clear. They are also substantially true. But it is most strange the clear-headed author does not see how expressly they overthrow his own theory. He has given us the strongest warrant for extending the meaning of βαπτίζω, by showing us the like extension in its primitive, βαπτω, from the very same

cause. He has proved that the idea of mode is secondary, and non-essential, when βαπτίζω is applied to the sacrament of Christ, by proving the very same of its primitive, βαπτω, when used in the sense of dyeing. The author has left no link wanting in his own refutation. The two words originally signify the same as to mode. Βαπτω acquires the secondary sense of dyeing; βαπτίζω acquires the secondary sense of baptizing. Βαπτω, from dyeing, by dipping, comes to denote dyeing in any manner. Βαπτίζω, from baptizing, by dipping, comes to denote baptizing in any manner. What analogy can be more perfect? What justification of the practice of the church can be more complete?

Here my opponent thinks he has irrefragably refuted me out of my own mouth. He has turned my critical doctrines against myself, and showed that instead of proving my own views of the meaning of the word in dispute, I have unanswerably proved his meaning. But with the utmost ease I shall wrest my weapons out of his hands. I have shown the principles that operate in the appropriation of words, and that words often wander far from their original import, being sometimes restricted in their use, and sometimes most capriciously extended; still, however, even in their wildest freaks, guided by principle, and capable of being definitely ascertained. I exemplified this in the case of βαπτω; and my present antagonist thinks he can turn the force of all that I have said, to demonstrate that there is a like change in the meaning of βαπτίζω. There is not, he thinks, a link in the chain wanting. In this, however, he is altogether mistaken. He wants an essential link. *Use has actually conferred the alleged meaning on βαπτω—use has not conferred the alleged meaning on βαπτίζω.* Now where is his demonstration? He might allege the authority of my philosophy to prove the possibility of such a change in the meaning of the word. But without proof that the process has actually taken place in the history of the word, this is of no service to his cause. Here is a poor Jew. I admit that though he is not now worth a farthing, he may possibly before his death be another Rothschild. At the end of thirty or forty years, my antagonist comes to me, saying, "I will prove by your own admissions that the Jew of whom we were speaking is now as rich as Rothschild. Did you not forty years ago admit that it was possible, that this man might in time become so rich? I did admit this, but I want proof that the thing admitted to be possible, has actually taken place. Just so with respect to these words. Give me the same proof that βαπτίζω, in the New Testament, has been brought to designate the ordinance of Christ without reference to mode, as there is

that βαπτω signifies to dye, and I will at once warrant the change by my philosophy. The gold coin called a sovereign is now worth twenty shillings. I admit that at some future time it may pass for fifteen shillings, or that it may be raised to the value of twenty-five shillings. Will this prove at any specified time that either of these things has actually taken place?

But I shall examine the conclusions of my opponent step by step. Speaking of my proof of the secondary meaning of βαπτω, he says, "He has given us the strongest warrant for extending the meaning of βαπτίζω, by showing us the like extension in its primitive, βαπτω, from the very same cause." I have given a warrant that usage has such a power, but I have given no warrant that, in this instance, it has availed itself of that power. On the contrary, I deny that use has ever exercised this power on this word. I have shown a process by which a word may receive a secondary signification, totally excluding the idea that is essential to the primary. But does this imply that any particular word has actually undergone such process, and received such secondary meaning? If the history of the word does not manifest such meaning, it has no warrant.

"He has proved," says the writer, "that the idea of mode is secondary and non-essential, when βαπτίζω is applied to the sacrament of Christ, by proving the very same of its primitive βαπτω when used in the sense of dyeing." By what process does this conclusion follow? Because it is proved that βαπτω has come to a secondary meaning which excludes mode, does it follow that when βαπτίζω is appropriated to an ordinance of Christ, it excludes mode? He might as well allege, that because βαπτω signifies to dye, βαπτίζω in the ordinance of baptism, must signify to dye. βαπτω has, without doubt, in its history taken the secondary meaning of dyeing. βαπτίζω, when applied to the ordinance of Christ, has not laid aside its meaning as to mode. Appropriation produces no such effect. But what does the writer mean by secondary and non-essential? Were it even true that mode is secondary, it does not thereby become non-essential.

"The author," says the writer, "has left no link in the chain wanting in his own refutation." A writer when he speaks thus, should be very sure that he stands on firm ground, and that he thoroughly understands what he is saying. That he speaks at random, I can show in a moment. But let us examine the chain. "The two words originally signify the same thing as to mode." Quite correct. Let this be the first link of the chain. "βαπτω acquires the secondary sense of dyeing." This is my doctrine.

I admit that it has this meaning totally independent of mode. Let this link, then, be made as strong as the smith can forge it. It is made of the very best iron. The next link is, “Βαπτίζω acquires the secondary sense of baptizing.” This link is pot metal; it will break the first snap. What does he mean by the word baptize in these circumstances? Does he mean that it designates the ordinance to which it refers without the expression of mode? If he does he is wrong: if he does not, it is nothing to his purpose. What can baptize in its appropriated application mean, but to immerse for a particular purpose? Is this any thing but the primary meaning of the word with a particular reference? The writer confounds the appropriation of a word, with a secondary meaning acquired by gradual use. When a word is appropriated, it is taken in its proper sense at the time of its appropriation: when a word has acquired a secondary sense by use, it has departed from its primary sense. To make the thing still more plain, let us take another word for illustration, and suppose that *ραινω*, to *sprinkle*, had been used. According to our author’s way of criticising, it would be said, the word primarily signifies to *sprinkle*, but as applied to the ordinance of Christ, it signifies secondarily to *rantize*. Now what can *rantize* mean, in such circumstances, but to *sprinkle for a particular purpose*—to sprinkle with reference to this ordinance? Would there be here any departure from the primary meaning of sprinkle? Let us again illustrate by the passover. The Jews were commanded to *sprinkle* the blood on the door-posts. Now does *sprinkle* in this command lose the idea of mode, and refer to the performance of the rite without reference to *sprinkling*? It is shameful for a scholar to trifle: it is awful for a christian to cavil. Surely a very child may see, that the appropriation of a word to a particular purpose, does not divest that word of its meaning. The only difference is, that it gives the meaning a peculiar reference to a particular subject. The author of this note applies my doctrine to his purpose, only because he does not thoroughly understand it. He has undoubtedly made some progress; and if he continues in this teachable temper, I will more readily acknowledge him to be my disciple, than I will newly-born infants to be called the disciples of Christ.

The next link of the chain is, “Βαπτω, from dyeing by dipping, comes to denote dyeing in any manner.” This link is as strong as adamant. I admit that I have taught this: but this chain is like the toes of Nebuchadnezzar’s image, partly of iron and partly of miry clay. The next link is of clay of the most brittle constitution. “Βαπτίζω, from baptizing by dipping, comes to

denote baptizing in any manner." This is mere mud. Where is the proof that the process has actually taken place? Had the change taken place, my doctrine would recognize it; but there must be proof of the actual change. Even were it in proof that the change had actually taken place, though my doctrine must recognize it, it would not prove that anything but immersion is scripture baptism.

Any change in the word, after its application to the ordinance is of no authority, as to its use in reference to the ordinance. Had sprinkling been universally adopted at any period, in place of immersion, by those who spoke the Greek language; and had the word which now designates immersion been applied to sprinkling, the fact would have no weight at all, in proving that sprinkling is warranted by the scriptures. The meaning of the word, in reference to the ordinance, must be determined by its meaning at the time of its application to the ordinance. Its meaning in the ordinance must be determined by its sense in the language at the period of appropriation, not by its use in church history in after ages. Does not any one see that a secondary meaning conferred after the institution of the ordinance can have no bearing on the question? If in its appropriation to the ordinance, it signified *immerse*, as the writer admits, immersion it must be for ever, as far as Christ's authority is regarded. Is it not enjoined in the sense of the word at the time? No after change in the rite, and in the meaning of the word, according to the change of the rite, can affect the meaning of the word as it stands in Christ's institution. I am utterly at a loss to conceive how any person of ordinary capacity, can attempt to fasten on a word in scripture, a meaning which use is supposed to have conferred on the word in after times. This is the same thing as to expound some words in our translation of scripture by their present use, instead of their old English acceptation. What would we think of an expositor who should expound the word *charity*, in scripture, agreeably to its present use in the language? To make blindness itself see this truth, let us take an illustration. Suppose that inspiration had recorded the ordinance in *English*, and that the mode had been at first sprinkling; but that in process of time it had been universally superseded by immersion. How would the secondary meaning of sprinkling in this ordinance, determine the meaning of the word sprinkle in the original institution? Would this be a warrant to neglect the scriptural mode of the ordinance, and to observe it according to after use? Will obstinacy never yield to argument? Will christians for ever resist the command-

ments of Christ? And is Mr. Bickersteth the man to sanction such perverted criticism, in order to make void the law of God as to the mode of a divine ordinance? Sophistry may invent evasions that for a time may impose on the ignorant, the unwary, and the prejudiced; but it is a fearful thing to lead away the disciples of Christ from implicit and universal obedience to his commandments. Jesus has said, that whosoever shall annul one of the least of his commandments, and teach men so, the same shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven. Reviewers, and periodicals, and applauding religious sects, may laud such efforts, but Jesus will at last judge the world, and determine between truth and error. One mode is the same to me as another, had not God interposed his authority; but I cannot force the word of God to sanction human errors. I read the word of God not to find a sanction for the practice of any church—not to find a sanction for my own practice; but to know what God requires, that to this I may conform my practice.

My opponent proceeds next to the subjects of baptism. Here he observes with respect to my treatise, that this part of it is less than half the length of the former. Is this also in his estimation an evidence of my view of comparative importance. I have only to say that when I shall find time to give a new edition of my treatise, which has long ago been earnestly solicited, in all probability I shall add to its length on that part of the subject which relates to the meaning of the word.

The writer confines his remarks to my view of the import of the commission. "And first," says he, "let us hear Mr. C.'s own statement: 'If our minds were not influenced by prejudice, this inquiry (that is, into the subjects of baptism), would not be tedious. We have the answer obviously in the words of the apostolic commission. The persons whom it warrants to be baptized, are scholars of Christ, have believed in him for salvation. If this needed confirmation, we have it in the record by Mark. The persons whom Matthew calls disciples, Mark calls believers. None then are warranted to be baptized but disciples or believers. I will risk the credit of my understanding on showing, that, according to this commission, believers only are to be baptized. I would gainsay an angel from heaven, who would say that this commission may extend to the baptism of any but believers. Here I stand entrenched, and I defy the ingenuity of earth and hell to drive me from my position. If infants are baptized, it is from another commission, and it is another baptism, founded on another principle. Even if there were such, when these infants believe the gospel, they must be

baptized according to the command, Matt. xxviii., without regard to their baptism in infancy. The commission commands all men to be baptized, on believing the gospel. Who is he that dares substitute infant baptism for the baptism of believers? Whoever he is, he is the man who by his tradition makes void the law of God.'” I had said that five minutes is sufficient to determine the subjects of baptism from the commission in either Matthew or Luke; this the writer thinks very strange, especially as I allow that so great a majority of christians do not agree with me on this subject. But I will now reduce the time to half the allowance. I will grant no more than two minutes and a half, and still I may have time to spare. My antagonist should have had the perspicacity to see that I do not rest on the time necessary to examine the foundations of the baptism of analogy and tradition. I have shown that if there is such a baptism it cannot shelter itself under the commission.

On my statements referred to by my antagonist, he says, “These are hard words and strong charges; and strange to say, they have not a syllable in the text on which to rest; nothing but the bare assertion of the writer.” I will make good every syllable in my statement. Let us then hear the grounds of the assertion. “The commission of Christ,” (says he), “does not contain the words go and baptize believers.” Does the writer mean that baptism is not in Mark xvi. 16, enjoined on believers? This must be his meaning, or his assertion would have no bearing on the subject. In direct opposition to this, I maintain that baptism is expressly enjoined on believers in this passage, “Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved.” Does the writer mean, that because the word relating to the ordinance in question is used as a participle, and not in the imperative mood, there is no command expressed? If he does, I am ashamed to speak as I think of such an assertion. If anything else could be forcibly taken out of his words, I would think it an insult to a scholar to understand him in this sense; and as a matter of fact, I hesitated to ascribe this meaning to him till I saw that he himself explained it as his meaning in the sequel. Is it unknown to this writer that what is usually effected by what are called grammatical modes may be effected in various other ways; and that it is often optional in expressing a command to employ either the imperative mood or a participle? Even in this very commission the command to *go into all the world* is expressed by the participle. But there is hardly a page of any sort of writing, in any language, from which I could

not exemplify this. I wish I had not found this in a writing sanctioned by Mr. Bickersteth; for I cannot avoid saying that it is either gross ignorance or downright cavilling. I will make the most illiterate man in England refute this criticism. Suppose a rebellion had taken place in Ireland, and her majesty had sent a commission, saying: Go, and proclaim a pardon to the nation; he that lays down his arms, and takes an oath of allegiance, shall be saved." Would the most illiterate man in the empire say, that this is not a command to lay down the arms of rebellion, and to take an oath of allegiance? What a shame is it for learned men to make themselves ignorant of what is known to the most uncultivated common sense. But how awful is it for christians to cavil with the language of the Spirit of God, in order to sanction the practices of men with the authority of institutions of Christ. Surely this writer cannot believe that there is no command given by Christ with respect to baptism. And if it is not here, where is it? How astonishing is it that christians will adopt such means of opposition to the ordinances of Christ! "These are hard words and strong charges." But will any one show me how, with a proper regard to truth, I can say less? I would gladly say nothing; but when I must speak, I must designate things by their proper names. When I see perversion so manifest, must I hide my eyes or pretend to think that it is all legitimate reasoning? No command in the commission to baptize! And does a good cause require such a paradox to maintain it? Christians in some things do not see, because they will not see. Lord Nelson when once in pursuit, refused to obey the signal of recall; but to excuse himself he put the telescope to one of his eyes that was blind, and turning it towards the object, swore that he did not see the signal: and christians sometimes do not see the signal because they put the telescope to the blind eye. I believe Lord Nelson was successful on the occasion, but shall christians expect success in acting contrary to the authority of their commander? Such conduct always implies contempt for the skill of him who gave the orders.

"Still less," continues my antagonist with respect to the words of the commission in Mark, "Go and baptize believers only." Such an addition is not necessary in order to confine baptism to believers. If none but believers are enjoined to be baptized, none but believers are, according to the commission, to be baptized. If there is a baptism for others, it must have other proof. Has my antagonist then the hardihood to assert that there is nothing in the commission on which my assertion can

rest? My assertions in every tittle are true beyond the power of the perversions of sophistry.

“The only command expressed on the subject,” says the writer, “is to baptize all nations.” There is no such command either expressed or implied. The command in Mark is, to preach the gospel to every creature, baptizing the believers. The command according to Matthew is, to disciple all nations baptizing the disciples. The phraseology “disciple all nations, baptizing *them*,” necessarily confines the baptism to the persons who shall be discipled. The antecedent to the pronoun is the word disciples, taken, as grammarians speak, out of the verb disciple. The very nature of the thing requires this; it is obviously only disciples that they could baptize. Unbelievers would not submit to baptism. I will undertake to show the greatest bumpkin in England, that the restriction is necessarily in the expression. “Go,” says a corn-merchant to his clerks, “buy up all the grain in the market, storing it, &c.” Does any idiot ask, what grain is to be stored? Is it not the grain that is bought, and not the grain that they could not obtain, or was bought by others? Could there arise a question on this subject? What would be thought of one of the clerks, who should ask, “Do you mean, sir, that I am to store all the grain in the market whether I can buy it or not?” Shame, shame, shame! Will the Lord’s people trifle in reasoning about the commands of their master, in a manner that would disgrace idiotcy? Shall they stave off conviction by quibbles, not to be exemplified in the most unprincipled chicanery?

It is evident that the writer’s own conscience is no more touched than is mine, in restricting the baptism to disciples instead of extending it to unbelievers in the nations. It is merely a stratagem to bring me to terms. If I allow him to bring in infants as disciples, he will very willingly allow me to exclude adult unbelievers. “The only limitation,” says he, “to be learned by inference, is previous discipleship.” Now this expressly grants that there is such a limitation, and it is perfectly indifferent how the limitation is made out. It makes no difference whether it is inferential or express. But if it is an inference, it must be a necessary inference, else it has no authority. An inference might exclude unbelievers, but no inference can bring anything into the word disciple, that is not already in it.

“The words in Mark,” says my antagonist, “contain no command to baptize at all; they are a promise to baptized believers.” I have disproved this assertion. I have shown it

to be unworthy of a scholar and of a christian. It is so utterly un scholar-like, that had not the author himself developed his meaning, I would have ascribed it to him with great hesitation, even when substantially avowed in previous statements. The apostles understood it as a command, for they commanded the disciples to be baptized. Indeed, a promise from Christ to baptized persons implies a command for the institution; for God does not give a promise to will-worship. But to make out a command I seek for aid from nothing but the words of the commission. "There is no ground in the commission," says the writer, "for saying that St. Mark calls the same persons believers, whom St. Matthew calls disciples. So far from affording an impregnable position, there is not a corner of the passage on which to rest the proof." What does the writer mean by this? Does he mean that the words of the commission in Matthew do not expressly assert, that those called disciples by him are by Mark called believers; and that the words of the commission in Mark do not assert that those called believers by him are by Matthew called disciples? This is very true, but for such a declaration we would not seek a corner of the passage. Who would expect such an assertion? Can it never be known that two accounts correspond, except there is an express declaration of the fact? then it could not be known that there is a correspondence in any two accounts in the different gospels. But on whatever occasions the things referred to by the two evangelists in this instance were spoken, can there be a doubt that they refer to the same thing? Are they not both an account of the sending out of the apostles to preach and baptize? Can there be any doubt that the two accounts substantially agree, and that the persons to be baptized are the same in both? Would Mark's account of the commission exclude any whom Matthew's account admits? Can any conscience be so hardened, as to refuse to admit that the disciples of Matthew are the believers of Mark? And does Mr. Bickersteth countenance such an effort to make void the law of God? Is he the man who thus labours to bring darkness out of light? Are the rites of a favorite church to be supported by trampling underfoot the commandments of God?

"In fact," says my opponent, "the commission of itself, waving other arguments, rather implies than excludes infant baptism. Taken in the narrowest sense the words allow, it commands all disciples to be baptized. Now a disciple is simply a learner. And the infants of pious and believing parents are, from their very birth, learners of Christ; they are by providence

placed immediately under the teaching of those who are themselves taught by Christ, and who are his appointed channels for imparting divine truth to them. They are, in the strictest sense of the word, *μαθηται*. Learners they are by the necessity of their age and by the privilege of believing parents, learners of Christ. To shut them out of the ordinance is then to reject those whom Christ has himself included." Of all the extravagances that I have ever met with in controversy, this is the most extravagant. Newly-born infants are scholars in the school of Christ!!! Sir, they are not scholars in any school; they know nothing of Christ, and can learn nothing of the things of his kingdom. A disciple and master, or teacher, are correlative terms, and in the very nature of things every disciple virtually recognizes the master as fit to teach. Newly-born infants are not fit to understand a teacher or any subject, and cannot be disciples in any sense. But to say that newly-born infants are disciples of Christ is to outrage common sense. Do they know anything of Christ more than they do of Mahomet? Can the writer produce a single example to justify his assertion? Is there any instance in which newly-born infants are called the disciples of Christ? Is there any instance in which newly-born infants are called the disciples of any teacher? Who were the disciples of Pythagoras, of Plato, and of all the ancient philosophers? Were they not persons who recognized them as their teachers, and received their doctrine? Who were the disciples of John the Baptist? Were they not persons who believed in him as a teacher sent from God, and submitted to his doctrine? Who were called the disciples of Christ when he was on earth? were they not the persons who believed in him, and who followed him as their teacher? Since the birth of Cain was it ever heard that any newly-born infant was called the disciple of any man? Does this writer suppose that we will take his mere assertions as proof? Why does he not justify the alleged meaning by examples? Another person may as legitimately allege that new-born infants are the disciples of Newton, or any of the philosophers. He might as reasonably allege that they are mathematicians, musicians, or astronomers. I meet the assertion then, not only as false, but as fanatical beyond the usual bounds of fanaticism. I meet it with indignation, because it manifests a disposition to hold a tenet, not only by forcing scripture, but by sacrificing common sense; I turn away from it as from the ravings of insanity. Give me argument, and I will answer by argument; but I cannot put down extravagance but by exposing it. I solemnly declare, that it pains me to be obliged to write in this way with

respect to a thing recognized by Mr. Bickersteth ; but I cannot expose madness but by showing it to be madness. I once met a simpleton, who answered as if he knew every thing that he was asked. After some time, I asked him if he understood Greek ; “ O aye,” was his reply. I then said, ‘ Paddy, were you ever in the moon ?’ “ O aye,” said Paddy with the utmost gravity of countenance. I followed poor Paddy no further : and what am I to say to the man who asserts that newly-born infants are scholars in the school of Christ? Verily I can see no more sanity in this, than I do in the assertion of innocent Paddy. I hold up this assertion to the reprobation of sober sense in all mankind. Had such an assertion been made in defence of an unpopular truth, the author would be hooted out of society. But great sects screen their advocates in all their wildest conceits. You could not put the Faquirs to shame in the land of the Faquirs. It is only the advocates of unpopular truth who are obliged to stand in awe of common sense.

Were it at all necessary to my purpose, it would be easy to show, not only that the word disciple implies teaching in the correlate, and capability of learning in the disciple, but that it is applied to the followers of Christ as it did to the followers of the philosophers ; implying that they have received his distinguishing doctrine, and submit to his laws. A man might have learned much from the philosophers who could not be called a disciple. To be called a disciple of Christ, implies not only to have learned something from Christ, but to have learned the doctrine of salvation, and to have submitted in all things to his teaching. But I do not need this, and therefore will pass it.

Could the writer satisfy my conscience that newly-born infants are disciples of Christ, he would relieve me of a considerable part of the burden of the cross of Christ. Nothing is so offensive in the country in which I reside, as to refuse to baptize infants. Men will not understand it in any other way than as denying infant salvation. I have no pleasure in being odious to the world ; still less in being disliked even by the people of God. But I cannot wrest the scriptures in order to please men, nor to retain popularity even among christians. I have lost this world : I do not wish to lose both worlds. What Christ has shown me in his word, I cannot conceal nor pervert : I must not be ashamed of his word more than of himself. I fight for no church, for no party. I do not make even my past attainments my standard ; I am willing to advance or recede, as I am made to hear the word of command. When Christ says “ Go,” I will go : when

he says "Come," I will come. If any man can show me wrong in anything, I shall be swift in changing my course. Truth is my treasure.

But the writer himself betrays his own want of confidence in this resource. If newly-born infants are really disciples, what need of any other proof for their baptism but the commission itself? Why is not the battle fought here? Why has he not collected all his force to bear on this part? If he proves that newly-born infants are disciples, is not the battle won? Obstinacy itself would not resist any longer. The newly-born infant is, on this principle, baptized as expressly by the commission, as its parent. But paedobaptists do not act on this principle. This writer himself, instead of opening a battery from the commission, aims only to show that they are not excluded by the commission. His chief reliance is on analogy and tradition, which can have no bearing on the commission, more than they have influence on the tides. He endeavours to force me to a compromise on the commission. If I will not allow him to modify it with analogy and tradition, he will force me to baptize the nations, believers and unbelievers. In this he is inconsistent with himself; he does not believe that unbelieving nations should be baptized; and the limitation to the disciples can have no influence in extending the meaning of the term. If disciples only are to be baptized, infants are of necessity excluded. Now this shows that his own conscience is not his own disciple. If newly-born infants are directly and expressly included among the disciples of the commission, why does he seek to modify the disciples of the commission by analogy and tradition? These two modes of defence destroy each other. Indeed, if infants are disciples, what temptation has he to make the baptism literally extend to unbelieving nations? All this management clearly shows that he has not himself full reliance on the discipleship of newly-born infants.

I ask the conscience of every christian, as a matter of fact, is it as disciples that newly-born infants are generally baptized? Are they baptized because they know Christ, have believed in his salvation and character, and have submitted themselves entirely to his authority? Is not this mode of defence merely a desperate resource, to be employed in dispute, but which has no influence on the conscience? Do they who practice infant baptism believe, that the children of christians know more of Christ when they are born, than do the children of unbelievers, or even heathens?

"Nay," says my opponent, "the argument may be carried

still further. We have reasoned as if the words had been, Go, disciple all nations, and baptize the disciples, &c. But these are not the exact terms. Our Lord's command is, Go, and disciple all nations, baptizing them, &c. If we press the force of the letter with Mr. C., setting aside all scripture analogy and argument, and all the testimony of the church, we should be led rather to the compulsory baptism of the ungodly, than to the exclusion of infants. It is reason, scripture analogy, and attention to the spirit of the command, which alone warrant any limitation, and these alike require that the only restriction should be drawn from the previous clause, and that the term disciples should be there interpreted in the largest sense." I have already answered this evasion; I have shown that the grammar of every day's conversation gives my interpretation to the words. Nothing but a spirit of the meanest cavilling would think of extending this command by force to the ungodly. I required neither analogy, nor the testimony of the church, to confine the command to those who are disciplined out of the nations. This is the legitimate meaning of the expression. And as I have not been obliged to the testimony of these two witnesses, I will not receive their testimony in extending the meaning of the word disciples to infants. On this they are not competent witnesses. The use of the word alone can determine this. But there is falsehood in the very face of this evasion. The command to disciple all nations expressly excludes force, and it is in connexion with their discipleship that their baptism is enjoined. If they cannot be made disciples by force, they are not to be baptized by force; for it is after they are disciplined, and as they are disciplined, that they are to be baptized. I ask the conscience of my antagonist, if he thinks that the language of the commission commands the ungodly in the nations to be baptized by force. If not, is it not a fearful thing to handle the word of God deceitfully? Does he say that the principle that I employ to exclude infants from the word disciples, will compel the baptism of the ungodly? This is so false that it has not even a shadow of truth. These two things depend on different grounds of evidence. Whether *disciple* has such an extent in its meaning depends on the use of the word: the other depends on the grammar of the sentence. Even were it granted, that analogy and tradition establish another baptism, still such baptism could not be brought by interpretation under the commission. No analogy can show that infants are included in a command to baptize disciples; no tradition can witness that a command to baptize disciples includes the baptism of infants. The thing is

a matter of interpretation, not of analogy or testimony. Let tradition and analogy have the own baptism, if they will, but it shall have no lodgment in the commission. My antagonist says, that the term disciples should be interpreted in the largest sense: by all means; I will give it the largest sense that he can prove that use has ever conferred on it. But though an Englishman, he is thus like the Irish; no matter how good measure you give him, he must have a *douragh* (that is, something additional). He will not be satisfied with me if I do not throw in the infants as a *douragh*.

The commission, as it is recorded by Mark, commands believers to be baptized. Now if there is an analogical and traditionary baptism in infancy, such analogical and traditionary baptism does not coincide with the baptism of the commission; and as soon as the person is brought to believe to the saving of the soul, he is enjoined by all the authority of Jesus to be baptized into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Should a thousand baptisms be proved from other sources they could not make void the baptism of the commission. But as we are assured that there is only one baptism in the religion of Christ, the baptism of analogy and tradition must be a human figment. This is the ground on which I have placed the subject in my treatise. Many a lever has been employed to move it off the foundation; but it remains like a rock, lashed by the waves of the ocean.

It is grievous that christians are not agreed about the ordinances of Christ; but can union ever be expected as long as they reason on the principles of my opponent? Can that man want proof for anything he wishes to prove, who asserts that newly-born infants are disciples of Christ? Can he be at a loss in justifying the change of any ordinance of Christ, when he justifies the substitution of pouring, or sprinkling, for immersion, by the authority of his church? If such principles of reasoning are not abandoned, the day of judgment will come and find us still divided.

That the utmost forbearance ought to be exercised on this and every other subject on which there is a difference among christians, I not only freely admit but strenuously contend. But when christians submit their reasonings to influence others, these reasonings must be tried by the most rigorous test of truth. To our brethren in error we ought to manifest forbearance; to the defence of their errors no indulgence is due. If their reasonings are not only inconclusive, but if they lay a foundation for other errors, they must be exposed in all their

deformity for the advantage of the whole christian brotherhood. We should not judge the individual, but we should unsparingly condemn the false reasoning and the false principles on which his errors rest. Error is more noxious in a christian than in a man of the world ; its influence tends to withdraw believers from the authority of Christ. The salvation of infants I do not question ; but their salvation does not depend on their faith and baptism. Faith and baptism are enjoined only on those who hear the gospel. But I cannot consent to show my faith in the salvation of infants by administering to them a rite which Jesus has not appointed for them. An act of will-worship in the parents will not bring the infants nearer heaven. God abominates all human invention in his service. Let christian parents pray for their children from their birth and before their birth ; let them teach them as soon as they are capable of learning : but who hath required them to baptize them ? Too much cannot be said to urge christian parents to faithfulness to their offspring ; but no advantage can be conferred by performing on them a rite, which in their case, Jesus has not enjoined. Could evidence of infant baptism be presented from the scriptures, I am as ready to receive it as I was before I gave up the practice. Every inducement is on that side ; but I cannot do in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, what Father, Son, and Spirit have not commanded.

BAPTISM NOT PURIFICATION;

IN REPLY TO

PRESIDENT BEECHER.

BY

ALEXANDER CARSON, A. M.

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BAPTISM NOT PURIFICATION.

MR. BEECHER, President of the College of Illinois, America, has lately written on the import of the word *βαπτισμὸς*, undertaking to prove that it refers not to mode at all, but signifies purification in general. Consequently, while we are on both sides of the question wrong, we are still right. We are wrong in believing that mode is designated, but we are on both sides right, because any mode of the religious application of water is baptism. This is the happy theory by which harmony is to be effected on this much and long controverted subject.

To much of the former part of the work I can have no possible objection, because it is a mere echo of my own philological doctrines, illustrated with different examples. In a work controverting the conclusions which I have drawn in my treatise on baptism, it surely was very unnecessary to prove that words may have a secondary meaning, wandering very far from their original import. Can any writer be pointed out who has shown this more fully than I have done? I do not question this principle. I have laid it down for him as a foundation. All I require is proof of the existence of the secondary meaning, and proof of the existence of the secondary meaning which he alleges. Had he given this, I would admit such secondary meaning; but would still show that the word in reference to the rite appointed by Christ, has its name from the primary meaning of this word. Mr. Beecher has done nothing of all this. He has not proved that the word, in reference to the ordinance of Christ, signifies *purification*: he has not proved that in any reference it signifies

purification; he has not proved that it has any secondary signification at all. His dissertation is no more to critical deduction, than Waverley or Kenilworth is to history. Indeed the relation is not so true: it wants that verisimilitude which is to be found in the novels of the illustrious Scott. To the ignorant there is an appearance of philosophy and learning; but sound criticism will have little difficulty in taking the foundation from under the edifice which he has laboured to erect.

The first argument which he alleges to prove that βαπτισμὸς signifies purification, is drawn from John iii. 25. "In John iii. 25, καθαρισμὸς is used as synonymous with βαπτισμὸς, and the *usus loquendi*, as it regards the religious rite, is clearly decided. The facts of the case are these, ver. 22, 23. John and Jesus were baptizing, one in Judea, the other in Ænon, near to Salim, and in such circumstances that to an unintelligent observer there would seem to be a rivalry between the claims of the two. The disciples of John might naturally feel that Jesus was intruding into the province of their master. They might even believe John to be the Messiah, and thus give rise to the sect which held that belief. On this point a dispute arose between the disciples of John and the Jews, (or a Jew as many copies read,) v. 25. They come to John and state the case, v. 26. "Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou bearest witness, *behold the same baptizeth, and all men come to him.*" Plainly implying that in so doing he was improperly interfering with the claims of John. John in reply, v. 27—31, disclaims all honor except that bestowed on him by God, of being the forerunner of the Messiah, and rejoices to decrease in order that he may increase—thus justifying the course which was so offensive to his disciples, and settling the dispute in favor of the claims of Christ. The argument from these facts is this: The dispute in question was plainly a specific dispute concerning baptism, as practised by Jesus and John, and not a general dispute on the subject of purification at large; so that ζήτησις περὶ βαπτισμοῦ is the true sense; and if it had been so written, the passage would have been regarded by all as perfectly plain. But instead of βαπτισμοῦ, John has used καθαρισμοῦ, because the sense is entirely the same. In other words, "a question concerning baptism," and "a question concerning purification," were at that time modes of expression perfectly equivalent; that is, βαπτισμὸς is a synonyme of καθαρισμὸς."

To this I reply, 1.—Mr. Beccher says, "on this point a dispute arose." On what point? As I understand the author, it is with respect to the conflicting claims of John and Jesus. This is the obvious reference, and this is confirmed as his

meaning, by his afterwards saying that John settled this dispute in favour of the claims of Christ. Now this is not at all the point to which the question at issue between the disciples of John and the Jews, had reference. That question was about *purifying*, and not at all about the claims of John and Jesus. For anything that appears in the document the Jews might never have heard of Jesus.

2. The author says, "they come to John and state the case." They did not state to John the case concerning purification. They stated another case quite different. What they stated to John was an expression of surprise that another person was baptizing, and especially that he was more successful than John himself. As this statement was for the purpose of eliciting a reply from John, I have no objection that it shall be called a question, though not so in form. But if it is a question, it is one different from that at issue between the disciples of John and the Jews. John replies to this question, but says nothing about purification, because nothing with respect to it was submitted to him.

3. Mr. Beecher says that, "the dispute in question was plainly a specific dispute concerning baptism as practised by John and Jesus." The dispute had no relation to the baptism of John and Jesus. The dispute does not imply the existence of the baptism of Jesus, nor of himself.

4. The author tells us that it was not "a general dispute on the subject at large." The dispute was a dispute on the subject of purification generally. This does not admit dispute with respect to any who submit to the assertion of the document. *Καθαρισμὸς* is not a species of purification, but purification without reference to species. Mr. Beecher assumes that *καθαρισμὸς* is the appropriated name of the rite of baptism. This is not only a groundless, but a false assumption. In early church history, it came with a multitude of other words and phrases to be applied to baptism, but at this period of its history it had no such application. At this period to speak, among the Jews, of baptism under the appropriated name *καθαρισμὸς*, would be to speak unintelligibly. President Beecher mistakes the meaning of *καθαρισμὸς* as well as of *βαπτισμὸς*. It could not come to designate baptism specifically on any other principle than that of appropriation, by which, though general in its original extent, it might be limited by use. If assumption would do the business, Mr. Beecher would prove his point.

5. The writer tells us here that the phrase *a question about purification*, is in sense the same as if it had been said, *a question about baptism*. I have shown that this is false. But in addition

to this I remark, that even if the word *baptism* itself had been used instead of *purification*, it would not have referred to a dispute concerning the conflicting claims of John and Jesus. A question about baptism, and a question about the conflicting claims of two persons engaged in baptizing, are surely two very different questions. This confusion of ideas does not argue well for the perspicacity of the antagonist with whom I am now about to engage. Even on this supposition the dispute between the disciples of John and the Jews about baptism, would have been a different matter from that submitted to John, and to which nothing in philosophy at all applies.

6. Mr. Beecher makes the general word *καθαρισμὸς* specific, in conformity to the word *βαπτίζω*, and the specific word *βαπτίζω* he makes general, in conformity to the word *καθαρισμὸς*, so that in fact he makes each of the words both general and specific. Why does he consider *καθαρισμὸς* specific? Because it here, he thinks, refers to the specific rite of baptism. Why does he make *βαπτίζω* here signify purification in general? Because he thinks it to be a synonyme of *καθαρίζω*. Does not this make each of the words both general and specific, at the same time? Is this philological? This is critical legerdemain.

So confident is the writer that he has succeeded on this part of the subject, that he adds: "The only mode of escaping this result is to say, that as immersion in water involves purification, and is a kind of purification, so it may have given rise to a question on the subject of purification at large: but to this I reply, that the whole scope of the passage forbids such an idea. The question was not general but specific, being caused by the concurrence of two claims to baptize; and so was the reply of John."

It is no part of my duty to show the process which led from one of those questions to the other; this it might be impossible to ascertain without any injury to my cause. But nothing can be more natural than that a question about purification should be suggested by a rite that was an emblem of purification, and that this should lead to a comparison of the baptism of John and of Jesus. But I will not deign to allege this in argument. My business is with the document before me. Anything expressed or necessarily implied, I will meet; but I sternly refuse to know anything but what is in evidence.

But what sort of a reply is this which the author gives to the argument which he professes to meet? The question, he says, is not general, but specific. The question is expressly stated as general, and not specific; for it is a question about *καθαρισμὸς*, which is *purification* without regard to species. The word is as

general as is purification, the corresponding word in English. It was caused, he says, by the concurrence of two claims to baptize. It was not caused by the concurrence of two claims to baptize; for these claims are never mentioned with regard to the dispute. If we had not the document in our hands, we would be led to think, from Mr. Beecher's representation, that the dispute was between the disciples of John, and the disciples of Jesus, with respect to conflicting claims between their masters.

“Moreover,” continues Mr. Beecher, “to assume a general dispute on purification renders the whole scope of the passage obscure; as is evident from the fact, that those who have not seen that in this case *καθαρισμὸς* is a synonyme of *βαπτισμὸς*, are much perplexed to see what a dispute on purification in general has to do with the facts of the case.”

Assume! Who is it that makes assumptions? We assume nothing in the whole controversy. That the dispute was about purification, and not about a specific rite of purification, is in express evidence from the word. And what necessity is there to show how the statement to John, and John's answer, bear on the subject of purification, when that statement and that answer never glance at the question of purification?

“The origin of the dispute, from the concurrence of two claims to baptize,” says the author, “is obviously indicated by the particle *οὐν* in v. 25, showing undeniably that the events just narrated gave rise to the question.” How can any particle in the twenty-fifth verse indicate the origin of the dispute, from the concurrence of two claims to baptize, when previously to that verse there is no mention of such concurrence? If the question arose from the events just narrated, how could it arise from a concurrence of conflicting claims? No doubt the dispute about purification originated in the baptism of John; but this does not imply that baptism signifies purification, nor that purification signifies baptism.

“And what reason is there,” says Mr. Beecher, “for denying this conclusion. None but the fear of the result.” It is not so, President Beecher. Fear of the result never in a single instance prevented me from admitting a sound argument. I do not fear the result; for truth is my object, wherever it may lie. But in this instance I can have no temptation to fear the result, because I could admit that *purification* here refers to baptism specifically, and still defeat President Beecher. He has laboured in vain. He builds on a false first principle. He assumes that if two words refer to the same ordinance, they must be identical in meaning. Nothing is more unfounded—palpably unfounded.

There are situations in which two words may be interchanged at the option of the writer, while they are not perfectly synonymous. They may so far agree that they may be equally fitted to fill a situation, while each has a distinct meaning. This is so obvious a truth, that I am perfectly astonished that it should lie hid from the President of the College of Illinois. This is a fact that lies on the very surface of philosophy. There is hardly a page of writing in which it might not be illustrated. The varied designations given to the ordinance of baptism by the ancients fully manifest the truth of this observation. Baptism they called *regeneration*, yet they did not consider that the word *baptism* and the word *regeneration* were identical in meaning. *Baptism* was the name of the rite from its mode, *regeneration* was the effect produced by the observance of the rite. They called baptism *renewing*, *renovation*, or *restoration*, for a like reason. But they did not understand the word baptism to signify any of these. Without exception, they all considered the word to mean immersion, while they gave it other names from its nature, effects, &c. They called baptism *sanctification*, because they supposed persons to be sanctified by it; not because they considered the two words as synonymous. They called baptism *illumination*, and the baptized they called *the illuminated*; yet they did not understand the word baptism as signifying *illumination*. Illumination was the effect of the rite. They called baptism *consecration*, yet they did not do so because they considered the word to have this meaning, but because the rite had this effect. They called baptism *initiation*, because *initiation* was effected by the rite, not because it was signified by the word baptism. They called baptism *the laver or washing*; not because they considered the word to signify this, but because washing was effected by immersion in pure water. They called baptism *the anointing*; because, in their view, persons are anointed with the spirit in baptism; not because baptism signifies *anointing*. They called baptism *the gift or grace*; yet they did not suppose that the word baptism denoted *gift or grace*. They spoke of baptism as the seal, yet they did not understand the word baptism as signifying *seal*. They called baptism *purification*, yet they did not on that account, with President Beecher, understand the word baptism as signifying *purification*. Baptism was an immersion which produced *purification*. Would he deserve the name of a philologist, who would say, that the word baptism is identical in signification with all these words, and that all these words are identical in signification with each other?

I might illustrate my doctrine by the various names which

are given to the followers of Christ. They are called *christians*, *disciples*, *believers*, *saints*, &c. Are these words identical in meaning? Does not each of these names designate the persons in a different manner?

The very case in hand may be verified in our own language. When it is asked, what is the name of the child? it may sometimes be answered, "it is not yet baptized." Are we from this to conclude that the word baptism is supposed to mean *the giving of a name*? This is not implied. The thing implied is that the name is given in baptism. In like manner, a vast variety of names is given to the rite of baptism, not implying that they are synonymous with the word, but that they are designations of the same ordinance.

The English word *immerse* itself, according to Mr. Beecher's philology, may be made to signify *cleanse*. The surgeon after an operation, says, "cleanse the instrument." The assistant immerses it in water. Immerse, then, signifies to cleanse.

Παντιζω, or *sprinkle*, may on the same principle be made to signify *to purify*. Purification is effected by sprinkling, therefore, sprinkling signifies purification. In Heb. ix. 22, the same thing that is called purging with blood, is in the preceding case called sprinkling with blood. Does it not follow, from Mr. Beecher's philology, that sprinkling means purging? But is it not obvious to every child, that sprinkling designates the mode of applying the blood, and purging the effect of the blood so applied?" Mr. Beecher, then, has failed in every point. He has laboured to prove that *καθαρισμός*, [John iii. 25, refers specifically to baptism, as practised by John and Jesus. His proof I have demolished. He assumes that if *καθαρισμός* here refers to baptism, the words must be identical in meaning. This I have shown to be a gross fallacy.

The next argument by which Mr. Beecher endeavours to prove that *βαπτισμός* signifies *purification*, is taken from Malachi. "This view alone," says he, "fully explains the existing expectation that the Messiah would baptize. That the Messiah should immerse is nowhere foretold; but that he should *purify*, is often and fully predicted. But especially is this foretold in that last and prominent prophecy of [Malachi, (iii. 1—3) which was designed to fill the eye of the mind of the nation, until he came. He is here presented to the mind in all his majesty and power, but amid all other ideas that of purifying is most prominent. He was above all things to purify and purge, and that with power so great, that few could endure the fiery day. Who may abide the day of his coming and who shall stand when he appeareth?"

This is so destitute of all appearance of a bearing on the subject, that it deserves no attention. It is answer sufficient to this allegation that this prophecy could have been perfectly fulfilled, had no rite of purification, in any mode, ever been appointed. It requires more than the patience of Job, to be able to mention such an argument without expressing strong feelings. Could not Christ have been a *purifier*, though he had instituted neither baptism nor the Lord's supper? His being said then to be a *purifier*, does not imply that a certain rite implying purification, must be called *purification*. May not a rite import purification, though *purification* is not its name? Even if it had been foretold by Malachi that the Messiah should appoint a rite of purification, that rite might have been designated, not *purification*, but have had its name from its mode, or a thousand other circumstances. It might have been called *immersion*, or *sprinkling*, or *effusion*, according to the mode appointed; as it might have been designated from any one of a multitude of other relations. Circumcision denoted purification, yet it had its name from the external operation. The passover had its name on the same principle. This argument manifests such a want of discrimination, and a confusion of things which differ, that the mind on which it has force, must be essentially deficient in those powers that qualify for the discussion of critical questions.

“Suppose now the word βαπτίζω to mean as I affirm,” says the author, “the whole nation are expecting the predicted purifier; all at once the news goes forth that a great purifier has appeared, and that all men flock to him and are purified in the Jordan. How natural the inference! the great purifier so long foretold, has at last appeared, and how natural the embassy of the priests and Levites to inquire, Who art thou? and when he denied that he was the Messiah, or either of his expected attendants, how natural the inquiry, ‘Why purifiest thou then? It is his work—of him it is foretold, why dost thou intrude into his place and do his work?’”

I might with perfect safety admit that on John's appearance, the report went forth that a great purifier had appeared. For if he was a great *immerser*, he was a great *purifier*, as immersion was for the purpose of emblematical purification. He might from the administration of this ordinance have been called a great purifier, while the name of the ordinance was *immersion*, or *sprinkling*, or any thing whatever. As a matter of fact, however, the news did not go forth that a great *purifier*, but a great *immerser* had appeared; and it is not said that all men came and were purified by him in Jordan, but that they were

immersed. The question of the priests and Levites was as apposite, on the supposition that the word βαπτίζω signified to *immerse*, or *sprinkle*, or *pour*, as if it signified to *purify*; because whatever was the mode and whatever was the name, the nature of the ordinance implied purification. There is no evidence that a general expectation prevailed that the Messiah should baptize, or use any rite of purification; and had there been such an expectation, and even a prophecy on which to found it, the fact could make no difference. The question put to John, on the supposition that he was not the Messiah, was not founded either on the name, or the nature of the rite, but on his employing a new rite. If he was not the Messiah, or at least Elias, or the prophet, they judged it improper for him to introduce a new baptism. It was not with the name of the rite they quarrelled. Does Mr. Beecher imagine that had the name of the rite been immersion, the question of the priests and Levites would have been precluded? Such reasoning is perfectly an astonishment to me. I have greater difficulty in conceiving how it can have force on any mind, than I have in refuting it. How can any discrimination think that the priests and Levites objected to John's baptism on the ground that to use this rite was to intrude into the work of the Messiah, when on the very question it is admitted that the thing might be done by Elias or the prophet? Is it not astonishing that gentlemen in eminent situations, will risk the character of their understanding by pouring forth such crudities? It is painful for me to use the knife so freely; but I must, for the sake of the christian public, find out the disease under which my patient labours. It is better that one delinquent should suffer, than that a multitude should be drawn into error by his transgression.

