BEING

ROTHER

Being

A STUDY IN METAPHYSICS

BY

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PREFACE

The treatise on **Being** herein submitted is an attempt to simplify a subject very important to the student of philosophy. In making the attempt, the author has pursued the method adopted by him in his treatise on **Certitude.**

INTRODUCTION

The solidity of a building depends mainly on the stability of its foundation. When this is poorly laid, the building is unsafe; when this becomes undermined, the edifice is sure to topple to the ground and bury its inmates under its ruins. Now, what the foundation is to a building, that metaphysics is to philosophy. Its notions and principles form the groundwork of all knowledge. One single error in matters metaphysical is often enough to bring about the total downfall of all true science and leave doubt and falsehood in its place. And not only does the fate of the natural sciences hinge upon correct metaphysical tenets: supernatural religion itself is dependent upon them; for faith must be reasonable; and how can it be so when first principles are perverted and denied?

We need but cast a glance at the History of Philosophy to find ample proof for our contention. All the false philosophy of modern times, which has wrought such frightful havoc in the realm of truth, starts with erroneous views upon metaphysical questions. Thus, to give just a few instances, Hegel bases his mon-

strous doctrine of philosophy on a wrong conception of "indeterminate being" (*ens ut sic*). Spinoza builds his wild speculations on an arbitrary definition of "substance." Kant endeavors to show that the existence of God cannot be certainly known "by the things that are made," for the reason that with him both the "concept of cause" and the "principle of causality" are purely subjective, and hence not applicable to things in themselves. Locke, by making personality consist in "actual self-consciousness," renders two of the most fundamental mysteries of our faith self-contradictory, namely, the Trinity of persons in the Godhead, and the unity of person in Christ. Descartes, as far as lay in him, dealt the deathblow to metaphysics by his teaching on the origin of "possible being": and this same Descartes is the father of the modern philosophical movement from Spinoza to Hegel.

From this we can see how important it is, to lay the foundation of philosophy broad and deep by expounding and safeguarding metaphysical notions and principles, however subtle and abstruse they may be.

Considerations such as these have encouraged us to undertake a systematic development of the concept of "BEING," the most metaphysical of all metaphysical concepts: with what success, the following pages will show.

BEING

CHAPTER FIRST

The Term Being

Summary: The province of metaphysics — The notion of being — Being and "ens" compared — Being employed as a participle and as a participial adjective — "Ens" as a noun and as a participle — Chimerical being — Wholly indefinite being described — Synonyms of being — The opposite of being or "nothing."

1. The Province of Metaphysics. The science of metaphysics opens with the consideration of the idea of being. For metaphysics investigates those notions which possess the most far-reaching universality. Some of these notions are literally common to all things: as, being, unity, truth, goodness; whilst the others occur in pairs of opposites or correlatives, which divide all things between themselves in such wise that either the one or the other of the two associated notions is predicable of any object whatsoever: as, cause and effect, substance and accident,

potency and existence. Hence these latter concepts might be called *disjunctively* common to all things. St. Thomas says that the subject-matter of metaphysics is "ens et ea quae ipsum consequuntur," that is, "being and those things which are consequent upon being."

Metaphysics, then, examines the broadest, and therefore the most fundamental, of notions. The reign of these notions is felt throughout the vast realm of existence and possibility. He who lays sacrilegious hands on any one of them by calling its objective validity into question, thereby brings the edifice of knowledge crashing about his head; nay more, such a one would reduce all being to absolute nothingness, did its existence depend on his denial. Father Balmes expresses this fundamental necessity in his own striking and graceful way: "Ontology," he says, "circulates like life-giving fluid through all the other sciences" (Fund. Phil. v. 2, n. 288). Hence it is that metaphysics has been called the queen of sciences. These considerations prove the folly of those who belittle and discountenance the study of metaphysics. They tell us, metaphysics is intangible, obscure, and prosaic. It is not intangible, but it is abstruse; and how could it be otherwise considering that it deals with the most extensive and most universal of notions. It is not obscure, but profound; for it descends to the lowest depths of reality and thought, to the last

causes, which lie buried away down as the foundations and basis of all things. Metaphysics, finally, is not prosaic; but it is sublime. True, it does not lay claim to that attractiveness and fascination which truths, clothed with all the witchery of fancy, possess: for the concrete only can present itself to man with all that fulness of perfection which appeals to the sense of the beautiful: but metaphysics is vast, it is comprehensive, it eludes whatever the fancy in its wildest flights can conjure up; and these are some of the characteristics of the sublime.

2. **The notion of being.** The foregoing considerations indicate that being is the most metaphysical of all metaphysical notions; for it is a term which may be applied to whatever has reality; and this is the reason, too, why the science of metaphysics begins with the analysis of being.

3. **Being and ens compared.** But here we are forced into an awkward situation. We are concerned here with the meaning of the English word "being," and not with the Greek term ὄν, or the Latin "ens." Now, we are apt to ascribe to being all that the old philosophers say of ὄν and of "ens." Are we justified in doing so? Is being the exact equivalent of the Latin "ens," which is the literal rendering of the Greek ὄν?

But perhaps some one might ask, why refer

to the meaning of the Latin "ens" at all? We are not discussing this subject in Latin, but in English.

There are several reasons why we should take particular notice of the Latin term "ens" in this connection. For, in the first place, the subject of being has been, and still is sifted most thoroughly in Latin works, which expound the teaching of the schoolmen; and hence a comparison of the Latin "ens" and the English "being," cannot but be very useful to all familiar with the original Latin sources. Moreover, very much of the philosophic thought stored up in English treatises has been garnered from the Scholastics. Lastly, the word "ens" has been incorporated into the English language, as any of our larger dictionaries will attest. Thus, one of them, the Century Dictionary, gives the following quotation under "ens":

> "To thee, Creator uncreate,
> O ens entium, divinely great."[1]

[1] It sometimes happens that scholarly students who are fond of the language of Virgil, Horace, and Cicero are shocked at meeting such a solecism or Latin monstrosity as the present participle of the verb "esse," and feel inclined perhaps to look with contempt upon the Schoolmen for using this and similar incorrect and uncouth expressions. We should not judge the scholastic philosophers too harshly for this apparent assault upon the purity of the Latin. For it must be admitted that this tongue is not rich in convenient philosophic terms and phrases, and that it lacks suitable expressions for some of the most ordinary and fundamental ideas of speculative thought. Thus, such words

Let us now return to the question just mooted, Are the Latin word "ens" and the English term "being" synonymous?

To settle this point, let us first determine the meaning of "being," and then compare it with the various acceptations of "ens."

4. Being employed as a participle and as a participial adjective. Being, as here understood, although it has the ending of a participle, is, in reality, a verbal noun with a twofold mean-

as "essentia," "existentia," "possibilitas," "individuatio," "personalitas," "causalitas," "certitudo," "motivum," and many others will be looked for in vain in classical writers. The Romans were a war-like nation, a practical people: they did not care much for subtle theorizing. This would explain the comparative barrenness of their language in terms and phrases for conveying abstract philosophic notions. The Greeks, on the contrary, were the very antipodes of the Romans in their relation to philosophy; for, their tongue teems with a wonderful wealth of clear-cut, metaphysical words and expressions, and justly glories in a surpassing suppleness and pliability for communicating the nicest shades of meaning. What then were the Scholastic philosophers to do? The Latin was the established medium of thought of those earnest and deep thinkers. It was not feasible to substitute the Greek tongue in place of the Latin; they did not think it wise to transplant Greek idioms unchanged into another language. Hence they felt themselves compelled to coin certain words and phrases, as we ourselves are doing constantly. As regards the frequent occurrence of the present participle of "esse," "ens," which may seem to some a barbarism for which no apology can be offered, something can be said in defence and palliation of Scholastic usage. For, as Andrew's Latin Dictionary tells us, "the part. pres. ens is used by Cæsar according to Prisc. p. 1140 P. and by Sergius Flavius according to Quint. 8. 3. 33."

ing, namely that of a participle and that of a participial adjective. For the sake of greater clearness, let us first state the difference between a participle and a participial adjective in general, and then apply it to our case.

The participial adjective denotes capacity, fitness, ability, readiness for the performance of an action; whilst the participle as such expresses the actualization or exercise of that capacity, fitness, ability and readiness.

Thus, when I say, "the physician is *observing*" or "the gladiator is *daring*," I mean that the former possesses the power of observation to a marked degree, and the latter is ready or prepared to face danger. But when I declare that the physician is *observing the symptoms* of his patient or the gladiator *daring the lion*, I want to denote the actualization of that power or readiness, in a word, the actual performance of an action.

Now let us transfer this to being. Mind, we do not say that being is a participle or a participial adjective; but that it may have the force of either. For it sometimes denotes merely reality, capacity for existence, that which can exist, regardless of the fact of its actual existence or non-existence. In this case, being has the force of a participial adjective; for example, when I say, God is infinite being. It is used in this way especially where it performs

the office of objective case to the verb "to have," as in the following propositions, "A blade of grass has being," "A dew-drop has being."

But being very frequently signifies the actualization of the capacity for existence. It is plain that in this instance, it has the force of the participle "existing"; for that which actualizes the capacity for existence, is, of course, existence itself. A case in point would be the sentence, "The Guardian Angels are loving, devoted beings," i. e. loving, devoted, *existing* realities.

