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BATTLES

OF THE



UNITED STATES
SEA AND LAND

BY HENRY B. DAWSON

MEMBER OF THE N.Y. HISTORICAL SOCIETY ETC

ILLUSTRATED BY ALONZO CHAPPEL

BATTLES
OF
THE UNITED STATES,

BY SEA AND LAND:

EMBRACING THOSE OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY AND INDIAN WARS,
THE WAR OF 1812, AND THE MEXICAN WAR;
WITH IMPORTANT OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

BY HENRY B. DAWSON,

MEMBER OF THE NEW YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ETC.

Illustrated with numerous highly-finished Steel Engravings,
INCLUDING BATTLE SCENES AND FULL-LENGTH PORTRAITS,—FROM ORIGINAL PAINTINGS
BY ALONZO CHAPPEL.

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P R E F A C E.

OF the various subjects which form portions of the history of a nation, none has been so generally acceptable to the people as the record of its WARS. The young have read with no greater degree of delight, than the aged have experienced in listening to the story of their country's conflicts; and many a fireside has been the scene of oft-told tales of daring, by the patriarch of the family, as he has corrected or amplified on the narrative in the school-history of his grandchild.

The general histories of the country, and even the general histories of the respective wars, embracing, as they do, so much that is general or political in its character, must, necessarily, be brief in their descriptions of the various movements of the armies, and the various conflicts in which they have been engaged; and the student and the general reader, alike, are left to gather from other sources—sometimes from those which are found only with great difficulty—the information they desire on this important branch of the history of their country.

To supply the demand which is thus created, this work has been prepared—a description of the battles of the republic, in detail, with such original documents relating thereto as will enable all who may refer to its pages to gain full and authentic information on the subject on which it treats. Not only have the wants of the great mass of readers been considered, but the peculiar requirements of the student

have been consulted in the careful examination of the details of the several engagements, and in the extent and character of the authorities to which reference has been made.

Seconded in my efforts by the liberality of the publishers, and the professional abilities of the artists who have illustrated the work, no labor has been spared in the preparation of these volumes. In the exercise of a strict impartiality, the exact truth has been sought; and, relying upon the ample supply of material which my own library and those of my friends have furnished; upon the care with which these materials have been used; and upon the enlightened judgment of an intelligent people, I submit the work to the reading public, feeling confident that as much pleasure will be derived from a perusal of its pages as has been enjoyed by me in the labor attending its preparation.

HENRY B. DAWSON.

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BATTLES
OF
THE UNITED STATES.

BOOK I.
THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

1775-1783.

CHAPTER I.

April 19th, 1775.

LEXINGTON AND CONCORD.

THE troubles between the colonies and the mother country, which, for upwards of half a century, had been accumulating and gaining strength, had been increased to an alarming extent by the passage of the stamp-act, in 1765.¹ The loyalty of the colonists had been so much impaired by the passage of that act, that its repeal, while it temporarily quieted them, did not effectually restore good-will;² and the mutiny act, which accompanied the repeal, and the act imposing duties on tea and other necessary articles, which speedily followed, called forth the energetic opposition of the people throughout nearly the whole of the British American colonies.³

Letters and remonstrances, and petitions for relief, had been addressed by the colonists and by the colonial assemblies to influential persons in Europe,

and to parliament and the king;⁴ conventions and congresses had been convened and dissolved;⁵ riots and loss of life and limb had marked the progress of the popular antipathies against the representatives of the crown;⁶ and committees of correspondence had been organized for the purpose of harmonizing the opposition, and of producing concert of action throughout the young confederacy.⁷

A determined spirit of resistance had been manifested in the different sea ports, when an intended attempt to force the tea into the colonies had been made known;⁸ and in New York and Boston, at least, the people, in their might, had returned the consignments to their owners,⁹ or re-consigned them to the waters of their harbors.¹⁰ The

¹ The stamp-act passed March 22, 1765, and went into operation on the first day of November following. The act is copied, at length, in "*Spencer's History of the United States*," vol. i. pp. 274-278.

² Marshall's *Life of Washington*, ii. p. 122; Stedman, i. pp. 48, 49; Irving, i. pp. 342, 343; Gordon, i. p. 207; Hutchinson's *Massachusetts*, iii. p. 147.

³ Gordon, i. pp. 214, 215; Irving, i. p. 343.

⁴ Addresses to the people of Great Britain and Canada are copied, at length, in "*Spencer's United States*," i. pp. 338-348; Petitions to the King, in the same work, i. pp. 348-352; 381-384. See also Stedman, i. p. 41; Irving, i. p. 404; Hutchinson, iii. pp. 481-488, 494.

⁵ Hutchinson, iii. pp. 118, 119; Stedman, i. pp. 39, 40; Irving, i. 392, 393, 398, 419, 425.—⁶ Stedman, i. pp. 38, 39; Hutchinson, iii. pp. 120-124, 270-274.

⁷ Bradford, i. p. 365; Hutchinson, iii. pp. 397-400.

⁸ Hutchinson, iii. pp. 422-442; Stedman, i. pp. 86, 87.

⁹ Hutchinson, iii. p. 430; Gordon, i. pp. 332-334.

¹⁰ Hutchinson, iii. pp. 436, 440, 441; Stedman, i. p. 87.

closing of the port of Boston;¹ the abrogation of the rights of the colonial assembly of New York;² the suspension of the charter of the colony of Massachusetts Bay;³ and other measures of a kindred character,⁴ had been adopted by the British government, or by the royal governors of the several colonies.

Non-importation leagues had been reorganized and their requirements enforced,⁵ and other retaliatory measures had been adopted by the colonists; the militia had been put into a state of greater efficiency;⁶ arms had been provided by those who were without them, and by the colonies for the general use;⁷ the manufacture of arms and of gunpowder had been commenced in several of the colonies; encouragement had been offered to those who would engage in the manufacture of saltpetre;⁸ military stores had been collected, and deposited in convenient places;⁹ and resistance to the power of the mother country, by open force, had been made the subject of common conversation.¹⁰

The "Committee of Supplies," appointed for that purpose by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,¹¹ had purchased a considerable quantity of

military stores and provisions,¹ and had placed a portion of them in the custody of Colonel James Barrett,² in the town of Concord, seventeen miles northwest from the town of Boston.³ Early in the spring of 1775, information of this movement had been conveyed to General Thomas Gage, the commander-in-chief of the British forces in Boston, and steps were taken for the capture or destruction of the stores.⁴ Officers in disguise had been sent out as spies, to sketch the roads, to ascertain the situation of the stores, and to obtain such other information as might be useful in the prosecution of the enterprise.⁵

A few days before the time appointed to make the seizure, the grenadier and light-infantry companies were taken off duty, under the pretence of enabling them to learn a new exercise, but really for the purpose of throwing the people of Boston off their guard.⁶ It had a contrary effect, however, and the Bostonians still more closely watched the movements of the troops and the government.⁷

A daughter of liberty, in Boston, privately notified Samuel Adams and John Hancock, who had withdrawn from Boston, and were residing in Lexington, that within a few days the troops would leave the town, but the object of the expedition was not ascertained.⁸ Mr.

¹ Irving, i. pp. 380, 381, 384; Hutchinson, iii. p. 457.

² Gordon, i. pp. 215, 216; Hutchinson, iii. pp. 168-173.—³ Irving, i. p. 380; Frothingham's Siege, pp. 8, 9.

⁴ Bradford, i. pp. 368; Hutchinson, iii. p. 179; Irving, i. 380.—⁵ Bradford, i. pp. 361, 362; Gordon, i. p. 218.

⁶ Gordon, i. p. 469; Bradford, i. pp. 357, 359, 367.

⁷ Stedman, i. p. 110; Bradford, i. pp. 356, 357, 363.

⁸ Gordon, i. p. 469; Stedman, i. p. 110.

⁹ Gordon, i. pp. 415, 469, 473; Bradford, i. pp. 364, 366; Stedman, i. pp. 113, 116.

¹⁰ Bradford, i. p. 362; Stedman, i. p. 110.

¹¹ Heath's Memoirs, p. 9; Bradford, i. p. 367

¹ Bradford, i. p. 367; Irving, i. p. 421.

² Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 522.

³ Bradford, i. p. 367; Ripley's Fight at Concord, p. 9; Stedman, i. p. 116.—⁴ Bradford, i. p. 370; Stedman, i. p.

116.—⁵ See statements of Capt. Brown and Lieut. D'Bernicre (*Gill, Boston, 1779*).—⁶ Gordon, i. p. 476; Letter from Boston, April 20, 1775.—⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Gordon, i. p. 476.

Adams inferred, from the number of troops to be employed, that the destruction or capture of the stores was the object;¹ and the "Committee of Safety," of the Provincial Congress, voted "that all the ammunition be deposited in nine different towns; and that other articles be lodged, some in one place, some in another: so as to the fifteen medicinal chests, two thousand iron pots, two thousand bowls, fifteen thousand canteens, and eleven hundred tents; and that the six companies of matrosses be stationed in different towns."²

On the eighteenth of April, for the purpose of still further concealing the purposes of the general, a party of officers dined together at Cambridge; but after dinner they scattered themselves upon the road leading to Concord, for the purpose of intercepting any expresses which might be sent out of Boston to alarm the country on the departure of the troops. Notwithstanding all their caution, however, they were seen, and the object of their mission was understood.³ The "Committee of Safety" had been in session at Menotomy (West Cambridge), and the veteran General William Heath, who was a member, on his return home, met eight or nine of the party riding towards Lexington. His experienced eye detected the character of their equipments; and that circumstance, con-

nected with the lateness of the hour, and their distance from Boston, excited his suspicion.¹

In the town the same secrecy was attempted, yet, although nearly all the leaders of the popular party had retired into the country, Dr. Joseph Warren, who remained, noticed the movements, and took immediate steps to prevent their success.² Assisted by Paul Revere,—subsequently well known as one of the earliest engravers in the country,—beacon lights were thrown out from the tower of the North Church; and Revere himself (rowed across the Charles River by a tried friend, five minutes before the sentinels on the Somerset man-of-war, which was anchored in the channel, received orders to prevent any person from passing) hastened towards Lexington, by way of Charlestown, while William Dawes was dispatched by way of Roxbury to the same place.³ A short distance beyond Charlestown Neck, Revere was stopped by two of the British officers who had been patrolling the road since sunset on the preceding evening, but, being mounted on a fine horse, he escaped, by way of the road leading to Medford.⁴ As he rode through that town he aroused the captain of the minutemen, and stopping at almost every house on his way to Lexington, the in-

¹ Heath's Memoirs, p. 11; Bradford, i. p. 370.

² Frothingham, pp. 56, 57; Gordon, i. p. 477; Bancroft, vii. p. 288.—³ Bancroft's U. S., vii. p. 289; Irving's Washington, i. p. 430; Frothingham, pp. 57, 58. Dr. Ripley says the latter messenger was "a Mr. Lincoln," p. 12.—⁴ Frothingham, p. 58; Bancroft, vii. p. 289.

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 288; Gordon, i. p. 476

Gordon, i. p. 476.—² Gordon, i. p. 477 Bradford, i. p. 370; Frothingham, p. 56.

habitants were prepared to discharge the important duty which was rapidly devolving upon them.¹ Dawes also successfully discharged the trust reposed in him, and arrived at Lexington in safety.² The two friends immediately proceeded to the house of Rev. Jonas Clark, the pastor of the church at Lexington, where John Hancock and Samuel Adams were secreted;³ and notwithstanding the guard of minute-men, who had been posted around the house, strangely forbade their entrance,⁴ they succeeded in arousing the sleeping patriots, and in persuading them to retire to Woburn.⁵ The two friends, joined by Samuel Prescott, of Concord—an active son of liberty—after arousing the minute-men in Lexington, proceeded towards Concord, calling up the inhabitants on their road,⁶ until they reached Lincoln, where they fell in with another party of British officers.⁷ Revere and Dawes were seized and taken back to Lexington; but Prescott, leaping over a stone wall, escaped and galloped on towards Concord, spreading the alarm along the road, and in the villages through which he passed.⁸ He reached Concord about two o'clock, and the alarm-bell, on the belfry of their meeting-house, called forth the inhabitants to the town-hall,

their place of rendezvous.¹ Old and young alike responded to the call;² and while the minute-men and most of the militia, headed by Rev. William E. Emerson, their pastor,³ carrying their guns, and powder-horns, and ball-pouches, answered to their names at roll-call, others, with equal or greater diligence, ran express to distant villages, or hurried away the stores and provisions, and secreted them in the woods and thickets, a load in a place.⁴ Children, even, whose tender age forbade heavier labor, ran beside the teams, and, with goads, urged on their unwilling steps;⁵ and women, trembling for the result, assisted in the work, wherever their efforts or their words of encouragement were found useful.⁶

At the different villages in the vicinity similar scenes were enacted, and the inhabitants generally seemed to have been thoroughly aroused, and appreciated the importance of the occasion.⁷

At Lexington, by two o'clock, the village green was thronged with excited men.⁸ The aged, who were exempt, unless when insurrection or invasion threatened the peace of the town, stood shoulder to shoulder with their sons; and, by their example and their experience, gave encouragement and strength to the undisciplined masses who were present.⁹ One hundred and thirty men,

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 289.—² Frothingham, p. 58.

³ Lossing's Field Book, i. pp. 523, 553.

⁴ Col. Wm. Munroe, who was the orderly-sergeant of the minute-men, hearing of the movements, "collected a guard of eight men, well armed, and put himself at their head, to guard Mr. Clark's house."—Ripley, p. 11.

⁵ Ripley, p. 13; Frothingham, p. 60.—⁶ Shattuck's Concord, p. 101.—⁷ Frothingham, p. 60; Bancroft, vii. p. 290.

⁸ Ripley, p. 12; Frothingham, p. 65.

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 290.—² Ripley, p. 13; Bancroft, vii. pp. 290, 291.—³ Frothingham, p. 65; Bancroft, vii. p. 290.

⁴ Ripley, pp. 13, 14; Frothingham, p. 65; Lossing, i. p. 551.—⁵ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 552.

⁶ Bancroft, vii. p. 297; Lossing, i. p. 551.

⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 299.—⁸ Gordon, i. p. 478; Bancroft, vii. p. 290.—⁹ Bancroft, vii. p. 291.

strong and true, answered to their names;¹ and John Parker, the captain of the beat, at the same time that he ordered them to load with ball, strictly enjoined them to reserve their fire until after the enemy commenced the assault.² No signs of the approach of the enemy being visible, the company was dismissed, with orders to reassemble at the roll of the drum.³

But to return to Boston. Lord Percy, a general in the British service, while crossing the Common in the evening, overtook a party of the townsmen, one of whom—probably recognizing his lordship, and intending to be heard—remarked, in his hearing, “They will miss their aim.” Percy inquired “what aim” was referred to, and was answered, “Why, the cannon at Concord.”⁴ Perceiving that the intended expedition was known in the town, Percy hastened to General Gage with the intelligence, and orders were immediately issued to the sentries on the Neck, and on the different vessels in the harbor, that no person should be permitted to leave the town without special orders from headquarters.⁵ These orders, as we have seen, were issued too late, and the energetic Revere and Dawes were beyond the reach of both the sentries and the general.

At length, about eleven o’clock, the grenadiers and light-infantry,—the *élite* of the army,—about eight hundred in

number, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Smith, embarked at the Common and proceeded up the Charles River, as far as a place known as Phipps’ Farm, on Lechmere’s Point, now East Cambridge.¹ Landing at that place, they immediately proceeded on their way towards Lexington, under the guidance of several loyalists, at whose urgent solicitation the expedition was planned.² In the selection of this course, the enemy was probably influenced by information which he had received of the meeting of the “Committee of Safety” at Menotomy (now West Cambridge) on the preceding afternoon, and by hopes which he entertained of securing some of its members, as the troops halted when they came opposite Wetherby’s tavern, where the meeting had been held.³ Several members of the committee, among whom were colonels Orne and Lee, and Elbridge Gerry, were then sleeping in the house; and they barely escaped, in their night-clothes, by the back-door, into the fields.⁴

The enemy’s approach to Lexington was announced by the firing of guns and the ringing of alarm-bells,⁵ and Colonel Smith, perceiving that his advance into the country had become known, immediately detached six companies of light-infantry, under Major

¹ Frothingham, p. 59; Gordon, i. p. 478.—² Frothingham, p. 59.—³ Frothingham, p. 60; Gordon, i. p. 478.

⁴ Frothingham, p. 58; Stedman, i. p. 119.

⁵ Stedman, i. p. 419; Bancroft, vii. p. 289.

¹ Committee of Safety’s dispatch, 10 A. M., April 19, 1775; Stedman, i. p. 116; Heath, p. 12; Gordon, i. p. 477.—² Gordon, i. p. 477; Dr. Gordon’s Letter, May 17, 1775.—³ Heath, p. 12.—⁴ Frothingham, p. 61; Heath, p. 12.—⁵ Irving, i. p. 430; Stedman, i. p. 116; Bancroft, vii. p. 290.

Pitcairn, of the marines, with orders to press on, by a forced march, to Concord, and secure the two bridges over the Concord River, near that place;¹ and, at the same time, he sent a messenger to Boston for reinforcements.² Pitcairn, as he was directed, advanced rapidly towards Lexington, capturing several persons on the way.³ One of these prisoners, named Thaddeus Bowman, escaped,⁴ and, hastening to Lexington, informed Captain Parker of the approach of the enemy.⁵ The drum was immediately beat to arms, and about seventy, who were in the immediate neighborhood, assembled on the green, one half of whom were without arms.⁶ Captain Parker ordered those who were unarmed to go into the meeting-house (near by), equip themselves, and join the company; while those who were armed, *thirty-eight in number*, he directed to follow him to the north end of the green, where he formed them in line, in single file.⁷ Before those who were in the meeting-house could obtain arms and ammunition, Pitcairn and his detachment came up; and the latter, probably by design, were wheeled so as to cut the former off, and prevent them from joining their comrades under Captain Parker.⁸

Marching up by column of platoons, the enemy advanced within fifty feet of the position occupied by Captain Park-

er, and there halted.¹ Major Pitcairn then advanced a few feet in front of his men, brandished his sword, and shouted, "*Lay down your arms, you damned rebels, or you are all dead men,*" and immediately afterwards, "*the rebels*" failing to comply with his first order, he ordered his men to "*Fire.*"² The first platoon discharged their pieces, but no one was hurt.³ Captain Parker then directed every man to take care of himself, and they accordingly dispersed.⁴ While they were retreating, the second platoon of the enemy also fired, killing several and wounding others.⁵

Accounts of the affair differ respecting the use of their arms by the party under Captain Parker. Some authorities state that they returned the fire when they found that they were fired upon while retreating;⁶ and Stedman, who went out from Boston with the reinforcement sent to meet Colonel Smith on his return, states that one British soldier was wounded, and that Major Pitcairn's horse was wounded in two places.⁷ Many of those who were present state positively that the enemy's fire was not returned by the Americans;⁸ and thus the matter rests, from conflict of testimony, in great uncertainty.

Of the Americans, the following were

¹ Stedman, i. p. 116.—² Letter from Boston, April 20, 1775.—³ Bancroft, vii. p. 293; Frothingham, p. 61.

⁴ Frothingham, p. 61; Lossing, i. p. 524.

⁵ Irving, i. p. 430; Lossing, i. p. 524.

⁶ Frothingham, p. 62; Gordon, i. p. 478.

⁷ Document I.; Stedman, i. p. 116.—⁸ Document I.

¹ Document I.—² D'Bernicre's Narrative; Document I.; Gordon, i. p. 478.—³ Frothingham, p. 62; Document I.

⁴ Document I.; Stedman, i. p. 116.

⁵ Frothingham, p. 63; Document I.; Stedman, i. p. 117; Heath, p. 12.—⁶ D'Bernicre's Narrative; Irving, i. p. 431; Gordon, i. p. 478; Lossing, i. p. 524.

⁷ Stedman, i. pp. 116, 117.

⁸ Documents I. and II.

killed: Ensign Robert Monroe,¹ Jonas Parker,² Samuel Hadley, Jonathan Harrington, jr., Isaac Muzzy, Caleb Harrington, and John Brown, of Lexington, and Asahel Porter, of Woburn; and nine were wounded.³

By this time the main body, under Lieutenant-colonel Smith, came up, and the whole party pushed on for Concord, six miles distant,⁴ probably elated with the victory which had been won at Lexington; and, more than ever, convinced of the truth of their insinuations respecting the courage of the colonists. Little did they suppose, however, that the blood shed on the village green at Lexington, like that of the martyrs, was but as "seed" in the hands of the husbandman, which being cast forth, produces fruit in its season. Although not the first blood shed in the cause of American freedom, it was the first which called forth the united opposition, by armed force, of the excited colonists, and broke down the wall of separation which had so long divided the different sections of the country—New York from Virginia, and both from New England.

In the mean time, Colonel Smith approached Concord, where preparations had been made to give him a proper reception.⁵

¹ Robert Monroe had served as ensign in the army sent against Louisburg in 1758.

² Jonas Parker has been supposed, by some writers, to have been Capt. Parker, who commanded the party at Lexington. The error will be apparent to those who read the captain's affidavit, Document II.

³ Bancroft, vii. pp. 293, 294.

⁴ Irving, i. p. 432; Stedman, i. p. 117; Heath, p. 12.

⁵ Gordon, i. p. 479; Stedman, i. p. 117.

As we have seen, the bell on the meeting-house had spread the alarm by two o'clock, and the inhabitants had responded to the call. Colonel James Barrett, a veteran of the French and Indian wars, assumed the command, and posted guards both at the north and south bridges, east from the village, and in the centre of the village itself—the whole under the command of Captain Jonathan Farrar.¹ About daybreak the company commanded by Captain David Brown paraded on the village green; but, as great uncertainty existed respecting Colonel Smith's movements, the men were dismissed, with orders to reassemble at Wright's tavern at the roll of the drum.² Shortly afterwards a company of minute-men from Lincoln, commanded by Captain William Smith and Lieutenant Samuel Hoare—a part of those who had been alarmed by Dr. Prescott³—marched into the village;⁴ and they, and those who answered to the beat of the drum from among the villagers, soon afterwards paraded on "the Common," or village green, received a supply of ammunition, and marched below the village, taking a position on the high grounds north of the Lexington road, where they could command the approach of the enemy.⁵

At about seven o'clock the enemy appeared in the distance, their brilliant uniforms and polished arms presenting

¹ Shattuck's Hist. of Concord, p. 105; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 525; Ripley's Fight at Concord, p. 16.

² Shattuck's Concord, p. 105.

³ Ripley, p. 14; Frothingham, pp. 55, 56.

⁴ Shattuck, p. 105; Bancroft, vii. p. 298.

⁵ Stedman, i. p. 117; Shattuck, p. 105

a novel and imposing sight;¹ and the little party of observation immediately consulted what was to be done. Some, animated by a desire to avoid hostilities as long as possible, insisted that "it would not do for *them* to begin the war;" while others, among whom was Mr. Emerson, the pastor of the church, thought they should keep their ground, few as they were, and abide the consequences.² The former opinion, in view of their comparative weakness, very properly prevailed, and they retired, as the enemy approached, to a position on another hill near the present site of the court-house.³

The enemy's light troops immediately occupied the position which had just been vacated by the colonists,⁴ while the grenadiers came up the main road, and halted on the Common, in the centre of the village.⁵

From the high grounds which the enemy occupied, Colonel Smith was enabled to reconnoitre the entire neighborhood; and finding that the colonists were assembling in great numbers, he hastened to discharge the duty which had devolved upon him.⁶ With this intention, he detached Captain Lawrence Parsons, of the tenth regiment, with six companies of light-infantry, to take possession of the North Bridge, and to destroy the stores which had been deposited in that direction;⁷ while

Irving, i. p. 432; Shattuck, p. 105.—² Shattuck, pp. 105, 106.—³ Stedman, i. p. 117; Shattuck, p. 106.

⁴ D'Bernicre; Stedman, i. p. 117; Shattuck, p. 106.

⁵ Frothingham, p. 67; D'Bernicre; Shattuck, p. 106.

⁶ Shattuck, pp. 106, 107.

⁷ Frothingham, p. 67; D'Bernicre; Heath, p. 13.

Captain Mundey Pole, also of the tenth regiment, with similar orders, was detached to take possession of the South Bridge; the grenadiers, under Colonel Smith, remaining in the centre of the town, to search for and destroy what was stored in that vicinity.¹

Of Captain Pole's adventures nothing has been recorded, and he, probably, accomplished nothing more than guarding the entrance to the village over the South Bridge.

The first act of aggression was the cutting down the liberty-pole, which was afterwards burned in the centre of the village.² They next visited the malt-house of Ebenezer Hubbard, and, tearing the boards off one end of the building, they rolled out a quantity of flour, and broke open, and attempted to destroy, about sixty barrels, of which about one half was subsequently saved.³ They also knocked off the trunnions of three iron twenty-four pound cannon, burned sixteen new carriage-wheels and a few barrels of wooden trenchers and spoons, and threw about five hundred pounds of balls into a mill-pond and the wells in the neighborhood.⁴ They also visited Captain Timothy Wheeler's store-house, where a quantity of flour was also stored, but the captain, who was a miller, adroitly misled them, and it was saved.⁵

Captain Parsons and his command, however, did not fare so well, or ac-

¹ Shattuck, p. 107; Frothingham, p. 67.

² Ripley, p. 18; Shattuck, p. 107.—³ Ripley, p. 19.

⁴ D'Bernicre; Gordon, i. p. 479; Shattuck, p. 107; Frothingham, p. 67.—⁵ Ripley, p. 19; Heath, pp. 12, 13.

complish, with so much ease, the object of the expedition. As soon as the colonists saw the movement, they retired from their position near the present site of the court-house, and marching a short distance before the enemy, they passed the bridge a very short time before Captain Parsons reached it, and occupied a high ground in the vicinity, from which the operations in the village were plainly seen.¹ Captain Parsons and his detachment, led by Ensign D'Berniere—one of the officers who had been previously detached, as spies, to sketch the country and ascertain the locality of the stores—approached and crossed the bridge, when Captain Parsons, leaving three companies under Captain Lawrie to guard the bridge,² proceeded with three companies to Colonel Barrett's house, about two miles distant, to destroy stores which had been deposited there, and, if possible, to seize the colonel.³ Perceiving the object of Captain Parsons, the colonel hastened home and completed the work of concealing the stores,⁴—part of them having been covered with a quantity of feathers, in his garret,—and returned to the bridge by a back road, before the enemy reached the house. Of course no stores were found, and Mrs. Barrett, with great presence of mind, prevented them from carrying off her son, and supplied them with the refreshments they needed so much, refusing to re-

ceive the pay which was tendered for them.⁵

In the mean time the colonists near the bridge had been greatly strengthened by the arrival of minute-men from Bedford, under the command of Captain Jonathan Wilson; and from Acton, under the command of Captain Isaac Davis; and of militia from several of the neighboring towns.⁶ They were formed into two battalions, as they arrived, by Joseph Hosmer, acting as adjutant, facing the town, with the minutemen on the right and the militia on the left of the line.⁷ Shortly afterwards the smoke which rose from the burning liberty-pole, carriage-wheels, and wooden-ware, in the centre of the village, attracted their attention and created a great excitement.⁸ The officers, and several leading citizens of the town, stood on the high ground near by, and Hosmer approached them and inquired earnestly, "Will you let them burn the town down?"⁹ An impromptu council was held on the spot;¹⁰ and, with noble firmness, worthy of this—the most important council of war ever held—it was resolved "to march into the middle of the town for its defence, or to die in the attempt."¹¹

Colonel Barrett immediately gave the command to march in double file from the right flank,¹² Major Buntress com-

¹ Frothingham, p. 67; Gordon, i. p. 479.
² D'Berniere's Narrative; Frothingham, p. 67; Shattuck, p. 107.
³ Ripley, pp. 18, 19; D'Berniere.—⁴ Ripley, p. 19.

⁵ Ripley, p. 21.—⁶ Shattuck, p. 110; Lossing, i. p. 526; Bancroft, vii. p. 299.—⁷ Frothingham, pp. 66, 67; Shattuck, p. 111.—⁸ Shattuck, p. 111; Lossing, i. p. 526; Frothingham, p. 68.—⁹ Shattuck, p. 111; Lossing, i. p. 526.—¹⁰ Ripley, p. 22; Frothingham, p. 68.

¹¹ Ripley, p. 23; Shattuck, p. 111.—¹² Ripley, p. 25; Frothingham, p. 68; Gordon, i. p. 480; Shattuck, p. 111.

manding,¹ while he remained in the rear, with the companies from Lincoln and Bedford.² As Major Buttrick's detachment approached the bridge a part of the Acton minute-men, under Captain Davis, passed by in front, marched a short distance towards the bridge, and halted.³ The Concord minute-men, under Captain David Brown, marched up till they came equally in front, and, side by side with the Acton company, they approached the bridge.⁴ As they approached, the enemy, under Captain Lawrie, withdrew, and commenced to remove the planks of the bridge.⁵ With a loud voice, Major Buttrick ordered them to desist and his men to advance.⁶ Captain Lawrie obeyed the orders,⁷ but three guns fired into the river, in quick succession, as signal-guns for relief, gave evidence of his own sense of danger, and of the rapid approach of the moment when the colonists were to decide the destiny of their country. When within ten or fifteen rods from the bridge, a single gun was fired by one of the enemy, the ball from which, passing under Colonel Robinson's arm, slightly wounded Luther Blanchard, a fifer in the Acton company, and Jonas Brown, one of the Concord minute-men.⁸ It was immediately followed by a volley, by which Captain Isaac Davis and Abner Hosmer, both from Acton,

were killed.¹ On seeing this, Major Buttrick instantly gave the orders, "*Fire, fellow-soldiers; for God's sake, fire!*"² and a general discharge from the whole line of the colonists was given, several of the enemy, including three lieutenants, falling on the spot.³ Continuing the retreat towards the main body, in the centre of the village, when about midway between the bridge and the meeting-house, Captain Lawrie was met by two companies of grenadiers who had been sent to reinforce him.⁴ Most of Major Buttrick's men continued the pursuit, although some returned to his house with the killed and wounded.⁵

A short time afterwards Captain Parsons and his detachment returned from Colonel Barrett's and joined the main body without molestation.⁶

The enemy observed the movements of the colonists with no small degree of anxiety and alarm. The objects of the expedition were not yet accomplished, or even scarcely commenced; yet the entire country had been alarmed, and parties of determined men were constantly coming in to aid in the work of repelling the invaders. Every thing indicated a spirit of resolute opposition, and Colonel Smith, after making some hasty provision for the wounded, collected his scattered parties, and prepared for a hasty retreat.⁶

¹ Ripley, p. 25; Shattuck, p. 111; Frothingham, p. 68.

² Ripley, p. 26.—³ Frothingham, p. 68; Shattuck, p. 111.

⁴ Shattuck, p. 111.—⁵ Ripley, p. 27; Shattuck, p. 111, 112; Gordon, i. p. 480; Frothingham, p. 69.

⁶ Ripley, p. 27; Shattuck, p. 112.—⁷ Shattuck, p. 112; Ripley, p. 27.—⁸ Frothingham, p. 69; Shattuck, p. 112; Ripley, p. 27.

¹ Heath, p. 15; Frothingham, p. 69; Gordon, i. p. 480; Stedman, i. p. 117.—² Shattuck, p. 112; Lossing, i. p. 527; Frothingham, p. 69; Bancroft, vii. p. 303.

³ Shattuck, p. 112; Lossing, i. p. 527.

⁴ Shattuck, p. 112.—⁵ D'Bernicre's Narrative; Frothingham, p. 71; Shattuck, p. 113.

⁶ Shattuck, p. 113; Lossing, i. p. 528.



THE TOWN OF WILMINGTON, DELAWARE, IN 1783. A PRINT BY J. S. GREEN.

The enemy left the town about twelve o'clock, in the same order as they entered it,—the light-infantry on the rising ground and the grenadiers on the main road,—but with flanking parties more numerous and further from the main body.¹ The hills, among which the road from Concord to Lexington passes, afforded abundant shelter for the excited yeomanry; and every wall, and ravine, and hill-side, and, very often, every tree, of sufficient size, sheltered a deadly foe.² Sometimes the flanking parties, coming unexpectedly upon them, would cut them off, but, generally speaking, the reverse was nearer the truth.³ Following closely after them, and fresh parties joining in the chase, as those who were tired fell off, it is not surprising that the colonists inflicted a severe loss on the fugitive enemy.⁴ Many were shot down, others gave out through mere exhaustion, the rest hurried on, seeking only their own safety.⁵ Just before reaching Lexington, Captain John Parker and his company, whom Pitcairn had attacked in the morning, renewed the acquaintance from the woods south of the road, pouring in a very destructive fire.⁶

At length, about two o'clock in the afternoon, Colonel Smith reached Lexington, where he was met by Lord Percy, with a brigade of a thousand

men and two field-pieces, which had been sent out, in response to his demand for reinforcements before reaching Lexington in the morning.¹

It is said that Lord Percy marched out of Boston to the tune of "Yankee Doodle," in derision of the colonists;² but before leaving Lexington he was enabled to correct an opinion thus hastily expressed, and to judge, from his own experience, before he reached Boston, whether or not Colonel Grant, with five regiments, could march through America.

Opening his ranks to the right and left, Lord Percy received the fugitives and securely sheltered them, while, perfectly exhausted from the want of food, the labors of the march, and the anxiety produced by the pursuit, they threw themselves on the ground and sought a few minutes repose;³ the colonists being kept at bay by the field-pieces which Percy had brought with him.⁴

About the same time, General William Heath joined the pursuit and assumed the command⁵—the proud distinction of having been the first general officer of the American army who commanded troops, in actual service, in the war of the Revolution; as he afterwards enjoyed the honor of issuing the orders for, and directing the mounting of, the first guard in the Revolution,

¹ D'Berniere's Narrative; Shattuck, p. 114.

² Gordon, i. pp. 480, 481; Stedman, i. pp. 117, 118; Shattuck, pp. 114, 115; Lossing, i. p. 552.

³ Shattuck, p. 115.—⁴ Gordon, i. p. 484; Heath, p. 13; Shattuck, p. 115.—⁵ Lossing, i. p. 528; Frothingham, p. 74.—⁶ Ripley, p. 31; Frothingham, p. 73.

¹ Frothingham, p. 76; Gordon, i. p. 481; Stedman, i. pp. 117, 118; Heath, p. 13.

² Gordon, i. p. 481; Frothingham, p. 75; Bancroft, vii. p. 306.—³ D'Berniere; Stedman, i. p. 118.

⁴ Gordon, i. p. 482; Shattuck, p. 115.—⁵ Heath's Memoirs, p. 13; Frothingham, p. 76; Bancroft, vii. p. 308.

at the foot of Prospect Hill, on the evening of the same day;¹ and, on the 10th of June, 1783, of being the *last* "general of the day" in the American army, to inspect, turn off, and visit the guards.² The colonists, who, before that, since the passage of the North Bridge, had acted independent of all command, and without concert, were now organized, and assumed an appearance of military order;³ and, shortly afterwards, Dr. Joseph Warren also arrived from Boston and assisted in bringing the militia into some system.⁴

Shortly afterwards the retreat was resumed, and with renewed vigor and greater effect the colonists resumed the pursuit.⁵ Throughout the entire line of march from Lexington, fresh bodies of troops poured in from Roxbury, Brookline, Dorchester, and other places,⁶ and the pursuit was so close, that when the enemy had reached West Cambridge, Doctor Downer, "an active and enterprising man," came to single combat with a British soldier, whom he killed with his bayonet.⁷

It was nearly dark when they reached Bunker's Hill,⁸ only a few minutes before a splendid regiment, of seven hundred men, commanded by Colonel Timothy Pickering, of Salem, joined in the pursuit.⁹ The arrival of this regiment

a few minutes earlier would have harassed the enemy's left flank, and, probably, have cut off their retreat.¹

Having reached Bunker's Hill, Lord Percy formed his men into line and awaited an attack, but General Heath judged it inexpedient, and ordered the militia to halt;² a guard to be formed, and posted near the foot of Prospect Hill; sentinels to be planted down to the Neck; and patrols to be vigilant in moving during the night.³ The next morning the general ordered Captain John Battle, of Dedham, with his company of militia, to pass over the ground which had been the scene of action, and to bury such of the dead as remained unburied;⁴ the grounds around Cambridge were reconnoitered; alarm posts assigned to the different corps; and in case the British made a sortie, and drove the militia from the town, they were ordered to rally and form on the high grounds near Watertown.⁵

Thus, in one day, was the spell broken. Instead of a proud and arrogant foe, despising the people, and regarding them as little better than the brutes of the field, they had become, in twelve short hours, a defeated, fugitive force, punished by those whom they affected to deride, cooped up within the limits of a single city, and denied the privileges and comforts of life which a constant and unrestrained communication with the country had previously given to them. But greater than all this was

¹ Heath's Memoirs, pp. 15, 383.—² Ibid. p. 383.

³ Gordon, i. p. 484; Lossing, i. p. 528.

⁴ Frothingham, p. 76; Heath, p. 13; Bancroft, vii. p. 308.—⁵ D'Berniere; Gordon, i. pp. 482, 483; Stedman, i. pp. 118, 119; Heath, p. 14.—⁶ Frothingham, pp. 76-80; D'Berniere.—⁷ Heath, p. 14.—⁸ Gordon, i. p. 483; Heath, i. pp. 14, 15; Stedman, i. p. 119.—⁹ Heath, pp. 14, 15; Frothingham, p. 78; Gordon, i. p. 484.

¹ Heath, p. 15; Gordon, i. p. 484.

² Heath, p. 15; Lossing, i. p. 529; Frothingham, p. 80

³ Heath, p. 15.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid. p. 16.

the charm of allegiance to the king, which had been broken ; and that of the union of the people,—without which the union of the colonies, though enacted by a thousand congresses, had been as nothing,—which had been cemented by the blood of brothers in a common cause.

The loss of the colonists, exclusive of those already named as being killed at Lexington, in the morning, was eighty-five killed, wounded, and missing.¹

¹ The following are the names of these proto-martyrs of American freedom :

Jedediah Moore, John Raymond, and Nathaniel Wyman, of *Lexington*; William Marcy, Moses Richardson, John Hicks, Jason Russell, Jabez Wyman, and Jason Winship, of *Cambridge*; Lieutenant John Bacon, Sergeant Elisha Mills, Amos Mills, Nathaniel Chamberlain, and Jouathan Parker, of *Needham*; Deacon Josiah Haynes and Asahel Reed, of *Sudbury*; Captain Isaac Davis, Abner Hosmer, and James Hayward, of *Acton*; Captain Jonathan Wilson, of *Belford*; Daniel Thompson, of *Woburn*; Henry Putnam and William Polley, of *Melford*; James Miller and Edward Barber, of *Charlestown*; James Coolidge, of *Watertown*; Elias Haven, of *Dedham*; Isaac Gardner, Esquire, of *Brookline*; Benjamin Pierce, of *Salem*; Henry Jacobs, Samuel Cook, Ebenezer Goldthwaite, George Southwick, Benjamin Deland, Jotham Webb, and Perley Putnam, of *Danvers*; Reuben Kerryme, of *Beverley*; Abednego Ramsdell, Daniel Townsend, William Flint, and Thomas Hadley, of *Lynn*—KILLED.

John Robbins, Solomon Pierce, John Tidd, Joseph Comee, Ebenezer Monroe, jr., Thomas Winship, Nathaniel Farmer, Prince Estabrook, Jedediah Monroe, and Francis Brown, of *Lexington*; Captain Charles Miles, Captain Nathan Barrett,¹ Abel Prescott, jr., Jonas Brown, and Captain George Meriot,² of *Concord*; Captain Samuel Whittemore,³ of *Cambridge*; Captain Eleazar Kingsbury, and — Tolman, of *Needham*; Joshua Haynes, jr., of *Sudbury*; Luther Blanchard, the fifer, of *Acton*; Job Lane, of *Belford*; George Reed, Jacob Bacon, and — Johnson, of *Woburn*; Daniel Heminway, of *Framingham*; Israel Everett, of *Dedham*; Daniel Conant, of *Stow*; John Nichols and Timothy Blanchard, of *Billerica*;

The estimated value of the property destroyed by the enemy, amounted, in Concord, to two hundred and seventy-four pounds, sixteen shillings, and seven pence; in Lexington, to seventeen hundred and sixty-one pounds, one shilling, and five pence; and in Cambridge, to twelve hundred and two pounds, eight shillings, and seven pence.¹

Of the enemy, Lieutenant-colonel Smith, commander of the expedition; Captain Lawrence Parsons, the commandant of the detachment to the North Bridge; Lieutenants Knight and Kelly, one sergeant, one drummer, and sixty-two rank and file, killed; two lieutenant-colonels, two captains, ten lieutenants, two ensigns, four sergeants, one drummer, and one hundred and fifty-seven rank and file, wounded; and two sergeants and twenty-four rank and file, missing.²

On the tenth of June, General Gage's dispatches reached England, but the government feared to publish them at length, and a synopsis, or, rather, "a made up" account, adroitly prefixed to the official return of killed and wounded, which bore General Gage's signature, was "gazetted" as official.³ This

Deacon Aaron Chamberlain and Captain Oliver Barron, of *Chelmsford*; Noah Wiswe, of *Newton*; Nathan Putnam and Dennis Wallace, of *Danvers*; Nathaniel Cleves, Samuel Woodbury, and William Dodge, of *Beverley*; and Joshua Felt and Timothy Munroe, of *Lynn*—WOUNDED.

Samuel Frost and Seth Russell, of *Cambridge*; Elijah Seaver, of *Roxbury*; Joseph Bell, of *Danvers*; and Josiah Breed, of *Lynn*—MISSING.

¹ Shattuck's *Concord*, p. 116; Foree's *American Archives*, 4th Series ii. fol. 675.—² Gen. Gage's official returns, Document IV.; Heath, p. 16.

³ See the whole publication from "The Gazette," Document IV.

¹ Gordon ca's him *Nathaniel*, but Ripley, Lossing, Frothingham, and Farmer call him *Nathan*.

² Gordon calls him *Minott*.—³ Gordon calls him *Williams*.

attempt by the government to mislead the people increased the clamor which the intelligence had produced, and the press and the street-corners teemed

with denunciations of the government, and called forth some of the most effective tracts, in opposition, which issued from the British press.¹

DOCUMENTS.

I.

THE following deposition, on one of the disputed questions connected with the battle of Lexington, gives a circumstantial account of this event, and is exceedingly interesting:

I, Sylvanus Wood, of Woburn, in the county of Middlesex, and commonwealth of Massachusetts, aged seventy-four years, do testify and say, that on the morning of the 19th of April, 1775, I was an inhabitant of Woburn, living with Deacon Obadiah Kendall; that about an hour before the break of day on said morning, I heard the Lexington bell ring, and fearing there was difficulty there, I immediately arose, took my gun, and, with Robert Douglass, went in haste to Lexington, which was about three miles distant. When I arrived there, I inquired of Captain Parker, the commander of the Lexington company, what was the news. Parker told me he did not know what to believe, for a man had come up about half an hour before, and informed him that the British troops were not on the road. But while we were talking, a messenger came up and told the captain that the British troops were within half a mile. Parker immediately turned to his drummer, William Diman, and ordered him to beat to arms, which was done. Captain Parker then asked me if I would parade with his company. I told him I would. Parker then asked me if the young man with me would parade. I spoke to Douglass, and he said he would follow the captain and me. By this time many of the company had gathered around the captain at the hearing of the drum, where we stood, which was about half way between the meeting-house and Buck-

man's tavern. Parker says to his men, "Every man of you, who is equipped, follow me; and those of you who are not equipped, go into the meeting-house and furnish yourselves from the magazine, and immediately join the company." Parker led those of us who were equipped to the north end of Lexington Common, near the Bedford road, and formed us in single file. I was stationed about in the centre of the company. While we were standing, I left my place, and went from one end of the company to the other, and counted every man who was paraded, and the whole number was thirty-eight, and no more.² Just as I had finished, and got back to my place, I perceived the British troops had arrived on the spot between the meeting-house and Buckman's, near where Captain Parker stood when he first led off his men. The British troops immediately wheeled so as to cut off those who had gone into the meeting-house. The British troops approached us rapidly in platoons, with a general officer on horseback at their head. The officer came up to within about two rods of the centre of the company, where I stood, the first platoon being about three rods distant. They there halted. The officer then swung his sword, and said, "Lay down your arms, you damned rebels, or you are all dead men—Fire!" Some guns were fired by the British at us from the first platoon, but no person was killed or hurt, being probably charged only with powder. Just at this time, Captain Parker ordered every man to take care of himself. The

¹ These papers may be found in the American Archives, 4th Series, ii. fols. 948–953.

² This does not include those who went into the meeting-house and were "cut off."

company immediately dispersed; and while the company was dispersing and leaping over the wall, the second platoon of the British fired, and killed some of our men. There was not a gun fired by any of Captain Parker's company, within my knowledge. I was so situated that I must have known it, had any thing of the kind taken place before a total dispersion of our company. I have been intimately acquainted with the inhabitants of Lexington, and particularly with those of Captain Parker's company, and, with one exception, I have never heard any of them say or pretend that there was any firing at the British from Parker's company, or any individual in it, until within a year or two. One member of the company told me, many years since, that, after Parker's company had dispersed, and he was at some distance, he gave them "the guts of his gun."

After the British had begun their march to Concord, I returned to the Common, and found Robert Roe and Jonas Parker lying dead at the north corner of the Common, near the Bedford road, and others dead and wounded. I assisted in carrying the dead into the meeting-house. I then proceeded towards Concord with my gun, and when I came near the tavern in Lexington, now kept by Mr. Viles, I saw a British soldier seated on the bank by the road. I went to him, with my gun in readiness to fire, if he should offer to resist. I took his gun, cutlass, and equipments from him. I then proceeded with him towards Lexington, and meeting a Mr. Welch and another person, I delivered the prisoner to them.

After Welch arrived in Lexington with the prisoner, I understood that another prisoner was taken by Mr. John Flagg, and that they were conducted to Burlington and put under the care of Captain James Reed. I believe that the soldier who surrendered his gun to me was the first prisoner taken by the Americans on that day.

SYLVANUS WOOD.

Middlesex, ss., June 17, 1826.—Then the above-named Sylvanus Wood personally appeared, and subscribed and made oath to the foregoing affidavit. Before me,

NATHAN BROOKS,
Justice of the Peace.

II.

The following depositions of Captain Parker and others, participants in the battle of Lexington, will prove interesting to the reader:

LEXINGTON, April 25, 1775.

I, John Parker, of lawful age, and commander of the militia in Lexington, do testify and declare, that on the nineteenth instant, in the morning, about one of the clock, being informed that there were a number of regular officers riding up and down the road, stopping and insulting people as they passed the road, and also was informed that a number of regular troops were on their march from Boston, in order to take the province stores at Concord, ordered our militia to meet on the Common in said Lexington, to consult what to do, and concluded not to be discovered, nor meddle or make with said regular troops (if they should approach), unless they should insult us; and upon their sudden approach, I immediately ordered our militia to disperse, and not to fire. Immediately said troops made their appearance, and rushed furiously, fired upon and killed eight of our party, without receiving any provocation therefor from us.

JOHN PARKER.

Middlesex, ss., April 25, 1775.—The above-named John Parker personally appeared, and after being duly cautioned to declare the whole truth, made solemn oath to the truth of the above deposition, by him subscribed. Before us,

WM. REED,
JOSIAH JOHNSON,
WM. STICKNEY,
Justices of the Peace.

LEXINGTON, April 25, 1775.

We, Nathaniel Mullekin, Philip Russell, Moses Harrington, junior, Thomas and Daniel Harrington, William Grimer, William Tidd, Isaac Hastings, Jonas Stone, jr., James Wyman, Thaddens Harrington, John Chandler, Joshua Reed, jr., Joseph Simonds, Phineas Smith, John Chandler, jr., Reuben Lock, Joel Viles, Nathan Reed, Sammel Tidd, Benjamin Lock, Thomas Winship, Simeon Snow, John Smith, Moses Harrington the third, Joshua Reed, Ebenezer Parker, John Harrington,

Enoch Willington, John Hosmer, Isaac Green, Phineas Stearns, Isaac Durant, and Thomas Headley, jr., all of lawful age, and inhabitants of Lexington, in the county of Middlesex, and colony of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England, do testify and declare, that on the nineteenth of April, instant, about one or two o'clock in the morning, being informed that several officers of the regulars had, the evening before, been riding up and down the road, and had detained and insulted the inhabitants passing the same; and also understanding that a body of regulars were marching from Boston towards Concord, with intent (as it was supposed) to take the stores belonging to the colony in that town, we were alarmed; and having met at the place of our company's parade, were dismissed by our captain, John Parker, for the present, with orders to be ready to attend at the beat of the drum. We further testify and declare, that about five o'clock in the morning, hearing our drum beat, we proceeded towards the parade, and soon found that a large body of troops were marching towards us. Some of our company were coming up to the parade, and others had reached it; at which time the company began to disperse. Whilst our backs were turned on the troops we were fired on by them, and a number of our men were instantly killed and wounded. Not a gun was fired by any person in our company on the regulars, to our knowledge, before they fired on us, and they continued firing until we had all made our escape.

NATHANIEL MULLEKIN,	JOEL VILES,
PHILIP RUSSELL,	NATHAN REED,
MOS. HARRINGTON, JR.,	SAMUEL TIDD,
THOMAS HARRINGTON,	BENJAMIN LOCK,
DANIEL HARRINGTON,	THOMAS WINSHIP,
WILLIAM GRIMER,	SIMEON SNOW,
WILLIAM TIDD,	JOHN SMITH,
ISAAC HASTINGS,	MOS. HARRINGTON, 3d.
JONAS STONE, JR.,	JOSHUA REED,
JAMES WYMAN,	EBENEZER PARKER,
THAD. HARRINGTON,	JOHN HARRINGTON,
JOHN CHANDLER,	ENOCH WILLINGTON,
JOSHUA REED, JR.,	JOHN HOSMER,
JOSEPH SIMONDS,	ISAAC GREEN,
PHINEAS SMITH,	PHINEAS STEARNS,
JOHN CHANDLER, JR.,	ISAAC DURANT,
REUBEN LOCK,	THOS. HEADLEY, JR.

Middlesex, ss., April 25, 1775.—Nathaniel Mullekin, Philip Russell, Moses Harrington, jr., Thomas Harrington, Daniel Harrington, William Grimer, William Tidd, Isaac Hastings, Jonas Stone, jr., James Wyman, Thaddeus Harrington, John Chandler, Joshua Reed, jr., Joseph Simonds, Phineas Smith, John Chandler jr., Reuben Lock, Joel Viles, Nathan Reed, Samuel Tidd, Benjamin Lock, Thomas Winship, Simeon Snow, John Smith, Moses Harrington, 3d, Joshua Reed, Ebenezer Parker, John Harrington, Enoch Willington, John Hosmer, Isaac Green, Phineas Stearns, Isaac Durant, and Thomas Headley, jr., above named, being duly cautioned to testify the whole truth, made solemn oath to the above deposition, as containing nothing but the truth, as subscribed by them.

WILLIAM REED,
JOSIAH JOHNSON,
WM. STICKNEY,
Justices of the Peace.

III.

The following documents, relating to the affair at Concord, will be found interesting:

LEXINGTON, April 23, 1775.

We, Nathan Barrett, captain; Jonathan Farmer, Joseph Butler, and Francis Wheeler, lieutenants; John Barrett, ensign; John Brown, Silas Walker, Ephraim Melvin, Nathan Buttrick, Stephen Hosmer, junior, Samuel Barrett, Thomas Jones, Joseph Chandler, Peter Wheeler, Nathan Peirce, and Edward Richardson, all of Concord, in the county of Middlesex, in the province of the Massachusetts Bay, of lawful age, testify and declare, that on Wednesday, the nineteenth instant, about an hour after sunrise, we assembled on a hill near the meeting-house, in Concord, aforesaid, in consequence of an information that a number of regular troops had killed six of our countrymen at Lexington, and were on their march to said Concord; and about an hour afterwards we saw them approaching, to the number, as we imagine, of about twelve hundred; on which we retreated to a hill about eighty rods back, and the afore-

said troops then took possession of the hill where we were first posted. Presently after this we saw them moving towards the North Bridge, about one mile from said meeting-house; we then immediately went before them, and passed the bridge just before a party of them, to the number of about two hundred, arrived. They there left about one half of these two hundred at the bridge, and proceeded with the rest towards Colonel Barrett's, about two miles from the said bridge. We then seeing several fires in the town, thought our houses were in danger, and immediately marched back towards said bridge; and the troops who were stationed there, observing our approach, marched back over the bridge, and then took up some of the planks. We then hastened our steps towards the bridge, and when we had got near the bridge they fired on our men, first three guns (one after the other), and then a considerable number more; upon which, and not before (having orders from our commanding officer not to fire till we were fired upon), we fired upon the regulars, and they retreated. At Concord, and on their retreat through Lexington, they plundered many houses, burnt three at Lexington, together with a shop and a barn, and committed damage, more or less, to almost every house from Concord to Charlestown.

NATHAN BARRETT,	NATHAN BUTTRICK,
JONATHAN FARRER,	STEPHEN HOSMER, JR.,
JOSEPH BUTLER,	SAMUEL BARRETT,
FRANCIS WHEELER,	THOMAS JONES,
JOHN BARRETT,	JOSEPH CHANDLER,
JOHN BROWN,	PETER WHEELER,
SILAS WALKER,	NATHAN PEIRCE,
EPHRAIM MELVIN	EDWARD RICHARDSON.

LEXINGTON, April 23, 1775.

We, Joseph Butler and Ephraim Melvin, do testify and declare, that when the regular troops fired upon our people at the North Bridge, in Concord, as related in the foregoing deposition, they shot one, and we believe two, of our people, before we fired a single gun at them.

JOSEPH BUTLER,
EPHRAIM MELVIN.

VOL. I.—4

Middlesex, ss., April 23, 1775.—The within-named Nathan Barrett, Jonathan Farrer, Joseph Butler, Francis Wheeler, John Barrett, John Brown, Silas Walker, Ephraim Melvin, Nathan Buttrick, Stephen Hosmer, jr., Samuel Barrett, Thomas Jones, Joseph Chandler, Peter Wheeler, Nathan Peirce, and Edward Richardson, appeared and made solemn oath to the truth of the above deposition by them subscribed. Before us,

JONATHAN HASTINGS,
JOHN CUMMINGS,
DUNCAN INGRAHAM,
Justices of the Peace.

LEXINGTON, April 23, 1775.

I, James Barrett, of Concord, colonel of a regiment of militia in the county of Middlesex, do testify and say, that on Wednesday morning last, about daybreak, I was informed of the approach of a number of the regular troops to the town of Concord, where were some magazines belonging to this province. When there was assembled some of the militia of this and the neighboring towns, I ordered them to march to the North Bridge (so called), which they had passed, and were taking up. I ordered said militia to march to said bridge and pass the same, but not to fire on the king's troops unless they were first fired upon. We advanced near said bridge, when the said troops fired upon our militia and killed two men dead on the spot, and wounded several others, which was the first firing of guns in the town of Concord. My detachment then returned the fire, which killed and wounded several of the king's troops.

JAMES BARRETT.

Middlesex, ss., April 23, 1775.—The above-named James Barrett personally appeared, and after due caution to testify the whole truth and nothing but the truth, made solemn oath to the truth of the above deposition by him subscribed. Before us,

WILLIAM REED,
JONATHAN HASTINGS,
DUNCAN INGRAHAM,
Justices of the Peace.

IV.

The following is a copy of the official account of the affairs at Lexington and Concord, extracted from the *London Gazette*:

WHITEHALL, June 10, 1775.

Lieutenant Nunn, of the navy, arrived this morning at Lord Dartmouth's, and brought letters from General Gage, Lord Percy, and Lieutenant-colonel Smith, containing the following particulars of what passed on the nineteenth of April last, between a detachment of the king's troops, in the province of Massachusetts Bay, and several parties of rebel provincials, viz.:

General Gage having received intelligence of a quantity of military stores being collected at Concord, for the avowed purpose of supplying a body of troops to act in opposition to his majesty's government, detached, on the eighteenth of April, at night, the grenadiers of his army, and the light-infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Smith, of the tenth regiment, and Major Pitcairn, of the marines, with orders to destroy the said stores; and the next morning eight companies of the fourth, the same number of the twenty-third and forty-ninth, and some marines, marched under the command of Lord Percy, to support the other detachment.

Lieutenant-colonel Smith finding, after he had advanced some miles on his march, that the country had been alarmed by the firing of guns and ringing of bells, dispatched six companies of light-infantry, in order to secure two bridges on different roads beyond Concord; who, upon their arrival at Lexington, found a body of the country people under arms, on a green, close to the road; and, upon the king's troops marching up to them, in order to inquire the reason of their being so assembled, they went off in great confusion, and several guns were fired upon the king's troops from behind a stone wall, and also from the meeting-house and other houses, by which one man was wounded, and Major Pitcairn's horse shot in two places. In consequence of this attack by the rebels, the troops returned the fire and killed several of them.

After which the detachment marched on to Concord without any thing further happening, where they effected the purpose for which they were sent, having knocked off the trunnions of three pieces of iron ordnance, burnt some new gun-carriages and a great number of carriage-wheels, and thrown into the river a considerable quantity of flour, gunpowder, musket-balls, and other articles. Whilst this service was performing, great numbers of the rebels assembled in many parts, and a considerable body of them attacked the light-infantry, posted at one of the bridges, on which an action ensued, and some few were killed and wounded.

On the return of the troops from Concord, they were very much annoyed, and had several men killed and wounded, by the rebels firing from behind walls, ditches, trees, and other ambuscades; but the brigade, under the command of Lord Percy, having joined them at Lexington with two pieces of cannon, the rebels were for a while dispersed; but as soon as the troops resumed their march, they began to fire upon them from behind stone walls and houses, and kept up in that manner a scattering fire during the whole of their march of fifteen miles, by which means several were killed and wounded; and such was the cruelty and barbarity of the rebels, that they scalped and cut off the ears of some of the wounded men who fell into their hands.

It is not known what numbers of the rebels were killed and wounded, but it is supposed that their loss was considerable.

General Gage says that too much praise cannot be given to Lord Percy, for his remarkable activity during the whole day; and that Lieutenant-colonel Smith and Major Pitcairn did every thing that men could do, as did all the officers in general, and that the men behaved with their usual intrepidity.

Return of the commissioned, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file, killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing, on the 19th of April, 1775:

Fourth, or the King's Own Regiment.—Lieutenant Knight, killed; Lieutenant Gould, wounded and prisoner; three sergeants and one

drummer wounded; five rank and file killed,¹ twenty-one wounded, and eight missing.

Fifth Regiment.—Lieutenant Thomas Baker, Lieutenant William Cox, Lieutenant Thomas Hawkshaw, wounded; five rank and file killed, fifteen wounded, and one missing.

Tenth Regiment.—Lieutenant-colonel Francis Smith, Captain Lawrence Parsons, and Lieutenant Wald Kelly, killed;² Ensign Jeremiah Lester, wounded; one rank and file killed, thirteen wounded, and one missing.

Twenty-third Regiment.—Lieutenant-colonel Berry Bernard, wounded; four rank and file killed, twenty-six wounded, and six missing.

Thirty-eighth Regiment.—Lieutenant William Sutherland, wounded; one sergeant wounded; four rank and file killed, and eleven wounded.

Forty-third Regiment.—Lieutenant Hull, wounded and prisoner; four rank and file killed, five wounded, and two missing.

Forty-seventh Regiment.—Lieutenant Donald McCloud and Ensign Henry Baldwin, wounded; one sergeant wounded; five rank and file killed, and twenty-one wounded.

Fifty-second Regiment.—One sergeant missing, three rank and file killed, and two wounded.

Fifty-ninth Regiment.—Three rank and file killed, and three wounded.

Marines.—Captain Souter and Second Lieutenant McDonald, wounded; Second Lieutenant Isaac Potter, missing; one sergeant killed, two wounded, and one missing; one drummer killed, twenty-five rank and file killed, thirty-six wounded, and five missing.

TOTAL.—One lieutenant killed, two lieutenant-colonels wounded, two captains wounded, nine lieutenants wounded, one lieutenant missing, two ensigns wounded, one sergeant killed, four wounded, two missing; one drummer killed, one wounded; sixty-two rank and file killed, one hundred and fifty-seven wounded, and twenty-four missing.

N. B. Lieutenant Isaac Potter reported to be wounded and taken prisoner.

THOMAS GAGE.

¹ Another copy says seven.

² In another copy the word "killed" does not appear, which agrees with the "*Total*" at the foot.

V.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM HEATH.

William Heath was born at Roxbury, Massachusetts, March 2, 1737. He was descended from an ancient family, being the fifth generation of the family who have inherited the same estate. He was brought up a farmer, of which profession he was passionately fond, although a taste for military knowledge had led him, at an early age, to study every treatise on that subject which was attainable. He became a member of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company of Boston, in 1765, and subsequently was elected, first to the lieutenancy, and then to the command of that celebrated corps.

In 1770 he published a series of addresses to the public over the signature of "A Military Countryman," in which he urged the necessity of military discipline, and skill in the use of arms, in the then threatening aspect of affairs.

When the *people* of Massachusetts organized the militia, he was chosen colonel of the first regiment of militia in Suffolk county; and when the Provincial Congress found it necessary to appoint a Committee of Safety, he was also named a member of that important body.

On the 9th of February, 1775, he was appointed one of the general officers of the provincial troops; and, as we have seen, had the honor to be the first general who commanded in armed opposition to the British troops, on the memorable 19th of April, 1775. On the 22d of June he was appointed a brigadier in the continental army, and was actively engaged opposite Boston until the enemy left it. He then removed to New York; on the 9th of August, 1776, was commissioned a major-general of the continental army; when the army evacuated New York, and took position near White Plains, he commanded one grand division of the army; and in the intrenchments at that place he commanded the left of the line. After General Washington passed over into New Jersey, General Heath commanded the troops in the Highlands, where he was directed to throw up works of defence. On the 11th of December, 1776, he left Peekskill and marched down the west bank

of the Hudson, to "give protection to the country and vigor to the cause in Jersey;" and having reached Paramus, and effected the object intended, he returned to Peckskill on the 23d. After the movements in West Jersey in December, General Heath, with the troops in Westchester county, moved down towards New York, and caused considerable alarm within the enemy's lines. In April, 1777, he took command of the eastern department, embracing the New England States; and, as such, became the custodian of the troops captured at Saratoga, which produced much trouble, from the overbearing and insolent conduct of General Burgoyne and his officers. In November, 1778, he was superseded by General Gates, and returned to his former command in Westchester county, N. Y. In June, 1779, he was elected a member of the Board of War, but declined the honor; in October, 1780, he was called to the command of West Point; and in May, 1781, when the army, from the want of food, had been driven into a state of disaffection bordering on mutiny, he was sent to the Eastern States, by General Washington, to seek assistance. In August, 1781, he joined the main army, and took command of the right wing; and when General Washington proceeded to Virginia, in the same

month, General Heath was left in command of the main army, near New York, to watch the movements of Sir Henry Clinton. General Washington resumed the command of the army on the 4th of April, 1782; and when the case of Captain Huddy called forth the angry feelings of both armies, and Sir Guy Carlton asked an interview to explain the matter, General Heath was appointed the commissioner on the part of General Washington, but subsequent events rendered his visit unnecessary. As second in command, he remained with the army until peace was restored, when he returned to his family to enjoy the privileges which he had labored for, and the honors which he had earned.

He passed the evening of life in peace, enjoying several political posts of honor, and died at Roxbury, January 24, 1814, aged 77 years. He describes himself as being "of middling stature, light complexion, very corpulent, and bald-headed, which led the French officers who served in America, very frequently to compare him to the Marquis of Granby." He wrote the memoirs of his own life,—one of the most interesting volumes connected with the history of America,—in which the curious will find full details of his long and faithful services.

CHAPTER II.

May 10 and 12, 1775.

CAPTURE OF TICONDEROGA AND CROWN POINT.

THE inhabitants of all the New England colonies seemed to have been moved as one man, when the information reached them that the enemy had shed the blood of their countrymen at Lexington and Concord; and they hastened, in great numbers, to the camp at Cambridge.¹ "The minute-men"—that powerful, patriotic, ever vigilant body—rose in their might on the instant;² while the militia and volunteers more deliberately, but not less earnestly, moved forward to sustain them.³ The farmer left his plough in the furrow, and unharnessing his team, hurried off;⁴ and the merchant and the mechanic, with the squad or the company to which they were attached, also took up their line of march to avenge the wrongs of their country, and to vindicate the rights of man.⁵

Nor were the other colonies heedless of the wrongs of New England. The news from Lexington reached New York on Sunday morning, April 23d, and struck terror among the officers of the government and the political mountebanks who, even at that day, made the polities of that city an enigma to all who were not her citizens; and giving to the latter class another opportunity to display their agility and the flexibility of their consciences.¹ The people threw off the incubus which had so long retarded their movements, and "*the respectable gentlemen*"² who, like the "*ungodly men*" of old,³ had "*crept in unawares*," were left to the enjoyment of an undignified "retirement."⁴

Regardless of the sanctity of the day, two sloops, belonging to Mr. Watts, which lay at the wharves, ready to sail with supplies for the king's troops at

¹ Letter from Wethersfield, Conn., April 28, 1775, in American Archives; Bancroft, vii. pp. 311-327; Lossing's Washington, i. p. 512; Sparks' Washington, p. 126; Thatcher's Journal, p. 20.

² Frothingham, pp. 83, 84; Thatener, p. 20.

³ Gordon, ii. pp. 2, 3; History of Civil War, i. p. 74; Thatcher, p. 20.—⁴ Bancroft, vii. p. 313; Gen. Putnam is said to have done so.—⁵ Gen. Arnold was a druggist; Gen. Knox, a bookseller; Gen. Green, an iron-master; and all were early at their posts at Cambridge.

¹ Letters from New York, April 24, 1775, in American Archives; Bancroft, vii. p. 328; Lossing's Washington, i. p. 516; History of the Civil War, i. p. 77; Gordon, ii. pp. 3-5.—² Colden's dispatches, June 1 and July 6, 1774; Leake's Lamb, pp. 87-94; Lossing's Field Book, ii. pp. 792, 793.—³ Jude, verse 4.

⁴ J. Sullivan to Portsmouth Committee of Correspondence, April 30, 1775.

Boston, were unloaded,¹ and eighty thousand pounds worth of provisions were thereby added to the colonial stores.² On Monday the custom-house was seized, and vessels which had cleared and were ready to sail, if destined for ports where the king's authority was recognized, were tied to the piers.³ The arsenals and powder-house were secured;⁴ volunteer companies mounted guard in the streets;⁵ cannon were hauled up to King's Bridge to defend the pass at that place;⁶ the Committee of Fifty-one, with its Delancys, and Waltons, and Duanes, and Jays, were dismissed, and another more satisfactory body installed in its stead.⁷ The royalists, even, succumbed to the mighty power of public opinion;⁸ and some of their allies among the gentlemen of the town, who, a short time before, had denounced the conduct of Boston, and refused to serve on a committee where the rights of the people

were considered,¹ now became ardent "patriots," and were among the first to sign a spirited and popular protest,² or in other ways to manifest their sympathy for the popular cause.³

The people of New Jersey,⁴ Pennsylvania,⁵ Delaware,⁶ Maryland,⁷ Virginia,⁸ the Carolinas,⁹ and Georgia,¹⁰ acted promptly, and nobly seconded the efforts of New England, as far as their distance and circumstances permitted.

In the mean time, Captain Benedict Arnold, who had marched to Cambridge at the head of a fine company from New Haven, addressed a letter to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, proposing to seize the fortress of Ticonderoga and its dependencies, and the cannon and military stores which were deposited there.¹¹ Before taking any steps in the matter, except to inquire from the captain "the number of cannon, &c., at Tieonderoga,"¹² Dr. Joseph Warren, in behalf of the committee, addressed a letter to the New York Com-

¹ Letters from New York, April 24, 1775, in American Archives; Bancroft, vii. p. 328.—² Bancroft, vii. p. 328.

³ Gen. Sullivan to Portsmouth (N. H.) Committee of Correspondence, April 30, 1775; Gov. Colden's dispatch, May 3, 1775; Lossing's Washington, i. p. 516; Gordon, ii. pp. 3, 4; Hamilton's Republic, i. p. 89.

⁴ Letter from New York, April 24, 1775, in American Archives; New York Committee to Gov. Trumbull, April 24, 1775; Hamilton, i. p. 89.

⁵ Letter from New York, April 24, 1775, in American Archives; New York Committee to Gov. Trumbull, April 21, 1775; J. Sullivan to Portsmouth Committee of Correspondence, April 30.

⁶ J. Sullivan to Portsmouth Committee of Correspondence, April 30, 1775; Gov. Colden's dispatch, June 7, 1775.

⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 329; Lossing's Washington, i. p. 516; Gordon, ii. p. 4. For list of names, see American Archives, 4th series, ii. p. 459.

⁸ Proceedings of the council of New York on Monday, May 1, 1775; Members of New York Assembly to Gen. Gage, May 5, 1775.

¹ Minutes of the Committee of Fifty-one, May 24, 1774; Colden's dispatch, June 1, 1774; Leake's Lamb, p. 88.

² Address of the "Committee of One Hundred," in New York, to the lord mayor and corporation of London, May 5, 1775, signed by Isaac Low, John Jay, and others. See also Bancroft, vii. p. 331.

³ Letter from New York, April 24, 1775, in American Archives; J. Sullivan to Portsmouth Committee of Correspondence, April 30, 1775; Gordon, ii. p. 6.

⁴ Bancroft, vii. p. 332; Gordon, ii. p. 6.

⁵ Bancroft, vii. pp. 332, 333; Gordon, ii. pp. 6, 7.

⁶ Bancroft, vii. p. 333.

⁷ Bancroft, vii. pp. 333, 334; Gordon, ii. p. 7.

⁸ Bancroft, vii. pp. 334, 335; Gordon, ii. pp. 7-9.

⁹ Bancroft, vii. pp. 336, 337; Gordon, ii. p. 9.

¹⁰ Bancroft, vii. p. 337.

¹¹ Letters of Committee to New York Committee and to Arnold, "Cambridge, April 30, 1775."

¹² Letter dated "Cambridge, April 30, 1775."

mittee of Safety,¹ informing the latter of the proposition, and of its "sense of the importance of that fortification, and the usefulness of those fine cannon, mortars, and field-pieces, which are there," and stating that it "would not, even upon this emergency, infringe upon the rights of their sister colony, New York," directing the bearer of the letter to "represent the matter to them, that they might give such orders as were agreeable to them."

It does not appear what reply was made to this letter, but it is evident that no objection was raised, as "orders" were issued to Captain Arnold, on the 3d of May, directing him to "proceed, with all expedition, to the western parts of Massachusetts and the neighboring colonies, where he was directed to enlist" a body of men not exceeding four hundred in number, "and with them forthwith to march to the fort at Ticonderoga, and use his best endeavors to reduce the same, taking possession of the cannon, mortars, &c., also the vessel and the other cannon and stores upon the lake." He was also directed "to bring back with him such cannon, mortars, stores, &c., as he should judge might be serviceable to the army at Cambridge, leaving behind what might be necessary to secure that post, with a sufficient garrison." He was instructed "to procure suitable provisions and stores for the army, and draw upon the Committee of Safety for the same, and to act in every exigency according

to his best skill and discretion for the public interest."²

Arnold proceeded, at once, to the western part of the colony, to discharge the duties which his commission imposed upon him;² but here the first important disappointment of his military life met him, and Providence directed to another and less meritorious brow the chaplet which properly belonged to him.

It appears that Captain Arnold had communicated his views on this subject to a member of the Connecticut Committee of Correspondence, on the day before he addressed the Massachusetts Committee of Safety on the same subject.³ It appears also that Messrs. Han-

¹ "Orders to Benedict Arnold, Esq., Commander, &c.," dated "In Committee of Safety, Cambridge, May 3d, 1775."

² Irving's Washington, i. p. 444; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 124; Arnold's letter to Massachusetts Committee of Safety, May 11, 1775.

³ It appears unjust to deprive Arnold of the credit of originating this movement, when a comparison of the contemporary authorities so clearly establish it. Lossing and Irving give the credit to the *Assembly of Connecticut*; the author of "*The Civil War in America*," Chief-justice Marshall, Gordon, Williams, Dunlap, and some others, place the matter among "some private gentlemen;" Ira Allen originates it in "the governor and council of Connecticut;" and Mr. Bancroft first makes "the Green-Mountain Boys," and afterwards, on the same page, John Brown, of Pittsfield, the author of the idea. Capt. Arnold reached head-quarters on the 29th of April, and immediately communicated his desire to the Committee, having previously written to a member of the Committee of Correspondence of Connecticut on the subject. The first movement, recorded by Ed. Mott, was on the 28th of April, among the very persons to whom Arnold's letter had been previously addressed. The evil deeds of Arnold were enough to consign him to universal infamy, yet it seems proper to extend, even to him, the merit to which he is justly entitled, the denial of which, even at that time, it may be, tended to produce the very treason which we condemn.

¹ Letter dated "Cambridge, April 30, 1775."

cock and Adams, delegates to the Continental Congress from Massachusetts, were also cognizant of the projected expedition;¹ and, it is probable, were also intrusted with some business connected with it to the committees in Connecticut and New York.² Accordingly they met the governor, council, and some of the leading members of the assembly of Connecticut, in secret consultation, at Hartford,³ on Friday⁴ or Saturday,⁵ April 28th or 29th, and arranged the business.⁶ Major Halsted, Captain Edward Mott, of Hartford, Captain Noah Phelps, of Simsbury, and Bernard Romans were appointed a committee,⁷ and three hundred pounds were given to them from the treasury of the colony,⁸ with instructions "to go forward, search into the situation of the garrison, and, if thought proper, to take possession of the same."⁹ Taking sixteen unarmed men with them, from Connecticut, the committee proceeded to Pittsfield, where they were joined by Colonel James Easton, John Brown, Esq., and between thirty and forty men.¹⁰ On the following Tuesday¹¹ (May 2d) they

proceeded to Bennington,¹ where they were joined by Colonel Ethan Allen²—to whom an express had been sent from Pittsfield³—and a party of his "Green-Mountain Boys," hardy frontiers-men, well adapted to the service to which they were called.⁴ A "Council of War" was immediately held, with Colonel Easton in the chair,⁵ and it was voted "that Colonel Allen should send forward parties to secure the roads to the northward, to prevent all intelligence from arriving before them."⁶

On Sunday afternoon (May 7) they reached Castleton, nine miles from Whitehall, with about one hundred and forty men.⁷ Here another "Council" was held, and the details of the expedition concluded on. A "Committee of War," of which Captain Edward Mott was chairman, was appointed; and officers for the command of the troops were designated, those who had raised the most being placed in the chief places, and Allen thereby acquired the chief command,—Colonel Easton taking the second, and Colonel Seth Warner the third places. Captain Douglass, of Jericho, was directed to proceed to Panton,⁸ to consult his brother-in-law, and send down some boats to Shoreham, if possible, to convey the

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 338; Letter from gentleman at Pittsfield, May 4, 1775, in American Archives.

² Minutes of Committee of One Hundred, May 5, 1775.

³ Letter from Pittsfield, May 4, 1775; Bancroft, vii. p. 338.—⁴ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com., May 11.

⁵ Letter from Pittsfield, May 4; Bancroft, vii. p. 338.

⁶ Letter from Pittsfield, May 4, 1775; Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11; Bancroft, vii. p. 338.

⁷ Letter of Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 1; Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 57.—⁸ Letter from Pittsfield, May 4; Letter of Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11; Gordon, ii. p. 10; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 36.

⁹ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.

¹⁰ Ibid.—¹¹ Letter from Pittsfield to the army, May 4th.

¹ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com., May 11; Letter from Pittsfield to the army, May 4th.—² Ibid.

³ Letter from Pittsfield, May 4th. Mr. Bancroft supposes the express was sent from Hartford instead of Pittsfield.

⁴ Irving, i. pp. 442, 443.—⁵ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.—⁶ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11; Gordon, ii. p. 12; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 35; Allen's Narrative, p. 16.—⁷ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.—⁸ Ibid.

men over the lake; and Captain Herrick and thirty men were ordered to proceed to Skenesborongh (now White-hall), at the head of Lake Champlain, take possession of the boats, seize the persons of "Major Skene and his party,"—prominent tories,—and, in the night, to proceed down the lake to Shoreham.¹ "All this was concluded should be done, or attempted, and voted universally."²

While the necessary preparations for carrying out these resolutions were being made, Captain Arnold arrived at Castleton, and claimed the command of the expedition by virtue of the commission which he had received from the Massachusetts Committee of Safety.³ He had heard of the movement under Allen, while engaged in enlisting men near Stockbridge;⁴ and, with his usual energy, he had hastened on, with only one attendant, leaving the men whom he had engaged to follow him as rapidly as possible.⁵

The consequence of Arnold's demand may be readily imagined, when the character of the men among whom he found himself is considered, the greater part of whom were frontiersmen, knowing no fear, possessing but little patriotism, and governed by a code of ethics essentially differing from that which was set up by the polished

and impetuous Arnold.¹ The Green-Mountain Boys declared they would "club their firelocks, and return home," if any other than Allen attempted to command them;² and, with a spirit which was honorable to him, Arnold yielded the right which he unquestionably possessed, and, as a volunteer,—with the rank but not the command,—he entered the ranks in the service of his country.³

A spirit such as this produced its legitimate results, and another council was soon after called,⁴ apparently through the influence of one of the gentlemen from Connecticut,⁵ when Arnold's commission was again examined, and it was arranged that orders should be issued by Allen and himself jointly, both being considered commanders of the expedition until the arrival of Arnold's men should relieve Allen's, and permit them to return to their homes.⁶

The detachments under Captains Herrick and Douglass were sent out,⁷ and the main body, under Allen and Arnold, moved forward to Shoreham (now Orwell), on the east side of the lake, two miles below Ticonderoga,⁸ where it

¹ The proceedings of the inhabitants of Vermont, in their correspondence with the King's government in Canada, 1780-1783 (Slade's State Papers of Vermont, pp. 142-156; Allen's Vermont, pp. 150-245), will show their want of patriotism. Arnold's letter of May 11 will show their want of respect for *legal* rights.

² Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.

³ Irving's Washington, i. p. 444; Dunlap's New York, ii. p. 10.—⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 12.—⁵ Gordon, ii. p. 12; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 36.—⁶ Arnold's letter to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11; Gordon, ii. p. 12; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 36; Ira Allen's Vermont, pp. 57, 58; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 264.—⁷ Mott's letter to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.—⁸ Irving, i. p. 444; Bancroft, vii. p. 339.

¹ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11; Dunlap's New York, ii. pp. 9, 10; Irving's Washington i. p. 443.—² Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.—³ Arnold to Continental Congress, May 29, 1775; Gordon, ii. p. 12; Bancroft, vii. p. 339.

⁴ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 124; Dunlap's New York, ii. p. 15.—⁵ Arnold's Letter to Com. of Safety, May 11.

arrived on Tuesday night, May 9th.¹ Both Herrick and Douglass failed to reach the appointed place of rendezvous,² and there were but two boats in the vicinity, with which to transport the men over the lake.³ The impetuous spirit of Arnold now showed itself, and, jumping into a batean, and inviting the men to follow him, he pushed off with as many as he could carry, and, in the midst of a violent storm, he passed over to the west side of the lake.⁴ The work of transporting the men was a slow one, and when day began to dawn on Wednesday, May 10th, the commanders, a lad named Nathan Beman, who had been engaged as a guide, and eighty-three men, were all who had made the passage.⁵

Fearing that further delay might reveal the movement and frustrate their designs, the commanders resolved to attack the fort at once, without waiting for the remainder of the men, with whom were Colonels Easton and Warner.⁶ The men were accordingly drawn up in three ranks,⁷ on the beach, near where the Pavilion now stands,⁸ and Allen, in a low tone, thns addressed them:⁹ "Friends and fellow-soldiers—

you have for a number of years past been a scourge and terror to arbitrary powers. Your valor has been famed abroad, and acknowledged, as appears by the advice and orders to me from the General Assembly of Connecticut, to surprise and take the garrison now before us. I now propose to advance before you, and, in person, conduct you through the wicket-gate; for we must this morning either quit our pretensions to valor, or possess ourselves of this fortress in a few minutes; and, inasmuch as it is a desperate attempt, which none but the bravest of men dare undertake, I do not urge it on any one contrary to his will. You that will undertake voluntarily, poise your firelocks." Of course every firelock was poised. Allen ordered them to face to the right, and placing himself at the head of the centre file, with Arnold by his side, on the left, he led them up the height to the sally-port, which was open.¹ The sentinel who was posted there snapped his fusee at Allen, but it missed fire, and he retreated through a covered way, followed closely by the Americans, whom he unintentionally guided to the parade in the interior of the fort.² There another sentry attacked one of the officers and slightly wounded him, and Allen saved his life on condition that he would point out

¹ Allen's Narrative, p. 16; Gordon, ii. p. 12; Williams, ii. p. 37.—² "*Veritas*," in Holt's New York Gazette; Irving's Washington, i. p. 444.—³ "*Veritas*," in Holt's New York Gazette; Allen's Narrative, p. 16; Gordon, ii. p. 13; Bancroft, vii. p. 339.—⁴ "*Veritas*," In Holt's New York Gazette.—⁵ Ethan Allen's Narrative, p. 16; "*Veritas*," in Holt's New York Gazette; Gordon, ii. p. 13; Bancroft, vii. p. 339.—⁶ "*Veritas*," in Holt's New York Gazette; E. Allen's Narrative, p. 16; Gordon, ii. p. 14; Bancroft, vii. p. 339; Allen's Vermont, p. 58.

⁷ E. Allen, p. 18; Bancroft, vii. p. 339.—⁸ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 124.—⁹ E. Allen's Narrative, pp. 16, 17.

¹ "*Veritas*," in Holt's New York Gazette; E. Allen's Narrative, p. 18; Irving, i. p. 445; Gordon, ii. p. 13; Bancroft, vii. p. 339; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 37; Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 58.—² "*Veritas*," in Holt's New York Gazette; E. Allen's Narrative, p. 18; Gordon, ii. p. 13; Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 58.

the commandant's quarters.¹ As the colonists entered the parade they were formed into two ranks facing outwards, so as to face the two lines of barracks, and gave three huzzas.² The affrighted garrison sprung from their pallets, and rushed to the parade, where they were seized by the colonists;³ while Allen and Arnold,⁴ ascending a flight of stairs in front of the garrison, approached the quarters of Captain Delaplace, the commander, and ordered him to surrender.⁵ With his breeches in his hand, having had no time to dress, he asked Allen by what authority *he* demanded a surrender, and was answered, "*In the name of the great Jehovah, and the Continental Congress!*"⁶ As has been said by a modern writer,⁷ "Delaplace had about as much respect for the 'Continental Congress' as Allen had for 'the great Jehovah'; and they respectively relied upon and feared powder and ball more than either. In fact, the 'Continental Congress' was but a shadow, for it did not meet for organization until six hours afterwards, and its 'authority' was yet scarcely recognized, even by the patriots in the field." Delaplace remonstrated, but Allen interrupted him, and, with his drawn sword near his head, again demanded the surrender of the garrison, with

which he complied, and ordered his men to be paraded without arms, for that purpose.¹ Besides the commandant and Lieutenant Feltham, the garrison consisted of a conductor of artillery, a gunner, two sergeants, and forty-four rank and file;² and one hundred and eighty-two pieces of cannon, of various sizes, one thirteen-inch mortar, and large quantities of military stores, were the trophies of the victory.³

Flushed with their sudden success, and strangers to discipline, the Green-Mountain Boys at once proceeded to plunder and destroy private property, and to commit other outrages.⁴ Against all this Arnold earnestly remonstrated, when he was reminded that he was a commander by courtesy only, and his authority was openly denied.⁵ Even Allen "positively insisted he should have no command;"⁶ the "Committee of War" formally deposed him,⁷ and he was not consulted, nor had he a voice in any matter.⁸ The effect of all this opposition to Arnold was such as has always appeared when lawlessness has been sustained by authority; and "the greatest confusion and anarchy" prevailed, the men "destroying and plundering private property, committing every enormity, and paying no attention to public service. There was not

¹ E. Allen's Narrative, pp. 18, 19; Bancroft, vii. p. 340.

² Ibid.—³ Irving's Washington, i. p. 445.

⁴ "Veritas," in Holt's New York Gazette.

⁵ E. Allen's Narrative, p. 19; Allen's Vermont, p. 58; Gordon, ii. pp. 13, 14.—⁶ E. Allen's Narrative, p. 19; Gordon, ii. pp. 13, 14; Bancroft, vii. p. 340; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 37; Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 58.

⁷ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 125.

¹ E. Allen's Narrative, p. 20; Bancroft, vii. p. 340.

² E. Allen's Narrative, p. 20; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 264.—³ Arnold's Report, Document IV.

⁴ Arnold to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Arnold to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11; The same to Continental Congress, May 29.—⁷ Ed. Mott, Ch'n to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.

⁸ Arnold to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.

the least regularity among the troops, but every thing was governed by whim or caprice; the soldiers threatening to leave the garrison on the least affront." He could do nothing, even towards securing the cannon, some of which were on the shore of the lake, covered with water, because the men would not obey him, and Allen and the "Committee of War" had other purposes to accomplish.¹

Arnold, thus unpleasantly situated, wrote to the Governor and Council of Connecticut, giving the information of his appointment, and of the situation of affairs at Ticonderoga;² while to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, whose officer he was, he addressed a dignified, business-like letter, with the details of his movements, and of the opposition he had experienced.³ He concludes his letter with these words: "I should be extremely glad to be honorably acquitted of my commission, and that a proper person might be appointed in my room. But, as I have, in consequence of my orders from you, gentlemen, been the first person who entered and took possession of the fort, I shall keep it, at every hazard, until I have further advice and orders from you and the General Assembly of Connecticut."⁴

On the same day the "Committee of War" also addressed the Committee of Safety of Massachusetts, from Shoreham, in Vermont, detailing the movements ending with the capture of the

fort, and complaining of Colonel Arnold's interference, but asking no change.⁵

On the next day (Friday, May 12), a party of men under Colonel Seth Warner took possession of Crown Point, with eleven prisoners,⁶ adding one hundred and eleven pieces of artillery, of various sizes and conditions, to the trophies of the expedition.⁷

At length Arnold's power began to be felt, even among the occupants of Ticonderoga. A portion of the troops which he had enlisted,⁸ in accordance with his orders,⁹ had passed through Skenesborough, securing Major Skene and his tory retainers, and capturing a small schooner, with which they sailed down the lake and reported themselves to Colonel Arnold on the afternoon of the 14th.¹⁰ The Colonel, taking fifty of his men, immediately armed the schooner, and proceeded with her to St. John's, on the Sorel River, where the king's sloop of war, "The George III," mounting sixteen guns, and a supply of provisions were known to be.¹¹

About the same time, desiring to reap some portion of the honor which he saw awaited Arnold's expedition, Colonel Allen, with about sixty men,

¹ Dated, "Shoreham, May 11, 1775."

² Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 59; Bancroft, vii. p. 340; Marshall, ii. p. 264; Gordon, ii. p. 14.—³ Document IV.

⁴ Arnold to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 19; The same to Continental Congress, May 29; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 154.—⁵ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 154.

⁶ Ibid. Mr. Irving supposes the seizure of Skene to have been made by "the party originally sent," under Capt. Herrick.—⁷ Arnold to Mass. Com., May 19, 1775; Same to Continental Congress, May 29, 1775; Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 59; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 154.

¹ Arnold to Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11.

² Arnold refers to this letter in his letter to the Mass. Com. of Safety, May 11, 1775.—³ Letter, May 11, 1775.

⁴ This sentiment is reported in his letter of May 23d.

embarked in bateaux, also for St. John's.¹

The superior character of Arnold's vessel gave him a great advantage over Allen, and he approached the fort at St. John's, which he surprised, taking the garrison prisoners; seizing the sloop, which was laden with provisions, and awaited a fair wind for Ticonderoga; captured four batteaux and destroyed five others; removed a portion of the stores from the fort; and, with his prisoners, re-embarked for Ticonderoga.² The wind, which had been from the south, chopped round to the north, just as he had accomplished the object of the expedition.³

Arnold, heavily laden with the spoils, met Allen fifteen miles above St. John's.⁴ The latter went on board the sloop, where Arnold was, received information of the situation of St. John's, and a small supply of provisions, of which he was destitute,⁵ and, contrary to Arnold's advice, determined to pro-

ceed to St. John's and occupy the fort.⁶ He landed just before night, but learning that a reinforcement for the enemy was close at hand, he retired across the river, where he was attacked, before morning, by a force of two hundred men, with six field-pieces.⁷ He made no attempt at resistance, but fled to his boats, and returned to Ticonderoga with the loss of three men taken prisoners.⁸

Thus, in a few days, a handful of undisciplined men, with small-arms only, and without a single bayonet,⁴ in a series of bold exploits, and without the loss or serious injury of a man, had secured that which had cost the mother country a succession of campaigns, the sacrifice of many lives, and an outlay of eight millions sterling;⁵ furnishing artillery and stores to the infant cause of freedom; and securing the great highway leading to his majesty's Canadian dominions.⁶

¹ Arnold to Mass. Com., May 19; E. Allen's Narrative, pp. 21, 22; Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 59; Gordon, ii. p. 15.

² Arnold to Mass. Com., May 19; Same to Continental Congress, May 29; Same to Albany Committee, May 22.

³ Gordon, ii. p. 15; Bancroft, vii. p. 364.

⁴ Arnold to Mass. Com., May 19; Same to same, May 23; Same to Albany Committee, May 22; Gordon, ii. p. 15.

⁵ Arnold to Mass. Com., May 19; Same to same, May 23; Same to Albany Committee, May 22; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 54.

⁶ Arnold to Mass. Com., May 19; Same to same, May 23; Same to Albany Committee, May 22; Allen's Vermont, p. 60.—⁷ Arnold to Mass. Com., May 23; Same to Continental Congress, May 29; Same to Albany Committee, May 22; Ira Allen's Vermont, p. 60.

⁸ Arnold to Mass. Com., May 23; Same to Continental Congress, May 29; Same to Albany Committee, May 22; Same to Connecticut Committee, May 23.

⁹ Ira Allen's Vermont, pp. 57, 60.

¹⁰ Bancroft, vii. p. 340.—¹¹ Stedman (i. pp. 130-132) gives so singular an account of this affair, differing, in almost every particular, from all other accounts, that I have not attempted to use it.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

TICONDEROGA, May 10, 1775.

To the Provincial Congress now sitting at Watertown.

This is to certify, that previous to Colonel Benedict Arnold's arrival to the forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point, a committee sent from the colony of Connecticut, furnished with money for the purpose of reducing and garrisoning said forts, had, with the assistance of seventy men from the Massachusetts, and one hundred and forty from the New Hampshire grants, marched within a few miles of Ticonderoga, and this morning, at daybreak, took possession of said fort, and have given the command thereof into the hands of Colonel Ethan Allen. And said Arnold refuses to give up his command, which causes much difficulty; said Arnold not having enlisted one man, neither do we know that he has or could do it. And as said committee have raised the men, and are still raising supplies for the purpose of repairing said forts, taking the armed sloop, and defending this country and said forts, we think that said Arnold's farther procedure in this matter highly inexpedient, both in regard to expense and defence.

JAMES EASTON, EDWARD MOTT,
EPAP. BULL, NOAH PHELPS,
Committee of War for the expedition against
Ticonderoga and Crown Point.

II.

ETHAN ALLEN'S REPORT OF THE CAPTURE OF
TICONDEROGA.

TICONDEROGA, May 11, 1775.

GENTLEMEN:—I have to inform you, with pleasure unfelt before, that on break of day of the 10th of May, 1775, by the order of the

General Assembly of the colony of Connecticut, took the fortress of Ticonderoga by storm. The soldiery was composed of about one hundred Green-Mountain Boys, and near fifty veteran soldiers from the province of the Massachusetts Bay. The latter was under the command of Colonel James Easton, who behaved with great zeal and fortitude, not only in council, but in the assault. The soldiery behaved with such resistless fury, that they so terrified the king's troops that they durst not fire on their assailants, and our soldiery was agreeably disappointed. The soldiery behaved with uncommon rancor when they leaped into the fort; and it must be confessed that the colonel has greatly contributed to the taking of that fortress, as well as John Brown, Esq., attorney-at-law, who was also an able counsellor, and was personally in the attack. I expect the colonies will maintain this fort. As to the cannon and warlike stores, I hope they may serve the cause of liberty instead of tyranny, and I humbly implore your assistance in immediately assisting the government of Connecticut in establishing a garrison in the reduced premises. Colonel Easton will inform you at large.

From, gentlemen, your most
Obedient humble servant,
ETHAN ALLEN.

To the Honorable Congress of the Province of the
Massachusetts Bay, or Council of War.

III.

COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD'S REPORT OF THE
CAPTURE OF TICONDEROGA.

TICONDEROGA, May 11, 1775.

GENTLEMEN:—I wrote you yesterday that, arriving in the vicinity of this place, I found one

hundred and fifty men collected at the instance of some gentlemen from Connecticut (designed on the same errand on which I came), headed by Colonel Ethan Allen, and that I had joined them, not thinking proper to wait the arrival of the troops I had engaged on the road, but to attempt the fort by surprise; that we had taken the fort at four o'clock yesterday morning without opposition, and had made prisoners, one captain, one lieutenant, and forty odd privates and subalterns, and that we found the fort in a most ruinous condition and not worth repairing; that a party of fifty men were gone to Crown Point, and that I intended to follow with as many men to seize the sloop, &c., and that I intended to keep possession here until I had farther advice from you. On and before our taking possession here I had agreed with Colonel Allen to issue farther orders jointly, until I could raise a sufficient number of men to relieve his people; on which plan we proceeded when I wrote you yesterday: since which, Colonel Allen, finding he had the ascendancy over his people, positively insisted I should have no command, as I had forbid the soldiers plundering and destroying private property. The power is now taken out of my hands, and I am not consulted, nor have I a voice in any matters. There is here at present near one hundred men, who are in the greatest confusion and anarchy, destroying and plundering private property, committing every enormity, and paying no attention to public service. The party I advised were gone to Crown Point, are returned, having met with head winds; and that expedition, and taking the sloop (mounted with six guns), is entirely laid aside. There is not the least regularity among the troops, but every thing is governed by whim and caprice,—the soldiers threatening to leave the garrison on the least affront. Most of them must return home soon, as their families are suffering. Under our present situation, I believe one hundred men would retake the fortress, and there seems no prospect of things being in a better situation. I have therefore thought proper to send an express, advising you of the state of affairs, not doubting you will take the matter into your serious consideration, and order a number of troops to join those I have coming on here; or

that you will appoint some other person to take the command of them and this place, as you shall think most proper. Colonel Allen is a proper man to head his own wild people, but entirely unacquainted with military service; and as I am the only person who has been legally authorized to take possession of this place, I am determined to insist on my right, and I think it my duty to remain here against all opposition, until I have farther orders. I cannot comply with your orders in regard to the cannon, &c., for want of men. I have wrote to the Governor and General Assembly of Connecticut, advising them of my appointment, and giving them an exact detail of matters as they stand at present. I should be extremely glad to be honorably acquitted of my commission, and that a proper person might be appointed in my room. But, as I have, in consequence of my orders from you, gentlemen, been the first person who entered and took possession of the fort, I shall keep it, at every hazard, until I have farther advice and orders from you and the General Assembly of Connecticut.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen,
Your most obedient humble servant,
BENEDICT ARNOLD.

P. S. It is impossible to advise you how many cannon are here and at Crown Point, as many of them are buried in the ruins. There is a large number of iron, and some brass, and mortars, &c., lying on the edge of the lake, which, as the lake is high, are covered with water. The confusion we have been in has prevented my getting proper information, farther than that there are many cannon, shells, mortars, &c., which may be very serviceable to our army at Cambridge.

B. A.

IV.

MAJOR-GENERAL BENEDICT ARNOLD.

Benedict Arnold, whose name is synonymous with all that is infamous, was born in Norwich, Connecticut, on the 3d of January, 1740. He was descended from an old and influential fam-

ily, one of whom, bearing the same name, had succeeded Roger Williams as governor of Rhode Island. He was educated for a druggist under the brothers Lathrop, of Norwich, who were so much pleased with him that they gave him two thousand dollars to commence business with. From 1763 to 1767 he carried on the business of druggist and bookseller in the city of New Haven, where he afterwards became captain of "The Governor's Guard," one of the oldest and finest companies in the colony. At the head of this company, on the receipt of the news from Lexington, he marched to Boston, reaching head-quarters on the 29th of April. The character of this company, and of its commander, may be understood from the fact that their arrival was made the subject of special action by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, and its accommodation was particularly provided for. On the day after his arrival he proposed an expedition to Ticonderoga, with what result this chapter has supplied a record. This position, however, was productive of much disappointment, and, if the records speak truly, of great injustice to Arnold and his men. Not only was he superseded by those who held no commissions or legal authority, but, after they had yielded the command to him, and he had restored order among the garrisons and secured the great object of the expedition, in forwarding, with great labor and expense, the artillery and stores to the army at Cambridge, he was again deprived of his honors in the most summary and indecent manner, by a committee from the Congress of Massachusetts, without the pretence even of any neglect of duty or official misconduct on his part.

Shortly after his return to head-quarters he was sent by General Washington, with about one thousand men, to penetrate through the forests of Maine into Canada, and to co-operate with the forces sent by way of Lake Champlain under General Montgomery. Notwithstanding the return of a portion of his party, from the want of provisions, the whole party nearly perished from fatigue and hunger. The greatest hardships and the most appalling difficulties were surmounted, and to such extreme want were the men reduced, that Captain Dearborn's dog was killed, and eaten, even to the feet and

skin, with a good appetite. After braving the dangers and fatigues of the wilderness for five weeks, he reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, on the 9th of November. On the 14th, he crossed the river, and creeping up the precipice, as Wolfe had done before him, he formed his half-starved party on the Heights of Abraham, in full view of the garrison. His force was not sufficient to make an assault on the town, and after remaining some days, without molestation, he retired to Point aux Trembles, twenty miles above Quebec, and awaited the arrival of General Montgomery. On the first of December the two parties effected an union, and they proceeded at once to besiege the city. During Arnold's absence, however, General Carlton had arrived with sixty men, and efficient steps had been taken by him to secure the city. On the 31st of December, an attack was made by Montgomery and Arnold, on opposite sides of the town. Montgomery was killed, and his party, dispirited with the loss of their commander, retired to their encampment. Arnold, at the head of three hundred and fifty men, passed through St. Roques, and attacked and carried a two-gun battery, where Arnold received a severe wound in the leg, and was carried from the field. His party boldly advanced, and continued the contest for three hours, but was finally obliged to yield, after nearly a hundred had fallen. The city was closely besieged until the following May, when he commenced a retreat, and finally, on the 18th of June, 1776, he evacuated Canada.

In August, 1777, he relieved Fort Schuyler, which had been invested by Colonel St. Leger with an army of fifteen hundred men; and, on the 19th of September, he was engaged in the battle of Stillwater. In the second battle, October 7th, after the enemy had retreated into his lines, Arnold attacked him there with great bravery. He at length forced his way, at the head of a few men, into the works, but his horse being killed, and he himself again badly wounded, he found it necessary to withdraw.

His wounds rendering him unfit for active service, he was appointed to the command of Philadelphia, after that city had been recovered from the enemy, in 1778. He assumed a style of living which his income would not allow,

which is said to have produced much of the trouble with which he was afterwards visited. He has justified his course, however, on the ground of a necessity to keep up a respectable appearance—such as was becoming to the office he held—among a people who were not very zealously inclined towards the popular cause; and whose love of display, notwithstanding their religious pretensions, would lead them to measure the importance of the cause by the appearance of its representative, the governor of the city. This, added to the irregularity of his pay, and the influence of his enemies in securing the rejection of portions of his accounts for disbursements, led him into embarrassments from which he never recovered. He continued, however, to retain the confidence of General Washington and many others of those who knew him best, until a short time previous to the foul act which has consigned his memory to everlasting shame. A committee of Congress, to whom had been referred specific charges of misconduct against Governor Arnold, by the president and council of Pennsylvania, reported that he was innocent of all criminality; yet, strange as it may appear, the Congress was so far influenced against him as to refer that report to a joint committee of members of its own body, and of the assembly of Pennsylvania, for new action in the premises. This new, double-headed committee, after laboring on the subject for some time, abandoned the task, but not the victim, whom they handed over to General Washington, to be tried by a military tribunal. The council of Pennsylvania, his accusers, after great delay in preparing for the prosecution, at length met the accused in a trial which continued from the 20th of December, 1779, to the 26th of January, 1780, and succeeded in sustaining, in part only, two of the four charges which had been preferred against him, for which he was sentenced to the mildest form of punishment—a simple reprimand by the commander-in-chief.

For several months, probably through the agency of his wife (who was the daughter of Edward Shippen, afterwards chief-justice of Pennsylvania), he had corresponded, on general topics, with officers of the king's army, and it is probable that this correspondence, and the sug-

gestions of his wife, gradually increased his dissatisfaction with the authorities of America, and led him to seek reconciliation, and a refuge from the importunities of his creditors, in the fold of His Majesty.

To render such a retreat profitable, and to secure the favor of the crown, he sought and obtained the command of West Point; but, before granting the request, General Washington urged him to join the army, and offered him the command of the left wing, which was declined on the ground of his inability, arising from the wounds which he had received.

Regularly corresponding with Sir Henry Clinton,—Arnold's letters, signed "*Gustavus*," being written by his wife,¹ and Clinton's, signed "*John Anderson*," by Major André,—he at length took measures, with the assistance of André, to surrender his post to the enemy, the details of all of which, being familiar to every school-child in the country, need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say, that André was arrested with the evidences of Arnold's guilt in his possession; that he voluntarily disclosed what was not mentioned in the papers found in his boot; that Arnold, hearing of André's arrest, escaped to a British sloop-of-war which lay in the river; and that André suffered, at Tappan, in Rockland county, the penalty of his crime. On the very day of his escape he addressed a letter to General Washington, declaring that he was actuated by patriotic motives, and asking protection for his family. A short time afterwards, Mrs. Arnold, with his clothes and baggage, were sent to New York.

During the exertions made to relieve André from his perilous situation, Arnold had the impudence to address General Washington on the subject, first appealing to his humanity, and then seeking to intimidate him,—a work which even he should have known would produce no effect.

Taking the rank of brigadier-general in the king's army, he was not long inactive; but, like

¹ A comparison of an account-book kept by Mrs. Arnold, while in Philadelphia, and now owned by Abraham Tomlinson, Esq., of Poughkeepsie, with the letters signed "*Gustavus*," shows them to have been written by her.

most proselytes, he became very active in evil deeds.

He first published an address to the inhabitants of America, in which he attempts a justification of his conduct. After declaring that he originally took up arms to protect the rights of his country, and that he had acquiesced in the Declaration of Independence, although he thought it premature, he stated that the rejection of the overtures made by Great Britain, in 1778, and the alliance concluded with France, had led him to examine the subject, and, finally, to abandon the American cause. This was followed, in about a fortnight, by a proclamation, addressed to the army, inviting them to follow his example, and offering great inducements for their encouragement.

In January, 1781, he made a diversion into Virginia, with about seventeen hundred men and a suitable naval force, and committed extensive ravages on the rivers and along the unprotected coasts.

In the fall of the same year he paid a similar visit to Connecticut, capturing forts Griswold and Trumbull, burning the city of New London, and committing other outrages, adding fresh leaves to the chaplet which adorned his brows, and riveting still stronger the chains of infamy with which he was bound.

At the close of the war he resided chiefly in England. In 1786, and again in 1790 to 1793, he was engaged in trade at St. Johns, New Brunswick, where he became very unpopular, and was the cause of much commotion.

He died in Gloucester Place, London, June 14th, 1801,

"Unwept, unhonored, and unsung."

He was twice married, first to Margaret Mansfield, who died June 19th, 1775, and is buried in the cemetery at New Haven, Connecticut, where a neat headstone marks her resting-place; and secondly, to Margaret Shippen, of Philadelphia, who survived him, and died in London, August 24th, 1804, aged forty-three years.

"He fought bravely for his country, and he bled in her cause, but she owes him no gratitude, for his subsequent conduct proved that he had no regard for her interests."

V.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ETHAN ALLEN.

Ethan Allen was born at Woodbury, Connecticut, in 1738. His parents, shortly afterwards, removed to Salisbury; and, at an early age, he himself removed to the New Hampshire grants, now the State of Vermont. When the troubles arose respecting the sovereignty of that district, in 1770, he took a leading part in favor of "The Green-Mountain Boys," against the claims of New York, and an act of outlawry against him was passed by that State, and fifty pounds reward offered for his person. The party to which he was attached was too strong to permit him to be disturbed, and he lived without molestation until the Revolution called him to other scenes.

The movements related in this chapter, and the part he took in them, relieved him of all farther trouble, and brought him forward among the popular leaders of the day.

In the same year (1775) he was sent twice to Canada, to observe the dispositions of the people, and to attach them, if possible, to the American cause. During his second visit he met Colonel Brown, of Pittsfield, referred to in this chapter, and was induced to attack Montreal, in concert with him, in which Allen failed and was taken prisoner. After being kept in irons for some time, in Canada, he was sent to England for trial, suffering great hardships on the passage across the Atlantic. On his arrival in England he was closely confined in Pendennis Castle, near Falmouth, where he remained until January 8, 1776, when he was carried, by a circuitous route, to Halifax; and thence, in October, to New York, where he remained a prisoner until exchanged for Colonel Campbell, in May, 1778.

After repairing to head-quarters, and offering his services to General Washington, he returned to Vermont, where he was received with every possible evidence of popular favor. He was appointed to the command of the militia of the district a short time afterwards, but he never took the field for active duty.

From 1780 to the close of the war, in connection with the leading men of Vermont, Ethan Allen was engaged in an active correspondence

with the king's government in Canada, with an expressed willingness to withdraw that territory and its inhabitants from the confederacy, and, like Arnold, to seek reconciliation with the king's government. The subject was well understood by the Continental Congress and by General Washington, and was the fruitful source of much anxiety to both; while to New York, to whom the jurisdiction of the territory belonged, it was no less a source of trouble, inasmuch as it not only extended comfort to her enemies, but despoiled her of a large portion of her territory. Ira Allen, Ethan's brother, who was a principal party in these negotiations, has left an extended account of the transactions, in his "History of Vermont," published in London, in 1798; and Governor Slade, in the "State Papers of Vermont," also alludes to the same subject, to both which works the curious in such matters are respectfully referred.

He died of apoplexy, at his estate near Colchester, February 13, 1789, and is buried in a beautiful cemetery near Burlington.

His first wife was Mary Brownson, of Roxbury; his second, Frances, daughter of Colonel Brush, of the British army.

General Allen possessed natural powers of mind, but they were never improved by education. He was brave, humane, and generous; and had the faculty of gaining the confidence and affection of his unpolished neighbors to a remarkable degree. In religion, he was a free-thinker, and passed for infidel. Unfortunately for his memory, he aspired to authorship, and left a work which was intended to ridicule the doctrine of Moses and the prophets. It has been said by a venerable divine, that "it would be unjust to bring against it the charge of having effected great mischief in the world, for few have had the patience to read it."

CHAPTER III.

May 11, 1775.

THE ACTION OFF MACHIAS.

THE first naval action of the Revolutionary War, like the first battle on land, was the result of a spontaneous, popular movement, originated, carried on, and consummated by *the people*, in their original, sovereign capacity, without orders from, or accountability to, any Committee of Safety, Provincial Congress, or other body or officer of their creation. It was an uprising of the people, in their might, for the redress of grievances imposed upon them by their government; and, having been blessed with ultimate success, like most other contests of that era, it has been the subject of congratulation, its authors have been immortalized, and the world has rung with the glory of the achievement. Had the result been different, however, posterity would have classed Colonel Barrett, and Jeremiah O'Brien, and George Washington, with the Wat Tylers, and Thomas Muncers, and Oliver Cromwells of European history, and consigned their names and their patriotic deeds, with those of their illustrious predecessors, blackened with all that malignant enmity could invent, to everlasting ridicule and contempt.

In the early part of May, 1775, an armed schooner, in the king's service, called *The Margaretta*, was lying in the port of Machias, in the district of Maine, having two sloops under her convoy that were loading with lumber for the use of the king's government at Boston.

On Saturday, the ninth of May, intelligence of the affair at Lexington and Concord reached Machias, and arrangements were immediately made to seize the Margaretta and her convoy, for the use of the commonwealth. For this purpose, the captain of the vessel which brought intelligence of the battle was enjoined to communicate it to no other person until Monday; and arrangements were made to seize Captain Moore and his officers, while they attended meeting on the following day. On Sunday the officers landed and entered the meeting-house, when those who were watching the movement rushed towards them with an evident intention to seize them,—creating considerable excitement, in the midst of which the officers jumped out of the windows and escaped to their vessel. The hostile disposition of the inhab-

itants having thus been manifested, springs were got on the Margaretta's cables, her broadside was laid to the town, and some harmless shot were fired over it, evidently for the purpose of intimidating those who had participated in the affair. Shortly afterwards Captain Moore considered it prudent to drop down the river to Scott's Wharf, about four miles below the town, where she was followed by a small party, headed by one Foster, and fired upon from a high bank which was so near the vessel that her guns could not be brought to bear. To escape this second interference, the vessel was carried down to the bay, where she was anchored, and remained all night.

On the following morning (Monday, May 11), two young men, Joseph Wheaton and Dennis O'Brien, happened to meet on the wharf at Machias, and the adventure of the previous day naturally becoming a subject of conversation, the former—a New York boy, temporarily residing in Machias—proposed an expedition against the fugitive Margaretta. To accomplish this, he proposed to seize one of the timber sloops, then lying in the stream, to haul her alongside the wharf, to beat up for volunteers, and to sail down the river to the anchorage of the schooner. Dennis O'Brien, ready for an adventure, concurred in the proposition, and two others, Peter Calbreth and — Kraft, who were near by, were called, and joined the party. Without any delay, this small party went on board the sloop, commanded by Captain Job

Haines, secured her crew, brought her alongside the wharf, jumped upon the bank, took off their hats, and gave three hearty cheers. The attention of the people having been drawn to the spot, Wheaton explained the proposed expedition, showing the part which had been already accomplished, and called for volunteers to assist in prosecuting the enterprise. Among those who came down to the river was Jeremiah O'Brien, an athletic, gallant man, possessing a good character, and commanding the confidence of those among whom he lived. Casting his eye around him, he was inspired with courage from the determined air of those among whom he stood, and, raising his voice above its ordinary tone, he observed: "*My boys, we can do it.*" Instantly every one present volunteered, and arms, ammunition, and provisions were immediately collected.

It was not long before they were ready to sail, where every hand was a willing one, and every heart beat in unison. Their equipment consisted of twenty fowling-pieces, with an average of three charges for each, thirteen pitchforks, ten or twelve narrow axes, a few pieces of salt pork, part of a bag of bread, and a barrel of water; and, with this supply, they set sail with a fair wind—a gentle breeze from the northwest. Profiting from the experience he had already acquired, Captain Moore, of the Margaretta, had kept a watch on the movement, and when the sloop left the wharf, the anchor of the schooner was weighed, and every sail was set to

avoid the persevering foe. Passing a very high and bold point of land, the wind being quite fresh, the schooner jibed her mainsail and carried away her boom. Thus crippled, she made, comparatively, but little headway until she reached Holmes' Bay, where Captain Robert Avery, commanding a vessel from Windsor, supplied her with a boom, and she proceeded on her course. By this time the sloop in chase hove in sight, and the schooner immediately shaped her course for Boston, standing well out to sea, hoping thereby to avoid her. The breeze continuing to freshen, with the wind on the quarter, the sloop proved to be the best sailer, and the Margaretta was speedily overhauled, notwithstanding the latter cut away three of her boats and opened a heavy fire on the sloop, killing a man named Neal, who was engaged in firing a wall-piece. This piece was immediately occupied by a man named Knight, who discharged it with great effect, killing the man at the Margaretta's helm, and clearing her quarter-deck. She instantly broached to, and the sloop's crew gave her a general discharge. Almost at the same instant the sloop's bowsprit came in contact with the main shrouds of the schooner, throwing the two vessels into such a position that a second volley was fired from the sloop with great effect. The crew of the latter was considerably annoyed by Captain Moore, who had commenced to throw hand-grenades. Two had been thrown, and he was engaged in preparing to throw a third, when he received two

balls in the breast, and fell. The gallant commander of the Margaretta having fallen, the crew made but little further resistance, and the vessel was boarded and carried; Joseph Wheaton lowering her colors—the first naval victory of the United Colonies of America.

The armament of the sloop has been already noticed. Her crew numbered less than thirty, of whom Jeremiah O'Brien, on the nomination of Wheaton, was chosen the commander, a few minutes before the attack opened on the Margaretta. The schooner carried four (some say ten) six-pounders, twenty swivels, two wall-pieces, forty muskets, forty cutlasses, forty pikes, forty boarding-axes, two boxes of hand-grenades, and ten pairs of pistols, with an ample supply of powder and ball. She was manned with two commissioned officers and thirty-eight warrant and petty officers and men—forty in all.

The exact loss, on either side, has not been recorded, but it is not supposed to have exceeded twenty in the aggregate.

It has been appropriately said of this affair, by one of America's most honored authors: "It was the Lexington of the sea, for, like that celebrated land conflict, it was a rising of the people against a regular force, was characterized by a long chase, a bloody struggle, and a triumph. It was also the first blow struck on the water, after the war of the American Revolution had actually commenced."

[NOTE.—This sketch is compiled entirely from Goldsborough's *Naval Chronicle* and Cooper's *Naval History of the United States*.]

C H A P T E R I V.

May 27, 1775.

THE AFFAIR ON NODDLE'S ISLAND.

ABOUT six hundred and sixty yards northeast from Boston, and about the same distance from Charlestown, lies the flourishing settlement of East Boston. Although it is entirely of modern growth, few places show the enterprising spirit of the age, and of the people among whom it is situated, better than East Boston. The Cunard line of steamers have their wharf there; the terminus of the Eastern Railroad is on one of its wharves; while manufacturing establishments and extensive ship-yards are scattered throughout the place.¹ It is separated from Chelsea by Chelsea Creek, about six hundred feet wide,² and, at the time of which we treat, at low tide, the water was not over three feet deep.³

Northeast from East Boston is a smaller island, known as Hog Island, which, like that on which East Boston is situated, is separated from the mainland by Chelsea Creek.⁴

These islands,—the former known as

Noddle's, the latter as Hog Island,—in the spring of 1775, and for years before and after that time, were used only for pasturage; and, at the time of which we treat, the former was occupied by Mr. Williams, of Boston; the latter, by Mr. Oliver Wendell, of Boston, and Mr. Jonathan Jackson, of Newburyport.¹

To prevent the enemy from securing the cattle and sheep which were on these and other islands in the harbor, the Committee of Safety, on the 14th of May, resolved, as its opinion, "that all the live-stock be taken from Noddle's Island, Hog Island, and Snake Island, and from that part of Chelsea near the coast, and be driven back. And that the execution of this business be committed to the Committee of Correspondence and selectmen of the towns of Medford, Malden, Chelsea, and Lynn, and that they be supplied with such a number of men as they shall need, from the regiment now at Medford."² It appears that no action was taken on the

¹ Barber's Historical Collections of Massachusetts, p. 538; Homans' History of Boston, p. 141.—² Barber, p. 538.

³ Frothingham, p. 109; Humphrey's Putnam, pp. 69, 70.

⁴ Ibid.

¹ American Archives, 4th Series, ii. fol. 719.

² Minutes of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, May 14, 1775.

subject by the towns to whom it was referred, but the committee did not lose sight of it, and, on the 24th of May, it "recommended to Congress immediately to take such order respecting the removal of the sheep and hay from Noddle's Island as they may judge proper, together with the stock on the adjacent islands."¹ Although there is no minute on the journals of the Provincial Congress that this "recommendation" ever reached that body, there seems to be but little doubt respecting the effect of the Committee's resolution.²

About eleven o'clock on Saturday, May 27th, a detachment of between twenty and thirty men went from Chelsea to Hog Island, and from thence to Noddle's Island, to drive the stock and to secure the hay referred to in the resolutions of the Committee of Safety. They were opposed by a party of forty marines, who had been stationed there to protect the stock;³ and a schooner and sloop, well armed, and a large number of marines, in boats, were dispatched from the enemy's fleet to strengthen the guard, as soon as the movement had been discovered. Before the reinforcement reached the island, however, the colonists had secured and sent off two fine English stallions, two colts, and

three cows; killed fifteen horses, two colts, and three cows; and burned a large barn full of salt hay, and an old farm-house. By this time the reinforcements came within gunshot, and the colonists retreated to a ditch, where they lay in ambush until they obtained a chance to fire on the marines, when they killed two and wounded two more, one of whom died soon after. Satisfied with this success, they immediately retreated to Hog Island, where they were joined by the remainder of the detachment who had been ordered to take part in the movement,—about two hundred in number,—and drove off all the stock which was on that island—"between three and four hundred sheep and lambs, some cows, horses, &c.;" the enemy contenting himself with firing on them from Noddle's Island, and from the vessels, without landing on Hog Island.¹

Having safely accomplished the object of the movement, the commander—whose name does not appear—drew up his men on Chelsea Neck, sent for a reinforcement, and showed a desire to fight. About nine o'clock in the evening, this reinforcement, consisting of three hundred men and two pieces of cannon, reached Chelsea, with Colonel Israel Putnam and Dr. Joseph Warren among them.²

¹ Minutes of Committee of Safety, May 24, 1775.

² Mr. Frothingham says the committee "directed the stock to be driven from the islands." Although this is not correct, as the language of their resolutions show, the effect was the same, and such a "direction" might easily be supposed to have been given.

³ "Circumstantial Account of the Battle at Chelsea, Hog Island, &c.," in Am. Archives; Humphrey's Putnam, p. 70.

¹ "Circumstantial Account, &c.," in Am. Archives; "Letter from the Camp, June 1, 1775, to a gentleman in New York," in the same; Frothingham's Siege, p. 109; Bancroft, vii. p. 363; Gordon, ii. pp. 24, 25; History of the Civil War, i. p. 79; Humphrey's Putnam, pp. 69, 70.

² It is claimed that Col. Putnam assumed command of the party, and he has received the honor which the commander, whoever he may have been, was entitled to. It

Colonel Putnam immediately went down to the beach and hailed the schooner, offering the men good quarters if they would surrender. They answered the summons with two cannon-shot, which were immediately returned by the colonists, and a sharp fire ensued from both sides, which was kept up until eleven o'clock, when the schooner's crew abandoned her, taking to the boats which had been sent to their assistance from the ships in the harbor.

The schooner, thus abandoned, drifted on the Winnisimmett ferry-ways; and the next morning, after removing four four-pounders, twelve swivels, her sails and rigging, the clothes and other effects of the crew, &c., some hay was carried under her stern, and she was set on fire, under a heavy fire from the sloop and Noddle's Island Hill.

The colonists promptly returned the fire of the sloop, and with so good an effect that her crew was unable to manage her, and she was saved only by the boats which were sent off to her assistance.¹

This affair, for obvious reasons, was magnified into a "battle;" and the effect of it was beneficial to the cause of America, so far as the gallant example of the soldiers could produce such an effect. It may be doubted, however, if, when all the circumstances are considered, it was not a serious disaster, since it was owing mainly to his presence with this party, on the beach at Chelsea, that Putnam was elevated to the post of major-general in the continental army,² at the expense, to the country, of the services of some of her best officers.³

has also been denied that he commanded, and with some reason. The troops were New Hampshire and Massachusetts troops, and Col. Putnam had no *right* to give them *orders*, and the practice of those times forbade the assumption of such a power. It is more likely that, like Dr. Warren, he was a volunteer, and that the only influence he exercised was that produced by his activity.

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¹ "Circumstantial Account, &c.,;" Letter from Camp, June 1, 1775; Frothingham, pp. 109, 110; Bancroft, vii. p. 363; Gordon, ii. pp. 24, 25; History of the Civil War, i. p. 70; Humphrey's Putnam, pp. 69, 70.

² Roger Sherman to Gen. Wooster, June 23, 1775.

³ Gen Washington to President of Congress, July 10, 1775.

CHAPTER V.

JUNE 17, 1775.

BATTLE OF BUNKER'S HILL

THE minute-men and militia, who had hurried away to Boston, on the receipt of the news from Lexington, had gradually returned to their homes,¹ and their places had been filled with troops enlisted for terms of service, varying from three to twelve months in extent;² yet, notwithstanding the dissolution of the old force, and the organization of a new army, the same degree of vigilance had been kept up in preventing any communication between the town and the main-land.³

The dishonorable position which the king's army was thus compelled to occupy,⁴ and the serious inconvenience which the want of vegetables and fresh provisions had produced,⁵ at length led General Gage to entertain and discuss the subject of a movement outside the town; and the occupation of the several heights, near Charlestown, at Dorches-

ter, and other adjacent points, was determined on.¹ When the information of this projected movement reached the camp at Cambridge, as it speedily did,² measures were adopted to frustrate it. The Committee of Safety provided for "an immediate augmentation of the army," "and ordered that all the militia in the colony should hold themselves in readiness to march on the shortest notice, completely equipped, having thirty rounds of cartridge per man," recommending, at the same time, "that Bunker's Hill be maintained by sufficient force being posted there;" and, as the particular situation of Dorchester Neck was unknown, the Council of War was desired to take and pursue such steps respecting the same as to them should appear to be for the security of the colony.³

¹ Heath's Memoirs, p. 18.—² Ibid., p. 17; Mass. Com. to Selectmen of Bradford, June 25, 1775.—³ Irving, i. p. 462.—⁴ Bancroft, vii. p. 406; Irving's Washington, i. pp. 462, 463; Frothingham's Siege, p. 114; Hall's Civil War, p. 77; Lossing's Washington, i. p. 555.

⁵ D'Bernicre's Narrative; Letter from Boston, June 23, 1775; Letter from delegate from Virginia—Phila., July 5, 1775; Lushington's Lord Harris, pp. 50-52.

¹ Frothingham's Siege, pp. 114, 115; Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20, 1775; Burgoyne to Lord Stanley, Document II.; Bancroft, vii. p. 407.

² Minutes of Com. of Safety, June 15; Frothingham, pp. 115, 116; Stedman, i. p. 125; Bancroft, vii. p. 407; Gordon, ii. p. 39; Irving's Washington, i. pp. 464, 465.

³ Minutes of Com. of Safety, June 15; Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20; Bancroft, vii. pp. 407, 408; Gordon, ii. p. 39.

Accordingly, on Monday, June 16th, 1775, measures were taken to occupy and maintain possession of Bunker's Hill.¹ Orders were issued for the regiments under Colonels Prescott, Frye, and Bridge, all belonging to Massachusetts,² and a fatigue party of two hundred Connecticut troops, under Captain Thomas Knowlton,³ to parade on Cambridge Common, at six o'clock in the evening;⁴ and Captain Samuel Gridley's company of artillery, numbering forty-nine men, with two field-pieces, was also ordered to parade at the same time and place.⁵ The men were directed to take with them their packs and blankets, with provisions for twenty-four hours, and the intrenching tools belonging to the camp;⁶ but the character of the service to which they were ordered was not divulged even to the officers.⁷

At the appointed time a portion only of the men ordered from the Massachusetts troops, the detachment under Captain Knowlton, and the artillery under Captain Gridley, numbering altogether about a thousand men,⁸ appeared on the Common; and the command was as-

sumed by Colonel William Prescott, of Pepperell, to whom written orders had been given by General Ward.¹ The men, thus assembled, were mostly husbandmen; and the graphic description of the appearance of the troops, at that time, by an eye-witness,² furnishes a fair picture of this important party. "To a man," says he, "they wore small-clothes, coming down and fastening just below the knee, and long stockings, with cow-hide shoes, ornamented by large buckles, while not a pair of boots graced the company. The coats and waistcoats were loose and of huge dimensions, with colors as various as the barks of oak, sumach, and other trees and shrubs of our hills and swamps could make them. Their shirts were all made of flax, and, like every other part of the dress, were home-made. On their heads were worn large, round-top, and broad-brimmed hats. Their arms were as various as their costume: here an old soldier carried a heavy Queen Anne's musket, with which he had done service in the conquest of Canada, many years before; while by his side walked a stripling with a Spanish fusée, not half its weight or calibre, which his grandfather may have taken at the Havana; while not a few had old French pieces, which dated back to the siege of Louisburg. Instead of a cartridge-box, a large powder-horn was slung under the arm, and occasionally a bayonet might be seen bristling in the ranks. Some of the

¹ Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20; Bancroft, vii. p. 408.—² Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. p. 408; Bradford's Massachusetts, i. p. 385; Irving's Washington, i. p. 465; Frothingham, p. 121.

³ Letter from Wethersfield, June 22, 1775; Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Irving, i. p. 465; Frothingham, pp. 121, 122.

⁴ Frothingham, pp. 121, 122; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 539.—⁵ Irving, i. p. 465; Frothingham, p. 121.

⁶ Letter from Wethersfield, June 22, 1775; Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Irving's Washington, i. p. 465; Frothingham, p. 121.—⁷ Irving, i. p. 465.

⁸ Mass. Com. of Safety's account, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 408; Gordon, ii. p. 39; Marshall, ii. p. 289; Ramsay's Am. Rev., i. p. 201.

¹ Frothingham, p. 122; Irving, i. p. 465.

² Cited in Kidder's New Ipswich.

swords of the officers had been made by our province blacksmiths, perhaps from some farming utensil, and appeared serviceable, but heavy and uncouth."

All necessary preparations having been made, a fervent and impressive prayer was offered by Dr. Langdon, the president of Harvard College,¹ and, about nine o'clock,² the little party took up its line of march, headed by two sergeants, carrying dark-lanterns,³ and by Colonels Prescott and Richard Gridley, the venerable engineer-in-chief;⁴ while the wagons, containing the tools, followed in the rear.⁵

"With hushed voices and silent tread" they proceeded on their way,⁶ knowing their country had called them, but ignorant of their destination until they had reached the neck which connects Charlestown with the main,⁷ where they were joined by Major Brooks;⁸ and a company of Massachusetts troops, under Captain Nutting, and ten men from Captain Knowlton's command, were ordered to proceed to the lower part of the town as a guard.⁹

The main body, proceeding over Bunker's Hill,¹⁰ halted at the foot of Breed's

Hill;¹ and Colonel Prescott, calling around him the officers of his command, communicated to them the orders he had received,² and asked their advice respecting the site and plan of the proposed intrenchment.³ General Putnam and another general, whose name is not given, are said to have been present, and participated in the council,⁴ but the veteran Gridley—whose noble old ancestor, "an honest poore man," suffered for conscience' sake, with Anne Hutchinson and John Wheel-right⁵—was the master-spirit of the conference.⁶ The Committee of Safety had recommended Bunker's Hill,⁷ but orders had been given "to march to Breed's Hill, in Charlestown,"⁸ and Prescott was too good a soldier to disobey, particularly when the latter position was better adapted to secure the object of the expedition,⁹ and better suited the daring spirits of his companions.¹⁰

The lines of a redoubt, about eight rods square,¹¹ were accordingly drawn by the engineers on Breed's Hill,¹² and a little after twelve o'clock the work was commenced.¹³ More accustomed to

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 408; Irving, i. p. 465; Frothingham, p. 122.—² Stedman, i. p. 125; Com. of Safety's account, Document III.; Irving, i. p. 465; Frothingham, p. 122.

³ Irving, i. p. 466; Frothingham, p. 122.

⁴ Frothingham, p. 122; Irving, i. p. 466; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 539.—⁵ Letter from Wethersfield, June 22; Frothingham, p. 122.—⁶ Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Stedman, i. p. 125; Frothingham, p. 122.

⁷ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 539. It does not appear that the orders were read at that time, but the route clearly indicated the object of the expedition.

⁸ Irving, i. p. 466; Frothingham, p. 122.—⁹ Frothingham, p. 123.—¹⁰ Irving, i. p. 466; Frothingham, p. 123.

¹ Frothingham, p. 123. —² Ibid. —³ Ibid.; Irving, i. p. 467; Bancroft, vii. p. 409.—⁴ Frothingham, p. 123; Irving, i. p. 467.—⁵ Winthrop's Journal, i. p. 296; Weld's Short Story, &c., p. 31.—⁶ Bancroft, vii. p. 409.

⁷ Minutes of Com. of Safety, June 15.

⁸ Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. p. 409.

⁹ Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Irving, i. p. 467; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 539.—¹⁰ Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Frothingham, p. 123.—¹¹ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Peter Brown to his mother, June 25; Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Frothingham, p. 135.

¹² Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Frothingham, p. 124.

¹³ Letter from Is. Lothrop, June 22; Com. of Safety's account, Document III.; Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish,

the use of the shovel and the pickaxe than to that of the musket or the sabre, and animated with the consciousness of being engaged in a righteous cause, and of the necessity of securing shelter before the break of day, "the patriotic laborers" silently, but faithfully, prosecuted the work which they had been ordered to perform;¹ and rapidly and surely the breastwork "assumed form, and height, and capacity for defence."²

The close proximity of the enemy, and the consequent danger of discovery, was the source of constant anxiety to Colonel Prescott, notwithstanding the presence of the sentries whom he had posted on the shore;³ and twice, in company with Major Brooks, he visited the margin of the river to make personal examinations of the neighborhood,⁴ and heard the drowsy sentinels, like the false prophets of old, proclaim "All's well."⁵ The last time he went down, a little before daylight, he ordered the sentries to join the main body on the hill.⁶

By daybreak the work on the redoubt was nearly completed;⁷ and soon afterwards the sentry on the Lively,

man-of-war, discovered it,¹ and called the attention of the officer on duty to the novel work. Without waiting for orders from the admiral,² the captain of the Lively immediately put a spring on her cable,³ opened a fire on the redoubt,⁴ and sent a boat on shore with the strange intelligence.⁵ The report of the guns, "breaking the calmness of a fine summer morning,"⁶ alarmed both friend and foe;⁷ and, in the town especially, it was not long before every available spot was occupied by citizens of the town, by the king's troops, or by tory refugees from the country, all anxiously gazing with wonder and surprise, and with pleasure or indignation, as their sentiments might dictate, upon the work which had so wonderfully arisen from the earth,⁸ and upon "the rebels," who, like busy bees, were still actively engaged in strengthening their position.⁹ Admiral Graves immediately ordered the Lively to suspend her fire,¹⁰ and the colonists on the hill were permitted to go on with their work without further molestation until about nine o'clock,¹¹ when the fire of a battery of

¹ Letter from Wethersfield, June 22; Do. from Boston, June 24; Do. from Boston, June 25; Irving, i. p. 468.

² Irving, i. p. 468; Frothingham, p. 125.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20, 1775; Letter from Boston, June 25; Gage's Dispatch, Document I.; Gage to Lord Dunmore, June 26; Stedman, i. p. 126.

⁵ Letter from British officer, June 18, 1775.

⁶ Frothingham, p. 125.—⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 410; Gordon, ii. p. 40; Frothingham, p. 125.

⁸ Bancroft, vii. p. 410; Irving, i. p. 469.

⁹ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 410; Gordon, ii. p. 40; Irving, ii. p. 472.

¹⁰ Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775; Peter Brown's letter to his mother, June 25, 1775; Frothingham, p. 125.

¹¹ Letter from Boston, June 24, 1775; Do., June 25.

July 22, 1775; Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Gordon, ii. p. 39.

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Gordon, ii. pp. 39, 40; Irving, i. p. 467.—² Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Irving, i. p. 468.

³ Irving, i. p. 467; Frothingham, p. 124, 125; Bancroft, vii. p. 409.—⁴ Irving, i. p. 467; Frothingham, p. 125; Bancroft, vii. p. 409.

⁵ Ezekiel, xiii, verse 10; Bancroft, vii. p. 409; Irving, i. p. 468.—⁶ Frothingham, p. 125; Irving, i. p. 468.—⁷ Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20, 1775, Letter from Boston, June 25; Stedman, i. p. 126; Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. 410; Heath's Memoirs, p. 18.

three twenty-four pounders and three howitzers¹ was opened on them from the works on Copp's Hill, at the northern extremity of the town;² and the Glasgow, man-of-war, which was anchored in the neighborhood, also opened her fire on the redoubt.³

About eleven o'clock the colonists mostly ceased their labor on the works, piling their tools in the rear, and patiently awaited the arrival of refreshments and reinforcements, which General Ward had promised to send to them.⁴ At this time the redoubt had been supplied with platforms of wood and earth, upon which the troops could stand while firing upon the enemy.⁵ A breastwork had also been built, extending from the northeast corner of the redoubt, in a northerly direction, about a hundred yards, towards a swamp, which laid at the foot of the hill,⁶ but the fire of the enemy had prevented its completion;⁷ and a sally-port, which had been left between the south end of the breastwork and the northeast corner of the redoubt, had been protected by a blind.⁸ This breastwork had also been supplied with a platform similar to that constructed within the redoubt.⁹

¹ Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775; Gage's Dispatch, Document I.; Gage to Dunmore, June 26, 1775.

² Letter from Wethersfield, June 22; Do. from Boston, June 25; Bancroft, vii. p. 410; Bradford's Mass., i. p. 384; Gordon, ii. p. 40.—³ Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775.—⁴ Bancroft, vii. p. 412; Irving, i. p. 472; Frothingham, p. 129.—⁵ Frothingham, p. 125.

⁶ Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. p. 410; Frothingham's "Who commanded on B. Hill." It did not extend all the distance to "*the slough*," as generally supposed, but only *towards* it.—⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 410; Page's Map of Bunker's Hill, 1776.—⁸ Frothingham, p. 135.—⁹ Ibid.

The men were suffering from fatigue, heat, and the want of refreshments;¹ many of them having neglected to supply themselves the preceding evening, in conformity with the orders which had been issued,² and none had yet arrived from the camp at Cambridge. The venerable Gridley, whose advanced years rendered him less capable of enduring fatigue, had been compelled to withdraw from the hill,³ although he returned again, in his sulky,⁴ before the close of the day;⁵ and Colonel Bridge and Lieutenant-colonel Brickett, being indisposed, could render but little service,⁶ and the most of the men under their command deserted the party;⁷—leaving Colonel Prescott in the redoubt, with three hundred men of his own regiment;⁸ and Captain Knowlton, with the two hundred Connecticut troops, stationed behind a fence, to protect the position.⁹ But all this produced no dismay or hesitation in either Prescott or Knowlton,¹⁰—kindred spirits, than whom none were more worthy to hold the posts of honor which they held on Bunker's Hill, or to receive the unbounded gratitude, yet unpaid, of their redeemed country. The former, to inspire confidence, mounted the parapet,

¹ Bancroft, vii. pp. 411, 412; Irving, i. p. 471; Frothingham, p. 126.—² Frothingham, p. 126.

³ Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. p. 410; Frothingham, p. 184.—⁴ Frothingham, p. 184.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. p. 411.

⁷ Peter Brown to his mother, June 25, 1775; Prescott's letter, Document IV.

⁸ After Brickett's men (Frye's regiment) and Bridge's men had deserted, those of Prescott, Knowlton, and Gridley were all who remained.

⁹ Frothingham, p. 136.—¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 166, 189.

and deliberately passed to and fro, with one of his captains, to examine the works and give directions to his officers,¹ while the balls from the enemy's artillery whistled around him.² He had reluctantly consented to dispatch messengers to Cambridge for reinforcements and provisions;³ but, with the exception of Reed's and Stark's regiments, none had been sent,—General Ward feeling anxious to avoid the hazard of a fight.⁵

In the mean time, the enemy was not wholly inactive. Taking advantage of a flood-tide, several vessels and floating batteries were brought up and moored where their fire could be rendered most effective;⁶ and, at half-past eleven o'clock, pursuant to orders, the ten oldest companies of grenadiers and light-infantry, and the fifth and thirty-eighth regiments, with blankets, ammunition, and provisions for three days,⁷ marched to the Long Wharf;⁸ while ten companies more of grenadiers and light-infantry, the forty-third and fifty-second regi-

ments, received similar orders to march to the North Battery;¹ and the forty-seventh regiment, the first battalion of marines, and some companies of light-infantry and grenadiers were ordered to proceed to the Battery, after the former should embark, and there await orders.² The remainder of the troops in the town were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning.³

About twelve o'clock the ships and batteries commenced to fire, more furiously, if possible, than ever.⁴ The Somerset, two floating batteries, and the battery on Copp's Hill, poured shot upon the works on the hill; the Falcon and the Lively commanded the low grounds in front of the works and the slope of the hill; while two floating batteries, the Symmetry, armed transport, and the Glasgow, man-of-war, commanded the Neck.⁵ About the same time the troops embarked at the North Battery and the Long Wharf; and when a blue flag was raised as a signal,⁶ the fleet of barges slowly moved towards Charlestown,⁷ under the command of Major-general Howe and Brigadier-general Pigot,⁸ and landed on the

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 411; Frothingham, p. 126; Irving, i. p. 469.

² It is said that while Prescott was thus engaged, Gen. Gage, in company with his officers and some of the leading civilians, was examining the works on the hill with a spy-glass. The tall, commanding figure of Prescott arrested his attention, and Willard, a royalist, who was near him, recognized the form of his brother-in-law, and informed the general who it was. "Will he fight?" anxiously inquired Gage; and when Willard replied, "He will, to the last drop of his blood," the General received an earnest of that which, before the setting of the sun, was confirmed by sad reality.

³ Frothingham, pp. 127, 128, 166; Bancroft, vii. p. 411.

⁴ Frothingham, p. 128; Bancroft, vii. p. 411; Irving, i. p. 471.—⁵ Frothingham, p. 129; Bancroft, vii. p. 414.

⁶ Frothingham, p. 129.—⁷ Stedman, i. p. 128.—⁸ Frothingham, p. 130; Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775.

¹ Frothingham, p. 130; Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775.—² Frothingham, p. 130.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20; Irving, i. p. 473; Frothingham, p. 131.—⁵ Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775; Frothingham, p. 131; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 539.—⁶ Frothingham, p. 131.—⁷ Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 413; Gordon, ii. p. 41; Irving, i. p. 473; Frothingham, p. 131.

⁸ Gen. Brugoyne to Lord Stanley, Document II.; Gage's Dispatch, Document I.; Gage to Dunmore, June 26; Stedman, i. p. 126; Heath, p. 18.

east side of the peninsula,¹ near the mouth of the Mystic River, with the evident intention to outflank the colonists and make them prisoners.²

Pereceiving the object of General Howe, Colonel Prescott proceeded to arrange his men in such a manner as would best counteract the movement.³ Had the breastwork been completed to the low ground on the bank of the Mystic, it had been more difficult to outflank him;⁴ but the unfinished portion of the line had left a way open to the rear,⁵ and the small number of his troops, reduced by desertion⁶ to less than six hundred men,⁷ seemed to render a successful defence hopeless. But even then Preseott did not despair.

The enemy had advanced no farther than the first rising ground, when he halted, and sent back for reinforcements,⁸—the troops already on the ground quietly eating their dinner.⁹ Taking instant advantage of this delay, Colonel Preseott ordered Gridley, with his artillery, a company of artillery which had been sent from Cambridge,

and Knowlton, with the Connecticut troops, “to go and oppose them.”¹ About two hundred yards in the rear of the unfinished breastwork—in a northeasterly direction from it²—stood a line of posts with two rails, set in a low stone wall, extending, for about three hundred yards, from the Mystic towards the high ground in the centre of the peninsula.³ Immediately in the rear of the wall the earth had been cast up to it, forming a slight ditch at its base, and rendering the whole “something of a breastwork”⁴ against small-arms; and here the noble, lion-hearted Knowlton took his position, posting Gridley’s artillery on his left flank, on the margin of the river.⁵ He speedily strengthened his position by removing a rail-fence⁶ which stood in the neighborhood, and placing it a short distance in front of the wall,⁷ filling up the space between the two with the hay which lay in windrows or was cocked in the neighboring meadows.⁸

The delay caused by General Howe

¹ Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20; Prescott’s letter, Document IV.; Irving, i. p. 473; Frothingham, p. 131.

² Bancroft, vii. p. 413; Irving, i. p. 476.

³ Frothingham, p. 134; Bancroft, vii. p. 413.

⁴ Page’s Map of the Battle.—⁵ Frothingham, p. 135.

⁶ Prescott’s letter, Document IV.; Peter Brown’s letter, June 25; Bancroft, vii. p. 418; Heath’s Memoirs, p. 19; Frothingham, p. 147; Chester’s letter to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775.

⁷ The men belonging to his own regiment, Gridley’s artillery, and Knowlton’s command.

⁸ Letter from Boston, June 23; Gage’s Dispatch, Document I.; Stedman, i. p. 126; Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Gordon, ii. p. 41; Irving, i. p. 473; Frothingham, p. 132.—⁹ Bancroft, vii. p. 420; Irving, i. p. 473; Frothingham, p. 132.

¹ Prescott’s letter, Document IV.; Capt. Chester’s letter to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Peter Brown’s letter, June 25; Bancroft, vii. pp. 413, 414. Mr. Irving says Putnam ordered Knowlton to this position, but Putnam exercised no command until *after the close of the battle*.

² Page’s Map of Battle of Bunker’s Hill, 1776; Irving, i. p. 474; Frothingham, p. 135.

³ Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Page’s Map of Battle, 1776; Frothingham, p. 134.

⁴ Chester to Fish, July 22, 1775. See also Bancroft, vii. p. 414.—⁵ Frothingham, p. 134; Bancroft, vii. p. 414.

⁶ Chester to Fish, July 22; Bradford’s Mass., i. p. 384. Mr. Bancroft supposes this was “a post and rail fence;” but a moment’s reflection would have shown that *posts* could not have been “set” without *time and tools*, which Knowlton did not have.

⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 414; Gordon, ii. p. 43; Frothingham, p. 134.—⁸ Ibid.

sending for reinforcements, also enabled reinforcements to reach the hill from the camp at Cambridge. The landing of General Howe was speedily known at the camp;¹ and although General Ward still supposed it was a feint,² and refused to order any reinforcement,³ the bells were rung, the drums beat to arms, and officers and soldiers, actuated by the same spirit which led them to Boston when "the news from Lexington" was heard, hastened off towards the scene of strife, without knowing, or stopping to inquire, if it was agreeable to the General or to the Committee of Safety.⁴

Earliest on the field—a short time only before the enemy attacked the lines⁵—was a party of New Hampshire men, from Stark's and Reed's regiments, led on by Colonel John Stark, a veteran of the French War.⁶ Casting his experienced eye along the Mystic River (where the artillery had been ordered to take a position, but had not done so),⁷ he saw at once the weakness of that important point; and hastening to complete a temporary shelter to protect them, he posted at that spot a triple line of his men,⁸ and awaited the approach of the enemy. General Putnam

also,¹ and the veteran Pomeroy,² and the youthful but noble Warren,³ each serving as volunteers,⁴ assuming no command,⁵ were on the field,—Pomeroy at the fence,⁶ Warren at the redoubt,⁷ and Putnam wherever he supposed he could render any service.⁸ No others reached the field before the attack was commenced,⁹ and not over a hundred and fifty, of different regiments, and under various officers, before the retreat;¹⁰ although many more reached the Neck, but hesitated to venture over it, in the face of the enemy's fire;¹¹ or still later, reached the neighborhood only in season to witness the retreat of their gallant countrymen from the field of glory.¹² There is reason, therefore, to believe that the statements of those who participated in the action were correct,¹³ when they asserted that the whole number of those engaged, on the part of the colonists, including all such as reached the ground in time to participate, to any extent, in the affair, did not exceed fifteen hundred.

At length the reinforcements which General Howe had ordered reached the

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 43; Frothingham, pp. 133, 134.

² Bancroft, vii. p. 417; Gordon, ii. p. 43; Frothingham, p. 133.—³ Gordon, ii. p. 43; Bancroft, vii. p. 417; Irving, i. p. 475.—⁴ Frothingham, pp. 133–136; Bancroft, vii. pp. 417–420.—⁵ Bancroft, vii. pp. 417–420; Heath, p. 20.—⁶ Bancroft, vii. p. 417; Frothingham, p. 136.—⁷ Heath's Mem., p. 20; Bancroft, vii. p. 418; Irving, i. p. 475; Frothingham, p. 136.

⁸ Frothingham, p. 136; Irving, i. pp. 474, 477, 483.

⁹ Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. p. 419.

¹⁰ Bancroft, vii. p. 419.—¹¹ Letter from Camp, June 27, 1775; Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Peter Brown to his mother, June 25; Gordon, ii. p. 46; Marshall, ii. p. 293.—¹² Frothingham, p. 176.—¹³ Bancroft, vii. p. 421; Gordon, ii. p. 46; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 294.

¹ Letter from Wethersfield, June 22; Bancroft, vii. pp. 414, 415; Frothingham, p. 132.

² Bancroft, vii. p. 416.

³ Ibid.; Irving, i. p. 471.—⁴ Bancroft, vii. pp. 416, 417.

⁵ Bancroft, vii. p. 418; Irving, i. p. 474; Frothingham, p. 134.—⁶ Peter Brown (letter, June 25) says they numbered five hundred men. Bancroft, vii. p. 418; Irving, i. p. 474; Frothingham, p. 134; Col. Stark to N. H. Cong., June 19.—⁷ Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Peter Brown's letter, June 25; Bancroft, vii. p. 418.

⁸ Bancroft, vii. p. 419.

hill,¹ consisting of several companies of light-infantry and grenadiers, the forty-seventh regiment, and the first battalion of marines, under Major Pitcairn, the hero of Lexington,²—the whole making his force “near upon three thousand men.”³

Immediately afterwards, and before he advanced towards the lines,⁴ General Howe sent orders to Clinton and Burgoyne, who stood on Copp’s Hill battery and witnessed the battle,⁵ to set the town of Charlestown on fire,⁶ under the pretence that his flanking parties had been fired upon from the houses,⁷ the truth of which has been expressly denied.⁸ The order was promptly obeyed;⁹ a quantity of shells thrown from Copp’s Hill,¹⁰ and a party of men sent from the Somerset,¹¹ effectually destroying this fine town,¹² and leaving

nothing standing therein except the chimneys.

About half-past two,¹ General Howe, being now ready to advance against the lines, addressed his troops, appealing to their national pride and to their sense of the danger of their position in case of defeat.² “Gentlemen,” he said, “I am very happy in having the honor of commanding so fine a body of men: I do not in the least doubt but that you will behave like Englishmen, and as becometh good soldiers. If the enemy will not come from their intrenchments, we must drive them out, at all events, otherwise the town of Boston will be set on fire by them. I shall not desire one of you to go a step farther than where I go myself at your head. Remember, gentlemen, that we have no recourse to any resources, if we lose Boston, but to go on board our ships, which will be very disagreeable to us all.”

The enemy then advanced in two divisions,³ under a tremendous cannonade from the ships, the batteries, and the field-pieces;⁴—the right division, under General Howe, advancing against the rail-fence;⁵ the left, under General Pigot, advancing against the breast-work and redoubt.⁶

As soon as Colonel Prescott saw the enemy was in motion, he ordered

¹ Frothingham, p. 137.—² Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775; Frothingham, p. 137.—³ Frothingham, p. 137; Gordon, ii. p. 41; Marshall, ii. p. 293; Ramsay, i. pp. 202, 203.—⁴ Letter from Boston, June 25, 1775.

⁵ Burgoyne to Lord Stanley, Document II.; Bancroft, vii. 422.—⁶ Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.

⁷ Ibid.; Gage to Dunmore, June 26, 1775; Stedman, i. p. 126; Bancroft, vii. p. 422.

⁸ Gordon, ii. p. 41. The Mass. Com. of Safety (Document III.) state that “one or two regiments of provincials had been posted there,” but they evidently refer to the guard which “were already removed.”

⁹ Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.; Bancroft, vii. p. 422.—¹⁰ Mass. Cong. to Cont. Cong., June 20; Letter from Boston, June 25; Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.; Bancroft, vii. p. 422; Gordon, ii. p. 42.

¹¹ Bancroft, vii. 422; Frothingham, p. 143.

¹² Letter from Boston, June 24; Do. from Is. Lothrop, June 22; Mass. Cong. to Albany Com., June 28, 1775; Stedman, i. p. 126; Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Prescott’s letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii.

422; Frothingham, pp. 143, 144. Dr. Bartlett (*Sketch of Charlestown*) says: “This fire destroyed a meeting-house, court-house, prison, county-house, two school-houses, and a work-house, with upwards of 380 dwellings and other

buildings, valued, under oath, at \$523,000, and 2000 persons were reduced from affluence and mediocrity to poverty and exile.”

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 422.—² Frothingham, p. 137.

³ Stedman, i. p. 126; Bancroft, vii. 422; Frothingham, p. 138.—⁴ Stedman, i. p. 126; Bancroft, vii. p. 422; Irving, i. p. 476.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Ibid.

Lieutenant-colonel Robinson and Major Woods, both of his own regiment, with separate detachments, to flank the enemy,¹ a duty which they discharged to his entire satisfaction.² At the same time he went through the lines, encouraging his men, and instructing them in the line of their duty.³ "The red-coats will never reach the redoubt," said he,⁴ "if you will but withhold your fire till I give the order, and be careful not to shoot over their heads."

At this moment the scene was terribly grand. In front, on the one hand, the king's troops, advancing slowly up the hill,⁵ with all the pomp and circumstance which, especially at that time, characterized the European armies, presented a magnificent spectacle; and, on the other hand, a noble town of five hundred buildings bursting into a blaze,⁶ proclaimed, in language which could not be misunderstood, the presence of vandals acting under the authority of a *gracious* sovereign. Beyond these, in the stream, lay the vessels of war and floating batteries,⁷ belching forth volumes of fire and smoke, and appearing to compete, each with the others, in the work of death and destruction; while farther still in the rear rose the towers, and steeples, and masts of the shipping at the wharves of the town of Boston,—all of which, with the heights and tree-tops in the surrounding country, were

crowded with anxious spectators,¹ witnesses of the deed which was to confirm the assumptions of a despot, or establish, for all time to come, the great fundamental truths of civil and religious freedom. On the hill-top, behind the temporary "screen" which they had thrown up, undismayed by the novel but terrible scene which was spread before their inexperienced eyes, stood one hundred and fifty² of the yeomanry of Massachusetts, each suffering from fatigue, and hunger, and thirst;³ and all sadly deficient of the ammunition which was necessary to supply their trusty firelocks. At their head, it is true, were the cautious, experienced Prescott, and the zealous, true-hearted Warren, in both of whom the gallant band reposed the utmost confidence; yet the hundred and fifty were but novices in war, who had come forth to defend an abstract right rather than to contend for a questionable privilege. On their left, but farther in the rear, behind a screen, still more temporary than Prescott's, stood Knowlton and his two hundred companions, and Stark and Reed, with their five hundred men, who had come from distant States to

¹ Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.; Bancroft, vii. p. 423; Gordon, ii. p. 43; Irving, i. pp. 478, 479; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 292.—² Prescott's letter, Document IV. Gen. Putnam having insisted upon the removal of the intrenching tools from the lines on Breed's Hill, where they had been used, to the rear of Bunker's Hill, a large party had left Col. Prescott's command, with Gen. Putnam, to take them, and, as the colonel supposed would be the case, *they never returned to their post*, preferring to remain, *with Gen. Putnam*, on the rear of Bunker's Hill, out of the range of the shot fired by both parties.

³ Irving, i. p. 471; Frothingham, p. 133.

¹ Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Frothingham, p. 138.

² Ibid.; Bancroft, vii. p. 423.—³ Bancroft, vii. p. 423.

⁴ Ibid.; Frothingham, p. 140.—⁵ Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.—⁶ Ibid.; Gordon, ii. p. 43.—⁷ Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.; Bancroft, vii. 422.

sustain their brethren at Boston, and now calmly awaited the moment when they could seal the bond of union with their blood. There, too, with firelock in hand, stood the veteran Pomeroy,¹ whose seventy summers would have furnished a reason for repose, had a subject less important than this occupied the care and the attention of his country.

"With steady steps, and slow,"² the king's troops advanced to the attack, occasionally halting to allow the artillery to clear the way,³ and discharging their muskets, without judgment and without effect, on the works above.⁴

Encumbered with their heavy knapsacks, weighing upwards of a hundred and twenty-five pounds,⁵ with the grass reaching to their knees,⁶ and frequently interrupted by the fences and walls which intersected the slope,⁷ the men advanced with difficulty.

In the redoubt, and the adjacent breastwork, all remained silent until the enemy had advanced within eight rods,⁸ when Colonel Prescott gave the order to "Fire," and, at once, every gun was discharged.⁹ Accustomed to the

use of their pieces in the woods which surrounded the dwellings of most of them, and to cripple, if not to kill, the objects of their aim, it is not surprising that the effect of the colonists' fire was severe and unexpected to their enemy. It is said that nearly the entire front rank fell, and that the rest were brought to a stand.¹ Hastening to reload under the shelter of the parapet, and exposing themselves only while they stood upon the platform to take aim,² the colonists continued to pour an irregular, but constant and deadly, fire upon the enemy for several minutes,³ until, overcome with dismay, they retreated, in disordered masses, to the foot of the hill,⁴ and some even entered the boats.⁵

Nor was the column under Howe more successful in its attack on Knowlton, Stark, and Reed, at the fence on the bank of the Mystic. Having less elevation to ascend than their fellows, they moved forward over the marsh with great gallantry,⁶ although their field-pieces, in consequence of the softness of the ground, had to be left behind.⁷ When they had approached within eighty or a hundred yards of

¹ Frothingham, p. 136.—² Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 423; Heath's Mem., p. 19; Gordon, ii. pp. 41, 43; Frothingham, p. 140.—³ Gordon, ii. p. 41; Marshall, ii. p. 291; Bancroft, vii. p. 423.

⁴ Bradford, i. p. 385; Bancroft, vii. p. 423; Frothingham, p. 140.—⁵ Stedman, i. p. 128; Frothingham, p. 140.

⁶ Ibid.; Bancroft, vii. p. 423.—⁷ Gage to Dunmore, June 26, 1775; Stedman, i. p. 128; Bancroft, vii. p. 423; Frothingham, p. 140.—⁸ Col. Prescott, cited by Mr. Bancroft (vii. p. 424). The Mass. Com. of Safety (Document III.) say "ten or twelve rods," but I consider Prescott better authority.—⁹ Stedman, i. pp. 125, 126; Gordon, ii. p. 43; Irving, i. p. 476; Bancroft, vii. p. 424; Frothingham, p. 141.

¹ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 424; Gordon, ii. p. 43; Frothingham, p. 141.

² Bancroft, vii. p. 424; Frothingham, p. 141.

³ Stedman, i. p. 127; Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 424; Gordon, ii. pp. 43, 44; Frothingham, p. 141.—⁴ Stedman, i. p. 127; Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 424; Bradford, i. p. 385; Gordon, ii. p. 44.

⁵ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Gordon, ii. p. 44; Bancroft, vii. p. 424.—⁶ Bancroft, vii. p. 424.

⁷ Frothingham, p. 139; Bancroft, vii. p. 424; Irving, i. p. 476.

the fence,¹ they deployed into line² with all the regularity and elegance of troops on the parade-ground, and advanced to the attack. Here, too, the colonists reserved their fire until the enemy had approached within a few yards;³ and here, as on the hill, unable to withstand a spirit which they could not comprehend, and a fire whose deadly character had swept whole ranks before it,⁴ the king's troops recoiled, and sought safety in an inglorious retreat,⁵ amid the joyful exultations of the wearied colonists.⁶

After an interval of about fifteen minutes, the enemy again advanced in the same order as before.⁷

The column under Pigot approached the redoubt and breastwork on the hill with evident reluctance,⁸ firing, as before, as soon as they approached within musket-shot.⁹ This time, desiring to make every grain of his powder do the full amount of execution, Colonel Prescott ordered his men to withhold their fire until the enemy had come within thirty yards,¹⁰ when the order was given, and the effect was, if possi-

ble, more fatal than ever.¹ With great spirit, however, the enemy pressed forward;² but, "from the whole American line there was a continuous stream of fire,"³ and, notwithstanding the efforts of the king's officers, who were seen using unusual means to urge on their men,⁴ they could not reach the redoubt; and, in a short time, they gave way in greater confusion than ever.⁵

A similar fate awaited General Howe's second attack on the fence near the river.⁶ He reached it, but could not penetrate it. "Indeed," wrote a survivor,⁷ "how could we penetrate it? Most of our grenadiers and light-infantry, the moment of presenting themselves, lost three-fourths, and many, nine tenths of their men. Some had only eight or nine men in a company left, some only three, four, or five." Howe was left nearly alone, so generally had the officers fallen around him.⁸

This second retreat afforded the colonists an opportunity to consult;⁹ and among those in the redoubt it was announced that the ammunition was almost exhausted.¹⁰ The supply which

¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 424.—² Ibid.; Frothingham, p. 141.

³ Gordon, ii. pp. 44, 45; Frothingham, pp. 141, 142; Bancroft, vii. p. 424.

⁴ Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; S. Gray to Mr. Dyer, July 12, 1775; Gordon, ii. pp. 43, 44; Frothingham, p. 142.

⁵ Stedman, i. p. 127; Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Bancroft, vii. p. 424; Bradford, i. p. 385; Gordon, ii. p. 44.—⁶ Frothingham, p. 142; Irving, i. p. 477.

⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 425; Frothingham, p. 143.

⁸ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Gordon, ii. p. 44.

⁹ Bancroft, vii. p. 425; Frothingham, p. 143.

¹⁰ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Gordon, ii. p. 44.

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 44; Frothingham, p. 145.

² Bancroft, vii. p. 425; Frthingham, p. 145.

³ Prescott, cited by Bancroft; Frothingham, p. 145.

⁴ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 425; Gordon, ii. p. 44.—⁵ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 425; Frothingham, pp. 145, 146; Irving, i. p. 478.—⁶ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Gordon, ii. p. 45; Frothingham, p. 145.

⁷ Cited by Bancroft (vii. pp. 425, 426). See also, in almost the same words, Gordon, ii. p. 48.

⁸ Stedman, i. p. 127; Bancroft, vii. p. 426; Frothingham, p. 145.—⁹ Frothingham, p. 146.

¹⁰ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Prescott's letter, Document IV.; Bancroft, vii. 426.

had been sent for had not arrived, and recourse was had to a few artillery cartridges, which remained, to supply the demand.¹

After a brief period of time, occupied in consultation with his officers, General Howe made preparations for a renewal of the contest,² although some of his officers remonstrated against it, declaring it to have been "downright butchery" to attempt to carry the lines.³ His plan of operations, however, was somewhat changed to meet the exigencies of the case.⁴ His cannon were brought to bear so as to rake the inside of the breastwork,⁵ and all those who had occupied that portion of the works, during the previous attacks, were obliged to find shelter within the redoubt,⁶ and leave one of the most important parts of the lines without protection. He next ordered the troops to remove their knapsacks and fix their bayonets;⁷ and, while the light-infantry and part of the grenadiers were dispatched against the rail-fence,⁸ the rest of the troops were concentrated on the redoubt.⁹ At this moment, General Howe was strengthened by the arrival, on the ground, of General Sir Henry Clinton,¹⁰ the next in command, who witnessed the trouble from Copp's Hill,

and pushed off in a boat to render such aid as was in his power.¹¹ Throwing himself at the head of the marines and the forty-seventh regiment,² who had hesitated to move from the beach,³ he led them up the southern slope of the hill;⁴ while the fifth, thirty-eighth, and forty-third regiments advanced from the east; and the grenadiers and the fifty-second regiment forced the now deserted breastwork, and attacked the redoubt from the rear.⁵

Within the redoubt the same cool, deliberate spirit prevailed, although none had over three or four rounds of ammunition left, and the greater part had not so many.⁶ Colonel Prescott directed his men to reserve their fire until the enemy was within twenty yards,⁷ when they poured upon them a well-directed volley;⁸ but the enemy, without returning it, pressed forward to the attack.⁹ Prescott immediately ordered those who had bayonets to form in front, within the redoubt, to oppose those who attempted to enter it; while those who had none were formed in the rear, with orders to fire on such as might show themselves on the parapet.¹⁰

Clinton, at the head of the troops who had ascended the southern slope of the hill, first reached the redoubt;¹¹

¹ Frothingham, pp. 147, 148; Bancroft, vii. p. 427.

² Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Irving, i. p. 478.

³ Frothingham, p. 148.—⁴ Irving, i. p. 479; Frothingham, p. 148.—⁵ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Bancroft, vii. p. 429; Frothingham, p. 148.

⁶ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Irving, i. p. 479; Bancroft, vii. p. 429.—⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 428; Frothingham, p. 148.—⁸ Frothingham, p. 149; Bancroft, vii. p. 428.—⁹ Bancroft, vii. p. 428.—¹⁰ Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.; Stedman, i. p. 127.

¹ Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.; Bancroft, vii. p. 428.—² Burgoyne to Stanley, Document II.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Bancroft, vii. p. 428.—⁵ Ibid., p. 429.—⁶ Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Frothingham, pp. 147–149; Bancroft, vii. p. 429.—⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 429; Frothingham, p. 149.—⁸ Frothingham, p. 149.—⁹ Bancroft, vii. p. 429; Frothingham, p. 149.—¹⁰ Frothingham, p. 150; Irving, i. p. 480.—¹¹ Bancroft, vii. p. 429.



Engraved by D. H. Fenn.

BATTLES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

BY JAMES M. COOPER

and many of his party were shot while attempting to scale the parapet;¹ and Major Pitcairn, of the marines,—he who figured so conspicuously at Lexington,—fell mortally wounded as he was entering the redoubt.² But the ammunition had been expended;³ and a volley of stones, thrown with desperate energy, while it revealed the weakness of the colonists, filled the enemy with hope.⁴ The works were speedily scaled on every side,⁵ and the contest was carried on hand to hand.⁶ With a determination worthy of their cause, the colonists confronted their enemies with the butt-end of their firelocks,⁷ dealing blows in every direction, and continuing the contest with the gun-barrels after the stocks had been broken.⁸

Such a contest, however, could not be long continued, and when the redoubt had become half-filled with the enemy,⁹ about four o'clock,¹⁰ Colonel Prescott gave orders to retreat.¹¹ The smoke of the battle, and the dust arising from the dry, loose dirt, were so dense as to conceal, in some measure, the withdrawal of the colonists.¹² Col-

onel Prescott was among the last to withdraw from the redoubt; and, notwithstanding the enemy attacked him, he so skillfully parried the passes that he escaped without injury, although his banyan and waistcoat were pierced by bayonets in several places.¹ It has been said by an eye-witness, that when the Colonel withdrew, "he did not run, but stepped along with his sword up;"² and his companions, as they found opportunity, made their way through the ranks of their enemies, who were too much exhausted to offer any serious opposition to the movement;³ while a characteristic blunder, on the part of a quartermaster in Boston, who supplied twelve-pound shot for six-pound guns,⁴ saved the fugitives from the effects of a cannonade while they were retiring from their intrenchments.⁵

In the mean time, the party behind the fence had been strengthened by the arrival of men under Captains Chester, Coit, Harris, and others,⁶ to the number of about a hundred and fifty;⁷ and when the light-infantry approached them the third time, they were easily checked,⁸ and the retreat of Colonel Prescott and his men satisfactorily secured.⁹ When it was perceived that

¹ Frothingham, p. 150; Bancroft, vii. p. 429.

² Bancroft, vii. p. 429.—³ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Frothingham, p. 150.

⁴ Frothingham, p. 150; Irving, i. p. 480.

⁵ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Prescott's letter, Document IV.—⁶ Frothingham, p. 150; Bancroft, vii. p. 429; Irving, i. p. 480.

⁷ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Marshall, ii. p. 293; Bancroft, vii. p. 429; Irving, i. p. 480.

⁸ Bancroft, vii. p. 429; Frothingham, p. 174.

⁹ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Marshall, ii. p. 293.—¹⁰ Bancroft, vii. p. 429.—¹¹ Frothingham, p. 150.

¹² Ibid.; Bancroft, vii. p. 430.

¹ Frothingham, p. 150; Bancroft, i. p. 429.

² Frothingham, p. 150.—³ Stedman, i. p. 127; Bancroft, vii. p. 430; Frothingham, p. 151.—⁴ Stedman, i. p. 129; Gordon, ii. p. 41; Bancroft, vii. 430.—⁵ Frothingham, p. 153.—⁶ Letter from Wethersfield, June 22, 1775; Capt. Chester to Rev. Jos. Fish, July 22, 1775; Samuel Gray to Mr. Dyer, July 12; Frothingham, p. 151.

⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 419.—⁸ Frothingham, p. 151.

⁹ Mass. Com. of Safety, Document III.; Frothingham, p. 151. 152; Bancroft, vii. p. 430; Irving, i. p. 481

Prescott was safe,¹ Knowlton and Stark led their men from the field with great coolness and in good order,² taking with them one of the field-pieces belonging to the party.³ The aged Pomeroy, disdaining to show his back to the foe, walked backwards from the field, and brandished his musket, in defiance to the enemy, until it was struck and marked by a ball.⁴

Passing over the brow of Bunker's Hill,⁵ the fugitives were exposed to the fire of the shipping and batteries,⁶ and here, and on Charlestown Neck, more than on any part of the field, their loss was very heavy.⁷ The great body, however, succeeded in reaching the camp, or, taking positions on Winter and Prospect Hills,⁸ lay on their arms until morning;⁹ while the King's troops, equally fearful of an attack, threw up, during the night, a line of breastworks on the northern side of Bunker's Hill, and anxiously awaited the return of daylight.¹⁰

The loss of the enemy, by his own account,¹¹ was two hundred and twenty-six killed and eight hundred and twenty-eight wounded; of whom thirteen of

the killed and seventy of the wounded were commissioned officers. Truly was it said, in view of this loss, "By this rule the Americans will put the whole army into the grave or hospitals in three or four nights' work, and an hour's fire in each morning."¹

The loss of the colonists amounted to one hundred and forty-five killed and missing, and three hundred and four wounded; the principal of whom was General Warren.² This distinguished man was shot in the head, just as he was leaving the trenches, and was buried on the field by the enemy.³

Such was Bunker's Hill, and well was it said of it by Governor Johnstone, in the House of Commons: "To a mind who loves to contemplate the glorious spirit of freedom, no spectacle can be more affecting than the action at Bunker's Hill. To see an irregular peasantry, commanded by a physician,⁴ inferior in numbers, opposed by every circumstance of cannon and bombs that could terrify timid minds, calmly await the attack of the gallant Howe, leading on the best troops in the world, with an excellent train of artillery, and twice repulsing those very troops, who had often chased the chosen battalions of France, and at last retiring for want of ammunition, but in so respectable a manner that they were not even pursued—who can reflect on such scenes

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 45; Frothingham, p. 152.

² Bancroft, vii. p. 430; Gordon, ii. p. 45; Frothingham, p. 152.—³ Bancroft, vii. p. 430; Frothingham, p. 186.

⁴ Bancroft, vii. p. 430; Frothingham, p. 152; Irving, i. p. 481.—⁵ Frothingham, p. 152; Irving, i. p. 481.

⁶ Stedman, i. p. 127; Gordon, ii. p. 46; Marshall, ii. p. 293.—⁷ Bancroft, vii. p. 430; Heath's Mem., p. 19; Gordon, ii. p. 46; Frothingham, p. 152.

⁸ Letter from Wethersfield, June 22; Gen. Greene to Jacob Greene, June 28, 1775; Gordon, ii. p. 47.

⁹ Bancroft, vii. p. 431; Frothingham, p. 153.

¹⁰ Gordon, ii. p. 47; Frothingham, p. 153.

¹¹ Gage's Dispatch, Document I.; Stedman, i. p. 127.

¹ Observations on Government Account of the late Battle of Charlestown, London, August 1, 1775.

² Document V.—³ Frothingham, p. 171.

⁴ Supposing Dr. Warren had the command.

and not adore the constitution of government which could breed such men!"

"It was the first regular battle between the British and the Americans," says a distinguished writer of our own State,¹ "and most eventful in its consequences. The former had gained the ground for which they contended; but, if a victory, it was more disastrous and humiliating to them than an ordinary defeat. They had ridiculed and despised their enemy, representing them as dastardly and inefficient; yet, here their best troops, led on by experienced officers, had repeatedly been repulsed by an inferior force of that enemy,—mere yeomanry,—from works thrown up in a single night, and had suffered a loss rarely paralleled in a battle with the most veteran soldiery."

The good effects of this action were counteracted by the intelligence of the death of Doctor Warren. Eloquent, self-sacrificing, and zealous, without rashness, no person had secured, at that early day, a deeper hold of the affections of the people; and the loss of none could be more severely felt. Poetry, and the fine arts, and history have all, in their turn, been enlisted in the good work of cherishing his memory; and the Congress of Massachusetts expressed the sense of the whole country, when it declared its "veneration for Joseph Warren, whose memory is endeared to his countrymen, and to the worthy in every part and age of the world, so long as virtue and valor shall be esteemed among men."

D O C U M E N T S

I.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF GEN. GAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE: FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.

WHITEHALL, July 25, 1775.

This morning arrived Captain Chadds, of His Majesty's ship Cerberus, with the following letter from the Honorable Lieutenant-general Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State.

BOSTON, June 25, 1775.

MY LORD: I am to acquaint your Lordship of an action that happened on the 17th instant,

between His Majesty's troops and a body of the rebel forces.

An alarm was given at break of day on the 17th instant, by a firing from the Lively, ship-of-war; and advice was soon afterwards received that the rebels had broke ground, and were raising a battery on the heights of the peninsula of Charlestown, against the town of Boston. They were plainly seen at work, and in a few hours a battery of six guns played upon their works. Preparations were instantly made for landing a body of men to drive them off, and ten companies of grenadiers, ten of light-infantry, with the fifth, thirty-eighth, forty-third, and fifty-second battalions, made a third line. The rebels upon the heights were perceived to be in great force, and strongly posted: a re-

¹ Irving's Washington, i. p. 482.

doubt thrown up on the 16th, at night, with other works, full of men, defended with cannon, and a large body posted in the houses in Charlestown, covered their right flank, and their centre and left were covered by a breastwork, part of it cannon-proof, which reached from the left of the redoubt to the Mistick or Medford River.

This appearance of the rebels' strength, and the large columns seen pouring in to their assistance, occasioned an application for the troops to be reinforced with some companies of light-infantry and grenadiers, the forty-seventh battalion, and the first battalion of marines,—the whole, when in conjunction, making a body of something above two thousand men. These troops advanced, formed in two lines, and the attack began by a sharp cannonade from our field-pieces and howitzers; the lines advancing slowly, and frequently halting, to give time for the artillery to fire. The light-infantry was directed to force the left point of the breastwork, to take the rebel line in flank, and the grenadiers to attack in front, supported by the fifth and fifty-second battalions. These orders were executed with perseverance, under a heavy fire from the vast numbers of the rebels; and, notwithstanding various impediments before the troops could reach the works (and though the left, under Brigadier-general Pigot, who engaged also with the rebels at Charlestown, which, at a critical moment, was set on fire), the brigadier pursued his point, and carried the redoubt. The rebels were then forced from other strongholds, and pursued till they were drove clear off the peninsula, leaving five pieces of cannon behind them.

The loss the rebels sustained must have been considerable, from the great numbers they carried off during the time of action, and buried in holes, since discovered, exclusive of what they suffered by the shipping and boats. Near one hundred were buried the next day after, and thirty found wounded in the field, three of whom are since dead.

I inclose your lordship a return of the killed and wounded of His Majesty's troops.

This action has shown the superiority of the King's troops, who, under every disadvantage, attacked and defeated above three times their

number, strongly posted and covered by breastworks.

The conduct of Major-general Howe was conspicuous on this occasion, and his example spirited the troops, in which Major-general Clinton assisted, who followed the reinforcement. And in justice to Brigadier-general Pigot, I am to add, that the success of the day must, in a great measure, be attributed to his firmness and gallantry.

Lieutenant-colonels Nesbit, Abercrombie, Clarke; Majors Butler, Williams, Bruce, Spendlove, Smelt, Mitchell, Pitcairn, and Short, exerted themselves remarkably; and the valor of the British officers and soldiers in general, was at no time more conspicuous than in this action.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

THOMAS GAGE.

Return of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates killed and wounded, of His Majesty's troops, at the attack of the redoubts and intrenchments, on the Heights of Charlestown, June 17, 1775:

* * * * *

TOTAL.—One lieutenant-colonel, two majors, seven captains, nine lieutenants, fifteen sergeants, one drummer, one hundred and ninety-one rank and file, killed; three majors, twenty-seven captains, thirty-two lieutenants, eight ensigns, forty sergeants, twelve drummers, seven hundred and six rank and file, wounded.

N. B.—Captain Downes, of the fifth regiment, and Lieutenant Higgins, of the fifty-second, died of their wounds on the 24th instant.

II.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL JOHN BURGOYNE TO LORD STANLEY.

BOSTON, June 25, 1775.

Boston is a peninsula, joined to the mainland only by a narrow neck, which, on the first tides, General Gage fortified; arms of the sea and the harbor surround the rest on the other side. On one of these arms, to the north, is

Charlestown, or rather was, for it is now rubbish, and over it is a large hill, which is also (like Boston) a peninsula. To the south of the town is a still larger scope of ground, containing three hills, joining also to the main by a tongue of land, and called Dorchester Neck. The heights, as above described, both north and south (in the soldier's phrase), command the town; that is, give an opportunity of erecting batteries above any that you can make against them, and consequently are much more advantageous. It was absolutely necessary we should make ourselves masters of these heights, and we proposed to begin with Dorchester; because, from the particular situation of batteries and shipping (too long to describe, and unintelligible to you if I did), it would evidently be effected without any considerable loss. Every thing was accordingly disposed; my two colleagues and myself (who, by the by, have never differed in one jot of military sentiment) had, in concert with General Gage, formed the plan. Howe was to land the transports on the point; Clinton in the centre; and I was to cannonade from the causeway or the neck; each to take advantage of circumstances. The operations must have been very easy; this was to have been executed on the 18th. On the 17th, at dawn of day, we found the enemy had pushed intrenchments with great diligence during the night, on the Heights of Charlestown, and we evidently saw that every hour gave them fresh strength; it therefore became necessary to alter our plan, and attack on that side. Howe, as second in command, was detached with about two thousand men, and landed on the outward side of the peninsula, covered with shipping, without opposition; he was to advance from thence up the hill which was over Charlestown, where the strength of the enemy lay; he had under him Brigadier-general Pigot. Clinton and myself took our stand (for we had not any fixed post) in a large battery directly opposite to Charlestown, and commanded it, and also reaching the heights above it, and thereby facilitating Howe's attack. Howe's disposition was exceeding soldier-like; in my opinion it was perfect. As his first arm advanced up the hill, they met with a thousand impediments from strong fences, and were much exposed. They

were also exceedingly hurt by musketry from Charlestown, though Clinton and I did not perceive it until Howe sent us word by a boat, and desired us to set fire to the town, which was immediately done; we threw a parcel of shells, and the whole was instantly in flames; our battery afterwards kept an incessant fire on the heights; it was seconded by a number of frigates, floating batteries, and one ship-of-the-line. And now ensued one of the greatest scenes of war that can be conceived; if we look to the height, Howe's corps ascending the hill in the face of intrenchments, and in a very disadvantageous ground, was much engaged; to the left the enemy pouring in fresh troops by thousands, over the land; and in the arm of the sea our ships and floating batteries cannonading them; straight before us a large and noble town in one great blaze—the church-steeple, being timber, were great pyramids of fire above the rest; behind us, the church-steeple and heights of our own camp covered with spectators of the rest of our army which was engaged; the hills round the country covered with spectators; the enemy all in anxious suspense; the roar of cannon, mortars, and musketry; the crash of churches, ships upon the stocks, and whole streets falling together, to fill the ear; the storm of the redoubts, with the objects above described, to fill the eye; and the reflection that, perhaps, a defeat was a final loss to the British empire in America, to fill the mind; made the whole a picture, and a complication of horror and importance beyond any thing that ever came to my lot to be witness to. I much lament Tom's¹ absence; it was a sight for a young soldier that the longest service may not furnish again; and had he been with me he would likewise have been out of danger; for, except two cannon-balls that went a hundred yards over our heads, we were not in any part of the direction of the enemy's shot. A moment of the day was critical; Howe's left were staggered; two battalions had been sent to reinforce them, but we perceived them on the beach seeming in embarrassment what way to march. Clinton then, next

¹ His nephew, Hon. Thomas Stanley (brother of Lord Stan'ey), who had gone a volunteer to Boston.

for business, took the part without waiting for orders, to throw himself into a boat to head them; he arrived in time to be of service; the day ended with glory, and the success was most important, considering the ascendancy it gave the regular troops; but the loss was uncommon in officers, for the numbers engaged. Howe was untouched, but his aid-de-camp, Sherwin, was killed; Jorden, a friend of Howe's, who came *engage le de cœur*, to see the campaign (a shipmate of ours on board the Cerberus, and who acted as aid-de-camp), is badly wounded. Pigot was unhurt, but he behaved like a hero. You will see the list of the loss. Poor Colonel Abercrombie, who commanded the grenadiers, died yesterday of his wounds. Captain Addison, our poor old friend, who arrived but the day before, and was to have dined with me on the day of the action, was also killed; his son was upon the field at the same time. Major Mitchell is but very slightly hurt, he is out already. Young Chetwynd's wound is also slight. Lord Percy's regiment has suffered the most, and behaved the best; his lordship himself was not in the action. Lord Rawden behaved to a charm; his name is established for life.



III.

EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.

July 25, 1775.

The following account of the late battle of Charlestown, prepared in obedience to a resolution of the Provincial Congress, was presented, accepted, and ordered to be transmitted to Great Britain:

IN PROVINCIAL CONGRESS,
WATERTOWN, July 7, 1775.

In compliance with a resolve of the Committee of Safety, recommending that a committee be appointed to draw up, and transmit to Great Britain, a fair and impartial account of the late battle of Charlestown, as soon as possible:

Ordered, That the said Committee of Safety be a committee for that purpose, and that they

likewise be a standing committee for that and like purposes.¹

(A true extract from the minutes.)

SAMUEL FREEMAN, *Secretary.*

IN COMMITTEE OF SAFETY, *July 25, 1775.*

In obedience to the above order of Congress, this committee have inquired into the premises, and upon the best information obtained, find that the commanders of the New England army had, about the 14th ult., received advice that General Gage had issued orders for a party of the troops under his command to post themselves on Bunker's Hill, a promontory just at the entrance of the peninsula of Charlestown, which orders were soon to be executed. Upon which it was determined, with the advice of this committee, to send a party, who might erect some fortifications upon said hill, and defeat this design of our enemies. Accordingly, on the 16th ult., orders were issued that a detachment of one thousand men should that evening march to Charlestown, and intrench upon that hill. Just before nine o'clock they left Cambridge, and proceeded to Breed's Hill, situated on the farther part of the peninsula next to Boston; for, by some mistake, this hill was marked out for the intrenchment instead of the other. Many things being necessary to be done preparatory to the intrenchments being thrown up (which could not be done before, lest the enemy should discover and defeat the design), it was nearly twelve o'clock before the works were entered upon; they were then carried on with the utmost diligence and alacrity, so that by the dawn of the day they had thrown up a small redoubt, about eight rods square. At this time a heavy fire began from the enemy's ships, a number of floating batteries, and from a fortification of the enemy's upon Copp's Hill, in Boston, directly opposite to our little redoubt. An incessant shower of shot and bombs was rained by these upon our works, by which only one man fell; the provincials continued to labor indefatigably

¹ This committee, appointed February 9, 1775, consisted of Messrs. John Hancock, Dr. Joseph Warren, Dr. Benj. Church, jr., Richard Devens, Capt. Benj. White, Col. Joseph Palmer, Abm. Watson, Col. Azor Orne, John Pigeon, Jabez Fisher, and Col. Wm. Heath.

till they had thrown up a small breastwork, extending from the east side of the redoubt to the bottom of the hill, but were prevented completing it by the intolerable fire of the enemy.

Between twelve and one o'clock a number of boats and barges, filled with the regular troops from Boston, were observed approaching towards Charlestown. These troops landed at a place called Moreton's Point, situated a little to the eastward of our works. This brigade formed upon their landing, and stood thus formed till a second detachment arrived from Boston to join them. Having sent out large flank guards, they began a very slow march towards our lines. At this instant smoke and flames were seen to arise from the town of Charlestown, which had been set on fire by the enemy, that the smoke might cover their attack upon our lines, and perhaps with a design to rout or destroy one or two regiments of provincials who had been posted in that town. If either of these was their design, they were disappointed, for the wind shifting on a sudden, carried the smoke another way, and the regiments were already removed. The provincials, within their intrenchments, impatiently awaited the attack of the enemy, and reserved their fire till they came within ten or twelve rods, and then began a furious discharge of small-arms. This fire arrested the enemy, which they for some time returned, without advancing a step, and then retreated in disorder, and with great precipitation, to the place of landing; and some of them sought refuge even within their boats. Here the officers were observed, by the spectators on the opposite shore, to run down to them, using the most passionate gestures, and pushing the men forward with their swords. At length they were rallied, and marched up with apparent reluctance towards the intrenchment. The Americans again reserved their fire until the enemy came up within five or six rods, and a second time put the regulars to flight, who ran in great confusion towards their boats. Similar and superior exertions were now necessarily made by the officers, which, notwithstanding the men discovered an almost insuperable reluctance to fighting in this cause, were again successful. They formed once more, and having brought some cannon to bear

in such a manner as to rake the inside of the breastwork from one end of it to the other, the provincials retreated within their little fort. The ministerial army now made a decisive effort; the fire from the ships and batteries, as well as from the cannon in the front of their army, was redoubled. The officers in the rear of their army were observed to goad forward the men with renewed exertions, and they attacked the redoubt on three sides at once. The breast-work on the outside of the fort was abandoned; the ammunition of the provincials was expended; and few of their arms were fixed with bayonets. Can it then be wondered that the word was given by the commander of the party to retreat? But this he delayed till the redoubt was half filled with regulars, and the provincials had kept the enemy at bay some time, confronting them with the butt-end of their muskets.

The retreat of this little handful of brave men would have been effectually cut off, had it not happened that the flanking party of the enemy, which was to have come up on the back of the redoubt, was checked by a party of provincials, who fought with the utmost bravery, and kept them from advancing farther than the beach. The engagement of these two parties was kept up with the utmost vigor; and it must be acknowledged that this party of the ministerial troops evidenced a courage worthy of a better cause. All their efforts, however, were insufficient to compel the provincials to retreat, till their main body had left the hill. Perceiving this was done, they then gave ground, but with more regularity than could be expected of troops who had no longer been under discipline, and many of whom never before saw an engagement.

In this retreat the Americans had to pass over the neck which joins the peninsula of Charlestown to the main-land. This neck was commanded by the *Glasgow* man-of-war, and two floating batteries, placed in such a manner as that their shot raked every part of it. The incessant fire kept up across this neck, had, from the beginning of the engagement, prevented any considerable reinforcement from getting to the provincials upon the hill, and it was feared would cut off their retreat, but they retired over it with little or no loss.

With a ridiculous parade of triumph, the ministerial troops again took possession of the hill, which had served them as a retreat in their flight from the battle of Concord. It was expected that they would prosecute the supposed advantage they had gained, by marching immediately to Cambridge, which was distant about two miles, and which was not then in a state of defence. This they failed to do. The wonder excited by such conduct soon ceased, when, by the best accounts from Boston, we were told that of three thousand men who marched out upon this expedition, no less than fifteen hundred (ninety-two of whom were commissioned officers) were killed or wounded, and about twelve hundred of them either killed or mortally wounded. Such a slaughter was perhaps never before made upon British troops in the space of about an hour, during which the heat of the engagement lasted, by about fifteen hundred men, which were the most that were at any time engaged on the American side.

The loss of the New England army amounted, according to an exact return, to one hundred and forty-five killed and missing, and three hundred and four wounded. Thirty of the first were wounded and taken prisoners by the enemy. Among the dead was Major-general Joseph Warren, a man whose memory will be endeared to his countrymen, and to the worthy in every part and age of the world, so long as virtue and valor shall be esteemed among mankind. The heroic Colonel Gardner, of Cambridge, has since died of his wounds; and the brave Lieutenant-colonel Parker, of Chelmsford, who was wounded and taken prisoner, perished in Boston jail. These three, with Major Moore and Major McClary, who nobly struggled in the cause of their country, were the only officers of distinction which we lost. Some officers of great worth, though inferior in rank, were killed, whom we deeply lament; but the officers and soldiers in general, who were wounded, are in a fair way of recovery.

The town of Charlestown, the buildings of which were in general large and elegant, and which contained effects belonging to the unhappy sufferers in Boston to a very great amount, was entirely destroyed; and its chimneys and cellars now present a prospect to the Americans,

exciting an indignation in their bosoms which nothing can appease but the sacrifice of those miscreants who have introduced desolation and havoc into these once happy abodes of liberty, peace, and plenty.

Though the officers and soldiers of the ministerial army meanly exult in having gained this ground, yet they cannot but attest to the bravery of our troops, and acknowledge that the battles of Fontenoy and Minden, according to the numbers engaged, and the time the engagements continued, were not to be compared with this; and, indeed, the laurels of Minden were totally blasted in the battle of Charlestown. The ground purchased, thus dearly purchased by the British troops, affords them no advantage against the American army, now strongly intrenched on a neighboring eminence. The continental troops, nobly animated from the justice of their cause, sternly urge to decide the contest by the sword; but we wish for no farther effusion of blood, if the freedom and peace of America can be secured without it. But if it must be otherwise, we are determined to struggle. We disdain life without liberty.

Oh, Britons! Be wise for yourselves before it is too late, and secure a commercial intercourse with the American colonies before it is forever lost; disarm your ministerial assassins; put an end to this unrighteous and unnatural war; and suffer not any rapacious despots to amuse you with the unprofitable ideas of your right to tax and officer the colonies, till the most profitable and advantageous trade you have is irrevocably lost. Be wise for yourselves, and the Americans will contribute to and rejoice in your prosperity.

J. PALMER, *per order.*¹

IV.

LETTER DESCRIBING THE ACTION, BY COLONEL WILLIAM PRESCOTT.

CAMP AT CAMBRIDGE, August 25, 1775

SIR:—I have received a line from my brother, which informs me of your desire of a particular

¹ The foregoing document was sent to London, accompanied by a letter to Arthur Lee, and was published in the newspapers in that city.

account of the action at Charlestown. It is not in my power, at present, to give so minute an account as I should choose, being ordered to decamp and march to another station.

On the 16th June, in the evening, I received orders to march to Breed's Hill, in Charlestown, with a party of about one thousand men, consisting of three hundred of my own regiment, Colonel Bridge and Lieutenant Brickett, with a detachment of theirs, and two hundred Connecticut forces, commanded by Captain Knowlton. We arrived at the spot, the lines were drawn by the engineer, and we began the intrenchment about twelve o'clock; and plying the work with all possible expedition till just before sun-rising, when the enemy began a very heavy cannonading and bombardment. In the interim, the engineer forsook me. Having thrown up a small redoubt, found it necessary to draw a line about twenty rods in length from the fort northerly, under a very warm fire from the enemy's artillery. About this time, the above field officers, being indisposed, could render me but little service, and the most of the men under their command deserted the party. The enemy continuing an incessant fire with their artillery, about two o'clock in the afternoon, on the seventeenth, the enemy began to land at a north-easterly point from the fort, and I ordered the train, with two field-pieces, to go and oppose them, and the Connecticut forces to support them; but the train marched a different course, and I believe those sent to their support followed, I suppose to Bunker's Hill. Another party of the enemy landed and fired the town. There was a party of Hampshire, in conjunction with some other forces, lined a fence at the distance of threescore rods back of the fort, partly to the north. About an hour after the enemy landed, they began to march to the attack in three columns. I commanded my lieutenant-colonel, Robinson, and Major Woods, each with a detachment, to flank the enemy, who, I have reason to think, behaved with prudence and courage. I was now left with perhaps one hundred and fifty men in the fort. The enemy advanced and fired very hotly on the fort, and meeting with a warm reception, there was a very smart firing on both sides. After a

considerable time, finding our ammunition was almost spent, I commanded a cessation till the enemy advanced within thirty yards, when we gave them such a hot fire that they were obliged to retire nearly one hundred and fifty yards before they could rally and come again to the attack. Our ammunition being nearly exhausted, could keep up only a scattering fire. The enemy being numerous, surrounded our little fort, began to mount our lines, and enter the fort with their bayonets. We were obliged to retreat through them, while they kept up as hot a fire as it was possible for them to make. We having very few bayonets, could make no resistance. We kept the fort about one hour and twenty minutes after the attack with small arms. This is nearly the state of facts, though imperfect and too general, which, if any ways satisfactory to you, will afford pleasure to

Your most obedient humble servant,
WILLIAM PRESCOTT.¹

To the Hon. JOHN ADAMS, Esq.

V.

THE NUMBER OF THOSE KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING, IN THE ENGAGEMENT ON BUNKER HILL.

(From General Washington's letter to Congress, dated "Camp at Cambridge, July 10, 1775.")

Colonel Frye's regiment, 10 killed, 38 wounded, 4 missing; Colonel Little's regiment, 7 killed, 23 wounded; Colonel Brewer's regiment, 12 killed, 22 wounded; Colonel Gridley's regiment, 4 wounded; Colonel Stark's regiment, 15 killed, 45 wounded; Colonel Woodbridge's regiment, 5 wounded; Colonel Scammon's regiment, 2 wounded; Colonel Bridge's regiment, 17 killed, 25 wounded; Colonel Whitecomb's regiment, 5 killed, 8 wounded, 2 missing; General Ward's regiment, 1 killed, 6 wounded; Colonel Gerrish's regiment, 3 killed, 5 wounded; Colonel Reed's regiment, 3 killed, 29 wounded, 1 miss-

¹ This letter was first published in the invaluable "History of the Siege of Boston," by R. Frothingham, jr., to whom it was furnished by Hon. Charles Francis Adams.

ing; Colonel Prescott's regiment, 43 killed and missing, 46 wounded; Colonel Doolittle's regiment, 6 killed and missing, 9 wounded; Colonel Gardner's regiment, 7 wounded; Colonel Patterson's regiment, 1 wounded; Colonel Nixon's regiment, 3 killed and missing; Connecticut regiment, 13 killed, 26 wounded. Total, 145 killed and missing; 304 wounded.

VI.

COLONEL WILLIAM PRESCOTT.

Colonel William Prescott, "the hero of Bunker's Hill" and of Throgg's Neck, was born at Groton, Massachusetts, in 1726. His father, Benjamin, was a member of the council of the colony; his grandfather, Thomas Oliver, also held a seat in that body; and from them he inherited a large estate. In the expedition against Cape Breton he served as a lieutenant, giving so good an account of himself that he was offered a commission in the regular army, which he declined, and returned to his farm at Pepperell, where he resided until the troubles in Massachusetts called him into the field again.

At the head of a regiment of minute-men he promptly responded to the call when the "news from Lexington" reached him; and he hastened to Boston. To him, as we have seen, was intrusted the important duty of occupying Breed's Hill on the evening of June 16, 1775, and he has the proud distinction of enjoying the honor of having been "*the hero of Bunker's Hill*." Zealous friends of other officers, and bitter enemies of our country, have strangely combined to rob him of this honor, some in favor of one officer and some of another; yet the question,—if question it may be called,—through the unwearyed industry and careful examination of R. Frothingham, jr., mainly, seems now to have been settled, and the name of Prescott no longer remains obscure or unknown. At the close of the contest he repaired to Cambridge, went before the Committee of Safety, and urged it to give him three regiments, with which to attack the enemy on Bunker's Hill, assuring it that he could carry the hill with such a force.

When General Howe landed, with the entire army, on Throgg's Neck, in Westchester county, New York, with the intention of falling in the rear of the continental army, then encamped at Kingsbridge, Colonel Prescott, with his regiment and a company of artillery, were sent to oppose him at Westchester Creek, and, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, General Howe was kept on the Neck six days, and finally retreated.

In the beginning of 1777 he resigned, and returned to private life; but when the northern frontier was threatened by General Burgoyne, he returned to the field, as a volunteer, and continued to discharge his duties until the capture of the enemy at Saratoga. He then returned to his farm at Pepperell, became a member of the legislature, and from 1786 until his death, was a magistrate in the town where he lived.

He died at Pepperell, October 13, 1795, aged sixty-nine years. It has been well said of him, that "he was a genuine specimen of an energetic, brave, and patriotic citizen, who was ready in the hour of danger to place himself in the van, and partake in all the perils of his country; feeling anxious for its prosperity, without caring to share in its emoluments; and maintaining beneath a plain exterior and simple habits, a dignified pride in his native land, and a high-minded love of freedom."

VII.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WARREN.

Joseph Warren was born at Roxbury, near Boston, Massachusetts, in 1740. His father, who was a farmer, was killed by falling from an apple-tree, in 1755. Joseph entered Harvard College in the same year, and graduated in 1759 with great credit. Adopting medicine as his profession, he studied under Dr. Lloyd, and rapidly rose to the front rank of that profession in Boston. Of an active, sympathetic temperament, and living at a time when all were politicians (and mostly partisans), it would have been strange if he had not become interested in

political matters; and stranger still if he had not been active, when the boldness, the sincerity, and the disinterested patriotism of his character are considered. He was, accordingly, an early member of "*The Sons of Liberty*," in Boston—one of the associations from which sprung that glorious Revolution which secured the rights and privileges which the people of our country so poorly appreciate and so slightly protect. In constant correspondence with Lamb, McDougal, Willett, Sears, and Scott, in New York; Van Rensselaer, Rosenbaum, and Young, in Albany; Hendrickson, of Freehold; Bradford and Howell, of Philadelphia, Adair and Allison, of Baltimore; and Paca and Chase, of Annapolis, receiving from them (and especially from those first named) the lessons of daring patriotism which led to resistance to stamps, tea-tax, and other usurpations of the crown, he fostered the same spirit in those among whom he moved; and by his fearless example, in all proper undertakings, promoted, more than any other person in New England, except Samuel Adams, the great cause of the American Revolution. When most of his associates wavered, he aroused them by his eloquence; when they moved forward, he cheered them on by his prudent examples. Without rashness, he was bold; without malignancy, he was denunciatory of wrongs; without disloyalty

to his sovereign, he loved America and demanded her rights.

When Hancock went to the Continental Congress, Dr. Warren was elected to the presidency of the Provincial Congress in his stead. On the evening of the 18th of April, it was Warren who stood sentry on the watch-towers of freedom, in Boston; detected the purpose of General Gage in sending troops to Concord, when all the subordinates under Gage, except Percy, were ignorant of it; dispatched Hawes and Revere with the messages to Lexington; and flung out the lanterns from the tower of the old North Church, which aroused the people along the line of the enemy's march.

He had been appointed a major-general of Massachusetts but four days, when he fell on Breed's Hill, on the 17th of June, 1775, and was buried in the trenches on the following morning.

After the enemy had evacuated Boston, in 1776, his remains were disinterred, and carried from the Representatives' Chamber to King's Chapel, where they were buried with military and masonic honors.

The King Solomon's Lodge of Freemasons—of which order he was the Grand Master of North America—erected a monument on the hill in Charlestown, which has since given place to the Bunker Hill Monument.

CHAPTER VI.

April 19, 1775, to March 17, 1776.

THE SIEGE OF BOSTON.

AMONG the several sieges which have occupied the attention of mankind, in different ages, whether considered in respect to the belligerents or the results, none possess more importance than the siege of Boston in New England.

A body of armed men,—yeomanry of the country,—led by officers of their own selection, from their own ranks; without a military chest, commissariat, or pay-table; without ammunition, and with but a few pieces of light-artillery, had left their ploughs or their workshops to redress grievances imposed upon them by the sovereign of the land, and by the officers whom he had sent among them. In the prosecution of this design, and in the defence of positions which they occupied, the royal army, plentifully supplied with every thing that the wealth of the nation could procure, had been met with varied success, ending with the investment of a town in which that army had taken refuge, and the establishment and prosecution of a siege with a degree of determination, skill, and success, which would have reflected honor on vet-

eran generals or properly appointed troops.

Extending through the space of eleven months, with constant and ever-changing scenes of patient endurance, of disinterested patriotism, and of reckless daring, the general and more prominent features of the siege can alone find places in these pages, leaving to another the field of minute examination and description, which he has so completely explored and reported.¹

The “siege,” as we have seen, began on the evening of the eventful nineteenth of April, when Lord Percy and Lieutenant-colonel Smith, at the head of their jaded and terror-stricken forces, found refuge on Bunker’s Hill from the vengeance of the colonists who had followed them from Concord and Lexington;² and General Heath, at the foot of Prospect Hill, “ordered a guard to be formed, and posted near that place, sentinels to be planted down to the Neck, and patrols to be vigilant in

¹ R. Frothingham, jr., of Boston, whose “*Siege of Boston*” has so completely exhausted the subject that nothing appears to have been left for future investigation or description.—² See Chapter I., p. 20.

moving during the night; and an immediate report to him, in case the enemy made any movements.”¹ The “Battle of Bunker’s Hill” was but an incident of the siege, wherein a sortie from the town expelled the besiegers from an advanced position which they had occupied, without touching, or attempting to touch, the lines which the colonists had occupied for nearly sixty days; or decreasing, in the least, the vigilance with which the siege was conducted, or the distress, within the town, which it had produced.

The “Battle of Bunker’s Hill” was not unproductive, however. The king’s troops, and the officers who commanded them, from “the trials” they had experienced, had learned that “the rebels were not the despicable rabble too many had supposed them to have been;” and “that the conquest of this country was not easy, and could be effected only by time and perseverance, and strong armies attacking it in various quarters, and dividing their forces;”² while, throughout the colonies, the extraordinary news, hurried from place to place by special express,³ increased the indignation of the people and made them more resolute in their determination to withstand the encroachments of the crown.⁴ To this, in Massachusetts and

Connecticut especially, was added the anxiety which the fate of absent friends would necessarily produce, in the midst of ten thousand rumors of carnage and of misery.

On the day after the battle (*Sunday, June 18*) the enemy renewed the cannonade which had been suspended during the night, and this circumstance, added to visible movements of his troops, led the colonists to suppose that he would make another attempt to move out of Boston.¹ Accordingly the Committee of Safety issued a circular to the militia in the neighboring towns, stating that “the troops under General Gage were moving from Boston into the country,” and ordering their officers, immediately, “to muster the men under their command, see them properly equipped, and march them forthwith to Cambridge;”² but, in the afternoon, the cannonade ceased,³ and the order was countermanded, although they were, at the same time, ordered to “hold themselves in complete readiness to give assistance when called upon.”⁴

On Monday, the 19th, General Gage indulged himself by issuing “a proclamation,” charging the inhabitants of Boston with bad faith in their promise to surrender their arms, requiring them to surrender such fire-arms, immediately; and threatening them with his vengeance in case they disobeyed.⁵

¹ Heath’s Mem., p. 15.—² Gen. Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth, June 25, 1775; Letter from an officer in Boston, June 18, 1775; Letter from naval officer in Boston, June 23, 1775.—³ Mass. Com. of Supplies to Com. of Safety, June 18, 1776; Col. Bartlett to Gen. Folsom, June 18, 1776.—⁴ Albany Com. to Prov. Cong. of Mass., June 23d; Stedman, i. p. 130; Letter from Philadelphia, July 10, 1775.

¹ Minutes of Mass. Com. of Safety, June 18.

² Minutes of Com. of Safety, June 18, 1775.

³ Frothingham, p. 207.—⁴ Minutes of Com. of Safety, June 18.—⁵ “By the Governor. A Proclamation,” dated “at Boston, 19th June, 1775.”

The works on Bunker's Hill, which General Howe commenced on the preceding Saturday, after the retreat of the colonists, were steadily carried on under the directions of that officer;¹ while, on the other hand, the colonists diligently prosecuted the works they were throwing up on Prospect² and Winter Hills,³ at Cambridge,⁴ Roxbury,⁵ Brookline,⁶ and Dorchester.⁷ Both parties occasionally cannonaded their opponents,⁸ but it could not be considered any thing more than an irregular warfare until the third of July, when GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON, who had been appointed *Commander-in-Chief*, took the command;⁹ and the colonists whom he found at Cambridge and its vicinity, became, in some degree, THE CONTINENTAL ARMY.¹⁰

On Tuesday, July 8th, about two hundred volunteers, from the Massachusetts and Rhode Island lines, commanded by Majors Tupper and Crane, attacked the enemy's advance guard on Boston Neck, routed them, captured some arms, burned two houses, and returned with-

out injury, after creating considerable alarm in the enemy's quarters.¹¹

The first care of General Washington was to ascertain the number and position, both of his own troops and those of the enemy, and for this purpose, on Wednesday, July 9th, he called a Council of War, which was attended by all the general officers in camp, the result of whose deliberations was, that "the force on the side of the enemy then amounted to eleven thousand five hundred men;" that "the public service requires the defence of the posts then occupied" by the continental army; that the army ought to be increased to "at least twenty-two thousand men;" that the colonies should be called upon to complete their quotas; that "the Welsh Mountains, near Cambridge, and in the rear of the Roxbury lines, was a suitable place" for rendezvous, in case of misfortune; and that it was not expedient either to take possession of Dorchester Point or to oppose the enemy should he attempt to do so.¹² At the same time the army was found to consist of thirteen thousand seven hundred and forty-three men fit for duty, exclusive of officers, and five hundred and twenty men attached to the artillery.¹³

On Tuesday, July 22d, the army was divided into brigades and divisions, and posted as follows: Ward's, Thomas's, Fellows', Cotton's, Danielson's, and

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch to Congress, July 10.

² Heath, p. 22; Nath'l Greene to Jacob Greene, dated "R. Island Camp, June 28, 1775;" Gen. Washington's dispatch, July 10.

³ Sparks, p. 133; Nath'l Greene to Jacob Greene, "R. I. Camp, June 28, 1775."

⁴ Letter from Camp, June 27.—⁵ Heath, p. 22; Gen. Washington to Congress, July 10.

⁶ S. Gray to Mr. Dyer, July 12.—⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Heath, pp. 22, 23; Frothingham, pp. 212, 213.

⁹ Sparks' Washington, p. 133.

¹⁰ General Orders, July 4, 1775. Although the army was not fully on "the continental establishment" until January, 1776, it was commanded by continental officers, and, to some extent, was under the control of the Congress.

¹¹ Heath, pp. 23, 24; Letter from Camp, July 9, 1775.

¹² Minutes of Council, inclosed in Gen. Washington's letter to John Hancock, July 10, 1775.

¹³ General Return of Army, July, 1775; Do. Gridley's artillery, July 20, and Crane's artillery, July 21, 1775.

Brewer's regiments composed a brigade under General Thomas; Spencer's, Parsons', Huntington's, Walker's, J. Read's, and Independents, composed another brigade, under Brigadier-general Spencer, the whole forming the right wing of the army, occupying "Roxbury and its southern dependencies," and commanded by Major-general Ward. Stark's, Poor's, Reid's, Nixon's, Mansfield's, and Doolittle's regiments formed a brigade, under General Sullivan, and were stationed at Winter Hill; Varnum's, Hitchcock's, Church's, Whitcombe's, Gardner's, Little's, and Brewer's, composed another brigade, under Brigadier-general Greene, and were stationed on Prospect Hill, the whole forming the left wing of the army, commanded by Major-general Lee. General Heath's, Patterson's, Scammon's, Phinney's, Gerrish's, and Prescott's, formed a brigade, under Brigadier-general Heath; and General Putnam's, Glover's, Frye's, Bridge's, Woodbridge's, and Sergeant's regiments, formed another brigade, under the senior officer, the whole forming the centre of the army, stationed at Cambridge, Malden, Chelsea, Medford, and Brookline, and commanded by Major-general Putnam.¹

In the mean time, General Washington was diligently employed in bringing his rude army into order, in strengthening his position, and in confining the enemy to his quarters.² Under the constant expectation of an assault, every precaution was taken to

prevent surprise, both by night and day;¹ and skirmishing parties were sent out nearly every day to harass the enemy and to accustom the men to the details of the service.² The army was gradually gaining strength by the arrival of recruits, not only from New England, but from the Middle and Southern colonies;³ and new works, advancing still nearer to the enemy's lines, were being constantly opened.⁴

The principal cause of anxiety, however, was the small supply of gunpowder, of which, on the 3d of August, only nine thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven pounds were on hand;⁵ and letters were addressed to the different colonies, urging them to forward the supplies of that article as speedily as possible.⁶

During all this time the enemy suffered severely from the want of supplies, and from a fear which prevailed, that General Washington was preparing to assault the town. The scarcity of fresh provisions and vegetables, and the intensity of the heat, had produced much sickness in the town, notwithstanding the troops were encamped on

¹ Frothingham, p. 223. Parties in whale-boats did guard duty, every night, to prevent a surprise by water.

² Heath's Mem., pp. 24-27; Letter from Cambridge, July 12; Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, July 21; Letter from Cambridge, July 31.

³ Sparks' Washington, p. 143; Weekly Returns of the Army, Document V.—⁴ Heath's Mem., pp. 26, 27; Frothingham, pp. 233-235; Letter from Camp, Aug. 31.

⁵ Minutes of Council of War, Aug. 3, inclosed in Gen Washington's letter to Congress, Aug. 4, 1775; Jos. Reed's to Thomas Bradford, Aug. 21, 1775; Do Aug. 24.

⁶ Letters of Gen. Washington to Governors of R. I. and Conn., to the N. H. Com. of Safety, and to Cont. Cong., Aug. 4.

the Common and other open places.¹ At length, on the 24th of July, a notice was published, requesting that such of the inhabitants as wished to leave the town should register their names at the Town-Major's office, and in two days upwards of two thousand names were left, notwithstanding many hesitated to do so with the certainty of suffering from the plunder of their property by the soldiers, if it was left unprotected. To some of those who thus applied, permission to leave the town was *not* granted; and none were allowed to take their plate, nor over five pounds in cash.²

No important military enterprise was carried out on either side, during the months of August and September—General Washington having been compelled, by the force of circumstances, to pursue a defensive policy, notwithstanding the spirit of dissatisfaction which evidently prevailed, both in and out of the ranks.³ The same scarcity of powder still prevailed,⁴ and yet it was unknown to all, except a few, in whom the utmost confidence could be placed. Ignorant of the cause, the people at large began to complain of the inactivity of the army;⁵ and even the Continental Congress delicately intimated its anxiety on the subject.⁶ On the 11th of September the subject of the attack on Boston, with all the attending cir-

cumstances, was laid before a council of war, but that body, after full deliberation, unanimously agreed, "That it was not expedient to make the attempt, at present, at least."¹

On the 10th of October, General Gage surrendered the command of the King's troops and sailed for England; and his successor, General Howe, promptly advised the evacuation of the town² for reasons which were fully and frankly expressed. What seems rather remarkable, in this connection, in view of the supposed obstinacy of the government, the Earl of Dartmouth, at an earlier day than that, had recommended to General Howe the same measure, in terms so clearly expressed, and so judicious in their character, that they will interest those who have been accustomed to look for nothing from that source but that which was arrogant and overbearing. "The intelligence and information of every day since," says he,³ "have shown more clearly both the obvious advantages which would arise from taking post at New York, and the hazard of the army's continuing at Boston in the winter; and the situation of the troops cooped up in a town, exposed to insult and annoyance, if not to surprise, from more places than one, deprived of the comforts and necessities of life, wasting away by disease and desertion faster than we can recruit, and no longer either the objects of

Hall's Civil War, p. 106.—³ Frothingham, p. 237.

³ Ibid., p. 242.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Aug. 14; Same to Gen. Schuyler, Aug. 15; Same to Cont. Cong., Aug. 23; Same to N. Y. Cong., Aug. 30; Reed to Thos. Bradford, Aug. 21; Same to same, Aug. 24.

⁵ Sparks, p. 145.—⁶ Minutes of Cong., cited by Frothingham, p. 265. See also Gordon, ii. p. 137.

¹ Minutes of Council, inclosed in the general's letter to Cong., Sept. 21.—² Letter to Earl of Dartmouth, Oct. 9, 1775.—³ Letter of Earl of Dartmouth to Gen. Howe, "Whitehall, Sept. 5, 1775."

terror or cause of distress to the rebels, is truly alarming, and demands the most serious consideration; and I am commanded by the King to say, that if no alteration for the better should have happened before this letter reaches you, or any unexpected advantages of carrying on the war on the side of New England should have opened themselves, it seems not only advisable, but necessary, to abandon Boston before the winter, to dismantle Castle William, and, having embarked all the stores and artillery, and afforded every means to the well-disposed inhabitants of getting safely away with their families and effects, to remove with the troops either to New York or some other place to the southward, which considerations of superior advantage, safety, and convenience, shall point out as the most proper, and where a squadron of the King's ships may not only lie, but carry on operations with security during the winter."

The anxiety to remove from Boston, which had been manifested both by the ministry and the general, was strangely overruled by the want of means of transit; and, much against the will of all parties,—the "rebels," as well as the loyal,—the King's troops were compelled to remain in Boston. In a dispatch, written subsequent to the receipt of the governmental dispatch of the 5th of September,¹ General Howe thus clearly points out the difficulty by

which he was controlled: "By the estimate, No. 1,¹ your lordship will observe the insufficiency of the tonnage of transports now in port, to carry the troops, the artillery, the stores of all denominations, the well-disposed inhabitants, with their effects, and such merchandise as it may be thought prudent to remove. If all our vessels were in port, the whole could not have gone at one embarkation, by a deficiency of eleven thousand six hundred and two tons, even with the addition of the ships and small craft to be procured in the harbor. And when I reflect upon a division of the army for two embarkations, in its present weak state; upon the situation this garrison and the troops sent to New York would be in, with respect to the enemy, it appears to me, that more would be hazarded than prudence could justify, especially, as I should, in that case, be dependent upon the return of transports, at a season when the navigation on this coast, from the violence of northerly winds, is so very precarious."

Thus unwillingly made the occupant of Boston, with the knowledge of the energetic character of his enemy, and a constant dread of his power to assault, General Howe continued the work of defence, which his predecessor had com-

¹ By this estimate, the tonnage necessary to transport the troops, artillery, stores, loyalists, &c., as per details given, was:

Tons	35,172
Tonnage in port.....	9,721
Tonnage out on service.....	7,039
Small craft in port.....	6,810—23,570
Deficit, as stated.....(Tons)	11,602

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch to Earl of Dartmouth, "Boston, Nov. 26, 1775."

menced, on Bunker's Hill and the Neck,¹ and provided quarters for the accommodation of his troops.² He also took severe measures with those who sought to leave the town "without his order or permission given in writing;"³ and recommended the inhabitants to associate themselves into companies to be employed in preserving order within the town.⁴

During the month of October, General Washington was also actively engaged in making preparations for wintering his troops,⁵ and in reorganizing his army.⁶ The camp was visited by a committee from Congress, who had been appointed to consult with other committees, in relation to a new organization of the army.⁷ Dr. Franklin, Thomas Lynch, of Carolina, and Colonel Harrison, of Virginia, formed the committee; and while they remained at Cambridge, delegates from the four New England colonies met with them in conference.⁸ After a full interchange of opinions, and a careful examination of the subject, occupying several days, it was determined to provide for the enlistment of twenty-six regiments, of eight companies each, besides riflemen and artillery.⁹ While the committee was in the camp, the subject of an as-

sault on the town was again referred to a council of war, and a unanimous opinion, adverse to the project, was again given.¹

About this time active measures were also taken to intercept the supplies which might be sent to Boston by sea, and for this purpose several armed vessels were fitted out, both by the colonial and the continental authorities.² The Assembly of Rhode Island had authorized two vessels to be fitted out under the command, respectively, of Abraham and Christopher Whipple, and they had been cruising for several weeks.³ The government of Connecticut had also authorized the preparation of two armed vessels as cruisers;⁴ and the General Court of Massachusetts was also considering the question.⁵ Early in the preceding month, General Washington, deeply impressed with the importance of the object, had issued a commission to Captain Broughton, of Marblehead,⁶ and early in October he made contracts for several other vessels,⁷ six of which—the Lynch, the Franklin, the Lee, the Warren, the Washington, and the Harrison—sailed

¹ Minutes of Council, Oct. 18, inclosed in Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 24.

² Letter from camp, Oct. 1, 1775; J. Reed to the General Court, Oct. 2; Same to Com. of Bristol, R. I., Oct. 20; Instructions of Gen. Washington to Col. Glover and Mr. Moylan, Oct. 4, 1775.

³ Gov. Cooke's letters to Gen. Washington, Aug. 30, Sept. 9, Sept. 14, Sept. 18, Sept. 26, Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 25.—⁴ Minutes of Com. of Safety, Aug. 2, 1775, and Oct. 2, 1775.—⁵ Minutes of the General Court, Sept. 28, Oct. 6, Nov. 1, Nov. 10.—⁶ Instructions to Capt. Nicholson Broughton, Sept. 2 and Oct. 16, 1775.

⁷ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 12, 1775.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 9; Gen. Washington's dispatch to Cong., Oct. 12.—² Gen. Howe to Earl Dartmouth, Oct. 9; Gen. Washington's dispatch to Cong., Oct. 12.—³ Gen. Howe's second proclamation, Oct. 28.

⁴ Gen. Howe's third proclamation, Oct. 28.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 4.

⁶ Sparks, p. 146, 147.—⁷ Committee's letter to Cong., Oct. 24, 1775.—⁸ Ibid., and Minutes of the meetings therof, Oct. 18 to 22, 1775.—⁹ Minutes of Conference, from Oct. 18 to Oct. 22, 1775.

about the close of the month, and cruised with various success.¹

On the 9th of November, a skirmish occurred at Lechmere's Point, between a foraging party from the town, about four hundred in number, and a party of riflemen and Pennsylvania troops sent out to oppose them. Although the enemy were covered by the Cerberus, man-of-war, and several floating batteries, and the continental forces had to wade through water of considerable depth, the latter marched gallantly to the attack, killing two of the enemy, with two of their own number wounded. The gallantry manifested by the troops was well calculated to raise the spirits of the people; and, although, in itself, the affair possessed no especial interest, it was the subject of much exultation throughout the colonies.²

On the night of the 22d of November, a strong detachment, under General Putnam, occupied Cobble Hill, working until break of day, and then retiring.³ On the following night, a similar party, under General Heath, completed the works, without interruption from the enemy.⁴

At this time the continental forces occupied an exceedingly critical position,⁵ and General Washington made the best possible disposition for a defence, should the enemy, who was ap-

prised of the troubles,¹ feel inclined to attack him.² With a continued scarcity of ammunition, and a large part of his force on the eve of departing for their homes,—some of them even anticipating the expiration of their terms of service by a shameful desertion,³—he was poorly prepared to withstand an attack, and much less so to make one, although the country appeared impatient with his inactivity.⁴ Fortunately, however, the enemy was also incapacitated, in some vital points, and could make no movement with any prospect of success;⁵ and thus, through the weakness of each, the respective armies could but watch each other, and wait for some dispensation of Providence which might enable them to assume an offensive position.

Fortunately the cruisers which had been sent out were tolerably successful,⁶ and while the enemy's means were reduced,—all his stores, even fagots for fuel, having to be sent from Europe,—the capabilities of the continental army were increased to a corresponding extent. This was especially the case when the *Lee* brought into Cape Ann the ordnance brig *Nancy*, on board of

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 27.—² Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 28.—³ Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Dec. 2; Same to Cong., Dec. 4.

⁴ Frothingham, pp. 254, 255.

⁵ Gen. Gage to Earl of Dartmouth, Oct. 1; Gen. Howe to same, Oct. 9.

⁶ Wm. Bartlett to Gen. Washington, Nov. 4; Wm. Watson to same, Nov. 6; Capts. Broughton and Selman to same, Nov. 6; Gen. Washington to Cong., Nov. 8; Wm. Bartlett to Gen. Washington, Nov. 8; Stephen Moylan, to Capt. Glover, Nov. 9; Wm. Bartlett to Gen. Washington, Nov. 9; Gen. Washington to Cong., Nov. 11; Same to same, Nov. 30.

¹ Joseph Reed's "List of the armed vessels, and a state of them," Oct. 29, 1775.—² Heath's Mem., p. 30.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Cong., Nov. 28, 1775; Same, Dec. 11; Heath, pp. 30, 31.—⁵ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 28; Same to Col. Reed, Nov. 28; Same to the General Court of Mass., Nov. 29.

which was a full assortment of military stores.¹

In December, the continental army advanced their works to Lechmere's Point, where a bomb-battery was erected without interruption from the enemy;² and, on the 17th of the same month, ground was broken for a water-battery by a party under General Putnam.³ This called forth the fire of the enemy, and the men were driven from the work; but, on the following day, General Heath, with another party, resumed the work, and continued until it was completed, much to the annoyance of the enemy, who kept up a constant fire, both from Bunker's Hill and the town.⁴

The *Lee*, during December, continued her cruises and made several important captures, one of which contained the mail from Europe.⁵

During the same month, the general was harassed by disaffection in the Connecticut line, who demanded a bounty, and because it was refused, deaf to the entreaties of their superior officers, regardless of the danger to the cause which such a course would produce, and in defiance of their own government, they resolved to leave the camp on the 6th of December—four days before the expiration of their terms of service.⁶ Steps were immediately taken to

secure the presence of three thousand minute-men from Massachusetts and New Hampshire,—a call which was nobly responded to,¹—when many deserted, carrying off their arms and ammunition, even before the day which they had assigned for their departure.² It is exceedingly doubtful if the loss of such troops was really an injury to the army. Possessing no interest beyond that which arises from the present personal gain which they secured, they could not have been depended upon in any trying moment, and it was well, probably, that their places were filled with those whose motives were purer, and whose actions, therefore, were more reliable. But still farther than this was the desertion of the Connecticut troops productive of good to the cause of the colonies. The general and his officers breathed more freely, and their anxiety, so far as men were concerned, was removed;³ while the army at large showed a better disposition and a greater degree of cheerfulness.⁴ Provisions were plentifully supplied, the men were promptly paid, and comfortable barracks afforded good quarters to the men, and secured their health. Fuel was the only article of which the army

Nov. 30; Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Dec. 2; Same to Cong., Dec. 4; Trumbull to Washington, Dec. 7.

¹ Gen. Sullivan to N. H. Com. of Safety, Nov. 29; Same to same, Nov. 30; Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Dec. 2; Gen. Sullivan to N. H. Com. of Safety, Dec. 8; Gen. Greene to Gov. Ward, Dec. 10.

² Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Dec. 2; Same to Cong., Dec. 4; Same to General Court of Mass., Dec. 5; Minutes of Conn. Com. of Safety, Dec. 6.

³ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 11.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Henry Ward, Dec. 18.

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., Nov. 30, inclosing a list of the stores; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 3.—² Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 25.—³ Heath, p. 32.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 4; Wm. Bartlett to Gen. Washington, Dec. 9; Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 18, with inclosures.

⁶ Gen. Sullivan to N. H. Com. of Safety, Nov. 29; Do.,

experienced any scarcity, and that was speedily procured.¹

Meanwhile the enemy's troubles increased. The successes of the continental and colonial cruisers, "taking advantage of the weakness or necessities" of his transports and storeships, had "already been too successful;"² difficulties which could not be surmounted had prevented the completion of the quarters, and kept the troops in the field;³ the advances of the continental troops had changed the plans of defence, and compelled the withdrawal of troops from one point, and the suspension of necessary works there, to other points where the necessity of defences appeared to be more urgent;⁴ transports which had been sent to Quebec for forage had been detained by Governor Carleton to meet the exigencies arising from the invasion of Canada by General Montgomery and Arnold;⁵ and, lastly, "Mr. Washington, commanding the rebel army, presuming upon the number and rank of the prisoners in his possession, had threatened retaliation in point of treatment to any prisoners of theirs in his power, and proposed an exchange, which was a circumstance he could not answer in positive terms, nor would he enter upon such a measure without the King's orders."⁶ Two transports, under convoy

of a man-of-war, and two armed schooners, had also been sent to Savannah after cargoes of rice, so great were the necessities of the garrison;¹ and the distress, both of the troops and the unfortunate inhabitants, was "great beyond all possible description."² To obtain fuel, the poorest buildings in Boston, and what remained of Charlestown, were razed; and fences, and other property of a kindred character, were thus destroyed.³

It has been well said, by one of her sons, that "Boston, at this period, presented its most deplorable aspect. Hostile cannon were planted on its hills and lawns, and an insolent soldiery sat around its hearth-stones, or used its buildings for fuel, or wantoned in its temples of worship. Its Faneuil Hall was a play-house, where the efforts of the Sons of Liberty were turned into ridicule. Its patriotic population, exposed to the ill-treatment of the army and to the espionage of its adherents, in want of the necessaries of life, and cut off from relief which friends would gladly have extended, were obliged to endure the severest trials. The pursuits of commerce and of the mechanic arts, the freedom of the press, of speech, and of public meetings, the courts, the churches, and the schools, were all interrupted. Even the air was filled with unwelcome noise, as the morning and evening guns sounded from Beacon

¹ Letter from Camp, Dec. 13, cited by Frothingham, p. 274.—² Gen. Howe's dispatch to Earl of Dartmouth, Nov. 27, 1775. See also dispatches of Dec. 3, Dec. 13.

³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 27.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., Dec. 3.—⁶ Gen. Howe's "Private" dispatch to the Earl of Dartmouth, Dec. 19, 1775

¹ Gen. Howe's "Private" dispatch to the Earl of Dartmouth, Dec. 19, 1775.—² "Advices received in England from America, Dec. 14, 1775."—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 11; Letter from Boston, Jan. 29.

Hill, or as the relief guards marched with their music to perform their stated duties. In a word, Boston, under rigid martial-law, was like a prison, and it is not strange that the inhabitants who sided with the patriots longed to leave a place so filled with hated sights and sounds, and to breathe, although in exile, the free air of the surrounding hills.”¹

On the first of January, the army—which, before that time, had been somewhat colonial in its character, notwithstanding the Continental Congress exercised a control over it, and one of its officers commanded it—became in name, as well as in fact, the Continental Army; and, for the first time, the Federal Flag, bearing the thirteen stripes, was flung to the breeze.²

On the same day the King’s speech, at the opening of Parliament, on the 26th of October previous, was received in the camp, and conveyed to the resolute colonists the information that measures would be adopted to enforce obedience to the authority of the King;³ leaving many to suggest, with General Greene, that, “thanks to God, since Providence has so determined it, America must raise an empire of permanent duration, supported upon the grand pillars of truth, freedom, and religion, based upon justice, and defended by her own patriotic sons.”⁴ The terms of service of many of the troops were

expiring, and thousands of them were hurrying home, some dissatisfied with one measure and others with another;¹ recruits, entire strangers to the duties of the camp, were slowly taking their places;² ammunition and arms were still in demand;³ and the country and Congress, ignorant of the causes which prevented it, were anxiously looking for the commencement of offensive operations against the enemy.⁴ In the midst of all these anxieties the general again submitted the question of an attack to a “council of general officers,” at which Messrs. John Adams and Joseph Warren were present, when it was agreed, “that a vigorous attempt ought to be made upon the ministerial army in Boston as soon as practicable, all concurring circumstances favoring the wished-for success; and advised his Excellency to request from this, and the neighboring colonies, thirteen regiments of militia to his aid, to be at Cambridge by the 1st of February, and to consist of the same number of men and officers as those upon the continental establishment, and to remain (should occasion require) until the last of March.”⁵ Three of these regiments, it was advised by a subsequent “council of war,” were to be detached to Canada, from which unfavorable news had been received, “the feeble state of the regi-

¹ Gen. Washington to Col. Reed, Jan. 4; Heath’s Mem., p. 35.—² Gen. Washington to Col. Reed, Jan. 14.

³ Gen. Washington to Cong., Jan. 4; Gen. Greene to Gov. Ward, Jan. 4; Gen. Washington’s dispatch, Jan. 14; Same to Col. Reed, Jan. 14.—⁴ Gen. Washington to President Reed, Feb. 10, 1776.—⁵ Minutes of Council of General Officers, inclosed in letter to Cong., Jan. 19, 1776.

¹ Frothingham, p. 282.—² General Orders, Jan. 1, 1776; Gen. Washington to Col. Reed, Jan. 4, 1776.

³ Gen. Washington to Col. Reed, Jan. 4; Gen. Greene to Gov. Ward, Jan. 4.—⁴ Letter to Gov. Ward, Jan. 4.

ments" at Cambridge rendering it "improper to detach any force from the lines to Quebec or Canada."¹

During January the continental army engaged in no enterprise of importance, except one in which Major Knowlton, of Connecticut, with Brigade-majors Henly and Cary, and two hundred men, destroyed the few remaining houses at Charlestown, which had escaped the destruction by fire on the 17th of June, and the subsequent demolition for fuel. With great gallantry, and greatly to the annoyance of the enemy, he burned eight of the houses, killed one man, and carried off five prisoners, without sustaining any damage, and without firing a shot.² The cruisers, during the same month, sent in several prizes, much to the annoyance of the enemy and the advantage of the army.³

General Howe's troubles, during the same month, were not decreased or diminished, and his want of facilities for evacuating Boston greatly troubled him.⁴ His troops, regardless of his efforts to prevent it, were plundering the inhabitants,⁵ and one of them was executed for the offence, while a second, who had been convicted of the same crime, was reprieved, and recommended to the King for pardon.

The month of February also passed without any movement worthy of no-

tice; and, although the enemy's condition invited an assault, the army was not prepared to take advantage of it.¹ On the 9th of that month, upwards of two thousand of his men were without firelocks;² while, on the 16th, of the force at the camp, only eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven men, exclusive of officers, were fit for duty.³ On the 16th of February, another "council of war" was held, when the general submitted the strength of the army, and informed the generals who met with him, "that the stock of powder was so small as to afford but little aid from cannon and mortars; and, therefore, that small-arms must be the principal reliance, in any event, till a supply could be obtained; that in the state Boston harbor had been all that year, and then was, a bombardment might probably destroy the town, without doing much damage to the ministerial troops within it, as there were transports, wooded and watered, with a view, more than probable, to take them in upon any sudden emergency; consequently that might not produce the desired effect, if those transports were sufficient for the embarkation of the army; that from the best intelligence which had been procured, the strength of the army in Boston did not much exceed five thousand

¹ Minutes of Council of War, inclosed in letter to Cong., Jan. 19, 1776.—² Gen. Washington to Cong., Jan. 11; Same to Col. Reed, Jan. 14; Heath's Mem., p. 35.

³ Lord Stirling to Cong., Jan. 24; Wm. Watson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 26; Same, Jan. 29.—⁴ Dispatch to the Earl of Dartmouth, Jan. 16, 1776.—⁵ Ibid., Jan. 22, 1776.

¹ Two letters from Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Feb. 8, 1776; Same to Pres. Reed, Feb. 10; Same to N. Y. Com. and to the Mass. Assembly, Feb. 10.

² Gen. Washington to Cong., Feb. 8.

³ Minutes of Council, Feb. 16, inclosed in letter of Gen. Washington to Cong., Feb. 18, 1776.

men, fit for duty; that considerable reinforcements were expected, and, when arrived, they would undoubtedly endeavor to penetrate into the country, if their strength should be sufficient, or remove to some other part of the continent, if not; and, thereby, greatly harass and fatigue our troops, by constant marching and countermarching, for which, in the present situation of affairs, they neither were nor could be provided; therefore, that a stroke, well aimed, at this critical juncture, might put a final end to the war, and restore peace and tranquillity, so much to be wished for. For these reasons, and under these circumstances, and as part of Cambridge and Roxbury Bays were so frozen as to admit an easier entry into the town of Boston than could be obtained, either by water or through the lines on the Neck, the general desired to know the sentiments of the general officers respecting a general assault upon the town. The questions being put, and their opinion demanded," the council passed this resolution: "Resolved, That an assault on the town of Boston, in the present circumstances of the continental army, is, for the following reasons, judged improper: Because it is the opinion of this council that the King's forces in Boston, comprehending new-raised corps, and armed tories, amount to a much larger number than five thousand, furnished with artillery, assisted by a fleet, and possessed of every advantage the situation of the place affords; the officers, in proportion to the number of men, are so many,

that the troops there may be said, with propriety, to be double officered; because our army is at present very defective in the numbers this council declared to be sufficient for the purposes of offensive war; and, also, deficient in arms to the amount of two thousand stands. The militia ordered and expected to be here, by the first of the month, are not more than half arrived, so that to assault the town of Boston, guard the works and stores, there remain only twelve thousand six hundred men, militia, commissioned, and non-commissioned officers included, a force not more than sufficient to defend the lines and maintain the blockade. Because, it appears to the council, by a report of a majority of the generals commanding brigades, that upon discoursing with the field officers of their respective regiments upon the subject of an assault, they, in general, declared a disapprobation of the measure, as exceedingly doubtful. Because, if an assault should be found practicable and expedient at any time, it was declared highly necessary that it should, for some days, be preceded by a cannonade and bombardment. His Excellency, the commander-in-chief, then required the opinion of the council, whether it would be advisable to begin a cannonade and bombardment, with the present stock of powder." When the following resolution was adopted: "Resolved, That a cannonade and bombardment will be expedient and advisable, as soon as there shall be a proper supply of powder, and not be-

fore;¹ and that, in the mean time, preparations should be made to take possession of Dorchester Hill, with a view of drawing out the enemy, and of Noddle's Island, if the situation of the water and other circumstances will admit of it."²

At length the Continental army was enabled to act offensively. The Sons of Liberty in New York had seized a quantity of stores at Turtle Bay,³ and these, added to those captured in an ordnance brig by the Lee, Captain Manley,⁴ and a small supply sent from Providence, and some other cities, enabled the General to change his policy. The works on Lechmere's Point were completed; and, on the 25th of February, some heavy cannon were mounted on them.⁵ On the 1st of March "several mortars were sent over to Roxbury, and great preparations were made to annoy the enemy."⁶ On the night of the 2d, another severe cannonade and bombardment began from the American works against the enemy, probably for the purpose of concealing the movements which were in preparation in the camp.⁷ On Mon-

day night, March 4th, it was renewed with great energy, under cover of which, about seven o'clock, General Thomas, with two thousand five hundred men, took possession of Dorchester Heights.¹ Eight hundred men formed the advance guard, followed by carts containing the tools; then followed the main body, under General Thomas in person, and a train of three hundred carts, loaded with fascines and trussed hay, brought up the rear. Moving with the greatest silence,² the party reached the ground about eight o'clock, one half of the advance guard proceeding to the point nearest Boston, the other to that nearest the castle.³ Notwithstanding the moon shone brightly, the cannonade so completely occupied the attention of the enemy that the work progressed without his knowledge, and by morning the works on both the hills were nearly completed.⁴ "Perhaps there never was so much work done in so short a space of time," the veteran Gridley overseeing the work, and the enemy were filled with astonishment and dismay.⁵ "The adjoining orchards were cut down to make the abatis; and a very curious and novel mode of defence was added to these works. The hills on which

¹ A "Return of cartridges for cannon," signed by Henry Knox, Feb. 19, 1776, shows that, at that date, only 2527 rounds of cartridges, of all kinds, and 7238 pounds of cannon-powder, were on hand; a "Return of musket-cartridges," signed Ezekiel Cheever, Feb. 8, shows that 136,520 were on hand; and a return of "Powder in the magazines," over the same signature, Feb. 18, shows that only 143 barrels were on hand.

² Minutes of Council of General Officers, Feb. 16, inclosed in Gen. Washington's letter to Cong., Feb. 18, 1776.

³ Gordon, ii. p. 192. These stores were seized, April, 1775, and a portion of them had been forwarded to the camp at Cambridge.—⁴ The *Nancy*, before referred to.

⁵ Heath's Mem., p. 39.—⁶ Ibid.; Gordon, ii. p. 191.

⁷ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7; Same to Gov. Trumbull, March 9; Col. Moylan to the commander at N. Y., March 9.

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7; Same to Gov. Trumbull, March 9; Col. Moylan to the commander at N. Y., March 9; Joseph Trumbull to Wm. Hooper, March 6; Letter from British officer, Boston, March 5; Gen. Howe to Earl of Dartmouth, March 21.

² Gordon, ii. p. 192.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7, 1776; Gordon, ii. p. 192.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7, 1776; Letter from British officer, March 5.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7, 1776; Gen. Howe to Earl Dartmouth, March 21.

they were erected were steep and clear of trees and bushes. Rows of barrels, filled with earth, were placed round the works. They presented only the appearance of strengthening the works; but the real design was, in case the enemy made an attack, to have rolled them down the hill. They would have descended with such increasing velocity, as must have thrown the assailants into the greatest confusion, and have killed and wounded great numbers.”¹

“The situation of the royal army now became critical; no alternative remained but that of evacuating the town, or that of driving the Continentals from the possession of these works,” and General Howe promptly “adopted the latter expedient. It was resolved to attempt to dislodge them, by hazarding an attack on the newly-erected works on the heights of Dorchester in two different points at the same time.”² Accordingly twenty-four hundred men, under the Earl Percy, were ordered to proceed to Castle William, from whence they were to make the attack on the right flank of the party, while another body moved against it in front.³

In the Continental lines the most intense excitement prevailed; and, under “the expectation of seeing the scenes of Bunker’s Hill acted over again, the surrounding heights were again filled

with spectators.⁴ General Thomas was strengthened by a reinforcement of two thousand men;² and General Washington visited the works, and cheered the men, reminding them it was the 5th of March, and calling upon them to avenge the death of their brethren.³ At the same time a detachment of four thousand men paraded at Cambridge, ready to proceed, in boats, and attack the town of Boston, the moment the enemy withdrew his forces to attack Dorchester. It was arranged that this expedition should proceed in two divisions—the one under General Greene, the other under General Sullivan; that they were to embark near the mouth of Charles River; that General Sullivan’s command was to land at the powder-house, and take possession of Beacon Hill and Mount Horam, while General Greene’s was to land near Barton’s Point, take possession of that post, and then join General Sullivan, force the gates and works at the Neck, and let in the troops from Roxbury. The command of this part of the army was given to General Putnam.⁴

The preparations on both sides seemed to be complete, and a bloody affray appeared to be inevitable. Yet the sacrifice of life and property which such an assault would produce was providentially spared, and the better course pursued by both parties. About mid-

¹ Heath’s Mem., p. 40; Stedman, i. pp. 166, 167; Gordon, ii. p. 196.—² Lieut. Hall’s History of the Civil War, pp. 108, 109.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7; Same to Gov. Trumbull, March 9; Letter from Cambridge, March 21; British officer’s letter, March 6; Gen. Howe’s dispatch, March 21.

⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 195.—² Frothingham, p. 299.

³ Gordon, ii. p. 195.—⁴ Gen. Washington’s dispatch, March 7; Report of the Generals to Gen. Washington, inclosed in his dispatch, March 7; Heath’s Mem., pp. 38, 40, 41.

night a violent storm arose; the wind, which was from the south, forcing in the windows, blowing down sheds and fences, driving vessels ashore, and doing other serious damage. The transports in which the enemy's troops had embarked were unable to reach the places of rendezvous, and a heavy surf, beating on the shore where the landing was to be made, rendered the use of boats entirely impracticable.¹ The storm continued through the succeeding day;² and the Continentals having been constantly engaged in strengthening their works, General Howe reluctantly abandoned his plan, and determined to evacuate the town, without delay.³

On the morning of the 7th of March General Howe's troubles reached their height, and his situation was at once humiliating and critical. The fleet, that engine of British power, of which Britons have never ceased to boast, had been defeated in its efforts by a few fishing-schooners, despoiled of its convoys, and now rode at anchor in safety, only through the forbearance of the Colonists; while the army, with all its boasted prowess—with the accumulated glories of ages clustering around its banners, and the honor of its Sovereign committed to its keeping—had been compelled to take refuge from a rustic foe whom it had affected to despise,

whose numbers and appointments were not equal to its own, whose officers had been made the subject of its elegant ridicule only a few evenings before. The loyalists, true to their Sovereign, but false to themselves, their country, and mankind, clustered around him and claimed that protection against their outraged countrymen which had been so frequently and so emphatically guaranteed to them, while the inhabitants of the town, many of whom had been unsuccessful applicants for permission to retire, now wore more cheerful countenances, and looked forward to the day when their troubles would be relieved.

No sooner was it known that General Howe had determined to evacuate the town, than steps were taken by the inhabitants to preserve it from destruction—a threat having been issued that such a course would be pursued if the Continental army moved to the assault.¹ To make this threat more effective, the admiral moored his ships around the town in such positions as were best calculated to carry such a threat into execution; and it was also stated that combustibles had been so disposed that a very short space of time would be required to reduce the town to ashes.² This course was not without effect. A number of influential citizens waited on General Robertson, and, probably with the sanction of General Howe, although without his signature, the following pa-

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7; Joseph Trumbull to Wm. Hooper, March 6; Letter from British officer, Boston, March 6; Gen. Howe's dispatch, March 21; Heath, p. 41.—² Jos. Trumbull to Wm. Hooper, March 6; Gen. Howe's dispatch, March 21.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Schuyler, March 19; Gen. Howe's dispatch, March 21.

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 110, 111.

² The History of the War in America, i. p. 152; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 111.

per was sent to the Continental lines by a flag of truce:¹

"*BOSTON, March 8, 1776.*

"As his Excellency, General Howe, is determined to leave the town, with the troops under his command, a number of the respectable inhabitants, being very anxious for its preservation and safety, have applied to General Robertson for this purpose, who, at their request, has communicated the same to his Excellency, General Howe, who has assured him that he has no intention of destroying the town, unless the troops under his command are molested during their embarkation, or at their departure, by the armed force without; which declaration he gave General Robertson leave to communicate to the inhabitants. If such an opposition should take place, we have the greatest reason to expect the town will be exposed to entire destruction. Our fears are quieted with regard to General Howe's intentions. We beg we may have some assurance that so dreadful a calamity may not be brought on by any measures without. As a testimony of the truth of the above, we have signed our names to this paper, carried out by Messrs. Thomas and Jonathan Amory, and Peter Joffonet, who have, at the earnest entreaties of the inhabitants, through the Lieutenant-governor, solicited a flag of truce for this purpose.

JOHN SCOLLAY,
TIMOTHY NEWELL,
THOMAS MARSHALL,
SAMUEL AUSTIN."

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7, 1776.

This paper was received at the lines by Colonel Learned, who carried it to headquarters; and, on the next day, under instructions from General Washington, the same officer, in his own name, answered that he had laid the paper before the General, and was answered, "That as it was an unauthenticated paper, without an address, and not obligatory upon General Howe, he would take no notice of it."¹

Notwithstanding the apparent coldness with which this paper was treated, it was well known that neither party desired to resume active operations, and the practical result was all that was desired by either party, although General Washington had made ample preparations to make an assault at any moment that General Howe made the least attempt to injure the town or maltreat the inhabitants.

At the same time General Washington continued actively engaged in completing his works around the town. On the 9th he planted a battery on the northeast of Bird's Hill, near the water at Dorchester Neck;² and, on the same night, a detachment was sent to occupy and strengthen Nook's Hill, also in Dorchester, which completely commanded Boston, and placed the enemy entirely at his mercy. By an imprudent act of some of the men, in lighting a fire, the movement was discovered, and a terrible cannonade, from both sides, ensued; the Continentals being

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 7, 1776. See also Gen. Washington to President Reed, March 7.

² Frothingham, p. 305.

driven from the hill with the loss of five men killed, and the work temporarily suspended.¹

Perceiving, from this, that General Washington intended to act promptly, before the arrival of reinforcements to General Howe could strengthen his force, the latter made immediate preparations to leave the town.² On the 10th, he issued a proclamation requiring the inhabitants to deliver all their woollen and linen goods to Crean Brush, a tory from New York, on board the Minerva, at Hubbard's Wharf;³ and the inhabitants were mercilessly plundered by this scoundrel, under the cloak of this proclamation.⁴ On the same day, part of the transports were ordered to fall down to Castle William; many of the cannon were spiked or had their trunnions knocked off, and some were thrown overboard; carriages were broken; and ammunition destroyed.⁵ For several days these scenes were continued, the embarkation of stores and people being steadily carried on.

On the 14th, the streets were barricaded, in different parts of the town, to prevent interruption from the inhabitants or the army;⁶ and, on the 15th, when it was intended to leave the town, proclamation was made that the inhabitants should not leave their houses, after eleven in the morning, in order that the troops might be insured against

annoyance during their last moments in Boston.¹ The wind changed, however, and, for two days longer, the town was subjected to insult and pillage from the sailors, as well as from the troops.²

During this time General Washington had but little information of the proceedings in the town, and grew impatient—in fact, the suspicion that General Howe was deceiving him, with the intention of remaining until his stores and reinforcements came in, began to be entertained;³ and, on the 13th, a Council of War was held, in which, among other measures, it was determined to fortify Nook's Hill, on the next day, "at all events," if the enemy had not previously evacuated the town.⁴ On the 16th (Saturday), the General sent a strong detachment to Nook's Hill, which the enemy discovered and attempted to dislodge by a severe cannonade. Without returning it, however, they continued at their work, and maintained their ground.⁵

On Sunday morning, at a very early hour, the embarkation commenced, and, about nine o'clock, the troops from Bunker's Hill and the last of the refugees left the wharf.⁶ The troops stationed at Cambridge and Roxbury, as soon as this movement of the enemy was discovered, were ordered to parade;

¹ Letter from Cambridge, March 21.—² Ibid.

³ Irving, ii. p. 194; Frothingham, pp. 308, 309.

⁴ Minutes of Council of General Officers, March 13, inclosed in Gen. Washington's dispatch of the same date.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Gen. Schuyler, March 19; Same to Congress, March 19; Letter from British officer, March 17.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 19; Letter from British officer, Nantasket Roads, March 17.

¹ Letter from Cambridge, March 10; Heath's Mem., pp. 41, 42.—² Gen. Howe's dispatch, March 21.

³ Proclamation of Gen. Howe, March 10.

⁴ Letter from British officer, Boston, March 10.

⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Frothingham, p. 308

and a detachment was sent forward to take possession of the Hill and the town; although, in consequence of the prevalence of small-pox in some parts of the town, the main body of the army did not enter Boston until the following Wednesday, March 20th.¹

The effective force of General Howe, including seamen, at the time of the evacuation, was about eleven thousand men;² and more than two thousand refugees also found shelter on the ships, and, with the troops, proceeded to Halifax.³

After destroying the block-house and barracks, and Castle William, the fleet proceeded to Nantasket Roads,⁴ where it laid ten days; and, on the 27th, it sailed for Halifax,⁵ with the exception of a few vessels, which were left to guard the entrance of the harbor, and direct the reinforcements and stores to Halifax or other places of safety.⁶

The Continental forces gradually retired from the town, and marched towards New York, which was known to be the point which General Howe would seek to occupy;⁷ yet five regiments,—one at Dorchester, one at Beverly, one at Charlestown, and two in Boston,—the whole under General Ward, were left near Boston to guard against any sudden movement on the part of the enemy's vessels, several of

which still hovered around the entrance of the harbor.¹

On the 17th of May, the *Franklin*, Captain Mugford, one of the Continental cruisers, captured the transport ship *Hope*, and brought her into Boston. She was freighted with a fine assortment of military stores, including fifteen hundred whole barrels of gunpowder.² On the 19th of May, the *Franklin*, and the *Lady Washington*, a privateer, which lay at anchor off Point Shirley, were attacked by thirteen boats from the enemy's vessels. The crews of the schooners fought with desperate energy, and drove off their assailants, with the loss of two of their boats. In the conflict, Captain Mugford, of the *Franklin*, was mortally wounded, but he continued to animate his men, exclaiming, "Don't give up the ship, you can beat them off!" until he died. No other person on the schooners was seriously injured.³

At length measures were taken to remove the enemy from the harbor, and General Benjamin Lincoln was ordered to take the command. About twelve hundred men were assembled at Pettick's Island and Hull, composed mostly of militia, only a few of the Continental troops being engaged in the enterprise. About six hundred militia and a detachment of artillery took post on Moon Island, at Hoff's Neck, and at Point Alderton; while Colonel Whitcomb, with a detachment of the army

¹ Frothingham, pp. 310, 311.—² Gordon, ii. p. 199.

³ Stedman, i. p. 167; Gordon, ii. p. 199.

⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, March 21.

⁵ Frothingham, p. 312.

⁶ Gordon, p. 200; Hist. of the War in America, i. p. 154.

⁷ Stedman, i. p. 168.

¹ Frothingham, p. 312.—² Gordon, ii. p. 264.

³ Frothingham, p. 313; Gordon, ii. p. 265.

and two eighteen-pounders and a thirteen-inch mortar, took post on Long Island. The troops reached their stations on the morning of June 18th, when a cannonade was opened on the ships from Long Island, which was returned with spirit by Commodore Banks, the officer in command, until a shot struck his upper works, when he made signals for the fleet to weigh anchor, and, after blowing up the lighthouse, he went to sea, and Boston harbor was cleared of the enemy.¹

As the intelligence of this event spread throughout the Colonies it was received with manifestations of delight, and General Washington and the army received congratulations from every quarter.² The selectmen of Boston,³ the General Court of Massachusetts,⁴ and the Continental Congress⁵ vied

with each other in the terms with which they expressed their gratitude, while the letters from individuals "were more spirited than those from public bodies."¹ In England the intelligence was received with astonishment; and the opposition in Parliament, headed by Edmund Burke, and David Hartley, and Colonel Barre, in the House, and the Duke of Manchester, the Marquis of Rockingham, and the Earls of Sherburne and Effingham, in the Lords, pursued the Ministry with awful severity.

