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To

MY FRIEND AND TEACHER

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG *Senack*



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The Basis of Musical Pleasure



PREFACE

THE following chapters grew out of a series of lectures delivered at the College for Women, Western Reserve University, during the autumn of 1900. Many changes have since been made in the plan of the work. The original intention was to elucidate the nature of a single and supreme fountain of musical pleasure. While the author still believes that there is such a unique source of delight—or it may be a unique combination of sources—where the pleasure aroused by the art is genuine and intense, the determination of this element is hopeless in the present state of knowledge. Hence an adherence to the original plan would be largely negative in character, one theory after another being rejected and no positive conclusion being established. It was deemed better, accordingly, to confine the inquiry to an enumeration and description of the actual sources of musical pleasure, reserving a determination

of what is secondary and what is essential to later insight.

In considering the theories which have been offered to explain the musical mystery, there is no pretension to be exhaustive ; however, the more familiar and representative views are included.

In the essay on *The Expression of Emotions in Music*, the author believes he has solved a controversy which for half a century has vexed the thoughts and stirred the passions of musical theorists. As the question involved in this controversy is a simple one, it seems plausible that the irreconcilable divergences of opinion which we find are due, as indicated in the text, to differences in the way of conceiving the subject. The article is reprinted from the *Philosophical Review* with the kind permission of the editor.

The Basis of Musical Pleasure

I

THE POWER OF TONE

WHEREIN lies the peculiar power and charm of music? What is its innermost nature and meaning? What enables it to lift us out of the prosaic atmosphere of everyday life and carry us into purer, ideal realms of being?

When we are moved by the events of a tragedy or admire a beautiful statue, it is not difficult to give a proximate explanation of our emotion. What we see represents aspects of life which, if experienced directly, would produce the same effects. It moves us by imitating what would move us in real life. The enchanting tones of the pianist,

however, are without apparent relation to the world of experience. They are as devoid of significance as the puddle of water which Mr. Lindsey, in Hawthorne's *Snow Image*, finds before the stove: but the puddle contained a merry, elfish figure; and the tones are capable of bearing us aloft, to the home of beauty and inspiration. What is the secret of their power, the explanation of their appealing charm?

This is the problem to be examined in the following pages. It will be our purpose to consider some of the more important theories which have been proposed for its solution, exposing what is faulty in them and retaining what is valuable. These theories may be subsumed under five headings, according to the principles they invoke in explanation. We may seek for the charm of music in its elementary effect, its formal elaboration, its associations, its symbolistic properties, and its agreement with the operations of the mind. Although all of these factors contribute to the result, we are not as yet able to unite them into a complete system. Like the diggers of a tunnel, we may approach the question from various sides and burrow a little into its

mysterious depths, but it will be long before a junction can be effected, yielding a satisfactory explanation. Notwithstanding the present hopelessness of success, however, we shall penetrate as far as possible into each particular inlet, and bring to light what we find.

First let us consider the elementary power of tone. Mere tones by themselves, together with simple combinations, exert an influence on sensibility which seems to baffle further analysis, and which can only be explained as a direct, physiological reaction of the nerves. Hanslick, Lazarus, and Sully give considerable prominence to this species of effectiveness. Tone, timbre, mass of sound, elementary harmony and melody, movement, and rhythm are some of the factors which are supposed to contribute to it. With certain qualifications these authors are right. A beautiful tone caresses the ear. Peculiarities of timbre are physiologically effective: witness the oboe, violin, trumpet, cymbals, and drum. Great masses of sound too—from the organ, chorus, or orchestra—operate similarly. The same is true of the motion involved in musical passages, especially of their rhythm. And finally we may include the beginnings of

melody and harmony in this effect! For purely physiological reasons the interval of an octave sounds better than that of a second. What is true of simultaneous intervals may also, as Helmholtz has shown, be applied to successive ones. Melody, accordingly, has the same physiological basis as harmony.

Here we approach the limitations of our subject. We must be careful not to include any of the higher, more specific musical charm in this species of effectiveness. Sully's unqualified use of terms, in referring the delight of harmony and melody to physiological sources, is liable to lead to this error.¹ What he calls harmony is nothing more than consonance. But consonance and harmony are by no means identical. In the more usual sense, consonance only applies to the simultaneous union of two tones. Harmony, on the other hand, includes any number of elements and, what is more important, combines the resulting formations into a sequence of chords. Physiological laws are utterly
* unable to account for the resulting pleasure. The triad already contains elements of charm

¹ Sully, "The Basis of Musical Sensation," in *Sensation and Intuition*, London, 1880, p. 170.

which transcend the lower plane. The minor chord involves a more or less evident contrast to the major, and its dreamy weirdness leads one to surmise the presence of psychical factors. The succession of chords openly leads into the domain of form. A sequence of tonic and dominant harmonies, to go no further, generates an impression of balanced opposition, the tonic representing the positive element, the dominant standing for the negative. What is true of harmony applies with still greater force to melody. The mere succession of the notes C-G (in the key of C) involves an opposition like that of the chords just mentioned. The essential principle of melody, accordingly, is formal in nature, physiological effectiveness dwindling to insignificance.

Whereas some of the pleasure, then, which might be attributed to nervous reaction belongs to form, another portion falls under the heading of symbolisation and extraneous association. Associations intrude into the most elementary experiences. Simple colours owe some of their effectiveness to suggestion. Odours please through the subconscious memories evoked. It may be impossible, at

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times, to detect the mental factors; we may seem to be immersed in bald sensation, incapable of analysis; yet associations may be present. Musical sounds, too, are effective through suggestion. An expressive tone on the violin may recall a human voice, a plaintive wail from the oboe remind us of pastoral scenes; the organ fills the mind with religious awe, the trumpet arouses martial ardour. Furthermore, the deeper sort of pleasure seems actually to spring into being with the significance. It is when we recognise a fervent appeal in the voice, when the burst of sound in the orchestra reminds us of cosmic energies, when the female chorus suggests angelic hymns, that we are stirred to the depths of our being. Considered merely as auditory sensations, the tones retain a certain neutrality; regarded as embodiments of nature and life, they gain expressive warmth.

All this is corroborated by direct experience. We feel the thrills the very moment that we recognise the significance. But significance may be present even when we are not aware of it. The word *ghoul* is among the most expressive in the English language, its weirdness being felt even by those who do not

know its meaning. What is the explanation of this fact? There are only a few words in the language that begin with the letters *gh*; and among these the commonest are *ghost* and *ghastly*. Whereas the first letters of the word thus remind us of these grewsome parts of speech, the last ones suggest *foul* and *owl*. Unconsciously, therefore, *ghoul* epitomises all these uncanny things. That this is the true explanation, and that the sound of the word is of but little consequence, is proved by changing the spelling from *ghoul* to *gool*. The first part of the word now agrees with *goose*, while the last part reminds us of *fool*. And in fact the word has a ridiculous connotation that may well be characterised as a synthesis of the edible fowl and the gullible human being.

We may conclude, accordingly, that much of the tonal effect which passes as physiological in nature is really traceable to higher sources. While we agree with the authors cited that there is a certain effectiveness attaching to the material of the art, we hold that its scope must be considerably restricted. It is doubtful whether the impressions which an uneducated lad might receive at a concert

would, as Sully believes, be "little more than a variety of sensations, delightful or painful in different degrees, the grounds of which he is wholly unable to give us"¹; even the most untutored youngster would very likely appreciate certain fragments of melody and feel the mysterious significance of some of the tones. Nor can we agree with Hanslick when he ascribes the vague emotional effect of a composition to "the *physical* properties of sound, the greater part of which is governed by *physiological* laws."² Physiological effectiveness is merely the substratum of musical delight. Before it can yield higher pleasure it must be elaborated into formal beauties and enriched with memories and symbolisations. It is to the formal elaboration that we shall first turn.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 163.

² *The Beautiful in Music*, London and New York, 1891, p. 128. The original German reads "zur guten Hälfte physiologischen Gesetzen folgt." In another respect, too, the sense has not been reproduced accurately. According to Hanslick it is the *emotional effect* which is largely governed by physiological laws, whereas the translation would lead one to believe that the *physical properties of sound* were meant. So far as our conclusion is concerned, the ambiguity is of no consequence.

II

FORM

BY reason of their overlapping, it is impossible to give an exhaustive, symmetrical view of the formal aspects of music. Perhaps as good a plan of division as any may be based on the properties of tone, —force, pitch, timbre, and duration.

Force gives us fluctuations of intensity. Loud passages may be relieved by soft ones, soft ones by loud. Gentle sections may be arrested by sudden *fortissimo* shocks, energetic movements interrupted for a moment by *pianissimo* whisperings. Subdued progressions may gradually swell into emphatic utterance, powerful beginnings die away into evanescence.

Timbre yields the contrasts of different voices and instruments. Simultaneously, any vocal or orchestral member may unite with any number of its fellows, any class of instru-

ments join one or more coördinate divisions. Successively, the contrasts are more varied still. In an orchestral waltz, Tschaikowsky even changes his instruments with every beat of the measure.

Duration may be considered under three headings:

1. Tempo.
2. Measure and rhythm.
3. Musical form.

Tempo depends on the prevailing rapidity with which tones succeed one another. In serial compositions, like the symphony, the movements are contrasted especially in tempo. Within a composition the tempo as a rule remains unchanged, but gradual accelerations and retardations of speed, corresponding to the fluctuations of force, are common.

Measure and rhythm demand more exact determinations. Measure deals with the regular recurrence of beats, indicated by the signatures $\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{4}{4}$, $\frac{6}{8}$, and so forth. Rhythm has to do with the grouping of successive tones. A single beat may hold several notes, a single note cover several beats: rhythm determines the distribution and grouping of the notes with reference to the beats. The

rhythm may agree or disagree with the measure. There is agreement when the notes coincide with the beats, disagreement when the beats are left empty, or when the notes are wrongly accented, a weak beat having an accented note or a strong beat one which is unemphasised.

The units involved in measure and rhythm are tones and measures; but several bars may also be united into larger groupings. According to a common arrangement, every four or eight measures are marked off into *phrases*; phrases are united into *periods*, periods into *primary forms*, and primary forms into larger organisms. The combination of smaller into more extensive systems is the subject of Musical Form, in the specific sense of the word; which is analogous in many respects to the arrangement of structural parts in architecture.

Pitch is the most complex of the factors. It may be considered with reference to

1. Melody, and
2. Harmony.

The tones of the scale are characterised by qualitative differences in accordance with which we call one higher or lower than another. In the chromatic scale the differences between

contiguous tones are all equal. The resulting ladder-like arrangement gives rise to geometrical dispositions in scales, arpeggios, skips, and composite figures. But this is not the most important feature of pitch. The octave, at the further end of the scale, is more closely related to the fundamental than the second; the third, but two notes away, more distantly than the fifth. There are peculiar relations of pitch, indeed, which defy exact designation and are only to be accepted at their face-value. Owing to this fact melody is not open to explanation. A series of taps on the snare-drum produces a rhythmical succession, without pitch; the wild, haphazard chase of sounds from the belfry gives us pitch, without rhythm: melody unites the two. The rhythm, of course, is amenable to exact description, as is the general grouping into phrases and periods; but the more intimate nature of the melody, depending on the value of the different intervals, and on the peculiar combination of intervals and rhythms, cannot at present be dissected.

Somewhat more open to treatment is the simultaneous union of intervals into harmonies or chords. Definite rules have been

formulated to which the grouping must conform; furthermore, it has been discovered that the combinations which are most pleasing, or consonances, contain the tones which are harboured by the fundamental note as partials. The sequence of chords is not so rigidly governed. Among the contrasts embodied, imparting life and interest, are those between

1. Major and minor harmonies.
2. Consonances and dissonances.
3. Fundamental and secondary chords.
4. The established and foreign keys.

The most important of these is the third. A piece usually begins with the fundamental harmony, keeps reverting to it, and settles upon it at the end as a point of rest. The commonest of the alternating chords, which may be regarded as the opposite of the fundamental harmony, is the dominant, built on the fifth of the scale. The subdominant, based on the fourth, also embodies a certain opposition. The other harmonies, however, cannot be explained in such simple terms. They seem to shoot off into various dimensions; they are qualitatively different, and in describing it is only possible to name them,

not to reduce their peculiar relations to lower terms.

In addition to the factors already mentioned there are several others which cannot be included under any single heading. Counterpoint refers to the simultaneous progression of several voices of a melodic character. Thematic work has to do with the transformation and variation of musical figures or themes. A group of tones can be played in longer or shorter notes, reversed, expanded or compressed through the use of different intervals, imitated rhythmically, or embellished by the insertion of additional notes. Classic music, especially, is rich in thematic treatment. Finally we may mention the contrast between *staccato* and *legato*, the former resulting from a short, precise rendition, every tone standing by itself, separate from the others; and the latter demanding a smooth connection, one tone being sustained until its successor is played.

Having enumerated the individual elements, let us consider their combination and interplay. Eight measures from the introduction of Schubert's C major symphony will serve as an illustration:

The image displays two systems of musical notation for piano. Each system consists of a grand staff with a treble clef on the upper staff and a bass clef on the lower staff. The first system contains four measures. The upper staff features a melodic line with slurs and accents, while the lower staff has a bass line with staccato marks (dots) and slurs. The second system contains three measures, continuing the melodic and bass lines with similar articulation. The notation is clear and uses standard musical symbols to illustrate the contrast between legato and staccato playing.

Though apparently clear and simple, these measures embody an endless wealth of complexity. There is the instrumental contrast between the upper and lower voices, the former being played by the wood-wind, the latter by the strings. There is the *staccato* of the bass and tenor, opposed to the *legato* of the alto and soprano. To illustrate this contrast graphically, we may adopt the device actually employed in musical notation and incorporated in the example, of designating the former by dots and the latter by slurs, thus

giving an approximate picture of the effect. The instrumental contrast may be indicated by different shading:



The rhythmical structure is aptly illustrated by means of single lines for the various voices:

The internal grouping, as determined by the melody, can be indicated as follows:




As is apparent, the passage consists of two parts, a^1 and a^2 , the former comprising three measures, the latter five. a^1 has two divisions, a^2 has three. b^1 , b^3 , and b^5 contain two measures each, b^2 and b^4 , one. Every measure, again, has two equal halves, and every half two equal beats.

The groupings of the remaining voices agree neither with each other nor with the soprano:

Four staves of musical notation, likely representing different voices. The top staff is a treble clef, the second and third are also treble clefs, and the bottom is a bass clef. The music is organized into four measures. The first measure shows a soprano line with a slur over the first two notes. The second measure shows a soprano line with a slur over the first two notes and a bass line with a slur over the first two notes. The third measure shows a soprano line with a slur over the first two notes and a bass line with a slur over the first two notes. The fourth measure shows a soprano line with a slur over the first two notes and a bass line with a slur over the first two notes. There are various markings, including slurs, accents, and dynamic markings, throughout the piece.



The geometrical aspect of the voices, or the direction of their motion, is roughly expressible like this:



Next come the harmonic relations. The contrasts of major and minor can be expressed with the help of two staves, the chords ruled by the major spirit being placed above, those by the minor beneath:

Major

Minor

etc.

This musical example consists of two systems of two staves each. The first system is labeled 'Major' and 'Minor'. The first staff of each system contains chords, while the second staff contains a bass line with moving notes. The second system ends with the word 'etc.'.

The alternations of consonance and dissonance may be indicated in the same manner:

Consonance

Dissonance

etc.

This musical example consists of two systems of two staves each. The first system is labeled 'Consonance' and 'Dissonance'. The first staff of each system contains chords, while the second staff contains a bass line with moving notes. The second system ends with the word 'etc.'.

Finally we have the alternations of tonality and non-tonality, or the presence and absence of the tonic chord:

Tonic Harmonies

Non-tonic Harmonies

etc.

There are no changes of key, no variations of force or tempo, and no thematic work. Counterpoint is present, but requires no separate scheme, as it is partly represented in the diagrams of rhythm, grouping, and direction, and as its remaining aspects—depending on pitch—are incapable of exact representation. If we now crowd all the various schemes together and unite them with the indescribable effects of pitch and harmony, we get the actual progression; and

if any one scheme is complex, the combination is infinitely more so. When we look at these different plans and then imagine them pressed together and mutually interpenetrating, we cannot banish the thought of the confusion which must arise; yet the combination results in perfect harmony. As in a complex mechanism, the various cogs and wheels all fit together, no matter how great their individual diversity.

This brings us to the musical agreements and disagreements, which form the soul of the art. We may classify them under the captions of rhythmical, structural, tonic, and harmonic relations. Further headings are possible, but these are the most important. Upon the first we have already dwelt. The measure of a piece may be regarded as an ideal substructure, with which the notes do or do not coincide. Where every beat has its properly accented note, we may speak of agreement; the absence of notes or the shifting of accents implies disagreement.

By structural agreement we mean the mutual correspondence of the successive figures, sections, phrases, and periods. Measures 3-4 of a period as a rule answer to measures

1-2, measures 5-8 to 1-4, while the whole period may be a pendant to a former group. Psychologically it is difficult to point out just where the agreements and disagreements are located. Sometimes both elements of effect seem to be combined, a certain abiding sense of the correspondence between a section and its predecessor being interpenetrated with a craving for its conclusion, which involves dissatisfaction. At times the sense of agreement is strong at the beginning of an answering section, especially when the piece is familiar and a pause on the preceding note generates an anticipation of its successor. At times, again, it is pronounced at the conclusion: the mind reviews the field traversed and experiences complete satisfaction.

Modern compositions are based on keys. Presence of the tonic or key chord may be designated as tonic agreement, deviation therefrom as disagreement. In the case of modulation, the new tonic is the decisive chord.

The harmony of a beat may be pure, or clouded with foreign notes arising from suspensions, changing notes, and the like. Purity would be designated as agreement, impurity as its opposite. This antithesis

answers closely to the opposition between consonance and dissonance.

While every one of these categories yields a varied interplay of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, their union offers a field for endless permutations and combinations. Rhythmic agreement may be accompanied by harmonic disagreement, harmonic and tonic agreement by rhythmic disagreement. The end of a phrase may embody complete rest, except that it is in the dominant instead of the tonic harmony; hence the satisfaction arising from the combination of rhythmic, structural, and harmonic agreement emphasises the tonic disagreement, and heightens the effect of the final chord in the next phrase, which, uniting all the factors, yields complete satisfaction. In this varied play of suspense and realisation, contrast and identity, lies the essence of music. This can be verified in the simplest folk song. The ever-recurring, regular accents, the matching of phrases, the passage from tonic to dominant and back again, and the exquisite coincidence of the various factors on the final chord, reconciling all the previous divergences, form the heart of musical charm.¹

¹ See Appendix A.

Distinct contributions to our pleasure flow from the contemplation of formal arrangement as sketched in the preceding pages. Among the elements most clearly yielding delight are the contrasts of intensity and instrumental timbre; also the structural division into phrases, periods, and the like. The majestic repetition in the full orchestra of a theme which has previously received soft enunciation in the violins, is an effect which never fails to thrill the listener, old and traditional though it may be. The succession of phrases and periods lies at the very foundation of musical pleasure, imparting charm to the most elaborate symphony and the simplest dance tune alike. In classic music the intricacies of counterpoint and thematic work perhaps come next. There is a perennial source of delight in the manifold combinations and transformations of themes; and when these factors are united with variations of force, speed, and instrumental timbre, there results a tissue of relations which is unsurpassed in the entire realm of art. The contrasts of major and minor, *staccato* and *legato*, together with the grouping of different keys, are also distinctly apprehended. Rhythmic relations

between the individual notes, alternations of consonance and dissonance, and of tonic and non-tonic chords, are clearly perceived at times; but as a rule they affect the mind semi-consciously, just as the symmetry of a *façade* is realised without expressly comparing the length of its sides. Nevertheless the enjoyment which they yield may be classified under the category of form.