“In view of these facts,” says the writer, “I do not hesitate to believe most fully, that the idea which came up before the mind of the Jews when the words *Ἰωάννης ὁ Βαπτιστῆς* were used, was not, John the immerser, or John the dipper, but John the purifier, a name peculiarly appropriate to him as a reformer—as puritan was to our ancestors, and for the same reason.”

In view of these facts! Shall he by sleight of hand be allowed to convert his suppositions into facts? What are the facts? Are we with the child to take his dreams for realities? There is not in all the references one fact that will bear the conclusion.

But there is an inconsistency in this specimen of philology. It makes the title of John originate in the administration of a rite of purification, yet its adaptation to him is grounded on his being a reformer, for the same reason that our ancestors were called puritans. Now, if John was the *purifier* as the adminis-

trator of a rite, he was not a *purifier* as a reformer. If he was a purifier as a reformer, he would have been a purifier had he administered no baptism at all. There is great confusion in the ideas of this writer. If John was called *the purifier* on account of the rite which he administered, he was not so called as a puritan. This is my philology.

Mr. Beecher's next argument is: "The contrast made by John between his own baptism and that of Christ, illustrates and confirms the same view."

Without adverting to Acts ii. 1—, which is evidently a fulfilment of John's declaration referred to, the phrase *immersed in the Spirit*, as referring to the ordinary work of the Spirit, is perfectly analogous to *steeping the senses in forgetfulness*, with which all are acquainted, and the contrast between the immersion of the rite, and the sanctification of the Spirit, is exactly on the same principle with, "Be not drunk with wine, but be filled with the Spirit." The abundance of the Spirit in sanctification is contrasted with the abundance of wine in the drunkard. If we may be said to be *filled with the Spirit*, in contrast with the drunkard filled with wine, may we not be said to be *immersed in the Spirit*, in contrast with the immersion in water in the rite of baptism? The contrast is obvious and just. Is it not sometimes said of persons distinguished for humanity and kindness, that their souls are steeped in the milk of human nature? There is no more incongruity in *immersing* a person in the Spirit, than there is in steeping a soul in milk. Such arguments and such objections are mere trifling.

"This sense," continues Mr. Beecher, "is never transferred to the mind, in any language, so far as I know, to indicate any thing like the effects of the agency of the Holy Spirit."

Were this true, it is nothing to the purpose. But having by the use of the language found that the word has this meaning, and no other, the example in question is an instance in which it is applied to the Holy Spirit. Mr. Beecher has adopted some of my philological doctrines. I will give him another lesson, which will prevent him from again alleging such an objection. It is this. Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its particular figures; but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance. It gives words a new application, but does not invest them with a new meaning. It is not, then, subject to the law of literal language, which for the sense of every word needs the authority of use. This I have established in my *Treatise on the Figures of Speech*, in opposition to the common doctrine of rhetoricians. With respect to the point in hand, I would maintain my ground, if a single other example of the

figurative use of this word could not be produced. Any word may be used figuratively in any view in which there is likeness. This argument of Mr. Beecher's is perfectly the same with that of Dr. Wiseman in proof of transubstantiation. He admits that the phrases, *this is my body*, and *eat my flesh*, may be used figuratively; but if they are used figuratively, they are always used in a bad sense. He challenges his opponents to show an instance in which it is otherwise. Now this sophism has, in my doctrine of the metaphor, a complete answer. Metaphors are not bound by the law of literal language: they need not the sanction of use. A writer may use as many as are just in resemblance; and the more original they are, they are the more meritorious.

But what shall we think of the philologist, who says, "when the agent is spiritual, the object spiritual, and the means spiritual, and the end purity, immersion is out of the question"? Must I dignify such trifling with refutation? When God says, *I will pour out my Spirit*, is not the agent spiritual, the object spiritual, and the means spiritual, and the end purity? Shall we, then, blaspheme the word of God, and say, *pouring* is out of the question? Literal *pouring* and immersion are out of the question, not figurative *pouring* and *immersing*. If one mode of employing water may be figuratively applied to the Spirit, what will prevent another mode from being applied? Ignorant persons in reading Mr. Beecher's work will think that he is a deep philosopher, and that he is a profound philologist. But the smallest degree of perspicacity will enable any one to see that his philosophy is very shallow sophistry. I have no wish to be severe; but no man ought with impunity to be allowed to trifle so egregiously with the disciples of Christ, and with the awful commandments of the eternal Jehovah.

The author thinks that his view is confirmed by comparing the language of John with the passage from Malachi, and refers to the word *διακαθαριεῖ*. But how could it escape him that *the purging of the floor* refers not to baptism at all in any view? Indeed it refers not even to the work of the Spirit in sanctification, but is the separating of the chaff from the wheat. But I will for a moment indulge him in his whim. Let this *purging* be baptism. May it not be *immersion* in mode, and *purging* as an emblem? The language of Malachi and the purification of John would equally accord with any meaning that may be assigned to the word baptism. I have never found a greater want of discrimination in any writer.

Mr. Beecher deduces another argument, from 1 Cor. xii. 13. In this passage, he tells us, "The Holy Spirit is directly said to

baptize, and in this case all external acts are of course excluded, and purify is the only appropriate sense: "For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body, and have been all made to drink into one Spirit." Now can any thing be more extravagantly idle than this? When the Holy Spirit is said to be *poured out* by God, are not all external acts equally excluded? Are we, then, to say that *χεω* does not signify to *pour*? Believers are said to have their hearts *sprinkled* from an evil conscience. All external acts are out of the question. Shall we, then, say that *ραντιζω* does not signify to *sprinkle*? Believers are said to wash their robes and to make them white in the blood of the Lamb. All external acts are out of the question. Are we, then, to say that *πλυνω* does not signify to wash? Am I to war eternally against nonsense? Even the very examples alleged by himself from Chrysostom, p. 23, refute him. Is there any literal immersion in the phrases *immersed in cares*, *immersed in sins*, *immersed in business*?

"But this baptism," says Mr. Beecher, "is as much a real work of the Spirit, as the causing to drink into one Spirit, which is not external, but internal and real." Who doubts it? But how can he be so blind as not to perceive that though "Causing to drink of the Spirit," is an internal work of the Spirit, yet *drink of the Spirit* is as much a figure relating to an external action, as is *immerse by the Spirit*? If believers are here said to be *immersed by the Spirit*, they are also said to be made to *drink* by the same Spirit. Is not *drinking* as much an external action as *immersing*? If we may figuratively *drink*, may we not figuratively *be immersed*? The writer has so little perspicacity as to argue against a figurative meaning with respect to the word *immerse*, by the very authority of a like figurative meaning with regard to drink. If there is spiritual *drinking*, may there not be spiritual *immersion*? But we have not yet done with Mr. Beecher's exploits in figurative language. He says that the *drinking* here referred to is not external, but internal and *real*. According to this philosophy, literal *drinking* is not real *drinking*.

"To immerse in water," he tells us, "is not the work of the Spirit." Where is it said, Mr. Beecher, that the Holy Spirit baptizes in water? And is it the work of the Spirit to *pour himself* out on believers literally? Is it the work of the Spirit literally to *sprinkle* the heart? Such cavilling is unworthy of a candid mind and a sound understanding.

Mr. Beecher founds another argument on the relation which the words *baptize* and *purify* have to the forgiveness of sins. *Βαπτίζω* and *καθαρίζω*," says he, "are so similarly used in connexion with the forgiveness of sins, as decidedly to favour

the idea that they are in a religious sense synonymous." This is philological mathematics; and if there is no error in the statement, or in the process, it is the evidence of an axiom. Two quantities that are equal to a third are equal to one another. But a mere breath will destroy this mathematical bubble. It is not as words that *baptize* and *purify* agree with *forgiveness of sins*: for neither *baptism* nor *purification* are as words identical in meaning with forgiveness of sins. Baptism is connected with the forgiveness of sins, not from its name, but from the nature and import of the rite. If baptism in its import is essentially connected with forgiveness of sins, it will have the same relation to purification, whatever be its name.

Faith is essentially connected with the forgiveness of sins, as well as purification. Is faith purification? *Holiness* is essentially connected with the forgiveness of sins, as well as faith. Is *holiness* faith? *Repentance* is essentially connected with the forgiveness of sins as well as purification. Is *repentance* purification? On the same principle unitarians allege that forgiveness of sins, in reference to Christ, is synonymous with *healing diseases*.

But it is strange to astonishment that President Beecher has not perceived that baptism would have the same connexion with the forgiveness of sins, whatever might have been the word employed as its designation. If the nature of the rite imports purification, though its name is *immersion*, has it not perfectly the same relation to the forgiveness of sins, as if its name were *purification*? Take any of the names assigned to it by the ancients, and you will still have the same connexion with the forgiveness of sins. But does each of these words signify purification? If baptism is called *regeneration*, it is connected with the forgiveness of sins. Must the word *regeneration* on that account signify *purification*? This argument proceeds on an amazing want of discrimination. Many things essentially connected with the forgiveness of sins are entirely different from one another. Baptism is a rite emblematical of purification; but this does not imply that its name must signify purification. The passover was a rite which was an emblem of atonement through the blood of Christ, or if you will, of purification. Does this imply that the word passover signifies purification or atonement? Whether the rite of baptism is called *pouring*, or *sprinkling*, or *immersing*, or *popping*, or *purifying*, or *consecrating*, or *initiating*, or *regeneration*, &c. &c., it has the same relation to the forgiveness of sins. The blood of Christ cleanses from all sin: baptism emblematically cleanses from sin: the blood of Christ, then, and the emblematical meaning of baptism, have the same relations to the forgiveness of sins. Does it follow that the

phrases, blood of Christ, and the word baptism, are synonymous?

Mr. Beecher gives us a dissertation on purification, which is no more to the purpose than a treatise on logarithms. He then tells us; "Between immersion and the forgiveness of sins no such associations had ever been established." Does not the writer here take for granted the very thing in dispute? He set out with saying that βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω are similarly used with respect to the forgiveness of sins: now he says that immersion has no such connexion. But if βαπτίζω has such a connexion, *immerse* must have the same connexion, as it is the only proper translation of the word that has this connexion. Whatever connexion βαπτίζω has with the forgiveness of sins, *immerse* has the same connexion.

There is another false principle at the bottom of this remark. It supposes that if baptism is connected with the forgiveness of sins, its name must denote this connexion. It supposes also that if a word has the same connexion with the forgiveness of sins with another word, it must have the same meaning with that word. This is another false principle. Circumcision was connected with the forgiveness of sins in the same manner as purification; but did the word circumcision denote either purification or forgiveness of sins? It was the nature of the rite of which circumcision was the name, which indicated purification, and was connected with the forgiveness of sins. It is the water in baptism that indicates purification, not the name of the rite. Immersion is an emblem of the believer's communion and oneness with Christ, in his death, *burial*, and resurrection. If mere purification was designated by baptism, *sprinkling* or *pouring* might have been used as well as *immerse*. But immersion represents the whole spiritual body of Christ as *dying* with him, *buried* with him, *risen* with him. As members of the body of Christ, they have done and suffered whatever Christ has done and suffered for them. True views of the import of baptism are essentially connected with clear views of the gospel.

"Now if any word," says Mr. Beecher, "is found to sustain the same relations as καθαρίζω to the same idea, forgiveness of sins, we have reason to think that it is used in the same sense." Here is a philological axiom. But it is a philological sophism. First, it assumes that it is βαπτισμός as a word, that is, that it is the meaning of the word, that has the supposed relation to the forgiveness of sins. But βαπτισμός has this relation only as designatory of an ordinance, which in its nature implies purification. Βαπτισμός has this relation to the forgiveness of sins, only as it refers to the rite of baptism.

Secondly, the conclusion is false, even on the ground on which it proceeds. Two words may have the same relation to the forgiveness of sins, yet not be identical in meaning. *Faith, repentance, regeneration, &c.*, have the same relation to the forgiveness of sins, yet they are very far from being identical. If each of the words signified forgiveness of sins, they must all indeed have the same signification; but none of these signifies forgiveness of sins. This is a childish fallacy.

He concludes this argument with the following deduction: "Hence, as βαπτίζω has the same extent of application with καθαρίζω, and as it stands in the same relations with it to the forgiveness of sins, it is highly probable that it has the same sense." Here, again, he assumes the point in debate. Has he found that βαπτίζω has the same extent of application with καθαρίζω? If this is in evidence, what is the dispute? It has not the same extent of application; for it applies to no purifications but such as were immersions. His business is to prove that it has such an extent of application—not to assume this as a ground of argument.

But the author is very modest; having assumed that βαπτίζω has the same extent of application with καθαρίζω, instead of bearing down on me with all the force of an axiom, he is contented with claiming a high probability. What! Highly probable! If the words are of the same extent in application, they are perfectly identical in meaning. What is sameness of sense, but sameness of extent of application? Not only has Mr. Beecher failed in proving his point by this argument, but I maintain that on such ground it is impossible to prove the meaning of a word. No sound philologist would ever think of availing himself of such a resource.

Mr. Beecher's next argument is, that "the account of baptism given by Josephus, a contemporary Jew, is perfectly in accordance with this view."

The account which Josephus gives of the baptism of John in no respect confirms the view of President Beecher: Why did he not produce his document? Is he to decide as a judge? Ought he not as a lawyer to exhibit his documents and his statutes, reasoning from their necessary import? Josephus represents John as exhorting the people, practising justice towards each other, and piety towards God, to come to *immersion*; declaring that the immersing would be acceptable to God, when done, not in deprecation of the punishment of any sins, but for the *purification* or *lustration* of the body, the soul being previously purified by righteousness. Josephus, as might be expected, gives a very false view of the object of John's baptism;

but with respect to the meaning of its name, he could not be mistaken. Instead of representing this name as signifying purification in its meaning, he represents the object of it to be purification. They come to baptism for the lustration (*ἐπι αῤυεια*) of the body. Does not this imply that *baptism* is one thing, and *lustration* another? Mr. Beecher confounds a thing with its effect. Baptism is the name of the rite from its mode: lustration is its effect from its nature, being an immersion in pure water.

This is confirmed by the contrast which Josephus states, denying it to be the proper object of baptism—namely the deprecation of punishment (*ἐπι παραιτησει*). This is an object which he supposes some might have, but which would not be acceptable to God. Here purification of the body is the lawful object of baptism: deprecation of punishment is a wrong object. Now we might as well confound *deprecation of punishment* with the meaning of the word *baptism*, as confound purification with it; for both are supposed to be its object—the one a lawful object, the other an unlawful one. Does baptism, then, signify deprecation of punishment, because it may be used for that purpose? It is this excessive deficiency in perspicuity that has emboldened Mr. Beecher to undertake to prove that *βαπτισμὸς* signifies *purification*. He everywhere confounds things that are different. From this he thinks that he has succeeded, when he finds baptism spoken of as a purification; not distinguishing between the name of the rite and its object. If one word can supply the place of another in a certain situation, he thinks they must be synonymous. If Josephus speaks of baptism as performed on account of purification, he states that he has proved the word baptism signifies purification. By this philology he might prove that the word *βαπτω* signifies to *draw water*, or to fill, because these words could sometimes be substituted for it. In one of the examples of the occurrence of this word, which I gave in my Treatise, p. 14, the translation is: “the youth held the capacious urn over the water, hasting to *dip* it.” Here *fill* might be substituted for *dip*. But does *dip* signify to *fill*? *Dipping* is the mode by which the vessel is to be filled. The filling of the vessel was the effect of the dipping; just so with the case in hand. Immersion is the mode—purification is the object. They were two things as different as *dipping* and *filling*. One of the Scholiasts, in expounding my next example, actually substitutes the words *αρνομαι*, and *χέμιζω*, I *draw water*—I *fill*. “Take a vessel, ancient servant, and having *dipped it* in the sea, bring it hither.” On Mr. Beecher’s principles of criticism, this would be sufficient authority to say that *αρνομαι* and *χέμιζω* are

synonymous with βαπτω. Even our own word *dip* might be made synonymous with *fill*. We may say either *dip the bucket* or *fill the bucket*. The writer who confounds distinctions on account of such facts, has not a soul for philological discussion.

But were we at a loss, on this occasion, to know in what sense Josephus here uses the word in question, where can we learn this with such authority as from his own use of the word in other places. In every instance in which he uses the word, he employs it for *immersion*, and never for *purification* or anything else.

Mr. Beecher passes next to Heb. ix. 10. But this passage cannot afford him any proof. For argument sake, I will first admit that the word here is used for purification in general. As it does not refer to the rite of baptism, it may have a secondary signification here, without affecting its modal meaning in the Christian ordinance. Had a word twenty significations, they must in every instance be capable of being definitely ascertained; otherwise language would be unintelligible. That it is used here in a religious application, makes no difference. Βαπτω, even in the art of dyeing may be used in the same page for *dyeing* and for *dipping*. And though it has a secondary signification of *dyeing*, it is often used with respect to religious *dipping*. The admission, then, that the word here signifies *purification*, does not at all affect the question at issue. I have undertaken to prove that the word has not a secondary meaning; but I have not done so on the ground that this is necessary for the proof of its modal meaning, in reference to the ordinance of baptism. Now, how can this prove that the word in reference to Christian baptism signifies *purification*, when I can admit all that Mr. Beecher attempts to prove from the passage, without admitting his conclusion? The proof which I have adduced for the modal meaning of the word in reference to the ordinance of Christ, remains still unaffected.

But instead of surrendering this passage, I utterly refuse to admit that the word has here a secondary signification. It is *immersion* here as well as everywhere else. Let us now examine my antagonist's reasoning.

"1. Those things only are spoken of in the whole discussion," says he, "which have a reference to action on the worshippers; that is, the whole passage relates to the effects of the Mosaic ritual entirely on *persons*, and not on *things*. The gifts, the sacrifices, the blood of sprinkling, the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, all relate to persons."

To this I reply, 1—Whether the word here signifies *immersion* or *purification*, it must extend to all the immersions, or all the purifications under the law. I am under no concern to

separate between action on persons, and action on things. If things were commanded to be immersed, which had no reference to persons, they must be included here, if the word signifies *immersion*. And if the word signifies *purification*, and if things are commanded to be purified which have no reference to persons, they must be here included. This distinction can bring no relief: for whether the word signifies *immersion* or *purification*, it must extend to all things immersed or purified.

2. The things admitted by Mr. Beecher to be immersed, had an equal relation to the person, as "the gifts, the sacrifices, the blood of sprinkling." Everything immersed, or sprinkled, or in any way purified, had a reference to the worshippers. The vessels which they used, the garments which they wore, the utensils which in the service they employed, had all a reference to their persons as much as the things which they offered.

3. Are not meats and drinks among the things referred to in this chapter? And had not their vessels, sacks, and skins, a reference to their persons, as well as the meats and drinks?

4. Was not the blood of sprinkling sprinkled on other things beside their persons, and as little connected with their persons, as the things admitted to be immersed? Was not the water of separation sprinkled on the tents and all the vessels, as well as all the persons?

5. But I care not that every purification referred to in the whole chapter, referred to persons solely and directly, except in this instance. I am not disturbed with the supposed fact. Whatever be the meaning of the word, it must extend to everything it includes, whether it signifies *immersion* or *purification*.

6. Even if the word here signified *purifications*, it must include the very things which Mr. Beecher excluded. If certain things are admitted to be immersed by the law, are they not purified by that operation? Then, though immersion should not be the only purification here denoted, it is at least included among the *purifications*. This refutes the assertion that the things admitted to be immersed, cannot be included here among the things said to be purified.

Mr. Beecher proceeds: "The βαπτισμοὶ are spoken of as enjoined, as well as the other rites. But of persons no immersions at all are enjoined under the Mosaic ritual." I have already shewn that it is not necessary that immersion of persons should have been practised under the law, in order that the word should here signify *immersions*. There is no evidence that the baptism here spoken of must refer to persons. They are not said to be the baptisms of persons, nor are they said even to include the baptism of persons. It is enough for my purpose

that there were *various immersions* under the law. There were immersions in blood, immersions in blood and water; immersions in water, immersions in water and the ashes of a red heifer; immersions in oil, and immersions in fire. But even if the word were admitted here to denote *purifications*, it must include all purification, and extend to the immersion of things.

But though it is not essential to the defence of my cause, to prove the immersions of persons under the law, I will undertake the task with all its supposed impossibilities. I admit that the Hebrew modal verb is not used with respect to persons, yet other circumstances imply that the mode of washing was immersion. How did they wash Aaron and his sons at the door of the tabernacle? Exod. xxix. 4. Must there not have been an immersion? Was there not constantly an immersion of the hands and the feet of the priests before engaging in the service? Exod. xxx. 18—20. Now, an immersion of the hands, or the feet, is to me as good as an immersion of the whole body fifty feet under water. Let it not be forgotten that we are not discussing a passage for an example of Christian baptism, but one that speaks of Jewish baptism. And an immersion of a part is to me as good as an immersion of the whole. All I want is an immersion of any part of the person.

Solomon made ten lavers for the washing of such things as they offered for the burnt offering. This was one of the baptisms under the law. But he made a sea for the priests to wash themselves. 2 Chron. iv. 6. Was not this washing performed by immersion?

Let it be observed that the Apostle is here speaking of the Jewish baptisms as *practised* under the law, and not giving an account of their institution. It is certainly implied that the baptisms referred to were agreeable to the law, and a fulfilment of it: but it is not necessary that they should have been presented specifically as the only mode of fulfilling the law of washing. If *immersion* was the usual mode of washing the person, and if that mode fulfilled the law, may not a writer in giving an account of the practice, include the immersion of the person among the immersions under the law? Was it not a fact that under the law there was an immersion of the person, when it is admitted that the washing of the person commanded by the law was usually performed by immersion, and that this immersion was a proper fulfilment of the law? It is not necessary that immersion should be the only mode in which the law of washing the person could possibly be fulfilled. It is quite enough that it was the usual way, and a lawful way. This may be proved by a similar fact. The immersion of Naaman was a

fulfilment of the command of Elisha; yet it was a specific way of fulfilling a command to wash without specification of mode. Is it not said that in obedience to the command of the prophet, Naaman *dipped* himself seven times in Jordan? Now, if the thing prescribed to Naaman had been a rite enjoined on all the Jews, which in every age they usually fulfilled by *dipping*, would not an historian speak of this as an immersion under the law? I think no sound understanding can hesitate a moment to receive this solution. This is confirmed by the fact that Trypho in Justin Martyr, p. 228, speaks of ablution after touching any of the things forbidden by the law of Moses, as *baptism*; and Justin Martyr everywhere uses the word for *immersions*.

“Nor is the washing of the clothes,” says Mr. Beecher, “so often spoken of, enjoined by a word denoting *immersion*.” Very true, but are clothes washed without immersion? In speaking, then, of the practice under the law, was not the washing of clothes, the immersion of clothes? But are not clothes and all other things that cannot endure the purification of fire, *to pass through water*? can they pass through water without being immersed? Num. xxxi. 23.

The argument from Tobit, vi. 2. is utterly valueless.—
1. This is not ceremonial purification, or fulfilment of the law of Moses. The young man went down to the river to bathe, not to cleanse himself from ceremonial defilement. The object of the writer in bringing his hero to the river, was to bring about the exploit with the fish.

2. That complete washing of the person without immersion is possible, we are not obliged to deny. No other washing, however, is called *baptism*. If a man washes himself without *immersion* he washes without *baptism*.

3. This washing is not called *baptism*.

4. Mr. Beecher here mistakes the argument of the baptists which he here represents. When he asks for what purpose the young man went down to the river, he answers: “To immerse himself of course, the advocates of immersion will reply.” This is not fact. *Bathing* or *washing* is the object: immersion is the mode in which that object is effected. But as the mode implies the effect, the mode may be substituted for the object, and instead of saying he went down to bathe, it may be said he went down to *dip himself*. The baptists will not say that immersion was the object, but that immersion was the mode of effecting the object. If he went down to bathe, of course he was *dipped*.

5. But Mr. Beecher’s criticism on the Greek word here employed for washing, is entirely false. He expounds the word as signifying a washing all around, “just as a man stands in a

stream and throws the water all over his body, and washes himself by friction." Mr. Beecher criticises from imagination—not from knowledge of the language. Has he justified his criticism by a single example? He seems better acquainted with the different circumstances in the operation of bathing, than with the occurrences of the word on which he undertakes to criticise. The simple word signifies to deluge, to overwhelm, to inundate, or flow over anything, and is generally applied to water flowing or rolling in a horizontal manner. It is much employed in the medical art, and occurs in Hippocrates times without number. It is compounded with almost all the prepositions, and is accordingly modified by them. It is applied to the waves of the sea rolling over the shores, or running in high currents or billows in the ocean. It is with *κατα* applied to the general deluge. With *περι*, the proposition with which it is here compounded, (*περικλυσασθαι*) it is applied to the earth which is all around, as to its shores, washed or overflowed by the waves of the ocean; and the adjective as an epithet is given as a characteristic of islands. It has no application to the throwing up of water about himself by a man standing in a river. There is no friction nor hand-washing in this word. It performs its purpose by running over, either gently or with violence. The word does not signify that the young man in bathing splashed about like a duck, or rubbed himself like a collier; but that he threw himself into the river that the stream might flow over him. He was then *baptised* indeed, and much more than *baptised*.

6. Even according to his own showing, the argument which baptists found on *going down to a river* is not refuted, nor weakened. The young man went down to the river to wash his whole person by friction. Does this countenance the opinion that persons usually go down to a river, to sprinkle a few drops of water on the face? He admits that it is probable that the young man immersed himself also. This then was not less than baptism, but more than baptism. Indeed, if the rite of Christ required a whole hogshead of water to be poured on the person, there could be no necessity to go down to the water. But in performing the rite of baptism, persons went not only *down to the water*, but *into the water*, which to every candid mind must ever prove immersion. From the manner in which the author ushers in his observations on this subject, one would think that he had made a discovery that would silence the argument for ever. "Whole volumes," says he, "of argument, as we all know, depend on *going down to the river*." Whatever are the number of volumes that have been written to enforce this argument, it remains in full force for anything this author has done. But it

requires only a naked statement, to make it irresistibly evident to any mind not jaundiced by prejudice.

“The only immersions enjoined in the Mosaic law,” says Mr. Beecher, “were immersions of things to which no reference can be had here—as vessels, sacks, skins, &c. In this case no act was performed that had any tendency to affect the *worshipper*, but only the thing immersed.” What! Does Mr. Beecher assert that the purification of vessels, &c. had no relation to the worshipper? Was it for the sake of the vessels, sacks, and skins, that they were purified? Was it not because the things immersed were used by the worshipper? Were not their vessels purified for the very same reason that their persons were purified? Had not the vessels, &c. been purified, the worshipper using them would have been defiled. What had God’s law to do with the purification of the vessels, &c. of the Jews more than of the heathens, but from the connexion of those things with the worshippers? Did ever so monstrous an idea enter the mind of man, as that God commanded a rite to be performed on vessels, &c. which had no reference to the worshipper, but only to the things immersed? I would not have thought that there could have been found a Christian child, who should make such an assertion. Had not the vessels, &c. the same relation to the worshipper, as the meats and drinks here specified? What nearer relation had a pure sacrifice to the worshipper, than had a pure vessel? Are not vessels, &c. ordinances of the flesh as well as meats and drinks? In fact, everything enjoined or forbidden in the ritual ordinances of Moses, had a reference to the flesh. They are all carnal ordinances.

What does Mr. Beecher mean when he asserts, that “no reference can be had to the immersions of *inanimate things*, but only to the purification of *persons*.” Are *meats* and *drinks* persons? Are gifts and sacrifices persons? Are the various things mentioned belonging to the tabernacle, persons? Had not the vessels which a man used the same relation to his flesh, as the meats which he ate? Why must the *baptisms* be confined to persons? The inanimate things immersed, had the same reference to the persons of the worshippers, as had the gifts and sacrifices, as had the meats and drinks, as had all the things specified in this chapter.

“What could any one think,” says Mr. Beecher, “that the immersion of vessels, of earth or wood, had to do with the purifying of the conscience or the heart of a worshipper? “The immersion of those things had just as much to do with purifying the conscience, as had the purification of the person. Neither of them could purify the conscience: both of them purified

ceremonially as types of that which truly purifies. And the purification of all our services is as necessary as the purification of our persons. If men, mistaking the meaning of the rites, might think that the purification of the body cleansed the conscience, so might they think of the purification of vessels? Did they immerse the vessels, sacks, and skins, to purify the conscience of the vessels, sacks, and skins? Can anything be more plain than that the true relation, and the falsely supposed effect of the Jewish rites to the persons of the worshippers, were the same with respect to what was to be performed on inanimate things, as to what were to be performed on the person itself? For what purpose were inanimate things *purified*, if they had no relation to the persons of the worshippers?

For a full answer to the objection from the epithet *divers or different*, I refer to my reply to the Presbyterian Review. I shall here merely observe, that though immersion is always the same as to mode, there may be innumerable different immersions. An immersion of the body is a different immersion from the immersion of things. An immersion of a variety of different things is in each a different immersion. An immersion of every different substance is a different immersion.

Why *immersions* are mentioned rather than *purifications* in general, it is not my business to declare. All I have to do is to show that *immersions* and not *purifications* are mentioned. It is to me quite obvious that there is no necessity to mention purifications universally in this place: the apostle is not professing to exhaust the subject of purification, but to give a specimen of the things practised under the law, to point out their insufficiency to purge the conscience; and other purifications are mentioned in other parts of the epistle. But I observe not this as a controversialist. In that character, I do not give an opinion, nor undertake to satisfy an opponent. There may be reasons which we cannot perceive. Our business is not to account for God's reasons for not saying what he has not said, but to discover what he has said. I act on this principle in every instance, as well as in this. I endeavour to find out the meaning of the Holy Spirit, by the words which he has used; not by speculations and opinions with respect to what he should say.

“No man,” says Mr. Beecher, “who had not a theory to support, could bring himself to do such violence to all the laws of interpretation in a case so plain.” I think I am entitled to ask, with indignation, the ground on which my antagonist presumes to make this assertion. I have no theory to support. I never use theories in ascertaining the truths and the ordinances of Christ. I interpret by the laws of language. Neither have

I any philological doctrine which demands my denial of such a secondary signification of this word. How can I have a theory to support in denying such a secondary meaning, when it is my doctrine that words might receive such secondary meanings? The process by which, in various instances, such secondary significations are imposed on words, I have exemplified in some of their wildest caprices. Mr. Beecher himself is in this doctrine merely my pupil. As far as he is right, he has adopted my philology; and has illustrated it merely by different examples. Must I then, in opposing his conclusion, have a theory to support in opposition to my own doctrine? Mr. Bickersteth's friend in proof that the word in question, from signifying baptism by *immersion*, came to signify baptism in any way, alleged the authority of my own doctrine against myself. There was, however, a trifling deficiency in his reasoning. He proved from my doctrine that the word might come to have such a meaning; but he forgot to prove that it actually underwent the supposed process. Perfectly on the same principle Mr. Beecher shows, from my doctrine, that the word might come to signify *purification*. But he has not proved that, in the history of the word before the time of Christ, it actually received such a meaning. The principle I do not dispute; it is my own principle. What temptation, then, can I have, from any theory of mine, to dispute this secondary meaning?

Again, I can have as little temptation from interest or popularity to do violence to any passage in order to prove a particular mode of any religious ordinance. Have I made a fortune by immersion? Would *purifications* destroy me? Would I become less popular among christians, or with the world, by returning to *sprinkling*? If emblematical purification by *sprinkling* or *pouring* were optional, as well as by *immersion*, I would most assuredly never *immerse*. Besides, why should I do violence to this passage, in order to reject *purification* as its meaning, when I could admit this meaning here, and still with the utmost ease prove immersion to be the mode of Christ's ordinance? Were I ever so partial to water, Mr. Beecher's good-natured doctrine will indulge me, and allow me to immerse as freely as to sprinkle. I can have no possible reason, then, for confining the word in this passage to *immersion*, but the innumerable proofs that it has this meaning, and the absence of all proof that it ever has any other. I would act perfectly in the same way, if the dispute were solely of a literary nature, and the question were the mode of a heathen rite.

But should it be admitted that the word here is confined to persons, and that it includes washings of the person in every mode,

still this would not countenance the opinion that it signifies *purifications*. All ceremonial washings were purifications; but all purifications were not washings. *Washings* and *purifications* are not synonymous.

Mr. Beecher next presents us with the usual objection from Mark vii. 4, and Luke xi. 38. "In Mark vii. 4, 8, and in Luke xi. 38, *καθαρίζω* is the natural and obvious sense of *βαπτίζω*, and *καθαρισμὸς* of *βαπτισμὸς*." Let us hear the proof. "1. This sense," says the writer, "fulfils perfectly all the exigencies of the passages." And if it did I care not. Many a false sense may fulfil all the exigencies of the connexion. This false sense, however, has not even this merit; whereas, *immersion* is quite suitable to the connexion, and *immersion* is the only meaning of the word in every instance in the whole compass of the language.

"I know indeed," says the writer, "that it is said by some, that in Mark there is a rise in the idea from the lesser washing of the hands, which was common before all meals, to the greater washing implied in the immersion of the body after coming from the market. But on the other hand, there is simply a rise from the specific to the general and indefinite. They always *wash their hands* before meals; and when they return from market they also *purify themselves* (as the nature of the case may require) before they eat." A rise from the specific to the general and indefinite! This indeed is a new climax. This is Gothic rhetoric. A rise from the washing of the hands to the immersion of the whole body, or to the washing of the body in any mode, is a rise which all can understand; but a rise from the washing of the hands to indefinite purifications is a fall. Mr. Beecher's own phraseology is nonsense. "They also purify themselves." Does not *also* imply that the washing of the hands is not purification! This is not an advancement from a species of purification to purification in general, but an advancement from what is supposed not to be purification to purification. But such an advance might be an *advance backwards*. The washing of the hands is a species of purification; if the advance is to purification indefinitely, then it may be fulfilled by something less than washing the hands, by dipping the finger, for instance, or by touching the body on any part with a drop of water, or even without water, with blood, &c.

If any reader has a conscience at all, I ask nothing more than common sense in him, to perceive in this passage, that the persons referred to usually washed their hands before eating; and that when they came from the market, they did something more than this. What that something more was depends on

the meaning of the word. "In the latter case," says Mr. Beecher, "Mr. Bloomfield remarks, it denotes a washing of the body, but not an immersion." Now, as far as the passage itself is concerned, it is fully admitted that it does not determine; and the climax would be the same to Mr. Bloomfield as to me. But I determine the meaning of the word here, by its meaning as established by the use of language. I never press an argument a hair's breadth farther than it can go. I tell Mr. Bloomfield that the word never signifies to *wash*, as I tell Mr. Beecher that it never signifies to *purify*. My authority is the practice of the Greek language.

But why does Mr. Beecher appeal to Mr. Bloomfield? Mr. Bloomfield is as much opposed to him as he is to me. If the word here signifies to *wash the body*, then it does not here signify to purify in general. Mr. Beecher's artifice is just that of the Socinians, when they explain the words "Before Abraham was I am," in the sense of the Arians. It is a dishonest and uncandid way of escaping. He does what he is able to make it *purify*. But as he cannot make it purify even to his own satisfaction, he will give it over to Mr. Bloomfield for washing the body without immersion. This is not my way of handling the word of God. Purification, then, cannot be the meaning of the word here, because it is not suitable to the phraseology in which it is employed. But let it be observed that this is more than I am bound to show. Were it suitable to the context I would equally reject it. I dismiss it *on the merits*, for want of a title from the use of the language. I am not here grounding a proof, but obviating an objection. It is quite sufficient that I can show that the meaning which I assign to the word is suitable to the passage: I am not bound to show that either *wash* or *purify* is unsuitable. The title of my client to the whole estate is already in evidence. My opponents must show that some part of it has been alienated. This passage will not prove such alienation.

Mr. Beecher's second proof is, "Nothing in the context demands the sense, immerse, and powerful reasons forbid it. All must confess that purification is the only idea involved in the subject of thought. Now it is no more likely that a want of *immersion* offended the Pharisee, Luke xi. 38, in the case of Christ, than it is that this was the ground of offence in the case of the disciples, Mark vii. It does not appear that Christ had been to the market. Nor is it likely at all that an immersion was expected, as a matter of course, before every meal, even on coming from a crowd. The offence in the case of the disciples, was that they had not washed their hands. An immersion was

not expected of them, though they had been in crowds. Why should it be of Christ?" It is not necessary that the context should demand the true meaning of a word; it is enough that the context does not forbid it. The usage of the language demands this meaning without any additional demand from the context. The context, however, forbids *purification*, though this is not necessary to me. The reasons alleged, as forbidding it to signify immersion, have no force. Might not the pharisees expect more sanctity in the Messiah than in his disciples, or than even they themselves professed? But I have nothing to do with conjectures. Whatever might be their reasons, they did expect that Christ would have immersed before eating. To deny this is to give the lie to the inspired narrator. The word used by the Holy Spirit signifies immersion, and immersion only. A thousand reasons might influence the pharisees in the expectation referred to, which may not at all be known to us. To know their reasons, is not at all necessary to the knowing of the meaning of the word. Mr. Beecher rests this argument on a false principle of interpretation, namely, that to know that a word is used in its established meaning, it is necessary to know that there are sufficient reasons to warrant its truth in such an application. This we are to take on the authority of the narrator. His meaning we are to know from his words, and his veracity we must rest on his character.

"Rosenmuller, on this passage," says Mr. Beecher, "well remarks, that the existence of any such custom of regular immersion before all meals, cannot be proved." This is another false first principle. What makes it necessary that a practice should be proved by foreign evidence, before the testimony of the Holy Spirit is received in its proper meaning? Is everything recorded in scripture to be denied, except it is proved by history? Am I to suspend my faith in the resurrection of Christ, till I find it proved by uninspired records? This is a Neological canon, well worthy of its author. It tends to sap the very foundations of christianity. Is not the testimony of the Spirit of God sufficient to prove this fact? And what word could he have used more decisively to assert immersion? The custom referred to as regards immersion after market, rests on the evidence of inspired history. Is not this as valid as the testimony of uninspired historians?

"But above all," says Mr. Beecher, "the immersion of the couches on which they reclined at meals is out of the question." I most freely admit that the word ought to be translated *couches* and not *tables*. It designates not only the couches on which they reclined at table, but even the beds on which they reposed at night. It applies also to the *litters* on which persons of

distinction were carried on the shoulders of men. I will never hesitate to recognise anything in evidence, whatever bearing it may have on my views. "Mr. Carson," says my antagonist, "seems to feel this point keenly, and yet manfully maintains his ground." Mr. Carson does indeed feel with regard to this objection, something that he does not wish to express. But he can assure President Beecher, that he never felt it even as a difficulty. In the strongest light in which it can be viewed, it is futile. There is no furniture in a house that could not be immersed. I have said that the couches might have been made to be taken to pieces, in order to their more convenient immersion; and were this necessary, it is a valid solution. The supposition is perfectly allowable. The couch on which rested the urn containing the ashes of Cyrus, is said by Arian, p. 144, to have had feet of solid gold; and those on either side of the throne of Alexander, for his friends to sit on, had feet of silver, p. 165. Now what could be more easy than to have the feet of the couch, of whatever materials composed, to be taken out at pleasure for the purpose of immersion? The immersion of the couches would be a thing of little trouble. But I care not that they were baptized all of a piece. The thing could be very easily accomplished. Ingenuity is very idly expended in making will-worship easy to superstition. The couches were immersed, because the word which is employed to express the operation, has this signification and no other.

Mr. Beecher, throughout his whole work, mistakes my doctrine as *to a possible sense* of a word; and labours under a fundamental error as to the difference of founding an argument on any passage, and answering an objection from it. When we found an argument on any passage, we must prove that the passage has our meaning, and no other: for if this is not proved, the argument can have no weight. But when we answer an objection from any passage, it is sufficient that a particular word may have the sense for which we contend: because, if it may have such a sense, the objection which supposes that it has not this sense, but another sense, is unfounded. It is a contradiction to say that a word *may* have such a sense in such a place, yet, that it *cannot* have this sense. If, then, the answer to the objection is *possible*, it is valid. Were not this so, christianity itself could not withstand the attacks of the infidel. Many objections must be answered by the authority of merely possible solutions. This is what I mean by a *possible sense*. I never extend this to cases in which I found an argument. I confine it resolutely to cases in which I answer objections. With respect to the passage now under discussion, Mr. Beecher is bound to

proof; because on this he founds proof that the word in question signifies to *purify*. I stand only on the defence; for I do not allege the passage as proof, but repel the objection which pretends that the passage is irreconcilable with immersion. In this point my antagonist proves himself ignorant of one of the fundamental laws of controversy. He demands proof from me, when he himself is bound to prove. He asks, "What has Mr. Carson proved? Why, truly, that in other instances βαπτίζω means immerse. But does this prove that it means it here?" Could any man who understands the self-evident laws of controversy, look for proof on my part from this passage? Is it not enough for me to show that there is nothing to prevent the word from having its established meaning in this passage? If this is possible, his objection is removed. My antagonist is bound from this passage to show that the word signifies to *purify*. How can he do this, if he has not proved the word to have that signification in any other place; and if even in this it may have its usual meaning? If, as he admits, I have found that βαπτίζω in other instances signifies to *immerse*, there is a certainty that it has this meaning here, except it is proved that it has another signification somewhere else. If another signification is found, I will not insist that immersion *must of course* be the signification here. In such a case as this, the meaning must be settled by additional evidence. When a word has two or more meanings, actually in proof, which of them may in any passage be the true meaning, is a question. But if no secondary meaning is in proof, there can be no question on the subject. *Now there is not in all Greek literature a single instance, ever alleged, in which this word MUST have a secondary meaning.*

Mr. Beecher admits that I have proved that the word signifies immersion in other places; but asks: "Does this prove that it means so here?" I answer most decidedly that it does prove this, if the word is not proved to have another meaning. If but one instance prove a word to have a certain meaning, it is proof that every other instance has the same meaning, except a secondary meaning is proved. If a secondary meaning is proved, then the claimants must rest their suit on their respective peculiar resources.

"The probability," says Mr. Beecher, "is all the other way." Here there is a want of discrimination and a confounding of things that differ. I am not speaking of what is *possible*, *probable*, or *certain*, independently of the testimony. I am speaking of the testimony of the word known by its use. I am saying that a word in a certain place must have the meaning which it is found to have in other places, when no secondary

meaning has ever been proved. Mr. Beecher alleges not the testimony of the word, but imposes a testimony on the word. He forces it to take a meaning which use has never given it, on the authority of what he thinks probable, utterly independent of the authority of the word. He tampers with the witness, and tells him what he must say. I allow witness to tell his own story, and believe him implicitly on his own authority, without regard to what I might think independently probable. Mr. Beecher's conduct is just the same with that of a jury who, having heard the testimony of a number of competent eye-witnesses, with regard to the way in which a man was killed, decide in opposition to their evidence, on the authority of the conjectures of a surgeon. This word declares that couches were purified by immersion. Mr. Beecher, on the authority of what he thinks probable, declares that it was not by immersion. He dictates to the word what it must say, instead of receiving its testimony. On the contrary, my decision is, that the way in which the couches were purified is to be known from the testimony of the word, and not from what, independently of that testimony, is probable; and that from this testimony they were immersed, because the word has no other meaning.

"Hence," says Mr. Beecher, "the demand to prove an impossibility of immersion is altogether unreasonable." If a secondary meaning had been proved from use, then, in any instance to demand an impossibility of the primary meaning, before the secondary is admitted, would be unreasonable. But is it unreasonable that a word should be understood in this passage as it is proved to signify in other passages, when no secondary signification has ever been proved? Instead of being unreasonable, the demand is founded on self-evident truth. Why should the word have a meaning here, which it is not proved to have in use, when its own established meaning will serve? How can a meaning which is not known to exist, dispute with the only established meaning? Views of probability, independently of the testimony of the word, are not a competent witness; for they are often mistaken. What we might, previously to the hearing of evidence, judge probable, might on the hearing of evidence be proved most satisfactorily to be false. The meaning of this word must be known from its use—not from views of probability independently of this use. When we hear that a certain person has *killed* another, we may think the thing very improbable; but shall we on that ground assert that *kill* does not *signify* to take away life? In fact, to allege that the *couches* were not immersed, is not to decide on the authority of the word used, but in opposition to this authority, to give the lie

to the Holy Spirit. Inspiration employs a word to designate the purification of the couches, which never signifies anything but *immerse*. If they were not immersed, the historian is a false witness. This way of conferring meanings on words is grounded on infidelity. It dictates to inspiration instead of interpreting its language. It would be improper in ascertaining the meaning of words even in a profane historian. Are we to deny the meaning of words established by use, as often as, independently of the testimony of the words, we may think a thing improbable? This would destroy the faith of history: it would destroy every doctrine of scripture. This is a usual way with some in interpreting the bible; but it is not the way that any interpret the language of the profane historian. When the profane historian narrates what is thought improbable, his veracity is questioned, but his words are not tampered with. When the Holy Spirit employs words whose meanings are not relished, critics do not say that he lies, but they say what is equal to this, that his words mean what they cannot mean. This is a respectful way of calling him a liar. If a word may have in any instance its established meaning, when it cannot be proved in any instance to have another meaning, it cannot be probable that it has in that instance a meaning which it cannot be proved to have anywhere else. Surely this is self-evident.