Thus ended the "siege of Boston;" and General Washington, "wishing for no other reward, than that arising from a conscientious discharge of his important trust, and that his services might contribute to the establishment of freedom and peace, upon a permanent foundation, and merit the applause of his countrymen and every virtuous citizen," sought, in the neighborhood of New York, fresh laurels and additional strength for the cause of his country.

¹ Gordon, ii. pp. 266, 267.—² Frothingham, p. 316.

³ This address, and the General's reply, can be found in the American Archives, 4th series, vol. v., folios 758, 759.

⁴ This address is copied at length in the minutes of the Massachusetts Council, March 27, 1776.—⁵ The resolutions of thanks will be found in the Journals of Congress, March 25th, and the letter conveying it, signed by "John Hancock, President," was dated April 2, 1776.

Frothingham, p. 320.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH.

ON BOARD HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP CHATHAM, }
NANTASKET ROAD, March 21, 1776. }

MY LORD:—It is with great regret I am obliged to inform your lordship, that after all my struggles to supply the army with provisions from the Southern provinces and the West Indies, from whence none of the vessels have yet returned, and after an anxious expectation of more transports to convey the troops, stores, civil officers, inhabitants, and effects, the enemy, by taking possession of, and fortifying the commanding heights on Dorchester Neck, in order to force the ships, by their cannon, to quit the harbor, has reduced me to the necessity either of exposing the army to the greatest distresses, by remaining in Boston, or of withdrawing from it under such straitened circumstances. The importance of preserving this force, when it could no longer act to advantage, did not leave any room to doubt of the propriety of its removal; and since my determination, taken on the 7th instant, I have exerted every expedient to accomplish the arduous task, which was executed on the 17th following, in the forenoon, without the least molestation from the rebels, the transports having been previously watered, and fitted for sea in every respect, excepting the article of provisions, in the view of complying with His Majesty's commands for a movement from Boston, as soon as I might be enabled to effect it.

In order to explain to your lordship more clearly the state I was reduced to in the article of provisions, I have inclosed a return, extracted from the commissary-general's reports between the 12th of February and 4th of March; also the tonnage of transports at the time of embarkation.

The rebels, about the latter end of January, erected new works and batteries on a point of land opposite to West Boston, at a place known by the name of Phipps's Farm, which, laying under cover of their strongest posts, and so situated as to be supported by their whole force from Cambridge, was not to be prevented; soon afterwards the militia of the country was called in, and, having intelligence that the enemy intended to possess themselves of Dorchester Neck, I ordered a detachment from Castle William, on the 13th of February, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Leslie, and one composed of grenadiers and light-infantry from Boston, commanded by Major Musgrave, to pass over the ice, with directions to destroy the houses and every kind of cover whatever upon that peninsula, which was executed, and six of the enemy's guard made prisoners.

On the 2d instant, at night, the rebels began a cannonade upon the town, from Roxbury and Phipps's Farm, and threw some shells from both places, without doing any personal damage, and but little to the buildings; the same was repeated on the evenings of the 3d and 4th, by which only six men were wounded; the fire being returned from our batteries, but at such a distance, as to be very uncertain in the execution.

It was discovered on the 5th, in the morning, that the enemy had thrown up three very extensive works, with strong abatis round them, on the commanding hill on Dorchester Neck, which must have been the employment of at least twelve thousand men, in a situation so critical. I determined upon an immediate attack, with all the force I could transport. The ardor of the troops encouraged me in this hazardous enterprise; regiments were expeditiously embarked on board transports to fall down the harbor, and flat-boats were to receive other troops, making the whole two thousand four

hundred men, to rendezvous at Castle William, from whence the descent was to be made, on the night of the 5th, but the wind unfortunately coming contrary, and blowing very hard, the ships were not able to get to their destination, and this circumstance also making it impossible to employ the boats, the attempt became impracticable.

The weather continuing boisterous the next day and night, gave the enemy time to improve their works, to bring up their cannon, and to put themselves into such a state of defence, that I could promise myself little success by attacking them under all the disadvantages I had to encounter; wherefore I judged it most advisable to prepare for the evacuation of the town, upon the assurance of one month's provision from Admiral Shuldham, who, in this emergency, as he has on every other occasion, offered all the assistance he could afford.

A thousand difficulties arose on account of the disproportion of transports for the conveyance of the troops, the well-affested inhabitants, their most valuable property, and the quantity of military stores to be carried away; however, as the enemy gave no interruption but during the nights, and that inconsiderable, I found the whole in readiness to depart on the 14th, if the wind had favored, and assisted by the abilities and assiduity of Captains Reynar and Montagu, of His Majesty's ships Chatham and Fowey, who superintended the embarkation, and by the alacrity of the officers under them, this operation was effected on the 17th, and the rear guard embarked at nine o'clock in the morning, without the least loss, irregularity, or accident. Such military stores as could not be taken on board were destroyed, and the utmost expedition is now using to get ready for sea in the best state our circumstances will allow; the admiral leaving all the ships-of-war he can spare from the convoy, for the security and protection of such vessels as may be bound for Boston.

Every provision my situation would afford has been made for the accommodation of the inhabitants, and the preservation of their effects; all the woollen goods, also, that I could find room for, belonging to those who chose to stay behind, the want of which is more distressing to the enemy than any other article whatever, have

been shipped; inventories of them taken in the best manner possible, and put under the charge of proper persons, in order to be hereafter stored. The demolition of the castle has been effectually executed, and an armed ship is sent by the admiral, express, to advise the different governors on the continent of this removal.

Halifax, though stripped of provisions during the winter, and affording few conveniences to so numerous a body, is the only place where the army can remain until supplies arrive from Europe. My first attention will be paid to the defence of the town, and His Majesty's dock-yard, and to enable Governor Legge to overcome the spirit of disaffection, which has lately appeared in the northern parts of Nova Scotia; after which, I conclude that three battalions, with Gorham's and Maclean's corps, will be a sufficient force for its protection.

I shall also detach three regiments to Quebec as soon as the navigation of the River St. Lawrence becomes practicable, if I do not, in the mean time, hear any thing to the contrary from Europe. The remainder of the army, which, after these detachments are made, may consist of about five thousand men, including sick, will be held in readiness to proceed to New York, when enabled by a supply of provisions, and an addition of transports sufficient for that undertaking; and, although the force, according to the present estimation, intended to go on this service, is too small to expect more from it than the possession of the town, which in itself is a most important post, I shall attempt it at all hazard, as soon as possible, apprehending it will be more advisable to pursue this measure without delay, than by waiting for reinforcements from Europe, whereof I have no certainty, to give the rebels time to form an army in the province of New York, and to check the encouragement they will receive from the apparent inactivity of the King's army retired to Halifax, as well as to prevent the contrary effect it may have upon the few friends to government remaining there.

I am justly sensible how much more conducive it would be to His Majesty's service, if the army was in a situation to proceed immediately to New York; but the present condi-

tion of the troops, crowded in transports, without regard to conveniences, the inevitable dissortment of stores, and all the incumbrances with which I am clogged, effectually disable me from the exertion of this force in any offensive operations, although I should receive a supply of provisions before my departure from hence, which considerations, I hope, will lead His Majesty to approve of my determination.

Unless these supplies are sent under convoy, or of force to defend themselves, they will become very precarious, as the rebels have greatly increased their naval strength, and I fear that many of those now on their voyage will fall into the enemy's hands, notwithstanding all the efforts which His Majesty's ships, unequal in point of numbers to the service they are upon, can make. In this persuasion, I humbly submit to your lordship whether it would not be an advisable measure to order all convoys directly to Halifax, from whence they may proceed with more certainty to the future destination of the army.

I beg leave to remark, that the last commands I had the honor to receive from your lordship, are dated the 22d of October, which will serve to show the difficulty ships, bound to this post, have met with on the coast, many whereof, I learn by a master of a vessel just arrived here, have been forced to the West Indies, and no less than thirty-seven sail of different kinds were at Antigua the last of this month, when he left that island.

I shall not fail to write as fully as possible to your lordship from Halifax.

I am, &c.,

W. HOWE.

(INCLUSION.)

State of provisions remaining in store at Boston, on the 12th, 19th, 26th of February, and 4th of March, 1776, per returns of those dates, received from the Commissary-general of Stores, showing how long the same will victual 11,000 men.

Feb. 12, 1776.—Beef and pork, 35 days; wheat flour, 72 days; bread, 12 days; butter and cheese, 13 days; oil, 32 days; split peas, peas, and oatmeal, 2 days; barley, suet, rice, and raisins, reserved for the use of the general hospitals.

Feb. 19th.—Beef and pork, 29 days; wheat

flour, 65 days; bread, 12 days; butter and cheese, 12 days; oil, 32 days; split peas, peas, and oatmeal, 9 days; barley, suet, rice, and raisins, reserved for the general hospital.

Feb. 26th.—Beef and pork, 22 days; wheat flour, 68 days; bread, 12 days; butter and cheese, almost 6 days; oil, 32 days; split peas, peas, and oatmeal, almost 6 days; barley, suet, rice, and raisins, reserved for the general hospital.

March 4th.—Beef and pork, almost 17 days; wheat and flour, almost 63 days; bread, 16 days; butter and cheese, almost 12 days; oil, 32 days; split peas, peas, and oatmeal, 10 days; rice, 27 days; suet, barley, and raisins, reserved for the use of the general hospital.

W. HOWE.

II.

GENERAL WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO THE CONGRESS.

HEAD-QUARTERS, CAMBRIDGE, *March 19, 1776.*

SIR:—It is with the greatest pleasure I inform you that, on Sunday last, the 17th instant, about nine o'clock in the forenoon, the ministerial army evacuated the town of Boston, and that the forces of the United Colonies are now in actual possession thereof. I beg leave to congratulate you, sir, and the honorable Congress, on this happy event, and particularly as it was effected without endangering the lives and property of the remaining unhappy inhabitants. I have great reason to imagine their flight was precipitated by the appearance of a work which I had ordered to be thrown up last Saturday night, on an eminence at Dorechester, which lay nearest to Boston Neck, called Nook's Hill. The town, although it has suffered greatly, is not in so bad a state as I expected to find it; and I have a particular pleasure in being able to inform you, sir, that your house has received no damage worth mentioning; your furniture is in tolerable order, and the family pictures are all left entire and untouched. Captain Cazneau takes charge of the whole until he shall receive farther orders from you. As soon as the ministerial troops had quitted the town, I ordered a thousand men (who had had the small-pox), under

command of General Putnam, to take possession of the heights, which I shall endeavor to fortify in such a manner as to prevent their return, should they attempt it; but as they are still in the harbor, I thought it not prudent to march off with the main body of the army until I should be fully satisfied they had quitted the coast. I have, therefore, only detached five regiments, besides the rifle battalion, to New York, and shall keep the remainder here till all suspicion of their return ceases. The situation in which I found their works evidently discovered that their retreat was made with the greatest precipitation. They have left their barracks, and other works of wood at Bunker's Hill, &c., all standing, and have destroyed but a small part of their lines. They have also left a number of fine pieces of cannon, which they first spiked up; also a very large iron mortar, and (as I am informed) they have thrown another over the end of your wharf. I have employed proper persons to drill the cannon, and doubt not shall save the most of them. I am not yet able to procure an exact list of all the stores they have left; as soon as it can be done, I shall take care to transmit it to you. From an estimate of what the quartermaster-general has already discovered, the amount will be twenty-five or thirty thousand pounds.

Part of the powder mentioned in yours of the 6th instant, has already arrived; the remainder I have ordered to be stopped on the road, as we shall have no occasion for it here. The letter to General Thomas I immediately sent to him. He desired leave for three or four days to settle some of his private affairs; after which he will set out for his command in Canada. I am happy that my conduct in intercepting Lord Drummond's letter is approved of by Congress.

I have the honor to be, with sincere respect,
sir, your most obedient servant,

GEO. WASHINGTON.

To the Honorable JOHN HANCOCK, Esq

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III.

DEPOSITION RESPECTING THE POISONING OF STORES LEFT BY THE KING'S TROOPS.

IN COUNCIL, Tuesday, April 9, 1776.

Deposition of Dr. John Warren, who testifies and says: That on or about the 29th day of March, last past, went into the work-house of the town of Boston, lately improved as an hospital by the British troops stationed in said town, and upon examining into the state of a large quantity of medicine there by them left, (particularly in one room, supposed to have been by them used as a medicinal store-room), he found a great variety of medicinal articles lying upon the floor, some of which were contained and secured in papers, whilst others were scattered upon the floor loose. Amongst these medicines, observed small quantities of what he supposed was white and yellow arsenic intermixed; and then received information from Doctor Samuel Scott that he had taken up a large quantity of said arsenic, from over and amongst the medicine, and had collected it chiefly in large lumps, and secured it in a vessel. Upon receiving this information, desired him to let him view the arsenic, with which he complied, and judged it to amount to about the quantity of twelve or fourteen pounds. Being much surprised by this extraordinary intelligence, he more minutely examined the medicine on the floor, and found them to be chiefly capital articles, and those most generally in great demand; and judging them to be rendered entirely unfit for use, he advised Doctor Scott to let them remain, and by no means meddle with them, as he thought the utmost hazard would attend the using them. They were accordingly suffered to remain, and no account was taken of them.

Read, and ordered, That the above deposition be committed to Samuel Holten, Esq., with Mr. Whiting and Mr. Freeman.

(Minutes of the Council of Massachusetts, April 9, 1776.)

CHAPTER VII.

JUNE 27, 1775, TO MAY, 1776.

THE EXPEDITIONS AGAINST CANADA.

THE expeditions against Ticonderoga, and the capture of that fortress by Colonels Arnold and Allen; and the subsequent capture of St. John's by the former officer, led each of them to project and propose farther aggressions on the enemy's Canadian possessions. Accordingly, each of these officers addressed letters, the former to the Provincial Congresses of New York and Massachusetts,¹ the latter to the Continental Congress,² giving their respective plans of operations, and asking a force to carry them out. Although both were in advance of the age, and received no immediate command, they both participated, in different parts of the country, in subsequent operations against Canada; each carving out for himself, in his operations, a character for bravery which will live forever; each suffering personally—one as a prisoner, the other a cripple; and both becoming witnesses of the fact that the advice they had given, had it been fol-

lowed earlier, would have secured Canada to the colonists, and facilitated the progress of the great work of revolution which ultimately severed the colonies from the mother country.

For the purpose of securing pay for their men, and, if possible, employment for the future, Colonel Allen and Captain Warner visited Philadelphia, and, on Friday, June 23d, at their own request, were admitted on the floor of Congress, "having some things of importance to communicate."¹ If Congress received any information, or was influenced by any such information, as has been supposed,² there is no evidence of it on the journals of that body.

On the following Tuesday, however,

¹ Dated "Crown Point, June 2, 1775," and "Crown Point, June 6, 1775."

² Dated "Crown Point, June 13, 1775."

¹ Journals of Cont. Cong., Friday, June 23, 1775. Mr. Lossing does Arnold injustice in charging him with employing Allen as the bearer of his letter to Congress in which he attacks "*the Green-Mountain Boys*," whom Allen commanded, and in whose behalf he visited Philadelphia. This careful writer refers to "*a letter from the officer at Crown Point, dated June 10*," supposing that to have been Arnold's letter, but it was simply *a letter of recommendation from the officers at Crown Point, signed by Major Samuel Elmer, as "President" of the "council,"* which was then considered. Arnold's letter was not written until the 13th, three days afterwards.

² Lossing's Washington, i. pp. 652, 653.

—Colonel Arnold's letter having, in the mean time, reached Philadelphia,—the Congress adopted the following resolutions—the first legitimate movement towards the invasion of the Canadas:

"The Congress resumed the consideration of the letter from Albany,¹ and after some debate, the Congress came to the following resolutions:

"Resolved, That Major-general P. Schuyler be directed to repair, as soon as conveniently he can, to the posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, to examine into the state thereof, and of the troops now stationed there, and how they are supplied with provision and necessary stores; into the state also of the sloop and other navigation on the lakes; also, to obtain the best intelligence he can of the disposition of the Canadians and Indians of Canada; that he confer with Colonel Hinman and Colonel Arnold on the subject of Colonel Arnold's letter to this Congress, and report as soon as possible the state of the whole, as near as it can be ascertained, to this Congress; and that he give orders for the necessary preparation of boats and stores, for securing to the United Colonies the command of those waters adjacent to Crown Point and Ticonderoga.

* * * * *

"Resolved, That if General Schuyler finds it practicable, and that it will not be disagreeable to the Canadians, he do immediately take possession of St. John's, Montreal, and any other parts of the country, and pursue any other measures in Canada which may have a tendency to promote the peace and security of these colonies.

"Resolved, That if General Schuyler shall have occasion for a larger quantity of ready money and ammunition, for carrying on such expedition, than he can in convenient time procure from the Provincial Convention of the colony of New York, that he do in such case apply to the Governor of Connecticut for such supplies as may be necessary, and can be furnished by that colony; and that Governor Trumbull be desired to furnish such supplies, and this Congress will make provision for reimbursing the same."¹

General Schuyler reached Ticonderoga, and assumed the command of the district on the eighteenth of July,² but, so far was he from being in a condition to advance, that his first care was to put his troops in a condition for defence. Colonel Hinman, who had superseded the energetic Arnold, "expected the general," and had not done any thing, either for offence or defence;³ his guards slept on their posts with impunity;⁴ the troops

¹ This letter, dated "Albany Committee-chamber, June 21, 1775," had been forwarded by express, and conveyed information of Gen. Carleton's preparations for attacking Crown Point and Ticonderoga; of his treaty with the French Caughnawaga Indians "to take up the hatchet" in behalf of the King; of the scarcity of powder, even in the forts; and of their desire to have the dispute, respecting rank between Cols. Arnold and Hinman disposed of.

² Journals of the Cont. Cong., Tuesday, June 27, 1775

³ Letter to Gov. Trumbull, July 18.

⁴ Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Washington, July 18.—⁴ Ibid.

were "crowded into bad barracks;"¹ and every thing wore an unpromising aspect.

On the twenty-fourth of July, General Schuyler dispatched an agent into Canada, to ascertain the real disposition of the people of that province, the number and condition of the King's troops, and the spirit with which an invading army would be received by the people;² but there was considerable delay in the collection both of men and supplies;³ and General Carleton, the royal Governor of Canada, was enabled to make considerable additions to his means of defence.⁴

At length, on the thirty-first of August, General Montgomery left Crown Point, with the regiments commanded by Colonels Waterbury, McDougal, Parsons, and Wooster, amounting to twelve hundred men;⁵ on the fourth of September he was joined by General Schuyler, "at the Isle-la-Motte, where he had arrived the preceding day, having been detained by adverse winds and rainy weather;"⁶ and, on the same day, the whole expedition advanced to the Isle-aux-Noix,⁷ a low fertile island, of eighty-five acres, at the foot of Lake Champlain. After establishing his head-quarters on this island, General Schuyler issued an address to the Canadians, explaining the purpose of the expedition

and promising protection to the persons and property of Canadians;¹ and, early on the sixth of September, after landing the provisions, baggage, &c., on the Isle-aux-Noix, he re-embarked, and advanced against St. John's.² Landing about a mile and a half above the town, the troops were formed in "a close, deep swamp;"³ but, meeting with some opposition, and losing fourteen men,—killed, wounded, and missing,—they encamped for the night, throwing up some small intrenchments to defend themselves in case of an attack during the night. "In the evening," information of the strength of the enemy reached General Schuyler, which led him to ask the advice of his officers, the next morning, respecting the disposition of his force. The result was a re-embarkation of the troops, and their return to the Isle-aux-Noix.⁴

On the eighth of September, General Schuyler was joined by three hundred Connecticut troops and four hundred New Yorkers, making his force seventeen hundred strong, with five pieces of cannon and two mortars.⁵

On the tenth, a second attempt to advance against the enemy, under the command of General Montgomery, was frustrated by the disgraceful cowardice of the troops.⁶

On the sixteenth, General Schuyler

¹ Gen. Schuyler to Gov. Trumbull, July 18.

² Maj. Brown to Gov. Trumbull, August 14.

³ Schuyler to Cont. Cong., August 2; Same to Gen. Washington, Aug. 6 and Aug. 31.—⁴ Schuyler to Cont. Cong., Aug. 6.—⁵ Schuyler to Gov. Trumbull, Aug. 31.

⁶ Gen. Schuyler to John Hancock, Sept. 8.—⁷ Ibid.

¹ "To the inhabitants of Canada," dated Isle-aux-Noix, Sept. 5, 1775.—² Gen. Schuyler to John Hancock, Sept. 8.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Washington, Sept. 20; Same to Cong., Sept. 8.

⁵ Gen. Schuyler to Cong., Sept. 8.—⁶ Inclosure No. 3, in Gen. Schuyler's letter to Cong., Sept. 19.

was compelled, from sickness, to return to Ticonderoga, General Montgomery resuming the command of the army;¹ and, on the same day, Colonel Warner joined the army with one hundred and seventy Green-Mountain Boys, "being the first that have appeared of that boasted corps," a part of them having mutinied, and the remainder stopping at Crown Point.²

On the seventeenth, in the evening, General Montgomery took a position near St. John's; and, on the following morning, he marched at the head of five hundred men to the north side of the fort, where the village of St. John's now stands. He there encountered a party from the garrison, with field-pieces, and repulsed them after a slight resistance. The General complained greatly of the insubordination and cowardice of his men, especially of the Green-Mountain Boys; and he maintained, that had silence been observed by the troops, a portion of the enemy's artillery might have been secured. Pushing forward with his five hundred men, the General occupied the two roads leading respectively to Chambly and Longueil, for the purpose of cutting off any supplies or reinforcements which might be sent to St. John's from Montreal or the back country. After providing for the security of the party, the General returned to the camp above St. John's, and made preparations for an immediate attack on the fort.³

"A succession of bad weather, and their own feebleness," however, "kept them back in their operations,"¹ and it was not until after the twenty-fourth that a battery could be opened on the enemy.² Nor was the General then much better situated than before. With but little ammunition; a scanty supply of provisions; sickness prevailing among his troops; a spirit of insubordination among the Eastern troops, which he, as a New Yorker, could not suppress; and a cowardice on the part of many of them, which led them to adopt strange measures to secure their discharge as invalids,³ were subjects which stared him in the face continually, and baffled all his efforts to overcome them.

Colonel Ethan Allen, Major Brown, and other officers, had been employed, with small parties of troops, and such friendly Canadians as they could induce to join them, as scouts, and for the pur-

¹ Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, "Camp south side of St. John's, Sept. 24, 1775."

² Mr. Leake, in his excellent "*Life of Gen. John Lamb*" (p. 112), and some other writers, who have probably relied on his general correctness, have fallen into error respecting these batteries, and the date of their erection. In his dispatch of Sept. 24, Gen. Montgomery says: "*I expect to set our mortars to work to-night; a gun-battery I have not been able to think of.*" In his dispatch of Sept. 28, he says: "Since my last, of the 24th, we have opened a battery of two twelve-pounders upon the ship-yards and schooner. The largest of the mortars is useless, and on the mortars I principally depended for distressing the garrison." From which it will be seen that no batteries of any kind were opened until after the 24th of Sept. In the same dispatch (Sept. 28), he says: "*I hope the thirteen-inch mortar and more powder are on the way,*" from which it will be seen that Capt. Lamb could not have bedded it and commenced a bombardment of the fort on the 26th.

³ As specimens, Gen. Schuyler states that some swallowed tobacco, while others burned their tongues with hot chocolate, to give an appearance of fever.

¹ Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Washington, Sept. 20.—² Ibid.

³ Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, "Camp near St. John's, Sept. 19, 1775"

pose of enlisting the favor of the people for the American cause. On the twenty-fourth of September, two of these parties met near Longueil,—the one commanded by Colonel Allen, the other by Major Brown,—and, without consulting their commanding general, a plan was arranged for an attack on Montreal. By this arrangement Allen was to cross the St. Lawrence with eighty men, from Longueil, a little below the city; while Brown, with two hundred men, was to cross the river above the city; and, at a concerted signal, both parties were to move simultaneously to the attack on opposite sides of the city. Allen returned to Longueil, collected a few canoes, added about thirty English-Americans to his party, and, in the midst of a dark and stormy night, crossed the river. Major Brown failed to cross the river, as he had promised to do, and daylight found Allen in the enemy's country, without the means of retreat, without support from his friends, and in constant danger of an attack from the enemy. After disposing of his handful of men to the best advantage, he dispatched two messengers,—one to La Prairie, where Major Brown was supposed to be, the other to L'Assomption, where a Mr. Walker resided,—and, from both, requested assistance. It does not appear that Brown did any thing, but Walker exerted himself in Allen's behalf, but effected nothing in season to prevent the disaster which ensued.¹

¹ Allen's Narrative, pp. 26, 31.

The city was thrown into a great uproar when Allen's movement became known, especially during the time when the strength of his party was unknown. "General Carleton and the royal party" made preparations for a removal from the city, and those who were inclined to favor the colonists were elated to a corresponding extent. A prisoner escaped from the camp, at this important moment, and conveyed to the city the intelligence of his weakness; and a change of General Carleton's plans were immediately made known. He immediately assembled such of the inhabitants of the city as he could control, a number of Canadians who lived in the suburbs of the city, a party of Indians, and about forty regular troops, the whole numbering about five hundred, and dispatched them under Major Campbell, against Allen and his men.¹

Each party fought after the most approved style of frontiersmen, sheltering themselves behind buildings, walls, and woodpiles; in ditches, and wherever a shelter was afforded. Many of Allen's men deserted him, but he kept up the contest for two hours with great spirit. At length, with but forty-five men left, almost surrounded by the enemy, and with no prospect of receiving any relief, Allen ordered his men to retreat. Closely pursued by the Indians and the Canadians, his force was reduced still more, when he surrendered himself, thirty-one effective men, and seven

¹ Allen's Narrative, pp. 31, 32; Letter from Quebec to Ayrshire, Scotland, Sept. 30, 1775.

wounded, prisoners of war, on the condition that "he should be treated with honor, and with the assurance of good quarters for himself and the men who were with him."¹

With the sufferings of Allen and his men, during a long captivity, it is not my province to speak in this place, farther than to state, that the shame of those who inflicted them, were they capable of such a feeling, should have consigned the memory of the inhuman monsters to everlasting infamy.² To Generals Montgomery,³ Schuyler,⁴ and Washington,⁵ this unauthorized expedition became the subject of great anxiety; indicating, as it did, the thorough insubordination of the troops, and the disregard of all officers who did not belong to New England.

The Canadians, south of the St. Lawrence, appear to have maintained their faith with General Montgomery, notwithstanding Allen's misfortune, and their scouts continued to furnish him with important and reliable information. At length these auxiliary forces projected an attack on the fort at Chamby,—twelve miles below St. John's,—and offered to carry the cannon which were necessary for the expedition, past the fort at St. John's, in bateaux, in

the night.¹ The General accepted their proposals, and dispatched fifty men, under Major Brown, to assist in the enterprise; while Major Livingston, at the head of three hundred friendly Canadians, took charge of the artillery, and did the greater part of the work.² After a feeble resistance, the garrison, composed of Major Stopford, eight officers, and eighty-three Royal Fusileers, surrendered themselves prisoners of war, on the nineteenth of October;³ while the ample amount of stores⁴ which the fort contained were conveyed to the camp at St. John's, and greatly facilitated the operations before that work.⁵

In the mean time, the operations before St. John's, in consequence of the mutinous spirit of the troops, were but poorly carried on, and the amiable General Montgomery was made the victim of men, all of whom, though wearing the garb of patriot soldiers, were traitors in heart, and deserved the traitors' doom.⁶

As far as the General could do so, he pushed the siege vigorously. On the twenty-eighth of October, after considerable solicitation, the troops were induced to change their position from the south to the north side of the fort, where they occupied a hill which en-

¹ Allen's Narrative, pp. 32, 35; Jas. Livingston to Gen. Montgomery, "Camp at Point Olivée, near Chamby, Sept. 27, 1775," Samuel Mott to Gov. Trumbull, Oct. 6, 1775.—² Allen's Narrative, pp. 35, 155; Letter from Quebec, Oct. 25, 1775; Gen. Montgomery to Maj. Stopford, Oct. 20, 1775; Same to Gen. Carleton, Oct. 22, 1775; Same to Gen. Schuyler, Nov. 24, 1775.

³ Gen. Montgomery to Robert Livingston, Oct. 20; Same to Gen. Schuyler, Sept. 28.—⁴ Letter to John Hancock, Oct. 5, 1775.—⁵ Letter to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 26, 1775.

¹ Gen. Montgomery's dispatch to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 20, 1775 (Document II).—² Ibid.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Inclosure to Gen. Montgomery's dispatch, Oct. 20, 1775 (Document II).

⁵ Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Washington, Oct. 26.

⁶ Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler. "Camp before St. John's, Oct. 13, 1775," and the "Proceedings of a Council of War, held at St. John's, Oct. 13, 1775," inclosed therein; Col. Bedell's letter to N. H. Com. of Safety, Oct. 27 and Nov. 2, 1775.

tirely commanded the enemy's works, and erected a battery thereon, notwithstanding the heavy fire of the garrison.¹ On the first of November, this battery opened its fire; and, with that on the east side of the river, continued through the day to harass the enemy.² Towards evening, General Montgomery summoned him to surrender, but it was not until the next day that this result was effected, when Major Charles Preston, about five hundred regular troops, and one hundred Canadian volunteers,—chiefly of the *noblesse*,—surrendered themselves prisoners of war,³ with nineteen pieces of brass and twenty-two pieces of iron artillery, seven mortars, and a quantity of naval stores.⁴

This result was hastened by the receipt of intelligence, which General Montgomery sent into the fort, of the repulse of General Carleton and a party of regulars, Canadians, and Indians, with which he was hastening to relieve the garrison, while they were landing at Longueuil, by Colonel Seth Warner and a detachment of Green-Mountain Boys and New Yorkers;⁵ and of a similar defeat by Majors Brown and Livingston, with a party of friendly Canadians and Green-Mountain Boys, of a similar relief party of Highlanders and Canadians

with which Major Maclean was hurrying up the banks of the Sorel.¹ Four prisoners, who were taken by Colonel Warner, reached General Montgomery's camp on the afternoon of the first of November, while the colonists' guns were playing on His Majesty's works, and one of the number was sent with the flag through which the General demanded the surrender of the fort, that Major Preston might be enabled to understand his real situation, and the necessity for his surrender.²

Among the prisoners taken at St. John's, were Major John André and Captain Anbury, both, subsequently, well known in the history of the Revolution.³

The liberal terms which the garrison received from the General created great dissatisfaction among the troops; the suit of new clothing which belonged to each man of the garrison,—having been charged to them by the commissary,—these patriotic individuals considering a fit subject for their plunder. General Montgomery nobly refused even to consider the subject, saying: "I would not have sullied my own reputation, nor disgraced the Continental arms, by such a breach of capitulation, for the universe."⁴

After securing the stores at St. John's, General Montgomery determined to push on to Montreal, but the insubordination of the troops again

¹ Letter from officer in N. Y. line, "St. John's, Nov. 3, 1775."—² Letter from St. John's, Nov. 3.

³ Letter from officer in N. Y. line, "St. John's, Nov. 3;" Letter from St. John's, Nov. 3; Articles of Capitulation, inclosed in Gen. Schuyler's dispatch to Cong., Nov. 7, 1775.—⁴ Inclosures in Gen. Schuyler's dispatch, Nov. 7, 1775.—⁵ Letter from La Prairie, Nov. 3, 1775; Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, Nov. 3, 1775; Letter from Quebec, Oct. 25, 1775; London Gazette, Dec. 16, 1775.

¹ Letter from Quebec, Oct. 25; London Gazette, Dec. 16, 1775.—² Letter from St. John's, Nov. 3, 1775.

³ Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, Nov. 3.

⁴ Ibid., Nov. 13.

frustrated his efforts.¹ At length, after much entreaty, and promising to give a discharge to all who desired it when they reached Montreal, he succeeded in inducing nearly all to accompany him. This cause, and "the badness of the weather, and worse roads," however, prevented him from reaching the St. Lawrence before the twelfth of November, and he was then mortified with the intelligence that, on the preceding night, General Carleton had taken advantage of a favorable wind, and left the city, with the garrison, civil officers, and gunpowder, "on board ten or eleven little vessels, reserved for that purpose."² The General had taken such steps, however, as frustrated General Carleton's intentions.

Colonel Easton had been stationed at the mouth of the Sorel River, and had thrown up some works there which commanded the passage of the river.³ After two unsuccessful attempts had been made to pass, on the nineteenth, General Carleton, "disguised *en Canadien*, and accompanied by six peasants, found means to escape,"⁴ but General Prescott—the second in command—surrendered by capitulation on the next day. The trophies of this feat were a

brigadier-general, two staff officers, ten commissioned officers, one hundred and thirty-two non-commissioned officers and privates; eleven vessels, of different sizes; twenty barrels biscuit, six hundred and seventy-five barrels of flour, seven hundred and sixty barrels of pork, three hundred and seventy-six firkins of butter, twelve barrels rice, a large quantity of intrenching tools, some ordnance and ordnance stores, and about two hundred pairs of shoes.¹

In the mean time, General Montgomery had secured the city of Montreal. On the day of his arrival (Nov. 12) he addressed a letter to the inhabitants, urging the propriety of a surrender of the city, for the reason of his friendly feelings towards them; and because humanity demanded, at that season of the year especially, that nothing should be done to injure the town.² The people assented; and, the governor having retired from the city, a committee of the citizens, in behalf of the whole, on the same day, formally surrendered;³ and, on the next day, the army entered the city.

While General Montgomery was thus employed, other important measures were adopted by General Washington for the conquest of Canada. Colonel Arnold had returned from Lake Cham-

¹ "I was obliged, at St. John's, to promise all such their dismission as chose it, to coax them to Montreal. Indeed, Wooster's regiment showed the greatest uneasiness."—*Montgomery to Schuyler*, Nov. 13. Wooster's regiment had before this refused to move above Crown Point, and it was only through the urgent appeal of their chaplain that they finally consented.

² Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, Nov. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 17.—⁴ Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Washington, Nov. 28.

¹ Returns of "Military Stores," of "Provisions," of "Ordnance and Ordnance Stores," of "H. M. Troops," and of "The Officers of H. M. Troops," inclosed in Gen. Schuyler's letter to Gen. Washington, Nov. 28.—² Gen. Montgomery "To the inhabitants of Montreal," Nov. 12, inclosed in Gen. Schuyler's dispatch to Cong., Nov. 18, 1775.

³ Articles of Capitulation, inclosed in Gen. Schuyler's dispatch to Cong., Nov. 18.

plain,—the scene of his first exploits and of his earliest wrongs,—and was settling his accounts with the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, at Watertown,¹ while General Washington was considering the propriety of sending a detachment, by way of the Kennebec and Chaudiere Rivers, to attack Quebec.² The intention of this movement was either to divert General Carleton, and withdraw him and his troops from the southern frontier, leaving the way open for the operations of Generals Schuyler and Montgomery; or, in case General Carleton remained to oppose these officers, to seize Quebec in the defenseless state in which it would be left by the withdrawal of the troops to the southern frontier.³ The General, looking through the designs of Colonel Arnold's enemies, in their systematic and steady calumnia of his character, and seeing in Colonel Arnold an untiring industry, a good disciplinarian, and a brave soldier, well qualified, in every respect, to command such an expedition, on the twenty-fifth of August he directed General Gates, the adjutant-general of the army, to request Colonel Arnold not to leave Massachusetts un-

til the return of an express which had been sent to General Schuyler.⁴

Due preparations having been made, and the object of the expedition having been kept perfectly secret, even from Congress,⁵ on the fourteenth of September General Washington delivered his instructions to Colonel Arnold,⁶ and, on the next day, he hastened to Newburyport, to make preparations for the transportation of his party eastward.⁷ His command consisted of ten companies of infantry and three of riflemen; and he was accompanied by Colonels Greene and Enos, Majors Return J. Meigs and Bigelow, Captain Daniel Morgan, and Aaron Burr, the latter a volunteer, aged nineteen years.⁸ They left the camp on their secret, but perilous, journey on the evening of the thirteenth of September, eleven hundred strong;⁹ on the nineteenth, they sailed from Newburyport;¹⁰ and, the next morning, entered the Kennebec.¹¹ So secretly had the affair been managed, that General Howe, then besieged in Boston, supposed the expedition was destined for an attack on Halifax.¹² After a few days' delay, to remedy defects in the bateaux which had been prepared for his use, and in dispatching several scouts, on the twen-

¹ Minutes of Mass. House of Reps., Aug. 7, 1775.

² Letter to Gen. Schuyler, Aug. 20. It has been claimed for Col. Arnold that *he* originated this expedition and proposed it to Gen. Washington. Gen. Gates' letter to Col. Arnold, Aug. 25, shows, however, that Arnold's papers were not laid before the General until the 24th, four days after the latter had written to Gen. Schuyler on the subject. The weight of testimony, therefore, is in favor of giving to Gen. Washington the honor of originating this celebrated expedition.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Schuyler, Aug. 20; To Gov. Trumbull, Sept. 2; To Congress, Sept. 21, 1775.

⁴ Adj.-Gen. Gates to Col. Arnold, Aug. 25.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Congress, Sept. 21.

⁶ The Instructions, at length, may be found among the Documents (I.) at the end of this chapter.

⁷ Col. Arnold's Journal.—⁸ Gordon, ii. p. 128; Jed. Huntington to Gov. Trumbull, Sept. 7.

⁹ Col. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, "Dead River, Oct. 13, 1775."—¹⁰ Col. Arnold to Gen. Washington, Sept. 25; Col. Arnold's Journal.—¹¹ Col. Arnold's Journal.

¹² Editorials copied into Am. Archives, 4th series, vol. iii., folios 781, 1084.

ty-fifth of September, the riflemen, under Captain Morgan, left Fort Weston,¹ and were followed, on the twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and twenty-eighth, by the remainder of the force, under the command, respectively, of Colonel Greene, Major Meigs, and Colonel Enos. On the twenty-ninth, Colonel Arnold left Fort Weston, in a bark canoe, and, pressing forward with great energy, he passed the several divisions, and overtook the rifles, under Captain Morgan, on the second of October.²

Of the terrible sufferings of this party, in its solitary march through the wilderness, it is not my intention to attempt a description—it has no parallel in the history of military adventure.³

Colonel Arnold reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, on the eighth of November, and immediately dispatched the welcome intelligence to Generals Washington⁴ and Montgomery.⁵ His approach was known in Quebec, through the treachery of an Indian to whom he had, indiscreetly, intrusted a letter to General Schuyler;⁶ yet his appearance was not regarded without interest by the garrison and inhabitants. The former had been strengthened by the arrival of a frigate, from St. John's, N. F., with one hundred and fifty recruits, on the

preceding Sunday;¹ and a few days after Colonel Arnold reached Point Levi,—where he was detained several days by a heavy storm,—the party under Major Maclean, whose defeat, while on their way to St. John's, has been already noticed, also reached Quebec.²

At length, in the night of the thirteenth of November, he crossed the river, landing at Wolfe's Cove;³ and emulating the example of the gallant Wolfe, sixteen years before, he immediately sealed the heights, and the break of day revealed to the garrison, as it had to that under Montcalm, on the morning of September 13, 1759, the persons of their gallant invaders, formed in order, on the Heights of Abraham.⁴

The garrison, including regulars, militia, and the crews of vessels who had been ordered on shore, amounted to eighteen hundred men, but they were disaffected, and but a small number could be relied upon;⁵ while Colonel Arnold's force but little exceeded five hundred effective men.⁶

He immediately sent a flag to the gate, demanding the surrender of the garrison;⁷ but the flag was fired upon, and the officer bearing it barely escaped with his life.⁸ On the morning of the

¹ Col. Arnold to Gen. Washington, Sept. 25; Col. Arnold's Journal.—² Col. Arnold's Journal.

³ Reference is made, on this subject, to the Journals of Col. Arnold, Maj. Meigs, and James Melvin; to the Narrative of Judge J. J. Henry; and to the letters of the commander, from which the curious can obtain reliable information.—⁴ Letter dated "Point Levi, Nov. 8."

⁵ Letter dated "St. Marie, two-and-a-half leagues from Point Levi, Nov. 8."—⁶ Gordon, ii. pp. 120-132.

¹ Col. Arnold to Gen. Washington, Nov. 8; Same to Gen. Washington, Nov. 8.—² Gordon, ii. p. 165.

³ Melvin's Journal. p. 16; Gordon, ii. pp. 165, 166.

⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 166.—⁵ Col. Arnold to Gen. Montgomery, Nov. 20.—⁶ "An Account of the state of Quebec, &c.;" Col. Arnold to Gen. Washington, Nov. 20; Same to Gen. Montgomery, Nov. 20.

⁷ Col. Arnold to Hon. Hector T. Cramahe, Lieut.-Gov. of Quebec, "Camp before Quebec, Nov. 14."

⁸ Col. Arnold to Lieut.-Gov. Cramahe, Nov. 15.

fifteenth the summons was repeated, with the same result.¹

On the eighteenth, a report reached Colonel Arnold that an armed vessel, with near two hundred men, was on its way down the River St. Lawrence, "and that the garrison, furnished with a good number of field-pieces, intended attacking him the next day," while a strict examination of the arms and ammunition revealed the startling fact that many of their cartridges which appeared good, were unfit for use, "and that he had no more than five rounds to each man." It was judged prudent, therefore, to avoid a battle, and to retire from the town until General Montgomery should arrive;² and, on the nineteenth, with his little party of men, six hundred and fifty in number, he retired to Point-aux-Trembles, eight leagues from Quebec.³

On the third of December, General Montgomery, with three hundred men, the artillery, "and the vessels Mr. Prescott made them a present of," joined Colonel Arnold, and they immediately moved down the river to Quebec, taking a position before the town on the next day.⁴

Notwithstanding the disaffection of the men, which sorely harassed both General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold,⁵—at one time preventing a pro-

jected assault on the city,¹—scaling-ladders were prepared;² "batteries of gabions, filled with snow, and water poured on till it froze quite hard," were erected;³ and an occasional cannonade and bombardment were kept up, exciting considerable alarm and some damage.⁴ The enemy returned the fire with spirit, and the ice batteries, to which reference has been made, were shivered into atoms;⁵ General Guy Carleton, whose escape from Montreal has also been noticed, succeeded in effecting an entrance into the city;⁶ and vigorous measures for the defence of the town were immediately adopted.

General Montgomery, as early as the sixteenth of December, had determined on a plan of operations. He had been led to suppose that if he could obtain possession of the lower town, the merchants and leading citizens would influence General Carleton to surrender, in order that their property might be spared, and his plans were laid with that object in view.⁷ He proposed, "the first strong northwester, to make two attacks by night: one, with about a third of the troops, on the lower town, having first set fire to some houses, which will, in all probability, communicate their flames to the stockade lately erected on the rock near St. Roque; the other upon Cape Diamond bastion, by escalade."⁸

¹ Col. Arnold to Lieut.-Gov. Cramahe, Nov. 15.

² Col. Arnold to Gen. Washington, Nov. 20; Same to Gen. Montgomery, Nov. 20.—³ Melvin's Journal, p. 16; Col. Arnold to Gen. Washington, and to Gen. Montgomery, Nov. 20.—⁴ Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, Dec. 5; Col. Arnold to Gen. Washington, Dec. 5.

Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 16.

¹ Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, Dec. 26.—² Melvin's Journal, p. 17.—³ Letter from "Before Quebec, Dec. 16;" Letter from Montreal, Dec. 17; Leake's Lamb, p. 124.—⁴ Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 124.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Letter from "Before Quebec, Dec. 16."—⁷ Davis' Mem. of Burr, i. p. 70.—⁸ Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 16.

Information of this plan was conveyed to General Carleton by some deserters from General Montgomery's camp, and the latter was induced to alter his designs.¹ Two feints on the upper town were intrusted, one to Major Brown, who was to menace the bastion on Cape Diamond;² the other to Colonel Livingston, who was to make an attack on St. Louis Gate, and set it on fire.³ At the same time, Colonel Arnold, with his own detachment and Captain Lamb's artillery, was ordered to attack the suburb St. Roque, on the north side of the city;⁴ while General Montgomery, in person, was to lead the remainder of the troops around the foot of Cape Diamond, and attack the lower town, on its southern margin,⁵ each party pressing forward to effect a junction, when the consolidated forces were to attack the Prescott gate, at the foot of Mountain-street, and rush into the city.⁶

At length, on the night of the thirtieth of December, the elements and the temper of the men happened to favor the movement. A furious storm of wind and snow promised its assistance, and the troops, very singularly, interposed no objections.⁷ At two o'clock in the morning of the thirty-first, the troops assembled at their respective places of rendezvous, and prepared for

their arduous task. The first New York regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, and a part of Colonel Easton's militia, which constituted General Montgomery's party, paraded at the Holland House; Colonel Arnold's veteran troops, accompanied by the gallant Captain John Lamb,—a New York "Son of Liberty,"—paraded at the quarters of Captain Daniel Morgan; while Colonel Livingston and Major Brown paraded their men on their respective parade-grounds.¹ Five o'clock was the hour fixed upon for the attack, and at that hour the troops appear to have taken up their respective lines of march.²

The two feints do not appear to have been followed by any benefit, although that under Major Brown, against the bastion at Cape Diamond, is said to have been conducted with great gallantry.³ The consequence was, that two points, to which the attention of the enemy was to have been diverted, were allowed to remain in comparative quietude; and the troops, whose care should have been employed in repelling the assaults of Major Brown and Colonel Livingston, were enabled to throw themselves in opposition to the movements under Colonel Arnold and General Montgomery.

The detachment under the General—led by him in person, notwithstanding the entreaties of his officers⁴—descend-

¹ Col. Arnold to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 31; Letter from Canada, Feb. 9.—² Col. Campbell to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 31.

³ Gordon, ii. p. 184; Leake's Lamb, p. 127.

⁴ Col. Campbell to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 31.

⁵ Col. Arnold to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 31.

⁶ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 198.—⁷ Gen. Carleton to Gen. Howe, Jan. 12; Leake's Lamb, p. 127

¹ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 197.—² Col. Arnold to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 31.—³ Leake's Lamb, p. 127.

⁴ Davis' Mem. of A. Burr, i. p. 71.

ed from the Heights of Abraham, by way of Wolfe's Ravine, and took up its line of march towards the lower town, on the margin of the river, at the foot of Cape Diamond, on the line of what is now *Champlain-street*. At the point where the precipice approached nearest to the river, called *Pres de Ville*, a block-house of hewed logs had been erected; the lower story of which had been loop-holed for musketry, while the upper story had been pierced for light pieces of artillery. Along the slope of the precipice, from the works above, and over the narrow beach, between the foot of the cliff and the river, in front of this block-house, a strong stockade had also been erected. When the party reached the stockade all was quiet within, and the General supposed that his approach was unknown. Sawing off four of the posts which formed the stockade,—with his own hand, it is said,—he appealed to his men:—"Men of New York, you will not fear to follow where your General leads: march on,"—and jumped through the opening which he had made, at the head of the party. At that moment, while the colonists were within forty paces, the enemy within the block-house, under Captain Barnsfare, discharged one of the three-pounders, which had been loaded with grape, killing every person who had passed through the opening except the French guide, including the General and both his aids (Captains McPherson and Cheeseman), the orderly-sergeant, and ten men. Appalled at this disaster, the party fell back to

Wolfe's Cove, where Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, Quartermaster-general of the army, took the command, and retreated to the Holland House, whence the detachment had marched a few hours before.¹

The fourth, and largest, division, like the third, was headed, in person, by its commander, the intrepid Arnold. Passing through the heavy snow-drifts, which had been piled along the bank of the St. Charles' River, he also led his men, at the foot of the cliff, where the *Sault au Matelot* now is. Here he encountered the first barrier and battery, on which two guns were mounted, well manned. At the head of his men, Colonel Arnold advanced to attack it, when he was disabled by a musket-shot in his knee, and carried back to the general hospital. Captain Morgan then assumed the command, and after withstanding a storm of grape and musket-balls for upwards of an hour, the deadly aim of his own riflemen, meanwhile, doing terrible execution, he drove the enemy before him, and took possession of the barrier and the battery, pressing forward towards the second barrier, which, extending also from the cliff to the river, commanded both the *Sault au Matelot* and St. Peter's-street. The Custom-house, then a private dwelling, supplied the place of a battery, having cannon mounted at the windows of the gable, and here, again, a fierce contest raged for three hours, with considerable

¹ Col. Campbell to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 31; Letter from Montreal, Jan. 5, 1776; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 198.

loss to both parties. At length this barrier was also carried, and Captain Morgan and his party were preparing to advance still farther, when General Carleton, relieved from the defence of other parts of the city, by the failure of some and the unwarrantable withdrawal of others of the auxiliary parties, sent out a large detachment, through the Palace Gate, on the north side of the city, to attack him in the rear. Captain Henry Dearborn, who had been left near the Palace Gate, with a small party, was overpowered and captured; and, soon afterwards, Captain Morgan, finding himself surrounded and unsupported, also surrendered, with the party under him, four hundred and twenty-six in number, as prisoners of war. A part of the division, in the rear, retreated to the camp, leaving, besides the prisoners, and Captain Lamb's artillery, upwards of one hundred and fifty of their comrades killed and wounded. Among the most daring of this gallant party were Major Ogden, and Captains Oswald, Aaron Burr, and John Lamb, all subsequently active participants in the affairs of their country.¹

General Carleton had no sooner secured or cleared the city of his daring enemies, than he took steps to secure the bodies of the slain and to provide for the necessities of the wounded. Struck with admiration of the virtues of General Montgomery, particular at-

tention was paid to his remains, and they were buried within the walls of the city, under the personal superintendence of Lieutenant-governor Cra-mahé.² Forty-two years afterwards they were removed, by order and at the expense of the State of New York; and they now rest beneath the portico of St. Paul's Church, in the city of New York, where a mural monument, erected by the Federal Congress, bears the record of his bravery and his worth.

Colonel Arnold immediately assumed the command of the fragments of the army, about eight hundred in number, but feeling his inability to make another assault, or even to defend himself successfully, he withdrew from the immediate neighborhood of the city, intrenched himself as well as he could, and attempted to blockade the town, and cut off its supplies from the country,³ where he continued until April, when General Wooster, who had spent the winter in Montreal, at the head of a considerable force, moved down to Quebec, and assumed the chief command.⁴

At the head of two thousand men, General Wooster renewed the siege, opening batteries on the town from the Heights of Abraham and from Point Levi, on the opposite side of the river, yet but little damage was done.⁴

¹ Col. Campbell to Gen. Wooster, Dec. 31; Col. Arnold to same, Dec. 31; Same to same, Jan. 2; "A Soldier," in the N. Y. Gazette, cited in Am. Archives, 4th series, vol. iv., folios 707, 708; Lossing's Field Book, i. pp. 199, 200.

² Gen. Arnold's letter, March 26; Same to Silas Deane, March 30; Same to Gen. Schuyler, April 20.

About the same time Colonel Arnold's horse fell and injured his wounded leg so severely that he was rendered incapable of performing duty, and, on the tenth of April, he retired to Montreal, leaving to General Wooster the sole guidance of the operations.¹

Early in May General Wooster was superseded by General Thomas,² but General Burgoyne having reached Quebec, on the sixth of May, at the head of a powerful reinforcement,³ the Continentals hastily retreated, leaving their stores and sick behind.⁴

Shortly afterwards, after suffering several reverses and the loss of its General, by small-pox,⁵ the army returned to the colonies,⁶ and the expeditions to Canada were suspended, to be revived again, years afterwards, with similar results.

To the steady insubordination of the troops, especially of those from Vermont and Connecticut, when Generals Schuy-

ler or Montgomery (New York officers) assumed to direct them;¹ to the want of supplies by Colonel Arnold; and, finally, to the inefficiency of Colonels Livingston and Campbell, on the morning of the attack, the unsuccessful termination of these expeditions must be attributed.

Originally designed with great care, and executed with exactness, in the face of obstacles which but few would confront, until the fatal thirty-first of December, each promised a brilliant success; and, although the commander of the one laid his life on the altar of his country, and the other, covered with ignominy, descended, silently, to a traitor's grave, the deeds of daring, and the disinterested patriotism which each displayed in Canada, entitle both to the grateful remembrance of their countrymen to the end of time.

¹ Gen. Wooster to Congress, April 10; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, April 20.—² Gordon, ii. p. 251.

³ Gen. Carleton to Lord Geo. Germaine, May 14.

⁴ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, May 10; Gen. Thomas to Gen. Washington, May 8.—⁵ Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Washington, June 10.—⁶ Gordon, ii. p. 262.

¹ Gen. Schuyler to Gov. Trumbull, Aug. 31. Compare the letter of Gen. S. to Gov. T. of Sept. 20, with that of Oct. 12, respecting sham sickness. Same to same, Sept. 20, Oct. 12; Gen. Schuyler to Gen. Washington, Sept. 20, Sept. 26, Oct. 26, Jan. 5, 1776; Gen. Schuyler to Cong., Sept. 19, Sept. 25, Sept. 28, Oct. 5, Oct. 14, Oct. 18, Oct. 21, Nov. 20, Dec. 8, Feb. 4, 1776, Feb. 20; Gen. Montgomery to Gen. Schuyler, Sept. 19, Sept. 24, Sept. 28, Oct. 13, Oct. 13, Nov. 13, Nov. 24, Dec. 5, Dec. 26.

D O C U M E N T S.

I.

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO COLONEL BENEDICT ARNOLD BY GENERAL WASHINGTON.

CAMP AT CAMBRIDGE, Sept. 14, 1775.

To Colonel BENEDICT ARNOLD, Commander of the Detachment of the Continental Army destined against Quebec.

SIR:—You are intrusted with a command of the utmost consequence to the interest and liberties of America; upon your conduct and courage, and that of the officers and soldiers detached on this expedition, not only the success of the present enterprise, and your own honor, but the safety and welfare of the whole continent, may depend. I charge you, therefore, and the officers and soldiers under your command, as you value your own safety and honor, and the favor and esteem of your country, that you consider yourselves as marching, not through an enemy's country, but that of our friends and brethren—for such the inhabitants of Canada and the Indian nations have approved themselves in this unhappy contest between Great Britain and America; that you check, by every motive of duty and fear of punishment, every attempt to plunder or insult any of the inhabitants of Canada. Should any American soldier be so base and infamous as to injure any Canadian or Indian, in his person or property, I do most earnestly enjoin you to bring him to such severe and exemplary punishment as the enormity of the crime may require; should it extend to death itself, it will not be disproportioned to its guilt at such a time and in such a cause. But I hope and trust that the brave men who have voluntarily engaged in this expedition, will be governed by different views; that order, discipline, and regularity of behavior, will be as conspicuous as their courage and valor. I also

give it in charge to you to avoid all disrespect or contempt of the religion of the country; and, if common prudence, policy, and a true Christian spirit, will lead us to look with compassion upon their errors, without insulting them, while we are contending for our own liberty, we should be very cautious of violating the rules of conscience in others, ever considering that God alone is the judge of the heart of man, and to him only in this case are they answerable.

Upon the whole, sir, I beg you to inculcate upon the officers and soldiers the necessity of preserving the strictest order during their march through Canada; to represent to them the shame, disgrace, and ruin to themselves and country, if they should, by their conduct, turn the heart of our brethren in Canada against us; and, on the other hand, the honors and rewards which await them, if, by their prudence and good behavior, they conciliate the affections of the Canadians and Indians to the great interests of America, and convert those favorable dispositions they have shown into a lasting union and affection.

Thus wishing you, and the officers and soldiers under your command, honor, safety, and success, I remain, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

GEO. WASHINGTON.

By His Excellency, GEORGE WASHINGTON, Esquire, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United Colonies of North America.

To Colonel BENEDICT ARNOLD.

1. You are immediately, on your march from Cambridge, to take the command of the detachment from the Continental Army against Quebec, and use all possible expedition, as the winter season is now advaneing, and the success of this enterprise (under God) depends wholly upon

the spirit with which it is pushed, and the favorable disposition of the Canadians and Indians.

2. When you come to Newburyport, you are to make all possible inquiry what men-of-war or cruisers there may be on the coast, to which this detachment may be exposed on their voyage to Kennebec River; and if you shall find that there is danger of being intercepted, you are not to proceed by water, but by land, taking care on the one hand not to be diverted by light and vague reports, and on the other not to expose the troops rashly to a danger which, by many judicious persons, has been deemed very considerable.

3. You are, by every means in your power, to endeavor to discover the real sentiments of the Canadians towards our cause, and particularly as to this expedition; ever bearing in mind that if they are averse to it, and will not co-operate, or at least, willingly acquiesce, it must fail of success. In this case you are by no means to prosecute the attempt. The expense of the expedition and the disappointment are not to be put in competition with the dangerous consequences which may ensue from irritating them against us, and detaching them from that neutrality which they have adopted.

4. In order to cherish those favorable sentiments to the American cause that they have manifested, you are, as soon as you arrive in their country, to disperse a number of the addresses you will have with you, particularly in those parts where your route shall lie, and observe the strictest discipline and good order, by no means suffering any inhabitant to be abused, or in any manner injured, either in his person or property; punishing with exemplary severity every person who shall transgress, and making ample compensation to the party injured.

5. You are to endeavor, on the other hand, to conciliate the affections of those people, and such Indians as you may meet with, by every means in your power; convincing them that we come at the request of many of their principal people, not as robbers or to make war upon them, but as the friends and supporters of their liberties as well as ours; and, to give efficacy to these sentiments, you must carefully inculcate upon the officers and soldiers under your com-

mand, that not only the good of their country, and their honor, but their safety, depends upon the treatment of these people.

6. Check every idea and crush in its earliest stage every attempt to plunder, even those who are known to be enemies to our cause; it will create dreadful apprehensions in our friends, and when it is once begun, none can tell where it will stop. I therefore, again, most expressly order that it be discouraged and punished, in every instance, without distinction.

7. Whatever king's stores you shall be so fortunate as to possess yourselves of, are to be secured for the Continental use, agreeable to the rules and regulation of war published by the honorable Congress. The officers and men may be assured that any extraordinary services performed by them will be suitably rewarded.

8. Spare neither pains nor expense to gain all possible intelligence on your march, to prevent surprises and accidents of every kind; and endeavor, if possible, to correspond with General Schuyler, so that you may act in concert with him. This, I think, may be done by means of the St. François Indians.

9. In case of a union with General Schuyler, or if he should be in Canada upon your arrival there, you are by no means to consider yourself as upon a separate and independent command, but are to put yourself under him, and follow his directions. Upon this occasion, and all others, I recommend, most earnestly, to avoid all contention about rank. In such a cause, every post is honorable in which a man can serve his country.

10. If Lord Chatham's son should be in Canada, and, in any way, fall in your power, you are enjoined to treat him with all possible deference and respect. You cannot err in paying too much honor to the son of so illustrious a character and so true a friend to America. Any other prisoners who may fall into your hands, you will treat with as much humanity and kindness as may be consistent with your own safety and the public interest. Be very particular in restraining, not only your own troops, but the Indians, from all acts of cruelty and insult which will disgrace the American arms, and irritate our fellow-subjects against us.

11. You will be particularly careful to pay the full value for all provisions or other accommodations which the Canadians may provide for you on your march; by no means press them or any of their cattle into your service, but amply compensate those who voluntarily assist you. For this purpose you are provided with a sum of money, in specie, which you will use with as much frugality and economy as your necessities and good policy will admit, keeping as exact accounts as possible of your disbursements.

12. You are by every opportunity to inform me of your progress, your prospects, and intelligence, and upon any important occurrence to dispatch an express.

13. As the season is now far advanced, you are to make all possible dispatch; but if unforeseen difficulties should arise, or if the weather should become so severe as to render it hazardous to proceed, in your own judgment and that of your principal officers, whom you are to consult, in that case you are to return, giving me as early notice as possible, that I may give you such assistance as may be necessary.

14. As the contempt of the religion of a country, by ridiculing any of its ceremonies or affronting its ministers or votaries, has ever been deeply resented, you are to be particularly careful to restrain every officer and soldier from such imprudence and folly, and to punish every instance of it. On the other hand, as far as lies in your power, you are to protect and support the free exercise of the religion of the country, and the undisturbed enjoyment of the rights of conscience in religious matters, with your utmost influence and authority.

Given at the camp at Cambridge the 14th day of September, 1775.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

II.

GENERAL MONTGOMERY'S DISPATCH ON THE CAPTURE OF CHAMBLY.

CAMP BEFORE ST. JOHN'S, Oct. 20, 1775.

DEAR GENERAL:—I have the pleasure to acquaint you with the surrender of Chambly to

Major Brown and Major Livingston, which last headed about three hundred Canadians. We had not above fifty of our troops. Indeed it was the plan of the Canadians, who carried down the artillery past the Fort of St. John's in bateaux. I send you the colors of the Seventh regiment and a list of stores taken. Major Brown assures me we have gotten six tons of powder, which, with the blessing of God, will finish our business here. Major Brown offered his service on this occasion. Upon this and all other occasions I have found him active and intelligent.

The enemy's schooner is sunk. They have not been very anxious to save her, else they might easily have protracted her fate. I must now think, unless some unlucky accident befalls us, we shall accomplish our business here, as I shall set to work in earnest on this side the water. The troops in high spirits. Colonel Warner has had a little brush with a party from Montreal. The enemy retired with the loss of five prisoners and some killed. Some of the prisoners (Canadians) are dangerous enemies, and must be taken care of—La Mouche, one of them. The Caughnawagas have desired one hundred men from us. I have complied with their request, and am glad to find they put so much confidence in us, and are so much afraid of Mr. Carleton; not that I think they had any thing to apprehend; he has too much business on his hands already to wish to make more enemies.

I shall endeavor, by means of the Chamby garrison, to obtain better treatment for Allen and the other prisoners, as well Canadians as our own troops.

* * * * *

I am much chagrined at your relapse; that you may speedily recover your health is the ardent wish of your sincere and affectionate humble servant,

RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

To General SCHUYLER.

(INCLOSURE.)

Account of stores taken at Chambly.

Eighty barrels flour; eleven barrels rice; seven barrels peas; six firkins butter; one hundred

and thirty-four barrels pork; seven barrels pork, damaged; one hundred and twenty-four barrels gunpowder; three hundred swivel-shot; one box musket-shot; six thousand five hundred and sixty-four musket-cartridges; one hundred and fifty stand of French arms; three royal mortars; sixty-one shells; five hundred hand-grenades; rigging for three vessels at least.

Royal Fusileers, 83. Accoutrements, 83.

III.

GENERAL MONTGOMERY'S DISPATCH ON THE CAPTURE OF ST. JOHN'S.

CAMP NEAR ST. JOHN'S, Nov. 3, 1775.

MY DEAR GENERAL:—I have the pleasure to acquaint you the garrison surrendered last night. This morning we take possession; to-morrow I hope the prisoners will set off. Inclosed you have the capitulation, which I hope will meet with your approbation, and that of Congress. I have ventured to permit an officer or two to go to their families, which are in some distress, at Montreal, upon their parole; they cannot do us any harm, and there would have been a degree of inhumanity in refusing them. When we had played on the fort some hours, from our battery of four twelve-pounders, on the northwest, and another of two twelve-pounders and two four-pounders, on the east side, some prisoners arrived, who had been taken in an action with Governor Carleton at Longueil. He made an attempt to land with thirty-four boats full of men. Warner's detachment, consisting of the Green-Mountain Boys and second regiment of Yorkers, repulsed them with loss; took two Indians and two Canadians prisoners. We have buried three Indians, and it is supposed many in the boats must have been killed; we had not a man even wounded. (This, I believe, is his last effort.) One of the above-mentioned prisoners I sent into the fort, to inform Major Preston of the circumstances of the action, that he might judge what prospect he could have of relief; it had the desired effect—the garrison having been on half allowance for some time. I am making the necessary preparations to proceed immediately

to Montreal, by way of La Prairie, as the enemy have armed vessels in the Sorel.

Send everybody you possibly can immediately down, as it is much to be apprehended many of the men on this service will insist on returning home when their times are expired. It will not be necessary to keep people with arms for the present at Ticonderoga. Several men of rank in Canada are among the prisoners. I have permitted them to remain at Crown Point till the return of two gentlemen they sent to their friends for money, &c.; they pleaded hard to return home, but they are too dangerous to let loose again.

I have this moment received your letter of 27th October. Not a word of Arnold yet. I have sent two express to him lately—one by an Indian, who promised to return with expedition. The instant I have any news of him, I will acquaint you by express. Colonel Easton and Major Brown, with their corps; and Mr. Livingston, with, I believe, one thousand Canadians, are going towards the mouth of the Sorel, pushing Colonel Allen Maclean before them. Maclean had many Canadians, but they joined through fear of fire and sword; you may easily judge how they will fight.

I send you a list of stores, artillery, &c.; and am, my dear sir, with respect and esteem, your much obliged humble servant,

RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

To General SCHUYLER.

P. S.—Half-past six. Just received your favor of 31st October; a good deal of artillery stores, but we have not time to ascertain them. Neither Macpherson nor Rensselaer have commissions.

IV.

COLONEL CAMPBELL'S DISPATCH ON THE ATTACK ON QUEBEC AND THE DEATH OF GENERAL MONTGOMERY.

AT HOLLAND-HOUSE, Saturday, Dec. 31, 1775.

DEAR SIR:—It is with the greatest distress of mind that I have the task of communicating to you the event of an unfortunate attempt that

was made to storm the town of Quebec, between the hours of two and seven this morning, by four different attacks; unfortunate, indeed, when, with bitterness of soul, I inform you that the gallant and amiable General Montgomery was killed the first fire, as, also, his valiant aid-de-camp, Captain John Macpherson, and Captain Cheeseman of the first New Yorkers, with two or three more. All this happened in the attack on the lower town, at Anse de Mères, where were the three battalions of Yorkers commanded by the General, whom I attended; and I found myself under the disagreeable necessity of drawing off the troops (too ready to depart) at about seven o'clock, after having passed the first barrier, and just opening to attempt the second.

In the other principal attack, made by Colonel Arnold, with the detachment under his command, Captain Lamb's company of artillery, and two field-pieces on sleighs, were at the Sole de Matelôt, where he succeeded so far as to force one gate or barrier, and battery, with the misfortune of having his leg splintered, yet I hope not very dangerous, though, from his gallant conduct, he sustained a considerable loss of blood, and is now in the general hospital, as also Brigadier-major Ogden, who was shot (a flesh-wound) through the upper part of his shoulder, after a spirited and officer-like conduct, which was distinguishable in the whole of the officers, particularly Lieutenant-colonel Greene, Major Bigelow, and Major Meigs, as, also, Captain E. Oswald, secretary to Colonel Arnold, and a volunteer in the campaign; yet, after carrying that barrier and a second one, they now remain in the possession of the house from Limeburner's Wharf, in the lower town, to the second barrier, where they now maintain themselves, with between three and four hundred men; and it is extremely difficult to support them till dark, when I shall hope to draw them off; for which purpose I sent Colonel James Livingston, with some of his regiment, and Major Dubois, of the third Yorkers, with upwards of two hundred men, down to the general hospital, to endeavor to throw themselves in, between this and night, or get Lieutenant-colonel Greene and his party out.

The other attack was with Colonel Living-

ston, and his Canadians, to endeavor burning St. John's Gate with prepared fagots of combustible matter, which was not effected, owing to an early alarm in the town. And the last was by another storm attack, from Major Brown's detachment, on Cape Diamond, commanded by Captain Brown.

Thus you have the four attacks that were concerted between the dear deceased General Montgomery and Colonel Arnold, which was, in many respects, hurried, from the circumstance of the enlistment of the troops under Colonel Arnold, whose service expires this day. Our whole loss, as far as I can collect without returns, does not exceed fifteen or twenty men killed and wounded, yet I think a reinforcement of two hundred men immediately, from Montreal, would be very proper; at the same time, I leave it to you to judge of the propriety of disarming the Tories of Montreal, and, at the same time, to assure you, it is no pleasure to me to enjoy the command, which falls on me from the death of the General and Colonel Arnold's keeping his bed; therefore I request you will set out for this place as instantly as you can, as your presence is essential on many accounts. I shall order every care of the troops and disposition that may occur to me necessary.

I must remind you of cash, as there is not above three or four hundred pounds here, from my recollection of what the General said a few days ago; but I have not yet examined anything, and it is unfortunate, in a particular manner, that both are gone who had the charge of it. The great consumption of powder from the garrison is an object which the General had much at heart, and may be worthy of remark to the Congress, as well as full of force for this country, as you must be convinced the Canadians will never be so firmly on our side, as when they are convinced we hold the scales. I hope the last affair will not strike them in the light it does me. I shall not make any alterations in commissions or officers till I have the pleasure of seeing you here, though application has been made. The remaining aid-de-camp, Mr. Aaron Burr, I would gladly recommend to you, for the memory of the deceased General, as well as his own personal bravery and good conduct.

I thought to have sent Mr. Melchior's express with this, but the bearer, Mr. Edward Antill, appointed by the General as engineer (whom I recommend to your favor and attention), being well acquainted on the road, I prefer him, for sake of dispatch, as I consider every moment important, and to whom I refer you to correct this hurried scroll, and give you particulars he was eye-witness to.

My love to all friends and acquaintance that inquire for me, and believe me to be, with love and esteem, your most obedient humble servant,

DONALD CAMPBELL.

To General WOOSTER.

V.

COLONEL ARNOLD'S DISPATCH RESPECTING THE ATTACK ON QUEBEC.

GENERAL HOSPITAL, December 31, 1775.

DEAR SIR:—I make no doubt but General Montgomery acquainted you with his intentions of storming Quebec, as soon as a good opportunity offered.

As we had several men deserted from us a few days past, the General was induced to alter his plan (which was to have attacked the upper and lower town at the same time); thought it most prudent to make two different attacks upon the lower town: the one at Cape Diamond, the other through St. Roque's. For the last attack I was ordered, with my own detachment and Captain Lamb's company of artillery. At five o'clock, the hour appointed for the attack, a false attack was ordered to be made upon the upper town. We accordingly began our march. I passed through St. Roque's, and approached near a two-gun battery, picketed in, without being discovered, which we attacked; it was bravely defended for about an hour; but, with the loss of a number of men, we carried it. In the attack I was shot through the leg, and was obliged to be carried to the hospital, where I soon heard the disagreeable news that the General was defeated at Cape Diamond, himself, Captain Maepherson, his aid-de-camp, and Captain Cheeseman, killed on the spot, with a num-

ber of others not known. After gaining the battery, my detachment pushed on to a second barrier, which they took possession of, at the same time the enemy sallied out from Palace Gate, and attacked them in the rear. A field-piece, which the roughness of the road would not permit our carrying on, fell into the enemy's hands, with a number of prisoners. The last accounts from my detachment, about ten minutes since, they were pushing for the lower town. Their communication with me was cut off. I am exceedingly apprehensive what the event will be; they will either carry the lower town, be made prisoners, or cut to pieces.

I thought proper to send an express, to let you know the critical situation we are in, and make no doubt you will give us all the assistance in your power. As I am not able to act, I shall give up the command to Colonel Campbell.

I beg you will immediately send an express to the honorable Continental Congress, and to his Excellency General Washington. The loss of my detachment, before I left it, was about two hundred men killed and wounded. Among the latter is Major Ogden, who, with Captain Oswald, Captain Burr, and the other volunteers, behaved extremely well.

I have only to add, that I am, with the greatest esteem, your most obedient and very humble servant,

B. ARNOLD.

To General WOOSTER, Montreal.

P. S.—It is impossible to say what our future operations will be, until we know the fate of my detachment.

VI.

GENERAL CARLETON'S DISPATCH TO GENERAL HOWE RESPECTING THE ATTACK ON QUEBEC.

QUEBEC, January 12, 1776.

SIR:—The 5th of December, Mr. Montgomery took post at St. Croix, within less than two miles of Quebec, with some field-artillery; his heavy cannon were landed at Cap Rouge; at the same time Arnold's party took possession of the other avenues leading to the town, and prevent-

ed all communication with the country. The 7th, a woman stole into town, with letters addressed to the principal merchants, advising them to an immediate submission, and promising a great indulgence, in case of their compliance. Inclosed was a letter to me, in very extraordinary language, and a summons to deliver up the town; the messenger was sent to prison for a few days and drummed out.

To give more efficacy to these letters, five small mortars were brought to St. Roque's, and a battery of five cannon and one howitzer raised upon the heights, within about seven hundred yards of the walls. Soon after, Arnold appeared with a white flag, said he had a letter for me, but was refused admittance, and ordered to carry back his letter. After every preparatory stratagem had been used to intimidate our wretched garrison, as Mr. Montgomery was pleased to call it, an assault was given the 31st of December, between four and five o'clock of the morning, during a snow-storm from the northeast. The alarm was general. From the side of the river St. Lawrence, along the fortified front round to the Basin, every part seemed equally threatened. Two real attacks took place upon the lower town: one under Cape Diamond, led by Mr. Montgomery; the other by Mr. Arnold, upon the part called the Saut au Matelot. This, at first, met with some success, but, in the end, was stopped. A sally from the upper town, under Captain Laws, attacked their rear, and sent in many prisoners; Captain McDougal afterwards reinforced this party, and followed the rebels into the post they had taken. Thus Mr. Arnold's corps (himself and a few others excepted, who were wounded and carried off early) were completely ruined. They were caught, as it were, in a trap; we brought in their five mortars and one cannon. The other attack was soon repulsed, with slaughter; Mr. Montgomery was left among the dead.

The rebels have, on this assault, between six and seven hundred men, and between forty and fifty officers, killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. We had only one lieutenant of the navy, doing duty as a captain in the garrison, and four rank and file, killed, and thirteen rank and file wounded; two of the latter are since dead.

You will be pleased to transmit a copy of my letter to the Secretary of State, by the first opportunity, for His Majesty's information, &c.

GUY CARLETON.

VII.

MAJOR-GENERAL RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

RICHARD MONTGOMERY was born in the north of Ireland, in the year 1737. Of his early life but little is known, although he appears to have entered the army at an early age. He served in America during the French war, participating in the capture of Quebec, under General Wolfe, in 1759; and he appears to have been quartered in America for several years after the establishment of the peace. He afterwards returned with his regiment to Europe; and, in 1772, although in a fair way for preferment, he withdrew from the army and returned to private life. Having become attached to America during his long residence here, he returned to New York; purchased a large estate on the eastern bank of the Hudson River, about a hundred miles above the city; married a sister of Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, and devoted his attention to agriculture and the cultivation of those social and intellectual privileges which his means and his marriage had placed at his command.

When the troubles with the mother country assumed a dangerous attitude, he promptly declared his attachment to the great political truths which the colonies were contending for, and his readiness to serve his adopted country, should she require his services in the field. He was appointed a Brigadier-general of the Continental armies on the 22d of June, 1775, and was assigned to the northern department, under the command of Major-general Schuyler. When the latter was stricken down with sickness, and compelled to return to Ticonderoga, the chief command devolved upon him. Encountering all the vexations which are incident to that state of affairs where the private considers himself the equal, and entitled to all the privileges,

of his commander; where those belonging to one colony yielded obedience only at pleasure to an officer from a different colony; where all ideas of discipline were openly set at defiance; where the stores, accumulated at great cost, were plundered and destroyed; where a strange people had to be conciliated and quieted; and with a military chest which was never properly supplied, he carried forward the flag of his country, and established it over two thirds of Canada, in one campaign; extorting from his enemies, on the floor of the British House of Commons (Monday, March 11, 1776), eulogiums of praise, in which Colonel Barré, Edmund Burke, Charles James Fox, and even the minister, Lord North, did not hesitate to participate.

Of his movements and success before Chambly, St. John's, and Montreal, and his glorious death before the walls of Quebec, a brief survey has been given in the chapter of which this sketch is the conclusion; and it only remains for

me to say that he fell while in the prime of life, with a prospect before him of honor to himself and usefulness to his country.

In 1818, at the instance of his lonely widow, and in conformity with a resolution of the State of New York, his remains were removed from the place where they had rested, for over forty years, in the city of Quebec; and now repose beneath the monument which had been erected to his memory, by the Continental Congress, under the eastern portico of St. Paul's Church, in the city of New York.

Possessing military abilities of a high order, he never insisted on their supremacy when the good-will of his men would be jeopardized, but sought to accomplish similar results by other and less objectionable means. He was amiable, benevolent, and strictly honest; and his death at once deprived his country of an accomplished officer, the State of a useful citizen, and his family of its chief ornament.

CHAPTER VIII.

December 9, 1775.

THE BATTLE OF THE GREAT BRIDGE.

WHILE the inhabitants of the Eastern and Northern Colonies were actively engaged in opposing the aggressions of the government, those of Virginia and other of the Southern Colonies were not less resolute or constant in the same good work.

In Virginia, Lord Dunmore, the royal Governor, had been compelled to seek shelter, with his family, on the Fowey, a man-of-war, lying off Yorktown,¹ whence he issued his proclamations,² sent forth parties to plunder the inhabitants,³ issued a newspaper from material which he had stolen from Mr. Holt of Norfolk,⁴ and committed such other acts as such a man, actuated by all that malice, avarice, and bigotry, of which he possessed so large a share, was alone capable of committing.

The people armed for the defence of their homes and property; and, in several instances, their unerring rifles car-

ried conviction among the Governor's party;¹ which produced, on the seventh of November, a proclamation of martial law, in which the Governor stigmatized as traitors all who would not resort to the royal standard, and offered freedom to all slaves "*appertaining to rebels*," who would join His Majesty's troops.² A motley party soon assembled at Norfolk and at Princess Ann,³ from whence orders were issued for the destruction of the colonial stores at Suffolk, in Nansemond county.⁴ To prevent this, Colonel Woodford, on the twentieth of November, sent a detachment of colonial troops, under Colonel Scott and Major Marshall; and, on the twenty-fifth, he reached the same place with the main body of the troops.⁵

About the same time evidence was brought to light of an attempt which the Governor had made to enlist the Indians in his cause. This served only to excite still more the already excited

¹ Letter to the House of Burgesses, in the minutes of that body, June 8, 1775.—² Proclamation of Nov. 7, 1775.

³ Capt. Leslie to Gen. Howe, Nov. 1; Letter from Alexandria, Oct. 26. ⁴ Letter from Williamsburg, Oct. 1, 1775, John Hunter Holt to the Public, "Norfolk, Oct. 12, 1775."

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¹ Gordon, ii. p. 111.—² "Proclamation by the Governor of Virginia," dated "on board the ship *William*, off Norfolk, the 7th day of November," signed "Dunmore."

³ Marshall, ii. p. 442; Howe's Hist. Coll., p. 112.

⁴ Howe's Hist. Coll. of Va., p. 112.—⁵ Ibid.

colonists; and Colonel Woodford took immediate steps to prevent its consummation.¹

The Governor, informed of Colonel Woodford's design, immediately detached a party to occupy and throw up intrenchments at "the Great Bridge," on the south branch of the Elizabeth River, the only route by which Colonel Woodford could approach Norfolk.²

This bridge, which is about nine miles from Norfolk, was admirably adapted to prevent the passage of an enemy. "Extensive marshes, filled and drained alternately with the flow of the tide, spread out on each side of the river, making the whole breadth of morass and stream, at this point, about half a mile. The Great Bridge extends across the main stream from two islands of firm earth, which are covered with trees and shrubbery. Each of those islands are connected with the main by a causeway and smaller bridges,"³ extending over the morass which borders either bank of the river. At the western extremity of "the bridge," at that time, as well as the present, stood a few houses and a church;⁴ while on the opposite extremity of the bridge, where the royal forces took ground, there appears to have been no improvements whatever. On the little island, at the western extremity of the bridge proper, at that time, there were six or seven houses; and piles of cedar and cypress shingles—in which trade the inhabi-

ants were engaged—were also scattered over its surface.¹

The royalists occupied the eastern extremity of the bridge, and threw up works, which were furnished with a numerous artillery, and commanded the causeways, the bridge, and the surrounding marshes. At the western extremity the colonists threw up a breastwork, which was occupied by a guard, but the main body of the colonists occupied the meeting-house, which stood at the head of the street, some four hundred yards distant; while the houses on the island were also occupied, every night, by a strong guard, which was regularly withdrawn before daylight every morning, to prevent annoyance from the royal artillery while crossing the causeway.²

At length Colonel Woodford, perceiving the advantages which the artillery secured to the enemy, it is said, adopted means to overcome them by stratagem. A trusty negro, owned by Major Marshall, after proper instructions, was permitted to *desert*, and informed Lord Dunmore that not more than three hundred *shirtmen* (a term applied to the riflemen of that day) were with the Colonel at the Great Bridge.³

Falling into the trap, his lordship

¹ Virginia Gazette, cited in Am. Arch.—² Ibid.

³ Col. Woodford to Va. Convention, Dec. 10, and the same to E. Pendleton, Dec. 10, speaks of the desertion, but says nothing of the arrangement; and Chief-justice Marshall, who was a lieutenant at the bridge, and to whose father the negro belonged, is also perfectly silent on the subject, attributing the movement to other causes (vol. ii. p. 443). On the other hand, Gordon speaks, without hesitation, of the arrangement with the negro; and I feel great confidence in his statements.

¹ Gordon, ii. pp. 114-116.—² Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 535.—³ Ibid., p. 533; Va. Gazette, cited by Mr. Force, in Am. Archives.—⁴ Va. Gaz., cited in Am. Archives.

prepared to attack the colonists, dispatching, from Norfolk, on the eighth of December, all the regulars, some two hundred in number; a party of marines and sailors from the Otter and other vessels then at Norfolk; a company of loyalists from Norfolk; and a large mongrel force of "white and black slaves," in all about six hundred men, with two pieces of artillery for that purpose.¹ Accordingly, on Saturday morning, the ninth of December, immediately after reveille beating,² two or three cannon were fired from the royalists' works, and the regulars, headed by Captain Fordyce and his company of grenadiers, advanced towards the colonists.³ Crossing the eastern causeway and the bridge, they set fire to the houses and shingles on the westernmost island,⁴ and then unsupported by their black and tory allies, who would not cross the bridge,⁵ they advanced towards the breastwork, where Lieutenant Travis and a guard of twenty-five men were stationed.⁶

Within the colonists' lines perfect regularity prevailed. The cannon which had been discharged attracted no particular attention, but Adjntant Blackburn observed the movement of the troops, and ordered the men to "stand to their arms."⁷ Lieutenant Travis was

reinforced by the addition of thirty-five men,¹ and the troops in the meeting-house repaired to their respective alarm-posts, under a heavy fire of grape from two field-pieces which the enemy had advanced to the bridge.² Orders had been given by Lieutenant Travis to reserve the fire until the enemy had come within fifty yards,³ and the grenadiers advanced steadily along the causeway, impressed with the belief that the breast-work had been abandoned.⁴ Captain Fordyce, waving his hat, cheered them on, reminded them of their ancient glory, and told them the day was their own.⁵ At this moment Travis gave the order to fire; and, rising on their knees, so as to take deliberate aim, with their rifles resting on the breastwork, the colonists poured a terrible fire upon the enemy.⁶ Every ball fulfilled its errand, and the causeway was covered with the killed and wounded,—Captain Fordyce, the gallant commander of the regulars, falling with fourteen balls in his body.⁷

In great disorder they immediately retreated, suffering additionally, on their retreat, from the Culpepper battalion, under Colonel Stevens, who had been sent round to the left to flank the enemy, on his retreat.⁸

Arriving at the eastern extremity of the bridge proper,—on the easternmost

¹ Col. Woodford to Ed. Pendleton, Dec. 9; Letter from a midshipman on the "Otter," Jan. 9.

² Maj. Spotswood to a friend, Dec. 9; Col. Woodford to E. Pendleton, Dec. 9; Same to Va. Convention, Dec. 10.

³ Maj. Spotswood to a friend, Dec. 9.—⁴ Va. Gazette, cited by Mr. Force.—⁵ Col. Woodford to Va. Convention, Dec. 10.—⁶ Va. Gazette, cited by Mr. Force.

⁷ Maj. Spotswood's letter, December 9.

¹ Compare the number Maj. Spotswood (*letter of Dec. 9*) says were present, with the number of his guard as represented in the Va. Gazette.

² Maj. Spotswood's letter, Dec. 9; Va. Gazette, cited by Mr. Force.—³ Va. Gazette, cited by Mr. Force.

⁴ Hall's Civil War, p. 148.—⁵ Va. Gazette, cited by Mr. Force.—⁶ Stedman, i. p. 148.—⁷ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 535.—⁸ Va. Gazette, cited by Mr. Force.

of the little islands, where the tories and negroes had remained,—Captain Leslie appears to have rallied them, but with no practically good result; and they retired to the fort, taking with them their guns¹ and a part of their killed and wounded;² but leaving behind them Captain Fordyce and twelve privates, dead; Lieutenant Battut and seventeen privates, wounded; three officer's fusils, thirty muskets, twenty-four bayonets, and a considerable quantity of other articles.³

The only loss or damage sustained by the colonists was a slight wound, from a grape-shot, which one of the privates received;⁴ while that of the enemy is estimated at from sixty⁵ to the extent of half his force.⁶

On the following morning, the enemy having in the mean time evacuated it, Colonel Woodford took possession of the fort, with seven pieces of artillery and a quantity of stores; but no ammunition, of any kind, was found.⁷

The capture of the fort at the Great Bridge opened the way to the city of Norfolk, and Colonel Woodford, reinforced by the arrival of a strong party of Carolinians and of others of Virgin-

ians, pushed forward to that place, the loyalists retiring to the vessels which lay in the harbor, on his approach.¹

From the buildings on the wharves the riflemen kept up a constant and destructive fire on the ships; and every head which appeared above the bulwarks was inevitably devoted to destruction.² To remove this difficulty, on the night of the first of January, 1776, a party was landed, under cover of the guns of the ships, and set fire to the obnoxious premises;³ and, either spreading from these buildings, as some suppose;⁴ or by the continued efforts of the enemy, as others suppose;⁵ or from the resolute patriotism of the inhabitants, who destroyed their property rather than let it be exposed to the enemy, as many, with some reason, maintain,⁶ the flames spread over the entire town, and reduced it to a heap of smoldering ruins;⁷ “and the mournful silence of gloomy depopulation now reigned where the gay, animating bustle of an active, emulous crowd had so lately prevailed.”

¹ Letter from midshipman on H. M. S. *the Otter*, Jan. 9; Col. Woodford to Va. Convention, Dec. 15; Col. Scott to Capt. Southall, Dec. 17.—² Letter from midshipman, Jan. 10; Lord Dunmore's Va. Gazette, Jan. 15, 1776, cited by Mr. Force; Forrest's History of Norfolk, p. 82.

³ Letter from midshipman, Jan. 10; Lord Dunmore's Va. Gazette, Jan. 15, 1776, cited by Mr. Force; Cols. Howe and Woodford to Va. Convention, Jan. 1; Col. Howe to the Convention, Jan. 2.—⁴ Gordon, ii. pp. 206, 207.—⁵ Letter from midshipman on board H. M. S. *the Otter*, Jan. 9.

⁶ Lord Dunmore's Va. Gazette, published on shipboard, off Norfolk, Jan. 15, 1776, cited by Mr. Force, says positively, that the destruction of the town was not intended, and that “the rebels cruelly and unnecessarily completed the destruction of the whole town, by setting fire to the houses in the streets back, which were before safe from the flames.” Lieut. Hall (Hist. of Civil War, p. 151) confirms this view.—⁷ Forrest's Hist. of Norfolk, pp. 82-85.

¹ It has been generally supposed that two field-pieces were left on the bridge, and fell into the hands of the colonists, but the evidence appears wholly against this conclusion. Col. Woodford, in his letter to Pres. Pendleton, Dec. 9; his letter to Va. Convention, Dec. 10; and the schedule of the spoils (*letter to E. Pendleton, Dec. 10*), all show the error of such a conclusion.

² Col. Woodford to E. Pendleton, Dec. 9; Maj. Spotswood's letter, Dec. 9.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Maj. Spotswood's letter, Dec. 9.—⁵ Letter from midshipman on H. M. S. *the Otter*, Jan. 9.—⁶ Maj. Spotswood's letter, Dec. 10.

⁷ Col. Woodford to E. Pendleton, Dec. 10.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR SPOTSWOOD TO A FRIEND IN WILLIAMSBURG.

GREAT BRIDGE, December 9, 1775.

WE were alarmed this morning by the firing of some guns after reveille beating, which, as the enemy had paid us this compliment several times before, we at first concluded to be nothing but a morning salute; but in a short time after, I heard Adjutant Blackburn call out, "Boys! stand to your arms!" Colonel Woodford and myself immediately got equipped, and ran out; the colonel pressed down to the breastwork in our front, and my alarm-post being two hundred and fifty yards in another quarter, I ran to it as fast as I could, and by the time I had made all ready for engaging, a very heavy fire ensued at the breastwork, in which were not more than sixty men; it continued for about half an hour, when the King's troops gave way, after sustaining considerable loss and behaving like true-born Englishmen. They mounted up to our intrenchments with fixed bayonets; our young troops received them with firmness, and behaved as well as it was possible for soldiers to do. Captain Leslie, of the regulars, commanded the fort on the other side of the bridge; Captain Fordyce, of the grenadiers, led the van with his company, and Lieutenant Battut commanded the advanced party; the former got killed within a few yards of the breastwork, with twelve privates; the lieutenant, with sixteen soldiers, were taken prisoners, all wounded. Several others were carried into the fort under cover of their cannon; and from the blood on the bridge, they must have lost one half of their detachment.

It would appear that Providence was on our

side; for during the whole engagement we lost not a man, and only one was slightly wounded in the hand. Colonel Woodford is a brave officer and a man I love; he has had Captain Fordyce buried with the military honors due to his rank, and all the prisoners that fell into our hands are taken the greatest care of. We have not as yet been able to ascertain the number of killed and wounded that fell on their side. Three officer's fusées, with bayonets and cartridge-boxes, fell into our hands; from which we judge that there were three commissioned officers killed. As soon as a general return can be made, it will be sent to the honorable convention. I am at present in the greatest hurry, and only can give an account of what I have seen.

II.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL WOODFORD TO THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION.

GREAT BRIDGE, December 10, 1775.

A servant belonging to Major Marshall, who deserted the other night from Colonel Scott's party, has completely taken his lordship in. Lieutenant Battut, who is wounded, and at present my prisoner, informs me that this fellow told them not more than three hundred shrtmen were here, and that imprudent man caught at the bait, dispatching Captain Leslie with all the regulars (about two hundred), who arrived at the bridge about three o'clock in the morning, joined about three hundred black and white slaves, laid planks upon the bridge, and crossed just after our reveille had beat; and lucky time for us, and, you will say, rather an improper

season for them to make their push, when, of course, all our men must be under arms. The above lieutenant commanded the advanced party, and Captain Fordyce, of the grenadiers, led the van with his company, who, for coolness and bravery, deserved a better fate, as well as the brave fellows who fell with him, who behaved like heroes. They marched up to our breastwork with fixed bayonets, and perhaps a hotter fire never happened, or a greater carnage, for the number of troops. None of the blacks, &c., in the rear, with Captain Leslie, advanced farther than the bridge.

I have the pleasure to inform you that the victory was complete, and that most of their dead and wounded, with two pieces of cannon, were carried off under cover of their guns from the fort. We buried twelve, besides the captain (him with all the military honors due to his rank), and have prisoners, Lieutenant Battut and sixteen privates, all wounded; thirty-five stands of arms and accoutrements, three officer's fusils, powder, ball, and cartridges, with sundry other things, have likewise fallen into our hands. This was a second Bunker's Hill affair, in miniature, with this difference, that we kept our post, and had only one man wounded in the hand.

III.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER WRITTEN BY A MIDSHIPMAN ON HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP THE OTTER.

ON BOARD H. M. S. OTTER, Jan. 9, 1776.

December 9th.—Our troops, with about sixty townsmen from Norfolk, and a detachment of sailors from the ships, among whom I had the honor to march, set out from Norfolk to attack, once more, the rebels at the Great Bridge, who had been lodged there some time, and had erected a breastwork opposite to our fort, upon their side of the river. We arrived at the fort half an hour after three in the morning, and, after refreshing ourselves, prepared to attack the rebels in their intrenchments.

Captain Squire, ever ready to assist my lord in the public cause, had sent his gunners and

men to manage two pieces of cannon, who were in the front, and ordered to begin the attack. But how can it be supposed that, with two hundred men, we could force a strong intrenchment, defended by at least two thousand? Yet this was attempted, and we marched up to their works with the intrepidity of lions. But, alas! we retreated with much fewer brave fellows than we took out. Their fire was so heavy, that had we not retreated as we did, we should every one have been cut off. Figure to yourself a strong breastwork built across a causeway, on which six men only could advance abreast; a large swamp almost surrounded them, at the back of which were two small breastworks to flank us in our attack on their intrenchments. Under these disadvantages it was impossible to succeed; yet our men were so enraged, that all the entreaties, and scarcely the threats of their officers, could prevail on them to retreat, which at last they did. The cannon were secured within the fort. We had sixty killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; among whom were the gallant Captain Fordyce, of the grenadiers of the fourteenth brigade. Lieutenants Napier and Leslie, and Lieutenant Battut, wounded and taken prisoners: men all universally esteemed, and for whom all shed tears. We set out on our return for Norfolk about seven o'clock in the evening, at which place we arrived at twelve, and the soldiers were embarked on board vessels prepared for that purpose.

December 14th.—The rebels having now nothing to obstruct their passage, arrived and took possession of Norfolk, and in the evening saluted us with a volley of small-arms; which the next morning, I was sent on shore to their commander to inform him, that if another shot was fired at the Otter, they must expect the town to be knocked about their ears.

January 9th.—The detested town of Norfolk is no more! Its destruction happened on New-Year's day. About four o'clock in the afternoon the signal was given from the Liverpool, when a dreadful cannonading began from the three ships, which lasted till it was too hot for the rebels to stand on their wharves. Our boats now landed, and set fire to the town in several places. It burned fiercely all night, and the

next day; nor are the flames yet extinguished; but no more of Norfolk remains than about twelve houses, which have escaped the flames.

IV.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM WOODFORD.

William Woodford was born in Caroline county, Virginia, in 1734. He distinguished himself in the French and Indian Wars; and, in the early days of the Revolution, he secured the confidence of his countrymen, by his resolution and the ability which he displayed. He was accordingly appointed colonel of the second

regiment of Virginia troops in 1775, when Lord Dunmore assumed a belligerent attitude. In the battle of "The Great Bridge,"—the subject of this chapter, and the operations in the neighborhood of Norfolk, subsequent thereto,—he acted with great bravery.

He was made a brigadier-general by the Continental Congress on the 21st of February, 1777, and the command of the first Virginia brigade was assigned to him. He was present at the battles of Brandywine and Monmouth (at the former of which he was wounded), and at the siege of Charlestown, in 1780, where he was made a prisoner. He was carried to New York by the enemy, and died in that city on the 13th of November, 1780, in the forty-sixth year of his age.

CHAPTER IX.

February 27, 1776.

THE BATTLE OF MOORE'S CREEK BRIDGE.

IN the early days of the Revolution, there existed a body of ignorant and disorderly men, on the frontiers of North Carolina, who styled themselves Regulators. With all the recklessness and ignorance usually found among the pioneers, these men assumed to "regulate" the affairs of those around them, setting all government at defiance, and endeavoring to control or stop the administration of justice throughout the new settlements of the West.¹

At the same time there was in the province a large number of emigrants from the Highlands of Scotland, whose earnest attachment to their native hills led them to become no less devoted to the prince under whose government they lived. Like many emigrants at the present day, they were only sojourners in Carolina, feeling no interest

in her welfare, and retaining for Scotland and for Scotland's king all the affectionate devotion which formed so prominent a feature of their character.¹

The royal Governor of North Carolina (Martin), who, like Dunmore and Tryon, had been compelled to seek shelter on a ship-of-war, supposed that by effecting an union of these two parties to his cause he could make a successful stand against the colonists; and this hope was increased by the knowledge that Sir Henry Clinton and Sir Peter Parker were approaching, each with a strong force, for the suppression of the revolution in the Southern colonies.²

He accordingly sent messengers, with commissions, to the leading men among the Scots; and to their chief, McDonald, he sent a commission as Brigadier-general, with a proclamation, in blank, commanding all persons, on their allegiance, to repair to the royal standard.³

¹ Williamson's North Carolina, ii. pp. 128-173; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 447; Martin's N. C., ii. pp. 233-379; Wheeler's N. C., i. pp. 54-63; Stedman, i. p. 178. There is no doubt that these "*Regulators*" originally represented a people contending for their rights against the oppressions of the government. This object, however, was abandoned after the battle of Alamance; and the subsequent engagements of this body to fight the battles of the Crown show that other parties were engaged in it.

¹ Martin's N. C., ii. p. 379; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 447; Stedman, i. p. 178; Hall's Hist. of Civil War, p. 161.—² Martin's N. C., ii. p. 379; Gordon, ii. p. 208; Stedman, i. p. 178.—³ Martin, ii. p. 380; Marshall, ii. p. 448; Gordon, ii. p. 208

Impatient to begin his operations, McDonald raised the standard, at Cross Creek, where Fayetteville now stands, in the early part of February, 1776, and a mixed mass of fifteen hundred men speedily responded to the call.¹

Information of these movements speedily reached General James Moore, a colonial officer; and, at the head of a small force, on the fifteenth of February, he took possession of Rockfish Bridge, an important post, seven miles from Cross Creek (where McDonald then was), threw up works for the defense of the pass, and waited for reinforcements. By the nineteenth, he was joined by Colonels Lillington, Kenon, and Ashe, with four hundred and fifty minute-men and militia. On the nineteenth,² McDonald advanced within four miles of Rockfish Bridge, and sent in, by a flag, copies of the Governor's proclamation and of a manifesto, with a letter from the General, requiring General Moore and his party to "join the royal standard," by twelve o'clock the next day, and extending to them an offer of the royal clemency.³ Desiring to gain time for the arrival of reinforcements, in order to cut off McDonald's retreat, General Moore declined complying with the request himself, but desired to lay the letter before his officers and take their judgment on it, promising "a

more particular answer" at twelve the next day.¹ On the following day, General Moore sent a letter stating that his officers had unanimously approved his answer of the preceding day, and, at the same time, inclosing a copy of the Test, which, if signed by McDonald and his party, by twelve the next day, would entitle them to be received into the Continental ranks "as friends and countrymen."² Of course McDonald spurned the offer with great indignation, and the correspondence ceased.³ In the mean time, Colonels Martin and Thackston crossed the Northwest River, at Campbelltown (*Fayetteville*), destroyed all the boats, and proceeded to Negro-head Point.⁴

General Moore immediately dispatched an express to Colonel Caswell, who was on his way to join him, directing him to return and occupy Corbett's Ferry, on Black River, and to harass the enemy as much as possible; at the same time he directed Colonels Martin and Thackston to take possession of Cross Creek (*Fayetteville*), in order to prevent their return to that place; while Colonels Lillington and Ashe were dispatched from his own camp, by a forced march to reinforce Colonel Caswell at Corbett's Ferry, with directions, if they could not reach Colonel Caswell, to take possession of Moore's Creek Bridge; while the General him-

¹ Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 76; Martin, ii. p. 381; Gordon, ii. p. 208.—² Gen. Moore, in his dispatch to the Prov. Council, March 2, says this correspondence took place on the 20th. A reference to the letters themselves shows it to have been the 19th, both letters bearing that date.—³ Gen. Donald McDonald to Gen. Moore, Feb. 19.

¹ Gen. Moore to Gen. McDonald, Feb. 19.—² Same to same, Feb. 20.—³ Gen. McDonald to Gen. Moore, Feb. 20.

⁴ Gen. Moore to the Prov. Council of N. C., March 2, 1776; Martin's N. C., ii. pp. 381-383; Stedman, i. pp. 179-181.

self, with the remainder of the forces, fell back, and crossed the river at Elizabethtown, so as either to meet them on their way to Corbett's Ferry, or fall in their rear and surround them there.¹

General McDonald was not slow in discovering the web which had been woven for his entanglement, nor was he idle in his efforts to release himself. A series of movements, on both sides, followed, until the twenty-sixth, when both parties appeared to rest their hopes on the passage of Moore's Creek Bridge, where Colonel Lillington was stationed with a small party. On the same afternoon Colonel Caswell joined Colonel Lillington, a small breastwork was thrown up, and the plank removed from part of the bridge.²

Early the next morning an alarm-gun was fired from the enemy's camp, and to the sound of the national bagpipes, Captain Macleod (on whom the command had devolved, from the sickness of General McDonald) marched at the head of the party to attack the colonists.³

It is said that the destruction of part of the bridge disconcerted them, and that in their efforts to cross on the timbers, many fell. At length their leader, Captain Macleod, and Captain Campbell, also one of their principal officers, fell within a few paces of the breastwork; and their men, having none to lead

them, immediately sought safety in flight, abandoning even their General, who was taken prisoner the next day.⁴

General McDonald afterwards stated that his force numbered "fifteen or sixteen hundred men," although it was commonly reported to have been much larger. The colonists comprised the Newbern battalion of minute-men, the militia from Craven, Johnston, Dobbs, and Wake, and a detachment of minute-men from Wilmington, the whole numbering about one thousand men.²

The loss sustained by the enemy was about thirty men killed and wounded; the colonists had but two wounded, one of whom recovered.³

Besides General McDonald, upwards of eight hundred and fifty common soldiers were taken prisoners, disarmed, and discharged. Thirteen wagons, with harness complete, two fine medicine-chests, fifteen hundred excellent rifles, a box containing half-joes and guineas, to the amount of fifteen thousand pounds sterling, three hundred and fifty guns, and one hundred and fifty swords and dirks, also formed part of the trophies of the victory.⁴

This battle "was of eminent service to the American cause in North Carolina. It broke the spirits of a great body of men, who would have consti-

¹ Gen. Moore to Prov. Council of N. C., March 2.

² Ibid.; Martin's N. C., ii. pp. 282, 283; Marshall, ii. p. 449; Stedman, i. p. 181.—³ Col. Caswell to Prov. Cong., Feb. 29; Gen. Moore to Prov. Council, March 2; Wheeler's N. C., pp. 76, 77; Stedman, i. p. 182.

⁴ Gen. Moore to Prov. Council, March 2; Col. Caswell to the Prov. Cong., Feb. 29; Martin, ii. pp. 383, 384; Wheeler's N. C., p. 77; Stedman, i. p. 182.

² Col. Caswell to Prov. Cong., Feb. 29.—³ Gen. Moore to Prov. Council, March 2.—⁴ "List of Rifles, Guns, &c.," inclosed in Col. Caswell's letter to Prov. Cong., Feb. 29; Col. Wheeler's N. C., i. p. 77.

tuted a very formidable reinforcement to an invading army; it increased the confidence of the provincials in themselves, and attached to them the timid and the wavering, who form a large portion of every community."¹

Had General McDonald effected an

union with General Sir Henry Clinton, the whole of the colony would have been placed at their mercy. This victory prevented it, the plans of Governor Martin were frustrated, and, soon afterwards, the royal government ceased to exist in North Carolina.

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL JAMES MOORE TO THE PROVINCIAL COUNCIL OF NORTH CAROLINA.

WILMINGTON, *March 2, 1776.*

ON the earliest intelligence that the Tories were collecting and embodying at Cross Creek, which I received on the 9th of February, I proceeded to take possession of Rockfish Bridge, within seven miles of Cross Creek, which I considered as an important post. This I effected on the 15th, with my own regiment, five pieces of artillery, and a part of the Bladen militia; but as our numbers were by no means equal to that of the Tories, I thought it most advisable to intrench and fortify that pass, and wait for a reinforcement. By the 19th, I was joined by Colonel Lillington, with one hundred and fifty of the Wilmington minute-men, Colonel Kenon, with two hundred of the Duplin militia, and Colonel Ashe, with about one hundred of the Volunteer Independent Rangers—making our numbers then in the whole about eleven hundred, and from the best information I was able to procure, the Tory army, under the command of General McDonald, amounted to about fourteen or fifteen hundred.

On the 20th, they marched within four miles

of us, and sent in by a flag of truce, the Governor's proclamation, a manifesto, and letter from the General, copies of which, together with another letter, and my answer, you have inclosed. I then waited only until Colonel Martin and Colonel Thackston, who, I had certain intelligence, were on their march, should get near enough to cut off their retreat, and determined to avail myself of the first favorable opportunity of attacking them. However, contrary to my expectations, I learned, on the 21st, that they had the night before, and that morning, crossed the Northwest River, at Campbelltown, with their whole army, sunk and destroyed all their boats, and taken their route the most direct way to Negro-head Point. I then dispatched an express to Colonel Caswell, who was on his march to join us, with about eight hundred men, and directed him to return and take possession of Corbett's Ferry, over Black River, and by every means in his power to obstruct, harass, and distress them in their march; at the same time, I directed Colonel Martin and Colonel Thackston to take possession of Cross Creek, in order to prevent their return that way. Colonel Lillington and Colonel Ashe I ordered, by a forced march, to endeavor, if possible, to reinforce Colonel Caswell; but if that could not be effected, to take possession of Moore's Creek Bridge, while I proceeded back with the remainder of our army, to cross the Northwest, at Elizabethtown, so as either to

¹ Marshall's Washington, ii. pp. 450, 451.

meet them on their way to Corbett's Ferry, or fall in their rear, and surround them there.

On the 23d, I crossed the river at Elizabethtown, where I was compelled to wait for a supply of provisions until the 24th, at night, having learned that Colonel Caswell was almost entirely without. Just when I was prepared to march I received an express from Colonel Caswell, informing that the Tories had raised a flat which had been sunk in Black River, about five miles above him, and by erecting a bridge, had passed it with their whole army.

I then determined, as the last expedient, to proceed immediately in boats down the Northwest River to Dollison's Landing, about sixty miles from them; and to take possession of Moore's Creek Bridge, about ten miles from them, at the same time acquainting Colonel Caswell of my intentions, and recommending him to retreat to Moore's Creek Bridge, if possible; but if not, to follow on in their rear.

The next day, by four o'clock, we arrived at Dollison's Landing; but as we could not possibly march that night, for want of horses for the artillery, I dispatched an express to Moore's Creek Bridge, to learn the situation of affairs there, and was informed that Colonel Lillington, who had the day before taken his stand at the bridge, was that afternoon reinforced by Colonel Caswell, and that they had raised a small breast-work, and destroyed a part of the bridge.

The next morning (the 27th), at break of day, an alarm-gun was fired; immediately after which, scarcely allowing our people a moment to prepare, the Tory army, with Captain Macleod at their head, made their attack on Colonel Caswell and Colonel Lillington; and finding a small intrenchment next the bridge, on our side, empty, concluded that our people had abandoned their post, and in the most furious manner advanced within thirty paces of our breast-work and artillery, where they met a very proper reception. Captain Macleod and Captain Campbell fell within a few paces of the breastwork, the former of whom received upwards of twenty balls through his body; and in a very few minutes their whole army was put to flight, and most shamefully abandoned their General, who was next day taken prisoner.

The loss of the enemy in this action, from the best accounts we have been able to learn, is about thirty killed and wounded; but as numbers of them must have fallen into the creek, besides many more that were carried off, I suppose their loss may be estimated at about fifty. We had only two wounded, one of which died this day.

Thus, sir, I have the pleasure to inform you, has most happily terminated a very dangerous insurrection, and will, I trust, put an effectual check to Toryism in this country.

II.

LETTER FROM COL. RICHARD CASWELL TO THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS OF NORTH CAROLINA.

CAMP AT LONG CREEK, *February 29, 1776.*

SIR:—I have the pleasure to acquaint you that we had an engagement with the Tories at Widow Moore's Creek Bridge, on the 27th current. Our army was about one thousand strong, consisting of the Newbern battalion of minutemen, the militia from Craven, Johnston, Dobbs, and Wake, and a detachment of the Wilmington battalion of minute-men, which we found encamped at Moore's Creek the night before the battle, under the command of Colonel Lillington: the Tories, by common report, were three thousand; but General McDonald, whom we have a prisoner, says there were about fifteen or sixteen hundred. He was unwell that day, and not in the battle. Captain Macleod, who seemed to be the principal commander, with Captain John Campbell, are among the slain.

The number killed and mortally wounded, from the best accounts I was able to collect, was about thirty: most of them were shot on passing the bridge. Several had fallen into the water, some of whom, I am pretty certain, had not risen yesterday evening when I left the camp. Such prisoners as we have made, say there were at least fifty of their men missing.

The Tories were totally put to the rout, and will certainly disperse. Colonel Moore arrived at our camp a few hours after the engagement

was over. His troops came up that evening, and are now encamped on the ground where the battle was fought; and Colonel Martin is at or near Cross Creek, with a large body of men. Those, I presume, will be sufficient effectually to put a stop to any attempt to embody again. I therefore, with Colonel Moore's consent, am returning to Newbern, with the troops under my command, where I hope to receive your orders to dismiss them. There I intend carrying the General. If the Council should rise before my arrival, be pleased to give order in what manner he shall be disposed of. Our officers and men behaved with the spirit and intrepidity becoming freemen contending for their dearest privileges.

RICHARD CASWELL.

To the Hon. CORNELIUS HARNETT, President of the Provincial Congress of North Carolina.

III.

GOVERNOR RICHARD CASWELL.

Richard Caswell was born in Maryland, August 3, 1729. His father, who was engaged in mercantile pursuits, having been unfortunate in his business, he was thrown upon his own resources at an early age. At the age of seventeen he left home to seek his fortune in North Carolina, bearing letters of introduction from the Governor of Maryland to Governor Johnston of North Carolina. He found employment in one of the public offices, and, in 1753, was appointed Clerk of Orange county and of the County Court, and Deputy Surveyor of the colony. Settling in Lenoir (then Dobbs) county, he married Mary McIlweane; and afterwards he married Sarah, daughter of William Herritage, under whom he studied law, which he practised with great success.

His first appearance in polities was as a member of the Colonial Assembly from Johnston county, in 1754; and he continued to represent it, continuously, until 1771. In 1770 and 1771 he was chosen Speaker of the House of Commons.

He was also colonel of the militia of his county, and, as such, commanded the right wing of the colonial forces in the battle of Alamance (May 16, 1771), where the Regulators were defeated so signally.

He took an early part in the contest with the crown, and, in 1774, was appointed one of the delegates to Congress—William Hooper and John Hewes being his associates. He continued in Congress during the sessions of 1774–5–6, when he resigned his seat to superintend the disordered finances of his State, as one of its treasurers. In 1776 he was appointed governor of the State, and occupied the post during the stormy period of 1776–7–8, declining any compensation for his services.

During all this period of trouble, and in the midst of all his official duties, of a civil character, Governor Caswell's military spirit was not inactive. As colonel of the minute-men of Dobbs county he was early in the field to oppose the operations of the Tories, under General McDonald; and, with Colonel Lillington, he participated in their defeat at the battle of Moore's Creek Bridge, to which this chapter has been devoted. He was also with the North Carolina troops at the battle of Camden, in 1780, and, it is said, had General Gates heeded the advice of De Kalb and Caswell, the result would have been entirely different.

In 1782 he was again called to the financial department of the State; and, at the same time, to the Speakership of the Senate, both of which posts he occupied until 1785, when he was again elected governor of the State. In 1787 the General Assembly elected him a delegate to the Convention of the States for the formation of a federal constitution, with the extraordinary power, in case of his inability to attend, *to select his substitute*. This important trust he declined, but he delegated William Blount as his substitute, and that gentleman's name is appended to the constitution. In 1789 he was elected Senator from the county of Dobbs (now Lenoir and Greene), and also a member of the Convention of the State, which was to assemble at Fayetteville in November, 1789, to consider the federal constitution.

He attended the General Assembly, and was

elected Speaker of the Senate, but the silver cord was strained for the last time, and, on the fifth of November, 1789, while presiding in the Senate, he was struck with paralysis; and, after lingering speechless until the tenth, he expired, in the sixtieth year of his age.

The character of Governor Caswell is one on which the mind can linger with delight. Without pretending to literary renown his acquirements were practically extensive, and his knowledge deep and accurate. As a lawyer, his thorough knowledge of the great fundamental principles gave him a standing which but few, among the many, have ever attained. As a statesman, his patriotism was undoubted, his

discernment quick, and his judgment sound. As a soldier, he knew no fear, and his vigilance was constant and untiring. Without being brilliant, he was endowed with that good judgment, that dignified deportment, that sterling integrity, and that solidity of character, which not only commanded the respect of all who knew him, but enabled him to retain to the last, and even to the present day, the affection of those among whom he lived and of those who have descended from them. It was of him that Nathaniel Macon spoke, when, in the convention of 1835, he said, "Governor Caswell, of Lenoir, was one of the most powerful men that ever lived in this or any other country."

CHAPTER X.

June 28, 1776.

THE ATTACK ON SULLIVAN'S ISLAND.

IN compliance with the urgent requests of the Governors of the several Southern colonies, the ministry prepared a large force to be sent to those colonies, in the spring of 1776, for the suppression of the revolutionary spirit which so generally prevailed, and ordered General Sir Henry Clinton to take the command of the land forces connected therewith. At the same time the governors of the colonies made all possible preparations to co-operate with them, by organizing the loyalists in their respective governments, and by suppressing, as far as they could do so, the popular movements.

Of the failure of these attempts, by the royal Governors of Virginia and North Carolina, the two preceding chapters bear record. It will be the place of this chapter to bear testimony to the integrity of South Carolina.

On the twelfth of February, 1776, the fleet, bearing the Fifteenth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third, Thirty-seventh, Fifty-fourth, Fifty-seventh, and seven companies of the Forty-sixth regiments, embarked at Cork, under the command of General Lord Cornwallis, under convoy

of two ships of the line and six frigates, commanded by Admiral Sir Peter Parker.¹ After a tedious voyage of nearly three months, the fleet reached Cape Fear, in North Carolina, on the third of May.² General Clinton immediately assumed the command, and, on the fifth, issued a proclamation, in which he denounces the "rebellion" against which he was to proceed, urges the people to return to their duty as good subjects of the King, and offers the royal clemency to all except Robert Howe and Cornelius Harnett.³

The effect produced by this proclamation was trifling, and the royal cause acquired by it but a small addition of adherents.⁴

Orders having been received by General Clinton to unite his force with General Howe's, at New York, as soon as the latter reached that city, the long voyage of the fleet left but little time for operations in the South. He had received information, however, that "the

¹ Stedman, i. p. 183.—² Ibid.—³ "By Major-general Clinton, &c. : A Proclamation," dated, "On board the *Pallas* transport, in *Cape Fear River*, the 5th day of May, 1776."—⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 279; Hall's Civil War, p. 162.

trade carried on from Charleston was the great support of the funds for the warlike preparations of the Southern colonies," and he concluded that he would secure that harbor by seizing the small fort on Sullivan's Island, which commanded the channel of entrance.¹

He accordingly prepared for that expedition, and on the fourth of June, he arrived off Charleston, with the *Bristol*, of fifty guns, the *Solebay*, the *Syren*, the *Active*, and the *Acteon*, of twenty-eight guns each, the *Sphinx*, of twenty, the *Friendship*, of eighteen, the *Ranger*, of eight, the *Thunder*, bomb-ketch, carrying six guns and two mortars, and several smaller armed vessels, and a large number of transports.²

Fort Sullivan, the object of attack, was an unfinished work of palmetto logs, standing on the southwestern shore of Sullivan's Island, on the eastern side of the entrance to the harbor of Charleston. The island is long, low, and sandy, and, with the exception of a few palmettoes, is entirely bare of trees or shrubs.³

Intelligence of the approach of the fleet reached Charleston on the first of June, and expresses were sent, immediately, ordering the militia to assemble for the defence of the city: the fortifications were visited by the President of the Convention, and preparations for the most vigorous defence ordered.⁴

¹ Stedman, i. p. 184.—² Ibid., p. 185; "Circumstantial Account, &c.," inclosed in Gen. Lee's dispatch to Cong., July 2, 1776.—³ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 757.

⁴ "Circumstantial Account, &c.," Gordon, ii. p. 280; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. pp. 141, 142; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 453; Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 140.

A few days afterwards several of the transports removed to Long Island,—a similar island to Sullivan's, and separated from the northeastern shore of the latter by a narrow creek, called *the Breach*,—and landed the troops.¹ The object of General Clinton was to advance with his troops and attack the fort, by land, simultaneously with the attack by the fleet, and he anticipated an easy victory, from the fact that the fort was unfinished on the land side.²

Colonel Thompson, with the third colonial regiment,—three hundred in number,—occupied the northeast shore of Sullivan's Island, opposite Long Island, where he anxiously watched the movements of the enemy's land forces.³ He was afterwards reinforced by the arrival of Colonel Clark, with two hundred troops, Colonel Horry, with two hundred South Carolina Rangers, a company of militia riflemen, an eighteen-pounder, and a field-piece;⁴ and, several times, they sustained a fire from the enemy on Long Island, without receiving any injury.⁵

On the twenty-fifth, the enemy's fleet was strengthened by the arrival of the *Experiment*, of fifty guns;⁶ and, on the twenty-seventh, dispositions were made for an attack on the fort, the works de-

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 142; Gordon, ii. p. 280; "Circumstantial Account, &c.;" History of Civil War in America, i. p. 167.—² Gen. Lee's dispatch to Cong., July 2; History of Civil War, i. p. 167.—³ Gordon, ii. p. 281; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 143; Marshall, ii. p. 455; Moultrie, i. p. 142.—⁴ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 145; Gordon, ii. p. 285; Moultrie, i. p. 142.

⁶ "Circumstantial Account, &c.;"—⁶ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 145; "Circumstantial Account, &c."

signed to cover the passage of the troops from Long Island to Sullivan's Island having been completed.¹

Accordingly, the next morning, signal was made by the Admiral to commence the action; and the *Thunder*, bomb, covered by the *Friendship*, began the work by throwing shells into the fort.² The *Active*, *Bristol*, *Experiment*, and *Solebay*, in the order named, took the positions assigned to them by the Admiral;³ and, with springs on their cables,⁴ began a most tremendous fire on the fort.⁵ Shortly afterwards the *Sphinx*, the *Aeteon*, and the *Syren* were ordered to take such a position, between Sullivan's Island and the city, as would enable them to enfilade the works, but they got entangled in a shoal, called the Middle Ground;⁶ and although the *Syren* got off without damage,⁷ and the *Sphinx* with the loss of her bowsprit,⁸ the *Aeteon* stuck fast, and could not be removed.⁹

After throwing about sixty shells, the *Thunder* was so disabled as to become useless.¹⁰ The fire, however, from half-musket shot distance,¹¹ continued with unabated fury on the little work and its

undisciplined garrison; and, with a determination which would have honored veteran troops, it was returned with the utmost coolness, deliberation, and precision.¹ Giving to the smaller vessels their share of attention, especial care was taken of the fifty-gun ships,² and, as the result shows, they were the severest sufferers. During the heat of the action, the fire of the garrison slackened from a want of ammunition, but General Charles Lee, who was at Charleston, and visited the fort at that time, ordered a fresh supply, and the fire was renewed with its former steadiness.³

Until near seven o'clock in the evening the enemy continued his fire, without intermission. About that time he slackened it,⁴ and at half-past nine it ceased altogether.⁵

About the time the ships commenced the action, in the morning, an armed schooner and a sloop took positions near the northeast extremity of Sullivan's Island, to cover the passage of the troops from Long Island.⁶ A cannonade was opened on Colonel Thompson's party, who opposed the passage, wounding one of his men;⁷ the light-infantry, grenadiers, and the Fifteenth regiment were ordered to embark in boats,⁸ and every appearance indicated

¹ Stedman, i. p. 185.—² "Circumstantial Account, &c.;" Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 144; Gordon, ii. p. 282.

³ "Circumstantial Account, &c."—⁴ Stedman, i. p. 185.

⁵ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 144; Stedman, i. p. 185; Gen. Lee's dispatch to Cong., July 2; "Circumstantial Account, &c.;" Gordon, ii. p. 282.—⁶ Gordon, ii. p. 283; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 146; Marshall, ii. p. 456; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 168.—⁷ Gordon, ii. p. 283.

⁸ "Circumstantial Account, &c.;" Gordon, ii. p. 283; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 146.—⁹ Stedman, i. p. 185; Gordon, ii. p. 283; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 146.

¹⁰ "Circumstantial Account, &c.;" Gordon, ii. p. 283.

¹¹ Gen. Lee's dispatch to Congress, July 2.

¹ Gen. Lee's dispatch to Cong., July 2; Marshall, ii. p. 457; Hist. of Civil War, i. pp. 168, 169.—² Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 175.—³ Gen. Lee's dispatch, July 2; Marshall, ii. p. 457; Stedman, i. p. 186; Hist. of the Civil War, i. p. 169.—⁴ "Circumstantial Account."—⁵ Stedman, i. p. 186; "Circumstantial Account;" Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 146. Col. Moultrie (Mem., i. p. 174) says, "about 8 o'clock, p. m."—⁶ "Circumstantial Account."—⁷ Ibid. ⁸ Stedman, i. p. 186.

an intention to cross the Breach, which separated Long from Sullivan's Island. Without making any attempt to land,¹ to the surprise of the troops under Colonel Thompson, as well as those of the enemy, they were immediately ordered to disembark, and the field of glory was left, undisputed, to Admiral Parker and the crews under his command.² It appears that a strong easterly wind, which had prevailed for several days, had forced the water into the Breach, rendering it impossible for the troops to ford the stream,³ while the only boats at the command of the General leaked so badly that they were considered unsafe.⁴

At eleven o'clock the same evening the ships slipped their cables, and quietly dropped down, under cover of the night, about two miles from the island.⁵

The next morning the garrison opened a fire on the *Acteon*, which still lay on the Middle Ground, and she returned the fire. Soon afterwards the crew set her on fire and abandoned her, with all her ammunition, provisions, and stores on board.⁶ The garrison immediately sent several boats on board, which brought off her colors, bell, some sails, and stores, firing three of her guns at the Admiral's ship, while the flames were bursting out on all sides. In less

than half an hour after this party left her, she blew up.¹

The fire from the fort was terribly severe. The *Bristol* had upwards of seventy balls pass through her hull. Her mainmast was carried away about fifteen feet below the hounds, her mizen-mast suffered so severely that it had to be replaced with a new one, her captain, several of her officers, and forty of her men were killed, and seventy-one wounded.² The Admiral was the only officer on her quarter-deck who sustained no injury, yet his escape was a narrow one, a cannon-ball having carried away part of his breeches.³ The *Experiment* also suffered severely; her captain lost his arm, and received other injuries, and twenty-three of her crew were killed, and seventy-six wounded.⁴ Each of the other vessels suffered severely.

The fort and the garrison received scarcely any damage. The palmetto logs, of which the works were constructed, received the balls without showing a fracture, and they were apparently uninjured.⁵

The garrison, which consisted of but three hundred and forty-four men from the Second South Carolina regiment, and a company of volunteer artillerists, the whole commanded by Colonel Wil-

¹ "Circumstantial Account;" Stedman, i. p. 186; Marshall, ii. p. 458.

² Stedman, i. p. 186; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 170.

³ Gordon, ii. p. 285; Marshall, ii. p. 458.

⁴ Stedman, i. p. 186.—⁵ "Circumstantial Account;" Gordon, ii. p. 285; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 459.

⁶ Gordon, ii. p. 285; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 146; Moultrie, i. p. 180.

¹ "Circumstantial Account;" Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. pp. 146, 147; Moultrie, i. p. 180.

² Gordon, ii. p. 284; "Circumstantial Account;" Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 147.—³ "Circumstantial Account;" Gordon, ii. p. 284.

⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 284; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 147.

⁵ "Circumstantial Account;" Gordon, ii. p. 286; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 147.

liam Moultrie,¹ lost but one sergeant and eleven men killed, and Lieutenants Gray and Hall, the fife-major, one sergeant, and twenty-one privates wounded, five of whom afterwards died.²

It was during this action that Sergeant Jasper performed the feat of daring which has immortalized his name. On one bastion of the fort was displayed the Union flag,—the equivalent of the present Federal colors,—while on the opposite bastion was hoisted the crescent flag of South Carolina. In the early part of the action the staff of the latter was shot away, and the colors fell on the beach, outside the works. Sergeant Jasper, of the grenadiers, observing it, deliberately jumped from one of the embrasures upon the beach, took up the flag and fixed it on a sponge-staff, mounted the merlon with it in his hand, and leisurely fixed it in its place.³

After a short time spent in repairing, the fleet, the transports, and the troops departed from the coast, the latter and part of the fleet repairing to New York;¹ the others to other and unknown ports.

When it is considered that the garrison was composed entirely of raw troops, with officers who had seen but little, if any, actual service,² this siege possesses more interest than any other on record. With a cool, deliberate courage, which no veteran army ever surpassed, and with a skilful use of their guns, which any artillery might be proud of, these raw, undisciplined Carolinians opposed and drove off a fleet of British ships, commanded by one of her ablest officers, and supported by a large land force, led by two of her most distinguished Generals.

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

GEN. LEE'S DISPATCH TO CONGRESS RESPECTING THE ENGAGEMENT AT SULLIVAN'S ISLAND.

CHARLESTOWN, July 2, 1776.

SIR:—I should have done myself the honor sooner of informing the Congress of the attack made by the enemy's squadron upon Sullivan's Island, and their repulse, but conjectured that

by waiting a day or two, I might be furnished, probably, with the means of sending a more minute, full, and satisfactory account. My conjecture was right; for yesterday five seamen made their escape, one of whom is a more intelligent fellow than is commonly found among men of his level. Inclosed is a copy of their narrative: some parts of it are, perhaps, too whimsical and trivial to merit the attention of Congress, but I think it my duty to present it as it is, without adding or curtailing a circumstance. I think, sir, I may venture to congratu-

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 283; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 144.

² Gen. Lee's dispatch to Cong., July 2; "Circumstantial Account;" Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 147; Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 176.—³ "Circumstantial Account;" Gordon, ii. p. 286; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 148.

¹ Stedman, i. p. 186; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., i. p. 147.

² Gen. Lee's dispatch to Congress, July 2.

late the Congress on the event: not only the advantages must be considerable, but the affair reflects no small credit upon the American arms.

On Friday, about eleven o'clock, the Commodore, with his whole squadron, consisting of two line-of-battle ships and six frigates, the rates of which are marked in the inclosed narrative, anchored at less than half musket-shot from the fort, and commenced one of the most furious and incessant fires I ever saw or heard of. It was manifestly their plan to land at the same time their whole regulars at the east end of the island, and of course invest the fort by land and sea. As the garrison was composed entirely of raw troops, both men and officers, as I knew their ammunition was short, and as the bridge, by which we could reinforce or call off the troops from the island, was unfinished, you may easily conceive my anxiety. It was so great, that I was in suspense whether I should evacuate it or not. Fortunately, while I was in this state of suspense, some ammunition arrived from the town, and my aid-de-camp, Mr. Byrd, returning from the island with a flattering report of the garrison's spirit, I determined to support it at all hazards. On this principle, I thought it my duty to cross over to the island, to encourage the garrison by my presence; but I might have saved myself that trouble, for I found, on my arrival, they had no occasion for any sort of encouragement. I found them determined and cool to the last degree; their behavior would have done honor to the oldest troops. I beg leave, sir, therefore to recommend, in the strongest terms, to the Congress, the commanding officer, Colonel Moultrie, and his whole garrison, as brave soldiers and excellent citizens. Nor must I omit, at the same time, mentioning Colonel Thompson, who, with the South Carolina Rangers and a detachment of the North Carolina Regulars, repulsed the enemy in two several attempts to make a lodgment at the other extremity of the island.

Our loss, considering the heat and duration of the fire, was inconsiderable. We had only ten men killed on the spot and twenty-two wounded, seven of whom lost their limbs; but with their limbs they did not lose their spirits, for they enthusiastically encouraged their com-

mander never to abandon the standard of liberty and their country. This I do assure you, sir, is not in the style of gaseonading romance, usual after every successful action; but literally a fact. I with great pleasure mention the circumstance, as it augurs well to the cause of freedom. At eleven the fire ceased, having continued just twelve hours without the least intermission.

What the enemy's intentions are now, it is impossible to divine. I am inclined to think they will (if they can repass the bar) bend their course to Chesapeake or Hampton Bay. Perhaps shame and rage may prompt their land forces to some attempt before their departure. On my part, I shall spare no pains to discover their intentions and baffle their schemes.

* * * * *

I most earnestly request you will pay my respects to the Congress, and be persuaded, sir, that I am most entirely and devotedly your most obedient servant,

CHARLES LEE.

To the Honorable JOHN HANCOCK, President of the Continental Congress.

II.

EXTRACT FROM SIR PETER PARKER'S DISPATCH TO THE ADMIRALTY.

[From the London Gazette.]

WHITEHALL, August 24.

Captain Hope arrived on Wednesday evening last, from South Carolina, with dispatches from Commodore Sir Peter Parker and Lieutenant-general Clinton.

Extract of a letter from Sir Peter Parker to Mr. Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, dated "Within Charles-Town Bar, July 9th."

"It having been judged advisable to make an attempt upon Charles-Town, South Carolina, the fleet sailed from Cape Fear on the 1st of June, and on the 4th anchored off Charles-Town Bar. The 5th, sounded the bar, and laid down buoys preparatory to the intended entrance of the harbor. The 7th, all the frigates and most of the transports got over the bar into Five-fathom Hole. The 9th, General Clinton landed on Long Island, with about four hundred or five hundred men. The 10th, the Bristol got over

the bar with some difficulty. The 15th, gave the captains of the squadron my arrangement for the attack of the batteries on Sullivan's Island, and the next day acquainted General Clinton that the ships were ready. The General fixed on the 23d for our joint attack, but the wind proving unfavorable, prevented it taking effect. The 25th, the Experiment arrived, and the next day came over the bar, when a new arrangement was made for the attack. The 28th, at half an hour after nine in the morning, informed General Clinton, by signal, that I should go on to the attack. At half an hour after ten I made the signal to weigh; and about a quarter after eleven, the Bristol, Experiment, Active, and Solebay brought up against the fort. The Thunder, bomb, covered by the Friendship, armed vessel, brought the salient angle of the east bastion to bear N. W. by N., and Colonel James (who has, ever since our arrival, been very anxious to give the best assistance) threw several shells a little before, and during the engagement, in a very good direction. The Sphynx, Actæon, and Syren, were to have been to the westward, to prevent fire-ships or other armed vessels from annoying the ships engaged, to enfilade the works, and if the rebels should be driven from them, to cut off their retreat, if possible. This last service was not performed, owing to the ignorance of the pilot, who ran the three frigates aground. The Sphynx and Syren got off in a few hours, but the Actæon remained fast till the next morning, when the captain and officers thought proper to scuttle and set her on fire. I ordered a court-martial on the captain, officers, and company, and they have been honorably acquitted. Captain Hope made his armed ship as useful as he could on this occasion, and he merits every thing that can be said in his favor. During the time of our being abreast of the fort, which was near ten hours, a brisk fire was kept up by the ships, with intervals, and we had the satisfaction, after being engaged two hours, to oblige the rebels to slacken their fire very much. We drove large parties several times out of the fort, which were replaced by others from the main. About half after three, a considerable reinforcement from Mount Pleasant hung a man on a

tree at the back of the fort, and we imagined that the same party ran away about an hour afterwards, for the fort was then totally silenced and evacuated for nearly an hour and a half; but the rebels, finding that our army could not take possession, about six o'clock re-entered the fort and renewed the firing from two or three guns, the rest being, I suppose, dismounted. About nine o'clock, it being very dark, great part of our ammunition expended, our people fatigued, the tide of ebb almost done, no prospect from the eastward, and no possibility of our being of any farther service, I ordered the ships to withdraw to their former moorings. Their lordships will see plainly, by this account, that if the troops could have co-operated in this attack, His Majesty would have been in possession of Sullivan's Island. But I must beg leave here to be fully understood, lest it should be imagined that I mean to throw the most distant reflection on our army: I should not discharge my conscience were I not to acknowledge, that such was my opinion of His Majesty's troops, from the General down to the private soldier, that, after I had been engaged some hours, and perceived that the troops had not got a footing on the north end of Sullivan's Island, I was perfectly satisfied that the landing was impracticable, and that the attempt would have been the destruction of many brave fellows, without the least probability of success; and this, I am certain, will appear to be the case when General Clinton represents his situation. The Bristol had forty men killed and seventy-one wounded; the Experiment, twenty-three killed and fifty-six wounded; and both of them suffered much in their hulls, masts, and rigging; the Active had Lieutenant Pike killed and six men wounded; and the Solebay eight men wounded. Not one man who was quartered at the beginning of the action on the Bristol's quarter-deck, escaped being killed or wounded. Captain Morris lost his right arm, and received other wounds, and is since dead; the master is wounded in his right arm, but will recover the use of it; I received several contusions at different times, but as none of them are on any part where the least danger can be apprehended, they are not worth mentioning. Lieutenants Caulfield, Molloy, and

Nugent were the lieutenants of the Bristol in the action; they behaved so remarkably well that it is impossible to say to whom the preference is due; and so, indeed, I may say of all the petty officers, ship's company, and volunteers: at the head of the latter I must place Lord William Campbell, who was so condescending as to accept of the management of some guns on the lower gun-deck. His lordship received a contusion on his left side, but I have the happiness to inform their lordships that it has not proved of much consequence. Captain Scott, of the Experiment, lost his left arm, and is otherwise so much wounded that I fear he will not recover. I cannot conclude this letter without remarking, that when it was known we had many men too weak to come to quarters, almost all the seamen belonging to the transports offered their service with a truly British spirit, and a just sense of the cause we are engaged in. I accepted of upwards of fifty, to supply the places of the sick. The masters of many of the transports attended with their boats; but particular thanks are due to Mr. Chambers, the master of the Mercury.

"All the regiments will be embarked in a few days. The first brigade, consisting of four regiments, will sail in a day or two, under convoy, for New York; and the Bristol and Experiment will, I hope, soon follow with the remainder."

III.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM MOULTRIE.

William Moultrie was born in 1730, and is said to have been a native of England. Of his early life little appears to be known. He was engaged in the Cherokee wars, in 1760, under Governor Littleton, Colonel Montgomery, and others; and he was among the first to oppose the aggressions of the mother country, in the early days of the Revolution. On the seventeenth of June, 1775, he was called to the command of the second regiment of South Carolina troops, and thenceforth he was constantly engaged in the service of his country until the peace of 1783 gave him a release from his engagements.

In September, 1775, he raised the first American flag which was unfurled in South Carolina,—a blue flag with a silver crescent in the dexter corner. On the nineteenth of December, with two hundred men, he occupied Haddrell's Point, in the harbor of Charleston, and drove off the men-of-war which had blockaded the port. In March, 1776, he was ordered to assume the command of Sullivan's Island, on which a large fort was in course of construction, and he afterwards defended it, in the most gallant manner, against the enemy's fleet, as this chapter has shown.

In September, 1776, the colonial troops of South Carolina were put on the Continental establishment, and Colonel Moultrie was commissioned a Brigadier-general of the Continental Army on the sixteenth of that month.

When General Lincoln took command of the southern department, General Moultrie joined the army with his brigade. In February, 1779, with a detachment of militia and nine regulars, he defeated a superior force of the enemy near Beaufort. Shortly afterwards he was ordered to Georgia, with twelve hundred militia and a few Continentals, to watch the motions of the enemy, who was collecting a force in that State. Early in May, having collected a force of nearly four thousand men, the enemy advanced towards Charleston. General Moultrie retired before him, destroying the bridges and otherwise impeding his progress, although more than half his men had deserted. In a few days he reached Charleston, but General Lincoln having marched at the head of four thousand men to strengthen the town, the enemy suddenly decamped.

General Moultrie was second in command at the siege of Charleston, in 1780, and, when the garrison surrendered, he became a prisoner of war, and remained in that condition until February, 1782, when he was exchanged for General Burgoyne. He was promoted to the rank of Major-general, but he was not afterwards engaged in the service.

In 1785–6 and in 1794–5 he was elected Governor of the State, and died September 27, 1805, aged seventy-five years.

He was an unassuming, easy, and affable companion, cheerful and sincere in his friendships, and was much esteemed by all who knew him.

CHAPTER XI.

AUGUST 27, 1776.

THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.

THE enemy had left Boston;¹ retired to Halifax for the relief of the troops and the arrival of reinforcements;² and re-embarked and occupied Staten Island, where the inhabitants had received him with open arms, and given him every comfort.³ He had been reinforced by large forces from the South and from Europe;⁴ the Tories had flocked to his standard in great numbers, and organized themselves into companies and battalions, or, scattering themselves over the country, they had served as spies to give information, and, as opportunities offered, to harass the people;⁵ commissions for the reconciliation of differences existing between the colonies and the mother country had been issued to Lord Howe, and General Howe, his brother;⁶ and the people, allured by the bait which this commission had thrown out, seemed to have forgotten their grievances in their anxiety for peace.

General Washington and the army, after the evacuation of Boston, had moved towards New York, and prepared for its defence, correctly supposing that that city would be the next point which General Howe would seek to occupy.¹ The passages to the city, both by the North and the East Rivers, had been defended by strong intrenchments, by chains, sunken vessels, and other obstructions.²

The Declaration of Independence had been promulgated, but the people were not prepared either to receive or sustain it;³ and a lukewarmness among the masses seemed to indicate the approach of disaster to the American cause.

Among other approaches to the city, Long Island had been provided for, and General Greene, assisted by General Sullivan,⁴ had faithfully secured or guarded the passes which led to Brooklyn through the surrounding hills.⁵ Works had been erected at Red Hook,

¹ Vide Chap. VI.—² Ibid.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, July 7, 1776; Heath's Mem., p. 48; Ramsay's Am. Rev., i. p. 291; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 800.—⁴ Hall's Civil War in America, pp. 175, 188; Gen. Howe's dispatches, Aug. 6, and Aug. 15.

⁵ Gen. Howe's dispatches, Aug. 16.—⁶ Hall's Hist. of Civil War, pp. 176, 177; Sparks' Washington, pp. 170, 171.

¹ Sparks' Washington, pp. 164–168.—² Thompson's L. Island, i. p. 216.—³ Reed's Life of Gen. Reed, i. pp. 195, 196; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 802.

⁴ Sparks' Washington, pp. 176, 177.—⁵ Ibid., p. 177.

on the Heights, and on the site of Fort Greene, at the Wallabout. An intrenchment extended from the work on the site of Fort Greene, northwesterly, to the corner of Portland-street and Flushing Avenue, in the city of Brooklyn, to which point the Wallabout then extended; and another, in a zig-zag course, by way of Flatbush Avenue and Powers-street, extended to the head of Gowanus Creek, near the junction of Carroll-street and Second Avenue. Near the intersection of Nevins and Dean streets, a redoubt was cast up, and five guns were mounted thereon. A short distance east from Washington Square, near the Jamaica Road, was another small work; while another, bearing four guns, was thrown up on Bergen's Hill; and one mounting three guns, on Atlantic-street, near the head of the railroad tunnel.¹ Mounted patrols watched the roads leading to the passes near Bedford, Flatbush, and Yellow Hook; and breastworks had been thrown up near the passes themselves, where three or four regiments were stationed.²

At this critical period, General Greene, from over-exertion, was taken sick, and General Putnam was sent over to take his place;³ and one of the first effects

of this change was the withdrawal of the mounted patrols to which reference has been made.¹

At length, on the twenty-second of August, a division of four thousand men, under General Clinton, passed over from Staten Island, and landed in Gravesend Bay, Long Island, without opposition; and, shortly afterwards, the rest of the army and artillery were also landed.²

Advancing from the Narrows, the enemy's line extended along the eastern foot of the hills to Flatbush, where they laid several days, "occupying the attention of the Americans, and frequently skirmishing with their patrols."³

In the mean time, Generals Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William Erskine had discovered the want of care which had been taken to secure the pass at Bedford, "and that it would not be a difficult matter to turn the Americans' left flank, which would either oblige them to risk an engagement, or to retire under manifest disadvantage;" and when they communicated the intelligence to General Howe, he consented to make the attempt.⁴

Accordingly, on the twenty-sixth, Lieutenant-general de Heister and the Hessian troops took post at Flatbush;

¹ For this minute description of the works at Brooklyn I am indebted to Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 806; to a map by Gen. Jeremiah Johnson, of Brooklyn, published in Valentine's Manual of the City of New York, 1858; to Thompson's Hist. of Long Island, i. p. 216; to Onderdonk's Revolutionary Incidents of King's Co., sec. 781.

² Sparks' Washington, p. 177; Stedman, i. p. 195.

³ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, Aug. 15; Onderdonk's King's Co., sec. 795; Ward's Battle of L. Island.

¹ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25, 1777.

² Stedman, i. p. 193; Sparks' Washington, p. 176; Onderdonk's King's Co., sec. 796. The debarkation was made on the farms of Isaac Cortelyou and Adrian Van Brunt, west from the Bath House.

³ Stedman, i. p. 194; Ward's Battle of Long Island; Lushington's Lord Harris, p. 76.—⁴ Stedman, i. p. 194. Onderdonk (King's Co., sec. 802) says the information was given by the disaffected inhabitants.

and, in the evening, General Lord Cornwallis advanced, with his division, to Flatlands, about two miles southeast from Flatbush. About nine o'clock the same evening the right of the army, commanded by General Sir Henry Clinton, and consisting of the light dragoons and the brigade of light-infantry; the reserve, commanded by General Lord Cornwallis, except the Forty-second regiment, which was left at Flatbush; and the Seventy-first regiment, with fourteen field-pieces, began to move from Flatland, by a circuitous route, to seize the pass in the high lands near Bedford, and to turn the left of the American lines then posted on the heights between Flatbush and Bedford.¹

About the same time, Major-general Grant, who commanded the enemy's left wing, advanced along the western road, leading from the Narrows to the city,² with the Fourth and Sixth brigades, the Forty-second regiment, and two compa-

nies of Tories, with ten pieces of cannon, as a feint, to divert the attention of the Americans from the movements on the opposite flank of their position. About midnight he fell in with the American advanced parties, who retired before him, and reported his advance to General Putnam, at Brooklyn, who ordered Lord Stirling, with fifteen hundred men, to oppose his progress. The object of General Grant being to amuse rather than to advance against the Americans by force, he was easily withstood; and he opposed General Lord Stirling with but little apparent spirit.¹

In the mean time, Sir Henry Clinton had reached a point within half a mile of the pass; and, as it was still two hours before daybreak, he halted and settled his disposition for the attack. One of his patrols falling in with a patrol of American officers, took them prisoners;² and from them he learned that the pass was not occupied. A battalion of light-infantry was immediately detached to secure it; and, at the break of day, he advanced with his corps, possessed himself of the heights, and made such a disposition as must have insured success, even in case the Americans had advanced in force against him. The main body, consisting of the guards, the

¹ Gen. Sir William Howe's dispatch to Lord Germain, "Camp at Newtown, Sept. 3, 1776;" Stedman, i. pp. 194, 195; Sparks' Washington, p. 177; Gordon, ii. p. 308; Onderdonk's King's Co., sec. 802; Statement of Wm. Howard, aged 87, cited by Mr. Onderdonk. The exact route taken by Sir Henry, in this detour, is a matter of dispute among those who have examined the matter most carefully. Mr. Onderdonk, whose industry in the collection of material relating to Long Island, is well known, maintains that the enemy crossed Shoemaker's Bridge, in which he is sustained by many of the best authorities; while J. Carson Brevoort, Esq., who is equally well known as a devoted and indefatigable antiquarian, denies that the enemy approached the bridge, and he also is sustained by Mr. Ward, and many others who have examined the subject.

² Messrs. Onderdonk, Ward, and Cleaveland, maintain that a part of Gen. Grant's troops advanced by way of Martense's Lane, which now forms the southern boundary of Greenwood Cemetery.

¹ Gen. Sir Wm. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3, 1776; Sparks' Washington, p. 177; Gordon, ii. p. 309; Onderdonk, sec. 802; S. Ward's Battle of Long Island; Cleaveland's Greenwood Illustrated, pp. 83, 84.

² "The British took Adj. Jeromus Hoogland, of the Light Troops, and Lieut. Dunscomb, American patrols, at the big white oak (since struck by lightning) in the middle of the road, by the mile-post, a little east of Howard's."—Statement of Wm. Howard, cited by Mr. Onderdonk.

Second, Third, and Fifth brigades, with ten field-pieces, led by Lord Percy, marched soon afterwards, and halted, an hoar before daylight, in the rear of General Clinton. These troops were followed by the Forty-ninth regiment, with four medium twelve-pounders; and the baggage closed the rear with a separate guard. Having thus secured access to the American position, and gained the rear of such of their forces as might have been stationed on the heights, between Bedford and the Flatbush Road, virtually gaining a victory without firing a shot, the troops were halted for the purpose of taking a little refreshment.¹

General de Heister and the Hessians, forming the centre of the army, remained quiet at Flatbush, until a little before daylight, when he began to cannonade the American position, to strengthen which General Sullivan had been ordered when intelligence of General Grant's approach on the left had reached General Putnam.² Shortly afterwards, intelligence of General Clinton's occupation of the pass reached General de Heister, (or he heard the signal-guns which were fired for that purpose,) when he ordered Count Donop, with his corps, to advance to the attack, and shortly afterwards he followed, at the head of his division.³

It will be seen that the American army was acting in entire ignorance of

the unfortunate movements of the enemy,¹ and that both Lord Stirling, on the Bay Road, and General Sullivan, on the Flatbush Road, were only the dupes of General Clinton, and shortly afterwards became his victims.

But to return to Bedford, where General Clinton and his troops were left at breakfast. After taking their meal, the march was resumed until half-past eight, when, having reached Bedford, they encountered several large bodies of Americans, probably the regiments which had been stationed in the hills to guard the passes, dispersing and following them to the lines in Brooklyn.² In the meantime, General Lord Cornwallis was detached with a large force to co-operate with General Grant in his movements on the Bay Road,³ and General Clinton, at the head of the main body, moved towards the Flatbush Road, where Generals Sullivan and de Heister were engaged.⁴

Lord Stirling's command embraced the flower of the American army,—the Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland troops;⁵ and he had occupied the slopes of the hills north from Greenwood Cemetery—the Pennsylvania troops on the line of Eighteenth-street, near the Gowanus Road, the Delaware and Maryland troops farther eastward, between Eighteenth and Twentieth streets.⁶ Here the

¹ Lushington's Lord Harris, p. 76.—² Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3; Lushington's Lord Harris, p. 76.


³ Gen. Lord Stirling to Gen. Washington, Aug. 29; Sparks' Washington, p. 178; Ward's Battle of L. Island.

⁴ Sparks' Washington, p. 178; Ward's Battle of L. Island.

⁵ Sparks' Washington, p. 178.—⁶ Cleaveland's Greenwood, pp. 83, 88; Lord Stirling's letter, Aug. 29.

¹ Gen. Sir Wm. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3, 1776; Gordon, ii. p. 308; Onderdonk's King's Co., sec. 802.

² Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3; Onderdonk's King's Co., sec. 802; Ward's Battle of Long Island.—³ Ibid.



BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.
RETRAIT OF THE AMERICANS UNDER GEN. STRICK ACROSS COWAN'S SWAMP.

Engraved for "Napier"

Engraved by A. S. E.

light troops of both parties had kept up a skirmish for two hours, when the enemy's light troops withdrew, and a cannonade ensued—each party having two pieces of artillery engaged—until eleven o'clock, when General Cornwallis's approach warned General Lord Stirling of his danger.¹ His plans were speedily concluded on, and ordering the remainder of his troops to make the best of their way over the marsh and creek at Gowanus,—where a mill-dam² afforded some slight assistance to them,—he gallantly attacked Lord Cornwallis,³ with about one half the Maryland regiment, and prevented that General from interrupting them in their retreat. In fact, with so much spirit was this attack made, that Lord Cornwallis was on the point of retiring, when large reinforcements came up, and General Lord Stirling and his little party were taken prisoners by General de Heister.⁴ The gallant men, whose escape he thus covered, mostly reached the creek, but in crossing, it is said, several were lost either in the creek or in the marsh on its margin.⁵

Against the troops which guarded the Flatbush Road, as has been shown, General de Heister, and the Hessians under his command, advanced as soon

as intelligence of General Clinton's success reached him.¹ General Sullivan was not on the ground (having taken four hundred men to reconnoitre),² and Colonels Miles and Williams offered but a feeble resistance.³ General Sullivan, with his party, soon afterwards returning, was met by General de Heister, while General Clinton fell on his rear. Thus hemmed in between the two parties, the Americans fought desperately, continuing the uneven contest from half-past nine to twelve o'clock, when those of them who survived, surrendered, and the enemy was the victor.⁴

It will be seen that this affair was, in reality, a series of skirmishes, each independent of the other, although the result of all was influenced by a single successful movement of the enemy. It will be perceived, also, that these detached affairs, added to the advantages afforded by the broken ground, covered with wood, on which they were fought, favored the retreat of the Americans, and many of them succeeded in reaching the lines.⁵ After the battle was over, General Howe encamped in front of the American lines, preparing to attack them by regular approaches, with the co-operation of the fleet.⁶

The entire strength of the Americans engaged in this affair did not exceed

¹ Lord Stirling's letter, Aug. 29; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3; S. Ward's Battle of Long Island; Cleaveland's Greenwood, p. 84.—² That of the Yellow Mills.

³ Near the old Cortelyou House.—⁴ Lord Stirling's letter, Aug. 29; Ward's Battle of Long Island; Cleaveland's Greenwood Cemetery, p. 85.—⁵ Gen. Howe's dispatch to Lord G. Germain, Sept. 3; J. S. Martin's Narrative of the Battle, cited by Mr. Onderdonk; Statement of Major Popham, aged 62, cited by the same author.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3.—² Gen. Sullivan's letter to Congress, Oct. 25, 1777.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3.—⁴ Gen. Sullivan's letter to Cong., Oct. 25, 1777; Letter from an officer of Gen. Frazer's brigade, cited by Mr. Onderdonk; S. Ward's Battle of Long Island; Cleaveland's Greenwood, p. 84.—⁵ Sparks' Washington, p. 178.

⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3; Sparks' Washington, p. 178.

five thousand, while that of the enemy was not less than three times that number.¹ The loss of the Americans, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was between eleven and twelve hundred men, more than a thousand of whom were prisoners in the enemy's camp.² Of the King's troops, five officers, and fifty-six non-commissioned officers and privates, were killed; twelve officers, and two hundred and forty-five non-commissioned officers and privates, were wounded; and one officer and twenty "grenadiers of the marines" were taken prisoners. The Hessians had two privates killed, and three officers and twenty-three rank and file wounded.³

The loss of the field, on Long Island, produced serious results in the American army. Nearly twelve hundred of the flower of the army were lost, a thousand of them being prisoners, among whom were Generals Sullivan and Lord Stirling. This defeat also discouraged the inexperienced troops under General Washington, and crowds of them left the army,⁴ spreading tales of terror wherever they went throughout the country, and working mischief of the severest character where its effect was most disastrous to the cause of America.

There has been much comment on this battle, both respecting the action itself and those on whom the responsibility of the loss should fall. It has been well said, by one whose means of judging were unusually fine, that "The

strange oversight in leaving the Jamaica Road unguarded, and the neglect in procuring early and constant intelligence of the movements of the British army, were the immediate causes of the deplorable events of the day."¹ That there should be any doubt respecting the proper person to whom the loss of the battle of Long Island should be attributed, with these undisputed facts in view, is a matter of surprise to me. It is unquestionably the duty of the commander of a district to provide, not only the means of securing intelligence of every movement of his enemy, but for the protection of his position; and, especially when any peculiar pass, or hill, or bridge, between him and the enemy, would secure advantages to that enemy, which would be dangerous to him, it is the unquestionable duty of the commander to occupy such position in force; or, in case he neglects it, the disgrace is *his*, and the responsibility for any evil effects arising from such neglect of duty devolves upon *him*. In fact, the commander is a sentinel whom the commander-in-chief or the government has placed to guard the interests of the people, and, like any other sentinel, he cannot sleep on his post without committing one of the highest crimes known to the military law.

With these axioms before us, let us examine, as far as the evidence goes, who commanded, and who slept on his post. It is said that General Greene

¹ Sparks' Washington, p. 178.—² Ibid.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 3.—⁴ Gen Washington to Cong., Sept. 2.

¹ Sparks' Washington, p. 180. See also Cleaveland's Greenwood, p. 89.

commanded on Long Island, that the defences were thrown up under his direction, and that he was taken sick with a fever and left the island.¹ It is said that General Sullivan then assumed the command;² that, notwithstanding the enemy was still on Staten Island, he employed mounted patrols, at an expense of fifty dollars per night, to mount guard on roads which he saw the enemy might use in approaching New York;³ and that, on the twenty-third of August,—the day after the enemy's army landed on Long Island,—he was superseded by General Putnam.⁴ It is said, and has never been contradicted, that General Washington gave General Putnam positive instructions to guard the passes through the hills leading to Brooklyn;⁵ it is said, also without contradiction, that General Sullivan, his predecessor and second in command, enforced the same measures on his attention;⁶ it is known, that, although the enemy, in full force, was encamped within four or five miles, opposite two of those very passes, General Putnam never reconnoitered that enemy's position, in fact, that he never left Brooklyn;⁷ and it is equally well known that,

although the enemy was then encamped at Flatbush, the mounted patrols which General Sullivan had established,¹ as well as the guards at some of the passes established by General Greene, were withdrawn,² leaving the country clear for the enemy's secret movements, and the passes conveniently unguarded for his especial accommodation. It is also a well-established fact, that no general officer was outside the lines at Brooklyn, on the night of the twenty-sixth, until the advance of General Grant was made known to General Putnam, at three o'clock, when Generals Sullivan and Lord Stirling were dispatched to Flatbush and the Bay Road to oppose the movements in those quarters.³

From these facts it appears conclusively that General Putnam paid no attention to the orders of General Washington, respecting the security of the passes, and that the advice of General Sullivan, on the same subject, was also disregarded, his patrols withdrawn, and the command outside the lines, where his knowledge of the ground rendered him peculiarly useful, taken from him and given to another;⁴ that, with an enemy encamped in full force within a

¹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, Aug. 15.

² General Orders, Aug. 20.—³ His letter to Congress, Oct. 25, 1777.—⁴ Sparks' Washington, p. 180.

⁵ "At the same time I would have you form a proper line of defence around your encampment and works, on the most advantageous grounds." "The woods should be secured by abatis, &c., where necessary, to make the enemy's approach as difficult as possible. Traps and ambuscades should be laid for their parties, if you find they are sent out after cattle," &c.—Orders to Gen. Putnam, Aug. 25.

⁶ Gen. Sullivan's letter to Congress, Oct. 25, 1777.

⁷ Thompson's Long Island, i. p. 222.

¹ Gen. Sullivan to Cong., Oct. 25, 1777. The "patrol" which Gen. Clinton captured was a *party of officers*, not a regular patrol.—² This is shown by Gen. Howe, in his dispatch, where he says: "The General, learning that the rebels had not occupied the pass, detached a battalion of light-infantry to secure it," &c.

³ See Lord Stirling's letter to Gen. Washington, Aug. 29; Gen. Sullivan's letter to Congress, Oct. 25, 1777.

⁴ Gen. Sullivan, to Cong., Oct. 25, 1777, says Lord Stirling was ordered to the command outside the lines, while he was ordered to remain *within* the lines as Gen. Putnam's second in command.

few miles of his position, he quietly remained at Brooklyn without reconnoitering that enemy's position, or sending out a scout; that he withdrew guards and failed to remount them, where they were essential to the safety of his position; and, finally, that to his ignorant, self-conceited inefficiency, the enemy is indebted for one of the greatest victories of the war, and his country for one of the most disastrous defeats, both military and moral, which it ever experienced.

Yet, in the words of a modern writer, "Not in vain was even the *defeat* of Brooklyn; not in vain, the anguish with which the usually calm spirit of

Washington was that day torn. Not in vain were those two anxious days and nights which he passed on horseback, and which saved from death or captivity nine thousand men. These, and more, were all needed. In the immortal letters and dispatches of the great commander, and in the painful annals of the time, we read the cost and the value of what we are now enjoying. Without these we had not fully known how inherent, how enduring and elastic, is the power of an earnest and virtuous patriotism. Without them, even the transcendent name of Washington could not have filled the mighty measure of his fame."¹

D O C U M E N T S.

I.

COLONEL ROBERT H. HARRISON'S (GENERAL WASHINGTON'S SECRETARY) LETTER TO CONGRESS.

NEW YORK, August 27, 1776, {
Eight o'clock, P. M. }

SIR:—I this minute returned from our lines on Long Island, where I left his Excellency, the General. From him I have it in command, to inform Congress that yesterday he went there, and continued until evening, when, from the enemy's having landed a considerable part of their forces, and many of their movements, there was reason to apprehend they would, in a little time, make a general attack. As they would have a wood to pass through before they could approach the lines, it was thought expedient to place a number of men there, on the different roads leading from whence they were stationed, in order to harass and annoy them in

their march. This being done, early this morning a smart engagement ensued between the enemy and our detachments, which, being unequal to the force they had to contend with, have sustained a pretty considerable loss: at least, many of our men are missing. Among those that have not returned, are General Sullivan and Lord Stirling. The enemy's loss is not known certainly; but we are told by such of our troops as were in the engagement, and that have come in, that they had many killed and wounded. Our party brought off a lieutenant, sergeant, and corporal, with twenty privates, prisoners. While these detachments were engaged, a column of the enemy descended from the woods and marched towards the centre of our lines, with the design to make an impression, but were repulsed. This evening they

¹ Cleaveland's Greenwood, pp. 90, 91.

appeared very numerous about the outskirts of the woods, where they have pitched several tents; and his Excellency inclines to think they mean to attack and force us from our lines by way of regular approaches, rather than in any other manner.

To-day five ships of the line came up towards the town, where they seemed desirous of getting, as they turned a long time against an unfavorable wind. And on my return this evening, I found a deserter from the Twenty-third regiment, who informed me that they design, as soon as the wind will permit them to come up, to give us a severe cannonade, and to silence our batteries, if possible.

I have the honor, sir, to be, in great haste,
your most obedient,

ROBERT H. HARRISON.

II.

GENERAL LORD STIRLING'S LETTER TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

EAGLE, August 29, 1776.

MY DEAR GENERAL:—I have now an opportunity of informing you of what has happened to me since I had last the pleasure of seeing you. About three o'clock in the morning, of the 27th, I was called up, and informed by General Putnam that the enemy were advancing by the road from Flatbush to the Red Lion, and ordered me to march with the two regiments nearest at hand to meet them; these happened to be Haslet's and Smallwood's, with which I accordingly marched, and was on the road to the Narrows just as daylight began to appear. We proceeded to within half a mile of the Red Lion, and there met Colonel Atlee, with his regiment, who informed me that the enemy were in sight; indeed, I then saw their front between us and the Red Lion. I desired Colonel Atlee to place his regiment on the left of the road, and to wait their coming up, when I went to form the two regiments I had brought with me, along a ridge from the road up to a piece of a wood on the top of the hill; this was done instantly, upon very advantageous ground.

Our opponents advanced, and were fired upon in the road by Atlee's, who, after two or three rounds, retreated to the wood on my left, and there formed. By this time Kichline's riflemen arrived; part of them I placed along a hedge, under the front of the hill, and the rest in the front of the wood. The troops opposed to me were two brigades, of four regiments each, under the command of General Grant, who advanced their light troops to within one hundred and fifty yards of our right front, and took possession of an orchard there, and some hedges that extended towards our left; this brought on an exchange of fire between those troops and our riflemen, which continued for about two hours, and then ceased by those light troops retiring to their main body. In the mean time, Captain Carpenter brought up two field-pieces, which were placed on the side of the hill, so as to command the road and the only approach for some hundred yards. On the part of General Grant there were two field-pieces: one howitz advanced to within three hundred yards of the front of our right, and a like detachment of artillery to the front of our left, on a rising ground, at about six hundred yards' distance. One of their brigades formed in two lines opposite to our right, and the others extended in one line, to top of the hills, in front of our left; in this position we stood, cannonading one another, till near eleven o'clock, when I found that General Howe, with the main body of the army, was between me and our lines, and saw that the only chance of escaping being all made prisoners, was to pass the creek near the Yellow Mills; and in order to render this the more practicable, I found it absolutely necessary to attack a body of troops commanded by Lord Cornwallis, posted at the house near the Upper Mills; this I instantly did, with about half of Smallwood's, first ordering all the other troops to make the best of their way through the creek. We continued the attack a considerable time, the men having been rallied, and the attack renewed five or six several times, and were on the point of driving Lord Cornwallis from his station, but large succors arriving, rendered it impossible to do more than provide for safety. I endeavored to get in between that house and Fort Box, but on at-

tempting it, I found a considerable body of troops in my front, and several in pursuit of me on the right and left, and a constant firing on me. I immediately turned the point of a hill, which covered me from their fire, and I was soon out of the reach of my pursuers. I soon found it would be in vain to attempt to make my escape, and therefore went to surrender myself to General de Heister, commander-in-chief of the Hessians.

III.

COLONEL HASLETT'S LETTER TO THOMAS RODNEY.

CAMP AT MOUNT WASHINGTON, Oct. 4, 1776.

On Sunday, the 25th of August last, my regiment was ordered to Long Island, in Lord Sterling's brigade, composed mostly of the Southern troops, by whom we were much caressed and highly complimented on our appearance and dexterity in the military exercise and manœuvres. On Tuesday, the 27th, his brigade, consisting of five regiments and a few of Sullivan's, not exceeding five thousand men, were ordered to advance beyond the lines and repulse the enemy. To oppose this small band were seventeen thousand regulars, much better furnished with field-pieces and every other military appointment than we. Several of the regiments were broken and dispersed soon after the first onset. The Delawares and Marylanders stood firm to the last; and, after a variety of skirmishing, the Delawares drew up on the side of a hill and stood upwards of four hours, with a firm, determined countenance, in close array, their colors flying, the enemy's artillery playing on them all the time, not daring to advance and attack them, though six times their number, and nearly surrounding them. Nor did they think of quitting their station, till an express order from the General commanded their retreat through a marsh and over a creek, the only opening left, which they effected in good order, with loss of one man drowned in passing. The Delawares, alone, had the honor of bringing off twenty-three prisoners.

I must also do Colonel Smallwood's battalion the justice to say, that the spirited attack made by them on the enemy, at the time the Delawares and themselves were retreating, greatly facilitated the retreat of both. Twenty-seven of the Delawares next morning were missing. In that number were Lieutenants Stewart and Harney; the latter a prisoner, the other not yet heard of. Major McDonough was wounded in the knee; a ball passed through the sleeve of his coat without wounding the arm or his body. Lieutenant Anderson had a ball lodged in his throat; Lieutenant Corn, a ball still in his back: they are recovered. The standard was torn with shot in Ensign Stephen's hand, who is now in his element and a most excellent officer. Such is our fate. The Delaware battalion, officers and men, are respected throughout this army. We are now in General Mifflin's brigade, who a few days since was appointed Quartermaster-general, and by special order we encamp on the lines, near the General's house. In the retreat from Long Island, which was conducted with great prudence, Colonels Shee, Smallwood, Hand, and some others I do not recollect, were called into council, and requested to take the defence of the lines upon us, while the main body of the army crossed the East River to New York, which was accepted; and last of all crossed ourselves, thank God, in safety.

IV.

COLONEL SMALLWOOD'S LETTER TO THE MARYLAND CONVENTION.

CAMP OF THE MARYLAND REGULARS, }
HEAD-QUARTERS, Oct. 12, 1776. }

SIR:—Through your hands I must beg leave to address the honorable Convention of Maryland, and must confess, not without an apprehension that I have incurred their displeasure, for having omitted writing when on our march from Maryland to New York and since our arrival here. Nor shall I, in a pointed manner, urge any thing in my defence, but leave them at large to condemn or excuse me, upon a pre-

sumption that, should they condemn, they will at least pardon, and judge me perhaps less culpable, when they reflect, in the first instance, on the exertions necessary to procure baggage-wagons, provisions, and house room for seven hundred and fifty men, marched the whole distance in a body, generally from fifteen to twenty miles a day, as the several stages made it necessary; and in the latter, I trust, they will give some indulgence for this neglect, for, since our arrival at New York, it has been the fate of this corps to be generally stationed at advanced posts, and to act as a covering party, which must unavoidably expose troops to extraordinary duty and hazard, not to mention the extraordinary vigilance and attention in the commandant of such a party in disposing in the best manner, and having it regularly supplied; for here the commanders of regiments, exclusive of their military duty, are often obliged to exert themselves in the departments of commissary and quartermaster-general, and even directors of their regimental hospitals.

Perhaps it may not be improper to give a short detail of occurrences upon our march to Long Island, and since that period.

The enemy, from the 21st to the 27th of August, were landing their troops on the lower part of Long Island, where they pitched a large encampment, and ours and their advanced parties were daily skirmishing at long shot, in which neither party suffered much. On the 26th, the Maryland and Delaware troops, which composed part of Lord Stirling's brigade, were ordered over. Colonel Haslet, and his Lieutenant-colonel, Bedford, of the Delaware battalion, with Lieutenant-colonel Hare and myself, were detained on the trial of Lieutenant-colonel Zedwitz; and though I waited on General Washington, and urged the necessity of attending our troops, yet he refused to discharge us, alleging there was a necessity for the trials coming on, and that no other field-officers could be then had. After our dismissal from the court-martial, it was too late to get over, but, pushing over early the next morning, found our regiments engaged, Lord Stirling having marched them off before day, to take possession of the woods and difficult passes between our lines and

the enemy's encampment. But the enemy, the overnight, had stole a march on our generals, having got through those passes, met, and surrounded our troops on the plain grounds, within two miles of our lines. Lord Stirling drew up his brigade on an advantageous rising ground, where he was attacked by two brigades in front, headed by the Generals Cornwallis and Grant, and in his rear the enemy's main body stood ready drawn up to support their own parties, and intercept the retreat of ours.

This excellent disposition, and their superior numbers, ought to have taught our Generals there was no time to be lost in securing their retreat, which might at first have been effected, had the troops formed into a heavy column, and pushed their retreat; but the longer this was delayed it became the more dangerous, as they were then landing more troops in front from the ships. Our brigade kept their ground for several hours, and in general behaved well, having received some heavy fires from the artillery and musketry of the enemy, whom they repulsed several times; but their attacks were neither so lasting or vigorous as was expected, owing, as it was imagined, to their being certain of making the whole brigade prisoners of war; for by this time they had so secured the passes on the road to our lines (seeing our parties were not supported from thence, which, indeed, our numbers would not admit of), that there was no possibility of retreating that way.

Between the place of action and our lines there lay a large marsh and deep creek, not above eighty yards across at the mouth (the place of action, upon a direct line, did not much exceed a mile from a part of our lines), towards the head of which creek there was a mill and bridge, across which a certain Colonel Ward, from New England, who is charged with having acted a bashful part that day, passed over with his regiment, and then burnt them down, though under cover of our cannon, which would have checked the enemy's pursuit at any time, otherwise this bridge might have afforded a secure retreat. There then remained no other prospect, but to surrender or attempt to retreat over this marsh and creek at the mouth, where no person had ever been known to cross. In the

interim, I applied to General Washington for some regiments to march out to support and cover their retreat, which he urged would be attended with too great risk to the party and the lines. He immediately afterwards sent for, and ordered me to march down a New England regiment, and Captain Thomas's company, which had just come over from York, to the mouth of the creek, opposite where the brigade was drawn up, and ordered two field-pieces down to support and cover their retreat, should they make a push that way. Soon after our march they began to retreat, and, for a small time, the fire was very heavy on both sides, till our troops came to the marsh, where they were obliged to break their order, and escape as quick as they could to the edge of the creek, under a brisk fire, notwithstanding which they brought off twenty-eight prisoners. The enemy, taking advantage of a commanding ground, kept up a continual fire from four field-pieces, which were well served and directed, and a heavy column advancing on the marsh, must have cut our people off, their guns being wet and muddy, not one of them could have fired; but, having drawn up the musketry, and disposed of some riflemen conveniently, with orders to fire on them when they came within shot, however, the latter began their fire too soon, being at two hundred yards' distance, which, notwithstanding, had the desired effect, for the enemy immediately retreated to the fast land, where they continued parading within six hundred yards, till our troops were brought over. Most of those who swam over, and others who attempted to cross over before the covering party got down, lost their arms and accoutrements in the mud and creek, and some poor fellows their lives, particularly two of the Maryland, two of the Delaware, one of Atlee's Pennsylvania, and two Hessian prisoners were drowned. Thomas's men contributed much in bringing over this party. Have inclosed a list of the killed and missing, amounting to two hundred and fifty-six, officers included. It has been said, the enemy, during the action, also attacked our lines, but this is a mistake. Not knowing the ground, one of their columns advanced within long shot without knowing they were so near, and upon our artillery and

part of the musketry's firing on them, they immediately fled.

* * * * *

I am, very respectfully, your obedient, and very humble servant,

W. SMALLWOOD.

V.

GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

CAMP AT NEWTOWN, LONG ISLAND, *Sept. 3, 1776.*

MY LORD:—On the 22d of last month, in the morning, the British, with Colonel Donop's corps of chasseurs and Hessian grenadiers, disembarked near Utrecht, on Long Island, without opposition, the whole being landed, with forty pieces of cannon, in two hours and a half, under the direction of Commodore Hotham, Lieutenant-general Clinton commanding the first division of the troops.

The enemy had only small parties on the coast, who, upon the approach of the boats, retired to the woody heights, commanding a principal pass on the road from Flatbush to their works at Brooklyn. Lord Cornwallis was immediately detached to Flatbush with the reserve, two battalions of light-infantry, and Colonel Donop's corps, with six field-pieces, having orders not to risk an attack upon the pass, if he should find it occupied; which proving to be the case, his lordship took post in the village, and the army extended from the ferry at the Narrows, through Utrecht and Gravesend, to the village of Flatland.

On the 25th, Lieutenant-general de Heister, with two brigades of Hessians from Staten Island, joined the army, leaving one brigade of his troops, a detachment of the Fourteenth regiment from Virginia, some convalescents and recruits, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dalrymple, for the security of that island.

On the 26th, Lieutenant-general de Heister took post at Flatbush, and in the evening, Lord Cornwallis, with the British, drew off to Flatland. About nine o'clock the same night, the van of the army, commanded by Lieutenant-general Clinton, consisting of the light-dragoons

and brigade of light-infantry, the reserve, under the command of Lord Cornwallis, excepting the Forty-second regiment, which was posted to the left of the Hessians, the First brigade, and the Seventy-first regiment, with fourteen field-pieces, began to move from Flatland across the country, through the New Lots, to seize a pass in the heights, extending from east to west, along the middle of the island, and about three miles from Bedford, on the road to Jamaica, in order to turn the enemy's left, posted at Flatbush.

August 27th.—General Clinton being arrived within half a mile of the pass, about two hours before daybreak, halted and settled his disposition for the attack. One of his patrols, falling in with a patrol of the enemy's officers, took them; and the General, learning from their information that the rebels had not occupied the pass, detached a battalion of light-infantry to secure it, and advancing with his corps at the first appearance of day, possessed himself of the heights, with such a disposition as must have insured success had he found the enemy in force to oppose him.

The main body of the army, consisting of the guards, Second, Third, and Fifth brigades, with ten field-pieces, led by Lord Percy, marched soon after General Clinton, and halted an hour before day, in his rear. This column (the country not admitting of two columns of march) was followed by the Forty-ninth regiment, with four medium twelve-pounders, and the baggage closed the rear, with separate guard.

As soon as these corps had passed the heights, they halted for the soldiers to take a little refreshment, after which the march was continued, and about half an hour past eight o'clock, having got to Bedford, in the rear of the enemy's left, the attack was commenced by the light-infantry and light-dragoons upon large bodies of the rebels, having cannon, who were quitting the woody heights before mentioned to return to their lines, upon discovering the march of the army; instead of which, they were drove back, and the army still moving on to gain the enemy's rear, the grenadiers and Thirty-third regiment being in front of the column, soon approached within musket-shot of the enemy's lines at Brooklyn, from whence these battalions,

without regarding the fire of cannon and small-arms upon them, pursued numbers of the rebels that were retiring from the heights so close to their principal redoubt, and with such eagerness to attack it by storm, that it required repeated orders to prevail upon them to desist from the attempt. Had they been permitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt; but as it was apparent the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate, by regular approaches, I would not risk the loss that might have been sustained in the assault, and ordered them back to a hollow way, in the front of the works, out of the reach of musketry.

Lientenant-general de Heister began, soon after daybreak, to cannonade the enemy in the front, and upon the approach of our right, ordered Colonel Donop's corps to advance to the attack of the hill, following himself at the head of the brigades. The light-infantry about that time having been reinforced by the light company, the grenadier company, and two other companies of the guards, who joined them with the greatest activity and spirit, had taken three pieces of cannon, and were warmly engaged with very superior numbers in the woods, when, on the Hessians advancing, the enemy gave way, and was entirely routed in that quarter. On the left, Major-general Grant, having the Fourth and Sixth brigades, the Forty-second regiment, and two companies of New York provincials, raised by Governor Tryon in the spring, advanced along the coast, with ten pieces of cannon, to divert the enemy's attention from their left. About midnight he fell in with their advanced parties, and at daybreak with a large corps, having cannon, and advantageously posted, with whom there was skirmishing and a cannonade for some hours, until, by the firing at Brooklyn, the rebels suspecting their retreat would be cut off, made a movement to the right, in order to secure it across a swamp and creek that covered the right of their works; but, being met in their way by part of the Second grenadiers, who were soon after supported by the Seventy-first regiment, and General Grant's left coming up, they suffered considerably; numbers of them, however, did get into the morass, where many were suffocated or drowned. The force of the

enemy, detached from the lines, where General Putnam commanded, was not less, from the best accounts I have had, than ten thousand men, who were under the orders of Major-general Sullivan, Brigadier-generals Lord Stirling and Udell. Their loss is computed to be about three thousand three hundred killed, wounded, prisoners, and drowned; with five field-pieces and one howitzer taken. A return of the prisoners is inclosed.

On the part of the King's troops, five officers and fifty-six non-commissioned officers and rank and file killed; twelve officers and two hundred and forty-five non-commissioned officers and rank and file wounded; one officer and twenty grenadiers of the marines taken, by mistaking the enemy for the Hessians.

The Hessians had two privates killed, three officers and twenty-three rank and file wounded. The wounds are in general very slight. Lieutenant-colonel Monckton is shot through the body, but there are the greatest hopes of his recovery.

The behavior of both officers and soldiers, British and Hessians, was highly to their honor. More determined courage and steadiness in troops have never been experienced, or a greater ardor to distinguish themselves, as all those who had an opportunity have amply evinced by their actions.

In the evening of the 27th, the army encamped in front of the enemy's works. On the 28th, at night, broke ground six hundred yards distant from a redoubt upon the left; and on the 29th, at night, the rebels evacuated their intrenchments and Red Hook, with the utmost silence, and quitted Governor's Island the following evening, leaving their cannon and a quantity of stores in all their works. At daybreak on the 30th their flight was discovered, the pickets of the line took possession, and those most advanced reached the shore opposite to New York as their rear guard was going over, and fired some shot among them.

The enemy is still in possession of the town and island of New York, in force, and making demonstration of opposing us in their works on both sides of Kingsbridge. The inhabitants of this island, many of whom had been forced into

rebellion, have all submitted, and are ready to take the oaths of allegiance.

This dispatch will be delivered to your lordship by Major Cuyler, my first aid-de-camp, who, I trust, will be able to give your lordship such farther information as may be required.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

WILLIAM HOWE.

P. S.—I have omitted to take notice, in its proper place, of a movement made by the King's ships towards the town, on the 27th, at day-break, with a view of drawing off the attention of the enemy from our real design, which, I believe, effectually answered the intended purpose



VI.

GENERAL SULLIVAN TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

WHITEMARSH, October 25, 1777.

I know it has been generally reported, that I commanded on Long Island when the action happened there. This is by no means true. General Putnam had taken the command from me four days before the action. Lord Stirling commanded the main body without the lines. I was to have commanded, under General Putnam, within the lines. I was uneasy about a road, through which I had often foretold that the enemy would come, but could not persuade others to be of my opinion. I went to the hill near Flatbush to reconnoitre, and, with a picket of four hundred men, was surrounded by the enemy, who had advanced by the very road I had foretold, and which I had paid horsemen fifty dollars for patrolling by night, while I had the command, as I had no foot for the purpose.

What resistance I made with these four hundred men, against the British army, I leave to the officers who were with me to declare. Let it suffice for me to say, that the opposition of the small party lasted from half-past nine to twelve o'clock.

The reason of so few troops being on Long Island was, because it was generally supposed that the enemy's landing there was a feint to

draw our troops thither, that they might the more easily possess themselves of New York. I often urged, both by word and writing, that, as the enemy had doubtless both those objects in view, they would first try for Long Island, which commanded the other; and then New York, which was completely commanded by it, would fall, of course. But in this I was unhappy enough to differ from every officer in the army, until the event proved my conjectures were just.

VII.

MAJOR-GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM.

Israel Putnam was born at Salem, Massachusetts, on the seventh of January, 1718. Delighting more in the cultivation of those physical qualities which enabled him to surpass in feats of strength and agility, his mind was never cultivated, and he entered manhood without that solid practical information which, even at that early day, was within the reach of every New Englander. At the age of twenty-one he removed to Pomfret, Connecticut, where he engaged in the cultivation of a considerable tract of ground, which he had purchased. It was at this place that the tremendous "she-wolf," of which the world has heard so much, killed, it is said, *in one night*, seventy-five sheep and goats of his flock, besides wounding many of his lambs and kids; and there also is the wonderful cave where this terrible beast found refuge, and in which Mr. Putnam so gallantly confronted and killed her.

When the French war broke out, he took the command of a company in Colonel Lyman's regiment of provincials; and, with it, joined the army near Crown Point. In the following year he rejoined the army, and it was in this campaign, while out on a scout near Ticonderoga, that the miraculous escape, so much spoken of and so well known, occurred; the *folded* blanket which he carried on his back, *when opened*, showing no less than fourteen bullet holes through it. In this campaign he appears also to have been taken prisoner by the Indians and carried to

Montreal, from which he was exchanged through the assistance of Colonel Schuyler.

After the peace he returned to his farm, where he remained until the troublesome times at Lexington and Concord aroused the country, and all New England seized their guns for the redress of their grievances. When "the news from Lexington" reached Pomfret, Colonel Putnam was ploughing; and, it is said, he unyoked his team, mounted his horse, and hurried off to Cambridge. The General Assembly immediately afterwards authorized the organization of six regiments of troops, and Colonel Putnam (who had been appointed a Lieutenant-colonel of militia in October, 1774) was appointed to the command of the Third, with the title of Second Brigadier-general of the Provincial Troops. He speedily filled up his regiment, and returned at its head to Cambridge; a detachment from it, under the noble Captain Knowlton, having been among the troops ordered to Breed's Hill under Colonel Prescott, and whose cup of honest renown was filled to overflowing by their undaunted bravery on the eventful seventeenth of June.

In a previous chapter, notice has been taken of the affair on Noddle's Island, and of the part which General Putnam did *not* take in it. It was his good fortune, however, to obtain the credit of that affair; and, through the management of interested parties in Congress, whose opposition to the commander-in-chief was then in embryo, but not less virulent, this intelligence, then just received in Congress, was so used as to secure for him the appointment of Major-general of the Continental Army, in June, 1775, to the mortification of General Washington, and the disgust of the officers from Massachusetts and Connecticut.

At the battle of Bunker's Hill, he is said, by his eulogists, to have performed prodigies of valor. Those who were present, admit that he went on the ground with Colonel Prescott and his party, on the evening before the battle, but they agree that he did not remain there. They say he returned on the following morning; but they agree that he ordered the intrenching tools to be removed from the redoubt, in opposition to the remonstrances of Colonel Prescott, and

for that purpose withdrew a large number of Colonel Prescott's troops from the redoubt, at a time when the approach of the enemy showed that they were actually needed in the works. When the reinforcements under Colonel Stark came on the hill, they saw General Putnam and a large body of men quietly standing on the safe side of Bunker's Hill, beyond the range of the enemy's artillery, and when the same body retreated, after the struggle at the works was ended, the General and his men were at the same place, and quietly joined in the retreat. For his "*gallantry*" at Bunker's Hill, Colonel Prescott,—the acknowledged hero of that engagement,—some years afterwards, at an official dinner with Governor Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, openly declared General Putnam *deserved to be shot*; but those who were *not* there, and whose information is generally acquired from *less* reliable sources, generally suppose the venerable Colonel was mistaken in his conclusions, notwithstanding Colonel Gerrish, in whose company the General was, and whose orders the Colonel was bound to obey, for *this very offence*, (?) was afterwards *arrested for cowardice, tried by a court-martial, cashiered, and universally execrated*.

On the reorganization of the army, under General Washington, General Putnam was ordered to the "reserve" of the army. After the evacuation of Boston had relieved the colonies, for a season, of the presence of the enemy, General Putnam was sent forward to New York, to take the command there, and to continue the execution of the plan proposed by General Lee for the defence of that city, unless the general voice of the brigadiers and the engineers concurred in any *slight* change.

After General Washington assumed the command in New York, General Putnam remained there, without command, until the sickness of General Greene afforded an opportunity for the display of any abilities he might possess in opposing the enemy's progress towards New York. Of the manner in which he discharged his duty in that important position, this chapter has furnished some evidence.

After the retreat into the county of Westchester, and the battle on Chatterton's Hill,

General Putnam was ordered to Philadelphia; and in January, 1777, he was ordered to Princeton, where he remained until spring.

In the spring of 1777 General Putnam was ordered to another of those quiet posts, where no particular abilities, beyond a strict obedience to orders, appeared to be required,—the command of the Highlands on the Hudson; but here, too, misfortunes visited him. After withdrawing the troops under his command beyond the limits within which they could render any assistance to the garrisons of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, leaving the passes exposed, and without even a guard or a patrol,—in direct violation of the orders of the commander-in-chief,—Sir Henry Clinton, as he had done at Bedford, on the twenty-seventh of August, stole a march on the vigilant and talented Putnam, and carried off the prizes, which furnished the key to the Highlands.

In November, 1777, the situation of affairs in Pennsylvania rendered it necessary for General Washington to strengthen the army in that quarter. He accordingly dispatched Colonel Hamilton, with orders to General Putnam, then at New Windsor, to send forward the brigades of Continental troops under Generals Poor and Sullivan, and the brigade of militia under General Warner, to head-quarters. But General Putnam had a desire to capture New York, and the commander-in-chief's orders were disregarded, until a letter, such as General Washington seldom wrote, brought the General to his senses. The result of this delay was the fall of Fort Mifflin, the evacuation of Red Bank, the loss of the defences on the Delaware, and the continued occupation of Philadelphia, through the succeeding winter, by General Howe.

In March, 1778, Congress ordered an investigation of the causes which led to the loss of the forts in the Highlands, and General Putnam was superseded in his command by General McDougal. The court of inquiry reported that, "upon full knowledge and mature deliberation of facts on the spot, they reported the loss to have been occasioned by *want of men*, and not by any *fault in the commanders*." This indirect condemnation of the conduct of General Putnam, whose force had enabled him to supply

the requisite number of men for the defence of the forts, was more positively confirmed by the action of General Washington, who ordered General Putnam to Connecticut, to "superintend the forwarding on of the new levies,"—a post of far less importance than such a soldier as General Putnam is said to have been would have been placed in, at that important period, if those who knew the man, and who were fully competent to judge of his merits, had agreed with the popular opinion at the present day.

It was during the General's residence in Connecticut that the celebrated descent down the slope at Horse-Neck (now Greenwich) took place. It is proper to state, however, that historians, or rather eulogists, have done the General great injustice respecting this affair. The

steep was not quite *perpendicular*, as some have supposed; nor did his horse dash down the hill, as picture-makers have taken for granted, but, General Putnam himself being the witness, "the horse was well trained and sagacious, and came down the hill in a sliding manner, resting upon his haunches," the General, meanwhile, being almost as comfortable as when in his easy-chair by his fireside.

General Putnam never afterwards enjoyed a separate command; and in 1779 he was rendered incapable of active duty of any kind, by an attack of paralysis, which, to a considerable extent, deprived him of the use of his limbs on one side.

The remainder of his days were spent in retirement, and on the twenty-ninth of May, 1790, he died, aged seventy-two years.

CHAPTER XII.

September 16, 1776.

THE BATTLE OF HARLEM PLAINS.

THE loss of the field on Long Island, and the bad effects which it produced on the minds of the army and the people, have been already noticed;¹ but the retreat of the army from Long Island, under the direction of Colonel John Glover, General Alexander McDougal, and the illustrious Commander-in-chief;² the cowardice of the Connecticut troops, under Generals Parsons and Fellows, at Kip's Bay;³ the retreat of the Americans to Kingsbridge;⁴ and the occupation of New York by the enemy,⁵ are subjects, although intimately connected with the subject and important features in the history of the country, do not come within the scope of this work.

Of the moral effect of the defeat on Long Island, a passing notice has been paid. The militia, of which the American army was chiefly composed, were dispirited, intractable, and impatient to return to their homes. "Great numbers of them went off; in some in-

stances almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time."¹ Of provisions, clothing, and ammunition, they had but a scanty supply; and their health and their spirits suffered alike in the vicissitude of events.

The army occupied the high and rocky ground between Manhattanville and Kingsbridge, on the extreme northern part of the island of New York.² Below them, in front, lay the perfectly level, sandy plain, extending from the East nearly to the North River, called the Harlem Plains; and still farther down, on the rocky heights south of the Plains, where the suburban village of Yorkville now stands, thence, westward, to the site now occupied by the Bloomingdale Lunatic Asylum, and thence, northwest, along the heights south of Manhattanville, were stationed the outposts of the royal army.

On the morning of the sixteenth of September, General Washington, for the purpose of arousing the spirits of the army, and of checking the lukewarm-

¹ Vide Chapter XI.—² Sparks' Washington, pp. 178, 179.

³ Gordon, ii. p. 327; Sparks, p. 186; Marshall, ii. p. 543.

⁴ Marshall, ii. pp. 537, 543, 544.—⁵ Sparks' Washington, pp. 185, 186; Lieut. Hindrichs to Dr. Aug. Lud. Schloezer, September 18.

¹ Gen. Washington to Congress, Sept. 2.

² Sparks' Washington, p. 186.

ness and discontent which appeared to be gathering over the country, detached two trusty officers,¹ Colonel Knowlton, of Connecticut, and Major Leitch, of Virginia, with parties of riflemen and rangers, to gain the rear of a party of the enemy's light troops, by way of *Vanderwater's Heights*² (where the Bloomingdale Lunatic Asylum now stands), while dispositions were made as if to attack them in front.³ In violation of the orders of General Washington, a fire was opened on their flank, before their rear was gained;⁴ and the enemy, taking advantage of the mistake, made good their retreat to their main body.⁵

Information of this movement having reached General Howe, the Second and Third battalions of light-infantry, supported by the Forty-second (Highland) regiment, under the command of General Leslie, were ordered to push forward and attack the Americans,⁶ who were then in the vicinity of *Martje Darij's Fly* (between the Eighth and Ninth Avenues, near the line of One Hundred and Twenty-fourth-street).⁷ With the greatest gallantry the Americans received them, and drove them

into a cleared field, about two hundred yards southwest from the Fly, where they took a position behind a fence covered with bushes, and continued the contest.¹ About this time General Washington ordered Colonel Richardson's, and part of Colonel Griffith's Maryland regiments, with some detachments from the Eastern regiments, to support Colonel Knowlton.² The enemy was speedily driven from the fence behind which he had taken shelter, leaving five of his men dead on the spot.³ He was thence pursued about four hundred yards to a buckwheat-field, on the top of a high hill,⁴ where he was strengthened by the arrival of a battalion of Hessian grenadiers, a company of chasseurs, and two field-pieces, while the "reserve" of the army occupied such a position as, it was supposed, would prevent any farther advance by the American troops.⁵ Here the enemy made a stand, and during a period of two hours, the conflict was continued with great spirit.⁶ At length the enemy retreated a third time, and passing into an orchard, and thence across a hollow, he made his way up another hill not far from the enemy's lines.⁷

At this moment the enemy, in considerable force,—probably the "reserve," of which notice has been already taken,—was discovered to be in motion, when

¹ Gen. Washington to Patrick Henry, Oct. 5. In the General's dispatch to Congress, Sept. 18, it is said the firing had commenced before he reached the lines, but I see nothing inconsistent in that fact with the idea that the attack on the enemy had originally been made on orders from head-quarters.

² Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 21; Gen. Washington to Cong., Sept. 18.—³ Gen. Washington to Gov. Henry, Oct. 5; Same to Cong., Sept. 18.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Gov. Henry, Oct. 5.—⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 21.

⁷ Gen. Clinton to the N. Y. Convention, Sept. 18; the Surveys of Harlem Common, by Gen. Swift, in the library of the Corporation of New York. This "Fly," or low ground, was still undisturbed within my recollection.

¹ Gov. Clinton to N. Y. Convention, Sept. 18.

² Gen. Washington to Congress, Sept. 18.

³ Gov. Clinton to N. Y. Convention, Sept. 18.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 21; Lieut. Hindrichs to Dr. Ang. Lud. Schloezer, Sept. 18.—⁶ Gov. Clinton to N. Y. Convention, Nov. 18; Lieut. Hindrichs to Dr. Ang. Lud. Schloezer, Sept. 18.—⁷ Ibid.

General Washington "judged it prudent to order a retreat," "and the enemy was well contented to hold the last ground to which he had been driven."¹

In this spirited affair the Americans lost the noble Colonel Knowlton—of whom the commander-in-chief said, he "would have been an honor to any country"—and sixteen privates killed, and Major Leitch and "about forty wounded."² The loss of the enemy, as reported to the government by General Howe, was fourteen killed, and eight officers and "about seventy" men wounded.³

The effect of this affair was immediately apparent. On the following morning General Washington noticed it in "general orders," and "*Leitch*" and "*Virginia*" were given out as the "parole" and "countersign" for the day. After thanking the officers and men who participated in the affair, and contrasting the behavior of the troops with that of the Connecticut troops at Kip's Bay,

on the day before, he appealed to the army, and urged both "officers and men to act up to the noble cause in which they were engaged, and to support the honor and liberties of their country."⁴ Although, in itself, it was a small affair, at that time it was equivalent to a victory.² Governor George Clinton, himself a witness of the battle, two days afterwards writes from the camp in these words: "It has animated our troops, gave them new spirits, and erased every bad impression the retreat from Long Island, &c., had left on their minds. They find they are able, with inferior numbers, to drive their enemy, and think of nothing now but conquest."³

Major Leitch lingered until the first of October, when he, too, died from lockjaw, produced by his wounds;⁴ but his last moments were cheered by the knowledge that he enjoyed the affectionate regard of his illustrious commander, and of the army which he had so recently entered.

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., Sept. 18; Gov. Clinton to N. Y. Convention, Sept. 18.—² Gov. Clinton to N. Y. Convention, Sept. 18. Mr. Sparks (p. 188) says fifteen were killed and forty-five wounded.

³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Sept. 21.

¹ General Orders, Sept. 17.—² Gov. Clinton to N. Y. Convention, Sept. 18; Gen. Washington to Gen. Schuyler, Sept. 20.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Humphrey's Putnam, p. 93.

D O C U M E N T S.

I.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF
CONGRESS.

HEAD-QUARTERS, AT COL. ROGER MORRIS'S HOUSE, }
September 18, 1776. }

SIR:—As my letter of the 16th contained intelligence of an important nature, and such as might lead Congress to expect that the evacuation of New York, and retreat to the Heights of Harlem, in the manner they were made, would be succeeded by some other interesting event, I beg leave to inform them, that as yet nothing has been attempted upon a large and general plan of attack. About the time of the post's departure with my letter, the enemy appeared in several large bodies upon the plains, about two and a half miles from hence. I rode down to our advanced posts to put matters in a proper situation, if they should attempt to come on. When I arrived there, I heard a firing, which I was informed was between a party of our rangers, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Knowlton, and an advanced party of the enemy. Our men came in and told me that the body of the enemy, who kept themselves concealed, consisted of about three hundred, as near as they could guess. I immediately ordered three companies of Colonel Weedon's regiment from Virginia, under the command of Major Leitch, and Colonel Knowlton, with his rangers, composed of volunteers from different New England regiments, to try to get in their rear, while a disposition was making as if to attack them in front, and thereby draw their whole attention that way.

This took effect, as I wished, on the part of the enemy. On the appearance of our party in front, they immediately ran down the hill, took

possession of some fences and bushes, and a smart firing began, but at too great a distance to do much execution on either side. The parties under Colonel Knowlton and Major Leitch unluckily began their attack too soon, as it was rather in flank than in rear.

In a little time Major Leitch was brought off wounded, having received three balls through his side; and in a short time after, Colonel Knowlton got a wound, which proved mortal. Their men, however, persevered, and continued the engagement with the greatest resolution. Finding that they wanted a support, I advanced part of Colonel Griffith's and Colonel Richardson's Maryland regiments, with some detachments from the Eastern regiments, who were nearest the place of action. These troops charged the enemy with great intrepidity, and drove them from the wood into the plain, and were pushing them from thence, having silenced their fire in a great measure, when I judged it prudent to order a retreat, fearing the enemy, as I have since found was really the case, were sending a large body to support their party.

Major Leitch, I am in hopes, will recover; but Colonel Knowlton's fall is much to be regretted, as that of a brave and good officer. We had about forty wounded; the number of slain is not yet ascertained, but it is very inconsiderable.

By a sergeant who deserted from the enemy, and came in this morning, I find that their party was greater than I imagined. It consisted of the second battalion of light-infantry, a battalion of the Royal Highlanders, and three companies of the Hessian Riflemen, under the command of Brigadier-general Leslie. The deserter reports that their loss in wounded and missing was eighty-nine, and eight killed. In

the latter, his account is too small, as our people discovered and buried double that number. This affair, I am in hopes, will be attended with many salutary consequences, as it seems to have greatly inspirited the whole of our troops. The sergeant farther adds, that a considerable body of men are now encamped from the East to the North River, between the seven and eight mile stones, under the command of General Clinton. General Howe, he believes, has his quarters at Mr. Aphorpe's house.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the highest regard and esteem, sir, your most obedient servant.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

P. S.—I should have wrote Congress by express, before now, had I not expected the post every minute, which I flatter myself will be a sufficient apology for delaying it. The late losses we have sustained in our baggage and camp necessaries, have added much to our distress, which was very great before. I must, therefore, take the liberty of requesting Congress to have forwarded, as soon as possible, such a supply of tents, blankets, camp-kettles, and other articles, as can be collected; we cannot be overstocked.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

II.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD-QUARTERS, HARLEM HEIGHTS, }
September 17, 1776. }

(Parole, *Leitch*—Countersign, *Virginia*.)

The General most heartily thanks the troops commanded yesterday by Major Leitch, who first advanced upon the enemy, and the others who so resolutely supported them. The behavior of yesterday was of such a contrast to that of some troops the day before, as must show what may be done when officers and soldiers will exert themselves. Once more, therefore, the General calls upon officers and men to act up to the noble cause in which they are engaged, and to support the honor and liberties of their country.

The gallant and brave Colonel Knowlton,

who would have been an honor to any country, having fallen yesterday, while gloriously fighting, Captain Brown is to take the command of the party lately led by Colonel Knowlton. Officers and men are to obey him accordingly.

The loss of the enemy, yesterday, would undoubtedly have been much greater if the orders of the commander-in-chief had not, in some instances, been contradicted by inferior officers, who, however well they may mean, ought not presume to direct. It is therefore ordered, that no officer commanding a party, and having received orders from the commander-in-chief, depart from them, without counter orders from the same authority; and as many may otherwise err through ignorance, the army is now acquainted that the General's orders are delivered by the Adjutant-general or one of his aids-de-camp, Mr. Tilghman, or Colonel Moylan the quartermaster-general.

* * * * *

III.

EXTRACT FROM GOVERNOR GEORGE CLINTON'S LETTER TO THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS.

KING'S BRIDGE, September 18, 1776.

GENTLEMEN:—

* * * * *

On Monday morning, about ten o'clock, a party of the enemy, consisting of Highlanders, Hessians, the light-infantry, grenadiers, and English troops (number uncertain), attacked our advanced party, commanded by Colonel Knowlton, at Martje Davit's Fly. They were opposed with spirit, and soon made to retreat to a clear field, southwest of that about two hundred paces, where they lodged themselves behind a fence covered with bushes. Our people attacked them in front, and caused them to retreat a second time, leaving five dead on the spot. We pursued them to a buckwheat-field on the top of a high hill, distant about four hundred paces, where they received a considerable reinforcement, with several field-pieces, and there made a stand. A very brisk action ensued at this place, which continued about two hours. Our people, at length, worsted them a third time,

caused them to fall back into an orchard, from thence across a hollow, and up another hill not far distant from their own lines. A large column of the enemy's army being at this time discovered to be in motion, and the ground we then occupied being rather disadvantageous, a retreat likewise, without bringing on a general action (which we did not think prudent to risk), rather insecure, our party was therefore ordered in, and the enemy was well contented to hold the last ground we drove them to.

We lost on this occasion, Colonel Knowlton, a brave officer, and sixteen privates killed. Major Leitch, from Virginia, and about eight or ten subaltern officers and privates wounded. The loss of the enemy is uncertain. They carried their dead and wounded off, in and soon after the action; but we have good evidence of their having upwards of sixty killed, and violent presumption of one hundred. The action, in the whole, lasted about four hours.

I consider our success in this small affair, at this time, almost equal to a victory. It has animated our troops, gave them new spirits, and erased every bad impression the retreat from Long Island, &c., had left on their minds. They find they are able, with inferior numbers, to drive their enemy, and think of nothing now but conquest.

* * * * *

I am, with much respect,
Your most obedient servant,
GEO. CLINTON.

IV.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

HEAD-QUARTERS, YORK ISLAND, }
21st September, 1776. }

MY LORD:—I have the satisfaction to inform your lordship of His Majesty's being in possession of this city of New York.

* * * * *

On the 16th, in the morning, a large party of the enemy having passed under cover of the woods, near to the advanced posts of the army,

by way of Vandewater's Height, the second and third battalions of light-infantry, supported by the Forty-second regiment, pushed forward and drove them back to their intrenchments, from whence the enemy, observing they were not in force, attacked them with near three thousand men, which occasioned the march of the reserve, with two field-pieces, a battalion of Hessian grenadiers, and the company of chasseurs, to prevent the corps engaged from being surrounded; but the light-infantry and Forty-second regiment, with the assistance of the chasseurs and field-pieces, repulsed the enemy with considerable loss, and obliged them to retire within their works. The enemy's loss is not ascertained; but from the accounts of deserters, it is agreed that they had not less than three hundred killed and wounded, and among them a colonel and a major killed. We had eight officers wounded, most of them very slightly, fourteen men killed and about seventy wounded.

Captain Balfour, my second aid-de-camp, will have the honor of delivering your lordship this dispatch; and with the most profound respect, I have the honor to be, &c. W. HOWE.

To Lord GEO. GERMAIN.

V.

COLONEL THOMAS KNOWLTON.

Thomas Knowlton was born at Ashford, Connecticut, about the year 1740. He was the third son of William Knowlton, who had emigrated into Connecticut from Ipswich, Massachusetts, and who died early in life, leaving a widow and seven children.

Thomas entered the army at the age of fifteen years, and served in the Colonial troops which were raised in New England, during six years of the war with France, leaving the service in 1760, with the rank of Lieutenant.

When the war with Spain broke out, in 1762, Lieutenant Knowlton again entered the service, joined the expedition against Cuba, and was present when the Havana was captured.

In 1764, he served under General Bradstreet, and with that campaign his military career

ended, until the troubles with the mother country again called him into the field.

On the 5th of April, 1759, he married Anne, daughter of Sampson Keyes, of Ashford; and when he retired from the service he returned to the more peaceful occupation of a farmer, finding comfort in the bosom of a happy and rising family. He was highly respected by those among whom he lived, filling, by their suffrages, various civil offices,—in 1775, being one of the selectmen of the town.

When the Assembly of Connecticut ordered the formation of six regiments of Colonial troops, in its session in April, 1775, Lieutenant Knowlton was named as a Captain in General Israel Putnam's regiment; and when the intelligence of the affair at Lexington reached Ashford, he marched for Cambridge, at the head of his company, reaching the camp before any other armed body from a sister colony.

He was present at the marking out of the works on Breed's Hill by Colonel Gridley, on the night of the 16th of June, 1775; he assisted in throwing up the redoubt and breastwork, under Colonel Prescott; and, from behind the rail-fence, on the bank of the Mystic, by the side of John Stark, he nobly defended the post against the assaults of the enemy, on the memorable 17th of June, 1775. Shortly afterwards he was promoted to the office of Major, and distinguished himself during the siege of Boston, on several occasions. In 1776, he was elevated to the office of Lieutenant-colonel, and the command of a regiment of rangers was given to him. He enjoyed the confidence of General

Washington, and was often employed under his personal instructions.

Stung with the disgrace which had fallen on his native State, by the cowardice of her troops at Kip's Bay, he entered on the duty assigned him on the 16th of September, with unusual spirit, and fell a sacrifice to her honor, as has been described in this chapter.

Possessing a commanding personal appearance, and endowed with all those virtues which attracted and retained the affections of those among whom he moved, Colonel Knowlton fell and was lamented by the whole country; and his memory is still precious wherever his name and his virtues are known.

His eldest son, Frederic, then less than fifteen years of age, was by his side when he fell; and his body was removed and buried in the trenches of Fort Washington, probably within the limits of what is now the Cemetery of Trinity Church, near Manhattanville.

Singular as it may appear, his native State appears to have left his memory to the tender mercies of a forgetful people, with the result which generally follows such neglect. The Historical Society of New York, however, has recently noticed the neglect, and a committee of its members has been directed to ascertain, as near as possible, the circumstances attending his death, and, if possible, the spot where he was buried, in order that proper respect may be shown to his memory.

His widow died May 22, 1808; and, within a few months past, a son—the last of his family—also died at his residence, at Willington, in Connecticut.

CHAPTER XIII.

October 11 and 13, 1776.

THE BATTLES ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

THE defeat and retreat of the American forces in Canada, in the spring and summer of 1776, have been already noticed in a preceding chapter of this work.¹

General Gates, to whom the command of the Northern army had been assigned, very properly supposed that the enemy would follow up the advantages he had secured, and attempt to recapture Crown Point and Ticonderoga.² A council of officers was therefore called together, and the subject submitted to them, when the abandonment of Crown Point and the concentration of the forces at Ticonderoga were advised, and resolved on by the General.³ Accordingly, General Sullivan, who was at Crown Point, retired to Ticonderoga, and the most vigorous measures were adopted to defend the latter position.⁴ Among other means of defence, a squadron of small vessels was considered necessary, and ship-builders having been ordered from the seaboard, the work was pushed

forward with great energy.¹ By the middle of August, so zealous had the Americans been, that one sloop of twelve guns, one schooner of twelve, and two of eight guns, and five gondolas of three guns each, were ready for duty,² and the command having been given to General Arnold, he moved down to Crown Point,³ and, afterwards, to Windmill Point, where he anchored his vessels across the lake, to prevent the passage of the enemy.⁴

No sooner was General Carleton advised of the movements of the Americans than he, too, prepared to build a squadron of vessels.⁵ Seven hundred men were ordered up from Quebec for this purpose, and, in a few weeks, he, too, had a squadron ready for duty at St. John's.⁶

Considerable bodies of the enemy

¹ Chapter VII.
² Lossing, i. p. 162.—³ Gordon, ii. p. 319; Wilkinson, i. p. 81; Palmer's Hist. of Lake Champlain, pp. 103, 104.

⁴ Palmer's Lake Champlain, p. 104.—⁵ Gen. Gates to Cong., July 29; Letter from Crown Point, Aug 27; Wilkinson, i. p. 81.—⁶ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Sept. 7; Palmer's Lake Champlain, p. 104.—⁷ Gordon, ii. p. 380; Palmer's Lake Champlain, pp. 102, 103.

⁸ Capt. Donglass to the Admiralty, Oct. 21; History of Civil War, i. pp. 209, 210.

¹ Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. pp. 80, 81.

having collected on the shores, in the neighborhood of General Arnold's anchorage, he fell back about ten miles up the lake,¹ where his force was increased by the addition of a sloop, three galleys, three gondolas, and twenty-one gun-boats.² He suffered great inconvenience from the want of gunners and seamen to work the vessels, the crews being principally composed of troops detached for that purpose, the greater part knowing nothing whatever of seamanship or gunnery.³ Ignorant of the strength of General Carleton's squadron, General Arnold determined to fall back to Valeour's Island, a short distance south from Plattsburg, where he anchored his little fleet across the narrow channel between the island and the western shore of the lake, and awaited the approach of the enemy.⁴

About eight o'clock, on the morning of the eleventh of October, the enemy's squadron appeared to the northward off Cumberland Head;⁵ and, in a short time, it swept around the southerly point of Valeour's Island, taking its position also in the channel between the island and the main, south of the position occupied by the American fleet.⁶ The enemy's force consisted of a ship, mounting eighteen guns, a snow, mounting the same number, one schooner, of

fourteen guns, and two of twelve, two sloops, a bomb-ketch, a rideau, carrying fourteen guns, a gondola, carrying seven nine-pounders, and twenty-four gun-boats and four long-boats, each armed with a single gun;¹ and it was manned with seven hundred choice seamen, taken from the vessels at Quebec, and a sufficient land force.²

General Arnold immediately prepared for action, and, about eleven o'clock, the action commenced.³ The schooner *Royal Savage* and the galleys alone got under way,⁴ the remainder of the squadron remained at anchor.⁵ In consequence of bad management, the schooner fell to leeward, and was the first to be attacked.⁶ In a short time one of her masts was wounded, her rigging shot away, and she became almost unmanageable, when her captain ran her ashore on the southerly point of Valeour's Island, where she was burned, to prevent her falling into the enemy's hands.⁷

With round and grape shot, the action was continued, with much desperation, until five o'clock, when the enemy hauled off, and, at a greater distance,

¹ In a list of vessels under Capt. Pringle, appended to Capt. Douglass' report to the Admiralty, no allusion is made to the "snow," to one schooner of twelve guns, or to the bomb-ketch. This statement is made from Gen. Arnold's report to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.

² "List of seamen detached from His Majesty's ships," &c., appended to Capt. Douglass' report to the Admiralty, Oct. 21, 1776. See also History of Civil War, i. p. 211.

³ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12. Gen. Waterbury (letter to Congress, Oct. 24) says the engagement lasted from ten o'clock until sunset.

⁴ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.—⁵ Ibid. See also Wilkinson, i. p. 88.—⁶ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.—⁷ Ibid. See also Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24.

¹ Lossing, i. p. 163; Palmer's Lake Champlain, p. 101. Wilkinson (vol. i. p. 89) says they were landed from the enemy's vessels.—² Wilkinson, i. p. 81.—³ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Sept. 18. —⁴ Capt. Pringle to the Admiralty, Oct. 15; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12; Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24.—⁵ Gen. Arnold's dispatch to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12, 1776; Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24.

⁶ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.

continued the action until darkness closed the affray.¹

The American loss, in killed and wounded, "amounted to about sixty;"² but, in addition to the loss of the *Royal Savage*, their vessels were much injured. The galley *Congress*, in which General Arnold was, received seven shots between wind and water, was hulled twelve times, had her mainmast wounded in two places, and her yard-arm in one. The galley *Washington* was hulled several times, and her mainmast shot through and rendered useless. The gondola *Philadelphia* was so much injured that she sunk within an hour after the close of the engagement.³

Immediately after the close of the action, General Arnold consulted with General Waterbury and Colonel Wigglesworth, when it was determined to return to Crown Point.⁴ The enemy had anchored in such a position, as he supposed, that General Arnold could not escape,⁵ yet a chilly north wind, and a very dark and foggy night, favored the project, and the attempt was made. At seven o'clock, Colonel Wigglesworth, in the galley *Trumbull*, got under way; the gondolas and small vessels followed, and the crippled galleys *Washington* and *Congress* "brought up the rear."⁶ Strange as it may appear, notwithstanding the early hour

at which it was made, and the disposition of the enemy's vessels,—stretching across the narrow channel between the island and the main,—the American fleet sailed through the enemy's fleet without being seen.¹ At daybreak, the King's forces sought their expected prey, but it had vanished; and was busily engaged at Schuyler's Island, ten miles south of Valcour's, in stopping their leaks and repairing other damage.²

As speedily as possible, the enemy weighed anchor, and pursued the fugitives, who, at two o'clock, continued their course towards Crown Point.³ A southerly breeze obstructed the progress of both parties, although the crippled condition of the latter enabled the enemy to gain on them.⁴ At six the next morning (13th), General Arnold had reached Willsborough,—twenty-eight miles from Crown Point,—but, about the same time, by one of those sudden irregularities of nature, which are sometimes seen, a fresh northeasterly breeze struck the sails of the enemy's vessels, and they rapidly approached the American vessels, which were still laboring against the southerly wind; and, when off Split Rock, they overtook them.⁵ The *Washington*, which was first overtaken, after sustaining the fire of three of the enemy's vessels, struck her colors, and General Waterbury and his men were made prisoners.⁶ The *Congress*

¹ Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12; Hist. of Civil War, i. pp. 212, 213.

² Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.—⁵ Capt. Pringle to the Admiralty, Oct. 15; Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24.—⁶ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.—⁷ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15.

¹ Capt. Pringle to the Admiralty, Oct. 15; Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24.—² Gen. Arnold to Gen. Gates, Oct. 12.—³ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15.

⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Sir Guy Carleton to Lord G. Germaine, Oct. 14; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15; Gen. Waterbury to Congress, Oct. 24.

was next overhauled, and sustained an uneven contest against a ship mounting twelve guns, a schooner of fourteen guns, one of twelve,—two under her stern, and one alongside,—“*for about five glasses,*” when, the vessel having become a perfect wreck,—“the sails, rigging, and hull having been torn to pieces”—General Arnold run her into a creek,¹ on the eastern shore of the lake, and set her on fire, with four gondolas, which accompanied him.² After watching the burning vessels until they were consumed,³ General Arnold and his men marched off through the woods to Chimney Point, and reached Crown Point at four o’clock the next morning.⁴

Of the little fleet, two schooners, a sloop, two galleys, and a gondola, alone

escaped.¹ Of the loss in the two days’ fight, on both sides, there does not appear to have been any report made. The prisoners which were captured in the *Washington* were released on their parole, on the day after their capture,² and they reached Crown Point on the same day.³

Although the Americans were defeated, “such were the skill, bravery, and obstinate resistance of General Arnold and his men, against a vastly superior force, the event was hailed as ominous of great achievements on the part of the Americans, when such fearful odds should not exist. Arnold’s popularity, so justly gained at Quebec, was greatly increased, and the country rang with his praises.”⁴ Dr. Sparks justly observes, respecting Arnold’s engagement on the thirteenth, that “there are few instances on record of more deliberate courage and gallantry than were displayed by him, from the beginning to the end of this action.”⁵

¹ Mr. Palmer (*History of Lake Champlain*, p. 220) says this is an error, and that the wrecks of the vessels are yet to be seen in *Adam’s Bay*, in *Panton*, nearly opposite *Barber’s Point*. This is confirmed by Mr. Thompson, in *History of Vermont*, Part III., p. 135.

² Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15; Capt. Pringle to the Admiralty, Oct. 15; Gen. Waterbury to Cong., Oct. 24; Gordon, ii. p. 384; Stedman, i. p. 255. It appears almost incredible that Gen. Arnold could sustain so uneven a contest for *five hours*, but the report is confirmed by other evidence.

³ Wilkinson, i. p. 91; Gordon, ii. p. 384; History of Civil War, i. p. 213; Lieut. Hall’s Civil War, p. 243; Stedman, i. p. 256.

⁴ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15.

¹ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15.

² Statement of Wm. Briggs, published at Newark, N. J., Oct. 21, 1776; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15; Gen. Waterbury to Congress, Oct. 24.

³ Gen. Arnold to Gen. Schuyler, Oct. 15.

⁴ Lossing’s Field Book, i. p. 165. See also Gordon, ii. p. 384; History of Civil War, i. pp. 213, 214; Wilkinson, i. p. 92.—⁵ Life of Arnold.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

COLONEL ARNOLD'S REPORT (OF THE FIRST ACTION) TO GENERAL GATES.

SCHUYLER'S ISLAND, *October 12, 1776.*

DEAR GENERAL:—Yesterday morning at eight o'clock, the enemy's fleet, consisting of one ship, mounting sixteen guns, one snow, mounting the same number, one schooner of fourteen guns, two of twelve, two sloops, a bomb-ketch, and a large vessel (that did not come up), with fifteen or twenty flat-bottomed boats or gondolas, carrying one twelve or eighteen pounder in their bows, appeared off Cumberland Head. We immediately prepared to receive them. The galleys and Royal Savage were ordered under way; the rest of our fleet lay at an anchor. At eleven o'clock, they ran under the lee of Valcour, and began the attack. The schooner, by some bad management, fell to leeward, and was first attacked; one of her masts was wounded, and her rigging shot away. The captain thought prudent to run her on the point of Valcour, where all the men were saved. They boarded her, and at night set fire to her. At half-past twelve, the engagement became general, and very warm. Some of the enemy's ships, and all their gondolas, beat and rowed up within musket-shot of us. They continued a very hot fire, with round and grape shot, until five o'clock, when they thought proper to retire to about six or seven hundred yards' distance, and continued the fire till dark. The Congress and Washington have suffered greatly; the latter lost her first lieutenant killed, captain and master wounded. The New York lost all her officers, except the captain. The Philadelphia was hulled in so many places, that

she sunk in about one hour after the engagement was ended. The whole killed and wounded amounted to about sixty. The enemy landed a large number of Indians on the island and each shore, who keep an incessant fire upon us, but do little damage. The enemy had, to appearance, upwards of one thousand men in bateaux, prepared for boarding. We suffered much for want of seamen and gunners. I was obliged, myself, to point most of the guns on board of the Congress, which, I believe, did good execution. The Congress received seven shot between wind and water; was hulled a dozen times; had her mainmast wounded in two places, and her yard in one. The Washington was bulled a number of times; her mainmast shot through, and must have a new one. Both vessels are very leaky, and want repairing.

On consulting with General Waterbury and Colonel Wigglesworth, it was thought prudent to return to Crown Point, every vessel's ammunition being three fourths spent, and the enemy greatly superior to us in ships and men. At seven o'clock, Colonel Wigglesworth, in the Trumbull, got under way; the gondolas and small vessels followed; and the Congress and Washington brought up the rear. The enemy did not attempt to molest us. Most of the fleet is this minute come to an anchor. The wind is small to the southward. The enemy's fleet is under way to leeward, and beating up. As soon as our leaks are stopped, the whole fleet will make the utmost dispatch to Crown Point, where I beg you send ammunition, and your farther orders for us. On the whole, I think we had a very fortunate escape, and have great reason to return our humble and hearty thanks to Almighty God for preserving and delivering

so many of us from our more than savage enemies.

I am, dear General, your affectionate, humble servant,

B. ARNOLD.

P. S.—I had not moved on board the Congress, when the enemy appeared, and lost all my papers and most of my clothes on board the schooner. I wish a dozen bateaux, well manned, could be sent immediately, to tow up the vessels in case of a southerly wind.

I cannot, in justice to the officers in the fleet, omit mentioning their spirited conduct during the action.

B. A.

II.

COLONEL ARNOLD'S REPORT (OF THE SECOND ACTION) TO GENERAL SCHUYLER.

TICONDEROGA, October 15, 1776.

DEAR GENERAL:—I make no doubt before this you have received a copy of my letter to General Gates, of the 12th inst., dated at Schuyler's Island, advising of an action between our fleet and the enemy the preceding day, in which we lost a schooner and a gondola. We remained no longer at Schuyler's Island than to stop our leaks, and mend the sails of the Washington. At two o'clock, p. m., the 12th, weighed anchor, with a fresh breeze to the southward. The enemy's fleet at the same time got under way; our gondola made very little way ahead. In the evening the wind moderated, and we made such progress, that at six o'clock next morning we were about off Willsborough, twenty-eight miles from Crown Point. The enemy's fleet were very little way above Schuyler's Island; the wind breezed up to the southward, so that we gained very little by beating or rowing, at the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze from the northeast, and by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside of us. The Washington and Congress were in the rear, the rest of our fleet were ahead, except two gondolas, sunk at Schuyler's Island. The Washington galley was in such a shattered condition, and had so many men killed and wounded, she struck to the enemy, after receiving a few broadsides. We were then at-

tacked in the Congress galley by a ship mounting twelve eighteen-pounders; a schooner, of fourteen sixes; and one of twelve sixes, two under our stern, and one on our broadside, within musket-shot. They kept up an incessant fire upon us for about five glasses, with round and grape shot, which we returned as briskly. The sails, rigging, and hull of the Congress were shattered and torn in pieces, the first lieutenant and three men killed, when, to prevent her falling into the enemy's hands, who had seven sail around me, I ran her ashore into a creek ten miles from Crown Point, on the east side, when, after saving our small-arms, I set her on fire, with four gondolas, with whose crews I reached Crown Point, through the woods, that evening, and very luckily escaped the savages, who waylaid the road in two hours after we passed. At four o'clock yesterday morning, I reached this place, exceedingly fatigued and unwell, having been without sleep or refreshment for near three days.

Of our whole fleet, we have saved only two gallies, two small schooners, one gondola, and one sloop. General Waterbury, with one hundred and ten prisoners, were returned by Carleton last night. On board of the Congress, we had twenty odd men killed and wounded. Our whole loss amounts to eighty odd. The enemy's fleet were last night three miles below Crown Point; their army is doubtless at their heels. We are busily employed in completing our lines, redoubts, &c., which, I am sorry to say, are not so forward as I could wish. We have very few heavy cannon, but are mounting every piece we have.

It is the opinion of Generals Gates and St. Clair that eight or ten thousand militia should be immediately sent to our assistance, if they can be spared from below. I am of opinion the enemy will attack us with their fleet and army at the same time. The former is very formidable, a list of which I am favored with by General Waterbury, and have inclosed. The season is so far advanced, our people are daily growing more healthy.

We have about nine thousand effectives, and, if properly supported, make no doubt of stepping the career of the enemy. All your letters

to me of late have miscarried. I am extremely sorry to hear, by General Gates, you are unwell. I have sent you, by General Waterbury, a small box, containing all my public and private papers and accounts, with a considerable sum of hard and paper money, which I beg the favor of your taking care of.

I am, dear General, your most affectionate, humble servant,

B. ARNOLD.

To Hon. Major-general SCHUYLER.

LIST OF THE ENEMY'S FLEET ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

One ship, eighteen twelve-pounders; one schooner, fourteen six-pounders; one schooner, twelve six-pounders; one rideau, six twenty-four pounders, twelve twelve-pounders, and four eight-inch howitzers; twenty-eight gondolas, with one gun each, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four pounders, and one eight-inch howitz; two gondolas, three guns each, twelve-pounders.

N. B.—Two of the above gondolas sunk by our fleet the first day, and one blown up with sixty men.

III.

GENERAL WATERBURY'S REPORT TO CONGRESS.

STAMFORD, October 24, 1776.

HONORED SIR:—I have now returned home on parole. Your honor has undoubtedly heard of my misfortune of being taken prisoner on the 13th instant, on Lake Chainplain. I shall give your honor a short sketch of our engagement, which is as follows:

On Friday morning, of the 11th instant, our alarm guns were fired, that the enemy's fleet was off Cumberland Head. I immediately went on board of General Arnold, and told him, that I gave it as my opinion, that the fleet ought immediately to come to sail, and fight them on a retreat in main lake, as they were so much superior to us in number and strength, and we being in such a disadvantageous harbor to fight a number so much superior, and the enemy being able, with their small boats, to surround us on every side, as I knew they could,

we lying between an island and the main. But General Arnold was of the opinion, that it was best to draw the fleet in a line, where we lay, in the Bay of Valeour. The fleet very soon came up with us, and surrounded us, when a very hot engagement ensued from ten o'clock in the morning till towards sunset, when the enemy withdrew. We immediately held council, to secure a retreat through their fleet, to get to Crown Point, which was done with so much secrecy, that we went through them entirely undiscovered. The enemy, finding next morning that we had retreated, immediately pursued us. The wind being against us, and my vessel so torn to pieces, that it was almost impossible to keep her above water; my sails were so shot, that carrying sail split them from foot to head, and I was obliged to come to anchor at twelve o'clock to mend my sails. When we had completed that, we made sail, just at evening. The enemy still pursued us all night. I found next morning that they gained upon us very fast, and that they would very soon overtake me. The rest of the fleet being all much ahead of me, I sent my boat on board of General Arnold, to get liberty to put my wounded in the boat, and send them forward, and run my vessel on shore and blow her up. I received for answer, by no means to run her ashore, but to push forward to Split Rock, where he would draw the fleet in a line, and engage them again; but when I came to Split Rock, the whole fleet was making their escape as fast as they could, and left me in the rear, to fall into the enemy's hands. But before I struck to them, the ship of eighteen twelve-pounders, and a schooner of fourteen six-pounders, had surrounded me, which obliged me to strike, and I thought it prudent to surrender myself prisoner of war. As soon as I was taken, General Arnold, with four gondolas, ran ashore and blew up the vessels ahead of me. One thing I have omitted in the former part of my letter, that is, the Royal Savage ran ashore on the Point of Valeour in the first of the engagement, and was lost.

I will just give the strength of the British fleet upon the lake: One ship, carrying six twenty-four-pounders, brass; twelve twelve-pounders, brass; four eight-inch howitzers; one

ship, eighteen twelve-pounders; one schooner, fourteen six-pounders; one schooner, twelve six-pounders; two gondolas, one carrying six, the other four carriage-guns; twenty-eight row-boats, carrying one gun each, from eighteen to twelve pounders, and some of them carrying howitzers. This is the truest account I am able to give.

Sir, I would have waited on the Congress in person, had it not have been that my parole confined me to Connecticut. But I hope I shall not be neglected in being exchanged, if any opportunity there be.

I remain, sir, with the greatest esteem, your honor's most obedient and very humble servant,

DAVID WATERBURY, JR.

IV.

GENERAL GUY CARLETON'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

ON BOARD THE MARIA, OFF CROWN POINT, }
October 14, 1776. }

MY LORD:—The rebel fleet upon Lake Champlain has been entirely defeated in two actions, the first on the eleventh instant, between the Island of Valcour and the main, and the second on the thirteenth, within a few leagues of Crown Point.

We have taken Mr. Waterbury, the second in command, one of their brigadier-generals, with two of their vessels, and ten others have been burnt and destroyed; only three, of fifteen sail, a list of which I transmit, having escaped. For farther particulars I refer your lordship to Lieutenant Daer, who will be the bearer of this letter, and had a share in both actions, particularly the first, where his gallant behavior in the Carleton schooner, which he commanded, distinguished him so much as to merit great commendation; and I beg to recommend him to your lordship's notice and favor.

At the same time, I cannot omit taking notice to your lordship of the good service done in the first action by the spirited conduct of a number of officers and men of the corps of artillery, who

served the gun-boats, which, together with the Carleton, sustained, for many hours, the whole fire of the enemy's fleet, the rest of our vessels not being able to work up near enough to join effectually in the engagement.

The rebels, upon the news reaching them of the defeat of their naval force, set fire to all the buildings and houses in and near Crown Point, and retired to Ticonderoga.

The season is so far advanced that I cannot yet pretend to inform your lordship whether any thing farther can be done this year.

I am, &c., GUY CARLETON.

LIST OF THE REBELS' VESSELS, ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN, BEFORE THEIR DEFEAT.

Schooners.

Royal Savage, eight six-pounders and four four-pounders. Went on shore, was set fire to, and blown up.

Revenge, four six-pounders and four four-pounders. Escaped.

A sloop, ten four-pounders. Escaped.

Row-galleys.

Congress, two eighteen-pounders in the bow, two twelve and two two-pounders in the stern, and six six-pounders in the sides. Blew up.

Washington, same force. Taken.

Trumbull, same force. Escaped.

The Lee, a cutter, one nine-pounder in the bow, one twelve-pounder in the stern, and four six-pounders in the sides. Run into a bay, and not known whether destroyed.

Gondolas.

Boston, one eighteen-pounder in the bow, two twelve-pounders in the sides. Sunk.

Jersey, ditto. Taken.

One, name unknown, same force. Run ashore. Five, ditto, ditto. Blown up.

Other vessels, not in the action.

A schooner, eight four-pounders. Sent from their fleet for provisions.

A galley, said to be of greater force than those mentioned above, fitting out at Ticonderoga.

G. C.

V.

CAPT. PRINGLE'S DISPATCH TO THE ADMIRALTY.

ON BOARD THE MARIA, OFF CROWN POINT, {
October 15, 1776. }

It is with the greatest pleasure that I embrace this opportunity of congratulating their lordships upon the victory completed the 13th of this month, by His Majesty's fleet under my command, upon Lake Champlain.

Upon the 11th I came up with the rebel fleet, commanded by Benedict Arnold; they were at anchor, under the island Valeour, and formed a strong line, extending from the island to the west side of the continent. The wind was so unfavorable, that for a considerable time nothing could be brought to action with them but the gun-boats. The Carleton, schooner, commanded by Mr. Daeres, who brings their lordships this, by much perseverance, at last got to their assistance; but as none of the other vessels of the fleet could then get up, I did not think it by any means advisable to continue so partial and unequal a combat, consequently, with the approbation of his Excellency, General Carleton, who did me the honor of being on board the Maria, I called off the Carleton and gun-boats, and brought the whole fleet to anchor in a line as near as possible to the rebels, that their retreat might be cut off, which purpose was, however, frustrated by the extreme obscurity of the night; and in the morning the rebels

had got a considerable distance from us, up the lake.

Upon the 13th, I again saw eleven sail of their fleet making off to Crown Point, who, after a chase of seven hours, I came up with, in the Maria, having the Carleton and Inflexible a short distance astern; the rest of the fleet almost out of sight. The action began at twelve o'clock, and lasted two hours, at which time Arnold, in the Congress, and five gondolas, ran ashore, and were directly abandoned and blown up by the enemy, a circumstance they were greatly favored in by the wind being off shore, and the narrowness of the lake. The Washington galley struck during the action, and the rest made their escape to Ticonderoga. The killed and wounded in His Majesty's fleet, including the artillery in the gun-boats, do not amount to forty; but from every information I have yet got, the loss of the enemy must indeed be very considerable.

Many particulars, which their lordships may wish to know, I must at present take the liberty of referring you to Mr. Daeres for; but as I am well convinced his modesty will not permit him to say how great a share he had in this victory, give me leave to assure you, that during both actions, nothing could be more pointedly good than his conduct. I must also do the justice the officers and seamen of this fleet merit, by saying, that every person under my command exerted themselves to act up to the character of British seamen.

CHAPTER XIV.

OCTOBER 28, 1776.

THE BATTLE OF THE WHITE PLAINS.

THE retreat from Long Island; the evacuation of the city of New York and its occupation by the enemy; the occupation of the rocky heights lying between Manhattanville and Kingsbridge, by the American army; and the spirited affair on the Harlem Plains, wherein the gallant Knowlton and Leitch fell in defence of their country, have already received the notice which the character of this work requires. A passing notice has also been paid to the distress of the American army, and to the dissatisfaction which prevailed in its ranks, inducing great numbers of the men to desert, and leaving the commander-in-chief with a moiety only of the army he had commanded previous to the unfortunate affair on Long Island.

With great industry the American army intrenched itself among the hills around "Kingsbridge,"¹ and all the efforts of General Howe to draw it from its intrenchments to the plains below proved unsuccessful.² His experience had proved the danger of attacking the

lines,³ and he wisely concluded to gain the rear, with the view of cutting off the communication with New England, of forcing the army from its position, and of bringing it to a general action.⁴

For the purpose of facilitating this movement, on the ninth of October, Admiral Howe dispatched three frigates, under Captain Hyde Parker, to Tarrytown,⁵ with the evident intention of giving encouragement to the yeomanry of Westchester county—the greater part of whom were "favorably disposed to the government,"⁶—in the disposition which they had shown to arm and march against their countrymen.⁵ The prompt movement of two regiments of Massachusetts troops, under General Lincoln;⁶ the active vigilance of Colonel Hammond, of the Westchester militia, and a few men of his command;⁷ the detach-

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatches, Sept. 25, and Nov. 30; Dunlap's New York, ii. p. 79.—² Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—³ Gaine's N. Y. Mercury, Oct. 14, 1776; Heath's Mem., p. 68; Gov. G. Clinton to Com. of Safety, Oct. 10; Middlesex (London) Journal, No. 1193.

⁴ Gov. Tryon's dispatch, Nov. 28, 1776.—⁵ Journal of the Com. of Safety of N. Y., Oct. 10 and 11, 1776.

⁶ Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Oct. 15.

⁷ Minutes of Prov. Convention of N. Y.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatches, Sept. 21, and Nov. 30, 1776; Graydon's Memoirs, p. 175.—² Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 202.

ment of a body of Continental troops, under Colonel Sargeant, to watch the ships;¹ and the promptitude of the Provincial Congress of the State, in calling for aid from Connecticut to suppress the intended insurrection,² effectually checked the spirit of the Tories of Westchester county, and rendered the visit of Captain Hyde Parker to the manor-house in Sleepy-Hollow entirely useless.

"All previous arrangements being made" for the movement, the first detachment of the enemy's forces left Turtle Bay early in the morning of the twelfth of October; and, taking advantage of a dense fog, passed through Hurlgate and the Sound, without being discovered by the American sentinels, and landed, the same morning, on Throgg's Neck, in Westchester county.³ In the afternoon of the same day the second detachment of the enemy's force also passed through Hurlgate,⁴ and all reached Throgg's Neck in safety.

Here General Howe met an old acquaintance. When his advance parties approached the creek which separates the Neck from the main land, they encountered Colonel Prescott and his regiment (whose acquaintance General Howe had made on Breed's Hill, more than a year previously), and their progress was checked.⁵ Nearly a week the Colonel confined the enemy on the Neck,

when he crossed over to Pell's Neck,—a short distance eastward from Throgg's Neck,—whence he passed to the main, after a gallant opposition from a brigade of troops under Colonel Glover.²

For several days the intentions of the enemy were not fully understood in the American camp; but, on the sixteenth of October, a council of war advised a retreat to the White Plains,³ about sixteen miles north of the encampment at Kingsbridge, and immediate steps were taken to carry it into effect.⁴ Of the masterly manner in which that retreat was conducted,⁵ of the narrow escape of General Lee and the fourth grand division of the army,⁶ of the various inexplicable halts and movements of the enemy,⁷ and of the constant and daring attacks on the enemy's forces by detached parties from the American camp,⁸ the historians of the war have paid some notice, and to their works the reader is referred.

The American army reached the White Plains, in detachments, from the twenty-first to the twenty-sixth of Oc-

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30: Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 203-205; Gordon, ii. p. 337.—² Heath's Mem., p. 73; Col. Glover's letter in Freeman's Journal, Nov. 26, 1776; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—³ Minutes of Council, inclosed in Gen. Washington's dispatch to Cong., Oct. 18, 1776.—⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

⁵ With the enemy within a short distance, and sometimes in sight, the baggage, &c., was removed without teams, and the army retreated to, and occupied, a new position without the loss of a man, and but a little of the baggage.—⁶ Letter from officer to his friend in Edinburgh; Heath's Mem., p. 76.—⁷ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

⁸ Ibid.; Col. Harrison to Cong., Oct. 20; Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Oct. 28; Heath's Mem., p. 76; Marshall, ii. pp. 573-575; Hall's Civil War, p. 205; Life of Reed, i. p. 245.

¹ Heath's Mem., p. 69.—² Journal of N. Y. Com. of Safety, Oct. 11.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Gordon, ii. p. 336; Hall's Civil War, p. 203; Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 12.—⁴ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 13; Heath's Mem., p. 71.—Heath's Mem., pp. 67-70; Life of Pres. Reed, i. p. 244.

tober,¹ and took post on the high grounds to the northwest and northeast of the village, and on the lower ground between them, extending from the Bronx River, on the right, to Horton's (now Willett's) Pond, on the left.² On this line temporary breastworks were thrown up, and where the *upper* line crossed the post-road,—near the residence of Alexander C. Tompkins, Esq.,—a redoubt of sods guarded the passage.³

In front of the lines lay the limited White Plains, and the little village bearing the same name, while southwest from the right of the lines, and separated from them by a narrow marsh, through which flows the little stream called the Bronx River, rises the rocky height known as Chatterton's Hill.⁴ This elevation is the last of several similar ones which skirt the western bank of the Bronx, for several miles; and on its eastern and southeastern sides, at the foot of which the Bronx flows, it presents an abrupt, rocky face; while in all other directions the ascent is gradual, and the productive fields which it bears give testimony not only to the industry of their owners, but to the fertility of the soil.

The enemy having advanced towards the White Plains as far as Scarsdale, where he laid encamped three days, on Monday morning, the twenty-eighth of October, he formed his army into two columns, and marched towards the Amer-

ican lines, four miles distant.¹ The right column, commanded by General Sir Henry Clinton, was composed principally of British troops; the left column, with which was General Howe, was composed principally of Hessians, and commanded by Lieutenant-general de Heister.²

The light-infantry and chasseurs drove before them the pickets and advance parties from the American camp, until a party of two thousand Eastern troops, under General Spencer, which had been sent out to check the enemy's progress, were encountered near the present village of Hart's Corners, a little more than a mile south of the lines. This party was advantageously posted "on the old York Road," and gave the advancing Hessians a full discharge of musketry, which threw them into disorder; yet they, themselves, appear to have been terror-stricken at what they had done, and retired from their position, passing through the Bronx at "the ford,"—a short distance below the railroad bridge, between White Plains and Hart's Corners,—and seeking refuge in the hills of Greenburg, closely pursued by a brigade of Hessians, commanded by Count Rahl,³ who afterwards abandoned the chase and took a position on a hill, south from Chatterton's Hill, on the western margin of the Harlem Railroad.⁴

¹ Heath's Mem., pp. 73-76.—² Sparks' Washington, p. 195; Heath's Mem., p. 75; J. W. Tompkins' Address.

³ J. W. Tompkins' Anniversary Address, Oct. 28, 1845.

⁴ Marshall, ii. p. 575

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Heath's Mem., pp. 77, 78; Gordon, ii. p. 340.—² Marshall, ii. p. 576; Stedman, i. p. 212.—³ Journal of Maj. Benjamin Tallimage, in manuscript, owned by his son, Frederic A. Tallimage, Esq., of New York; Gordon, ii. pp. 340, 341; Lieut. Hall, p. 207; Stedman, i. p. 212; Letter from the army, Nov. 1

⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

While the enemy was on his march, General Washington had dispatched Colonel Rufus Putnam with a party of militia to Chatterton's Hill, with orders to throw up some intrenchments;¹ and, soon afterwards, Colonel Haslett, with the Delaware regiment, was ordered to strengthen the position, while General Alexander McDougal, with his brigade, was ordered to the same post, and directed to assume the chief command.²

Colonel Haslett reached the hill about the same time that General Spencer commenced to retreat before the Hessians on the plains below, and a portion of the cannonade which was opened by the enemy was directed against his party.³ At the second fire, one of the militia-men who had been sent with Colonel Putnam was wounded in the thigh, "upon which the whole regiment broke and fled immediately, and were not rallied without much difficulty."⁴

Shortly afterwards, and before the main body of the enemy had entered the Plains, General McDougal reached the hill. His brigade consisted of the skeletons of the First and Third New York regiments, the Maryland regiment, under Colonel Smallwood, a regiment from Connecticut, under Colonel Webb, and a regiment of Massachusetts militia, under Colonel Brooks.⁵ These

regiments had been greatly reduced by sickness and special commands, and, in the aggregate, did not number much more than fourteen hundred and fifty men.¹

Placing the militia, under Colonel Brooks, behind a stone wall, on the right of his line, towards the southern slope of the hill, with Colonel Haslett's Delaware regiment to support them,² he formed his own brigade farther to the left, and nearer the summit of the hill, with Colonel Smallwood's Marylanders on his right, and Colonel Webb's Connecticut troops on his left.³ Afterwards, when the movements of the enemy, on the plains below, showed the plan of attack which he had adopted, General McDougal, at the suggestion of Colonel Haslett, and in consideration of the cowardice which had been displayed by the militia, ordered the Maryland and Third New York regiments to the extreme right of the line, to oppose the combined attack of Colonel Rahel and the left of the column, which then crossed the Bronx, and in that order awaited the approach of the enemy.⁴

When General Howe had advanced so far that the force on the hill became visible, he ordered both columns of his

¹ Col. Harrison to Cong., Oct. 29; Hildreth's Mem. of R. Putnam, p. 64.—² Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Nov. 12; Marshall, ii. p. 575; Sparks' Washington, p. 196; Life of Gen. Hull, p. 54.—³ Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Nov. 12.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Returns of the Army, Nov. 3; Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Nov. 12.

¹ "The General Returns of the Army," Nov. 3, showed McDougal's brigade to have had 829 men fit for duty; Brooks' regiment of militia, 340 men, and Haslett's regiment, 273 men — total, 1442, then fit for duty. The "*alterations* since the previous return" (during which period the battle was fought), were 23 dead, 2 discharged, 15 deserted.—² Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Nov. 12

³ Ibid.—⁴ Ibid. Col. Haslett makes no reference to the Third N. Y. regiment, under Col. Ritzema, but nearly all the letters written from the camp, at that time, say the two regiments stood side by side throughout the battle.

army to halt, and the general officers were summoned to a council on the spot.¹ It was of short duration, but it soon became evident that General Howe's entire plan of operations had been changed, and that the main lines of the American army were not to be attacked until after the force under General McDougal had been removed from the advantageous position it occupied on the left flank of the enemy, although the numerical weakness of the party was evidently unknown.

In the prosecution of the new arrangements General Howe ordered several field-pieces to advance to the edge of the marsh, in the vicinity of the railroad station at the White Plains, and a heavy fire was opened on General McDougal's command.² An attempt was made to return it from the hill, but the three or four field-pieces employed were "so poorly appointed" that but little execution was done, and they were speedily dismounted.³ "The enemy then made a nearer approach, and with chain and grape shot continued the cannonade for more than an hour."⁴

While this was continued, the necessary preparations were made for attacking General McDougal—the main bodies of both armies remaining inactive spectators of the scene.⁵

The brigade of Hessian grenadiers, under Count Donop, which had formed

a part of General Clinton's command, was ordered to the left; while orders were given to a battalion of Hessians to pass the Bronx, and attack General McDougal in front, the Second brigade of British troops, under General Leslie, and the brigade of Hessian grenadiers, just referred to, being ordered to support them. At the same time, Colonel Rahl was ordered to charge the militia on the right of the American lines;¹ and thus attacked simultaneously, in front and flank, the speedy repulse of the American forces was evidently anticipated.

There appears to have been some difficulty in the execution of these orders, however, and while the Hessian forlorn hope appear to have crossed the stream, as they were ordered, the supporting parties passed down to "the ford," half a mile below, and *waded* the stream at that place.²

After the two brigades had crossed the stream, they marched along the western bank of the river, at the foot of the hill,—on the line of what is now known as *the Mill Lane*,—until the right of the column came opposite to the left of General McDougal's line, when they halted, and, by facing to the left, formed a line parallel with that on the hill, when they ascended the rocky face of the hill with great steadiness,

¹ Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Nov. 12.

² Col. Harrison to Cong., Oct. 29; Life of Gen. Hull, p. 54.—³ Life of Gen. Hull, p. 54. See also Col. Haslett's letter to Thos. Rodney, Nov. 12.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 209.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

² Stedman, i. p. 214; Sparks, p. 196; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Heath's Mem., p. 78. Some authors assert that a bridge was built over the Bronx for the passage of the troops, but there is no cotemporary evidence of it. In fact, *all the evidence* derived from cotemporary authorities shows that they *forsawd* the stream.

notwithstanding the opposition of the American troops,¹ the cannonade from the eastern bank of the river, which had been incessant for an hour, having been discontinued to allow their advance.²

In three separate divisions the enemy ascended the hill,³ attacking, simultaneously, the Maryland and Third New York regiments on the southern slope; the Delaware regiment and the militia on the summit of the hill; and the First New York and the Connecticut regiments on the north; while Colonel Rahl, with his brigade of Hessians, advancing from the hill which he had occupied after the retreat of General Spencer's brigade, attacked the right flank.

The field-pieces under Colonel Haslett did but little good;⁴ the militia, which had been posted behind the wall, fled in confusion, without more than a random scattering fire;⁵ and the conflict, although obstinately carried on by Colonel Haslett, was too uneven to be long continued.

On the right, Colonels Smallwood and Ritzema led their men to the edge of the hill⁶ and vigorously opposed the ascent of the enemy, contesting nobly the possession of every inch of the ground.⁷

On the left, the Connecticut and New York troops were attacked by the British and Hessian light troops, with the evident design of turning General

McDongal's left flank, and cutting off his communication with the main body of the army.¹ The General, perceiving this movement, ordered Colonel Webb to take a position farther to the left, to check it; and Captain William Hull was detached from the line, with a body of men, for that purpose.² This order was executed with promptitude, gallantry, and effect. Although more than double his number, the enemy was repulsed, and the line of communication with the main army, through which a safe retreat was soon afterwards accomplished, was preserved.³

On every part of the hill the ground was obstinately contested, and the advancing columns of the enemy were, more than once, thrown into disorder.⁴ But the uneven contest could not long continue, and General McDongal's troops were compelled to give way. They moved off with sullenness, however, "in a great body," as an eye-witness describes it, "neither running or observing the best order;"⁵ and the enemy made no attempt whatever to pursue them, but simply "dressed his line," and made preparations for his dinner.⁶

Of the numbers engaged in this affair the records give complete evidence. The American force, exclusive of the troops under General Spencer and the two regiments of militia, all of whom

¹ Heath's Memoirs, p. 78.—² Ibid., pp. 78, 79.

³ Life of Gen. Hull, p. 55.—⁴ Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Nov. 12.—⁵ Ibid.; Marshall ii. p. 577.

⁶ Marshall, ii. p. 577.—⁷ Letter from White Plains to Annapolis, Oct. 29; Marshall, ii. p. 577.

¹ Life of Gen. Hull, p. 55.—² Gen. Brooks to Gen. H. Dearborn, Feb. 4, 1814; Life of Gen. Hull, p. 55.

³ Gen. Brooks to Gen. H. Dearborn, Feb. 4, 1814; Life of Gen. Hull, p. 55.—⁴ Letter from White Plains to Annapolis, Md., Oct. 29.—⁵ Heath's Memoirs, p. 79.

⁶ Ibid.; Sparks' Washington, p. 196.

ran away without rendering any other service,¹ was about twelve hundred men;² the enemy's comprised the Hessian regiment sent forward as a forlorn hope;³ the regiments of Knyphausen, Lossberg, and Rahl, comprising the brigade of Hessians commanded by Colonel Rahl;⁴ the corps of chasseurs, and Linsing's, Mingerode's, Lengereck's, and Kockler's regiments of Hessians, commanded by Count Donop;⁵ and the Fifth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-fifth, and Forty-ninth regiments of British troops under General Leslie,⁶—thirteen regiments of healthy, well-appointed troops.

The loss of the Americans, including all those who fell or died within the week in which the battle was fought, was, in General Spencer's party, twenty-four killed and twenty-one wounded; in General McDougal's party on the hill, exclusive of the Delaware regiment, from which no returns of the *wounded* have been found, thirty-five killed and forty-four wounded.⁷ They lost also the following prisoners: "One captain,

two lieutenants, one quartermaster, and thirty-five privates."¹ General Howe reported that the Hessians lost seventy-four men, killed, wounded, and missing, including one captain and two lieutenants; and that the British troops lost a lieutenant-colonel, two captains, one lieutenant, one ensign, a sergeant, and twenty-two privates killed; one captain, four lieutenants, twelve sergeants, and one hundred and twelve privates wounded.²

After retiring from the hill, General McDougal led his troops over the bridge west from the railroad station, and falling in the rear of General Beals' Flying Camp, which had been sent, under General Putnam, to reinforce him, he marched into the lines, east of the Bronx, without interruption from the enemy.³

During the night after the battle, General Washington drew back his lines and strengthened his works to so great an extent that General Howe considered an attack too hazardous, and ordered reinforcements from Mamaroneck and New York.⁴

On the night of the thirty-first of October, General Washington silently evacuated his lines,⁵ and fell back to "The Hills," a very strong position, about two miles north from the White

¹ Vide p. 181, note 5, 1st column. The efforts of some authors to secure for Cols. Silliman, Donglass, Chester, &c., whose commands composed this party, the credit of the action on the hill, are ridiculous. Their own major of brigade (Tallimage) says they retreated before Rahl across the Bronx; and Gordon and other writers, whose opportunities were ample, sustain him.—² Vide p. 179, note 1, 2d column.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

⁴ This brigade was captured at Trenton, and Col. Rahl was killed. The regiments composing it appear in the reports of that splendid victory.