5. **Ens as a noun and as a participle.** The Latin word "ens" is likewise used in two ways, namely as a noun and as a participle. When employed as a participle, it is equivalent in meaning to "existing," and hence corresponds to the English being in one of the acceptations just given. As a noun, ens has the same signification as the English participial adjective; for in Latin, participles are often used as nouns to express capacity for something, as when I say, "Omne vivens est substantia."

Let us now note in what being and ens differ. In the first place, being is in common use in our everyday language, whereas ens is a purely philosophical term of middle age Latin.

As regards the meaning of the two, it would seem that in English, being, in its *ordinary acceptation,* denotes the same as that which exists.

This also is the prevailing signification of the word "ens" in Latin. Thus, St. Thomas tells us that the word "ens" is chiefly used to designate the existent, whilst the term "res" is reserved for expressing essence in its most abstract form or the mere capability for existence.

However, as hinted before, "ens" may also be used as a noun, and "being" in the sense of a participial adjective, provided it appears from the context or in some other way that such use is intended.

"Being" is also frequently taken as the present participle of the auxiliary verb "to be," as in the sentence, "The enterprise is being carried out"; and very often, it is employed in place of the copula "is" in participial constructions; e. g. "This being so . . ." Of course, "ens" is never used in this manner.

The above comparison shows that, excepting the last two acceptations of "being," "ens" and "being" are substantially equivalents.

Let us now analyze a little more accurately the nature of being as having the force of a participial adjective. For it is with being in this sense only, that we are at present concerned.

6. **Chimerical being.** But before entering upon our analysis of being thus taken, we must first somewhat restrict its meaning. For being can exist in a twofold state, namely, in the real and in the logical state. At present, our busi-

ness is with "real being," that is being which can exist apart from the mind, and not with "logical being" or being whose existence is confined to the region of mere thought. Being of this latter sort is called "ens rationis," a mere creature or figment of the mind, which is never to be found outside of cognition. Thus, should I conceive a triangular square as something, or attribute being to a number of animals sitting in council and making speeches, or to rocks and stocks listening in rapture to Orpheus' lute — it is plain that in all these cases the "being" signified can have existence nowhere except in the mind: being of this sort is a mere mental product or figment, and might not unfittingly be called "chimerical" being. For, according to Webster, "chimerical" in one of its meanings denotes the same as "having or capable of having no existence except in thought."

7. **Wholly indefinite being described.** Our concern here, then, is not with this kind of being, but with real being, and that in its most general acceptation, that is, as shorn of all determinations and specifications whatsoever. Hence, we abstract even from the circumstance, as to whether it is actual or merely possible. Being as here taken, is the most indeterminate concept conceivable; it is a concept in which abstraction has been pushed to its ultimate limit, a concept stript of whatever discriminates or

differentiates one thing from another; it is the vanishing point of all distinction and diversity; it is being conceived in its greatest vagueness. It might not improperly be styled in English "wholly indefinite being"; and this is what the Schoolmen call "ens ut sic," "being as such."

8. **Synonyms of being.** There are a number of synonyms of the term being, as thing, something, reality, entity, object. To determine their very nice shades of difference, belongs to the grammarian and lexicographer rather than to the philosopher. We would only call attention to the term "object," which regards being as presented to the mind. For "object" from the Latin "objicere," literally signifies that which is thrown or lies before (viz. the mind). Webster defines "object" as "that which is set or may be regarded as set before the mind, so as to be apprehended or known." The other synonyms of being view being rather as it is in itself.

9. **The opposite of being or "nothing."** Thus far we have spoken of the meaning of being and of some of its synonyms, all positive notions. But the explanation of a positive concept calls for the elucidation of its opposite. For opposites are, after a manner, correlated, and on this account involve, suggest and shed light upon, each other. Now the opposite of "being" is its negation, namely "non-being" or

" nothing," of which " beinglessness " and " nothingness " form the abstract names.

Nothing or non-being admits of a twofold meaning, according to the sense in which we take " thing " or " being " which it negatives. If these stand for that which actually exists, then " nothing " merely denotes the non-existent, and includes whatever is not, yet can be: thus understood " nothing " is not an empty concept, as might perhaps seem at first sight, but the plenitude of all possible reality. " Nothing " taken in this sense is technically known as " positive " nothing. It has this meaning in the following verse found in the second book of Machabees: " I beseech thee, my son, look upon heaven and earth and all that is in them, and consider that God made them out of nothing and mankind also."

But " nothing " has also another signification. It sometimes denotes the negation of " thing " or " being " in its broadest acceptation as that which can be; in this case, it conveys the same meaning as the impossible, or that which neither exists nor can exist, and is, in philosophical terminology, styled " absolute nothing." To this region of absolute " beinglessness " must be relegated all absurdities, contradictions and inconceivabilities; as a square circle, a thinking block of wood, a tree suffering pain, a finite God, and the like. They are all included under the fig-

ments of the mind (*entia rationis*), mentioned before. Beinglessness of this sort is entirely barren; the very conception of a state of absolute nothingness ever obtaining, is itself an absurdity. For had such ever been the case, nothing would or could exist.

CHAPTER SECOND

Unity and Commonness of Being

Summary: Inquiry outlined — Comprehension and extension of ideas — Thesis: Concept of being one in itself and common to all things — Preliminary remarks to thesis — Two exceptions taken — Proofs of thesis — Answer to exceptions.

10. Inquiry outlined. After having thus explained the meaning of "being" and its opposite "nothing," let us now enter a little more deeply into this matter by determining some of the properties of being.

In examining the concept of being, we are at once struck with its absolute universality. For the term being can be applied to everything. The question now forces itself upon the inquirer, Is being as thus referable to all things one and the same concept throughout, or is it manifold in its signification?

11. Comprehension and extension of ideas. But before going any further in our exposition of being, we must first briefly recall from Dialectics a few notions which we shall have frequent occasion of using and which, unless clearly

grasped, would seriously hamper us in our investigations, namely the notions "comprehension" and "extension" in their logical meaning.

By the *comprehension* of a notion (or concept) we understand that which the notion comprises, namely the sum total of the attributes which go to make up its meaning. Thus the comprehension of "eagle," for instance, is, corporeal, living, irrational, feathered, rapacious biped, having strong talons and beak, remarkable for strength, size, graceful figure, keenness of vision, extraordinary flight, etc. Another name for the comprehension of a notion is "content." In fact, this term seems preferable, since its prevailing meaning suggests more readily than comprehension, the sum total of the attributes constituting a given notion. For comprehension, according to its primary signification, denotes the act of grasping an object with the mind, whereas the radical meaning of content is all that which a thing contains. It also appears from the above explanation that the content of a notion is really nothing else than its *meaning* or *definition;* for what is the meaning or definition of a conception but the totality of notes constituting it?

Extension, the other term to be explained, stands in very close relationship to content. It has a twofold meaning. In its primary signification it denotes the capacity which an idea possesses, of representing a greater or smaller

number of kinds, species, or individuals; or, to express it somewhat differently, it is the applicability of an idea to a more or less wide range of objects.

Thus understood, extension is a property of ideas. It is, as it were, the measure of an idea, its scope, breadth or sphere. Hence the terms "scope," "breadth," "sphere," when predicated of ideas, are used synonymously with extension.

The word extension is chosen in the above logical signification, because for an idea to apply to a subject, is, after a manner, to "extend" to it.

To illustrate what we have just said by an example: the idea "tree" has a larger extension than the idea "oak," because the predicability of the former is greater than that of the latter; in fact, "oak-tree" is contained within the scope of "tree."

But it is not unusual to employ the word "extension" for the objects themselves which can be ranked under a given concept. Thus the entire aggregate of trees viewed either as groups or as individuals makes up the extension of "tree."

The objects classed under a certain idea are called the *subjects* of that idea, because the idea in question is predicable of these objects as its subjects. They are also sometimes named the subordinate parts or simply the subordinates

of the idea comprising them. Thus, when I say, "The oak and the elm are trees," I regard "oak" and "elm" as subjects, subordinate to the concept "tree."

Hitherto we have viewed comprehension and extension, each in itself. Considering them as related to one another, we discover this peculiarity about them, that the two vary in an inverse ratio, that is to say, if the comprehension of an idea increases, its extension diminishes, and vice versa. For example, take the notion "man," and add to it the note "white"; it is plain at once that by thus making the sum total of predicates larger, I narrow down the sphere of the applicability of the concept "man." For "white man" embraces fewer individuals than "man" alone.

This inverse ratio between comprehension and extension, however, does not obtain, except when the new attribute (or mark) joined is such as belongs only to some of the individuals to which it is annexed: in other words when the mark in question is *restrictive.*

For if it is not restrictive, but merely *explicative,* that is, involved in the concept to which it is united, although not distinctly expressed by it, then the above law regarding the inverse ratio of content and extension does not hold. Thus take the concept "rational being" and modify it by the accession of "endowed

with the power of speech,"—"capable of perceiving the incongruous and giving expression to this perception by laughter": we do not thereby lessen the number of individuals, of which the notion "rational being" alone is affirmable.

12. **Being one in itself and common to all things.** After this interruption, let us again take up the thread of our discussion where we began to inquire whether being as predicable of any thing whatever, is one and the same concept wherever applied, or whether it is manifold in its signification. It will serve the purpose of clearness to formulate in a thesis what we have to say on this subject.

THESIS 1

The concept being is one in itself and common to all things.

13. **Preliminary remarks.** When we affirm that the concept of being is one in itself, we want to say that it does not exhibit in its content any of the determinations differentiating the objects of which it is predicated, but abstracts from all of them. We state this in refutation of certain philosophers who consider being as a sort of mosaic or agglomeration of all the objects to which it can be applied. According to them, when I conceive being, I really represent to

myself God, creatures, substance and accident, at least in a hazy and confused way.