“And it is,” continues my antagonist, “against his own practice in other cases. Does he not admit that βαπτω means to dye, or color, when it is applied to the beard and hair?” Here I am caught at last. Surely my feet are entangled in my own net. But let the reader see with what ease I can extricate myself. The assertion of my antagonist arises from his want of discrimination. I admit that βαπτω has a secondary signification, because such secondary signification is in proof, and instances may be alleged in which its primary meaning is utterly impossible. When applied, for instance, to the lake, the immersion of a lake in the blood of a frog is beyond the bounds of possibility. Show me anything like this with respect to βαπτίζω, and I will grant a secondary meaning. And as soon as a secondary meaning is ascertained on sufficient grounds, I do not demand in every instance a proof of impossibility of primary meaning before the secondary is alleged. The competition between the rival meanings must then be determined on other grounds. This law I apply not to βαπτίζω only, but to every word of every language. The immersion of the couches, in no light in which it can be viewed, has the smallest difficulty. From an excess of good nature I made faith easy to the weak, by fixing the couches so as readily to be taken to pieces. But

if obstinacy will not avail itself of this help, I will force it to carry the couches to water wherever it may be found.

“The fact is,” says Mr. Beecher, “that the whole reasoning against the sense claimed for βαπτίζω in these passages, rests on false principles.” False principles! What now are our false principles? Is it a false principle to rest on the ascertained meaning of a word, and not on probabilities independently of the word? Is it a false principle to refuse a word a meaning in a disputed passage, till it proves itself to have such meaning in an undisputed passage?

“It assumes,” says my antagonist, “a violent improbability of the meaning in question, and resorts to all manner of shifts to prove the possibility of immersion, as though that were all that the case required.” What shall I say of this? Is it calumny? or is it want of perspicacity? *Assume!* I assume nothing, Mr. President Beecher, but self-evident truth. My reasoning does not at all rest on assumptions. The meaning which you assign to the word, I reject, because it wants evidence, not on any assumption of its violent improbability. *All manner of shifts!* I repel the charge with indignation. I never used a *shift* in all the controversy I ever wrote. Does it require a shift to prove that in all the cases referred to, immersion was possible? Will any man of common sense question the possibility? If the possibility is unquestionable, why shall I be supposed to employ all manner of *shifts* to prove it?

But my opponent asserts also that I consider that the *possibility* of immersion in the cases referred to, is all that is required to prove it. Is this a *shift*? It is worse than a *shift*: it is not a fact. The proof that immersion was used in the cases referred to, is that the word has this meaning and no other. The *possibility* of immersion only removes objection. But for argument's sake, I will for a moment admit that *immersion* was in these cases impossible: even then I will deny the title of *purifications*. *Washing* is a meaning which would come previously to *purifying*. These passages, then, cannot in any view, ground the title of *purification*.

His next argument, Mr. Beecher grounds in a passage in Ecclesiasticus. “In the case,” says he, “so often quoted from Sirach xxxiv. 25, βαπτίζω requires the sense, καθαρίζω. The passage is this: βαπτιζόμενος ἀπὸ νεκροῦ καὶ πάλιν ἀπτόμενος αὐτοῦ τί ὠφέλησε τῷ λουτρῷ αὐτοῦ. ‘He that is cleansed from a dead body, and again touches it, of what profit to him is his cleansing?’” No such thing is required. But let us hear his proof.

“1. The sense, καθαρίζω, purify,” says he, “suits the pre-

position *απο*;—immerse does not.” The preposition, I assert, equally suits immersion. *Immersed from a dead body*, is an elliptical expression, for *immersed to purify from the pollution contracted by the touch of a dead body*. And on this principle it is translated into English, in the common version, though the translators were not *immersers*. “He that washeth himself after the touching of a dead body, if he touch it again, what availeth his washing.” But it is strange beyond measure that President Beecher did not perceive that even if the word *purify* itself had been here used, there would have been a similar ellipsis. To *purify from a dead body*, is to purify from the pollution contracted by touching a dead body. This is school-boy criticism, Mr. President.

His second observation on this example is: “No immersion, in the case of touching a dead body, was enjoined, but simply a *washing of the body*.” It is not necessary that an immersion should be enjoined: it is quite sufficient that the injunction of washing the body was usually performed by immersion. The writer is alluding to practice, and is not relating the words of the injunction.

Mr. Beecher’s third observation on this passage is, that “the rite of purification from a dead body was complex, and no import of the word *βαπτίζω*, but the one claimed, is adapted to include the whole.” The writer is not describing the whole process of the rite of purification according to the law of Moses. Why then should the word include the whole? He is referring to a part of that rite merely as an illustration of another subject. Priests were *anointed* to their office, but there were other things included in the rite of inauguration, besides *anointing*. Might it not be said, “If a priest is anointed, and afterwards render himself unfit for his office, of what avail in his anointing?” The washing completed the process of purification. Another touch of a dead body defiled again, and rendered the washing, consequently the whole process, useless.

But in the word *λουτρον*, there is the most decisive evidence that the whole process of purification is not included in *βαπτίζω*. The word *λουτρον* here refers to the thing done to the person by his baptism. But *λουτρον* cannot refer to purification in general, but only to washing. It cannot include the sprinkling of the water of separation. This is purification, but not washing.

On this view, Mr. Beecher asks: “How then is it consistent to apply it to the blood of Christ, which is spoken of as the blood of sprinkling?” This to Mr. Beecher appears an unanswerable question: to me it has not the smallest difficulty.

We are said to be *washed* in the blood of Christ, and we are said to be *sprinkled with* the blood of Christ. But the *washing* and the *sprinkling* are never confounded. We are not said to be washed by being sprinkled, nor is *sprinkling* called *washing*. These two forms of speech refer to the application of the blood of Christ under figures entirely different. When Christ's blood is said to be sprinkled on us, there is an allusion to the sprinkling of the blood under the law; when we are said to be washed in the blood of Christ, there is an allusion to the *washing* under the law. Does not Mr. Beecher know what a difference there is between a mixture of metaphors, and a succession of distinct metaphors? Careless readers will imagine that there is wonderful acuteness in Mr. Beecher's observations. But the eye of the philosopher will perceive that they are subtle without discrimination. A little more perspicuity would have saved him from undertaking the impracticable task of proving baptism to mean purification.

But were we to grant that the word here signifies *purification*, this would not be proof that it has this signification in the rite of Christian baptism. It would give ground to send the case to the jury; but would not decide the controversy. Still we would most satisfactorily prove that baptism must be by immersion.

"The case of Judith also," Mr. Beecher alleges, "sustains the same view." But what appearance of difficulty does this occurrence of the word present? Is it a thing impossible, or even difficult, to be immersed near a fountain? Might she not have had attendants with her to provide her with a bath at the fountain, had this been necessary? From the civilities and attentions of the governor, could she be supposed to want anything that would not be most cheerfully supplied? Was it not usual to have stone troughs at fountains, for the purpose of watering cattle? "Haynes informs us," says Mr. Whitecross, in his *Anecdotes illustrative of scripture*, "that having arrived at Nazareth, at the end of December, about five in the evening, upon entering the town, he and his party saw two women filling their pitchers with water at a fountain he had described, and about twelve others waiting for the same purpose, whom they desired to pour some into a trough which stood by, that their horses might drink; they had no sooner made the request than the women complied, and filled the trough, and the others waited with the greatest patience," p. 83. Yes, but Mr. Beecher will say, *Mr. Carson has not proved that there was such a trough at this fountain. Mr. Carson will reply, this is not necessary, Mr. President; it is sufficient for my purpose, if it may have been so.*

I am answering an objection, and if the thing might be as I suppose, the objection is invalid.

But what should prevent her from bathing in the fountain, even if we were assured that there was no other way of bathing? This is quite usual to superstition. Charlotte Elizabeth, speaking of a holy well at the top of Slieve Donard, a lofty mountain in Ireland, says, "Many a diseased creature had dragged his feeble, perhaps crippled limbs and exhausted frame to the top of Slieve Donard, to plunge them in the so called holy well, hoping to find a healing power in its spring:" shall less be expected from Jewish superstition? In fact, the English version, which was not made by immersers, actually translates the passage, "and washed herself *in* a fountain of water by the camp." Judith, xii. 7. It is true that the exact rendering is *immersed herself at a fountain*, not *in* a fountain. The immersion is proved not by the preposition, but by the verb. And though *at a fountain* does not signify *in a fountain*, yet it is consistent with it. A person may be said to be *immersed at a fountain*, when he is *immersed in it*. A person coming from Palestine may say, I was baptised at the Jordan, when he was immersed in it.

I have said all this, however, only to put obstinacy to the blush, and overwhelm it with confusion. Not a word of it is essentially necessary. Had Judith been most rigorously treated, and confined to her tent, when she is said to be baptised for purification, I will make the word find her water. Can anything be more unreasonable than for persons at the end of thousands of years to allege difficulties as in certain cases insuperable? Could not innumerable things render a thing practicable, which to us are now unknown?

"We are told," says Mr. Beecher, "of her courage, and faith, and of possible bathing places near the spring, and all for what? To avoid so obvious a conclusion as that the writer merely means to say, that she purified or washed herself without reference to the mode." To avoid such a conclusion, it is not necessary to allege any of the things mentioned. The immersion would be secured by the word, though we could see no way of its accomplishment. It is enough that nothing is seen to render it impossible. When we take the trouble of showing how the immersion might be accomplished, it is a work of supererogation. How is the conclusion obvious that the historian means only that she purified or washed herself, without reference to mode, when the word that he employs designates mode in the most decisive manner? What is the ground of the supposed obvious conclusion? Is it that it would have been sufficient to tell us that she washed or purified herself, without telling us the

mode? This is no ground for such a conclusion. This does not imply that she did not purify in the mode of immersion, or that the historian should not mention the mode employed. But can anything be sufficient ground for a conclusion as to this point, but the import of the word itself? How do we conclude that she purified herself at all? Is it not from the word used by the historian? Ought we not, then, to ground our conclusion, as to the mode of that purification, on the same word, and not on independent probability? We have no testimony on the subject, but that contained in the word βαπτίζω, and that testimony asserts immersion. How can it be concluded that the historian speaks of purification without expressing mode, when he employs the word that most definitely expresses mode?

“What reason is there,” says Mr. Beecher, “for all this?” Astonishing demand! What reason is there for giving a word the only meaning it is known to possess? When a person says, *I dipped myself in the river*, shall we say, “what reason is there to suppose that the word *dip* here signifies to *immerse*? Is it not here intended to tell us that *he bathed himself*? What reason, then, is there to suppose that *dip* does not signify to bathe without reference to mode?” Our reason for believing that Judith was *immersed* is, that the historian tells us that she was *immersed*. Is not this a sufficient reason?

“Is not the sense *purify*,” continues Mr. Beecher, “*a priori* probable?” Whether in giving an account of the performance of a rite of purification, a writer will mention the process in the rite to be performed without specification, cannot be previously known. It must be learned from the words of the narrative. That Mr. President Beecher will be immersed in one of the great American rivers, is now very improbable; but should I ever read that in obedience to Christ, he was *immersed*, I certainly will not attempt to discredit the account by alleging that *immerse* does not here signify to *dip*.

“Does it not,” continues Mr. Beecher, “fulfil all the exigencies of the case?” This is no criterion. A word might fulfil all the exigencies of the case, and yet another word, either more general, or more specific, might be used. When a person says, *I dipped myself in the river*, either *washed* or *bathed*, would fulfil all the exigencies of the case. Does this prove that *dip* signifies to *wash* or *bathe* without referring to mode?

“Was it of any importance,” says Mr. Beecher, “to specify the mode?” If it is truth, the importance is not to be weighed. My last reply will serve equally here. But is it a thing of no importance to specify the mode in which a rite is performed?

“Do the circumstances of the case,” continues my opponent,

“call for immersion?” The word calls for immersion; it is enough that no circumstances forbid it. If this was the usual mode of performing the rite of washing in purification, which is admitted, why is it not demanded? Such objections are unworthy of an answer. Suppose it is said that an army on its march *forded* a river near such a place. Suppose again that I know that in that neighbourhood there is a bridge over the river. Is it not probable, that if there is a bridge, the army will pass by the bridge? Am I then to say that *ford* signifies *to pass a river by a bridge*? Whitecross relates the following anecdote. “Very near Columbo is a school built in a beautiful and romantic situation, on the high bank of a noble river, across which a bridge of boats had recently been thrown for the convenience of the public. A number of fine little boys residing on the side of the river, opposite the school, were exceedingly anxious to enjoy the benefits of the instruction which it afforded, but were utterly unable, from their poverty, to pay the toll for passing this bridge four times every day, to and from school. In removing this serious difficulty, the little fellows showed at once their eagerness to obtain instruction, and their native ingenuity. Wearing only a light cloth around them, according to the custom of the country, they were accustomed to assemble on the bank in the morning, and the larger boys binding up the books of the smaller ones, which they had home with them to learn their tasks, to tie them on the back of their heads, and swim over, the little ones following them. And this inconvenience they constantly encountered, rather than be absent from school.”

Now, if instead of this particular narrative, which explains every circumstance, it had been recorded only that the boys passed the river by *swimming*; while we knew that a bridge of boats was near, what would be the sense in which, according to Mr. Beecher’s philology, a foreigner should understand the language? “*Swim*,” says the writer, “must undoubtedly be here taken to signify to walk over *a bridge of boats*. It is true, in many books in the English language, the word *swim* has another meaning, but there is the highest probability that it has not this signification here. Is it to be believed that the boys swam, in the primary sense of the word, across a great river when there was a bridge at the place? Incredible, utterly incredible, utterly incredible! My opponents, it is true, may plead the authority of classical English; but I rely on Columbine English. The word *swim*, then, must here have the secondary signification for which I contend.” Every child who speaks English will laugh the critic to scorn. But to his own country-

men, as little acquainted with the English language as himself, he would appear to be a very profound philologist. I maintain that this is exactly Mr. Beecher's criticism, and that it can satisfy nothing but ignorance.

Is it not evident, on the face of the document, that Judith went out from the camp to the fountain at Bethulia for the purpose of bathing, or washing her whole person? This the law of purification required, and no other reason made it necessary for her to go to the fountain. Even then, supposing that it were allowed that the word signifies to wash without reference to mode, this gives no countenance to Mr. Beecher's opinion that the word signifies *to purify*. *To wash* and *to purify* are not identical. On this supposition, the passage would favour those who think that the word signifies to *wash*—not those who think that it signifies to *purify*.

Again, if the washing of the person in any manner was the way in which the law was fulfilled, why did she go to the fountain? Why did she leave the tent? Could not a small basin of water have served the purpose of successive washing?

Again, even had it been said that she washed her person at the fountain, was not immersion likely to be the mode? Is it not the usual and the most convenient way of washing the person? Why then shall it be supposed that it was not the mode employed here, even though the word of mode had not been used? But especially when the word of mode is used, why should supposed difficulties make it incredible? The alleged difficulties, however, are no difficulties. Mr. Beecher cannot find a tree while he is in the forest.

But even were it admitted that the word signifies *purify* in this place, this would not prove that it has this signification in the ordinance of baptism. We could still prove immersion to be the mode of the christian rite. Mr. Beecher fails in everything which he attempts to prove; yet were he successful, it would not prove his position.

Throughout his whole work, my antagonist labours under an essential error. He reasons on the supposition that every instance of the occurrence of the word must be treated independently of its established meaning, and its meaning assigned according to views of probability, without reference to testimony. He understands not the difference between answering an objection and founding an argument; and calls upon me for proof, when he himself is bound to prove. In answering objections, a merely possible supposition is as good as demonstration: in proof, probability, even the highest probability, avails nothing against testimony. If Judith is said to have been baptised, she

must have been immersed, though a thousand difficulties may occur in providing the water. My opponents are more unreasonable with me than the Israelites were with Moses. They murmured when they had no water. Must I bring water out of the rock, when there is enough in the fountain? Such a mode of disproving the established meaning of a word, and of giving a new and unauthorized meaning, I cannot dignify with any other designation than that of perverse cavilling.

Mr. Beecher alleges as another argument, that, "No contrary probability, or usage, can be established from the writers of the New Testament age, or of the preceding age, who used the Alexandrine Greek." With probability we have nothing to do in this question. We are enquiring about a matter of fact, namely, whether a certain word had a secondary meaning. We admit proof from writers of all classes to the time of Christ. Mr. Beecher tells us that to refute a secondary meaning, it is of no use to appeal to the earliest writers. This also we admit. If in all the history of the word till its appropriation to the ordinance of Christ, he brings one instance in which it must have a secondary meaning, we admit that a secondary meaning is fully proved. An example from Alexandrine Greek would prove the fact, though it should not be owned by any writer of antiquity. Is not this admission sufficiently liberal? Candour requires no less: it cannot require more. I have no object but truth; and I am so strong in truth, that I fearlessly grant everything that candour can demand.

But what does the writer mean when he asserts that no contrary usage can be established from the writers of the New Testament age, or of the age preceding? Does he mean that during this time the word is not used in its primary sense? If he does, the assertion is palpably false. Does he mean that during the specified time, there are examples of this secondary meaning? Is not this the very point in dispute? To assume it is to assume the question at issue. There is not one instance to prove this.

Here, however, Mr. Beecher labours under his usual mistake. He puts proof on his opponent, when it lies upon himself. Why should we prove a contrary usage in the times of the New Testament, or the preceding age? Does not proof lie upon him? If I prove that in its early history a word has a certain meaning, it must in every age be supposed to have the same meaning, till a contrary usage is proved. If the possessor of an estate proves that he has hitherto possessed it by a good title, his possession cannot be disturbed till alienation is proved. It is possible that he may have sold it, but this is to be proved, not taken for granted.

“I do not deny,” says my antagonist, “that these writers do also use the word βαπτίζω in other circumstances, and in a secular sense, to denote immersion, sinking, overwhelming, or oppression. But this only proves that the two usages did co-exist; just as Mr. Carson proves that the two usages of βαπτο did co-exist in Hippocrates, and that the existence of the one did not disprove the existence of the other.”

But is there not a great difference between Mr. Carson’s *proving*, and Mr. Beecher’s *asserting*, and supposing, and alleging *probabilites*, independently of the word. All my opponents endeavour to take advantage of my candour in proving the secondary meaning of βαπτο, taking it for granted that this equally applies to βαπτίζω. Let βαπτίζω show as good evidence of a secondary meaning, as I have shown on the part of βαπτο, and I will without controversy admit the fact. But when Mr. Beecher has done this, he has not succeeded. Even then I am perfectly able to prove that the word applies to the ordinance of baptism in its primary meaning. A primary and a secondary meaning may co-exist, while each of them must be capable of being definitely ascertained. I deny a secondary meaning, not because it would disprove immersion in the ordinance of baptism, but because it wants the countenance of use. I give my opponents the whole range of Greek literature till the institution of the ordinance of baptism. I have never met an example which I cannot reduce to the one meaning.

Mr. Beecher’s explanation of Acts xxii. 16, is not a little singular. On the strength of this single example I would undertake to refute his meaning of the word in dispute. Let us hear his explanation of it. “Here,” says he, “we have faith in Christ, the washing away or pardon of sins, and a purification intended to symbolize it. βαπτισαι, purify thyself, or be purified bodily,—ἀπόλουσαι τας ἀμαρτίας, wash away thy sins, as to the mind, by calling on the name of the Lord.” On this I remark. 1. This makes the pardon of sins to be conferred at the time of baptism. It is the very error which he reprobates, p. 42. If the distinction is, that purification is emblematic, and pardon of sins real, then the pardon of sins takes place in baptism. In fact this is what he expressly says. He makes *purify* refer to the body, and *wash away thy sins* refer to the mind. Could Mr. Beecher more clearly avow the doctrine which he stigmatizes?

2. This makes the external rite of baptism purify the body from sin, while the mind is purified not by baptism but by calling on the name of the Lord. If the body is not purified

from sin by the rite, it is not according to Mr. Beecher purified at all. It is the mind only, as distinguished from the body, that is purified by calling on the name of the Lord.

3. This represents the mind as purified at the time of baptism, by calling on the name of the Lord. Is it not by faith in the blood of Christ, that both soul and body are purified? And does not this take place at the moment when the sinner believes in Christ?

4. It is not said that he was to wash away his sins by calling on the name of the Lord, but that he was to be baptized, *having called* on the name of the Lord.

5. *Purify* and *wash* are not indeed synonymous, but they are too nearly related to be both applied *together* with reference to the same thing. The one is the genus, and the other is a species under it. *Be purified*, and *wash away thy sins*, would be intolerable English. Is not *washing* contained in *purifying*? What need is there for both the genus and the species?

6. Mr. Beecher has felt this consequence, and to avoid it, he has invented a distinction, not suggested by the words; but inconsistent both with truth and with the passage.

7. The emblem in baptism refers to the soul as well as to the body, though the body only is washed; and the thing signified by the emblem refers to the body as well as to the soul. The body is washed from sin as well as the mind. The distinction, then, is not between the baptism of the body and the washing of the soul.

8. "*Be baptized*," evidently refers to the rite as designated from its mode; and "*wash away thy sins*," to its emblematical meaning. *Baptism* is the name of the rite; the *washing away of sins* is its emblematical import. Sins are washed away by the blood of Christ, the moment a person believes on him. This is exhibited in emblem immediately after believing the truth, by being immersed in water. Sins are emblematically washed away in baptism, just as ceremonial sins were washed away by ceremonial purification. In like manner the Lord's supper represents that which has already taken place, and not that which is done during the ordinance. The blood was previously shed, the atonement was made, and the sins of the worthy partakers were remitted. But in the ordinance of the supper all this is exhibited in emblem.

9. This phraseology shows that baptism is a *washing* or *bathing*. Then it cannot be a purification by sprinkling a few drops of water. This is no washing. The whole person was bathed.

10. Yet though there is a washing in baptism, the word

baptism cannot signify washing, for this would be to say, "Be washed, and wash away thy sins." Two words with exactly the same meaning could not be thus conjoined. No criticism will ever be able to reconcile this passage with either *washing* or *purifying* as the meaning of the word *baptism*. It is suitable only to its modal meaning, *immersion*.

Mr. Beecher thinks that 1 Pet. iii. 21, prove his view. The apostle, he tells us, "seems to think that, if he left the word βαπτισμα unguarded, he might be taken to mean the external purification of the body." Is not this reason of caution as applicable to *immersion* as to purification? Whatever might have been the name or mode of the ordinance, it is an ordinance of emblematic purification, and as such was liable to perversion. Have not baptists as much need to caution ignorance against supposing that the external rite is salvation, as those who make the word signify *purification*? The *immersion* is an emblematical *washing*, and it is necessary to guard against the universal proneness to superstition, in substituting rites for the things signified by them.

Mr. Beecher seems to think that the word baptism in this passage does not at all refer to the christian rite, but to purification or atonement by the blood of Christ. This conceit is unworthy of notice. 1. Immerse is the meaning of the word, whatever the immersion may represent. 2. It is the appropriated name of the ordinance, and to the ordinance it must refer here, whatever the word may signify. 3. That it refers to the ordinance of baptism is evident on the whole face of the document. No man could deny this, who had not a purpose to serve. 4. Mr. Beecher does not, as he ought, show the consistency of the meaning alleged, with the phraseology of the passage. 5. The ordinance of baptism, and the salvation of Noah by water, have the most lively resemblance. Noah and his family were saved by being buried in the water of the flood; and after the flood they emerged as rising from the grave. There is no correspondence between *purification* and the water of the flood. 6. We are saved by baptism, just as Paul washed away his sins by baptism—just as the bread in the Lord's supper is Christ's body, and the wine his blood—just as the rock was Christ—just as the joint participation in eating the bread, and drinking the wine in the supper, is the communion of the body of Christ, and of the blood of Christ. There is no difficulty in this phraseology to any who have not some heresy to support by perversion.

The author refers next to the authority of Josephus. I have already disposed of the testimony of Josephus, with regard to

the baptism of John. It is completely in accordance with our views of the mode of the ordinance of Christ. "To denote baptism," says Mr. Beecher, "he uses the word *βάπτησις*, and to denote its import he states that they are to use it, *ἐφ' ἄγνεια τοῦ σώματος*," &c. Josephus does not use *βαπτμοσις* to denote the rite of baptism, but for the act of baptizing. To denote the rite he uses *βαπτισμος*. The *ἡ βάπτησις* is the immersing—*βαπτισμος* is the rite of *immersion*. And the words of Josephus, quoted by the author, are the import of the rite as to its nature or object, not the import of its name. This manifests a great want of discrimination in my opponent. Except this were the import of the name of the rite, it cannot serve him.

The import of the rite, as given by Josephus, instead of serving my opponent, refutes him. If the people came to John's baptism on account of purification, then baptism is the name of the rite, and *purification* is its object. They came to be *immersed* in order to be purified by that immersion. Surely a very child will understand this.

"Now here I remark," says my antagonist, "that there was nothing to cause Josephus or any other Jew to think of the mode, or to attach any importance to it." What trifling is this? What necessity for Josephus to think anything of the mode? Does this say that a certain mode was not employed, and that Josephus did not mention the purification by the name of the mode employed? Does any one expect Josephus to attach importance to the mode whatever it might be? Does this imply that Jesus attached no importance to the mode? I never met so great and so constant a want of discrimination. Suppose an infidel to give an account of the performance of this rite by immersion, would he not speak of it as an immersion?

"No idea," continues the author, of a fancied reference, in the rite, to the death of Christ, could bias his mind to the sense immersion." Was it necessary that Josephus should understand the reference of the mode of this rite to the death of Christ, in order to his knowing it to be an immersion; and in order to his giving it the modal appropriated name? I am not sure that John the Baptist understood this. Did Josephus understand the emblem of the burial of Christ, that was contained in the figure of Jonas in the belly of the whale? Did all men know what was the import of the rite of circumcision, who spoke of it by its appropriated name; and who knew what was performed in the rite? How many people know that the baptists immerse in the performance of the ordinance of baptism, who do not know that in that mode they have a reference to the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ? I am weary of replying to childish trifling.

“To him, it is plain,” continues the author, “that it meant nothing but purifying the body,” &c. It may be very true that the rite was understood by Josephus to mean nothing but purifying the body, without implying that its name signified purification. As usual the author does not distinguish between the name of the rite and the object of the rite. Though Josephus might see no emblem in the mode, does this imply that immersion was not its mode; that it had not its name from the mode; and that Josephus spoke not of it by its appropriated modal name? It is sickening to be obliged to notice such arguments.

“Now,” says the writer, “although I would not rely on such places for proof, against a strong contrary probability, yet when I find them so perfectly coincident with all other facts; when all shades of probability so perfectly harmonize and blend in a common result, I cannot hesitate, for I see no good reason for doubt.” Whatever may be supposed the probability with regard to the mode in the facts referred to, independently of testimony, the moment competent testimony gives its evidence, it decides the matter. Instead of a probability, there is a certainty that immersion was the mode, because the word used by the historian signifies immersion, and has no other meaning. Is not the meaning of a word testimony? The author here admits the possibility of immersion in each of the cases referred to. What, then, should prevent it, when it is testified by a word that has no other meaning? This is testimony against previous improbability, which in all courts is competent evidence. That cannot be a safe principle, which, it is admitted, may possibly fail. Now the author himself here admits that the principle on which he interprets this word, will not universally hold good.

Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth, namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of the language, ascertained by acknowledged examples; but from views of probability as to the thing related, independently of the testimony of the word. He learns not facts from history; but he dictates to history. The historian he will not allow to use his words in the sense acknowledged by the language, because that sense is, he thinks, unsupported by the previous probability of the fact.

If a word is found to have two meanings, it is lawful in every instance of its occurrence, to bring their respective claims to the test. But if a secondary meaning is not in proof, previous probability as to the fact has nothing to do; because a thing previously improbable may be received as truth, with perfect

confidence, on sufficient testimony. To allege probability against the ascertained meaning of a word, is to deny testimony as a source of evidence; for the meaning of testimony must be known from the words used. This is a Neological canon, and is the very principle on which Neologists interpret the Bible. It is very improbable, they say, that such a thing was the case, therefore the words of the historian do not mean this. It is very improbable, some say, that Samson killed so many people with a jaw-bone of an ass; therefore the word does not here signify the jaw-bone of an ass, but the *tooth of a rock*, which being loosely attached, was pulled down on his enemies by the hero. This canon would not leave a miracle in the Bible. Nor a doctrine in revelation.

On the same principle, should a foreigner read in English, that a prisoner was immersed in jail, on the belief of the gospel, he might say, "as it is improbable that there was water for the *dipping* of his person, it is to be concluded that *immerse* here signifies to purify without reference to mode." Yet *immerse* does not more decidedly mean to *dip*, than did βαπτίζω; and there is not in all Mr. Beecher's examples, a higher probability than this. Such previous probabilities give place to testimony, as darkness gives place to light.

Mr. Beecher alleges that "it is not a solitary fact on which the argument rests." This can mean no more, as to the examples alleged, than that there are several instances of improbability, considered previously to testimony. But this is not a combination of evidence. Each of the cases considered separately is nothing; all taken together, then, must be nothing. It is the addition or multiplication of ciphers. The *Columbine bridge* will solve a thousand such difficulties.

There is no word, whose meaning is not liable to the like objections, as are here alleged with respect to the word in dispute. What word is there, which in the whole history of its use, does not sometimes occur in circumstances, in which the thing which it attests is previously as improbable as immersion in the cases referred to by Mr. Beecher. Yet this never shakes our confidence as to the meaning of any word, when it testifies. There are some islands in which it is very improbable that horses should be found; yet if a traveller tells us that he saw a horse, we will believe either that he really saw a *horse*, or that he deceives us. We never think of solving the difficulty, by alleging that *horse* here signifies a *leopard*.

With respect to the relation between the name of this ordinance and purification, the reason is quite obvious. That a coincidence and harmony should exist between a word which is

the appropriated name of an ordinance, and the thing emblematically meant by the ordinance, is a thing that can strike no philologist with surprise. This is altogether necessary, instead of being a thing unexpected. There cannot be an instance of a similar connexion without a similar result. If βαπτισμός is the name of the ordinance, whatever may be supposed its meaning; and if purification is the emblem of the ordinance, there must be such a coincidence. Any man of ordinary understanding will perceive the ground of the connexion, without any recourse to identity of meaning in the terms *baptize* and *purify*. Was not the ordinance of circumcision so connected with purification? Yet the word *circumcise* does not signify to *purify*.

But if all these examples were admitted to imply this meaning, it would not prove that the rite of baptism is not an immersion. These examples refer not to baptism. Even on that supposition we would fight the battle with success.

“The argument,” says my antagonist, “from the usage of the writers of Alexandrine Greek, is now at an end.” Would not any one from reading this conclude that he had brought from these writers, examples in which the word is used without reference to mode? But has he alleged one such? All he has done is to allege that the word is sometimes used, when, without reference to the testimony of the word, immersion is improbable. Does this imply that the thing is improbable, after the word gives its testimony? Have I not exemplified this by an instance from Columbine English? He need not go to Alexandrine Greek for such instances. They might occur in the oldest Greek without affecting the question.

Mr. Beecher next professes to find proof in the Fathers. Proof from the Fathers that βαπτίζω signifies to *purify*! As well might he profess to find in them proof for the existence of rail roads and steam coaches. There is no such proof. There is not an instance in all the Fathers in which the word, or any of its derivatives are so used. Without exception, they use the word always for immersion. Now a reader not acquainted with the Fathers, may ask himself, how it is possible that two persons can give a directly contradictory account of the testimony of the same documents. Without any reference to the veracity of either of the combatants, he may say, the fact must be so easily decided, that it is strange that any of them should be rash in his testimony. Let such a reader attend a moment to me, and I will ask no learning in him, in order to enable him to decide between us. All I demand is a little common sense.

Well, how does Mr. Beecher bring out his proof? If the writings of the Fathers prove that they understood this word in

Mr. Beecher's sense, must not Mr. Beecher prove this by alleging examples of the use of the word in this sense? Common sense, what do you say? But Mr. Beecher attempts no such thing. He does not appeal to the use of the word by the Fathers, but to other words applied by the Fathers to the same ordinance.

Now I do not charge my opponent with dishonesty in the use of this argument. I do him the justice to believe that he is the dupe of his own sophistry. But it is a sophistry childishly weak. I have already disposed of this argument. It assumes as an axiom, that words that apply to the same ordinance are identical in signification. Every child may see that this is not fact. The same ordinance is called by different persons, the *Lord's supper*, the *communion*, the *ordinance*, the *sacrament*, the *eucharist*, &c. Does this imply that each of these words is identical in meaning with the term *Lord's supper*, or that they are identical in meaning with each other? Every one of these words has a meaning of its own, while they all agree in designating the same ordinance. *Baptism* itself is by some called *christening*. Does this imply that the word *baptism* signifies christening? I could produce examples at will: but no reader can need more. The Fathers called baptism *regeneration*; but they never supposed that the word baptism signified regeneration. Both the words referred to the same ordinance, but they referred to it under a different view of it. Baptism was its appropriated name from its mode: regeneration was its name from its supposed effect. When I say *William the First*, and *William the Conqueror*, I refer to the same man, but I do not mean that *the first* signifies *the Conqueror*. William the First, is the designation of the man as King of England—the Conqueror is a designation of the same man from the way in which he became king. Even if *καθαρισμο* itself had been the appropriated name of the ordinance of baptism, it would not be identical in meaning with the word regeneration. In fact, this is one of the words which the Fathers employed to denote baptism, yet this did not make it identical in meaning either with baptism, or with the other words by which they designated this ordinance. When baptism is called *purification* by the ancients, it is considered as it was supposed to purify: when it was called *regeneration*, it was considered as a new birth. *Purification* is baptism under one view of it: regeneration is the same ordinance under another view. *Purification* does not signify *new birth*; nor does *new birth* signify *purification*. A hundred words or terms might be used to denote the same ordinance, without implying that any two of them were perfectly

identical in meaning. In fact, a great multitude were actually employed, while each designated the same ordinance in its own peculiar manner. The Fathers employed a great multitude of terms to designate baptism; but they did not make the word baptism designate the same idea with each or any of these terms.

“What is it to purify the spirit,” he asks, “but to regenerate.” It is true that they who are purified are regenerated, and they who are regenerated are purified. Still, however, the terms have quite different meanings. *Regeneration* is a new birth: *purification* is an effect of this.

I might now dismiss this part of the subject; but our author gives us such a delicious morsel of his philosophy, in accounting for the fact that baptism came to be considered as regeneration, that I am tempted to take a look at it for a moment. Nothing enables us with greater certainty to estimate the powers of an author, than his attempts at philosophy.

“Now,” says the writer, “in a case where analogical senses exist, one external and material, and the other spiritual, it is natural that they should run into each other, and terms applied to one be applied to the other. Thus, if βαπτίζω means to purify, then there is natural purification and spiritual purification, or regeneration, and there would be a tendency to use ἀναγεννάω to denote the latter idea, and also to transfer it to the external rite. And, at first, it would be so done as merely to be the name of rite, and not to denote its actual efficacy.”

Upon this I remark: 1.—The author here mistakes what he calls the external and material sense, for the emblematic sense. It is of the emblematic sense, as distinguished from the proper sense of the word, he is speaking; and not of an external or material sense as distinguished from a spiritual sense. Purification, for instance, first applied to external things, and afterwards by analogy was transferred to the mind. But it is not of *external*, or *material*, or *natural* purification, as distinguished from spiritual purification, he is speaking; but of emblematic purification, as distinguished from the purification of the soul and body from sin. Every external, or material, or natural purification, is not the purification of which he is speaking, namely, baptism. It is only when the purification is emblematic, that it is the purification of which he speaks. The relation, then, which subsists between what he calls the external, or material sense, and the spiritual sense, is not the same with the relation that subsists between the emblematic sense, and the proper sense of the word. *Purification* applies as properly to mind as to matter, and designates neither of them separately,

but includes both of them. To apply to either of them separately, the word has not to give up its meaning, or to run into a different meaning.

2. *The running of two senses into each other* is philological transubstantiation. Two senses cannot run into each other, nor can one sense run into another sense. This language is paradoxical. Not only does the whale swallow Jonah, but Jonah at the same time swallows the whale. Whatever change may take place in the application of words, one sense cannot become another. This would imply that a thing is different from itself.

3. The author here supposes that purification in baptism is natural purification. But is the design of baptism to wash away the filth of the flesh? Is not the purification of baptism an emblematic purification?

4. He tells us that on the supposition that βαπτίζω signifies to purify, with reference to both material and spiritual purification, there would be a tendency to use the word ἀναγεννάω to denote the latter idea. What is the latter idea? Is it not spiritual purification, or regeneration? What is this but to say, that, on a certain condition, there is a tendency to use a word in its own sense? There is a tendency to use the word regeneration for regeneration; and a tendency to use a word that signifies spiritual purification for spiritual purification. A wonderful tendency indeed! Does not the author himself explain regeneration as signifying spiritual purification? He must be a hardy sceptic who will deny this.

5. He tells us here that if βαπτίζω signifies to purify, with reference to both natural and spiritual purification, there will be a tendency to transfer the word ἀναγεννάω to the external rite. Now would not this tendency be the same, on the supposition that the purification was to be found in the nature of the rite, as if it were found in the name of the rite?

6. If βαπτίζω signifies both natural and spiritual purification, and ἀναγεννάω signifies only the latter, what tendency is there to transfer ἀναγεννάω to a rite designated by βαπτίζω, in that part of its signification which ἀναγεννάω does not possess; abandoning that part of the meaning of βαπτίζω which it does possess? Surely if from the partial agreement of βαπτίζω and ἀναγεννάω, the latter is transferred to a rite designated by the former, it must be in that part of their meaning in which they agree—not in a meaning in which they differ. This is a very perverse and capricious tendency. Can the author illustrate this tendency? He affirms it, but does not show it.

7. He tells us that in the first application of ἀναγεννάω to baptism, it would be as the name of the rite without reference to

its effect. This is absurd and self-evidently false. How does *ἀναγεννάω* come to be applied to the rite of baptism? Is it not, even on the author's theory, because it agrees with *βαπτίζω* in a part of its meaning? If then it is applied to the rite, from its agreement with the appropriated name of the rite in a part of its meaning, it must be applied to the rite in that part of its meaning in which it agrees with *βαπτίζω*, and not in that part of the meanings of *βαπτίζω* with which it has nothing common. No axiom is more clear than this.

8. Of all the terms by which the Fathers designated baptism, there is not one of them conferred on it on the principle supposed by the author. Even *καθαρισμὸς* is not given to this ordinance on the principle of the connexion between analogical meanings; but as the nature of the rite is supposed to be a purification. The various names are conferred on it, not from their relation to the word *βαπτίζω*, the appropriated name of the ordinance, but from the supposed nature of the ordinance. Any child may understand this. It is called *initiation*, for instance. Has initiation any relation to the meaning of the word *βαπτίζω*? It is called *illumination*. Has the word illumination any relation to the word *βαπτίζω*, whatever may be the meaning of *βαπτίζω*? The author's philosophy is false, absurdly and extravagantly false. He gives us eight lines of philosophy. I will give a premium to any one who will produce me a greater quantity of absurdity in the same compass, under the appearance of wisdom. The only merit this nonsense can claim, is that it is original nonsense. No one these seventeen hundred years has ever thought of accounting for the opinion that baptism is regeneration, on the principle of President Beecher. It grieves me to be obliged to write in this manner; but I cannot avoid it. Half learned people will think that this account of the phenomenon is an unparalleled effort of philosophy; and thousands will rely on it who cannot pretend to fathom it. They will conclude that either he is right, or that the subject is so deeply involved in obscurity, that it is utterly impossible to bring the truth to light. I cannot avoid showing that there is neither learning nor logic in the attempt to unsettle the meaning of the word in question.

But the source from which baptismal regeneration springs is not left to philosophical investigation. The ground on which the Fathers considered baptism to be the means of regeneration, and to be essential to salvation, is clearly attested by themselves. The very passage which Mr. Beecher quotes from Justin Martyr fully explains this. It was their view of John iii. 3. In giving an account of the dedication of christians to God,

Justin Martyr tells us, that after a certain process, the candidates were led by the christians to a place where there was water, and were *regenerated* as they themselves had been *regenerated*. Here I observe that President Beecher is mistaken in supposing that ἀναγεννάω here describes the rite. It does not describe the rite; but tells us what is effected by the rite. The persons baptized were regenerated by baptism. Justin then tells us the reason why he says they were regenerated by baptism. "For," says he, "they are *washed* or *bathed* in the water, in the name of the Father," &c. Does not this imply that the *washing* was the baptism; and that by that washing they were regenerated. It is because they were so washed, that he considers them to have been born again. Regeneration is not here considered as the name of the ordinance, nor as synonymous with its name; but as an effect of the rite, which consists in a certain washing.

Justin Martyr next expressly refers to John iii. 3, as their authority for considering that regeneration was effected by baptism. He then refers to Isaiah i. 16, to prove the same thing. Justin subjoins an account which he alleges they had from the apostles, of the necessity of this second birth, by a contrast of it with the first birth. And in this he expressly asserts, that they obtained remission of former sins "in the water." Here is a foundation for all the towers of Babylon.

Now if President Beecher had this document before him, as his quotation leads us to believe, how could he give such a philosophical account of the origin of the belief of baptismal regeneration? How could he doubt that baptism was understood by the Fathers to be a washing of the whole body? Is it not described as a washing of the person? On what account are candidates led to places where there was water? Are not baptized persons considered as having their former sins remitted *in the water*? What is the hardihood of men who can presume to allege the Fathers on the other side?

I may observe also that the editor in a note refers to Clemens Alexandrinus, who says that "the same thing is often called *gift*, and *illumination*, and *initiation*, and *bathing*. Bathing, because through it we are cleansed from our sins; *illumination*, because through it that holy light which is salvation is beheld," &c. Justin himself says that this *washing* is called *illumination*, because the minds of those who learn these things are *enlightened*. Is it not obvious to a child that every one of these names are given to the rite on a different ground. None of these is given as a synonyme of βαπτισμὸς. It is *washing* for one reason, it is *illumination* for another, and *initiation* for another. Even in

this very passage, Justin commences by referring to baptism as a dedication. See Justin Martyr, p. 89, Ed. Thirl.

It is strange to astonishment that President Beecher did not perceive that each of the words applied by the Fathers to the rite of baptism, has the same right to force its meaning on the word baptism, as the word purification has, from the fact of this application. If any one chooses to adopt the theory that the word baptism signifies *illumination*, or *initiation*, or *dedication*, &c. &c.; may he not allege that the Fathers called baptism by this name? The answer to all is, the Fathers did call baptism by all these names; but they did not make the word *baptism* signify any of them. It was baptism from its mode: it was each of all those other things from its nature. He who cannot perceive this, is not fit for the discussion of a deep philological question.

"This view," says Mr. Beecher, "explains not only the early prevalence of the idea of baptismal regeneration, but also the other extreme, the entire denial of water baptism." There is no philosophy in this observation. Will a rite be more likely to be perverted from its name, than it will be from its nature? Is it not obvious that whatever may be the meaning of its name, if it implies purification in its nature, or import, the supposed tendency will be the same? And as to the latter part of the argument, whatever may be the meaning of the name, or even the import, of the rite, when it is grossly perverted, there will be the same tendency for one extreme to produce another. Some in flying from the perversion of the ordinance, will relieve themselves by denying the ordinance altogether. Whether the name of the rite signifies immersion, or pouring, or sprinkling, or purification, or initiation, or dedication, &c. &c., if purification is implied in its nature, there will be the same tendency to pervert it, and when the perversion is perceived, there will be the same tendency to get rid of the perversion, by freeing themselves from the rite.

"Besides this general reasoning from well-known facts," says Mr. Beecher, "there is also philological proof that the word was often used by the Fathers in the sense *καθαρίζω*."

1. Now how does he prove this? I am fond of philological proof. His first philological proof that the Fathers often used the word in the sense of *purify* is taken from the passage in Justin Martyr already considered; in which he refers to baptism by the phrase *λουτρὸν ποιοῦνται*, "they wash or purify them:" that is, there is proof that the word is here used in a certain sense, when the word is not here used at all!

2. He here assumes that wash and *purify* are the same. They

are not the same ; and they are distinguished in the very passage quoted from Justin Martyr. The words which he cites from Isaiah are *λουσασθε, καθαροὶ γενεσθε*, “wash ye, make you clean.” Washing is the action performed—purification is the effect of this action. Will President Beecher never learn to distinguish things that differ ? Even if the word baptism signified washing, this would not make it signify purification in general. Even this, instead of proving, would overturn, Mr. Beecher’s theory.