In spite of their importance, however, the formal aspects of music do not exhaust the pleasure which the art is capable of yielding. Two compositions may be equally interesting from a formal point of view, yet musically there may be a vast difference between them. Indeed, a less elaborate piece may even out-rank a more pretentious one. The theme of the *Allegretto* from Beethoven's seventh symphony may be played on the piano, thus foregoing the richness of orchestral timbre; it is short and embodies no great variety of inner structure; its rhythm is simple almost to monotony; it contains no decided variations of force or speed, and makes use neither of counterpoint nor intricate thematic work; it is simplicity itself, containing only the minimum of form, and yet it is a mine of genuine musical

value. The first four measures of Schumann's *Aus meinen Thränen sprissen*, the opening bars of his fourth *Nachtstück*, the initial harmonies of the *Vorspiel* to *Parsifal*, Luther's *Ein feste Burg*, and numerous other compositions, all prove that musical beauty and formal elaboration are not necessarily convertible terms.

To be sure, our analysis of form may be far from complete. We have examined only those features which are directly open to investigation, and can be marked off on music-paper. There is a more delicate aspect, a musical histology, which corresponds to the intimate structure of animal tissues. Many harmonies which are apparently indivisible may be resolved into double triads. Rhythmic and melodic abridgments are common, and they are so subtle in many cases as to be only detected with difficulty. Hauptmann even derives the single three-part measure from the overlapping of two two-part unities. There is a region of intimate relations, indeed, which has not yet been adequately explored. Here much of the peculiar "impenetrable" effectiveness of melody and harmony may conceivably be found to reside. Acoustic investigation has shown that the single tone

is really a subconscious chord. So a short melodic succession of notes, seemingly indivisible in its effect, might turn out to resemble a complete "form," like the sonata or rondo, with numerous subdivisions, contrasts, similarities, and cross-relations.¹

And if form shrinks, on the one side, into the elusively minute, it is dissipated, on the

¹ The following may give an idea of the more delicate form of analysis:



If we try to characterise the effect of these four chords, we shall find that the first typifies undisputed harmony of elements, the second opposition, the third compromise, and the fourth renewed harmony. Is it possible to find an explanation of this effect in the constitution of the chords? The harmony of the first chord is clear enough. An examination of the second shows that the highest note (F), which but a moment ago was the fundamental of its chord, has now become the fifth; but the fifth has a subservient, vassal-like character (in spite of the opposition predicated of the dominant on another page), as its function is to lead into the fundamental; hence the sway of the first chord is disputed, and a new "ruler" threatens to absorb it. With chord number three there is a mutual yielding of the conflicting elements: B flat leads into C, F drops to E,—the two combining to form the body of the dominant. And a moment later both unite to form the identical extremes of the final, satisfying harmony.

Such analyses, if extended to longer passages, with vari-

The first musical example consists of two staves. The upper staff is in treble clef with a key signature of two flats (B-flat and E-flat) and a common time signature. It features a melodic line with a slur over the first two measures and a fermata over the final note of the second measure. The lower staff is in bass clef with the same key signature and time signature, showing a simple accompaniment of quarter notes.

Later it occurs in a more florid form:

The second musical example consists of two staves. The upper staff is in treble clef with a key signature of two flats and a 3/8 time signature. It features a more complex melodic line with a slur over the first two measures and a fermata over the final note of the second measure. The lower staff is in bass clef with the same key signature and time signature, showing a simple accompaniment of quarter notes. The instruction *p dolce.* is written in the first measure of the upper staff.

The third musical example consists of two staves. The upper staff is in treble clef with a key signature of two flats and a common time signature. It features a complex melodic line with a slur over the first two measures and a fermata over the final note of the second measure. The lower staff is in bass clef with the same key signature and time signature, showing a simple accompaniment of quarter notes.

And later still the embellishment becomes even more pronounced:

p dolce.

The effect in each case depends on the memory of what has gone before: the second appearance is felt as an advance upon the first, the third requires the background of the other two. Next the melody appears in minor:

p



Its wonderfully expressive, almost startling effect is due to the long sojourn in major. The theme would be different were any of the previous enunciations missing, different still if it stood at the beginning, with no background whatever. And the impression of the *fortissimo*, a little later,



depends on the contrast with the preceding *piano*. Take away the memory of the past, and the result will be entirely different.

These relations are as valid and real, if not as evident, as those between successive notes. The *fortissimo* owes its effect just as unmistakably to the softness of the first enunciations as a sudden crash to the silence upon which it ensues. But this rule cannot be confined within the limits of a composition. In Wagner's *Ring of the Nibelung* motifs are introduced which borrow much of their stirring quality from their rendition on previous evenings. The impression of the Funeral March in *Götterdämmerung*, for example, is the outcome of hundreds of thematic repetitions during four successive performances. Indeed, even the circumstance that the works belong together is unessential. Unrelated compositions will affect one another as inevitably as those which are related. The whole realm of music may be regarded as a single huge composition, in which all the parts react on each other. As the sudden creation of a star would be felt throughout the universe, exerting a gravitative attraction on every fellow-member, so every note that is written

exerts its influence throughout the domain of tones. To speak with Guyau, it changes the very conditions of beauty.¹

This explains the different effects produced by the same composition at different times. The harmonies which sound novel to-day will be familiar in a few decades; the volume and richness of sound which pleased our ancestors are inadequate to-day. This is as much a matter of form as contiguous shadings of loudness and tempo. The effect of the following progression depends on the contrast between the soft and the loud tones:



Similarly a great burst of sound, produced by an orchestra of unusual dimensions, impresses us because it transcends what we are accustomed to hearing. The ordinary manifestations of force correspond to the notes which are marked *piano*, while the unusual effort rises above them as the *forte* emerges out of the continuum of subdued sound.

¹ Guyau, *Les Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, Paris, 1897, p. 140.

It is clear, then, that if we would adequately realise the form of a composition, we must not only mark off the symmetries directly apparent, but also search for the minute interstitial relations between the tones, and establish the larger affiliations with the entire field of music. Undoubtedly this widened conception of form would help in the explanation of musical charm. Both Helmholtz and Gurney incline to such a view. Helmholtz regards the existence of hidden, imperfectly divined form as essential to artistic beauty. In the lower realms of musical effectiveness his acoustic discoveries, he believes, have exposed the hidden order; which implies, of course, that there is further undiscovered order, on which the higher beauty depends.¹ Gurney says: "The melodic satisfaction of our semi-human or savage ancestors depended on some embryonic proportional and rhythmical element not extending, perhaps, beyond a few short and familiar recurrences; but I believe that in the hidden and unique processes by which the modern lover of music realises a melodic form, we have merely an infinitely elaborated and complex develop-

¹ Helmholtz, *Sensations of Tone*, London, 1885, p. 367.

ment of the same proportional sense.”¹ That is, there is a realm of minute, interstitial form, which as yet baffles the acumen of philosophers.

Even if we were to fathom the mysteries of this realm, however, there would be a further question to answer. Formal relations which are clearly perceived please us by this very fact. But where the relations elude observation the matter is not quite so simple. Consonance, for example, depends on an arithmetical proportion between the vibrations forming two or more tones; but since these vibrations are not consciously apprehended, we cannot attribute the harmonious effect to their proportion, but explain it as a physiological phenomenon. In general, where a formal relation is not evident to the senses, it is incumbent on us to explain why it pleases. Gurney, for example, does not regard the æsthetic value of his original,

¹ Gurney, *The Power of Sound*, London, 1880, p. 122. As a champion of the uniqueness of the musical faculty, Gurney might reject the idea that formal analysis could aid in explaining the charm of music. However, this conclusion is clearly involved in his words. If modern music is an elaborated development of an embryonic proportional element, analysis would certainly reveal the original nucleus of elaboration. See also p. 194 of his work.

embryonic element as inherent, but derives it from association. Hence the pleasure of the "elaborated and complex development" would also be derived from association. For the present we can say little about these mysterious matters. We must first know what the forms really are before we can speculate about the reason for their effectiveness. Suffice it to say that there must be a reason.

Meanwhile there are other sources of tonal delight to be examined. Association is a prominent factor in all varieties of æsthetic pleasure. By some theorists, indeed, it has been invoked as the foremost element of poetic charm. Let us devote the next chapter to it, and endeavour to determine the part which it plays in the enjoyment of musical compositions.

III

ASSOCIATION

WHEN we wish to remember a thing, we may resort to the old expedient of tying a string around the finger. The knot which fastens the string also unites or *associates* the two thoughts, the perception of the finger arousing the idea of the thing which was to be remembered. A feeling likewise may be associated with an idea. The name of the person who insulted us will cause our heart to beat faster, the Christmas bell awakens poetic sentiments. Artistic effectiveness depends in great measure on associated feelings of this nature. Poetry makes liberal use of words that are suffused with sentiment. Painting represents scenes that recall interesting experiences.

Music likewise owes some of its charm to this source. Waltzes that we have repeatedly danced to retain a halo of vanished pleasure.

Songs that we sang in our youth are depositaries of precious experience. But the scope of this species of effectiveness is limited and uncertain. My waltz may not be the one which my neighbour has woven into his life, the song of the Irishman will not awaken tender memories in the bosom of the Slav. Accident alone is the guiding factor in these cases, an insufficient basis for æsthetic determinations.

To be sure, entire classes of music may affect us in a similar way. Hymns in general lift us into a religious frame of mind, triumphal fanfares and military marches awaken patriotic fervour. Even particular instruments—like the trumpet, oboe, and organ—have their characteristic emotional tinges, contributed in part by association. In Greek music this specialisation of effect was prominent. Certain scales were employed for definite purposes,—one, for example, being reserved for sacred occasions, another for the expression of love, a third for the accompaniment of martial feelings, and so forth; as a result the circumstances attending the employment of the scales reacted on the latter, and lent them a specific quality. There is an approach to

this sort of effectiveness in the folk songs and dance music of the modern nations: we find it in the gypsy strains of Hungarian music, the yodellings of the Tyrolese mountaineers, and the fandangos and boleros of the Spanish maidens. But the closest approach is perhaps to be found in the Gregorian chant, the unique effect of which is due to the fact that it is confined almost wholly to a single set of circumstances and feelings.

In a broader sense all music may be said to have acquired a certain sweetness, sacredness, and dignity as a result of the festive occasions on which it is employed. This may be the true source of that vague, general pleasure which Lazarus attributes to the art, and which is independent of the specific nature of any composition,—independent even of a definite perception of its tones.¹ Likewise there may be an internal accretion of delight. At the theatre the mere sight of the footlights, together with the odours peculiar to the place, arouses a pleasure which is a legacy of the former plays we have witnessed; so music yields a compound interest of

¹ Lazarus, *Das Leben der Seele*, Berlin, 1897, vol. iii., p. 150.

satisfaction, the enjoyment once experienced tending to renew itself on later occasions. The tragic impression of the key of C minor, for example, may be due to the fact that Beethoven wrote so many compositions of a tragic nature in this key. (Witness the sonatas for piano Op. 13 and 111, the fifth symphony, and the overture to *Coriolanus*.)

But all these contributions of pleasure will not afford much help in the solution of our problem. Where the previous delight of a composition lingers on, we must first account for the original charm; and accidental associations, even if they apply to whole classes of music, have nothing to do with intrinsic value. An atheist may appreciate the musical worth of a choral as keenly as a believer, a Frenchman reap as much enjoyment from *Die Wacht am Rhein* as the most patriotic German.

If association is to account for the deeper charm of music, it must be involved in the very essence of the art. (We may venture the suggestion, in this connection, that some of the pleasure aroused by music is due to association with the experiences of rocking and related movements during the first years

of life. If any trace of this period were to survive oblivion, it would very likely be that of the sensations in question, deep-reaching and pervasive as they were at the time. The whole life of the infant is enclosed, as it were, in the systole and diastole of rhythmical movement; is it absurd to suppose that the rhythms of music arouse, in a dreamy, far-off manner, the sensations of opening, budding life?

From this suggestion we pass to a more serious attempt at explanation. The union of ideas and feelings so far considered must be effected in the life-time of an individual. Though the odour of a Christmas tree arouses poetic sentiments in me—because I played about the tree when I was young—my children will not be affected unless they again have the same associations established. It is conceivable, however, for a frequent repetition of experiences, during successive generations, to end in the establishment of hereditary associations, the feelings of the ancestors being aroused in the descendants without renewed coupling. According to some writers, the delights of landscape are explicable in this manner. Our savage forefathers, living

in close contact with nature, had the strong emotions of their wild lives interwoven with natural objects; so that the mysterious sentiments aroused in us by nature are a reverberation of feelings which were experienced countless generations ago. The charm of music, too, has been made the subject of a similar explanation. Darwin proposes a theory of this kind, the conclusions of which are accepted by Gurney. Song—the primary form of the art—is supposed to have been developed by sexual selection. Those of our remote ancestors who could sing best were chosen as mates by the opposite sex, as is the case among birds; the emotions of love, rivalry, triumph, and the like, experienced during the breeding season, were associatively welded to the perception of the tones, so that we, in hearing music, have called up “vaguely and indefinitely the strong emotions of a long-past age.”¹

An initial difficulty with every theory which, like this, depends on hereditary association of ideas, resides in the doubtful possibility of the transmission, from parent to child, of characteristics acquired during the life of

¹ Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, New York, 1898, p. 584.

the parent. | The Chinese have long distorted the feet of their women, yet Chinese babes have normal feet. According to Weissmann only inborn characteristics are, with rare exceptions, handed down from one generation to another. Life resembles the chain clock. The normal, "inborn" motion of the chains is straight downward. We may deflect this course by swinging the chains from side to side or revolving them in circles, but we shall only influence the present descent: wind up the clock again, and the "inborn" course reasserts itself.

Since Weissmann's view is not established, however, it is not absolutely fatal to the theory; but there are other difficulties awaiting it. It is not universally admitted even that birds emit sounds in order to attract the other sex: Spencer maintains that their heightened vitality at the breeding time finds an outlet, as in other ways and at other times, in vocal utterance. Then the case of birds has no bearing whatever on human music. One might as well try to establish a theory of human instincts by the analogy of spiders. The class of birds diverged from the tree of life as far back as the reptilian age, and a

connection between the two kinds of singing would presuppose the existence of music already in the common reptilian ancestors,—an absurd supposition. But it is almost equally improbable that music was independently developed by sexual selection in the animals leading up to man. Darwin himself regards it as surprising that “we have not as yet any good evidence that these [the vocal] organs are used by male mammals to charm the females.” Furthermore we find among savage songs comparatively few that refer to love,—a strange fact if music arose in connection with the amatory instinct.

Balfour opposes another difficulty: “If it is the primitive association which produces the pleasure-giving quality, the further this is left behind by the developing art, the less pleasure should be produced. . . . according to all association theories of music, that which is charged with the raw material of æsthetic pleasure is not the music we wish to have explained, but some primeval howl . . . and no solution whatever is offered of the paradox that the sounds which give musical delight have no associations, and that the

sounds which had associations give no musical delight.”¹

This objection, too, may not be insuperable. It is conceivable that the original strains involved a mental process the arousal of which demands more and more complex groupings of tone as the mind grows in organisation. It is something like this, we imagine, that Gurney had in mind when he spoke of the “embryonic proportional and rhythmical element” and its “infinitely elaborated and complex development” in the music of to-day.² However, if this way of escaping the difficulty is to be chosen it is incumbent on the champions of the theory to exhibit the aboriginal elements, with their manifold elaborations in modern music. That nothing of the kind has been done it is needless to say. In general the theory of Darwin suffers from lack of proof; it rests on mere conjecture, and, though it is impossible to refute it, the difficulties besetting it are so numerous that acceptance seems out of question.

✓ The only argument of weight in favour of

¹ Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*, New York, 1895, p. 39 *et seq.*

² See quotation in Chap. II.

an evolutionary explanation of musical enjoyment is to be drawn from the pleasure derived from the art by young children. Their limited years of experience might seem inadequate as a basis for the associations and symbolisations required by some other theories. However, this point is by no means settled; and there are few or no data regarding the enjoyment of musical compositions by children under ten years of age; so that it is doubtful whether the pleasure which they experience is really of the deep and penetrating kind experienced by adults.

IV

SYMBOLISATION

WE arrive at the theories of symbolisation. They must be distinguished from the type just considered. According to both kinds of explanation, music reminds us of things which have emotional value; but in the case of symbolisation it imitates or reproduces these things, while association presupposes no resemblance between the tones and the objects or feelings which they suggest. When a song which I heard in my youth reminds me of boyhood joys, the connection is merely accidental; but when a cradle song arouses tender sentiments, it does so by simulating the motion of the cradle, and reproducing the quiet and repose and gentle singing which accompany the act of motherly devotion.

THE THEORY OF SPENCER

Following the theory sketched in the last

chapter, it may be well to take up an explanation proposed by another great champion of the evolutionary doctrine. According to Herbert Spencer, music derives its effectiveness from speech.¹ This is said to be "compounded of two elements, the words and the tones in which they are uttered—the signs of ideas and the signs of feeling. While certain articulations express the thought, certain modulations express the more or less of pain and pleasure which the thought gives. Using the word *cadence* in an unusually extended sense, as comprehending all variations of voice, we may say that *cadence is the commentary of the emotions upon the propositions of the intellect.*" Music is supposed to have its root "in those tones, intervals, and cadences of speech which express feeling—arising by the combination and intensifying of these, and coming finally to have an embodiment of its own"; and the special signs of feeling which ultimately produce music are loudness, quality or timbre, pitch, intervals, and rate of variation. Excitement and strength of feeling vent themselves in sounds

¹ Spencer, *Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, New York, 1896, p. 400 *et seq.*

that are louder, more resonant, higher or lower, make use of greater intervals, and skip from tone to tone more rapidly, than those expressive of ordinary feelings. Song is an augmentation of these traits, distinguished from ordinary speech by the "vocal peculiarities which indicate excited feeling." "Every one of the alterations of voice which we have found to be a physiological result of pain or pleasure, is carried to an extreme in vocal music." Here we find still greater loudness, resonance, extremes of pitch, intervals, and rapidity of variation. Hence the emotions originally accompanying passionate utterance will be revived in the musical extension; indeed, since the marks which indicate such utterance are exaggerated, there will even be an intensification of effect.

The trouble with this theory is that it gives us the cage without the bird. It overlooks the essential aspect of music. For it is possible to augment all the traits of excited speech without obtaining music, and also to produce music with the features in question developed even less than in ordinary speech. We can imagine a group of persons with voices of superhuman strength and resonance

and with ranges extending from the deepest bass to the highest soprano, engaged in a furious dispute, in the heat of which intervals of several octaves would be jumped with marvellous rapidity; yet nobody would mistake the resulting din for a cantata, nobody would admire its melodic beauty, harmonic richness, or contrapuntal interweaving of themes. On the other hand let us imagine the following little sequence of tones played softly on a xylophone, an instrument of little resonance:



Although the tones are softer than those of speech, lie at an ordinary pitch, vary but little in intervals, confine themselves to successive intervals of a second and to the total range of a third, nobody will fail to recognise a musical phrase. Indeed, if the rhythm of the phrase is merely reproduced by taps on the table, with the loss of all

resonance, pitch, and variation of intervals, the result will be more musical than the din of the disputants; the germ of music is present, which is not the case in the confusion of voices.