The unity attributed to being here is, of course, *logical* unity, of which we shall say a little more presently.

In the second part of the thesis, we assert that the concept of being is "transcendental." A transcendental concept is one which is affirmable of *all* things whatsoever, and hence, as it were, transcends or passes beyond, all other notions of a circumscribed scope of applicability. It is, then, opposed to a "universal" concept, which can, indeed, be attributed to *many* things, but not to *all*.

Note also that we speak here principally of the objective concept, although what is true of it, can, with certain restrictions, be likewise applied to the subjective. The subjective concept, as we know from Dialectics, is the *act* of the mind representing an object, whilst the objective, is this *object* as represented by the mind.

14. **Two exceptions taken to the unity and commonness of being.** The statement embodied in our first thesis may perhaps seem to some self-evident, and its further elucidation be considered a mere loss of time. But looking more closely into the matter, the case is not so simple, and the road before us not so smooth, as would appear at first sight. For if the concept "being" is *common* to *all* things, then it must in

some way include *all things;* consequently it must receive, and, as it were, absorb into itself all the real *differences* by which things are distinguished one from another: but if so, how can it remain one? Hence, it would almost seem that *oneness* and *commonness* in respect to all things are exclusive of each other. Again, are there not certain realities, such as the Uncreated and the created, substance and its accidental modifications, which have no points of resemblance at all, and hence cannot enter into one common concept?

But let us first put our thesis on a firm basis and then see how we can dispose of the above seeming paradox and puzzle.

15. **First proof of the unity and commonness of being.** We prove our above assertion thus: In order that the mind may form a concept which is at once *one* and *common* to *all* things, there must, in the first place, be some sort of resemblance amongst all things, that renders it possible for the intellect to gather them all into one common notion; and secondly, the intellect must be able to unravel and separate the common element from the myriad forms through which things differ from one another. Now it cannot be denied that all realities do bear some sort of likeness to each other in one particular at least: they are all something, they are all opposed to nothing. The Lord Almighty and his lowliest

handiwork are something: the one towering to infinite hights, it is true, and the other just rising above the abyss of nothingness: yet both have this in common that they are real, that they are not nothing. The human soul is a something, and so are its thoughts and aspirations which come and go whilst itself endures. However much the permanent soul and the fleeting thought and affection may differ, they are similar in this, that they are set over against the void of nothingness.

There is then an element in which all things agree. But for the mind to conceive all things under one aspect, it is not enough that they should be alike in something; the intellect must, moreover, be able to disentangle the common feature from the multiform differences which diversify it: and this it can do. For it possesses the power of abstraction in its highest perfection. By the aid of this power, the intellectual faculty can lop off, one after another, all the differentiating marks between things, until it arrives at a concept, simple, all-embracing, in which all entities agree. And this is the concept of totally indeterminate being, of being in general, of "ens ut sic," in the Schoolmen's phrase. Take, for example, the concept man: drop, one by one, all his distinguishing characteristics, such as rational, sensitive, living, corporeal, substantial, and you will come to the no-

tion being, beyond which you cannot go. The concept of being then is one in itself and common to all things.

16. Second proof of the unity and commonness of being. In the argument just given, we deduced our conclusion from a consideration of the things of which being is predicated. We can arrive at the same result by analyzing the concept of being itself.

If we gaze attentively at our stock of ideas, we shall discover amongst them one which differs from all the rest in this, that it is entirely indeterminate, stripped of all specifications and particularizations whatever; it is neither God nor creature, substance, nor accident: it expresses mere opposition to nothing; it represents not-nothing, something, being in general. That we possess such an idea, depicting just that and nothing more, is a fact of consciousness, which no sincere observer looking into himself, will deny. Now, this concept thus limited in its content to a minimum, is for that very reason broadest in its applicability to determinate realities; for content and breadth of an idea, are in inverse ratio (No. 12). There cannot be anything of which it is not predicable. For whatever has reality, is by this very fact placed in opposition to nothing. Whence we infer that one and the same concept "being" is common to all things.

From the preceding proofs, it follows by way

of corollary, that being is a simple concept, not in the sense that, like spirit, it is without physical parts, but in this sense that it expresses and comprises but one note or attribute, irresolvable into any other notes or attributes. For were it not so, it could not be the "common" predicate of "all" things, since nothing can be affirmed of its own parts.

17. **Answer to the two exceptions taken to the unity and commonness of being.** We must now reply to the two difficulties set down at the beginning of the thesis. We stated there that if the concept of being is of altogether common predicability, then it must likewise include the differences discriminating one thing from another, since they, too, are something; but if so, being apparently ceases to be one; hence it would seem impossible for being to be one in itself and yet common to all things.

In answer to this, we readily grant that being must comprise the differences of things; not, however, just as "differences," but as "being," that is, in so far as even these differences are alike. Thus take the two marks distinguishing God and creatures, viz. "self-existent" and "deriving existence from another." The concept being comprises both of them as "being," but not just as "determining" attributes. Hence we see that being can embrace *all* the differences, and yet remain *one* in itself.

The other objection to our thesis, namely that there are certain realities which seemingly have nothing in common, has been already disposed of in our proofs. For we pointed out there expressly that this is a mistake, since the Infinite and the finite, substance and accident, agree at least in this that they are all something, that they stand opposed to mere nothing.

CHAPTER THIRD

Unity Of Being Not Real

Summary: Question stated — Concept of unity — Divisions of unity — Real unity — Individual unity — Essential unity — Logical unity — Manner of obtaining concepts possessing logical unity — Prescision subjective and objective — Distinction real and logical — Logical distinction purely mental and not purely mental — Foundation of distinction not purely mental — Foundation either perfect or imperfect — Foundation of objective prescision — Purely mental distinction in its relation to prescision — Being not really distinct from its modes — Introductory remarks to proofs — Meaning of term "mode" — Modes of being four in number — Proofs of thesis — Some objections answered.

18. **Question stated.** We have then shown the concept of being to be one in itself; it still remains for us to prove that the kind of unity attributed to it, is logical unity, and not real.

19. **Concept of unity.** But in order to have a clearer understanding and a firmer grasp of the question of the unity of being, a question

which shall come up for consideration again and again under various forms, we must briefly develop the concept of unity, as well as give some of its main divisions.

We call a thing one when it is not divided within itself, that is, when its constituent elements are not separated from one another. Introduce division into a thing, and it ceases to be one and becomes many. Your watch is one object, as long as its parts, case, face, hands, wheels, spring, etc., are united; take them apart, and you have no more one, but a number of objects. Hence in general a thing is one when it is undivided in itself; and consequently, unity and indivision are synonymous terms.

Sometimes the words "and divided from all else," are joined to the definition of unity in general, so that "the one" is said to be that which is undivided in itself and divided from all else. If this is done, we no longer regard the one exclusively as it is in itself, but we view it relatively, that is, as opposed to *others,* together with which it does, or, at least, may exist. This quality or state of "being other," or "otherness," as it is sometimes called, is not, however, of the essence, but merely a necessary property of unity or oneness.

20. **Divisions of unity — Real unity.** Let us now pass on to the main divisions of unity. Unity is either real or logical. Real unity is the

unity which is found in things independently of the mind. It is either individual or essential (formal).

21. **Individual unity.** Individual unity consists in this that an individual is incapable of self-multiplication as an individual, that is to say, of becoming two or more individuals which are all the same original individual. To express this idea in technical language, individual unity is the indivisibility of an individual into other individuals identical with itself. Thus the fact that Julius Cæsar could not turn himself into two or more Julius Cæsars, each of whom was the same original Julius Cæsar, constitutes his individual unity.

That every individual is one in this sense, is too evident to need proof. It follows from the very concept of an individual; for, an individual is that which exists distinct from everything else; it is "this" particular, determinate being, and not "that" or any other.

22. **Essential unity.** *Essential unity* is that property of an essence, on account of which it is impossible for it to be any other essence except the one it is. In strict philosophical phraseology, it is the indivisibility of an essence into other essences identical with itself. It is also called "formal" unity, because with the Schoolmen essence and form are synonymous. To

illustrate our definition by an example — it is impossible for the nature (or essence) of a stag, as long as it remains the nature of a stag, to be that of a wolf or serpent or butterfly.

23. **Logical unity.** *Logical* unity, which we opposed to real, is the unity proper to a concept expressive of a nature common to many things and multipliable in them. Thus "man" as a general concept, has logical unity. For it is *one* as existing in the ideal or logical order through abstraction; and it is capable of being multiplied or becoming many in the individuals of which it can be affirmed.

These few, brief remarks on the kinds of unity will suffice here. A fuller account of them is given in the treatise on the "Attributes of Being."

24. **Manner of obtaining concepts possessing logical unity.** But there is still another point, closely connected with logical unity, which must be touched on here, before we can give an intelligent exposition of many of the subtler questions about being. It regards the manner of obtaining concepts possessing logical unity.

25. **Prescision in metaphysics.** Scholastic Philosophers tell us that concepts possessing logical unity are obtained by what they call "objective prescision," a rather strange sounding and at first sight meaningless expression. Let us

first explain what is meant by the phrase and then see how we can best clothe the thought underlying it in words.