3. The phrase *λουτρὸν ποιούνται* in Justin Martyr, as I have already showed, does not designate regeneration, but the action by which regeneration was supposed to be effected, or as President Beecher himself here says, “the mode of regeneration.”

4. Baptism is a washing, and is so called by the scriptures as well as by the Fathers. But this does not imply that the word baptism signifies washing. I think by this time I will have forced this distinction into the head of my opponent.

5. This phrase is not only not inconsistent with immersion, but immerse is the only thing that will explain it. A purification performed by sprinkling or pouring a few drops of water would not be a *λουτρον*.

Mr. Beecher’s second argument to prove that the Fathers used the word as signifying purification, is, that Chrysostom says, that Christ “calls his cross and death a cup and baptism ; a cup, because he readily drank it ; baptism, because by it he purified the world.” But is it not obvious that Chrysostom refers not to the name of the rite, but to the rite itself in its import ? Whatever may be supposed the meaning of the name of this rite, it is in its nature a rite of purification. The meaning of Chrysostom is perfectly the same, whatever may be supposed the meaning of the word baptism. It is quite immaterial whether the idea of purification be found in the name, or in the nature, of the ordinance. Will I never be able to force this into the mind of my antagonist ? If he would allow himself to perceive this distinction, he would be delivered from much false reasoning. I will then try to make the thing plain to every child. When it is said that “Christ our passover is sacrificed for us,” it is implied that the passover was a sacrifice. But does this imply that the word *passover* signifies *sacrifice* ? The phrase *circumcision in heart*, signifying purity of mind, implies that circumcision denoted purity. But does this imply that the term *circumcision* means purity ? Will Mr. Beecher need another lesson ?

But there must be in my antagonist a most astonishing want of perspicacity, else he would have perceived that he was making a snare for his own feet, out of which he could not possibly

escape. If the calling of Christ's cross and death a baptism, because it purifies, implies that the word baptism signifies purification, then for the same reason, does not the calling of his cross and death a cup, because he readily drank it, imply that the word cup signifies *drinking*? Try, now, Mr. President, to escape out of this snare. Is it not obvious to every man of common sense, that Chrysostom refers to baptism in its import or nature, and not to its name? There is nothing in the name that signifies either *purification* or *drinking*. The same answer serves for the quotations from Theophylact, and for all others of a similiar kind. The purification is in the nature, not in the name of the rite.

Mr. Beecher's third argument to prove that the Fathers used the word as signifying purification, is that they "sometimes, in describing the rite, use *purify* alone;" that is, a great number of passages in which the Fathers did not use the word at all, prove that they used it in a certain sense! This fact proves that the Fathers used *purify* in reference to the ordinance of baptism, not that they used the word baptism as signifying purification. I have already fully explained the principle on which this word and all the other names were given to this ordinance. None of them are of the same meaning with the word baptism.

Mr. Beecher seems quite aware that the authority of the Fathers for the use of this word is against him; and endeavours to escape from this argument. "It would be of no use here," says he, "to say that the Fathers did in fact immerse, this could not decide that *purify* was not the sense."

1. If the Fathers immersed, it proves that they considered immersion as the proper mode of the ordinance.

2. The authority of the Fathers on this question is not their practice, but their use of the word. They not only immersed in baptism, but they use the word always for immersion. They knew the meaning of the language which they spoke. On their practice I would not have the least reliance on any question.

3. If there is a single instance of immersion, it is evidence of a conviction of its necessity. Would any one go to a river to plunge, if he could be sprinkled in a parlour?

4. Why does Mr. Beecher doubt as to the practice of the Fathers, when Justin Martyr shows him what was the usual practice?

"And even if it could be shown," adds the author, "that some of them use the word βαπτίζω to denote the act of immersion in baptism, it would avail nothing, it would only prove inconsistent usage."

1. Could it be shown that some of the Fathers used βαπτίζω for the act of immersion in baptism! Might he not as well say, could it be shown that the sun shines at noon-day? Can the man who will not concede this, be in earnest in the search of truth? Can any man who has read the Fathers consider it as a matter of doubt whether any of them uses this word in this sense? No fact in history can be better ascertained. Most of the best established facts on record have not as clear evidence. If the words in which they are recorded were to be interpreted on Mr. Beecher's principles, not a fact of them could remain in evidence.

2. This assumes that the author has proved a contrary practice. But he has not proved this in a single instance.

3. If it is admitted that some of the Fathers used the word in the sense of immersion, all the arguments alleged by Mr. Beecher will be quashed. They can prove nothing against an admitted fact.

4. If I can explain all his alleged facts in accordance with my sense of the word, and if it is admitted that some of the Fathers use the word in this sense, is it likely that his sense of the word is the just one, when it makes the Fathers inconsistent with one another in the use of a common word?

5. Inconsistent usage can never be fairly alleged, if any way of reconciliation is possible. Only on this principle could the scripture itself be freed from the charge of contradiction. And I have shown the reconciliation.

6. Inconsistent usage cannot be charged till each of the alleged meanings is in full proof. Our meaning is in proof that candour can never question: the other meaning is not in proof.

7. Is it on the authority of such arguments as are produced by Mr. Beecher, that we are to charge inconsistency of usage with respect to a common word, on writers who lived at the same time, and derived their knowledge of the ordinance from the same sources?

8. Were we for the sake of argument to admit that the word had a secondary meaning, and were we to indulge Mr. Beecher in supposing that it was in that signification applied to designate the ordinance of Christ, this would not produce an inconsistency of usage in the use of the word with respect to that ordinance. The sense in which it was used by the apostles must have been known most assuredly to all that either heard them, or read their writings. To suppose that persons who spoke the Greek language might understand their words in a sense different from that in which they used them, would be to charge the scripture

as not being a revelation. Whatever was the sense in which the apostles used the word, must have been known to all who heard them or read their writings. To talk of "two currents" is to speak without thinking.

9. Can any other such inconsistency of usage be found? The cause that produced this inconsistency must have produced many others.

10. This Alexandrine Greek is a perjured witness. When it is brought into court by the sprinklers, it most solemnly swears that the word received a secondary meaning of sprinkling or pouring, and in this sense it is applied to the rite of baptism. When it has been tampered with by Mr. Beecher, it as solemnly on oath renounces such a meaning; and deposes that its true secondary meaning in this ordinance is *purify*. May it not with equal propriety be brought into court by *initiate, dedicate, illuminate*, and by every one of all the numerous claimants? What is it that this witness ever refused to swear, when solicited by a sufficient temptation? If President Beecher should turn into Greek letters, a document in any of the languages of the Indian tribes, I have no doubt that this witness would swear in an English court, that it is good Alexandrine Greek.

11. Where is this Alexandrine Greek to be found? If it exists at all, must it not be in the Septuagint? Yet no such usage prevails in that translation. The word is used here, and by the other Jewish writers, perfectly in the same sense as it is used by classical Greeks. The case of Naaman the Syrian presents this fact in the strongest light. Instead of βαπτίζω having the sense of καθαρίζω, it took seven βαπτίζω to make one καθαρίζω. And even a child may here see that the washing and the cleansing are different ideas. "Wash in Jordan seven times, and thou shalt be clean." Washing is the means of effecting the purification.

12. If βαπτίζω signified *purify* in Alexandrine Greek, why is it that in all the numerous passages in which purification is spoken of, this word is not once to be found in the Greek translation of the Old Testament? Is it possible that a word in its primary sense signifying to *dip*, should from its constant application to the rites of purification among the Jews who spoke the Greek language, come to signify to *purify*; yet in all the translations used by those Hellenistic Jews, the word should never occur in that sense, when speaking of their different purifications? I confidently affirm that this observation must appear convincing to every one who is capable of weighing it. Is it possible that a word could get a secondary meaning, from being so constantly applied to certain rites, when, in speaking of these rites, it is

never used in that sense? Now let any one who knows only so much Greek as to enable him to trace the two words βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω in a Greek concordance of the Old Testament; and I pledge myself that, if he has a spark of candour or honesty he will be convinced.

Nay, I will make the matter plain even to the most unlearned. Let them take an English concordance, and trace the word purify; and when they are assured, on sufficient testimony, that βαπτίζω is not used in any of the places, will they ask any other evidence that βαπτίζω did not, in the estimation of the Greek translators, signify to purify?

13. Even the Jews, who lived in countries where the Greek language was spoken, would use their own language in their worship. There could be no ground for their giving a Greek word a secondary meaning, from their frequent use of it in religious matters. There is no philosophy in this philology.

14. If a secondary meaning was likely to be given to this word from its frequent application to purifying rites, would not this principle operate more powerfully on the Hebrew word which was always used for immersion by the Jews? Yet the Hebrew word that signifies to dip, never obtained the secondary meaning of purify.

15. If frequent application of a modal word to rites of purification, would confer a secondary meaning, ραντίζω would have been more likely than βαπτίζω to receive the meaning of purify. It is more frequently applied to purifying rites than the other.

16. Βαπτίζω is by no writer, either with respect to things sacred or civil, ever applied to any object but such as may be immersed. To things palpably too great for immersion it was never applied. To the purification of a house, of the city Jerusalem, of the temple, it is applied by no writer. Now, if it signified purification as definitely as καθαρίζω itself, how is it that it is never used to designate the purification of any object too large to be immersed? If it signified purification, we would certainly, on some occasion, find it applied to the largest objects that were purified, as well as the smallest.

17. Had it been intended that the word to be appropriated to designate this rite, should signify purification, καθαρισμός itself would, without doubt, have been the word. This suited in every respect. Why then should another word be employed, which certainly was not so suitable for the supposed purpose? What should prevent καθαρισμός? What should give the preference to βαπτισμός? Was βαπτισμός employed in order to create confusion?

18. Though the rite of baptism is an emblematical purifica-

tion, yet purification is not the only thing represented by the emblem. The communion of the believer with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection, and his salvation by that union, and only by that union, is also represented. *Καθαρισμὸς*, then, was not suitable as the appropriated name of the ordinance.

19. Is there any scripture rite in which the way in which the things appointed are to be used, is not also appointed? Now, according to Mr. Beecher, there is no specific way appointed for the performance of this rite. We may plunge the person once, or three times; we may pour water all over him, or pour a little on any part of him; we may sprinkle him all over, or sprinkle a few drops on any part of him; we may rub a little water on any part of him with our finger, as in the Eucharist the ancients rubbed the child's lips, or we may rub him all over. Any application of water, according to Mr. Beecher, will be equally sufficient for this ordinance. Can sobriety of mind receive this doctrine? Could sobriety of judgment have suggested it?

I have now examined Mr. Beecher's arguments, and there is not the shadow of evidence that the word *baptism* signifies *purification*. I have met everything that has even a shadow of plausibility; and completely dissected my antagonist. Am I not now entitled to send *purify* to the museum as a *lusus naturæ*, to be placed by the side of its brother *pop*?

FACTS WHICH DISPROVE MR. BEECHER'S THEORY.

Having fully refuted every argument presented by Mr. Beecher, I shall now as briefly as possible, state a number of facts which dispute his theory.

Passages of Scripture which explain baptism as an immersion.

Not only do occurrences of the word in question prove that it signifies *immersion* and not *purification*, but the scriptures themselves explain it as an immersion. No candid mind can read these passages without being impressed with this conviction.

Rom. vi. 4, for instance, must bring conviction to every mind not shut against evidence. All attempts to explain it otherwise are unnatural, forced, and perfectly unsuccessful. The same may be said with respect to Col. ii. 12. The apostle in these passages reasons on immersion as the mode of this ordinance, and draws conclusions from its import.

Is not this the most satisfactory way of bringing the truth of

criticism to the test? The phraseology of 1 Peter, iii. 21, gives the same testimony. Baptism is explained here in a way that will coincide with no view of this ordinance, but that of immersion.

Passages which imply that immersion was the mode of baptism.

Baptism is not only explained by scripture as *immersion*, but many passages imply that this was its mode. Of this kind are the passages which represent the persons as going to the water, being baptized in the water, and after baptism coming up out of the water. Could madness itself allege any other reason for this, than that baptism was an immersion of the body? Even if it should be supposed a washing of the body without reference to mode, it is equally fatal to *purify*. It could not mean purification in general, or purification by a few drops of water, if the whole person must be washed. It must be a purification by washing the whole body.

The reason alleged for John's baptizing in Ænon, John iii. 23, implies that baptism was immersion. Had any mode of purification by water been sufficient, there would have been no need for *many* waters.

Christ refers to his death as a baptism in a figurative sense. But if the word in a figurative sense signifies afflictions, the literal sense cannot be anything but immersion. Neither purify nor sprinkle, nor any other supposed meaning, will admit the figurative meaning of afflictions, or calamities. This is the figure also by which the calamities of the Saviour are figuratively designated in the Psalms. He is represented as overwhelmed with great waters.

Passages which allude to baptism as an immersion.

There are many passages of scripture which allude to baptism in such a way as to show that immerse was its mode. Of this kind is John iii. 5, a passage, the misunderstanding of which has laid a foundation for the grossest superstitions of nominal christianity. *To be born of water* most evidently implies, that water is the womb out of which the person who is born proceeds. That this is the reference of the figure, whatever may be supposed to be its meaning, cannot for a moment be doubted by any reflecting mind. Here the figure must signify the washing of the believer in the blood of Christ, which is figuratively represented by the water in baptism. This our Lord stated in a figurative manner, as he did other things, which were more clearly to be exhibited in the teaching of his apostles. Who

can doubt that it is the blood of Jesus Christ that washes away the sins of the believer?

Many persons on both sides of the question are unwilling to allow any allusion to baptism here, in order to avoid the supposed consequence, that it would imply the necessity of baptism to salvation. It has always appeared to me that candour cannot deny that there is an allusion to baptism, and I will never, for fear of the consequences, refuse to admit anything that appears to be in evidence. But no such consequences can flow from this admission. In whatever way its reference may be explained, it cannot possibly imply that baptism is essential to salvation. Were this the case, then it would not always be necessarily true that faith is salvation. Were this true, it would imply that an external work performed by man, is necessary to salvation. I need not state the thousandth part of the absurdity that would flow from this doctrine. Whatever is the truth of the matter, this cannot be true. It is contrary to the whole current of scripture. One fact will by example prove that baptism is not necessary to salvation. The thief who believed on the cross was saved without baptism. This single fact will for ever forbid such a meaning to be taken out of this passage.

Having then in the most satisfactory manner ascertained from scripture that baptism cannot be essential to salvation, we may next examine what is the figurative import of this expression, *born of water*. To be *born of water*, then, as a figurative expression, signifies to be washed or cleansed from our sins. In what we are to be washed we must learn from other parts of scripture, which teach us that we are to be washed in the blood of Christ.

The objection which naturally presents itself to the considering of the water in reference to the thing signified by the water, is that this is supposed to be immediately added—"and of the Spirit." It is supposed that *born of the Spirit*, is the thing signified by *born of water*. But this is not the case. To be born of the Spirit, is not the thing signified by the figure *born of water*. The water in baptism is not the emblem of the Spirit, but of the blood of Christ. The Spirit washes us not as being himself like water, but as the agent who uses the water by which we are cleansed, that is, the blood of Jesus Christ. Let a man understand this, and he will cease to feel difficulty on this passage. To be *born of water*, and to be *born of the Spirit*, are expressions which do not refer to the same thing. The one refers to the blood of Christ, and the other to the Spirit who is the agent of the spiritual birth, and of the washing away of sins through the application of Christ's blood. We must be born both of the blood of Christ and of the Spirit. It is in the blood

of Christ that the Spirit washes us. There is the washing in Christ's blood, and also the renewing of the Spirit.

Let it be observed that though this passage alludes to baptism as the foundation of the figure which it employs, yet baptism is only alluded to—not mentioned. It is not said that except a man is baptized he cannot be saved; but except he is *born of water*. Now figuratively considered, a man may be *born of water* without having water literally applied to him. . He is born of water when he is washed from sin, in whatever way sin is to be washed away. There are many figurative expressions of this nature—and on this fact I will venture to rest the whole solution of the difficulty. When Poets are said to drink of the Castalian Springs, the figure is perfectly the same. There is no real drinking. It is the supposed reception of the spirit of poetry. So in being *born of water*—the thing meant is the being washed in the blood of Christ. If a person presents us with a specimen of his poetry, which we do not approve; may we not answer that except a man drink of the Castalian Springs, he will never be a poet? Do we mean literal drinking at the place?

That this is the true explanation of the passage we have infallible evidence. I can produce an inspired commentator to warrant my solution of this difficulty. Christ gave himself for the Church, "That he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word," Eph. v. 26. Here it is expressly said that the washing of water is by the word. The word is the means by which the believer is washed in the blood of Christ. The whole church is supposed to be washed in this way. The believer then is washed by the word, even although, from ignorance of his duty, or from want of opportunity, he has never been washed in water. I may observe also that this is another passage of scripture which alludes to baptism as a washing of the whole person. A purification with a few drops of water would not suit the phraseology. Here I observe also that *sanctification* and *cleansing*, or *purification* and *washing*, are considered as different from each other. Sanctification and purification are not exactly coincident: nor is either of them coincident with washing. They are all effected by the instrumentality of the word.

"But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God." 1 Cor. vi. 11. Here also *washing* and *sanctification* are distinguished; and both are effected in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God. Faith in Christ is that through which they are washed; and the Spirit of our God is the agent

who washes them by this means. This washing is represented in baptism to which this passage refers.

In Rev. i. 5, Christ is said to wash us from our sins in his own blood. Christ washes us by his Spirit in his blood. But his blood is the cleansing element in which we are washed. This shows that to be born of water is to be washed in the blood of Christ.

When Paul says: "My little children, of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you," Gal. iv. 19, is there any literal travailing in birth? "I bare you on eagles' wings," Exod. xix. 4, is a similar figure. Would a child understand it literally? Gill shows very bad taste when he supposes that it is necessary to supply *as*, the note of similitude, to prevent it from being understood in the literal meaning. Why then should there be a literal washing with water in the phrase *born of water*?

Is not the phrase *born of God* figurative, referring to that spiritual birth of which God is the author, and in which he is our Father? So *born of water* is that birth which is represented by being immersed in water.

The heart is said to be purified by faith, Acts xv. 9. Now, if faith purifies the heart, the water in baptism cannot be essential to the purification. It must be an emblem—not a means. The purification is effected without it, and before its application.

It is on a good conscience produced by faith in Christ, as distinguished from the external washing, that Peter places the value. 1 Peter, iii. 21.

"Seeing," says Peter, "ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit." 1 Peter, i. 22. It is the belief of the truth, then, that purifies the soul—not the water of baptism. This purification is effected by the Spirit. He is the agent, and the truth is the instrument. The water is an emblem; but whether it has place or not, it has no share in the effect, either as an efficient, or as an instrument. "Being born again," says he, "not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God." In the whole process of the spiritual birth the word of God is the only means, as the spirit is the only agent. In Heb. x. 22, believers are said to have their bodies washed with pure water. This must be an allusion to baptism. And what could answer to this but immersion? It is a bathing of the whole body. Purification could not correspond to this. No application of water but a washing of the whole person could suit this language.

"Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regenera-

tion, and renewing of the Holy Ghost.” Here the washing of regeneration is expressly distinguished from the renewing of the Holy Ghost. What in John iii. 5, is called *born of water*, is here called the *washing of regeneration*, and what is there called *born of the spirit*, is here called *the renewing of the Holy Ghost*. *Born of water*, then, and *born of the spirit*, are two distinct things; and born of the spirit is not, as many suppose, the explanation or meaning of *born of water*. The *washing of regeneration* is the washing that takes place when we are born again of the incorruptible seed of the word, or by the belief of the truth. We are washed by faith in the blood of Christ. This washing takes place before baptism, and there must be evidence that it has taken place, before any person is entitled to be emblematically washed in baptism. The person who is thus *washed* is also *renewed* by the Holy Ghost. We are regenerated by faith, and not by the rite of baptism. Baptism is an emblem of this washing and regeneration.

Those who would reduce the conversion of sinners unto God, to a sort of religious manufacture, understand the *washing of regeneration* here to be the rite of baptism. But though they have the support of the superstition of the Fathers, they have not the authority of the doctrine of the apostles. The scriptures never speak of baptism as regeneration. Regeneration is the act of God—not the effect of a rite performed by man. The apostle is in this passage asserting salvation by mercy in express opposition to works of righteousness of our own. In asserting, then, that we are saved by the *washing of regeneration*, he cannot mean we are saved by a work performed on us by human hands.

But if it is a truth, that in this passage the washing of regeneration is the rite of baptism, and not the doctrine of which baptism is the emblem, it is a very melancholy truth with respect to most of those who believe it. They are not baptized. No person is *baptized*, who is not *immersed*. And no person is baptized with Christ's baptism, who is not baptized as a believer. The great multitude, then, of those who speak of the necessity of baptism to salvation from the authority of this passage, are, according to their own view of it, condemned by it. But although every believer ought to be urged with all the authority of Jesus to submit to all his commandments, yet neither ignorance of them, nor want of opportunity to observe them, will exclude them from his favour. No ordinance of Christ ought ever to be put in the room of Christ. I will fight the battle of baptism with all zeal; but I will acknowledge, in the greatest heat of my zeal, the worst instructed of all the disciples of Christ. To set at nought the very least of them, is to insult Christ himself.

The reference to baptism in this passage is decisive of its mode. It refers to the washing at the birth of an infant. Both the things referred to and the word translated washing, imply that the whole body is covered with water in baptism.

Dissertation on Λουω.

The philosophical linguist, Dr. Campbell, of Aberdeen, in distinguishing the words *λουω* and *νιπτω*, makes the first signify to *wash* or *bathe* the whole body, the last to wash or bathe a part. This distinction has been generally recognised since the time of Dr. Campbell. Mr. Beecher calls it in question, yet he does not touch the subject with the hand of a master. He merely alleges an objection which he thinks calculated to bring confusion into what is thought to be clear; but he gives no additional light by any learned observation of his own. I shall endeavour to settle this question by evidence founded on the practice of the language, as well as the practice of the New Testament. I shall as much as possible avoid the technicalities of criticism, and as little as possible disfigure my page with Greek quotation. I request the merely English reader to understand that I intend to carry him along with me. There is very little real criticism which may not be made obvious to good sense without the knowledge of the language which the criticism respects. All that my unlearned reader will be obliged to take on trust, is the fairness of my references to my authorities; and for this he has the security that I am open to the assault of all my enemies, if I unfairly represent.

Dr. Campbell's distinction in the use of the two words referred to, is well founded in fact, but he has scarcely reached the exact truth. It is this that lays his doctrine open to the objection of Mr. Beecher. That this distinction in the use of these words is fairly made out by the examples alleged by Dr. Campbell, and by the practice of the New Testament and Septuagint, is a fact that cannot be overturned. That it is a fact established by classical authority I will show afterwards. But the reason alleged for this usage by Dr. Campbell is not the true reason. It is not because one of the words *signifies* to wash or bathe a part, and the other *signifies* to wash or bathe the whole body. The difference is in the action of the verbs. They are not the same *washing*. One of them may most generally be translated by our word *wash*. Though *wash* is rather general for it; and the other may almost always be translated by our word *bathe*, though we would sometimes translate it also by *wash*. In the one the *washing* is by the pressure and motion of the water without manual operation, as in our word *bathe*, yet

this bathing may also be accompanied with washing by the hand, though it is not signified by it. In the other, the action of the hand in the washing is almost always necessary. Now this is the reason why the one is generally applied to the bathing of the whole body, and the other to the washing of a part; because the body is generally bathed in this manner, and the hands or the feet are generally washed with the operation of the hands. One plunge in a river is a bathing. But when the hands are washed, friction is generally necessary. A mere bathing is not sufficient. Now, while this accounts for the fact asserted by Dr. Campbell, it will also allow the possibility of the application of *νιπτω* to the whole body, if it must be all successively washed; and it will allow the application of *λουω* to a part, if the part is specified. Accordingly, we find in the first Idyl of Bion, that when Adonis was wounded by a boar, some bring water in golden caldrons—others *bathe* his thighs, one of the parts in which he was wounded. It is evident, however, that even here they must have put him in a bath for this operation. Yet this does not at all disturb the fact as to the practice alleged by Dr. Campbell, had he placed that fact on its true foundation. The criticism is this, and if I mistake not, the criterion will suit every occurrence: the verb when it has no regimen supplied by the context, always refers to the bathing of the whole body. When it refers to a part, the context must supply the part. This observation will guide the reader through the whole practice of the Greek language. If every part of the body requires the washing that this word imports, there is nothing to prevent the application of *νιπτω*.

We make the same distinction in the use of our word *bathe*. When the physician directs his patient to *bathe*, without giving the verb any regimen, every one understands it to be a bathing of the whole body. Yet we also speak of bathing the feet.

There is another distinction between these verbs, to which I have observed no exception. *Λουω*, like our word *bathe*, applies to animal bodies only. We do not speak of bathing cloth.

Now to confirm this doctrine by examples. Nothing but the authority of the practice of the language can be of any weight. If I have not thought it too laborious to collect my examples, my readers must not think that I call them to hard duty, when I demand their patience to attend to them. No labour can be too much to settle the meaning of the commandments of God. This can be known only from the meaning of the language in which they are revealed.

Let us begin with Hesiod. The distinction which Dr. Campbell points out in the New Testament and Septuagint is

as strongly marked in the second book of the Works and Days. Several examples occur between line 343 and 371. He forbids to pour out black wine to Jupiter in the morning with *unwashed hands*. He enjoins the washing of the hands before passing through a stream of running water, and speaks of the danger of *unwashed hands*.

On the other hand, when speaking of the whole body, he forbids to bathe in vessels not purified, and men he forbids to wash their body in a woman's bath. The word used is *λουτρον*. What then is the *λουτρον*, when applied to baptism? Let the most unlearned judge from this.

In the beginning of the Theogony, Hesiod speaks of the Muses of Helicon, as bathing their tender bodies in the fountain of Termessus, *λοεσσαμεναι*.

Let us now examine the testimony of Herodotus. He tells us, p. 54, that Cyrus commanded the Persians to assemble on a particular occasion, *λελουμενοι*, *bathed*. Here the verb has no regimen, yet its regimen is perfectly understood. The distinction, then, is as clear in Herodotus, as Dr. Campbell asserts it to be in the New Testament and Septuagint.

Speaking of the Egyptians, p. 104, he says they bathe, *λουνται* twice each day, and twice each night. Here the distinction is also marked, the verb having no regimen. If Mr. Beecher would bring this to the test of his probability, by which he would force its meaning from the word baptize, he would doubtless have much better reason to deny that they were actually bathed twice each day and twice each night. A baptism before dinner after market he thinks incredible in the superstition of a Jew. What shall we make of this purification of the Egyptians? Many people think it a great yoke for Christians to be obliged once in their lives to take the trouble of immersion. The devotees of superstition are contented to be baptized twice every day and twice every night.

Speaking of the Scythians (p. 248) he says that they use a certain fumigation instead of the *bath*, *λουτρον*; adding that they never *bathe the body with water*; but the women pouring out water and making a certain preparation, daub themselves all over with it.

Heraclides, as cited in the Appendix to Herodotus, (p. 594) observes that the attendants on the king of Persia at supper, ministered after being *bathed*, *λελουμενοι*. Here the same distinction is recognised. The verb without a regimen refers to the washing of the person.

Ctesias, as cited in the same appendix, (p. 664) asserts that the wives of the Cynocephali, or dog-headed Indians, bathe,

λουνται, once a month; and that the men do not bathe at all, but only wash their hands, απονιζονται. Here the distinctive use of the two verbs is clearly and strongly marked; and the verb which refers to bathing has no regimen.

The same writer, (p. 666) mentions a fountain in which the Indians of distinction, men, women, and children, λουνται, bathe, for the purpose of purification, and the expulsion of diseases. Here we see that the word refers to the bathing of the person; and that people bathed not only at, but in the holy well. He tells us also that they all swam in it, as they could not, on account of the nature of the water, sink in it.

Hippocrates affords us many examples which definitely ascertain the distinctive meaning of this word. And precision of meaning is no where so exact as in medical language, with respect to words which designate the application of fluids. He tells us, p. 26, that in summer it is necessary to use many *baths*, or frequent bathings; in winter, fewer; and that it is more necessary for the morose to be bathed, than for the corpulent. Here λουτρον and λουεσασθοι without any regimen, refer to the bathing of the whole body.

In a certain case he directs (p. 159) to *bathe* twice or thrice each day, *except the head*. Nothing can be more decisive than this exception. The word itself is supposed so definitely to refer to the whole body, that it is thought necessary to except the part that should not be bathed. After this, who can doubt that this word, when used without a regimen, refers to the bathing of the person? And would any one, in fulfilling this medical prescription, rub a little water over the body, instead of putting the body in the water, as Mr. Beecher fulfils the law of Moses?

That the word may, contrary to the doctrine of Dr. Campbell, be applied to the bathing of a part, the two following examples leave no doubt; and I conceal no part of the truth. For pains in the head, Hippocrates tells us that it is profitable to warm the head thoroughly, *bathing* it with much warm water, &c. In the same passage he says, "If the pain falls into the ears, it is profitable to *bathe* them with much warm water." Here, however, the regimen is supplied by the connexion; and the part which is the object of the action of the verb, is all covered with the water. Even in such cases as this, the complete covering of the object by the fluid, is as clearly seen as when the whole body is the object of the bathing.

In the case of tenesmus, (p. 184) he orders to *bathe* with warm water, *except the head*. Here the word λουειν without any regimen refers to the body; and as there is a part which

must not be *bathed*, that part must be expressly excepted. Surely this is decisive of the distinctive meaning of this word. In the same passage he speaks of "softening the body with *warm baths*, except the head."

In page 376, he gives us a whole treatise on bathing, referring to almost everything in the process, and showing when it is useful, and when injurious. The vat, or vessel, in which the bathing is effected, is called *πυελος*. And to this the verb *λουειν* and the noun *λουτρον* are constantly applied without any regimen.

The usage of Homer makes the same distinction in these words; and *λουω*, without a regimen supplied by the connexion, always refers to the person. His baths for his heroes after battle, and after death, are well known, and uniformly conform to this distinction. It is so clearly marked in the tenth book of the Iliad, that were there not another passage, this is sufficient to establish it. In the beautiful language of Cowper it is :

"Then, descending to the sea,
Neck, thighs, and legs from sweat profuse they cleansed,
And, so refresh'd and purified, their last
Ablution in bright tepid baths performed.
Each then completely laved and with smooth oil
Anointed, at the well-spread board they sat,
And quaff'd, in honour of Minerva, wine
Delicious, from the brimming beaker drawn."

Here the heroes, returning from slaughter, go down into the ocean and wash off the sweat, *απενιζοντο*. A mere bathing would not be sufficient. The gore must be washed off by rubbing—much rubbing. And in my judgment, the adverb *πολλον* ought to be joined with the verb, as designating *much washing*, and not with the word sweat, according to Cowper. This, however, is not material to the point which I have now in hand. It is evident that the poet, in designating the action of cleansing the person by hand-washing, uses the verb *νιπτω*. Neck, thighs, and legs are specified, because these are the parts defiled. But there is no reason to allege, according to Dr. Campbell's ground of the distinction, that if every part of the body had been so washed with the hand, the same verb could not have been used. Indeed the wave is expressly said to *wash the body from its filth*, *νιψεν απο χρωτος*.

In the next place, after this washing in the sea, they went into the *baths*, and were bathed, *λουσαντο*. Nothing can more clearly manifest a distinction in the use of these words, and prove that the distinction is what I have alleged.

In the twenty-third book of the Iliad he applies the word to the horses of Achilles. Speaking of Patroclus, the poet, according to the translation of Cowper, says :

“Who many a time hath cleansed
Their names with water of the crystal brook,
And made them sleek himself with limpid oil.”

Here the translator applies the word to the manes of the horses; but I think it ought to be applied to the horses themselves. Literally it is, “he poured limpid oil on their manes, having bathed in pure water.” Now the regimen to bathe may be either the manes of the horses, or the horses themselves; and there is every reason to make it the horses. The horses appear first to have been bathed in the river; and after this their manes were anointed with oil to make them shine. I have no objection that the word should be applied to a part; but I think it would hardly be applied to the washing of hair. This interpretation is confirmed by a passage in book fifteenth, in which, referring to Hector, the poet says:

“As some stall’d horse high pamper’d, snapping short
His cord, beats under-foot the sounding soil,
Accustomed in smooth-sliding streams to lave
Exulting.”

Here we see it was usual to bathe horses in rivers.

In the third book of the *Odyssey* the word is used with respect to the bathing of Telemachus in a bath. When he had bathed, he is represented as *going out* of the bath.

In book VI, both the words are employed with respect to Ulysses washing in the river after his shipwreck. This was both a bathing and a hand washing. Here the *απολουω* is applied to his shoulders, which shows that it may be applied to a part; and *νιπτω* is applied to the body in general. *He washed the brine from his body.* This shows that the distinction is not what it is made by Dr. Campbell, though that in every instance there is a distinction cannot be doubted.

In the eighth book, Ulysses is bathed at the house Alcinoiis. *Λουω* is the word several times used, and he is represented as going into the bath, and *coming out* of it.

In the tenth book, in the house of Circe, the hero is again led to the bath; and warm water is plenteously poured on his head and shoulders, until he is completely refreshed. And after he was clothed and seated on his throne, a nymph brings water for his hands. Here *νιπτω* is used without the regimen—the word hands being understood in the use of the verb, as Dr. Campbell observes on John ix. 7.

In the seventeenth book, Telemachus leads Piræus, the messenger of Menelaus, into his house, and they bathe before the banquet. Water was also ministered for the washing of the hands after they were clothed and seated. If Cowper, when he translates the passage thus, “And plunged his feet into a

polished bath," means that only the foot-bath was used, he is undoubtedly in error. They are represented as themselves going into the bath, and coming out of it; and the word *λουω* without a regimen implies this. Perhaps the translator takes this way to express their going into the bath.

In the nineteenth book, the command of Penelope with respect to Ulysses as a beggar, which Cowper translates, "give him the bath my maidens; then spread his couch," it is undoubtedly the foot-bath that is meant. The verb is *απουιψατε* without a regimen. "Attend him also at the peep of day with bath and unction." This refers to the bathing of the whole body. He was to be bathed and anointed before breakfasting with Telamachus. That it was the foot-bath that was meant in the first part of the sentence is clear from the reply of Ulysses.

Nor me the foot-bath pleases more; my feet
Shall none of all thy minist'ring maidens touch,
Unless there be some ancient matron grave
Among them, who hath pangs of heart endured
Num'rous, and keen as I have felt myself;
Her I refuse not. She may touch my feet.

It was actually the foot-bath that was used on this occasion, and his feet only were washed by his nurse, for which *νιπτω* is the verb used.

Simonides, concerning women, represents one as *unbathed* and *unwashed* in garments, *αλουτος*, *απλυτος*, with characteristic reference. He speaks of another as *bathed* twice and sometimes thrice every day. Here the verb has no regimen, yet definitely refers to the whole body.

Ælian, in the beginning of the third book of his Var. Hist., speaks of certain springs in Tempe, whose waters are good, *λουσαμενοις*, to those who are bathed in them. He speaks also in the thirteenth book of an eagle snatching the slipper of Rodope the Egyptian, while she was *bathing*, carrying it to Memphis, and dropping in on the bosom of Psammitichios sitting on the judgment seat. The word *λουομενης* is twice used without a regimen to designate the bathing of the person.

Nicolas of Damaseus tells us that the King of Babylon ordered one of his Eunuchs to bathe a certain person twice a-day. He uses the word *λουε* without a regimen, as definitely importing the bathing of the whole body. He tells us also of a certain usurer, who ordered Cræsus to wait at the door, until the usurer should *bathe* himself. Here also the same verb is used with reference to the whole body without any regimen. He speaks of the Dardani, an Illyrian nation, as being bathed only three times in their lives—when they are born, when they are married, and when they die. Here the word is used without any regimen;

and nothing can more definitely show its distinctive meaning.

Arrian (p. 165) giving an account of the last illness of Alexander the Great, uses the word ten times in conformity with the distinction I have assigned. After his debauch he bathed and slept. Again he supped, drank till far in the night, and afterwards *bathed*, ate a little and slept. He was several times bathed during his fever, and usually bathed before sacrifice. Homer's heroes sometimes wash their hands before prayer, and before meat. Telemachus walking along the beach, having washed his hands in the hoary sea, prayed to Minerva. Od. ii. Ulysses and his companions having washed their hands, feasted on the stag. Od. x.

The Essenes, Josephus informs us, (p. 728) after working for some hours in the morning, assemble in one place, and girding themselves with linen veils, bathe before dinner. Here we see a daily baptism by a whole sect of the Jews. Mr. Becher thinks a baptism after market incredible in Jewish superstition.

Justin Martyr not only always uses the word conformably to this distinction; but speaking of the pagan purifications invented by the Demons in imitation of baptism, he showed that they used the washing of the whole body as the most complete purification, p. 91.

Eusebius, speaking of Simon Magus, represents him as continuing his hypocrisy even to the bath, *μεχρι λουτρου*, p. 12; and the places where the Christians usually baptised he calls *λουτρα*, bathing places.


On these grounds, then, there can be no hesitation in maintaining a distinctive use of the word *λουω*. There are situations in which either of the words may be used, because both of them are in their peculiar meaning applicable. According to my view of the distinctive meaning of this word, there is nothing to prevent it from being applied to the vessels in the vestibule of ancient churches, for washing the hands of the worshippers. These might be called either *λουτήρες* or *νίπτήρες*, because the hands might be either bathed or washed. I have shown that the essential distinction has no reference to the whole and a part; though from circumstances the one is usually applied to a part of the body, and the other to the whole. And that the word does not necessarily express mode, I readily admit. This must be determined by circumstances; though as a matter of fact, immersion is almost always the way of bathing. All I contend for from this word is, that the object to which it is applied is covered with the water, and that when used without a regimen in the context, it refers to the whole body. The application of this word to baptism shows that the rite was

a bathing of the whole body; and as immersion is the usual way of bathing, baptism must have been an immersion, because when it is called a bathing, the reference would be to the common way of bathing, not to a merely possible way. I claim, then, the evidence of all those passages in the New Testament, which by this word refer to the ordinance of baptism. I make a similar demand with regard to the use of the word by the Fathers. Baptism, then, is immersion; and nothing but immersion is baptism.

The following matter was received too late to be inserted in the body of the work.

LUCIAN, in the dialogue of Micyllus and the Cock, uses the word λουω without a regimen for bathing in a bath. He was invited to come to a feast, having bathed himself. He speaks also of his impatience in waiting for the time of the bath, *αχρι λουτρου*. This determines not only the use of the word, but also shows that it was customary even for gentiles to bathe before dinner. The bath was a luxury, not a penance.

I shall shortly, perhaps, pay my respects to Dr. Henderson, who, as the oracle of the Committee of the British and Foreign Bible Society, has pronounced Mr. Beecher's work to be *demonstration*.



INCOMPETENCY OF DR. HENDERSON

AS AN UMPIRE

ON THE PHILOLOGY OF THE WORD

BAPTISM,

PROVED FROM THE UNSOUNDNESS AND EXTRAVAGANCE
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
IMPLIED IN HIS LETTER TO MR. BRANDRAM, WITH
REFERENCE TO THAT QUESTION.

BY ALEXANDER CARSON, A.M.

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REPLY TO DR. HENDERSON.

FALSE principles of interpretation are the chief source of the corruption of the truths and ordinances of scripture. It is not possible that conclusions so very different on almost every question, should be grounded on the same words, if on all sides the same sound and self-evident laws of language were employed in the deduction. The meaning of the word baptism has no difficulties arising from its use, or its origin; and never has been questioned by any of the great masters of Greek literature. The claims of *immersion* never have been disputed but from the necessity of shielding present practice; and on grounds subversive of sound criticism. Immersion can be evaded only by trampling on first principles, and by establishing false principles. A more flagrant manifestation of this I have never seen, than in Dr. Henderson's letter to Mr. Brandram. He grounds on principles of interpretation, which, if admitted, would render all language definitively inexplicable. This may be supposed a learned question, but I engage to take my unlearned reader with me. To understand my arguments, and estimate their force, I demand nothing but a sound and an unprejudiced mind.

“With respect to the Greek word βαπτίζω,” says Dr. Henderson, “after having read almost every work that professes to throw any light upon it, and carefully examined all the passages in which both it and its derivatives occur in the sacred volume, and a very considerable number of those in which it is found in classical authors; we are free to confess we have not yet fallen in with a single instance in which it can be satisfactorily proved, that it signifies a *submersion of the whole body*, without, at the same time, conveying the idea that the submersion was *permanent*, i. e. that the body thus submerged, sunk to rise no

more.* So far as has yet been ascertained, the word is never used by any ancient author in the sense of one person performing an act of submersion upon another; yet it is necessary that we bring this idea with us to the reading of the New Testament, before we can affix to βαπτίζω, as there occurring, the sense of immersion."

On this single passage I would rest the proof of my charge. It teems with false principles of interpretation.

1. It implies that in order to prove that, with respect to baptism, the word βαπτίζω signifies immersion, it is necessary to produce an instance in which it is so applied to the human body. Now, though we can comply with this requisition, it is arbitrary and unphilological. I refuse to admit the principle of interpretation. The immersion of a dog is as good an example as the immersion of a saint. What the thing is which is to be immersed, we are to learn, not from the word βαπτίζω, but from the words in connexion.

2. This observation of Dr. H. assumes as a first principle, that no examples can be admitted as proof of the meaning of this word, in reference to the ordinance of baptism, but such as refer to the immersion of the whole body. Now the extent of the immersion has nothing to do with the meaning of the word. The meaning of the word is perfectly the same, whether the action of the verb extends to the whole or only a part of the object. Whether in baptism the whole body, or only a part of it, is to be immersed, we do not inquire at this word.

3. This observation of Dr. H. implies, that when the word applies to cases in which the person or thing immersed remains permanently under water, it is the word itself which imports the permanency of the submersion. This is ridiculously false. The permanency of the submersion must be indicated by something else. The word in question has nothing to do with the after state of the person or thing immersed. Whether the person or thing said to be baptized lies permanently at the bottom, or immediately rises, deponent saith not. Shall the word which signifies to immerse, also signify to emerge? But though we refuse to submit to this principle of interpretation, we could easily comply with it. How could Dr. H. forget the case of Naaman? Did he lie permanently under water? Was he not immersed seven times? Even with respect to Aristo-

* "It may be proper to observe, that even if it could be proved that the term was used in Greek works of classical antiquity, in the sense of plunging a person entirely in water, this would not determine the meaning attaching to it in the New Testament. It is an acknowledged principle in sacred philology, that numerous Greek words are employed by the writers of the N. T. in an altogether appropriated or religious acceptance."

bulous, who was eventually drowned, it is obvious from the account in Josephus that he was several times dipped before he was entirely suffocated. If so, the action of the verb was performed on him without destroying him. He might have been saved after having been immersed. It was not the word βαπτίζω which destroyed him. It was the keeping him too long under the water after immersion. "Always pressing him down when swimming, and immersing him as in sport, they did not give over till they altogether suffocated him," pp. 458. This shows that he might have been immersed without suffocation, and that suffocation was the result of several immersions.

4. The observation on which I am now animadverting implies, that in order to prove that the word signifies to *immerse* in reference to baptism, we must produce an example in everything corresponding to the christian ordinance. Nothing of this kind is necessary. It is quite enough to prove that the word has this signification in reference to anything. From the word itself we cannot learn that even water is to be used in the ordinance. An example in which the thing is immersed in oil, or in melted metal, is as good as an example from the water of the river Jordan. Herod, in his last illness, was placed by his physicians in a vessel of oil; and had this been called a baptism, it would have been as good an example, as if it had been done in water as a sacred ordinance. From the examples of the occurrence of this word, we inquire merely the meaning of the word; from other words we learn what is essential to the rite.

5. The observation quoted from Dr. H. implies, that the application of the word to persons and to things affects the meaning of the word. How is the meaning of the word affected by the objects of its reference? It has perfectly the same signification when applied to persons, that it has when applied to things.

6. Dr. H. here assumes as a first principle, that in order to prove immersion as the mode of baptism, we must give an example in which the word is used by ancient authors, in cases where one person immerses another. Was ever demand more unreasonable? Was ever a law of criticism more monstrously absurd? What has the meaning of the word to do with the persons by whom the action of the verb is to be performed? Is it the word itself that is to determine this? Dr. H. absurdly confounds the meaning of the word that designates this ordinance, with the whole pattern of the rite in all its parts and circumstances. Are we to expect in Greek literature a pattern for the whole rite of christian baptism? Can anything be more extravagantly unreasonable than this demand? From Greek

literature we are to learn the meaning of the word, and from the New Testament we are to learn whether we are to baptize ourselves or be baptized by others? Can sobriety designate such observations as anything but perverse cavilling to avoid the law of Christ? Can such arguments really weigh in any conscience?

