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THE BATTLE OF FLODDEN

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THE RAIDS OF 1513

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BY

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'THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF BORDER BALLADS' AND

'FURTHER ESSAYS ON BORDER BALLADS'

EDINBURGH

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PREFACE

In this book no attempt has been made to paint a vivid picture of romantic and thrilling events; it is but a study of the evidence upon which our greatest historians have based their accounts—a study which, I hope, may elucidate various obscure or disputed points, as, for instance, the motives actuating the Earl of Surrey on the day before, and morning of the battle, and the probable effect of his movements on the mind and action of King James. Perhaps the most interesting conclusion arrived at is that the Scots were no longer on Flodden Hill on the morning of the battle, but had taken up a position, behind the Till, facing that occupied by the English on the previous evening, and consequently it was from here, and not from Flodden Hill itself, that they marched to Branxton Hill where the battle was fought.

With regard to the battle, although extremely little information exists—and much of this is con-

tradictory—we yet have knowledge of a few incidents which occurred in each of the conflicts engaged in by the various divisions of the two armies, and this, together with a thorough acquaintance with the ground, renders it possible to arrive at fairly plausible conjectures regarding the general drift of each 'battel.' This is particularly evident in the case of the fighting on the Scottish right; by studying the few scraps of apparently trivial information which we possess regarding it, side by side with the ground, we obtain a probably true view of the causes which led to the defeat of the Highlanders under Lennox and Argyle.

Again, only a little consideration of the few known facts suffices to explain the part played by the Borderers on the other flank of the Scottish army. The charge of treasonable apathy, in not moving to the King's assistance, so generally levelled against their commander, Lord Home, melts into thin air, and we see in him a wise and gallant soldier, maintaining to the last a front to the foe, covering the retreat of a shattered army, and defending the Scottish frontier with a spear which was *not* 'shivered,' with a shield which was *not* 'broken.'

That he was disloyal to his country or to his king, that he was unworthy of the great name he bore, there is not one tittle of evidence.

The concluding chapter concerns the English raids into Scotland after Flodden and the commonly alleged devastation wrought by them on our Borders. The only authentic information I know of regarding these matters is in letters written by Lord Dacre to King Henry VIII. and the English Council, which I have examined in such close detail as may prove tedious to those who have no acquaintance with the Border country; but this is unavoidable, if just conclusions are to be drawn. In a book I published a few years ago, *The Trustworthiness of Border Ballads* (Blackwood and Sons), I expressed the opinion that after Flodden the Scottish Borderers were not only well able to protect themselves, but that they in fact inflicted more damage upon England than they received from her. This view is here strongly confirmed.

For my facts I have been dependent solely upon the English chroniclers of the period, Halle and Holinshed, and the Scottish chroniclers, Lindsay of Pitscottie, Lesley, and Buchanan; also upon a

curious tract, evidently written shortly after the battle, entitled, 'Hereafter ensue the trewe Encounter or Batayle lately don between Englande and Scotlande . . .'; and also upon *English State Papers*. I have, I hope, noticed all points of importance with regard to which these authorities appear to differ, and I have endeavoured to reconcile these differences as far as possible and to determine the truth.

I ought to point out an omission of which I have been guilty when preparing the map of Flodden Field. The movements of the Scots immediately prior to the battle are so much a matter of controversy that I decided not to show the routes which, in my opinion, they followed, as I have done in the case of the English troops. I had, however, intended to state upon the face of the map that the words 'Branxton Hill' indicate the position which, there can be hardly room for doubt, was occupied by the Scots at the commencement of the battle—this, unfortunately, I have omitted to do.

FITZWILLIAM ELLIOT.

EDINBURGH, *July* 1911.

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CHAPTER I

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR

A.D. 1512

'THIS zeire, 1512, K. Henrey the 8, of England, denuncis warre to the Frenche King; and the King of France, by his ambassador, seues for aide at K. James handes.'[1]

'Also the Queen of France wrote a Love-Letter to the King of Scotland, calling him, "Her Love"; shewing him, "That she had suffered much Rebuke for his Sake, in France, for the defending of his Honour." She believed surely, that he would recompence her again, with some of his kingly Support, in her Necessity, that is to say, That he would raise her an Army, and come three Foot of Ground on English Ground, for her Sake: To that Effect she sent him a Ring off her Finger, with fourteen thousand French Crowns to make his Expences.'[2]

[1] Sir James Balfour's *Annales of Scotland.*

[2] Lindsay of Pitscottie's *Historie and Cronicles of Scotland.*

1513

In June 'K. James sends Lyone K. of Armes into France, to K. Henrey the 8., then beseidgeing Tornay, with letters, and a soleme message, aither to desist from troubling and molesting his allayeis of France and Gulders, and to repaire suche wronges his subjects had susteined by the Englishe on the seas and borders, wtherwayes to denunce warre to K. Henrey. Lyone getts audience of the Englishe King, and his anssuer, and is dismissed.'[1]

In the summer King James despatched 'a nauey of 47 shipes to the Frenche Kings aide, against the Englishe,' and 'made a Proclamation full hastily, through all the Realm of Scotland, both East and West, South and North, as well in the Isles as in the firm Land, That all Manner of Man betwixt sixty and sixteen Years, that they should be ready, within twenty Days, to pass with him, with forty days Victual, and to meet at the Burrow-Muir of Edinburgh, and there to pass forward where he pleased. His Proclamations were hastily obeyed, contrary the Council of Scotland's Will: But every Man loved his Prince so well, that they would, on no Ways, disobey him; but every Man caused make his Proclamation so hastily, conform to the Charge of the King's Proclamation.

'The King came to Lithgow, where he happened to be for the Time at the Council, very sad and dolorous, making his Devotion to God to send him

[1] *Annales.*

good Chance and Fortune in his Voyage. In this mean Time, there came a Man clad in a blue Gown in at the Kirk-Door, and belted about him in a roll of Linnen-Cloth ; a Pair of Brotikins on his Feet, to the Great of his Legs, with all other Hose and Clothes conform thereto ; but he had nothing on his Head, but syde red yellow Hair behind, and on his Haffits, which wan down to his Shoulders ; but his Forehead was bald and bare. He seemed to be a Man of two and fifty Years, with a great Pyke-Staff in his Hand, and came first forward among the Lords, crying and speiring for the King, saying, He desired to speak with him. While, at the last, he came where the King was sitting in the Desk at his Prayers : But when he saw the King, he made him little Reverence or Salutation, but leaned down groflins on the Desk before him, and said to him in this Manner, as after follows. Sir King, my Mother hath sent me to you, desiring you not to pass, at this Time, where thou art purposed ; for, if thou does, thou wilt not fare well in thy Journey, nor none that passeth with thee. Further, she bade thee mell with no Woman, nor use their Counsel, for if thou do it, thou wilt be confounded and brought to Shame.

'By this Man had spoken thir Words unto the King's Grace, the Even-Song was near done ; and the King paused on thir Words, studying to give him an Answer : But, in the mean Time, before the King's Eyes, and in Presence of all the Lords that

were about him for the Time, this Man Vanished away, and could noways be seen nor comprehended, but vanished away as he had been a Blink of the Sun, or a Whip of the Whirlwind, and could no more be seen. I heard say, Sir David Lindesay, Lyon Herauld, and John Inglis, the Marshal, who were, at that Time, young Men, and special Servants to the King's Grace, were standing presently beside the King, who thought to have laid Hands on this Man, that they might have speired further Tidings at him: But all for nought; they could not touch him; for he vanished away betwixt them, and was no more seen.

'Yet all thir Warnings and uncouth Tidings, nor no good Counsel, might stop the King, at this Present, from his vain Purpose and wicked Enterprize, but hasted him fast to Edinburgh, and there to make his Provision and Furnishing in having forth of his Army against the Day appointed, that they should meet in the Burrow-Muir of Edinburgh: That is to say, Seven Canons that he had forth of the Castle of Edinburgh, which were called The Seven Sisters, casten by Robert Borthwick the Master-Gunner, with other small Artillery, Bullet, Powder, and all Manner of Order, as the Master-Gunner could devise.

'In this mean Time, when they were taking forth their Artillery, and the King being in the Abbay for the Time, there was a Cry heard at the Market-Cross of Edinburgh, at the Hour of Mid-night, proclaiming as it had been a Summons, which was

named and called by the Proclaimer thereof, The Summons of Plotcock ;[1] which desired all Men, "To compear, both Earl and Lord, and Baron and Gentleman, and all honest Gentlemen within the Town (every Man specified by his own Name) to compear, within the Space of forty Days, before his Master, where it should happen him to appoint, and be for the Time, under the Pain of Disobedience." But whether this Summons was proclaimed by vain Persons, Night-Walkers, or drunk Men, for their Pastime, or if it was but a Spirit, I cannot truly tell : But it was shewn to me, That an In-dweller of the Town, Mr. Richard Lawson, being evil-disposed, ganging in his Gallery-Stair foreanent the Cross, hearing this Voice proclaiming this Summons, thought Marvel what it should be, cried on his Servant to bring him his Purse ; and when he had brought him it, he took out a Crown, and cast over the Stair, saying, "I appeal from that Summons, Judgment and Sentence thereof, and takes me all whole in the Mercy of God, Christ Jesus his Son." Verily, the Author of this, that caused me to write the Manner of this Summons, was a landed Gentleman, who was, at that Time, twenty Years of Age, and was in the Town the Time of the said Summons ; and thereafter, when the Field was stricken, he swore to me, there was no Man that escaped that was called in this Summons, but that one Man alone, which made his Protestation, and appealed from

[1] 'Plotcock,' *i.e.* the Devil.

the said Summons ; but all the Lave were perished in the Field with the King.' [1]

The first serious blow in the campaign was struck by Lord Home, the Warden of the Scottish Marches, who with a force of three thousand horsemen penetrated for some distance into Northumberland. After burning numerous villages, he was returning with a large quantity of booty towards Scotland, when he was intercepted at Millfield by an English force, under Sir William Bulmer, numbering about a thousand men, of whom two hundred were mounted archers. It is said that the English were hidden in ambush among tall broom near the route by which the Scots had to pass, and suddenly surprised them. The Scots, being all mounted men and encumbered with spoil, were unable to reply to the fire of the English archers, and lost heavily. This occurred on the 13th August.[2]

At about this time the main Scottish army must have been gathering near the eastern frontier, for only nine days later we hear of the King having joined it on the Tweed, near the mouth of the Till.

[1] Pitscottie.

[2] The accounts of this battle vary greatly. Ridpath states the Scots lost five or six hundred men killed, and four hundred prisoners, while the English lost only sixty men, and recovered the booty. (*Border History of England and Scotland*, 1776.)

Buchanan, who estimates the loss in prisoners at only two hundred, says the invaders divided their plunder in the enemy's country, each proceeded home with his portion by the nearest route ; that it was the rear which fell into the ambuscade, and that the plunder, which had been sent on before, arrived


Melrose
To Edinburgh (via Soutra)
Home Castle
Duns
THE MERSE
R. Teviot
Kelso
R. Tweed
Jedburgh
Coast
Norham
Wark
Twizel Bridge
Berwick
R. Till
Etal
Crookham
Glendale
Ford
Flodden
Milfield
Barmoor
Coast
THE CHEVIOTS
Frontier
Weetwood Bridge
Wooler
Holy Island
NORTHUMBERLAND
N.
Bolton
0
5
10
Miles
Alnwick
To Morpeth
THE SEA

Pitscottie relates that the King had assembled on the Borough Muir near Edinburgh 'all his Lords, Barons, Burgesses, and Freeholders, and all Maner of Man betwixt sixty and sixteen, as well Spiritual as Temporal, both Burgh and Land, as well the out Isles as the firm Land, which hastily came, and were to the Number of a hundred thousand fighting Men, together with the Carriage-Men and Artillery, which was to the Number of thirty Shot of great Artillery, and thirty Field-Pieces, with all their Ordinance of Powder and Bullet; and passed syne forward to Esk, and camped There; and on the Morrow went to Wark and Norham, and cast them down.' These details have been accepted by modern historians more literally than I am inclined to do, for I cannot believe that the whole Scottish army concentrated at Edinburgh. I am not for a moment questioning the accuracy of the statement that when Marmion rode over Blackford Hill a

> 'Thousand pavilions, white as snow,
> Spread all the Borough-moor below,'

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safely in Scotland. (*History of Scotland*, revised and corrected from the Latin original, 1733.)

Fraser Tytler (*History of Scotland*, vol. 5) also gives an account of the battle, the result of which he imputes to military incapacity on the part of the Scottish leaders, and to 'the Borderers, more solicitous for the preservation of their booty than their honour, having dispersed upon the first alarm,' a remark indicative of ignorance as to the object of a raid—namely, to obtain booty but to avoid battle. This is the first of several unjustifiable and foolish charges brought against the Borderers, and their great leader, Lord Home, for misconduct during the Flodden campaign.

nor am I doubting the genuineness of the Borestone, now to be seen at Morningside. Large Scottish forces were no doubt collected here, but not the army as a whole. The Borderers, whose presence on the frontier must have been urgently required, were surely not brought to Edinburgh in order to march back to the Borders; neither would the men of Kyle, Carrick, and Galloway have been so, whether James intended to strike at the east or west frontier. No details, so far as I know, exist of the concentration of the army previous to the Flodden campaign, but we do possess information as to how a similar concentration, previous to moving to the same part of the frontier, was effected ten years later,[1] and there is great likelihood of both operations having been conducted on the same lines. So far as the story of the Flodden campaign is concerned, however, the question as to the manner of concentration of the army is of no great importance, and it will suffice to say, with reference to Pitscottie's statement, that it is absolutely certain that the whole army of a hundred thousand men, or even of thirty thousand, accompanied by guns and impedimenta, did not march from the Esk—only a few miles from Edinburgh—to the Tweed, at Wark or Norham, a distance of about forty miles, in one day.

The siege of Norham was commenced on the 23rd or 24th. We are told in Halle's *Chronicles*

[1] I hope shortly to publish another volume dealing with the military events on the Borders in 1522-23, when this subject will be closely gone into.—F. E.

that some time before the siege Lord Surrey, to whom King Henry had given the command of the English forces, had inquired of the Governor, Sir Richard Cholmeley, as to the castle being sufficiently strong to withstand an attack, and he had offered to move at once to its assistance. The Governor, however, replied 'to the earle, thankyng hym, and prayed God that the kinge of Scottes would come with hys puyssaunce, for he would kepe hym playe tyll the tyme that the kinge of Englande came out of France to reskew it, whyche aunswer rejoysed the earle muche.' Later on, when at Durham, Surrey was informed 'how the kynge of Scottis with hys great ordinaunce had rased the walles of the castell of Norham, and had made thre great assaultes thre dayes together, and the capitaynes valiauntly defended hym, but he spent vaynely so much of his ordinaunce, bowes and arrowes, and other municions, that at the last he tacked, and so was at the vi. day compelled to yield hym symply to the kynge's mercye. Thys castell was thought impregnable, yf it had bene well furnished, but the Scottes, by the undiscrete spendynge of the capitayne, toke it in sixe dayes; thys chaunce was more sorrowful to the earle than to the bishoppe [of Durham] owner of the same.'

After the capture of Norham—on the 28th or 29th—the army was divided into two parts, one of which under the command of the King marched south to Etal, on the right bank of the Till.

After taking and destroying the castle there, he laid siege to Ford Castle, only a mile or so higher up the river on the same bank. This was also taken—at the cost, Pitscottie says, of a good number of men—and burned. The importance of these castles and of their capture should not be underrated. The Till is practically unpassable to large bodies of troops, except at the bridges, and the only bridges existing between Twizel, close to the Tweed, and Weetwood, near Wooler, more than ten miles higher up, were at Etal and Ford. By taking possession of these, the King gained the advantage of being able to throw his army to either side of the river at will.

The other part of the army crossed to the left bank of the Till by the bridge at Twizel, and moved up the Tweed to Wark Castle, which, after slight resistance, was taken and razed to the ground. This accomplished, they proceeded to rejoin the King and, since we have no information on the subject, we may assume they did so by the best and most direct route, namely by Branxton, Crookham, and Ford. But, as no good object would have been gained by actually crossing the bridge here and encamping on the heights beyond, they probably remained on the left bank of the Till, occupying the ground, peculiarly suitable for a large camp, between the eastern foot of Flodden Hill and Sandyford. (See map, p. 116.)

The general position of the Scottish army in the

early days of September must, then, have been somewhat as follows: The King with, Pitscottie says, ten thousand men at and about Ford, on the right bank of the Till; another large force in the position just alluded to on the left bank; both covered by large and numerous detachments pushed forward in every direction, with the two-fold object of facilitating the maintenance of their own army and of hindering that of the enemy by laying waste the country through which they would have to advance.

The strength of the army is in truth a matter of conjecture; there is, however, some ground for thinking that on the day of battle it was slightly under thirty-five thousand fighting men. Such information as I know of bearing on the subject will be found in Appendix II.

While the Scots were thus engaged, the Earl of Surrey was advancing rapidly from the south with an army of about twenty-six thousand men. On the 29th August he reached Durham, where he was met next day by Lord Dacre, Sir W. Bulmer, Sir Marmaduke Constable, and other influential local persons, who were directed to bring their respective forces to Bolton by the 4th September. By that date, however, Surrey himself was prevented by heavy rains from getting further than Alnwick, five miles short of Bolton. Being here joined by a force of highly trained men

from King Henry's army in France, under the command of his son, Thomas Howard, Lord Admiral, he felt himself sufficiently strong to encounter the Scots, of the dwindling away of whose numbers he must surely have been aware, and accordingly he sent his herald, Rouge Croix, from Alnwick to King James at Ford challenging him to battle on the 9th. This occurred on the 4th, and one cannot but surmise that the long interval between the despatch of the challenge and the proposed battle may have been due to an expectation on Surrey's part both of a further diminution in the strength of the Scottish army and of a further reinforcement for his own. Or has a mistake been made as to the dates ?

James accepted the challenge ; in so doing, it is said, he acted contrary to the advice pressed upon him by his nobles, and more especially by the old Earl of Angus, who was told by the King that ' if he was afraid he might go home.' In consequence of this alleged unjustifiable insult, Angus quitted the camp, leaving behind him two sons, both of whom, together with two hundred others of his name, fell in the subsequent battle.[1]

Buchanan's account of what now occurred is curious ; he writes that the nobles advised the King that ' it was no dishonour to the Scots to retreat

[1] Buchanan, Holinshed, and others relate this story. Pitscottie, though he makes no mention of Angus, refers to the nobles having advised the King to retire.

(since the English had not kept the time appointed) without fighting ; or else, not to fight but when they themselves thought fit. The first of these advices was, in many respects, more safe ; but if that did not please him, he had a fair opportunity offered him to comply with the latter. For seeing the river Till had very high banks, and was almost nowhere fordable, there was no passing for an army over it within ten miles, but by one bridge, where a few men might keep back a great body ; and if some of the English should get over, he might so place his ordnance as to beat down the bridge, and so they who had passed over might be destroyed, before they could be relieved by those on the contrary side. The King approved of neither advice. . . .' Further on he relates that as the result of this determination of the King's, the Scots decided 'to advantage themselves by the opportunity of the ground and place, and so to encamp upon an hill that lay near them'—that is to say, upon Flodden Hill, on the left bank of the Till, the bank by which the English were then operating.

The words in brackets seem to refer to something of which we are ignorant ; if the 9th was, as we are told, the day fixed upon by Surrey and King James for battle, and since the English fought upon that day, the words clearly apply to their having failed to keep some previous appointment. The words are, so far as I can see, meaningless, unless the challenge sent by Surrey on the 4th was for battle

on a day previous to the period to which Buchanan is referring, that is to say previous to the occupation of Flodden Hill by the Scots. The matter, though curious, is not important and need not be further considered. There are, however, two other points worth noticing; one is that seemingly the decision come to was rather that of the nobles than of the King himself; the other is that the alternative course of action suggested to the King, when still on the right bank and when the English were on the left bank—though remote from it—was precisely similar to that which—as will be noticed later—many modern critics assert he ought to have adopted on the morning of the battle, when both armies had changed banks.

On the 6th,[1] James, with the troops on the right bank, crossed the river by the bridge at Ford, and, together with the forces from Wark, occupied the heights of Flodden, which, rising to about 400 feet above the river, constitute a strong line of defence against an army advancing from the south.

We must now consider what reasons are likely

[1] Not later than the 6th, possibly earlier. See a curious tract entitled 'Hereafter ensue the trewe Encounter or Batayle lately don between Englande & Scotlande. . . .' It is not dated, and the authorship being unknown, it can hardly be considered good evidence. It contains little which is not mentioned by Halle or the Bishop of Durham, and some of the sentences are identical with theirs. It will be found in a work entitled *A ballad of the Scottysshe Kynge*, reproduced by John Ashton, and published by Elliot Stock, London, in 1882. Future references will be made to it as 'MS. Batayle.'

to have actuated the Scottish leaders in this, and whether they had been wise or not. There were four courses open to them : (1) to retire to the north bank of the Tweed. From a purely strategical and tactical point of view, this would perhaps have been the wisest course, but, with an undisciplined army such as James's, it would certainly have led to discord and probably to the disbandment of a great portion of his forces. We need not consider it. (2) To advance farther into England. There must have been little to recommend such a course, and, if suggested, it would have been at once put aside. (3) To remain in the Ford position on the right bank of the Till. (4) To transfer the army to the left bank. Now, in deciding between these two courses of action, they had to consider what Surrey's probable intentions were, and it must be remembered that, since the Scots had determined not to advance, the initiative lay entirely with him. He might either march direct on the Scottish position and engage battle forthwith — and the fact of his having sent James a challenge to battle leads one to infer, perhaps hastily, that such had indeed been his intention—or he might march round the Scottish flank and throw his army on to, and even beyond, the Tweed, where, being within easy communication with Berwick, he would be in a convenient position with regard to supplies, and would also be so placed as to render the situation of the Scots desperate.

In considering the former possibility, the Scots must have felt that to take up a position for battle near Ford would be most hazardous—on their rear flowed the Tweed, for many miles a tidal stream, with, at its mouth and on the north bank, the strong English fortress of Berwick, barely nine miles from where the left of their army would rest; while the Till, on their right flank, would seriously impede a retreat, should such become necessary, to the west. Evidently it would be more prudent to occupy a position on the left bank of the river, whence easy communication existed with Scotland via Coldstream, or Kelso, or even Yetholm. There can be no doubt that had the battle been fought and lost in the Ford position, the disaster would have been even greater than it was; and more than this, a retreat necessitated by a mere want of supplies, and not by defeat, would have been, with the English army hanging on their rear and the Berwick garrison on their flank, equally disastrous and perhaps less honourable. A complete victory alone could avert an overwhelming calamity.

But now, supposing Surrey's object was not to bring about immediate battle but to throw himself on the Tweed. With the Scots in the Ford position, it was open to him to keep to the west of the Till and to strike the Tweed between the confluence of these rivers and Coldstream, where he would not only be master of all the Scottish lines of com-

munication, but also be able, in conjunction with the garrison of Berwick, to defeat any attempt the Scots might make to recross the Tweed east of the Till. It may be thought that such a movement would have been both difficult from deficiency of supplies and rash from the proximity of the Scottish army, but in fact the Scottish leaders had no reason to think that the English were so poorly furnished with supplies as to be unable to march to the frontier of their own country, and they must undoubtedly have recognised the fact that the Till would allow of such a march being carried out without the possibility of serious interruption, for this river, which in most parts is deep and has generally steep banks and a muddy bottom, is extremely difficult to ford. No doubt there are places where individuals can generally get across, but they would be of little use for large bodies of either infantry or cavalry, and altogether so for guns.

With the Scots, however, in the Flodden position on the left bank of the Till, Surrey could only reach the Tweed between the Till and Berwick, where he would not be master of the Scottish communications—excepting, of course, that by Cockburnspath and Dunbar—and where his movements might even be harassed to some extent by the Scottish garrison in Norham. It is clear, then, that Surrey on the Tweed below the Till would be a lesser danger to the Scots than Surrey on the Tweed above it. It follows that whether Surrey's intention was to

bring about immediate battle or to reach the Tweed without battle, the Scottish leaders were wise in transferring their army from the right bank of the Till to the left, in spite of one very evident objection, namely that in so doing they uncovered the routes leading to Berwick, and thus enabled Surrey to base himself upon that fortress without striking a blow.

Regarding this change of position, one other remark remains to be made : if King James was himself responsible for it, and again if his character was in truth of the reckless, impetuous nature commonly believed, he was probably actuated less by the above-mentioned strategical considerations than by a knowledge of the great strength of the Flodden position, and by the belief that Surrey would hurl his forces against it as hotly and inconsiderately as he himself, had he been in Surrey's place, would have done. Had the position been of less strength than it was, Surrey would possibly have advanced directly upon it, but in fact its very strength rendered it useless.[1]

On Tuesday, the 6th, Surrey reached Woolerhaugh, some six miles from Flodden Hill, where he halted till the 8th, doubtful of the course to pursue.

[1] Halle says the position could not be attacked 'excepte the Englishmen woulde have temerariouslye ronne on his ordinaunce,' which were placed at the foot of the hill. The armies were separated by only three 'littell myles' and James caused 'hys great ordinaunce to be shot at the Englishe armye, but it hurt neither man nor beaste.' (*Chronicles of England*, 1548.)

Although he clearly had no intention of fighting on disadvantageous terms, yet, as late as five o'clock in the afternoon of the 7th, he seems to have hoped for early battle, for at that hour he sent a letter to James remonstrating against the transfer of the Scottish army from the position occupied on the 4th, when his challenge had been accepted, to one which was 'more like a fortress or camp' than the 'indifferent ground' on which a fair battle could be waged; he desired the King to lead his army down from the heights to Milfield Plain—between Flodden and Wooler—on the following day, undertaking to be there himself between twelve and three o'clock in the afternoon.[1] To this extraordinary request King James naturally declined to accede, remarking that he would 'take and kepe his grounde and felde at his oune pleasure, and not at the assignyng of Therle of Surrey.'[2]

On the 8th Surrey, crossed the upper Till near Weetwood, about two miles north-east of Wooler, and that evening encamped at Woodend Wood, two miles north-west of Barmoor Castle.

From our knowledge of subsequent events we are naturally inclined to fancy that Surrey's movement formed part of a bold scheme for interposing between the Scots and the frontier, but there is really no good ground for thinking this. He may, perhaps, have had some dim idea of such a project, but it

[1] Ellis's *Original Letters*, vol. i. p. 86.
[2] Ridpath, p. 489, also MS. Batayle.

can hardly have entered seriously into his calculations, since its practicability would depend wholly on James remaining stationary, and why should he do so? He had changed his position on the 5th or 6th, why not again on the 8th or 9th? While Surrey moved down the right bank of the Till, why should not James follow suit and move down the left bank, thus defeating an attempt to cut him from his base? In all probability Surrey, at this time, had no other object in view than that of securing the advantages which the movement necessarily gave to him. In the first place, he exchanged a long line of communications with Newcastle for a short one with Berwick; in the second place, he gained a position which not only directly covered the communications with his new base, but gave him the option of either invading Scotland by passing over the Tweed between the mouth of the Till and Berwick, an easy and safe operation, or of quietly remaining where he was to await the effect which a scarcity of supplies would soon produce upon the Scots; doubtless his troops also had suffered much from want of supplies, but now that he was based upon Berwick and only a few miles from it, he might safely count on being able to outstay his enemies. And what could these do? They could not attack; an advance further into England would be suicidal; a retreat only was open to them. In my opinion, by the evening of the 8th, Surrey had already gained the campaign;

had he remained stationary, seizing merely the passages over the Till, until circumstances had forced the Scots to retreat, he would have inflicted upon Scotland a greater disaster, a greater humiliation than that of Flodden Field, where at least she

> '. . . sternly tore
> The blossoms from the tree of fame,
> And purpled deep their tints with gore.'

The march to Barmoor, which was, of course, completely safeguarded by the Till from serious interruption, was conducted in full view of Flodden Hill,[1] and we must now consider what action, if any, it induced the Scots to take. As to this we have no definite information—nothing more than slight, though suggestive indications—and we are therefore compelled to conjecture. We must assume either that they did something or nothing; most, I think all, modern historians assume the

[1] Curiously enough an idea, fostered by even our greatest historians, has arisen that the Scots were ignorant of this movement. The evidence as to the reverse having been the case is simply overwhelming. Halle refers to the Scots being in sight of the English, and consequently the English must have been in sight of the Scots; he writes also that 'there was a littell hyll that saved the Englishmen from the gonne shotte, on which hyll the lord admyrall perfightly sawe and discouered them all,' words which imply that some of the English troops were within gunshot range of the Scots. Ridpath, on the authority of Paul Jovius, states that the Admiral was actually fired upon when on this hill. Holinshed, again, in his third volume of *Chronicles*, though making no mention of the Admiral, says the Scots and English 'ceased not to bestow shot and powder either

latter, and consequently their readers are asked to believe that the Scots remained fronting south, gazing into empty space. I shall, on the contrary, assume that they did something, and my reason for so doing is that in cases where we have no definite information as to the course of action pursued we ought to discard any suggestion of its having been in outrageous opposition to common-sense and to human nature—we ought to assume the reverse. Since, then, it is not in accordance with human nature to remain stationary with your rear or flank turned to the enemy, let us discard the thought; on the other hand, it is in accordance with human nature to face your enemy, or to run away from him, and since we know the Scots did not do the latter, we are justified in inferring they did the former. Moreover, of the truth

at other, though without doing any great hurt at all.' Again, in MS. Batayle we read that Surrey's passage over the Till and the whole of his movements on the 8th were conducted in sight of the Scots. But, in truth, had all these authorities written in the opposite sense, it would have been difficult to believe that an army of the size of Surrey's, with guns, carts, etc., could have moved from Wooler to Barmoor without the fact being known to the Scots on Flodden Hill.

The Rev. Mr. Jones, Vicar of Branxton, in his *Battle of Flodden* (Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1864) identifies the 'littel hill' with Watch Law, an eminence east of Etal, and, if so, it most certainly did not screen the view from Flodden Hill towards the east and south-east; yet Fraser Tytler in his *History of Scotland* writes that Surrey's 'march was concealed from the enemy by an eminence on the east of Ford; but that the manœuvre was executed without observation, or interruption, evinced a shameful negligence in the Scottish commanders.'

of this view there are some indications, of which notice will now be made of two. It appears from Halle's *Chronicles* that towards the conclusion of the English march, the Admiral, Thomas Howard, 'saw and discovered' the Scottish army. These words imply that the Scots had not remained wholly stationary in the position they had been known to occupy for days—they imply that the Scottish army had already begun to change its ground and that the Admiral 'discovered' them in a new position. This position doubtless fronted east and lay between the lower eastern slopes of Flodden Hill and Sandyford.

A further indication of the truth of the view here adopted is afforded by a statement made by Ridpath that 'the Scots had erected a battery of cannon, near the foot of the eastern declivity of Flodden Hill, bearing full on the bridge of Ford.'[1] Guns would never have been so placed until all expectation of a frontal attack from the south had passed away, that is to say, not until the English had crossed to the right bank of the Till early on the 8th. If the statement is correct, it is strong evidence of a change of front having been made that day.

[1] Ridpath's *Border History*, p. 490. A foot-note records that the vestiges of the entrenchment are still visible. It may be worth noticing that on the only occasions on which the position of guns on Flodden Hill is referred to by the old writers they are described as being on low ground. During the battle they were on high ground, and this was decidedly unfavourable to them.

It may be thought that the Scots are unlikely to have abandoned the hill so soon as this ; but it had been occupied because its southern slopes offered a strong defence to an attack from the south, and now that the English were no longer to the south of it, it had lost all importance. But, again, it may be urged the northern slopes were equally strong or even stronger ; doubtless they were, but no reason whatever existed for thinking they would be attacked. Many writers on Flodden appear to be influenced by the belief that both James and Surrey were bound by the laws of chivalry to fight on the 9th, and that James ought therefore to have remained in his strong position ; surely this theory may be set aside ? No doubt Surrey tried to work, for his own ends, on the chivalrous nature ascribed to the King, but it is equally certain that the latter declined to be fooled, and that the course pursued by each was in truth dictated solely by military considerations.

Surrey's first challenge was sent in the hope that it would bring about a battle in a position disadvantageous to James. Was that chivalrous ? James accepted the challenge, but transferred himself to a position disadvantageous to Surrey. Was that chivalrous ? Surrey refused to fight, and appealed to James to leave his strong position and to fight in a weak one. Was that chivalrous ? James refused to do so. Was that chivalrous ? In the ballad of *Chevy Chase* we read that Douglas

and Percy agreed to fight a personal duel in order to avoid the slaughter which a battle would entail. That was true chivalry; but it was not chivalry that induced King James to hope that Lord Surrey would hurl his army against an impregnable position, or that induced Lord Surrey to hope that King James would exchange his strong position for a weak one. It should also be noticed that on the 7th Surrey evidently considered the challenge, which he had given on the 4th for the 9th, had been cancelled by James's change of position. The second challenge was to fight on the 8th, and this was refused. In so far as the laws of chivalry are concerned the combatants were perfectly free to fight or not on the 9th, as they liked. Moreover, it is evident that James left Flodden Hill for military reasons, and that, at that time, he did not consider the English were bound to fight nor did he expect them to do so. Halle says he abandoned the position because he thought Surrey was about to enter Scotland; Holinshed writes that James 'thought it stood not with his honour to sit still and suffer himself to be forestalled forth of his own realm'; Lesley says that the English appeared to be advancing into Scotland, and this caused the King 'to leif the strenthe and com doun fra the hill callit Flowdoun.' He also gives us a curious and suggestive piece of information; he says that on the day of the battle (9th) the King marched *towards* 'the place where the English had encamped'

the previous night.[1] Now, this would have brought the Scots to the very ground I have already designated as likely to have been occupied on the 8th or 9th—which day is not important, for the point to be determined is the position the Scots were in on the morning of the 9th.