To be sure, the phrase is not beautiful; but if we insist on beauty we may turn to the theme of the *Allegretto* from Beethoven's seventh symphony: almost as simple as the illustration above, it nevertheless harbours genuine musical value. The difference between this case and the noise of the quarrelers, as between all music and ordinary speech, lies in the formal, symmetrical nature of the music and the hap-hazard, random character of the vocal *mêlée*. But form and plan cannot be imparted by any amount of mere loudness, resonance, or variation of pitch. As well might one expect to get a patterned carpet by throwing together a heap of bright and variegated threads. What we need is a definite arrangement of threads: this will give us the carpet, even with the use of only a few colours. Likewise music demands a definite arrangement of tones; the tones may be few in number and may vary from one another by the smallest intervals; yet, cast

into the regular mould, they will result in music. The effectiveness, accordingly, ought somehow to reside in the mould.¹

To be sure, the question involves delicate psychological considerations. A pretty design pleases by itself, through the arrangement of its parts; if it is used for a piece of jewelry, however, and embellished with precious stones, its intrinsic charm is overshadowed by the brilliancy of the gems. Use gold, without any stones, and it is doubtful which is to be regarded as the main factor. So likewise at the theatre. When we are infatuated with the heroine's personality and the plot is not especially interesting, we enjoy watching her, and the rest is a mere setting. Reverse the conditions and the play rises to paramount importance, while the heroine becomes an accessory. How is it in music? Does the formal elaboration merely constitute a framework for imitations of the cadences of speech? Such a condition is not intrinsically

¹ In fairness we must quote Spencer's words to the effect that "the distinctive traits of song are simply the traits of emotional speech intensified and *systematised*." The trouble is that he makes no effort to show whence the systematisation is derived, or to indicate any connection between it and speech. This, however, is the vital aspect of the question.

impossible; but it is not verified by experience. When we pronounce on the relative importance of material and design, as in the case of the trinket, we are guided by our feeling, regarding that as essential which engrosses our attention. But the effectiveness of music does not seem to be involved in imitations of speech: it is this effect of harmony or that flow of melody that we enjoy, not the suggestion they afford of human utterance. Who can detect any resemblance to speech in Chopin's *étude* on the black keys; who would attribute the charm of Strauss's *Blue Danube Waltzes* to this source? As well might one expect a pine chest to do service for a pine tree, and recall the Christmas experiences of youth.

Here we have a case where Balfour's objection, mentioned in the last chapter, has complete validity. The tones that had associations are not those which we enjoy; and the tones which we enjoy are not those that had associations. It is conceivable that modern music, as Gurney says, is an elaboration of some elementary proportion; but where shall we look for imitations of speech in the *Andante* of Beethoven's tenth sonata, where seek it in

the opening of his magnificent *Waldstein*? Who can hear cadences of voice in Wagner's *Fire Music*, who recognise linguistic effects in the turmoil of his *Venusberg*? Is not the mere reference to these examples a *reductio ad absurdum*?

The criticism may be continued along other lines. If Spencer's theory is true, three conditions must be fulfilled: Definite emotions must vent themselves in invariable cadences of speech; compositions which arouse definite emotions must have invariable musical characteristics; the cadences and the characteristics must agree. Not even the first of these propositions has received anything like proof. In fact, the actual state of affairs is chaotic. The same feelings may receive expression in different cadences, and the same cadences may accompany different feelings. To cite but two examples from Gurney, the sentences "I love you" and "I hate you" may both be pronounced with the same rise of pitch on the second word; and "The command 'Go away' may be given quite as naturally with a sudden rise on the last syllable as with a sudden drop."¹ The rules of correspondence are

¹Gurney, *The Power of Sound*, London, 1880, pp. 484 and 481.

but few in number and general in character, affording no basis for a theory of musical effectiveness like that under consideration.


Finally it may be suggested that the emotional accompaniment of speech is too slight, as a rule, to furnish the basis of powerful associations. Association (together with symbolisation like that in question) operates by distilling off and transmuting feelings that were previously experienced. But this presupposes an original fund of sufficient depth. It is difficult to see how the neutral communications that fill the greater part of our conversation should generate exalted feelings like those aroused by the *Vorspiel* to *Parsifal*. So we are driven back to the cadences indicative of the more deeply emotional kinds of speech, which greatly restricts the explanation and heightens the difficulties to be overcome.

There is no doubt that music occasionally moves the hearer by suggesting impassioned utterance; but this is only one of its many channels of effectiveness. The symbolisation of speech is co-ordinate with other varieties of symbolic suggestion, some of which far out-rank it in importance. To lift it to the posi-

tion of a solitary and supreme explanation, is totally unwarranted by the facts.

SCHOPENHAUER AND LOTZE

We must devote considerable space to the theory of Schopenhauer. The fundamental thought of this philosopher's metaphysical system is that space, time, and matter do not constitute the essential world. The heart of being is to be found in the *will*: as our own body is the manifestation of a personal striving, desiring, and willing, so the whole universe, with its wealth of mineral, vegetable, and animal forms, is the "objectification" of a world-will, which is distinguished from that of the individual by the fact that it is unconscious, except where it crops forth in human or animal intelligence. The arts represent the "forms" of the world in their purity and essence; as such they copy what Schopenhauer, following Plato, calls the Ideas. Music, however, occupies a distinct place: it represents the will directly, forming an objectification in exactly the same sense as the material world or the Ideas. Music and the material world, or its Ideas, thus turn out to be co-ordinate or parallel to each other.



Owing to this agreement, there is an analogy between the two realms. The deepest tones correspond to the lowest grades of will-manifestation, comprising unorganised nature or the mass of the planet. The fact that the bass notes are accompanied by the higher partials, and that "only those high notes may [harmonically] accompany a bass-note which actually already sound along with it of themselves," is "analogous to the fact that the whole of the bodies and organisations of nature must be regarded as having come into existence through gradual development out of the mass of the planet," which is "both their supporter and their source." Bass occupies the same position in harmony which "unorganised nature, the crudest mass, upon which

all rests, and from which everything originates and develops," occupies in the world of matter. The tenor corresponds to the vegetable kingdom, the alto to the realm of animals. "The disconnected course of all the complementary parts, and their regulation by definite laws, is analogous to the fact that in the whole irrational world, from the crystal to the most perfect animal, no being has a connected consciousness of its own which would make its life into a significant whole, and none experiences a succession of mental developments, none perfects itself by culture, but everything exists always in the same way according to its kind, determined by fixed law."

Man finds his counterpart in the soprano. "As he alone, because endowed with reason, constantly looks before and after on the path of his actual life and its innumerable possibilities, and so achieves a course of life which is intellectual, and therefore connected as a whole . . . the melody has significant intentional connection from beginning to end. It records, therefore, the history of the intellectually enlightened will. . . . Now the nature of man consists in this, that his will

strives, is satisfied and strives anew, and so on forever. . . . And corresponding to this the nature of melody is a constant digression and deviation from the key-note in a thousand ways . . . yet there always follows a constant return to the key-note."¹ The analogy is carried out in some detail, and illustrated by reference to various styles of composition; but a comprehension of the theory does not require that we enter into all these particulars.

In considering the value of the theory we may ignore its philosophical basis. The attempt to establish a musical doctrine by means of a system of metaphysics resembles the endeavour to reach a neighbouring city by first travelling around the globe. Until philosophers agree, we may relinquish such efforts. Then, too, the theory need not be despoiled by this abbreviation. We have but to rub out the will and the Ideas in our scheme, and it still remains, as a plausible explanation of musical charm. The question then becomes: are Schopenhauer's analogies correct; is the art of tones a reflection of the

¹ Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, London, 1891, p. 333 *et seq.*

material world as indicated by the philosopher?

The arbitrary, fantastic nature of the functions ascribed to the four voices, in the representation of the natural realms, must be apparent at a glance. Analysis supports this impression by revealing many inaccuracies in the supposed parallelism. Music does not necessarily consist of four voices: previous to the ninth century a single voice was the rule. Furthermore, even strictly four-part music in general comprises only three distinct parts, the fourth, or soprano, being a duplication of one of the others. Where is this significant feature matched in the material world? Is the life of man merely a repetition of the lower realms? Through his intellectual nature, to be sure, man pictures the subhuman world, but animals likewise have images of plants and inorganic things, yet the alto is not a repetition of the tenor or bass. Then, too, the thoughts of human beings are occupied in the main with other human beings, not with subhuman things,—a fact which is not reflected in the combinations of harmony, where the soprano doubles one of the lower voices. Occasionally—in the seventh chords—we have four distinct parts instead of three, another puzzling

feature. And finally there is the notorious fact that melodies are not confined to the soprano: sometimes they jump systematically from one voice to another, sometimes two or more are combined in different parts. Is it possible to reconcile this with the statement that the soprano alone has connection as a whole, and that the other voices are mere disconnected complements?

As a rule the secondary parts are organically interwoven with the soprano; the psychological effect is that of a whole, not of four united elements. Accordingly, if the lower parts are to be conceived as reflections of the subordinate realms, they do not picture them in isolation, but rather as they enter into human activities. And if the soprano represents human life, it can only delineate the same in its interconnection with the lower realms. But do the vicissitudes of coal-mining, potato-growing, and cattle-raising form the subject of the melodic communications? Are the interests of every human life neatly parcelled out among the activities of digging, planting, and sheep-tending? Has every passion these appendages of the soil? Viewing humanity as a whole, to be sure, there is a relation to

the other realms somewhat similar to that between the soprano and the lower voices. But according to the theory of Schopenhauer it is the detailed view of humanity, not the bird's-eye panorama, which is depicted in the soprano. "The inexhaustibleness of possible melodies corresponds to the inexhaustibleness of Nature in difference of individuals, physiognomies, and courses of life."¹ The scale of measurement for the soprano is too small for the other voices, that of the other voices too large for the soprano. We must adjust our eyes for one or the other view, a combination being impossible.

So much for the flaws in Schopenhauer's theory. In his analysis of the soprano he exhibits a highly significant correspondence.

* | Melody, with its harmonic basis, is an interplay of agreement and disagreement, life an alternation of desire and appeasement. In both there is a perpetual expectation, a striving toward goals, a satisfaction of attainment, with a supervening renewal of desire. There is an overlapping of aims, the attainment of one end being a stepping-stone toward the realisation of another, which is higher and

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 337.

more comprehensive. Hence appeasement and expectation often coexist, a partial satisfaction preparing the way for a more emphatic effort. Provisional endings or attainments give way to periods of full-blast energy, in which both music and life are at a white heat of effort and emotion. Subsidence follows: but there is no absolute repose; new ends already appear in the background, and anon the movement recommences. An example will make the matter clearer :

SCHUBERT, Serenade.

The musical score consists of four staves of music in 3/4 time, with a key signature of one flat (B-flat). The measures are numbered 1 through 16. Measure 1 begins with a piano (*p*) dynamic and a triplet of eighth notes. Measures 2, 7, and 8 also feature triplet markings. Measure 15 is marked with a pianissimo (*pp*) dynamic. The score includes various musical notations such as slurs, accents, and fermatas.

Measure 1 may be regarded as a kind of enunciation or statement, an entrance of

actors, with no purpose or end as yet clearly indicated. In measure 2 the statement grows more involved, and a tendency to resolve it becomes apparent. The resolution comes in measure 3; the note A, especially, has a goal-like character, being the logical outcome of the preceding notes, the point toward which they were moving. It is not the complete goal, however, but requires the whole of the third and fourth measures to produce entire satisfaction; even while we welcome its arrival we look forward to its supplementation in the following notes. At the end of measure 4, then, there is a temporary halt; we have finished the first cycle of activity and stop to realise our progress. But our repose is only temporary. Satisfaction is already intermingled with the anticipation of further developments, and our contentment resembles a storing of force, a strengthening readiness for coming efforts. In measure 7, then, the effort is renewed with heightened energy. We have a feeling, too, that it will be effective enough to break through the barriers of key and lead to new realms of activity: the first six measures, we feel, were only a preparation for the events to

come. Measure 8 continues the movement and measures 9-10 realise our expectations: we are well out in the sea of activity and experience satisfaction at the progress of events. But again our satisfaction is only the prelude of renewed activity, which in measure 13 makes its entrance with a vigour and strenuousness even beyond that of the previous bars.

Finally, after the end of the piece is reached, after the last satisfying chords have been played, do we experience unalloyed contentment? Having attained our end, may we revel in continued, unending delight? Far from it. A dwelling on the final chord would mean intolerable monotony: either we must turn away from the music altogether, or begin again with dissonance, effort, and strife. In life, too, there is a constant passage from one desire and its realisation to another. We sometimes delude ourselves into the belief that the attainment of this or that end will be the termination of all activity: our desires will once for all be satisfied and bliss will begin an unending reign in our bosom. But we are the dupe of an illusion; for our end, once attained, loses all the charm which it possessed in the distance, and lo! off yonder

another goal has appeared, beckoning to us with alluring promise.

Although Schopenhauer's theory is fantastic, then, in its cosmical analogies, the parallelism which it traces between melody and human life is profoundly significant. Closely related to this theory is the one proposed by Lotze. It has been stated so vaguely by its author that it is difficult to seize its substance. The function of music seems to be located in the representation of the types or moulds of events, the formulæ according to which things happen. "If we find ourselves reaching a long desired goal through incessant consistency of action, we do not merely value the definite advantage which accrues to us through the attainment of this particular aim, but we rejoice no less in the thought of the general constancy of the world, which renders it possible for steady consistency to be successful . . . if we survey the world in its totality and find that it does not disintegrate into lawless diversity, but that fixed classes of beings, related to one another with different degrees of affinity, develop, each according to its kind, and that each finds in the surrounding external world

the sufficient conditions of its development, we retain of this picture, long after we have forgotten the single features, the image of a harmonious whole, in which every single living instinct does not exhaust itself, solitary and forlorn, in emptiness, but in which each may hope to find accompanying tendencies, which support it, strengthen it, and lead it to the goal. And this grand panorama can hardly be referred to without spontaneously resolving itself into music; without our immediately becoming aware that just this is the object of the art of tones,—to express the profound joy which resides in this constitution of the world, and of which the pleasure of every single empirical feeling is only a particular reflection. . . . So we fully agree . . . that music directly reproduces only the dynamic aspect of the events which happen, only the *figures* of their happening; but we do not regard the value of these figures as inherent; they appear beautiful by awakening the memory of the countless blessings that are imaginable in the same rhythms of happening, and only in them.”¹

¹ Lotze, *Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland*, Munich, 1868, p. 485 *et seq.*

This is evidently an approximation to the theory of the great pessimist, with the fantastic elements left out. "All possible efforts, excitements, and manifestations of will," corroborates Schopenhauer, "all that goes on in the heart of man . . . may be expressed by the infinite number of possible melodies, but always in the universal, in the mere form, without the material."¹

It behoves us now to ask: what are the *figures of happening*; what is implied in the *universal*, in the mere *form without the material*? Something similar, it would seem, to that embodied in the symbols of algebra or logic. The logical formulæ express no definite truths, but represent the types of all correct reasoning; and so music might be supposed to express life in its general features: desire, strife, attainment, joy, sadness, languor, victory in general, but not this or that particular feeling or occurrence. It brings to view what the various occurrences have in common, the rhythm or mould of their happening.

But this, too, is no exact definition. Let us attempt to formulate such a definition, by

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 339.

extending the theories just considered, and expressing them in more specific terms.

MUSIC AS A DELINEATION OF LIFE IN PERSPECTIVE

When we go up in a balloon, the aspects of nature undergo transformation. The broad, pond-like river changes into a shining ribbon, the forest is transformed into a dark patch. And if we could continue our journey, well on toward the moon, the change would be greater still: small streams, forests, ponds, and hills would disappear, and in their place the larger features of the earth's surface—the mountain ranges, continents, and oceans—would come to view. What would be the impression if we could similarly perceive life in perspective? Is there any product of human endeavour which could furnish a clew to the answer? Verbal expositions—in prose or poetry—reproduce a man's career in features of any desirable breadth or minuteness, but the result is a conceptual, not a perceptual product; it corresponds to the verbal description of a landscape or a house, while we demand an actual picture, similar to the dup-

lications of painting and photography. The drama, it is true, reproduces directly, but its delineations are in life-size, not in perspective. The events which are portrayed occupy as much time as they would in reality, the condensation of longer periods being effected by choosing salient, important occurrences and skipping over what is intermediate. Is it impossible, then, to give an actual, contracted delineation of life, corresponding to the maps and perspectives of the graphical art?

Let us see whether music does not fulfil the necessary requirements. Being temporal in nature, it satisfies the first condition. Again, its tonal material is admirably adapted for the reflection of mental and emotional developments. There is no resemblance between the word "contentment" and the condition it signifies. But when the string orchestra plays a sustained A major chord, possibly accompanied by delicate trills in the flutes and clarinets, we have a tolerably good representation of this condition. And when the chord changes to minor, there is a simulation of states which are more elegiac and melancholy in nature. Indeed, single tones already serve

tolerably well as reflections of feeling: a prolonged note on the violin is analogous to the state of contentment, a tone on the English horn approaches the effect produced by the minor chord. Continuing, we find excellent delineative helps in shadings of force. Loud tones answer to forcible manifestations of life, soft tones correspond to gentler conditions, *crescendos* and *diminuendos* imitate an increase or decrease in the strength of feeling. Characteristics of tempo and rhythm indicate the slower or faster pace of a man's experiences, and exhibit the hesitations, pauses, and precipitate advances which may break, retard, or accelerate them. Measure corresponds to the regular succession of physical and physiological conditions,—night and day, hunger and satisfaction; harmony and counterpoint to the variety of events which develop side by side. But most important of all is melody. Schopenhauer has shown how admirably the melodic progression, with its alternating agreement and disagreement, answers to the fluctuating course of experience. Here, then, we have a means of depicting the higher aspects of life: purpose, volition, attainment.

It is impossible to put a limit on the extent

of the correspondence. Perhaps even the regular succession of intervals in the scale may find its parallel in life. Psychology offers an analogous case. An increase of stimulation in an organ of sense is not accompanied by a similar increase in the intensity of sensation: while the stimulation accumulates without interruption, the sensation advances by pulsations or leaps. The result is a gamut of feelings, accompanying the continuum of physical influence. Is it inconceivable that a similar condition prevails in the case of life? Although one situation seems to grow out of another without break or interruption, might not a broader view gain the impression of a serial advance, corresponding to the broken progression of the scale?

In fact, there are certain phenomena in life which already show a rough correspondence to those of the scale. A diatonic progression does not merely produce more or less of the same sensation: the octave, for example, does not differ from the fifth solely because it is higher; while the fifth embodies a distinct opposition to the fundamental, the octave agrees with the fundamental. The fourth,

again, though situated between the third and the fifth, by no means shares their qualities, but produces an effect which is unique and which belongs only to itself. In life, too, augmentations of feeling or stimulation do not always produce greater quantities of the same feeling. A point arrives where the feeling begins to alter, or even develops into its opposite. Pleasure becomes pain, sorrow turns into desperation. Interest grows to a culmination, then wanes, and finally sinks into indifference. There are qualitative differences, indeed, which show a decided resemblance to those of the scale. Is it absurd to suppose that there may be an affinity between the two sets of phenomena?

Having developed the correspondence from the musical side, let us now reverse the procedure, and endeavour to outline the aspects of life when seen under the conditions postulated. How would life appear if it could be viewed in perspective, the events sweeping past at a quickened rate? In the first place the details would drop out of sight,—the speeches and gestures, the duties of the hour, and in general all those smaller activities which merely form the fringes of the larger currents. In-

stead, streams of tendency would come to view, surgings to and fro, obstructed efforts, precipitate advances, victorious emergences, expectations, hesitations, and satisfactions. And is not music admirably adapted to form a picture of all these things? How better reproduce longing and expectation, with its resulting satisfaction, than by means of a sustained dominant, followed by the resolving tonic? Is not the following passage a superb reproduction of vigorous effort, fighting its way through obstruction, and climbing to victory and light?

The image displays two systems of musical notation for piano. Both systems are in a minor key, indicated by two flats in the key signature. The first system consists of five measures. The right-hand part (treble clef) features a sustained dominant chord (F major) with a melodic line that rises and then falls. The left-hand part (bass clef) provides a rhythmic accompaniment with chords and single notes. The first measure of the first system is marked with 'cres' (crescendo). The second system also consists of five measures. The right-hand part continues the melodic line, and the left-hand part provides accompaniment. The first measure of the second system is marked with 'cen' (crescendo), and the final measure is marked with 'do' (tonic). The music concludes with a resolving tonic chord in the right hand.