If we inspect our store of ideas with care, we will discover that amongst them there are a good many which, though different in content or meaning, yet relate to attributes that are altogether identical in the object itself. Thus take the two concepts, "substance" and "corporeal": it is plain that as verified in bodies, they are identical, since substance itself is corporeal. Yet the meanings of the two are quite different. For "substance" denotes independence of a subject of inhesion and "corporeal" is the same as having parts.

26. **Subjective Prescision.** The mind then has the power to separate or break up what is one and the same in the physical order, into two or more distinct concepts, or, if you will, it is able to prescind or abstract one of two or more attributes which are physically identical. To express the same under still another form: the mind can represent one of several attributes which are in reality identical, and disregard or turn away from the rest. Now this process of considering apart from each other attributes identified in the object we call "subjective prescision."

This so-called subjective prescision is really nothing else than a species of abstraction; for

abstraction — a broader term than prescision — embraces the power of the intellect to view apart as well things merely joined together, as attributes which are strictly identical. Thus if I fix my attention upon a man's eye without noting the other members of his body, the mental process by which this is effected, is called abstraction, whereas if I consider his eye merely as a living substance and neglect its sensibility, the process is named prescision.

27. **Objective Prescision.** But the word prescision is not only applied to the subjective process of prescinding identical properties; it also designates the condition or resulting state of an attribute existing separated from others with which it is identified: and this is what the Schoolmen mean by "objective prescision." The qualification "objective" is added to "prescision," because the "object" of thought is subjected to a process of division in the ideal order. Thus when the concavity of a circle presents itself to your mind apart from its convexness, you have an instance of what is meant by "objective prescision."

Let it be noted here that the terms abstraction and prescision in this last sense are very uncommon: the phrase "objective prescision," is likewise extremely rare, in fact, it would seem, it is never used except perhaps in translations from the Latin; for this reason it will be pref-

erable, where at all feasible, to give these expressions another turn by employing some circumlocution.

But the question now arises, do attributes physically identical really exist separate in thought? Yes, they do; of this there can be no doubt; it is an incontestable fact of consciousness. It only remains for us to show how this can come about. How is it possible for one attribute, even in the ideal order, to shut out another with which it is, in reality, identical, and present itself as altogether freed from its own self, so to speak? It is plain that this cannot take place, unless these physically identical qualities are first rendered distinct in the ideal order; for separation presupposes distinction. Hence the question, how can two (or more) physically identical attributes exist apart in thought, resolves itself into this other, how can the mind render distinct things which are in themselves indistinct? Berkeley, it would seem, thought that there was no answer to this; for he says: "I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist separated." This, however, is a mistake.

28. **Distinction.** But to settle this question satisfactorily, we must first briefly define what is meant by "distinction" in general, and then enumerate its various divisions, noting at the

same time such of their properties, as bear on the matter at issue.

"Distinction" is opposed to identity, and hence denotes an absence or want of identity; or, to give a definition of it in the concrete, we might say, that whenever one entity is not the other, we have distinction of some sort.

29. Distinction real and conceptual. Distinction is either "real" or "conceptual" according as the lack of identity belongs to the "things in themselves" independently of the mind, or else is only in the "concepts," which the intellect forms regarding the "same" thing. Thus one of two apples is not the same as the other, without any reference to the intellect; but "Demosthenes" and "the greatest orator of ancient Greece" are really identical; and the distinction exists only in the two concepts which I have of the same man.

30. Division of conceptual distinction. Conceptual, sometimes named logical, distinction may be divided into two further classes, of primary importance in matters philosophical, known in Scholastic phraseology as the "distinctio rationis ratiocinantis" and the "distinctio rationis ratiocinatae," expressions which are sometimes met with in their Latin form in English treatises.

31. Conceptual distinction purely mental. The "distinctio rationis ratiocinantis" (literally, the distinction of the thinking or reasoning

mind), is called in English "purely" conceptual or "purely" mental distinction, as being the result altogether of the action of the reasoning power without any grounds for the distinction except such as are extrinsic to the object. We simply repeat the same idea or make one idea do duty for two, with some slight change in the mode of expression.

Thus, the foundation for my distinguishing between the two ideas "Napoleon" and "Bonaparte," is the fact that the French Emperor bears two names; and this circumstance is, of course, external to the person signified. The same is to be said in regard to the distinction between the object defined (e. g. man) and its definition (rational animal), and, in general, between two or more concepts having the same content, but each emphasizing a different note in that content; as when I conceive the same right angled triangle by two ideas, the one making the right angle stand out clearly, and the other throwing the hypotenuse into strong relief, without, however, altogether shutting out the remaining constituents of the figure in question. For, in these cases, the basis for the distinction between the two (or more) concepts, is not anything in the object itself, but, it is to be looked for in something extrinsic to it, namely the greater or less clearness and distinctness with which the attributes composing the contents

of the ideas present themselves to the mind.

32. **Conceptual distinction not purely mental.** We now come to the distinction which is called "distinctio rationis ratiocinatae" in Scholastic terminology, and, in English, conceptual distinction not purely mental.

It differs from the preceding in this, that here the foundation for forming several concepts of one and the same reality, is not "outside," but "in" the object itself. Hence it is, that philosophers often style it conceptual distinction "founded on reality" (i. e. the object).

33. **Foundation of conceptual distinction not purely mental.** But what is the foundation in the thing itself which gives rise to this distinction? In other words, what is the suitableness on the part of the object which renders it possible for the intellect to distinguish attributes that are physically indistinct? This is the problem that awaits our solution.

To clear up this point, we must first direct attention to the fact that every object is possessed of many perfections which are physically identical. The same object is, as it were, equivalent to many realities which exist in it in perfect identity, yet may be found separate and differently combined in other objects. Thus take a human individual: it is made up of the perfections, "bodily substance," "life," "sensation" and "reason," all identified. Yet bodily sub-

stance is also found in stones, vegetative life in plants, and sensation in brute animals.

Now this equivalence of one and the same thing to many perfections is the (main) foundation or ground which renders identical attributes distinguishable and enables the mind to apprehend them by means of divers concepts.

34. Perfect and imperfect foundation of conceptual distinction not purely mental. This foundation, however, is not always of the same character; for it may be either "perfect" or "imperfect." It is perfect when the perfections to which one and the same thing is equivalent, are of such a nature that any one can be conceived adequately or fully without the companion perfections with which it is identified; and it is imperfect, if such is not the case. A second way of testing the character of the foundation is, to see whether either of, say, two identical perfections can exist in a different object without the other. If it can, the foundation for the conceptual distinction is perfect; if it cannot, then, as before, it is imperfect. Thus, human nature offers a perfect foundation for the distinction between animality and rationality, since animality is perfectly realizable in brute animals without the rationality accompanying it in man; and animality can be fully conceived without conceiving rationality. For the definition of animality, namely, "the state of being

sentient," is altogether different from that of rationality, which is "the character of being rational."

Let us add an instance where the foundation for the distinction between two concepts is imperfect. Take the two attributes of God, Justice and Mercy; they are, indeed, conceivable one without the other, yet not perfectly. For if we analyze God's Mercy, we will find that, being divine, it is infinite, and therefore includes all other possible perfections, one of which is, of course, Justice. It is also plain that, unlike e. g. animality, which exists outside of man in brute beasts, none of the Divine attributes can ever be found in any other being except God. It is this kind of distinction, which obtains between being and its determinations.

35. **Foundation of objective prescision.** Let us now return to "objective prescision" or the separation of physically identical attributes. Its explanation is now clear, since what holds true of conceptual distinction not purely mental, applies likewise to the separation of physically identical attributes by the mind: both the one and the other have the same foundation; for if two qualities identical in themselves, can be rendered distinct in conception, it is plain that one of them can exist apart in thought from the other. Hence the foundation for the separation of physically identical attributes (or objective

prescision) is likewise the equivalence of one and the same object to two or more perfections.

The separation of physically identical attributes in the ideal order taking place, as it does, *in virtue* of something in the object, is also sometimes called *virtual* prescision by the Schoolmen; just as the distinction which paves the way to it, is styled *virtual* distinction.

Note also, that, according as the aforenamed foundation is perfect or imperfect, the separation existing between the identical attributes of an object in conception, is likewise accounted perfect or imperfect, just as distinction on the same score is divided into perfect and imperfect.

36. Purely mental distinction in its relation to prescision. The *purely mental distinction* (*rationis ratiocinantis*) likewise involves some sort of prescision, which, however, implies no separation of identical attributes, but consists in this, that of two concepts having altogether the same contents, the one emphasizes some attribute (or attributes), which the other represents only in a somewhat dim and less marked manner. Hence, the process of prescinding, in this last case, means merely this, that one notion represents less clearly and distinctly certain attributes which another brings out prominently. Thus "domestic animal of the feline kind, fond of mice, characterized by a plaintive cry, called mewing, and sometimes amusing itself by pur-

ring," expresses the same as "cat," the only difference between the two being, that "cat" conveys only obscurely the marks and peculiarities, on which the other more explicit concept lays stress.

Prescision thus taken is a purely subjective method of procedure with no foundation in the object.

37. **Being not really distinct from its modes.** These remarks having been premised, we shall now gradually unfold our teaching in regard to the kind of unity possessed by being.

Let us start our investigation of this subject with the following thesis.

THESIS 2

It is self-contradictory to suppose that there exists an extra-mental distinction of any sort between being and its determinations.