7. Dr. H. here demands from ancient authors an example in which one person immerses another, yet an example from ancient authors to determine the meaning of the word he accounts of no value. This is inconsistent and absurd. Ancient authors are competent to determine the meaning of a word in their time, which must still be received as the meaning of the word, except a change is proved: they are no authority, whether in a christian rite one person is to perform an act of immersion on another, or every one is to immerse himself. The ancients are called in to do what they are not competent to do; and they are refused to be heard in the testimony which they are competent to give. Could any evidence satisfy men who are so unreasonable? Could any kind of proof overcome such obstinacy? Can the man be in search of truth, who will not allow Greek writers to be an authority for the meaning of a word in their own language, while he considers their authority essential for the proof of something enjoined in a christian rite? Should one rise from the dead, he could not satisfy incredulity so perverse.

8. Were it admitted as a first principle, that in order to prove that βαπτίζω signifies to *immerse*, in reference to the ordinance of baptism, an example must be given in which the word is used when one person performs an act of immersion upon another, followed by immediate emersion, does not Mr. H. perceive that this equally destroys the claims of *purify*, the sense for which he now contends? Can an instance be given from ancient authors in which this is used to designate an act of purification, performed by one person upon another? In making such a demand, he may have thought himself secure against retaliation, by relying on the rites of purification under the law. But a little perspicacity would have enabled him to see that this is a false refuge. Instances may be produced in abundance in which one person purifies another; but the case requires that such purification shall be designated by the word in question. Can he, then, give one instance from ancient authors, in which the word designates an act of purification as performed by one person on another. Now can anything be more unreasonable than that obstinacy which demands from a meaning which it rejects, a condition which is equally wanting to that meaning which it receives as demonstrably certain? Can that mind be in a

proper state for weighing the evidence of truth, that is so partially balanced? This is a suicidal argument. But could President Beecher or Dr. H. produce authority from use proving that the word in question signifies to *purify*, I would make no farther demand in order to admit its competency.

Upon the whole, no word in any language could have its meaning definitely ascertained on the principles involved in the passage quoted. The author demands that the words should determine the objects to be subjected to the action of the verb, the persons by whom the action of the verb is to be performed, and the substance in which the action is performed by the agent or the object of the action. He finds in the verb the baptized person, the baptizer, and the water in which the baptism is performed. The word itself has nothing to do with any of these things, whatever its meaning may be supposed to be. All I require from the word is, the nature of the action imported by it. Everything else I will rest on its proper basis. Persons who do not understand this, are not qualified to enter into the discussion of this, or any other philological question. In reality, the most illiterate men of good sense are better qualified to find out truth, than critics who adopt false principles of interpretation. The man who determines the meaning of scripture, as he does that of the letter of his friend, is more likely to find it than the man who adopts chimerical laws of interpretation, that will enable him to prove any conceit, however forced; and deny any truth, however obvious. I maintain that on Dr. Henderson's principles of interpretation, there is not a word in language whose meaning might not be evaded. Here, then, the battle must be fought. It is useless to contend about the meaning of words in certain situations, till we have agreed on the great principles which determine the meaning of words. As long as our opponents hold the principles of interpretation on which they now act, it is impossible for them rationally to find truth. They may sometimes stagger on it, but it will be merely at random.

Dr. H. refers us to Mr. Ewing's Greek Lexicon, "where," he says, "the whole philological question is treated with an accuracy and ability, which we have not met with in any other work." He gives us in a note, "the admirable classification of meanings which the learned author presents under βαπτίζω." Now this will afford us another criterion, by which we may estimate the qualifications of Dr. H. to assume the chair of an umpire on this question.

It is not my intention in this place to discuss the meaning of the word. This I have done on many occasions. I shall here confine myself to the science of the classification.

The first meaning is: "*I plunge or sink completely under water.* Used only in the passive voice and in a neuter sense." Now here is false philology at the very threshold. The *completeness* of the immersion, as respects the whole of the object, is not expressed by the word at all; but is known from the connexion. The same verb, the same voice, &c., could be used with respect to a person sinking in a quagmire up to the knees. The verb does not express that the whole of the object was subjected to its action, nor does it express that the action was performed in water. This mischievous philology brings into the word things that are not expressed by it, but by other words in the connexion.

2. There is a false principle in supposing that the meaning of a verb in one voice is not authority for its meaning in another. When it is said of a ship that "*it dips,*" a foreigner from this example would be warranted in supposing that when he finds the same verb in the active or passive voice, it has the same meaning actively or passively.

3. Nor is it true, as Mr. Ewing thinks it is, that in the examples referred to, the verb has, strictly speaking, a neuter sense. In a free translation it may be rendered *sink*; but the word still has its own proper signification, and some force is supposed to be the cause of the immersion.

4. Mr. Ewing says: "Neither in these examples, nor in any similar passages, does it appear that the *putting under water actively*, as done by a different agent to the object put under water, is meant to be expressed by βαπτίζω, but merely the neuter sense of sinking or going down."

In none of the instances referred to by Mr. Ewing, is the thing immersed an agent in its own immersion. A person sinking in water unwillingly is not an agent. A ship sinking by the winds is not an agent in its own immersion. When the thing is expressed passively as in immersion, it is the weight of the object, or the force of the storm, that is the baptizer.

But without any regard to this, and granting that the verb is strictly neuter in such examples, can anything be more absurd than to expect that occurrences of a word in which all agency is excluded, should prove a certain kind of agency? If in such cases there can be no agency, we do not look for agency. But is this any reason why the same verb, in an active or passive sense, should not admit the particular agency in question? The verb itself, as I before showed, has nothing to do with the agent who performs its action. And if the verb is used to signify *plunge* in a neuter sense, why may it not signify *plunge* in an active sense? No sound critic would have made

this observation. Are not such examples, in every view in which they can be considered, evidence that the word in an active sense signifies to *immerse*?

When a person says—"I fell over the bridge and was immersed in the river," shall a foreigner show his critical skill in the English language by alleging that—"Here *immersed* is used in the passive voice and in a neuter sense; and therefore it does not appear that the *putting under water actively*, as done by a different agent to the object put under water, is meant to be expressed by the word *immerse*." Would not an Englishman laugh at him? Shall learned criticism for ever trample on common sense?

5. "Ceasing to float," is one of the expressions which Mr. Ewing uses for this sense of the word. This implies that the word imports a floating previous to sinking. Now when this is the case, it is no part of the meaning of the word. It is as applicable when the object sinks immediately, as when it floats long before it sinks.

6. Another expression by which Mr. Ewing characterizes this sinking, is: "I cover with water by sinking down." There is neither *covering* nor *water* in the word. All this false philology proceeds on the absurd supposition, that a verb embraces in its meaning everything in connexion with it, in every occurrence. The adoption of such a principle of interpretation must lead to confusion and error. It is impossible to follow it without being led away from truth. It betrays ignorance of the first principles of language. Not contented with ascertaining what is the action imported by the verb, these philologists embrace in its meaning, the person by whom the action of the verb is performed, the person or thing upon whom the action of the verb is performed, the substance in which the action of the verb is performed, the previous state of the object on which the action of the verb is performed, the effect produced on the object by the action of the verb, the extent to which the object of the action of the verb is exposed to the action, &c. They might as well make the word designate the whole Athanasian creed.

The second meaning in Mr. Ewing's admirable classification is: "I cover partially with water." "I am covered with water to a certain degree." Doubtless it is a very scientific classification that gives a different meaning when it is applied to a part of an object, from what it has when it is applied to the whole. What has the word to do with the extent or degree of its application to its object? It is not the word itself that informs us that its action is applied to the whole of an object, or to a part. This is done by words in connexion. The word

itself has perfectly the same meaning when it is applied to a part of an object, as when it is applied to the whole. In the examples given by Mr. Ewing, is there not information in express words determining the extent of the immersion? "It happened that their march was in the water the whole day, being baptized or immersed up to the middle." Is it from the word *baptized* here that we learn that the immersion was partial? Is it not expressly asserted by the words "up to the middle." Where is the difference in the signification of the word *baptize* in this instance, from instances in which it applies to things wholly immersed?

The other example is: "The foot-soldiers passed over with difficulty, *baptized* as far up as the breast." Is it not the expression "as far up as the breast," that informs us of the extent of the immersion? Surely a very child will know that the word *dip* has the same meaning in the expression, "I was *dipped* over the head," and in the expression, "I was *dipped* up to the chin." Is there a man or child in England that would assign two different meanings to the word in these situations? It blasphemes science, it outrages common sense, to call this classification an admirable classification of meanings. Were it not that my friends in England think I am too severe, I would certainly speak strongly here. But I will be as mild as the summer breeze.

I shall enable the unlearned reader to appreciate the merit of this part of the classification, by an example of the use of the English word *immerse*, taken from the Londonderry Sentinel. "On Tuesday morning, about ten o'clock, as his Royal Highness Prince Albert was skating on the spacious water in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, his Royal Highness unfortunately passed over some rotten ice, which immediately broke under him, and he *was immersed* to the chin in water." Now does not every child know that the word *immersed* here has exactly the same signification, as if the Prince had been *immersed* over the head? That he was only partially immersed is known not from the word *immersed*, but from the words "up to the chin." What an admirable classification, then, is it, that would have given a different meaning to the word *immersed* had the water been a little deeper and covered his Royal Highness over the head? I had scarcely copied the last extract, when I read in the next Sentinel, that his Royal Highness "was *immersed* over head and ears in the water." Now would any one who speaks English, think that the word *immersed* has a different meaning in these two extracts? Surely the word *immerse* has nothing to do with the extent of the immersion. Indeed; according to the

philology of Mr. Ewing and Dr. Henderson, every line in the length of the Prince's body, and he is said to be five feet eleven inches, would give a different meaning to the word immerse, according to the depth of the immersion. Were I not determined to be extravagantly gentle, I would think it my duty to lash such trifling with the utmost severity.

But there is an absurdity on the very face of this classification, which renders it self-evidently false. It is not possible that the same word can designate both the whole and a part of an object. If one meaning designates that the action of the verb is applied to the whole of an object, how can another meaning of the same word designate that the action is confined to a part? And if it is not the word itself, but something in the connexion, which determines this, then the designation is not in the word.

The above extract will apply to the first meaning in the classification also. The word *immersed*, it may be said, is here used in the passive voice, and in what Mr. Ewing and Dr. Henderson would call a neuter sense. "Neither in this example, then, nor in any similar passages, does it appear that the *putting under water actively*, as done by a different agent to the object put under water, is meant to be expressed by the verb *immerse*." Can any trifling be more extravagant than this? Will not every man who understands the English language, consider this as determining the meaning of the word? Will any man expect that a neuter sense will also be an active sense? The meaning of the word *immerse* is to be learned from every occurrence of it in the language: whether in a particular rite one man is to immerse another, or every man is to immerse himself, cannot be learned by the word, but by other information. As long as our opponents allow themselves to trifle so egregiously, no evidence could convince them. On similar principles they might deny every doctrine in christianity. As far as they have truth they are not indebted to their laws of interpretation.

The third meaning in Mr. Ewing's classification is: "I overwhelm or cover with water by rushing, flowing, or pouring upon." Science, in classing the meanings of a word, will always ascertain the primary meaning, if it is possible; showing how every secondary meaning flows from this: amidst much diversity it will generally discover a family likeness. It will never ascribe a secondary meaning as long as the primary will serve; and a third or fourth meaning will not be assigned as long as the primary or secondary will apply to all examples. No meaning will be admitted that is not in full evidence from examples which

necessarily imply it. These requisitions are self-evidently just ; and no sound philologist will question them. Without them definiteness of expression would be impossible. Had Mr. Ewing attended to them, instead of eight meanings to this word he would not have found a second.

Nothing is more easy than to reduce to the primary meaning of the word, all the examples which Mr. Ewing brings to justify his third meaning. I have on other occasions disposed of every example of this kind. I shall here teach the unlearned reader to do the work for himself, by justifying my criticism by an example from his own language. Mr. Ewing's first example is : "To arrive at certain desert places full of bullrushes and seaweeds, which when it is ebb, are not *immersed*, but when it is full tide, are inundated." Now, even with ourselves, when a part of the country is overflowed by a river, is it not quite common to say that it is submerged by the river ? Is it possible to give a more satisfactory justification of any expression ?

In the "Pastoral Annals" we have the following sentence : "The peat, the common fuel of the Irish people, remained in great part uncut, for the incessant rains of the past summer had exceedingly impeded that important branch of labour. Much which had undergone the first process of sowing, abandoned from the same cause, and *submerged* in the accumulating waters, or drenched by torrents, was irrecoverably lost for all purposes of firing," p. 184. Will the most stupid man in England understand the author as intending to say, that the peat were actually dipped under the water, and not that the water came around them ? But what no wise man nor fool will say, with respect to the language which he speaks, a controversialist will solemnly allege as decisive evidence with respect to a dead language. Let a foreigner, with a smattering of English, try his hand on the above extract, on Mr. Ewing's principles of interpretation. "Here," says the learned critic, "the word *submerge* cannot signify, as some foolishly contend, to *sink under*, but to *wet, cover with water*," &c. The peat are not put under the water, but the water falls on the peat, or flows over them. The word, then, here properly signifies, I *overwhelm* or cover with water by *showering down*, or *flowing over*." Can anything be more *demonstrative* than this philosophical criticism ? It is a truly admirable specimen of classification of meaning.

The other two examples, alleged by Mr. Ewing to justify the third meaning, are real immersions. "Of the land animals, a great part overtaken by the river are destroyed, being *immersed*." The force of the current immersed them in the river. "The river rushing down with a stronger current *immersed* many," &c. There is not a shadow of difficulty in such examples.

But in no view can Mr. Ewing's classification in this point be looked on as scientific. What connexion is there between *plunge* and *pour upon*? How does the latter rise out of the former? Mr. Ewing may fancy that he connects these meanings by making them both signify to cover with water. But there is no water nor covering in the word. To *pour upon* and to *plunge* have no more relation than any two words in the language. Besides, an object may have something poured on it, when it is not covered with it. Still farther, a word which designates to cover in a certain mode, cannot designate to cover in a different mode. This would render the word unintelligible. If it signifies to cover by plunging in, it cannot signify to cover by pouring on.

Again, this meaning includes three meanings, more different than the first meaning is from the second. *Rushing, flowing,* and *pouring upon,* are all different modes, while there is no difference in the mode, nor in the meaning of the word in any respect, when it is applied to the whole of an object, and when it is, applied only to a part. A horizontal inundation is as different from pouring upon, as either of them is from immersion.

Again, this classification makes the same word designate *plunge* and *pour upon*. The same general word may apply in a general sense to both, but no word can designate both.

Besides, what relief does any of these meanings bring to Mr. Ewing and to Dr. Henderson? The thing said to be baptized is, in every instance, even according to their own showing, covered with the water, as far as it is said to be *baptized*. Is there anything like this in their mode of baptism? Let it be observed that Mr. Ewing does not here make the word to signify to pour upon, but to *cover with water by pouring upon*. If the object is not covered with water it comes not under this meaning.

The fourth meaning in Mr. Ewing's classification is, "*I drench or impregnate with liquor by affusion, I pour abundantly upon, so as to wet thoroughly, I infuse*. Here the lexicographer mistakes the figurative for the literal application of the word. Is drunkenness produced by drenching or affusion? Is a man made drunk by pouring wine abundantly upon him? or by wetting him with wine? or by infusing wine into him, as you drench a horse? And I say the same thing with respect to immersion. When a drunken man is said to be *immersed in wine*, there is no literal *dipping*. Whatever may be the meaning of the word, this is a figurative application of it, and not a distinct meaning. It is to me overwhelmingly astonishing that a man

like Mr. Ewing should expound such phrases as "drenched with wine," as a literal *affusion*, *pouring upon*, *wetting*, or *infusion*. I do not expound the phrase in the original as a literal *immersion*. The *immersion* is only figurative. Now a scientific philologist would first settle the literal meaning of the word, and then understand the figure in conformity to this. The figurative use of a word gives it no new meaning in the language, and consequently is not properly the province of the lexicographer. It needs not to be explained; for a good metaphor contains its own light. There is no need to hold up a candle to enable us to see the sun. Its beauties may be pointed out, but if it needs explanation it should be degraded. Besides, to explain or enumerate all the possible metaphorical applications of a word is impossible. They are innumerable, and every person has a right to issue as many new ones as he chooses, if he does it with good effect.

All the examples under this alleged meaning are evidently figurative. No person, I presume, after the thing is pointed out, will question this. If so, whether they are to be understood in reference to literal *drenching*, or *affusion*, or *pouring upon*, or *infusion*, or *immersion*, must be settled by the examples of the literal meaning of the word. I have no right to understand them in reference to *immersion*, till I have proved that this is the literal meaning of the word; and Mr. Ewing has no right to refer them to *drenching*, &c., till he has by the use of the language proved that this word literally has this meaning. This he has not done: this he cannot do. He has, then, built his house upon the sand.

Mr. Ewing's fourth meaning, I observe also, includes different meanings. Is *affusion* the same as *infusion*?

The fifth meaning in the classification is: "I oppress or overwhelm by bringing burthens, affliction, or distress upon." This use of the word, Mr. Ewing himself allows to be metaphorical. If so, why is it a different class of meanings? Why is it distinguished from the fourth class? Surely the fourth class is as really figurative as the fifth. Whether we say "drenched with wine," or "immersed in wine;" the expressions are equally metaphorical, and both equally so with *overwhelmed with debt*, or *immersed in debt*. Even if figurative applications are to be considered different meanings, why are not all figurative meanings included in one class? Is every distinct figure to be a distinct class of meanings? Then, instead of one class or two classes of metaphorical meanings, we will have classes innumerable. *To be immersed in debt*, or *to be overwhelmed with debt*, will be one class—to be immersed in love

will be another, *to be immersed in trouble* will be another, *to be immersed in business* will be another, *to be immersed in cares* will be another, *to be immersed in pleasure* will be another, *to be immersed in wine* will be another, &c. &c. Each of these is as distinct from the others, as the fifth class is from the fourth. This surely is an admirable classification.

Mr. Ewing unaccountably takes it for granted, that, in such metaphorical expressions, the likeness is between the objects in the figure themselves. But this likeness is between their effects. I may say with equal propriety of a drunken man, that he is drenched with wine, or that he is immersed in wine; but by neither expression do I intend to show the way in which the liquor was applied to him. Were this the case I could not use both expressions of the same man at the same time; for the modes are different, and it is only in one mode that the wine was applied. *Overwhelmed with debt*, and *immersed in debt*, are equally good figures, but neither of them is intended to show the way in which debt was incurred by the debtor. We may *be drowned in debt*, *sunk in debt*, *buried in debt*, *burthened with debt*, &c. &c. Surely, then, such figures are not expressive of the way in which debt comes on the debtor. I venture to assert, that there is no instance in which the most unlettered savage of the forest makes the same mistake, that is here made by the lexicographer.

But what does Mr. Ewing gain by these his two classes of meaning? Even were it granted that they import a difference of mode, all the examples, even according to himself, unite in showing that the things which are the objects of the action of the verb, are completely covered with water. Has this any appearance of countenancing a baptism by sprinkling a few drops?

That it is used in the sense of *pouring upon, or into*," says Dr. H. "every one must be convinced who will be at the pains to consult the important article in Ewing's Greek Lexicon under βαπτίζω, 3, 4, 5." Now I have taken a great deal of pains with these three classes of supposed meanings, and I affirm that there is not one example under any of them that will justify this assertion; and I think all my impartial readers will now have the same conviction. The fourth and fifth classes are figurative, and the third is *immersion*. But even admitting that it is *overwhelming*, *rushing*, *flowing*, *inundating*, it is not *pouring*. The *overflowing* of the tide, the *rushing* of a torrent, the *overwhelming* of a flood, are modes of the motion of a fluid very different from *pouring* a fluid upon an object. The examples given, then, to support *pouring*, as one of the meanings of this

word, have not even the appearance of yielding their countenance. In everything I complain of a want of philosophy in this able, accurate, and admirable specimen of lexicography.

Mr. Ewing's sixth class of meanings is: "I wash in general." This meaning is not assigned on sound philological principles. Every example brought to establish it will explain with perfect ease on the ground that the word signifies to *immerse*. If so, such examples cannot be a safe foundation for a new meaning. This I hold to be a self-evident canon, universally applicable to the words of all languages. A new meaning should not be admitted while authenticated meanings will serve. Give up this axiom, and universal confusion and uncertainty will ensue on all subjects. The sixth meaning, then, is dismissed, not on the merits, but for want of proof. The history of the word does not prove that it obtained such a meaning. The proof from 2 Kings, v. 10, 14, proceeds on the principle that words which may in any circumstances be interchanged, are perfectly synonymous. After what I have said on this subject to President Beecher, it is useless to give another lesson. The man who grounds on this foundation is not a philologist, though he should speak as many languages as were spoken on the day of Pentecost.

But I will enable the most unlearned reader to perceive the fallacy of this argument, by reducing the example to the English language. "Go," says superstition to the devotee, "bathe seven times in the holy well: he went and *dipped* himself seven times in Saint Ronan's well, and returned cured." There we see that our word *dip* is capable of the very use that is here made of the corresponding word in Greek. Now a foreigner, interpreting English on the principles of Mr. Ewing and Dr. Henderson, would, from this example, prove to demonstration that the English words *bathe* and *dip* are perfectly synonymous.

With respect to Judith xii. 7, Mr. Ewing says: "In this case, the washing could not have been done by immersion, being done at a spring or a fountain." Why so, Mr. Ewing? Is it not possible to get timber in the forest? Cannot immersion be performed either in or at a fountain? "The Syrians," says Dr. Joseph Wolffe, as quoted by the Baptist Magazine, "baptize the children in the following manner. The child is placed in the fountain so that a part of the body is in the water; then the priest three times takes water in his hand, and pours it out on the child's head, repeating at each time the name of one person in the Trinity: after this the body is immersed." Can anything be more absurd than to allege that immersion cannot be performed at a fountain?

Mr. Ewing's other example, instead of having any appearance of supporting him, is directly and palpably against him. It is not "wash thyself in the sea," as Mr. Ewing translates, but "dip thyself into the sea." Mr. Ewing builds a bridge on pillars of ice.

The seventh meaning in Mr. Ewing's classification is: "*I wash for the special purpose of symbolical, ritual, or ceremonial purification.*"

I have on different occasions disposed of the examples alleged by Mr. Ewing for this meaning. My business here is merely with the science of the classification. Now, even admitting that the word does sometimes signify *to wash*, there is no propriety in making symbolical washing a different class of meaning. The purpose of the washing is not a part of the signification of the word, but is intimated by other words in the connexion. In the phrase *washed from a dead body*, the word *washed* has the same meaning that it has in the sixth class; and the symbolical or ritual nature of the washing is known from the additional words which express it. That the washing is for a holy or religious purpose, is no part of the meaning of the word. Must a musician, when he designs to perform a sacred tune, put on holy fiddle-strings? Washing is washing, to whatever the word may be applied.

The eighth meaning in Mr. Ewing's classification is: "*I administer the ordinance of christian baptism, I baptize.*" This gives the word no meaning at all, but merely as the designation of an ordinance, without any reference to anything which that ordinance teaches or represents. On this principle, the rite might as well have been designated by any junction of letters jumbled together at random, without being previously a word in any language. In this sense it has no relation to any of the seven other senses, more than if it had not in it a letter in common with them. As far as this meaning is concerned, the rite might not only have been performed in any mode, but it might have had any import imaginable. It might have been a symbolical pollution, instead of a symbolical purification. This meaning is self-evidently false.

This principle, however, is the only safe one on which to rest the propriety of transference instead of translation. Undoubtedly, if the word has no meaning in the original, but as the designation of an ordinance, it should have no meaning in a translation but as the designation of an ordinance. How could it be translated if it has no meaning? To give it a meaning significant of anything but of the rite itself, would be to mislead the reader.

But how can Dr. H. agree both with Mr. Ewing and President Beecher? Mr. Ewing gives the word no meaning, but as the designation of an ordinance: President Beecher gives it the meaning of *purify*. How can the same man agree with both?

It is a self-evident truth that any word in a language taken to designate a new rite, must be appropriated according to its meaning in the language. If this word has previously seven other meanings, it must in reference to baptism be appropriated in one of these senses. Can any instance be pointed out in any language, in which a word is taken from the language and appropriated to the designation of a rite, when in that rite there is no reference to the meaning of the word in the language?

As an argument for transference instead of translation, Mr. Ewing alleges: "From the various senses in which, from the foregoing examples, it appears that βαπτίζω was used among Greek writers, it must be evident that no proper English term could be found when applied to this initiatory rite, to convey a corresponding signification." Here it is supposed that this word in this application has sense enough, if our language could enable us to express it by a single term. This eighth sense is not only not without sense, but it actually has seven other senses implied in its own sense. Yet the definition of the eighth meaning in the classification denies it any sense, but as the name of a symbolical rite.

The difficulty, or rather impossibility, of translation, it seems, arises from the impossibility of finding an English term for this eighth meaning, corresponding to the seven other meanings. Was ever absurdity so absurd, as the supposition that a symbolical application of a word must embody all the meanings of the word in the language? Is it not enough that it corresponds to that meaning of the word on which it is founded? Should my opponents succeed in showing that the word in question has several meanings, I would not demand that, in reference to baptism, it must have a meaning corresponding to each of their several meanings. I would esteem it quite sufficient, if it corresponded to that one of them on which they pretend to found it. Here, then, this word, which in reference to baptism, by definition has no meaning, but as the designation of an ordinance is made to embody seven other meanings. This, surely, is an admirable specimen of classification.

Here, then, are eight senses of a word, founded on examples, all of which I have, with the utmost ease, reduced to one signification. If simplicity is an essential in science, it is obvious that my view is the most scientific.

But Mr. Ewing should have added another class, in reference

to the baptism of the Spirit. This surely, according to his views, better deserves a distinct place in the classification than some of the meanings which he has dignified with that distinction. He founds this use of the word on its fourth meaning. This is self-evidently false. He might, without absurdity, allege that the meaning of the word in the christian rite is founded on its fourth meaning in common use. But the word in the phrase *baptism of the Spirit*, is incontrovertibly founded on the rite of baptism, whatever may be the nature of that rite, and whatever may be the import of its name. *Baptism of the Spirit* is a figurative expression, founded on the rite of baptism.

The figurative baptism in reference to sufferings, should also, according to Mr. Ewing's classification, have formed a distinct meaning. This is as different from any of his other classes as his fourth class is different from his fifth. Mr. Ewing grounds this use of the word on the fifth meaning. Beyond question when the sufferings of Christ are called his baptism, the reference is directly to the rite of baptism, and not to the mode either of his sufferings or of the rite.

Dr. H. must add an eleventh meaning to his classification. To *purify* is very different from *wash*. But Mr. Ewing's doctrine will not admit this meaning. This gives a distinct meaning to the word, which may and must be translated. Mr. Ewing's philology utterly forbids and defies translation. Can Dr. H. consistently agree with both?

But we have not yet reached the bottom of the mine of absurdity. Dr. H. declares that it is demonstratively certain that the word in question signifies *to purify*, while with the same breath he pronounces Mr. Ewing's classification admirable, though it does not in all its classes contain the meaning which is demonstratively certain. An admirable classification truly, which does not in all its range include the true meaning of the word in the ordinance of baptism.

Why does Dr. H. attempt to couple Mr. Ewing and President Beecher in the same yoke? Would he have his readers believe that the theory of Mr. Beecher is just the completion of the system of his predecessors, or that it is consistent with it? If President Beecher is right, Mr. Ewing and all the late defenders of *sprinkling* or *pouring* are wrong; and have spent their energies in establishing error. There is no more propriety in Dr. Henderson's identifying himself with President Beecher, than there would be in my identifying myself with the President. Indeed the difference between Mr. Beecher and me, is not so great as is the difference between him and them. Yet, because his doctrine is contrived to allow every one to follow his

own accustomed practice, they are willing to have it thought that he and they are perfectly agreed. If Dr. H. now says that President Beecher is right, he must say that Mr. Ewing and all the other defenders of sprinkling and pouring are wrong. President Beecher will not oblige them to alter their practice; but he will oblige them to change their doctrine. Why are the sprinklers so willing to submit to President Beecher? Because they have to change only their view of the meaning of the word, and not to change their old practice. Had President Beecher obliged them to change their practice, he would have found them as restiff with him as they are with me.

My last observation on this classification is, that while the seven preceding meanings all imply that whatever may be the mode, the *baptized* object is covered with the water as far as he is said to be *baptized*, the eighth meaning employs but a few drops.

Here then are the sources of the error of my opponents. Is it possible that, grounding on such principles, they can come at truth?

Dr. Henderson's observation with reference to the Syriac translation* abounds with false principles and contradictions. I shall select a specimen.

1. He is as sure as if he had been with the witch of Endor, that our Lord, in giving the commission, used a certain word which signifies *to stand*; yet he is equally sure that President Beecher has given the proper translation of the Greek word, which is *to purify*. Can there be a fairer specimen of contradiction? To *purify* is not to *stand*. If, then, βαπτίζω correspond to the word which our Lord is supposed to have used, it must signify *to stand*. This is a new theory.

2. As President Beecher has attempted to prove that the word βαπτίζω signifies *to purify*, with respect to this ordinance; and as Dr. H. has declared that this proof is demonstration, either our Lord Jesus Christ was wrong in the word he employed in verbally giving this commission, and was justly corrected by the Greek scriptures, or the Greek scriptures gave a false representation of his commission. It is impossible for any man to agree with both. If Christ, when giving the commission to the apostles, used a Syriac word which signifies *to stand*, and if the scriptures give a Greek word which signifies *to purify*, the scriptures, so far from being inspired, are not a faithful uninspired translation. Cease Dr. H. to pervert the word of God:

* For a full and most satisfactory answer to Dr. Henderson with respect to ancient and many modern translations, I refer to Mr. Gotch's critical examination.

cease to defend your error at so fearful an expense: cease to massacre the witnesses of God's truth: cease to contradict yourself.

3. It is self-evidently false that the word in reference to this rite signifies to *stand up*, or to *stand erect*. This would correspond to the rite in no view ever given of it, or which can be conceived. This is evidently a desperate resource, which can serve the purpose only of evasion, but which is equally opposed to both the contending parties.

4. Dr. H. says that "it obviously suggests the idea of a person's taking his station at or in the water, in order to have the act of baptism performed upon him." Here is another absurdity. If the word suggests the idea of a person's taking his station for baptism, how does it signify the *act* of baptism? According to this, we should have another word to designate the act of baptism, as this designates merely a previous process. Is *standing up* in order to be baptized, baptism? Should a person *stand up in order to be baptized*, as long as Lot's wife stood on the plain of Sodom, this would not baptize him in any mode. According to this lucid philology, the word does not at all signify the act of baptizing. For that we must have another word. Does the command enjoining soldiers to stand erect, call on them to *present* and *fire*.

5. Yet while Dr. H. makes the word designate a process previous to baptism, he makes it again designate the rite itself. Is it not the Syriac term which designates baptism? This is a contradiction.

6. If the word employed by our Lord signifies to *stand erect*, implying that the persons to be baptized took their station in an erect posture at or near the water, does Dr. H. make his recruits of a few days old take their station at or in the water, and *stand erect* in order to receive baptism? Surely that which is essential to the meaning of the word is essential to the ordinance.

7. If the word signifies to *stand*, to *stand up*, to *stand erect*, how does Dr. H. make it designate the purpose of the standing, and the place of standing? According to his own showing, these circumstances are not in the word.

8. It is assumed that the meaning of the word βαπτίζω, in reference to this ordinance, is *purify*; it is assumed also that the version referred to is a translation of βαπτίζω; must not the Syriac word, then, signify to *purify*, if it is a just translation? How can it be a translation of the Greek word, if it signifies to *stand*? Can anything be more absurd than to suppose that the word which is the translation of *purify*, signifies not to *purify*, but to *stand erect*?

9. If the Syriac is a just translation with respect to this word, and if the Syriac word signifies to *stand up*, then βαπτίζω must signify, not to *purify*, as Dr. Henderson and President Beecher contend, but to *stand up*, or to *stand erect*. *Pouring* and *sprinkling*, and *popping* and *dipping*, are all impostors. *Standing up* is the true heir to the inheritance.

10. Dr. H. assumes that our Lord gave the commission in Aramaic. I have no objection to this as a possible fact. But it is not in evidence from scripture, and can be no foundation for a scripture doctrine. We have nothing to do with the language in which our Lord spoke: we must be guided by the language in which his words and actions are reported. To go to the language which he is supposed to have spoken is to go beyond first principles. We have no more concern with the language which Christ spoke on earth, than we have with the language which he now speaks in heaven. Our opponents overlook first principles which are as clear as the light, and they bring in first principles which have neither proof nor self-evidence. Here, in order to have a good foundation, Dr. H. attempts to dig to the antipodes.

11. Dr. H. assumes that if our Lord spoke in Aramaic, he must have used the word found in the Peshito Syriac version. If that word signifies to *stand*, there is the most perfect certainty that he did not use it: if he used that word, there is the utmost certainty that in that use it does not signify to *stand*; because in that sense it would not correspond to the word in the New Testament. What reason can we have for saying that Christ must have used either one word or another, but as such word corresponds to βαπτίζω? Is it by necromancy that we are to find out what word our Lord used on this occasion? Do we know anything of the nature or mode of this ordinance but from the New Testament? Dr. H. here absurdly pretends to find out the meaning of the word used for the ordinance in the scriptures, by the word which Christ is supposed to have used in the language in which he uttered the commission, though the word which Christ used in conveying the commission cannot be even guessed at, but from the word used in the New Testament. This is like another of the author's exploits, in which he pretends to found the doctrine of inspiration, not on the declaration of scripture, but on the authority of the Son of God, as if the knowledge of the authority of the Son of God did not itself rest on the authenticity of the scriptures!

12. Dr. Henderson's advice to the Bible Society is inconsistent with his confidence of conviction with respect to the meaning of the word. He believes that it is demonstratively

proved that it signifies to *purify*. How, then, can he advise to transfer the word, or translate it by any other word? It is an axiom, as clear as any in mathematics, that everything in the original, as far as it can be ascertained, ought to be communicated in a translation of scripture. There can be no reason for withholding anything with respect to one ordinance or doctrine, that will not equally apply to every other. If it is lawful to withhold the knowledge conveyed in one word, it is lawful to withhold the whole scriptures. If it is lawful to mistranslate one word, it is equally lawful to mistranslate the whole. If any translator believes that the word signifies to *sprinkle*, or to *pour*, he is bound so to translate it. If any one thinks that it signifies to *purify*, as an honest man he must translate accordingly. But to advise concealment, or misrepresentation, of what it is believed God has revealed, is most monstrous. If any translator, after all his study, research, and prayer, is unable to determine the meaning of this word, I am not the person to blame him for transferring it. What can he do but transfer? Every one must act according to his own light. No man ought to be advised to conceal or misrepresent. God is the Almighty, and needs not the assistance of our dishonesty. Jacob would have obtained the blessing without his knavery.

13. Dr. H. scruples to assist a translation which renders the word *immerse*, while he thinks the baptists very unreasonable because they will not co-operate with the Bible Society; though they not only decline assisting baptist translations, but also assist translations which the baptists disapprove.

14. Dr. H. assumes that the opinion of Mr. Greenfield, that the mode of the ordinance is a matter of indifference, invalidates his testimony about the meaning of the word, and of the words employed by ancient translations to represent it. Could any well-regulated mind urge such an argument? What connexion has an opinion regarding the importance of the mode of an ordinance, with the testimony respecting the meaning of the word which denotes it? A sound mind is better than the gift of tongues.

15. Dr. H. assumes that the objection to the word *baptize* on the part of the baptists, is because it is an exotic; and gravely proceeds to show the same thing of the term *immerse*. Was there ever such trifling? The objection to the word *baptize* is not because it is an exotic, but because as an English word, it is merely the designation of an ordinance, without expressing the mode, which is expressed by the word in the original. *Baptize* has become an English word, but as an English word it has not the sense of the Greek word which it is employed to represent.

Many people were astonished at the verdict of the House of Lords with respect to Lord Cardigan: there is not a man in the empire who can have any doubt with respect to the matter of fact. How then could all the noble Lords lay their hands upon their breasts and pronounce the words: "Not guilty upon mine honour!" There is no reason for astonishment. According to the first principles on which their Lordships were bound to decide, their verdict could not have been different. The name of the person challenged must be accurately specified in the indictment; and it was not so specified. Just so on this subject. As long as our opponents lay down arbitrary and absurd principles of interpretation, it is useless to present evidence from examples. Were they ever so numerous and clear; the disputant, grounding on his first principles, will lay his hand on his breast and say: "Not proved upon mine honour." Unless on one side or other our first principles are false, how is it possible that the meaning of this word cannot be settled? It cannot be from any difficulty in the word itself. No word in the language can afford better sources for definite decision. Was ever any word in any language so fully discussed? Is doubt to be eternal? I arraign our opponents as establishing innumerable false principles of interpretation, and as trampling on many of the clearest laws of language. Here, then, let me be met. We need not send the jury into the box, till we have laid down the principles on which they are to decide on the proof that shall come before them on the evidence of examples. I call on the unlearned of both sides to judge for themselves. I engage to make everything plain to every man of good sense. My rules of criticism may be understood and estimated by men utterly unacquainted with the Greek language. They equally apply to all languages, and to all words of all languages. Let me entreat the studious and prayerful attention of every christian to this controversy. To suppose that it cannot be decided, is to insult the word of God. Were it the least of Christ's commandments it ought not to be disregarded. But the subject is important in itself: it is important as it regards the peace and prosperity of the churches, the translation and circulation of the scriptures, and the interpretation of the word of God on every subject. It is a fearful thing to teach the children of God how to evade his commandments, by adopting laws of interpretation calculated to extinguish every doctrine in scripture.

UNITARIAN MYSTERY;

OR,

REPLY

TO

MR CARMICHAEL'S STRICTURES

ON

MR CARSON'S

VIEWS OF INSPIRATION.

BY ALEX. CARSON, A. M.

BELFAST: DRUITT, TRACT DEPOSITORY, GREER, AND PHILLIPS.

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1840. ●



## UNITARIAN MYSTERY,

&c.

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WHEN the volumes of Mr Carmichael came into my hands, I was so engaged with another work that I had not time to look at them. Among other things, which I have not yet read, I find that they contain Strictures on my views of Inspiration. I shall now, very briefly, notice what relates to myself. I had said that I would not allow philosophy to interfere on the subject; however august a personage she may be in her own territories, she has no right to invade the territories of revelation. This, it seems, Mr Carmichael disputes. He asks—"Does Mr Carson forget that the peculiar business of philosophy is to study and unfold the wonderful works of the Creator; that the creation is, beyond all doubt or controversy, the production of infinite intelligence—a volume written by the very finger of God, and requiring no other proof than to behold it and its wisdom, to satisfy us that it was so written?"

Mr Carson does not forget this: after labouring so much to prove this, it would be strange if he would forget it; nor do his views of inspiration require that he should forget so great a truth. If it is the peculiar business of philosophy to study the works of creation—how is it her business to speak on inspiration? The works of creation speak nothing about inspiration. We could not from creation know that there is such a book as the Bible. Let philosophy, then, keep to her own province; let her not presume to speak on subjects of which she can know nothing. Whether there is a revelation, and whether that revelation is written in an inspired book, are matters of fact, and must be determined by testimony, not by science. The stupidity of pretended philosophers in not perceiving so obvious a truth, I have lashed with great severity:

and Mr Carmichael instead of delivering them, has only subjected himself to the same punishment. "Whereas," says he, "the volume of revelation was as undoubtedly written (whether inspired or uninspired) by the finger of man, and we must *search for evidence* that it is the result of inspiration, that it flowed from the dictation of God; and in this search, if we seek for evidence not actually inherent in the Scriptures themselves, we can seek it alone among the treasures of philosophy."

*Seek proof of the doctrine of inspiration among the treasures of philosophy!* It might as well be sought among the treasures of Cræsus. The author shows himself to be so unacquainted with the subject on which he writes, as to be ignorant of the very sources from which it derives its proof. Inspiration is a doctrine taught by Scripture, the existence of which could not be known from any other source. There is nothing in the works of creation to inform us whether there is such a thing as inspiration in the Scriptures, or even whether there is such a thing as the Scriptures themselves. Has not the author himself told us that the peculiar business of philosophy is to study and unfold the works of the Creator? What, then, has philosophy to do with the subject of inspiration? Is inspiration a part of the works of creation? Inspiration is a matter of Divine testimony, and the proof of the existence and nature of it depends on interpretation, not on science. To speak of the treasures of philosophy as a source of the proof of inspiration, is as absurd as to speak of proving *an alibi* from the treasures of philosophy. Mr Carmichael, it seems, is a lawyer; then let his client be accused by credible testimony. He rises in defence, and instead of appealing to testimony, he exclaims—"My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I beg to be heard on the works of creation. I maintain that nothing can be more certain than they are the works of the finger of God. Whether or not my client can be proved guilty, this is not so certain as is the divine origin of the world; opposite counsel relies altogether on testimony, but I appeal to the treasures of philosophy." Now, what effect will this raving have on the court? Would not the whisper go round the circle, "Carmichael is deranged, should not some friend lead him out of court?" And is



it only in religion that one may appear wise in the effusions of insanity? Inspiration is no more a matter of philosophy than is a trial before a jury.

Inspiration is so entirely a matter of interpretation, that the proof of its being taught in Scripture is independent even of the authenticity of Scripture. That the Scriptures teach the doctrine of inspiration, I would prove as completely on the supposition that they are false, as that they are true. The authenticity of Scripture must be argued with the infidel only; the inspiration of Scripture is argued on the ground that the Scriptures are authentic; even a professed infidel might consistently undertake to prove that the Scriptures assert their own inspiration. The infidel Lord Bolingbroke was convinced that the doctrines of grace are taught in Scripture, though he did not believe the Scriptures. To the Countess of Huntingdon he said, "Your ladyship may at any time command my pen; I can easily prove that your doctrines are taught by Scripture."

Here is a will, and a certain person, by virtue of it, claims an estate. The heir at law alleges that the will is a forgery: the issue is tried, and the will is proved authentic. The claim of the heir at law is set aside. But another claimant comes forward, acknowledging the authenticity of the will, but alleging that he is the person to whom the estate is bequeathed. Here instead of making proof bear on the authenticity of the will, this is taken for granted on both sides, and evidence is directed to the ascertaining of the meaning of the will. Such is the dispute about inspiration: it is solely a matter of interpretation. It would not be more ridiculous to ascertain the colour of Paul's cloak from the treasures of philosophy, than to determine the existence and nature of the inspiration of the Scripture from that source. My antagonist degrades the Son of God, but defies philosophy. Yet he is as destitute of a truly philosophical mind, as he is of Christianity. I find it a thousand times more easy to refute him, than to avoid too strongly expressing my contempt of his imbecility. Is this the writer who has ventured to give strictures on my views of the doctrine of inspiration?—a writer who cannot distinguish be-

tween a question of fact, and a matter of science. This gentleman must have drawn largely from the treasures of philosophy. If he has any thing in bank, I advise him to draw a little more freely from the treasures of common sense.

“But this writer,” continues my antagonist, “staring with astonishment at the bold interpolation of the sun and moon of Joshua, will not allow philosophy herself to *prate* on the impossible supposition, that God would check the rapid career of the earth and the moon round the sun, in order that a handful of Israelites might have an hour or two’s leisure to butcher a handful of Amorites; but having found what this interpolated passage of Scripture has said, will make every human discovery among the works of God *bend* to this interpolation.”

Here we have a specimen of the audacious profaneness of Unitarians. But I shall not spend time in exposing their impiety. My business shall be to shew the incompetency of my antagonist. My first observation, then, on this passage, shall be, that it is unwarranted to say, that it is impossible for God to “check the rapid course of the earth and moon round the sun.” The man who asserts that it is impossible for God to interfere as he pleases with his works, is not worthy of argument. He is not a sound deist. Surely the hand that put the earth and the moon in motion, and that continually moves and upholds them, can stop them at his pleasure. If any thing is self-evident, it is this.

2.—My second observation is, that the miracle referred to, is as easy to Omnipotence, if supposed to be done according to the discoveries of astronomy, as if done according to the conceptions of the vulgar. The discoveries of astronomy, then, have in no degree tended to make the miracle incredible.

3.—My third observation is, that whether God actually performed this miracle, depends on authentic testimony; and authentic testimony we have in the Scripture record.

4.—My fourth observation is, that to deny this miracle, is not only awfully wicked, but that it is as weak and unphilosophical as it is wicked. On what grounds is it denied? Has it been proved that this part of the narrative is interpolation? No such thing. The only objection is, its supposed incredi-

bility. Now, such an objection cannot be valid except the thing is an impossibility, which no sound mind will assert it to be. Mr Carmichael may allege that the occasion of the supposed miracle is not worthy of God. But this is to speak like a Unitarian—not like a philosopher, or a lawyer, or a man of sense. This is putting his own wisdom in opposition to that of God. Is not the foolishness of God wiser than men? God himself knows better than man, what is worthy of him; and God has declared that he has performed this miracle on this occasion. Who is the audacious man who will dare to give him the lie? Who is it that knows better than God, when God should work, and what he should work? If this is authentic Scripture, let the account of this miracle be received as other Scriptures. If the narrative can be proved an interpolation, then let it be rejected; not on the ground of a want of credibility, but of a want of authentic evidence. No man, who has proper conceptions of God, even as manifested in the works of creation, would dare to question conduct ascribed to God on the same evidence that all the rest of Scripture is ascribed to him. To question or doubt on such a principle, is not wisdom, but madness.—I find no more difficulty in believing the account of this miracle, than in believing the record, that, “In the beginning God created the Heaven and the earth.” The only question I ask, is, Is this narrative a part of Scripture? What God has done, or will do, I am to learn from his own Word, not from my own predilections. I am not afraid to grapple with a fellow mortal, but against the Almighty I will never contend.