⁵ The regiments of which this brigade was composed are known from the "Report of the Distribution of the Army," signed by Gen. Howe.

⁶ Returns of Gen. Leslie, Oct. 28.

⁷ Returns of killed and wounded of the several regiments and brigades, in Force's Am. Archives, 5th series, vol. iii., folios 715-730

¹ "Returns of prisoners taken in the campaign, 1776," appended to Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 3.

² Returns of killed, &c., inclosed in his dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, Dec. 3.—³ Col. Haslett to Gen. Rodney, Nov. 12; Marshall, ii. p. 578.—⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Gordon, ii. p. 342.—⁵ Heath's Mem., p. 80; Gordon, ii. p. 343; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 210.

Plains, where the enemy could not approach him without certain defeat.¹

On the following morning General Howe gave evidence of his disappointment by cannonading the left of the lines,—between the post-road and Horton's Pond,—where General Heath commanded; killing one American, without doing any other damage.²

On the fourth of November the ene-

my's forces began to withdraw from the White Plains, and on the following day the main body retired, by way of Dobbs' Ferry, to Kingsbridge,¹ whence, soon afterwards, they invested Fort Washington, and began to secure that series of victories which carried distress into the American camp, and dismay into the hearts of the people, from one extremity of the Confederacy to the other.

D O C U M E N T S.

I.

COLONEL R. H. HARRISON'S (GENERAL WASHINGTON'S SECRETARY) TO CONGRESS.

WHITE PLAINS, October 29, 1776.

SIR:—The situation of our affairs not permitting his Excellency to write himself, I have it in charge to inform you, that on yesterday morning, about ten o'clock, the enemy appeared in several large columns in our front, and from their first movements, seemed as if they meant an attack there. However, halting for a little time, their main body filed off to our left, and presently began a most severe and incessant cannonade, at a part of our troops who had taken post on a hill, with a view of throwing up some lines. At the same time, they advanced in two divisions, and, after a smart engagement for about a quarter of an hour, obliged our men to give way. Our loss is not certainly known, but from conjecture, is between four and five hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. What theirs was, we have not heard. After gaining the hill (upon which they are intrenching), and leaving a sufficient number of men and artillery to prevent our repossessing it, they proceeded to advance by our left, and as far as I can dis-

cover, their posts or encampments now form nearly a semicircle. It is evident their design is to get in our rear, according to their original plan. Every measure is taken to prevent them, but the removal of our baggage, &c., is attended with infinite difficulty and delays. Our post, from its situation, is not so advantageous as could be wished, and was only intended as temporary and occasional, till the stores belonging to the army, which had been deposited here, could be removed. The enemy coming on so suddenly has distressed us much. They are now close at hand, and most probably will, in a little time, commence their second attack. We expect it every hour. Perhaps it is beginning: I have just heard the report of some cannon.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

ROBT. H. HARRISON.

To the Hon. JOHN HANCOCK, Esq., President of Congress.

II.

COL. HASLETT TO GEN. THOMAS RODNEY.

November 12 1776.

I received his Excellency's orders to take possession of the hill (Chatterton's Hill) beyond our lines, and the command of the militia regi-

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Gordon, ii. p. 344; Sparks, p. 197.—² Heath's Memoirs, pp. 80-82.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

ments there posted; which was done. We had not been many minutes on the ground when the cannonade began, and the second shot wounded a militiaman in the thigh, upon which the whole regiment broke and fled immediately, and were not rallied without much difficulty. Soon after, General McDougal's brigade took post behind us. Some of our officers expressed much apprehension from the fire of our friends so posted. On my application to the General, he ordered us to the right, formed his own brigade on the left, and ordered Brooks' Massachusetts militia still farther to the right, behind a stone fence.

The troops being thus disposed, I went up to the top of the hill, in front of our troops, accompanied by Major McDonough, to reconnoitre the enemy. I plainly perceived them marching to the White Plains, in eight columns, and stop in the wheat-fields a considerable time. I saw their general officers on horseback assemble in council, and soon their whole body face about, and, in one continued column, march to the hill opposite our right. I then applied to General McDougal again to vary his disposition, and advised him to order my regiment farther onward, and replace it with Colonel Smallwood's, or order the Colonel forward, for there was no dependence to be placed on the militia. The latter measure was adopted.

On my seeing the enemy's march to the creek begin in a column of their main body, and urging the necessity of bringing our field-pieces immediately forward to bear on them, the General ordered one, and that so poorly appointed, that myself was forced to assist in dragging it along the rear of the regiment.

While so employed, a cannon-ball struck the carriage, and scattered the shot about, a wad of tow blazing in the middle. The artillerymen fled. One alone was prevailed on to tread out the blaze and collect the shot. The few that returned made not more than two discharges, when they retreated with the field-piece. At this time the Maryland battalion was warmly engaged, and the enemy ascending the hill, the cannonade from twelve or fifteen pieces, well served, kept up a continual peal of reiterated thunder. The militiamen behind the fence fled in confusion, without more than a random scat-

tering fire. Colonel Smallwood, in a quarter of an hour afterwards, gave way also. The rest of General McDougal's brigade never came up to the scene of action.

Part of the first three Delaware companies also retreated in disorder, but not till after several were wounded and killed. The left of the regiment took post behind a fence on the top of the hill, with most of the officers, and twice repulsed the light troops and horse of the enemy; but seeing ourselves deserted on all hands, and the continued column of the enemy advancing, we also retired. Covering the retreat of our party, and forming at the foot of the hill, we marched into camp in the rear of the body sent to reinforce us.

III.

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

NEW YORK, November 30, 1776.

MY LORD:—The service in which I have been employed, since the departure of Captain Balfour, with advice of the reduction of New York, would not allow of an earlier time to send an account to your lordship of the progress made from that period.

The very strong positions the enemy had taken on this island, and fortified with incredible labor, determined me to get upon their principal communication with Connecticut, with a view of forcing them to quit the strongholds in the neighborhood of Kingsbridge, and, if possible, to bring them to action.

All previous arrangements being made, the army embarked on the 12th of October, in flat-boats and other craft, and pressing through the dangerous navigation of Hell Gate in a very thick fog, landed on Frog's Neck, near the town of Westchester, about nine in the morning; the Carysfort frigate being placed to cover the descent. The presence of Lord Howe, the activity of Commodore Hotham, most of the captains of the fleet, and of the navy officers in general, were infinitely conducive to the King's service in this difficult movement: only one artillery-boat was overset, having three six-pounders on

board, which were lost, and three men drowned. Lieutenant-general Earl Percy remained with two brigades of British and one of the Hessians, in the lines near Harlem, to cover New York.

The army remained in this situation until the stores and provisions could be brought up, and three battalions of Hessians drawn from Staten Island, which, together with some bad weather intervening, occasioned a delay of five days.

On the 18th, several corps re-embarked in flat-boats, and passing round Frog's Neck, landed on Pell's Point, at the mouth of Hutchinson's River; after which the main body crossed the mouth of that river to the same place, advanced immediately, and laid that night upon their arms, with the left upon a creek opposite to East Chester, and the right near to Rochelle.

On the march to this ground, a skirmish ensued with a small party of the enemy, posted to defend a narrow causeway, who were pursued for a mile, when a considerable body appearing in front, behind stone walls and in woods, some companies of light-infantry and a part of the chasseurs were detached to dislodge them, which they did effectually. Lieutenant-colonel Musgrave, commanding the First battalion of light-infantry, and Captain Evelyn of the Fourth regiment, were both wounded; the latter is since dead, and much to be regretted as a gallant officer; but Lieutenant-colonel Musgrave is in a fair way of recovery. Three soldiers were killed and twenty wounded.

The enemy's loss upon this occasion, was a Lieutenant-colonel killed, a Major wounded, and about ninety men killed and wounded. The part of the Sixteenth light-dragoons, that arrived with Lieutenant-colonel Harecourt on the 3d instant (one transport being still missing), and the whole of the Seventeenth light-dragoons, joined the army on the 20th.

On the 21st, the right and centre of the army moved to a position about two miles to the northward of Rochelle, on the road to the White Plains, leaving Lieutenant-general Heister, with two brigades of Hessians and one of British, to occupy the former ground. Lieutenant-colonel Rogers, with his corps of Rangers, was detached to take possession of Mamaroneck, where the carelessness of his sentries exposed

him to a surprise from a large body of the enemy, by which he lost a few men, killed or taken; nevertheless, by a spirited exertion, he obliged them to retreat, leaving behind them some prisoners, and several killed and wounded.

The Sixth brigade, commanded by Brigadier Agnew, was moved the 22d to sustain the post of Mamaroneck. On the same day, Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, with the Second division of Hessians and regiment of Waldeckers, having arrived the 18th at New York, landed at Rochelle, was ordered to remain there to cover the disembarkation of the stores and provisions.

Upon the movement of the army to Frog's Neck, the enemy detached a corps to White Plains, and quitted their position about Kingsbridge with some precipitation, leaving two thousand men for the defence of Fort Washington, extending their force behind the Bronx, from Valentine's Hill to the White Plains, in detached camps, everywhere intrenched; their left by this means covering an upper communication with Connecticut, as well as the road along the North River, it was judged expedient to move to the White Plains, and endeavor to bring them to an action. Lieutenant-general Heister with his corps having orders to join on the march, the army moved in two columns on the 25th, and took a position with the Bronx in front, the right of the line being at the distance of four miles from the White Plains; upon which the rebels immediately quitted their detached camps between Kingsbridge and the White Plains, assembling their whole force at the latter place, behind intrenchments that had been thrown up by the advanced corps.

The army marched by the right in two columns towards the White Plains, early on the 28th, Lieutenant-general Clinton leading the right, and Lieutenant-general Heister the left column. Before noon all the enemy's advanced parties were drove back to their works by the light-infantry and chasseurs, and the army formed with the right upon the road from Mamaroneck to the White Plains, about a mile from the centre of their lines, and the left to the Bronx, near the same distance from the right flank of their intrenchments. A corps of the enemy was formed on a commanding ground, separated from the

right flank of their intrenchments by the Bronx, which also, by changing its course nearly at right angles, separated this corps in front from the left of the King's army. Colonel Rahl, who commanded a brigade of Hessians on the left, observing this position of the enemy, and seeing a height on the other side of the Bronx, unoccupied by them, from whence their flank might be galled, took possession of it with great alacrity, to the approbation of Lieutenant-general Heister, who was acquainted with this movement by Sir William Erskine. Upon viewing the situation, orders were given for a battalion of Hessians to pass the Bronx, and attack this detached corps, supported by the Second brigade of British, under the command of Brigadier-general Leslie, and the Hessian grenadiers, sent from the right, commanded by Colonel Donop; giving directions at the same time for Colonel Rahl to charge the enemy's flank as the Hessian battalion advanced to them in front; but there being some difficulty in passing the Bronx, the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-fifth regiments, who were the first to support, passed it in a place most practicable, and formed on the opposite side, though under the enemy's fire, with the greatest steadiness; ascended the steep hill in defiance to all opposition, and rushing on the enemy, routed and drove them back from their works. These two battalions were closely supported by the Fifth and Forty-ninth regiments, who showed the same zeal to distinguish themselves; the Hessian grenadiers also coming up, and passing the Bronx, ascended the height with the greatest alacrity and in the best order. This material post being gained, the Hessian grenadiers were ordered forward on the heights within cannon-shot of the intrenchments, the Bronx, from its winding course, being still between them and the enemy's right flank; the Second brigade of British formed in the rear of the Hessian grenadiers, and the two brigades of Hessians on the left of the Second brigade, with their left upon the road leading from Tarrytown to the White Plains. The right and centre of the army did not remove from their ground. In this position the troops lay upon their arms that night, and with very little alteration encamped next day. The officers and men of the British

and Hessian artillery deserve much commendation for their active services on this occasion.

The killed, wounded, and prisoners taken from the enemy during the course of this day, is said to be not less than two hundred and fifty. The loss of His Majesty's troops and allies was small, as your lordship will observe by the general return, considering the strength of the ground from whence the enemy was forced; though the loss of Lieutenant-colonel Carr, of the Thirty-fifth regiment, who died the next day of his wounds, is much to be lamented.

The enemy drew back their encampment on the night of the 28th; and observing their lines next morning much strengthened by additional works, the designed attack upon them was deferred; and the Fourth brigade left with Lord Percy, with two battalions of the Sixth brigade, were ordered to join the army. These battalions having joined on the 30th, in the afternoon, a disposition was made for the attack next day; but the night and morning proving very wet, it was postponed.

In the mean time, the rebels having intelligence by a deserter of their danger, most prudently evacuated their camp in the night of the 1st of November, after setting fire to all the houses in and near their lines, most of which were consumed, and retired with their main force towards North Castle, leaving a strong rear guard upon the heights and in the woods, for one mile back from their intrenchments, the possession of which was immediately taken, and the Hessian grenadiers remained upon the ground. All these motions plainly indicating the enemy's design to avoid coming to action, I did not think the driving their rear guard farther back an object of the least consequence.

Lieutenant-general Knyphausen being ordered, on the 28th of October, to leave the regiment of Waldeck at Rochelle, and to move with the six battalions of Hessians of his corps towards Kingsbridge, took post at Mile Square and Valentine's Hill, and on the 2d of November encamped on the island of New York, near to Kingsbridge: the enemy, quitting the heights of Fordham at his approach, retired to Fort Washington. The army was ordered on the 3d to provide three days' forage; and the next day

Major-general Grant marched with the Fourth brigade to Mile Square and Valentine's Hill; the Sixth brigade to a bridge over the Bronx, in Westchester, near De Lancey's mills; and the Waldeck regiment took post at another, three miles above the former, on the same river. On the 6th, the army encamped at Dobbs' Ferry, upon the North River. When this movement was made, the rebels came down from their strongholds, burning what they had not before destroyed at the White Plains, and distressing the inhabitants by small parties in a most wanton degree. The park of artillery moved to Kingsbridge on the 7th, under a strong escort, with a detachment of chasseurs, to join Lieutenant-general Knyphausen. Two battalions of light-infantry, and the remainder of the chasseurs, with four field-pieces, took post next day on the communication to Kingsbridge. On the 10th a brigade of Hessians was sent as a reinforcement to Lieutenant general Knyphausen. On the 12th the army marched in two columns towards Kingsbridge, and encamped the day following upon the heights of Fordham, forming a line with the right to the Bronx, upon the Westchester road, and the left to the North River.

* * * * *
I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,
W. HOWE.

IV.

MAJOR-GENERAL ALEXANDER McDUGAL.

Alexander McDougal was the son of a Scotchman, who served the inhabitants of New York with milk, but when he was born is unknown. In early life he followed a seafaring life, but must have left it before the troubles arose between the Colonies and the Ministry, as he was among the earliest, most consistent, and most decided of "The Sons of Liberty" of the city of New York, with whom originated most of the opposition to the Crown. When the commercial classes flinched and betrayed their associates, Alexander McDougal, with Marinus Willett, John Morin Scott, Alexander Hamilton, John Lamb, Isaac Sears, and others, many of whose names appear in these volumes, took

decided ground against them, and Alexander McDougal wrote the call for a popular meeting (and was imprisoned for doing so),—the largest meeting which had ever assembled in New York,—to denounce their action.

In 1774 he was a member of the Committee of Fifty-one, and was appointed, with Isaac Low, James Duane, and John Jay, a sub-committee on the vote of Boston renewing the non-importation league. His colleagues, co-operating with the officers of the Crown, refused to approve the measure, and McDougal and his friends withdrew from the body, called a meeting of the people in the Commons (now the Park), and presided over its deliberations. This meeting—which was ever known as "*The great meeting in the Fields*"—was addressed by Alexander Hamilton in the first political speech he had made, and carried dismay into the ranks of the royal officers, and of the syeophants who pandered to the royal cause.

When New York ordered troops to be raised, McDougal was called to the command of a regiment; and, on the ninth of August, 1776, the Continental Congress appointed him a brigadier-general in the army of the United States. In October, 1776, he commanded at the battle on Chatterton's Hill, known as "*The Battle of White Plains*." He also commanded at Peekskill, in March, 1777, when the enemy succeeded in destroying the stores at that place. He participated in the battle of Germantown, in October, 1777, and on the twentieth of that month was promoted to a Major-generalship by the Congress of the United States. In March, 1778, when General Putnam was removed from the command of the Highlands, General McDougal was placed in command of that station.

In 1781 he was elected a member of the Continental Congress, taking his seat in that body on the seventeenth of January; and on the twenty-seventh of February was elected by that body "Secretary of Marine," which he declined, in consequence of the duties of that office requiring him to retire from the line of the army.

He was afterwards elected to the Senate of the State of New York and to the presidency of the Bank of New York, and died on the eighth of June, 1786.

C H A P T E R X V.

November 16, 1776.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT WASHINGTON.

THE enemy had returned from his luckless expedition to the White Plains, and the various divisions of his army were gradually concentrating around Kingsbridge.¹ The object of these movements was, evidently, the capture of Fort Washington, the possession of which secured to the Americans the command of the Hudson River;² and, as the possession of the fort was considered "absolutely necessary" by General Howe,³ he made ample preparations for securing it. To facilitate this design, thirty flat-boats had been passed up the river, in the night of the fourteenth of November, under the directions of Captains Wilkinson and Molloy, without being discovered by the garrison, and the morning of the sixteenth of November was selected as the time for the attack.⁴

At this time Fort Washington and its dependencies covered a large area of ground, and required a greater number of men to defend them than were sta-

tioned there.¹ The fort was, in fact, the great central work, of which the redoubts, breastworks, &c., which covered the American position at Kingsbridge, referred to in the preceding chapter, were but accessories. It occupied the very elevated position—the highest point on the island—between One Hundred and Eighty-first and One Hundred and Eighty-sixth streets, and completely commanded the navigation of the river. It was a strong earth-work, of irregular form, covering, with its ravelins, several acres of ground; and inclosing within its area a still stronger work, in which was the magazine. On the point below the fort, known as *Jeffry's Hook* or *Fort Washington Point*, where the telegraph masts stand, was a redoubt, which was intended as a covering to the *chevaux-de-frise* and other obstructions constructed in the channel of the river at that place. About half a mile north from the fort, on the same elevated range, was a redoubt mounting

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30. — ² Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16; Same, Nov. 19. — ³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Hall's Civil War, p. 211.

⁴ Lord Howe's dispatch to the Admiralty, Nov. 23; Sparks' Washington, p. 198; Hall's Civil War, p. 214.

¹ Graydon's Mem., pp. 191-194; Letter from Fort Lee, Nov. 17; Col. Reed to Gen. Lee, Nov. 21; Gen. Greene to Gov. Cooke, Dec. 4

two guns; while at the extreme point of the island, overlooking *Spuyt den Duyvel Kill*, was a small redoubt, mounting two guns, and known as *Cock Hill Fort*; and on the Westchester shore was a square redoubt, with bastions, known as *Fort Independence*. There were also batteries, redoubts, &c., at Manhattanville, along the heights west from the Harlem River, and along the Kingsbridge Road. In the vicinity of One Hundred and Fifty-first-street, a line of intrenchments, with three batteries and abatis, crossed the island; and half a mile farther north a similar line, with batteries and abatis, was constructed. From Colonel Morris's house, westward, along the line of One Hundred and Seventieth-street, a third line of works crossed the island; and all the prominent points on the Harlem River were properly protected.¹ When General Knyphausen first approached Fort Washington, the garrison did not number over twelve hundred men,² and, although an equal number of militiamen were afterwards sent over by General Greene, it is exceedingly doubtful if the garrison was much strengthened by the reinforcement.³ Ten thousand experienced soldiers would have been required, if the works had been properly manned; and, looking back on the subject, with the knowledge which we possess, it appears to have been a sad mistake in attempting to hold the position under such great disadvantages.

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 816; Graydon's Mem., pp. 197, 198.—² Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16.

³ Graydon, p. 191.

On the fifteenth of November, the Adjutant-general of the British army, Colonel Patterson, was sent to summon the garrison to surrender, threatening, at the same time, to "put it to the sword," if the summons was rejected.¹ Of course Colonel Magaw, to whom the defence of the fort had been intrusted, declined the invitation, and sent a copy of his answer to General Greene.² Colonel Magaw disposed of his little force with considerable skill. Colonel Rawlings, with the regiment of riflemen which he commanded, was posted in the redoubt north of the fort, a few of his men being ordered to the *Cock Hill Fort*, already referred to;³ Colonel Baxter, and the militia which he commanded, was posted on the heights along the Harlem River;⁴ Colonel Cadwalader, and the regiment he commanded, about eight hundred in number, were posted at the lower lines which crossed the island, as has been shown, on the line of One Hundred and Fifty-first-street;⁵ and the remainder of the troops were scattered in the different works, Colonel Magaw, with a small party, remaining in the fort.⁶

Early in the morning, on the sixteenth of November, the enemy opened a heavy fire on the positions occupied

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Col. Magaw to Gen. Greene, Nov. 15; Stedman, i. p. 217; Gordon, ii. p. 348.

² Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16; Graydon's Mem., p. 190; Col. Magaw to Col. Patterson, Adj.-Gen. of British army, Nov. 15.—³ Marshall, ii. p. 587; Graydon, pp. 194, 199; Irving, ii. p. 420.—⁴ Lossing's Field Book, ii. pp. 825, 826; Irving, ii. p. 420; Graydon, pp. 194, 199.

⁵ Graydon's Mem., pp. 194, 199; Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16.—⁶ Marshall, ii. p. 587; Lossing, ii. p. 326; Graydon, pp. 194, 199.

by Colonels Baxter and Cadwalader, from their batteries on the Westchester side of the Harlem River, during which time the dispositions for the attack were made by the enemy.¹

At about ten o'clock Lord Percy, with three brigades, which he commanded, moved towards the position of Colonel Cadwalader, from his post on the heights at Yorkville.² Driving in the several advance parties which the Colonel had thrown out, the enemy's progress was checked by Colonel Cadwalader for upwards of an hour and a half,³ during which time General Washington, with Generals Putnam, Greene, and Mercer, crossed the river from Fort Lee, visited the Morris House, examined the position of the troops, and reconnoitered the operations of the enemy. Having satisfied himself respecting the operations of both parties, the General and his attendants retired, and returned to Fort Lee.⁴

About noon General Knyphausen and the Hessians attacked the works from Kingsbridge.⁵ Dividing his forces into two divisions,—the one having been assigned to Colonel Rahl, the General himself leading the other,⁶—the troops under Colonel Rawlings, both those in the redoubt and those in *Cock Hill Fort*, were attacked with great impetu-

sity, but the rifles in their hands did terrible execution as the enemy scrambled over the rocks and through the woods.¹ The rifles, at length, from frequent use, becoming foul, were rendered useless,² and the Colonel retired into the fort.³ The columns of the Hessians, having gained possession of the heights, immediately pushed for the fort, and took post behind a large storehouse, within a short distance of it.⁴ Another summons to surrender was immediately dispatched to the fort by Colonel Rahl, and when General Knyphausen reached the position, Colonel Magaw, perceiving farther resistance to be useless, complied, surrendering himself and the garrison, twenty-seven hundred in number, prisoners of war.⁵

In the mean time, however, other movements facilitated the surrender.

Simultaneously with the advance of the Hessians, before referred to, two other columns of troops advanced against the American lines, from different directions. One of these, the Forty-second regiment, commanded by Colonel Stirling, embarked in bateaux, in a creek opposite Colonel Morris's house; and, although intended to act as a feint, when the check which Lord Percy had experienced at the lower lines became known to General Howe, he was ordered to land and co-operate with his lordship.⁶

¹ Graydon, pp. 195, 199; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 215; Stedman, i. p. 217.—² Heath's Mem., p. 86; Graydon, p. 199.—³ Graydon, pp. 199, 200; Samuel Chase to Maryland Council of Safety, Nov. 19.—⁴ Graydon, p. 200.

⁵ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 215.

⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Letter from an English officer, Nov. 26.

¹ Graydon, p. 200; Gen. Washington to Cong., Nov. 19; Col. Harrison to Gen. Heath, Nov. 20; Marshall, ii. p. 589.—² Graydon, p. 200.—³ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16.—⁴ Graydon, p. 200; Lieut. Hall, p. 216.

⁵ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

Information of this movement having been conveyed to Colonel Cadwalader, he detached fifty men, under Captain Lenox, to oppose it, and shortly afterwards one hundred more were sent, under Captains Edwards and Tudor.¹ With great spirit these troops discharged the duty imposed upon them, killing and wounding upwards of ninety of the enemy, when, having been overpowered by numbers, they retired, with some loss, to Fort Washington;² Colonel Stirling taking a position near Morris's house, within the second lines, where he captured a party of one hundred and seventy Americans.³ Colonel Cadwalader having been informed of this movement, immediately withdrew his force from the lower lines, and retired to the fort, by the road "under the heights by the North River," suffering but little, if any, loss.⁴

The fourth division of the enemy, consisting of the First and Second battalions of light-infantry, and two battalions of guards, led by General Mathew, using the thirty flat-boats which had been brought up from New York,⁵ landed on the bank of the Harlem River, and pushed up the rocky steeps, under a brisk fire from the militia, under Colonel Baxter, which had been posted in that vicinity;⁶ the party having been supported by the First and Second grenadiers, and the Thirty-third

regiment, under Lord Cornwallis,¹ and by a heavy fire of artillery from the Westchester shore.² The militia stood their ground manfully, but having been overpowered by numbers, and Colonel Baxter having fallen, as he was gallantly encouraging his men, the troops retired to the fort, while the enemy pushed across the island to the Hudson River, a short distance below the fort, where Colonel Cadwalader had passed a few minutes before, on his retreat from the lower lines.³

It will be seen that the different parties which had been stationed in the outworks of the fort, gradually returned to the centre, as they were overpowered by the enemy, and that in some of these redoubts and breastworks the contest was continued after the fort had fallen into General Knyphausen's hands.⁴ As the several parties reached the fort, of course they became prisoners, and at half-past one o'clock the British flag waved over the fort, the representatives of His Majesty having become the undisputed masters of the works.⁵

The loss of Fort Washington was a severe blow to the American cause.⁶ The loss of men, killed and wounded, was not severe—the killed, as near as it could be ascertained, having been Colonels Baxter and Miller, Lieutenants Harrison and Tannihill, and about fifty privates; the wounded comprising Colonel Rawlings, Major Williams, Lieu-

Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16.

² Graydon, p. 200; Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 217.—³ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Nov. 16; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—⁴ Graydon, p. 201.

⁵ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—⁶ Graydon, p. 201.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—² Graydon, p. 201.

³ Ibid., pp. 201, 202.—⁴ Ibid., p. 203.—⁵ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 827.—⁶ Irving, ii. p. 425; Sparks' Washington, p. 199.

tenant Hanson, and about ninety privates.¹ Of prisoners, however, the gain of the enemy was much greater, the returns showing that four colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, five majors, forty-six captains, one hundred and seven lieutenants, thirty-one ensigns, one chaplain, two adjutants, two quartermasters, five surgeons, two commissaries, one engineer, one wagon-master, and two thousand six hundred and seven privates, had been taken prisoners.² Fifty-five pieces of ordnance and some stores were also among the spoils.³

The enemy's loss was, in the British troops, Captain McIntosh, two sergeants, and seventeen privates, *killed*; Lieutenants Grant, Graham, McLeod, and Collier, eight sergeants, one drummer, and eighty-nine privates, *wounded*; and one sergeant and five privates, *missing*: in the Hessians, Captains Medern, Barkhausen, and Walter, Lieutenants Lowensfeld, Schwein, and Justy, one sergeant, one drummer, and fifty-one privates, *killed*; Lieutenant-colonel De Borcke, Major Di Dichow, Captain Hessemuller, Lieutenants De Lendaw, De Wurmb, Brude, and Kunen, Ensigns De Ende, Werneck, and Wend, seventeen sergeants, and two hundred and forty-six privates, *wounded*.⁴

¹ List of officers killed and wounded at Fort Washington, in Force's Am. Archives; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—² Return of prisoners taken during the campaign of 1776, signed, "Jos. LORING, Commissary of Prisoners," inclosed in Gen. Howe's dispatch of Nov. 30.

³ Return of ordnance, &c., taken, signed by "SAML. CLEAVELAND, Brig.-Gen. Royal Artillery," inclosed in Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.—⁴ Return of killed, wounded, and missing, inclosed in Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30.

The loss of Fort Washington was quickly followed by the loss of Fort Lee, on the western bank of the Hudson, and, afterwards, by the well-known disastrous retreat through the Jerseys with all its accumulated troubles, the details of which have been so faithfully portrayed by the historians of the war.

The enemies of the commander-in-chief were not slow in their attempts to cast censure upon him, and in attributing to his want of knowledge, or to his indecision, the loss of Fort Washington.¹ The *treason* had even reached the military family of General Washington,² and the second in command had, even at that early day, taken his position at the head of the infernal gang.³ The malignant character of these charges will be seen when it is known that General Washington opposed the occupation of this post;⁴ that it was so occupied at the request of a council of officers;⁵ and that the two officers referred to knew what the General's sentiments had been, when he was overruled by the council, or had been in a position to have ascertained the whole truth at any moment.

¹ Hall's Civil War, p. 218.—² Letter of Col. Jos. Reed, Adjutant-general of the army, to Gen. Lee, Nov. 21. Those who feel interested in pursuing this unpleasant subject, in its connection with Col. Joseph Reed, may find interesting matter connected with it in a compilation of the documents, published, with the title of "Nuts for future Historians to Crack," in Philadelphia, in 1856.

³ See his letter to Jas. Bowdoin, of Mass., Nov. 21, 1776; That to Jos. Reed, Nov. 24; Same to the President of the Council of Mass., Nov. 22; Same to Gen. Gates, Dec. 13, 1776.—⁴ Letter to John Augustine Washington, Nov. 19; Letter to Gen. Greene, Nov. 8; T. Tilghman to R. R. Livingston, Nov. 17.—⁵ Gen. Washington to John Augustine Washington, Nov. 19; Minutes of Council of War, held October 16.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GEN. WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO CONGRESS.

GEN. GREENE'S QUARTERS, Nov. 16, 1776.

SIR:—Since I had the honor of addressing you last, an important event has taken place, of which I wish to give you the earliest intelligence. The preservation of the passage of the North River was an object of so much consequence, that I thought no pains or expense too great for that purpose, and therefore, after sending off all the valuable stores, except such as were necessary for its defence, I determined, agreeable to the advice of most of the general officers, to risk something to defend the post on the east side, called Mount Washington. When the army moved up, in consequence of General Howe's landing at Frog Point, Colonel Magaw was left on that command with about twelve hundred men, and orders given to defend it to the last. Afterwards, reflecting upon the smallness of the garrison, and the difficulty of their holding it, if General Howe should fall down upon it with his whole force, I wrote to General Greene, who had the command on the Jersey shore, directing him to govern himself by circumstances, and to retain or evacuate the post as he should think best, and revoking the absolute order to Colonel Magaw to defend the post to the last extremity.

General Greene, struck with the importance of the post, and the discouragement which our evacuation of posts must necessarily have given, reinforced Colonel Magaw with detachments from several regiments of the Flying Camp, but chiefly of Pennsylvania, so as to make up the number about two thousand.

In this situation things were yesterday, when

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General Howe demanded the surrender of the garrison, to which Colonel Magaw returned a spirited refusal. Immediately upon receiving an account of this transaction, I came from Hackensack to this place, and had partly crossed the North River, when I met General Putnam and General Greene, who were just returning from thence, and informed me that the troops were in high spirits, and would make a good defence, and it being late at night I returned. Early this morning, Colonel Magaw posted his troops partly in the lines thrown up by our army on our first coming thither from New York, and partly on a commanding hill lying north of Mount Washington, the lines being all to the southward. In this position, the attack began about 10 o'clock, which our troops stood, and returned the fire in such a manner as gave me great hopes the enemy was entirely repulsed. But at this time a body of troops crossed Harlem River in boats, and landed inside of the second lines, our troops being then engaged in the first. Colonel Cadwalader, who commanded in the lines, sent off a detachment to oppose them; but they being overpowered by numbers, gave way; upon which Colonel Cadwalader ordered his troops to retreat, in order to gain the fort. It was done with much confusion; and the enemy crossing over, came in upon them in such a manner that a number of them surrendered. At this time the Hessians advanced on the north side of the fort in very large bodies. They were received by the troops posted there with proper spirit, and kept back a considerable time. But at length they were also obliged to submit to a superiority of numbers, and retire under the cannon of the fort. The enemy, having advanced thus far, halted, and immediately a flag went in with a

repetition of the demand for the fortress, as I suppose. At this time I sent a billet to Colonel Magaw, directing him to hold out and I would endeavor this evening to bring off the garrison, if the fortress could not be maintained, as I did not expect it could, the enemy being possessed of the adjacent grounds. But before this reached him, he had entered too far into a treaty to retract. After which Colonel Cadwalader told another messenger who went over, that they had been able to obtain no other terms than to surrender as prisoners of war. In this situation matters now stand.

I have stopped General Beall's and General Heard's brigades to preserve the posts and stores here, which, with the other troops, I hope we will be able to effect.

I don't yet know the numbers killed or wounded on either side, but from the heaviness and continuance of fire in some places, I imagine there must have been considerable execution. The loss of such a number of officers and men, many of whom have been trained with more than common attention, will, I fear, be severely felt; but when that of the arms and accoutrements is added, much more so, and must be a farther incentive to procure as considerable a supply as possible for the new troops as soon as it can be done.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

GEO. WASHINGTON.

II.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO
LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

NEW YORK, November 30, 1776.

MY LORD:—

* * * * *

During the continuance of the army at Dobbs' Ferry, the enemy sent a large detachment over the North River by King's Ferry to Jersey, and were employed in intrenching at Croton Bridge and the White Plains, and building barracks at those places, and at Peekskill, near the foot of the Highlands, for their winter habitations. Lieutenant-general Knyphausen had for some

days established his post on the York side of Kingsbridge, within cannon-shot of Fort Washington, which was covered by very strong ground, and exceeding difficult of access; but the importance of this post, which, with Fort Lee, on the opposite shore of Jersey, kept the enemy in command of the navigation of the North River, while it barred the communication with York by land, made the possession of it absolutely necessary. Preparations were therefore made for a general attack, and thirty flat-boats, under the direction of Captains Wilkinson and Molloy, passed up the North River on the night of the 14th, undiscovered by the enemy.

Every thing being prepared, and the attack fixed for the morning of the 16th, Lieutenant-colonel Patterson, Adjutant-general, was sent the 15th to summon the commanding officer to surrender, and to warn him of the consequences that must attend a general attack; to which he replied, he would defend himself to the last extremity. Four attacks were determined upon. The first, under the command of Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, against the enemy's left, on the side of Kingsbridge, in two columns, formed by detachments from the Hessians of his corps, the brigade of Rahl, and regiment of Waldeck. The second, by the First and Second battalions of light-infantry, and two battalions of guards, under the command of Brigadier-general Mathew, to land by Harlem Creek upon the enemy's right, from thirty flat-boats; which attack was to be supported by the First and Second grenadiers and Thirty-third regiment, under the command of Lord Cornwallis. The third attack, intended as a feint, by the Forty-second regiment, to be embarked in batteaux in a creek opposite to Colonel Morris's house, and upon the left of the enemy's lines towards New York. The fourth, by Lord Percy, with the corps under his command, on York Island, to assault the right flank of the enemy's intrenchments on that side.

The field-artillery and batteries being properly disposed for the three attacks on the side of Kingsbridge and Harlem Creek, Lieutenant-general Knyphausen moved forward about noon, but having a very thick wood to pass, in which the enemy was very advantageously posted, it

was some time before he could penetrate; from which difficulties his corps was for a considerable time exposed to the fire of three pieces of cannon. As soon as this attack began, the light-infantry moved and landed under a brisk fire, before and after they had quitted the boats, from a party of the rebels posted behind rocks and trees; however, by getting up a very steep, uneven mountain, with their usual activity, they soon dispersed the enemy. The guards, followed by the grenadiers and Thirty-third, landed without any loss. Intelligence in the mean time being received, that Lord Percy had carried an advanced work, orders were sent Lieutenant-colonel Stirling, commanding the Forty-second regiment, to endeavor to land, and for two battalions of the Second brigade to support him. Upon which he immediately advanced in his boats through a heavy fire, with great perseverance, and forcing his way up a steep height, which was well defended by a body of the rebels, he gained the summit, took one hundred and seventy prisoners, and penetrating across the island, facilitated Lord Percy's success against

the enemy's lines opposed to him, which his lordship passed.

Colonel Rahl, who led the right column of Lieutenant-general Knyphausen's attack, having, after a considerable opposition, forced the enemy from their strongholds, pushed forward to their advanced works, and lodged his column within one hundred yards of the fort, from whence he summoned them to surrender, upon which they readily desired to treat.

Lieutenant-general Knyphausen's column having more impediments to encounter in passing through the wood, could not join the right column until they had got up to the fort. The enemy, upon his appearance, surrendered prisoners of war, to the number of two thousand seven hundred, including officers, besides the prisoners made by the Forty-second regiment. The enemy had three officers and fifty men killed, and six officers and ninety men wounded in the different attacks.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,

W. HOWE.

CHAPTER XVI.

December 26, 1776.

THE BATTLE OF TRENTON.

THE latter part of the year 1776 was the darkest period of the American Revolution. The best troops in the army, with a few exceptions, had been captured with Fort Washington; Fort Lee had also fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the trophies of the enemy's victory had been graced with the heavy cannon, tents, baggage, and a large quantity of provision belonging to the Continental Army.¹ The celebrated retreat through the Jerseys followed, and the commander-in-chief, with less than four thousand men,²—the wreck of the Continental Army,—closely pursued by Lord Cornwallis, sought refuge on the western bank of the Delaware.³ The treason of General Charles Lee also took place at that time; and, although the character of the affair was not *then fully known*, the country was filled with astonishment and regret.⁴ The enemy had gained possession of Rhode Island, Long Island, the city of

New York, and nearly all the Jerseys, and awaited only the accumulation of ice in the Delaware to extend his conquest into Pennsylvania.¹ By sickness, and the expiration of their terms of service, the Continental Army was fast dwindling away, until it appeared rather like an outpost than the main body of an army, to whose protection the political interests of a continent, if not those of all mankind, had been intrusted.² And, lastly, flushed with their successes, and considering the revolutionary spirit as nearly eradicated, General and Admiral Howe issued a joint proclamation, offering a pardon, in the King's name, to all who would take the oath of allegiance, and come under his protection within sixty days,³—an offer which was accepted by great numbers of those whose wealth and position gave weight to their actions.⁴

But these reverses were not without benefit to the cause of America. Her

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Nov. 30; Marshall, ii. p. 592; Sparks, p. 201.—² Marshall, ii. pp. 592-603; Sparks, pp. 201, 202; Stedman, i. p. 223.—³ Gordon, ii. p. 390; Sparks, pp. 201-205.—⁴ Marshall, ii. pp. 608, 609; Sparks, pp. 202-204.

¹ Gen. Howe to Lord G. Germain, Dec. 20; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 245-247, 251.—² Gen. Washington to Gen. Gates, Dec. 14.—³ "Proclamation." "Dated at New York, Nov. 30, 1776."—⁴ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 248; Marshall, ii. p. 600; Sparks, p. 205.

professed friends were sifted; and those whose friendship was not real, were driven to the enemy by the force of circumstances; while those whose actions were influenced by principle, were seen and known by all men.

General Howe covered his acquisitions in the Jerseys by a chain of cantonments at Pennington, Trenton, Bordentown, and Burlington,¹ and held a strong body in reserve at New Brunswick, ready to move in any direction at short notice.²

General Washington retained the position he had occupied, on the west bank of the Delaware, and his little force had been strengthened by the arrival of the division recently commanded by General Lee and by three regiments from Ticonderoga,³ while the militia from Eastern Pennsylvania, which had turned out in considerable numbers, encamped, a part at Bristol under General Cadwalader, and a part opposite Trenton, under General Ewing.⁴

At this time General Washington entertained the idea of recrossing the Delaware, and attacking the enemy in his cantonments.⁵ At Trenton three regiments of Hessians were stationed, under the command of Colonel Rahl (whom the reader will remember as a prominent participant in the affairs at the White Plains and Fort Washington); and it was on this party that

General Washington's choice fell as the first object of his attack.¹

The time selected was the night of the twenty-fifth of December;² and the plan of attack was for General Ewing and the militia to cross the Delaware below Trenton, and General Washington and his little army to cross at McKonkey's Ferry, about nine miles above Trenton, when both were to unite in attack on the Hessians,³ while General Cadwalader was to cross at Bristol and assault the enemy's outposts at Bordentown, Burlington, Black-Horse, and Mount Holly.⁴

At the appointed time the cold was intense, a heavy storm of snow and hail was raging, and the floating ice rendered the passage of the river a work of great difficulty. At dusk, the troops selected for the service, amounting to twenty-four hundred men, with twenty pieces of artillery, began to cross the river at McKonkey's Ferry; and, although it was supposed the passage would have been effected by twelve o'clock, the ice retarded the boats so much that it was nearly four o'clock before the whole body had landed and was ready to march.⁵

The troops were speedily formed into two divisions; one of which, under General Sullivan, marched on the lower or river road, which entered Trenton on

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 390; Marshall, ii. p. 610.

² Sparks, p. 211.—³ Ibid. —⁴ Marshall, ii. p. 605, 615; Sparks, p. 211.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Dec. 14; Same to Gen. Gates, Dec. 14; Same to Gen. Heath, Dec. 14; Marshall, ii. p. 614.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 29: Hist. Civil War, i. p. 225; Sparks, p. 211.—² Gen. Washington to Gen. Heath, Dec. 27; Same to Cong., Dec. 27.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 226; Marshall, ii. p. 615.—⁴ Hist. Civil War, i. p. 226; Marshall, ii. p. 615

⁵ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. p. 128; Gordon, ii. p. 394.

its western extremity;¹ the other, led by General Greene, with whom were also Generals Washington, Stirling, Mercer, and Stephen, took the upper or Pennington road, leading to the northern part of the town.² The distance being about the same on both roads, orders were given to both divisions to force the enemy's pickets, and push directly into the town, before his main body had time to form.³

It is said that General Grant, at Princeton, had heard of the proposed expedition, and the time it was to march, and had notified Colonel Rahl;⁴ that early in the evening a body of men had emerged from the woods, fired on the Hessian pickets, and retired;⁵ and that Colonel Rahl, mistaking the attack on his pickets for the attack against which he had been warned, had been thrown off his guard, and permitted his troops to return to their quarters and to their Christmas festivities.⁶ It is a matter of interest to know what troops attacked these Hessian outposts at that important moment, when it is not known that a single Continental soldier was, at that time, east of the Delaware; and yet more interesting is it to know whence the information of General Wash-

ton's projected movement reached General Grant at Princeton. The secret had been committed to but few, and they were officers whose standing should have been a guarantee for their honor. The second in command, however, had proved recreant to his trust, and by throwing himself into the hands of the enemy, had disarmed the country and the commander-in-chief of that suspicion which a more open abandonment of the American cause would have elicited.¹ General Gates, his accessory and confidential friend, to whom General Washington had communicated his designs, was, at that moment, on his way to Baltimore,² where Congress was then sitting, to spread among that body that poisonous influence which afterwards produced, in the Conway Cabal, so much disaster to the country. To him,³ and to Colonel Reed, of Pennsylvania,⁴ besides those who participated in the affair, the secret had been communicated, and from one of those the enemy evidently received the information; but to the more patient investigation of the historical student must be left the task of determining which of them was the unsuccessful traitor.

The troops pursued their way towards Trenton, with the storm driving the sleet into their faces, and two of

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27. See also Wilkinson, i. p. 128; Marshall, ii. p. 615; Sparks, p. 212.

² Ibid. See also Wilkinson, i. p. 128; Irving, ii. p. 478.

³ Ibid. See also Marshall, ii. p. 616; Irving, ii. p. 479.

⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 29; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 252; Life of Reed, i. p. 277.

⁵ Col. White's statement, Feb. 25, 1777; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 29; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 253; Irving, ii. p. 479. Gordon says this was a party of fifty men, under Col. Wm. Washington, who acted without the knowledge of the commander-in-chief.—⁶ Gordon, ii. p. 395.

¹ It is now well known that Gen. Lee was a traitor to America. Through the laborious efforts of G. H. Moore, Esq., the librarian of the N. Y. Historical Society, that body has become the possessor of a portion of the correspondence between Lee and Gen. Howe, which establishes that fact.—² Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. pp. 126, 127.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Gates, Dec. 14.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Col. Reed, Dec. 23.

their number, overcome by the intensity of the cold, were frozen to death on the march.¹ Many of the muskets were also wet and useless;² and it was daylight before the head of the columns reached the outskirts of the village.³

Here, however, the storm proved beneficial to the expedition, by keeping every one within doors, and by concealing the approach of the troops and artillery over the frozen ground.⁴

The column led by General Greene entered the village about three minutes before that commanded by General Sullivan entered the western side of the town.⁵ The advance guard of the former was commanded by Captain William A. Washington, and Lieutenant James Monroe, both, subsequently, well known in the history of their country;⁶ that of the latter was led by Colonel John Stark,⁷ whose cool and deliberate bravery behind the rail-fence on Breed's Hill has been already referred to. Both drove the pickets before them, the latter taking refuge behind the houses on the line of their retreat, and firing on the advancing columns.⁸

In the mean time, the alarm had reached the enemy's main body, and the drums beat to arms, the astonished Hessians quickly falling into their places

under the experienced eye of their commander, Colonel Rahl.¹

Part of General Greene's division pushed down King (now Warren) street, the remainder down Queen (now Greene) street, and General Sullivan's command entered the town through Second and Front streets.² By this disposition of the troops the enemy was hemmed in between the Americans and the Assanpink Creek, a considerable stream which flows through the town;³ and when the artillery reached the head of King-street, a six-gun battery opened its fire on the enemy, under the personal directions of General Washington.⁴ To oppose these, and to check the advance of the Americans, the Hessians trained two pieces of artillery, near the spot where the canal feeder crosses Warren-street, but Captain Washington and Lieutenant Monroe rushed forward with a part of their command, drove the men from their guns, and took both the pieces when on the point of being fired.⁵ Both the captain and the lieutenant were wounded in this desperate attack,—the former in his wrist, the latter in his shoulder.⁶

Colonel Rahl with some difficulty extricated his men from the town and led them into an orchard, with an intention, apparently, of contesting for the mastery with General Washington.⁷ Changing his mind, however, he resolved to meet

¹ Sparks, pp. 211, 212; Irving, ii. p. 480; Gordon, ii. p. 396; Marshall, ii. p. 616.—² Wilkinson, i. p. 129; Irving, ii. p. 480.—³ Marshall, ii. p. 616; Stedman, i. p. 232; Wilkinson, i. p. 129.—⁴ Irving, ii. pp. 480, 481; Life of Reed, i. p. 297.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27.—⁶ Wilkinson, i. p. 130; Irving, ii. p. 481.

⁷ Wilkinson, i. p. 129; Irving, ii. p. 482.

⁸ Gen. Washington to Congress, Dec. 14; Gordon, ii. p. 396.

¹ Irving, ii. p. 483; Lossing, ii. p. 228.—² Wilkinson, i. p. 128; Lossing, ii. p. 227.—³ Lossing, ii. p. 227.

⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 29; Wilkinson, i. pp. 129, 130; Stedman, i. p. 232.—⁵ Wilkinson, i. p. 130.

⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Irving, ii. p. 483.

the General in the village, and crying out, "All who are my grenadiers, forward!" he rushed back into the streets which he had left but a few minutes before.¹ In doing so, however, he received a fatal wound from a musket-ball, and fell from his horse;² when his men, bewildered not only by the appearance of the Americans, but by the confusion into which their commander's sudden movements had thrown them, disregarding the orders of Colonel Schaffer, the second in command, turned and fled along the banks of the Assanpink, with the design of escaping to Princeton.³ Perceiving the object of this movement, General Washington threw Colonel Hand's regiment of riflemen before them,⁴ while a body of Virginia troops were dispatched to gain their left.⁵ Brought to a stand, and perfectly bewildered, the Hessians struck their colors and surrendered themselves prisoners at discretion.⁶

The conflict was ended, and Colonel Rahl, supported by a file of sergeants, approached General Washington and presented his sword,⁷ when he was conveyed with great care to his quarters, in the house of Stacey Potts, a respectable Quaker, who lived in King-street⁸

—now Warren-street—opposite Perry, where the house still stands.¹

A small party of horse, which was with Colonel Rahl, "about two hundred men of the brigade," and fifty chasseurs fled, at the beginning of the action, and reached Bordentown in safety.²

The loss of the Americans, besides the two who were frozen to death, was two privates killed; and two officers and one or two privates wounded.³ The enemy lost six officers, beside Colonel Rahl, and between twenty and thirty privates killed, and nearly a thousand prisoners.⁴ Six pieces of brass artillery, three ammunition-wagons, a thousand stand of arms, four stands of colors, and twelve drums, were also among the trophies of the victory.⁵

The ice had formed so fast, that the troops under Generals Cadwalader and Ewing were unable to cross over at the appointed time.⁶ From this cause, added to the strength of the enemy at the surrounding posts, the commander-in-chief resolved to hazard nothing farther, and he recrossed the Delaware, with his prisoners and booty, reaching his encampment at Newtown before midnight.⁷

¹ Irving, ii. p. 484.—² Wilkinson, i. p. 130; Marshall, ii. p. 617; Stedman, i. p. 233. ³ Hist. Civil War, i. pp. 226, 227; Wilkinson, i. p. 130; Marshall, ii. p. 617; Sparks, p. 212; Stedman, i. p. 233.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Wilkinson, i. p. 131.

⁵ Wilkinson, i. p. 131.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 227; Wilkinson, i. p. 131; Marshall, ii. p. 617.

⁷ Wilkinson, i. p. 131; Irving, ii. p. 485.

⁸ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 228.

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 228.—² Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 29; Sparks, p. 212.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Wilkinson, i. p. 131; Capt. Nicholson to S. Purviance, Dec. 27.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 29; S. Nicholson to S. Purviance, Dec. 27.—⁵ Col. Moylan to Robt. Morris, Dec. 27; Gen. Washington to Gen. Heath, Dec. 27.

⁶ Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 227; Wilkinson, i. p. 131; Gen. Cadwalader to Council of Safety, Dec. 27; Marshall, ii. p. 617.—⁷ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Dec. 29; Gen. Washington to Cong., Dec. 27; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 227; Gordon, ii. p. 397.

SURRENDER OF CO. RAIL AT THE BATTLE OF TRIDENTON



The effect of this brilliant affair was soon apparent. The enemy immediately broke up his posts in the vicinity of the Delaware and fell back on Princeton;¹ the tories and the "pliant whigs" who had sought the King's protection, began to tremble;² and General Cornwallis, who was about to sail for England on "leave of absence," was ordered to resume his command in New Jersey.³ Nor was the effect on the Ameri-

can cause less speedily manifested. The news passed through the country, and appeared to infuse new life and new spirits among the people; the army, from a panic-stricken, defeated, and discongraged mass, became a triumphant army; and the year closed with brighter hopes and more resolute determination than had been seen since the independence of the States had been proclaimed.¹

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

GEN. WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

HEAD-QUARTERS, NEWTOWN, Dec. 27, 1776.

SIR:—I have the pleasure of congratulating you upon the success of an enterprise which I had formed against a detachment of the enemy lying in Trenton, and which was executed yesterday morning.

The evening of the 25th I ordered the troops intended for this service to parade back of McKonkey's Ferry, that they might begin to pass as soon as it grew dark, imagining we should be able to throw them all over, with the necessary artillery, by twelve o'clock, and that we might easily arrive at Trenton by five o'clock in the morning, the distance being about nine miles. But the quantity of ice, made that night, impeded the passage of the boats so much, that it was three o'clock before the artillery could be all got over, and near four before the troops

took up their line of march. This made me despair of surprising the town, as I well knew we could not reach it before the day was fairly broke. But as I was certain there was no making a retreat without being discovered and harassed, on repassing the river, I determined to push on at all events. I formed my detachment into two divisions, one to march by the lower or river road, the other by the upper or Pennington road.

As the divisions had nearly the same distance to march, I ordered each of them, immediately on forcing the outguards, to push directly into the town, that they might charge the enemy before they had time to form.

The upper division arrived at the enemy's advanced post, exactly at eight o'clock, and in three minutes after I found, from the fire on the lower road, that that division had also got up. The outguards made but small opposition, though, for their numbers, they behaved very well, keeping up a constant retreating fire from behind houses. We presently saw their main body formed; but, from their motions, they

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 256; Marshall, ii. p. 620; Stedman, i. p. 235 —² Lossing, ii. p. 231.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 256.

¹ Letter from Philadelphia, Dec. 30; Gordon, ii. pp. 397, 398.

seemed undetermined how to act. Being hard pressed by our troops, who already got possession of part of their artillery, they attempted to file off by a road on their right, leading to Princeton; but, perceiving their intention, I threw a body of troops u their way, which immediately checked them. Finding from our disposition that they were surrounded, and that they must inevitably be cut to pieces, if they made any farther resistance, they agreed to lay down their arms.

The number that submitted in this manner was twenty-three officers and eight hundred and eighty-six men. Colonel Rahl, the commanding officer, and seven others were found wounded, in the town. I don't exactly know how many they had killed, but I fancy not above twenty or thirty, as they never made any regular stand. Our loss is very trifling indeed, only two officers and one or two privates wounded.

I find that the detachment of the enemy consisted of the three Hessian regiments of Lans-patch, Knyphausen, and Rahl, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, and a troop of British light-horse; but immediately upon the beginning of the attack, all those who were not killed or taken, pushed directly down the road towards Bordentown. These would likewise have fallen into our hands, could my plan have been completely carried into execution. General Ewing was to have crossed before day at Trenton ferry, and taken possession of the bridge leading out of town; but the quantity of ice was so great that, though he did every thing in his power to effect it, he could not get over. This difficulty also hindered General Cadwalader from crossing with the Pennsylvania militia from Bristol. He got part of his foot over; but finding it impossible to embark his artillery, he was obliged to desist. I am fully confident, that could the troops under Generals Ewing and Cadwalader have passed the river, I should have been able, with their assistance, to have driven the enemy from all their posts below Trenton. But the numbers I had with me being inferior to theirs below me, and a strong battalion of light-infantry being at Princeton, above me, I thought it most prudent to return the same evening with the prisoners and the

artillery we had taken. We found no stores of any consequence in the town.

In justice to the officers and men, I must add, that their behavior on this occasion reflects the highest honor upon them. The difficulty of passing the river in a very severe night, and their march through a violent storm of snow and hail, did not in the least abate their ardor; but when they came to the charge, each seemed to vie with the other in pressing forward; and were I to give a preference to any particular corps, I should do great injustice to the others.

Colonel Baylor, my first aid-de-camp, will have the honor of delivering this to you; and from him you may be made acquainted with many other particulars. His spirited behavior upon every occasion requires me to recommend him to your particular notice.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

GEO. WASHINGTON.

Inclosed you have a particular list of the prisoners, artillery, and other stores.

Return of the prisoners taken at Trenton the 26th December, 1776, by the army under the command of his Excellency, General Washington.

REGIMENTS.	Colonels.	Brig.-Genls.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Sergeants.	Drummer.	Musicians.	Officers' Servt.	Rank and file.	Total.
Lossberg	1	1	3	4	..	38	6	5	9	205	274
Knyphausen	1	1	2	3	3	25	6	..	6	258	303
Rahl	1	1	1	2	2	5	25	8	4	9	244	303
Artillery.....	1	4	1	32	38
	1	2	3	4	8	12	2	92	20	9	25	740 918

Six double-fortified brass three-pounders, with carriages complete; three ammunition-wagons; as many muskets, bayonets, cartouch-boxes, and swords, as there are prisoners; twelve drums; four colors.

II.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD G. GERMAIN.

NEW YORK, December 29, 1776.

On the 25th instant, in the evening, a party of the enemy attacked an outguard from the post of Trenton, where Colonel Rahl commanded with three battalions of Hessians, fifty chas-

seurs, and twenty light-dragoons, having with them six field-pieces, which party was beaten back.

On the succeeding morning, at six o'clock, the rebels appeared in force with cannon, evidently intending to attack the post. Colonel Rahl, having received intelligence of their design, had the troops under arms, and detached his own regiment to support an advanced picket: this picket being forced, and falling back upon the regiment, threw it into some disorder, which occasioned them to retire upon the other battalions; no advantage being taken of this, they recovered themselves, and the whole formed in front of the village.

The rebels, without advancing, cannonaded them in this situation, and Colonel Rahl moved forward to attack them, with the regiments of Lossberg and Rahl; in which attack Colonel

Rahl was wounded, and the regiments were made prisoners. The rebels then advanced to the regiment of Knyphausen, and also made that corps prisoners.

Some few officers and about two hundred men of the brigade, with the chasseurs and a party of dragoons, retreated to Colonel Donop's corps at Bordentown, six miles distant. Several officers were wounded, and about forty men killed and wounded.

This misfortune seems to have proceeded from Colonel Rahl's quitting his post and advancing to the attack, instead of defending the village.

The rebels recrossed the river Delaware immediately, with the prisoners and cannon they had taken.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
W. HOWE.

CHAPTER XVII.

January 3, 1777.

BATTLE OF PRINCETON.

THE panic which had seized the enemy since the success at Trenton, and the high spirits which appeared to animate his own troops, induced General Washington to recross the Delaware and take post at Trenton, on the thirtieth of December,¹ where he was immediately afterwards joined by Generals Cadwalader and Mifflin, each with eighteen hundred Pennsylvania militia.² By promising a bounty of ten dollars, hard money, per man (which the disinterested patriotism and unlimited credit of Robert Morris enabled him to discharge),³ General Washington induced the Eastern troops, whose term of service expired with the year, to remain six weeks longer;⁴ and he felt that he was so far strengthened, that offensive operations could be resumed with safety.

Lord Cornwallis, who had obtained leave of absence, and was about to leave for England, had been ordered to re-

sume his command in New Jersey.¹ General Grant had previously called in the outposts in his vicinity, and, with the main body of the army, had taken up his line of march towards Trenton, when General Lord Cornwallis overtook him at Princeton, on the first of January.² Leaving three regiments of the Fourth brigade, under Colonel Mawhood, at Prineeton,³ and the Second brigade, under General Leslie, at Maidenhead,⁴ to secure the communication, Lord Cornwallis approached Trenton the next day,⁵ but he was so much harassed by strong parties, which had been sent out to oppose him, that it was near four o'clock in the afternoon before he reached that place,⁶ the parties which General Washington had sent, slowly retiring before him.⁷

The American army had, meanwhile, retired to the high grounds on the

¹ Lossing, ii. p. 232.—² Sparks' Washington, p. 213; Gordon, ii. pp. 397, 398; Marshall, ii. p. 622.

³ Irving, ii. pp. 498, 499.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. McDougal, Dec. 30; Same to Robt. Morris, Dec. 31; Life and Recollections of John Howland, pp. 70, 71. Gordon says (vol. ii. p. 398) that nearly one half took the bounty, and then deserted within a few days.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5, 1777; Stedman, i. p. 236.

² Lient. Hall's Civil War, p. 256; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5.

⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Jan. 5; Gordon, ii. p. 399; Marshall, ii. p. 622; Ramsay's Am. Rev., i. p. 323; Irving, ii. pp. 502, 503; Wilkinson, i. pp. 136, 137.—⁷ Life and Recollections of John Howland, pp. 72, 73; Life of Jos. Reed, i. p. 286.

south bank of the Assampink¹ (now in South Trenton),² and when the enemy approached the village, General Washington sent forward the brigade commanded by Colonel Hitchcock, to cover the retreat of the skirmishers who had been checking the advance of the enemy on the road from Princeton.³ With some difficulty the enemy was held in check, and the troops passed the narrow bridge in safety; but the enemy pressed forward in the rear, with the hope of also securing the passage.⁴ Both the bridge and the ford above—near the spot where the railroad now crosses the stream⁵—were well guarded with artillery, and three several times the enemy was repulsed;⁶ when night put an end to the attempt, the enemy intending to renew the combat in the morning,⁷ by which time he expected reinforcements from Princeton and Maidenhead.⁸

This moment was, probably, one of the most critical periods in the war.⁹ Separated by a small stream, were encamped two small armies, on whose movements depended the fate of the young confederacy, and of the great

principles of government of which that confederacy was the exemplar. In numbers, the two armies were about equal, but there the comparison ended. The American army was composed of raw troops, more than one half of whom were militia who had never seen a battle, and had been but a few days in service; with but poor appointments, and with scarcely any supplies. The enemy was somewhat the stronger of the two, and within nine miles he had left strong forces, part of which had been ordered to Trenton to assist in the intended attack on the next day. His men were experienced, well provided for, and well supplied with ammunition, and there seemed to be but little doubt that success awaited his movements.

In view of these facts General Washington sought the advice of his officers, and a council was convened for that purpose at the house of a Miss Dagworthy, then the quarters of General St. Clair, General Washington having been driven from his own quarters by the enemy.¹ After propositions to “engage with the enemy,” and “to march down the east bank of the Delaware and to recross it at Philadelphia,” had been rejected,² General St. Clair proposed to turn the enemy’s left, and by a forced march attack his posts at Princeton and

¹ Gen. Howe’s dispatch, Jan. 5; Gen. Washington’s dispatch, Jan. 5; Life of Reed, i. pp. 285, 286; Stedman, i. p. 236; Marshall, ii. p. 622.—² Lossing’s Field Book, ii. p. 232.—³ Life and Recollections of John Howland, pp. 72–74.—⁴ Ibid., p. 73; Ramsay’s Am. Rev., i. p. 323.

⁵ Lossing’s Field Book, ii. p. 233.—⁶ Gen. Washington’s dispatch, Jan. 5; Lossing’s Field Book, ii. p. 233; Irving, ii. p. 503.—⁷ Sparks’ Washington, p. 214; Hall’s Civil War, p. 257; Gordon, ii. p. 400; Stedman, i. p. 236.

⁸ Sparks’ Washington, p. 214.—⁹ Gordon, ii. pp. 399, 400; Life of Reed, i. p. 287; Marshall, ii. p. 623; Ramsay’s Revolution, i. p. 323; Irving, ii. p. 504; Wilkinson, i. pp. 138, 139.

¹ Gen. St. Clair’s Narrative, p. 242; Wilkinson, i. pp. 139, 140. Some authors state that this council was held at Gen. Mercer’s quarters, but I have followed Gen. St. Clair’s personal statement, wherein he states, positively, that it was held at his quarters. Gen. Wilkinson, who was on the ground, confirms it, and says the house where Gen. St. Clair was quartered belonged to a Miss Dagworthy.

² Gordon, ii. p. 400.

New Brunswick.¹ General Mereer immediately joined in urging the adoption of this measure, "and very forcibly pointed out its practieability, and the advantages that would necessarily result from it;" General Washington highly approved it, and it was adopted without a single dissenting voice.² Immediate preparations were made for the movement, under the direetions of General St. Clair. The baggage was removed to Burlington for safety,³ and at midnight the silent march was commeened.⁴ The fires were kept burning, the sentries occupied their proper positions, and a working party was kept busily and noisily at work until daybreak,⁵ and the most complete success attended the movement. General Mereer, with the remains of his "Flying Camp," led the way,⁶ and the main body, under General Washington's immediate command, followed,⁷ the route taken being a new road, known as "the Quaker road,"⁸ the stumps and other obstruotions in which proved to be serious, and well-nigh fatal obstruotions to the march.⁹ The Amer-

ican army reached the upper bridge over the Stony Brook (near the Delaware and Raritan Canal) a little before sunrise;¹ and, thence pursuing its way along the bank of the creek, it shortly afterwards reached the woods south of the old Quaker Meeting-house, where a new disposition of the forces was made.² The advance, under General Mereer, was detaeched from the main body, with orders to proeeed along the Quaker road until it reached the old post-road leading to Trenton, where it was to take possession of, and, if possible, destry the lower bridge by which it crosses the Stony Brook, with the intention, thereby, to retard the movements of Lord Cornwallis, should he have taken the alarm and pursued, as well as to cut off the retreat, if an attempt was made, in that direetion.³ The main body filed off to the right, and pursued a by-road, which was more direct and less exposed than that on which it had been passing.⁴

The three regiments which General Lord Cornwallis had left at Princeton, wholly unconscious of danger, had been in motion from an early hour, and two of them—the Seventeenth and Fifty-fifth—were, at the time General Washington reached the old Quaker Meeting-house, on their way to join General Leslie at Maidenhead.⁵ When the Americans were opposite the old Meet-

¹ Gen. St. Clair's Narrative, p. 242; Wilkinson, i. p. 140.

² Gen. St. Clair's Narrative, p. 243.—³ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Jan. 5; Gen. St. Clair's Narrative, p. 243; Gordon, ii. p. 400; Col. Reed to Gen. Putnam, Jan. 2, 1777.—⁴ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Jan. 5; Life of Joseph Reed, i. p. 288.

⁵ Sparks' Washington, p. 215; Hall's Civil War, p. 257; Gordon, ii. pp. 400, 401; Life of Reed, i. p. 288; Stedman, i. p. 236; Marshall, ii. pp. 624, 625.

⁶ Life of Reed, i. p. 288; Marshall, ii. p. 625; Irving, ii. p. 506. Wilkinson (Mem., i. p. 141) states that Gen. St. Clair, with his brigade, led the column.

⁷ Marshall, ii. p. 625; Life of Reed, i. p. 288.

⁸ Irving, ii. p. 506.

⁹ Life and Recollections of John Howland, p. 75; Irving, ii. p. 506.

¹ Wilkinson, i. p. 141.—² Life of Reed, i. p. 288.

³ Wilkinson, i. p. 141; Life of Reed, i. p. 289.

⁴ Life of Reed, i. p. 288; Wilkinson, i. p. 141.

⁵ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 258, 259.

ing-house, Colonel Mawhood, who commanded the two regiments referred to, was ascending the hill (now Millett's) on the old post-road, south from the bridge,¹ and the glittering of the arms in the morning sun discovered the presence of each party to the other.² Colonel Mawhood, ignorant of the movements of General Washington, and supposing that the troops he had seen were a skirmishing party which had been sent out to check his movements, immediately wheeled and countermarched with the intention of taking a position on a high ground near the house of William Clark, or, if possible, to unite with the Fortieth regiment at Princeton.³ General Mercer, perceiving his design, immediately started towards the same high ground, and, having been favored in distance, he reached it and occupied a worm-fence in front of the house, before Colonel Mawhood came upon the ground.⁴ The action immediately commenced with a deadly volley from Mercer's rifles, which the enemy returned, and immediately charged.⁵ As the American rifles were not fitted for bayonets, after the third fire, the troops under General Mercer gave way and fled in disorder—the loss of their General and Colonel, both of whom were mortally wounded, adding to their consternation.⁶ Pursuing the fugitives with

great energy, Colonel Mawhood then, for the first time, discovered the column under General Washington, which was hastening to sustain General Mercer.¹ Throwing himself between the pursuers and the fugitives,² the commander-in-chief rallied the panic-stricken troops,³ while Captain Moulder's artillery opened a fire on the enemy, and checked his pursuit.⁴ With the utmost gallantry, Colonel Mawhood next attempted to charge and take the artillery,⁵ but a galling fire of grape, and the approach of Colonel Hitchcock's brigade, caused him to retire,⁶ and he fell back upon the high ground first spoken of. From thence he was driven by a squad of the troop of horse from Philadelphia, still known as "*The First Troop of City Cavalry*," led by General Washington in person;⁷ and afterwards, with the Seventeenth regiment, he took up the line of march towards Trenton,⁸ while the Fifty-fifth retreated towards the village of Princeton.⁹ The Fortieth regiment, which was separated from the others, took but little part in the action,¹⁰ but (with the exception of a part of the regiment, and of the Fifty-fifth, which joined it, who took post in the buildings of the col-

¹ Wilkinson, i. p. 142.—² Gordon, ii. p. 401; Life of Reed, i. pp. 289, 290; Ramsay's American Revolution, i. p. 323; Irving, ii. pp. 508, 509.

³ Life of Reed, i. p. 290; Gordon, ii. p. 401; Ramsay's American Revolution, i. p. 325.

⁴ Wilkinson, i. p. 143.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 145.—⁸ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5; Gordon, ii. p. 402.

⁹ Sparks' Washington, p. 215; Hall's Civil War, p. 263; Gordon, ii. p. 402; Wilkinson, i. p. 144.

¹⁰ Gordon, ii. p. 402.

¹ Wilkinson, i. pp. 141, 142.—² Life of Reed, i. p. 289; Wilkinson, i. p. 142.—³ Hall's Civil War, p. 260; Gordon, ii. p. 401; Life of Reed, i. p. 289.—⁴ Life of Reed, i. p. 289; Wilkinson, i. p. 142.—⁵ Hall's Civil War, p. 261; Stedman, i. p. 237; Wilkinson, i. p. 142.

⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5; Gordon, ii. p. 401; Stedman, i. p. 237; Wilkinson, i. pp. 142, 143.

lege)¹ fled in disorder towards New Brunswick.²

But, to return to Trenton, where Lord Cornwallis and his army were left comfortably asleep at midnight. It is said the morning was foggy,³ and that the first intimation which they received of General Washington's advance was from the report of the cannon at Princeton.⁴ Lord Cornwallis, perceiving that General Washington had out-generalled him, immediately retreated from Trenton, and, by a forced march, pushed forward to Princeton;⁵ but the bridge over the Stony Brook having been destroyed, he was detained an hour or two before he could enter the town,⁶ enabling General Washington to gain a safe distance from the enemy's van.⁷ Pursuing the two fugitive regiments as far as Kingston, the General there turned to the left, and reached Pluckemin the same night;⁸ whence, the next day, he advanced to Morristown, where his winter quarters were finally established.⁹

The loss of the Americans in this affair has never been ascertained, the accounts which have been published varying from thirty¹⁰ to nearly a hundred.¹¹ The chief loss, however, was

General Mercer, Colonel Haslett, of the Delaware line, Colonel Potter, of Pennsylvania, Major Morris, Captain William Shippen, Captain Neal, of the artillery, Captain Fleming, who commanded the Seventh Virginia regiment, and three other officers.¹

The enemy lost Captain Leslie, son of the Earl of Levin, one sergeant, and sixteen privates, *killed*; one captain, two lieutenants, two ensigns, five sergeants, and forty-eight privates, *wounded*; and one captain, one lieutenant, two ensigns, five sergeants, four drummers, and nine hundred and eighty-seven privates, *missing*, some of whom afterwards reached their regiments in safety.²

Having reached Morristown, General Washington continued to harass the enemy, by detached parties, with so much skill and success, that in three weeks there remained not a single soldier of the enemy's force in New Jersey, except at New Brunswick and Amboy.³ Philadelphia was thus relieved from danger;⁴ New Jersey was rescued from the enemy;⁵ the *revolving* inhabitants of that State were compelled to remove the red rags from their door-posts, where they had been placed as emblems of their submission to royal authority;⁶ the despair which had chilled the energies of the people at large was dispelled;⁷ the martial spirit was re-

¹ Life and Recollections of John Howland, p. 76; Wilkinson, i. p. 144.—² Hall's Civil War, p. 263; Gordon, ii. p. 402; Wilkinson, i. p. 144.—³ Stedman, i. p. 236.

⁴ Hall's Civil War, p. 258; Gordon, ii. p. 403.

⁵ Sparks' Washington, p. 216; Gordon, ii. p. 403.

⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Jan. 5; Gen. Washington's dispatch, Jan. 5; Life of Reed, i. p. 290.—⁷ Ramsay's Am. Rev., i. p. 326.—⁸ Sparks' Washington, p. 216; Hall's Civil War, p. 266; St. Clair's Narrative, p. 244; Gordon, ii. p. 403.—⁹ Hall's Civil War, p. 267; Sparks' Washington, p. 216.—¹⁰ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Jan. 5.—¹¹ Marshall, ii. p. 626.

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Jan. 5.—² Gen. Howe's report, Jan. 5.—³ Sparks' Washington, p. 217; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 231.—⁴ Marshall, ii. p. 629; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 231.—⁵ Sparks' Washington, p. 217.

⁶ This, as well as a similar badge worn on the hat, was the evidence of loyalty to the King.—⁷ Sparks' Washington, p. 217; Ramsay's Am. Rev., i. p. 328.

vived, and a determination to avenge the wrongs of the country was manifested;¹ new life seemed to animate the public counsels;² and, finally, the glory of the commander-in-chief shone forth with a more brilliant, but not less hallowed lustre.³ In the words of an eloquent European writer:⁴ "Achievements so astonishing, gained for the American commander a very great reputation, and were regarded with wonder by all nations, as well as by the Americans. Every one applauded the prudence, the firmness, and the daring of General Washington. All declared him

the savior of his country; all proclaimed him equal to the most renowned commanders of antiquity, and especially distinguished him by the name of the AMERICAN FABIUS. His name was in the mouths of all men, and celebrated by the pens of the most eminent writers. The greatest personages in Europe bestowed upon him praise and congratulation. Thus the American general wanted neither a noble cause to defend, nor an opportunity for acquiring glory, nor the genius to avail himself of it, nor a whole generation of men competent and well disposed to render him homage."

D O C U M E N T S.

I.

GENERAL WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

PLUCKEMIN, January 5, 1777.

SIR:—I have the honor to inform you, that since the date of my last from Trenton, I have removed, with the army under my command, to this place. The difficulty of crossing the Delaware, on account of the ice, made our passage over it tedious, and gave the enemy an opportunity of drawing in their several cantonments, and assembling their whole force at Princeton. Their large pickets advanced towards Trenton; their great preparations, and some intelligence I had received, added to their knowledge, that the 1st of January brought on a dissolution of the best part of our army, gave me the strongest reasons to conclude that an attack upon us was meditating.

Our situation was most critical, and our force small. To remove immediately, was again destroying every dawn of hope, which had begun to revive in the breasts of the Jersey militia; and to bring those troops who had first crossed the Delaware and were lying at Crosswick's, under General Cadwalader, and those under General Mifflin at Bordentown (amounting in the whole to about three thousand six hundred), to Trenton, was to bring them to an exposed place. One or the other, however, was unavoidable. The latter was preferred, and they were ordered to join us at Trenton, which they did, by a night march on the 1st instant. On the 2d, according to my expectations, the enemy began to advance upon us; and, after some skirmishing, the head of their column reached Trenton about four o'clock, while their rear was as far back as Maidenhead. They attempted to pass Assanpink Creek, which runs through Trenton at different places; but, finding the fords guarded, they halted and kindled their fires. We were drawn up at the other side of the creek. In this situation we remained till dark, cannonading the enemy, and receiving the fire of their field-pieces, which did us but little damage.

¹ Marshall, ii. p. 629; Ramsay's Am. Rev., i. pp. 327, 328.—² Sparks' Washington, p. 217.—³ Hall's Civil War, pp. 257, 258; History of Civil War, i. p. 231.

⁴ Storia della Guerra dell' Indipendenza degli Stati Uniti d' America, tom. ii. lib. 7, cited by Mr. Sparks.

Having by this time discovered that the enemy were greatly superior in number, and that their design was to surround us, I ordered all our baggage to be removed silently to Burlington soon after dark; and at twelve o'clock, after renewing our fires, and leaving guards at the bridge at Trenton, and other passes on the same stream above, marched by a roundabout road to Princeton, where I knew they could not have much force left, and might have stores. One thing I was certain of, that it would avoid the appearance of a retreat (which was of consequence, or to run the hazard of the whole army being cut off), while we might by a fortunate stroke withdraw General Howe from Trenton, and give some reputation to our arms. Happily, we succeeded. We found Princeton, about sunrise, with only three regiments, and three troops of light-horse in it, two of which were on their march to Trenton. These three regiments, especially the two first, made a gallant resistance, and in killed, wounded, and prisoners, must have lost five hundred men; upwards of one hundred of them were left dead upon the field; and with what I have with me, and what were taken in the pursuit and carried across the Delaware, there are near three hundred prisoners, fourteen of whom are officers, all British.

This piece of good fortune is counterbalanced by the loss of the brave and worthy General Mercer, Colonels Hazlet and Potter, Captain Neil of the artillery, Captain Flemming, who commanded the first Virginia regiment, and four or five other valuable officers, who, with about twenty-five or thirty privates, were slain in the field. Our whole loss cannot be ascertained, as many who were in pursuit of the enemy (who were chased three or four miles) are not yet come in. The rear of the enemy's army lying at Maidenhead, not more than five or six miles from Princeton, was up with us before our pursuit was over; but as I had the precaution to destroy the bridge over Stony Brook, about half a mile from the field of action, they were so long retarded there, as to give us time to move off in good order for this place. We took two brass field-pieces, but for want of horses could not bring them away. We also took some blankets, shoes, and a few other trifling articles,

burned the hay, and destroyed such other things as the shortness of the time would admit.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, &c.,

G. WASHINGTON.

II.

GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

NEW YORK, January 5, 1777.

MY LORD:—In consequence of the advantage gained by the enemy at Trenton, on the 26th of last month, and a necessity of an alteration in the cantonments, Lord Cornwallis deferring his going to England by this opportunity, went from hence to Jersey, on the 1st instant, and reached Princeton that night, to which place General Grant had advanced, with a body of troops from Brunswick and Hillsborough, upon gaining intelligence that the enemy, on receiving reinforcements from Virginia, Maryland, and from the militia of Pennsylvania, had re-passed the Delaware into Jersey.

On the 2d, Lord Cornwallis having received accounts of the rebel army being posted at Trenton, advanced thither, leaving the Fourth brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Mawhood, at Princeton, and the Second brigade, with Brigadier-general Leslie, at Maidenhead. On the approach of the British troops, the enemy's forward posts were driven back upon their army, which was formed in a strong position, behind a creek running through Trenton. During the night of the 2d the enemy quitted this situation, and marching by Allenstown, and from thence to Princeton, fell in on the morning of the 3d with the Seventeenth and Fifty-fifth regiments, on their march to join Brigadier-general Leslie at Maidenhead.

Lieutenant-colonel Mawhood, not being apprehensive of the enemy's strength, attacked and beat back the troops that first presented themselves to him, but finding them, at length, very superior to him in numbers, he pushed forward with the Seventeenth regiment, and joined Brigadier-general Leslie. The Fifty-fifth regiment retired by the way of Hillsborough to Brunswick, and the enemy proceeding immediately to Prince-

ton, the Fortieth regiment also retired to Brunswick.

The loss upon this occasion to His Majesty's troops, is seventeen killed, and nearly two hundred wounded and missing; Captain Leslie, of the Seventeenth, is among the few killed, and for farther particulars I beg leave to refer your lordship to the inclosed return. Captain Phillips, of the Thirty-fifth grenadiers, returning from hence to join his company, was on this day beset, between Brunswick and Princeton, by some lurking villains, who murdered him in a most barbarous manner; which is a mode of war the enemy seem, from several late instances, to have adopted, with a degree of barbarity that savages could not exceed.

It has not yet come to my knowledge how much the enemy has suffered, but it is certain there were many killed and wounded, and among the former, a General Mercer, from Virginia.

The bravery and conduct of Lieutenant-colonel Mawhood, and the behavior of the regiments under his command, particularly the Seventeenth, are highly commended by Lord Cornwallis. His lordship, finding the enemy had made this movement, and having heard the fire occasioned by Colonel Mawhood's attack, returned immediately from Trenton; but the enemy being some hours' march in front, and keeping this advantage by an immediate departure from Princeton, retreated by King's Town, breaking down the bridge behind them, and crossed the Millstone River at a bridge under Rocky Hill, to throw themselves into a strong country.

Lord Cornwallis seeing it could not answer any purpose to continue his pursuit, returned with his whole force to Brunswick, and the troops at the right being assembled at Elizabethtown, Major-general Vaughan has that command.

III.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUGH MERCER.

Hugh Mercer was a native of Scotland, and graduated, at an early age, in the science of medicine. At the celebrated battle of Culloden he acted as an assistant-surgeon in the Pretender's army; and, in company with many others, sought a refuge in the wilds of America. He

landed at Philadelphia, but remained there only a short time, removing thence to Fredericksburg, Virginia, where he married, and became distinguished for his skill in his profession. In the Indian war of 1755, he served as a captain, under Washington, was wounded in the wrist, and, having been separated from his command, returned to the settlements, after enduring great hardships and making several hairbreadth escapes from the savages.

The opening of the American Revolution found Doctor Mercer in the enjoyment of an extensive practice, and of every comfort of life which is calculated to increase his happiness. Deeply devoted to his adopted country, and to the great principles which then formed the subject of dispute between the colonies and the crown, he abandoned his business and his family, and threw the great weight of his experience and his influence on the side of the former.

After rendering great service in Virginia, in securing order and discipline among the raw troops, on the fifth of June, 1776, he was appointed a Brigadier-general by the Continental Congress, and entered its army in the stormy campaign and disastrous times at the close of that year, rendering efficient service, and securing the esteem of the Congress, the army, and the country.

In the action of Princeton, while rallying his troops, who had given way under the pressure of the charge under Colonel Mawhood, he was dismounted by the injury sustained by his horse from a cannon-shot, and, finding himself unable to reach a place of safety, he surrendered himself a prisoner of war. He was instantly surrounded by a party of British soldiers, who refused to give him any quarter, knocking him down with the butts of their muskets, and bayoneting him in thirteen places. Feigning to be dead, he escaped further injury, one of his murderers exclaiming, "Damn him, he is dead, let us leave him!" but he was afterwards picked up and properly cared for. General Washington sent his own nephew, Major George Lewis, to take care of him and provide for his comfort, and Doctor Rush afforded all the assistance that skill and friendship could afford, but he died on the twelfth of January, aged about fifty six years.

CHAPTER XVIII.

April 25—27, 1777.

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST DANBURY.

IN the latter part of the year 1776, the commissioners of the American army selected Danbury, Connecticut, as a place of deposit for a portion of the stores and provisions collected for the use of the army; and, during the winter and succeeding spring, a large quantity had been collected and stored there.¹

Danbury is pleasantly situated in a narrow valley, twenty-two miles north from Norwalk, thirty-six from New Haven, and five miles from the New York State line.²

In the latter part of April, 1777, the royal governor, Tryon, who had been commissioned a Major-general in the provincial service, entertained the project of destroying these stores, and preparations were made for carrying it into execution. For this purpose, detachments of two hundred and fifty men from each of the following regiments, viz.: the Fourth, the Fifteenth, the Twenty-third, the Twenty-seventh, the Forty-fourth, and the Sixty-fourth; three

hundred men from Brown's corps of provincials; a few light-dragoons, and some field-pieces, accompanied by Generals Agnew and Erskine, were placed under his command, and embarked in transports.¹ He left New York, under convoy of two frigates, on the twenty-third of April,² and landed at Crompo Point (or Cedar Point, as it was sometimes called), about four miles east from Norwalk, on the afternoon and evening of the twenty-fifth of the same month.³

The landing having been effected by ten o'clock, p. m.,⁴ the enemy, guided by Stephen Jarvis and Eli Benedict, of Danbury,⁵ proceeded on his way to that place without molestation, arriving there about three o'clock the next afternoon.⁶

The Continental troops, about one hundred and fifty in number,⁷ com-

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 276.—² Gen. Howe's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, "N. York, April 24, 1777."

³ Gen. Howe's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, May 22, 1777. See also Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 276; Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 154; Conn. Journal, April 30.

⁴ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 276; Conn. Journal, April 30.—⁵ Deming's Oration on Wooster, p. 45; Hinman, p. 138.—⁶ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 277; *The Conn. Journal* says, "two o'clock, p. m." Marshall (*Life of Washington*, iii. p. 93) says, "ten o'clock next day."

⁷ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 93.

¹ Hinman's Revolution in Connecticut, p. 187.

² Barber's Historical Collections of Conn., p. 364.

manded by Colonel Cook,¹ which had been stationed at Danbury, after securing a part of the stores, retired from the town,² and the enemy was enabled to accomplish the destruction of the stores without any obstruction.³

No time was lost in useless display, but the work of destruction commenced immediately on their arrival, and continued until the next morning;⁴ destroying not only immense quantities of public stores, but nineteen dwelling-houses (not one of which belonged to or was occupied by a Tory), the meeting-house of the New Danbury Society, and twenty-two storehouses and barns with all their contents, valued, by a committee appointed for that purpose, at fifteen thousand eight hundred and sixty-two pounds, nine shillings and seven pence.⁵ The public stores destroyed were, eighteen hundred barrels of pork and beef, seven hundred barrels of flour, two thousand bushels of grain, clothing for a whole regiment, and seventeen hundred tents.⁶

Having accomplished the object of the expedition, about ten o'clock, in the morning of the twenty-seventh,⁷ the enemy marched from the scene of de-

struction at Danbury to return to his shipping. He was not favored, however, with as comfortable a retreat as he had been led to expect, from the lukewarmness which had been shown on his march to Danbury. As soon as the landing of the enemy, on the twenty-fifth, had become known to General Silliman, then at his home in Fairfield, he sent expresses to order the militia to assemble, and, early the next morning, he pursued the enemy at the head of five hundred men.¹ At Reading he was joined by Generals Wooster and Arnold; and additions to his ranks were made throughout the day.² A very heavy rain, which continued all the afternoon, retarded the march, and they did not reach Bethel, two miles from Danbury, until eleven o'clock at night, when it was considered prudent to remain there until morning, to refresh the men, and dry their muskets, which had been rendered useless by the wet.³ Early the next morning (April 27th), about four hundred men were sent, under Generals Silliman and Arnold, to take a position on the road leading from Danbury to Ridgefield; the remainder, about two hundred in number, continuing at Bethel, with General Wooster.⁴ Intelligence of the enemy's movement towards Ridgefield reached General Wooster immediately after Danbury had been

¹ Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 365. Marshall (p. 93) says Col. Huntington commanded.—² Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 277; Conn. Journal, April 30.—³ Sparks' Writings of Washington, iv. p. 405, note; Hinman, p. 139.

⁴ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 277; Gordon, ii. p. 463; Conn. Journal, April 30; Deming's Oration, p. 49.

⁵ Dr. Robbins' Century Sermon.

⁶ Gordon, ii. p. 463. Dr. Robbins (*Century Sermon*) states that "3000 barrels of pork, more than 1000 barrels of flour, several hundred barrels of beef, 1600 tents, 2000 bushels of grain," &c., were destroyed.

⁷ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 277.

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 463; Marshall, iii. p. 93; Conn. Journal, April 30; Deming's Oration, pp. 53, 54.

² Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 94; Gordon, ii. p. 463.

³ Conn. Journal, April 30, Gordon, ii. p. 463.

⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 463; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 407; Conn. Journal, April 30; Deming's Oration, p. 54.

evacuated, and he hastened over to the western road and pursued the enemy;¹ while General Arnold, by a forced march, pressed forward to Ridgefield, with five hundred men,—a hundred having joined him during the morning,—threw up a barricade of logs, stones, &c., across the upper end of the main street, and awaited the approach of the enemy.²

At about eleven o'clock General Wooster overtook the enemy and attacked his rear-guard, taking forty prisoners.³ He continued to press on the enemy's rear; notwithstanding the artillery galled his force, until he reached a hill about two miles from the Ridgefield meeting-house, where he received a musket-ball, fired by a Tory neighbor of his, it is said, which broke his backbone.⁴ Falling from his horse, he was immediately carried back to Danbury, *on his sash*,⁵ where he died a few days afterwards.⁶

Continuing his retreat, the enemy shortly afterwards reached Ridgefield, where General Arnold had stationed himself behind a temporary breastwork, his right resting on a house owned by Mr. Stebbins (and still owned by his descendants), and his left on a ledge of

rocks on the opposite side of the road.⁷ When General Tryon saw the position which General Arnold occupied, he ordered General Agnew to advance with the main body, in solid column, while detachments were sent out to flank the breastwork and fall on General Arnold's rear.⁸ For nearly an hour the enemy was held in check,⁹—three hundred of General Arnold's men having been posted on the flanks of his position,⁴ leaving only two hundred behind the breast-work,⁵—and it was not until General Agnew had gained the ledge of rocks on his left that General Arnold ordered his men to retreat.⁶ It is said that the enemy left nearly thirty of his men, killed and wounded, on the field at this place.⁷ Shortly after the retreat had been ordered, General Arnold's horse was shot and fell dead under him, with his rider entangled in his stirrups. Perceiving this, a Tory from New Fairfield, named Coon, rushed towards the fallen General, with his bayonet raised, saying, "Surrender! you are my prisoner!" At this moment the General extricated himself, sprung to his feet, drew his pistol, and answering, "Not yet," shot the Tory dead on the spot, when he turned and joined his men without having sustained any injury.⁸

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, May 22; Conn. Journal, April 30.—² Lient. Hall's Hist. of Civil War, p. 277; Barber's Hist. Coll., p. 400; Gordon, ii. p. 464; Gen. Howe's dispatch, May 22, 1777; Conn. Journal, April 30.

³ Gordon, ii. p. 464; Marshall, iii. p. 94; Conn. Journal, April 30; Deming's Oration, p. 54.

⁴ National Portrait Gallery; Barber's Historical Collections of Connecticut, p. 400; Hinman, p. 139; Deming's Oration, p. 54.

⁵ Deming's Oration, p. 54.—⁶ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 408; Deming's Oration, p. 54.

⁷ Conn. Journal, April 30; Lossing's Field Book, i. pp. 408, 409; Gordon, ii. p. 464.—⁸ Lossing's Field Book, i. pp. 408, 409.—⁹ Sparks' Writings of Washington, iv. p. 406, note; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 95; Conn. Journal, April 30. Gordon says it lasted only about ten minutes, but he was evidently mistaken.

¹⁰ Conn. Journal, April 30.—¹¹ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 409; Conn. Journal, April 30.—¹² Gordon, ii. p. 464; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 409.—¹³ Conn. Journal, April 30.

¹⁴ Hinman, p. 139.

Having repulsed the Americans, General Tryon encamped, until the next morning, upon the high ground nearly a mile south from the Congregational meeting-house, at Ridgefield;¹ and when he resumed his march he set fire to a house near by, as is supposed, to notify the squadron which laid off Crompo of his approach.² It is said that three other houses were burned, and that the meeting-house, in which was stored a considerable quantity of pork and wheat, was also set on fire, but extinguished by the inhabitants before any serious damage had been done.³

About sunrise, on the twenty-eighth, the enemy resumed his march through Wilton towards Norwalk, but "they were assailed on all sides by the Americans, who, from the first alarm, had been collecting, and were now assembled in force. This force was increased every mile the British retreated, and from houses and stone walls, with which that country abounds, galled them on their way to their shipping."⁴ To add to his troubles, General Tryon soon learned that General Arnold, with the troops under his command, and three companies of artillery and three field-pieces with which he had been strengthened, had taken a position from which he could harass the enemy on either of the two roads which he might select as the line of his retreat: enabling him to cut off his retreat by way of Norwalk,

if that route was selected; or to intercept him at the Saugatuck Bridge, and cut off the retreat by way of the Crompo road, if the latter route was chosen.⁵ Perceiving the danger into which he was marching, General Tryon adopted the advice of a Tory guide who was with him, and filed off to the left when three miles above General Arnold's position, forded the Saugatuck, and passed down its eastern bank before the American troops under General Arnold could cross the bridge and intercept his march.⁶ This adroit movement saved the enemy from destruction, notwithstanding he continued to be harassed by the Americans who hung on his rear.⁷

Having reached Crompo Hill, the enemy took a position there and prepared to defend himself.⁸ The Americans, advancing in two columns, one led by General Arnold, the other by General Silliman, seemed inclined to attack him, and there is little doubt that he would have been destroyed or fallen into their hands, if the troops had done their duty.⁹ His men, having had no rest for three days and nights, were "almost exhausted of strength, as well as of ammunition, and many dropped down with fatigue." Despairing of success in any other way, General Sir William Erskine, at the head of four hun-

¹ Barber's Hist. Coll., p. 400; Hall's Civil War, p. 277; Gen. Howe's dispatch, May 22.—² Barber's Hist. Coll., p. 400.—³ Gordon, ii. p. 464.—⁴ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 278; Gen. Howe's dispatch, May 22.

⁵ Leake's Life of Gen. Lamb, p. 159; and the map of the country between Danbury and the Sound, in the same volume.—⁶ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 278; Gordon, ii. p. 464; Conn. Journal, April 30.—⁷ Gordon, ii. pp. 464, 465; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 278.—⁸ Gen. Howe's dispatch, May 22; Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 161; Marshall, iii. p. 95.—⁹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 278, 279.

dred men, charged and broke the two columns,¹ notwithstanding the gallant effort of Colonel Lamb of the artillery, with two hundred men, to check the enemy from behind a stone wall.² The enemy then embarked without farther molestation.³

The enemy lost about two hundred men, killed and wounded, including ten officers:⁴ the Americans, about twenty killed and forty wounded.⁵

This expedition, so disastrous in its results on the comfort of the American army, reflects but little credit on any one, except upon Generals Wooster and Arnold and Colonel Lamb, whose personal bravery deserved much credit. The expedition was almost exactly a parallel to that against Concord, in April, 1775. Ample notice of the movements of the enemy, and an injudicious leisure in his march after landing, however, gave the people in Connecticut full opportunity to remove the stores and oppose his progress; while, in the other case, the movement was secret, and only the notice which could be given by express, after the troops were in motion, could possibly be given. The people of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the short notice they received, removed and secreted the greater part of the stores which the enemy had been sent to destroy; those of Connecticut

had not removed an article, and, with the exception of a small quantity removed by the guard, all were destroyed. The people of Massachusetts hesitated to oppose the enemy's progress before he, himself, commenced the strife; the people of Connecticut allowed an avowed enemy, with whom they had been at war for two years, to land on their shores, march leisurely twenty-five miles into the country,—encamping on their way for repose,—and destroy not only an immense amount of public stores, but a large amount of private property, without a single evidence of their dissent, or a single attempt at opposition. It is not even clearly evident that the conduct of those who assembled after the enemy had left Danbury was very commendable. The enemy, admitting the exhausted state of his troops and their want of ammunition, chronicles the cowardice of the troops against which Sir William Erskine led the four hundred, and attributes the safety of the entire command of General Tryon to that cowardly flight;¹ while an American authority, whose general correctness every student of history can vouch for, says: "A great number of the Connecticut militia assembled; but not more than six hundred or seven hundred of them subjected themselves to any order; the rest were mere spectators: of such as did subject themselves, too many behaved in a disgraceful, cowardly manner."² The expedition to Danbury was as disgraceful to the people of Connecti-

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 279; Gen. Howe's dispatch, May 22.—² Gordon, ii. p. 465; Leake's Lumb, pp. 161, 162.—³ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 279; Gordon, ii. p. 466; Gen. Howe's dispatch, May 22.

⁴ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 279.

⁵ Gordon, ii. p. 466; Conn. Journal, April 30.

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 279.—² Gordon, ii. p. 466.

cut, who permitted, as to Governor Tryon, who planned and executed it.

On the twentieth of May the Continental Congress resolved, "That the Quartermaster-general be directed to procure a horse, and present the same, properly caparisoned, to Major-general Arnold, in the name of this Congress, as a token of their approbation of his gallant conduct in the action against the enemy in their late enterprise to Danbury, in which General Arnold had one horse killed under him, and another wounded;"¹ and, on the seventeenth of June, on a report made by a special committee which had been appointed to consider the subject, the same body resolved, "That a monument be erected

to the memory of General Wooster, with the following inscription: 'In honor of David Wooster, Brigadier-general in the army of the United States. In defending the liberties of America, and bravely repelling an inroad of the British forces to Danbury, in Connecticut, he received a mortal wound on the 27th day of April, 1777, and died on the second day of May following. The Congress of the United States, as an acknowledgment of his merit and services, have caused this monument to be erected.' *Resolved*, That the executive power of the State of Connecticut be requested to carry the foregoing resolution into execution; and that five hundred dollars be allowed for that purpose."¹

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE EXPEDITION TO DANBURY.

[From "The Connecticut Journal," April 30, 1777.]

On Friday the 25th instant, twenty-six sail of the enemy's ships appeared off Norwalk islands, standing in for Cedar Point, where they anchored at four o'clock, P. M., and soon began landing troops; by ten o'clock they had landed two brigades, consisting of upwards of two thousand men, and marched immediately for Danbury, where they arrived the next day at two o'clock, P. M.

The handful of Continental troops there were obliged to evacuate the town, having previously secured a part of the stores, provisions, &c. The

enemy, on their arrival, began burning and destroying the stores, houses, provisions, &c. On the appearance of the enemy, the country was alarmed. Early the next morning, Brigadier-general Silliman, with about five hundred militia (all that were collected), pursued the enemy; at Reading he was joined by Major-general Wooster and Brigadier-general Arnold. The heavy rain all the afternoon, retarded the march of our troops so much that they did not reach Bethel (a village two miles from Danbury) till 11 o'clock at night, much fatigued, and their arms rendered useless by being wet. It was thought prudent to refresh the men, and attack the enemy on their return. Early the next morning (which proved rainy) the whole were

¹ Journals of Congress, Tuesday, May 20, 1777 (vol. iii. p. 158).

¹ Journals of Congress, Tuesday, June 17, 1777 (vol. iii. p. 197).

in motion, two hundred men remained with General Wooster, and about four hundred were detached under General Arnold and General Silliman, on the road leading to Norwalk. At 9 o'clock, A. M., intelligence was received that the enemy had taken the road leading to Norwalk, of which General Wooster was advised, and pursued them, with whom he came up about 11 o'clock, when a smart skirmishing ensued, in which General Wooster, who behaved with great intrepidity, unfortunately received a wound by a musket-ball, through the groin, which it is feared will prove mortal. General Arnold, by a forced march across the country, reached Ridgefield at 11 o'clock, and having posted his small party (being joined by about one hundred men) of five hundred men, waited the approach of the enemy, who were soon discovered advancing in a column, with three field-pieces in front and three in rear, and large flank guards of near two hundred men in each. At noon they began discharging their artillery, and were soon within musket-shot, when a smart action ensued between the whole, which continued about an hour, in which our men behaved with great spirit, but being overpowered by numbers, were obliged to give way, though not until the enemy were raising a small breastwork, thrown across the way, at which General Arnold had taken post with about two hundred men (the rest of our small body were posted on the flanks), who acted with great spirit: the General had his horse shot under him, when the enemy were within about ten yards of him, but luckily received no hurt; recovering himself, he drew his pistol and shot the soldier, who was advancing with his fixed bayonet. He then ordered his troops to retreat through a shower of small and grape shot. In the action the enemy suffered very considerably, leaving about thirty dead and wounded on the ground, besides a number unknown buried. Here we had the misfortune of losing Lieutenant-colonel Gold, one subaltern, and several privates killed and wounded. It was found impossible to rally our troops, and General Arnold ordered a stand to be made at Saugatuck Bridge, where it was expected the enemy would pass.

At 9 o'clock, A. M., the 28th, about five hun-

dred men were collected at Saugatuck Bridge, including part of the companies of Colonel Lamb's battalion of artillery, with three field-pieces, under command of Lieutenant-colonel Oswald, a field-piece with part of the artillery company from Fairfield, sixty Continental troops, and three companies of volunteers from New Haven, with whom Generals Arnold and Silliman took post about two miles above the bridge. Soon after the enemy appeared in sight, their rear was attacked by Colonel Huntington (commanding a party of about five hundred men), who sent to General Arnold for instructions, and for some officers to assist him. General Silliman was ordered to his assistance. The enemy, finding our troops advantageously posted, made a halt, and after some little time wheeled off to the left and forded Saugatuck River, three miles above the bridge. General Arnold, observing this motion, ordered the whole to march directly for the bridge, in order to attack the enemy in flank; General Silliman at the same time to attack their rear: the enemy, by running full speed, had passed the bridge on Fairfield side with their main body before our troops could cross it. General Silliman, finding it impossible to overtake the enemy on their route, proceeded to the bridge, where the whole were formed; they marched in two columns, with two field-pieces on the right, the other on the left of the enemy, when a smart skirmishing and firing of field-pieces ensued, which continued about three hours. The enemy having gained the high hill of Compo, several attempts were made to dislodge them, but without effect. The enemy landed a number of fresh troops to cover their embarkation, which they effected a little before sunset, weighed anchor immediately, and stood across the Sound for Huntington, on Long Island. Our loss cannot be exactly ascertained, no return being made. It is judged to be about sixty killed and wounded. Among the killed, are one lieutenant-colonel, one captain, four subalterns, and Doctor David Atwater, of this town, whose death is greatly lamented by his acquaintance. Among the number wounded, are Colonel John Lamb (of artillery), Arnah Bradley, and Timothy Gorham, volunteers from New Haven, though not mortally.

The enemy's loss is judged to be more than double our number, and about twenty prisoners. The enemy on this occasion behaved with their usual barbarity, wantonly and cruelly murdering the wounded prisoners who fell into their hands, and plundering the inhabitants, burning and destroying every thing in their way. The enemy, the day before they left Fairfield, were joined by ten sail, chiefly small vessels.

II.

GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

NEW YORK, May 22, 1777.

MY LORD:—Your lordship's dispatches by Major Balfour, in the Augusta, arrived on the 8th instant; but, as the present conveyance is by a private merchant-ship, I shall defer answering them particularly until the sailing of the packet, which will be in a short time.

In my letter of the 24th of April (No 51), I mentioned an embarkation of troops, detached under the command of Major-general Tryon, for the destruction of one of the enemy's magazines of provisions and stores, collected at Danbury, in Connecticut. I have now the honor of reporting to your lordship the success of that expedition, and to inclose a return of the stores destroyed.

The troops landed without opposition in the afternoon of the 25th April, about four miles to the eastward of Norwalk, and twenty from Danbury.

In the afternoon of the 26th the detachment reached Danbury, meeting only small parties of the enemy on the march; but General Tryon having intelligence that the whole force of the country was collecting, to take every advantage of the strong ground he was to pass on his return to the shipping, and finding it impossible to procure carriages to bring off any part of the stores, they were effectually destroyed, in the execution of which the village was unavoidably burned.

On the 27th, in the morning, the troops quitted Danbury, and met with little opposition until they came near to Ridgefield, which was

occupied by General Arnold, who had thrown up intrenchments to dispute the passage, while General Wooster hung upon the rear with a separate corps. The village was forced, and the enemy drove back on all sides.

General Tryon lay that night at Ridgefield, and renewed his march on the morning of the 28th. The enemy having been reinforced with troops and cannon, disputed every advantageous situation, keeping at the same time smaller parties to harass the rear, until the General had formed his detachment upon a height within cannon-shot of the shipping, when the enemy advancing, seemingly with an intention to attack him, he ordered the troops to charge with their bayonets, which was executed with such impetuosity that the rebels were totally put to flight, and the detachment embarked without farther molestation.

The inclosed returns set forth the loss sustained by the King's troops, and that of the enemy, from the best information; but I have the satisfaction to inform your lordship, our wounded officers are in the fairest way of recovery.

* * * * *

I am, &c., Wm. Howe.

III.

MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID WOOSTER.

David Wooster, the youngest son of Abraham and Mary Wooster, was born at Stratford, Connecticut, on the second of March, 1710. He graduated at Yale College in 1738; and in the following year, when the war with Spain broke out, he was engaged as first lieutenant, and afterwards as captain of the *Defense*, the first vessel built and armed by the colony to guard its coast.

On the sixth of March, 1740, he married Mary, the daughter of President Clapp of Yale College. Pursuing the inclination of his mind, he was appointed to the command of a company in Colonel Burr's regiment, which formed a part of the troops sent by Connecticut, in the expedition against Louisburg, where he greatly

distinguished himself. Shortly after the capture of that important place, he was sent to Europe in charge of a cartel-ship, and was received in England with great favor. He was presented to the King, and soon became a great favorite at court, the King admitting him into the regular service, and presenting him with a captaincy in Sir William Pepperell's regiment, with half-pay for life. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle restored Captain Wooster to private life, where he remained until the war again broke out, 1756, when he was appointed Colonel of a regiment raised in Connecticut, and afterwards to the command of a brigade, in which station he remained until the peace was established, in 1763. He then returned to his family and private life.

Soon afterwards he engaged in mercantile pursuits in New Haven, and held the post of Collector of His Majesty's Customs for that port.

When the troubles with the mother country broke out, General Wooster promptly and heartily sided with the colonies, notwithstanding he

was an officer in the regular service, and entitled to half-pay for life. He was among those who dispatched men from Connecticut to seize the stores at Ticonderoga; and in April, 1775, he was appointed to the command of the troops raised by Connecticut, with the title of Major-general. On the twenty-second of June he was appointed the third Brigadier-general in the Continental army by the Continental Congress; but, in consequence of the advancement of General Putnam, he was greatly dissatisfied, and, for a long time, declined the office.

In his capacity, as an officer of Connecticut, he continued in the field, serving near Boston, and in Canada under General Montgomery.

He was occupied principally within the State of Connecticut after his return from Canada, and took part in opposing the retreat of the enemy from Danbury, as described in this chapter, receiving the wound from the effects of which he died, on the second of May, 1777, aged sixty-seven years.

C H A P T E R X I X.

May 20, 1777.

T H E SIEGE OF FORT LOGAN.

UNTIL the year 1767, that portion of our country which is now known as "*The West*," "had been the resort of wild beasts, and of men no less savage."¹ In that year John Finley and his comrades visited what is now known as *Kentucky*, and "traversed the boundless scene with sensations of wonder and delight never known by them before; and thence returned home to Virginia the same year, to give to their friends an account of the new Eden which they had found. Their narrative excited much curiosity, some belief, and not a little doubt; but raised up no immediate adventurers, for the pathless wilderness which intervened, and the yet darker forests which overshadowed the promised land,"² presented obstacles to emigration which were not easily overcome. The intelligence of his discovery gradually spread through the adjoining colonies, and, here and there, companies were formed for the exploration and settlement of the inviting regions³ which John Finley had but entered

and made known to mankind.¹ Daniel Boone,² Colonel James Knox,³ Benjamin Logan,⁴ James Harrod,⁵ and Richard Henderson,⁶ had also explored the country; and Daniel Boone, at *Boonesborough*;⁷ James Harrod, at *Harrodsburg*;⁸ and Benjamin Logan, at Logan's Fort, since *Standford*, in Lincoln county, had been the first to establish permanent settlements within its limits.⁹

Troubles with the Indians, who claimed the right to hunt on "the dark and bloody ground,"¹⁰ speedily followed;¹¹ and Harrodsburg¹² and Boonesborough¹³ had been successively besieged by the savages, and abandoned by them. On

¹ Of Finley nothing more is known after his return to the East.—² Filson's Kentucky, pp. 276, 277; Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 8, 16, 17; Boone's Narrative, appended to Filson's Kentucky.—³ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 9, 10; Butler's Kentucky, p. 20.—⁴ Butler, p. 30; Flint's Indian Wars of the West, pp. 56, 59; Wither's Chronicles of Border, p. 143.—⁵ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 12; Butler's Kentucky, p. 26.—⁶ Filson, p. 278.

⁷ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 13, 16, 17, 22.

⁸ Butler's Kentucky, p. 26; Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 23–26.—⁹ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 28–30; Butler's Kentucky, p. 30.—¹⁰ The Indian name for *Kentucky*.

¹¹ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 43–45, 48, 49; Boone's Narrative.—¹² Boone's Narrative; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 48.—¹³ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 49; Boone's Narrative.

¹ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 2.—² Ibid., pp. 5, 6; Filson's Kentucky, p. 276; Butler's Kentucky, pp. 18, 19.

³ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 9, 10; Butler, pp. 18–20.

the twentieth of May, 1777, Logan's Fort was surrounded by about a hundred of the savages, a part of whom had probably been among those who had recently attacked Boonesborough.¹ The assailants concealed themselves among the thick cane which still surrounded the fort until the close of the day,² when the women, guarded by a part of the men, went outside the fort for the purpose of milking their cows.³ A sudden fire upon the settlers killed one man and wounded two others, one of them⁴ mortally, but the rest of the party, including all the women, got into the fort without injury,⁵ leaving one of the wounded, who was supposed to have been killed, outside the works.⁶ It was immediately afterwards discovered that he was still alive and sensible, and the sympathies of the little garrison were greatly excited.⁷ His name was Harrison, and his family, which was within the fort, was so terrified with the apparent danger which the presence of the savages had elicited, that it appeared to be insensible of the loss which it had experienced in the loss of its head.⁸ Benjamin Logan, participating in the sympathy which the scene excited, immediately exerted himself to form a

small party to take him into the fort, but so imminent appeared the danger, that his proposition was met only with objections or refusals, and he found none willing to accompany him.¹ Forgetting his own danger, in his determination to save a fellow-being from the hands of the savages, Logan determined to go alone, if none would accompany him, and he immediately rushed from the gate, took the wounded man into his arms, and carried him into the fort, amidst a shower of bullets from the savages, many of which struck the palisades about his head as he entered the gate.²

The rude fort afforded protection to thirty-four souls, of whom twelve only, since the loss on the twentieth, were men, capable of defending the fort;³ while of powder and ball, as was generally the case, they had but a small supply, without any prospect of increasing it from the surrounding settlements.⁴

Contrary to their usual custom, however, the savages continued to invest the little fort,⁵ and the supply of ammunition becoming almost exhausted,⁶ the garrison was called upon to decide whether it would surrender to the merciless enemy who surrounded it, or send to Holston for a fresh supply

¹ Boone's Narrative; Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 49, 50; Butler's Kentucky, p. 91.—² Butler's Kentucky, p. 91; Flint, p. 63; Withers, p. 146.—³ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 50; Butler, p. 91; Flint, p. 63; Withers, p. 146.

⁴ Boone's Narrative; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 50; Withers, p. 146; Flint, p. 63.—⁵ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 50; Butler's Kentucky, p. 92; Flint, p. 63.—⁶ Butler's Kentucky, p. 92; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 50.

⁷ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 50; Flint, pp. 63, 64; Withers, pp. 146, 147.—⁸ Butler's Kentucky, p. 92; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 50.

¹ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 50, 51; Butler's Kentucky, p. 92.—² Butler's Kentucky, p. 92; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 51; Flint, pp. 63, 64; Withers, pp. 146, 147.

³ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 49, 50. Flint (p. 63) says fifteen, forgetting that two had been killed and a third disabled.—⁴ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 51; Flint, p. 64.

⁵ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 51.

⁶ Withers, p. 148.

of powder and lead.¹ Equally disastrous effects appeared to follow either alternative. "The individuals who should attempt the journey would be greatly exposed, and the garrison, already small, would be reduced by their absence: if the supply was not successfully attempted, the consequence seemed still more terrible and certain." In this awful dilemma, Logan's intrepidity again came into action, and he volunteered, in company with two of his garrison, to proceed to Holston and procure the necessary supplies. Leaving the fort in the night, and traversing the woods by unusual paths, the little party avoided the savages and reached Holston in safety. Having procured the necessary powder and lead, Logan gave proper directions to the two men who accompanied him and returned alone to the fort, having been absent less than ten days, the little garrison receiving him with the liveliest feelings of gratitude and delight. In due time, the escort with the ammunition also reached the fort in safety.²

More than three months the savages closely watched the little garrison; and, although the enemy lacked the skill which was requisite to carry on a regular siege, as well as the discipline necessary to carry the fort by assault, the untiring vigilance which he showed

soon rendered the situation of the garrison both irksome and distressing.

At length, in the beginning of September, Colonel Bowman marched into the western country at the head of a hundred men, from Virginia, and directed his course towards Logan's Fort, sending forth a detachment considerably in advance of the main body.¹ The savages boldly attacked this detachment and killed several of their number, the remainder made their way into the fort, which had the effect of dispersing the enemy, to the great relief of the garrison.²

This "siege," although wanting in all the peculiarities which distinguish the operations of a hostile army among civilized nations, was not behind any in the vigilance of the besiegers, or the watchful care and the steady perseverance of the besieged. Depending upon the chase for their supply of meat, the garrison was compelled to detach portions of the most experienced men to obtain the necessary supplies, notwithstanding the constant danger with which that expedient was attended.³ The settlers were also compelled to attend to their corn, as opportunities offered, notwithstanding the danger of exposure, and none, in our days, can tell the hairbreadth escapes which the settlers in the West then experienced.

¹ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 51; Butler, p. 92; Flint, p. 64; Withers, p. 148.

² Butler's Kentucky, pp. 92, 93; Withers, p. 148; Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 51, 52; Flint, pp. 64, 65.

¹ Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 53, 54; Boone's Narrative; Butler, p. 93; Flint, p. 65; Withers, p. 149.

² Butler, p. 93; Withers, p. 149; Flint, p. 65.

³ Marshall, i. p. 52.

CHAPTER XXX.

July 4 to 7, 1777.

TICONDEROGA AND HUBBARDTON.

IN the beginning of June, 1777, the Northern army, composed of four thousand British and three thousand German troops, marched from their winter quarters, and encamped on the western shore of Lake Champlain, where they were joined by some Canadians and a body of Indians.¹

On the twenty-seventh of June this body, commanded by Lieutenant-general Burgoyne, appeared before Crown Point, when the small American garrison stationed there abandoned the fort and retreated to Ticonderoga.² After quietly taking possession of the works, and establishing a hospital, a magazine, and stores there, General Burgoyne proceeded to Ticonderoga on the thirtieth.³ The advanced corps, composed of the British light-infantry and grenadiers, the Twenty-fourth regiment, some Canadians and Indians, and ten pieces of light-artillery, commanded by General Frazer, moved up the western shore of the lake to Three-mile Point, three miles below Ticonderoga; and, at the

same time, the German reserve, consisting of the Brunswick chasseurs, light-infantry, and grenadiers, under Lieutenant-colonel Breyman, were moved up the eastern shore of the lake to a point opposite to the Three-mile Point; while the fleet anchored in a line extending across the lake, without the reach of the American batteries.¹

The works at Ticonderoga were garrisoned by only "about two thousand half-armed men and boys" (a force which, if formed in single file on the different works, and along the lines of defence, it is said, would have separated them so much that they would have been scarcely within the reach of each other's voices),² commanded by General Arthur St. Clair. A small detachment of the garrison occupied the old French lines north of the fort; another the saw-mills, where the village of Ticonderoga now stands; and the Grenadiers' Battery, on the Point, was occupied by a third. The garrison in the

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 7.—² Ibid.

³ Journal of Proceedings, inclosed in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, July 11.

¹ Journal of Proceedings, inclosed in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, July 11. See also Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 181; Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, p. 22.—² St. Clair's Narrative, p. 245.

star fort, on Mount Independence, on the eastern bank of the lake, opposite Fort Ticonderoga, was stronger and better provisioned than that in Ticonderoga. It was strongly picketed, and well supplied with artillery, and its approaches were guarded by batteries and *abatis*.¹

The enemy, without making any attack on either of the works, immediately occupied Mount Hope, north of them, and commanding the line of communication, by water, with Lake George. On the third of July, General Frazer, with three brigades of British, took a position on Mount Hope.²

On the night of the fourth of July a party of the enemy's light-infantry took possession of Mount Defiance, on the south side of the entrance to Lake George; and on the morning of the fifth, Lieutenant Twiss, of the Engineers, reported that this hill entirely commanded the buildings, both of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at the distance of about fourteen hundred yards from the former and fifteen hundred from the latter; the summit could be levelled so as to receive cannon; and that the road to convey them, though difficult, could be made practicable in twenty-four hours.³ Immediate steps were taken to raise a battery on Mount Defiance.⁴

¹ Journal, &c., inclosed in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11; Lamb's Jour. of Occurrences, p. 139; Marshall, iii. pp. 242, 243.—² Marshall, iii. p. 246; Gordon, ii. p. 480; Journal, &c., in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11; Wilkinson, i. pp. 181, 182.—³ Journal, &c., in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11.—⁴ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 374; Marshall, iii. 247; Wilkinson, i. p. 184.

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In the mean time, General St. Clair had satisfied himself that his garrison was too weak to hold the post, and that his want of stores and ammunition rendered it impossible for him to avail himself of the assistance of any of the militia who were assembling to oppose the progress of the enemy.¹ He accordingly asked the advice of his officers, and the council unanimously advised an immediate retreat, both from Ticonderoga and Mount Independence,² which was carried into effect on the night of the fifth of July.³

As soon as night permitted, the baggage, and such stores and ammunition as was considered necessary, were placed on board two hundred bateaux, and dispatched, under convoy of five armed galleys, up the lake to Skenesborough, now known as Whitehall;⁴ the cannon were spiked;⁵ the garrison of Ticonderoga passed over the lake to Mount Independence;⁶ and thence the entire force moved towards Castleton, on its way to Skenesborough.⁷ The utmost silence was observed, and one of the batteries kept up a furious cannonade on Mount Hope, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.⁸ The rear-guard, commanded by Colonel Francis, left Mount Independence about four o'clock,⁹ and the whole force pressed on, without

¹ Gen. St. Clair to Cong., July 14.—² Minutes of Council, inclosed in Gen. St. Clair's letter to Cong., July 14.

³ Gen. St. Clair to Cong., July 14.—⁴ Hist. of the Civil War, i. p. 280; Gen. St. Clair to Cong., July 14; Marshall, iii. pp. 248, 249.—⁵ Gordon, ii. p. 481.

⁶ Marshall, iii. p. 249.—⁷ Gen. St. Clair to Congress, July 14.—⁸ Gordon, ii. p. 481.—⁹ Lossing, i. p. 135; Neilson, p. 25.

regularity, to Hubbardton, where they halted two hours.¹

The main body, commanded by General St. Clair, moved forward to Castleton, six miles farther, while the rear-guard, under Colonels Seth Warner and Francis, contrary to the General's orders,² remained at Hubbardton until some who had been left behind should come up.³

The approach of day had, meanwhile, revealed to the enemy at Ticonderoga the escape of the garrison, and General Frazer, without waiting for orders from his commander, hastened to pursue the fugitives with his pickets, leaving orders for his brigade to follow as soon as they could accoutre.⁴ Major-general Reidesel, with the Hessians, soon followed to sustain Frazer,⁵ and General Burgoyne, in person, prepared to pursue the bateaux which had proceeded to Skenesborough.⁶

A passage for the vessels was speedily opened in the bridge which connected Ticonderoga and Mount Independence,⁷ and, late in the afternoon, the fugitives were overtaken at Skenesborough, and the galleys which defended them were either taken or blown up.⁸ The crews of the bateaux, finding that they could no longer protect them, set fire to them, as well as to the fort, mills, storehouses, and other property at

Skenesborough, and retired.¹ Great quantities of stores, baggage, &c., were thus destroyed.²

During this time General Frazer continued his pursuit of General St. Clair until about one o'clock, having picked up several stragglers from the American forces on his way. While his men were taking their dinner the Hessians overtook them, and arrangements for continuing the pursuit having been made, General Frazer moved forward again, and during the night lay upon his arms. At three o'clock in the morning of the seventh of July he renewed his march, and about five o'clock his advanced guard discovered the American sentries, who discharged their pieces and retreated to the main body.³

The American force consisted of the regiments of Colonels Warner and Francis, a regiment of militia, under Colonel Hale, a number of stragglers, and a body of invalids, numbering, in the aggregate, about twelve hundred men;⁴ and were posted on a rising ground near the junction of the road from Ticonderoga with that leading from Skenesborough to Crown Point,⁵ in the southeastern part of Hubbardton, Vermont.

It was an exceedingly hot morning, and at about seven o'clock General

¹ Journal, &c., in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11. See also Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 376, 377; Stedman, i. p. 324.—² Marshall, iii. p. 250.—³ Journal, in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 377.

⁴ Gen. St. Clair to Cong., July 14. Wilkinson (*Mem.*, i. pp. 188, 189) says that Warner's regiment, eight days before, numbered only 173, all told; and that Francis's regiment, on the 5th of July, contained only 310 men. Hale's regiment ran away.—⁵ Map of the engagement, by Gerlach, in Burgoyne's Narrative.

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 482; Neilson, p. 25.—² Wilkinson, i. p. 186.—³ Gen. St. Clair to Congress, July 14.

⁴ Journal, &c., inclosed in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11; Gordon, ii. p. 482.—⁵ Gordon, ii. p. 483; Neilson, p. 26.—⁶ Journal, &c., in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11.—⁷ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 375, 376.

⁸ Journal, &c., in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11.

Frazer's party moved to the attack.¹ The General ordered his light-infantry to occupy a commanding ground on the left of their position, and a considerable body of the Americans attempting the same, they met, and the battle commenced.² At this moment Colonel Hale and his regiment withdrew and fled towards Castleton, leaving only seven hundred men to oppose the enemy.³

The battle raged furiously for some time, the Americans having fallen back on their original position, and the British grenadiers having been advanced to support the advance guard which had commenced the action.⁴ General Frazer commanded in person on the left of his line, and was successfully opposed by a portion of the American force which "defended itself by the aid of logs and trees."⁵ The grenadiers soon afterwards occupied the Castleton road, for the purpose of cutting off the Americans' retreat, but a galling fire from the latter compelled them to retire.⁶ About this time Colonel Francis endeavored to occupy a more advantageous position than he then occupied, but his orders were misunderstood, and a general retreat commenced.⁷ In his attempt to restore order the Colonel was killed,⁸ but the object of the movement was understood, and the troops rallied and renewed the action.⁹ Again the conflict was carried on with great obstinacy, and

victory again hovered over the ranks of the Americans.¹ At this critical moment the bugles of the advancing Hessians were heard in the distance, and the chasseurs and eighty grenadiers and light-infantry, led by General Riedesel in person, came dashing on the field, followed, in a few minutes, by the main body of the Hessian corps.² This movement decided the day, and a general charge by the entire British line, supported by the Germans, was followed by a general retreat of the Americans, some over the Pittsford Mountain towards Rutland, and others down the valley towards Castleton.³

The enemy's loss in this engagement was twenty officers, and one hundred and eighty-three men, killed and wounded;⁴ that of the Americans was twelve officers, and three hundred and twelve men, killed, wounded, and prisoners.⁵

When General St. Clair heard the firing, he ordered two regiments of militia, who had halted two miles from Colonel Warner, to march to the relief of the Americans at Hubbardton, but they steadily refused to move,⁶ and the regulars and others were too far on their way to Fort Edward to be recalled.⁷

The result of this battle, gallantly as it was contested, added to the disap-

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 483; Wilkinson, i. pp. 186, 187.

² Journal, &c., inclosed in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, July 11.—³ Gordon, ii. p. 483.—⁴ Journal, &c.

⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Ira Allen's Vermont, pp. 93, 94.

Ibid.—⁸ Ibid.

¹ Testimony of Earls of Balcarres and Harrington, before the House of Commons; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 377, 378; Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 138.

² Journal, &c., in Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 378.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 484; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 378; Marshall, iii. p. 251.—⁵ Gordon, ii. p. 484.

⁶ Gen. St. Clair to Congress, July 14; Wilkinson, i. p. 187.—⁷ Gordon, ii. p. 484.

pointment produced by the evacuation of Ticonderoga, was a terrible blow to the American cause.¹ The loss of artillery, ammunition, and stores was immense; but the most serious effect was the consternation which was spread throughout the country. At Albany, it is said, the people ran about as if distracted, sending off their goods and furniture;² and this feeling pervaded the entire northern and eastern part of New York, and the adjoining portions of Vermont and Massaehusettts.

This feeling was probably produced, in a great measure, by the security which the works at Ticonderoga had promised to the people. Immense sums had been expended on them; and the strength of its garrison had been greatly overrated by the country. The sudden and unexplained evacuation of this post; the loss of a train of artillery, consisting of one hundred and twenty-eight pieces, and of all the baggage, stores, and provisions; the attack and defeat of the retreating garrison; and the advance of a powerful and triumphant enemy, were well calculated to excite astonishment and alarm; while the officers who had preferred the sacrifice of their popularity to the loss of the garrison at that important period, were universally condemned. Congress ordered their recall and an inquiry into their conduct;³ and throughout New England, especially, even General Schuyler was openly charged with treachery.⁴

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 257.—² Richard Varick to Gen. Schuyler.—³ Journals of Congress, July 29, 30, Aug. 1, 3.

⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 258.

Subsequently a court of inquiry was ordered by Congress, when it was shown that the garrison required to man and defend the works was not less than five times as great as that which was there;¹ that they were scarcely half armed;² that the supply of provisions on hand was too small to justify the calling for reinforcements of militia;³ that scarcely twenty days' rations were on hand;⁴ and that the works on Ticonderoga were incomplete, with their flanks undefended.⁵ The court, after carefully examining the testimony, acquitted the officers of all blame; and the country and the world have confirmed the decision.⁶

Of General Schuyler, also, the country needs no defense. His steady, self-sacrificing, consistent patriotism knew no rest, was checked by no disappointment, and defied all calumny. Unstained by the consciousness of his own integrity, he continued at his post; and, notwithstanding the intrigues of his enemies prevailed in imposing another officer on his command, for the purpose of robbing him of his hard-earned fame, the country speedily discovered that to his steady opposition it was indebted for that web of difficulties which surrounded and entangled General Burgoyne, and compelled him, shortly afterwards, from necessity, to fall, a helpless victim, into the hands of General Gates.

¹ Gen. St. Clair to Cong., July 14; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 102; Marshall, iii. p. 245; Minutes of Council of Officers, June 20; Wilkinson, i. pp. 177, 178.

² Gen. St. Clair's Narrative, p. 24.

³ Gen. St. Clair to Cong., July 14.—⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 259.

⁵ Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 99; Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 139.—⁶ Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. pp. 167, 168.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GENERAL ST. CLAIR'S DISPATCH TO CONGRESS.

FORT EDWARD, 14th July, 1777.

SIR:—Congress may probably think it extraordinary that so much time has elapsed before they heard from me, after a step of so much consequence as the evacuation of the posts that had been intrusted to my care; but it was not in my power to write while on the march to this place. I am sorry to find that my letter to General Schuyler, the night the evacuation took place, has not come to his hands, as, for want of that, though he has doubtless informed Congress of the event, he could not give them the reasons that induced it. They were these:

Seeing the posts of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were nearly invested, and having intelligence by my spies that they would be completely so in twenty-four hours, when we should be cut off from the possibility of succor; that the batteries of the enemy were ready to open, and the whole of our encampment on the Ticonderoga exposed to their fire;—considering, at the same time, the weakness of the garrisons; that the effective numbers were not sufficient to man one half of the works, and that consequently the whole must be upon constant duty, which they could not possibly long sustain, and that of course the places, with their garrisons, must inevitably, in a very few days, fall into the enemy's hands,—I saw no alternative but to evacuate them, and bring off the army; whereupon I called the general officers together, to take their sentiments. They were unanimously of opinion that the places should be evacuated without the least loss of time; and it was accordingly set about that night, the fifth instant. After embarking in the boats as much

of our cannon, provisions, and stores as was possible, the boats were ordered to Skenesborough, and I sent Colonel Long, an active, diligent, good officer, to take the command there, with his regiment and the invalids, until I should join him with the army, which was to march to that place by the way of Castleton. The body of the army reached Castleton the next evening, thirty miles from Ticonderoga, and twelve from Skenesborough; but the rear-guard, under Colonel Warner, which with the stragglers and infirm amounted to near twelve hundred, stopped short of that place six miles, and were next morning attacked by a strong detachment the enemy had sent to hang on our rear and retard our march. Two regiments of militia, who had left us the evening before, and halted about two miles from Colonel Warner, were immediately ordered to his assistance, but, to my great surprise, they marched directly down to me: at the same time I received information that the enemy were in possession of Skenesborough, and had cut off all our boats and armed vessels. This obliged me to change my route, that I might not be put betwixt two fires, and at the same time be able to bring off Colonel Warner, to whom I sent orders, if he found the enemy too strong, to retreat to Rutland, where he would find me to cover him, that place lying at nearly equal distances from both. Before my orders reached him, his party was dispersed, after having, for a considerable time, sustained a very warm engagement, in which the enemy suffered so much that they pursued him but a small distance. Our loss I cannot ascertain, but believe it does not exceed forty killed and wounded. About two hundred of the party joined me at Rutland and since, but great numbers of them are still missing, and I suspect

have gone down into New England by the way of Number Four. After a very fatiguing march of seven days, in which the troops suffered much from bad weather and want of provisions, I joined General Schuyler the twelfth instant.

It was my original plan to retreat to this place, that I might be between General Burgoyne and the inhabitants, and that the militia might have something round which to collect themselves: it is now effected, and the militia are coming in, so that I have the most sanguine hopes that the progress of the enemy will be checked, and I may yet have the satisfaction to experience, that by abandoning a post I have eventually saved a State.

Perhaps I may be censured, by those who are acquainted with the situation I was in, for not sooner calling the militia to my assistance. I think I informed Congress that I could not do that for want of provisions; and as soon as I got a supply I did call for them, and was joined by near nine hundred the day before the evacuation; but they came from home so ill-provided, that they could not, nor would not, stay with me but a few days. The two Massachusetts regiments of militia, likewise, which composed part of the garrison, gave me notice that their time expired in two days, and then they intended to go home. In vain did I beg of their officers to exert every influence they had over them, and from their subsequent behavior, I am fully persuaded the officers were most to blame. They kept with me, however, for two days; but their conduct was so licentious and disorderly, and their example beginning to affect the Continental troops, I was constrained to send them off.

Inclosed you will find a copy of the council of war, in which is contained the principles upon which the retreat was undertaken. As I found all the general officers so fully of opinion that it should be undertaken immediately, I forebore to mention to them many circumstances which might have influenced them, and which I should have laid before them had they been of different sentiments; for I was, and still am, so firmly convinced of the necessity as well as the propriety of it, that I believe I should have ventured upon it had they been every one against it.

I have the utmost confidence in the candor of

Congress, and persuade myself that, notwithstanding the loss they have sustained, when they have impartially considered I was posted, with little more than two thousand men, in a place that required ten thousand to defend it; that these two thousand were ill-equipped and worse armed (not above one bayonet in ten, an arm essential in the defence of lines); that with these two thousand I have made good a retreat from under the nose of an army at least four times their numbers, and have them now between the country and the enemy, ready to act against them, my conduct will appear, at least, not deserving of censure.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.

P. S.—The enemy's force, from the best accounts, is three thousand five hundred British, four thousand Brunswick and Hesse Hanau, two hundred Indians, and two hundred Canadians.

Minutes of Council, inclosed in preceding dispatch.

At a Council of General Officers, held at Ticonderoga, 5th July, 1777—

PRESENT

MAJOR-GENERAL ST. CLAIR,
BRIGADIER-GENERAL DE ROCHEFERMOY,
BRIGADIER-GENERAL POOR,
BRIGADIER-GENERAL PATTERSON,
COLONEL-COMMANDANT LONG.

General St. Clair represented to the council that, as there is every reason to believe that the batteries of the enemy are ready to open on the Ticonderoga side, and the camp is very much exposed to their fire, and to be enfiladed on all quarters, and as there is also reason to expect an attack upon Ticonderoga and Mount Independence at the same time, in which case neither could draw any support from the other, he desires their opinion, whether it would be most proper to remove the tents to the low grounds, where they would be less exposed, and wait the attack at the Ticonderoga lines, or whether the whole of the troops should be drawn over to Mount Independence, the more effectually to provide for the defence of that post. At the same time the General begged leave to inform them, that the whole of our force consisted of two thou-

sand and eighty-nine rank and file, including one hundred and twenty-four artificers unarmed, besides the corps of artillery, and nine hundred militia that have joined us, and will stay but a few days.

The council was unanimously of opinion, that it is impossible with our force to defend Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and that the troops, cannon, and stores should be removed this night, if possible, to Mount Independence.

2dly. Whether, after the division of the army at Ticonderoga have retreated to Mount Independence, we shall be in a situation to defend that post, or in case it cannot be defended, is a retreat into the country practicable?

The council are unanimously of opinion, that as the enemy have already nearly surrounded us, and there remains nothing more to invest us completely, but their occupying the neck between the lake and the east creek, which is not more than three quarters of a mile over, and possessing themselves of the narrows betwixt us and Skeneborough, and thereby cutting off all communication with the country, a retreat ought to be undertaken as soon as possible, and that we shall be fortunate to effect it.

(Signed) ARTHUR ST. CLAIR, *Maj.-Gen.*
DE ROCHEFERMOY, *Brig.-Gen.*
ENOCH POOR, *Brig.-Gen.*
JOHN PATTERSON, *Brig.-Gen.*
COLONEL-COMMANDANT LONG.

(A true copy, taken from the original.)

ISAAC BUDD DUNN.

Published by order of Congress,
CHARLES THOMSON, *Sec'y.*

II.

GENERAL BURGOYNE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

SKENEBOURGH, July 11, 1777.

MY LORD:—I have the honor to inform your lordship that the enemy dislodged from Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on the 6th instant, and were driven on the same day beyond Skeneborough on the right, and to Humerton on the left, with the loss of one hundred and

twenty-eight pieces of cannon, all their armed vessels and bateaux, the greatest part of their baggage and ammunition, provisions and military stores, to a very large amount.

This success has been followed by events equally fortunate and rapid. I subjoin such a detail of circumstances as the time will permit, and for His Majesty's farther information, I beg leave to refer your lordship to Captain Gardner, my aid-de-camp, whom I thought it necessary to dispatch with news so important to the King's service, and so honorable to the troops under my command.

Journal of the late principal proceedings of the Army.

Having remained at Crown Point three days, to bring up the rear of the army, to establish the magazines and the hospital, and to obtain intelligence of the enemy, on the 30th of June I ordered the advanced corps, consisting of the British light-infantry and grenadiers, the Twenty-fourth regiment, some Canadians and savages, and ten pieces of light-artillery, under the command of Brigadier-general Frazer, to move from Putnam Creek, where they had been encamped some days, up the west shore of the lake to Four-mile Point, so called from being within that distance off the fort of Ticonderoga. The German reserve, consisting of the Brunswick chasseurs, light-infantry, and grenadiers, under Lieutenant-colonel Breyman, were moved at the same time to Richardson's farm, on the east shore, opposite to Putnam Creek.

July 1st.—The whole army made a movement forwards. Brigadier Frazer's corps occupied the strong post called Three-mile Point, on the west shore; the German reserve, the east shore, opposite: the army encamped in two lines, the right wing at the Four-mile Point, the left wing nearly opposite, on the east shore.

The Royal George and Inflexible frigates, with the gun-boats, were anchored at this time just without the reach of the enemy's batteries, and covered the lake from the west to the east shores. The rest of the fleet had been some time without guns, in order to assist in carrying provisions over Lake Champlain.

The enemy appeared to be posted as follows: A brigade occupied the old French lines on the

height to the north of the fort of Ticonderoga. These lines were in good repair, and had several intrenchments behind them, chiefly calculated to guard the northwest flank, and were farther sustained by a block-house. They had, farther to their left, a post at the saw-mills, which are at the foot of the carrying place to Lake George, and a block-house upon an eminence above the mills, and a block-house and hospital at the entrance of the lake.

Upon the right of the lines, and between them and the old fort, there were two new block-houses, and a considerable battery close to the water's edge.

It seemed that the enemy had employed their chief industry, and were in the greatest force upon Mount Independence, which is high and circular; and upon the summit, which is table-land, was a star fort, made of pickets and well supplied with artillery, and a large square of barracks within it.

The foot of the hill, on the side which projects into the lake, was intrenched, and had a strong abatis close to the water. This intrenchment was lined with heavy artillery, pointed down the lake flanking the water-battery above described, and sustained by another battery about half-way up the hill. On the west side the hill runs the main river, and in its passage is joined by the water which comes down from Lake George. The enemy had here a bridge of communication, which could not at this time be reconnoitred. On the east side of the hill the water forms a small bay, into which falls a rivulet, after having encircled in its course part of the hill to the southeast. The side to the south could not be seen, but was described as inaccessible.

July 2d.—About nine in the morning a smoke was observed towards Lake George, and the savages brought in a report that the enemy had set fire to the farther block-house, and had abandoned the saw-mills, and that a considerable body were advancing from the lines towards a bridge upon the road which led from the saw-mills towards the right of the British camp. A detachment of the advanced corps was immediately put in march, under the command of Brigadier Frazer, supported by the Second brigade

and some light-artillery, under the command of Major-general Phillips, with orders to proceed to Mount Hope, which is to the north of the lines, to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and to take advantages of any post they might abandon or be driven from. The Indians, under Captain Frazer, supported by his company of marksmen, were directed to make a circuit to the left of Brigadier Frazer's line of march, and endeavor to cut off the retreat of the enemy to their lines; but this design miscarried through the impetuosity of the Indians, who attacked too soon, and in front; and the enemy were thereby able to retire with the loss of one officer and a few men killed, and one officer wounded. Major-general Phillips took possession of the very advantageous post of Mount Hope this night, and the enemy were thereby entirely cut off from all communication with Lake George.

July 3d.—Mount Hope was occupied in force by General Frazer's whole corps—the first British brigade and two entire brigades of artillery. The second brigade, British, encamped upon the left of the first; and the brigade of Gall, having been drawn from the east shore to occupy the ground where Frazer's corps had originally been, the line became complete, extending from Three-mile Point to the westernmost part of Mount Hope; on the same day Major-general Riedesel encamped on the east shore, in a parallel line with Three-mile Point, having pushed the reserve forward near the rivulet which encircles Mount Independence. The enemy cannonaded the camps of Mount Hope and of the German reserve during the most part of this day, but without effect.

July 4th.—The army worked hard at their communications, and got up the artillery, tents, baggage, and provisions; the enemy, at intervals, continued the cannonade upon the camps, which was not in any instance returned. The *Thunderer*, radeau, carrying the battering-train and stores, having been warped up from Crown Point, arrived this day, and immediately began to land the artillery.

July 5th.—Lieutenant Twiss, the commanding engineer, was ordered to reconnoitre Sugar Hill, on the south side of the communion from

Lake George into Lake Champlain, which had been possessed in the night by a party of light-infantry. It appeared at first to be a very advantageous post, and it is now known that the enemy had a council some time ago upon the expediency of possessing it; but the idea was rejected, upon the supposition that it was impossible for a corps to be established there in force. Lieutenant Twiss reported this hill to have the entire command of the works and buildings, both of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, at the distance of about fourteen hundred yards from the former and fifteen hundred from the latter; that the ground might be levelled so as to receive cannon, and that the road to convey them, though difficult, might be made practicable in twenty-four hours. This hill also commanded, in reverse, the bridge of communication; saw the exact situation of their vessels; nor could the enemy, during the day, make any material movement or preparation without being discovered, and even having their numbers counted.

It was determined that a battery should be raised on Sugar Hill for light twenty-four-pounders, medium twelves, and eight-inch howitzers. This very arduous work was carried on so rapidly, that the battery would have been ready the next day.

It is a duty, in this place, to do some justice to the zeal and activity of Major-general Phillips, who had the direction of the operation; and, having mentioned that most valuable officer, I trust it cannot be thought a digression to add, that it is to his judicious arrangements and indefatigable pains, during the general superintendency of preparation which Sir Guy Carleton intrusted to him in the winter and spring, that the service is indebted for its present forwardness,—the prevalence of contrary winds, and other accidents, having rendered it impossible for any necessaries prepared in England for the opening of the campaign yet to reach the camp.

July 6th.—Soon after daylight an officer arrived express on board the Royal George, where in the night I took up my quarters, as the most centrical situation, with information from Brigadier Frazer that the enemy were retiring, and that he was advancing with his pickets, leaving

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orders for the brigade to follow as soon as they could account, with intention to pursue by land.

This movement was very discernible, as were the British colors, which the Brigadier had fixed upon the fort of Ticonderoga. Knowing how safely I could trust to that officer's conduct, I turned my chief attention to the pursuit by water, by which route I understood one column were retiring in two hundred and twenty bateaux, covered by five armed galleys.

The great bridge of communication, through which a way was to be opened, was supported by twenty-two sunken piers of large timber, at nearly equal distances; the space between were made of separate floats, each about fifty feet long and twelve feet wide, strongly fastened together by chains and rivets, and also fastened to the sunken piers. Before this bridge was a boom, made of very large pieces of timber, fastened together by riveted bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and a half square.

The gun-boats were instantly moved forward, and the boom and one of the intermediate floats were cut with great dexterity and dispatch, and Commodore Lutwidge, with the officers and seamen in his department, partaking the general animation, a passage was formed in half an hour for the frigates also, through impediments which the enemy had been laboring to construct since last autumn.

During this operation, Major-general Riedesel had passed to Mount Independence, with the corps, Breyman, and part of the left wing. He was directed to proceed by land to sustain Brigadier Frazer, or to act more to the left, if he saw it expedient so to do.

The Sixty-second regiment, British, and the Brunswick regiment of Prince Frederick, were stationed at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in the place of the parties of Frazer's brigade, which had been left in possession of the artillery and stores, and the rest of the army was ordered to follow up the river as they could be collected, without regard to the place in the line.

About three in the afternoon I arrived with the Royal George and Inflexible, and the best sailing gun-boats, at Sonth Bay, within three miles of Skeneborough, at which latter place

the enemy were posted in a stockaded fort, and their armed galleys in the falls below.

The foremost regiments, viz., the Ninth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first, were immediately disembarked, and ascended the mountains with the intention of getting behind the fort, and cutting off the retreat of the enemy; but their precipitate flight rendered this manœuvre ineffectual. The gun-boats and frigates continued their course to Skenesborough Falls, where the armed vessels were posted.

Captain Carter, with part of his brigade of gun-boats, immediately attacked, and with so much spirit that two of the vessels very soon struck; the other three were blown up, and the enemy, having previously prepared combustible materials, set fire to the fort, mills, storehouses, bateaux, &c., and retired with the detachment left for that purpose, the main body having gone off when the troops were ascending the mountain. A great quantity of provisions and some arms were here consumed, and most of their officers' baggage was burnt, sunk, or taken. Their loss is not known; about thirty prisoners were made, among which were two wounded officers.

During these operations upon the right, Brigadier-general Frazer continued his pursuit to Castleton till one o'clock, having marched in a very hot day from four o'clock in the morning till that time. Some stragglers of the enemy were picked up, from whom the Brigadier learned that their rear-guard was composed of chosen men, and commanded by Colonel Francis, one of their best officers. During the time that the men were refreshing, Major-general Riedesel came up, and arrangements for continuing the pursuit having been concerted, Brigadier Frazer moved forward again, and during the night lay upon his arms, in an advantageous situation, three miles nearer the enemy.

July 7th.—At three in the morning he renewed his march, and about five his advanced scouts discovered the enemy's sentries, who fired their pieces and joined the main body. The Brigadier, observing a commanding ground to the left of his light-infantry, immediately ordered it to be possessed by that corps; and a considerable body of the enemy attempting the same, they met. The enemy were driven back

to their original post; the advanced guard under Major Grant was by this time engaged, and the grenadiers were advanced to sustain them, and to prevent the right flank from being turned. The Brigadier remained on the left, where the enemy long defended themselves by the aid of logs and trees, and after being repulsed and prevented getting to the Castleton road by the grenadiers, they rallied and renewed the action; and, upon a second repulse, attempted their retreat by Pitsford Mountain. The grenadiers scrambled up a part of that ascent, appearing almost inaccessible, and gained the summit before them, which threw them into confusion; they were still greatly superior in numbers, and consequently in extent, and the Brigadier, in momentary expectation of the Brunswickers, had laterally drawn from his left to support his right. At this critical moment, General Riedesel, who had pressed on, upon hearing the firing, arrived with the foremost of his columns, viz., the chasseurs company and eighty grenadiers and light-infantry. His judgment immediately pointed to him the course to take: he extended upon Brigadier Frazer's left flank. The chasseurs got into action with great gallantry, under Major Barner. They fled on all sides, leaving dead upon the field Colonel Francis and many other officers, with upwards of two hundred men; above six hundred were wounded, most of whom perished in the woods, attempting to get off; and one colonel, seven captains, ten subalterns, and two hundred and ten men were made prisoners: above two hundred stand of arms were also taken.

The number of the enemy before the engagement amounted to two thousand men. The British detachment, under Brigadier-general Frazer (the parties left the day before at Ticonderoga not having been able to join), consisted only of eight hundred and fifty fighting men.

The bare relation of so signal an action is sufficient for its praise.

Should the attack against such inequality of numbers, before the German brigade came up, seem to require explanation, it is to be considered that the enemy might have escaped by delay; that the advanced guard on a sudden found themselves too near the enemy to avoid

action without retreating; and that Brigadier Frazer had supposed the German troops to be very near. The difference in time in their arrival was merely accidental.

The Germans pushed for a share in the glory, and they arrived in time to obtain it. I have only to add, that the exertions of Brigadier Frazer on this day were but a continuance of that uniform intelligence, activity, and bravery, which distinguish his character upon all occasions, and entitle him to be recommended, in the most particular manner, to His Majesty's favor.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, your lordship's, &c., J. BURGOYNE.

III.

COLONEL SETH WARNER.

Seth Warner was born at Woodbury, in Connecticut, about the year 1744. Of his early life little is known, beyond the fact that he was early distinguished for the solidity and extent of his understanding. About the year 1763 his parents purchased a tract of land near Bennington, Vermont, and soon afterwards removed to that town with their family. Here he became distinguished as a hunter, and from a slight knowledge of the medical properties of the plants and roots indigenous to the country, he became widely known throughout the new settlements as a physician.

When the troubles arose between the people of what is now Vermont and the Crown, respecting the territorial rights of New York, Seth Warner and Ethan Allen were chosen the leaders of the former. When the authorities of New York proceeded with an armed force to attempt to execute the laws, Warner met them with a body of settlers, properly armed, and so formidable in point of numbers, that the Governor of New York was obliged to give up this mode of proceeding. When the sheriff came to extend his executions and eject the settlers from their farms, Warner would not allow him to

proceed. The emissaries of the government he caused to be arrested, tried, and whipped; and an officer sent to arrest him was engaged, wounded, and disarmed. The consequence of these acts of rebellion was an act of outlawry, which was passed against him on the ninth of March, 1774, by virtue of which Governor Tryon offered a reward of fifty pounds to any person who should arrest him.

When the expedition sent from Connecticut for that purpose engaged the assistance of Ethan Allen, Warner was one of the high contracting parties, and, at the head of a body of Vermontmen, took part in that affair, marched into Ticonderoga with Allen and Arnold, and the next day seized Crown Point and its dependencies.

Warner was afterwards commissioned by Congress to raise a regiment to assist in the reduction of Canada, and he served under General Montgomery until Montreal had been taken, when he returned to Vermont. After the death of General Montgomery he returned to Canada, and continued there until the Americans left that province, when he covered the retreat with great success, much to the satisfaction of the commanding general and of Congress.

He was afterwards appointed Colonel of another regiment raised from among those who had served in Canada. With this regiment he met the enemy at Hubbardton, as detailed in this chapter, and afterwards brought his men safely to Manchester. On the sixteenth of August, 1777, he reached Bennington just in season to save the fortunes of the Americans, who had encountered the Hessians under Colonel Baum, at that place. He afterwards joined General Gates, and remained with him until the close of the campaign at Saratoga, on the seventeenth of October.

He shortly afterwards returned to his family, an invalid from the fatigues and hardships to which he had been exposed. With a constitution broken down by excessive labor, he gradually sunk, and died at his native place, in 1785, aged forty-one years.

The State of Vermont, gratefully remembering his many valuable services, granted a valuable tract of land to his widow and family.

IV.

GENERAL ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.

Arthur St. Clair was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1734. He is said to have descended from a distinguished family, but little is known of his early history. He came to America in 1755, with Admiral Boscawen, served in Canada in 1759 and 1760, and after the peace was appointed to the command of Fort Ligonier, in Pennsylvania, near which post he had received a grant of one thousand acres of land. He shortly afterwards left the army and entered upon a business life, which did not prove profitable; in December, 1775, was married, and held an honorable position in the neighborhood in which he lived. He accompanied the commissioners to the Indians, in their journey to Fort Pitt, in the same year; and, without solicitation, he received a commission as Colonel in the army, through their influence.

His regiment was sent to Canada to cover the retreat of the troops after the disastrous siege of Quebec, and took a prominent part in the operations in Canada in the spring of 1776. On the ninth of August he was appointed a Brigadier-general by the Continental Congress, and joined the army during its disastrous retreat through the Jerseys. In the memorable attack on the Hessians at Trenton, his brigade did active duty under General Sullivan; and in that on the British at Princeton, he not only planned the expedition, but much of the preliminary preparation for the midnight march was intrusted to his care and supervision. On the seventeenth of February, 1777, he was appointed a Major-general by the Continental Congress, and on the twelfth of June took command of the garrison at Ticonderoga. Crippled in his efforts by the scarcity of provisions and of men, he nobly breasted the storm of public censure, and preserved, for the service of their country, the troops composing his garrison, rather than continue a hopeless siege, and finally surrender

them as prisoners of war. His course was fully sustained by the Commander-in-chief, and by a Court of Inquiry, which was ordered by Congress, and the country has long since ratified the decision.

When an attempt on Rhode Island was expected, in 1780, he was ordered to take command of the light-infantry; and when the allied armies of France and the United States moved to the South to attack General Cornwallis, the immediate command of the latter was given to General St. Clair, General Washington intending to assume the chief command of the combined armies. Congress, fearing a diversion in favor of the besieged Cornwallis by an attack on Philadelphia, ordered General St. Clair to remain for the defence of that city; until the pressing request of General Washington induced that body to relieve him, too late, however, to take any prominent part in the operations before Yorktown.

After the peace, General St. Clair resided in Pennsylvania, and in 1786 and 1787 represented that State in the Congress of the United States: the latter year he presided over that distinguished body. In 1788 he was appointed Governor of the Northwest Territory,—now the mighty West,—and, after fourteen years of fatigue, privation, and danger, he returned from that post a poor, *but honest*, man.

While Governor of the Territory, in 1791, he was appointed to the command of the forces sent against the Western Indians after General Harmar's defeat, and from the cowardice of a portion of the troops, and other circumstances beyond his control, he was defeated by the savages on the fourth of November in that year.

The latter years of his life were embittered by poverty, occasioned by the withholding of his pay for services and disbursements, and he sunk to rest, in severe want, on the thirty-first of August, 1808, aged eighty-four years, and was buried in the Presbyterian church-yard at Greensburg, Pennsylvania.

CHAPTER XXI.

August 2 to 22, 1777.

FORT SCHUYLER AND ORISKANY.

AMONG the earliest and most ardent friends of the cause of America, and, consequently, among the severest sufferers in its behalf, were the Germans and their descendants in the valley of the Mohawk. Separated, in a great measure, from the older settlements, the aborigines and the younger settlers were personal acquaintances and friends, who had grown up side by side; and when the influence of the Johnson family was brought to bear on the Indians, and induced them to take an active opposition to their friends and neighbors, the contest assumed a peculiar and distressing character.

On the site of the present flourishing village of Rome, on the banks of the Mohawk, stood "*Fort Schuyler*."¹ It had been built in the earlier French and Indian Wars, and was known, at that time, as "*Fort Stanwix*";² but having fallen into ruins, in 1776 it had been reoccupied, repairs made, and its name changed to *Fort Schuyler*, in compli-

ment to General Philip Schuyler, the officer commanding the Northern Department.¹ In April, 1777, Colonel Peter Gansevoort, of the New York line, was appointed to the command of this station, and when he reached the post he found the works in an unfinished state, and "not only indefensible, but untenable."² On the twenty-ninth of May, Colonel Marinus Willett was directed to join the garrison at Fort Schuyler with his regiment;³ and, with the active assistance of that officer, Colonel Gansevoort proceeded to put the fort into as defensible a state as the circumstances would permit,⁴ without knowing the character or strength of the enemy they were destined to oppose.

When the plan of the campaign in the northern part of the State was arranged in London, under the directions of General Burgoyne, as auxiliary to his force, and subject, to some extent, to his

¹ Journal of Rev. John Taylor's Missionary Tour in 1802; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. Y., p. 367.

² Documents relating to "*Fort Stanwix*" (*Documentary History of New York*, vol. iv. pp. 323-326), with the map.

³ Benton's Herkimer Co., p. 74; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. Y., p. 368.—² Stone's Life of Brant, i. p. 223; Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 89.

⁴ Willett's Narrative, p. 42.—⁴ Stone's Brant, i. p. 223; Willett's Narrative, pp. 44, 45; Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 89.

orders, an expedition was ordered to leave Montreal simultaneously with him, and to proceed to Oswego, where a union was to be effected with the Indian and loyalist forces. Thence they were to proceed, by way of Oneida Lake and Wood Creek, to the Mohawk Valley, at Fort Schuyler, and, after checking the movements which might be made in that quarter to assist the American forces, to descend the valley and join General Burgoyne at Albany.¹

In accordance with that arrangement, Lieutenant-colonel Barry St. Leger,² with the Eighth and Thirty-fourth regiments, was detached on this service. Early information of the preparations which were being made reached the valley through the medium of a half-breed Sachem of the Oneidas, named Thomas Spencer, who had been present at a Council of the Six Nations, where Colonel Daniel Claus had presided, and urged the Indians to join St. Leger at Oswego, boasting of the strength of the army under General Burgoyne, and assuring them of success.³ Instead of arousing the inhabitants to a sense of their danger, and to the employment of means of defence, it appeared to paralyze them, while those who were inclined to favor the King became more openly his supporters; and the timid and the

time-servers among the Whigs, either became neutral or secretly acting Tories.¹

To counteract this effect, on the seventeenth of July, General Herkimer, commanding the militia in that county, issued a brief but stirring "proclamation," informing the inhabitants of the gathering of the enemy's forces at Oswego, and calling upon all, between the ages of sixteen and sixty years, to hold themselves in readiness to repair to the field, while the invalids, and those over sixty years of age, were directed to arm for the defence of the women and children. The disaffected, and all who refused to obey the call, were ordered to be arrested and disarmed, and the members of the popular "Committee," and all who had held commissions in former wars, were invited to rendezvous in the common cause, "not doubting that the Almighty Power, upon our humble prayers and sincere trust in Him, will then graciously succor our arms in battle for our just cause, and victory cannot fail on our side."² This appeal was not without its effect, and the militia and the people, stimulated by the danger which was so apparent, moved with a degree of alacrity which contrasted strongly with their former apathy.³

Meanwhile, Colonel St. Leger had reached Oswego, and been joined by the Royal Greens and other bodies of loyalists, under Sir John Johnson, Col-

¹ History of Civil War in America, i. p. 245; Stone's Brant, i. p. 209.

² I have followed the example of Gen. Burgoyne, his commander, in calling St. Leger a "Lieutenant-colonel," notwithstanding he claimed to be a "Brigadier-general."

³ Stone's Brant, i. pp. 209, 210; Campbell's Border Warfare, pp. 86-88.

¹ John Jay to Gouv. Morris, July 21; Stone's Brant, i. pp. 211-214; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 241.

² Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 91; Stone's Brant, i. p. 215; Benton's Herkimer County, pp. 75, 76.

³ Stone's Brant, i. p. 217.

onel Daniel Claus, and Colonel John Butler;¹ by about two thousand Canadians, for axe-men, &c.;² and by a large body of Indians, led by the celebrated Joseph Brant.³ His force, in the aggregate, exclusive of the axe-men and other non-combatants, numbered seventeen hundred men.⁴ The march was conducted with great caution, and the "order of march" through the woods displays greater skill than, probably, any other officer in the command than the Butler family or Joseph Brant possessed.⁵ An advance party, detached from the Eighth regiment, under Lieutenant Bird, moved a day or two in advance, and invested the fort on the second of August, on which day Joseph Brant and his Indians also reached the fort,⁶ a few minutes after the arrival of several bateaux, laden with stores, which had been sent to the fort under an escort of two hundred men, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Mellon.⁷ On the next day, Colonel St. Leger, with the main body of his motley force, arrived before the fort.⁸

On the morning of the third, a flag was sent to the fort, and left copies of a pompous proclamation which had been issued by Colonel St. Leger, in which, much after the manner of Gen-

eral Burgoyne, he dealt liberally in threats of vengeance on those who refused to recognize the King and submit to his authority.¹ This proclamation produced no effect on the garrison, and active hostilities commenced on the morning of the fourth of August.² At that time the Indians opened a brisk fire from their rifles, which considerably harassed the men who were engaged in raising the parapets, several of whom were wounded, and marksmen were posted in different parts of the works to return the fire as opportunities were afforded.³ The next day (August 5) the enemy was similarly engaged, occasionally varying his amusement by throwing a shell into the works.⁴ During these two days detachments were employed in opening Wood Creek (which had been completely obstructed by the garrison), and in opening a road from the Pine Ridge on Fish Creek, sixteen miles from the fort, for the transport of the provisions, stores, and artillery.⁵

The arrival of Colonel St. Leger before Fort Schuyler soon became known throughout the valley of the Mohawk, and General Herkimer summoned the inhabitants, in accordance with his proclamation.⁶ They nobly responded to his summons, and not only the militia, but the gentlemen of the county, and the members of the committee, hastened to Fort Dayton, now Herkimer, the

¹ St. Leger's Account of Occurrences; Stone's Brant, i. pp. 209, 210, 230.—² Neilson's Burgoyne, p. 18.

³ Stone's Brant, i. p. 218.—⁴ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 266; Stone's Brant, i. p. 218.

⁵ The "order of march," engraved from the original copy, found in St. Leger's baggage, can be found in Stone's *Life of Brant*, i. p. 219.—⁶ St. Leger's Narrative of Occurrences.

⁷ Willett's Narrative, pp. 49, 50; St. Leger's Narrative of Occurrences.—⁸ St. Leger's Narrative of Occurrences; Gordon, ii. p. 529; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 393.

¹ This document is copied, at length, in Campbell's *Border Warfare*, pp. 96–98.—² Stone's Brant, i. p. 221.

³ Willett's Narrative, pp. 50, 51.—⁴ Stone's Brant, i. p. 231; Willett, p. 51.—⁵ St. Leger's Account of Occurrences.

⁶ Campbell, p. 93; Stone's Brant, i. p. 233.

place of rendezvous;¹ and, on the fourth, a force of about eight hundred men marched to the relief of the garrison.² Thomas Spencer, the faithful Oneida,—whose good services in behalf of American freedom, yet unrecognized, are above any praise which I can bestow,—was with him;³ and noticing the impetuosity of the troops, and the total disregard of all order with which they moved, without reconnoitering or throwing out flanking parties, he insisted upon these precautionary measures being adopted, in which he was joined by General Herkimer and some of the older officers. The junior officers, however, ridiculed the idea, and General Herkimer, contrary to his own judgment, did not enforce the order.⁴ They are said to have crossed the river at Old Fort Schuyler (*Utica*),⁵ and, on the fifth, encamped near Oriskany, probably near where Whitesborough now stands.⁶ While the party remained at that place, General Herkimer sent Adam Helmer and two other trusty men⁷ to apprise Colonel Gansevoort of his approach, and to concert measures of co-operation.⁸ Three successive discharges of cannon were to be the signal announcing their safe arrival at the fort;⁹ but, although the distance was but eight miles, so much difficulty was experienced in ap-

proaching the fort, that they did not succeed in entering it until ten o'clock on the morning of the sixth.¹ The signal-guns were immediately fired, and as the message from General Herkimer intimated his intention to force a passage to the fort, a sortie was immediately arranged, for the purpose of diverting the attention of the enemy.²

It appears that on the morning of the sixth, a renewal of the scenes enacted on the fourth took place in General Herkimer's camp. With that caution which the General had previously manifested, he desired to remain where he was until reinforcements came up; or, at least, until some evidence was received that a movement from the fort had been made.³ The new-born zeal of his junior officers, headed by Colonels Cox and Paris, revolted at the idea, and angry words ensued, in which the brave old man was denounced as a coward and a Tory. Mildly remonstrating against the use of such language, it was again hurled at him; when, stung by the imputations which had been heaped on him, and indignant at their authors, he gave the order to "*March on*," and with a shout, they *rushed* forward.⁴ It is said, positively, by those who were present, however, that they marched in double files, preceded by an advanced guard, with flanking parties on either side;⁵ yet such precautions appear in-

¹ Stone's Brant, i. p. 233; Campbell, p. 93.

² Gordon, ii. p. 529; Campbell, p. 93. Benton (*Hist. Herkimer Co.*, p. 76) says he had "nine hundred men."

³ Campbell, p. 93.—⁴ Stone's Brant, i. p. 233; Campbell, pp. 93, 94.—⁵ Benton's Herkimer, p. 77; Stone's Brant, i. p. 233.—⁶ Stone's Brant, i. p. 233.

⁷ Benton's Herkimer Co., pp. 77, 148; Stone's Brant, i. p. 233.—⁸ Stone's Brant, i. p. 233.—⁹ Ibid.

¹ Willett, p. 51.—² Marshall, iii. p. 267; Stone's Brant, i. p. 234.—³ Stone's Brant, i. p. 234; Benton's Herkimer Co., p. 77.—⁴ Willett, p. 52; Hist. Civil War, i. pp. 292, 293.

⁵ The opposite opinion has prevailed among historians, but Mr. Stone, in his valuable Life of Joseph Brant (i. p.

consistent with the character of the attack an hour afterwards.

Information of the approach of General Herkimer having reached Colonel St. Leger, on the evening of the fifth, and the latter preferring to receive him in the field than in his camp, he detached a portion of Sir John Johnson's regiment of Royal Greens, under Major Watts, Sir John's brother-in-law, and the entire body of Indians, under Joseph Brant, the whole under Sir John Johnson, to intercept his approach.¹ It appears that the influence of Joseph's counsels prevailed, and that it was determined to draw the Americans into an ambuscade.² For this purpose, with a sagacity which does even that remarkable man great credit, a position was selected which was admirably adapted for his purpose, about two miles west from Oriskany, and six from Whitesborough.³ At that place a deep ravine crossed the road on which the Americans were advancing, "in a north and south direction, extending from the high grounds on the south to the river, and curving towards the east in a semicircular form. The bottom of this ravine was marshy, and the road crossed it by means of a causeway of earth and logs. On each side of the ravine the ground

235), cites the statements of Adam Miller and — Walter, two persons who were present, asserting the contrary.

¹ St. Leger's Account of the Occurrences; Gordon, ii. pp. 529, 530; Hist. Civil War, i. pp. 292, 293; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 394; Stedman, i. p. 334; Campbell, p. 98. Col. Willett and others say Sir John was not at Oriskany, although Col. St. Leger says, positively, he went there and "*met the rebel corps.*"

² Stone's Brant, i. p. 235.—³ Barber and Howe's Historical Collections of New York, p. 380.

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was nearly level, and heavily timbered, and a thick growth of underwood, particularly along the margin of the ravine, favored concealment."¹ The ambuscade was laid on the western margin of this ravine, in a circular form, nearly inclosing the causeway referred to, leaving open only a small segment where the road entered.²

The advancing column, in great disorder, descended the slope into the ravine, followed by the baggage-wagons; and the van had ascended the western slope,³ when Joseph Brant gave the signal, and the circle was closed, the war-whoop sounded, and a torrent of rifle-balls was poured, from all directions, upon the unfortunate victims.⁴ The rear-guard, under Colonel Visscher, which had not yet reached the causeway, was cut off from the main body;⁵ and being outside the magic circle, it immediately fled, ingloriously, from the field, pursued by the Indians, and suffered more severely, it is said, than those who remained on the field.⁶

The increased confusion into which this sudden onslaught threw the Americans, and the terrible fire to which they were exposed, for some time threatened the party with annihilation; but they speedily recovered, and fought with the courage and skill of veterans.⁷ Early in the action General Herkimer was wounded, a musket-ball having passed

¹ Lossing, i. p. 246; Campbell, p. 99.—² Stone's Brant, i. p. 235.—³ Campbell, p. 99.—⁴ Stedman, i. p. 334; Stone's Brant, i. p. 236.—⁵ Campbell, p. 99; Stone's Brant, i. p. 236.—⁶ Willett, p. 52; Campbell, p. 100.

⁷ Campbell, p. 100.

through and killed his horse, shattering his own leg just below the knee.¹ He was taken up, and, at his own request, was placed upon his saddle at the foot of a large beech-tree, where, having lighted his pipe, he sat and continued to order the battle, with the utmost firmness and composure, until the enemy retreated.² For three quarters of an hour the contest continued with the utmost desperation on both sides, neighbor being arrayed against neighbor, and, often, brother against brother, in deadly hand-to-hand strife.³ At that time the enemy began to concentrate his forces, and, by slow degrees, to close in upon the Americans from all parts of the circle. Noticing this movement, the latter immediately formed themselves into circles, and their resistance, from that moment, became more effective.⁴ To counteract it, the fire of the Tories was discontinued, and the enemy charged with the bayonet; and then, more than ever before, the contest "became a death struggle, hand to hand and foot to foot."⁵ Never, however, did brave men stand a charge with more dauntless courage, and the enemy made no impression. At this moment a heavy thunder-shower passed over the battle-field, and the rain, bursting upon the combatants with great fury, arrested the work of death for upwards of an hour.⁶ The enemy sought shelter, at a respectful distance, among the trees,⁷ but the

Americans, under the directions of their General, took possession of an advantageous position, farther up the slope, where they formed themselves into a circle, and, as the shower broke away, awaited the movements of the enemy.¹ They also adopted a new mode of bush-fighting, to counteract the operations of the Indians, who, whenever they saw a gun fired from behind a tree, rushed upon and tomahawked the marksman before he could reload. To prevent this, General Herkimer ordered *two* men to take each tree, one only to fire at a time, and the other to reserve his fire for the Indian who might seek the scalp of his associate.²

The storm at length passed over, and, amidst one of the most intensely hot days of the season, the battle was renewed with increased fury.³ The new position occupied by the Americans, and the new system of "bush-fighting," however, soon produced their legitimate effects, and the Indians suffered very severely, so much so, indeed, that they began to show signs of great uneasiness,⁴ and Major Watts moved forward a second detachment of the Royal Greens, which had been sent out by Colonel St. Leger, to support them.⁵ As has been said before, "these men were mostly loyalists, who had fled from Tryon county, now returned in arms against their former neighbors. As no quarrels

¹ Stone's Brant, i. p. 237.—² Campbell, p. 100; Stone's Brant, i. p. 237.

³ Stone's Brant, i. p. 236.—⁴ Ibid., p. 237; Lossing, i. p. 246.—⁵ Stone's Brant, i. p. 237.—⁶ Willett, p. 52.

⁷ Stone's Brant, i. p. 237.

¹ Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 102.
² Campbell, p. 100.—³ Stone's Brant, i. p. 237; Campbell, p. 100.

are so bitter as those of families, so no wars are so cruel and passionate as those called civil. Many of the Americans and Greens were known to each other; and as they advanced so near as to afford opportunities of mutual recognition, the contest became, if possible, more of a death-struggle than before. Mutual resentments and feelings of hate and revenge raged in their bosoms. The Americans fired upon them as they advanced, and then springing like chafed tigers from their covers, attacked them with their bayonets and the butts of their muskets; or both parties, in closer contact, throttled each other and drew their knives, stabbing, and sometimes literally dying, in one another's embrace.”¹

After this contest had continued some time, a firing was heard from the direction of the fort,²—an evidence to the Americans of the sortie which had been asked for by General Herkimer,—and the enemy sought means for closing the engagement. For this purpose Colonel Butler attempted a *ruse-de-guerre*, and was nearly successful in its execution. He ordered a detachment of the Royal Greens (who wore hats similar to those worn by the Americans) to turn their coats inside out, and to march towards the Americans from the direction of the fort, hoping to deceive the latter by making them suppose it to be a relief from the garrison.³ The Americans were deceived, as Butler intended, until

the experienced eye of Captain Gardiner discovered their real character, and ordered his men to fire upon them, and, rushing upon them himself, followed by some of his men, upwards of thirty of the turncoats were slain, and the remainder fled in confusion.⁴

The Indians, perceiving with what ardor the Americans opposed the enemy, and finding their own ranks somewhat reduced in numbers, at once raised their retreating cry of “Oonah, Oonah,” and fled in every direction;⁵ while the Tories, perceiving that their allies had deserted them, and supposing, from the continued firing, that their presence was necessary elsewhere, also retreated with precipitation, “leaving the victorious Tryon county militia and volunteers masters of the field,”⁶ at about two o’clock in the afternoon,⁷ after a contest of eight hours’ duration.

While this contest was raging, the garrison was not unemployed. The messengers sent forward by General Herkimer, announcing his approach, reached the fort in safety, about ten o’clock in the morning, and, as we have seen, immediate preparations were made for diverting the attention of the enemy, by means of a sortie.⁸ For this purpose, two hundred men—one half from Colonel Gansevoort’s regiment, the other from Colonel Wesson’s⁹—were placed under the command of Colonel Marinus Willett,⁷ and had been prop-

¹ Stone’s Brant, i. p. 237. See also Gordon, ii. p. 530; Campbell, pp. 100, 101.—² Stone’s Brant, i. p. 238

³ Ibid.; Lossing, i. p. 247.

⁴ Stone’s Brant, i. pp. 238–240.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Campbell, p. 101; Stone’s Brant, p. 244, note.

⁸ Willett, p. 51.—⁹ Col. Willett’s Statement, Document I. Willett, p. 51.

erly disposed when the thunder-shower, before spoken of, burst upon the fort.¹ An hour's delay ensued, after which time it was made, and proved eminently successful. In addition to the troops previously detached, fifty more, under Captain Swartwout, were added, to protect a light iron three-pound field-piece, which had been mounted on a travelling carriage. As the enemy's sentries were directly in sight of the fort, his movements were necessarily rapid; and the sentries were driven in and their advanced guard attacked before Colonel St. Leger had time to form his troops. So sudden and so impetuous, indeed, was the attack of Colonel Willett, that the enemy could not make the least opposition, safety being sought in flight; and within a very few minutes from the time he left the sally-port he was master of the camps, both those of the whites and that of the Indians. Sir John Johnson, with his troops, crossed the river, while the Indians took to the woods, both being severely handled by Colonel Willett's party. Twenty-one wagon-loads of camp-equipage, clothing, blankets, and stores, including five British standards, the baggage of Sir John Johnson and all his papers, the desk and papers of Colonel St. Leger, and the baggage of a number of other officers, with memoranda, journals, and orderly-books, were the trophies of this movement, and Colonel Willett returned to the fort without the loss of a single

man.² The five British flags were immediately hoisted on the flag-staff of the fort, under the American colors, and all the troops in the garrison, having mounted the parapets, saluted them with three hearty cheers.³ The loss to the enemy, from this sortie, was very severely felt, and, among the Indians especially, it occasioned great dissatisfaction;⁴ while the garrison appeared to regard it as a certain forerunner of a complete triumph over its enemies.⁴

On the afternoon of the seventh, the day after the battle, "the beating of the chamade and the appearance of a white flag, was followed with a request that Colonel Butler and two other officers might enter the fort with a message to the commander. Permission having been granted, they were conducted, blindfolded, into the fort, and received by Colonel Gansevoort in his dining-room. The windows of the room were shut and candles lighted; a table was also spread, covered with crackers, cheese, and wine. Three chairs, placed at one end of the table, were occupied by Colonel Butler and the two other officers who had come with him; at the other end, Colonels Gansevoort, Willett, and Mellon were seated. Seats were also placed around the table for as many officers as could be accommodated, while the rest of the room was nearly filled with the other officers of the garrison, indiscriminately, it being

¹ Willett, p. 51. See also St. Leger's Account of Occurrences.

² Willett, pp. 53, 54; Gordon, ii. pp. 530, 531; Campbell, pp. 101, 102; Col. Willett's Statement, Document I.

³ Willett, pp. 54, 55.—³ Annual Register for 1777.

⁴ Willett, p. 55.

desirable that the officers in general should be witnesses of all that might take place. After passing round the wine, with a few common-place compliments, Major Aneron, one of the messengers, with a very grave, stiff air, and a countenance full of importance, spoke, in nearly the following words: 'I am directed by Colonel St. Leger, the officer who commands the army now investing the garrison, to inform the commandant, that the Colonel has, with much difficulty, prevailed on the Indians to agree, that if the garrison, without farther resistance, shall be delivered up, with the public stores belonging to it, to the investing army, the officers and soldiers shall have all their baggage and private property secured to them. And in order that the garrison may have a sufficient pledge to this effect, Colonel Butler accompanies me to assure them, that not a hair of the head of any one of them shall be hurt.' (Here turning to Colonel Butler, he said, 'That was the expression, I think, made use of, was it not?'—to which the Colonel answered, 'Yes.') 'I am likewise directed to remind the commandant, that the defeat of General Herkimer must deprive the garrison of all hopes of relief, especially as General Burgoyne is now in Albany; so that, sooner or later, the fort must fall into our hands. Colonel St. Leger, from an earnest desire to prevent farther bloodshed, hopes these terms will not be refused; as in this case, it will be out of his power to make them again. It was with great difficulty the Indians con-

sented to the present arrangement, as it will deprive them of that plunder which they always calculate upon, on similar occasions. Should, then, the present terms be rejected, it will be out of the power of the Colonel to restrain the Indians, who are very numerous, and much exasperated, not only from plundering the property, but destroying the lives of, probably, the greater part of the garrison. Indeed, the Indians are so exceedingly provoked and mortified, by the losses they have sustained in the late actions, having had several of their favorite chiefs killed, that they threaten—and the Colonel, if the present arrangements should not be entered into, will not be able to prevent them from executing their threats—to march down the country, and destroy the settlement, with its inhabitants. In this case, not only men, but women and children, will experience the sad effects of their vengeance. These considerations, it is ardently hoped, will produce a proper effect, and induce the commandant, by complying with the terms now offered, to save himself from future regret, when it will be too late.'

"With the approbation of Colonel Gansevoort, Colonel Willett made the following reply. Looking the important Major full in the face, he observed, 'Do I understand you, sir? I think you say, that you come from a British Colonel, who is commander of the army that invests this fort; and by your uniform, you appear to be an officer in the British service. You have made a long speech on the occasion of your visit,

which, stripped of all its superfluities, amounts to this, that you come from a British Colonel to the commandant of this garrison to tell him, that if he does not deliver up the garrison into the hands of your Colonel, he will send his Indians to murder our women and children. You will please to reflect, sir, that their blood will be on your head, not on ours. We are doing our duty : this garrison is committed to our charge, and we will take care of it. After you get out of it, you may turn round and look at its outside, but never expect to come in again, unless you come a prisoner. I consider the message you have brought a degrading one for a British officer to send, and by no means reputable for a British officer to carry. For my own part, I declare, before I would consent to deliver this garrison to such a murdering set as your army, by your own account, consists of, I would suffer my body to be filled with splinters and set on fire, as you know has at times been practised by such hordes of women and children killers as belong to your army."¹

The officers who were present manifested their sentiments by a round of applause on the conclusion of Colonel Willett's address, and by brief remarks to the same effect, and the flag returned to the British camp without effecting any thing farther than a cessation of hostilities for three days.²

To guard against any contingencies

which might arise, it was thought advisable by the officers in the fort, to make another attempt to obtain succors from without, and the militia of Tryon county having shown great regard for Colonel Willett, it was thought if he could show himself among them it might inspire them with confidence, and induce them to make a second attempt. Influenced by these considerations the Colonel undertook the hazardous enterprise, and about ten o'clock in the evening of the tenth of August, he left the fort, with one companion, passed silently along the marsh, and crossed the river, creeping on a log, only a few yards distant from the enemy's sentinels. With great difficulty and skill they passed through the encampment of the Indians, and through the forests to Fort Dayton (Herkimer), arriving about three o'clock on the afternoon of the twelfth, when they learned that a reinforcement had been ordered by General Schuyler for their relief ; that General Larned, with his brigade of Massachusetts troops, was then on his way ; and that General Benedict Arnold, under whose command the detachment was placed, was about to follow General Larned, with the first regiment of New York troops.¹ Colonel Willett immediately proceeded to Albany, where he met General Arnold, and returned with him, and the relief, to Fort Dayton, where they were to assemble.²

It appears that intelligence of the

¹ Willett's Narrative, pp. 55-58.—² Ibid., pp. 58, 59 ; Gordon, ii. p. 532 ; Stedman, i. p. 334.

¹ Willett, pp. 58-61 ; Gordon, ii. pp. 531, 532 ; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 295 ; Stedman, i. p. 334 ; Campbell, pp. 111, 112.—² Willett, p. 61.

approach of General Arnold did not reach Colonel St. Leger at as early a date as might have been expected, and he pushed the siege with great industry.¹ The garrison, also, steadily and gallantly defended its position, and harassed the enemy in all his approaches.²

At length, on the twenty-second of August, General Arnold having reached Fort Dayton, "the investing army," under Colonel St. Leger, suddenly, and to the astonishment of the garrison, broke up their encampments, and fled in such haste and confusion as to leave their tents and a great part of their artillery, camp equipage, and baggage behind.³ It is said this strange and sudden movement was produced by a *ruse-de-guerre* practised by General Arnold, in sending an eccentric, half-idiotic semi-tory, named Hon-Yost Schuyler, among the Indian allies of Colonel St. Leger, with exaggerated stories of his strength and of his near approach, which so terrified the savages and, indirectly, St. Leger, that a farther stay was considered injudicious and dangerous.⁴

Thus ended the siege of Fort Schuyler, the enemy hastening back to Oswego with the remnant of his force, and thence to Montreal;¹ while Colonel Gansevoort and his garrison enjoyed the satisfaction of having done their duty, as well as the commendations of their country, which were generally bestowed on them.²

Of the battle of Oriskany,—the most terrible of the war,—both parties, with some reason, claimed the victory. The Americans retained their position and the field, while the enemy fled and were pursued, and the former considered themselves the victors;³ the latter, however, say that the object of the expedition was defeated,—that the fort was not relieved, as was intended,—and that the Americans were defeated.⁴ The question admits of argument on both sides, but to others more interested in the solution of nice questions that discussion is left. The loss of the Americans is stated to have been near two hundred slain, besides the wounded.⁵ General Herkimer, who was among the wounded, was carried home, and died a few days afterwards.⁶ Of the enemy's loss nothing positive is known, Colonel

¹ Willett, p. 63; St. Leger's Account of Occurrences; History of Civil War, i. p. 295.

² Stone's Brant, i. pp. 256, 257.

³ Ibid., p. 257; Willett, p. 62; Gordon, ii. pp. 534, 535; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 296; Marshall, iii. p. 277; Stedman, i. p. 335; Campbell, pp. 113, 114.

⁴ Gordon, ii. pp. 532, 533; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 295; Lient. Hall's Civil War, pp. 395, 396; Stedman, i. p. 335; Campbell, p. 113. Although this story has been cited by most of the modern writers, from Gordon to Irving, I have strong doubts of its truth. Willett says nothing about it, although he was with Gen. Arnold, and would have known had it taken place; and Gen. Arnold's

letters are equally silent. What the Indians, themselves or by others, did to alarm St. Leger, and induce him to retreat, I know not, but the latter attributes the messenger to the Indians and not to Arnold.

⁵ Lient. Hall's Civil War, p. 397; Marshall, iii. p. 277.

⁶ Stone's Brant, i. p. 263; Willett, pp. 137, 138.

⁷ Stone's Brant, i. p. 240, note.

⁸ Col. St. Leger's Account of Occurrences; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 293; Lient. Hall's Civil War, p. 394.

⁹ Campbell, p. 102.

¹⁰ Benton's Herkimer County, p. 164.

St. Leger having concealed it in his report. The Indians are said to have suffered very severely, several of their most prominent chiefs having been among the slain.¹

The sortie under Colonel Willett se-

cured for that officer the commendations, both of his own countrymen and of the enemy.¹ The Continental Congress voted him their thanks, with a sword of honor,² and he lived to a good old age, respected by all who knew him.

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

COLONEL WILLETT'S STATEMENT SENT TO GOV. TRUMBULL.

HARTFORD, August 21, 1777.

The following is a narrative of part of the transactions at and near Fort Stanwix, since the investiture of that place by the enemy, given in manuscript, by Lieutenant-colonel Willett, of that garrison.

On Saturday evening, August the 2d, five bateaux arrived with stores for the garrison. About the same time we discovered a number of fires a little better than a mile from the northwest corner of the fort. The stores were all got safe in, and the troops, which were a guard to the bateaux, marched up. The captain of the bateaux and a few of his men, delaying their time about the boats, were fired upon by a party of Indians, which killed one man and wounded two; the captain himself was taken a prisoner.

Next morning the enemy appeared in the edge of the woods, about a mile below the fort, where they took post in order to invest it upon that quarter, and to cut off the communication with the country; from whence they sent in a flag, who told us of their great power, strength, and determination, in such a manner as gave us reason to suppose they were not possessed of sufficient strength to take the fort. Our answer was a determination to support it.

All day on Monday we were much annoyed by a sharp fire of musketry from the Indians and German riflemen, which, as our men were obliged to be exposed on the works, killed one and wounded seven. The day after, the firing was not so heavy, and our men under better cover; all the damage was one man killed by a rifle-ball. This evening indicated something in contemplation by the enemy. The Indians were uncommonly noisy; they kept up the most horrid yellings, great part of the evening, in the woods, hardly a mile from the fort. A few cannon were fired among them.

Wednesday morning there was an unusual silence. We discovered some of the enemy marching along the edge of the woods downwards. About 11 o'clock, three men got into the fort, who brought a letter from General Harkaman of the Tryon county militia, advising us that he was at Eriska (eight miles off), with part of his militia, and proposed to force his way to the fort for our relief. In order to render him what service we could in his march, it was agreed that I should make a sally from the fort with two hundred and fifty men, consisting of one half Gansevoort's, one half Massachusetts' ditto, and one field-piece (an iron three-pounder).

The men were instantly paraded, and I ordered the following disposition to be made: thirty men from the advanced guard, to be com-

¹ Col. St. Leger says they lost thirty killed, and as many wounded. Gordon, ii. p. 530; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 293.

² History of Civil War, i. p. 294.—² Journals of Congress, Oct. 4, 1777; Willett's Narrative, pp. 137, 138.

manded by Captain Van Benscotton and Lieutenant Stockwell; thirty for the rear-guard, under the command of Captain Allen, of Massachusetts troops, and Lieutenant Deuffendorf; thirty for flank-guards, to be commanded by Captain ——, from Massachusetts, and Ensign Chase. The main body formed into eight subdivisions, commanded by Captain Blacker, Lieutenants Comine, Bogardus, McClenner, Coffraunder, Ensigns Begley, Lewis, and Dennison: Lieutenant Ball, the only supernumerary officer, to march with me. Captain Jansen to bring up the rear of the main body. Captain Swartwoudt, with Ensigns Magee, Arnett, and fifty men, to guard the field-piece, which was under the direction of Major Bedlow.

Nothing could be more fortunate than this enterprise. We totally routed two of the enemy's encampments, destroyed all the provisions that were in them, brought off upwards of fifty brass kettles, and more than one hundred blankets (two articles which were much needed), with a quantity of muskets, tomahawks, spears, ammunition, clothing, deer-skins, a variety of Indian affairs, and five colors (the whole of which, on our return to the fort, were displayed on our flag-staff, under the Continental flag). The Indians took chiefly to the woods, the rest of the troops then at their posts, to the river. The number of men lost by the enemy is uncertain. Six lay dead in their encampments, two of which were Indians; several scattered about in the woods; but their greatest loss appeared to be in crossing the river, and an inconsiderable number upon the opposite shore. I was happy in preventing the men from scalping even the Indians, being desirous, if possible, to teach even the savages humanity; but the men were much better employed, and kept in excellent order. We were out so long, that a number of British regulars, accompanied by what Indians, &c., could be rallied, had marched down to a thicket on the other side of the river, about fifty yards from the road we were to pass on our return: near this place I had ordered the field-piece; the ambush was not quite formed when we discovered them, and gave them a well-directed fire. Here, especially, Major Bedlow, with his field-piece, did considerable execution. Here,

also, the enemy were annoyed by the fire of several cannon from the fort, as they marched round to form the ambuscade. The enemy's fire was very wild, and though we were very much exposed, did no execution at all. We brought in four prisoners, three of whom were wounded. One of the prisoners is a Mr. George Singleton, of Montreal; he is Lieutenant in a company of which Mr. Stephen Watts, of New York (brother-in-law to Sir John Johnson), was Captain, and who was himself killed in the battle with the militia about two hours before. Mr. Singleton told me that Sir John Johnson was with him when we attacked their camp, and that he thinks he ran to the river. It is said, by some of the Oneida Indians, that he is killed, which does not appear unlikely. From these prisoners we received the first accounts of General Marmont's militia being ambushed on their march; and of a severe battle they had with them about two hours before, which gave reason to think they had, for the present, given up their design of marching to the fort.

I should not do justice to the officers and soldiers who were with me on this enterprise, if I were not in the most positive terms to assure their countrymen, that they in general behaved with the greatest gallantry upon this occasion; and next to the very kind and signal interposition of Divine Providence, which was powerfully manifested in their favor, it was undoubtedly owing to that noble intrepidity which discovered itself in this attack, and struck the enemy with such a panic, as disengaged them from taking pains to direct their fire, that we had not one man killed or wounded. The officers in general behaved so well, that it is hardly right to mention the name of any particular one for their singular valor; but so remarkably intrepid was Captain Van Benscotton, and so rapid was his attack, that it demands from me this particular testimony of his extraordinary spirit.

Among other things taken from the enemy were several bundles of papers, and a parcel of letters belonging to our garrison, which they had taken from our militia, but not yet opened; here I found one letter for myself; there were likewise papers belonging to Sir John Johnson and several other of the enemy's officers, with

letters to and from General St. Leger, their commander: these papers have been of some service to us. On the evening of the next day, the enemy fired a few cannon at us from high ground, about half a mile north of the fort, where they have erected a small battery. Next day, being Friday, the 8th, they threw a parcel of shells from the same battery, none of which did any execution. This evening they sent us a flag, with which came their Adjutant-general, Captain Armstrong, Colonel Butler, and a surgeon; the surgeon to examine Singleton's wounds; the principal business of the flag was to acquaint us that General St. Leger had, with much difficulty, prevailed on the Indians to agree, that if the commanding officer would deliver up the fort, the garrison should be secure from any kind of harm, that not a hair of their heads should be touched, but if not, the consequence to the garrison, should it afterwards fall into their hands, must be terrible; that the Indians were very much enraged, on account of their having a number of their chiefs killed in the late action, and were determined, unless they got possession of the fort, to go down the Mohawk River, and fall upon its inhabitants. Our answer was, that should this be the case, the blood of those inhabitants would be upon the heads of Mr. Butler and his employers, not upon us, and that such proceedings would ever remain a stigma upon the name of Britain; but, for our parts, we were determined to defend the fort.

That evening, it was agreed by the field-officers that I should undertake, with Lieutenant Stockwell (who is a good woodsman), to endeavor to get into the country, and by making a proper representation of our affairs, endeavor to procure such force as may be sufficient entirely to extirpate this miscreant band. After a most severe march of about fifty miles through the wilderness, I arrived at this place, and am in no doubt of beholding, in a few days, a force sufficient to accomplish this important piece of business. By the best accounts, the loss of the Indians is very considerable, and they are quite sick of the expedition.

MARINUS WILLETT.

GERMAN FLATS, August 11, 1777.

II.

COLONEL ST. LEGER'S ACCOUNT OF OCCURRENCES, SENT TO GENERAL BURGOYNE.

A minute detail of every operation since my leaving La Chine with the detachment intrusted to my care, your Excellency will permit me to reserve to a time of less hurry and mortification than the present, while I enter into the interesting scene before Fort Stanwix, which I invested on the 3d of August, having previously pushed forward Lieutenant Bird, of the King's regiment, with thirty of the King's troops and two hundred Indians, under the direction of Captains Hare and Wilson, and the chiefs Joseph and Bull, to seize fast hold of the lower landing-place, and thereby cut off the enemy's communication with the lower country. This was done with great address by the Lieutenant, though not attended with the effect I had promised myself, occasioned by the slackness of the Messasagoes. The brigade of provision and ammunition boats, I had intelligence of being arrived and disembarked before this party had taken post. The fourth and fifth were employed in making arrangements for opening Wood Creek (which the enemy, with the indefatigable labor of one hundred and fifty men, for fourteen days, had most effectually choked up), and the making a temporary road from Pine Ridges upon Fish Creek, sixteen miles from the fort, for a present supply of provisions and the transport of our artillery: the first was effected by the diligence and zeal of Captain Bouville, assisted by Captain Harkimer of the Indian department, with one hundred and ten men, in nine days; while Lieutenant Lundy, acting as assistant quartermaster-general, had rendered the road, in the worst of weather, sufficiently practicable to pass the whole artillery and stores, with seven days' provision, in two days.

On the 5th, in the evening, intelligence arrived, by my discovering parties on the Mohawk River, that a reinforcement of eight hundred militia, conducted by General Herkimer, were on their march to relieve the garrison, and were actually at that instant at Oriska, an Indian settlement twelve miles from the fort. The garrison being apprised of their march by four men,

who were seen enter the fort in the morning, through what was thought an impenetrable swamp, I did not think it prudent to wait for them, and thereby subject myself to be attacked, by a sally from the garrison in the rear, while the reinforcement employed me in front. I therefore determined to attack them on the march, either openly or covertly, as circumstances should offer. At this time I had not two hundred and fifty of the King's troops in camp, the various and extensive operations I was under an absolute necessity of entering into, having employed the rest; and therefore could not send above eighty white men, rangers and troops included, with the whole corps of Indians. Sir John Johnson put himself at the head of this party, and began his march that evening at five o'clock, and met the rebel corps at the same hour next morning. The impetuosity of the Indians is not to be described; on the sight of the enemy (forgetting the judicious disposition formed by Sir John, and agreed to by themselves, which was, to suffer the attack to begin with the troops in front, while they should be on both flanks and rear) they rushed in, hatchet in hand, and thereby gave the enemy's rear an opportunity to escape. In relation to the victory, it was equally complete, as if the whole had fallen; nay, more so, as the two hundred who escaped only served to spread the panic wider: but it was not so with the Indians; their loss was great (I must be understood Indian computation, being only about thirty killed, and the like number wounded, and in that number some of their favorite chiefs and confidential warriors were slain). On the enemy's side, almost all their principal leaders were slain. General Herkimer has since died of his wounds. It is proper to mention, that the four men detached with intelligence of the march of the reinforcement, set out the evening before the action, and consequently the enemy could have no account of the defeat, and were in possession only of the time appointed for their arrival; at which, as I suspected, they made a sally with two hundred and fifty men towards Lieutenant Bird's post, to facilitate the entrance of the relieving corps, or bring on a general engagement, with every advantage they could wish.

Captain Hoyes was immediately detached to ent in upon their rear, while they engaged the Lieutenant. Immediately upon the departure of Captain Hoyes, having learned that Lieutenant Bird, misled by the information of a cowardly Indian, that Sir John was pressed, had quitted his post to march to his assistance, I marched the detachment of the King's regiment, in support of Captain Hoyes, by a road in sight of the garrison, which, with executive fire from his party, immediately drove the enemy into the fort, without any farther advantage than frightening some squaws, and pilfering the packs of the warriors, which they left behind them. After this affair was over, orders were immediately given to complete a two-gun battery and mortar-bed, with three strong redoubts in their rear, to enable me, in case of another attempt, to relieve the garrison by their regimented troops, to march out a larger body of the King's troops.

Captain Lernoult was sent with one hundred and ten men to the lower landing-place, where he established himself with great judgment and strength, having an inclosed battery of a three-pounder opposed to any sally from the fort, and another to the side of the country where a relief must approach; and the body of his camp deeply intrenched and abatised.

When, by the unabated labor of officers and men (the smallness of our numbers never admitting of a relief, or above three hours' cessation for sleep or cooking), the batteries and redoubts were finished, and new cheeks and axletrees made for the six-pounders—those that were sent being reported rotten and unserviceable—it was found that our cannon had not the least effect on the sodwork of the fort, and that our royals had only the power of teasing, as a six-inch plank was a sufficient security for their powder-magazine, as we learned from the deserters. At this time, Lieutenant Glenie, of the artillery, whom I had appointed to act as assistant engineer, proposed a conversion of the royals (if I may use the expression) into howitzers. The ingenuity and feasibility of this measure striking me very strongly, the business was set about immediately and soon executed, when it was found that nothing prevented their operating

with the desired effect but the distance, their chambers being too small to hold a sufficiency of powder.

There was nothing now to be done but to approach the town by sap to such a distance, that the rampart might be brought within their portice, at the same time all materials were preparing to run a mine under their most formidable bastion.

In the midst of these operations, intelligence was brought in by our scouts of a second corps of one thousand men being on their march. The same zeal no longer animated the Indians; they complained of our thinness of troops and their former losses. I immediately called a council of the chiefs; encouraged them as much as I could; promised to lead them on myself, and bring into the field three hundred of the best troops. They listened to this and promised to follow me, and agreed that I should reconnoitre the ground properst for the field of battle next morning, accompanied by some of their chief warriors, to settle the plan of operations. When upon the ground appointed for the field of battle, scouts came in with the account of the first number swelled to two thousand; immediately after, a third, that General Burgoyne's army was cut to pieces, and that Arnold was advancing, by rapid and forced marches, with three thousand men. It was at this moment I began to suspect cowardice in some, and treason in others; however, I returned to camp, not without hopes, with the assistance of my gallant coadjutor, Sir John Johnson, and the influence of the superintending Colonels, Claus and Butler, of inducing them to meet the enemy. A council, according to their custom, was called, to know their resolutions, before the breaking up of which I learned that two hundred had already decamped. In about an hour they insisted that I should retreat, or they would be obliged to abandon me. I had no other party to take, and a hard party it was to troops who could do nothing without them, to yield to their resolves; and therefore proposed to retire at night, sending on before my sick, wounded, artillery, &c., down the Wood Creek, covering them by our line of march.

This did not fall in with their views, which

were no less than treacherously committing ravage upon their friends, as they had lost the opportunity of doing it upon their enemies. To effect this, they artfully caused messengers to come in, one after the other, with accounts of the nearer approaches of the rebels; one, and the last, affirmed, that they were within two miles of Captain Lernoult's post. Not giving entire credit to this, and keeping to my resolution of retiring by night, they grew furious and abandoned; seized upon the officers' liquor and clothes, in spite of the efforts of their servants, and became more formidable than the enemy we had to expect. I now thought it time to call in Captain Lernoult's post, retiring with the troops in camp to the ruined fort called William, in the front of the garrison, not only to wait the enemy, if they thought proper to sally, but to protect the boats from the fury of the savages, having sent forward Captain Hoyes, with his detachment, with one piece of cannon, to the place where Bull Fort stood, to receive the troops, who waited the arrival of Captain Lernoult. Most of the boats were escorted that night beyond Canada Creek, where no danger was to be apprehended from the enemy. The creek, at this place bending from the road, has a deep cedar swamp between. Every attention was now turned to the mouth of the creek, which the enemy might have possessed themselves of by a rapid march by the Oneida Castle. At this place the whole of the little army arrived by twelve o'clock at night, and took post in such a manner as to have no fears of anything the enemy could do. Here we remained till three o'clock next morning, when the boats which could come up the creek arrived, or rather, that the rascally part of all nations of the Indians would suffer to come up; and proceeded across Lake Oneida to the ruined fort of Brereton, where I learned that some boats were still laboring down the creek, after being lightened of the best part of their freight by the Messasagoes. Captain Lernoult proposed, with a boat full of armed men, to repass the lake that night, to relieve them from their labor, and supply them with provision.

On my arrival at the Onondago Falls, I received an answer to my letter from your Excel-

lency, which showed in the clearest light the scenes of treachery that had been practised on me. The messenger had heard, indeed, on his way, that they were collecting the same kind of rabble as before, but that there was not an enemy within forty miles of Fort Stanwix.

Soon after my arrival here, I was joined by Captain Lernoult, with the men and boats he had been in search of. I mean immediately to send off, for the use of the upper garrison, all the overplus provisions I shall have, after keeping a sufficiency to carry my detachment down, which I mean to do with every expedition in my power, the moment this business is effected, for which purpose I have ordered here the snow. The sloop is already gone from this with her full lading.

Officers from each corps are sent to Montreal to procure necessaries for the men, who are in a most deplorable situation, from the plunder of the savages, that no time may be lost to join your army.

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, sir, your Excellency's most obedient, faithful servant,

BARRY ST. LEGER.

Oswego, August 27, 1777.

His Excellency, General BURGOYNE.

III.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NICHOLAS HERKIMER.

Nicholas Herkinier was the eldest son of Johan Jost Erghemar, one of the original patentees of Burnetsfield, in Herkimer county, N. Y. The family was German, and there is no information on record whence or at what time they came to America, although they evidently possessed wealth, and soon became influential in the Mohawk Valley. He was commissioned a Lieutenant in Captain Wormwood's company of militia, January 5, 1758, and commanded at Fort Herkimer, in the same year. Taking an active part with the colonists in their troubles with the crown, he was appointed Colonel of the First battalion of the militia of Tryon county, in 1775, and on the fifth of September, 1776, he was promoted to a Brigadier-generalship by the Provincial Congress of New York.

When the popular troubles arose, Nicholas Herkimer was sent to the Committee of Safety of Tryon county, as the representative of his district; and in 1776 he acted as Chairman of that body, maintaining a high character for integrity, and greatly influencing his countrymen throughout the valley, in their political action in opposition to the crown.

Of the action taken by him, in opposition to the enemy which had invested Fort Schuyler, of the sullen bravery which he exhibited at Oriskany, and of the wound which he received there, notice has been taken in this chapter, and the closing scenes of his life are all that remain for us to notice.

After the action, General Herkimer was conveyed to his own house, in the present town of Danube, in Herkimer county, where his leg was amputated. It was done in the most unskillful manner, the leg having been cut off square, without taking up an artery, and he died from the effects of the hemorrhage which ensued. Finding that the time for his departure was nigh, he called for his Bible, read to those who were around him the thirty-eighth Psalm, and shortly afterwards he died; but the day of his death found no recorder, and that, as well as the day of his birth, appear to be now unknown.

IV.

COLONEL MARINUS WILLETT.

Marinus Willett was born at Jamaica, Long Island, July 31 (O. S.), 1740, being the youngest son of Edward Willett, a farmer in that town. He joined the army, under General Abercrombie, in 1758, as a lieutenant, in Colonel Delaney's regiment; was present at the disastrous battle at Ticonderoga; and accompanied Bradstreet in his expedition against Fort Frontenae. Exposure in the wilderness injured his health, and he was confined by sickness in the newly-erected Fort Stanwix, the scene of the gallant sortie under his command, which has been described in this chapter, until the close of the campaign.

He identified himself, at a very early date, with the "Sons of Liberty," in the city of New

York, and soon became one of the most daring members of that body. In "the affair of Broad-street," Marinus Willett, single-handed, arrested the progress of the battalion of royal troops who were guarding the arms which had been ordered from New York to Boston; and, notwithstanding the remonstrances of Whitehead Hicks, the Tory Mayor of the city, and of Gouverneur Morris, with the assistance of John Morin Scott, another "Son of Liberty," and afterwards a General in the Continental establishment, he defeated the purposes of the Governor and Council, carried off and concealed the arms, and, afterwards, used them in equipping the First regiment of New York troops in the army of the United States.

He was appointed second captain in the regiment commanded by Colonel Alexander McDougal,—also a "Son of Liberty"—accompanied General Montgomery in the expedition against Canada, and was appointed to the command of St. John's, where he remained until January, 1776. In that year he was appointed Lieutenant-colonel, and, on the opening of the campaign of 1777, he was ordered to the command of Fort Constitution, on the Hudson

River. In May of that year he was ordered to Fort Schuyler, as noticed in this chapter, where he distinguished himself as the commander of the sortie made from that garrison, for which he received a sword of honor and the thanks of the Continental Congress, the freedom of the city of Albany, and other honors from his grateful countrymen.

The next year he joined the main army, and participated in the battle of Monmouth. In 1779 he accompanied General Sullivan on his expedition against the Indians; and was actively engaged in the Mohawk Valley in 1780, 1781, and 1782.

In 1792, General Washington sent him to treat with the Creek Indians, and, on his return he was appointed a Brigadier-general in the army intended to operate against the Northwestern tribes, which appointment he declined, being opposed to the expedition. He was Sheriff of the city and county of New York from 1791 to 1795, and in 1807 he was Mayor of the city.

He lived to a good old age, honored by all who knew him, and died August 23, 1830, aged ninety-one years.

CHAPTER XXII.

AUGUST 16, 1777.

BATTLE OF BENNINGTON

THE obstacles opposed to General Burgoyne's progress towards Albany increased at every step he advanced; and the labor of opening roads and of removing the obstructions which had been placed in his way had so far exhausted his means that he began to experience alarm respecting his supplies while he was at Fort Edward, in the beginning of August.¹ To replenish his stock of provisions from a supply which had been stored for the Continental army at that place,² to obtain draught-horses and horses for General Riedesel's *horseless* dragoons,³ to encourage the loyal—of whom he had been led to suppose Vermont was somewhat prolific⁴—and to alarm the New England States with an appearance of advancing against them,⁵ General Burgoyne concluded to detach a body of troops to Bennington, in the

New Hampshire Grants, now Vermont, although his general officers disapproved the measure.¹

For this service he selected the Brunswick (Riedesel's) dragoons, Captain Frazer's corps of Rangers, Peters' corps of Provincial (Tory) troops, a body of Canadian volunteers, and one of Indians, the whole numbering four hundred and eighty-six men,² and placed the command in Lieutenant-colonel Baume, an experienced Hessian officer;³ while Governor Skene was *requested* to accompany the expedition, and afford to Colonel Baume the benefit of his knowledge of the country and of the people.⁴ In order to facilitate the movement, and to be ready to take advantage of its success, General Burgoyne, with the main body of the army, moved up the east bank of the Hudson River.⁵

¹ Burgoyne's Narrative, pp. 12, 13; Gen. Burgoyne to Gen. Harvey, July 11; Anburey's Travels, i. p. 364.

² Ibid. See also Instructions by Gen. Burgoyne to Col. Baume.—³ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 207; Instructions to Col. Baume.—⁴ Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 13; Instructions to Col. Baume; Testimony of Lieut.-Col. Kingston before House of Commons.—⁵ Wilkinson, i. p. 207; Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 12; Gen. Burgoyne to Lord Geo. Germain ("Private"), July 11.

¹ Gen. Riedesel's Military Mem., Campaign of 1777, p. 140; Lieut.-Col. Kingston's testimony before the House, Ans. 36, 37.—² Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 151.—³ "Instructions for Lieut.-Col. Baume," &c.

⁴ "Instructions to Col. Skene upon the expedition to Bennington."

⁵ Gen. Burgoyne to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 20. I have followed the language of the writer of this letter, although I believe he was in error when he said the army

On the eleventh of August, Colonel Baume encamped at Saratoga, and, at five o'clock in the morning of the twelfth, he advanced towards Bennington.¹ He had moved a mile only, however, when his progress was arrested by orders from General Burgoyne, and he encamped on the Battenkill until the next morning, when he proceeded sixteen miles, and encamped at Cambridge.² On his way he captured five Americans, was fired upon by a small party of fifteen men, and learned that the Americans who had assembled at Bennington to oppose him numbered not less than eighteen hundred men.³ On the morning of the fourteenth, he reached Van Schaick's Mill (still standing on the Walloomscoick, near North Hoosick),⁴ which was occupied by a small party, who broke down the bridge and retired before him, leaving seventy-eight barrels of very fine flour, a thousand bushels of wheat, twenty barrels of salt, and a thousand pounds' worth of pot and pearl ashes.⁵ During the day "people flocked in hourly," to assist him, professing loyalty, "but wanted arms;"⁶ and General Burgoyne states, on what authority is not shown, that although these men took the oath of allegiance which was administered to them, they "were the first to fire" on

the detachment.¹ It does not appear that Colonel Baume took a supply of arms for the purpose of arming such applicants;² nor is it pretended that they left the camp to obtain them elsewhere, and it is, therefore, a matter of doubt, in my mind, whether they did abandon their new allies and fire upon them, as stated by the General, who was not present to witness what he states took place. To deliberately perjure themselves might be the disposition of a few men, but when it is said such characters came in "flocks," "hourly;" that they came without arms; that they took a solemn oath of allegiance to the King; and that, *unarmed as they were* (for Baume had no baggage with him, much less spare arms for such recruits), they immediately assumed an offensive position, and "were the first to fire," there is room for doubts respecting the correctness of the latter part, if not of the whole of the statement.

Colonel Baume advised General Burgoyne of his progress; and, on the fourteenth, while he supposed that from fifteen to eighteen hundred men were in Bennington, he supposed, also, "they would leave it on his approach," and promised "to fall on them the next day, early."³ On the receipt of this

moved "up" the east bank of the Hudson. There is no evidence except this, that the enemy retreated from Fort Edward up the Hudson. See also Anburey's Travels, i. p. 394.

¹ Col. Baume to Gen. Burgoyne, Aug. 12. ² Same to same, Aug. 12 and 13. ³ Same to same, Aug. 13.

⁴ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 391.—⁵ Col. Baume to Gen. Burgoyne, Aug. 14.—⁶ Ibid.

¹ Gen. Burgoyne to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 20.

² From the fact that the detachment was sent out on secret service, depending much on the quickness of its movements, it was encumbered with no tents or baggage (even that of the officers was left behind, unless sent on their own bat-horses), and it is fair to conclude that no *spare* arms were sent with it.

³ Letter from "Sancoick, 14th Aug., 9 o'clock."

letter General Burgoyne wrote an answer, approving his actions,¹ and, at the same time,² gave orders to Colonel Breyman, who was encamped near the Battenkill, in advance of the army,³ to march *immediately* to his support⁴ with the Brunswick grenadiers, light-infantry, and chasseurs,⁵ about five hundred in number.⁶ These orders did not reach Colonel Breyman until eight o'clock the next morning, and he did not move until an hour afterwards, when an officer was dispatched to inform Colonel Baume of the movement of the reinforcement.⁷

In the mean time, Colonel John Stark, who had responded to the call of the General Court of New Hampshire, left his farm, and, with the title of Brigadier-general, assumed the command of the troops who had been assembled at Bennington, Manchester, and other points in Vermont,⁸ hearing of the appearance of Indians near Cambridge, on the thirteenth of August, detached Col-

onel Gregg with two hundred men to oppose them.¹ In the evening of the same day he received information that a large body of the enemy, with field-pieces (Colonel Baume's command), was also advancing towards Bennington, in the rear of the Indians.² He immediately assembled his brigade and a few of the State militia then at Bennington, ordered the remains of Colonel Warner's regiment from Manchester, and directed the militia of the neighborhood to assemble for the support of his troops;³ and, on the following morning (the fourteenth), in company with Colonels Warner (without command), Williams, Herrick, and Brush, went out to meet the enemy.⁴

He had marched about five miles when he met Colonel Gregg, who was retiring before Colonel Baume,⁵ and immediately disposed his men in order for battle;⁶ but Colonel Baume hesitated to attack him, and took an advantageous position upon the high ground on the north bank of the Walloomscoick, near a bend of that stream, and commenced to intrench.⁷ The ground occupied by General Stark being unsuitable for his purposes, he retired about a mile, and there encamped;⁸ and sent out small skirmishing parties to harass the enemy,

¹ Letter dated "Near Saratoga, Aug. 14, 1777, seven at night."—² Testimony of the Earl of Harrington before the House of Commons, Answers 28-31.

³ Gen. Burgoyne to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 20.

⁴ Testimony of Earl of Harrington, Answer 29; Col. Breyman's Report, Document IV.—⁵ Gen. Burgoyne to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 20; Col. Breyman's Report, Document IV.—⁶ Sergeant Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 153.—⁷ Col. Breyman's Report, Document IV. It has been said by some that Col. Baume asked for this reinforcement. I have carefully examined the several documents, and the testimony taken before the House of Commons, and am satisfied that such was not the case. The reinforcement was sent by Gen. Burgoyne, on the supposition that it would be required, and not at the request of Col. Baume.

⁸ Mem. of Gen. Stark, in Farmer and Moore's Hist. Coll. of New Hampshire, i. p. 102; Ira Allen's Vermont, pp. 97-100; Belknap's Hist. of New Hampshire, ii. p. 316.

¹ Gen. Stark to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22; Same to the General Court of New Hampshire, Aug. 18.—² Ibid.

³ His letter to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Gen. Stark's letter to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Same to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22.—⁶ Ibid. See also Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, p. 91.—⁷ Gen. Stark's letter to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Same to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22. See also Stedman, i. pp. 332, 333.—⁸ Gen. Stark's letter to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Same to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22. See also Neilson, p. 91; Gordon, ii. p. 539.

one of which killed thirty, including two Indian chiefs.¹ On the next day (August 15th) it rained, and both parties remained within their lines, preparing for the battle.²

On the following morning (August 16th), General Stark was strengthened by the arrival of Colonel Simmons with some troops from Berkshire county,³ and a body of local militia also came into camp,⁴ which increased his force to about sixteen hundred men.⁵ The General arranged his forces into three divisions, and directed Colonel Nichols, who commanded one of these divisions, numbering about two hundred men, to take a circuitous route and gain the rear of the enemy's left wing; while Colonel Herrick, with a party of three hundred men, was ordered to proceed in a similar manner on the enemy's right, gain the rear of Colonel Baume's right wing, and join with Colonel Nichols in a simultaneous attack on the rear of the enemy's position. At the same time Colonels Hubbard and Stickney, with two hundred men, were detached to attack the American (Tory) Volunteers, who occupied a position on the south side of the Walloomscoock, on the right, and in advance of Colonel Baume's position; and a detachment of one hundred

were sent forward to the front to divert the enemy's attention.¹ Shortly afterwards Colonel Nichols asked for a reinforcement, and one hundred men were sent to support him;² when, about three o'clock in the afternoon, he commenced the attack, and the engagement immediately became general.³ Posted behind their breastworks, and strengthened with two field-pieces, the enemy fought nobly for two hours against the superior force which had been brought against them;⁴—the dragoons drawing their sabres and charging hand to hand, after they had expended all their ammunition⁵—but they were compelled to yield, and most of the whites surrendered themselves prisoners of war,⁶ the Indians having fled early in the afternoon.⁷

During this contest, the reinforcement which General Burgoyne had sent out on the morning of the fifteenth, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Breyman, was approaching the battlefield from the northwest, unconscious of the trouble which had overtaken Colonel Baume;⁸ and, at the same time, from

¹ Gen. Stark to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22; Same to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Belknap's New Hampshire, ii. p. 319; Gordon, ii. pp. 539, 540. Serg. Lamb (*Jour. of Occur.*, p. 153) says Baume supposed these troops were *Tories*, coming to assist him.—² Gen. Stark to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Belknap's History of New Hampshire, ii. p. 319.

³ Gen. Stark's letters to Gen. Gates and the Gen. Court.

⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Gordon, ii. p. 540; Serg. Lamb's *Jour. of Occurrences*, p. 153; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 122.

⁶ Gen. Stark's letters to Gen. Gates and the Gen. Court.

⁷ Serg. Lamb's *Jour. of Occur.*, p. 153; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 121; Thatcher's Military Journal, p. 93.

⁸ Gen. Burgoyne to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 20; Serg. Lamb's *Jour. of Occur.*, p. 153; Gordon, ii. p. 540; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 291; Stedman, ii. p. 333; Col. Breyman's Report, Document IV.

¹ Gen. Stark's letter to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Same to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22. See also Gordon, ii. p. 539.

² Gen. Stark's letter to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Same to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22. See also Thatcher's Military Journal, p. 93; Neilson, p. 92; Gordon, ii. p. 539.

³ Gen. Stark's letter to the Gen. Court, Aug. 18; Same to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22. See also Neilson, p. 92.

⁴ His letter to the General Court, Aug. 18.

⁵ Belknap's New Hampshire, ii. p. 319.



THE SAKA TAKI YUKE. (The King of the Sakas, the King of the Huns.)

an opposite direction, the regiment of Colonel Warner was also hastening thither to strengthen the already victorious force of General Stark.¹

The troops under General Stark, having secured the victory, were about to plunder the enemy's camp,² when information of the approach of Colonel Breyman reached them; and an attempt to re-form and prepare to receive him was immediately made.³ At this moment Colonel Warner's regiment came on the ground, and having been strengthened by as many as could be collected from the ranks of General Stark's brigade, another and distinct contest ensued.⁴ Both parties fought manfully until sunset,⁵ when the enemy retreated towards Saratoga, and was pursued until dark by the victorious troops under General Stark and Colonel Warner.⁶

The aggregate force of the Americans was probably near two thousand men,⁷ nearly double the number of the forces originally led from the enemy's camp by Colonels Baume and Breyman; although the additions which they received from the Tories in the vicinity afterwards, rendered the forces more nearly equal.⁸

¹ Gen. Stark's letters to Gen. Gates and the Gen. Court; Gordon, ii. p. 540.—² Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 122; Gordon, ii. p. 540; Marshall, iii. p. 275.

³ Gen. Stark's letters to Gen. Gates and the Gen. Court; Gordon, ii. p. 540.—⁴ Ibid. See also Allen's Hist. of Vermont, p. 101; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 122.—⁵ Gen. Stark's letters to Gen. Gates and the Gen. Court; Gordon, ii. p. 541.—⁶ Ibid. Belknap states Gen. Stark had sixteen hundred men; Col. Warner afterwards joined him, and I have thought, with Judge Marshall (vol. iii. p. 273), that his aggregate force was about two thousand men.

⁸ Lieut. Hall (*Civil War*, p. 389) says many of the Tories who joined Baume were in arms, and assisted him.

Of the enemy's force, two hundred and seven were left dead on the field; the number of wounded is not known.¹ The loss of the Americans was about thirty killed and forty wounded.²

The trophies of the victory were four pieces of cannon, twelve brass drums, two hundred and fifty sabres, four ammunition-wagons, and several hundred stand of arms;³ besides "Lieutenant-colonel Baume, one major, seven captains, fourteen lieutenants, four ensigns, two cornets, one judge-advocate, one baron, two Canadian officers, six sergeants, one aid-de-camp, one Hessian chaplain, three Hessian surgeons, and seven hundred prisoners."⁴

This event was the harbinger of good news from the Northern department—that scene of disaster and trouble. The army of the invader was paralyzed, the prospect of a supply of provisions became more gloomy, the dissatisfaction of the British forces that Germans had been employed was loudly expressed, and the Indian auxiliaries abandoned the army. On the other hand, the spirits of the American armies, and of the people, revived; the ability of the militia to contend with regular troops, posted behind intrenchments and de-

¹ Gen. Stark to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22; Ira Allen's Hist. Vermont, p. 101. Thatcher (*Military Journal*, p. 93) says the killed and wounded numbered 280.

² Gen. Stark to Gen. Gates, Aug. 22; Allen's Vermont, p. 101; Williams' Vermont, ii. p. 123.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Gen. Stark to the Gen. Court of New Hampshire, Aug. 18. Mr. Irving (*Life of Washington*, iii. p. 180) gives, as the number of prisoners, five hundred and sixty-four; of sabres, nine hundred. Dr. Thatcheher (*Military Journal*, pp. 93, 94) says six hundred and fifty-four were prisoners. I have preferred the statements of Gordon.

fended with cannon, was demonstrated; the movements of General Burgoyne, and his abilities to do mischief, were checked; and new hopes and new resolutions were produced. Congress, passing by all questions of insubordination which had occupied its attention, hastened to return its thanks to the troops who had refused to recognize its authority or to obey its officers; the gallant Stark, whom it had insulted a

short time previous, and refused a hearing when he asked leave to remonstrate against its action, had a Brigadier-general's commission thrust upon him with only one dissenting voice; and the country and the world, then and since, has determined that the battle of Bennington, unimportant as it may appear, was one of the most important battles, in its results, of the American Revolution.

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

GENERAL STARK'S DISPATCH TO GEN. GATES.

BENNINGTON, August 22, 1777.

DEAR GENERAL:—I received yours of the 19th instant, which gave me great pleasure: I beg to be excused for not answering it sooner, I have been so sick ever since that I could not write, neither am I well yet. But General Lincoln has written, and I joined with him in opinion on the subject of his letter. I shall now give your honor a short account of the action on the 16th instant. I was informed there was a party of Indians in Cambridge, on their march to this place: I sent Colonel Gregg, of my brigade, to stop them, with two hundred men: In the night I was informed, by express, that there was a large body of the enemy on their march in the rear of the Indians: I rallied all my brigade, and what militia was at this place, in order to stop their proceedings; I likewise sent to Manchester, to Colonel Warner's regiment, that was stationed there; also sent expresses for the militia to come in with all speed to our assistance, which was punctually obeyed; I then marched in company with Colonels Warner, Williams, Herrick, and Brush, with all the men that were present. About five miles from this place I met

Colonel Gregg on his retreat, and the enemy in close pursuit after him: I drew up my little army in order of battle; but when the enemy hove in sight, they halted on a very advantageous hill or piece of ground. I sent out small parties in their front, to skirmish with them, which scheme had a good effect; they killed and wounded thirty of the enemy, without any loss on our side; but the ground that I was on did not suit for a general action. I marched back about one mile and encamped, called a council, and it was agreed that we should send two detachments in their rear, while the other attacked them in front; but the 15th it rained all day, therefore had to lay by, could do nothing but skirmish with them. On the 16th, in the morning, was joined by Colonel Simmons, with some militia from Berkshire county: I pursued my plan, detached Colonel Nichols, with two hundred men, to attack them in the rear; I also sent Colonel Herrick, with three hundred men, in the rear of their right, both to join, and when joined, to attack their rear: I also sent Colonels Hubbard and Stiekney, with two hundred men, in their right, and sent one hundred men in their front, to draw away their attention that way; and about three o'clock we got all ready for the attack. Colonel Nichols began the same, which was followed by all the rest. The

remainder of my little army I pushed up in the front, and in a few minutes the action began in general: it lasted two hours, the hottest I ever saw in my life—it represented one continued clap of thunder; however, the enemy was obliged to give way, and leave their field-pieces and all their baggage behind them; they were all environed within two breastworks with their artillery, but our martial courage proved too hard for them. I then gave orders to rally again, in order to secure the victory, but in a few minutes was informed that there was a large reinforcement, on their march, within two miles. Lucky for us, that moment Colonel Warner's regiment came up fresh, who marched on and began the attack afresh. I pushed forward as many of the men as I could to their assistance: the battle continued obstinate on both sides till sunset; the enemy was obliged to retreat; we pursued them till dark; but had day lasted an hour longer, we should have taken the whole body of them. We recovered four pieces of brass cannon, some hundred stands of arms, and brass-barreled drums, several Hessian swords, about seven hundred prisoners: two hundred and seven dead on the spot; the number of wounded is as yet unknown; that part of the enemy that made their escape marched all night, and we returned to our camp. Too much honor cannot be given to the brave officers and soldiers for gallant behavior; they fought through the midst of fire and smoke, mounted two breastworks that were well fortified, and supported with cannon. I cannot particularize any officer, as they all behaved with the greatest spirit and bravery. Colonel Warner's superior skill in the action was of extraordinary service to me; I would be glad he and his men could be recommended to Congress. As I promised in my order that the soldiers should have all the plunder taken in the enemy's camp, would be glad your honor would send me word what the value of the cannon and other artillery stores above described may be. Our loss was inconsiderable; about forty wounded and thirty killed. I lost my horse, bridle, and saddle in the action.

I am, sir, your most devoted and most obedient humble servant,

JOHN STARK.

Major-general GATES, Albany

II.

GENERAL BURGOYNE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEO.
GERMAIN.

CAMP NEAR SARATOGA, *August 20, 1777.*

MY LORD:—In my last dispatch (a duplicate of which will be inclosed herewith) I had the honor to inform your lordship of the proceedings of the army under my command to the 30th of July.

From that period to the 15th of August, every possible measure was employed to bring forward bateaux, provisions, and ammunition, from Fort George to the first navigable part of Hudson's River, a distance of eighteen miles, the roads in some parts steep, and in others wanting great repair. Of the horses furnished by contract in Canada, not more than a third part was yet arrived. The delay was not imputable to neglect, but to the natural accidents attending so long and intricate a combination of land and water carriage. Fifty teams of oxen, which had been collected in the country through which I had marched, were added to assist the transport; but these resources together were found far inadequate to the purposes of feeding the army, and forming a magazine at the same time. Exceeding heavy rains augmented the impediments. It was often necessary to employ ten or twelve oxen upon a single bateau; and after the utmost exertion for the fifteen days above stated, there were not above four days' provision beforehand, nor above ten bateaux in the river.

Intelligence had reached me that Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger was before Fort Stanwix, which was defended. The main army of the enemy opposed to me was at Stillwater, a place between Saratoga and the mouth of the Mohawk.

A rapid movement forward appeared to be of the utmost consequence at this period. The enemy could not have proceeded up the Mohawk without putting themselves between two fires, in case Colonel St. Leger should have succeeded; and at best being cut off by my army from Albany. They must either, therefore, have stood an action, have fallen back towards Al-

bany, or have passed the Hudson's River, in order to secure a retreat to New England, higher up. Whichever of these measures they had taken, so that the King's army had been enabled to advance, Colonel St. Leger's operations would have been assisted, a junction with him, probably, secured, and the whole country of the Mohawk opened. To maintain the communication with Fort George during such a movement, so as to be supplied by daily degrees, at a distance continually increasing, was an obvious impossibility. The army was much too weak to have afforded a chain of posts. Escorts for every separate transport would have been a still greater drain; nor could any have been made so strong as to force their way through such positions as the enemy might take in one night's march from the White Creek, where they had a numerous militia. Had the enemy remained supine, through fear or a want of comprehending so palpable an advantage, the physical impossibility of being supplied by degrees from Fort George was still in force, because a new necessity of land carriage for nine miles arises at Stillwater; and in the proportion that carriages had been brought forward to that place, the transport must have ceased behind.

The alternative, therefore, was short; either to relinquish the favorable opportunity of advancing upon the enemy, or to attempt other resources of supply.

It was well known that the enemy's supplies in live cattle, from a large tract of country, passed by the route of Manchester, Arlington, and other parts of the Hampshire Grants, to Bennington, in order to be occasionally conveyed from thence to the main army; a large deposit of corn and of wheel-carriages was also formed at the same place, and the usual guard was militia, though it varied in numbers from day to day. A scheme was formed to surprise Bennington. The possession of the cattle and carriages would certainly have enabled the army to leave their distant magazines, and to have acted with energy and dispatch; success would have also answered many secondary purposes.

Lieutenant-colonel Baume, an officer well qualified for the undertaking, was fixed upon to command. He had under him two hundred dis-

mounted dragoons of the regiment of Riedesel, Captain Frazer's marksmen, which were the only British, all the Canadian volunteers, a party of the provincials who perfectly knew the country, one hundred Indians, and two light pieces of cannon: the whole detachment amounted to about five hundred men. The instructions were positive to keep the regular corps posted, while the light troops felt their way, and not to incur the danger of being surrounded, or having a retreat cut off.

In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its success, the army moved up the east shore of Hudson's River. On the 14th, a bridge was formed of rafts, over which the advanced corps passed and encamped at Saratoga. Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's corps were posted near Battenkill, and upon intelligence from Colonel Baume, that the enemy were stronger at Bennington than expected, and were aware of his attack, that corps, consisting of the Brunswick grenadiers, light-infantry, and chasseurs, were sent forward to sustain him.

It since appears that Lieutenant-colonel Baume not having been able to complete his march undiscovered, was joined at a place called Sancoix Mills, about four miles short of Bennington, by many people professing themselves to be Loyalists. A provincial gentleman of confidence who had been sent with the detachment, as knowing the country and character of the inhabitants, was so ineptious as to leave at liberty such as took the oath of allegiance.

His credulity and their profligacy caused the first misfortune. Colonel Baume was induced to proceed without sufficient knowledge of the ground. His design was betrayed; the men who had taken the oaths were the first to fire upon him; he was attacked on all sides. He showed great personal courage, but was overpowered by numbers.

During this time Lieutenant-colonel Breyman was upon the march, through a heavy rain; and such were the other impediments stated in that officer's report, of bad roads, tired horses, difficulties in passing artillery, carriages, &c., that he was from eight in the morning of the 15th to four in the afternoon of the following day, making about twenty-four miles.

He engaged, fought gallantly, and drove the enemy from three several heights; but was too late to succor Colonel Baume, who was made prisoner, and a considerable part of his dragoons were killed or taken. The failure of ammunition, from the accidental breaking to pieces of a tumbril, unfortunately obliged Lieutenant-colonel Breyman to retire conquering troops, and to leave behind two pieces of cannon, besides two which had been lost by Lieutenant-colonel Baume. The Indians made good their retreat from the first affair, as did Captain Frazer, with part of his company, and many of the Provincials and Canadians.

The loss, as at present appears, amounts to about four hundred men, killed and taken in both actions, and twenty-six officers, mostly prisoners; but men who were dispersed in the woods, drop in daily. A correct return shall be transmitted to your lordship the first opportunity.

This, my lord, is a true state of the event. I have not dwelt upon errors, because in many instances they were counterbalanced by spirit. The enemy will of course find matter of parade in the acquisition of four pieces of cannon: but that apart, they have small cause of exultation; their loss in killed and wounded being more than double to ours, by the confession of their prisoners and deserters, and of many inhabitants who were witnesses to the burial of their dead.

The chief subject of regret on our side, after that which any loss of gallant men naturally occasions, is the disappointment of not obtaining live cattle, and the loss of time in bringing forward the magazines. This heavy work is now nearly completed, and a new bridge of boats is thrown over the Hudson's River, opposite to Saratoga; the former one of rafts having been carried away by the swell of water after the late continual rains. When enabled to move, nothing within my scale of talent shall be left unattempted to fulfil His Majesty's orders, and I hope circumstances will be such, that my endeavors may be in some degree assisted by a co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe.

I have the honor to be, with great respect,
your lordship's most obedient and most humble
servant,

J. BURGOYNE.

III.

EXTRACT FROM A PRIVATE LETTER FROM GEN.
BURGOYNE TO LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

CAMP NEAR SARATOGA, *August 20, 1777.*
Private.]

MY LORD:—I need not enlarge upon the concern I have in communicating any sinister events. I am persuaded your lordship will give me credit for partaking every sentiment that your lordship, or any other man warmed with principle and zeal in this contest, can feel.

In regard to the affair of Sainteoick, I have only to add to the public account, that if ever there was a situation to justify enterprise and exertion, out of the beaten track of military service, it was that in which I found myself. Had I succeeded, I should have effected a junction with St. Leger, and been now before Albany. And I flatter myself, I need only mention those views, to show that in hazarding this expedition I had the soundest principles of military reasoning on my side, viz., that the advantages to be expected from success, were in a great degree superior to the evils that could attend miscarriage. The secondary purposes, to which I alluded in the public letter, were to try the affections of the country; to complete the Provincial corps, many recruits for which were unable to escape from their villages without a force to encourage and protect them; and to distract the councils of the enemy, by continuing their jealousy towards New England.

Major-general Riedesel has pressed upon me, repeatedly, the mounting his dragoons; the men were animated by the same desire; and I conceived it a most favorable occasion to give in to their ideas and solicitations, because, in exerting their zeal to fulfil their favorite purpose, they necessarily would effect the greater purpose of my own. The rest of the troops were selected from such as would least weaken the solid strength of the army, in case of ill-success; and I thought it expedient to take a little trial of the Provincials and Canadians before I might have occasion for them in more important actions.

The original detachment could not have been

much larger without opening roads, and other preparations of time, nor should I have thought it justifiable to expose the best troops to loss upon a collateral action. Had my instructions been followed, or could Mr. Breymen have marched at the rate of two miles an hour any given twelve hours out of the two-and-thirty, success would have probably ensued—misfortune would certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the present crisis, to mark these circumstances to the public so strongly as I do in confidence to your lordship; and I will venture to say I expect, because I think justice will warrant the expectation, that while, for the sake of public harmony, that necessary principle for conducting nice and laborious service, I color the faults of the execution, your lordship will, in your goodness, be my advocate to the King and to the world, in vindication of the plan.

* * * * *
I have the honor to be, &c.,
J. BURGOYNE.

IV.

COLONEL BREYMAN'S DISPATCH.

WALLOON CREEK, 16th August, 1777.

On the 15th of August, at eight o'clock in the morning, Sir Francis Clarke, aid-de-camp to his Excellency General Burgoyne, brought me the order to march immediately, with the corps under my command, consisting of a battalion of grenadiers, one of chasseurs, one rifle company, and two pieces of cannon, to the support of Lieutenant-colonel Baume.

I marched at 9 o'clock; and on account of the scarcity of carts, I put two boxes of ammunition upon the artillery carts—each soldier carried forty rounds in his pouch.

The troops being obliged to ford Batten's Kill, I was detained a considerable time by it; the number of hills, excessive bad roads, and a continued rain, impeded our march so much that we scarce made half an English mile in an hour; each gun and ammunition cart was obliged to be dragged up the hills one after another; one artillery cart was overturned, and with the

greatest difficulty was put into a situation to proceed.

All these difficulties delayed us much; and, notwithstanding every means was used, and no trouble or labor spared, it was not possible for me to march faster. Our guide lost his way, and after a long search in vain, Major Barner was obliged to look out for a man who put us again in the right road.

All these accidents prevented me from reaching Cambridge the evening of the 15th, and I was therefore obliged to halt seven miles on this side of it, where the men lay upon their arms all night.

Before I came to the place where I halted, I wrote to Lieutenant-colonel Baume, to acquaint him of my coming to his support. Lieutenant Hannerman went with this account, and from thence to Lieutenant-colonel Baume's post, where he arrived at eleven o'clock at night; I received an answer the next morning (16th).

Early in the morning I marched on; but as the artillery horses had no food all the day before, and very little during the night, they were so weak as to be scarce able to drag the cannon; on which account our march was very slow.

Major Barner, with the advanced guard, was obliged to go forward to press horses, which we immediately made use of; and we continued our march as fast as possible, till about two miles on the other side of Cambridge, where I halted about half an hour, to assemble the troops.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, Colonel Skene sent me two men, desiring an officer and twenty men, to take possession of the mill at St. Coyke, which the rebels intended possessing themselves of.

Instead of the detachment which he asked for, I sent a Captain Gleissenberg with the advanced guard, consisting of sixty grenadiers and chasseurs, and twenty riflemen.

I followed with the column as fast as possible: upon this march an ammunition-cart broke down.

At half-past 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I reached the mill, and found the advanced guard in possession of it and all quiet.

I must positively declare, that neither during the march, nor even after I reached the mill, I did not hear a single shot fired, either from small arms or cannon.

Colonel Skene was at the mill; and as he gave me to understand that the corps of Lieutenant-colonel Baume was not above two miles from me, I imagined I could not do better than push on to his support. Colonel Skene was of the same opinion, and we marched on over the bridge near the mill, endeavoring to reach Colonel Baume as soon as possible.

At this time I knew nothing of his engagement being over. If Colonel Skene knew it, I cannot conceive what his reasons were for concealing it from me. If I had known it, I certainly should not have engaged the enemy.

I had scarce passed the bridge one thousand yards, when I perceived a considerable number of armed people, some in jackets, some in shirts, who were endeavoring to gain a height which was on my left flank.

I showed these people to Colonel Skene, who assured me they were royalists, and rode up towards them, and called out, but received no other answer than a discharge of fire-arms. I immediately ordered Major Barner's battalion to move off towards the heights, the rifle company and grenadiers moving towards the heights; and then began the attack, and lasted till towards eight o'clock.

The cannon were posted on the road where there was a block-house, which the rebels left as soon as they began to fire upon it.

Notwithstanding fresh support was constantly coming to them, they were driven from every height.

The troops did their duty, and every one concerned did the same. As all the ammunition was expended, and the cannon ceased firing, nothing was more natural than to expect that the enemy would renew the attack, which, in fact, was the case.

I hastened with a number of men towards the cannon, in order to bring them off. On this occasion the men received the most dangerous wounds, particularly Lieutenant Spannengberg, some fire-workers, and some artillery: the horses were all killed, and if even one had

been alive, it would not have been possible to have moved him.

In order then not to risk every thing, as I could not return the enemy's fire, as soon as it was dark I retired over the bridge, which I broke down, brought off as many of the wounded as I could, and in company with Colonel Skene arrived about 12 o'clock at Cambridge, where, after taking the necessary precautions, I remained all night; and the next day, the 17th, I arrived at the camp.

This is the best account I can give of this whole affair. The loss of my cannon gives me the greatest concern; I did every thing in my power to save them, but the want of ammunition prevented me not only from returning the enemy's fire, but even from getting out of it. Many lost their lives and limbs; and could I have saved my cannon, I would with pleasure have sacrificed my life to have effected it.

BREYMAN, *Lieut.-Col.*

V.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN STARK.

John Stark was born at Londonderry, N. H., on the twenty-eighth of August, 1728. His father was a native of Dunbarton, in Scotland, educated in the university at Edinburgh, and emigrated to America early in the last century, settling first at Londonderry, and, subsequently, at Derryfield, now Manchester.

Mr. Stark was unable to afford to his children the privileges which he had enjoyed, and John was employed on his father's farm, and, occasionally, in hunting, in which latter employment he soon became well known for his daring deeds and powers of endurance.

On the 28th of April, 1752, while out on a hunting expedition with his brother William, and two other persons, he was captured by the Indians—who had always, until then, appeared friendly—and was taken, with one of his comrades, to their settlement, on the St. François River, adopted into their tribe, and showed every respect. He remained among them three months, when he was redeemed for one hundred and three dollars, by a Mr. Wheel-

wright, of Boston. It is an interesting fact that this was the first act of hostility in the French and Indian War.

Soon after his return a report was raised that the French had entered Coos, and were erecting fortifications, when the colony appointed a committee to repair thither and ascertain the particulars. John Stark, with the title of Ensign, accompanied this committee, as its guide; and on its return, he was appointed Lieutenant, under Robert Rogers,—afterwards the notorious Major of the Revolutionary War,—of a corps of rangers, which was ordered to be raised for the defence of the colony. When the troubles called for other similar companies, Rogers was promoted, and to Lieutenant Stark was given the command of the corps. His courage and prudence soon secured for him the confidence and friendship of his superior officers, and he served until the close of the war, with honor.

When "the news from Lexington" reached Derryfield, those who first assembled dispatched a messenger to Captain Stark, informing him of the character of "the news," and inviting him to lead them to Boston. The messenger found him at work at his saw-mill near the Amoskeag Falls, and delivered his message, when the Captain immediately stopped his mill and repaired to his house, took his musket and three dollars in money, and without any coat, that he might not be encumbered, he accompanied the messenger to the place of rendezvous. The little party, headed by Stark, immediately started for Massachusetts, receiving accessions at every cross-road until the next morning; when they reached Lexington, he found himself at the head of a thousand resolute men. Proceeding at once to Cambridge, he presented himself to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, by whom he was received with much joy, and all New England rang with his name. The next morning he received a Colonel's commission, and within two hours he recruited eight hundred men.

At the battle of Bunker's Hill, Colonel Stark, with part of his regiment, took post behind the fence near Mystic River, and manfully defended it.

During the siege of Boston, Colonel Stark's regiment was actively engaged; and after that

town was evacuated it was ordered to the Northern Department.

At the battle of Trenton, Colonel Stark led the advance of the right column, and he also participated in the battle of Princeton.

At the close of the campaign of 1776 he visited his family, when he learned that the Congress had promoted Colonel Poor, a junior officer, to a Brigadiership. An old dispute, concerning rank, by this promotion was revived, and Colonel Stark immediately resigned his commission, returning to his farm as a private citizen. When General Burgoyne advanced from Canada the object of his expedition was not known, and New England was filled with alarm lest she should be visited. In this extremity the legislature of New Hampshire called upon Colonel Stark to lead her troops, with a commission as Brigadier-general. He responded to the call, with the condition that he should not be subject to the orders of any officer of the Continental army, and he immediately assumed the chief command, met the enemy at Bennington, and gained a complete victory.

The Continental Congress immediately tendered him a vote of thanks, and created him a Brigadier-general. Without assuming any command, he rendered great assistance to General Gates in his operations against General Burgoyne.

In 1778 he commanded in the Northern Department; in 1779 he was at Rhode Island; in 1780 he was in New Jersey with General Washington; and in 1781 he again commanded in the Northern Department, in none of which positions, however, was he called to take part in any important movement.

When peace was declared he returned to his farm, where he lived respected by all who knew him; and there, on the eighth of May, 1822, he died, aged ninety-three years, eight months.

His private character is said to have been unexceptionable. He was frank in his manners, although somewhat eccentric; in his intercourse with the world he was honest; in the discharge of his duties as a citizen he was prompt and useful. The State, in him, lost one of her best citizens; the Confederacy, one of her most distinguished founders and most constant friends.

CHAPTER XXIII.

September 1, 1777.

THE SIEGE OF FORT HENRY.

AMONG the many feats of daring which the History of the Revolution has developed, the defence of the stockade, known as "*Fort Henry*," is among the most remarkable.

This work, which had been constructed as a place of refuge from the assaults of the savages, by the early settlers in that vicinity, stood immediately on the left bank of the Ohio River, about a quarter of a mile above Weeling Creek,¹ upon the spot now occupied by "*Zane's Row*," in the city of Wheeling, Virginia.² It was built in 1774, from the plans of the celebrated George Rogers Clark, under the superintendence of Ebenezer Zane and John Caldwell, and was called "*Fort Fincastle*";³ but, in 1776, it was strengthened and refitted, when its name was changed to "*Fort Henry*," in honor of Patrick Henry, who, at that time, was Governor of Virginia.⁴ It was in form, a parallelogram, having its greatest length along the river; and it was built of pickets of white-oak, about seventeen

feet in height, with bastions at the angles. It contained several cabins, arranged along its western side; while in the centre of the inclosed area were built a two-story house for the commandant, a storehouse, and other public buildings.¹ The principal entrance was through a gateway on the eastern side of the fort.

Early in August, 1777, reports reached the settlements that the Indians were gathering, and that they meditated an early attack on the whites,² and scouts were kept out, who constantly watched the movements of the savages.³ About the same time information was conveyed to General Hand, at Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh), and thence among the settlements along the valley of the Ohio, that a large body of Indians, chiefly from the Northwestern tribes, were assembling under the command of the notorious Simon Girty, whose relentless ferocity added terror to the unwelcome news, and hurried still more the anxious settlers in their removal to the forts and blockhouses in their vicinity.⁴

¹ Communication of G. S. M. Kiernan, in the "*American Pioneer*," i. p. 304.—² De Hass' Indian Wars of Va., p. 277.

³ Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.—⁴ De Hass, p. 277, note.

¹ De Hass, p. 277.—² Ibid., p. 223.

³ Ibid., p. 224.—⁴ Ibid.

On the receipt of the information the settlers at the mouth of the Weeling Creek,¹ about thirty families, betook themselves to the cabins in Fort Henry, and prepared to defend themselves.²

On the thirty-first of August the enemy, consisting of over three hundred and fifty Indians, of the Mingoe, Shawnee, and Wyandotte tribes, approached the Ohio River, in small parties, by unfrequented paths, and rendezvoused about two miles below Weeling Creek. They were said to have been supplied with arms, ammunition, and provisions, by Hamilton, the British governor of Detroit.³

During the night they crossed the river and occupied the creek-bottom, which was cleared and mostly planted with corn, forming two lines across it from the river to the creek and concealing themselves among the corn.⁴ Near the centre of these lines, and close to a frequented path, six Indians were concealed as a decoy for the whites, of whom they supposed that some would pass during the next day.⁵ During all this time, notwithstanding the vigilance of the little party in the fort, the presence of these savages was entirely unknown within the walls, and the little garrison, numbering only forty-two ef-

fective men, all told,¹ reposed in fancied, although not unguarded, security.

Shortly after daybreak on the next day (*September 1st*), Dr. McMechen, who was about to return to the old settlements, sent out a white man, named Boyd, and a negro, to catch and bring in his horses. They had proceeded only a short distance when they discovered the six Indians who had been stationed on the path, and turning, attempted to reach the fort. The negro was permitted to return (evidently for the purpose of conveying to the garrison the apparent number of the assailants), but Boyd was shot.²

Colonel David Shepherd, who commanded in the fort,³ supposing the Indians to be few in number, immediately ordered Captain Samuel Mason, who had brought his company into the fort on the previous evening, to go out and dislodge the enemy.⁴ With fourteen of his men the Captain proceeded to discharge the duty imposed on him. After proceeding a short distance he discovered and fired on the six Indians, when, at the same instant, the main body of the Indians, who laid in ambush, in every direction around him, arose, and with horrible yells, rushed upon him and his men. Perceiving that to stand was useless, he ordered an immediate retreat, and led the way in person.⁵ Of the fourteen of which his detachment was composed, only two,—Hugh Me-

¹ I have employed the term which, *at that time*, was employed to distinguish this locality. It is said that the term is an Indian word, signifying *the place of a head*; and that it was applied to this spot from the fact that the *head* of a white man had been placed on a pole at this place, at an early day, for the purpose of checking the spirit of emigration which, even at that day, pervaded the old settlements.—² Com. of Mr. Kiernan.—³ De Hass, p. 224.

⁴ Withers' Chron. of Border Warfare, p. 161; De Hass, pp. 224, 225.—⁵ De Hass, p. 225; Withers, p. 161.

¹ De Hass, p. 225.—² Withers, p. 161; De Hass, p. 225.

³ Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.

⁴ De Hass, p. 225; Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.

⁵ Withers, p. 161; De Hass, p. 225.

Connell and Thomas Glenn,—besides himself, escaped.¹

At this time a dense fog hung over the bottom, concealing from those in the fort the number of the assailants, as well as the exact character of the assault.² The yells of the Indians, mingled with the cries of the victims, however, reached the fort, and Captain Joseph Ogle, an experienced frontiersman, and a dozen veteran scouts, left the fort to cover the retreat of Captain Mason's party.³ Of this latter party, three only, besides the Captain, escaped,⁴ and the garrison, now reduced to nearly one third its original number, was made aware of the character and strength of its assailants.

Preceded by a drum and fife, and a British flag,⁵ the enemy approached the fort in two columns, displaying the bloody scalps which, a few minutes before, had been torn from the heads of the hapless parties under Mason and Ogle.⁶ One of the two parties Girty brought around the base of the hill, and distributed among the cabins near the fort; the other defiled along the bank of the river, close to the fort, which was thus completely surrounded by the relentless enemy.⁷

Having arranged his force, Girty next followed the usage of his peers by demanding the surrender of the post, boasting of his power, and threatening vengeance in case of a refusal; reading,

at the same time, a proclamation which had been issued by Hamilton, governor of Detroit.¹ To this demand, Colonel Shepherd returned the following answer: "Sir, we have consulted our wives and children, and all have resolved,—men, women, and children,—sooner to perish at their posts than place themselves under the protection of a savage army, with *you* at its head; or abjure the cause of liberty and the colonies."² Girty commenced to reply, when a lad in one of the bastions fired a gun at him, and the conference was closed abruptly, and Girty retired.³

It was still quite early in the morning, the sun not having appeared above the summits of the hills, and the day is represented to have been one of surpassing beauty.⁴ The Indians, immediately after the withdrawal of Girty, commenced the siege by a general discharge of their rifles, and they continued an indiscriminate fire against the oak pickets, the gate, and other parts of the fort, until about one o'clock, when they discontinued, and fell back from the fort to the foot of the hill.⁵

It was during this suspension of hostilities that Elizabeth Zane, a sister of Ebenezer, performed her well-known feat of daring. It appears that the stock of gunpowder in the fort began to grow low, and the necessity of securing a keg which had been left in Colo-

¹ De Hass, p. 225; Withers, pp. 161, 162.

² De Hass, p. 226, note.—³ De Hass, pp. 225, 226; Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.—⁴ De Hass, p. 226.—⁵ Ibid., p. 227.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 226, 227.—⁷ Ibid., p. 227.

¹ Withers, p. 163; De Hass, p. 227.—² De Hass, p. 227. Withers (*Chron. Border Warfare*, p. 163) says Colonel Zane commanded.—³ Withers, p. 163; De Hass, p. 227.

⁴ De Hass, p. 227; Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.

⁵ De Hass, p. 228; Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.

nel Zane's house, outside the works, became the subject of anxious discussion. The force on whom this arduous duty would fall must necessarily be greatly exposed, and the number of those who remained to defend the fort had already been so much reduced by the loss of the men under Captains Mason and Ogle, that a farther reduction, or the risk attending such a movement, was a serious question in the council. Unwilling to *order* any one to undertake this hazardous enterprise, the commandant called for volunteers, and three or four young men stepped forth. As but one could be spared, the aspirants for the honorable duty were directed to select him by lot, but the eagerness of each to secure the choice caused considerable delay, and fears were entertained that the Indians would resume their operations before the powder could be secured. At this moment Elizabeth Zane, who had just returned from boarding-school at Philadelphia, came forward and asked that she might be permitted to go out, stating that the loss of a man was a serious matter, while, if she fell, her loss would be less seriously felt. After strenuous efforts to prevent it, her entreaties were successful, and the gate was opened for her to pass out. Several Indians were wandering around in the vicinity of the gate, and saw Elizabeth pass from the fort, without offering any opposition; but when she appeared at the door of the dwelling, with the keg in her arms, the object of her journey was apparent, and a volley of rifle-balls whistled harmlessly around

her as she glided swiftly into the fort with the precious prize.¹

At about half-past two o'clock the Indians again put themselves in motion, and approached the fort a second time.² A portion of them took possession of the houses in the little village which had grown up around the fort, others sheltered themselves behind Colonel Zane's fence, others occupied a blacksmith's shop and stable which were opposite the north line of the fort, and others, forming probably the largest portion, occupied the southern side of the fort, where a rail fence and several piles of timber afforded them a shelter.³

The attack commenced on the southern side, with great fury, which brought out the whole garrison to that side, and the assailants met with a heavy loss.⁴ In the mean time, while the garrison was thus occupied on the southern line of the fort, some eighteen or twenty warriors, with rails and sticks of wood, and led by Girty in person, passed over from Colonel Zane's yard, and made an assault on the gate of the fort. This movement was discovered in time to prevent its success, and the enemy was repulsed with the loss of several of the assailants.⁵ On the northern and eastern sides of the fort the contest raged furiously until night, when the rifles used by the garrison became so much

¹ Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.; De Hass, pp. 270, 280. Withers supposes this occurred during the second siege.

² Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c. De Hass (p. 228) says they returned at 3 o'clock.—³ Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.; De Hass, p. 228.—⁴ De Hass, p. 228.—⁵ Ibid., pp. 228, 229; Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.

heated by continued firing, that they were rendered temporarily useless, and recourse was then had to muskets, a supply of which was found in the storehouse.¹ The obstinacy of the garrison appeared to discourage the Indians, and the main body fell back again to the foot of the hill for refreshment and repose.² Straggling parties and ambitious individuals, however, kept up an irregular, scattering fire during the whole night, and destroyed such articles of furniture as they found in the several cabins outside the fort.³

A short time before the main body of the enemy withdrew, Francis Duke, a son-in-law of Colonel Shepherd, rode up to the fort, but was shot before he could enter it. He was a brave man, well known on the frontiers, and was the Assistant-commissary at Beach Bottom Blockhouse. Having received information of the attack, he rode with all speed to assist the garrison, but met an untimely death before he could reach the scene of operations.⁴

About four o'clock the next morning Colonel Andrew Swearengen, with fourteen men, arrived in a periagua from Holliday's Fort, at Cross Creek, twenty-four miles above, and made his way into the fort without the loss of a man.⁵

About daybreak, on the second, Major Samuel McCullock, at the head of forty mounted men, from Short Creek, also reached the fort, and the gate was again opened with joy by the weary

garrison.¹ The wily enemy immediately rushed to the gate to cut off the reinforcement and, if possible, gain an entrance themselves. Strange as it may appear, the men all secured an entrance, the Major only having been left outside.² Turning his horse from the fort, he galloped up the hill which still overhangs the city of Wheeling, hoping to reach Van Metre's Fort. Leaving his pursuers far behind, he had reached a point on the hill near where the Cumberland road crosses, when he encountered another considerable body of Indians, who were just returning from a plundering expedition among the settlements. He instantly perceived the danger of his situation, and as quickly decided what course to pursue. He well knew that the savages desired to take him alive, for the purpose of torturing him, in retaliation for the many victories he had gained over them, and he preferred to face death in some other form. Accordingly he galloped to the edge of the precipice on the bank of the Wheeling Creek (at that place almost perpendicular, and about a hundred and fifty feet high), and taking his rifle in his left hand, and carefully adjusting his reins with the other, he urged his horse down the slope. In a few seconds he was at the foot of the precipice, much to the astonishment of the Indians, when he dashed across the creek and escaped.³

Soon afterwards the Indians, under

¹ Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c.—² Ibid.—³ De Hass, p. 229.

⁴ Com. of Mr. Kiernan, &c. Withers (p. 263) says this occurred during the second siege.—⁵ De Hass, p. 229.

¹ De Hass, pp. 229, 230; Com. of Mr. Kiernan.

² De Hass, p. 230.—³ Ibid., pp. 340, 341; Communication of Mr. Kiernan.

Girty, assembled at the foot of the hill near the fort, set fire to all the houses, buildings, and fences in the vicinity, killed nearly three hundred head of cattle belonging to the settlers, and decamped, to seek in some other and more exposed neighborhood the bloody laurels they coveted.¹

As has been stated, the enemy numbered over three hundred and fifty warriors; and it is supposed that his loss was between forty and fifty in killed and wounded.² The garrison numbered thirteen after the loss of the parties under Captains Mason and Ogle (for those who escaped did not re-enter the fort, but secreted themselves among the logs, &c., in the vicinity of the corn-field),³ and not a single person was killed, and but one was slightly wounded.⁴

In this, as in all similar contests, there was but little order or appearance of discipline. The effectives of the garrison embraced all who could handle a rifle, without regard to age; while the women moulded bullets, cooled the guns, prepared the patches, or loaded the rifles and handed them to the men, as circumstances required. Some of them occasionally took their positions by the side of their husbands, and it is said that two of them, Mrs. Glenn and Betsey Wheat, took and kept their po-

sitions at the port-holes, dealing death to many a dusky warrior.¹

When the extreme weakness of the garrison is considered, the defence of the fort at Weeling Creek must be considered one of the most successful on record. Among its defenders, however, were Silas and Ebenezer Zane, John Caldwell, Abraham Rogers, John Lynn, Joseph Biggs, and Robert Lemon, each of them a terror to the savages, and all of them then, and subsequently, well known as among the best Indian-hunters of the West.² The example of Elizabeth Zane, and of her sister-in-law, the wife of Ebenezer Zane, as well as the cool determination of the females who had sought refuge in the fort, cheered the garrison and spurred them on in the performance of their duty.³

Such were the early days of "the mighty West," and of the pioneers who introduced civilization within its borders; such were the actions of the acknowledged representatives of the Christian King of Great Britain, in their avowed purpose to restore solitude to the wilderness. To whom the glory belongs, when the promoters of civilization and the welfare of mankind are spoken of,—to the pioneer settlers of the Ohio Valley or "the Christian King of Great Britain,"—the world has already decided.

¹ Withers, p. 164; De Hass, p. 229.—² De Hass, p. 230.

³ Ibid., pp. 225, 226; Communication of Mr. Kiernan.

⁴ De Hass, p. 230.

¹ Withers, pp. 163, 164; De Hass, p. 228.

² Communication of Mr. Kiernan.—³ Ibid.

CHAPTER XXIV.

September 11, 1777.

THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE.

THE reinforcements which General Howe had asked for, arrived later and in smaller numbers than he anticipated; and the plans for the campaign of 1777 were, therefore, necessarily curtailed, and the active operations of the army, even under the reduced plans, were not commenced until late in the season.¹ The movements in New Jersey, already noticed, with which General Howe opened the campaign late in June, had failed to draw General Washington from his strong position near Middlebrook; and the former, withdrawing his forces from New Jersey, had embarked on board the fleet, put out to sea, entered the Chesapeake Bay, and was threatening Philadelphia.² The mysterious movements of General Howe had caused great embarrassment in the American camp, and it was only when the enemy had entered the bay that any correct idea could be formed of his intended point of attack.³ The judicious disposition of his forces by General Washington, in the mean time, had so com-

pletely covered the Capital, however, that the enemy was unable to take any advantage; and when he landed below the head of the Elk, on the twenty-fifth of August,¹ the American forces were ready to oppose him.²

On the twenty-eighth of August, General Howe, with the main body of his army, advanced to the head of the Elk River (where Elkton, Maryland, now stands), leaving General Knyphausen, with three brigades, at the landing-place, and one brigade between the two posts, to keep open the communication.³ Gradually concentrating his forces, and advancing towards Philadelphia, General Howe encamped, on the eighth of September, at Hokessen, on the Lancaster road, and within four miles of the right of the position occupied by General Washington on Red Clay Creek.⁴

Suspecting an intention on the part of General Howe to turn the right flank of the army, pass the Brandy-

¹ Sparks' Washington, pp. 226, 227.—² Ibid., pp. 228-232.—³ Marshall, iii. pp. 131-139.

¹ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 30.

² Marshall, iii. p. 143, 144; Sparks' Washington, p. 232.

³ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 30.

⁴ Ibid., Oct. 10.

wine, and, by occupying the high grounds on the north bank of that stream, cut off his retreat,¹ General Washington called a council of general officers, and, by their advice, determined to abandon the position he then occupied and take post on the north bank of the Brandywine.² Accordingly, about two o'clock in the morning of the ninth, the army moved,³ at ten o'clock, crossed the stream,⁴ and, before night, fully occupied its new position;⁵ while the enemy, his right by way of Hokessen meeting-house and his left by way of New Garden and Kennet's Square, steadily advanced, and, on the morning of the tenth, concentrated his forces at the latter place.⁶

The Brandywine Creek, behind which the American army had encamped, was formed by the junction of two small streams, known as the East and West Branches, whence, after flowing in a southeasterly direction about twenty-two miles, it unites with the Christiana Creek, forms the harbor of Wilmington, and empties into the Delaware Bay, about twenty-five miles below Philadelphia. It was passable only at the fords, the principal of which, in the direct route from the enemy's camp to Philadelphia, was Chadd's Ford;⁷ above which were Brinton's, Jones', and Wistar's, on the main stream; Buffington's,

Jefferis's (six miles above Chadd's Ford), and Taylor's, on the East Branch; and Trimble's (half a mile above the forks), on the West Branch.¹ It was supposed that the principal point of attack would be at Chadd's Ford, and there General Washington established the centre of his position, and threw up intrenchments for its defence.² The main body of the army, embracing the brigades of Generals Wayne, Weedon, and Muhlenberg, with the light-infantry under General Maxwell, was stationed there to defend the pass; while the Pennsylvania militia, under General Armstrong, composing the left wing, guarded the fords below Chadd's; and the brigades, embraced in Generals Sullivan's, Stephens', and Lord Stirling's divisions, composing the right wing, extended up the creek two miles, and guarded the fords below the forks.³

At daybreak, on the eleventh, the enemy was in motion,⁴ and the success which had attended the movements on Long Island, in August, 1776, had induced General Howe to attempt a similar manœuvre in this case. For this purpose the army had been divided into two commands, and immediately advanced, in two columns, against the Americans. The right column, composed of four Hessian battalions, under General Stirn; the first and second brigades of British, three battalions of the Seventy-first regiment, the Queen's

¹ Gen. Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 9.

² Irving, iii. p. 200.—³ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., Sept. 9.—⁴ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10.—⁵ Ibid. See also Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 91.

⁶ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10.

⁷ Marshall, iii. p. 149; Life of Reed, i. p. 307.

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 377.—² Gordon, ii. p. 508; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 309.—³ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 91; Lossing, ii. p. 378.—⁴ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10; History of Civil War, i. p. 253.

Rangers, and a squadron of the Sixteenth dragoons, under General Grant, having with them six medium twelve-pounders, four howitzers, and the light-artillery belonging to the brigades, the whole numbering about five thousand men, commanded by General Knyphausen, took the direct road to Chadd's Ford, seven miles distant from Kennet's Square, and slowly advanced, driving before him the advanced corps and light troops of the American army. This division of the army, designed only to amuse the Americans in front, while more important movements were executed on their flanks, advanced only far enough to drive the light troops over the Brandywine, when it halted on a commanding ground, and, at about ten o'clock, opened a heavy fire on the American lines, east of the creek, and played with the Americans by repeated pretended attempts to cross the stream.¹

In the mean time, the enemy's left column, under General Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by Generals Grey, Matthews, and Agnew, composed of the mounted and unmounted chasseurs, two squadrons of the Sixteenth dragoons, two battalions of light-infantry, two battalions of British and three of Hessian grenadiers, two battalions of Guards, the third and fourth brigades of British troops, numbering about thirteen thousand men, with four light twelve-pounders, moved along the Lancaster road, which runs nearly parallel with the

creek, crossed the West Branch at Trimble's Ford, and the East Branch at Jefferis's Ford, and thence, taking the road to Dilworth, turned the right flank of the American army;¹ a dense fog, which enveloped the country, greatly facilitating the movements by concealing them from the American scouting parties.² It was not wholly concealed, however, General Washington receiving information, through General Sullivan, from Colonels Bland, Ross, and Hazen, of the movements,³ although the strength of the enemy seems to have been strangely underrated, probably in consequence of the fog concealing his numbers.

On the receipt of this information the General ordered General Sullivan, with the right wing of the army, to cross the Brandywine and attack General Cornwallis, while he, in person, would take the centre and attack General Knyphausen.⁴ Before these movements could be fully executed, intelligence reached General Sullivan from the forks of the Brandywine that nothing had been seen in that neighborhood to excite alarm; and a trusty sergeant, who had been sent out in search of intelligence, having come in and confirmed the last report, both General Sullivan and the commander-in-chief discredited the intelligence first received, and reoc-

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 10.—² Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 378.

³ Gen. Washington to Col. Theodore Bland, "Chaddsford, 11th Sept., " Gordon, ii. pp. 509, 510; Marshall, iii. pp. 150, 151; Life of Reed, i. pp. 308, 309.

⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 510; Marshall, iii. p. 151; Life of Reed, i. p. 309.

¹ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 253; Hall's Civil War, p. 310; Marshall, iii. pp. 149, 150; Sparks' Washington, p. 233.

cupied their positions.¹ This change of purpose decided the fortunes of the day, and when, at "a quarter-past one o'clock," Colonel Bland dispatched a second messenger to General Sullivan, informing him of the presence of the enemy, "just on the right of the two widow Davises, who live close together on the road called the Fork Road, about half a mile to the right of the meeting-house (Birmingham),"² the victory had, in reality, been gained by the strategy of General Howe.

On the receipt of this note, General Sullivan again moved the three brigades, forming the right wing of the army, to meet General Cornwallis,³ and took a strong position on the commanding ground above the meeting-house, with his left extending nearly to the Brandywine, both flanks covered with very thick woods, and his artillery advantageously disposed.⁴ In consequence of a dispute respecting the right of the line,—the post of honor,—between General Sullivan and a French officer named Deborre, the division was not fully prepared for action⁵ when General Lord Cornwallis, and the troops under his command, about four o'clock in the afternoon,⁶ swept over Osborne's Hill, in three columns, and attacked it with

great fury.¹ The Hessians led the attack, and as they advanced in an unbroken, well-dressed column, they were severely harassed by a company of American light troops, stationed in an orchard² north of Samuel Jones' dwelling-house. The artillery of both armies opened with terrible effect, and the conflict became general and severely contested.³ With an obstinacy which older troops might have been proud of, the Americans maintained their ground, and repelled charge after charge from the powerful and well-disciplined force which opposed them, until overwhelming numbers forced them to yield. The right of the line, General Stephens' brigade, commanded by General Deborre, first gave way, and the left, General Sullivan's brigade, soon followed,⁴ but the centre, under Generals Lord Stirling and Conway, stood firm, and nobly defended its position.⁵ Failing in every effort which they made to rally the fugitive brigades, Generals Sullivan and Lafayette rode to this party, and joined in the terrible conflict.⁶ The noble eight hundred of which this brigade was composed could do but little in opposing the enemy, however, although they maintained their ground for a considerable time. Two of General Sullivan's aids were killed, and General Lafayette, having dismounted, that he might act more efficiently, was wounded in the leg by a musket-ball, when,

¹ Gordon, ii. p. 510; Marshall, iii. p. 151; Life of Reed, i. p. 309.—² Col. Theod. Bland to Gen. Sullivan, Sept. 11.

³ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 254; Marshall, iii. p. 152; Gen. Sullivan's letter to Congress, Sept. 27.

⁴ Ibid. See also Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 311, 312; Marshall, iii. pp. 152, 153.—⁵ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, pp. 94, 340; Lossing, ii. p. 381.—⁶ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10.

¹ Sparks, p. 234.—² Lossing, ii. p. 381.—³ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10; Stedman, i. p. 292.

⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 153; Lossing, ii. p. 381.

⁵ Gen. Sullivan to Congress, Sept. 27.—⁶ Ibid.

farther resistance being useless, the remnants of the brigade retreated, leaving the enemy master of the position.¹

In the mean time, the note from Colonel Bland, with one from General Sullivan, reached the commander-in-chief, at Chadd's Ford; and, leaving Generals Wayne and Maxwell to oppose the progress of General Knyphausen,² with General Greene and the brigades of Generals Weedon and Muhlenberg, he hastened to strengthen General Sullivan.³ He was not in time to prevent the retreat,⁴ but, by a skilful movement, General Greene opened his ranks and received the fugitives, when, closing them, he successfully covered their retreat and checked the progress of the enemy.⁵ At a narrow defile, about a mile from the meeting-house, which had been previously pointed out to him by General Washington, and by his orders, he changed his front, and having his flank covered by heavy woods, he kept the enemy at bay during the remainder of the day.⁶

When the report of the artillery, on the extreme right, reached the ears of General Knyphausen, he immediately ordered General Grant, with the Fourth and Fifth regiments, to cross the creek and attack the position occupied by General Wayne and the Pennsylvania

troops.¹ The latter, with the light troops, under General Maxwell, defended their position with great gallantry until intelligence of the defeat of the right wing was received, when a retreat was ordered,² and in great disorder, and with the loss of all their artillery and stores, they fell in on General Greene's rear.³

During the succeeding night the defeated forces of General Washington retreated to Chester, and, on the following day, to Germantown, where they encamped.⁴

The expediency of engaging, in this place, with an enemy so much more powerful and better appointed, has been the subject of considerable comment, both in Europe and America; and, by many, the commander-in-chief has been censured.⁵ On the other hand, it has been said that both the Congress and the people expected the army would, at least, attempt to defend the Capital, even at the expense of a defeat; that a defeat would be productive of less injury, in its effects on the public mind, than the tame submission of the Capital to the enemy, without a struggle; that he hoped to have made a better resistance, and would have done so had his intelligence been less confused; and that, although some of his troops behaved badly, others, and the larger

¹ Sparks, p. 234.

² Marshall, iii. p. 152.

³ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, pp. 94, 340; Gordon, ii. p. 511; Marshall, iii. p. 152.

⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 511; Marshall, iii. p. 150.

⁵ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10.

⁶ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, pp. 94-98, 340; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 255; Gordon, ii. pp. 511, 512.

¹ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 94; Marshall, iii. p. 154.

² Gen. Washington to Cong., Sept. 11; Marshall, iii. p. 154.—³ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 97; Marshall, iii. p. 154.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Cong., Sept. 11; Life of Muhlenberg, p. 100; Gordon, ii. p. 513.—⁵ Sparks, p. 235.

part, fought with signal bravery, and inspired both him and themselves with a confidence which could have been produced only by a trial.¹

The strength of the armies have never been accurately ascertained. Chief-justice Marshall,² and, with him, President Sparks,³ and other standard writers,⁴ estimates the enemy to have been eighteen thousand strong, with abundance of every thing which was considered necessary for the prosecution of such a campaign; while the effective troops under General Washington did not exceed eleven thousand.⁵

The loss of each is also a subject of doubt. General Howe reported to his government a loss of ninety killed, four hundred and eighty-eight wounded, and six missing.¹ General Washington, from the disconnected condition of the army, found it impossible to make a return of his loss.² General Howe stated, of course from conjecture only, that, including four hundred prisoners, the loss of the Americans was about thirteen hundred,³ but it has been suggested that in this estimate nearly four hundred prisoners were wounded, and had been previously counted in that class.⁴

D O C U M E N T S.

I.

GENERAL WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO THE
PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

EIGHT MILES FROM WILMINGTON, }
September 9, 1777.

SIR:—The enemy advanced yesterday with a seeming intention of attacking us upon our post near Newport. We waited for them the whole day; but they halted in the evening at a place called Milltown, about two miles from us. Upon reconnoitering their situation, it appeared probable that they only meant to amuse us in front, while their real intent was to march by our right, and by suddenly passing the Brandywine, and gaining the heights upon the north side of that river, get between us and Philadelphia, and cut us off from that city. To prevent this, it was judged expedient to change our position immediately.

The army accordingly marched at two o'clock this morning, and will take post this evening on the high grounds near Chad's Ford. We have heard nothing circumstantial from the enemy this day. When I do, I shall immediately transmit to you an account.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

GEO. WASHINGTON.
To the President of Congress.

II.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF
CONGRESS.

CHESTER, 12 O'CLOCK AT NIGHT, }
September 11, 1777.

SIR:—I am sorry to inform you, that in this day's engagement we have been obliged to leave the enemy masters of the field.

¹ Sparks' Washington, pp. 235, 236.—² Life of Washington, iii. p. 145.—³ Sparks' Washington, p. 235.

⁴ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 90.—⁵ Sparks' Washington, p. 235; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 90.

¹ Letter to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10, inclosure.

² Sparks, p. 235.—³ Letter to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10.—⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 154.

Unfortunately, the intelligence received of the enemy's advanceing up the Brandywine, and crossing at a ford six miles above us, was uncertain and contradictory, notwithstanding all my pains to get the best. This prevented me from making a disposition adequate to the force with which the enemy attacked us on our right; in consequence of which the troops first engaged were obliged to retire before they could be reinforced. In the midst of the attack on the right, that body of the enemy which remained on the other side of Chadd's Ford, crossed it and attacked the division there under the command of General Wayne, and the light troops under General Maxwell, who, after a severe conflict, also retired. The militia, under the command of General Armstrong, being posted at a ford about two miles below Chadd's, had no opportunity of engaging.

But, though we fought under many disadvantages, and were, from the causes above mentioned, obliged to retire, yet our loss of men is not, I am persuaded, very considerable; I believe much less than the enemy's. We have also lost seven or eight pieces of cannon, according to the best information I can at present obtain. The baggage having been previously moved off, is all secure, saving the men's blankets, which, being at their backs, many of them doubtless are lost.

I have directed all the troops to assemble behind Chester, where they are now arranging for this night. Notwithstanding the misfortune of the day, I am happy to find the troops in good spirits; and I hope another time we shall compensate for the losses now sustained.

The Marquis de Lafayette was wounded in the leg, and General Woodford in the hand; divers other officers were wounded, and some slain; but the numbers of either cannot now be ascertained.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
GEO. WASHINGTON.

P. S.—It has not been in my power to send you earlier intelligence, the present being the first leisure moment I have had since the action.

III.

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL SULLIVAN'S LETTER
TO PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

CAMP ON PERKIOMY, Sept. 27, 1777.

MUCH ESTEEMED SIR:—

* * * * *

I have never endeavored to establish my reputation by my own pen, nor have I, according to the modern custom, employed others for the purpose; neither have I adopted the still more infamous method, of raising my own reputation by destroying that of others. I have always contented myself with a consciousness of having done my duty with faithfulness; but being constrained to say something at this time respecting the late battle, and some other matters, I hope Congress will look upon it, rather as the effect of necessity, than any desire of making a merit of my services.

I never yet pretended that my disposition in the late battle was perfect; I knew it was very far from it; but this I will venture to affirm, that it was the best that time would allow me to make. At half-past two, I received orders to march with my division, to join with and take command of that and two others, to oppose the enemy, who were coming down on the right flank of our army. I neither knew where the enemy were, nor what route the other two divisions were to take, and of course could not determine where I should form a junction with them. I began my march in a few minutes after I received my orders, and had not marched a mile when I met Colonel Hazen with his regiment, which had been stationed at a ford three miles above me, who informed that the enemy were close upon his heels, and that I might depend that the principal part of the British army was there; although I knew the report sent to head-quarters made them but two brigades. As I knew Colonel Hazen to be an old officer, and a good judge of numbers, I gave credence to his report, in preference to the intelligence before received. While I was conversing with Colonel Hazen, and our troops still upon the march, the enemy headed us in the road, about forty rods from our advanced guard. I then found it necessary to turn off to the right

to form, and so got nearer to the other two divisions, which I at that moment discovered drawn up on an eminence, both in the rear and to the right of the place I was then at. I ordered Colonel Hazen's regiment to pass a hollow way, file off to the right, and face, to cover the artillery. The enemy seeing this, did not press on, but gave me time to form my division on an advantageous height, in a line with the other divisions, about almost half a mile to the left: I then rode on to consult the other general officers, who, upon receiving information that the enemy was endeavoring to outflank us on the right, were unanimously of opinion that my division should be brought on to join the others, and that the whole should incline farther to the right, to prevent our being outflanked; but while my division was marching on, and before it was possible for them to form to advantage, the enemy pressed on with rapidity and attacked them, which threw them into some kind of confusion. I had taken post myself in the centre, with the artillery, and ordered it to play briskly to stop the progress of the enemy, and give the broken troops time to rally and form in the rear of where I was with the artillery. I sent off four aids-de-camp for this purpose, and went myself, but all in vain. No sooner did I form one party, but that which I had formed ran off, and even at times when I, though on horseback and in front of them, apprehended no danger. I then left them to be rallied by their own officers and my aids-de-camp; I repaired to the hill where our artillery was, which by this time began to feel the effects of the enemy's fire. This hill commanded both the left and right of our line, and if carried by the enemy, I knew would instantly bring on a total rout and make a retreat very difficult; I therefore determined to hold it as long as possible, to give Lord Stirling's and General Stephens' divisions, which yet stood firm, as much assistance from the artillery as possible, and to give Colonel Hazen's, Dayton's, and Ogden's regiments, which still stood firm on our left, the same advantage, and to cover the broken troops of my division, and to give them an opportunity to rally and come to our assistance, which some of them did, and others could not by their officers

be brought to do any thing but fly. The enemy soon began to bend their principal force against the hill, and the fire was close and heavy for a long time, and soon became general. Lord Stirling and General Conway, with their aids-de-camp, were with me on the hill, and exerted themselves beyond description to keep up the troops. Five times did the enemy drive our troops from the hill, and as often it was regained, and the summit often disputed almost muzzle to muzzle. How far I had a hand in this, and whether I endured the hottest of the enemy's fire, I cheerfully submit to the gentlemen who were with me. The general fire of the line lasted an hour and forty minutes; fifty-one minutes of which the hill was disputed almost muzzle to muzzle, in such a manner that General Conway, who has seen much service, says he never saw so close and severe a fire. On the right, where General Stephens was, it was long and severe; and on the left, considerable. When we found the right and left oppressed by numbers and giving way on all quarters, we were obliged to abandon the hill we had so long contended for, but not till we had almost covered the ground between that and Birmingham meeting-house with the dead bodies of the enemy. When I found that victory was on the side of the enemy, I thought it my duty to prevent, as much as possible, the injurious consequences of a defeat; for which purpose I rallied my troops on every advantageous piece of ground, to retard their pursuit and give them fresh opposition. How far I exerted myself in this, Congress will readily see by consulting the inclosed testimonies; and that the last parties I assisted to rally and post against them, were between sunset and dark. By this means the enemy were so much fatigued that they suffered our whole army, with its artillery, baggage, &c., to pass off without molestation, and without attempting to pursue us a step.

I wish Congress to consider the many disadvantages I labored under on that day. It is necessary, in every action, that the commanding officer should have a perfect knowledge of the number and situation of the enemy, the route they are pursuing, the ground he is to draw up his troops on, as well as that where the

enemy are formed, and that he have sufficient time to view and examine the position of the enemy, and to draw up his troops in such a manner as to counteract their design; all of which were wanting. We had intelligence of two brigades coming against us, when in fact it was the whole strength of the British army, commanded by General Howe and Lord Cornwallis. They met us unexpectedly, and in order of battle, and attacked us before we had time to form, and upon ground we had never before seen. Under these disadvantages, and against those unequal numbers, we maintained our ground an hour and forty minutes; and by giving fresh opposition on every ground that would admit, we kept them at bay from three o'clock until after sunset. What more would have been expected from between three and four thousand troops against the chief part of the British army?

* * * * *

Dear sir, I have the honor to be, with much respect, your Excellency's most obedient servant,

JOHN SULLIVAN.

His Excellency, JOHN HANCOCK, Esq.

IV.

GENERAL SIR WM. HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

HEAD-QUARTERS, GERMANTOWN, Oct. 10, 1777.

MY LORD:—In my last dispatch, of the 30th of August, I had the honor to advise your lordship of the army having landed on the west side of Elk River, and of its being afterwards divided into two columns: one under the command of Lord Cornwallis, at the head of Elk; and the other commanded by Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, at Cecil Court-house. I am therefore to give your lordship an account of the operations from that period, wherein will be included two general actions, in both of which I have the satisfaction to premise that success has attended His Majesty's arms.

On the 3d of September, Major-general Grant, with six battalions, remaining at the head of Elk to preserve the communication with the

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fleet, the two columns joined at Pencadder, lying four miles to the eastward of Elk, on the road to Christien Bridge. In this day's march, the Hessian and Anspach chasseurs, and the Second battalion of light-infantry, who were at the head of Lord Cornwallis's column, fell in with a chosen corps of one thousand men from the enemy's army, advantageously posted in the woods, which they defeated, with the loss of only two officers wounded, three men killed and nineteen wounded, when that of the enemy was not less than fifty killed and many more wounded.

On the 6th, Major-general Grant, after Captain Duncan, who superintended the naval department, had destroyed such vessels and stores as could not be removed from the head of Elk, joined the army.

The whole marched on the 8th by Newark, and encamped that evening in the township of Hokessen, upon the road leading from Newport to Lancaster, at which first place General Washington had taken post, having his left to Christien Creek and his front covered by Red Clay Creek.

The two armies in this situation being only four miles apart, the enemy moved early in the night of the 8th by the Lancaster road, from Wilmington, and about ten o'clock next morning crossed Brandywine Creek at Chadd's Ford, taking post on the heights on the eastern side of it.

On the 9th, in the afternoon, Lieutenant-general Knyphausen marched with the left of the army to New Garden and Kennet's Square, while Lord Cornwallis with the right moved to Hokessen meeting-house, and both joined the next morning at Kennet's Square.

On the 11th, at daybreak, the army advanced in two columns, the right commanded by Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, consisting of four Hessian battalions under Major-general Stern, the First and Second brigades of British, three battalions of the Seventy-first regiment, the Queen's American rangers, and one squadron of the Sixteenth dragoons under Major-general Grant, having with them six medium twelve-pounders, four howitzers, and the light-artillery belonging to the brigades. This column took

the direct road to Chadd's Ford, seven miles distant from Kennet's Square, and arrived in front of the enemy about ten o'clock, skirmishing most part of the march with their advanced troops, in which the Queen's rangers, commanded by Captain Wemyss of the Fortieth regiment, distinguished themselves in a particular manner.

The other column, under the command of General Cornwallis, Major-general Grey, Brigadier-generals Matthew and Agnew, consisting of the mounted and dismounted chasseurs, two squadrons of the Sixteenth dragoons, two battalions of light-infantry, two battalions of British and three of Hessian grenadiers, two battalions of Guards, the Third and Fourth brigades, with four light twelve-pounders, marched about twelve miles to the forks of the Brandywine, crossed the first branch at Trimble's Ford, and the second at Jefferis's Ford, about two o'clock in the afternoon, taking from thence the road to Dilworth, in order to turn the enemy's right at Chadd's Ford.

General Washington, having intelligence of this movement about noon, detached General Sullivan to his right with near ten thousand men, who took a strong position on the commanding ground above Birmingham church, with his left near to the Brandywine, both flanks being covered by very thick woods, and his artillery advantageously disposed.

As soon as this was observed, which was about four o'clock, the King's troops advanced in three columns, and upon approaching the enemy, formed the line, with the right towards the Brandywine; the Guards being upon the right and the British grenadiers upon their left, supported by the Hessian grenadiers, in a second line: to the left of the centre were two battalions of light-infantry, with the Hessian and Anspach chasseurs, supported by the Fourth brigade. The Third brigade formed the reserve.

Lord Cornwallis having formed the line, the light-infantry and chasseurs began the attack; the Guards and Grenadiers instantly advanced from the right, the whole under a heavy train of artillery and musketry; but they pushed on with an impetuosity not to be sustained by the

enemy, who, falling back into the woods in their rear, the King's troops entered with them, and pursued closely for nearly two miles.

After this success, a part of the enemy's right took a second position, in a wood about half a mile from Dilworth, from whence the Second light-infantry and chasseurs soon dislodged them, and from this time did not rally again in force.

The First British grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers and Guards, having in the pursuit got entangled in very thick woods, were no farther engaged during the day.

The Second light-infantry, Second grenadiers, and Fourth brigade, moved forward a mile beyond Dilworth, where they attacked a corps of the enemy that had not been before engaged, and were strongly posted to cover the retreat of their army by the roads from Chadd's Ford to Chester and Wilmington; which corps not being forced until after it was dark, when the troops had undergone much fatigue, in a march of seventeen miles, besides what they supported since the commencement of the attack, the enemy's army escaped a total overthrow, that must have been the consequence of an hour's more daylight.

The Third brigade was not brought into action, but kept in reserve in the rear of the Fourth brigade, it not being known before it was dark how far Lieutenant-general Knyphausen's attack had succeeded; nor was there an opportunity of employing the cavalry.

Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, as had been previously concerted, kept the enemy amused in the course of the day with cannon, and the appearance of forcing the ford, without intending to pass it until the attack upon the enemy's right should take place: accordingly, when it began, Major-general Grant crossed the ford with the Fourth and Fifth regiments; and the Fourth regiment passing first, forced the enemy from an intrenchment and battery, where three brass field-pieces and a five-and-a-half-inch howitzer were taken, that had been placed there to command the ford. The enemy made little stand on that side after the work was carried, when the Guards appearing on their right flank, the retreat became general, but darkness coming on

before Lieutenant-general Knyphausen's corps could reach the heights, there was no farther action on that side.

From the most correct accounts, I conclude the strength of the enemy's army, opposed to Lieutenant-general Knyphausen and Lord Cornwallis, was not less than fifteen thousand men, a part of which retired to Chester, and remained there that night, but the greater body did not stop until they reached Philadelphia. Their loss was considerable in officers killed and wounded, and they had about three hundred men killed, six hundred wounded, and near four hundred made prisoners.

The loss on the side of His Majesty's troops, and the ordnance, ammunition, and stores taken from the enemy, will appear in the inclosed returns.

The army laid this night on the field of battle, and on the 12th Major-general Grant, with the First and Second brigades, marched to Concord. Lord Cornwallis, with the light-infantry and British grenadiers, joined him next day, and proceeded to Ashtown, within five miles of Chester.

* * * * *

With most perfect respect, I have the honor to be, &c.,

W. HOWE.

CHAPTER XXV.

September 19 and October 7, 1777.

THE BATTLES NEAR SARATOGA, N. Y.

AMONG the most important actions of the War of the Revolution, were those which were fought near Saratoga, resulting in the capture of General Burgoyne and the forces under his command.

Of the early movements of General Burgoyne, of his capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, his victory at Hubbardton, and his defeat at Bennington, notice has been already taken.¹ The troubles which he experienced concerning the supply of provisions for his army, where every article was drawn from Canada, thickened around him day by day, as stream after stream, impassable, but without bridges, were reached;² as ditch after ditch, cut across the roads, had to be filled up; and fallen trees and hidden pit-falls retarded his march and destroyed the energies of his men.³ His failure at Bennington, while it had raised the spirits of the Americans, and taught them to

rely on their own strength, had filled his own troops with discontent⁴ and sacrificed great numbers of his auxiliaries, without adding an atom to his stores. The Americans, under the active superintendence of General Schuyler, were collecting for the defence of the country;⁵ and, having secured their crops, they turned out in greater numbers and exhibited less impatience with the service than usual. While some portions of their number were obstructing the way, others were harassing the enemy during his laborious and tedious march through the wilderness,⁶ and causing great distress in his camp, for the want of forage and other necessary articles of provisions.⁷

Notwithstanding all these discouraging circumstances, General Burgoyne pressed forward for the accomplishment of the great object of the expedition,⁸ hoping to find a recompense for his toil and anxiety in the success with which he would have executed the plans of

¹ Vide chapters XX. and XXI.

² Gen. Burgoyne to Gen. Harvey, July 14; Same to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. pp. 342, 358, 364, 381, 382, 407; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Oeour., p. 158.

Amburey, i. pp. 358, 364; Stedman, i. p. 327.

³ Anburey, i. pp. 394, 395.—² Ibid., pp. 360, 361, 429.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 364, 365; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 144; Gordon, ii. pp. 486, 487.—⁴ Anburey, i. p. 435.

⁵ Marshall, iii. p. 284.

the government and obeyed the orders of his Sovereign. The scarcity of teams, which he hoped to remedy by the expedition to Bennington,¹ did not prevent him from drawing a supply of provisions from Lake George for thirty days in advance,² during which time he hoped to reach Albany, effect a union with the forces of Sir William Howe, separate the Eastern from the Middle and Southern Colonies, and lay the foundation for that complete subjugation of the rebellious colonists which was the object of the government and the King.

On the thirteenth and fourteenth of September the army passed from the eastern to the western bank of the Hudson, and encamped on the heights and in the plain of Saratoga, now known as Schuyler'sville, the American army being then in the neighborhood of Stillwater, about nine miles distant.³ On the next day (*Sept. 15th*) General Burgoyne advanced to Do-ve-gat, now called Coveville, where he encamped in a good position, and remained there until the seventeenth, in order to reconnoitre the country and repair the bridges between his camp and what is now called Wilbur's Basin.⁴ On the seventeenth he advanced as far as "Sword's House," about four miles from the American camp, where he again encamped upon

advantageous ground,¹ General Arnold, who had been sent out with fifteen hundred men to oppose his progress by harassing his flanks, having failed to accomplish any thing, from the unfavorable character of the ground for operations of that character.² On the eighteenth, General Burgoyne advanced to and occupied a position near what is now known as Wilbur's Basin, about two miles from the American camp, and immediately proceeded to strengthen it by throwing up intrenchments and redoubts;³ the position being farther strengthened by a deep ravine which was immediately in front and parallel with the line of the encampment.⁴

On the next day (*Sept. 19th*) the paths around the ravine, and other roads leading towards the American camp, having been reconnoitred, preparations were made for an advance and attack on the latter position.⁵

The right, composed of the light-infantry and grenadiers (flank companies), belonging to the Ninth, Twentieth, Twenty-first, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-ninth, Thirty-first, Thirty-fourth, Forty-seventh, Fifty-third, and Sixty-second regiments, supported by the Hessian riflemen⁶ under Colonel Breyman, and led by General Frazer, Major Ackland, and the Earl of Balcarres,⁷ was directed,

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's instructions to Col. Baume
² Gen. Burgoyne to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 20.
³ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, October 20; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. p. 235.

⁴ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Wilkinson, i. p. 435; Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, p. 133.

⁵ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Order of Battle, in Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur.; Anburey, i. p. 410; Test of Earl Harrington, Question 39.

⁶ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Order of Battle, &c.

by a circuitous route, to pass the head of the ravine without leaving the high ground,¹ and to occupy a position which would enable them to cover the line of march of the centre and left wing.²

The centre, composed of the Twentieth, Twenty-first, and Sixty-second regiments³ (with the Ninth regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Hill, as a reserve),⁴ led by General Burgoyne, in person, and General Hamilton,⁵ was to pass the ravine in a direct line towards the American lines, and form in order of battle when they gained the summit on the south side of the ravine,⁶ but not to advance until the two wings had accomplished the duties assigned to them,⁷ —the right, of passing around the head of the ravine; the left, of repairing the bridges and being equally ready to proceed.

The left, composed of the Hessian troops (except Breyman's riflemen, who were on the right), and the British artillery,⁸ led by Generals Riedesel and Philips,⁹ was to march on the great northern road, which here passed through the alluvial meadows which stretch along the west bank of the Hudson, at the foot of the high grounds occupied by the centre and right of the army.¹⁰

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 410; Test. of Earl of Harrington, Ques. 39.—² Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—³ Order of Battle, in Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occur.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 410; Test. of Earl of Harrington, Ques. 39.—⁷ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—⁸ Order of Battle, in Serg. Lamb's Jour.; Anburey, i. p. 410; Test. of Earl of Harrington, Ques. 39.

⁹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—¹⁰ Ibid.; Anburey, i. p. 410; Test. of Earl of Harrington, Ques. 39.

The Forty-seventh regiment guarded the bateaux containing the stores of the army;¹ and the Canadians, the Tory corps, and the Indians, were assigned as skirmishers and flanking parties to *the right wing*.²

At this time the Americans occupied an advantageous position near Bemis's tavern, and had strengthened it by throwing up breastworks and redoubts.³ The right of the army, commanded by General Gates in person, occupied the meadows, between the river and the high ground, and that high ground itself to the foot of Bemis's Heights; while the left of the army, composed of the brigades of Generals Poor and Larned, the riflemen commanded by Colonel Morgan, and a body of militia, commanded by General Arnold, occupied Bemis's Heights and some high grounds west from them.⁴ The space between the two encampments, on the low grounds near the river, was cleared and cultivated; on the hills, with the exception of three or four small openings, it was heavily wooded.⁵ In front of the right wing of the American camp, and parallel with it, was a deep, closely-wooded ravine, similar to that which covered the enemy's camp;⁶ and, about half way between the two armies, an-

¹ Test. of Maj. Forbes, Ques. 14; Test. of Col. Kingsston, Ques. 59; Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.

² Order of Battle, in Serg. Lamb's Jour., Anburey, i. p. 410.—³ Gen. Wilkinson's Mem., i. pp. 235, 236; Neilson's Burgoyne, pp. 114, 115.—⁴ Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 134.—⁵ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 236; Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, pp. 115, 116.

⁶ Ibid. Mr. Neilson, in his useful map of the ground, has erroneously put the intrenchments *in front of the ravine*.

other of the same character extended westward beyond the western flanks of both armies.¹ A small party of light troops, under Lieutenant-colonel Colburn, had been detached to the east of the Hudson to watch the movements of the enemy, with orders to report such movements as he might consider worthy of notice.²

Early in the day³ (*Sept. 19th*), the enemy moved from his encampment, agreeably to the orders before referred to, the centre in a direct line across the ravine towards the American camp, the right towards the head of the ravine, and the left along the road on the margin of the river. It was not until between one and two o'clock in the afternoon, however, that the three divisions of the army were ready to advance, so great were the obstacles which they encountered,⁴ when the report of three guns, the signal designated in orders,⁵ set all simultaneously in motion. The advance and flanking parties of the enemy were immediately met and fired upon by the pickets and scouts from the American army with varied success;⁶ but the main body had marched less than an hour, when the advance of the British column encountered Colonel Morgan's regiment of riflemen and a

detachment of light-infantry under Major Dearborn, who had been sent to oppose the progress of the enemy in that direction.¹ Major Morris, who led Morgan's men, rushed on the enemy with so much impetuosity that his men became scattered,² and the enemy having been reinforced, Colonel Morgan was driven from the field with the loss of Captain Swearingen and twenty men.³ This check on the enemy's right having been reported to General Gates, he ordered the regiments commanded by Colonels Scammel and Cilley to strengthen Morgan,⁴ and General Arnold led them out to the *left* of Morgan, with an evident intention to turn General Frazer's flank. Notwithstanding the movements were made with promptness, and the attack was sustained with all the impetuous and determined courage which characterized General Arnold, it was unsuccessful, and the assailants were compelled to withdraw,⁵ General Gates having refused to send any reinforcements.⁶

Not to be frustrated, however, General Arnold took advantage of the shelter which the woods afforded, and, by a rapid counter-march, fell suddenly on the enemy's centre, where General

¹ Map in Neilson's Campaign; Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 236.—² Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 236. After reporting the movement of the enemy, on the morning of the 19th Sept., he joined his regiment (Col. Scammell's), and was killed in the action.—(*Return of Killed, &c.*)—³ Wilkinson (Mem., i. p. 236) says it was before 8, A. M. The Baron de Riedesel says (*Military Memoir concerning the Campaign of 1777*) that they marched at 11, A. M.—⁴ Anburey, i. p. 410.

⁵ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—⁶ *Ibid.*

¹ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 236; Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Gen. Gates' letter to Congress, Sept. 22.

² Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 237.—³ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 411; Wilkinson, i. p. 237; Gen. Gates' letter to Congress, Sept. 22.—⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 159.

⁶ Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, p. 136; Irving's Washington, iii. p. 230, and Col. Varick's letter to Gen. Schuyler, cited by him.

Burgoyne commanded.¹ With an apparent intention of dividing the enemy's line and of detaching General Frazer,² General Arnold rushed on the enemy with great fury.³ Ordering up the remainder of his division, General Arnold was strengthened by the successive arrival of the Second regiment of New Hampshire troops, under Colonel Hale; the New York troops, under Colonels Pierre Van Courtlandt, James and Henry Livingston; the Massachusetts regiments, under Colonels Bailey, Weston, Jackson, and Marshall; and the Connecticut militia regiments, under Colonels Cook and Latimer.⁴ With the most unwavering courage both parties maintained the strife, and success appeared to await each, alternately, as their reinforcements gave new vigor to their movements, and encouragement to their troops.⁵ General Frazer rendered such assistance as prudence allowed, although it was not thought advisable to evacuate the high ground on the right of the enemy's line, which he occupied,⁶ otherwise than by occasionally detaching a part of his force to the assistance of the centre.⁷ The extreme left of the enemy's line, on the margin of the river, was not able to render much assistance

to General Burgoyne. General Phillips, when the action assumed a serious appearance, hastened through the woods to the centre with four pieces of artillery, commanded by Major Williams, and rendered efficient service;¹ while General Riedesel, late in the day, came on the field at the head of his infantry regiment and two companies of the Rhetz regiment,² and charged the Americans "with regularity and bravery."³

For four hours this stubborn conflict continued,⁴ one party determined to conquer, the other not to be conquered, and darkness finally accomplished what man was unable to effect.⁵ The Americans retired from the field in good order and without pursuit,⁶ claiming the victory because they had checked the progress of the enemy;⁷ the British retained a field, barren alike of advantage and glory, claiming also to be victors, from their possession of the field of battle.⁸

The force of the two armies actually engaged was nearly equal, the Americans numbering about three thousand, the enemy about three thousand five hundred.⁹

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 414; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 159.—² Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 139.—³ Test. of Capt. Money, Ques. 45; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 159.—⁴ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 239; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 159; Gordon, iii. p. 549.—⁵ Gen. Burgoyne's Review of the Evidence, p. 121; Wilkinson, i. p. 238; Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 38.—⁶ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 415.—⁷ Ibid. See also Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. p. 240.

⁸ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 415; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 160.—⁹ Baron de Riedesel's Military Mem.—¹⁰ Gen. Burgoyne's Dispatch, Oct. 20; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 160.—¹¹ Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 16; Anburey, i. p. 415; Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 35.—¹² Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 39; Anburey, i. p. 415; Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 241.

¹³ Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 39; Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—¹⁴ Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 97; Marshall, iii. p. 287; Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 145.—¹⁵ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 417, 420, 424; Wilkinson, i. pp. 241, 242; Stedman, i. p. 337.—¹⁶ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 239; Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, p. 145.

The loss, on the part of the enemy, was about six hundred, killed and wounded;¹ the Sixty-second regiment, which left Canada with five hundred men, coming out of the battle with less than sixty effective men and only four or five officers;² while the artillery corps lost its captain (Jones) - and thirty-six men out of forty-eight.³ The Americans lost two lieutenant-colonels, three captains, one lieutenant, two ensigns, and fifty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates (total sixty-five), *killed*; six captains, fourteen lieutenants, one ensign, and one hundred and ninety-seven non-commissioned officers and privates (total two hundred and eighteen), *wounded*; and one captain, one lieutenant, and thirty-six non-commissioned officers and privates (total thirty-eight), *missing*.⁴

The enemy, as has been said, occupied the field after the battle closed, and both armies, on the following day, proceeded to strengthen their respective positions,⁵—the one waiting for a co-operative movement from New York, the other watching the enemy to prevent his progress towards Albany. Works were thrown up on the western

flanks of both armies,¹ while on the left of the enemy's line, both on the heights and on the meadows, especial care was taken to protect the bateaux containing the stores.²

About this time a misunderstanding, which had been growing between Generals Gates and Arnold for some time previous, broke out into an open rupture, and threatened even the safety of the army.³ It appears, that when the unrighteous removal of General Schuyler from the command of the army was ordered by Congress, through the influence, and for the especial benefit of those who afterwards formed the notorious "Conway Cabal,"⁴ General Arnold, in common with all true friends of their country, considered it an indirect attack on the commander-in-chief; and he sympathized with General Schuyler, taking Colonels Richard Varick and Brockholst Livingston, his secretary and aid-de-camp, into his military family.⁵ The intense jealousy of General Gates, and his partisan animosity against General Schuyler, were speedily aroused, and a coolness, terminating in an open rupture, was extended to General Arnold.⁶ General Wilkinson, the adjutant-general of the army, and the espe-

¹ Stedman, i. p. 337; Hall's Civil War, p. 400; Test. of Maj. Forbes, Ques. 16; Test. of Col. Kingston, Ques. 61.

² Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 16; Test. of Capt. Money, Ques. 30; Testimony of Col. Kingston, Question 65.

³ Gen. Burgoyne's Rev. of Evidence, p. 121. Capt. Anburey (i. p. 418) says all, *except one*, were either killed or wounded.—⁴ "Returns of the killed, &c., of the Army between Stillwater and Saratoga, Sept. 19, 1777," dated "Camp, Bemis's Heights, Sept. 21st," signed "JA. WILKINSON, Dep. Adjt.-Gen."—⁵ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 263; Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 16; Test. of Capt. Money, Ques. 52-55; Test. of Earl of Harrington, Ques. 95-101.

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 416.

² Test. of Earl of Balcarres, Ques. 46; Anburey, i. p. 416.

³ Wilkinson's Memoirs, pp. 253-261; Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, pp. 151, 152.

⁴ The "Conway Cabal" was the name given to a clique of officers of the army and members of Congress who were opposed to Gen. Washington remaining at the head of the army. Generals Lee, Conway, Gates, Mifflin, and many of the members of Congress from New England, headed by James Lovell, composed the group.

⁵ Irving's Washington, iii. p. 224.—⁶ Ibid.

cial friend and apologist of General Gates, himself one of the notorious "Cabal" referred to,¹ goes so far as to state that General Gates sent *him*, after General Arnold had left the camp, to lead the charge on the enemy's right wing, with orders to "remand Arnold to camp;"² and that "*not a single general officer was on the field of battle the 19th September*, until the evening;"³ forgetting that, in falsifying history for the purpose of robbing General Arnold of his hard-earned fame, he at the same time impeached the military character of General Gates, in maintaining that an action of this importance, where the destiny of the country and of the great principles on which the parties had taken issue was involved, was intrusted to the individual caprices of colonels of regiments,⁴ without the controlling superintendence of a general officer; and "*was fought by the general concert and zealous co-operation of the corps engaged, and sustained more by individual courage than military discipline.*"⁵ Fortunately, the testimony of eye-witnesses furnishes abundant evidence of the partisan bias of both Wilkinson and his patron, and General Arnold has been amply protected in his rights as the real hero of Saratoga, notwithstanding his name has been carefully excluded from all the official documents relating to that event.⁶ The trouble be-

tween the two Generals was brought to an issue by the detachment of Colonel Morgan's riflemen and Major Dearborn's light-infantry from General Arnold's command;¹ and an unpleasant interview² and an equally unpleasant correspondence followed,³ the result of all which was the removal of General Arnold from all command and *his exclusion from head-quarters,*⁴ General Gates first taking the command of the left wing himself,⁵ and afterwards, on the twenty-fifth of September, assigning it to General Lincoln.⁶

On the third of October, the supply of provisions in the enemy's camp had become so far reduced that the daily rations were diminished;⁷ and the difficulties of a retreat to Canada, as well as the opportunity which such a retreat would afford for General Gates to turn his force against General Howe, were made the subjects of anxious consideration in the family of General Burgoyne.⁸ At the same time the attacks on the camp by the American troops were frequent and severe.⁹ General Burgoyne himself says: "From the twentieth of September to the seventh of October, the armies were so near that not a single night passed without firing, and

Gen. Schuyler, cited by Mr. Irving; Stedman, i. pp. 336, 337, 341; Hall's Civil War, pp. 400, 407; Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, pp. 152, 177.

¹ Wilkinson's Mem., i. pp. 253, 254.—² Ibid., p. 254.

³ Ibid., pp. 254–260.—⁴ Ibid., p. 260.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., i. p. 261.—⁷ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Baron de Riedesel's Military Mem., p. 146; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 163.—⁸ Baron de Riedesel's Military Mem., pp. 146, 147.—⁹ Anburey, i. p. 431; Baron de Riedesel's Military Mem., p. 145; Madame de Riedesel's Account, &c., p. 167.

¹ It was through Wilkinson's weakness that the complicity of Gen. Gates in this affair was made known to Gen. Washington.—² Memoirs, i. pp. 245, 246.

³ Ibid., p. 245.—⁴ Ibid., p. 246.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 164; Col. Varick to

sometimes concerted attacks upon our advanced pickets; no foraging party could be made without great detachments to cover it; it was the plan of the enemy to harass the army by constant alarms, and their superiority of numbers enabled them to attempt it without fatigue to themselves. * * * * I do not believe either officer or soldier ever slept during that interval without his clothes, or that any general officer or commander of a regiment passed a single night without being upon his legs occasionally, at different hours, and constantly an hour before daylight."¹

With great obstinacy, under the circumstances, General Burgoyne braved his troubles, and resolved to await the arrival of an answer to communications which he had sent to Sir Henry Clinton, at New York, before he made another movement.² This resolution was defeated, however, by the great scarcity of forage, and the necessity of a movement of the army to obtain it, and a second and decisive battle "was precipitated by some days."³

The apparent, unexplained inactivity of General Burgoyne caused some anxiety in the American camp.⁴ It was supposed he was waiting for reinforcements from Canada, and such dispositions were made of the militia as would "render their arrival difficult, if not impracticable."⁵ It was also suspected that succors from New York might be

expected, or that a movement on the *east* bank of the Hudson or on the extreme *left* flank of the army might be intended, and all proper precautions were taken to prevent their success, should either of them be attempted;¹ yet no disposition was manifested by General Gates to make a general attack on the enemy's lines.

At length the anxious impatience of the Americans was relieved, and the fruit of General Schuyler's industrious and judicious patriotism, and of General Arnold's impetuous and obstinate courage, now fully ripe, fell, without an effort on his part to secure it, into the hands of General Gates.

On the seventh of October, General Burgoyne having received no intelligence from New York, and the limit of his intended stay in the position he then occupied having almost expired, "it was judged advisable to make a movement to the left of the American camp, not only to discover whether there were any possible means of forcing a passage should it be necessary to advance, or of dislodging him for the convenience of a retreat, but also to cover a forage of the army, which was in the greatest distress on account of the scarcity."² For this purpose, leaving the guard of the camp on the heights with Generals Hamilton and Specht, and those of the redoubts and the plain with General Gall,³ between eleven and twelve o'clock, General Burgoyne, in person, accompa-

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's Review of the Evidence before the House of Commons, p. 124.—² Baron de Riedesel's Military Mem., p. 147; Stedman, i. p. 339.—³ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—⁴ Wilkinson, i. pp. 263, 264.—⁵ Ibid.

¹ Wilkinson, i. pp. 263, 264.—² Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Testimony of Col. Kingston, Question 78.

³ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 436.

nied by Generals Phillips, Riedesel, and Frazer, moved with a detachment of fifteen hundred regular troops, two twelve-pounders, six six-pounders, and two howitzers, and formed within three quarters of a mile from the left of the American lines; while Captain Frazer's rangers, the Indians, and the Tory refugees, were directed to move through the woods around the left flank of the former and make a diversion, and, if possible, to keep the Americans in check.¹ It was after noon before the desired position was gained by the main body of the detachment,² and the bat-men had just commenced their work of gathering forage, when the position occupied by the enemy was reconnoitred by the adjutant-general of the American forces.³ It occupied a low ridge of ground;⁴ the British grenadiers, under Major Aekland, being on the left of the line (which was nearest the American camp), with the Germans and the Twenty-fourth regiment on their right; and the British light-infantry, under General Frazer, and covered by a rail-fence, occupied the extreme right of the line.⁵

The report of the adjutant having been made to General Gates, he ordered Colonel Morgan to take a circuitous route and gain the high ground on the right of the enemy's line,⁶ while Gen-

eral Poor's brigade, composed of the First, Second, and Third regiments of New Hampshire troops, under Colonels Scammel, Hale, and Cilley; the New York regiments, under Colonels Van Courtlandt and Henry Livingston; and the Connecticut militia, under Colonels Cook and Latimer, were to advance against his left.¹ The movements were made with secrecy,² the intervening woods enabling the troops to march without being seen, and the time was arranged so that a simultaneous attack should be made on both flanks, and on the front of the enemy's line.³

By a very sudden and rapid movement⁴ the attack commenced on the extreme left of the line, where Major Aekland and the grenadiers were stationed,⁵ and within a few minutes the Germans were also engaged.⁶ At this moment Colonel Morgan rushed on the right of the line, and the action became general.⁷ General Burgoyne, seeing that any attempt to withstand the force which had attacked his position would be useless, immediately ordered the light-infantry and part of the Twenty-fourth regiment to form a second line, in the rear of the position they then occupied, in order to secure the retreat of the detachment;⁸ but while this movement was being made, the grenadiers and German troops on the left of

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 435. Baron de Riedesel says (*Mil. Mem.*, p. 147) they marched at 10, A. M.—² Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. p. 267.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Baron de Riedesel's *Mil. Mem.*, p. 148; Wilkinson's *Mem.*, p. 267; Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 163.

⁵ Map of engagement, in Burgoyne's Narrative. See also Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.

⁶ Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. pp. 267, 268.

⁷ Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. p. 268.—⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Wilkinson's *Mem.*, i. p. 268; Baron de Riedesel's *Military Memoirs*, p. 148.

¹⁰ Ibid.—¹¹ Ibid.—¹² Baron de Riedesel's *Military Mem.*, p. 148; Campbell's *Life of Gen. Hull*, p. 101.

¹³ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Wilkinson, i. p. 269.

the line, which had been attacked by Major Dearborn with the American light-infantry,¹ gave way,² and the right (the Twenty-fourth and the light-infantry) was compelled, by a quick movement, to march to their assistance, in doing which General Frazer was mortally wounded.³ The situation of the enemy's lines was now very serious,⁴ and orders having been given to Generals Phillips and Riedesel to cover the retreat of the detachment,⁵ General Burgoyne, with such troops as he could collect, hastened back for the purpose of defending them, in case they were attacked.⁶ The enemy, closely pursued, reached the lines, leaving behind them six pieces of artillery, all the horses having been killed, and most of the men which belonged to them having been either killed or wounded.⁷ The impetuosity of the attack on this detachment, the skill with which the movements were made, and the desperate courage with which the attack was sustained, commanded the respect even of the enemy;⁸ while the terrible carnage proved that that respect was well founded.

But the battle was not yet ended, and the fears which General Burgoyne had evinced for the safety of his lines were speedily realized.⁹ General Arnold, who, notwithstanding the efforts of General

Gates to prevent it,¹ had headed his troops in the desperate attack on the left and centre of the detachment which had just retreated,² was cheering them on in the pursuit of the fugitives. Rushing wildly from regiment to regiment, giving to each its orders, and encouraging all with his example,³ he was received everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm, and the troops pushed after him to attack the lines of the enemy, behind which the remnant of General Burgoyne's detachment had taken refuge.⁴ When General Patterson's brigade, which he was leading, encountered a heavy abatis, and was driven back by the enemy,⁵ he threw himself at the head of Colonel Jackson's regiment and pressed forward.⁶ With great gallantry that part of the lines which he attacked was defended successfully by Lord Balcarras, the successor of the lamented General Frazer;⁷ but the intrenchments occupied by the German reserve, under Colonel Breyman, were carried and retained by Lieutenant-colonel Brooks, at the head of another part of the same regiment,⁸ and by that success the right and rear of the enemy's lines were opened to the American army.⁹

¹ Wilkinson, i. p. 273; Irving, iii. p. 256.

² Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 169; Irving, iii. p. 256.

³ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 273; Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 183; Irving, iii. p. 256.—⁴ Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 174.—⁵ Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 164; Gordon, iii. p. 561.—⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 48; Anburey, i. p. 442; Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch Oct. 20; Serg. Lamb's Journal, p. 164.

⁸ Gen. Burgoyne's di-*patch*, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 442; Wilkinson's Mem., i. pp. 271, 272; De Riedesel's Mil Mem., p. 148.—⁹ Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 272; Anburey, i. p. 442; Serg. Lamb's Journal, p. 165; Testimony of Earl of Balcarras, Questions 51, 52.

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Wilkinson, i. p. 269.—² Ibid.—³ Gen. Burgoyne's di-*patch*, Oct. 20; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 163.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Test. of Capt. Money, Ques. 59; Gen. Burgoyne's di-*patch*, Oct. 20.

⁶ Gen. Burgoyne's di-*patch*, Oct. 20.—⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Burgoyne's Narrative, pp. 17, 18; Baron de Riedesel's Military Mem., p. 148.—⁹ Testimony of Capt. Money Question 59; Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.

A second time the close of day put an end to the battle,¹ and the Americans were this time acknowledged to be the victors. Besides the loss of the field on which the action commenced, and the intrenchments of the German reserve, the enemy suffered severely in the killed and wounded among his officers and men. Besides General Frazer, who was mortally wounded, Sir Francis Clark, aid-de-camp of General Burgoyne, and Lieutenant-colonel Breyman, were killed, and Majors Ackland and Williams were taken prisoners, the former wounded.² The exact loss of the enemy is unknown, but it has been supposed to amount to not less than six hundred, killed, wounded, and prisoners.³ The loss of the Americans did not exceed one hundred and fifty, killed and wounded,⁴ among the latter of whom was General Arnold, who, just as the victory had been won, received a ball, which fractured his leg and killed his horse.⁵

The disastrous result of the action, especially the loss of the German intrenchment, rendered a change in the position of his army necessary,⁶ and General Burgoyne effected it, without loss, during the night of the seventh of October, by taking post upon the heights above his hospital, on the west bank of the Hudson, near the present

village of Wilbur's Basin.¹ The American army occupied the camp which the enemy had abandoned, on the morning of the eighth,² and the day was spent in a random fire of artillery and small-arms,³ but General Gates declined the attack, which General Burgoyne invited, on the new position which the latter then occupied.⁴

On the morning of the eighth, General Gates dispatched General Fellows with his brigade, about thirteen hundred men,⁵ to occupy the barracks at Saratoga, in the rear of the enemy's position,⁶ in order to check the latter, should he attempt to retreat; but that position being too much exposed,⁷ he was afterwards ordered to take post on the east side of the Hudson, for the purpose of preventing the enemy from crossing the river at that place.⁸ At the same time a detachment of two thousand men was sent to intercept him at Fort Edward;⁹ and another of fifteen hundred, with a similar object, was ordered to the ford higher up.¹⁰ These troops, marching past the enemy's right flank, were supposed by the

¹ Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 53; Anburey, i. p. 446. Baron de Riedesel says the stay here was for the purpose of effecting the removal of the hospital.

² Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 279.—³ Test. of Earl of Harrington, Ques. 67; Test. of Col. Kingston, Ques. 84, 85; Gen. Burgoyne's Review of Evidence, p. 125.

⁴ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 447; Serg. Lamb's Jour., 165; Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 54.—⁵ Gen. Fellows to Gen. Lincoln, "Saratoga Barracks, Oct. 8, 1777."—⁶ Ibid. See also Wilkinson's Mem., i. p. 280.—⁷ Wilkinson, i. pp. 280, 281.

⁸ Col. Wilkinson to Gen. Fellows, Oct. 8; Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—⁹ Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 207; Testimony of Col. Kingston, Ques. 95; Gordon, iii. p. 566.—¹⁰ Ibid.

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 442; Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 177; Stedman, i. p. 341.—² Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occur., p. 164.

³ Neilson (*Camp. of Burgoyne*, p. 181) says it was about seven hundred.—⁴ Neilson's Camp. of Burgoyne, p. 182.

⁵ Thatcher's Mil. Jour., p. 102; Marshall, iii. pp. 293, 294.—⁶ Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 18; Anburey, i. p. 446.

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latter to have been intended for other objects,¹ and an immediate retreat to Saratoga was determined on.² Accordingly, at nine o'clock in the evening of the eighth,³ the army began to move, General Riedesel commanding the vanguard and General Phillips the rear.⁴ In his haste to secure a new position, and in consequence of the bad state of the roads, General Burgoyne abandoned his sick and wounded, some three hundred in number.⁵ The retreat was conducted with great secrecy, and, although encumbered with a heavy train, and with all the baggage of the army, it was effected without loss.⁶ The fugitives reached Do-ve-gat (now Coveville) at daybreak on the morning of the ninth,⁷ and remained there some time, the day being exceeding rainy, and the bateaux containing the small supply of provisions which the army possessed being guarded with great difficulty.⁸ The army reached Saratoga (Schuyler-ville) on the night of the ninth,⁹ but the artillery could not pass the ford of the Fish Creek until the following morning.¹⁰

The American army remained in the encampment until the afternoon of the tenth,¹ and it was not until four o'clock on that day that the advance of the army came within sight of the enemy's position.² On the following morning, which was very foggy, a movement was made with an intention to attack the enemy in his lines.³ It was one of General Gates's peculiarly injudicious movements, without even reconnoitering the position of the enemy or the disposition of his troops, and it is owing entirely to a disobedience of his peremptory orders, on the part of General Larned and some other officers, that the American army was saved from a most disastrous defeat.⁴

The enemy continued to occupy the heights on the north side of Fish Creek, hoping for the arrival of assistance, but hoping in vain. On the 12th, the Generals Burgoyne, Riedesel, Phillips, and Hamilton, met in Council of War, and discussed the difficulties of their situation.⁵ General Burgoyne informed the Council that the American army had been increased to fourteen thousand men, well supplied with artillery; and that an attack was threatened; that another "army," numbers unknown, was between their position and Fort

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.—² Ibid.

³ Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 165; Anburey, i. p. 450.—⁴ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 450.—⁵ Gen. Burgoyne to Gen. Gates, Oct. 8; Wilkinson, i. p. 282.—⁶ Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 55, 56; Test. of Earl of Harrington, Ques. 70; Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Mad. de Riedesel's Account, &c., p. 173.

⁷ Anburey, i. p. 452; Gen. Burgoyne's Rev. of Evidence, p. 126.—⁸ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. pp. 452, 453; Baron de Riedesel's Mil. Mem., p. 149.—⁹ Gen. Burgoyne's Rev. of Evidence, p. 129; Anburey, i. p. 453; Test. of Earl of Balcarras, Ques. 58; Testimony of Maj. Forbes, Question 22.

¹⁰ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, October 20; Anburey, i. p. 457.

¹ Wilkinson, i. p. 284; Anburey, i. p. 451.—² Wilkinson, i. p. 284; Neilson's Campaign of Burgoyne, p. 197.

³ Burgoyne's Narrative, p. 18; Rev. of the Evidence, p. 130; Wilkinson, i. pp. 285-289; De Riedesel's Military Memoirs, p. 150.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Baron de Riedesel says (*Mil. Mem.*, pp. 150, 151) that this was an adjourned meeting from one held by the Major-generals only, on the preceding day. He also says that General Gall was present at this meeting.

Edward, with another body of fifteen hundred in another post; that the Americans had cannon on the east side of the Hudson, with a bridge over the Hudson by which the different bodies could communicate; that their own bateaux had been destroyed, and they had no means of crossing the Hudson, even if the positions of the Americans permitted them to do so; that the only means of retreat, therefore, were by the ford at Fort Edward (which was well guarded by General Gates); or, *secondly*, by other fords higher up (which were also similarly guarded); or, *thirdly*, by taking to the mountains, pass to the westward of the head-waters of the Hudson and Lake George, through the woods, and thence to Ticonderoga; or, *lastly*, by taking to the mountains, in the same way, pass the upper waters of the Hudson on rafts; that the repairs on the bridges, which a retreat to Fort Edward would demand, would require great labor, and enable General Gates to throw heavy forces in their front, to harass their march or to dispute the passage of the ford, while his main body followed in the rear; that no reliable intelligence had been received from Sir Henry Clinton; and that the provisions *might* hold out for eight days longer, although they then had *neither rum nor spruce-beer*, and he requested the sentiments of the members on the following questions: *First*, Should they wait for an attack from the Americans, or the chance of favorable events? *Second*, Should they attack the Americans? *Third*, Should

they retreat towards Fort Edward, repair the bridges for the passage of their artillery, and attempt to pass the river at that place? *Fourth*, Should they retreat by night, leaving their artillery and baggage; and in case they could not force the passage at Fort Edward with small-arms only, to attempt the upper fords, or make the passage through the woods, around the west side of Lake George? And *fifth*, In case General Gates extended his lines so far towards his left that his rear was left open, should they force a passage to Albany? The first, second, third, and fifth propositions were considered impracticable, and on the fourth the Council decided it was the only resource, but to effect even that the utmost secrecy was necessary, so as to insure for the army *four miles march from their lines without being discovered*.¹

In the mean time, scouts had been sent out to examine the different routes, and their reports were considered necessary, before the time for making even the desperate attempt which the recommendation of the Council indicated, was fixed upon.² In due season these scouts returned, and reported "that the enemy's (Americans') position on the right was such, and they had so many small parties out, that it would be impossible to move without the march being *immediately discovered*,"³ and the projected retreat, desperate as it was, and

¹ Minutes of Council of War, Oct. 12.—² Marshall, iii. p. 299; Anburey, i. pp. 460.—³ Note to Minutes of Council, Oct. 12; Anburey, i. p. 460; Testimony of Col. Kiugston, Question 93.

small as the required advantage (*four miles undisturbed march*) might have been, was abandoned.

During all this time the enemy's troops were supplied with short rations, and they had no rum or spruce-beer to deaden their sensibilities, but were compelled to lay continually upon their arms and submit to be cannonaded in every part, even rifle-balls and grape-shot coming into all parts of the camp.¹ On the thirteenth, an examination of the stores revealed the fact that but three days' supply of short rations remained,² and another Council of War, to which all the field-officers and captains commanding corps were invited, was held to consult on their situation and prospects.³

General Burgoyne laid before this Council the same information of his own and his opponent's condition which had been submitted to the general officers on the twelfth, with all the additional intelligence which he had subsequently received; and he stated that he was ready to undertake any enterprise which they might consider within their means, and to lead them in its execution. He added, "that he had reason to believe a capitulation had been in the contemplation of some, perhaps of all, who knew the real situation of things; that upon a circumstance of

such consequence to national and personal honor, he thought it a duty to his country, and to himself, to extend his council beyond the usual limits; that the assembly present might justly be esteemed a full representation of the army; and that he should think himself unjustifiable in taking any step in so serious a matter, without such a concurrence of sentiments as should make a treaty the act of the army, as well as that of the General." The first question, therefore, he desired them to decide was, "Whether an army of three thousand five hundred fighting men, well provided with artillery, was justifiable, upon the principles of national dignity and military honor, in capitulating in any possible situation?" The Council decided, unanimously, in the affirmative. The General then inquired, "Is the present situation of that nature?" and the Council decided, unanimously, "That the present situation justifies a capitulation upon honorable terms." The General immediately drew up a letter to General Gates,¹ inviting him to treat for a surrender, and having submitted the draft to the Council and received its unanimous approval,² the meeting adjourned, and the letter was forwarded to the American camp.³

On the following day (*October 14th*), the Council reassembled, and the Gen-

¹ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. pp. 461, 462; Serg. Lamb's Jour., p. 166; Test. of Earl of Balcarres, Ques. 64.—² Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20.

³ Gen. Burgoyne's dispatch, Oct. 20; Anburey, i. p. 463; De Riedesel's Mil. Mem., p. 152; Test. of Earl of Balcarres, Ques. 63.

¹ A copy of this draft of letter will be found appended to the minutes of the Council of War.

² Minutes of General Council of War, Oct. 13; Test. of Earl of Balcarres, Ques. 65, 66; De Riedesel's Mil. Mem., pp. 152, 154.—³ The particulars of the reception of this letter are given in Wilkinson, i. pp. 298–302.

eral laid before it the proposals of General Gates.¹ The sixth article, requiring the enemy to ground their arms in their encampment, was rejected as inadmissible in any extremity; and the answers of General Burgoyne to the propositions of General Gates,² and his own counter-propositions,³ were unanimously approved, when the Council again adjourned.⁴

On the fifteenth the Council reassembled a second time, when General Gates' answers to General Burgoyne's proposals⁵ were pronounced "satisfactory, and a sufficient ground for proceeding to a definitive treaty."⁶

The usual preliminary negotiations having been completed, it took but a very short time for the "*Commissioners*" from each army to draw up and submit the articles;⁷ but General Burgoyne frittered away the time,⁸ and even held a Council to determine if he was bound, in honor, to complete the Convention, *after the "preliminary articles" had been signed*, evidently hoping that successors would arrive from New York. The Council decided against the General's wish to retire from the Convention by

a vote of fourteen to eight,¹ considering such a withdrawal a breach of honor; yet the General persisted, and it was only after members of the Council had declared "that the posts were untenable," "that there would be considerable desertion," "that the Forty-seventh regiment could not be depended upon," "that the Sixty-second was disheartened and not equal to their former exertions," and "that the men generally seemed to have got the Convention in their heads as desirable," that he concluded to ratify and sign it.²

On the sixteenth of October the signatures were appended to the Convention,³ and on the seventeenth Colonel Wilkinson was directed to visit General Burgoyne, and accompany him to the green in front of old Fort Hardy, on the north bank of Fish Creek, near its intersection with the Hudson, where his army was to lay down its arms.⁴ They then crossed the creek, at General Burgoyne's request, and proceeded to the head-quarters of the American army. General Burgoyne, in full uniform, rode in front, with Major Kingston, his adjutant-general; Lord Petersham and Lieutenant Wilford, his aids-de-camp, followed; and then Generals Phillips, Riedesel, Hamilton, Skene, and Gall, with their suites, according to their rank. General Gates, having been informed of their approach, met them at

¹ A copy of Gen. Gates' proposals, at length, will be found in *Wilkinson's Mem.*, i. pp. 304, 305, and in *Stedman*, i. pp. 346, 347.—² General Burgoyne's answers will be found opposite the several proposals of Gen. Gates, in *Wilkinson*, i. pp. 304, 305, and in *Stedman*, i. pp. 346, 347.

³ Gen. Burgoyne's proposals will be found in *Wilkinson's Mem.*, i. pp. 306–308, and *Stedman*, i. pp. 347, 348.

⁴ Minutes of General Council of War, Oct. 14; Test. of Earl of Balcarres, Ques. 67, 68.—⁵ These answers are copied at length, opposite the several proposals, in *Wilkinson*, i. pp. 306–308, and *Stedman*, i. pp. 347, 348.

⁶ Minutes of General Council of War, Oct. 15.

⁷ Wilkinson, i. pp. 309, 310.—⁸ Riedesel's Military Memoirs, p. 158; Wilkinson, i. pp. 310–317.

¹ Riedesel's Mil. Mem., p. 157.—² Minutes of General Council of War, Oct. 16; Riedesel's Mil. Mem., pp. 157–160; Testimony of Earl of Balcarres, Ques. 69–73, 132.

³ The articles, as signed, are copied in full in Document IV.—⁴ Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. p. 321; Neilson's Burgoyne, p. 216.

the head of his camp. When General Burgoyne had come "within a sword's length" of General Gates he halted, and was introduced by Colonel Wilkinson, when he gracefully raised his hat, saying: "*The fortune of war, General Gates, has made me your prisoner;*" to which the General replied, "*I shall always be ready to bear testimony that it has not been through any fault of your Excellency.*" General Phillips, an old acquaintance of General Gates, next approached him, and after him the Baron Riedesel and other officers present were introduced.¹

At the appointed time the enemy's troops marched from their encampments to the green near old Fort Hardy, where they deposited their arms and emptied their cartridge-boxes;² when they were immediately re-formed, with the light-infantry in front, and passed through the American camp, under an escort of dragoons, the band at their head playing the popular tune of "Yankee Doodle."³ As the head of the procession approached the marquee of General Gates, that officer, in company with the general officers of both armies, who were able to be present, and their suites, passed out and took their position in front. Not a word was spoken, but, for a few minutes, each looked on the scene before him with such feelings as only those who had been interested could witness it.⁴

The conquered, from the haughty spirit and high-toned "proclamations" with which they had opened the campaign, were filled with mortification and distress; the victors, flushed with the advantage which this success would secure to themselves, their party, or their country, as one or other of these objects governed their actions, were anxious to reach the plunder, or other wished-for benefit; or, plotting with their associates, were devising other schemes of aggrandizement; or, honest in their devotion to their country and her cause, looked forward to the advantages which this success would secure to both, and thanked God for his goodness in securing it.

When the head of the procession reached the spot where the Generals stood, General Burgoyne stepped back, drew his sword, and, in the presence of both armies, presented it to General Gates, who received, but instantly returned it, in the most courteous manner,¹ and thus was the enemy formally surrendered into the hands of the representative of the United States.

The troops which were thus surrendered were, two lieutenant-generals, two major-generals, three brigadier-generals, two deputy adjtnt-generals, three assistant deputy quartermaster-generals, six aides, one secretary, five brigade-majors, one deputy judge-advocate-general, one surgeon-general, one deputy paymaster-general, one assistant com missary-general, one wagon-master, six

¹ Wilkinson, i. pp. 321, 322.—² The Sexagenary, or Reminiscences of the American Revolution (suppressed edition), pp. 111, 112.—³ The Sexagenary, p. 115; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 171.—⁴ The Sexagenary, p. 115.

¹ The Sexagenary, p. 115.

lieutenant-colonels, eleven majors, seventy-eight captains, one hundred and thirty lieutenants, forty-one ensigns, eight chaplains, six adjutants, five quartermasters, fourteen surgeons, thirteen surgeons'-mates, three hundred and eighty-nine sergeants, one hundred and ninety-seven musicians, and four thousand eight hundred and thirty-six privates, making a total of five thousand seven hundred and sixty-three.¹ The property surrendered embraced twenty-seven pieces of cannon, with implements and stores complete for the pieces, five thousand stands of arms, great quantities of musket-cartridges, a number of ammunition-wagons, travelling-forges, &c.²

The success at Saratoga was soon followed by the evacuation of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and the power of the enemy in the North was prostrated. Of the effect of this victory it has been beautifully remarked, that "all over the land a shout of triumph went up, and from the furrows, and workshops, and marts of commerce; from the pulpit, from provincial halls of legislation, from partisan camps, and from the shattered ranks of the chief at White Marsh, it was echoed and re-

echoed. Toryism, which had begun to lift high its head, retreated behind the defence of inaction; the bills of Congress rose twenty per cent in value; capital came forth from its hiding-places; the militia readily obeyed the summons to the camp; and the great patriot heart of America beat strongly with pulsations of hope."¹

Nor was the effect of this victory on the cause of America less apparent in Europe than in America. In the British Parliament, the Earls Chatham, Temple, and Coventry, and the Duke of Richmond in the Lords; and Fox, Burke, and Barre in the House, led the opposition in a terrible onslaught against the Government; while the friends of America, throughout the country, took fresh courage, and manfully sustained her cause. On the continent, the American character and the American representatives were more respected, her calls for aid were more cheerfully responded to, and France, Spain, Holland, and even Russia and the Pope, manifested more interest in the ultimate success of her cause.

From that day the United States of America assumed a position among the nations of the earth, and the effect of the struggle of her people was felt throughout the whole world.

¹ Field Return of the British Forces which surrendered to the arms of the United States, at Saratoga, Oct. 17, 1777.

² Return of Ordnance and Stores taken, signed "EBEN-EZER STEPHENS, Major commanding U. S. Artillery."

¹ Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 83.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

COL. WILKINSON'S LETTER TO COL. VISSCHER,
RESPECTING THE ACTION SEPT. 19.

CAMP FOUR MILES ABOVE STILLWATER, }
September 20, 1777. }

DEAR SIR:—General Gates being extremely hurried, has desired me to answer your letter of this day. The committee have his hearty thanks for their attention paid to the wounded. The wagons they have sent on will meet them at Stillwater, to which place they have been sent in boats. The General is sensible that the committee will afford the director-general, Dr. Potts, every assistance in their power, whose care and attention to those unfortunate brave men, deserves the highest credit.

Being yesterday informed by our reconnoitering parties that the enemy had struck their camp, and were advancing towards our left, the General detached Colonel Morgan's light corps to examine their direction and harass their advance. This party, at halfpast twelve, fell in with a picket of the enemy, which they immediately drove, and, after a brisk fire, were beat back by a strong reinforcement. This skirmish drew a regiment from our camp, and the main body of the enemy to support the action, which, after a short cessation, was renewed with double ardor, and continued incessant till the close of the day, when our men retired to camp and the enemy a small distance in rear of the field. The succor which we occasionally detached, amounted to eleven Continental and two militia regiments. I have not yet obtained a return, but have reason to believe that our killed do not exceed eighty, and that the missing and wounded do not amount to two hundred. The concurrent testimony of the prisoners and deserters

of various characters, assures us that General Burgoyne, who commanded in person, was wounded in the left shoulder, that the Sixty-second regiment was cut to pieces, and that the enemy suffered extremely in every quarter where they were engaged. As General Burgoyne's situation will shortly constrain him to a decisive action, reinforcements should be immediately pushed forward to our assistance, as our numbers are far from being equal to an insurance of victory, and every bosom must anticipate the consequences of a defeat. The enemy have quietly licked their sores this day.

The news of the taking of Ticonderoga is corroborated by several prisoners, and as an attack was designed on that post, I am inclined to believe it.

I am, dear sir, &c.,

JAMES WILKINSON.

Col. MATT. VISSCHER.

II.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GATES TO THE HONORABLE JOHN HANCOCK, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS, DATED, "CAMP HEIGHTS ABOVE BEHMAN'S, SEPT. 22, 1777," RESPECTING THE ACTION SEPT. 19.

Friday morning I was informed by my reconnoitering parties, that the enemy had struck their camp, and were removing towards our left. I immediately detached Colonel Morgan's corps, consisting of the rifle regiment and light-infantry of the army, to observe their direction and harass their advance. This party, at half past twelve, fell in with a picket of the enemy which they immediately drove; but the enem

being reinforced, after a brisk conflict, they were in turn obliged to retire. This skirmish drew the main body of the enemy, and a brigade from my left, to support the action, which, after a short cessation, was renewed with great warmth and violence. At this instant, hearing from prisoners that the whole British force and a division of foreigners had engaged our party, I reinforced with four more regiments. This continued the action till the close of day, when both armies retired from the field.

Inclosed is a return of our loss, and I am well assured, by the concurrent testimony of prisoners and deserters of various characters, that General Burgoyne, who commanded in person, received a wound in his left shoulder—that the Sixty-second regiment was cut to pieces, and that the enemy suffered extremely in every quarter where they were engaged. The general good behavior of the troops, on this important occasion, cannot be surpassed by the most veteran army: to discriminate in praise of the officers would be injustice, as they all deserve the honor and applause of Congress. Lieutenant-colonel Colburn, and Lieutenant-colonel Adams, with the rest of the unfortunate brave, who fell in their country's cause, leave a lasting monument to their glory. The armies remain encamped within two miles of each other.

This instant I wrote to all the neighboring States, and pressingly demanded the immediate march of their militia. When proper reinforcements arrive, I hope to give your Excellency more interesting intelligence. Inclosed is a return of the army, which but barely equals that of the enemy.

III.

GENERAL JOHN GLOVER'S LETTER ON THE ACTION
OF OCTOBER 7TH.

CAMP THREE MILES ABOVE STILLWATER, }
October 9, 1777. }

DEAR GENERAL:—This will acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 29th ult., and will inform you, that on Tuesday last the enemy advanced from their right with a design to take post on

our left. Our scouts were drove in—they continued advancing.

Three regiments were ordered out, who met them a mile from our lines, a small eminence between them, each rushed hard for it—our troops gained it. The attack began at 4 o'clock, P. M., continued till dark, without any intermission, during which we drove them two miles, and at last entered their works sword in hand. In the action, and in their works, were taken two brass twelve-pounders and six six-pounders, three ammunition-wagons, about three hundred tents, a great quantity of baggage, with upwards of thirty horses, wagons, &c., &c.

It now became very dark, could not pursue them any farther, nor was it safe or practicable, the woods being very thick. We halted half a mile in the rear of them, there remained the whole night with our arms in our hands: not a man slept.

About four in the morning they began to move; we pushed till they were drove into their strong works on the river road; skirmishing parties were sent out the whole day; some prisoners taken, some killed and wounded on our side.

Among the wounded is the good Major-general Lincoln, shot through the leg; wish he may save it, but it is much doubted. The brave General Arnold was wounded in the action the day before.

As we have not been able to get in returns, cannot give you a particular account of our loss; however, it is very inconsiderable: I believe I may venture to say, not more than thirty killed, nor more than one hundred wounded.

The enemy's loss on Tuesday must be great. General Frazer wounded (since dead). Taken, three field-officers, six captains, ten subalterns, one quartermaster-general, one hundred and ninety privates. Taken in the hospital on Wednesday, about three hundred sick and wounded, with some medicines, two hundred barrels of flour, with many other articles. Besides these, upwards of one hundred now lay dead upon the ground, which we have not been able to bury.

Much honor is due to our officers and men, who fought like heroes.

The enemy began their retreat at about 11

o'clock at night, breaking up all the bridges, and otherwise spoiling the roads in their rear.

Thursday morning three hundred men, served with three days' provisions, began their march to hang on their left flank (the right being on the river), and two brigades on the river road in their rear, but could not proceed, as it set full of rain, and so continues. Shall push on immediately on its clearing up, when I hope to give you a farther account of them. Till then, I am your honor's most obedient servant,

JOHN GLOVER, *Brig.-Gen.*

October 10, nine o'clock.—Three thousand have already marched on their left flank; and our whole body is paraded, and will march immediately.

P. S.—10th, A. M.—This morning, symptoms much in favor of General Lincoln. I am in hopes he will save his leg.

The express heard a very heavy cannonade all the next day, while on his way hither.

IV.

GEN. GATES' DISPATCH TO CONGRESS, RESPECTING THE ACTION OF OCT. 7, AND THE SURRENDER OF GEN. BURGOYNE.

CAMP SARATOGA, *October 18, 1777.*

SIR:—I have the satisfaction to present your Excellency with the convention of Saratoga, by which his Excellency Lieutenant-general Burgoyne has surrendered himself and his whole army into my hands, and they are now upon their march for Boston. This signal and important event is the more glorious, as it was effected with so little loss to the United States army.

This letter will be presented to your Excellency by my adjutant-general, Colonel Wilkinson, to whom I must beg leave to refer your Excellency for the particulars that brought this great business to so happy and fortunate conclusion.

I desire to be permitted to recommend this gallant officer, in the warmest manner to Congress; and entreat that he may be continued in

his present office, with the brevet of a brigadier-general.

The honorable Congress will believe me when I assure them, that from the beginning of this contest, I have not met with a more promising military genius than Colonel Wilkinson, and whose services have been of the last importance to this army.

I have the honor to be your Excellency's most obedient and humble servant,

HORATIO GATES.

His Excellency, JOHN HANCOCK, Esq., }
President of Congress. }

—
(INCLOSURE.)

Articles of Convention between Lieutenant-general Burgoyne and Major-general Gates.

I.

The troops under Lieutenant-general Burgoyne to march out of their camp, with the honors of war and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of the river, where the old fort stood, where the arms and artillery are to be left; the arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers.

II.

A free passage to be granted to the army under Lieutenant-general Burgoyne to Great Britain, on condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest; and the port of Boston is assigned for the entry of transports to receive the troops, whenever General Howe shall so order.

III.

Should any cartel take place, by which the army under General Burgoyne, or any part of it may be exchanged, the foregoing article to be void, as far as such exchange be made.

IV.

The army under Lieutenant-general Burgoyne to march to Massachusetts Bay by the easiest, most expeditious, and convenient route, and to be quartered in, near, or as convenient as possible to Boston, that the march of the troops may

not be delayed when transports arrive to receive them.

v.

The troops to be supplied on their march, and during their being in quarters, with provisions, by General Gates' orders, at the same rate of rations as the troops of his own army; and, if possible, the officers' horses and cattle are to be supplied with forage at the usual rates.

vi.

All officers to retain their carriages, bat-horses and other cattle, and no baggage to be molested or searched; Lieutenant-general Burgoyne giving his honor that there are no public stores secreted therein. Major-general Gates will of course take the necessary measures for the due performance of this article. Should any carriages be wanted during the march for the transportation of officers' baggage, they are, if possible, to be supplied by the country at the usual rates.

vii.

Upon the march, and during the time the army shall remain in quarters in Massachusetts Bay, the officers are not, as far as circumstances will admit, to be separated from their men. The officers are to be quartered according to rank, and are not to be hindered from assembling their men for roll-call, and other necessary purposes of regularity.

viii.

All corps whatever, of General Burgoyne's army, whether composed of sailors, bateaumen, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army, of whatever country, shall be included in the fullest sense and the utmost extent of the above articles, and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.

ix.

All Canadians, and persons belonging to the Canadian establishment, consisting of sailors, bateaumen, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and many other followers of the army, who come under no particular description, are to be permitted to return there: they are to be conducted immediately, by the shortest route, to

the first British post on Lake George, are to be supplied with provisions in the same manner as the other troops, and are to be bound by the same condition of not serving during the present contest in North America.

x.

Passports to be immediately granted for three officers, not exceeding the rank of captains, who shall be appointed by Lieutenant-general Burgoyne, to carry dispatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and to Great Britain, by the way of New York; and Major-general Gates engages the public faith that these dispatches shall not be opened. These officers are to set out immediately after receiving their dispatches, and are to travel the shortest route and in the most expeditious manner.

xi.

During the stay of the troops in Massachusetts Bay the officers are to be admitted on parole, and are to be allowed to wear their side-arms.

xii.

Should the army under Lieutenant-general Burgoyne find it necessary to send for their clothing and other baggage, to Canada, they are permitted to do it in the most convenient manner, and the necessary passports granted for that purpose.

xiii.

These articles are to be mutually signed and exchanged to-morrow morning, at 9 o'clock, and the troops under Lieutenant-general Burgoyne are to march out of their intrenchments at three o'clock in the afternoon.

HORATIO GATES, *Maj.-Gen.*
J. BURGOYNE, *Lieut.-Gen.*

SARATOGA, October 16, 1777.

To prevent any doubts that might arise from Lieutenant-general Burgoyne's name not being mentioned in the above treaty, Major-general Gates hereby declares that he is understood to be comprehended in it as fully as if his name had been specifically mentioned.

HORATIO GATES.

V.

GEN. BURGOYNE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

ALBANY, October 20, 1777.

MY LORD:—No possibility of communication with your lordship having existed since the beginning of September, at which time my last dispatch was sent away, I have to report to your lordship the proceedings of the army under my command from that period; a series of hard toil, incessant effort, stubborn action; till disabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians; the desertion or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, some individuals excepted; disappointed in the last hope of any timely co-operation from other armies; the regular troops reduced by losses from the best part to three thousand five hundred fighting men, not two thousand of which were British; only three days' provisions upon short allowance in store; invested by an army of sixteen thousand men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into council all the generals, field-officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major-general Gates.

Your lordship will see, by the papers transmitted herewith, the disagreeable prospect which attended the first overtures; and when the terms concluded are compared, I trust that the spirit of the councils I have mentioned, which under such circumstances dictated, instead of submitting, will not be refused a share of credit.

Before I enter upon the detail of these events, I think it a duty of justice, my lord, to take upon myself the measure of having passed the Hudson's River, in order to force a passage to Albany. I did not think myself authorized to call any men into council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders and the season of the year admitted no alternative.

Provisions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the other necessary stores prepared, and the bridge of boats completed, the army passed the Hudson's River on the 13th and 14th of September; and encamped on the

heights and in the plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighborhood of Stillwater.

15th.—The whole army made a movement forward, and encamped in a good position in a place called Dovacote.

16th.—It being found that there were several bridges to repair, that work was begun under cover of strong detachments, and the same opportunity was taken to reconnoitre the country.

17th.—The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon advantageous ground about four miles from the enemy.

18th.—The enemy appeared in considerable force to obstruct the further repair of bridges, and with a view, as was conceived, to draw on an action where artillery could not be employed; a small loss was sustained in skirmishing, but the work of the bridges was effected.

19th.—The passages of a great ravine, and other roads towards the enemy, having been reconnoitred, the army advanced in the following order.

Brigadier-general Frazer's corps, sustained by Lieutenant-colonel Breyman's corps, made a circuit, in order to pass the ravine commodiously, without quitting the heights, and afterwards to cover the march of the line to the right. These corps moved in three columns, and had the Indians, Canadians, and Provincials upon their fronts and flanks. The British line, led by me in person, passed the ravine in a direct line south, and formed in order of battle as fast as they gained the summit, where they waited, to give time to Frazer's corps to make the circuit, and to enable the left wing and artillery, which, under the commands of Major-general Phillips and Major-general Riedesel, kept the great road and meadows near the river in two columns, and had bridges to repair, to be equally ready to proceed. The Forty-seventh regiment guarded the bateaux.

The signal-guns, which had been previously settled to give notice of all the columns being ready to advance, having been fired between one and two o'clock, the march continued. The scouts and flankers of the column of the British line were soon fired upon from small parties, but with no effect. After about an hour's march, the pickets, which made the advanced guard of

that column, were attacked in force, and obliged to give ground, but they soon rallied and were sustained.

On the first opening of the wood I formed the troops. A few cannon-shot dislodged the enemy at a house from whence the pickets had been attacked, and Brigadier-general Frazer's corps had arrived with such precision in point of time, as to be found upon a very advantageous height on the right of the British.

In the mean time, the enemy, not acquainted with the combination of the march, had moved in great force out of their intrenchments, with a view of turning the line upon the right, and being checked by the disposition of Brigadier-general Frazer, countermarched, in order to direct their great effort to the left of the British.

From the nature of the country, movements of this sort, however near, may be effected without a possibility of their being discovered.

About three o'clock, the action began by a very vigorous attack on the British line, and continued with great obstinacy till after sunset. The enemy being continually supplied with fresh troops, the stress lay upon the Twentieth, Twenty-first, and Sixty-second regiments, most parts of which were engaged near four hours, without intermission; the Ninth had been ordered early in the day to form in reserve.

The grenadiers and Twenty-fourth regiment were some part of the time brought into action, as were part of the light-infantry, and all these corps charged with their usual spirit.

The riflemen, and other parts of Breyman's corps, were also of service, but it was not thought advisable to evacuate the heights, where Brigadier-general Frazer was posted, otherwise than partially and occasionally.

Major-general Phillips, upon first hearing the firing, found his way through a difficult part of the wood to the scene of action, and brought up with him Major Williams and four pieces of artillery, and from that moment I stood indebted to that gallant and judicious second, for incessant and most material services, particularly for restoring the action in a point which was critically pressed by a great superiority of fire, and to which he led up the Twentieth regiment, at the utmost personal hazard.

Major-general Riedesel exerted himself to bring up a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to charge the enemy with regularity and bravery.

Just as the light closed the enemy gave ground on all sides, and left us completely masters of the field of battle, with the loss of about five hundred men on their side, and, as supposed, thrice that number wounded.

The darkness preventing a pursuit, the prisoners were few.

The behavior of the officers and men, in general, was exemplary. Brigadier-general Frazer took his position, in the beginning of the day, with great judgment, and sustained the action with constant presence of mind and vigor. Brigadier-general Hamilton was the whole time engaged, and acquitted himself with great honor, activity, and good conduct. The artillery in general was distinguished, and the brigade under Captain Jones, who was killed in the action, was conspicuously so.

The army lay upon their arms the night of the 19th, and the next day took a position nearly within cannon-shot of the enemy, fortifying their right and extending their left to the brow of the heights, so as to cover the meadows through which the great river runs, and where their bateaux and hospitals were placed. The Forty-seventh regiment, the regiment of Hesse Hanau, and a corps of provincials, encamped in the meadows, as a further security.

It was soon found that no fruits (honor excepted) were attained by the preceding victory, the enemy working with redoubled ardor to strengthen their left; their right was already unattackable.

On our side it became expedient to erect strong redoubts, for the protection of the magazines and hospital, not only against a sudden attack, but also for their security, in case of a march to turn the enemy's flank.

Sept. 21.—A messenger arrived from Sir Harry Clinton, with a letter in cypher, informing me of his intention to attack Fort Montgomery in about ten days from the date of his letter, which was the 12th instant. This was the only messenger of many that I apprehend were dispatched by Sir William Howe and him, that had reached

my camp since the beginning of August. He was sent back the same night to inform Sir Harry of my situation, and of the necessity of a diversion, to oblige General Gates to detach from his army, and my intention to wait favorable events in that position, if possible, to the 12th of October.

In the course of the two following days, two officers in disguise, and other confidential persons, were dispatched by different routes, with verbal messages to the same effect, and I continued fortifying my camp, and watching the enemy, whose numbers increased every day.

I thought it advisable, on the 3d of October, to diminish the soldiers' rations, in order to lengthen out the provisions, to which measure the army submitted with the utmost cheerfulness. The difficulties of a retreat to Canada were clearly foreseen, as was the dilemma, should the retreat be effected, of leaving at liberty such an army as General Gates' to operate against Sir William Howe.

This consideration operated forcibly to determine me to abide events as long as possible, and I reasoned thus:—the expedition I commanded was evidently meant at first to be hazarded; circumstances might require it should be devoted; a critical junction of Mr. Gates' force with Mr. Washington might possibly decide the fate of the war; the failure of my junction with Sir Harry Clinton, or the loss of my retreat to Canada, could only be a partial misfortune.

In this situation things continued till the seventh, when, no intelligence having been received of the expected co-operation, and four or five days for our limited stay in the camp only remained, it was judged advisable to make a movement to the enemy's left, not only to discover whether there were any possible means of forcing a passage, should it be necessary to advance, or dislodging him, for the convenience of a retreat, but also to cover a forage of the army, which was in the greatest distress, on account of the scarcity.

A detachment of fifteen hundred regular troops, with two twelve-pounders, two howitzers, and six six-pounders, were ordered to move, and were commanded by myself, having with

me Major-general Phillips, Major-general Riedesel, and Brigadier-general Frazer.

The guard of the camp upon the heights was left to Brigadier-generals Hamilton and Specht, the redoubts and the plain to Brigadier-general Gall; and as the force of the enemy immediately in their front consisted of more than double their numbers, it was not possible to augment the corps that marched, beyond the numbers above stated.

I formed the troops within three quarters of a mile of the enemy's left, and Captain Frazer's rangers, with Indians and provincials, had orders to go by secret paths in the woods to gain the enemy's rear, and by showing themselves there, to keep them in check.

The further operations intended were prevented by a very sudden and rapid attack of the enemy on our left, where the British grenadiers were posted to support the left wing of the line. Major Ackland, at the head of them, sustained the attack with great resolution; but the enemy's great numbers enabling them in a few minutes to extend the attack along the front of the Germans, which were immediately on the right of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be removed to make a second line to the flank, where the stress of the fire lay. The right was at this time engaged, but it was soon observed that the enemy was marching a large corps around their flank, to endeavor cutting off their retreat. The light-infantry, and part of the Twenty-fourth regiment, which were at that post, were therefore ordered to form a second line, and to secure the return of the troops into camp. While this movement was proceeding, the enemy pushed a fresh and strong reinforcement to renew the action upon the left, which, overpowered by a great superiority, gave way, and the light-infantry and Twenty-fourth regiment were obliged to make a quick movement to save that point from being entirely carried, in doing which Brigadier-general Frazer was mortally wounded.

The danger to which the lines were exposed being by this time of the most serious nature, orders were given to Major-general Phillips and Riedesel to cover the retreat, while such troops as were most ready for the purpose, returned

for the defence of them. The troops retreated, hard pressed, but in good order; they were obliged to leave six pieces of cannon, all the horses having been killed, and most of the artillery-men, who had behaved as usual with the utmost bravery, under the command of Major Williams, being either killed or wounded.

The troops had scarcely entered the camp when it was stormed with great fury, the enemy rushing to the lines under a severe fire of grape-shot and small-arms. The post of the light-infantry, under Lord Balcarras, assisted by some of the line, which threw themselves by order into the intrenchments, was defended with great spirit, and the enemy, led on by General Arnold, was finally repulsed, and the General wounded; but, unhappily, the intrenchments of the German reserve, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Breyman, who was killed, were carried, and although ordered to be recovered, they never were so, and the enemy by that misfortune gained an opening on our right and rear. The night put an end to the action.

Under the disadvantages thus apparent in our situation, the army was ordered to quit the present position during the night, and take post upon the heights above the hospital.

Thus, by an entire change of front, to reduce the enemy to form a new disposition.

This movement was effected in great order and without loss, though all the artillery and camp were moved at the same time. The army continued offering battle to the enemy, in their new position, the whole day of the 8th.

Intelligence was now received that the enemy were marching to turn the right, and no means could prevent that measure but retiring towards Saratoga. The army began to move at nine o'clock at night, Major-general Riedesel commanding the van-guard, and Major-general Phillips the rear.

This retreat, though within musket-shot of the enemy, and encumbered with all the baggage of the army, was made without loss, but a very heavy rain, and the difficulties of guarding the bateaux, which contained all the provisions, occasioned delays, which prevented the army reaching Saratoga till the night of the 9th, and

the artillery could not pass the fords of the Fishkill till the morning of the 10th.

At our arrival near Saratoga, a corps of the enemy, between five and six hundred, were discovered throwing up intrenchments on the heights, but retired over a ford of the Hudson's River at our approach, and joined a body posted to oppose our passage there.

It was judged proper to send a detachment of artificers, under a strong escort, to repair the bridges, and open a road to Fort Edward on the west side of the river. The Forty-seventh regiment, Captain Frazer's marksmen, and MacKoy's provincials, were ordered for that service, but the enemy appearing on the heights of the Fishkill in great force, and making a disposition to pass and give us battle, the Forty-seventh regiment and Frazer's marksmen were recalled; the provincials, left to cover the workmen at the first bridge, ran away upon a very slight attack of a small party of the enemy, and left the artificers to escape as they could, without a possibility of their performing any work.

During these different movements, the bateaux with provisions were frequently fired upon from the opposite side of the river, and some of them were lost, and several men were killed and wounded in those which remained.

October 11th.—The attacks upon the bateaux were continued; several were taken and retaken, but their situation being much nearer to the main force of the enemy than to ours, it was found impossible to secure the provisions any otherwise than by landing them and carrying them up on the hill: this was effected under fire, and with great difficulty.

The possible means of farther retreat were now considered in councils of war—composed of the general officers—minutes of which will be transmitted to your lordship.

The only one that seemed at all practicable was by a night march to gain Fort Edward, with the troops carrying their provision upon their backs: the impossibility of repairing bridges putting a conveyance of artillery and carriages out of the question, it was proposed to force the ford at Fort Edward or the ford above it. Before this attempt could be made, scouts returned

with intelligence that the enemy were intrenched opposite these fords, and possessed a camp in force, on the high ground between Fort Edward and Fort George, with cannon. They had also parties down the whole shore to watch our motions, and posts so near to us, upon our own side of the water, as must prevent the army moving a single mile undiscovered.

The bulk of the enemy's army was hourly joined by new corps of militia and volunteers, and their numbers together amounted to upwards of sixteen thousand men. Their position, which extended three parts in four of a circle round us, was, from the nature of the ground, unattackable in all parts.

In this situation the army took the best position possible and fortified, waiting till the 13th, at night, in the anxious hope of succors from our friends, or the next desirable expectation, an attack from our enemy.

During this time the men lay continually upon their arms, and were cannonaded in every part: even rifle-shot and grape-shot came into all parts of the line, though without any considerable effect.

At this period an exact account of the provisions was taken, and the circumstances stated in the opening of this letter became complete.

The council of war was extended to all the field-officers and captains commanding corps of the army, and the event ensued, which I am sure was inevitable, and which, I trust, in that situation was honorable, but which it would be superfluous and melancholy to repeat.

After the execution of the treaty, General Gates drew together the force that had surrounded my position, and I had the consolation to have as many witnesses as I have men under my command, of its amounting to the numbers mentioned above.

During the events stated above, an attempt was made against Ticonderoga, by an army assembled under Major-general Lincoln, who found means to march with a considerable corps from Huberton undiscovered, while another column of his force passed the mountains between Skeneborough and Lake George, and on the morning of the 18th September, a sudden and general attack was made upon the carrying

place at Lake George, Sugar Hill, Ticonderoga, and Mount Independence. The sea officers commanding the armed sloop stationed to defend the carrying place, as also some of the officers commanding at the posts of Sugar Hill and at the Portage, were surprised, and a considerable part of four companies of the Fifty-third regiment were made prisoners; a blockhouse, commanded by Lieutenant Lord of the Fifty-third, was the only post on that side that had time to make use of their arms, and they made a brave defence till cannon, taken from the surprised vessel, was brought against them.

After stating and lamenting so fatal a want of vigilance, I have to inform your lordship of the satisfactory events which followed.

The enemy having twice summoned Brigadier-general Powell, and received such answer as became a gallant officer intrusted with so important a post, and having tried during the course of four days several attacks, and being repulsed in all, retreated without having done any considerable damage. Brigadier-general Powell, from whose report to me I extract this relation, gives great commendations to the regiment of Prince Frederick and the other troops stationed at Mount Independence. The Brigadier also mentions with great applause the behavior of Captain Taylor, of the Twenty-first regiment, who was accidentally there on his route to the army from the hospital, and Lieutenant Beecroft, of the Twenty-fourth regiment, who with the artificers in arms defended an important battery.

On the 24th instant the enemy, enabled by the capture of the gun-boats and bateaux, which they had made after the surprise of the sloop, to embark upon Lake George, attacked Diamond Island in two divisions.

Captain Aubrey, and two companies of the Forty-seventh regiment, had been posted at that island, from the time the army passed the Hudson River, as a better situation for the security of the stores at the south end of Lake George than Fort George, which is on the continent, and not tenable against artillery and numbers. The enemy were repulsed by Captain Aubrey, with great loss, and pursued by the gun-boats under his command to the east shore,

where two of their principal vessels were retaken, together with all the cannon. They had just time to set fire to the other bateaux, and retreated over the mountains.

I beg leave to refer your lordship for further particulars to my aid-de-camp, Lord Petersham, and I humbly take occasion to recommend to His Majesty's notice that nobleman, as one endued with qualities to do important services to his country in every station to which his birth may lead. In this late campaign, in particular, his behavior has been such as to entitle him to the fullest applause, and I am confident his merit will be thought a sufficient ground for preferment, though deprived of the eclat and sort of claim which generally attends the delivery of fortunate dispatches.

I have only to add, my lord, a general report of the killed and wounded; I do not give it correct, the hurry of the time and the separation of the corps having rendered it impossible to make it so. The British officers have bled profusely and most honorably; those who remain unwounded, have been equally forward, and the general officers, from the mode of fighting, have been more exposed than in other services.

Among the rest of this station, I have had my escapes. It depends upon the sentence His Majesty shall pass upon my conduct; upon the judgment of my profession, and of the impartial and respectable parts of my country, whether I am to esteem them blessings or misfortunes.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
J. BURGOYNE.

VI.

LETTER FROM GENERAL BURGOYNE TO LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

[Private, by Lord Petersham.]

ALBANY, October 20, 1777.

MY LORD:—I have little to add to my public letter respecting the course of unsuccessful events therein detailed. I rest my confidence in the justice of the King and his councils, to support the General they thought proper to appoint to as arduous an undertaking, and under as posi-

tive a direction as perhaps a cabinet ever framed. It will, I am sure, be remembered, my lord, that a preference of exertions was the only latitude given to me, and that to force a junction with Sir William Howe, or at least a passage to Albany, was the principle, the letter, and the spirit of my orders. Indeed, the appearances at the time I passed the Hudson's River, though subject to doubt in some instances, as I then wrote your lordship, were, upon a general view, such as I am persuaded would have rendered inaction censurable, had my orders, instead of being peremptory, been discretionary. Promises of the professing loyalists were not then brought to the test; the spirit of the enemy, in combat against regular British troops, had only been tried at Ticonderoga, at Huberton, at Skeneborough, and Fort Anne, in all which places it had failed; the total disappointment of effectual co-operation could not be foreseen or supposed; and sure I am, had I then made supposition that any thing like what has happened, might have happened, and remained cautiously posted, no exertion attempted, my conduct would have been held indefensible by every class and distinction of men in government, in the army, and in the public.

The expediency of advancing being admitted, the consequences have been honorable misfortunes. The British have persevered in a strenuous and bloody progress. Had the force been all British, perhaps the perseverance had been longer; but as it was, will it be said, my lord, that in the exhausted situation described, and in the jaws of famine, and invested by quadruple numbers, a treaty which saves the army to the State, for the next campaign, was not more than could have been expected. I call it saving the army, because if sent home, the State is thereby enabled to send forth the troops now destined for her internal defence; if exchanged, they become a force to Sir William Howe, as effectually as if any other junction had been made.

I should now hold myself unjustifiable if I did not confide to your lordship my opinion, upon a near inspection, of the rebel troops.

The standing corps, which I have seen, are disciplined. I do not hazard the term, but ap-

ply it to the great fundamental points of military institution, sobriety, subordination, regularity, and courage. The militia are inferior in method and movement, but not a jot less serviceable in woods. My conjectures were very different after the affair of Ticonderoga, but I am convinced they were delusive; and it is a duty to the State to confess it.

The panic of the rebel troops is confined, and of short duration; the enthusiasm is extensive and permanent.

It is a justice to Major-general Phillips to inform your lordship, that when the crisis of our situation at Saratoga arrived, he very handsomely offered to hazard his person by making a circuit through the woods, and attempt to throw himself into Ticonderoga, to defend that place, should it be the object of the enemy to endeavor the retaking it.

In regard to myself, I am sunk in mind and body; but while I have a faculty of either, it shall be exerted for the King's service. I shall wait in the neighborhood of Boston the orders of Sir William Howe.

I have the honor to be, &c., &c.,
J. BURGOYNE.

VII.

MAJOR-GENERAL HORATIO GATES.

Horatio Gates was born in England in 1729. He entered the army at an early age, was aid to General Monekton at the capture of Martinico, and was with General Braddock at the time of his defeat, in 1755, where he received a severe wound. He appears to have settled in Virginia after the peace, and there he became acquainted with many of the leading spirits of revolutionary America.

When the Continental establishment was organized, in 1775, he was appointed Adjutant-general with the rank of Brigadier-general, and in that capacity he accompanied General Washington to Cambridge, when he went to that place to assume the command of the army. In June, 1776, he was promoted to the office of Major-general, and the command of the army

in Canada was given to him. His conduct while in that department was not approved, either by Congress or the commander-in-chief, and, after the enemy had returned to winter quarters, in the fall of that year, he joined the main army in the Jerseys.

Having joined his political fortunes with those of the notorious members of "The Conway Cabal," through their influence he superseded General Schuyler in the command of the Northern army, and reaped the honors, in the capture of General Burgoyne, which the good judgment and herculean labors of General Schuyler, the terrible bravery of General Arnold, and the brilliant efforts of Colonel Morgan, had entitled them to enjoy.

Becoming an open and malignant opponent of General Washington, he co-operated with Generals Charles Lee, Thomas Conway, Thomas Mifflin, and others of that party, to displace him from the chief command; and for the purpose of carrying out these designs more effectually, his confederates in the Continental Congress placed him at the head of the Board of War—a post which he did not hesitate to use for the promotion of his unholy desires.

After the defeat of General Lincoln, in 1780, he was ordered to assume the command of the army in the South. His military friends appear to have anticipated the result; and the able, but erratic Charles Lee, is said to have remarked, that "*his Northern laurels would be exchanged for Southern willows.*" Their surmises were speedily realized; and the disastrous defeat of his army by Lord Cornwallis, near Camden, within two months after he assumed the command, at once paralyzed the Americans and deprived him of his laurels. On the third of December, in the same year, he was succeeded by General Greene, whose brilliant abilities were rendered more glorious by their contrast with the inefficiency of his more noisy predecessor.

After an investigation by Congress he was restored to the line of the army, but he never recovered any portion of the laurels which he had lost.

At the close of the war he returned to his estate in Virginia, where he remained until

1790. In that year, having emancipated his slaves, and provided for the support of such of them as were unable to support themselves, he removed to the city of New York, where, on Rose Hill, near the corner of East Twenty-third street and the Second Avenue, he spent the remainder of his days. He died on the tenth of April, 1806, aged seventy-eight years.

He was an accomplished scholar, and his manners were marked with great politeness. While his social qualities and extreme benevolence made him a good neighbor and a warm friend, his vanity misled his judgment, and often perverted the finer and better feelings of his nature. He left no issue, but his widow survived him about four years.

CHAPTER XXVI.

September 20, 1777.

THE MASSACRE AT PAOLI.

THE action at Brandywine produced nothing but an empty victory for the enemy.¹ Retiring to Chester, on the evening of the battle, and to Germantown the next day,² after allowing his men but a single day for repose,³ General Washington retraced his steps across the Schuylkill, and advanced to meet the enemy.⁴ Taking the Lancaster road, on the sixteenth of September, the advance guards of the two armies met near the Warren Tavern, about twenty-three miles from Philadelphia.⁵ The advance of the American army, led by General Wayne, immediately commenced the action with all the impetuosity which characterized its gallant commander,⁶ but a heavy shower of rain coming on, the combatants were reluctantly compelled to separate;⁷ and the Americans retired, first, to the Yellow Springs, and, subsequently, to the east side of the Schuylkill, to enable them to repair their damaged firelocks,

to obtain a fresh supply of ammunition, and to revive the spirits of the army.¹

Before crossing the Schuylkill the General detached General Wayne, with fifteen hundred men and four pieces of cannon, to annoy the enemy's rear, and to attempt to cut off his baggage-train;² at the same time ordering General Smallwood, who was advancing with eleven hundred and fifty Maryland militia, and Colonel Gist, who was also leading seven hundred men, to unite their forces with General Wayne's, and act under his orders.³

At this time the enemy laid near the Tredyffrin meeting-house,⁴ and General Wayne, by a secret march, occupied a secluded spot, about three miles southwest from his lines.⁵ It is now "about a quarter of a mile from the highway, east of the Westchester railway (which connects with the Columbia railway, near 'the Paoli'), a mile south of the Warren Tavern, on the Lancaster turnpike, and a little more than two miles

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 312.—² Vide page 277.

³ Sparks' Washington, p. 236.—⁴ Gordon, ii. p. 514.

⁵ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 385.

⁶ Bell's Anniversary Address at the Paoli, Sept. 20, 1830.

⁷ Gen. Washington to Congress, Sept. 23.

¹ Marshall, iii. pp. 163, 164.—² Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, Sept. 19.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Bell's Anniversary Address; Marshall, iii. p. 165.

⁵ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10.

southwest from the Paoli Tavern;¹ but, at the time of "the massacre," no public road passed near the position; the country in every direction, but especially towards the enemy, was difficult of access; and the dense forest by which he was surrounded served to conceal him from straggling parties of the enemy who might pass that way.²

What nature, and the care of General Wayne,³ had done to secure the detachment, was frustrated by the treachery of loyalists residing in the neighborhood.⁴

No sooner had General Wayne occupied the position than it was made known to General Howe, and guides were tendered to conduct an expedition, should one be ordered to cut him off.⁵ Preparations were immediately made for this purpose, the Second light-infantry, and the Forty-second and Forty-fourth regiments being detached for the purpose, and Major-general Grey assigned to the command.⁶ Information of the intended attack was conveyed to General Wayne, between nine and ten o'clock in the evening, by a Mr. Jones, who had seen a boy belonging to Mr. Clayton,⁷ who had come from the enemy's camp, but the story

seemed so improbable that its correctness was seriously questioned; nevertheless, General Wayne increased the number of his videttes and sentries, and took every conceivable precaution to prevent a surprise.¹

Conducted by friendly Americans,² the enemy passed through by-paths and secret ways, so that his approach was not known until he had approached within a mile of the encampment, when the alarm was given, and he rushed forward,³ reaching the ground before the Americans, who had formed in column, ready to move,—with the light-infantry and First regiment, under General Wayne, as a covering party,—when the alarm was first given, had retired from their position.⁴ It appears that every thing was in readiness—the artillery had moved off; the covering party, under the command of General Wayne in person, had taken its position; the orders had been conveyed to Colonel Humpton, to move off "by the left and gain the road leading on the summit of the hill towards the White Horse;" and the column had actually been formed ready to move,—yet, "owing to some neglect or misapprehension" of Colonel Humpton, the column did not move until a second and third order had been given.⁵

This delay proved fatal. General

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 369.—² Bell's Anniversary Address.—³ It is well established that he posted sentries and pickets in every direction where they were thought necessary, and videttes patrolled the adjacent country.

⁴ Bell's Anniversary Address; Marshall, iii. p. 165; Day's Hist. Coll. of Penn., p. 214.—⁵ Gordon, ii. pp. 516, 517; Day's Historical Collections of Pennsylvania, p. 214.

⁶ Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 257; Gordon, ii. p. 517. Lieut. Hall (*Civil War*, p. 314) says the detachment embraced the 2d light-infantry, the 42d, 44th, 45th, and 55th regiments.

⁷ Gen. Wayne's Defence, Document I.

¹ Bell's Anniversary Address; Irving, iii. p. 216; Gen. Wayne's Defence, Document I.—² Bell's Anniversary Address.—³ Day's Hist. Coll. of Penn., p. 215; Gen. Wayne's Defence, Document I.—⁴ Gen. Wayne's Defence, Doc. I.

⁵ Ibid. Ramsay (*American Rev.*, ii. p. 18) and Mr. Bell suppose the enemy attacked the Americans while they were still in confusion, and Col. Humpton made this

Grey,—who had ordered his men to employ the bayonet only,¹ and, it is said, had also directed them to *give no quarter*,²—reached the ground while the troops were thus delayed.³ Colonel Humpton, and the troops under his command, immediately retreated, leaving General Wayne, with the covering party before referred to, and the Fourth regiment, under Colonel Butler, to oppose the enemy.⁴ With the greatest gallantry, worthy of the men and their leader, the uneven contest was maintained, until, from the force of numbers, the Americans were compelled to give way, which was done in comparative good order.⁵

The peculiarity of this affair is the savage cruelty with which it was attended, securing for it the distinctive title of "*The MASSACRE of Paoli*." It

has been always asserted and never denied, that many were killed with the utmost barbarity, after resistance on their part had ceased. "The cry for quarter was unheeded, and mercy knocked in vain at the hearts of men denominated Christians. The British bayonet did its work with unpitying ferocity, and the morning sun looked down from the pure heavens on a scene of butchery, the memory of which time itself has not effaced."¹

The enemy claims to have killed and wounded not less than three hundred on the spot, and of having taken not less than seventy to eighty prisoners, with the greater part of the arms belonging to the detachment, and eight wagon-loads of baggage and stores, at an expense of a captain and three men killed and four men wounded.²

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

GENERAL WAYNE'S DEFENCE BEFORE THE COURT-MARTIAL WHO INVESTIGATED HIS CONDUCT AT PAOLI.

After the expiration of five weeks, during which period the tongue of slander has not been

point a "charge" against Gen. Wayne before the court-martial to which the matter was referred. The defence of Gen. Wayne positively denies it, the court sustained the General, and it is fair to conclude that the evidence disproved the "charges."

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 314; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 257; Gordon, ii. p. 517; Stedman, ii. p. 294.

² Bell's Anniversary Address; Day's Hist. Coll. of Penn., p. 215; Lossing, ii. p. 370.

³ Gen. Wayne's Defence, Document I.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Bell's Anniversary Address; Marshall, iii. p. 166.

idle, I am happy to bring my case before a court, of whose honor and impartial judgment I cannot have the least doubt.

I shall not intrude on the patience of this court by any useless preface, but proceed to answer the charge.

The charge exhibited against me is, "That I had timely notice of the enemy's intention to attack the troops under my command on the night of the 20th of September, and notwithstanding

¹ Bell's Anniversary Address; Day's Historical Collections of Pennsylvania, p. 215.

² Gen. Howe to Lord Geo. Germain, Oct. 10; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 258; Stedman, i. p. 294. Lieut. Hall (Civil War, p. 314) states that three hundred *were killed*, and one hundred made prisoners. Gordon agrees with Gen. Howe. Gen. Wayne says (Marshall, iii. p. 166) his loss was about a hundred and fifty killed and wounded.

standing that intelligence, I neglected making any disposition until it was too late, either to annoy the enemy or make a retreat, without the utmost confusion."

The first part of the charge, that "I had timely notice of the enemy's intention to attack the troops under my command," is very readily answered.

I shall briefly notice what these gentlemen call a timely notice:—A Mr. Jones, an old gentleman, living near where we were encamped, came to my quarters between 9 and 10 o'clock at night, and informed me, before Colonels Hartley, Broadhead, and Temple, that a servant-boy, belonging to Mr. Clayton, had been taken by the enemy and liberated again, who said that he had heard some of their soldiers say that they intended to attack me that night. Although this could not be deemed *a sufficient notice*, on any military principle, yet I immediately ordered out a number of videttes, in addition to those already planted, with directions to patrol *all* the roads leading to the enemy's camp. I also planted two new pickets, the one in front, on a blind path leading from Warren to my camp; the other to the right, and in the rear, which made, on that night, not less than six different pickets. I had, exclusive of these, a horse picket, under Captain Stoddard, well advanced on the Swedesford road, being the very way the enemy marched that night. But the very first intelligence which I received of their advancing was from one of the very videttes which I sent out, in consequence of the *timely notice* from Mr. Jones, who had only *time* to go about a mile before he met the enemy. Immediately on his return, the troops were all ordered to form, having been warned to lay on their arms in the evening, for a purpose which I shall presently mention. At this time it was raining, and in order to save the cartridges from wet, I ordered the soldiers to put their cartouch-boxes under their coats. This, gentlemen, does not look like a surprise, it rather proves that we were prepared either to move off or act as the case might require, when once apprised which way the enemy were actually advancing. To have made any move previous to ascertaining that fact, might have been attended by fatal consequences,

or totally subversive of the views of the commander-in-chief. So soon as it was discovered that the enemy were pushing for our right, where our artillery was planted, Major Ryan carried my orders to Colonel Humpton, and to the division, to wheel by sub-platoons to the right, and to march off by the left, and gain the road leading on the summit of the hill towards the White Horse, it being the very road on which the division moved two miles the previous evening. The division wheeled accordingly, the artillery moved off, but owing to some neglect or misapprehension, which is not uncommon in Colonel Humpton, the troops did not move off until a second and third order were sent, although they were wheeled and faced for the purpose. At the very time this order for the retreat was first given, and which I presumed was obeyed, I took the light-infantry and First regiment and formed them on the right, and remained there with them and the horse in order to cover the retreat. If this was not making a disposition, I acknowledge I know not what *a disposition* is.

Those troops met and received the enemy with a spirit becoming free Americans, but were forced to give way to numbers. The neglect or misapprehension of Colonel Humpton had detained the division too long, otherwise the disposition would have been perfect. I was, in consequence, necessitated to form the Fourth regiment to receive the enemy and favor the retreat of the others; in this, Colonel Butler and the infantry of that regiment were concerned, and witnesses of. About three hundred yards in rear of that I again rallied, with such of the division as took the proper route; those who went a contrary way, and out of supporting distance, perhaps Colonel Humpton can give the best account of. Here I have a fair and ample field for recrimination, were I so disposed. I shall waive the subject, and beg leave to read the orders which I received from time to time from his Excellency General Washington.

In the eyes of gentlemen and officers, I trust that I stand justified for the part that I took on that night. I had the fullest and clearest advice that the enemy would march that morning at two o'clock for the river Schuylkill, and, in

consequence of this intelligence, I had reconnoitred a road leading immediately along the right flank of the enemy, in company with Colonels Humpton and Hartley, and had the men *laying* on their arms, to move (as soon as General Smallwood should arrive), not *from*, but *to* the enemy. For this purpose I had sent Colonel Chambers, as a guide, to conduct that officer into my rear; who, with his division, was expected to arrive every moment from two in the afternoon until we were attacked, at which time he was within a short distance of our rear, and retreated to the White Horse.

I shall just put a serious question or two, and then submit the matter to the decision of this court. Suppose, that after all these repeated orders from his Excellency, and the arrival of General Smallwood, I had retreated before I knew whether the enemy intended to attack me or not, and that they should have marched for the Schuylkill that morning, which they actually did, would not these very gentlemen have been the first to default me, for putting it out of my power to attack their rear? Would not his Excellency, with the greatest justice, have ordered me in arrest for cowardice and disobedience of his repeated, peremptory, and most pointed orders? Would not I have stood culpable in the eyes of the world? Would I not have justly merited immediate death or cashiering? I certainly would. What line could I follow but the one I trod? What more could be done on the occasion than what was done? The artillery, ammunition, &c., were covered and saved by a body of troops who were rallied and remained on the ground more than an hour after that gentleman, Colonel Humpton, the prosecutor, had effected his escape from *danger*, although, perhaps, not without *confusion*.

I hold it needless to say any more, or to take up the time of this court on the occasion. I rest my honor and character, which to me are more dear than life, in the hands of gentlemen, who, when deciding on my honor will not forget their own.

II.

GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

HEAD-QUARTERS, GERMANTOWN, Oct. 10, 1777.

MY LORD:—

* * * * *

The enemy crossed the Schuylkill on the 18th, above French Creek, and encamped upon the river on each side of Perkyomy Creek, having detached troops to all the fords of Schuylkill, with cannon at Swedesford and the fords below it.

Upon intelligence that General Wayne was lying in the woods with a corps of fifteen hundred men, and four pieces of cannon, about three miles distant, and in the rear of the left wing of the army, Major-general Grey was detached on the 20th, late at night, with the Second light-infantry, the Forty-second and Forty-fourth regiments, to surprise this corps.

The most effectual precaution being taken by the General to prevent his detachment from firing, he gained the enemy's left about one o'clock, and, having by the bayonet only, forced their out-sentries and pickets, he rushed in upon their encampment, directed by the light of their fires, killed and wounded not less than three hundred on the spot, taking between seventy and eighty prisoners, including several officers, the greater part of their arms, and eight wagons loaded with baggage and stores. Upon the first alarm the cannon were carried off, and the darkness of the night, only, saved the remainder of the corps. One captain of light-infantry and three men were killed in the attack, and four men wounded. Gallantry in the troops, and good conduct in the General, were fully manifested upon this critical service.

* * * * *

With most perfect respect,

I have the honor to be, &c.,

W. HOWE.

CHAPTER XXVII.

October 4, 1777.

THE BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN.

AFTER the battle of Brandywine, as has been stated already, General Washington retreated towards Philadelphia, and encamped near Germantown.¹ Measures were immediately taken to strengthen the army, both by calling in the services of the Continental troops, who were serving on distant stations, and by requisitions for the militia of Pennsylvania and the adjoining States;² while Congress, from the stress of circumstances, which had silenced the disaffection which prevailed in that body, delegated unusual powers to the commander-in-chief;³ and, unintentionally, furnished an opportunity to the illustrious object of its envious animosity to disprove, by his conduct, the truth of the insinuations which had been so industriously circulated to injure his reputation. In the mean time, after remaining at Germantown one day only, General Washington had recrossed the Schuylkill, taken the Lancaster road, which led to the position occupied by the left wing of the enemy, and offered to renew the battle.⁴ On the sixteenth of

September the two armies met, near Goshen, and the light troops were beginning to skirmish, when they were separated by a very heavy rain; and the ammunition of the American army having been damaged by the water, General Washington again retreated to the Yellow Springs, and, finally, passed the Schuylkill at Parker's Ford.¹ After a series of manœuvres, in which the respective commanders sought to obtain the advantage of his opponent, the enemy took possession of Philadelphia,² the American army not being in a condition which enabled it to offer any opposition.³

The occupation of Philadelphia by Sir William Howe, was immediately followed by the withdrawal of the fleet under Lord Howe from the Chesapeake, and his entrance into the Delaware, with the intention of attacking the works at Red Bank and Mnd Island, and of opening a communication between the army and the fleet.⁴ To aid in this undertaking, a body of troops

¹ Vide page 277. ² Marshall, iii. p. 158.—³ Journals of Cong., Wednesday, Sept. 17, 1777.—⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 162.

¹ Sparks' Washington, pp. 236, 237.

² Marshall, iii. pp. 167-172.—³ Ibid., pp. 169, 170.

⁴ Sparks' Washington, p. 238.

was detached, under Colonel Stirling,¹ the main body of the army being partly in the city and partly in Germantown.²

This situation of the enemy was observed by General Washington, and communicated to his general officers, who, without dissent, advised that a favorable opportunity was afforded to attack the camp at Germantown,³ and the morning of the fourth of October was chosen for that purpose.⁴

Germantown is an ancient village, six miles northwest from the city of Philadelphia;⁵ and, although so near the city, at the period of the Revolution, and even at this day, it maintains many of the characteristics which distinguished it a century ago.⁶ Having no lateral streets, the village formed one continued street for two miles, along which the substantial stone dwellings, stores, &c., were built, and, in many cases, still remain.⁷ At a considerable distance to

the eastward from the village, nearly parallel with the main street,—which, by a curve, it intersected at “the market-house,”—extended “*the Lime-kiln road* ;” and, still further east, extending in a similar direction, was “*the old York road*,” to both of which allusion will be made hereafter. Westward from the village, and also nearly parallel with the main street, flowed the Wissahiccon, and farther still the Schuylkill, while between the two extended “*the Manatawny road*,” which crossed the former stream at “*Van Deering’s Mill*,” and communicated with the village, at “the market-house,” by a continuation of “*the Lime-kiln road*,” which was here known as “*the School-house lane*.” It will be seen that the village could be approached from the north by either of these four roads—three of which met at “*the market-house*,” in the lower part of the village, while the fourth extended so near, that but a few minutes were required to pass over the intervening space between it and the main street.¹

The enemy’s camp was in the lower or southern part of the village, extending from the Schuylkill River on the left, along the School-house lane and the Lime-kiln road, crossing the main street of the village, nearly at right angles, where “*the market-house*” stood.² The left of the line, extending from the main street to the Schuylkill, was composed of seven British and three Hessian battalions, flanked by the Hessian

¹ Gen. Washington’s dispatch (*Document I.*) ; Gen. Sullivan’s letter to Pres. of N. Hampshire, Oct. 25 (*Document II.*) ; Gen. Howe’s dispatch, Oct. 10 (*Document III.*).

² Sparks’ Washington, p. 238.—³ Gen. Washington’s dispatch, Oct. 5 ; Gen. Sullivan’s letter, Oct. 25 ; Gen. Howe’s dispatch, Oct. 10.

⁴ Gen. Washington’s dispatch, Oct. 5. Although there was no difference of opinion respecting the propriety of the attack, it appears that the Council differed respecting the time when it should be made—Brig.-Gens. Smallwood, Wayne, Scott, Potter, and Irvine favoring an *immediate* attack, while Maj.-Gens. Sullivan, Greene, Stirling, Stephen, and Armstrong, and Brig.-Gens. McDougal, Knox, Muhlenberg, Nash, and Conway opposing such a movement until the reinforcements had arrived from Peekskill. Had the latter opinion prevailed, the result at Germantown might have been different.

⁵ Day’s Hist. Coll. of Penn., p. 593.—⁶ Lossing’s Field Book, ii. p. 313.—⁷ Day’s Hist. Coll. of Penr., p. 593 ; Lossing’s Field Book, ii. p. 313. Gen. Howe’s dispatch, Oct. 10.

¹ Map of the Battle at Germantown.

² Ibid. ; Gen. Howe’s dispatch, Oct. 10.

chasseurs, both mounted and dismounted, and commanded by Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, Major-generals Stirn and Grey, and Brigadier-general Agnew; the right of the line, extending eastward from the main street, to a wood about one mile from the town,¹ was composed of the corps of Guards, six regiments of British troops, and two squadrons of dragoons, flanked by the First battalion of light-infantry and the refugee corps of "Queen's American Rangers," commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, the command of the wing being vested in Generals Grant and Matthew.² General Howe, in person, commanded the whole, and made his quarters a short distance below the village, in the house of David Deshler.³

The American army was encamped near the Skippack Creek, fourteen miles distant from the enemy;⁴ and, about seven o'clock, on the evening of the third of October,⁵ the line of march was taken for the purpose of attacking the enemy's lines, in his camp at Germantown. The divisions commanded by Generals Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by the brigade under General Conway, was to enter the village at Chesnut Hill, and, passing down the main street, attack the centre and left of the lines; while General Armstrong, with about one thousand of the Pennsylvania militia, was to pass down the Manatawny road,

cross the Wissahiccon, at Van Deering's Mill, turn the enemy's left flank, and act on his rear. The divisions under Generals Greene and Stephen, flanked by the brigade under General McDougal, were to pass down the Lime-kiln road,⁶ enter the village at "the market-house" (which stood at the intersection of that road with the main street), and attack the enemy's right wing; while the New Jersey and Maryland militia, commanded by Generals Forman and Smallwood, were to pass down "the old York road," turn his right flank, and fall upon his rear at that part of his line.¹ The brigades commanded by Generals Nash and Maxwell were placed under General Lord Stirling, and acted as a reserve.² General Washington marched down with General Sullivan's division.³

At sunrise,⁴ on the morning of the fourth, one regiment from Conway's brigade and one from the Second Maryland brigade, which had been detached for that purpose,⁵ attacked a picket which was stationed at Mr. Allen's

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.

² Ibid. Judge Marshall (iii. p. 183) states that the reserve was composed of "the division of Lord Stirling, and the brigades of Nash and Maxwell," and many of those who have succeeded him have fallen into the same error. The dispatch of the commander-in-chief is very clear on this subject, while Gen. Sullivan (*letter, Oct. 25, Document II.*) is not less explicit. Gen. Sullivan differs from Gen. Washington respecting the route of the left wing, but I have preferred to follow the statement of the latter.

³ T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 183; Gordon, ii. p. 522. Gen. Muhlenberg supposes the General accompanied the Pennsylvania militia under Gen. Armstrong. I prefer the statement of Mr. Pickering, *who rode by his side*.

⁴ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5.

⁵ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.

¹ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.—² Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 10.—³ Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. p. 363.

⁴ Sparks' Washington, p. 238.—⁵ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5. Gen. Sullivan (*letter of Oct. 25th*) says nine o'clock.

house, on Mount Airy,¹ about two miles above the centre of the village.² The picket was immediately strengthened by the enemy's light-infantry,³ and by the Fortieth regiment,⁴ and General Conway was obliged to advance with his brigade to sustain the attacking regiments.⁵ The enemy sustained the attack with great resolution, until the division under General Sullivan moved down to support General Conway,⁶ when, after a short conflict, and two attempts to outflank General Sullivan (which were prevented by the latter detaching Colonel Ford's regiment to the left, and two regiments of foot and one of cavalry to the right), they were compelled to give way, leaving their encampment⁷ and baggage.⁸ Meanwhile, the columns commanded by Generals Armstrong and Greene having failed to reach the ground, General Sullivan had ordered General Wayne to form his division *on the east side of the main road*, to attack the enemy's right wing⁹—a portion of the field and a duty which had been assigned to General Greene,¹⁰ and he had also detached General Conway, with part of his brigade, to flank the column on the right¹¹—a part of the duty assigned to General Armstrong.¹²

Thus, to some extent, covering the entire field with his command, and as-

suming the responsibility and the burden of the enterprise, General Sullivan moved forward towards Germantown,¹ the enemy's light-infantry with great gallantry taking positions behind every fence and stone wall, and in every ditch they passed, and retarding the progress of General Sullivan by every means in their power.²

The enemy's forces were driven before the divisions of Generals Sullivan and Wayne—one on the west side, the other on the east side of the road—the former taking advantage of every house and building in their retreat for the purpose of harassing the American troops.³ Into one of these, a large stone house owned by Chief-justice Chew,⁴ situate about one hundred yards east from the line of the street,⁵ and about a mile above the centre of the village,⁶ Lieutenant-colonel Mnlgrave threw himself with six companies of the Fortieth regiment,⁷ barricaded the doors and lower windows, and opened a fire on the American troops from the roof and upper windows.⁸ Leaving a regiment to guard this house and its garrison,⁹ General Wayne pushed on, and, with General Sullivan, continued the pursuit upwards of a mile farther down the street;¹⁰ while the reserve, un-

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.—² Ibid. See also Hall's Civil War, p. 319.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826.

⁵ T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 10; T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826. Some writers say five companies formed the impromptu garrison.—⁸ T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826.—⁹ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 108.

¹⁰ Gen. Armstrong to Gen. Gates, Oct. 9; T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826; Gen. Wayne to Gen. Gates, Nov. 21.

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.—² T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826.

³ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.—⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 10.—⁵ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.

⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5.

⁹ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.—¹⁰ Vide p. 320.

¹¹ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.—¹² Vide p. 320.

der General Lord Stirling, slowly followed.

When the reserve reached Mr. Chew's house, which Colonel Mulgrave had occupied, General Washington sought the advice of such of his officers as were near him respecting the course to be pursued.¹ General Knox, the only general officer present, considered "it would be unmilitary to leave a castle in their rear," and insisted on sending a summons, while Colonel Pickering maintained that a regiment posted to watch it was all that was necessary, and that a flag and summons, if one was sent, would only *be fired upon*.² Unfortunately the counsel of General Knox prevailed,³—the Assistant Adjutant-general (Lieutenant Smith of Virginia), who bore the flag, *was fired on and killed*;⁴ General Maxwell, with his brigade and four pieces of cannon, was ordered to attack it;⁵ and a siege was commenced.

In the mean time the column under General Greene came on the ground—General Stephen's brigade advancing on the west side of the Lime-kiln road, and Generals Scott's, Muhlenberg's, and McDougal's, on the east side.⁶ As may be supposed, the former encountered the rear of the division commanded by

General Wayne,¹ who was slowly pursuing the enemy on the ground assigned to General Greene's command, as has been already shown; and not being able to see them clearly, from a heavy fog which prevailed at the time, General Stephen opened a fire on them,² throwing them into disorder,³ retarding his own advance, and separating his division from the remainder of General Greene's column, which it did not join again during the day.⁴ Pressing forward, under his orders from the commander-in-chief, General Greene reached "the market-house," on the main street of the village, attacked, and, after a severe contest, defeated the enemy's right wing, and maintained his position until misfortune in other parts of the field of battle compelled him to retire.⁵

At this moment, although both columns of militia had failed to render any useful service, victory appeared to be within the grasp of the American army.⁶ The enemy's left had been defeated by Generals Sullivan and Conway, who were slowly driving it before them through the village; while the right wing, also defeated, were retreating before the victorious troops commanded by Generals Wayne and Greene. The dense fog, which concealed from each the operations and success, and

¹ T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826. Dr. Gordon (ii. p. 523) supposes Col. Reed was present; but Col. Pickering's statement is confirmed by other authorities, showing that he was not present.

² T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826; Gordon, ii. p. 523.

³ T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 10; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 320


⁶ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 108.

¹ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 108.—² Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 109.

³ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 109.

⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid., pp. 110, 111.

⁶ Gen. Washington to his brother, Oct. 18; Gen. Armstrong to President Wharton, Oct. 5; Same to Gen. Gates, Oct. 5; Gen. Wayne to same, Nov. 21.



BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN.

JUDGE CHEVES' HOUSE.

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even the position of his fellows;¹ the inability of General Stephen, through intoxication, to extricate his division from the confusion into which it had been thrown by its collision with General Wayne;² the heavy firing at the Chew house, which was unexplained, and therefore misunderstood by the troops in front,³ causing General Wayne to fall back under the supposition that General Sullivan had been attacked by the enemy's left wing;⁴ and the exposure of General Sullivan's left, which the retrograde movement of General Wayne produced,⁵ all conspired, however, to deprive the American army of the advantages which a decisive victory would have produced at this time.

The reserve remained near Judge Chew's house—a mile above "the market-house,"⁶ near which part of the village other parts of the army were engaged—until General Grey, at the head of three battalions of the Third brigade of British, and General Agnew, at the head of the Fourth brigade of British, came up and repulsed it.⁷

The disorder into which General Greene's column had fallen, through

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; Same to his brother, Oct. 18; Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25; Gen. Wayne's letter (Doc. III.); Gen. Armstrong to President Wharton, Oct. 5 (Doc. IV.); Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 108; Gen. Armstrong to Gen. Gates, Oct. 9.

² Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 110; J. F. Watson, Esq., in Hazard's Register of Penn., i. p. 291. Marshall (*Life of Washington*, iii. p. 189) says that for this he was tried and cashiered.—³ Gen. Wayne's letter to Gen. Gates, Nov. 21; Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.

⁴ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25; Gen. Wayne's letter (Doc. III.); Same to Gen. Gates, Nov. 21.

⁵ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.—⁶ T. Pickering's letter, Aug. 23, 1826.—⁷ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 10.

the incapacity of General Stephen, the retrograde movement of General Wayne, and the failure of the militia on "the old York road" to support him, was taken advantage of by the enemy; and General Grant, who was upon the right, rallied the scattered troops, and, with four pieces of artillery, attacked and repulsed him,¹ notwithstanding the gallant but divided efforts of Generals Muhlenberg, McDongal, and Scott.²

A portion of the troops which had formed the enemy's right wing, about the same time attacked the troops commanded by General Sullivan, who had pushed down to the lower part of the village,³ when a sudden panic, which even their own officers could not understand, seized the entire division, and it retired faster than it had advanced, notwithstanding every effort which was made to prevent it.⁴

The army immediately retired from the village,⁵ Generals Wayne's and Stephen's divisions covering the retreat,⁶ but the enemy did not consider it expedient to press the pursuit when he saw that the fugitives were prepared to protect themselves.⁷

The loss of the Americans, in killed, wounded, and missing, was about one

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Oct. 10.—² Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, pp. 112, 113.

³ Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.

⁴ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; Same to his brother, Oct. 18; Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25; Gen. Armstrong to Gen. Gates, Oct. 9; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. pp. 365, 366.—⁵ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 113; Gen. Wayne's letter (Doc. III.); Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25.

⁶ Gen. Wayne's letter; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 113.

⁷ Gen. Wayne's letter (Doc. III.); Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 322, 323.

thousand men.¹ General Nash of North Carolina was among the wounded, who died shortly after the action.² The returns of General Howe show the enemy's loss to have been five hundred and thirty-five,³ although it is intimated that his loss was really much greater.⁴

There has ever been a mystery connected with the battle of Germantown, and the confusion on the field has produced confusion in the several accounts of the battle which the commanding officers have left for our information, as will be seen by a comparison of those which are appended to this chapter.

The dense fog which prevailed, so completely concealed the several movements of both armies, that each regiment of both became, in fact, an independent command, and the result was such an one

as such circumstances would naturally produce. The confusion which prevailed among the American troops, notwithstanding their generally successful current towards the lower part of the village, was increased, and their success neutralized by the unfortunate delay at Judge Chew's house, and by the failure of ammunition among General Sullivan's troops, who had been engaged nearly three hours, and expended nearly forty rounds per man.¹

The plan of General Washington for conducting this enterprise, was one of the most carefully elaborated designs which that distinguished man ever issued; and the ultimate failure in its execution, while it did not discourage the Americans,² was not productive either of pleasure or profit to the enemy.³ The ability to design, and the resolution to execute, which were there displayed, commanded the respect of the enemy; and, notwithstanding the army retired to its camp, fourteen miles distant, General Howe sought safety by retiring to Philadelphia.

¹ Gen. Washington to his brother, Oct. 18. Dr. Gordon (*Hist. Rev.*, ii. p. 525), on the authority of the Board of War, says the loss was 152 killed, 521 wounded, and about 400 prisoners.

² Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5.

³ Return No. 3, appended to Gen. Howe's dispatch.

⁴ Dr. Gordon says (*Hist. Rev.*, ii. p. 526): "When the royal army left Germantown, the Americans found, in one of the chimney-hearths, some papers, torn to pieces, and observing figures on them, certain officers attempted putting them together, and found them to be the returns of the killed and wounded, amounting to about eight hundred."

¹ Gen. Washington to his brother, Oct. 18.

² Gen. Washington's dispatch, Oct. 5; Gen. Sullivan's letter, Oct. 25; Gen. Wayne's letter (Document 111.)

³ Lieut. Hall's History of Civil War, pp. 322, 323.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GEN. WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO CONGRESS.

CAMP NEAR PENNIBECKER'S MILL, Oct. 5, 1777.

SIR:—Having received intelligence, through two intercepted letters, that General Howe had detached part of his force for the purpose of reducing Billingsport and the forts on the Delaware, I communicated the accounts to my general officers, who were unanimously of opinion that a favorable opportunity offered to make an attack upon the troops, which were at and near Germantown. It was accordingly agreed that it should take place yesterday morning, and the following dispositions were made.

The divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway's brigade, were to enter the town by way of Chesnut Hill, while General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, should fall down the Manatawny road, by Vandeer's mill, and get upon the enemy's left and rear. The divisions of Greene and Stephen, flanked by McDougal's brigade, were to enter, by taking a circuit by way of the Lime-kiln road, at the market-house, and attack their right wing; and the militia of Maryland and Jersey, under Generals Smallwood and Forman, were to march by the old York road, and fall upon the rear of their right. Lord Stirling, with Nash's and Maxwell's brigade, was to form a *corps de reserve*.

We marched about seven o'clock the preceding evening, and General Sullivan's advanced party, drawn from Conway's brigade, attacked their picket at Mount Airy, or Mr. Allen's house, about sunrise the next morning, which presently gave way; and his main body, consisting of the right wing, following soon, engaged the light-

infantry and other troops encamped near the picket, which they forced from their ground. Leaving their baggage, they retreated a considerable distance, having previously thrown a party into Mr. Chew's house, who were in a situation not to be easily forced, and had it in their power, from the windows, to give us no small annoyance, and in a great measure to obstruct our advance.

The attack from our left column, under General Greene, began about three quarters of an hour after that from the right, and was for some time equally successful. But I cannot enter upon the particulars of what happened in that quarter, as I am not yet informed of them with sufficient certainty and precision. The morning was extremely foggy, which prevented our improving the advantages we gained, so well as we should otherwise have done. This circumstance, by concealing from us the true situation of the enemy, obliged us to act with more caution and less expedition than we could have wished, and gave the enemy time to recover from the effects of our first impression; and, what was still more unfortunate, it served to keep our different parties in ignorance of each other's movements, and hinder their acting in concert. It also occasioned them to mistake one another for the enemy, which I believe, more than any thing else, contributed to the misfortune that ensued. In the midst of the most promising appearances, when every thing gave the most flattering hopes of victory, the troops began suddenly to retreat, and entirely left the field, in spite of every effort that could be made to rally them.

Upon the whole, it may be said the day was unfortunate rather than injurious. We sustained no material loss of men, and brought off all our

artillery, except one piece, which was dismounted. The enemy are nothing the better by the event; and our troops, who are not in the least dispirited by it, have gained what all young troops gain by being in actions. We have had, however, several valuable officers killed and wounded, particularly the latter. General Nash is among the wounded, and his life is despaired of. As soon as it is possible to obtain a return of our loss, I will transmit it. In justice to General Sullivan, and the whole right wing of the army, whose conduct I had an opportunity of observing, as they acted immediately under my eye, I have the pleasure to inform you that both officers and men behaved with a degree of gallantry that did them the highest honor.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

GEO. WASHINGTON.

P. S.—As I have observed, I have not received a return of our loss; but from what I have just now learned from General Greene, I fear it is more considerable than I at first apprehended, in men. The cannon, mentioned above, is said to have been brought off in a wagon.



II.

GENERAL SULLIVAN'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

CAMP AT WHITEMARSH, Oct. 25, 1777.

SIR:—I hope the constant movements of our army, since the battle of Germantown, will apologize for my not having before given you a particular account of this unsuccessful affair. Upon receiving intelligence that part of the enemy's force was detached for particular purposes, and that their main army lay encamped, with their left wing on the west side of the road leading through Germantown, flanked by the Hessian forces, who were encamped on the Schuylkill, and their right on the east side of the road extending to a wood about one mile from the town, with their light-infantry encamped in a line in their front, within less than a quarter of a mile of their picket at Mount Airy. Upon this intelligence, it was agreed in council, that

we should march the night of the 3d instant, and attack the enemy in the following manner:

My own and Wayne's divisions were to compose the right wing, which I had the honor to command. This wing was to be sustained by the corps of reserve, composed of Nash's and Maxwell's brigades, commanded by Major-general Lord Stirling. The right wing was to be flanked by Conway's brigade, which led the column. The whole of these marched down the Skippack road, leading over Chesnut Hill into Germantown. General Armstrong, with about one thousand Pennsylvania militia, was to pass down the road which runs near the Schuylkill and attack the Hessians, who covered the enemy's left flank. The left wing was composed of Greene's and Stephen's divisions, commanded by Major-general Greene, who were to march down the York road and attack the enemy's right, while the troops I had the honor to command attacked their left. General McDougal's brigade was to attack their right flank, and Smallwood's division and Forman's brigade of militia were to make a larger circuit, and attack the rear of their right wing. The reason of our sending so many troops to attack their right was, because it was supposed that if this wing of the enemy could be forced, their army must be pushed into the Schuylkill or be compelled to surrender. Therefore two thirds of the army, at least, were detached to oppose the enemy's right.

The attack was to begin on all quarters at daybreak. Our army left their encampment at Matuchen Hills at nine in the evening, marched all night, and at daybreak the right wing arrived on Chesnut Hill, when one regiment from Conway's brigade, and one from the Second Maryland brigade were detached to Mount Airy, followed by Conway's brigade, to attack the enemy's picket at Allen's house. My own division followed in the rear of Conway's, and Wayne's division in the rear of mine. The picket was soon attacked, and suddenly reinforced by all their light-infantry. This compelled General Conway to form his brigade to sustain the attacking regiments and to repulse the light-infantry. They maintained their ground with great resolution, till my division was form-

ed to support them. The enemy endeavoring to flank us on the left, I ordered Colonel Ford's regiment to the other side of the road to repulse them, till General Wayne's division arrived; and upon finding that our left wing, which had near four miles farther to march than the right, had not arrived, I was obliged to form General Wayne's division on the east of the road, to attack the enemy's right. I then directed General Conway to draw off such part of his brigade as was formed in the road, and in front of our right, and to fall into my rear, and file off to the right to flank my division; but, the morning being too dark to discover the enemy's movements, and no evidence being given of General Armstrong's arrival, I was obliged to send a regiment from Wayne's, and another from my own division, to keep the enemy from turning our right. I also detached Colonel Moylan's regiment of light-horse to watch their motions in that quarter.

This being done, my division were ordered to advance; which they did with such resolution, that the enemy's light-infantry were soon compelled to leave the field, and with it their encampments. They, however, made a stand at every fence, wall, and ditch they passed, which were numerous. We were compelled to remove every fence as we passed, which delayed us much in the pursuit. We were soon after met by the left wing of the British army, when a severe conflict ensued; but our men being ordered to march up with shouldered arms, they obeyed without hesitation, and the enemy retired. I then detached my aid-de-camp, Major Morris, to inform his Excellency, who was in the main road, that the enemy's left wing had given way, and to desire him to order General Wayne to advance against their right. His Excellency immediately detached part of the residue on my right and part on the left of the road, and directed Wayne's division to advance, which they did with great bravery and rapidity.

At Chew's house, a mile and a half from where the attack began, Wayne's division came abreast with mine, and passed Chew's house, while mine were advancing on the other side of the main road.

Though the enemy were routed, yet they

took advantage of every yard, house, and hedge in their retreat, which caused an incessant fire through the whole pursuit. At this time, which was near an hour and a quarter after the attack began, General Stephen's division fell in with Wayne's on our left, and soon after, the firing from General Greene's was heard still farther to the left. The left wing of our army was delayed much by General Greene's being obliged to countermarch one of his divisions before he could begin the attack, as he found the enemy were in a situation very different from what we had been before told. The enemy had thrown a large body of troops into Chew's house, which caused Maxwell's brigade to halt there with some artillery to reduce them. This was found very difficult, as the house, being stone, was almost impenetrable by cannon, and sufficient proof against musketry. The enemy defended themselves with great bravery, and annoyed our troops much by their fire. This, unfortunately, caused many of our troops to halt, and brought back General Wayne's division, who had advanced far beyond the house, as they were apprehensive, lest the firing proceeded from the enemy's having defeated my division on the right. This totally uncovered the left flank of my division, which was still advancing against the enemy's left. The firing of General Greene's division was very heavy for more than a quarter of an hour, but then decreased, and seemed to draw farther from us. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the facts to determine with precision what was done in that quarter. A regiment commanded by Colonel Matthews advanced with rapidity near the town; but, not being supported by some other regiments, who were stopped by a breastwork near Lucan's mills, the brave Colonel, after having performed great feats of bravery, and being dangerously wounded in several places, was obliged, with about a hundred of his men, to surrender.

My division, with a regiment of North Carolinians commanded by Colonel Armstrong, and assisted by part of Conway's brigade, having driven the enemy a mile and a half below Chew's house, and finding themselves unsupported by any other troops, their cartridges all

expended, the force of the enemy on the right collecting to the left to oppose them, being alarmed by the firing at Chew's house so far in their rear, and by the cry of a light-horseman on the right, that the enemy had got round us, and at the same time discovering some troops flying on our right, retired with as much precipitation as they had before advanced, against every effort of their officers to rally them. When the retreat took place, they had been engaged near three hours, which, with the march of the preceding night, rendered them almost unfit for fighting or retreating. We, however, made a safe retreat, though not a regular one; we brought off all our cannon and all our wounded. Our loss in the action amounts to less than seven hundred, mostly wounded. We lost some valuable officers, among whom were the brave General Nash and my two aids-de-camp, Majors Sherburne and White, whose singular bravery must ever do honor to their memories. Our army rendezvoused at Pawling's mills, and seems very desirous of another action. The misfortunes of this day were principally owing to a thick fog, which, being rendered still more so by the smoke of the cannon and musketry, prevented our troops from discovering the motions of the enemy or acting in concert with each other. I cannot help observing, that, with great concern, I saw our brave commander exposing himself to the hottest fire of the enemy, in such a manner, that regard to my country obliged me to ride to him, and beg him to retire. He, to gratify me and some others, withdrew a small distance; but his anxiety for the fate of the day soon brought him up again, where he remained till our troops had retreated.

I am, &c., JOHN SULLIVAN.

To the Hon. the President of New Hampshire.

III.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER WRITTEN BY GENERAL WAYNE, DESCRIBING THE ACTION.

CAMP NEAR PAWLING'S MILLS, Oct. 6, 1777.

On the 4th instant, at dawn of day, we attacked General Howe's army at the upper end

of Germantown; the action soon became general, when we advanced on the enemy with charged bayonets; they broke at first, without waiting to receive us, but soon formed again, when a heavy and well-directed fire took place on each side. The enemy again gave way, but being supported by the grenadiers, returned to the charge. General Sullivan's division and Conway's brigade were at this time engaged to the south of Germantown, while my division had the right wing of the enemy's army to encounter on the north of the town, two thirds of our army being then too far to the north to afford us any assistance; however, the unparalleled bravery of our troops surmounted every difficulty, and obliged the enemy to break and run in the utmost confusion. Our people, remembering the action of the night of the 20th of September, near the Warren, pushed on with their bayonets, and took ample vengeance for that night's work. Our officers exerted themselves to save many of the poor wretches, who were crying for mercy, but to little purpose, the rage and fury of the soldiers were not to be restrained for some time, at least not until great numbers of the enemy fell by their bayonets. The fog, together with the smoke occasioned by our cannon and musketry, made it almost as dark as night: our people, mistaking one another for the enemy, frequently exchanged shots before they discovered their error. We had now pushed the enemy near three miles, and were in possession of their whole encampment, when a large body of troops were advancing on our left flank, which being taken for the enemy, our men fell back in defiance of every exertion of the officers to the contrary, and after retreating about two miles, they were discovered to be our own people, who were originally intended to attack the right wing of the enemy. The fog, and this mistake, prevented us from following a victory, which, in all human probability, would have put an end to the American war. General Howe for some time could not persuade himself that we had run away from victory, but the fog clearing off, he ventured to follow us with a large body of his infantry, grenadiers, and light-horse; I, at this time, being in the rear, with a view of col-

leeting the stragglers of our retreating army, and finding the enemy determined to push us hard, drew up in order of battle, and awaited their approach: when they advanced sufficiently near, we gave them a few cannon-shot; not being pleased with this reception, our pursuers broke and retired: thus ended the action of that day, which continued from daylight until near 10 o'clock. I had forgot to mention that my roan horse was killed under me, within a few yards of the enemy's front, and my left foot a little bruised by a spent ball, but not so much as to prevent me from walking. My poor horse received one musket-ball in the breast and one in the flank, at the same instant that I had a slight touch on my left hand, which is scarcely worth noticing. Upon the whole, it was a glorious day.

Our men are in high spirits, and I am confident we shall give them a total defeat the next action, which is at no great distance.

My best love and wishes to all friends,

ANTHONY WAYNE.

IV.

LETTER FROM GENERAL ARMSTRONG TO THOMAS WHARTON, JR., PRESIDENT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

CAMP NEAR THE TRAPP, 5th Oct., 1777.

SIR:—By a forced march of fourteen miles or upwards, on Friday night, General Washington attacked, about sunrise yesterday morning, the British and foreign troops encamped at Germantown, Vandeerling's, and elsewhere, towards the York road. We marched by four different routes—those on the left did not arrive so soon as the columns on the centre and right. The Continental troops drove the principal part of the enemy at Germantown full two miles. Yet, what shall I say, a victory almost in full embrace, was frustrated, but by what means cannot yet be easily ascertained. I think by a number of casualties, a thick fog, whereby, not only our ammunition was expended without an object, but it is thought that our own troops had been taken in an instance or two for reinforcements of the enemy, whereby a panic and

retreat ensued, which the General could not prevent! Thus may it be said, through some strange fatality (though not the less faulty on our part), that we fled from victory. Another reason was the time spent about Mr. Chew's house, where a number of the enemy took *sanc-tuary*, and from which a number of our people were killed and wounded. We can yet tell nothing perfectly of our loss, nor of that of the enemy. General Nash's thigh, and the head of Major Witherspoon, were, it is said, both taken away by one and the same cannon-ball. I should be glad to send you a copy of our order of battle or attack, but have it not here. My destiny was against the various corps of Germans encamped at Vandeerling's, or near the Falls. Their light-horse discovered our approach a little before sunrise. We cannonaded from the heights on each side of the Wissahiccon, whilst the riflemen on opposite sides acted on the lower ground. About nine, I was called to join the General, but left a party with the Colonels, Eyers and Dunlap, and one field-piece, and afterwards reinforced them, which reinforcement, by the by, did not join them until, after a brave resistance, they were obliged to retreat, but carried off the field-piece; the other I was obliged to leave in the *Horrenduous* hills of the Wissahiccon, but ordered her on a safe route to join Eyers, if he should retreat, which was done accordingly. We proceeded, and above Germantown, some three miles, directed by a slow fire of cannon, until we fell into the front of a superior body of the enemy, with whom we engaged about three quarters of an hour; but their grape-shot and ball soon intimidated, and obliged us to retreat, or rather file off: until then I thought we had a victory, but, to my great disappointment, soon found our army were gone an hour or two before, and we the last on the ground. We brought off every thing but a wounded man or two—lost not quite twenty on the whole, and hope we killed at least that number, besides diverting the Hessian strength from the General in the morning. I have neither time nor light to add, but that

I am, respectfully, yours,

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

V.

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S DISPATCH TO
LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

HEAD-QUARTERS, GERMANTOWN, Oct. 10, 1777.

MY LORD:—

* * * * *

The enemy, having received a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men from Peekskill, one thousand men from Virginia, and presuming upon the army being much weakened by the detachments to Philadelphia and Jersey, thought it a favorable time for them to risk an action. They accordingly marched at six o'clock in the evening of the 3d, from their camp near Skip-pach Creek, about sixteen miles from Germantown.

This village forms one continued street for two miles, which the line of encampment, in the position the army then occupied, crossed at right angles, near a mile from the head of it, where the Second battalion of light-infantry and the Fortieth regiment were posted.

In this line of encampment Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, Major-generals Stirn and Grey, Brigadier-general Agnew, with seven British and three Hessian battalions, the mounted and dismounted chasseurs, were upon the left of the village, extending to the Schuylkill, the chasseurs being in front.

Major-general Grant and Brigadier-general Matthew, with the corps of guards, six battalions of British and two squadrons of dragoons, were upon the right; the First battalion of light-infantry and the Queen's American Rangers were advanced in the front of this wing.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 4th, the patrols discovered the enemy's approach, and upon the communication of this intelligence the army was immediately ordered under arms.

Soon after the break of day the enemy began their attack upon the Second light-infantry, which they sustained for a considerable time, supported by the Fortieth regiment; but at length being overpowered by increasing numbers, the light-infantry, and a part of the Fortieth, retired into the village, when Lieutenant-colonel Mulgrave, with six companies of the

latter corps, threw himself into a large stone house in face of the enemy, which, though surrounded by a brigade, and attacked by four pieces of cannon, he most gallantly defended, until Major-general Grey, at the head of three battalions of the Third brigade, turning his front to the village, and Brigadier-general Agnew, who covered Major-general Grey's left with the Fourth brigade, by a vigorous attack repulsed the enemy, that had penetrated into the upper part of the village, which was done with great slaughter: the Fifth and Fifty-fifth regiments from the right, engaging them at the same time on the other side of the village, completed the defeat of the enemy in this quarter.

The regiments of Du Corps and Donop, being formed to support the left of the Fourth brigade, and one battalion of the Hessian grenadiers in the rear of the chasseurs, were not engaged; the precipitate flight of the enemy preventing the two first corps from entering into action, and the success of the chasseurs, in repelling all efforts against them on that side did not call for the support of the latter.

The First light-infantry and pickets of the line in front of the right wing, were engaged soon after the attack began upon the head of the village; the pickets were obliged to fall back, but the light-infantry being well supported by the Fourth regiment, sustained the enemy's attack with such determined bravery, that they could not make the least impression on them.

Two columns of the enemy were opposite to the guards, Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth regiments, who formed the right of the line.

Major-general Grant, who was upon the right, moved up the Forty-ninth regiment, about the time Major-general Grey had forced the enemy in the village, and then advancing with the right wing, the enemy's left gave way, and was pursued through a strong country between four and five miles.

Lord Cornwallis, being early apprised, at Philadelphia, of the enemy's approach, put in motion the two battalions of British, and one of the Hessian grenadiers, with a squadron of dragoons; and his lordship getting to Germantown just as the enemy had been forced out of the

village, he joined Major-general Grey, when, placing himself at the head of the troops, he followed the enemy eight miles, on the Skippach road; but such was the expedition with which they fled, he was not able to overtake them.

The grenadiers from Philadelphia, who, full of ardor, had run most of the way to Germantown, could not arrive in time to join in the action. The country in general was so strongly inclosed and covered with wood, that the dragoons had not any opening to charge, excepting a small party on the right, which behaved most gallantly.

The enemy retired near twenty miles, by

several roads, to Perkyomy Creek, and are now encamped near Skippach Creek, about eighteen miles distant from hence.

They saved all their cannon by withdrawing them early in the day. By the best accounts, their loss was between two hundred and three hundred killed, about six hundred wounded, and upwards of four hundred taken. Among the killed was General Nash, with many other officers of all ranks, and fifty-four officers among the prisoners.

* * * * *

With most perfect respect, I have the honor to be, &c.,

W. HOWE.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

October 6, 1777.

THE CAPTURE OF FORTS CLINTON AND MONTGOMERY.

THE advance of General Burgoyne from the North towards Albany had been checked, and his army was suffering from the want of provisions;¹ while, at the same time, General Howe, with the main body of the army under his command, was struggling with General Washington for the possession of Philadelphia.² Between these objects, and the defence of the Mohawk Valley, from which Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger had but a short time before been driven,³ the American forces were generally occupied; and, notwithstanding the disadvantages under which they struggled, they manfully, and, for the most part, successfully, contended against the superior numbers and discipline of the royal armies. Their defeats even were substantial victories—"blessings in disguise"—and the people, the armies, and the Congress, alike appear to have joined heartily and confidently in the struggle for the sovereignty of the people and the independence of the young federal Republic.

For the purpose of diverting the at-

tention of the American forces, to secure the passes in the Highlands,¹ and, if possible, to withdraw a portion of General Gates' army from its careful attention to General Burgoyne,² General Sir Henry Clinton, then in the city of New York, organized an expedition for the capture of Forts Clinton and Montgomery, on the Hudson River, and for such other movements in that direction as the circumstances might warrant.

These forts occupied the points on the west side of the Hudson River, where the Poploopen's Kill empties its waters into the river;³ about five miles above Peekskill, and six miles below West Point. They were laid out by Bernard Romans, an engineer who accompanied the expedition from Connecticut to Ticonderoga, in 1775, and they were properly considered the most important works in the United States.⁴

Fort Montgomery, occupying the

¹ Chap. XXV.—² Chap. XXIV.—³ Chap. XXI.

¹ Stedman, i. p. 358.—² Gordon, ii. p. 553; Stedman, i. p. 365.—³ "Plan of the attack of the Forts," in Stedman's Hist. of the American War; Eager's Hist. of Orange county, p. 572.—⁴ Leake's life of Lamb, p. 173; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 303.

northern bank of Poplopen's Kill,¹ was a large work, which was yet unfinished at the time of its capture;² and its garrison consisted of militia from the surrounding country,³ many of whom were unarmed,⁴ with one company of artillery and a few regulars, the whole commanded by Colonel John Lamb.⁵ From this point a heavy *cheveaux-de-frize* of timber, protected by a boom and a heavy chain,⁶ the links of which were two inches and a half square,⁷ extended across the river to Anthony's Nose.⁸

Fort Clinton, occupying the southern bank of the Kill,⁹ was a smaller but stronger work, one hundred and twenty-three feet above the river.¹⁰ A garrison, similar in character with that which occupied Fort Montgomery, was stationed here, and the command was vested in Brigadier-general James Clinton.¹¹

General Israel Putnam, to whom had been given the general command of the Highlands, occupied Peekskill with fifteen hundred men.¹²

Information of the proposed expedition had been conveyed to General Putnam by General Parsons, and Governor Clinton, to whom General Putnam forwarded the intelligence, immediately ordered that portion of the militia of

New York which was not with General Gates to move to the Highlands, part of them to strengthen General Putnam, the remainder to strengthen the posts at the mouth of Poplopen's Kill. As the enemy was not yet in motion, the General yielded to the solicitations of the men, and dismissed a portion of them, even after his force had been weakened by the desertion of great numbers, whose anxiety to get in their winter grain rendered them extremely restless.¹

The Governor, properly considering "it essentially necessary that they should remain in the field some time, in order to check the progress of the enemy, should he attempt to put his designs into execution,"² immediately renewed his orders, but directed one half to remain a month before taking the field, when those who first assembled could return to complete their autumn work, while those who had remained behind, could supply their places in the camp.³ The garrisons within the forts were to be strengthened; the pass at Sydman's Bridge, at the mouth of the Clove, was to be secured; and the remainder were to be placed at the disposal of General Putnam, on the east side of the Hudson.⁴

The watchful care of Governor Clinton was not successful in recovering the advantage which General Putnam had thrown away, when he dismissed the militia which the Governor first ordered to support him and to strengthen

¹ "Plan of the attack," in Stedman.

² Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 173; Stedman, i. p. 360.

³ Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 173.—⁴ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁵ Leake's Life of Gen. Lamb, p. 173; Marshall, iii. p. 305.—⁶ Irving, iii. p. 240; Marshall, iii. p. 304.—⁷ Stedman, i. p. 363; Gordon, ii. p. 556.

⁸ "Plan of attack," &c., in Stedman's Hist.—⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Stedman, i. p. 363; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 166.

¹¹ Leake's Life of Gen. Lamb, 173.

¹² Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.; Irving, iii. p. 239.

¹ Gov. Clinton, Doc. II.—² Ibid.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Ibid.

the forts. Before the second order could be executed (on the third of October), a large number of flat-boats, bateaux, &c., were taken from New York to Spuyten-duyvel Creek, under the directions of Captains Pownall, Jordan, and Stanhope.¹ In the evening of that day about eleven hundred men were embarked on these vessels, and taken to Tarrytown, where they landed at daybreak on the following morning;² while a second division, of about the same strength, marched up from Kingsbridge and joined them at that place.³ A squadron of vessels, commanded by Captain Ommany, and a large number of galleys and small armed vessels, commanded by Sir James Wallace,⁴ had moved up the river and anchored in the cove at Tarrytown, on the day before (*October 3d*),⁵ and were ready to receive the troops and proceed on their way when the arrangements were completed. So far every movement had been made with great care, in order that the *real* object of the expedition might be concealed behind the *apparent* intention to attack the position occupied by General Putnam on the east side of the river.⁶ Not the least evidence was shown of any intention to attack the forts, although the rules of war were such as should have led the commander of that district to prepare for such a contingency.

¹ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.—² Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.—³ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.

On the morning of the fourth of October, the third division of troops left the city of New York, in transports, convoyed by the *Preston*, man-of-war, commanded by Commodore Hotham; and, during the same morning, these also cast anchor off Tarrytown.¹ During the following night, the troops who had been encamped on shore embarked on the squadron, which still lay at anchor in the cove;² and, on the morning of the fifth of October, the whole force, led by the squadron of galleys and small vessels, commanded by Sir James Wallace, as an advanced guard, proceeded up the river, reaching Verplanck's Point about noon.³ The troops on the flat-boats, four hundred in number,⁴—a small party comparatively,—immediately landed;⁵ the Americans, who occupied the Point, retiring before them without firing a shot, leaving a twelve-pound gun behind them.⁶ Sir James Wallace immediately proceeded up the river, with his galleys and flat-boats, to cut off the communication between Peekskill and the forts,⁷ and to mask the King's Ferry.⁸

General Putnam, with twelve hundred Continental troops and three hundred militia,⁹ immediately retired to the high grounds in the rear of the landing

¹ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.—² Ibid.

³ Ibid. Gov. Clinton (*Dispatch*, Doc. II.) says they landed at daybreak.—⁴ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.; Hall's Civil War, p. 326. Mr. Irving erroneously states, "about one thousand were left there."

⁵ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.—⁶ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.; Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.; Stedman, i. p. 359.—⁷ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.—⁸ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.

⁹ Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.

at Peekskill;¹ and, although he was fully impressed with the idea that his post was the object of the expedition,—so completely had he fallen into the trap which General Sir Henry Clinton had laid for him,—he not only took no steps to oppose either the landing of the enemy at Verplanck's Point or at Peekskill, or to harass him on his march after he had landed; but (although he was only four miles above the Point, where the enemy then was) he took no steps, until the following day, to ascertain the exact position occupied by the enemy, his numbers, or his movements.² The four hundred Provincial troops (Tories) who had landed at Verplanck's Point, he supposed, "from the best accounts," to number *fifteen hundred*;³ Sir James Wallace's squadron, which, after landing the troops, had been detached to cut off the communication between Peekskill and the forts, he supposed were designed to land troops, "both at Fort Independence and Peekskill Landing," although, being flat-boats and small gun-boats, the absence of troops *for land service* could have been seen at once;⁴ and, when the landing of the main body of the enemy's force, on the west side of the river, was made known to him, on the morning of the sixth, and, notwithstanding he saw the light from the burning of the American storehouses at that point, he strange-

ly "thought they had only landed with a view of destroying said houses," where not even a sentry had been posted to give an alarm.¹ But, above all others, the most remarkable evidence of the delusion of General Putnam, on this occasion, exists in the fact that, on the fifth of October,—while the enemy was off Verplanck's Point,—a regiment under Colonel Malcolm, which was guarding the most important pass in the mountains, leading to the forts, (Sydman's Bridge, at the mouth of the Clove,) was removed to the east side of the Hudson, by his orders;² and a party of sixty men, to be stationed on Anthony's Nose,—opposite the forts,—were also, by the same orders, withdrawn from the garrisons.³

Governor Clinton, who was attending the session of the legislature at Kingston, providentially heard of the movements of the enemy, and understood his object.⁴ Although he could not always understand the marches and counter-marches, the defences and the retreats, to which General Washington was compelled to resort,⁵ he could clearly perceive the motive which led the enemy up the Hudson; and, prorogueing the legislature, he hastened down the river and took the command of Fort Montgomery,⁶ in season to prevent some of the consequences which would have followed in the train of General Putnam's inefficiency. He detached two hundred men

¹ Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.; Irving, iii. p. 241.

² No allusion is made to any movement or reconnoitre until that on the 6th, during which he heard the report of the guns at the forts.

³ Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.—⁴ Ibid.

¹ Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.—² Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Gov. Clinton to John McKesson, "Camp near White Plains, Oct. 31, 1776."—⁶ Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 175; Gordon, ii. p. 555.

—one fourth of his entire force—under Major Moffatt, to guard the pass at Sydman's Bridge, from which post Colonel Malcolm's regiment had been withdrawn by General Putnam;¹ and Major Logan, “an alert officer, who was well acquainted with the ground,” was sent through the mountains to reconnoitre, and, if possible, to gain intelligence of the enemy’s movements.²

In the mean time the enemy lay off Verplanck’s Point,—the detachment of four hundred men under Colonels Bayard and Fanning being on shore at that place; and Sir James Wallae and his gun-boats, &c., were laying off Peekskill. At daybreak, on the morning of the sixth of October, the general debarkation took place at Stoney Point, nearly opposite to Verplanck’s Point,³ and the advance-guard, of nine hundred men, composed of the Fifty-second and Twenty-seventh regiments and Emerick’s chasseurs, and four hundred Tories commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Beverly Robinson of New York, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, pushed forward to secure the pass of the Dunderberg (Thunder Hill).⁴ The main body, composed of the grenadiers and light-infantry, the Twenty-sixth and Sixty-third regiments, one company of the Seventy-first regiment, one troop of dismounted dragoons, and the Hessian chasseurs, numbering twelve

hundred men, commanded by General Vaughan, followed after;¹ and Major-general Tryon, with the Seventh regiment and the Hessian regiment of Trumbuck brought up the rear.²

Orders were given to Colonel Campbell, after he had taken possession of the pass, to march around the foot of the Dunderberg Mountain and Bear Hill,³ a distance of seven miles, and *debouchee* in the rear of Fort Montgomery;⁴ while General Vaughan was to cover the advance, regulating his march so that he might reach Fort Clinton and attack it simultaneously with Colonel Campbell’s attack on Fort Montgomery;⁵ and General Tryon, after leaving a detachment to secure the pass of the Dunderberg and the communication with the fleet, was stationed in such a position that he could either cover a retreat, should misfortune overtake either of the columns, or render assistance should either column require it.⁶

The enemy’s columns were guided through the mountains by a Tory named Abraham Springster,⁷ but the difficult

¹ Sir Henry Clinton’s dispatch, Doc. III., and the note thereon.—² Ibid.

³ Sir Henry Clinton’s dispatch, Doc. III.: Leake’s Life of Lamb, p. 175; Irving, iii. p. 242. Stedman, and other writers who have borrowed from his pages, have supposed that the troops crossed *over the mountains*, instead of making a detour around them; notwithstanding Stedman’s *own map of the action is correct*, and designates the roads by which they moved.

⁴ Sir Henry Clinton’s dispatch, Doc. III.; Leake’s Life of Lamb, p. 175.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Beverly Garrison, a revolutionary soldier, communicated to Mr. Lossing. Abraham (or, as he was generally called, *Brom*) was afterwards captured by the Americans, and guided Gen. Wayne over the same rugged hills to attack Stoney Point, as a condition that his life should be spared.

¹ Gov. Clinton’s dispatch, Doc. II.—² Ibid.

³ Sir Henry Clinton’s dispatch, Doc. III.; Com.霍桑的dispatch, Doc. IV.; Stedman, i. p. 359.

⁴ Sir Henry Clinton’s dispatch, Doc. III., and the note thereon.

ties of the march were so great that it was late in the afternoon before they reached their destination.¹

About nine o'clock, on the morning of the sixth, Major Logan, who had been sent out to reconnoitre, returned to the forts and reported, "that from the best intelligence he could procure, and the rowing of the boats, he had reason to believe the enemy had landed a considerable force on the west side of the river, but as the morning was foggy it was impossible to discern them, so as to form any judgment of their numbers."² On the receipt of this information a messenger was sent to General Putnam for a reinforcement,³ and Lieutenant Jackson was dispatched with a small party of thirty men, from Fort Clinton, to watch the enemy's movements; but he had not proceeded more than two miles, on the road leading to Haverstraw, when he fell into an ambuscade which an advanced party of the enemy had formed near Doodletown. After returning the fire, he retreated⁴ to Fort Clinton.⁵

Meanwhile the enemy had prosecuted his march around the base of the Dunderberg; and in the valley which flanks it on the north, separating it from Bear

Hill, Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, with the troops under his command, left the troops under Generals Vaughan and Tryon, and proceeded around the western base of the latter, on the road leading from the Forest of Dean to Fort Montgomery, for the purpose of attacking the latter post;¹ the latter body, with whom was Sir Henry Clinton,² remaining on the ground which it then occupied, to enable the former to make the *detour* and attack Fort Montgomery simultaneously with the attack on Fort Clinton.³

The reports of the musketry in the skirmish with Lieutenant Jackson were heard at the forts,⁴ and Governor Clinton immediately ordered Lieutenant-colonel Bruyn with fifty Continental troops, and Lieutenant-colonel McLaughry with fifty militia, also from Fort Clinton, to sustain Lieutenant Jackson;⁵ while, for the purpose of harassing the enemy in his march around Bear Hill, Captain John Fenno, with a brass field-piece and sixty men, was dispatched from Fort Montgomery.⁶

The troops under Colonels Bruyn and McLaughry were immediately attacked and driven before the enemy into Fort Clinton, notwithstanding they contested the ground "inch by inch";⁷ and Sir Henry Clinton ordered his

¹ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Document III.

² Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Document II.

³ As these reinforcements did not reach the forts, it has been supposed the messenger acted treacherously and withheld the letter. There is no evidence, however, of this, and Judge Marshall attributes the delay to the absence of Gen. Putnam.—⁴ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II. See also Gov. Clinton to the Prov. Cong. of N. Y., Oct. 7, 1777; Letter from Kingston, Oct. 9, cited by Barber and Howe; Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 175; Gordon, ii. p. 555.—⁵ Gov. Clinton to Prov. Cong., Oct. 7.

⁶ Plan of the attack on the Forts, in Stedman's Hist. of the War.—⁷ Stedman, i. p. 360.—⁸ Plan of the attack, &c., in Stedman.—⁹ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

¹⁰ Ibid. See also his letter to Prov. Cong., Oct. 7; Letter from Kingston, Oct. 9, cited by Barber and Howe; Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 175.—¹¹ Ibid.—¹² Ibid.

column to advance towards the fort.¹ A heavy abatis, extending from the Hudson to Sinnipink Lake—a small sheet of water at the foot of Bear Hill—obstructed his progress for half a mile;² and a party from the garrison, stationed behind a stone breastwork, also offered a spirited resistance;³ but the superior force which he brought against them finally drove them from the ground, and he occupied that position until the column under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell had reached Fort Montgomery and commenced the attack on that post.⁴

The field-piece under Captain Fenno, with another body of sixty men who had been detached to support him, had only just reached the position to which they had been ordered, when Lieutenant-colonel Campbell and his division approached them, and a spirited discharge of grape-shot arrested his progress.⁵ After repeated attempts to force a passage, in which he was repulsed with considerable loss, he filed his men to the right and left of the defile, and endeavored, by passing around it, through the woods, to surround Captain Fenno's party. Perceiving the object of this movement, the Captain spiked the field-piece and retreated with but very little loss, except that of Captain Fenno, who was made prisoner.⁶ A twelve-pounder, under the direction of Colonel John Lamb, had also been

stationed in a commanding position, and by a spirited discharge of grape-shot, served to check the progress of Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, as well as to cover the retreat of the party commanded by Captain Fenno;¹ and all, finally, reached the fort without sustaining any serious loss.²

At about five o'clock a flag approached Fort Montgomery—where Governor George Clinton then was—demanding the surrender of the fort. Colonel Henry Livingston, who received the flag, announced the intention to defend the forts to the last extremity, demanding, in his turn, the surrender of the force which appeared before the works.³ Immediately afterwards the assault was commenced, simultaneously, on both the forts by the enemy's land forces;⁴ while the galleys under Sir James Wallace, and the ships under Commodore Hotham, pressed forward up the river, to distract the attention of the garrisons, and to render such assistance as they were enabled to afford.⁵

General Sir Henry Clinton, leaving the regiment of Trumbach (which Governor Tryon had ordered to his assistance) at the stone wall, to cover the retreat, if misfortune overtook him,⁶

¹ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Same to Provincial Congress, Oct. 7.—² Ibid.

³ Ibid. It has been said by some writers that the flag threatened to put the garrisons to the sword, if they refused to surrender without resistance, but Gov. Clinton makes no reference to such a threat, although he enters fully upon the message and the answer of Col. Livingston.

⁴ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.; Gov. Clinton to Prov. Cong., Oct. 7; Steedman, i. p. 360; Hall's Civil War, p. 329.—⁵ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.

⁶ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.

¹ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.—² Ibid.

³ Ibid. See also Hall's Civil War, p. 328.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II; Same to Provincial Congress, Oct. 7.—⁶ Ibid.

advanced against Fort Clinton, through an abatis of four hundred yards, and in the face of ten pieces of artillery, which commanded the approach.¹ He ordered the works to be stormed, and not a shot was fired by his men.² After a desperate resistance from the garrison,³ whose numbers were insufficient to man the lines,⁴ the works were carried at the point of the bayonet.⁵

Meanwhile the attack on Fort Montgomery was resisted with equal gallantry,⁶ and Lieutenant-colonel Campbell fell at the head of his division.⁷ The command then devolved on Lieutenant-colonel Beverly Robinson,⁸ under whose command the lines were carried, at almost the same moment that Fort Clinton surrendered.⁹

Taking advantage of the darkness and of their knowledge of the ground, Governor George Clinton, General James Clinton, and the greater part of the garrisons, escaped from the works after

the enemy had taken possession of them;¹ and they returned to their homes, or to the camp of General Putnam, as they found opportunities to do so.²

The loss of the Americans was about two hundred and fifty men, killed, wounded, and missing;³ of whom General James Clinton, who was wounded in the thigh by a bayonet,⁴ and Lieutenant-colonels Livingston, Bruyn, and McLaughry, among the prisoners,⁵ were the principal.

The enemy's loss was reported to be about forty killed, including Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, Count Grabowski, a Polish nobleman, who was serving as an aid-de-camp to Sir Henry Clinton, Majors Sill and Grant, and about one hundred and fifty wounded.⁶

The forts having fallen, the command of the boom, chain, and chevaux-de-frise passed into the hands of the enemy.⁷ Two frigates, two galleys, and an armed sloop, which laid above the obstructions, attempted to escape by sailing up the river, but the wind failing, the crews set fire to them and abandoned them.⁸ Early the next day the

¹ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.; Stedman, i. pp. 360, 361; Hall's Civil War, p. 329.

² Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.; Stedman, i. p. 361.—³ Stedman, i. p. 361.

⁴ Gov. Clinton (*Dispatch*, Doc. II.) says the aggregate of both garrisons "did not exceed six hundred men, and many of these unarmed militia." See also Leake's Lamb, p. 178.

⁵ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 164) relates an interesting anecdote, communicated to him by Beverly Garrison, hereinbefore mentioned. He says that the last gun fired by the Americans was touched off by the celebrated *Molly Pitcher*, whose exploits at Monmouth, in 1778, are well known. Her husband belonged to the artillery, and as the enemy entered the fort he dropped his match and fled. Molly picked it up, touched off the piece, and scampered after him. Molly lived and died near the fort after the war.

⁶ Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 178.—⁷ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.—⁸ Ibid.—⁹ Ibid

¹ Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Same to Prov. Cong., Oct. 7; Same to ——, Oct. 8; Stedman, i. p. 360; Letter from Kingston, cited by Barber.—² Gen. Putnam's dispatch, Doc. I.

³ Marshall, iii. p. 309. Mr. Eager (*Hist. of Orange Co.*, pp. 576–578) gives the names of 237 who were taken prisoners, which, doubtless, included all the wounded.

⁴ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Same to Prov. Cong., Oct. 7.—⁵ Marshall, iii. p. 309.

⁶ Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.; Hall's Civil War, p. 330.—⁷ Marshall, iii. p. 309.

⁸ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.; Com. Hotham's dispatch, Doc. IV.; Stedman, i. pp. 363, 364.

obstructions were forced; Fort Constitution (opposite West Point) was abandoned;¹ and the wanton destruction of the Continental Village² and Esopus speedily followed.³

These disasters arrested the attention of the Continental Congress, by whom, on the twenty-eighth of November, an inquiry was ordered to be made into the loss of the forts, and into the conduct of the principal officers commanding them.⁴ The commissioners, to whom the subject was referred, met in Fishkill in the following March; but the outraged feelings of the people had been so emphatically declared in their express determination to render no assistance or support while *he* retained the command of the post,⁵ and the charges,

in which his sympathy with the cause of the enemy was seriously complained of, had become so powerful,¹ that General Putnam was *removed from the command of the department*,² and never afterwards held an independent command,—the superintendence of the recruiting department in Connecticut being the post to which he was afterwards ordered.

The report of the commissioners confirmed the judgment of the people when it declared “the loss to have been occasioned by want of men, and not by any fault in the commanders;”³ and General Putnam, who had refused to strengthen the garrisons,⁴ and by whom they had been *reduced*, less than twenty-four hours before the enemy moved to the attack,⁵ stood forth the only person on whom the terrible responsibility could be imposed.

¹ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.; Stedman, i. p. 364.

² Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. III.; Com. Howtham's dispatch, Doc. IV.; Stedman, i. pp. 364, 365.

³ Stedman, i. pp. 365, 366; Marshall, iii. p. 310; Hall's Civil War, pp. 331, 332.—⁴ Journals of Cong., Friday, Nov. 28, 1777.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Gen. Putnam, “Valley Forge, 16th March, 1778.”

¹ R. R. Livingston to Gen. Washington, Jan. 14, 1778.

² Gen. Washington to Gen. Putnam, March 16, 1778.

³ Humphrey's Life of Putnam, p. 120.

⁴ Leake's Life of Lamb, p. 174.

⁵ Gov. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GENERAL PUTNAM'S DISPATCH TO GENERAL
WASHINGTON.

FISHKILL, 8th October, 1777.

DEAR GENERAL:—It is with the utmost reluctance I now sit down to inform you that the enemy, after making a variety of movements up and down the North River, landed on the morning of the 4th instant, about three thousand men at Tarrytown; and, after making an excursion five miles up the country, they returned and re-embarked the morning following, advanced up near King's Ferry, and landed on the east side of the river; but, in the evening, part of them re-embarked, and the morning after landed a little above King's Ferry, on the west side. The morning being so exceedingly foggy, concealed their scheme, and prevented us from gaining any idea as to the number of troops they landed. In about three hours we discovered a large fire at the ferry, which we imagined to be the store-houses; upon which it was thought they only landed with a view of destroying the said houses. The picket and scouts which we had out could not learn the exact number of the enemy that were remaining on the east side of the river; but, from the best accounts, they were about fifteen hundred. At the same time a number of ships and galleys, with about forty flat-boats, made every appearance of their intention to land troops, both at Fort Independence and Peekskill Landing.

These circumstances, and my strength, being not more than twelve hundred Continental troops and three hundred militia, prevented me from detaching a party to attack

the enemy that day on the east side of the river.

After we had thought it impracticable to quit the heights, which we had then possession of, and attack the enemy, Brigadier-general Parsons and myself went to reconnoitre the ground near the enemy; and on our return from thence, we were alarmed with a very heavy and hot firing, both of small-arms and cannon, at Fort Montgomery, which immediately convinced me that the enemy had landed a large body of men in the morning, at the time and place before mentioned. Upon which I immediately detached five hundred men to reinforce the garrison; but, before they could possibly cross the river to their assistance, the enemy, far superior in numbers, had possessed themselves of the fort.

Never did men behave with more spirit and activity than our troops upon this occasion. They repulsed the enemy three times, who were in number at least five to one. Governor Clinton and General James Clinton were both present; but the engagement continuing till dusk, gave them both an opportunity, together with several officers and a number of privates, to make their escape. Governor Clinton arrived at Peekskill the same evening, about 11 o'clock, and with the advice of him, General Parsons, and several other officers, it was thought impossible to maintain the post at Peekskill with the force then present, against one that the enemy might, in a few hours, bring on the heights in our rear. It was therefore agreed, that the stores ought to be immediately removed to some secure place, and the troops take post at Fishkill, until a reinforcement of militia shall come to their aid.

I am, &c.,

ISRAEL PUTNAM.

II.

GOVERNOR GEORGE CLINTON'S DISPATCH TO GEN.
WASHINGTON.

NEW WINDSOR, October 9, 1777.

DEAR GENERAL:—I have to inform you, that in consequence of intelligence received by General Putnam from General Parsons (who lay with his brigade at the White Plains), of the enemy's having received a reinforcement from Europe, at New York, and that by their movements there was reason to believe they intended an attack on Peekskill, and to possess themselves of the passes in the Highlands, the General immediately wrote to me these circumstances; and to prevent, if possible, the disagreeable consequences that might arise if the army at the different posts was not timely reinforced, I ordered that part of the militia of this State that had not already marched to the northward, to move, and part of them to join General Putnam, and the remainder to reinforce the posts of Fort Montgomery and Fort Clinton; but, it being a critical time with the yeomanry, as they had not yet sown their grain, and there being at that time no appearance of the enemy, they were extremely restless and uneasy. They solicited General Putnam for leave to return, and many of them went home without his permission. Urged by these considerations, he thought proper to dismiss a part of them.

As I thought it essentially necessary that they should remain in the field for some time, in order to check the progress of the enemy, should they attempt to put their designs into execution, I issued another order for one half of them immediately to march, part of them to join General Putnam, and a sufficient number to reinforce the forts and the pass at Sydman's Bridge, at the mouth of the Clove; and, in order to induce them to turn out with the greater alacrity, I thought it necessary to fix their time of service to one month, at the expiration of which time they were to be relieved by the other half. While this was in agitation, and before a proper arrangement could possibly be made by the respective officers, as to what part

of them could serve for the first month, they were not so expeditious as was absolutely necessary, which the event has fully evinced. A number of the enemy's ships made their appearance on the 3d instant in Tarrytown Bay, where they weighed anchor the next day, being joined by several ships of war and transports from New York. They proceeded up the river as high as King's Ferry, and at daybreak on Sunday, the 5th, landed a considerable body of men on Verplanck's Point.

As I was apprehensive, from many circumstances, that an attack on the forts was intended, I dispatched Major Logan, an alert officer, who was well acquainted with the ground, on Sunday evening, through the mountains, to reconnoitre, and if possible gain intelligence of the enemy's motions. The Major returned about nine o'clock on Monday, informing me that from the best intelligence he could procure, and the rowing of the boats, he had reason to believe they had landed a considerable force on the west side of the river at King's Ferry, and between that and Dunderberg; but as the morning was foggy, it was impossible to discern them, so as to form any judgment of their numbers. As soon as I had obtained this intelligence, I immediately dispatched Lieutenant Jackson with a small party to discover the enemy's movements; but they had not proceeded more than two miles on the Haverstraw road, when they were attacked by a party of the enemy, who had formed an ambuscade at a place called Doodletown. They immediately retreated, after returning the fire. As soon as the firing was heard, I detached Lieutenant-colonel Bruyn with fifty Continental troops, and as many of the militia under Lieutenant-colonel McLaughry, to sustain Lieutenant Jackson; the garrison being at the same time so weak, that we could not afford them greater aid on that road, and I imagined it would be necessary to send out a party, likewise, on the road which leads to the Forest of Dean. The detachments under Colonels Bruyn and McLaughry were soon engaged, but, being too weak to withstand the enemy's great force, retreated to Fort Clinton, disputing the ground inch by inch. Their gallant opposition, and the roughness of the ground, checked

the progress of the enemy for some time. While matters were in this situation in the neighborhood of Fort Clinton, a large body of the enemy were advancing on the road which leads from the Forest of Dean to Fort Montgomery. As I had only one field-piece at the above fort, I ordered Colonel Lamb of the artillery to send it off to an advantageous post on that road, with a covering party of sixty men, and another of the same number to sustain them, in order to give the enemy a check, and retard their movements till I could receive a reinforcement from General Putnam, to whom I had sent an express for that purpose. This order being immediately complied with, the piece had hardly reached the place of its destination, and the covering party been posted on strong ground, when the enemy was seen advancing with hasty strides; but, being unexpectedly annoyed by discharges of grape-shot from the field-piece and a well-directed fire from the muskets, which made great havoc among them, as we have since been informed, they were repeatedly driven back, till filing off through the woods upon the right and left, with a view of surrounding our men, and the handful of brave fellows being alarmed at their critical situation, they were constrained to abandon their field-piece, after rendering it useless to the enemy by spiking it. In order to cover the men who were retreating, and to check the farther progress of the enemy, I ordered out a twelve-pounder, which, being well served with grape-shot, annoyed them greatly, and gave the men an opportunity of retreating into the garrison with but very little loss on our side, except that of Captain Feno, who commanded the field-piece, and was made a prisoner.

This was about two o'clock in the afternoon; and the enemy approached the works and began the attack, which continued, with few intervals, till about five o'clock, when an officer appeared with a flag. I ordered Lieutenant-colonel Livingston to meet him without the works and know his business. Colonel Livingston having demanded his rank and business, he was told by the bearer of the flag that he was Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, and that he came to demand the surrender of the fort, to prevent

the effusion of blood. Colonel Livingston replied that he had no authority to treat with him, but if they would surrender themselves prisoners of war, they might depend upon being well treated; and if they did not choose to accept of those terms, they might renew the attack as soon as he should return within the fort, he being determined to defend it to the last extremity. As soon as Lieutenant-colonel Livingston returned, the attack was renewed with great violence; and after as obstinate a resistance as our situation and the weakness of the garrison would admit, having defended the works from two o'clock till the dusk of the evening, the enemy, by the superiority of numbers, forced the works on all sides. The want of men prevented us from sustaining and supporting every part, having received no reinforcement from General Putnam.

Our loss, killed, wounded, and prisoners, is not so great as might have been expected, when the strength of the enemy, and our weakness, are properly considered. My brother was wounded with a bayonet. Many officers and men, and myself, having the advantage of the enemy by being well acquainted with the ground, were so fortunate as to effect our escape under cover of the night, after the enemy were possessed of all the works. I was so happy as to get into a boat, crossed the river, and immediately waited on General Putnam, with a view ofconcerting measures for our future operations, to prevent the designs of General Clinton, and impede his progress in facilitating the movements of Burgoyne from the Northward.

I can assure your Excellency that I am well convineed, if night had not approached too fast to correspond with our wishes, the enemy would have been disappointed in their expectations; as a reinforcement of five hundred men from General Putnam's army were at the east side of the river, ready to pass for our relief, when the works were forced; and many of the militia were in the mountains, on their march to join us, had not the communication between us and them been cut off.

I have to add, that by some fatality, the two Continental frigates were lost, they having been ordered down by General Putnam for the de-

fence of the chain; but being badly manned, they could not be got off in time, though I ordered the ship Congress to proceed to Fort Constitution the day before the attack, lest she should meet with a disaster; and the ship Montgomery, which lay near the chain, having neither anchor nor cables to secure her, it being the ebb of tide, and the wind failing, fell down so near the chain, that Captain Hodge was constrained to set her on fire, to prevent her from falling into the hands of the enemy. The Congress, unfortunately getting aground on the flat near Fort Constitution, shared the same fate. Fort Constitution, being destitute of troops to defend it, was evacuated, after bringing off part of the stores. I am now about three miles from New Windsor, with Colonel Samuel B. Webb's regiment of Continental troops, the remains of Colonel Dubois's, about one hundred of Colonel Lamb's regiment, who escaped from the fort, and some militia; and I intend to collect what force I possibly can, to oppose the enemy, should they land on this side of the river. Sir Henry Clinton commanded in person. Governor Tryon, General Vaughan, and two other general officers, were with him.

The army who attacked us, by the lowest account, consisted of three thousand, chiefly British and Hessian troops. The garrison of both our posts did not exceed six hundred men, and many of these unarmed militia. The ordinary garrison was thus reduced by detaching Major Moffatt, with two hundred men, to the post at Sydman's Bridge, and Colonel Malcolm's regiment being ordered from thence, and sixty men on Anthony's Nose, by General Putnam's orders, received the day before the action. I have only to add, that where great losses are sustained, however unavoidable, public censure is generally the consequence to those who are immediately concerned. If, in the present instance, this should be the case, I wish, so far as relates to Fort Montgomery and its dependencies, it may fall on me alone; for I should be guilty of the greatest injustice, were I not to declare that the officers and men under me, of the different corps, behaved with the greatest spirit and bravery.

I am, &c.,

GEORGE CLINTON.

III.

GENERAL SIR HENRY CLINTON'S DISPATCH TO
GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE.

FORT MONTGOMERY, October 9, 1777.

SIR:—In the last letter which I had the honor to write to your Excellency, I mentioned my intention, with the small force that could be spared from the important post you had left under my command, to make an attack upon Forts Clinton, Montgomery, &c. Your Excellency recollects the situation of these forts, that they are separated by a creek which comes from the mountain, and communicate with each other by a bridge. In my opinion, the only way of effecting it was by a *coup-de-main* in the unguarded state they then were. The Commodore and I having made our arrangements, and every proper jealousy having been given for every object but the real one, the little army, consisting of about three thousand men, arrived off Verplanck's Point, preceded by the galleys under the command of Sir James Wallace. On our appearance, the enemy retired without firing a shot, leaving a twelve-pounder behind them; and Sir James moved up to Peekskill Neck to mask the only communication they had across the river on this side the Highlands.

At daybreak on the 6th, the troops disembarked at Stony Point. The *avante-garde* of five hundred regulars and four hundred *Provincials*,¹ commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, with Colonel Robinson of the *Provincials* under him, began its march to occupy the pass of Thunder Hill.² This *avante-garde*, after it had passed that mountain, was to proceed by a detour of seven miles round the hill, and *de-bouchee* in the rear of Fort Montgomery, while General Vaughan, with twelve hundred men,³ was to continue his march towards Fort Clinton, covering the corps under Lieutenant-colonel

¹ Fifty-second and Twenty-seventh regiments, Loyal Americans, New York Volunteers, and Emerick's Provincial chasseurs.—² Dunderberg.

³ Grenadiers and light-infantry, Twenty-sixth and Sixty-third regiments, one company of the Seventy-first, one troop of dismounted dragoons, Hessian chasseurs.

Campbell, and *dportée* to co-operate, by attacking Fort Clinton, or, in case of misfortune, to favor the retreat. Major-general Tryon, with the remainder, being the rear-guard,¹ and leave a battalion at the pass of Thunder Hill, to open our communication with the fleet.

Your Excellency, recollecting the many, and I may say, extraordinary difficulties of this march over the mountains, every natural obstruction, and all that art could invent to add to them, will not be surprised that the corps intended to attack Fort Montgomery in the rear could not get to its ground before five o'clock; about which time I ordered General Vaughan's corps, *dportée* to begin the attack at Fort Clinton, to push, if possible, and dislodge the enemy from their advanced station behind a stone breastwork, having in front, for half a mile, a most impenetrable abatis. This the General, by his good disposition, obliged the enemy to quit, though supported by cannon, got possession of the wall, and there waited the motion of the co-operating troops, when I joined him, and soon afterwards heard Lieutenant-colonel Campbell begin his attack. I chose to wait a favorable moment before I ordered the attack on the side of Fort Clinton, which was a circular height, defended by a line for musketry, with a barbet-battery in the centre of three guns, and flanked by two redoubts; the approaches to it through a continued abatis of four hundred yards, defensive every inch, and exposed to the fire of ten pieces of cannon. As the night was approaching, I was determined to seize the first favorable instant. A brisk attack on the Montgomery side; the galleys with their oars approaching, firing, and even striking the fort; the men-of-war that moment appearing, crowding all sail to support us; the extreme ardor of the troops; in short, all determined me to order the attack. General Vaughan's spirited behavior and good conduct did the rest. Having no time to lose, I particularly ordered that not a shot should be fired; in this I was strictly obeyed, and both redoubts, &c., were stormed. General Tryon advanced with one battalion, to support General Vaughan in case it might be

necessary, and he arrived in time to join the cry of victory.

Trumbach's regiment was posted at the stone-wall to cover our retreat in case of misfortune. The night being dark, it was near eight o'clock before we could be certain of the success of the attack on Fort Montgomery, which we afterwards found had succeeded at the same instant that of Fort Clinton did, and that by the excellent disposition of Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, who was unfortunately killed in the first attack, but seconded by Colonel Robinson,¹ of the Loyal American regiment, by whose knowledge of the country I was much aided in forming my plan, and to whose spirited conduct in the execution of it, I impute in a great measure the success of the enterprise.

Our loss was not very considerable, excepting in some respectable officers, who were killed in the attack.

About ten o'clock at night the rebels set fire to their two ships, Montgomery and Congress, some galleys, and other armed vessels, with their cannon, stores, &c., in them.

I have the honor to send to your Excellency a return of the cannon, stores, &c., taken. That of stores is very considerable, this being, I believe, their principal magazine.

The Commodore has assisted me with his advice and every effort. We sent a joint summons to Fort Constitution, but our flag meeting with an insolent reception, unknown in any war, we determined to chastise, and therefore an embarkation, under Major-general Tryon and Sir James Wallace, with the galleys, was ordered. They found the fort evacuated in the greatest confusion, their store-houses burnt, but their cannon were left unspiked. The Commodore immediately ordered Sir James Wallace up the river, and if it should be possible to find a passage through the chevaux-de-frise, between Polypus Island and the main, he may probably do most essential service.

In justice to Captain Pownall, who commanded the flat-boats, and the officers under him, I

¹ Royal Fusileers and Hessian regiment of Trumbach.

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¹ Col. Beverly Robinson, whose residence, near West Point, is well known in the narrative of Major André's history.

must mention to your Excellency that service could not have been more zealously or punctually attended to.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
H. CLINTON, *Lieut.-Gen.*

P. S.—*Oct. 9, 10 o'clock at night.*—Major-general Tryon, whom I dispatched this morning with Emerick's chasseurs, fifty jagers, the Royal Fusileers, and regiment of Trumbach, with two three-pounders, to destroy the rebel settlement, the Continental Village, has just returned, and reported to me that he has burned barracks for fifteen hundred men, several store-houses, and loaded wagons. The extreme badness of the weather making it necessary to be expeditious as possible, no account could be taken of the stores, but I believe them to have been considerable. I need not point out to your Excellency the consequence of destroying this post, as it was the only establishment of the rebels in that part of the Highlands, and the place from whence any neighboring body of troops drew their supplies. Fanning's and Bayard's corps marched from Verplanck's Point to co-operate with General Tryon, but finding he met with no opposition, they were ordered back to their post.

H. C.

IV.

EXTRACT FROM COMMODORE HOTHAM'S DISPATCH TO ADMIRAL HOWE.

Sir Henry Clinton having thought it advisable to make a diversion up the North River, and the necessary arrangements being made in consequence, the flat-boats and bateaux on the 3d instant proceeded to Spuyten-devil Creek in three divisions, under the Captains Pownall, Jordan, and Stanhope—Captain Pownall having the direction of the whole.

A body of about eleven hundred troops were embarked in them that evening, and the same night proceeded to Tarrytown, where they landed at daybreak, and occupied the heights adjoining. A second division, nearly of that number, marched out at the same time from Kingsbridge,

and formed a junction by land with those who passed by water. The squadron under Captain Onmaney had moved up the day before to receive them; the smaller part of it, namely, the galleys and armed vessels (as they might be to act separately), I thought it advisable on this occasion to make a distinct command, and could not place them better than under the direction of Sir James Wallace, whose knowledge of the river, as well as Captain Onmaney's, we fully experienced the advantage of.

The third division of troops were embarked in transports, and on the 4th, in the morning, left New York, under convoy of the *Preston*, and in course of the same tide arrived off Tarrytown. The general embarkation was that night made, and the wind being still favorable, the whole, preceded by the squadron under Sir James Wallace, as an advanced guard, reached Verplanck's Point at noon the day following, and those in the flat-boats landed with appearance only of an opposition. Sir James Wallace was immediately dispatched higher up the river, to cut off the enemy's communication by Peekskill Ferry.

The 6th, at daybreak, the general debarkation took place, and all the troops, except about four hundred, who were left to secure Verplanck's Neck, were soon landed at Stoney Point, upon the opposite shore, from whence they had about twelve miles to march, through a mountainous and rugged road, to Forts Clinton and Montgomery.

The ships and transports then moved higher up, and anchored opposite Peekskill Landing.

In the afternoon, the advanced squadron and the two frigates got under sail and opened Fort Montgomery, with a view only to make an appearance, and thereby to cause a diversion in favor of the attack, which we observed had now begun. Sir James, by the help of his oars, now got near enough with the galleys to throw some shot into the fort. The cannonading and fire of musketry continued till night, when, by a most spirited exertion, a general and vigorous assault was made, and the two important forts of Clinton and Montgomery fell by storm to His Majesty's arms, on which I have the honor to congratulate your lordship most sincerely. The

rebel frigates are both burnt, with a galley, and a sloop of ten guns is taken.

The loss on the enemy's side is not yet exactly known, but they are supposed to have had about two hundred killed and two hundred and fifty taken prisoners. The greatest loss on the side of the King's troops are about forty killed, among whom are some valuable officers, namely, Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, Major Sill, Major Grant, and Captain Stewart, and about one hundred and fifty wounded.

A summons, signed by Sir Henry Clinton and myself, was the next day sent up to Fort Constitution by a flag of truce, which, being fired at, returned, and determined the General immediately to correct the insult by an attack. An embarkation was accordingly made on the morning of the 8th, and proceeded up the river for that purpose, under cover of the galleys.

We found, upon our arrival, the fort had been abandoned in great confusion, their barracks burnt, but all their artillery left. The whole number of cannon taken in three forts amount to sixty-seven, with a large quantity of provisions, ammunition, and stores of all kinds to a very considerable amount. I have directed such part of the chain and boom as cannot be saved to be destroyed: the construction of both give strong proofs of labor, industry, and skill.

Sir James Wallace, with his flying squadron, is gone still higher up the river, and if he passes the chevaux-de-frise at Pellipus Island he may do essential service, as there can be nothing to give him essential interruption.

When it is considered that this attack was made after a most fatiguing march over precipices, and through roads almost impenetrable, which made it impossible for the troops to avail themselves of the use of cannon, so necessary for such a purpose, and the little assistance they could therein promise themselves from the ships; the access through the Highlands to the forts, rendering the approach to them so precarious, it redounds the more to the credit of the enterprise, which was formed and executed with equal judgment, valor, and success.

The captains, officers, and men under my command, have been so strenuously zealous in their exertions upon this occasion, that every

testimony is due from me in approbation of their conduct during this service of fatigue, of which Captain Pownall has had his share, and is well able to inform your lordship of every particular.

I have the pleasure to acquaint your lordship that General Tryon is just returned from Continental Village, where he has destroyed barracks for fifteen hundred men, with stores to a considerable amount.



V.

GENERAL GEORGE CLINTON.

George Clinton, the youngest son of Colonel Charles Clinton, was born at Little Britain, in the town of Hamptonburg, Orange county, New York, July 26th, 1739; and was named after the colonial governor of that name, who was an intimate friend of his father. His education, which was conducted principally by his father, whose accomplishments qualified him for the task, was very complete; and after studying law in the office of William Smith, the historian of New York, he settled in his native county, and speedily rose to eminence in his profession.

In 1768 he was elected to the Colonial Assembly as a representative of Ulster county, and he continued in that body until the opening of the War of the Revolution. In May, 1775, he took his seat in the Continental Congress; and on the fourth of July, 1776, he voted for independence, but having been appointed Brigadier-general of the militia, and the exigencies of his country rendering it necessary for him to take the field, he left immediately after his vote had been given, and before the instrument was transcribed for the signatures of members, for which reason his name does not appear among the signers.

He entered the field at the head of the State troops, and participated in the several movements around New York to the close of the campaign of 1776. On the 25th March, 1777, he was made Brigadier-general in the Continental army.

When the State of New York had adopted

its constitution, he was elected *both Governor and Lieutenant-governor at the same time*. Accepting the former office, Pierre Van Cortland, of Westchester county, was chosen to the latter, and discharged the duties of both, during the greater part of the time, while Governor Clinton, at the head of the New York troops, nobly battled with the enemies of his country. Cordially co-operating with General Washington, the services of Governor Clinton were invaluable in preserving the army from ruin, and in preventing the enemy from separating the Eastern from the Middle and the Southern States. His gallantry in action has been noticed in this chapter; and his enemies, as well as his friends, have borne testimony to his bravery and good judgment.

For eighteen successive years he filled the gubernatorial chair, when ill health compelled him to seek repose in private life. In 1800 he reluctantly consented to take a seat in the legislature of the State, where his influence, exerted against the assumption by the government of doubtful powers, promoted the political revolution which followed, and obliged him to accept the office of governor in the following year. In 1804 he was elected Vice-president of the United States, in which office he continued until his death, on the 20th April, 1812.

"Eminent in council, and distinguished in war, he filled, with unexampled usefulness, purity, and ability, the offices to which he was called. While he lived, his virtue, wisdom, and valor were the pride, the ornament, and the seenrity of his country; and when he died, he left an illustrious example of a well-spent life, worthy of all imitation."

VI.

GENERAL JAMES CLINTON.

James Clinton, the third son of Colonel Charles Clinton, was born at Little Britain, Hamptonburg, Orange county, New York, on the 9th of August, 1736. Born on the frontiers, with a vigorous constitution, and accustomed to constant alarms from the Indians, he may be said

to have been trained to arms from his youth. In 1757 he was commissioned ensign, in 1758 a lieutenant, and in 1759 a captain in the provincial forces; and in the latter year, with his brother George as his lieutenant, he served under General Bradstreet, and assisted in the capture of Fort Frontenac, with great credit. He continued in the army until the close of the war, and was actively engaged, with the New York troops, in the various stirring events of that important struggle.

When peace secured to Great Britain the extended territories of France on our Northern borders, Captain Clinton returned to his farm in Orange county, married Mary De Witt, a daughter of Egbert De Witt, and enjoyed the comforts of private life, until the Revolution in the colonies called him into the field.

In 1775 Captain Clinton was appointed Colonel of the Third regiment of the New York Line, and on the ninth of August, 1776, he was promoted to the office of Brigadier-general. In the summer of 1776 he was employed in Canada, under General Montgomery, and was before the walls of Quebec when that distinguished officer was killed. In 1777 he was ordered to the Highlands, when the siege of Forts Montgomery and Clinton, related in this chapter, terminated in their capture, after a desperate defence against a greatly superior force. During the greater part of 1778 he commanded at West Point, and was actively engaged in strengthening that important position. In 1779 he commanded that portion of the expedition against the Iroquois Indians which passed up the Mohawk Valley and Otsego Lake; joining General Sullivan's command on the Tioga, August 22d, and proceeding, with him, up that river to Newtown (now Elmira), where the savages were met and defeated. After executing the object of the expedition, and laying waste the countries of the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas, he returned to the Eastward, and resumed his command at West Point. In the fall of 1780 he was ordered to Albany, and took command of the Northern department, under the instructions of the commander-in-chief. In that important post the services of General Clinton were invaluable in disconcerting the schemes of the Tories on the

Northern frontiers, and in supplying the army with provisions. In August, 1781, he joined General Washington, but Congress, as was then too often the case, promoted a junior officer over him, and justly considering it an intended insult, he withdrew from the army. He joined the General when the Americans entered New York, November 25, 1783, and formed one of that memorable party who met at Fraunce's Tavern, at the corner of Pearl and Broad streets, in the city of New York, to bid farewell to his beloved commander, after which he again retired to his farm in Orange county.

He was a delegate from Ulster county in the Constitutional Convention which met in Pough-

keepsie, in June, 1788, where, with his brother, Governor George Clinton, and other master minds, he opposed the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and, to the last, voted against it.

He was afterwards elected to the Senate of the State, was a member of the State Convention for revising its Constitution, and assisted, as a Commissioner, in running the boundary between New York and Pennsylvania.

He died at Little Britain, December 22, 1812. In the words of his illustrious son, De Witt Clinton, "He was a good man and a sincere patriot, performing, in the most exemplary manner, all the duties of life; and he died, as he had lived, without fear and without reproach."

CHAPTER XXXIX.

October 22, 1777.

THE ATTACK ON FORT MERCER, RED BANK, N. J.

THE result of the action at Germantown having, to some extent, established the possession of Philadelphia in the enemy, it became necessary that the passage of the Delaware should be secured, in order that the full benefit of that occupation might be enjoyed, and Philadelphia be made the winter-quarters of the army. In fact, without being able to communicate with the fleet, by water, it was evident that Sir William Howe would be compelled to abandon that city; and, while he anxiously brought the great force under his command to the accomplishment of this object, he was as anxiously opposed by General Washington, with the means of which he was the master.¹

The principal obstacles which obstructed the passage of the river, and checked the progress of the enemy's fleet, were a *chevaux-de-frise* at Byllinge's Point;² a strong redoubt and outworks, named Fort Mifflin, on Mud

Island, a little below the mouth of the Schuylkill River;¹ a strong redoubt, named Fort Mercer, on the eastern bank of the Delaware, opposite Fort Mifflin;² a line of *chevaux-de-frise* between Forts Mifflin and Mercer;³ and a strong naval force, above the works, to defend the stream.⁴ The *chevaux-de-frise* at Byllinge's Point had been forced by Captain Hammond,⁵ while Colonel Sterling had taken possession of the works which covered it,⁶ and several small vessels had passed up the river, casting anchor near Hog Island,

¹ Hall's Civil War, p. 415; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 177; Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 231.

² Marshall's Washington, iii. pp. 177, 202; Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 232.—³ Ibid.

⁴ The following description of the American fleet is taken from Lossing's *Field Book*, ii. p. 293:—Thirteen galleys—one carrying one 32-pounder, two carrying each one 24-pounder, and ten each carrying one 18-pounder; twenty-four galleys, each carrying a 4-pounder; two xebiques, each carrying two 24-pounds, two 18-pounds, and four 9-pounds; two floating batteries, one carrying twelve 18-pounds, the other ten 18-pounds; one ship carrying ten 18-pounds; fourteen fire-ships; one brig of fourteen 6-pounds; one schooner and one brig, each carrying two 18-pounds and two 9-pounds; and a number of fire-rafts.

⁵ Stedman, i. p. 297; Adm'l Howe's dispatch, Doc. V.

⁶ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 181; Adm'l Howe's dispatch, Doc. V.

¹ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 192; De Chastellux' Travels, i. pp. 255, 256; Gordon's New Jersey, p. 252; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 264; Stedman, i. pp. 300, 301.

² Marshall, iii. pp. 177, 178; Lossing's *Field Book*, ii. p. 292.

a short distance below Fort Mifflin.¹ The battle at Germantown appeared to produce no other result than an increased desire, on both sides, to secure the passage of the Delaware; and while General Howe concentrated his forces in and around Philadelphia, and made other dispositions for an attack on the forts,² General Washington withdrew the garrisons, which had been composed of militia, and detached a regiment from the Rhode Island line to Fort Mercer, and one from the Maryland line to Fort Mifflin,—the command of the former being intrusted to Colonel Christopher Greene, of Warwick, Rhode Island, that of the latter to Lieutenant-colonel Samuel Smith, of Baltimore.³ Requisitions on the Governor of New Jersey were also issued, asking for a detachment of militia to strengthen the garrison at Fort Mercer, and for the organization of a covering party, whose duty it should be to cover the rear of the works and check the operations of any force which might attack the fort in that quarter.⁴ Orders were also given to obstruct the channel of the river, above the works, by sinking some of the vessels which could be dispensed with;⁵ and, by transferring their crews to other vessels, render the naval force more efficient; while the utmost activity prevailed in cutting off the supplies which the enemy's gold and silver were seducing from the farmers and traders, both of Pennsylvania

and New Jersey.¹ At the same time General Washington, with the main body of the army, reoccupied the position from which he had marched to attack the enemy at Germantown, with the intention of acting offensively, as circumstances might warrant.²

To counteract these measures, on the fourteenth of October,³ General Howe erected some batteries at the mouth of the Schuylkill, but the American naval force attacked and silenced them.⁴ The next night a detachment was sent to occupy and strengthen Province Island—between Mud Island and the Pennsylvania shore; but the naval force was again put into requisition, and the detachment was taken prisoners.⁵ Another and more successful attempt was afterwards made by the enemy,⁶ and Province Island continued to harass the garrison at Fort Mifflin, compelling it to throw up new works for the protection of the men who worked the guns, and defeating two gallant attempts to storm it, which were made by Colonel Smith.⁷

The militia from New Jersey did not respond to the requisition of General Washington,⁸ and the garrisons having been greatly reduced in numbers by sickness, they were strengthened by de-

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 195.—² Ibid., p. 196.

³ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 415. Mr. Lossing supposes these works were not commenced until after Count Donop's repulse at Red Bank, but I have preferred to follow Lieut. Hall, who was with the enemy, and possessed unusually fine opportunities to procure correct information.—⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 196; Adm'l Lord Howe's dispatch, Doc. V.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp 415, 416; Marshall, iii. p. 197; Stedman, i. p. 298.

⁷ Marshall, iii. p. 197.—⁸ Ibid.

¹ Irving, iii. p. 292.—² Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Oct. 24, 1777.—³ Marshall, iii. pp. 179, 193.

⁴ Ibid., p. 193.—⁵ Ibid., p. 194.

tachments from the Continental lines;—that ordered to Fort Mercer being Colonel Angell's Rhode Island regiment;¹ that to Fort Mifflin a portion of Colonel Greene's Virginia regiment,²—making the effective force of each about four hundred men.³

At length the removal of these obstructions became a matter of stern necessity, and a combined military and naval attack was ordered.⁴ On the twenty-first of October, Count Donop was detached with the grenadier regiments of Donop, Mingerode, and Linsing; the regiment of the line, Mirbach; and the infantry chasseurs, all Hessians, to attack Fort Mereer in the rear;⁵ while the works on Province Island, mounting two eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, two eight-inch mortars, and two eight-inch howitzers, were to assault the rear and flank of Fort Mifflin,⁶ and the naval force, under Admiral Lord Howe, was to attack them in front.⁷

Count Donop and his command crossed the Delaware at Cooper's Ferry, opposite Philadelphia, and marched as far as Haddonfield, where they remained all night.⁸ At three o'clock in the morning they resumed their march, but the guard at Timber Creek having re-

moved the bridge on their approach, they were compelled to make a *detour*, and crossed the creek at a bridge¹ four miles above.² This so much retarded their progress, that their advanced party did not reach the vicinity of the fort until twelve o'clock, and not until half-past four was it summoned to surrender.³ This military formality was performed by a Hessian officer, who employed the most insolent language, and displayed, in a peculiar manner, the haughty, disdainful spirit, which characterized all the actions of these ignorant mercenaries. Preceded by a drummer, he stalked towards the fort, and delivered his message in these words: "The King of England orders his rebellious subjects to lay down their arms; and they are warned, that if they stand the battle, no quarters whatever will be given." The answer of Colonel Greene was, that he and the garrison accepted the challenge, and there should be no quarter on either side.⁴

At a quarter before five the enemy opened his fire on the fort;⁵ and, soon afterwards, he advanced in two columns to the assault,⁶—one towards the northern, the other, led by Count Donop in person, towards the southern side of the works.⁷ On reaching the outer works of the fort (which had been evacuated by the garrison in consequence of its

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 198.—² Ibid.—³ Irving, iii. pp. 292, 293.—⁴ Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 264; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 416; Marshall, iii. p. 201; Stedman, i. p. 301.

⁵ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. IV.

⁶ Gordon's New Jersey, p. 253; Hist. of Civil War, i. pp. 264, 265; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 1; Marshall, iii. pp. 201, 202; Adm'l Howe's dispatch, Doc. V.

⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. IV.

¹ Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II. Mr. Lossing and some other writers say "this was a *fording-place*."

² Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II.—³ Ibid.

⁴ De Chastellux, i. p. 262.—⁵ Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ De Chastellux, i. pp. 262, 264.

inability to man the entire lines),¹ the enemy supposed the fort had been abandoned, and this supposition was strengthened by the garrison remaining perfectly quiet within the inner works.² The drummer (who had accompanied the flag before referred to, and whose manners had excited the indignation of the garrison at that time) struck up a lively tune, and, with a shout of victory, the enemy marched towards the inner works with all the precision observed on the parade.³ They passed the *abatis*, gained the ditch, and some few scaled the pickets, when a well-directed fire was opened by the garrison.⁴ The obnoxious drummer and the officer who had borne the flag were among the first who fell,⁵ and terrible execution was done among the assailants. This was produced, in part, by a cross-fire, to which they were exposed from a part of a curtain of the old intrenchment, behind which a party of the garrison had been thrown to harass their flank.⁶

The attack was maintained with great obstinacy, and the officers were seen to rally their men wherever any signs of weakness were manifested.⁷ Count Donop, especially, was among the most active, until the insignia of the orders to which he belonged pointed him out to the American marksmen, and he fell, mortally wounded, among those whom he had commanded.⁸ At length the as-

sailants retired, and attempted to redeem their fortunes by attacking the works on the side of the escarpment; but here they were also exposed to the fire from the galleys in the river, and they again retreated with great loss, and found safety in the wood, under cover of which they had approached the fort.¹

The column which attacked the fort on the opposite side was equally unsuccessful. Notwithstanding the men succeeded in passing the *abatis*,² and *fossé*,³ and in mounting the *berme*,⁴ they were stopped by the *fraises*,⁵ with which the ramparts were provided, and were taken prisoners.⁶

The force of the enemy was not less than twelve hundred men,⁷ that of the garrison about four hundred:⁸ the loss of the former was Lieutenant-colonel Mingerode, three captains, four lieutenants, and nearly seventy non-commissioned officers and privates killed, and Count Donop, his brigade-major, one captain, one lieutenant, and upwards of seventy non-commissioned officers and privates wounded and prisoners, besides

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. IV.; De Chastellux, i. p. 263.—² "Piles of trees, or branches of trees, sharpened, and laid with their points outwards in front of ramparts, to prevent assailants from mounting the walls."—Webster

³ "A ditch or moat."—Webster.

⁴ "A space of ground of three, four, or five feet in width, left between the rampart and the fossé or moat."—Webster.

⁶ "A defence consisting of pointed stakes driven into the ramparts, in a horizontal or inclined position."—Webster.

⁶ De Chastellux, i. p. 264.

⁷ Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II.; Marshall, iii. p. 201. De Chastellux (i. p. 261) says it was twenty-five hundred.—⁸ Gordon, iii. pp. 1, 2. De Chastellux says there were but three hundred in the fort, and as Mauduit, who held a command there, gave him the information, he is entitled to respect.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. IV.; De Chastellux, i. p. 262; Marshall, iii. p. 202.—² Irving, iii. pp. 294, 295.

³ De Chastellux, i. p. 262.—⁴ Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II.; De Chastellux, i. pp. 262, 263.—⁵ De Chastellux, i. p. 262.—⁶ Ibid., p. 263.—⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Ibid.

those which were taken away:¹ that of the garrison, one captain, five sergeants, one fifer, and seven privates killed; one captain taken prisoner; and one ensign, two sergeants, and twenty privates wounded.²

It does not appear that Count Donop received the support from the enemy's fleet, or from his works on Province Island, which he had expected to receive. Indeed, it was not until half-past six on the morning of the twenty-third that the latter opened their fire, and the fleet did not commence its operations until seven o'clock.³ Nor was the fire then opened on Fort Mercer,⁴—the works on Mud Island (Fort Mifflin⁵),

and the fleet¹ above the *chevaux-de-frise*, receiving all their attention. After an incessant fire until after twelve o'clock they gave way,² and in their retreat the *Augusta*, a sixty-four-gun ship, and the *Merlin*, a sloop of twenty guns, ran aground, and were set on fire and completely destroyed.³ The American naval force sustained but little damage; while the dispatch from Fort Mifflin makes no reference to any loss or injury to the garrison.

The successful defence of Fort Mercer inspired Congress and the army with great hopes, respecting the permanent defence of the Delaware and the evacuation of Philadelphia by the enemy.⁴ The Continental Congress ordered three "elegant" swords to be provided, and presented to Colonel Greene, Lieutenant-colonel Smith, and Commodore Hazelwood, as mementos of the high sense which that body entertained of the merit of those officers.⁵

¹ Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II. De Chastellux (i. p. 257), on the authority of De Mauduit, says the loss was between five and six hundred. Gordon (*Hist. New Jersey*, p. 253) says Col. Linsing carried off "many of the wounded," and that his loss amounted to four hundred. The author of "*The History of the Civil War*" (Dublin, 1779) says the loss was "probably not less than four or five hundred." Dr. Gordon supposes the loss to have been "between four and five hundred men." Lieut Hall (*Civil War*, p. 417) says they lost "not less than four hundred men, with many of their best officers." Marshall (iii. p. 203) says they carried off part of their wounded, and that their loss was about four hundred. Serg. Lamb (*Jour. of Occur.*, p. 236) says many of the wounded were carried off.

² Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II.

³ Robert Ballard to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Adm'l Lord Howe's dispatch, Doc. V.

⁴ Sam. Ward to Gen. Washington, Doc. II.

⁵ Robert Ballard to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.

¹ Com. Hazelwood to Gen. Washington, Doc. I.; Sam. Ward to same, Doc. II.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. IV.

² Robert Ballard to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.

³ Com. Hazelwood to Gen. Washington, Doc. I.; Robert Ballard to same, Doc. III.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. IV.; De Chastellux, i. pp. 256, 257; *Hist. of Civil War*, i. p. 266; Hall's *Civil War*, i. p. 418 (where it is stated that a lieutenant, the chaplain, and one hundred men perished in the flames); Adm'l Lord Howe's dispatch, Doc. V.

⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 205.—⁵ Journals of Congress, Tuesday, Nov. 4, 1777 (morning session.)

DOCUMENTS.

I.

COMMODORE HAZELWOOD'S DISPATCH TO GEN.
WASHINGTON.

RED BANK, *October 23, 1777.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCE:

This will acquaint your Excellency, that early this morning we carried all our galleys to action, and after a long and heavy firing we drove the enemy's ships down the river, except a sixty-four-gun ship and a small frigate, which we obliged them to quit, as they got on shore, and by accident the sixty-four-gun ship blew up, and the frigate they set on fire themselves, took the people all out, and quitted them. Our action lasted till twelve o'clock, and our fleet has received but very little damage. You will be informed of the glorious event of last night by Colonel Greene. We in our galleys were of great use in flanking round the fort. As I am very much fatigued, I hope your Excellency will be satisfied with this short account of our affairs of the river and fleet.

Being in haste, I hope soon shall have it in my power to give you a better account of this action. Besides the sixty-four and frigate being burnt, the Roebuck, who lay to cover them, we damaged much, and drove off, and had she lain fast, we should have had her in the same situation.

Am your Excellency's most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN HAZELWOOD.

His Excellency GENERAL WASHINGTON.

II.

SAM. WARD'S LETTER TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

RED BANK, *October 23, 1777.*

SIR:—By the desire of Colonel Greene, I congratulate your Excellency on the success of

the troops under his command, yesterday. On the 21st instant four battalions of Germans, amounting to twelve hundred men, commanded by the Baron Donop, Colonel-commandant, landed at Cooper's Ferry, and marched the same evening to Haddonfield. At three o'clock yesterday morning they marched for this place: when the guard at Timber Creek Bridge were informed of their approach, they took up that bridge, and the enemy filed off to the left, and crossed at a bridge four miles above. Their advanced parties were discovered within a quarter of a mile of the fort, at twelve o'clock; at half-after four, p. m., they sent a flag to summon the fort, who was told that it should never be surrendered. At three quarters after four they commenced a brisk cannonade, and soon after advanced in two columns to the attack. They passed the abatis, gained the ditch, and some few got over the pickets, but the fire was so heavy that they were soon drove out again with considerable loss, and retreated precipitately towards Haddonfield.

The enemy's loss amounts to one lieutenant-colonel, three captains, four lieutenants, and near seventy killed; and the Baron Donop, his brigade-major, a captain, lieutenant, and upwards of seventy non-commissioned officers and privates, wounded and taken prisoners. We are also informed that several wagons are taken. He also enjoins me to tell your Excellency, that both officers and private men behaved with the greatest bravery. The action lasted forty minutes. Colonel Greene's regiment has two sergeants, one fifer, and four privates killed; one sergeant and three privates wounded; and one captain (who was reconnoitering) taken prisoner. Colonel Angell has one captain, three sergeants, and three rank and file killed; and one ensign,

one sergeant, and fifteen rank and file wounded; two of Captain Duplessis' company were slightly wounded. Too many handsome things cannot be said of the Chevalier, who, as well as his officers, showed a truly heroic bravery.

There has been already brought into the fort near three hundred muskets, a considerable number of swords, cartridge-boxes, &c. There has been a smart firing between ours and the enemy's fleet this morning; several fire-ships have been sent down the river.

I am, with the greatest respect, your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,

SAM. WARD.

His Excellency GENERAL WASHINGTON.

III.

ROBERT BALLARD'S LETTER TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

RED BANK, 2 o'clock, October 23, 1777.

SIR:—I am just arrived at this place, on command, from Fort Mifflin, and finding that Colonel Greene and the Commodore were sending, by express, to your Excellency, the glorious event of last evening and this morning, I think proper to give you the particulars from our garrison. This morning, at half-past six o'clock, the enemy from Province Island began a very heavy fire from their bomb-batteries, and in about half an hour after was joined by their fleet, which kept up on us incessantly till after twelve o'clock. Our battery, in concert with the Commodore's fleet, playing on them the whole time; in short, we plied them with eighteen and thirty-two pound shot so closely that they, I believe, began to give ground; however, they ran a sixty-four-gun ship and a twenty-gun frigate aground, and after fruitless attempts to get them off, they set fire to them both. We sustained no damage, except a captain and a private slightly wounded. Our garrison showed a firmness and resolution becoming brave men, and I don't doubt will acquit themselves with honor. The fleet are making down fast, as low as Billingsport. I have the honor to be, &c.,

ROBERT BALLARD.

His Excellency GENERAL WASHINGTON.

IV.

GEN. HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

PHILADELPHIA, October 25, 1777.

MY LORD:—The enemy having intrenched about eight hundred men at Red Bank, upon the Jersey shore, some little distance above Fort Island, Colonel Donop, with three battalions of Hessian grenadiers, the regiment of Mirbach, and the infantry, chasseurs, crossed the river Delaware on the 21st instant to Cooper's Ferry, opposite to this town, with directions to proceed to the attack of that post. The detachment marched a part of the way on the same day, and on the 22d, in the afternoon, was before Red Bank. Colonel Donop immediately made the best disposition, and led on the troops in the most gallant manner to the assault. They carried an extensive outwork, from whence the enemy were driven into an interior intrenchment, which could not be forced without ladders, being eight or nine feet high, with a parapet boarded and fraised. The detachment, in moving up and returning from the attack, was much galled by the enemy's galleys and floating batteries.

Colonel Donop and Lieutenant-colonel Mingerode being both wounded, the command devolved upon Lieutenant-colonel Linsing, who, after collecting all the wounded that could be brought off, marched that night about five miles towards Cooper's Ferry, and on the following morning returned with the detachment to camp.

Colonel Donop, unfortunately, had his thigh so much fractured by a musket-ball that he could not be removed, but I since understand there are some hopes of his recovery. There were several brave officers lost on this occasion, in which the utmost ardor and courage were displayed by both officers and soldiers.

On the 23d, the *Augusta*, in coming up the river, with some other ships of war, to engage the enemy's galleys near the fort, got aground, and by some accident taking fire in the action, was unavoidably consumed; but I do not hear there were any lives lost. The *Merlin*, sloop, also grounded; and the other ships being obliged

to remove to a distance from the explosion of the *Augusta*, it became expedient to evacuate and burn her also.

These disappointments, however, will not prevent the most vigorous measures being pursued for the reduction of the fort, which will give us the passage up the river.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
W. HOWE.

P. S.—I have the satisfaction to inclose to your lordship a report, just received, of a very spirited piece of service performed by Major-general Vaughan and Sir James Wallace, up the Hudson's River.

V.

EXTRACT OF LETTER FROM VICE-ADMIRAL LORD VISCOUNT HOWE TO MR. STEPHENS, SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

ON BOARD HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP EAGLE, IN THE }
RIVER DELAWARE, Oct. 25, 1777. }

On my arrival off Chester, on the 6th instant, I learnt that the rebel army, since the 11th of last month, had always been retiring with precipitation to avoid a general action, sometimes attempting advantages by surprise, but the King's forces maintaining their usual ascendancy on every occasion.

The General was in possession of Philadelphia, and a frigate of thirty-two guns, named the *Delaware*, attempted to be passed above the town, had been taken by the troops which were first posted there.

Captain Hammond (who was returned here in the *Roebuck*) had removed up the river with the *Pearl*, *Camilla*, and *Liverpool*, as the army advanced.

When I came to this station he was lying with those frigates off of Billingsport, where the rebels had nearly completed a very extensive work for defending the approach to the first double line of sunk frames, or chevaux-de-frise, which crossed the navigable channel in that part of the river.

The General having a few days before appointed a strong corps of infantry to be landed on the Jersey shore, to dislodge the enemy from that post, they abandoned it at his approach. The front to the river had thereupon been destroyed, and the troops that evening been withdrawn.

A trial had, in the mean time, been begun for opening a passage through that first obstruction, which the enemy, with their fire-rafts, galleys, and other armed craft, repeatedly endeavored to prevent, under cover of the night, but without any material injury to the frigates; and a sufficient channel was at length (though not without much difficulty) made for the larger ships by the advanced squadron; the conduct of which was, on every occasion, to be much approved.

The remaining obstructions to an uninterrupted communication with the town of Philadelphia, consisted of an inclosed work, erected on a flat, muddy island, named Fort Island, a little distance below the entrance of the Schuylkill, strengthened by four block-houses; with two floating-batteries, of nine guns each, and twelve or fourteen galleys, mounting heavy cannon, besides many other armed craft of lesser force, and several fire-ships. Opposite thereto, on the eastern shore, at Red Bank, above Manto Creek, a redoubt was constructed, under which their movable water-force could find protection occasionally.

In the front of these defences, to the extent of half a mile or more below the island (being the part of the channel where the navigation was contracted in the width to about two hundred fathoms), several rows of the chevaux-de-frise were sunk, so as to render the nearer approach of the ships impracticable; and no attempt could be made for removing the sunk frames, or otherwise clearing the channel, till the command of the shores on each side of the river could be obtained.

For these purposes the General ordered some batteries to be erected on the western shore, to dislodge the enemy from the island; and a body of troops to be landed for forcing the redoubt on Red Bank.

It was intended that the *Vigilant* should pass

through a shallow and very confined channel between Hog Island (next below Fort Island) and the Pennsylvania shore, to arrive and act upon the rear and less defensible part of the work; and the circumstances of the navigation not admitting of a more serious attack, for the reasons before mentioned, a diversion was proposed to be made at the same time by the advanced frigates, together with the *Isis* and *Augusta*, in the eastern or main channel of the river, as well as for engaging the attention of the enemy at Fort Island and the redoubt, as to restrain the motions of the galleys and other armed crafts, which had retired under the works at Red Bank, when they discovered the danger which they would be exposed to in their former stations, near Fort Island, from our batteries on the western shore.

The wind continuing from the northward several successive days, the *Vigilant* could not proceed, according to her destination, at the time intended. The *Augusta*, *Roebuck*, *Liverpool*, and *Pearl* were, nevertheless, ordered above the first line of chevaux-de-frise, the 22d instant, to be in readiness for such service as they should be able to render when the redoubt should be attacked; and Captain Reynolds, being the senior officer, succeeded to the command of the advanced squadron.

The detachment of the army, consisting of Hessian troops under Colonel Donop, appointed to attack the redoubt, crossed the Delaware, opposite Philadelphia, the 21st instant, in a division of flat-boats, which Captain Clayton conducted in the night by Fort Island, along the western shore, for that purpose.

The attack of the redoubt being observed to take place the evening of the 22d, just upon the close of day, Captain Reynolds immediately slipped, and advanced with the squadron (to which the *Merlin* had been joined) as fast as he was able with the flood, to second the attempt of the troops, which were seen to be very warmly engaged; but the change in the natural course of the river, caused by the obstructions, appearing to have altered the channel, the *Augusta* and *Merlin* unfortunately grounded some distance below the second line of chevaux-de-frise; and the fresh northwardly wind, which then

prevailed, greatly checking the rising of the tide, they could not be got afloat on the subsequent flood.

The diversion was endeavored to be continued by the frigates, at which the fire from the enemy's galleys was chiefly pointed for some time. But as the night advanced, the Hessian detachment having been repulsed, the firing ceased.

The rebels discovering the state of the *Augusta* and *Merlin* in the morning of the 23d, renewed the fire from their galleys, works, and floating batteries. But their movable force approaching little nearer than a random shot, the injury was inconsiderable to the ships; and by the alertness and spirit of the officers and seamen (of the transports as well as ships of war) attending on the boats of the fleet, on this occasion, four fire-vessels directed against the *Augusta* were sent without effect.

The *Isis* was at this time warping through between the lower chevaux-de-frise. Empty transports had been ordered up from the fleet, and other preparations made for lightening the *Augusta*, when by some accident, no otherwise connected with the circumstances of the action, but as it was probably caused by the wads from her guns, the ship took fire abaft, and it spread with such rapidity that all endeavors to extinguish it were used in vain. The men were thereupon taken out, except a very small number, not yet ascertained. The second lieutenant, Ballock, the chaplain, and gunner, appear to have been of that number.

In this state of the proceeding it was necessary to withdraw the frigates, for securing them from the effects of the blast. And as the *Merlin* could not be protected from the same injury, I judged it necessary to give orders for the sloop to be evacuated and destroyed. The other ships dropped nearer down to Billingsport.

Much commendation is due to the several captains, inferior officers, and seamen concerned in this service; and particularly in their resolute exertions to assist in saving the crew of the *Augusta*.

I have the honor to be your most obedient, humble servant,

HOWE.

VI.

COLONEL CHRISTOPHER GREENE.

Christopher Greene was born at Warwick, Rhode Island, in 1737. Of his early life no account has been left, and the record of his deeds in behalf of his country is his only memorial. When the expedition to Concord aroused the people of New England, he felt the influence of the example and joined the army before Boston.

After the battle on Bunker's Hill he was given the command of a regiment of Rhode Island troops; and he crossed the wilderness, under Arnold, with his regiment, sharing the terrible circumstances of that march and of the subsequent operations around Quebec, with his gallant commander, reaping honor, but gaining no other advantage. After his release he was intrusted with the command of Fort Mercer, near Red Bank, where he sustained an attack of the Hessians commanded by the Count Donop, and repulsed them, as has been described in this chapter.

He continued in active duty until 1781, in the spring of which year he was posted with his command near the Croton River, in Westchester county, New York. On the 13th of May, in that year, while quartered in Davenport's house, in the town of Yorktown, he was surprised by a party of Delaney's light-horse, guided by Gilbert Totten, a Westchester Tory, and, with his major, two subalterns, and twenty-seven of his men, was cruelly killed, after desperately defending himself in his room against a dozen opponents.

His mangled remains were removed to headquarters, and his funeral was attended by the commander-in-chief and all whose duties permitted their attendance.

He is represented as having been "stout and strong in person, about five feet ten inches high, with a broad round chest; his aspect manly and demeanor pleasing, enjoying always a high state of health, its bloom irradiated a countenance which significantly expressed the fortitude and mildness invariably displayed throughout his life."

His widow, Ann Lippett, of Warwick, with three sons and four daughters, survived him.

CHAPTER XXX.

November 10 to November 15, 1777.

THE ATTACK ON FORT MIFFLIN.

THE defeat of Count Donop before Fort Mercer, and that of the fleet on the following day, did not discourage the enemy, or materially check his efforts to secure the passage of the Delaware. Strictly watched by the Continental army, under General Washington;¹ separated from his naval auxiliaries, and, consequently, from his supplies;² and all communication with the farmers of easy virtue, whose love of specie was stronger than their love of country, having been diligently cut off;³ with his troops suffering for bread—having none for four days together;⁴ with a horde of unsympathizing mercenaries, anxious only for their rations and their pay—the latter heavily in arrears;⁵ and all, from the constant activity of Lee and other partisan officers in the Continental service, worn out with guard or fatigue duty,⁶ it would have been strange if the General and Admiral had

not aroused all their dormant energies to remove so insignificant an obstacle as that which arrested their progress in the Delaware, and so effectually destroyed their comfort. It is, indeed, true that they were indolent men, lovers of pleasure; yet they were possessed of ample means, and, even when other motives were lacking, that very love of pleasure would sometimes impel them to employ unusual means to remove an obstruction which interfered with the enjoyment of their “comforts;” and not unfrequently to leave, unemployed, opportunities for success, when the use of them would have disturbed the forbidden pleasures of which the brothers were votaries.¹

Fort Mifflin, as has been before stated, occupied the lower extremity of Mud Island,—a low, reedy island, about seven miles below Philadelphia.² The defences were mostly in front (the chief object of its erection was to provide a defence against shipping below the chevaux-de-frise), the rear being defended only by a ditch and palisades,

¹ History of Civil War, i. p. 266; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 237.—² Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Oct. 18.

³ Same to same, Oct. 27.—⁴ Same to same, Oct. 24; Same to same, Oct. 25.—⁵ Same to same, Oct. 25.

⁶ Life of Gen. Reed, i. p. 324; Gen. Reed to Gen. Washington, Oct. 23; Same to Pres. Wharton, Oct. 25; Marshall, iii. pp. 207, 208.

¹ Galloway's Letters to a Nobleman.—² Vide pp. 350, 357.

with two block-houses, the upper story of which had been destroyed in the attack on the shipping, on the twenty-third of October.¹ Above the fort two batteries had been erected, opposite to the enemy's batteries on Province and Carpenter's Islands, from which they were separated by a narrow channel some four or five hundred yards in width.² The garrison had been reduced to about three hundred Continental troops, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Smith of Baltimore,—a number insufficient to form a single line around the works.³ The naval force in the river was commanded by Commodore Hazelwood, an officer in the pay of Pennsylvania, and between him and the Continental officers, as was customary in those times, a serious misunderstanding existed. The consequence of this unfriendly feeling was, that the guard-boats and galleys in the channel, between the belligerents, were not regularly or properly kept on their stations, and the little garrison was left in constant anxiety lest the enemy, by a *coup-de-main*, should seize the post, or take possession of the upper part of the island, and batter down the slight defences which covered them in that direction.⁴

The ever-watchful care of General Washington was not diverted from this important station; and, although the army could not be properly moved to the support of the garrison, notwithstanding

standing his constant desire to do so, the illustrious commander-in-chief superintended every movement which was made for the defence of the post. The naval forces were stationed and acted under his orders;¹ the garrison was strengthened by a detachment of one hundred and fifty Pennsylvania troops;² General Varnum, with his brigade, was ordered to take post at Woodbury, near Red Bank, New Jersey, to cover the left of the works,³ and General Foreman was directed to join General Varnum, with as many of the New Jersey militia as he could collect.⁴

In the mean time, General Howe steadily prosecuted the plans which he had formed, and floating-batteries and new and extensive works on Province Island, which had been prepared before their eyes, foretold the terrible scenes to which the garrison was about to be subjected.⁵

At length, early in the morning of the tenth of November, two new and powerful batteries,⁶ mounting four thirty-two-pounders,⁷ six twenty-four-pounders,⁸ and a thirteen-inch mortar,⁹ together with the batteries which had before been employed, opened a furious cannonade on Fort Mifflin, at about five hundred yards distance.¹⁰ On the four-

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 210.—² Ibid., p. 211. Gordon (iii. p. 5) says the reinforcement consisted of 120 Virginia troops.—³ Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Nov. 4.

⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 211.—⁵ Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Nov. 4.—⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. III.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 420; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 237.

⁷ These guns were taken from the *Somerset*, man-of-war.

⁸ These guns were taken from the *Eagle*, man-of-war.

⁹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 420.—¹⁰ Marshall, iii. p. 218.

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 209.—² Gordon, iii. p. 5.
Marshall, iii. pp. 208-210.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 6.

teenth, two floating-batteries were sent down from Philadelphia; but they "answered no good purpose," and were speedily silenced.¹ On the fifteenth, "the grand attack" was made by the combined military and naval forces of the enemy.² The Somerset, ship of the line, and the Isis, of fifty guns, proceeded up the river, to act against the fort in front; the Roebuck, of forty-four guns, the Pearl, of thirty-two, the Liverpool, a frigate, the Cornwallis galley, and the small vessels of the navy, attacked a new work which the Americans had built in a situation to rake the ships engaged against the fort; and the Vigilant, armed ship, of sixteen guns, with a hulk, mounting three eighteen-pounders, for the purpose of enfilading the works, passed into the channel between Mud and Province Islands³—the obstructions in the main channel of the river having forced the water into these minor channels, and deepened them sufficiently to enable large vessels to enter them.⁴ With this immense accession to the enemy's strength, the operations were commenced, and a terrible fire was opened from every quarter on the little garrison.⁵

With a determination which has never been surpassed, Major Thayer, on whom the command had devolved, and his companions, renewed the conflict,

and continued it, notwithstanding the Vigilant and the hulk, in the channel between Mud and Province Islands, had taken a position within a hundred yards of the works,¹ and, from her round-top, picked off with small-arms every man who appeared on the platform.² At length the works appeared to be no longer tenable;³ Colonel Smith was wounded and removed to Red Bank;⁴ Major Fleury, the engineer under whose direction the works were thrown up, was also wounded;⁵ and Captain Treat, commanding the artillery, was killed.⁶ The block-houses and palisades in the rear were beaten down; the ramparts were almost destroyed; all the guns were dismounted; and the garrison was entirely without protection.⁷ Notwithstanding the apparent hopelessness of the case, the garrison, with desperate energy, maintained its position and continued the conflict.⁸ Major Thayer, the officer in command, applied to Commodore Hazelwood for assistance to drive the hulk and the Vigilant from their position, but that officer failed to render any aid, and the project was abandoned.⁹

At length, about eleven o'clock at night, when any farther continuance on the island would have been an useless sacrifice of life, the ruins were set on

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 221.—² Gen. Washington to Cong., Doc. I.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 19.—³ Marshall, iii. p. 221.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 6.