An analogous case is to be found in the transition from the third to the last movement of Beethoven's fifth symphony, from which the above example is taken. And still confining ourselves to the same composition, we may depict the emergence from troubling religious doubt to the certainty of faith, from sickness to health, or from want to independence, covering months or years of time, by means of the following chords:





In life, as in the tones of this example, we often have an exacerbation, a crisis, just before the deliverance. To be sure, it is doubtful whether life would resolve itself into an exact counterpart of music, with measures and phrases, augmented triads and changing notes; but something analogous to the tonal progressions—something corresponding to the agreements and dissonances, the struggles and victories—would probably come to view.¹

To render the psychological aspect of the matter clearer, let us consider what may be called the perspective of memory. We reproduce the events of yesterday in their immediate, life-size dimensions: we recall how we jumped out of bed, breakfasted, read the paper, began our work, received a caller,

¹ See Appendix C.

mailed some letters,—almost as if we were living over the experiences again. The interstices between the remembered events are small in dimension: hours, half-hours, and minutes. When we think of the occurrences of last month, however, the widening has already begun: we no longer pass from the events of one hour or minute to those of the next, but jump from day to day. And when we recur to the years gone by, the measure has grown to such an extent that events separated by entire years pass before us in juxtapositions as close as those of yesterday's occurrences. Like the railway tracks over which we are speeding, the time-lengths shrink together as the events recede into the past.

The process is clearly exemplified in certain metaphors. When we speak of the early efforts in an art as a "twittering," or characterise the movements of a wandering tribe as a "restless surging," we are viewing the activities in perspective. Originally they did not make the impression of twitterings and surgings, but when they are seen from a distance they move together and assume the aspects embodied in the figures of speech. Professor Royce informs us that Schelling's

“early works followed one another like lightning flashes, each one striking in a new and unexpected place.”¹ And a biography of Haydn tells us that at one time the composer “thought of finding some less precarious means of earning enough to eat and drink than music presented, and for a moment he turned his back on the art he loved so well.”² In reality the works of Schelling underwent the usual lengthy process of publication and circulation, and the “moment” of the composer may have covered many weeks of time.

Why do these figures appeal to us? Because the mind is prepared for their reception, because there is something in the mind that corresponds to the motions they suggest. And music, according to our hypothesis, would please for the same reason. Owing to the compression of events, the mind is ready to duplicate the forms of motion assumed by experience when seen in perspective. For experience in perspective is nothing but memory at a distance. Hence music, which simulates the larger outlines of experience,

¹ Royce, *Studies of Good and Evil*, New York, 1898, p. 350.

² *Famous Composers and their Works*, Boston (copyright 1891), vol. ii., p. 248.

agrees with the course of thought as the mind views the occurrences of the past.

The theory thus developed furnishes an admirable explanation of the mysterious charm of music. It often seems to us, when listening to a musical composition, as if we were receiving familiar communications; likewise the feelings aroused are apt to be of a composite nature, as if numerous emotions and experiences were being blended together. This is exactly what the theory would lead us to expect. Reproducing life in perspective, the tones tell us of our own experiences; but the diminution in size forms such an effective disguise that we are unable to recognise any single occurrences. And the scale of reproduction is so extensive that countless experiences are caught up in progressions covering but little time; hence the peculiar mixture of emotions.

LAZARUS, SULLY, LIPPS, MISS PUFFER, KASSEL

Before concluding this chapter we must briefly review several other theories of the symbolistic type. Lazarus recognises five sources of musical pleasure, three of which correspond to the species of effectiveness

touched upon in the three preceding chapters. More important than all of these, however, is the symbolic element. The musical forms are not only perceived as such, but become "symbols of plastic forms and spiritual movements"; they affect us through their resemblance to non-musical objects and happenings, and hence are apprehended as "living, energetic, and ethical beings and events." "Grace, gentleness, and melancholy, charm and emotion, profundity and high sentiment, dulness and pedantry, nobility and distinction are ascribed to the musical as to the poetical composition. Tragedy and humour, plain-tiveness and buffoonery, laughing and weeping, exultation and grieving, are said to receive expression and portrayal. . . . Richness of colour, festive pomp, gloomy and cheerful, rugged and harmonious illumination are *seen* in the tones; sweet euphony, rhythmical grace, melodic charm, declamation, song, poetry are *heard* in the (instrumental) tones; truth, earnestness, and depth; sensations, feelings, thoughts, happenings, and conditions of life are *thought* in them."¹

¹ Lazarus, *Das Leben der Seele*, Berlin, 1897, vol. iii., p. 121 et seq.

The author makes no attempt to point out the musical features on which these qualities depend: the analogy is only felt, not made evident to the understanding. In order to complete the theory, it would be necessary to indicate specifically what tonal combinations produce the effects of grace, gentleness, nobility, dulness, truth, depth, and so forth, and to make clear why they do so.

The theory of Lipps is similar. The essence of music is supposed to lie in a "psychical resonance," or agreement between the tonal forms and our own experience. "Countless recollections, ideas, and thoughts potentially exist in us whose characteristic it is to run the same course in us and excite us in the same way as the tones and their total movement. We may say that potentially many 'tones' related to the audible ones always exist in us, which are ready to chime along."¹

According to Sully there are three sources of musical pleasure,—tone, form, and suggestion.² The third is supposed to account for

¹ Lipps, *Grundlegung der Aesthetik*, Hamburg and Leipzig, 1903, p. 480.

² Sully, *Sensation and Intuition*, London, 1880, Essays on

most of the peculiar emotional delight generated by musical compositions. Although he is sane and fertile in his reasoning when he deals with the first two factors, Sully appears to be singularly one-sided in regard to the third. He is a devoted follower of Spencer. Beyond form and nervous stimulation he sees little in the art but suggestions of speech. Everything is led back to this one source, while analogies which press themselves on the attention are ignored. "The convergence of two series [of tones] from a wide interval to perfect unison, or from greatly unequal to equal intensities or rapidities" is supposed to have its prototype in verbal intercourse; likewise the "similarities and contrasts in the pitch, intensity, direction of interval, and rapidity of two or more series of tones." That is, the contrapuntal interplay of themes, which is beautiful, borrows its charm from the *mêlée* of several speakers, which is chaotic. Contrasts in the loudness, tempo, and character of different sections and

"The Basis of Musical Sensation," "Aspects of Beauty in Musical Form," and "On the Nature and Limits of Musical Expression." The tonal factor includes simple combinations of tones, so far as they are physiologically effective.

movements are explained in the same way, by reference to the vocal accompaniments of analogous sequences of feeling. It does not occur to the author to compare the musical and emotional sequences directly, instead of approaching the latter by means of the words in which they gain utterance.

The trouble with Sully is that he persists in leading us through the gate of speech, when there is no fence to prevent direct access at any point. The same answer can be made to him that was opposed to Spencer: symbolisations of speech contribute to musical delight, but do not exhaust it.

Miss Puffer's theory may be regarded as a psychological approach to the theory of Schopenhauer.¹ The essence of musical pleasure is supposed to reside in the satisfaction of the will as it is embodied in the tones. The two fundamental aspects of the art are rhythm and tonality. Both of these involve a satisfaction of expectation, one in the regular recurrence of beats, the other in the constant return to the key-note. The

¹ Ethel D. Puffer, *The Psychology of Beauty*, Boston and New York, 1905, p. 151 *et seq.* The classification of this theory is not obvious. In certain respects the theory resembles those of the parallelistic type.

three factors of volition—anticipation, effort, and realisation—are reproduced in the anticipation of the tonal and rhythmical termini, the movement toward them, and their final realisation in the satisfying notes. Music thus arouses the illusion and exaltation of the triumphant will.

Still another theory is that of Charles Kassel.¹ Music derives its charm, according to him, from its resemblance to various natural and human phenomena. Mass of sound finds its prototype in the "roar of preying beast or torrent—the howl and shriek of wind and wave—the clap and growl of angry skies"; height and shrillness of pitch answer to great intensity in the turmoil of the elements, softness and moderation of tempo to gentler aspects of nature. Human utterances reinforce this association. Rhythm, on the other hand, has its origin in the regular movements of the dance. In all these cases ancestral associations are involved, explaining the depth and mystery of the musical impression. We may ignore the disputed nature of inherited associations, and agree with the

¹ Charles Kassel, "The Psychology of Music," in *The Open Court*, Nov., 1908, p. 650 *et seq.*

author that the resemblances he points out, novel in certain respects, are efficacious in fostering musical pleasure; but they merely deal with a secondary aspect of the problem. In fact, with the exception of rhythm, the musical factors dwelt upon are subordinate in nature. Force, mass, and timbre do not constitute the essence of the art; they are merely the qualifying adjuncts of melody and harmony, which are to be regarded as the essential factors, and which have not been accounted for in the theory under consideration.

GENERAL REMARKS

In reviewing the theories sketched in this chapter, we are struck by the variety of explanations. All are valid to a certain degree, and contribute to an elucidation of the problem; but they err whenever they undertake to give a complete solution, and advance their claims to the exclusion of other theories. The shortcomings, too, are varied. Spencer and Sully are narrow in their symbolisations. Lipps and Lazarus are wide, but do not trace the correspondences in detail. Kassel lays the emphasis on accessories.

From this point of view Schopenhauer, Lotze, Miss Puffer, and the perspective theory seem to have the advantage: dealing with essentials, they gain a more universal application.

Symbolisation, according to most of the writers considered, accounts for the deepest charm of the art. Formal relations and elementary qualities may arouse a fair degree of pleasure, but the innermost springs of emotion are only touched by the significance of the tones. This calls for some remarks.

There is no doubt that profound emotions are awakened by the perception of symbolic values; in fact, the feelings often swell perceptibly with the recognition of meaning. On the other hand it is by no means true that there *must* be a consciousness of definite significance in order that enjoyment may be reaped. Persons differ immensely in the amount of meaning which they extract from musical compositions. In fact, two pieces successively heard by the same person may be effective in entirely different ways,—one arousing definite images, and the other pleasing by the sheer force of its melodies and harmonies. Here, however, we are confronted with the possibility of unconscious

symbolisation. Like the word *ghoul*, a thing may be significant even though we are not distinctly aware of it. Hence music, too, may please through the arousal of subconscious memories. Whether it actually does so or not, of course, remains a question as yet.

Meanwhile, another difficulty arises. Is the symbolisation pervasive enough to account for the steady, continuing charm of lengthy compositions? Will it not give out in places? And if it does, to what source shall we attribute the charm which continues unabated? The symbolisations which have been indicated mostly resemble patches; they form no system, no plot or plan, accompanying a work from beginning to end; they only guarantee a fitful enjoyment, a fragment here, a gleam there, but no growing, organic exaltation like that actually afforded by musical compositions. To be sure, there is an irradiation of delight; like visual after-images, the glows arising from the recognition of symbolic affinities linger on; grasping hands over the unsymbolic gaps, they tend to spread over the entire composition. Notwithstanding, they are too uncertain to serve as the basis of musical enjoyment. They may and

they may not be generated in the mind; whereas the peculiar musical beauty, depending on melody, harmony, and rhythm, is unfailing in its effect if the mind is open to enjoyment at all.

We do not, to be sure, share the views of those æstheticians who would exclude all associative pleasure from the sphere of beauty. Associations and symbolisms may not objectively be apparent in a work of art, but if they are infallibly aroused during its enjoyment, they are valid elements of beauty. A poem on paper may be compared to an inactive piece of fireworks; there are no sparks and colours in it to dazzle and delight the eye: but read it, enjoy it, set it into action, and the associations, like flashes, begin to appear. There is a "permanent possibility" of suggestive pleasure in the work, which is as important as the symmetries more directly apparent.

The trouble with the musical symbolisms, however, is that they are not infallibly and exhaustively aroused; they do not saturate a composition down to its ultimate components; they are not connected with those intimate factors of musical structure which form the soul of the art. Melody and harmony seem

to please directly, without necessary reference to external facts. It remains for musical histology to prove that this is not the case, and that, while we seem to be enjoying irreducible, meaningless combinations of tones, we are really moved by subtle hints of significance. Until this is done, we must deny that symbolisation accounts for the essential charm of the art.¹

¹ See Appendix D.

V

TONAL AND MENTAL PARALLELISM

IN his *Laocoön*, Lessing develops the idea of correspondence between the structure of a work of art and the mental nature of the percipient. Poetry, he declares, is not adapted for the portrayal of stationary bodies because, while the constituents of a material thing are perceived simultaneously, the elements of poetry succeed one another in time. The office of painting, on the other hand, is to copy the immutable, the depiction of actions and events falling beyond its domain.

Writers on music have appropriated this important principle for the explanation of musical charm. Von Dommer invokes it in his *Elemente der Musik*. Haweis works it out in detail.¹ Emotion is characterised, according to him, by five qualities: elation and depression, velocity, intensity, variety, and form. The first element receives expression in pitch,

¹ Haweis, *Music and Morals*, New York, p. 28 *et seq.*

the higher notes within an octave answering to elation, the lower ones to depression. Velocity is matched by the different lengths of the individual notes and their prevailing rate of succession, or tempo. Intensity finds a natural counterpart in the degrees of force. Variety becomes evident in the simultaneous progression of several parts, and emotional form is duplicated in musical form.

Vischer goes still further. In his opinion music is so faithful a reflection of the emotions that it ought to be utilised in their study. Pitch, force, colour, measure, tempo, melody, and harmony are some of the musical factors which are foreshadowed in the realm of feeling. In the case of colour and measure the emotional prototype is not indicated, but merely postulated on general principles.

Without repudiating the opinions of these writers, and granting full recognition to the facts which they bring to view, let us widen the scope of inquiry, and trace the analogies between music and the mental flow in its entirety. Since the emotions reside in the mind, this will involve no conflict with the view according to which the tones form a duplication of the feelings.

This mode of explanation must be distinguished from the one developed in the last chapter. Symbolisation is a kind of delineation. The tones imitate certain human or natural phenomena, and hold them up as duplications; and the mind recognises them as such or at least tends to do so. In the case of parallelism, on the other hand, we can hardly speak of imitation, but rather of agreement. The tones harmonise with the operations of the mind, a relation which is not supposed to become an object of cognition. We can symbolise the steps of a pedestrian by graphically suggesting their movements, or imitating their sounds; parallelism, on the other hand, would be typified by actually moving up to the pedestrian and keeping step with him.

The first and most general correspondence between the realms of tone and thought is to be found in the succession and simultaneity characterising them both. Both music and mind are essentially temporal in nature: ideas succeed one another, tone follows tone. Secondly both are composed of simultaneous members,—music spreading out into a network of themes and voices, mind unfolding

into a spectrum of thoughts and feelings. Music thus possesses the general qualifications for a reflection of thought; it forms a suitable background for the mental photograph.

Beginning with the elements of the photograph itself, we meet with air-vibrations as the ultimate constituents of tones, and vibrations in the nerves and brain-tracts as the physiological substratum of thought and feeling. In both cases the oscillations are so minute and rapid as to elude observation.

Their products are characterised by differences of intensity, apparent on the one hand in shadings of tonal loudness, on the other in degrees of conscious force or vividness. Our feelings may be strong or weak, energetic or subdued; now they swell with power, now break forth into chord-like outbursts, and anon subside into mild *pianissimos*.

Likewise there are shadings of tempo. The metronome could as appropriately be applied to the mental as to the musical domain. Some people's thoughts progress at a heavy *largo* rate, others trip along in merry *allegros*. In the individual, too, ideas sometimes relapse into a state of inertness, as if grazing in the pastures of meditation; then again they hurry

along, trip each other up with feverish haste, and dash forward in headlong, irrepressible flight. We have our *ritenutos* and *accelerandos*, our ominous pauses, and remonstrating hesitations.

Not so apparent are the mental counterparts of the more formal factors,—measure, melody, harmony, and counterpoint. Where, indeed, shall we look for such distinct and well-defined phenomena in the operations of the mind? The mind resembles a stream, with none of the sharp cleavages characteristic of tonal combinations. Yet they may be there under the surface, undifferentiated and undistinguished. Music may be a prism, separating and spreading out the rays which in the soul are perceived as homogeneous white light. It exhibits the overtones, which are entirely immersed in the fundamentals of feeling, and are experienced merely as quality or timbre.

Measure seems to offer insuperable difficulties. Our mental life assumes the form of a continuous, uninterrupted current, without sudden breaks or jars. But we must remember that the mental life contains a good deal that is unconscious or only semi-

conscious. If we could take a peep underneath the threshold of sensibility, we might find the object of our search. If we could raise the whole activity of the brain into consciousness, we should discover measure in those of its functions which regulate the heart, the lungs, and numerous voluntary muscles. To be sure, we may not as a rule be aware of this rhythm; but, strange as it may sound, the rhythmical aspect of music is also predominantly subconscious in its effect. We seldom pay any direct attention to it; we are often unable to tell whether a piece that we have just heard was in double or triple time, and a question concerning this point is likely to catch us napping. Measure thus occupies the same place in the perception of tonal forms as its counterpart in the flow of mental functions.

Totally opposed to it, in conscious prominence, is the melodic aspect of the art. Whereas measure rarely becomes an object of direct attention, melody is always in the glowing centre of mental vision. In looking for its analogue, accordingly, we ought to turn to the foremost elements of our mental life, which form the centre of conscious

interest. Melody, indeed, ought to correspond to the definite sensations and ideas aroused in us by external objects, or evoked by memory and imagination. Here, it must be confessed, the correspondence fails. If the sequence of thoughts which fills our mind from minute to minute bears any close resemblance to melodic structure, it is so subtle that nobody has yet been able to detect it. However, is it necessary to trace an analogy? May not the mental phenomenon and the musical counterpart here melt together? May not the melody be substituted for the important train of thought which it is supposed to mirror? In the case of measure, force, and tempo, music duplicates or photographs the mind; in the case of melody, it coincides with it.

After melody comes harmony. We may approach it by means of timbre, with which it has much in common. Timbre is incipient harmony, harmony is developed timbre. Both have the same physical foundation, being based on the simultaneous resonance of several tones; only in timbre the tones are not separately distinguished, but are enclosed in the fundamentals, which they serve to

enrich. In their general "colour-effect," as well, timbre and harmony are similar. To be sure, there are important differences between the two, but these need not occupy us for the present.

Timbre is due to the presence, in a tone, of various higher tones or partials; though usually too weak to be distinguished by the unaided ear, these can readily be detected with the help of artificial devices. What is its mental counterpart? Let us seek an answer by asking another question. What constitutes the difference between the words *sweat* and *perspire*, *hug* and *embrace*? What imparts such a characteristic effect respectively to *castle*, *palace*, *mansion*, *manse*, *cottage*, *villa*? Why do *wine* and *champagne* lend themselves so readily to poetic use, while *beer* and *whiskey* make a prosaic impression? Why do the botanic names of flowers appeal to us less sweetly than those of colloquial use? What is there in the names of the old Norse gods and heroes that exercises such a powerful spell over the imagination?


There is something about these words very similar to the effect of timbre. Here, likewise, there are certain overtones present in the

fundamentals (or words), which suffuse them with a halo of sentiment. When we read about *cottages*, the stories of humble peasant-life, and the country drives which have led us past cosy homes, exist in the mind as overtones; when we see the word *castle*, the tales of the robber-knights and legends of the Rhine operate to produce a rich fundamental; with *villa* the recollection of velvety lawns, spirited horses, and fashionable carriages is awakened; *wine* lends itself to poetic use partly because it is associated with sunny vineyards and dancing vintners, partly because it has frequently been invoked by poets; *beer* and *whiskey* lack these overtones, contributed by natural scenes and existing poems. And the same principle applies to all the other words as well.

So far as harmony resembles timbre, it may be said to have a similar counterpart. A harmonic accompaniment often serves to lend a peculiar cast to a melody; this is true, for example, when a melody which was first played in major appears in minor, or when the harmony has an Oriental tinge. The resulting effect is not radically different from that produced by an odd instrumental colour.