5.—My fifth observation is, that the admission that the narrative of the miracle referred to is an interpolation, would not serve my antagonist, nor injure my doctrine about inspiration. If it is an interpolation, then it is not authentic Scripture; and I have contended for the inspiration of authentic Scripture only. Could Mr Carmichael prove one half of the volume to be interpolation, my doctrine would be unaffected. That to which I ascribe inspiration, must be recognized as authentic Scripture. Here again I fasten on my antagonist the charge of childish imbecility. He thinks he is belabouring me with

his blows, when he is only beating the air. If any passage is proved to be an interpolation, what have I to do with it as the defender of the doctrine of the inspiration of all Scripture? To charge any passage as an interpolation, is not to increase my difficulty, but to deliver me from all trouble with it. My other antagonists gave me more trouble; for they held that parts of Scripture are authentic, yet that they could not be inspired. Mr Carmichael is as silly as the Irish rebels, who are said, with a view to injure Mr Beresford, to have lit their pipes with the notes of his bank. Surely any one may perceive that my engagement to prove the inspiration of all Scripture, as a doctrine of Scripture, does not oblige me to prove the inspiration of forgeries afterwards foisted into the volume. It is only of the autographs I speak when I ascribe inspiration to every part of them, and to every word of them.

6.—My sixth observation is, that the author is unfounded in his assertion that in the recognition of the miracle referred to, the discoveries of philosophy are made to *bend*. I maintain that there is no contradiction between the discoveries of astronomy, and the miracle. The miracle can recognise both the Newtonian philosophy, and the utmost extent of the works of creation that astronomy can claim. The miracle cannot be disturbed by any discoveries that astronomy has ever made, or can possibly make.

7.—My seventh observation is, that in the author's management of this matter, there is a want of candour in the statement. He speaks of me as making the discoveries of philosophy to *bend* to an interpolation. This supposes that I view the passage as an interpolation, while I inconsistently make the discoveries of philosophy to *bend* to it. If I view it as the Word of God, it is not strange that I should make every thing *bend* to it. Is this conduct worthy of an upright controversialist?

8.—My last observation on this point is, that the typical character of Joshua and the people of Israel, sufficiently accounts for this wonderful display of Divine power in their favour. To those not acquainted with this the whole conduct of God to the Israelites appears strange and unaccountable

They can see no reason why God has dealt with his people, so very differently from his treatment of all other nations. This, however, I merely suggest to those who can understand it. The defence of inspiration requires it not. It is not for man to suspend his belief of God's Word on his own views of the importance or end of any particular action ascribed to God by his own testimony as recorded in the Scriptures. God must be credited on his own authority. Who is he that shall dare to demand a voucher for his veracity?

“With respect to the irreconcilable variances and discrepancies to be found in Scripture,” says my antagonist, “so adverse to the presumption of this plenary inspiration, Mr Carson does not suffer himself to be in the slightest degree disturbed.”

Upon this I remark: First, It is here taken for granted that I believe there are in Scripture irreconcilable variances and discrepancies, while I believe that these irreconcilable variances and discrepancies are the work of inspiration. This supposition is altogether necessary; for, if I do not consider the things referred to, as being irreconcilable variances and discrepancies, why should I be disturbed with them? Now, what are we to think either of the intellect or the honesty of this writer?

2.—Does the writer mean that these irreconcilable variances and discrepancies are part of the authentic Scriptures? If so—what idea has he of revelation?

3.—If he means that these irreconcilable variances and discrepancies are interpolations,—why should I be disturbed with them? It is my business to vindicate the inspiration of nothing but what is authentic Scripture.

I had reprehended my antagonists for want of perspicacity, in not perceiving that the thoughts of Scripture bear an equal impression of the mind of man as does the style. Mr Carmichael kindly comes to their aid, by declaring, “for my part, I must confess, I want it as much as any of them.” Now, this is what I can very easily admit. I have, more than once, proved that he is remarkably deficient in perspicacity; but in the present instance, he shifts the object of perspicacity. What I blamed my antagonists for not perceiving, was a thing before

their eyes. What Mr Carmichael complains of not being able to perceive, is a thing which I have not attempted to explain; but which I held on the authority of the divine testimony. The Scriptures, in one sense, are of man; in another, they are of God. How this can be so, it is not for me to explain; it is enough if I can shew that Scripture testifies the fact. Now, nothing can be more evident than that the Scripture is sometimes ascribed to man, and sometimes to God; what David is said in one place to speak, the Holy Spirit is said in another to speak. It must, then, belong to both, but to each in a different point of view. Peter speaks of the epistles of Paul, yet Paul speaks of all Scripture as given by inspiration of God—the Scriptures, then, must be the work both of the writers and of the Spirit of God. A most astonishing instance of this we have in the fact, that what Sarah said with respect to her own private affairs, is asserted in the New Testament to have been spoken by the Scripture with respect to the Gospel. Is not faith an operation of the mind itself? yet, is not faith the gift of God? Who can presume to shew the manner of the consistency of these things? We must receive the kingdom of God as little children—otherwise, into it we shall never enter.

“He, however,” continues the author, “qualifies his peculiar views of plenary inspiration, by observing, that to say ‘that every word of Scripture has been inspired, does not imply that every speech or sentiment recorded there should be inspired; but it is *inserted* in the Scriptures *by inspiration.*’”

Mr Carmichael is a lawyer, he should have more perspicacity; this is not a modification, it is an explanation merely. The fact referred to does not modify the doctrine of inspiration in the smallest degree. The letter of Claudius Lysias is recorded by Scripture, but it is not Scripture. A writer who is ever drawing from the treasures of philosophy should have discrimination.

“With the same view,” continues Mr Carmichael, “he says elsewhere, ‘it is indeed perfectly agreeable to the doctrine of complete inspiration, that the writers of the Gospel should have taken much of their accounts from external sources.

Inspiration applies to them in copying a genealogical table, receiving a fact from an eye-witness, copying uninspired records, or making extracts from them, as well as in the most important communications of the Holy Spirit.' ” On this he remarks, “yet with these modifications he still maintains his views of plenary inspiration with unabated spirit.” These are no modifications, they are admissions for the sake of argument, and an assertion that even in such instances inspiration is equally without modification.

Mr Carmichael quotes from me the following passage—“ It is true, indeed, that the substance of a narrative may be true, while there is a mistake in the dates ; and two facts may be true, while they are erroneously combined ; but error in any of these respects, brings the whole Bible into suspicion, and when the whole claims the authority of inspiration, a false date is as bad as a false narrative. When we read, “ *All Scripture is given by inspiration of God,* ” we cannot admit that God has committed an error in the date more than in the transactions. This passage of Scripture demands truth in the dates, as well as in the substance of the narratives. If the Scriptures assert inspiration equally with respect to every part of them, an error of any kind, were it established against them, would overturn their authority.”

Now, can demonstration itself be more convincing than this? Yet my antagonist asks, “ Is it Voltaire or Gibbon who has recorded this observation? or is all this sweeping recklessness to be ascribed to an orthodox minister of the Gospel?” Into what a fearful situation have I brought myself! Am I really changed into a Voltaire or a Gibbon? Let me try to deliver myself; nothing more easy. The question is grounded on a total want of discrimination in my antagonist. To make my observation of any service to a Voltaire or a Gibbon, it must be taken for granted, both that the Scriptures assert inspiration of every part of themselves, and that notwithstanding this, some parts of them are false. I hold the former, but strongly deny the latter. A Voltaire or a Gibbon would never imagine that he had any ground here on which to rest his lever. In order to make out a case for Voltaire and

Gibbon, my antagonist combines a part of his own view and a part of mine together, and by that mixture he forms a strong poison. I believe that the Scriptures are not only true in every part of them, but that every part of them is inspired. I believe, also, that a single error in the autographs would condemn the whole. Mr Carmichael believes that there are many falsehoods in the Scriptures, but that the Scriptures do not assert universal inspiration with respect to themselves. To make out a case for Voltaire and Gibbon, he takes his own doctrine that the Scriptures in some things are false, and combines it with my doctrine, that one falsehood in a book pretending universal inspiration would condemn the whole. Now, have I not performed a miracle of transubstantiation? Have I not changed from a Voltaire or a Gibbon, into Alexander Carson? Mr Carmichael has no head for nice discussion. He wants powers of discrimination. It is ignorance gives him boldness.

There is another instance of a want of discrimination here. He adds, "Yet this dangerous, this desperate dogma, is built upon a single text." What is this dangerous, this desperate dogma? Read the passage quoted from my work, and you will see it is this—that a single error would destroy the credit of the Bible, on the supposition that inspiration is asserted of every part. Now this dogma is not built upon any text; it can stand on its own authority; it is a self-evident truth. The contrary is a contradiction, for it supposes that the same thing may be both true and false. It is the doctrine of universal inspiration that is founded on this text—not the dogma to which the author refers.

Mr Carmichael next treats of the celebrated passage, 2 Tim. iii. 16. On this part of the subject, for full information I refer my reader to my work on the "Theories of Inspiration," referred to by Mr Carmichael, and especially to the discussion on this text at the end of my "Refutation of Dr Henderson's Doctrine on Inspiration," which Mr Carmichael has not noticed. I shall here make only a few slight observations on what is alleged by my present antagonist.

He tells us that this passage is received in a sense adverse



to us by the majority of Biblical critics. Now; this is not fact. Many critics on the Orthodox side of this question, do, indeed, adopt the Unitarian version of this passage; but instead of adopting the Unitarian sense of it, they contend most earnestly against it. One of my principal antagonists, Dr Pye Smyth, is inclined to coincide with the version of Mr Gilbert Wakefield, but he contends warmly that instead of proving the Unitarian doctrine of inspiration, it proves the inspiration of all the books of the Old Testament. His words are—"Thus the passage before us, though we adopt that construction of *θεόπνευστος* which Unitarians generally approve furnishes the strongest testimony to the inspiration of each and every of the books of the Old Testament. The importance of this conclusion, in relation to our present subject, and to every other part of the controversy with the Unitarians, needs not to be pointed out." Bishop Middleton, while he agrees with Wakefield in translating by "every writing" instead of "all Scripture," yet makes the verb understood apply to both adjectives, and takes the assertion to be "every writing (viz. of the sacred writings just mentioned) is divinely inspired, and is useful." Now, Mr Carmichael is altogether without excuse in his representation, for he saw this in my work. Where will he find his majority of Biblical critics? None of my former antagonists adopt the Unitarian sense of this passage; the Unitarian translation of this passage is quite a different thing from the Unitarian sense of it.

He asserts, also, that the ancient versions manifest a sense adverse to us. Nor is this fact. Dr Pye Smith adopts the Syriac version of the passage, yet contends that it ascribes inspiration to each and every of the writings of the Old Testament. But I take higher ground. Ancient versions cannot be an authority paramount to the original, and the original demands that the substantive verb be applied to both adjectives equally. It is not possible to translate the passage accurately without asserting inspiration. The ancient versions referred to, it is admitted on all hands, do not translate the particle *καὶ*, and, therefore they are not a translation of the passage. Bishop Middleton remarks, that not a single manuscript wants

the particle. Versions, then, which cannot translate it, cannot be versions. Modern attempts to translate it are so bungling, as not to require to be refuted. “All inspired writing is *also* useful,” is not English. When we say that it is also useful, it is implied that something else had formerly been asserted of it. *It is inspired: it is also useful.* Let our adversaries attend to the demand of the learned Bishop Middleton; let them produce a similar construction with their meaning. If they cannot, they are not entitled even to a hearing. Even Wakefield allows that the Æthiopic is equivalent to all the rest of the old versions in a difficult or disputed passage, and the Æthiopic does not omit the particle. Translators who cannot render a passage without omitting a word, are self-evidently wrong.

Mr Carmichael tells us—“It is remarkable that in the original Greek there is no verb, and that the substantive verb, which is understood, may be placed at the option of the reader, wherever he considers it most rational to place it.” Had the learned gentleman read any Greek, the ellipsis of the substantive verb he would not have thought at all remarkable; but that it should be supplied at the option of the reader, wherever he may consider it most rational to place it, would, indeed, be a very remarkable thing. This, however, cannot be a fact with respect to any language. It is a grammatical axiom, which must be true equally with respect to all languages, that elliptical words can be supplied in their proper place by all persons who understand the language. The only justifiable ground of any ellipsis is its being so obvious both as to word and place, that there is no need to express it. Every other ellipsis is essentially vicious. Neither the elliptical word, nor its situation in the sentence, is at the option of the reader; nor to be determined by reason from consideration of the nature of the thing expressed, but from grammatical principles. Were the doctrine of my antagonist true, certainty of interpretation would be utterly impossible. A writer, or a speaker, expresses himself elliptically, not at random, but, because every hearer or reader can instantly supply the ellipsis in its proper place. The observation of my antagonist shews

him to be as deficient in the philosophy of Rhetoric, as he is awfully heretical in theology. Mr Carmichael says that I am no more privileged to place the ellipsis in the early part of the sentence, than my adversaries are to place it more remotely. It is neither by privilege nor by patent that I pretend to fix the ellipsis, but by grammatical principles. Why is an ellipsis supposed at all? why is it supposed at the end of the sentence? Because it cannot be wanted. For the same reason I place it in the early part of the sentence. The sentence cannot be construed without the substantive verb be supplied to the first adjective as well as to the second. Let us take an instance in our own language. A speaker makes an observation in conversation; another in reply says, "An observation just and useful." Here there is no verb, but there is no child that could not supply the ellipsis; and who would not understand the language to be an assertion that the observation referred to is just and useful? "Stop a little," exclaims Mr Carmichael, "the conclusion is rash." It is remarkable that there is here no verb, and that the substantive verb which is understood, may be placed at the option of the hearer, wherever he considers it most rational to place it. Now, I consider it most rational to apply the substantive verb to the last adjective only, and the sense is, that an observation that is just, or as far as it is just, is also useful. This does not assert of the observation of the speaker, that it is just, but asserts merely that every just observation is useful.

But for the sake of argument, I will for a moment admit not only the Unitarian version, but the Unitarian sense of this passage, and I will undertake to prove my doctrine of verbal inspiration, with respect to every part of Scripture that is admitted to be inspired. The phrase "every Divinely inspired writing," implies, that there are some inspired writings. If there are, I contend that as it is the writing of which the inspiration is predicated, the words, as well as the thoughts, must be inspired. No artillery which my adversaries can bring into the field, will ever be able to dislodge me from this stronghold.

In the discussion already referred to, I have proved that the assertion of inspiration applies to "all Scripture," as directly

with respect to the New Testament as the Old. The absence of the article, complained of by many who are friendly to the doctrine, I have shewn to be the very thing that fits the general assertion. Mr Carmichael speaks about forgeries and interpolations, and forgeries and interpolations cannot be spoken of with too great abhorrence. But is not perverted translation an equally detestable offence; and equally dishonest? What is the difference whether a person forges a document, or, in giving its testimony from a foreign language, misleads the court? The forced and unnatural version to which Unitarians have recourse, bring their own testimony of wilful corruption. What, for instance, is the darkness of this passage? What is the reason that forbids it to have its natural meaning, as affirmatory of inspiration with respect to all Scripture? The only reason is, that this does not suit the Unitarian doctrine. The deity of Jesus Christ could not be plausibly denied, if the Scriptures are all admitted to be inspired. If some parts are allowed to be inspired, and others not to be inspired, Unitarians have some hope that they may retain their heresy.

On the promise to the Apostles, "It is not you that speak, but the Holy Spirit," I had remarked:—"Now, if verbal inspiration was communicated on such occasions, surely it would not be withheld from the Scriptures, which are to abide to the end of the world." To this, Mr Carmichael replies:—"Why not? The Evangelist who heard the inspired defence of an Apostle, surely could record it without the aid of inspiration; and his record would abide to the end of the world, as full of truth as if he owed the narrative to inspiration, and not to his sense of hearing, and his recollection of what he had heard." This does not at all repel my argument. Whatever need the Apostles had of inspiration in defending themselves, they had more need of it in writing the Scriptures as an *infallible rule* for Christians in all ages. This is an axiom of common sense, which I leave to the judgment of all mankind.

"Mr Carson," says he, "in discussing the inscription written over the head of Jesus on the cross, which is differently worded by the four Evangelists, maintains, that 'as four

honest men might have related this fact with this variety of expression, without any impeachment of their veracity, so may the Holy Spirit. The man who says that it is impossible for any of these accounts but one to be the language of inspiration, virtually asserts that none of them can be the language of truth but one. If the four accounts are all substantially true, and would not discredit any of four uninspired men, they may, without any disparagement to God, be all the language of the Holy Spirit. In speaking the language of men, his veracity must be tried by the rules of human language. Instead then of saying that such a variety of expression in relating this fact, supposes that the words were left to the Evangelists themselves, I will fearlessly assert that each of the four accounts is verbally the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. If the four accounts are true, and reconcileable as the language of men, they are equally true and reconcileable, as the language of God.’”

This reasoning I might leave to the judgment of mankind, without a single additional word. As long as self-evident truth is authority, my doctrine here is unassailable. I shall, however, present my readers with the objection of my antagonist. “Not so!” says he, “Men are fallible—their faculties imperfect—their memory fallacious; and if their evidence correspond in substance, however it may vary in trifling details, there is no imputation upon their veracity: it is evident they mean to speak the truth; and they are credited accordingly. But God is infallible—he must have known what the inscription actually was—he could only describe it as containing the very words, and no other could have appeared in each of the four narratives of the Evangelists, if they write, not from the evidence of their senses, from memory, or from hearsay, but from the dictation of God himself. He could not vary or err a single point from the truth: therefore, their variations and discrepancies are not to be ascribed to the infallible God, but to the fallible men who recorded the circumstance. Their mistakes are no imputation on their veracity, but on their weakness. What weakness then, to ascribe their mistakes not to them, but to God?”

To this I reply: 1.—My doctrine in the above extract is

an axiom ; if there is any thing self-evident it is, that truth is *the same to every being* ; that which is truth when spoken by any being, must be equally truth when spoken by any other. To the man who denies this I would prescribe medicine instead of argument ; no one deserves to be treated as a rational being, who holds that a thing may be true when spoken by one being and false when spoken by another. Here I rest on first truth ; if any one scruples to receive it, I must turn from him either as an obstinate man, or a lunatic.

2.—I observe that my antagonist does not make the phraseology referred to truth, even with regard to men. It is only excusable falsehood, tolerated on account of fallibility, imperfection of faculties, or fallaciousness of memory. He speaks of such statements as mistakes ; now, mistakes may be consistent with veracity, but never with truth.

3.—If such expression is not truth, it is not consistent with veracity, because it could be avoided. Fallibility, imperfection of faculties, and fallaciousness of memory, will not justify a man in stating as truth, what he does not know to be truth ; far less what, on the supposition, he knows to be false : if he does not remember the exact words, he should not use expressions that, according to the supposition, implies that he both knows and relates them. If the doctrine of Mr Carmichael is true, every man who uses this phraseology is a liar ; if he knows the exact expression and does not give it, he is a liar ; if he does not know it, and uses phraseology, which implies that he knew it, he is a liar. All men are liars according to this Unitarian morality.

4.—As a matter of fact, such modes of speech are universally accounted truth, and are not merely excused as mistakes. For the correctness of this observation, I appeal to the experience of all mankind. Except some hypocondriac, or most extravagant fanatic, it would be impossible to find in human nature any one who would pretend to find falsehood in such expressions. Verbal exactness is never expected, even though every word should be most perfectly recollected. In referring to the saying of Lord Bolingbroke to Lady Huntingdon, I would not think it necessary to take the book off the shelf in

order to make my report verbally coincident with the record ; and were I to quote it twenty times, I would never think of having reference to the words of my first report. No sane mind requires such verbal exactness.

Such modes of speech have their known value in currency, and never pass for more than current value. According to the fanatical morality of my antagonist, a great part of figurative language would be morally vicious. Forms of speech are used, which we know to be not literally true—does any man pretend to avoid them on this account? Are not round numbers also frequently given in statement, when the exact truth is known, and when the meaning may be something more or something less? This is justified, not by reason of fallibility, or imperfection of faculties, or fallaciousness of memory, but by the fact that greater exactness is not necessary, and is not expected. All the grounds, then, on which my antagonist rests his objection to my solution of the alleged difficulty, are mere shadows.

I ask, what is truth of statement but conformity of expression to meaning, according to the import of language by use? Now, what is the import of such language by use? Is it not what I have represented? If, then, God employs the language of men to direct mankind, will he not use their language as they use it? Is there any axiom, if this is not an axiom? It can never be justly alleged that God deviates from truth when he expresses his mind in man's language, as man himself expresses his. Surely I have a right to triumph in the solution which I gave to this difficulty, and which I was the first to give. The enemies of verbal inspiration considered that in the narratives of the Evangelists they had an irrefragable proof of their doctrine. If accounts vary, they considered it self-evident that only one of them could be verbally inspired. This I viewed as a sophism, plausible only to those who are void of discrimination. Such narratives are consistent with truth—they are, therefore, consistent with inspiration. Now, how irresistibly evident must my answer be, when my present antagonist can find no way to overturn it but by denying self-evident truth, contradicting the universal sense of mankind re-

corded in their practice, and assuming a fanatical morality of which Johanna Southcote might be ashamed.

5.—My antagonist himself, when off his guard, admits that such modes of expression are true. It is evident that it is only to serve a purpose that he charges them as mistakes, or excusable falsehoods. In a preceding extract, he asserts that an Evangelist could, without inspiration, record the inspired defence of an Apostle, and that such record would be *full of truth*. Now, he will not pretend that such a record would give the exact words.— So then, it seems, a record may be full of truth, without giving the exact words. This shews that the charge of mistake with respect to the modes of speech under question, is not according to the deliberate judgment even of my antagonist himself.

6.—My antagonist contradicts himself. He not only asserts that such modes of speech may be full of truth, but that they may be as full of truth as if they were inspired. Now, inspiration he requires to give the exact words, else it will not tell truth; yet modes of speech, which according to him are not true, are not only full of truth, but as full of truth as the very words of inspiration, which are the very words used. It is not easy for a writer to force truth, and preserve self-consistency. How great must be the enmity of Unitarians to the genuine meaning of the Word of God, when they will employ so desperate a mode of evading it! I would wish to be as gentle as possible, but in justice to the truth that I defend, I am obliged to dissect my antagonists alive. Why did Mr Carmichael place himself on my dissecting table?

7.—Were the truth of such modes of expression questionable, the Scriptures settle the question. The Scriptures say, “all Scripture is given by inspiration of God,” and the Scriptures use these modes of expression. Truth, then, they must be.

“Mr Carson, however,” continues my opponent, “appears on many occasions to have been admitted into the counsels of the Almighty, and to know as well as himself, what he has inspired, and what he has left without inspiration. I shall give a single instance. In discussing Paul’s occasional disclaimer



of inspiration: 'But I speak by permission, and not of commandment,' Mr Carson proceeds,—'Admitting that Paul disclaims inspiration on this point, I maintain that the chapter containing this admission, as a part of Scripture, is inspired equally with any chapter in the Bible. Though he was not inspired to decide the question, he was inspired to write the account which he has given of the matter. If the Apostle has told us that he is not inspired on this point, he has been inspired to make the denial. Not a line has he written in that chapter that is not immediately from the Holy Ghost.' "

I might safely leave this extract with the reader, without another word. From my premises my reasoning is undeniable. What, then, is the objection of Mr Carmichael? "How accurately," he exclaims, "does his own observation apply to himself! Does vain man consider himself a perfect judge of what in all cases is fit for God to write? Is he able to give counsel to the perfection of wisdom? Must revelation come up, in all things, to his standard?"

Now, should I repress the strongest feeling of contempt for the man who writes thus? Instead of attempting to refute my irresistible reasoning, he dishonestly applies what I have said with respect to writers who form theories of inspiration from their own invention, to my assertions which I ground on the testimony of Scripture. Has this any bearing on any thing in the extract? Does the extract import that I consider myself a perfect judge of what in all cases it is fit for God to write? Does it imply that I think myself able to give counsel to the perfection of wisdom? Does any thing in the extract imply that the Almighty must confine himself to my standard? Does the extract import that my knowledge of Paul's inspiration in the chapter referred to, was derived from having been admitted to the counsel of Jehovah? Is not my information derived from Paul's own assertion with respect to the inspiration of all Scripture? I ground only on the documents before me. I am reasoning as closely from the testimony of Scripture, as ever lawyer reasoned from the words of a statute. How can any man of common sense mistake me? The chapter referred to, as a part of Scripture, must be every word inspired, be-

cause it is testified that "all Scripture is given by inspiration of God." Is any intellect so obtuse, as not to perceive that the ground of my assertion is the document before me? It is very difficult for me to repress the feelings which management so disingenuous must excite in every candid breast. Do I not treat the question entirely as a matter of testimony?

He speaks also of my discussing Paul's disclaimer of inspiration. Does not this import that I consider the thing referred to as a disclaimer of inspiration? Does not the extract itself shew that I admit the thing only for the sake of argument. I do not consider it as a disclaimer of inspiration. On the contrary, I hold with perfect assurance that when Paul says, "I speak this by permission, and not of commandment," he means, *I permit the thing, but do not enjoin it—not, I am permitted to say this, but I am not commanded to say it.* But in order to grind my antagonists to powder, I shew that even admitting their own interpretation, it would not affect the inspiration of the document as a part of Scripture.

Mr Carmichael gives the following extract from my work: "The proper province of inspiration, as we are told, is confined to things of a moral and religious nature. The proper province of inspiration, I maintain, is every part of a book declared by God to be inspired. It is the proper province of every writer to be pledged for every thing in the book which he authenticates by his name. Would I permit an amanuensis to foist in, under my name, every thing he chose to communicate to the public? And if I adopt any thing from him, am I not pledged for it as my own? Shall the inspired writers then, take a liberty with God that would be utterly unwarrantable with man? Is it not the province of God to be the author of every part of the Book which he recognizes as his own writing? For an amanuensis to foist in any thing not inspired, would be downright forgery. If there are some things unfit for inspiration, such things should not have a place among things inspired, so as to make a part of a book, of which inspiration is, without exception, asserted. Had God permitted such a heterogeneous mixture to be given to the world, than which nothing could be more absurd to suppose, he would

not have allowed the whole to be designated by his name; and he would, doubtless, have given a criterion to distinguish what is Divine from what is human. That no such thing is the case, besides the absurdity of the thing, there is the highest evidence in the fact, that no such criterion is given by God."

Now, I defy the ingenuity of man to refute the doctrine of this extract. What, then, can my antagonist object? Why, he utterly and most audaciously perverts its meaning and bearing. Let us hear him: "Here," says he, "we find that if Mr Carson were God, he would have declared (what God has not declared) that every part of the Bible is inspired—and would thus have pledged himself for every thing in the book authenticated by his name, and he would not have permitted any amanuensis to thrust in, under his name, any forgery of his own. How differently has God acted! We still read in the seventh verse of the fifth chapter of the first epistle of John, that 'there are three that bear record in heaven—the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; and these three are one.' Yet this is universally admitted to be a forgery; but (with views altogether different from Mr Carson's) God still permits it to remain, and neither the forger nor the forgery has ever been blasted by his lightning."

Was ever commentary so audaciously false? Is there any thing in the extract declaring what I would do if I were God? Has such blasphemy proceeded from my pen? Do I not expressly speak of what I would do with a writing of my own? How could malignity or stupidity understand me as saying what I would do if I were God? I say that if I assert of any book that it is all my own, I am answerable for every thing in it. Shall God, then, authenticate a book, any part of which is not his own? If there is not wilful misrepresentation here, there is stolidity.

What an utter want of discrimination is manifested in what he says about forgery. I speak of forgeries foisted into the book before I subscribe it; he applies this to forgeries foisted in after I have subscribed. I am answerable for the first, and adopt them as my own; for the latter I am not answerable; and I will call the forger to account in due time. If there

are any forgeries in our present copies of the Scriptures, they were not in them when God delivered them to the saints. But when he says of the passage in 1 John v. 7, that it is "universally admitted to be a forgery," he says what is not fact. It is not in proof from manuscripts; but it has never been proved a forgery; it is still possible that it may be genuine. Mr Carmichael is a lawyer, and ought to know that the true heir may be nonsuited for want of evidence. Mr Carmichael is exceedingly reckless in his statements.

Speaking, in continuation, with respect to 1 John v. 7, as a forgery, Mr Carmichael thus writes: "Nor was it necessary: God has given man reason and intelligence—the power of comparing, discriminating, and judging; and thus he has been able to detect this imposture, even without Mr Carson's desideratum—his fanciful criterion for distinguishing what is divine from what is human. And so long as the light of science advances, and the means of knowledge present themselves, he will, it may be hoped, possess the power to distinguish throughout the whole of the sacred volume, what is human from what is divine—what is inspired from what is uninspired—what is falsehood and error, interpolation and forgery from what is truth and consistency, authenticity and fact; and to stamp with his stigma, for the reprobation of Christendom, every pious fraud and fabrication which has adulterated the hallowed pages of that volume. The text which was intended to have established for ever three divine persons on the throne of the living and true God, mere human sagacity and wisdom have scorched and blackened with disgrace and infamy, as effectually as if it had been branded by a thunder-bolt from heaven."

Never was there manifested in the same compass a greater number of instances of want of perspicacity and judgment, than this passage exhibits. 1.—It supposes that it is my doctrine that God would not suffer an interpolation at any time to creep into the Scriptures. This is not legitimately grounded on any of the statements which he has quoted from me. My observation respects Scripture as authenticated by God.

2.—He speaks of the criterion referred to as mine. The smallest degree of perspicacity would perceive that the crite-

tion is not mine, but one which the theory of my antagonists demands.

3.—The province of the supposed criterion would not be to judge between true and false, but between inspired truths and truths not inspired. Dr Parry, and those who adopt his theory, do not, like Mr Carmichael, hold that some parts of Scripture are true, and some false; but that all are true, though not all inspired, as not needing inspiration. Now, it is on this supposition that I demand a criterion. Such a criterion could not bear on interpolation.

4.—Mr Carmichael speaks of 1 John v. 7, as displaced by sagacity and wisdom. Now this is not at all a matter of science; it is solely a question of fact, the solution of which requires nothing but common sense. To speak of the advances of science as discovering interpolation, is as absurd as to pretend to determine the provisions of an Act of Parliament by the advances of science. If 1 John v. 7 were extant in all the ancient copies of the original, we would laugh at science were she to pretend to question its authority. All the sciences in the world, existing in the utmost advancement of which they are capable, are unfit to displace from the canon a single text warranted by all the manuscripts. The writer who speaks so about science, is ignorant of the very object of science. Dare science pretend to displace John i. 1?

5.—Mr Carmichael does not speak as a philosopher, nor as a lawyer, when he asserts that 1 John v. 7 has been scorched and blackened as a forgery. It never has been proved a forgery; though in the present state of evidence, we are not entitled to use it in proof.

6.—What a book is the Bible of the Unitarians! Their sacred volume is a collection consisting partly of what is human, and partly of what is divine; partly of what is inspired, and partly of what is uninspired; partly of error, interpolation, and forgery; and partly of truth, consistency, authenticity, and fact. Its hallowed pages are adulterated with pious frauds and fabrications, which need to be stamped with a stigma, and held up to the reprobation of Christendom. I call on every Christian to take notice of this. Is it strange that Unitarians employ the most daring

perversions in evading the testimony of Scripture, when they view it in this light? They can talk reverently about it, and when it suits them, they can say "It is written," but whatever is obstinate, they can disgrace as forgery. Could there be surer evidence that, even in their own estimation, the Bible is against them, than their audacity in blaspheming the Scriptures? If two men have a suit depending on the evidence of a written document: if one of the parties declares that he rests confidently on it; and the other speaks of it as abounding with forgeries, will not every man in court say to himself, "The document will testify against this man?"

The following passage I quote as a specimen of Unitarian candour:—"To cultivate the reason of man, and not his credulity or superstition, seems one grand object of the Universal Father; yet a host of pious persons, assuming the title of Evangelical and Orthodox, (who, if ignorant or blind may be accounted honest; but if learned and astute cannot but invite depreciating suspicions) represent the Deity as displeased with those advances in science which have discovered the mighty laws by which he governs nature, and have penetrated the unfathomable profundity of infinite space, to clothe him, as it were, before man, as he was already clad before angels, with the stupendous majesty appertaining to the Creator of a universe comprehending in its boundless expanse myriads of myriads of universes: I repeat, they represent him as displeased with these his authentic glories, and pleased only with the adoration of the ignorant, the childish, and the doting, whose grovelling conceptions cannot soar beyond an inexplicable, inconsistent, contradictory, perverted, and preposterous mystery, as revolting to the reason he has conferred upon us, as it is derogatory to his own transcendent and dazzling magnificence." What a tissue of misrepresentation is contained in this extract! It is here insinuated that according to his opponents, it is the object of God to cultivate the credulity and superstition of man. Does any man teach this? Does this flow from any sentiment which his opponents hold? To believe God with the most absolute and implicit confidence, we glory in holding to be the duty of man; but only on evidence that

it is God who speaks. Is this credulity? Is not this true wisdom? Is it rational for creatures to hesitate in receiving the testimony of their Creator? Has any of those, to whom this writer refers, taught that it is God's object to cultivate superstition in man?

Mr Carmichael here asserts, that a host of pious persons, assuming the title of Evangelical and Orthodox, represent the Deity as displeased with the advances of science which have discovered the mighty laws by which he governs nature. Was ever falsehood more audacious and impudent? Instead of such a host, is there one among all of those to whom he refers, guilty of what he lays to their charge? I have a right to consider the charge as especially directed against myself, and I distinctly pronounce it a most impudent calumny. I often speak with scorn of science, falsely so called—never of the discoveries of science. I frown on the impotency of pretended philosophers who attempt to degrade the word of God—I honour men of real science. Instead of representing God as displeased with those advances in science, which have discovered the laws by which he governs nature, I rejoice in all such discoveries. It is the arbitrary, infidel, and fanatical inferences which pretended philosophers draw from their facts, that I condemn. I despise men who, like Mr Carmichael, attempt to determine matters of fact by scientific evidence. Who, then, is the man who has represented God as displeased with those advances in science, which have discovered the mighty laws by which he governs nature? If a calumniator has no conscience, he should have some shame. Might not Mr Carmichael expect that I would severely chastise him for such calumnies?

With respect to the extent of creation, whatever number of myriads of myriads of systems the universe has been found by astronomers to contain, I wish they may be increased a thousand and a thousand fold. All worlds belong to Christ, and what belongs to Christ I claim as a joint heir with Christ. The astronomers are my surveyors; and if they shall find that my estates are inconceivably more extensive than I had expected, I certainly shall not grieve.

Mr Carmichael farther asserts that we represent God as pleased only with the adoration of the ignorant, the childish, and the doting. Now, what does the writer deserve who makes so reckless charges? I will not speak of him as he deserves. Unitarians speak of themselves as rational, and affect to despise the intellect of their adversaries. Now I never have had occasion to complain of them as having too much intellect; and in the present instance, whether my antagonist possesses a superabundance of perspicacity, I leave the reader to judge from the samples of it that I have laid before him. I have shewn many things which are comprehensible and distinguishable, which the author has not had the discrimination to discover, while from pride of intellect he rejects the mystery of godliness. It would humble me very much if Mr Carmichael could shew me that some things are comprehensible to him, which I cannot understand; but it does not humble me at all to confess that I am not able to comprehend the nature of God.

The author closes the half-acre sentence which I have last quoted, by designating believers of the deity of Christ as persons whose grovelling conceptions cannot soar beyond a mystery. How is it possible to soar beyond a mystery? This surely is the boldest flight of imagination. How it is possible to soar beyond a mystery, is to me a mystery. This is a Unitarian mystery. If we are to blame because our grovelling conceptions cannot soar beyond a certain mystery, it is to be supposed that our opponents in their exalted imaginings, can soar far beyond mysteries. Others have blamed us for soaring too high: this writer blames us for not being able to soar beyond the highest heaven. I offer a premium to any one that will shew us how to soar beyond a mystery. I confess that with my pinions, I cannot attempt it.

It seems, however, that our mystery is faulty, even as a mystery. It is inexplicable. *Inexplicable!* Is any mystery explicable? Even the Unitarian mystery of soaring beyond mystery is inexplicable. It has another fault: It is contradictory. If it is contradictory, it is not a mystery. A mystery is a thing incomprehensible, but of all things a contradiction is



the most obvious. We cannot say that a thing is contradictory if we do not clearly understand it. What does the learned author mean by a perverted mystery? What does he mean by a preposterous mystery? The application of the epithets with which he loads the word, is quite a mystery to me.

There is another thing in this extract which is very mysterious to me. He tells us that the advances in science have *penetrated the unfathomable profundity of infinite space!!!* This is deeper than Milton's hell, for Satan, as he fell, still found a lower deep ready to receive him. But Mr Carmichael's men of science have plumbed the *profundity of infinite space*—aye, *infinite and unfathomable space* has been *fathomed*. Mystery of mysteries—all is mystery! There is something very contemptible in this attempt to be sublime. He has powder only for a pop gun: it is ridiculous to put it into the mouth of roaring Meg. No man can succeed in rising to sublimity, who cannot think. Sublimity of expression consists not in great words. Does it become such a writer to speak of the believers in the doctrine of the Trinity, as persons of grovelling conceptions—ignorant, childish, and doting?

But what has driven the author to the subject of mystery? Was he not here giving strictures on my views of inspiration? Is it not obvious that hostility to the doctrine of the Deity of Christ, is the true ground of his hostility to the doctrine of inspiration? He cannot degrade the Son of God, till he first degrades revelation. Let the lover of Jesus and the Bible look at this.

Mr Carmichael closes his strictures with the following observations:—“These men would despoil him of his overwhelming immensity, in order to reduce him (such their boasted humility—such the child-like prostration of their spirit) to a companionship with themselves. They would blot out the splendours of creation, and would leave no trace of the Creator except in revelation; because they conceive, that in revelation that the Creator and the creature stand more on an equality with each other, are on more familiar terms; the subjects not many degrees inferior to their sovereign, capable of taking measure of his power and dignity; qualified to circumscribe

the exercise of his will; authorized to decide on the propriety or impropriety—the extent and the frequency—the policy or the necessity of his interference in their concerns; nay, as if they were admitted into his very council chamber, they announce the exact quantum of inspiration effused in Holy Writ. ‘Not a line has Saint Paul written in that chapter, that is not immediately from the Holy Ghost!!!’ Who communicated these positive and unqualified tidings to this modern prophet—this presumptive messenger of God?” &c.

It is impossible to speak of this in terms sufficiently expressive of indignation at the recklessness of its calumny. Who is he among us who attempts to despoil Jehovah of his immensity? Do the union and fellowship of believers with God through Christ depend on the lowering of the Godhead to an equality with men? Does their elevation imply his degradation? Do they wish to blot out the splendours of creation? I have a right to consider the charge as levelled particularly against me, and I leave my work on “the knowledge of Jesus, the most excellent of the sciences,” to give it a direct contradiction. I not only admit, but contend *that the works of creation are a revelation from God—that they are a prior revelation, and that no after revelation can contradict any thing that they declare.* Can any rational man go farther than this? Now, what is the impudence of the falsehood that represents us as not leaving a trace of the Creator, except in revelation? I am sometimes blamed as being a little severe: here, I am sure, I will be condemned for my lenity. I may, however, be excused, as every reader may perceive the utter falsehood of his charges. Now, who could trust those Unitarians in giving an account of documents in a dead language, when they falsify so impudently the opinions of their living opponents? Is that cause the cause of truth, which demands such a sacrifice?

And what a calumny to represent us as affecting something of an equality with God! “*The subjects not many degrees inferior to their sovereign!*” Do we ever for a moment institute a comparison between the highest possible created being and the Creator? Instead of making ourselves only a few degrees inferior to God, we hold that the highest elevation that we can

attain, cannot entitle us to a comparison with God in the least degree. Even the human nature of Christ makes no approach to Godhead. When with Christ we shall reign over all worlds, we shall not have made the smallest approach to Godhead, though all creation shall be under us. To institute a comparison between God and the highest created being is insanity. Away, then, with the blasphemy imputed to us by our calumniator.

Where has our accuser found that we have represented ourselves as capable of taking measure of the power and dignity of God? Have we pretended to be qualified to circumscribe the exercise of the Divine will? In accounting for such extravagance of calumny, I have sometimes asked myself, Is the writer deranged? It would be a relief to the feelings of humanity to find such an excuse for him.

Who are they who have taught that they are authorized to decide on the propriety or the impropriety—the extent and the frequency—the policy or the necessity of God's interference in their concerns? Is it not indecent, and even blasphemous, to speak of policy with respect to God? Of all God's ways, we pretend to know nothing, but as God reveals his will. In asserting that “not a line has Paul written in that chapter that is not immediately from the Holy Ghost,” have I founded on the supposition that I have been admitted to the Divine council-chamber? Have I not rested my assertion on the declaration of God, 2 Tim iii. 16? Have I any appearance of speaking as a prophet, or as a presumptive messenger of God? Have I done any thing but urge *the import of Scripture language*? I expound Scripture: I do not utter oracles. Shall I be blamed, then, if I laugh to scorn the philosophical pretensions of this learned lawyer, expose his imbecility, and trample his puerilities in the dust?

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**LETTERS**  
TO THE  
AUTHOR OF AN ARTICLE  
IN THE  
**EDINBURGH REVIEW,**  
ON  
“**EVANGELICAL PREACHING,**”

IN WHICH  
THE PRINCIPLES OF THAT WRITER ARE SHEWN TO BE IN DIRECT CON-  
TRADICTION TO THE WORD OF GOD, AND THE DOCTRINES  
OF SCRIPTURE ARE STATED AND DEFENDED.

By **ALEXANDER CARSON, A.M.**  
OF TUBBERMORE, COUNTY DERRY.

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## P R E F A C E.

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AT first sight, nothing appears more astonishing than that so many different and opposite doctrines should be taken out of the Scriptures. Can it be possible that in a revelation from God, with respect to the most momentous of all questions—the way of salvation—there should be just ground for all the innumerable variety of plans that have professedly been deduced from it? Are the Scriptures, like the heathen oracles, designed to be capable of different and opposite interpretations? If they are intelligible, why do not all men understand them in the same sense? Is it not the highest interest of every man to know the plan that God has appointed for sinners to escape the wrath to come? What then is the cause of this wonderful difference among those to whom this revelation is addressed? We have the answer to this question in the denunciation of God by Ezekiel against the false prophets. “Son of man, prophesy against the prophets of Israel that prophesy, and say thou unto them that prophesy *out of their own hearts*, Hear ye the word of the Lord; Thus saith the Lord God, Woe unto the foolish prophets, that follow *their own spirit*, and have seen nothing!” Here the reason of the error of the false prophets, is, that “they prophesied out of their own hearts,” and “followed their own spirit,” instead of submitting to the predictions that God had delivered by the true prophets. Had not Jeremiah, for the space of forty years, in the most precise manner, and with a variety of emblems, declared to the people of Israel, that their city should be destroyed, and themselves carried into capti-

vity to Babylon? Why then was not this believed? Why did they not return from their idolatry, as the only means by which they could escape this dreadful catastrophe? Was it not the true interest of both people and prophets to understand the mind of God on this subject? Was not error in this matter the greatest evil? Yet neither prophets nor people believed God. On the contrary, the prophets predicted peace, and encouraged the people to hope that the city and temple should not be destroyed, and that they themselves should not be carried to Babylon. The false prophets prophesied out of their own hearts. They predicted not what God had declared on this subject, but what was agreeable to their own wishes. Instead of following the spirit of the Lord, they followed their own spirits, and declared visions, when in reality they had seen nothing.

In these false teachers of Israel, we have a picture of all false teachers in every age. Their doctrines are not taken from the Scriptures, but from their own hearts. They follow their own spirit, instead of searching for the mind of the Spirit of the Lord in his word. They proclaim their dogmas as the truths of revelation, when in revelation they have found no such thing. They have seen nothing; yet they utter their own sentiments as the dictates of the Holy Spirit. This strikingly applies to the Author of the Article in the "EDINBURGH REVIEW," which is the subject of the following Strictures. His doctrines are not founded in Scripture; they are in direct opposition to Scripture; yet he pretends that they have their foundation in the Word of God. He "speaks out of his own heart," and "follows his own spirit," yet he ushers in his errors with a "Thus saith the Lord."