⁵ Marshall, iii. p. 219.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Gen. Washington to Cong., Doc. I.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421; Gordon, iii. p. 7.

⁸ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. iii.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421.—⁹ Marshall, iii. p. 221.

¹ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 420.—² Gordon, iii. p. 7; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 420.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., Doc. I.; Lord Howe's dispatch to the Admiralty, Doc. II.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. III.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421.—⁴ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. pp. 18, 19.

⁵ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421.

fire by the garrison, and it withdrew to Fort Mercer;¹ and, at daybreak on the sixteenth, Mud Island was occupied by the grenadiers of the Royal Guards.²

In this terrible conflict the naval force rendered but little, if any assistance;³ and the garrison, notwithstanding it was occasionally relieved from Fort Mercer,⁴ performed prodigies of valor. The works themselves were but mere shells, entirely unfit for the purposes for which they were employed; while the necessity for repairs, and the obstinate perverseness of Commodore Hazelwood, which compelled the garrison to mount full guards at night, rendered the duties of the garrison unusually severe.⁵ Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and the protracted struggle through which they passed, the garrison appears to have suffered less than might have been expected. The total loss is said to have been about two hundred and fifty killed and wounded.⁶ The enemy's loss, as reported by the General and Admiral, amounted to thirteen killed and twenty-four wounded.⁷

A few days afterwards Lord Cornwallis crossed over to Billing's Point, with a strong force, for the purpose of

attacking Fort Mercer.¹ General Greene was immediately dispatched to New Jersey to take command of the troops there, and other steps were taken to check his progress, but having been reinforced from New York, Lord Cornwallis advanced towards the fort before means had been provided to prevent it, and on his approach the garrison abandoned the works.²

The fleet, also, which had cost so much labor, and which, under other officers, might have saved the forts,³ with the exception of a few of the gallies, was abandoned and burned without an effort being made to save it.⁴ The expressions of dissatisfaction with the conduct of Commodore Hazelwood were very emphatic, and Colonel Smith declined to accept the sword which the Congress voted to him, because he considered it no compliment to his bravery, while a similar compliment, in every respect, was enjoyed by the Commodore.⁵ Of Major Thayer, the volunteer commander of the fort after Colonel Smith was wounded and Colonel Russell was taken sick, no notice appears to have been taken, although the honor of the last day's defence—what the enemy has been pleased to call “the grand attack”—belongs to him.

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., Doc. I.; Lord Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. III.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421; Gordon, iii. pp. 7, 8.

² Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. III.

³ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421; Gordon, iii. p. 8.

⁴ Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 420; Marshall, iii. pp. 219, 220.

⁵ Marshall, iii. p. 220.—⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 8.

⁷ Lord Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. III.

¹ Lord Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. III.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, pp. 421, 422; Gen. Reed to Gen. Washington, Nov. 18.—² Ibid.

³ Gordon, iii. p. 8.—⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. III.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 421; Gordon, iii. p. 9.

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 8. See also Gen. Washington to Congress, Doc. I.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GENERAL WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO CONGRESS.

WHITEMARSH, November 17, 1777.

SIR:—I am sorry to inform you that Fort Mifflin was evacuated the night before last, after a defence which does credit to the American arms, and will ever reflect the highest honor upon the officers and men of the garrison. The works were entirely beat down; every piece of cannon dismounted, and one of the enemy's ships so near, that she threw grenades into the fort and killed men upon the platforms, from her tops, before they quitted the island. This ship had been cut down for the purpose, and so constructed that she made but a small draft of water, and, by these means, warped in between Fort Mifflin and Province Island. Some complaints are made, that the captains of the galleys did not sufficiently exert themselves to drive this vessel from her station; but I shall not determine any thing upon the matter till a proper inquiry is made.

Nothing in the course of this campaign has taken up so much of the attention and consideration of myself and all the general officers, as the possibility of giving farther relief to Fort Mifflin, than what we had already afforded. Such a garrison was thrown into it, as has been found by experience capable of defending it to the last extremity; and Red Bank, which was deemed essentially necessary, not only for the purpose of keeping open the communication, but of annoying the enemy's ships, and covering our own fleet, has been possessed by a considerable detachment from this army. The only remaining and practical mode of giving relief to the fort, was by dislodging the enemy from

Province Island, from whence they kept up an incessant fire. But this, from the situation of the ground, was not to be attempted with any degree of safety to the attacking party, unless the whole or a considerable part of the army should be removed to the west side of the Schuylkill, to support and cover it.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be

Your obedient servant,
GEO. WASHINGTON.

II.

ADMIRAL LORD HOWE'S DISPATCH TO THE ADMIRALTY.

[From the London Gazette Extraordinary.]

ADMIRALTY-OFFICE, January 8, 1778.

The following is an extract of a letter, received last night by the Eagle packet, from the Vice-admiral Lord Viscount Howe, commander-in-chief of His Majesty's ships and vessels in North America, to Mr. Stephens, dated on board His Majesty's ship the Eagle, in the Delaware, the 23d November, 1777.

EAGLE, DELAWARE, November 23, 1777.

SIR:—The General, advising me of his intention to send a packet immediately to England, I avail myself of the opportunity to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, respecting the progress of the military services in which the ships of war have been concerned, since the date of my last letter of the 25th of October.

I mentioned in that letter the preparations making for the attack meditated on the works the rebels had constructed on either shore, for

preventing an open communication by water with the army at Philadelphia, on which, it was obvious to them, that the farther operations of the campaign would greatly depend.

The wind still continuing to prevent the Vigilant from passing to the rear of the enemy's works on Fort Island, by the only channel practicable for that purpose, the opportunity was taken by the King's forces, and by the enemy with equal assiduity, to strengthen the preparations judged expedient on either part for the proposed attack.

The officers and seamen of the ships of war and transports were employed, in the mean time, with unremitting fatigue and perseverance, to convey provisions, artillery, and stores to the Schuylkill, between Fort Island and the Pennsylvania shore: six twenty-four-pounders from the Eagle, and four thirty-two-pounders from the Somerset, transported in the same manner, with the requisite proportions of ammunition, were mounted in the batteries erected by the General's appointment on Province Island.

The wind becoming favorable the 15th instant, that first occasion was taken for ordering the ships upon the intended service.

The Somerset and Isis were appointed to proceed up the eastern channel of the river, to act against the fort in the front. The Roebuck, Pearl, and Liverpool, with the Cornwallis galley, and some smaller armed vessels, against a battery with heavy artillery, which the rebels had lately opened on a point above, and near to Manto Creek, in a situation to rake the ships anchored to fire upon the fort, and more advantageously chosen, as the shoalness of the water did not admit ships to approach within a desirable distance of the work.

The Vigilant, with a hulk mounting three eighteen-pounders, commanded by Lieutenant Botham, of the Eagle, proceeded at the same time through the channel round Hog Island, and anchored on that side of the fort, according to the intention pointed out for co-operating with the batteries on the Pennsylvania shore.

The Isis being as well placed in the eastern channel as the circumstances of the navigation would permit, rendered very essential service against the fort and galleys, much to the per-

sonal honor of Captain Cornwallis, and credit of the discipline in his ship. The Roebuck and other frigates stationed against the battery were equally well conducted. Greater caution being necessary in placing the Somerset, that ship could not be carried as far up the channel as the Isis was advanced. The impression made by the batteries on Province Island (before very considerable) being united with the well-directed efforts from the Vigilant and hulk, soon silenced the artillery of the fort; and farther preparations being in progress for opening the Estocade and forcing the works next morning, the enemy set fire to and evacuated the fort during the night.

The numbers of the enemy killed and wounded appeared to have been very considerable. Those in the different ships, as stated in the annexed return, were much less than could be supposed, particularly of the Isis and Roebuck, which were struck many times from the galleys and works.

A detachment from the army, under the command of Lord Cornwallis, having been landed the 18th, at Billingsport (where a post had been some time before established), for attacking the redoubt at Red Bank, the enemy abandoned and blew up the works. They had passed several of their galleys unperceived above the town of Philadelphia, in the night of the 19th, which proved very favorable for the purpose; and attempted to do the same with the rest of the galleys and other water force the following night, but being seasonably discovered, they were opposed with so much effect, by Lieutenant Watt, of the Roebuck (ordered by Captain Hammond, before my arrival, to take his station in the Delaware, prize, near the town), that not more than three or four of the former appeared to have escaped; and being otherwise unable to prevent the capture of the rest of their armed craft (consisting of two xebeques, the two floating-batteries, and several ships, besides fire-vessels, amounting to about seventeen in number), they were quitted and burned. Lieutenant Watt having testified great propriety and spirit on this occasion, I have continued him in command of the Delaware, retained as an armed ship in the service, to remain near the

town of Philadelphia, where such additional naval force is particularly requisite.

A more accurate inspection of the obstructions to the navigation of the river adjacent to Fort Island, becoming practicable under the circumstances before mentioned, two channels were discovered, through which the transports, containing the provisions, stores, and other necessaries for the army, might proceed to Philadelphia. They were ordered up the river accordingly, to be afterwards secured at the wharfs of the town, for the approaching winter months.

The unfortunate event of Lieutenant-general Burgoyne's operations with the northern army terminating, as I am advised by the commander-in-chief, with the surrender of those troops, agreeable to the tenor of a convention, executed the 16th day of last October, has rendered a suitable provision necessary to be made for their conveyance to Europe. A proper number of transports has been appropriated for that occasion. But as it would be scarce practicable, at this season of the year, for light transports to gain the port of Boston, where the embarkation is conditioned to take place, the transports have been ordered under convoy of the Raisonable to Rhode Island; that if the proposed alteration is adopted, and the troops can be embarked at that port, they may be sooner released.

THE FOLLOWING ARE COPIES OF THE PAPERS REFERRED
TO IN THE AFOREMENTIONED EXTRACT.

Return of the number of men killed and wounded on board the different ships employed in the attack of the works of the enemy on Fort Island, their armed craft, and other defences erected to obstruct the passage of the River Delaware, on the 15th day of November.

Somerset.—Five seamen wounded. *Isis.*—Three seamen wounded. *Roebuck.*—Three seamen killed, seven ditto wounded. *Liverpool.*—None. *Pearl.*—One master killed, three seamen wounded. *Vigilant.*—One midshipman, one seaman killed, lent from the *Eagle*. *Cornwallis, galley.*—One second master and pilot wounded. *Sloop*, commanded by Lieutenant Botham.—None. *TOTAL.*—Killed, six; wounded nineteen. In all, twenty-five.

III.

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S DISPATCH TO
LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

[From the Gazette.]

WHITEHALL, January 8, 1778.

The following is a copy and extract of two letters from the Hon. General Sir William Howe to Lord George Germain.

PHILADELPHIA, November 28, 1777.

MY LORD:—From a variety of difficulties attending the construction of additional batteries, in a morass, against the fort upon Mud Island, and in the transportation of the guns and stores, they were not opened against the enemy's defences until the 10th instant. On the 15th, the wind proving fair, the *Vigilant* armed ship, carrying sixteen twenty-four-pounders, and a hulk, with three twenty-four-pounders, got up to the fort through the channel between Province and Hog Islands; these, assisted by several ships of war in the eastern channel, as well as by the batteries on shore, did such execution upon the fort and collateral block-houses, that the enemy, dreading an impending assault, evacuated the island in the night, between the 15th and 16th, and it was possessed on the 16th, at daybreak, by the grenadiers of the guards. Much commendation is due to Brigadier-general Cleaveland, to the officers and men of the corps of artillery, and to the troops in general, employed upon this service, attended with great fatigue.

The enemy's fire upon the ships of war, the *Vigilant* and hulk, from two floating batteries, seventeen galleys and armed vessels, and from a battery on the Jersey shore, was exceedingly heavy; but the gallantry displayed by the naval commanders, their officers and seamen, on this occasion, frustrated all their efforts, and contributed principally to the reduction of the enemy's works. Permit me, at the same time, to report to your lordship, that the perseverance of the officers and seamen employed in bringing up stores from the fleet, under the command of Captain Duncan of the *Eagle*, demand my highest acknowledgments; and that the services

they rendered were most essential, and borne with the utmost cheerfulness.

The enemy's loss during the siege is computed to have been four hundred killed and wounded. The loss to the King's troops was only seven killed and five wounded.

On the 18th, at night, Lord Cornwallis marched with a corps from camp, and passed the Delaware on the 19th, from Chester to Billingsfort, where he was joined by Major-general Sir Thomas Wilson, with a corps that arrived a few days before, from New York, under his command, having with him Brigadier-generals Leslie and Pattison.

As soon as the necessary preparations were made, his lordship pursued his march to attack the enemy intrenched at Red Bank. Upon his approach the rebels evacuated the post, and retired to Mount Holly, where they joined the corps of observation, detached from the main army of the rebels encamped at Whitemarsh. The intrenchments being demolished, his corps returned by Gloucester on the 27th, and joined the army in this camp.

The enemy's shipping having no longer any protection, and not finding it advisable to attempt the passage of the river, the channel being commanded by the batteries of the town and the Delaware frigate, they were quitted without being dismantled, and burnt on the night between the 20th and 21st; but the galleys of a smaller draught of water, by keeping close along the Jersey shore, escaped, from the great breadth of the river.

* * * * *

With the most perfect respect, I have the honor to be, &c.,

W. HOWE.

IV.

MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL SMITH.

Samuel Smith was born in Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, July 27, 1752. While he was a

lad his parents removed to Baltimore, and his education, which had been commenced at Carlisle, was completed at the academy at Elkton, Maryland. He afterwards entered his father's counting-room, where his business education was conducted, for five years, under his parent's eye; and, in 1772, he was dispatched to Havre, as the supercargo of one of his father's vessels.

After travelling throughout Europe, he returned home in season to join in some of the earlier movements of the Revolutionary War. Concord and Bunker Hill had been fought, and he immediately sought and obtained a commission in the noble regiment commanded by Colonel Smallwood. Soon afterwards he was promoted to the rank of Major, and early in 1777 he was promoted to a Lieutenant-colonel's command.

He served with honor throughout the war, fighting, with gallantry, at Brandywine, Fort Mifflin, and Monmouth; and suffering, with patience, at Valley Forge.

After the establishment of peace, he was appointed Brigadier-general of militia, and commanded the Maryland quota of troops in "the Whiskey War" in Pennsylvania.

In 1793 he was elected a representative of Maryland in the Congress of the United States, and served in that capacity until 1803, when he was elected to the Senate, in the place of John Eager Howard. He continued to hold that distinguished office until 1815. In December, 1822, he returned to the same post, as the successor of William Pinckney, and remained there until March 3, 1833.

In the War of 1812, he served as Major-general, and the troops which assembled for the defence of Baltimore, in 1814, were placed under his command.

In the fall of 1836, he was elected Mayor of Baltimore, an office which he continued to hold until his death.

He departed this life April 22, 1839, aged eighty-seven years.

CHAPTER XXXI.

December 5 to December 8, 1777.

THE SKIRMISH AT WHITEMARSH.

ABOUT fourteen miles from the city of Philadelphia, in one of the pleasant little valleys of Montgomery county, stands the unpretending village of Whitemarsh.¹ Upon the hills, about three quarters of a mile northeast from this little village, with his right on the Wissahiccon Creek and his left on the Sandy Run, General Washington and the American army took up their position, early in November.²

The action at Germantown had been followed by a retreat to Perkiomen Creek, where the army remained until the thirtieth of October.³ In the mean time, General Varnum's brigade of Rhode Island troops, about twelve hundred in number, and about a thousand Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia troops, had reached the camp;⁴ and, with this reinforcement, the advance to Whitemarsh was considered judicious by a council of general officers, to whom the subject was referred.⁵

While the army occupied this posi-

tion, as has been seen already, the enemy succeeded in removing the obstructions in the Delaware River,¹ and his army and his naval force enjoyed the mutual gratification of seeing the communication between the two arms of the service again secured and opened, and comfortable winter quarters established in the city of Philadelphia. This unfortunate result was the legitimate effect of the machinations of that notorious body known in history as "the Conway Cabal," whose principal object was the degradation of the commander-in-chief, and of those officers of the army who most enjoyed his confidence. Numbering in its ranks, or among its auxiliaries, Generals Charles Lee, Israel Putnam, Horatio Gates, Thomas Mifflin, Thomas Conway, and Joseph Reed; James Lovell, a delegate in Congress from Massachusetts, and some other members of that body, no means were left unemployed for the accomplishment of its purposes. Gates refused to recognize the commander-in-chief, in making his report of the capture of Bur-

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 320.—² Gen. Howe's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, Doc. II.; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 267. ³ Marshall, iii. p. 188.—⁴ Irving, iii. p. 291.

⁵ Lossing, ii. p. 320.

¹ Vide pp. 363, 366, 367.

goyne directly to Congress,¹ and the Congress became a party in the intrigue when it condescended to receive from his messenger, on the floor of the House, a verbal report of the affair,² and to send, through its own officers, an account of the same to General Washington at the camp.³ Intoxicated with his success, and rendered more impudent from the evidence of his strength in the Continental Congress, which the proceedings referred to evinced, the requisitions for troops which General Washington issued were disregarded, even when borne and enforced by the youthful, but intelligent Hamilton.⁴ Putnam, at that time at Fishkill, to whom similar orders had been sent, imitated his leader, and, also, disregarded the orders;⁵ while Lee, who was a prisoner in New York, was prompting General Howe, pointing out the weak spots in the American cause, and suggesting plans of operations for the royal army;⁶ and James Lovell, from the halls of the Congress itself, was fomenting treason, and urging, by his letters, such a course as would inevitably demoralize and destroy the army itself.⁷

Thus crippled by the want of men, while large bodies, unemployed, were

held back from his camp, and unsustained by those in authority, the General was compelled to witness the loss of the defences on the Delaware and the firm establishment of the enemy in the city of Philadelphia; while his means allowed but little more than an occasional skirmish, or the minor operations necessary to intercept the supplies furnished by the farmers of Pennsylvania to the enemy's troops.

Encouraged by the weakness of the army, and probably supposing that the movement to Whitemarsh was intended as an invitation to battle, on Thursday night, December the fourth, General Howe, with the army under his command, marched from Philadelphia and took post on Chestnut Hill, about three miles from General Washington's right wing.¹

As soon as the position occupied by General Howe had been ascertained, six hundred men from the Pennsylvania militia,² commanded by Gen. James Irvine,³ was ordered to move from the right of the line,⁴ and engage the enemy's light-infantry commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie.⁵ They were opposed by the Second battalion of light-infantry, and by a part of the First,⁶ and a smart skirmish ensued,

¹ Vide Doc. II., pp. 301, 302; Irving, iii. p. 300.

² Journals of Cong., Friday, Oct. 31 (vol. iii. p. 368), and Monday, 4 P. M., Nov. 3, 1777 (vol. iii. pp. 371, 372).

³ Ibid., Friday, Oct. 31, 1777 (vol. iii. p. 368).

⁴ Irving, iii. pp. 301, 311-313.—⁵ Ibid., pp. 313-316.

⁶ The "plan" suggested by Gen. Lee, in his autograph, indorsed as such by the commissioners' secretary, is among the historical treasures in the collection of "The N. Y. Historical Society"—⁷ Gates' papers, MS., in The N. Y. Historical Society's library. A specimen of his writing can be seen in Irving, iii. pp. 316-318.

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch to Cong., Doc. I.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Elias Boudinot to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 9.—² Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10. Gen. Howe, in his dispatch, gives the number at one thousand.—³ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I., calls him "General Irvine," but Mr. Reed (*Life of Gen. Reed*, i. p. 350) gives his christian name.

⁴ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I.

⁵ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 423—⁶ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.

resulting in the defeat of the Americans, with the loss of the commanding officer and four or five men, who were wounded and taken prisoners,¹ while the enemy are said to have lost about twelve, among whom was Sir James Murray.²

No farther important movements were made until one o'clock on Sunday morning (*Dec. 7th*), when the enemy abandoned his position on Chesnut Hill,³ and moved to Edge Hill, one mile distant from the left of the American lines, his right being extended as far north as the Abingdon Presbyterian Meeting-house, forming a half-circle around the American army.⁴ As soon as this movement was seen, Colonel Morgan's riflemen, and the Maryland militia, under Colonel Mordecai Gist, were ordered to oppose them on the right; while Colonel Webb's Continental regiment, supported by the brigade of Pennsylvania troops commanded by General Potter, were ordered to perform a similar service on the left.⁵

Colonel Morgan met the enemy's advance parties at Edge Hill, near where the road crosses to the Presbyterian Meeting-house,⁶ and a sharp conflict ensued, in which they were opposed by the First battalion of light-infantry and

the Thirty-third regiment,¹ commanded by Lord Cornwallis.² Four officers and thirty men fell before the unerring rifles of Morgan's corps, before they could be dislodged from their position,³ when they were compelled to retire before superior numbers, Major Morris, and twenty-seven of their own party, and sixteen or seventeen of Major Gist's command, having been killed and wounded.⁴

On the left wing, the American light troops, under Generals Potter, Reed, and Cadwalader, and Colonel Webb, took a position in the woods in the rear of Twickenham, a country-seat belonging to President Wharton, in the town of Cheltenham, but the troops gave way without facing the enemy.⁵ General Reed rallied a considerable number of them, who complained of their officers, and asked him to lead them into the action; but, although they advanced under favorable circumstances, they "got no honor."⁶ Major-general Grey, at the head of a body of the enemy's light troops, the Queen's Rangers (Tories), the Hessian chasseurs, and a brigade of British troops, drove them

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10. Gen. Howe supposes the loss to have been "between thirty and forty."

² Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10.

³ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II. Lieut. Hall (*Civil War*, p. 423) supposes this movement was made on the 8th.—⁴ Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁵ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II. ⁶ Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Lieut. Hall's *Civil War*, p. 423.—² "Landmacht von Grossbritannien zu Unfang, des J. 1777," in Schlozer's *Briefwechsel*, Th. II., Heft xii. p. 349; Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.

³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Lieut. Hall's *Civil War*, p. 424.—⁴ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10; Marshall, iii. p. 332.

⁵ Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10; Elias Boudinot to same, Dec. 9.—⁶ Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10. Gen. Reed had a narrow escape in this affair. His horse was killed, and the enemy's light troops rushed towards him with their bayonets. His own troops fled, but he was saved by Capt. Allen McLane, of the Maryland line.

before him with the loss of near fifty men,¹ and the main body of General Howe's army occupied the post behind Twickenham, which the American troops under Colonel Webb and General Potter had occupied in the beginning of the action, while his pickets were advanced within half a mile of the American lines.²

A general engagement now appeared to be inevitable, and every preparation was made for that contingency,³ but after various movements the enemy halted and pitched their tents.⁴ On Monday afternoon (*Dec. 8th*) the enemy moved still farther to the right, and built up a long row of fires on the heights on which he had bivouacked.⁵ As soon as it was dark, however, he withdrew "with precipitancy and silence,"⁶ by way of the old York road,⁷ into the city, burning a house or two on their way.⁸ As all the movements were calculated to impress General Washington with the idea that an attack on his lines was intended, the exact character of this movement does not appear to have been understood, and the main body of the American troops were not

allowed to pursue the fugitives, or to withdraw from their post on the hills of Whitemarsh.¹ General Howe pursued his solitary way amid the expressed dissatisfaction of his officers,² and reached Philadelphia about nine o'clock.³

No farther movements were made in 1777, and shortly afterwards the army, worn down with long and hard service, broke up the encampment at Whitemarsh, and took up its blood-stained march to Valley Forge, in Chester county, about eight miles distant, where, with its illustrious commander, it huddled for the winter.⁴

With some of the trials to which both were subjected during that severe winter—the army suffering from a scarcity of clothing and supplies,⁵ the General, in addition thereto, from the abominable treatment which he received from General Gates, the partisan "Board of War," and the almost equally partisan Continental Congress—my readers are acquainted; and to other writers, whose field of investigation is more general than mine, the task of recording its terrors is gladly left.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.; Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 424.—² Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10.

³ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I.; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 332.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Elias Boudinot to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 9.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Gen. Reed to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 10. Gen. Washington says they moved off "by two or three routes."

⁸ Gen. Washington to Pres. Wharton, Dec. 9; Capt. Allen McLane's MS. Journal.

¹ Gen. Washington's dispatch, Doc. I. The small parties of light troops sent out by the General could not come up with them, so rapid was the retreat.

² Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 424; Stedman, i. pp. 306, 317.—³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁴ Gordon, iii. pp. 11, 12; Irving's Washington, iii. pp. 332, 333; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 22.

⁵ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 22; Committee of Cong. to the Pres. of Cong., "Camp at Valley Forge, Feb. 12, 1778;" Stedman, i. p. 310.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GEN. WASHINGTON'S DISPATCH TO CONGRESS.

HEAD-QUARTERS, WHITEMARSH, Dec. 10, 1777.

SIR:—I have the honor to inform you, that in the course of last week, from a variety of intelligence, I had reason to expect that General Howe was preparing to give us a general action.

Accordingly, on Thursday night he moved from the city with all his force, except a very inconsiderable part left in his lines and redoubts, and appeared the next morning on Chesnut Hill, in front of, and about three miles distant from, our right wing. As soon as their position was discovered, the Pennsylvania militia were ordered from our right, to skirmish with their light advanced parties; and I am sorry to mention, that Brigadier-general Irvine, who led them on, had the misfortune to be wounded and to be made prisoner. Nothing more occurred on that day.

On Friday night the enemy changed their ground, and moved to our left, within a mile of our line, where they remained quiet and advantageously posted the whole of the next day. On Sunday they inclined still farther to our left; and from every appearance there was reason to apprehend they were determined on an action. In this movement, their advanced and flanking parties were warmly attacked by Colonel Morgan and his corps, and also by the Maryland militia under Colonel Gist. Their loss I cannot ascertain; but I am informed it was considerable, having regard to the number of the corps who engaged them. About sunset, after various marches and countermarches, they halted; and I still supposed, from their disposition and preceding manœuvres, that they would attack

us in the night or early the next morning; but in this I was mistaken.

On Monday afternoon they began to move again, and, instead of advancing, filed off from their right; and the first certain account that I could obtain of their intentions was, that they were in full march towards Philadelphia by two or three routes. I immediately detached light parties after them to fall upon their rear; but they were not able to come up with them.

The enemy's loss, as I have observed, I cannot ascertain. One account from the city is, that five hundred wounded had been sent in; another is, that eighty-two wagons had gone in with men in this situation. These, I fear, are both exaggerated, and not to be depended upon. We lost twenty-seven men in Morgan's corps, killed and wounded, besides Major Morris, a brave and gallant officer, who is among the latter. Of the Maryland militia there were also sixteen or seventeen wounded. I have not received farther returns yet. I sincerely wish that they had made an attack; as the issue, in all probability, from the disposition of our troops, and the strong situation of our camp, would have been fortunate and happy. At the same time I must add, that reason, prudence, and every principle of policy, forbade us from quitting our post to attack them. Nothing but success would have justified the measure; and this could not be expected from their position.

The constant attention and watching I was obliged to give the enemy's movements, would not allow me to write before; and this, I believe, was the less material, as I have reason to think your committee, who were in camp most of the time, and who are now here, transmitted an account of such occurrences as they deemed important in any degree. The first cause too,

sir, and my engagements with the committee previous to the coming out of the enemy, will, I trust, sufficiently apologize for my not acknowledging before, the honor of your favors of the 13th ultimo and the 1st instant, which came to hand in due order and time.

I have the honor to be
Your obedient servant,
GEO. WASHINGTON.

To the President of Congress.

II.

GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

PHILADELPHIA, December 13, 1777.

MY LORD:—Lord Cornwallis having applied for leave of absence, to attend his private business in Europe, I take this opportunity of sending my dispatches by his lordship in the Brilliant, armed ship.

Since my last, the enemy, being joined by upwards of four thousand men, with cannon from the Northern army, assembled their whole force in a strong camp at Whitemarsh, covered in part by Sandy Run, fourteen miles distant from hence, with their right to Wissahiecon Creek.

Upon a presumption that a forward movement might tempt the enemy, after receiving such reinforcement, to give battle for the recovery of this place, or that a vulnerable part might be found to admit of an attack upon their camp, the army marched on the night of the 4th instant, the van commanded by Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis, the main body by Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, and on the next morning took post upon Chesnut Hill, in front of the enemy's right. The enemy soon after detached a corps of one thousand men to attack the light-

infantry posted in front, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie; the consequence of which was, that upon the first onset of the second battalion of light-infantry and part of the first, they were instantly defeated, with the loss of between thirty and forty men killed and wounded, and a brigadier made prisoner.

Not judging it advisable to attack the enemy's right, the army, having remained in the same position during the 6th, marched at one o'clock in the morning of the 7th, the van and main body commanded as before, to take post on Edge Hill, one mile distant from the enemy's left. A corps of one thousand men, composed of riflemen and other troops, from the enemy's Northern army, were found by the van-guard, posted on this hill with cannon. Lord Cornwallis immediately attacked, with the First light-infantry, supported by the Thirty-third regiment, and defeated this body, with a considerable loss of officers and men, their cannon narrowly escaping. The thickness of the wood where the rebels were posted, concealing them from the view of the light-infantry, occasioned the loss of one officer killed, three wounded, and between twenty and thirty men killed and wounded, from their first fire. Major-general Grey, with his brigade, light-infantry of the Guards, Queen's Rangers, Hessian and Anspach chasseurs, took post upon the left, in front of the enemy's centre. A detachment to harass this corps was immediately routed by the General's advanced guard, composed of his light troops, with a loss to the enemy of fifty killed and wounded.

Your lordship will see, by the inclosed return, the loss sustained by the King's troops in the above-mentioned attacks.

* * * * *

With the most perfect respect, I have the honor to be,

W. HOWE.

CHAPTER XXXII.

March 7, 1778.

THE LOSS OF THE RANDOLPH.

AMONG the most interesting of the many conflicts which the War of the Revolution produced, was the loss of the frigate Randolph, commanded by Captain Nicholas Biddle, of Philadelphia.

This vessel, a fine new frigate, of thirty-two guns, was built in Philadelphia, under the provisions of the law of December 13, 1775;¹ and when, in the fall of 1776, Captain Biddle was ordered to get her ready for sea, he entered upon the duty with great energy.² The difficulty which he experienced in procuring American seamen, was the source of much trouble, and he was compelled to ship a number of British seamen from among the prisoners of war, to complete his complement.³

Having completed his arrangements, Captain Biddle sailed from Philadelphia in February, 1777; but the Randolph's masts being defective, were soon afterwards carried away, and he was obliged to put into Charleston, to refit. While bearing away for that port, that por-

tion of his crew which had been taken from the prisoners, probably taking advantage of his crippled condition, endeavored to create a revolt, but the prompt and decisive measures adopted by the officers effectually suppressed it.¹

After refitting his vessel, and obtaining other hands, in place of the malcontents, Captain Biddle again proceeded to sea; and when three days out he fell in with four West Indiamen, bound to London, one of which, the *True Briton*, mounted twenty guns.² The commander of this vessel, with the bravado which too frequently prevails among the self-conceited, had frequently expressed a wish, among his passengers, to fall in with the Randolph; but, as soon as his wish had been gratified, he made all the sail he could, to secure his escape.³ The superior sailing qualities of the Randolph soon enabled her to overhaul the fugitives; and, after putting prize crews on them, he returned to

¹ Cooper's Naval History, i. p. 95, 100.

² Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 289.—³ Ibid.; Clark's Sketches of the Naval Hist. of U. S., p. 29.

¹ Clark, p. 29; Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 289. Cooper (i. p. 145) supposes this revolt was one of the causes of the return to Charleston.

² Clark, p. 29; Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 289; Cooper, i. p. 145.—³ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 289; Clark, p. 29.

Charleston with his prizes,¹ arriving at that port within a week from the date of his departure.²

The State of South Carolina, encouraged by his success, immediately fitted out a squadron of small vessels,—the *General Moultrie*, of eighteen guns, Captain Sullivan; the *Polly*, of sixteen guns, Captain Anthony; the *Notre Dame*, of sixteen guns, Captain Hall; and the *Fair American*, of fourteen guns, Captain Morgan,—which were placed under his command.³ A detachment of fifty men from the South Carolina regiment was detailed to these vessels;⁴ and, with them, Captain Biddle, in the *Randolph*, sailed from Charleston early in February, 1778.⁵

His intention was to seek and attack the *Carysfort*, thirty-two; the *Perseus*, twenty; the *Hinchinbrook*, sixteen; and a privateer, which had been cruising off Charleston for some time previous, greatly annoying the trade;⁶ but, notwithstanding his efforts, he could not find them.⁷ He afterwards proceeded to the West Indies, and cruised in the vicinity of Barbadoes, taking a British schooner, from New York, bound to Grenada.⁸

The intelligence of this squadron's operations was soon conveyed to the enemy, and about three o'clock in the afternoon of the seventh of March,⁹

when about fifty leagues to the eastward of Barbadoes,¹ a sail was seen to the windward of the Randolph. Signals were immediately made to her consorts, in consequence of which the squadron hauled upon a wind, in order to speak her. At four o'clock the stranger was seen distinctly, when she was discovered to be a ship, though as she neared and came before the wind, she had the appearance of a large sloop with only a square sail set. About seven o'clock, the Randolph being to windward, hove to; and the General Moultrie, which was about one hundred and fifty yards astern, and rather to the leeward, followed her example. About eight o'clock the stranger came up, firing a shot across the Moultrie's bows and hailing her, receiving for answer that she was the *Polly of New York*. She then hauled her wind and hailed the Randolph, the crew of the latter then first discovering that she was a two-decker.²

After several questions and answers had passed between the vessels,³ as the stranger was ranging up alongside the Randolph, and had got on her weather-quarter,⁴ Lieutenant Barnes, of the latter ship, called out, “*This is the Randolph*,” hoisted her colors,⁵ and gave the former a broadside.⁶ The action immediately assumed a decided character,

¹ Cooper, i. p. 145.—² Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 290; Garden's Anecdotes, i. p. 223.—³ Cooper, i. p. 145; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 7.—⁴ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 290; Garden's Anecdotes, i. p. 223.—⁵ Capt. Vincent to Adm'l Young, March 17, 1778.—⁶ Cooper, i. p. 145; Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 290. ⁷ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 290.

* Ibid., pp. 290, 291. ⁸ Ibid., p. 291.

¹ Capt. Vincent to Adm'l Young, March 17, 1778.

² Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 291.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Ibid.; Capt. Vincent's letter to Adm'l Young, March 17, 1778.

⁵ All accounts agree that the colors were not displayed until the action commenced.

⁶ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 291; Capt. Vincent's letter to Adm'l Young, March 17, 1778.

the Randolph's fire being constant and well directed, three broadsides being given to the enemy's one.¹

The General Moultrie also engaged the enemy, but the latter having shot ahead so far as to bring the Randolph between them, the last broadside of the General Moultrie struck the latter instead of the enemy, doing considerable damage.²

About this time, probably from the Moultrie's shot, Captain Biddle received a wound in the thigh and fell, which created considerable confusion among the crew, who supposed he had been killed. Perceiving the effect of his fall, he ordered a chair to be brought, said he was but slightly wounded, and, being carried forward among the men, rallied them and restored order.³

The action had continued about twenty minutes,⁴ and the surgeon was engaged in examining Captain Biddle's wound when the Randolph blew up.⁵

The ships were so near that the enemy's ship "was in a manner covered with parts of the Randolph; a great piece of a top timber, six feet long, fell on her poop; another large piece of timber stuck in her fore-topgallant sail; and an American ensign, rolled up, was blown upon the forecastle, not so much as singed."⁶ Captain Morgan, of the Fair American, supposing it was the

strange ship which had blown up, stood for the survivor, with his trumpet in his hand, to hail her, when he discovered his mistake, and retreated.¹

The little squadron, having lost its commander, immediately dispersed in different directions;² the stranger attempting to pursue them,³ but her sails having been "torn all to pieces in a most surprising manner"⁴—so vigorously had the Randolph maintained the action—that she soon lost sight of them.⁵

The strange ship which the Randolph had so gallantly attacked was the *Yarmouth*, of sixty-four guns, commanded by Captain Vincent; and, beside the damage which she sustained, five of her crew were killed and twelve wounded, during the brief engagement.⁶

Five days after the engagement the Yarmouth was cruising in the vicinity, when a piece of a wreck, with four men on it, was discovered. The men were picked up, and proved to be the only survivors of the crew of the Randolph—three hundred and fifteen in number⁷—who had so gallantly sustained the action on the preceding week. They had subsisted, while on the wreck, on nothing but rain-water, which they caught on a piece of blanket.⁸

The cause of this disaster is one of the hidden things of Providence, the

¹ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 291.—² Ibid.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 292. Capt. Vincent says, "about fifteen minutes" Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 70) says seventeen minutes.—⁵ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 292; Capt. Vincent's letter to Adm'l Young, March 17, 1778; Clark, p. 31; Cooper, i. p. 116.—⁶ Capt. Vincent's letter to Adm'l Young, March 17, 1778.

¹ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 292.—² Capt. Vincent's letters, March 17, 1778.—³ Ibid.; Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 292; Cooper, i. p. 146; Clark, p. 32.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.; Moultrie's Mem. ii. p. 198.

⁷ Capt. Vincent (*Letter to Adm'l Young*) and Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 87) say the crew numbered only 305 men.

⁸ Ramsay's *Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 70; Garden's *Anecdotes*, i. p. 223; Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 292.

survivors being unable to give any information on the subject. It is a singular fact, however, that the clerk, after having copied the signals and orders for the small vessels which accompanied the Randolph, wrote at the foot of them, "In case of coming to action in the night, be very careful of your magazines."¹

Of the conduct of Captain Biddle it has been remarked, by one who was competent to judge,² "We regard with

admiration the steadiness and spirit with which, according to the account of his enemy, Captain Biddle commenced this action, against a force so vastly his superior; and, although victory was almost hopeless, even had all his vessels behaved equally well with his own ship, we find it difficult, under the circumstances, to suppose that this gallant seaman did not actually contemplate carrying his powerful antagonist, most probably by boarding."

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM CAPT. VINCENT
OF H. M. S. YARMOUTH TO ADMIRAL YOUNG.

BARBADOES, *March 17, 1778.*

I take the opportunity of the January packet's sailing from hence to-morrow morning, directly for St. John's, Antigua, of acquainting you my having on the 7th instant, at half-past five, p. m., discovered six sail in the southwest quarter, on a wind, standing to the northward; two of them ships, three brigs, and a schooner. We were then fifty leagues to the east of the island. We immediately bore down upon them, and about nine got close to the weather-quarter of the largest and headmost ship. They had no colors hoisted; and as ours were then up, I hailed her to hoist hers or I would fire into her; on which she hoisted American, and immediately gave us her broadside, which we returned, and in about a quarter of an hour she blew up. It was fortunate for us that we were to the windward of her; as it was, our ship was in a manner covered with parts of her; a great piece

of a top timber, six feet long, fell on our poop; another piece of timber stuck in our fore-top-gallant sail (then upon the cap); an American ensign, rolled up, blown in upon the forecastle, not so much as singed. Immediately on her blowing up, the other four dispersed different ways. We chased, a little while, two that stood to the southward, and afterwards another, that bore away right before the wind, but they were soon out of sight; our sails being torn all to pieces in a most surprising manner. We had five men killed and twelve wounded. But what I am now going to mention is something very remarkable: the 12th following, being then in chase of a ship steering west, we discovered a piece of a wreck with four men on it, waving; we hauled up to it, got a boat out, and brought them on board; they proved to be four men who had been in the ship which blew up, and who had nothing to subsist on from that time but by sucking the rain-water that fell on a piece of blanket, which they luckily had picked up. They informed us the ship blew up was called the Randolph, of thirty-six guns and three hundred and five men; the other ship was the General Moultrie, of twenty guns; and the other

¹ Portfolio, 3d series, ii. p. 292.—² Cooper, i. p. 147.

three, armed brigs; and sailed from Charleston, South Carolina, about a month before. I resumed the chase, but she was too far ahead to get up with her; however, I continued it, in order to drive her at least off the station, till eleven that night, when we made this island, having lost sight of her.

II.

CAPTAIN NICHOLAS BIDDLE.

Captain Nicholas Biddle, son of William Biddle, was born in Philadelphia, September 10, 1750. He was descended from one of the first settlers and proprietors of New Jersey; and his mother was a daughter of Nicholas Scull, who for many years was surveyor-general of Pennsylvania.

At an early age he manifested a preference for a seafaring life, and, before the age of fourteen, he had made a voyage to Quebec. In 1765 he made a voyage to the West Indies and suffered shipwreck, and experienced great hardships on an uninhabited island on which the crew was cast.

He afterwards made several voyages to Europe, and when the war with Spain was expected, in 1770, he went to London for the purpose of entering the Royal navy. He served as a midshipman under Captain Sterling, to whom he had letters of recommendation.

When the government fitted out the well-known expedition to ascertain how far the Northern Ocean could be navigated, in 1773, Biddle applied for a transfer, but Captain Sterling prevented it. Nothing daunted, however, he laid aside his uniform and enlisted before the mast, on the *Carcase*, to which vessel young Horatio Nelson, the well-known hero of the Nile

and Trafalgar, was also attached. It is said that these two youthful heroes were appointed coxswains, an evidence of their activity and trustworthiness.

At the opening of the Revolutionary War he returned to America, and engaged in the service of his country. He was first appointed to the command of the *Camden*, galley, fitted for the defence of the Delaware. Finding this too inactive a service, he applied for a command in the expedition against New Providence, under Commodore Esek Hopkins, and was ordered to the *Andrew Doria*, a brig of fourteen guns and one hundred and thirty men.

On the return of the expedition to New London, Captain Biddle was ordered to cruise off the banks of Newfoundland, in order to cut off the supplies and reinforcements which were intended for the besieged garrison of Boston; and was very successful.

He continued in command of the *Andrew Doria* until the fall of 1776, when he was transferred to the *Randolph*, and his career, as commander of that vessel, has been already noticed.

He fell, at the age of twenty-seven years, "as gallant an officer as any country ever boasted of. In the short career which Providence allowed to him, he displayed all those qualities which constitute a great soldier. Brave to excess, and consummately skilled in his profession, no danger nor unexpected event could shake his firmness, or disturb his mind. An exact and rigid disciplinarian, he tempered his authority with so much humanity and affability, that his orders were always executed with cheerfulness and alacrity. Perhaps no officer ever understood better the art of commanding the affections as well as the respect of those who served under him,—if that can be called an art which was rather the natural effect of the benevolence and magnanimity of his character."

CHAPTER XXXIII.

MARCH 18, 1778.

THE SKIRMISH AT QUINTIN'S BRIDGE.

THE American army and its illustrious commander-in-chief still occupied the huts at Valley Forge, when General Anthony Wayne was dispatched into New Jersey to procure provisions and horses for its use. To counteract the movements of General Wayne, and, at the same time, to forage for their own troops, the British commanders dispatched similar parties, so that New Jersey was thoroughly and relentlessly searched and stripped of its horses and provisions.¹ Yet, strange as it may appear, the people submitted tamely to the oppression, and the local militia rarely interposed any opposition.²

One of these parties of the enemy's force, composed of the Twenty-seventh and Forty-sixth regiments, the Queen's Rangers, under Major Simcoe, and the New Jersey Volunteers,—the two latter being corps of refugees,—the whole commanded by Colonel Mawhood, embarked at Philadelphia on the twelfth of March, dropped down the Delaware, and, on the seventeenth, reached Salem,

in New Jersey.³ The Rangers had borrowed horses to mount their hussars,⁴ thirty in number, and the forage was to take place on the next day.⁵

About five miles southeast from Salem, on the Alloway's Creek, was Quintin's Bridge,⁶—the central one of three bridges which crossed that stream,—and at the eastern extremity of it was stationed a small party of militia,⁷ commanded by Colonel Holmes.⁸ On the eastern margin of the stream the bank rose quite suddenly, while on the western, a marsh, some two hundred yards in width, intervened between the stream and the higher ground; and on the edge of that high ground, where the road descended to the marsh, stood a public house, kept by Benjamin Weth-

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 46. I have followed Simcoe, although I believe he is in error. If the party sent to mask the bridge belonged to the 17th regiment, as he repeatedly states, a portion of that regiment must have formed part of the detachment, in addition to the above; or, on the other hand, he has written the 27th instead of the 17th. Gen. Howe, in his dispatch of May 11, says there were *three* regiments of regulars, which confirms my views.—² Simcoe's Journal, p. 46; Stedman, i. p. 367.

³ Simcoe's Journal, p. 47.—⁴ Gordon's Gazetteer of New Jersey, p. 221. Johnson (*Hist. of Salem, N. J.*) says *three miles*.—⁵ Gordon's Hist. of New Jersey, p. 264; Stedman, i. p. 368.—⁶ Marshall, iii. p. 475; Johnson's Salem, N. J.

¹ Sir Wm. Howe's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, May 11, 1778.—² Gordon's New Jersey, p. 264; The (Phila.) Pennsylvania Ledger, No. 141, April 4, 1778.

erby, for "the entertainment of man and beast."¹

On the eastern bank of the creek, on the high ground, the militia had thrown up breastworks for their defence, and, to add to their safety, the planks had been taken from the bridge.² To mask this bridge, and to enable the forage to proceed without interruption from the party under Colonel Holmes, an officer, with seventy men from the Seventeenth regiment, was ordered to take post near the tavern on the western bank of the creek; but he appears to have considered his position a dangerous one, and to have notified Colonel Mawhood of that opinion. The Colonel immediately marched to his assistance with the Rangers, taking a circuitous route, in order to mislead the Americans respecting the object of his attack.³

When the detachment approached the bridge it was halted in a wood where the Americans could not see it; and Colonel Mawhood and Major Simcoe rode forward to the party on the ground to reconnoitre, but in such a manner as to create no suspicion that they formed part of a reinforcement. The plan of operations having been determined upon, Major Simcoe was directed to carry it into execution. Taking advantage of the broken ground, on which was an orchard, in the rear of the tavern, he brought Captain Stephenson of the Rangers, and his com-

pany, into the house, without being discovered by the Americans. The shutters in the rear of the house, next to the bridge, were closed; the inmates of the house were ordered into the cellar, and entire silence enjoined on them; and Lieutenant M'Kay of the Rangers was placed behind the open door, armed with a bayonet, and ordered to seize the first person whose curiosity might prompt him to enter the house. Two other companies of Rangers, under Captain Saunders, were concealed behind a fence, a short distance westward from the tavern; and farther still, in a wood which came up to the road at that spot, the main body of the Rangers were placed in ambuscade.¹

In the mean time the masking party of the Seventeenth regiment, which originally occupied the ground, made demonstrations of retreat in order to attract the attention of the Americans; and, when all the preparations had been completed, the sentinels were called in, and it retreated up the road with every appearance of haste. The trap was well laid, the decoy performed its duty admirably, and the success was complete. The masking party had no sooner moved than the planks of the bridge were relaid, and the Americans crossed the creek in full pursuit. The main body, some two hundred in number, followed the supposed fugitives; while a detachment filed off to the right and occupied the high ground north from the tavern, probably for the purpose of

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 48; Map of the skirmish, by Simcoe; Johnson's Salem, N. J., cited by Barber and Howe.

² Simcoe's Journal, p. 48.

³ Ibid.; Stedman, i. p. 368.

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 48.

covering the bridge. When the column reached the tavern, the open door, and apparently deserted dwelling, tempted some of the *thirsty* Americans to propose a visit, *probably to its bar*, but the officer in command, in the exercise of an unfortunate prudence, "both by words and by actions," prevented it; and they passed on, leaving the enemy, under Captain Stephenson, behind them. Immediately afterwards the officer in command of the column rode into the field on the south side of the road, and discovered the two companies under Captain Saunders, who were concealed behind the fence. He immediately ordered a retreat, but a shot wounded him and he was taken prisoner. The company, under Captain Stephenson, immediately sallied from the house and intercepted the retreat of the column, while Captain Saunders, with his command, from behind the fence, and the main body of the Rangers, from the woods beyond, joined in the pursuit of the retreating Americans, who now sought safety in a disorderly flight, across the fields, towards the creek. The masking party from the Seventeenth regiment—who had so admirably performed the part of a decoy—was countermarched, and, with the grenadiers and the Highlanders belonging to the Rangers, were moved forward to the tavern to seize the bridge, if an opportunity was afforded. The detachment of Americans which occupied the high grounds near the tavern appear to have repassed the bridge in safety; and the enemy, probably contented with the

success of this achievement, shortly afterwards returned to Salem.¹

The enemy numbered, according to Major Simcoe's own account,² about three hundred Rangers, beside the seventy who first occupied the ground. The Americans engaged, on the same authority,³ numbered about two hundred, and were entirely undisciplined militia.⁴

The enemy took but few prisoners,⁵ driving all whom he did not kill into the creek; and, on his own authority,⁶ he succeeded in drowning "the greater part" of those whom he thus pursued. The loss of the Americans in this particular affair is not recorded, that of the enemy was one hussar, mortally wounded.⁷

The people of New Jersey have always considered this affair as but little better than deliberate murder, and, to

¹ Simcoe's Journal, pp. 49, 50. Johnson (*Hist. of Salem, N. J.*) says the pursuit was checked by the opportune appearance of Col. Hand, with a reinforcement, in the vacated breastwork; and by the hardihood of Andrew Bacon, a militiaman, who, with an axe, cut away the chains of the draw-bridge. I find no reference to either incident in the cotemporary accounts, on either side, and have not considered them authentic.

² Simcoe's Journal, p. 47. Gordon says they numbered twelve hundred. Probably the entire detachment did so, but all, except those here referred to, appear to have been left at Salem.

³ Simcoe's Journal, p. 49.

⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 475.

⁵ Simcoe, p. 50. *The (Phila.) Penn. Ledger*, No. 138, March 25, 1778, and Gaines' "*New York Gazette, Extra*," No. 1381, April 8, say ten prisoners were taken. Col. Hand (*letter to Col. Mawhood, March 22, 1778*) charges the enemy with bayoneting the Americans *after they had surrendered*.

⁶ Simcoe, p. 50.—⁷ Ibid. *The (Phila.) Penn. Ledger*, and *The New York Gazette*, already cited, say that twenty were killed, and ten prisoners taken.

this day, have not ceased to call it "*The Massacre at Quintin's Bridge.*" The troops employed by the enemy, the diabolical spirit with which the orders of their superiors were executed among their former neighbors, and the sufferings of the people which were produced by these inroads, all tend to keep alive the remembrance of the

outrage among the descendants of the sufferers; and Time has failed to heal the wounds which were then received by the inhabitants of these secluded villages. It was a blow received from their own countrymen, indeed from their own neighbors, and the remembrance of it can never be wholly effaced.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

March 21, 1778.

THE SKIRMISH AT HANCOCK'S BRIDGE.

THE movements of the Americans in New Jersey, and the counter-movements of the British, have been already noticed in a preceding chapter; and the skirmish at Quintin's Bridge has also been described.¹

Immediately after the return of Colonel Mawhood, to Salem, from Quintin's Bridge, he resolved to attack the party of militia who had assembled at Hancock's Bridge²—the lower of the three bridges which span the Alloway's Creek. It is situated in Salem county, New Jersey, about five miles south from Salem;³ and then, as now, a few houses had been collected around it, forming a small country village.⁴ The principal house was a large double, two-story brick house, owned by a Mr. Hancock,⁵ a prominent Tory, who had rendered himself obnoxious to the patriotic Jerseymen around him, and been compelled to conceal himself at a distance from home, except at night, when he

returned to his family.¹ In front of this little village flowed the Alloway's Creek, and surrounding it, on the rear, were low meadows and marshes, here and there intersected by dykes, to prevent them from being overflowed.² At the time referred to, the position was occupied by a large party of militia, who had been aroused by the outrages committed by the enemy's foraging parties, and the plank had been removed from the bridge for the protection of the post.³

Reports reached Colonel Mawhood that four hundred men were posted there, and he anticipated a glorious triumph for the royal cause.⁴ On the evening of the nineteenth of March, however, the main body of the militia—the intended victims—was moved to some other post,⁵ leaving only twenty men at Hancock's to guard the pass;⁶ and the success was not so complete, and the blow not so severe, against the Americans as Colonel Mawhood had expected or desired.

¹ Vide Chap. XXXIII.—² Stedman, i. p. 369.

³ Gordon's Gaz. of New Jersey.—⁴ Map of the affair, in Simcoe's Journal.—⁵ This house was standing in 1844, and a view of it is given in Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of New Jersey, p. 426.

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 52.—² Map in Simcoe's Journal.

³ Ibid.—⁴ Simcoe's Journal, p. 50.—⁵ Ibid., p. 52.

⁶ Penn. Ledger, No. 148, Phila., April 29, 1778.

The enterprise was intrusted to Major Simcoe, of the Queen's Rangers, although Mawhood accompanied him on a preliminary reconnoitre of the post, and, probably, assisted in forming the plan of attack. The party, composed of the Rangers and "The Jersey Volunteers,"—all Tories, embarked at Salem on Friday evening, March 20th, with orders to land at an inlet on the Delaware, seven miles below the mouth of Alloway's Creek; when the boats were to be returned to Salem, and the expedition, by a private road, was to approach the bridge, across the marshes, from the rear of the position; while Major Mitchell, with the Twenty-seventh regiment of regular troops, was to approach from the front, and co-operate with Major Simcoe. The plan was well laid, and, had Major Simcoe been dependent upon none but his own Rangers, it would have been as well executed. The naval officers, however, were differently constituted; and when the expedition reached the mouth of Alloway's Creek, the tide set so strong up the river that it made but little headway, and Major Simcoe found it would be midday before it reached its destination. With the prompt, decisive energy which marked all his movements, he immediately landed on the marshes at the mouth of Alloway's Creek; and, taking with him a quantity of plank, which he found there, to form temporary bridges across the ditches, with which the low grounds abounded, he marched two miles, every step sinking to the knees in mud and

water, to the high ground, where he formed his troops for the attack.¹

He had received orders from Colonel Mawhood to give no quarter,² and the disposition of his troops was made especially for the accomplishment of this object. Captain Saunders was detached to form an ambuscade and destroy a bridge on a dyke, by which persons on foot could pass over the marshes to Quintin's Bridge,—a line of retreat which he supposed the fugitives would take; different parties were assigned to each of the buildings in the little village, for Major Simcoe was still ignorant of the march of the main body, on the nineteenth; Captain Dunlop and his company were detached to the rear of Hancock's house,—where he supposed the officers would be quartered,—with orders to enter it, from the rear, at the same moment the light-infantry, who were to approach it by the road, entered it in front; and still another party was detached to relay the bridge. Those assigned to the cottages and other buildings, had orders to assemble at Hancock's house as soon as they had mastered the defenceless militiamen, whom he supposed would be found in them; while those sent against Hancock's house were ordered to barricade it, and prepare for defence.³

The plan of operations was thus completed, and, with a silent step, the expedition approached the village, with the confident expectation of butchering, in

¹ Simcoe's Journal, pp. 50, 51; Stedman, i. p. 369.

² Lieut. Hall's Civil War, p. 426.

³ Simcoe's Journal, pp. 51, 52; Stedman, i. pp. 369, 370.

cold blood, upwards of four hundred of their countrymen, before they could arise from their beds to defend themselves. Not a gun was to be fired, lest the report might alarm some outpost or summon some more distant auxiliary force to avenge the death of their brethren. The sanguinary bayonet was the sole instrument of death which the enemy employed; and the vilest passions of the human heart were appealed to in placing that instrument, with orders to show no quarters, in the hands of the neighbors and relatives of those whose destruction had been so deliberately determined.

On approaching the village two sentinels were seen, silently passing to and fro on their respective posts; and two men from the light-infantry were detached to follow and silently approach them, and, as they turned about to retrace their steps, to bayonet them on the spot. With fiend-like alacrity the order was promptly executed; and the different parties, "each with proper guides,"¹ about the break of day,² rushed forward to the scene of operations allotted to it. The surprise was complete, and the result, as far as it went, was generally satisfactory. Many of the parties had no work for their hungry bayonets to perform; those who entered Hancock's house, butchered its

owner and his brother,—both Tories,³—instead of the American officers they expected to find there.⁴ Those who had been sent against the building occupied by the guard, in the language of that day, "opened the door and came in, many of the guard being asleep, without giving the least alarm. Nay, so far from it, that it is said some of them shook hands, in a friendly manner, with some of the guard with whom they were intimately acquainted, as indeed they were with most of them, and immediately they began bayoneting of them, without our people making the least show of resistance, not only reeking their fury on the guard, but also on sundry of the peaceable inhabitants who were slumbering in their beds."⁵

Faithful to the orders which had been given, every man of the guard,⁴ as well as "sundry of the peaceable inhabitants," and all, except one, who escaped, of a patrol,⁵ were killed on the spot. No prisoners were taken, nor were any left to linger in misery from wounds which would have indicated a duller bayonet or a less willing hand. The bloody work was done, it was *well* done; and nowhere, but in similar, fratricidal contests, can its parallel be found for cold-hearted villainy.

¹ One of these was a Quaker, crippled in both his arms.—*Collins' N. J. Gazette*, No. 19, Trenton, April 8, 1778.

² Simcoe's Journal, p. 52.

³ Penn. Ledger, No. 148, April 29.

⁴ Simcoe's Journal, p. 52; Stedman, i. p. 370.

⁵ Simcoe's Journal, p. 53; Stedman, i. p. 370.

¹ It is said that a negro, named Frank, belonging to a Mr. Nicholson, and a white man, named Jonathan Ballenger, were the guides.

² Penn. Ledger, No. 148, Phila., April 29, 1778.

CHAPTER XXXV.

May 1, 1778.¹

THE SKIRMISH AT THE CROOKED BILLET.

THE farmers of Pennsylvania and New Jersey continuing to supply the enemy in Philadelphia with flour and other supplies, a body of militia commanded by General Potter, and subsequently by General Lacey, was stationed at the Crooked Billet, in Montgomery county, Pennsylvania, for the purpose of intercepting them.² From the expiration of their terms of service, his force had decreased from four hundred and fifty-six, fit for duty, on the twenty-fourth of February, to fifty-three, fit for duty, on the twenty-seventh of April,³ and, although reinforcements were expected,⁴ it appears that but few, if any, had actually reached him.

At this time information of his situation was conveyed to Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, and arrangements were made to attack him, in his encampment, on

the first of May. A large body of light-dragoons and four hundred light-infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie,¹ were detached early on Friday morning, May 1st,² with orders to proceed along the road leading to the Valley Forge, past the Horseham meeting-house, and to conceal themselves in a wood near General Lacey's encampment.³ At the same time Major Simcoe, with three hundred of the Queen's Rangers,⁴ was to make a circuitous march, and get into a road leading from Philadelphia to York,⁵ which passed along the rear of the Billet, less than half a mile distant from it. When the Rangers attacked the Americans, if the latter were not completely surprised, it was supposed the attack under Colonel Abercrombie would complete it; while their retreat would be intercepted, and the victory rendered complete.⁶

¹ Gen. Howe, in his dispatch, and all the British writers (*Stedman, Lieut. Hall*, the author of "*Hist. of Civil War, &c.*"), probably copying from that report, say this affair took place on the 4th of May. I prefer the date mentioned by Gen. Lacey, which is evidently correct. The newspapers of the day also confirm the latter.

² Stedman, i. p. 372; Hall's *Civil War*, p. 426.

³ Gen. Lacey to Gen. Armstrong, April 28, 1778.

⁴ Gen. Lacey to Gen. Washington, April 27.

¹ Gen. Howe's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, May 11 (Doc. II.)—² Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 23, Trenton, May 6, 1778.—³ Simcoe's Journal, p. 57; Stedman, i. p. 372

⁴ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁵ Stedman says this was the road to *New York*, but he appears to have been mistaken.

⁶ Simcoe's Journal, p. 57; Stedman, i. p. 372.

With great caution the two detachments moved to the positions assigned to them, and the surprise, in this case also, was complete,¹—one of the American patrols, who met the enemy about two miles from the camp, being so terrified that he could not find courage sufficient to raise an alarm, although he found means to secure his own safety.² The camp was reached about daylight,³ and one of the sentinels discovering the dragoons raised the alarm.⁴ With great presence of mind General Lacey immediately moved his men, in a column,⁵ towards a wood which laid on the left of his encampment, where he made a stand and returned the enemy's fire with good effect.⁶ Perceiving that the enemy was much stronger than he was, General Lacey took advantage of the woods, abandoned his baggage, and continued his retreat, skirmishing with the enemy for upwards of two miles, when, by making a sudden turn to the left, through another wood, he extricated himself from the pursuit,⁷ and the

enemy returned to Philadelphia with General Lacey's baggage,¹ but without any other advantage, either in spoils or glory.

Of General Lacey's command about thirty were killed and seventeen wounded;² of the enemy, General Howe reported nine wounded.³ In this case, as in those in New Jersey, the enemy acted with the greatest cruelty towards the wounded who fell into his hands. “Some were set on fire with buckwheat-straw, others had their clothes burned on their backs. Some of the surviving sufferers say they saw the enemy set fire to the wounded, while yet alive, who struggled to put it out, but were too weak, and expired under the torture.”⁴ General Lacey, himself, saw those laying in the buckwheat-straw, and says “they made a most melancholy appearance.” “Others I saw,” he continues, “who, after being wounded with a ball, had received near a dozen wounds with cutlasses and bayonets.”⁵

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 59.—² Gen. Lacey to Gen. Washington, May 2, Doc. I.; Same to Gen. Armstrong, May 7.

³ Gen. Lacey to Gen. Washington, Doc. I.—⁴ Simcoe's Journal, p. 59; Stedman, i. p. 373.—⁵ Gen. Lacey to Gen. Washington, Doc. I.—⁶ Ibid.; Gen. Lacey to Gen. Armstrong, May 7; Simcoe's Journal, p. 59; Stedman, i. p. 374.—⁷ Ibid.

¹ Simcoe's Journal, pp. 59, 60; Stedman, i. p. 375.

² Gen. Lacey to Gen. Washington, Doc. I. In his letter to Gen. Armstrong, May 7, five days later, he says his loss was only twenty-six killed and eight or ten severely wounded.

³ Gen. Howe's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁴ Gen. Lacey to Gen. Armstrong, May 7. See also his letter to Gen. Washington, Doc. I.—⁵ Ibid.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GEN. LACEY'S DISPATCH TO GEN. WASHINGTON.

CAMP NEAR NESHAMINY BRIDGE, }
YORK ROAD, May 2, 1778. }

SIR:—My camp, near the Crooked Billet, was surrounded on the morning of the first instant, by daylight, with a body of the enemy, who appeared on all quarters. My scouts had neglected the preceding night to patrol the roads, as they were ordered, but lay in camp till nearly day, although their orders were to leave it by two o'clock in the morning. One of the parties, commanded by a lieutenant, met the enemy near two miles from the camp, but never gave us the alarm. He makes his excuse, that he was so near them before he espied them, that he thought himself in danger of being cut to pieces by their horse in case he had fired; but that he sent off a man to give notice the enemy were approaching, who, however, did not come. To the disobedience and misconduct of this and the other officers of the scouts, I have to lay my misfortunes.

The alarm was so sudden I had scarcely time to mount my horse before the enemy was within musket-shot of my quarters. I observed the party in my rear had got into houses and behind fencees; and as their numbers could not be ascertained, I did not think it advisable to attack them in that situation—especially as another body appeared in my front, to the east of the Billet. In this uncertainty as to the numbers I had to contend with, I thought it best to open my way under cover of wood to the left of my camp, towards Colonel Hart's, for which my little body moved in column, the baggage following in the rear. I had not passed far before my flanking parties began to exchange fire with

the enemy. I kept moving on till I made the wood; when a party of both foot and horse came up the Byberry road, and attacked my right flank; the party from the Billet fell upon my rear; the horse, from the rear of my camp, came upon my left flank; and a body of horse appeared directly in front. We made a stand in this wood, and gave them some warm fires, which forced them to retire. Their horse suffered considerably as they charged us, and were severely repulsed. Their strength gathering from all quarters, I thought it best to move on, which I did with the loss of the baggage, the horse giving way in front as we advanced. We continued fighting and retreating for upwards of two miles, when I made a sudden turn to the left, through a wood, which entirely extricated myself from them. I came into the York road near the cross-roads, and moved slowly down towards the Billet, in hopes to take some advantage of them on that quarter, where they might least expect me; but I found they had retired towards the city. My people behaved well. My loss is about thirty killed and seventeen wounded. Some were butchered in the most savage and cruel manner; even while living some were thrown into buckwheat-straw, and the straw set on fire. The clothes were burnt on others; and scarcely one left without a dozen wounds, with bayonets and cutlasses.

The enemy's loss is not known; but it is currently reported there is one field officer among their slain. We took three of their horses, and five are left dead on the field, their riders either killed or wounded.

The times of the militia light-horse are all expired, and they have left me. They have been of much service to me, and I now feel their loss.

Twenty horse are better than fifty foot to make discoveries and give intelligence.

I am, with respect, your most obedient servant,

J. LACEY.

His Excellency GENERAL WASHINGTON.

II.

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM McMICHAEL, CONCERNING
THE BURNING OF THE WOUNDED.

[From Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet, Philadelphia, Tuesday,
November 3, 1778.]

William McMichael, of the Northern Liberties, of the city of Philadelphia, calker, on his solemn oath, deposeth and saith, that he was in service as a volunteer in the militia of this State, under the command of Brigadier-general Lace, on or about the first day of May last, when the British troops attacked the said General's camp; and that after some contest, the said General Lace was obliged to retire, leaving many of his wounded men on the field of action. That, having retired some small distance, he, this deponent, saw the enemy carrying straw to the places where the wounded were left, and did verily believe they intended to have comforted them therewith; but that before he had proceeded more than four hundred yards from where the wounded lay, he saw the straw in flames. And further this deponent saith, that on the same day he passed over the same ground, in company with several other persons, and saw the bones of the bodies lying among the ashes of the straw, together with some remains of accoutrements. The deponent further saith, that he heard two privates, who were taken the day aforesaid, say that the British troops were ordered not to give any quarter, and to take no prisoners, and that they were threatened by their officers with having no allowance of rum if they did.

WILLIAM McMICHAEL.

PHILADELPHIA, Sept. 16, 1778.

Sworn before me,

JONATHAN B. SMITH.

III.

GENERAL HOWE'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE
GERMAIN.

PHILADELPHIA, May 11, 1778.

MY LORD:—

* * * * *

Since the earliest return of spring, a succession of detachments from hence has ranged the country for many miles round this city, and in the province of Jersey, to open the communication, for bringing in supplies, to relieve the peaceable inhabitants from the persecution of their oppressors, and to collect forage for the army. These detachments have, without exception, succeeded to my expectations, greatly to the credit of the troops employed, to the annoyance of the enemy, and to the advantage of His Majesty's service. Colonel Mawhood, in particular, with three battalions and a Provincial corps, made a descent on the coast of Jersey, near Salem, in the month of March; and, after dispersing the force collected in that part of the country, returned with a very seasonable supply of forage.

To the skill and activity of Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, must be attributed a successful surprise, made on the 4th instant, upon a corps of the enemy consisting of nine hundred men, under the command of a brigadier-general, posted about seventeen miles from hence, with four hundred light-infantry, three hundred rangers, and a party of light-dragoons; that officer attacked and defeated this corps of the enemy, killing, wounding, and taking one hundred and fifty men, including officers, with the loss of only nine wounded. The rout would have been far more complete, if the long march of the infantry, in effecting this surprise, had not disabled them from a vigorous pursuit.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, &c.,

W. HOWE.

C H A P T E R X X X V I .

JUNE 1, 1778.¹

T H E B A T T L E O F C O B E L ' S - K I L L .

THE cause of freedom in America found no more reliable friends, and no more zealous supporters, than the early settlers of the Mohawk Valley and its vicinity. It became an object of the enemy, at an early day, therefore, to check this rising spirit, and to compel the hardy frontiersmen to retain their allegiance, if not their good-will, to the King. As has been already noticed, the services of the Johnsons and Butlers, and those of Joseph Brant and his people, were retained, and the region of country west from Schenectady and Albany became the scene of their savage operations.

Among these early settlements, in which the patriotic feelings of the people had been displayed, were those on the Cobel's-kill, in Schoharie county, New York, embracing, within a distance of three miles, about twenty families, all of whom are said to have favored the American cause. Fearing trouble from their savage neighbors,

these people had organized a company for their defence, appointed Christian Brown their captain, and Jacob Borst their lieutenant, but had not erected any works for their protection, although three forts had been built in other parts of the Schoharie Valley—the *Upper Fort*, in the present town of Fulton; the *Middle Fort*, on the farm lately owned by Ralph Manning, near Middleburg village; and the *Lower Fort*, now the well-known old stone meeting-house in Schoharie village.

Early in the spring of 1778, straggling parties of Indians hung around the settlements of the Cobel's-kill, and the inhabitants were too well acquainted with the habits of these strangers to let the warning pass without notice. Messengers were accordingly sent to the Middle Fort for assistance, and Captain Patrick, of Colonel Ichabod Alden's Massachusetts regiment,¹ with a small party of volunteers, was dispatched, reaching the residence of Captain Brown on the twenty-sixth of May, where they remained two days, and, on

¹ The date of this affair appears to have been well settled, notwithstanding the errors of Stone and Campbell, by Mr. Simms, and I have followed him in placing it at this date.

¹ Stone's Brant, i. p. 354.

the twenty-eighth, moved up the va'ley to the house of Lawrence Lawyer.

Scouts were kept out, in different directions, but nothing important occurred until the thirty-first, when one of them, composed of Lieutenant Borst, Joseph Borst, and —— Freemire, which had been stationed up the creek, encountered two Schoharie Indians, named Ones-Yaap and Han-Yerry. The scout, it appears, was fishing, and the Indians sprung upon it with a savage yell, evidently more with the desire to intimidate than to injure it. Being personally acquainted with each other, the Indians saluted the scout in a friendly manner, and a conversation ensued, in the course of which the former reproved the latter "for being in the woods to shoot Indians who did them no harm," and the latter replied, that "they intended no harm to those who were friendly." While thus engaged, Han-Yerry (who was a chief) took up Joseph Borst's gun, in a careless manner, and, after looking at it, playfully threw open the pan, and, by a sudden jerk, spilled the priming on the ground, saying, as he did so, "*Yo yener y hatste*" ("*It is good if this be gone*"). Borst, seeing the movement of the Indian, instantly seized Han's gun, and wrenching the flint from the lock, replied, "*Yo yener sagat*" ("*It is good if this is served so*"). The Indian immediately clinched Borst, and, at the same instant, Ones-Yaap approached Lieutenant Borst and demanded his surrender. Joseph Borst, being the stronger man, speedily brought Han-

Yerry to the ground, while his brother, stepping back, shot Ones-Yaap on the spot. Seeing the fate of his companion, Han freed himself from Joseph's grasp, and escaped, leaving his flintless gun and that of his adversary, without priming, useless on the ground.

The next morning (*Saturday, June 1st*), Captain Miller, who had been sent out from the Lower Fort to reconnoitre, arrived at Lawyer's house, and several of his men volunteered to remain with Captain Patrick. The regulars, under the latter officer, then amounted to between thirty and forty; while the local militia, under Captain Brown, numbered only fifteen.¹

Soon afterwards the troops marched up the valley to the house of George Warren, who was one of the Committee of Safety, then the most southern house in the settlement, now the site of a flourishing orchard in Cobel's-kill Centre. They had been at Warner's but a very short time when a party of Indians showed themselves at a short distance above the house, and Captain Patrick ordered his entire force to march out and pursue them. Captain Brown, who was better acquainted with the Indian mode of warfare, remonstrated; but the regular ridiculed the advice, and taunted the militiaman with cowardice. The result, like that in many other similar cases, from Braddock to the present time, showed the correctness of the judgment which Captain Brown displayed.

¹ Mr. Stone (*Life of Brant*, i. p. 313) supposes there were twenty-two militia and thirty regulars.

The Indians, who were but a decoy, retired before the troops until even Patrick was convinced that a farther pursuit would be injudicious, and halted. He immediately formed his troops (who were then near the present residence of Lambert Lawyer), with the militia on his right; and, the main body of the enemy having showed itself, the battle commenced. Although the battle was fought in the usual style of such encounters—each man acting independently, from any shelter which he can secure—it was soon evident that the enemy greatly outnumbered the Americans. At length Captain Patrick was wounded in the thigh, and two of his men attempted to carry him from the field, when all were surrounded by the savages and immediately killed. When Captain Patrick fell, the command devolved on Captain Brown, who ordered an immediate retreat, and saved the little party from being surrounded.

On arriving at Warner's house, from which they had marched a short time before, three of the regulars and John Freemire and Martinus Fester, militia, took refuge in it; while the remainder of the troops passed farther down the valley, and, being favored by the delay occasioned by the halt of the enemy to dislodge the five men at Warner's house, they escaped without farther loss. The unfortunate men at Warner's, while they secured the retreat of their associates, laid down their lives as a sacrifice to the barbarities of the savage enemy. After attempting, in vain, to dislodge them by firing through the

windows, the house was set on fire by the Indians, and three of the little garrison perished in the flames, one being shot while attempting to escape, and the fifth taken alive and put to the torture, his remains having been found afterwards, *with a roll of Continental bills in his hand*, where it had been placed, in derision, by the loyal savages, or by the Tories who accompanied them.

In this action, involving as much principle, and more personal courage, than many which are more frequently noticed, Captain Patrick and sixteen of his men,¹ with John Zeh, John Fester, Martinus Fester, Jacob Freemire, John Freemire, and Jacob Shafer, militia, were *killed*; five or six regulars, and Peter Shafer, Henry Shafer, and Leonard King, militia, were *wounded*; and two regulars were taken prisoners.² The enemy's loss is said to have been twenty-five killed on the spot, and seven others who died from their wounds while on their way to Canada.

The strength of the Americans has been already noticed; that of the enemy, who was commanded by Joseph Brant and Service,³ a noted Tory leader, numbered over three hundred and fifty.⁴

¹ Mr. Stone (*Brant*, i. p. 354) says Capt. Patrick, his lieutenant, and twenty of his men were killed.

² Mr. Stone (*Life of Brant*, i. p. 313) states the loss of the Americans to have been fourteen killed, eight wounded, and two missing. Mr. Campbell (*Border Warfare*, p. 176) says twenty-two were killed, and two prisoners, mentioning none of the wounded.

³ Mr. Stone (*Brant*, i. p. 354) says Barent Frey, a Tory, was one of the leaders.

⁴ Mr. Stone (*Brant*, i. p. 313) says, "by their own account they were 450 strong."

After plundering the houses and burning them, together with the barns and out-houses, the enemy left the valley and returned to Canada; while the distressed and homeless settlers gathered up the wounded and the remains of those who had fallen, and recommenced the work of providing a shelter for themselves and their families.

It was in this battle the well-known circumstance occurred, in which the great Mohawk chief saved the life of an officer, who had claimed from him the protection of a brother. The lieutenant of Captain Patrick's company, being in great personal danger, gave a Masonic sign for relief, when Joseph Brant sprang forward and rescued him; and he was spared to bear witness that

while the chief, as the leader of his people, was made to bear the shame of much that he was not guilty of, he was also entitled to the credit of possessing and exercising more humanity than many of those relentless and remorseless savages known to us under the general name of "Tories."¹

[The several accounts of this engagement are, generally, very confused, and I have followed that of Mr. Simms (*History of Schoharie County*), which, from having been received from the lips of some of those who were present, appears to be most correct. Where other authorities have not been mentioned, therefore, the narrative is given on Mr. Simms' authority.]

¹ Mr. Stone (*Brant*, i. p. 354), by maintaining that this lieutenant was killed, appears to discredit this anecdote.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

JUNE 28, 1778.

THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.

THE hardships to which the troops had been exposed at Valley Forge had tried their fidelity, as well as their powers of endurance; and they gathered around their illustrious chief, in his dreary quarters, to cheer his solitary moments and to make new resolves for their future government.¹ The machinations of his enemies, in their attempts to destroy the confidence which his country had reposed in him, by forging letters in his name,² and in producing distress among the troops, by secretly interfering with his quartermaster's and commissary's departments,³ had failed to withdraw from him the affections of the army; and, although the sufferings of the troops were extreme, the Cabal received no accessions to its numbers from that source. They were true to their chief and their country; and Gates, at the head of the Board of War; Lee, in nominal captivity; and Mifflin, Conway, and Reed, in more comfortable quarters, were left to concoct new schemes, and to create new discontents.

The enemy, amply provided for in Philadelphia, had passed the winter gayly and in comparative inactivity; the celebrated *Conciliatory Bills*, introduced by Lord North, had been published in the United States, and their proffered conciliation had been rejected by the Congress;¹ three commissioners, sent over from England, to negotiate with that body, had extended the olive-branch to the country in vain;² and the formal alliance of France with the infant republic had been consummated and proclaimed, infusing fresh hopes and more determined activity among the people.³

With thanksgivings to the Almighty Disposer of events for the increased strength which this alliance had brought to the cause of freedom, the army and the people entered on the active duties of the campaign of 1778 with increased confidence, while the enemy, numbering more than twice the force of the Americans, was preparing to open the operations of the campaign by a *retreat*, and to expose himself—with nineteen thou-

¹ Sparks' Washington, p. 257.—² Gen. Washington to H. Lee, May 25; Irving, iii. pp. 359-361.—³ Sparks, p. 255.

¹ Sparks, pp. 263-265.—² Gordon, iii. pp. 129, 130.

³ Sparks, 267, 268.

sand five hundred men in Philadelphia, and ten thousand four hundred at New York, within supporting distance—to the public shame of being *pursued* by eleven thousand eight hundred half-starved and half-clad Americans, from the huts of Valley Forge. His experienced commanders-in-chief, Gage, Burgoyne, and the Howes, with their well-laid plans, their extensive supplies, and their powerful armies, and no less powerful fleets, in magnificent procession, had appeared before the world, displayed their emptiness, and disappeared; and another, who had seen much service, and who understood the character of the contest, was about to take the place which they had occupied, and, ultimately, to share with them the animosity of an unwise ministry and the censure of a despoiled nation.¹

The treaty between France and America had compelled the enemy to change his proposed plan of operations; and the expected co-operation of a powerful fleet with the allies rendered a farther occupation of the Delaware and the city of Philadelphia impossible, without jeopardizing the safety, both of the army and the fleet.² General Sir Henry Clinton, who had succeeded General Howe in the command of the British forces, saw his danger, and made immediate, although secret, preparations to withdraw to New York.³ A scarcity of transports prevented him from proceeding by water;⁴ and he determined

to ship his cavalry, the provision train and heavy baggage, many of the loyalists of Philadelphia, and part of the German troops,¹ while, with the main body, he would march through the Jerseys, and risk an action with the feeble force under General Washington.²

Although General Clinton was thus actively engaged, the greatest secrecy was observed;³ and, while it was known to the Americans that an enterprise of some kind was intended, it was a matter of doubt what was to be its character and object. General Gates had expressed his belief that the Hudson River and the Eastern States would be the objects of attack.⁴ Elias Boudinot had suggested a different view;⁵ and General Charles Lee, who had been exchanged and returned to his post in the army, supposed the enemy would either "march directly and rapidly towards Lancaster," and force the army into a general engagement on disadvantageous terms, or that he would march down and occupy the lower parts of the Susquehannah, from whence, supported by his shipping, he could foster the Indian disaffections, and, at the

¹ Sparks, p. 270; Irving, iii. p. 416; Duer's Life of Lord Stirling, p. 195. Notwithstanding this determination, it appears that all the troops, except the Anspach regiment of German mercenaries, were taken across the Jerseys. "They were afraid to trust" the Anspachers on this route, and some of our well-known citizens have sprung from those who deserted from the ranks of the Hessians, whose desertion showed that they, too, could not be relied on.

² Sparks, p. 270.—³ Writings of Washington, v. p. 407, note.—⁴ Ibid., p. 403, note.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lee, June 15.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 89.—² Stedman, ii. pp. 14, 15; Marshall, iii. p. 490.—³ Gordon, iii. pp. 130, 131.—⁴ Gen. Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, May 23, 1778.

same time, act advantageously against the Americans.¹ General Lee "had particular reasons to think" the latter was their object,² but General Washington thought differently, and the desires of the traitor, in attempting to open a free course for the escape of Sir Henry Clinton, were disregarded.

The commander-in-chief, probably from intelligence which had been communicated by his secret correspondents in the city, was convinced that a retreat through the Jerseys was intended, and all his energies were directed in that direction.³ General Dickinson, the energetic commander of the militia of New Jersey, was already in the field,⁴ and General Maxwell, also a Jerseyman, was ordered to cross the Delaware with a brigade of Jersey troops, to take post in the neighborhood of Mount Holly, and to co-operate with General Dickinson in breaking up the bridges, felling trees in the roads, and in harassing the enemy should he attempt to march in that direction.⁵ Particular instructions were given to avoid every possibility of being surprised, and to keep small parties on the enemy's flanks in order to annoy him, without being too much exposed themselves.⁶

On the evening of the seventeenth of

June, the enemy's arrangements being nearly completed, General Washington asked the advice of his Generals on the question of attacking the enemy, in case he retreated through the Jerseys; and he requested them to submit their answers, in writing, on the following morning.¹ The events of that evening and the following morning rendered these answers of great interest to the General; and to the student of the history of our country, with the transactions of the succeeding week before him, they are not less important. General Lee, the second in command,—evidently with the same motives which influenced him in his attempted diversion of the General's attention towards Lancaster and the Susquehannah on the fifteenth,²—with great vehemence, opposed all offensive operations, and maintained that it would "be criminal" to hazard an engagement.³ General Duportail, the Baron Steuben, and a large majority of the general officers, were influenced by General Lee's arguments, and by his high reputation as an officer, and reported against the proposed engagement,⁴ Generals Greene, Lafayette, Wayne, and Cadwalader, alone sustaining the views of the commander-in-chief.⁵

While this important question was pending in the American camp, near Valley Forge, about three thousand of

¹ Gen. Lee to Gen. Washington, June 15.

² Gen. Lee, in his celebrated "*Plan*," communicated by him to Gen. Howe, had advised this very step, as the one best calculated to suppress the revolt; and, as was shown by G. H. Moore, Esq., in his paper on "The Treason of Gen. Lee," read before the N. Y. Historical Society, June, 1858, it is quite evident that he understood what were the views and intentions of Gen. Sir Henry Clinton.—³ Irving, iii. p. 417.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Dickinson, June 5.

⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 16.—⁶ Marshall, iii. p. 493.

¹ Sparks, p. 271; Writings of Washington, v. p. 410, note; Marshall, iii. pp. 494—496; Life of Muhlenberg, pp. 148, 149.—² Gen. Lee to Gen. Washington, June 15.

³ Sparks, p. 271; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, pp. 148, 149; Marshall, iii. pp. 494, 495.

⁴ Life of Muhlenberg, pp. 149, 150; Marshall, iii. p. 495.—⁵ Ibid.

the enemy's troops were embarked on the transports,¹ and, about nine o'clock on Wednesday evening, June 17th, his baggage, and a portion of his troops crossed the Delaware by way of Cooper's Ferry, the grenadiers and light-infantry occupying the lines, and lying on their arms during the whole night.² At an early hour on the following morning (*Thursday, June 18th*), General Clinton and the remainder of the troops left the city by way of Gloucester Point, three miles below Camden;³ when the entire force, led by the Hessians under General Knyphansen, marched five miles, to Haddonfield, and halted.⁴

Some of the American scouting-parties and light-horse, discovering the movement, pushed into the city and captured some sixty or seventy prisoners, among whom were six officers.⁵ The joyful intelligence was immediately conveyed to Valley Forge, reaching the camp at half-past eleven in the morning,⁶ when six brigades—those of Generals Hunterdon, Poor, and Varnum, under General Lee; and that of General Conway, and the First and Second Pennsylvania brigades under General Wayne—were put in motion, the former moving at three o'clock and the

latter at five o'clock the same day.⁷ They were directed to cross the Delaware at Coryell's Ferry⁸ (now the site of the New Hope and Lambertsville Bridge⁹), with orders "to halt on the first strong ground after passing the Delaware, until farther orders; unless they should receive authentic intelligence that the enemy had proceeded, by direct road, to South Amboy, or still lower: in this case they were to continue their march to the North River."¹⁰ At five o'clock the next morning (*Friday, June 19th*), the main body of the army moved towards Coryell's Ferry,⁵ but its progress, as well as that of Generals Lee and Wayne's commands, was much impeded by heavy rains,⁶—the latter crossing the Delaware on Saturday night (*June 20th*), and the former on Monday (*June 22d*⁸).

In the mean time the movements of the enemy had been marked with unusual deliberation and caution. On Friday (*June 19th*), General Knyphausen, with the Hessians and two brigades of British troops, remaining at Haddonfield,⁹ General Clinton and the main body of his army moved about eight miles, to Evesham, and encamped.¹⁰ On his march thither, General

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., June 18.

² Andrew Bell's Journal, June 17.

³ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 18, 1778; Gordon, iii. p. 131; And. Bell's Journal, June 18; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, July 5 (Doc. II.)—⁴ And. Bell's Journal June 18; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁵ Joseph Clark's Diary, June 18.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., 11½ A. M., June 18.

⁷ Jos. Clark's Diary, June 18; Gen. Washington's Instructions to Gen. Wayne, June 18.—⁸ Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, June 18.—⁹ Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., pp. 241, 242.—¹⁰ Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, June 18.—⁶ Jos. Clark's Diary, June 19.

⁶ Gen. Washington to Gen. Arnold, June 21; Same to Pres. of Cong., June 22.—⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 22.—⁹ And. Bell's Journal, June 19.

¹⁰ Ibid.; Simcoe's Journal, p. 63.

Leslie, who commanded the enemy's advanced guard, fell in with a reconnoitering party, and wounded and captured Captain Jonathan Beesley of the Cumberland county militia, one of the number.¹ He refused to give any information of the movements of the American army, and died on the same afternoon, when he was buried with the honors of war, the General remarking, that "he was a brave man, and should not be treated with indignity."²

At four o'clock, on the following morning (*Saturday, June 20th*), the line of march was again resumed, and at eleven, having reached Mount Holly, about seven miles from Evesham, the column again halted, and remained until Monday.³

At nine o'clock on Sunday morning (*June 21st*), General Knyphausen, with his command, who had been left at Haddonfield on the preceding Friday, joined the main body, having marched from that place by way of Moorestown;⁴ and, on Monday morning (*June 22d*), the entire force marched to the Black Horse (*now Columbus*),⁵ seven miles from Mount Holly, where it halted.⁶

At five o'clock on Tuesday morning (*June 23d*), the enemy was again in motion.⁷ General Leslie, with the Yagers and Fifth brigade of British troops,

took the Bordentown road;¹ General Clinton, with the First and Second battalions of grenadiers, the First and Second light-infantry, two battalions of Hessian grenadiers, and the First, Second, and Third brigades of British troops, advanced to Crosswicks (four miles east from Bordentown, on the road to Freehold),² and General Grant, with the Fourth brigade of British troops, and General Knyphausen, with the remainder of the Hessians, brought up the rear.³ As General Leslie approached Bordentown, he was advised of the occupation of that place by a portion of the troops commanded by General Dickinson, the main body of which had been withdrawn and posted in other positions, where it was supposed the enemy might approach. This small party was commanded by Colonels Frelinghuysen, Van Dyke, and Webster, and when the approach of the enemy was discovered, they took up the planks from, and raised the draw of the bridge which here crossed Crosswick's Creek, preventing his passage, and forcing him to seek a more eligible crossing-place.⁴ General Clinton, also, met with some opposition as he approached Crosswick's. About five hundred men appeared to oppose his passage across the creek at that place, by felling trees across the road which approached it, but when the advanced party, under Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe,

¹ And. Bell's Journal, June 19; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., pp. 105, 106.—² Ibid.

³ And. Bell's Journal, June 20 and 21; Simcoe, p. 63.

⁴ And. Bell's Journal, June 21; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 98.—⁵ Barber and Howe, p. 110.

⁶ And. Bell's Journal, June 22.—⁷ Ibid., June 23.

¹ And. Bell's Journal, June 23; Barber and Howe, p. 104.—² Barber and Howe, p. 103; And. Bell's Journal, June 23; Simcoe, p. 64.—³ And. Bell's Journal, June 23

⁴ Barber and Howe, p. 104.

appeared, they prudently retired, taking up the planks of the bridge occupying a wood on the opposite bank, and making an appearance of contesting the passage. The most formidable demonstrations were immediately made,—troops formed in order of battle, flanked by dismounted dragoons, and supported by several pieces of artillery,—when the little party retired, and the Rangers, after the danger had ceased to exist, "behaved with their usual spirit," crossing over on the timbers of the bridge, and gallantly pursuing, without catching, the retreating militia.¹

On Wednesday (*June 24th*) Generals Clinton and Knyphausen, in the same order, crossed the creek, and resumed their march—the former halting at Allentown, in Monmouth county,² and the latter in Imlaystown, three miles nearer Freehold. General Leslie, who had been sent towards Bordentown on the preceding day, joined the main body, with the detachment under his command, at this place.³

On Thursday (*June 25th*) the forces were put in motion at an early hour.⁴ General Clinton, until he reached Allentown, had not determined what route he would pursue.⁵ At this place, through the sagacity of Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, he received information of the movements of General Washington

and the different portions of the American army and he was no longer left in doubt respecting the proper course for him to pursue. The passage to the Raritan River was too difficult and hazardous, and he resolved, instead of that, to take the road to Sandy Hook, by way of Freehold,² hoping, thereby, to "outwit" the Americans, and secure his baggage and provision-train, the possession of which, he supposed, was the principal object of General Washington's movements.⁶ His rear and flanks were also harassed by the American light troops,—the gallant Morgan being on his right flank, General Maxwell's brigade on his left, and Generals Scott and Cadwalader in his rear,⁴—while General Dickinson, in his front, destroyed the bridges and opposed his progress with remarkable energy.⁵ With a clear understanding of his danger, General Clinton "requested" General Knyphausen, who commanded the advance, to take the baggage of the whole army under his charge, and move forward at an early hour the next morning, while he, in person, would cover the retreat.⁶ In accordance with this request, the veteran Hessian, with an immense train, extending nearly twelve miles, moved from Imlaystown early on the morning of the twenty-fifth,⁷ and, at five o'clock, Generals Les-

¹ And. Bell's Journal, June 23; Simcoe, pp. 64-66; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—² And. Bell's Journal, June 24; Barber and Howe, p. 370; Simcoe, p. 66; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—³ And. Bell's Journal, June 24; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁴ And. Bell's Journal, June 25.

⁵ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 67.—² And. Bell's Journal, June 25; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

³ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁴ Gen. Washington to President of Congress, July 1; Stedman, ii. p. 17.

⁵ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Ibid.

lie and Clinton followed, with their respective divisions.¹ General Knyphausen, sensible of the importance of his charge, notwithstanding the intense heat, marched to the borders of Freehold, thirteen miles distant,² while the main body halted at the Rising Sun, seven miles from Allentown.³

On Friday (*June 26th*), General Knyphausen moved four miles, to Freehold, and foraged,⁴ where, at 10 A. M., the main body also arrived, having marched nineteen miles that morning, and remained during that and the following day.⁵

During this series of deliberate movements,—which was probably caused more by the intense heat,⁶ the frequent and heavy showers,⁷ and the extreme activity of the American light troops in obstructing the enemy's march, than by any feeling of security on his part,—General Washington, and those who were under his command, were not disinterested or idle spectators. Generals Lee and Wayne had been pushed forward to harass the retreating enemy;⁸ General Arnold had been sent to Philadelphia to take the command in that city, with orders to detach some four hundred Continental troops and as many volunteers as he could obtain, under General Cadwalader, for the

same purpose;¹ and the commander in-chief, with the main body of the army, had passed the Delaware,² detached Colonel Morgan, with six hundred men, to strengthen the advance,³ and on Tuesday, the twenty-third of June, taken post at Hopewell township, about five miles from Princeton.⁴

The extreme heat, rendered still more oppressive by frequent and heavy showers, added to the labors of the march, had greatly fatigued the troops,⁵ and they remained in camp during that and the following day (*June 24th*).⁶ While at Hopewell, it is said that a second council of war was held, at which, after presenting the relative positions and strength of the two armies, General Washington asked, "Will it be advisable to hazard a general engagement?" Again General Charles Lee, the second in command, interposed, and, with his usual impetuosity and brilliant declamation, influenced the council to answer that it was not advisable to do more than detach fifteen hundred men to strengthen the forces which were already hanging on the enemy's left flank and rear, while the main body should preserve a relative position, to act as circumstances might require. It appears that General Wayne did not sympathize with this decision at all; and that Generals Greene, Lafay-

¹ And. Bell's Journal, June 25.—² Ibid.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., June 26; Simcoe, p. 68.—⁵ And. Bell's Journal, June 26 and 27; Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 28.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 28.

⁷ Gen. Washington to Gen. Arnold, June 21; Same to Pres. of Cong., June 22.

⁸ Instructions to Gen. Wayne, June 18; Gen. Washington to Gen. Arnold, June 21.

¹ Gen. Washington to Gen. Dickinson, June 24; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Washington, June 22; Marshall, iii. p. 499.

² Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 22; Same to same, July 1.—³ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.—⁴ Jos. Clark's Diary, June 23; Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.—⁶ Ibid.

ette, Steuben, Duportail, and Paterson, desired to send forward twenty-five hundred, or, at least, two thousand men; while "it was clearly the wish of these officers," unlike those of General Lee and his friends, to draw the enemy into a general engagement, if it could be done under favorable circumstances.¹ It is equally clear that the commander-in-chief was disposed to hazard the risks of a battle, on almost any terms, and that disposition was strengthened by the fearless dissent of General Wayne, and the subsequent privately expressed opinions of Generals Greene and Lafayette.² With apparent deference to the decision of the council, therefore, he immediately dispatched General Scott, with fifteen hundred men, "to gall the enemy's left flank and rear,"³ but it is quite evident that he had not been convinced of his error by the action of the council, and that he had determined to adopt such measures—and to employ such instrumentalities as would, probably, accomplish the result which he desired.⁴

On Thursday (*June 25th*), the army advanced to Kingston, about three miles east from Princeton;⁵ and, having learned that General Clinton had given evidences of alarm by taking the lower road, towards Freehold, instead

of the upper road, leading towards New Brunswick, General Washington no longer hesitated to fulfil the expectations of his country in attacking her fugitive enemy.¹ With this intention, passing by those whose opinions differed from his own, and placing the enterprise in the hands of those who were its friends and the friends of its originator, he ordered General Wayne, with one thousand picked men,² and General Lafayette, with orders to take the command of the entire advance of the army, including General Maxwell's brigade and Colonel Morgan's riflemen, who were on the enemy's flanks,³ and General Poor's brigade, which he took with him,⁴ to move forward and "to take the first fair opportunity of attacking the enemy's rear."⁵ On the evening of the same day (*June 25th*), leaving his baggage at Kingston, the whole army approached still nearer the enemy's line of march by moving to Cranberry, where it arrived early the next morning (*June 26th*).⁶

A heavy storm coming on, the army was compelled to remain at Cranberry during the entire day, but the advanced corps before referred to, moved forward and occupied a position on the Freehold road, within five miles of the enemy's rear.⁷ At this time General Lee, perceiving the effect which the detach-

¹ Sparks' Writings of Washington, v., Appendix, xviii. pp. 552, 553; Marshall, iii. pp. 499, 500.

² Marshall, iii. p. 499; Mem. of Muhlenberg, p. 152.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Dickinson, June 24; Same to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Marshall, iii. p. 500.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lee, June 26; Marshall, iii. p. 501.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Jos. Clark's Diary, June 25.

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 501.—² Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.—³ Ibid.; Instructions to Gen. Lafayette, June 25.—⁴ Instructions to Gen. Lafayette, June 25.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.

⁶ Ibid.; Jos. Clark's Diary, June 26.—⁷ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.

ment under General Lafayette would produce in overthrowing his treasonable designs and in preventing the safe retreat of General Clinton, manifested considerable uneasiness, and requested permission to take the command of it.¹ General Lafayette, having been advised of this trouble,² had expressed a wish "to ease him of it;"³ and General Lee was directed to take with him the brigades of Generals Scott and Varnum, and to support "the several detachments then under the command of the Marquis."⁴ This, without apparent indignity to General Lafayette, vested the command in General Lee, the senior officer, although he was instructed to allow the Marquis to carry out any plan which he might have began to execute.⁵ During the same day, the army being still at Cranberry, it was found that the advanced corps was too remote to be properly supported, and too far to the right either for efficient offensive or defensive movements.⁶ General Lafayette was, therefore, ordered to file off by his left towards Englishtown, which was done on Saturday morning (*June 27th*);⁷ and, during the same day, the main body, under General Washington, moved from Cranberry,

and encamped within three miles of the same place.¹

The two armies were thus brought within eight miles of each other, while the American advanced guard, under General Lee, some five thousand strong, exclusive of Colonel Morgan's corps and the New Jersey militia, were three miles nearer; and thus they passed the night of Saturday, the twenty-seventh of June.² The enemy had now reached a point within ten or twelve miles from the Heights of Middletown, on reaching which it would be impossible to attempt any thing against him with any prospect of success, and General Washington resolved to attack his rear the moment he moved from the position he then occupied.³ Orders were accordingly issued to General Lee, without incumbering him with details, and he was expected to arrange the plan of operations in such a manner as would secure that object.⁴ In addition to that order, the commander-in-chief, through Colonel Hamilton, late on Saturday night, directed General Lee to detach a party of observation to watch the enemy's movements, to prevent a sudden retreat in the night, and to keep up a communication with the main body.⁵ With a singular disregard of the spirit

¹ Gen. Lee to Gen. Washington, June 25.

² Although the letter to Lafayette has escaped my notice, it is evident, from Gen. Washington's letter to him (June 26), that his consent had been given before Lee received his orders to take the command.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lafayette, June 26.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lee, June 26; Same to Gen. Lafayette, June 26.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.

⁷ Ibid.

¹ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 28; Same to same, July 1; Jos. Clark's Diary, June 27.

² Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.

³ Ibid.—⁴ Ibid.; Charles King's address at Freehold, Sept. 13, 1849; Marshall, iii. p. 566; Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Scott's testimony, July 4; Gen. Wayne's Test., July 4; Col. Fitzgerald's Test., July 4.

⁵ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Hamilton's Test., July 4; Captains Mercer's and Edward's Test., July 4.

and object of this order, it was three o'clock before it was promulgated,¹ and it was sunrise before the detachment,—which embraced the brigades of Generals Scott and Varnum, numbering about three hundred men in each,—commanded by Colonel Grayson, was put in motion.²

As has been stated, it was near sunrise before this party of observation marched from the camp, and when it reached the ground between the church and the court-house the enemy was found to be engaged with a portion of General Dickinson's troops, whose presence had become obnoxious to him; and, soon afterwards, he retired.³

At about five o'clock, General Washington had received intelligence from General Dickinson that the enemy's advance was moving from his position near Freehold,⁴ and orders were immediately issued to General Lee to move forward with the advance and attack the enemy, unless some powerful reason prevented.⁵ At the same time the main body was put in motion to sustain him, the men leaving behind them their packs,⁶ and, in some cases, their coats,⁷ to enable them to move forward with greater expedition and comfort, the morning being an intensely hot one, and both men and officers feel-

ing confident that some severe work was to be done. The right wing of the army, in the absence of General Lee, was commanded by General Greene, and the left by General Lord Stirling.¹ The former, to expedite the march, and to counteract any attempt which might be made to turn the right flank, was ordered to file off near the "new" meeting-house,—now so well known to all who have attempted to unravel the tangled thread of occurrences at Monmouth,—and to fall into the road again a short distance in the rear of the court-house;² while Lord Stirling, with the left wing, was to move directly on towards the same spot.³

In the mean time, the advanced corps, under General Lee, had moved from Englishtown towards the enemy⁴—Colonel Richard Butler, at the head of the column, with two hundred men;⁵ followed by General Scott's and part of General Woodford's brigades, about six hundred in number, with two pieces of artillery; General Varnum's brigade, of about the same strength, with two pieces of artillery; General Wayne's command, a thousand strong, with two pieces of artillery; General Scott's "detachment" of fourteen hundred men, with four pieces of artillery; and General Maxwell's detachment of a thousand men, with two pieces of artillery,⁶

¹ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Grayson's Test., July 11.

² Ibid.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Meade's Test., July 4.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Same to his brother, July 4; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Meade's Test., July 1; Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Meade's Test., July 4.

⁶ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 359.

¹ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.—² Ibid.; Mem. of Gen. Muhlenberg, pp. 154-156.—³ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.—⁴ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6.—⁵ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Butler's Test., July 12; Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6. Gens. Wayne and Scott to Gen. Washington, June 30.

⁶ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6.

in all, exclusive of Colonel Grayson's command of six hundred men, and of the flanking parties under General Dickinson and Colonel Morgan, five thousand men and twelve pieces of artillery.¹ During their progress they were occasionally halted, in consequence of the contradictory and imperfect intelligence which was conveyed to General Lee;² and, during one of these halts, General Wayne was ordered to leave his detachment, which was some distance back in the column, and to take command of the troops which had been sent out in the morning under Colonel Grayson.³ Advancing towards Freehold, the column soon afterwards came in sight of a small body of the enemy's troops, cavalry and infantry, when it was immediately halted, and, by "wheeling to the right, it was reduced to a proper front to the enemy's horse," and Generals Lee and Wayne rode forward to reconnoitre.⁴ General Wayne soon perceived that it was merely a small covering party, and ordered Colonels Butler and Jackson, with their detachments, to dislodge them, which was done, amidst which it was seen that "the enemy was moving from them in very great disorder and confusion."⁵

¹ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6; Col. Lawrence's, Meade's, and Hamilton's Test., July 13; Col. Fitzgerald's Test., July 14. Willett's Narrative, p. 66.

² Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Meade's Test., July 4; Gen. Lafayette's Test., July 5; Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6; Gen. Scott's Test., July 6.—³ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Meade's Test., July 4; Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6.

⁴ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6. Gens. Wayne and Scott to Gen. Washington, June 30.—⁵ Ibid.; Col. Cilley's Test., July 11; Jos. Clark's Diary, June 28.

While these movements were being made by the advance under General Lee, the main body, under Generals Greene and Lord Stirling, was moving forward to support it, and to share in the perils and glories of the contest;¹ and General Sir Henry Clinton was urging onward his plans for securing his army and its baggage, which he supposed to be the primary object of attack.² General Knyphausen had moved forward, at an early hour, with the baggage-train;³ and, at eight o'clock, Sir Henry took up his line of march.⁴ He had collected in his rear the very *élite* of his army,⁵ evidently under the supposition that an attack would be made at some time during the day. With the Third, Fourth, and Fifth brigades of British troops, the First and Second battalions of British grenadiers, the entire bodies of the Hessian grenadiers and of the British Guards, the First battalion of light-infantry, and the Sixteenth regiment of light dragoons, he descended from the heights, on which he had encamped, to the plains of Monmouth,⁶ and took the route which General Knyphausen had taken at an earlier hour in the morning.⁷

It was this movement which General Wayne had seen, and he immediately dispatched a messenger to General Lee, asking that "the troops might be pushed

¹ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.

² Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Jos. Clark's Diary, June 28; Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁵ Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Stedman, ii. p. 18.

⁶ Jos. Clark's Diary, June 28.

⁷ And. Bell's Journal, June 28; Stedman, ii. p. 19.

on."¹ No such order was issued, however, until it was evident that the enemy (or a small party in his rear, apparently from eight to nine hundred in number) had halted, and appeared to invite an attack.² Orders were then issued to General Wayne to take about four hundred men from the detachments of Colonels Butler and Jackson, and to advance towards him.³ With his wonted gallantry, General Wayne did so,⁴ when the Queen's light-dragoons were sent back by General Clinton to check the movement.⁵ Forming his troops to receive the charge, Colonel Butler, with great gallantry, repulsed the enemy, driving the horse back upon a body of foot which had been sent out to support them, and following it up with a rapid pursuit.⁶ A larger body of troops soon afterwards appeared to be moving towards General Wayne's right, when he ordered his two pieces of artillery to open a fire on them, asked a reinforcement, and prepared for battle.⁷

While General Wayne was thus employed, General Lee appears to have determined to cut off the party with which the former was engaged,⁸ and, for this purpose, he made a *detour* on the left, with the intention of falling on

the line of Sir Henry Clinton's march, between the rear of the main body and this detachment.¹

This movement, with those of Colonel Morgan, and Generals Dickinson and Wayne, appears to have confirmed the suspicion of General Clinton, that the capture of the baggage was the object of General Washington, and he determined to return to the plains near Freehold, and take measures for its protection.² With great good judgment he reasoned, that while this immense train, which was comparatively unprotected, was in the defiles, through which it had to pass, it would be in great danger, and the most certain way to protect it, and insure its safety, was to attack the corps which harassed his rear, and to press it so hard as to oblige the detachments to return from his flanks to the assistance of their friends.³ He supposed General Washington was too far in the rear to support the advanced corps,⁴ and he immediately, by a retrograde movement, proceeded to carry out his design.⁵

The first step taken was to attack the command of General Wayne, of which notice has been already taken; the next was the detachment of the Seventeenth light-dragoons and a brigade of British troops from General

¹ Gens. Wayne and Scott to Gen. Washington, June 30; Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6.

² Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6; Maj. Lenox's Test., July 11.—³ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Gen. Wayne to his family, July 1; Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6; Gen. Forman's Test., July 6.

⁷ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6.

Marshall, iii. pp. 507, 508; Gordon, iii. p. 140.

¹ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Lafayette's Test., July 5. Gordon, iii. p. 140; Marshall, iii. pp. 507, 508.

² Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Marshall, iii. pp. 508, 509; Stedman, ii. p. 19.

³ Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁴ Ibid. Jos. Clark's Diary, June 28; Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Wayne's Test., July 6; Maj. Lenox's Test., July 11.

Knyphausen's command, to strengthen General Clinton's right flank; and, finally, a disposition of the main body, under Lord Cornwallis, was made on the plain, to attack General Lee and the several detachments of the advance corps, under his command.¹

Perceiving these movements before they had been fully accomplished, General Lee had given orders to the several corps of his detachment to retreat,² and they fell back towards the meeting-house, in some cases in great confusion,³ and in all without knowing either the object of the retreat⁴—the great body of the troops having seen nobody, and, except General Wayne's small detachment, none having fired a shot⁵—or the ground on which they were to reform.⁶ All were indignant,⁷ but General Wayne, whose position and opportunity corresponded with his wishes, was peculiarly so, and gave vent to his feelings in the severest terms.⁸

While this series of misfortunes was attending the movements of General Lee, the main body of the army, under General Washington, was hastening on towards Freehold—the left wing, led

by David Forman and Peter Wikoff, as guides,¹ marched on the road,² the right, by a *detour*, marched at some distance from the left³—wholly unconscious of the retreat of the advance, and unprepared to counteract its evil effects.⁴ The commander-in-chief, with the left wing, was passing down the road, between the meeting-house and the parsonage,⁵ when he met a fifer, “who appeared to be a good deal frightened. The General asked him whether he was a soldier belonging to the army, and the cause of his returning that way; he answered that he was a soldier, and that the Continental troops that had been advanced were retreating.” It is said, “the General seemed to be exceedingly surprised, and rather more exasperated, appearing to discredit the account, and threatened the man, if he mentioned a thing of the sort, he would have him whipped.”⁶ He passed on “a few paces,” when a similar scene ensued between the General and two or three others whom he met; but, as he had heard no firing except a few cannon, a considerable time before, he still appeared to discredit the statements.⁷ It was considered prudent, however, to send forward some trusty officers to gain information, and Colonel Harrison

¹ Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doe. II.

² Marshall, iii. p. 510; Gen. Wayne to his family, July 1; Willett's Narrative, p. 67; Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Lafayette's Test., July 5; Col. Lawrence's Test., July 13.

³ Gen. Lee's trial—Gen. Forman's Test., July 6; Gen. Scott's Test., July 6; Col. Cilley's Test., July 11; Col. Fitzgerald's Test., July 14.—⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 510; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Grayson's Test., July 11; Col. Fitzgerald's Test., July 14; Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1.

⁶ Marshall, iii. p. 510; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Grayson's Test., July 11; Col. Lawrence's Test., July 13; Col. Meade's Test., July 13.—⁷ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.—⁸ Willett's Narrative, p. 67.

¹ Barber and Howe, p. 339.—² Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Tilghman's Test., July 14.—³ Marshall, iii. p. 512; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.

⁴ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Hamilton's Test., July 13; Col. Meade's Test., July 13.—⁵ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Harrison's Test., July 14. Col. Tilghman says (*Test., July 14*) this occurred between Englishtown and the meeting-house.—⁶ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Harrison's and Col. Tilghman's Test., July 14.—⁷ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.

(the General's "old secretary") and Colonel Fitzgerald having volunteered for that purpose, rode forward towards Freehold.¹ At the bridge these officers met Colonel Grayson's regiment; a little farther on, Colonel Parke's; and farther still, Colonel William Smith's. Colonel Ogden was next met, and, in a towering passion, informed the anxious inquirers, "By God! they were flying from a shadow." Colonel Rhea and General Maxwell were next encountered, but all were alike "agitated, expressive of their disapprobation, and concerned that they had no place assigned to go where the troops were to halt." They were all ignorant of the cause of the retreat, and each appeared to feel that *he* had been robbed of the laurels which had been providentially placed within his reach. General Lee was the next person seen by Colonel Harrison, but he was silent; and, in the post of danger, next to the enemy,—who was "pressing very hard upon them at two, or three, or four hundred yards distance,"—were Colonel Stewart, General Scott, and General Wayne. Having "no other concern than at the retreat itself," the latter saw no difficulty in checking the enemy "provided any effort or exertion was made for the purpose, alleging that a 'very select body of men had been that day *drawn off* from a body far inferior in number;" and he sent some suggestions to General Washington for the disposition

of the troops. Leaving the gallant Pennsylvanian in the post of danger,—where he remained during the day,—Colonel Harrison galloped back, and reported the situation of affairs—the first intimation which the General had received of the position and movements of the enemy.¹

While his faithful and intelligent secretary was thus engaged in the front, General Washington was not less active in seeking information and in checking the retreat. Riding forward, and accosting the several commandants of regiments as he met them, he received the same negative answers and the same evidences of dissatisfaction that his secretary had received,² until, in the rear of the retreating column, he met the commands of Colonels Ramsay and Stewart.³ Calling these officers to him, and telling them that "he should depend upon them, that day, to give the enemy a check,"⁴ he directed General Wayne to form them, with two pieces of artillery on their right, and hold the enemy in check.⁵ At this instant⁶ the guilty author of the mischief, General Lee, rode up, and the commander-in-chief demanded, in the sternest manner,

¹ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.

² Marshall, iii. p. 510; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Tilghman's Test., July 14.—³ Marshall, iii. p. 511; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.

⁴ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Stewart's Test., July 11; Maj. Fishbourne's Test., July 12; Col. Hamilton's Test., July 13; Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.

⁵ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Same to his brother, July 4; Gen. Wayne to his family, July 1; Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Hamilton's Test., July 13; Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.—⁶ Gen. Lee's trial—Dr. McHenry's Test., July 14.

¹ Gen. Lee's trial—Col. Fitzgerald's Test., July 14; Col. Harrison's Test., July 14.



they approached General Wayne's position a deadly fire was opened upon them, in which their gallant leader and several other officers were killed, and—after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle for the possession of Colonel Monckton's body, in which the Americans succeeded¹—they were repulsed, and it was not attacked again during the day.²

Sir Henry Clinton moved the main body of the British army against the left of the American lines, where Lord Stirling commanded, but the batteries were so well served that he was glad to seek an inglorious retreat.³ He then moved towards the right of the American position, but General Greene, with the right wing, opposed him, and Chevalier Plessis De Mauduit (one of the heroes of Red Bank) took him in the flank with six pieces of cannon, and he was equally unsuccessful in that direction.⁴

At this moment General Wayne "advaneed with a body of troops, and kept up so severe and well-directed a fire that the enemy was soon compelled to retire behind the defile where the first stand was made, in the beginning of the action."⁵ In this charge by Gen-

eral Wayne a characteristic incident occurred, which was not without its effect on the enemy. His dispositions had been made for the charge, and his men,—who were mostly without their coats,—seeing the character of the intended movement, and knowing the peculiarities of their leader, were impressed with the idea that a struggle of unusual determination was about to be commenced. For the purpose of rendering themselves as free as possible, some of the troops *rolled up their shirt-sleeves*, which was immediately imitated by their associates, and when the trying moment arrived the detachment rushed forward with a shout, and handled their weapons with so much vigor that the enemy, astonished and overpowered, hastily retired.¹

In this new position the enemy was comparatively secure. His flanks were seured by thick woods and morasses, while his front could only be approached through a narrow pass.² Notwithstanding these advantages, General Washington resolved to attack him; and, for this purpose, ordered General Poor, with his own and the Carolina brigades, to move round upon his right, while General Woodford was to move, in a like manner, upon his left, and the artillery was to gall his front. Before these detachments reached the ground

¹ King's Address; Lossing, ii. p. 363; Dr. Sam. Forman's statement.—² Lossing, ii. p. 363; Dr. Sam. Forman's statement.

³ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Life of Gen. Hull, p. 137; Marshall, iii. pp. 511, 512; Gen. Wayne to his family, July 1.

⁴ Gen. Washington to President of Congress, July 1; Life of Gen. Hull, p. 138; Marshall, iii. p. 512; Mem. of Muhlenberg, p. 155; Gen. Wayne to his family, July 1.—⁵ Ibid.

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¹ This statement is made on the authority of the late John Crolius, Esq., of this city, who was one of the first of those who rolled up their shirt-sleeves.

² Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Same to his brother, July 4; Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 138; Marshall, iii. p. 513.

they had been directed to occupy, night overtook them, and they bivouaced for the night within a very short distance of the enemy's lines. The entire army, worn out with fatigue, threw itself on the ground and slept soundly until morning,¹ when it awoke to learn that the prize which, on the evening before, was considered within its reach, was no longer in the neighborhood.

Sir Henry Clinton "having reposed the troops until ten at night, to avoid the excessive heat of the day, took advantage of the moonlight to rejoin General Knyphausen, who had advanced to Nut Swamp, near Middletown,"² taking with him his wounded, except about forty, who could not be removed;³ and, on the following morning, the extreme heat, the fatigue of the men, and the distance the enemy had gained, rendering a pursuit "impracticable and fruitless," it was not attempted.⁴

"The battle of Monmouth"—for such is the title by which it was designated—was attended with many circumstances of peculiar interest. The day was unusually hot,⁵ and many of the troops, in both armies, died from its effects;⁶ while the tongues of hundreds of others were swollen so as to render them incapable of speaking.⁷

¹ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Same to his brother, July 4; Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 138; Marshall, iii. p. 513.—² Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Same to Gen. Gates, July 3; Stedman, ii. p. 20.

³ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Same to Gen. Gates, July 3; Stedman, ii. p. 20.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Gen. Washington to Gen. Gates, July 3; Gen. Clinton's dispatch, Doc. II.; Gen. Wayne to his family, July 1.

⁷ Dr. Sam. Forman's statement.

Here, also, the well-known Molly Pitcher gained her commission and epaulette, as a reward for her energetic conduct in supplying her husband's place at the cannon to which he had been attached.¹

But, above all, here the treason of General Charles Lee received its final check. Opposing the commander-in-chief, in his proposition to the council of general officers, he determined to oppose him in the field, also;² and thus secure the retreat of the British army, and the stores and baggage which retarded its march. With this intent he secured the command of the advance,—superseding those who were known to favor an attack on the fugitive enemy,—received the orders to *bring on a general action*, by attacking the *main body* of the enemy; and sent back messages of confidence in the result, in order to mislead the commander-in-chief and to retard his movements. Instead of carrying out the expectations of the army and the orders of his chief, he attacked the *rear-guard* only, instead of the *main body*; and instead of bringing on a *general engagement*, he attempted nothing more than the *carrying off a covering party*. It is true the result was different from that which he expected and desired, but it is equally true that it was also different from that which Sir Henry Clinton anticipated. Both these officers appear to have manœuvred for the same end—the safety

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 361; Dr. Sam. Forman's statement.—² Gen. Lee's trial—Dr. Griffith's Test., July 15.

of the baggage and stores; and both supposed General Washington was beyond supporting distance, and therefore beyond the distance where he could control the movements of either army.

In the retreat of General Lee, *per se*, there can, probably, be but little to condemn, beyond its disorderly character. It is, doubtless, true that the detachment was in great danger; and that a retreat (or, as General Lee termed it, "a retrograde movement") was as necessary to secure it from actual capture by Sir Henry Clinton, as to secure the safety of General Knyphausen's division. It is equally true, however, that General Lee's disobedience of orders was the cause of Sir Henry Clinton's "retrograde movement," which produced the danger spoken of; and that an attack on the enemy's main body by the five thousand picked troops, which General Lee commanded, would have secured the co-operation of the detachments under Colonel Morgan and General Dickinson, which, under existing circumstances, were rendered entirely inefficient from want of orders.

The enemy's loss, it is said, was Lieutenant-colonel Hon. H. Monckton, Captain Gore, Lieutenants Vaughan and Kennedy, four sergeants, and fifty-seven rank and file *killed*; three sergeants

and fifty-six rank and file *died from fatigue*; Colonel Trelawney, Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, Major Gardner, Captains Catheart, Bereton, Willis, Leighton, Powell, Bellue, and Ditmas, and Lieutenants Kelly, Paumier, Goroffe, Desborough, and Gilchrist, seven sergeants, one hundred and forty-eight rank and file *wounded*; and seven sergeants and sixty-one rank and file *missing*.¹ The American army lost Lieutenant-colonel Bonner, Major Dickinson, three captains, three lieutenants, one sergeant, seven matrosses, one bombardier, and fifty-two rank and file *killed*;² two colonels, nine captains, six lieutenants, one ensign, one adjutant, nine sergeants, one gunner, ten matrosses, and one hundred and twenty-two rank and file *wounded*;³ five sergeants, one matross, and one hundred and twenty-six rank and file *missing*, many of whom, who had been overcome by the heat, afterwards came in.⁴

¹ It is evident that a great error was made in the report of Sir Henry Clinton to the government, from which this statement is copied, as four officers and 245 privates were buried by the Americans, besides those who had been buried by the enemy.—*Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1, and Jos. Clarke's Diary, June 28.*

² *Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Same to Gen. Gates, July 3.*—³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 1; Marshall, iii. p. 515.*

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

ENGLISHTOWN, July 1, 1778.

SIR:—I embrace this first moment of leisure to give Congress a more full and particular account of the movements of the army under my command, since its passing the Delaware, than the situation of our affairs would heretofore permit.

I had the honor to advise them, that on the appearance of the enemy's intention to march through Jersey becoming serious, I had detached General Maxwell's brigade, in conjunction with the militia of that State, to interrupt and impede their progress by every obstruction in their power, so as to give time to the army under my command to come up with them, and take advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves. The army having proceeded to Coryell's Ferry, and crossed the Delaware at that place, I immediately detached Colonel Morgan, with a select corps of six hundred men, to reinforce General Maxwell, and marched with the main body towards Princeton.

The slow advance of the enemy had greatly the air of design, and led me, with many others, to suspect that General Clinton, desirous of a general action, was endeavoring to draw us down into the lower country, in order by a rapid movement to gain our right, and take possession of the strong grounds above us. This consideration, and to give the troops time to repose and refresh themselves from the fatigues they had experienced from rainy and excessively hot weather, determined me to halt at Hopewell township, about five miles from Princeton,

where we remained till the morning of the 25th. On the preceding day I made a second detachment of fifteen hundred chosen troops, under Brigadier-general Scott, to reinforce those already in the vicinity of the enemy, the more effectually to annoy and delay their march.

The next day the army moved to Kingston, and having received intelligence that the enemy were prosecuting their route towards Monmouth Court-house, I dispatched a thousand select men under Brigadier-general Wayne, and sent the Marquis de Lafayette to take the command of the whole of the advanced corps, including Maxwell's brigade and Morgan's light-infantry, with orders to take the first fair opportunity of attacking the enemy's rear. In the evening of the same day the whole army marched from Kingston, where our baggage was left, with intention to preserve a proper distance for supporting the advanced corps, and arrived at Cranberry early the next morning. The intense heat of the weather, and a heavy storm unluckily coming on, made it impossible for us to resume our march that day, without great inconvenience and injury to the troops. Our advanced corps being differently circumstanced, moved from the position it had held the night before, and took post in the evening on the Monmouth road, about five miles from the enemy's rear, in the expectation of attacking them the next morning on their march. The main body having remained at Cranberry, the advanced corps was found to be too remote, and too far upon the right, to be supported, in case of an attack either upon or from the enemy, which induced me to send orders to the Marquis to file off by his left towards Englishtown, which he accordingly executed early in the morning of the 27th.

The enemy, in marching from Allentown, had changed their disposition and placed their best troops in the rear; consisting of all the grenadiers, light-infantry, and chasseurs of the line. This alteration made it necessary to increase the number of our advanced corps, in consequence I detached Major-general Lee, with two brigades, to join the Marquis at Englishtown, on whom, of course, the command of the whole devolved, amounting to about five thousand men. The main body marched the same day, and encamped within three miles of that place. Morgan's corps was left hovering on the enemy's right flank; and the Jersey militia, amounting at this time to about seven hundred or eight hundred men, under General Dickinson, on their left.

The enemy were now encamped in a strong position, with their right extending about a mile and a half beyond the court-house, to the parting of the roads leading to Shrewsbury and Middletown, and their left along the road from Allentown to Monmouth, about three miles this side of the court-house. Their right flank lay on the skirt of a small wood, while their left was secured by a very thick one; a morass running towards their rear, and their whole front covered by a wood, and for a considerable extent towards the left with a morass. In this situation they halted till the morning of the 28th.

Matters being thus situated, and having had the best information, that if the enemy were once arrived at the heights of Middletown, ten or twelve miles from where they were, it would be impossible to attempt any thing against them with a prospect of success, I determined to attack their rear the moment they should get in motion from their present ground. I communicated my intention to General Lee, and ordered him to make his disposition for the attack, and to keep his troops constantly lying upon their arms, to be in readiness at the shortest notice. This was done with respect to the troops under my immediate command.

About five in the morning General Dickinson sent an express, informing that the front of the enemy had begun their march. I instantly put the army in motion, and sent orders by one of my aids to General Lee, to move on and attack

them, unless there should be very powerful reasons to the contrary; acquainting him at the same time that I was marching to support him, and for doing it with the greatest expedition and convenience, should make the men dismember themselves of their packs and blankets.

After marching five miles, to my great surprise and mortification, I met the whole advanced corps retreating, and, as I was told, by General Lee's orders, without having made any opposition, except one fire (given by a party under the command of Colouel Butler), on their being charged by the enemy's cavalry, who were repulsed. I proceeded immediately to the rear of the corps, which I found closely pressed by the enemy, and gave directions for forming part of the retreating troops, who, by the brave and spirited conduct of the officers, aided by some pieces of well-served artillery, checked the enemy's advance, and gave time to make a disposition of the left wing and second line of the army upon an eminence and in a wood a little in the rear covered by a morass in front. On this were placed some batteries of cannon by Lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing, which played upon the enemy with great effect, and seconded by parties of infantry detached to oppose them, effectually put a stop to their advance.

General Lee being detached with the advance corps, the command of the right wing, for the occasion, was given to General Greene. For the expedition of the march, and to counteract any attempt to turn our right, I had ordered him to file off by the new church, two miles from Englishtown, and fall into the Monmouth road, a small distance in the rear of the court-house, while the rest of the column moved directly on towards the court-house. On intelligence of the retreat, he marched up, and took up a very advantageous position on the right. The enemy, by this time, finding themselves warmly opposed in front, made an attempt to turn our left flank; but they were bravely repulsed, and driven back by detached parties of infantry. They also made a movement to our right, with as little success; General Greene having advanced a body of troops, with artillery, to a commanding piece of ground —which not only disappointed their design of

turning our right, but severely enfiladed those in front of the left wing. In addition to this, General Wayne advanced with a body of troops, and kept up so severe and well-directed a fire, that the enemy were soon compelled to retire behind the defile, where the first stand in the beginning of the action had been made.

In this situation the enemy had both their flanks secured by thick woods and morasses, while their front could only be approached through a narrow pass. I resolved, nevertheless, to attack them, and for that purpose ordered General Poor, with his own and the Carolina brigade, to move round upon their right, and General Woodford upon their left, and the artillery to gall them in front; but the impediments in the way prevented their getting within reach before it was dark. They remained upon the ground they had been directed to occupy, during the night, with intention to begin the attack early the next morning; and the army continued lying upon their arms in the field of action, to be ready to support them. In the mean time, the enemy were employed in removing their wounded, and, about 12 o'clock at night, marched away in such silence that, although General Poor lay extremely near them, they effected their retreat without his knowledge. They carried off all their wounded except four officers and about forty privates, whose wounds were too dangerous to permit their removal. The extreme heat of the weather, the fatigue of the men from their march through a deep, sandy country, almost entirely destitute of water, and the distance the enemy had gained by marching in the night, made a pursuit impracticable and fruitless. It would have answered no valuable purpose, and would have been fatal to numbers of our men—several of whom died the preceding day with heat.

Were I to conclude my account of this day's transactions without expressing my obligations to the officers of the army in general, I should do injustice to their merit and violence to my own feelings. They seemed to vie with each other in manifesting their zeal and bravery. The catalogue of those who distinguished themselves is too long to admit of particularizing in-

dividuals. I cannot, however, forbear mentioning Brigadier-general Wayne, whose good conduct and bravery during the whole action deserve particular commendation. The behavior of the troops in general, after they recovered from the first surprise occasioned by the retreat of the advanced corps, was such as could not be surpassed. All the artillery, both officers and men, that were engaged, distinguished themselves in a remarkable manner.

Inclosed Congress will be pleased to receive a return of our killed, wounded, and missing. Among the first, were Lieutenant-colonel Bonner, of Pennsylvania and Major Dickinson, of Virginia—both distinguished officers, and much to be regretted. The enemy slain on the field, and buried by us,—according to the return of the persons assigned to that duty,—were four officers and two hundred and forty-five privates. In the former was the Hon. Colonel Monekton. Exclusive of these they buried some themselves—as there were several new graves near the field of battle. How many men they may have had wounded cannot be determined; but, from the usual proportion, the number must have been considerable. There were a few prisoners taken.

The peculiar situation of General Lee at this time, requires that I should say nothing of his conduct. He is now in arrest. The charges against him, with such sentence as the court-martial may decree in his case, shall be transmitted, for the approbation or disapprobation of Congress, as soon as it shall be passed.

Being fully convinced, by the gentlemen of this country, that the enemy cannot be hurt or injured in their embarkation at Sandy Hook (the place to which they are now moving), and, unwilling to get too far removed from the North River, I put the troops in motion early this morning, and shall proceed that way—leaving the Jersey brigade, Morgan's corps, and other light parties (the militia being all dismissed) to hover about them, countenance desertion, and prevent depredations as far as possible. After they embark, the former will take post in the neighborhood of Elizabethtown, the latter rejoin the corps from which they were detached.

I have the honor to be your obedient, humble servant,

GEO. WASHINGTON.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the American army, in the battle of Monmouth, on the 28th day of June, 1778.

Killed.—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 3 captains, 2 lieutenants, 1 sergeant, 52 rank and file.

Wounded.—2 colonels, 8 captains, 4 first-lieutenants, 2 second-lieutenants, 1 ensign, 1 adjutant, 8 sergeants, 1 drummer, 120 rank and file.

Missing.—5 sergeants, 126 rank and file. Some of the missing, dropped through fatigue and hardship, since come in.

ARTILLERY.—*Killed.*—1 first-lieutenant, 7 matrosses, 1 bombardier. *Wounded.*—1 captain, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 gunner, 10 matrosses.

Missing.—1 matross. Six horses killed and two wounded.

II.

SIR HENRY CLINTON'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEO. GERMAIN.

[From the London Gazette Extraordinary.]

WHITEHALL, August 24, 1778.

The following letter, from Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Clinton, Knight of the Bath, to Lord George Germain, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, was received on Saturday night by Colonel Patterson, who arrived in the Grantham packet from New York.

NEW YORK, July 5, 1778.

MY LORD:—I have the honor to inform your lordship that, pursuant to His Majesty's instructions, I evacuated Philadelphia on the 18th of June, at three o'clock in the morning, and proceeded to Gloucester Point, without being followed by the enemy. Every thing from thence passed in safety across the Delaware, through the excellent disposition made by the Admiral to secure our passage: the army marched at ten o'clock, and reached Haddonfield the same day. A strong corps of the enemy having, upon our approach, abandoned the difficult pass of Mount Holly, the army proceeded without any interruption from them, excepting what was occasioned by their having destroyed every bridge on our road, as the country is much intersected with marshy rivulets, the obstructions we met with were frequent, and the excessive heat of the

season rendered the labor of repairing the bridges severely felt.

The advanced parties of our light troops arriving unexpectedly at Crosswicks, on the 23d, after a trifling skirmish, prevented the enemy from destroying the bridge over a large creek at that village, and the army passed it the next morning. One column, under the command of his Excellency Lieutenant-general Knyphausen near Imlaystown; and as the provision train and heavy artillery was stationed in that division, the other column, under Lieutenant-general Earl Cornwallis, took a position at Allenstown, which covered the other encampment.

Thus far, my lord, my march pointed equally towards the Hudson's River and Staten Island, by the Raritan. I was now at the juncture when it was necessary to decide ultimately what course to pursue. Incumbered as I was by an enormous provision-train, &c., to which impeded the probability of obstructions, and length of my march, obliged me to submit, I was led to wish for a route less liable to obstacles than those above mentioned.

I had received intelligence that Generals Washington and Lee had passed the Delaware with their army, had assembled a numerous militia from all the neighboring provinces, and that Gates, with an army from the Northward, was advancing to join them on the Raritan. As I could not hope that, after having always hitherto so studiously avoided a general action, General Washington would now give into it, against every dictate of policy, I could only suppose that his views were directed against my baggage, &c., in which part I was indeed vulnerable. This circumstance alone would have tempted me to avoid the difficult passage of the Raritan; but when I reflected, that from Sandy Hook I should be able, with more expedition, to carry His Majesty's farther orders into execution, I did not hesitate to order the army into the road which leads through Freehold to the Navesink. The approach of the enemy's army being indicated by the frequent appearance of their light troops on our rear, I requested his Excellency Lieutenant-general Knyphausen to take the baggage of the whole army under the charge of his division, consisting of the troops

mentioned in the margin.¹ Under the head of baggage was comprised not only all the wheel-carriages of every department, but also the bat-horses; a train which, as the country admitted but of one route for carriages, extended near twelve miles. The indispensable necessity I was under of securing these is obvious; and the difficulty of doing it, in a most woody country, against an army far superior in numbers, will, I trust, be no less so.

I desired Lieutenant-general Knyphausen to move at daybreak, on the 28th, and that I might not press on him in the first part of the march, in which we had but one route, I did not follow with the other division² till near eight o'clock. Soon after I had marched, reconnoitering parties of the enemy appeared on our left flank. The Queen's Rangers fell in with and dispersed some detachments among the woods in the same quarter. Our rear-guard having descended from the heights above Freehold, into a plain near three miles in length, and about one mile in breadth, several columns of the enemy appeared likewise descending into the plain, and about ten o'clock they began to cannonade our rear. Intelligence was at this instance brought me, that the enemy were discovered marching in force on both our flanks. I was convinced that our baggage was their object; but it being at this juncture engaged in defiles, which continued for some miles, no means occurred of parrying the blow, but attacking the corps which harassed our rear, and pressing it so hard as to oblige the detachments to return from our flanks to its assistance.

I had good information that General Washington was up with his whole army, estimated at about twenty thousand; but as I knew there were two defiles between him and the corps at which I meant to strike, I judged that he could not have passed them with a greater force than

what Lord Cornwallis's division was well able to engage; and had I even met his whole army in the passage of those defiles, I had little to apprehend, but his situation might have been critical.

The enemy's cavalry, commanded, it is said, by M. Lafayette, having approached within our reach, they were charged with great spirit by the Queen's light-dragoons. They did not wait the shock, but fell back in confusion upon their own infantry.

Thinking it possible that the event might draw to a general action, I sent for a brigade of British, and the Seventeenth light-dragoons, from Lieutenant-general Knyphausen's division; and having directed them on their march to take a position effectually covering our right flank, of which I was most jealous, I made a disposition of attack in the plain; but before I could advance the enemy fell back, and took a strong position on the heights above Freehold court-house. The heat of the weather was intense, and our men already suffered severely from fatigue; but our circumstances obliged us to make a vigorous exertion. The British grenadiers, with their left to the village of Freehold, and the guards on the right of the grenadiers, began the attack with such spirit that the enemy gave way immediately. The second line of the enemy stood the attack with great obstinacy, but were likewise completely routed. They then took a third position, with a marshy hollow in front, over which it would have been scarcely possible to have attacked them. However, part of the second line made a movement to the front, occupied some ground on the enemy's left flank, and the light-infantry and Queen's Rangers turned their left.

By this time our men were so overpowered with fatigue that I could press the affair no farther, especially as I was confident the end was gained for which the attack had been made.

I ordered the light-infantry to rejoin me; but a strong detachment of the enemy having possessed themselves of a post which would have annoyed them in their retreat, the Thirty-third regiment made a movement towards the enemy, which, with a similar one made by the First grenadiers, immediately dispersed them.

I took the position from whence the enemy

¹ Seventeenth light-dragoons, 2d battalion of light-infantry, Hessian Yagers, 1st and 2d British brigades, Stirn's and Loo's brigades of Hessians, Pennsylvania Loyalists, West Jersey Volunteers, Maryland Loyalists.

² Sixteenth light-dragoons, 1st battalion of British grenadiers, 2d ditto, 1st battalion of light-infantry, Hessian grenadiers, Guards, 3d, 4th and 5th Brigades British.

had been first driven after they had quitted the plain, and having reposed the troops till ten at night, to avoid the excessive heat in the day, I took advantage of the moonlight to rejoin Lieutenant-general Knyphausen, who had advanced to Nut Swamp, near Middletown.

Our baggage had been attempted by some of the enemy's light troops, who were repulsed by the good disposition made by Lieutenant-general Knyphausen and Major-general Grant, and the good countenance of the Fortieth regiment, whose pickets alone were attacked, and one troop of the Seventeenth light-dragoons. The two corps which had marched against it (being, as I have since learned, a brigade on each flank) were recalled, as I had suspected, at the beginning of the action.

It would be sufficient honor to the troops, barely to say that they had forced a corps, as I am informed, of near twelve thousand men, from two strong positions, but it will, I doubt not, be considered as doubly creditable, when I mention that they did it under such disadvantages of heat and fatigue, that a great part of those we lost fell dead as they advanced, without a wound. Fearing that my first order had miscarried, before I quitted this ground I sent a second, for a brigade of infantry, the Seventeenth light-dragoons, and Second battalion of light-infantry, to meet me on the march, with which additional force, had General Washington shown himself the next day, I was determined to attack him; but there not being the least appearance of an enemy, I suspected he might have pushed a considerable corps to a strong position near Middletown, I therefore left the rear-guard on its march, and detached Major-general Grant to take post there, which was effected on the 29th. The whole army marched to this position the next day, and then fell back to another, near Navesink, where I waited two days, in the hope that Mr. Washington might have been tempted to have advanced to the position near Middletown, which we had quitted; in which case I might have attacked him to advantage.

During this time the sick and wounded were embarked, and preparations made for passing to Sandy Hook Island by a bridge, which, by the

extraordinary efforts of the navy, was soon completed, and over which the whole army passed in about two hours time; the horses and cattle having been previously transported.

Your lordship will receive herewith a return of the killed, wounded, missing, &c., of His Majesty's troops, on the 28th of last month. That of the enemy is supposed to have been more considerable, especially in killed.

The loss of Lieutenant-colonel Monckton, who commanded the Second battalion of grenadiers, is much to be lamented.

I am much indebted to Lord Cornwallis for his zealous services on every occasion; and I found great support from the activity of Major-general Grey, Brigadier-generals Matthew, Leslie, and Sir William Erskine.

I beg leave to refer your lordship, for any other particulars which you may wish to be informed of, to Colonel Patterson, who will have the honor of delivering these dispatches, and whose services in this country entitle him to every mark of your lordship's favor.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

H. CLINTON.

Return of the killed, wounded, missing, &c., of the troops under the command of General Sir Henry Clinton, in an engagement with the rebel army, on the heights of Frechold, county of Monmouth, New Jersey, the 28th of June, 1778.

Total British.—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 56 rank and file killed; 3 sergeants, 45 rank and file died with fatigue; 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 7 captains, 5 lieutenants, 7 sergeants, 137 rank and file wounded; 3 sergeants, 61 rank and file missing.

Total German.—1 rank and file killed; 11 rank and file died with fatigue; 11 rank and file wounded.

General Total.—1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 57 rank and file killed; 3 sergeants, 56 rank and file died with fatigue; 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 7 captains, 5 lieutenants, 7 sergeants, 148 rank and file wounded; 3 sergeants, 61 rank and file missing.

H. CLINTON.

C H A P T E R X X X V I I I .

J U L Y 1 to J U L Y 4, 1778.

W Y O M I N G .

AMONG the many interesting spots, rendered classic by the war of the American Revolution, is the valley of Wyoming.

It is principally in Luzerne county, extending from the northeast to the southwest, about twenty-one miles in length, with an average breadth of three miles,¹ and, through its entire length, the lovely Susquehannah follows its winding course.² "Two ranges of mountains hem in the valley, the eastern being of an average height of one thousand feet, and the western about eight hundred. The eastern range is precipitous and generally barren, but is strikingly diversified with clefts, ravines, and forests, and presents a most picturesque view. The western range is rapidly yielding to the process of cultivation."³ "It is diversified by hill and dale, upland and intvale. Its character of extreme richness is derived from the extensive flats, or river bottoms, which in some places extend from one to two miles from the stream, unrivalled in expansive beauty, unsurpassed

in luxuriant fertility. Though now generally cleared and cultivated, to protect the soil from floods a fringe of trees is left along each bank of the river—the sycamore, the elm, and more especially the black-walnut, while here and there, scattered through the fields, a huge shell-bark yields its summer shade to the weary laborers, and its autumn fruit to the black or gray squirrel, or the rival plough-boys. Pure streams of water come leaping from the mountains, imparting health and pleasure in their course; all of them abounding with the delicious trout. Along those brooks, and in the swales, scattered through the uplands, grow the wild-plum and the butternut, while, wherever the hand of the white man has spared it, the native grape may be gathered in unlimited profusion."¹

History relates the story of its original occupants,² and of the missionary zeal which, in 1742, led the Count Zinzendorf and the peaceful Moravians to enter the valley;³ and here, a few years

¹ Peck's Wyoming, p. 9.—² Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 340.—³ Peck's Wyoming, p. 10.

¹ Miner's Wyoming, pp. xiii. xiv.—² Chapman's Wyoming, pp. 1-35; Miner, pp. 24-38.—³ Peck, pp. 13, 14; Miner, pp. 38-41; Chapman, pp. 19-22.

later, began that celebrated contest between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, for the possession of the valley, which the troubles with the mother country could not wholly overcome.¹

The commencement of the Revolution found the valley in the possession of settlers scattered throughout its entire length;² and, as they were mostly from Connecticut, these settlers generally recognized the authority of that State in all their affairs.³ As it was an outpost of civilization, surrounded and overrun by the Indians,⁴ the settlers and their families experienced, at an early day, the peculiar hardships attending a frontier war.⁵ Upwards of three hundred of her hardy sons had entered the service of the Continent from Wyoming;⁶ and the aged men and the women, who remained at home, built *forts* for their defence, planted and cultivated the crops,⁷ and even manufactured the gunpowder which was used for the public defence.⁸ Of the *forts* referred to, the most important were Fort Durkee, which stood on the left bank of the river, half a mile below the borough of Wilkesbarre, near the Shawnee flats; Fort Wyoming, which stood where the court-house in Wilkesbarre now stands; Ogden's Fort, which stood near the mouth of Mill Creek, three and a half miles above the

bridge at Wilkesbarre; the Pittstown redoubts, also on the left bank of the river, eight miles above the bridge; Forty Fort, on the right bank of the river, near the spot where Myers' Tavern has more recently stood, three and a half miles above Wilkesbarre; Wintermoot's Fort, also on the right bank of the river, eight miles above the bridge, on property lately owned by Mr. David Goodwin; and Jenkins' Fort, on the same side of the river, about a mile above Wintermoot's.¹

The Indians having showed some disposition to annoy the inhabitants, the Continental Congress, in August, 1776, ordered two companies to be raised, and stationed in proper places, for the defence of the inhabitants of the valley; subject, however, to the orders of the Congress, and to serve in any part of the United States.² Of these companies, Robert Durkee and Samuel Ransom were elected Captains,³ and in less than sixty days the ranks had been filled from the few able-bodied men who still remained in the valley.⁴ The reverses at Long Island, Fort Washington, and in the Jerseys, soon followed; and General Washington, with the few who remained with him, on the eighth of December, found safety in Pennsylvania. Deserted by the timid and the wavering, he crossed the Delaware at the head of a mere handful of men, and the cause of Free-

¹ Prof. Silliman's Notice of the Valley; T. Pickering's letter, Dec. 31, 1818; Miner, pp. 62-134.

² Stone's Brant, i. p. 328, note.—³ Miner, pp. 153-181.

⁴ Peck, p. 29; Statement of Mrs. Myers, in same work, p. 147.—⁵ Miner, p. 54.—⁶ Peck, p. 29.—⁷ Ibid., pp. 30, 31; Miner, p. 212.—⁸ Miner, p. 212.

¹ Prof. Silliman's Notice.—² Jour. of Cong., Friday, Aug. 23, 1776 (vol. ii. p. 306).—³ Ibid., Monday, Aug. 26, 1776 (vol. ii. p. 307).—⁴ Miner, p. 193.

dom appeared to be fast losing ground. He required the assistance of cool heads and strong arms, and the two companies in Wyoming, when ordered by Congress, hastened to join him, leaving their homes entirely exposed to the savage enemy, by whom they were surrounded.¹

Early in the spring of 1778, the Congress received information of the enemy's designs, and of the preparations which were being made for a descent on Wyoming.² From Niagara, and from the Indian country, the rumors reached Congress; while General Schuyler, with his characteristic diligence, wrote to the Board of War on the same subject.³ These rumors spread throughout the valley, and the greatest excitement prevailed. Messengers were dispatched to the army to hasten the return of the companies under Captains Durkee and Ransom; the officers and men seconded the appeals, urged the necessities of their families, then left defenceless, and appealed to the terms and purposes of their enlistment.⁴ But "mercy, justice, and policy plead in vain." The appeals were disregarded, both by Connecticut (in whose quota the Wyoming troops were counted) and by the Congress,⁵ and it has been well said of it, that "history affords no parallel of the pertinacious detention of men under such circumstances. Treachery is not for

a moment to be lisped, and yet the malign influence of the policy pursued, and the disastrous consequences, could not have been aggravated, if they had been purposely withheld. Nothing could have been more frank and confiding, more brave and generous, than the whole conduct of the Wyoming people from the beginning of the contest; and it is saying little to aver that they deserved, both at the hands of Congress and Connecticut, a different requital."¹

The Indians and Tories having withdrawn from the vicinity, and joined the enemy, preparatory to the attack,² the Continental Congress again interposed for the protection of Wyoming, ordering one full company of foot to be raised in the town of Westmoreland, for its defence; the said company to serve one year, and to find its own arms, accoutrements, and blankets—the latter condition, from the scarcity of arms, being a peculiarly severe imposition upon the inhabitants.³

As early as the month of May, scouting parties from the enemy hovered around the settlements, and, soon afterwards, they assumed a more hostile position by firing upon the settlers while they passed along the roads and streams or worked in the fields.⁴

The inhabitants of the outer settlements immediately fled to the forts;⁵ and the appeals to the Congress for

¹ Jour. of Cong., Thursday, Dec. 12, 1776 (*vol. ii. p. 466*) ; Miner, p. 194.—² Miner, p. 212.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 212, 213.—⁵ Ibid. Gordon (*iii. p. 187*) says the letters were intercepted by the Tories.

¹ Miner, pp. 212, 213.—² Gordon, *iii. p. 186*; Miner, p. 213.—³ Jour. of Cong., Monday, March 16, 1778, *iv. p. 113*.—⁴ Stone's Brant, *i. p. 331*.—⁵ Ibid., p. 332; Statement of Mrs. Myers, in Peck, *p. 155*; Miner, p. 215.

the relief which was needed were still more urgently and frequently made.¹ Disregarding the authority of those who denied them a hearing, all, except two, of the commissioned officers in the Wyoming companies resigned and returned to their homes, and upwards of thirty of the privates deserted and followed their example.²

At length the enemy concentrated his forces at Newtown (*now Elmira*) and Tioga,³ and, on the morning of the thirtieth of June, 1778, he entered the head of the valley.⁴ His force consisted of about four hundred whites,—composed of Butler's Rangers, a detachment of Sir John Johnson's Royal Greens, and Tories from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania;⁵ and from six to seven hundred Indians under Gi-en-gwah-toh or Gueingerachton,⁶ the whole being commanded by Colonel John Butler.⁷

The first work which he encountered was Fort Jenkins, into which had been collected the families of John Jenkins, Esq., the Hardings, the Gardiners, and others in that part of the valley.⁸ As the movements of the enemy were unknown to the settlers, a party of seven men and a boy had, on the morning of the thirtieth of June, taken their arms

and gone to their labor in Exeter, about three miles distant. Towards evening they were attacked by the enemy, and after a stubborn defence, three of their number—Daniel Weller, John Gardiner, and Daniel Carr—were taken prisoners; and four of them—James Hadsell, James Hadsell, jr., and Benjamin and Stukely Harding—were killed; while John Harding, the boy, by throwing himself into the river, and laying under the willows, with his mouth above the surface of the water, escaped without injury.¹

The news of this attack spread like wild-fire throughout the valley, and, by common consent, Colonel Zebulon Butler assumed the command of the settlers.² On the next day (*July 1st*), in company with Colonel Denison and Lieutenant-colonel Dorrance, he marched, with all his force, up to Exeter, the scene of the unequal conflict on the preceding day.³ Two savages, who were watching the dead, in order to seize other victims from among those who might come to remove the bodies, were shot; and the mutilated remains were removed and interred near Fort Jenkins, where a neat monument has been erected to their memory.⁴

No obstruction was offered by the enemy, but Colonel Butler had no sooner returned than the former advanced to Fort Wintermoot,—a mile below Fort Jenkins,—and took posses-

¹ Peck, p. 156.—² Sketch of M. Hollenback, in Peck's Wyoming, p. 102.—³ Miner, p. 215.—⁴ Stone's Brant, i. p. 332; Chapman, p. 121; Peck, p. 38; Col. J. Butler's dispatch, July 8, 1778.—⁵ Miner, pp. 216, 217.

⁶ Col. J. Butler's dispatch; Stone's Brant, i. p. 332; Lossing's Field Book, i. p. 351.—⁷ Col. Z. Butler (*dispatch, July 10*) supposes there were only 400 Indians.

⁸ Miner, p. 218; Stone's Brant, i. p. 331; Peck, p. 38.
⁹ Miner, p. 217.

¹ Miner, p. 217.—² Peck, p. 38; Miner, p. 217.

³ Stone's Brant, i. p. 332; Col. Z. Butler's dispatch, July 10, 1778; Miner, p. 217.—⁴ Col. Z. Butler's dispatch, July 10, 1778; Miner, pp. 217, 218.

sion of it without opposition.¹ This fort was occupied by the Wintermoots, Daniel Ingersoll, and others, with their families.² The former had long been suspected by their neighbors, and when the enemy approached they told Mr. Ingersoll that Colonel John Butler "would be at home there," forbade any opposition, and claimed him as a prisoner of war.³

The same evening (*July 1st*), Captain Caldwell, with a detachment of the Royal Greens, was sent back to secure Fort Jenkins.⁴ Four of the garrison having been already killed, and three others taken prisoners, those who remained offered no resistance,⁵ Colonel Butler guaranteeing to them, "entire, the lives of the men, women, and children."⁶

On the following morning (*July 2^d*), Mr. Ingersoll, who had been captured at Wintermoot's, was sent, under escort of an Indian and a Tory, to Forty Fort, to demand from Colonel Butler the surrender of that post and of the valley.⁷

This demand was repeated on the next morning (*July 3^d*), and again refused.⁸ After the messengers had retired from the fort, Colonel Butler called a Council of War, to consider the course most proper to be taken; and, it is said, the opinions of the offi-

cers were various and freely expressed.¹ On the one side, Colonels Butler and Denison, and Lieutenant-colonel Dorrance, with many others, were inclined to delay operations, supposing that the alarm which had been produced by the sudden irruption would subside, and the people become better able to oppose the enemy; that the absent companies of militia would arrive; and that the Wyoming troops then in the army, would also, in all probability, reach the settlements in a few days, all of which appeared to be absolutely necessary, in order to insure success. On the other hand, a majority of the officers, giving way to their excited feelings, dwelt on the loss of the Forts Wintermoot and Jenkins, and insisted that three days had been already spent in rapine and murder, with the work still progressing. It soon became evident that the little garrison would not submit to inactivity within the fort; that an active life would be required to keep them together; and that, unless they were led to meet the enemy, many of them would leave the fort, with the desperate hope of defending, single-handed, their respective firesides.²

With great reluctance, therefore, the minority yielded, and preparations were immediately made to march out and meet the enemy.³ The young, the middle-aged, and the gray-haired veterans, the private citizens and those in author-

¹ Hazard's Register of Penn., vi. p. 58; Stone's Brant, i. p. 332; Col. J. Butler's dispatch, July 8, 1778.

² Miner, p. 218.—³ Stone's Brant, i. p. 332; Marshall, iv. p. 25; Miner, p. 218.—⁴ Miner, p. 218.

⁵ Col. J. Butler's dispatch; Miner, p. 218.

⁶ Articles of Capitulation, Doc. I.—⁷ Col. J. Butler's dispatch; Mrs. Myers' statement; Miner, p. 218.

⁸ Miner, pp. 218, 219.

¹ Hazard's Register, vi. p. 58; Chapman, p. 122; Miner, p. 219.—² Hazard's Register, vi. p. 59; Stone's Brant, i. p. 333; Chapman, pp. 122-124; Mrs. Myers' statement; Miner, p. 219.—³ Miner, p. 219.

ity, alike shouldered their pieces and went out to oppose the spoiler¹—some three hundred in number.² They were organized into six companies: “*The Regulars*,” being the company organized under the resolution of the Continental Congress, commanded by Captain Dethic Hewitt, numbering about forty men; “*The Plymouth Company*,” commanded by Captain Asaph Whittlesey, numbering forty-four men; “*The Hanover Company*,” commanded by Captain Lazarus Stewart, numbering about forty men; “*The Lower Wilkes-barre Company*,” commanded by Captain James Bidlack, jr., numbering thirty-eight men; “*The Upper Wilkes-barre Company*,” commanded by Captain Rezin Geer; and “*The Kingston Company*,” commanded by Captain Aholiab Buck, the strength of which are not known.³ In addition to these companies, the judges of the courts and all the civil officers went out, and Colonel Zebulon Butler assumed the command.⁴

This little party left Forty Fort a little after noon,⁵ and the intelligence of the movement was immediately conveyed to the enemy, at Wintermoot’s Fort, when orders were issued for the

immediate return of the party which was then at Jenkins’, and preparations were made for battle.⁶

As the settlers approached Wintermoot’s they saw the fort was in flames, the enemy having set it on fire, probably, for the purpose of creating a belief that he had retreated,⁸ and of throwing the Americans off their guard.

When Colonel Zebulon Butler saw the situation of the enemy he dispatched Captains Ransom and Durkee, and Lieutenants Ross and Wells, officers on whose judgment he could rely, to select the spot and mark off the ground on which to form the order of battle.⁴ Notwithstanding this precaution, it is evident the enemy had previously selected the ground, and was formed in order of battle, ready to receive the Americans;⁵ and nothing remained to be done but to form and advance to the attack.

The ground occupied by the enemy was near Fort Wintermoot, on the upper bank of the river. His left, composed of the Rangers, rested on the fort, and was commanded by Colonel John Butler, in person,⁶ who, divested of his uniform, appeared on the ground with a handkerchief tied on his head.⁷ On his right were placed the Royal Greens, commanded by Sir John John-

¹ Miner, p. 220.—² The number of the Americans engaged in the fight has been the subject of much dispute. Prof. Silliman says 368 were present; Mr. Stone agrees with him. I have preferred the authority of Mr. Miner (*Hist. of Wyoming*, p. 219) and Dr. Peck (*Wyoming*, p. 38), strengthened as they are by Col. Z. Butler’s dispatch, July 10, 1778, and Mrs. Myers’ statement.

³ Miner, pp. 219, 220.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Col. J. Butler’s dispatch; Miner, p. 219. Hazard (*Reg. of Penn.*, vi. p. 59) says, “at dawn of day,” and Chapman (p. 124) agrees with him.

⁶ Miner, p. 220.—⁷ Col. J. Butler’s dispatch, Mrs. Myers’ statement.—⁸ Col. J. Butler’s dispatch. Some accounts state that an attempt was made to draw the Americans into an ambuscade, but I have doubts of their correctness.

⁹ Miner, p. 221.—⁶ Hazard’s Register, vi. p. 59; Col. Z. Butler’s dispatch, July 10, 1778; Col. J. Butler’s dispatch, July 8, 1778.—⁸ Prof. Silliman’s Notice; Chapman, p. 124; Miner, p. 222.—⁷ Miner, p. 222.

son, and on their right, forming the right wing of the enemy's position, was the main body of the Indians, commanded by Gi-en-gwah-toh, a chief of the Senecas.¹ The wings were flanked by parties of Indians,² and the entire force, for its greater safety, and, possibly, to conceal their real strength and position, lay flat upon the ground, waiting the approach of the Americans.³

On coming up, Colonel Zebulon Butler addressed his troops in these words: "Men, yonder is the enemy. The fate of the Hardings tells us what we have to expect if defeated. We come out to fight, not only for liberty, but for life itself, and, what is dearer, to preserve our homes from conflagration; our women and children from the tomahawk. Stand firm the first shock, and the Indians will give way. Every man to his duty."⁴ The column then displayed to the left; and, under the direction of the officers who had been sent forward for that purpose, the several companies occupied the places to which they had been assigned, and advanced, in line, to the proper position, where they halted.⁵ The right, resting on the steep bank which separated the river bottom from the upper bank, was composed of Captain Bidlack's, or the Lower Wilkesbarre company, and on his left was Captain Hewitt's company of "regulars." The extreme left, which rested on a swamp, was composed of Captain Whittlesey's, or the Plymouth com-

pany.¹ Colonel Zebulon Butler, assisted by Major John Garrett, commanded the right wing; Colonel Nathan Denison, assisted by Lieutenant-colonel George Dorrance, commanded the left.² Captains Ransom and Durkee, whose great experience gave them rights to posts of unusual honor and responsibility, were posted, the former with Captain Whittlesey on the left of the line, the latter with Captain Bidlack on the extreme right.³

The Americans approached within two hundred yards of the enemy,⁴ and, at about four o'clock⁵ they opened their fire, advancing until they had come within a hundred yards of the enemy's line.⁶ Until this time the latter had received the Americans' fire without returning it,⁷ but, Colonel John Butler having given the order to commence the action, the Indians on the enemy's right wing opened their fire, and the action soon became general.⁸

The fire on both sides was well sustained for several minutes, and the enemy's line began to show signs of uneasiness, notwithstanding his officers exerted themselves to preserve order.⁹ The Indians who had been posted on the bottom ground, on the enemy's left, kept up a galling fire, from which Lieutenant Gore lost his left arm and Cap-

¹ Miner, p. 222; Mrs. Myers' statement.

² Stone's Brant, i. p. 334; Chapman, p. 125; Miner, p. 222.—³ Miner, p. 222.—⁴ Hazard's Register, vi. p. 59; Stone's Brant, i. p. 334; Chapman, p. 125; Col. J. Butler's dispatch.—⁵ Miner, p. 223.—⁶ Col. J. Butler's dispatch.—⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Col. Z. Butler's dispatch; Statements of M. Hollenback and Mrs. Myers; Miner, p. 223.

¹ Miner, p. 222.—² Ibid.—³ Col. J. Butler's dispatch.

⁴ Miner, p. 222.—⁵ Ibid., pp. 221, 222.



tain Durkee was killed.¹ The Indians, divided into six distinct bands, kept up a constant din, and maintained their ground with desperate energy.²

After the battle had raged about half an hour, with great uncertainty respecting the result, a body of Indians, who had taken possession of the swamp on the left of the American line, opened a fire and completely outflanked it.³ The left wing, of course, was thrown into confusion; and Colonel Denison gave orders that the Plymouth company, which occupied the extreme left, should wheel back, and form an angle with the main line, so that his front, instead of his flank, might be presented to the enemy.⁴ Such a movement, at all times dangerous when in front of the enemy, was particularly disastrous in this case. The men did not fully understand the order,—some, even understood it was an order to retreat,⁵—and that important part of the line was thrown into some disorder.⁶ Quickly perceiving the advantage which this mistake afforded, Gi-en-gwah-toh as promptly seized it, and rushing forward with his warriors, the conflict became a hand-to-hand engagement.⁷ Amidst the most terrible yells of the savages, and the great disadvantages of the most perfect disorder, Colonel Denison and his men continued the

contest, until the right of the line was also broken,¹ and victory rested on the banners of the enemy.

The troops fought bravely—every man did his duty; and when it is remembered that every captain who led a company fell *in or near the line*,² it will be seen that the troops were led by lion-hearted officers.

Perceiving the advantage which had been gained, and the disorder of the American line, the Indian flanking parties immediately pushed forward, cut off the retreat to Forty Fort, and pressed the fugitives, now between two fires, into the river.³ Monockasy Island, the only means for crossing the stream which offered itself, was a mile distant, and thither the unfortunate settlers retreated, closely pursued by the savages.⁴

On reaching the bank of the river, a few swam over and escaped,⁵ but many were killed in the water, and their bodies were borne down with the current.⁶ Others, vainly attempting to conceal themselves among the bushes and willows on the margin of the river, were drawn forth by their relentless pursuers and butchered in cold blood.⁷ One of these, named Henry Pensil, while so concealed, discovered his own brother approaching, and immediately came forth, threw himself at his feet, begging for protection, and promising

¹ Miner, p. 223.—² Ibid.—³ Hazard's Register, vi. p. 59; Stone's Brant, i. p. 334; Chapman, p. 125.

⁴ Miner, p. 223. Chapman supposes the entire wing was to fall back.—⁶ Hazard's Register, vi. p. 59; Col. Z. Butler's dispatch; Statement of M. Hollenback.—⁶ Chapman, p. 125; Mrs. Myers' statement; Miner, p. 223.

⁷ Miner, p. 223.

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¹ Hazard's Register, vi. p. 59; Miner, p. 223.

² Miner, p. 224.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Stone's Brant, i. pp. 334, 335; Chapman, pp. 125, 126; Statement of M. Hollenback; Miner, p. 224.

⁶ Hazard's Register, vi. p. 59; Stone's Brant, i. p. 335; Miner, p. 225.—⁶ Prof. Silliman's Notice; Miner, p. 225.

⁷ Miner, p. 225.

to serve him for life if he would spare him. With a look of contempt the heartless wretch replied, "*Mighty well, you damned rebel,*" and instantly shot him dead.¹ Another, Lieutenant Elijah Shoemaker, whose abundant means had long enabled him to respond to the promptings of a charitable disposition in dispensing his bounty to the distressed, had also sought refuge in the river. He was soon afterwards discovered by a wretch named Windecker, whose troubles had frequently been soothed by his unhappy victim; and with a "*Come out, come out, you know I will protect you,*" he invited him to leave his hiding-place, and extended his left hand to assist him in doing so. Before the victim reached the shore, however, Windecker dashed his hatchet into the head of his benefactor, who fell back, and immediately floated away.²

Nor were the Indians less inactive in the work of death than their merciless associates. Many were invited by them to come ashore, with promises of safety, and then butchered. Others, with an accuracy of aim which none could surpass, coolly singled out single officers and shot them through the thighs, effectually disabling them, but leaving them alive for torture.³ Captain Bidlack, who was found near the lines before life was extinct, was thrown among the burning logs of the fort, and held there with pitchforks until he expired.⁴

Others were arranged in circles, and suffered death at the hands of their savage victors, who passed from man to man in their work of destruction.¹ In one of these circles, some sixteen or eighteen had been arranged around a large stone, and surrounded by a large number of Indians. This little party had been assigned to a female named Esther, who held authority in one of the tribes, and she immediately proceeded to discharge the duty which devolved upon her with great apparent satisfaction. Striking up a tune, she passed from one victim to the next, and, with a death-man or tomahawk,—sometimes one weapon was used and sometimes the other,—she dashed out the brains of her victims.² Two of the devoted circle, Lebbens Hammond and Joseph Elliott, seeing there was no probability of escape, unless by running, suddenly sprung from those who held them and fled for the woods. Strange as it may appear, notwithstanding the savage marksmen and runners employed every means to secure or kill them, they escaped in safety.³

At length "night threw her kindly mantle over the field, and darkness arrested the pursuit."⁴ The sad tidings had reached the forts where the families of the sufferers had been left, and terror reigned supreme.

Colonel Denison, gathering the few who had escaped, took command of

¹ Hazard's Register, vi. p. 59; Stone's Brant, i. p. 337; Chapman, pp. 127, 128; Stone's Wyoming, p. 215; Miner, p. 225.—² Peck, pp. 47, 48; Miner, p. 225.

³ Miner, p. 225.—⁴ Ibid., p. 226.

¹ Prof. Silliman's Notice; Miner, p. 226.—² Prof. Silliman's Notice; Peck, pp. 284—290; Miner, p. 226.

³ Miner, p. 226.—⁴ Ibid.

Forty Fort, while Colonel Zebulon Butler proceeded to the fort at Wilkesbarre, and every possible precaution was taken to prevent a surprise, and secure the families of the victims.¹

It is said that two hundred and twenty-seven scalps were taken in this affair,² and the lives of only five prisoners were saved.³ One hundred and forty escaped.⁴ The enemy's loss was never known; the statement which was made by Colonel John Butler⁵ being so grossly false that no notice need be taken of it, except to condemn it.

Many sought safety by immediately flying from the valley; and, in their haste, forgetting to take provisions with them, they suffered severely from hunger before they reached the settlements.⁶ Pursuing their lonely way, they scattered throughout the country, as far eastward as Connecticut, the stories of their sufferings;⁷ and these, growing more terrible with every repetition, were the basis of those accounts of the "massaere of Wyoming" which disfigure the pages of nearly all the historians of those times.⁸

On the morning of the fourth of July a council was held in Forty Fort, in which it was determined to send to Wilkesbarre for cannon, to bring all the people to the former post, and to defend themselves to the last extrem-

ity.¹ It was soon found, however, that such a course was impracticable.² Consternation reigned throughout the valley, and those who sought safety in flight, embraced the greater portion of the inhabitants.³ Soon afterwards a messenger reached the fort, demanding its surrender, and requesting Colonel Denison to go up to Wintermoot's, where Colonel John Butler then was, to agree on terms of capitulation.⁴ After consulting with his officers and those who were with him, he went, taking with him Obadiah Gore, Esq., and Dr. Gustin.⁵ During the conference Colonel John Butler insisted that Colonel Zebulon Butler, and the remains of Captain Hewitt's company, being on the Continental establishment, should be surrendered prisoners of war.⁶ Colonel Denison desired time to consult with his officers, returned for that purpose, but, before he had reached to Wintermoot's again, Colonel Zebulon Butler and the troops alluded to had retired from the valley.⁷ On renewing the conference, terms were agreed upon, and at four o'clock the same afternoon the gates of the fort were thrown open and the enemy took possession.⁸

Notwithstanding the Indians violated the terms of the capitulation by plundering the property of the inhabitants,⁹

¹ Miner, p. 227.—² Col. J. Butler's dispatch. Mr. Miner says about 160 were killed.—³ Col. J. Butler's dispatch.

⁴ Miner, p. 228. C. Hurlbut, a survivor, says only 60 escaped.—⁵ Dispatch, July 8, 1778.

⁶ Miner, pp. 229-231.—⁷ See Holt's N. Y. Journal, Poughkeepsie, July 20, 1778, for one of these stories.

⁸ Marshall, iv. pp. 24-28; Gordon, iii. pp. 187-191.

¹ Miner, p. 229.—² Ibid.—³ Col. Z. Butler's dispatch.

⁴ Miner, p. 231.—⁵ Col. Z. Butler's dispatch; Miner, p. 231.—⁶ Col. Z. Butler's dispatch; Miner, p. 232.

⁷ Ibid. Mr. Stone (*Brant*, i. p. 335) strangely supposes the settlers were acting treacherously against Col. Butler

⁸ Articles of Capitulation, Doc. II.; Miner, p. 232.

⁹ Stone's *Brant*, i. p. 335; Mrs. Myers' statement; Miner, p. 234.

it does not appear that any personal violence was offered to any one after the articles had been agreed upon;¹ and the terrible particulars to which reference has been made are entirely erroneous.

After destroying considerable property, and collecting upwards of a thousand head of cattle, and sheep and swine in great numbers, on the eighth of July the enemy retired from the valley.²

Much has been said and written respecting the part which Colonel John Butler and Joseph Brant have been said to have taken in this horrible affair. It appears to have been well established, however, that the great Mohawk chief was not in that vicin-

ity;¹ and Mr. Miner, to whose faithful labors the world is indebted for the history of Wyoming, as clearly establishes the innocence of Colonel Butler. He was entirely powerless, and the outrages of the savages were committed in defiance of his positive orders.²

But the withdrawal of Colonel Butler and his command did not wholly restore peace to Wyoming. The savages continued to harass the few who returned to gather their crops and to secure the fragments which had not been destroyed; and even after the close of the revolutionary struggle the contest between the rival claimants of the soil—those of Connecticut and Pennsylvania—was bitter and long continued.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION OF FORT JENKINS.

FORT JENKINS, July 1, 1778.

Between Major John Butler, on behalf of His Majesty King George the Third, and John Jenkins.

Art. 1. That the fort, with all the stores, arms, and ammunition, be delivered up immediately.

Art. 2. That Major John Butler shall preserve to them, entire, the lives of the men, women, and children.

JOHN BUTLER,
JOHN JENKINS.

¹ Stone's Brant, i. p. 336; Walter N. Butler to Gov. Geo. Clinton, Feb. 18, 1779; Col. Z. Butler's dispatch.

² Col. Z. Butler's dispatch; Miner, p. 235.

II.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION OF FORTY FORT.

WESTMORELAND, July 4, 1778.

Capitulation made and completed between Major John Butler, on behalf of His Majesty George the Third, and Colonel Nathan Denison, of the *United States of America*.

Art. 1. That the inhabitants of the settlement lay down their arms, and the garrison be demolished.

Art. 2. That the inhabitants are to occupy their farms peaceably, and the lives of the inhabitants preserved entire and unhurt.

¹ Stone's Brant, i. pp. 338, 339; Peck, pp. 88-93; Guy Johnson to Lord Germain, Sept. 10, 1778; Col. J. Butler's dispatch.—² Mrs. Myers' statement; Miner, pp. 235-237.

ART. 3. That the Continental stores be delivered up.

ART. 4. That Major Butler will use his utmost influence that the private property of the inhabitants shall be preserved entire to them.

ART. 5. That the prisoners in Forty Fort be delivered up, and that Samuel Finch, now in Major Butler's possession, be delivered up also.

ART. 6. That the property taken from the people called *Tories*, up the river, be made good; and they to remain in peaceable possession of their farms, unmolested in a free trade in and throughout this State, as far as lies in my power.

ART. 7. That the inhabitants that Colonel Denison now capitulates for, together with himself, do not take up arms during the present contest.

NATHAN DENISON,	JOHN JOHNSON,
JOHN BUTLER,	SAMUEL GUSTIN,
ZARAH BEECHI,	WM. CALDWELL.

III.

COLONEL ZEBULON BUTLER'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE TO THE BOARD OF WAR.

GNADEHUTTEN, PENN TOWNSHIP, July 10, 1778.

HONORED SIR:—On my arrival at Westmoreland, which was only four days after I left Yorktown, I found there was a large body of the enemy advancing on that settlement. On the 1st of July we mustered the militia, and marched towards them by the river above the settlement—found and killed two Indians at a place where, the day before, they had murdered nine men engaged in hoeing corn. We found some canoes, &c., but finding no men above their main body, it was judged prudent to return: and as every man had to go to his own house for his provisions, we could not muster again till the 3d of July. In the mean time the enemy had got possession of two forts, one of which we had reason to believe was designed for them, though they burned them both. The inhabitants had some forts for the security of their women and children, extending about ten miles on the river, and too many men would stay in them to

take care of them; but, after collecting about three hundred of the most spirited of them, including Captain Hewitt's company, I held a council with the officers, who all agreed that it was best to attack the enemy before they got any farther. We accordingly marched, found their situation, formed a front of the same extension of the enemy's, and attacked from right to left at the same time. Our men stood the fire well for three or four shots, till some part of the enemy gave way; but, unfortunately for us, through some mistake, the word *retreat* was understood from some officer on the left, which took so quick that it was not in the power of the officers to form them again, though I believe, if they had stood three minutes longer, the enemy would have been beaten. The utmost pains were taken by the officers, who mostly fell. A lieutenant-colonel, a major, and five captains, who were in commission in the militia, all fell. Colonel Durkee, and Captains Hewitt and Ransom, were likewise killed. In the whole, about two hundred men lost their lives in the action on our side. What number of the enemy were killed is yet uncertain, though I believe a very considerable number. The loss of these men so intimidated the inhabitants that they gave up the matter of fighting. Great numbers ran off, and others would comply with the terms that I had refused. The enemy sent flags frequently; the terms you will see in the inclosed letter. They repeatedly said they had nothing to do with any but the inhabitants, and did not want to treat with me. Colonel Denison, by the desire of the inhabitants, went and complied, which made it necessary for me and the little remains of Captain Hewitt's company to leave the place. Indeed, it was determined by the enemy to spare the inhabitants after the agreement, and that myself and the few Continental soldiers should be delivered up to the savages, upon which I left the place, and came away, scarcely able to move, as I have had no rest since I left Yorktown. It has not been in my power to find a horse or man to wait on the Board till now. I must submit to the Board what must be the next step. The little remains of Hewitt's company, which are about fifteen, are gone to Shamoken, and Captain

Spaulding's company, I have heard, are on the Delaware. Several hundred of the inhabitants are strolling in the country, destitute of provisions, who have large fields of grain and other necessaries of life at Westmoreland. In short, if the inhabitants can go back, there may yet be secured double the quantity of provisions to support themselves, otherwise they must be beggars, and a burden to the world.

I have heard from men that came from the place since the people gave up, that the Indians have killed no person since, but have burned most of the buildings, and are collecting all the horses they can, and are moving up the river. They likewise say the enemy were eight hundred, one half white men. I should be glad that, if possible, there might be a sufficient guard sent for the defence of the place, which will be the means of saving thousands from poverty, but must submit to the wisdom of Congress. I desire farther orders from the honorable Board of War, with respect to myself and the soldiers under my direction.

I have the honor to be your honor's most obedient humble servant,

ZEBULON BUTLER.

IV.

MAJOR JOHN BUTLER'S REPORT TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BOLTON.¹

LACUWANACK, July 8, 1778.

SIR:—On the 30th of June I arrived, with about five hundred Rangers and Indians, at Wyoming, and encamped on an eminence which overlooks the greatest part of the settlement, from which I sent out parties to discover the situation or strength of the enemy, who brought in eight prisoners and scalps. Two loyalists who came into my camp, informed me that the rebels could muster about eight hundred men, who were all assembled in their forts. July the 1st, I marched to the distance of half a mile

of Wintermoot's Fort, and sent in Lieutenant Turney with a flag to demand immediate possession of it, which was soon agreed to. A flag was then sent to Jenkins' Fort, which surrendered on nearly the same conditions as Wintermoot's, both of which are inclosed. I next summoned Forty Fort, the commandant of which refused the conditions I sent him. July 3d, parties were sent out to collect cattle, who informed me that the rebels were preparing to attack me. This pleased the Indians highly, who observed they should be on an equal footing with them in the woods. At two o'clock we observed the rebels upon their march, in number about four or five hundred. Between four and five o'clock they were advanced within a mile of us. Finding them determined, I ordered the fort to be set on fire, which deceived the enemy into an opinion that we had retreated. We then posted ourselves in a fine open wood, and, for our greater safety, lay flat upon the ground, waiting their approach. When they were within two hundred yards of us they began firing. We still continued upon the ground, without returning their fire, until they had fired three volleys. By this time they had advanced within one hundred yards of us, and, being quite near enough, Gueingerachton ordered his Indians, who were upon the right, to begin the attack upon our part, which was immediately well seconded by the Rangers on the left. Our fire was so close and well directed that the affair was soon over, not lasting half an hour from the time they gave us their first fire to their flight. In this action were taken two hundred and twenty-seven scalps and only five prisoners. The Indians were so exasperated with their loss last year, near Fort Stanwix, that it was with the greatest difficulty I could save the lives of these few. Colonel Denison, who came in next day with a minister and two others, to treat for the remainder of the settlement of Westmoreland, assured us that they had lost one colonel, two majors, seven captains, thirteen lieutenants, eleven ensigns, two hundred and sixty-eight privates. On our side were killed, one Indian, two Rangers, and eight Indians were wounded. In this incursion we have taken eight palisades, (six) forts, and burned about one thousand

¹This document has been copied from "Wyoming," by Rev. Dr. Peck, to whom it had been furnished by Hon. George Bancroft.

dwelling-houses, all their mills, &c. We have also killed and drove off about one thousand head of horned cattle, and sheep and swine in great numbers. But what gives me the sincerest satisfaction is, that I can with great truth assure you that in the destruction of this settlement not a single person has been hurt, of the inhabitants, but such as were in arms; to these, indeed, the Indians gave no quarter.

I have also the pleasure to inform you, that the officers and Rangers behaved during this short action highly to my satisfaction, and have always supported themselves through hunger and fatigue, with great cheerfulness.

I have this day sent a party of men to the Delaware to destroy a small settlement there, and to bring off prisoners. In two or three days I shall send out other parties for the same

purpose, if I can supply myself with provisions. I shall harass the adjacent country, and prevent them from getting in their harvest.

The settlement of Scohary, or the Minisinks, will be my next object, both of which abound in corn and cattle, the destruction of which cannot fail of greatly distressing the rebels. I have not yet been able to hear any thing of the expresses I sent to the Generals Howe and Clinton; but as I sent them by ten different routes, I am in hopes that some of them will be able to make their way to them and return.

In a few days I will do myself the honor of writing to you more fully, and send you a journal of my proceedings since I left Niagara.

I am, sir, with respect, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN BUTLER.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

August 5 to August 30, 1778.

THE OPERATIONS IN RHODE ISLAND.

A TREATY of alliance having been concluded between the United States and the King of the French,¹ a fleet was fitted up for the American service, and left Toulon on the thirteenth of April, 1778.² It was composed of twelve ships of the line and four large frigates, and the command was given to Admiral the Count D'Estaing, a brave and successful officer.³ Information of this movement was laid before the British ministry on the sixth of May, when a powerful fleet of twenty-two sail of the line, commanded by Admirals Byron and Hyde Parker, was ordered to sea; but the cabinet, being still uncertain of the destination of the French fleet, countermanded the order; although they speedily renewed

it, the fleet finally sailing on the fifth of June.

After a tedious voyage of eighty-seven days, on the eighth of July, Admiral D'Estaing anchored at the entrance of Delaware Bay;¹ and after communicating with the Congress at Philadelphia, he weighed anchor and sailed for Sandy Hook,² reaching that point on the eleventh of July.³ On reaching that point he found that his ships could not enter the bay, because of a sand-bar, which, at that time, extended from Staten Island to Sandy Hook,⁴ and he anchored on the Jersey shore, not far from the mouth of the Shrewsbury River.⁵

At the urgent request of General Washington, on the 22d of July,⁶ the Count sailed from Sandy Hook to Rhode Island, for the purpose of co-

¹ Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 323; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. pp. 59-68.—² Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 523.

³ Stedman (ii. p. 25), Marshall (iii. p. 523), and some other writers, give six as the number of frigates. In Collins' "N. J. Gazette, Trenton, Aug. 19, 1778," the following are named as the vessels under Count D'Estaing: Languedoc, 90; Tonnant, 80; Cesar, 74; Zele, 74; Nector, 74; Marseilles, 74; Protecteur, 74; Guerriere, 74; Jantasse, 64; Provence, 64; Vaillant, 64; Saggitaire, 54; Chinnere, 30; L'Engeante, 26; L'Alemente, 26; L'Arimable, 26. This is confirmed by a letter from Newport, in Gaines' New York Gazette and Mercury, No. 1399, Aug. 10, 1778.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 154; Stedman, ii. p. 26; Admiral Howe's dispatch, July 11. The fleet was delayed by adverse winds in the Mediterranean, and did not pass Gibralter until the fifteenth of May.

² Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 523.—³ Adm'l Howe's dispatch, July 11.—⁴ Sparks' Washington, p. 279; Los-sing's Field Book, ii. p. 79; Gordon, iii. pp. 155-157.

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 155; Irving, iii. p. 452; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1395, July 20.—⁶ Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1397, July 27.

operating with General Sullivan, who commanded there, and was then preparing to attack the enemy, who then occupied the island of Rhode Island.¹ He appeared off the harbor of Newport on the twenty-ninth of July;² cast anchor about five miles below the town;³ and, soon afterwards, a plan of operations was arranged between him and General Sullivan.⁴

At this time the enemy occupied Newport and the island of Rhode Island: and the Americans were encamped in the vicinity of Providence.⁵ The former, embracing the Twenty-second, Forty-third, Fifty-fourth, and Sixty-third British regiments, Fanning's and Brown's corps of provincials, and the Hessian regiments of chasseurs, Huyn, Bunau, Ditfurth, Landgrave, Seaboth, and Voit, commanded by Major-general Pigot,⁶ were securely intrenched and supported by several frigates and smaller vessels.⁷ The latter, embracing the brigades of Generals Cornell, Greene, Lovell, and Titecomb, the advance of Livingston's, the reserve of West's, and a body of artillery,⁸ commanded by General Sullivan,⁹ had been reinforced with the brigades commanded by Generals Glover and Varnum,¹⁰ and large numbers of militia from Massachusetts,

Rhode Island, and Connecticut.¹ General Greene, also, was dispatched by the commander-in-chief to assist, with his great abilities, in executing the objects of the expedition.²

The enemy having withdrawn Brown's Provincial corps and two regiments of Hessians from Canonicut Island, where they had been stationed, and concentrated his forces in and around Newport,³ it became unnecessary to move against the island, and an attack on the town was alone provided for.⁴ For this purpose the Count D'Estaing was to enter the harbor, pass up the main channel to Dyer's Island, near which, on the west side of Rhode Island, the French troops were to be landed; while the Americans were to pass down and cross the eastern channel, occupying the eastern shore at the same moment, as nearly as possible, that the French occupied the western.⁵

In accordance with these arrangements, on the fifth of August, two ships of the line were detached to the western, or Narragansett passage, and two frigates to the eastern, or Seaconet passage,⁶ compelling the enemy to burn or sink the *Juno*, the *Lark*, the *Orpheus*, the *Flora*, and the *Cerberus*, each of thirty-two guns, the *Falcon* of eighteen, and the *King-fisher* of sixteen, whose

¹ Peterson's Rhode Island, p. 220.—² Gordon, iii. p. 157; Stedman, ii. p. 27; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 333; Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31.—³ Stedman, ii. p. 28; Peterson's Rhode Island, p. 221.—⁴ Irving, iii. p. 454; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1401, Aug. 24, 1778.

⁵ Marshall, iii. p. 530.—⁶ Peterson's R. I., p. 220.

⁷ Marshall, iii. p. 530; Sparks' Washington, p. 279; Stedman, ii. p. 34.— Heath's Mem., pp. 190, 191.

⁸ Marshall, iii. p. 526; Gordon, iii. p. 157.

⁹ Heath's Mem., p. 189.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 157; Laco, No. III.; Penn. Packet, Phila., Aug. 20, 1778.—² Marshall, iii. p. 527; Gordon, iii. p. 158.—³ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Stedman, ii. p. 35; Peterson's R. I., p. 223.—⁴ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 531.—⁵ Ibid., pp. 531, 532.

⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 158; Stedman, ii. pp. 28, 34; Letter from Newport, in Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1399, Aug. 10, 1778.

retreat was thus cut off;¹ and, on the eighth of August, the main body of the fleet entered the main channel with a light wind, keeping up a warm fire on Brenton's Point, Goat Island, and the North Batteries, which were manned by the crews of the vessels destroyed on the fifth, and commanded by Captain Christian and Lieutenants Forrest and Otway, of the navy.² On the same day General Sullivan joined General Greene at Tiverton, and the ninth was fixed upon as the time for the descent on the island.³ The militia failed to reach the place of rendezvous in season, however, and General Sullivan was compelled to ask a postponement until the next day;⁴ but having afterwards learned that the enemy had evacuated the works on the northern extremity of Rhode Island, and fearing that the postponement might cause them to reoccupy them, he determined, without consulting the Count, to pass over to the island without delay, which was accomplished, without opposition,⁵ by way of Howland's Ferry.⁶ When the Count was informed of this movement he was very indignant, and resented the

fancied insult in the most emphatic terms.¹

In the mean time messengers had been sent to New York to acquaint Admiral Lord Howe of the arrival of the French fleet at Newport,² and that officer—whose fleet had been strengthened by the arrival at New York of several other ships³—immediately sailed for Rhode Island, where he arrived on the morning of the ninth; and, having ascertained the situation of the Count D'Estaing, cast anchor off Point Judith.⁴ The presence of Admiral Howe, and the affront the Count had received, served to disconcert the arrangements still farther; and, on the morning of the tenth, instead of landing four thousand men on the western shore of Rhode Island, to co-operate with the American forces, the Count weighed anchor, and, with a stiff north-east breeze, stood down the channel, receiving and returning a heavy fire from the batteries as he passed them, and bearing down on the British fleet with an evident intention of giving battle.⁵ The Count D'Estaing having the weather-gage, Lord Howe weighed anchor and stood to the southward, followed by the Count, for two days, when a tremendous storm overtook them, and so far disabled both fleets that both were scattered and compelled

¹ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Stedman, ii. p. 35; Peterson's Rhode Island, pp. 221, 222; Letter from Newport, in *Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury*, No. 1399, Aug. 10, 1778.

² Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Gordon, iii. p. 158; Peterson's R. I., p. 222; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 334; Penn. Packet, Phila., Aug. 18, 1778.

³ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 533.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 35; Peterson's R. I., p. 223; Gordon, iii. pp. 158, 159; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 534; Letter from Camp, Aug. 17, in *Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury*, No. 1403, Sept. 14, 1778.

⁶ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Hist. of Civil War, i. p. 334.

¹ Marshall's Washington, iii. pp. 534–536.

² Stedman, ii. p. 29.—³ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 89; Marshall's Washington, iii. pp. 536, 537; Stedman, ii. p. 29.—⁴ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Stedman, ii. p. 29; Peterson's R. I., p. 224; Gordon, iii. p. 159; Penn. Packet, Phila., Aug. 20, 1778; John Hancock to Pres. Powell, Aug. 11.—⁵ Ibid.

to make a friendly port for repairs.¹ The Count D'Estaing, leaving General Sullivan without support, sailed for Boston, notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of the general officers in the American lines.²

The same storm which scattered the fleets caused great trouble and loss in General Sullivan's encampment. The tents were prostrated, most of the cartridges were destroyed, many horses were killed, and several men perished from the severity of the storm. It continued three days, and the condition of the army was deplorable.³

At length, on the fifteenth,⁴ General Sullivan moved down towards the enemy's lines; the advance, composed of the light troops, the independent companies, and fifty men from each brigade, being commanded by Colonel Livingston;⁵ the main body, in three columns, by Generals Sullivan, Lafayette, and Greene;⁶ the second line by General John Hancock, of Massachusetts; and the reserve by Colonel West.⁷ General Sullivan quartered on what is known as the Gibbs Farm, five miles from Newport; General Greene, in Mid-

dletown, on the farm recently owned by Colone. Richard K. Randolph; and the Marquis Lafayette on what was then called the Boller Garden.¹ General Pigot immediately strengthened his position,² by throwing up a new breast-work on the heights from Green-end to Irish's redoubt, and by an abatis. On the seventeenth General Sullivan broke ground on Honyman's Hill, on the summit of which, and on the right of the Green-end road, he erected a battery mounting four guns. On the eighteenth, another battery for five guns was thrown up on his left, and in a direct line with the former; and, on the same day, a line of approach was likewise begun by him from the battery on the right to Green-end road, during all which time the enemy continued to pour a constant and heavy fire on him. On the nineteenth, the Americans opened the fire from their five-gun battery, and compelled the enemy to remove his encampment farther to the rear, to throw up a new line of defences from his redoubt near the residence of Mr. Irish to Fomini Hill, and to throw up a battery for three guns on his right, to counteract the effect of the American fire. On the same day the Americans broke ground for a second line of approach.

¹ Stedman, ii. pp. 29-32; Peterson's R. I., p. 224; Gordon, iii. pp. 159, 160; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1401, Aug. 24, 1778.—² Gordon, iii. pp. 161-164.—³ Peterson's R. I., p. 224; Gordon, iii. p. 161; Marshall's Washington, iii. pp. 538, 539.—⁴ Peterson's R. I., p. 224; Gordon, iii. p. 161; Marshall's Washington, iii. pp. 538, 539. Gen. Pigot, in his dispatches (Doc. II.), and Stedman (ii. p. 35), say the advance of Gen. Sullivan took place on the 14th. I have followed the American account.—⁵ Letter from an officer to his friend in Boston, Aug. 11, in "The Penn. Packet, Phila., Aug. 25."

⁶ Peterson's R. I., p. 224—⁷ Letter from an officer to his friend in Boston, Aug. 11, in "The Penn. Packet, Phila., Aug. 25."

¹ Peterson's Rhode Island, p. 224.

² The position then occupied by the enemy was the heights, about two miles from Newport. Their lines extended from Coddington's Cove to Easton's Beach, the whole distance being defended by breastworks and redoubts. Beside this they had a second line, nearer the town, extending from the west of the North Mill, down to the Gibbs Farm, formerly owned by Nicholas Easton.

On the twenty-second two other batteries were opened by the Americans, which greatly annoyed the enemy. A bomb-battery was also begun; and, on the twenty-fifth, a third approach in front, and to the right of the lower batteries, was also commenced.¹

In the mean time, on the twentieth, the fleet under Count D'Estaing anchored off Newport, and the most earnest endeavors were made to secure the co-operation of the French forces, even for two days, but in vain. Offended at the prompt movements of General Sullivan, and harassed by the jealousies of his own subordinates, who let no opportunity to make trouble pass unemployed, he determined to sail for Boston; and, on the twenty-second, he left Newport for that port.² A universal clamor was raised against the French, and the ingenuity of the commander-in-chief, and of the cooler and more judicious part of the community, was severely taxed to counteract the effects of the outcry.³ Large numbers of the militia and volunteers left the camp immediately after the departure of the fleet, and General Sullivan's situation was rendered exceedingly critical.⁴ About the same time information had been sent by the commander-in-chief, that Sir Henry Clinton was on his way,

with four thousand troops, to reinforce General Pigot, and a retreat was considered necessary.¹

On the twenty-sixth, the erection of new works was discontinued, and all the spare heavy artillery and baggage were sent off the island.² On the twenty-eighth a Council of War was held, when it was resolved to fall back to the high grounds on the north end of the island, fortify the camp, open a communication with the main, and await the return of a messenger who should be sent to Boston to ascertain if the fleet would return to Rhode Island and assist in the operations against the common enemy; the Marquis Lafayette, by request of the general officers, undertaking that mission.³

Between nine and ten o'clock the same night, the army began to move with great order and regularity, carrying with it all its baggage, stores, &c., and it reached its new position at three in the morning.⁴ With so much regularity and silence was this retreat conducted, that it was daybreak the next morning before the enemy discovered it, when immediate steps were taken to annoy the fugitives on their march.⁵

Major-general Prescott was ordered to detach a regiment towards the left flank of the deserted lines, and a part

¹ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Peterson's R. I., p. 225; Heath's Mem., pp. 191, 192.

² Marshall's Washington, iii. pp. 539-543; Peterson's R. I., p. 226; Gordon, iii. pp. 161-164; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 90.—³ Gordon, iii. p. 164; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., pp. 248, 249.—⁴ Peterson's R. I., p. 226; Gordon, iii. p. 164; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 249; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 90; Heath, p. 192

¹ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 547.—² Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Gordon, iii. p. 165.

³ Peterson's R. I., p. 227; Gordon, iii. pp. 165, 166; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 91.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 165.

⁵ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 545; Stedman, ii. p. 36.

of Brown's Provincial corps (Tories) was ordered to take possession of the works. Brigadier-general Smith, with the Twenty-second and Forty-third regiments, and the flank companies of the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fourth regiments, was ordered to pursue the Americans by way of the East road; and the Hessian Major-general, Losberg, with the regiments of chasseurs, Voit, and Seaboth, was ordered on a similar duty on the West road.¹

At about seven in the morning, of the twenty-ninth, the Americans were aroused by the report of a brisk fire between their outposts and the advanced parties of the enemy, who had pushed forward in the pursuit to the American lines.² A council of general officers was immediately held, and General Greene urged the propriety of marching out to meet the enemy, while his forces were divided, and before reinforcements from the enemy's lines could reach them. Unfortunately, as appears to us, this opinion was overruled, and the light troops only were sent out to skirmish and harass the enemy—Colonel Henry B. Livingston, of New York, taking the East road, and Colonel John Laurens, of South Carolina, the West.³ Each was obliged to give way, was reinforced, and, in his turn, repulsed the enemy. Reinforce-

ments were ordered from the enemy's lines,—General Smith, on the East road, receiving the Fifty-fourth (British) regiment, the Hessian regiment of Huyn, and part of Brown's Provincial corps; and Fanning's corps of New York provincials were dispatched to support General Losberg, on the West road—and the American skirmishers, in their turn, were obliged to give way.¹ Advancing towards the position occupied by the Americans, who were formed in order of battle, General Smith met the command of the sturdy old seaman, General John Glover, received at his hands a severe defeat, and fell back to the high ground known as Quaker Hill.² General Losberg took possession of two small redoubts, which had been cast up to cover the retreat, on Turkey Hill, and several severe skirmishes between the two armies occurred during the day.³

The following night intelligence was received that Count D'Estaing could render no immediate relief, and a farther retreat was immediately resolved on.⁴ The close proximity of the enemy's outposts rendered it necessary to use great caution to prevent discovery; but the practical experience of General Glover, whose passages of the army from Brooklyn in August, 1776, and across the Delaware in December of the same

¹ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.

² Gordon, iii. p. 165; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 91.

Peterson (*Rhode Island*, p. 227) says this outpost was in ambush behind a stone wall, which extended from the west a little to the north of Sampson Sherman's house.

³ Gordon, iii. p. 165.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 166; Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Ramsay's Am. Rev. ii. p. 91.

² Peterson's R. I., p. 228; Gordon, iii. p. 166.

³ Gen. Pigot's dispatch, Aug. 31, Doc. II.; Peterson's R. I., p. 228; Gordon, iii. pp. 166, 167; Heath's Mem., pp. 192, 193.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 168.

year, are well known, was again made available. A number of tents were pitched in sight of the enemy, and the whole army was employed in throwing up intrenchments, while the baggage, stores, &c., were sent over the bay to the main land. At dark the tents were struck, the light baggage and troops passed down, and before midnight the main body was safely landed at Bristol.¹ General Lafayette, expecting that an engagement would ensue, had ridden to Boston (near seventy miles) in seven hours, and returned in six and a half, in order to be present with his command; and he reached the lines in season to bring off the pickets and cover the retreat of the army, which was so well done that "not a man was left behind nor the smallest article lost."²

In the engagement near Quaker Hill the loss of the Americans was thirty

¹ Peterson's R. I., pp. 228, 229; Gordon, iii. p. 168; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 92. Marshall (iii. p. 548) says the army passed over to Tiverton.

² Gordon, iii. p. 168; Peterson's R. I., p. 229.

killed, one hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and forty-four missing;¹ that of the enemy is reported to have been thirty-eight killed, two hundred and ten wounded, and twelve missing.

At this distance of time, a careful examination of the facts fully exonerate the Count D'Estaing from blame in not returning to Newport, notwithstanding his absence was the cause of the failure of the expedition. It appears that his instructions required him to retire to Boston in case of misfortune; that his officers unanimously protested against his return as a violation of those instructions; that notwithstanding his supposed affronts, he offered to march from Boston at the head of his forces, and place himself and them under the orders of General Sullivan; and to do any thing, which was not in violation of his orders, for the promotion of the object for which the expedition had been organized.

¹ Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Doc. I.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GENERAL SULLIVAN'S DISPATCH TO CONGRESS.

HEAD-QUARTERS, TIVERTON, Aug. 31, 1778.

ESTEEMED SIR:—Upon the Count D'Estaing's finding himself under a necessity of going to Boston to repair the loss he sustained in the late gale of wind, I thought it best to carry on my approaches with as much vigor as possible against Newport, that no time might be lost in making the attack upon the return of his fleet, or any part of it, to co-operate with us. I had sent expresses to the Count to hasten his return, which I had no doubt would at least bring part of his fleet to us in a few days. Our batteries played upon the enemy's works for several days with apparent good success, as the enemy's fire from the outworks visibly grew weaker, and they began to abandon some of those next us; and on the 27th we found they had removed their cannon from all the outworks except one. The town of Newport is defended by two lines, supported by several redoubts connected with the lines. The first of these lines extends from a large Pond called Easton Pond, near to Tomminy Hill, and then turns off to the water, on the north side of Windmill Hill: this line was defended by five redoubts in front. The second line is more than a quarter of a mile within this, and extends from the sea to the north side of the island, terminating at the north battery: on the south, at the entrance by Easton's Beach, where this line terminates, is a redoubt which commands the pass, and has another redoubt about twenty rods on the north. There are a number of small works interspersed between the lines, which render an attack extremely hazardous on the land side, without a naval force

to co-operate with it. I, however, should have attempted carrying the works by storm, as soon as I found they had withdrawn their cannon from their outworks, had I not found, to my great surprise, that the volunteers, which composed great part of my army, had returned, and reduced my numbers to little more than that of the enemy; between two and three thousand returned in the course of twenty-four hours, and others were still going off, upon a supposition that nothing could be done before the return of the fleet. Under these circumstances, and the apprehension of the arrival of an English fleet, with a reinforcement to relieve the garrison, I sent away all the heavy articles that could be spared from the army to the main; also a large party was detached to get the works in repair on the north end of the island, to throw up some additional ones, and put in good repair the batteries at Tiverton and Bristol, to secure a retreat in case of necessity. On the 28th a council was called, in which it was unanimously determined to remove to the north end of the island, fortify our camp, secure our communication with the main, and hold our ground on the island till we could know whether the French fleet would soon return to our assistance.

On the evening of the 28th we moved, with our stores and baggage, which had not been previously sent forward, and about two in the morning encamped on Bull's Hill, with our right extending to the West road, and left to the East road; the flanking and covering parties still farther towards the water on right and left. One regiment was posted in a redoubt advanced off the right of the first line; Colonel Henry B. Livingston, with a light corps, consisting of Colonel Jackson's detachment, and a

detachment from the army, was stationed in the East road. Another light corps, under command of Colonel Laurens, Colonel Fleury, and Major Talbot, was posted on the West road. These corps were posted near three miles in front; in the rear of these was the picket of the army, commanded by Colonel Wade. The enemy, having received intelligence of our movement, came out early in the morning with nearly their whole force, in two columns, advanced in the two roads, and attacked our light corps; they made a brave resistance, and were supported for some time by the picket. I ordered a regiment to support Colonel Livingston, another to support Colonel Laurens, and, at the same time, sent them orders to retire to the main army in the best order they could. They kept up a retreating fire upon the enemy, and retired in excellent order to the main army. The enemy advanced on our left very near, but were repulsed by General Glover. They then retired to Quaker Hill. The Hessian column formed on a chain of hills running northward from Quaker Hill. Our army was drawn up, the first line in front of the works on Bull's Hill, the second in rear of the hill, and the reserve near a creek, and near half a mile in rear of the first line. The distance between those hills is about one mile. The ground between the hills is meadow-land, interspersed with trees and small copse of wood. The enemy began a cannonade upon us about nine in the morning, which was returned with double force. Skirmishing continued between the advanced parties until near ten o'clock, when the enemy's two ships-of-war and some small armed vessels having gained our right flank and began a fire, the enemy bent their whole force that way, and endeavored to turn our right under cover of the ship's fire, and to take the advanced redoubt on the right. They were twice driven back in great confusion; but a third trial was made with greater numbers and with more resolution, which, had it not been for the timely aid sent forward, would have succeeded. A sharp contest of near an hour ensued, in which the cannon from both armies, placed on the hills, played briskly in support of their own party. The enemy were at length routed, and fled in great

confusion to the hill where they first formed, and where they had artillery and some works to cover them, leaving their dead and wounded in considerable numbers behind them. It was impossible to ascertain the number of dead on the field, as it could not be approached by either party without being exposed to the cannon of the other army. Our party recovered about twenty of their wounded, and took near sixty prisoners, according to the best accounts I have been able to collect; among the prisoners is a lieutenant of grenadiers. The number of their dead I have not been able to ascertain, but know them to be very considerable. An officer informs me, that in one place he counted sixty of their dead. Colonel Campbell came out the next day to gain permission to view the field of action, to search for his nephew, who was killed by his side, whose body he could not get off, as they were closely pursued. The firing of artillery continued through the day, the musketry with intermission of six hours. The heat of the action continued near an hour, which must have ended in the ruin of the British army, had not their redoubts on the hill covered them from farther pursuit. We were about to attack them in their lines, but the men having had no rest the night before, and nothing to eat either that night or the day of the action, and having been in constant action through most of the day, it was not thought advisable, especially as their position was exceedingly strong, and their numbers fully equal, if not superior, to ours. Not more than fifteen hundred of my troops have ever been in action before. I should before have taken possession of the hill they occupied, and fortified it; but it is no defense against an enemy coming from the south part of the island, though exceedingly good against an enemy advancing from the north end towards the town, and had been fortified by the enemy for that purpose.

I have the pleasure to inform Congress that no troops could possibly show more spirit than those of ours which were engaged. Col. Livingston, and all the officers of the light corps, behaved with remarkable spirit. Colonels Laurens, Fleury, and Major Talbot, with the officers of that corps, behaved with great gallantry.

The brigades of the first line, Varum's, Glover's, Cornell's, and Greene's, behaved with great firmness. Major-general Greene, who commanded in the attack on the right, did himself the highest honor, by the judgment and bravery exhibited in the action. One brigade only of the second line was brought to action, commanded by Brigadier-general Lovell; he, and his brigade of militia, behaved with great resolution. Colonel Crane, and the officers of the artillery, deserve the highest praise. I inclose Congress a return of the killed, wounded, and missing on our side, and beg leave to assure them that, from my own observation, the enemy's loss must be much greater. Our army retired to camp after the action; the enemy employed themselves in fortifying their camp through the night.

In the morning of the 30th I received a letter from his Excellency General Washington, giving me notice that Lord Howe had again sailed with the fleet; and receiving intelligence at the same time that a fleet was off Block Island, and also a letter from Boston, informing me that the Count D'Estaing could not come round so soon as I expected, a council was called, and, as we could have no prospect of operating against Newport with success without the assistance of a fleet, it was unanimously agreed to quit the island until the return of the French squadron.

To make a retreat in the face of an enemy, equal, if not superior, in number, and cross a river, without loss, I knew was an arduous task, and seldom accomplished if attempted. As our sentries were within two hundred yards of each other, I knew it would require the greatest care and attention. To cover my design from the enemy, I ordered a number of tents to be brought forward and pitched in sight of the enemy, and almost the whole army to employ themselves in fortifying the camp. The heavy baggage and stores were falling back and crossing through the day; at dark, the tents were struck, the light baggage and troops passed down; and before twelve o'clock the main army had crossed with the stores and baggage. The Marquis de Lafayette arrived about eleven in the evening from Boston, where he had been by request of the general officers, to solicit the

speedy return of the fleet. He was sensibly mortified that he was out of action; and that he might not be out of the way in case of action, he had rode from hence to Boston in seven hours, and returned in six and a half, the distance near seventy miles. He returned time enough to bring off the pickets and other parties which covered the retreat of the army, which he did in excellent order; not a man was left behind, nor the smallest article lost.

I hope my conduct through this expedition may merit the approbation of Congress. Major Morris, one of my aids, will have the honor of delivering this to your Excellency. I must beg leave to recommend him to Congress as an officer who, in the last, as well as several other actions, has behaved with great spirit and good conduct, and doubt not, Congress will take such notice of him as his long service and spirited conduct deserves.

I have the honor to be, dear sir, with much esteem, your Excellency's most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN SULLIVAN.

P. S.—The event has proved how timely my retreat took place, as one hundred sail of the enemy's ships arrived in the harbor the morning after the retreat. I should do the highest injustice if I neglected to mention that Brigadier-general Cornell's indefatigable industry in preparing for the expedition, and his good conduct through the whole, merits particular notice. Major Talbot, who assisted in preparing the boats, afterwards served in Colonel Laurens' corps, deserves great praise.

JOHN SULLIVAN.

A return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of the Honorable Major-general Sullivan, in the action of the 29th August, 1778.

Killed.—4 subalterns, 3 sergeants, 23 rank and file.

Wounded.—2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 captain, 8 subalterns, 13 sergeants, 113 rank and file.

Missing.—2 sergeants, 42 rank and file.

Total.—211.

Published by order of Congress,

CHARLES THOMSON, *Secretary.*

II.

GENERAL PIGOT'S DISPATCH TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

NEWPORT, R. I., *August 31, 1778.*

Though by several letters since the 29th of July last, more especially by that I had the honor of writing by Lieutenant-colonel Stuart, and the accuracy of his intelligence, your Excellency will have been informed of the state of affairs here to the 28th instant; yet, as many of those letters, from the uncertainty of the communication, may not have reached you, a summary of the transactions since the 29th of July, when the French fleet arrived, to the last period, will not be unnecessary, and may help to explain subsequent events.

From the first appearance of the fleet to the 8th instant, our utmost exertions were directed to removing to places of security, the provisions, ammunition, military and naval stores, which were either on board ship or on the wharves, preparing a fortified camp, and disposing every thing for resisting the combined attacks of the French and rebels upon us; and I immediately withdrew, from Conanticut, Brown's Provincial corps and two regiments of Anspach, which had been stationed there. The next morning the guns on the Beaver-tail and Dumplin batteries, the former of which were directed with some effect against two line-of-battle ships that entered the Narraganset Passage, were rendered unserviceable, as the fleet entering the harbor would cut off all communication with that island; of which the French admiral soon took a temporary possession, and landed the marines of his squadron. During this period, from the movements of the French ships in the Seaconet on the 30th, the King Fisher and two galleys were obliged to be set on fire; and afterwards, on the 5th instant, the four advanced frigates, from the approach of two of the enemy's line-of-battle ships from the Narraganset, were likewise destroyed, after saving some of their stores and securing the landing of the seamen. When it was evident the French fleet were coming into the harbor, it became necessary to collect our forces, and withdraw the troops from the

north parts of the island, which was accordingly done that evening. I likewise ordered all the cattle on the island to be driven within our lines, leaving only one cow with each family, and every carriage and intrenching tool to be secured, as the only measures that could be devised to distress the rebels, and impede their progress.

On the 8th instant, at noon, the French fleet (which, from its first appearance, had continued, with little variation, at anchor about three miles from the mouth of the harbor) got under way, and standing in under a light sail, kept up a warm fire on Brenton's Point, Goat Island, and the North Batteries, which were manned by seamen of the destroyed frigates, and commanded by Captain Christian and Lieutenants Forrest and Otway, of the navy, who returned the fire with great spirit, and in a good direction. The last of these works had been previously strengthened, and some transports sunk in its front, as an effectual measure to block up the passage between it and Rose Island.

The next morning we had the pleasure to see the English fleet, and I immediately sent on board to communicate to Lord Howe our situation and that of the enemy. By nine o'clock the following day the French fleet repassed our batteries, and sailed out of the harbor, firing on them as before, and having it returned with equal spirit on our side. By this cannonade from the ships, on both days, very fortunately not one man was hurt, or any injury done, except to some houses in town.

I shall now proceed to inform your Excellency of the movements of the enemy from the 9th instant, when they landed at Howland's Ferry.

The badness of the weather for some days must have prevented their transporting of stores, or being in readiness to approach us, as they did not make their appearance near us until the 14th, when a large body took possession of Honyman's Hill. To repel any attempts from that quarter, a breastwork was directed to be made along the heights from Green-end to Irish's redoubt, which was strengthened by an abatis.

On the 17th the enemy was discovered breaking ground on Honyman's Hill, on the summit

of which, and on the right of the Green-end road, they were constructing a battery. The next day another was commenced by them for five guns, to their left, and in a direct line with the former, which was prepared for four. On this day a line of approach was likewise begun by them, from the battery on the right to Green-end road, which works we endeavored to obstruct by keeping a continual fire on them. The 19th, the enemy opened their left battery, which obliged our encampment to be removed farther in the rear. This day we began another line, for the greater security of our left, from Irish's redoubt to Fomini Hill; and I directed a battery of one twenty-four and two eighteen-pounders to be raised on our right breastwork, to counteract those of the enemy, which was opened the following day, when they were observed busied in forming a second approach from the first, to a nearer distance on the road.

At noon the French fleet again came in view, much disabled, and anchored off the port, where it continued till the 22d, when it finally disappeared.

This day the rebels were constructing two other batteries, much lower down the hill than the former, one on the right for five, the other, on the left of Green Hill road, for seven guns, both which were opened the next day, when I found it necessary to attempt silencing them, and therefore ordered a battery for seven heavy guns on commanding ground, near Green-end, which, from the obstructions given by the enemy's fire, could not be completed till the 25th, when the rebels thought proper to close the embrasures of their lower batteries, and make use of them for mortars. During this time they had been constructing on the height of the East road another, for one of thirteen inches, and this day began a third approach in front, and to the right of the lower batteries.

The 26th, observing the enemy to discontinue their works, and learning from deserters they were removing the officers' baggage and heavy artillery, I detached Lieutenant-colonel Bruce, with one hundred men of the Fifty-fourth regiment, in the night, over Easton's Beach, in quest of intelligence, who, with great address, surprised and brought off a picket of

two officers and twenty-five men, without any loss. Some of Colonel Fanning's corps, at different times, exerted themselves in taking off people from the enemy's advanced posts; but little intelligence to be depended upon was ever obtained from them; nor were other attempts to procure it more efficacious, as from all that could be learned, it was doubtful whether their intentions were to attack our lines or retreat.

On the 27th, the *Sphynx* and two other ships of war arrived; and I had the honor of being informed by Colonel Stuart of your Excellency's intention to reinforce this post.

On the following day the *Vigilant* galley took a station to cover the left flank of our army; and at ten o'clock that night the rebels made an attempt to surprise a subaltern's picket from the Anspach corps, but were repulsed, after killing one man and wounding two others.

The 29th, at break of day, it was perceived that the enemy had retreated during the night, upon which Major-general Prescott was ordered to detach a regiment from the second line under his command, over Easton's Beach, towards the left flank of the enemy's encampment, and a part of Brown's corps was directed to take possession of their works. At the same time Brigadier-general Smith was detached with the Twenty-second and Forty-third regiments, and the flank companies of the Thirty-eighth and Fifty-fourth by the East road. Major-general Losberg marching by the West road with the Hessian chasseurs and the Anspach regiments of Voit and Seaboth, in order, if possible, to annoy them in their retreat; and upon receiving a report from General Smith that the rebels made a stand, and were in force upon Quaker's Hill, I ordered the Fifty-fourth and Hessian regiment of Hnyn, with part of Brown's corps to sustain him; but before they could arrive, the perseverance of General Smith, and the spirited behavior of the troops, had gained possession of the strong post on Quaker's Hill, and obliged the enemy to retire to their works at the north end of the island. On hearing a smart fire from the chasseurs engaged on the West road, I dispatched Colonel Fanning's corps of provincials to join General Losberg, who obliged the rebels

to quit two redoubts made to cover their retreat, drove them before him, and took possession of Turkey Hill. Towards evening, an attempt being made by the rebels to surround and cut off the chasseurs, who were advancing on the left, the regiments of Fanning and Huyn were ordered up to their support; and, after a smart engagement with the enemy, obliged them to retreat to their main body on Windmill Hill.

After these actions, the enemy took post in great numbers on Windmill Hill, and employed

themselves in strengthening that advantageous situation.

This night the troops lay on their arms on the ground they had gained, and directions were given for bringing up the camp equipage. Artillery was likewise sent for, and preparations made to remove the rebels from the redoubts; but by means of the great number of boats, they retreated in the night of the 30th over Bristol and Howland's Ferry; thus relinquishing every hold on the island, and resigning to us its entire possession.

CHAPTER XL.

AUGUST 8 TO AUGUST 20, 1778.

THE SIEGE OF FORT BOONE.

In a former chapter the early settlements of Kentucky have been referred to, and the troubles with the Indians have also been made the subject of remark.¹

The unsuccessful attacks on the settlements at Harrodsburg, Logan's Fort, and Boonesborough, have been noticed;² and a second attack on the latter post had also proved unsuccessful.³ Daniel Boone, with twenty-seven men, had been captured by the Indians and carried to Chillicothe; from whence they were afterwards carried by the savages to Governor Hamilton, the British commandant at Detroit.⁴ Leaving the men at Detroit, Boone was afterwards carried back to Chillicothe, adopted into the Shawnee nation, and remained with them until the sixteenth of June, 1778, when he effected his escape, reaching Boonesborough on the twentieth, after a journey of one hundred and sixty miles, during which he ate but one meal,⁵ which he had concealed in his blanket.⁶

This desire to escape was hastened by the sight of four hundred and fifty warriors, ready to march against Boonesborough¹—his home, where, as he supposed, his wife and children were finding shelter; and the successful attempt produced a delay, on the part of the savages, before they started out on the expedition.

At the time referred to, Boonesborough was one of the fortified posts on the frontiers of civilization, and was designed to afford shelter to the surrounding settlers and their families, in case of any invasion by the Indians or British. It was situated on the site of the village of that name, on the south side of the Kentucky River, in Madison county, about thirty-six miles, in a direct course, southeast from Frankfort. It was built of logs, forming a parallelogram about two hundred and sixty feet long by one hundred and fifty feet wide, with one of its angles on the bank of the river near the water.²

¹ Chap. XIX.—² Ibid.—³ McClung's Sketches of Western Adventure, pp. 57, 58.—⁴ Boone's Narrative, appended to Filson's Kentucky.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 58.

¹ Boone's Narrative; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 58; Butler's Kentucky, p. 96. McClung (p. 60) says "one hundred and fifty," but the larger number appears to be well sustained.

² Collins' Hist. Sketches of Kentucky, p. 419.

When Boone reached the fort, the necessity of his presence was manifest in the neglect and insecurity of the works on which the settlers depended for protection. The people, suspecting no danger, had left for the pursuit of their ordinary avocations, and allowed the works at the fort to go to waste; his wife, supposing he had been killed, had returned to her father's house in North Carolina, taking with her her children and property; and the cattle and horses were wandering through the woods and river-bottom, uncared for and unattended.¹ Sensible of the importance of immediate action, he called in the garrison, and new gates, new flanks, and new bastions were soon completed; the stock was collected and brought into the fort; stores and ammunition were provided; parties were sent out to harass the enemy; and other steps were taken to secure the post and the neighborhood.²

At length, on the eighth day of August,³ the mixed array appeared before the fort, and, with British and French colors flying,⁴ in the name of the King of Great Britain,⁵ demanded its surrender,⁶ threatening "the hatch-

et" in case of refusal.¹ The enemy numbered four hundred and forty-four Indians, commanded by Captain Duquesne, eleven other French Canadians, and their own chiefs;² while the garrison numbered less than fifty men.³ To the summons, Captain Boone delayed giving an answer, and two days were given for consideration, during which time the preparations for defence were completed.⁴ Before the expiration of the term allowed, the garrison assembled to consider the subject, but the council was a short one, all present entertaining the same views and advising the same answer—"We are determined to defend our fort as long as a man of us lives." When this answer was given to the enemy, Captain Boone added, "We laugh at all your formidable preparations, but thank you for giving us notice and time to provide for our defence. Your efforts will not prevail, for our gates shall forever deny you admittance."⁵

On the receipt of this answer, Captain Duquesne stated that his orders, from Governor Hamilton, were to take the garrison captive and not to destroy it;⁶ and he proposed that nine of the garrison should go out of the fort to treat with him, when he would withdraw his force and return home peaceably.⁷ To this remarkable proposition,

¹ Boone's Narrative, in Filson; McClung, p. 60.

² Boone's Narrative; McClung, p. 60.

³ McClung, p. 60; Butler's Kentucky, p. 97; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 59; Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 350. Mr. Collins (*Hist. Sketches of Kentucky*, p. 420) and Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 493) say the attack was made on the ninth of September, but I prefer the authorities cited above, and have adopted the date mentioned by them.—⁴ Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 350; Butler's Kentucky, p. 97. McClung and Collins only refer to the British colors.—⁵ Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 350; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 59.—⁶ Ibid.

¹ McClung, p. 61; Collins, p. 420.—² Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 350.—³ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 60.

⁴ Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 350.—⁵ Ibid.; McClung, pp. 61, 62; Butler's Kentucky, p. 97; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 60.—⁶ McClung, p. 62; Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 351.—⁷ Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 351; Marshall, i. p. 60.

indicating a premeditated surprise, Captain Boone gave as remarkable an assent,¹ and, with eight of his associates, proceeded some sixty yards outside of the fort to treat for peace, in open violation of what was known and acknowledged to be the orders received from the British commander at Detroit.² The articles, having been discussed and agreed to, they were duly signed, when the Indians claimed the privilege of shaking hands, as evidence of their good-will. It was observed, however, that two stalwart savages approached each white man, one taking each hand. Still the usually cautious settlers appear to have entertained no suspicions of treachery, until each found himself firmly grappled by his newly formed friends, with all the savage host surrounding and supporting them. With desperate energy, worthy of their renown, each threw his custodians from him, rushed from the inclosure, and made his way back to the fort, through a heavy fire—all, except one, who was slightly wounded, reaching it in safety.³

Mortified at the result of this expedient, the enemy immediately opened a constant and heavy fire on the fort; and day and night, for nine days, the siege was continued.⁴

At one time the enemy began to un-

dermine the fort, beginning at the bank of the river, sixty yards distant. Perceiving his object, the garrison immediately dug a deep trench, within the walls, and proceeded to countermine, throwing the clay outside the fort. Discovering from this movement the determination of the garrison to adhere to its first resolution, and to defend the position to the last extremity, on the twentieth of August, Captain Duquesne and his savage command raised the siege and disappeared in the woods.¹

After the enemy had retired, one hundred and twenty-five pounds of bullets were picked up on the field, besides those which had entered the logs of the fort. Of the garrison, two men were killed and four wounded; of the enemy, thirty-seven were killed, besides great numbers who were wounded and carried away.²

Thus ended the last siege of Boone's Fort, or Boonesborough, a scene which “exhibits a striking instance of the impotency of physical force while destitute of knowledge and the arts. For what military enterprise could have been easier, to men knowing only how to make ladders, than scaling a wall of stockades twelve feet high, or mounting cabin roofs not even so high, when their numbers were six times greater than those within?”³

¹ McClung (pp. 62, 63) discusses, in appropriate terms, the peculiarity of this negotiation.—² Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 351; Marshall's Kentucky, pp. 60, 61.

³ McClung, p. 63; Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 351; Butler's Kentucky, p. 98; Collins' Kentucky, p. 421; Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 60, 61.—⁴ Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 351; Collins' Kentucky, p. 421.

¹ Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 351; McClung, p. 64; Marshall's Kentucky, i. pp. 61, 62.

² Boone's Narrative, in Filson, p. 351; Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 62; Butler's Kentucky, p. 99.

³ Marshall's Kentucky, i. p. 62.

DOCUMENT.

DANIEL BOONE.

Daniel Boone, the first white man who made a permanent settlement in Kentucky, was born in Bucks county, Pennsylvania, February 11, 1731. He is said to have descended from one of the first settlers of Maryland, but he was pre-eminently the architect of his own fortunes.

While he was yet young his father removed to Reading, in Pennsylvania, and afterwards, to one of the valleys of the Yadkin, in North Carolina. Of his early life, prior to his emigration to the wilderness in Kentucky, but little is known. He was always passionately fond of hunting, and it is probable he spent the first forty years of life in that pursuit.

In 1767 Findlay returned from his adventurous journey into the western wilderness, and the glowing accounts which he gave of the beauty and fertility of the newly explored valleys west of the mountains filled the mountain regions of North Carolina and Virginia with wonder, and the hardy settlers hastened still farther westward to enjoy the advantages which were offered in the new country. In 1769, in company with Findlay and four others, Daniel Boone also crossed the mountains; built his cabin on the bank of the Red River, in Kentucky; and, on the 22d December, was captured by the Indians, with one of his companions. After a captivity of seven days they escaped, but on returning to the encampment they found it dismantled and deserted—the last that has been heard from their more fortunate companions who escaped the Indians.

A series of hairbreadth adventures followed, resulting in the establishment of a settlement at Boonesborough, on the Kentucky River; and, on the twenty-fifth of September, 1771, having

sold his property in North Carolina, he removed his family to his new home, in company with several other families whom he had induced to join him. On their way they were attacked by the Indians, who killed or wounded six of their number, among the former of whom was Boone's eldest son. This so discouraged them, that the whole party fell back to the settlements on Clinch River, where they remained three years, during which time Boone was employed by Governor Dunmore, of Virginia, to conduct a party of surveyors through the wilderness to the falls of the Ohio, and in other situations of a similar character. He was also interested in the land purchased by Colonel Henderson, and accompanied an expedition to Kentucky, with that company, in 1775, reaching the Kentucky River, and founding Boonesborough on the first of April in that year. After several desperate engagements with the savages the fort was completed, and soon afterwards Boone removed his family to that place. Thenceforth Boone participated in all the exciting scenes with which the history of Kentucky abounds, a series of which are related in this chapter.

After the enemy had abandoned the assault on his fort, he returned to North Carolina for his family, to whom his appearance was as of one risen from the dead; and in November, 1780, he returned to Boonesborough. In 1782 he took part in the action at the Blue Licks,—probably the last of his adventures among the Indians.

Having suffered severe losses from imperfections in the titles of his lands, he appears to have been filled with disgust, and, in his old age, determined to seek a new home in the wilderness of Missouri, then under the dominion of the King of Spain. Here, in the society of his family and in the pursuit of his favorite occupa-

tion, he passed the last years of his life in peace, and died at the house of his son, in Flanders, Calloway county, Missouri, September 26, 1820, in the ninetieth year of his age.

"He united, in an eminent degree, the qualities of shrewdness, caution, and courage, with uncommon muscular strength. He was seldom surprised, he never shrank from danger, nor cowered beneath the pressure of exposure and fatigue. In every emergency he was a safe guide and a wise counsellor, because his movements were conducted with the utmost circumspection, and his judgment and penetration were proverbially accurate. Powerless to originate plans on a large scale, no individual among the pioneers could execute with more efficiency and success the designs of others. He took the lead in no expedition against the savages; he disclosed no liberal and enlarged views of policy for the protection of the stations; and yet it is not assuming too much to say, that without him,

in all probability, the settlements could not have been upheld, and the conquest of Kentucky might have been reserved for the emigrants of the nineteenth century. His manners were simple and unobtrusive, exempt from the rudeness characteristic of the backwoodsman. In his person there was nothing remarkably striking. He was five feet ten inches in height, and of robust and powerful proportions. His countenance was mild and contemplative, indicating a frame of mind altogether different from the restlessness and activity that distinguished him. His ordinary habiliments were those of a hunter—a hunting-shirt and moccasins uniformly composing a part of them. When he emigrated to Louisiana, he omitted to secure the title to a princely estate on the Missouri, because it would have cost him the trouble of a trip to New Orleans. He died, as he had lived, in a cabin, and perhaps his trusty rifle was the most valuable of his chattels."

CHAPTER XLI.

September 27, 1778.

THE MASSACRE OF COL. BAYLOR'S TROOPS AT TAPPAN.

THE action near Freehold had been followed by the retreat of Sir Henry Clinton, with a great loss of men from desertion, to the city of New York;¹ while General Washington also continued his march to the Hudson River, and finally to the White Plains, where he encamped.² The French fleet, under the command of Count D'Estaing, had sailed for Boston for repairs; and Sir Henry Clinton was preparing expeditions to the West Indies and to Florida, from the city of New York.³

During this time, with the activity which naturally prevails while two expeditions are being organized, the intentions of Sir Henry Clinton were kept secret, and General Washington was considerably perplexed in his endeavors to guard against them.⁴ It was supposed, by some, that Boston was the object, and General Washington disposed his forces in such a manner that they could be speedily moved either to the South or East, as circum-

stances might warrant.¹ Sir Henry Clinton, taking advantage of these movements, immediately detached powerful foraging parties into Eastern New Jersey and Westchester county, which not only ravaged these districts, but threatened the passes in the Highlands.² That on the west bank of the Hudson was commanded by General Cornwallis, while that in Westchester county was under General Knyphausen.³

Notwithstanding the great strength of these foraging parties, General Washington understood their object, and small parties of troops were disposed at proper distances to check their movements.⁴ One of these parties, commanded by General Wayne, took a position in front of Lord Cornwallis, west of the Hudson; a part of it, composed of New Jersey militia, under General Wind, being quartered in the village of New Tappan, in Rockland county, New York; the remainder, a

¹ Sparks' Washington, p. 277.—² Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 525.—³ Sparks' Washington, pp. 280, 281.

⁴ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 563.

¹ Irving's Washington, iii. pp. 471, 472; Sparks, p. 282.

² Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 563; Sparks' Washington, p. 282.—³ Irving's Washington, iii. p. 472; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 563; Gordon, iii. pp. 193, 194.

⁴ Marshall, iii. p. 563.

regiment of light-horse, known as "*Mrs. Washington's Guards*," under Lieutenant-colonel Baylor, was cantoned at Old Tappan, or Harrington, near the Hackensack River, about two and a half miles southwest from the main body.¹

Lord Cornwallis having been informed of the exposed situation of these parties, took immediate steps to cut them off.² For this purpose the Seventy-first regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, and the Queen's Rangers, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, were detached from General Knyphausen's command, with orders to cross the Hudson River at Dobbs' Ferry, and attack the militia at New Tappan; while a detachment from Lord Cornwallis' command, composed of the Second light-infantry, the Second battalion of grenadiers, and the Thirty-third and Sixty-fourth regiments,³ under General Grey, the hero of the Paoli massacre, was ordered to move from the New Bridge, at nine in the evening, against Colonel Baylor's light-horse.⁴

The boats which had been ordered from New York did not reach Yonkers until three hours after the appointed

time, and Colonel Campbell's command, which was to cross the river from Colonel Phillips' house to Sneden's Landing (*Dobbs' Ferry*), was unsuccessful,¹ the militia having received information of the expedition from a deserter, and changed its position, without giving any notice to Colonel Baylor.²

The command of General Grey, guided by the Tories of the neighborhood,³ approached the rear of Colonel Baylor, and was eminently successful. A sergeant's guard, of about a dozen men, which was stationed at a bridge over the Hackensack, where two roads meet, a short distance from the quarters, was butchered in cold blood,⁴ as the sentries at Hancock's Bridge had been butchered a few weeks before,⁵ and the quarters of the defenceless men were speedily and silently surrounded.⁶ The success of the affair at Paoli had taught General Grey the importance of silence, and his relentless spirit gloated over the advantage which the bayonet had gained on that memorable night. He did not fail, therefore, to renew his orders for the removal of the flints and the drawing of the charges from the guns of his men;⁷ and, with the bayonet alone, he ordered the work

¹ Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of New Jersey, pp. 78, 79; Irving's Washington, iii. p. 472; Marshall, iii. p. 564. Dr. Gordon says (iii. p. 194) that Baylor quartered at a distance, in order that he might not be under the command of Wind.

² Irving, iii. pp. 472, 473; Gordon, iii. p. 194.

³ Gaines' N. Y. Mercury, No. 1407, Oct. 5, 1778.

⁴ Gen. Wayne to Col. Hartley, Doc. I.; Simcoe's Journal, p. 90; Irving, iii. p. 473; Marshall, iii. p. 564; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette, No. 1407, Oct. 5, 1778.

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 90; Marshall, iii. p. 564.

² Marshall, iii. p. 564; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 94.

² Gen. Wayne to Col. Hartley, Doc. I.; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 44, Trenton, Oct. 7, 1778.—⁴ Irving, iii. p. 473; Marshall, iii. p. 564; Gordon, iii. p. 194; Gaines' N. Y. Mercury, No. 1407, Oct. 5.—⁵ Vide p. 385.

⁶ Marshall, iii. p. 564; Gordon, iii. p. 194; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 94; Gaines' N. Y. Mercury, No. 1407, Oct. 5.—⁷ Gordon, iii. p. 195; Irving, iii. p. 473; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 94.

of destruction to commence, *without quarter*, upon the unsuspecting dragoons.¹

The parties who had been detached to the respective quarters of the troops rushed simultaneously to the attack, and bayoneted many before they could arise from their beds, amidst the most piteous cries for mercy. Naked and unarmed, "begging for compassion, being incapable of resistance," the light-horse were mercilessly butchered, thirty-seven alone escaping.² One of General Grey's captains, heeding the claims of humanity more than the orders of his

superior officer, spared the whole of the Fourth troop, and they were carried off prisoners.¹

Shortly after the close of this terrible scene, Colonel Campbell joined General Grey; and, soon afterwards, he penetrated farther into the country, collecting all the cattle he could find, and stripping the farmers of Rockland county of their means of support. In the evening of the same day the two commands returned to their respective encampments, exulting over their success in the diabolical mission in which they had been engaged.²

D O C U M E N T S.

I.

GEN. WAYNE'S LETTER TO COL. HARTLEY.

DEAR HARTLEY:—Your interesting address of the 2d ult. has been received. I should have been happy in sharing the few laurels that have offered with my friend and brother soldier; and, although fate destined you to make war in another quarter, it is not against a more savage foe.

It is with pain I am to inform you of the disaster of poor Colonel Baylor, and his regiment of light-dragoons.

A few days since the enemy made a descent on New Jersey, where that corps and other

troops were stationed. After drawing their attention to the front, near Hackensack, a large body of British troops landed at Dobbs' Ferry in the night, and by the aid and guidance of caitiff Tories, fell into the rear of Baylor, surprised him with his detachment consisting of upwards of one hundred men, in their beds, refused any quarter, and in cold blood most barbarously and mercilessly put to the bayonet, men naked and unarmed, begging for compassion, being incapable of resistance.

Among the dead is Major Clow, with several other officers. Colonel Baylor is yet alive, but supposed to be mortally wounded, having three stabs in his body. One officer, a captain, with ten men, was surrounded in the house where he was quartered, for the men were cantoned in different houses. He offered to surrender if they would give him quarter, which they per-

¹ Marshall, iii. p. 564; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 94; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 44, Trenton, Oct. 7, 1778; Gaines' N. Y. Mercury, No. 1409, Oct. 19, 1778.

² Gen. Wayne to Col. Hartley, Doc. I.; Sparks' Washington, p. 282; Gordon, iii. pp. 194, 195; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 94; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 44, Trenton, Oct. 7.

¹ Irving, iii. p. 473; Marshall, iii. p. 565; Gordon, iii. p. 195; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 95.

² Simcoe's Journal, p. 90.

emptorily refused, and ordered "the damned rebel" to be bayoneted. He had a pistol in his hand, which he fired in the face of the officer commanding the party, which opened the way for himself and his companions to escape. I cannot find that they gave quarter to any, though many are still alive, covered with wounds, who may yet survive to avenge the fate of their unfortunate comrades. This will be a severe stroke on the Ancient Dominion; as we have heard, which I sincerely hope may not turn out to be the fact, that several young fellows of family have fallen, among others, a Captain Fitzhugh.

The caitiff's retired with the utmost precipitation on hearing that a body of troops were in full march to return the compliment. The enemy have carefully avoided a general action, but they have taken every opportunity of striking our small parties, which, as in this instance, being masters of the water, they are enabled to facilitate.

I am, with every sentiment of esteem, your friend and most obedient humble servant,

ANTHONY WAYNE.

COLONEL HARTLEY.

II.

LORD CORNWALLIS' DISPATCH TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

NEW BRIDGE, September 28, 1778.

SIR:—Having received intelligence that a considerable body of militia and a regiment of light-dragoons were assembled in the neighborhood of Tappan, in order to interrupt our foraging, a plan was formed on the evening of the 27th for surprising them. Three deserters from the right column alarmed the militia, who were posted near New Tappan, by which means they made their escape; but the left column, commanded by Major-general Grey, were so fortunate as not to be discovered; and the Major-general conducted his march with so much order and so silently, and made so good a disposition to surround the village of Old Tappan, where the regiment of dragoons lay, that he entirely surprised them, and very few escaped be-

ing either killed or taken. He likewise fell in with a small party of militia, a few of whom were killed, and some taken prisoners. The whole loss on our side was one man killed, of the Second battalion of light-infantry, which corps had the principal share in this business, and behaved with their usual spirit and alacrity.

The Seventy-first regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, and the Queen's Rangers, under Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, who crossed the North River from Lieutenant-general Knyphausen's division, and were to have co-operated with the other columns, were prevented by the desertion of the three men before mentioned, from surprising a body of militia, who by that means took the alarm and made their escape.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
(Signed) CORNWALLIS.

III.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION AT TAPPAN, SUNDAY NIGHT, THE 27TH ULT.

[From H. Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Weekly Mercury, No. 1407, Monday, October 5, 1778.]

The Second battalion of light-infantry led the column, supported by the Second of grenadiers, with the Thirty-third and Sixty-fourth regiments; these, commanded by Major-general Grey, marched from the New Bridge at nine o'clock on Sunday evening, and between one and two in the morning arrived at the rebel cantonments; Major Straubenzie had been detached with six companies of the same battalion of light-infantry, the other six, under the Honorable Major Maitland, kept the road, by which manœuvres the enemy's patrol, consisting of a sergeant and about a dozen men, was entirely cut off. Major Straubenzie moved on with the Seventy-first light-company, and in a small village surprised a party of Virginia cavalry, styled "Mrs. Washington's Guards," consisting of more than a hundred, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Baylor, who, with Major McLeod and two other officers, upon forcing the door of a house, attempted to get up a large Dutch chimney;

the two former were mortally wounded, the third killed, the fourth made prisoner. From thence a part of Sir James Baird's company was detached to a barn where sixteen privates were lodged, who discharged ten or twelve pistols, and striking at the troops *sans effet* with their broadswords, nine of them were instantly bayoneted and seven received quarter.

Major Maitland's force coming up at that time attacked the remainder of the rebel detachment, lodged in several other barns, with such alertness as prevented all but three privates from making their escape. The troops lay on their arms till break of day, when, moving forward, the light-infantry fell in with a volunteer company of militia in a very thick wood and swamp. These gave one fire, which the Fortieth company, commanded by Captain Montgomery, returned, and drove off, leaving six dead, but afterwards, scampering across the road in front of a company of grenadiers, three more were killed by them. The light-infantry, in pursuing them up to Tappan, where they were entirely dispersed, took five prisoners, all of them wounded. The whole loss on this occasion, was one private of Second battalion light-infantry killed.

Upon entering the abovementioned house,

one of the rebel officers demanding the name of the corps which had attacked them, was answered, "The British Light-infantry;" on which he exclaimed, "Then we shall all be cut off."

[From the same paper, No. 1409, October 19, 1778.]

Among the officers who fell into the hands of the enemy in Colonel Baylor's late disaster, at Old Tappan, were Captain Swan, Doctor Evans, junior, surgeon, Lieutenant Randolph, and three cornets. Captain Stith being suddenly surrounded by the enemy's horse and foot, and seeing no probable way of getting off, called out for quarter; but they, contrary to the rules of war and every sentiment of humanity, refused his request, called him a *damned rebel*, and struck him over the head with a sword, which fired him with such indignation that he bravely fought his way through them, leaped over a fence, and escaped in a morass. Lieutenant Barrett got off on horseback; and Lieutenant Morrow, with a number of others, badly wounded and left on the field as dead, were next morning brought off by a party of the regiment, the remaining part of which is now commanded by Captain Stith. Several of those his party brought off are since dead of their wounds.

CHAPTER XLII.

September 27, 1778.

THE LOSS OF THE RALEIGH.

AT seven in the morning of Friday, the twenty-fifth of September, 1778, the United States frigate *Raleigh*, of thirty-two guns, commanded by Captain John Barry, sailed from Boston,¹ having a brig and a sloop under convoy.²

The wind was fresh at northwest, while the ship ran off to the east by south;³ and about eleven o'clock two strange ships were made at southeast by east, about fifteen miles distant, which gave her chase.⁴ The Raleigh immediately hauled her wind to the northward, and night coming on, the chase was lost sight of.⁵ At eight o'clock on the following morning⁶ (*Saturday, Sept. 26th*) the ships were again in sight, and continued the chase all day.⁷ At seven

o'clock on Sunday morning (*Sept. 27th*) the chase was discovered to windward, coming down on the Raleigh with all sail set, when the latter immediately hauled her wind, steering about north by west, which was also done by the enemy.¹

In the afternoon the enemy's leading ship overhauled the Raleigh; and at five o'clock the engagement commenced.² At the second fire, the Raleigh lost her foretop-mast³ and mizzen-topgallant-mast,⁴ which gave her opponent a great advantage in manœuvring, yet the battle raged furiously until night-fall, and the Raleigh "had the advantage."⁵ At this time the enemy's sternmost ship came up and engaged the Raleigh; and for half an hour longer the unequal conflict continued, when Captain Barry wore ship, and made for the shore, with the intention of running aground.⁶

¹ New Hampshire Gazette, No. 33, Portsmouth, Tuesday, Oct. 6, 1778; Letter from Naval Commissioners to Marine Committee, Oct 7 (see Doc.)

² N. H. Gazette, No. 34, Oct. 13, 1778.

³ Ibid. Mr. Cooper (*Naval Hist.*, i. p. 92) says she ran N. E.—⁴ N. H. Gazette, Nos. 33 and 34; Letter from Naval Commissioners (see Doc.)—⁵ N. H. Gazette, No. 33.

⁶ Mr. Cooper (*Naval Hist.*, i. p. 92) says the morning was hazy, and that it was noon before the vessels were seen. The N. H. Gazette, No. 34, speaks of the haze, but names nine or ten o'clock as the time when the ships were seen.—⁷ N. H. Gazette, No. 33.

¹ N. H. Gazette, No. 33.—² Ibid.—³ Naval Commissioners' letter (see Doc.)

⁴ N. H. Gazette, No. 34.

⁵ Naval Commissioners' letter (see Doc.); N. H. Gazette, No. 34.—⁶ Naval Commissioners' letter (see Doc.); N. H. Gazette, No. 33.

Unfortunately, the enemy followed, and a running fight continued until two o'clock in the morning¹ (*Monday, Sept. 28th*), when the chase was shaken off, and the *Raleigh* succeeded in reaching the land.

It is said she ran aground on Fox's Island in Penobscot Bay;² that the ship and twenty-two men were taken by the

enemy;¹ and that the remainder of the crew was saved.² Her captors were the *Experiment*, Captain Wallace, of fifty guns, and the *Unicorn*, of twenty-two guns, the latter of which had ten men killed, and was greatly damaged, both in her hull and rigging.³ The loss on board the *Raleigh* was twenty-five men killed and wounded.⁴

D O C U M E N T.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE NAVY BOARD, AT BOSTON, TO THE MARINE COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS.

[From the Pennsylvania Packet, Philadelphia, Thursday, October 22, 1778.]

BOSTON, October 7, 1778.

"This will inform you of the loss of the *Raleigh* frigate, commanded by John Barry, Esq. She sailed on Friday, the 25th of September, and in a few hours after discovered two of the enemy's ships, one of 50 or 60 guns, and the other a frigate, which Captain Barry endeavored to avoid, and once supposed himself clear of them; but the next day was pursued by the same or two other ships. The frigate after some time, being a copper-bottom and going very fast, came up, and an engagement ensued between the two frigates, which lasted several

hours, in which the *Raleigh*, though she had lost her foretop-mast, had the advantage, and would have taken the frigate, had not the larger ship come up, when Captain Barry and his crew, after supporting an unequal conflict with the two ships with great gallantry for half an hour, ran the *Raleigh* on shore, so that though he has lost his ship he has gained laurels to himself and honor to his country; perhaps no ship was ever better defended. Captain Barry had made preparations to burn the ship as soon as the sick and wounded could be landed, but by some misfortune that was not executed, the enemy took her off next day. We shall add no more, but that Captain Barry's conduct is highly approved here, and that his officers and men are greatly pleased with him."

Published by Order of the Marine Committee,
JOHN BROWN, Secretary.

¹ N. H. Gazette, No. 34, says midnight.—² Mem. of Com. Barry, in the Portfolio, Third Octavo series, vol. ii. p. 4.

¹ Penn. Packet, Phila., Tuesday, Nov. 10, 1778; N. H. Gazette, No. 34.—² N. H. Gazette, No. 34.

³ Penn. Packet, Nov. 10, 1778.—⁴ N. H. Gazette, No. 33.

CHAPTER XLIII.

October 15, 1778.

THE MASSACRE OF COUNT PULASKI'S LEGION.

THE deeds of daring with which the American privateersmen harassed the enemy's shipping, were not less troublesome in the Revolutionary war than in that of 1812, and the British commanders were compelled to take steps to abate the nuisance. Accordingly, in October, 1778, Captain Collins, of the *Zebra*, sloop-of-war, with the *Vigilant*, *Nautilus*, two galleys, and four small armed vessels and transports, in all nine sail;¹ and Captain Ferguson of the Seventieth regiment, with three hundred regulars and the Third New Jersey volunteers, were dispatched to Little Egg Harbor, in New Jersey, for that purpose.²

This harbor, which was a great resort for the privateers in the war of the Revolution, is on the eastern part of Burlington county, about fifty miles from Philadelphia and sixty from Trenton;³ and the enemy appeared off the bar on the evening of the fifth of Octo-

ber.¹ It appears, however, that the inhabitants had received notice of the approach of the enemy from Governor Livingston, and three privateers, of six or eight guns each, and an armed pilot-boat, left the harbor three days before Captain Collins reached the bar; while those vessels which could not be got ready for sea were carried up the creek as far as Chesnut-neck.² It was also evident that preparations were in progress to prevent the destruction of the vessels and the stores, in consequence of which Captain Ferguson hastened to accomplish the object of the expedition, pushing up the creek with the small vessels and as many soldiers as could be crowded into them, without waiting for the ships to cross the bar; destroying ten large vessels, about a dozen houses, and several storehouses filled with prize goods; and returning to the ships without any material loss.³

In the mean time a Frenchman named

¹ Gaines' N. Y. Gazette, No. 1410, Oct. 26, 1778; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 216, N. Y., Oct. 24, 1778.

² Stedman, ii. pp. 42, 43; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette, No. 1410, Oct. 26, 1778; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 216, N. Y., Oct. 24, 1778.

³ Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of New Jersey, p. 107.
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¹ Capt. Ferguson to Sir H. Clinton, Oct. 10, 1778; Stedman, ii. p. 43; Gordon, iii. pp. 195, 196.—² Ibid.

³ Ibid.; II. Gaines' Gazette, No. 1410, Oct. 26, 1778; Penn. Packet, Phila., Oct. 10, 1778.

Juliet,¹ a captain in the Count Pulaski's legion,—which had been ordered from Trenton to cover Little Egg Harbor,²—deserted to the enemy, and gave such an account of the position it occupied,³—some eight or ten miles distant,⁴—as induced the enemy to attempt a surprise. This “legion” consisted of three incomplete companies of light-infantry, three troops of light-horse, a company of artillery, and one brass field-piece,⁵ and it occupied such a position as would prevent the different arms of the service from acting in concert.

At eleven o'clock, in the evening of the fourteenth of October, two hundred and fifty men were embarked in small vessels, and, after rowing ten miles, landed on Mincecock Island, at four the next morning, within a mile of a defile which had been, carelessly, left unguarded, although its possession was essential to the security of the position occupied by the legion. Leaving fifty men to occupy this pass, Captain Ferguson pushed forward to the quarters

of the light-infantry, who occupied three houses, and, taking example from General Grey, literally cut the defenceless men to pieces.¹ The cries for quarter were entirely disregarded, and about fifty of the unfortunate men, including Lieutenant-colonel the Baron de Bose and Lieutenant de la Borderie, were butchered.² Only five prisoners were taken;³ and the enemy himself, in a spirit of self-condemnation, has since endeavored to excuse his cruelty, in the fact that it was a night attack,⁴ and in the orders of Count Pulaski, in which, it was falsely asserted, the legion had been directed to show no quarter to the enemy.⁵

At the first alarm the Count hastened forward with his cavalry, and arrested the progress of the massacre;⁶ the enemy making a hasty and inglorious retreat,⁷ with five men killed, wounded, and missing,⁸ embarking at ten o'clock the same morning.⁹

¹ Gen. Pulaski's letter to Cong., Oct. 16, Doc. I.; Marshall, iii. p. 566; Capt. Ferguson to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 15, Doc. II.

² Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 566; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 44, Trenton, Oct. 7, 1778; Penn. Packet, Phila., Oct. 10.—³ Stedman, ii. p. 44; Gordon, iii. p. 196.

⁴ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 566. Stedman (ii. p. 44) says “twelve miles.”

⁵ Capt. Ferguson to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 15, Doc. II.; Stedman, ii. p. 44; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 566.

¹ Hugh Gaines' N. Y. Gazette, No. 1410, Oct. 26; Capt. Ferguson to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 15, Doc. II.; Stedman, ii. pp. 44, 45; Gordon, iii. p. 196; Hist. Civil War, i. p. 330.—² Stedman, ii. p. 45; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 567; Ramsay, ii. p. 94; H. Gaines' N. Y. Gazette, No. 1410, Oct. 26; Rivington's “Royal Gazette,” No. 215, N. Y., Oct. 21, 1778.—³ Capt. Ferguson to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 15, Doc. II.—⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 45.

⁵ Capt. Ferguson to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 15, Doc. II.

⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 197; Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 567; Irving, iii. p. 475.—⁷ Marshall's Washington, iii. p. 567.—⁸ Capt. Ferguson to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 15, Doc. II.; H. Gaines' N. Y. Gazette, No. 1410, Oct. 26, 1778.

⁹ H. Gaines' N. Y. Gazette, No. 1410, Oct. 26, 1778.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL COUNT PULASKI TO CONGRESS.

[From Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet, Tuesday, Oct. 20, 1778.]

October 16, 1778.

SIR:—For fear that my first letter concerning my engagement should miscarry or be delayed, and having other particulars to mention, I thought proper to send you this letter.

You must know that one Juliet, an officer, lately deserted from the enemy, went off to them two days ago with three men whom he debauched, and two others whom they forced with them. The enemy, excited, without doubt, by this Juliet, attacked us the 15th instant, at three o'clock in the morning, with four hundred men. They seemed, at first, to attack our pickets of infantry with fury, who lost a few men in retreating; then the enemy advanced to our infantry. The Lieutenant-colonel Baron de Bose, who headed his men, and fought vigorously, was killed with several bayonet-wounds, as well as the Lieutenant de la Borderie, and a small number of soldiers and others were wounded. This slaughter would not have ceased so soon, if, on the first alarm, I had not hastened with my cavalry to support the infantry, which then kept a good countenance. The enemy soon fled in great disorder, and left behind them a great quantity of arms, accoutrements, hats, blades, &c.

We took some prisoners, and should have taken many, had it not been for a swamp, through which our horses could scarcely walk. Notwithstanding this, we still advanced, in hopes to come up with them, but they had taken up the planks of a bridge, for fear of being overtaken, which accordingly saved them.

However, my light-infantry, and particularly the company of riflemen, got over the remains of the plank and fired some volleys on their rear. The fire began again on both sides. We had the advantage, and made them run again, although they were more in number.

I would not permit my hunters to pursue any farther, because I could not assist them, and they returned again to our line without any loss at that time.

Our loss is estimated, dead, wounded, and absent, about twenty-five or thirty men, and some horses. That of the enemy appears to be much more considerable. We had cut off the retreat of about twenty-five men, who retired into the country and the woods, and we cannot find them. The general opinion is, that they are concealed by the Tories in the neighborhood of this encampment.

In Congress, 17th October, 1778.

Ordered to be published.

HENRY LAURENS, *President.*

II.

CAPTAIN FERGUSON'S REPORT TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

LITTLE EGG HARBOR, Oct. 15, 1778.