In the accounts of the battle we frequently read of King James having come down from Flodden Hill 'into the plain' and forthwith engaging in battle on Branxton Hill! Branxton Hill is not a plain. The expression is absolutely inapplicable to the battlefield; it might, however, be appropriately applied to the ground to which the Scots, in my opinion, moved on quitting Flodden Hill on the evening of the 8th or morning of the 9th.

Since the evidence is, as I have shown, strongly opposed to the theory that James ought to have expected battle on the 9th, and since to have remained on Flodden Hill after the English had moved from Wooler to Barmoor would have been contrary to human nature, to common-sense, and to what little evidence bearing directly on the subject we possess, we ought to conclude that the Scots conformed to the movement of the English, and that, consequently, by the evening of the 8th, or early next morning, they no longer fronted south, but east, and occupied a position which, though absolutely secure from frontal attack, was eminently disadvantageous, in that no offensive blow could

[1] *Historie of Scotland*, 1570.

be struck from it, and in the highest degree perilous.

It may be as well to draw attention to the extreme importance of the unorthodox conclusion here arrived at, for upon its soundness or otherwise depends to a great extent that of many of the views expressed later on.

CHAPTER II

THE PASSAGE OF THE TILL AND MARCH ON BRANXTON[1]

THE accounts regarding the movements of the English troops on the 9th September are extremely meagre and differ essentially from each other. An old document,[2] written in French and signed by the Admiral, Lord Howard, relates that he led his division, together with the artillery, to the left bank of the Till by the bridge at Twizel, and it also tells us distinctly that he was followed by his father, Lord Surrey. The first of these statements is accepted by all authorities on the subject; the second is accepted by Ridpath, Walter Scott, Fraser Tytler, Burton, and probably many other distinguished historians, but it is not in accordance with the accounts given by the English

[1] See map at page 116.

The bog shown thereon no longer exists. The Rev. Mr. Jones, whose work has already been referred to, states that it was a mile and a half long, and in many parts two hundred and fifty yards broad. 'In the centre of this bog, or moat of water,' was, he writes, an ancient bridge called Branx Brig, the site of which is marked on the Ordnance Survey Sheet.

[2] This document — for which see Appendix I. — has been termed 'The English Gazette' and I shall so refer to it in the following pages.—F. E.

chroniclers, Halle and Holinshed, nor the Scottish chroniclers, Buchanan and Pitscottie, nor do writers of the present day appear generally to hold to it. It will therefore be as well to consider the point.

When an officer—in this instance the second in command of the army—makes a definite statement regarding operations of which he has personal cognisance, it ought not to be set aside, unless it can be shown to have been impossible, or in the highest degree improbable, or unless some reasonable motive can be suggested for his having intentionally given false information.

We must then in the first place determine whether the army could possibly have marched from Barmoor to the field of battle—which will presently be shown to have been near Branxton village—a distance of, say, thirteen miles, between daybreak and four or five o'clock in the afternoon, at which hour it was drawn up in battle array.[1] The troops had to file across a bridge, which would not conveniently allow of men marching on a larger front than that of fours,[2] and to move by roads, or tracks, which,

[1] 'They (the English) kept arraye on horseback from fyve of the clocke in the mornynge tyll foure of the clocke at afternone, and were alwayes in the sighte of the Scottes.'—Halle's *Chronicles*. The battle commenced 'quatre à cinq heures après dîner.'—*Gazette*.

[2] This has been written in the belief that the bridge now over the Till at Twizel was the one actually in existence in 1513, but as to this, I am informed, there is reasonable doubt. The bridge existing in 1513, however, is unlikely to have been wider than the present one.—F. E.

doubtless, according to our modern ideas, were extremely bad, and which may have been rendered exceptionally so by the wet weather which had prevailed.

In forming an opinion we shall, fortunately, not be compelled to consider either the strength of the force—as to which our information is unreliable—or the rates at which the various arms moved. It is sufficient to know that, as a matter of fact, Howard's division, hampered with guns drawn by long teams of horses or oxen and moving at a snail's pace, covered the distance between the bridge and the battlefield between eleven o'clock—at which hour the *Gazette* tells us the Admiral crossed the bridge—and four or five o'clock, and hence we know that Surrey's division, of much the same strength as the Admiral's but not accompanied with artillery, would have had ample time to follow over the bridge and to reach the same destination at the same hour, though marching by perhaps a slightly longer route.

Again, there is no improbability in the statement that Surrey's division crossed the Twizel Bridge. When he set out in the morning, he cannot have reckoned on the Scots remaining stationary, but he more probably expected them to move parallel to himself on the other bank of the river. If such was his expectation, a strong presumption would exist against his having, at this time, intended to cross the Till at all, an operation entailing, in his belief, the forcing, in the face of his enemy, of its extremely difficult

and easily guarded passages. There is, then, sound reason for thinking that, on leaving Barmoor, his troops were directed not towards the Till, but towards the Tweed, and that it was not until later, when he ascertained that the Scots were not acting as he had reasonably expected and when his army was already approaching Twizel, that he determined to cross the river by the bridge there.

Lastly, we can conceive no possible motive on the Admiral's part for giving incorrect information regarding the route followed by his father's division.

We have, then, no choice but to accept as correct the testimony of the *Gazette* upon this particular point. But we ought not to take it too literally; we need not necessarily understand that every troop and every company passed by Twizel Bridge, but merely that Surrey's main body did so. Other passages across the river are almost certain to have been used by small bodies, and possibly by the rear guard. This may, perhaps, explain why the accounts of the chroniclers differ from the *Gazette* and also from each other. Halle and Buchanan relate that Surrey crossed at Mylford—which Ridpath identifies with the ford near Heton Mill, a short distance above Twizel Bridge; Holinshed mentions that he used two bridges, and these can have been none other than those at Twizel and Etal. Pitscottie also refers to the English having made use of a bridge which was clearly not the one at Twizel, since he describes it as within range of the Scottish

artillery—Etal Bridge may perhaps have been so, but most certainly not Twizel Bridge. Halle and Buchanan may have got their information from individuals who passed by the ford, Holinshed may have got his from others who passed over Etal Bridge, and these may quite conceivably have unintentionally, or through ignorance, given it to be understood that the army generally did what they did themselves.

Twizel Bridge having been crossed, the army 'mysdrent icelles en deux batailles,' each with two wings, which can surely only mean—since the *Gazette* had already referred to the existence of two distinct commands—that a decision was then arrived at for the two commands to act separately and apart. It appears further that the force under the Admiral continued to advance directly towards the Scottish communications with Cornhill, while that under Surrey turned to the left and moved towards Pallinsburn. This may be inferred from a statement in the *Gazette* that the Admiral, later on, halted in a position where he remained until Surrey's division came into touch with one of his wings—which wing is not mentioned, but our knowledge of the order in which the troops subsequently stood on the field of battle shows that it must have been the left wing. Consequently Surrey must have come up to the Admiral from the east; it also follows that, when the two divisions parted company at Twizel Bridge, the Admiral's must have kept the right-

hand route, leading towards Cornhill, Surrey's the left, towards Pallinsburn.

Let us glance for a moment at the motives which are likely to have influenced Lord Surrey, in the first place, to throw the whole of his army across the Till, and, in the second place, after having done so, to operate by two distinct routes at a considerable distance apart.

It has already been pointed out that the position he had gained on the 8th secured to him the certainty of a victorious campaign. He had but to sit still, and his enemies would necessarily withdraw, a procedure entailing certainly loss of credit and honour, and probably disbandment of the army. But when Surrey reached Twizel Bridge, he saw the possibility of gaining even more than this, he saw the possibility of preventing the Scots from retiring into Scotland at all. The opportunity of severing their communications with Coldstream and, at the same time, of maintaining his own with Berwick, now offered itself to him, and he at once seized it. If he could but succeed in this, he knew the Scots would be unable to remain in their position as long as he could in his, and that they would be compelled, sooner or later, to endeavour to force a road into Scotland. Had he moved his whole army towards Cornhill on the Flodden-Coldstream road, he would have exposed his communications with Twizel Bridge, and also have rendered it possible to the Scots to regain Scotland by crossing the

Tweed between the mouth of the Till and Berwick ; had he moved the whole army towards Pallinsburn he would not have cut the Scottish communications ; but, by directing one half of his army towards Cornhill, and the other towards Pallinsburn, both objects would be obtained, though doubtless at the risk of either wing of his army being overwhelmed before the other could come to its aid. That this grave danger was actually incurred and nearly resulted in disaster will presently be related. In short, his ultimate object was to prevent the Scots from regaining their own country without battle, and battle, no doubt, meant the hazarding of all the advantages he had already gained. Many may, perhaps, doubt the wisdom of the course determined upon at Twizel Bridge, but, surely, all must admire Lord Surrey's courage in adopting it and admit that in so doing he proved himself a true soldier.

A most important inference regarding the movements of the Scottish army may now be drawn. Surrey would not have divided his army had the Scots been advancing towards him, or had they been retiring on Cornhill, or had there been a sign of an intention on their part to recross to the right bank of the Till by the Ford and Etal bridges. We may be certain that, by eleven o'clock, the information possessed by Surrey was to the effect that the Scots were either remaining stationary or were moving away from him, perhaps to Flodden Ridge, where a strong position fronting north offered itself.

Another important inference which may fairly be drawn is that Surrey did not intend to engage battle that day. His troops had been on the move since daybreak, and he knew that a considerable distance had yet to be traversed, and many hours would elapse before battle could be engaged; the Scots were—in his belief—double his own strength; they were fresh men, possibly occupying a strong position; nothing was to be gained, much to be risked, by forcing on immediate battle. It is difficult to think that Surrey, with his weary troops, can have wished to fight that evening, or that, in the few remaining hours of daylight, he can have expected to be able to drive the Scots from their ground and to gain a decisive victory—an indecisive battle would be worse than useless. The view that such was not his intention is strongly corroborated by the decision arrived at at Twizel Bridge to divide his forces and to act by two separate lines. Had he expected immediate battle, he would have kept his army intact.

We must now try to locate the position in which the Admiral halted and where Surrey rejoined him. The *Gazette* tells us that, after the forces had re-united, they advanced in one front and joined battle; from this it is clear that the position was in the near neighbourhood of the battlefield, which, the *Gazette* says, was at Branxton, a statement which may be accepted here as correct, but which will be examined into carefully later on. The halt-

ing place is further referred to as being in a 'little valley,' words which, as will be seen from the map, are applicable only to the low ground lying to the west of Pallinsburn bog and to the north-west of Branxton village, or to that, lying between the eastern extremity of the bog and the River Till, through which flows the Pallinsburn, referred to in Halle's *Chronicles* as 'a little brook, called Sandy-ford, which is but a man's step over.' We are also further informed that when the Admiral halted, the Scots were drawn up on a hill near Branxton, and we are given to understand that the halt was due to the undesirability of approaching nearer to them. The Admiral clearly thought his position critical and sent a pressing message to his father for assistance. Had the Admiral been, at this time, between the eastern end of the bog and the Till, no pressing reason for a halt would have existed, the Scots being still far distant. Had he, however, been in the low ground to the north-west of Branxton village, a halt would clearly have been imperative.

Again, we learn from the same source that after the English divisions had joined hands they at once became engaged. Had this re-union occurred when between the bog and the Till the rival armies would have had to move a considerable distance before joining battle, which would have been fought near Mardon, the English facing south-west, the Scots north-east; there is no reason for thinking such was the case. On the other hand, if the re-union

occurred in the only other possible locality, namely, to the west of the bog, the two armies would have met immediately and upon ground which in many ways fits well with the few particulars known regarding the battle itself.

Such are the reasons for locating the position where the Admiral halted and awaited Lord Surrey's arrival, somewhere near to and north-west of Branxton village. If this conclusion is correct it follows that the Admiral, after leaving Twizel Bridge, moved at first towards Cornhill and later, bending to the left, as shown on the map, marched direct for Branxton, halting shortly before reaching the village.

In the meantime, Lord Surrey, having also crossed the bridge, turned to his left and directed his march towards the interval between the eastern end of the bog and Crookham on the Till, being probably joined *en route* by such detachments as may have crossed the river by Etal Bridge or by any practicable fords. It was, perhaps, about the time of his approaching the Pallins burn that he heard of the Admiral having halted in close proximity to the enemy, and received from him an urgent appeal for immediate assistance,[1] an appeal which could safely be complied with since he can have had no longer

[1] Halle relates that shortly before the battle commenced 'the Lorde Admirall . . . sent to hys father, the Earle of Surrey, his Agnus Dei, that honge at hys breste, that in all haste he would joyne battayl (*i.e.* bring up his troops) even with the front or breste of the vantgarde; for the forward alone was not able to encountre the whole battayll of the Scots.'

cause to fear for his communications. Some of Surrey's troops possibly moved across the bog by Branx Brig, others across the burn near Sandyford, and then, screened from the enemy's view by the steep slopes on the southern side of the vale, they gradually ascended to the higher ground on which stands Branxton village, there coming into touch with the Admiral's left flank, and at the same time into full view of the Scottish army.

> 'Then fully on the broad hills
> we bushed with our standards;
> And on a sheugh us beside
> there saw we our enemies.'[1]

We must now look at the Scottish movements, leaving the English troops situated much as follows: The Admiral with half of the army and the guns a little to the north-west of Branxton village; the head of Surrey's main body approaching that village; the rest of his troops stretching away towards Branx Brig and Pallinsburn, with a rearguard, under Stanley, of which so far no mention has been made, still to the north of that stream, having perhaps crossed the Till at Etal or by fords near Crookham, as has been somewhat fancifully shown on the map.

When, on the morning of the 9th, James became

[1] A contemporary Cheshire alliterative poem, preserved among the Lyme MSS., entitled 'The Scottish Field.' Quoted in the *Days of James IV.* by Mr. Gregory Smith.

The little rill or ditch now separating Branxton Hill and Stock Law (or Piper's Hill), marked S. L. on the map at page 116, is a 'sheugh'—the word is still used in the south of Scotland.

aware of the march of the English from Barmoor—which, Halle tells us, was 'always in the sight of the Scots'—he must have been in anxious doubt of their intentions. Though they were moving straight towards Scotland, yet at the point where their left would reach the frontier, close to the confluence of the Tweed and Till, was a bridge over the latter river. Could it be possible that Surrey, who, on the 7th, had refrained from attacking from the south, and again, the next day, from the east, now intended to do so from the north—to throw his army across the Till and offer battle with the Tweed and Scotland behind him, the Till on his left flank, and the Scottish army between him and England?

Or did he mean to cross the Tweed and enter Scotland? James might well have thought this probable; he might also have thought that such a course would be to him the least disadvantageous of any Surrey could take, and that it would be unwise to hinder it.[1]

Reasons have been already given for thinking that up to midday James was still stationary in his position. We ought to impute this inactivity not, as many writers do, to ignorance of the English movements, but to a natural disinclination to

[1] It has been said that James perhaps thought the English were moving on Berwick; he may well have thought so on the 8th, but hardly after the commencement of the march from Barmoor on the 9th.

commit himself to any definite course while the English intentions remained doubtful. He has been severely criticised for not hurling himself on the one half of the English army before the other half crossed the Till, in imitation of Wallace's tactics at Stirling, but his critics have failed to see an essential difference between the conditions. At Stirling, the English intentions were manifest long before it was necessary for Wallace to act, indeed, he had to delay action until they were partly executed. At Twizel Bridge, the English intentions remained doubtful until it was too late for James to prevent their being carried out. When the Admiral reached the bridge, Surrey's intentions were still open to question, and when he commenced passing his troops over it, James had no longer the power of preventing him.

The views expressed by our greatest Scottish historians regarding the movements of the Scottish army immediately preceding the battle are curiously confused and conflicting.

Burton, in his *History of Scotland*, writes that 'Surrey formed his order of battle on the plain called Branxton, and the Scots descended from Flodden Hill to meet him there,' and the context implies that the latter movement was due to quixotic chivalry on James's part. The important points to notice are, firstly, that the Scots attacked the English, and, secondly, that the former did not leave Flodden Hill until the latter had formed up

at Branxton, until, that is to say, immediately before the commencement of the battle.

In *The Tales of a Grandfather* we read that King James was under the impression that if he did not descend from Flodden Hill and give battle to the English, Surrey would enter Scotland and lay waste the country, from which we must understand that the Scots abandoned Flodden before Surrey's final intention had been disclosed, that is to say, then, before the Admiral's troops had commenced to pass over Twizel Bridge. But we also read that the movement did not occur until after James saw the English army 'interposed betwixt him and his dominions,' and this, of course, was not until after they had crossed the Till. Thus we cannot say what Sir Walter Scott's views were.

Fraser Tytler, in his *History of Scotland*, relates that the King 'descended from the hill [Flodden Hill] with the object of occupying the eminence on which the village of Brankstone is built.' From this it would seem that the movement was made not with the immediate intention of attacking the English, but in order to take up a new position and to await an attack there; apparently, however, by this account the battle commenced before they reached the desired position.[1]

[1] On many points Fraser Tytler's views are difficult to grasp. In my opinion he has confused two perfectly distinct movements, a march to Branxton Hill and an advance from it towards Branxton village. The 'eminence on which the village is built' is not at all identical with Branxton Hill.

In Ridpath's *Border History* we are told that 'in order to pre-occupy the ground which it was believed the English would attempt to gain on the western side of the hill [Flodden] the Scots . . . made a motion westward; . . . the English had almost arrived at the foot of the hill' [Flodden] when 'Surrey favoured by the trepidation which the unexpected circumstances of his approach had excited in the Scottish army, and perceiving the ascent of the hill [Branxton], to be short and moderately steep, resolved immediately to give battle.'

The various accounts of the occurrences immediately preceding the battle are truly bewildering; after reading them one remains in doubt on almost every point. Did the Scots remain on Flodden Hill up to the last moment before the battle, or did they abandon it at an earlier period? Were they actuated by strategical or tactical reasons, or by a chivalrous desire to fight on even terms? Did the English take up a position at Branxton and await the Scots, or did the Scots occupy it and await the English? Did the English attack the Scots, or the Scots attack the English?

These questions can be answered reasonably, and probably correctly, by a study of the *Chronicles* upon which our historians have chiefly based their accounts.

Halle tells us that King James, seeing the English marching towards Scotland, 'thought that they woulde have entered Scotlande, and burne and

forray the plentifull countray, called the Marche . . . wherefore, the sayde kynge ' came down from his position on Flodden Hill and ' caused his tents to be removed to another hyll in grate haste, least the Englishemen shoulde have taken the same hyll.' The hill to which Halle refers is that on which he describes the battle as having been subsequently fought, and we must assume for the moment —what will hereafter be shown to be almost certainly true—that this was Branxton Hill.

It appears, then, firstly, that the Scots, for a perfectly sound reason, abandoned Flodden Hill before the English crossed the Till, and secondly, that, also for a perfectly sound reason, they moved hurriedly to Branxton Hill ; but if these reasons refer to one and the same move, they are absurd in themselves and inconsistent with each other ; in this sense they could only have been put forward and connected with each other by some one completely ignorant of the geography of the district. Each assertion, each reason, may be, and probably is, true ; but if so the move from Flodden and the move to Branxton were absolutely distinct operations.

Holinshed says that it was not until after the English had crossed the Till that James changed his position—which we must understand from the context to have been on Flodden Hill, though this is not quite definitely stated—to another hill ' which he doubted least the enimie should have

taken before him.' The reason is the same as that assigned by Halle, but it is not equally absurd since, according to Holinshed's account, the English were marching towards the Scots, according to Halle's away from them ; nevertheless it does not bear examination, for no reason can be suggested for any possible desire on James's part to transfer his army from its strong position on Flodden Hill to a less strong one on Branxton Hill ; and had he so wished, there would have been no need for haste in order to reach it before the English, as it lay immediately below him and within a very short mile.

My view is that Halle is correct in saying that the Scots moved from Flodden Hill before the English crossed the Till ; that Holinshed is correct in saying they did not move to Branxton Hill until after the English crossed the Till ; and that both are probably correct in the reason they give for the move to Branxton Hill, and in their description of its having been hastily conducted.

The confusion is due to both chroniclers erroneously referring to the movement on the 9th as having originated from the position occupied on the 7th. Now, it has already been shown that this position had previously been abandoned and that on the morning of the 9th the Scots were lying between the eastern slopes of Flodden Hill and Crookham, facing the Till. This being so, the reason mentioned by Halle for the abandonment of Flodden Hill, on the 8th or early morning of the 9th, is intelligible

and probable, and moreover quite consistent with the assurance that James moved hastily to Branxton Hill immediately before the battle. There was, indeed, as soon as James heard that the English had crossed Twizel Bridge and were moving towards his communications with Coldstream, every need for haste ![1]

Now will be a convenient time to remark upon two incidents which are said to have occurred immediately before the commencement of the battle, but which are generally discredited by modern writers, who, however, have no hesitation in accept-

[1] No reference has been made in the text to Buchanan's account of the movements of the armies on the 9th, for it is quite incomprehensible. A certain interest, however, may attach to it for that very reason, since Buchanan, who ten years later served as a soldier on this frontier, might have been expected to give valuable information, and at all events to have written sense.

Having referred to the pressure put upon the King by his nobles to retire into Scotland—and this occurred at Ford when the English had barely reached Wooler—he writes that the Scots determined to move to a hill that was near them. 'It was where the Cheviot hill do gently decline into a plain, a small spot, with a narrow entrance into it, gradually sloping downwards. This passage they defended with their brass guns: behind them were the mountains; at the foot of them there was a moorish piece of ground, which secured their left wing; on the right ran the river Till, whose banks were very high; over which there was a bridge for passage, not far from the camp. When the English had intelligence by their scouts, that they could not attack the Scots camp, without great damage, or rather certain, they marched from the river, and made a show as if they intended to leave the enemy, and retire towards Berwick, and so directly into the neighbouring parts of Scotland, which was the best part of the country; there to damage the Scots more than the Scots had

ing much greater improbabilities. I refer firstly to Pitscottie's story of how, when the English were passing over the Till, 'the Master-Gunner came in Presence of the King, and fell on his Knees, desiring at the King's Grace, that he might shoot his Artillery at the English Host, where they were coming over the Bridge of Till; for he promised and took in hand, he should cut the Bridge at their Over-Coming, that the King should have no Displeasure at the one Half, while the other should be devoured; for he stiled (aimed) his Artillery for the Bridge, and they came thereon. The King answered to Robert Borthwick his Gunner, like a Man that had

done the English before. And James was most inclinable to believe they would do so, because there was a rumour spread abroad, which either had an uncertain birth among the people, or else was devised on purpose by the English, that their design lay that way, in order to draw the enemy down into the plain and champain country. James would not endure that, and therefore set fire to the straw and huts, and removed his camp. The smoke occasioned by the fire, covered all the river, so that the Scots by means of it could not see the English. These marched farther from the river, through places more unpassable; but the Scots had a level and open march near the side of it, till hardly observing each other, they both came at last to Fluidon or Floddon, a very high hill. There the ground was more level, and stretched itself out into a large field; and the river was also passable by a bridge at Tuisil; and there was a ford also at Milford. The English commanded their forlorn, first to draw their brass pieces over the bridge, the rest marched through the ford, and taking their ground, they set themselves in battle array, so as to cut off their enemies retreat. Their numbers were so great, that they divided themselves, as it were, into two armies, distinct from one another; either of which was almost equal to the whole army of the Scots.'

been reft of his Wit, saying to him, I shall hang thee, quarter thee, and draw thee, if thou shoot one Shot this Day. I am determined, that I will have them all before me on a plain Field, and see then what they can do all before me.'

The story is nowadays held to be pure nonsense, and so it is if connected—as it invariably is—with the view that the Scottish army was at the time perched on the top of Flodden Hill. No doubt also the story is an impossible one, whether the Scots were on Flodden Hill or in the Sandyford position, if Pitscottie was referring to Twizel Bridge; but no reason exists for thinking he was so, while, on the contrary, his assertion that the English, before reaching the bridge, were not a mile distant from the Scots, is good evidence that he was not; he certainly mentions 'the bridge of Till,' but there were three bridges over that river, and we have seen that to command one of these a battery had in fact been placed. The story is also an extremely improbable one if reference was being made to Ford Bridge. Again, if Etal Bridge was the one referred to, the story would—assuming the Scots were on Flodden Hill—be impossible, since the bridge would have been out of range and moreover it would have been so far in advance of the position that a detachment is hardly likely to have been posted there specially for its defence. But, supposing the Scots had already abandoned Flodden Hill and were in the Sandyford position, how then?

On the previous evening the English, after marching from Wooler, had halted near Barmoor, having somewhat overshot Ford Bridge, and it must then have been evident that Etal Bridge, close to the Scottish left flank, was a greater danger to the Scots than was the former, and therefore, if we believe Ridpath as to Ford Bridge having been carefully guarded by the Scots, we ought to admit the probability, or at least the possibility, of Etal Bridge having been so also. We have no right, in order to discredit Pitscottie's story, to assume that the opposite was the case, simply because we have no information on the subject, but even so, the story might still be true, since fire could have been brought to bear upon the bridge from positions in the neighbourhood of Crookham, where the master-gunner might have intended moving his guns. I can see no reason for asserting dogmatically that the story is, in its essentials, untrue; the pith of it is simply that the master-gunner was refused permission to fire upon a bridge over the Till, by which the English were about to pass. The reasons given by Borthwick for his request and by the King for his refusal, the latter being accompanied by words which, if translated into modern English, would run 'I 'll be hanged if I do' or something stronger, are mere embellishments to the story.[1]

[1] Perhaps attention should be drawn to the bare possibility of Branx Brig having been the one referred to. No fire could have been brought upon it from either Flodden Hill or from the

The other incident to which I have to refer is that of the alleged firing of the Scottish camp. In *Marmion* we read that

'From the sharp ridges of the hill,
All downward to the banks of Till,
Was wreathed in sable smoke.
Volumed and fast, and rolling far,
The cloud enveloped Scotland's war,
As down the hill they broke;
Nor martial shout, nor minstrel tone,
Announced their march; their tread alone,
At times one warning trumpet blown,
At times a stifled hum,
Told England, from his mountain-throne
King James did rushing come.—
Scarce could they hear, or see their foes,
Until at weapon-point they close.—
They close, in clouds of smoke and dust,
With sword-sway, and with lance's thrust.'

. . . . . .

That the camp was fired is testified to by Halle, Holinshed, and Buchanan, but these authorities differ widely as to the details; thus the two former relate that it occurred after the English had crossed the Till, while Buchanan says it occurred previous to their doing so. Again, while Halle imputes it to custom—and that it was customary with the

top of Branxton Hill, but suitable positions might perhaps have been found, near Mardon, during the march from Sandyford to Branxton Hill. Had it been destroyed no serious inconvenience to the English would have resulted.

Highlanders to set fire to their huts on vacating them, there is no doubt [1]—Holinshed's view is that the Scots desired to raise a screen of smoke to conceal their movements from the English, and, on the other hand, Buchanan complains that 'the Scots by means of it could not see the English.'

The *English Gazette* makes no reference to the circumstance, nor does either Pitscottie or Lesley, but if the act was in truth due merely to custom, the silence of the two latter is not surprising.

The affirmative evidence is surely sufficiently strong to allow of our accepting the broad statements that the camp was fired, either intentionally or unintentionally, that a great smoke arose, and that the armies, or rather portions of them, were concealed for a time from each other; from this we shall be able to deduce matter of some importance.

[1] In Pitscottie's *History* (p. 146, edition of 1728) a curious account is given of 'a fair Palace of green Timber, wind with green birks,' made by the Earl of Athole during a hunting expedition of James v. in the Highlands. 'The Ambassador of the Pope, seeing this great banquet and triumph which was made in a wilderness, where there was no town near by twenty miles, thought it a great marvel. . . . But most of all, this Ambassador marvelled to see, when the King departed, and all his men took their leave, the Highlandmen set all this fair place in a fire, that the King and Ambassador might see it. Then the Ambassador said to the King, I marvel, Sir, that you should thole yon fair place to be burnt, that your Grace had been so well lodged in. Then the King answered the Ambassador, and said, It is the use of our Highlandmen, though they be never so well lodged, to burn their lodging when they depart.'

Sir Walter Scott states that a similar custom prevailed with the Borderers.

At the time of the battle the wind was in favour of the Scots,[1] and if these were, as there is good reason to believe, facing north-west, it must have been between south and east. Now, in this case, had the huts, when fired, been situated on Flodden Hill the smoke could not have inconvenienced the English when approaching the Sandyford brook, as is related by Halle. Ridpath, who holds that the Scots maintained their position on Flodden Hill up to the time of the battle, states that it was on the eastern portion of the hill where the Scots set fire to their camp; if so, the smoke would, doubtless, had the wind been due south, have drifted towards Sandyford, but smoke rarely falls and is, therefore, unlikely to have either enveloped the English or —since the Scots must have been moving to a lower level—have concealed the armies from each other.

On the other hand, how would it have been had the Scottish army been encamped between Sandyford and the eastern foot of Flodden Hill? With the wind anywhere between south and east, the smoke from fires here might quite conceivably have been blown in the faces of the English troops as they reached the rising ground about Crookham, and we can also understand how, when they descended to 'the little brook,' that 'the smoke was passed, and the air fair and clear.'[2] After firing the camp, the Scots must have moved westward and from a lower to a higher level, and consequently

[1] Brewer's *State Papers*, 4461 (1513). [2] Halle.

the probably rising smoke, floating away towards the English, might have hidden them from view until the English, on descending to the low ground near the stream and then also moving westward, got clear of it, when 'each army myghte playnlie see one another at hande.' [1]

It seems to me that the two incidents are closely connected with each other and occurred when the Scots were about to set out on their march to Branxton Hill. While these were still in the neighbourhood of Etal Bridge, no English troops are likely to have attempted to cross it until Surrey's division was known to be approaching from Twizel Bridge. Again, the Scots are unlikely to have remained after becoming aware of the English movements at Twizel Bridge, a knowledge which probably reached Sandyford at about the same time, or perhaps shortly before, that of Surrey's approach reached Etal. Surely very little imagination is necessary to picture the scene which then may well have arisen—the King, realising the critical position in which his army, if it remained longer stationary, would be placed in by the Admiral's advance, hastily issuing orders for its immediate departure—

[1] It may be objected that the Scottish position on Branxton Hill, is not visible from Sandyford brook, and that after the English had turned up the stream they would have remained hidden from view until they reached Branxton village. Nevertheless, that portion of James's army which had fired the camp and was still on the march, might conceivably have been in view of parts of Surrey's command.

the master-gunner, ignorant possibly of the reason for the order and seeing English troops pouring down the slopes on the opposite side of the river towards the bridge, imploring permission to exhibit the power of his own cherished arm to destroy it and thus to prevent the junction of what he may well have believed were the main wings of the enemy's army, so 'that the King should have no Displeasure at the one Half, while the other should be devoured' —James again hotly refusing one moment's delay, reiterating his commands, and perhaps directing that the camp should be fired to screen the direction of his march. To me both stories seem not merely possible, but vividly probable. I shall claim both as evidence of the truth of the view I have expressed regarding the position occupied by the Scots on the morning of the 9th September previous to marching for the field of battle.

And now comes the question, Where was the field of battle? What reasons exist for thinking it was on the slopes of Branxton Hill?

When we know the ground upon which a battle has been fought we can check much that is recorded regarding it; but in the case of Flodden, we have, out of hazy descriptions of events, many of which if they occurred at all have not been clearly understood by the narrators themselves, to construct a theory as to the ground.

The *English Gazette* says the battle was fought at Branxton.

On the other hand, Pitscottie tells us that it 'was stricken and ended at Flowdon hills.' Buchanan also writes, 'This is the famous fight of Flodden,' but in so writing he may not necessarily have meant that the battle was fought at Flodden, any more than a writer of to-day when mentioning the battle of Waterloo would mean that the battle was fought at Waterloo. Again, Holinshed refers casually to fighting having occurred at Branxton: 'James was slain at Branxton.' 'Sir E. Stanley was rewarded for his good services at Branxton.' Like Buchanan, he was merely referring to the battle by its common name.

Halle tells us that after passing the Till, the English crossed the brook of Sandyford, and that Surrey brought his army to the foot of the hill called Bramston; that the English army then stretched east and west, with their backs north, and that the Scots were to the south before them on the hill called Bramston. This is far from being clear, and indeed is intelligible only if we understand the first mention of the 'hill called Bramston,' to refer to the hill on which Branxton village stands, and the second mention to refer to Branxton Hill.

Stowe appears to be responsible for the statement that James was killed on Piper's Hill, which Mr. Jones identifies, if I understand him correctly, with an underfeature of the eminence on which the village stands, marked on the Ordnance Survey as Stock Law.

Then, as further evidence of fighting having occurred in this immediate neighbourhood, we have the fact, recorded on the Ordnance Survey, of human remains and a leaden cannon ball having been found in the low ground to the north-west of Branxton Hill.

We have also tradition; 'Branx Brig, according to the tradition of the oldest inhabitants, whose ancestors for generations resided in Branxton and the neighbourhood, was always pointed out,' writes Mr. Jones, 'as the bridge over which the English passed on their way to the battle.' This, however, is only evidence as to the route followed by some English troops on the day of battle; it is compatible with the battle having been fought either at Branxton, or on Branxton Hill, or on Flodden Hill.