And the mental parallel may be sought in those cases where a thought is conveyed so as to exhale a particular sentiment,—where it has a melancholy, humorous, or cynical character, as the case may be. In one important respect, however, harmony is different: it forms an integral adjunct of melody, and helps to determine the melodic progression. The harmony of the dominant not only forms a timbre-like background for the melodic note, but likewise guides the transition to the ensuing tonic. We must seek for an analogue, then, in those aspects of mind which are secondary and qualifying in nature, and yet have a determining influence on the central current of thought. The subject is difficult, and a few hints must suffice in lieu of an explanation. The sentence “I ignored him” conveys a definite thought; but this thought may be coloured differently, or even assume a different significance, according to the by-thoughts which cluster about it. The meaning will vary according as I say “Although he was there, Despite my inclination, or On general principles—I ignored him.” Roughly speaking, harmony may be said to correspond to what Professor James has styled the fringe of

thought. Like this it “blends with and suffuses and alters” the effect of the melodic notes. For this reason, too, it is admirably adapted for the elaboration of some of Professor James’s examples. “Suppose,” says this writer, “three successive persons say to us: ‘Wait!’ ‘Hark!’ ‘Look!’ Our consciousness is thrown into three quite different attitudes of expectancy, although no definite object is before it in any one of the three cases.”¹ To indicate a parallel, let us suppose the three following chords played on the piano:



The highest or melodic note is identical in all cases, yet the total impression varies, according to the change in harmonic background. As in the case of the interjections, it is the background which imparts direction and significance. And it is the background in the mind which constitutes the so-called fringe.

Counterpoint, which follows harmony, answers to the coexistence of parallel trains of

¹ James, *The Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1890, vol. i., p. 250.

thought or feeling. As two or more themes may run along side by side, alternating with each other or sounding together, so various trains of thought may share the field of attention. Witness those divided states of mind when we are attending to several things at once,—talking to a friend we have met on the street and thinking of the appointment we must keep, finishing a letter and watching for the mail-man, busy with our work and worrying about some impending event. Pedal points, especially, are admirably adapted for the reflection of such conditions, the sustained or recurring notes in the bass corresponding to the thoughts which keep boring or thumping away in the background of the mind.

Psychologically timbre, harmony, and counterpoint may be regarded as different degrees of a single process, namely, the fringe-like accompaniment of the main stream of thought. In timbre the secondary elements are still imbedded in the stream, indiscernible by the unaided ear. In harmony they begin to peep forth, though without losing subservience to the melodic centre of motion. With the incipient examples of counterpoint—the frag-

mentary suggestions of melody, the pedal points, and so forth—they begin to assert their independence, until finally they gain liberation and course along with the main theme as co-ordinate voices.

The interlinking of successive chords finds an analogue in the connection of ideas. According to a rule of harmonic sequence, two successive chords usually have one or more notes in common. Likewise two ideas associated by similarity share a part of their content. The Metropolitan Opera House associatively reminds me of Richard Wagner, because both include the "opera" among their connotations. What makes this analogy especially significant is the fact that the harmony, which forms the basis of musical connection, corresponds to the fringe of thought, in which the interlinking of successive ideas takes place.

We pass to the structural features of the art. The coda of sonatas and symphonies, and the analogous stretto of fugues, in which the preceding sections are gone over in rapid succession, are typical of the mind's habit of doubling up upon itself and condensing its previous activities. Related processes are

to be found in the novel and drama, where all the characters are brought together at the end for a final adieu; likewise in the concluding summary of arguments. They are even present in works of sculpture, painting, and architecture. Though not objectively embodied in these works, codas and strettos are read into them by the perceiving mind. For it is common, after we have devoted some time to the examination of an elaborate building, painting, or sculptural group, to make a rapid survey of its component parts, in a final pulse of appreciation.

The first glance at a building may be compared to the initial theme of a composition: both introduce us to their respective works, of which they offer a kind of epitome. And in both, the symmetrical, balanced nature of the works is most clearly impressed. Indeed, the similarity can be traced quite minutely, as may be illustrated with the help of the following example:

BRETHOVEN, Sonata Op. 2, No. 3.



The second figure observes the same general sequence as the first, beginning with a long note, continuing with a rapid succession of sixteenths, and ending with the firm upward leap of the quarter notes. In the case of an architectural surface the situation appears to be different: starting at one side, we seem to approach the centre, and then to pass through to the other, related side; we end as we began, the process involving a reversed duplication. In reality, however, this is not a true account of the matter. Where the surface is large enough to demand sequential perception, the eye starts from the centre, moves toward one of the sides, thereupon jumps back to the centre, and repeats the procedure the other way. There is direct, not inverted superposition, and the process really corresponds to that involved in the musical theme.

After we have studied the more important parts of a building, our attention may be diverted by some secondary features. Our observations assume a different character; forming a contrast to the initial ones, they may be compared to the trios or intermediate movements of musical compositions. Like-

wise, we may institute comparisons between the various sections, reviewing their salient features, and noting their mutual harmonies and contrasts,—which would correspond to the elaborate “developments” of symphonic works, in which the themes are worked up in manifold juxtapositions. Soon, however, we revert to the more important parts, just as the composition comes back to the original theme; and finally, as mentioned, we rapidly go over the essential features of the whole once more, in a coda or stretto.

So much for the individual analogies. Collectively they are characterised by a solidarity and systematic agreement which are highly significant. The various factors of mind and music not only match each other individually, but also in their totality and interconnection. To begin at the bottom, we find vibrations similarly underlying both sets of phenomena: in both they form the physical substratum, imperceptible to the listening and thinking individual. Approaching the threshold of consciousness, we are confronted with the musical overtones and their mental analogues, the inseparable associations of our ideas. Here, also, the relation to the centre of atten-

tion is the same: both the overtones and the associations fail to impress us separately, but merely suffuse the elements of which we are distinctly conscious. Harmony signalises an emergence from the depths of the subconscious, answering to the fringe-like shadings of meaning which perceptibly qualify our ideas. Rhythm, too, vacillates about the threshold of perception, being taken up in a semi-conscious manner, like the motions of breathing and walking. Incipient counterpoint marks considerable advance in conscious prominence, pedal points and fragmentary melodic figures moving about in the background of the musical flow in the same manner in which secondary thoughts keep entering the depths of the mind. Melody and developed counterpoint, finally, lead us into the full glow of consciousness: both occupy the *fovea* of attention, melody filling it all alone, and the voices of a contrapuntal complex alternating with each other like the members of a divided train of thought. In both music and mind, all these factors are traversed by the shadings of tempo and force, and enveloped in the stream of time.

Having traced the correspondence between the two fields in detail, it remains for us to indicate its significance. How does the agreement which has been sketched tend to explain the mysterious charm of the art? In the first place, it results in a facility of perception, accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction and delight. When we are lifting a heavy object and another person suddenly adds his strength to our own, our laboured movement is rendered easy, and we experience a sensation of buoyancy and relief. The result must be similar when outer objects harmonise with the natural processes of perception: they too are helping hands, facilitating the easy progress of thought. Most ordinary experiences and perceptions are not thus favourable: they have a wayward character, and ignore the mental demands. Works of art and literature, however, follow the lines of mental cleavage more closely. Here we may find the secret of good style. It is easier to read "I gave the book to John" than "To John gave I the book," or "Book the John gave to I," because the first sentence follows a prepared channel or groove, whereas the others move in more unaccustomed se-

quences.¹ Our delight in artistic, graceful lines may depend on their conformation to the spontaneous movements of the eye. They form a prepared track, a flowery, velvety road, over which the eye may pass without obstruction. And although the pleasure which the eye as such would gain may be slight, it may be supplemented by associated feelings of gratification which add considerable timbre. The uncomfortable aspect of crowded rooms, or of articles of furniture standing in doorways and other improper places, is due to the nascent feelings of the difficulty of moving about under the conditions presented. On the other hand, the cosy impression of an arm-chair depends on the incipient recollection

¹ This criterion seems to be more satisfactory than the one suggested by Spencer in his *Philosophy of Style*,—according to which good style consists in economy of attention,—because it includes Spencer's, accounts for the cases which it covers, but also explains those to which it fails to apply. The mind ordinarily tends to follow the line of least resistance, which usually embodies the greatest economy of attention. There are times, however, when it wants to expend strength, when it delights in rough mental roads, and prefers the difficult style of Carlyle and the Germans to the smooth flow of words characteristic of the French. These cases are neatly covered by the criterion suggested. For there is a tendency at such times to exercise the mind, whence the difficult style is the good one, not that which draws the mind along without effort.

of the pleasant moments of rest spent in such chairs. Similarly, lines admitting of easy perception might acquire a reverberation of pleasure in the feelings formerly associated with their perception.

Musical progressions, then, will gain a certain beauty through their agreement with the operations of the mind. The sounds, as they succeed one another, not only do not oppose the development of thought, but even assist it, drawing the thoughts forth as with magnetic force. Whenever a mental condition is ready to give birth to its successor, the music is there and helps in the delivery. Ordinary experience is a struggle for existence, in which perceptions clash with great loss of vitality. Musical experience, however, is an elysium, with harmony and co-operation reigning supreme. It is a dance, wherein the mind and the tonal progressions are the partners. Every step in the one finds its counterpart in the other, which elicits and supports it. Every note of the music is anticipated and welcomed by the mind. The mind both rushes toward it and is drawn to it. There is perfect reciprocity of action: not a single inner expectation is thwarted by outer

perception, not a single outer perception unprepared by inner expectation.

All this pertains to the ordinary flow of ideas and feelings; but music may likewise imitate the most harmonious, perfect flow. As rhythm represents the most delightful form of physical movement, so music conceivably duplicates the easiest, most perfect progression of thoughts and feelings: to continue the figure, it may be regarded as a rhythm of all the mental faculties combined. And as rhythmical movement is rich in delight, so a harmonious co-operation of the faculties ought to yield considerable pleasure.

But this would not account for the more profound emotional effects aroused by the art. Music is more than an easy chair for the mind. Possibly the deeper effects may be explained on the analogy of sympathetic vibration; indeed, this appears to be the view entertained by the writers mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. Music corresponds to the tone which awakens a response in strings properly attuned, and the emotions evoked by it stand for the response. Our feelings may be accompanied by certain internal motions, every shade of joy or sorrow being

conditioned by a corresponding psycho-physiological process. Whenever the process is simulated, then, the emotions are sympathetically caught up, and started on a similar course. This explains the correspondence which we have been tracing between the tonal and the mental flow, which answers to the identity in the number of vibrations underlying the tone and its echo, and which serves as the condition of sympathetic response. To a certain degree music undoubtedly acts in this manner. It is the rhythm of the tones which induces the regular movements of the limbs,—an effect which very likely extends far beyond the apparent manifestations. During moments of intense enjoyment the points of emphasis will often be reinforced by the breathing apparatus, an extra little push being given the exhalations at these places. Unlike the tappings of the feet, which merely add a superficial pleasure, these reactions seem to be connected with the depth of enjoyment. We sometimes catch ourselves welling up with a *crescendo*, or experiencing a shock at a sudden burst of sound. Indeed, these manifestations may even be apparent to an observer. The con-

clusion seems inevitable that there must be numerous effects of a subtler nature, extending into the recesses of the bodily and nervous organisation. When in a languorous condition, we crave for sweet, lingering strains; at energetic times we want brisk movements, punctuated with lively accents. Must there not be something in the psycho-physiological condition which corresponds to the tones demanded? It is a question, of course, how far the correspondence extends. There is no doubt that rhythm, tempo, and force, with their shadings of retardation, acceleration, diminution, and augmentation, are matched in the psychical realm. But is there a psychical process answering to the minor chord, as distinguished from the major? Does Schubert's *Serenade* answer to one type of mental action and the *Preislied* from *Die Meistersinger* to another? Here we feel the need of mental resonators which, like the acoustic devices of Helmholtz, would enable us to detect the elements of our blended feelings. It seems reasonable, however, to suppose that the correspondence does not extend as far as the particular melodies and compositions. Indeed, we have been led to the

conclusion that melody is not a duplication of any mental content, but a content itself. So we have again arrived at that knottiest problem of musical æsthetics, which seems to defy all analysis, *i. e.*, the nature of melody. So far as a melody is typical,—so far as it is characteristically fast, slow, loud, soft, daring in its leaps, lingering in its motion,—it may correspond to the appropriate kind of mental action; but that which is unique in the melody, and which stamps it as a particular sequence of tones, can hardly be accounted for in this way.

Meanwhile there is sufficient scope for the species of effectiveness dwelt on in this chapter. The analogy between music and mind is close enough to produce considerable emotional reverberation. Furthermore, the effect which has already been explained, and which is due to ease of perception and sympathetic response, will be augmented by the incipient resuscitation of numerous memories and associations. As the emotions, according to hypothesis, depend on psychical processes, which are sympathetically aroused by the tones, these processes must often have been connected with external objects and events.

Indeed, the external occurrences would only have affected us by awakening the inner movements: joyous events would have set our thoughts and feelings dancing along in lively rhythms, sad ones retarded them into the sluggish tempos of melancholy. The forms which are set into operation by music are also those which have been used in taking up life and experience. Hence the musical progressions, by imitating the receptacles of experience, will stir up multitudinous vague memories and revive the buried contents of the receptacles. This might help to account for the feeling which music imparts, that we are living over vast tracts of life and experiencing the essence of events; likewise for the mixture of emotions so characteristic of its enjoyment.

VI

CONCLUSION

IN conclusion we must add a few words on a peculiarly difficult part of our subject, namely, the combination and interplay of factors.

It is strange that the problem of musical effectiveness has so rarely been approached through the medium of the dance. No form of art shows as great a structural resemblance to music as the artistic dance. Both are temporal in nature; both please through a succession of regular, symmetrical groupings; and in both, these groupings have no direct reference to reality.

Three elements contribute to the pleasure yielded by the sight of an artistic dance. In the first place we enjoy the personality of the dancer, especially if she be of unusual attractiveness. (We are assuming the dancer to be a woman.) Then we enjoy the figures

performed by her. And finally we derive pleasure from the spirit and animation which she puts into her movements. The first element may be regarded as the material of our enjoyment. It corresponds to the power of tone considered in the opening chapter. Unlike this, however, it can be isolated, by regarding the dancer as she appears in a position of repose. Unlike this, again, it is highly important: it may so far outrank in value both of the other elements that we should prefer to see a pretty *danseuse* in a quiet position, rather than to watch the figures of the dance performed by an unattractive person. The figures correspond to the formal aspect of music. It is evident, of course, that they are vastly inferior to it in variety, interest, and value. The pleasure which they afford could likewise be isolated, by substituting automatons for the living personality. However, there would be something lacking under these conditions. This "soul of the dance" is supplied by the third element, the spirit or animation infused into the movements,—which corresponds to the symbolic element in music. We not only wish to see pretty movements, but movements expres-

sive of inner conditions,—graceful, coquettish, agile, languid, tender, lively, passionate, furious movements, movements imbued with life and suggestive of the personality behind them. To obtain this in isolation—or rather conjoined with the first element—we have but to watch an expressive person venting thoughts and feelings of an exciting nature in appropriate gestures and words.

In music there is a similar combination of factors. As in the dance, there are elemental, formal, and symbolic or expressive elements. To these must be added the agreement with thought sketched in the preceding chapter. Association, being fortuitous in character, may be neglected.

The elementary power of tone operates like a sounding-board, imparting timbre and resonance to the other factors. As mentioned, it is not as important as its terpsichorean analogue, but answers rather to the enhancing effect of colour in paintings. Here, too, as in the case of colour, we must exclude from the strictly elementary effect all emotion aroused by association.

Tones are combined into tonal forms. How manifold and complex these are, and how

they serve to arouse pleasure in the auditor, was made clear in Chapter II. Besides the function of yielding direct enjoyment, musical form also serves as a framework on which the numerous symbolisations and agreements which subserve the deeper enjoyment may be hung. It is the plot or story which unifies all the elements. Without it we should be lost in a bewildering chaos. The chirping of crickets, the crackling of a wood fire, the roar of waves may be suggestive; but merely stringing them together, without plan or order, would soon prove tiresome. Beyond form, absolute music has no plot or plan. All efforts to read further meanings into it, and to trace definite delineations, must fail. Music is presentative in character, not representative. Measure, to be sure, may correspond to the beating of the pulse, a final cadence may picture the satisfaction of desires, the coda may simulate a mental summary; but the composition in its totality, with its particular melodies, harmonies, and rhythms, and with the specific union of all these elements characteristic of this one composition, does not represent any definite psychological or material fact. It is unique, and

combines the more or less expressive elements into a totality which only exists by and for itself.

In this respect there is a correspondence between music and the dance. A succession of expressive movements and gestures, without uniting principle, would pall on us. The uniting principle is furnished by the "form" of the dance. But by itself this would be cold and barren. Both here and in music, the form must have warmth and vitality infused into it. The symbolisations assume this office. They impart character, and give animation and interest. Terpsichorean symbolisation comprises suggestions of force, abandon, passion, languor, and various other mental states; musical symbolisation was elaborated in Chapter IV, and need not detain us again. In both cases definite things are occasionally portrayed, the bodily imitation of specific actions being matched in the delineations of programme music.

Tonal and mental parallelism is a species of effectiveness which is not shared to any noticeable degree by the art of dancing. Its triple method of arousing feeling was traced in the last chapter. It is important likewise in

breaking down the barrier which separates the hearer and the composition. Owing to the perfect correspondence between the tonal figures and the mental processes, the distinction between that which is subjective and objective tends to be obliterated: we pass into the tones and blend with their very being.

Sometimes this, sometimes that factor will predominate in our enjoyment. At times the formal structure will stand forth, and our pleasure will depend on the contemplation of architectonic beauties; at times the agreement with our mind will be more important, and we throb along with the tones as if our very existence were involved in them; then again the symbolic element will assert itself, and the composition becomes rich in the utterance of the secrets of life. When all factors are potently active, we experience some of the most blissful moments of which human consciousness is susceptible. The formal framework expands into a living cosmos, animated by strife, energy, love, hate, passion, vehemence, despair, and triumph; the wall which separates the subject and the object falls, and we enter into the very life of the tones: we seem to be the creator of this

little universe of sound; we feel all its pangs and discords, but they are all united in a harmonious, magnificent totality.

There is a correspondence, then, between the elements of terpsichorean and musical effectiveness. But the factors which subserve musical delight are beset with obscurities and complexities not to be found in the other case. To begin with, there are the problems of parallelism, nonexistent for the dance. What is the internal "structure" of the emotions? Does music correspond with it? And how far does the correspondence extend,—only to the more general features of the art, or also to the smaller details? Then how about the elementary power of tone? How much of it is associational in character, how much physiological; and what is the *modus operandi* of the part which is physiological? With reference to form, what is the solution of the melodic and harmonic mysteries; what is the nature of interstitial form, what are the laws which regulate the larger interaction of unrelated compositions? Is it possible to trace the exact correspondences which underlie musical symbolism,—to show how the tones depict cadences of speech,

moulds of happenings, perspective views of experience? Which of these species of symbolisation is the most important, on which does the more intrinsic charm of the art depend? And does symbolisation always accompany musical effectiveness, is there significance even where we are not aware of it?

These are some of the questions which must be answered by those who propose to give a solution of the musical mystery. Every one of the contributing factors shades off into the unknown; small wonder, then, that the problem of musical enjoyment should baffle all attempts at explanation. It is only after we have revealed the secrets involved in these nebulous regions that we may undertake to give a complete theory of the subject. Having explained every factor by itself, we may then show how the various elements combine and interact; we may indicate where one ends and the other begins, assign each one to its proper place in the grouping of effects, figure out the precise share of enjoyment which it affords, and thus approach a perfect solution of the problem.