38. **Introductory remarks to proofs.** In this thesis we deny that indeterminate being is possessed of *real* or *physical* unity or, in other words, that it is *really* and *physically* distinct from its modes or determinations. We say this to refute the Scotists (or followers of Dun Scotus) who hold that there exists an extra-mental distinction between being and any of its

modes, v. g. "existing in itself." This distinction they choose to style "distinctio formalis ex natura rei." They use the term "formalis" to point out the distinction between what they call "formalities" or metaphysical grades (No. 57), as rationality and animality. The qualifying phrase "ex natura rei" means the same as "in external nature" and may be rendered into English by "extra-mental."

But before taking up the proofs of our thesis and discussing the objections, we shall explain the meaning of the term "mode."

39. **Meaning of term "mode."** Mode, in its widest signification, denotes the same as modification or limitation; it is something which has no independent existence, but clings to another as its determination. Thus, e. g., we say that heat is a mode of motion, figure a mode of an extended body, fluidity and solidity modes of the existence of metals, and the like.

But in the present case we regard mode in a specific sense. We mean by it a concept determining or modifying another, and that in a very particular manner. To understand this, note that a modifying concept is generally of such a nature as to amplify or enlarge the contents of the notion to which it is affixed; it expresses something new, not contained in the concept to which it is added. A qualifying concept of this kind is called a "differentia" and

the qualified notion, a "genus." But it sometimes happens, that the concept joined to another as a determination of its meaning, does not enlarge its contents; it adds nothing new, but merely brings out clearly the various states and conditions in which a thing can be found. Now, whenever one concept qualifies another in this way, it is called a "mode" in contradistinction to a "differentia."

To illustrate: if I say, "The soul is a spiritual substance," the concept "spiritual" adds something new to the notion "substance"; something not included in it before; hence, "spiritual" is a true differentia relatively to "substance." But when I state "God is an absolutely independent being" (*ens a se*), and "creature is a being existing dependently on God" (*ens ab alio*), the additions "absolutely independent" and "existing in dependence on another," do not amplify the content of the concept "being"; they add nothing new to being or distinct from it: they merely make known to us the manner in which God and creatures possess being. The force of this last example will perhaps not be fully appreciated until we have gone a little further in our investigations, when this point will be professedly treated.

40. **Modes of being four in number.** The modes with which we have to do in this treatise are four, namely, "self-existent" (*a se*), "de-

riving existence from another" (*ab alio*), "existing in itself" (*per se*), and "existing in another as in a subject" (*in alio*); for these four qualifications affect being immediately, since being *as being* is either self-existent or derived from another, independent of a subject of inhesion or dependent on such a subject: hence they are determinations of being as being or of being properly so called. Other additions to being (such as spiritual, bodily, living, sensitive, rational) are modifications of more or less *determinate* being, and consequently are determinations of being only in an improper sense. Whenever, then, we speak of determinations of being, the expression is to be understood in its strict meaning, unless the contrary is expressly stated, or the context warrants a different acceptation.

Should any one feel annoyed at the many unproved assertions we have been making, let him bear in mind that, at this stage of our disquisition, we are merely explaining and defining; afterwards we hope to substantiate our now unsupported statements.

41. **There is no extra-mental distinction between being and its modes: First proof.** We are now ready to prove our thesis, namely that there is no extra-mental distinction between being and its modes. The two arguments which we shall give, though applying to all modifica-

tions of being whatsoever, are principally introduced to shed light on the relation of being to its four so-called modes.

We proceed thus: If being is *distinct* from its modes (or *primary* determinations) *outside of thought,* then we rightly infer that, however closely united it may be to them, still, when regarded in itself in the *physical* order, it is altogether clear of all of them; and if clear of *them,* it is likewise clear of all further modifications superadded to them. Consequently, being as it exists independently of the mind, would be wholly indeterminate; we would, therefore, have to admit the presence of a reality which possesses *physical* universality: a thing which is utterably inconceivable.

Suppose there were such a thing as a universal animal outside the mind, how would it look? It would be an exceedingly strange being in very truth! For it would neither be mammal nor bird nor fish nor reptile nor insect nor any other kind of animal. It would neither be a myriapod nor a centipede nor a quadruped nor a biped nor apodal. Its skin would neither be covered with hair nor wool nor feathers nor scales, nor would it be altogether bare. The queer creature would neither walk nor fly nor swim nor crawl, nor would it be fixed to one spot. In a word, it would be destitute of everything except what is common to all animals.

What an odd monster to behold! A veritable chimera indeed!

This delineation of a universal existing in physical nature is intended merely as an appeal to common sense. It will suffice, however, to convince us what a senseless medley of irreconcilable notions a universal leaving the regions of thought to take up its abode in the real order, would be.

If then any one wants to conceive "being" as denuded of all its determinations independently of the intellect, he must be prepared to accept imaginings similar to the above.

42. **There is no extra-mental distinction between being and its modes: Second proof.** We can also regard the refutation of the Scotistical distinction from another point of view, thus: If the aforenamed modes (namely, existing of itself, deriving existence from another, etc.) are *distinct* from being as it exists in the real order, then they are evidently not being. And if they are not being, what are they? Non-being, nothing! But "nothing" cannot be a determining mode. Hence, the Scotistic theory destroys the very concept of determining modes.

43. **Some objections answered.** To put our thesis on a still more solid footing, let us examine a few objections that might be brought against it.

If being and its determining modes, it might

be said, are not distinct in the external object, then it would follow that things are differentiated from one another by the very same reality in which they agree. For, to take a particular instance, God and creatures agree in this, that both possess being, and they differ in this, that the being of God is altogether independent, and that of the creature wholly dependent on him. Now if being is not distinct from its determining modes "independent" and "dependent," then it would be at once the ground why creatures resemble God and differ from him. But how can this be? Is not this a patent contradiction? In fact, our contention, it might be further urged, would make God and creatures identical, since both would be undistinguished from the same reality "being."

The objection, subtle though it may seem, is by no means insolvable. It seems to hinge on an ambiguous use of the term "agree." For when we say that two things agree in something, we often mean that they are identical in a certain property or quality. Thus, if I tell you that the two roses I hold in my hand agree in color, I want to signify that they are identical in color, i. e. that they can be represented by means of one common concept, viz. red color. The identity in this case is, of course, *logical*, not *real*.

It will be readily granted that in the meaning

just given, there is no contradiction in supposing God and creatures to agree and differ by reason of the same reality. For agreement or identity here, has reference to the *logical,* and diversity to the *real* order; and there can be no contradiction unless the same predicate is affirmed and denied of the same thing, and that, too, in the same sense.

But some one might demur at our answer and say, how can there be identity in the logical or ideal order, when there is only diversity in the real?

We need not go far for a reply to this. For in order to have such agreement or identity of divers things in the logical order, it is enough that there should be some foundation for it in reality: and such there is in the present case, namely *resemblance* between the objects conceived as identical.

This leads us naturally to the other signification of the word "agree." Sometimes this term also denotes the same as "resemble"; thus when I regard two friends as agreeing in disposition, my meaning is, that they resemble each other in their natural bent. Hence the statement "God and creatures agree in the very same entity by which they are distinguished," can mean that the same principle is at once the ground of the similarity and dissimilarity, or the resemblance and the want of resemblance between God and

creatures. This resemblance is, of course, only imperfect.

But here a serious difficulty presents itself. For as these two, similarity and dissimilarity, have both reference to the same *real* order, it would seem, as if, in this second sense of the verb "to agree," there were a contradiction after all in asserting that the very same reality, say of creatures, should be at once the reason why it resembles God and differs from him.

There is, however, nothing inconsistent in this statement. For one and the same reality may be equivalent to different perfections of such a character, that on account of one of them it is similar to something else, and on account of another, it is dissimilar to the same. Thus, "white" agrees with "red" in color in general, but differs from "red" in what is peculiar to it, namely, "whiteness," and this for the reason that "white" embraces two perfections, color and whiteness, within itself, which differ, indeed, in concept to some extent, but are not exclusive of one another in reality. In the same manner, God and the creature may resemble each other in being and differ in the modes of being, although being and its modes are but one and the same identical perfection. Hence there is no contradiction in the assertion that "God and creatures are distinguished by the same entity in

which they agree," in either of the two above meanings of the statement.

The explanation given also disposes of the further inference from our teaching that, if the modes differentiating God and creatures are not distinct from being extra-mentally, we would seem to identify God and creatures. Let us not be needlessly alarmed at this bugbear of pantheism: as long as God and creatures are *identical* in being only *in concept,* and merely *resemble* each other in the *real* order, the deduction of our deifying the universe is utterly unwarrantable. If the identity referred to were real, then, indeed, we could not repel the charge of pantheism. But as the matter stands, it is the defenders of an extra-mental distinction between being and its modes, who lay themselves open to that charge. For if, as they claim, "being" exists outside the mind stripped of all its modes, and hence also of individual existence, it is an entity common to all things. Consequently, the same being which is in me, is also in God independently of thought, and this is to make all things God, or else lower God to the level of the creature.

This last captious puzzle is sometimes proposed under a slightly different form, and that even seriously, thus: If being in general is identified with its modes, then these modes can be nothing else than being in general. For a

thing is that with which it is identified. But if so, there can be no variety and diversity among things, an inference altogether false.

There are more flaws than one in this process of reasoning. For, in the first place, if being is identified with its modes, the modes are also identified with it; and hence, I have as much right to say that, on this supposition, nothing exists except the modes, and that being vanishes from them altogether. This much by way of rejoinder.