Again, a large erect stone, situated about a mile to the north-west of Branxton village, has been named by tradition 'The King's Stone,' and Sir Walter Scott states it marks the spot where King James fell,[1] which, if we believe the *English Gazette*, was in the thick of the fight, and close to where Surrey was standing. This view has been much discredited by the assertion of archæologists and other wise men that the stone in question was undoubtedly in its present position many centuries before the battle of Flodden. This is very probably true, but if so, proves merely

[1] *Marmion*, note to stanza 35, canto vi.

that the stone was not erected to commemorate the battle. Why tradition should have given it the name it bears, or why Sir Walter should have said that the king fell near it, is not explained. I may notice also that cannon balls have been found near it, one at a considerable distance beyond it, about 1500 yards to the north-west.[1]

The reasons which cause me to think that the battle was fought on the north-western slopes of Branxton Hill, and upon the ground in front of them, are not based upon the mere assertion of any one authority, but upon inferences drawn from various scraps of information. Of these, some have reference to the actual battle and will be noticed hereafter, others have already been mentioned and I shall now again refer to them.

I have been much influenced in forming my opinion by the views I have expressed regarding the movements of the English divisions under Lord Surrey and the Admiral after crossing Twizel Bridge, and regarding the march of the Scots having originated from the Sandyford position. If I have correctly located the 'little valley' in which the Admiral halted, then the hill, upon which he describes the Scots as being drawn up—of course on completion of their movement—can have been no other than Branxton Hill, Flodden Hill being far too remote from his position, and the rising ground at Branxton village too near.

[1] As to how this cannon ball can have come here see page 115.

Again, assuming the Scots were, at the time the direction of the movements of the English divisions from Twizel Bridge became known to them, in the position I have suggested, nothing is more probable than that they should at once have commenced to move towards Branxton, either with a view to retiring on Kelso, or to re-opening their communications with Coldstream. At this moment, the following courses were open to them: (1) to fall on Surrey's division and to attempt to destroy it before it could be assisted by the Admiral; (2) to march towards Kelso or towards Cornhill—in either case they would have to move via Branxton; (3) to take up a position on Branxton Hill; (4) to take up a position on Flodden Hill; (5) to cross to the right bank of the Till, and throw themselves across the English communications with Berwick, while, at the same time, regaining for themselves a safe line of retreat into the Merse; (6) to remain where they were—but this is barely conceivable.

There can surely be no doubt but that when James moved off, his intention was either to march towards Kelso or Cornhill, or to take up a position on Branxton Hill. How then would he have put his forces into motion? Firstly, he would have despatched the lightest and most rapidly moving of his troops—to wit, the Borderers; then the heavier and more regular troops; and lastly, those which happened to be on the flank nearest to Surrey's advancing division, that is to say, the

troops encamped in the immediate neighbourhood of the Sandyford brook. Now, it has already been shown that the smoke which, at this time, inconvenienced the English, arose from the firing of probably the Highland camp, and if so, there are grounds for the conjecture that the Highlanders were encamped in this part of the field, and consequently that they were the last to move off.

The order of march of the Scottish army would then have been as follows : (1) The Borderers, under Lord Home ; (2) the divisions under Crawford, Montrose, the King, and Bothwell ; (3) the Highlanders under Lennox and Argyle.

If the movement was the result of James having decided to adopt course (2) we can easily imagine that, on approaching Branxton Hill, they may have found it necessary, or at all events desirable, to halt, in consequence of the approach of the Admiral's division. If so, they must have formed front to their right—as of course they would also have done had they adopted course (3)—and they would then have found themselves arranged thus : —Lord Home on the left ; the King (including Crawford, etc.), in the centre ; Lennox and Argyle on the right. Now, we shall see in the next chapter that this was the actual arrangement.

Before passing from this subject, I should like to ask those who disagree with my view as to the position occupied by the Scots on the morning of

the day of battle, and who believe that they moved to Branxton Hill direct from Flodden Hill, to explain the object of the movement. They cannot urge that it was through fear of their communications with Kelso being cut; nor in consequence of a desire to keep their communications with Coldstream open, for had they been moving in that direction, they would have got far beyond Branxton Hill before being forced to form into order of battle by the approach of the Admiral. I certainly shall not accept as an explanation the old, and I hope for ever discredited assertion that James 'came down into the plain' with the sole object of fighting 'in a fair field,' or, in other words, that he intentionally changed from a strong position to one less strong—only two days previously he had declined to commit such a folly. I can think of no good explanation; the least bad that occurs to me is that James, seeing the English army moving in two divisions widely apart, may have wished to rush on the Admiral's and destroy it singly; but then, why, after advancing only about three quarters of a mile, should he have come to a halt?

All writers on Flodden must presumably have asked themselves, though I do not think they have explained to their readers, how it happened that the Admiral, on his march from Twizel Bridge, should have found himself so close to the Scots as to be obliged to halt in an extremely critical

position. Since we cannot conceive that he can have done so deliberately and with intention, we must conclude that until his arrival in the 'little valley,' and the simultaneous discovery of the Scottish army on Branxton Hill, he was unaware of the whereabouts of his enemy. But this is inadmissable on the hypothesis of the Scots having been on Flodden Hill all the morning, and having marched thence to Branxton Hill; in this case their presence must have been known not only to the Admiral, but to every man in his command. On the other hand, had the Scots been moving from the ground lying between the eastern spurs of Flodden Hill and Sandyford, they would naturally have followed the slight depression between Flodden and Branxton Hills, and in so doing they would have remained hidden from the Admiral's view until they chose to move to the crest of the hill on their right hand.[1]

Some pages back the conclusion was arrived at, that Surrey did not intend to fight on the 9th. I must now point out how, upon one hypothesis, and one only, this may be wrong. If the English were in overwhelming strength, if, that is, we accept as correct Buchanan's statement that when

[1] A public road—not shown on my map—called 'Encampment Lane' marks the course which, in my opinion, was probably followed by a large portion of the Scottish army. From 'Encampment Farm,' it proceeds in a westerly direction south of Branxton Hill, passing the figures '485.'

they crossed the Till 'their numbers were so great that they divided themselves, as it were, into two armies, distinct from one another: either of which was almost equal to the whole army of the Scots,' then we can easily understand why Surrey detached the Admiral's force, while he himself advanced on the Scots in 'the plain' near Sandyford. These would then very naturally have hurried off to the west, and have startled the Admiral by their sudden appearance on Branxton Hill.

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE

I. *The Formation of the Troops.*

We must now try to ascertain the order in which the divisions of the rival armies stood when Surrey's troops came into touch with the Admiral's left.

Halle tells us that the English army, when marching north from Alnwick, was formed into a 'Foreward, or 1st Line,' commanded by the Admiral, and a 'Rereward Line,' commanded by the Earl of Surrey, each consisting of two wings, the right and left of the former being, respectively, under the orders of Sir Edmund Howard (Lord Surrey's third son) and Sir Marmaduke Constable, the right and left of the latter under Lord Dacre and Sir Edward Stanley. Neither line, then, had a main body; neither Surrey nor the Admiral had a force under his immediate orders. I am inclined to doubt the correctness of this, for, in the sixteenth century, it appears to have been customary to divide an army on the march into three portions—'the first part that marcheth wee call the vantgard; the second the battell;

the third the arrier ward' [1]—and since in the accounts of the battle references to the forces immediately under the command of Surrey and the Admiral show them as distinct from those under their subordinates, there is reason to think that the custom was adhered to in this instance,[2] at all events after—and what was the case before is really immaterial—it had been determined that Surrey's and the Admiral's commands should act independently of one another.

Assuming this to have been so, the main divisions of the English army were drawn up thus: The Admiral's right wing, under Sir Edmund Howard, formed the extreme western corps; on its left stood his main body, under his own immediate orders; then came his left, under Sir M. Constable. The leading troops of the Rereward Line—including a force of Border Horse, under Lord Dacre—formed up on Constable's left, and Surrey's main body prolonged the line eastward, its left flank forming the extreme left of the army—for Sir Edward Stanley, with Surrey's left wing, did not reach the field till later, and when it did, did not come, as will be shown hereafter, into quite the same alignment as the rest of the army.

The arrangement of the Scottish divisions can only be inferred from information given by the *Gazette*

[1] *Practise, Proceedings, and Lawes of Armies.* Matthew Sutcliffe, 1598.

[2] MS. Batayle shows this to have been the case. See Appendix II.

and *Chronicles* as to those of the English army with which each engaged; unfortunately, however, the accounts are extremely contradictory, and we shall therefore be obliged to examine them with care.

From the *English Gazette* we learn that

1. The Scots were formed in five divisions.

   Nevertheless particulars are given only as to four divisions.

2. Lord Home's division engaged Sir Edmund Howard's troops.

   Since the latter formed the extreme English right, the former was, probably, on the extreme Scottish left.

3. A division under Huntly, Erroll, and Crawford attacked the Admiral.

   The Admiral was on Edmund Howard's left, and therefore the Scottish division must have been on Home's right.

4. King James engaged Surrey.

   Surrey was on the Admiral's left, therefore the King was on the right of the division under Huntly, Erroll, and Crawford.

5. Lennox and Argyle engaged Edward Stanley.

   Stanley was on the extreme English left, and consequently Lennox and Argyle must have stood on the extreme Scottish right.

Halle's *Chronicles* state that the Scots stood in

four divisions, but that there were two others which 'never came to handstrokes.'

On all the other points Halle agrees with the *Gazette*, except that he puts Huntly with Lennox and Argyle on the right.

In Holinshed's *Chronicles* we read that 'the whole army was divided into five wards or regiments, to this intent, that the battell wherein the king himself stood with his standard, might be enclosed as it were with two wings on either side one. In the Right wing, the Earls of Huntly, Crawford and Montrose . . . in the left were the earls of Lennox and Argyle, with Lord Home.' I presume the troops under Crawford and Montrose formed one ward, or division, those under Lennox and Argyle another; these, together with the King's, Huntly's, and Home's divisions, would make the five referred to.

Halle's statement that there were two divisions in rear which 'never came to handstrokes' is also repeated.

The information given regarding the fighting is hopelessly inconsistent; we are told that

1. Home's division and that under Lennox and Argyle engaged Edmund Howard.

   In this case these two Scottish divisions were on the left of their army; this is consistent with his statement that they formed the left wing, and also, in so far as Home's position is concerned, in agreement with the

Gazette and with Halle ; but it differs from them as to the position of Lennox and Argyle.

2. Crawford and Montrose engaged the Admiral.

This is in accordance with the *Gazette* and Halle ; but from (1) it follows that they must have been on the immediate right of Lennox and Argyle. It is, of course, inconsistent with the statement that they were on the right wing.

3. The King engaged Surrey.

This is in accordance with all authorities.

4. Lennox and Argyle—who have already been mentioned in (1)—engaged Edward Stanley.

5. No mention is made of the part played by the fifth ward (Huntly's). Holinshed merely mentions that Huntly and Home 'got horses and escaped away together,' [1] implying that they had been engaged in the same part of the field, and this is inconsistent with the earlier statement that Huntly was with Crawford and Montrose, and Home with Lennox and Argyle.

It will be admitted that no safe deductions can be drawn from Holinshed's account as to the positions occupied by the troops.

Let us now turn to the Scottish authorities.

Buchanan, the most explicit, though perhaps the least accurate, tells us that

[1] See footnote on p. 69.

1. The Scots were in four bodies, of which three were to charge first, and the fourth was for a reserve.
2. The King led the main body—presumably in the centre.
3. Huntly and Home formed the right wing.
4. Lennox and Argyle led the third body—presumably the left wing.
5. Bothwell ' with his clans,[1] and the rest of the nobility of Lothian ' were in reserve—presumably forming the fourth body.
6. The English left was defeated by the Scottish right.

Lesley makes no mention of wings ; according to him Home had the vanguard, Crawford and Montrose the rearguard, and ' the King was in the great battle and with him the Earls of Argyle, Lennox, and others.' Now, if the army in fact moved in this order to Branxton Hill from the Sandyford-Encampment Farm position it would, when halted and fronting north, have had Home on the left, the King, Argyle, and Lennox in the centre, Crawford and Montrose on the right.

[1] Possibly Liddesdale clans. Mr. Armstrong in his *History of Liddesdale* writes that no record exists of the part these played at Flodden, and he suggests the probability of their having been with their feudal superior, Lord Bothwell. On the other hand one can hardly think so wild a lot would have been placed with a central division rather than with the other Borderers on the flank.

Lastly, Pitscottie states that the Scottish vanguard was commanded by Huntly and Home, and that they defeated the English with whom they engaged; as the only English troops which were defeated were on the English right flank, Huntly and Home must have been on the Scottish left. Thus the view that the vanguard formed the left of the line of battle is confirmed.

All authorities are, then, agreed as to the King having been in the centre; also all, Buchanan excepted, as to Home having been on the left.

In favour of the view that Lennox and Argyle were on the right flank, we have the *Gazette*, Halle, and also the reasons mentioned at page 58; while, on the other hand, Huntly and Home are placed there by Buchanan, and Crawford and Montrose by Lesley.

It seems likely that the fifth division mentioned by the *Gazette* was identical with the 'fourth body' referred to by Buchanan as under Bothwell's command; possibly also it may have been one of the two divisions mentioned by Halle as 'not having come to handstrokes,' but if so, the accusation is untrue, since Bothwell and other men of note bearing Lothian names were killed, which fact affords fairly good grounds for believing that the division was engaged. The chief, or at all events a prominent man of a Liddesdale clan—Master Elliot—was also killed.

In truth, however, from a military point of view,

no interest attaches to the position occupied by Bothwell, nor is it important whether the right flank was formed of troops under Lennox and Argyle or under Crawford and Montrose ; but it is important to be certain that Home's Borderers, the only division that held its ground, were not on that flank. The left was the vital flank, and so long as it stood firm the lines of retreat by Kelso or Yetholm were covered ; had the right flank held its ground and the left yielded—as Buchanan relates—the disaster would have been even greater than in fact it was.

On the whole, there can be little doubt that the Scottish divisions stood in the order that has been deduced from the information given in the *Gazette*, with one slight modification. Huntly is there bracketed with Erroll and Crawford ; that Huntly should have been with them towards the close of the battle is likely enough, and this would be consistent with Pitscottie's account as to Huntly, upon the termination of the fighting in which he and Home had been engaged, having moved to the assistance of the centre, but with regard to his position at the commencement of the battle, we ought to be guided by the definite statements of Pitscottie and Buchanan that he was with Lord Home.[1]

[1] Huntly's position on the field has for long been a matter of controversy, but I do not think there ought to be much doubt about it. Lord Dacre says (letter to the English Council, 17th May 1514, in Appendix IV.) he fought with Home and Huntly ; Pitscottie also brackets them together, and the *Gazette* brackets Huntly with Crawford in the left centre. This is strong evidence

In my opinion, at the commencement of the battle the divisions of the rival armies were arranged much as shown in the following diagram :—

ENGLISH

RIGHT.	CENTRE.	LEFT.
E. Howard—Admiral—Constable.	Dacre—Surrey.	Stanley.

LEFT.	CENTRE.	RIGHT.
Home—Huntly	Crawford, Montrose—King—and Errol. Bothwell.	Lennox and Argyle.

SCOTS

(For the approximate strengths of these divisions see Appendix III.)

As to the formations adopted by the several divisions, we have absolutely no information regarding the English; as to the Scottish divisions, the *English Gazette* says they were formed 'en grand trouppeaulx,' some 'en quadrans,' others 'en manière de pointe,' terms which have been translated into 'squares' and 'wedges.'

of Huntly having stood between Home and Crawford and quite outweighs Halle's statement that he was with Lennox and Argyle at the time they were attacked by Edward Stanley. That his standard was taken by the Cheshire men—see Weber's *Flodden Field*, page 198—the greater number of whom were on the English left, proves nothing, since, after defeating the Scottish right, they swept over the ground on which the Scottish centre had stood. The standard might have been taken here, to which part of the field Pitscottie tells us he had moved.

The *Gazette* further tells us that the Scottish divisions were at intervals of 'environ unq traict d'arc'; by this the distance of an arrow's flight —three hundred and twenty to four hundred yards— can hardly have been intended; perhaps the ordinary distance for target practice, namely two hundred to three hundred yards, may have been meant.[1] Upon this hypothesis—if we accept the statement in the *Gazette* that the Scots had five divisions—it follows that the front occupied must have measured from eight hundred to twelve hundred yards in addition to the breadths of the fronts of each of the divisions.

What these were, what the total length of front occupied by the Scots was, we shall never ascertain; our knowledge as to the formations adopted at this period by other European armies will not assist us here in the case of one of which the central divisions only are likely to have been composed of men armed and trained in the manner of other nations.[2] We may be sure that the Highlanders and Borderers, accustomed to methods of war peculiar to themselves, adhered to their own customs and formations;

[1] In the reign of Henry VIII. it was enacted that 'no person above the age of 24 should shoot at any mark that was not above eleven score yards distance, under pain of forfeiting for every shot 6s. 8d.'

[2] Professor Oman, in *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, writes: 'Not in one single instance can we reconstruct the exact array of a Yorkist or Lancastrian army.' The Wars of the Roses concluded only twenty-eight years before Flodden was fought.

the former were probably armed in a manner very similar to their descendants who fought at Killiecrankie, Prestonpans, and Culloden, and followed similar tactics. As to the manner in which the Borderers fought, it is impossible to form a reasonable conjecture; it has been said that they were in the habit of dismounting previous to battle, and no doubt on certain specified occasions they did so, but it would be rash to conclude that such was their invariable rule. The probability is rather in favour of the view that they fought mounted or dismounted according to the nature of the ground and the circumstances of the moment in which they might find themselves, and that it would be as false to think of them as infantry as cavalry.

Of cavalry, as we now understand it, there was none on either side; modern writers sometimes refer to Lord Dacre's Borderers as cavalry, but they were doubtless of the same character as our Scottish Borderers.

Regarding the artillery we are equally ignorant. I know of only two references to positions occupied by the Scottish guns previous to the battle, and these were in low rather than on high ground. Lesley, however, states that in the battle the guns were on high ground, and Ridpath asserts they were in front of the line and in the spaces between divisions. Such a position seems hardly credible unless, indeed, the Scots, when they occupied

Branxton Hill, had intended to remain purely on the defensive.

As I have said of the cavalry, so might it equally be said without much exaggeration of the artillery, that, as we understand it, there was none. The guns, varying much in calibre—amongst the seventeen pieces taken by the English at Flodden there were four distinct classes—were heavy, cumbersome machines, drawn by long teams of horses or oxen, throwing round shot of iron, lead, or stone, for some thousand paces or so, with the absolute certainty of not hitting the object aimed at. Their quick-firers perhaps accomplished twelve rounds in an hour. Under these circumstances we can understand why a writer of the sixteenth century should have said that 'in the field the great ordnance doeth more trouble than service: the effects of it is but noyse and foolerie.'[1]

II. *The Sequence in which the Divisions Engaged Battle.*

We left Surrey as the head of his column was approaching Branxton, where he was about to join hands with the Admiral who had halted hard by. When this was effected, the combined forces, says the *Gazette*, advanced 'en un front' towards the Scots, who then descended the hill, and the battle

[1] *Practice, Proceedings, and Laws of Armies*, by Matthew Sutcliffe (1598).

forthwith commenced. Now, the ordinarily accepted view is that the whole English army had come into line, but this is neither definitely stated, nor is it conceivable, to my mind at all events, that battle should have been delayed—more especially by the Scots—until the arrival of Stanley's division, and later occurrences show reasons for believing it was not.

As in modern days, the battle began by artillery fire from both sides. 'In the doune cumin' of the Scots from Flodden (? Branxton) Hill, writes Lesley, 'the Inglis ordinaunce schot fast and did greate skaithe and slew his principall gunnars; bot the Kingis artillarie did small skaithe, be ressoun of the hiecht quhair thay stude, thay shote over the Inglis army.' Holinshed, in his Scottish history, says much the same: 'In the mean while were the Englishmen advanced to the foot of Floddon (? Branxton) Hill, having thereby gotten double advantage; for the Scottish ordnance could not much annoie them in marching upwards under the hill thereof, and they againe might gall the Scots in shooting at them as they came downwards.'

Halle, after mentioning that the English army had formed opposite the hill of Bramston, writes: 'Then oute brast the ordinaunce on both sydes, with fyre, flamme and hydious noyse; and the master gonner of the English part slew the master-gonner of Scotlande, and bet all hys men from their ordinaunce, so that the Scottishe ordinaunce dyd no

harme too the Englishemen ; but the Englishemen's artyllerie shotte into the myddes of the kynges battayll, and slewe many persones ; which seyinge, the kynge of Scottes and his noble men, made the more haste too come too joynenge ; and so all the foure battayles in maner discended the hyll at once. And after that the shotte was done, whiche they defended with pauishes, thei came to handstrokes, and were encontred seuerally, as you shall here.'

From these accounts it would seem that the artillery fire was maintained during the advance of the armies towards each other, the Scottish guns remaining probably on the high ground abandoned by the infantry. The artillery, apparently, played no further part in the battle and will not be again referred to.

The real struggle, which, according to the *Gazette*, began ' environ de quatre à cinq heures après dîner,' [1] was that between the divisions, and concerning it, though much has been written and many a thrilling account given, little is known. The real truth is that all is conjecture, save the broad facts that on the morning after the battle the English army alone was on the field, the Scottish army—one division perhaps excepted—had gone, their dead lay thick upon the moor, their guns were abandoned, their King missing. Nevertheless, in spite of our

[1] This has been somewhat freely translated by modern writers, following, no doubt, the text of R. O. St. P. iv. d. into ' between four and five in the afternoon '—*Brewer*, vol. i., 4441.

little knowledge, we can make fairly reasonable conjectures on some extremely interesting points.

It is a truism to say that an account of a battle ought to begin at the beginning and that the occurrences ought to be related as far as possible in the order in which they happened, and, further, that a narrator is almost certain to endeavour so to arrange his tale. But it may happen that he is ignorant of the sequence of events, in which case he will probably begin by relating the occurrences at one extremity of the field of battle and work on through the centre to the other extremity.

Now, the account given in the *English Gazette* was authorised by the Admiral, who must have known the true sequence of events, and therefore there is some ground for thinking that these were referred to in the order in which they occurred. No such inference can be drawn from any of the other accounts of the battle, and consequently any differences noticeable in the sequence of narration may be with reason attributed to the writer of the *Gazette* having adhered to the order of occurrence, while the other writers have been influenced by reasons of convenience.

The *English Gazette* refers first of all to the struggle between the Admiral and Huntly, Erroll, and Crawford ; it then passes on to the fighting between Surrey and the King ; then to that on the Scottish right and English left ; and lastly to the occurrences at the western extremity of the field between the

Admiral's right, under Edmund Howard, and the Scottish left, under Lord Home.

Halle's narrative commences—where the *Gazette* ends—with the fighting between Edmund Howard and Home ; it then passes on to that between the Admiral and Crawford ; then to that between Surrey and the King ; and lastly, to that on the extreme eastern extremity of the field, between Edward Stanley and Lennox and Argyle, but since it also tells us that ' all these iiij battels, in maner fought at one tyme, and were determined in effect, littell in distance and endynge of any of them before the other '—an exception is made regarding the struggle between Stanley and Lennox and Argyle, which is said not to have commenced till after the other divisions had become engaged—we must infer that the sequence was adopted merely for the sake of convenience of narration, and is no evidence of the battle having commenced on the Scottish left flank.

Holinshed's, Lesley's, and Buchanan's accounts are so hopelessly confused that when they narrate the doings of the various leaders we cannot be certain as to what part of the field reference is being made.

Pitscottie gives it to be understood that the battle was commenced by the Scottish vanguard under Home and Huntly, but he does not designate its position on the field of battle. If the Scots moved to battle from Flodden Hill, the vanguard

might have found itself on either flank of the line ; if, however, they marched from the Sandyford-Encampment position, as I believe was the case, the vanguard would necessarily, as has already been shown, have formed the left flank. Upon this hypothesis only can Pitscottie's words be claimed as evidence of the battle having, in his opinion, commenced on the Scottish left. I know of no other good evidence to this effect.

The point is an important one, but, I fear, can never be definitely determined ; yet, there has been little or no controversy regarding it, and there have been few writers on Flodden who have not assumed as a fact that the battle commenced on the extreme Scottish left. This general unanimity of opinion must, I think, be due to their having been influenced not so much by Pitscottie's words—for no one has hitherto expressed the view that the Scots did not march to the field direct from Flodden Hill—as by the sequence in which Halle has narrated the chief events.

In my opinion we ought to take the *English Gazette* as good evidence of the battle having terminated on the Scottish left, and should consider the inference, deduced from Pitscottie's words, as to it having commenced there, as extremely unreliable. I confess, however, that it has some weight with me, and there is, of course, the possibility of the battle having both commenced and terminated on that flank.

III. *The Fighting engaged in by the several Divisions.*

I must now pass on to consider the accounts of the fighting, and I shall commence—but it must be clearly understood merely for the sake of convenience—with that which occurred on the western extremity of the field, that is to say, between the Scottish left, under Home and Huntly, and the English right, under Edmund Howard.

And in the first place let us take Pitscottie's account; it runs thus: 'The English Men were come all over the Bridge, and the Vanguards were marching near together; to wit, The Scottish Vanguard, the Earl of Huntley, the Lord Hume, with the Borderers, and Country Men thereof, in like Manner, who joyned cruelly on every Side, and fought cruelly with uncertain Victory: But, at last, the Earl of Huntley's Highlander Men, with their bows and two-handed Swords, wrought so manfully, that they defeat the English-Men, without any Slaughter on their Side. Then the Earl of Huntley and Lord Hume blew their Trumpets, and convened their Men again into their Standards.' After giving a short account of the fighting in the centre, Pitscottie continues: 'The Earl of Huntley and the Lord Hume then standing in arrayed Battle, who had win the Vanguard before, and few of their Men either hurt or slain; the Earl of Huntley desired at the Lord Hume, that he would help the King and rescue him in his Extremity; for he said, That

he was overset with the Multitude of Men. Notwithstanding the Lord Hume answered the Earl of Huntley in this Manner, saying, He does well that does for himself. We have foughten our Vanguards, and have won the same : Therefore let the Lave do their Part, as well as we. The Earl of Huntley answered again, and said, He could not suffer his native Prince to be overcome with his enemies before his Eyes : Therefore called his Men together by Sluggorn, and Sound of Trumpets, to have past to the King : But, ere he came, all was defeat on either Side, that few or none were living, neither on the King's Part, nor on the other.'

What can Pitscottie have meant by the words 'The English men were come all over the bridge, and the vanguards were marching near together' ? If he was referring to Twizel Bridge, or to any bridge over the Till, the words are nonsense. This would not, however, be quite so evidently the case if he was referring to Branx Brig, for, if the English vanguard passed over this bridge, we can easily understand how the two vanguards quickly came to blows. But, if we accept this meaning, it follows that the English vanguard, under the Admiral, did not follow the route which, on a previous page, I have shown as probable, and the 'petite vallée' in which he halted was not where I have located it, immediately in front of Branxton Hill. Further, it follows—on the hypothesis that the battle commenced on the Scottish left—that the Scottish left

was posted in the near neighbourhood of Branx Brig, and their general position extended thence eastwards towards the hill marked on the map '250.' In this case Branxton Hill would not have been occupied at all.

In my opinion no weight whatever should be attached to the above words of Pitscottie's; we ought to abide by the conclusions already come to regarding the route followed by the Admiral, the position in which he halted, and the position occupied by the Scots.

The next point to notice is that Pitscottie assigns the credit for the success gained by the Scottish over the English vanguard to Huntly and his Highlanders rather than to Lord Home and his Borderers.

Lastly, with regard to the alleged conversation between Home and Huntly. The story can, of course, have weight only with those who deny the probability of the writer of the *Gazette* having arranged his facts in the order in which they occurred, and who believe that the last occurrence related, namely Home's struggle with Edmund Howard, in fact terminated before the fight in the centre had done so.

It is curious that this alleged exchange of words during the hurly-burly of a furious conflict should have been generally accepted as true even by serious writers. These have failed to realise the true position of affairs at the moment preceding the

King's defeat, and consequently, in order to find an explanation of Home's refusal—if he did refuse—to move to the King's assistance, have greedily swallowed words, which Pitscottie, in order to embellish his tale, and following a not uncommon practice, fancifully placed in the mouths of his dramatis personæ. The words accredited to Huntly and Home express probably no more than the motives which Pitscottie wished his readers to believe actuated them. His story should be looked upon merely as an allegation—possibly a true one, if the *Gazette* is wrong—that after Home and Huntly had defeated the troops with which they had been engaged, the latter went to the King's assistance, the former did not; and, secondly, that before Huntly reached the King, the latter's division had been defeated. It is, perhaps, superfluous to observe that since Huntly had not time to reach the King before his troops were overthrown, neither would Home—who was on Huntly's outer flank and consequently more remote—have had time to do so.

Halle's account of the fighting in this part of the field is rather of personal than of general interest. He relates that Sir Edmund Howard 'was thre tymes felled to the ground, and left alone, savynge his standarde berar, and twoo of hys servants, to whome came Jhon Heron, bastarde, sore hurte, saiyinge, there was never noble man's sone so lyke too be loste as you be thys daye; for all my hurts,

I shal here lyve and dye with you; and there the sayde Sir Edmonde Howarde was in a great daunger and jeopardy of his lyfe, and hardlye escaped; and yet as he was goinge to the bodye of the vantgarde, he met with Davy Home, and slew him wyth hys owne hande, and so came to the vantgarde.' [1]

Unlike Pitscottie, Halle credits Lord Home alone with the success gained on this flank; he does not mention Huntly.

Holinshed's account is interesting in that it states that the Admiral's division advanced some distance up the hill (? Branxton) on which the Scots stood. When the right wing, under Sir Edmund Howard, 'was got up on the hill side' the 'battell of Scots with speares on foot, beat downe and broke that wing of the Englishmen,' who were presumably pursued down the hill by the Scots into the lower ground, when we can well picture to ourselves how 'the lord Dacres, watching to aid where need appeared, came in on the sides of the Scots, and gave a charge on them with his horsemen, whereby Sir Edmund Howard being somewhat relieved, escaped to the English vantgard, which was led by his brother, lord Howard, who being now also got aloft on the hill, pressed still forward to renew the

[1] By the 'body of the vantgarde' is clearly meant the main body of 'The Foreward, or First Line'; this goes far to prove the truth of my surmise on page 63 as to both Lines being formed into three bodies.

battell, and to succour those whom he saw put to the worse, so that thereby they tooke new courages, and laid about them againe.' The troops under the Admiral, however, became engaged not with the Scottish left division, but with that under Crawford and Montrose.

Lesley and Holinshed (in his *Scottish History*) give somewhat similar accounts, though the latter says that the rival armies met at the *foot* of the hill.

In none of the *Chronicles* is, I think, any reference made to a disaster having befallen Home's troops subsequent to their success over Edmund Howard's wing, and indeed but little mention is made of them again ; Buchanan casually observes ' that Alexander Hume and his soldiers, who remained untouched, gathered up a great part of the spoil at their pleasure,' implying that they had certainly not suffered defeat. Similarly in Holinshed's *Scottish History* we read that ' the Lord Chamberlain bare the most blame, for that he did not cause a new onset to be given,' which he could not have done had he been defeated. Pitscottie, again, tells us distinctly that Home remained on the battlefield till next morning when he might have saved the artillery had he chosen to do so ; this latter assertion implies that he was not merely in the neighbourhood of the field, but actually on the position in which the guns had been placed, Branxton Hill itself.

The assertion that Home's Borderers remained on the field till next day is somewhat corroborated by

two casual remarks in Halle's *Chronicles*; firstly, that during the night after the battle the English camp was plundered by Teviotdale men—and these probably belonged to Home's command;[1] and secondly, that on the day after the battle—it is not absolutely clear whether Halle is referring to the day after or to several days after the battle—'the Lorde Admirall came to the felde, and there some Scottes apered on an hyll; but William Blackenall, whyche was the chyeffe doar and ruler of all the ordynaunce, shott suche a peale, that the Scottes fledde, orelles the Lorde Admirall had bene in greate jeopardye: and then all the ordynaunce was brought in safety to the castel of Eitel, and there remayned for a tyme.'

But the *English Gazette* tells another tale. After mentioning the Chamberlain's success, it states that Dacre, with fifteen hundred men, came to Edmund Howard's assistance 'et tellement exploicta qu'il mist en fuyte les d'Escossois, et eut envyron . . . des gens dud. seigneur Dacres tuez, et en la d^e^ bataille fut tué ung grant nombre des d'Escossois.' The impression here conveyed is that Home's success was but very temporary, and that the English, quickly recovering themselves, drove his troops back in rout, thus bringing to a successful

[1] Lord Dacre refers to a William Carr having been killed at the time he, Dacre, was engaging Lord Home. (Letter to the English Council, 17th May 1514, see Appendix IV.) The Kerrs were a Teviotdale clan.

close the last and crowning struggle of the great battle.

Later on (see page 108) consideration will be given to the question as to whether credence should be placed in the *Gazette* or in the other authorities quoted.

We must now turn to the division on Home's right, referred to by the *Gazette* as under the command of Huntly, Erroll, and Crawford, and of a strength of seven thousand men. It is the action of this division which the *Gazette* recounts before that of any of the others, thereby implying, as I have already pointed out, that the battle commenced in this part of the field. It fell upon the Admiral's division, but 'en brief ilz tournèrent le doz, et furent la plus grant partie deulx tuez.' The *Gazette* tells us no more.

Halle writes that on Sir Edmund Howard's left 'was the Lorde Admyrall with the vantgarde, with whome encountred the Earles of Crafforde and Montroos, accompaygned with many lordes, Knightes, and gentlemen, all with speres on foote; but the Lorde Admyrall and hys compaignie acquyted themselfes so well, and that with pure fightyng, that thei brought to grounde a great number, and both the Earles slayne.' This certainly implies that the English had the best of the fight, but it hardly bears out the assertion in the *Gazette* that the Scots fled.