To the last moment, the false prophets of Israel continued to deceive the people, by assurances that the predictions which denounced evil, should not be accomplished. Thus they surrounded the city with a wall, that on the outside appeared to the people sufficient, but which was incapable of withstanding assault. "Because, even because they have seduced my people, saying, Peace, and there was no peace; and one built up a wall, and, lo, others daubed it with untempered mortar:



Say unto them which daub it with untempered mortar, that it shall fall: there shall be an overflowing shower; and ye, O great hailstones, shall fall; and a stormy wind shall rend it. Lo, when the wall is fallen, shall it not be said unto you, Where is the daubing wherewith ye have daubed it? Therefore thus saith the Lord God, I will even rend it with a stormy wind in my fury; and there shall be an overflowing shower in mine anger, and great hailstones in my fury, to consume it. So will I break down the wall that ye have daubed with untempered mortar, and bring it down to the ground, so that the foundation thereof shall be discovered, and it shall fall, and ye shall be consumed in the midst thereof; and ye shall know that I am the Lord. Thus will I accomplish my wrath upon the wall, and upon them that have daubed it with untempered mortar; and will say unto you, The wall is no more, neither they that daubed it; to wit, the prophets of Israel, which prophesy concerning Jerusalem, and which see visions of peace for her, and there is no peace, saith the Lord God.”—Ezek. xiii. 10—16.

Here we see that these false prophets deceived the people with the cry of peace, and assured them that the city should not be taken. Yet destruction was at their very door. So shall it be with every refuge of lies invented by false teachers, in order to deliver sinners from the wrath to come. They may build up a wall for defence, and cover it over with untempered mortar, which may give it an appearance of strength, but it will fall when the storm of the Divine fury assails it. Instead of saving the inhabitants of the city, it will crush them under its ruins.

The same disposition that originated the false refuges of the prophets and people of Israel, models the doctrines of the Scriptures in every age. The Scriptures give an account of man, that is not at all agreeable to himself, and therefore false teachers employ all their subtlety, to alter or modify that account. The Scriptures represent men, by nature, as the children of wrath,—as totally corrupted and ruined: false teachers, speaking “out of their own hearts,” and “following their own spirit,” force the Scriptures either to retract or qualify their

assertions. The Scriptures assure us, that without a spiritual birth, men cannot enter into the kingdom of God: this doctrine is not agreeable to the human mind, and therefore it continues to represent this spiritual birth as nothing but a change from heathenism, to a profession of Christianity; or, if the language of Scripture is refractory, and will not yield to this torture, still man must have the glory of *choosing* whether the Spirit of God shall bring him to life. The Scriptures assure us, that men are not justified by works, either in whole or in part; but that they are justified freely by faith in the Lord Jesus, who gave himself to redeem his people from their sins: yet false teachers, "speaking out of their own hearts," evade the clearest, and strongest, and fullest declarations to this purpose, and assure men, that their works must have some share in their acceptance. If all other expedients fail, faith itself is turned into a work; salvation is supposed to be by faith, because of the excellence of faith as a moral quality. There is not one declaration of Scripture that has not been set aside by this pernicious principle. On every subject, the Scriptures are obliged to speak, not what God has given them in charge, but what the wisdom of this world thinks most suitable to be spoken. In interpreting the Scriptures, false teachers "speak out of their own hearts,"—"follow their own spirit, and have seen nothing." Their object is not to ascertain with precision what God has spoken, but to make God speak what is agreeable to their own system.

The Lord calls the prophets of Israel, *foolish prophets*. No doubt they were at the head of the wise men of this world, and had the greatest influence in their country. They might look down with insolent contempt on the "silly creatures that saw their lost and perishing condition by nature;" they might value themselves on account of their superior attainments; but in the estimation of Jehovah, they were fools. And were they not fools in the highest sense of the word? Was it not the most consummate folly to hope to evade the divine judgments, by denying them? A short time discovered their folly; and the ruin of Jerusalem, with the

captivity of the people, proved them to be prophets of lies. And are they wise, who attempt to banish the evangelical doctrines from the Bible? Will not God, though he be long silent, at length arise to speak on this subject? The storm will at last fall down upon this crazy wall, and crush the false teachers under their own works. Let modern false teachers read their doom in God's denunciations against the prophets of Israel. "They have seen vanity and lying divination, saying, The Lord saith; and the Lord hath not sent them: and they have made others to hope that they would confirm the word. Have ye not seen a vain vision, and have ye not spoken a lying divination, whereas ye say, The Lord saith it; albeit I have not spoken? Therefore thus saith the Lord God, Because ye have spoken vanity, and seen lies, therefore, behold, I am against you, saith the Lord God. And mine hand shall be upon the prophets that see vanity, and that divine lies; they shall not be in the assembly of my people, neither shall they be written in the writing of the house of Israel, neither shall they enter into the land of Israel; and ye shall know that I am the Lord God."—Ezek. xiii. 6—9.

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State to the President, dated 18th March 1847. It contains a report on the progress of the negotiations for the purchase of the Texas territory. The letter is followed by a copy of the President's reply, dated 22nd March 1847. The document then contains a copy of the treaty between the United States and Mexico, signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo on 2nd February 1848. The treaty is followed by a copy of the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate, dated 23rd March 1848. The document concludes with a copy of the ratification of the treaty by the Mexican government, dated 27th March 1848.

TO THE  
AUTHOR OF AN ARTICLE  
IN THE  
EDINBURGH REVIEW,  
ON  
EVANGELICAL PREACHING.

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LETTER I.

SIR,

IN your *Strictures on Evangelical Preaching*, you commence by observing, that “Persons who appropriate to themselves, as *par excellence*, a title which others claim an equal right to enjoy, or profess a similar desire to merit, must expect their pretensions to be subjected to a somewhat rigid scrutiny; nor are they ever entitled to complain, if they incur a certain degree of obloquy and invective.” With the former part of this observation, I cordially agree; the latter I denounce as unchristian and unreasonable. Let the pretensions of every doctrine be examined with a scrutiny, rigid in proportion to its importance. As the point referred to is the most momentous that can occupy the attention of the human mind; as the system called Evangelical, denounces every opposite system, as being eternally ruinous to the souls of men, let it be tried with the utmost severity, by the only test of truth—the Word of God. But to assert that the speaking of a certain set of doctrines as Evangelical, while others opposed to them claim the same title, justly incurs any degree of obloquy and invective, is as disgraceful to a philosopher, as it is unworthy of a Christian. Two systems opposed to each other, cannot both be the gospel; and shall he be reproached, who calls that system *evangelical*, which he perceives to accord with the Scriptures? Even if he is wrong, he is not worthy of *obloquy and invective*. If

he uses false reasoning, let him be exposed ; if he employs quibbles or disingenuous resources, let him be lashed with the utmost severity ; but if he is honest in the declaration of his sentiments, let him not be reproached, because he assumes that two opposite systems cannot both be the gospel. Must a noble lord decline his title, and share his estate with a pretender, till the matter is determined by the judge ? If, relying on his own exclusive right, he treats all other claimants as mere pretenders, is he worthy of *obloquy and invective* ? You glory in morality, and blame the Evangelical Preachers for not sufficiently enforcing it ; but your own morality is most immoral.

The manner of speaking which you reprobate is exemplified and justified by the Apostle Paul. He speaks of *his gospel*, which insinuates, that there would be other doctrines claiming the title of the Gospel of Christ : he speaks of *another gospel*, and declares that it is not truly a gospel—"which is not another," importing that every doctrine different from what he preached, whatever may be its pretensions, is not the gospel that saves sinners. In designating one system of doctrines as evangelical, in denying this designation to every other system, what more is done than the Apostle has done in the beginning of his Epistle to the Galatians ? Instead of admitting that different systems have an equal claim to be designated the gospel, he declares that the perversion of the gospel is ruinous. "There be some," says he, "that trouble you, and would pervert the gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. As we said before, so say I now again, if any man preach any other gospel unto you than that which ye have received, let him be accursed." This is a hard saying, who can bear it !

You speak of other designations as being equally unjustly assumed as exclusively belonging to this obnoxious party ; "such as saints, people of God, and the like." This you represent as "disparaging to the rest of the Christian world." By this you seem to admit that these titles exclusively belong to what you call the Christian world. Now, is not this disparaging to what I suppose you would call virtuous heathens, and to all who do not profess Christianity ? Why do you adopt titles which cannot include these persons ? The titles referred to do not justly belong to all who call themselves Christians, more than they do to heathens, or Mahomedans. Let them be given to those on whom the Holy Spirit conferred them. Let persons who have the holiness of the truth be called saints. Shall persons who are not only unholy, but who ridicule holiness, be called *saints*, or

holy persons, as a designation? Most of those who call themselves *Christians* would think it a disparagement to be called *saints*. These evangelicals, it seems, “evince considerable aptitude in discovering that they are objects of persecution, and in availing themselves of whatever presumption is thence to be drawn of the genuineness of their pretensions; not seeming to recollect, that though the people of God are taught to expect persecutions, all persecuted people, or all who conceive themselves persecuted, are not necessarily people of God.” Certainly it requires in any person very great sagacity to discover when he is persecuted! It is a most mystical subject. Are we then reduced to such a situation, that we should not confidently say that we are persecuted, when, on account of our doctrines, we are hated and ill treated? But we are admonished that all persecuted people are not necessarily people of God. We need not the admonition. We believe that a man may suffer for his evil conduct, as well as for the truth. Persecution is indeed not a test of truth; yet it is of great importance for the Christian to know, that it will always be the lot of genuine Christianity, as far as its enemies have the power. “Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness sake,” says Christ, “for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake. Rejoice and be exceeding glad; for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you.” If we have not the truth of Christ, and if the evil speaking is not false, we claim no share in the blessing.

“We would advise the persons of whom we speak,” you say, “well to consider whether the hostility of which they complain, or rather of which they boast, is not the natural return for those terms of contempt and reprobation which they are in the habit of so freely bestowing on all beyond their own *clique*; and (since we are not aware that in this age or country religion is ever visited with obloquy; as such) whether it is by the maintenance of religious truth, or religious duty that reproach is incurred, and not rather by dogmatical absurdities, or superstitious observances.” Very kind advice. On this extract, it is quite sufficient to observe, that the system designated Evangelical, is hated; and that its professors are exposed to persecution, let their lives be ever so blameless. The grossest dogmatical absurdities and superstitious observances are not so much the object of the displeasure of the world, as the unadulterated gospel of God. The persons to whom you allude, speak not of others with contempt; but they faithfully declare the testimony of God with re-

spect to the character and prospects of all unbelievers. The condemnation of the enemies of the gospel is not gratifying to their feelings, but is a deep and constant source of sorrow. Every real Christian will have feelings in unison with those of the Apostle, when he so earnestly and affectionately declares,—“ I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart, for I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ, for my bretheren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.” When in the further examination of your views, I shall tell you that you have a gospel different from that of Paul—a gospel that cannot save sinners—I will do so in the spirit, not of hostility, but of love. I disclaim having any thing to glory in more than the guiltiest of mankind. Had it not been for the sovereign power of God, I might have been opposing the gospel as well as you. In the same sovereignty, you may yet repent to the acknowledgement of the truth.

There is a statement in this extract, which appears inconsistent with a former admission. You tell us, in a parenthesis, that “ you are not aware that in this age or country, religion is ever visited with obloquy *as such*.” I presume, you mean, religion *as such*. You had previously admitted that “ the people of God are taught to expect persecution.” Now, whence do these persecutions come? If in this age and country, the gospel of Paul is not an object of obloquy, how can Christians be taught to expect persecutions? Is it in heaven that they are to be persecuted? Your thoughts, Sir, are very crude. You have the cloak and staff of the philosopher, but you want his soul.

You give us a number of characteristics belonging to this system, as presumptions of unsoundness and delusion. It is “ *the fashion*.” If you mean that it is generally adopted by the people of *fashion*, nothing can be more untrue. If you mean that it has of late been very generally received, this is no presumption of unsoundness and delusion. The knowledge of the Lord shall fill the earth as the waters cover the sea. Will this be a presumption of delusion? Your observation seems to be an admission, that Evangelical religion is on the increase. This is good news.

It is with you another suspicious thing, “ when a peculiar set of views are seen to arrive at a sudden and violent growth.” Do you forget the first progress of the gospel? You seem, however, to guard against this, by adding, “ a set of views, not for the first time promulgated.” But the fact that the progress of the gospel depends on God’s *sovereign power*, strangles this sophistry. Were a nation born



to God in a day, there would be no presumption of unsoundness or delusion.

But this system has the misfortune, it seems, "not to profess to be the result of recent improvements in Scriptural criticism, or in Natural Theology, or Ethics." It would indeed be a presumption of unsoundness in any system, to profess to be the result of recent discovery in Scriptural criticism. The true system of doctrine, whatever it may be, must be contained in the most defective translation of the Scriptures, if it is honest. The discoveries of sound criticism will corroborate it, and crush the pretensions of its adversaries. What an absurdity, to speak of a system as owing its origin to improved criticism! I say this on the admission that the improvements in Scripture criticism, are fully equal to the boasts of a certain set of Theologians. This, however, I do not admit. I believe that an extensive acquaintance with the writings in the languages of the Scriptures, guided by a sound understanding, would make a better translation than any of those modern ones, that are made on the principles of boasted Scripture canons. Many real improvements of our translation, in particular passages, have undoubtedly been made. But by far a greater number of pretended improvements are gross corruptions, not founded on an interpretation according to the principles of language. Besides, it is in small matters they amend; in matters of the highest importance they pervert and corrupt. It is still a greater absurdity to speak of a system of the doctrine of Scripture, as the result of Natural Theology, or Ethics. Natural Theology, or Ethics, might, without absurdity, profess to overturn the Scriptures; but without the grossest absurdity, it cannot profess to interpret the language of Scripture. This, let the result be what it may, must be done on the principles of language itself.

"Their doctrines," you say, "derive their birth from a period when comparatively little light was sought or claimed from these sources." These doctrines, Sir, derive their birth from the Bible, and needed not the aid of criticism to bring them out. They are the obvious testimony of the Word of God, to all who are acquainted with the language in which they are written; and no honest translation can entirely exclude them. On every branch of our system, we dare the learning of our antagonists, and defy criticism to bring our colours from the mast. Every advance in sound criticism, will add to the evidence of the evangelical doctrines, and take away the foundation of their competitors.

Another presumption of unsoundness and delusion in these doctrines, you profess to find in the fact, that "during a long space, dis-

tinguished by some of the most illustrious names in divinity ever known in the world, they had become all but exploded." How long was truth exploded during the dark ages of Popery? How many of the best scholars and metaphysicians have been involved in the darkness of that system? The Scriptures provide an answer, "Not many wise."—"I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight." "For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved, it is the power of God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?"

Another symptom of unsoundness and delusion in these doctrines, you make to consist in the supposed fact, that "in their present spread, they have made their progress not downwards from the enlightened and reflecting, but upwards." Let this be a fact, and it is quite in unison with the Word of God. It manifests, that it is not by human wisdom, and power, and influence, but from the working of God, that the truth prevails. The gospel, at first, came not from Jewish doctors, or Gentile philosophers, but from the Fishermen of Gallilee; and it made its progress also at first among the poor.

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## LETTER II.

SIR,

IN announcing your plan, you tell us, that "it is not your purpose at present to test the peculiar doctrines of the Evangelical School, by their uniformity either with Scripture, or with particular ethical theories." To what tribunal, but that of Scripture, should their doctrines be brought, if the purpose is to know whether they are Scriptural? An infidel may consistently try them by another standard; but to all who profess that the Scriptures are the Word of God, the test of all doctrines claiming a foundation in Scripture, must be their conformity with Scripture. The abstract truth or falseness of those doctrines is not the question; but whether they are doctrines of Scripture. If they are found to be doctrines of Scripture, they must be received as truth by all who receive the Scrip-

tures. Were the Scriptures found to contain any doctrine self-evidently false, the conclusion would be, that the Scriptures are false, not that they do not contain such doctrines. You act like a lawyer, who, in ascertaining the meaning of a will, proceeds independently of the will.—“ My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I do not mean to inquire whether the claimant before you is named as heir in the will—I will content myself by shewing that he is a very unworthy man, and that many others have a better right to the inheritance.” Opposite counsel, smiling contemptuously, replies, “ My Lord, the merits of the different claimants is not the question; I have found that this is the true last-will and testament of a man in a sound state of mind, and one who had a full right to dispose of his property. My client is expressly named as his heir.” It is strange that in religion, even the devotees of science and reason lose common sense. I object to your plan, Sir, as unphilosophical and absurd, Can it be ascertained whether certain doctrines are evangelical, by any other test than the Scriptures? If you say that the doctrines referred to are self-evidently false, renounce the Scriptures, and fight us as an infidel.

You speak of Ethical theories as a test of those doctrines, though you decline at present to employ it. Here again you do not act as a philosopher, more than as a Christian. Can any ethical theory prove that such doctrines are not in Scripture? Even allowing that Ethical theories have a right to be an umpire with respect to all religious doctrines, still, in ascertaining what is contained in Scripture, we must employ solely the principles of the interpretation of language. But Ethical theories, instead of being admitted to the high honour of deciding what is truth, are worthy of no more respect than a madman's dreams. They are not self-evident, and therefore can be of no avail against a revelation attested by sufficient evidence. In your views, Sir, I can perceive neither Scripture nor reason. The Neological principle, which accommodates the meaning of Scripture to philosophical views, is as absurd as it is wicked.

The doctrine of *human depravity* is the first thing in the system of your opponents, which you assail. You admit the thing in some sense, but charge the evangelical views on this point, as extravagant. “ The evangelical divines,” you say, “ insist, that every thing whatever that man does, (at least in his natural state) is evil, and altogether evil; that he not only never seeks to do good, but that he is continually and wholly intent upon wickedness; that his every thought, and every act is wickedness, and only wickedness.” Without correcting the exaggeration of this phraseology, I merely observe,

that the evangelical doctrine, is not that every thing done by a sinful man is in its own nature sinful; but that as the action of the sinner it is sinful. The thing itself may be duty. "Now, if these assertions," you say, "were mere figures of speech, we should not quarrel with them." Then I would differ from you here also. There could be no such figures of speech; and persons who, in the interpretation of Scripture, explain away the meaning of the Word of God, on the principle of figures of speech, shew that they are as ignorant of the nature of figurative language, as of the doctrines of the Bible. "But if they are literally meant," you say, "nothing else can possibly be said of them; but that they are utterly nonsensical." Here again I differ from you. Even if these doctrines are false, they are not nonsensical. Do you not know, Sir, that a thing may be untrue, without being nonsense? "Surely," you continue, "some, at least, of the thoughts and motives of men are directed to procure food, and clothes for themselves, and their children. Is there wickedness in this?" Here, Sir, you think you are strong; but it is ignorance of the doctrine of your opponents that gives you this confidence. To provide food and raiment, your opponents do not account sinful, but even those things as done by the sinner are sinful. Do not the Scriptures say, that the plowing of the wicked is sin? Plowing is a duty in itself, yet it is sinful as the action of the sinner. "Sometimes we are told," you say, "that every action is sinful that does not proceed exclusively from a regard to the Divine commands." It is not necessary that regard to the Divine commands should be the *exclusive* principle. The Scriptures address our hopes and fears, &c. but surely a regard to the command of God is necessary to obedience. This is self-evident.

"Again," you say, "we are told that we are blind to sin, until our eyes are opened by the Holy Spirit." Your opponents do not mean that men, in a state of nature, do not discern any thing to be sinful, but that they have not a sufficient view of the guilt of sin. You say, "If sin is not known to be sin, it is for that very reason (as a subject of responsibility at least) not sin." Why then were there so many offerings for the sin of ignorance under the Old Testament? Are you a better judge of sin than God? When God speaks, let men be silent, and receive his testimony with the most cheerful submission. What an arrogant creature is man? Who is he that dares to question what is taught by the Almighty? Was Paul innocent in persecuting the Christians? Yet he did it with a good conscience, "I verily thought," says he, "with myself, that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." He counted him-

self the chief of sinners, on account of this conduct, yet he declares that he did it ignorantly. What regard is to be had to your speculations about sin, when the Word of God speaks so expressly to the contrary? It was wise in you not to attempt to test the doctrine of your adversaries by the Scriptures.

In a note, you observe, "In the declarations made with such peculiar zest and complacency by the evangelical party, on the depravity of human nature, we are apt to view them as merely indulging in feelings of deep humility, until it is recollected, that, of this depravity, they themselves (at least by their own account) have ceased to be partakers. The depravity, then, which they so ingenuously confess, is the depravity of all mankind except themselves." I suppose, Sir, you thought this very witty, as well as very severe. But it is sheer colouring. The evangelical party confess not only that they are involved in the universal guilt of human nature, but that even after they are born again, there is still a law in their members that warreth against the law of their mind. Each of them confesses with Paul, "In me, that is in my flesh, there dwelleth no good thing." You must be totally ignorant of the principles of those whom you oppose, else you would not speak thus. The sentiment which you here reprobate, is altogether *unevangelical*.

You speak with great contempt of "the silly creature impressed with the necessity of seeing his 'lost and perishing state by nature.'" But on whom does your ridicule fall? On God himself, who attests the fact as to the lost and perishing condition of all men by nature. "And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins; wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of this world; according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience: among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others. . . But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ; (by grace ye are saved.)" Who are you, Sir, that you will reply against God? With respect to the universal guilt of human nature, I will lay before you one statement of the Word of God, which, if you do not believe, neither would you believe if one should rise from the dead. "What then? are we better than they? No, in no wise: for we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin. As it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one: there is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all

gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable ; there is none that doeth good, no, not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre : with their tongues they have used deceit : the poison of asps is under their lips : whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness : their feet are swift to shed blood : destruction and misery are in their ways ; and the way of peace have they not known : there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we know, that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law ; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight : for by the law is the knowledge of sin." - I am well aware of the profane attempts of false criticism to give a turn to this passage, that will limit its application. But they are utterly vain, forced, and even childish. This passage answers all the questions which you put to your opponents. Whatever consequence you may dare to draw from it, this divine description of human nature makes all men "by nature the children of wrath."

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### LETTER III.

SIR,

You are next led to the subject of regeneration, and you ask :—"Is there any Christian preacher who fails to inculcate the necessity of repentance, and amendment, in every respect in which a man's life has not been in conformity with the Divine law, as that without which there can be no salvation—any preacher who holds out the hope of salvation to the man who wilfully continues in the practice of any sin, or the neglect of any duty—to the man who does not, in short, make the Law of God the paramount rule of his life? We do not think that any preacher requires *less* than this, as entitling any man to nourish the hope of salvation—we do not know that evangelical preachers can possibly require any thing more." This, Sir, is not a mode of reasoning that I should expect in a work that pretends to dictate to the philosophical world. You meet your antagonist on his view of regeneration ; and you answer him by discussing its effects. Even were there an entire agreement between you and your opponents, on the points mentioned by you, still the subject of regeneration remains to be discussed. You tell us in a note, that you "do not here enter into the question, whether *regene-*

*ration—conversion—being born again*, even bears at all in Scripture, the evangelical meaning.” But this is the very thing that must be first determined. Not one step can be advanced till this is settled. If you find fault with the doctrine of your opponents, on the subject of regeneration, you must state your view of the subject, and shew in what respects their doctrine is erroneous.

“In insisting, then,” you say, “on the necessity of regeneration as an *effect*, there is no ground for the exclusive pretensions of the latter.” What do you mean by regeneration as an *effect*? If your conclusion has any connexion with the observations on which it pretends to be founded, you must mean the effects of regeneration. But if this is your mind, you have very unhappily expressed it: for regeneration as an *effect*, and *the effects of regeneration*, are very different things.

Having so easily disposed of your antagonist, on the subject of regeneration itself, you then examine him as to the *manner* of regeneration. “Now,” you say, “the impression which evangelical preachers constantly convey on this head, is to the effect, that every man must, at a particular assignable period of his life, have made a *change altogether* different, in kind, and degree, from any step in moral or spiritual improvement made either before or after; a change so great, that the part of his life immediately preceding it, as compared with that which immediately succeeds it, may, in the most literal and proper terms, be denominated a state of utter and desperate wickedness, recklessness, and blindness,” &c. Here, again, I perceive imbecility, and confusion. Instead of speaking of the *manner* of regeneration, which you propose, you speak solely of its nature, and the time of its taking place. After this, Sir, what title have you to look with contempt on the most silly of “the silly creatures who are impressed with the necessity of seeing their lost and perishing state by nature?” The most fanatical ranter could not leave his subject more completely than you have done.

As to the manner of regeneration, your opponents say nothing, for they are taught of their Lord, that this is inexplicable.—“The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit.” As to the thing itself, it is a new spiritual life, as much the effect of God’s immediate power, as is the life of the embryo in the womb of the parent. No man can serve God acceptably, without this new birth. Even Nicodemus; though he was a teacher in Israel, is taught that he must be born again: “Verily, Verily, I say unto thee,” says Christ to Nicode-

mus, "except a man be born again, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God." Believers are said to have been naturally dead in sin, and to be *quicken*ed, or made alive by God. "And you hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins." The effect of Divine power was not more real in raising Lazarus from the grave, than it is in giving spiritual life to every child of God. This cannot be expressed more strongly in human language, than it is in that of the Spirit of God. From this we will not recede a hair's breadth. We dare not modify the testimony of the Spirit of truth. If all the saints and angels in heaven, in concert with all the Christians on earth, were to attempt to produce this spiritual life in any individual, without the aid of the Spirit of God, they would utterly fail in the accomplishment. Even the word of the Saviour himself, when not accompanied with his Spirit, did not produce this life and light. "Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." So then, Sir, we are not afraid to state this truth, in terms even stronger than yours.

When you assert, however, that your opponents teach that the time of the communication of this new life is always *assignable*, you misrepresent them. That some persons may speak in this way, I admit; but it is not the doctrine of the evangelical system; and, as a matter of fact, I do not know an individual of them, of any denomination, who holds this. The new life may have been communicated so early, or so imperceptibly, that the moment of its commencement may not be ascertainable. The great matter with every individual is, not to be able to ascertain when he was made alive unto God, but that he is now actually alive.

You come next to treat of the *agency* in regeneration. "On this head," you say, "we have never known any Christian preacher who did not assiduously seek to impress his hearers with a sense of the deep and arduous nature of the Christian course, and of the difficulties, and dangers, and temptations, with which it is beset, carefully calling their attention, at the same time, to the promise of Divine assistance, which Scripture affords, and earnestly urging them to seek that assistance, as that which could alone enlighten, and strengthen, and purify them." Here, again, you leave your subject. You profess to treat of the *agency* in regeneration, and you speak of the arduous nature of the Christian course. Instead of speaking of the agency of God in producing new life, you speak of that agency in supporting this new life.

"All this, however," you say, "will not satisfy evangelical



preachers : for they never cease maintaining that man can do *nothing* for himself, and that regeneration is *altogether and entirely* the work of the Spirit. Every case in which a person contracts religious impressions, or enters upon a religious course of life, is spoken of as a plain evidence of Divine interposition, as shewing “the power of God.” In the strongest terms that language can afford, we ascribe this new life entirely to God. But we do not teach that every case, in which a person contracts religious impressions, or enters upon a religious course of life, is an evidence of Divine interposition. There is much religion in the world, and many religious impressions, which are not of God.

“Such expressions as these,” you say, “obviously mean that when one man has come into a state of salvation, another has not; this is not by the first person doing something which the other failed of doing, but by a supernatural intervention being made in behalf of the former, which was not made in behalf of the latter;—in other words, that a man’s salvation has not been made to depend upon himself—has not been put into his own power.” This is the doctrine of your opponents. This is the doctrine of the Word of God. “As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God. God forbid! For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So, then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” Here, Sir, is a statement as strong as it is possible for language to express. Is this less offensive to you than the language of those who receive it as the declaration of God? The apostle proceeds to a still more offensive doctrine. “For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? for who hath resisted his will?” Mark, Sir, the only answer that the apostle deigns to give to such objections as yours.—“Nay, but, oh man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?” This will for ever answer all the quibbling sophistry of those who attempt to hold the Scriptures, and deny the evangelical doctrines. I know that the whole ingenuity of man has been employed to give a turn

to this phraseology that may put it aside from its object. But till heaven and earth pass away, the attempt will be fruitless. The sagacity of Satan could not pervert these words with plausibility.

But if this is the meaning of your opponent, you ask what is the object of the hortatory parts of evangelical discourses? It is a sufficient reply to this, that the same God who testifies of man's inability, has commanded that all men should be called to believe the Gospel. We are not bound to satisfy any man who professes faith in the Scriptures, as to the manner of the consistency of these things. If we prove that they are both from God, they must be consistent, though we should not be able to prove their consistency. Calls to faith and repentance, are the means by which God brings his people to the knowledge of himself—means, however, that will never be successful but through his own infinite power.

You ask, "What kind of sense is this, to urge a man to do something, and tell him in the same breath he can do nothing?" Do not the Scriptures call on all men to believe? Do they not say that faith is the gift of God? I will exemplify to you, from the conduct of Jesus himself, the consistency of this apparent inconsistency. "Jesus said to the man with the withered hand; Stretch forth thine hand." Was the man able to stretch forth his hand? was he able to move it, more than he was able to move the mountains, or bring down the sun from the firmament? Yet he stretched forth his hand in a moment; with the command, Jesus communicated the power to obey. So with the calls to faith; men are dead in sin, but God gives life, and faith, through his Word, by his Spirit. Had the man with the withered arm adopted your plan, he would have petulantly replied to Jesus, "why do you mock? why do you call on me to do, what you know I am not able to do?" This might have been very clever; but it would have ruined both body and soul. Had you been at the tomb of Lazarus when Christ raised him from the dead, you would have had a very appropriate subject for your ridicule; and, doubtless, you would have been very witty. *Lazarus come forth*, said the Saviour, with a loud voice. "*Lazarus come forth*," cries the mocker, "you might as well call upon the rocks to live. Have you not been told that the man is four days in the grave? Why do you call upon a dead man to live?" Yet the Word of the Lord was not in vain. Jesus spoke the world into existence, and by the power of the same word, Lazarus heard, and lived, and came forth. In these facts, Sir, we will for ever have an answer to all the quibbles of sophistry, with respect to calling on dead sinners to believe.

“But, say the evangelical preachers,” you observe, “we do not recognise man’s own power to do what we urge; and our persuasions, or threats, are merely the means by which the influence of the Holy Spirit is to be conveyed to him. Well; but how do these things operate? Is their use commanded, without any reference to their adaptation to the end?” We are not bound to shew how these means operate. It is sufficient, that he, who can effect the end, has commanded the means. There is, *no* doubt, an adaptation to the end, in all the means appointed by God; but the means have no fitness to do the thing without God’s immediate power. Was it the virtue of the word, or the power of the speaker, that produced creation? “Can they operate otherwise,” you say, “than through man’s sense of being able to make a choice—able to make some effort or exertion?”—They do not operate through any such conviction.—In faith this is never thought of.—Was the man with the withered hand restored to soundness, by a consciousness of being able to make some effort? Was Lazarus brought to life, by a conviction that he had the power to make a choice of continuing in death, or of coming to life? Your metaphysics are as bad as your theology.

“Supposing the means not to succeed,” you say, “would it be admitted to be quite rational and allowable for a man to say—the Holy Spirit has not yet moved me—I must be damned in consequence, I cannot help it?” To this it is sufficient to reply, that while faith is said to be the gift of God, unbelief is declared to be not only a sin, but the greatest of all sins. We are not bound to show the consistency of the metaphysics of this question. We reply, with the apostle on the subject:—“Nay, but, Oh man, who art thou that repliest against God?” Unbelief is a man’s sin, although faith is the gift of God.

“Or, on the other hand,” you say, “supposing the means to succeed, the persuasion or threats to take effect, in that case, will the man have done nothing? Will he have remained purely passive?” Faith is the gift of God, yet, faith is the act of the human mind. You may as well ask, when a man sees with his eyes, has he done nothing?

“If it is said,” you observe, “the choice, though apparently a man’s own act, is really not his own, but the work of the Spirit in him; we answer, it may be so: It may be that we are not the same men we were yesterday; that our recollection of the past, and our perceptions of the present, are altogether fallacious; but this, we shall say, that if there be any one thing that we are sure of, it is, that our volitions, or acts of choice, are our own, and not those of

another being, and that we are wholly responsible for them." No doubt, Sir, you think you are very strong here. You think you have entrenched yourself behind self-evident truth. But your confidence arises solely from your want of discrimination, and your ignorance of the doctrine of your adversaries. They do not say that a man's choice and volitions are not his own, and that they are the choice and volitions of another being. But they say, that a man will not choose or will what is good, without the Spirit of God enabling him. They do not call our volitions God's volitions: they teach that God enables us to will. In all such quibbling, it is sufficient to reply with an apostle, "It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Can any thing more expressly declare that we are not able to will good more than to do good of ourselves? "If we are conscious of the power of choice," you say, "the Spirit acts, or does not act, just as we choose to act in this or that way; so that, still, our situation, in every practical meaning, would rest with ourselves." Does not this say, that the dead man is continued in death, or brought to life, just as he may choose life or death? But the Word of God meets all such objections. The passage already quoted, assures us that God worketh in us both to will and to do, not according as we perversely choose, but according to his own *good pleasure*. Another apostle assures us, "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth." *Of his own will*—not of *our own choice*. Believers "are born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." In every respect, then, this new birth is of God. Indeed, it is absurd and ridiculous to speak of a birth, in which the person born in any respect co-operates. You speak of absurdity in the system of your opponents, but your own system is palpably absurd. It makes the child its own parent.

"If a man can do nothing to save himself," you say, "he is damned for not doing what he cannot do. Is this consistent with the divine justice?" Is not this the very objection anticipated by the Apostle Paul, and which he answers, not by shewing the metaphysics of the question, but merely by denying the consequence? "What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid." The depths of the divine councils are not to be fathomed by us. What he asserts must be true, and, at the same time, however unaccountable it may appear to us, it is perfectly just. God must be believed on his own authority; not on the grounds of our ability to justify him.

"To evade this consideration," you say, "we shall be presented with fine spun distinctions, between a natural, and a moral inability."

This distinction I believe to be sound and satisfactory. Yet there is no necessity to employ it in order to repel such conclusions as yours. It is quite enough that God testifies both that men by nature are dead in sin, and that they are guilty on account of unbelief. Both must be true, in whatever way they may be consistent. The obvious ground of harmony is, that different kinds of inability are spoken of. But, independently of understanding this, both truths must be received on the testimony of God. In replying to such men as you, I will enter into no metaphysical solution of difficulties. I will shew you that God testifies that all men are dead in sin, and that faith is the gift of God, while I will contend as strenuously as you can do, that men's sins are their own, and justly render them liable to the wrath of God. I believe God, and receive the kingdom of God as a little child.

“What,” you ask, “is the specific case of fault or error which is conceived to require such frequent and urgent assertions of this doctrine?” What other justification is necessary to bring any doctrine forward, than that God has taught it? Is it not a sufficient reason to urge it continually, that it meets us so frequently in the Word of God? Must not men be told their true state before God? Is a truth not the more earnestly to be pressed, when it is so hotly and violently assailed by men who know not the Gospel?

You ask, “Whether it is for the credit of Christianity, as a system fitted for the acceptance of a rational being—whether it is consistent with the supposition of man's being a rational being, to say, on the one hand, that revelation has not sufficient evidence to procure his belief, does not present considerations sufficient to move his conduct; or, on the other, that he is incapable of being moved by such evidence and such considerations, without a supernatural interference?” Does the credit of Christianity require it to do what it does not profess to do? What it asserts God only can do? It is, indeed, worthy of all acceptance; yet it teaches us that none will accept it without the power of God. Is it any discredit to a truth, that men are so blinded by hatred to it, that they will not receive it till God opens their hearts? But speculations on this subject are useless and vain. It is a matter of Divine testimony, and on this ground only, will I rest its defence. If I prove that this doctrine is the testimony of God, I will give your speculations to the wind. Man is a rational being, but almost every thing in his conduct is most irrational. It is not possible to defend the honour of ra-

tionality in man, even if the Scriptures had never been published.

“What,” you ask, “shall we say of the complete sacrifice of all worldly ease and pleasure, of the dreadful privations and tortures often incurred by the Hindoo, with a view to secure his welfare in a future world? Yet, we believe, supernatural interference will not be pleaded in such an instance as this?” What shall we say? This fact has no difficulty—no application to the point in hand. We say, that the Hindoo does what a man dead in sin may do. Nay, we say, that this conduct is a proof of his spiritual death. We say, also, that a man under the name of a Christian, may give his body to be burned, as well as his goods to feed the poor, without being spiritually alive. This objection shews the deepest ignorance of the subject. Does the conduct of the Hindoo please God, or show him to be in the lowest degree spiritually alive? If not, how can the example bear on the subject? This, Sir, is not reasoning, more than it is Christianity.

“Is the Christian’s belief, then,” you ask, “formed on less sure grounds? Is the conduct required of him less rational, less practical? Is the Christian himself less rational, less sensible of the wisdom of sacrificing all worldly good for the sake of his everlasting happiness?” Here you give us an example of your usual confusion of ideas. The point in hand concerns the natural man—the unbeliever—the man dead in sin. Here you pass to the Christian, as now made alive by the Spirit of God. Your questions take it for granted, that your opponents hold that there are some works in their nature so difficult, as not to be performed by men in their own strength. To disprove this, you shew us what we must admit the Hindoo does in his own strength. We crush your objection, by admitting that all this and more may be done by men spiritually dead. You take it for granted that the Hindoo makes himself spiritually alive by the works referred to. If not, it is nothing to your purpose. Is there any accuracy of thinking in this reasoning?

In a note, you observe, “If it is not alleged that, in such cases, the Divine interference is manifest to our perceptions, or that the effect is inexplicable from known motives on the human mind, the fact of such interference must be rested on the authority of Scripture. But what shall we say when these very instances, as they are termed, of Divine power, are produced as proofs of the truth of Scripture, *i. e.* the miracle first proved by Scripture, then Scripture by the miracle!” Here you think you have completely entrapped

your antagonist. You triumph over him as reasoning in a circle. But, Sir, in a moment I will shew that all the wonder of your mark of admiration ought to be directed against your own ignorance. I will deliver your opponents out of this magic circle. When I reason with a man who denies regeneration, while he admits the Scriptures to be the Word of God, I will prove regeneration solely from the Scriptures. When I reason with an infidel, I appeal, as a subordinate argument, to the undeniable fact, that by the belief of the Gospel, millions of the most abandoned characters have been charged in views and conduct in a manner which philosophy never effected—never professed. This I consider a most solid argument. But, whatever you may think of it, it is not reasoning in a circle. It is nothing akin to the process by which men prove the Scriptures by the church, and the church by the Scriptures.

“But, waiving this,” you say, “Scriptural usage in one sense, ascribes *every thing* to God, in respect that every faculty we possess is given by him, and cannot be exercised independently of him; in another more particular sense, it ascribes to him all the effects produced by the promises and threatenings contained in revelation.” This is mere assertion, and I meet it by asserting, that there is no such Scriptural usage.

“But, let them define what they mean by a saving faith,” you say, “and then tell us whether as great a devotion to religious duty in a Christian, as a Hindoo or a Mahometan sometimes exhibits, would not be a saving faith?” What an absurdity! *Devotion to religious duty* is not faith of any kind. This is the grossest abuse of language.

I overlook the philosophy of your account of the favour which evangelical doctrines enjoy among the weak and ignorant. If we can prove that these are the doctrines of Scripture, the *strong* and the *wise* will be damned if they reject them. I will not take time to expose your error in supposing, that if the influences of the Spirit are sensibly felt, they are *distinguishable* from the operations of the mind that feels them. It is in the operations of the mind that the influences of the Spirit are felt. But I cannot forbear tasting a delicious morsel of philosophy in the following quotation:—“The idea of man’s being wholly passive in the work of spiritual improvement—the mere subject of a change impressed upon him by a power external to himself—seems to be fast producing the persuasion, that if any thing can be done for salvation at all, it can only be done by the use of what are called religious ordinances.” So, then, the idea that nothing can be done, is fast producing the idea that something in a

particular way can be done! But the evangelicals are so weak and ignorant, that they cannot penetrate to the bottom of this sage philosophy.

You speak contemptuously of religious ordinances, and then endeavour to save yourself, by observing, that you are opposed merely to the disproportionate zeal for them. "Prayer-meetings abound, preachings are thronged, preachers run after; observance of the Sabbath, punctual attendance on public worship, are the most common, and treated as the most important subject of inculcation." Such language appears to undervalue the things mentioned, and not merely to censure undue importance as given to them. Though Christians ought not to substitute any ordinance for the gospel itself, yet too much zeal cannot be manifested for the Sabbath, and the ordinances of worship.

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#### LETTER IV.

SIR,

THE question of faith and works is the next subject of your discussion. "Here," you say, "we are prepared to maintain, in spite of all the efforts of evangelical preachers, to make the contrary appear, that some of their most common representations must have the effect (if they have any effect at all), of relieving men from the duties of morality, of making morality utterly useless as regards salvation, and, of course, of removing all motives to the practice of moral virtue that may be drawn from that source.—Every body knows," you continue, "that no topic is a more constant and favourite one with the evangelical preachers, than the inefficacy of *works*, as means of obtaining salvation;—nothing the object of more frequent denunciation than the placing of any dependance on our works, or the using of any attempts, or entertaining any hopes, to procure salvation in this way; nor do they ever omit to reprobate, as an error of the most fatal kind, the idea that our works can, even in part, and together with the atonement of Christ, contribute to the procuring of our salvation. Will any man who is acquainted with the meaning of language, say, that from representations of this kind, it is not the first and most natural inference, that we cannot benefit ourselves by practising moral virtue;—that we need not, therefore,



seek to practise it; that the practice of moral virtue is useless? For, if good works do not contribute to our salvation, what motive is there (founded on a regard to our salvation) for the performance of them?"

No doubt you think that your reasoning here is perfect demonstration, or rather self-evident truth. But I will prove, in a few words, that your speculations, instead of being the brightness of truth, are not only in direct opposition to Scripture, but that they manifest a want of the perspicuity of a philosopher. You do not distinguish where there is an essential difference. You say "the first and most natural inference is, that we cannot benefit ourselves by practising moral virtue." If you mean that moral virtue cannot have the smallest effect in our justification, this is not an inference from the above language. It is the direct assertion. How absurd to speak of an inference in this sense! But this is not your meaning, your inference is not sound.—Good works may be very useful in several respects, nay, they may be absolutely necessary, though they are utterly useless for justification. You must either be deficient in powers of discrimination, or you must be so blinded by hostility to the doctrine which you oppose, that you cannot coolly examine it. Has an heir no motive to love a kind father, though the estate descends to him by entail, and not by will? "We love God, because he first loved us." If we believe that when we were dead in sin Christ died for us, have we no motive to do his will? Though good works have nothing to do in our justification, yet we are told, without holiness no man shall see the Lord. Is there then no motive to holiness? We learn from Scripture, that believers, though justified entirely by faith in the blood of Christ, will be rewarded in proportion to their works. Is there, then, no motive to perform good works? But, Sir, though your speculations were so subtle as to perplex my philosophy, I would, with unabated confidence, rest all upon God's testimony. The word of Him who cannot lie, assures us that works cannot justify, and the same word assures us, that those works "are good and profitable unto men." Who is he who thus dares to reply against God? "Now, in regard to this statement," you say, "we in the first place, not merely deny that faith will produce good works; flattering the idea, or definition of a saving faith (which evangelical divines themselves furnish), but assert the very contrary." After the express declarations of God in the Scriptures, such language is truly surprising. This gives God the lie in the most audacious manner. Well, let us hear how the assertion is supported. After telling us in what the perfection of faith consists,

you ask, "will a belief that our works can in no degree or way contribute to our salvation, produce works? will it not produce, if it produce any thing at all, the very reverse?" Here, again, I discover either a want of perspicuity, or a want of honesty. You represent faith to consist in believing that works can in no degree contribute to our salvation. But this is not the faith that saves the sinner. The faith that saves us includes indeed the idea that works cannot contribute to our justification; but it consists in believing in the Lord Jesus Christ. It is possible that a man might believe that works cannot save, and yet not have the faith of the gospel. You err, then, Sir, in representing as saving faith, that which is only an idea pre-supposed in it; and which may subsist without it. Before you can prove, that instead of producing good works faith will produce the very reverse, you are obliged to misrepresent it. That faith which will produce bad works, is not the belief that we are justified by the blood of Jesus, but a faith *that believes that good works are in every respect useless*. Such a faith would, indeed, produce bad works; but such is not the faith of the gospel.

"The fact is," you say, "that the evangelical professors here unconsciously borrow a leaf out of the ordinary system. That faith will, according to its degree, produce good works, is a true proposition, where faith means a belief not merely in Christ as our Saviour, but a belief in all that Christ has told us,—one of these things being, that we shall be saved if we practise good works according to his commands, not saved otherwise." Not a leaf, not a letter, is borrowed from your system. It is true that faith in every Divine declaration will produce corresponding effects; but the faith of the Gospel itself produces good works. Can a man believe that Jesus died to save him, while he could do nothing to save himself; and shall he not love and obey him who died for him?

"But the proposition that faith will necessarily produce good works," you say, "in the evangelical idea of faith, *i. e.* faith involving the belief that our works can in no degree help to procure salvation for us, is an absurdity but just one step removed from a contradiction in terms." Instead of being a contradiction in terms, I maintain that there is not the smallest inconsistency in this doctrine. Is it a contradiction in terms to assert that a malefactor pardoned by his Majesty, may afterwards love and serve his sovereign, though his love and service cannot possibly have any influence on the pardon? You do not reason as a philosopher, more than as a Christian. "Instead of proving," you say, "that we wholly and entirely trusted in Christ, our performance of works should prove just the contrary."