But to answer directly: it would rather seem that if two realities different in concept are identified, the result should be a third reality, sharing the perfections of both. And so, in fact, it is. Thus if you combine "being" and "self-existent" into one, the outcome is God, who is at once being and self-existent. In a similar manner, by uniting "being" and "deriving existence from another," the compound concept "creature" is formed, of which both "being" and "deriving existence from another" are predicable.

To illustrate by a case not at all parallel, it is true, yet somewhat analogous; if you pour wine and water into a goblet, the contents will not be simply wine, nor simply water, but a mixture of the two.

It further follows that by thus identifying "being" with "self-existent" and with "deriv-

ing existence from another," there result two complete objects, God and creature, which are *similar* in the real order of things and *identical* in the *logical,* just what we have contended for all along.

CHAPTER FOURTH

Inclusion of the Modes in Being

Summary: The problem stated — Thesis: Being includes its modes at least as being, but it expresses them only as being — The metaphysical order — Being in the metaphysical order — A concept may include a perfection without expressing it — Proof of thesis.

44. The problem stated. Being then is not physically distinct from its determining modes; but is it not so at least metaphysically? Our answer is, no. Let us state what we think on this point more explicitly in the following thesis.

THESIS 3

The abstract concept of being, and hence being as it exists in the metaphysical order, *contains* the four primary modes *at least* as being; but it *expresses* them *only* as being, and in no other way.

45. The metaphysical order. Before we prove this proposition we must first explain what

the metaphysical order is. Its nature will be best understood by contrasting it with the physical, to which it is opposed.

The physical order is the state of existence which things have independently of the mind, whereas the metaphysical regards these same things as having undergone certain changes through the action of the intellect. Thus, if we consider a lily as it is out of thought, we view it as it exists in the *physical* order; but the same belongs to the sphere of *metaphysics,* if we contemplate it as having been transformed by the operation of the mind, e. g. as a lily in general, and hence as shorn by a process of mental abstraction of its individuating marks. We must not, however, imagine that the metaphysical order deals with mere chimeras or figments of the mind; no, it has to do with the real just as much as the physical order has. The only difference between the two orders is, that whereas the physical has respect to some one thing together with all that belongs to it, the metaphysical exhibits the same thing as isolated and away from, one or more realities, which form part and parcel with it in external nature.

As regards the term "metaphysical" (*μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*), it was first used by the followers of Aristotle as a name for those writings of their master which came after (*μετά*) his treatise on physics. But since what follows physics, and

is, after a fashion, built upon it, may be said to pass above and beyond the region of the physical, metaphysics came to denote the abstract and universal as distinguished from the concrete and determinate; and this is now its ordinary signification. It has also several other meanings, which it does not concern us to notice in this place.

The metaphysical order is also called the logical (in a restricted sense), ideal, supersensuous or hyperphysical.

46. Being considered in the metaphysical order. Let us now apply the above to the concept of being. Being may, then, be regarded in a twofold state, namely first, as it is in itself out of the mind or in the physical order, and secondly, as it is when subjected to the prescinding action of the intellect or in the metaphysical order. We have done with being under the former aspect. We now come to consider it from the second point of view. We must show, as stated in our thesis, that the concept of being, even in the metaphysical order, includes its determining modes at least as being, but that it represents them only as being.

47. A concept may include a perfection without expressing it. To avoid confusion, note that it is not the same for a concept to include a perfection, and to express or represent the same. It may include something without

representing it, though not vice versa. Thus, the antecedent of a syllogism, indeed, contains the conclusion, yet it does not express it as such; for if it did, no process of ratiocination would be needed for inferring it. To illustrate this point by a rather homely example: a purse may contain money without necessarily indicating it. — Perhaps you reply this is true, but then a purse is not a concept; it would seem that for a *concept* to include something and to express it, are altogether the same.— We answer that this may be so, when there is question of the *subjective* concept (the purely mental representation); but here we speak of the *objective* (the object represented); and it is this which we affirm can contain something without at the same time expressing or presenting it to the mind.

48. **Proof of thesis.** Let it also be remarked that it is our intention here only, to settle whether being contains its modes as being; whether it contains them in any other way, we shall decide in one of the following theses (thesis 5).

Our thesis is a direct corollary of what precedes; we show it thus: The concept of being, as it exists in the metaphysical order, evidently includes all reality: for otherwise it would not be common to all things (thes. 1). Now the modes of being are, of course, real; since, were they not so, they would be nothing (thes. 2). Hence being must *include* them at least as reality

or as being, in the metaphysical order. And it expresses them, too, not indeed as modes — for in that case the concept of being would not be one in itself (thes. 1) — but as being. We cannot free being of its modes by any amount of abstraction: the connection between being and them is of so close and unique a character, that any attempt at complete separation is doomed to failure; in fact, it would involve the very destruction of being, since being is nothing else than its determining modes vaguely and obscurely conceived.

Such is not the case with most other notions and their modifications. Take the concept *animal* which is determined by the addition of *rational.* Animal, in no way, contains rational; for rationality is not animality, whereas any of the modes of being is being. Animality is, indeed, identical with rationality in the physical order. But it does not include it in the metaphysical.

CHAPTER FIFTH

Being Not a Genus

Summary: Transition to a new thesis — Thesis: Being not a genus — Precise force of terms, species, genus, and differentia — Proofs of thesis — Confirmation of thesis by the authority of St. Thomas — Being not any of the five predicables.

49. **Transition to a new thesis.** The preceding considerations have paved the way for our next thesis, viz.:

THESIS 4

The concept of being cannot be regarded as a genus.

50. **Precise force of terms species, genus, and differentia.** Before we show the intimate connection between our present and the preceding thesis, we must briefly explain the precise meaning and force of the term "genus" as well as of the related notions "species" and "differentia"; for they all bear on the solution of the question mooted.

The "species" expresses the whole essence of an object or group of objects; the "genus" represents the attributes common to two or more species; and the "differentia" sets forth the mark by which any one of these species differs from the others. Thus, "vertebrate" is the genus under which mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians etc., fall as species. The essential element distinguishing any one of these classes from the rest, is its differentia.

Now, for a genus to be truly such, it is required that the differentiating marks added to constitute the various classes under it, should be altogether extrinsic to it, that is to say, neither contain it nor be contained in it. If such is not the case, the common attribute is not considered a genus in the proper sense of the word, but a quasi-genus, nor are the distinguishing marks accounted true differentiæ, but quasi-differentiæ.

These two necessary requisites of the genus and the differentia must be carefully borne in mind, as a right understanding of this thesis hinges on them.

51. Being is not a genus: First proof. The first argument to establish our thesis, viz., that being is not a generic concept, runs thus: Genus is understood to be a concept which is not contained in the differentiæ, and hence is not predicable of them; thus "animal" is a true genus in respect to "rational." For

"animal" denotes an organized being endowed with sensation, whilst "rational" signifies that in man from which his faculty of understanding and reasoning proceeds; now it is plain that the former concept is not involved in the latter; and consequently, I am not allowed to say, "to be rational is to possess the faculty of feeling."

But not so with "being"; for it is essentially included in the concept of any entity, and hence also in the limiting modes, so that it may truly and really be predicated of, say, self-existence or creatureship; for this reason, it cannot be regarded as a "genus" in the technical sense of the word. Nor would it be proper to call the modes of being "differentiæ," without any qualification, since it is agreed that a differentia must not include that which it determines. They may be called quasi-differentiæ or differentiæ in a loose sense.

52. Being is not a genus: Second proof. Let us now pass on to our other proof; this considers the differentiæ in reference to the genus, whereas the first viewed the genus relatively to the differentiæ. It proceeds thus: As appears from what we said at the beginning of the thesis, the determinations of a true genus lie altogether outside of it and are therefore in no sense comprised within its contents. This will be best understood by recurring to the example given in the first argument. "Animal"

is a genuine genus, since rationality in no way enters the notion of animality. But with "being," the case is quite different. For there can be no determination whatever outside of being; because outside of being there is only nothingness, and nothing cannot be a determination. Hence the modes of being are enclosed within the content of being, at least as being, and therefore being is not a genus.

It is plain that the argument just given, is a direct application of the previous thesis (thes. 3), to the matter under consideration. The first proof we advanced also stands in intimate relation both to the second argument and to the preceding thesis. For being could not include its modes, if it were not essentially and explicitly predicable of them. We say this to show how closely these last discussions are linked together.

53. Statement that being is not a genus, confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. Let us corroborate our teaching in regard to the non-generic character of being by two passages from St. Thomas. He says (lib. 3. metaph. lect. 8, parag. k.): "Non enim genus ponitur in definitione differentiæ, quia differentia non participat genus"; that is to say: "The genus does not enter the definition of the differentia, because the differentia does not involve the genus." And again he writes (1 p. 3. a. 5.): "Ens non potest esse genus alicujus. Omne

enim genus habet differentias quae sunt extra essentiam generis. Nulla autem differentia potest inveniri, quae non sit ens, quia non ens non potest esse differentia." This passage might be rendered thus: "Being cannot be a genus in regard to anything comprised under it. For every genus has differentiæ which are outside the essence expressed by the genus. Now there can be no differentia which is not being; because non-being cannot be a differentia."

54. **Being not any of the five predicables.** Being then is not a genus, nor is it any of the other four predicables, viz. species, differentia, property, and accident, as can be readily seen from an even superficial analysis of these notions.

That it is not a differentia, has been already explained in the thesis. But let us briefly restate the reason in a slightly different form. The differentia is a notion which distinguishes one thing from another; hence, as all things agree in being, it cannot be a differentia.