Holinshed relates that the Admiral had 'got aloft on the hill' before being attacked by Crawford and Montrose; these Earls 'came with their battell of speares also on foot, and incountring with the said lord Howard, after sore fight on both sides, continued with more malicious hatred than force of the parties, both the said earles were slaine, besidese a great number of other; the whole battell which they led being put to flight and chased out of the field, maimed, wounded, and slaine.' This appears, at first sight, to corroborate the *Gazette*, but we should remember that in fact Holinshed is referring to the defeat of troops on the Scottish right, for it is there where he placed Crawford and Montrose.

Our Scottish chroniclers give no information of the part played by this division; neither Pitscottie nor Buchanan mention it at all, while Lesley merely refers to it as forming the rearguard.

We now come to the King's division.

The *Gazette*, after telling us of Crawford's defeat by the Admiral, continues: 'Le Roy d'Escosse vint, avec une tresgrant puissance, sur le Conte de Surrey; lequel Conte avoit à sa main gauche le filz du s^{r} Darcy; et eulx deulx portèrent tout le fes de ceste bataille. A laquelle bataille le Roy d'Escosse fut tué dedens la longueur d'une lance du d. Conte de Surrey; et plusieurs nobles gens y furent tuez, et nuls prins prisonniers des Escossois dedans les deux batailles.' No mention is made of the King's

division having been put to flight, as the *Gazette* expressly states in referring to the other divisions.

Halle, on the other hand, describes it as having been completely annihilated ; of the King's ' owne battaill none escaped, but Sir William Scot, knyght, his chauncelour, and Syr Jhon Forman, knight, his seriaunt porter, whiche were taken prisoners, and wyth great difficultie saved.'

Neither the *Gazette* nor Halle refers to the defeat of the King's division as the final episode of the battle.

Holinshed, after relating the defeat of the Scottish right, under Crawford and Montrose, by the Admiral (!), and that of their left, under Lennox and Argyle, by Edward Stanley (!), states that the King had perceived, shortly after he had joined battle with Surrey, that his flanks were ' distressed,' and he thereupon called on his troops to rush forward with him against their enemies, when ' a new battell more eager than the first began to arise. . . . But while the battell was thus foughten in most earnest maner about the standards with doubtful chance of victorie, the lord Howard and Sir Edmund Stanley having vanquished their enemies in either wing, returned to ' Surrey's assistance. ' At the same time, the lord Dacres came with his horsemen upon the backs of the Scots ; so that they being thus assailed behind and before, and on either side, were constreined (as invironed about) to fight in a round compasse.'

Of course if, as is here stated, the flanks were

defeated before the centre, Lord Home must be absolved of blame for not having moved to the King's assistance. Although in my opinion the charge against Lord Home is a grossly unjust one, I attach no importance to Holinshed's statement, and I shall also show presently that, with regard to the Scottish right wing, the evidence is strongly in favour of the view that it was not defeated until after the King's division had been so. The assertion that Dacre came with his horsemen on the King's rear is surely ridiculous!

We learn from Lesley that the King's forward rush was due not, as Holinshed implies, to despair at the defeat of his wings, but to over-confidence engendered by the defeat of an—he does not say which—English division. 'Quhilk the King persevand, beleving all to be his awin, and that the ennemies had givin bakkis, avancit forduart the battell, nocht abyding the reirgard, him self being on fute with thame, set encourageouslie on the Erle of Surris battell, quhair eftir mony arrows schott on everie syde, and greit skaith done thairwith, Sir Edward Stanley with his reirgard come fireselie doun of the hill of Brankis-toun upon the back of the Kingis army, quhairin thay faucht cruellye one baith syds lang space; at last the victory inclinit to the Inglis men, and mony of the Scottis men slane or takin presoneris.' The Scottish rearguard was, according to Lesley, composed of the division under Crawford and Montrose, so if we accept this account the King's division came

into action before theirs. Then, while we have here an account of the King's right flank being turned by Stanley, no mention whatever is made of a similar turning movement on the other flank.

Buchanan tells us very little—indeed, all he says is that 'the King's Body, and Hepburn's brigade, with the Lothianers, fought it out stoutly. There was a great slaughter on both sides, and the dispute continued till night; by which time both sides were weary. There were a great many slain of the King's body.' The inference from this is that the King's division did not break, but kept its ground till darkness put an end to the fight, and if we infer this much, we must also consistently infer that, in Buchanan's opinion, the troops under Lennox and Argyle broke before the King's division retired, and secondly, that the King's division was not routed by an attack on the flank or rear by the victors of Lennox and Argyle. As to an attack on their other flank, by either the Admiral or Dacre, Buchanan makes no suggestion whatever.

From Pitscottie's account, again, there is nothing to lead one to think that the King was overwhelmed by a flank attack. After describing the Scottish victory on the left he continues: 'By this the two great Battles of England came forward upon the King's Battle, and joyned awfully at the Sound of the Trumpet, and fought furiously a long While; but, at last, the King of Scotland defeat them both. Then the great Battle of England, led by the Lord

Howard, who was, under his Father the Earl of Surrey, Governor of that Battle, who came furiously upon the King, to the number of twenty thousand fresh Men : But the King's Battle encountred them hardily, and fought manfully on both Sides, with uncertain Victory, till that the Streams of Blood ran, on either Side, so abundantly, that all the Fields and Waters were made red with the Confluence thereof.' Then follows the account, already given, of Lord Home refusing to join Huntly in the latter's attempt to assist the King. Pitscottie does not attribute the King's defeat to his being attacked either in flank or rear, but to his being overwhelmed by the divisions immediately in his front before Huntly's troops could join him.

We must now turn our attention to the division under Lennox and Argyle forming the right wing of the Scottish army.

I have already expressed a doubt as to Sir Edward Stanley's division having come up into line with the rest of the English army at the time Surrey and the Admiral advanced in one front towards the Scots. The improbability of Stanley's division having formed on Surrey's left precisely when the latter was forming on the Admiral's left is evident to any one with any experience of the movements of large bodies of troops. Whether Stanley followed Surrey over Twizel Bridge, or whether he moved by the Etal Bridge and fords in the neighbourhood, he is

certain, after crossing to the right bank of the Pallinsburn, to have turned up the little valley in rear of the main body; but upon approaching the field upon which battle was already being engaged, he would have formed to his front in battle array, and his division, instead of prolonging the general line of battle of the English army, would have moved obliquely into action; his right might, perhaps, have come into touch with Surrey's left, but his own left would have been thrown forward. The Scottish right division, under Lennox and Argyle, would then of necessity have changed front to their right, in order to save themselves from being attacked in flank. The struggle, then, in this part of the field would have been more or less separate and distinct from that engaged in by the rest of the army, a surmise which is somewhat strengthened by the following considerations. In the first place, Pitscottie makes no allusion whatever to the fighting here, a fact which points to his having looked upon it as of no great importance, as a subsidiary, detached, combat having no influence on the general issue. On the other hand, the omission may be due to the evident prejudice he bore against Home; he attributes the success on the Scottish left to Huntly's men rather than to Home's; he relates the silly story of Home refusing to assist the King at the request of Huntly, 'who could not suffer his native Prince to be overcome with his enemies before his eyes'; he asserts that Home

might easily have saved the whole of the artillery on the morning after the battle ; in short, his account inclines a reader to attribute the disaster to the Scottish arms as due rather to what might have been done by the left wing than to what actually occurred elsewhere. The omission, then, may be due, not as I have above suggested, to Pitscottie having considered the struggle unimportant, but to his not having wished to bring its unfortunate result into prominent notice.

Again, the *Gazette*, after referring to the struggle, in which the divisions under Crawford and the King had been engaged, in a manner conveying the impression that they were fighting, if not absolutely shoulder to shoulder, at all events in close proximity to each other, continues : ' Et à l'heure de la bataille les Contes de Lynouxe et Argille, avec leur puissance se joignièrent à l'encontre de messire Edouar Standley, et les d'Contes et leurs gens furent contrainctz deulx metre en fuyte.' Now, to me these words convey a somewhat different impression—they suggest that while the King and Crawford were engaged with Surrey and the Admiral, Lennox and Argyle were engaged in a separate fight with Stanley.

It should, perhaps, be noticed here that the *Gazette* gives no clue as to whether the defeat of the right wing preceded or followed that of the centre—an important point, concerning which there has been much difference of opinion—and makes no suggestion that the defeat of either contributed to

that of the other, which must surely have been the case unless the two defeats occurred at the same moment, or unless the right wing was at a considerable distance from the centre.

Halle tells us that Surrey's left wing, under Sir Edward Stanley, 'clame up to the toppe of the hyll called Bramston, or the Scottes wyste, and wyth hym encontred the Earles of Huntley, Lennoux, and Argile, with a great number of Scottes, whyche were sore fought wyth all. . . . Such as fled, the sayde Syr Edwarde and his people followed them over the same grounde, where the Earles battle firste ioyned, and founde ther the Scottes, whyche were by the earles battaill slayne before, and sodainly left the chace, and fell a spoyling, and spoyled the kynge of Scottes, and many that were slayne in his battaill, but they knew him not, and founde a crosse and certain thynges of hys ;[1] by reason wherof, some saide that he was slayne by that wyng, whyche could not be true ; for the prisoners of Scotland testified, that the kynges battayll fought onely with the Earles battels ; but for a truthe this wyng dyd very valiauntly ; wherfore it was thought that the sayd Syr Edwarde myght that day not have bene missed.' Again, he writes further on that Stanley's division 'was the last that fought, for he came up to the toppe of the hyll, and there foughte with the Scottes

[1] All this points to the Scottish right not having been pursued to any distance, and also to the troops composing Stanley's division having been as keen for plunder as the much-maligned Borderers and men of Teviotdale and Redesdale.

valiauntly, and chaced them doune the hyll over that place where the kynges battaill ioyned.'

That Stanley ascended the hill 'ere the Scots wist,' or, in other words, that he surprised the Scots, must appear to any one who knows the ground a sheer impossibility; but it is not improbable that Lennox and Argyle, having originally been drawn up in line with the rest of the army and parallel to the general English line of battle under Surrey and the Admiral, were, after becoming aware of Stanley's advance on their flank, unable to complete the necessary change of front before he was upon them. To change front in face of the enemy is not an easy thing to do, more especially with undisciplined troops; the manœuvre can, of course, be carried out only in one of three ways—either by wheeling the whole forward or backward, pivoting on either flank, or by taking a central point as pivot and wheeling partly forwards, partly backwards. Consequently a change of front necessitates either an advance, or a retirement, or both, and neither, once entered upon in the face of an enemy, is easily stopped. That the Highlanders composing this division did in fact advance and thereby become considerably disordered is recorded by Buchanan thus: 'Lennox and Argyle, being encouraged by the success of their fellows, regardless of their ranks, fell upon the enemy in a very disorderly manner, leaving their colours far in the rear: Tho' La Motte, the French Resident, cried out much

against it, and told them, they would run headlong to their own destruction; for they were received not only by the English standing in array before them, but were set upon by another party in the rear, and so almost cut off.' 'Another party'! Then Stanley's command must have been divided into two portions. Some light upon this is thrown by Holinshed; he says that Sir Edward Stanley 'having begun to incounter with the Scots on that side, forced them to come downe into a more even ground and brought to that point with such incessant shot of arrowes as his archers bestowed amongst them, that to avoid the danger of that sore and sharp storme, the Scots were constreined to break their array, and to fight not closed togither in order of batell, but insunder one separated from another, so that their standards began to shrinke here and there. Which thing when Sir Edward Stanley perceived, forthwith bringing about three bands, which he had kept in store fore such like purpose; he invaded the open sides of his enimies by a fresh onset, and put them in such disorder, that they were not able longer to abide the violence of the Englishmen mightilie preassing upon them; so that taking themselves to flight, and running headlong downe the steepe descent of the mounteine, they escaped to the woods[1] and there saved themselves. But the

[1] This is one of the few instances, occurring either in the *Chronicles* or in Brewer's collection of letters, of reference to the nature of the country, of which we are very ignorant.

Earles of Argile and Lenox, dooing what they could to staie their people from running awaie, were slaine in the same place.' We may, surely, identify the party mentioned by Buchanan, as attacking the Scots in rear, with the force which, Holinshed here tells us, Stanley had kept in hand for the purpose.

They were sent against 'the open sides' of the Scots. What is meant by this? Of course, if the struggle here was at all detached from that in the centre, both flanks would have been open; but if such was not the case, if Lennox and Argyle were in touch with the King's division, then their right flank only would have been open. In either case, however, this would have been the more exposed of the two and the more likely to be attacked; the view that this was, indeed, the flank attacked by 'the three bands' is strengthened, as will now be shown, by our knowledge of the direction subsequently taken by the fugitives and pursuers.

Halle asserts that, previous to engaging, Stanley had gained the top of the hill on which the Scots stood; Holinshed, however, states that, in order to engage, the Scots came down the hill, and again he relates that, after being routed, they 'ran headlong down the steep descent of the mountain.' These apparently inconsistent statements may be reconciled. Stanley appears to have divided his command into two portions, and of these one may

have gained the top of the hill without fighting, the other may not. Again, the Highlanders also may have been—and probably were—in two portions, the one under Lennox, the other under Argyle. When changing front to meet Stanley's flank attack, the left-hand portion may have advanced, and if so it must have gone down the hill, and the troops with which it engaged cannot have been on the top of the hill. The right-hand portion, however, when the change of front was being effected, would have remained on the top of the hill, and in this case we can understand how Stanley's three bands gained the summit before becoming engaged. That this force attacked the right flank of the Highland division is shown by the statement that the charge of the 'three bands' resulted in the flight of their enemies 'headlong down the steep descent of the mountain.' From the eastern part of Branxton Hill the ground slopes gently away towards the south and south-east, soon to rise again to form the hill of Flodden, and consequently there was no steep hill in this direction for the fugitives to fly down—they did not then yield to an attack coming from either the north or north-west. They yielded to an attack on their right flank from the east or south-east, and rushed headlong down the very steep slope of the northern, or more accurately the north-western, face of the hill, when both fugitives and pursuers would necessarily have poured on to the ground on which occurred the struggle between the King and

Surrey, as related by Halle, Lesley, and Holinshed (in his *Scottish History*).[1]

These three authorities, however, differ as to when this disaster occurred, Halle stating definitely, and with considerable detail, that it followed the defeat of the King's division—amongst other details he mentions that the Scottish prisoners 'testified that the King's battayll fought onely with the Earles battells'—while Lesley and Holinshed say equally distinctly that Stanley's troops fell on the back of the King's division, and this is the view generally accepted by modern writers, who build upon it their picturesque accounts of the monarch

[1] Halle's words that Stanley 'clame up to the toppe of the hyll' imply that his attack was directed up the steep part; if so, he must have been in the same alignment as the rest of the English army, and the Highlanders in the same alignment as the rest of theirs. But, in this case, the fugitives from the Highland division could not possibly have come, as described by Halle and others, to the ground where the King's division was, or had been, fighting. It may, however, be argued that though the vanquished troops could not have done so, Stanley's victorious men might—by being halted and wheeled to their right. I disagree. Once a large body of even highly disciplined troops are launched forward in a furious charge and have tasted blood, they are not to be halted at a moment's notice and wheeled at will to the right or left as if they were tin soldiers; the direction originally given to the charge is generally more or less maintained.

If the fugitives and pursuers went headlong down the steep hill, it follows that Stanley did not assault the steep hill, that his troops were not in alignment with the rest of their army, nor the Highlanders with theirs. The front occupied by the Highlanders must have been thrown back obliquely to the front of the King's division.

fighting desperately to the last, completely hemmed in by his enemies. There is, however, reason to think it is incorrect, for what little evidence we possess points, as I shall show hereafter, to the termination of the battle having been brought about, not by the King's defeat, but by the setting in of darkness. The probability appears to me to be in favour of Halle's account being the true one, that is to say that the defeat of the Scottish right did not occur until after the fighting in the centre had ceased.

The defeat of the right wing is generally, and possibly truly, attributed to a too hasty advance on the part of the Highlanders, but opinions differ as to the reason for this movement; Buchanan asserts that they were encouraged to do so by the success of their comrades—presumably Home's Borderers, the only division which scored any success that day. There is, however, no certainty that Home's division had become engaged at this time, and even assuming such to have been the case, it was in such a distant part of the field that its movement would have been barely observable. Holinshed relates that Stanley forced them to advance, but how so is not easily understood, for they were not fired upon by the English bowmen, so far as we know, until after they had moved forward into the lower ground. I have suggested that their advance may have been necessitated by a change of front in order to meet a flank attack, a conjecture which is con-

sistent with the opinion I have formed regarding the direction of Stanley's attack and the course taken by the fugitives and pursuers.

Only one other Scottish division, namely Bothwell's, remains to be referred to, and with regard to it we have practically no information. Neither the *Gazette*, Holinshed, Pitscottie, nor Lesley, makes any mention of Bothwell; nor does Halle further than showing his name in the list of killed; while Buchanan merely refers to 'Adam Hepburn, with his clans, and the rest of the nobility of Lothian' having been in the reserve, and again to 'the King's body, and Hepburn's brigade, with the Lothianers' having 'fought it out stoutly.' If Hepburn's brigade did, as here implied, fight shoulder to shoulder with the King's division, it persumably had closed up on to the right of that division at the commencement of the fight, and the two commands then practically merged into one; if so, we can understand no separate mention being made of Bothwell's command.

Lastly, what were the two 'battayles' mentioned by Halle which 'never came to handstrokes'? [1]

[1] In Weber's *Flodden Field* (1808), at page 356, we read: 'These two battles were, as Holinshed informs us, Huntly's and Home's divisions.' Holinshed must be acquitted of having made such an absurd statement. The following is, I think, the only reference he makes to the subject: 'The lord Hume and the Earle of Huntley got horses, and escaped away together with certain bands, placed in the two hindermost wards, which of all that day never came to handstrokes, but stood still and gave the looking on. . . . Many Englishmen . . . were taken of the Scots that were in the two battels that went away with clear hands, and

It has already been suggested that these ' battayles,' or one of them, may have been identical with the fifth division, mentioned by the *Gazette*, or with Bothwell's, alluded to by Buchanan. There is also the possibility of their having been merely the baggage train and camp-followers, of whom, doubtless, there were considerable numbers, making the best of their way towards Scotland while the battle was still undetermined.

IV. *The general Result of the Fighting.*

The *English Gazette* states that the entire Scottish army was driven in rout off the field on the same evening—' La bataille et disconfiture commença envyron de quatre à cinq heures après dîner, et la chasse continua lieue et demye, on fut merveilleuse-

never fought. Also, diverse were taken by the lord chamberlain (Home) which fought with the wing of Sir Edmund Howard. . . .' Nothing can be clearer than that in Holinshed's opinion Home's division was not one of the bands which never engaged battle. As a matter of fact, Holinshed is quoting from Halle, making one slight verbal alteration, the motive for which may not at first sight be clear, but without it the story—which is not in Halle's account—of Huntly's and Home's flight would not have fitted in. In the original statement by Halle we are told that the two battles which never engaged ' fled first,' that is to say, then, before Home's or any other division had done so. Had Holinshed adhered to this, he could not have associated with it the other assertion as to Huntly and Home having fled with them, without implying that these two leaders fled before their own troops had been beaten back. It would have been too much to ask any one to believe this, and consequently the words ' fled first ' have been altered into ' went away with clear hands.'

ment grant tuerie ; et en eust eu dix mil tuez davantage, si les Anglois eussent esté à cheval.' The truth of this may be questioned, but its meaning is absolutely clear.

Halle writes : ' After that the felde was foughte, and the Scottes fled, many Englyshemen folowed them into Scotlande, and were so farre that they wiste not whyche waye to returne, and so were taken prysoners of the Scottes that were in the ij battailes that fled first, and never fought. Also dyverse were taken by the Lord Chamberlayne of Scotlande . . . and were carried with hym to the number of sixtye. Of the Scottes that fledde some passed over the Twede at Caudstrome Foorde, and other by the dry marches, during the tyme of the fyghte ; and the nyghte after, manye menne loste their horses, and such stoffe as they lefte in their tentes and pavillions, by the robbers of Tindale and Tiviotdale.' It should be noticed that Home's division was not the only Scottish one to make prisoners ; also, that Halle discriminates between ' the battels that had fled first ' and Home's division ; and lastly, that a portion, at all events, of Home's command, namely the Teviotdale men—who ought not to have been bracketed as robbers with the English Borderers, who doubtless deserved the appellation—remained on the field of battle during the night.

Halle continues : ' The Lord Dacre, wyth hys company, stode styl all daye unfoughten with all. When the felde was done, and the skoute watche

broughte woorde that there was no more appearance of the Scottes, but all were returned, the earle thanked God wyth humble harte. . . . Then the Earle and the Lord Admirall departed to Barmerwodde, and appointed' (here follow the names of those appointed) 'to kepe the place where the felde was, for savynge of the Englyshe ordinaunce, and the ordynaunce that was taken from the Scottes. . . . Well knowen it was by them that fought, and also reported by prysoners of Scotlande, that their kynge was taken or slayne; but his bodye was not found till the nexte daye, because al the meane people, as well Scottes as Englysh, were strypped out of their apparell as they laye at the felde; yet at the laste he was founde by the Lorde Dacres, who knew hym well by hys pryvye tookens, in that same place where the battayle of the Earle of Surrey and hys fyrste joyned together.

'Thys kynge had diverse deadlye woundes, and in especyall one wyth an arowe, and another with a byll, as apered when he was naked. After that the bodye of the kinge of Scottes was founde and broughte too Barwicke, the Earle shewed it too Sir William Scot, hys chaunceller, and Sir Jhon Forman, his seriante-porter, whyche knew hym at the fyrste syghte, and made greate lamentacyon. Then was the bodye bowelled, embawmed, and cered, and secretlye amongest other stuffe conveyed to Newcastell. But the same daye the Lorde Admirall came to the felde, and there some Scottes apered on

an hyll; but William Blackenall, whyche was the chyeffe doar and ruler of all the ordynaunce, shott suche a peale, that the Scottes fledde, orelles the Lord Admirall had bene in greate Jeopardye: and then all the ordinaunce was broughte in savetye to the castel of Eitel, and there remayned for a tyme.'

There can, surely, be no reasonable doubt that Halle believed not only that the Scots had entirely abandoned the field on the 9th, but that Surrey and the English were on that evening well aware of their having gained a complete victory. Yet there is room for doubting whether in Halle's opinion, Home's troops had partaken in the rout and whether they had not remained till next day in the neighbourhood of the battlefield.

Holinshed's *English Chronicles* contain no information regarding the events immediately succeeding the battle which are not given by Halle, but in his *Scottish History* he writes that 'in the night following after this terrible battell, the residue of the Scottish army returned homewards the same way they came, wasting and spoiling the English borders as they passed.'

We must now turn to our Scottish writers.

Lesley sums up the result of the fighting very shortly, thus: 'At last the victory inclinit to the Inglis men, and mony of the Scottis men slane or takin presoneris; yit nochtheles thair wes in that battell ane griter nombre of the Inglis men slane

nor of the Scottis men. . . . This battell done, the Inglis men being sa soir handlit thairat, and sa mony of thair folkis slane, they wor glaid to returne within thair cuntrey without farder invasioun of Scotland, and sua the bourdouris wes at greit quietnes all the nixt yeir thaireftir.'

Then, Buchanan writes that 'the fight was carried on so obstinately that, towards night, both parties were weary, and withdrew, almost ignorant of one another's condition; so that Alexander Hume, and his soldiers, who remained untouched, gathered up a great part of the spoil at their pleasure. But the next day, in the morning, Dacres being sent out with a party of horse, to make discovery, when he came to the place of fight, and saw the Scots brass guns without a guard, and also a great part of the dead unstripp'd, he sent for Howard, and so gathered up the spoil at leisure, and celebrated the victory with great mirth.' This account seems probable enough although it differs from the English accounts both as to the manner in which the fight actually terminated and as to Home's proceedings; but the relation of the next morning's events are not inconsistent with Halle's story. The detail as to a great part of the dead being still unstripped has a ring of truth in it, and is decidedly suggestive of the victors having, up to that time, been in ignorance of their victory.

But it is chiefly upon Pitscottie's account, I think, that are based the opinions of those who hold that

neither side knew on the evening of the battle who had gained it, and that Home maintained his position till next day. 'Neither England nor Scotland,' he says, 'knew who had the better in that battle, but that the Scottish-Men mist their King; and so many of the English-Men that were alive, retired to the Earl of Surrey, and Lord Howard his Son, and retired a little from the Field, and stood on their Feet that Night, while on the Morn at nine Hours, not knowing who had win or tint the Field: and likewise the Lord Hume stood all that Night on his Feet, with the Number of ten thousand Men; while, on the Morrow that the Sun rose, he seeing no Noise, neither of English nor Scots, departed his Way, and left the King's Artillery behind him, which he might have had rescued, and brought with him, if he had pleased: For I have heard say, upon the Morn at ten Hours, that a hundred Scottish-Men might have brought away the King's Artillery safely, without any stop of English-Men. But soon after, the English-Men hearing that the Lord Hume was retired from the Field, came soon together with the Number that they might be, carted it, and had it away to Berwick, where much of it remains to this day.'

It is on the foregoing accounts that we have to decide whether the English and Scots were aware, the former of their victory, the latter of their defeat, on the evening of the battle, and whether Home did or did not hold his ground till next day. The

English authorities, the *Gazette* and Halle, say one thing, the Scottish authorities another. Can we determine which are the more worthy of credence, or which story is in itself the more probable ?

While there can be no question that the *Gazette*, written at the time and signed, it is said, by the Admiral himself, is better evidence than the Scottish versions, composed at a later period by persons who were not present and who must have been dependent for their information upon others, yet we must bear in mind the undeniable fact that the reports of English Border officers, like those of all other officers of every nation in the world both before and since, invariably put matters in the most favourable light possible to themselves. Curiously enough, Scottish writers of the present day are somewhat inclined to do the reverse ; they exaggerate the misfortunes of their country, in order, perhaps, to accentuate the valour and stubbornness with which they were faced, and are too ready to accept as literally true every word the English commanders may have written to their superiors regarding their own military exploits. The older Scottish historians, however, cannot be accused of this, and certainly not Pitscottie. Yet, in estimating the value of the latter's account of Flodden, we ought to remember that he is markedly hostile to Home, and when recording that a force of ten thousand Borderers remained inactive on the field of battle till next day, he may have been gratifying a wish to exhibit their leader's conduct

in as bad a light as possible. Nevertheless, hostile as he was, he surely would not have entirely invented the story—which is in itself highly creditable—merely in order to have the pleasure of throwing a stone at Home for not saving the artillery;[1] but to have this pleasure he may conceivably have exaggerated the strength of the force, and may also have refrained from mentioning details—such, for instance, as the position occupied—which might have shown that the removal of the guns from Branxton Hill would have been impossible.

Since, then, neither the English nor Scottish authorities can be looked upon as peculiarly trustworthy regarding this particular point at issue, we ought, in forming an opinion regarding it, to be guided by considerations as to which view is the more probably true one. The answer must greatly depend on the hour of day at which the Scottish retreat commenced; if before dark, Home, even assuming that his troops had suffered only slight loss, would never have remained on Branxton Hill all night, and it is absolutely certain that the English would have seen whether the Scottish guns had been abandoned or not. If, however, the battle continued till after dark, Surrey might quite well have been ignorant of the magnitude of the Scottish

[1] If Pitscottie's estimate of the number of guns the Scots brought into the field is correct (see page 7), and if the *Gazette* is correct as to the number captured, many must have been saved.

disaster and have been doubtful whether James, of whose death he was then unaware, had definitely retreated or merely fallen back to some other position, perhaps on Flodden Hill. We can also understand how it happened that the abandonment of the guns —if, indeed, they were then abandoned—was not observed by the English, as Halle tells us, till next day.

The *Gazette* gives the somewhat vague information that the battle began 'environ de quatre à cinq heures après dîner,' and we know that on that evening the sun set at six o'clock; we may therefore be assured that there was but very little time available before darkness for the complete driving from the field of a large and well-equipped army, a wing of which admittedly gained considerable success, by another army of not much greater strength—indeed, the English claim of considerably less.[1]

Pitscottie and Buchanan aver that the fighting did not break off until darkness had set in and neither side knew 'who had won or tint the field.' Halle also regrets that the day had not 'been longer by three hours'—a considerable addition to daylight!—not only because in that case they might have killed a greater number of the Scots, but because 'wythin

[1] Neither Halle, Holinshed, Pitscottie, Lesley nor Buchanan mentions the hour at which the battle commenced; modern writers, on the other hand, such as Ridpath, Scott, Fraser Tytler, Burton, and others say definitely that it began about 4 P.M. See footnote to page 75.

a little while they might have put the realme of Scotlande in suche a misery and trouble, that for ever they shoulde have bene ware how to enter the realme of Englande,' that is to say, then, that the fall of night saved the Scottish army from a calamity, which would have rendered it incapable of opposing an English advance.

On the whole the probability appears to be in favour of the view that the struggle terminated, not in consequence of the Scots having been annihilated or routed, but on account of darkness. In this case, Surrey, though perhaps confident that his troops had had generally the best of the fight and though aware of the collapse of the Scottish right and withdrawal of the centre, would have been ignorant of his own losses as well as of those suffered by his enemies.

And now how about Lord Home and the Borderers ?

On a former page I have referred to the divergent views expressed, on the one hand by the *Gazette*, and on the other hand by all the authorities I have quoted, English as well as Scottish, as to the part played by them after the termination of the battle. Their action must now be examined more closely.

In the first place, it will be generally admitted by candid minds that the evidence in favour of Home having remained with his division intact upon the field of battle, or at all events upon Branxton Hill, till next morning is extremely weak.

In the second place, all who have studied the English Border State Papers of this period will agree that they are inclined to minimise failures and exaggerate successes, and in this particular instance the Admiral must have been sorely tempted to gloss over the disaster that had fallen upon his own right wing, commanded by his brother. His account as to Home's complete rout is irreconcileable with the undoubted fact that the latter carried into Scotland a large number of prisoners, many of whom belonged to the very force which is asserted to have effected his rout.[1] There would, then, be good ground for disbelieving the statement, even if it were not inconsistent with other accounts. But, after all, the interesting question to determine is, Were the Borderers forced to retire by an English counterstroke, or did they remain somewhere in the neighbourhood of the battlefield—not necessarily on Branxton Hill itself—till next day ?

Now, it is a difficult and risky thing to retire when engaged in a hand-to-hand fight ; doubtless

[1] Having no information from Scottish sources as to the number of prisoners taken, we have to depend upon English authorities, who are certain to have understated it. Halle puts the number at sixty, amongst whom must have been the ' Maistre Gray et Mesr Humfrey ' (? Sir Humphrey Lyle) named in the *Gazette*, John Fitton, referred to by Holinshed, and Philip Dacre, Lord Dacre's brother, ' with many other of his kinsmen, servants, and tenants taken (and slain),' mentioned in Lord Dacre's letter to the English Council, 17th May 1514. This does not look as if Dacre had met with the great success claimed for him in the *Gazette*.

in the accounts of ancient and mediæval battles we read of such retirements being made in order to entice an enemy to advance from some strong position and to pursue into an ambush when a counter-attack would be made in flank by comrades of the flying men, who would then be able to rally and to turn the tables. But, in the present instance, there is no reason to think any such intention existed; if the Borderers retired before Dacre's charge, they did so for no other reason than that they could not hold their own, and under circumstances which would have quickly caused the retreat to degenerate into a rout; but we have just come to the conclusion that there was no rout, and hence we must also conclude that the retreat, if there was one, was not the immediate result of the charge, and, further, is most unlikely to have been commenced until darkness had set in and the battle ceased. That the Borderers should have then retired from the low ground to which they had forced back Edmund Howard and where they had been engaged by Dacre —this lay, I imagine, in the neighbourhood of the spot marked on the map 'pit where human bones have been found'—to their original position on Branxton Hill seems probable enough, and we may assume they did so. But now comes the important question, Did they remain there all night, was this the hill referred to by Halle as that upon which they were posted next morning and fired upon by the English? It is difficult to think so; it is difficult

to believe that after having covered the retreat of the rest of the army—which moved on Coldstream and the Dry Marches [1]—they should have remained, without any apparent object, in so precarious a situation. It is surely common-sense to believe that, if Home fell back on Branxton Hill, he did not remain there a moment longer than was necessary; we may be fairly confident that when the hill was abandoned by the rest of the army, he followed, covering the retreat with his own unbroken troops.

But is this view consistent with the statement that his troops were fired upon next morning by the English? I think it is.

Nothing is more likely than that Edmund Howard's defeated wing should have been pursued by some of the wild, undisciplined Border clans who, following the fugitives along the route by which a few hours earlier they had advanced from Twizel Bridge, would shortly have reached the high ground east of Cornhill near the farm of Marldown. On their way they would have passed the King's stone, where, as we have seen, tradition states severe fighting occurred. When the pursuit ended, we can well understand their remaining in their then position, whence they could easily fall back upon the fords at Coldstream without fear of molestation.

But, it may be asked, if it be true that some of the Borderers advanced to Marldown and that others

[1] See Note A at end of this chapter.

fell back after dark to Branxton Hill, how can Home himself have been on the field next day with a force of ten thousand men, as asserted by Pitscottie ?

Assuming the truth of the conjecture that Home covered, with one portion of his division, the retreat of the main army on Coldstream, he would very probably have wished to occupy a position suitable to the protection of the fords, and for this purpose he would undoubtedly have moved in the direction of the position on which, it has been conjectured, the other portion of his division halted after the termination of its pursuit of Edmund Howard's troops. No ground more suitable could possibly have been selected.