So, then, if the pardoned criminal loves and serves his sovereign, he proves that he does not believe that pardon was owing to mercy, but to his own deserts! May there not be other motives for performing good works, though they should not have any share in our justification? Surely a sound mind might see this distinction.

“Surely,” you say, “the obvious and natural way of proving that we trust altogether to Christ, and not at all to our works, is not to perform these works.” Can it be a natural way to prove, that we trust altogether in Christ for our justification, and not in works, to neglect the thing that Christ has commanded? While works are not performed for justification, they are necessary for other purposes.

In a note, you observe, “This is the exact counterpart of St Paul’s reasoning, (Gal. v. 2—6.) He urges on the Jewish converts, if they will resort to circumcision, and the other rites of the ceremonial law, Christ’s sacrifice can profit them nothing; because this would indicate a want of reliance on that sacrifice. From which we draw this inference, and beg the earnest attention of evangelical divines to it—that if, in these texts where St Paul speaks of faith as the exclusive means of salvation, as opposed to works, he had spoken with a view to *moral* works, he would have prohibited these works on the same ground as he prohibited circumcision. Did St Paul prohibit moral works?” Here you think you have your opponents in a net; but I can shew you in a moment that your reasoning is sophistry, and that its apparent strength lies in a want of discrimination. I observe, in the first place, that the works excluded by Paul from having a share in salvation, are not merely ceremonial rites, but all works of the law, moral as well as ritual. “For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.” Is not this the whole law, moral as well as ceremonial? “But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident: for the just shall live by faith.” Is this the ceremonial part of the law only? Could this assertion be made, if men are justified by the moral part of the law? It absolutely excludes from salvation all who trust in the law in every view of it. “And the law is not of faith: but the man that doeth them shall live in them.” Is not this the whole law? “Is the law, then, against the promises of God? God forbid: for if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law.” Does not this exclude works of the moral part of the law, as well as of the ceremonial? “Tell me, ye

that desire to be under the law, do ye not hear the law?" This shews that they desire to be under the law as a whole. The attempt, then, to prove that it is ceremonial, and not moral works which the apostle excludes from having any share in justification, is as silly as it is wicked.

Now, let us take a look at your inference. You say, that if Paul had excluded moral works as well as ceremonial works from justifying, he would have prohibited both. I maintain, on the contrary, that he might expressly exclude both from justification, while he might have prohibited the one, and enjoined the other. Moral works are good in their own nature; ceremonial works are good only as the appointment of God. The one then cannot be prohibited, the other may be prohibited, while the former has no more concern in justification than the latter. This, Sir, is my philosophy; shew me where it is wrong. But there is another mistake in your view of this matter. Paul equally prohibits moral and ceremonial works in the matter of justification. But he did not prohibit circumcision to the Jews at that time. They might practise it, but not for salvation; Paul circumcised Timothy.

"But, in the next place," you say, "supposing that faith necessarily did produce good works—so that, where no good works appeared, there could be no faith—still, if works, as works, were not means of salvation, there could be no motives for the performance of them." What! if works cannot be useful for one purpose, can they not be useful for another? If works are not means of justification; they are not to be performed for justification; but if they are necessary for other purposes, they must be performed for those other purposes. The most silly of "the silly creatures, who see their lost and ruined condition by nature," can discern this.

"If the faith is not there," you say, "the performance of works will not make it to be so, and therefore cannot mend the matter." Very true.—But what has this to do with the question at issue? though it is contended that faith will always produce good works, yet it is not contended that works will at any time produce faith. We do not say that a man should eat and drink in order to create an appetite, but that a man, who has an appetite, will eat and drink.

"But now," you say, "leaving all these objections to the manner in which evangelical divines rebut the charge of making good works, or moral virtue, unnecessary to salvation.—Since they acknowledge, in point of fact, however inconsistently, that good works cannot be dispensed with, what, we desire to know, becomes of their assertion, so often, so absolutely insisted upon, that we are saved by faith

alone, without good works,—and that all that is necessary for us is to believe in Christ? To say to a man you are saved by faith without works, but you must give the works too, or else you cannot be reckoned to have the faith—what is this but a pitiful sophism?” There is no sophism in the doctrine of your opponents on this point, the inconsistency is all in your own apprehension. When it is said that a man is saved by faith, without works, the meaning is, that he is justified by faith without works. When it is said that works are necessary, it is not meant that they are necessary for justification, but as the fruits of faith. Paul asserted, that of all the ship’s company there should not one lose his life; yet he afterwards declared, that unless the sailors should abide in the ship, salvation was impossible, (Acts xxvii. 22, 31.)

You observe in a note on this passage, “ We have now and then heard evangelical discourses constructed on this plan:—in the *first* head, the preacher would maintain, in the most express and unequivocal terms that we are saved by faith alone, without works: the *second*, he would commence by asking, Do I then say we can be saved without works?—absurd, ridiculous, a vile calumny, and what not:—never seeming to observe that the supposition thus indignantly disclaimed in the *second* head, is, to the letter, the very proposition maintained in the *first*.” Though this appears to you directly contradictory, I will shew you that it is, when rightly understood, perfectly consistent. Salvation sometimes applies to justification, and sometimes to admission into heaven. When it is said that salvation is by faith alone without works, the meaning is, that we are justified before God without works; but when it is asserted that a man cannot be saved without works, the meaning is, not that he cannot be justified without works, but that he cannot enter heaven without works. Works are as necessary in their own place, as faith is in its own place. What inconsistency is in this? “ Does God Almighty,” you ask, “ thus trifle with the understanding of his creatures? and is revelation really a thing of riddles and conundrums for men to exercise their wits withal?” God Almighty does not trifle with the understanding of his creatures, but his creatures often misuse their understanding in perverting his word, when it opposes their own views and wishes. Revelation is not a thing of riddles; but many, from their own blindness, find inconsistency in its most consistent doctrines. “ If our Gospel be hid,” says Paul, “ it is hid to them that are lost: in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not, lest the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine into them.”

The doctrine you oppose is as clearly the doctrine of God, as the heaven and the earth are his work. It is only by the most daring and obstinate perverseness that you can misrepresent it. Consider then, Sir, that as God will not trifle with the understanding of his creatures, neither will he allow his creatures to trifle with him. If this is the Word of God, what is the guilt of the man who, on that supposition, charges God with trifling with the understanding of his creatures? Jeremiah predicted that Zedekiah, king of Judah, should behold the eyes of the king of Babylon: Ezekiel predicted that Zedekiah should not see the land of the Chaldeans. Josephus informs us, that Zedekiah considered these two prophecies as contradictory, and therefore disbelieved both. But, in due time, he found that both were true. Sir, the day will come, when you shall see that all the Divine declarations are consistent with one another. There will be a time when the doctrine of faith and works will not appear a juggle.

In a note to the last extract, you say, "Here we cannot help alluding to the manner in which evangelical preachers manage to get over the numerous plain declarations of Scripture, that we shall be judged according to our *actions*." Is not this flagrant calumny? Do your opponents deny that men shall be judged according to their works? Have they any need to get over the passages to which you refer? Is not the doctrine of these passages a part, an essential part, of their system?

"If a text says," you continue, "that a man who obeys the Divine laws, will be rewarded with future happiness—yes, they say, if he does keep the Divine laws *to the letter*." Well, and what is this to the subject on which you bring it to bear? Does this imply that men shall not be judged according to their works? It says only, that there are no men who keep the law. As to the question whether a man is entitled to the reward of keeping a law, who does not keep it fully, the negative is self-evidently the proper answer. Can a man be entitled to the reward of keeping a law, who in any degree breaks the law? To a certain person who wished to have eternal life, by doing some good thing, Christ says, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." Are the commandments kept when any of them is broken? Is not this a contradiction in terms? And does not an apostle tell us, that "whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all?" How, then, can men have a reward by the keeping of the law?

But, you add, "As if God would mock his creatures with promises of his reward, which he knew they could never—without his

merciful allowance—act so as to obtain.” Is it mockery to tell a man who wishes to be saved by doing good, what is the good that he must, according to that way of salvation, perform? And is not this the most effectual way to convince him that salvation in that way is impossible? But view the matter as you will, mockery or truth, this is the necessary import of the expression. *To keep the law, is not to break the law.* The keeping of the commandments, insisted on by Christ, cannot admit in any point the breach of them. If they are broken, in any instance, they cannot be said to be kept. It requires no great depth of intellect to understand this *truism*. But you speak of a *merciful allowance*. You have called the evangelical doctrines nonsensical, where I have shewn them to be consistent. But, I maintain, that it is *sheer nonsense* to speak of salvation by the keeping of a law, while there is a merciful allowance for breaking that law. Does this keep the commandments? Such an observation is as disgraceful to intellect as it is opposed to Scripture: Let it be allowed, for the sake of argument, that God will make allowances for the breach of his law, then salvation is not by the keeping of the commandments. This way of salvation is neither law nor gospel. It is mere absurdity.

“So also they say,” you remark, “that, by the good works to which reward is promised, we must understand merely the righteousness of Christ, imputed to the *believer*.” This is not a correct statement. Believers are justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to them, or reckoned as their own, because they are one with Christ by faith. In Christ they are every thing that the law requires in them, in order to escape its curse. “For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.” But the works that shall be rewarded in believers, are the works which they have in their own persons wrought, through faith in Christ. They are *their* works, yet they are works which Christ works in them. “For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained, that we should walk in them.” “It is God who worketh in us, both to will and to do of his own good pleasure.”

“Thus,” you say, “a text declaring that our salvation depends on our works, is made to declare that it does *not* depend on our works, but on our faith.” This is another misstatement. If there are any fanatics who speak thus, they must not be confounded with those who have a title to the character of evangelical preachers. The texts, the innumerable texts, that require good works in be-

lievers, are not explained as if they meant that faith is required. Both classes of passages are allowed their own meaning, and insisted on with equal zeal. Both faith and works are necessary in the heirs of salvation; but they are necessary for a different purpose. While it is declared that he that believeth not shall be damned, it is declared with equal correctness, that without holiness, no man shall see the Lord. The inconsistency which you discover in the system of your opponents, is not in their doctrine, but in your own misrepresentation. "The great body of Protestants," you say, "maintain that all men are sinners, and liable to punishment; and that no man can, by any works, moral or ceremonial, make atonement for his sin: in this sense, they maintain that works cannot contribute to their salvation." But, Sir, not only are works unable to make atonement; they are equally unavailing as a medium of connection with the atonement. It is by faith, and not by works, that men are justified, through the atonement. Your doctrine here is as faulty as it is every where else; though you falsely represent it as the doctrine of the generality of Protestants. Besides, Sir, if "all men are sinners, and liable to punishment," can they be rewarded for keeping the commandments? Are they to be both rewarded and punished? But you may say, that the atonement blunts the edge of the law. Then, Sir, salvation is not by the keeping of the law, but partly by the law, and partly by the atonement. How then could Christ say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments?"

"It is never in any other meaning than this," you say, "that the New Testament writers represent salvation as attainable without works." The New Testament writers exclude works, as well from being the medium of connecting sinners with the atonement, as they exclude them from making atonement. It is as a medium of connection with Christ, and not as an atonement, that faith is commanded. It is on this point only that faith and works are contrasted. Indeed, it is self-evident, that neither faith nor works can make atonement. Though we could keep the whole law at present, this would not make atonement for former breaches of the law.

"And, though their proposition (in this meaning) holds equally true," you add, "both as to moral and ceremonial works, it was in respect of the latter *solely*, that the occasion for maintaining the proposition existed." Were this true, it is nothing to the purpose. No matter what gave occasion to the statement of the proposition, if the proposition includes moral works as well as ceremonial. But your statement is not true. Even the error of the Galatian churches was not confined to circumcision as a rite unconnected with law, but



as a part of the law; and though circumcision was particularly the object of their zeal, yet they evidently joined with it the whole law. The Apostle's reasoning supposes this. This is every where obvious from the epistle, "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ,—for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified." "This only would I learn of you: received ye the spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith?" "For as many as are under the works of the law are under the curse." "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them. But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident: for the just shall live by faith." "And the law is not of faith." "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law." Does not the term *law* here refer to the whole law of Moses? "Ye observe days, and months, and times, and years." Circumcision then, while it was the great, was not the only point in which they were attached to the law.

"There is not, we believe," you add, "*one* text to be found, to the effect that faith alone, without works, can procure salvation, which has not, by the context, *a direct and visible* reference to the case mentioned in Acts xv. 1." This is not so. When Paul directly treats on the subject of justification in the Epistle to the Romans, he speaks of the law without any reference to circumcision. "Therefore," says he, "by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin." Is the knowledge of sin by circumcision? "But now the righteousness of God, without the law, is manifested." Does the law here mean circumcision only? "Where is boasting then? it is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay: but by the law of faith. Therefore we conclude, that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law." Is circumcision the only thing that could afford a ground of boasting? Sir, your observation is not only unfounded, but there is no plausible occasion to suggest it. When works are excluded from justification, the whole law of God is referred to, and moral works are as directly excluded as ceremonial. This perversion of the Word of God, by which some have endeavoured to set aside the Apostle's doctrine, is without any colour of plausibility.

"Preaching," you say "against seeking salvation by works *now*, in the way that St Paul found it necessary to preach it, is among the greatest absurdities that ever entered the human brain." I have shewn you that the Apostle Paul preaches against works as a ground of justification, as directly with respect to moral works, as with re-

spect to ceremonial. But were it otherwise, your doctrine here is false. Though the occasion of preaching against works as a ground of salvation, had invariably been the reliance of the Jews on circumcision, still, as the Apostle puts down reliance on circumcision, by reasoning that will equally apply to every work of the law, it would be quite proper to make this application of his doctrine to every case in which works of any kind are relied on for justification. The individual case referred to, might respect a work of the ceremonial law, but the principle on which it is condemned, refers to the whole law. If prejudice does not here blind you, I cannot compliment your understanding, on account of this observation. In overturning circumcision as a ground of justification, the Apostle shews in general, that works of law cannot justify ; yet your perspicuity allows you to assert, that to include works of moral law is an absurdity. Silliness, I see, is not the exclusive characteristic of the Evangelicals.

You ask, " Why do not evangelical preachers take some pains to put down the worship of Baal ?" Now, I cannot see the appropriateness of this example. To make it appropriate, you must suppose that the evangelical preachers are now preaching against justification by circumcision, though there is no one who holds it. And then ask, " As they do this, why do they not also preach against the worship of Baal, although there is now no man who worships him ?" But the evangelical preachers are using the apostle's doctrine against circumcision, just as they might use the condemnation of the worship of Baal. The worship of Baal is forbidden, on grounds that exclude from worship every thing but God ; and, on this authority, they might preach against the Baalism of Popery, and every other species of idolatry. I may bring this example to refute yourself. If an apostle, in reprobating the worship of Jupiter, or any other of the heathen gods, would ground his doctrine on the truth, that there is no proper object of worship but the One God, who made heaven and earth, would it not be proper on this ground to exclude from worship every thing that in modern times is worshipped ? Now, this is the very thing that the apostle has done. He opposes circumcision on grounds that respect works of law of every kind. Moral works are as expressly included in his reasoning, as even the works of the ceremonial part of the law.

" As forgiveness of the past," you say, " does not imply a dispensation for the future, and as a pardon for the past would be a nullity when the transgression was not abandoned, and where fresh

guilt was to be incurred, it is also held that there can be no pardon without repentance and amendment." Now, while I hold the necessity of works in their proper place, as strongly as you can do, yet I have an objection to this phraseology. It makes atonement respect sins antecedent to repentance and amendment only, and justifies the after part of the life, either by perfect conformity to law, or leaves him to punishment for every breach. Now, the Scriptures represent the influence of the atonement as extending to the whole life.—“If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father.” Dares your penitent amended man incur no fresh guilt? If he does, this doctrine of yours does not provide for it. It must be provided for by some “merciful allowance.”

Having so satisfactorily reconciled the contesting claims of faith and works, you triumphantly ask, “In what does the statement now given fall short of, being evangelical, or wherein consists that ‘trusting to works,’—that ‘self-righteousness,’—that ‘pride of the human heart,’—which evangelical professors never cease inveighing against as damnable errors, into which all but themselves have fallen?” I fancy, Sir, I have shewn you a trifling difference between your system and that of your adversaries on this subject. That difference, every unprejudiced mind must see to be an essential and a wide one.

“The ‘self-righteousness’ which we find the most severely condemned in Scripture,” you tell us in a note, “is that of the persons who trusted that they were righteous, and *despised others*. Whether the evangelical party are distinguished by an extraordinary exemption from this fault, we shall not pretend to say.” This insinuation is most injurious and unjust. Every one who truly receives the evangelical doctrines, glories only in the righteousness of Christ. Instead of *despising others* no less righteous than he is himself by nature, he receives salvation on the same ground as the thief on the cross.

You censure your opponents, in a subsequent paragraph, for distinguishing between outward act and motive, as if no one, in viewing actions, fails in including the exercise of a moral and religious principle. But, Sir, the glory of God is a motive essential in every good action.—“Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink,” says the apostle, “or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.” Every thing, then, must be done to the glory of God, and whatever is not done to the glory of God, is sin, is a breach of this Divine law.

“On the other hand,” you say, “if evangelical teachers include, in their idea of faith, the principle of moral virtue, a regard to moral

and religious obligation, where will their doctrine differ from that of all other Christian teachers?" Their doctrine will not indeed differ from that of any who can with propriety be called Christian teachers; but it will differ vastly from your doctrine. I have shewn you that difference. I observe here, that faith, as connecting the sinner with the work of Christ, is not to be considered as a work of obedience to the law, but as a divinely appointed medium. Faith is efficient, not from its own intrinsic excellence, but from the divine appointment. It is the work of Christ that is the righteousness of the saint, and his faith connects him with that work. They who speak of salvation being by faith, on account of the excellence of faith itself, are virtually on the same foundation with those who preach salvation directly by works.

Having, as you think, convicted and exposed the doctrines of your opponents, with an evidence of truth, which you seem to consider as equal to demonstration, you come next to accuse them of neglecting the duties of morality. Now, Sir, were all your representations true, it would only say, that they act in direct opposition to their own system. That works ought to be pressed on their own proper ground, is as much their doctrine, as that faith is to be preached for justification. I am very little acquainted with the actual labours of the body of evangelical preachers; but I am not to believe your report contrary to their own profession. On the contrary, I am to believe that they preach works as they hold them. If any teacher of God's people, calling himself evangelical, neglects to urge every thing that he believes Christ to have appointed, I am not his apologist. Good works can never be too earnestly, or too often pressed on all believers. They ought to be taught all things that Christ has enjoined; and they ought to be reminded of things that they may have already learned. If any of us are deficient on this point, we thank you for reminding us of our duty. But, Sir, I suspect that what displeases you, is, that the evangelical preachers do not press the duties of a Christian on sinners. You are displeased that some food is not administered to Lazarus, to help to bring him to life. But you may see in the Word of God, that men were to believe in Christ, before they were to be fed as Christians.

You say in a note, "We are very far from wishing to say that all the sermons of evangelical preachers are of a profitless character." But, Sir, the comment contradicts the text. The thing, you say, you have no wish to say, is the very thing you have said. "No attempts," you say "are ever made to excite feelings of gratitude towards the Deity." "There is an utter and entire neglect

of giving instruction as to the various duties required of man." How does such language consist with such a modification? If you really repented for having calumniated your opponents, you should have expunged the text, instead of giving an inconsistent explanation in a note.

"We have heard," you say, "we know not how many evangelical sermons on the subject of the question put by the jailer at Philippi, and the answer given to him. It never seems to be considered that the jailer at Philippi was a heathen, who had not, at the time of his question, believed in Christ before. Because this was a proper answer to a heathen, does it follow that it is equally proper to a congregation of professing Christians? Surely human absurdity cannot go beyond this." The same question, Sir, must have the same answer in all times and in all countries. It supposes ignorance in the person who puts it; and that ignorance may be found in such a congregation as you refer to, as well as among heathens. If all who do not bring forth fruit unto holiness are to be accounted unbelievers, as the Scriptures teach, then such congregations abound with persons who need information on this great question. But granting, for the sake of argument, that all who go to hear the Gospel, believe it previously, still there is a warrant to preach as Paul did to the Philippian jailer. The apostle preached to the churches the same Gospel that he preached to the heathen. "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the Gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain." Again, granting that all such congregations are exclusively real believers, then they will have been saved by the same faith as was preached to the jailer at Philippi. This will not make a different way of salvation for them and for him. Do you mean that something more will be required of such congregations, than what is required in heathens? Will faith save a heathen, and are others to be saved by works? What confusion of ideas is this! If more is required of such congregations than is required of the jailer at Philippi, because he was a heathen, does not the jailer come into their situation the moment he believes? Is he then to have salvation by faith only? Or, in addition to this, must he *now* be saved by works? If he is to be saved by works, then what Paul first preached to him is not true.

That the same Gospel is to be preached to all men in every age and country, is clear from the express words of Christ:—"Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to *every creature*. He that

believeth and is baptized, shall be saved ; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." *Every creature—every creature !* Then, Sir, the absurdity in this matter rests with yourself, and not with the evangelical preachers. But how childish is your proof that every one of such congregations must be a Christian because he goes to hear preaching? Were all the multitudes who heard Christ disciples? The claims even of many who favoured him, were rejected by him.

I have no language sufficient to express my abhorrence of a sentiment expressed in the following quotation :—" The abstrusest portions in Hebrews, Romans, Galatians,—all relating to temporary and local subjects of discussion, and which, to the great majority of a congregation, cannot convey the shadow of an idea,—appear to receive a marked preference, &c." Is this language to be employed about any part of that book, of every part of which, we are assured by the Spirit of God, that it is profitable? Who are you, Sir, that you take upon you to blaspheme the Scriptures?

" The fatal defect of the evangelical system, when representing salvation as obtained by faith alone, obviously lies," you tell us, " in the narrow signification they so unreasonably attach to the term faith or belief ; making it to denote certain mystical and undefined feelings in regard to the atonement only, (notions, by the way, for which Scripture does not afford the shadow of a warrant), instead of a general persuasion of the reality of Christ's authority, and consequent reception of his instructions, and submission to his commands." Faith, Sir, your opponents do not make to consist in mystical and indefinite feelings in regard to the atonement. It respects Christ as he is revealed in the Gospel. It includes both his person and his work. When you speak of faith as being a general persuasion of the reality of Christ's authority, you are essentially wrong. Many confessed that authority, who were rejected by him. Nicodemus was taught that the belief of this authority was not enough. It was essential to believe that *he was the Son of God*, obviously in the proper sense of that term. But, when you include as an ingredient, in faith, " the reception of his instructions, and submission to his commands," you speak neither Scripture, nor philosophy, nor common sense. Submission to authority is not faith of any kind : it is merely an effect of faith. Is this the man who is to overturn the evangelical school? Learn, Sir, the common meaning of words before you undertake to reform the phraseology of evangelical preachers. To believe and to submit, are as different as cause and effect.

" This it is," you allege, " which keeps them constantly on the strain

to discover, in the term faith, or belief, some extraordinary and mysterious import; it being undeniable, that, in the ordinary sense of the word, their hearers believe already." No mysterious, nor extraordinary meaning is attached to the word faith as it respects salvation. It is never taken to import more or less than its common meaning. But it is maintained, that the man who mistakes the meaning of what is reported to him, does not truly believe it, though he may be conscious of believing it as he apprehends it. Would you say that a person believes any proposition in Euclid, when you find that he does not understand it? Now, as faith will always produce good works, if a man could speak of the gospel, apparently as clearly as an angel of heaven, yet continue in sin, we are warranted to say, not only that he is a wicked man, but that he does not believe the gospel. He is under some mistake about it, though no man may be able to point it out. We never flinch from this assertion, in the most absolute sense, "He that believeth shall be saved."

You ask,—“Do they not discover an evident shyness of approaching to the subject of moral conduct, as if it were dangerous ground to tread upon?” Again, you speak of “their evident disinclination even to read the moral parts of Scripture.” I solemnly and distinctly disavow this, on the part of all truly evangelical preachers of every denomination. This is the most licentious calumny. To any man who thoroughly understands the gospel, there is not even the appearance of inconsistency between the simplest preaching of faith, and the most ardent zeal for the abounding of good works. Every part of Scripture, true evangelical preachers value as more precious than diamonds. Is it quite consistent, that the writer who takes so licentious a liberty should adopt the maxim, that his opponents, for the assertion of their views, are worthy of obloquy and invective? Is the ninth commandment no part of the law?

As you speak with coolness with respect to the ordinances of worship, so you speak with laxity with respect to the practices of the school of Satan,—balls, plays, and the misspending of the Sabbath. Refraining from these things, it seems, belongs “to evangelical austerities.” So then, your zeal for morality is enlightened and discriminating. It burns for some favourite points of duty, but is lax enough with respect to the first table of the Divine law. The amusements to which you refer are doubtless the works of the flesh, and are included in the “such-like,” appended to the specifications of Scripture. The stage, as it exists, has been condemned by many moralists, who knew not the gospel of Christ, and were influenced by no higher motive than the welfare of society. But with you, it

seems, it is an innocent amusement for a child of God. It is at least to be countenanced for certain purposes. Are these amusements really innocent? If they are, let them be followed.—If they are not, let no supposed good effect from allowing them, induce us to follow them. Of the man who does evil that good may come, the Scripture says that his damnation is just. But let us take a glance at your arguments for tolerating these practices:—“By drawing the line that separates religion and irreligion too far on the side of the former, they place a great many persons beyond the pale.” Sir, the line that separates these territories must be drawn by the Word of God; and our business is not to draw a line, but to discover the line. Instead, then, of being a good thing to draw this line too far on one side, it would be a very wicked thing. Let us not make any thing sin, that is not really sin. Well, but it seems there is danger of placing beyond the pale, persons who are “near the boundary.” What a cluster of incongruities is here! How can we put out of the pale, persons who, by the very supposition, are out of it? But, what is still a more wonderful thing, those persons who are placed out of the pale, who were previously without it, might have been kept within it, by a certain process! This is a still more surprising miracle. To keep people within a boundary who are without that boundary, must certainly be a very clever thing. You talk of the juggling of your opponents, with respect to their doctrine of justification by faith; but your own exploits would baffle the skill of the most expert of the Indian Jugglers. How silly do the wisest men appear, when they attempt, by sober argument, to justify sin?

“It can never be too earnestly kept in view,” you sagely remark, “that every difficulty we add to religion, is a persuasion to irreligion.” What, Sir, have we to do with adding or taking away difficulties with respect to religion? Is it not God only who has a right to forbid, or permit every thing in this respect? Is it a persuasion to irreligion, to tell men that practices contrary to the Word of God, will be at last visited with his vengeance? Your morality is as bad as your doctrine, and your philosophy is as bad as your morality. There is nothing but confusion in your system.

“Next,” you say, “if religious persons refuse to countenance what are generally reckoned innocent amusements, these amusements will not be therefore abstained from.” But if religious persons do not reckon them innocent amusements, are they to countenance them, in order to catch people by guile? Shall they not tell the thief or the drunkard that he is in danger of hell, because the thief, and the drunkard may continue in their crimes? If the



amusements referred to are in themselves innocent, let them be vindicated on that ground.

“ But, being thus left,” you say, “ entirely in the hands of the worthless, they will acquire a dangerous character, from which they might otherwise have been kept free.” This takes it for granted, that they are innocent, and only susceptible of abuse. But your opponents think them all bad. Shall they then engage in things which they account wicked, to prevent others from becoming worse? Shall we join the thief in filthy frauds, to keep him back from doing that which would bring him to the gallows? You speak of your opponents as “ placing religion more in the performance of ordinances of worship, than in the regulation of the heart and conduct.” Certainly the midnight revels of the ball-room, and the gross impurities of the stage, are admirably calculated to regulate the heart and conduct!

It has always been triumphantly alleged in favour of the evangelical doctrine, that it produces that morality which its opponent possesses only in theory. This you do not attempt to disprove, though in part you endeavour to account for the fact on another principle. But your account is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural. “ We may admit the fact,” you say, “ as alleged, in regard to many of the supporters of those opinions; we can even admit that evangelical preaching, may have been the means of bringing to a religious life, persons for whom soberer views would have had no attractions.” Now, who are these people? I presume they are very wicked and ignorant people. Well, admitting that such persons are brought to a profession of religion by the evangelical doctrine, what, I ask, is it that makes them moral, seeing their doctrine not only naturally, but necessarily, produces immorality? According to your views, while they are zealous for religious doctrine, they ought to be abandoned to every vice, seeing sin is quite consistent with their salvation. Then, Sir, I reject your philosophy as unsound, while I denounce your religion as infidelity.—You produce an effect, not only without a cause, but contrary to a cause. We can produce thousands of the vilest characters made virtuous by our gospel. If, then, that gospel necessarily leads to licentiousness, what is the cause of that change? You allege that this morality is not the result of our doctrine, but that it arises *in spite of* that doctrine. Now, if this is so, what is that wonderful principle that is so powerful as to produce morality, in spite of a cause that *necessarily* produces immorality?

You allege that “ the assumption of such opinions has oftener

been the issue, than the commencement of a pious and virtuous character." But granting, for the sake of argument, that a virtuous life precedes the adoption of these views, why is it not abandoned the moment they are received? Why do men continue to practise what they now see to be useless? Above all, how can they continue virtuous, while the doctrine which they have received necessarily leads to vice. Did you ever know a man believing sin to be harmless, who did not practise it? Sir, there is no philosophy in your reasoning. Besides, I ask, are you as good a judge in this matter as your opponents? Are they not the best judges whether a virtuous life has preceded or followed their alteration of views? Are they not the best judges with respect to the principle that moves them to virtuous actions? Ask every individual of all who are truly born again, through the truth of the gospel by the spirit, and their answer without a single exception will be, that their morality is the effect of their principles.

You have one observation with respect to our argument on this point, to which I by no means object. "If our objections to the evangelical system," you say, "be unsound, let them be exposed; otherwise we cannot allow of even good results being brought about by false representations of religion." I cordially assent to this. Your doctrine is not proved from the Scriptures; no fancied good results can warrant it. But, if our doctrine is the obvious meaning of the whole current of Scripture; if nothing but false reasoning and forced criticism can banish it from the Scriptures, then the fact now referred to, is a most powerful and satisfactory confirmation that our views are just.

"We regard evangelical opinions, then," you say, "as having sprung out of an increase of religious feelings, rather than as having produced it." Will you shew how religious feeling naturally produces such doctrines? Is it not unphilosophical and absurd to speak of religious feeling as the origin of belief? Is not believing the foundation of all human conduct?

"In the estimation, however, usually made of evangelical practice," you say, "there is a fallacy or two to be pointed out. The evangelical party claim a greater zeal for religion in respect of their more frequent attendance on religious ordinances—stricter observance of the Sabbath—abstinence from many amusements," &c. Does not this indicate that *frequent attendance on religious ordinances, strict observance of the Sabbath, &c.* are not considered by you as matter of duty? Now, Sir, as you admit that there are ordinances of Divine appointment, you are self-condemned? If God has appointed or-

dinances, are they not to be strictly observed? I maintain, that not only is frequent attendance on religious ordinances a duty, but that a single day's unnecessary absence from what God has appointed, is a sin. What, Sir, could you say to any one who should reason on the eighth commandment, as you do on the fourth? If one day is the Lord's Day, is it not wholly to be given to the Lord? Is it lawful to turn it into man's day?

"A Roman Catholic," you say, "is not a more religious man than a Protestant, because the latter does not, like the former, do penance or perform pilgrimages." Very true. But have you not admitted that these religious ordinances are Divine appointments? Do you believe that penance and pilgrimages are such? This reasoning is not only disgraceful to philosophers, like the far-famed Edinburgh Reviewers, but is disgraceful to common sense.

In conclusion, you observe, "The folly may have its day, but common sense will ultimately prevail." The opposers of evangelical doctrine, are in the habit of speaking, as if all sound understanding were on their side, and that their adversaries were mere fanatics. I hope, Sir, I have lowered your pulse a little. I have shewn you that there is neither Scripture nor philosophy in the reasoning that expels the evangelical doctrines from the Bible. I undertake to shew, against all the Edinburgh Reviewers, assisted by all the school of German Neology, that it is not possible to banish the evangelical doctrines from the Scriptures, without betraying error in the operations of intellect in their reasoning, and a violation of the laws of language in their criticism.

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## LETTER V.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH you speak of salvation and atonement, I perceive that you are entirely unacquainted with the plan on which sinful man is accepted by the just and holy God. You make salvation a compound of Divine mercy and human merit. But the Scriptures represent salvation as harmonizing the mercy and justice of God. Man is saved altogether of mercy, yet he is at the same time, in another view, saved altogether in accordance with justice.

The work of Christ becomes the work of the believer by his oneness with him by faith. Every believer is a part of the body of Christ, and what Christ has done for him, thus becomes his own.

The believer died with Christ and has risen with Christ. What you may think, or what I may think, on this subject, independently of the Word of God, is of no value. Let us then for a moment, come to the Scriptures, on this momentous question. May God enlighten your eyes, and grant you repentance to the acknowledgment of the truth. Let us turn to Rom. iii. 20—28 :—“ Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight : for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now, the righteousness of God, without the law, is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets ; even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe ; for there is no difference : For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God : Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus : Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God ; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness ; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus. Where is boasting, then ? It is excluded. By what law ? Of works ? Nay ; but by the law of faith. Therefore we conclude, that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.” Here the Apostle does not speak merely of mercy, but of righteousness, yet of *righteousness without the law*. What strange language is this ! Is there any thing but the evangelical doctrine will give meaning to this language ?

The sinner obtains righteousness, yet he obtains it without the law, or without himself fulfilling the law. He is made righteous by Christ’s fulfilling of the law in his room. That this is the meaning is expressly asserted, for it is added :—“ Even the righteousness of God, by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe.” Is there any darkness here ? What fair interpretation can avoid our doctrine in this place ? Are not believers said here to be justified *freely by his grace*, and that through the redemption of Jesus Christ ? Where is there any room for your system in this passage ? If the believer is justified freely by grace, how can he be justified by his works ?

What is still more wonderful, God is here said to be *just* in this way of salvation, and yet to justify the ungodly. How can God be just in forgiving sin ? How he is merciful in forgiving sin, it is easy

to discover ; but how is the forgiveness of sins just ? Through the redemption in Christ. God is faithful and just to forgive the sins for which Christ has accounted. It would be very unjust to make the believer suffer for sins for which Christ has suffered. This would be to pay the same debt twice. The sinner then is saved by faith, in a way in which he becomes completely just—as innocent as the angels of heaven—as pure as the throne of God. Though in themselves believers are sinners, yet in Christ they are perfect in righteousness, and in holiness. Christ sees no deformity in his spouse. “Thou art all fair, my love, there is no spot in thee.” “He hath not beheld iniquity in Jacob, neither hath he seen perverseness in Israel.” Now, if God sees no spot in his people, there must be a point of view in which they are without spot ; for God perceives things as they are. The salvation that the apostle here speaks of excludes boasting ; does your plan of salvation exclude boasting ?

Look now to the beginning of the fourth chapter. “For if Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God. For what saith the Scripture ? Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness. Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin.” Does this language need any commentary ? The man who is here represented as justified, worketh not for his justification, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly. I defy any system ever invented by man to give consistency to this language. On all other views but that of justification in Christ, it is a contradiction in terms. If they are ungodly, how are they to be justified ? If they are justified, how can they be ungodly ? In themselves they are ungodly, the children of wrath by nature as well as others ; in Christ there is no unrighteousness in them. They have in him paid their debt : they have suffered the full penalty of the law, and have fully kept all the commandments. Here it is supposed also that believers are saved by God’s not imputing sin to them. But if this is so, there must be a point of view in which there is no sin in them ; for God, the just God, will impute sin wherever he finds it. But he will not impute sin to believers, because he has imputed it to their substitute and head. He cannot reckon it to both.

Agreeably to this, believers are said, in the beginning of the fifth

chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, not merely to be saved by faith, but to be justified by faith. In Christ Jesus all believers are as righteous as if they had never sinned, but had themselves kept the whole law. "Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ." This plan of salvation, by justification through Christ, is not only the doctrine of Scripture, but is a proof that the Scriptures are not the invention of man. It never could have occurred to man, that it was possible to save him in a way of righteousness. Indeed this is so strange, that men, even after the word of God has come to them, continue to hold their own views, while they profess to receive the Scriptures as the word of God. Man's wisdom could not find out how a sinner could become righteous, and the wise men of this world still continue to reject it, even when they receive the book as Divine, in which the revelation is made. The Scripture then can be no forgery. Man naturally looks for salvation by merit, or by mercy, or by a mixture of merit and mercy. They only who become as little children, will look for a salvation that makes them righteous, while they are in themselves sinners.

In the end of the same chapter, the Apostle asserts that "grace reigns through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord." *Grace reigns*, that is, salvation is altogether of grace; in it grace reigns as a sovereign. It has no partner in its throne. But how does grace reign? Does it reign so as to dishonour justice, and to encourage sin? No: it reigns through righteousness. It has provided a sacrifice to take away the sins of those over whom it reigns. It does not injure justice. It gives the law of God all its dues. Christ obeyed its demands in his life; he suffered its penalty in his death. This, Sir, is Paul's gospel; how different is it from yours?

Agreeably to this view, Paul considers his crown of glory as a *crown of righteousness*, and the judge who awards this crown, as a *righteous judge*. Could any man under heaven justly speak in this way, from the merit of his own works? That perfection that the law requires in us, is to be found in Christ, and only in him. Of God he is made to us wisdom, and righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. The highest angel in heaven must give place to the weakest believer on earth. The angels are represented in a circle without the throne; but believers sit down on the throne of Jesus. As one with him, they can have no superior in heaven, among all the creation of God. All things in heaven, as well as in earth, are

Christ's, and what is Christ's is the believer's : for every believer is a fellow-heir with Christ.

In the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, Paul exclaims, " Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect ?" This imports, that the most imperfect of all those who are saved, are without sin, in Christ. None in heaven or earth can lay any thing to their charge. Christ has paid the debt. Even God himself, who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, sees no blame in believers in Christ. They have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb. This is the salvation of the Bible : How different from the salvation which you preach !

You maintain, Sir, that faith, instead of producing good works, will produce the contrary. In this you are at direct issue with the God of the Bible. He has, in many places, solemnly asserted what you have the rashness expressly to deny. In Acts xv. 9.—We read : " and put no difference between us and them, *purifying their hearts by faith.*" Here faith is said to be the means of purifying the hearts both of Jews and Gentiles. Who then is the man who takes on him to assert that faith will not purify the heart, but that, on the contrary, it would lead to sin ? Peter says :—1 Peter i. 22.—Seeing ye have purified your souls, in obeying the truth through the Spirit, unto unfeigned love of the brethren." Here the belief of the truth, through the Spirit, is represented as purifying the souls of men. To obey the truth, is to believe the truth. The gospel calls on men to believe. He who believes, obeys that call ; and by the belief of the truth is purified in heart, and, consequently, in life.

1 John iii. 3.—" And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself, even as he is pure." Hope is the effect of faith. All hope of being made like Jesus, when he shall appear, is grounded on faith in him as a Redeemer.

Titus ii. 11—14.—" For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us, that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously, and godly, in this present world ; looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ ; who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." Thus the grace of the Gospel, instead of leading to sin, teaches those who receive it to deny ungodliness.

Colossians i. 6.—" Which is come unto you, as it is in all the

world; and bringeth forth fruit, as it doth also in you, since the day ye heard of it, and knew the grace of God in truth." Those who know the grace of God in truth bring forth fruit from the moment of hearing it.

The Apostle James says:—"Yea a man may say, thou hast faith, and I have works: shew me thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works." Faith then must always produce good works.

1 Thess. ii. 13.—"For this cause also thank we God without ceasing, because, when ye received the Word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of man, but (as it is in truth) the Word of God, *which effectually worketh also in you that believe.*" Here the Gospel is said to work effectually in those that do believe.

1 John v. 4, 5.—"For whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world: and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?" Can any thing more expressly refute your doctrine than this? He that is born of God overcomes the world. Faith gives the victory over the world. What faith is it that gives the victory over the world? The faith that Jesus is the Son of God. What regard, Sir, ought we to have to your speculations, in opposition to the express, the clear declarations of the word of the living God? Who are you, that you will presume to grapple with the Almighty? If you will hold your system, give up the Bible. The attempt to oppose the evangelical doctrines, while the Scriptures are admitted as the tribunal of judgment, is as vain as an attempt to overturn the pillars of heaven.

Philosophers, whether as infidels, or under a profession of faith in revelation, have always presumed to treat true Christianity with indignity. The Greek philosophers scorned the doctrine of the apostles as foolishness; and modern Ethical science, more unjust, while it has pilfered from the Bible almost every thing valuable in its various systems, advances positions in fundamental opposition to revelation. Sometimes this is done with undisguised hostility to the religion of Christ, but oftener with a show of respect for it as the religion of the country. But, Sir, the most dishonourable situation in which it is found, is when it presumes to promulgate its dogmas under the sanction of the word of God, and explain the dictates of the Spirit of God, by the doctrines of the schools. In none of these



characters, however, does it appear a formidable enemy to the simplest Christian, who is aware of the proper mode of defence. All the difficulties that Christians have found in defending the doctrines of grace, have arisen from an undue respect to the authority of systems of philosophy, and a desire to vindicate the unsearchable ways of God. This is an undertaking uncalled for and profane. It is as unwarrantable to attempt to vindicate God in the unfathomable depths of his counsels, as it is to arraign him. If we are assured that it is God who speaks, it is absurd, as well as impious, to demand of him a reason for his conduct. I admit that the light of nature is a revelation previous to that of the Scriptures, and that nothing can be true that is self-evidently contrary to this. If there is not something known without revelation, man is incapable of receiving a revelation, and the grossest contradictions of superstition might claim a sanction from the word of God. But, beyond this range, philosophy is not to be allowed to advance a single step. A contradiction cannot be true; and no revelation can be from God, that professes to teach contradictions. But of the mysterious ways of God, the light of human intellect is not an adequate judge; and from God only can we learn any thing of them. Whatever a properly attested revelation from God teaches of him, or of us, must be submitted to with the most unqualified deference. The pretensions of philosophers on this point, are not only to be resisted as false, but scorned as assuming and unphilosophical. They build on their own fancies as first principles, and disregard principles that are self-evident. As the Scriptures came recommended by the most abundant evidence, Christians are entitled to trample on every dogma of philosophy, that stands in opposition to the doctrine of Christ.

But not only is philosophy an enemy from whom Christianity has nothing to fear, it is one whom she is entitled to despise. Though Christianity is not the wisdom of this world, yet it is the "wisdom of God," and to every person who understands it, it has its evidence in itself. It gives a character of God at once perfect in every attribute, with all his attributes in harmony. It discovers a plan of salvation that never would have presented itself to the human mind, and, therefore, is incapable of being forged; while it gives a ground of hope most completely satisfactory to the conscience, under the deepest conviction of guilt, and apprehension from the Divine justice. To the question, how man, being a sinner, can stand with acceptance in judgment before a just and holy God, it affords

an answer that gives confidence to the chief of sinners who receives the account, while it cuts away every hope from any righteousness in the sinner himself.

It manifests a righteousness so perfect, as to enable the guiltiest sinner on earth, to lift up his head before the tribunal of justice, with the confidence of an angel; while, at the same moment, he looks on himself as having in himself by nature no good thing; and with respect to his own character he exclaims, "God be merciful to me a sinner!" Here, then, is a scheme of salvation that brings glory to God with salvation to man. God is just, and the justifier of the ungodly who believe in Jesus. The law of God, instead of being injured by the intervention of Christ, is magnified and made honourable. But has philosophy given an answer to this question? Never, never, never! No scheme ever formed by it, harmonizes the justice with the mercy of God in man's salvation. And what, Sir, is your doctrine on this point? It is neither law nor Gospel; it is neither philosophy nor Christianity. It is a vain attempt to mix mercy with merit; and reconcile an infidel metaphysics with the grace that brings salvation. With you, God is neither perfectly just nor perfectly merciful: while you speak of atonement, you speak also of salvation by a merciful allowance in judgment. It is quite evident that you have no consistent views on the subject; and that, while you profess to hold the Scriptures as a revelation from God, you oblige them to speak according to your own predilection.

Your doctrine, indeed, is not new, nor is it now exhibited with an unusually imposing address. Your objections to the evangelical doctrines are the same that in every age, unbelief has urged against the Gospel of Christ. In urging them, you have discovered no accuracy of thinking, no vigour of intellect and expression, no deep penetration, or discrimination, that are at all calculated to make us dread you as an adversary. But you have one advantage that will for a time operate in your favour. You have come forward under the sanction of a periodical work of high character and influence among speculative men. With many, it will be a sufficient recommendation of your doctrines, that they are ushered into the world by the Edinburgh Review. But the evangelical doctrines dread not the attack of the proudest school of infidel science. Ingenuity has long expended all its resources in opposing the doctrines of the cross, and every fresh assault will afford Christianity a new triumph. It is not to be doubted, that every instance of opposition to the Gospel of grace, under all the various modifications of unbelief, is a part of the

plan of Him, who in weakness died for his people, but who, now, with all power reigns over all worlds, and regulates every event for the glory of God and the good of his people. Heresies must arise, that they who are approved may be made manifest, but "the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, the Lord knoweth them that are his."

THE END.