SIR:—Since the letter which I did myself the honor of writing to you on the 10th instant, Captain Collins has received a letter from Admiral Gambier, signifying that the Admiral and you are both of opinion, that it is not safe for us to remain here, as the army is withdrawn from the Jerseys and ordering our immediate return; but as the wind still detained us, and we had information by a captain and six men of

Pulaski's legion, who had deserted to us, that Mr. Pulaski had cantoned his corps, consisting of three companies of foot, three troops of horse, a detachment of artillery, and one brass field-piece, within a mile of a bridge, which appeared to me easy to seize, and from thence to cover our retreat; I prevailed upon Captain Collins to enter into my design, and employ an idle day in an attempt that was to be made with safety, and with a probability of success. Accordingly, at eleven last night, two hundred and fifty men were embarked, and, after rowing ten miles, landed at four this morning, within a mile of the defile, which we happily secured, and leaving fifty men for its defence, pushed forward upon the infantry, cantoned in three different houses, who are almost entirely cut to pieces. We numbered among their dead about fifty, and several officers, among whom, we learn, are a lieutenant-colonel, a captain, and an adjutant. It being a night attack, little quarter could of course be given, so that there are only five prisoners; as a rebel, Colonel Proetor, was within two miles, with a corps of artillery, two brass twelve-pounders, one three-pounder, and the militia of the country, I thought it hazardous with two hundred men, without artillery or support, to attempt any thing farther, particularly after Admiral Gambier's letter.

The rebels attempted to harass us in our re-

treat, but with great modesty, so that we returned at our leisure, and re-embarked in security.

The captain who has come over to us is a Frenchman, named Bromville. He and the deserters inform us that Mr. Pulaski has, in public orders, lately directed no quarter to be given; and it was therefore with particular satisfaction, that the detachment marched against a man capable of issuing an order so unworthy of a gentleman and a soldier.

PAT. FERGUSON, *Capt. 70th Regt.*

P. S.—The dispatch vessel not having got to sea last night, I am enabled to inform you, that our yesterday's loss consists of two men of the Fifth, and one of the provincials missing, and two of the Fifth slightly wounded. Ensign Camp, of the Third Jersey volunteers, has received a stab through his thigh.

We had an opportunity of destroying part of the baggage and equipage of Pulaski's legion, by burning their quarters, but as the houses belonged to some inoffensive Quakers, who, I am afraid, may have sufficiently suffered already in the confusion of a night's scramble, I know, sir, that you will think with us, that the injury to be thereby done to the enemy would not have compensated for the sufferings of those innocent people.

CHAPTER XLIV.

October 28, 1778.

THE CAPTURE OF THE PIGOT.

THE operations on Rhode Island, and the destruction of the enemy's vessels, have been already referred to;¹ and the command of the ferries, and other lines of communication, between the island and the main, were secured to the inhabitants, much to the annoyance of the royal authorities.² To close one of these points,—the east passage,—a fine stout schooner, of about two hundred tons, was procured; her upper deck removed; her lower deck pierced for twelve eight-pounders, which had been removed from the *Flora*; strong boarding-netting carried around her bulwarks; and forty-five men, under Lieutenant Dunnlap, of the Royal Navy, placed on board.³ She was named the *Pigot*, in honor of the royal commander on Rhode Island, and, anchored near Howland's Ferry,⁴ at the mouth of the Seacomet,⁵ “she completely barred its entrance, and, for a long period, kept a sullen and undisturbed watch, greatly to the detriment of the island and the American army.”⁶

Against this vessel, on the twenty-fifth of October, Major Talbot, with forty-five men,¹ and two three-pounds, left Providence, on board a small coasting-sloop called the *Hawk*.² Soon after he left the town, the wind died away, and he was compelled to anchor and remain there during that and the following days.³ On the night of the twenty-sixth, the wind again favored the expedition, and it proceeded as far as the Taunton River, receiving, on its way, the fire of the enemy's battery at the Bristol Ferry.⁴ The wind being unfavorable for the new course which the sloop had to take, on the following morning (*Oct. 27th*) Major Talbot went on shore, and, on horseback, proceeded to reconnoitre the enemy.⁵ He rode down until he came opposite the *Pigot*, when her position, equipments, &c., were carefully examined and noted,

¹ As Talbot had but sixty men when he captured the *Pigot* (*Cooper*, i. p. 91), after receiving the party under Lieut. Hclms, he could not have had more than this number when he left Providence.

² Gordon, iii. p. 201; Tuckerman's *Talbot*, p. 55; Clark's *Naval Hist.*, p. 49; Ramsay's *Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 100; Cooper's *Naval Hist.*, i. p. 91.—³ Maj. Talbot's letter to Gen. Sullivan, Doc. I.—⁴ Tuckerman's *Talbot*, p. 55.

⁵ Chap. XXXIX. pp. 432-434.—⁶ Tuckerman's *Life of Talbot*, pp. 52, 53.—⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Gordon, iii. p. 201.

⁹ Tuckerman's *Talbot*, p. 53.—¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 56, 57.

after which he returned to his vessel, and prepared for action.¹ Fearing that his force was insufficient to accomplish his object, he applied to General Cornnell for a reinforcement; and, about nine in the evening, after receiving an addition to his small party of fifteen men and Lieutenant Helms, from the Rhode Island line, he weighed anchor, and sailed down the passage.² When he approached the Fogland Fort, he lowered his sails and drifted down, under bare poles, securing his passage through that part of the channel without being discovered.³

Having lashed a kedge-anchor on his jib-boom, and hoisted his sail again, he speedily neared the *Pigot*, was hailed, and made no answer.⁴ The sentries' muskets were then discharged at the *Hawk*, but, such was her headway, at half-past one in the morning of the twenty-eighth,⁵ before a cannon could be discharged by the schooner, she was alongside the *Pigot*; the anchor on her jib-boom had torn the netting from the bulwarks of the schooner, and had grappled her fore-shrouds; and Lieutenant Helms, and his party of fifteen men, had gained her deck, sword in hand.⁶ A brisk fire was immediately opened on the *Pigot*, and her crew, terrified at the audacity of her assailants,

begged for quarters and ran below, leaving the deck unoccupied.¹ The crew of the *Hawk* immediately passed over the bowsprit of the sloop and boarded the schooner; while Lieutenant Dunlap, her commander, in his shirt and drawers, rushed from his berth, and gallantly defended his vessel, single-handed;² but his bravery availed nothing, and, in a few minutes, his crew was safely secured in the hold of the vessel, her anchor was weighed, and, with the *Hawk*, she was on her way down the Narraganset Bay, neither party having lost a man.³

On the following day the vessels reached Stonington, in safety; whence the prisoners were marched, in triumph, to Providence.⁴ "Congratulations, acknowledgments, and honors were profered the bold leader in this enterprise from all quarters. The Assembly of Rhode Island presented him with a sword;"⁵ "the Congress of the United States presented its thanks, and a Lieutenant-colonel's commission;"⁶ but, perhaps, of all the compliments bestowed on the occasion, the one he received with the greatest relish, was the character awarded him in the British report of the loss of the *Pigot*—"One of the greatest arch-rebels in nature."⁷

¹ Tuckerman's Talbot, pp. 56, 57.—² Ibid., p. 58.

³ Maj. Talbot to Gen. Sullivan (see Doc.); Gordon, iii. p. 201; Clark's Naval Hist., p. 49.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 201; Tuckerman's Talbot, p. 60; Clark, p. 49.

⁵ Maj. Talbot to Gen. Sullivan (see Doc.); Gordon, iii. p. 201; Clark's Naval Hist., p. 49.—⁶ Tuckerman's Talbot, p. 60; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 100; Maj. Talbot to Gen. Sullivan (see Doc.).

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 201; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 100; Clark's Naval Hist., p. 49; Maj. Talbot to Gen. Sullivan (see Doc.)—² Gordon, iii. pp. 201, 202; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 100; Cooper's Naval Hist., i. p. 91; Maj. Talbot to Gen. Sullivan (see Doc.)—³ Tuckerman's Talbot, pp. 60, 61; Gordon, iii. p. 202; Clark's Naval Hist., p. 49; Maj. Talbot to Gen. Sullivan (see Doc.)—⁴ Maj. Talbot to Gen. Sullivan (see Doc.)—⁵ Tuckerman's Talbot, p. 64.

⁶ Jour. of Cong., Saturday, Nov. 14, 1778 (vol. iv. p. 471).—⁷ Tuckerman's Talbot, p. 64.

DOCUMENT.

LETTER FROM MAJOR TALBOT TO GENERAL SULLIVAN.

STONINGTON, *October 29, 1778.*

DEAR GENERAL:—The Sunday that I sailed from Providence with the troops you put under my command, I got no further than the Rocky Island for want of wind. The next day I got through Bristol Ferry to Mount Hope. Wednesday, at ten o'clock at night, made sail; run down through Howland's Ferry, in order to attack the schooner Pigot; when I came to Fogland Ferry, I hauled down all my sails, and let her drift through the ferry under her bare poles, for fear of the fort on Rhode Island firing upon us, and giving the alarm to the schooner I intended to attack; it had the desired effect, I sailed through undiscovered; at half-past one A. M. got sight of the schooner Pigot, but a small distance from her was hailed by her, and fired upon by her marines from the quarter-deck, but reserved our fire till we had run our jib-boom through her fore-shrouds, then threw in such a volley of musketry, loaded with bullets and buckshot, and some cannon, that the

seamen that were on deck immediately ran below, begging for quarters, and them that were below never made their appearance upon deck, the consequence of which was, my men run out upon our jib-boom and boarded her without the loss of a man. We came to sail with her and run into this harbor, where my men are all landed, and on their march to Providence, in good health. The Pigot mounted eight twelve-pounders, had forty-five men on board, their nettings were eight feet higher than our gunwale. The Captain of the Pigot behaved with the greatest resolution, and defended the sides of his vessel in his shirt and drawers for some time, without a single soul of his crew to assist him. My men behaved all well, Lieutenant Helms, of Colonel Topham's regiment, behaved with the greatest spirit, and was the first man on board.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient, humble servant,

SILAS TALBOT.

MAJOR-GENERAL SULLIVAN.

In Congress, November 7, 1778.

Ordered, That the letter from Major Talbot to General Sullivan be published.

CHARLES THOMSON, Secy.

CHAPTER XLV.

November 11, 1778.

THE MASSACRE AT CHERRY VALLEY.

THE village of Cherry Valley, upon Cherry Valley Creek, in the county of Otsego, New York, is thirteen miles northeast from Cooperstown, and fifty-three from Albany.¹ It was settled in 1740,² and, at the period of the Revolutionary war, it was remarkable, among the frontier settlements, for the respectability, intelligence, and good morals of its inhabitants.³ With few exceptions, these took part in the earlier movements of the war, and signed the association early in the summer of 1775;⁴ but the exposed situation of the settlement, and the growing animosities of the Indians, were the sources of constant alarm. At length, in 1777, the house and two large barns belonging to Colonel Samuel Campbell—the grandfather of Judge William W. Campbell, the annalist of Tryon county—were selected as the nucleus of a fortification for the protection of the neighborhood. A rude embankment was thrown up, inclosing the buildings, and into this primitive defensive work the inhabi-

ants of the surrounding country conveyed their families and more valuable effects. Military rules were observed, and “the garrison” remained within the walls during most of the summer, returning to their respective habitations in the following autumn.¹

In the spring of 1778 General Lafayette directed a fort to be built at Cherry Valley, the inhabitants returning to their old quarters, at Colonel Campbell’s, and remaining there until the new works were completed. The necessary farm work was done in companies, while part of the number stood as sentinels to guard against a surprise, and every precaution was taken for the protection of the lives and property of the settlers.²

During the summer, Joseph Brant, the well-known chief of the Six Nations, hovered around the neighborhood with his warriors, destroying Springfield,³ and several times threatening Cherry Valley, until at length the aggressions of the Indians assumed so serious a character that, about the beginning of

¹ Barber and Howe’s Hist. Coll. of New York, p. 440.

² Campbell’s Border Warfare, p. 30.—³ Stone’s Life of Brant, i. p. 371.—⁴ Campbell’s Border Warfare, pp. 46, 47.

¹ Campbell’s Border Warfare, pp. 124, 125.—² Ibid., pp. 125, 126.—³ Stone’s Brant, i. p. 312.

July, a regiment of Continental troops, commanded by Colonel Ichabod Alden, was ordered to Cherry Valley; and the little village meeting-house having been surrounded with a heavy stockade, the regiment took possession of that little fortress. It is said that Colonel Gausevoort solicited the command of this post; and, with the regiment with which he had so nobly defended Fort Schuyler against Colonel St. Leger, he proposed to defend the settlers of Otsego from the assaults of Brant. Unfortunately his proffered services were rejected; and an eastern regiment, entirely unacquainted with the peculiarities of a border warfare, was sent to a post wherein all the experience which could be secured was essentially necessary, not only for the mere protection of life and estate, but for the purpose of counteracting the general schemes of the Tories and the more wily designs of the savages.

As winter again approached, both parties, as if by mutual consent, suspended hostilities,—the settlers returning to their deserted homesteads, and Joseph Brant to Niagara, where he proposed to spend the winter. The latter, while on his way westward, was met by Captain Walter Butler, son of Colonel John Butler,—a Tory from Tryon county,¹ who had been confined by the republicans, but escaped from their hands,²—at the head of a detachment of two hundred men, from the “Butler

Rangers,” a band of Tories commanded by his father.¹ He was thirsting for an opportunity to avenge himself for the indignities he had suffered,² and was on his way to destroy Cherry Valley—an object which Joseph Brant fully appreciated—yet the latter was not on friendly terms with Butler, and he was with difficulty induced to join in the expedition. After some entreaty he was persuaded to return, however, and the united strength of the two bands was seven hundred men.³

On the sixth of November the commander of Fort Schuyler sent an express to Colonel Alden, with information of the intended assault,⁴ but the latter received the tidings with coolness;⁵ and when older and wiser men desired to return with their families and effects to the fort, he refused to allow them to do so, ridiculing their fears, and treating the information as an Indian story unworthy of credit.⁶ He promised to send out scouts, however, and he did so, on the following morning, leaving an old Indian path unprotected;⁷ but the fate which might reasonably be expected to befall such scouts was theirs; and those on the route of the enemy fell victims to their inexperience, without giving any warning of their danger to the garrison.⁸

On the night of the tenth of Novem-

¹ Simms' Schoharie County, p. 283.—² Stone's Brant, i. pp. 369, 371.—³ Ibid., p. 371.—⁴ Letter dated Nov. 6, copied by Mr. Campbell; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 56, Trenton, Dec. 31, Doc. I.—⁵ Letter of Col. Alden, Nov. 8.

⁶ Campbell, p. 135.—⁷ Letter from officer, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 56, Doc. I.—⁸ Campbell, pp. 135, 136; Letter from officer, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 56, Doc. I.

¹ Simms' Schoharie County, p. 283.—² Stone's Brant, i. pp. 255, 256, 369.

ber the enemy reached the outskirts of the village, encamping on the top of a hill, thickly covered with evergreens, about a mile southwest from the fort. He had learned from the captured scouts that the officers of the garrison lodged in private houses outside the fort, and his forces were arranged so that simultaneous attacks should be made, by small parties, on the several houses where the officers were quartered, while the main body attacked the garrison.

During the night, snow fell to the depth of several inches; but, early in the morning, the storm turned to rain,¹ and the atmosphere became thick and hazy. The inhabitants felt perfectly secure, and the weather was well calculated to increase that confidence; while, to the assailants, it afforded every facility for concealing their approach.

Taking advantage of these facilities—the supposed security of the inhabitants, the rainy morning, rendered still more unpleasant by the fog, and the exposed path—the enemy, *through the latter*,² approached the village, passing two houses on their way without being discovered, and rendezvoused in “a swamp a small distance back of Mr. Wells’ house,”³ since owned and occupied by Mr. Phelon.⁴

A Mr. Hamble, who was riding to the village, when a short distance from

it, at half-past eleven o’clock, was fired upon, and wounded in the arm, by two Indians. With great presence of mind he rode to the house of Mr. Wells,¹ where Colonel Alden lodged, but that officer affected to discredit his statement that the enemy, in force, was approaching the village, supposing that his informant had been shot by some straggler.

Having reached the village, the Rangers stopped to examine their rifles, the rain having wet the priming and rendered the pieces useless; and Joseph Brant and his Indians rushed past and entered the village, the Senecas, the most ferocious of the Iroquois, leading the way. According to the arrangements, each man took his position, and the sad work of destruction began.

Mr. Wells’ house was attacked by a mixed party of Tories and Senecas, and before the Rangers reached it the entire family, present, had fallen,—Mr. Wells, his wife, his four children, and his mother, together with his brother John, his sister Jane, and three domestics,—one only, his son John, who was at school at Schenectady, escaping the general massacre. Colonel Alden, who lodged there, escaped from the house, but was pursued by an Indian, refusing to surrender, and defending himself, as he ran, with his pistol. At length his pursuer threw his tomahawk and the Colonel fell, and his scalp was taken as a trophy by his relentless enemy. Mr. Wells was killed by a Tory while en-

¹ Letter from officer, in Collins’ N. J. Gazette, No. 56, Doc. I.—² Ibid.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Judge Campbell’s Centennial Address.

¹ Letter from officer, in N. J. Gazette, No. 56, Doc. I.

gaged in his morning devotions; and his sister Jane, who was universally beloved for her amiable disposition and her Christian charities, fled to a wood-pile for concealment, whence she was drawn forth and tomahawked by one of the savages, notwithstanding the entreaties of Peter Smith, a Tory, who interposed, saying she was his sister, and entreated that her life might be spared.

Another party surrounded the house of the venerable pastor, Rev. Samuel Dunlop, the father of Mrs. Wells; and his aged partner was immediately killed before his eyes. His own life and that of his daughter were preserved by Little Aaron, a chief of the Mohawks, who led him out from his house, and stood by his side to protect him. The weight of years and of troubles, notwithstanding the kindness of the chief, soon bore down the aged man; and, about a year afterwards, he followed his kindred to the grave.

The party which surrounded Colonel Campbell's house, took Mrs. Campbell and her four children prisoners. Her husband was absent, but, hastening home when the first discharge of cannon from the fort bore the tidings of danger through the neighboring hills, he reached it in time to witness the destruction of his property, without the satisfaction of learning even the fate of his family.

Without pursuing the details of the sad story, it is necessary to say that thirty-two of the inhabitants,¹ prin-

pally women and children, and eleven Continental soldiers,¹ were killed; that all the houses and outhouses in the settlement² were burned, with the hay and grain which the latter contained; and that about forty, including several of the officers of the garrison, were carried into captivity.³

The enemy, possessing no artillery, made no impression upon the fort; and no sooner was the work of destruction around it completed,—at four in the afternoon,—than he withdrew. He was annoyed, afterwards, by a sally from the fort, but no benefit to the sufferers was secured. The next day he secured all the sheep, cattle, and horses he could find, and at sunset of the same day (*Thursday, Nov. 12th*), he took up his line of march, with his prisoners, into the wilderness.⁴ On the second day all the women and children, except the families of Colonel Campbell and Mr. Moore, were permitted to return to their desolate homes;⁵ the others, with their captors, passed down the Susquehanna and up the Tioga rivers, and thence down the Seneca Lake to the Seneca castle of Kanadasago (*near Geneva*), where they arrived about the last of November.

On the second day after the mas-

¹ Letter from officer, in N. J. Gazette, No. 56, Doc. I.; Letter from Tryon Co., in Penn. Packet, Doc. II.

² According to the "Letter from Tryon Co.," in the Penn. Packet (Doc. II.), these buildings were 32 houses, 31 barns, a grist-mill, a fulling-mill, and a blacksmith's shop.

³ The letter (Doc. II.) states that thirty of the inhabitants, four officers, and thirteen private soldiers were taken captive.—⁴ Letter from officer, in N. J. Gazette, Doc. I.

⁵ Letter from Tryon Co., Nov. 20, in the Penn. Packet.

sacre (*Nov. 13th*)¹, a party of militia, two hundred in number,² reached the fort from the Mohawk Valley, and the mangled remains of the victims were gathered and interred in as decent a manner as the circumstances would permit.³

It only remains for me to notice the part taken by Joseph Brant in the atrocities of that day, and to relieve him, and those with whom he especially acted, from a portion of the odium which properly arose from this horrible outrage. Many appear to have considered, as in the case of Wyoming, that Joseph Brant was the personification of evil, and that he, necessarily, was the author of all the crimes which stand most prominent in the annals of Western New York and Northern Pennsylvania. His name, therefore, appears as the leader of this party,⁴ and his character has been assailed as the responsible author of the wrongs it committed. Without shielding him from the censure which justly attaches itself to his character, it is proper to remark that he was *not* the commander of this expedition, and that *he* was not the fiend who controlled it and guided its operations. That pre-eminent position was occupied by a baser wretch, "Walter N. Butler, Capt. Com. of the Rangers,"

—one who could make no just claims to the attributes of civilized life, whose evil deeds made him loathsome even to Joseph Brant and his warriors, and whose name has passed down to posterity associated with every thing that is evil in the character of mankind. He it was who commanded the massacre, while Joseph Brant "did all in his power to prevent the shedding of innocent blood." Brant endeavored to protect Mr. Wells' family, as Little Aaron did that of Mr. Dunlop's, but a plowed field, over which he had to pass, offered so much opposition that he could not reach the house in season to secure the object of his visit. Shortly afterwards he entered the dwelling of a royalist, and, finding the mistress of the house employed in her household matters, inquired, "Are you thus engaged while all your neighbors are murdered around you?" With the hardened brutality which characterized the Tories, generally, she replied that *they* were royalists; but Joseph told her, "that plea will not avail you to-day." "They have murdered Mr. Wells' family," he continued, "who were as dear to me as my own." Without knowing her visitor, she then remarked, "There is one Joseph Brant, if he is with the Indians we are safe;" but Joseph immediately told her, "I am Joseph Brant, but I have not the command, and I know not that I can save you; but I will do what is in my power." At this moment the Senecas approached, and Joseph directed her to get into the bed and feign sickness, while he stood by and protected her.

¹ Letter from officer, in N. J. Gazette, Doc. I.; Letter from Tryon county, in Penn. Packet, Doc. II.

² The letter from an officer, in N. J. Gazette, says the reinforcement numbered *eight* hundred.

³ Letter from Tryon Co., in Penn. Packet, Doc. II.

⁴ H. Gaines' New York Gazette, No. 1415, Nov. 30, 1778.

He also expressed himself in a similar manner to the captives on their way through the wilderness.

It is also proper to remark that Butler denied¹ his complicity in these outrages, and cast the shame on the Sene-

cas, who, as he maintains, had been injured by the Americans, and committed these murders as a vindication of their bravery, and of their contempt for imprudent threats made by officers of the American army.¹

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

[From Collins' New Jersey Gazette, No. 56, Trenton, December 31st, 1778.]

BOSTON: *December 3.*—From an officer who was at the fort at Cherry Valley, November 11, when it was attacked, we have the following account, viz.:

On Saturday night, 8th November, an express arrived from Fort Stanwix, informing an Oneida Indian had acquainted them that he sat in Council in the Seneca country with the Six Nations, and other tribes, and that they had concluded to attack Fort Alden, in Cherry Valley. On Sunday morning a sergeant and twelve men were sent on the road by Beaver Dam, towards the enemy, to continue five days; another scout, with a non-commissioned officer and five men, were sent on the road to Springfield, to continue four days. These two roads being the only avenues from the enemy's country to this place, except an old Indian path, which had been neglected by us; at the same time we sent by the same roads scouts, in the morning, which returned at night. On Wednesday, the 11th, it rained very hard, the enemy came by the abovementioned path, passed by two houses, and lodged themselves in a swamp a small distance back of Mr. Wells's house, headquarters; half-past eleven a. m. Mr. Hamlin came by and discovered two Indians, who fired

upon him and shot him thro' the arm; he rode to Mr. Wells's and acquainted the Colonel, the Lieut. Colonel, Major, and Adjutant being present, the two last (the house at this time being surrounded by the Indians) got to the Fort through their fire, the Colonel was shot near the fort; the enemy, 800 in number, consisting of 500 Indians commanded by Brant, 50 regulars under Capt. Colvill, and another Captain with some of Johnson's Rangers and above 200 tories, the whole under Col. Butler's command, immediately surrounded the fort, excluding several officers who were quartered out of the garrison and had gone to dinner; they commenced a very heavy fire on the fort, which held three and a half hours, and was as briskly returned; they were so near as to call to the fort and bid the damn'd rebels surrender, which was answered with three cheers and a discharge of cannon and musketry; at four p. m. the enemy withdrew, Capt. Ballard sallied out with a party, which the enemy endeavored to cut off, but were prevented by a reinforcement; the next day they made it their whole business to collect horses, cattle, and sheep, which they effected, and at sunset left the place. On Friday morning the fort was reinforced by 800 militia. The enemy killed, scalped, and most barbarously

¹ Letter to Gen. James Clinton, dated, "Niagara, Feb. 18, 1779."

¹ The account of this massacre, as given by Judge W. W. Campbell, in his Annals of Tryon County, has been, generally, as far as it goes, followed in this narrative. Where no other authority has been cited, therefore, that well-known work has been used.

murdered 32 inhabitants, chiefly women and children, also Colonel Alden, and the following soldiers of his regiment, viz.: Robert Henderson, Gideon Day, Thomas Sheridan, Pelletiah Adams, Simeon Hopkins, Benjamin Worcester, Thomas Holden, Daniel Dudley, Thomas Knowles, and Oliver Deball. The following officers were taken prisoners, viz.: Lt. Col. Stacey, Lieut. Aaron Holden, Ensign Garret, Surgeon's-mate Francis Souza de Bierge, and 13 privates; burned 24 houses with all the grain, &c., took above 60 inhabitants prisoners, part of whom they released on going off. They committed the most inhuman barbarities on most of the dead. Robert Henderson's head was cut off, his scull-bone was cut out with the scalp. Mr. Willis's¹ sister was ripped up; a child of Mr. Willis's, two months old, scalped, and arm cut off; the clergyman's wife's leg and arm cut off; and many others as cruelly treated. Many of the inhabitants and soldiers, shut out from the fort, lay all night in the rain, with children, which suffered very much. The cattle that were not easy to drive they shot. We were informed by the prisoners that they sent back, that the Lieutenant-Colonel, all the officers and continental soldiers, were stripped and drove naked before them.

The fort was commanded by the brave Major Whiting of Dedham, and the two cannon under the direction of the brave Capt. Hickling, of this town, who was chief engineer in building the fort, and whose assistance contributed in saving of it.

II.

[From Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet, Philadelphia, Jan. 7, 1779.]

POUGHKEEPSIE, December 14.—Extract of a letter from Tryon county, dated Nov. 24, 1778.

SIR:—I have had no opportunity to give you an earlier account of the destruction at Cherry Valley, where I arrived the day after the tragedy was acted, and did not return home till last night, having been busied in collecting and burying the dead, and getting the distressed

inhabitants brought off. I was never before spectator of such a scene of distress and horror. The first object that presented, was a woman lying with her four children, two on each side of her, all scalped; the next was the wife of the Rev. Mr. Dunlap, likewise scalped, stripped quite naked, and much of her flesh devoured by the Indian dogs. But it would be tedious to mention all the shocking spectacles that were to be seen. I shall only give you the general account as I took it down:

At the house of	Killed.	Prisoners returned.	Prisoners not returned.
Mr. Wells.....	13	0	2
Mr. Moon ¹	0	0	4
Mr. Johnston.....	1	0	0
Mr. Rumsey.....	0	1	4
Mr. Mitchel.....	5	0	2
Mr. Richey.....	0	0	2
Mr. Alaghlen.....	0	3	0
Mr. Henderson.....	0	0	1
Colin Campbell ²	1	0	4
Mr. Bacon	0	8	0
Mr. Hurlbut.....	4	0	0
Mr. Dunlap	3	4	1
Mr. Dickson.....	1	0	0
Mr. McLeland.....	0	0	3
Mr. Scott	2	5	3
Mr. Wilson	0	0	1
Mr. Lighman.....	0	3	1
Mr. Moore	0	4	0
Mr. Cannon	2	0	1
Mr. Campbell	0	5	1
Mr. Shankland	0	2	0
Mr. Bagnal	0	5	0
Total	32	40	30

The persons named were some of them wounded, some carried away, and some killed.

Besides these, there were two men wounded who were not carried away.

Burned 32 houses, 31 barns, 1 grist-mill, 1 fulling-mill, and 1 blacksmith's shop.

Besides the foregoing, Col. Alden, in the Continental service, and 10 rank and file were killed; Lieutenant-colonel Stacey was taken prisoner, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 1 Surgeon's mate, 1 Sergeant, and 13 rank and file are missing.

Of the wretched surviving inhabitants, there are 182 who have neither house nor home, nor

¹ Probably intended for Mr. Wells.

² Probably intended for Colonel Campbell

a morsel of bread; are almost naked, and a great part of them without a penny to purchase any of the necessaries of life. And in all this massacre, there were but three men of the place killed, all the rest being helpless women and children. A great part of the sufferers, both killed and prisoners, were people much suspected of Tory principles, and greatly depended on protection from Brant and Butler, who conducted this bloody and inhuman business, which was perpetrated the eleventh instant; and on the 20th, they made an excursion to another settlement, called the Coile (lying on the road from Fort Plank to Lake Olsago, between Springfield and Andrews Town, which were destroyed in the summer), at this settlement they burned 5 houses and carried off 6 prisoners. We have now not one settlement left in this county at any distance from the south side of

the Mohawk river, and have the greatest reason to fear, that in a very short time. We shall not have one on it, unless very speedy and effectual measures are taken to check the savages and worse than savage Tories. The prisoners who are returned, inform us that the party was commanded by Joseph Brant, Walter Butler, and the Seneca chief, and consisted of 443 Indians and 200 Tories, many of which horrid miscreants, were inhabitants of Cherry Valley, and some whose parents were living there.

It is not improbable that you will have seen the substance of the foregoing account before this gets to your hand, as I have had opportunities of transmitting it to you, but this you may depend on as fact, and as near as I could possibly collect, the particulars of this doleful affair, wherein I have a sister and her amiable daughter carried off by the enemy. M. R.

CHAPTER XLVI.

December 29, 1778.

THE CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

THE energetic opposition of the people in Georgia and South Carolina had caused the royalists, in large numbers, to seek refuge in East Florida,¹ from whence a predatory war was carried on during the years 1776, 1777, and 1778, and great distress ensued.² With all the bitterness of partisans the forays were continued on both sides, until the spring of 1778, when the refugees threatened an unusually vigorous invasion of Georgia.³ For this purpose detachments of troops from the regular army had been ordered to St. Augustine, to co-operate with the refugees; and General Robert Howe, to whom the command of the southern army had been given, removed his head-quarters from Charleston to Savannah, and made preparations to oppose them.⁴ His command did not exceed five hundred and fifty men, but he was strengthened soon after with the commands of Colonels Charles C. Pinckney, Bull, and Williamson, and by Governor Houstoun of Georgia, at the head of three hundred and fifty militia, and he pushed forward

to Fort Tonyn, on the St. Mary's River, to meet the enemy.¹ The Governor of Georgia here refused to obey the General's orders, and Colonel Williamson, at the head of his volunteers, followed his example, while Commodore Bowen, who commanded the galleys which had been provided for the expedition, refused to recognize the authority of any land officer.²

The result of this disaffection will be obvious. An immediate dissolution of the force followed, and the several parties returned to their respective homes, the enemy, without striking a blow, being more completely triumphant than he would have been after a most disastrous battle.³

Encouraged by the result of this expedition, and with the expectation of great assistance from the disaffected among the Americans, the enemy made immediate preparations for invading Georgia.⁴ For this purpose Lieutenant-colonel Campbell was dispatched from New York, on the twenty-seventh of

¹ Lossing, ii. p. 727.—² Gordon, iii. pp. 211, 212; Stedman, ii. p. 67.—³ Lossing, ii. p. 729.—⁴ Ibid.

¹ White's Hist. Coll. of Georgia, p. 209; Lossing, ii. p. 729.—² White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 209.

³ Lossing, ii. pp. 729, 730.—⁴ Ibid.

November,¹ with the Seventy-first regiment, two battalions of Hessians, four battalions of Provincial troops (Tories), and a detachment of the Royal Artillery, numbering, in the aggregate, about three thousand five hundred men.² He was convoyed by a squadron of vessels commanded by Commodore Hyde Parker,³ and, with the exception of two horse-sloops, he reached the island of Tybee, fifteen miles from Savannah, on the twenty-third of December following.⁴

Previous to the departure of Lieutenant-colonel Campbell from New York, orders had been dispatched to Major-general Prevost, who commanded in East Florida, directing him to collect all the forces which could be spared from that colony; to enter Georgia with his command; to make a junction with the former officer; and to take the command of the whole.⁵ Preparations were immediately made to carry this order into execution, but, before General Prevost reached Savannah, the troops from New York, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell had succeeded in capturing the town.⁶

On the arrival of the fleet off Tybee Island, a strong southerly current set the fleet to the southward,⁷ and no portion of it could cross the bar, until the

next day,¹ when the Commodore, in the *Phoenix*, and the greater part of the transports, entered the river and anchored near the lighthouse.²

Having no intelligence that could be depended upon respecting the strength or disposition of the American forces, on the night of the twenty-fifth of December, a company of Highlanders, commanded by Sir James Baird, was dispatched in two flat-boats, commanded by Lieutenant Clark, of the navy, to seize some of the inhabitants of the neighboring plantations, from whom the requisite information could be obtained. Two men were taken from Wilmington Island, by this party, and from them the enemy learned the defenceless state of the town—two galleys, at the mouth of Augustine Creek, being the only means of defence, the batteries being out of repair, and very few troops on duty.³

With this information before them, the Commodore and Colonel Campbell resolved to lose no time; and, on the twenty-eighth of December,⁴ the fleet proceeded up the river, reaching Giradeau's plantation (about two miles from Savannah), the appointed place of embarkation, about four o'clock in the afternoon.⁵ The two galleys, before referred to, made a slight resistance, and this cause added to the detention of several of the transports, which had grounded some five or six miles below,

¹ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Com. Parker's dispatch to the Admiralty, "Savannah River, Jan. 14, 1779;" Gordon, iii. p. 213.—² Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gordon, iii. p. 213.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. See also Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779.

⁵ Raumsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 96; Gen. Prevost's dispatch to Sir H. Clinton.—⁶ Gen. Prevost's dispatch to Sir H. Clinton.—⁷ Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779.

¹ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779.—² Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.

³ Ibid.; Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.

rendered a delay, until the following morning, absolutely necessary.¹

Savannah is situated on the southwest bank of the Savannah River,² on a high bluff, forty feet above low-water mark, about eighteen miles, by the course of the river, from the ocean.³ When the approach of the enemy was made known, General Robert Howe, with less than seven hundred men, was at Sunbury, about thirty miles distant, and messengers were immediately dispatched with the information; the public records were removed for safety to Purysburg; and a small battery on the eastern extremity of the city was strengthened.⁴ With as little delay as possible, General Howe marched to Savannah, and, with his little force, encamped near the eastern extremity of the present remains of the French works, on the southeast side of the town.⁵ The militia, probably remembering and taking advantage of the disaffection of Governor Houstoun, before referred to,⁶ came in but slowly, so that on the morning of the battle his entire force numbered only eight hundred and twenty men.⁷ With this little party, General Howe prepared to contest the possession of Savannah with the relatively powerful force of the invaders.

At length, at daybreak on the morning of the twenty-ninth of December,

the enemy's first division, composed of all the light-infantry, the New York Volunteers (Tories) under Colonel Turnbull, and the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Maitland, were landed on the levee in front of Giradeau's (or Brewton's, as it is sometimes called),¹ from whence a causeway, six hundred yards in length, with a ditch on each side, led through a rice-swamp directly to Giradeau's house, which occupied a bluff in that neighborhood.² To prevent the passage of the enemy over this canseway, Captain J. C. Smith of South Carolina,³ with fifty men, was detached by General Howe;⁴ and when the enemy's advance, led by the light company of the Seventy-first (Highland) regiment, under Captain Cameron, approached, he opened "a smart fire of musketry" on it, killing Captain Cameron and two of his men, and wounding five others.⁵ Seeing their captain and their comrades fall, the company rushed forward to avenge their deaths; and, in a few minutes, overwhelmed by the numerical superiority of their opponents, the little party under Captain Smith retired

¹ Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779; Narrative of Mordecai Sheftall, Dep. Com. of Issues.

² Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779; Gordon, iii. p. 213; Sheftall's Narrative.—³ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 731.

⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 213; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. pp. 96, 97; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 4; Rivington's "Royal Gazetteer," No. 246, New York, Feb. 6, 1779.

⁵ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 97; Stedman, ii. p. 69; Rivington's "Royal Gazetteer," No. 246, New York, Feb. 6, 1779.

¹ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779.—² Mr. White (*Statistics of Geo.*, p. 155, and *Hist. Coll. of Geo.*, p. 302) states that it stands on the southeast bank of the river. I have ventured to differ from him.—³ White's *Hist. Coll. of Geo.*, p. 302.—⁴ Lossing, ii. p. 731.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Vide p. 472.—⁷ Gordon, iii. p. 213.

from their position, leaving the enemy the undisputed masters of the cause-way.¹

While the remainder of the troops were debarking on Giradeau's levee, Lieutenant-colonel Campbell reconnoitred the position occupied by General Howe,² while the latter officer formed his troops in order of battle. With his centre on the great road leading from Giradeau's to Savannah,—about half a mile north from the estate of Governor Wright,—defended by two field-pieces, General Howe's right, composed of Colonels Huger's and Thompson's regiments of South Carolinians, under Colonel Huger, extended to a wooded swamp, and was covered by the buildings on Tatnal's plantation, in which were posted a hundred Georgian riflemen, under Colonel George Walton, and by a single field-piece; while his left, composed of Georgian militia, under Colonel Elbert, extended to the rice-swamps on Governor Wright's plantation, with the fort on Savannah bluff behind the left wing, and a single field-piece to protect the flank. About a hundred yards in front of the position, "at a critical spot between two swamps," a ditch was cut across the road; and about a like distance in front of this ditch, a marshy creek, which ran parallel to the American lines, was crossed by a bridge, which had been destroyed.³

It was two o'clock before the enemy

had completed his debarkation;⁴ and no attempt was made to advance beyond the bluff on which Giradeau's house stood until after that time.⁵ Leaving the Second battalion of the Seventy-first regiment and the First battalion of Delancy's New York Provincials to cover the landing-place, Colonel Campbell formed his troops and advanced towards the Americans' position.⁶ The light troops, throwing off their packs, led the column, supported by the New York Volunteers; who, in their turn, were followed by the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, with two six-pounders, and the Wellworth regiment of Hessians, with two three-pounders; while part of the Weissenbach's regiment of Hessians brought up the rear.⁷ When he came within a thousand yards of General Howe's position he halted, threw out his light-infantry and the first battalion of the Seventy-first on his right, and made other dispositions to lead that officer to suppose that an attack on the left of the American lines was intended.⁸ In the mean time, taking advantage of information which he had received from a negro⁹ named Quamino Dolly, he withdrew the light-infantry from his right, and dispatched them, under Sir James Baird, through a secret path in the wooded swamp which flanked General Howe's right; with orders to gain

¹ Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779.—² Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 97; Stedman, ii. p. 69.—³ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.; Gordon, iii. p. 213.—⁶ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gordon, iii. p. 214; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 97.

¹ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 97; Stedman, ii. p. 69.—² Ibid.

and attack the latter in the rear of his right flank.¹ The battalion of New York Volunteers, under Colonel Turnbull, was ordered to support Sir James Baird;² while Colonel Campbell, in person, disposed the artillery and the remainder of the troops to the best advantage, and amused General Howe in front.³

At length the success of Sir James Baird's movement "was visible," and a well-directed fire from his artillery, followed by a rapid movement of the troops, both from the front and the rear of Colonel Huger's right flank, secured to Colonel Campbell a complete and, almost, a bloodless victory.⁴ Colonel Walton, who occupied the extreme right, was wounded and taken prisoner, with the greater portion of his command.⁵ Colonel Huger, with the South Carolinians under his command, and General Howe, with the centre, in accordance with orders to that effect, retreated over the causeway across Musgrove's Swamp, west from the city; but Colonel Elbert, with the left of the line,—the Georgia troops,—was less fortunate. Taking to the rice-fields, while it was high water, none but those who could swim found safety,

and these lost their arms and accoutrements. Many were drowned, and more taken prisoners, to suffer, in the loathsome prison-ships, the penalty of their patriotism.

Before the close of that day Savannah was in possession of the enemy; and thirty-eight officers, and four hundred and fifteen non-commissioned officers and privates, one stand of colors, forty-five pieces of cannon, twenty-three mortars and howitzers, ninety-four barrels of gunpowder, and other stores,¹ together with three ships, three brigs, and eight smaller vessels,² were among the trophies of the victory.

The loss of the enemy was Captains Cameron and Campbell, and five privates, killed; and Lieutenant French, one drummer, and seventeen privates, wounded.³

The loss of Savannah was speedily followed by the loss of Sunbury;⁴ and, in less than ten days, the enemy was firmly established in Georgia.⁵ The inhabitants flocked by hundreds to the King's officers, and made their peace at the expense of their patriotism, and Georgia soon became one of the most loyal of His Majesty's possessions.⁶

¹ Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Gordon, iii. p. 214; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 97; Stedman, ii. p. 70.

² Col. Campbell's dispatch, Doc. I.; Stedman, ii. p. 70.

³ Ibid.—⁴ Ibid. See also Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 97.

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 214; White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 211.

¹ Returns appended to Col. Campbell's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain.—² Returns appended to Com. Parker's dispatch to the Admiralty.—³ Returns appended to Col. Campbell's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain.

⁴ Gen. Prevost's dispatch.—⁵ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 98.—⁶ Com. Parker's dispatch, Jan. 14, 1779.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CAMPBELL'S DISPATCH TO
LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

SAVANNAH, January 16, 1779.

MY LORD:—In consequence of Sir Henry Clinton's orders to proceed to Georgia, with His Majesty's Seventy-first regiment of foot, two battalions of Hessians, four battalions of Provincials, and a detachment of the Royal Artillery, I have the honor to acquaint your lordship of our having sailed from the Hook on the 27th of November, 1778, escorted by a squadron of His Majesty's ships of war, under the command of Commodore Parker; and of the arrival of the whole fleet off the island of Tybee, on the 23d of December thereafter, two horse-sloops excepted.

Having no intelligence that could be depended upon, with respect to the military force of Georgia, or the disposition formed for its defense, Sir James Baird's Highland company of light-infantry, in two flat-boats, with Lieutenant Clark of the navy, was dispatched in the night of the 25th, to seize any of the inhabitants they might find on the banks of Wilmington Creek. Two men were procured by this means, by whom we learned the most satisfactory intelligence concerning the state of matters at Savannah, and which settled the Commodore and I in the resolution of landing the troops the next evening, at the plantation of one Gerridoe, an important post. This post was the first practicable landing-place on the Savannah River; the whole country between it and Tybee being a continued tract of deep marsh, intersected by the creeks of St. Augustine and Tybee, of considerable extent, and other cuts of water, impassable for troops at any time of the tide.

The Vigilant, man-of-war, with the Comet, galley, the Keppel, armed brig, and the Greenwich, armed sloop, followed by the transports in the divisions, in the order established for a descent, proceeded up the river with the tide at noon; about 4 o'clock in the evening the Vigilant opened the reach to Gerridoe's plantation, and was cannonaded by two rebel galleys, who retired before any of their bullets had reached her: a single shot from the Vigilant quickened their retreat.

The tide and evening being too far spent, and many of the transports having grounded at the distance of five or six miles below Gerridoe's plantation, the descent was indispensably delayed till next morning. The first division of the troops, consisting of all the light-infantry of the army, the New York Volunteers, and first battalion of the Seventy-first under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Maitland, were landed at break of day on the river-dam, in front of Gerridoe's plantation, from whence a narrow causeway of six hundred yards in length, with a ditch on each side, led through a rice-swamp directly to Gerridoe's house, which stood upon a bluff of thirty feet in height, above the level of the rice-swamps.

The light-infantry, under Captain Cameron, having first reached the shore, were formed and led briskly forward to the bluff, where a body of fifty rebels were posted, and from whom they received a smart fire of musketry, but the Highlanders, rushing on with their usual impetuosity, gave them no time to repeat it: they drove them instantly to the woods, and happily secured a landing for the rest of the army. Captain Cameron, a spirited and most valuable officer, with two Highlanders, were killed on this occasion, and five Highlanders wounded.

Upon reconnoitering the environs of Gerri-doe's plantation, I discovered the rebel army, under Major-general Robert Howe, drawn up about half a mile east of the town of Savannah, with several pieces of cannon in their front. The first division of troops, together with one company of the second battalion of the Seventy-first, the first battalion of Delancey's, the Wellworth, and part of the Weissenbach regiment of Hessians, being landed, I thought it expedient, having the day before me, to go in quest of the enemy, rather than give them an opportunity of retiring unmolested.

A company of the second battalion of the Seventy-first, together with the first battalion of Delancey's, were accordingly left to cover the landing-place, and the troops marched for the town of Savannah.

The troops reached the open country near Tatnal's plantation before three o'clock in the evening, and halted in the great road about two hundred paces short of the gate leading to Governor Wright's plantation, the light-infantry excepted, who were ordered to form immediately upon our right of the road, along the rails leading to Governor Wright's plantation.

The enemy were drawn up across the road, at the distance of eight hundred yards from this gateway; one half consisting of Thompson's and Engee's regiments of Carolina troops, were formed under Colonel Engee, with their left obliquely to the great road leading to Savannah, their right to a wooded swamp, covered by the houses of Tatnal's plantation, in which they had placed some riflemen; the other half of their regular troops, consisting of part of the first, second, third, and fourth battalions of the Georgia brigade, was formed under Colonel Elbert, with their right to the road and their left to the rice-swamps of Governor Wright's plantation; with the fort of Savannah Bluff behind their left wing, in the style of second flank; the town of Savannah, round which they had the remains of an old line of intrenchment, covered their rear. One piece of cannon was planted on the right of their line, one upon the left, and two pieces occupied the traverse, across the great road, in the centre of their line. About one hundred paces in front of this traverse, at a

critical spot between two swamps, a trench was cut across the road, and about one hundred yards in front of this trench, a marshy rivulet ran almost parallel the whole extent of their front; the bridge of which was burned down to interrupt the passage and retard our progress.

I could discover from the movements of the enemy that they wished and expected an attack upon their left, and I was desirous of cherishing that opinion.

Having accidentally fallen in with a negro, who knew a private path through the wooded swamp, upon the enemy's right, I ordered the first battalion of the Seventy-first to form on our right of the road, and move up to the rear of the light-infantry, whilst I drew off that corps to the right, as if I meant to extend my front to that quarter, where a happy fall of ground favored the concealment of this manœuvre, and increased the jealousy of the enemy with regard to their left. Sir James Baird had directions to convey the light-infantry, in this hollow ground, quite to the rear, and penetrate the wooded swamp upon our left, with a view to get round by the new barracks into the rear of the enemy's right flank. The New York volunteers, under Colonel Trumbull, were ordered to support him.

During the course of this movement, our artillery were formed in a field on our left of the road, concealed from the enemy by a swell of ground in front, to which I meant to run them up for action, when the signal was made to engage; and from whence I could either bear advantageously upon the right of the rebel line, as it was then formed, or cannonade any body of troops in flank which they might detach into the wood to retard the progress of the light-infantry.

The regiment of Wellworth was formed upon the left of the artillery, and the enemy continued to amuse themselves with their cannon, without any return upon our part, till it was visible that Sir James Baird and the light-infantry had fairly got round upon their rear. On this occasion I commanded the line to move briskly forward. The well-directed artillery of the line, the rapid advance of the Seventy-first

regiment, and the forward countenance of the Hessian regiment of Wellworth, instantly dispersed the enemy.

A body of the militia of Georgia, posted at the new barracks, with some pieces of cannon, to cover the road from Great Ogeechee, were at this juncture routed, with the loss of their artillery, by the light-infantry under Sir James Baird, when the scattered troops of the Carolina and Georgia brigades ran across the plain in his front. This officer, with his usual gallantry, dashed the light-infantry on their flank, and terminated the fate of the day with brilliant success.

Thirty-eight officers of different distinctions, and four hundred and fifteen non-commissioned officers and privates, one stand of colors, forty-eight pieces of cannon, twenty-three mortars, ninety-four barrels of powder, the fort, with all its stores, agreeable to the inclosed return, and in short, the capital of Georgia, the shipping in the harbor, with a large quantity of provisions, fell into our possession before it was dark, without any other loss on our side than that of Captain Peter Campbell, a gallant officer of Skinner's light-infantry, and two privates killed, one sergeant and nine privates wounded. Eighty-three of the enemy were found dead on the Common, and eleven wounded. By the accounts received from their prisoners, thirty lost their lives in the swamp, endeavoring to make their escape.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
A. CAMPBELL.

II.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROBERT HOWE.

Robert Howe, of Brunswick county, North Carolina, was one of the earliest, most active, and most resolute of the opponents of the ministerial measures, and secured for himself, with

Cornelius Harnett of the same State, the immortal honor of an exception, when Sir Henry Clinton offered a pardon to the inhabitants of North Carolina, in May, 1776.

When North Carolina ordered the organization of a military force, Robert Howe was appointed Colonel of the First regiment; and, at the head of that body, he marched to the assistance of Norfolk, when Lord Dunmore, the royal governor, invested it, in the latter part of 1775. After the destruction of Norfolk, Colonel Howe was appointed a Brigadier-general on the Continental establishment, and returned to North Carolina.

On the 12th of May, 1776, Lord Cornwallis, with nine hundred men, visited his plantation, and, after ravaging, completely destroyed it.

In 1778 he commanded the troops in South Carolina and Georgia, where, as related in this chapter, he was compelled to contend not only with a foreign enemy, but with State jealousy, local feuds, and disaffection among his own forces. His well-disposed troops, after suffering severely from a sickly climate and a scarcity of provisions, were defeated on Brewton's Hill, near Savannah; and with that, and the loss of the town, which followed, the campaign closed—Georgia falling, where for some time she had practically belonged, a willing suppliant at the feet of the King.

From that time General Howe disappears; and North Carolina, ungrateful for the eminent services for which he had been outlawed, has allowed his memory to be so far neglected, that nothing more, even the day of his death and the place of his burial, is now known of him. Such instances as this, and Herkimer's, in New York, would go far to prove that republics are truly *ungrateful*, did not the sacred fidelity with which New England cherishes the memory of even the smallest of her sons, prove that a popular government, as well as a monarchy, can recognize the merit of her children.

CHAPTER XLVII.

February 3, 1779.

THE BATTLE OF BEAUFORT.

THE defeat of General Robert Howe on Brewton Hill, the surrender of Savannah, and the establishment of the royal authority in the lower parts of Georgia, have been already referred to.¹ These successes were speedily followed by the surrender of Sunbury and Augusta;² and by the, generally, peaceful submission of the inhabitants throughout the State of Georgia.³ General Lincoln, who had been appointed to the command of the Southern Department,⁴ at the head of the troops from the Carolinas, had taken post at Purysburg, on the Savannah River, where he had been joined by the remains of General Howe's little force,⁵ and contented himself by attempting to protect the State of South Carolina from the ravages of the enemy.⁶

The force of General Prevost, the British commander in Georgia, numbered about three thousand men, exclusive of the irregulars who had joined him in Georgia;⁷ that of General Lincoln, the

American commander in South Carolina, numbered three thousand six hundred and thirty-nine, of which number one thousand two hundred and eleven were inefficient; and only eleven hundred and twenty-one were regulars, the remainder being inexperienced, undisciplined, and restless militia.¹ The force of neither party warranted the passage of the river, without great danger, although both were anxious to extend their authority to the opposite bank of the stream.² At length the enemy sought to dissolve the difficulty, by detaching Major Gardiner, with two companies from the Sixtieth regiment and one from the Sixteenth regiment, about two hundred men,³ to take possession of the island of Port Royal, on the Broad River, about seventy-five miles southwest from Charleston.⁴ When this movement became known to General Lincoln, he dispatched Colonel William Moultrie⁵ to endeavor to persuade the forces in the vicinity to cross over to Beaufort, on Port Royal Island, and to

¹ Vide Chap. XLVI.—² Marshall, iv. pp. 66, 67.

³ Ramsay's Rev. in South Carolina, ii. p. 8; Lee's Mem. of the War, p. 42.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 228.

⁵ Marshall, iv. p. 70; Stedman, ii. p. 106; Lee's Mem., p. 42.—⁶ Marshall, iv. p. 70; Lee's Mem., p. 43.—⁷ Ibid.

¹ Marshall, iv. p. 70; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 12; Gordon, iii. pp. 229, 230.—² Marshall, iv. p. 70.

³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 12.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Col. Moultrie to Col. Chas. Pinckney, Feb. 1, 1779.

prevent the spiking of the cannon by the terrified inhabitants, who were flying from their plantations as the enemy approached.¹ The sight of Colonel Moultrie gave great confidence to the militia, and they requested him to lead them against the enemy. He accordingly crossed the ferry, on the morning of the second of February, with near three hundred of the Charleston militia—who, with two field-pieces, had been dispatched from that city under General Bull—and eight Continental troops, under Captain De Treville, with a brass two-pounder and fifteen rounds of ammunition. After resting the troops a few hours, he entered Beaufort at sunrise on the morning of the third, and ordered the troops into quarters. Soon afterwards intelligence was received that the enemy was marching towards Beaufort, not more than five miles distant, when the troops were again assembled, and moved off to meet them. After some attempts of the enemy to elude the Americans,² the two parties finally met about four o'clock in the afternoon.³

General Moultrie formed his troops on both sides of the road,—the two field-pieces being in the centre, the small two-pounder on the right, in a wood, and the Charleston troops on the left,⁴—about two hundred yards distant from the enemy's line. As the enemy approached, the artillery opened on him with great effect, and the wings

advanced towards him, to render their fire more effective. The enemy occupied a wooded swamp; the Americans, except a portion of the right wing, an open ground: and, notwithstanding the disadvantage of their position, the raw troops under General Moultrie manfully stood their ground. For three quarters of an hour the battle raged with great fury. Early in the action, on the first or second fire, a shot, directed by Lieutenant Benjamin Wilkins, struck the enemy's howitzer and dismounted it; which, as this was his only piece of artillery,¹ gave the Americans an advantage.²

At length the enemy began to move off, and with such haste as to leave part of his wounded;³ while the Americans, from want of ammunition, were unable to pursue them, except with a party of fifteen light-horse, under Captain John Barnwell, who harassed his rear and captured a sergeant⁴ and six men, with twelve stands of arms.⁵

The entire force commanded by General Moultrie (with the exception of Captain De Treville's command)⁶ were militia; the enemy's troops were picked men, light-infantry.⁷ The former lost

¹ Letter from an officer, Doc. I.; Letter from Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. II. Dr. Johnson supposes he had *three* pieces of artillery.—(*Traditions*, p. 211.)

² Letter from Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. II.

³ Letter from an officer, Doc. I.—⁴ Dr. Johnson (*Traditions*, p. 213) says this sergeant had acted as drill-sergeant of the Charleston Artillery company, then present on duty, and was recognized and cared for by its older members.

⁵ Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. II.; Johnson's *Traditions of the Revolution*, p. 212.—⁶ Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. II. Dr. Johnson (*Traditions*, p. 210) supposes the Capt. belonged to the Charleston Artillery.

⁷ Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. II.; Johnson's *Traditions of the Revolution*, p. 212; Gordon, iii. p. 230.

¹ Gen. Moultrie to Col. C. Pinckney, Feb. 1, 1779.

² Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, Feb. 4, 1779, Doc. II.

³ Letter from an officer, Doc. I.—⁴ Ibid.

Lieutenant Benjamin Wilkins and seven privates, *killed*, and Captains Heyward and McLaughlin, Lieutenants Brown and Sawyer, and eighteen privates, *wounded*;¹ the loss of the enemy was very severe, both among the officers and privates; one of the prisoners—Lieutenant Hazelwood—supposing it would reach half his number.²

The troops behaved with all the coolness of veterans, and it appears that

nothing prevented the entire destruction of the enemy's force but the unfortunate, but not uncommon, scarcity of powder.¹ This enabled him to secure his retreat, and the small, but gallant troop under Captain Barnwell, could do but little more than hang on his rear and pick off the stragglers.

Contented with this reception, General Prevost made no farther attempts to pass the limits of Georgia.²

DOCUMENTS.

I.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM AN OFFICER IN THE AMERICAN ARMY.

BEAUFORT, February 4.

Yesterday afternoon, about four o'clock, we met the enemy marching up to receive us, who were, as the prisoners inform us, three companies, two of the Sixtieth, and one of the Sixteenth, all light-infantry, and being about one hundred and fifty rank and file. The engagement began at about one hundred and twenty yards distance. The Charlestown detachment were placed to the left of the artillery, where there appeared the greatest danger of our flank being turned. The artillery were very well served, and did great execution. The enemy had only one cohort, the limbers of which were broke to pieces by the first or second discharge of our field-pieces. The action continued with unremitting fury till five o'clock, when our ammunition, particularly for the artillery, running short, orders were given to retire slowly. At the same time the enemy retreated precipi-

tately, leaving their killed and five of their wounded on the field. I have just come from the scene of action, where I went this morning, to look after some of my acquaintance whom I saw wounded; I there saw seven of the enemy killed, and five wounded; of the former, there were Lieutenants Calderwood and Finlay; of the latter, Lieutenant Hazelwood: the prisoners, besides, now in our hands, are seven or eight. Our whole force was about two hundred and fifty, one hundred of which were from Charlestown, and our loss is seven killed and about twenty-five wounded. Lieutenant Hazelwood told me the loss of the British, in killed and wounded, could not be less than the half of the whole party.

II.

GEN. MOULTRIE'S DISPATCH TO GEN. LINCOLN.

BEAUFORT, February 4, 1779.

DEAR SIR:—I wrote to you a few days ago from General Bull's camp, when I was there

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 13, 391, 392; Gordon, iii. p. 230.—² Letter from an officer, Doc. I.

¹ Marshall, iv. p. 71.—² Ibid., p. 72; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 13.

the militia requested me to cross the river with them, which I readily consented to. The next morning, after leaving a proper guard to our camp, we began to cross the ferry, and got near three hundred over by sunset. We immediately marched off, and continued till we got within one mile of Beaufort; here I rested the troops a few hours, and then proceeded to the town, which we entered at sunrise the next morning. Having ordered the troops into quarters and reposed myself a little, I rode down to view the fort with General Bull and two or three other gentlemen: we had scarce been a moment there, when an express arrived, informing that the enemy were in full march for Beaufort, and not more than five miles off. Upon this I requested General Bull to ride on to town, and have the men turned out; I followed immediately, found them all paraded, and had another account that the enemy were coming very fast. I then moved off the troops in order to meet them, and having marched two miles, was again informed they were within four miles of us. I then proceeded very slowly, looking for a proper piece of ground to form upon. Having soon found a very advantageous spot, I remained there an hour waiting for the enemy, and was then informed that they had, after halting a while, altered their march, and were going towards our ferry: I followed them, and had gone about three miles, when I learned that they were upon their return from the ferry, in full march towards us, and not more than one mile distant. Having sent my aid, Mr. Kinloch, to reconnoitre, and bring me a particular account, he soon returned, and informed me they were just at hand. I hastened our march to gain a swamp which was near, but finding the enemy had already got possession of the ground I intended to occupy, I halted about two hundred yards distance from the enemy, and drew up the troops to the right and left of the road, with two field-pieces (six-pounders) in the centre, and one small piece (two-pounder) on the right, in the wood. On the enemy's near approach, I ordered Captain Thomas Heyward to begin with the two field-pieces, and advanced my right and left wings nearer the swamp, and then the firing became pretty general. This

action was reversed from the usual way of fighting between the British and Americans, they taking to the bushes, and we remaining upon the open ground. After some little time, finding our men too much exposed to the enemy's fire, I ordered them to take trees. About three quarters of an hour after the action began, I heard a general cry through the line of "*no more cartridges,*" and was also informed by Captains Heyward and Rutledge, that the ammunition for the field-pieces was almost expended, after firing about forty rounds from each piece; upon this I ordered the field-pieces to be drawn off very slowly, and their right and left wings to keep pace with the artillery, to cover their flanks, which was done in tolerable order for undisciplined troops. The enemy had beat their retreat before we began to move, but we had little or no ammunition, and could not of consequence pursue. They retreated so hastily as to leave an officer, one sergeant, and three privates wounded, in a house near the action, and their dead lying on the field—it is impossible, as yet, to be particular with respect to the latter, two officers we have found and seven men; they fought from the bushes: Captain John Barnwell, with a few light-horse, was of infinite service in giving us frequent intelligence of the enemy's motions, and attacking their rear. He had at one time Captain Brewer, who is much wounded, two sergeants, and twelve privates, prisoners; but a party of the enemy, having rallied in their retreat, retook the captain, one sergeant, and six men; the remainder, however, he brought off with twelve stands of arms. Barnwell had about fifteen men. It makes me happy to assure you that our militia have that spirit they have always been allowed to possess: nothing but discipline is wanting to make them good troops. The Charlestown artillery behaved gallantly, they stood to their pieces like veterans, and served them well, until I was constrained to order them to retire, in consequence of their ammunition being nearly expended. I had in the action only nine Continental troops—Captain De Treville, two officers, and six privates, with one brass two-pounder, and only fifteen rounds: I must, in justice to them, say that they behaved well. It seems

absolutely necessary for me to remain here a few days longer, in order to have the wounded properly taken care of, and other matters put in a right channel. This moment died a valuable officer and good citizen of the wound he received yesterday—Lieutenant Benjamin Wilkins, of the Charlestown Artillery. We have three other officers wounded, Captain Heyward in the arm, and Lieutenants Sawyer and Brown, both of the light-infantry; with six or seven privates killed on the field, and fifteen wounded. I cannot be very particular as yet, having had no regular returns made me. The enemy's body consisted of two companies of the Sixtieth,

and one of the Sixteenth regiments, all picked light-infantry.

We had five deserters from them immediately after the action, who informed us of several particulars already mentioned, also that our second shot from the field-piece had disabled a howitzer, which they had fired but once. I think by all you may collect from this letter, you must allow we have beat them.

I am, dear General, your affectionate and humble servant, WILLIAM MOULTRIE,
Brigadier-general.

P. S.—My aid-de-camp is a very gallant youth, and is an honor to his country.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

February 14, 1779.

THE DISPERSION OF BOYD'S TORIES, AT KETTLE CREEK.

THE occupation of Augusta by Colonel Campbell, while it served to extend the King's authority and to keep in check the upper parts of the State, was not less useful in affording encouragement to the Tories who thronged the western borders of the Carolinas and Georgia, and waited for an opportunity to join the royal standard, which had been planted at Savannah.¹ The good fortune of Colonel Campbell and General Prevost had been duly communicated to these loyalists, and they had been invited to join the former at Augusta, when the certain success of the united forces appeared within their reach.² To give countenance to these movements, as well as to force obedience to the authority of the King, Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton of North Carolina, with "two hundred infantry, mounted on horseback," was dispatched towards the western frontier of the State.³ His progress was impeded by an occasional, well-meant, but inefficient,

opposition, but he appears to have succeeded in accomplishing the object of his mission.¹

In the mean time, in response to the invitation referred to, and encouraged by the movement under Hamilton, about seven hundred of the Tories of the Carolinas had embodied themselves, chosen a Colonel Boyd as their leader, and began their march on the borders of South Carolina, for Augusta.² Embracing in their number many whose desperate characters had caused their expulsion or their voluntary exile from the lower settlements, the character of Boyd's command was not very select, and its progress was marked with a series of outrages upon the inhabitants, —robbing them, destroying their property, and, often, committing violence upon their persons.³

Colonel Andrew Pickens of South Carolina, who had united his command

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 106; Marshall, iv. p. 72; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 13.—² Marshall, iv. p. 72; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 14; Garden's Anecdotes, ii. p. 86.

³ Stedman, ii. p. 106.

¹ Stedman, ii. pp. 106, 107; White's Hist. Coll. of Georgia, p. 683.—² Stedman, ii. p. 107; Marshall, iv. p. 72; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 14; Garden's Anecdotes, ii. p. 86.—³ Marshall, iv. pp. 72, 73; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 14; Garden's Anecdotes, i. p. 35; ii. p. 86.

with that of Colonel Dooley of Georgia, and assumed the command of both,¹ numbering about three hundred men,² had crossed the Savannah to intercept Colonel Hamilton;³ leaving Captain Anderson, with a party of his men, to guard the Cherokee Ford,⁴ where he supposed Colonel Boyd would attempt to cross the river. It was not long before the latter appeared, and attacked Captain Anderson's party, compelling him to retire,⁵ after which he passed the river and proceeded on his way.⁶ When Colonel Pickens heard of the successful passage of Boyd's party he left Kerr's Fort,⁷ where he was watching Colonel Hamilton,⁸ and pursued the former, overtaking him, on the morning of the fourteenth of February,⁹ on the north side of Kettle Creek, in Wilkes county, Georgia.¹⁰

Colonel Boyd was ignorant of the approach of Colonel Pickens, and had taken no steps either for his protection against a surprise, or for his defence against an attack.¹¹ His men had returned from the neighboring plantations with a drove of cattle, which they were then engaged in slaughtering;¹² their horses had been turned into a

swamp, and were feeding upon the young cane which abounded there; and the encampment appeared more like an assembly of banditti, in one of their fastnesses, than the camp of an organized military body.¹ At this moment Colonel Pickens approached them, Colonel Dooley commanding the right wing, Lieutenant-colonel Clark the left wing, and Colonel Pickens the centre;²—the two former attacking them on either flank, simultaneously with an attack on their front by the latter.³ The sentries, as the Americans approached, fired their pieces and fled to the camp, where the utmost confusion was immediately produced.⁴ Colonel Boyd, whose fitness for the leadership appeared conspicuous, formed his men to the best advantage, and retreated with coolness, disputing his ground with great obstinacy.⁵ For nearly an hour this running fight continued,⁶ when Colonel Boyd having been severely wounded,⁷ upwards of forty of his party killed,⁸ many others wounded, and seventy-five taken prisoners,⁹ the party fled in every direction.¹⁰

Three hundred of the fugitives afterwards reached Augusta,¹¹ the remainder,

¹ White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683.—² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 15; Garden's Anecdotes, ii. p. 86; Gordon, iii. p. 281.—³ Stedman, ii. p. 107; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 14.—⁴ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 14; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 231.—⁵ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 14, 15.—⁶ Stedman, ii. p. 107; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 15; Gordon, iii. p. 231.—⁷ White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683.—⁸ Stedman, ii. p. 107.—⁹ Gordon, iii. p. 231; Lossing, ii. p. 712.—¹⁰ Stedman, ii. p. 107; Marshall, iv. p. 72; White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683.

¹¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 712.—¹² White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683.

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 712.—² White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 712.

³ White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683.—⁴ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 712.—⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 107; White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683.—⁶ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 15; Garden's Anecdotes, i. p. 35; Same, ii. p. 86; Gordon, iii. p. 231.—⁷ Stedman, ii. p. 107.—⁸ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 15; Garden's Anecdotes, i. p. 35; Gordon, iii. p. 231. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 712) says 70.

⁹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 712.—¹⁰ Garden's Anecdotes, ii. p. 86; Gordon, iii. p. 231.—¹¹ Stedman, ii. p. 107; Marshall, iv. p. 73; White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683.

returning to their several homes, threw themselves on the mercy of their respective States;¹ while the prisoners were taken back to South Carolina, tried on charges of treason, convicted, and,—except five of their leaders, who were executed,—afterwards pardoned.²

The Americans lost nine killed and twenty-three wounded.³

The success of this exploit was very important. The Tories of the Caro-

linas never afterwards assembled, except in small parties; and their combined efforts were no longer exerted in supporting the royal cause. A predatory warfare, for plunder and the redress of individual grievances, was all they afterwards attempted, and the inhabitants, while they suffered just as much from their incursions, were relieved of the idea that they were oppressed by those in authority.¹

D O C U M E N T .

BRIGADIER-GENERAL ANDREW PICKENS.

Andrew Pickens was born in the town of Paxton, Pennsylvania, September 19, 1739. He was descended from Huguenot ancestors who had fled from France on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and settled, first in Scotland, and afterwards in the north of Ireland. His father was an early emigrant to America, and settled in Pennsylvania; from whence, while Andrew was very young, he removed to Virginia, and, in 1752, to the Waxhaws, in South Carolina, of which he was one of the first settlers. In common with the descendants of the pioneers generally, he was not blessed with the advantages of an early education, but spent his early years in the cultivation of the ground, and in the pleasures of the chase, in which he acquired those great physical powers, which, in after years, were so remarkable.

In the French War he served with great credit, and received those practical lessons which

rendered him so useful in the Revolutionary War. During that period he became acquainted with Rebecca Calhoun, the aunt of the late distinguished John C. Calhoun, and married her; soon after which he removed to the Long Cane settlement, near where the Abbeville courthouse now stands.

When the troubles with the mother country began to show themselves, Andrew Pickens took an early and decided stand, raising a company of militia, and taking the command of it. The loyalty of the inhabitants on the borders of South Carolina and Georgia found in him a stern, active, and uncompromising opponent; and in the border warfare which followed, none were more active or determined.

He rose rapidly to the command of Major, Colonel, and Brigadier-general, and, with Marion and Sumpter, kept the spirit of patriotism alive in the darkest days. His pursuit of Prevost and attack on Boyd have been referred to in this chapter. He was at Stono Ferry, under General Lincoln, and covered the retreat, with

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 107; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 15.

² Stedman, ii. pp. 107, 108; Marshall, iv. p. 73; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 15, 16.—³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 15; Gordon, iii. p. 231.

¹ White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 683; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 16.

the loss of his horse. At the battle of the Cowpens he commanded the militia; and his gallantry, and skill in rallying the militia for the second attack of the enemy, excited the astonishment of the enemy, and secured the victory. He afterwards laid siege to Augusta, and compelled it to surrender; and at the battle of the Eutaws he was wounded in the breast with a ball—his belt-buckle, which was struck by the ball, saving his life.

At the close of the war he was called by his neighbors to represent them in the legislature

of the State, in the Convention for forming a constitution for the State, and in the Congress of the United States. He was also a Commissioner for settling the boundaries between South Carolina and Georgia; and in all the treaties made with the Southern Indians, while he was in public life, he was also a Commissioner.

The latter years of his life were spent on his farm, in the enjoyment of that respect which followed his patriotic services and amiable character; and he died suddenly, on the 11th of August, 1817, aged seventy-eight years.

CHAPTER XLIX.

MARCH 3, 1779.

THE BATTLE AT BRIAR CREEK.

THE advantages gained by the Americans at Beaufort and Kettle Creek, had stimulated the militia of South Carolina to make still greater exertions to protect that State from the enemy; and reinforcements flocked to the headquarters of General Lincoln, at Purysburg,¹ and were detached by him in different directions, for the purpose of checking the enemy, and, if possible, of recovering what had been lost in Georgia.² Retaining his own position at Purysburg, with between three and four thousand men, he detached General Williamson to the eastern bank of the Savannah River, opposite Augusta, with about twelve hundred; General Rutherford to the Black Swamp, with seven or eight hundred; and General Ashe, with fifteen hundred North Carolina militia, and the remains of the Georgia Continentals, in all about twenty-three hundred men, to the upper part of the State.³ When General Ashe had reached General Williamson's camp, opposite Augusta, while on

his way to his post above, the enemy suddenly evacuated Augusta and retreated rapidly down towards Savannah.¹ General Ashe was immediately ordered to cross the river, and move down its western bank, as rapidly as possible, in pursuit of the fugitives;² but Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, who commanded them, again displayed his fine abilities, and succeeded in passing Briar Creek before the American light-horse could reach the bridge, securing his own troops, with the loss of only a gun, and, by destroying the bridge himself, preventing any farther pursuit.³ General Ashe, with his party, and two hundred light-horse who had joined him,⁴ reached Briar Creek on the twenty-seventh of February,⁵ occupied a desirable position on the north bank of

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 108; Gen. Moultrie to Chas. Pinckney, Feb. 27, 1779; Lee's Mem., p. 44; Gordon, iii. p. 232.—² Stedman, ii. p. 108; Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.; Lee's Mem., p. 44; Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Ashe, Feb. 16, cited by Dr. Gordon.

³ Gen. Moultrie to Chas. Pinckney, Feb. 27, 1779; Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.

⁴ Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.; Gen. Moultrie to Chas. Pinckney, March 2, 1779; Lee's Mem., p. 44; Gordon, iii. p. 232.

⁵ Lee's Mem., p. 44; Gordon, iii. p. 232.

¹ Stedman, i. p. 108; Lee's Mem., p. 44.—² Lee's Mem., p. 44.—³ Moultrie's Mem., i. pp. 321, 322; Lee's Mem., p. 44.

the stream, and proceeded to repair the bridge.¹

The importance of this movement was perfectly understood by General Prevost, and he immediately adopted measures to remove General Ashe.² With this object in view, Major McPherson, with the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, some irregular troops, and two field-pieces,³ was directed to take a position in front of General Ashe, on the southern bank of the creek, for the purpose of masking the movement of Lieutenant-colonel Prevost,⁴ who, by making a detour, and crossing the creek some fifteen miles above General Ashe's position, was preparing to fall on the rear of the American camp.⁵

The position occupied by General Ashe was considered a very strong one—his left resting on a swamp and the Savannah River, and his front protected by an impassable stream, sixty yards in width,—while his light-horse enabled him to establish and support all necessary patrols and videttes to insure his safety.⁶

By making a circuitous march of over fifty miles,⁷ Lieutenant-colonel Prevost was enabled to cross the creek and approach the camp without being dis-

covered.¹ His party, consisting of the second battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, a corps of light-infantry commanded by Sir James Baird, three companies of grenadiers of the Sixtieth regiment, a troop of Provincial light-horse, and about one hundred and fifty provincials, numbered about nine hundred men.² Although reconnoitering parties of the enemy appear to have showed themselves to the Americans on the second, and in the morning of the third of March,³ when, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the latter day,⁴ the main body of Lieutenant-colonel Prevost's party appeared, no steps had been taken either to defend the post or to retreat, except the formation of the troops into column, by platoons from the right,⁵ with General Elbert and about a hundred regulars in front.⁶ When the enemy appeared, the latter moved forward about a hundred yards, and opened a very sharp fire;⁷ while the main body, panic-stricken and terrified, went to the right about, and fled without firing a single shot, notwithstanding the efforts of General Ashe to rally them.⁸ The regulars, finding themselves deserted, in spite of the efforts of their gallant commander, also fled, after continuing the fire a few

¹ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.

² Ibid.; Lee's Mem., p. 44.

³ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 265.

⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.; Lee's Mem., p. 44.—⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Lee's Mem., p. 44; Gordon, iii. p. 233.—⁶ Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.—⁷ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.; Gordon, iii. p. 233.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 233.—² Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.; Stedman, ii. p. 109; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 265.—³ Gordon, iii. p. 233.—⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.; Gen. Ashe to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. I.; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 16.

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 233.—⁶ Gen. Ashe to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. I.; Gordon, iii. p. 233.—⁷ Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.; Lee's Mem., pp. 44, 45; Gordon, iii. p. 233.

⁸ Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.; Gordon, iii. pp. 233, 234.

minutes.¹ The fugitives, throwing down their arms,² in many cases plunged into the swamp, and thence into the river, and met a watery grave;³ while others, more fortunate, succeeded in reaching their homes, or the camp of General Lincoln, at Purysburg.⁴

In this engagement the enemy lost only five privates killed, and one officer and ten privates wounded;⁵ that of the Americans was never ascertained with any correctness.⁶ It is supposed that from one hundred and fifty to two hundred men were lost, either in the action or the flight;⁷ while General Elbert, Colonel McIntosh, Major Douglass, Captains Hicks, Nash, Cuthbert, Scott, Pendleton, Corbet, Sprowl, and Daley, and one hundred and sixty-two non-commissioned officers and privates, were taken prisoners;⁸ and of those who escaped,

not more than four hundred and fifty rejoined the army,¹ the remainder returning to their homes, never again to enter the service.²

Of this affair it has been well said, that "Lieutenant-colonel Prevost³ did honor to himself by the handsome manner in which he accomplished the enterprise committed to his conduct. While commendation is justly bestowed upon the British officer, censure cannot be withheld from the American commandant. The flattering prospect of recovering a lost State was dashed to pieces in an instant, by the culpable inattention of an officer, high in rank, highly intrusted, and imperatively summoned to take care that his country should not be injured by his negligence; yet it was injured, and that too while the late terrible blow, sustained from the same cause by General Howe, was fresh in recollection, and while the wounds there received were still bleeding."⁴

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 234.—² Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 324.

³ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Gen. Ashe to Gen. Lincoln, Doc. I.; Moultrie's Mem., ii. pp. 324, 325; Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.; Gordon, iii. p. 234.

⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 325.

⁵ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Doc. III.; Lee's Mem., p. 45.

⁶ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 325.—⁷ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.; Gordon, iii. p. 234.

⁸ Gen. Lincoln's letter, Doc. II.; Gordon, iii. p. 234.

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 109; Lee's Mem., p. 45; Gordon, iii. p. 234.—² Stedman, ii. p. 109; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 17.—³ This officer was a brother of the commanding General.—(Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 265.)

⁴ Lee's Memoir of the War, p. 45.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

GENERAL ASHE'S LETTER TO GENERAL LINCOLN.

MATTHEWS' BLUFF, *March 3, 1779.*

SIR:—I am sorry to inform you that at three o'clock p. m. the enemy came down upon us in force; what number I know not. The troops in my division did not stand fire five minutes. Many fled without discharging their pieces. I went with the fugitives half a mile, and finding it impossible to rally the troops, I made my escape into the river swamp, and made up in the evening to this place. Two officers and two soldiers came off with me, the rest of the troops, I am afraid, have fallen into the enemy's hands, as they had but little farther where they could fly to. Luckily, Major Grimkie had not got the artillery out of the boat, so that I shall keep them here with General Rutherford's brigade to defend this pass until I receive farther orders from you. This instant General Bryant and Colonel Perkins arrived. Colonel Eaton was drowned crossing the river.¹ Since writing the above, a number of officers and soldiers have arrived. We have taken a man who says he was taken by them, and would not take their oath, and was formerly under Lee to the Northward. He informed there were seventeen hundred red-coats in the action, also a number of new levies from New York, Georgia militia, and Florida scouts; that fifteen hundred men had marched up to Augusta, to fortify that place; that they are fortifying Hudson's very strongly; that the day before they marched off, seven thousand men had arrived from New

York. Generals Bryant and Rutherford are of opinion that it is better to retreat to your quarters, therefore I am inclined to march tonight, when we get all our fugitives over.

I am your most obedient humble servant,
JOHN ASHE.

MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN.

II.

EXTRACT FROM MAJOR-GENERAL LINCOLN'S LETTER.

PURYSBURG, *March 7, 1779.*

After the enemy left Augusta, General Ashe, who was stationed on the opposite side of the river, was ordered to cross and take post at or near Briar Creek lower bridge, as thereby he could cover the upper part of the country, and as this was considered one of the strongest posts therein, his left being secured by a deep swamp and the Savannah River, his front by the creek, which, at this place, was unfordable, and about sixty yards wide; besides, he had a party of about two hundred horse to cover his right rear. Boats were provided for the troops to reeross the Savannah, in case the enemy should move against them in force,¹ and the baggage was sent over, that they might not be encumbered therewith, in case they should be obliged to retire into the country. But, notwithstanding, on the 3d of March, 1779, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy fell in his rear, his horse at that time being over Briar Creek, and began the attack so suddenly, that the General

¹ This is an error. Col. Eaton crossed in safety, and carried the intelligence of Gen. Ashe's defeat to Gen. Lincoln.

¹ This was shown to be an error on the trial of Gen. Ashe by the Court-martial.

had not time to form the whole of his troops, which amounted to about twelve hundred, exclusive of the horse; those which were formed soon gave way, though many officers exerted themselves to prevent it, excepting a few under General Elbert, and one or two regiments of North Carolina militia. Some, he informs me, fled without firing; they took to a swamp, and escaped either by swimming the river or being brought across in a boat. General Ashe supposes his loss to have been one hundred and fifty or two hundred. Prisoners taken, General Elbert, Georgia troops; Lieutenant-colonel McIntosh, in the Continental service; Major Douglass, aid-de-camp; Captains Hicks, Nash, Cuthbert, Scott, Pendleton, Corbet, Sprowl, and Daley; one hundred and sixty-two non-commissioned officers and privates.

III.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL PREVOST TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

HEAD-QUARTERS, EBENEZER, IN }
GEORGIA, March 5. }

I did myself the honor, on the 19th of January last, to acquaint your lordship of my having arrived at Savannah, and, agreeable to the commander-in-chief's instructions, taking upon me the chief command of His Majesty's troops in this province.

* * * * *

I now proceed to inform your lordship, that some days ago, intelligence being received that the rebels, in considerable force, had taken post at Briar Creek, thirteen miles above our post, at the Hudson's, and that they were busy in repairing the bridge (which had been destroyed by Colonel Campbell in his return downwards), as if intending to advance by that route; our post was reinforced, and dispositions secretly made to give a proper reception; and it being much to be wished that they would put the creek in their rear, which would put it in our power to attack them on advantageous ground, means were used to inspire them with confidence to attempt it. But, after waiting two days, finding that they meant only to establish

themselves merely for the purpose of hampering us in our quarters, and cutting us off from all communication with the upper country, and perhaps had views of co-operation with their main army, it was judged proper to dislodge them. Accordingly, Major McPherson, with the first battalion Seventy-first regiment, and some irregulars with two field-pieces, was directed by Lieutenant-colonel Prevost to advance towards the bridge to mask the movement he himself had made with the second battalion Seventy-first regiment, a corps of light-infantry commanded by Sir James Baird, and three companies of grenadiers of the Florida Brigade, with which he took a long circuit of fifty miles to cross the creek above them, and endeavor to gain their rear; dispositions were also made by the army to favor the attempt, and to amuse and keep Mr. Lincoln in check, should he in the mean time attempt any thing in this quarter. Our plan was happily effected. The rebels being in some measure surprised, on the 3d instant, were totally defeated and dispersed, with the loss of seven pieces of cannon, several stands of colors, almost all their arms, all their ammunition and baggage, which were left to the victorious troops, the intrepidity and behavior of which I am intreated by Lieutenant-colonel Prevost to report to your lordship, to be laid before His Majesty. Permit me at the same time to mention him, as a person deserving some mark of His Majesty's royal favor; his indefatigable activity and his faithful services, entitle him to your lordship's patronage.

The second in command, Brigadier Gen. Elbert, one of their best officers, several more of note, in the whole, 27 officers, with near 200 men, were taken prisoners, and about 150 killed on the field of battle and adjoining woods and swamps; but their chief loss consists in the number of officers and men drowned in attempting to save themselves from the slaughter, and plunging into a deep and rapid river.

The loss on our side was only five privates killed, and one officer and ten privates wounded. The rebels by the best account were above two thousand. The Commissary, our prisoner, says, two thousand five hundred. On our side three Grenadier Companies of the 60th regi-

ment, Sir James Baird's light-infantry, the 2d battalion 71st regiment, Captain Tawe's troop of light-dragoons, with about 150 provincials, rangers, and militia, making in all about 900, composed the corps that attacked.

The good consequences of this defeat will, I hope, soon appear. The rebels will not again disturb us in this province. Our communication with our back friends and the Indians will be open; and though I cannot think it prudent to extend, immediately, far upwards, in the mean time, whilst we guard what we have already got, we hold ourselves in readiness to catch at further favorable incidents, as they may occur.

I have only to add to your lordship, that I wish you to be assured, that nothing within the compass of my abilities shall be left undone, that may be thought to tend to the advantage of His Majesty's service.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

A. PREVOST.

IV.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN ASHE.

John Ashe was born in England in 1721. His father was a friend of Lord Craven, and, under his powerful patronage, he emigrated to America in 1727, settling in North Carolina, and holding several important offices under the Colonial government.

John was a prominent opponent of the measures of the government during the earlier stages of the troubles with the mother country. As Speaker of the Assembly from 1762 to 1765 he rendered himself popular by his superior talents and unwavering firmness, and was the acknowledged leader of the most daring of the people of North Carolina in the struggles against the Stamp Act and other obnoxious measures of the ministry.

He accompanied Gov. Martin in his expedition against the Regulators in 1771; but, soon afterwards, as a member of the Assembly, of the Committee of Correspondence, of the Provincial Congress, and of the Committee of Safety, he renewed his active opposition to the royal authority. In 1775 he headed the party who destroyed Fort Johnston, compelling Gov. Martin to seek safety in flight to a sloop-of-war, and suffering the penalty of being declared a rebel.

He was the first person who received a commission from the people of North Carolina, when he took command of the militia of New Hanover county, and equipped a regiment at his own expense.

In 1776 he was made the Brigadier-general of the Wilmington District, and was actively engaged in the various duties of his station until he joined General Lincoln in South Carolina in 1779.

His misfortune at Briar Creek called forth violent denunciations against him, and he returned home. A court-martial, of which General Moultrie was the President, examined his conduct therein, and with, apparently, great propriety, decided "that General Ashe did not take all the necessary precautions which he ought to have done to secure his camp, and to obtain timely intelligence of the movements and approach of the enemy, but it did entirely acquit him of every imputation of a want of personal courage, and that he remained in the field as long as prudence and duty required."

He never returned to the army, and, soon afterwards, was betrayed into the hands of the British by his confidential servant, and suffered a long and severe confinement.

While a prisoner he contracted the small-pox, when he was paroled, but he died from its effects while his family was removing him to a place of safety, in October, 1781, aged sixty years.

CHAPTER L.

April 29 to June 20, 1779.

THE INVASION OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND BATTLE AT STONO FERRY.

THE people of South Carolina witnessed the movements in Georgia with great interest, and the disasters which followed the American arms, in that State, instead of depressing, served rather to stimulate them to make still greater exertions for their own protection.¹ By an almost unanimous vote John Rutledge had been elected Governor of the State, and to his great abilities and good judgment the legislature confided the trust "of doing every thing that appeared to him and to the council necessary for the public good."² The laws governing the militia were amended;³ the greater part of the people were ordered to arm for the defence of their homes and laws;⁴ an encampment was formed at Orangeburg, near the centre of the State, whence forces could be sent in any direction at a moment's warning;⁵ and, with well-intended zeal, parties were sent into Georgia to cut off the supplies

and harass the enemy's movements.¹ The force under General Lincoln was also strengthened,² and a thousand men were sent to strengthen the position of General Moultrie at the Black Swamp.³

Encouraged by these evidences of good-will among the people, General Lincoln, with the advice of his officers in council,⁴ crossed the Savannah on the twenty-third of April⁵ for the purpose of cutting off the enemy's communication with the back country,⁶ of circumscribing his limits,⁷ and of protecting the Legislature of Georgia, which had been summoned to meet at Augusta on the first of May.⁸

General Prevost observed this movement with great interest,⁹ but the difficulties by which he was surrounded prevented the exact accomplishment of his desires. His troops were less nu-

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 18; Marshall, iv. p. 76.

² Lee's Mem., p. 45; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 19.

³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 18, 19; Marshall, iv. p. 77.—⁴ Lee's Mem. p. 45.—⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 253; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C. ii. p. 19.

¹ Gen. Moultrie to Gov. Rutledge, April 16, 1779; Gov. Rutledge's orders to Gen. Williamson, April 5 and April 11, 1779.—² Stedman, ii. pp. 109, 110; Lee's Mem., p. 45.

³ Gen. Moultrie to Col. Chas. Pinckney, April 16, 1779.

⁴ Minutes of the Council of General Officers, held at Head-quarters, Black Swamp, April 19, 1779.

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 254.—⁶ Minutes of Council, &c.

⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Lee, p. 45; Stedman, ii. p. 110.

⁹ Lee, p. 45; Marshall, iv. p. 78.

merous than General Lincoln's, but they were better disciplined, better armed, and better provided with stores, and he had nothing to fear if they could meet on equal terms.¹ But the streams were everywhere swollen from recent rains, and presented impassable barriers to the progress of an invading army,² and other, and more feasible measures were adopted to arrest General Lincoln's progress.

With this object, on the twenty-ninth of April, General Prevost crossed the Savannah, at the head of twenty-four hundred men, besides a considerable body of Indians.³ He entered South Carolina at Purysburg,⁴ and Colonel McIntosh, who had been left there with detachments from the Second and Fifth South Carolina regiments, numbering two hundred and twenty men,⁵ retired before him and joined General Moultrie at the Black Swamp.⁶ Thither, on the thirtieth, General Prevost pursued him,⁷ but General Moultrie, with his combined forces, had moved from there three hours before the enemy arrived, and taken post at Coosohatchie Bridge.⁸ On the following day (*May 1st*), both parties appear to have advanced—the main body of the enemy, which had been increased to about three thousand

men, to Middleton's plantation in Black Swamp,¹ and General Moultrie to Tullifiny Bridge,² the latter leaving one hundred men at Coosohatchie as a rear-guard.³ Expresses had been sent to General Lincoln⁴ and to Orangeburg for reinforcements,⁵ and to Charleston.⁶ The enemy still advancing, on the third of May, the rear-guard was ordered to withdraw from Coosohatchie⁷ (before doing which Colonel Laurens rashly crossed the river and attacked the enemy),⁸ and, at noon, on the fourth, after destroying the bridge at Tullifiny, General Moultrie retired to Salt-ketcher chapel, where he encamped for the night.⁹ General Prevost, by a rapid movement, pursued General Moultrie, and encamped at Pocotaligo, five miles in his rear;¹⁰ on learning which, General Moultrie, at midnight, broke up his camp and retired to Ashepoo, burning the bridges as he passed, and greatly retarding the progress of the enemy.¹¹ On the sixth of May, General Moultrie reached Jacksonburg;¹² and on the seventh, at night, he arrived at Charleston.¹³

¹ Gen. Moultrie to Gov. Rutledge, May 2.

² Same to same, 5 p. m., May 1.—³ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 402.—⁴ Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, May 1.

⁵ Same to same, May 1; Same to Gov. Rutledge, May 1.

⁶ Same to Lieut.-Gov. Bull, April 29, 1779.

⁷ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 402.—⁸ Ibid., pp. 402, 403.

Dr. Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 21) and Gen. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 46) suppose Col. Laurens was ordered to make this attack. Gen. Moultrie says otherwise, and I have followed him.—⁹ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 403.—¹⁰ Ibid., p. 404; Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, 10 o'clock, May 4.

¹¹ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 404; Gen. Moultrie to Col. C. Finckney, May 5, 1779.—¹² Gen. Moultrie to Gov. Rutledge, May 6, 1779.

¹³ Same to Gen. Lincoln, May 8, 1779.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 45.—² Marshall, iv. p. 77; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 265.—³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 20; Stedman, ii. p. 110.—⁴ Gen. Moultrie to Lieut.-Gov. Bull, April 29.—⁵ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 377, note; Gen. Moultrie to Gov. Rutledge, April 24, 1779.

⁶ Gen. Moultrie to Lieut.-Gov. Bull, April 29, 1779.

⁷ Letters to Gen. Lincoln, April 30.

⁸ Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, April 30; Same to Gov. Rutledge, April 30.

In the mean time the citizens of Charleston were filled with the greatest alarm, and the Lieutenant-governor and council (Governor Rutledge being at Orangeburg) made strenuous efforts to put the city in a condition to defend itself.¹ The houses in the suburbs were burned, abatis and lines of defensive works were carried across the Neck, cannon were mounted on every commanding position, and the militia in the vicinity were summoned and assembled to man the lines.² When General Moultrie entered the city he was received with open arms by the terrified inhabitants, and his powerful influence and good judgment soon restored confidence and order where before were only alarm and confusion.³ About the same time the troops from Orangeburg, under Governor Rutledge,⁴ and a detachment from General Lincoln's army, under Colonel Harris,⁵ reached the city; and General Lincoln, in person (who had hesitated to return, under the supposition that General Prevost's movement was intended as a feint only),⁶ was advancing, by forced marches, towards the city.⁷

General Prevost, who had received encouragement from the absence of the troops,⁸ the general panic into which

the inhabitants along his route had fallen,¹ the desertion of the troops commanded by General Moultrie,² and the encouragement received from the Tories in Charleston,³ had been induced to change his original plan,—which was truly to draw General Lincoln from Georgia,—and to push for Charleston.⁴ Had this decision been made at first, and his march been continued beyond Salt-ketcher chapel, as it had been commenced, the town must have fallen without a blow, but his stay at the former place destroyed his opportunity of success.⁵ Leaving his main body and baggage on the south side of the Ashley River,⁶ on the morning of the eleventh of May⁷ he crossed the river, and approached the town at the head of nine hundred men.⁸ When his presence became known within the American lines, General Pulaski, who had entered the town about two hours before, moved out, at the head of eighty men, to meet him and check his progress.⁹ Posting the men behind a temporary shelter, he galloped forward and joined a party of light-horse which was skirmishing with the enemy, a mile in advance, and engaged the British cavalry with the intention of drawing them within the range of his men whom he

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 23; Gordon, iii. p. 256.

² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 24; Mills' Statistics of S. C., p. 241; Stedman, ii. p. 111; Lee's Mem., p. 47.

³ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 411.—⁴ Mills' Statistics of S. C., p. 241; Stedman, ii. p. 111; Lee, p. 47.—⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 111; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 24.—⁶ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 21; Stedman, ii. p. 110; Lee's Mem., p. 46.—⁷ Marshall, iv. p. 80; Gordon, iii. p. 257.

⁸ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 22; Gordon, iii. p. 255.

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 22; Marshall, iv. p. 79.

² Mill's Statistics of S. C., p. 241; Marshall, iv. pp.

78, 79.—³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 23; Gordon, iii.

pp. 255, 256.—⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 110, 111; Marshall, iv.

p. 80.—⁵ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 23; Lee's Mem.,

pp. 46, 47; Marshall, iv. p. 81.—⁶ Stedman, ii. p. 112;

Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 24, 25.—⁷ Ramsay's Rev.

in S. C., ii. p. 24.—⁸ Ibid.; Moultrie's Mem., i. pp. 423,

424.—⁹ Moultrie's Mem., i. pp. 423, 424.

had thus concealed. His plan succeeded admirably until the troops behind the breastwork, in their eagerness to fire, exposed themselves, rendering abortive the projected ambuscade, and bringing down upon themselves a greatly superior force, with the loss of the greater part of their number.¹ The gallantry of this attack by the cavalry, and the obstinacy of the defence of the infantry, under General Pulaski, served to dispel the general panic which prevailed among the people, as well as to excite in the mind of the invader an unpleasant misgiving respecting the character of the reception which awaited him.²

Knowing the advantage of gaining time,³ and in accordance with the request of the council of the city, on the morning of the eleventh, General Moultrie opened a correspondence with General Prevost respecting a surrender of the town,⁴ and continued it until the afternoon of the twelfth, when, with an apology for "detaining them so long,"⁵ General Moultrie decided to "fight it out," and prepared for action.⁶ No action took place, however, and the town was spared for another and more formidable enemy. On the morning of the thirteenth, it was discovered that the enemy had retreated during the

preceding night;¹ and, before the Count Pulaski, with his Legion, could reach him, he was safely transported across the Ashley River.²

Having intercepted a letter from General Lincoln,³ General Prevost feared either to remain before the town,—which would place him between the fire of the town in front, and that of General Lincoln in the rear,—or to return by the route on which he had advanced,—as that would bring him in contact with General Lincoln,⁴—he filed off to the left and occupied James' Island and Wappoo,⁵ about two miles from Charleston, and within sight from the steeple in that town.⁶ Soon afterwards he retired to John's Island,⁷ leaving a detachment on the main to cover the ferry;⁸ and General Lincoln, who had returned to Charleston, proceeded to Stono to watch his movements, and be ready to take advantage of any circumstances which might promise success.⁹

At length, on the fifteenth of June, General Lincoln, after consulting the Governor and Council, determined to attack the enemy's lines, on the main land, at Stono Ferry.¹⁰ It is probable

¹ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 435; Stedman, ii. p. 112.

² Mills' Statistics of S. C., p. 242; Stedman, ii. p. 112.

³ Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Moultrie, 4 P. M., May 10, 1779; Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, 12½ o'clock, May 13.

⁴ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 437.—⁵ Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, May 14; Same to same, May 16; Moultrie's Mem., i. pp. 444, 449.—⁶ Moultrie's Mem., i. pp. 444, 449.

⁷ Col. Grimkie to J. Kean, June 21 (Doc. II.); Stedman, ii. pp. 113, 115; Lee's Mem., p. 48; Marshall, iv. pp. 82, 83.—⁸ Col. Grimkie to J. Kean, June 21 (Doc. II.); Gen. Huger to Gen. Moultrie, June 1; Stedman, ii. p. 115; Lee's Mem., p. 48.—⁹ Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Moultrie, 10 A. M., May 30, 1779; Lee's Mem., p. 48.

¹⁰ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 479.

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 25, 26; Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 424.—² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 26; Gordon, iii. p. 257.—³ Mills' Statistics of S. C., p. 242; Stedman, ii. p. 112; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 27.

⁴ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 427; Gordon, iii. p. 257.

⁵ The entire correspondence is published in Moultrie's Mem., i. pp. 427-435.

⁶ Moultrie's Mem., i. p. 434.

he was induced to take this step from the preparations which had been made for the withdrawal of the enemy's force from the State, and when, on the sixteenth, General Prevost with the grenadiers returned to Savannah,¹ the project was rendered still more promising.

The enemy's position was well chosen and judiciously protected. His front was covered by two square redoubts, with a battery of three pieces between them; while his right was secured by a marsh and a deep creek, over which was thrown a very narrow causeway, defended by a round redoubt, with a piece of artillery; and his left by a small breastwork, with two field-pieces. The Stono covered his rear, and a heavy abatis surrounded the whole of the works.² The garrison consisted of the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment (Highlanders), part of a regiment of Hessians, a detachment of artillery, and a body of Carolina loyalists,³ numbering together about eight hundred men,⁴ and the command was vested in Lieutenant-colonel Maitland.⁵

Orders had been given to General Moultrie, on the nineteenth,⁶ "to throw over to James' Island all the troops which can be spared from Charleston; to show them to the enemy on John's Island,"—for the purpose of preventing reinforcements from being sent to Col-

onel Maitland,—“and to carry his boats up Wappoo-cut, ready to throw his men on John's Island,”—to attack the enemy in the rear,—“in case an opportunity should offer without risking too much.” This order was not obeyed promptly, and, although the troops reached James' Island,¹ the vessels lost the tide in Wappoo Inlet,² and could not be used in checking the advance of the reinforcements from John's Island, as General Lincoln desired.³

Shortly after midnight, on the morning of the twentieth of June, General Lincoln advanced against the enemy's lines, in accordance with the plan of operations which had been adopted.⁴ The Continental troops, with four field-pieces, commanded by General Huger, formed the left wing; the militia from North and South Carolina, with two field-pieces, commanded by General Sumner, occupied the right, while Colonel Malmedy and Lieutenant-colonel Henderson, with two companies of light-infantry, covered either flank; the Virginia militia, with two field-pieces, formed the reserve; and the cavalry, on the right and rear of the reserve, guarded the rear.⁵ Through the inefficiency of the guides, the line

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 116.—² Col. Grimkie to J. Kean, June 21 (Doc. II.) ; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 29, 30; Stedman, ii. p. 115.—³ Stedman, ii. p. 116.

⁴ Gen. Prevost to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 4 (Doc. III.)

⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 116; Marshall, iv. p. 83.—⁶ Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Moultrie, “Stono Ferry, June 19, 1779.”

¹ Gen. Moultrie to Gen. Lincoln, “Wappoo, June 20, 1779.”—² Johnson's Traditions of the Rev., p. 225, where it is said, on the authority of one of those who were present, that Gen. Moultrie was detained at a convivial party in Charleston.—³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 29; Marshall, iv. pp. 84, 85.—⁴ Gen. Prevost to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 4, 1779 (Doc. III.) ; Col. Grimkie to John Kean, June 21 (Doc. II.)

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 258; Lee's Mem., p. 49; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 29.

was formed at a distance of nearly a mile from the enemy's position, and the ground over which the right had to pass being densely wooded with small pine saplings, its progress was retarded; while the left moved with more facility, through an open forest of stately pines.¹ The enemy's pickets were driven in with but little opposition,² about seven o'clock,³ and the line advanced without any obstruction until Lieutenant-colonel Henderson, who covered the left flank, encountered two companies of Highlanders, under Captain Campbell,⁴ which had been posted in advance of the lines to check the accustomed morning attack on the lines by the American light troops.⁵ With genuine Scottish bravery these companies attacked the Americans, and, notwithstanding the great inferiority of their numbers they continued the contest, hand-to-hand (for the Americans attacked them with the bayonet),⁶ until all except eleven privates were left, wounded or dead, on the field.⁷ Aroused by this spirited prologue, and emulating the example of the Highlanders, the American line advanced within three hundred yards of the enemy's works,⁸ and a heavy fire was opened, which was continued with great spirit for about an hour.⁹ At this time an

approaching reinforcement for the garrison,¹ which the orders to General Moultrie had been designed to counteract, rendered it impolitic to continue the action, and the troops were ordered to retire.²

Perceiving the movement of General Lincoln's troops, the garrison sallied in pursuit;³ but the good order in which the retreat was made,⁴ and the vigilance of the light troops, commanded by Colonel Andrew Pickens, rendered it fruitless.⁵

The loss of the enemy was three officers and twenty-three men *killed*; ten officers and ninety-three men *wounded*; and one man *missing*;⁶ that of the Americans was one hundred and forty-six *killed and wounded*; and one hundred and fifty-five *missing*.⁷

This attack hastened the retreat of the enemy; and, a few days afterwards, passing from island to island as far as Port Royal, where a post was established, he took shipping from that place and returned to Savannah.⁸

If the British service gained no honor from this expedition, its officers and

¹ Gen. Prevost to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 4 (Doc. III.) ; Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Moultrie, June 20 (Doc. I.) ; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 30 ; Stedman, ii. p. 117 ; Lee's Mem., p. 50.—² Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Moultrie, June 20 (Doc. I.) ; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 30 ; Stedman, ii. p. 117 ; Lee's Mem., p. 50.—³ Gen. Lincoln to

Gen. Moultrie, June 20 (Doc. I.) ; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 30.—⁴ Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Moultrie, June 20 (Doc. I.) ; Stedman, ii. pp. 117, 118.—⁵ Gen. Lincoln to

Gen. Moultrie, June 20 (Doc. I.) ; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 30.—⁶ Gen. Prevost to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 4 (Doc. III.) —⁷ Gordon, iii. p. 259. Lee (Mem., p. 51) says the loss was 165.—⁸ Gen. Prevost to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 4 (Doc. III.) ; Stedman, ii. p. 119 ; Lee's Mem., p. 52.

¹ Col. Grimkie to J. Kean, June 21 (Doc. II.)

² Stedman, ii. p. 117 ; Col. Grimkie to J. Kean, June 21 (Doc. II.) —³ Stedman, ii. p. 117 ; Marshall, iv. p. 84.

⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 117.—⁵ Col. Grimkie to J. Kean, June 21 (Doc. II.) Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 30 ; Stedman, ii. p. 117.—⁶ Col. Grimkie to J. Kean, June 20 (Doc. II.)

⁷ Stedman, ii. p. 117.—⁸ Ibid. ; Lee's Mem., p. 50.

⁹ Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Moultrie, June 20 (Doc. I.)

soldiers added greatly to their personal wealth through its means.¹ Negroes, horses, cattle, household furniture, plate, and every species of property, were carried away without reserve,² and the inhabitants on the route of the army suffered the most ruinous losses. "The troops spread over a considerable extent of country, and small parties visited every house, stripping it of whatever was most valuable, and rifling the

inhabitants of their money, rings, jewels, and other personal ornaments. And yet what was destroyed by the soldiers was supposed to be of more value than what they carried off. The devastations committed by them were so enormous, as that a particular relation of them would scarcely be credited by people at a distance, though the same could be attested by hundreds of eye-witnesses."¹

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

GEN. LINCOLN'S LETTER TO GEN. MOULTRIE.

NEAR STONO, June 20, 1779.

DEAR SIR:—From various accounts of deserters, and others, which we were informed of by a person of character, who left the lines the evening before the last, I was led to believe that they were retreating; and by the same person, who spent a day in their lines at Stono Ferry, that their whole force there did not exceed six hundred men, we thought it our duty to attack them this morning. This resolution caused me to write to you yesterday, requesting you would attempt to divert them on John's Island.

The attack was made, which lasted about fifty-six minutes. During that time we had some officers and men wounded, and some few men killed. Among the former was our brave and good friend Colonel Roberts, since dead of his wounds. The enemy did not choose to leave their lines, and being much better covered therein than was expected, and having in the time of the action received a very consid-

erable reinforcement, I was induced to withdraw our troops, after securing our wounded, wagons, and artillery, as I saw no prospect of continuing with any rational hope of success. In justice to the officers and men, I must say they behaved well in general. I wish the troops had been so broken to service as that they could have been brought to charge the enemy with fixed bayonets. The soldiers are in good spirits, and think that if they had had the enemy out of the lines, they could have flogged them easily—I think they would. It is said by many of the officers who saw the enemy's dead that their loss is very considerable. If your troops are on James' Island it will be well to keep them there (if it can be done with safety to the town), for probably you may aid thereby some future movements of ours. I yet think the enemy mean to leave their present post soon, and hope we shall have an opportunity of harassing their rear. After a little rest, I shall be able to give you a more particular state of matters, than I can undertake at present, having been ten hours on horseback, without any sleep. I cannot get a list of the wounded offi-

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 31.—² Gordon, iii. p. 259.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 259.

cers, none were left dead on the field. Major Anernm is dangerously wounded; Colonel Lamoy and General Huger had each a slight wound.

There was a creek on the right of the enemy's works, which ran in front of the redoubts, and which was the real reason why our Continental troops did not storm the works, as was intended. We were wholly ignorant of there being such an obstruction in the advance of our troops, otherwise our order of attack would have been reversed. However, it proved the bravery of our men, who marched to the very brink of the creek, and there remained exposed to the fire of the enemy, who were under cover, by their works.

The order for retreat was not given until the causeway, which is three fourths of a mile long, and twenty-eight feet wide, leading from John's Island (and which you might clearly discern from our right), was completely covered, from the woods down to the river, with the British reinforcements. The retreat was conducted in an orderly and regular manner, our platoons frequently facing about and firing by the word of command upon their pursuers, who, however, very soon gave over the chase.

I am, &c.,

B. LINCOLN.

GEN. MOULTRIE.

II.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL GRIMKIE TO J. KEAN.

CAMP AT SOMMERS, June 21, 1779.

The enemy having established themselves at Stono Ferry, on the main; maintained a garrison in their works of about 5 or 600 men. It was of the utmost consequence that it should be in their possession, as it secured the navigation of the Stono River, and facilitated their retreat to Georgia, towards which place all their movements pointed. They had already withdrawn their cavalry to John's Island, where the main body of their army was encamped; their transports had arrived from Savannah; and the baggage was embarking. The season for action

was almost exhausted, and the heat of the weather, or the attendant disorders of our summers, would have shortly put an end to the contention of the two armies, and compelled them to retire into Summer quarters. The campaign had, as yet, for us been unfortunate, for after the retreat of the army out of Georgia, a feeble and fruitless attempt was made on the enemy's galleys, in the river Savannah; a detachment of Georgia Continental troops, and North Carolina militia, amounting to 7 or 800 men, had been surprised and totally routed at Brier Creek; and the march of Gen. Lincoln to Augusta, 120 miles from the town of Savannah, to cross the river there, into the State of Georgia, had left the State of South Carolina open to the irruptions of the enemy, who had appeared before and summoned Charleston to surrender, spreading ruin and devastation from the Savannah to the Ashley River. A proper and well-concerted attack upon the enemy at Wappoo, whilst they were divided in their force, was countermanded, almost at the very moment of the assault on their works, in consequence of which General Pulaski had withdrawn his legionary corps from the service, in disgust. Our army now encamped at Sommers, mouldering away; the South Carolina militia, under Gen. Williamson, were retiring home privately and individually; and the time of the Virginia and North Carolina militia would expire in a few days. This was the situation of the two armies, when Gen. Lincoln called a Council of War, on the evening of the 19th of June, wherein it was determined to attack the enemy's post at Stono Ferry, on the next morning.

The army was in motion at midnight, and having joined the battalion of light-infantry, under Lieutenant-colonel Henderson, which had been advanced towards the enemy's works, we arrived about an hour after daybreak before the works. The front of the enemy was covered by two square redoubts, and a battery between them of three pieces of ordnance, which pointed down the road leading from the ferry, over Wallis bridge, to Charleston. Their front was secured by a marsh and a deep creek, over which led a very narrow causeway that was defended by a round redoubt and one piece of ar-

tillery, posted on the outside of this last work. A small breastwork on the bank of, and at right angles with the river, sufficient to cover about 80 or 100, with 2 field-pieces, protected the landing; and between this work and their left square redoubt, mentioned before, was almost equidistantly placed a small flank. The river covered their rear, and an abatis surrounded the whole of their works.

Our flanks were covered by the two battalions of light-infantry; the left of our line was composed of Continental troops, under Gen. Huger, with four field-pieces; and the brigade of North and South Carolina militia, with two field-pieces, under General Sumner, formed our left. In the rear of this body was posted the Virginia militia, with two field-pieces in reserve; and the cavalry were posted on the right of the reserve, and rather more retired.

The position of the enemy was nearly in the centre of an old field (extending about a mile along the river), and advanced about 200 yards from its margin.

Unfortunately for us, by the misinformation of our guides, we formed our line at the distance of three quarters of a mile from the enemy's works, which retarded the progress of the right of our army very much, as the ground over which they had to pass was very fully wooded with a vast number of pine saplings; the left advanced with more facility, as the ground over which they passed had never been cleared, and was wooded only with full-grown, tall, and stately pines. Our light troops soon drove in their pickets, who made little or no resistance; and the battalion commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Henderson, on the left, in endeavoring to gain his position, fell in with two companies of the 71st regiment, which had been posted in the woods, with a design of checking those daily attacks which our light troops had been accustomed to make upon them every morning. Lieut. Colonel Henderson, who was in column, when he first perceived the Highlanders, formed under their fire very deliberately and returned it; then, ordering a charge with bayonets, drove the enemy with great precipitation into their works, leaving nearly half of their men killed or wounded on the field.

III.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL PREVOST TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN, DATED SAVANNAH, AUG. 4, 1779.

Since my last dispatches from St. John's Island (copies of which are herewith sent), I have had no opportunity to write directly to your Lordship. Our operations since that time have been chiefly confined in removing from one island to another, and establishing the different posts intended to be occupied during the great heat and the sickly season: however, on the 20th of June, after every preparation had been made to abandon the post on the main at Stono Ferry, and to quit the island of St. John, the enemy's whole force attacked the post with eight pieces of cannon and 5000 men. Their attack was at first spirited, but the good countenance of the troops and the fire of the armed flat that covered the left flank of our post, just as the troops were ferrying over to reinforce it, obliged the enemy to retreat. A favorable opportunity of pursuing them and giving them a severe check was lost for the want of the horses, which had been sent away two or three days before; and before the troops arrived on the ground, the rebels had got too great a distance to expect to come up with them with the foot. I have the honor of sending herewith a return of our loss on that day. Lieutenant-colonel Maitland, who commanded there, had with him the 1st battalion 71st, then much reduced, a weak battalion of Hessians, and the refugees of North and South Carolina, amounting in the whole to about 800 men; they all behaved with coolness and bravery. The enemy lost a Colonel of Artillery, much esteemed amongst them, and about 28 officers of different ranks, and between 3 and 400 killed and wounded. They were enabled to carry off the latter, and many of the former, by having a number of empty wagons brought along with them for that purpose. The troops, after remaining three days longer on that ground, at last abandoned it, and began to move towards Port Royal Island, where the last arrived about the 12th ult.

A. PREVOST, M. G.

CHAPTER LI.

July 2, 1779.

THE SKIRMISH AT POUNDRIDGE, N. Y.

ABOUT twenty-one miles northeast from the village of White Plains, Westchester county, N. Y., on an elevated situation, near the centre of the town of the same name, lies the village of Poundridge.¹ At the period of the Revolution it had been settled several years, and there resided Major Ebenezer Lockwood, one of the most active of the Whigs of Westchester county, for whose arrest a special reward had been offered by the King's officers.²

For the accomplishment of this object, or for the purpose of surprising a party of troops who had been stationed there, an expedition was organized by Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton; and, on the first of July, 1779, he proceeded to put it into execution.³ His force consisted of seventy men from the Seventeenth light-dragoons; a detachment, both infantry and cavalry, from the Legion; and parties from the Queen's Rangers, the Hussars, and the Yagers, all mounted,⁴ and numbering about three hundred and sixty men.⁵ He

left Mile Square¹ at about half-past eleven in the evening, and, proceeding by way of the North Castle meeting-house and Bedford,² he approached Poundridge about sunrise.³

Notwithstanding the silence with which he marched, his approach had been made known some hours before by Luther Kinnicut, a spy, who was employed by the Committee of Safety; and Major Lockwood, and Colonel Sheldon, a party of whose light-horse was near by, made preparations for his reception.⁴

When he approached the meeting-house at Poundridge, which stood where the meeting-house of the Presbyterian church now stands,⁵ his guides mistook their way;⁶ and Colonel Sheldon formed his men a short distance above, and awaited his approach.⁷

Having rectified the error into which he had fallen, Colonel Tarleton formed his troops into column of seven or eight

¹ Bolton's Hist. of Westchester Co., ii. p. 8.—² Ibid., p. 12.—³ Col. Tarleton to Sir Henry Clinton, 11 p. m., July 2, 1779.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Heath's Mem., p. 208.

¹ Heath's Mem., p. 208.—² Col. Tarleton's dispatch, July 2.—³ "Letter from an officer, Salem, July 3, 1779," in Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1448, Monday, July 19, 1779.—⁴ Bolton's Westchester Co., ii. p. 12.
⁵ Ibid., p. 9.—⁶ Col. Tarleton's dispatch, 11 p. m., July 2.
⁷ Ibid.; Letter from an officer, July 3.

in front, with the Seventeenth light-dragoons in the van, and advanced towards Colonel Sheldon's position.¹ He quickly drove in the advanced parties, and Colonel Sheldon, finding himself unable to cope with an enemy fourfold stronger than himself, retired towards Salem.² The enemy pressed close on his rear for two miles, both parties keeping up a scattering fire, with some loss to each;³ when the gathering of the militia,⁴ and the frequent shots received from the houses and farm-buildings which he passed,⁵ warned the impetuous Tarleton of the danger which surrounded him. He accordingly sounded "the retreat," when Colonel Sheldon and the people along the road, in their turn, became the assailants,⁶ and pursued him down to Newcastle.⁷

A sudden and precipitate retreat followed,⁸ in which the enemy succeeded in carrying off the colors of Sheldon's

regiment¹—which had been left, accidentally, in their quarters²—and the baggage of some of the officers.³ A part of his force having been left at Poundridge, while the main body pursued Colonel Sheldon, the Presbyterian meeting-house, the dwellings of Major Lockwood and some other Whigs, and some stores, were burned;⁴ and Mr. Hays' house, at Bedford, was also burned while he passed through that place.⁵

The loss of the Americans was a corporal, a trumpeter, and eight privates, *wounded*; and three sergeants, a corporal, four privates, and twelve horses, *missing*, the latter, probably, having been taken prisoners.⁶ The enemy's loss, as usual, has been differently reported—Colonel Tarleton reporting one man and one horse killed, and one man wounded;⁷ while Colonel Sheldon claims four men and four horses taken.⁸

¹ Col. Tarleton's dispatch, July 2.—² Heath's Mem., p. 208; Letter from an officer, July 3; Col. Tarleton's dispatch, 11 p. m., July 2.

³ Letter from an officer, July 3.

⁴ Col. Tarleton's dispatch, 11 p. m., July 2.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Heath's Mem., p. 208; Letter from an officer, July 3; Col. Tarleton's dispatch, 11 p. m., July 2.

⁷ Letter from an officer, July 3.—⁸ Ibid.

¹ Heath's Mem., p. 208; Col. Tarleton's dispatch, July 2; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 289, N. Y., July 7, 1779.—² Heath's Mem., p. 208.—³ Col. Tarleton's dispatch, July 2.—⁴ Heath's Mem., p. 208; Col. Tarleton's dispatch, July 2; Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 9.—⁵ Heath's Memoirs, p. 208; Col. Tarleton's dispatch, July 2; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 289, July 7, 1779.—⁶ Heath's Mem., p. 208; Letter from an officer, July 3.—⁷ Col. Tarleton's dispatch, July 2.

⁸ Heath's Mem., p. 208; Letter from an officer, July 3.

DOCUMENT.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BANASTRE TARLETON'S
LETTER TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

CAMP ON THE BRONX, }
July 2, 1779, ELEVEN P. M. }

SIR:—I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that I arrived with the detachment you were pleased to entrust me with, consisting of seventy of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, part of the Legion Infantry and Cavalry, Queen's Rangers, Hussars, and some mounted Yagers, in all about two hundred, at half-past eleven o'clock at night. The weather being remarkably bad, prevented my reaching North-castle Church before four o'clock next morning, where I received confirmation of my intelligence relative to the numbers and situation of Sheldon's regiment and one hundred Continental foot, but no tidings of Moylan's regiment of dragoons.

I pursued my route through Bedford to Poundridge without any material occurrence. In the district of the Ridge, and within three hundred yards of the enemy, who were not alarmed, my guide in front mistook the road; another guide informed me of the error, and it was rectified as soon as possible.

The enemy's vidette had noticed, to them, our passing their front. The whole regiment was mounted and formed behind the Meeting-house. An attack was instantly made by the advanced guard, consisting of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, the ground not allowing more than seven or eight in front. The enemy did not stand the charge—a general rout immediately ensued. The difficulty of the country, and there being no possibility of obtaining their rear, enabled the greatest part of the regiment to escape. The pursuit continued for four miles on the Stamford and Salem roads.

The loss of men in Sheldon's Dragoons, upon inquiry and comparison of accounts, I estimate at twenty-six or twenty-seven in killed, wounded, and prisoners; but their disgrace, in the loss of the standard of the regiment, and of helmets, arms, and accoutrements, was great. Part of the officers and regimental baggage fell into our hands. I have hitherto omitted mentioning the militia to the amount of one hundred and twenty, who, together with the Continental foot, broke and dispersed at the approach of the King's troops.

The militia assembled again on eminences and in swamps, and, before we quitted the ground on which the first charge was made, they fired at great distances. We were successful in killing, wounding, and taking fifteen of them; the rest hovered almost out of sight.

The inveteracy of the inhabitants of Poundridge, and near Bedford, in firing from houses and outhouses, obliged me to burn one of their meeting and some of their dwelling houses, with stores. I proposed to the militia terms, that if they would not fire shots from buildings, I would not burn. They interpreted my mild proposal wrong, imputing it to fear. They persisted in firing till the torch stopped their progress; after which not a shot was fired.

With pleasure I relate to your Excellency that the loss sustained by His Majesty's troops is trifling, one hussar of the Legion killed, one wounded, one horse of Seventeenth dragoons killed; the whole of the detachment, except the above, being returned to camp. The infantry of the Legion, mounted on horses, are extremely fatigued by a march of sixty-four miles in twenty-three hours.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

BANASTRE TARLETON,
Lieutenant-Colonel British Legion.

CHAPTER LI.

July 5 to 12, 1779.

THE INVASION OF CONNECTICUT.

THE enemy's forces had been greatly annoyed by the small vessels and the whale-boats which the inhabitants of Connecticut and New York, on the borders of Long Island Sound, had employed in attacks on his commerce, as well as on the posts which had been established in the neighborhood of that channel;¹ and measures were taken, pursuant to orders from the ministry,² to suppress the practice as well as to punish the offenders. In the adoption of this measure, it is probable that Sir Henry Clinton was somewhat influenced by the activity of the people of Connecticut in supplying the Continental army with supplies; and it is also not improbable that he hoped thereby to draw General Washington from his strong position, near the Highlands, and be enabled to move against him with greater prospects of success.³

Accordingly arrangements were made to move against the seaboard of Connecticut, and Major-general Tryon, who had visited Danbury, in that State,

some months before,¹ was placed in command of the forces ordered for that duty.² The troops, composed of the Twenty-third and Fifty-fourth regiments of the line, the Fusileers, and the flank companies of the Guards, British; the Hessian and Landgrave's regiments, and a detachment of Yagers, Germans; and the "King's American regiment" of Tories,³ in all twenty-six hundred men,⁴ embarked in transports and rendezvoused at White Stone, where, on the third of July, they were joined by General Tryon.⁵ On the same evening they got under way,⁶ and proceeded, under convoy of the Camilla, Scorpion, Halifax, brig, and Hussar, galley,⁷ to the harbor of New Haven, where they arrived early in the morning of the fifth, and anchored off West Haven.⁸

At about five o'clock A. M. the first

¹ Vide Chap. XVIII.—² Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

³ Ibid.—⁴ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 269; Stedman, ii. p. 142; Marshall, iv. p. 116.—⁵ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁶ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁷ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 269.

⁸ Connecticut Journal, July 7, 1779; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.

¹ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Marshall, iv. p. 116.—² Gordon, iii. pp. 264, 265.—³ Stedman, ii. p. 142; Marshall, iv. p. 116.

division, composed of the Guards, the Fusileers, the Fifty-fourth regiment, and the Yagers, with four field-pieces, under the command of General Garth,¹ landed at Savin Rock, in the present town of Orange, on the west side of the harbor;² and began its march towards New Haven,³ under the guidance of a man named Chandler.⁴ The inhabitants fled in every direction as it approached, and from *them* it met with no opposition.⁵ A small party of young men from New Haven, some of them students of Yale College, led by Captain James Hillhouse, took a position near the West Haven Green, and opposed the progress of the enemy.⁶ Although not more than twenty-five in number, they drove the light troops of the Guards, which formed the advance, back upon the main body.⁷ General Garth immediately threw out strong flanking parties, and advanced with his entire force, until he reached the "West Bridge," by which the Milford turnpike crosses the West River, the plank from which had been removed.⁸ Some works had also been hastily thrown up, on the eastern bank of the stream, and two pieces of cannon had been brought from the town to dispute the passage.⁹ A smart engagement took place in this vicinity, in which Adjutant Campbell,

of the Guards, was killed,¹ and the Rev. Dr. Daggett, afterwards president of Yale College, was taken prisoner.² At length the enemy retired, and, passing up the western bank of the river, he crossed it at Thomson's Bridge,³ and, by way of Hotchkisstown,⁴ approached the town, on the old Derby road.⁵ Every step of his progress was the scene of opposition, and he reached New Haven, "not without loss and fatigue," at half-past one in the afternoon.⁶

In the mean time General Tryon, with the second division of his troops, embracing the Twenty-third, the Hessian, the Landgrave's, and the "King's American" regiments, with two field-pieces, approached the south end,⁷ near where the lighthouse now stands, in the town of East Haven.⁸ A small party, with a field-piece, opposed his landing;⁹ and as one of the boats approached the shore, Ensign Watkins, the adjutant of the "King's American regiment," rose from his seat and called out, "Disperse, ye rebels!" He was immediately shot through the body, and was buried near where the lighthouse stands.¹⁰ Having effected a landing,

¹ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—² Conn. Journal, July 7, 1779; Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 80; Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 246.

³ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁴ Conn. Journal, July 7, 1779.—⁵ Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 81.—⁶ Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., pp. 172, 246.—⁷ Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 81

⁸ Conn. Journal, July 7.—⁹ Ibid.

¹ Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 81.—² Statement of Dr. Daggett, in Sec. of State's office; Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 81.—³ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.; Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 173.—⁴ Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 81.—⁵ Conn. Journal, July 7; Barber's New Haven, p. 81.—⁶ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 269; Stedman, ii. p. 142; Gordon, iii. p. 266.

⁷ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁸ Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 15.

⁹ Conn. Jour., July 7; Barber's New Haven, p. 15.

¹⁰ Barber's New Haven, p. 15.

General Tryon marched towards New Haven,¹ plundering and burning, on his way, the house known as "The Morris Place;"² and taking possession of the fort at Black Rock, now the site of Fort Hale.³

The vessels soon afterwards approached the town;⁴ and General Garth determined, as soon as the "*Neck Bridge*" (which crossed the Mill River on the east side of the town)⁵ could be occupied, "he should begin the conflagration which he thought was merited,"⁶ because of the opposition he had experienced from the inhabitants. The occupation of that bridge, however, was more easily desired than attained; and he was compelled to remain on the north side of the town until the following morning, while General Tryon remained on the heights in East Haven, on the eastern shore of the harbor.⁷

On the following morning (*Tuesday, July 6th*), after plundering the inhabitants of their valuables, and in many instances destroying their furniture,⁸

General Garth, with the greatest silence and dispatch, called in his guards,¹ ordered the Fifty-fourth regiment to their transports,² and, about seven o'clock, with the remainder of the troops, crossed over to East Haven,³ where General Tryon had remained with his entire division. He appears to have changed his mind respecting the destruction of the town, and contented himself with the plunder he secured, six field-pieces, and a small privateer, which he also carried away with him,⁴ and with destroying the public stores which he found in the town.⁵

In the afternoon of the same day, the entire force marched down to the Rock Fort (*Fort Hale*), and, at about six o'clock, re-embarked,⁶ carrying away with it between thirty and forty of the inhabitants of New Haven;⁷ and, an hour afterwards, during the evening, the fleet left the harbor,⁸ to seek new conquests on other parts of the coast.

The loss of the Americans was twenty-two *killed* and seventeen *wounded*;⁹ that of the enemy, two officers and seven men *killed*; three officers and thirty-seven men *wounded*; and twenty-five men *missing*.¹⁰ A committee, appointed by the General Assembly in October, 1779, after a careful examination, reported that the damage to the property of the inhabitants, from this visit of the

¹ Conn. Journal, July 7; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

² Barber's Hist. of New Haven, p. 15.—³ Conn. Jour., July 7; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.—⁴ Conn. Journal, July 7.

⁵ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II. This bridge, if I have been correctly informed, is not the same as *Tomlinson's Bridge* (which crosses an arm of the harbor, formed by the confluence of the Mill and Quinnipiac Rivers), as Mr. Lossing supposes (*Field Book*, i. p. 435).

⁶ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁷ Ibid.; Stedman, ii. p. 142. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, i. p. 425) is in error when he supposes "the Neck Bridge" was forced by the enemy. Tryon did not cross Mill River at all, and Garth did so by "the Ferry."

⁸ Conn. Jour., July 7; Depositions of Sarah Townsend, John Collins, Elias Beers, Isaac Beers, Lois Cook, Abigail English, and Chas. Alling, of New Haven, Conn.; Gordon, iii. p. 266.

¹ Conn. Jour., July 7; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

² Ibid.—³ Conn. Jour., July 7; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁴ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁵ Ibid.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., pp. 270, 271.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Conn. Jour., July 7.—⁸ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁹ Conn. Jour., July 7.—¹⁰ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

enemy to New Haven, "was twenty-four thousand eight hundred and ninety-three pounds, seven shillings, and six-pence, as cash in 1774, and one thousand eight hundred and ninety-two pounds in Continental money, which was destroyed."¹

On Thursday morning (*July 8th*), the fleet anchored in front of the village of Fairfield, a county-seat of Fairfield county, Connecticut,² twenty-one miles southwest from New Haven.³ The boats being insufficient to land the whole force, and the entirely defenceless condition of the village being apparent, General Tryon debarked, with the light companies of the Guards, one company of the Landgrave's regiment of Germans, and the regiment of Tories.⁴ He landed in what is known as "The Black Rock Harbor," east from the village,⁵ and pursued his march with but little opposition.⁶ Pushing rapidly forward, the inhabitants fled at his approach, leaving nearly all their property behind them;⁷ and he occupied the village, and the heights west of it, until the following morning.⁸ In the meantime General Garth, with the remainder of the troops, had landed two miles to the south of General Tryon's landing.

¹ Hinman's Connecticut in the Revolutionary War, pp. 612, 613.—² Dwight's Travels, iii. p. 512; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.

³ Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 351.

⁴ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁵ Ibid. Mr. Lossing has overlooked this fact in remarking (*Field Book*, i. p. 425) that the landing was made at the Pines, near Kenzie's Point.

⁶ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁷ Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 354.

⁸ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

place, and joined the latter, in his position near the village.¹

On Friday morning (*July 9th*), having plundered the deserted houses, and outraged those of the inhabitants who remained,² the torch was applied "to resent the fire of the rebels and to mask the retreat,"³ and the entire force retired to their boats, which laid off the place where General Garth had landed, and again embarked, "a weak scattering fire" on his flanks having been his only obstruction.⁴

The loss of life on the American side, if any, has not been recorded; that of the enemy was nine non-commissioned officers and privates, *killed*; thirty, *wounded*; and five, *missing*.⁵

The property destroyed at Fairfield consisted of two meeting-houses, eighty-three dwelling-houses, fifty-four barns, forty-seven storehouses and shops, two schoolhouses, the jail, and the county-house, which, with the private property, amounted in value to thirty-four thousand three hundred and fifty-nine pounds, five shillings, and sixpence, as in the year 1774.⁶

After leaving Fairfield, the enemy landed at Green's Farms, in the same town;⁷ plundered the inhabitants; and burned and destroyed the meeting-house, fourteen dwellings, thirteen barns,

¹ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

² Depositions of Eunice Burr, Jane Bulkley, Mary Beers, Isabel Trubee Abigail Bulkley, and Ann Nichols, of Fairfield.—³ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Stedman, ii. p. 143.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Returns appended to Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

⁶ Hinman's Conn. in Rev. War, pp. 613, 614.

⁷ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.

and a store, with property therein, the whole being valued (at the value in 1774) at three thousand nine hundred and four pounds, seventeen shillings.¹

Having completed the work of destruction at Fairfield, the fleet crossed the Sound to Huntingdon, where it laid at anchor until Sunday (*July 11th*),² when it again crossed the Sound and anchored off the bay of Norwalk,³ about eleven miles west from Fairfield.⁴ General Tryon immediately took the boats with the Fifty-fourth regiment, the Landgrave's regiment of Germans, and the Yagers;⁵ and, at about nine o'clock, he landed on "the Cow Pasture, a peninsula on the east side of the harbor, within a mile and a half of the bridge," to which place he was followed, the same night, by the "King's American regiment,"⁶ while General Garth, with the remainder of the troops, passed farther westward, and advanced towards the village by way of the Old Well, on the west side of the river.⁷

After laying on their arms, on the Cow Pasture, until the break of day, the troops under General Tryon took up their line of march for Norwalk, the Fifty-fourth regiment leading the column;⁸ and they soon encountered Cap-

tain Stephen Betts, of Butler's Continental regiment, who, with fifty men, disputed their passage.¹ This small party, notwithstanding the vigorous defence which it offered, was soon overpowered, and it retired before the enemy, with the loss of four men, taking a position on the heights near the village,² while the enemy, at about four o'clock, occupied Grummon's Hill, on the eastern extremity of the village, about a cannon-shot distant from Captain Betts.³ It is evident that General Tryon had been severely handled by Captain Betts, as he hesitated to cross the bridge, while the latter was east of the river; and he waited until nine o'clock, when General Garth arrived with "the second division," before he attempted to dislodge the party, who for five hours had kept up a continual fire, from the houses, on his advanced guards.⁴ The arrival of General Garth, with his fresh troops, at about nine o'clock, relieved General Tryon, and the former, with the Fusiliers and the Guards, was dispatched to dislodge Captain Betts, which was accomplished with some loss.⁵

Having accomplished this purpose, a work of plunder and destruction, similar to that pursued at New Haven and Fairfield, immediately commenced.⁶ The extensive salt-works (at that time a leading branch of industry in that neighborhood), the magazines, stores,

¹ Hinman's Conn. in Rev. War, p. 616; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 270; Stedman, ii. p. 143.

² Mr. Betts' statement, in Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., pp. 391, 392; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

³ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Mr. Betts' statement; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁴ Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 390.—⁵ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁶ Mr. Betts' statement; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁷ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁸ Ibid.

¹ Mr. Betts' statement; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

² Mr. Betts' statement.

³ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

and vessels, were all destroyed;¹ after which the dwellings of the inhabitants and other private property were also burned,² when the enemy again retired to his shipping,³ and, after crossing the Sound to Huntingdon harbor, he remained at anchor until, on the thirteenth of July, he was ordered to White Stone.⁴

The property at Norwalk which was thus destroyed, consisted of two meeting-houses, one hundred and thirty dwellings, eighty-seven barns, twenty-two stores, seventeen shops, four mills, and five vessels, which, with the private property, were valued at one hundred and sixty-six thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight dollars.⁵ The loss of life on the part of the Americans has not been recorded; on that of the enemy, it was two privates, *killed*; twenty-five

non-commissioned officers and privates, *wounded*; and two privates, *missing*.¹

Such was the notorious expedition against the inhabitants of Connecticut—one respecting which the people of America have ever retained the most intense indignation, and one of which, it is believed, even the enemy, at that time, felt heartily ashamed.² It secured one point, however, if no more, in this, that it degraded the regular service of the British army to a level with their irregular and savage auxiliaries, as shown at Wyoming and Cobel's-kill; and sealed the lips of those, in the service of the King, who might otherwise have condemned the parallel treatment extended, by Colonel Van Schaick and General Sullivan, to the enemies of America among the Six Nations in New York.

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK ON NEW HAVEN.

[From the Connecticut Journal, July 7, 1779.]

NEW HAVEN, July 7.

About two o'clock on the morning of the 5th instant, a fleet consisting of the Camilla and Scorpion, men-of-war, with tenders, transports, &c., to the number of 48, commanded by Commodore Sir George Collier, anchored off West

Haven. They had on board about 3000 land forces, commanded by Major-general Tryon; about 1500 of whom, under Brigadier-general Garth, landed about sunrise on West Haven point. The town being alarmed, all the preparation which the confusion and distress of the inhabitants, and a necessary care of their families would permit, was made for resistance. The West Bridge, on Milford road, was taken up, several field-pieces were carried thither, and some slight works thrown up for the defence of

¹ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.; Sir Geo. Collier's dispatch, Doc. III.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 270; Stedman, ii. p. 143.—² Ibid.—³ Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Sparks' Writings of Washington, vi. pp. 292, 293, note.

¹ Returns appended to Gen. Tryon's dispatch, Doc. II.

² Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain; Lord Geo. Germain to Sir Henry Clinton, Nov. 4, 1779.

that pass. The division under General Garth being landed, immediately began their march towards the town. The first opposition was made by about 25 of the inhabitants, to an advanced party of the enemy of two companies of light-infantry. These, though advancing on the height of Milford Hill, were attacked with great spirit by the handful of our people, driven back almost to West Haven, and one of them was taken prisoner. The enemy then advanced in their main body, with strong flanking parties, and two field-pieces; and finding a smart fire kept up from our field-pieces at the bridge aforesaid, chose not to force an entrance to the town by that, the usual road, but to make a circuitous march of nine miles, in order to enter by the Derby road. In this march our small party on Milford Hill, now increased to perhaps 150, promiscuously collected from several companies of the militia, had a small encounter with the enemy's left flank, near the Milford road, in which was killed their adjutant, Campbell, the loss of whom they lamented with much apparent sensibility. Our people on the hill, being obliged by superior numbers to give way, kept up a continual fire on the enemy, and galled them much, through all their march to Thomson's Bridge on the Derby road. In the mean time those who were posted at the West Bridge, perceiving the movements of the enemy, and also that another large body of them had landed at the South End, on the east side of the harbor, quitted the bridge and marched thence to oppose the enemy at Thomson's Bridge. But by the time they had reached the banks of the river, the enemy were in possession of the bridge, and the places at which the river is here fordable: yet having received a small accession of strength by the coming in of the militia, they gave the enemy a smart fire from two field-pieces and small-arms, which continued with little abatement, till the enemy were in possession of the town. Our people being obliged to retreat, either to the fields north and west of the town, or through the town across the Neck Bridge, the enemy entered the town between 12 and 1 o'clock. In the mean time, the division of the enemy, before mentioned to have landed at South End, which was under the im-

mediate command of Gen. Tryon, was bravely resisted by a small party of men, with one field-piece, who, besides other execution, killed an officer of the enemy, in one of their boats at their landing. This division marched up by land, and attacked the fort at Black Rock; at the same time their shipping drew up and attacked it from the harbor. The fort had only 19 men and 3 pieces of artillery, yet was defended as long as reason or valor dictated, and then the men made good their retreat.

The town being now in full possession of the enemy, it was, notwithstanding the subjoined proclamation, delivered up, except a few instances of protection, to promiscuous plunder: in which, besides robbing the inhabitants of their watches, money, plate, buckles, clothing, bedding, and provisions, they broke and destroyed their household furniture to a very great amount. Some families lost every thing their houses contained; many have neither food nor clothes to shift.

A body of militia sufficient to penetrate the town, could not be collected that evening: we were obliged, therefore, to content ourselves with giving the enemy every annoyance in our power, which was done, with great spirit, for most of the afternoon, at and about the Ditch-corner.

Early on Tuesday morning, the enemy unexpectedly, and with the utmost stillness and dispatch, called in their guards and retreated to their boats, carrying with them a number of the inhabitants captive, most, if not all of whom, were taken without arms, and a few who chose to accompany them. Part of them went on board their fleet, and part crossed over to Gen. Tryon at East Haven. On Tuesday afternoon the militia collected in such numbers, and crowded so close upon Gen. Tryon, that he thought best to retreat on board his fleet, and set sail to the westward.

The loss of the enemy is unknown; but for many reasons it is supposed to be considerable, and includes some officers whom they lament, besides Adjutant Campbell. Ours, by the best information we can obtain, is 27 killed and 19 wounded. As many of our dead, upon examination, appear to have been wounded with shot,

but not mortally, and afterwards to have been killed with bayonets, this demonstrated the true reason, why the number of the dead exceeded that of the wounded, to be, that being wounded and falling into the enemy's hands, they were afterwards killed. A further confirmation of this charge is, that we have full and direct testimony, which affirms that Gen. Garth declared to one of our militia, who was wounded and taken, that "he was sorry his men had not killed him, instead of taking him, and that he would not have his men give quarter to one militiaman, taken in arms."

Although in this expedition it must be confessed, to the credit of the Britons, that they have not done all the mischief in their power, yet, the brutal ravishment of women; the wanton and malicious destruction of property; the burning of the stores upon the wharf, and eight houses in East Haven; the beating, stabbing, and insulting of the Rev. Dr. Daggett, after he was made a prisoner; the mortally wounding of Mr. Beers, Senr., in his own door, and otherwise abusing him; the murdering the very aged and helpless Mr. English in his own house; and the beating, and finally cutting out the tongue of, and then killing, a distracted man, are sufficient proofs that they were *really Britons*.

They were conducted to the town by William Chandler, son of Joshua Chandler, late of this town, who with his family went off with the enemy in their retreat.

The enemy carried off between thirty and forty of the inhabitants of the town, among whom was John Whiting, Esq., judge of probate and clerk of the County Court.

II.

EXTRACT OF LETTER FROM GENERAL TRYON TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

NEW YORK, July 20, 1779.

Having, on the 3d instant, joined the troops assembled on board the transports at White Stone, Sir George Collier got the fleet under way the same evening; but the wind being

light, we did not reach the harbor of New Haven until the 5th, in the morning.

The first division, consisting of the flank companies of the Guards, the Fusileers, 54th regiment, and a detachment of the Jagers, with four field-pieces, under Brigadier-general Garth, landed about five o'clock (A. M.) a mile south of West Haven, and began their march, making a circuit of upwards of seven miles, to head a creek on the western side of the town.

The second division could not move till the return of the boats, but before noon I disembarked with the 23d, the Hessian, Landgrave's, and "King's American" regiments, and two pieces of cannon, on the eastern side of the harbor, and instantly began the march of three miles to the ferry from New Haven east towards Brentford.

We took a field-piece which annoyed us at our landing, and possessed ourselves of the Rock Battery of three guns, commanding the channel of the harbor abandoned by the rebels on our approach. The armed vessels then entered, and drew near the town.

Gen. Garth got into the town, but not without opposition, loss, and fatigue, and reported to me, at half-past one, that he should begin the conflagration which he thought it merited, as soon as he had secured the bridge between us over Neck Creek.

The collection of the enemy in force on advantageous ground, and with heavier cannon than his own, diverted the General from that passage; and the boats that were to take off the troops being not up, I went over to him, and the result of our conference was a resolution, that with the first division he should cover the north part of the town that night; while, with the second, I should keep the Heights above the Rock Fort. In the morning the first division embarked at the southeast part of the town, and, crossing the ferry, joined us on the East Haven side, excepting the 54th, which were sent on board their transports.

In their progress, on the preceding day, from West Haven, they were under a continual fire; but by the judicious conduct of the General, and the alertness of the troops, the rebels were everywhere repulsed. The next morning, as

there was not a shot fired to molest the retreat, Gen. Garth changed his design, and destroyed only the public stores, some vessels and ordnance, excepting six field-pieces and an armed privateer, which were brought off.

The troops re-embarked at Rock Fort, in the afternoon, with little molestation; and the fleet leaving the harbor that evening, anchored the morning of the 8th off the village of Fairfield.

The boats being not sufficient for the whole of the first division, I landed only with the flank companies of the Guards, one company of the Landgrave's, and the "King's American" regiment, with two field-pieces, east of the village, and southwest of the Black Rock Battery, which commands the harbor.

We pursued our march (under a cannonade without effect) towards the village, but in our approach received a smart fire of musketry. The rebels fled before the rapid advance of the Guards, and left us in possession of it, and of the Heights in the west, until Gen. Garth, who landed two miles in the south, joined us with the remainder of the troops, in the evening.

Having laid under arms that night, and in the morning burned the greatest part of the village, to resent the fire of the rebels from their houses, and to mask our retreat, we took boat where the second division had landed, the enemy throwing only a weak scattered fire on our flanks; the regiment de Landgrave, by a very proper disposition, having effectually covered our rear.

Wanting some supplies, we crossed the Sound to Huntingdon, and there continued till the 11th; and repassing that day, anchored five miles from the Bay of Norwalk.

The sun being nearly set before the 54th, the Landgrave's regiment, and the Yagers were in the boats, it was near nine in the evening when I landed with them at the Cow Pasture, a peninsula on the east side of the harbor, within a mile and a half of the bridge, which formed the communication between the east and west parts of the village, nearly equally divided by a salt creek.

The King's American regiment being unable to join us before three next morning, we lay that night on our arms. In our march, at the first dawn of the day, the 54th led the column,

and soon fell in with the rebel outposts, and, driving the enemy with great alacrity and spirit, dispossessed them of Drummond Hill and the Heights at that end of the village, east from and commanding the bridge.

It being now but four o'clock in the morning, and the rebels having taken post, within random cannon-shot, upon the hills upon the north, I resolved to halt until the second division, landing at the Old Well, on the west side of the harbor, had advanced and formed the junction.

General Garth's division passed the bridge by nine, and, at my desire, proceeded to the north end of the village, from whence, and especially from the houses, there had been a fire, for five hours, upon our advanced guards.

The Fusileers, supported by the light-infantry of the Guards, began the attack, and soon cleared the quarters, pushing the main body and a hundred cavalry from the northern heights, and taking one piece of their cannon.

After many salt-pans were destroyed, whale-boats carried on board the fleet, and the magazines, stores, and vessels set in flames, with the greatest part of the dwelling-houses, the advanced corps were drawn back, and the troops retired in two columns to the place of our first debarkation, and, unassaulted, took ship and returned to Huntingdon Bay.

We were waiting only for fresh supplies of artillery and force adequate to the probable increase of the rebels, by the decrease of the objects of their care, and the alarm of the interior country, when I was honored, on the 13th, with your command of the 12th, for the return of the troops, with the fleet, to White Stone.

The rebels in arms at New Haven were considerable, more numerous at Fairfield, and still more so at Norwalk.

Two hundred and fifty continental troops had now joined their militia, under General Parsons, and together are said to be upwards of 2000. The accounts of their loss are vague—it could not be trifling.

* * * * *

I have the honor, herewith, to transmit your Excellency a general return of the killed, wounded, and missing on this expedition.

III.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR GEORGE COLIER TO MR. STEPHENS, SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.

RAISONABLE, OFF NEW YORK, July 27, 1779.

You will be pleased to acquaint their lordships, that the rebels on the shores of the province of Connecticut, having, for a considerable time past, impeded and almost totally destroyed the trade of His Majesty's faithful subjects passing through the Sound, it was judged necessary by Sir Henry Clinton and myself that desultory invasions should be made along the Connecticut coast, with an intention of destroying their whale-boats and other piratical craft, to prevent a continuance of their depredations. The land-forces, consisting of 2600 men, commanded by Major-general Tryon, I caused to be embarked in transports; and sending the Renown, Thames, Otter, and two armed vessels to block up New London and the east entrance of the Sound, I proceeded, on the 3d inst., from New York, by way of Hell-Gate, with His Majesty's ships Camilla, Scorpion, Halifax brig, and Hussar galley, together with the transports, and, on the 5th, landed the army, in two divisions, at the town of New Haven; which, after an irregular resistance from the rebels, was taken possession of by us, together with a small fort at the entrance of the harbor, which latter we destroyed (after spiking up the guns), as also many warehouses filled with stores, &c., together with sev-

eral vessels and whale-boats. The number of killed, wounded, and missing, on our side, amounted to 56; that of the rebels we are unacquainted with, but suppose the number considerable. We embarked the troops without loss, and, two days afterwards, our flat-boats, covered by the galley and gun-boats, landed near Fairfield, though opposed by the militia and some continental troops. The rebels firing from the windows and tops of the houses occasioned the band of loyal refugees to set several of them on fire, which communicating to others, burned the whole town, and also several whale-boats. The troops embarked from thence without molestation, and the third day following they were landed again in three divisions at the town of Norwalk, which, for the treacherous conduct of the rebels, in murdering the troops from windows of houses, after safeguards were granted them, was destroyed, together with five large vessels, two privateer brigs on the stocks, and 20 whale-boats; as also two saw-mills, a considerable salt-work, several warehouses of stores, merchandise, &c. The small town of Greenfield suffered the same chastisement; two row-boat privateers were destroyed, and many whale-boats.

I returned afterwards with the fleet to New York, and flatter myself that the navigation of the Sound will be more clear, for some time, from the numerous pirates that infested it, and the passage to Rhode Island rendered more safe and secure.

C H A P T E R L I I I.

July 16, 1779.

T H E S T O R M I N G O F S T O N Y P O I N T.

No portion of the country possessed a greater degree of interest, during the war of the American Revolution, and none was more carefully guarded, than the Highlands on the Hudson. The "passes" in these hills were the objects of the greatest attention; and the student of the history of those times will have noticed the constant reference to that subject which pervade the correspondence of the master minds which, at that time, under God, guided the destinies of America.

At the foot of these Highlands, on the west side of the Hudson, about forty miles above the city of New York, is Stony Point,¹—a little rough promontory which puts out into the river, and prepares the mind of the passer-by, on his way northward, for the proper attention to those mighty barriers, which, just above, arrest the waters of the noble river in their tranquil progress towards the ocean. "The river washed three fourths of its base, and the remaining fourth was covered, in a great measure, by a deep marsh, which commenced near the river, on the upper

side, and continued into it below. Over this marsh there was but one crossing-place; but, at its junetion with the river, was a sandy beach, passable at low water."¹

The army under General Washington, in accordance with the defensive policy adopted by Congress, remained in its winter quarters, perfecting its discipline under the experienced eye of Baron Steuben, and preparing to move wherever its presence might be found necessary;² that under General Clinton, equally indisposed to move, remained in its quarters in New York, and showed itself only in an occasional predatory expedition to ravage the sea-coast, to plunder the inhabitants, or to burn their villages.³

At length, in the latter part of May, Sir Henry Clinton, at the head of a respectable force, moved up the Hudson, with the evident intention to seize the passes in the Highlands;⁴ and, on the first of June, he took possession of

¹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 122.—² Sparks' Washington, pp. 294, 295.—³ The expeditions against Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut were of this character.

⁴ Sparks, p. 297; Marshall, iv. pp. 111, 112; Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, June 18, 1779.

¹ Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. Y., p. 476.

Stony Point and Verplanck's Point—the termini of “the King's Ferry”—at both of which points some works had been thrown up by the Americans.¹ His farther progress, however, was arrested by the rapid movements of General Washington² (who had received early intelligence of the expedition),³ and, after leaving strong garrisons at both these posts, he returned to New York.⁴

The enemy's movement against the coast of Connecticut was intended, in part, to draw General Washington farther eastward, and to afford General Clinton an opportunity to complete his design;⁵ but he was so far from succeeding, that the former took advantage of the division of the enemy's forces to retaliate, by attacking the posts which the latter had just secured on the Hudson. A farther inducement to do this was offered in the great inconvenience which the Americans would experience, in being cut off from the great line of communication at the King's Ferry;⁶ in “the necessity of doing something to satisfy the expectations of the people, and reconcile them to the defensive plan he was obliged to pursue, and to the apparent inactivity which his situation imposed upon him;” in the valne

of stores, artillery, and men which it contained; in the check which it would exercise on the predatory movements of the enemy on the Sound; and in the effect it would produce on the forces if the campaign could be opened with a brilliant success.¹

With this object in view, the General employed every means within his power to obtain information respecting the strength and disposition of the troops within the lines, the character and extent of the works which they were erecting, and the points at which they could be attacked with the greatest certainty of success.² General Wayne, who commanded the light-infantry,³ was also ordered to head-quarters;⁴ and, two weeks later, the same officer, in a “private and confidential” letter, was farther instructed to make the preparations necessary for the assault on the works.⁵ On the tenth of July, the commander-in-chief communicated *his* views of the enterprise to General Wayne; and the letter, which also contained the details of the proposed surprise, is one of the most remarkable specimens extant of the powerful mind of this great man. Every portion of the preparations, every step of the movements and the attendant contin-

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., June 3; Writings of Washington, vi. p. 269, *note*; Stedman, ii. pp. 140, 141; Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, June 18.

² Gen. Washington to Cong., June 3, June 6, June 11; Marshall, iv. p. 113.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., May 25 and June 3; Marshall, iv. pp. 109, 110.

⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 115; Gordon, iii. p. 262.

⁵ Marshall, iv. pp. 116, 119.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Cong., June 11 and July 20; Marshall, iv. p. 120; Sir H. Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, June 18.

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., July 20; Marshall, iv. p. 120.—² Letter to Henry Lee, jr., June 28; To Gen. Wayne, July 1; To the same, July 9; To the Pres. of Cong., July 20, 1779; Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, July 3; Marshall, iv. p. 120; Gordon, iii. p. 268.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, June 1; Marshall, iv. p. 121; Sparks' Washington, p. 299.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, “Smith's in the Clove, June 21, 1779.”

⁶ Letter, July 1, 1779.

gencies, every thing which *might*, possibly, defeat the enterprise, had passed his scrutiny. The reconnoitre, the watchword and badges by which the men were to be distinguished from the enemy, the time of night when the enemy's sentries and officers of the night were least vigilant, the necessary precautions to prevent skulking and desertion, and others, the most trivial, were the objects of *his* care.¹ Yet, notwithstanding all this, the proposed assault was a profound secret.² The brigade of troops commanded by General Muhlenberg was selected as a covering party, yet it was moved with some other *apparent* object; and its course was so regulated that it was at the *necessary* point, at the *proper* moment, so far as the brigade was concerned, by *accident* only, without knowing its own importance in the great drama.³ The enemy's artillery were to be turned on his own shipping, opposite the fort, and a party of American artillerists had been provided for that purpose, yet they took with them, from the park, two field-pieces, as a mask to the movement, and to prevent suspicion among themselves.⁴

At length, on the fourteenth of July, General Washington gave permission to General Wayne "to carry it (the proposed attempt) into execution, to-morrow night, as he desired," at the same time authorizing him to adopt either of

the several "plans" on which they had conversed.¹

But General Wayne could find no "plan" better adapted to secure the object of the expedition than that suggested and explained by the commander-in-chief, in his letter of the tenth of July;² and he immediately proceeded to execute it.

On the morning of the fifteenth, three small parties of picked men, under prudent and vigilant officers, were dispatched to secure the passes leading to Stony Point;³ Colonel Ball's regiment was ordered from Rose's farm, to support the column, on its rear, for the purpose of giving confidence to the men;⁴ Colonel Henry Lee, jr.—"Light-horse Harry"—was also ordered to meet General Wayne, and to furnish any information he might possess respecting the post or its garrison;⁵ and Major William Hull, with a detachment of troops under his command, was ordered down from West Point, where he was engaged in erecting fortifications to defend that pass.⁶

The necessary preparations having been made, the troops assembled at Sandy Beach, fourteen miles above Stony Point;⁷ and, at twelve o'clock,

¹ Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, July 14, 1779.

² A comparison of the orders issued by Gen. Wayne (Doc. 1.), with the plan of Gen. Washington (*Letter to Gen. Wayne, July 10*), will show that the plan and details of the expedition were Gen. Washington's.

³ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, 11 A. M., July 15.

⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Col. Henry Lee to Pres. Reed, "Stony Point, 11 P. M., July 18."—⁶ Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 158; Gordon, iii. p. 268.—⁷ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, July 17, Doc. III.

¹ Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, July 10, 1779.

² Letters to Gen. Wayne, July 1, July 10 July 14; Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, 11 A. M., July 15.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Muhlenberg, July 15.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Wayne, July 10.

on the fifteenth of July, they moved,¹ under the guidance of Brom Springster,² over the hills and through the defiles of the Highlands, towards that post. The roads are represented as having been "exceedingly bad and narrow," compelling the troops to move, the greater part of the distance, in single files;³ and it was eight o'clock in the evening before the van of the column reached Mr. Springsteel's—a mile and a half distant from the fort.⁴ The greatest care had been taken to prevent the desertion of any of the party, through whose treachery the enemy could be informed of the expedition; and the most perfect silence was enforced through the entire route.⁵

As the troops came up they were formed into solid columns of half platoons,—Colonel Febiger's regiment in front, followed by Colonel Webb's (under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Meigs), and the detachment under Major Hull, forming, together, the right wing; and Colonel Butler's regiment, and two companies of light troops from North Carolina, commanded by Major Murfey, constituting the left wing.⁶ Henry

Lee's light-horse followed in the rear of all, as a *corps de reserve*;¹ and General Muhlenberg's brigade covered the entire party.² The former of these columns was preceded, at the distance of twenty paces, by one hundred and fifty determined and picked men, led by Lieutenant-colonel Fleury; the latter, in like manner, by a hundred men of similar character, led by Major Stewart;³ while still farther in advance of each column was a *forlorn hope* of twenty men, that on the right led by Lieutenant Gibbons, of the Sixth Pennsylvania regiment; and that on the left by Lieutenant Knox, of the Ninth regiment, from the same State.⁴

While the troops were thus being formed into columns, General Wayne and his staff rode forward to reconnoitre;⁵ and on his return the troops, for the first time, were made acquainted with the service to which they were ordered.⁶ Each man, at the same time, was ordered "to fix a piece of white paper in the most conspicuous part of his hat or cap, to distinguish him from the enemy;" and a watchword,—"*The fort's our own*,"—was communicated to each, with orders to give it "with repeated and loud voice," "when the

¹ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.

² Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 164. This, without doubt, was an old man's mode of pronouncing *Abraham Springsteel*, a name well known in the northern part of Rockland county to this day. This same *Brom* had guided Gen. Sir Henry Clinton when he captured the forts. (*Vide pp. 336, 337.*)—³ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, pp. 158, 159.

⁴ *Ibid.*—⁵ Gen. Wayne's Orders, Doc. I.—⁶ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Life of Hull, p. 159. This name is spelled "Murfree" in Gen. Wayne's Orders (Doc. I.) Mr. Sparks has adopted this style of spelling it.

¹ Major Lee to Pres. Reed, 11 p. m., July 18; Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, 11 a. m., July 15.

² Gen. Washington to Gen. Muhlenberg, July 15; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, pp. 173–175; Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.—³ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 159; Henry Lee, jr., to Pres. Reed, 11 p. m., July 18, 1779.

⁴ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, pp. 159, 160.—⁵ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 34.—⁶ Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 159.

works were forced, *and not before*.¹ After the column had been formed, it remained at Mr. Springsteel's, *every man standing on his ground*,² until half-past eleven o'clock, when the whole moved forward.³

The fort on Stony Point had been supplied with a sufficient number of heavy pieces of ordnance; and several breastworks and strong batteries were advanced in front of the principal works, while, farther down the hill, on the land side, were two rows of abatis. These several defences "commanded the beach and the crossing-place of the marsh, and could rake and enfilade any column which might be advancing from either of those points towards the fort. In addition to these defences several vessels of war were stationed in the river, so as, in a considerable degree, to command the ground at the foot of the hill."⁴ The garrison was composed of the Seventeenth regiment of foot, the grenadiers of the Seventy-first regiment, and detachments from the Loyal Americans and the Royal Artillery,⁵ in all about six hundred men,⁶ commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Johnson of the Seventy-first.⁷

¹ Gen. Wayne's Orders, Doc. I.

² Positive orders were given that no man should leave his ground without being accompanied by an officer. This was done, probably, to prevent desertion to the enemy.

³ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.

⁴ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 122.

⁵ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. IV.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 273; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 34. Stedman (ii. p. 145) names other regiments.

⁶ Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 273; Marshall, iv. p. 122; Stedman, ii. p. 145.

⁷ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, Doc. IV.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 273; Marshall, iv. p. 122.

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With the utmost silence the columns pursued their way, until the small stream which separates the point from the main land had been passed, when the left wing diverged towards the eastern flank of the works; and the right, with which was General Wayne, towards the western flank.¹ Soon afterwards the North Carolina light troops, under Major Murfey, moved from the rear of the left wing and proceeded, directly, towards the fort, between the two columns, for the purpose of masking their approach.² The tide being up, the beach was covered with more than two feet of water;³ and, soon after the columns separated, the right wing encountered one of the enemy's outposts, which fired on the assailants and alarmed the garrison.⁴

In the mean time Major Murfey pushed forward between the two columns, and opened, and kept up, a heavy fire on the enemy, diverting his attention from the real points of attack,⁵ and receiving the greater part of the heavy fire of musketry and of artillery, loaded with grape-shot, which was opened on the Americans from the works.⁶

With this exception not a gun was

¹ Map of the movement, in Sparks' Writings of Gen. Washington, vi. p. 304.—² Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 163; Hist. of Civil War in America, p. 35.

³ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 162; Hist. Civil War, iii. p. 35.

⁴ Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, pp. 162, 165.

⁵ Ibid., p. 163; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 35.

⁶ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, pp. 162, 165; Holt's N. Y. Journal, Poughkeepsie, Monday, Aug. 2, 1779. It has, generally, been supposed the garrison was *surprised*, but these, and other cotemporary authorities, show the contrary.

fired by the assailants, and the two columns pushed forward, through the marsh, in perfect silence.¹ The abatis was cleared with more difficulty, and the obstructions thrown in their way were more formidable than had been expected; yet "neither the deep morass, the formidable and double rows of abatis, nor the high and strong works, in front and flank, could damp the ardor of the troops, who, in the face of a most tremendous and incessant fire of musketry, and from artillery loaded with grape-shot, forced their way, at the point of the bayonet, through every obstacle, both columns meeting in the centre of the enemy's works nearly at the same instant."²

Scaling the parapet, and creeping through the embrasures, on either side, the assailants raised the cry, "The fort's our own," and drove the garrison before them, notwithstanding the most desperate resistance was offered.³ While this terrible hand-to-hand contest was raging within the fort, General Wayne, who had been wounded in the head with a musket-ball,⁴ was laying near the abatis, where he fell,⁵ but when the enemy had surrendered,⁶ as he soon did, the General was borne into the fort by Major Hull and his aids, "bleeding, but

in triumph."⁷ Three hearty cheers from his victorious troops, formed the salute under which the daring Wayne was carried into the fort, to receive the submission of the garrison;⁸ and the neighboring "Highlands," under the inspiration of the moment, caught up the joyful sound, and, tossing it from hill-top to hill-top, proclaimed, "The fort's our own."⁹

No time was lost in turning the guns of the fort against the shipping in the river, and against Fort Fayette, on Verplanck's Point, conveying to them the information that Stony Point was no longer in the possession of the King's troops.⁴ The latter received the information in sullen silence;⁵ the former slipped their cables and dropped down the river, with the ebb of the tide.⁶

In this gallant affair the Americans lost fifteen killed and eighty-three wounded;⁷ the enemy, one officer and nineteen men *killed*; six officers and sixty-eight men *wounded*; two officers and fifty-six men *missing*; and twenty-five officers and four hundred and forty-seven men *prisoners*.⁸

The ordnance and stores, which were in the fort, were valued at one hundred and fifty-eight thousand, six hundred

¹ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 162; Marshall, iv. p. 124; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 35.

² Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.

³ Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 163.

⁴ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 163.—⁵ Ibid.; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 274; Hist. Civil War, iii. p. 35.

⁶ Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 163.

⁷ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 163.—⁸ Campbell's Life of Gen. Hull, p. 163.—⁹ Grand Master Macoy's Address on laying the corner-stone on Stony Point, July 16, 1857.

⁴ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 164.—⁶ Campbell's Mem. of Gen. Hull, p. 164.—⁶ Gen. Wayne to Gen. Washington, Doc. III.; Campbell's Gen. Hull, p. 164.

⁷ Sparks' Writings of Washington, vi. p. 540.

⁸ Lieut.-Col. Johnson to Sir Henry Clinton, July 24, 1779.



and forty dollars, and this amount, in conformity with the promise of General Wayne, before the assault, was divided among the troops in proportion to the pay of the officers and men;¹ besides which fifteen hundred dollars were divided among the first five men who entered the fort.² Congress presented its thanks to the troops, and, in accord-

ance with the suggestions of General Washington,³ ordered medals to be struck in honor of the event, and presented to General Wayne, Colonel Fleury, and Major Stewart;⁴ the country was filled with joy;⁵ and even the enemy was compelled to pay homage, not only to the daring of the assailants, but to the generous mercy of the victors.⁶

D O C U M E N T S .

I.

GENERAL WAYNE'S ORDERS TO THE TROOPS EMPLOYED AGAINST STONY POINT.⁷

LIGHT INFANTRY HEAD QUARTERS, FORT {
MONTGOMERY, 15th July, 1779. }

The troops will march this day at twelve o'clock and move by the right, making a short halt at the creek or run on this side Clement's. Every Officer, and non-commissioned officer will remain with and be answerable for every man in their platoons. No Soldier to be permitted to quit the ranks on any pretence whatever, until a general halt is made, and then to be attended by one of the Officers of the Platoon.

¹ Sparks' Writings of Washington, vi. p. 540.

² Gen. Wayne's Orders, Doc. I.

³ I am indebted to my esteemed friend, Hon. Jared Sparks, for this copy of the original order, now printed for the first time, in its complete form, as issued by the General; and the interest which the importance of this document would produce, in any event, is greatly increased from the fact that it is, evidently, a copy taken from that which General Wayne furnished to the traitor, General Charles Lee, at his request.—(*Letter of Gen. Lee, "Berkely County, Aug 11, 1779,"* and *Gen. Wayne's reply, "Heights of Haverstraw, Oct. 20, 1779."*) The "sketch of Stony Point," referred to by Gen. Wayne, in that letter, is also referred to in this document.

When the Van of the troops arrive in the rear of the hill z, Colonel Febeger will form his regiment into a solid column of a half platoon in front, as fast as they come up. Colonel Meigs will form next in Febeger's rear, and Major Hull in the rear of Meigs; these will compose the right column. Colonel Butler will form his regt. in a column on the left of Febeger, and Major Murfree in his rear. Every Officer and Soldier are then to fix a piece of white paper in the most conspicuous part of his hat or Cap to distinguish him from the Enemy.

When the order is given to march, Colonel Fleury will take command of One Hundred and fifty determined and picked men properly officered, and with their arms unloaded, placing their whole dependance on the bayonet will move about twenty paces in front of the right column by the rout No. 1, and enter the sally port C; Fleury will detach an officer and twenty men a little in front with orders to secure the Sentrys, remove the Abbatis and other obstructions, that the column may pass through which will follow close in the rear with shouldered

⁴ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., July 20.

⁵ Journals of Cong.—⁶ Benj. Rush to Gen. Wayne, Aug. 6, 1779; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 36.

⁷ Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., pp. 273, 274; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. pp. 35, 36; Stedman, ii. p. 145.

musquets, under Colo. Febeger with General Wayne in person.

When the works are forced, and not before, the victorious troops as they enter will give the watchword¹ with repeated and loud voice, and drive the enemy from their works & Guns.

Should the enemy refuse to surrender, or attempt to make their escape by water or otherwise, vigorous means must be used to force them to the former, and prevent their accomplishing the latter.

Colonel Butler will move by the ront No. 2 preceeded by one hundred men with unloaded arms, and fixed bayonets under the command of Major Steward, who will observe a distance of twenty yards in front of the column, which will immediately follow under the command of Colo. Butler, and enter the Sally ports C. or D. Major Steward will also detach a proper officer and twenty men a little in front to secure the sentries, &c. As soon as they enter the works they are to give and continue the watch word, to prevent confusion and mistake. Major Murfree will follow Colonel Butler to the first figure 3, when he will divide a little to the right and left, and wait the attack on the right which will be his signal to begin, & keep up a perpetual and galling fire, and endeavor to enter and possess the works a, a.

If any soldier presumes to take his musquet from his Shoulder, attempt to fire, or begin the battle till ordered by his proper officer, he shall be instantly put to death by the officer next him; for the cowardice or misconduct of one man is not to put the whole into danger or disorder with impunity. The troops in advancing to the works will observe the strictest & most profound silence, and pay the greatest attention to the commands of their Officers.

As soon as the lines are carried, the officers of artillery, with the men under their command, will take possession of the Cannon, turn them on the Shipping and the post on Verplancks Point so as to facilitate the attack on that quarter.

The General has the fullest confidence in the

bravery and fortitude of the Corps he has the happiness to command; and the distinguished honor conferred on every officer and Soldier who has been drafted into this Corps by his Excellency General Washington, the credit of the States they respectively belong to, and their own reputation will be such powerful incitements to each man to distinguish himself, that the General cannot have the least doubt of a glorious victory. And as a further encouragement, he engages to reward the first man who enters the work, with five hundred dollars, and immediate promotion, to the second four hundred, to the third three hundred, to the fourth two hundred, and to the fifth one hundred dollars, and will represent the conduct of every officer and Soldier who distinguishes himself on this occasion in the most favorable point of view to his Excellency who receives the greatest pleasure in rewarding merit. But should there be any soldier so lost to every feeling, every sense of honor, as to attempt to retreat one single foot, or shrink in the face of danger, the officer next him is immediately to put him to death, that he may no longer disgrace the name of a Soldier, or the Corps, or the State to which he belongs.

As General Wayne is determined to share the danger of the night, so he wishes to participate of the glory of the day in common with his fellow Soldiers.

True copy from the original Orders.

H. W. ARCHER, *Vol. aide de Camp.*

The Hon. MAJOR-GENERAL LEE.

II.

GENERAL WAYNE'S FIRST DISPATCH TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

STONY POINT, TWO O'CLOCK A. M., }
16 July, 1779. }

DEAR GENERAL:—The fort and garrison, with Colonel Johnson, are ours. Our officers and men behaved like men who are determined to be free.

Yours, most sincerely,
ANTHONY WAYNE.

¹ "The fort's our own."

III.

GENERAL WAYNE'S SECOND DISPATCH TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

STONY POINT, July 17, 1779.

SIR:—I have the honor to give you a full and particular relation of the reduction of this Point by the light-infantry under my command.

On the 15th instant, at twelve o'clock, we took up our line of march from Sandy Beach, distant fourteen miles from this place; the roads being exceedingly bad and narrow, and having to pass over high mountains, through deep morasses and difficult defiles, we were obliged to move in single files the greatest part of the way. At eight o'clock in the evening, the van arrived at Mr. Springsteel's, within one mile and a half of the enemy, and formed into columns as fast as they came up, agreeably to the order of battle annexed; namely, Colonels Febiger's and Meigs' regiments, with Major Hull's detachment, formed the right column, Colonel Butler's regiment and Major Murfey's two companies the left. The troops remained in this position, until several of the principal officers with myself had returned from reconnoitering the works. At half-after eleven o'clock, being the hour fixed on, the whole moved forward. The van of the right consisted of one hundred and fifty volunteers, properly officered, who advanced with unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Fleury; these were preceded by twenty picked men, and a vigilant and brave officer to remove the abatis and other obstructions. The van of the left consisted of one hundred volunteers, under the command of Major Stewart, with unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets, also preceded by a brave and determined officer, with twenty men, for the same purpose as the other.

At twelve o'clock the assault was to begin on the right and left flanks of the enemy's works, whilst Major Murfey amused them in front; but a deep morass covering the whole front, and at this time overflowed by the tide, together with other obstructions, rendered the approaches more difficult than was at first ap-

prehended, so that it was about twenty minutes after twelve before the assault began. Previously to which I placed myself at the head of Febiger's regiment, or the right column, and gave the troops the most pointed orders not to fire on any account, but place their whole dependence on the bayonet, which order was literally and faithfully obeyed. Neither the deep morass, the formidable and double rows of abatis, nor the strong works in front and flank, could damp the ardor of the troops, who, in the face of a most tremendous and incessant fire of musketry, and from cannon loaded with grape-shot, forced their way, at the point of the bayonet, through every obstacle, both columns meeting in the centre of the enemy's works nearly at the same instant. Too much praise cannot be given to Lieutenant-colonel Fleury (who struck the enemy's standard with his own hand) and to Major Stewart, who commanded the advanced parties, for their brave and prudent conduct.

Colonels Butler, Meigs, and Febiger, conducted themselves with that coolness, bravery, and perseverance, that will ever insure success.

Lieutenant-colonel Hay was wounded in the thigh, bravely fighting at the head of his battalion. I should take up too much of your Excellency's time were I to particularize every individual who deserves it, for his bravery on this occasion. I cannot, however, omit Major Lee, to whom I am indebted for frequent and very useful intelligence, which contributed much to the success of the enterprise; and it is with the greatest pleasure I acknowledge to you, that I was supported in the attack by all the officers and soldiers under my command, to the utmost of my wishes. The officers and privates of the artillery exerted themselves in turning the cannon against Verplanck's Point, and forced the enemy to cut the cables of their shipping, and run down the river.

I should be wanting in gratitude were I to omit mentioning Captain Fishbourn and Mr. Archer, my two aids-de-camp, who, on every occasion, showed the greatest intrepidity, and supported me into the works after I received my wound in passing the last abatis.

Inclosed are the returns of the killed and wounded of the light-infantry, as also of the

enemy, together with the number of prisoners taken, likewise of the ordnance and stores found in the garrison.

I forgot to inform your Excellency, that previously to my marching, I had drawn General Muhlenberg into my rear, who, with three hundred men of his brigade, took post on the opposite side of the marsh, so as to be in readiness either to support me, or to cover a retreat, in case of accident; and I have no doubt of his faithfully and effectually executing either, had there been any occasion for him.

The humanity of our brave soldiery, who scorned to take the lives of a vanquished foe calling for mercy, reflects the highest honor on them, and accounts for the few of the enemy killed on the occasion.

I am not satisfied with the manner in which I have mentioned the conduct of Lieutenants Gibbons and Knox, the two gentlemen who led the advanced parties of twenty men each. Their distinguished bravery deserves the highest commendation. The former belongs to the Sixth Pennsylvania regiment, and lost seventeen men killed and wounded in the attack; the latter belongs to the Ninth Pennsylvania regiment, and was more fortunate in saving his men, though not less exposed.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
ANTHONY WAYNE.

IV.

SIR HENRY CLINTON'S DISPATCH TO LORD GEORGE GERMAIN.

[From the London Gazette of Tuesday, October 5, 1779.]

WHITEHALL, October 5, 1779.

Extract of a letter from General Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DOBBS FERRY, July 25, 1779.

In my dispatch, No. 57, I had the honor to inform your Lordship of my having taken possession of Verplanck's and Stony Point, upon the North River.

On the night of the 15th instant, the enemy suddenly assaulted and carried the lines at Stony Point. The greater part of the garrison, con-

sisting of the Seventeenth regiment of foot, the grenadier company of the Seventy-first regiment, a company of the Loyal Americans, and a small detachment of the Royal Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Johnson, of the Seventeenth regiment, were either killed or taken. I have not yet been able to procure accounts sufficiently satisfactory to form a decisive judgment upon this accident. I have the honor to inclose Lieutenant-colonel Johnson's account, as likewise that published by the rebels.

The enemy immediately began a heavy cannonade with our guns from Stony Point upon Lieutenant-colonel Webster, who commanded at Verplanck's, with the Thirty-third regiment, Loyal Americans, and detachments from the Royal Artillery, and from the Seventy-first regiment. At the same time Lieutenant-colonel Webster was informed that a considerable force was in his rear, who, if they did not mean to attack him from that quarter, at least would make his retreat, should he be driven to that extremity, very difficult.

Upon the first intelligence I received of this matter, I ordered the army to advance to Dobbs Ferry, pushing forward the cavalry and some light troops to the banks of the Croton River, to awe the enemy in any attempt, by land, against Verplanck's. Brigadier-general Stirling was, in the mean time, embarked with the Forty-second, Sixty-third, and Sixty-fourth regiments, for the relief of Verplanck's, or the recovery of Stony Point. The northerly winds, rather uncommon at this season, opposed Brigadier-general Stirling's progress till the 19th, when, upon his arriving within sight of Stony Point, the enemy abandoned it, with precipitation and some circumstances of disgrace.

Lieutenant-colonel Webster, who had with great firmness supported the heavy fire of the enemy, had not, during the whole time, deigned to return a single shot, being sensible that it would have been of no material effect. The enemy, possibly, supposing, from this circumstance, that he might have no heavy cannon, brought down a galley to carry off, from Stony Point, part of the artillery, which would have found difficulty in retiring through the roads of that country. As soon as the cannon were

aboard the galley, Lieutenant-colonel Webster turned upon her an eighteen-pounder, the only piece of heavy ordnance he had, which raked her with such effect, that, to prevent her sinking, the crew ran her ashore, and then set fire to her. Such of the caanon as remained upon Stony Point were buried, or thrown into the river by the enemy, who immediately made a most precipitous retreat.

Having been apprehensive that the delay, occasioned by the contrary wind, might have given the enemy time to collect a force at the Points, too powerful for Brigadier-general Stirling, and being anxious that no step should be omitted for the security of Verplanck's and recovery of Stony Point, I had embarked with the light-infantry, and joined General Stirling at Haverstraw Bay. My whole army being within my reach, I had some hopes of being able to betray Mr. Washington into an engagement for the possession of Stony Point. Possibly he suspected my view, and declined adventuring any measure which might bring on an action in a country unfavorable to him.

Brigadier-general Stirling is now at Stony Point with five battalions, repairing the works, which are a good deal damaged.

[*Inlosure.*]

COPY OF A LETTER FROM LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHNSON, OF THE SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT, TO SIR HENRY CLINTON.

HARDY'S TOWN, July 24, 1779.

The bearer, Lieutenant Armstrong, of the Seventeenth regiment of infantry, will give you a full and perfect account of the unfortunate event of the morning of the 16th instant, whereon the post of Stony Point fell into the hands of

the enemy. I am inclined to think, that upon a just representation, you will be fully convinced that it was not any neglect on my part, nor of the troops under my command, but the very superior force of the enemy, that caused the capture of the place. Inclosed I send a return of the killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, as nearly as could be collected by the commanding officers of the corps.

The very distressed situation of our people, for want of necessaries of every kind, occasioned my making application for a flag, in order to have them provided. General Washington's permission to send a subaltern officer of each corps, I received but this instant. The commissary of prisoners being under the necessity of returning immediately, obliges me to draw to a conclusion, referring your Excellency to Lieutenant Armstrong for any further particulars.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

H. JOHNSON, Lieut.-Col. 17th foot.

His Excellency SIR HENRY CLINTON, &c.

Total return of the killed, wounded, missing, and taken prisoners by the enemy, of His Majesty's troops, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Henry Johnson, at the engagement upon Stony Point, July 16, 1779.

1 captain, 3 sergeants, 1 drummer, 15 rank and file, *killed*; 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 2 ensigns, 1 sergeant, 67 rank and file, *wounded*; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 1 drummer, 54 rank and file, *missing*; 1 colonel, 4 captains, 12 lieutenants, 5 ensigns, 1 adjutant, 1 surgeon, 1 conductor, 23 sergeants, 16 drummers, 408 rank and file, *prisoners*.

H. JOHNSON,
Lieut.-Col. 17th infantry.

CHAPTER LIV.

July 22, 1779.

THE BATTLE OF MINISINK.

The incursions of the Indians, and the Tories who acted with them, on the frontier settlements of New York, have been already noticed; and the sufferings of the inhabitants have filled many pages of the histories of that State.

Among these depopulated neighborhoods, where the hand of the spoiler and the assassin fell with unusual severity, was Minisink, an ancient settlement in the western part of Orange county, New York. It is situated about ten miles west from Goshen, on the Nauisink River, among the Shawangunk Mountains; and its earlier history abounds with stirring incidents, among which the record of a bloody battle with the Indians, in July, 1669, is a prominent feature.¹

During the winter of 1778-79, the Count Pulaski, with his cavalry, was stationed in that neighborhood; but when, in February, he was ordered to the South,² the entire frontier, in that part of the State, was left wholly ex-

posed. Taking advantage of this, the Indians visited the neighboring settlements in small parties, and plundered them;¹ and, during the night of the nineteenth of July, Joseph Brant, at the head of sixty warriors and twenty-seven Tories, disguised as Indians,² stole upon the settlement at Minisink. It is said this was but a detachment from a larger body, which was left at a distance; and plunder rather than murder appears to have been its object.³ Setting fire to several of the houses, the savages appear to have obtained full possession of the village before any alarm was raised among the slumbering inhabitants; and, when the latter, aroused by the glare of the burning buildings and the whoops of the savages, sought safety in flight, they were allowed to escape without any interrup-

¹ Stone's Brant, i. p. 415.

² Letter to Gen. Sullivan, Minisink, July 28, in The Penn. Packet, Tuesday, Aug. 19; Gordon, iii. p. 312; Stone's Brant, i. p. 415. As Brant often left the main body of his forces, and went out with smaller parties on minor excursions, and as this small force appears to be inconsistent with the statement of cotemporary writers, it is probable it was only a detachment from a larger body.

³ Brant claimed that this was the sole object of the expedition.

¹ Eager's Hist. of Orange Co., N. Y., pp. 406-420; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 101.—² Jour. of Cong., Tuesday, Feb. 2, 1779 (vol. v. p. 31); Gen. Washington to Count Pulaski, Feb. 8, 1779.

tion, while the former appeared contented with the plunder which they secured, after destroying ten houses, eleven barns, a church, and a grist-mill.¹

Intelligence of this outrage was forwarded to Goshen, and Colonel Tusten immediately issued orders to the officers of his regiment to meet him at Minisink, on the following morning, with as many of their men as they could muster. At the appointed time, one hundred and forty-nine men,² many of them the principal inhabitants of the county, who had volunteered for the occasion, assembled around the charred remains of the settlement at Minisink, and a "Council" was called to decide what course should be pursued. Colonel Tusten,—sensible of the disadvantages under which so small a force would move, and conscious of the skill of his opponent, while the Tories who were with him possessed a thorough knowledge of the ground,—opposed a pursuit until reinforcements came up, and a larger supply of ammunition was obtained. The majority, led away by the excitement of the moment, and by the rashness of Major Meeker and a few others, appeared to be determined to pursue the enemy, who was represented as cowardly, and afraid to meet such a force as was then on the ground. While these matters were being dis-

cussed by the party—for in "councils" such as this was, the officers and men occupied the same platform—Major Meeker mounted his horse, flourished his sword, and called out, "Let the brave men follow me; the cowards may stay behind." This decided the question, and the entire party immediately took up its line of march, on the old Kathegton Path,¹ the trail of the retreating savages. After marching seventeen miles, to Skinner's saw-mills,² it encamped for the night, and, on the following morning, was joined by Colonel Hathorn, of the Warwick regiment, with a small reinforcement. Being an older officer than Colonel Tusten, the former took the command, and the party proceeded on its march. After it had proceeded a few miles, to Halfway Brook, it reached the place where the enemy had passed the preceding night; and the extent of ground which had been occupied, and the number of fires which had been lighted, showing his force to have been much greater than that of his pursuers, a second "council" was held. The same desperate course which had been followed at the former council was followed here, and with the same result, notwithstanding the exertions of Colonels Hathorn, Tusten, and others, whose courage was tempered with prudence.

Captain Tyler, who had more knowledge of such matters than the other

¹ Letter to Gen. Sullivan, in Penn. Packet, Tuesday, Aug. 19. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 312) says eleven barns, two mills, and a stockade were destroyed.

² H. Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1453, Aug. 23, 1779, says "120 men, officers included."

¹ H. Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1453, Aug. 23, 1779.—² Ibid.

officers, was dispatched, with a small scouting-party, to reconnoitre, since it was evident that the enemy was but a very short distance in advance. He had proceeded only a short distance, however, when he fell into an ambuscade and was shot—a warning which fell, unnoticed, on the reckless mass who followed, after the alarm, which his death had momentarily produced, had subsided. Disregarding this timely notice, as well as the counsels of their senior officers, the settlers madly rushed forward, and, soon afterwards, they emerged upon the hills on the Delaware, north from where Port Jervis now stands, upon the eastern bank of which stream, about three quarters of a mile in advance, they saw the Indians deliberately marching towards the fording-place, at the mouth of the Lackawaxen.

Desiring to intercept the enemy before he reached the ford, Colonel Hathorn left the trail and moved off to the right, when, by the intervening woods and hills, the opposing forces lost sight of each other. Joseph Brant, who had seen his pursuers, and anticipated their design, immediately made a counter-movement, for the purpose of securing the advantage of a position, without alarming his opponent. Moving off, also, to the right of his line of march, up a deep ravine, over which Colonel Hathorn had already passed, Brant threw his force in the rear of the Americans, and formed an ambuscade on advantageous ground. The latter, on reaching the fording-place, were dis-

appointed that their enemy was not there; and that feeling was increased when it was found that he was no longer on the route on which they had seen him a few minutes before. While this feeling, and a desire to do any thing, no matter how imprudent, to avenge their disappointment, prevailed, a solitary Indian, mounted on a horse which had been stolen from Minisink, appeared in a quarter where they least expected to see an enemy—on the path over which they had just passed. The sight of an enemy was sufficient to arouse all their energies, especially when to it was added that of one of his trophies, and they pursued, and shot him. Others then appeared, and gradually the conflict became general. By an ingenious movement, early in the day, upwards of fifty of the American troops were cut off from the main body, and were prevented from taking any part in the battle, leaving only about eighty men to oppose the enemy. These, occupying the summit of a hill, with the ground descending in all directions, formed, as nearly as possible, a hollow square, sheltering themselves behind the trees and rocks, and keeping up a constant and deadly fire. From ten o'clock in the morning until late in the afternoon, this obstinate conflict continued, when the faithful occupant of a sheltering rock, on the northeast angle of the square, fell, and exposed that important point to the assaults of the enemy. The quick eye of Joseph Brant instantly saw this opening in the American lines, and, as quickly, availed him-

self of the opportunity which it afforded. The chief, at the head of such of his men as were near him, dashed in through the opening and attacked the Americans on all sides. Discouraged at this sudden reverse, and suffering from the want of ammunition, the latter retreated in every direction, and the savages joined in an energetic and bloody pursuit.

Early in the day the wounded were provided with a sheltered retreat, under a large rock, and here seventeen men had been collected, with Colonel Tusten, who was a skilful surgeon, to attend to them. All these were immediately butchered, and more were killed in the pursuit than in the battle. Of those who were in the battle, forty-five fell¹—some on the field, others in the retreat; while many who had been wounded suffered a more terrible death, in the torments which their solitary and helpless condition produced. Of those who were cut off, before the fight began, there is no other account than that they, too, were “missing;” and as it is generally acknowledged that, of the one hundred and forty-nine who went out, only thirty returned, there is no doubt that they, too, fell a sacrifice to their own rashness.²

Having relieved himself from the pursuit of the Americans, Joseph Brant continued on his way; and, in a few days afterwards, he fell on a village in the Mohawk Valley, with a blow similar to that which befell Minisink.¹

In after years, Joseph was censured for the cruelties which were alleged to have been perpetrated in this expedition. He denied the charge with great energy; maintaining that he desired only to obtain supplies, which was probably true; and stated that when the Americans approached his hiding-place he arose, placed himself openly in their view, addressed the officer in command—telling him that his force greatly outnumbered the Americans, demanded their surrender, and promised them protection. While he was thus parleying with them, a ball from the Americans passed through his belt, when he retired from the ground and joined his warriors.² He also charged an American officer with using dishonorable means to save his life. It appears that this officer (Major Wood), by some means, had obtained a knowledge of the Master Mason’s grand hailing-sign of distress, although not a member of the order; that he had given the mystic sign in the presence

¹ Forty-five names appear on the monument at Goshen, although *forty-four* is the number referred to, on the east side of it, as having fallen in the battle. See also a “letter from Orange Co., July 28,” in the “Penn. Packet,” Phila., Aug. 7, 1779; A “letter to Gen. Sullivan,” in the Penn. Packet, Thursday, Aug. 19, 1779.

² Rivington’s “Royal Gazette,” No. 296, New York, Saturday, July 31, 1779, says all, except fifteen, were killed. H. Gaines’ N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1450,

Aug. 2, says “at least 150 of the rebel militia were killed on the spot;” and, in the next number of the same paper, it is said, “we have reason to believe the number of the rebels that were killed by the Indians near Minisink, as mentioned in our last, was not in the least exaggerated.” The statement in Rivington’s “Royal Gazette,” No. 301, Wednesday, Aug. 18, 1779, also says 119 were “missing.”

¹ Stone’s Brant, i. p. 421.—² Ibid., pp. 418, 419.

of the chief; and that the latter, faithful to his vows, had interposed and saved his life. Discovering, afterwards, the deception which had been practised on him, he was exceedingly indignant, yet he spared his life; and he returned to Orange county, where he spent the evening of his days, respected by all who knew him.¹

For forty-three years the remains of those who fell in this battle laid, scattered over the country, without a burial: and "their bones suffered to whiten among the rocks of the mountain, after their flesh had been devoured by wild beasts, of some, perhaps, before they were dead!" At length, "mourning

their death, and acknowledging their own ingratitude," in July, 1822, the people of Orange county, *their own descendants*, gathered the bones together, and gave them the honorable burial which had been so long withheld, and General Hathorn, the commander of the expedition, laid the corner-stone of the monument which now, at Goshen, bears the record of the conflict.¹

¹ The address of Rev. James R. Wilson, delivered on the occasion of the burial of the remains of those who fell at this battle, at Goshen, July 22, 1822, has formed the basis and chief authority of all who have written on this subject since that time; and, having been prepared and delivered among those who were present,—the chairman of the meeting having been the commander of the Americans in the battle,—there is no doubt of its correctness. For this reason I have used it; and, when other authorities have not been cited, I have relied entirely on the statements it contains.

¹ Stone's Brant, i. p. 419.

CHAPTER LV.

July 31 to September 30, 1779.

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SENECA'S.

THE outrages committed by the Indians and their Tory allies had been made the subject of a careful examination in the Congress of the United States, on the memorials of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania and the Governors of New York and Connecticut, seconded by the personal efforts of a committee from the latter body;¹ when, on the twenty-fifth of February, 1779, the Congress ordered copies of the papers to be transmitted to General Washington, who was directed, by the same resolution, "to take effectual measures for the protection of the inhabitants and chastisement of the savages."² This measure had been anticipated, to some extent, by General Washington, who had so far completed his plans that he intended the operations should begin on the first of May, although the purposes and even the officers who were to command, were a profound secret, known to few, if any, but himself.³

On the receipt of the resolution and papers, from the Congress, confidential

letters were immediately addressed to Governor Clinton, of New York,¹ and to General Gates²—that to the former asking for a body of militia to co-operate with the regular troops; that to the latter tendering the command of the expedition, and inviting him to head-quarters. General Gates declined the command in terms which did not meet General Washington's approval;³ and it was tendered to, and accepted by, General Sullivan.⁴ In the selection of the officer to command this important expedition,—of which it was said, "according to all present appearances, it will be of the second, if not the first, importance for the campaign,"⁵—the commander-in-chief was called to the discharge of a delicate duty, involving not only the rank but the personal qualifications of the several general officers. General Lee, being a prisoner,

¹ Gen. Washington's letter, March 4, 1779; Gov. Clinton to Gen. Washington, March 18, 1779.

² Gen. Washington's letter, March 6, 1779.

³ Gen. Gates to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1779; Gen. Washington to John Juy, Pres. of Cong., April 14, 1779.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Gates, March 6, 1779; Writings of Gen. Washington, by Mr. Sparks, vi. p. 190, note.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., April 14, 1779.

¹ Jour. of Cong., Thursday, Feb. 25, 1779 (vol. v. p. 55).

² Ibid.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., March 3, 1779.

from his situation, was out of the question; General Schuyler—whose appointment would have been most agreeable to the General—had become fatigued with the intrigues and slanders of the dominant party, both in and out of Congress, and contemplated an early retirement from a service in which he had made such heavy sacrifices; to General Putnam, with the memory of Long Island and Fort Montgomery clinging to his name, there was no necessity for a reference; General Gates, the next in seniority, although his correspondence had manifested both coldness and constraint towards General Washington, was the favorite of the Congress, and had rejected the command;¹ and General Sullivan received the honor which devolved upon a command of such great importance.

The design of the expedition was “the total destruction and devastation of the Indian settlements, and the capture of as many prisoners of every age and sex as possible;”² and to accomplish it, two divisions of troops—the main body, under General Sullivan, from Easton, by way of Wyoming; the other, under General James Clinton, from Canajoharie, by way of Otsego Lake and the head-waters of the Susquehanna—were to advance against the enemy.³ The progress of the troops under General Sullivan was slow, and when he had reached Wyoming, another delay was occasioned by the necessity

to replace the greater part of his stores, which had been spoiled, and to obtain greater supplies of ammunition than he then possessed.⁴ From these causes he was detained at Wyoming until the last day of July,⁵ and it was not until the eleventh of August that he reached Tioga Point⁶—where the force under General Clinton had been ordered to join him.⁴

At nine in the evening of the following day (*Thursday, August 12th*), a detachment, commanded by General Hand, marched from the camp to attack Chemung, an Indian village, a short distance therefrom. After a dreary march through the woods, at daybreak the next morning, the village was found, but the inhabitants had fled, and nothing remained but the wigwams—seventeen in number—and some fine fields of Indian corn, all of which were burned. After occupying the ground until the next day, and losing seven men, killed, and Major Franklin of Wyoming, seriously wounded, the detachment returned to the camp, where it arrived at nine in the evening.⁵

While General Sullivan was thus wasting his time in Pennsylvania,⁶ his

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 308; Marshall, iv. p. 154.—² Maj. Daniel Livermore's Journal, July 31, 1779; Lieut. Wm. Barton's Journal, July 31; Dr. Ebenezer Elmer's Journal, July 31; Miner's Wyoming, p. 267.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Stone's Brant, ii. p. 5.—⁵ Maj. Livermore's, Lieut. Barton's, and Dr. Elmer's Journals, Aug. 12; Letter from Tioga, Aug. 15, in the Penn. Packet, Phila., Aug. 24, 1779.—⁶ This delay was probably caused by circumstances over which Gen. Sullivan had no control. Gen. Joseph Reed, then Governor of Pennsylvania, was greatly opposed to him, and, undoubtedly, through his influence, great obstacles were thrown in the way of Gen. Sullivan, especially in obtaining supplies for the army.

¹ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., April 14, 1779.

² Same to Gen. Sullivan, May 31, 1779.—³ Ibid.

second in command, General James Clinton, was busily engaged in completing his arrangements in Northern New York. The letter which General Washington had addressed to Governor Clinton, already alluded to, had been responded to with all the energy which that officer possessed; and when, on the second of June, General Sullivan ordered General Clinton to prepare for the campaign, much of the labor had been done, and all the preparations were in a state of great forwardness.¹ Bateaux had been provided at Schenectady, and large quantities of provisions had been thrown into Fort Schuyler, leaving but little undone, and enabling General Clinton to reach Canajoharie, at the head of fifteen hundred men, within fourteen days after receiving his first order on the subject.² On the next day (*June 17th*) he commenced the transportation of his boats (two hundred and ten in number), and all his stores, over the portage from the Mohawk River, at Canajoharie, to the head of Otsego Lake,—a distance of twenty miles, over excessively bad roads, which he cut through the forest, and a hilly country.³ An enterprise like this, requiring so much labor and the surmounting of so many obstacles, would have appalled many of the officers; yet, on the twenty-sixth of the same month, all the stores and pro-

visions required for a campaign of three months, and one hundred and seventy-three boats, had reached the lake, and thirty-seven—all that remained—were on the road.⁴ In this work General Clinton received great assistance from Colonel Marinus Willett, who had volunteered in the expedition, and from the people who lived near the route, who turned out with great spirit and cheerfulness to second the efforts of the General.⁵ Four days afterwards (*June 30th*), he wrote to General Sullivan that his arrangements were complete, his stores, &c., all safely carried over the portage, and that he awaited orders for embarkation at any moment.⁶ On the next day (*July 1st*), he passed down the lake to its foot, where Cooperstown now stands, and there, on the site of that beautiful village, awaited orders.⁷ While thus detained at Otesaga, the troops built a substantial dam across the outlet of the lake, by which its waters were raised several feet,⁸ and afterwards employed, as will be seen, not only in facilitating the transit of General Clinton's command, but in destroying the crops of the Indians on the banks of the Susquehanna, and in the production of a moral effect on that people which favored the objects of the expedi-

¹ Gov. Clinton to Gen. Washington, March 18, 1779; Stone's Life of Brant, ii. p. 5.

² Stone's Life of Brant, ii. p. 5.

³ Gen. Jas. Clinton to Gov. Geo. Clinton, July 6; Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 151.

⁴ Stone's Brant, ii. p. 6.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Gen. Clinton to Gov. Geo. Clinton, July 6, 1779; J. F. Cooper's Chronicles of Cooperstown, pp. 11, 12; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 10.

⁸ Gen. J. Clinton to Gov. Clinton, July 6, 1779; Cooper's Chronicles of Cooperstown, p. 12; Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 152; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 146; Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 144.

tion.¹ The delays which General Sullivan met with, to which reference has been made, prevented any movement of General Clinton until the ninth of August; and when, on that day, he was relieved from his vexatious halt, and the dam was broken down, "his flotilla was not only borne triumphantly along upon the pile of the impatient waters, but the swelling of the torrent beyond its banks, caused wide and unexpected destruction to the growing crops of the Indians, on their plantations at Oghkwaga and its vicinity. They were, moreover, greatly affrighted at the sudden and unexpected rise of the waters in the dryest season of the year, especially as there had been no rains—attributing the event to the interposition of 'the Great Spirit,' who thus showed he was angry with them. The whole expedition was, indeed, calculated to impress them with terror, as it might have done a more enlightened and less superstitious people. The country was wild and totally uninhabited, except by scattered families of Indians, and, here and there, by some few of the more adventurous white settlers, in the neighborhood of Unadilla. The sudden swelling of the river, therefore, bearing upon its surge a flotilla of more than two hundred vessels, through a region of primitive forests, and upon a stream that had never before wafted upon its bosom any craft of greater burden than a bark canoe, was a spectacle which might well appall the un-

tutored inhabitants of the regions thus invaded."² At Oghkwaga, General Clinton was joined by a detachment from Colonel Albert Paulding's regiment at Warwasing;³ and, on the twenty-second of August, he arrived safely at Tioga Point, and joined General Sullivan.⁴

The united divisions—comprising the brigades of Generals Clinton, Hand, Poor, and Maxwell, a corps of riflemen commanded by Major Parr, and Procter's artillery—numbered five thousand effective troops;⁴ but the preparations had been so long in progress, and the movements so slow, that the enemy was, in a great degree, prepared to receive them.⁵ For this reason greater caution was now necessary, and when, on Thursday, August 26th, the encampment at Tioga was broken up, a strong advanced guard of light-infantry, and large flanking parties, were thrown out to prevent surprise, on the line of march.⁶

At length, on Thursday, August 26th, the troops took up their line of march, leaving behind them, at Tioga, a great part of the baggage and two hundred and fifty men, with two six-pounders, under Colonel Shreve.⁷ They proceeded up the east bank of the

¹ Stone's Brant, ii. pp. 17, 18; Life of Maj. Van Campen, pp. 144, 145.—² Stone's Brant, ii. p. 18.

³ Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 22; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30; Miner, p. 269.

⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 308; Marshall, iv. p. 155; Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 146.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Gen. Sullivan, July 1, 1779; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 146.

⁶ Miner's Wyoming, p. 270; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 18; Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 153.

⁷ Maj. Livermore's Jour., Aug. 26; Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 25 and 26; Miner's Wyoming, p. 270.

Chemung River, and, on the following day (*Friday, Aug. 27th*) they came to and destroyed large fields of growing corn, beans, potatoes, and pumpkins.¹ On the following day (*Saturday, Aug. 28th*) some few Indians were seen at a distance; and these and other evidences of the presence of the enemy, indicated that the time was fast approaching when the mastery was to be contended for by the Americans and their savage opponents.²

At ten o'clock the next day (*Sunday, Aug. 29th*) the troops again moved forward, but the difficulty of the march was so great that but very little progress was made.³ At about noon the riflemen, who were in advance, discovered the enemy, who had determined to risk an engagement for the defence of their country;⁴ and, for this purpose, had occupied and strengthened a very advantageous position about a mile in advance of Newtown, the present site of Elmira, New York.⁵ The ground which they occupied was on the left of the line of march on which the Americans were advancing, and was so covered by a bend of the river that the front and the left of the line were alone exposed. The front, for half a mile, was defended by a breastwork of logs, which they had attempted to conceal by cutting bushes and sticking them in

the ground in front of their line; while the left was protected by a high ridge, running at an angle with their breast-work; and farther still, on the left, was another ridge, parallel with the first, and extending to the rear of the American army.¹ The path on which the Americans were advancing, a short distance before it reached the ground which was occupied by the enemy, crossed a brook, since called Baldwin's Creek,² turned to the right, and ran parallel with the breastwork, within rifle-shot of it;³ and it is evident that they hoped to conceal their position from General Sullivan, until he had advanced so far as to expose his entire left flank to their fire.⁴ To secure all the advantages which might be offered in that event, as well as to protect their own left, in case of an attack within their works, large bodies of men had been posted on both sides of the ridges on the left of the breastwork, extending to the rear of the American army.⁵

As soon as the enemy was discovered, the light troops were formed in a wood, about four hundred yards from his lines, and a series of skirmishes was kept up until the main body had reached the ground, and been disposed for action.⁶

¹ Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 27.—² Ibid., Aug. 28.—³ Ibid., Aug. 29.

⁴ Ibid.; Miner's Wyoming, p. 271; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 157; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30, 1779.—⁵ Miner's Wyoming, p. 270; Gordon, iii. p. 308; Marshall, iv. p. 156; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 19; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.

¹ Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 29; Miner's Wyoming, p. 270; Marshall, iv. p. 156; Civil War in America, iii. p. 64; Letter from Tioga, Aug. 31, 1779, in the Penn. Packet, Sept. 7, 1779; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.—² Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 146.—³ Miner's Wyoming, p. 270; Marshall, iv. pp. 156, 157.—⁴ Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 29; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.—⁵ Miner's Wyoming, p. 270; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.—⁶ Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 29; Miner's Wyoming, p. 271; Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 147; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.

At length the artillery was ordered to open its fire on the left of the enemy's line,¹ while the New Hampshire and Massachusetts regiments, under General Poor,² supported by the brigade of General Clinton,³ were ordered to clear the hills on the rear and right of the American line; and, following the ridge, to turn the enemy's left flank and gain his rear.⁴ At the same time Generals Maxwell and Hand covered the artillery in front,⁵ without advancing against the enemy's line.⁶ With the greatest coolness the command of General Poor ascended the hill, but its possession was bravely contested by Joseph Brant and the Indians under his command.⁷ "Every rock, and tree, and bush shielded its man, from behind which the winged messengers of death were thickly sent, but with so little effect as to excite astonishment. The Indians yielded ground only inch by inch; and, in their retreat, darted from tree to tree with the agility of the panther, often contesting each new position to the point of the bayonet, a thing very unusual even with militiamen, and still more rare among the undisciplined warriors of the woods. Thayendanegea (*Joseph Brant*) was the animating spirit of the savages. Always in the thickest

of the fight, he used every effort to stimulate his warriors, in the hope of leading them to victory."¹ But the great personal bravery of Joseph Brant, powerful as its influence justly was, could not prevent the savages from falling back,² and General Poor pressed forward toward the left of the enemy's line.³ With that great good sense for which Brant was so remarkable, he perceived the object of this movement, before any other of the enemy's officers had noticed it; and rallying his warriors to a second attempt, and calling a company of Tories to his assistance, he rushed forward to oppose, the second time, the progress of the Americans.⁴ The terrible war-whoop again filled the air, and contended for the mastery of sound with the reports of the artillery and musketry; while with more desperate energy, if possible, than before, the warriors and their gallant chief fought for their corn-fields, their homes, and their country.⁵ All their efforts, however, were fruitless, and their left flank was speedily turned.⁶ On perceiving this, no farther resistance was offered by the enemy, the "retreat-halloo" was raised, and they fled precipitately, leaving their packs, a number of their tomahawks and scalping-knives,

¹ Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 29; Miner's Wyoming, p. 271; Gordon, iii. p. 309.—² Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 29.—³ Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30; Marshall, iv. p. 157.—⁴ Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 29; Miner's Wyoming, p. 271; Marshall, iv. p. 157.—⁵ Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.—⁶ Ibid.; Miner's Wyoming, p. 271.

⁷ Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 29; Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 149.

¹ Stone's Brant, ii. p. 20; Marshall, iv. p. 158; Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 150.—² Marshall, iv. p. 158; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 20; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lafayette, Sept. 12, 1779; Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 29; Miner's Wyoming, p. 271; Marshall, iv. pp. 157, 158; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 20.

⁴ Stone's Brant, ii. p. 20.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Maj. Livermore's Jour., Aug. 29; Miner's Wyoming, p. 271; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 21; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30.

and eleven of their dead behind them.¹ The loss of their dead, especially, showed the precipitation of the retreat, and the vigor with which the troops pursued them. They were followed two miles, during which the bodies of fourteen warriors were discovered among the leaves, and eight scalps were taken by the victors.² The loss of the enemy is unknown; that of the Americans was seven killed, and about thirty wounded.³ The strength of the Americans, as has been seen, was about four thousand seven hundred men, although the number actually engaged was probably less than a third of that number;⁴ that of the enemy was estimated by General Sullivan and his general officers at fifteen hundred, while the enemy's own accounts state that it was only five hundred and fifty Indians, and two hundred and fifty Tories,⁵ in which they have been supported by the opinions of American officers who were on the field,⁶ and by well-informed contemporary American writers.⁷

On the day after the battle (*Monday, Aug. 30th*) the army sent the wounded, the heavy artillery, and the

wagons, back to Tioga Point;¹ buried those who had been killed the preceding day;² destroyed a village and corn-fields near by;³ and prepared to move forward on the following morning. On the next day (*Tuesday, Aug. 31st*) the village of Newtown (*Elmira*) —in which were “some good buildings of the English construction”—and large and valuable crops, were totally destroyed.⁴ On the following day (*Sept. 1st*) the army arrived at “French Catharine’s” (*Havannah*), and spent the next day (*Thursday, Sept. 2d*) in destroying that village and the improvements with which it was surrounded.⁵ Passing thence down the eastern bank of the Seneca Lake, on Saturday (*Sept. 4th*), a village called Appletown,⁶ and on Sunday (*Sept. 5th*), an ancient settlement named Kandaia, containing about twenty houses of a superior class, and surrounded by extensive corn-fields and fine orchards,⁷ were also totally destroyed. On Tuesday (*Sept. 7th*) the army crossed the outlet of Seneca Lake, and, in three divisions, approached Ganundäsaga, the chief town of the Senecas,⁸ in which were some sixty houses, surrounded with thrifty orchards of apple and peach trees, and fine gardens, all of which, with the neighboring corn-fields,

¹ Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 29; Gen. Sullivan's dispatch, Aug. 30; Gordon, iii. p. 309; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 21.—² Stone's Brant, ii. p. 21.

² Maj. Livermore's Jour., Aug. 29; Gordon, iii. p. 309; Marshall, iv. p. 158. Maj. Van Campen says (p. 151) that the loss was 70. Gen. Sullivan (*dispatch, Aug. 30*) says the loss was three killed, and thirty-nine wounded.

³ Two hundred and fifty men had been left at Tioga Point, and only the brigade of Gen. Poor appears to have been engaged, while the other troops either remained inactive, or merely covered the artillery.

⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 156.—⁵ Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 29. Maj. Livermore (*Jour., Aug. 29*) supposes Brant had “about 600 chosen savages.”—⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 308.

¹ Maj. Livermore's Jour., Aug. 29; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 22; Journal of “an officer,” cited by Judge Campbell.

² Maj. Livermore's Jour., Aug. 30.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Maj. Livermore's and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Aug. 31.—⁵ Maj. Livermore's, “an officer's,” and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 1 and 2; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 24.

⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Maj. Livermore's, “an officer's,” and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 5; Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 158.—⁸ Near Geneva, N. Y.

were totally destroyed.¹ From this place, on Wednesday (*Sept. 8th*), a detachment was sent up the west side of the lake, and destroyed a village of twenty houses, "and vast quantities of corn, peas, beans, and other vegetables;"² while a second detachment, under Colonel Harper, made a forced march on the eastern side of the lake and destroyed Schoy'ase (*Waterloo*).³ On Friday (*Sept. 10th*) the army moved to Gaii'-un-dă-gwa (*Canandaigua*), where twenty-three large and elegant houses, mostly framed, and several others of an inferior class, with extensive fields of corn, were also destroyed.⁴ On Saturday (*Sept. 11th*) Hä'-ne-ä-yĕh (*Honeayę*) was destroyed;⁵ and, after establishing a post there, leaving with it part of the provisions and one field-piece,⁶ the army moved on, on Monday (*Sept. 13th*) to Kanaghsha, where twenty-five houses and large corn-fields were destroyed.⁷

From this place a detachment of twenty-six men, under Lieutenant William Boyd of the Rifles, was sent forward to reconnoitre Little Beardstown (*Cuyler, Livingston Co., N. Y.*), the

next village on the route, and one of the principal in the nation. Having discharged his duty and started on his return to the camp, two Indians were seen, shot, and *scalped*, but when within a short distance of the main body he was intercepted by a large body of the enemy. With desperate energy he attempted, three times, to escape by forcing his way through the enemy, but as often he was repulsed—three only succeeding, while twenty-two fell on the field, and he and Sergeant Parker were taken prisoners. Knowing the certainty of his fate, unless immediate relief was afforded, Lieutenant Boyd asked for Joseph Brant, who commanded the Indians who had taken him, and claiming from him the protection of "a brother," was assured by the chief that he should suffer no harm. The prisoners were immediately conducted to Little Beardstown, and Boyd was well treated; but, during a short absence of Joseph Brant, shortly afterwards, Butler—the infamous Tory chief—called on the prisoners for information respecting the American army. Declining to answer, they were threatened with torture, but still refused; and, with fiend-like cruelty—such as none but Butler and his kind could invent, and none but savages execute—the threat was enforced, and Boyd and Parker fell, martyrs in the cause of their country.¹

¹ Maj. Livermore's, Lieut. Barton's, and "an officer's" Journals, Sept. 7; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 26; Turner's Pioneer History, p. 81.—² Maj. Livermore's and "an officer's" Journals, Sept. 8; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 26.

³ Stone's Brant, ii. p. 26.—⁴ Maj. Livermore's, "an officer's," and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 10; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 27; Turner's Pioneer History, p. 81.

Maj. Livermore's, "an officer's," and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 11; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 27.

Lieut. Barton's Jour., Sept. 11; Maj. Livermore's and "an officer's" Journals, Sept. 12.—⁷ Maj. Livermore's, "an officer's," and Lieut. Barton's Journal's, Sept. 13; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 29.

¹ Maj. Livermore's, "an officer's," and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 13; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 29; Life of Mary Jemison, the White Woman, pp. 121, 122; Life of Maj. Van Campen, pp. 161-171. The remains of Boyd and Parker were disinterred, and buried, with appropriate ceremonies, in Mount Hope Cemetery, near Rochester, in

The main body moved forward as rapidly as possible, but reached the scene of action only in season to bury the dead, and to capture the packs, blankets, and stores belonging to the enemy.¹ The same day the enemy threatened to attack the army, but on the approach of General Clinton's division they immediately retired;² and the army advanced to a village called the New Genesee village, and destroyed it. On the following morning (*Tuesday, Sept. 14th*) the army crossed the Genesee River and reached the old town of Genesee, or Little Beardstown, where the mutilated bodies of Lieutenant Boyd and Sergeant Parker were found and buried.³ Upwards of a hundred and twenty houses, and seven hundred acres of growing corn, besides vast quantities of other property, were here destroyed.⁴

The army proceeded no farther, and on Thursday (*Sept. 16th*) it recrossed the Genesee River and marched homeward.⁵ The same route was pursued that the army advanced by, and, with the exception of the detachment of parties of troops to destroy the towns on the banks of Cayuga Lake,⁶ nothing requiring especial notice occurred on the

march. On the thirtieth of September the troops reached Wyoming, and on the fifteenth of October they arrived at Easton.¹

The immediate result of this expedition was neither beneficial to the frontiers or serviceable to the country at large. The army failed in its efforts to cripple the effective force of the enemy, and the frontiers were ravaged with still greater diligence by the savages, to revenge the desolation which had been spread around their own villages;² while the country suffered from the effects of a campaign which produced so complete a destruction of the evidences of civilization, in an enemy's country, in the condemnation which it received from every friend of mankind.³ A greater degree of barbarity than Pontiac or Brant ever exercised—putting even Wyoming to the blush—was seen in the savage mutilation of the bodies of the fallen enemy, by scalping them,⁴ and by flaying them *for boot-tops*;⁵ in the destruction, without any mercy, of the growing crops, and of the orchards which surrounded the dwellings;⁶ in

¹ Campbell's Border Warfare, p. 162; Maj. Livermore's Journal, Oct. 15; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 37.

² Stedman, ii. pp. 154, 155; Miner's Wyoming, pp. 276–307; Gordon, iii. p. 312; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. pp. 147, 148.

³ Marshall, iv. p. 160; Gordon, iii. p. 311; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 65.

⁴ Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 29 and Sept. 13; "an officer's" Jour., Sept. 13; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 21.

⁵ Lieut. Barton's Jour., Aug. 30.

⁶ The savages, in their excursions among the settlements, never injured either the growing crops or the fruit-trees; and the destruction of the latter was entirely uncalled for, even if it had been found necessary to destroy the crops.

August, 1842; and in the little volume, containing a record of the proceedings of that ceremony, are many interesting items respecting this expedition.

¹ Maj. Livermore's, "an officer's," and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 13. This occurred in Groveland, Livingston, Co., N. Y.—² Maj. Livermore's, "an officer's," and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 13.

³ Life of Maj. Van Campen, p. 173.—⁴ Life of Mary Jemison, p. 123.—⁵ Stone's Brant, ii. p. 35.

⁶ Maj. Livermore's, "an officer's," and Lieut. Barton's Journals, Sept. 20 and 21; Stone's Brant, ii. p. 36.

the burning of cabins, with the helpless and decrepit who had sought refuge therein, after the latter had received promises of protection:¹ and no one can read the details of the movements,

in all their parts, without lamenting that the honor of the infant republic, and the progress of civilization among the savage aborigines of New York, should have experienced, at the hands of a Continental officer, so severe a blow

¹ Lieut. Barton's Journal, Sept. 26.

CHAPTER LVI.

August 19, 1779.¹

THE ASSAULT ON PAULUS HOOK, N. J.

WHILE the British occupied the city of New York, an outpost was maintained on Paulus Hook, where Jersey City now stands, on the western bank of the Hudson River, opposite the former city.² At that time the march of improvement had not obliterated the natural features of the ground, farther than by substituting the homestead of the farmer for the original forest; and Paulus Hook could then, more properly than now, be said to have been "a sandy peninsula, connected with the main by a narrow marshy neck."³ It had been fortified with considerable care, and, at the time of which this narrative treats, it was garrisoned by about three hundred and fifty men.⁴ The main defence was a

circular redoubt, with a ditch and abatis, mounting six heavy guns, situated on the site of the building now occupied by the Morris Canal Co., at the corner of Grand and Greene streets. A short distance southeast from this was another redoubt, of an oblong form, mounting three twelve-pounders and one eighteen. On the margin of the marsh, which separated the Hook from the main-land, was a deep creek, fordable only in two places; a short distance inside of this creek a deep ditch had been dug, from the river to the bay, over which access to the Hook could be had only by means of a draw-bridge, which was strengthened, at its eastern terminus, with a heavy barred gate; about thirty paces within this ditch had been placed a heavy abatis, which extended around to the eastern front of the Hook, both on the river and the bay; and, lastly, forming the fourth line of defence, beside the marsh, on the land side, were two blockhouses and two breastworks, while on that

¹ The date of this important affair appears to have been misunderstood. Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 109), the author of "*The Civil War in America*" (iii. p. 37), Hon. W. B. Reed (*Life of Pres. Reed*, ii. p. 125), Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 284), and others, state it occurred on the 19th of July. I have followed the date referred to in Maj. Lee's dispatch; that which is indicated by the period embraced in his correspondence on the subject with Gen. Washington (*Aug. 10 to Aug. 23*), and the date inscribed on the medal awarded to him by Congress.

² Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., pp. 231, 232.

³ Lo-sing's Field Book, ii. p. 828.

⁴ One hundred and fifty-eight were taken prisoners;

some forty or fifty, with Maj. Sutherland, found refuge in a blockhouse; and Col. Buskirk, with about one hundred and thirty men, were on the main-land.

part of the shore which was not protected by the abatis, before referred to, was a line of breastworks, which effectually covered every portion of the shore.¹ The only approach to this post, by land, from the American position, was over "the New Bridge," which crossed the Hackensack River, fourteen miles above Paulus Hook; but as the latter stream ran parallel with the Hudson River, and but a very short distance from it, that entire distance; and as Sir Henry Clinton laid between Manhattanville and Kingsbridge, on the eastern bank of the Hudson River, whence he could, on two hours' notice, throw a body of troops to cut off the retreat of any intruder, an attempt to approach Paulus Hook, in that direction, was probably seldom thought of².

The American army, under General Washington, remained in the neighborhood of the Highlands;³ and the only enterprise which appeared to engage the attention of the commander-in-chief, was the employment of strong parties to check the depredations of the British, and to restrain their intercourse with the Tories, who, like evil spirits, infested every part of the country which lay between the two armies.⁴ Among the most daring of those who were thus engaged was Major Henry Lee, jr., of Virginia, whose parties often

scoured the country as far as "the New Bridge" on the Hackensack; and whose foraging parties not unfrequently passed over the bridge, and visited the country on the neck, towards Paulus Hook, as far down as Bergen.¹ He had formed a *corps de reserve* to General Wayne, when the latter stormed Stony Point, and had witnessed that officer's brilliant achievement, without being able to secure for himself a portion of the honor.² Thirsting for fame, he looked for a field on which he could secure it, and, at the suggestion of General Washington,³ his mind rested on Paulus Hook, and he determined to attempt its capture. If Wayne could capture Stony Point, he could secure Paulus Hook; and with him, as with Wayne, having decided the question in his own mind, the work had been half accomplished. He had obtained all the information which was so necessary in the prosecution of the enterprise; he had formed the plans both for the surprise of the works and the safe retreat of his men; he had measured his own and the enemy's strength and activity; and he had decided that he could accomplish his object.⁴

With these facts before him, on the ninth of August, he submitted the sub-

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 828; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 136.—² Marshall, iv. p. 137.

³ The correspondence of Gen. Washington was all dated at West Point. See also Sparks' Washington, p. 298.

⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 135; Sparks, p. 298.

¹ Marshall, iv. p. 135; Duer's Life of Lord Stirling, p. 204.—² Vide p. 520.

³ This is apparent from the language of the General's letter to Maj. Lee, Aug. 10, 1779, wherein the former alludes to "the plan" submitted by the latter for the attack on Paulus Hook. In this letter Gen. Washington refers to "the idea he had of the matter" before the receipt of Lee's plan, and refers the latter's attention thereto.

⁴ Gen. Washington's letter to him, Aug. 10.

jeet to the commander-in-chief;¹ but the latter, while he approved the plans, "in the (then) present position of the enemy's army, he deemed the attempt too hazardous, and not warranted by the magnitude of the object," at the same time expressing a preference for an approach by water.² It appears, however, that General Washington subsequently withdrew the objections which he had made, probably on the conditions that not more than three hundred men should be employed; that provision should be made for crossing the Hackensack, below the bridge, after the works had been carried; and that no attempt whatever should be made to hold the post after it had been captured—on the latter of which his orders are said to have been peremptory.³

At length, at about half-past ten o'clock on Wednesday morning, the eighteenth of August, Major Lee moved from Paramus,⁴ seven miles northwest from Hackensack,⁵ at the head of two companies of Maryland troops, under Captain Levin Handy.⁶ At the New Bridge, over the Hackensack River, he was joined by three hundred Virginia troops and a troop of dragoons, dismounted,⁷ making an aggregate force of

four hundred men,¹ with which, at four o'clock in the afternoon, he commenced his march towards Paulus Hook²—the Marylanders occupying the van.³ He took with him a number of wagons, in order to lead the enemy to suppose it was a foraging party; while the patrols of dragoons which had been thrown out on the roads leading to the river, whence the enemy might cut off the retreat, and the infantry which had been thrown out in front, as a mask, were well calculated to strengthen the deception.⁴ As the Bergen road afforded greater facilities for the march, he followed that for some distance; but, as he approached the enemy's outposts, he filed off to the left and took the road through the mountains.⁵ Here his principal guide, either through treachery or timidity, failed to discharge the duties for which he had been employed; and, misleading the troops, obliging them to regain their route "through deep mountainous woods," and causing some parties of the command to become separated from the main body, the troops were unnecessarily fatigued, the time appointed for the assault was disregarded, and the entire expedition placed in jeopardy.⁶ The loss of the troops who had thus been separated "affected Major Lee most sensibly, as it not only diminished the number of the men destined for the assault, but de-

¹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 9.—² Gen. Washington to Maj. Lee, Aug. 10.—³ Gordon, iii. pp. 283, 284; Ramsay, ii. p. 109; Marshall, iv. p. 141; Gen. Washington to Maj. Lee, Sept. 1, 1779.—⁴ Capt. Levin Handy to Geo. Handy, 22d July (August?), 1779.

⁵ Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 72.

⁶ Capt. L. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22, 1779.

⁷ Ibid.; Gordon, iii. p. 284; Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

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¹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

² Ibid.—³ Capt. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22, 1779.

⁴ Duer's Lord Stirling, p. 205; Marshall, iv. p. 138.

⁵ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Marshall, iv. p. 138.—⁶ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

privided him of the aid of several officers of distinguished merit."¹

About the same time the Virginians, because Major Lee was ranked by some other officer of that line, then present,² became dissatisfied, and one half of their number "left" the expedition; and of those who remained, notwithstanding the exertions of Major Clarke, their commander, it has been said, that "their efforts to second his endeavors were not the most vigorous."³

Thus crippled and harassed, Major Lee approached Paulus Hook, without interruption from the enemy.⁴ Through the incompetence of his guide, his men had been fatigued before their work had commenced; instead of being enabled to assault the enemy's lines at half-past twelve o'clock, from the same cause, it was near four o'clock before he approached the marsh which separated the Hook from the main. The near approach of day, and the rising of the tide over the marsh, warned him that not a moment could be lost; and the separation of some of his troops from the main body, the desertion of one half the Virginians, and the discon-

tent of the others, had reduced his really effective force to the two companies of Marylanders and the troop of the Legion, yet he had resolved to assault the Hook, and the necessary dispositions—the change of circumstances having rendered his "first disposition impracticable"—were immediately made for that purpose.¹

Lieutenant Michael Rudolph, of the dragoons, was immediately sent forward to reconnoitre, and returned with the report that "all was silence within the works," and that he had sounded the ditch ("canal") and found "the passage on the central route was still admissible," notwithstanding the rising tide would speedily increase the difficulties by rendering that fording-place impassable.² The troops were ordered to advance, without farther delay, in three solid columns³—two commanded by Major Clarke⁴ and Captain Forsyth,⁵ preceded by forlorn hopes under Lieutenant McAllister of the Marylanders,⁶ and Lieutenant Rudolph of the Legion Dragoons,⁷ to assault the works on either flank; the third, under Captain Handy,⁸ to advance against the front, and to act as a reserve, should one be found necessary.⁹ In this reorganiza-

¹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

² An indignant letter by Maj. W. Croghan, of Virginia, addressed to "Mr. Barnard Gratz, Phila.," dated "Camp north of Smith's Clove, Aug. 22, 1779," explains the trouble, intimates that Maj. Lee will be arrested for his presumption in commanding his seniors, and speaks of a correspondence with Lord Stirling, "concerning his ordering 300 of our men under Maj. Lee."

³ Maj. Lee to Pres. Reed, Aug. 27, 1779. In the account of the affair, published by Rivington (*Royal Gazette*, No. 302, *Saturday Aug. 21, 1779*), it is said the post "was attacked by one hundred rebels, the rest being posted on the heights of Bergen to secure a retreat."

⁴ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

¹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Capt. L. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22.—² Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22; Marshall, iv. p. 138.—³ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Capt. L. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1453, Aug. 23.—⁴ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Same to Pres. Reed, Aug. 27.—⁵ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.—⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Ibid.; Garden's Anecdotes, i. p. 129.—⁸ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Capt. L. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22.

⁹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

tion of his reduced force, Major Lee was compelled to order his men to advance in their then disposition, without regard to the punctilios of honor or rank; and, with the exception of the Virginians, they "stood by him faithfully."¹ In perfect silence, and with trailed arms,² the troops waded the marsh and approached the works; and the first notice which the enemy received of the assault was when the forlorn hopes jumped into the ditch which separated the works from the marsh.³ A brisk fire of musketry was immediately opened on them by the enemy, from the blockhouses and along the line of abatis, but the energetic movements of the forlorn hopes, supported by the right column, under Major Clarke, soon broke through all opposition, and the latter gained possession of the main work before the garrison had an opportunity to discharge a single piece of artillery.⁴ At the same time the centre column, under Captain Forsyth, took possession of a house, known as "Number Six," and of the officers and soldiers who were quartered there; while the left, or rear column, under Captain Handy, moved forward and covered the whole.⁵ The men pushed forward with "pans open, cocks fallen," to prevent all possibility of a fire,⁶ and, in a few moments,

without the discharge of a single musket,¹ the post was in possession of the Americans, and the colors were struck by Lieutenant McAllister of the Maryland line.² The garrison—with the exception of some forty or fifty Hessians, who, with Major Sutherland, had thrown themselves into a small work near the ditch³—had been taken prisoners, and the triumph appeared to be complete.⁴

The obstacles which the expedition had experienced on its march, and the delay produced thereby;⁵ the fatigue of the troops;⁶ the danger attending their retreat;⁷ the entire loss of all their ammunition in wading the ditch;⁸ the alarm-guns in the city of New York, which were arousing the enemy's troops at that place;⁹ the information that Colonel Buskirk and his regiment had left the works and marched up to the English Neighborhood, the preceding evening;¹⁰ and the appearance of approaching day,¹¹ all warned Major Lee that his immediate retreat was necessary to insure his safety. Accordingly, Captain Forsyth was ordered to select such men as were least fatigued, from the several columns, and to occupy Ber-

¹ Capt. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22, 1779; Jas. Abeel, D. Q. M. G., to Gov. Livingston, "Morristown, Aug. 21, 1779."—² Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Gen. Washington to Cong., Aug. 23.—³ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Duer's Stirling, p. 205; Gordon, iii. p. 284; Marshall, iv. p. 139; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 109.—⁴ Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1453, Aug. 23, 1779.—⁵ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.—⁶ Ibid.; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1453, Aug. 23, 1779.—⁷ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.—⁸ Ibid.—⁹ Duer's Stirling, p. 205; Marshall, iv. p. 139.—¹⁰ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Rivington's Royal Gazette, Aug. 21 and Aug. 25, 1779.—¹¹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

¹ Maj. Lee to Pres. Reed, Aug. 27.—² Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.—³ Ibid.; Marshall, iv. p. 138; Rivington's Royal Gazette, N. Y., Aug. 25, 1779.

⁴ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1453, Aug. 23, 1779; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 303, N. Y., Aug. 25, 1779.

⁵ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.

⁶ Capt. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22, 1779.

gen Heights, for the purpose of covering the retreat; and Major Clarke, with the right column, was ordered to move with the greater part of the prisoners; while Captain Handy was ordered to follow with the remainder, guarded by the Legion; and Lieutenants Armstrong and Reed commanding the rear-guard.¹

Hastening forward, Major Lee soon learned that a number of boats, under Captain Peyton, which had been provided for his passage across the Hackensack, had been removed,² and a tedious land march to the New Bridge would be necessary. He immediately sent off an express to Lord Stirling (who had moved down to the Bridge, with five hundred men, to cover the expedition),³ with information of his disappointment; and, after ordering Major Clarke to regain the Bergen road and to move towards the New Bridge, he returned to the rear of the column, where he supposed the greatest danger was, and continued his retreat.⁴ When the column reached the point opposite Weehawken, where the roads meet, the rear column, under Captain Handy, was ordered to take the mountain road; Major Clarke continued on the Bergen road; and Major Lee took the central road. At this point Captain Catlett, of the Virginia line, with fifty men, joined the retreat, and Major Lee immediately divided them among the three columns, as rear-guards, to prevent a surprise by the enemy—

neither of the columns having any ammunition which had not been destroyed by water; and the magazine of the garrison having resisted every effort which had been made to open it in order to get a fresh supply before leaving Paulus Hook. Soon afterwards a detachment, under Colonel Ball, which Lord Stirling had sent out to cover the retreat of the expedition, was met; and just before reaching the liberty-pole, near English Neighborhood Creek, the detachment from the garrison, under Colonel Buskirk, before referred to, fell on the right flank of Major Lee's column. Lieutenants Reed and Rudolph were ordered to cover the retreat, when the enemy retired; and, at one o'clock on Thursday afternoon (*Aug. 19th*), the expedition reached the New Bridge in safety, with all its prisoners.¹

In this remarkable exploit the enemy lost about fifty men, who were bayoneted,² and one hundred and fifty-eight men, who were carried off by Major Lee;³ while that of the Americans was only two killed and three wounded.⁴

The gallantry of Major Lee and his party was soon known, and the country resounded with his praise. The commander-in-chief announced it to the army, in general orders, with much approbation;⁵ and the Continental Congress, besides tendering its thanks, ordered a medal to be struck in honor of the event.⁶

¹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.—² Ibid.; Duer's Stirling, p. 205; Marshall, iv. pp. 139, 140.—³ Duer's Stirling, p. 205.—⁴ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22,

¹ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22, 1779.—² Ibid.; Capt. L. Handy to Geo. Handy, July 22.—³ Report of prisoners appended to Maj. Lee's letter, Aug. 22.—⁴ Maj. Lee to Gen. Washington, Aug. 22.—⁵ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 141.—⁶ Jour. of Cong., Friday, Sept. 24, 1779.

DOCUMENTS.

I.

MAJ. LEE'S DISPATCH TO GEN. WASHINGTON.

SIR:—Lord Stirling was pleased to communicate to your Excellency my verbal report to his lordship of the 19th instant. I now do myself the honor to present a particular relation of the enterprise which your Excellency was pleased to commit to my direction.

I took command of the troops employed on this occasion on the 18th. They amounted to four hundred infantry, composed of detachments from the Virginia and Maryland divisions, and one troop of dismounted dragoons.

The troops moved from the vicinity of the New Bridge about four o'clock p. m. Patrols of horse being detached to watch the communication with the North River, and parties of infantry stationed at the different avenues leading to Paulus Hook. My anxiety to render the march as easy as possible, induced me to pursue the Bergen road lower than intended. After filing into the mountains, the timidity or treachery of the principal guide prolonged a short march into a march of three hours; by this means the troops were exceedingly harassed, and being obliged, through deep mountainous woods, to regain our route, some parties of the rear were unfortunately separated. This affected me most sensibly, as it not only diminished the number of the men destined for the assault, but deprived me of the aid of several officers of distinguished merit.

On reaching the point of separation, I found my first disposition impracticable, both from the near approach of day and the rising of the tide. Not a moment being to spare, I paid no attention to the punctiliois of honor or rank, but

ordered the troops to advance in their then disposition. Lieutenant Randolph, whom I had previously detached to reconnoitre the passages of the canal, returned to me at this point of time and reported that all was silence within the works, that he had fathomed the canal and found the passage on the centre route still admissible. This intervening intelligence was immediately communicated from front to rear, and the troops pushed on with that resolution, order, and coolness which insures success.

The forlorn hopes, led by Lieutenant McAllister, of the Maryland, and Lieutenant Randolph, of the Dragoons, marched on with trailed arms, in most profound silence. Such was the singular address of these two gentlemen, that the first notice to the garrison was the forlorns plunging into the canal. A firing immediately commenced from the blockhouses and along the line of the abatis, but did not in the least check the advance of the troops. The forlorn, supported by Major Clarke, at the head of the right column, broke through all opposition, and found an entrance into the main work. So rapid was the movement of the troops, that we gained the fort before the discharge of a single piece of artillery. The centre column, conducted by Captain Forsyth, on passing the abatis, took a direction to their left. Lieutenant Armstrong led on the advance of this column. They soon possessed themselves of the officers and troops posted at the house No. 6, and fully completed every object of their destination. The rear column, under Captain Handy, moved forward in support of the whole. Thus were we completely victorious in the space of a few moments.

The appearance of daylight, my apprehension lest some accident might have befallen the boats,

the numerous difficulties of the retreat, the harassed state of the troops, and the destruction of all our ammunition by passing the canal, conspired in influencing me to retire the moment of victory. Major Clarke, with the right column, was immediately put in motion with the greater part of the prisoners. Captain Handy followed on with the remainder. Lieutenants Armstrong and Reed formed the rear-guard.

Immediately on the commencement of the retreat, I sent forward Captain Forsyth to Prior's Mill to collect such men from the different columns as were most fit for action, and to take post on the heights of Bergen to cover the retreat.

On my reaching this place I was informed by Cornet Neill (who had been posted there during the night for the purpose of laying the bridge and communicating with the boats), that my messenger, directed to him previous to the attack, had not arrived, nor had he heard from Captain Peyton, who had charge of the boats.

Struck with apprehension that I should be disappointed in the route of retreat, I rode forward to the front, under Major Clarke, whom I found very near the point of embarkation and no boats to receive them. In this very critical situation I lost no time in my decision, but ordered the troops to regain Bergen road and shove on to the New Bridge: at the same time I communicated my disappointment to Lord Stirling by express, then returned to Prior's Bridge to the rear-guard.

Oppressed by every possible misfortune, at the head of troops worn down by a rapid march of thirty miles, through mountains, swamps, and deep morasses, without the least refreshment during the whole march, ammunition destroyed, ineumbered with prisoners, and a retreat of fourteen miles to make good, on a route admissible of interception at several points, by a march of two, three, or four miles; one body moving in our rear, and another (from the intelligence I had received from the captured officers), in all probability well advanced on our right; a retreat naturally impossible to our left; —under all these distressing circumstances, my sole dependence was in the persevering gallantry of the officers and obstinate courage of the

troops. In this I was fully satisfied by the shouts of the soldiery, who gave every proof of unimpaired vigor the moment that the enemy's approach was announced.

Having gained the point of intersection opposite Weehawk, Captain Handy was directed to move with his division on the mountain road, in order to facilitate the retreat. Captain Catlett, of the Virginia regiment, fortunately joined me, at this moment, at the head of fifty men, with good ammunition. I immediately halted this officer, and having detached two parties, the one on the Bergen road in the rear of Major Clarke, the other on the banks of the North River, I moved with the party under the command of the Captain on the centre route. By these precautions a sudden approach of the enemy was fully prevented. I am very much indebted to this officer, and the gentlemen under him, for their alacrity and vigilance on this occasion.

On the rear's approach to the Fort Lee road, we met a detachment under the command of Colonel Ball, which Lord Stirling had pushed forward, on the first notice of our situation, to support the retreat. The Colonel moved on, and occupied a position which effectually covered us.

Some little time after this, a body of the enemy (alluded to in the intelligence I mentioned to have received from the officers while in the fort) made their appearance, issuing out of the woods on our right, and moving through the fields directly to the road. They immediately commenced a fire upon my rear. Lieutenant Reed was ordered to face them, while Lieutenant Rudolph threw himself, with a party, into a stone house which commanded the road. These two officers were directed mutually to support each other, and give time for the troops to pass the English Neighborhood Creek, at the liberty-pole. On the enemy's observing this disposition, they immediately retired by the same route they had approached, and gained the woods. The precipitation with which they retired, preventing the possibility of Colonel Ball's falling in with them, saved the whole.

The body which moved in our rear, having excessively fatigued themselves by the rapidity

of their march, thought prudent to halt before they came in contact with us.

Thus, sir, was every attempt to cut off our rear completely baffled. The troops arrived safe at the New Bridge, with all the prisoners, about one o'clock p. m. on the nineteenth.

I should commit the highest injustice, was I not to assure your Excellency that my endeavors were fully seconded by every officer in his station; nor can any discrimination justly be made, but what arose from opportunity. The troops vied with each other in patience under their many sufferings, and conducted themselves, in every vicissitude of fortune, with a resolution which reflects the highest honor on them.

During the whole action not a single musket was fired on our side—the bayonet was our sole dependence.

Having gained the fort, such was the order of the troops, and attention of the officers, that the soldiers were prevented from plundering, although in the midst of every sort.

American humanity has been again signally manifested. Self-preservation strongly dictated, on the retreat, the putting the prisoners to death, and British cruelty fully justified it; notwithstanding which, not a man was wantonly hurt.

During the progress of the troops in the works, from the different reports of my officers, I conclude not more than fifty of the enemy were killed, and a few wounded. Among the killed, is one officer, supposed (from his description) to be a captain in Colonel Buskirk's regiment. Our loss, on this occasion, is very trifling. I have not yet had a report from the detachment of Virginians; but, as I conclude their loss to be proportionate to the loss of the other troops, I can venture to pronounce that the loss of the whole, in killed, wounded, and missing, will not exceed twenty. As soon as the report comes to hand, I will transmit to headquarters an accurate return. I herewith inclose a return of the prisoners taken from the enemy.

At every point of the enterprise I stood highly indebted to Major Clarke for his zeal, activity, and example. Captains Handy and Forsyth have claim to my particular thanks for

the support I experienced from them on every occasion. The Captains Reed, McLane, Smith, Crump, and Wilmot, behaved with the greatest zeal and intrepidity. I must acknowledge myself very much indebted to Major Burnet and Captain Peyton, of the dragoons, for their council and indefatigability in the previous preparations to the attack. The premature withdrawal of the boats was owing to the non-arrival of my dispatches; and though a most mortifying circumstance, can be called nothing more than unfortunate. Lieutenant Vanderville, who was to have commanded one of the forlorns, but was thrown out by the alteration of the disposition of battle, conducted himself perfectly soldier-like. The whole of the officers behaved with the greatest propriety; and, as I said before, no discrimination can justly be made, but what arose from opportunity.

The Lieutenants McAllister, Armstrong, Reed, and Rudulph, distinguished themselves remarkably. Too much praise cannot be given to those gentlemen for their prowess and example. Captain Bradford, of the train, who volunteered it with me, for the purpose of taking direction of the artillery, deserves my warmest thanks for his zeal and activity. I am personally indebted to Captain Rudulph and Dr. Irvine, of the dragoons, who attended me during the expedition, for their many services.

I beg leave to present your Excellency with the flag of the fort by the hands of Mr. McAllister, the gentleman into whose possession it fell.

It is needless for me to explain my reasons for the instantaneous evacuation of the fort. Your Excellency's knowledge of the post will suggest fully the propriety of it. The event confirms it.

Among the many unfortunate circumstances which crossed our wishes, none was more so than the accidental absence of Colonel Buskirk and the greatest part of his regiment. They had set out on an expedition up the North River the very night of the attack. A company of vigilant Hessians had taken their place in the fort, which rendered the secrecy of approach more precarious, and, at the same time, diminished the object of the enterprise by a

reduction of the number of the garrison. Major Sutherland fortunately saved himself by a soldier's counterfeiting his person. This imposition was not discovered until too late.

I intended to have burned the barracks; but on finding a number of sick soldiers, and women with young children in them, humanity forbade the execution of my intention. The key of the magazine could not be found, nor could it be broken open in the little time we had to spare, many attempts having been made to that purpose by the Lieutenants McAllister and Reed. It was completely impracticable to bring off any pieces of artillery. I consulted Captain Bradford on the point, who confirmed me in my opinion. The circumstance of spiking them being trivial, it was omitted altogether.

After most of the troops had retired from the works, and were passed and passing the canal, a fire of musketry commenced from a few stragglers, who had collected in an old work, on the right of the main fort. Their fire being ineffectual, and the object trifling, I determined not to break in upon the order of retreat, but continued passing the defile in front. I cannot conclude this relation without expressing my warmest thanks to Lord Stirling for the full patronage I received from him in every stage of the enterprise. I must also return my thanks to the cavalry, for their vigilant execution of the duties assigned them.

Captain Rudolph waits on your Excellency with these dispatches. I beg leave to refer to this officer for any farther explanation that may be required.

I have the honor to be, sir, with the most perfect respect, your Excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,

HENRY LEE, jr.

PARAMUS, August 22, 1779.

His Excellency GENERAL WASHINGTON.

Return of prisoners taken at Paulus Hook on the morning of the 19th of August, 1779.

Sixty-fourth Regiment.—One captain.

Garrison Regiment.—Six sergeants, sixty-seven rank and file.

Buskirk's Regiment.—One surgeon, one sur-

geon's-mate, one quartermaster, four subalterns, two sergeants, thirty-nine rank and file.

Hessians.—One sergeant, ten rank and file.

Artificers.—Two.

Inhabitants.—Ten.

Artillery.—One sergeant, one corporal, two gunners, nine matrosses.

TOTAL.—One hundred and fifty-eight.

The surgeon on parole.

By order of Major Lee.

ROBERT FORSYTH,

Capt. P. L. Dragoons.

Published by Order of Congress.

CHARLES THOMSON, *Secretary.*

II.

BRITISH ACCOUNT OF THE AFFAIR.

[From "The N. Y. Gazette and Mercury" (J. Gaines'), No. 1453, Monday, August 23, 1779.]

As the Printer of Saturday's Paper¹ has not represented Facts relative to the attack on Paulus-Hook, on the 19th Instant, it is not amiss that the Printer should have the Candor to insert the following:

That nearly half an Hour after two, the Rebels in three Divisions (exceeding 400 Men) passed the Ditch in front of the Abatis, about 20 Yards from the Abatis, where they were fired upon by a few Centries, but having seized immediately on the Block House Guards (who in place of defending their post, ran out to see what was the matter) they proceeded to the Work, which they soon became masters of, with the Cannon, &c. But they were so confused and alarmed, they neither Spiked the Cannon, nor damaged the Barracks, or made any other use of their Victory, than carrying off about 100 prisoners, among whom there are about ten Hessians (whose Loss is much regretted) and four Officers of Colonel Buskirk's Battalion, and plundering a few Women.

This Panic (amongst them) was occasioned by an incessant Fire kept on them from a small

¹ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," No. 302, New York, Saturday, August 21, 1779.

Redoubt into which Major Sutherland threw himself with a Capt. Subaltern, and 25 gallant Hessians on the first Alarm. The Rebels repeatedly challenged the Redoubt to surrender, or they would bayonet them, to which they received a fire and No, for answer. About half after 8 o'clock Major Sutherland was joined by one Light Infantry Company of the Guards, under the Command of Captain Dundass, with which he immediately marched, and Captain Maynard was shortly after ordered to follow Major Sutherland by Colonel Gordon, on which Major Sutherland marched both Companies, in order to succour Colonel Buskirk, and after going about 15 Miles, he found that Colonel Buskirk had a smart Engagement with the Rebels some Time before, and had returned. There were a few Prisoners made, amongst whom is a

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Captain Meale, who was found asleep from the great Fatigue he underwent; and surely unless he had been a Livingston, Laurens, or Adams, he could not in that Situation forfeit his Claim to British Valor and Humanity. The Light Infantry rested here for an Hour, during which Dr. Gordon gallantly charged two Rebels, who had fired at him, and took one of them.

Major Sutherland finding one Object of his March answered, by Colonel Buskirk's being safe, and 100 Men not sufficient to answer his other Intentions, returned, this charming Body of Men, having made a march of about 30 miles in less than 10 Hours.

Ensign Barrete (who was a Volunteer) reported to Major Sutherland, that he destroyed a Gunsmith's Tools, &c., to the Amount of £100.

CHAPTER LVII.

September 23, 1779.

THE CAPTURE OF THE SERAPIS AND COUNTESS OF SCARBOROUGH.

DURING the summer of 1779, through the exertions of Doctor Franklin, a squadron was fitted out in France, and the command given to Captain John Paul Jones. It consisted of the *Bon Homme Richard*,—an old East India man (which had been condemned and laid up as a hulk),¹ mounting six old eighteen-pounders in the gun-room, twenty-eight old twelve-pounders on her main-deck, and eight six-pounders on her quarter-deck and forecastle;² the *Alliance*,—a fine Continental frigate mounting thirty-six guns;³ the *Pallas*,—a merchant ship carrying thirty-two guns;⁴ the *Vengeance*,—a merchant brig carrying twelve guns;⁵ and the *Cerf*,—a fine large cutter mounting eighteen guns.⁶ The cost attending this squad-

ron appears to have been borne in part by the King of the French,¹ in part by the American Commissioners,² and the remainder by M. le Ray de Chaumont, a banker in Paris;³ and a similar *partnership* appears to have controlled the officers and the movements of the vessels, throughout the cruise which followed, producing insubordination and disaster wherever they went.⁴

After cruising on the coast of Great Britain, and spreading terror among her people for several weeks,⁵ on the twenty-third of September, 1779, while in company with the *Alliance* and the *Pallas*, Commodore Jones was cruising off Flamborough Head, on the coast of Yorkshire, England⁶ (*latitude* $54^{\circ} 7' N.$, *longitude* $0^{\circ} 5' W.$), and discovered a fleet of more than forty sail.⁷ From intelligence which the Commodore pos-

¹ Analectic Magazine, viii. p. 14; Capt. N. Fanning's Mem., p. 36.—² Cooper's Naval Hist., i. p. 120. Sherrburn (*Life of John Paul Jones*, p. 103) says she mounted six 18-pounders, fourteen 12-pounders, fourteen 9-pounders, and seven 6-pounders; and Fanning (*Mem.*, p. 33) appears to confirm it.—³ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 33.

⁴ Clark's Naval Hist., p. 66; Gordon, iii. p. 297. Capt. Fanning (*Mem.*, p. 33) says her force was 28 guns.

⁵ Clark's Naval Hist., p. 66; Gordon, iii. p. 297; Waldo's Paul Jones, p. 98. Capt. Fanning says her force was 16 guns.—⁶ Clark's Naval Hist., p. 66; Gordon, iii. p. 297; Waldo's Paul Jones, p. 98. Capt. Fanning says her force was 10 guns.

¹ De Sartine, Minister of Marine, to J. P. Jones, Feb. 4, 1779.—² Cooper (i. p. 99) says the *Alliance* was added by Dr. Franklin, under authority from Congress to do so, although he says (p. 100) the Dr. "made no advances to any of the ships employed."—³ Cooper, i. p. 99.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 100, 101; Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779.—⁵ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779; Clark's Naval Hist., p. 67.—⁶ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 41.—⁷ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779; Lieut. Dale's statement.

sessed, he was convinced that this was the Baltic fleet, which was returning home under convoy of the *Serapis*, forty-four, and the *Countess of Scarborough*, twenty-two; and he prepared to attack them.¹ Perceiving from his movements, and from information which the authorities of Scarborough had communicated,² that the little squadron was an enemy, the commandant of the *Serapis* signalled to his consort to follow him, and gallantly hauled out to sea, until he had got to windward of his convoy, when he tacked and stood inshore again, to cover it, and enable it to find shelter near Scarborough.³

The Commodore had signalled his consorts to form a line, with the *Pallas* in the van, and the *Alliance* astern of the *Richard*, and to chase the enemy;⁴ but the insubordination of Captain Landais frustrated all the plans, and he not only deprived the Commodore of the assistance of that vessel, but endeavored to withdraw that of the *Pallas* also.⁵ The Commodore, notwithstanding this diminution of his force, stood steadily on,⁶ and, about seven o'clock,⁷ he came up with the *Serapis*, the *Countess of*

Scarborough being a short distance to leeward.¹

The *Serapis*, which, with the *Richard*, now demands our particular attention, was a new, double-decked "forty-four," and was considered a fast sailer. She mounted twenty eighteen-pounders on her lower gun-deck, twenty nine-pounders on her upper gun-deck, and ten six-pounders on her quarter-deck and forecastle; and her crew was a fine one of three hundred and twenty men, commanded by Captain Richard Pearson.²

The weather was clear, the surface of the sea unruffled, and, just as the *Richard* came within gun-shot of her opponent, the moon rose with unusual splendor,³ to reveal the terrible struggle, which was about to open, to the anxious spectators who had crowded on the edges of the cliffs, which, at that place, formed the coast of England.⁴ "What ship is that?" was asked by the captain of the *Serapis* as the *Richard* came up; and, "Come a little nearer and I will tell you," was the equivocal reply. "What are you laden with?" was the next inquiry; and the answer—"Round, grape, and double-head shot," hurled back a defiance on the self-conceited interrogator.⁵ A broadside from the *Serapis*⁶ immediately thundered in re-

¹ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779.