If the reader will refer to the map he will notice that the spot where the iron cannon ball, referred to at page 56, was found is shown near Marldown. How did it get there ? It must either have fallen from an ammunition wagon during the Admiral's march from Twizel Bridge, or have been fired later on in the day from a Scottish gun, or from an English gun at a subsequent period.

Now, we are told on good authority that 'the greater number of shot fired by the Scotch were leaden balls, and by the English iron,' [1] and there can, indeed, be little doubt of the shot in question being English ; those who disagree will have to prove either that the Scottish guns could throw a

[1] *Flodden Field*, by the Rev. R. Jones, vicar of Branxton.

nine-pound shot for a distance of two miles or that the Scottish position at the commencement of the action was considerably to the north of Branxton Hill.

The ball, then, is English, and the position in which it was found must mark either the route followed by the Admiral's division on its march from Twizel Bridge to Branxton, or the ground occupied by the Scots when fired upon by the English on the day after the battle.

In conclusion I must express the opinion that had daylight continued only a little longer, Surrey's victory would have been of an even more overwhelming nature than in fact it was ; the guns would have at once been captured ; Home's division would have been swept off the field ; and the rout of the entire Scottish army would have resulted, and, what is more, have been apparent. Surrey could then have crossed the Tweed without misgiving, have devastated the Border counties, and have advanced on Edinburgh.

But, in truth, nightfall allowed the Scots to retire unknown to the English, and if their retreat degenerated into a rout—as to which I know of no evidence, though modern Scottish writers appear to accept it as a fact—the presence of the Borderers prevented Surrey from learning it. In doubt as to the advisability of an advance into Scotland, he decided to rest satisfied with his glorious victory, to sheath his sword, and, after securing his trophies, con-


ro Kz

FLODDEN FIELD (1513)


DUDDO
Direction of Berwick about 10 miles from Ford.
To Barmoor.
FORD
R. TILL
Milfield.
Willow ford
Crookham
Sandyford
Encampment Farm
Marden
Cheviot Hills
Surrey's
Stanley's route

sisting of seventeen useless guns and, perhaps, the King's dead body, disbanded his army.

The Scottish losses are very variously estimated. Buchanan states that, from the lists taken up through the several counties of Scotland, they must have been about five thousand. Now, the county authorities, when framing these lists, must have been guided rather by their knowledge of the numbers who did not return to their homes than by direct information, and consequently they must have included many who had been unable to return, either from being prisoners, or being wounded, or from some other cause. Remembering this and also that the reputed loss at Milfield alone was between five and six hundred, and that at the attack on Ford Castle it was reported to have been heavy, and further that the army had been engaged besieging Norham for a week, as well as in the minor sieges of Wark and Etal, we may safely say that, judging from the county lists, the actual number of Scots killed at the battle of Flodden itself cannot have exceeded four thousand.

This is the lowest estimate I know of. The highest is given in a table, said to be affixed to the Duke of Norfolk's [1] monument at Thetford. The Scottish loss is therein recorded as '2 Bishops, 11 Earls, 17 Barons, 400 knights, besides other gentlemen, with 17,000 in number.' It is said that this number was actually counted on the field. It

[1] After the battle the Earl of Surrey was created Duke of Norfolk.

amounts to more than half the probable number engaged, and, indeed—since Home's division of ten thousand men can have suffered but slightly—it represents a loss of between seventy and eighty per cent. of the remainder in less than three hours' fighting!

The *Gazette* puts the Scottish loss at about ten thousand men, and as it is not likely to have underestimated the number, we may conclude that other authorities who have computed it at nine or ten thousand are not far wrong. The real truth is that the severity of the blow to Scotland did not lie in the mere numbers slain, but rather in the loss of her King and leaders.[1]

With regard to the English losses we are equally at sea. In the *Annales of Scotland* we read that 'in this batell of floudon hill, altho the Englishe had the wictorey, zet had they no grate resson to want of it, in respecte of the grate slaughter of ther men; which made Scotland haue a peaceable winter.' Some authorities write that 'the loss could not have been less than 5000.' Ridpath says that 'some of the English writers compute the loss of their countrymen to have been only 1500 killed and taken prisoners;'[2]

[1] A list of the Scottish men of note who fell at Flodden is given in Appendix IV.

[2] See also R. O. St. P. iv. 1 (Brewer, 4441). The Bishop of Durham, writing to Wolsey on the 20th September (see Brewer, 4461), states that '10,000 Scots were slain and a great number of noblemen. . . . The English did not trouble themselves with prisoners, but slew and stripped King, Bishops, lords and nobles

but, though the number had been much greater, as the Scottish historians affirm it was, yet when compared with the destruction of their enemies it was of no consideration, as scarce an Englishman of note fell in the battle, which circumstance shews that much execution was done by the English artillery and archers.'

It certainly shows that little execution was done by the Scottish artillery and archers.

A few words must be said regarding the death of the King. The *Gazette* is responsible for the statement that he fell fighting close to Surrey—' dedens la longueur d'une lance ' are the words, and these imply that he was recognised at the time. But that he should have been seen by the English to fall within a few yards of their own commander-in-chief, and yet that his body was not found till next day, when there was a doubt as to its identity, is so difficult to believe that it is impossible not to think that the *Gazette* had less the intention of specifying the exact spot where James fell than of conveying indirectly the impression that Surrey himself had been in the thickest of the fight and had shared its dangers equally with him. In other accounts of the battle we do not find as much laudation given to Surrey personally as might be expected and as, in

and left them naked on the field.' Yet in the same letter, apparently (Brewer, 4462), he mentions that four hundred or five hundred prisoners were taken from Lord Home's division alone ! He says also 'the English have lost 1000 men, but only one of eminence, Sir John Bothe.'

my opinion, he deserved, and Pitscottie even puts into Lord Lindesay's mouth words referring to him as 'an old crooked Caril lying in a Chariot; and though they (the English) tyne him, they tyne but little'—words which perhaps reflect Pitscottie's sentiments rather than those of Lord Lindesay. But to return to the death of the King: we are told that he was killed by an arrow, in which case he fell before the troops came to hand-to-hand fighting —or after its conclusion; that he had also a severe wound from a bill (as Halle relates) does not in the least shake this inference, which is, of course, inconsistent with the view that he was killed in the midst of a mêlée close to Surrey. It is indeed useless to attempt to determine the exact spot where the King fell, and moreover there is no absolute certainty that he fell at all. With reference to this, Pitscottie writes that on the day after the battle 'the English-Men . . . went through the Field seeking the Noblemen who were slain, and in special the King's Grace. They found many like him, clad in his Coat of Armour; but no Man could say surely that it was he; because, the same Day of the Field, he caused ten to be clad in his coat of Armour; among the Rest were two of his Guard, the one called Alexander Macculloch, and the other The Squire of Cleish, which were Men of Makedom both like the King: Therefore, when they were dead gotten in the Field, and the King's Armour upon them, the English-Men believing that one of them was the

King, they took one of them, whom they thought most apparently to be like the King, and cast him in a Chariot, and had him away to England with them : But yet we know surely that they got not the King, because they had never the token of the Iron-Belt [1] to show to no Scottish-Man.'

Whether the King died at Flodden or not, whether it was his body or another's which the English carried away with them, are matters of no military interest now ; he was lost to Scotland, and therein lay the severity of the defeat. It may, however, be worth pointing out that his death was very generally discredited for many years from the top to the bottom of society in Scotland,[2] and consequently the stories which relate so vividly his glorious end, making it almost heresy to combat the idea that he and his immediate surroundings were the last to show front to the foe, must have originated many years later, or, at all events, if they originated at the time, were far from being universally believed in.

[1] The King was in the habit of wearing an iron belt round his waist as penance for his share in the occurrences which led to his father's defeat and death at Sauchie Burn.

[2] ' The most remarkable corroboration on record of the statement that the King survived the battle is to be found in *State Papers* (June 23, 1525) where it is stated that Queen Margaret Tudor, when desirous of divorcing her second husband, Angus, observed that the king had been alive three years after he was believed to have died at Flodden—a fact which, if true, would have invalidated her second marriage, contracted within that period.'—*Border Sketches*, by the third Countess of Minto.

V. *On the Causes which brought about the Defeat.*

What was the cause of this terrible defeat ?

One line in 'The Flowers of the Forest' [1] always jars upon me :

'The English for ance by guile won the day.'

No ! the English won the day because they deserved to win it ; when equally brave men, of much the same numbers, engage in battle, the victory will assuredly fall to those who are the better led, the better disciplined, and the better armed ; so it happened at Flodden. The Scottish army was composed of extremely heterogeneous elements—Celts and Saxons, speaking different tongues—Highlanders, Borderers, Lowlanders, all at strife with each other when there was no common enemy to fight, and consisting largely of clans, commanded by men who, however competent to lead their own small bands, were unaccustomed to act in combination with others, and were unable to subject their views to the wills of those who, for the time being, might be placed over them—the divisions of the army differed in tactics, in arms, and in character.

Then the English were admittedly very superior to the Scots in the use of the bow ; it has, I am aware, been alleged by various authorities of modern date that they did not owe their victory at Flodden to this cause ; neither do I consider it the sole cause, but it must necessarily have greatly aided

[1] Jean Elliot, daughter of the second Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto.

them. Accuracy of fire, whether artillery, rifle, or bow fire, must be advantageous. We are told by the Bishop of Durham that the Scottish knights were so encased in armour the English arrows had little effect on them ; if there is any value in this statement at all, it lies in the proof it affords of there having been a heavy fire of arrows, which must have had effect on those, by far the more numerous, who were not encased in armour, and we are told that the King himself, who was in armour, was killed by an arrow.

Some writers impute the defeat to a want of steadiness on the part of the Scottish right. We read that ' Lennox and Argyle fell like heroes, while their men fled ' ; and similarly another writer ' turns away in disgust ' at the conduct of this division. Again, others impute the blame to bad conduct on the part of the Borderers and of their commander, Lord Home, on the other flank—in short, while the troops in the centre around the King fought as heroes never fought before nor since, those elsewhere were cowards, traitors, or knaves.

A few words must be said about Home's conduct.[1]

[1] It may be worth noticing that Lord Dacre, who commanded the English Borderers and was immediately opposed to Home, was also unjustly accused of inactivity. ' The Lord Dacre, wyth hys companye, stode styl all daye unfoughten with all ' (Halle). Possibly these similar charges may have originated from one and the same cause, namely that Piper's Hill may have hidden occurrences on the western flanks of the armies from general observation. Or were they due to a hatred of ' Borderers ' generally, common to both English and Scottish writers ?

It has already been pointed out that Pitscottie himself shows that there would have been no time for him, after defeating Edmund Howard, to have reached the King before the latter's division had fallen back. This is conclusive enough of the weakness of the charge which that historian has levelled against him ; but for the sake of argument, let us say that Pitscottie was correct in everything which tells against Home, incorrect as regards points in his favour, incorrect that is as to Huntly, who was between Home and the King, not reaching the latter before he was routed. Let us say that Home would have had time to do so, and examine the question on that hypothesis.

Though Home had been victorious in his struggle with the Admiral's right wing, there is no suggestion that he had not still large forces in his front, and, indeed, according to the *Gazette*, it was more than he could do to hold his own against them. Now, I do not think that writers, who blame Home for not moving to the King's assistance, can appreciate the intense difficulty, amounting frequently to an impossibility, of moving troops to a flank when in the immediate presence of the enemy, and in this instance the armies were in actual contact. It will be at once said, Huntly did so, why should not Home have done so also ? The answer is that, in the first place, though Huntly personally did so, we do not know that his division moved with him ; but, even assuming that it did, such a movement

would have been facilitated by the fact of Home's division still maintaining a front to the enemy. Home personally might have gone to the King's assistance—though surely no one can be found bold enough to assert he ought to have done so and to have abandoned his own troops!—but for him to have moved his division was clearly impossible so long as he had a strong force of the enemy in his front; while these remained, so also had his troops to remain to prevent an enveloping movement and to secure to the remainder of the Scottish army the only line of retreat remaining open. It can hardly be doubted that had Home abandoned his position the loss to the Scots would have been much greater than in fact it was. Of course it may be said that had Home moved to the King's assistance the result of the battle would have been different; certainly it would; but we may well doubt whether the difference would have been to the advantage, or otherwise, of the Scots. We must remember that although he would have reinforced the King, the force he had been containing would have reinforced Surrey, or, perhaps, have been brought to bear in an even more vital direction. Common-sense must have told him to hold firm to his position; darkness was quickly coming on, and there was every reason to think that if the divisions on his right were forced to give way, they would be able to rally on the high ground in their rear, covered by his own force. Even had Home been able to foresee

the complete collapse that actually occurred, he could not have done better than stay where he was.

Histories of mediæval wars attribute the action taken by commanders more frequently to personal or chivalrous reasons than to pure military considerations, yet in all probability the reverse is nearer the truth.

At Bannockburn, the Scottish left wing, under Randolph, Earl of Moray, was in such imminent danger of being overwhelmed—and had this resulted Stirling would have been relieved—that Douglas implored Bruce for permission to go to its aid. Bruce is said at first to have refused—'Let Randolph redeem his own fault; I cannot break the order of battle for his sake.' Nevertheless, he did break the order of battle, not for Randolph's sake, but for that of Scotland, and Douglas rode off to Randolph's assistance. Before reaching him, he saw that the English had been repulsed and, in accordance with evident military considerations and moreover with Bruce's expressed desire, he at once returned to his position in the line of battle. This reason, however, is too prosaic for historians, who prefer to tell us that Douglas's action was due to his chivalrous desire not to lessen Randolph's glory by approaching the field he had won.

At Crécy, again, much the same thing occurred; the King refused to send assistance to the Black Prince, whose troops were being hard pushed. The reason was doubtless a purely military one, yet we

are asked to believe that, as in the case of Douglas and Randolph, the King wished his son to have the sole glory of the hoped-for victory.

At Flodden, had James and his division defeated their opponents, a similar reason would, perhaps, have been assigned for Home's inaction; but since they were themselves defeated, it is ascribed to cowardice or treachery.

Bruce, Douglas, King Edward, Home, each followed the course which reason pointed out as the most likely to ensure victory.

The sudden collapse of the Scottish troops can have been due to no other cause than a complete breakdown of discipline, and this, again, to a want of leaders, and this, we are frequently told by historians, was due to the King and his nobles having preferred the work of private soldiers to their own proper business of command. When night fell, the rival armies were still fronting each other; how was it, then, that next morning the sun declared to England a victory, to Scotland a terrible defeat? The reason was that the English troops, not being disorganised by the loss of their officers, stood in array on the ground upon which they had fought; whereas, in the Scottish army, the brigades, the clans, the standards were, with the exception of one division, leaderless, and

> 'Their King, their lords, their mightiest low,
> They melted from the field as snow,
> When streams are swoln and south winds blow,
> Dissolves in silent dew.'

That the catastrophe was not greater still was due to Home and to his Borderers, yet to them is frequently attributed the chief blame for the disaster! To do so is contrary to evidence, to reason, and to all sense of gratitude. It would be equally grossly unjust to ascribe the blame to the gallant men who fought stubbornly, though unavailingly, in the centre, or to the hot, impetuous Highlanders on the right flank; but, if we accept the view that the King and his nobles in truth abandoned their proper functions of command, the blame rests chiefly upon them. But I do not accept this view; I know of no evidence in support of it beyond the bare fact that the King and a very large proportion of the nobility engaged fell; but may not officers fall in large numbers without being accused of deserting their trust? Would Napoleon have been wrong to have placed himself at the head of his old guard at Waterloo in their final charge? He might have won the day had he done so. Would he have been fairly accused of abandoning his proper duties and of performing the work of a private soldier? We *know* so very little about Flodden; let us then throw no stones, neither at Highlander, Lowlander, nor Borderer, neither at King, lords, nor men, neither at those who fell, nor at those who fled, nor at those who covered the retreat across the Tweed.

Possibly, had the King and nobles taken greater care of themselves, the army might, after darkness had put an end to the fighting, have been rallied on

the high ground in rear and have shown front to the foe next morning ; but I am sceptical—I confess to having little knowledge of mediæval warfare—as to troops in those days having been sufficiently disciplined to allow of this, and I cannot, at this moment, call to mind a single instance of a worsted army being rallied in the dark and showing fight next day ; but even had the leaders at Flodden succeeded in doing so, it is still highly questionable whether victory would have resulted. This would have depended chiefly on the relative condition of each army in regard to supplies.

Holinshed, in his *Scottish History*, relates, on the authority apparently of Paul Jovius, that the nobles had advised the King, previous to the battle, to remain where he was 'in place of advantage, and, with prolonging the time, to trifle with the enimie, in whose camp there was already great scarsitie of vittels, neither was it possible that they should be vittelled from the inner parts of the realme, by reason of the cumbersome waies for carriage to passe now after such abundance of continuall raine as of late was fallen, and not like as yet to cease, so that in sitting still and attempting nothing rashlie without advisement, the king should have his enimies at his pleasure, as vanquished without stroke stricken through disadvantage of the place, and lack of vittels to susteine their languishing bodies.'

Halle also tells us that on the day of battle 'the Englishe armye hadde not vitayle, and were fastynge,

and two dayes afore they had only dronke water, and could scarce get any sustenaunce for money.'[1] Assuming the general truth of all this, and assuming also that the Scots were fairly well off for supplies, it may reasonably be asserted that the English would have been unable to count on victory next morning, and that an immediate retreat, probably the dissolution of their army, would have resulted.

But were the Scots themselves any better off than the English? Pitscottie tells us that many days before the battle 'the Victuals and Vivers of the Commons were spent; and many of the far North-land and Isles Men were spent and wasted in the Famine, in this same Manner, that it was Force to them to pass Home.' But really, it is unnecessary to refer to authorities on such a point as this, for it is self-evident that to have moved a host of, as we are told, a hundred thousand men from Edinburgh to the Borders, and to have maintained a large proportion of them in Northumberland for nearly three weeks, must have been a matter of the greatest difficulty, and one which could not have been carried out without great hardship to the troops. It is incredible that a Scottish army of, say, thirty-four thousand men could have remained on or in the neighbourhood of Flodden Ridge for a week in September, that is, before the harvest, without being sorely pinched for food. If their numbers

[1] The *Gazette* mentions that 'la bataille . . . commença . . . après dîner.'

were, as some historians estimate it, sixty thousand or more, the greater, of course, would have been their suffering.

Nevertheless, modern writers assure us that the reverse was the case. We are asked to believe that a Scottish army, which had remained for some time stationary in a hostile territory, was better provisioned than an English army which had been moving through its own friendly country, on no better evidence than that afforded by a few words in a letter from the Bishop of Durham, written a few days after the battle. He says that 'the Scots had a large army, and much ordnance, and plenty of victuals. Would not have believed that their beer was so good, had it not been tasted and viewed by our folks to their great refreshing, who had nothing to drink but water for three days.'[1] Now, to rightly appraise the value of these words we should notice other statements in the same letter, for instance: 'They (the English) were in much danger having to climb steep hills to give battle' (!) 'They (the Scots) were so cased in armour the arrows did them no harm' (!) 'They were such large and strong men, they would not fall when four or five bills struck one of them' (!) 'The English slew and stripped king, bishop, lords and nobles, and left them naked on the field. There might be seen a number of goodly men, well fed and fat' (!). The

[1] Brewer's *State Papers*, 4461. Ruthall to Wolsey, 20th September 1513.

Bishop was surely repeating, in the natural exhilaration of victory, some camp tales which he did not expect to be taken absolutely literally; his letter should be read as meaning no more than that supplies of food and beer were found in the Scottish camp;[1] but it would have been extraordinary if such had not been the case. The existence of supplies, even large supplies, is no evidence of the army, as a whole, not having been on short rations, and does not shake Pitscottie's assertion that 'the Commons were short of vivers.'

We know so little regarding the actual conditions obtaining at the time, that it is highly rash to assert, as a well-known Scottish historian has lately done, that the English 'could hardly have endured another day of drought,' and that if the Scots 'had sat still, drinking their beer, which the learned bishop highly commends, the force of Surrey, unvictualled, would have melted like a mist.'[2]

One more word on the battle of Flodden.

It is unfortunate, and even sad, that on both sides, English as well as Scottish, charges of misconduct—charges which probably originated from

[1] The following curious sentence occurs in the Bishop's letter: 'Albeit that our army, doubting that the said victuals had been poisoned for their destruction, would not save but utterly them destroyed' (*Proceed. Antiq.* (*Scot.*), vii. 151). It would seem, then, that, in the opinion of the English, the supplies had been intentionally deserted by the Scots. Their capture was not the result of a Scottish rout, and presumably was not made till next day.

[2] *History of Scotland*, by A. Lang.

the political, possibly personal, animosity of individuals and which have been perpetuated through sheer lack of consideration of the circumstances by modern historians—should have been brought against some of the commanders and troops engaged in this great contest, where of shame there was none, of glory much.

NOTE A

In the *Monastic Annals of Teviotdale* we are told, on the authority of 'Cotton MS. Calig. B. vi. 37' and 'Leslæus, de Rebus gestis Scotorum,' that on the night after the battle, Andrew Ker of Ferniehirst, an active and powerful adherent of Lord Home, broke into the abbey of Kelso, and, having turned the superior out of doors, forcibly kept possession of it.

Thus Halle's statement that a portion of the Scottish army retired by the dry marches is corroborated.

'This violence,' continues the author of the *Annals*, 'must have been perpetrated in behalf of his (Kerr's) brother,' and he further suggests that 'the disorders of the government likely to ensue upon the death of the King, who was slain in the battle,' might have tempted Kerr to commit this act. So here again, we find bad motives attributed to the brave men who fought so hard for Scotland, whereas in all probability they were acting in accordance with the most commonplace military considerations. While Home himself undertook to cover the retreat of those who moved by Coldstream, he may well have directed Kerr to perform a similar duty with reference to those retiring by Kelso, and in this case the latter would undoubtedly have taken

possession of the abbey, commanding, as it did, the bridge there; that a bridge over the Tweed at Kelso existed in those days we have good, though not conclusive, reasons for believing—but even if this was not the case, the importance of guarding the passages over the Tweed and Teviot at that point is manifest. It was here where, a generation later, Lord Hertford spent much time and labour in repairing the old Castle of Roxburgh, occupying the angle formed by the two rivers. Not to have occupied such an important position, immediately after their defeat at Flodden, would have been inconceivably stupid on the part of those who must have been anticipating an immediate invasion of their country. It is surely ungenerous and unnecessary to attribute this rough Borderer's act to a prophetic forecast of future domestic disorders arising from the death of the King, of which fact—if indeed fact it was—he may well have been ignorant at the time.

CHAPTER IV

AFTER THE BATTLE TO THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE

We have seen that on the morning of the 10th September the Borderers, under Lord Home, were occupied in covering the retreat across the Tweed of the remnants of the Scottish army, and it is not unreasonable to conjecture that they remained in the neighbourhood until it became evident—as in a few days it did—that there was no fear of an English invasion. Even as late as the 20th, Scottish forces were apparently not very remote from the battle-field, for on that day the Bishop of Durham, in a letter to Wolsey, expressed the fear that they might recapture their artillery, which was then at Etal—'it were too great a loss if it should miscarry, as God defend.'[1] That Home's division, then, did not break up immediately after the battle, there is good reason to think. And why should it have done so? It had not been demoralised by the fight—on the contrary, since it had met with some success; had captured, it is said, much booty, and many prisoners; and had, probably, suffered little loss. The men

[1] Quoted in *The Days of James IV.*, by G. Gregory Smith.

composing it were too well accustomed to war with England not to be well alive to the fact that the most dangerous and most foolish thing for them to do would be to scatter—so long as an invasion was imminent, they knew well that, to save their booty and their own skins, it was essential they should act together, shoulder to shoulder. But once the fear of invasion was dispelled, they also knew that the war of the future would be one of raids, and then we may be sure the clans dispersed, each to its own district, each ready to repel a small raid, all ready to combine against a large one.

Historians delight in depicting the terror and woe which, as they choose to imagine, spread over the length and breadth of Scotland when the result of the battle became known. For instance, Fraser Tytler writes that 'the wail of private grief, from the hall to the cottage, was loud and universal. In the capital were to be heard the shrieks of women who ran distractedly through the streets bewailing the husbands, the sons, or the brothers who had fallen, clasping their infants to their bosoms, and anticipating in tears the coming desolation of their country. In the provinces, as the gloomy tidings rolled on, the same scenes were repeated.' It is, of course, highly probable that amongst the riff-raff of the population of a large town such as Edinburgh, within some fifty miles or so of the fatal field, there should have been an undue display of excitement, grief, and even fear, but surely, in the absence of

corroborative evidence, it is a libel on the national character to assert that at a time when the army was shattered and dispersed—though the extent of this has probably been much exaggerated—at a time when all men, and women too, should have been emulating one another in readiness to face whatever dangers might be impending, the people were universally giving way to useless lamentations. Fraser Tytler quotes no authority, though to substantiate what he says in so far as Edinburgh is concerned, he refers to the well-known proclamation of the magistrates, forbidding women and vagabonds from crying and wailing in the streets. This proclamation was issued after rumours of defeat had commenced to circulate through the town, but before reliable information had been received, before the existence of any sound cause for a general manifestation of grief and despair. It runs thus: 'The x. day of September, we do you to witt, for as mekill as, thair is ane greit rumber now laitlie rysin within this toun, tueching our Soverane Lord and his army, of the quilk we understand thair is cumin na veritie as yet, quhairfore we charge straitlie, and commandis, in our Soverane Lord the Kingis name, and the Presidents for the Provost and Baillies within this burgh, that all manner of personis, nyhbours, within the samen, have reddy their fensabill geir and wapponis for weir, and compeir thairwith to the said Presidents, at jowing of the comoun bell, for the keeping and defens

of the toun against thame that wald invade the samyn.

'And also chairgis, that all women, and specialie vagabounds, that thai pass to thair labours, and be not sene upon the gait, clamourand and cryand, under the pane of banesing of thair persons but favors; and that the other women of gude, pass to the kirk and pray, quhane time requires, for our Soverane Lord and his army, and nyebouris being thairat, and hald thame at their privie labors off the gaitt within thair houses, as affeirs.'[1]

Are some half-dozen words in this simple, manly proclamation to be taken as evidence of the whole country having been paralysed by fear and grief? I read in it nothing but a firm determination to defend the capital, a resolve to maintain order, the first requisite for defence, and, perhaps, an acknowledgment that every effort may prove vain unless aided by that Power before whom all must bow, though it is quaintly enough ordained that such assistance is to be asked for only 'quhane time requires.' The proclamation proves that even when nerve-destroying rumour was rampant, the predominant spirit in the capital was a proud and unyielding one. Is there any reason to think that when rumour was replaced by a knowledge of the stern facts, this manly spirit was also replaced by womanish fears, or that in other parts of Scotland the spirit was different? In answering this question

[1] Quoted in Weber's *Flodden Field.*

we should be guided by deeds, not words, and we know that the citizens of Edinburgh at once set to work to strengthen its defences, and those who may take the trouble to read the following pages will learn how the Borderers continued ever watching the frontier, ever ready to delay invasion, ever successful in repelling raids—aye, and in raiding, too, across the Border.

It would have been curious, indeed, if, immediately upon the defeat at Flodden becoming known, no fear of invasion had arisen, but this appears from the following extract from the Records of Parliament to have quickly subsided, more quickly perhaps than it ought reasonably to have done, 'Perth, 22nd October 1513.—The quhilk day, in presens of the saidis lordis, my lord chamerlane (Lord Home) tuk upon him the rewle of the Merss fra all reiffes, slauchtreis, and all uther attemptatis, and as for Tividale, Liddesdale, Eisdale, and Ewisdale, Annanderdale, the said lord has promittit to caus the heidsmen of thaim to convene at ane certain day, quhar it sall pleiss the lordis to affix, and do his best to cause tham to mak gude rewle in thai partis for the stanching of all sic attemptatis, etc.' From this it would seem that, only six weeks after the battle, Parliament was more concerned in suppressing internal disorders than in preparing to repel invasion —or has the meaning of the above words been misunderstood? Possibly the 'reiffes, slauchtreis, and uther attemptatis' referred to English raids rather

than to clan feuds? With reference to this, it is worth noticing that, as will presently be shown, the first raids sent by the English into Scotland after Flodden occurred between the 10th and 15th October, only a few days before the date affixed to the above extract.

As to the doings of the English immediately after Flodden we know little; the captured artillery was removed to Berwick, the army disbanded, and instructions were issued confining the war in future to one of raids and forays.

If the Scottish army was so completely annihilated as we are taught to believe, if the English gained their victory with the trifling loss they assert, the fact that they did not follow it up may be attributed possibly to ignorance of the everwhelming nature of the disaster, possibly to political reasons, possibly to difficulties of supply. That this last consideration had considerable weight appears from the Bishop of Durham's letter [1] of the 20th September to Wolsey, in which he expresses the 'fear' that, on account of foul weather and want of victuals, they (the English) would have to assent to a truce proposed by Lord Home. But whatever the cause, the broad fact remains that very shortly after the battle their army dispersed, and, further, Scotland was not molested even by paltry raids for many weeks.

In the first week of October Lord Dacre had a conference with Lord Home—presumably to discuss

[1] Brewer, 4462.

terms for a truce [1]—when he describes himself as having been ' sore chafed ' with the Scots, who were evidently in a less pliant mood than was to have been expected of those lately chastened by severe defeat. He also excuses himself for not having carried out a ' great raid ' which he had planned for the 4th, on the ground that it had been ' prevented by the waters ; if they continue will have to wait till next moon.' Probably there were other reasons as well ; that he was fully alive to the difficulties and dangers attending such enterprises appears from a letter which he had written, only a few days before, to the bishop. He points out that when the Duke of Gloucester, ' a King's broder,' and the Earl of Northumberland were wardens of the Marches they looked upon a raid into Teviotdale as a serious undertaking, although they had the assistance of their friends and adherents ; and, again, he says that in the last war ' my lords of Norfolk, Winchester, Conyers, Sir William Bulmer and others and 1000 soldiers, supported by Berwick and Norham, found it as much as they could do to make a raid in Tevydale.' Nevertheless, he continues, that ' although a man of much less substance, he will attempt it on the West at the King's desire.' [2]

[1] Brewer, 4497. This letter is dated the 9th October—a Sunday—and the conference is referred to as having taken place ' on Saturday last.' From this it is not certain whether the previous day, the 8th, is meant, or the 1st. Internal evidence rather points to the latter.

[2] Brewer, 4518.

A curious inference may be reasonably drawn from this letter, namely that it had not occurred to Lord Dacre that Teviotdale was less able to offer resistance than at the earlier periods to which he refers—that the Borders of Scotland had been materially weakened by the great battle fought on their threshold only a few weeks before had not crossed his mind.

A few days later he wrote to King Henry acknowledging the receipt of orders to make two raids into Scotland, the one upon the West and the other upon the Middle Marches, and undertaking to carry them out as soon as the moon and weather will permit, and, he adds, that in the meantime he will make small raids which shall be no less annoying to the Scots.[1]

Lord Dacre was, in truth, opposed to the principle of 'great raids'; though, of course, willing to obey the King, his letters indicate that, in his opinion, 'small raids' were equally effective and preferable.

The next day (23rd) he again writes to the Bishop 'acknowledging his right discreet letter, advising him to undertake raids into Teviotdale,' which Dacre says he will do. He now for the first time mentions raids having been made into Scotland; he writes that since meeting the Chamberlain (Lord Home) 'on Saturday se'nnight,' he had sent four

[1] Brewer, 4522. In the letter to which this is the reply, the King had mentioned that Lord Darcy had been ordered to make a raid upon the East March. This does not appear to have been done.

raids into Teviotdale, and three into Annandale, and adds that he 'intends Tevidale shall be kept waking.'[1] These raids, then, which must have occurred between the 10th and 15th October, were the first sent into Scotland after Flodden; not a man crossed the frontier till five weeks after the battle.

The Great Raid of November 1513. (*See map at page* 164.)

We must now consider a curious account[2] of a 'great raid' into Teviotdale, given in a well-known letter from Lord Dacre to the King. After an attentive perusal of this letter—and this is absolutely necessary in order that the following observations

[1] Brewer, 4522. What Saturday is meant? He was writing as usual on a Sunday, and the words seem to imply Saturday the 15th. But the meeting with the Chamberlain was stated in his letter of the 9th to have occurred 'on Saturday last,' meaning probably the 1st; but if so, the expression 'Saturday se'nnight' must mean the Saturday three weeks previous to the day of writing. The matter is capable of three possible explanations: (1) There may have been two meetings; (2) the meeting referred to in the letter of the 9th may have occurred on the 8th, not on the 1st as assumed in the text—in which case 'Saturday se'nnight' refers to a Saturday a fortnight before the day of writing; (3) there may be a clerical error. The object of fixing the date of the meeting is to determine the date of the raids and hence the date on which the first English soldiers entered Scotland after Flodden. The letter of the 9th proves no raid occurred before that date, the letter of the 23rd that the raids therein mentioned occurred not later than the 15th.

[2] Lord Dacre to Henry VIII., 13th November 1513. The letter is given in full in Appendix IV.

may be understood—it will be seen that disappointingly little information is given with regard to matters of any real importance, and that in order to arrive at any reasonable opinion as to them it is necessary to draw, from such facts as are mentioned, inference after inference, conjecture after conjecture, in doing which we may easily fall into grievous error.

It is impossible to appreciate any military enterprise, great or small, or to judge of the success that attended it, without a knowledge of the object with which it was undertaken, and as to this Lord Dacre says not a word; he tells merely of the destruction of a few, apparently insignificant, 'towns' and peels, and we well know that this was not the main object which such an army as that assembled under the orders of the English Warden can have had in view.