"Species" is a compound of genus and differentia; but we have just shown, being is neither the one nor the other. Further, being is a simple concept, and hence it cannot be broken up into two or more. Being, then, has none of the characteristics of a species.

Nor is it a "property" or an "accident." For both of these are something superadded to

reality fully constituted, whereas being lies at the very root of everything, it is the most fundamental of all the constituents of an entity. Moreover, an accident can come and go, and the thing of which it is an accident, remains. But not so with being; take away being, and you have nothing left.

CHAPTER SIXTH

Composition of Being With Its Modes

ARTICLE 1

Composition of Being With Its Modes Not Metaphysical

Summary: Inquiry outlined — Meaning of restricting the applicability of a concept — Metaphysical grades — General notion of composition — Division of composition into metaphysical, physical, and logical — First proof of thesis — Preliminary remarks to second proof — Adequate and inadequate conception of a perfection — Second proof — An inference — An explanatory remark — A query answered — Third proof — Scholium.

55. **Inquiry outlined.** There now arises a serious difficulty from all we have said, which demands an answer. It cannot be denied, on the one hand, that being may be determined or narrowed down to more concrete concepts, as, e. g. to substance and accident. But how is this possible if being has no differences, and if, moreover, it includes all being within itself?

We shall evolve what is to be held on this rather perplexing question in the next three theses. It is found more convenient to begin this discussion by showing that being is not determined in the manner in which concepts are ordinarily rendered definite. Hence the first thesis on this phase of our subject will be of a negative character.

THESIS 5

The concept of being is not restricted in its applicability, by adding to it another concept adequately distinct from it, or, in technical language, by "metaphysical composition."

56. Meaning of restricting the applicability of a concept. Before proceeding to the proof of the thesis, we must explain the meaning of some of the terms used in it; and first of all, let us make clear what we want to convey when we speak of restricting, limiting, contracting, or narrowing down the applicability of a concept.

We are said to restrict the applicability of a concept when we determine its content and reduce its extent or scope of predication by the addition of some distinguishing mark. Thus, I restrict the notion "living being" by attaching "sensitive," and I limit the latter by joining "rational" to it; and, if I choose, I can still

further narrow down the predicability of the compound notion "rational, sensitive, living being" by the qualifying attributes "white," "learned," and the like. Recall what we said on this matter when speaking of the extension of ideas (No. 11). This method of reducing the breadth of a concept constitutes a sort of composition or putting together of two concepts, and hence it has been called by metaphysicians the determination of a concept by "composition."

Now there are several kinds of composition which we must consider a little more fully in order to clear up our notions.

57. Metaphysical grades. But before doing so, we have to explain a point which enters into the proper understanding of "composition" in its present use, and will also frequently occur in our later discussions, namely the meaning of the phrase "metaphysical grades of being." These so-called metaphysical grades of being are nothing else than the different essential attributes, whether generic, specific, or individual, constituting a finite individual. Thus, this man Peter comprises the attributes rational, sensitive, living, corporeal, and substantial, together with the distinctive mark which makes him *this* particular person and has been called by reputable writers "Petreity." These several perfections are called "grades" (gradus, steps), because they are, as it were, the rungs or rounds by the

aid of which the mind ascends from the particular to the universal when analyzing a concept. The example given a few lines back, will serve to illustrate our meaning.

These grades are qualified as "metaphysical," because by means of them what is physically one, becomes metaphysically many, in as much as the mind projects into the object, distinctions which it contrives to create by its own innate power of abstraction, where there are none in external reality. This pluralizing of physically identical attributes, lying as it does, above and beyond the physical, belongs, therefore, to the metaphysical order. Now, these metaphysical grades are mutually exclusive, and on this account, exist in the ideal or metaphysical order as entirely separate entities; in other words, any one of them prescinds altogether from the rest constituting the same individual. That such is the case, follows from the fact that any two of these grades are reciprocally deniable, as when I say, "to be material is not to be substantial": nor can our right to do this be questioned; for the definitions of the various metaphysical grades of being are different; thus in the example just adduced, "substantiality" expresses independence of a subject of inhesion, and "materiality" denotes multiplicity of parts.— These considerations are fully set forth in the treatise on "Unity," to which they properly belong.

58. General notion of composition — Division of composition into metaphysical, physical and logical. Let us now return to the subject of "composition" and show its connection with the determination and restriction of concepts.

Composition, in general, is the union of things which are distinct. It is divided into real, metaphysical and logical. It is real, if the parts put together are really distinct, as e. g. the stem, the leaves, the sepals and the petals of a violet. It is metaphysical, when the parts combined, though physically identical, are conceptually distinct, and that in such a way as to be mutually exclusive of one another; in other words, metaphysical composition is the union of metaphysical grades of being.

The union of both physical and metaphysical parts is composition strictly so called. For, to have genuine composition, it is required that two realities be added which are not mutually inclusive; and this condition is fulfilled in the two kinds of composition, termed physical and metaphysical respectively.

But there is still a third sort of composition, called logical, which, however, falls short of genuine composition and can lay claim to that name only by analogy. In it we also have two concepts which are put together, but these concepts are not distinct in the proper acceptation of the term. For they neither stand for two

things, of which one is not the other independently of the mind, nor for two objective notions completely prescinded from one another, and hence reciprocally exclusive. On the other hand, these notions are not altogether the same; for if they were, we could not have composition of any sort whatsoever. How then do they differ? In this way, that the one of the two concepts expresses distinctly, what the other contains, indeed, yet represents only indefinitely.

Composition of this sort does not consist in making a concept definite by the addition of another altogether extrinsic to it, but in this, that the mind determines and evolves the contents of a notion by expressing or bringing out what is already latent in it, or in other words, by rendering explicit what before was in it merely implicitly. It might perhaps not be inaccurate to say, that what is added in this case, is definiteness and precision.

Let us now clear up the difference between metaphysical and logical composition by two comparisons. We omit physical composition as irrelevant to our present subject matter. Bear in mind, however, that all comparisons are lame and therefore always fall short in some respects. We shall begin with metaphysical composition. — Suppose you want to sketch the head of some one, say of Benjamin Franklin. At first, you draw merely the outlines of his face in broad

touches, then you fill in, adding stroke to stroke until the features are all sharply and accurately traced. This picture of the inventor of the lightning rod is thus obtained, as it were, by constant extraneous additions made to the original draught; and hence this process might be likened to "metaphysical composition" of concepts, where the attribute joined is outside and distinct from the notion to which it is affixed, e. g. rational in respect to animal.

But there is another way of rendering an object definite.— Suppose that on entering a drawing-room you notice a painting at its further end. You see, indeed, that it represents a human being, but whether a man or a woman you cannot yet tell. Being curious to know who it is, you walk up closer. In your new position, you can make out that the painting is that of a man, in fact, you can already form some idea of the general outlines of his features; but all is still vague and indefinite. You advance still further, and now every lineament stands out plainly and distinctly. You find yourself confronted by a person with a countenance expressive of the highest intellectuality and beaming with benevolence. You recognize the face at once; it is that of Benjamin Franklin.

Here we have something akin to what happens in logical composition. As you approach nearer and nearer to the picture, nothing new

is added to it. What you see now was there from the very outset, though at first it was perceived only in an indistinct manner. But with every step forward, what lay, as it were, hidden under the shadowy form, is brought out more and more, till at last the noble figure of the great American statesman reveals itself to you in all its details and minutiæ.— The sketch of which we spoke in the first example, was given definiteness by filling in, so to speak; the picture just alluded to, is rendered determinate by merely bringing into clearer view what was contained in it all along.

59. **The composition of being with its modes is not metaphysical: First argument.** We are now ready to prove our thesis in which we state that being is not narrowed down to its primary divisions by "metaphysical composition," that is, by the addition of a concept adequately prescinded from being and exclusive of it. What we are about to say, will, in fact, seem little else than a repetition of previous conclusions, and rightly so; for the present thesis is only a corollary of principles laid down before. Let us take our first proof from a consideration of the modes of being in their relation to being in general.

We proceed thus: In order to have what is called "metaphysical composition," we require two concepts which are mutually exclusive.

Now, can we exclude being from its modes? No, this is impossible. For being is essentially predicable of all its modes, because "self-existent," "deriving existence from another," etc. are something, and therefore possess being. Hence it follows that being cannot be shut out from its modes.

We can show this also from the absurd consequences implied in the assumption that the mind can take being from its determining modes. Let us make the attempt to do so. What is a mode thus divested of being? Is it something or nothing? It cannot be maintained that it is nothing, since a mode is a determination, and "nothing" does not determine. If, on the other hand, we suppose that the mode is something, then it is being; and hence I am just where I was at the outset. I can repeat the operation, but with the same result always, no matter how often reiterated; and this is tantamount to saying that the separation of being from its modes cannot be effected. One might just as well undertake to fill a barrel without a bottom with water as to part being from its modes.

60. **Preliminary remarks to second proof of thesis: Adequate and inadequate conception of a perfection.** Let us now pass to another argument, based on the character of being as inclusive of its modes. But before beginning the proof, we must first call attention to a double

way of regarding the concept being. For, as hinted at in the wording of the thesis, being can either be conceived *adequately* and *perfectly,* or else *inadequately* and *imperfectly.*— In general the conception of a perfection is said to be adequate when it expresses all that is required, in order that the perfection in question may exist in the real order. Thus, I conceive " man " adequately, when my mind represents all that his essential definition implies, namely, rational, sensitive, and organic life together with bodily substance. For these constituent elements suffice in order that man may exist as man. But were I to conceive " man " merely as a sensitive or corporeal being, I would not apprehend him adequately, since more is required for man as man to exist apart from thought. To know " animal " perfectly, however, I need not think " rationality " or " irrationality." For these lie outside the concept of animal; they are, indeed, required that animal may exist as man or brute, but not precisely as animal. Hence to conceive a perfection fully, it is enough to think just those attributes which go to make up the particular grade of perfection under consideration, however low in the scale of being that may be.