It is needless to repeat that we have as yet

made little headway toward the attainment of this goal. Although the charm of music has long been a subject of thought, the results in the way of positive insight have been surprisingly meagre. So impenetrable does the subject seem as to nourish the suspicion that we may be dealing with some of the deeper aspects of psychical existence, and that an adequate solution might throw light on many hidden aspects of mind and emotion.

Here we must conclude our research. It is better to make a frank confession of ignorance than to indulge in empty guesses and untenable hypotheses. Let us hope that the problem is not essentially incapable of explanation, and that a day may arrive which shall witness a solution of its puzzling mysteries.

APPENDIX A

(See p. 25)

The following is an attempt to represent some of the agreements and disagreements of the Schubert passage diagrammatically:

The diagrammatic score consists of the following elements:

- Harmony:** A row of upward-pointing triangles above the staff.
- Tonality:** A row of triangles above the staff, alternating between upward and downward pointing.
- Melody:** A single staff in treble clef containing the musical notes.
- Rhythm:** A bracket on the left side groups four staves below the melody, labeled 'Sopr.', 'Alto', 'Tenor', and 'Bass'. Each of these staves contains a series of upward-pointing triangles.

The marks which point upward indicate agreement, those which point downward, disagreement. The accented beats have larger marks than the unaccented. The structural relations, being difficult of exact representation, have not been introduced. Strictly speaking, the presence of a second note to the beat, as in the tenor, is a violation of perfect agreement. However, the violation is so slight, and is overshadowed to such an extent by the effect of

the first note, that we have included these cases under the category of agreement.

APPENDIX B

(See p. 30)

In order to illustrate the interrelation of sections referred to in the text, and also to reveal the complexity of the process involved in hearing music, we subjoin a psychological analysis of some Beethoven measures. It is by no means complete, but only presents the more evident factors involved.

BEETHOVEN, *Symphony No. 7.*

The musical score is presented in two systems, each with a grand staff (treble and bass clefs). The first system contains measures 1 through 5. Measure 1 is labeled '1' and 'Flutes and Oboes'. Measure 2 is labeled '2' and 'Oboes'. Measure 3 is labeled '3' and 'Oboes and Clarinets'. Measure 4 is labeled '4' and 'Clarinets'. Measure 5 is labeled '5' and 'Bassoons'. Below the grand staff, the text 'Strings pizzicato' is written. The second system contains measures 6 through 11. Measure 6 is labeled '6' and 'and Horns'. Measure 7 is labeled '7' and 'Strings'. Measure 8 is labeled '8' and 'pizzicato'. Measure 9 is labeled '9' and 'Flutes and Oboes'. Measure 10 is labeled '10' and 'Oboes'. Measure 11 is labeled '11' and 'Oboes and'. The notation includes various note values, rests, and dynamic markings.

The image shows a musical score for five measures, numbered 12 to 16. The score is divided into two systems. The first system contains measures 12, 13, and 14. The second system contains measures 15 and 16. The instruments are Clarinets (measures 12-14), Bassoons and Horns (measures 13-14), and Strings pizzicato (measures 15-16). The notation includes various rhythmic values, accidentals, and articulation marks.

Measures 1-2 involve:

1. the expectation of their completion in 3-4;
2. " " " a drop in pitch;
3. " " " " change in instrumentation;

Measures 3-4:

4. the satisfaction of 1;
5. " " " 2;
6. " " " 3;
7. " expectation of 5-8, as an answer to 1-4;
8. " " " a further drop in pitch;
9. " " " " " change in instrumentation;

Measures 5-6:

10. the partial satisfaction of 7;
11. " satisfaction of 8;
12. " " " 9;
13. " expectation of 7-8, as a completion of 5-6;
14. the expectation of a further drop in pitch;
15. " " " " " change in instrumentation;

16. the expectation of a change to staccato;
 Measures 7-8:

17. the completed satisfaction of 7;
18. " satisfaction of 13;
19. " " " 14;
20. " " " 15;
21. " " " 16;
22. " expectation of a continuation in 9-10,
 corresponding to 1-2;
23. the expectation of an ascent in pitch, corre-
 sponding to 1-2;
24. the expectation of a change in instrumenta-
 tion, corresponding to 1-2;
25. the expectation of a return to legato, corre-
 sponding to 1-6;
26. the expectation of 9-16, answering to 1-8;
27. " " " a succession of pitch
 alterations like those of 1-8;
28. the expectation of an instrumental arrange-
 ment like that of 1-8;

Measures 9-10:

29. the satisfaction of 22;
30. " " " 23;
31. " " " 24;
32. " " " 25;
33. " the partial satisfaction of 26;
34. " " " " 27;
35. " " " " 28;
36. " expectation of 11-12, as a completion
 of 9-10;
37. the expectation of 11-12, answering to 3-4;

- 38. the expectation of a drop in pitch, answering to that of 3-4;
- 39. the expectation of a change in instrumentation, answering to that of 3-4;

Measures 11-12:

- 40. the satisfaction of 36;
- 41. " " " 37;
- 42. " " " 38;
- 43. " " " 39;
- 44. " continued satisfaction of 26;
- 45. " " " " 27;
- 46. " " " " 28;
- 47. " expectation of 13-16, completing 9-12;
- 48. " " " 13-16, answering to 5-8;
- 49. " " " a drop in pitch, answering to that of 5-6;
- 50. the expectation of a change in instrumentation, answering to that of 5-6;

Measures 13-14:

- 51. the satisfaction of 49;
- 52. " " " 50;
- 53. " partial satisfaction of 47;
- 54. " " " " 48;
- 55. " continued " " 26;
- 56. " " " " 27;
- 57. " " " " 28;
- 58. " expectation of 15-16, completing 13-14;
- 59. the expectation of 15-16, answering to 7-8;
- 60. the expectation of a drop in pitch, answering to that of 7-8;

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- 61. the expectation of a change in instrumentation, answering to that of 7-8;
- 62. the expectation of a change to staccato, answering to that of 7-8;

Measures 15-16:

- 63. the satisfaction of 58;
- 64. " " " 59;
- 65. " " " 60;
- 66. " " " 61;
- 67. " " " 62;
- 68. " completed satisfaction of 47;
- 69. " " " " 48;
- 70. " " " " 26;
- 71. " " " " 27;
- 72. " " " " 28.

Complex though this analysis is, the actual psychological state of affairs is still more involved. The condition of mind, in appreciating the passage, is not that of sixteen measures spread out laterally, for easy comparison, but of a single shifting measure or two, with all the preceding measures crowding behind and the succeeding ones casting their shadow in front. The mind is a stage across which one scene after another passes, or, better still, a stereopticon into which view after view is introduced, with the important difference that the views all remain inside, the preceding ones affecting the nature of those which succeed. The correspondences and contrasts, accordingly, so far as they are held together by the mind, come to view within the short span of a measure or two, forming an intricate tissue of relations.

An adequate representation of such a condition would be possible only through the employment of the third dimension, the preceding measures being placed behind the succeeding ones; even this, however, would hardly be satisfactory. Here we have arrived at the intimate region of musical histology. It is not inconceivable that minute dissections in this region would cast some light on the elusive secrets of musical structure.

APPENDIX C

(See p. 78)

Generally, it would seem, the perspective depictions of music are limited to certain restricted aspects or fragments of life. We may simulate a struggle ending in victory, a doubt leading to certainty, a desire followed by satisfaction, as in the examples of the text, but the fragments thus reproduced do not unite in the delineation of a complete life-history. The unifying principle of music, as shown in the concluding chapter, does not lie in any plot or plan, but is furnished by the formal structure of the art. Nevertheless, there are instances in which the symbolisation is more systematic, and where complete biographies or histories, as it were, are reproduced. Such an instance is to be found in Chopin's Nocturne Op. 15, No. 3.

After reading Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, and while the powerful emotions aroused by the concluding pages were still reverberating in my mind, this composition occurred to me as an expression of my

inmost feelings. It seemed to embody the essential impression produced by the incidents in the career of the guilty woman. Riper consideration showed that this was only partly true. There is a vicious, almost diabolical element in the life of Madame Bovary which is not to be found in the elegiac *notturmo*. Yet the two show a pronounced affinity. Apart from the blame which must attach to the passionate heroine, she awakens a milder feeling of pity as we muse over the steps of her erring career. Our sympathy deepens into a profound *Weltschmerz* as we realise that her life is but a symbol of human life in general; and it is this feeling, as well as the particular story of the novel, which finds expression in the nocturne.

Unrealised ideals, shattered hopes, emptiness, tedium, vanity,—these are the burden of the mournful tale. We see Emma in her paternal home, dreaming of love and bliss. She marries, but fails to find the happiness for which she had sighed. We see her at the ball, dazzled by the unattainable wealth and splendour which unfold themselves before her. We see her languishing away for excitement, seeking relief in a new home, falling in love with Léon, and suffering from his departure. Rodolphe now enters into her existence, joy flames forth for a moment, only to be engulfed in despair at his desertion. Illness and religious calm take hold of her, but love reawakens, and with Léon she abandons herself to the gratification of her passion. Disenchantment follows, however, disaster overtakes her, and in an access of despair she ends her restless existence. Her life is aptly

summed up in the following words: "She was not happy—she never had been . . . nothing was worth the trouble of seeking it; everything was a lie. Every smile hid a yawn of boredom, every joy a curse, all pleasure satiety."¹

Now it is this same impression of unrest and disappointment, of longing and disillusion, which is awakened by the nocturne. But there is no final catastrophe; instead, religious peace ensues as a redeeming power. For the purpose of our analysis, the nocturne may be divided into three parts. The first comprises fifty measures and ends just before the mysterious *sotto voce*. The second includes thirty-eight measures and leads as far as the choral. The third extends from here to the end of the piece. The theme with which the composition begins is distinctly melancholy and resigned in character. With measure four we have a transition to brighter regions, and a ray of hope appears. There is a moment of suspense and anticipation, but the theme settles down to a progression which, though agreeable, is rather trivial, and fails to satisfy the expectations raised by the change of key. Sadly we relapse into the original theme. Again there is an attempt to escape from the thralldom of depression, and this time it seems to come from within, and leads with a passionate sweep into the key of D minor. In vain, however; even this energetic effort is unable to break the spell; the trivial figure recurs and helplessly we fall back into the original strain. Once more, as in the fourth measure,

¹ Flaubert, *Madame Bovary*, Chicago, p. 330.

there is a prospect of relief, and once more, too, the soul endeavours to free itself through a vigorous effort of its own; as before, both transitions are followed by the dreariness of disenchantment. Sick and weary with strife, the soul now lapses into a mystic state (beginning of second part); gleams of a deeper joy than this life can afford suffuse the heart with quiet beatitude; again we hear the mystic strains, and again the beatific visions appear. The prospect of relief now combines with the unsatisfied longing and the desire becomes more vehement; fighting its way through every obstacle, it finally leads into a tremendous crisis full of the sharpest anguish. This is followed by a relapse, due to the soul's exhaustion from feverish excitement. And now, while the last soft tones of the struggle are dying away, the consoling harmonies of the choral resound, proclaiming deliverance from the pain of unsatisfied desire.

It is a life-history in tones, a musical sermon; its subject is the vanity of existence and the redeeming power of religion; and it unfolds this subject as logically as a verbal exposition.

APPENDIX D

(See p. 91)

In the following an attempt is made to trace the basis of symbolisation in certain melodies, and thus to account for some of their characteristic effect. We shall begin with the theme of Beethoven's *Eroica* symphony.



The impression of this theme is one of great stability, firmness, quiet strength, and confidence. It is an elemental theme,—simple, direct, and full of resolute purpose. To account for these qualities we note, in the first place, that the theme is rhythmically precise; the notes fall on the important beats, without syncopation or hesitation. Again the theme consists entirely of the tones which constitute the fundamental chord of the key. And of these, the tone which occurs most frequently is the fundamental itself. *E flat* appears four times, *g* and *b flat* twice. Furthermore, *e flat* always falls on the first beat of the measure; and, as if to heighten the stability still more, it occupies the centre of the theme with reference to pitch. First the theme rises a third above the fundamental, then descends a fourth beneath it, again rises above it a fifth, and finally settles down on the fundamental as a firm foundation. If we draw a horizontal line through the middle of the theme, it will correspond approximately to the fundamental. And if we draw vertical lines through the fundamental, they will enclose the theme at both ends and divide it at regular intervals. The fundamental, in short, pervades the entire theme as a ruling spirit.

Radically different in effect and construction is the march theme from Raff's *Lenore* symphony.

The motto of this piece is taken from Freiligrath's famous poem, *O lieb so lang du lieben kannst*. Unswerving devotion, accordingly, is its subject. Now the characteristic of unswerving devotion is adherence to its object through any and every circumstance; and this is fittingly mirrored in the theme. Of the six measures which have been given, the note *c* fills three and a half. The harmony changes three times, yet the *c* remains; in fact, the deviation of a semitone in measure three—the smallest possible deviation—only serves to heighten the immediate return to the prevailing note. And when finally the melody is obliged to break away from the tone to which it has adhered so tenaciously, it returns to it once more for a final caress, before finding rest in the concluding *a flat*.

Without doubt the effect of these themes is partly due to the features indicated. But it is by no means exhausted by them. Not every adherence to a single tone will produce a melody so wondrously beautiful as that of the *Liebstraum*; not every avoidance of the key-note will yield a romantic *Lenore* theme. It is only when these characteristics are added to a beauty which was already present that we obtain the impression which thrills the heart. The symbolisations that have been indicated may help to account for the character of the themes, but there is a more purely musical quality which is not thereby explained. Whether this also is due to a subtle symbolisation, or whether it is entirely formal in character, is still left an open question.

The Opera Problem



THE OPERA PROBLEM

THE opera has been the subject of more controversies than any other branch of music. Its very birth was the outcome of a revolt against existing musical conditions, and disputes mark the path of its history down to the present day. Among the more important of these are the Parisian contest between the Gluckists and Piccinists, in the eighteenth century, which agitated the populace of the French capital as violently as a political or religious crisis, and that between the Wagnerians and anti-Wagnerians of our own day, which for decades has been dividing the musical opinion of the entire western world. Are these controversies of an accidental, fortuitous character, or inherent in the nature of opera? Is it not of the very essence of this branch of art to engender internal conflicts, rendering difficult or impossible a perfection which shall do justice to all the warring elements?

The opera was originally promulgated as a

resuscitation of the Greek drama. When Constantinople fell, in 1453, many of its citizens migrated westward, carrying with them and imparting the remains of the old civilisation, which had been perpetuated in Byzantium. From these germs sprang the Renaissance, or rebirth of ancient ideas, as it manifested itself in a love and imitation of everything classic. In art, especially, the Renaissance bore rich fruit, giving impetus to the luxuriant development of sculpture and painting in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and producing the styles of architecture which bore its name. Thus it was natural for men to turn to the classic drama as well, and attempt its revival.

A special impetus in this direction was derived from the dissatisfaction of certain Italian minds with the contrapuntal music of the day. The music of the restored drama was to be an entire departure from this,—and herein consisted the revolt mentioned above: it was to be simpler in character, was to dispense with counterpoint, and combine with the words in harmonious union, “supplying a support to the declamation of the voice.”¹

¹ Parry, *The Art of Music*, New York, 1893, p. 141.

To be sure, this co-operation of words and music was not of long duration. The tonal half of the operatic union encroached more and more on the poetic, until finally the original equality of the two was forgotten, and the former was openly hailed as ruler. Opera gradually developed into a species of scenic concert, in which the performers appeared in costume and indulged in a little acting while they sang. The music was supreme, text and plot merely forming a background, or, as a well-worn simile has it, holding together the musical gems as a string unites a row of beads.

This continued for a long time, until finally a champion of the enslaved muse, a poetic emancipator, appeared in the person of Gluck. Gluck's aim was to rectify the lopsided condition of opera, and restore the words to their rightful position. He had a severe struggle with his opponents, which culminated in the famous fight between the Gluckists and Piccinists, in which the former were victorious. But though he gained temporary recognition for his theories, they were forgotten after his death, and in Rossini, Bellini, and Donizetti we have the singers trilling and warbling away again as uncon-

cernedly as of old: music had once more elevated herself in the proud pose of victory, and poetry merely served as her pedestal.

But again a reformer was to come, of talents and powers greater even than Gluck. For decades Richard Wagner bombarded the public with his ideas of reform, and he fought with such enthusiasm, consistency, and force, that he transformed an unwilling, hissing world into an audience of admirers, of which half have become ardent disciples, while all are compelled to recognise the loftiness of his genius and aspirations.

There were some novel features in the teachings of Wagner,—such as the abolition of the conventional arias and concerted numbers,—but essentially his work may be viewed as an attempt to establish the ideas which had previously been advanced by Gluck, and which had already inspired the founders of opera. Poetry was once more to shake off the tyranny of music; words and music were to combine harmoniously and, with the aid of the scenic and histrionic arts, were to constitute a perfect amalgamation of æsthetic effects.

How shall we regard these endeavours of

the Bayreuth master? How shall we characterise his effort to unite the various branches of art, and thus to condense into a single composite the effects producible by each?

As an ideal it is laudable, but its realisation appears problematical. The perfect opera seems to imply a union of incompatible elements,—resembling the perfect man, who is nowhere to be found because his realisation would involve the co-existence of mutually exclusive virtues.

As Professor James says:

Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well-dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a *bon-vivant*, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a “tone-poet” and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The millionaire’s work would run counter to the saint’s; the *bon-vivant* and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay. Such different characters may conceivably at the outset of life be alike *possible* to a man. But to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed.¹

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1890, vol. i., p. 309.

So, we are inclined to believe, the perfect art-work of the future is a bundle of incompatible elements, in which "to make any one of them actual, the rest must more or less be suppressed." We may have poetry in perfection, as in the ordinary drama, or music in perfection, as in the operas of Mozart; but to keep poetry and music in harmonious, exalted combination, turns out to be a well-nigh hopeless task.

The first problem to be encountered by the opera is that of the propriety of dramatic singing: people do not sing at each other in real life, it is said, whence the opera is an unnatural form of art. In answer, it is pointed out that poetry too is unnatural, that people do not ordinarily address each other in verse, but that the great dramatists are not thereby deterred from using verse for their tragedies. The retort follows that many dramatists in fact decry its employment, that the tendency to substitute prose has been growing for over a century, that the lines are usually run together in enunciation so as in fact to make the effect of prose, and that the permission of a slight alteration of speech, as in verse, by no means justifies

a complete distortion and transformation, as in song.

Experience, however, refutes these objections, and proves that it is possible to overlook the unnaturalness of dramatic singing: we accept so many conventionalities in art that this, too, will cause no special difficulties. But the implications of this fact are more far-reaching than may be supposed. To begin with, it is only by sacrificing the demand for perfect naturalness that the enhancement of song is gained. We cannot have both realism and musical idealisation, and as long as we insist on the one, we shall be compelled to forego the other. We must relinquish the zest of real life in order to gain the romance of fairy-land. But the same selection and sacrifice must be allowed with reference to other features of the opera as well. How can we, while blinking the unnaturalness of song, consistently object when, by means of the repetition of words in arias and the combination of voices in duets, trios, and choruses, a composer still further sacrifices a certain amount of dramatic truth for the sake of musical beauty? Will not the same arguments which justify the one do the same

for the other? Shall we cross the Rubicon and then be daunted by a little insignificant creek?

Here we arrive at the second problem or conflict of opera, which has formed the basis of most discussions; it is the conflict between expression and form, or between the musical and dramatic elements. Hitherto expression has usually been neglected, to the advantage of form. The libretto was arranged for beautiful arias, duets, trios, and choruses, in which trivial words were often repeated in a senseless, unnatural manner, while but little heed was paid to the correspondence between the text and the character of the music. This was the state of affairs which Gluck and Wagner sought to remedy. In considering the rival tendencies with unbiased mind, we must admit that both are founded on legitimate demands. It is good to have beautiful music, and it is good, also, to have expressive music, clinging to and fitting the meaning of the words. But, it may be asked, is it not possible to combine both in exalted union? The answer has already been indicated: any marked concession on one side is likely to be accompanied by a loss on the

other. Without question the finest music, as pure music, is that which is written in the regular forms of the aria, sonata, symphony, and the like; the comparatively formless recitatives of the Wagnerian music drama are certainly, qua music, inferior to the more symmetrical instrumental compositions of Beethoven, and the arias and concerted pieces of Mozart's operas. But if we set our librettos to such music we lose in dramatic truth: dramatic truth requires a continuous progression of the dialogue, without conventional repetitions and unnatural combinations of voices. So we are in the dilemma of choosing between dramatic truth and the beauty of regular forms.