When two large forces, serving under the same commander, assemble at points widely apart, and march thence in the direction of an enemy's town or stronghold, there is reason to believe that that is their objective. Nine or ten years after the time we are referring to, two English forces moved into Scotland, one from the east frontier, one from the west, and converged on Jedburgh, which they attacked and burned. So also in the present instance, one English force assembled on the Northumberland frontier and advanced to the immediate neighbourhood of that town, while the other assembled on the Cumberland frontier and,

following precisely the same route as that taken ten years later, came to within five or six miles of it. Surely then in each instance the objective was the same.

It may be thought that the considerable difference between the strengths of the armies in 1513 and 1523 indicate different objectives. In 1523 the army numbered between nine and ten thousand men; in 1513 only four thousand four hundred—an insufficiently strong force to venture on so formidable an undertaking; but it should be remembered that in 1523 there was more in view than Jedburgh; the intention was to advance on Melrose, then to lay waste the Merse, and a movement threatening Edinburgh was even mooted. Again, the raid of 1523 occurred on the eve of war, when Scotland was arming to the teeth and when strong opposition might reasonably be expected; in 1513 the raid occurred on the morrow of a great Scottish disaster, when less serious opposition would have been looked for. Moreover, the enterprise had been designed for a larger force than was in fact employed; Lord Dacre had been disappointed by the unwillingness shown by the Northumberland gentlemen to take part in it, and more especially by the non-appearance at the rendezvous of Lord Ogle, of the Constable of Alnwick, and of others, upon whom he had counted to bring large forces. It is not unreasonable to think that he had hoped that the force under his immediate command would have at the least

equalled that which he had placed under his younger brother, in which case the total would have amounted to nearly seven thousand men. When he found he had but a thousand, he was advised—and he himself admitted—that his force was insufficiently strong. But insufficiently strong for what? Certainly not for a day's ride into Scotland and back again, as the Tynedale men had done only three weeks before over the same ground—they burned Ancrum, four miles beyond Jedburgh—but for some greater, more serious enterprise that had been contemplated. There is, indeed, sound reason for asserting that the English forces were assembled on both frontiers with the view of making a raid on Jedburgh; that to Sir Christopher, Jedburgh continued to be the objective, until he was met, as we shall presently see, in Rule Water by Lord Dacre's flying horsemen; that to Lord Dacre, Jedburgh ceased to be the objective after the assembling of his forces. He may, possibly, have retained hopes of making a successful dash upon the place, but we ought to recognise that his final determination to advance, contrary to the counsel and advice of his guides, was due solely to his wish not to leave his brother in the lurch; his immediate object probably was to distract the attention of the Scots from Sir Christopher and to do all in his power to aid him in retiring safely to the English side of the Border. Lord Dacre displayed the spirit of a soldier and of an Englishman. Long may it live!

When two forces move from different points in order to reach some other point at the same time, it is, of course, necessary for the one which is the more remote either to commence its march before the other or to move with greater rapidity. In this instance, Sir Christopher's force was considerably the more remote of the two. Since it consisted partly of infantry—three thousand horse and four hundred foot—while Lord Dacre's was wholly of horse, it cannot have been expected to move with greater rapidity, and consequently we may assert that Sir Christopher commenced his movement in the direction of Jedburgh before Lord Dacre commenced the march which brought him into its immediate vicinity.

Again, when the objective is too distant to be struck at on the first day, the forces should endeavour to reach points within striking distance of, and equi-distant from, it. Now, Lord Dacre on the Northumberland frontier was within striking distance, Sir Christopher on the Cumberland frontier was not. Hence, when the latter left his rendezvous and entered Scotland, his primary object was to attain a point at about the same distance from Jedburgh as was the frontier across which Lord Dacre was to advance. A glance at the map will show that when he reached Rugheswyre [1] he had succeeded in this.

[1] Spelt 'Ruchswyre' in Pont's map (1654). It is not shown on the Ordnance Survey Map.

Let us now try to fix the day on which the raid commenced. This is, of course, in itself absolutely unimportant; what was the day of the week or of the month matters not; but it is essential for a right understanding of the subject that we should know whether the occurrences referred to in Lord Dacre's letter occupied one day or more.

With reference to his own movements, Lord Dacre writes: 'Upon Thursday last past, I assembled your subjects in Northumberland to the number of a thousand horsemen, and rode in at Gallespeth, and so to the water of Kale, two miles within Scotland, and there set forth two forays. . . .'

With reference to Sir Christopher's movements he writes: 'My brother come in at Cressop [1] Bridge . . . and so come through Liddesdale to the Rugheswyre, fourteen miles within the ground of Scotland, and there he put forth two forays.'

The sentences are framed similarly and should surely be interpreted similarly. I shall presently show good reason for believing that Sir Christopher halted for a night at Rugheswyre and that all the later occurrences mentioned in the letter, including the despatch of the forays, took place on the following day. And so also should we understand Lord Dacre, when referring to his own command, to mean that all occurrences, subsequent to his arrival

[1] Now spelt Kershope. The burn is the march between England and Scotland.

at the water of Kale, happened on the following day.

Observe also how few names of localities are mentioned throughout the letter; yet a swyre, high up in the barren hills, the abode of whaups and peewits, is not only mentioned, but its distance from the point where Sir Christopher crossed the frontier is carefully recorded. Why? Because there it was where the day's march concluded, whence the advance was continued next morning. Similarly, Lord Dacre, relating his own movements, mentions Kale Water, but neither Oxnam nor Jed Waters, both of which he crossed, nor a single place between it and the Dunian. And, as in the case of the Rugheswyre, so here, the distance within Scotland is given. Why? Because it was here where he halted, it was from here whence his march on Jedburgh commenced next day.

Let us assume for the moment that this view is erroneous, let us assume that Lord Dacre's men assembled, as he states, on Thursday the 10th, and further, what he does not state, that the occurrences subsequently related also took place that day, and that he reached Harbottle by midnight. Is this credible? We do not, of course, know the distances the various parties composing the force marched in order to reach the place of assembly, nor do we know the distance thence to Gallespeth, but they cannot have been by any means inconsiderable. However, we do know approximately the distance passed over

after leaving the latter place, and there is no exaggeration in the assertion that the horses generally must have travelled not less than fifty to sixty miles, some more, some perhaps slightly less. The feat is not an impossible one, merely highly improbable, more especially in view of the fact that the force was engaged not only in marching, but in fighting—and in driving pigs !

Another reason for believing that Lord Dacre's advance to Jedburgh occurred from a point within Scotland, and on the day after the force had assembled, rests on his statement that the beacons had been lighted on the night previous to the occurrences he relates, and this would not have been the case had those occurrences and the assembly of the troops been on one and the same day. Why, indeed, should the beacons have been lighted before the troops assembled ? In the case of raids—I am not referring to armies of invasion—they were, I should imagine, seldom lighted until the frontier had been crossed, not that the inhabitants refrained from any sense of etiquette, but because the raiders, aware that their enterprise to prove successful must be of the nature of a surprise, were careful to assemble at points sufficiently remote from the frontier for observation ; if they were observed and the beacons lighted the raid fell through. I ought, however, to point out that in the present instance the beacons to which Lord Dacre refers might have been those lighted in consequence, not of his own force having

entered Scotland, but of Sir Christopher's having done so.

With reference to the remark that raids should be of the nature of a surprise, it may be worth noticing that even when the English had reached Rugheswyre on the one hand and Kale Water on the other, their ultimate intentions would not have been revealed; those at the Rugheswyre might equally well be credited with an intention to move down Rule Water or the Kirkton Burn as down Jed Water; those on the upper Kale might be expected with better reason to turn down the valley than to move in the direction of Jedburgh. It must also be noticed that the inhabitants of Liddesdale, being presumably ignorant of the existence of Lord Dacre's force, can have had no reason to think that Sir Christopher was not acting purely on his own account; so also those of the Kale Water can have had no reason to think that Lord Dacre was acting in combination with another.

I must refer to one other point. Lord Dacre mentions that the horses had been for twenty-eight hours without bait, from which it would seem that the raid had occupied more than one day.

So far, then, the foregoing reasoning points to Lord Dacre's force having assembled on Thursday the 10th and having that same day or evening passed across the Border to upper Kale Water, and having next day advanced beyond Jedburgh and having returned to Harbottle by midnight.

Against the correctness of this surmise there is, however, the following strong evidence. Lord Dacre, after referring to his return into England by the Reidswyre, writes: 'I come to Harbotell at mydnyght; my broder, Sir Christopher, lay that night at the tower 'of Otterburne, and upon the morne to Hexham, and his folks in other towns upon the water of Tyne, and on the thrid day at home, as many as might get.' Lord Dacre was writing on a Sunday. Now if the retreat into England occurred on Friday, Sir Christopher was that night at Otterburn, next day at Hexham, and his men returned home on Sunday; but, it may be said, Lord Dacre would have been unable to mention this last fact, and consequently that it must have been on Thursday-Friday night that he was at Harbottle and Sir Christopher at Otterburn, on Friday that the latter was at Hexham, and on the Saturday that the men returned home. To this I reply that granting the improbability of Lord Dacre having known the fact on the day of writing, there was no impossibility, and further, the words 'as many as might get' imply ignorance as to whether the men had got home.

Let us consider Sir Christopher's movements. Did he enter Liddesdale on the day on which he was met at the Dunian by Lord Dacre, or on the day before? Surely the latter. In so thinking, I am influenced not only by the reasons already mentioned, but by the historical fact that ten years later another

force, though exclusively of mounted men, also entered Scotland at Kershope foot on their way to Jedburgh. It halted and passed the night at the Rugheswyre, and did not approach Jedburgh till the following afternoon. No doubt the march might have been executed in one day, but, putting aside the possibility of opposition being met with on the way, the men would have arrived exhausted and at too late an hour to allow of an attack being made on the town that day. They would have been obliged to bivouac in the neighbourhood, a procedure the danger of which was exemplified by the well-known occurrences of the following night. No; if, on the present occasion, Jedburgh was the objective, the intention must have been to strike at it on the day after Sir Christopher crossed the frontier.

Again, we are told that Sir Christopher lay at Otterburn on the night after he was at the Belling. If this was the same day as that upon which he entered Scotland, he must have traversed some fifty or sixty miles of country, which, though not actually mountainous, is high, rough, and unsuitable for rapid marching, with a force partly composed of infantry!

If he entered Scotland on Thursday the 10th, we may be confident he did not get to Otterburn that night, and that the night mentioned by Lord Dacre as that of his arrival there was not the night of Thursday-Friday, but of Friday-Saturday.

The truth is that if we understand Lord Dacre

to mean that he reached Harbottle, and Sir Christopher Otterburn, on the 10th, we have to admit that the statement is inconsistent with his other assertion that his forces only assembled on that day. It seems to me that we should accept the latter, which is definite and clear, rather than the former, which is, after all, nothing more than a doubtful interpretation of a sentence in a decidedly obscure letter. But whether this opinion is right or wrong is of no importance; whether the raid occurred on the 9th and 10th or on the 10th and 11th is, as I have already said, immaterial; the point is that it occupied more than one day, and this I claim to have proved conclusively.

We must now pass on and consider the account of the occurrences of the second day of the raid.

Lord Dacre mentions that the point on Kale Water at which he arrived from the rendezvous was two miles within Scotland, which shows that he must have hit upon the upper waters of the stream, not far from Pennymuir, where are the remains of a large Roman camp. A Roman road connects 'Gallespeth' with this camp, and we may conclude with certainty that up to this point Dacre had moved along it. After leaving Pennymuir we cannot be so sure how he proceeded, but probably he continued along the road and, if so, it will have led him to near the confluence of the Jed and Teviot, within two miles of Jedburgh. He would, however, have overshot that town by a couple of miles.

When on Kale Water, he 'set forth two forays,' each of three hundred men, one under the command of his brother, Philip Dacre, the other under that of Sir Roger Fenwick. The former went to Ruecastle, the latter to Lanton, 'which towns are in the heart of the country two mile beyond Jedworth upon the Water of Teviot,' while Lord Dacre with the main body moved to the Dunian, 'a mile from Jedworth.'[1] Although these places are ten to twelve miles, as the crow flies, from where he crossed the Kale, no reference whatever is made to 'towns' or peels having been attacked, or opposition having been met with, and from this it may, I think, be inferred that he did not go as the crow flies, that he did not cross Oxnam Water where he would have found plenty to harry, nor Jed Water above Jedburgh, where he would have been in disagreeable propinquity to Ferniehirst Castle, the stronghold of the Kerrs, and have found plenty of opposition to his march. To reach the Dunian, we may be confident he kept Jedburgh on his left, that is to say, then, that the above-mentioned probability of his having followed the Roman road has grown, in my opinion, to be a certainty. The road keeps generally to high, bleak country, in which his finding nothing to destroy, and meeting with no opposition,

[1] The Dunian is a hill rising to about one thousand feet above the Teviot. The distances here given are very accurate, a fact which should incline us to accept others as equally so. 'Town' is a term frequently applied in the south of Scotland to farms or a few cottages.

is understandable enough. And now comes a question which surely every reader of Lord Dacre's letter, possessed of local knowledge, must have asked himself, Why did he go to the Dunian? Certainly not merely in order to harry Lanton and Ruecastle; those places were burned simply because they happened to be in his neighbourhood. But why was he in their neighbourhood? He does not tell us, so we can but conjecture. If Jedburgh was the objective, the intention must have been, as I have already pointed out, for Lord Dacre's and Sir Christopher's forces to approach it at much the same time. Now, as a matter of fact, when Lord Dacre arrived at within two or three miles of Jedburgh, say at Cappock, Sir Christopher was still far distant; but the former cannot have known this, and therefore may quite probably have waited somewhere between the Oxnam and Jed, hoping to see or to hear of his brother's approach. But, seeing nothing, hearing nothing, what was he to do? To move to some not remote point, whence he might perhaps see signs of his brother? For this, no spot more suitable than the Dunian could possibly be found. Or, perhaps, it would be wiser to abandon the Jedburgh enterprise altogether and to move at once in his brother's direction? In this case also his route lay by the Dunian—of course his direct way was by Jed Water, but had he followed it he would have quickly heard that 'Jeddart 's here!' and he would have found certain folk of the name of

Kerr and Rutherfurd who might not have proved over-civil. The answer then to the question, Why did he go to the Dunian ? is, partly, because it lay on the safest route he could follow in order to join Sir Christopher, and, partly, for the reason which takes us there on a fine summer day, the view. Not only would he be able to have a look for his brother, but the extensive view both up and down Teviotdale would enable him to ascertain whether there was any immediate likelihood of Scottish forces under the Warden or others coming upon the scene.

But not a sign did he see of Sir Christopher's approach—possibly, however, a gleam, a sun-flash from a distant spear may have caused him to realise the critical position in which his chivalrous determination to assist his brother had placed him.

Having burned the 'towns' of Lanton and Ruecastle and two peels at the latter place, but apparently leaving untouched the many others existing in that district, he commenced what was seemingly a hasty retreat. He was pursued, he tells us, 'right sore to the Sclater ford [1] on the water of Bowset where the Scots bickered with us and gave us handstrokes.' These Scots were presumably the men of Lanton and Ruecastle, who, acting on the old maxim of it being 'better to hear the lark sing than the mouse squeak,' had

[1] See footnote (2) on page 160.

abandoned their towers and dwellings, the former indestructible, the latter worthless huts, to combine with each other and with men of the neighbouring 'towns' to tackle the enemy in the open. To pursue and to attack Dacre's thousand horsemen, they must have been in by no means insignificant numbers.

At the Sclater Ford the Scots were reinforced by three standards, 'that is to say, David Kerr of Ferniehirst and the Laird of Bonjedward upon the one side, and the Sheriff of Teviotdale (Douglas of Cavers) on the other side, with the number of seven hundred men or more.' Of the fight which now occurred we are told merely that 'divers Scotsmen were hurt'—two are named—and that one of the Scots' horses was killed and another taken—and that is absolutely all the information given! But much may be read between the lines of the sentence that follows: 'And so we came forward where we saw my brother, Sir Christopher Dacre, with his host arrayed at a place called the Bellyng, which was to us no little comfort and to him a great gladness seeing the small power we were of at that time.' It is clear enough that Lord Dacre was thankful for having been able to save his force from disaster.

The words 'seeing the small power we were of' imply that the Scots were numerically very superior. Lord Dacre had one thousand men; at Sclater Ford the Scots received a reinforcement of seven hundred

men, and consequently if the force which pursued the English numbered three hundred, the combatants would have been equal. In order to give to the Scots a great superiority, we must consider the pursuers to have numbered at least six hundred men. It seems, then, that at the time of Dacre's retreat from the Dunian, large Scottish forces must have been rapidly gathering.

We must now turn to Sir Christopher's doings.

The letter relates that with a force of three thousand horsemen and four hundred footmen he entered Scotland at Cressop Bridge 'and so come through Liddesdale to the Rugheswyre, 14 mile within the ground of Scotland,' whence he sent forward—as I have shown reason for believing, on the following day—two 'forays' of five hundred men each, under Sir John Ratclif and Nicholas Haryngton. The former, following probably the Wheel Causey, advanced to Dykerawe, 'six miles from the swyre,' where they burned the town and smoked the occupants out of a tower. They then destroyed the 'towns' of Sowdon (Southdean) and Lurchestrother (Lustruther) and another tower, and 'destroyed all the cornes about them and toke diverse prisoners with much insight and goods.' This is the only reference in the letter to the capture of prisoners.

The other foray, under Haryngton, 'burned the town of Hindhalghehede and a tower in the same, floor and roof; and in likewise the towns of West

Sawside and East Sawisde with a peel of lime and stane in it.' [1]

In support of these two parties, Sir Christopher moved with the main body, consisting of two thousand horse and four hundred foot, to Dykeraw, where 'the forreyeres releved hym' [forayers rejoined him]. He then advanced to meet Lord Dacre, who, as we have seen, was in trouble at the Sclater Ford [2] and evidently in urgent need of assistance. But as to what then happened Lord Dacre says not a word; he merely writes 'we had not ridden above the space of a mile when we saw the Lord Chamberlain (Lord Home) appear in our sight.' We can but infer from his silence that he was not successful in driving back his pursuers, and was forced to continue his retreat towards the Belling, which is at about the distance from the Sclater Ford that Lord Dacre says he covered before Lord Home came in sight. It was only on reaching the higher ground, whence a better view of the surrounding country was gained, that he became aware of Lord Home's advance, with a force of two thousand men, but whence these came he gives no indication whatever. This is unfortunate, for the matter is one of

[1] Hindhalghehede, spelt Hyndheuchhead, is shown on Pont's map (1654) opposite Slack on the Jed. Sawside may be Faside, or perhaps Shaw on the Shaw Burn. The matter is unimportant.

[2] Local antiquarians have located Sclater Ford at a spot considerably lower down the Fodderlee Burn than where, on my map, Lord Dacre's course is shown as crossing it. They place it at about where the cross swords are marked below the first letter of Bowshot.

great interest, relating as it does to the system of the defence of the Borders. All we have a right to assert definitely is that since the force formed apparently one combined body it cannot have been composed of men hailing at one and the same time from the east and the north and the west; men coming from the east would not have come on to the field in one body with those from the west. They did not come from the Merse, which would have been too distant—a few well-mounted men may have done so, possibly Lord Home himself, but we can hardly think that any large body can have done so; Oxnam Water is unlikely to have supplied a contingent, for it must have been through Oxnam Water that the earliest news of Lord Dacre's advance reached Jed Water, and the two Waters are certain to have acted together under Kerr of Ferniehirst and Douglas of Bonjedward. The force might have been composed of men from Lower Teviotdale and Lower Kale Water; or possibly of men from that part of Teviotdale lying to the north of the Teviot. But, to my mind, the most probable conjecture is that it was recruited from the districts nearest to the frontier first invaded. I have shown reason for believing that it was on the 10th when the English entered and marched through a great part of Liddesdale; on that day Liddesdale, Hermitage Water, Slitrig Water are in arms; that night

'On Penchrise glows a bale of fire,
And three are kindling on Priesthaughswire';

next morning Ewesdale, possibly Eskdale, and upper Teviotdale are to the fore. Thus we can well conceive a force of two thousand men approaching the Belling by the afternoon of the 11th.

The strengths of the forces now facing each other were, according to Lord Dacre's figures, as follows :—

English—four thousand horsemen and four hundred foot.

Scots —two thousand seven hundred men in addition to those who pursued the raiders from the Dunian to the Sclater Ford.

And now what happened ? Sir Christopher's large fresh force of horse and foot and Lord Dacre's wearied, harassed thousand find themselves face to face with a Scottish force of somewhat smaller numbers. We shall surely hear of battle. But no, we are told that the English forthwith retreated by the shortest route into England ! Is this credible ? I think not, unless the Scots were of superior, or at least equal strength.

Lord Dacre's words are : ' We put in arreye and come homeward, and rode no faster than nowr (? nowt) sheep and swine that we had won would drive, which was of no great substance, for the country was warned of our coming and the beacons burnt from midnight forward. And when the Scots had given us over we returned home and come in at the Redswyre.'

The first sentence, following as it does immediately upon the reference to Lord Home's arrival on the field, implies that the English retreat was undertaken in consequence of it.

The second sentence, however, implies that the retreat was not commenced till the Scots had 'given them over,' and from this we must understand one of three things—*either* that the Scots brought a large force to the Belling merely to march home again, a supposition which must be ruled out not only on account of its intrinsic absurdity, but because had this happened Dacre would most undoubtedly have mentioned it; *or* that the Scots attacked without success and then 'gave them over,' a supposition which must also be ruled out, partly because to attack would have been a silly game for the Scots, in their then circumstances, to have played, and partly because Dacre would, as in the former case, have undoubtedly exulted—and rightly so—in his victory; *or*, lastly, that the Scots pursued the English after the latter had commenced their retreat. This is consistent with the first of the above sentences.

To pursue, to harass, to cut off stragglers, to recapture the 'gear,' but to refrain from a pitched battle, was evidently the game for Lord Home—if indeed his was the inferior force—to play, and there is no reason to think that, if the circumstances were as stated, he did not so play it; but to believe this, is to believe that the English com-

menced to retire before the inferior force had 'given them over,' and this I have just said is incredible. Some readers may disagree as to its being incredible, and may argue that to retreat would have been a reasonable course, since by this time, the whole country having been aroused, Lord Dacre must have become aware of the impossibility of proceeding with the raid and of the desirability of a quick return home. I cannot, however, consider this to be the true explanation of why some four or five thousand English—the triumphant victors of the battle fought but a couple of months earlier at not more than twenty miles from the spot on which they now stood—retreated without a blow, when face to face with a very inferior force of their lately vanquished foes. No, the probably true explanation is that the Scots were considerably superior in strength; that, in spite of the defeat at Flodden, the organisation on the Borders for the rapid concentration of men to repel invasion was still in a high state of perfection, and that the numbers brought into the field on this occasion were far greater than we have been led to imagine. This conjecture, though opposed to Lord Dacre's figures, is consistent with his complaint as to the insufficiency of his numbers; he would, he says, had he not felt bound to his brother to go on with the raid, have abandoned it after Lord Ogle and others had failed to appear at the rendezvous at Gallespeth. Surely, then, when he


LORD DACRE'S "GREAT RAID."
10TH - 11TH NOVEMBER 1513.
R. Teviot
Ancrum
Jed foot
180'
Crailing
Bonjedworth
450'
Timpendean
Lanton
Minto
Newton
Ruecastle
926'
Jedburgh
200'
300'
Howden
500'
730'
Scraesburgh
Oxnam Water
Oxnam
Oxnamrow
450'
Denholm
Dunian
1100'
Blaklaw
Bedrule
Ferniehirst
Swinnie
Jed Water
Rule Water
Fulton
1400'
Ruberslaw
Cavers
Hallrule
850'
Weens
Abbotrule
Bowshot
Wester houses
The Balling
1160'
936'
Edgerston
Bonchester
1060'
450
Fallside
Hyndheuchhead
Chesters
Claiklypeel
1500'
Sawside
Shawburn
Slack
Lustruther
Southdean
Dykerawe
Letham
Carter Burn
700'
1100
Reidsw
1400'
Wauchope Burn
Hyndlee Burn
Raven Burn
R. Jed
Carter Fell
1400'
Rughesgwyne
1460'
Wormscleugh Burn
Roman Road
Wheel Causey
R. Liddel
1600'
To Kershope Foot
To Otterburn
1960'
0 1 2
miles
Lord Dacre's
Sir Christophe
Bonjedward
Ferniehirst
The Sheriff's


Crailing.
Morebattle.
Cessford
Kale Water
300'
Cappock.
Roman Road
Whitton Lock
Oxnam Water
Oxnam
Hounam
1100'
1150
976'
800'
Pennymuir Camp
1250
700'
1388'
Watling Street
Ad Fines.
Gallespeth.
to Harbottl. (10 miles)
Reidswire
1400'
1540'
to Harbottl. (15 miles)
to Otterburn (15 miles)
N.
W.
E.
S.
2 3 4 5
Miles. (Scale 1/10560)
Lord Dacre's line of march.
Sir Christopher's " " "
Banjedward's " " "
Greenichirst's " " "
The Sheriff's " " "

advanced he fully expected to meet large forces. His expectations were, in my opinion, realised.

The letter is indeed a difficult puzzle to unravel. Sometimes I am inclined to wonder whether it is as originally written, whether particulars here and there have not been struck out. Thus, not a word intervenes between Dacre's arrival on the Kale, where he sent out two 'forays,' and his, and their, arrival on the Dunian. Then he 'comes' to the Dunian and 'went' to the Sclater Ford; it is hardly credible that he should not have said why he came and why he went. Then again, after joining his brother at the Belling, he writes 'we come homeward,' but not a word as to being harassed by the Scots who, only a few lines before, had been mentioned as having pursued them for miles and being strongly reinforced; he does not even mention that the Scots had abandoned their pursuit. Yet he then repeats that he and Sir Christopher returned to England. Why this repetition if nothing had happened in the meantime? And then he says the Scots 'had given us over'!

But however this may be, there can be little doubt that Lord Dacre suffered a severe defeat, a defeat quite sufficing to explain the fear he expresses of a Scottish invasion of the Middle Marches of England: 'I dare not be absent during this light for fear the Scots should burn and destroy the country in my absence.' And again, ten days later, he says that his 'brother, Sir Christopher, could make no raid

into Scotland,' and also that 'the inhabitants of Teviotdale are great thieves.'[1] But when can they have done any thieving? This points strongly to the probability of Home's men having pursued the English 'thieves' across the Border.

On this occasion Lord Dacre learned a lesson he never neglected so long as Lord Home remained in command on the Scottish side. He learned, or, perhaps, it would be fairer to say he was confirmed in the opinion he had already expressed—for in justice to Lord Dacre it should be remembered that this 'great raid' was in consequence of the King's direct command—that an invasion of Teviotdale by large raids was a hazardous experiment, and that small raids were more effective. After this time we hear of only one 'great raid' as being even suggested, and that one could not, for some unmentioned reason, be carried out. 'Small raids' were in future to be the rule, and these, since we have no particulars of any sort regarding them, may be assumed to have been few in number and unimportant in result.

1514.

Although no event of any military importance occurred on the Borders in the year 1514, modern historians assure us that the English under Lord Dacre made frequent raids into Scotland, burning and devastating the country far and wide.

[1] Brewer, 4573.

Now, concerning this I am decidedly sceptical; no doubt, when two nations are at war it would be extraordinary if the inhabitants on contiguous frontiers did not suffer occasionally and severely from raids; but this is hardly what we are asked to believe. We are told that the Scottish side was laid waste—that misery unspeakable was inflicted upon a terror-stricken population unable to defend itself—that the English practically met with no opposition, no retaliation. But, where lies the evidence for this? Indeed, is there evidence of there having been any raids into Scotland in the year 1514?

That upon which historians appear chiefly to rely is furnished by a letter from Lord Dacre to the English Council, dated 17th May 1514, and they assume that the raids therein referred to occurred in that year. Now, I shall attempt to show reasons for believing that in fact they took place in the year 1513 and previous to the defeat inflicted upon the combined forces of Lord Dacre and his brother, Sir Christopher, by Lord Home, Kerr of Ferniehirst, and the Douglases of Bonjedward and Cavers, on the 11th November.

It will be seen that Dacre's letter, which is given in full in the Appendix, is nothing more nor less than a defence of his own conduct against serious charges, of which the only ones we need consider relate to his having failed to protect the English Borders against Scottish inroads, and to his not retaliating on the

Scots for injuries done to the English. We cannot, then, be surprised to find that the only raids referred to in this letter are those which terminated successfully; Lord Dacre naturally enough makes no allusion to reverses, of which in every war there are sure to be some.

His letter may be epitomised as follows: He begins by relating the circumstances under which he agreed to become Warden of the East and Middle Marches in December 1511.

He then rehearses the complaints which have been brought against him. They are: (1) That, though endowed with full authority by the King, 'the Scots have and daily doth' raid the country 'without any great hurt is done against them.' (2) That he had had secret meetings with Lord Home without informing the King of them. (3) That he makes 'not so good espiall in Scotland' as he might.

In the third paragraph of his letter he mentions that he had an interview with the King at Windsor in December 1513. He also writes that since then he had only met Lord Home once, namely in February, by the desire of many persons who wished him to arrange for the ransoming of their kinsmen and friends whom the Scots had made prisoners.

In the fourth paragraph he writes that he had encountered Lord Home and Lord Huntly at Flodden; he mentions the names of some of the killed belonging to his and their divisions.

In the fifth paragraph he says the Scots 'love him worst of any Englishman living, by reason that he found the body of the King of Scots, slain on the field.' [The reason he gives for their hatred should be noticed; it was *not on account of* any raids into Scotland or misery brought by him on the population, as is so frequently stated.]

In the next three paragraphs he replies to the charge of not making 'good espial' in Scotland.

In the ninth paragraph he answers the charge brought against him of permitting the Scots to raid the English Borders 'without any hurt being done again to them.' He says that it is impossible 'for a poor Baron' like him to resist and keep safe the East, Middle, and West Marches without great help and assistance, and this he cannot get, for the inhabitants, though blaming him for not obtaining the assistance of soldiers, refuse to take a part in the work themselves, either for the purpose of resistance or of invasion. He remarks also that in former times the Duke of Gloucester and the Earl of Northumberland were unable to keep the Borders in spite of the large forces at their command; and again the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Winchester will remember what difficulty they had, during the last war with Scotland,[1] when they lay on the East

[1] Lord Dacre had used almost the same words in his letter of the 20th October (Brewer, 4518) to the Bishop of Durham, warning him of the difficulties to be faced. His warnings were unheeded, and unpleasant incidents resulted. He is now practically saying as courteously as possible, 'Told you so.'

Marches and had the aid and assistance of the inhabitants. Lastly, Lord Dacre reminds the Council that when he was last before them he told them that he 'had no strength nor assistance from men, friends, nor tenants . . . that would aid and assist' him to serve the King.

The tenth paragraph refers to Scottish raids into the East Marches. He says that since he was last with the King—namely in December, see the third paragraph—the Scots had not burnt more than eighty houses of small value, and he adds that the marches were 'sawne to the frontier.'

In the eleventh paragraph he refers to the West and Middle Marches extending from Bowness to Hangingstane, a distance of fifty miles; here he says little harm has been done—not twenty houses have been burnt.

The twelfth paragraph apparently refers to all three Marches. He compares the number of cattle and sheep taken and houses burnt by the Scots with the number taken and burnt by the English. [It should be noticed that the number of houses burnt by the English is reckoned from the beginning of the war, *i.e.* from the summer of 1513; the number burnt by the Scots is reckoned since Dacre was 'with his Highness,' namely in December.]

In the thirteenth paragraph he names the lands in the Middle March of Scotland which have been raided by his orders, and he mentions the number of 'ploughs' on each.

In the fourteenth paragraph he names the townships and houses he had destroyed in the West March.

Now, it will not be necessary to discuss all the points referred to in this letter, which, however, should be read in full in order to appreciate the spirit in which it was conceived, and I shall confine my observations to points connected with raids.

It will be seen, in the first place, that Lord Dacre attempts merely to explain the cause for his failure to prevent Scottish raids into England—he does not deny their having occurred. Whether he be thought successful or not in clearing himself of the charge brought against him is a matter of no importance here; the important point, in so far as we are concerned, is that Lord Dacre admits that between December 1513 and May 1514 Scottish raids had been made into England sufficiently numerous and sufficiently serious to occasion a feeling of anger and discontent against him.

In the second place, Lord Dacre tries to prove that he retaliated on the Scots by sending raids into their country to burn and destroy, and this he asserts with considerable success, in that he inflicted more damage on the Scots than they had on the English.[1]

[1] That Scottish opinion on this point would have been very different may be inferred from a letter written shortly after the conclusion of peace by the Duke of Albany to the King of Denmark, in which it is stated that since Flodden the Scots 'had had frequent and successful rencounters with the enemy and had done more damage to the English than they had received from them.'