² Capt. Pearson's dispatch to the Admiralty, Oct. 6, 1779.

³ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Lieut. Dale's statement; Mem. of Capt. Fanning, p. 42; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6, 1779.

⁴ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779; Lieut. Dale's statement.

⁵ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779; Analectic Magazine, viii. p. 13; Cooper, i. p. 105.

⁶ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Cooper, i. p. 106.

⁷ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3. Capt. Pearson, of the *Serapis*, says 7 20. Lieut. Dale says "about 8." Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 298) says "a little after seven."

¹ Cooper, i. p. 106.—² Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 45; Cooper, i. p. 105; Analectic Magazine, viii. p. 14.

³ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 46.—⁴ Lieut. Dale's statement; Analectic Magazine, viii. p. 21.

⁵ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 46. Com. Jones does not particularize, or tenting himself with stating he was hailed. Lieut. Dale gives a different version; and Capt. Pearson still another. As Capt. Fanning was in the main-top, I have supposed he heard what was said.

⁶ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779; Lieut.

sponse, and the action commenced.¹ The sea being smooth, the Commodore relied greatly on the six eighteen-pounders which had been mounted in the gun-room, but, at the first discharge, two of them burst, blowing up the deck above, and killing and wounding nearly all the men who were stationed at them.² The four which remained, by the Commodore's orders, were immediately abandoned, and the men who were stationed at them were posted elsewhere.³ It will be perceived, however, that the abandonment of these guns rendered the contest still more uneven, especially when, ten minutes later, the enemy ran out his eighteen-pounds on the lower deck, and opened that terrible fire which reduced the *Richard* to a perfect wreck before the close of the action.⁴ The *Richard*, having backed her topsails, exchanged several broadsides with her opponent, when she filled again, and shot ahead of her; upon which the latter luffed across the *Richard's* stern, pouring in a raking broadside, as she passed, and came up on the weather quarter of the latter, taking the wind out of her sails, and, in her turn, passing ahead.⁵ While the *Ser-*

Dale's statement; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6, 1779. Capt. Fanning (*Mem.*, p. 46) says she fired her upper and quarter deck guns only.

¹ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Lieut. Dale's statement; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 46; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6, 1779.—² Lieut. Dale's statement; Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Cooper, i. p. 106. Capt. Fanning says *three* of these guns burst.

³ Capt. N. Fanning's *Mem.*, p. 47; Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3, 1779; Cooper, i. p. 106.


⁴ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 47.—⁵ Lieut. Dale's statement; Cooper, i. p. 106.

apis was thus ahead of the *Richard*, she failed in an attempt to go down athwart the fore-foot of the latter, to rake her, and was obliged to put her helm hard down to keep clear of her.¹ In this manner she lost some of her way, while the *Richard*, keeping on her course, and taking advantage of a fresh breeze which at that moment filled her sails, soon ran aboard of her, bows on, the jib-boom of the former passing between the starboard mizzen-shrouds and the mizzen-vang of the *Serapis*.² The Commodore immediately ordered the grapping irons to be thrown out, and the boarders to stand by, but the chains attached to the irons were cut away by the enemy, and the vessels separated.³ As soon as she had obtained room to do so, the *Serapis* put her helm hard down, laid all aback forward, shivered her after sails, and wore short round,⁴ with the intention, it is supposed, of luffing up athwart the *Richard's* bow, in order to rake her again.⁵ Perceiving the object of the enemy, and knowing his own weakness, the Commodore ordered Mr. Stacey, the sailing-master of the *Richard*, to lay the enemy on board again,⁶ when the helm was put hard-a-weather, and the *Serapis* laid athwart-hawse, the jib-boom of the latter passing through the mizzen-shrouds of the former.⁷ The

¹ Lieut. Dale's statement; Cooper, i. p. 106.

² Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 48; Lieut. Dale's statement; Cooper, i. p. 107.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Lieut. Dale's statement; Cooper, i. p. 107.—⁵ Cooper, i. p. 107.

⁶ Fanning's *Mem.*, p. 48.—⁷ Lieut. Dale's statement; Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.



THE BATTLE OF THE HORNET AND THE CLOUDS

Richard's grappling-irons were again thrown out; while the jib-stay of the *Serapis*—which had been cut away—was employed to make the latter fast to the mizzen-mast of the former.¹ The pressure of the breeze on the after-sails of the *Serapis*, and the strain produced by the crew of the *Richard*, by means of the trailings attached to their grappling-irons, soon caused the jib-boom of the former to give way,² when the two ships dropped alongside of each other,³ head and stern, and the fluke of the spare anehor of the *Serapis* hooking on the quarter of the *Richard*,⁴ they were firmly secured, so near to each other, that the muzzles of their guns touched each other's sides.⁵ During all this time the cannonade continued with great fury, and both vessels suffered severely.⁶ A strong foree having been placed in the *Richard's* tops, and a constant fire maintained therefrom, the men in the tops of the *Serapis*, as well as those on her quarter-deck and forecastle, suffering severely.⁷

Soon after the vessels had been lashed together, it was seen that the current was carrying them in shore, and the *Serapis* dropped her anchor, with the hope that the *Richard* would

drift clear of her.¹ But this hope was not realized, and as the vessels slowly turned to the tide, the enemy attempted to board the *Richard*, but were repulsed.² Each party speedily followed in similar attempts to board, but neither succeeded, although many lives were lost in the attempts.³

At this time the vessels, firmly secured to each other, laid at anchor about three miles east, by south, from Flamborough Head, in about ten or twelve fathoms water.⁴ They had been engaged about three quarters of an hour, and, with increased fury, the conflict continued. The tops of the *Serapis* had been cleared, and the crews of her quarter and main decks were falling rapidly before the fire of the *Richard's* topsmen, and before the hand-grenades which were thrown among them.⁵ The greater part of her guns, from the position of the *Richard*, had been rendered useless, four only, on her starboard bow,—two eighteen-pounders on her lower gun-deck, and two nine-pounders on her upper gun-deck,—being effective.⁶ The *Richard*, also, had suffered severely, both in her hull and in the ranks of her crew, and she, too, had but two or three of her small guns in use on her upper deck.⁷ Her crew had mostly abandoned the lower

¹ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 48. Lieut. Dale says they were made fast with a hawser. Com. Jones (*Letter to Dr. Franklin*, Oct. 3) says they were made fast without specifying the means.

² Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.—³ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6. Capt. Fanning says they were hauled up.

⁴ Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.

⁵ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Lieut. Dale's statement.—⁶ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3.

⁷ Ibid.; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.

¹ Lieut. Dale's statement; Mem. of Capt. Fanning, p. 48.

² Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6; Capt. Fanning's Mem., p. 49; Cooper, i. p. 108.—³ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 49; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.

⁴ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 49.—⁵ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 49; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.—⁶ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 50.—⁷ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3.

decks to escape the fire of the *Serapis*;¹ and, through the port-holes, with lances, pikes, pistols, and grenades, they attacked the enemy's crew.² The singular spectacle was thus presented of the Americans commanding the upper deck and the tops of the *Serapis*, and driving the men therefrom; while, at the same moment, the enemy was tearing the *Richard's* lower deck to pieces, and forcing her crew to seek shelter in her forecastle and on her upper decks.

In this singular condition the battle raged furiously, until some of the light sails on the *Serapis* took fire, which spread to the rigging, and thence to the *Richard's* tops, when the firing ceased, and the crews of both ships joined in combating their new enemy. After some time spent in this manner the fire was extinguished, and, immediately afterwards, the battle was renewed.³ Ten or twelve times this scene was repeated — alternately combating each other, and the flames, which threatened destruction to both.⁴

Thus hour after hour this unparalleled conflict continued, one having resolved to conquer, the other not to be conquered. At length, at thirty-five minutes past nine o'clock, one of those sudden dispensations of Providence, which no one can foresee, scattered the crew of the *Serapis* from her main-deck, and gave the victory to the Americans.

¹ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Cooper, i. p. 108.

² Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6; Mem. of Capt. Fanning, p. 50.—³ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 50.

⁴ Lieut. Dale's statement; Mem. of Capt. Fanning, pp. 50-52; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.

Some time previous, one of the *Richard's* topsmen had passed over to the main-top of the *Serapis* with a match and a bucket filled with grenades, where he employed himself in dropping these combustibles among the crew beneath him.¹ At the same time the powder-boys, on the main-deck of the *Serapis*, had brought the cartridges up from the magazine faster than they had been used, and a row of them had been laid on the deck, parallel with the guns.² One of the grenades which this daring topsman had thrown down, towards a small party of the crew between the decks, accidentally struck the combings of the upper hatchway,³ and, glancing off, fell among the cartridges to which reference has been made.⁴ By its explosion the cartridges were ignited, and the flash, passing from one to another, from abreast the mainmast to the extreme after part of the ship, the whole were discharged among the crew with terrible effect. More than twenty men were instantly killed, and, a week afterwards, thirty-eight, who had been thus wounded, were still alive.⁵

This disaster, while it served to discourage the enemy, increased the hopes, and rendered more active the exertions of the *Richard's* crew.⁶ At this moment the *Alliance*, which had been hovering around the combatants, came

¹ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 50; Cooper, i. p. 108.

² Lieut. Dale's statement; Cooper, i. pp. 108, 109; Clark, p. 69.—³ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 53.

⁴ Lieut. Dale's statement; Cooper, i. p. 109; Clark, p. 69.—⁵ Lieut. Dale's statement; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6; Gordon, iii. p. 299; Cooper, i. p. 109.

⁶ Cooper, i. p. 109.

within gunshot, to the windward of the ships, and opened an indiscriminate fire on friend and foe alike.¹ Keeping away a little, she soon reached the larboard quarter of the *Richard*, and it is asserted by some that her fire was continued until she got nearly abeam of that vessel. For some time this singular conduct was continued, and it was not until the signals of recognition were hoisted that the firing discontinued.² Soon afterwards the crew of the *Richard* was alarmed with the report that the ship was sinking, and several hundred English prisoners, who had been confined below, were set at liberty by the master-at-arms.³ The confusion which was thus produced was heightened by a report that all the officers had been killed; and the gunner, supposing himself to be the senior officer, hurried on deck and called for "quarter."⁴ Captain Pearson, of the *Serapis*, hearing the joyful sound, hailed the *Richard*, and inquired if she had surrendered, when the Commodore undeceived him;⁵ and throwing his pistol at the gunner, severely wounded him.⁶

The prisoners who had been lib-

erated were immediately set to work at the pumps; and the crew of the *Richard* appeared to feel, more than ever, determined to conquer.¹ A few more guns were brought to bear—one of them, loaded with double-headed shot, directed by the Commodore in person, was especially directed against the mainmast of the *Serapis*²—and increased exertions were put forth on every side. At length, at about half-past ten o'clock,³ Captain Pearson of the *Serapis* struck her colors with his own hand, none of his crew daring to expose themselves for that purpose.⁴

As soon as it was known that the *Serapis* had surrendered, Lieutenant Richard Dale passed on board and took possession of the prize; while Captain Pearson and his officers passed over to the *Richard*, and surrendered their swords to the Commodore.⁵ In doing so Captain Pearson remarked, "It is with great reluctance I am obliged to resign my sword to a man who may be said to fight with a halter about his neck." Some have supposed this was intended as an insult to the Commodore, but, if it was so,—which may well be doubted,—it signally failed, the latter simply replying, "Sir, you have fought like a hero, and I make no doubt your Sovereign will reward you for it in the most ample manner."⁶

¹ The conduct of Capt. Landais, of the *Alliance*, has been the subject of frequent and exceedingly contradictory reports. I have followed the accounts of our own officers, yet it is proper to say that Capt. Pearson, in his dispatch to the Admiralty, gives an entirely different version.—² Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 53.

³ Lieut. Dale says there were 500. Capt. Pearson gives 300 as the number.

⁴ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, pp. 50–52; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6; Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3.

⁵ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 52; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6; Cooper, i. p. 111.—⁶ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 51; *Analectic Magazine*, viii. p. 21.

¹ Cooper, i. p. 111; Clark, p. 70.—² Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3.—³ Ibid.; Lieut. Dale's statement; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 3; Clarke's Naval Hist., p. 70. Capt. Fanning (*Mem.*, p. 54) says it was one o'clock.

⁴ Lieut. Dale's statement; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 54.—⁵ Lieut. Dale's statement.

⁶ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 54.

While this conflict was raging, the *Pallas* attacked the *Countess of Scarborough*, and, after a severe action of two hours, captured her.¹

As soon as Lieutenant Dale had received a prize-crew on the *Serapis*, the lashings were cut, and the *Richard* slowly drifted away, the prize following her as soon as her cable could be cut.²

Thus terminated one of the most desperate struggles which the world ever witnessed; but a new danger now presented itself. The *Richard* was both sinking and on fire;³ and it was owing to the assistance of men, sent from the other vessels of the squadron, that she was preserved long enough to secure the removal of the wounded and her crew.⁴ An examination, early next morning, showed that abaft, on a line with the guns of the *Serapis* which had been employed after the vessels had been lashed together, her timbers and siding had been entirely demolished, a few futtocks, which remained, being the only support of her poop and upper deck.⁵ Her rudder had been cut from her stern post;⁶ her transoms had been nearly driven out of her;⁷ the flames, which had got within her ceiling, had extended so far as to menace the magazine;⁸ and the pumps, by constant use,

could barely keep the water at the same level.¹ After securing those who were on board, about nine o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth of September, the officer who had charge of her, with his crew, took to their boats; and, at ten o'clock, the *Bon Homme Richard* settled slowly into the sea, bows foremost, and disappeared.²

The *Serapis* had suffered much less than the *Richard*, probably in consequence of the guns of the latter having been lighter and sooner silenced; yet she lost her main and mizzen masts and her fore top-mast, immediately after the ships had been separated,³ and was taken into the Texel under jury-masts.⁴

The loss of life was also unusually severe, although there appears to be great uncertainty respecting its exact extent. It has been said by a competent and well-informed writer to have amounted, on the *Richard*, to one hundred and sixty-five *killed*, and one hundred and thirty-seven *wounded and missing*;⁵ while that on the *Serapis* is supposed to have been nearly, if not quite, equal to that on her opponent—the same well-informed author, already cited, stating that she lost one hundred and thirty-seven *killed*, and seventy-six *wounded*.⁶

¹ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 57; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6; Capt. Piercy to Capt. Pearson, Oct. 4, 1779.

² Lieut. Dale's statement.—³ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, pp. 55, 56; Capt. Pearson's dispatch, Oct. 6.—⁴ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Cooper, i. p. 113.—⁵ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3.—⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Ibid.; Cooper, i. p. 113.

⁸ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, pp. 55, 56; Clark, p. 70.

¹ Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Cooper, i. p. 113.

² Com. Jones to Dr. Franklin, Oct. 3; Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 61; Cooper, i. p. 113.

³ Mem. of Capt. N. Fanning, p. 55.

⁴ Clark, p. 71; Cooper, i. p. 113.

⁵ Analectic Magazine, viii. p. 21. Mr. Cooper (*Naval Hist.*, i. p. 114) appears to dispute the statement.

⁶ Capt. Pearson's dispatch (Oct. 6) gives the loss 49 killed and 68 wounded.

The wonderful obstinacy with which this battle was maintained, speedily attracted the attention of the sovereigns of Europe, and Commodore Jones was praised or condemned as the whims or the interests of parties dictated. By the English, and those whose prejudices or connections led them to favor that nation, John Paul Jones was condemned and execrated as *a pirate*, and, to this day, his character is blackened in many such quarters by similar slanders. The French, on the contrary, and those who were unfriendly with England, received the Commodore with every honor; and preferment in the service of Russia was

tendered and accepted.¹ The King of the French presented a splendid sword of honor, decorated him with an order of merit, and sought an interview with him;² the Empress of Russia elevated him to the post of Rear-admiral in her navy;³ and the Congress of the United States presented their thanks,⁴ and, some time afterwards, it caused a medal of gold to be struck and presented to him in commemoration of the event.⁴

¹ Cooper, i. p. 117; Analectic Magazine, viii. p. 25.

² Goldsborough's Naval Chronicle, p. 21; Journals of Congress, Tuesday, Feb. 27, 1781.

³ Cooper, i. p. 117.

⁴ Journals of Congress, Saturday, April 14, 1781.

CHAPTER LVIII.

September 23 to October 18, 1779.

THE SIEGE OF SAVANNAH.

THE success of the French fleet, under Admiral D'Estaing, in its attack on the British West Indian colonies, and its continued presence on that station, served to check the operations of the enemy in the Southern States; and Governor Rutledge, of South Carolina, and General Lincoln were convinced, that if it could be secured to co-operate with the American army, the power of the State might be re-established in Georgia, where the royal authority, at that time, prevailed.¹ For the purpose of consulting the admiral, after securing the approval of Mons. Plombard, the French consul at Charleston, messengers were dispatched to the West Indies;² and the fleet, consisting of forty-one ships—twenty-two being ships of the line and eleven frigates—immediately sailed for the coast of Georgia.³ Dispatching two ships and three frigates to Charleston to announce his approach,

and to concert with Governor Rutledge and General Lincoln a plan of operations,¹ the main body of the fleet steered for Savannah, arriving off Tybee Island on the eighth of September, and anchoring, off the bar, on the following day.²

The vessels which had been dispatched to Charleston having been seen, off Tybee, on the third of September, and ascertained to be French, the enemy took the alarm, and made preparations for strengthening his position.³ A fast-sailing tender was dispatched to New York to inform Sir Henry Clinton; dispatches were sent to Colonel Maitland, commanding the troops at Port Royal Island, and to Captain Christian, of the *Vigilant*, ship

¹ Stedman, ii. pp. 121, 122; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 144. ² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 34, 35; Gordon, iii. p. 325; Marshall, iv. p. 144.
³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 35; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 33; Capt. Henry's dispatch to the Admiralty, Nov. 8, 1779. Stedman (ii. p. 122) supposes he had 14 frigates.

¹ Moultrie, ii. p. 33; Capt. Henry's dispatch, Nov. 8; Marshall, iv. pp. 144, 145; Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement.—² Capt. Henry's dispatch, Nov. 8. Gordon (iii. p. 325) supposes he arrived on the 1st Sept., and Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 120) appears to entertain a similar impression.—³ Capt. Henry's dispatch; Gen. Prevost's dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, Nov. 1. Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 120), Dr. Gordon (iii. p. 326), and Stedman (ii. p. 123), suppose the French arrived off Savannah and surprised the enemy, and state that four of his vessels were captured before they could retire. This is an error.

of war, "to repair to Savannah as soon as possible, with the troops, ships, and galleys there;" the *Fowey*, *Rose*, *Kep-pel*, and *Germain*, vessels of war, were so stationed that they could either retire up the river or defend the entrance of the harbor, as circumstances admitted; the buoys which marked the courses, at the entrance of the harbor, were removed; and the garrison, strengthened by two hundred negroes, from the neighboring plantations, "went to work with every exertion to increase the fortifications of the town." Under the directions of Captain Monerieff, the troops and their auxiliaries worked night and day, and old works were strengthened, and new ones erected, with great skill and rapidity.¹

When the French fleet approached Tybee, the enemy's naval force ran up the river, and, uniting with the land force, prepared to defend the town; the guns and ammunition were removed; the sailors were appointed to the different batteries, and the marines incorporated with the grenadiers of the Sixtieth regiment;² the *Rose*,—an old and unseaworthy vessel, the *Savannah*,—an armed ship, and four transports, were sunk in the channel and blocked it up; several small vessels were sunk, and a boom placed across the river, above the town, to prevent the passage of fire-rafts down the river; and the

Germain, with her armament on board, was placed off Yamaeraw to flank the lines.³

Small vessels having been sent from Charleston for the purpose of assisting the French fleet,⁴ the troops—of which the Irish brigade, commanded by General Dillon, and detachments from other regiments, numbering, in the aggregate, three thousand five hundred and twenty-four men, were on the fleet⁵—were carried up the river into Osaba Inlet; and thence, by launches, to Bewlie, about twelve miles from Savannah,⁶ when they landed, under cover of four galleys.⁷ On the fifteenth of September, General Pulaski, with his Legion, joined the French forces,⁸ and, on the sixteenth, after egotistically announcing the strength and courage of his troops, Admiral D'Estaing summoned the garrison at Savannah "to surrender to the arms of the *King of France*."⁹ General Prevost, who commanded in the town, declined to surrender, unconditionally, but invited terms;¹⁰ when Admiral D'Estaing replied, that the proposition

¹ Capt. Henry's dispatch, Nov. 8; Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 35, 36; Gordon, iii. p. 326; Stedman, ii. pp. 123, 124; Lee's Mem. of the War, p. 55.—² Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 33; Capt. Henry's dispatch, Nov. 8.

³ "Summary of Operations," in Paris Gazette, Jan. 7, 1780; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 146; Lee's Mem. of the War, p. 55.

⁴ Capt. Henry's dispatch, Nov. 8; Stedman, ii. p. 124; Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement.—⁵ Capt. Henry's dispatch, Nov. 8.—⁶ Hist. of Civil War with America, iii. p. 53; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 146; Lee's Mem. of the War, p. 55.—⁷ Count D'Estaing to Gen. Prevost, "Camp before Savannah, Sept. 16, 1779," No. I.

⁸ Gen. Prevost to Count D'Estaing, "Camp, Savannah, Sept. 16, 1779," No. I.

¹ Capt. Henry's dispatch, Nov. 8; Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 35, 36; Gordon, iii. p. 326; Stedman, ii. pp. 123, 124; Lee's Mem. of the War, p. 55.

² Gordon (Rev., iii. p. 326) says: "the 16th regiment."

of terms belonged to the besieged.¹ The enemy, who only desired to gain the time which an extension of negotiations would procure, asked and received a truce, until the following day² (during which time the forces from Port Royal Island, under Colonel Maitland, with great labor, were passed through Wall's Cut and reached the town in safety),³ when he declined to surrender, and hostilities were renewed.⁴

In the mean time, on the fourth of September, the messenger from Admiral D'Estaing reached Charleston, and measures were adopted to move the American forces toward Savannah.⁵ The small vessels then in the harbor were dispatched to Savannah, to assist in removing the guns, stores, and men, to the shore;⁶ the militia were ordered to take the place of the regulars in the forts and on guard duty;⁷ the legislature adjourned;⁸ volunteers flocked in to strengthen General Lincoln's force;⁹ and the greatest enthusiasm prevailed among the people.¹⁰ The troops moved off on the eighth of September, and, on the twelfth, General Lincoln left Charleston to take the command.¹¹ Crossing the Savannah River at Zub-

ley's Ferry,¹ the progress of the American army was much impeded by the destruction of the bridges, which had been secured by General Prevost,² and it was not until the sixteenth of September that the troops joined the French, then before Savannah.³

After reconnoitering the works with which the town was defended, the commanders thought it was not advisable to attack them by storm; and some farther delay, occasioned by a scarcity of horses and carriages, to assist in the removal of the guns and stores, enabled the enemy to strengthen them, still more, before the siege was opened.⁴ Retarded by these difficulties, the combined forces did not commence to break ground until the twenty-third of September;⁵ and, on the next day, and, on the night of the twenty-seventh, two sorties from the garrison,—the first led by Major Graham of the Sixteenth regiment; the latter by Major McArthur, which was so skilfully managed that it produced a fire between the French and American armies,—interrupted their progress.⁶ At an early hour on the fifth of October, the fire was opened from a battery mounting nine large mortars; and, at daybreak, thirty-three pieces of

¹ Count D'Estaing to Gen. Prevost, "Camp before Savannah, Sept. 16," No. II.—² Gen. Prevost to Count D'Estaing, "Camp, Savannah, Sept. 16, 1779," No. II., and reply of Count D'Estaing, of same day.

³ Capt. Henry's dispatch; Gen. Prevost's dispatch; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 37; Johnson's Traditions, p. 239.—⁴ Gen. Prevost to Count D'Estaing, Savannah, Sept. 17, 1779.

⁵ Moultrie, ii. p. 33.—⁶ Vide p. 558.

⁷ Moultrie, ii. p. 34.—⁸ Ibid.—⁹ Ibid.; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 121.—¹⁰ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 36; Moultrie, ii. p. 34.—¹¹ Moultrie, ii. p. 34.

¹ Gen. Lincoln to Cong., Oct. 22, 1779; Marshall, iv. p. 146.—² MS. Diary of Gen. Lincoln, Sept. 13; Gen. Lincoln to Cong., Oct. 22.

³ MS. Diary of Gen. Lincoln, Sept. 16; Marshall, iv. p. 146; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 54.

⁴ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 37; Stedman, ii. p. 126; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 121; Marshall, iv. p. 148.

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 328; Stedman, ii. 126; Marshall, iv. p. 148; MS. Diary of Gen. Lincoln, Sept. 24.

⁶ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 37, 38; Gordon, iii. p. 328; Stedman, ii. p. 127; Gen. Prevost's dispatch.

heavy artillery also opened on the enemy with great fury.¹ This terrible fire, increased by sixteen guns on the river,² continued until the morning of the 8th, seriously damaging the town, and burning several houses, although the works were not visibly injured;³ and a daring attempt to fire the abatis, with which the works were surrounded, by Major L'Enfant and five men, was also unsuccessful, in consequence of the dampness of the air and the moisture of the green wood of which it was composed.⁴

The disappointment of the Admiral, in failing to secure the submission of the town, soon led him to find apologies for a change of policy, and, finally, for abandoning the expedition. The exposed situation of the French colonies in the West Indies; the danger which his own fleet was exposed to, from the supposed approach of Admiral Byron; the insecurity of the coast, at that season of the year; and the remonstrances of his officers, were all reasons which he assigned for discontinuing the siege by regular approaches,—which would probably require ten days longer,—and for retiring from before the town, unless an assault, by storm, could be attempted.⁵

¹ MS. Diary of Gen. Lincoln; Marshall, iv. p. 148. Capt. Henry (*dispatch to the Admiralty*), Gen. Prevost (*dispatch, Nov. 1*), and Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 328), say the fire was opened on the *third*, from 37 pieces of artillery.

² Ramsay's *Rev.* in S. C., ii. p. 38; Gordon, iii. p. 328; Marshall, iv. p. 148; Gen. Prevost's *dispatch*, Nov. 1.

³ MS. Diary of Gen. Lincoln; Capt. Henry's *dispatch*; Gordon, iii. p. 328 Stedman, ii. p. 127; Marshall, iv. p. 148; Gen. Prevost's *dispatch*.—⁴ Ramsay's *Rev.* in S. C., ii. p. 38; Gordon, iii. p. 328.—⁵ Lee's *Mem. of the War*, p. 55; Gordon, iii. p. 329; Ramsay's *Rev.* in S. C., ii. pp. 38, 39; Moultrie, ii. pp. 36, 37; Stedman, ii. p. 129.

Savannah stands on a bluff on the right bank of the Savannah River, and was protected on the north by a thick swamp and woody morass communicating with the river; while the south and west sides were, originally, open to the country. On the north side of the town, in addition to the morass, three redoubts had been thrown up: that on the right, near the river, was garrisoned by a detachment from the King's Rangers, under Captains Roworth and Wyllie; that in the centre by two companies of militia, with the regiment of North Carolina loyalists, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton, to support them; and that on the left, called "the Spring Hill redoubt,"—on the site of the Augusta railroad station,—by a detachment of dragoons, dismounted, commanded by Captain Tawes, and supported by the regiment of South Carolina loyalists. On the extreme right of this line, on the bank of the river, was a sailor's battery of nine-pounders, covered by a company from the British Legion, commanded by Captain Stewart; between the central and Spring Hill redoubts was a similar battery, commanded by Captain Manby, supported by the grenadiers of the Sixtieth regiment and the marines which had been landed from the ships. On the south side of the city, two heavy redoubts, composed of framed logs and sand, were erected: that near the river being garrisoned by a body of Georgia Volunteers, under Major Wright; that on the right by the First battalion of Delaney's New York regiment, com-

manded by Lieutenant-colonel Cruger; both being supported by detachments from the Georgia militia, the Seventy-first regiment of the line, and the New Jersey Volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Allen. In front, on the west side of the town, were stationed a heavy picket of regulars, and a large body of armed negroes. Within the impalements, which extended along the southern and western fronts of the town, were posted the two battalions of the Seventy-first regiment of the line, the Hessian regiments of Trombach and Weissenbach, the New York Volunteers under Major Sheridan, the Second battalion of New York troops under Lieutenant-colonel Delaney, and the light-infantry of the army under Major Graham of the Sixteenth regiment, numbering, in the aggregate, fit for duty, exclusive of negroes, two thousand, three hundred, and sixty men.¹

The assault having been determined on, the morning of the ninth of October was selected for making the attempt.² At a very early hour, in accordance with the plan adopted, a heavy cannonade and bombardment was commenced from all the batteries, and the *élite* of the combined armies was drawn out.³ About three thousand five hundred French, about six hundred Continental

troops,—including Count Pulaski's Legion,—and two hundred and fifty militia, from Charleston, intended to make the real attack, were formed into two columns:⁴ one, led by General Dillon, was to march along the foot of the bluff, on the north side of the town,⁵—which was entirely sheltered from the enemy's fire,⁶—and turn the extreme right of the enemy's lines, near the sailor's battery, on the bank of the river;⁷ while the other, led by Admiral D'Estaing and General Lincoln,⁸ were to advance against and attack the Spring Hill redoubt, on the northwest corner of the town;⁹ and, at the same time, General Huger of South Carolina, at the head of five hundred men from the First and Second brigades of militia, General Williamson's brigade, and the Second battalion of Charleston militia, moved against the enemy's works on the south side of the town, as a mask, with orders, however, "should a favorable opportunity offer, to improve it, and push into the town."¹⁰ The troops were ordered to move at four in the morning,¹¹ and to wear, in their hats, a piece of white paper, by which they could be distinguished.¹²

From some unknown cause the troops failed to move at the appointed time, and it was daylight before they ap-

¹ Stedman, ii. pp. 128, 129, and the map in that work. Count D'Estaing ("Summary of Operations, &c.") says there were 3085 Europeans, 80 Indians, and 4000 negroes.

² Gen. Lincoln to Cong., Oct. 22; "Summary of Operations," &c., in Paris Gazette, Jan. 7, 1780; Gordon, iii. p. 329; Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement.

³ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779; Civil War in America, iii. p. 57.

⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 130; Lee's Mem., p. 58.—⁵ Hist. Civil War in America, iii. p. 58.—⁶ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779.—⁷ Stedman, ii. p. 130.—⁸ Ibid.; Marshall, iv. p. 150.—⁹ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779; Stedman, ii. p. 130.—¹⁰ Gen. Lincoln's evening orders, Oct. 8; Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement.—¹¹ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 40; Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement.

¹² Gen. Lincoln's evening orders, Oct. 8.

proached the lines;¹ while the large body of troops, under Count Dillon, who were intended to attack the enemy's right, lost their way in the swamp, and were exposed to the enemy's fire, suffering a heavy loss, without rendering the least assistance to their friends.² The attack was thus, practically, confined to the operations under the Admiral D'Estaing and General Lincoln, against the Spring Hill redoubt; and here, too, the enemy was fully prepared to receive them.³ The desertion, on the preceding day, of James Curry, sergeant-major of the Charleston Grenadiers, had placed the information of the intended assault in the hands of the enemy,⁴ and the flower of his force, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Maitland,—one of his most accomplished officers,—had been placed on the right of his line, to defend it.⁵ The allies advanced against the redoubt with the most determined bravery, yet they suffered severely, both from the direct fire from the redoubt, and from the cross-fire which proceeded from the works on its right, the *Germain*, armed ship, in the river, and a body of troops who had formed in front of the works, near the left of the redoubt.⁶ It is said, also, that the men were crowded together in

the ditch and upon the berme, until they had not room sufficient to raise an arm; and that, while they were thus huddled together, they were exposed to a full fire from the enemy, which was terribly severe.¹ In the midst of this confusion, a portion of the troops sealed the ramparts, and the French colors and the crescent of South Carolina,—the colors of the Second South Carolina regiment,—the latter borne by Lieutenants Bush and Hume, were planted on the redoubt.² They, with their gallant supporters, were almost instantly shot down, when Lieutenant Gray raised them, a second time, and received a mortal wound. Sergeant Jasper immediately raised one of them, a third time, with a similar result, but he saved the colors which he bore, and died shortly afterwards.³ For fifty-five minutes the troops maintained the conflict with the works, and with the grenadiers and marines under Major Glazier,—who had been moved forward to support the garrison,⁴—when they were compelled to give way, and were driven over the ditch and through the abatis, over the edge of the bluff up which they had advanced to the attack;⁵ and, as it was evident that further attempts were useless, a retreat was ordered.⁶

¹ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 40. Gen. Prevost says this delay was caused by the troops moving farther into the swamp than was intended.

² Stedman, ii. pp. 130, 131; Lee's Mem., p. 58.

³ Marshall, iv. p. 150.—⁴ "Summary of Operations," in Paris Gazette, Jan. 7, 1780; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 42; Gordon, iii. p. 329.—⁵ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 42.

⁶ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779; Stedman, ii. p. 131; Lee's Mem., p. 58. Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement.

¹ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 40.—² Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 40; Gordon, iii. p. 330; Lee's Mem., pp. 58, 59.—³ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 40.

⁴ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 41; Stedman, ii. p. 131; Gordon, iii. p. 330.

⁵ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1; Stedman, ii. p. 131; Lee's Mem., p. 59; Hist. Civil War in America, iii. p. 58; Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement; Marshall, iv. p. 151.

⁶ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1; Stedman, ii. p. 131.

While the troops were thus engaged against the Spring Hill redoubt, the Count Pulaski, pursuant to his orders, at the head of his Legion, dashed forward, between the redoubt and that which was "next toward the river," with an intention of charging in the rear of the enemy's line, when a small cannon-ball struck him in the groin, and he fell, mortally wounded.¹ His first lieutenant seized the banner which his chief had borne, and, for a few minutes, kept the troops in motion, but the severity of the fire and the retreat of the main body rendered their efforts fruitless, and they, too, retired, carrying with them the mangled body of Pulaski, who still lingered in agony.²

General Huger, at the head of his command, waded through the rice-fields, and advanced against the enemy's left. A heavy fire was opened on him, also, and after losing twenty-eight men he retired.³

The discomfited allies having withdrawn from the lines to their encampments, a truce was asked for the purpose of burying their dead;⁴ and the commanders-in-chief consulted in relation to future operations. General Lincoln desired to continue the siege, but the Admiral D'Estaing, whose loss had been very heavy, opposed this course, and resolved to leave the coast.⁵ Ac-

cordingly the siege was raised; and, on the evening of the eighteenth of October, the allies moved from their positions—the Americans, on the next day, recrossing the river, at Zubley's Ferry;¹ the French marching down to Thunderbolt, and thence, on the twentieth, returning to the fleet.²

The strength of the opposing forces has been already noticed. The loss of the enemy, during the entire siege, was Captain Tawes, who commanded "the Spring Hill redoubt," Captain Simpson, Lieutenant McPherson, Ensign Pollard, four sergeants, and thirty-two rank and file, *killed*; two captains, two lieutenants, two sergeants, one drummer, and fifty-six rank and file, *wounded*; two drummers and two rank and file, *missing*; and five sergeants, two drummers, and forty-one rank and file, *deserted*.³ That of the American officers, Majors Motte, Wise, and Jones; Captains Beraud, Shepherd, and Donnom; Lieutenants Hume, Bush, Wickham, and Bailey, *killed*; and General Pulaski; Captains Bentelo, Giles, Roux, Farrar, Bowie, Smith, Warren, Hogan, and Davis; and Lieutenants Gray, Petrie, Gaston, Desaussure, Parker, Walker, Vieland, Parsons, Bonneau, Wilkie, and Wardel, *wounded* and *missing*.⁴ The number of non-commissioned officers and privates, in the American army, who were killed and wounded, do not appear to have

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 320; Gen. Thos. Pinckney's statement; Johnson's Traditions of the Revolution, pp. 239, 245.

² Lossing's Field Book, ii. pp. 391-393, 738.

³ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 41.—⁴ Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779.—⁵ "Summary of Proceedings," &c., in Paris Gazette, Jan. 7, 1780; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 43; MS. Diary of Gen. Lincoln.

¹ Gen. Lincoln's report to Cong., Oct. 22; MS. Diary of Gen. Lincoln.—² "Summary of Proceedings," &c., in Paris Gazette, Jan. 7, 1780.—³ Returns appended to Gen. Prevost's dispatch, Nov. 1, 1779.

⁴ Return of the officers killed, &c.

been reported, although General Lincoln says it was about one hundred and seventy; and that of the French, fifteen officers, and one hundred and sixty-eight "subalterns and soldiers," *killed*; and forty-three officers, and four hundred and eleven "subalterns and soldiers," *wounded*.¹

With the raising of the siege of Savannah the campaign of 1779 virtually closed, although the uncertainty which surrounded the movements of Admiral D'Estaing, kept both General Washington and Sir Henry Clinton on the *qui vive* some weeks longer.²

The effect of this disaster was very injurious to the popular cause, not only in depressing the spirits of the people,

and in depreciating, still more, the already nearly worthless public securities; but in shaking the confidence of the country in the good faith and the usefulness of the French allies. Both in the Chesapeake and in Rhode Island, the fleet, under the Count D'Estaing, had aroused the hopes of the people; and, in the latter, had called forth their co-operative exertions, to a great extent, without producing any result, except disappointment. A second time, the same promises were followed by similar disasters, when success appeared to be within reach of the allies; and it was evident that enmity to Britain, and a desire to eripple that nation, alone animated the French government; while good-will, either to the young republic or to her people, and, especially, good-will to the cause which they represented, was, at no time, any more than incidental and questionable.

¹ "Summary of Operations," &c., in Paris Gazette, Jan. 7, 1780.—² Gen. Washington to Gov. Trumbull, Sept. 30; To the Pres. of Cong., Oct. 4; To Gen. Lafayette, Oct. 20; To Henry Laurens, Nov. 5; To Gen. Duportail and Col. Hamilton, Nov. 11; To Gen. Gates, Nov. 16; To Gen. Schuyler, Nov. 24.

C H A P T E R L I X

March 29 to May 12, 1780.

T H E S I E G E O F C H A R L E S T O N .

THE repulse of the allies before Savannah, and the withdrawal of the French fleet from the Southern coast of the United States, were followed by the return of the militia to their homes, and the prostration of all confidence and hope, in the result of the conflict, among the people of that portion of the Confederacy.¹ The contest had been maintained by the inhabitants of that section of the country, single-handed,—the people north of the Carolinas having failed to render any assistance farther than in supplying a General,²—and the enemy, strengthened by the Tories, who were in their midst, had not only overpowered, but, apparently, he had also subdued them.³

Taking advantage of this state of affairs, and of the withdrawal of the Continental army into winter quarters, the mildness of the climate, which permitted a winter campaign, and the probability of securing an extension of the royal authority on the left bank of

the Savannah River,¹ Sir Henry Clinton determined to move, with a part of his forces, against Charleston.² With this object he sailed from New York on the twenty-sixth of December, "with four flank battalions, twelve regiments and corps, a powerful detachment of artillery, two hundred and fifty cavalry, and ample supplies of military stores and provisions."³ He was convoyed by Admiral Arbuthnot, "with a naval force competent to the purpose, and which was superior to any thing in the Amer-

¹ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 45; Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 4.—² Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 4; Hist. Civil War in America, iii. pp. 80, 81; Lee's Mem. of War in South, p. 62.

³ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 4; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, March 9, 1780; Gen. Washington to Gen. Lafayette, March 18. The following list of these regiments, &c., and the number of men in each, was published in "*The Political Magazine*," London, April, 1780, among its "*Advices from Charleston*."

	Men.	Men.	
Light-infantry	800	Queen's Rangers....	200
Grenadiers.....	900	Guides and Pioneers,	150
7th Regiment.....	400	Fanning's Corps....	100
23d "	400	Hessian Grenadiers .	1000
33d "	450	Ferguson's Corps ...	300
42d "	700	2d Hessian Regim'nt,	800
63d "	400	Yagers.	200
64th "	350	British Artillery....	200
British Legion	200		<u>7550</u>

¹ Marshall, iv. p. 181.—² Gen. Lincoln, of Mass., commanded in the Southern Department; although it does not appear that any but Carolinians and Georgians were under his command.—³ S. C. in the Rev. War, p. 77.

ican seas."¹ His voyage was a disastrous one, and a succession of storms scattered the vessels, destroyed the greater part of the horses, injured the stores, and nearly proved destructive to the expedition.² After repairing the damages, as far as that could be done, and augmenting the force with the Seventy-first regiment, and several corps of volunteers,³ the expedition sailed from Savannah on the tenth of February,⁴ and, on the following day, entered the North Edisto,⁵ about thirty miles south from Charleston,⁶ and took immediate possession of John's Island and Stono Ferry, James' Island and Wappoo Cut;⁷ and, soon afterwards, of the bank of the Ashley River, opposite Charleston.⁸

While the preparations for this expedition were in progress in New York, General Washington rightly supposed it was intended for an attack on Charleston;⁹ and he took steps for strengthening that post, by detaching from the army a portion of Baylor's and Bland's regiments of cavalry, the Virginia levies, and the North Carolina line;¹⁰ and, soon

afterwards, the Virginia line was also detached for the same object.¹

At Charleston there was, comparatively, nothing to prevent the enemy from taking instant possession. The troops, under General Lincoln, did not exceed a thousand in number,² and the militia disregarded the orders which were issued by the State authorities.³ Fort Moultrie was greatly out of repair;⁴ Fort Johnson, on James' Island, was in ruins;⁵ the lines on the Neck, which had been thrown up in 1779, were unfinished;⁶ and it was found impossible to obtain a sufficient number of negroes to repair them, much less to erect new works.⁷ Soon afterwards a reinforcement of between three and four hundred Virginia troops, and some militia and levies from North Carolina, strengthened the garrison;⁸ and, still later,—the legislature having vested the Governor and Council with extraordinary powers,—about six hundred slaves were employed on the works.⁹

It is a curious fact that both the belligerents, at this time, were in nearly the same state,—each being crippled, and unable to move against his antagonist,—but they did not long continue to occupy that relative equality. The Americans, notwithstanding the gradually increasing strength of the garri-

¹ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 4. The following vessels formed this convoy: Europe, 64 guns; Russel, 74; Robuste, 74; Defiance, 64; Raisonable, 64; Renown, 50; Romulus, 44; Roebuck, 44; Blonde, 32; Perseus, 32; Camilla, 20; Raleigh, 28; Richmond, 32; Virginia, 28.

² Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, March 9.—³ Political Magazine, London, April, 1780.—⁴ Tarleton, p. 5.

⁵ Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, March 9; Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14.—⁶ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 47.—⁷ Political Mag., London, April, 1780; Sir Henry Clinton's dispatch, March 9; Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14.—⁸ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, March 9.

⁹ Letters to Pres. of Cong., "Peekskill, 29 Nov., 1779," "Morristown, 7 Dec."—¹⁰ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., Nov. 29; Same to Gen. Lincoln, Dec. 12; Same to Gen. Woodford, Dec. 13.

¹ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lincoln, Feb. 27; Same to Gen. Lafayette, March 18.—² Marshall, iv. p. 182.

³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 48, 52.

⁴ Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Washington, Nov. 7, 1779.

⁵ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 182.—⁶ Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Washington, Nov. 7, 1779.—⁷ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 183.—⁸ Ibid., p. 184; Lee's Mem., pp. 62, 63

⁹ Marshall, iv. p. 185; De Brahm's Jour., March 30, 1780.

son, were compelled to content themselves with opposing the enemy's movements with a few cavalry and a small body of light troops¹—the great body of their forces being employed on the works near Charleston:² while the enemy, in the possession of more ample means, speedily mounted his cavalry, and employed it, successfully, in dispersing the militia who assembled for the support of the town.³

Soon afterwards it was discovered that the naval force, which had been prepared to oppose the passage of the enemy's fleet over the bar, could not, possibly, be so anchored that its fire would annoy him; that the channel was too narrow for it to form the line of battle; and that, should it attempt to do so, it would be exposed to the fire from the batteries which the enemy had already erected on the land.⁴ The little squadron—which was composed of the *Briscole*, of forty-four guns; the *Providence* and *Boston*, each mounting thirty-two guns; the *Queen of France*, of twenty-eight guns; *L'Avanture* and the *Truite*, each of twenty-six guns; the *Ranger* and *General Lincoln*, each of twenty guns; and the *Notre Dame*, of sixteen guns, commanded by Commodore Whipple⁵—was, therefore, moored in a narrow passage between Sullivan's Island and the bar known as the Mid-

dle Ground, in a line with Fort Moultrie;¹ and some attempts were made to obstruct the channel, so as to check the progress of the enemy, and hold him within the range of the guns of the fort and fleet.² On the twentieth of March³ the enemy's squadron,—composed of the *Renown*, of fifty guns; the *Romulus* and *Roebuck*, each of forty-four guns; the *Richmond*, *La Blonde*, *Virginia*, and *Raleigh*, each of thirty-two guns; and the *Sandwich*, armed ship, commanded by Admiral Arbuthnot,⁴—crossed the bar, in front of Rebellion Road, and anchored in Five Fathom Hole, without opposition.⁵ The enemy having passed the bar in safety, it was properly supposed that no serious obstacle to his passage up the harbor would be found in Fort Moultrie;⁶ and that, having already secured the banks of the Ashley River, which flows on the west and south of the town, he would employ his fleet to occupy the Cooper River, which flows on the east side, and thus be enabled to enfilade the batteries, and entirely cut off the communication between the town and the surrounding country.⁷ To prevent this the American fleet was removed

¹ Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Gen. Moultrie to his friend, March 22; Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Washington, March 24.—² Marshall, iv. p. 188.

³ Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Gen. Moultrie's letter to a friend, March 20; Sml. Baldwin's Diary, March 20; Tarleton, p. 10; Lee's Mem., p. 65.

⁴ Gen. Moultrie to his friend, March 20; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 50; Tarleton, p. 10. Col. Tarleton (p. 10) says the frigates also entered, which is, doubtless, true, although not mentioned elsewhere.

⁵ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 50.—⁶ Marshall, iv. p. 188

⁷ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 51; Lee's Mem., p. 66

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 352; Marshall, iv. p. 186.

² Marshall, iv. p. 186.—³ Gordon, iii. pp. 351, 352; Marshall, iv. p. 186; Tarleton, p. 10.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 349; Marshall, iv. p. 187; Lee's Mem., p. 65.

⁵ List appended to Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Gordon, iii. p. 349; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 50, 51.



from the channel near Fort Moultrie, and, on the twenty-first of March, it entered the Cooper River, when the guns, stores, and men from all, except the Ranger, were taken on shore and employed on the land batteries.¹ Soon afterwards eleven vessels were sunk across the channel of the Cooper River, in a line extending from the Exchange Battery, nearly northeastward, to Shute's Folly.² Cables, extending from mast to mast of the sunken vessels, and a boom, rendered the passage impracticable;³ while the Ranger and two galleys prevented the passage through Hog Island Channel equally dangerous, and, for some time longer, preserved the communication.⁴

Relying upon the promises of support to the number of ten thousand men, one half of whom were to be regulars,⁵ General Lincoln resolutely prepared to defend the town with the feeble force at his disposal.⁶ He repaired old works and threw up new ones until the lines, although not strong, were at least respectable.⁷ At the lower extremity of the city, commanding the entrance to both the rivers, was Fort Wilkins, mounting sixteen guns; whence, proceeding up the Ashley

River, were Fort Gibbs, mounting nine guns; Ferguson's Fort, mounting five guns; the Sugar House Fort, mounting six guns; the Old Magazine, mounting five guns; the Fort on Cumming's Point, mounting five guns; and the Fort on Northwest Point, mounting four guns: while, on the bank of the Cooper River, proceeding northward from Fort Wilkins, were Darrell's Fort, mounting seven guns; the fort at the end of the bay, mounting four guns; the Exchange Fort, mounting seven guns; the fort at the Governor's Bridge, mounting three guns; and the fort at the Old Indian, mounting five guns, while Gadsden's Wharf was defended by seven guns.¹ At the same time the Neck was defended by a heavy work, at the gates of the city, on King-street,² with strong lines and redoubts,—mounting sixty-six guns, besides mortars,—extending from river to river, and fraized and covered, through their entire extent, by a double abatis and deep, wet ditch, picketed; while, throughout the entire extent of the lines, between them and the abatis, deep holes were dug at short distances, to break the regularity of advancing columns.³ On both flanks of this line the works were particularly strong, and so constructed as to enfilade the ditch, in almost its entire length.⁴

In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton

¹ Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Gen. Moultrie to his friend, March 22; Saml. Baldwin's Diary, March 21, 22, 23; Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Washington, March 24

² Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Saml. Baldwin's Diary, March 25, 26, 27, April 12, 15; De Brahm's Jour., March 9; Tarleton, p. 11.—³ Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; De Brahm's Jour., March 9, 10.

⁴ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 52; Gordon, iii. p. 351.

⁵ Gordon, iii. p. 348; Marshall, iv. p. 190.

⁶ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 49; Marshall, iv. pp. 184, 185; Lee's Mem., p. 64.—⁷ Marshall, iv. p. 191.

¹ "Sketch of the Operations," &c., in Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 45.—² Johnson's Traditions of Rev., pp. 249, 250.—³ Col. Laurens to Gen. Washington, April 9; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 49; Gordon, iii. p. 349; Marshall, iv. pp. 191, 192.—⁴ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 49.

gradually surrounded the town and approached the lines. He had been strengthened by the arrival of twelve hundred men, under General Patterson, who had marched from Savannah without meeting any effective opposition from the militia;¹ and, on the twenty-ninth of March, he had crossed the Ashley River, twelve miles above Charleston, also without opposition.² On the following day a body of two hundred American light-infantry, led by Lieutenant-colonel John Laurens, attacked the enemy's advanced guards, and, after wounding the Earl of Caithness, Sir Henry Clinton's aid-de-camp, and a few private men, they retired with the loss of Captain Bowman, killed, and Major Hyme and seven men wounded.³ On the night of the first of April, under cover of an advanced detachment, Sir Henry Clinton broke ground, and, before daybreak the next morning, two large redoubts, within eight hundred yards of the American lines, had been completed.⁴ The next night another

was added, and for five days more the working parties labored diligently, completing the first line, with the guns mounted in battery, on the eighth of April.¹

On the same day (*April 8th*) the enemy's fleet, which had remained at anchor at Five Fathom Hole since it crossed the bar, taking advantage of a strong southerly wind, passed Fort Moultrie, without engaging it, and anchored off Fort Johnson.² A heavy fire was opened on it, as it passed, by Colonel Charles C. Pinckney, who commanded at Fort Moultrie, killing and wounding twenty-seven seamen, carrying away the *Richmond*'s fore top-mast, and, generally, damaging the masts and rigging of the other vessels; while the *Acetus*, transport, having naval stores on board, grounded within gun-shot of Fort Moultrie, and received so much damage that she was abandoned and burned.³ All communication between the town and country, except on its eastern front, was thus cut off.⁴

¹ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13, 1780.

² De Brahm's Jour., March 29; S. Baldwin's diary, March 29; Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, March 13; Gen. Woodford to Gen. Washington, April 8; Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Washington, April 9; Col. Laurens to Gen. Washington, April 9; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 49; Stedman, ii. p. 177; Gordon, iii. p. 348. Gen. Moultrie (*Journal*, March 28) says he crossed on the *twenty-eighth*. Maj. Lee (*Memo. of War in the South*, p. 63) says it was the *thirtieth*.

³ Gen. Moultrie to his friend, April 23; S. Baldwin's Diary, March 30; Gen. Moultrie's Jour., March 30; De Brahm's Jour., March 30; Col. Laurens to Gen. Washington, April 9; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 50.

⁴ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Gen. Moultrie to his friend, April 3; S. Baldwin's Diary, April 2; Col. Laurens to Gen. Washington, April 9. Gen. Lincoln (*Letter to Gen. Washington*, April 9) says he broke ground *March 31st*.

¹ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Gen. Moultrie's Jour., April 2, 8; S. Baldwin's Diary, April 3.

² Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; S. Baldwin's Diary, April 8; De Brahm's Jour., April 8; W. Croghan to Michael Gratz, April 8; Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Washington, April 9; Col. Laurens to Gen. Washington, April 9; Lee's Mem., pp. 65, 66. Gen. Woodford (*Letter to Gen. Washington*, April 8) and Gen. Moultrie (*Letter to his friend*, April 7, and *Journal*, April 7) say they passed on the *seventh*; and Adm'l. Arbuthnot (*Dispatch*, May 14) says, the *ninth*. Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 124, Trenton, Wednesday, May 10, 1780, says of this passage, that it was made while a severe thunder-storm was raging, which caused the ships to be "invisble near half the time of their passing."

³ Adm'l. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Gen. Moultrie's Jour., April 7; S. Baldwin's Diary, April 9, 10; De Brahm's Diary, April 9; Gen. Woodford to Gen. Washington, April 8.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 353.

On the seventh of April, General Lincoln was strengthened by the arrival of General Woodford with the Virginia line, numbering seven hundred men;¹ and by that of Colonel Harrington, with a body of North Carolina militia.²

On the tenth a joint note was sent to General Lincoln by General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, demanding the surrender of the town;³ and, on the same day, in an exceedingly appropriate note, the summons was rejected.⁴

Between nine and ten o'clock on the morning of the thirteenth, the enemy opened his fire on the town;⁵ and continued it, both from his batteries on the Neck and his galleys and battery on Wappoo Cut, until the nineteenth,⁶ when his second parallel was completed, and a fire opened from within three hundred to four hundred and fifty yards of the lines.⁷

On the fourteenth of April an outpost of American cavalry, commanded by General Huger, was surprised and severely handled, by Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, at Monk's Corner;⁸ and, on the twenty-first, General Lincoln pro-

posed to surrender the town and its dependencies on condition that the garrison, and such of the inhabitants as desired to do so, should be permitted to withdraw with their arms, field-artillery, ammunition, baggage, and such of the stores as they could carry with them; that the American ships should be allowed to withdraw from the port unmolested; and that those of the inhabitants who were unwilling to live under the British government, should be allowed twelve months in which to dispose of their property and remove from the town.¹ This proposition was instantly rejected by Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, and hostilities recommenced.²

The arrival of Lord Cornwallis, with twenty-five hundred men, from New York, on the eighteenth of April,³ and the entrance of the fleet into the harbor, had enabled the enemy to strengthen the troops which had been engaged in cutting off the communication between the town and the country;⁴ prevented the completion of the works which General Lincoln had commenced on Lamptiere's Point;⁵ and, at Lenew's Ferry, on the fifth of May, completed the destruction of the corps of American light troops and cavalry, which had been surprised at Monk's Corner a

¹ Gen. Moultrie to his friend, April 7, 2 p. m.; S. Baldwin's Diary, April 7; Gen. Woodford to Gen. Washington, April 8; Gen. Lincoln to same, April 9.

² Gen. Moultrie's Jour., April 6; Gen. Lincoln to Gen. Washington, April 9.—³ Their Letter to Gen. Lincoln, April 10, 1780.—⁴ His letter, "Head-quarters, Charlestown, April 10, 1780."—⁵ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Gen. Moultrie's Jour., April 13; S. Baldwin's Diary, April 13; De Brahm's Jour., April 13.—⁶ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13.—⁷ Ibid.; S. Baldwin's Diary, April 14; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 53.—⁸ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 53; Stedman, ii. p. 183; Gordon, iii. p. 352; Tarleton, pp. 15, 16.

¹ His letter "Charlestown, April 21, 1780," and "articles" proposed by him the same day.

² Their answer, "Camp before Charlestown, April 21st, 1780, 8 o'clock at night."

³ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Gordon, iii. p. 353

⁴ Stedman, ii. pp. 182, 183.—⁵ Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Gen. Moultrie's Jour., April 27; De Brahm's Jour., April 28.

short time before.¹ These advantages were strengthened, on the 24th, by the capture of the works on Mount Pleasant, near Haddrell's Point;² on the seventh of May, by the surrender of Fort Moultrie;³ and, on the same day, by the completion of the third parallel, with the guns in battery, and the traverses and communications complete.⁴ The "canal," or ditch, which protected the American lines, had, also, been sapped and drained;⁵ and the enemy's Yagers had been thrown so far forward that they picked the Americans off while they were within the lines.⁶

On the eighth of May the enemy summoned the town a second time,⁷ and terms were proposed by General Lincoln.⁸ Alterations, which principally related to the shipping, to the militia being considered prisoners on parole, and to the march which should be beat when the Americans left the town to pile their arms, were proposed by the Admiral and Sir Henry Clinton,⁹ and rejected by General Lincoln,¹⁰ and, on the ninth of May, the

fire was again opened by the garrison,¹ and answered by the enemy.²

At this time the enemy's third parallel was completed in all its parts, coming within a hundred yards of the American lines;³ and from this, and from the other works, on every side, and from the vessels in the harbor, nearly two hundred heavy cannon, besides mortars,⁴ threw shot, shells, and carcasses into the devoted town, from nine o'clock on the morning of the ninth, until the eleventh of May;⁵ and, during the same time, it was as steadily returned by the little garrison.⁶ The fire-department of the town, with great perseverance, combated the flames wherever the carcasses or bombs set fire to the buildings;⁷ sand-bags were prepared and used to repair the breaches or afford shelter for the riflemen on the lines;⁸ and the shrubbery which ornamented the gardens of the people was freely offered and used as fascines in the defence of the town.⁹ The garrison and the inhabitants—with such slender defences, so poorly supplied with stores and provisions, and so feebly supported by the militia of South Carolina—performed wonders;¹⁰ and after the surrender, their gallantry elicited the admiration of the enemy who had

¹ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Gordon, iii. p. 355; Tarleton, pp. 19, 20.—² Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14. Gen. Moultrie (*Jour.*, April 25, 26) says this occurred on the twenty-fifth.—³ Adml. Arbuthnot's dispatch, May 14; Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Stedman, ii. p. 184.

⁴ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13.

⁵ Ibid.; Gen. Duportail to Gen. Washington, May 17; Stedman, ii. p. 184.—⁶ Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 58; B. Smith to his wife, April 30; Lee's Mem., p. 72.

⁷ Sir H. Clinton to Gen. Lincoln, May 8.

⁸ "Articles of Capitulation proposed, May 8."

⁹ "Alterations of Articles proposed, May 9."

¹⁰ Gen. Lincoln to Sir H. Clinton, May 9.

¹ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 96; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 58; Gordon, iii. p. 356.—² Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 86; De Brahm's Jour., May 9; Gordon, iii. p. 356.

³ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 58.—⁴ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 96.—⁵ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 58.

⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 356.—⁷ Johnson's Traditions, p. 251.

⁸ Gen. Moultrie's Jour., May 8.—⁹ Johnson's Traditions, p. 258.

¹⁰ Marshall, iv. p. 205.

overpowered them.¹ At length their provisions failed, and rice, coffee, and sugar, were the only food of the garrison.² The intelligence of this fact soon reached the enemy's camp, through the instrumentality of those wretches who had continued to hover around the American forces from the beginning of the war,³—nominal friends, receiving their confidence and honors, and prostituting them to the enemy for the vilest purposes. A shell, filled with rice and sugar, and thrown into the town, soon attracted the attention of the garrison, because it did not explode, and told, in terms of ridicule, that its distress was known to the enemy;⁴ when, in a spirit of proud defiance, the same shell, filled with hog's lard and sulphur (itch ointment), was thrown into the Scotch regiments, in the parallels, inviting them, in contemptuous terms, to employ that remedy to cure their traditional national infirmity.⁵

At length, worn down with fatigue, and with no immediate prospect of relief, on the eleventh of May, General Lincoln renewed the negotiations for a surrender;⁶ and, on the twelfth, the articles were signed,⁷ Sir Henry Clinton

and Admiral Arbuthnot, although they had previously stated they would not renew the offer, “besides their dislike to the cruel extremity of a storm, not being disposed to press to unconditional submission an enemy whom they wished to conciliate by clemency.”⁸

The loss of the Americans, during the siege, was only eighty-nine killed, and one hundred and thirty-eight wounded, among the Continental troops;² three killed and eight wounded among the Charleston artillery, who manned the principal work on the lines;³ and about twenty of the inhabitants were killed in their houses:⁴ that of the royal troops amounted to seventy-six killed, and one hundred and eighty-nine wounded.⁵

About eleven in the morning of the twelfth of May, between fifteen and sixteen hundred Continental troops—the entire force, except some five hundred in the hospital⁶—marched out of the town, *to a Turkish march*,⁷ and, near the principal work on the line, between it and the ditch, they grounded their arms;⁸ and, soon afterwards, the militia and the male adults among the inhabitants, many of whom had never done duty in the lines, also marched out to the same place, for the

¹ Moultrie's Mem., p. 108; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 134, Trenton, July 19, 1780.—² Gen. Moultrie's Jour., May 8.—³ Capt. Rochfort informed Gen. Moultrie that the Tories “came out every night, and gave information of what was passing in your garrison.”—*Moultrie*, ii. p. 108.

⁴ Johnson's Traditions, p. 259; Gen. Moultrie's Jour., May 2.—⁵ Johnson's Traditions, pp. 259, 260; Garden's Anecdotes, i. pp. 400, 401.—⁶ Gen. Lincoln to Sir H. Clinton, May 11; De Brahm's Jour., May 11.

⁷ “Articles of Capitulation,” &c., signed “B. Lincoln, H. Clinton, M. Arbuthnot,” May 12, 1780.

⁸ Tarleton, p. 22.—² Return, published by order of Cong., June 17. “The militia and sailors being in a different part of the town, suffered no less.”—*Ibid.*

³ Gordon, iii. p. 360.—⁴ *Ibid.*—⁵ Returns appended to Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13.—⁶ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 108.—⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 101. By thus compromising this delicate question—whether a British or an American march should be played—the capitulation was expedited.

⁸ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 108.

same purpose.¹ Two major-generals, five brigadier-generals, three brigade-majors, sixteen colonels, nine lieutenant-colonels, fifteen majors, eighty-four captains, eighty-four lieutenants, forty-one cornets or ensigns, a paymaster, seven adjutants, six quartermasters, eighteen surgeons, six surgeon's-mates, three hundred and twenty-two sergeants, one hundred and thirty-seven drummers, and four thousand seven hundred and ten rank and file, including Continentals, militia, and town's-people;² twenty-one brass and two hundred and ten iron guns, nine mortars, one howitzer, fifteen stands of colors, five thousand four hundred and sixteen muskets, be-

sides the vessels,—already referred to,—large quantities of military stores, and the garrisons and armaments of Mount Pleasant and Fort Moultrie, graced the enemy's triumph.¹

In the loss of Charleston, notwithstanding his gallant defence, General Lincoln was censured by those who had not moved to its support;² and the cause of freedom in the South received a terrible blow.³ South Carolina became, in fact, a British province,⁴ and the enemy was now, more than ever, confirmed in his determination to continue the war until the whole Union should have acknowledged its allegiance to the King.

¹ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 108. It is said the inhabitants were threatened with severe penalties if *all* their arms were not brought out; that this produced many who had never done duty; and that, in this manner, "the militia" was swelled greatly beyond the true number of effectives.

² Return of "rebel forces at the surrender of Charlestown," signed "John André, Deputy-adjutant-general," appended to Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13, 1780.

¹ "Return of ordnance, &c., in Charlestown, &c.," signed "Peter Traill, Major," appended to Sir H. Clinton's dispatch, May 13, 1780.

² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 59.—³ Lee's Mem., pp. 75, 76.—⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 209; Lee's Mem., pp. 77, 78; Johnson's Traditions, pp. 265, 266; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 389, N. Y., June 21, 1780.

C H A P T E R L X.

February 3, 1780.

THE AFFAIR AT YOUNG'S HOUSE, WESTCHESTER CO., N. Y.

ALL who have read "The Spy," will recollect the "Hotel Flanagan, a place of entertainment for man and beast," which graced the hamlet of Four Corners, in Westchester county. This celebrated spot was near what was then known as "Joseph Young's house," or, later in the war, as "The burnt house,"¹ or, since the war, as "*The Van Wart place*," where Mr. Alexander Van Wart, a son of a captor of Major André, now resides, on the old road which leads from Tarrytown to the White Plains, in the town of Mount Pleasant, and about five miles northeast from the village of Tarrytown. It was on what was known as "The American Lines;" and its elevated position, and the number of outbuildings which belonged to it, rendered it a convenient post for the American troops; and it was well known, as such, throughout the country.²

In the early part of the year 1780, "Young's house" and its vicinity were occupied by five companies of Continental troops, numbering, in the aggregate, about two hundred and fifty men,³ and commanded by Lieutenant-colonel

Thompson, of Massachusetts.¹ Captain Watson, of the Third regiment, with his company, was at Young's house, with the lieutenant-colonel; Captain Roberts, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment, and Captain Stoddard, of the First regiment, with their companies, were posted west from Young's, extending two miles towards the Hudson; and Captain-lieutenant Farley, of the Ninth regiment, and Captain Cooper, of the Fourteenth regiment, were posted eastward from Young's, extending over a greater space than those on the right. Pickets were stationed, at proper distances, in front of the whole line; and all necessary precautions were taken to insure the safety of the troops.²

As these troops were designed to protect that portion of the country which lies between Bedford and the Hudson, the Croton River and the lines,³ and had, generally, been in motion, remaining but a short time in the same place,⁴ there is but little doubt the intelligence of their occupation of

¹ Bolton's Hist. of Westchester Co., i. pp. 350, 351.

² Ibid.—³ Heath's Mem., p. 230; Thatcher's Mil. Jour., p. 185.

¹ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1477, Monday, Feb. 7, 1780; Lieut. Mathews' Narrative. —² Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780; Heath's Mem., p. 230.

³ Heath's Mem., p. 230 —⁴ Ibid.

Young's house had been conveyed to the enemy by some of the Tories with which Westchester county abounded at that time, and awakened in him a desire to surprise them in their quarters. Accordingly, between ten and eleven o'clock, in the evening of Wednesday, the second day of February, 1780,¹ four flank companies of the First and Second regiments of Guards; detachments, of fifty men each, from two Hessian battalions which were stationed at Kingsbridge; a party of Yagers, a part of whom were mounted; and forty mounted Westchester Tories, from Colonel James Delancy's corps,²—between four and five hundred infantry and one hundred horsemen, in the aggregate,³—the whole commanded by Colonel Norton of the Guards,⁴ left the heights near Fort Knyphausen (*Fort Washington*) in sleighs which had been collected, privately, for that purpose.⁵ They had not proceeded far, however, when the bad state of the roads, in connection with the peculiar character of the expedition, rendered it advisable to order the sleighs to return; and, with two light field-pieces which had been brought out,

¹ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Wednesday, Feb. 9, 1780; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1477, N. Y., Monday, Feb. 7, 1780; Lieut. Mathews' Narrative.—² Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1477, N. Y., Feb. 7, 1780; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Feb. 9, 1780.

³ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10. "Nearly six hundred strong—350 Guards, 150 Hessians, and about 100 horse."—(*Narrative of Lieut. Mathews, of the Coldstream Guards, an officer in the expedition.*)—⁴ Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1477, N. Y., Feb. 7, 1780.

⁵ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Wednesday, Feb. 9, 1780; Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1477, N. Y., Feb. 7, 1780.

they were sent back to Kingsbridge. Colonel Norton then determined to move through less frequented roads, in order to avoid "the patrols which covered the principal approaches;" and it was nine o'clock on Thursday morning (*Feb. 3d*) when he met the first picket,¹ —a sergeant and eight men,—who, after gallantly opposing the advance guard, and throwing it into confusion, were captured by the horsemen.² They were also discovered by Mr. Campbell, one of the Westchester guides, who, at nine o'clock, informed Lieutenant-colonel Thompson of their approach within two miles and a half of Young's, and that they were in considerable force; advising him, at the same time, to take a stronger position, a little in the rear of the house. With that indiscretion which is frequently shown in similar cases, Lieutenant-colonel Thompson disregarded the information and the advice, considering himself strong enough to withstand the attack; and contented himself with calling in the four companies on his flanks.³

In the mean time Colonel Norton was advancing up the main road towards the American position;⁴ and, after the capture of the patrol, had ordered the horsemen to move forward, as rapidly as possible, and to surround the house, to cut off the retreat of the Americans, or to take advantage of any

¹ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Feb. 9, 1780; Heath's Mem., p. 230. Mathews' Narrative, in which it is stated the party, instead of moving along the roads, "went across the lots."—² Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780.—³ Ibid.; Heath's Mem., p. 230.—⁴ Bolton's Westchester Co., i. p. 354.

circumstances which might offer success.¹ Captain Roberts and his company having come up and formed on the right of the house, a short time before the horsemen reached it, the latter halted, discharged their rifles at long distances, and awaited the coming up of the infantry.² Shortly afterwards Captain-lieutenant Farley's company came on the ground, and formed on the left of the house;³ and, about the same time, the main body of the enemy came up—one portion moving directly against the house; the other, moving to the left, threatened the American right flank.⁴ The three companies then on the ground appear to have maintained their position, with considerable gallantry, for fifteen minutes;⁵ while the superior numbers of the enemy enabled him not only to turn the right flank of Captain Roberts' company, but even to occupy the orchard in the rear of the house.⁶ About the same time Captain Roberts fell, mortally wounded;⁷ and Captains Stoddard and Cooper being unable to render any assistance,⁸ the troops gave way—some retreating up the road, others into the house,⁹—and the enemy dashed after them in pursuit.¹⁰ The usual cruelties with which the Tories

visited their countrymen were extended to the Americans in this case; and the bodies of the dead and the wounded bore evidences of their heartless barbarities.¹ The grenadiers of the Guards having forced the house in which a few of the fugitives had taken refuge,² it was set on fire, and, with five wounded men who were in it,³ and the surrounding buildings, it was consumed.⁴ After securing his prisoners the enemy retired, arriving at Kingsbridge at about nine in the evening.⁵

In this affair the Americans lost thirteen men killed, besides Captain Roberts.⁶ Thirty-seven were wounded, of whom seventeen were left behind,⁷ and twenty taken prisoners.⁸ Sixty-eight, exclusive of the wounded,⁹—seventy-six in all,—were taken prisoners, among whom were Joseph Young,—the owner of the property,—Lieutenant-colonel Thompson, Captain Watson, Captain-lieutenant Farley, Lieutenants Burley and Maynard, and Ensigns Fowler and Bradley.¹⁰ The loss of the enemy is said to have been five killed and eighteen wounded.¹¹

¹ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Wednesday, Feb. 9, 1780.—² Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780; Heath's Mem., p. 230; Thatcher's Mil. Jour., p. 185.—³ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780.—⁴ Ibid.; Bolton's Hist. of Westchester Co., i. p. 354.—⁵ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 112, Wednesday, Feb. 16, 1780.

⁶ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10; Heath's Mem., p. 231.—⁷ Heath's Mem., p. 231.—⁸ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780.—⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Heath's Mem., p. 231; Thatcher's Mil. Jour., p. 185.

¹ Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 112, Trenton, Wednesday, Feb. 16, 1780.—² Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Feb. 9, 1780.—³ Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 112, Wednesday, Feb. 16, 1780.—⁴ Heath's Mem., p. 231.—⁵ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Feb. 9, 1780.—⁶ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10; Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 112, Trenton, Wednesday, Feb. 16, 1780.—⁷ Gen. Heath to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1780.—⁸ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 352, N. Y., Feb. 6, 1780.—⁹ Ibid.—¹⁰ Heath's Mem., p. 231.—¹¹ Gaines' N. Y. Gazette and Mercury, No. 1477, Feb. 7, 1780; Heath's Mem., p. 231. Rivington (Royal Gazette, No. 352, Feb. 9, 1780) says the loss was *three killed and fifteen wounded*; and Lieut. Matl ews, in his Narrative, says *three, only, were killed*.

CHAPTER LXI.

May 29, 1780.

THE ACTION AT THE WAXHAWS, S. C.

THE surrender of Charleston was followed by the precipitate retreat of several parties of militia which were advancing to its relief;¹ and by the rapid march of detachments from the enemy's main body at Charleston, through different parts of the State, to suppress the spirit of insurrection which had prevailed, and to receive the submission of the planters, which had been so cheerfully yielded to the victors, wherever they had appeared.²

One of these parties, composed of three hundred men from Petersburg, Virginia,³ and commanded by Colonel Buford,⁴ had reached Lanneau's Ferry, on the Santee, when intelligence of the surrender met it,⁵ and a messenger was sent to General Huger, the senior officer in Carolina, for instructions.⁶ He directed Colonel Buford to retire to Hillsborough, by way of Camden; to take with him, or destroy, the stores

and ammunition which had been collected there; and to remove, from that place, some thirty or forty prisoners who had been detained there.¹ In conformity with these instructions, such stores as could not be removed were thrown into a creek, and, with the remainder and the prisoners, the party proceeded on its way towards Hillsborough, and had halted, to rest its horses, near the Waxhaw Creek,² about nine miles north from Lancaster Court-house, S. C.³

In the mean time General Cornwallis, who had left Huger's Bridge on the eighteenth of May, at the head of twenty-five hundred men and five pieces of artillery, had reached Lanneau's Ferry, and crossed the Santee River.⁴ On the twenty-second he moved forward in pursuit of Colonel Buford; but when he had reached Nelson's Ferry, he found that the latter was so far in advance that it was impossible for the main body to overtake him.⁵ Having

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 360.—² Ibid. ; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 108.—³ Gen. Woodford to Gen. Washington, April 8; Adj. Bowyer's "Particular account of Colonel Buford's defeat."—⁴ Adj. Bowyer's account; Gordon, iii. p. 360; Moultrie's Mem., p. 203.

⁵ Adj. Bowyer's account.—⁶ Ibid.

¹ Adj. Bowyer's account.—² Ibid.—³ Lossing's Field Book, ii. pp. 663, 664.—⁴ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, pp. 26, 27; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 203.

⁵ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 27.

no inclination to abandon the pursuit while any means remained unemployed, on the twenty-seventh of May, Lord Cornwallis detached forty of the Seventeenth dragoons, one hundred and thirty of the Legion, one hundred mounted light-infantry, also from the Legion, and a three-pounder, under Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, to continue the pursuit.¹ The rapidity of the march and the heat of the climate proved fatal to his horses, but Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton seized others to take their places, and pressed forward.² On the twenty-seventh the detachment reached Camden, and Rugely's Mills on the twenty-eighth, when he learned that Colonel Buford was about twenty miles in advance of him.³ He started in pursuit, but Colonel Buford was also pushing forward as rapidly as possible, and it was not until the next day that Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton approached the Americans.⁴ Desiring to check their progress, the former resorted to stratagem to effect it; and for that purpose⁵ sent forward Captain Kinlock of the Legion, with a summons to Colonel Buford, magnifying the numbers of the pursuit, and requiring his surrender.⁶ It was hoped, by this means, "to in-

timidate him into submission, or, at least, delay him while he deliberated on an answer,"¹ and there is but little doubt that, as deceit and falsehood were employed, with the avowed purpose of gaining the advantage which honorable pursuit could not secure, that some portion, at least, of the outrage which followed had, even then, been determined upon.

In the mean time the repose of the American troops had been disturbed by a young man, who, riding forward from Rugely's Mills, warned them of the approach of the detachment which was pursuing them.² The troops were immediately put in motion again, and had proceeded about two miles when they were overtaken by Captain Kinlock, whom Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton had sent forward on a mission of dis-honor.³ Adjutant Bowyer was ordered to meet him, but he declined to communicate his message to any but Colonel Buford.⁴ The latter, after halting his column, and forming his men across the road, repaired to the spot where Captain Kinlock was,⁵ read his summons and the proffered terms, and was assured by the latter, "on his honor, as a gentleman and an officer," that the pursuit numbered upwards of six hundred men, half of whom were cavalry.⁶ Disbelieving the story which Captain Kinlock had conveyed, Colonel Buford

¹ Col. Tarleton to Lord Cornwallis, May 30; Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 27; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 203.

² Tarleton, p. 27.—³ Ibid., p. 28; Moultrie, ii. pp. 203, 204.—⁴ Tarleton, p. 28.—⁵ Col. Tarleton (*Southern Campaign*, p. 28) says this was "*a stratagem to delay the march of the enemy,*" showing the bad faith in which the summons was sent, and proving, conclusively, that the massacre had been already determined on.

⁶ Col. Tarleton to Col. Buford, with the proffered terms, May 29, 1780; Tarleton, p. 28; Moultrie, ii. p. 204.

¹ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 28.—² Adj. Bowyer's account.—³ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 28; Adj. Bowyer's account.—⁴ Adj. Bowyer's account.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. This is fully confirmed by Tarleton (*Southern Campaign*, p. 28).

answered, "I reject your proposals, and shall defend myself to the last extremity," and dismissed the flag.¹ He then returned to his troops, and informed his officers what he had done, receiving their general approval of the course he had adopted.²

Preparations were immediately made for action; and having posted his men in an open wood, on the right of the road, Colonel Buford formed his men in a single line, with a small reserve, and awaited the enemy's approach.³

Lientenant-colonel Tarleton advanced within three hundred yards of Colonel Buford's position, and, without molestation, formed his men.⁴ His right wing, composed of sixty dragoons and nearly as many infantry, under Major Coehrane, was moved—the infantry to gall the Americans' left flank, the dragoons to attack their front; his centre, composed of forty from the Seventeenth dragoons and part of the Legion light-horse, commanded by Captains Corbet and Kinlock, was to charge the American centre; and his left wing, composed of thirty chosen horse and some infantry, led by Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, was to assault the right and reserve of the American forces. In this order they advanced to the attack,⁵

and, the Americans' fire having been reserved until the cavalry was *within ten yards* of their line,¹ the charge swept the single line before it and threw it into instant disorder.²

Colonel Buford, perceiving that further resistance would be useless, directed Adjntant Bowyer to advance with a flag to Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, and to say that he would accept the terms which had been offered in the morning.³ The action, notwithstanding this flag, continued on both sides, and while Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton was conversing with Adjntant Bowyer, his horse was shot in the head, and fell with his rider under him.⁴ Indignant at this violation of their own flag, by the Americans, an indiscriminate slaughter was immediately commenced by the enemy.⁵ Closing his ears against every appeal for mercy, and giving full scope to every passion which malice, revenge, and victory could produce, the Americans, with but few exceptions, were cut down; the Colonel and a few others were all who escaped.⁶ On the bodies of those who were too badly wounded

¹ Col. Abr. Buford to Lieut.-Col. Tarleton, Waxhaws, May 29, 1780; Adj. Bowyer's account.

² Adj. Bowyer's account.—³ Col. Tarleton to Lord Cornwallis, May 30; Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 29; Adj. Bowyer's account; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 204.

⁴ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 30; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 204.—⁵ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, pp. 29, 30; Adj. Bowyer's account; Moultrie's Mem., ii. pp. 204, 205.

¹ Tarleton's Southern Campaign, p. 30; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 205.—² Col. Tarleton to Lord Cornwallis, May 30; Gordon, iii. p. 361; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 205; Marshall, iv. pp. 208, 209; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 87.

³ Adj. Bowyer's account. Maj. Lee (*Mem. of War in the South*, pp. 78, 79) refers to this offer, but supposes it was made before the action commenced. Judge Marshall (*Washington*, iv. p. 208) says the first offer was rejected by Col. Buford, but says nothing of the subsequent offer of the latter to accept the proffered terms.

⁴ Adj. Bowyer's account.—⁵ Ibid.; Gordon, iii. p. 361; Lee's Mem., pp. 78, 79.—⁶ Adj. Bowyer's account; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 109, 110; Stedman, ii. p. 193; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 158.

to be removed, an average of sixteen wounds on each man appeared,¹ and no stronger evidence than this is required to show the savage cruelty which the enemy exercised over their fallen adversaries.

Of the Americans, one lieutenant-colonel, three captains, eight subalterns, an adjutant, a quartermaster, and ninety-nine rank and file, were killed on the spot; three captains, five subalterns, and one hundred and forty-two sergeants and privates, were so badly wounded that they could not be removed; and three officers and fifty privates—mostly wounded—were taken prisoners:² of the British, two officers, three privates, and eleven horses were killed; and one officer, eleven privates, and nineteen horses were wounded.³ Three colors, two brass six-pounders, two royals, and a large quantity of ammunition, with twenty-six wagons loaded with clothing and other stores, were also taken by the enemy.⁴

While the savage butchery of men pleading for mercy, and the relentless

chopping to pieces of the helpless and wounded among the victims, must stamp this as one of the most heartless occurrences of the war, it must not be forgotten that the continuation of the fire, while a flag was negotiating for a surrender, was a violation of a well-settled rule, and, to some extent, justified, among military men of that day, the severity with which it was resented.¹ The necessities of the times, however, in this case, as in many others, seized the occurrence, and employed it as an instrumentality for arousing the dormant energies of the people; and "*Tarleton's quarter*"—originating in this affair—became a standing by-word throughout the country.²

The affair at the Waxhaws is also memorable, from the fact that there the last vestige of the popular power in South Carolina was extinguished;³ and Sir Henry Clinton, having completely conquered the State and subdued the greater part of her people, returned in triumph to New York, to receive the congratulations of his friends and the applause of his country.⁴

¹ Garden's Anecdotes, ii. pp. 139, 140.

² "Return of rebels killed, &c.," appended to Col. Tarleton's letter to Lord Cornwallis, May 30. Gen. Cornwallis in General Orders, "*Head-quarters, Charlestown Neck, June 1, 1780,*" states that "one hundred and seventy were cut to pieces."—³ "Return of British killed, &c.," appended to the same letter.

⁴ Ibid. Rivington's *Royal Gazette*, No. 388, N. Y., June 17, 1780, contains a notice of this affair, in which it is stated the artillery taken were "Saratoga cannon."

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¹ It has been denied that the Americans violated the flag, and some, even, have asserted that *no* resistance was made by them. Judge Marshall (iv. pp. 208, 209) inclines to that opinion, but the testimony of Adj. Bowyer, one of Col. Buford's officers, I consider to be conclusive on the subject.—² Gordon, iii. p. 361.—³ Sir H. Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, June 4, 1780; Tarleton's Mem., p. 32; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 110, 112; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 208.—⁴ Moultrie's Mem., p. 209; Marshall, iv. p. 211.

C H A P T E R L X I I .

JUNE 1, 1780.¹

THE ACTION BETWEEN THE TRUMBULL AND THE WATT.

THE obstinate defence of the *Bon Homme Richard*, in 1779, had given character to the infant navy of the United States; and the operations of the following year were opened with an action which was well calculated to sustain the reputation which it had previously acquired.

On the first of June, 1780, the *Trumbull*, of twenty-eight guns (mounting twenty-four twelve-pounders and six six-pounders), with one hundred and ninety-nine men, and commanded by Captain James Nicholson,² was cruising in latitude $35^{\circ} 54' N.$, longitude $66^{\circ} W.$, when a strange sail was made to windward.³ Orders were immediately given to furl all her canvas, in order that the character of the stranger might be ascertained without exposing herself.⁴ It was soon made out that the sail was a large ship, and that she was coming

down on the Trumbull's quarter.¹ Some manœuvring then followed, to test the stranger's sailing qualities, and to ascertain her strength; after which the Trumble took in her light sails, hauled up her courses, hove her main-top-sail to the mast, and cleared for action.² At half-past eleven, the stranger being within gunshot to windward, the Trumbull filled, and, as she outsailed the former, she quickly fetched to windward, and determined to engage her.³

At this time the stranger appeared, for the first time, to seek to avoid an action; and after firing three guns, and showing British colors, she edged off, with an intention, evidently, to pursue her course.⁴ Unwilling to part from his new acquaintance in so unceremonious a manner, Captain Nicholson harangued his men, and made sail and pursued her.⁵ When within about a hundred yards of the stranger, she gave the Trumbull a broadside, which the latter returned, and the action commenced.⁶

¹ "The Protest of Capt. John Coulthard," in Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 387, N. Y., Wednesday, June 14, 1780. Mr. Cooper (*Naval Hist.*, i. p. 123) and Mr. Clark (*Naval Hist.*, p. 72) suppose the action was fought on the second of June.—² Goldsborough's Naval Chron., p. 14; Cooper, i. p. 123; Clark, p. 72.

³ "Capt. Coulthard's Protest;" Clark, p. 72; Cooper, i. p. 123. Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 132, Trenton, July 5, 1780, says she was in Lat. $35^{\circ} N.$, Lon. $64^{\circ} 10' W.$ The Boston Gazette appears to confirm it.

⁴ Cooper, i. p. 123.

¹ Capt. Coulthard's Protest; Cooper, i. p. 123.

² Cooper, i. p. 123; Clark, p. 72.—³ Cooper, i. p. 123.

⁴ Cooper, i. p. 123; Clark, p. 73. Capt. Coulthard's Protest speaks of having fired two guns, and wearing to the westward.—⁵ Capt. Coulthard's Protest; Cooper, i. p. 123.—⁶ Capt. Coulthard's Protest; Clark, p. 73.

For upwards of three hours and a half the vessels laid nearly abeam of each other,—never more than half a cable's length apart, and sometimes with their yards nearly interlocked,—the action continuing, during that time, with unabated fury.¹ Twice the Trumbull was set on fire by the enemy's wads, and once her adversary suffered in a similar manner from hers.² At length the enemy's fire slackened, and victory appeared within the reach of the Americans, when the mainmast gave evidence of severe injury, and to save it,—and probably the ship,—the Trumbull made sail, and shot ahead of her adversary.³

She had not proceeded more than a hundred yards, however, when her main and mizzen top-masts went overboard;⁴ and, soon afterwards, notwithstanding every effort was made to save them, every spar came down except the fore-mast.⁵ Under these disadvantages the enemy appeared to have complete control of the Trumbull; but, instead of profiting by her misfortune, she went off on her proper course.⁶

It soon afterwards appeared that the stranger was the *Watt*, a heavy well-

armed letter-of-marque, commanded by Captain Coulthard;¹ that she had been armed to resist an attack from frigates;² had on board a valuable cargo, which was supposed to be so secure that it had not been insured;³ that her rigging and braces were shot away, her masts severely wounded,—the main top-mast being carried away while she was in sight from the Trumbull,—and one hundred balls had struck her hull; and that ninety-two of her men were killed or wounded.⁴

The Trumbull lost eight of her crew, killed, and thirty-one wounded, among the former of whom were two of her lieutenants.⁵

When it is considered that the Trumbull, in consequence of the difficulty in procuring seamen, had manned a large number of landsmen, many of whom, at the time of the action, were suffering from sea-sickness, it is not strange that this has been considered, in many respects a more remarkable action than that between the Good Man Richard and the Serapis.

¹ The "Protest" of the Capt., in Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 387, N. Y., Wednesday, June 14, 1780.

² Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 132, July 5, 1780, says she mounted 36 guns, six and twelve pounders. The Boston Gazette, June 19, gives the same description. Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 392, N. Y., Saturday, July 1 1780, says she carried 32 guns and 163 men.

³ Capt. Coulthard's Protest. Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 132, July 5, 1780, says the action continued for "fire glasses."—⁴ Cooper, i. p. 123; Clark, p. 73.—⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Boston Gazette, June 17.

⁷ Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 132; Trenton, July 5, 1780; Cooper, i. p. 123; Clark, p. 73.

⁸ Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 132, Trenton, July 5, 1780; Cooper, i. p. 123. Capt. Coulthard says, in his Protest, he chased the Trumbull eight hours.

⁹ Clark, p. 73.—¹⁰ Capt. Coulthard's Protest.

¹¹ Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 132, Trenton, July 5, 1780; Boston Gazette, June 19, cited by Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 392, Saturday, July 1, 1780.

CHAPTER LXIII.

JUNE 7, 1780.

THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE CONNECTICUT FARMS, N. J.

THE spring of 1780 was one of the most trying times of the war, and the young republic staggered under the burdens which it was compelled to carry. The currency of the country—that fruitful source of trouble, even at the present day—was the subject which attracted the attention of the people, and filled with alarm every patriot in the land. Two hundred millions of paper dollars had been created by the Continental Congress, besides those which the several States had issued, and no portion of either had been redeemed. The faith of the people of the States which respectively issued it, had been plighted for the security of the latter; and the honor of thirteen sovereign States, united in a common cause, had given an appearance of value, at least, to the former; but, with the multiplication of bills of credit, to be used as currency,—then, as now,—the relative value of gold and paper became deranged, and fictitious values were placed on every species of property. At the time referred to, forty dollars of paper were required to represent one of specie or its equivalent, and the business

of the country became unsettled and uncertain.¹

The commissaries of the army, with this currency, found it extremely difficult to obtain supplies, and great discontent prevailed among the troops, as well as among the people.² The pay of the troops, from this cause, had become little more than a promise—insufficient to furnish the necessary clothing for their use,—and the utmost distress stared them in the face.³ The officers of several of the lines, were therefore, *compelled* to resign;⁴ while the men, in many instances, soured from other causes, were driven into an actual mutiny.⁵

The enemy at New York was duly informed of the existence of these troubles, and of their effect on the army and the country;⁶ and he flattered him-

¹ Sparks' Washington, pp. 306, 307; Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 241, 242.—² Stedman, ii. pp. 239, 240; Sparks, p. 306; Marshall, iv. pp. 241, 242; Gen. Washington to Col. Matthias Ogden, Jan. 8, 1780; Same to the Magistrates of N. J., Jan. 8, 1780.—³ Marshall, iv. p. 268; Gordon's N. J., p. 305.—⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 269.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 269-274; Gordon's N. J., p. 305.

⁶ Stedman, ii. p. 240; Murray's Notes on Elizabeth-town, p. 96; Marshall, iv. p. 274.

self with an opinion that the former waited only for an opportunity to desert its colors and its General, and that the people of New Jersey—among whom the troops were cantoned, and whose supplies had been most frequently levied on—were ready to change their government and return to the allegiance of the King.¹

To strengthen this supposed disposition among the people, to encourage desertion in the army,² and, probably, to break up the encampment at Morristown,³ in the evening of Tuesday, the sixth of June, 1780,⁴ about five thousand⁵ men, commanded by Brigadiers Mathew, Tryon, and Sterling,⁶ the whole under the command of General Knyphausen, crossed over from Staten Island to Elizabethtown Point,⁷ and, at an early hour the next day, moved to the Connecticut Farms,⁸ a small village about four miles northwest from Elizabethtown.⁹

¹ Stedman, ii. pp. 240, 241; Marshall, iv. p. 274.

² Stedman, ii. pp. 240, 241; Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Marshall, iv. p. 274.—³ Marshall, iv. p. 274.

⁴ Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 103; Sedgwick's Life of Wm. Livingston, p. 349; Gordon, iii. p. 368; Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 10.—⁵ Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 103; Lieut. Mathew's Narrative; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 368.—⁶ Lieut. Mathew's Narrative; Sparks' Life of Washington, p. 309; Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 103; Letter from Baskinridge, June 10; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 275.

⁷ Stedman, ii. p. 240; Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 103; Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 129, Trenton, Wednesday, June 14, 1780.—⁸ Stedman, ii. p. 211; Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 103; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 368; Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette.

⁹ Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 196.

No sooner was the enemy put in motion, than the real character of the discontent in New Jersey was made known by the appearance of the people, in arms, to oppose his progress.¹ The militia, also, turned out with great alacrity; and, in conjunction with the people and small parties of Continental troops, it kept up a galling fire on the enemy,² and convinced him that “although the inhabitants of the Jerseys had murmured, they had never thought of deserting the American cause.”³

It is probable that the enemy, thus enlightened, would have returned at once, had he not hoped to find, in the disaffection among the troops, some encouraging circumstances. He pushed forward, therefore, nearly to Springfield⁴—every step being opposed by the inhabitants and the militia—but his progress was arrested at the bridge which crosses the Rahway River, east from that village,⁵ where “a detachment from that army which was represented to be mutinous, was seen drawn up in force, ready to dispute his pas-

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 241; Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 129, June 14, 1780; Letter from Morristown, June 9, in Collins, No. 130; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 368; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 104.—² Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 104; Stedman, ii. p. 241; Marshall, iv. pp. 274, 275; Lieut. Mathew's Narrative.—³ Stedman, ii. p. 241; Hist. of Civil War, iii. pp. 104, 105.—⁴ Ibid.; Murray's Elizabethtown, p. 96; Hist. Civil War, iii. p. 104; Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 129, June 14, 1780; Lieut. Mathew's Narrative.

⁵ Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 129; Marshall, iv. p. 276; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 369; Letter from Morristown, June 9, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 130, June 21, 1780.

sage."¹ Soon afterwards a stronger body arrived from the camp at Morristown, taking a position on the Short Hills, near by;² and the enemy, finding "the information upon which the expedition had been undertaken was not to be depended upon,"³ took advantage of a dark, rainy night,⁴ and returned to Elizabethtown.⁵ It is said that he would have passed over to Staten Island the same night, had it not been low water, which prevented the embarkation of the cavalry until the next morning, and it was considered necessary that the infantry should also remain to cover the embarkation.⁶ This short stay at the Point afforded an opportunity for reflection, and General Knyphausen determined, "*for the credit of the British arms*, to remain some days longer in New Jersey, lest their precipitate retreat should be represented as a flight."⁷ This "credit," however, was quickly impaired by the approach of General Maxwell and a body of militia, who encamped near by and watched his movements;⁸ while scarcely a day passed that some exploit of the Jerseymen did not detract from

the same "credit," by carrying off some of his troops or beating in his outposts.¹

The exact loss of neither party has been recorded. It appears, however, that four officers of the Jersey brigade were wounded, and one (Mr. Ogden) killed on the first day, and "considerable damage" is said to have been sustained, at the same time, by the enemy.² Including all subsequent operations near Elizabethtown by this party, the loss of the Americans was "computed to be about thirty killed and wounded, Captain Reeves being among the former; and that of the enemy is said to be a hundred and fifty killed and as many more wounded."³

What renders this expedition more conspicuous, was the murder of Mrs. Hannah Caldwell, the wife of Rev. James Caldwell, pastor of the Presbyterian church in Elizabethtown, which was then perpetrated;⁴ and the outrages which were committed on the inhabitants, generally, after their contin-

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 241; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 369.

² Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette; Gen. Washington to Cong., June 10; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 105; Marshall, iv. p. 277.

³ Stedman, ii. p. 241.—⁴ Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette; Marshall, iv. p. 277; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 105; Stedman, ii. pp. 241, 242; Lieut. Mathew's Narrative. Dr. Murray (*Elizabethtown*, p. 96) supposes he returned the next day.—⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 241; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 370; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 105.—⁶ Stedman, ii. pp. 241, 242.

⁷ Ibid., p. 242.—⁸ Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 129, June 14, 1780.

¹ Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 105; Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette; Letter from Morristown, June 9, in same paper, No. 130, June 21, 1780; Marshall, iv. p. 277.—² Letter from Baskinridge, June 10, in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 129, Trenton, June 14, 1780.—³ Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 129, Trenton, Wednesday, June 14, 1780.

⁴ Dr. Murray's Men. of Rev. Jas. Caldwell, read before the N. J. Hist. Society, May 25, 1848; Dr. Murray's Notes on Elizabethtown, p. 96; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 104; Sedgwick's Life of Wm. Livingston, p. 350; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 196; Marshall, iv. pp. 275, 276; Gordon, iii. p. 369; Letter from a British officer, in Rivington's Gazette, No. 389, N. Y. June 21, 1780. Dr. Murray (*Notes on Elizabethtown*, p. 75), Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 182), and the inscription on the monument to her memory, state she was killed on the second visit of the enemy.

ued attachment to the cause of freedom had been witnessed by the enemy.¹

Mrs. Caldwell and her family had left their home in Elizabethtown, and sought shelter in the parsonage at Connecticut Farms, where she remained until the enemy entered the village, notwithstanding the remonstrances of her friends. Her amiable disposition, her fervent piety, and her charitable care of the poor and the distressed, had obtained for her the particular attachment of all who knew her; and, as the enemy approached the village she retired to her bedroom, at the back part of the house, with her children, for their greater security. While there, a Tory, who had jumped over the fence into the back yard of the premises, fired at her through the window, and she fell, pierced with two balls, a victim of that ferocity which especially characterized the Tories in their opposition to their countrymen.² The infant which was in her arms when she fell,—whose days have been lengthened until within a short time past,³—and the terror-stricken children were removed; and,

soon afterwards, the body of the unfortunate victim—at the urgent solicitation of some of the inhabitants—was dragged out, and thrown into the street;¹ when the house, in common with all the other buildings in the village, except one house, which then belonged to Captain Henry Wade,² at the instance of General Tryon, who was present,³ were committed to the flames.⁴ On the following morning her husband, who was with the troops, obtained a flag, and removed the body for interment.

Besides the destruction of buildings at Connecticut Farms, the enemy marked his progress with a series of outrages and robberies. Every thing which could be carried away was removed in wagons which had been brought for that purpose; and so far was the spirit of plunder and destruction carried, that the feather-beds were ripped open, the feathers scattered in the roads, and the ticks carried away.⁵

¹ Murray's Elizabethtown, pp. 76, 96; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 182; Garden's Anecdotes, ii. p. 216; Letter from an officer, dated "Camp, June 13," in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 130, June 21, 1780.

² Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 197.

³ Marshall, iv. p. 275; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 103.

⁴ Murray's Elizabethtown, pp. 76, 96; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 196; Marshall, iv. p. 275; Gordon, iii. p. 369; Lieut. Mathew's Narrative. Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 182) says thirteen houses and a meeting-house were burned at Connecticut Farms.

⁵ Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 196.

¹ Sedgwick's Life of Wm. Livingston, p. 350; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 196; Letter from an officer, "Camp, June 13," in Collins' N. J. Gazette, No. 130, Trenton, June 21, 1780.

² Murray's Elizabethtown, pp. 75, 76, 96; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 182; Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., pp. 196, 197.—³ Maria, wife of Robert S. Robertson, of New York, was the child here referred to.

CHAPTER LXIV.

JUNE 20, 1780.¹

THE BATTLE OF RAMSOUR'S MILL.

THE reduction of Charleston, and the return to New York of Sir Henry Clinton, left Lord Cornwallis at the head of affairs in the Southern Department.² Two of the newly organized States had, practically, returned to their allegiance to the King; and his lordship's attention was next directed to North Carolina, as a field for future conquests; while the correspondence which he had opened with the Royalists of that State presented, in glowing colors, the most flattering prospects of success. The extreme heat—which seriously affected the troops—and the scarcity of provisions in that State, from which the troops could not be supplied until after harvest, however, presented insuperable obstacles; and Lord Cornwallis urged his correspondents to remain quiet, until after the harvest had been got in, and to collect stores,—promising that, in the latter part of August or beginning of September, the Royal troops would advance and cover the organization and operations of the Royalists in that State.³

The Royal troops were quartered in

the several posts of South Carolina and Georgia; and the restless spirits among them prompted kindred spirits among the Tories, in the adjoining State, to disregard the injunctions of Lord Cornwallis, and to organize for service in the field. Against these the people of North Carolina had, more than once, assembled in arms and witnessed their dispersion or their removal, without coming to action.

One of these ambitious leaders, a man named John Moore,—whose parents resided within six miles of Ramsour's Mill, in Lincoln county, North Carolina,—appeared in that vicinity, on the 7th of June, and announced himself the Lieutenant-colonel of the regiment of North Carolina Loyalists, of which John Hamilton, of Halifax county, was the Colonel. He was attired in a suit of shabby regimentals, wore a sword, talked largely of the campaign in South Carolina, and ordered the people to assemble, on the tenth of June, in the woods on Indian Creek, seven miles from Ramsour's Mill. At the appointed time forty men appeared, when Moore communicated to them the wishes of Lord Cornwallis, respecting their movements; and they were about to return to their homes, when an express

¹ See also Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 217. Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 386) and Maj. Henry Lee (*Mem. of War in the South*) say the action took place on the *twenty-second*.

² Gordon, iii. p. 38 ³ Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 95; Moultrie's Mem., p. 218.

came in to inform them that Major Joseph McDowell of Burke county, with twenty Whigs, was approaching to attack them, and that he was within eight miles of them. This incident, simple in itself, instantly gave a new character to the movement, and rendered inoperative all the judicious advice of Lord Cornwallis,¹ and all the good intentions of their leader. Confident of their strength, flushed with the zeal of untried soldiers, and ambitious of fame in their new vocation, the assembly resolved to attack the Major; but, on the next day, when they were ready, he had retired, and was beyond their reach. They returned to their homes, therefore, with orders to reassemble at Ramsour's Mill on the thirteenth, two days afterwards.

When Moore next met his newly-formed command, two hundred men were there; and these were joined on the following day (*June 14th*) by many others, among whom was Nicholas Welch, a Major in the regiment of which Moore was the Lieutenant-colonel. They remained encamped near Ramsour's Mill for several days, accessions to their numbers coming in daily; and on the twentieth of June, thirteen hundred men, one quarter of them without arms, were there assembled.

In the mean time the Whigs of North Carolina had not been inactive. Lord Rawdon, with a party of Regulars, had

taken post at the Waxhaws, on the borders of South Carolina; and, on the 12th of June, eight hundred of the militia of North Carolina assembled, at the call of General Rutherford, to check his movements. When intelligence of the organization of the Tories reached him, on the fourteenth, he promptly issued orders to Colonel Locke, of Rowan county, and other officers in that neighborhood, to take measures to disperse them, while he watched Lord Rawdon in his movements in South Carolina.

The success of Moore and Walsh, in their movements near Ramsour's, speedily attracted the attention both of General Rutherford and Colonel Locke; and both simultaneously moved against them. The messengers which General Rutherford sent to convey his orders to Colonel Locke never reached him; and while the former waited for the arrival of the latter, and the latter, too weak to attack them without assistance, waited for the solicited co-operation of the former, both remained inactive.¹ At length, after sending Colonel Johnson to General Rutherford's camp to apprise him of the movement, late in the evening of the nineteenth of June, Colonel Locke² and those under his command—four hundred in number—

¹ Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 386) and Maj. Henry Lee (*Mém. of War in the South*, p. 81) suppose Col. Locke was detached from Gen. Rutherford, because the latter had not arms for a greater party. Dr. Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 128) appears to concur with them in that opinion.

² Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 161), Stedman (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 196), Tarleton (*Southern Campaigns*, p. 91), Gen. Cornwallis (*Letter to Sir H. Clinton*, June 30, 1780) suppose Gen. Rutherford commanded in the action.

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 196; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 91. Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, June 30, 1780, where the want of authority to take the field is fully maintained.

marched from Mountain Creek, sixteen miles from Ramsour's, where they had been encamped, and, by daybreak on the twentieth, they had arrived within a mile of the enemy's camp.

The organization of both parties was only nominal; and each moved and fought more under the directions of the *captains* than of the colonels who were the nominal commanders-in-chief. The Whigs had *arranged*—for the whole movement was democratic, having been determined either by the whole expedition, or by the officers, “in council,” *as the representatives of their men*—that the companies of Captains Falls, McDowell, and Brandon, should be mounted, and act as cavalry; while all the others should “be left to the officers to be governed by circumstances after they should have met the enemy.” The Tories were encamped on a hill, three hundred yards east of Ramsour's Mill, and half a mile north of the village of Lincolnton, with a picket-guard six hundred yards in advance, besides which there appears to have been but little appearance of regularity.

The hill on which the Tories had encamped was one of a range which extended in nearly an easterly course along the southerly side of the mill-pond; and, at its foot, swept, with a graceful curve, a beautiful glade, between which and the summit of the hill—a distance of three hundred and fifty yards—the gentle southerly slope was covered with bushes; while, here and there, a tree remained—the scattered memorials of the primitive forest.

Across the point of this range of hills, west from the Tories' encampment, the road from Ramsour's to the Tuckasege Ford extended in a southeasterly direction; on the easterly side of which road, from the summit of the hill to the glade at its foot, was a fence—the well-known rail-fence of that country.

Along this road, from the south, the Whigs—they could not be called *troops*—approached the enemy, the mounted companies of Captains Falls, McDowell, and Brandon being in front, the others, in double-file, following in the rear. When the horsemen came in sight of the enemy's picket, which was stationed on this road at a point two hundred and fifty yards southeast from the foot of the hill, the latter discharged their pieces and fled to the camp, carrying with them, in the most indefinite terms, the first intelligence of the approach of the Whigs. The camp was instantly thrown into the greatest disorder; and when the horsemen, who pressed after the picket, turned to their right into the glade, and thence galloped up the slope towards the enemy's line, the confusion, if possible, was increased.¹ Those of the Tories who were unarmed—and some who had arms with them—turned and ran away, taking a position on the other side the creek; while those who remained or were less active, taking courage from the small number of their assailants,—the Whigs who were on foot having been unable to keep up with the horsemen, when the latter

¹ See also Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 218.

pushed after the picket,—opened a fire on them, and drove them down the hill. Seeing the effect of their fire, and, probably, supposing that this handful of horsemen constituted the entire strength of the assailants, the Tories pursued them, and had passed some distance down the slope, when the Whigs who were on foot came in sight; fled to their right, out of the road, into the glade; formed their line at the foot of the slope; and opened their fire. Neither party displayed any knowledge of the art of war, and the lines of both were formed in the clumsiest manner—some places being crowded to excess, while others were entirely unoccupied. A warm and well-directed fire from the Whigs was opened and kept up; while one which was, probably, not less destructive, was returned by the Tories. Gradually, however, the latter fell back to the summit of the hill, and then over it, when the slight shelter which was thus afforded them gave them encouragement, and they rallied for the defence of their position. The Whigs, in their turn, were then compelled to fall back to the foot of the hill; and, in the positions which the parties *first* occupied the contest was obstinately continued. At this moment Captain Harden led a small party of Whigs along the road, up the hill; and, taking advantage of the shelter which the zig-zag rail-fence afforded, he opened a galling fire on the right flank of the Tories. At the same moment, but without any apparent concert, a portion of the Whigs on the right of their line moved

obliquely in that direction, in order to take advantage of some shelter which the ground afforded; and, having secured it, opened a destructive fire on the enemy's left flank. A fire which was so destructive as this could not be long sustained; and the Tories once more fell back towards the summit of the hill. Perceiving this evidence of defeat, the Whigs on the flanks appear to have closed on the rear of the enemy's position, near the summit of the hill, for the purpose of cutting off his retreat, and the Tories were thus hemmed in between two fires. When both parties became thus commingled, with neighbor struggling against neighbor, and kinsman against kinsman, the most desperate energies of both were called into requisition. Having no bayonets, they clubbed their rifles; and, wherever a twig of green pine stuck in a hat indicated a Tory, the sturdy blows of the Whigs fell with the utmost good-will. After this conflict had continued for some time, success at one time appearing to favor the one, and at another, the other party, the Whigs appeared to be gaining ground, when the Tories speedily abandoned the field, falling back, and joining their companions on the other side the creek.

Having thus driven the Tories from their position, the Whigs appear to have seen, for the first time, the line which had been formed by the fugitives; and, supposing that preparations were being made to renew the battle, the Whigs attempted to re-form their line near the summit of the hill. Not-

withstanding all their efforts only *one hundred and ten men*, out of the four hundred who entered the battle, could be collected. Messengers were immediately dispatched to General Rutherford, who was on his way to the field, to hurry forward with his troops; and every measure which was thought of was adopted to add to their security. In the mean time the Tories, instead of intending to renew the action, were fearful that the Whigs would pursue them, and were busily engaged in devising plans for securing *their safety*. For this purpose a flag was sent to the Whigs, under pretence of asking a suspension of hostilities for the purpose of providing for their wounded and burying their dead;¹ and while the Whigs were amused by the negotiations for that purpose, the Tories, singly, or in small parties, ran away.² Moore, with thirty of his men, reached Camden, where he joined the Regnlars under Lord Rawdon; the remainder of his force, probably, returned to their homes,³ wiser, if not better men.

As has been noticed before, the entire force of the Whigs was four hundred men—of which it is supposed that not more than two hundred and fifty were in the action, of which about one hundred and fifty were killed or wound-

ed,—Captains Falls, Dobson, Smith, Bowman, and Armstrong being among the former, and Captains Houston and McKissick among the latter.¹ The entire force of the enemy was nearly thirteen hundred men, of whom probably not less than seven hundred were engaged, and a hundred and fifty killed and wounded,—Captains Cumberland, Murray, and Warlick being among the former, and Captain Carpenter among the latter.²

The only marks of distinction used were the small twigs of pine stuck in the hats of the Tories, and pieces of white paper in those of the Whigs, and it was difficult to distinguish the one from the other after they had fallen; and when, on the evening of the day of battle, the people of the surrounding country came on the field, and recognized a neighbor, a friend, or a relative among the fallen, “a scene was witnessed which was truly afflicting to humanity.” In this respect, as in the peculiar desperation of the struggle, it more nearly resembled Oriskany than did any other action of the war.

¹ Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 387) says that only twenty-two Whigs were killed or wounded.

² James Williams, in a letter to his wife, dated “Camp Catawba, Old Nation, July 4, 1780” (Gen. Sumter’s camp), says the enemy numbered 1300 men, that 35 were killed, that all their baggage, 500 horses, arms, &c., were taken.

³ Maj. Henry Lee (*Mem. of War in the South*, pp. 81, 82) supposes this flag was sent *before* the action, and appears to have supposed that *no action took place*. Dr. Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 129) appears to concur with him in this view.—² See also Dr. Gordon’s *Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 387.

² This is sustained by the words of Stedman (ii. p. 196), who says they were “dispersed.” As Stedman was a Commissary in this part of the army, under Lord Cornwallis, his statements are entitled to great credit.

[This narrative has been based on an account of the action which was written by Gen. Joseph Graham (the father of Hon. Wm. A. Graham, late Secretary of the Navy), whose distinguished services in the army of the Revolution, and whose intimate acquaintance with the persons and incidents which lie described, give peculiar weight to his statements. It was published in “*The Catawba Journal*,” published in Charlotte, N. C., February 1, 1825.]

CHAPTER LXV.

JUNE 23, 1780.

THE ACTION AT SPRINGFIELD, N. J.

WHILE the enemy, "for the credit of the British arms," was laying in an intrenched camp, at Elizabethtown Point, as related in a preceding chapter,¹ Sir Henry Clinton, and a portion of the troops which he had taken with him to the South, returned to New York;² and the small body of troops which had been left near Springfield, under General Greene, to cover the country and the stores at Morristown,³ were the only obstacles, besides the militia, between the enemy and the camp.

The honor of the enemy's service, since his "precipitate retreat"⁴ from Springfield, on the seventh of June, appeared to require some successful expedition to vindicate its character;⁵ and as these stores at Morristown,—with General Greene before them, and General Washington and the main army to cover them,—offered sufficient inducement for the attempt, preparations were made for that purpose.⁶

Reinforcements were sent from New York to Elizabethtown Point,⁷ while, for the purpose of withdrawing Gen-

eral Washington beyond supporting distance, a large body of troops were embarked on transports, which laid at anchor in the North River, with the intention, apparently, of moving up the river against the Highlands.¹ With a proper regard for the safety of the Jerseys, and, at the same time, to be enabled to move to the support of the Highlands, if that should be necessary, General Washington moved to Rockaway Bridge, about eleven miles, towards Pompton, northeast from Morristown, and there encamped.²

All things being ready, about five o'clock on the morning of the twenty-third of June, the enemy moved from Elizabethtown Point, on the same road on which he passed on the seventh of June.³ He moved rapidly and in close order,⁴ so that the people had but little opportunity to oppose his progress, although General Greene, at Springfield, had notice of the projected movement the night before,⁵ as well as of his pro-

¹ Vide Chap. LXIII.—² Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, July 4, cited by Mr. Sparks; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 106; Stedman, ii. p. 243.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Greene, June 21.

⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 242.—⁵ Ibid.—⁶ Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 106; Stedman, ii. p. 241; Caldwell's Life of Greene, p. 86.—⁷ Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 106.

¹ Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, July 4, cited by Mr. Sparks; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 106; Stedman, ii. p. 244.—² Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 25; Stedman, ii. p. 244.—³ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 106.—⁴ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 372; Stedman, ii. p. 243.—⁵ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, 5 o'clock, June 22; Same to same, 10 p. m., June 22; Lieut. Mathew's Narrative.

ress after he had left Elizabethtown,¹ and Major Henry Lee and Colonel Dayton, with small parties of Regulars, had been thrown out to check his advance.² As he approached Springfield, his right wing, about two thousand five hundred men, made a detour, by the Vauxhall road, in order to turn the left flank of the American forces, and, if possible, to gain their rear; while the left wing, of the same strength, continued its march towards the village by way of the main road.³

At that time the Short Hills, in the rear of the village, were occupied by the brigades of Generals Stark and Maxwell, with the local militia on either flank; while Colonel Angell's Rhode Island regiment and several small detachments, numbering altogether less than two hundred men,⁴ with a field-piece, were posted to secure the bridge over which the main road from Elizabethtown to Morristown crossed the creek, on the front, or southeastern entrance to the village; Colonel Shrieve's New Jersey regiment protected the bridge over which the same road crossed the creek, in the rear, or northwestern entrance; and Major Henry Lee, with the dragoons of his Legion, and Captain Walker, with a strong picket, supported by Colonel Ogden, defended

"Little's Bridge," over which the Vauxhall road crossed another branch of the Rahway River, a short distance northeast from the village—the whole being under the command of General Greene.¹

The enemy's plan of attack appears to have intended the left wing, on the main road, to be employed as a mask, in order to amuse the right of the Americans, until their left, at Little's Bridge, could be overcome, their flank turned, and their rear gained.² In this manner—so successfully carried out on Long Island,³ at the forts in the Highlands,⁴ and at Savannah⁵—an easy victory, and a glorious retaliation for the former "precipitate retreat," from the same ground, were expected.⁶ It is not for man to command success, however, even for his best laid plans; and a commander of a different grade of intellect, and troops whose energies had not been destroyed by internal feuds, now stood between the enemy and success.

Major Lee, whose laurels, gained at Paulus Hook, were yet green—and those who supported him, disputed the passage of the bridge with great obstinacy, inflicting "very considerable injury" on the assailants, compelling them to wade the stream;⁷ "when, as they occupied a hill which approached his left and com-

¹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, 6 o'clock, June 23; Same to Same, 11 o'clock, June 23.—² Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 23; Same to same, June 24; Johnson's Greene, i. pp. 191, 192.—³ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 23; Same to same, June 24; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 46.—⁴ Gordon's Hist. of N. J., p. 307; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 106; Johnson's Greene, i. p. 192.

¹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Map of the action, in Barber and Howe's Hist. Coll. of N. J., p. 194; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. pp. 372, 373; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 192.—² Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, 11 A. M., June 23.—³ Vide Chap. XI.—⁴ Vide Chap. XXVIII.—⁵ Vide Chap. XLVI.—⁶ Stedman, ii. p. 242.

⁷ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373.

manded his position, he gave up the pass," at the bridge where he was posted,¹ and slowly retired towards the main body.²

Perceiving that his right wing had secured the pass at the bridge, on the Vauxhall road, and, evidently expecting a movement in his favor on the left of the American position, the enemy's left began the attack on Colonel Angell at the bridge in front of the village.³ With that steady bravery which the Rhode Island line generally displayed, the Colonel disputed the passage, notwithstanding the artillery of the enemy was greatly superior to his own,⁴ for forty minutes, when he fell back, passing through the village, and taking post with Colonel Shrieve behind the second bridge, in the rear of it.⁵ Here, also, a warm reception awaited him,—the just indignation of the Jersey troops being about to show itself,—but the greatly superior force of the enemy induced the General, after a few minutes, to order the troops to fall back and join the main body on the Hills.⁶

At this time the front of the American

position was considerably extended; and the right wing of the enemy was pressing forward, up the Vauxhall road, to gain its rear, notwithstanding the opposition of Major Lee, Captain Walker, and Colonel Ogden.¹ The small force under his command, it was evident, was insufficient to enable General Greene to maintain his entire line, as it was then disposed; and he prudently fell back to another range of hills, where the several roads more nearly approached each other, and the passes were not so widely separated.² Besides the advantages which this new position afforded from the superior character of the ground, by the concentration of his line it was so far strengthened that he could safely detach a portion of his force to support the troops who were contesting the enemy's advance on the Vauxhall road.³ Accordingly Colonel Jackson's Massachusetts regiment and Colonel Webb's Connecticut regiment, with a field-piece, were sent down the Vauxhall road to strengthen Major Lee's party, and the enemy advanced no farther.⁴

Perceiving the readiness with which General Greene invited him to attack the new position which the Americans had occupied,⁵ and considering "the opposition made at Springfield as an indication that every mile of his future march, through a country naturally dif-

¹ Barber and Howe (*Hist. Coll. of N. J.*, p. 194) strangely suppose this "pass" refers to "the first bridge," by which was known that where Col. Angell was stationed.

² Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373; Johnson's Greene, i. p. 192.

³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Howe, June 25; Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373.—⁴ The enemy's left column had seven pieces of artillery (*Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington*, 11 A. M., June 23), while Col. Angell had but one (*same to same*, June 24).

⁵ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Lord Sterling to same, June 23; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 106; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 192.

⁶ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373.

¹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Hist. of Civ'l War, iii. p. 106.—² Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington June 24; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 182; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373; Stedman, ii. p. 243.—³ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Ibid.; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373.

ficult, and abounding with strong passes, would be no less obstinately disputed,"¹ and that the "enterprise, even if it should be successful, might cost him too much," the enemy "abandoned" it,² and made no attempt to dislodge the Americans. After setting fire to almost every house in the village,³ a second retreat was ordered, and, with a degree of haste which added nothing to "the credit of the British arms,"—about which so nervous an anxiety had been manifested,—he returned to Elizabethtown,⁴ closely pursued by Captain Davis and a small party of Regulars, and by the militia of the country, who, from every wall and tree on his route, on his flanks and in his rear, rose up in judgment against him, and demanded satisfaction.⁵ He reached Elizabethtown the same evening,⁶ and, without seeking any thing but safety, he occupied an old redoubt to cover his embarkation,⁷ and passed over to Staten Island before morning,⁸ leaving to his numerous killed, wounded, and deserters, the guardianship of his honor in East New Jersey.

The heavy loss which he sustained in this enterprise has been concealed, as

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 244.—² *Ibid.*—³ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Lord Stirling to same, June 23.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 25; Same to Gen. Howe, June 25; Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 107.

⁵ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, June 24; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 182; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 391, N. Y., June 28, 1780; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 107; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 374.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 25.—⁷ Stedman, ii. p. 243.

⁸ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 25; Same to Gen. Howe, June 25; Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, July 4, cited by Mr. Sparks; Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, 7 a. m., June 24; Lieut. Mathew's Narrative.

much as possible, by the enemy, the greater part of his authorities making no reference whatever to the subject.

He burned nearly fifty dwellings—leaving only four standing—and this appears to have been the only effect of the enterprise.¹

The loss of the Americans, exclusive of that in Captain Davis's detachment, was one officer, and twelve non-commissioned officers and privates, *killed*; five officers, and fifty-six privates (including militia), *wounded*; and nine privates, *missing*.²

When it is borne in mind that the enemy's force numbered upwards of five thousand infantry, and a large body of cavalry, with several field-pieces;³ and that General Greene had less than a thousand Continental troops,⁴ besides the inexperienced militia of the country, it will be seen that this was one of the most successful defences which the War of the Revolution produced.⁵ Nor is the honor of this success alone due to General Greene and the Continentals under his command. To General Dickinson of New Jersey,⁶—one of the mer-

¹ Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 373; Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 107; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 182. Lieut. Mathew, in his "*Narrative*," says: "The burning of Springfield was against the positive orders of the commanding officers; but they found it impossible to keep the soldiers from setting fire to the houses." As the Lieut. was an Aid to Gen. Mathew, one of the British officers, his statement is entitled to respect.

² Returns appended to Gen. Greene's letter to Gen. Washington, June 24.

³ Gordon's Hist. of N. J., p. 307; Murray's Notes on Elizabethtown, p. 97.

⁴ Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 107; Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. p. 371.—⁵ Hist. of Civil War, iii. p. 107.

⁶ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 25.

itorious dead, whose memory has been unnoticed by the State whom he served, and whose existence, even, is unknown to the mass of her citizens,—and to the militia of that State,¹ whose energy alone expelled him when he first visited

it, and whose indignant opposition filled him with alarm when he renewed the attempt, no small share of the honor is due. To both, and to all alike, the need of praise belongs.

CHAPTER LXVI.

July 12, 1780.

THE AFFAIR AT WILLIAMSON'S PLANTATION, S. C.²

THE activity of Colonel William Bratton and Captain John McClure in arousing the dormant energies of the South Carolinians, after the surrender of Charleston, and their successful attacks on the Tories at the Old Field and Mobley's meeting-house, had attracted the attention of the enemy, and induced him to take measures for their punishment.³

Accordingly, early in July, Lieutenant-colonel Trumbull of the British Legion, who was stationed at Rocky Mount, in Chester District, detached Captain Christian Houk⁴ with thirty

or forty dragoons, twenty mounted infantry of the New York Volunteers, and about sixty "militia"¹ (Tories), with orders to "collect all the royal militia" on his march, and to "push the rebels as far as he deemed convenient."²

In pursuance of these orders, it is said, the Captain succeeded in assembling about four hundred men,³ and, at the head of this force, on the eleventh of July, he visited, successively, the residences of the two officers who were the especial objects of his expedition.⁴ At Mrs. McClure's he found her son, James, and her son-in-law, Edward Martin, engaged in casting bullets from the

¹ Gen. Washington to Pres. of Cong., June 25; Gordon's N. J., p. 307; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii p. 183.

² Mr. Simms (*Hist. of S. C.*, p. 170) calls this "Williams' Plantation."—³ Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of the Rev., p. 189; Johnson's Traditions of the Rev., pp. 335, 336, 340, 341.—⁴ Dr. Johnson (*Traditions*, p. 336) gives a copy of the Captain's instructions, wherein his name is thus spelled; and Mrs. Ellet (*Women of the Rev.*, i. p. 240) gives a copy of the same paper, wherein the name is spelled *Huyck*. I have followed the spelling of the former authority.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 83; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 93; Letter from Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, July 15, 1780.—² Col. Trumbull's orders to Capt. Honk.

³ Johnson's Traditions, pp. 336, 341; Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., iii. p. 179.—⁴ Johnson's Traditions, pp. 336, 341, 342; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., pp. 190, 192.

old lady's pewter dishes; and, after plundering the house and premises, he departed, taking the two young men with him, as prisoners, to be hanged on the following day.¹ He then proceeded to the residence of Colonel Bratton, and after committing similar outrages there,² he repaired to the plantation of James Williamson, senior,—the next adjoining to Colonel Bratton's,—where he quartered for the night, the officers in the house, the men in the immediate vicinity.³

In the mean time information of this expedition had reached the camp of General Sumter, where Colonel Bratton and Captain McClure then were;⁴ and, soon afterwards, on the arrival of Mary McClure, who had been sent as a messenger, by her mother, the reports were confirmed.⁵

Measures were immediately taken to prevent the Captain from returning to his quarters without punishment; and, late in the day, Colonel Bratton and Captain McClure left the camp, at the head of one hundred and twenty-five volunteers, for the scene of the outrages.⁶ Fifty of the party dropped off in the course of the march, leaving only sev-

enty-five effective men,¹ with whom they reached the vicinity of Houk's encampment before daybreak, and concealed themselves in a neighboring swamp.²

Colonel Bratton immediately reconnoitered the position of the enemy—his thorough knowledge of the ground affording him unusual advantages—and formed his plan of attack.³ Posting a trusty follower opposite each of the enemy's sentries, with strict orders to make no movement until after the first gun had been discharged,⁴ he took one half of the force to the eastern end of the road, above the enemy's position, while the other half, under Captain McClure, moved below it, each occupying the road which passed in front of it. At the appointed time each of the two parties moved along the road towards Mr. Williamson's house, and both were in the midst of the enemy's camp before the alarm was given.⁵ Separating the enemy's troops from their horses, and attacking them vigorously while they were yet in confusion, an easy conquest ensued, notwithstanding the efforts of their officers, who attempted to rally the discomfited party.⁶ Being armed

¹ Johnson's Traditions, p. 342; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist., p. 190; Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., iii. pp. 179-182.—² Johnson's Traditions, pp. 336, 337; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist., p. 192; Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., i. pp. 241, 242.—³ Johnson's Traditions, p. 336; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 192. This spot is now known as *Brattonsville*.—⁴ Johnson's Traditions, p. 341; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist., p. 191.—⁵ Johnson's Traditions, p. 342; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist., p. 191; Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., iii. p. 182.

* Johnson's Traditions, pp. 337, 342; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist., p. 191.

¹ Johnson's Traditions, pp. 337, 342. Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 162) and Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 389) say there were *one hundred and thirty-three*.

² Johnson's Traditions, pp. 337, 342.—³ Ibid., p. 337. Mrs. Ellet (*Domestic Hist.*, p. 192) says the disposition of the enemy was ascertained from Mr. Adair.

⁴ Johnson's Traditions, p. 337.—⁵ Ibid., pp. 337, 342, 343; Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., iii. p. 184; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 135; Gordon, iii. p. 389.

⁶ Johnson's Traditions, pp. 337, 343; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist., p. 193; Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., iii. p. 184; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 135; Gordon, iii. p. 389.

only with sabres and pistols, and unable to reach their horses, the enemy's troops fought on very disadvantageous terms, where muskets and rifles were brought against them,¹ and but one of the Whigs—a man named Campbell—was killed;² while of the enemy, Captain Honk, Colonel Ferguson, and "the greater part" of their men were killed or wounded.³ The remainder fled in every direction, pursued by Captain McClure and his men, and were taken prisoners, or laid among the bushes, concealed, until opportunities were afforded for them to return to Rocky Monnt.⁴

In this action—the first check which the enemy's *regular* troops had received from the undisciplined militia of South Carolina since the fall of Charleston,¹—the people of the vicinity in which it was fought were largely represented. Two brothers named Ross, two named Hanna, two named Adair,² three named Gill, three named Rainey, four named Moore, five named Williamson,—sons of the planter whose premises afforded quarters to the invader—and three named Bratton, all belonging to the neighborhood, participated.³ They fought, in reality, for "their altars and their fires,"—and they fought gallantly,—"arresting the predatory warfare of the Tories, reanimating the drooping spirits of the people, and inspiring them with new life and lively hopes."⁴

¹ Johnson's Traditions, pp. 337, 338, 343.—² Ibid., p. 338.

² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 135; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 93. Gen. Lord Cornwallis (*Letter to Sir Henry Clinton, July 15, 1780*) says "only twelve of the legion, and as many of the militia, escaped."

⁴ Johnson's Traditions, p. 343; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist., p. 193; Women of Rev., iii. pp. 185, 270; Lee's Mem., p. 83.

¹ Johnson's Traditions, p. 338; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 163.—² One of these was, subsequently, the well-known G:n. John Adair.—³ Johnson's Traditions, p. 338.—⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER LXVII.

July 30, 1780.¹

THE ATTACK ON ROCKY MOUNT, S. C.

In a former chapter reference has been made to the detachment of a portion of the enemy's forces in South Carolina to Rocky Mount; and to the defeat which had been sustained by Captain Houk, who commanded a party which had been sent out from that post to suppress the rising spirit of rebellion which prevailed in the vicinity of the Catawba.²

The success which had attended the movement of Colonel Bratton had so far encouraged the people, that the little party under General Sumter had been increased to near six hundred men, commanded by Colonels Lacy, Erwine, and Neale;³ and it was determined, by striking at the head-quarters from whence this and other similar parties had been detached, to rid that part of the State of the presence of the enemy.

Accordingly, after arranging with Major Davie, who was then encamped

near the Waxhaws, to move, with his command, towards the Hanging Rock,¹—another British post, twelve miles from the Rocky Mount,²—and hold that garrison in check;³ General Sumter moved, on the twenty-ninth of July,⁴ against Rocky Mount. He crossed the Catawba River at Land's Ford,⁵ at sunset of that day; and, after marching all night, approached that work at sunrise the next morning.⁶

Rocky Mount, in Chester District, South Carolina,—the position which General Sumter was about to attack,—is a high hill on the western bank of the Catawba River, thirty miles northwest from Camden. At the period of the Revolution its summit was encircled

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 88. Maj. Gardon (*Anecdotes Am. Rev.*, i. p. 38) says Maj. Davie was at Rocky Mount, but this, evidently, is an error.—² Lee's Mem., p. 88; Lossing's *Field Book*, ii. p. 660.

³ Lee's Mem., p. 88. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 660) says Maj. Davie was to attack the outposts of the camp at Hanging Rock, which, if so, he failed to perform.

⁴ As the attack was made on the 30th July, as before shown, this movement must have been on the 29th, as here stated, notwithstanding Mrs. Ellet's and Mr. Lossing's statements appear to indicate the former date.

⁵ Mrs. Ellet's *Domestic Hist. of Rev.*, p. 195. Col. Tarleton (*Southern Campaigns*, p. 94) says he crossed the "Broad River, at Blair's Ferry," which is evidently an error. Mr. Lossing says he crossed the Catawba at Blair's Ford.—⁶ Mrs. Ellet's *Domestic Hist. of Rev.*, p. 195.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 428; Ramsay's *Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 136; Moultrie's *Mem.*, ii. p. 219; Stedman, ii. p. 201. Mrs. Ellet (*Domestic Hist. of Rev.*, p. 195, and *Women of Rev.*, iii. p. 165), Maj. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 88), and Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 659) assign a different date—July 31.

² Vide Chap. LXVI.—³ Ramsay's *Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 163; Ramsay's *Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 136; Moultrie's *Mem.*, ii. p. 219; Lee's *Mem.*, p. 88.

by an open wood, a ditch, and an abatis, within which had been erected a redoubt and two houses, of logs, the sides of which were perforated with loop-holes for the purpose of enabling the garrison to protect itself, with small-arms, against any assailant.¹ It was garrisoned by a party of New York Volunteers, one hundred and fifty in number, with a detachment from the South Carolina Loyalists; and it was commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Turnbull of the former corps.²

Intelligence of the approach of General Sumter had been conveyed to the enemy by the Tories on his route,³ and when the former came before the works the latter was fully prepared to receive him.⁴ With all the impetuosity which characterized the movements of this gallant officer, wherever he went, the Americans approached the works; and three several times they were repulsed,⁵ notwithstanding the forlorn hope, the last time, penetrated within the abatis.⁶ Having no artillery, they could make no impression on the covered log-works

of the enemy; and were compelled to content themselves, after their attempts to pass the ditch and abatis had been defeated, with firing from behind the trees and rocks in the vicinity, and picking off those of the enemy who showed themselves through the loop-holes or crevices between the logs.¹ It is said that General Sumter offered four thousand dollars to any one who would fire the abatis;² that strenuous efforts were made to effect it, by means of brush and straw, without effect; and that a shower of rain falling while the troops were thus engaged, finally put an end to the attempt.³

About the close of the day, all hope of success having vanished, General Sumter withdrew his troops, without any opposition from the garrison, and retired to the position, on the east side the Catawba, which he had abandoned on the preceding day.⁴

The loss of the Americans, in this expedition, was Colonel Neale and about thirteen men, killed and wounded;⁵ that of the garrison, was two officers and about ten men killed and wounded.⁶

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 88, 89; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 94. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 660) supposes the log works "were near the bottom of the slope," where Gen. Sumter could completely command them.

² Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 94; Stedman, ii. p. 201; Lee's Mem., p. 88.—³ Lossing's *Field Book*, ii. p. 660.

⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 89.—⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 201; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 94; Lee's Mem., p. 89.

⁶ Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 94; Lossing's *Field Book*, ii. p. 660.

¹ Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 94; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 163; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. Rev., p. 195; Lee's Mem., p. 89.—² Narrative of Rev. Samuel McCreary, cited by Mrs. Ellet.—³ Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. Rev., p. 196; Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., iii. pp. 167, 168.

⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 89; Stedman, ii. pp. 201, 202; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. Rev., p. 196.—⁵ Lossing's *Field Book*, ii. p. 660.—⁶ Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 94; Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clint. n. Aug. 6, 1780.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

AUGUST 1, 1780.¹

THE AFFAIR AT THE GREEN SPRING, S. C.²

THE determined opposition of a few restless and determined men caused great trouble in the enemy's councils, not merely from their constant movements against the outposts of the army, but from the check which they continually held over the Tories in nearly every part of the Carolinas and Georgia. To counteract these movements, and, if possible, to punish the offenders, Major Ferguson³ was dispatched to the back country; and, at the period of which we write, probably, supposing he was beyond all danger, he was engaged in recruiting, among the Tories, for the cavalry.⁴

About the same time Colonel Elijah Clark, of Wilkes county, Georgia,—one of the most resolute of the noble band of unchronicled Revolutionary heroes,—passed through the neighborhood, and determined to beat up the enemy's quarters. A reconnaissance, however, appears to have changed his purpose, and he contented himself with attacking an outpost, after which he retired,

through by-paths, and bivonacked near the Green Spring in Spartanburg District, South Carolina—stopping, on his way, at the house of Captain Dillard, one of his officers, and partaking, without dismounting, of some milk and potatoes.¹ The horses were not unsaddled, and the men slept on their arms, while videttes and patrols on the several roads insured the safety of the party.

About half an hour before break of day, a woman, riding at full speed, came to one of the videttes, and demanded an immediate interview with Colonel Clark. She was accordingly conducted to him, and recognized as Mrs. Dillard—who had furnished the humble repast on the preceding day—when she told him “to be in readiness either to fight or fly, as the enemy was on his way to attack him, and was very strong.” It appears that Major Ferguson had pursued Colonel Clark with a force of about five hundred men; that they had called at Captain Dillard’s house to obtain information of Colonel Clark’s movements, and to procure supper for the officers; that while they were at

¹ Wheeler's Hist. N. C., ii. p. 99.—² This is sometimes called Cedar Spring.—³ Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 99. Mills (*Statis. of S. C.*, p. 738) says he was a Colonel.

⁴ See also Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 219; Mills' *Statis. of S. C.*, p. 738.

¹ See also Mrs. Ellet's Women of the Rev., i. p. 292; Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 219.

the table, a spy came in with the information that the Americans were to encamp, for the night, at the Green Spring; and that orders were immediately given to march in that direction. The anxious matron, whose husband was among the party whom Ferguson had doomed to destruction, immediately slipped out of the house, bridled a colt, and, without a saddle, galloped off to apprise Colonel Clark of his danger, and succeeded in saving the party.¹

Every man was immediately aroused and in his saddle; and, a few minutes afterwards, when Captain Dunlap—who had been sent forward by Major Ferguson—dashed into the camp, at the head of sixty dragoons and one hundred and fifty mounted riflemen, he was met, and resisted with the greatest gallantry, much to his own disappointment. The darkness of the morning was a serious obstacle to both parties, yet they appear to have fought desperately for fifteen or twenty minutes, when the enemy gave way. After pursuing the fugitives about a mile, Colonel Clark returned to the scene of action, collected his wounded, and proceeded on his way towards North Carolina. Captain Dunlap, while retreating, met Major Ferguson, with the main body, about two miles from the battle-ground; and, after having united their commands,

they moved forward, but reached the camp only after Colonel Clark and his command were beyond their reach.²

In this affair it will be seen that Captain Dunlap commanded about two hundred and ten men, while Colonel Clark's entire force, including eighteen reenlists enlisted the day before, was only one hundred and eighty-six.³ The former left twenty-eight of his dragoons dead on the field, besides the wounded, and the riflemen, of whose loss no record has been left. The latter lost four killed and twenty-three wounded,—among the former was Major Smith, among the latter were Colonels Clark and Robertson, Captain Clark, and several other officers.⁴

It appears that the movements of the enemy were seen by other persons, and that they, too, sent or carried intelligence to Colonel Clark—among whom Mrs. Thomas was conspicuous. It appears to be generally admitted, however, that Mrs. Dillard was earliest at the camp, and that to her efforts the party was indebted for its safety. All alike labored for success, and deserved it, she alone secured it.⁴

¹ See also Mrs. Ellet's Women of Rev., i. p. 294; Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 220; Mills' *Statis. of S. C.*, pp. 738, 739.—² Mr. Mills (*Statis. of S. C.*, p. 738) says the force under Col. Clark numbered 198 men.

³ Mills' *Statis. of S. C.*, pp. 738, 739.—⁴ Ibid., p. 739.

[This chapter is based on the "Notes" of Col. Samuel Hammond, one of Col. Clark's party, which have been preserved by Dr. Joseph Johnson in his "*Traditions and Reminiscences of the American Revolution;*" and in all cases, except where exclusive credit or confirmatory evidence is given to other authorities, these "Notes" are my only authority.]

¹ See also Mrs. Ellet's Women of the Rev., i. pp. 292, 293; Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 219; Mills' *Statis. of S. C.*, p. 738. Col. Wheeler (*Hist. of N. C.*, ii. p. 9), supposes Col. Isaac Shelby commanded; but no other authority, within my reach, mentions his name in any matter connected with this affair.

CHAPTER LXIX.

August 6, 1780.¹

THE BATTLE OF THE HANGING ROCK.

THE attack on the enemy's post at the Rocky Mount, and the repulse of General Sumter, has been noticed in a preceding chapter.² After this gallant officer had returned to his camp he became convinced that constant employment was necessary, not only for the preservation of his command, but to restore confidence among the people;³ and he, accordingly, resolved to unite his force with Major Davie's, for the purpose of attacking the enemy's post at the Hanging Rock. The two parties met at Land's Ford, on the Catawba, on the fifth of August; and a council of the officers having been held, the proposition of General Sumter was agreed to, and afterwards approved by the men.⁴ Early in the evening the troops moved from their po-

sition, and, about midnight, they halted within two miles of the enemy.

General Sumter's force consisted of a detachment of North Carolina troops, about five hundred in number, under Colonel Irwin and Major Davie; and one of South Carolina troops, about three hundred in number, under Colonels Laceey and Hill; that of the enemy was composed of the infantry of the British Legion, one hundred and sixty in number, under Captain McCulloch;¹ Colonel Morgan Bryan's regiment of North Carolina Tories; and a detachment of Colonel Montfort Brown's regiment of Prince of Wales' Loyal American Volunteers, two hundred and seventy-eight in number, under Major Carden,² who commanded the post.³

The main body of the enemy was encamped on the high rolling plain, at Cole's Old Field, on the western bank of Hanging Rock Creek,⁴ twelve miles from Rocky Mount, in Lancaster district, South Carolina; while the North Carolinians, under Colonel Bryan, occu-

¹ Maj. Davie's Narrative; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 94; Lee's Mem., p. 89. Mrs. Ellet (*Domestic Hist. Rev.*, p. 196) and Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 428) say it occurred on the seventh of August; and Mills (*Statis. of S. C.*, p. 601), on the twenty-seventh of that month.

² Vide Chap. LXVIII.—³ See also Ramsay's *Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 163.

⁴ Throughout the entire war, especially in the partisan corps and the militia, the commandants of companies and regiments were the *representatives of their privates*, as well as their commandants; and they generally consulted the latter before they consented to any proposed movement or measure.

¹ See also Tarleton, pp. 92, 94, 95.—² See also Onderdonk's Queen's Co., pp. 142, 143, 247; Stedman, ii. pp. 202, 203.—³ Stedman (ii. p. 203) says he resigned the command to Capt. Roussel, of the Legion, "*in the heat of action.*"—⁴ Lossing's *Field Book*, ii. pp. 661, 662.

pied a post on its left flank, half a mile from the main body,¹ and separated from it by a narrow piece of woods.

It was determined that the Americans should advance, in their divisions, against the enemy's centre, dismount, and each division, on foot, attack the position assigned to it; and, about day-break, they moved forward. Major Davie commanded the right column, which was composed of his own corps of forty mounted riflemen and the same number of dragoons, a detachment under Major Bryan, and some independent companies of South Carolina troops; the centre was composed of the Mecklenburg (N. C.) militia, under Colonel Irwin;² and the left, of South Carolina troops under Colonel Hill. As the column approached the enemy it diverged from the line of march,—with the intention of returning to it, under cover of a defile near the camp,—for the purpose of avoiding his pickets and patrols; but, through the errors of the guides it was misled,³ and the whole of the assailants fell on the encampment of the North Carolinians, under Colonel Bryan, on the left of the enemy's line.⁴ After a feeble resistance⁵ the latter gave way, and fell back, with a severe loss of men, on the encampment of the

infantry of the Legion, who occupied the centre of the line.¹ The impetuosity of the assailants was here, temporarily, checked by the detachment from the Legion, which had taken a position behind a fence, and opened a deadly fire on the Americans as they approached, following up their transient success with two successive charges with the bayonet,² in both of which they were repulsed, and, in the last, compelled to abandon their position, leaving their encampment in the hands of the Americans.

In the mean time the regiment of "The Prince of Wales' Loyal American Volunteers," who occupied the extreme right of the enemy's line, by a bold and skilful manœuvre, and by a circuitous route, moved towards the left of the line, and occupied the wood which separated the encampment of the North Carolinians from that of the infantry of the Legion, from whence it opened a heavy fire on the flank of the Americans who were then engaged with the latter body. A part of the Americans immediately took shelter behind the trees, and opened so deadly a fire on them, that in a short time those who survived, threw down their arms and surrendered.

A great portion of the American troops immediately engaged in plundering the enemy's camp, and, in a short time, the greatest disorder prevailed. The Commissary's stores were

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. pp. 661, 662.—² Mrs. Ellet (*Domestic Hist. of Rev.*, p. 196) says this column was led by the intrepid Captain John McClure, one of the heroes of Williamson's Plantation, who was killed in the attack.

³ See also Lee's Mem., p. 89; Lossing, ii. p. 662.

⁴ See also Tarleton, p. 94; Lee's Mem., p. 89; Stedman, ii. p. 202.—⁵ See also Tarleton, p. 95; Stedman, ii. p. 202.

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¹ See also Tarleton, p. 95; Lee's Mem., p. 89; Stedman, ii. p. 202.—² Tarleton, p. 95; Stedman, ii. p. 202.

ransacked; those who, a few minutes before, had been engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with the enemy, now wholly disregarded all authority; and, on many of them, the evidence of their guilt was stamped on their stupid and besotted countenances.¹ The enemy, perceiving this state of affairs, was encouraged in the belief that he could regain the fortunes of the day; and, while one party threw itself into a hollow square, in the vicinity of the centre, another, and a larger body, rallied and formed near the wood, already alluded to. The latter were immediately charged, and put to flight, by Major Davie's dragoons; but against the square, supported as it was by two pieces of artillery, the two hundred men, and Major Davie's dragoons—all whom General Sumter could rally for that purpose—could make no impression.

A small party of the Legion cavalry, under Captains Stewart and McDonald,² about the same time appeared on the Camden road; and, although they were charged by Major Davie, and driven back into the woods, the situation of the Americans was becoming more critical every moment. The most strenuous efforts of the officers to preserve order were unavailing, and the greatest excesses prevailed. An immediate retreat was the only alternative, and measures were adopted to secure the troops while making that movement.

¹ See also Lee's Mem., p. 90; Garden's Anecdotes of Rev., i. pp. 33, 38, 39; Lossing, ii. p. 663.

² Tarleton, p. 95; Stedman, ii. p. 202.

Those who were able to bear the burden, were loaded with the plunder, and, soon afterwards,—about one o'clock in the afternoon,—the line of march was taken up, Major Davie covering the retreat, while the fragments of the enemy's force looked on without making any attempt to molest them.¹

In this engagement,—which continued nearly four hours,²—the forces of both parties were about equal in number, although the two field-pieces which were in possession of the enemy gave him a decided advantage. The loss of the Americans, in consequence of the inattention to the making up of returns by the militia, has not been recorded;³ that of the enemy was very severe. Of the North Carolinians, Lieutenant Brown and "not less than seventy men were killed or wounded;"⁴ of the Legion, sixty-two were killed or wounded;⁵ of the Prince of Wales' Loyal American Volunteers, *only nine escaped*⁶—two hundred and sixty-nine being either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners.

It is said that when the American troops attacked the camp, they had only ten rounds of ammunition per man; and that the latter part of the action was fought with cartridges which

¹ See also Lee's Mem., p. 90.—² See also Lossing, ii. p. 663.—³ Tarleton (p. 95) says they left "about one hundred dead and wounded on the field of battle;" while Gen. Davie says the wounded were removed to Charlotte, N. C.—⁴ Lieut. Roderick McKenzie's Strictures on Tarleton, p. 26.—⁵ Maj. Davie's Narrative. Tarleton (p. 95) says three officers and twenty men were killed, and "*upwards of thirty wounded.*"—⁶ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 163; Onderdonk's Queen's Co., p. 247.

were taken from the enemy's supplies.¹

This was one of the most obstinately contested battles of the war; and when it is recollect that it was purely a struggle between the Whigs and the Tories of America—not a single regular

soldier being present—it is not less remarkable.¹

[This chapter is based on the Narrative of Major (afterwards General) William R. Davie, as cited by Col. Wheeler; and in all cases, except where exclusive credit or confirmatory evidence is given to other authorities, this is my only authority.]

CHAPTER LXX.

August 15, 1780.

THE AFFAIR AT THE FORD OF THE WATREEE, S. C.²

THE approach of General Gates, with the respectable force under his command, had rendered it necessary for the enemy to concentrate his forces, and to strengthen his positions.³ Accordingly, Camden, in South Carolina, was selected as the head-quarters of the army; and to that place the smaller garrisons repaired, and stores of all kinds were carried there to meet the several requirements of the greatly increased force which quartered there.⁴

While the enemy was thus drawing together his forces, General Gates received information from General Sumter,⁵ who was on the western bank of the Wateree, that a strong detachment

of the enemy was on its way from Fort Ninety-six, bringing with it a quantity of stores; and that if he could be supplied with artillery to secure a redoubt, which covered the ferry over which this detachment was to pass the Wateree, he would be enabled to intercept it.² Although General Gates was very near the main body of the enemy,³ he immediately detached a company of artillery, with two field-pieces, one hundred infantry from the Maryland line, and

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 428; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 137; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 219. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 663) says, "They had not two rounds each."

² This is sometimes called the Wateree *Ferry*. As this pass was only one mile from Camden, Mr. Lossing errs when he says (*Field Book*, ii. p. 660) it is in Fairfield District.—³ Lee's Mem., pp. 90, 91; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 145.—⁴ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20, 1780.

⁵ Lee's Mem., p. 91; Gordon, iii. p. 433.

¹ I am aware that in this conclusion I differ from many who have preceded me. Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 170), Col. Wheeler (*Hist. N. C.*, ii. pp. 192, 193), Mrs. Ellet (*Domestic Hist. Rev.*, p. 198), Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 429), Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 136), Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 662), all refer to "regulars" whom they have supposed were present. Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 163), and Gen. Moultrie (*Mem.*, ii. p. 219), make no reference to "regulars"; and, as *none of the troops referred to were "regulars"*—"The Prince of Wales' Loyal American Volunteers" being a body of Tories, many of them from New England; Col. Bryan's, a similar body from North Carolina; and the Legion, a similar body, in every respect, I have not assumed that any others, besides those referred to, were present.

² Lee's Mem., p. 91.—³ Ibid.

three hundred men from the North Carolina militia, the whole under Lieutenant-colonel Woolford, to strengthen General Sumter.¹

With this powerful reinforcement General Sumter immediately moved along the western bank of the Wateree, the enemy's guards, from Elkin's Ford to Whitear's Ferry, five miles below Camden, retiring before him, crossing the river, and joining the main body at the latter place.² The redoubt which covered the Wateree Ford was sur-

prised on the morning of the fifteenth of August, when seven of its garrison were killed and Colonel Cary and thirty prisoners were taken, together with thirty-eight wagons loaded with corn, rum, &c.; and during the same day the detachment of regulars from Fort Ninety-six, upwards of seventy in number, with six wagons loaded with clothing, a large quantity of baggage, &c., was added to the trophies of victory.¹

The troops under General Sumter appear to have sustained no loss.

D O C U M E N T .

GENERAL GATES' DISPATCH TO CONGRESS.

HILLSBOROUGH, August 20, 1780.

SIR:— * * * *

The 15th, at daylight, I reinforced Colonel Sumter with three hundred North Carolina militia, one hundred of the Maryland line, and two three-pounders from the artillery, having previously ordered him down to the Waxhaws, and directed, as soon as the reinforcements joined him, that he should proceed down the Wateree, opposite Camden, intercept any stores coming to the enemy, and particularly the troops from Ninety-six, who were likewise withdrawn from that post. This was well executed by Colonel Sumter, as his letter inclosed will show.

* * * *

I have the honor to be, &c.,
HORATIO GATES.

(INCLOSURE.)

WATREE FERRY, August 15, 1780.

DEAR GENERAL:—I have just time to inform you, that early this morning I took possession of all the passways over the Wateree River, from Elkin's Ford to Mr. Whitear's ferry, five

miles below Camden. The enemy had guards at many different places upon the river, all of which were evacuated last night or this morning, and the guards ordered into Camden, except those at Wateree Ferry, which were continued on both sides of the river, of which the guard upon the west side was surprised by a party of my men, who killed seven, and took about thirty prisoners, among whom was Colonel Cary, the commander, together with thirty-eight wagons, loaded with corn, rum, &c., also a number of horses. The boats are all upon the opposite side of the river: the ground upon this side is very bad. The enemy keep up a constant fire, but I have received no damage yet.

* * * * *

I am, dear General,

With the greatest respect, &c.,

THOMAS SUMTER.

His Excellency GENERAL GATES.

P. S.—I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that I have this instant made about seventy prisoners, all British, six wagons, baggage, &c., just from Ninety-six; many of the prisoners are sick.

¹ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20, 1780; Johnson's Greene, i. p. 206.

² Gen. Sumter to Gen. Gates, Aug. 15, 1780.

¹ Gen. Sumter to Gen. Gates, Aug. 15, 1780; Johnson's Greene, i. p. 299.

CHAPTER LXXI.

AUGUST 16, 1780.

THE BATTLE OF CAMDEN.

THE Southern army, under General Gates, having taken a position near Clermont,¹ or, as it is sometimes called, Rugeley's Mills,² thirteen miles north from Camden,³ the several outposts of the enemy were called in, and his force concentrated at Camden.⁴ On the fifteenth of August, the energetic opposition of General Sumter drove over to Camden, or compelled to surrender to his force, the several guards which occupied the western bank of the Wateree;⁵ and General Gates endeavored to make a simultaneous movement on its eastern bank, in order to gain a position which would more perfectly command the enemy's position at Camden.⁶

The force under General Gates was composed chiefly of militia—those from Virginia, numbering eight hundred men, under General Stevens,⁷ and those from

North Carolina, numbering twenty-one hundred men, under General Caswell;¹ besides which he had Colonel Armand's Legion of Regulars, numbering about one hundred and twenty men;² the Maryland line and the Delaware regiment—the latter the well-known "Blue-hen's-chickens," whose gallantry on Long Island and at the White Plains has been already noticed—numbering about nine hundred men;³ about seventy volunteer cavalry;⁴ and three companies of Colonel Harrison's regiment of artillery, numbering about one hundred men;⁵ the whole numbering about four thousand one hundred men, exclusive of Colonel Sumter's command,⁶ of whom only three thousand and fifty-two were "present fit for duty."⁷ The enemy's force at Camden was composed of a detachment of the Royal artillery, numbering two officers and seventeen men; four light companies, numbering seven

¹ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 165; Gordon, iii. p. 433; Narrative of Col. O. H. Williams, Adj.-Gen.

² Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20, 1780; Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21.

³ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 665; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 145.—⁴ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20, 1780.—⁵ Gen. Sumter to Gen. Gates, Aug. 15, 1780.

⁶ Gordon's Am. Rev., iii. pp. 433, 434.

⁷ The troops originally sent with Gen. De Kalb were all regulars. They were afterwards joined by Col. Portersfield, with 100 Virginians (Gordon, iii. p. 430), and soon afterwards by Gen. Stevens, with 700 more (Gordon, iii. p. 433), making 800 in all.

¹ Deducting the strength of the several bodies of troops, as below, from 4103—the entire body of the American army, Aug. 15—it shows this result.

² Gordon, iii. p. 436. Maj. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 93) supposes it did not exceed *one hundred* in number.

³ Gordon, iii. p. 436; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 146.

⁴ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 166; Gordon, iii. p. 436.

⁵ Lee's Mem. of War in Southern Department, p. 84.

⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 436.—⁷ Narrative of Col. Otho H. Williams, Adj.-Gen.

officers and one hundred and forty-one men; three companies of the Twenty-third regiment (Welsh Fusileers), numbering ten officers and two hundred and eighty-two men; five companies of the Thirty-third regiment, numbering fifteen officers and two hundred and eighty-three men; five companies of the Seventy-first regiment, numbering seventeen officers and two hundred and thirty-seven men; the "Volunteers of Ireland," commanded by Lord Rawdon, numbering sixteen officers and two hundred and eighty-seven men; the "British Legion," commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, numbering eleven officers and one hundred and seventy-one men, cavalry, and eight officers and one hundred and eighteen men, infantry; the "Royal North Carolina regiment," numbering twenty officers and two hundred and forty-seven men; two officers and twenty-six men of the Pioneers; and of volunteer militia, fourteen officers and three hundred and eight men, forming, in the aggregate, a force of one hundred and twenty-two officers and two thousand one hundred and seventeen men,¹ commanded by General Lord Cornwallis, who had left Charleston for that purpose.²

The general officers of the American army, to whom General Gates had submitted his plan of operations, having acquiesced, without approving it,³ it was

determined to put the army in motion on the evening of the fifteenth of August, and to take a position behind Saunders' Creek, about seven miles from Camden;¹ and, by a singular coincidence, Lord Cornwallis had resolved to attack the American camp at an early hour the next morning²—each party, ignorant of the intended movement of his adversary, fixing upon ten o'clock in the evening as the hour when they would leave their respective quarters.³

At the appointed time—ten in the evening⁴—the armies marched, and approached Saunders' Creek—the Americans from the north, the British from the south. Of the former, Colonel Armand's Legion led the column, flanked on the right by Colonel Porterfield's Virginia light-infantry, and on the left by Major Armstrong's North Carolina light-infantry, each of which marched in Indian files, two hundred yards distant from the flanks of the Legion; after these, in regular succession, marched the regular troops, the North Carolina militia, the Virginia militia, and the rear guard and baggage, the volunteer cavalry flanking the latter. The strictest silence was enjoined upon the troops,

concl., the orders were no sooner promulgated than they became the subject of animadversion."—*Narrative of Col. Otho H. Williams, Adj.-Gen.*

¹ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20, 1780. Maj. Garden (*Anecdotes of Am. Rev.*, i. p. 346) says the position selected was "behind Granny Creek," but this is, evidently, an error, as he had already passed below Granny Creek, and was near Saunders' Creek, when the armies met.

² Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21, 1780.

³ Compare Gen. Gates' dispatch to Cong., Aug. 20, with Lord Cornwallis' dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Narrative of Col. Otho H. Williams, Adj.-Gen.*

¹ "Field return of the troops, Aug. 15, 1780," appended to Lord Cornwallis' dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21, 1780.—² Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Ramsay's *Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 166.

³ "Although there had been no dissenting voice in the

and orders were given to put to death, instantly, any "soldier who offered to fire without the command of his officer."¹ Of the British column, the right was composed of an advance guard of twenty cavalry and as many mounted infantry of the British Legion, supported by four companies of light-infantry, and followed by the Twenty-third and Thirty-third regiments, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Webster, of the latter regiment; the centre was composed of "The Volunteers of Ireland," the Legion infantry, Colonel Hamilton's "Royal North Carolina Regiment," and Colonel Bryan's volunteer militia, the whole commanded by Lord Rawdon; and the two battalions of the Seventy-first regiment formed the left, or reserve, after which a few wagons were taken, and the Legion cavalry, forming the rear guard, brought up the rear;² four pieces of cannon marched with the divisions, and two with the reserve. The same silence which had been imposed on the American column had been ordered in this, and thus the columns approached each other.³

When the right of the columns had reached a point about eight miles from Camden,⁴ at about half-past two in the morning,⁵ they met; and the British

Legion, cavalry, which formed the enemy's advance, charged the American Legion, cavalry, which, under Colonel Armand, formed the advance of the American column.¹ In conformity with the orders of General Gates,² the latter received the charge, and the flanking parties, under Colonel Porterfield and Major Armstrong, pouring in a destructive fire, the enemy fell back.³ The light companies in their rear coming up to support them, the cavalry renewed the attack, and succeeded in driving Colonel Armand back, in some confusion, upon the Maryland line, Colonel Porterfield being severely wounded.⁴

While the fortune of the field was thus alternating between the two "Legions," both the main bodies were preparing to form their lines of battle, in the darkness which enveloped the field, in which they were guided only by such imperfect information, respecting the ground and their adversaries, as the prisoners which had fallen into their hands, the guides, and the country people, could impart.⁵

The ground which the armies then occupied was very well adapted for purposes of war, although, as has been seen, neither of the parties had taken

¹ After-orders, "Camp at Rugeley's, 15th Aug., 1780;" Tarleton's Hist. of Campaigns of 1780-81, p. 104.

² Tarleton, p. 104.—³ This is evident, also, from the fact that the approach of the enemy was not known until he had charged the advance.—⁴ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20. Mr. Lessing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 666) says it is *seven*, and Gen. Cornwallis (*to Lord Geo. Germain*, Aug. 21) says it is *nine* miles from Camden.

⁵ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21, 1780; Johnson's Greene, i. p. 297.

¹ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20; Tarleton, p. 104.—² "The colonel (Armand) will, therefore, consider the orders to stand the attack of the enemy's cavalry, be their numbers what they may, as positive."—After-orders, "Camp at Rugeley's, 15th August, 1780."

³ Tarleton, p. 104.—⁴ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 167; Gordon, iii. p. 437; Narrative of Col. Otho H. Williams, Adj.-Gen.

⁵ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Tarleton, p. 105; Narrative of Col. Otho H. Williams, Adj.-Gen.

any part in its selection. It is a high ground, then, as now, covered, with an open forest of pines, situated about half a mile north of Saunders' Creek,—a limpid stream, about two hundred feet wide,—the site of General Gates' proposed encampment.¹ An impenetrable swamp protected either flank of both armies, beyond which, at some distance, the country is again passable.²

After a few pickets had been thrown out, to prevent surprise, both armies laid on their arms and awaited, patiently, the approach of day.³ At early dawn the commanders proceeded to form their respective lines, and to make arrangements for the battle.⁴ The Second Maryland brigade, under General Mordecai Gist, and the Delaware regiment,—the whole under the Baron De Kalb,—occupied the right of the American line,—the swamp, already referred to, securing his right flank; the North Carolina militia, under General Caswell, formed the centre; and the Virginia militia, under General Stevens, occupied the left,—a swamp securing this flank, also. The artillery, which had been divided among the brigades, along the line, was “placed in the centre of the front;”⁵ Armand’s Legion of cavalry covered the left flank, to oppose the enemy’s cavalry; and the First Mary-

land brigade, commanded by General William Smallwood, formed a reserve, at a proper distance in the rear.¹ The British line also extended from swamp to swamp,—the light-infantry occupying the extreme right, and, with the Twenty-third and Thirty-third regiments, forming the right wing under Lieutenant-colonel Webster; while the “Volunteers of Ireland,” the infantry of the British Legion, the “Royal North Carolina” regiment, and Colonel Bryan’s North Carolina volunteer militia, formed the left wing, under Lord Rawdon. Two six, and two three-pounders occupied the centre, under Lieutenant McLeod; the two battalions of the Seventy-first regiment, with two six-pounders, formed a second line; and the cavalry of the British Legion, in column—ready to move at a moment’s notice—was posted on the right of the centre, immediately in rear of the second line.²

It is said, that when the light became sufficient to enable General Gates to see the position of his enemy, he attempted to make some change in the disposition of the troops forming his left wing and centre, and that General Lord Cornwallis, taking advantage of this unusual movement, seized that moment to commence the action. At any time, and under all circumstances, a change in a

¹ Lossing’s Field Book, ii. p. 666; Tarleton, p. 105.

² Map of the action, in Tarleton’s Southern Campaigns; Serg. Lamb’s Jour. of Occur., p. 303.—³ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Tarleton, p. 105.

⁴ Ibid. Tarleton says (p. 106) that Gen. Gates formed his line of battle “before daybreak,” and Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 147) appears to confirm the statement.

⁵ Narrative of Col. O. H. Williams, Adj.-Gen.

¹ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20; Gordon, iii. p. 438; Ramsay’s Rev. in *S. C.*, ii. p. 147. Maj. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 94) says Armand’s corps ran away at the first attack, in the night, and “were still flying” when the line was formed in the morning, so that this portion of the order was not obeyed.

² Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Tarleton, pp. 105, 106; Gordon, iii. p. 439.

line of battle, in the face of the enemy, is a dangerous experiment; but when, as in this case, it involves a movement of undisciplined militia, in front of thoroughly disciplined troops, it invariably produces disorder and defeat; and at Camden, like causes produced a like result.¹

The experienced eye of Lord Cornwallis immediately perceived the advantage which General Gates was tendering to him, and he promptly seized the laurels which had been thrown at his feet. Dispatching an aid to Lord Rawdon, on the left of his line, with orders to advance, he *went in person* to his right wing, where Lieutenant-colonel Webster commanded, and ordered the veteran troops who composed it to charge the moving mass of militia in their front.² The command was promptly obeyed; and the light-infant-

ry, supported by the regulars, moved forward with spirit and charged the militia.¹ The legitimate consequence of such a combination of untoward circumstances immediately ensued, and, after a single, harmless fire, the militia, forming the centre and left wing of the American line, threw away their arms and sought safety in a shameful and precipitate retreat, which no authority could check, no entreaty overcome.² One regiment of the North Carolina troops, under Colonel Dixon, which formed the right of the centre, alone remained on the ground;³ and these, for a short time, with the right wing, under the veteran De Kalb, gallantly resisted every effort of Lord Rawdon, and maintained their ground.⁴ Indeed, it is said that Lieutenant-colonel John Eager Howard, at the head of a regiment of Marylanders, pressed the enemy so closely that even Lord Rawdon began to fall back.⁵ At this moment the enemy's right wing, under Lieutenant-colonel Webster,—having repulsed the militia, and dispatched the light troops and cavalry of the Legion in

Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Tarleton, pp. 106, 110; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 99; Stedman, ii. p. 209. Gen. Gates (*Letter to Pres. of Cong.*, Aug. 21) says the militia were advancing to attack the enemy's line. If this is so, the indiscretion of Gen. Gates was not less apparent. To move a body of *undisciplined* militia, who had only, *the preceding day*, received their bayonets for the first time, against the veteran regulars of the 23d and 33d regiments, while occupying their position in the line of battle, and in perfect order, was too unwise a movement to be countenanced, for a moment, by any *great* General; and quite as indiscreet, *per se*, as that which is condemned in the text. Whether Gen. Cornwallis or Gen. Gates is correct, therefore, the latter is equally censurable, and has *confessed* his own want of even the fundamental qualities which are necessary to form a great commander. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 167) says nothing of the American movement. In his *Revolution in S. C.* (ii. p. 148) he follows Gates' dispatch referred to above, and Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 439), and Maj. Lee (*Mem. of War*, p. 94) all appear to sustain him. Col. Otho H. Williams, Adj.-Gen., in his "*Narrative*," sustains Gen. Gates' dispatch, but attributes it to an ignorance of the situation of the enemy.—² Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Tarleton, pp. 106, 107; Gordon, iii. 410; Hist. of Civil War in Am, iii. p. 99.

¹ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Tarleton, p. 107.

² Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20; Tarleton, p. 107; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 167; Gordon, iii. p. 410; Lee's Mem., p. 95. Col. O. H. Williams, Adj.-Gen., in his Narrative, says, "They threw down their *loaded* arms and fled, in the utmost consternation." And again, "a great majority of the militia (at least two thirds of the army) fled without firing a shot."—³ Gov. Nash to Delegates in Cong. from N. C., Aug. 23; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. pp. 167, 168; Gordon, iii. p. 410; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 304; Lee's Mem., p. 97.—⁴ Gov. Nash to Delegates in Cong. from N. C., Aug. 23; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Tarleton, p. 107; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 149; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 304; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 99.—⁵ Lee's Mem., p. 95.

pursuit of the fugitives,¹—turned and attacked the left flank of the First Maryland brigade, under General Smallwood, which had been moved down and occupied the ground from whence the militia had fled.²

The little handful of regular troops thus became the only opponents of the concentrated efforts of the enemy. With the torrent of fugitives, who rushed from the field of battle, were the general officers who had commanded them, and General Gates;³ and the gallant De Kalb, and Gist, and Smallwood,—whose undaunted bravery was well known,—were left to provide measures for their protection, without the assistance of their commanding general. With the same unflinching obstinacy which they had shown at the Gowanus⁴ and on Chatterton's Hill,⁵ in 1776, the Delaware and Maryland troops contended with the superior force of the enemy for nearly an hour.⁶ At length the Baron De Kalb, at the head of one of the regiments, made a vigorous charge on the enemy, but fell, after having received eleven wounds.⁷ His aid-de-camp, Lieutenant-colonel De Buysson, was near him when he fell; and rushing to the spot, embraced him, announced his name and rank to the enemy's troops by

which he was surrounded, and begged that they would spare his life. In this noble object he received several dangerous wounds, which had been intended for his General; but he succeeded in his efforts to save the Baron from insult and immediate death, and, with him, was taken prisoner.¹ A few minutes afterwards, by a united charge of the cavalry and the foot, the little remnant of the American army, no longer sustained by the presence and great example of their General, gave way before superior numbers, and abandoned the unequal contest.²

So closely were the troops pursued, that no attempt could be made to rally them. "Never was a victory more complete, or a defeat more total. Every corps was broken and dispersed through the woods. The marshes and brush, which in some degree covered them from the enemy, served to separate them more entirely from each other."³ Generals Smallwood and Gist, with a few of the regulars, succeeded in reaching Charlotte, North Carolina;⁴ but the militia returned to their homes,⁵ many of them, it is probable, to recount, in after years, to admiring crowds, the glorious deeds, at Camden, in which they were willing to be considered as among the *unrewarded* participants.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 95; Marshall, iv. p. 232; Stedman, ii. p. 209.—² Tarleton, p. 107; Lee's Mem., p. 95; Marshall, iv. p. 233.—³ Gen. Gates to Pres. of Cong., Aug. 20; Gov. Nash to Delegates in Cong., Aug. 23; Gordon, iii. p. 442; Col. Otho H. Williams', Adj.-Gen., Narrative.—⁴ Vide p. 147.—⁵ Vide p. 181.—⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 442; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 149; Hist. of Civil War in Am., iii. p. 99. Chief-justice Marshall and Lord Cornwallis say "three quarters of an hour."

⁷ Tarleton, p. 107; Gordon, iii. p. 443; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 150; Scrg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 304.

¹ Garden's Anecdotes, i. p. 208; Gordon, iii. p. 443; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 150. Col. Williams, Adj.-Gen., in his *Narrative*, says they stripped the wounded General "even of his shirt."—² Tarleton, pp. 107, 108; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. pp. 167, 168; Marshall, iv. p. 233.

³ Marshall, iv. p. 234.—⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 446; Marshall, iv. p. 235.—⁶ Gordon, iii. p. 442; Col. Otho H. Williams', Adj.-Gen., Narrative.

The loss of the Americans on this disastrous field, in consequence of the flight of the militia, cannot be accurately ascertained.¹ The noble Delaware regiment was nearly annihilated—its survivors, consolidated into the skeleton of two companies, under Captain Kirkwood, remaining a living monument of the determined obstinacy with which it maintained its position.² Of the regulars, probably about six hundred and fifty, in the aggregate, were killed, wounded, and taken;³ of the North Carolina militia about one hundred were killed and wounded, and about three hundred (sixty-three of them being wounded) were taken prisoners;⁴ only three of the Virginia militia were wounded.⁵ Of the enemy, one captain, one lieutenant, and sixty-six rank and file were *killed*; two lieutenant-colonels, three captains, eight lieutenants, five ensigns, and two hundred and twenty-seven rank and file were *wounded*; and

two sergeants and nine privates were *missing*.⁶ Thirteen pieces of artillery, twenty-two ammunition-wagons, two thousand stands of arms, nearly two hundred wagons, the greater part of the baggage, all the stores, and eighty thousand musket-cartridges, were also among the spoils of the victory.¹

The defeat at Camden closed the public military services of General Horatio Gates, and proved, conclusively, the unsoundness of his pretensions as a military commander. It had been his good fortune—although at the expense of his integrity—to become one of the notorious opponents of General Washington and his friends; and, as the reward of his treachery, to take the place of General Schuyler, in season to receive all the benefits arising from the policy of that eminent patriot. It had also been his good fortune to reap the honors which had fallen in the train of General Arnold, at Saratoga; leaving him, like the crow in the fable, the clumsy wearer of honors to which he was not entitled, and with the proper use of which he had no acquaintance. At Camden he was stripped of his stolen honors, and when he reached Hillsboro', on the 18th of August, he stood before the people, self-condemned, an incompetent officer, at least, if nothing more.

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 446; Marshall, iv. p. 235. Lord Cornwallis (*Letter to Lord Geo. Germain*) says that "between eight and nine hundred were *killed*," and "about one thousand prisoners taken, many of whom were wounded."

² Lee's Mem., p. 96.

³ Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 446) says that their loss, here and at the Catawba Ford, on the 18th (including killed, wounded, and missing), was 126 officers and 604 rank and file: allowing eighty out of the one hundred who were with Sumter, to have fallen or been taken, six hundred and fifty would belong to the fallen at Camden. Dr. Williamson, who visited them, says 206 wounded regulars were taken into Camden, prisoners, by the enemy.

⁴ Gordon, iii. p. 445; Marshall, iv. p. 235. Dr. Williamson, Surg.-Gen. of N. C. Militia, who visited them with a flag, says "*eighty-two.*"—⁵ Gordon, iii. pp. 445, 446; Marshall, iv. p. 235. Dr. Williamson says "*two.*"

⁶ "Returns," &c., appended to Lord Cornwallis' letter

to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21, 1780. Gen. Gates (*Letter to Gen. Washington, Aug. 30*) supposes the enemy "had upwards of five hundred men, with officers in proportion, killed and wounded."—¹ Returns, &c., appended to Lord Cornwallis' letter to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 150; Gordon, iii. p. 445.

CHAPTER LXXII.

AUGUST 18, 1780.¹

THE BATTLE AT MUSGROVE'S MILLS, S. C.

THE expedition of Major Ferguson and his party to "the back country" of the Carolinas, to which reference has been made,² had encouraged some of the Tories in that part of the country to assemble for active duty in support of the Royal cause. One of these parties, about two hundred in number,³ had met at Musgrove's Mills, on the Enoree River, in what is now the southwestern part of Union District, South Carolina;⁴ information of which was conveyed to Colonel James Williams,⁵ who, with Colonels Bratton of South Carolina, Clarke of Georgia, and Shelby of Virginia, was on the southern borders of North Carolina.⁶

On the sixteenth of August, with about two hundred men, they moved towards the Broad River,⁷ crossing it

on the following day.¹ The march was silently and skilfully conducted, and about daybreak on the morning of the eighteenth, they arrived in the immediate vicinity of the enemy.² Two trusty men were sent forward to reconnoitre, but were discovered and fired on by a patrol, and they returned to the main body with no other information than that which showed the enemy was posted on the opposite side of the river. It appeared, subsequently, that the Tories had been strengthened, a few hours previously, by the arrival of Colonel Ennis with two hundred regular troops and one hundred Tories, making an aggregate force of five hundred men.³

Dispositions were immediately made by Colonel Williams, and his associates in command, to receive the enemy, who had been alarmed by his patrol. The main body was dismounted, and the horses, guarded by sixteen men, were picketed three hundred yards in the rear. Sixteen expert riflemen, well mounted, moved forward towards the bank of the river, to reconnoitre; with

¹ Gordon, iii. p. 449; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 220; Mills' Statis. of S. C., p. 764; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 650. Col. Hammond and Col. Wheeler (*Hist. N. C.*, ii. pp. 57, 100) suppose it was fought on the nineteenth.

² Vide p. 606.—³ Report of Col. Williams, published by order of Congress, in the Penn. Packet, Phila., Saturday, Sept. 23, 1780; Col. Hammond's Statement, published in Dr. Johnson's "Traditions of the Rev.;" Gordon, ii. p. 449.—⁴ Mills' Statis. of S. C., p. 764. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 650) says it is in Laurens District.

⁵ Col. Hammond's statement.—⁶ Col. Wheeler (*Hist. of N. C.*, ii. pp. 57, 100) says they were encamped at Smith's Ford, on Broad River, but made a wide detour to avoid Ferguson, who was encamped on the direct route to the Mills.—⁷ Col. Hammond's statement.

¹ Col. Williams' report to Congress. Col. Wheeler (*Hist. of N. C.*, ii. pp. 57, 99) says the troops were detached by Gen. McDowell, but Col. Hammond appeared to think differently.—² Col. Williams' report to Congress.

³ Ibid.; Gordon, iii. p. 449.

orders, if the enemy manifested any desire to attack them, to draw towards the main body, and afterwards, if possible, to fall on his left flank; while Captain Shadrick Inman of Georgia, with a similar party, moved so that he could co-operate with the other party, and fall on the enemy's right. The main body, now reduced to but little more than a hundred men,¹ was formed in a single line, in open order, across the road and along the ridge, on the top of which it was posted.² Every man was ordered to "take his tree," to reserve his fire until Colonel Shelby fired, and "then to take his object, sure."³

In the mean time, the sixteen riflemen who had been sent forward discharged their duty, and succeeded in drawing the enemy over the river. Anticipating an easy victory, he came up, on a brisk trot—the regulars, under Major Fraser, in the centre, the Tories, on the right and left. When he had come within a hundred and fifty yards of the line, he displayed, and opened a heavy fire, but it was not noticed except by the two small flanking parties, who kept up a well-directed fire in reply. Perceiving that his attack, at so great a distance, was ineffectual, he, soon afterwards, trailed arms, and, in

open order, approached the American line.¹ When he had come within eighty yards,² Colonel Shelby's rifle conveyed the fatal order, and, to use the expressive words of an eye-witness, his "ranks were thinned."³ The unerring rifles had sent death into his ranks, and, before a second fire could be given, he had fallen back in disorder. Rallying his troops, Colonel Innis advanced a second time, and the same result followed. A general fire was then opened at a greater distance, and, for fifteen minutes, it was continued warmly on both sides.⁴ At the end of that time the enemy gave way in great confusion, the Americans rushing after them with more energy than prudence. The thirty-two mounted men, under Captain Inman, charged the disordered ranks of the fugitives; while the main body, on foot, pressed on their rear, until they reached the river, and succeeded in capturing several prisoners. While on the bank of the river, waiting for their horses, in order to continue the pursuit, an express arrived with intelligence of the defeat of General Gates, and of the approach of Major Ferguson, with considerable force, against them, and the pursuit was discontinued no farther.⁵

The loss of the Americans was Captain Inman and four men killed, and

¹ That the force originally consisted of two hundred men appears to be well established (*Col. Hammond's statement*; *Col. Williams' report*; *Gordon*, iii. p. 449), from which Col. Bratton had withdrawn a small party, and forty-eight men had been detached for flanking parties and guards for the horses.—² *Col. Williams' report*; *Col. Hammond's statement*.

³ *Col. Hammond's statement*; *Gordon*, iii. p. 449.

⁴ *Col. Hammond's statement*; *Gordon*, iii. p. 449.

⁵ *Col. Williams' report*.

⁶ *Col. Hammond's statement*. The accounts of this action published by *Col. Wheeler* (*Hist. of N. C.*, ii. pp. 57, 58, 99, 100) differ so much from the contemporary reports that I have not noticed them.

eleven men wounded.¹ The enemy lost Major Fraser, four captains, and eighty-five men killed;² Colonel Innis, and

several officers and men wounded; and three captains and seventy-three privates, mostly regulars, prisoners.¹

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

AUGUST 18, 1780.

THE SURPRISE OF GENERAL SUMTER AT FISHING CREEK, S. C.

THE occupation of the western bank of the Wateree by General Sumter, and his successes near the Wateree Ford, have been alluded to in a previous chapter of this work.³ While he was reposing in his camp, on the evening of the sixteenth of August, he was disturbed by the arrival of Captain Martin, with two dragoons, who had been charged with a message from Major Davie, informing him of the defeat of General Gates at Camden; urging him to effect a retreat, from his present position, as speedily as possible; and requesting him to repair to Charlotte, N. C., whither the remnants of the army appeared to be concentrating.⁴

In the mean time, Lord Cornwallis had given orders to Lieutenant-colonel Trumbull, who then occupied a position on Little River,⁵ to move down with

the New York Volunteers, Major Ferguson's detachment, and the Loyalists of the Carolinas, to intercept General Sumter's retreat;² while Lieutenant colonel Tarleton, with the British Legion and the light-infantry of the army was directed to move in pursuit of him on the following morning.³

With his usual celerity General Sumter retreated up the western bank of the Wateree, carrying with him his prisoners and booty, and passed the night of the seventeenth in the vicinity of Rocky Mount;⁴ while Colonel Tarleton, with equal promptness, moved up its eastern bank, and reached the ferry at dusk on the same evening.⁵ General Sumter's fires being distinctly visible, the enemy immediately secured all the boats, and passed the night without lighting any fires, to prevent General

¹ Col. Hammond's statement. Col. Williams (*Report to Congress*) says *three* were "killed on the field, and eight wounded, one of them mortally," and Dr. Gordon has followed that report.—² Col. Williams mentions only *sixty* killed "on the field." I have preferred the more minute account of Col. Hammond, who was present.

³ Vide Chap. LXXI.—⁴ Lee's Memoirs of War, p. 98.

⁵ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Lee's Memoirs, p. 98.

¹ Col. Hammond's statement.

² Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 111; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Lee's Memoirs, p. 98.

³ Tarleton, p. 111; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21.

⁴ Tarleton, p. 111; Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 235 237; Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 194.

⁵ Tarleton, p. 111; Lee's Memoirs, p. 99.

Sumter from receiving notice of his presence in the neighborhood.¹

At an early hour the next morning (*August 18th*), General Sumter renewed his retreat, directing his course towards the fords of the Catawba, where he intended to cross the river;² and, soon afterwards, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton crossed the river and pursued him.³

The Americans were almost exhausted, from the fatigue and the intense heat to which they had been exposed, and, after marching eight miles, and crossing Fishing Creek, they halted for temporary repose.⁴ The ground which they occupied was on the northern bank of Fishing Creek, about two miles from its junction with the Catawba, in Chester District, South Carolina. As the creek approaches the river, an elevated ridge of land, from the top of which both can be seen, is formed between them;⁵ and on this ridge General Sumter, as he supposed, had halted in perfect security.⁶ His sentries and videttes had been thrown out to insure his safety;⁷ his prisoners and booty, in the van, under the command of his advance-guard, were beyond danger of rescue;⁸ some of his men were killing cattle,

others cooking their dinner, and still more of them were bathing in the creek or sleeping on the grass;¹ while Sumter, himself, without hat, coat, or vest, was sleeping in the shade of a wagon.²

When the enemy had reached Fishing Creek, at twelve o'clock, the greater part of his men, too, were overpowered with fatigue. He proceeded, therefore, to select a hundred cavalry and sixty foot soldiers to move forward, while the remainder—about two hundred men, with a field-piece—were left behind.³ With the greatest caution and silence the party moved forward, killing with their sabres, on their way, two of the American videttes, who had fired on them as they approached.⁴ A few minutes afterwards Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton ascended the ridge, and, suddenly, discovered the bivouac of the American troops, perfectly quiet, and suspecting no danger.⁵ Forming his entire force into a single line, he immediately rushed forward, securing the arms—which were stacked—and the artillery, before the Americans could be assembled to defend themselves or their position, and overcoming the few guards who interposed any opposition.⁶

¹ Tarleton, p. 111.—² Ibid.; Marshall, iv. p. 237.

³ Tarleton, p. 112; Stedman, ii. p. 212.

⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 237; Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 153; Lee's Mem., p. 99; Gordon, iii. p. 447. This fact would appear to disprove the remarks about tents, &c., which some writers have indulged in.—⁵ Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 199.

⁶ Marshall, iv. p. 237; Lee's Mem., p. 99; Stedman, ii. p. 212.—⁷ Marshall, iv. p. 237; Lee's Mem., p. 99; Gordon, iii. p. 447; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 153.

⁸ Tarleton, p. 112.

¹ Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195; Lee's Mem., p. 99; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 199.—² Mrs. Ellet, p. 201; Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195.—³ Tarleton, p. 113; Lee's Memoirs, p. 99; Stedman, ii. p. 213.

⁴ Tarleton, p. 113. Dr. Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 153), Judge Marshall (*Washington*, iv. p. 237), Dr. Gordon (*Hist. of Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 447) charge these videttes with having slept on their posts. This disproves the charge.

⁵ Tarleton, pp. 113, 114.—⁶ Ibid., p. 114; Gen. Gates to Gen. Washington, Aug. 30, 1780; Marshall, iv. p. 237; Stedman, ii. p. 212.

Panic-stricken at this unexpected assault, and separated from their arms, the greater part of General Sumter's force fled precipitately to the river and woods¹—a few only offering a feeble resistance from behind the wagons.² General Sumter escaped without his hat, coat, or boots;³ and, with the exception of about three hundred and fifty men,⁴ the entire command was either killed, wounded, or dispersed.⁵

The loss of the Americans was one

hundred and fifty, officers and men, killed and wounded; upwards of three hundred taken prisoners;¹ the entire body of prisoners and the booty which had been captured by General Sumter at the Wateree Ford; and all the baggage, artillery, and arms which belonged to his own force.² All this was accomplished with the comparatively small loss of one officer, and eight non-commissioned officers and privates killed; and six privates wounded.³

CHAPTER LXXIV.

September 21, 1780.

THE AFFAIR AT WAHAB'S PLANTATION.

THE defeat of General Sumter having finished the work which that of General Gates had commenced, and South Carolina having fallen, once more, into the hands of the King, Lord Cornwallis concentrated his forces at Camden, and, on the eighth of September, moved from that place, to seek new conquests and fresh laurels in North Carolina.⁶ With expectations of great success he moved, with the main body, to the Waxhaws, and thence towards Charlotte, with the intention, ultimately, to

proceed to Salisbury.⁴ Parallel with the route of the main body, on the western bank of the Wateree, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton moved, in the same direction, at the head of the British Legion and the light-infantry;⁵ while still farther westward, in a similar course, moved Major Ferguson and the Tories under his command.⁶ The American troops, under Colonel Davie, fell

¹ Tarleton, p. 114; Gov. Nash to Delegates in Cong. from N. C., Aug. 23, 1780; Marshall, iv. p. 237.

² Tarleton, p. 114; Marshall, iv. p. 237; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 169; Stedman, ii. p. 212.—³ Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195; Stedman, ii. pp. 212, 213.—⁴ Lee's Mem. of War, p. 99.—⁵ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 153; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occurrences, p. 307; Gordon, iii. p. 447.

⁶ Lee's Mem. of War in South, p. 103.

¹ Tarleton, p. 115; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 101.

² Tarleton, p. 115; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21; Marshall, iv. p. 237.—³ Returns appended to Lord Cornwallis' Dispatch to Lord Geo. Germain, Aug. 21.—⁴ Lee's Mem. of War in South, p. 103; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 158; McKenzie's Strictures on Tarleton, pp. 42–46; Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195.

⁵ Lee's Memoirs, p. 104. Compare Tarleton, p. 158, with McKenzie's Strictures, on this subject, pp. 44, 45.

⁶ Lee's Memoirs, p. 104; McKenzie's Strictures on Tarleton, p. 45.

back as Lord Cornwallis approached, and took post at Providence, while the latter halted at the Waxhaws.¹

The scarcity of provisions in that part of the country was so great that the enemy's forces were, necessarily, divided,²—the light troops and Tories remaining on the western side of the Catawba, while the main body occupied the eastern,—and Colonel Davie determined to beat up the quarters of the British Legion, which had rendered itself peculiarly obnoxious to the patriotic republicans of the Carolinas. Accordingly, on the evening of the twentieth of September, 1780, he left his position at Providence; and, by taking a widely circuitous route, he not only turned the left of the main body, but he also approached the camp of the Legion without being discovered. Receiving intelligence that the Legion was occupying the plantation of Captain Wahab,—one of the officers of his command,—he hastened in that direction, and, at an early hour in the morning of the twenty-first, he came within sight of the premises.³

This plantation was a short distance from Charlotte, in North Carolina, and, at the period of this occurrence, was approached through a lane; while a cornfield, on one side, was cultivated nearly to the door, and effectually concealed the movements of those who approached the house from that direction.

A part of the Legion, and some of the Tories, being already in the saddle, when Colonel Davie first saw the house, he was convinced that some expedition was being organized, and no time could be spared in unnecessary delay. He accordingly detached Major Davidson with the greater part of the riflemen of his command, and ordered them to approach the house, without delay, through the cornfield; while he, with the dragoons and the small party of riflemen which he retained, occupied the lane, and approached the house in front.¹

The plan was admirably executed; and when the horsemen, with a shout, dashed up to the front of the house, through the lane, the enemy was terror-stricken, and, without attempting to strike a single blow, he gave way in a precipitate flight. At this juncture the riflemen met them, and pouring a destructive fire into the disordered ranks, the rout was complete. Sixty of the enemy were killed or wounded on the spot; while, of the assailants, only one man was wounded and none were killed. Ninety-six horses and their equipments, with one hundred and twenty stands of arms, were the trophies of this expedition; and, after collecting these,—before the light-infantry, in the neighboring encampment, could rally to oppose him,—Colonel Davie retired, and reached his camp, at Providence, the same evening, in safety.²

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 104.—² Lieut. McKenzie (*Strictures on Tarleton*, pp. 46, 47) emphatically denies this statement. As Maj. Lee sustains Lieut.-Col. Tarleton, in this respect, I have relied on their statements.—³ Lee's Mem., p. 104.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 104.—² Ibid.; Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195.

It is said that Captain Wahab spent the few minutes he was on his premises with his wife and children; that the enemy, sensible of his presence, set fire to the premises as soon as Colonel Davie left them; and that, as he rode

away, the patriotic planter witnessed the destruction of his home, without being able to extend the least relief to his helpless, unprotected family. These were, truly, "the times which tried men's souls."¹

CHAPTER LXV.

September 26, 1780.

THE AFFAIR AT CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA.

ON the twenty-fifth of September, 1780, Lord Cornwallis, with his army, moved from the Waxhaws, by way of the Steel Creek road, towards Charlotte; and General Sumter, on the same day, retired to Salisbury, leaving Colonel Davie, with his corps, and a few volunteers, under Major Joseph Graham, to hover around the enemy, observe his movements, and, as far as they could do so, to check his progress. In obedience to these orders Colonel Davie skirmished with his light troops, and, about midnight, entered Charlotte with several prisoners.¹

This place, the county-seat of Mecklenburg county, North Carolina, is finely situated upon a high, rolling plain, on the eastern bank of the Sugar Creek, a small tributary of the Catawba.² At the period of the Revolutionary War, the village contained about twenty houses, fronting on two streets which

crossed each other at right angles.³ An ancient court-house stood in the centre of the village,⁴ and much of the ground along the sides of the streets, even within the bounds of the village, appears to have been an open common.⁴

On the morning of the twenty-sixth of September, Lord Cornwallis approached the village, and Colonel Davie prepared to receive him in a manner which should reflect credit even on "*the Hornet's Nest of America.*"⁵ Dismounting his men, the cavalry of his corps, "not exceeding twenty in number,"⁶—who were armed with muskets, sabres, and pistols,—were posted near

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 104, 105.—² Ibid., p. 105.

³ The lower story is said to have been used as a *market*, and the material of which it was constructed has become the subject of discussion—Maj. Lee supposing it was *stone*, Mr. Stedman that it was *brick*, and Mr. Lossing, on local tradition, that it was *wood*.

⁴ This appears from Maj. Lee's description of the position of the American troops, at the beginning of the action. See also Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195.

⁵ The term which had been applied to that locality, from the sturdy independence of its inhabitants.

⁶ Stedman, ii. p. 216.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 105.—² Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 616.

the court-house, under cover of a strong stone wall, about four feet high; while farther in front, behind the garden fences on either hand, were posted the two companies of riflemen which belonged to his corps, and the small party of Mecklenburg militia, commanded by Major Graham.¹ While the troops were taking their positions the van of the enemy, composed of Tarleton's British Legion, commanded by Major Hanger,² entered the village. Extending his front entirely across the street, with flanking parties of light-infantry, Major Hanger moved, slowly, up the street towards the court-house. The riflemen and militia, who were posted in the gardens, received the enemy warmly, and the light-infantry soon found ample employment in its attempts to dislodge them; while the cavalry of the Legion dashed forward to assault the dragoons who were behind the stone wall near the court-house.³ These, too, opened a fire on their numerous assailants with such deadly effect that they fell back in disorder, and would not renew the attack.⁴ Their officers entreated, their commander exerted himself, and even Lord Cornwallis, in person, rode up and appealed to their "former reputation,"⁵ but they steadily refused to "approach

the American militia,"¹ by whom they had been so severely handled; and "the whole of the British army was actually kept at bay, for some minutes, by a few mounted Americans, not exceeding twenty in number."²

In the mean time, the Americans on the right side of the street had been driven in, and those on the left had been withdrawn, the whole concentrating their force near the court-house, and increasing, if possible, the immobility of the Legion dragoons.³ About the same time the light-infantry and the infantry of the Legion were moved forward,⁴ and the action was renewed and continued, with great vigor, until they had turned the right flank of Colonel Davie's little party, when the latter withdrew from the court-house, and formed on the eastern side of the town.⁵ Shortly afterwards he retired from the town, by way of the great Salisbury road, the militia under Major Graham covering his rear.⁶ After skirmishing with the enemy's light troops as far as "The Gum Tree," Major Graham retreated until he reached the plantation lately owned by Joseph McConaughey, where he again made a stand. When he reached the hill above where the Sugar Hill Meeting-house now stands he renewed the conflict; and, soon afterwards, Colonel

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 105; Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195.

² Stedman, ii. p. 216; Tarleton, p. 159; Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 195. Lieut.-Col. Tarleton was sick with a fever, and Maj. Hanger appeared to be the next in command.

³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 105; Tarleton, p. 159.

⁴ Lieut. McKenzie (*Strictures on Tarleton*, p. 47) appears to dispute the question that the legion cavalry charged at all. I have followed Maj. Lee (*Memoirs*, p. 105) and Stedman (ii. p. 216).—⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 216.

¹ Lieut. McKenzie's *Strictures on Tarleton*, p. 47.

² Stedman, ii. p. 216. See also Johnson's Greene, i. p. 308.—³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 105.

⁴ Lieut. McKenzie's *Strictures on Tarleton*, p. 48.

⁵ Lee's Memoirs, pp. 105, 106.

⁶ Ibid.

Francis Locke, the hero of Ramsour's Mills, was killed, and Major Graham severly wounded.¹

The loss of the Americans, in this brilliant affair, was one officer and five

privates killed, and one officer and twelve men wounded.¹ The enemy's loss was greater than that of the Americans, but it is not known, precisely, its extent.²

CHAPTER LXXVI.

October 7, 1780.

THE BATTLE OF KING'S MOUNTAIN, S. C.

AMONG the most accomplished and active of the King's officers in the Southern army, was Major Patrick Ferguson, of the Seventy-first regiment, to whom frequent reference has been made in these pages.² He had been detached to the borders of the Carolinas, to encourage and assist the Loyalists, in that part of the country, to organize and take the field in the service of the King; and his zealous efforts in that work had drawn upon him the peculiar hostility of the Whigs.³

In the latter part of September and the beginning of October, 1780, he occupied Gilbert-town, near Rutherfordton, in Rutherford county, North Carolina, with a small body of regular troops, and upwards of a thousand Tories, evidently intending to intercept Colonel Elijah Clarke of Georgia, who

had recently attempted to seize Augusta, been compelled to raise the siege, and was then retiring towards the borders of North Carolina.⁴ At the same time he was watched by several of the partisan officers in that vicinity;⁴ and, at the suggestion of Colonel Isaac Shelby,⁵ measures were taken to secure the co-operation of these several officers to cut off Ferguson's retreat.⁶ Accordingly, one hundred and sixty men from Burke and Rutherford counties, North Carolina, under Colonel Charles McDowell; two hundred and forty men from Washington county, North Carolina,—now part of Tennessee,—under Colonel John Sevier; two hundred and forty men from Sullivan county,—also now a part of Tennessee,—under Col-

¹ Wheeler's Hist. of N. C., ii. p. 234.

² Ibid., p. 102; Garden's Anecdotes, ii. pp. 152, 153; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 177. Serg. Lamb (*Jour. of Occur.*, pp. 308, 309) gives a very fine description of his abilities.

³ Vide p. 606.

⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 106.—² Maj. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 106) says twelve were killed, "and many" wounded; and Lieut.-Col. Tarleton (*Southern Campaigns*, p. 159) says three officers and twelve men were killed and wounded.

⁵ Report of Cols. Campbell, Shelby, and Cleaveland to Gen. Gates.—⁴ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 380; Moultrie's Mem., ii. pp. 242, 243.—⁶ Wheeler's N. C., ii. pp. 100, 101.—⁶ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. pp. 175, 176.

onel Isaac Shelby; and four hundred men from Washington county, Virginia, under Colonel William Campbell, assembled at Watauga, on the twenty-fifth of September; and, on the following day, they moved towards the enemy.¹ On their arrival at the Catawba River, on the thirtieth of September, they were joined by Colonel Benjamin Cleaveland, with three hundred and fifty men, from Wilkes and Surrey counties; and, on the following day, a messenger was sent to General Gates for a general officer to take the command of the whole,—Colonel Campbell, at the same time, being vested with the temporary command.²

In the mean time, Major Ferguson had received intelligence of the approach of these several parties, and immediately retreated from Gilbert-town, by the Cherokee road, towards the Catawba,³ at the same time asking for a reinforcement from Lord Cornwallis;⁴ but the rapidity of the pursuit, and the failure of his attempt to secure an additional force,⁵ compelled him to change his plan, and to take post on the King's Mountain and prepare for an action.⁶

The ground which was thus selected by Major Ferguson was one of a range of hills, which extends north and south

a distance of sixteen miles, in the States of North and South Carolina.¹ It is a narrow stony ridge, about a mile in length, and averaging a hundred feet in height above the ravines which surround it.² It is situated twelve miles northwest from the court-house at Yorkville, South Carolina, about a mile and a half south of the North Carolina line, and, at the time of the action, was densely wooded.³

On the sixth of October the Americans reached the Cowpens, on Broad River;⁴ and, on the evening of the same day, Colonel James Williams, with a small party of South Carolinians, joined the expedition, and gave information of the position occupied by the enemy.⁵ A council of the principal officers was immediately held, and it was determined to select nine hundred of the best horsemen⁶ and pursue the enemy without delay, leaving the remainder of the force to follow as fast as possible.⁷ At eight o'clock the same evening the detachment began its march; and a little after noon, on the next day, they approached King's Mountain.⁸ Having

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 629; Mills' *Statis.* of S. C., p. 780.—² Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 629; Mills' *Statis.* of S. C., p. 778. Col. Wheeler (*Hist. of N. C.*, ii. p. 59) differs from all other writers in making this range extend east and west; and this particular hill 500 yards, instead of a mile in length.—³ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 629; Mills' *Statis.* of S. C., p. 778; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 108.

⁴ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates; Gen. Lenoir's "Account of the Battle, &c."—⁵ Wheeler's *N. C.*, ii. p. 59; Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates; Ramsay's *Rev.* in S. C., ii. p. 182.—⁶ Gen. Davison's letter to Gen. Sumner, Oct. 10, says 1600 men were selected; but I have preferred the report of the Colonels, in which it is stated that 900 only were taken.

⁷ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates.—*Ibid.*

¹ Report of Cols. Campbell, Shelby, and Cleaveland to Gen. Gates.—² *Ibid.*—³ Tarleton, p. 164; Marshall, iv. p. 381.—⁴ P. Ferguson to Lord Cornwallis, without date, published by the Americans after the battle; Tarleton's *Southern Campaigns*, p. 164; Wheeler's *N. C.*, ii. p. 101.

⁵ Col. Wheeler (*Hist. of N. C.*, ii. p. 101) says his messenger was Abraham Collins, and that he did not reach Gen. Cornwallis in time to be of any service.

⁶ Wheeler's *N. C.*, ii. p. 101; Tarleton, pp. 164, 165.

learned, from two prisoners, the exact position of the enemy,¹ the troops were formed into four columns—Colonel Williams' command and part of Colonel Cleaveland's regiment, commanded by Colonel Cleaveland in person, formed the extreme left column, and Colonel Shelby's regiment that on left of the centre; while Colonel Campbell's regiment formed the column on the right of the centre, and Colonel Sevier's regiment, and the remainder of Colonel Cleaveland's, under Major Winston, formed the column on the extreme right.² In this order they approached the mountain, and about three o'clock in the afternoon they attacked the enemy.³ The two central columns, under Colonels Shelby and Campbell, and the extreme right column, under Major Winston and Colonel Sevier, appear to have attacked the enemy in front and on his left flank simultaneously;⁴ and, five minutes afterwards, his right flank was attacked by Colonel Cleaveland.⁵

Each of the columns, as they came on the ground, dismounted under a heavy fire from the enemy, and pushed forward up the hill.⁶ The two central

columns were the first to gain the summit, and opened a destructive fire on the enemy as they ascended the hill.¹ With the greatest gallantry Major Ferguson resisted their progress; and, at the point of the bayonet,—the American rifles having no bayonets,—the assailants were driven down the hill.² While the action was thus raging in front, Colonel Cleaveland encountered a picket on the enemy's right flank, upon which he thus addressed his men: “My brave fellows, we have beat the Tories, and we can beat them again. They are all cowards: if they had the spirit of men they would join their fellow-citizens in supporting the independence of their country. When you are engaged, you are not to want for the word of command from me. I will show you, by my example, how to fight; I can undertake no more. Every man must consider himself an officer, and act from his own judgment. Fire as quick as you can, and stand your ground as long as you can. When you can do no better, get behind trees, or retreat; but I beg you not to run quite off. If we are repulsed, let us make a point of returning and renewing the fight; perhaps we may have better luck in the second attempt than the first.

¹ Gen. Lenoir's “Account of the Battle, &c.”

² Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates.

³ Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 59; Garden's Anecdotes, ii. p. 153; Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates.

⁴ Compare the Colonels' report to Gen. Gates, with Gen. Lenoir's account of the battle.

⁵ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates. Col. Campbell (*letter dated “Camp on Brier Creek, October 20, 1780”*) says it was ten minutes after the *first* attack had been made on the enemy; which has been, generally, attributed to Col. Cleaveland.

⁶ Gen. Lenoir's “Account of the Battle, &c.;” Capt. Thomas Young's “Annals,” in Johnson's Traditions of the Rev.; Lee's Mem., p. 108.

¹ Report of the Colonels to Gen Gates. As this report was signed by Cols. Campbell, Shelby, and Cleaveland, I have disregarded the statement which has, generally, been adopted—giving the honor of the *first attack* on the enemy to Col. Cleaveland. It is not probable that he would have signed a statement which transferred to other officers the honor which belonged to himself.

² Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 60; Gen. Lenoir's “Account of the Battle, &c.”

BANISTER'S ① THE IRISH COASTAL MOUNTAINS.

BY W. H. — TELL LAMMILL — E. — TRIPPER, ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE SIXTH.

LOHMAN, NEW YORK.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY J. R. GREEN, 10, NEW BOND STREET, LONDON.



If any of you are afraid, such shall have leave to retire, and they are requested immediately to take themselves off.”¹ A heavy fire was immediately thrown into the picket, and it fled up the mountain to the main body, closely pursued by Colonel Cleaveland and his regiment, against whom Major Ferguson immediately led his troops, and they, too, were driven down the hill at the point of the bayonet.² By this time the two central columns, under Colonels Campbell and Shelby, had renewed the attack in front; and upon them, a second time, Major Ferguson brought the full force of a desperate charge, and, a second time, they fell back.³ The column on the extreme right, under Colonel Sevier, however, had gained the summit of the hill, and was driving the enemy’s left flank upon his centre;⁴ when the enemy, now entirely surrounded, turned from the pursuit of the centre, and fought with the greatest bravery for the mastery.⁵ Rushing from one regiment to another, encouraging some and directing others, Major Ferguson performed prodigies of valor, when he was shot by an American rifleman,⁶ and Captain Abraham De Peyerster, of “The King’s American Regi-

ment,”—a Tory from New York,¹—took the command.²

After the action had raged for an hour and five minutes³ the enemy raised a white flag,⁴ and surrendered themselves prisoners at discretion.⁵

The number of Americans engaged, as has been shown, was nine hundred;⁶ that of the enemy, from the provision-rolls found in their camp, after the battle, was eleven hundred and twenty-five.⁷ The loss of the former was Colonel Williams, Major Chronicle, Captain Mattocks, two lieutenants, four ensigns, and nineteen privates, *killed*; and one major, three captains, three lieutenants, and fifty-three privates, *wounded*; that of the latter was, of the Tories, two colonels, three captains, and two hundred and one privates, *killed*; one major, and one hundred and twenty-seven privates, *wounded*, and, being unable to march, left on the field; and one colonel, twelve captains, eleven lieutenants, two ensigns, one quartermaster, one adjutant, two commissaries, and six hundred and eighteen rank and file, taken *prisoners*. Of the regular troops, the loss was Major Ferguson, one captain, two lieutenants, and fifteen pri-

¹ Moultrie’s Mem., ii. pp. 243, 244; Ramsay’s Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 182, 183; Gordon, iii. pp. 464, 465.

² Moultrie’s Mem., ii. p. 244; Ramsay’s Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 183.—³ Wheeler’s N. C., ii. p. 60; Gen. Lenoir’s “Account of the Battle, &c.”

⁴ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates; Wheeler’s N. C., ii. p. 60; Gen. Lenoir’s “Account of the Battle, &c.”

⁵ Tarleton, p. 165; Wheeler’s N. C., ii. p. 60; Ramsay’s Am. Rev., ii. pp. 176, 177; Lee’s Mem., p. 109.

⁶ Wheeler’s N. C., ii. p. 60; Garden’s Anecdotes, ii. p. 153; Ramsay’s Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 184.

¹ This regiment was composed, generally, of New York Tories, under Col. Edmund Fanning, of New York, son-in-law of Gov. Wm. Tryon.—² McKenzie’s Strictures on Tarleton’s Southern Campaigns, pp. 66, 67.

³ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates. Gen. Davison (*Letter to Gen. Sumner, Oct. 10*) says *forty-seven* minutes.

⁴ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates; Wheeler’s N. C., ii. p. 60; Gen. Lenoir’s “Account of the Battle.”

⁵ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates; Col. Campbell’s letter, Oct. 20, 1780.—⁶ Vide p. 629. See also Gordon, iv. p. 464; Ramsay’s Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 182.

⁷ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates.

vates, *killed*; thirty-five privates *wounded*, but, being unable to march, were left on the ground; and two captains, four lieutenants, three ensigns, one surgeon, and fifty-eight taken *prisoners*.¹ About fifteen hundred muskets and rifles, besides other arms, and stores, also graced this victory;² and many of the officers of the militia who had been unable to procure swords, after that time were enabled to carry those useful symbols of their authority.³

This was one of the most important victories of the war, both in its immediate and its ultimate results. It was entirely a contest between the people and the enemy, after that people had been regarded as conquered and powerless. It was also a popular triumph of raw, undisciplined troops, the greater

part of whom had never been in battle before, all of them serving voluntarily, without bounty or pay, at their own expense for provisions, ammunition, &c., and without the expectation or hope of reward. The consequence was the retreat of Lord Cornwallis, by a forced march, to Winnsborough, where he remained until he had been reinforced;¹ and the entire destruction of the Tories' influence in North Carolina.² The people, not only of the South, but of the entire Confederacy, hailed the event as the harbinger of a more glorious future³—a hope which was soon realized in the masterly movements of General Greene, and, finally, consummated before the village of Yorktown.

¹ Report of the Colonels to Gen. Gates.

² Lee's Mem., p. 109; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 149.—³ Gen. Lenoir's "Account of the Battle, &c."

¹ Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 60; Marshall, iv. p. 384.

² Ramsay's Rev., in S. C., ii. pp. 185, 186.

³ Letter from Mr. Jefferson, in 1822, cited by Col. Wheeler (*Hist. of N. C.*, ii. p. 98.)

CHAPTER LXXVII.

November 9, 1780.¹

THE AFFAIR AT FISH DAM FORD, S. C.

WHILE General Lord Cornwallis, with the main body of the British army, lay at Winnsborough, and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton was busily engaged in fruitlessly endeavoring to entrap "the Swamp Fox," General Sumter, at the head of a large party of Carolinians, restrained the foraging parties which were sent out from Camden, and, by moving along the west bank of the Santee, kept the enemy in continual alarm for the safety of Fort Ninety-six.²

At length Lord Cornwallis determined to remove him from the neighborhood; and for this purpose an expedition was arranged to surprise him in his camp, near the Fish Dam Ford, on the eastern bank of Broad River, in Chester District, South Carolina.³ Accordingly, on the evening of the eighth of November, Major Wemyss, of the Sixty-third regiment, with "a considerable part of that regiment," mounted, and forty men belonging to the cavalry

of the British Legion, left the main body and moved towards General Sumter's camp,¹ under the guidance of a Tory named Sealy.² Arriving in the immediate vicinity of the camp at an earlier hour than he expected, supposing that his approach was unknown to General Sumter, and fearing that the American patrols would discover him before morning, he determined to attack the camp, without delay, and before his intended victim could withdraw to the opposite side of the river.³

It appears, however, that General Sumter was prepared to receive him; and when, about one o'clock, Major Wemyss, at the head of his command, dashed into one of the American pickets,⁴ instead of surprising it, he was surprised by a well-directed volley, two balls from which shattered his own arm

¹ Tarleton, p. 173; Marshall, iv. p. 387; Lee's Mem., p. 112. Stedman (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 228) says the whole of the Sixty-third regiment was in this expedition. Rivington (*Royal Gazette*, No. 441, N. Y., Wednesday, Dec. 20), from the "*S. C. Gazette*," says he had 160 men.

² Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, i. p. 316.—³ Tarleton, p. 173; Marshall, iv. p. 387; Stedman, ii. p. 228.

⁴ This picket was commanded by Col. Thomas Taylor, who had directed a line of large fires to be kept up in front of his position. This expedient enabled him to keep his men concealed, while the approaching enemy was exposed, by the light, to the fire of his men.

¹ Gen. Cornwallis to Col. Tarleton, Nov. 9, 1780; Tarleton, p. 173. Gen. Moultrie (*Mem.*, ii. p. 248), Dr. Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 188), and Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iii. p. 471) say it occurred on the *twelfth* of November.

² Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 386, 387; Ramsay's *Am. Rev.*, ii. pp. 178, 179; Gen. Gates to Congress, Nov. 14, 1780.—³ Tarleton, p. 173; Stedman, ii. p. 228.

and thigh, and totally disabled him.¹ The command was assumed by a young officer,² whose name does not appear, but whose gallantry is manifest, notwithstanding the efforts which have been made to heap upon his alleged ignorance³ the unfortunate result of General Sumter's superior vigilance and skill. The picket, having fired several volleys, fell back to a rail-fence, and finally to the main body, and the enemy pressed forward, in pursuit.⁴ Here, also, the Americans were on the alert, and a volley of rifles, under the personal direction of General Sumter, brought twenty-eight of the enemy to the ground.⁵ This terrible reception, for a moment, appeared to intimidate

the enemy, and he began to fall back, when the gallant, but nameless, leader of the detachment rallied them, and the contest was resumed.¹ His efforts, however, appear to have been unavailing, and his command was compelled to retreat, leaving behind the wounded, including Major Wemyss, who were properly attended to and provided for by the Americans.²

The loss of the enemy in this action—which, according to his general practice, was claimed as a victory³—was reported to have been a sergeant and five rank and file, *killed*; and the major, a sergeant, and fifteen rank and file, *wounded*.⁴ It appears, however, that twenty-five were taken prisoners by the Americans,⁵ and there is but little doubt the loss was really much greater than that reported by the enemy himself.

¹ Marshall, iv. p. 387; Tarleton, p. 174; Lee's Mem., p. 112; Lord Cornwallis to Col. Tarleton, Nov. 9; Same to same, Nov. 10.—² Marshall, iv. p. 387; Stedman, ii. p. 228; Lord Cornwallis to Col. Tarleton, Nov. 9 and 10.

³ Marshall, iv. p. 387; Tarleton, p. 174; Lord Cornwallis to Col. Tarleton, Nov. 9 and 10.

⁴ Lossing's Field Book, ii. pp. 651, 652; Lee's Memoirs, p. 112.— Lee's Memoirs, p. 112.

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 652.—² Gordon, iii. p. 471; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 189.—³ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 441, N. Y., Wednesday, Dec. 20, 1780.

⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Gen. Gates to Cong., Nov. 14, 1780.

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

November 20, 1780.¹

THE AFFAIR AT BLACKSTOCK'S PLANTATION, S. C.

AFTER the enemy had been defeated near the Fish Dam Ford, as related in the last chapter, General Sumter crossed Broad River;² and, having received accessions to his strength from the commands of Colonels Twiggs, Clarke, and Candler of Georgia, Thomas and Bratton of South Carolina, and Majors McCall and Hammond of the latter State, who had joined him,³ he threatened Fort Ninety-six—one of the most important posts in the possession of the enemy.⁴ Alarmed for the safety of this post, Lord Cornwallis sent an express to recall Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton from his pursuit of General Marion, with orders to proceed, by the nearest route, against General Sumter; while, at the same time, the Sixty-third regiment—which had been handled so severely at Fish Dam Ford—was ordered to join him on his march, and the Sev-

enty-first was moved to Brierly's Ferry for the purpose of supporting him.¹

These movements were made with so much expedition and secrecy, that General Sumter was moving towards the fort, with the greatest confidence, entirely unconscious of the near approach of the enemy, when a deserter to his command, from the Sixty-third regiment, warned him of the movement, and enabled him, by an immediate retreat, to avert the danger.² Crossing the Ennoree, he marched towards the Tiger River; and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton pressed forward, in pursuit, hoping to fall on his rear before he could cross the latter stream.³ The rapidity of the march had so completely fatigued the troops under the latter officer, that, at four o'clock in the afternoon of the twentieth of November, he was compelled to leave his infantry in the rear, to follow at their own pace; while with one hundred and seventy mounted men of the Legion, and eighty

¹ Col. Hammond's statement; Ramsay's Am. Rev. ii. p. 179; Lee's Mem., p. 113; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 189; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 41, N. Y., Wednesday, Dec. 20, 1780. Gen. Moultrie (*Mem.*, ii. p. 249) supposes it occurred on the seventeenth.

² Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 174.

³ Col. Saml. Hammond's statement, in "Johnson's Traditions of Rev.;" Lord Cornwallis to Col. Tarleton, Nov. 10.

⁴ Lord Cornwallis to Col. Tarleton, Nov. 9 and 11.

¹ Lord Cornwallis to Col. Tarleton, Nov. 9 and 11; Samo to Sir Henry Clinton, Dec. 3; Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 41, N. Y., Dec. 20, 1780.—² Col. Hammond's statement; Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Dec. 3; Tarleton, p. 176; Marshall, iv. p. 388.—³ Ibid.

mounted men of the Sixty-third regiment, he pressed forward in advance.¹ An hour afterwards he overtook General Sumter, who had taken an advantageous position on Blackstock's Plantation, near the Tiger River, in the extreme western part of Union District, South Carolina.²

The position which the Americans occupied was a high ground, at the foot of which, in front of a rail-fence, flowed a branch of the Tiger. The slope of this hill was quite abrupt, and, from bottom to top, it was covered with brush and underwood.³ By a peculiar formation of the country, the rear and part of the right flank of the American line were covered by the Tiger River; the centre, through which passed "the great road to the ford," was posted in the buildings belonging to the plantation, and behind the fences which skirted the road, on either hand; and the left was covered by a large log-barn, into which a part of the troops had been thrown, and from which a most destructive fire was kept up during the action.⁴

When Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton had reached the brook, at the foot of

the hill, the strength of General Sumter's position was apparent, and he hesitated to make the attack until the troops, who had fallen in the rear, had come up. With this intention, desiring, also, to induce General Sumter to make a similar halt, he ordered his men to dismount; but the latter officer failed to appreciate the good intentions of his pursuer.¹ He had been informed, by one of the patriotic daughters of Carolina, of the division of the enemy's force;² and he wisely resolved to take advantage of that injudicious movement before the rear could come up. With that object, Colonel Elijah Clarke was ordered to "take one hundred good men," pass the enemy's right flank, and check the advance of the infantry who had been left on the road;³ while General Sumter, in person, led a heavy body, in front, against the dismounted men under Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, who occupied the high ground on the other side the brook.⁴

The detachment from the Sixty-third regiment, under Major Money, which was in front, received the fire of General Sumter's detachment, and gallantly charged on the assailants,⁵ but it suffered severely—losing its commander, Lieutenants Gibbons and Cope, and one third of the privates.⁶ Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, observing the

¹ McKenzie's Strictures on Tarleton, p. 75; Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Dec. 3; Tarleton, p. 177; Marshall, iv. pp. 388, 389; Stedman, ii. p. 229; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 179; Gordon, iii. p. 471. The Hist. of Civil War in America (iii. p. 150) appears to indicate a greater number of regulars, and Lieut. McLeod (*Rivington's Royal Gazette*, No. 441) says Tarleton had 190 horse and 90 infantry.

² Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Dec. 3; Mills' Statis. of S. C., p. 764.—³ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 75; Col. Hammond's statement; Tarleton, pp. 177, 178; Marshall, iv. p. 389; Gordon, iii. p. 471.—⁴ Ibid.

¹ Tarleton, p. 178; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 150.—² Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Dec. 3; Tarleton, p. 177; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 150.

³ Col. Hammond's statement; Tarleton, p. 178.

⁴ Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Dec. 3; Tarleton, p. 178; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 150.

⁵ Ibid.—⁶ McKenzie's Strictures on Tarleton, p. 76.

danger which surrounded the Sixty-third, moved forward with his dragoons to support it, and they, also, charged on the Americans.¹ The latter appear to have fallen back, and been pursued, across the brook and up the slope of the hill, by the impetuous Tarleton, until he had come within the range of the rifles which had been posted behind the fences which skirted the road, and in the buildings of the plantation, when a murderous fire was opened on him from enemies whom he could not see.² With well-intended zeal he labored to overcome this obstacle by dislodging the Americans, but he struggled in vain;³ and, with some difficulty, through the presence of mind evinced by Lieutenant Skinner, who attacked the party under Colonel Clarke, and covered the retreat,⁴ he succeeded in effecting a retreat,⁵ leaving General

Sumter in quiet possession of the field and of the wounded.⁶

After providing for the comfort of the enemy's wounded,⁷ and burying his own dead,⁸ General Sumter crossed the Tiger, and was speedily beyond the reach of the enemy.⁹ The force which General Sumter had, in this action, numbered five hundred and sixty men, of whom forty ran away during the action;⁵ that of the enemy, actually engaged, according to his own statements, was two hundred and fifty.⁶ The loss of the Americans was three killed and four wounded, among the latter of whom was General Sumter;⁷ that of the enemy was ninety-two killed, and one hundred wounded.⁸

ment; Marshall, iv. p. 390; Stedman, ii. p. 231. The pretension of Tarleton, in claiming a victory, was ridiculed by his own countrymen, and excited some amusement.

¹ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 76; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, Dec. 3; Tarleton, p. 178; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 150; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 179.

² Col. Hammond's statement; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, Dec. 3; Tarleton, p. 178.

³ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 76; Marshall, iv. p. 390; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 179; Gordon, iv. p. 471.

⁴ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 76; Tarleton, p. 178.

⁵ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 76; Col. Hammond's state-

ment; Stedman, ii. p. 231; Lee's Mem., p. 114.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Col. Hammond's statement; Lee's Mem., p. 114.

⁸ Col. Hammond's statement; Marshall, iv. p. 390.

⁹ Col. Hammond's statement; Lee's Mem., p. 113, note. Lieut. McKenzie supposes he had 500.

¹⁰ Tarleton, p. 177; McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 75.

¹¹ Marshall, iv. p. 390.—¹² Ibid. Lieut. McLeod (*Rivington's Royal Gazette*, No. 441) says the loss was fifty killed and wounded.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

November 23, 1780.¹

THE CAPTURE OF FORT ST. GEORGE.

IN the autumn of 1780 a party of refugees from Rhode Island occupied the St. George's manor-house on Smith's Point, in the town of Brookhaven, Long Island, and strengthened it by the addition of a picket, ditch, and other works, for the purpose of protecting the wood-cutters who were engaged in that vicinity, and of keeping open a communication with the Tories who infested that part of the island. Information of this movement having been conveyed to Major Benjamin Tallmadge, a native of that town, he resolved to dislodge them and to destroy a quantity of forage which had been collected in that vicinity—General Washington, to whom he had communicated his design, having approved the expedition.²

Accordingly, at four o'clock in the afternoon of the twenty-first of November, 1780, he embarked on board of eight boats,³ at Fairfield, Connecticut, and, at nine o'clock in the evening, he landed near Old Man's Harbor—since called Mount Sinai⁴—on the south shore

of the Sound. His force consisted of two companies of dismounted dragoons, from Colonel Sheldon's regiment, numbering, including the crews of the boats,¹ about eighty men; and after detaching twenty men, under Captain Sutton, to guard the boats, which had been hauled up and concealed in the bushes, he put his troops in motion to cross the island. After proceeding four or five miles, a heavy southeast wind, followed by rain, warned the Major that he could not re-cross the Sound while it continued, and he returned to his boats, and concealed himself and his men, during the remainder of the night and the following day. At seven o'clock on the evening of the twenty-second, the rain having abated, he again set out for the South Bay, on which the enemy was posted, under the guidance of William Booth;² and about four o'clock in the morning, he had reached a point within two miles of the enemy. After halting a short time to refresh the troops, and to arrange the plan of attack, he approached the fort.

As has been already stated, this post was on Smith's Point, a small "neck" of land which puts out into the Great

¹ Maj. Tallmadge's report to Gen. Washington, Nov. 25, 1780.—² Gen. Washington to Maj. Tallmadge, Nov. 11, 1780.—³ Rivington's Royal Gazette, No. 436, N. Y., Saturday, Dec. 2, 1780.—⁴ Thompson's Long Island, i. pp. 432, 433.

¹ Maj. Tallmadge's report to Gen. Washington, Nov. 25, 1780.—² Onderdonk's Suffolk Co., p. 96.

South Bay, on the south side of Long Island, New York.¹ The large manor-house of the St. George's Manor, standing some distance from the shore, formed the original base of the operations, from which, in front, diverged two strong stockades, twelve feet high, and terminating—that on the right wing, at a small but strongly barreled house; that on the left wing, at a strong fort, on the shore, mounting two pieces of artillery, and defended with a deep ditch and a heavy abatis. The fort and the small house were also connected by a stockade, similar, in all respects, to those which formed the other sides of the triangular inclosure;² and the works had been named *Fort St. George*, after the manor on which it stood.³

The plan adopted by Major Tallmadge was to place two small parties, under trusty officers, on two of the fronts of the works, while he, at the head of the main body, approached the third. The entire party moved with unloaded muskets, and strict orders were issued to the subalterns who commanded the two detachments, to remain in concealment until the enemy had fired on the Major's command.

Just as the day began to dawn, the column which Major Tallmadge commanded, preceded by a party of pioneers, under Lieutenant Brewster, moved towards the east front of the fort; and the head of the column approached within twenty yards of the stockade

before the enemy discovered it.¹ At that moment the sentinel hailed it, and fired; when each of the parties, on the other fronts, rushed from their places of concealment, and prepared to scale the stockade. Although the Major's party was the first to make a breach, the several divisions entered the works at the same moment; and the watchword, "*Washington and Glory*," was repeated from three points of the fort at the same time. Small detachments having been left at the breach and around each house, to prevent the prisoners from escaping, the column was led against the main work, which was carried, "with the bayonet, in less than ten minutes," and the colors of the fort were struck.

While the assailants were standing in the centre of the fort, congratulating themselves on their victory, the action was renewed by a portion of the garrison who had taken possession of one of the houses. The fire was immediately returned, and the whole force of the assailants was directed against the treacherous garrison. With considerable difficulty an entrance was soon afterwards effected, and the greater part of the occupants of the house was thrown headlong from the windows of the second story, receiving at the hands of the infuriated soldiers below, the pun-

¹ Maj. Tallmadge's report to Gen. Washington, Nov. 25, 1780, as published, "by order of Cong.," in *Penn. Packet*, No. 688, *Tuesday, Dec. 12, 1780*. In the "Mem. of Col. B. Tallmadge, prepared by himself" (p. 40), it is said, "The pioneers who preceded my column had reached within 40 yards of the stockade before they were discovered by the enemy."

² Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 834) supposes "the garrison surrendered without resistance." I have used the Major's own language, and suppose it indicates an opposition by the garrison.

¹ Thompson's *Long Island*, i. p. 414.—² Onderdonk's *Suffolk Co.*, pp. 95, 96.—³ Gen. Washington to Maj. Tallmadge, Nov. 28, 1780; Maj. Tallmadge's report to Gen. Washington, Nov. 25, 1780; Mem. of Maj. Tallmadge, p. 40. Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 834) calls it *Fort George*.

ishment which their bad faith had qualified them to receive.

About the same time, also, a vessel,¹ which lay near the fort, was discovered to be in motion, and it was found that the crew was endeavoring to make its escape. The guns of the fort having been brought to bear on her, she was soon secured.

Before sunrise the victory was complete, and after securing the prisoners, two and two, and lashing on their backs bundles containing some of the most valuable of the spoils. The works, the vessel, and great quantities of stores were destroyed, and the Americans and their prisoners, under the command of Captain Edgar, about eight o'clock in the morning, commenced their march, across the island, to the Old Man's Harbor.

Although the victory, at the fort, had been entirely completed, the duty which had devolved on Major Tallmadge was but half finished, while the stores of forage which had been collected at Coram²—some seven or eight miles distant—remained undestroyed. With the intention, therefore, of fully securing the object of his expedition, before leaving Fort St. George, he selected ten men, with Lieutenant Brewster, mounted them on horses which he

found at the fort, and proceeded with them to Coram. He reached that place after riding an hour and a half, and after overcoming the small guard which had been placed there to protect it, he burned about three hundred tons of hay, and met Captain Edgar and the prisoners, on their route to the Sound, after an absence of not more than three hours.

The column reached the Sound at four in the afternoon, and, before sunset, the gallant Major, with his men and his prisoners were afloat and beyond the reach of the enemy. As the darkness overtook them, while they were on the water, they were separated from each other; but one after another they reached Fairfield, and a little after midnight the last came in, in safety.

The loss of the Americans was only one man wounded; that of the enemy was seven killed and wounded, and four officers and fifty rank and file taken prisoners.¹

The successful termination of this expedition, especially the destruction of the forage, called forth the approval and thanks of the commander-in-chief;² and the Federal Congress, also, signified its pleasure by a vote of thanks to the gallant Major and his men.³

¹ I think it is clear that but *one* vessel laid there, although some accounts would indicate a greater number.

² "The destruction of the forage, collected for the use of the British army, at Coram, is of so much consequence, that I should advise the attempt to be made. If the party of refugees at Smith's house can be attempted, without frustrating the other design, or running too great a hazard, I have no objection. But you must remember that this is *only a secondary object.*"—Gen. Washington to Maj. Tallmadge, Nov. 11, 1780.

¹ Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 834) supposes the prisoners were "*three hundred in number.*"—² Gen. Washington to Maj. Tallmadge, Nov. 28. 1780; Gen. Washington's General Orders, Nov. 29, 1780.—³ Journals of Cong.

[This narrative has been founded on the official report of Maj. Tallmadge to Gen. Washington, Nov. 25, 1780, and on his "*Memoir, prepared by himself, at the request of his children, and privately printed for their use,*" for a copy of which I am indebted to his son, Hon. Frederic A. Tallmadge, of the city of New York. Where other works have not been cited, therefore, these are my sole authorities.]

CHAPTER LXXX.

January 5 and 6, 1781.

THE DESTRUCTION OF RICHMOND, V.A.

THE defection of Benedict Arnold was followed, as is usual, in such cases, by the display of an inordinate zeal in the cause of his new master; and, although he had been authorized to raise a regiment of malcontents, his countrymen had no confidence, either in his "Address"¹ or his "Proclamation,"² and all his efforts proved perfectly abortive.³ Disappointed with this unfavorable result, and impatient for more active service, he was, soon afterwards, appointed to the command of a predatory expedition against Virginia, which was intended not only to cripple the cause of the young republic, in that State, and prevent her troops from marching to the aid of General Greene, but, at the same time, to create a diversion in favor of General Cornwallis, and, if necessary, to furnish the means to strengthen his command.⁴

In pursuance of the orders which he

had received, General Arnold sailed from Sandy Hook on the nineteenth of December, 1780,¹ with the Eighteenth, or Edinburgh regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Dundas; the Queen's Rangers, under Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe; a detachment from the New York Volunteers, under Captain Althause; and about two hundred men, whom the General had enlisted into his own corps, in New York,² the whole embracing a force of sixteen hundred men.³ The troops were among the best in the service, and General Arnold might reasonably have felt proud of his command, had not the commander-in-chief, with commendable caution, manifested his distrust of the traitor, not only by the strictness of his orders, but by the appointment of "two officers of tried ability and experience, and possessing the entire confidence of their commander"—Colonel Dundas and Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe,—to accompany him, and

¹ The "Address" of Gen. Arnold, "to the Inhabitants of America," dated "New York, Oct. 7, 1780," can be found, at length, in Rivington's "Royal Gazette," No. 421, N. Y., Wednesday, Oct. 11, 1780, and in *Hist. of Civil War in America*, iii. pp. 378-380.—² This "Proclamation" was published in Rivington's "Royal Gazette," N. Y., from No. 425 (Wednesday, Oct. 25, 1780) to No. 437 (Wednesday, Dec. 6, 1780).—³ Sparks' Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold, p. 318.—⁴ Ibid.

¹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 444. Lieut.-Col. Simcoe (*Jour.*, p. 159) says it sailed on the 21st December.

² Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 174.

³ Sparks' Benedict Arnold, p. 318; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 444; Stedman, ii. p. 382. The author of Hist. of Civil War in America (iii. p. 174) says the force numbered 1700, and Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iv. p. 59) says it was more than 1900.

to share, with him, the honors and responsibilities of the command.¹ A violent gale, which occurred on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, separated the fleet,² but the scattered vessels, except three transports, on board of which were four hundred men, and one armed vessel,³ rejoined it off the Capes of the Chesapeake, and entered Hampton Roads on the thirtieth.⁴

On the thirty-first, without waiting for the arrival of the transports, which were still at sea,⁵ the troops—about twelve hundred in number—were transferred to small vessels and boats, adapted to the navigation,⁶ and proceeded up the James River under convoy of the *Hope* and *Swift*, two small armed vessels.⁷ Late in the evening of the third of January, 1781, the expedition came near Hood's Point,⁸ on which a small party of fifty men had been stationed⁹ with three eighteen-pounders, one twenty-four-pounder, and one brass eight-inch howitzer.¹⁰ When the vessels approached the Point this little force gallantly opened a heavy fire on them; and, as it was quite dark, and the enemy

had no means of knowing the strength or position of his opponents, he cast anchor until the next morning.¹ While it was still dark, General Arnold ordered Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe to land with one hundred and thirty of the Queen's Rangers, the light-infantry, and the grenadiers of the Eightieth regiment, and to attack the battery.² With the greatest possible secrecy a landing was effected at about a mile from the Point, and, by a circuitous route, the troops were led to the attack; but the little garrison having heard the movement had retired, and the Rangers and their commander found no laurels in their victory.³ After spiking the guns Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe returned to the vessels, carrying with him the brass howitzer,⁴ and the expedition moved up the river.⁵ On the next day (*Jan. 4th*) it anchored at Westover, about twenty-five miles below Richmond, where the troops were landed;⁶ and at two o'clock in the afternoon, the line of march to the latter place was taken up.⁷

This descent of the enemy appears to have been entirely unexpected, and no provision had been made to guard against the contingency. When the fleet arrived, the State had no immediate means of defence, and the people

¹ Sparks' Benedict Arnold, p. 319.—² Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extraordinary, N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 445.—³ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., Feb. 3, 1781; Simcoe's Jour., p. 159; Sparks' Benedict Arnold, pp. 319, 320.—⁴ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 445.—⁵ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Simcoe's Jour., p. 159; Spark's Benedict Arnold, p. 320.—⁶ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 190; Randall's Jefferson, i. pp. 297, 298; Marshall, iv. p. 445.

⁷ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781.—⁸ Ibid.; Simcoe's Jour., p. 159.—⁹ Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781.—¹⁰ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781.

¹ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781.—² Ibid.; Simcoe's Jour., p. 159.—³ Simcoe's Jour., p. 160.—⁴ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781.—⁵ Ibid.; Simcoe's Jour., p. 160.

⁶ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 191; Randall's Jefferson, i. pp. 298, 299.—⁷ Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781; Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., Feb. 3, 1781; Simcoe's Journal, p. 160; Marshall, iv. p. 446.

appear to have been comparatively helpless. It is true that Governor Jefferson sent General Nelson to "the lower country" as soon as the presence of the fleet had become known, and had vested in him full "powers to call on the militia in that quarter, or act otherwise, as exigencies would require;"¹ and it is no less true that General Steuben, supposing the stores at Petersburg were the objects of attack, employed about two hundred Continental troops, which he had under his command, to remove them beyond the reach of the invader.² It is equally true, however,—and it was the source of evident mortification to the patriotic leaders in Virginia,³—that the enemy moved into the heart of the country, accomplished his work, and retired with, comparatively, no opposition, while every foot of his progress was susceptible of an obstinate and successful defence. The causes which have been assigned⁴—the numerous impassable rivers which intersect "the lower country," and the thinness of the population—in fact, furnish reasons against the surprise and disgrace with which she was then overtaken, and Virginia can never wholly excuse the apathy which was apparent throughout the entire extent of her central and lower counties.

The march of the enemy from Westover to Richmond was entirely unop-

¹ Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781; Randall's Jefferson, i. p. 297; Tucker's Jefferson, i. p. 147.

² Lee's Memoirs, p. 190; Marshall, iv. p. 445.

³ Lee's Memoirs, pp. 189-194; Col. John Page to Col. Theo. Bland, Jan. 21, 1781.—⁴ Randall's Jefferson, i. pp. 301-304; Marshall, iv. p. 446.

posed,—the few militia who had responded to the orders which had been issued, being too weak to offer any effectual resistance, having fled as he approached,¹—and at one in the afternoon of the fifth of January, he entered the town.²

About two hundred men had assembled,³ under Colonel John Nicholas,⁴ on the heights of Richmond Hill, near the venerable meeting-house of St. John's Church;⁵ and Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe was ordered to dislodge them,⁶ but, without firing a shot, they fled in confusion when he reached the summit of the hill.⁷ A small body of cavalry,⁸ near the site of the capitol, on Shockoe Hill,⁹ who had been watching the movements of Colonel Dundas,¹⁰ also fled when they were approached.¹¹

Without halting at Richmond,¹² after the dispersion of the militia, Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, with his Rangers and the flank companies of the Eightieth regiment,¹³ pushed forward to Westham,¹⁴ six miles above,¹⁵ where were a fine foundry, laboratory, and work-

¹ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Simcoe, p. 161.—² Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781; Tucker's Jefferson, i. p. 149.

³ Simcoe's Jour., p. 162; Randall's Jefferson, i. p. 299.

⁴ Randall's Jefferson, i. p. 299.—⁵ Map in Simcoe's Jour.; Randall's Jefferson, i. p. 299.—⁶ Simcoe's Journal, p. 162.—⁷ Ibid.; Randall's Jefferson, i. p. 299.

⁸ Simcoe's Jour., p. 162.—⁹ Map in Simcoe's Journal

¹⁰ Simcoe's Jour., p. 162.—¹¹ Ibid.—¹² Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781.—¹³ Simcoe's Jour., p. 163; Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781.—¹⁴ Simcoe's Journal, p. 163; Randall's Jefferson, i. p. 299; Marshall, iv. p. 447; Gordon, iv. p. 59.

¹⁵ Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Feb. 10, 1781; Simcoe's Jour., p. 163; Tucker's Jefferson, i. p. 147. Mr. Randall (*Lett. of Jefferson*, i. p. 298) says it is *seven* miles, and Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iv. p. 59), *eight* miles distant.

shops; while General Arnold and the main body remained at Richmond. As no resistance was offered, the expedition was perfectly successful, and, after destroying the greater part of the papers of the auditor's office, and the books and papers of the council office—which had been removed thither for safety—together with five or six tons of gunpowder, the boring-mill, workshops, public store, and foundry; knocking off the trunnions of some iron field-pieces; and carrying off a few muskets, and some other articles, it returned to Richmond, where it arrived the same night.¹

In the mean time the main body, at Richmond, had not been idle. With characteristic impudence the enemy had sent two citizens to Governor Jefferson, with an offer that he would not burn the city, provided the British vessels were allowed to come up the river and remove the tobacco from the warehouses, without molestation.² This proposition was instantly rejected;³ and, on the morning of the sixth, the public property and large quantities of private property, together with some build-

ings, both public and private, were destroyed.⁴

The public loss was much less than has been generally supposed. Besides the destruction of the *roof* of the foundry,—the furnaces and chimneys of which remained uninjured,—the magazine, boring-mill, four workshops, the public store, and quartermaster's store, the public loss appears to have been confined to the books and papers of the council, the papers of the auditor's office; five brass field-pieces; one hundred and fifty stand of arms, from the loft of the capitol; the same number taken in a wagon; a small quantity of linen, cloth, &c.; some quartermasters' stores, including one hundred and twenty sides of leather; the tools in the workshops; and three wagons.¹ The loss to private individuals was much greater.²

About noon, on the sixth of January, the enemy retired from the city,³ and the next day he reached Westover, without the loss of a man.⁴

¹ Mem. of loss, by Mr. Jefferson, copied into Washington's edition of Jefferson's Writings, ix. p. 214; Gov. Jefferson to Gen' Washington, Jan. 10, 1781.—² Mr. Jefferson's "Mem. relative to invasion of Va., 1781."

³ Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 447. Maj. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 192) supposes he retired on the *seventh*.

⁴ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Simcoe's Jour., pp. 164, 165; Marshall, iv. p. 447.

¹ Simcoe's Jour., p. 163; Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781. Maj. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 192) supposes Westham was destroyed on the *sixth*.

² Randall's Jefferson, i. pp. 299, 300; Tucker's Jefferson, i. p. 148.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, Jan. 10, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 447.

C H A P T E R L X X X I.

January 8, 1781.

THE SURPRISE AT CHARLES CITY COURT-HOUSE, VA.

WHILE General Arnold laid at Westover, after his return from Richmond, he was anxious to learn what movements, if any, were in progress to intercept his retreat; and, on the night of the eighth of January, he detached Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, with forty-two troopers, on a scout towards the Long Bridge, for the purpose of procuring the desired information. This party had proceeded about two miles when the advance, under Sergeant Kelly, was challenged by two American mounted-men—a vidette which belonged to General Nelson's command. One of these, with a negro,—the latter of whom was a messenger from some neighboring Tory to the enemy, who had been captured by the vidette,—were taken by Sergeant Kelly, and from them the intelligence was received that a large body of Americans (militia), under Colonel Dudley, was then at Charles City Court-house, a few miles distant, while another body, in advance of the last, was stationed on the road to Westover. It is highly probable the negro's message was an important one, although the nature of it has not transpired, as the little party was immediately ordered to the right about,

and, under his guidance, marched towards the court-house, where the main body was laying. "An unfrequented pathway, which led close to the creek, between the body which was supposed to be in front and that which was at the court-house," was taken; and Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe boldly resolved to "beat up" the latter post,—where, in fancied security, the militia were carousing and making merry at the old tavern, now occupied by Mr. Christian,—and, if successful, to fall on that which was advanced on the Westover road.

This bold design was immediately attempted, but, a short distance in front of the position occupied by the Americans, the assailants were challenged by another vidette, who gave the alarm, and fled towards the main body. The enemy's advance, under Lieutenant Holland, rushed forward towards the court-house, and opened a fire on the militia, by whom it was returned in a confused and scattering manner; while Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, adopting a well-conceived stratagem, completed the confusion into which the latter had been thrown, and secured the victory. Before reaching the court-house he sent

his buglers to the right, "with orders to answer his challenging and sound when he ordered." He then loudly ordered the *imaginary* light-infantry to move, and the clear notes of the bugles, as they sounded "the advance," rang through the frosty air and carried terror to the militia, while the pale moon¹ failed to give sufficient light to show that not a single light-infantryman responded to the call, or that their assailants were not one tenth as numerous as they. Stricken with the terrors which this bold manœuvre had thrown around them, and trembling before the *superior* force which they supposed was about to surround and cut them to pieces, the entire force fled, almost

without resistance, and was pursued by the audacious victors, with all the assurance which a more powerful body might impart.

The old tavern, among other places, became the scene of bloodshed, and here, and in the immediate vicinity, upwards of twenty men, killed and wounded, and eight prisoners, paid the penalty of their reckless negligence and dissipation;¹ while one man killed and three wounded was the only loss incurred by the enemy in this bold and well-conceived assault.²

[This narrative is based on the statement of Lieut.-Col. Tarleton, and, except where other authors are cited, his Journal has been my only authority.]

CHAPTER LXXXII.

JANUARY 17, 1781.

THE BATTLE AT THE COWPENS, S. C.

THE disastrous result of the short campaign in the South, under General Gates, had scattered the laurels which he had worn since October, 1777, and had woven for him that chaplet of willows of which General Charles Lee had given so significant a forewarning.² Where, before this event, his presence

had inspirited the people, he was now met with distrust, or indifference, or positive censure; and, instead of a cordial greeting, wherever he went, no eye was turned to him in sympathy, no tongue saluted him in terms of kindness.³ Even the Federal Congress,

¹ Lieut.-Col. Simcoe says the night was *very dark*; but Ex-Pres. John Tyler informed Mr. Lossing, on the authority of his father, who lived in the immediate vicinity, that the moon was at the full, and the night was a clear, frosty one. See *Field Book of Rev.*, ii. pp. 443, 444.

² "When Gen. Gates was about to set out from Virginia for the South, his old acquaintance and fellow-soldier, Gen.

Charles Lee, waited on him to take leave, and pressing him by the hand, bade him bear in mind, that the laurels of the North must not be exchanged for the willows of the South."—*Lee's Memoirs of the War*, p. 116.

³ Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781; Tucker's Life of Jefferson, i. p. 149.—² Rivington's "Royal Gazette," Extra., N. Y., Feb. 3, 1781.

³ Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 21.

whose auxiliary he had been, in times past, when unworthy deeds were to be executed, now abandoned him; and, without manifesting any uneasiness, in any previous action, it suddenly suspended him from his command, ordered a Court of Inquiry to examine his conduct, and provided for the appointment of a successor in the command of the army.¹

The consternation and dismay which prevailed in the South, after this disaster, had found but little relief in the enterprise and successes of Davie, Campbell, Marion, and Sumter; and when General Greene assumed the command of the department, on the third of December, 1780, the army was but a skeleton, without discipline or supplies, and without means for obtaining even the necessaries of life.² Two thousand men, more than one half of whom were militia, constituted the entire force;³ and he immediately detached General Daniel Morgan, with about six hundred men, to the western bank of the Catawba, with orders to take post in the country between the Broad and the Pacolet Rivers, to check the enemy's foraging parties, and to encourage the inhabitants in that vicinity;⁴ while, with the main body, he moved to Hicks' Creek, on the eastern bank of the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw Hills, and threatened Camden.⁵

¹ Jour. of Cong. (Dunlap's edition), Thursday, Oct. 5, 1780.—² Lee's Mem., pp. 124-126; Graham's Life of Morgan, p. 256—³ Graham's Morgan, p. 258.—⁴ "Instructions" of Gen. Greene, to Gen. Morgan, Dec. 16, 1780; Lee's Memoirs, p. 127; Graham's Morgan, pp. 258-260.

⁵ Graham's Morgan, pp. 258-260.

Lord Cornwallis, with his command, was still at Winnsborough, patiently awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Charleston; and the activity which General Morgan displayed in checking the organization of the Tories, and his own sensitive anxiety for the safety of Fort Ninety-six, filled the former with alarm, and induced him to seek safety in an attempt to cut off the audacious intruder.¹

Accordingly, on the first of January, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton was ordered to cross the Broad River, with the Legion, the First battalion of the Seventy-first regiment of regulars, and two three-pounders, to oppose the movements of General Morgan.² After moving a short distance, and ascertaining the position, strength, and probable intention of his opponent, Tarleton asked for a reinforcement,³ and the Seventh regiment of the line, and about fifty men from the Seventeenth light dragoons, were detached to strengthen him.⁴ With a force now increased to upwards of a thousand men,⁵ Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton immediately pressed forward, crossing the Ennoree and the Tiger on the fourteenth; and, on the morning of the sixteenth, the Pacolet was forded, and an advantageous position, in the neighborhood of General Morgan, taken pos-

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 127.—² Lord Cornwallis to Lieut.-Col. Tarleton, Jan. 2, 1781; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, pp. 210, 211.—³ Lieut.-Col. Tarleton to Lord Cornwallis, Jan. 4, 1781.

⁴ Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 212; Lord Cornwallis to Lieut.-Col. Tarleton, Jan. 5, 1781, 8 p. m.; Same to Sir Henry Clinton, Jan. 18, 1781.

⁵ Ramsay's Revolution in S. C., ii. p. 196.

session of.¹ Patrols were immediately dispatched to seek information, and it soon appeared that General Morgan,—who had left the position which the enemy then occupied, only a short time before the latter reached it²—had encamped near the Cowpens, where, having received some reinforcements, under General Pickens, he had resolved to measure his strength with that of the enemy.³

The position which the Americans occupied is in Spartanburg District, South Carolina, about three and a half miles south from the line of North Carolina. It is intersected by the road which leads from the Cherokee Ford, on the Broad River, to Mills' Gap through the mountains, and by that which leads from the court-house of the district, over the Broad River, at the Island Ford, into North Carolina; being about twenty-five miles northeast from Spartanburg Court-house. It embraces a number of small, parallel ridges, at short distances apart, crossing the road at right angles; and, at the time of the action, it was covered with a heavy growth of red-oak and hickory, with little, if any, underbrush. There was no swamp or other obstruction to protect the flanks of General Morgan's force; while the Broad River, which

ran parallel with his rear, and but a short distance from it, effectually cut off his retreat.¹

Against this position, at three o'clock in the morning of the seventeenth of January, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton led his troops, leaving his baggage to follow him, under a proper guard, after sunrise.² Three companies of light-infantry, supported by the infantry of the Legion, formed the advance of the column; the Seventh regiment, the field-pieces, and the First battalion of the Seventy-first, formed the centre; and the mounted men brought up the rear.³ The extreme darkness and the bad state of the road retarded the march so much that it was near day-break when the Thicketty Creek was passed; and, soon afterwards, the advanced guard was strengthened by a heavy detachment of cavalry from the rear.⁴

In the mean time the movement of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton had been reported to General Morgan, and, having refreshed his men, preparations were made for the action.⁵ The Americans were formed on the crest of one of the ridges above referred to.⁶ The first line, under General Andrew Pick-

¹ Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, pp. 212, 213.

² "On the evening of the 16th inst, they took possession of the ground I had removed from in the morning."—*Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781.* Lee's Mem., p. 130; Stedman, ii. p. 320.—³ Lee's Mem., p. 130. Col. Howard states that Gen. Pickens reached Morgan's camp the night before the action, and it was only then that Gen. Morgan resolved to fight.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 130; Stedman, ii. p. 321.

² Tarleton, p. 214; Lee's Memoirs, p. 130.—³ Tarleton, pp. 214, 215.—⁴ Ibid., p. 215.

⁵ "An hour before daylight one of my scouts returned and informed me that Lieut.-Col. Tarleton had advanced within five miles of our camp. On this information I hastened to form as good a disposition as circumstances would admit, and from the alacrity of the troops, we were soon prepared to receive him."—*Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781.* See also Tarleton, p. 215.

⁶ Graham's Morgan, p. 295.

ens, of South Carolina, was composed of North and South Carolina militia; the second line, under Lieutenant-colonel John Eager Howard, embraced a battalion of Virginian veterans, under Major Triplett, and the Continental troops; Lieutenant-colonel Washington, with his cavalry, and forty-five men from Colonel McCall's South Carolina regiment, mounted, and armed with sabres, were posted in the rear, on the descent, as a *corps-de-reserve*; while in front of all were posted the light troops, under Lieutenant-colonel Cunningham, Majors McDowell and Hammond, and Captain Donnelly,¹ with orders to feel the enemy, as he approached; and, on being pressed, to keep up a well-directed fire as they retired, and to form on the flanks of the front line.² Having formed his troops and issued his orders, General Morgan availed himself of the few minutes which preceded the action to exhort his troops. The scene, which was one of unusual interest—especially since it has become known that, a short time previous, he had sought the assistance of Almighty God, in humble prayer—is thus described by a contemporary writer, under the sanction of the distinguished commander of the second line in this action:—"First addressing himself, with his characteristic pith, to the line of militia, he extolled the zeal and bravery so often displayed by them,

when unsupported by the bayonet or sword; and declared his confidence that they could not fail in maintaining their reputation, when supported by chosen bodies of horse and foot, and conducted by himself. Nor did he forget to glance at his unvarying fortune, and superior experience; or to mention how often, with his corps of riflemen, he had brought British troops, equal to those before him, to submission. He described the deep regret he had already experienced in being obliged, from prudential considerations, to retire before an enemy always in his power; exhorted the line to be firm and steady; to fire with good aim; and if they would but pour in but two volleys, at killing distance, he would take upon himself to secure the victory. To the Continentals he was very brief. He reminded them of the confidence he had always reposed in their skill and courage; assured them that victory was certain if they acted well their part; and desired them not to be discouraged by the sudden retreat of the militia, *that being part of his plan and orders*. Then taking post with this line, he waited in stern silence for the enemy."³

When Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton had approached General Morgan's position, and discovered the preparations which had been made for his reception, he ordered the dragoons of the Legion to drive in the light troops who were acting as skirmishers, and to reconnoitre the disposition and extent of the Amer-

¹ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781; Graham's Morgan, pp. 295, 296; Col. Sam'l. Hammond's statement, in Johnson's "Traditions of the Rev.;" Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 254; Lee's Memoirs, p. 131; Stedman, ii. p. 321.—² Lee's Memoirs, p. 131.