The difficulty may partly be overcome by introducing regular numbers in a natural manner, as in the form of serenades, shepherd songs, hymns, or singing contests à la *Tannhäuser* and *Die Meistersinger*. But the formal pieces resulting herefrom will be few, while a frequent repetition of the device will reveal its mechanical nature. Try to escape it as we will, the conclusion seems to bear down on us that dramatic poetry and music are essentially unfit to enter into perfect,

harmonious union, in which both are at their best and nevertheless go together without mutual interference. The attempt to make them do so resembles the endeavour to make a horse and a dog trot in step. It is of the essence of dramatic poetry to advance steadily and in a single voice,—without repetitions and with but rare occasions for the combination of several speakers; and it is of the essence of music to repeat itself in symmetrical forms and advance simultaneously in several voices. Naturally these tendencies will clash, a combination being possible only through a neglect of one or the other factor.¹ How great the neglect shall be, what propor-

¹ To be sure, the voice and the orchestra form coördinate members, and the latter may again be subdivided into a variety of melodic parts, without interfering with the single progression of the text. In the recurrence of the *leit-motif*, too, there is a possibility of formal elaboration which does not interrupt the continuous development of the plot. However, these methods of introducing variety will not completely satisfy the musical demands. Where human voices are involved we do not wish to have all the harmony and counterpoint in the instruments, but also expect an occasional combination of the voices; the adherence to the solo form will prove monotonous when prolonged for hours. Still less is the sporadic, hap-hazard repetition of the *leit-motif* calculated to satisfy the demand for musical form, nourished as it has been by the magnificent arias and concerted pieces of the older school.

tions will be chosen in combining the two factors, will depend on the *penchant* of the composer or the taste of the audience for which he writes. At one end of the scale we shall find the auditors who do not even admit the legitimacy of dramatic singing,—whose preference for the spoken drama is so strong and who have so little appreciation of music that all singing on the stage impresses them as farcical. At the other end are those who unreservedly adopt the vocal fiction with all its implications, and who, for the sake of musical beauty, will go to any extreme, and accept the most glaring absurdities of the conventional old Italian opera. Between these limits there will be numerous gradations. One party is satisfied with a slightly greater degree of dramatic truth than that embodied in Italian opera, mixing dramatic truth and musical beauty in the proportions represented by Gluck, Weber, and Wagner's earlier efforts; another approaches nearer the realistic extreme, advocating the proportions embodied in Wagner's later works, *i. e.*, in the specific music dramas. It is also possible to conceive of a still closer approach to the dramatic end, the songlike recitative being replaced by

one of a more declamatory character: here, in addition to the loss of regular forms, the beauty of the human voice would also be sacrificed. The last intermediate link between opera and drama would be represented by the melodrama, in which the words are spoken, but are accompanied by a background of musical sound. Expressed in the form of a table, we have the following series:—

Italian Opera.

German “ (Gluck, Weber, Wagner’s
earlier works).

Wagnerian Music Drama.

Declamatory “ “

Melodrama.

Drama.

Roughly speaking, and making allowance for the genius of individual composers, there is a decrease in musical beauty as we go down in the scale, accompanied by an increase in dramatic truth.¹ Italian opera lays most stress on musical beauty and least on dramatic truth, a proportion which is gradually modified, until in the drama music is relegated to

¹ As will be shown later, most of the effective passages of Wagner are not involved in the nature of the music drama, but are superadded, as it were.

the intermissions, while the development of the plot becomes all-important. Who would venture to determine which of these positions was the correct one,—which the proper proportion? Is it not clear that one is as legitimate as another, and that the individual's preference will depend on his mental trend, his æsthetic habits, and the contagious effect of his fellows' tastes? A monotonous, regular succession of sounds will by one person be arranged into groups of three, by another into groups of four: objectively there is no stronger basis for either arrangement, one being as justifiable as the other; so, likewise, the individual is free to attune himself to the reception of any combination of musical and dramatic elements.

Hitherto, we have seen, the poetic side has usually been moulded to suit the needs of the musical. This seems to rest on a simple, practical consideration, namely, the difficulty of singing words with clear and intelligible enunciation. If two arts are to coöperate in producing an impressive effect, both must be open to perception. It will not help us to adorn a building with statues and paintings which are hidden from view; a ballet will not

please us if it is performed behind the curtain, so that nothing but the accompanying music reaches our senses. Likewise poetry cannot remain on a footing of equality with music if the very mode of its presentation bars its perception. We cannot expect people to go into raptures over words which they are unable to catch, or to manifest delight over the musical reflection of poetic sentiment, when this sentiment is hidden behind a cloud of draping tones.

Three methods of seizing the words are possible: the first is the natural one of catching them while they are being sung, the second consists in following them in the libretto, and the third, in reading or learning them beforehand. The first method, as we have seen, is inefficacious. Short songs may occasionally be rendered intelligibly in a parlour or a hall of moderate dimensions,—although even under these most favourable conditions many words will generally elude the listeners if they are unfamiliar with the text. But in opera, which lasts throughout a whole evening, which is presented in large theatres, and in which the singing is accompanied by immense modern orchestras, the case is different: all the condi-

tions of operatic rendition, indeed, make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the words to stand forth intelligibly, without prompting from the libretto or memory.

Turning to the other two methods, we find them equally unsatisfactory. There is a physical obstacle to the reading of the libretto, in the darkness prevailing in our theatres. Besides, such a reading is not likely to enhance enjoyment: the attention is divided between the book and the music, and the calm, receptive attitude necessary for æsthetic enjoyment gives way to a strained and studious one. As for the previous study of the libretto, that is a condition which will be complied with by few people; indeed, its adequate compliance is almost out of question. It is possible, of course, to learn the plot of an opera from a preliminary reading,—possible even to gain some idea of its more intimate contents; but an adequate appreciation of the correspondence between words and music—on which the beauty of the new art-work largely depends—requires a memorisation so exact and minute that not one in a thousand would be willing to make it.

The fundamental condition for the exalted

position given the words, *i. e.*, their perceptibility, is accordingly lacking. The question is sometimes asked: Why is it that people, while demanding that their plays be performed in their own tongues, will permit their operas to be sung in foreign languages? The answer is obvious: it would not help them much, so far as comprehension is concerned, to have it otherwise; the words are imperfectly seized at best, and the attention is forcibly diverted toward the music. Indeed, people realise this, and hardly expect to understand much of the text; they attend the opera for the sake of the music; they regard it as a species of tone-work, not as a species of poetry.

In the difficulty of understanding the words we have probably struck the rock bottom, or we may say rather the shifting quicksand bottom, of our troubles. One auditor may know nothing of the text, another may have learned it by heart; a third may be acquainted with its general drift, seizing the passages which are rendered by the singer who enunciates clearly, but failing to comprehend those which come from the one with poor articulation. The stable foundation, accordingly,

for the construction of a work of art is lacking. He who knows nothing of the text will appreciate formal numbers and find the recitative passages tedious; he, on the contrary, who has read the libretto may find the latter full of interest, while being repelled by the artificiality of the former. The single numbers will produce different effects, according to the accidental amount of familiarity with the words. Manifestly no composer can write adequately under such conditions. He must proceed in accordance with one or the other presupposition throughout: either the words are to be intelligible or they are not; but neither presupposition, we have seen, agrees with the actual status, whence the uncertainty of the results.

The fourth problem concerns the union of music and action. Music must not only accompany the text, but also the movements and gestures of the actors. Again it becomes a question whether the steps of this pair, like those of poetry and music, are not by nature opposed to each other, their union being bound to hamper the one or the other in its free and natural development. The works of Wagner, at least, are not very reassuring on this point.

How painful to watch a heroine trying to fill out a number of bars in the orchestra with a slow and measured, orbit-like extension of her arms, inch by inch, until finally, with the conclusion of the passage, aphelion is reached; or to count the moments during which two lovers stand ready to embrace each other, timing their unnatural pose with the baton-strokes of the conductor, and awaiting the delivering note, which allows them to rush together. It is especially after seeing some well acted drama that the unreality of such movements is impressed: the actors seem to be paralysed, *erstarrt*, and the various poses, as they succeed one another, resemble the single views of a cinematographic series in the slowness of the advance. The true counterpart of music, in the realm of pose and gesture, is the dance, just as the true verbal counterpart is the traditional libretto, with all its inanities. But if both gestures and words must suffer such a transformation—or deterioration from the standpoint of naturalness—in order to adapt themselves to the highest music, is it not likely that music must suffer a similar change if it is to adapt itself to the natural, unconstrained progression of words and movements?

In conclusion the question might be asked whether the very conditions of perception, the limitations of attention, do not form a bar to the adequate enjoyment of simultaneous visual and auditory phenomena. The question occurs as a result of my own experience at the opera: it has often happened that for long sections of time I have heard nothing of the music; the overture may have been effective, but with the rise of the curtain all auditory impressions were precipitately banished from consciousness,—chased away by the importunate, powerful horde of sights with which I was besieged. The opposite, I imagine, may also be true, sounds obtruding themselves so strongly as to obliterate the sights. And in the endeavour to catch the words, both music and action are sometimes neglected. Thus there would be a natural obstacle to the harmonious coöperation of dramatic action (with words) and music; any balance that the composer might put into his works would immediately be destroyed by the recipient: one would polarise the works through his optical mind, another through the auditory, one look for dramas and spectacular exhibitions, the other for beautiful music; we should

require separate music dramas for visualisers and *audiles*, and a new Bayreuth would rise by the side of the old.

This would complete our view of the various conflicts and problems of opera, as they obstruct the realisation of the perfect art-work of the future. First, there is the conflict between naturalness and dramatic singing; second, between formally beautiful and expressive music; third, between the words and the tones with which they are invested; fourth, between music and action; and fifth, between the various sensual and mental faculties. Opera, indeed, has to run the gauntlet of so many difficulties that it is doubtful whether it can emerge without mutilation.

To strengthen this conclusion, let us add some considerations of a historic nature. Whatever may be the possibilities of the future, the fact is that up to the present the ideal opera has not appeared. We speak of classic works of architecture, sculpture, literature, and instrumental music, but rarely of classic operas. In all the other arts, and even in most branches of the musical art, we possess productions which may be stamped

as perfect,—productions which seem to embody the highest that is attainable in their special directions, and beyond which it is not easily possible to go; productions characterised by such an exquisite balance of elements that they are universally regarded as unapproachable models. For sculpture witness the statues of Phidias, for architecture the Grecian temples; for painting turn to the Madonnas of Raphael, for poetry to the dramas of Sophocles and Molière. Certain kinds of music exhibit the same perfection, the fugues of Bach representing the older, strictly contrapuntal style, the symphonies of Beethoven crowning the more modern, instrumental type, and Schubert's *Lieder* standing for the lyric song.

This perfection is absent in opera. There are great operas enough, to be sure, but they are not of that balanced, rounded character which would tempt us to apply the epithets *perfect* or *model* to them. There is always some shortcoming, some undue preponderance of certain elements, with a resulting sacrifice of others.

To begin with there is, in the works preceding Wagner, that preponderance of the

musical and neglect of the dramatic elements which the master so justly condemns, even the works of Gluck falling short of the Wagnerian standard in this respect. But if the older operas fail through their disregard of the dramatic elements, those of Wagner are deficient through a neglect of the formal. However great their merits and beauties may be—and it is not our desire to minimise them—they contain much that is tedious: not only are they for the greater part inordinately long—so long that they are rarely given without cuts—but they harbour deserts of tiresome recitative which are hardly balanced even by the oases of stirring instrumental and melodious vocal passages. Furthermore, those portions which are universally adjudged the most beautiful and by which the master is most widely known, are not the ones on which the theory of the new artwork lays stress—the recitatives—but rather the instrumental portions and the more melodious solos, concerted numbers, and choruses, as witness the famous preludes and overtures; the march, Pilgrims' Chorus, and Song to the Evening Star from *Tannhäuser*; the Prize Song from *Die Meistersinger*; the Spring

Song, Ride of the Valkyries, and Magic Fire Scene from *Die Walküre*; the *Waldweben* from *Siegfried*; the Song of the Rhine-daughters from *Götterdämmerung*; and the Flower Scene from *Parsifal*.

The music dramas of Wagner, indeed, do not represent the ideal opera; they do not reach that level of perfection attained by the symphonies of Beethoven and the comedies of Molière. While this is no proof that the perfect opera is essentially impossible of realisation, it is a fact that the opera has, in number of years, long passed the stage at which most other branches of art have reached the zenith of their glory. There is a remarkable agreement between the various arts in this respect. Almost without exception the stride toward perfection, the consummation of a great art-movement, has been accomplished in a period not covering more than a century or two. The brilliant epoch of Greek sculpture began about 600 B.C., only 116 years before the birth of Phidias. Gothic architecture made its appearance early in the twelfth century, and a hundred years later witnessed the beginning of its crowning monument, the cathedral of Amiens.

Cimabue and Giotto, the Nestors of Italian painting, were born in 1240 and 1276 respectively, Leonardo da Vinci and Raphael in 1452 and 1483. About the same span separates the terminal figures of Flemish painting, the birth of the Van Eycks falling into the latter half of the fourteenth century, that of Rubens into the latter half of the sixteenth. In France, literary classicism required but little over a century to develop to the height of its glory,—from Ronsard to Racine; and German classicism made the step from Klopstock to Goethe in less than a century. Early contrapuntal music extended over a period of about one hundred and fifty years, from Dufay to Palestrina. Instrumental music budded forth in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and by the beginning of the nineteenth had reached its culmination in Beethoven. Artistic song, finally, jumped to its pinnacle of excellence in a few decades.

Opera forms a decided contrast to all this. Although from the very beginning one of the most assiduously cultivated of all musical forms, it has not yet, after three hundred years, arrived at the stage of perfection exemplified in so many other forms of art and

music. Instead there have been perpetual conflicts between the adherents of rival schools, and even to-day we are informed that the entire theory and practice up to Wagner has been faulty, and that a new departure must be made for the attainment of the ideal. Although this exceptional position, this tardy advance, is no absolute proof that perfection is impossible, yet, coupled with the theoretic considerations, it has some weight, reinforcing the conviction that there is some special, inherent obstacle to perfection.

As to the future, it is precarious to venture a prophecy. The example of the past might lead us to expect a return to musical supremacy. But whatever form of opera may triumph, we must not suppose that any one form is necessarily more legitimate than another. The true position in the whole matter, it seems, is that which includes both the Wagnerian and the anti-Wagnerian tendencies, or better, which excludes them both. Both sides have their valid claims, and both have their weaknesses. Wagner is justified in his opposition to the absurdities of the older opera, and his insistence on dramatic

truth; but the Italians are also justified in upholding musical beauty. The choice of parties will depend on personal inclination, prevailing tendencies, and other extrinsic factors.

And whatever efforts may be made to unite the conflicting currents, it is doubtful whether the ideal opera, satisfying every faction, will ever be completely realised. The highest excellence seems to belong to music and drama in isolation. Combine them, and you pair off two hostile sets of demands. There will always be beautiful operas enough, but they will not attain that state of perfection which is the glory of the single arts.

THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTIONS IN MUSIC¹

A COLLECTION of little lines, scattered about at random, is meaningless and uninteresting; having no further significance, it fails to arrest our attention, which wanders off to more stimulating objects. If the lines are grouped into a square or an octagon, our eye lingers a trifle longer: there is plan and purpose in the grouping, and we are confronted with a definite form. And if, finally, they are arranged so as to form a crude representation of a house or an animal, their appeal is more intimate still: having acquired significance, they possess an interest far beyond that of the chaotic grouping or the geometrical figure.

So also if we listen to the hubbub of noises from a busy street. At first we merely get a medley of meaningless sounds. If we iso-

¹ Reprinted from *The Philosophical Review*, July, 1903, with the permission of the editor.

late the rhythmic clatter of a horse's hoofs, we obtain an individualised, ordered series of sounds, comparable to the geometric figure. And if we hear somebody shout from the sidewalk, announcing a public calamity, we prick up our mental ears and strain our necks to get a glimpse of the speaker. The sounds which produce this effect also have significance and symbolic value, and it is this which gives them their firm grasp on our attention.

Poetry, painting, and sculpture deal with symbolic values like these. Their works are enlarged and complicated cases similar to the crude sketch and the significant utterance. Like these, they represent and convey messages, only their representations are more minute and detailed, their messages more elaborate.

What is the case when we turn from poetry and fine art to music? If I strike the note *c* on the piano, nobody will detect a representative value in the resulting sound; a mere tone, it corresponds to one of the scattered lines, or a meaningless noise from the street. Combined with *e* and *g*, likewise, it embodies no expressive value, like that of the sketch or the startling announcement: it is an auditory

form, comparable to the geometric figure, and without further recognisable purport. Even when I bind together a few chords in a harmonic exercise, significance would still seem to be lacking. If the triad resembles a regular figure, the sequence is comparable to a shifting, connected series of figures, like the varying shapes of a kaleidoscope.

Does the matter assume a different aspect when we come to longer passages, worked out in greater complication and detail, or to complete compositions, like the sonatas and symphonies of Beethoven? Does the music, like the lines and the sounds of the speaker, develop a suggestive quality, does it become representative of extraneous facts?

The question has formed the basis of endless controversies. On the one hand there are the formalists, headed by the renowned critic Eduard Hanslick, who maintain that music is merely a beautiful play of tones, effective solely through its formal relations, and without reference to extra-musical realities. Opposed to them are the "expressionists," who contend that like poetry and painting it has a significant content or meaning, which raises it from the level of a worthless kalei-

doscopic pastime to that of a true and noble art.

The decision between these views is not easy. True, if music were confined to the isolated chords and harmonic exercises mentioned above, we should not hesitate in siding with the formalists. But when we turn to Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony, with its *Scene at the Brook, Storm, and Shepherd's Song*, in which states of mind and objective occurrences are so charmingly suggested; when we recall the descriptive overtures of Mendelssohn, the vivid tone-pictures of Berlioz, the exquisite sketches of Schumann; when we consider the masterful delineation of thought and action throughout the music dramas of Richard Wagner,—we must certainly agree that the champions of expression are not theorising on air, and that it will not do to ignore their claims.

In view of such compositions we must admit that music can and may represent extra-musical things. It can directly imitate certain natural sounds, like the song of birds and the noises of animals. Examples are to be found in Haydn's *Creation* and Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony. Again, it may

symbolically represent many physical occurrences. It can flow along smoothly, swell forth with power, subside again, sweep by majestically, burst forth in crashes, trip lightly, rustle delicately, move boldly, hesitatingly, calmly, playfully. And through these modes of motion it is able to suggest and in a symbolic manner portray, many natural as well as artificial occurrences and actions. It can represent the fury of the storm, the bubbling of the brook, the rustling of the wind, the rotation of the spinning wheel, the trotting of the horse, and numerous other poetic manifestations of nature and life. The storm scene of the Pastoral Symphony, the prelude of Wagner's *Walküre*, the *Waldweben* of his *Siegfried*, and the whole class of cradle and spinning songs, are familiar examples. Thirdly, since emotional states also have a kind of internal motion, which can be duplicated in the musical flow, music is able to portray and give expression to such states. We have calm, agitated, stormy, hurrying, hesitating, rushing, energetic, playful states of mind and soul; which are capable of finding expression in the analogous progressions of the musical art.