He writes thus: 'And for one cattle taken by the Scotts, we have taken, won, and brought away out of Scotland a hundred; and for one sheep, two hundred of a surety. And as for the townships and houses, burnt in any of the said East, Middle, and West Marches, within my rule, from the beginning of this war unto this daye, as well when as the late king of Scotts lay in the same East Marches, as at all other times, I assure your Lordships for truth that I have, and have caused to be, burnt and destroyed six tymes more towns and houses, within the West and Middle Marches of Scotland, in the same season than is done to us, as I may be trusted and as I shall evidently prove. For the water of Liddell being twelve miles of length within the Middle March of Scotland, whereupon was 100 ploughs; the water of Ludder, in the same Marches, being 6 miles in length, whereupon was 40 ploughs; the two towns of Carlanriggs with the demaynes of the same, whereupon was 40 ploughs; the water of Ewse, being eight miles in length, in the said Marches, whereupon was 27 ploughs; the head of the water of Tevyote from Branksholme up into Ewse doores, within the same March, being 8 miles in length, whereupon was 24 ploughs; the water of Borthwick, within the same March, being in length 8 miles, that is to say from Borthwick mouth to Craike Cross, whereupon was a 100 ploughs; and the water of Ale, from Askrige to Elmartour [1]

[1] Probably 'Ashkirk' and 'Ale Muir Tower.'

in the said Middle Marches, whereupon was 50 ploughs ; lies all and every one of them waste now, and no corn sown upon none of the said grounds, which grounds is over and besides the great raid that I made in the said Middle March upon Martinmas day last past, the contents of which I wrote to the King's Grace by post.[1] And upon the west marches I have burnt and destroyed the townships of Annand '—thirty-three other places are named— ' and the water of Esk, from Stabulgorton down to Cannonby, being 6 miles in length, whereas there was in all times past 400 ploughs and above, which are now clearly wasted, and no man dwelling in any of them in this day, save only in the towers of Annand, Stepel, and Wauchope.'

Now, this ' proof,' as he terms it, is, in fact, no answer to the charge at all ; to compare the results of English raids from the commencement of the war with the result of Scottish raids since December is futile, for the true point of the charge was that for some months before May 1514—presumably after his meeting with the King in December—he had neglected to take proper steps either to ensure the safety of the Borders or to make inroads into Scotland ; neglect previous to December, or certainly to November, was not charged against him. What we want to know is the comparative result of the English and Scottish raids in 1514, or, let us say,

[1] The letter here referred to is that of the 13th November 1513, which is given in the Appendix.

since the 10th November 1513, and on this point Lord Dacre's letter enlightens us not at all; the Scots, he says, burnt a hundred houses since December; the number of houses burned by the English during this period is not stated, but, he says, that they had burned six times as many houses as the Scots had done *since the commencement of the war*. Now, this line of defence adopted by Lord Dacre inclines one necessarily to think that whatever the balance of successes from the commencement of the war may have been, it was probably favourable to the Scots reckoning from November 1513. This view is further strengthened by the letter itself, which shows that during this latter period there *had* been Scottish inroads, there *had* been complaints regarding them, he *had* been rebuked for them. Had they proved disastrous to the raiders there would have been no complaints, no rebukes, nor would Lord Dacre have omitted to rejoice over them in his reports to the King and Council. But he made no report, wrote no letter even to the Bishop of Durham—at least not one bearing on the subject is published in Brewer's collection of *State Papers*—until in May he is forced into defending himself. His silence—all the more noticeable from his having from early in October to the middle of November written so frequently—is easily understood and easily forgiven.

It is more difficult in these days to forgive him for not giving us fuller details regarding those raids

which he does mention. There are so many matters one would like to know about, such as the difficulties encountered, the resistance offered, the numbers engaged, the routes followed, the distances covered, the hours occupied, and the dates on which the several raids occurred.

In spite of Lord Dacre having definitely stated that the period to which he was referring commenced from the beginning of the war, modern writers appear to be under the impression that all the devastations related by him as having been wrought on Scotland occurred in the year 1514, or at all events after the great raid of the 10th November. Now, although there may quite probably have been raids into Scotland after that date, Lord Dacre's letter cannot be said to supply evidence of them, unless, indeed, the words following his enumeration of the districts raided can be taken as such, namely, these districts 'lies all and every one of them waste now and no corn sown upon none of the said grounds.' It may be said, and fairly enough, that the implication is that the devastations were quite recent, not long before the letter of the 17th May was written, but I can find nothing in Brewer's *State Papers*, or elsewhere, suggestive of Lord Dacre having sent a raid into Scotland after the 10th November 1513, while we do find that on the 23rd November he reported to Wolsey that his brother, Sir Christopher, 'could make no raid into Scotland.'[1] He

[1] Brewer, 4573.

added that 'the inhabitants of Teviotdale are great thieves,' from which we may gather that the Blue Bonnets had been over the Border.

On the other hand, reasons exist for thinking that all the raids mentioned in the letter of the 17th May 1514 occurred previous to the great raid of the 10th November 1513.

In a letter from Lord Dacre to the Bishop of Durham, dated 23rd October 1513, mention is made of a raid to Carlenrig during the previous week (see sketch-map, page 180). This place is also mentioned in the May letter as having been raided. Now, great must have been its recuperative powers if, between October and May, when war was raging all around, it should have arisen as a Phœnix from the ashes and have prospered so well as to have afforded for a second time valuable spoil to the raiders; yet we have to believe this or to believe that the raid referred to in the later letter was identical with the one mentioned in the earlier.

Again, the October letter mentions a raid to Howpasley on the Borthwick Water, and the May letter mentions the raiding of the Borthwick Water; for a similar reason to that just given we must surely admit that both letters refer to the same raid.

Again, the May letter mentions the raiding of Teviot, from Branxholm to the Ewes Dores; this is not mentioned in the October letter. But, since Teviot Water lies between Borthwick Water and

the frontier, we may be confident it was raided at about the same time as Borthwick Water, possibly shortly before, but surely it was not spared for seven months.

Again, Ewesdale is mentioned in the May letter, though not in the October letter, as having been laid waste. But Ewesdale lies on the direct route from the frontier to Carlenrig and to the upper waters of the Teviot and Borthwick, and we can hardly believe that when those districts were laid waste in October it did not share a similar fate. Moreover, we know that that portion of the valley below the confluence of the Ewes and Esk was harried on the 26th and 27th October, the upper part of Eskdale having been similarly dealt with on the 25th.[1]

Again, the raiding of Ale Water, mentioned only in the May letter, must surely have occurred simultaneously with that of Borthwick Water. Ale Muir Tower, to which the raiders went, is only a short two miles from the Borthwick Water. On the face of it, it seems improbable that the harrying of this district should have been postponed to a later time, more especially since the so doing would have necessitated the despatch of a party over the already devastated districts of Ewesdale, of Upper Teviotdale, and of Borthwick Water.

The May letter refers to the raiding of only two other districts, namely the Water of Liddel, twelve

[1] Brewer, 4529.

miles long, in the Middle Marches of Scotland, whereon were a hundred ploughs, and the Water of Ludder, in the same marches, six miles long, with forty ploughs.

With regard to the Water of Ludder, I cannot be quite certain as to what stream is referred to; no such name appears on the Ordnance Survey, nor on Pont's map, nor on any old map I have consulted; nor, so far as I am aware, has any writer, though many have quoted the passage in which the name occurs, made any remark as to its whereabouts.[1] I shall make no further reference to it, but at once pass on to the raiding of Liddesdale.

Now, it will be remembered that 'the Water of

[1] I am inclined to identify the Water of Ludder with Hermitage Water. No other stream in this district, not mentioned in Dacre's letter, is likely to have been termed a 'water,' with the exception of Tarras, which flows through a wild, inhospitable country and leads nowhere. Hermitage Water, on the other hand, is very likely to have been followed by English raiders aiming for the head of Ewesdale or for Carlenrig, and, indeed, is almost certain to have been raided at much the same time as Liddesdale and Ewesdale. In length it agrees with the description given of the Ludder. In Pont's Atlas no name is given to this stream, but on it is a place named 'Lada,' which might easily have been corrupted from, or into, Ludder. On a map, dated 1590, in the British Museum (reproduced in the Hon. George Elliot's *Border Elliots*, etc.) the stream is shown as the 'Riddall,' so presumably 'Hermitage Water' is not an old name—the earliest mention of it that I have met with occurs in a MS. map of the Duke of Buccleuch's estates, prepared in 1718. In the thirteenth century it bore the name of 'the Merchingburn.' See Morton's *Monastic Annals of Teviotdale*, p. 125, quoting from the Chartulary of Kelso.

Liddel' was traversed on the 10th November by Sir Christopher Dacre with a force of between three thousand and four thousand men, and it is inconceivable that, if there was anything at that time worth burning or stealing, it should have escaped; but yet, had any 'towns' or towers been destroyed or taken, Lord Dacre would most certainly have taken credit for the same in his letter to the King of the 13th November. From the fact of his not having done so it is to be inferred that the district had already been laid waste and there was nothing left for the English to burn, to destroy, or to plunder. To my mind, the probability is that Liddesdale was raided at the same time as Ewesdale, Carlenrig, and the other localities specified in the letter of the 17th May, that is to say, during the week previous to the 23rd October. But then, it will be asked, how is it that the letter of the 23rd October makes no mention of this apparently successful raid? A satisfactory answer cannot be given, but it may be interesting to point out that in that letter reference is made to four raids having entered Teviotdale, yet details are given only of three. What happened to the fourth? I suggest that it was intended to co-operate with the two parties moving on the Upper Teviot and, perhaps, to act as a link between them and the force of Tynedale men who moved on Ancrum (see sketch-map). It looks as if the raids in the third week of October, though small in themselves, together constituted a

big invasion; one body moved up Ewesdale, over Ewes Doors, to the sources of the Teviot and so on to Howpasley on the Borthwick; on its right, another party moved either by Ewes Water, or Hermitage (? Ludder) Water, to Carlenrig and thence to the Teviot above Hawick; the third party we are told moved from Tynedale to Ancrum, about twelve miles below Hawick; the fourth party was, I suggest, directed on the Teviot at some point between the second and third parties. Moving up Liddesdale, it would have crossed the hills at the head of the valley and proceeded towards Kirkton; then following the stream of that name the party would have reached the Teviot at a spot about three miles below Hawick. Now, this is the very spot where tradition relates that a party of English raiders were, shortly after Flodden, cut to pieces by a body of Hawick men, who took their pennon and carried it back with them in triumph to their town. The fact of disaster having overtaken the English troops may account for no information having been given regarding the raid in which they had been engaged.

I can see no reason to doubt the general truth of the tradition, but unfortunately details have, in comparatively late times, been added to it which detract from its trustworthiness. We are now told that the combat occurred in the year 1514. Now, though occasionally tradition refers to events as having occurred in a certain



Rough Sketch — not drawn to scale — to illustrate the routes followed by the raids into Teviotdale, mentioned in Lord Dacre's letters of the 23rd October 1513 and 17th May 1514.

– – – – – *Routes taken by raids of which the destinations are specified.*

• • • • • • • *Probable route followed by the fourth raid (see October letter).*

. . . . . " " " *when raiding the "Water of Ludder" (see May letter).*

month, or at a certain season, or on some particular day, *e.g.* :

> 'It fell about the Lammas tide,
> When the muir-men win their hay,'

and again :

> 'On July seventh, the suthe to say,
> At the Reid-Squair the tryst was set.'

it rarely, if indeed ever, specifies years ; the dates of occurrences referred to in tradition are determined by our knowledge of the dates of other occurrences which are connected with the former. It is this principle which I have followed ; I have connected the raid mentioned in tradition with others mentioned in official papers, and so determined the date. Those who hold that the raid occurred in 1514, connect it with nothing and claim that the date is fixed by the tradition itself. They point to the flag upon which is inscribed the date '1514,' and ask, How can you doubt that ? It is not a difficult question to answer. The original flag has long ceased to exist ; after for many years being annually carried in triumph round the Burgh Marches it became worn out and was replaced by a copy, which in its turn had to be replaced by another, and so on. Well, the date, 1514, does not appear on the oldest of these copies, which bears the date 1707, that presumably being the year of its manufacture. The date, 1514, appears for the first time on a copy believed to have been brought into

use about the end of the eighteenth century, that is to say nearly three centuries after the capture of the original. This is no evidence at all.

While there is no evidence in the Dacre correspondence of English raids having been made into Scotland after the 10th November 1513, there are reasons for believing that the Scots were somewhat active after that date. Between the 9th October and the 13th November Dacre was constantly writing on the subject of raids into Scotland, but later on we have hardly any information from him at all; indeed, the only letters published in Brewer's collection of *State Papers* bearing upon Border warfare during the period between November and May are the one from Dacre to the Bishop of Durham (quoted at page 166) in which he refers to the men of Teviotdale as great thieves; one, dated 10th March, from King Henry VIII. to Lord Darcy in which the King writes that he 'learns the news of the preparation made by the Scots against Berwick and the desire of the town for aid,' and another letter, of the same date, from Dacre to the King, acknowledging 'orders to bring by land to Newcastle in all haste the ordnance taken at the last field against the Scots to avoid the danger of a sea passage from Berwick.' These are all, and they certainly point rather to Scottish than to English aggression.

There remains one point in Dacre's letter of the 17th May which, though not bearing directly on the matter of Scottish aggression, is decidedly suggestive

of the Scots having met with considerable success in their various encounters with the English. He refers to his having met the Chamberlain (Lord Home) at Cocklaw in February for the purpose of negotiating the ransom of the English prisoners then in the hands of the Scots. What prisoners can these have been ? Early in October at a conference between Dacre and Home the question of ransoming the prisoners taken by the Borderers at Flodden had been discussed,[1] and that terms were then agreed to would appear from the fact that Philip Dacre, one of the Flodden prisoners, was soon afterwards liberated and on the 10th November was serving under his brother, as we have seen, on the occasion of the ' Great Raid.'

The prisoners, then, to whom Dacre referred in his May letter were presumably taken by the Scots after his interview with the Chamberlain in October ; some may have been taken on the occasion of the raids into Teviotdale during the third week of October ; very probably many were taken at the time of the ' Great Raid ' ; and equally very probably some were taken at a later time by Scottish raids into England, of which we have no details, and of which, indeed, we should have had no knowledge had it not been for Lord Dacre's letter of the 17th May proving conclusively that after the 10th November the Scots gave the English plenty of cause for retaliation.

[1] Brewer, 4497.

One other matter in this letter remains to be noticed. Historians have understood Lord Dacre, when mentioning 'ploughs,' to have been referring to the agricultural implement, whereas I am inclined to think he used the word in the sense it bears in 'Bonnie May':

> 'I am a lord of castles and towns,
> With fifty ploughs of land and three.'

Two centuries later, the ploughs used in Scotland consisted, save for the coulter and share, entirely of wood and could be made in a forenoon for a shilling (Graham's *Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 156), and it seems hardly credible that Dacre should have referred to the destruction of such valueless implements as evidence of the great damage he had wrought on Scotland. On the other hand, he might well have boasted of the destruction of agricultural lands, but, if so, he cannot have credited this to raids between late in November and early in May, because there would then have been no crops to destroy. Thus, in 1523, Lord Dacre was strongly opposed to orders he had received from Henry VIII. to invade the south of Scotland in the month of June, on account of the impossibility of inflicting serious damage on the country at that time of year; it would, he said, be useless to invade before Michaelmas. All this points to the raids referred to in Lord Dacre's letter of May 1514, having occurred in the autumn of 1513, and

being identical with those which, as has already been mentioned, laid waste the same localities in October.

Conclusion of Peace.

In Brewer's collection of *State Papers* no letter of a date subsequent to the 17th May occurs giving any information relating to the war on the Borders, from which fact we may, perhaps, infer that the English arms met with no successes to boast of.

Modern historians, however, tell us that in August the English Government, satisfied with the desolation wrought on the Scottish Borders, consented to a peace, which the Scots, willing and anxious for hostilities to cease, had taken steps to bring about.

That the Scottish Borders had not suffered to any very serious extent has already been clearly shown, and I shall now attempt to give reasons for doubting the second assertion that the Scots were desirous for the war to end.

Negotiations for peace were first entered into by the King of England with the King of France, Scotland's ally, and not directly with the Government of Scotland. One of the terms was to the effect that if the King of Scots, or Warden, or any Scottish subject commissioned by them, should, after the 15th September, enter England and commit hostilities,

the treaty should be void; such was also to be the case if the King of Scotland or his Warden, after being duly warned of Scottish subjects having invaded England with three hundred men or upwards, should fail to give redress within forty days; but in cases where hostilities were committed by a smaller number, then justice should be done in the manner of former times. The King of England and his lieutenants, wardens, and subjects were equally to abstain from all acts of injustice and violence against the Scots.[1]

Again, eight months later (April 1515) a new treaty was arranged between England and France in which Scotland was, as before, to be included as an ally of France, provided that after the 15th May the Scots did not commit such acts of hostility as were described in the treaty of the previous August. Now, surely this goes a long way to prove that the former treaty had not been ratified by the Scots, or at all events that they had not observed its provisions. However, the main point I wish to press is not so much whether the treaty in August 1514 was, or was not, concluded, as whether we can truly say that the Scots felt at that time so humbled and crushed as to be desirous for a peace with England.

It was necessary, of course, for the King of France to communicate the proposed terms of peace with England to the Scottish Government and to ask

[1] Ridpath's *Border History* page 498.

their acceptance of them. With this object he despatched a letter to Scotland which arrived there on the 3rd May. Twelve days later an answer was sent to it, signed by a number of the nobles and clergy. 'They accepted and ratified the offered peace; moved thereto, as they said, by the earnest solicitations of their ancient ally the French King, by their regard to their Holy Father Pope Leo . . . and that it might appear that the Scots could forgive their private injuries, for the sake of bringing about a general union of Christian potentates against the Turks. They take notice in this letter, of their late heavy misfortunes known to all the world; but affirm, that their successful conflicts since that time with their enemies had taught them to entertain better hopes, and to repay the damages they had sustained; adding, that at present, while the sense of their sufferings was recent in their memories, and they had learned to dread less the strength of their foes, it would not have been wonderful, if they, who had not hitherto thought even of a truce with their enemies, should have refused the peace that was now offered them.' [1]

Then, again, in a very similar strain, the Duke of Albany wrote to the King of Denmark that at the time of his arrival in Scotland (which was in May 1515) the nobles and common people despised and opposed a truce with the King of England,

[1] *Ibid.*

because they breathed after either a revenge of their late misfortunes, or death; that they had had frequent and successful rencounters with the enemy; had done more damage to the English than they had received from them; and had with small numbers resisted a proud and exulting enemy, although their King was a child, the governor abroad, and the faction of the Queen opposed their proceedings, or divided their nation.[1]

This letter of the Duke of Albany's—the absence of letters, or of reports, or even of traditions, telling of successful English inroads into Scotland — the defeat suffered by Lord Dacre on the 10th-11th November — the complaints, subsequent to that defeat, from the inhabitants of the English Marches regarding Scottish raids into their country — their further complaints that there had been no attempt at retaliation—all these facts taken together go far to prove the sincerity of the letter addressed by the Scottish leaders to the King of France and the truth of their assertions that they had been carrying on the war with success, that they had already repaid themselves for the damages they had suffered, that they had confident hopes of the future, that they had no longer fear for the strength of their foes, and that they had no thought of peace.

With the peace of May 1515, the campaign of Flodden ends, yet the account that has been given

[1] Ridpath.

of it will hardly be complete without some reference to the fate of the commander of the only Scottish division which had not been routed and swept away at the great battle, the one division which on the morrow of the fight still showed front to the foe; of the commander to whom the Scots owed the successful conflicts gained since that black day; who had taught them 'to dread less the strength of their foes and to entertain better hopes'; through whose skill, energy, and bravery they had been able to 'repay the damages they had sustained.' Surely it cannot be said that these successes were due merely to a 'system,' or to incapacity on the part of the English commanders. In my opinion, they were due partly, perhaps, to the excellence of the system in vogue on the Scottish Borders for the rapid assembly of forces at any threatened point, partly to the determination and hardihood of the men composing those forces, partly to the personal influence of their immediate leaders, and probably very greatly to the ability and skill of Lord Home, to whom had been deputed the duty of maintaining good rule over the East and Middle Marches of Scotland.

In October 1516, he was executed. Pitscottie tells us that he and his brother, William, were allured by false pretences on the part of the Regent Albany into Holyrood House, and that as soon as the latter had entered 'into the Abbay-Gates, the said Gates were closed, and the French-Men past to

their Harness, and laid Hands on the Lord Hume and his Brother, and put them in Prison, to wit, They put the said Mr. William to the Ships, and put him in the Castle of Inch-Garvie, and kept Lord Hume still in the Abbay, till they summond an Assize, and convicted them of Treason; and thereafter strake the Heads from them.' As to the justice or otherwise of the sentence there is no necessity here to inquire, and, indeed, to do so would entail entering upon matters entirely outside the scope of this work; I shall do no more than mention three of the charges which were brought against him, viz.: (1) that he had murdered the King after the battle of Flodden had been lost and from which James had escaped into the Merse; (2) that at the battle he had displayed a treacherous inactivity; (3) that he had suffered the English to repair the Castle of Norham, which he might easily have prevented by the great power he had in that neighbourhood.[1]

With reference to the first charge it would be difficult in these days to find any one inclined to give it the faintest credence; it was undoubtedly prompted by malice.

With reference to the second charge, I have in the foregoing pages discussed the question as to whether it was in Home's power to do more than he did; whether, with the best will in the world, he could have moved to the assistance of the King's

[1] Ridpath, page 505.

division, and whether, in the event of such a move being possible, it would have been a right one to have taken. On these points I have expressed my opinion clearly; others may hold a different view and may think he might and ought to have done more than he did. But the point now to consider is not whether his decision was, in a purely military sense, a wise one or not, but whether it was formed with a treacherous intent. There lies the gravamen of the charge. Home was a friend of the King's; by his death he had everything to lose, nothing to gain; to murder him would have been contrary not only to his feelings, but to his interests; to have behaved treacherously towards him on the field of battle would have involved the far greater offence of treachery to his country, and to assert that the man who, a few weeks before the great battle, had gallantly led a Scottish raid into England, and who, a few weeks after the battle, had brilliantly repulsed an English raid into Scotland, was, at the battle itself, guilty of this, is palpably false.

The third charge is interesting in that it somewhat emphasises a view I have already expressed.[1] It shows that in the opinion of Home's accusers the defeat at Flodden did not greatly, if at all, shake Lord Home's power on the Border; that he could, had he had the will, have prevented the victorious English from repairing what was, perhaps, the most

[1] See chapter on 'Border verse relating to Flodden' in *The Trustworthiness of Border Ballads* (Blackwood, 1906).

important of their fortresses on the south bank of the Tweed. Possibly, no doubt, this charge may have been as unjustifiable, as malicious, as the previous two, but, nevertheless, it furnishes, to some extent, additional evidence of the truth of the view that after Flodden the Scottish Borderers were far from lying shattered and helpless at the feet of England—that 'fair Scotland's spear' was *not* 'shiver'd,' 'her shield' *not* 'broken.'

APPENDIX I

(Taken from Pinkerton's *History of Scotland*, vol. ii. p. 456.)

GAZETTE OF THE BATTLE OF FLODDEN, M.S., HERALDS' COLLEGE, LONDON.

ARTICLES envouez aux Maistres des Postes du Roy d'Angleterre par son serviteur,[1] de la fourme et maniere de bataille, d'entre le Roy d'Escosse et Mons^r^ le Conte de Surrey, lieuten. dud. s^r^ Roy d'Engleterre, a Brankston le ix^t^ jour de Septembre, lequel serviteur estoit a la bataille.

Premierement, quant les deux armees estoient a lieue et demy, l'une de l'autre, le Conte de Surrey envoya Rouge Croix Poursuivant devers le d'Roy d'Escosse, luy desirant bataille; a quoy repondit qu'il atendroit la jusques au Vendredi none.

Le s^r^ de Haward, filz aisné dud. Conte de Surrey, envyron l'heure de unze heures, le ix^t^ jour, passa le pont de Tuissell, avant l'avantgarde et artillerie; et le Conte son pere le suyvit, et passa apres, avec l'arriere-garde; et la d. armee passee, mysdrent icelles en deux batailles, avec ii Elles chūne bataille.

Item—a la bataille dud. Roy d'Escosse estoit divisee en cinq batailles, et chūne bataille loing l'un de l'autre,

[1] 'Howard the Admiral? See the end.'

environ unq traict d'arc ; et toute cinq estoient advances sur la bataille des Anglois, aussi loinq l'une comme l'autre, en grant trouppeaulx ; et partie deulx estoient en quadrans, et autres en maniere de pointe, et estoient sur le haulte d'une montagne, bien a unq quart de myle du pied de la d' montagne.

Le seigneur de Haward fist arrester subitement son avantgarde en une petite Vallee, jusques ad ce que l'arrieregarde feust joinct avec l'une des Elles de sa bataille ; a dont les deux marcherent tout en ung front, et eulx avansans a l'encontre de l'armee des d. Escossois, lesquelz Escossois descendirent la d. montaigne en bonne ordere, en la maniere que marchent les Allemans, sans parler, ne faire aucun bruit.

Les Contes de Huntley, Arrell, et Crafford, avec leur hoste de vii^{m} hommes, vindrent sur le s^{r} de Haward ; et en brief ilz tournerent le doz, et furent la plus grant partie deulx tuez.

Le Roy d'Escosse vint, avec une tresgrant puissance, sur le Conte de Surrey ; lequel Conte avoit a sa main gauche le filz du s^{r} Darcy ; et eulx deulx porterent tout le fes de ceste bataille. A laquelle bataille le Roy d'Escosse fut tue dedens la longueur d'une lance du d. Conte de Surrey ; et plusieurs nobles gens y furent tuez, et nuls prins prisonniers des Escossois dedans les deux batailles. Et a l'heure de la bataille les Contes de Lynouxe et Argille, avec leur puissance se joingnierent a l'encontre de messire Edouard Standley, et les d'Contes et leurs gens furent contrainctz deulx metre en fuyte.

Item—Edmond Haward, second filz du Conte de Surrey, avoit avec luy mil hommes du pays de Lanqchere et Cheshire, et plusieurs autres gentilz hommes de la conté d'York. Et faisoit le d'Edmond la droicte Elle

du seigneur de Haward son frere, sur lesquelz le seigneur Chambellan du Roy d'Escosse, avec plusieurs autres s^rs donnerent dedans. Maistre Gray, et Mes^r Humfrey, demourent prisonnirs, et Messire Richard Harbottell tué, et le d'Edmond Haward fut trois fois abatu ; et vint a son relief le seigneur Dacres avec xv^c hommes ; et tellement exploicta quil mist en fuyte les d'Escossois, et eut envyron . . . des gens dud. seigneur Dacres tuez, et en la d^e bataille fut tue ung grant nombre des d'Escossois.

Item—la bataille et desconfiture commenca environ de quatre a cinq heures apres disner, et la chasse continua lieue et demye, on fut merveilleusement grant tuerie ; et en eust eu dix mil tuez davantage, si les Anglois eussent este a cheval.

Item—les Escossois estoient envyron iiii^xx mille, et envyron dix mille d'eulx de tuez ; et des Anglois au dessoubs de quatrescens.

Les souldiers ne prindrent pas seullement de quatre a cinq mille chevaulx des d'Escossois ; mais les beufz qui tiroient leur artillerie ; et apres vindrent a leur pavillons, et prindrent toutes les estouffes qui estoient dedens, et tuerent plusieurs des Escossois qui les gardoient.

L'artillerie d'Escosse et d'Engleterre a este covoyee, par l'ayde dud. s^r Dacres, au chateau de Etal en Angleterre.

Le corps du Roy d'escosse a este porté a Barwycke. If ny a guere de grans personages du royaume d'Escosse retournez a l'ostel, fors le Chambellan d'Escosse ; et pense l'on que peu d'eulx sont demourez en vye :—

(Here follows a list of the Scottish killed.)

Le nombre de l'artillerie, que le Roy d'Escosse perdit a la journee de Brankston, le ix^t jour de Septembre.

Item—cinq groux courtaulx.

Item—deux colorynes.

Item—quatre sacre de la mesme grandeur, qui estoient au devant du navyre appelle la Roze Gallee.

Item—six serpentynes plus grandes, et plus longues, que serpentyne que le Roy nre Sr. a.

En tout la quantite de xvii pieces.

Lesquelles sont le plus cleres, et les plus neetes, et les myeulx fassonees, et avec les moindres pertuys a la touche ou l'on met le feu, et les plus belles de leur grandeur et longueur que jai viz oncques ; et les d'courtaulx sont des fort bonne taille et neetes.

Signées au dessoubs des choses dessue d'Thomas Sr de Howard Admiral d'Angleterre, qui estoit a la d'bataille avec le conte de Surrey son pere, et menoit l'avantgarde.

APPENDIX II

STRENGTHS OF THE ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH ARMIES IN 1513, AS GIVEN BY VARIOUS AUTHORITIES.

THE SCOTTISH ARMY

	Authority	
At Edinburgh.	Halle.	200,000.
„ „	Pitscottie.	100,000.
On entering England (22nd August).	Halle.	100,000.
„ „ „	Polyd. Vergil.	60,000.
At Flodden Field (9th September).	*English Gazette.*	80,000.
„ „ „	Buchanan.	26,000 (well under).
„ „ „	Holinshed. (*Scot. Hist.*)	26,000 „ „

STRENGTHS OF VARIOUS PORTIONS OF THE ARMY

	AUTHORITY		
At Ford with the King (about 4th September).	Pitscottie.	10,000	'by Borderers,' etc.
At Flodden Field—			
The King's Division.	Pitscottie.	20,000.	
Home (Vanguard).	Halle.	10,000.	
Huntly and Home (Vanguard).	Pitscottie.	10,000.	
Huntly, Erroll, and Crawford.	*Gazette.*	7,000.	
„ „ „	R. O. St. P. IV. 1.	6,000.	

Assuming the correctness of both Pitscottie and the *Gazette* as to the strengths of Home's, Huntly's, Erroll's, and Crawford's divisions it follows that

Home's	division numbered	7000 men.
Huntly's	„ „	3000 „
Erroll's and Crawford's		4000 „

ENGLISH ARMY

	AUTHORITY	
2nd Sept. at York.	Halle.	500.
5th Sept. in Glendale.	Halle.	26,000.
„ „ „	Holinshed.	26,000.
„ „ „	Buchanan.	26,000.
„ „ „	Pitscottie.	50,000.

THE DIVISIONS

[Admiral, on 4th Sept., Force brought by.	Halle.	1000.
„ „ „	Holinshed.	1000.
„ „ „	Buchanan.	6000.
„ „ „	Pitscottie.	6000.]

	Authority		
At Flodden, 9th Sept.—			
'The great battel of England' (under Admiral, *sic.*).	Pitscottie.	20,000.	
Edmond Howard.	*Gazette.*	1000	and other gentlemen.
„ „	R. O. St. P. IV. 1.	1500	„ „
„ „	Holinshed.	3000.	
Lord Dacre.	*Gazette.*	1500.	

N.B.—No estimate is given by any of the above authorities of the total strength of the English army on the day of battle.

In the Tract referred to in *The Days of James IV.* as 'MS. Batayle' (see *ante*, page 14) the strengths of the English divisions are given in detail as follows :—

On 6th September at Bolton—

The 'breste of the Vanwarde'—under the Admiral	9,000	men.
The right wing „ „ „ Edmond Howard	3,000	„
The left wing „ „ „ Mar. Constable	3,000	„
	15,000	
The 'breste of the rearward'—under Surrey	5,000	„
The right wing „ „ „ Lord Dacre	3,000	„
The left wing „ „ „ Stanley	3,000	„
	11,000	

Total Strength, 26,000 men.

OBSERVATIONS

If we accept Pitscottie's estimate of the strength of the Scottish army at Edinburgh—and by 'Edinburgh' I think we should understand 'the various places of muster,' for the whole army certainly did not assemble

at Edinburgh—rather than Halle's larger estimate, and if we accept the *Gazette's* estimate of its strength at the battle rather than Buchanan's smaller estimate, even then the waste would have been enormous—it would have been about a fifth of the whole !—yet in all probability it was even greater. I know of no reason for doubting that the whole force originally numbered a hundred thousand, and there are strong reasons for thinking that not half the number stated by the *Gazette* were present. It is surprising to find Mr. Lang, in his *History of Scotland*, discrediting the assertion that the Scots were much weakened by waste; yet we know that with large armies on the march it is always very considerable; the Scottish chroniclers tell us such was the case here, and the figures given by both English and Scottish chroniclers prove the same thing. Halle says two hundred thousand men mustered at Edinburgh and that only one hundred thousand entered England; Holinshed says one hundred thousand laid siege to Norham and that only twenty-six thousand were at the battle. Pitscottie says one hundred thousand assembled at Edinburgh and that at Flodden the King's, Huntly's, and Home's divisions—he mentions no others—numbered thirty thousand.[1] Widely as these figures differ, they nevertheless prove clearly that contemporary writers believed that the army which fought at Flodden was a

[1] Pitscottie's figures have been discredited because he states that when the King was at Ford he had only ten thousand men with him. There is nothing improbable in this statement, as the army was at the time divided in two parts, and probably many men were employed on small raids. It is clear from Pitscottie's later reference to the numbers that fought in the battle that he had not intended to imply that the whole army had been reduced to ten thousand.

much smaller one than that which had been mustered. Of course, it may be said that these figures are so absolutely untrustworthy that no argument ought to be based upon them. But then how is it that modern historians venture to express any opinion at all regarding the strength of the Scottish army ? How do they arrive at the figures they never hesitate to give ?

Again, if we disregard the figures entirely, there still remain in favour of there having been great waste, the definite assertions of the Scottish chroniclers and our knowledge of other campaigns.

In estimating the actual strength of the Scots we ought to be guided rather by the figures of Scottish chroniclers, who, writing after the event, presumably had inquired into the subject, than by those in the *Gazette*, written presumably by an English officer immediately after the battle, and based on probably nothing more trustworthy than information obtained from prisoners and spies.

Again, it is easier to judge the number of men in small bodies than in large, and therefore I think greater reliance ought to be placed in the numbers assigned to divisions than to the numbers assigned to the whole.