³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 131.

ican lines.¹ The desired information having been obtained, the light-infantry was ordered to file to the right, until its right flank was opposite the left of the American line; the infantry of the Legion, with one of the field-pieces, was moved forward, and took post on the left of the light-infantry; and, still farther to the left,—forming the extreme left of the British line,—the Seventh regiment was formed with the second piece of artillery. A troop of dragoons, under a captain, was placed on each flank. The Seventy-first regiment, under Major McArthur, and the remainder of the cavalry, formed the reserve.²

The intended disposition of the troops, as here described, having been fully executed,³ Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton—probably desiring to take advantage of some apparent disorder in the American lines—threw himself at the head of the first line, and dashed upon the American militia, commanded by General Pickens.⁴ The latter, in accordance with the orders they had received, poured in upon him a close and well-directed fire, at forty or fifty yards dis-

tance;¹ but, as it did not check his progress, in accordance with the same orders,² they retired,—firing as they fell back,—part of them forming again on the right of the second line, agreeably to orders, the remainder retreating until they came to the place where their horses were picketed,³—“probably with orders to remove them to a farther distance;”⁴ or, as mounted men, to render more equal the force, in that arm of the service, of the two detachments.

Naturally supposing that victory was within his reach, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with that reckless impetuosity, which had made his name so famous, even at that early day, rushed forward and attacked the second line; directing, at the same time, the cavalry, which formed his right flank, to charge the left of the American position.⁵ The latter were checked by the fire of General Morgan’s reserve; and Lieutenant-colonel Washington’s cavalry charging on them, while they were still in con-

¹ Graham’s Morgan, p. 300; Moultrie’s Mem., ii. p. 254; Lee’s Mem., p. 132; Ramsay’s Am. Rev., ii. p. 233.

² “The whole of Col. Pickens’ command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders.”—Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781. “They were ordered to give a single fire as the enemy approached, and then to fall back into the intervals which were left for them in the centre by the other battalions of militia. As it was not expected that the militia could long maintain their ground, they were ordered to keep up a retreating fire by regiments till they should pass the Continental troops, on whose right they were directed again to form.”—Marshall’s Washington, iv. p. 401.


³ Tarleton, p. 216; Lee’s Mem., p. 132; Stedman, ii. p. 321; Hist. Civil War in America, iii. p. 153; Ramsay’s Am. Rev., ii. p. 233.—⁴ Lee’s Mem., p. 132.

⁵ Graham’s Morgan, p. 301; Tarleton, p. 216; Lee’s Mem., p. 132; Stedman, ii. p. 322; Hist. Civil War in America, iii. pp. 153, 154.

¹ Tarleton, p. 215.—² Ibid., p. 216; Stedman, ii. p. 321. Gen. Morgan, in his dispatch to Gen. Greene, falls into an error respecting the disposition of the several corps which constituted the enemy’s line; and he has misled many who have followed him.

³ “The disposition being completed, the front line received orders to advance, &c.”—Tarleton, p. 216. Lient.-Col. Lee says (Mem., p. 132), “The disposition was not completed, when, &c.” I have preferred the former authority, notwithstanding Ramsay (Am. Rev., ii. p. 233), Gordon (Am. Rev., iv. p. 34), and Stedman (ii. p. 321) confirm Lee’s version.

⁴ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781; Tarleton, p. 216; Lee’s Mem., p. 132.



fusion, they were driven back with considerable loss;¹ the former was received with the greatest coolness by Lieutenant-colonel Howard and his men, and the contest was maintained with great obstinacy.² Each party, animated by the example of its leader, contended, nobly, for the victory; yet neither showed any signs of uneasiness, or faltered in the discharge of its duty. At length, hoping, by that means, to close the contest, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton ordered the reserve—the Seventy-first regiment—to advance, with orders to pass, on the extreme left of his line, and a little in advance of it, and to deliver its fire; the cavalry still farther to the left, with orders to turn the right flank of the American line.³ When the Seventy-first regiment had advanced, agreeably to the orders it had received, the entire line of the enemy pushed forward, and the Continentals opposing it with equal gallantry, the battle raged furiously.⁴ Perceiving that the enemy was turning his right flank, as before described, Lieutenant-colonel Howard adopted the dangerous experiment of ordering his right flank company to change its front, by throwing back its extreme right and forming at right angles with the main

body.¹ As might reasonably have been expected, the orders were not understood by the men, and instead of changing its front, as its commander desired, the company fell back, and, the line being broken, the field was put in jeopardy.² Perceiving the danger, General Morgan immediately ordered the entire line to fall back, and the order was obeyed with the utmost coolness and precision—the flank company, which had caused the movement, assuming its proper place in the line and restoring order where, but a few moments before, were disorder and impending ruin.³ Considering this retrograde movement an evidence of defeat and the beginning of a flight, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with his entire line, rushed forward, without regard to order or discipline, to reap the honors of their apparent victory.⁴ Yet the same Power which had restored order to the broken line, a few minutes before, still lingered on the field; and witnessing the apparent flight and the eager pursuit, it again interposed in behalf of the cause of Freedom. One bold experiment had produced the disorder; a second, equally bold, had remedied it;

¹ Graham's Morgan, p. 302; Lee's Memoirs, p. 132; Marshall, iv. p. 402.—² Ibid.

³ Tarleton, p. 217; Lee's Mem., p. 132; Stedman, ii. p. 322; Marshall, iv. pp. 402, 403. Mr. Graham (*Life of Morgan*, p. 302) supposes the line retired *without orders*; but Gen. Morgan's dispatch, especially, proves the contrary; and Lieut.-Col. Howard, the commander of the line, who corrected the second edition of *Maj. Lee's Memoirs*, confirms it by leaving on record the same statement.

⁴ "The British rushed forward."—Tarleton, p. 217. "The British rushed on with impetuosity and disorder."—Lee's Memoirs, p. 132. See also Marshall, iv. p. 403.

¹ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 17, 1781; Graham's Morgan, p. 301; Tarleton, p. 216; Lee's Memoirs, p. 133; Stedman, ii. p. 322.

² Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 255; Tarleton, p. 217; Lee's Memoirs, p. 132; Stedman, ii. pp. 321, 322.

³ Tarleton, p. 217; Stedman, ii. p. 322; Marshall, iv. p. 402.

⁴ Tarleton, p. 217; Lee's Memoirs, p. 132; Hist. Civil War in America, ii. p. 154; Marshall, iv. p. 402.

and two more, not less novel in character and successful in execution, remained, to consummate the wonderful victory.

Perceiving the utter disorder into which the enemy had fallen, in the anxiety of his pursuit, General Morgan ordered the line to halt and face about.¹ The astonishment with which the enemy witnessed this sudden movement, was increased when a close, well-directed, and destructive fire was immediately opened on his scattered troops, from the entire line, which, a few moments before, appeared to be retreating before him; and that astonishment soon gave way to increased confusion, alarm, and evidences of flight.² At that auspicious moment, Lieutenant-colonel Howard, taking advantage of the peculiar circumstances which presented themselves before him, ordered the Continentals of his line to fix their bayonets, and charge the enemy.³ The gallant style in which this movement was made, decided the contest, and the enemy retreated in the most perfect disorder.⁴ Notwithstanding the superiority, in numbers, of the

enemy's cavalry, which would have enabled him to cover his retreat, he was unable to avail himself of it, from the fact that while Lieutenant-colonel Howard was engaged in dispersing the infantry, Lieutenant-colonel Washington was closely engaged with the cavalry, and with a similar triumphant result.⁵

The strength of the Americans who were engaged in this memorable action was not more than a thousand men, of whom not more than eight hundred were engaged;⁶ that of the enemy was from a thousand to eleven hundred.⁷ The loss of the former was twelve *killed* and sixty *wounded*;⁸ that of the latter was ten officers and upwards of a hundred rank and file *killed*; twenty-nine officers and upwards of two hundred *wounded*; and more than five hundred, exclusive of the wounded, were taken *prisoners*.⁹ In addition to this, the enemy lost two field-pieces, eight hundred muskets, two standards, thirty-five baggage-wagons, and upwards of a hundred dragoon horses.¹⁰

Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, in company with forty of his cavalry, and a few of his infantry, who he had mounted on his wagon-horses, escaped, and found his way to the head-quarters of

¹ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781; Tarleton, p. 217; Lee's Mem., p. 132; Marshall, iv. p. 403. "Their numbers being superior to ours, they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position. We re-tired in good order about fifty paces, formed, advanced on the enemy, and gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder."—Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 17, 1781.

² Tarleton, p. 217; Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Jan. 18, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 132; Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 17, 1781; Graham's Morgan, p. 304; Marshall, iv. p. 403.—³ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 17, 1781; Graham's Morgan, p. 304; Tarleton, p. 217; Lee's Mem., p. 132; Stedman, ii. p. 322; Marshall, iv. p. 403.—⁴ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 17, 1781; Tarleton, p. 217; Lee's Mem., p. 132; Stedman, ii. p. 322; Marshall, iv. p. 403.

¹ Graham's Morgan, p. 303; Lee's Mem., pp. 132, 133; Stedman, ii. p. 322; Marshall, iv. p. 403.—² "We fought only eight hundred men, two thirds of which were militia."—Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781.

³ Gen. Morgan (*Letter to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781*) says, "We were opposed by upwards of a thousand British troops."—⁴ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 234.—⁵ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781; Stedman, ii. p. 323; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 234; Marshall, iv. pp. 404, 405.—⁶ Gen. Morgan to Gen. Greene, Jan. 19, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 405.

Lord Cornwallis; and, during the same, and the following days, the greater part of the cavalry also came in. The infantry, however, was less fortunate, nearly all, except the baggage-guard,—those above referred to,—having been either killed or taken.¹

It has been said that what Bennington was to General Burgoyne, in the North, the Cowpens was to General Cornwallis, in the South—the source of untold mischief, and the precursor of disaster and defeat. But here the parallel ceases. In the former, General Stark met an inferior force of Germans—strangers in our country, whose habits and appointments were not adapted to the warfare in which they were en-

gaged: in the latter, General Morgan opposed a superior force, embracing the *élite* of the British army, provided with artillery and a superior body of cavalry, perfectly acquainted with the country and the habits of the people, and led by one of the most energetic and successful officers in the British service. Notwithstanding this difference in the circumstances attending the two actions referred to, the heroes of both merited the honor which they have received; and the deeds of Stark and Warner, Nichols, Hubbard, and Stickney, beside those of Morgan and Pickens, Howard, Washington, and Triplett, will always be precious in the memory of their countrymen.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

February 1, 1781.

THE ACTION AT McCOWAN'S FORD.

THE intelligence of the defeat of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, at the Cowpens, was received by General Lord Cornwallis "with serenity, but deep regret;" and measures were immediately adopted to retrieve the loss he had sustained.² With this object in view, he converted his entire army into light troops, destroying the baggage and heavy stores,

and leaving nothing but a small supply of clothing, and a sufficient number of wagons for the conveyance of hospital-stores, salt, and ammunition, and four others for the accommodation of the sick and wounded.¹ Immediately afterwards he moved from his encampment, and commenced that celebrated pursuit, which, next to that through

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 133; Stedman, ii. pp. 322, 323.

² Stedman, ii. p. 325; Lee's Memoirs, p. 135.

¹ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Stedman, ii. p. 326; Lee, p. 135.

the Jerseys, in the fall of 1776, has attracted more attention than any similar movement in the history of America.

In the mean time General Morgan had not been inactive. Knowing his own weakness, and the peculiarity of his position, the troops were called back from their eager pursuit of the fugitives, and preparations were made for an immediate retreat. Leaving the wounded, whom he had captured at the Cowpens, with surgeons to take care of them, he ordered the militia to move forward with the prisoners, while, with the regulars and the cavalry, he brought up the rear.¹ The same evening he crossed the Broad River, and by a rapid movement, on the evening of the twenty-ninth of January, he reached Sherrard's Ford, and crossed the Catawba,² at which place, two days afterwards, General Greene, who had hastened to meet him, also arrived.³

The rear guard of General Morgan's command had just passed the river when the advance of the enemy appeared on the opposite bank, but Lord Cornwallis, considering the American force to be already within his reach, made no immediate attempt to pass the stream.⁴ Again, by a special intercession of Providence, which was signally displayed, General Morgan's party was spared from the enemy; and, on the following morning, the Catawba—whose

angry waters, swollen by the rain which had fallen during the night, were no longer fordable—interposed a barrier which neither might nor power could remove.¹ For two days the enemy was thus kept in check, and General Morgan, taking advantage of the delay, sent forward the prisoners, the arms, and the stores, which he had captured at the Cowpens,² while, relieved from this incumbrance, in person, he watched the enemy, and, with the assistance of the Mecklenburg and Rowan militia, who had assembled, under General William Davidson, for that purpose, he took steps to impede his progress.³

On the thirty-first of January, General Greene reached the camp of General Morgan, and assumed the command of the detachment;⁴ and, on the evening of the same day, General Cornwallis took measures to secure the passage of the river. He had previously obtained the assistance of "inhabitants and spies," "to discover the state of the private passes through the river, that the main column of the army might attempt some place not strongly guarded, whilst a detachment, with great demonstration, occupied the attention of the Americans at the most frequented and shallowest part of the Catawba;"⁵ and he resolved to renew the stratagem which had been employed so

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 325; Gordon, iv. p. 37.—² Gordon, iv. p. 37.—³ Stedman, ii. p. 327; Gordon, iv. p. 38.

⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 326; Lee's Memoirs, p. 136; Ramsay's American Revolution, ii. p. 237.

⁵ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 206.—⁶ Lee's Mem., p. 136; Gordon, iv. p. 38; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 206.—⁷ Tarleton's Memoirs, pp. 223, 224.

frequently, and, sometimes, so successfully, in other parts of the country. Accordingly orders were issued that "a large proportion of the King's troops"¹ should move, at one o'clock in the morning of the first of February, to McCowan's Ford—six miles below Beattie's Ford, where General Greene then laid with the main body; while, at sunrise, Colonel Webster was to move, with the Thirty-third regiment, the Second Battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, the North Carolina refugees,—known as "the Royal North Carolina Regiment,"—under Lieutenant-colonel Hamilton, the Yagers, the artillery, and all the wagons, to the latter pass.² The morning being very dark and rainy, and part of the way, over which the main body had to pass, being through a wood, in which was no beaten road, one of the field-pieces was overset into a swamp, part of the troops—among whom was the artilleryman who carried the match, which was necessary to render the second field-piece useful—were separated from the main body, and some confusion ensued.³ At the same time, the camp-fires, on the opposite side of the Catawba, showed conclusively that General Greene had not left the ford without protection, although it was a "private ford," at a distance of six miles below his encamp-

ment;⁴ and it was also evident "the opposition would be greater than General Cornwallis had expected."⁵ It is probable that the enemy, had he been left to himself, would not have attempted the passage, but the falling rain reminded him of the possibility of another freshet keeping him in check, beyond the time which he might desire repose; and the intelligence of General Huger's approach, with the main body of the Southern army, warned him of the possibility of an early junction of the two bodies. He determined, therefore, to press forward, and force a passage.⁶

The pass at McCowan's—or, as it is generally written, Cowan's—Ford, is in the southwestern part of the State of North Carolina, about twenty miles northwest from Charlotte, North Carolina. The Catawba, at that place, is a rapid stream, about five hundred yards wide, and the ford, about the middle of the stream, diverges from a straight line, terminating some distance below.⁴ On the left bank of the Catawba, opposite the eastern terminus of the ford, for the purpose of defending it, General Davidson had been stationed, with three hundred of the Mecklenburg militia, among whom were Captain Joseph Graham and his company.⁵

General Cornwallis having determin-

¹ Tarleton, p. 224. Gen. Cornwallis (*Letter to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17*) says this body embraced Gen. O'Hara's brigade of Guards, the regiment of Bose (Hessian), two hundred cavalry, and two three-pounders.

² Tarleton, p. 224; Stedman, ii. p. 327.

³ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781.

⁴ Stedman, ii. 327; Lee's Mem., p. 136.—⁵ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781.—⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Map of the action in Stedman's Hist. of the War; Stedman, ii. p. 327.—⁸ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Stedman, ii. p. 327; Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, pp. 343–345; Wheeler's N. C., ii. pp. 235, 264.

ed to proceed across the river, General O'Hara's brigade of guards, led by the light company, under Lieutenant-colonel Hall, moved forward and entered the river, with orders, however, not to fire until after they had gained the opposite bank.¹ When the head of the column had reached the middle of the stream, the American sentry hailed it, and gave the alarm;² when a fire was immediately opened by Captain Graham's company,³ and, afterwards, by the entire detachment.⁴ The guide, who was conducting the column, becoming alarmed when the fire was opened, deserted his post, without informing Lieutenant-colonel Hall of the change in the course of the ford;⁵ and that officer led the enemy *directly* across the river, much to the inconvenience of the troops⁶ and the disappointment of General Davidson, who had taken a position at the termination of the ford.⁷

Perceiving, from the course of the enemy's column, that his position was unsuited for the purpose intended, General Davidson immediately ordered his little force to incline to the right. This movement was promptly and handsomely performed by the militia, but before the new position could be occupied, the enemy's light-infantry had gained the shore, formed, and opened its fire.⁸

¹ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781.

² Stedman, ii. p. 328; Tarleton, p. 224; Lee's Mem., p. 136.—³ Wheeler's N. C., ii. p. 235.—⁴ Lamb's Jour. of Occur., pp. 344, 345; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 158.—⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 328; Lee's Memoirs, p. 136.

⁶ Tarleton, p. 224; Stedman, ii. p. 328; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., pp. 343-345; Lee's Memoirs, p. 136.

⁷ Lee's Memoirs, p. 136.—⁸ Stedman, ii. p. 328; Lee's Memoirs, pp. 136, 137; Gordon, iv. p. 39.

Undismayed by this new and unexpected result, the militia formed and opened a well-directed fire, both on the light-infantry and on the troops who were still in the river and pressing forward to gain the shore. Lieutenant-colonel Hall, on shore, was killed,¹ and General Cornwallis's horse was shot while it was in the water, and fell as soon as it had borne its rider to the shore.² As the enemy's troops reached the shore they formed into line, and supported the light troops, until, overborne by numbers, the militia were obliged to retreat.³ Their gallant commander, General Davidson, when the retreat commenced, called for his horse, for the purpose of directing the movements of his troops, but, as he was mounting, he was shot through the heart, and fell dead.⁴

When the entire force of the enemy had passed the river, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with the remnant of the Legion and the Twenty-third regiment, was ordered to move against the rear of the American camp at Beattie's Ford; or, in case the camp had been broken up, to patrol the country and to seek information. In consequence of the retreat of General Greene, the latter duty was all that remained for the detachment to perform; in the course of which intelligence was received that a

¹ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Tarleton, p. 225; Stedman, ii. p. 329.

² Stedman, ii. p. 329, note; Serg. Lamb, p. 345.

³ Lee's Mem., p. 137.—⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 328; Lee's Mem., p. 137. As Gen. Davidson was killed by a rifle-ball, while the British troops were armed with muskets, it has been supposed he was shot by a *Tory*.

body of militia was to rendezvous at Tarrant's tavern, ten miles from McCowan's at two in the afternoon of that day. Exulting over this splendid opportunity to avenge his defeat on the seventeenth of January, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with his cavalry, hastened forward to attack this party. He was evidently disappointed, however, in finding the militia "were vigilant, and prepared for an attack;" nor were his doubts removed, when, by their first fire, the militia killed and wounded seven of his men, and twenty of his horses. With great good judgment he immediately desired his men to "*remember the Cowpens*," and ordered them to charge. They immediately dashed into the centre of the militiamen's line, and the latter, with but a trifling loss, gave way and fled.¹

¹ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Tarleton, pp. 225, 226; Stedman, ii. p. 329. The latter writer, who was with Lord Cornwallis, says, "A

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The loss of the Americans, at the ford, besides General Davidson, "was small,"¹ but the exact number has not been recorded:² that of the enemy was Lieutenant-colonel Hall and three men, *killed*, and thirty-six *wounded*.³

General Greene having withdrawn from Beattie's Ford, as soon as the enemy's passage, at McCowan's, was made known to him, Lieutenant-colonel Webster passed the river at Beattie's, and joined the main body on the same day, when another of the series of pursuits and retreats, which have rendered this campaign so famous, was commenced.⁴

British officer who rode over the ground, not long after the action, says that he did not see *ten* dead bodies of the provincials in the whole."

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 137.—² Tarleton (*Southern Campaigns*, p. 225) says it amounted to "about forty men, killed and wounded."—³ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Stedman, ii. p. 329.

⁴ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 137; Ramsay's American Revolution., ii. p. 236.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

February 25, 1781.

THE DEFEAT OF THE TORIES UNDER COLONEL PYLE.

THE retreat of General Greene, to which reference has been made, was followed by his junction with General Huger, near Guilford,¹ and by a continuation of his retreat, and of the pursuit under Lords Cornwallis and Rawdon, until the Dan River separated the two armies, and guaranteed the safety of the fugitives.² The withdrawal of the enemy's force to Hillsborough, North Carolina, and the elevation of the royal standard, at that place, soon followed;³ while the remnants of the "Regulators," and of the Highlanders, and others who sympathized with the Royal cause, flocked around it, in response to the proclamations which were scattered by General Lord Cornwallis.⁴

To counteract these movements, on the eighteenth of February,⁵ Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with his Legion; Captain Oldham, with two companies of Maryland veterans; and General Andrew Pickens, with the South Carolina militia, were ordered to repass the Dan;

to gain the front of Lord Cornwallis, and to place themselves as close to him as possible, for the purpose of cutting off some of his lines of communication, and of checking the designs of the loyalists.¹ No time was lost in unnecessary delay, and these orders were immediately executed.

Soon afterwards, while the enemy was still ignorant of the return of the Americans to North Carolina, the scouts which had been sent out returned with information that Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with his Legion, had passed up the Haw River, probably for the purpose of covering the movements of the Tories.² A movement was immediately made in pursuit of this detachment, and a position, four miles from that occupied by the enemy, was taken, temporarily, by the Americans. The utmost privacy was necessary, however, to conceal the pursuit, and it appears to have been perfectly successful. The fortunate capture of a countryman, who communicated full particulars concerning the strength and disposition of the enemy's force, ap-

¹ Gordon, iv. p. 41; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 238.

² Marshall, iv. pp. 409-416.—³ Gordon, iv. p. 47; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781.

⁴ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 238; "By the Right Honorable Charles, Earl Cornwallis, &c., A Proclamation," dated "Hillsborough, Feb. 20, 1781."

⁵ Marshall, iv. p. 417.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 152.—² Marshall, iv. p. 418; Gordon, iv. p. 48; Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781.

peared to indicate an immediate engagement, and the troops were moved forward in order of battle, for that purpose; but Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton had moved forward before the Americans had reached his position, and the anxious pursuers were disappointed. Once more the pursuit was resumed; and, in order to render the movement still more secure, it was determined to assume the character of a reinforcement which had been sent from Hillsborough to strengthen Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton. As the two parties were advancing on the same road; as their uniforms were but slightly different; and, as the re-entrance of the Americans into North Carolina was entirely unknown to the enemy, this deception was readily accomplished, and the most perfect success appeared to be within the grasp of the pursuers.

While thus moving forward, in the immediate vicinity of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's new position, the American column was met by two young countrymen, well mounted, who were accosted by the former, in its assumed character. Supposing they were among friends, the latter announced themselves as messengers who had been sent forward from a party of loyalists, in their rear, to ascertain the position of Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's camp, and to receive his orders. They were immediately carried back to Lieutenant-colonel Lee, preceded by a dragoon, who conveyed the information they had already imparted; and immediate steps were taken to conceal the deception. An officer was dis-

patched to General Pickens, with a request that the militia might be removed to the extreme left of the column, beyond the sight of the two messengers; two prisoners, who had been taken by the Americans, were enjoined to keep silent, on pain of death; and Lieutenant-colonel Lee assumed the name and character of Tarleton. The messengers were received with great apparent cordiality, their loyalty was applauded, and the information they conveyed was received with great satisfaction. One of them, with two dragoons, was sent to the van, with a request that they would ride forward to Colonel Pyle,—who commanded the Tories,—and desire him to draw his troops on the margin of the road, in order that the weary column might pass forward to its proposed encampment, without delay: the other messenger was detained by Lieutenant-colonel Lee.

When the head of the American column had come within sight of the Tories, it halted, agreeably to the orders which it had received; and Lieutenant-colonel Lee advanced to meet Colonel Pyle. The latter, at the head of four hundred well-mounted and well-armed men, had formed his line on the *right* side of the road; and, with the greatest deference, awaited the approach of his supposed friend; while the possibility of surprise does not appear to have entered his mind.¹ Lieu-

¹ The spot where this action took place is on "a plantation-road," belonging to Col. Michael Holt, about half a mile north of the old Salisbury highway, and two miles from the Allamance, in Orange Co., North Carolina.

tenant-colonel Lee states that his design was to pass in front of the enemy's line, and place it under the control of his own force, when he proposed to make known his true character, "with a solemn assurance of the enemy's perfect exemption from injury, and with the choice of returning to their homes, or of taking a more generous part, by uniting, with the defenders of their common country, against their common foe."

The American column passed along the front of the line, and Lieutenant-colonel Lee, on the extreme right, was in the act of taking Colonel Pyle by the hand, when the extreme left of the line of Tories discovered, in the twigs of evergreens which graced the hats of General Pickens' militia, the emblem of republican sentiments; and a fire was opened on Captain Eggleston's troop of cavalry, which formed the rear of that part of the American column. The fire was immediately returned by the latter, and, in a few seconds, the entire line was engaged. The unfavorable position occupied by the Tories, the surprise which manifested itself at the sudden appearance of an enemy who was supposed to have been in Virginia, and the superior discipline of the Americans, rendered the affair a short, but bloody one. Ninety of the enemy

were killed on the spot, and nearly all the survivors were wounded; while, of the Americans, not a man, and but one horse was lost.¹

It appears that Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with his command, were not more than a mile distant from the scene of this terrible slaughter;² and those who escaped found shelter within his encampment. It is also said that the frightful stories of the fugitives filled him with so much terror that he hastened to recross the Haw, and returned to Hillsborough with the greatest possible speed.³

"This terrible carnage, in a great measure, broke the spirits of the Tories in that part of the country, and intimidated many who were disposed to take up arms in support of the Royal cause. Some, who were actually on their way to join the British standard, returned, in order to wait the issue of events, before they went too far to recede."⁴

¹ Serg. Lamb (*Jour. of Occur.*, p. 347) says "two or three hundred were inhumanly butchered;" and Stedman (*Hist. of Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 334) and Marshall (*Life of Washington*, iv. p. 419), confirm this statement.

² Marshall, iv. p. 418.—³ Ibid., p. 419; Ramsay's *Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 240.—⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 419; Gordon, iv. p. 49; Caldwell's *Life of Greene*, p. 219.

[The narrative of Lieut.-Col. Lee (*Mem.*, pp. 153-157) has formed the basis of this chapter, and, where no other author has been referred to, that work forms my sole authority.]

CHAPTER LXXXV.

MARCH 6, 1781.

THE SKIRMISH AT WETZELL'S MILL.

THE detachment of General Pickens, Lieutenant-colonel Lee, and Captain Oldham, and their movement across the Dan, into North Carolina, was followed, a few days afterwards, by the advance of General Greene, with the main body, in the same direction.¹ This was followed by the retreat of Lord Cornwallis from Hillsborough, where he had raised the Royal standard a short time before, and by his occupation of a position near the Allamance Creek and Stinking Quarter.² Of this movement it has been well said, by one of the most active officers in the enemy's service: "If General Greene lost the confidence of his friends by quitting North Carolina when pursued by a superior force, Earl Cornwallis likewise relinquished his claim to the superiority of the British arms by abandoning Hillsborough upon the return of the American general into the province; and both officers, from this period, placed their future hopes in their own military conduct, and rested the event of the campaign upon the operations of their respective armies."³

When General Greene had received information of the retreat of General Cornwallis, he, too, crossed the upper waters of the Haw, and took post between Troublesome Creek and the Reedy Fork.¹ By a constantly changing policy,—one day moving in one direction, the next threatening a post in a different direction, and the third falling back on the Troublesome,—the enemy was perplexed, and in continued dread of an attack; while the light troops, under Colonel Otho H. Williams, which constantly hovered between the two armies, served, still more, to perplex and annoy him.²

On the fifth of March, information was received by Lord Cornwallis, that General Greene, with the main body of the army, had taken a position near Guilford Court-house; while the American light troops and militia extended down the Reedy Fork, towards the Haw River, for the purpose of protecting the country and keeping open the communication with Virginia and the upper country.³ Feeling unwilling to

¹ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Lee's Mem. of the War, p. 160.—² Stedman, ii. p. 334; Tarleton, p. 234.—³ Tarleton, p. 234.

¹ Tarleton, p. 234; Marshall, iv. p. 420.

² Marshall, iv. pp. 420, 421; Caldwell's Life of Greene, pp. 221, 222; Lee's Mem., p. 161.—³ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781.

tolerate so close a neighbor as this,¹ he resolved "to distract General Greene's communications, and derange his projects,"² and, with that object, early in the morning of the sixth of March, he crossed the Allamance, and approached the Reedy Fork.³ The light troops, supported by Colonel Webster's brigade, led the column; the regiment of Bose and the brigade of Guards formed the centre; and Hamilton's corps of North Carolina refugees, with the wagons, brought up the rear.⁴ The morning was very foggy, and effectually concealed the movement until the head of the column had nearly reached the left of the American lines.⁵ This position was occupied by the Virginia militia, under Colonel Campbell,—one of the heroes of King's Mountain, who had recently joined the light troops and relieved General Pickens,⁶—but the Legion, under Lieutenant-colonel Lee, moved forward to its support, and the enemy's progress was checked⁷ until the main body of the light troops had secured its retreat over Reedy Fork,⁸ when they also retired, without loss, and joined Colonel Williams.⁹

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 162.—² Tarleton, p. 237.

³ Stedman, ii. p. 336; Marshall, iv. p. 421; Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 348.—⁴ Tarleton, p. 237.

⁵ Marshall, iv. p. 421; Gordon, iv. p. 50; Lee's Mem., p. 162; Col. O. H. Williams to Gen. Greene, March 7, 1781.

⁶ Lee's Mem., p. 162. Col. O. H. Williams (*Letter to Gen. Greene, March 7, 1781*) says the covering party was commanded by Col. Preston.

⁷ Gordon, iv. p. 51; Lee's Memoirs, p. 162.

⁸ Stedman, ii. p. 336; Gordon, iv. p. 51; Lee's Mem., p. 162; Col. O. H. Williams' letter to Gen. Greene, March 7, 1781.—⁹ Stedman, ii. p. 336; Gordon, iv. p. 51; Col. O. H. Williams to Gen. Greene, March 7, 1781.

As the Reedy Fork was fordable, both above and below Colonel Williams' position, he determined to retire, leaving Colonel Campbell and Lieutenant-colonel Lee to cover his rear and check the enemy's advance. For this purpose, a company of Colonel Preston's Virginia militia was detached to guard the pass near Wetzell's Mill, a short distance to his left; while the main body was also disposed in such a manner that it could check the enemy, should he attempt to ford the stream. The infantry was drawn up in a single line, parallel to the stream, with its right resting on the road; the riflemen, under Colonels Preston and Campbell, occupied a copse of wood, with its left resting on the road opposite the right of the infantry; and the cavalry, in a second line, was well situated to cover the flanks of the infantry, or to check the enemy's horse in case of a retreat.¹

In the mean time Lord Cornwallis had ordered Colonel Webster, with his brigade,—composed of the Twenty-third, Thirty-third, and Seventy-first regiments,—the light company of the Guards, and the Yagers, to form a line and attack the American position, while the remainder of the troops remained in column, and they approached the stream for that purpose.² As they descended the bank, into the stream, a heavy fire of musketry and rifles threw them into disorder, and they fell back to the edge of the bank. At this moment Lieutenant-colonel Webster rode

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 163.—² Tarleton, p. 237.

up, addressed the men, threw himself in front of the line, and plunged into the stream. Notwithstanding a select party of twenty-five picked marksmen poured their fire upon him, he escaped without injury, and formed his men under the high bank of the stream.¹

When it was seen that the enemy had gained the bank, the American line retired from its flanks, and re-formed on the rear of the cavalry; while the centre, still occupying its original position, maintained an active opposition while the enemy was ascending the bank.² The superiority of numbers, however, enabled the enemy, as soon

as he formed on the bank, to dislodge the little party, which was done, and his advance was continued until he was checked by the Legion cavalry. Soon afterwards the Americans retired, the cavalry under Lieutenant Rudolph covering the rear; and, evening coming on, nothing farther was attempted.³

The gallantry with which the enemy was checked by so small a party was worthy of all praise, and a loss of thirty men has been acknowledged by his officers,² who also claim that the Americans lost upwards of a hundred men, although the loss did not exceed fifty.³

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

MARCH 15, 1781.

THE BATTLE AT GUILFORD.

AFTER the skirmish at Wetzell's Mill, of which notice has been taken,³ Lord Cornwallis withdrew his troops to their former station on the Allamance Creek;⁴ while General Greene fell back to the iron-works, on Troublesome Creek.⁵ Soon afterwards, the reinforcements from Virginia and North Carolina, which General Greene had expected, reached the camp;⁶ and, on the thirteenth of March, his force—including

one hundred and sixty-one cavalry, and fourteen hundred and ninety Continentals—numbered four thousand, four hundred, and four men.⁴ He had, previously, disbanded the light corps; and, now, supposing that his force warranted the movement, on the fourteenth, he moved to Guilford Court-house, within

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 163, 164.—² Marshall, iv. p. 421;

Lee's Mem., p. 164.—³ Vide Chap. LXXXV.

⁴ Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 348.—⁵ Lee's Mem. of War, p. 165.—⁶ Gordon, iv. p. 53; Lee's Mem., p. 165.

2 Tarleton, p. 238; Gordon, iv. p. 52; Lee's Mem., p. 164. 2 Tarleton, p. 238. Marshall (*Life of Washington*, iv. p. 422) supposes the enemy's loss was greater than that of the Americans; and Gordon (iv. p. 52) concurs in that opinion.—³ Marshall, iv. p. 421; Gordon, iv. p. 52; Col. O. H. Williams (*Letter to Gen. Greene, March 7, 1781*) says, "our loss is very inconsiderable; very few were killed, and most of our wounded were brought off."

⁴ Gordon, iv. p. 54.

eight miles of Lord Cornwallis's camp, and offered battle;¹ and, on the same day, he dispatched Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with the Legion, as an advance guard, on the road which led towards the enemy's camp, some two or three miles from the main body.²

Intelligence of this movement of the American army soon reached the enemy's camp, and Lord Cornwallis, considering it an offer of battle, dispatched his baggage and stores, under a strong guard, to Bell's Mill, on the Deep River, and prepared for action.³ Early in the morning of the fifteenth of March, in pursuance of this design, he moved from his position, near the Quaker's Meeting-house, between the forks of the Deep River, "to meet General Greene on the way, or attack him in his encampment."⁴ Taking the great road, with Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton in the van, and the brigade of Guards in his rear,⁵ he had not proceeded half the distance when he was met by Lieutenant-colonel Lee, who, after skirmishing with the advance guard, for some distance, suddenly turned on it and cut to pieces a section of Tarleton's dragoons; pursued and drove it into the light-infantry of the Guards, who followed it; and, following the advantage, inflicted a heavy blow on the latter, and compelled his lordship to move the Twenty-third regiment—the Welsh

Fusileers—to support the advance and repel the assailants.¹ Captain Goodricke, of the Guards, and about thirty of the enemy, fell in this attack;² while Lieutenant-colonel Lee and his party, after winning golden opinions, even from their opponents,³ retired with but little loss;⁴ and the enemy approached the position occupied by General Greene.

"Guilford Court-house," or, as it has since been called, Martinsville, near which General Greene was encamped, was, at that time, the county-seat of Guilford county, North Carolina. It is five miles northwest from Greenesborough, the present county-seat, and is eighty-seven miles west from Raleigh, the capital of the State. At the time referred to "the greater part of the country was a wilderness, with a few cleared fields interspersed, here and there; and the army was drawn up on a large hill, surrounded by other hills, the greater part of which was covered with timber and thick underbrush."⁵ The front line, with two field-pieces, under Captain Singleton, was composed entirely of North Carolina militia, under the command of Generals Eaton and Butler, and occupied the edge of the wood, with two of the cleared fields on their front. The rail-fence, which separated the woods from the cleared fields, formed an important defence; and, although

¹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 168.—² Lee's Memoirs, p. 168.

³ Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Tarleton, p. 270.—⁴ Gordon, iv. p. 54; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 169.—⁵ Tarleton, pp. 270, 271; Stedman, ii. p. 337.

¹ Tarleton, pp. 270, 271; Lee's Camp. of 1781, pp. 169, 170; Lee's Mem. of the War, pp. 168-170; Stedman, ii. p. 337.—² Tarleton, p. 271. Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iv. p. 54) supposes the loss was about 150 men.

³ Tarleton, p. 271; Hist. of Civil War in America, p. 169; Stedman, ii. p. 337.—⁴ Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 170.

⁵ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March, 16, 1781.

the militia was undisciplined, it was hoped that it would render good service. The second line, which occupied the woods, about three hundred yards in the rear of the first, was composed of Virginia militia, under the command of Generals Stevens and Lawson; and the third line, which occupied a hill, behind two cleared fields, about four hundred yards in the rear of the second line, was composed of the Virginia and Maryland lines of Continental troops,—the former under Colonel Green and Lieutenant-colonel Hawes, the latter under Colonel Gunby and Lieutenant-colonel Ford,—the whole under the command of General Huger and Colonel Otho H. Williams. The formation of the ground was such that the third line was not parallel with the second—the left diverging from it; and “as the hill drew to a point where they were posted,” it presented a double front. The right of the third line was covered by Lieutenant-colonel Washington, with the dragoons of the First and Third regiments; the remains of the gallant Delaware regiment, under Captain Kirkwood, acting as light-infantry; and a regiment of riflemen, under Colonel Lynch, while Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with his Legion, a detachment of light-infantry, and a corps of riflemen, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, covered the left of the line.¹

¹ This description of the ground, and the disposition of the troops, has been compiled from various statements, among the principal of which are Gen. Greene's dispatch to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; the Maps of the action, in Tarleton and Stedman; Lee's Mem. of the War; Tarleton's Southern Campaigns; Stedman's Ameri-

As the enemy approached the position which was occupied by the American troops, the latter opened a fire with their field-pieces, and the enemy immediately answered it, during which he formed his line of battle.¹ Major-general Leslie was moved to the right, with the Seventy-first regiment of the line and the Hessian regiment of Bose; while the First battalion of the Guards, under Lieutenant-colonel Norton, was also moved in that direction, as the reserve; and, at the same time, Lieutenant-colonel Webster was moved to the left, with the Twenty-third and Thirty-third regiments; and the Second battalion of the Guards and the grenadier company, under General O'Hara, were moved in the same direction, as a reserve to that wing. The artillery, under Lieutenant McLeod, occupied the highway, in the centre, opposite the American field-pieces; the Yagers and the light-infantry of the Guards, after the line had been formed, moved to the extreme left; and Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, with his Legion and the dragoons, in consequence of the under-brush, were compelled to move in column in the rear, until the open fields, in front of the first line, could be reached.²

Immediately after the enemy had formed his troops, at about half-past

can Revolution; Lee's Campaign of 1781; and Lee's Memoirs of the War, pp. 170, 171.

¹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Tarleton, pp. 272, 273; Gordon, iv. p. 55; Lee's Mem., p. 171.—² Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Tarleton, pp. 272, 273.

one o'clock, he moved forward "with steadiness and composure," towards the American lines.¹ The North Carolinians, who occupied the fence, maintained their position until the enemy had approached within one hundred and fifty yards, when a part of them opened a fire, but the greater part retained it.² After returning the fire, the enemy, with a shout, charged rapidly with the bayonet, when the entire line of Carolinians, a considerable part without firing at all, turned and fled, notwithstanding their officers "did all they could to induce them to stay."³ The second line opened its files and allowed the fugitives to pass through;⁴ while, in concert with the flanking parties which supported the Carolinian militia, it opened a destructive fire, and severely handled the enemy as he approached.⁵ In fact, the opposition which Colonel Campbell and Lieutenant-colonel Lee made on the enemy's right, and the terrible execution which the riflemen inflicted on his flank, rendered it necessary for General Leslie to move his reserve, under Lieutenant-colonel Nor-

ton, into the line; while a similar reception of his left, by Colonel Lynch, Lieutenant-colonel Washington, and Captain Kirkwood, compelled the reserve of the enemy's left wing, under General O'Hara, to move forward and take a position in the line commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Webster.¹ The second line of Americans, composed wholly of Virginians, fought nobly; and, as it contended for the victory with the ablest officers in the British army, and with its best troops, it appeared, for a time, that npon it would fall the honor of the victory.² When the reserves had been moved forward, into the centre of the line, as heretofore described, and their support had been felt, the Thirty-third regiment was turned upon the left flank, where Colonel Lynch was posted, and the Hessians against Colonel Campbell, on the right;³ while the Twenty-third, the Guards, and the Seventy-first pushed forward and charged the Virginians, under Generals Stevens and Lawson.⁴ The militia, of which this line was composed, while it could oppose the enemy, at a distance, could not withstand the charge, and it "no longer presented even the show of resistance," falling back and forming again in the rear of the third line.⁵

¹ Tarleton, p. 273; Stedman, ii. pp. 338-339; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 427.

² Tarleton, p. 273; Gordon, iv. p. 55.

³ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Tarleton, p. 273; Gordon, iv. p. 55; Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 171; Lee's Mem., p. 173. Dr. Ramsay (*Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 242) says of this retreat, "It was occasioned by the misconduct of a colonel, who, on the advance of the enemy, called out to an officer at some distance, that 'he would be surrounded.' The alarm was sufficient. Without inquiring into the probability of what had been injudiciously suggested, the militia precipitately quitted the field."—⁴ Gordon, iv. pp. 55, 56; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 221.—⁵ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781.

¹ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17 1781; Tarleton, p. 273; Lee's Mem. of War, p. 173; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 167.—² Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Lee's Camp. of 1781, pp. 171, 172; Lee's Mem. of War, p. 173; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 167.—³ Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 172; Lee's Mem., p. 173; Stedman, ii. p. 339.—⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 173.—⁵ Ibid.; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 173.

The riflemen, under Colonel Campbell, and the Legion infantry, on the enemy's right flank, notwithstanding the retreat of the second line, maintained their ground, and the Hessians and the First battalion of Guards, under Colonel Norton, were left to oppose, and, if possible, to dislodge them.¹ The cavalry, under Lieutenant-colonel Washington, the Delaware companies, under Captain Kirkwood, and Colonel Lynch's riflemen, which had covered the right of the line, fell back to the third line and supported its flank;² the third line, composed of Continental troops, on whom the brunt of the battle now fell, was, generally, new levies;³ and as has been truly said, by an eye-witness, "at this period the event of the action was doubtful, and victory alternately presided over each army."⁴

Foremost in the attack on this line was the gallant Lieutenant-colonel Webster, with the enemy's left wing, but Colonel Gunby and Lieutenant-colonel Howard, with the Maryland veterans, Lieutenant-colonel Hawes, with a regiment of Virginians, and Captain Kirkwood, with the Delaware company, were prepared to receive him. The attack, led by so experienced and brave an officer, could not be otherwise than well conducted, yet the cool determination of the Continentals, and the want of support—the remainder of the line being yet in his rear—compelled the

assailants to fall back, and find safety by recrossing a ravine in his rear.¹

While Lieutenant-colonel Webster was falling back, Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, at the head of the Seventy-first regiment, the Second battalion of the Guards and the grenadiers,—General O'Hara having been wounded,—pressed forward against the Second Maryland regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Ford, which occupied the extreme left of the American line, Colonel Gunby forming the left of the centre, with Colonel Hawes' regiment of Virginians on his right. When Colonel Williams, who commanded the Marylanders, saw this movement, he hastened to the scene, but was mortified with the sight of a sudden and precipitate flight of the regiment, and the loss of two field-pieces, which were stationed on its left.² Encouraged by this success, the Guards commenced a pursuit of the fugitives, when Colonel Gunby, who had been left without employment by the retreat of Lieutenant-colonel Webster, wheeled his regiment to the left, took them on their left flank, and opened a destructive fire.³ The sudden appearance of this new opponent—who had been concealed from him by an intervening copse of wood—and the havoc which its fire had made in his ranks, caused Lieutenant-colonel Stewart to suspend his

¹ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 176; Lee's Mem., p. 173.

² Lee's Memoirs, p. 174; Marshall, iv. p. 425.

³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 178.—⁴ Tarleton, p. 274.

¹ Tarleton, p. 274; Lee's Campaign of 1781, pp. 173, 174; Lee's Memoirs, p. 174; Stedman, ii. pp. 339, 340.

² Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Tarleton, p. 274; Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 174; Letter of Col. Carrington, cited in Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 187.

³ Tarleton, p. 274; Lee's Mem., p. 174.

pursuit of Lieutenant-colonel Ford, and attack Colonel Gunby.¹ The flower of the respective armies had now met, face to face, and a struggle which would have honored the veterans of any age or nation, was immediately commenced. The "Maccaronis," who, under Colonel Smallwood, had met the enemy at Brooklyn² and on Chatterton's Hill;³ and, subsequently, at Germantown,⁴ Camden,⁵ and the Cowpens,⁶ were now confronted in battle against the British Guards, and the glorious past lent energy and determination to both, in their determination to conquer or die. Colonel Gunby was dismounted,⁷ and Lieutenant-colonel Stewart fell by the sword of Captain Smith, of the Marylanders.⁸ The Guards, at length, after a desperate struggle, showed evidence of weakness, when Lieutenant-colonel Washington fell upon them with his dragoons;⁹ and, at the same moment, Lieutenant-colonel Howard—who had taken the command when Colonel Gunby fell—ordered his men to charge with the bayonet.¹⁰ The combined operations of the dragoons and the infantry were irresistible, and but few of the Guards remained to tell the tale

of that overwhelming onslaught.¹ With so much ardor, indeed, were this charge and the subsequent pursuit conducted, and such were their effects on the other regiments of Lord Cornwallis' command, that the latter, fearing that the impetuosity of the victors might lead them to extend their operations, and sweep the field, ordered his artillery to open a fire on that part of the field where this contest was raging, although he knew that every ball which reached them must pass through the ranks of his own gallant Guards.² The work which Howard and Washington had undertaken, had been done, however, before this desperate step was adopted by Lord Cornwallis, and they retired from the slaughter without farther pursuit of the fragments of their enemy.³

When the First Maryland regiment wheeled and attacked the Guards, the Virginians, under Lieutenant-colonel Hawes, were left without support,—Colonel Green having been withdrawn from the line to form a reserve,⁴—and Lieutenant-colonel Webster moved forward, a second time, and renewed the attack.⁵ At the same time, General O'Hara, notwithstanding his wounds, moved the First battalion of Guards from the rear,—where, in connection

¹ Tarleton, p. 274; Lee's Mem., p. 174.

² Vide Chap. XI.—³ Vide Chap. XIV.—⁴ Vide Chap. XXVII.—⁵ Vide Chap. LXXI.—⁶ Vide Chap. LXXXII.

⁷ "His horse being killed at the instant, and himself entangled in the fall, the charge was led by Lieut.-Col. Howard."—Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 174.

⁸ Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 175; Lee's Memoirs, p. 174

⁹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 174.

¹⁰ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 175.

¹ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Gordon, iv. p. 56; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 175; Lee's Memoirs, p. 175; Stedman, ii. p. 340.

² Lord Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 175; Lee's Mem., p. 175; Stedman, ii. p. 340.—³ Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781.—⁴ Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 174; Lee's Mem., p. 176; Marshall, iv. p. 431.—⁵ Tarleton, p. 275; Lee's Memoirs, p. 175; Stedman, ii. p. 341.

with the Hessians, it had been engaged with Colonel Campbell and Lieutenant-colonel Lee,—and joining it with the remains of the Second battalion, and the Seventy-first and the Twenty-third regiments, moved against Lieutenant-colonel Howard's Maryland regiment.¹

At this moment the field presented a sad but curious spectacle. Two regiments of Continental troops were contending for the victory in different parts of the field; while a regiment of militia (Colonel Campbell's), a mile in the rear, was resolutely engaged with a regiment of Hessians—each of these several engagements being entirely independent of the others. There is but little doubt that the Americans were rapidly gaining ground,—the Hessians having retreated, a few minutes afterwards, and relieved Colonel Campbell and Lieutenant-colonel Lee's Legion for other service,—but General Greene adhered to his determination to spare his men, as far as possible, and ordered a retreat.²

This movement was effected in good order;³ but, in consequence of the artillery-horses being mostly killed, the field-pieces were abandoned.⁴ The Twenty-third and Seventy-first regiments, with Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's Legion, followed the army for a short distance, and threatened to fall on it,⁵ but "Earl Cornwallis did not think it advisable

for the British cavalry to charge,"¹ and General Greene, covered by the regiment of Virginians, under Colonel Green, retired to the iron-works without molestation.²

The number of Americans on the field, as has been seen, consisted of one thousand and sixty North Carolina militia, in the first line; sixteen hundred and ninety-three Virginia militia, in the second line and on the flanks; seven hundred and seventy-eight Virginia, and six hundred and thirty Maryland regulars in the third line; one hundred and fifty-seven in Lee's Legion, and eighty-six in Washington's cavalry, say four thousand, four hundred, and four men in all:³ that of the enemy is said to have been fourteen hundred and forty-five.⁴ The loss of the former was, of the North Carolina militia, six privates, *killed*; two officers and three privates, *wounded*; two captains, nine subalterns, and five hundred and fifty-two privates, *missing*: of the Virginia militia and riflemen, four captains and eleven men, *killed*; one major, two captains, seven subalterns, and fifty-seven men, *wounded*; and one major, two captains, eleven subalterns, and three hundred and eight, *missing*; and of the Continentals, Major Anderson, one captain, three subalterns, and fifty-two, *killed*; eight captains, four subalterns, and nine-

¹ Tarleton, p. 275; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 168; Stedman, ii. pp. 340, 341.—² Lee's Mem., p. 176.

³ Gordon, iv. p. 56; Lee's Mem., p. 176; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 242; Stedman, ii. p. 341.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Gen. Washington, March 16, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 177.—⁵ Tarleton, p. 276; Lee's Memoirs, p. 177; Stedman, ii. p. 341.

¹ Tarleton, p. 275; Stedman, ii. p. 341.

² Gen. Cornwallis to Lord Geo. Germain, March 17, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 177.

³ Gordon, iv. p. 54.

⁴ Field Returns, cited by Stedman (*American Revolution*, ii. p. 344, note). Ramsay (*American Revolution*, ii. p. 241) says the force was over 2400 men.

ty-nine men, *wounded*; and one hundred and sixty-one, *missing*.¹ The loss of the latter was Lieutenant-colonels Stewart and Webster, Captains Wilmouski, Schutz, Maynard, and Goodricke, Lieutenants O'Hara and Robinson, Ensigns Talbot, Grant, and De Trott, and eighty-eight men, *killed*; Generals O'Hara and Howard, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton, Captains Swanton, Maitland, Lord Dunglass, Peter, and Eichendrobt; Lieutenants Salvin, Wynyard, Schwener, and Graise; Adjutants Colquhon and Fox; Ensigns Stuart, Kelly, Gore, and Hughes, and three hundred and eighty-nine men, *wounded*, and twenty-six *missing*.²

No battle in the war was more honorable to the British troops, yet none was less productive to the Royal cause. In-

cluding those who ran away, the Americans were nearly three times as numerous as the enemy, while the position they occupied was very advantageous, and the troops were disposed with great skill. Yet the only advantage Lord Cornwallis secured was the field of battle, the heavy loss he had experienced rendered the relative strength of the two armies more advantageous to the Americans. The great abilities of General Greene, in bringing on this engagement, were soon apparent in the speedy retreat of Lord Cornwallis from his dearly-bought position, leaving behind him about seventy of his wounded,¹ and in the pursuit which was immediately commenced by the American army, and continued until the enemy had found safety on the right bank of the Deep River.²

¹ "Returns, &c.," signed "O. H. Williams, Dep. Adj.-Gen.," appended to Gen. Greene's dispatch, March 16, 1781.—² "Returns, &c.," signed "J. Despard, Dep. Adj.-Gen.," appended to Gen. Cornwallis' dispatch, March 17, 1781.

¹ Tarleton, p. 278; Gordon, iv. p. 57.—² Tarleton, pp. 279, 280.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

April 15 to April 23, 1781.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT WATSON, S. C.

DURING the time which Lord Cornwallis was engaged with General Greene, in North Carolina, Lord Rawdon controlled the affairs of South Carolina and Georgia and occupied Camden;¹ and he strengthened his position, and, at the same time, more effectually promoted the Royal cause, by the establishment of a line of posts between Charleston, on the one hand, and Augusta on the other.² The energetic and determined opposition of Generals Sumter, Pickens, and Marion, which completely baffled the power of the enemy, kept alive the cause of the people;³ yet but little practical good was secured from their efforts, and South Carolina and Georgia appeared to have fallen back to their allegiance to the Crown.⁴

Such was the condition of South Carolina when, in the spring of 1781, General Greene determined to rescue her from the hands of the enemy.⁵ In the prosecution of this design, on the sixth of April, Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with his Legion and a company of Maryland troops, was sent from Ramsay's Mills, on Deep River, where Gen-

eral Greene was then encamped, with orders to join General Marion,—who was then in the lower part of the State,—to deliver the dispatches which conveyed the proposed plan of operations, and to co-operate with the latter officer in a diversion in that section of the State.¹ At the same time, General Pickens was ordered to assemble the western militia, and to invest Augusta and Ninety-six,² while the main body moved against Camden, leaving Lord Cornwallis in North Carolina; to pursue, at his convenience, any line of policy which his orders or his own inclination might dictate.³

On the fourteenth of April, Lieutenant-colonel Lee reached the swamps on Black River, where General Marion was encamped, and the commands of the two officers were united for active operations;⁴ and, on the evening of the next day, they moved out into the open country, with the intention of investing Fort Watson, one of that chain of posts to which reference has been made.⁵

¹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 566.—² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 229; Caldwell's Life of Greene, p. 256.

³ Marshall, iv. p. 567; Stedman, ii. p. 359.

⁴ Marshall, iv. p. 567.—⁵ Gordon, iv. p. 80.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 213; Stedman, ii. p. 360.

² Marshall, iv. pp. 568, 569; Lee's Memoirs, p. 213.

³ Lee's Memoirs, pp. 204-213.—⁴ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 217.

⁵ Lee's Memoirs, p. 217.

Fort Watson, the post in question, was a small stockade which occupied the summit of Wright's Bluff, about five miles above Vance's Ferry, in Sumter District, South Carolina.¹ This "bluff" is an ancient tumulus, some thirty or forty feet in height, which stands on the upper extremity of Scott's Lake, near the eastern bank of the Santee; and, at the period of which we write, it was surrounded, except on its river front, by a level plain, destitute of trees.² The work was a simple stockade, strengthened with three rows of abatis,³ and garrisoned with eighty regulars and forty Tories, commanded by Lieutenant McKay.⁴

The post was invested on the same evening on which the assailants left their position near the Black River;⁵ and, as the garrison obtained water from the neighboring lake, a portion of the force was thrown between them, for the purpose of cutting off the supply.⁶ With commendable diligence the garrison immediately dug a well near the stockade,⁷ by that means securing a constant supply; and, as the assailants possessed neither artillery or intrenching tools,⁸ and as Colonel Watson—a British officer who had originally occu-

pied the post—was approaching, at the head of five hundred men,¹ the commanders despaired of success.²

At this moment Major Hezekiah Maham, of South Carolina, suggested a novel remedy, and it was immediately adopted. He proposed to erect a tower of logs, which should be sufficiently high to overlook the stockade, and command the garrison, and to place on the top of it a party of expert marksmen, to pick off such of the garrison as might expose themselves outside their cabins.³ This structure was immediately erected; and when, on the morning of the twenty-third of April, the besieged witnessed its effects, in connection with a movement of the infantry below, who threatened an assault, they proposed terms, and surrendered themselves—one hundred and fourteen in number—prisoners of war.⁴

Of the assailants, two were killed and six wounded,⁵ and the survivors, with their accustomed energy, immediately moved towards Colonel Watson, with the intention of attacking him.⁶ "The acquisition of this post reanimated the friends of the Revolution in that part of the State, and afforded the means of interrupting the intercourse between Cam-

¹ Mills' Statistics of S. C., p. 745; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 706.—² Mills, p. 745; Stedman, ii. p. 360.

³ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781.

⁴ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 707.—⁵ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 218.

⁶ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781.

⁷ Ibid.; Marshall, iv. p. 580. Lieut.-Col. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 219) says the garrison "ent a trench, secured by abatis, from the fosse to the river," for this purpose.

⁸ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 579.

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 360; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 259; Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occur., p. 364.

² Lee's Memoirs, p. 219.

³ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 219; Stedman, ii. p. 360.

⁴ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781, with the Articles of Capitulation appended thereto; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 229; Gordon, iv. p. 81.

⁵ Gen. Marion to Gen. Greene, April 23, 1781.

⁶ Marshall, iv. p. 581; Stedman, ii. p. 360.

den and Charleston, and of intercepting those supplies which the former required from the latter. It also opposed an obstacle to the retreat of Lord Rawdon,

which, with his present strength, he would have found it difficult to surmount."

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

April 16 to June 5, 1781.

THE SIEGE OF AUGUSTA, GEORGIA.

THE fall of Forts Watson¹ and Mott² was soon followed by that of Fort Granby, and by the movement of General Pickens against Augusta,³ General Marion against Georgetown,⁴ General Sumter against Orangeburgh,⁵ and General Greene against Fort Ninety-six.⁶ Lord Rawdon, at the same time, was gradually moving towards Charleston,⁷ and South Carolina was rapidly resuming her proper place in the Confederacy—the judicious movements and the victorious assaults of General Greene keeping pace with the crest-fallen retreat of the enemy.

For the purpose of facilitating the capture of Augusta, and the recovery of Georgia, General Greene strengthened the Legion with a battalion of North Carolina levies, under Major

Eaton,¹ and, on the sixteenth of May,² detached it to the assistance of General Pickens, who was in the vicinity of Augusta.³ The peculiar state of the enemy's affairs leading to a supposition that Fort Ninety-six might be abandoned by the enemy, and its garrison united with that of Augusta, in the preservation of Georgia, it became necessary for Lieutenant-colonel Lee to move with great rapidity, in order that a junction with General Pickens might be effected before the enemy could concentrate his forces, and a forced march, across the country, was immediately resolved on.⁴ While on his way Lieutenant-colonel Lee learned that the annual presents from the King to the Indians had arrived at Fort Galphin,⁵—on the

¹ Vide Chap. LXXXVII.—² Vide Chap. XCII.

³ Lord Rawdon to Lord Cornwallis, June 5.

⁴ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 584.—⁵ Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 484; Stedman, ii. p. 362; Gordon, iv. p. 89.—⁶ Lord Rawdon to Lord Cornwallis, June 5; Tarleton, p. 485; Stedman, ii. p. 363.—⁷ Gen. Greene to President of Congress, May 14; Lord Rawdon to Lord Cornwallis, May 24 and June 5; Tarleton, p. 482.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 236.—² Lee's Campaign of 1781, pp. 381, 386.—³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 236.

⁴ Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 125, 126; Gen. Greene to Col. Lee, May 22, 1781.

⁵ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 587; Lee's Mem., pp. 236, 237. Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 131) says the presents were in boats, on their way up the river, and had been compelled to seek shelter, at Fort Galphin, from the threatened assault of Col. Clarke.

property of George Galphin, Assistant-superintendent of Indian Affairs, about twelve miles below Augusta,¹—where they were protected by two companies of infantry, which had been detached from the garrison at Augusta, for that purpose.² As these presents generally embraced many articles which were needed by the army, he resolved to seize that post before he approached Augusta.³ Adopting the same means which were brought by Joshua, of old, against the city of Ai and her king,⁴ the same measure of success attended this movement under Lieutenant-colonel Lee;⁵ and, with the loss of one man, from the heat and fatigue,⁶ on the twenty-first of May,⁷ he deprived the enemy of a very important portion of his force, while the victorious Americans were supplied with an abundance of powder, ball, blankets, and other essential articles.⁸

After resting for a few hours, Lieutenant-colonel Lee detached Major Eggleston, with the cavalry of the Legion, to the western bank of the Savannah, with orders to join any force which he might find on the western front of Augusta, and to summon that place to

surrender; while, in the evening, he followed, with the infantry, artillery, and baggage, and joined the forces under General Pickens and Colonel Elijah Clarke,¹ some of which had been encamped in the woods, in that vicinity, since the sixteenth of April.

Augusta, the scene of this narrative, is situate on the western bank of the Savannah River, ninety-two miles from Milledgeville, and one hundred and twenty above the city of Savannah.² At the period of the War of the Revolution its western front was a dense forest, while, about half a mile above it, was a swampy ravine, extending up from the river.³ In the centre of the town, where the meeting-house of St. Paul's Church now stands, stood a strong work, which was known as Fort Cornwallis; and on the northwestern border of the ravine, between the present "Upper Market" and the river, was another, but smaller, work, mounting two guns, and known as Fort Grierson.⁴ The garrison of the latter was composed of Georgia militia, about eighty in number, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Grierson, a Tory; that of Fort Cornwallis was composed of about five hundred and fifty men, three hundred of whom were Creek and Cherokee Indians, the others being Tories, principally from Florida, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Brown,

¹ Johnson's *Traditions of the Revolution*, p. 356.

² Lee's Mem., p. 237.—³ Marshall, iv. p. 587. Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 131) maintains that this occurred after Lee reached Augusta; that Gen. Pickens detached Lee for that purpose; and that Capt. Rudolph was the victor, while Lee "was not present at the affair." I can find no contemporary evidence to sustain this theory.

⁴ Joshua, chap. viii.—⁵ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 248; Lee's Memoirs, p. 237.—⁶ Lee's Memoirs, p. 237.

⁷ Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 386.—⁸ Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 132; Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 283; Gordon, iv. p. 91; Lee's Memoirs, pp. 237, 238.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 238.—² White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 593; White's Statistics of Geo., p. 501.

³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 238.

⁴ Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 132; White's Hist. Coll. of Geo., p. 596.

who was the commander of the post and of the neighboring country.

The summons which Major Eggleston had been directed to make had been rejected by Colonel Browne, with every possible indignity; and, while the troops were taking refreshments, Lieutenant-colonel Lee reconnoitred the enemy's position. Having completed his examination of the ground, that officer determined "to drive Grierson out of his fort, and to destroy or intercept him in his retreat to Fort Cornwallis;" and, General Pickens and Colonel Clarke approving the design, it was adopted. By the plan which was adopted, General Pickens and the militia were posted on the northern and western fronts of the fort; Major Eaton, with the North Carolina levies, by passing along the northern side of the ravine, was to approach it on the south; Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with the infantry and artillery, covered the advance of Major Eaton; and Major Eggleston, with the Legion cavalry, occupied a position near Fort Cornwallis, for the purpose of acting against any detachment which might be sent to the relief of Fort Grierson.¹ The parties on the northern, western, and southern fronts moved, simultaneously, against the enemy; and, after a short resistance, the works were evacuated, and the garrison, without formally surrendering, attempted to escape to Fort Cornwallis.²

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 238, 239.—² Dr. Johnson's Traditions of Rev., pp. 356, 357; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 283. Judge Johnson (*Life of Gen. Greene*, ii. p. 133) says, "no immediate action was intended upon Fort Grierson,"

In this attempt, however, but very few succeeded. The Major, and thirty of the garrison, were killed on the spot, by the exasperated Georgians under Colonel Clarke, whom they had abused;¹ the Lieutenant-colonel, with some others, was taken; a few only reached the river, and "escaped under cover and concealment of its banks."² The garrison of Fort Cornwallis, while this attack was in progress, moved out from the lines, as if it intended to give battle to Lieutenant-colonel Lee; but it contented itself with a distant cannonade; and, after the works at Fort Grierson were taken, it retired within the lines.³

With the fall of Fort Grierson both parties prepared for a continuation of the contest—Lieutenant-colonel Browne and the garrison, assisted by two hundred negroes, by strengthening the works at Fort Cornwallis; the assailants by reconnoitering, and occupying positions whence they could annoy the

and intimates that the works were evacuated before the besiegers had taken any steps to attack or invest it.

¹ Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 133, 134; Lee's Mem., p. 239; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 239. Whether Col. Grierson was killed at that time, or after the surrender of Fort Cornwallis, is a question which has been the subject of much controversy. That he was shot by Capt. James Alexander, *after his surrender*, is admitted by all. That he surrendered, *while retreating from Fort Grierson*, does not appear to have been claimed by any one; and it may be reasonably inferred that the "surrender" spoken of was that of Fort Cornwallis. Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 134) says "a major and thirty men were killed," and Col. Lee (Mem., p. 239) says, "Grierson, with his major and many of his garrison, killed;" while Gen. Pickens (*Letter to Gen. Greene, June 7*) says Grierson was shot on "yesterday afternoon," the day after *Fort Cornwallis* surrendered.

² Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 134 ³ Lee's Mem. p. 239.

enemy with the greatest advantage. Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with the Legion, occupied a large brick mansion, which stood on the bank of the river, near the ravine; while General Pickens, with the militia, occupied the woods on the left and rear of the fort. The tools which had been taken at Fort Galphin, and all which could be collected from the neighboring plantations, were called into requisition, and ground was broken on the banks of the Savannah, and the works extended thence towards the enemy's left and rear.¹ The progress of the besiegers, however, in this direction, was greatly retarded by the vigilance and resolution of Lieutenant-colonel Browne; and those which were subsequently commenced in the rear of the fort were also carried on with difficulty, from the same cause.² But the active opposition of the besieged was not the only obstacle. There was no elevation in the surrounding ground which would enable the besiegers to bring their field-pieces to bear upon the enemy; and the untiring energies of Lieutenant-colonel Lee were necessarily taxed to their utmost capacity. Procrastination, in this case, as in most others, was emphatically the thief of time; and the possibility of the arrival of reinforcements to the garrison, while it added fresh energy to the enemy, was not less prolific in its incentives to the anxious besiegers. Accordingly the "Mayham tower," which had been pro-

ductive of so much advantage at Fort Watson, was again resorted to; and orders were issued for the preparation of the timber which was necessary for that purpose.¹ At the same time the works on either side of the fort were gradually approaching completion, and the closing scene, it was evident, was not far distant.

The garrison witnessed all these preparations with great interest; and hoping to postpone, if not defeat, the object of its enemies, it resolved to sally, and attempt the destruction of the works. In the prosecution of that design, at midnight of the twenty-eighth of May, a heavy detachment fell on the works which had been erected on the bank of the river, drove the guard before it, and threatened their safety. The supporting party, under Captain Handy, of the Maryland line, was immediately moved forward to the support of the guard, and, after an obstinate conflict, the trenches were regained, and the enemy forced to seek shelter within the fort. On the next night (*May 29th*) a similar attempt was made, in the same quarter, but the guard had been strengthened, and a desperate and long-continued conflict ensued. Each party fought manfully, and not until Captain Rudolph, "by a combined charge of the bayonet," cleared the trenches, did the gallant assailants withdraw to the fort.²

On the thirtieth the timber which

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 240.—² Stedman, ii. p. 363; Lee's Memoirs, p. 242.

¹ Johnson's Traditions, pp. 357, 358; Lee's Mem., p. 243.

² Lee's Memoirs, p. 243.

had been prepared for the tower was brought on the ground; and, during that night and the following day, it was raised to a level with the enemy's parapet; and, at the same time, its body was filled up with earth, stones, &c., to add strength and solidity to the structure.¹ Meanwhile the works in the rear of the fort had been pushed forward with great vigor, in order to connect them with the tower.² The attention of Lieutenant-colonel Browne was soon drawn to the new structure which was gradually rising before his works; and, fully understanding the purposes for which it was intended, he determined to demolish it, without delay. The besiegers, however, were not less wary. Fully confident of the good judgment and unceasing watchfulness of Lieutenant-colonel Browne, General Pickens, and Lieutenant-colonel Lee, on the night of the thirty-first of May, doubly manned the lines which had been intrusted to the militia; and Captain Handy, with one half the regular infantry, was ordered to support them. The North Carolina levies, lately commanded by Major Eaton, supplied the place of the latter, on the bank of the river; and a full company was stationed for the protection of the tower. The night was not one third passed before the guards on the river-side were attacked with great gallantry, and a desperate, hand-to-hand fight ensued. The accomplished Captain Rudolph, of

the Legion, who commanded on that front, with his accustomed bravery, at length overcame the enemy, and drove him back, with great loss, into the fort.¹ It appears, however, that this well-conducted, and equally well-sustained assault, was intended merely as a feint; and, while it was yet undetermined, Lieutenant-colonel Browne, with the *élite* of the garrison, fell upon the works in the rear of the fort. The militia, under General Pickens, sustained its position, for some time, with great steadiness, but was, finally, compelled to give way before a vigorous bayonet-charge of the assailants. At this moment Captain Handy moved forward with the covering party,—a portion of those Marylanders whose courage had been so often and so favorably tried,—and, repeating the experiment which had been so successful elsewhere, he ordered them, also, to charge with the bayonet.² In the language of one who was in the action, “the conflict became *furious*;”³ and as bayonet crossed bayonet, and shout responded to shout, the most relentless characteristics of human nature were fully developed. The hands of fellow-countrymen were raised against each other in deadly strife; and while those of the one party fought for their King and his Crown, and those of the other for their Country and the rights of man, both appeared to be equally lost to all the distinctive features which distinguish men from demons, and as-

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 243, 244.—² Johnson's Traditions, p. 357; Lee's Mem., p. 244.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 244.—² Ibid.—³ Ibid.; Johnson's Traditions, p. 358.

snage, if they cannot wholly prevent, the asperities of war.

Defeated in both these attempts, Lieutenant-colonel Browne directed his attention to other means. He erected a platform on one of the angles of the fort, opposite the Mayham tower, and mounted thereon two of his heaviest pieces. A steady fire was immediately opened on the unfinished tower, yet the exertions of the builders did not slacken, and, on the second of June, it was completed, and found to command nearly every part of the enemy's works. Before noon, on that day, "the enemy's two pieces were dismounted from the platform, and all the interior of the fort was raked, excepting the segment nearest to the tower, and some other spots sheltered by traverses."¹

A sergeant of artillery, under the guise of a deserter, was next sent out from the fort, for the purpose of burning the tower, and was nearly successful in his mission,—the caution of Lieutenant-colonel Lee having been completely quieted by the superior shrewdness of the deceitful Scot, until after the latter had assumed his coveted position on the tower, when the returning reason of the Lieutenant-colonel influenced the latter to commit him to the quarter-guard.²

A vacant house, in close proximity to the tower, was the next scene of Lieutenant-colonel Browne's enterprise. It had escaped the torch, when, during a sortie of the garrison, which was made on the morning of the 3d June, several

others were burned; and, from its advantageous position, it was considered an important auxiliary whenever an assault on the works should be made. During the night of the third of June, this house was examined to ascertain its capacity, and the number of men which would be required to occupy it, in anticipation of an assault, which had been ordered to take place on the morning of the fourth. Other necessary preparations for the assault were also made; when, about three o'clock in the morning of the fourth, the besiegers were startled by a violent explosion, and the house in question was found to have been blown into fragments. It appears that Lieutenant-colonel Browne had perceived the advantageous position of the building, and had, intentionally, left it standing for the purpose of receiving a covering party of the besiegers when the assault should be made; but, at the same time, he had pushed a sap under it, with the intention of blowing it up, with the party which might then have been ordered to occupy it. The movement which was made to test the capacity of the building was mistaken for the supposed occupation by the covering party, and, soon afterwards, when the party which had been sent to test its capacity had withdrawn, and all had become quiet again, the occupation was supposed to have been perfected, the sap was sprung, and the *unoccupied* house was totally destroyed without injuring a single individual.¹

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 245.—² Ibid.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, pp. 246. 247.

The hour of nine, in the morning of the fourth of June,—the time appointed for the assault,—found the several columns in the positions which had been assigned to them, and ready for the orders to move.¹ It had been determined by the commanding officers, however, that another opportunity should be given for an honorable surrender of the fort, before the troops were ordered to attack it.² Accordingly a flag had been dispatched, on the preceding day,³ with a summons, which had been rejected;⁴ but, from some unexplained cause, the assault was not made on the appointed day, notwithstanding the action of the besieged.⁵ On the next day (*June 5th*) a flag was sent out from the fort, and terms of capitulation were proposed by Lieutenant-colonel Browne.⁶ A correspondence, extending throughout the entire day, ensued, resulting in the surrender of the fort and garrison on the fifth of June;⁷ and, at eight

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 247.—² Ibid.—³ Gen. Pickens and Lieut.-Col. Lee to Lieut.-Col. Browne, June 3, 1781.

⁴ Lieut.-Col. Browne to Gen. Pickens and Lieut.-Col. Lee, "Fort Cornwallis, June 3."

⁵ There is some confusion in the account of these transactions, as given by Lieut.-Col. Lee, and his *Memoirs* are not sustained by the letters which have been published in his foot-notes. Presuming the error to be in the narrative rather than in the letters, I have followed the latter rather than the former.

⁶ Lieut.-Col. Browne to Gen. Pickens and Lieut.-Col. Lee, *without date*, but referred to, in the answer, as of "*this day*."—⁷ Articles of Capitulation, dated "Head-quarters, June 5, 1781."

o'clock on the following morning (*June 6th*) Captain Rudolph, of the Legion, took formal possession of the works and the appurtenances; the garrison, soon afterwards, marching out, and piling its arms agreeably to the terms of the surrender.¹

The outrages which had been committed by Lieutenant-colonels Grierson and Browne were so numerous and so horrible, that Captain Samuel Alexander, of the militia, as has been seen, murdered the former, after he had surrendered, in retaliation of his wrongs;² and the latter, for his safety, was taken into the care of Captain Armstrong, of the Legion cavalry, and a guard assigned for his protection. He was, afterwards, conveyed to Lieutenant-colonel Lee's quarters, where he remained until he was paroled, and, in company with a few of his officers, sent, under the protection of a strong guard, to Savannah.³

The loss of the Americans, during this siege, was about forty men, killed and wounded;⁴ that of the enemy, during the siege, was heavy, in addition to which, about three hundred men were taken prisoners.⁵

¹ Lee's Memoirs, pp. 247-249.—² Ibid., pp. 249, 250.

³ Garden's Anecdotes, i. pp. 125, 126; Lee's Mem., pp. 250, 251.—⁴ Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 249; Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 283; Gordon, iv. p. 91.

⁵ Gordon, iv. p. 91; Marshall, iv. p. 588.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

April 25, 1781.

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL, S. C.

THE movement of General Greene against Camden, in pursuance of his design to remove the seat of war into South Carolina, has been referred to in a former chapter. On the nineteenth of April he encamped at a point called Logtown, within half a mile of the enemy's works, the occupants of which were perfectly prepared to receive him.¹

Camden, the present seat of justice of Kershaw District, South Carolina, is about thirty-three miles northeast from Columbia, and occupies an elevated plain on the east bank of the Wateree—Pinetree Creek, with Belton's branch, flowing on two other sides of the village, and nearly inclosing it.² At the period of the Revolution a chain of strong redoubts extended from the river to the Pinetree Creek, and protected the north and east sides of the post;³ while Lord Rawdon,—one of the best officers in the service,—and about a thousand men, formed a garrison which

General Greene was too weak to assault, or even to invest on all sides.¹

Soon afterwards General Greene fell back to Hobkirk's Hill, a high ridge which overlooks the plains of Camden, about a mile distant from it,² and while he was thus encamped, intelligence of the approach of Colonel Watson, with five hundred men, reached the camp, and measures were immediately taken to intercept him before he could join the garrison. Accordingly, the artillery and baggage were sent to Lynch's Creek, about twenty miles north from Camden, under the protection of Lieutenant-colonel Carrington and the North Carolina militia, while General Greene, on the twenty-second, with the main body of the army, crossed Sandhill Creek and encamped near the Charleston road, on the east side of the town.³ Two days afterwards he became satisfied that Colonel Watson was farther from Camden than he had supposed, and, after ordering his artillery and baggage

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 220; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 569. Dr. Gordon (*American Revolution*, iv. p. 81) says this occurred on the morning of the twentieth of April.

² Mills' Statis. of S. C., p. 590; Marshall, iv. p. 569.

³ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 275; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 230.

¹ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 275; Lee's Mem., p. 220; Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 246.—² Ramsay's Am. Rev., ii. p. 246; Gordon, iv. p. 82.—³ Lee's Mem., pp. 220, 221; Lee's Camp. of 1781, pp. 263–270; Lieut.-Col. John Eager Howard to Gen. H. Lee, Sept. 26, 1810; Gordon, iv. p. 82; Marshall, iv. p. 571.

to rejoin him, he recrossed the Sandhill and returned to his former position on Hobkirk's Hill, on the north side of the town.¹

This position was taken with the hope of drawing the garrison from the town, where it could be engaged with poorer prospects of success than in the country,² and the stratagem was entirely successful. Lord Rawdon received intelligence of the absence of Lieutenant-colonel Carrington and the artillery, through the desertion of an American drummer, named Jones; and he resolved to strike a blow while General Greene was thus crippled.³ Accordingly, every person in Camden who was able to shoulder a musket was pressed into the service; and, at an early hour in the morning of the twenty-fifth of April,—after calling the convalescents to perform garrison duty,—he sallied from the town at the head of about nine hundred men, for that purpose.⁴

Hobkirk's Hill, as before stated, is a high ridge which rises from the plain on which Camden stands, about a mile north of the town. It is rather steep in front, but towards its eastern extremity the rise is more gradual; and, at the time of the action, it was densely wooded.⁵ On this ground, wishing for a

sorcie of the garrison but expecting none, the American troops were busily engaged in preparing or eating their breakfast, at about ten o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth,¹ when the pickets on the left of the position, commanded by Captain Benson of Maryland and Captain Morgan of Virginia, supported by the remains of the Delaware line, under Captain Kirkwood, discovered the enemy, gave the alarm, and checked his advance.² He had moved from the town with the hope of surprising General Greene; and, in order to effect it, had made an extensive circuit through the woods and swamps, but the pickets had observed the movement and frustrated his design.³

The pickets and the Delaware troops, aware of the importance of allowing the army to form, defended their position with great obstinacy, and not until Lord Rawdon had moved against them with his entire force did they consent to retire.⁴ By this time the main body had fallen into line, on the summit of the hill—the Virginians, under General Huger, forming the right wing; the Marylanders, under Colonel Williams, the left wing; and Colonel Harrison, with the artillery, in the centre—Lieutenant-colonel Washington's cavalry,

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 221; Gordon, iv. p. 82; Marshall, iv. p. 571.—² Gen. Greene to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Same to same, April 29; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 230; Gordon, iv. p. 82.—³ Lieut.-Col. Balfour to Lord Geo. Germain, May 1, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 222; Marshall, iv. p. 571.—⁴ Tarleton, p. 463; Moultrie, ii. p. 276; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 184; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 230.

Gen. Greene to Cong., April 25, 1781.

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¹ Lieut.-Col. Balfour to Lord Geo. Germain, May 1, 1781. Gen. Greene (*Letter to Cong., April, 1781*) says it was eleven o'clock, and Marshall (*Hist. of Washington*, iv. p. 572) agrees with him.—² Gen. Greene to Cong., 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 222; Marshall, iv. p. 573.—³ Tarleton, p. 463; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 184; Stedman, ii. p. 324; Marshall, iv. p. 573.—⁴ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 222; Marshall, iv. p. 572.

and two hundred and fifty North Carolina militia, under Colonel Reade, forming a reserve.¹ The enemy, also, formed his line—the Sixty-third regiment of the line, supported by the Volunteers of Ireland,² on his right; the New York Volunteers—a body of Tories commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Turnbull—in the centre; and the King's American regiment—also a body of Tories, commanded by Colonel Fanning—supported by Robertson's corps, on his left. About sixty cavalry and the South Carolina Volunteers formed the reserve, and moved in the rear of the line.³

The enemy advanced slowly up the gentle slope, presenting a line of but limited extent, when General Greene ordered Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, whose regiment of Virginia riflemen formed his extreme right, and Colonel Ford, whose regiment of Maryland troops occupied his extreme left, to turn the enemy's flanks;⁴ while Colonel Gunby and Lieutenant-colonel Hawes, whose regiments were on the left and right of the centre, were ordered to move down the hill with trailed arms, and charge the enemy in front,⁵ and Lieutenant-colonel Washington, with his

cavalry, were directed to turn his right flank, fall on his rear, and cut off his retreat.¹ These several orders were obeyed with spirit and alacrity; and, as the enemy moved his supporting columns forward, into the line, to check the movements of the American flanking parties, the entire body of both armies was speedily engaged in a close and bloody action.² The artillery, in the centre of the line, played on the enemy with considerable effect;³ the charge on his right and rear, by Washington's cavalry, was brilliant and successful, two hundred prisoners having already graced the efforts of the young commander;⁴ the veteran Marylanders, and the Virginians, under Lieutenant-colonel Hawes, were pushing forward with their wonted gallantry,⁵ and the entire destruction of the enemy's force appeared to be inevitable.⁶ At this moment, while the enemy's left was retiring from the field,⁷ the First Maryland regiment (Colonel Gunby's) fell into disorder—a part of it (in consequence of the death of Captain Beatty, its commander, it is said⁸) dropping out of the line, and falling into the rear.⁹ Every effort which its officers made to

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 222, 223; Marshall, iv. p. 572.

² This was a body of Southern Tories, of which Lord Rawdon was the Colonel.

³ Stedman, ii. pp. 356, 357; Marshall, iv. p. 573. Gen. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 223) reverses this order, and Mr. Lossing (*Field Book*, ii. p. 679) falls into the same error.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 223; Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 276; Stedman, ii. p. 357; Gordon, iv. p. 83; Marshall, iv. p. 573.—⁵ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 276; Stedman, ii. p. 357; Gordon, iv. p. 83.

¹ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781. Gen. Moultrie (*Mem.*, ii. p. 276) strangely supposes this charge saved the army.

² Gen. Greene to Cong., April 28, 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Stedman, ii. p. 357; Marshall, iv. p. 574.—³ Ibid.—⁴ Tarleton, p. 464; Gen. Greene to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 184; Col. J. E. Howard, cited by Gen. Lee (*Camp of 1781*, pp. 280, 281, note); Stedman, ii. p. 358.

⁶ Stedman, ii. p. 357.—⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781.—⁹ Marshall, iv. p. 575; Lee's Mem., p. 223.

⁹ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781.

rally the men failed, and Colonels Gunby and Williams, also, were equally unsuccessful in their efforts to restore order.¹ In his anxiety to restore the unity of the line,—after endeavoring, in vain, to induce the right, which had fallen back, to advance—Colonel Gunby ordered the other companies to fall back, and form on those which had produced the disorder, hoping thereby to give countenance to the latter, and to induce them to move forward.² Unfortunately the object of this retrograde movement was not understood, and the entire regiment—whose glorious history had rendered them the boast of their commander—considered it an order to retreat, and ingloriously fled from the triumph which was within its reach.³ The Second Maryland regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Ford, which had been ordered to turn the enemy's right flank, next caught the contagion; and that, too, broke and fled, suffering its commander to fall, mortally wounded, in his gallant endeavors to rally its broken ranks.⁴ The enemy, perceiving the effect of this fatal order, rallied; and his right pushed forward, gained the summit of the hill, compelled the artillery to retire, turned the left flank of Lieutenant-colonel Hawes' regiment, and was advancing

down the back slope of the hill.⁵ At the same time the contagion appeared in Lieutenant-colonel Campbell's regiment of Virginians, who occupied the extreme right of the line;⁶ and General Greene, perceiving the panic into which the troops had fallen, and knowing that his second line could not be relied on, ordered Lieutenant-colonel Hawes, with his regiment, to retire and cover the retreat.⁷ The entire force then fell back, in good order, under cover of Lieutenant-colonels Hawes and Washington, without serious molestation, carrying with it its artillery, baggage, and wounded.⁸ The enemy pursued the re-treating army about three miles, when Lieutenant-colonel Washington, with his cavalry and a small body of infantry, fell on a troop of horse, which led the pursuit, routed it, and pursued the entire party until it found refuge in Camden.⁹ General Greene fell back to Saunders' Creek, and, on the following day, to Rugeley's Mills.⁶

The strength of the American army was about twelve hundred men;⁷ that

¹ Tarleton, p. 463; Gen. Greene to Congress, April, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 575.—² Gen. Greene to Congress, April, 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 224; Marshall, iv. p. 576.—³ Gen. Greene to Congress, April, 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 576.—⁴ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781; Lee's Memoirs, p. 224; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 231; Marshall, iv. p. 576.—⁵ Tarleton, p. 463; Gen. Greene to Congress, April, 1781; Stedman, ii. p. 358; Gordon, iv. p. 84; Marshall, iv. p. 577.—⁶ Lieut.-Col. Balfour to Lord Geo. Germain, May 1, 1781; Stedman, ii. p. 358.—⁷ Marshall, iv. p. 577. Ramsay (*Rev. in S. C.*, ii. p. 230) says it amounted to "about seven hundred Continentals;" Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iv. p. 81) says, "the American army consisted of 843 Continentals, besides 56 cavalry and 31 dismounted dragoons; together with 254 North Carolina militia, who had joined them on the 25th"

¹ Gordon, iv. p. 84.

² Gen. Greene to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 223; Lee's Camp. of 1781, p. 277; Marshall, iv. p. 575.

³ Gen. Greene to Cong., April, 1781; Same to Col. H. Lee, April 28, 1781; Lee's Mem., p. 224.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Cong., April 9, 1781 Lee's Mem., p. 224; Marshall, iv., p. 575.

of the enemy was about nine hundred men.¹ Of the former, Captain Beatty, and eighteen men, were *killed*; Lieutenant-colonels Ford and Campbell, Captains Smith, Dunholm, and Bruff, Lieutenants Gallaway and Ball, and one hundred and eight men, were *wounded*; and one hundred and thirty-six were *missing*:² of the latter, two hundred and fifty-eight were killed, wounded, and missing.³

Of this action, and its immediate results, an eye-witness—an officer in the enemy's army, and one of his standard authorities—thus speaks: “The victory at Hobkirk's Hill, like that at Guilford

Court-house, although most honorable and glorious to the officers who commanded, and the troops that were engaged, produced no consequences beneficial to the British interest. The general disaffection of the province still continued; the force under General Greene, although diminished, was yet respectable; and the American partisans were more than ever active in making predatory incursions into various parts of the province, assaulting the weakest British posts, waylaying convoys of provisions, and interrupting the communication between Camden and Charleston.”¹

CHAPTER XC.

April 25, 1781.

THE SKIRMISH AT PETERSBURG, VA.⁴

THE successful movements of Lord Cornwallis, in the Carolinas, had given so much encouragement to the enemy

that energetic measures for the conquest of Virginia were also adopted. For this purpose, General Phillips, with two thousand troops, had been dispatched from New York, and he had taken the command of all the King's forces in Virginia.² The defences at Portsmouth, which General Arnold had began to construct, were hurried forward and completed;³ and being then ready to

¹ Stedman (*Hist. Am. Rev.*, ii. p. 355) says it was something more than eight hundred men, but by arming every person in the garrison, capable of bearing arms, even musicians and drummers, he mustered an effective force of about nine hundred men.”—² Returns, signed “O. H. Williams, Dep. Adj.-Gen.,” appended to Gen. Greene's dispatch to Cong., April, 1781.—³ Tarleton, p. 464; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 185.

⁴ This action is sometimes called “*The Battle of Blandford*,” and, as it was fought in that village, that is, probably, the most proper name for it. I have felt compelled, however, to follow the general practice, and have given it the usual title.

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 361.—² Ibid., p. 383; Gordon, iv. p. 62; Sparks' Writings of Washington, vii. pp. 457, 458, note.

³ Simcoe's Journal, p. 189; Stedman, ii. p. 383; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 482.

commence offensive operations, on the eighteenth of April,¹ the light-infantry, part of the Seventy-sixth and Eightieth regiments, the Queen's Rangers, the Yagers (Hessians), and the American Legion,² in all upwards of twenty-five hundred men,³ were embarked, and fell down to Hampton Roads.⁴ They afterwards proceeded up James River, landing at various points, destroying and pillaging whatever property could be found as the objects of their attention.⁵

At six o'clock, in the afternoon of the twenty-fourth of April, a landing was effected on City Point;⁶ and at ten o'clock, on the next day, the enemy marched towards Petersburg,⁷ where immense quantities of tobacco and other stores had been deposited,⁸ and General Muhlenberg, with about a thousand men, was posted.⁹ It is said the approaches to the town were entirely without protection; and the enemy approached without encountering any opposition.¹⁰ When he had arrived within two miles of the town he encountered one of the American pickets,¹¹ consist-

ing of forty men, under Captain House, of Brunswick,¹ and having driven it in, he soon discovered the main body posted on an eminence near the eastern extremity of Blandford.² After having reconnoitred the Americans, he advanced in two columns—the main body on the road leading to the village; the other, consisting of the Queen's Rangers, supported by the Second battalion of light-infantry, under Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, along the Old Lane and across the ravine at Miller's old mill, on the right of the American position.³

The former, led by Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, moved up the road,⁴ the picket commanded by Captain House retreating before him, until he reached Taylor's Mill, where the latter was strengthened by Colonel Dick, with three hundred men.⁵ A stand was made at this place, and, for half an hour, the enemy was held in check.⁶ At length, overpowered by the superior force of the enemy, the detachment fell back, in good order, to the main body, which had remained in position near the Bollingbrook warehouse,—the site of the City Point Railroad station,⁷—and formed in its rear.⁸ In this position, with the right resting on Mrs. Bolling's gate,—at the foot of the hill, in front of the Bollingbrook House,⁹—

¹ Simcoe, p. 189; Stedman, ii. p. 383.—² Gen. Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, May 12.—³ Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16, 1781; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 247; Gordon, iv. p. 107.—⁴ Gen. Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, May 12.—⁵ Ibid.; Simcoe, pp. 189-195; Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, April 23 and May 9, 1781; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 191; Stedman, ii. p. 383.—⁶ Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12, 1781.

⁷ Ibid.—⁸ Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 191; Marshall, iv. p. 483.—⁹ Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12, 1781; Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16, 1781; Gen. Muhlenberg to his brother; Gordon, iv. p. 107. The Baron Steuben has been supposed, by some, to have commanded, but it appears to be an error.

¹⁰ Simcoe, p. 195.—¹¹ Ibid., p. 196; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 247.

¹ Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16, 1781.

² Simcoe, p. 196; Map in Simcoe's Jour.; Gordon, iv. p. 107.—³ Simcoe, p. 196; Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16, 1781.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16.—⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Maxwell's Va. Hist Register, iv. p. 200.—⁸ Simcoe, p. 197; Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16.

⁹ Maxwell's Va. Hist. Register, iv. p. 200.

and the left on the warehouse, the Blandford bridge in front having been removed by Colonel Dick, the small party awaited the approach of the enemy.¹

In the mean time both columns of the enemy were pressing forward—the main body along the road, in front; the detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, on the American right flank.² The former, as he entered Blandford, was troubled by the American field-pieces, which had been posted on Baker's Hill, on the north bank of the Appomattox, and had opened a warm fire of grape-shot on his right flank;³ the latter appears to have made so extensive a detour that he was not enabled to render any effective assistance.⁴ The contest, at this position, appears to have been well sustained for a considerable length of time, and it was not terminated until the four pieces of artillery, which the enemy possessed, had been carried to the hill, between Mrs. Bolling's and Doctor Black's, and opened a heavy fire on the right flank of the American line.⁵

Perceiving that farther resistance would be productive of no good result, orders were given to retire; and in good order, the little party moved, by its left flank, along the causeway, by the river, to the Pocahontas Bridge,

which it crossed, and took up, preventing the enemy from pursuing.¹ While the fugitives were ascending Archer's Hill, on the north side of the river, when near T. Short's house (Violet Bank), the enemy opened a fire, with so much skill, that ten men were killed or mortally wounded.²

The Americans retreated to Chesterfield Court-house;³ while the enemy occupied Petersburg, and, on the next day, he ordered the inhabitants to move the tobacco from the warehouses, or all should be consumed together. The tobacco was, accordingly, removed, and, to the amount of four thousand hogsheads, together with a ship and several smaller vessels,⁴ it was destroyed.⁵

On the twenty-seventh the enemy crossed the river and destroyed the bridge, after which he moved to Osborne's.⁶

The strength of the Americans was less than one thousand militia, who had never been in action before;⁷ that of the enemy was not less than twenty-three hundred picked men. The loss of the former was about sixty, killed and wounded;⁸ that of the latter was

¹ Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12, 1781; Simcoe, p. 197; Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16; Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, May 9; Lee's Mem., p. 199; Gordon, iv. p. 108.—² Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16.—³ Gordon, iv. p. 108.

⁴ Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 191; Gordon, iv. p. 108.

⁵ Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12; Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16; Lee's Mem., p. 199.

⁶ Gordon, iv. p. 108.—⁷ Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16; Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12; Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 248; Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, May 9.—⁸ Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, May 9; Girardin's History of Virginia, p. 466.

¹ Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16.

² Simcoe, p. 197.—³ Ibid.

⁴ Map in Simeoe's Jour. I have come to this conclusion because Simcoe makes no allusion, in his Journal, to the part taken by himself in the action, and because he is not referred to by any other writer.

⁵ Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16.

supposed to have been quite as great,¹ although he claims that only one was killed and ten wounded.²

When it is considered that this was a contest between undisciplined militia, and double their number of veterans, it

will be seen that this was one of the most interesting engagements which took place in Virginia; and it reflects equal credit on the men and on the officers who led them.

CHAPTER XCII.

April 27, 1781.

THE ACTION AT OSBORNE'S, VIRGINIA.

THE American troops having been driven from Petersburg, and the tobacco, which had been stored there, having been destroyed,³ on the twenty-seventh of April, the enemy left the scene of their wantonness, in search of fresh supplies.⁴ General Phillips, with the light-infantry, and part of the Yagers, and of the cavalry of the Queen's Rangers, marched to Chesterfield Court-house, where he destroyed a range of barracks which would accommodate two thousand men, three hundred barrels of flour, and other stores;⁵ and, at the same time, General Arnold moved to Osborne's, a small village on the south side of the James River, about fifteen

miles below Richmond, with the Seventy-sixth and Eightieth regiments, part of the Yagers and of the Queen's Rangers, and the American Legion.¹

Osborne's, the scene of General Arnold's exploits, was the rendezvous of the small naval force which had been collected with the intention of co-operating with the French fleet in a projected attempt against Portsmouth,² and it appears somewhat singular that it should have been allowed to remain in so exposed a situation while the enemy remained within striking distance.

With the great shrewdness which General Arnold was wont to display, the movement was a secret one, care having been taken that no information of the approach of the enemy should reach the Americans, and he came into their immediate vicinity before his pres-

¹ Life of Gen. Muhlenberg, p. 248; Gov. Jefferson to Gen. Washington, May 9; Girardin's Hist. of Va., p. 466.

² Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12, 1781; Simcoe, p. 197.—³ Vide Chap. XC.

⁴ Gordon, iv. p. 108; Simcoe's Journal, p. 198.

⁵ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 484; Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12, 1781.

¹ Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12; Simcoe, p. 198.—² Marshall, iv. p. 484; Lee's Memoirs, p. 200.

ence was known.¹ Before he opened his fire, however, he summoned the commander to surrender, "offering one half the contents of their cargoes in case they did not destroy any part." With a degree of resolution and of patriotic virtue, which should have made the traitor blush, the nameless commander sent word, in answer, "We are determined and ready to defend our ships, and will sink them rather than surrender."² On the receipt of this reply, General Arnold ordered two three-pounders, under Lieutenant Rogers, to open a fire on the stern of the *Tempest*, a State ship, mounting twenty guns; while Captain Fage, with two six-pounders, "opened from an unexpected quarter, with great effect." At the same time Lieutenant Spencer was ordered to lead a party of Yagers, "by a route partly covered with ditchies, within thirty yards of her stern," in order that all who showed themselves on deck might be picked off.³

A brisk fire was immediately opened by the *Tempest*, the *Renown*, of twenty-six guns, the *Jefferson*, of fourteen guns, and some smaller vessels, as well as by a body of militia, who occupied the northern bank of the river; but, when the greatly superior force of the enemy is considered, the contest was too une-

qual to be either long-continued or successful to the Americans.¹ A shot from one of the enemy's pieces having cut the cable of the *Tempest*, she sheered around, and exposed herself to a raking fire from Lieutenant Rogers' three-pounders, when the crew, taking to the boats, attempted to escape.² As the enemy had no boats, and the wind was blowing quite hard, he could not take advantage of the panic into which the entire squadron appears to have fallen;³ yet two ships, three brigs, two schooners, and five sloops, all laden with tobacco, flour, cordage, &c., were taken, and four ships, five brigs, and several smaller vessels, similarly laden, were burned or sunk.⁴

Upwards of two thousand hogsheads of tobacco, besides other stores, were destroyed, without any loss to the enemy,⁵ and if any loss, except that of the property, was sustained by the Virginians, it has not been recorded.

The result of these predatory expeditions was a terrible blow to Virginia,—her tobacco being her circulating medium,—and, indirectly, to the cause of America;⁶ yet, strange to say, not a

¹ Gordon, iv. p. 108; Marshall, iv. p. 485; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 192; Gen. Arnold to Gen. Sir H. Clinton, May 12.

² Simcoe, p. 199; Gordon, iv. p. 108.

³ History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 192; Gen. Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, May 12; Simcoe, pp. 200, 201.

⁴ Gordon, iv. p. 108; Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12; Simcoe, p. 201.

⁵ Gordon, iv. p. 108; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 192; Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12.

⁶ Stedman, ii. p. 383; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 191.

¹ Simcoe's Journal, p. 199.

² Gordon, iv. p. 108; Marshall, iv. p. 484; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 191; Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12; Simcoe, p. 199.

³ Simcoe's Jour., p. 199; Marshall, iv. p. 485; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 191; Lee's Mem., p. 200; Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, May 12.

single man moved from the Northern or Eastern States to render any assistance, or to ward off a single blow which was aimed at her existence. Well might her people "touch largely on the conduct of their Eastern friends,

in the day of peril, compared with their conduct to the latter in their day of trial."¹

[NOTE.—Gen. Arnold's dispatch to Sir Henry Clinton, on the subject of this action, has been omitted by the Publishers for want of room.]

CHAPTER XCII.

May 12, 1781.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT MOTTE, S. C.

The establishment of a line of posts between Augusta and Charleston, by way of Camden, by the enemy, and the capture of Fort Watson, one of the number, by General Marion and Lieutenant-colonel Lee, have been heretofore noticed in these pages. The fall of a second one is the subject of this chapter, and the disinterested patriotism of one of the daughters of Carolina, in connection with the siege, adds to the interest which, under any circumstances, would attach to the subject.

Fort Motte, the post referred to, occupied an elevated spot, near the Buck's Head Neck, on the southern bank of the Congaree River, a little above the confluence of that stream and the Wateree, thirty-three miles below Columbia, the capital of the State.² It was a fine large house, owned by a widow lady,—Mrs. Rebecca Motte,³—

who, together with her family, was known to be friends of their country, and was dispossessed by the enemy, and compelled to seek shelter in her farm-house, which occupied a hill north from the mansion.⁴ It was surrounded with a heavy stockade, a deep ditch, and an abatis;⁵ was garrisoned with one hundred and fifty men, under Lieutenant McPherson;⁶ and was one of the principal of the chain of posts to which allusion has been made.⁷ At the period of which this narrative treats, the garrison had been strengthened by the temporary sojourn of a small body of cavalry, which was on its way from

¹ Col. J. Banister to Col. Theo. Bland, May 16, 1781.

² Gordon, iv. p. 90; Lee's Memoirs, p. 229.

³ Gen. Greene to President of Congress, May 14; Gordon, iv. pp. 89, 90; Lee's Memoirs, p. 229.

⁴ Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 233. Many suppose McPherson was a Captain, but Lord Rawdon, in his letter to Lieut.-Col. Lee ("Camp, May 14, 1781"), styles him "Lieut. McPherson."

⁵ "This post was rendered peculiarly important by having been made the depository of all the supplies designed for Camden."—Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 583.

¹ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 683.

² Gordon, iv. pp. 89, 90; Weems and Horry's Marion, p. 220.

Charleston to Camden with dispatches for Lord Rawdon.¹

Against this post General Marion and Lieutenant-colonel Lee moved, after Colonel Watson had eluded their pursuit;² and, on the eighth of May, they occupied the high grounds in its vicinity³—Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with a six-pounder, near the farm-house, on the north side of the fort, and General Marion on the eastern declivity of the ridge on which the fort stood.⁴ The fort was completely invested in a short time, and the field-piece was mounted, in battery, on a small mound which was cast up, by General Marion, on the eastern side of the works; while Lieutenant-colonel Lee, protected by a valley which separated his position from the fort, broke ground, and advanced by a regular “parallel.”⁵ Both these works, with the assistance of relays of negroes, which were furnished from the neighboring plantations, every four hours, advanced with rapidity;⁶ and such was their forwardness that, on the tenth of May, the commandant of the fort was summoned to surrender, which was declined.⁷

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 229. These dispatches were sent to Lord Rawdon after the surrender of the fort; and, in a letter to Lieut.-Col. Lee, dated “Camp, May 14, 1781,” his lordship returns “many thanks for the politeness in transmitting” them to him.

² Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 581.—³ Gen. Greene to Pres. of Cong., May 14; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 280; Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. p. 233.—⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 230; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. Rev., p. 275.—⁵ Lee's Mem., p. 230.—⁶ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 280; Lee's Mem., p. 230.

⁷ Lee's Mem., p. 230; Mrs. Ellet (*Domestic Hist. of Rev.*, p. 275) says the fort was summoned on the twentieth; and the error is repeated in her “*Women of the Rev.*,” ii. p. 69.

On the evening of that day the evacuation of Camden, by Lord Rawdon, was made known to the assailants, and they correctly supposed that he would move down towards Charleston, by way of Fort Motte. Every possible exertion, therefore, was made to secure the garrison before his arrival, but, on the following night, the beacon-fires, on the distant hills, were visible, and “gave the joyful annunciation of his approach,” to the despairing garrison while, to the besiegers, it betokened a speedy issue, either for good or evil.¹

At this juncture, when no *immediate* success appeared possible, the commanders resolved to adopt a new, but, as it proved, an effectual expedient.² The area of the inclosure, within the works, it was known, was nearly all occupied by the mansion; and if that could be *burned*, the garrison would be compelled to surrender, in order to save itself from destruction. An attempt to carry this idea into execution was the subject of this resolution.³

The “parallel” which was approaching the north side of the fort, it was seen, would be within *bowshot* of the fort before noon, on the twelfth, and orders were issued for the preparation of “bows and arrows, with missive combustible matter.” The idea, however, also involved many features which filled the minds of the assailants with regret.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 230; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., pp. 275, 276.—² Lee's Mem., p. 230. Weems and Horry (*Life of Marion*, p. 220) say Marion originated and carried out the idea.—³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 230; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic History of Revolution, p. 276

The house was the home of a tried friend of her country, "and she was a widow." Her brothers and her deceased husband had never swerved from the duty which had devolved on them; and her son-in-law, Major Thomas Pinckney, the husband of her eldest daughter, had fought and bled under the banners of his country, and, at that moment, was a prisoner in the hands of her enemies. Her own good deeds, to the sick and wounded, as well as to those in authority among the besiegers, had endeared her to all alike; and the contemplated destruction of her property was the cause of great anxiety and regret.¹

On the following morning (*May 12th*) Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with many apologies, conveyed the unpleasant intelligence to the lady, but, "with a smile of complacence she listened to the embarrassed officer, and gave instant relief to his agitated feelings, by declaring that she was gratified with the opportunity of contributing to the good of her country, and that she should witness the approaching scene with delight. Shortly afterwards, seeing, accidentally, the bow and arrows which had been prepared, she sent for the Lieutenant-colonel, and, presenting him with a bow and its apparatus, imported from India, she requested his substitution of these, as, probably, better adapted for the object than those which had been provided."²

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 230, 231; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 276.—² Lee's Mem., p. 231; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 280; Ramsay's Revolution in S. C., ii. pp. 233, 234; Gordon, iv. p. 90.

The lines were immediately manned, and an additional force was stationed at the battery to guard against any sudden movement of the enemy, which his desperate situation might induce him to make.³ All necessary preparations having been made, a flag was sent to the garrison to explain the danger of its situation, and invite it to surrender; but, although the officer was received with the greatest politeness, the commander repeated his determination of holding out to the last.⁴

It was about noon when the flag returned, and the scorching rays of the sun had prepared the shingle roof for the reception of the missiles.⁵ The bow was held by Nathan Savage, one of General Marion's men,⁶ and his first arrow struck the roof and set it on fire. A second was less successful, but the third kindled a blaze in another part of the roof.⁷ The garrison was immediately ordered into the garret to knock off the shingles, and check the progress of the flames; but the field-piece was brought close to one of the gables of the house, and, by opening its fire, raked the loft from end to end, and forced the soldiers to retire.⁸

No other means of checking the flames could be commanded, and Lieutenant McPherson hung out a white flag, and asked for mercy, which was granted.⁷

The officers were immediately pa-

³ Lee's Mem., p. 231; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., p. 276.—⁴ Lee's Mem., pp. 231, 232.—⁵ Ibid., p. 232.

⁶ Simms' Marion.—⁷ Lee's Mem., p. 232; Mrs. Ellet's Domestic Hist. of Rev., ii. p. 276.—⁸ Ibid.

⁷ Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 280; Lee's Memoirs, p. 232.

roled,¹ and, with their victorious opponents, sat down to a sumptuous dinner which Mrs. Motte had provided,² while "the deportment and demeanor of that lady gave a zest to the pleasures of the table. She did its honors with that unaffected politeness which ever excites esteem mingled with admiration. Con-

versing with ease, vivacity, and good sense, she obliterated the recollection of the injury she had received; and, though warmly attached to the defenders of her country, the engaging amiability of her manners left it doubtful which set of officers constituted those defenders."³

CHAPTER XCIII.

May 21 to June 19, 1781.

THE SIEGE OF FORT NINETY-SIX, S. C.

FORT Ninety-six, to which frequent reference has been made, was one of the principal outposts of the enemy in South Carolina, and was situated near the village of Cambridge, in Abbeville District, South Carolina.⁴ The village had been stockaded as a protection against the Indians in the earlier days of the settlement;⁴ and, after the enemy had taken possession of the State, it had been strengthened by the addition of other works of defence.⁵ The principal of these, called *The Star Battery*, had been constructed from plans of Lieutenant Haldane of the engineers, an aid of Lord Cornwallis;⁶ and it consisted of sixteen salient and re-enter-

ing angles, surrounded by a dry ditch, fraise, and abatis, and was situate on "the right," or southern side of the village, with which it communicated. On the opposite side of the village was a valley, through which ran a brook, from which the garrison received its supply of water. The district prison, which was within the inclosure of the village, was fortified, for the purpose of commanding this brook, on its southern bank, while on the northern, for the same purpose, a strong stockade fort, with two block-houses, also communicating with the village by a covered-way, had been erected.² The garrison consisted of about one hundred and fifty men from Delaney's First battalion of New York Tories; two hundred from the Second battalion of New Jersey

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 232.—² Ibid.; Weems and Horry's Marion, p. 221.—³ Mills' Statistics of S. C., p. 350.

⁴ McKenzie's Strictures on Tarleton, p. 142; Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 138; Lee's Mem., p. 240; Stedman, ii. p. 364.—⁵ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 139; Lee's Memoirs, p. 240; Stedman, ii. p. 364.

⁶ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 143; Lee's Memoirs, p. 240.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 232.—² McKenzie's Strictures, p. 143; Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 140; Lee's Memoirs, pp. 240, 241; Stedman, ii. p. 364.

Volunteers (Tories); and about two hundred South Carolina Tories, under Colonel King, the whole being under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Cruger—a New York Tory.¹ Two hundred men, under Major Green of Delaney's regiment, formed the garrison of *The Star Battery*; “a captain's party and some militia” were posted in the stockade fort, north from the brook; and the remainder of the garrison, with the commander, occupied the stockaded village.² Three three-pounders constituted the whole of the artillery which the garrison possessed, and the supply of ammunition, as well as of artillerists, is said to have been small.³

On the twenty-first of May, the advance of General Greene's army appeared before the works;⁴ and on the next day the main body came up.⁵ Although the works were yet unfinished, they were formidable, and the skill and energy of the commander were called into requisition to render them as perfect as possible.⁶

The weakness of General Greene's force prevented a complete investment of the works,⁷ and this cause, added to the want of a proper battery,—his artillery consisting of light field-pieces,⁸—retarded the progress of the siege.

¹ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 144; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, ii. p. 139; Stedman, ii. p. 366.—² McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 145.—³ Ibid., pp. 145, 146; Lee's *Mem.*, p. 241; Stedman, ii. pp. 365, 366.—⁴ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 146; Stedman, ii. p. 366.—⁵ Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 143; Lee's *Mem.*, p. 240.—⁶ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 146; Stedman, ii. pp. 364, 365.—⁷ Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 142.—⁸ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 146; Marshall, iv. p. 589.

On the night of the twenty-first, with great indiscretion, two works were thrown up within sixty yards from the fort, without even sending a summons to the garrison. Stung with this indignity, their destruction was determined on; and, by eleven o'clock the next morning the platform in the salient angle of the Star, nearest to the besiegers, was completed, and mounted with guns to fire *en barbet*. These, with the co-operation of a sortie, under Lieutenant Roney, on the next night, entirely destroyed the obnoxious structures before General Greene, who moved with the covering parties to protect them, could reach the ground.¹

The celebrated Kosciusko was the engineer,² and, under his directions, on the twenty-third of May, ground was broken at a greater distance;³ the *Star Battery* was approached by parallels; and two saps were begun, with batteries to cover them, and a proper guard.⁴ Notwithstanding the frequent sorties from the garrison, which interrupted the work, the second parallel was completed on the third of June, and the garrison was then summoned to surrender.⁵ This summons having been re-

¹ Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 143; McKenzie's *Strictures*, pp. 147, 148; Lee's *Mem.*, pp. 241, 242; Stedman, ii. pp. 366, 367; Montrie's *Memoirs*, ii. p. 285.

² Mills' *Statis. of S. C.*, p. 351; Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 141; Lee's *Mem.*, p. 241. Mills (p. 351) condemns Kosciusko for not opening his trenches nearer the lines, but the last sentence relieves him of this charge.

³ Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 143; McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 148; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 242; Stedman, ii. p. 367

⁴ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 149.

⁵ Ibid.; Johnson's *Greene*, ii. pp. 143, 144; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 252; Stedman, ii. pp. 367, 368.

jected, a heavy cross-fire was opened from the besiegers' light pieces; and the works were pushed forward with great zeal.¹

On the eighth of June, General Greene was strengthened by the arrival of General Pickens and Lieutenant-colonel Lee, and their command, from Augusta,²—which had fallen into the hands of the Americans three days before,³—and, taking advantage of this small increase in his force, he immediately invested the small stockade on the north side of the brook, for the purpose of cutting off the garrison's supply of water.⁴

In the mean time Lord Rawdon, who had arrived in Charleston, had been reinforced, on the third of June, by the arrival of three regiments from Ireland,⁵ and on the seventh he marched for the relief of Fort Ninety-six.⁶ On the eleventh the intelligence of this movement reached General Greene; and, notwithstanding the expected reinforcements from Virginia had not arrived, he adopted such measures to secure his army and the garrison, as his circumstances allowed.⁷ He immediate-

ly detached all his cavalry to strengthen General Sumter's command, and gave orders to that officer to keep in his lordship's front, and to exert every means in his power to check his progress.¹ Orders were also issued to Generals Marion and Pickens to co-operate with General Sumter; and it was hoped to secure the garrison before Lord Rawdon could reach the ground.²

At the same time the approaches were pushed forward with great vigor;³ the third parallel was nearly completed;⁴ a Mayham tower—which had been employed with so much success at Forts Watson and Cornwallis⁵—had been carried to the height of forty feet, overlooking the parapets of the *Star Battery*, and affording shelter to a large body of superior marksmen;⁶ arrows, bearing fire-balls, were discharged—as they had been at Fort Motte⁷—and compelled the garrison to remove the roofs from the quarters and other buildings;⁸ and, on the twelfth of June, a

¹ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 151; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 252; Stedman, ii. p. 368; Marshall, iv. p. 587.

² Lee's *Mem.*, p. 251; Stedman, ii. p. 369; Marshall, iv. p. 587. Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 147) says they arrived on the twelfth.—³ Vide Chap. LXXXVIII.

⁴ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 153; Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 147; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 252; Marshall, iv. p. 588.

⁵ Stedman, ii. p. 371; Gordon, iv. p. 93.

⁶ Lee's *Mem.*, p. 253; Gordon, iv. p. 93; Marshall, iv. p. 589. Judge Johnson (*Life of Gen. Greene*, ii. p. 152) says he left Charleston on the eleventh.

⁷ Johnson's *Greene*, ii. pp. 144, 146; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 253; Gen. Greene to Congress, June 20, 1781.

¹ Johnson's *Greene*, ii. pp. 146, 147; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 253; Gen. Greene to Congress, June 20, 1781; Marshall, iv. p. 589. It is said the message was carried by a young lady, named Emily Geiger. With considerable difficulty she succeeded in her purposes, notwithstanding she was captured on her way.—*Mrs. Ellet's Domestic History of Revolution*, ii. pp. 280, 281.

² Johnson's *Greene*, ii. pp. 146, 147; Lee's *Memoirs*, p. 253.—³ Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 143; Lee's *Mem.*, p. 253.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Congress, June 20, 1781.

⁵ Judge Johnson (*Life of Gen. Greene*, ii. p. 147) erroneously supposes this was the first attempt to use such structures, but, by reference to Chap. LXXXVII., and the references there cited, his error will be seen.

⁶ McKenzie's *Strictures*, p. 151; Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 148; Stedman, ii. p. 368; Gen. Greene to Congress, June 20, 1781.—⁷ Vide Chap. XCII.

⁸ McKenzie's *Strictures*, pp. 151, 152; Johnson's *Greene*, ii. p. 147; Stedman, ii. p. 368.

rash attempt was made to set fire to the stockade, by means of the abatis, wherein Sergeant Whaling and five men were killed, four only escaping.¹ On the seventeenth of June the communication between the fort and the brook was cut off, and taken possession of by Lieutenant-colonel Lee; and "the sufferings of the garrison," now deprived of water, and unable to procure it by digging, "were now extreme."²

The successful termination of the siege was now supposed to be not far distant; but, on the same day (*June 17th*), intelligence of the rapid approach of Lord Rawdon, who, by a detour, had eluded the vigilance of Generals Sumter, Marion, and Pickens, gave encouragement to the garrison, and forced new plans on the besiegers.³

On the morning of the eighteenth of June the third parallel was completed, the abatis of the *Star Battery* was turned, the pickets were drawn out, two trenches and a mine were brought forward within a few feet of the ditch, and the Mayham tower was completed.⁴ The troops had witnessed the spirit of their commander, and manifested a strong desire to attack the works before the arrival of the reinforcements; and orders were accordingly issued, and

preparations made, for an assault at noon on the eighteenth.¹

Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, of Virginia, with detachments from the Virginia and Maryland lines, was intrusted with the attack on the left—that on the *Star Battery*; and Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with the Legion infantry and the fragment of the veteran Delaware regiment, was placed in command of the attack on the right—that on the stockade fort; Lieutenants Duval and Seldon commanded the forlorn hopes on the left; Captain Rudolph, of the Legion, that on the right.² At eleven o'clock the third parallel was manned; and the Mayham tower was occupied by the sharp-shooters.³ At twelve the assaulting parties moved forward to attack the lines; the field-pieces opened, if possible, a more furious fire; the riflemen, from the tower, cut down every man who showed himself within the works; the ditch, filled with fascines, which had been prepared for that purpose, were passed by the forlorn-hopes; and detachments, provided with hooks, attempted to tear down, from the parapets, the sand-bags behind which the garrison had taken shelter.⁴ Every man in the forlorn-hopes performed his duty, and none appeared to falter in the discharge of those labors which had been assigned to him.

¹ Garden's Anecdotes, i. pp. 149, 150; McKenzie's Strictures, p. 155; Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 147, 148; Lee's Mem., pp. 253, 254.—² Lee's Mem., p. 254; McKenzie's Strictures, p. 156; Stedman, ii. p. 370; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 365.—³ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 157; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 148; Marshall, iv. p. 589.

⁴ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 158; Lee's Mem., p. 255; Stedman, ii. p. 372. Mr. Mills (*Statis. of S. C.*, p. 350) gives a description of this mine.

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 255.—² Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 149; Lee's Mem., p. 255; Gen. Greene to Congress, June 20, 1781.—³ Lee's Mem., p. 255; Marshall, iv. p. 591.

⁴ Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 149, 150; Lee's Mem., pp. 255, 256; Stedman, ii. p. 372; Gen. Greene to Congress, June 20, 1781; McKenzie's Strictures, p. 158.

The besieged, however, were not less determined; and, while the preparations for the assault were in progress, outside the town, equally judicious arrangements were in progress, within the works, to repel the assailants. Sandbags had been piled on the parapets, with loop-holes between them, through which the riflemen could pour a certain fire on the assaulting columns without danger from the sharp-shooters which had been posted on the Mayham tower;¹ a battery, mounting his entire force of artillery, had been so placed that it could command the advance of both wings of the assailants;² and small parties of light troops had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness to make sorties whenever the state of the assailants appeared to warrant such a movement.³

When the forlorn-hopes, under Lieutenants Duval and Seldon, entered the ditch of *the Star*, a heavy and destructive fire, from behind the sand-bags, was opened on them; and the enfilading fire, from the battery, swept their position.⁴ At this moment, Major Green, who commanded in *the Star*, ordered two light parties, of thirty men each, commanded by Captain Campbell, of New Jersey, and Captain French, of New York, to sally from a port in the rear of the battery, and by taking opposite direc-

tions, to fall on the flanks of the forlorn-hopes, with the bayonet, while the fire from the parapets, in front, covered the movement. This order was promptly obeyed, and a desperate contest ensued.¹ With a gallantry which was never surpassed, Lieutenants Duval and Seldon maintained the unequal contest, until both fell, wounded, when they were ordered to withdraw, and retired with great loss²—the assaulting party, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, from some unexplained cause, having remained in the trenches,³ without rendering any support to the gallant forlorn-hopes, and, without doubt, contributed, very materially, to the unfortunate result. The right wing of the assailants, led by Captain Rudolph, was more successful in its assault on the left of the enemy's lines. Entering the ditch, “and followed by the column,” the forlorn-hope “soon opened its way into the fort,” from which the enemy had, unknown to the assailants, retreated on the preceding night.⁴

General Greene, witnessed the repulse of his left wing with regret, al-

¹ McKenzie's Strictures, pp. 159, 160; Lee's Mem., p. 256; Stedman, ii. pp. 372, 373. Judge Johnson (*Life of Gen. Greene*, ii. p. 150) disputes the correctness of that part of the account which relates to the sortie.

² Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 497; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 150; Stedman, ii. p. 373; Gen. Greene to Congress, June 20, 1781; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 366; Gordon, iv. p. 94. Lieut.-Col. Lee (*Memoirs*, p. 256) says they were *driven back*.

³ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 159; Stedman, ii. p. 372; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 366; Gordon, iv. p. 95.

⁴ Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 150; McKenzie's Strictures, p. 156; Gordon, iv. p. 94. Lieut.-Col. Lee (*Memoirs*, p. 256) says he drove the garrison from the redoubt.

¹ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 151; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 148; Lee's Memoirs, p. 254; Stedman, ii. p. 368.

² Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 150; McKenzie's Strictures, p. 158; Marshall, iv. p. 591.—³ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 159.

⁴ Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 150; Lee's Memoirs, p. 256; Gordon, iv. pp. 94, 95.

though he was "charmed with the courage which was displayed" by the troops; but the cardinal principle of his policy—"the preservation of an adequate force to keep the field"—forbade a renewal of the assault on *the Star*, even with the increased chances of success, which the occupation of the stockade fort afforded, while *it was possible* it might reduce his force beyond the bounds of prudence.¹ He resolved, therefore, to withdraw from the lines, without hazarding a meeting with Lord Rawdon, who was then rapidly approaching; and, after burying his dead,² on the evening of the nineteenth, he raised the siege, and retired towards Charlotte in North Carolina.³

The loss of the Americans in this un-

fortunate affair, was Captain Armstrong of the Maryland line, and one hundred and fifty-four, killed and wounded;¹ that of the enemy, Lieutenant Roney and eighty-four men.²

On the morning of the twenty-first, Lord Rawdon reached Fort Ninety-six, having been only fourteen days on the route from Charleston;³ and on the same evening he started in pursuit of General Greene.⁴ On the south side of the Enoree River his advance came up with the American rear guard, commanded by Lieutenant-colonels Lee and Washington;⁵ but no attempt was made to molest the retreat,⁶ and, soon afterwards, his lordship returned to Fort Ninety-six, and soon afterwards that post was evacuated.⁷

¹ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 151; Lee's Memoirs, p. 256.

² Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 152. Lieut.-Col. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 256) says Col. Cruger rejected the flag by which Gen. Greene asked permission to bury his dead which had fallen within the lines; but Judge Johnson cites the words of the written answer, showing the error.

³ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 160; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 154; Lee's Memoirs, p. 257; Stedman, ii. p. 373.

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¹ Marshall, iv. p. 592.—² McKenzie's Strictures, p. 164; Stedman, ii. p. 373.—³ McKenzie's Strictures, p. 160; Lee's Memoirs, p. 257; Stedman, ii. p. 373.

⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 258; Stedman, ii. p. 373; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 367. Judge Johnson (*Life of Gen. Greene*, ii. p. 155) says Lord Rawdon did not leave Ninety-six until the morning of the twenty-fourth.

⁵ Lee's Memoirs, p. 258.—⁶ Gordon, iv. p. 96.

⁷ Marshall, iv. p. 596; Tarleton, p. 502.

CHAPTER XCIV.

JUNE 26, 1781.

THE ACTION AT SPENCER'S ORDINARY, VA.

WHILE Lord Cornwallis was attempting to regain Virginia, as he had regained South Carolina and Georgia, he was opposed, among others, by General Lafayette, and a respectable force of efficient troops.¹ On the sixteenth of June the enemy entered Richmond; but, having received information of the approach of a strong body of mounted men, under General Muhlenberg, and acting under the instructions received from Sir Henry Clinton, that position was abandoned on the twenty-first, and the army moved towards Williamsburg, by way of New Kent Court-house.

While Lord Cornwallis was at the latter place, information was received that a foundry and some boats were on the Chickahominy Creek;² and, on the twenty-third of June,³ Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, with the Queen's Rangers and a party of Yagers, was detached "to destroy this property, to collect all the cattle he could find in the country, and to proceed to Williamsburg." At an early hour on the next morning, the detachment moved to the Chickahomi-

ny Creek, but it found "little or nothing to destroy," and "cattle-driving"—an employment in which the Tories in all parts of the country took particular delight and peculiarly excelled—was all which remained for the marauders to do.

With the assistance of a kindred band of Tories from North Carolina, led by Captain Branson, the several plantations on the route were stripped of their cattle; and the Rangers, with the drove, were hastening onward towards Williamsburg, by way of Spencer's Ordinary—a well-known tavern, kept by one Spencer, which stood at the junction of the roads which led to Jamestown and to Williamsburg, some six or seven miles from the latter place.¹

Intelligence of the movements of this expedition had reached General Lafayette, who was then posted at Tyre's plantation, about twenty miles from Williamsburg,² and he determined to intercept it. Accordingly, he detached Lieutenant-colonel Butler—one of the most energetic officers in the army³—with his regiment of riflemen; two

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 299.—² Ibid.

³ Mr. Girardin (*Hist. of Virginia*, p. 509) supposes this detachment was sent from Williamsburg. As Lord Cornwallis did not reach that place until the 25th, it will be seen that he is in error, in that respect.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 300.—² Ibid., p. 299.

³ Col. Butler was second in command, under Col. Morgan, at the battle of Saratoga.

other corps of riflemen commanded by Majors Call and Willis; and Major McPherson with about one hundred and twenty horsemen, for that purpose;¹ and the enemy was overtaken near Spencer's, while he was refreshing his party, and awaiting the return of his cattle-drivers, who had been sent out to the neighboring plantations to rob them of their stock.

The infantry and Yagers, which were in advance, with two field-pieces, occupied the right of the Williamsburg road, opposite Spencer's tavern; while the cavalry, in the rear, were feeding their horses at Mr. Lee's plantation, an elevated position on the right of the Jamestown road. A company of the Legion infantry had been posted, in the rear, as a picket; and Trumpeter Barney had also been stationed on an elevated ground, in the rear of Mr. Lee's, as a vidette, to guard against surprise.

With so much address was the advance of the pursuing party conducted that it escaped the notice of the picket; and the cavalry was close upon the Legion cavalry, at Mr. Lee's, before it was seen. At that moment the trumpeter saw them, and gave the alarm; but, before the horsemen could mount, the assailants had seized the enemy's battle-horses. A sharp conflict ensued between the Legion cavalry, led by Captain Shank,² and the American horsemen, led by Major McPherson, in which

the latter were repulsed, with the loss of Lieutenant Breso and some privates, who were taken prisoners.¹

At the same time, while the cavalry were thus engaged, the main body of the Americans had moved forward to support Major McPherson; driving the enemy's picket, before referred to; covering the retreat of the cavalry with "a heavy fire;" and compelling the enemy's cavalry, in its turn, to retire. It acted nobly; and, after having repulsed the enemy's cavalry, on the right of the main road, towards Mr. Lee's, it formed, by *echelons*, behind a fence which separated the woods from the cleared fields, in the rear of Spencer's tavern, on the opposite side of the road, and checked the advance of the enemy's infantry, which had formed, and was advancing to turn its left flank. While this movement was in progress, and the infantry of both parties were evidently preparing for a desperate struggle, the enemy's cavalry was moved, by a circuitous route, from the scene of its repulse, at Mr. Lee's, to the left flank of his line of infantry, where it occupied the road, ready to take advantage of any success, or to break the blow, in case of a disaster befalling the infantry. One of the enemy's field-pieces—the other having been disabled—had been placed in battery, on a rising ground, on the left of his line; the stolen cattle had been pushed forward, with the baggage, towards Williamsburg; expresses had been sent to Lord

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 300.—² Lieut-Col. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 309) says the charge was led by *Lieut. Lollar*; but, as Col. Simcoe, the commander of the party, has said it was *Capt. Shank*, I have preferred his statement.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 300.

Cornwallis, with intelligence of the attack; the Quarter-master had been directed to cut down trees for the purpose of barricading a pass, near by, near which the corps was to rally, in case of defeat; and every precaution, which the experience and good judgment of the enemy could devise, had been adopted.

The enemy's line,—which had been so far expanded that intervening spaces, of some extent, existed between the companies,—was moving slowly over the ploughed field which lay in front of the American line, when a considerable body of troops, which Lieutenant-colonel Butler had left on the right side of the road, to protect his right flank, attempted to cross the road, and fall on its left flank. In consequence of the high fences which skirted the road, this movement was made without any regard to order; and Captain Shank taking advantage of the confusion into which the party had fallen, dashed up the road, with the remnants of his cavalry, and scattered it, with considerable loss. This fact, probably, produced an evil effect in the American line,—the charge of the cavalry having been made on its right flank,—and, although it sustained the action for some time, it finally gave way.

Notwithstanding the apparent triumph, “the instant Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe could draw off and collect his force, *it was thought proper to retreat*,” leaving his wounded at Spencer's tavern, with a flag and his surgeon's mate, at the mercy of the Americans.

Both parties appear to have been deceived respecting the positions and movements of the main bodies of their respective antagonists; and each retired, apparently satisfied with the result, and claiming the victory.

The enemy's loss, according to his own statement, was about thirty-five; but General Lafayette supposed it exceeded one hundred and fifty. The loss of the Americans is not known.

The enemy exulted considerably over the result of this affair, and Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, speaking of it, has said that he “has ever considered it as the climax of a campaign of five years; as the result of true discipline acquired in that space by unremitting diligence, toil, and danger; as an honorable victory earned by veteran intrepidity.” Without desiring to disturb the equanimity of that gallant officer, it may not be improper to remark, that if *this* result was “the climax,” and the end for which the zealous officers of that active band of loyalists had labored for five years, they had been easily satisfied; and, in view of the fact that the action at Spence's Ordinary is now so little known, even in Virginia, does it not prove, in truth, that

“This world is but a fleeting show?”

[The narrative in this chapter has been based on the account given by Lieut.-Col. Simcoe, in his interesting “*Journal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers*,” and on the very valuable map of the ground and movements, which he has preserved. Where other references have not been made, therefore, Simcoe's Journal and map are my only authority.]

CHAPTER XCV.

July 6, 1781.

THE ACTION AT JAMESTOWN FORD, V.A.

GENERAL Cornwallis having reached Williamsburg, as related in a former chapter,¹ preparations were made for his passage over the James River;² and General Lafayette, waiting his motions, remained at Tyre's plantation.³

In accordance with the plan of operations which he had adopted, Lord Cornwallis moved from Williamsburg on the fourth of July;⁴ and on the evening of the same day, the Queen's Rangers, under Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, passed the river for the purpose of covering the passage of the baggage.⁵ On the fifth and sixth of July the passage of the baggage and bat-horses was continued; and the seventh was the time which had been assigned for the passage of the main body of the army.⁶

The *intentions* of the enemy were properly understood by General Lafayette; the principal difficulty which he experienced being in the means to be employed for securing correct informa-

tion of the enemy's *movements*. In this he was opposed, chiefly, by the character of the manœuvres of Lord Cornwallis, who, penetrating the purposes of General Lafayette, so concealed his own, that the latter was kept in perfect ignorance of the details of the movements of his adversary, while he supposed that every feature was fully understood.¹

The design of General Lafayette was to wait until the greater part of the enemy had passed the river, and then to fall on the rear of that portion which remained, while its numbers or means of defence were not sufficient to secure it from his assault. With this design he moved from Tyre's, and, on the evening of the fifth of July he encamped within eight or nine miles of the enemy. On the next morning, supposing the proper time had come for his intended blow, he prepared for the assault; and, notwithstanding intelligence was brought by Lieutenant-colonel Mercer, from Greenspring, that the main body had not yet crossed the river, he pressed forward to that place,

¹ Vide Chap. XCIV.—² Tarleton's Southern Campaigns, p. 352.—³ Gordon, iv. p. 117; Lee's Mem., p. 300.

⁴ Campbell's Hist. Virginia, p. 176; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, " Cobham, July 8, 1781;" Tarleton, p. 352; Gordon, iv. p. 117.—⁵ Simcoe's Jour., p. 239; Tarleton, p. 352; Lee's Mem., p. 301.—⁶ Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 373; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, July 8, 1781.

¹ Gordon, iv. p. 117; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 233; Lee's Memoirs, pp. 301, 302.

reaching it within a few minutes after Lord Cornwallis had left it and moved towards the ford. So perfect, indeed, had Lord Cornwallis perfected his plans, that General Lafayette discredited the report of Lieutenant-colonel Mercer; and this, added to the anxiety to fight, which the army evinced, induced him to abandon his usual caution, and attack the enemy.¹

The ground, in front of Greenspring, between the mansion and the Williamsburg road, is low and wet, forming a morass, about a quarter of a mile in width, and passable only by a narrow causeway of logs.² Over this causeway the enemy had gradually withdrawn; and the same narrow pathway afforded the only way by which General Lafayette could pursue him. "Sage and experienced" as he was, Lord Cornwallis rejoiced that his adversary was giving way to the rashness of youth; and "his measures were taken to encourage the adventurous spirit, with the resolution of turning it to his own advantage."³ His troops, both on the line of march and in camp, were kept as compact as possible; and orders were given, in case of an attack, that his pickets should fall back with the appearance of alarm and confusion, for the purpose of leading on the assailants.⁴

At length, about three o'clock in the afternoon, General Lafayette moved

from Greenspring, in pursuit of what he supposed to have been the rear of the British army. A small party of dragoons, followed by the rifles, commanded by Majors Call and Willis, led the way over the causeway, and halted in a wood near the Williamsburg road. The cavalry of Colonel Armand and Lieutenant-colonel Mercer's commands, led by Major McPherson, followed next; and they were supported by the Pennsylvania line, led by the fearless General Wayne. The Baron Steuben, with the militia, remained at Greenspring, *as a reserve*; but the distance between the two bodies, and the intervening causeway, neutralized the benefit which such a body might, reasonably, be expected to afford.¹

After the main body had crossed the causeway the riflemen were thrown upon the flanks, while the cavalry continued to move in advance of the column.² In this order the advance had not moved more than a mile when, about sunset,³ it was thrown back by a heavy fire from the enemy's Yagers; when Lieutenant-colonel Mercer and Major McPherson were directed to leave the cavalry and take command of the riflemen—the former, those on the right; the latter, those on the left.⁴ With these the enemy's pickets were again attacked and driven back, with considerable loss, on his horse, which had been formed in an open

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 302.—² Ibid.—³ Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, July 8, 1781; Tarleton, p. 353; Lee's Mem., p. 303.—⁴ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 498; Serg. Lamb's Journal of Occurrences, p. 373; Girardin's Virginia, p. 512.

¹ Lee's Mem., pp. 303, 304; Girardin's Virginia, p. 512.
² Lee's Mem., p. 304.—³ Campbell's Virginia, p. 176; Girardin's Virginia, p. 512; Stedman, ii. p. 394.

⁴ Lee's Memoirs, p. 304.

field, about three hundred yards in the rear.¹ At this moment the American cavalry came up and joined the riflemen,—that commanded by Colonel Armand supporting Major McPherson; that of the Virginia establishment supporting Lieutenant-colonel Mercer,—but the latter, made more bold by their supposed advantage, pushed forward, and formed in a ditch, under cover of a rail-fence, from which they renewed their fire, on what now showed itself to be the main body of the British army.² They were joined, soon afterwards, by Majors Willis and Galvan, with two battalions of Continental troops (light-infantry), and by Captain Savage, with two field-pieces, all of whom joined in the engagement, and opened their fire on the enemy's line.³

When the American artillery opened its fire, it is probable Lord Cornwallis supposed the time had come when he should strike the fatal blow; and his line, in order of battle, moved against the Americans.⁴ His right wing,—composed of the splendid brigade of veterans, which Lieutenant-colonel Webster had commanded throughout the earlier part of the campaign, embracing the Twenty-third, Thirty-third, and Seventy-first regiments, and the light troops, the brigade of the Guards, the Hessians, two battalions of light-infantry, and three field-pieces,—led by Lieutenant-colonel Yorke,⁵ encountering the party

led by Major McPherson; while his left,—composed of the Forty-third, Seventy-sixth, and Eightieth regiments, supported by the cavalry of the Legion, and the light companies,—led by Lieutenant-colonel Dundas,¹ encountered Lieutenant-colonel Mercer. This formidable array of troops moved against the riflemen, in their position behind the rail-fence; but the latter, supported by the cavalry and the Continentals, received them with perfect coolness, and “the conflict was keenly maintained for some minutes.”² The force of numbers, however, compelled the Americans to fall back; and the enemy, animated with the prospect of an easy victory, rushed forward in pursuit.³

A short distance in the rear of the first line, but, to some extent, concealed from the enemy by a dense wood, General Anthony Wayne—the hero of Stony Point—was holding a select body of about five hundred Pennsylvania troops in readiness for action.⁴ When the light troops, in front, fell back, and revealed the unpleasant fact, that, instead of meeting a rear-guard, the main body of the British army,—a body of veterans,—led by Lord Cornwallis in person, was moving against

¹ Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, July 8, 1781; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 233.

² Lee's Memoirs, p. 304; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, July 8, 1781.—³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 304.

⁴ Gordon, iv. p. 118; Girardin's Virginia, p. 513. The “eight hundred,” spoken of by Marshall (*Life of Washington*, iv. p. 499), and by Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iv. p. 117), doubtless included the troops commanded by Majors Willis and Galvan, who had been engaged in front, with Col. Mercer and Major McPherson.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 304.—² Tarleton, p. 353.

³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 301; Girardin's Virginia, p. 512.

⁴ Tarleton, pp. 353, 354.—⁵ Ibid., p. 354; Girardin's Virginia, p. 512.

him, all the peculiar characteristics of General Wayne's character were displayed. The sword and the bayonet were the favorite companions of that distinguished officer;—he rather gloried in their companionship, than sought to avoid their acquaintance,—and when the formidable array, which was moving down upon him, and the scattered fragments of his light-troops came in sight, he disdained to retreat before he had crossed his steel with that of the enemy. With a degree of cool, determined resolution, which has scarcely a parallel in history, he awaited the approach of the enemy's left wing,—the right being engaged in the pursuit of the light troops,¹—and when it had nearly reached him,—far outflanking him, both to the right and the left,—he ordered his men to charge with the bayonet, and dashed against the line, with his usual impetuosity.² The three regiments whom he had assailed, not less than their distinguished commander-in-chief, were astonished at this unexpected attack; nor was their surprise diminished, when, after sustaining an action, with great spirit, for several

minutes,³ the audacious assailant coolly withdrew his men, and retired about half a mile, where he joined his light troops, and passed over the causeway to Greenspring in safety.⁴

The novelty of the last movement, and the unsurpassed bravery with which it was executed, appear to have changed the plan of operations which Lord Cornwallis had adopted; and probably supposing it was designed as a stratagem to draw him into an ambuscade, he made no attempt at pursuit;⁵ but allowed the Americans to withdraw to Greenspring without interference, and crossed over to Jamestown Island before morning, with every appearance of undesired haste.⁶

The loss of the Americans, in this action, exclusive of that of the riflemen, which was not ascertained, was one hundred and eighteen men, killed, wounded, and missing;⁵ that of the enemy is said to have been about seventy-five.⁶

¹ Tarleton, p. 354; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, July 8, 1781; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 233.

² Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 499; Gordon, iv. pp. 117, 118.

³ Tarleton, p. 354; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 499; History of Civil War in America, iii. p. 233; Stedman, ii. p. 395.—² Tarleton, p. 354; Gordon, iv. p. 118; Marshall, iv. p. 499.—³ Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 499, 500; Tarleton, p. 354; Gordon, iv. p. 118; Lee's Memo., p. 305; Girardin's Virginia, p. 513.—⁴ Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, July 8, 1781; Tarleton, p. 357; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 233.—⁵ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 500; Campbell's Virginia, p. 176; Lee's Memoirs, p. 305.—⁶ Tarleton, p. 354; Lee's Memoirs, p. 305.

CHAPTER XCVI.

July 17, 1781.

THE BATTLE OF QUINBY'S CREEK BRIDGE, S. C.

THE retreat of General Greene and his little army from Fort Ninety-six, and the pursuit by Lord Rawdon, as far as the Enoree, have been noticed in a former chapter.¹ The various movements of General Greene and his gallant subordinates,—Generals Sumter, Pickens, and Marion, and Lieutenant-colonels Washington and Lee;² the constantly changing scenes of the audacious assaults of these officers on the enemy, as he slowly concentrated his forces at Charleston;³ and the distress to which the troops were subjected, for want of food,⁴ while they form interesting subjects, in this connection, and are essential to a proper understanding of the history of the war in South Carolina,

are beyond the scope of this work, and can receive only a passing notice. At length, with his little force worn down with fatigue, want of food, and the heat of the season, General Greene determined to repair to the High Hills of Santee, and to pass the sultry season in that convenient and healthy location, hoping, thereby, to recruit the health and the spirits of his men.¹ At the same time that the main body moved towards the Santee, the light troops, under Generals Sumter and Marion and Lieutenant-colonel Lee, were detached, with orders to move rapidly towards Charleston; to beat up the enemy's quarters near that city; to break up the post at Dorchester; and, after uniting at Monk's Corner, to dislodge the Nineteenth regiment of foot, which, under Lieutenant-colonel Coates, was stationed at that post, and to return to head-quarters.²

A small detachment of men from General Marion's brigade, under Colonel Mayham, was sent, by a circuitous route, to cut off the retreat of the enemy, on the east side of the Cooper

¹ Vide Chap. XCIII.—² Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 152-178; Stedman, ii. pp. 373-376.

³ Stedman, ii. p. 376; Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 290.

⁴ "We had often experienced, in the course of the campaign, want of food, and had, sometimes, seriously suffered from the scantiness of our supplies, rendered more pinching by their quality; but never did we suffer so severely as during our few days halt near Orangeburg. Rice formed our substitute for bread. Of meat we had literally none. Frogs abounded in some neighboring ponds, and on them, chiefly, did the light troops subsist. They became in great demand, from their nutritiousness, and were diligently sought for. Even the alligator was used by a few; and very probably, had the army been much longer detained upon that ground, might have rivalled the frog, in the estimation of our epicures."—Lee's Memoirs, p. 264.

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 376; Gordon, iv. p. 97.

² Gordon, iv. p. 97; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 424; Lee's Memoirs, p. 264.

River, by occupying the bridge over Watboo Creek. At the same time Colonel Henry Hampton was moved to the bridge over Four-holes Creek; while Colonel Wade Hampton moved to the east of Dorchester, by the Wassmasaw road, and occupied the Goose-creek Bridge, cutting off the retreat of the enemy on the route west of Cooper River.¹

Each corps moved secretly and on different routes; but all were "prepared to fall, at the same moment, in different directions, upon the country lying between the Ashley and Cooper rivers."² Each was successful in the object of its attack; and so audacious were the intruders, that a party of twelve men, belonging to General Sumter's Cavalry, cut off, and made prisoners, a patrol of British dragoons and the advance guard at "the Quarter-house," on Charlestown Neck—fifty in number; and another party, composed of men belonging to the Legion cavalry, swept the upper part of the Neck itself, filling the city with alarm and confusion, and making even the head-quarters of the South tremble for its safety.³

The several parties having, successfully, accomplished the object of their march, they joined General Sumter and moved against the Nineteenth regiment, and other forces, posted near Monk's Corner.⁴ This party embraced over five hundred infantry, one hundred and

fifty cavalry, and a howitzer¹—the former being one of three regiments, from Ireland, which came into Charleston on the third of June,² and had not been worn down by the arduous duties to which their associates had been exposed.

After forcing Colonel Mayham to retire from the Watboo bridge,³ and securing, by that means, his retreat to Charleston, Colonel Coates continued to amuse General Sumter until the evening,⁴ when, after piling his stores in the Biggen meeting-house, near by, he set them on fire, and moved off, by way of the Watboo and Quinby Creek bridges, towards Charleston.⁵ About three o'clock in the morning the flames burst through the roof of the meeting-house, announcing the fact of the enemy's flight. The troops were immediately called to arms; and, notwithstanding it was evident that the enemy had gained considerable ground in his retreat, they started in pursuit of him—the cavalry of the Legion and the State cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Hampton, leading the column.⁶

After crossing the Watboo, it was found that the enemy's cavalry had separated from the infantry and taken the right-hand road, which crosses the

¹ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 167.—² Lee's Memoirs, p. 265.—³ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 168; Gordon, iv. p. 97; Lee's Memoirs, p. 265.

⁴ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 168.

¹ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 169; Gordon, iv. p. 97; Simms' Marion, p. 255.—² McKenzie's Strictures on Tarleton, p. 161.—³ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 169; Simms' Marion, p. 255.—⁴ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 170; Simms' Marion, p. 256.—⁵ Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 290; Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 170; Gordon, iv. p. 98; Lee's Memoirs, p. 265.—⁶ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 170; Ramsay's Revolution in S. C., ii. p. 249; Lee's Memoirs, p. 266.

eastern branch of the Cooper River at Bonneau's Ferry; while the latter, pressing forward on the left-hand road, proposed to cross the Cooper River at Quinby's bridge—that branch of the Cooper sometimes being called the Quinby's Creek.¹ Against the cavalry, on the right-hand road, Colonel Hampton pressed forward as fast as his jaded animals would permit; and he fondly hoped that he could overtake it before it could reach the ferry. In this, however, he was disappointed; and, as the boats had all been secured on the opposite side of the river, the retreat was cut off.²

Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with his cavalry and Colonel Mayham's command, the latter of which had joined him in the pursuit, continued to follow the infantry on the left-hand road; and, when within a short distance of the bridge, their advance came within sight of the enemy's rear.³ The main body, with the howitzer, had crossed the river, and was quietly awaiting the passage of the rear-guard and baggage, having, meanwhile, loosened the plank from the sleepers, preparatory to throwing them into the river, after the rear had passed, and planted the howitzer for the defence of the pass, in case of emergency.⁴

The bridge, at this place, crossed a stream, which was about sixty feet

wide, but it was not fordable, nor, in consequence of the marsh through which it ran, could it be passed with horses, by swimming them.¹ It was approached, on either side, by a narrow causeway; and, about a mile from the bridge, before it had reached the marsh, the rear-guard was overtaken.²

Before the cavalry came up, Lieutenant-colonel Lee ordered it to take close order, and detached Captain Eggleston, with his troop, to move through the woods, on the left, and turn the enemy's right flank; while the main body, with Lieutenant-colonel Hampton's cavalry, which had again joined in the pursuit, moved on the road against his front.³ When Captain Campbell—whose command of one hundred men composed the object of attack⁴—perceived that he was pursued, he formed his men into line, with his left on the road and his right on the woods, through which Captain Eggleston was moving against him.⁵ “The instant the enemy had formed, the charge was sounded,” and, from two directions, at the same time,—in front and in flank,—the cavalry rushed upon him, with drawn swords. The order to “fire” was given by Captain Campbell, and distinctly heard in the American lines, but not a musket was levelled; and the assailants, fearing that the fire was reserved, in order to make it more fatal, by a nearer aim, felt some uneasi-

¹ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 170; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 428.—² Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 170; Simms' Marion, p. 256.—³ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 170; Lee's Memoirs, p. 266.

⁴ Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 429; Simms' Marion, p. 257; Lee's Memoirs, p. 267.

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 268.—² Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 171; Lee's Memoirs, p. 266.

³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 266.—⁴ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 170.—⁵ Lee's Memoirs, p. 266.

ness. They were soon relieved, however by seeing the entire party throw down its muskets and beg for "quarter;" and, with a degree of satisfaction, which is seldom surpassed, the entire guard, with the baggage and military chest of the regiment, was taken and secured.¹

As no alarm had been raised, Lieutenant-colonel Lee supposed that the main body had not been disturbed; and he promised himself an easy victory.² But Lieutenant-colonel Coates, in the rear of his main body, had witnessed the loss of his rear-guard and baggage, and, hastening forward, he made such preparations for the reception of the assailants as his limited time and the situation of his troops would admit.³ The cavalry of the Legion, however, flushed with its success, was immediately behind him; and,—although a slight delay occurred, in consequence of doubtful powers, in the officer, to cross the stream,⁴—in the teeth of the howitzer, while the mattross, with lighted match, was hurrying forward, Captain Armstrong, at the head of the first section, dashed over the bridge, drove the guard from the gun, and captured it.⁵ Some of the

loose plank, by this movement, were thrown into the stream, and a formidable chasm was opened before the advancing column. Notwithstanding this obstacle, the second section, led by Lieutenant Carrington, leaped over it, and closing with Captain Armstrong, their united forces dashed after the terrified and fugitive enemy. The hoofs of the horses of the second section threw other plank into the water, and increased the width of the chasm; and the third section and the troops under Colonel Mayham rode up, but feared to attempt the leap.¹ Next came up Captain Macauley, of General Marion's brigade, with his first section, and with a desperate courage, which has never been excelled, they also sprang over, and, dashing forward, joined in the terrible hand-to-hand conflict, on the causeway, in which their associates were already engaged.² Lieutenant-colonel Coates, taking shelter behind a wagon, was engaged in a personal encounter with Captain Armstrong;³ and nearly the entire body of the enemy, with the three sections of cavalry, was crowded on the narrow causeway and in a small adjoining lane, engaged in one of the most unequal but uncompromising conflicts on record.⁴

In the mean time, Lieutenant-colonel

¹ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 170; Moultrie's Mem., ii. p. 290; Ramsay's Rev. in S.C., ii. p. 249; Gordon, iv. p. 98; Lee's Mem., pp. 266, 267.—² Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 170; Lee's Memoirs, p. 267.

³ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. pp. 170, 171; Simms' Marion, p. 257. Gen. H. Lee (*Campaign of 1781*, p. 429) denies this, following the inference of his father (*Mem.*, p. 267).—⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 267; Lee's Campaign of 1781, pp. 429, 430.—⁵ Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 171; Lee's Memoirs, p. 267; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 430; Simms' Marion, p. 257.

¹ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 171; Lee's Mem., p. 267; Simms' Marion, p. 257.—² Johnson's Life of Greene, ii. p. 171; Simms' Marion, p. 257. Gen. H. Lee (*Campaign of 1781*, p. 430) appears to dispute this statement.—³ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 171; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 430; Lee's Memoirs, p. 267.

⁴ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 171; Simms' Marion, pp. 257, 258.

Lee had reached the bridge, and, with Colonel Mayham and other officers, was busily engaged in attempting to make it passable, in order that they might participate in the conflict, of which they were now only the unwilling spectators.¹ In this, however, they were unsuccessful;² and the gallant party who had passed the bridge, perceiving the cause of their want of support, extricated themselves from the enemy, "forced their way down the great road," and turning into the woods, on the upper side, passed up the margin of the stream, with the hope of joining their corps.³

In the mean time, intelligence had been forwarded to Generals Marion and Sumter, who, with their commands, and the infantry of the Legion, were in the rear, urging them forward and directing them to move towards a ford, some distance up the stream, where the cavalry proposed to cross;⁴ while, at the same time, Lieutenant-colonel Coates, fearing to retreat farther in the face of so active an enemy, collected his disordered force, and occupied the buildings on Captain Shubrick's plantation, which afforded many advantages, in case of another attack.⁵

The movement of the Americans, by way of the fording-place, occupied until three in the afternoon, at which hour

General Sumter and his command approached the enemy a second time. Lieutenant-colonel Coates had formed his men into a square, in front of Captain Shubrick's mansion, with his howitzer, in battery, in front of his line, and there awaited the attack; and, at four o'clock, having divided his force into five parties, General Sumter moved forward and attacked the position. The infantry of the Legion, and other auxiliary bodies of foot were divided into three parties, and moved against the front and flanks of the enemy; General Marion's brigade, which had been sadly thinned, was formed into two divisions, and moved against the right of the enemy; General Sumter's brigade, led by Colonels Middleton, Polk, Taylor, and Lacey, covered by a line of negro houses, which they were ordered to occupy, advanced in front; and the entire body of cavalry, as it could not be employed elsewhere, was formed into a reserve, to cover the infantry from any pursuit to which it might be subjected. Each of these parties moved to its appointed place with alacrity; and all advanced against the enemy with the utmost coolness and bravery. The negro houses, in front, were occupied by General Sumter's command, and, from them, the unerring rifles were directed with great effect. Colonel Thomas Taylor, at the head of forty-five men, soon afterwards pressed forward, and occupied a fence on the enemy's left, from which a galling fire was opened, and kept up, until it commanded the attention of Lieutenant-colonel Coates, and com-

¹ Lee's Memoirs, pp. 267, 268; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 430; Simms' Marion, p. 258.

² Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 290.—³ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 171; Lee's Campaign of 1781, p. 431.

⁴ Lee's Memoirs, p. 268.

⁵ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 172; Simms' Marion, p. 258.

elled him to move a body of men, with orders to clear the ground at the point of the bayonet. The small party under General Marion, although on the opposite flank, witnessed these movements, saw the value of Colonel Taylor's services, and his great danger, and resolved to rescue him; and, with a firmness which would have honored veteran troops, they rushed through the fire of the entire line, occupied the fences on the enemy's left, and, by one of those deadly fires which characterized this corps, they covered the retreat of Colonel Taylor, and insured his safety.

Soon afterwards the enemy retired into the house, and opened a fire from the doors and windows; while a picketed garden also afforded shelter to some of his troops. Having no artillery, the Americans fought at great disadvantage; and, considering that the whole of their force numbered less than one half that of the enemy, the sacrifice of so many men appears to have been useless, and entirely unjustifiable. At length, after continuing the action until sunset, a period of three hours, the troops were withdrawn, and encamped about three miles from the enemy.¹

During the night, so great was the dissatisfaction, the greater part of General Marion's men, and the entire body of the Legion, moved off; and, soon afterwards, General Sumter also retired,

leaving Colonel Coates to pursue his way without farther molestation.²

The loss of neither party has been recorded, although the Americans claimed that they had killed seventy of the enemy, besides wounding many others;³ with the loss, to themselves, of "about forty men, killed and wounded."⁴

Of this series of blunders and deeds of daring too much cannot be said, either in condemnation of the one, or in admiration of the other. That the bridge at Watboo should not have been properly secured;⁵ that the field-piece, under Lieutenant Singleton should have been left behind, when the pursuit of the fugitive enemy, from Monk's Corner, was ordered;⁶ that the supply of ammunition should have been so small, while that which had been captured at Dorchester had been sent to head-quarters;⁶ that so small a body of men, without artillery, should have been ordered to attack twice their number, with artillery, and in a sheltered position;⁷ or that, for three hours, they should have been continued in front of the enemy, without a hope of success,⁸ were blunders, for which, at this distance of time, no excuse can be found. At the same time the assault on the main body, at the bridge, by Captain

¹ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 173.

² Simms' Marion, p. 259.—³ Gordon, iv. p. 98; Ramsay's Revolution in S. C., ii. p. 249. Gen. Moultrie (*Memoirs*, ii. p. 291) says the loss was "upwards of fifty."

⁴ Lee's Memoirs, p. 266; Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. pp. 169, 170.—⁵ Simms' Marion, pp. 259, 260; Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 170.

⁶ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 173.

⁷ Simms' Marion, p. 259.

⁸ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 173.

¹ Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. pp. 172, 173; Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. pp. 290, 291; Ramsay's Revolution in S. C., ii. p. 249; Gordon, iv. p. 98; Simms' Marion, pp. 258, 259; Lee's Memoirs, pp. 268, 269.

Armstrong; the advance of Colonel Taylor, on the enemy's left, at Captain Shubrick's; and the movement of General Marion's brigade, at the same place, to cover the retreat of Colonel Taylor,

were acts of such consummate daring, that the failings of the chief in command are forgotten, in the admiration which such deeds, among his subordinates, invariably elicit.

CHAPTER XCVII.

September 8, 1781.

THE BATTLE OF EUTAW SPRINGS, S. C.

THE withdrawal of General Greene, with his little force, to the High Hills of Santee, for a short season of repose, has been the subject of a passing notice in a preceding chapter.¹ This temporary withdrawal of the main body, however, did not operate as an entire withdrawal of the opposition which General Greene had organized and sustained against the royal forces; nor was the British army less annoyed in its encampment on the opposite bank of the Santee, than it had been before. The light troops were kept as busily employed as before; and Marion, Pickens, Lee, Washington, and Henderson continued to harass the enemy, to cut off his foraging parties and supplies, and interrupt his communications in every direction.²

At length, on the twenty-second of August, the camp on the High Hills of

Santee was broken up, and the army again put in motion.¹ In order to meet the several bodies of reinforcements which he expected, as well as to overcome the effects of the freshets which had been produced by recent heavy rains, General Greene moved up the left bank of the Wa^teree as far as Camden, reaching that place on the twenty-fifth.² The reinforcements which he expected having failed to arrive,³ the prospect before him was rather a gloomy one, yet he did not despair or shrink from the difficulties. Taking the road to Howell's Ferry, where Colonel Henderson was stationed, he moved down by slow marches, in the cool of the day, towards the enemy.⁴ On the twenty-eighth of August he reached the ferry, where he was joined by the militia, under General Pickens, and by

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 376; Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 314; Marshall's Washington, ii. p. 603.

² Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 311; Stedman, ii. p. 377.—³ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 314, 315.

⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 230; Greene's Life of Greene, p. 316.

¹ Vide Chap. XCVI.—² Greene's Life of Gen. Greene (*Sparks' American Biography*, xx.) pp. 313, 314; Simms' History of S. C., p. 256.

the State troops, under Colonel Henderson;¹ and, soon afterwards, he encamped at Fort Motte, in order that the enemy, who was retreating before him,² might develop his plans.³

Intelligence having been received that the enemy had halted at the Eutaw Springs, the army moved from Fort Motte, on the fifth of September; and, by slow and easy marches, approached the former place.⁴ When, on the evening of the seventh, it had reached Burdell's plantation, seven miles from the Eutaws, General Marion joined it with his party, and every necessary preparation was made for an immediate attack on the enemy.⁵

The Eutaw Springs, the scene of the action about to be described, is in the northern part of Charleston District, near the line of the Orangeburg District, and about sixty miles northwest from the city of Charleston, South Carolina.⁶ The ground on which the enemy was encamped was on the south side of the Eutaw Creek, near the celebrated Eutaw Springs,⁷ and is now embraced, with the Springs, in the plantation of William Sinkler, Esq.⁸ The encampment occupied a large open field,

which was intersected by the main Congaree road, having a dense wood on its western, southern, and southeastern sides; the Eutaw Creek, which was skirted by a narrow strip of bushes, on the north, and the large brick mansion, with a large garden, inclosed with pickets, on the northeast.¹ In this position Lieutenant-colonel Stewart was encamped, with the Third, Sixty-third, and Sixty-fourth regiments, and the shattered remains of the New York and New Jersey refugees, and other regiments which had passed through the various battle-fields of the South, the whole numbering, probably, about twenty-three hundred men.²

The little party, led by General Greene, numbering about two thousand three hundred men,³ bivouacked at Burdell's on the evening of the seventh; and, although no especial means had been adopted to prevent the knowledge of its approach from reaching Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, the latter was wholly ignorant of the existence of so close an enemy.⁴ So confident, indeed, was he, that at an early hour on the morning of the eighth, a large unarmed "rooting party," under a small escort, was sent out to dig sweet-pota-

¹ Greene's Life of Greene, p. 317; Lee's Mem., p. 330.

² "This movement was made for the purpose of meeting a convoy of provisions then on the road from Charleston, rather than weaken the army, whilst an attack was expected, by sending off so strong an escort as would have been necessary for securing its safe arrival."—*Stedman*.

³ Greene's Life of Greene, p. 317; Simms' S. C., p. 257.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11.—⁵ Greene's Life of Greene, p. 318; Lee's Mem., p. 331; Stedman, ii. p. 377.

⁶ Mills' Statistics of S. C., p. 459; Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 699, note.—⁷ Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 224.

⁸ Lossing's Field Book, ii. p. 698.

¹ Map in Johnson's Life of Gen. Greene, ii. p. 224; Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 319, 320; Simms' S. C., p. 260.—² Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 320; Simms' S. C., p. 258; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 219.

³ Lee's Mem., pp. 331, 332. Dr. Gordon (*Am. Rev.*, iv. p. 170) says 1900 only were in action. Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 258) says, "two thousand" men; and Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 219) sustains him.

⁴ Lee's Memoirs, pp. 330, 331; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 222; Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 318; Simms' S. C., p. 258.

toes on the neighboring plantations; and when, about six o'clock in the morning, two deserters, from the North Carolina line, came into his camp, and informed him of General Greene's near approach, and of the intended attack, he supposed they were spies, discredited their statements, and treated them accordingly.²

At early dawn the American army was in motion; and, at four o'clock, it took up its line of march in that order which afforded the best opportunity for the formation of the line of battle.³ Lieutenant-colonel Lee, with his Legion, led the column; and the State troops, under Lieutenant-colonels Wade Hampton, and William Polk, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Henderson, followed—the two commands forming, together, the advance of the army.⁴ The right of the column was composed of a battalion of South Carolinians, led by General Marion; after which four small battalions of North Carolinians, commanded by Colonel Malmedy; and another battalion of North Carolinians, commanded by General Pickens, brought

up the rear.¹ The right of the second column was composed of the North Carolina battalions of levies, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Ashe, and Majors Armstrong and Blount, the whole commanded by General Sumner; the centre was composed of the Virginia battalions, commanded by Major Sneed and Captain Edmonds, the whole under Colonel Campbell; and the Maryland veterans, led by Lieutenant-colonel Howard and Major Hardman, the whole under Lieutenant-colonel Williams, brought up the rear.² Two three-pounders, under Captain-lieutenant Gaines, moved in the centre of the first column; two six-pounders, under Captain Browne, in the centre of the second column; and Lieutenant-colonel Washington, with his dragoons and the veteran Delaware line, formed the rear-guard.³

It appears that Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, notwithstanding his confidence, had subsequently detached Brevet-major Coffin, with one hundred and forty infantry and fifty cavalry, to reconnoitre, and, if necessary, to order the routing party to return to the camp.⁴ The reconnoitering party encountered the Legion, about four miles from the Eu-

¹ Col. Stewart to Lord Cornwallis, Sept. 9; Stedman, ii. p. 378; Moultrie's Memoirs, ii. p. 293.

² Col. Stewart to Lord Cornwallis, Sept. 9; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 222; Stedman, ii. pp. 377, 378. Several writers have supposed that these deserters gave the information to the enemy, on which he acted in preparing for the action. The reader will find, in note 2, on page 714, an examination of this subject.

³ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 322; Lee's Memoirs, p. 322; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 222.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 322; Moultrie, ii. p. 293. Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 222) and Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 258) suppose the entire advance guard was under Lieut.-Col. Henderson's command.

¹ Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Moultrie, ii. p. 293; Marshall, iv. p. 605. Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 222) and Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 258) give the command of the first column to Gen. Marion.

² Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Moultrie, ii. p. 293; Marshall, iv. p. 605. Judge Johnson (*Life of Greene*, ii. p. 222) and Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 258) give the command of the second column to Gen. Sumner.

³ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 321, 322; Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11; Moultrie, ii. p. 293.

⁴ Col. Stewart to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 9; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 222.

taws; and, with a degree of recklessness, which indicated either his ignorance of its strength and the presence of the main body, or his contempt for the service, he charged, and was repulsed, with considerable loss, while "the rooting party" was compelled to surrender, prisoners of war.¹ Making the best of his way to the camp, he communicated to his commander the first *accredited* information which had been received of the near approach of the American army;² and it afforded the enemy an opportunity to prepare for action and to form his line of battle.³ For this purpose his men were withdrawn from their encampment into the wood which was in front of it;⁴ and there, in a single line, with his right resting on the steep bank of the Eutaw, Lieutenant-colonel Stewart awaited the approach of his opponent.⁵ The Third

regiment—the newly-formed "Buffs"—formed his right; the gallant Lieutenant-colonel Cruger,—the hero of Fort Ninety-six,—with the fragments of several corps, formed his centre; and the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth, "in air," formed his left. Major Majoribanks, with a battalion of light-infantry, posted in a thicket of blackjack, protected the right flank; Brevet-major Coffin, with the cavalry, covered the left flank; a small body of infantry formed a reserve, in the rear of the line, ready to act, as circumstances might require; and a detachment of infantry, with a single field-piece, was sent forward to skirmish with the American army. The remainder of the artillery were distributed along the line. In this order and position the enemy calmly awaited the great issue.¹

In the mean time, the American army moved slowly, and cautiously approached the enemy's position. The peculiar character of the attack on its van, by Major Coffin, had led General Greene to suppose that his assailant formed the advance of the British army;² and he had ordered the first line to be formed, and the march to be continued in that order, notwithstanding it retarded the progress of the army.³

After moving, in this order, about

¹ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 323, 324; Simms' S. C., pp. 258, 259; Col. Stewart to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 11; Stedman, ii. p. 378. Lieut.-Col. Lee (*Memoirs*, p. 332) says the "rooting party" escaped.

² Lieut.-Col. Stewart to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 9; Stedman, ii. p. 378; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 222; Montrie's Mem., ii. p. 293. Mr. Simms (*Hist. of S. C.*, p. 258), Prof. Greene (*Life of Gen. Greene*, p. 318), Judge Marshall (*Life of Washington*, iv. p. 603), and some others, suppose the deserters gave the information; but Stedman, as above, says, "their report was neither credited nor inquired into; but they, themselves, sent to prison;" and Lieut.-Col. Stewart, in his dispatch, confirms the statement.


³ "Finding the enemy in force so near me, I determined to fight them. I immediately formed the line of battle, with the right of the army to Eutaw branch," &c.—Col. Stewart to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 9, 1781.

⁴ Map in Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 224; Lee's Mem., p. 333.

⁵ Col. Stewart to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 9; Simms' S. C., p. 259; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 224; Map in the same work; Stedman, ii. p. 378; Serg. Lamb's Jour. of Occur., p. 368. Lieut.-Col. H. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 333) says the right rested "on the Charleston road," which being

"in air," is inconsistent; while it is well established that Major Majoribanks' right rested on the Entaw. More recent writers, following this authority, have fallen into a similar error.

¹ Stedman, ii. p. 378.—² Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 324; Simms' S. C., p. 259; Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11.—³ Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11.



BAPTISTE (OF TERRASSY) SPRINGS.

an hour,—Lieutenant-colonels Lee and Hampton being still in front,—the enemy's advance, with a field-piece, was encountered.¹ As soon as General Greene had been advised of the presence of the enemy,—in this, his second appearance,²—he ordered Captain-lieutenant Gaines, with his two field-pieces, to move rapidly to the front, to strengthen the light troops; while he hastened forward with the first line to support them.³ The advance—with the reinforcement under Captain-lieutenant Gaines—immediately attacked the enemy; and the first line coming up, soon after, he was quickly driven in, and the action commenced.⁴

The order of battle, on the part of the Americans, was similar to that of the columns in the line of march. The first line was composed of a battalion of South Carolina militia, under General Marion, on the right; two of North Carolinians, under Colonel Malmedy, in the centre; and another battalion of South Carolinians, under General Pickens on the left. The North Carolina regulars, under General Sumner, occupied the right; those from Virginia, under Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, the centre; and those from Maryland, led by Lieutenant-colonel Williams, the left of the second line. The artillery and reserve were posted in the same relative

positions as on the line of march. As the front line moved forward, the Legion and the State cavalry,—the one under Lieutenant-colonel Lee, the other under Lieutenant-colonel Hampton,—diverging to the right and left, firing obliquely, took post on the flanks, agreeably to the orders of battle.¹

The first line advanced with alacrity, and the battle soon became very warm;² but, a short time afterwards, the Sixty-fourth regiment, uniting with a part of the centre, made a vigorous and unexpected movement against the centre of the American line, where the North Carolinians, under Colonel Malmedy, were stationed, and, after sustaining the attack with great spirit,—each man having fired seventeen rounds,³—it was compelled to give way;⁴ leaving the State troops and the Legion, on the two flanks, detached from the main body, and from each other, to oppose the onslaught of the main body of the enemy.⁵ Perceiving this defection in his front, General Greene immediately moved the right of his second line—the North Carolinians, under General Sumner—to occupy the vacant ground, which had thus been formed, between the two flanks, and to renew the ac-

¹ Lee's Memoirs, p. 323, and the note on the same page, by the editor; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 223.

² Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 325; Lee's Memoirs, p. 334; Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 224, 225; Stedman, ii. p. 378.—³ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 326; Simms' S. C., p. 261; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 225.

⁴ Col. Stewart to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 9; Simms' S. C., p. 261; Lee's Memoirs, p. 334; Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 225.

⁵ Lee's Memoirs, p. 334.

¹ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 324; Lee's Memoirs, p. 322; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 223.

² Lee's Memoirs, p. 322; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 223.

³ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 324; Lee's Memoirs, p. 322.

⁴ Simms' History of South Carolina, pp. 260, 261.

tion.¹ This movement was executed with precision and promptness; and the first line having been again perfected, the battle raged more furiously than ever.² The ground which the enemy had gained, while the front rank was broken, was soon recovered; and the experienced eye of Lieutenant-colonel Stewart speedily discovered the symptoms of weakness which his line displayed, in its gradual recession before the energetic advance of the North Carolinians and the light troops; and he took immediate steps to strengthen and reassure them. For this purpose the reserve was moved forward into the line; and Major Coffin, with his cavalry, at the same time, was ordered to take post on the left, for the purpose of counteracting any movement of the American cavalry, which, at this crisis, he had reason to look for and to fear.³ About the same moment Lieutenant-colonel Henderson was disabled, which, temporarily, affected the exertions of the State troops on the left flank, but Lieutenant-colonel Hampton quickly rallied them, and the entire line continued the action with the utmost coolness and intrepidity.⁴ But the front line,

unaided, could not long withstand the combined attacks of the entire force of the enemy. The North Carolinians, in the centre, were compelled to fall back;¹ and the Legion and the State troops—like two guides, at the extremities of the line—continued the action alone until they were, a second time, reinforced from the second line.² The enemy witnessed the defection of the line with the utmost satisfaction; and, raising a shout of triumph, he pressed forward with so much ardor that his line became considerably disordered.³

At this moment the relative condition of the two armies indicated a speedy triumph for the American army. The entire body of the enemy was closely engaged, and, although partially successful, it was not wholly able to overcome the steady and determined assaults of its opponent. The American army, on the other hand, had its entire reserve and two thirds of its second line—embracing the *élite* of the troops—still perfectly fresh and disengaged; and, while the former, even in its momentary triumph, showed evidence of discouragement, the latter, elated with its prospective victory, was buoyant and full of life. Such was the relative condition of the two armies when General Green moved the Virginian and Maryland brigades into the front line, in quick time and with trail-

¹ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 326; Simms' S. C., p. 261; Lee's Mem., p. 334; Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 225. Lieut.-Col. Lee (*Mem.*, p. 334) errs, when he says *the centre* of the second line was ordered up to strengthen the flanks of the first, as his son, in a note on the preceding page, has shown. Gen. Sumner commanded *the right* of the second line, not *the centre*.—² Lee's Memoirs, p. 334; Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 225.

³ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 326, 327; Lee's Memoirs, p. 334; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 225.

⁴ Lee's Mem., p. 334; Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 225, 226.

¹ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 327; Note in Lee's Mem., p. 334; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 226. Gen. Greene says nothing of the second defection of the front line.

² Lee's Memoirs, p. 334, and note.—³ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 327; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 226.

ed arms;¹ ordering the strengthened line, immediately afterwards, to charge the enemy, and *to depend entirely on the bayonet.*² With a hearty shout of exultation, which rivalled in volume the cheers of the advancing enemy, these rival brigades sprang forward to the post and the duty which had been assigned to them; while the Legion and the State troops, reanimated by the noble example of the veteran troops who were now by their side, maintained the relative position which, *from the first*—through three successive assaults—had been placed in their keeping. While the line was thus advancing against the enemy, in front, Lieutenant-colonel Lee noticed that the right of the American line outflanked the left of that of the enemy; and he ordered Captain Rudolph to turn that flank, “and to give him a raking fire as soon as he turned it.”³ The impetuosity of the charge in front, and the fire on the flank combined, could not be long sustained by the enemy; and the extreme left, followed by the centre, and finally, after a severe struggle, by the right,—where “*the Buff’s*” were stationed,—retired from the field.⁴

It was during this final struggle that Major Majoribanks, with the light-in-

fantry, on the enemy’s right, was put in motion.¹ This called forth an order for the reserve to dislodge him; and Lieutenant-colonel Washington and Captain Kirkwood, supported by the South Carolina State troops, under Lieutenant-colonel Hampton, moved against him.² Lieutenant-colonel Washington, spurting forward his cavalry, was first on the ground; but the thicket of black-jack behind which the enemy was posted, while it furnished ample shelter to the latter, was perfectly impervious to the former, and all his efforts to penetrate it were in vain. An open space in the rear of the enemy appeared to promise greater success; and, notwithstanding the hazard of the undertaking, Lieutenant-colonel Washington determined to attack him in that quarter. In order to do so, however, he was compelled to wheel, by sections, to the left, immediately under the enemy’s fire—an opportunity which was not lost upon the able commander of the position. As the delicate manœuvre was performed, therefore, Major Majoribanks poured in a most destructive fire, killing or wounding every officer but two; taking Lieutenant-colonel Washington prisoner; and spreading death and confusion through his ranks.³ At this moment Lieutenant-colonel Hamp-

¹ Lee’s Mem., p. 334; Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Johnson’s Greene, ii. p. 226; Gordon, iv. p. 169; Moultrie, ii. p. 294.—² Lee’s Memoirs, p. 334.—³ Ibid.; Johnson’s Greene, ii. p. 227; Gordon, iv. p. 169.

⁴ Stedman, ii. p. 379; Lee’s Mem., p. 334; Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Johnson’s Greene, ii. pp. 226, 227. Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 261) supposes the flank was not turned until *after* the enemy had “recoiled” before the charge of the Americans in front.

¹ Lee’s Memoirs, pp. 334; Johnson’s Greene, ii. p. 228.

² Greene’s Life of Gen. Greene, p. 331; Johnson’s Greene, ii. p. 228.—³ Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Stedman, ii. p. 379; Simms’ S. C., pp. 262, 263; Lee’s Mem., p. 335; Col. Stewart to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 9; Johnson’s Greene, ii. p. 228. Dr. Gordon (*2d. Rev.*, iv. p. 169) supposes this attack was made *after* Majoribanks had retired to the garden-fence.

ton and Captain Kirkwood came up, and the attempt was renewed, but without success.¹ The retreat of the main body of the enemy, however, exposed this portion of his force so much, that, soon afterwards, Major Majoribanks fell back, and took a new position, fronting the main road, with his rear to the creek, and his left resting on the picket-fence of the garden, where he acted in concert with other portions of the enemy's force.²

In the retreat of the enemy, to which allusion has been made,³ the fugitives were closely followed by the American troops, whose regular movements, to some extent, checked the pursuit.⁴ After passing from the wood, at the edge of which the action was fought, the Americans entered the enemy's camp,—the tents of which had been left standing,—and when the bountiful supply of stores which it contained met their eyes, many of them could not resist the temptation, but broke from the ranks, scattered themselves throughout the camp, and seized the unwonted delicacies. Others, not content with supplying the demands of nature, seized the spirituous liquors which they found there, and gave themselves up to dissipation and disorder.⁵

In the mean time Major Sheridan,

¹ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 331, 332; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 228, 229.—² Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 229. Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 263) supposes the Major, after leaving the thicket, occupied a new position, "*behind* the palisadoes," but this appears to be incorrect.—³ Vide p. 717.

⁴ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 329.—⁵ Ibid.; Simms' *S. C.*, p. 264; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 229.

with part of the New York Volunteers (Tories), had thrown himself into the large brick mansion; and, from the windows of the upper stories, "with a few swivels and his musketry," had opened a most destructive fire on the pursuers;¹ while Majors Coffin and Majoribanks—the one on the left, the other on the right of the enemy's disordered and retreating line—were protecting the flanks of the enemy.² The victory of the Americans now appeared to be nearly complete—the expulsion of the little party from the mansion alone remaining unfinished. Perceiving the cause of the trouble, General Greene ordered his field-pieces to open a fire on the mansion, "but the fire from it was so brisk, that it was impossible to force it, or even to bring on the cannon;"³ while the men who had manned the pieces were quickly shot down.⁴ At this moment, while the troops were still held in check by the Tories who occupied the mansion, or were still less capable of defence from the disorder and dissipation into which they had fallen, within the enemy's camp, Majors

¹ Lee's Mem., p. 336; Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 230; Stedman, ii. p. 379.

² Map in Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 224; Lee's Memoirs, p. 336; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 230.

³ Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 231; Stedman, ii. p. 379. Prof. Greene (*Life of Gen. Greene*, p. 332) says, "the pieces were too light to make any impression upon its solid walls;" Mr. Simms (*Hist. S. C.*, p. 265) also appears to suppose a fire was opened from these pieces; and Judge Marshall (*Life of Washington*, iv. p. 607) appears to entertain the same opinion, but the remarks of Gen. Greene, cited above, evidently contradict it.

⁴ Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 231; Simms' *S. C.*, p. 265; Stedman, ii. p. 379.

Coffin and Majoribanks turned and charged on either flank of the pursuit.¹ The cavalry of the Legion, which was ordered to meet the former, was repulsed;² and, forcing his way through the ranks of those who, disregarding the allurements within the enemy's camp, were pressing the pursuit, or attempting to dislodge Major Sheridan, Major Coffin dashed among the ranks of those who were despoiling the enemy's stores, and whose drunken insubordination rendered them an easy prey to the enterprising light-horsemen.³ He had scarcely commenced the work, however, when Lieutenant-colonel Hampton, with the State cavalry of South Carolina, galloped up to contend for the prize, and an obstinate hand-to-hand conflict ensued. With a degree of determination, which evinced the value of the object for which they contended, these two bodies of cavalry maintained the action; and when the enemy, no longer able to withstand the blows of the State troops, fled to his main body, he was pursued by the latter until the fire from the mansion compelled them, in their turn, to retreat, and submit to the pursuit of the former.⁴ At that moment Major Majoribanks joined in the pursuit; and, after capturing the American field-pieces,—

their own, as well as those which had been taken from the enemy, all of whose complements of men had fallen,¹—he pressed forward, and drove the drunken insubordinates from the scene of their disgrace.²

Perceiving that the object of the engagement had been secured,—the enemy having been driven from the field, with so much loss that it was impossible for him to remain in his present position,³—General Greene considered it unnecessary to sacrifice more lives for the empty honor of expelling the enemy from the mansion by storm;⁴ and he determined to return to the position which he had left in the morning, where, alone, a sufficient quantity of water could be obtained.⁵

Accordingly, after collecting his wounded and prisoners;⁶ leaving Lieutenant-colonel Hampton on the ground, with a strong picket;⁷ and ordering General Marion and Lieutenant-colonel Lee to occupy the line of the enemy's retreat; and to hold him in check, if he moved towards Charleston, until the main body of the American army could come up;⁸ General Greene retired from the scene of his glorious struggle. But the enemy had become satisfied with his experience in the recent contest; and, after destroying his stores, and

¹ Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 230, 231; Stedman, ii. p. 379; Lee's Mem., p. 337; Greene's Life of Greene, p. 332; Simms' S. C., p. 264.—² Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 332, 333; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 230; Simms' S. C., p. 264.—³ Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 230, 231; Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 333.

⁴ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 333; Simms' S. C., p. 265; Johnson's Greene, ii. pp. 230, 231.

¹ Vide p. 718.—² Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 333; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 231; Lee's Memoirs, p. 337.

³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 337; Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11.—⁴ Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, p. 333.

⁵ Lee's Memoirs, p. 339; Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 231.

⁶ Gen. Greene to Cong., Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 231; Gordon, iv. p. 170.—⁷ Ibid.—Lee's Mem., p. 339.

leaving behind him seventy of his wounded,¹ on the night of the ninth, he retreated, as rapidly as possible, to Charleston²—the parties under General Marion and Lieutenant-colonel Lee having been unable to do more than to hang on his rear, and to cut off some small parties.³ After halting a short time at the Eutaws, on the twelfth, General Greene crossed the Santee, at Nelson's Ferry, and, by slow and easy marches, returned to his former encampment on the High Hills of Santee.⁴

The strength of the respective armies, as has been shown, was nearly equal. The loss of the Americans was seventeen officers (including Lieutenant-colonel Campbell) and one hundred and twenty-two men, *killed*; forty-three officers (including Lieutenant-colonels Washington, Howard, and Henderson) and three hundred and thirty-two men, *wounded*; and eight *missing*.⁵ That of the enemy, according to his own report,

was three officers and eighty-two men, *killed*; sixteen officers and three hundred and thirty-five men, *wounded*; and ten officers and two hundred and forty-seven men, *missing*.¹ There is reason to believe the enemy's report is incorrect, from the fact that the prisoners which fell into the hands of the Americans, exclusive of those who had been wounded, numbered more than four hundred and thirty, instead of two hundred and forty-seven, as reported by Lieutenant-colonel Stewart.²

The great importance of this victory called forth the emphatic approval of the Congress and the people. The former tendered a vote of thanks, a British standard which he had captured, and a gold medal, as a testimonial of its gratification;³ while the latter, from that moment to the present, have not ceased to contrast the conduct of General Greene with that of General Gates, and to accord to the former the honor of having destroyed the empire of the enemy in the Southern States of the Confederacy.

¹ Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11; Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 232.—² Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11; Gordon, iv. p. 170.—³ Lee's Memoirs, p. 340; Greene's Life of Gen. Greene, pp. 335, 336.—⁴ Lee's Memoirs, p. 341; Gen. Greene to Congress, Sept. 11.

⁵ Returns appended to Gen. Greene's dispatch, published by order of Congress.

¹ Returns appended to Col. Stewart's report to Gen. Cornwallis, Sept. 9.

² Johnson's Greene, ii. p. 232.

³ Journals of Congress, October 29, 1781.

CHAPTER XCVIII

September 6, 1781.

THE INVASION OF CONNECTICUT.

THE treason of Benedict Arnold, and his subsequent incursion into Virginia, have been noticed in other parts of this work;¹ and he had been withdrawn from that scene of his military career to answer to his commander-in-chief, in New York, the evidence of duplicity, in his correspondence with the Ministry, which Sir Henry Clinton had received from Europe.² Soon afterwards General Washington, with the allied armies of the United States and France, moved from the neighborhood of New York,³ which they had threatened to attack,⁴ towards Virginia, where the Admirals De Grasse and De Barras, and Generals Lafayette and St. Simon, were holding Lord Cornwallis in close confinement;⁵ and a plan was devised, probably by the traitor himself,⁶ to make a diversion on the North, with the hope of recalling the army, or a material portion, for the defence of that part of the country.⁷

The scene which was selected for these operations was the shore of Con-

nnecticut, of which State the traitor was a native, and it was peculiarly appropriate that the command of the expedition should be given to him. He had sold himself to the enemy of his country, and when his services were called into requisition by his new master, it seemed proper that he should appear in his new character among the scenes which had been familiar to him in his boyhood;¹ and that the people who had been witnesses of his early career, as a tradesman and a soldier, should, also, be permitted to witness the mature results of his treason.

The port of New London, on the western bank of the Thames River, where, at that time, large quantities of merchandise, from Europe and the West Indies, had accumulated,² was the point which had been particularly selected for attack; and it is not improbable that the value of the expected spoils, added to the superior advantages which the traitor's acquaintance with that neighborhood would give him, had been among the principal of the causes

¹ Vide Chap. LXXXI., LXXXII.—² Sparks' Life and Treason of Arnold (*Am. Biog.*, iii.), pp. 323, 324.—³ Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 520, 531; Heath's Memoirs, pp. 297, 298, 301, 302.—⁴ Sparks' Washington, p. 335.

⁵ Gordon, iv. pp. 180-186; Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 524-529.—⁶ Sparks' Life and Treason of Arnold, p. 324.—⁷ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 531.

¹ Gen. Arnold was born at Norwich, thirteen miles from New London; and, at the same place, he "served his time," as an apprentice to Messrs. Lathrops, druggists.

² Hollister's Connecticut, ii. p. 397; Miss Caulkins' Hist. of New London, p. 545; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 532.

which had operated with him in making the selection.

The force which had been detached for this expedition—embracing the Thirty-eighth, Fortieth, and Fifty-fourth regiments of the line, detachments of Yagers and of artillerists, the Third battalion of New Jersey Volunteers (Tories), the Loyal Americans, and the American Legion¹ (also Tories), about seventeen hundred in all²—embarked at New York on the fourth of September;³ and, at two in the afternoon of the fifth, the expedition anchored on the Long Island shore, about thirty miles distant from New London.⁴ The necessary preparations having, meanwhile, been perfected, at seven the same evening the expedition sailed, with a fair wind, towards New London, and, six hours afterwards,⁵ it arrived off that port.⁶ At this time the wind suddenly shifted to the northward, and it was half-past six o'clock on the morning of Thursday, the sixth of September, before the transports could beat into the harbor,⁷ and nine before the troops could be landed.⁸

¹ Gen. Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, Sept. 8, 1781.

² Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 546; Hollister's Conn., ii. p. 398. Gov. Trumbull (*Heath's Mem.*, p. 306) says the force embraced "2000 infantry and 300 horse."

³ Heath's Memoirs, p. 306.

⁴ Gen. Arnold to Sir Henry Clinton, Sept. 8, 1781.

⁵ Gen. Arnold (*Report to Sir Henry Clinton, Sept. 8, 1781*) says it was *one o'clock*. Capt. Bazely (*Report to the Admiral, Sept. 8, 1781*) says it was *two o'clock* when the expedition arrived off New London.—⁶ Capt. Bazely's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781; Gen. Arnold to Sir H. Clinton, Sept. 8.

⁷ Gen. Arnold (*Dispatch, Sept. 8*) says *nine o'clock*. Capt. Bazely (*Dispatch, Sept. 8*) says it was *half past six* when the vessels entered the harbor.

⁸ Capt. Bazely's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781. Gen. Arnold (*Dispatch, Sept. 8*) says it was *ten o'clock*.

At the period of which we write, New London was defended by Forts Trumbull and Griswold¹—the former of which, having been constructed for the sole purpose of guarding the harbor, was untenable on the land side, and stood on the west bank of the river;² while the latter, a strong square fortification stood on Groton Hill, on the opposite bank.³ "Its walls were of stone, ten or twelve feet high on the lower side, and surrounded by a ditch. On the wall were pickets which projected over twelve feet, above which was a parapet with embrasures, and, within, a platform for the cannon, and a step to mount to shoot over the parapet with small-arms. In the southwestern bastion was a flag-staff, and in the side near the opposite angle was the gate, in front of which was a triangular breastwork to protect the gate; and to the right of this, about one hundred and twenty yards from the gate, was a redoubt, on which was mounted a three-pounder. Between the fort and the river was another battery, with a covered way."⁴ Fort Trumbull was garrisoned with Captain Adam Shapley's company of State troops, numbering about twenty-four men;⁵ while Fort Griswold contained about one hundred and forty

¹ Gordon, iv. p. 178; Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 546.—² Connecticut Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781.

"It was a mere breastwork, or water-battery, open from behind."—Stephen Hempstead's *Narrative*, p. 5.

³ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 532.

⁴ Stephen Hempstead's *Narrative*, pp. 5, 6. See also History of Civil War in America, ii. p. 237.

⁵ Stephen Hempstead's *Narrative*, p. 4; Caulkins' New London, p. 546; Hollister's History of Connecticut, ii. p. 398.

men,¹ chiefly militia hastily collected,² under Lieutenant-colonel William Ledyard, of the State line,³ who had held the command of the post and its vicinity since March, 1778.⁴

Supposing the vessels which were then in sight was a "plundering party after stock," such as they had, occasionally, seen before,⁵ alarm-guns were immediately fired from Fort Griswold,⁶ but these signals of alarm had been so frequently employed that they attracted little, if any, attention, beyond the immediate vicinity of the town.⁷ The inhabitants of New London and its vicinity, however, were soon aroused from their slumbers, and the utmost consternation prevailed. Sending their families forward, to places of safety,—or, at least, beyond the bounds of present danger,—the most valuable portion of their movable effects were carried after them; and throngs of terror-stricken

women and children, and equally anxious fathers, sons, and brothers, crowded every road which led into the country.¹ Lieutenant-colonel Ledyard visited the town and Fort Trumbull, making the best disposition of the forces which the circumstances allowed; and sent messengers to the officers of militia in the neighborhood and to Governor Trumbull at Lebanon, twenty-three miles distant, to solicit assistance.² The owners and crews of the vessels, also, were busily employed in attempting to secure their property, by running up the river, notwithstanding there was neither wind or tide in their favor.³ After the morning had been spent in this tedious labor, with but very little benefit, a favorable breeze came in from the south, and those of the vessels which laid in the stream, "with most of those at the wharves,"⁴ succeeded in effecting their escape.⁵ Gradually small numbers of those who had succeeded in removing their families and effects to places of supposed safety, returned to look after their property which had been left behind; and these, to the number of about a hundred,⁶ hastily armed and anxious to protect their homes from the hand of the invader, but without a leader, assembled on Town Hill, with the intention of opposing the traitor when he landed; but although they

¹ The garrison is said to have been "about 160 men," at the time of the action, but, as Capt. Shapley, with the garrison of Fort Trumbull, had joined it, this must have been its original strength.—² Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781; Gordon, iv. p. 178; Marshall, iv. p. 532.

³ Sparks' Life and Treason of Arnold, p. 325; Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 309; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 533; Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.

⁴ Minutes of the Committee of War (of Conn.), March 25, 1778.—⁵ Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781.

⁶ Caulkins' New London, p. 546; Capt. Bazely's dispatch, Sept. 8.

⁷ Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781. Miss Caulkins (*Hist. of New London*, pp. 546, 547), on this subject, says the signal "consisted of two regular guns, at fixed intervals, while three guns was the signal of rejoicing, to give notice of a victory, or a prize. It was evident that these signals had been communicated to the enemy, for when the two distress-guns were fired, one of the large ships in the fleet added a third, so as to alter the import. This stratagem had some influence in retarding the arrival of the militia."

¹ Caulkins' New London, pp. 546, 547; Hollister's Conn., p. 399.—² Caulkins' New London, p. 548.

³ Ibid.; Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.

⁴ Capt. Bazely's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.

⁵ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781; Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781.—⁶ Caulkins' New London, p. 549.

"maneuvred" on the heights until the landing had been effected, it does not appear that any thing farther was done, at that time, to oppose his progress.¹

At length, about nine in the morning, the armed vessels, "*Association*" and "*Colonel Martin*," went close into the shore, on the western shore of the harbor, near the light-house, for the purpose of covering the debarkation of the troops destined to attack New London,² while the remainder of the fleet—six in number—anchored on the opposite side of the river, for the purpose of covering the landing of that portion which was under orders to attack Fort Griswold.³ The debarkation immediately followed;⁴ and, from the twenty-four transports, in four detachments, the troops were sent on shore.⁵ On the western side of the harbor the traitor landed in person, with the Thirty-eighth regiment of the line, the Loyal Americans, the American Legion, and sixty Yagers⁶—in all about nine hundred men;⁷ while on the eastern side, on Groton Point, were landed the Fortieth and Fifty-fourth regiments of the line, the third battalion of New Jersey Volunteers, and detachments of the Yagers and the Royal Artillery,⁸—in all about eight hundred men,⁹—commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Eyre.

¹ Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781.

² Lieut.-Col. Uyham (N. J. Volunteers) to Gov. Franklin, Sept. 13, 1781.—³ Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781.—⁴ Ibid.; Capt. Bazely's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781. Gen. Arnold (*Letter to Sir Henry Clinton, Sept. 8, 1781*) says it was ten o'clock.—⁵ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.

⁶ Ibid.—⁷ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 546.

⁸ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.—⁹ Caulkins' New London, p. 546; Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 309.

With his foot on the soil of his native State, General Arnold speedily saw the necessity which existed for an immediate attempt to prevent the escape of the vessels, and his division was put in motion without delay.¹ Moving up in a straight course, through what is called Brown's Gate, into the Town Hill road,² the division marched towards New London, until it reached the cross-road, leading down to the shore,³ about half a mile from Fort Trumbull,⁴ where, about eleven o'clock, Captain Millett, with four companies of the Thirty-eighth regiment, was detached to attack the fort.⁵ The main body continued to advance on the road, west from the fort, intending to attack, on its way, a redoubt which had been thrown up on Town Hill,⁶ and which, from its insignificance, had received the nickname of "Fort Nonsense."⁷

While Captain Millett was on his way to the fort his force was strengthened by a junction with a company of Tories, commanded by Captain Frink, which was approaching the fort by a different route, nearer the shore.⁸ As has been already stated, Fort Trumbull was a work of very little strength—a mere water-battery, intended only to oppose the passage of vessels up the river, while its rear was entirely open.⁹ Captain Shapley, with his twenty-three

¹ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 532.—² Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 549; Hollister's Conn., ii. p. 399.—³ Caulkins' New London, p. 549.—⁴ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.

⁵ Ibid.; Stedman, ii. p. 402.—⁶ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.—⁷ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 550.

⁸ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.—⁹ Vide p. 722.

men, could do but little, therefore, to oppose Captain Millett with his five companies; and after firing a single well-directed volley, he spiked the guns and retreated.¹ In accordance with Lieutenant-colonel Ledyard's orders, he embarked, with his men, and joined the garrison of Fort Griswold, with the loss of one of the boats, and seven men wounded.² It is said that from the single volley of grape-shot with which Captain Shapley received the approaching enemy, "four or five of his men were killed or wounded."³

While Captain Millett and his command were thus engaged in driving before them twenty-four American militiamen, General Arnold, with the main body, was also pressing forward, with but little opposition, against Fort Non-sense.⁴ Although the garrison of this insignificant affair could not have been any other than some of the townsmen, whose services were called into requisition on the spot, it appears that here, too, the enemy was not permitted to approach without opposition. "A brisk fire," it is said, was kept up therefrom, and the enemy suffered considerably;⁵ although, as he approached to assault it, the garrison retired.⁶

Having thus gained possession of the

only works which obstructed his march, General Arnold appears to have dispatched orders to Captain Millett to leave one company in Fort Trumbull, to detach another to Fort Nonsense, and with the remainder of his force to join the main body.¹ Desiring to secure the vessels which then lay becalmed in the harbor, he also dispatched orders from thence to Lieutenant-colonel Eyre, directing him "to make an attack upon Fort Griswold as soon as possible," and, immediately afterwards, he resumed his march towards New London.²

While thus advancing towards the village, the enemy was again opposed by a party of the inhabitants, who had manned an old iron six-pounder, which, for a long time, had occupied Manwaring's Hill, and been used for trainings, alarms, and rejoicings.³ As the enemy came down Town Hill, the old piece was discharged several times—sufficient to allow the traitor an opportunity to speak of it in his dispatches;⁴ but as he approached nearer, the amateur gunners turned and fled.⁵ A detachment of the enemy's force was sent up Black-hall-street to silence this gun; but, as it appears that the party who had manned it had fled when the enemy came on the ground, the danger attending this movement was only slight.⁶

The plan of operation which General

¹ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 549; Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781; Lieut. Stephen Hempstead's Narrative, p. 5; Gordon, iv. p. 178.—² Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 550; Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7; Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 5; Gordon, iv. p. 178.

³ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Stedman, ii. p. 402.

⁴ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 550.—⁵ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Hollister's Connecticut, ii. p. 401.

⁶ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Stedman, ii. p. 403.

¹ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.—² Ibid.

³ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 550; Hollister's Connecticut, ii. p. 401.—⁴ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Miss Caulkins' New London, pp. 550, 551.

⁵ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.

⁶ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 551.

Arnold adopted appears to have been to move a strong body of his force, by a *detour*, and to enter, simultaneously, at both ends of the town; to follow the line of the river; and, after having effected a junction in the centre, to commence the work of destruction from that point. With this intention, when the enemy had reached the southerly part of the village, General Arnold detached the New Jersey Volunteers, under Lieutenant-colonel Upham, with orders to take possession of the hill north of the meeting-house, on which a party of the townsmen had gathered; and to hold it as one of the outposts of the expedition.¹ Moving through Cape Ann-street and Lewis-lane, and, on its way, setting fire to the house of Pickett Latimer, on the old Colchester road, now Vauxhall-street; and, after a feeble resistance, driving before them the little party who had occupied the hill, Lieutenant-colonel Upham took possession of the ground, with the loss of one man killed and one wounded.²

It appears that General Arnold either accompanied this party or followed it; and from the high ground which it occupied he reconnoitred Fort Griswold and the surrounding country. Perceiving, from thence, that the fort was "much more formidable than he had expected, or than he had formed an idea of, from the information he had before received;" observing, also, "that

the men who had escaped from Fort Trumbull had crossed in boats and thrown themselves into Fort Griswold;" and that "a favorable wind springing up, the ships were escaping up the river, notwithstanding the fire from Fort Trumbull, and a six-pounder which he had with him," he immediately sent an officer with orders to Lieutenant-colonel Eyre countermanding his first order, already referred to, but the officer arrived a few minutes too late to prevent the terrible tragedy which had been, already, enacted, on the eastern bank of the river.¹

Having thus secured possession of the town, the traitor lost no time in completing the work of destruction. The firebrand was speedily applied, and the result is thus noted by the industrious authoress of "*The History of New London*":² "At the north end of the town the torch of destruction was first lighted at the printing-office and the town-mill. From thence a detachment of the enemy went on to Winthrop's Neck, and set fire to the Plumb house, scouring the whole point, destroying the battery, shipping, warehouses, and every species of combustible property on that side, except the Merrill house, which escaped. On Main-street, south of the printing-office, a considerable number of old family homesteads were consumed. The most valuable was that of General Gordon Saltonstall. The house of Captain Guy Richards, at the foot of Richards-

¹ Lieut.-Col. Upham's report to Gov. Franklin, of New Jersey, Sept. 13, 1781; Hollister's Connecticut, ii. p. 402.

² Lieut.-Col. Upham's report to Gov. Franklin, of New Jersey, Sept. 13, 1781; Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 551.

¹ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.—² Miss Caulkins' New London, pp. 552-555.

street, was marked out for destruction, but a daughter of Captain Richards lying ill at the time, the English officer listened to the supplications of those who attended upon her, and spared the house.

"On the east side of the street several private houses, with the custom-house and collector's dwelling near it, various shops of merchandise, mechanics' shops, and warehouses, with all the wharfing, boating, and lumber, were involved in a long line of destruction. Below Hallam's corner, in this street, no buildings were burned. At this point the main body of the enemy turned towards Beach or Water street, where several noted warehouses and shops were situated, and a part of the vessels lay.

"Of course vengeance and destruction had no check: shops, stores, dwellings, piles of lumber, wharves, boats, rigging, and vessels, were soon enveloped in smoke and flame. Hogsheads were knocked in, sugar and coffee lay in heaps, and rum and Irish butter melted in the fire, trickled along the street, and filled the gutters. The prize-ship *Hannah*, partly unladen, lay at Shaw's wharf. When burnt nearly to the water's edge, she drifted away and sunk near the end of Winthrop's Neck.

"On the Parade all was destroyed. The market-wharf, the old magazine and battery, the court-house, jail and jail-house, the Episcopal Church, and several contiguous shops and dwelling-houses, were soon a heap of ashes. The western part of this street was left unhurt.

"At the south end of the town the ravage was coincident with the destruction at the north. All the boats and fishing craft around the coves were burnt. A house and shop belonging to a person who held a commission in the garrison of the fort, were singled out and burnt, showing that the guides of the enemy were familiar with the locality.

"In this part of the harbor were the spar and ship yards, and a considerable number of unemployed vessels, which were all given to the flames. A privateer sloop, fitted for a cruise, and in fine order, that lay swinging from a cable fastened to a ring in a projecting rock, where is now Brown's Wharf, was set on fire, and her cable burning off, she drifted across the harbor, a mass of flame. Through the whole of Bank-street, where were some of the best mercantile stands and the most valuable dwelling-houses in the town, the torch of vengeance made a clean sweep. No building of any importance was left on either side of the street: all combustible property, of every description, was consumed."

The part which General Arnold had in this work of destruction has been the subject of much discussion. In his dispatches to the commander-in-chief he has himself attributed much of the damage to the consequences resulting from the explosion of gunpowder which had been stored in the warehouses,¹ and many more recent writers have

¹ Dispatch, Sept. 8.

entertained similar opinions.¹ On the other hand, other authors have attempted to throw discredit on this view of the subject; and, by appealing to the massacre at Fort Griswold as evidence of the passion which actuated the invader, they charge, by implication at least, the entire criminality of the expedition on General Arnold.²

In the mean time, the detachment which had landed in Groton, on the east side of the harbor, had not been idle. Composed of two regiments of the line and a battalion of Tories, with parties of Yagers and artillery,³ the detachment had landed at Groton Point, simultaneously with the landing of the remainder of the troops at Brown's Farm, and had moved forward towards Fort Griswold, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Eyre.⁴ It was nearly noon when the detachment emerged from the wood, about half a mile distant from the fort, and sought temporary shelter behind the ledges of rock, which were then in that vicinity, until they were formed "under the lee of a rocky height, about one hundred and thirty yards southeast from the fort, near the present burying-ground."⁵

About this time the officer whom General Arnold had first dispatched over the river, with orders for an immediate attack on the fort, reached the

enemy's position,¹ and the Lieutenant-colonel immediately dispatched Captain Beckwith with a flag to demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the garrison,² threatening, at the same time, to storm the fort instantly, if the terms were not accepted.³ The flag was received by Captain Adam Shapley,⁴ and a council of war was summoned, when it was voted, unanimously, that the garrison was *unable* to defend themselves against so superior a force.⁵ Colonel Nathan Gallup, of the Groton militia, who was present, insisted, however, that he could procure a reinforcement of two or three hundred men, from the militia in the neighborhood, in fifteen minutes, if the garrison would hold out;⁶ and Lieutenant-colonel Ledyard was, unfortunately, misled by these assurances, and returned, through Captain Shapley,⁷ an answer declining to comply with the order.⁸ Unfortunately the Colonel failed to meet with that success which he expected—his men offering to meet the enemy in the field, but peremptorily declining to

¹ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.—² Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 558; Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Lieut. Stephen Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6.

³ Lieut. Stephen Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6. Miss Caulkins (*Hist. New London*, p. 558) and Mr. Hollister (*Hist. Conn.*, ii. p. 406) suppose this threat was sent with a *second* flag.—⁴ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6.

⁵ Ibid. Miss Caulkins says (*Hist. New London*, p. 558) it was unanimously and immediately decided *not to surrender*.

⁶ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 559; Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6.—⁷ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6. Miss Caulkins (*Hist. New London*, p. 558) says the flag was answered by three others; and she says the flag was dispatched a second time to the fort, before the assault was made.—⁸ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 558; Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.

¹ Miss Caulkins' New London, pp. 555, 556; *Hist. of Civil War in America*, iii. p. 238; Stedman, ii. p. 403.

² Gordon, iv. p. 179.—³ Vide p. 724.

⁴ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8, 1781.

⁵ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 558; Lieut. Stephen Hempstead's Narrative, p. 5.

enter the fort, "to fight against such great odds, with no chance to escape."¹

The answer of the garrison had no sooner reached the enemy, than his troops were put in motion;² and they advanced with a quick step, in solid column, towards the fort.³ Before reaching the fort the column divided, and the assault was opened, on opposite sides, at the same moment.⁴ Although not more than one seventh as numerous as the enemy by whom it had been surrounded, the little garrison offered a judicious and successful opposition; and, on all sides the enemy was repulsed.⁵ Lieutenant-colonel Eyre was mortally wounded, and borne from the field;⁶ Major Montgomery, the second in command, was thrust through the body by Captain Shapley,⁷ while he was about entering the works, at the head of his men, near the southwest bastion of the fort;⁸ Ensign Whitlock, of the Fortieth regiment was killed;⁹ and three other officers of the Fifty-fourth regiment, and

the same number belonging to the Fortieth regiment were wounded.¹

Notwithstanding this repulse the enemy was speedily rallied, and, under the command of Major Bromfield,² the attack was renewed.³ Approaching the fort, as they had done before, on three sides at the same time, the enemy's troops moved forward with great coolness and bravery, made a lodgment in the ditch, and, a second time, reached the fraizing, notwithstanding it was defended by strong pickets, which were broken or removed with great difficulty, and were so high that the soldiers could not ascend them without assisting each other.⁴ The little garrison, however, was equally active and determined. So close was the contest, and so resolutely maintained, that shot were hurled from the ramparts, by hand, it is said, upon the heads of the assailants below;⁵ while one of the survivors has left on record the fact that he had loaded and discharged his musket *eighteen times* during the contest.⁶ The obstinate bravery of the garrison, notwithstanding its weakness, was, soon afterwards, a second time, triumphant, and the enemy was compelled to retire.⁷

During the last attack an accident oc-

¹ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 559. Mr. Barber (*Hist. Coll. of Conn.*, p. 309) says he got drunk and neglected his duty.—² Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6; Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 559.—³ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6; Hollister's Conn., ii. p. 406.

⁴ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6; Hist. Civil War in America, iii. p. 237; Marshall, iv. p. 533.—⁵ Miss Caulkins' New London, pp. 559, 560. Gen. Arnold says nothing about any *repulse*; and Mr. Barber (*Hist. Coll. of Conn.*) follows him.

⁶ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.

⁷ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, pp. 6, 7. It is claimed, by some, that a colored man, named Jordan Freeman, confronted and killed the Major.

⁸ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 6. Miss Caulkins (*Hist. New London*, p. 560) supposes he fell on the *north* side of the fort, while the Captain was engaged in the southwest angle.

⁹ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.

¹ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.—² Ibid.; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 238.—³ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 7.—⁴ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.

⁵ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 7; Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 560; Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 309.—⁶ Joseph Woodmaney, in Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 560, note.—⁷ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 7. The Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781, says the enemy was repulsed but *once*; and Miss Caulkins (*Hist. New London*, pp. 560, 561) agrees with it.

curred which may have been instrumental in producing the slaughter which subsequently took place. A shot from the enemy cut the halyard on the flag-staff within the fort, and the colors of the garrison fell to the ground. Although they were instantly remounted on a pike-pole, it is said that the enemy supposed they had been struck, and was encouraged therefrom to renew the attack.¹ Be this as it may, it is true that the enemy rallied a second time, and advanced to the third attack with redoubled impetuosity.² The garrison, likewise, exerted itself to the utmost, and the fort was defended with the most desperate bravery.³ At length, forty minutes after the first assault was made,⁴ the enemy forced the works,⁵—probably at different points at about the same time,⁶—and the gate was opened, and, by Lieutenant-colonel Ledyard's order, the garrison surrendered.⁷

From some unexplained cause it appears that the enemy continued to fire on the garrison, even after it had surrendered; and it is an undoubted fact that when Lieutenant-colonel Buskirk inquired, "Who commands this garrison?" and Lieutenant-colonel Ledyard answered, "I did, sir, but you do now,"

¹ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 7; Gordon, iv. p. 178.—² Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 7.

³ Ibid.; Gordon, iv. p. 178.—⁴ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Gordon, iv. p. 179.—⁵ Gordon, iv. p. 179.

⁶ Lieut. Hempstead (*Narrative*, pp. 7, 8) says the southwest bastion was first forced; while Miss Caulkins (*Hist. New London*, p. 561) supposes the northeast bastion was the first which was carried.—⁷ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 8. Gov. Trumbull (*Heath's Mem.*, p. 306) says there were *four* attempts made before the enemy succeeded in taking the works.

at the same time surrendering his sword, the former, with the ferocity which was so prevalent among the Tories, plunged the weapon into the body of its owner;¹ and that several British soldiers who were present immediately finished the work by plunging their bayonets into the prostrate body of their gallant, but fallen, opponent.² Encouraged by such an example as this, on the part of their commander, it would have been strange if the bitter feelings of the Tories, the ignorant, misguided prejudices of the Yagers, and the not less ignorant, misguided loyalty of the regulars, had not been aroused to their utmost extent. Every American, who was seen, immediately became the object of their attack; and, with a savage cruelty, which has seldom found a parallel, an indiscriminate slaughter ensued.³ Seeking shelter from the fiend-like fury of their enemy, the Americans fled into the magazine or the barracks, or crept, for concealment, under the platforms and into other places of supposed safety.⁴ But all this availed nothing. The former were pursued and fired on, even at the risk of blowing up the magazine;⁵ while the latter were mangled by the swords and bayonets which were

¹ Heath's *Mem.*, pp. 306, 307; Barber's *Hist. Coll. of Conn.*, p. 309; Lieut. Hempstead's *Narrative*, pp. 8, 9; Gordon, iv. p. 179.

² Heath's *Memoirs*, p. 307.

³ Miss Caulkins' *New London*, pp. 562, 563; Barber's *Hist. Coll. of Conn.*, p. 309; Gov. Trumbull to Gen. Washington, cited by Marshall, iv. p. 534.

⁴ Miss Caulkins' *New London*, p. 563; Lieut. Hempstead's *Narrative*, p. 9; Hollister's *Conn.*, ii. p. 410.

⁵ Miss Caulkins' *New London*, p. 563; Lieut. Hempstead's *Narrative*, p. 9.

thrust into them,¹ and few, if any, succeeded in securing their safety. Captain William Seymour, from Hartford, after his knee had been shattered by a ball, and he had become helpless in consequence of the wound, received thirteen bayonet wounds;² Ensign Woodmancy, while laying disabled by a wound, was cruelly hacked with a cutlass;³ Lieutenant Avery, who laid disabled, with his skull broken, was bayoneted in his side;⁴ and Lieut. Hempstead, after he had been wounded in the head and in his left elbow, by balls, was bayoneted in his right hip.⁵ Other cases, equally cruel and inexcusable, were seen; and a scene of more brutal, wanton carnage was never witnessed.

In the defence of the fort only six of the garrison were killed, and eighteen wounded;⁶ while, during the subsequent butchery, seventy-nine were killed, and, so thoroughly was the work conducted, seventeen, only, were mortally and dangerously wounded.⁷

Nor did the cruelty of the enemy then cease. After the thirst for blood had been assuaged, the victims were plundered, and left literally naked.⁸ They were also doomed to still more cruel tortures; and the refined barbarism of the enemy has found but few parallels, even among the savages.

¹ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 563.—² Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 9.—³ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 563.—⁴ Hollister's Conn., ii. p. 411.—⁵ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, pp. 9, 10.—⁶ Ibid., p. 9; Gordon, iv. p. 179. Gov. Trumbull (*Heath's Mem.*, p. 306) says that three only were killed before the surrender.

⁷ Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7.—⁸ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 9; Hollister's Conn., ii. p. 411.

Gathering up the helplessly wounded of both parties, those of the enemy were properly cared for; while those of the garrison, deprived of nearly all their clothing, were exposed to the intense heat of a summer sun, in front of the barracks;¹ and, soon afterwards, the most helpless of them were put into an ammunition wagon, taken to the brow of the hill,—which was quite steep, and at least a hundred rods in descent,—and thence sent down the slope, towards the river, without any means to regulate their course or check their progress. Dashing down the hill, and tossing its mutilated occupants from side to side as it struck a rock or a stump, or bounded over a hole, the wagon pursued its course, until its progress was, at length, arrested by running against a tree, and the jar, on the wounded men, "was like bursting the cords of life asunder, causing them to shriek with almost superhuman force."² Their cries were heard and noticed on the opposite side of the river (which is nearly a mile wide), amidst all the confusion which raged in the burning and sacking of the town."³ In this condition they remained, exposed to the sun, when they were hunted up, and, at the urgent solicitation of Ebenezer Ledyard, a brother of the fallen commander of the fort, they were paroled and taken to the house of Ebenezer Avery, one of

¹ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 9.—² Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781; Barber's Hist. Coll. of Conn., p. 310; Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, pp. 9, 10; Gordon, iv. p. 179.—³ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 10; Gordon, iv. p. 179.

their number, which was near the scene.¹

After plundering and burning nearly all the buildings in Groton,—leaving but few buildings standing,²—the enemy, about eleven o'clock in the evening,³ retired to their shipping, taking with him, from among the garrison of Fort Griswold, from that portion of the garrison of Fort Trumbull which was captured in the boat, while crossing the river, and from among the people, about seventy prisoners.⁴

The loss of the enemy, in this expedition, was Major Montgomery, Ensign Whitlock, two sergeants, and forty-four rank and file, *killed*; Lieutenant-colonel Eyre, three captains, two lieutenants, two ensigns, eight sergeants, two drummers, and one hundred and twenty-seven rank and file, *wounded*, many of

whom afterwards died.⁵ The loss of the Americans on the New London, or western side of the river, was about twenty killed and wounded;¹ on the Groton, or eastern side, eighty-five were killed and sixty-five wounded.² Thirty-five pieces of cannon, one hundred and six muskets, eighty pikes, and a large supply of military stores, were lost in Fort Griswold; eight pieces of cannon were also lost at Fort Nonsense; one piece on the road; and twenty-seven pieces, with a quantity of stores, in Fort Trumbull.³ Besides this, sixty-five dwellings, thirty-one stores and warehouses, eighteen shops, twenty barns, a meeting-house, court-house, jail, market, custom-house, and other buildings and property, together with the wharves, ten or twelve vessels, and an immense amount of European and West Indian goods were destroyed.⁴

¹ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 10.—² Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 8.

³ Lieut. Hempstead's Narrative, p. 10. The Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781, says it was "about sunset;" and Mr. Hollister (*Hist. of Conn.*, ii. p. 412) appears to agree with it.

⁴ Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781.—⁵ Returns appended to Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.

¹ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 568.—² Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8; Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 564.

³ Returns appended to Gen. Arnold's dispatch, Sept. 8.

⁴ Miss Caulkins' New London, p. 569; Conn. Gazette, New London, Sept. 7, 1781; Hist. of Civil War in America, iii. p. 238; Gordon, iv. p. 179.

CHAPTER XCIX.

September 28 to October 19, 1781.

THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, VIRGINIA.

THE seventh year of the War of the Revolution was productive of great events. Opening with the mutiny of the Pennsylvania line of troops, its progress soon developed the disaffection of the New Jersey line also, and all the skill of the commander-in-chief was necessary to maintain that discipline in the army on which the salvation of the country depended.¹ The resources of the country, from the long-continued struggle through which it had passed, during six years, had become exhausted; its currency had become depreciated beyond precedent;² and the people, weary of the contest, were lukewarm as well as enervated.³

At that time, also, the Federal Congress appeared to lack that nerve and decision which had marked the proceedings of the same body earlier in the war; and contenting itself with *recommendations*, without attempting to enforce its requisitions, or even to advise the adoption of compulsory measures by the States, it left the troops who were in the field without clothing, provisions, or pay; and, indirectly, forced upon them those acts of apparent insurrection, which, resolved to their first

elements, might, not improperly, have been called "*acts of necessity*," and been justified, in charity, as essential to their self-preservation.¹

So gloomy, indeed, were the prospects of American independence, at that time, that the interposition of some foreign government was, by general consent, considered absolutely essential;² and never were the good qualities of the commander-in-chief more nobly displayed than at this period, when, amid the most pressing discouragements, referred to, he urged the States to strengthen the bonds of the Confederacy, and to renew their efforts for the great final struggle with their haughty and determined enemy.³

The enemy, still anxiously seeking to establish his power in the Southern States, had sent General Arnold to Virginia, with a strong detachment of troops, to co-operate with Lord Cornwallis, who was busily engaged, in a series of movements, in measuring his strength and his skill with General Greene; and, soon afterwards, a second detachment, under General Phillips, was sent to the same State.

¹ Sparks' Washington, pp. 320-322.

² Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 514, 515.—³ Sparks' Washington, pp. 333, 334.

¹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 503; Sparks' Washington, p. 325.

² Sparks' Washington, p. 322.—³ Letter to J. P. Custis, Feb. 28, 1781.

Early in May the Count de Barras arrived from Europe with the welcome intelligence of the approach of reinforcements from France; and that a strong fleet from the West Indies, under Count de Grasse, might be expected, in the American waters, within a few weeks.¹ In view of these facts, a conference, between General Washington and the Count de Rochambeau, was held at Weathersfield, soon afterwards, and the plans of the campaign were discussed and determined on.²

Among the principal of the operations proposed was an attack on the city of New York; and in accordance with these plans, the allied forces of America and France moved against that city.³ Every necessary preparation had been made for the commencement of active operations, when, on the fourteenth of August, a letter reached General Washington, in which the Count de Grasse informed him that the entire French West Indian fleet, with more than three thousand land forces, would shortly sail from St. Domingo for the Chesapeake, intimating, however, that he could not remain longer than the middle of October, at which time it would be necessary for him to be on his station again.⁴ As the limited period which the Count could spend in

the service of the allies was not sufficient to warrant the supposition that he could be useful before New York, the entire plan of the campaign was changed, and it was resolved to proceed to Virginia, with the whole of the French troops and as many of the Americans as could be spared from the defence of the posts on the Hudson; and instead of besieging Sir Henry Clinton, in his headquarters in New York, a movement against Lord Cornwallis, and the powerful detachment under his command, was resolved on.¹

At the period in question, Lord Cornwallis had moved out of the Carolinas; formed a junction with the force under General Phillips; and had overrun the lower counties of Virginia, until General Lafayette, who had been sent to the State some weeks after, by superior skill and the most active exertions, had succeeded in checking his progress.² The purpose of the allies was to prevent the escape of Lord Cornwallis from his position near Yorktown; and General Lafayette was ordered to make such a disposition of his army as should be best calculated to effect that purpose.³ In case this purpose should be defeated, and Lord Cornwallis succeed in effecting a retreat into North Carolina, it was designed to pursue him with sufficient force to overawe him; while the remainder of the armies, at the same time, should proceed, with the French fleet, to Charleston, which was,

¹ Count Rochambeau to Gen. Washington, May 8; Count de Barras to same, May 11; Marshall, iv. pp. 509, 510.

² Gen. Washington to Pres. Weare, of N. H., May 24; Same to Pres. of Cong., May 27, 1781; Gen. Washington's Diary, May 18-22, 1781.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., May 27, 1781.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lafayette, Aug. 15, 1781; Diary of Gen. Washington, Aug. 14, 1781.

¹ Gen. Washington to Count de Grasse, Aug. 17, 1781.

² Sparks' Washington, p. 337.—³ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lafayette, Aug. 15, 1781.

at that time, the enemy's head-quarters in the South.

The marine force of the allies was composed of two fleets—that of Admiral Comt de Grasse, then on its way from the West Indies, composed of twenty-six sail of the line and several frigates;¹ and that of Admiral Count de Barras, then at anchor in Newport, composed of eight sail of the line, beside transports and victuallers:² their military force embraced the main bodies of the American and French armies, under Generals Washington and Roehambeau, then near New York;³ the detachment of American troops, under General Lafayette, then in Virginia;⁴ and more than three thousand French troops, under General St. Simon, who were then on their way from the West Indies, with the Comt de Grasse.⁵

The main body of the enemy's force, under Sir Henry Clinton, was in the city of New York and its immediate vicinity;⁶ Lord Cornwallis, with his own command and that which, under Generals Phillips and Arnold, had overrun some portions of Virginia, numbering, in the aggregate, about seven thousand three hundred and fifty men, ex-

clusive of seamen and Tories, was occupying the neck of land between the James and York rivers, where General Lafayette was holding him in check;¹ while the Southern army, under Lieutenant-colonel Balfour, through the successful movements of General Greene, was mostly confined to Charleston and its immediate vicinity.² Admiral Rodney, with a large naval force, was leisurely spending his time in securing his portion of the spoils in the West Indies;³ Sir Samuel Hood, with fifteen sail of the line, and six smaller vessels, had been detached by Admiral Rodney to intercept Admiral de Grasse, and to maintain an equality of power in the American waters;⁴ and Admiral Graves, with part of his fleet in New York and a part before Newport, caused the enemy to feel perfectly secure in the positions he occupied.⁵

As has been stated, the intelligence from Admiral de Grasse changed the plans of the allies; and, instead of General Clinton and the main body of the enemy, in the city of New York, Lord Cornwallis and the combined forces under his command, then at Yorktown, were made the objects of General Washington's attention. In executing this plan, however, it was necessary to exercise great caution, not only to prevent Sir Henry Clinton from moving to the

¹ Sparks' Washington, p. 339.—² Account of his arrival in the Chesapeake, in *The Pennsylvania Packet*, No. 786, Phila., Sept. 25, 1781; Sparks' Writings of Washington, viii. p. 114, note.—³ Diary of Gen. Washington, July 2 to July 21, 1781.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lafayette, July 13 and July 30, 1781.—⁵ Diary of Gen. Washington, July 14, 1781.

⁶ The number of troops¹ at New York and its dependencies, on the 1st of August, 1781, including 326 British recruits, joined June 27th," was 10,075.—"View of the strength," &c., appended to Sir Henry Clinton's "Observations on Earl Cornwallis's answer."

¹ Sparks' Washington, p. 337.—² Ramsay's Rev. in S. C., ii. pp. 263-265, 271.—³ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 525; Speech of Edmund Burke, in the House of Commons, Dec. 4, 1781.—⁴ Speech of Adm'l Rodney, in reply to Mr. Burke, in the House of Commons, Dec. 4, 1781.

⁵ "Defence of Adm'l Graves," in the "Political Magazine," second supplement, 1781.

assistance of Lord Cornwallis, but, also, to prevent Admiral Graves from joining Sir Samuel Hood, and, by occupying the Chesapeake, keeping open the communication, by sea, between Yorktown and New York.¹

For this purpose, on the nineteenth of August, the New Jersey line and Colonel Hazen's regiment were sent to New Jersey, by way of Dobbs' Ferry, to protect a large number of ovens, which were ordered to be erected near Springfield and Chatham, in that State;² and forage and boats, with some efforts to display the same, were also collected on the west side of the Hudson,³ by which the enemy was led to suppose that an attack was intended from that quarter.⁴ Fictitious letters were also written and put in the way of the enemy, by which the deception was confirmed;⁵ and Sir Henry Clinton appears to have supposed that Staten Island, or a position near Sandy Hook, to cover the entrance of the French fleet into the harbor, was the real object of the movements, until the allied forces—which had crossed the Hudson, leaving General Heath, with a respectable force, on its eastern bank—had passed the Delaware, and rendered the true object of the movement a matter of obvious certainty.⁶

¹ Gen. Washington to Gen. Lafayette, Aug. 15; Same to Count de Grasse, Aug. 17.—² Sparks' Washington, i. p. 365; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 454; Journal of the operations of the French troops under Count Rochambeau.

³ Sparks' Washington, i. p. 365; Sparks' Writings of Washington, viii. p. 140, note.—⁴ Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, Sept. 7, 1781.—⁵ Sparks' Washington, p. 365.—⁶ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 455; Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, Sept. 7, 1781.

The body of troops, with which General Washington moved to the South, embraced all the French auxiliaries, led by Count Rochambeau; the light-infantry of the Continental army, led by Colonel Alexander Scammel; detachments of light troops from the Connecticut and New York State troops; the Rhode Island regiment; the regiment known as "Congress' Own," under Colonel Hazen; two New York regiments; a detachment of New Jersey troops; and the artillery, under Colonel John Lamb, numbering, in the aggregate, about two thousand Americans and a strong body of French.¹ It is said that the American troops, who were mostly from New England and the Middle States, marched with reluctance to the southward, showing "strong symptoms of discontent when they passed through Philadelphia," and becoming reconciled only when *an advance of a month's pay, in specie*,—which was borrowed from Count Rochambeau for that purpose,—was paid to them.²

The allies, having thus successfully eluded the watchfulness of the enemy in New York, pressed forward towards Annapolis and the Head of Elk, whither transports had been dispatched from the French fleet to convey them to Virginia;³ and, on the twenty-fifth of September, the last division reached Williamsburg,⁴ where, with General Lafay-

¹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 454.—² Sparks' Washington, i. p. 366; Gen. Washington to Rob't Morris, Aug. 27, 1781; Robert Morris's Diary, Sept. 5, 1781; Rob't Morris to Count Rochambeau, Sept. 6, 1781.—³ Sparks' Washington, i. p. 366.—⁴ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 460.

ette and his command, and the auxiliary troops, the entire army had rendezvoused.¹

In the mean time, the enemy, as well as the French auxiliaries, had not been inactive. Lord Cornwallis, vainly expecting reinforcements from New York, had concentrated his army at Yorktown and Gloucester, on opposite sides of the York River, and had been busily employed in throwing up strong works of defence, and preparing to sustain a siege.²

Admiral Graves, after a bootless cruise to the eastward, for the purpose of intercepting some French storeships, had returned to New York on the sixteenth or seventeenth of August,³ and, since that time, had been employed in refitting, taking in stores, &c., in blissful ignorance of the approach of Admiral de Grasse.⁴ Admiral Rodney, advised of the movements of the French fleet, had sent "early notice"⁵ to the Admiral commanding in America; but his dispatches, which were sent by the *Swallow*, Captain Wells, never reached Admiral Graves.⁶ Sir Samuel Hood's squadron, also, which had been sent to the northward to check the movements of the French fleet or to strengthen the fleet of Admiral Graves, after touching at the Chesapeake, before the French fleet arrived there,⁷ had sailed for New

York;¹ and, on the afternoon of the twenty-eighth of August, had reached that port,² and communicated to the Admiral the first intelligence of the movements of the French fleet which he had received.³ On the thirty-first of August the Admiral, with five ships belonging to his own command, and the squadron under Sir Samuel Hood, sailed for the Chesapeake, where he found the French fleet,⁴ and, on the fifth of September, accepted the invitation to fight which the Admiral de Grasse extended to him;⁵ but considered it prudent to return to New York, immediately afterwards.⁶

The Admiral, Count de Grasse, with a naval force of twenty-six sail of the line and some smaller vessels,⁷ had sailed from St. Domingo on the fifth of August;⁸ on the thirtieth of the same month he entered the Chesapeake and anchored at Lynn Haven;⁹ on the following day he had blockaded the mouths of the James and York rivers, and prevented the retreat of the enemy by water;¹⁰ and, as has been before stated,—notwithstanding the absence of about nineteen hundred of his men,¹¹ besides three ships of the line and two

¹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 451.

² Journal of Operations, &c.; Defence of Adm'l Graves.

³ Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 451, 452.

⁴ Jour. of Operations, &c.; Camp. of the Naval Army; Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, Sept. 7, 1781.

⁵ Journal of Operations, &c.; Campaign of Naval Army.

⁶ Journal of Operations, &c.; Gen. Washington to Count de Grasse, Sept. 15, 1781.—⁷ Sparks' Washington, p. 366.

⁸ Campaign of the Naval Army under Count de Grasse.

⁹ Ibid.—¹⁰ The *Experiment*, *Andromaque*, and several smaller vessels, occupied the James; the *Glorieux* and two frigates occupied the York.—*Campaign of the Naval Army*, &c.

¹¹ Camp. of the Naval Army; Jour. of Operations, &c.

¹ Journal of the Operations of the French troops, &c.; Campaign of the Naval Army.—² Journal of the Operations, &c.—³ Defence of Adm'l Graves.—⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Speech of Adm'l Rodney, in the House of Commons, Nov. 30, 1781.

⁶ Speech of Adm'l Rodney, in the House, Dec. 4, 1781, in reply to Mr. Burke.

⁷ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 451.

fifties, with their crews,¹—had went out and fought with Admiral Graves and nineteen sail of the line.² General, the Marquis St. Simon, at the head of thirty-three hundred French troops, had been landed from the fleet on the second of September; joined General Lafayette on the third; and, on the fifth, with the latter officer and his command, had moved down to Williamsburg, fifteen miles from York, and cut off the retreat of the enemy, by land.³ The Admiral de Barras, with his squadron and ten transports, having on board the siege artillery and a large body of French troops, under M. de Choisy,⁴ sailed from Newport on the twenty-fifth of August,⁵ and entered Lynn Haven Bay in safety, on the tenth of September,⁶ while Admiral de Grasse was absent, in engagement with Admiral Graves.⁷

As before mentioned, the different divisions of the allied forces rendezvoused at Williamsburg, in the vicinity of Yorktown, in the latter part of September.⁸ At that time the enemy's fleet, overawed by the superior force of the combined fleets under Admirals de Grasse and De Barras, had returned to New York, leaving General Cornwallis and his army to the fortunes of war; and enabling the naval force of the

allies to co-operate with their military in all the operations of the siege. General Heath, with two New Hampshire, ten Massachusetts, and five Connecticut regiments, the corps of invalids, Sheldon's legion of dragoons, the third regiment of artillery, and "all such State troops and militia as were retained in service," remained in the vicinity of New York to protect the passes in the Highlands, and to check any movement which Sir Henry Clinton might make for the relief of Lord Cornwallis.¹

At daybreak, on the twenty-eighth of September, the entire body of the army moved from Williamsburg, and occupied a position within two miles of the enemy's line; the American troops occupied the right of the line; the French auxiliaries the left.²

York, the scene of operations referred to, is a small village, the seat of justice of York county, Virginia; and is situated on the southern bank of the York River, eleven miles from its mouth.³ On the opposite side of the river is Gloucester Point, on which the enemy had also taken a position; and the communication between the two posts was commanded by his land-batteries and by some vessels of war which laid at anchor under his guns.⁴

On the twenty-ninth of September the besiegers were principally employed in reconnoitering the situation of the

¹ Vide p. 737, note 10.—² Camp. of the Naval Army; Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Geo. Germain, Sept. 26, 1781.


³ Camp. of the Naval Army.—⁴ Jour. of Operations, &c.; Sparks' Writings of Washington, viii. p. 161, *note*.

⁵ Jour. of Operations, &c.—⁶ Sparks' Writings of Washington, viii. p. 161, *note*. ⁷ The Count de Grasse returned to his anchorage on the 11th.—*Camp. of the Naval Army*.

⁸ Vide p. 736; Gordon, iv. p. 187.

¹ Instructions to Gen. Heath, Aug. 19, 1781.—² Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 1; Jour. of Operations, &c.; Thatcher's Military Jour., p. 270; Stedman, ii. pp. 408, 409.

³ Howe's Hist. Coll. of Va., p. 519; Thatcher's Military Journal, p. 270.—⁴ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 538.



Painted by Chappel

DEATH OF COL. SCAMMELL AT THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.

In the original painting by Sir David Wilkie, R.A., the artist has

Johnson, NY & CO Publishers New York

enemy, and in arranging their plans of attack.¹ The main body of the enemy was found intrenched in the open grounds about Yorktown, with the intention of checking the progress of the allies, while an inner line of works, near the village, had been provided for his ultimate defence;² Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe, with his Legion, the Eightieth regiment of the line, and the Hereditary Prince's regiment of Hessians, the whole under Lieutenant-colonel Dundas, being in possession of Gloucester Point.³ The only movement was an extension of the right wing of the allied armies, and the consequent occupation of the ground east of the Beaver-dam Creek, by the American forces.⁴

On the evening of that day Lord Cornwallis received dispatches from New York, in which Sir Henry Clinton advised his lordship, that "at a meeting of the general and flag officers, held this day (*September 24, 1781*), it is determined that above five thousand men, rank and file, shall be embarked on board the King's ships, and the joint exertions of the navy and army made in a few days to relieve you, and, afterwards, to operate with you. The fleet consists of twenty-three sail of the line, three of which are three-deckers. There is every reason to hope that we start from hence the 5th October."⁵ Grati-fied with this promise of assistance,

and, probably, confident of his ability to hold his inner position until he could be relieved, Lord Cornwallis imprudently retired from the outer line of works which he had occupied;¹ and, on the same night (*September 29*) occupied the town, leaving the outer lines to be occupied by the allies, without resistance, on the next day.²

On the thirtieth of September the allies occupied the deserted positions, and were, thereby, "enabled to shut up the enemy in a much narrower circle, giving them the greatest advantages."³ Before the allies moved to the positions which had been thus deserted, Colonel Alexander Scammell, the officer of the day, approached them for the purpose of reconnoitering, when he was attacked by a party of the enemy's horse, which was ambushed in the neighborhood, and, after being mortally wounded, was taken prisoner.⁴ On the same day the transports, having on board the battering train, came up to Trubell's, seven miles from York, whence they were transported to the lines;⁵ and the lines were completely and effectively occupied. The French extended from the river, above the town, to a morass, in the centre; while the Americans continued the lines from the morass to the river, below the town, the whole forming a semicircle, with the river for a chord.⁶

¹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 538.—² Map of the positions of the armies, in Stedman, Tarleton, and Gordon.

³ Simcoe's Jour., p. 248.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 1, 1781; Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 539.

⁵ Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, Sept. 24, 1781

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 1, 1781.—² Jour. of Operations, &c.; Stedman, ii. p. 109.—³ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 1, 1781.—⁴ Thatcher's Military Journal, pp. 271, 272; Gordon, iv. p. 188.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 6, 1781; Journal of Operations, &c.

⁶ Journal of Operations, &c.; Stedman, ii. p. 409.

On the same day the Duke de Lauzun, with his Legion of cavalry, and General Weedon, with a body of Virginian militia, the whole under Sieur de Choisey, invested Gloucester,¹ in the course of which a party of the Queen's Rangers, which had been sent out to observe the movements of the allies, was driven in with considerable loss.²

On the following day (*October 1*), eight hundred marines were landed from the fleet to strengthen the party which was investing Gloucester;³ and from that time until the sixth both the allies and the enemy vigorously prosecuted their several works of attack or defence, or otherwise prepared for the great struggle which was then inevitable.

On the night of the sixth of October, under the command of General Lincoln, the besiegers opened their trenches within six hundred yards of the enemy's lines,⁴ yet with so much silence was it conducted that it appears to have been undiscovered until daylight on the seventh, when the works were so far completed that they afforded ample shelter for the men, and but one officer and sixteen privates were injured.⁵ In this attack the enemy appears to have bent his energies chiefly against the French, on the left of the trenches; and the regiments of Bourbonnois, Soissonnois, and Touraine, commanded by the Baron de Viomenil,

were most conspicuous in the defence of the lines.¹

The seventh, eighth, and ninth of October were employed in strengthening the first parallel, and in constructing batteries somewhat in advance of it, for the purpose of raking the enemy's works and of battering his shipping.² Communications were also made in the rear of the left of the line, in order to secure the greater number of openings.³ On the night of the tenth the trenches on the left were occupied by the regiments of Agenois and Saintonge, under the Marquis de Chastellux; on that of the eighth by the regiments of Gatinois and Royal-Deux-Ponts, under the Marquis de St. Simon.⁴

At five o'clock in the afternoon of the ninth the American battery, on the right of the line, opened its fire;⁵—General Washington, in person, firing the first gun,⁶—and six eighteen and twenty-four pounders, two mortars, and two howitzers, were steadily engaged during the entire night.⁷ At an early hour, on the morning of the tenth, the French battery, on the left, with four twelve-pounders and six mortars and howitzers, also opened its fire; and, on the same day, this fire was increased by the fire from two other French and two American batteries—the former mounting ten eighteen and twenty-four pounders, and six mortars and howitzers, and

¹ Journal of Operations, &c.; Simcoe's Jour., p. 250.

² Simcoe's Jour., p. 250.—³ Camp. of Naval Army; Jour. of Operations, &c.—⁴ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 12, 1781; Jour. of Operations, &c.; Camp. of the Naval Army; Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 20, 1781.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 12, 1781.

¹ Jour. of Operations, &c.—² Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 12, 1781; Jour. of Operations.—³ Jour. of Operations.—⁴ Ibid.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 12, 1781; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, Oct. 20, 1781.

⁶ Thatcher's Military Jour., p. 274.—⁷ Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 12, 1781.

four eighteen-pouncers respectively; the latter mounting four eighteen-pouncers and two mortars.¹ "The fire now became so excessively heavy that the enemy withdrew their cannon from their embrasures, placed them behind the merlins, and scarcely fired a shot during the whole day."² In the evening of the tenth, the *Charon*, a frigate of forty-four guns, and three transports, were set on fire by the shells or hot shot, and entirely consumed; and the enemy's shipping was warped over the river, as far as possible, to protect it from similar disaster.³

On the night of the eleventh the second parallel was opened within three hundred yards of the enemy's lines;⁴ and, as in the former instance, it was so far advanced before morning that the men employed in them were, in a great measure, protected from injury when the enemy opened his fire.⁵ The three following days were spent in completing this parallel, and the redoubts and batteries belonging to it; during which time the enemy's fire was well sustained, and more than usually destructive.⁶ Two advanced batteries, three hundred yards in front of the enemy's left, were particularly annoying, inasmuch as they flanked the second parallel of the besiegers;⁷ and, as the engineers reported that they had been severely injured by the fire of the allies,

it was resolved to attempt to carry them by assault.⁸

Accordingly, in the evening of the fourteenth, these redoubts were assaulted—that on the extreme right by a detachment, embracing the light-infantry of the American army, under General Lafayette;⁹ the latter by a detachment of grenadiers and chasseurs, from the French army, commanded by the Baron Viominel.³ The attacks were made at eight in the evening;⁴ and in that of the Americans the advancee was led by Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Hamilton, with his own battalion and that of Colonel Gimat—the latter in the van; while Lieutenant-colonel John Laurens, at the head of eighty men, took the garrison in reverse, and cut off its retreat.⁵ Not a single musket was loaded;⁶ and the troops rushed forward with the greatest impetuosity,—passing over the abatis and palisades,⁷—and carrying the work with the bayonet, with the loss of nine killed, and six officers and twenty-six rank and file wounded.⁸ The French performed their part of the duty with equal gallantry, although, from the greater strength of their opponents, it was not done so quickly as that of the Americans.⁹ The German grenadier regiment of Deux-Ponts,

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 16; Jour. of Operations, &c.—² Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 16.

³ Ibid.; Jour. of Operations, &c.—⁴ Thatcher's Military Jour., p. 275.—⁵ Report of Gen. Lafayette to Gen. Washington, Oct. 16, 1781.—⁶ "Agreeably to your orders, we advanced in two columns, with unloaded muskets."—Report of *Lor. Cd. Hamilton* to Gen. *Lafayette*.—⁷ Gen. Lafayette's report, Oct. 16; Thatcher's Mil. Jour., p. 276, note.

⁸ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 465, note; Thatcher's Mil. Jour., p. 275.—⁹ Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 543.

¹ Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 12, 1781.; Jour. of Operations, &c.—² Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 12, 1781. See also Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, Oct. 20, 1781.—³ Ibid.; Jour. of Operations.—⁴ Ibid.; Stedman, ii. p. 410.—⁵ Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 12 and 16.

⁶ Jour. of Operations, &c.; Gen. Washington to Cong., Oct. 16.—⁷ Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 16.

led by Count William Forback de Deux-Ponts, led the column;¹ and Captain Henry de Kalb, of that regiment, was the first officer who entered the work.² The chasseur regiment of Gatinois supported the attack;³ and, in like manner with that on the right, the redoubt was carried at the point of the bayonet.⁴

During the night these redoubts were connected with the second parallel; and, during the next day (*October 15*), several howitzers were placed on them, and a fire opened on the town.⁵ These works, important as they had been to the enemy, were not less so to the allies, from the fact that, with them, the entire line of the enemy's works could be enfiladed, and the line of communication between York and Gloucester commanded.⁶

The situation of Lord Cornwallis had now become desperate. He "dared not show a gun to the old batteries" of the allies, and their new ones, then about to open their fire, threatened to render his position untenable in a few hours. "Experience has shown," he then wrote, "that our fresh earthen works do not resist their powerful artillery, so that we shall soon be exposed to an assault in ruined works, in a bad position, and with weakened numbers."⁷ To retard, as much as possible, what now appeared to be inevitable, at an early hour next

morning (*October 16*) the garrison made a sortie; when three hundred and fifty men, led by Lieutenant-colonel Abercrombie, attacked two batteries within the second parallel, carried them with inconsiderable loss, and spiked the guns; but the guards and pickets speedily assembled, and drove the assailants back into the town before any other damage was done.¹

About four in the afternoon of the sixteenth the fire of several batteries in the second parallel were opened on the town, while the entire line was rapidly approaching completion.² At this time the situation of the enemy was peculiarly distressing—his defences being in ruins, his guns dismounted, and his ammunition nearly exhausted, while an irresistible force was rapidly concentrating its powers to overwhelm and destroy him. At this time Lord Cornwallis entertained the bold and novel design of abandoning his sick and baggage, and, by crossing the river to Gloucester, and overpowering the force under General de Choisy, which was then guarding that position, to fly for his life, through Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the Jerseys, to New York. As no time could be lost, the attempt was made during the same night, but a violent storm coming on while the first detachment was still on the river, preventing the landing of part of it, the movement was abandoned; and those troops who had crossed

¹ Jour. of Operations, &c.—² This officer was a cousin of Baron de Kalb, who was killed at Camden; and Mr. Kapp (*Life of Steuben*, p. 459) relates an interesting anecdote of his connection with this assault.—³ Jour. of Operations, &c.

⁴ Thacher's Mil. Jour., i. 276.—⁵ Jour. of Operations, &c.; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, Oct. 20; Stedman, ii. p. 410.—⁶ Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 16.

⁷ Letter to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 15.

¹ Journal of Operations, &c.; Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 20; Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 16; Thacher's Military Journal, pp. 276, 277.—² Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 545; Stedman, ii. p. 411.

the river returned to York during the next day.¹

On the morning of the next day (*October 17*) the several new batteries, which supported the second parallel, opened their fire,² when Lord Cornwallis considered it no longer incumbent on him to attempt to hold his position, at the cost of his troops; and, at ten o'clock, he beat a parley and asked a cessation of hostilities, that commissioners might meet to settle the terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester.³

A correspondence ensued between the commanders-in-chief;⁴ and, on the eighteenth, the Viscount de Noailles and Lieutenant-colonel John Laurens met Colonel Dundas and Major Ross, to arrange the terms of surrender.⁵ Without being able to agree on all points, the commissioners separated; when General Washington sent a copy of the rough articles, which had been prepared, to Lord Cornwallis, with a note expressing his expectation that they would be signed by eleven o'clock on the nineteenth, and that the garrison would be ready to march out of the town within three hours afterwards.⁶ Finding all attempts to obtain more

advantageous terms unavailing, Lord Cornwallis yielded to the necessities of the case, and surrendered, with his entire force, military and naval, to the arms of the allies.¹

The *army*, with all its artillery, stores, military-chest, &c., was surrendered to General Washington; the *navy*, with its appointments, to the Admiral de Grasse.

The terms were precisely similar to those which the enemy had granted to the garrison of Charleston, in the preceding year; and General Lincoln, the commander of that garrison, on whom the illiberality of the enemy then fell, was designated as the officer to whom the surrender should be made.²

"At about twelve o'clock," says an eye-witness,³ "the combined army was arranged and drawn up in two lines, extending more than a mile in length. The Americans were drawn up in a line on the right side of the road, and the French occupied the left. At the head of the former the great American commander, mounted on his noble courser, took his station, attended by his aids. At the head of the latter was posted the excellent Count Rochambeau and his suite. The French troops, in complete uniform, displayed a martial and noble appearance, their band of music, of which the timbrel formed a part, is a delightful novelty, and produced, while marching to the ground, a most enchanting effect. The Americans, though not all in uniform, nor their dress so neat,

¹ Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, Oct. 20; Stedman, ii. pp. 411-413.—² Journal of Operations, &c.

³ Campaign of Naval Army; Lord Cornwallis to Sir H. Clinton, Oct. 20; Same to Gen. Washington, Oct. 17, 1781.

⁴ Gen. Washington to Lord Cornwallis, Oct. 1781; Earl Cornwallis to Gen. Washington, Oct. 17 (*second note*); Gen. Washington to Lord Cornwallis, Oct. 18; Lord Cornwallis to Gen. Washington, Oct. 18.

⁵ Journal of Operations, &c.; Gen. Washington to Congress, Oct. 19; Sparks' Washington, p. 369.

⁶ Marshall's Washington, iv. pp. 551, 552.

¹ Articles of Capitulation, Oct. 10, 1781.—² Marshall's Washington, iv. p. 554; Thatcher's Military Journal, pp. 278, 279.—³ Thatcher's Military Journal, pp. 279, 280.

yet exhibited an erect, soldierly air, and every countenance beamed with satisfaction and joy. The concourse of spectators from the country was prodigious, in point of numbers probably equal to the military, but universal silence and order prevailed. It was about two o'clock when the captive army advanced through the line formed for their reception. Every eye was prepared to gaze on Lord Cornwallis, the object of peculiar interest and solicitude; but he disappointed our anxious expectations; pretending indisposition, he made General O'Hara his substitute as the leader of his army. This officer was followed by the conquered troops in a slow and solemn step, with shoulered arms, colors cased, and drums beating a British march. Having arrived at the head of the line, General O'Hara, elegantly mounted, advanced to His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, taking off his hat, and apologizing for the non-appearance of Earl Cornwallis. With his usual dignity and politeness, His Excellency pointed to Major-general Lincoln for directions, by whom the British army was conducted into a spacious field, where it was intended they should ground their arms. The royal troops, while marching through the line formed by the allied army, exhibited a decent and neat appearance, as respects arms and clothing, for their commander opened his stores, and directed every soldier to be furnished with a new suit complete, prior to the capitulation. But in their

line of march we remarked a disorderly and unsoldierly conduct, their step was irregular and their ranks frequently broken. But it was in the field, when they came to the last act of the drama, that the spirit and pride of the British soldier was put to the severest test; here their mortification could not be concealed. Some of the platoon officers appeared to be exceedingly chagrined when giving the word, '*ground arms;*' and I am a witness that they performed this duty in a very unofficerlike manner, and that many of the soldiers manifested a *sullen temper*, throwing their arms on the pile with violence, as if determined to render them useless. This irregularity, however, was checked by the authority of General Lincoln. After having grounded their arms and divested themselves of their accoutrements, the captive troops were conducted back to Yorktown, and guarded by our troops till they could be removed to the place of their destination. The British troops that were stationed at Gloucester surrendered at the same time, and in the same manner, to the command of the French General de Choisy. This must be a very interesting and gratifying transaction to General Lincoln, who, having himself been obliged to surrender an army to a haughty foe the last year, has now assigned him the pleasing duty of giving laws to a conquered army in return, and of reflecting that the terms which were imposed on him are adopted as a basis of the surrender in the present instance."