The important question now arises whether music *must*, like poetry and painting, give expression to extra-musical facts, whether it is of its *essence* to portray and imitate, and whether portrayal and imitation may be adopted as criterions in judging of the value of any particular composition?

Here we may at once drop the first two kinds of portrayal: the representation of material sounds and processes, though by no means rare, is on the whole of a sporadic nature, and has never been regarded as the peculiar function of music. It is rather the portrayal of emotions which has been insisted on by the champions of expression; and in endeavouring to decide between the two parties we shall only regard this aspect of the matter. We shall ask ourselves: Is music merely a formal play of tones, a sounding kaleidoscope, without further import and meaning; or has it rather the peculiar office of representing and giving expression to the emotions?

The answer is a compromise, based on certain distinctions between the meanings of the word *expression*. In one sense of the word the formalists seem to be right, in another,

their opponents. On the whole, we incline toward the position of the formalists, whose use of the word is more precise, and more congruent with its ordinary signification. If *expression* corresponds to the definite embodiment of ideas in works of literature, or the delineation of forms in sculpture and painting, if it is approximately synonymous with *representation*, *portrayal*, or *imitation*,—then we should say that the formalists were right, and that it was not the office of music to delineate or “express” the emotions. As this is the sense in which we have been using the word so far, we shall adhere to it for the time being, postponing a consideration of the other meanings until a later page. Our contention will then be, that it is not of the essence of music to express emotions, that it need not convey meanings, and that its effectiveness, so far as apparent, is confined to the mere tones and their combinations.

In support of this view it can be shown that there are innumerable compositions—even masterpieces—in which we can detect no expression of feelings. Take the *Andante* from Beethoven's tenth sonata. Surely an exquisite piece of music, sparkling with

beauties, in which almost every measure, like a separate gem, contains charms of its own. Where, however, is the expression of emotion? Does the emotion lie in the first measures? Or does it belong to the first part of the composition as a whole; and in this case are the other portions mere continuations of the same feeling, or does every part express a different state of affection? Or finally, is it exhaled^{吐出} by the composition in its entirety, and not by any particular sections? For myself, I confess that I am unable to detect the expression of emotion either in the separate parts or in the piece as a whole; yet I have frequently derived genuine æsthetic enjoyment from this piece. My pleasure, however, is based on its peculiarly musical aspects. I enjoy the delightfully simple character of the main theme, the exquisitely appropriate alternations of *legato* and *staccato*, *piano* and *forte*, the interesting disguises of the theme in the variations, and the admirable grouping of these variations. I enjoy the pure music of it all, and seek for no extraneous meaning; the tones are adequate by themselves, and require no interpretative commentary in order to thrill and satisfy me.

The same is true of many other compositions. Take Chopin's waltz in A flat major or the minuet from *Don Juan*; take the fugues of the old contrapuntists or the dance tunes of to-day: would it not seem arbitrary to proclaim these as the media of expression? Dance music may be gay in character, but we could hardly style it an *expression* of gaiety: it *is* gay, but does not *represent* gaiety. The nucleus of our enjoyment, in such music, depends on purely musical elements,—on the delightful rhythms, entrancing melodies, and sensuous beauty of the tones. But as Hanslick says, in commenting on the wholesale exceptions to the expressionistic thesis: "If large departments of art, which can be defended both on historical and æsthetic grounds, have to be passed over for the sake of a theory, it may be concluded that such a theory is false."¹

These considerations alone ought to suffice for a proof; but they are supplemented by others of almost equal force. Not only do we have effective compositions without noteworthy expression, but we also have expressive

¹ *The Beautiful in Music* (translated by Gustav Cohen), London and New York, 1891, p. 43.

compositions with but moderate effectiveness. Witness our operatic recitatives, written with a view to the faithful interpretation of the text, but often painfully tedious. Witness the programme music of the modern masters, avowedly delineative in character, but frequently inferior to the "absolute" style of the older schools. All degrees of value or worthlessness, indeed, are coupled with expression. While expression, however, does not invariably point to value, formal beauty—of melody, harmony, or structure—always does. We can always say, when listening to a beautiful composition: "What exquisite melody! What interesting counterpoint! What wealth of harmony!" or something of the sort,—but not necessarily, "What wonderful expression!"

And as we may have all degrees of merit accompanying expression, so, to approach the question from the other side once more, we may have all degrees of expression accompanying worth (or worthlessness). Many beautiful compositions, as mentioned, are not delineative in character at all; but even where there is expression, it bears no constant relation to the beauty. It may range through all degrees of prominence—from its

vague^{いん}st and most incipient presence to the definite delineation of programme music—without offering us the least indication of the value of the music. We have little or no expression in many of the fugues and instrumental compositions of the older masters, and considerable in our modern romanzas and recitatives, —yet the former may excel the latter. We have more expression in Beethoven's fifth and sixth symphonies than in his eighth, yet one would hesitate offhand to pronounce any one of these works decidedly superior to the others. Marx divides music into three classes,—tone-play, language of feeling (or music of the soul), and ideal representation (or music of the mind and spirit); and he includes Beethoven's splendid sonata Op. 53 in the class of mere tone-play, while numbers one and two come under the heading of language of feeling. Yet who would for a moment dream of setting these earlier efforts above the magnificent *Waldstein*?

In view of all these converging and reinforcing lines of argument, our conclusion ought now to stand forth clearly. The whole literature of music appears like an elaborate,

systematic experiment, which demonstrates that musical beauty is not connected primarily with the expression of emotions. This conclusion might perhaps have been gained even more quickly by direct introspection. A careful examination of our state of mind during the appreciation of a piece of music would show that our enjoyment had its main roots, not in the recognition of expression, but in the unique, indefinable, intrinsically musical qualities of the tones. The greater part of the musical beauty remains unexplained from the expressionistic point of view, and falls through the interpretative meshes. The expression only becomes evident upon the rendition of longer sections, or crops out at isolated moments, while the enjoyment is always present, dropping into the mind measure by measure or even note by note. Even the most extreme expressionists admit that the interpretation cannot be hunted down to the individual bars. Would not the conclusion seem to follow that the musical beauty, which adheres to the bars, does not depend on interpretation?

But pending the personal introspection involved in the establishment of this conclu-

sion, the differences in the amount of expression which various people find in the same composition, and the similarity of the accompanying enjoyment, point in the same direction. We may have the most elaborate interpretations on the one hand, and a total lack of interpretation on the other, with many intermediate degrees, yet the enjoyment may be equally deep and genuine in all cases. Gustav Engel finds that the introduction to the second act of *Fidelio* portrays the severe, undeserved suffering of a noble man, who for the sake of virtue and justice has become the victim of a villain. Hanslick, on the other hand, would probably detect very little representation whatever; yet his enjoyment is presumably as real as Engel's. It is allowable, of course, to read meanings into the art, a procedure which may at times produce considerable heightening of pleasure. The point to be observed is, that musical enjoyment does not depend on interpretations, and that it may also be reaped by those who abstain from making them.

This, indeed, is the crucial point, that compositions may be thoroughly enjoyed, not only by those who regard them as the embodi-

ment of emotions, but also by those who accept the formalistic view. The enjoyment can be explained just as easily by reference to the exquisite instrumentation, the rich harmony, and the enchanting flow of melody, as by an appeal to the emotions which are supposed to be depicted. We need not think of anything but these purely musical beauties, as the cause of our enjoyment,—we need make no reference to external meanings. So we are brought back once more to the formalistic conclusion, that the expression of emotions is no essential function of music, and that the art is primarily a mere empty play of tones.

Let us repeat, however, that this conclusion is connected with one particular meaning of the word, and that there are other meanings, according to which it may be proper to speak of music as an expression of the emotions. In order to distinguish between the meanings, let us bring them together in the following statement:

“The thoughts which Emerson expresses in these sentences, and which so aptly express his innermost nature, express much that I have often vaguely felt, but have never been able to express.”

1880
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Here we have at least three distinct meanings of the word. The first one refers to the specific thoughts formulated by the philosopher in his sentences,—which they alone denote, and which no other sentences ever written precisely convey. It refers to their *contents*, to the ideas which they embody and present on an intellectual plate or tray, as it were, and which are opposed to thousands of other ideas that they might conceivably have conveyed. If one of the sentences reads “Self-trust is the essence of heroism,” it simply expresses this fact,—not that self-trust is not the essence of heroism, or that heroism is fine, or that John kissed Jane, or two times two make four. In this sense literature expresses or represents life; and in this sense, we have seen, music expresses nothing at all, and Hanslick is justified in calling it a purely formal art.

The second meaning—contained in the clause: “which so aptly express his innermost nature”—does not refer to the directly formulated content of the sentences, which they were *intended* to formulate, but to a secondary manifestation or side-gleam of the same, which they exhale, as it were, and which

is superadded to their central purpose. It is in this sense that a man's literary or artistic taste expresses the nature of his education; or his walk, voice, gestures, and handwriting give indication of his temperament and character. Evidently this use of the word is entirely distinct from the first. We might substitute other sentences for those under consideration, thereby changing their direct expression and yet retaining the other; for the substituted sentences might express the nature of the philosopher fully as well as the original ones.

The third meaning—embodied in the words: "express much that I have often vaguely felt"—differs from both the others. What is here expressed was already present in the mind, although vaguely and indistinctly, and the expression consists in matching and arousing this, not in the presentation of new thoughts; it refers to the correspondence between my own ideas and those presented by the author, not to the specific content of the latter. The same sentences might, in this sense, express what one person feels or thinks and the opposite of what another feels or thinks; yet they would be identically the

same sentences in both cases, and would express the same thoughts and personal traits according to the first two meanings of the word.

The case of a virtuoso will also serve to illustrate the distinctions. In the first place the composition he is rendering may be delineative of objective facts and feelings. This would correspond to the direct, specific embodiment of thoughts in a piece of writing. Then again, being selected by the virtuoso in preference to other compositions, it may be expressive of his tastes and personality—which would correspond to the reflection of Emerson's nature in the example above. And finally it may express the feelings of the listeners, in the same way in which the sentences in question reflect the thoughts of the reader.

The first type of expression might be called *direct embodiment, representation, or denotation*. Three elements are involved in it,—two of them objective, *i. e.*, the work itself and the expressed content, and one of them subjective, the perceiving mind.

The second might be styled *indirect embodiment* or *connotation*. Here, likewise, three factors are present: the expressing medium,

the thing expressed, and the perceiving mind.

For the third type we might select the words *parallelism*, *contagion*, or *sympathetic arousal*. Only two elements are operative in this case, instead of three: one of them, the expressing medium or work, is objective; the other, the perceiving individual, is subjective. The content lies in the subject instead of the object, and the expression consists in drawing this forth and harmonising with it, instead of in presenting a novel, objective content.

Now music as a whole, like the single composition of the virtuoso, may be expressive in various ways: by denotation, by connotation, and by contagion or sympathetic arousal. But not all varieties of expression are equally important. The first kind, as indicated, is not essential in nature; we may regard it as an incidental and contingent factor, and agree with Hanslick that the intrinsic beauty of music is not involved in it.

The second kind—by indirect embodiment—is of course present in music: since everything we do or practise is capable of embodying expression in this sense, music must likewise be included. But here, too, the effectiveness is not connected with the ex-

pression. Just as a disagreeable way of shaking hands or laughing may form an excellent indication of personality, so a mediocre composition may afford us much insight into the nature of its composer. The amount of connotative expression and the artistic excellence, in short, bear no relation to each other.

In regard to the third kind, the case is different. Here we are not disinclined to agree that expression forms an integral part of the very purpose and essence of the art, in the absence of which music sinks to an empty jingle or a dry and quasi-mathematic intellectual pastime. We do not actively share this view, but grant its plausibility. Just as a speaker's peroration or poet's verse may voice one's thoughts and sentiments, fitting them so admirably as almost to draw them forth with magnetic power, so music, when one fully enjoys it, might be supposed to elicit and draw forth the feelings, swaying to and fro with them as in a delightful dance of the soul. Every inner tension, every shade of feeling, is matched and answered by a corresponding movement of the tones. - Our feeling, for instance, may be swelling with a

crescendo; just as it is about to call out "enough" then, and ask for a *diminuendo*, lo! the tones have answered its call and the *diminuendo* has begun. Every tone of the musical progression finds a resonator in the soul, every slightest tendency of the soul finds firm, supporting arms in the music, which steady it and lead it to its fullest realisation. Doubtless it is this arousal and furtherance of the feelings, this reciprocity of motion, this fluent "give and take" between the feelings and the musical progressions, this delightful interplay of stimulation and response, on which the expressionistic thesis is based. But it is not necessary at present to decide on the legitimacy of its conclusions. The vital point is, that there are various kinds of expression, and that the art of tones may conceivably be bound to observe one kind, and not the others.

It would now be in order to prove that the actual differences of opinion have arisen from the different interpretations of the word, and that, while one of the contending parties has upheld and the other denied the importance of expression, both have had different kinds of expression in mind. Let us begin

with Hanslick, the champion of formalism, and examine his use of the critical word.

The subject of a poem, a painting, or statue [he says], may be expressed in words and reduced to ideas. We say, for instance, this picture represents a flower-girl, this statue a gladiator, this poem one of Roland's exploits. . . . The whole gamut of human *feelings* has with almost complete unanimity been proclaimed to be *the subject of music*. . . . According to this theory, therefore, sound and its ingenious combinations are but the material and the medium of expression, by which the composer represents love, courage, piety, and delight. . . . The beautiful melody and the skilful harmony as such, do not charm us, but only what they imply: the whispering of love, or the clamour of ardent combatants.¹

It is clear that Hanslick is using the word in the first sense; and the same is true of that other keen antagonist of the expressionistic theory, Edmund Gurney. In approaching the subject he says:

So far we have been considering Music almost entirely as a means of *impression*. . . . We have now to distinguish this aspect of it from another, its aspect as a means of *expression*, of creating in us a consciousness of images, or of ideas, or of feelings, which are known to us in regions outside Music, and which

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 32 et seq.

therefore Music, so far as it summons them up within us, may be fairly said to *express*.”¹

Turning to the other side, we first meet with the æsthetician Hand. In his treatise on the *Æsthetics of Musical Art* he devotes considerable space to a consideration of the relations between music and emotion. There seems to be no exact definition of the word “expression,” but it is evident that his conception of it is radically different from that of Hanslick and Gurney. Music, he says,

gives only feelings and inner emotions—without signs that may be immediately associated with an idea, and not imitatively, whereby comparison may be made with an original. . . . We do not wish to perceive individual things, which, for the most part, fall to the lot of sensuous contemplation, nor does the real listener to music seek for a translation into ideas. . . . Truly we cannot expect objective representations in music, but only inner conditions of life, and even these not in abstractions, but in immediate appearance, and for direct transmission into other souls. The excited and moved life of him who sings and produces music, propagates itself, exciting and moving, into the soul of the listener, and a more intimate conformity and blending is not possible. . . . The play of tones

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 312.

transplants us into the same state of feeling, and thus verifies the contents.¹

Evidently Hand has the third kind of expression in view. His remarks about "the moved life of him who produces music propagating itself, exciting and moving, into the soul of the listener," and about the "play of tones transplanting us into the same state of feeling and thus verifying the contents," admit no other interpretation. But still more certain is it that the expression he claims for music is not of the first kind, dwelt on by the formalists. His divergence from the formalistic position is emphasised in the light of two statements from the authors before considered, the first from Gurney and the second from Hanslick: "However *impressive* a phenomenon may be . . . we have no right to call it *expressive*, unless we can say what it expresses";² and "The query 'what' is the subject of music, must necessarily be answerable in words, if music really has a '*subject*.'"³ Remember Hand's contention that the real

¹ Quoted from various sections of the translation by Walter E. Lawson, London, 1880.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 162.

listener does not "seek for a translation into ideas," and that music gives feelings and emotions "without signs that may be immediately associated with an idea, and not imitatively, whereby comparison may be made with an original,"—and the conviction must settle upon us that the two parties are disputing about widely different things.

But Hand is not alone in his interpretation. According to Ambros

Music conveys moods of finished expression; it, as it were, forces them upon the hearer. It conveys them in finished form, because it possesses no means for expressing the previous series of ideas which *speech* can clearly and definitely express. . . . Now, *the state of mind which the hearer receives from music he transfers back to it*; he says: "It expresses this or that mood." Thus music receives back its own gift, and thus we perceive how the best intellects . . . could claim for music, as a fact beyond doubt, so to speak, the "expression of feelings."¹

Again it is the third meaning on which the conclusion is based. But the second, too, is sometimes employed, as in the following quotation: "The musician formulates the

¹ *The Boundaries of Music and Poetry* (translated by J. H. Cornell), New York, 1893, p. 53.

direct expression of man's innermost feelings and sensibilities. . . . The story of music has been that of a slow building up and extension of artistic means of formulating utterances which in their raw state are direct expressions of feeling and sensibility."¹ Although the author uses the term "direct," he is not referring to denotative expression; the connotative nature of the expression is confirmed a moment later, when the "dog reiterating short barks of joy at the sight of a beloved friend or master" is instanced as a case of "direct" expression.

Is it a wonder, in view of the uncertain, shifting nature of the term, that disagreements and controversies should result? And is it not evident that the variety of interpretations is to blame for the differences of opinion? Ordinarily, of course, the term is clear enough, but the art of tones seems to be a "critical" region, where the meanings separate, and where the most divergent results ensue according to our choice of signification.

The question may now be asked: Which interpretation is the most proper; which

¹ Parry, *The Art of Music*, New York, 1893, p. 4.

interpretation
should be adopted in considering the problem? So far as the dignity of the art is concerned, it does not matter which. There seems to be great fear in some quarters that the adoption of the formalistic conclusion would result in the despoliation of the art. Nothing is further from the truth. Music will retain its intrinsic value no matter what function we may theoretically ascribe to it. Furthermore, there may be representation and meaning even though the tones are apparently devoid of these qualities. Money, to cite an analogous case, is generally handled without thought of its significance, yet it has a significance and stands for extraneous values. So the meaningless tones, likewise, might be expressive of deeper things, even though we were not clearly aware of the fact.

Logically it seems to us as if the preference ought to be given to the first interpretation rather than the third. If asked for the content of poetry or painting, we should hardly refer to the mental and emotional states they arouse, but to the thoughts and scenes they directly set forth. It is the absence of such a definite content in music that draws our attention to the other sort of expression—by

sympathetic arousal—and leads us to regard music as an embodiment of the emotions. Poetry, also, might be considered expressive in this sense; the feelings which it arouses sway along with the words in the same way in which the emotions awakened by music follow the tones. But since poetry also has its direct, denotative expression, we pay attention to this and lose sight of the other. Suppose, however, that instead of playing on our emotions with tales of love, war, heroism, and the like, and thus conveying definite, attention-absorbing meanings, it were to accomplish this end by symbolistic means, by verses which, although without specific meaning, aroused the same emotions as the significant words,—some of the attention now directed to the content of the words would be set free, the fluctuation of the feelings would obtrude itself, and poetry, like music, might also come to be regarded as an art which had the feelings for its subject-matter, and whose function it was to express these feelings.

Yet it would have gained this function by a loss rather than an addition of content,—by the loss, namely, of those definite ideas which at present it embodies. Music, it

seems, corresponds to such a denuded poetry, divested of definite meanings and producing its effects by apparently empty figures. If we are to adhere to a single point of view, valid in every art, we are bound to say that music expresses nothing and has no contents in the sense in which this can be affirmed of the other arts.

However, an author has a right to use his terms in any legitimate sense; and if it pleases him to attach another meaning to the word *expression*, we have no alternative but to follow him and judge of his statements from his own point of view. The important point to be established is that there are different points of view, and that the differences of opinion are due to this fact. So much, we hope, has been accomplished. The formalists, we have seen, are right when they maintain that music need not be expressive in the sense of a definite portrayal or denotation; and the expressionists may be right when they insist that it shall awaken, nurture, and harmonise with the feelings, and thus express them by contagion or sympathetic arousal.


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