Now, Pitscottie mentions that the King's battle numbered twenty thousand men, and says it engaged the 'two great battles of England,' namely, Surrey's and the Admiral's, and the *Gazette* tells us that Surrey and the Admiral engaged the divisions under the King, Huntly, Errol, and Crawford. Pitscottie, therefore, probably included the forces of the three Earls in the twenty thousand. The *Gazette* puts the strength of the three Earls at seven thousand, therefore the King's command falls to thirteen thousand. But Bothwell's men also fought with the King ; to estimate their

number is pure guess-work, but still we may guess reasonably that the strength was much the same as that of the division under Crawford and Errol, namely four thousand; this would reduce the King's command to nine thousand men. Let us also say that the division under Lennox and Argyle, on the right flank, was of the same strength as Home's on the left. We should then have the strengths of the divisions as follows:—

Home	7,000
Huntly	3,000
Erroll and Crawford . . .	4,000
The King	9,000
Bothwell	4,000
Lennox and Argyle . . .	7,000
	34,000

Modern historians vary greatly in their opinions as to the number of men engaged; thus while Burton finds it difficult to believe that one hundred thousand men should have been assembled at Edinburgh prior to the advance towards the Border, Fraser Tytler considers it extremely probable;[1] then whereas the former mentions that fifty thousand took part in the battle, the latter thinks an estimate of thirty-five thousand to forty thousand will not be far from the truth, and Mr. Andrew Lang, again, in his *History of Scotland*, puts

[1] Ayala, the Spanish ambassador, writing to Ferdinand and Isabella in 1498, mentioned that the King of Scotland could 'assemble within thirty days 120,000 horse . . . two or three times I have seen, not the whole army, but one third of it assembled, and counted more than twelve thousand great and small tents.' Quoted in *The Days of James IV.*, by G. Gregory Smith.

the number at 'perhaps sixty thousand.' As examples of extreme opinions on either side, I may quote Sir James Balfour's *Annales of Scotland*, in which we are told that out of forty-eight thousand men of which the army had at first consisted, not above twelve thousand were with the King on the day of battle, and, on the other hand, 'MS. Batayle' asserts that the Scots numbered 'an hundrede thousande men at the least.'

Let us now look at the table of the English strengths.

A noticeable point is that the total number of troops engaged in the battle is not given by any of the authorities quoted. Halle says that on the 5th September Surrey 'tooke hys felde at Bolton, in Glendall, as had been appointed, where all the noblemen and gentelmen met wyth their retynewes, to the number of six and twenty thousande men,' and these words are, I believe, the foundation for the assertion frequently made that such was the strength of the army at Flodden. The words, however, may be taken as referring either to the strength of the army as a whole or to that of the retinues which joined it. The latter interpretation is that apparently put upon them by Fraser Tytler (*History of Scotland*, vol. v. p. 58), and in my opinion rightly so. If this is Halle's meaning, we have, in order to arrive at the strength of the army on the day of battle, to add to his figures: (1) the number of men Surrey brought from the south; he had five hundred at York, and many more must have joined him on his march thence to Bolton; (2) the number accompanying the Admiral, variously estimated at between one thousand and six thousand; the English chronicler Stowe puts it at five thousand; (3) the number which joined between the 5th and the 9th—during this time we may be toler-

ably certain that very considerable reinforcements must have joined Surrey to assist in repelling the invasion of a host which, according to English statements, numbered twice, or even three or four times, as many men as Surrey had with him at Bolton. In view of these considerations I do not think we can well estimate the strength of the English army which fought at Flodden at less than thirty-five thousand men, and, indeed, remembering how prone men of all nations are to understate the number of their own troops engaged in battle, to overestimate the number of their foes, I am myself inclined to think that forty thousand would be nearer the truth.

With regard to the strengths of the component parts of the English army, their authorities tell us nothing, save in the case of those commanded by Lord Dacre and Sir Edmund Howard. Dacre's troops constituted the right wing of Surrey's division, Howard's troops the right wing of the Admiral's division; both these wings are shown by the *Gazette* to have been of very similar strength; that they should have been so is what one would have expected, and the fact is corroborated by 'MS. Batayle,' though here the wings are shown at double the strength, namely three thousand. This latter figure, which Holinshed also gives, is, in my opinion, more likely to be correct than that given by the *Gazette* —fifteen hundred; it is really barely credible that at such a juncture Dacre should have brought so small a force into the field; two months later we shall find him in Teviotdale at the head of four thousand men (see page 162), and again in 1523 he headed a force of similar strength to Jedburgh.

It may be worth noticing that while the four wings of the two main divisions of the army are shown in 'MS. Batayle' as of like strength, yet the Admiral's immediate command was nearly double the strength of Surrey's; this is curious, and I would suggest the possibility of its being due to Surrey having, when organising his army into various commands on the 6th, been expectant of further reinforcements, which would naturally be attached as they came up to his half, the rear half, of the army.

APPENDIX III

THE following list—doubtless a very incomplete one—of members of the Scottish nobility, etc., who fell at Flodden has been compiled from Douglas's *Peerage*, 1764, and from the lists given in Halle's *Chronicles*, in Abercromby's *Martial Achievements*, and in the Tract referred to as 'MS. Batayle,' regarding which see footnote, page 14.

Church Dignitaries.—The Arch-Bishop of St. Andrews (the King's natural son), Bishop of the Isles, Abbot of Kilwinning, Abbot of Inchaffrey (son of Lord Oliphant).

In addition to these, the Tract gives the Bishop of Ketnes, but this is doubtless a mistake for the Earl of Caithness; and Halle mentions the Dean of Ellester, but no such dignitary existed.

Earls.—Argyle, Athole, Bothwell, Caithness, Cassillis, Crawford, Erroll, Lennox, Montrose, and Rothes.

In addition Halle mentions the Earl of Adill, but there was no peer of this name; were it not that he mentions Athole, it would be natural to think that he had misspelt that name. He and Abercromby also mention the

Earl of Morton, but the *Peerage* does not record his having been at Flodden nor the date of his death. In the poem entitled *Flodden Field*, published by Weber, and said to be ancient, Morton is mentioned as having been present, but not as having been killed.

They also give the Earl of Glencairn, but the earl of the Flodden period is shown in the *Peerage* as having survived till 1527.

The Tract also gives the Earl of Loncar, but no peer of this name existed—possibly ' Glencairn ' was intended.

Lords.—Borthwick, Elphinstone, Erskine, Hay of Yester, Herries, Lorn, and Innermath, Maxwell,[1] Ross, Seaton, Semphill, Sinclair, and Knolis, Lord of St. John and Treasurer of Scotland.

In addition to the above the following are mentioned :

Lord Arskyll (by Halle and the Tract) ; no such title in the *Peerage* ; probably Erskine is intended, mentioned neither by Halle nor the Tract.

Blakkater (by Halle) ; not in the *Peerage*. See under list of gentlemen.

Bogony (by Halle) ; not in the *Peerage*. Possibly Lundy of Balgonie.

Coluin (by the Tract) ; not in the *Peerage*.

Cowyn (by Halle) ; not in the *Peerage*.

Daunley (by Halle) ; not in the *Peerage*.

Dawissie (by the Tract) ; probably Sir Alexander Ramsay of Dalhousie.

[1] Halle states that Lord Maxwell and four brethren fell, Abercromby mentions Lord M. and three brothers. The Tract and the *Peerage* mention only Lord M. The *Peerage* shows him to have had only two brothers, and neither is mentioned as having been at Flodden. His brother-in-law, Sir Alexander Stewart of Garlies, fell there.

Forbes (by Halle, Abercromby, and the Tract); the peer of this period succeeded to the title in 1505 and died 1547. See *Peerage*.

Inderby (Halle and the Tract); not in the *Peerage*. Weber identifies it with Innermath.

Lovat (by Halle and the Tract); a mistake for the Master of Lovat.

Tempyl (by the Tract); presumably a mistake for Sempill.

Knights and Gentlemen.—Abercromby of Ley, Master of Angus, Arnot of Woodmil, Balfour of Denmill, Blackedar of Blackader, Boswal of Balmuto, Boswal of Uchinleck, Sir Duncan Campbell, Caufelde, John Carnegie of Kinnaird, Master of Cathcart and his brothers, Robert and John,[1] William Carr,[2] Mayster Cawel, clerk of the Chauncery, Sir William Cockburn of Langton,[2] Sir Robert Colville of Ochiltree, Cornwal of Bonhard, Crawford of Ardagh, Crawford of Achnames, Sir William Douglas, Sir John Douglas, Sir John Dunbar, Mayster Ellot, Fleming of Barochen, Sir Alexander Gordon, Mayster John Grant, Graham of Garvock, Graham of Callandar, Sir Alexander Guthrie, Haig of Bemerside, Sir John Haldane, Adam Hall (ancestor of the Laird of Fulbar), Henderson of Fordil, Sir Adam Hepburn, Sir David Home of Wedderburn and his son George, Sir John Home, Cuthbert Home of Fastcastel, Sir Patrick Houston, Lord Keith and his brother William

[1] 'Declaration by Adam Wallace before the Sheriff Depute of Ayr that the deceased William Wallace of Craigie and three sons of John Lord Cathcart had been slain in the battle of Flodden. 2nd March 1516.' (In the possession of the present Earl Cathcart.)

[2] Not mentioned in Halle's or Abercromby's lists, nor in the Tract, but see Lord Dacre's letter to the English Council, 17th May 1574.

Keith (sons of the third Earl Marshall),[1] Walter Lindsay (son of Sir David of Edzell), Sir Robert Livingstone, The Master of Lovat, Sir Saunder Lowder (? Alexander Lauder), Sir George Lowder (? Lauder), Maclean of Dowart, Mac Keyn (Mackaye ?), Mackenzie of Kintail, Sir William MacLellan (de Bombie), William Maitland, heir of Sir John, Sir Thomas Maule, William Melvile de Raithe, Sir Alexander Napier of Merchiston, Lawrence Oliphant (Abbot of Inchaffrey, second son of Lord Oliphant), The Master of Oliphant,[2] Pitcairn of Pitcairn, Sir Alexander Ramsay of Dalwolsey, The Master of Ruthven, Sir Alexander Scot of Hassendean, Sir Alex. Scotlon (? Sir A. Scot or Seton), Sir Alex. Seton, Sir William Sinclair, Sir John Somerville, Sir Alexander Stewart of Garlies, Sir John Stewart of Minto, Sir John Stuart, second son of the Earl of Buchan; Spotiswood of Spotiswood, William Wallace of Craigie (see foot-note to 'Cathcart'), Sir David Wemyss.

Total Loss as above.

The King.
4 Church Dignitaries.
10 Earls.
11 Barons.
The Treasurer of Scotland.
68 Knights and gentlemen.

[1] Halle's list gives also 'Mayster Marshall' and 'Mayster Keye,' and Abercromby's list gives 'Mayster Marshall' and 'John Keith.' Neither list gives 'Lord Keith' and 'William Keith,' sons of the third Earl Marshall, given in the *Peerage*. It is to them, probably, that Halle and Abercromby referred.

[2] The Master of Oliphant is given only in Abercromby's list, in which no mention is made of Lawrence Oliphant or of the Abbot of Inchaffrey, given in the *Peerage*. The *Peerage* makes no mention of the Master having fallen at Flodden. Presumably, then, Abercromby has made a mistake in including his name.

NOTES REGARDING THE PARTICULARS GIVEN IN DOUGLAS'S 'PEERAGE,' 1764.

Save in three instances no information is given regarding individuals beyond that they fell while fighting for their King and country; the exceptions are the following:—

(1) Lord Elphinstone. 'Having a great resemblance to his majesty's person, 'tis said he rushed in amongst the thickest of the enemies, in hopes of saving his royal master's life, by risking his own; but they were both slain in that fatal battle.'

(2) Earl of Errol. 'He with a great many of his friends, and almost all the gentlemen of his name, accompanied King James IV. to the battle of Flowdon, where they all lost their lives, with their royal master.' Nevertheless, the *Peerage* shows no relative as having fallen, and he was succeeded by his son.

(3) Sir Thomas Maule of Panmure. 'He attended King James to the battle of Flowdon, and, to his singular honour, when many of the first quality left the king before the armies engaged, he, though well advanced in years, and very corpulent, would not desert him, but fought with remarkable courage, and received many wounds, of which he instantly died in the field.' This is more flattering to Sir Thomas than to others!

I can find only three references to persons who were present but were not killed at the battle.

(1) Sir Walter Scot of Branxholm and Buckcleugh. 'He accompanied king James IV. to the fatal field of Flodden, where he remarkably distinguished himself; and tho' he had the good fortune to come off the field

alive, where he left many of his brave countrymen dead, yet he did not long survive it, but died in 1516.'

(2) The Earl of Huntly. 'He gave his opinion against fighting where so many disadvantages were obvious, yet when he found the king determined, he yielded to his majesty; and having command of the right wing of the army, performed wonders, and drove all before him that stood in his way; but the left wing and the main body were not so successful, being overpowered with numbers, and the king and flower of the nobility being killed, he was at last obliged to give way, and with great difficulty made his retreat in the evening.' It should be remarked that this is incorrect in so far as Huntly was with the left, not the right wing; also that no reference is made to his having moved to the assistance of the king; also that it is asserted that the rest of the army broke before his own troops gave way; and, lastly, that he did not remain on the field with Home till next morning.

(3) Lord Mackenzie (see Seaforth). 'He accompanied king James IV. with a good body of his vassals and followers, to the field of Flodden, when but a young man, where he behaved with singular courage and intrepidity, and narrowly escaped being made prisoner.'

It is curious that, save in the case of Huntly, no information whatever is given regarding the parts played by any of the great leaders, and, most curious of all, no reference is made to Lord Home having even been present at the battle!

It may also be remarked that no mention is made of the tradition regarding the Earl of Caithness related by Sir Walter Scott in a note to Leyden's 'Ode on visiting Flodden' in the *Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border*.

APPENDIX IV

THOMAS, LORD DACRE, TO KING HENRY VIII.

[13*th November* 1513 (Ellis's *Original Letters*).]

Pleas it your Highnes to knowe I have receyved your most honourable Lettres of your gracious thanks for my pure service done to your Grace according to my dieuty which is to me the most singler comforth and rejoysing I can have ; for by the same I well perceyve your Highnes regardeth not the sinistre reaport or rumor surmised ayenst me, ne your Grace regardeth or geveth ony credence thereunto, whereby I am bounde the rather to do unto your Highnes the most laudable and acceptable service, I can or may do, and so shall undoubtedly at all my power ; and where as by the same your most honourable letters, I understond your pleasor and commaundment is that I shold effectually procede to the spedy execucion of ij Roads opon the West and Medyll Marches to the most annoyaunce of the Scotts that I possibly may, like it your Grace to knowe, opon Thuresday last past, I assembled your subgietts in Northumberland to the nombre of a thousand horsmen, and rode in at Gallespeth, and so to the watre of Kale two myle within Scotland, and there set furth two foreyes : my broder Philipp Dacre with ccc men which burnt and destroyed the town of Rowcastell with all the cornes in the same and thereabouts, and wan two toures in it, and burnt both roppe and flores ; and Sir Roger Fenwike with ccc men burnt the town of Langton and

destroyed all the cornes therein: which Townes er in the hert of the countre two myle beyond Jedworth opon the watere of Chevyot (Teviot). And I came with a stale to a place called the Dungyon, a myle from Jedworth, and so went to the Sclater furd on the water of Bowset, and there the Scotts persewed us right sore, ther bekered with us, and gave us hand stroks; there come thre standards to bak theym, that is to say, David Karr of Fernehirst, and the lard of Bondgedworth opon the oon side, and the sheriff of Tevidale on the othre side, with the nombre of Dcc men or mo.

The lard of Walghope was hurt there with oon arrowe and his hors slane; Mark Trumbill was strikken with a spere and the hede left in hym, his hors was won, and diverse Scotesmen were hurt there. And so we come forwards, where we saw my broder Syr Cristofer Dacre with his oste arreyed at a place called the Bellyng, which was to us no litill comforte, and to hym gret gladness seyng the small power we were of at that time.

My said broder come in at Cressop brige, and there entred the Medyll marches, and so come thorow Ledesdale to the rughes wyre (*sic*), xiiij myle within the ground of Scotland, and thire he put furth two forreyes: Syr John Ratclif with fyve hundreth men in oon, which burnt the town of Dyker, sex myle from the said swyre, with a toure in the same, thei layed corne and straw to the dore and burnt it both rofe and flore, and so smoked theym out.

Also the said Syr John and his company burnt the Townnes of Sowdon and Lurchestrother, with a toure in it, and distroyed all the cornes about theym and toke diverse prisoners with much insight and goods. Nicholes Haryngton, Nicholes Rydley, Thomas Medilton, and

George Skelton, with othre to the nombre of fyve hundredth in the othe forrey burnt the towne of Hyndhalghehede and a toure in the same, flore and rofe; and in likewise the townnes of West sawsyde and Est sawsyde, with a Pele of lyme and stane in it: and my said broder Syr Cristofer with two thousand horsmen and cccc fute men with bowes, for savegard of thost in strayts, come in a stale to Dykerawe; and there the said forreyeres releved hym, and so come forward and met me. We had not rydden above the space of a myle when we sawe the Lord Chambrelane appere in our sight with ij M. men, and four standerds; the othre thre standerds resorted to hym, and so the countre drew fast to theym.

We put us in arreye and come homeworde, and rode no faster than nowte, shepp, and swyne that we had won wold dryve, which was of no gret substance, for the countre was warned of our comyng, and the bekyns burnt fro mydnyght forward. And when the Scotts had geven us overe we retourned home and come in at the Redswyre. I come to Harbotell at mydnyght: my broder Syr Christopher lay that night at the toure of Otterburne, and opon the morne to Hexham, and his folks in other townnes opon the water of Tyne, and on the thrid day at home, as many as might git.

Sir, I se not the gentilmen of the countre in a redyness for defence of your bordoures, for certen of theym to whome I had geven warnyng, as my Lord Ogle, which promised to come to me, the constable of Alnewike, and othre, trustyng thei wold haue bene glad to do your grace service accordingly as thei have done to your Wardens in tyme of werre, come not to me at the place appoynted, whereby I was not accompanyed as I thoght to have been. I was councelled and avised by my

guyds to have regoined my purpose, and so wold have done, but oonly that I had appoynted with my broder Syr Christofer to mete hym in Scotland, for he departed fro me to the West Merches, to bring my folks from thens, whome I might not disappoynt, for I had no space to gif him warnyng, it was xxx^{ti} myle fro me and more, and els I had not keped my purpose, which now is performed, thanked be Jhesu, and all your subgietts in savety bot a servaunt of myn, which was killed there; and two Scotts were slain and many othre hurt the same tyme.

Pleas it your Grace, as for the Rode to be made opon your Weste marche, I can not se how it can be done conveniently unto the next light, for two consideracions, oon is bycause I dar not be absent of this Medill March during this light, for fere the Scotts schold distroye and burne the countrie in myn absence, which I regard gretly; and oon othre is, that my servants' horses which come to this Rode was sore labored, for thei rode xxviij^{ti} oures without any bayte. And in the next light I shall, God willing, performe the said rode; and in the meane tyme shall cause small Rodes be made, which shalbe as gret annoyaunce to the Scotts as a great Rode shold be, and thus shall yo^{r} money be employed to the best I can, and for the grettiest hurt and destruccion of the Scotts; for I shalbe as goode a husband thereof as I wold be of myn awn, and alwey I shalbe redy to gif accompt of the same at your pleasure.

Also pleas it your Grace, me seammes it were necessary that yo^{r} lettres of commandment were direct to my lord of Northumbreland and to my Lord of Clifford, to cause their tenannts gif attendance opon your Wardens, as thei have bene accustomed to do in tymes passed;

for, as I understond, my Lord Clifford's tenannts er^e^ warned not to ride without his speciall commaundment. . . .

(The remainder of the letter has no reference to the subject of raids or Border warfare.)

. . . and as newes shal be occurant in theis parties, your Grace shal be advertised by the grace of Almighti God whom I besech to preserve your most honorable estate. At Harbotill the xiij day of Novembre at vj. of the clok in the mornyng.

Your humble subgyet,

THOMAS DACRE.

To the King's Highnes.

THOMAS, LORD DACRE, TO THE COUNCIL OF ENGLAND

[17*th May* 1514 (*Caligula*, B. 11, 155).]

(Taken from Pinkerton's *History of Scotland*, vol. ii. Appendix.)

Pleas it your good lordships to haue it in remembrance, that at Grenewiche in the moneth of Decembre was two yeares, where as the King of Scotts, of his malicious and untrew purposse, was aboutward to haif stollen the Town of Berwyke, My Lord Darcy wold not be Wardain of the Est and middel marchies, but upon unresonable sommes of money by hym desyred. And for because it was a momring tyme, not plainly determyned warr, but that them laye alwey in awayte of untrouthe, as is proved by the said King of Scotts, I toke upon haunde to be Wardain of the Este and middill marchies, unto the ffeast of Estre then next ensueing; and furthir of the pes continewed at our Soueraine Lords pleasure, as in thendentes therupon made more largely doth appere.

At whyche tyme, in the Kyngs Inner chambre, I maide on me to the Kings grace, or you my lords of his most honorable counsaill, that noo credence shuld be taken therat, unto I had maide myn aunsuer, whyche your lordships did fully promyse me.

Now I am informed that the misreporte is maide, and put in to the Kings grace, and . . . me specifieing that, inasmuche as I am wardain of the Marchies, and has the hole authorite in my hands under the Kings grace, the Scotts have and daily doth distres the Kings bordours, and subgietts, without any great hurte is done again unto them. And also that diuerse metings has bene betwixt me and the Chamberlain, of which I have not advertised the Kings grace, nor you. And over that I make not so good espiall in Scotland as I might.

My Lords, sens my beyng with the King's highnes at Windesore, in Decembre last passed, I neyther trysted ne mett the Chamberlain of Scotland, save oonys in ffebruary last, that I mett hym at Coklawe upon the middill marche, at the instant desyre of sundry our Souveraine lords subgietts, for the ransomyng and getting to liberte their kynnesmen and freynds, beyng presoners, lyke as I certified the Kings grace by . . . as apperes in oone article emongs other in my lettre dated at Morpathe in the moneth of Marche ; the copie whereof my fellowe Doctor Conyers, this berer, shall shewe unto you. Assuring your lordships that I had non othre meting with hym, ne with none othre Scot in Scotland, for non othre matier or cause, prevely or openly, as I woll aunsuere the Kings grace, and you upon my lyf, launds, and goods. And as I shall prove at any season, afore the Kings highness and you, my lords, when as you woll commande me to com to your presence.

My Lords, has for any intelligence, famuliarite, or kyndnesse, that is betwixt me and the Chamberlayn, truely I know non; for in the felde of Brankston it fortuned that I, and my freynds beyng in my hoose and companye, met the erle of Huntley and the Chamberlain, and encountred to gidders. Where as Sir John Home, Sir Will^m^ Cokburne of Langton Knights, Cuthbert Home of Fastcastell, the Son and Heir of Sir David Home, the larde of Blacater, William Carr, and thre brethren of the Bromfelds, Gentilmen, with many othur kynnesfolks, freynds, and seruaunts, of the said Chamberlain's, were slayne be me, and my folks; and my Broder Philip Dacre taken prisoner, with many other my kynnesfolk, seruants, and tennants, taken and slayne in the said battel, as is well knowen.

And has for any intelligence had with any Scot in Scotland, I assure your Lordships of trouthe I haue non, as shalbe sufficiently proved; for they love me worst of any Inglisheman living, be reason that I fande the body of the King of Scotts, slayne in the felde, and therof aduertised my lord of Norfolke be my writing; and therupon I brought the Corps to Berwyke, and deliuered it to my said lord: at which tyme as I was intreated in my said lord's presence, be oone Langton of Berwyk, I reaporte me to his Lordship, and as yit it is not punyshed.

And where it is thought I make not too good espiall in Scotland, as I might doo. My Lords I assure your Lordships, that I maide the best espiall at all tymes hiddertoward, and shall maike in tyme to com, that I oder can or may unfenydly, and neithre spare for cost ne charge. And alway, as I gatt any certain matier worthy writing, I certified the Kings highnesse, or you, by post in euery behalf at lienth, as apperes more largely by the

copies of the same letters, which my said fellowe has to shewe your lordships.

My lords, there is soo great brutilnesse, mutabilite, and instableness, in the counsaill of Scotland, that truely noo man can or may trust them, or there sayings and devises, without it be of things concluded and determined at a parliament season, or generall counsaill of the Lords spirituall and temporall. Of whyche determined mynds and purposes, from tyme to tyme, as often as they have sittin, and as fere as I couthe gitt knowledge be myn espies, or otherwise, I certified the Kings grace or you, as is aforewritten.

To have daily acombred the Kings grace, or you, in sending up writings be poostis of tryffills, and flieng tailes of noo certanty, like as I suppose other has done, to no litell cost and charges of the Kings grace, I wold have bene loth to have done.

And as to the distruccion of the King's bordours and subgietts, without any great hurte done again unto them, Right harde and impossible it is for suche a poure Baron as I am, to make resistence and kepe the King's subgietts and there goods in suretie, all along the Est, middill, and West Marchies, against the hole power of the Realm of Scotland, without great help and assistance; where as in tymes passed the Duke of Gloucestre, beyng a Kyng's Broder, and therll of Northumberlond, with there great powers, couth not well kept them, but ever distroyed. And as my Lord of Norfolk and my lord of Winchestre knowes that, in the last werr, when as they both laye upon the Est bordours, with the ayde and assistence of the hole marchies; what busines and payne they toke on them, and had, I doubt not they can reaporte. And over that I doubt not but your Lordships

remembreth, that at my said beyng with you, I shewed you that I had no strienth ne help of men, freynds, ne tennants, within the same Est Marchies, that wolde ayde and assist me to serve the Kings grace; fforasmiche as Berwyke, Bamburghshyre, Dunstanburghe, with Sir Roger Grey power, is in my lord Darcy haunds and reull. Alnwyke and Werkworthe, belonging to my lord of Northumberland; Elandshyre, Norhamshyre, and the Greys launds, belonging to my lord of Duresme, and William Heron of Furde, now belonging to my lorde of Northumberlond, with all oder Gentilmeynys launds, and men, whiche lyes upon the said Est Marchies, woll noder ryde ne goo, ne non of them doo seruice for me, ne at my commandment in the Kings name, and yours. The inhabitants whereof gyffs me the hole blame that the Kings grace sends down noo soldiours to the said bordours; ne wages to them to make resistence or invasion, without whiche they said to me they couth doo no seruice, like as my writing purporteth. And like as I shewed your Lordships be mouthe, wages gevin to the inhabitants there were in manner waisted and lost.

And as to the destruccion of the same Est Marchies, sens my said beyng with hys highnes last, I assure your Lordships there is not iiii^{xx} howsis, and cotags burnt, which by estimacion exceds not the some and value of xl li. at the vttermost. At whiche tyme your Lordships shewed me that oder should my Lord Darcy come downe to be wardaine of the said Est Marchies with diligence, and defent the same, or els the Kings grace and you wold provide for som other person to come downe, and be wardaine; for whom I loked, and daily lokes; and the most substance of the said Marchies is sawne to the frountours of the bordour.

And as unto the state of the West and Middill Marchies, beyng drye bordours from Bownes to Hangingstane, conteignyng l. Myles in lienth, as the bordours goeth, where as euery person of horsbak or foote may ryde and enter at there pleasures. I have soo endeavoured me during this warr tyme that there is litell harme done to oder of them, neither in burnyng, spoling of goods, ne otherwise ; but ar fully plenyshed to the verey bordour, in as large maner as ever they were the daies of my lyffe, both in housing, sawing, and pasture. And as yit there is not burnt xx howsys within both the same Marchies, as I woll aunsuer the Kings grace and you. Whiche is a metely good bounds in lienth for siche a man as me to gouerne, reull, and kepe in sauetie, during this warr tyme without any chargies of the Kings grace.

And for oone cattell taken by the Scotts, we have takyn, won, and brought awey out of Scotland cth ; and for oone shepe, ccth of a surity. And as for the townships and housis, burnt in any of the said Est, Middill, and West Marches, within my reull, fro the begynnyng of this warr unto this daye, as well when as the late king of Scotts laye in the same Est Marchies, as at all other tymes, I assure your Lordships for truthe that I have, and hes caused to be, burnt and distroyed sex tymes moo townys and howsys, within the West and Middill Marchies of Scotland, in the same season then is done to us, as I may be trusted, and as I shall evidently prove.

For the watter of Liddall, beyng xii myles of Lienth, within the Middill Marche of Scotland, whereupon was cth pleughes ; the Watter of Ludder in the same Marchies, beyng vi myles of Lienth, whereupon was xl pleughes ; The two Townys of Carlangriggs, with the demaynes of

the same whereupon was xl pleughes; the Watter of Ewse, beyng viii myles of Lienth in the said Marches, whereupon was vii^{xx} pleughes; the hede of the Watter of Tevyote, from Brankshohne up unto Ewse Doores, within the same Marche, beyng viii myles in lienth, whereupon was iiij^{xx} pleughes; the Watter of Borthwike within the same Marche, beyng in lienth viii myles, that is to sey from Borthwyke mouthe to Craikecrosse, whereupon was cth pleughes; and the Watter of Ale fro Askerige to Elmartour [1] in the said Middillmarchies, whereupon was L. pleughes; lyes all, and euery of them, waist now, and noo corne sawne upon none of the said grounds. Whiche grounds is over and besyde the great Rode that I made in the said Middill marche, upon Martilmas day last past, the contents wherof I wrote to the Kings grace by poost.

And upon the West Marchies of Scotland, I haif burnt and distroyed the townships of Annand, Dronok, Dronokwod, Tordoff, Fyshegewghe, Stokes, Eskrige, Ryelande, Blawetwood, Foulsyke, Westhill, Berghe, Rigge, Stapilton, Wodhall, Raynepatrike, Woddishill, Overbrotts, Nethirbrotts, Elistrige, Caluertsholme, Beltemmount, Hole, Kirkpatrike, Hyndhill, Mossesyde, Stakehughe, Bromeholme, Walghopp, Walghopdale, Baggraye, Murtholme, Langhane, Grymesley, and the Watter of Esk, fro Stabulgorton downe to Cannonby, beyng vi myle in lienth. Where as there was, in all tymes passed, ccccth pleughes, and above, whyche er now clerely waisted, and noo man duelling in any of them, at this daye; saue oonly in the Towyrs of Annand, Stepill, and Walghopp. And soo I shall continewe my seruice with deligence, from tyme to tyme, to the most

[1] Presumably Ashkirk and Alemuir Tower.

annoysance of the Scotts ; and neyther spare for laubor, paine, ne charge, to the vttermost of my litell power. Desiring your Lordships that I may com to myn aunsuer, and furthir declaracion ; and prove the premisses afore the Kings grace, and you. Wherunto I am and shalbe redy, when soo ever it shall like you to command me. . . .

At Kirkoswald the xvii daye of May.

Yours redy att commandement,

THOMAS L. DACRE.

To my singular good lords, my Lord of Norfolk, my lord of Winchestre, my lord of Duresme, my lord of Lincolne, my lord of Surrey ; and other my Lords of the Kings most honorable Counsaill.

APPENDIX V

THE HAWICK TRADITION

THE tradition as told in the *History of Hawick* (1825) is as follows : ' The most accredited account of the origin of the colour or standard, belonging to the town of Hawick, was given by the late Mr. Scott of Burnhead, as follows :—

' " A marauding party of the English, the year after the battle of Flodden, came up the Teviot for plunder. Previous to their arrival at Hawick, the magistrates called a meeting of the inhabitants, and proposed that the enemy should be resisted, seeing their number was

not great, and that the town should be defended to the last, rather than given up to plunder. Recollections of Flodden sharpened the revenge of the people, who shouted unanimously to be led to battle, when about two hundred stout men were armed with such weapons as the town or neighbourhood could supply. This band set off the following morning, and met the English plunderers at Trows, two miles below Hawick, where a desperate conflict took place. The enemy, about forty in number, with a flag, were come upon rather by surprise, when a complete massacre ensued. The flag was taken, and scarcely a soldier escaped. This colour, or its emblem, has been carried round the marches of the burgh property at the common riding ever since." '

There is nothing improbable in this story, but it would be interesting to know whether the statements as to the date and as to the numbers engaged are based on any authority, or on tradition merely, or whether they are purely imaginary. Since it was written the details of this affair have been somewhat improved upon. In a work entitled *Upper Teviotdale and the Scotts of Buccleuch* (1887) we learn that the combat occurred in the spring of the year; that the Hawick men advanced silently and cautiously, screening themselves with the trees and brushwood; that the English had laid aside their arms, and were lying half asleep under the trees at the moment of attack. We are also told that the Hawick party consisted chiefly of youths, many of the able-bodied men having perished at Flodden. But in the *Annals of Hawick* (James Wilson, town-clerk of Hawick, 1850) we read that on the occasion of Flodden 'the Hawick youth . . . were nearly all exterminated'

and 'the older inhabitants had declined to join the Scottish army.'

We are also told in this book that the determination of the burgh to resist was come to when the number and strength of the enemy were still unknown, whereas in the above quotation from the *History of Hawick* we have seen that the magistrates proposed to resist the enemy 'seeing their number was not great.'

But by far the most interesting statement is that the marauders 'apparently belonged to the party of English who invaded the East Border, but was speedily met by the Earl (*sic*) of Home, who was enabled, not only to offer a decided check to the English, but also to effect something in the way of retaliation.' What English invasion is this? by whom was it commanded? where can we obtain information regarding it? In *November* 1513 Lord Darcy had been directed to send a raid into the East Marches of Scotland, but it does not appear to have been carried out. Again, *in the same month*, Lord Home certainly offered a very decided check to the English.

If the writer of *Upper Teviotdale*, etc., is referring to either of these events, why say that the combat occurred in the spring of 1514 rather than in the autumn of 1513?

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