To apply what we have said to the case of being. The mind knows being adequately when it lays hold on all that without which being as being cannot exist in nature. Now it is plain

that in order to conceive being as realizable apart from thought, we cannot set aside these modes, since they belong to the very essence of being as being. For being as found in God is intrinsically different from that of creatures, because God is being, or opposed to nothing in quite a different sense from creatures. Creatures, true, are not a non-entity, yet they may become so; God also is not a non-entity, but it is utterly impossible for him ever to be reduced to nothingness.— The same holds true, "mutatis mutandis," of being as constituting substance and accident.

Now, it is of the concept of being adequately viewed, or taken as to all it essentially implies, that we are speaking in the following proof, whilst in the first thesis, where we discussed the unity of being, we dealt with the inadequate concept of being, which omits or fails to represent something belonging to the very essence of being, viz. its modes. This inadequate concept is also sometimes called the logical, and the adequate, the metaphysical concept of being.

61. **The composition of being with its modes is not metaphysical: Second argument.** We are now ready for the other proof of our thesis. In fact, we have already anticipated it to some extent, as we could not well explain the above notions without doing so. Our argument runs thus:

If the composition of being with its modes were of the metaphysical sort, then being adequately considered would be entirely clear of its modes, and hence would be equally susceptible of any of the various differentiations which may be added to it: in other words, the very same identical being, which, when predicated of God, is joined to "self-existent," could, when affirmed of creatures, be coupled with "deriving existence from another." All this follows from the very definition of metaphysical composition as above given. Consequently, when I say, "God is being," the concept of being as thus realized in God and exhaustively conceived as to all it includes as being, would not involve self-existence; and when I state, "Creatures are being," the idea of being as objectified in creatures and likewise fully considered in regard to all that is in it, would not imply dependence on another. Now, either of these inferences is utterly untenable. For there is nothing in God which is not under every respect unconditioned and self-existent, and there can be nothing in the creature which is not wholly conditioned and dependent on God. For this reason, it is not correct to say that being as predicated of God is so completely denuded of its determining modes as not to *include* them. Whence it follows that when I add "self-existent" to being as attributed to God, or join "dependent" to being as affirmed

of creatures, I really do not affix a *new* note, but I merely evolve and draw out what was in being already.

What we have said of being as predicated of God and creatures, holds true, of course, also of being in reference to substance and accident, since the very being of substance is independent of a subject in which to inhere, whilst the very being of accident is opposed to nothing in absolute dependence on a subject of inhesion.

62. **An inference.** From the above, we can readily see how the assertion that being is determined by metaphysical composition would lead to a pantheistical conception of God and the world, since the being in both would be of entirely the same nature; and to suppose this is a form of pantheism.

Since then the modes cannot be taken from being altogether, neither is it strictly accurate to say that they are added to it. Such an expression is allowable only in a restricted sense. The addition in this case is merely logical, that is, conceived as such by the mind.

63. **An explanatory remark.** Our last argument also assigns a new reason why being is not a genus. We proved in thesis 4, that being has no title to this name, because it contains its own differences as being, and now we have proven that the objective concept of being as applied to its primary divisions moreover *includes*

its distinguishing modes as such, though, of course, it never *expresses* them as such, even obscurely. (The difference between a concept including something and expressing the same, was given No. 47.) In technical language, being involves its modes "virtually" but not "formally" or "explicitly."

64. **A query answered.** But some one might say, cannot all this be said of any generic concept as well, e. g. of animal as predicated of brute and man? Is not the animality as found in man wholly rational, and as inherent in brute entirely irrational? and might we not say that if animality as predicated of man does not contain rationality, there would be something in man which is not wholly and entirely rational? Our answer is, that there is something in man which is not wholly rational, in fact, not rational at all. True, in the physical order, animality and rationality are identified in man; yet these two perfections are of such a nature that each can be fully or adequately conceived without the other; and hence in the metaphysical order, neither includes the other, whereas being in God and self-existent, involve each other even in the metaphysical order.

65. **The composition of being with its modes is not metaphysical: Third argument.** To clear up this abstruse subject a little more, we shall give a third proof, which, however, is

a mere modification of the previous one, based on the relation of the differentia to the genus.

First note, that if being were compounded with its defining modes by metaphysical composition, then, by definition, being and any of its modes would constitute two so-called metaphysical grades (No. 57), and hence stand to each other in the relation of genus and differentia. For when we have two metaphysical grades, of which one determines the other, the determining grade is called differentia, whilst the determined is named genus. Now, it is admitted on all hands that the differentia, to be truly such, must add something distinct to the genus, something in no way included in the generic concept. If being then is a genus, "self-existent" v. g. should be something lying altogether outside its concept.

To find out whether such is the case, let us ascertain what being as a genus in the proper sense of the word would denote. We assert that it would signify simply being, nothing but being, being unrestricted, being without any admixture of non-being. For since being is now supposed to be a truly generic concept, all determinations, restrictions, and limitations would be shut out from it, and therefore it would express only being to the elimination of all non-being, just as animal sets forth that which constitutes an animal, to the exclusion of all non-animality. Now, being of this sort is, of course,

"self-existent" being. This is the philosophical reason why God said to Moses, that his name was Javeh, ὁ ὤν, that is, very being itself, independent and underived. Hence it follows that, if being were a genus, it must include "self-existent" (*a se*), and consequently, this latter cannot be regarded as a differentia, since this always makes some real addition to the genus. From this, then, we infer that "being" and "self-existent" cannot stand to each other in the relation of genus to differentia.

But granting that "self-existent" (*a se*) is not a true differentia of being, may not perhaps "deriving existence from another" (*ab alio*) be considered as such? No, it cannot, and that even less than "self-existent." For since being, if a genus, would mean "self-existent being" (as just proven), "derived being," on the same supposition, would mean "self-existent, derived being," a senseless medley of ideas.

This same process of reasoning can be readily adapted to "being existing by itself" (*ens per se*), and "being existing in another as in a subject of inhesion" (*ens in alio*).

The relation of being to its modes is, therefore, not that of genus to differentia; but being together with any of its four primary determinations constitutes but one complete concept, which can be also represented by two incomplete concepts. Thus substance is *one* complete concept,

a true metaphysical grade of being, a genuine genus; and this one concept can also be conceived by means of two partial concepts, "being" and "existing by itself," the former expressing substance according to its common character, and, as it were, as a concrete subject, and the latter representing the same as to the discriminating element which determines the common subject.

66. **Scholium.** In our last proof we have shown that being is not a genus because it *includes* its modes as *modes* in the manner explained; in the third thesis we pointed out that it has no claim to the name of genus, because it comprises its modes as *being*. These two statements are very closely connected: in fact, as a little reflection will show, the reason why being includes the modes also as modes is, because it contains them as being: for it follows from this, that being is of the very essence of the modes; and hence, just as being is inseparable from the modes, so are they from it.

ARTICLE 2

The Composition of Being with Its Modes Logical

Summary: Subject of inquiry stated — Thesis: Composition of being with its modes logical — Two proofs of thesis — Manner in which modes of being are evolved out of being.

67. Subject of inquiry stated. We now pass to the positive part of this phase of our investigation, in which we shall show, how being, in matter of fact, is determined and narrowed down to its supreme subordinate members. Let us compress our teaching on this point into the following thesis:

THESIS 6

Being is determined and narrowed down to its four supreme divisions, by what is known as "logical composition," that is to say, by a more definite conception of the vaguer reality being.

The meaning of our thesis in other words is this: Being is not restricted in its applicability by adding something extrinsic to it, something from which it fully prescinds and which is fully prescinded from it; but it is thus restricted by bringing out what the concept of being contains indeed, but does not express.

68. Two arguments to show that the composition of being with its modes is logical. We shall proceed at once to our arguments; for they follow immediately and readily from our previous thesis.

Let us begin with an argument from exclu-

sion: Composition, as is universally acknowledged, is either physical, metaphysical or logical. Now as regards being and its modes, it is not physical (thes. 3), nor metaphysical (thes. 4). Hence it must be logical. Thus we have proved our contention with little labor. Let it be noted, however, that such arguments as this, though perfectly convincing, yet are not very luminous, as they show only that an assertion is so, without at the time assigning the reason why it is so.

Let us then add another, more direct demonstration, that will tell us something of the grounds for our thesis. It runs thus:

Composition is logical, when two concepts are put together which, on the one hand, are not exclusive of one another, and, on the other, are not altogether the same. That these two conditions are required is plain; for where mutually exclusive concepts are joined together, the composition is metaphysical: and where there is no distinction at all between the notions brought into conjunction, there is no composition of any sort. For nothing is compounded with itself: thus it would be ridiculous to say, "a stone is a bodily body." That the two requirements are fulfilled in the case of being, admits of no doubt. For the modes of being include being, and being includes them. On the other hand, being in general differs from its modes; for, although it

includes them, yet it does not express them as such: and the modes differ from mere being, for they are being in general rendered definite and precise.— Now we can understand why "the logical composition" of being is said to consist in the fuller expression and evolution of being; for the four primary modes are really nothing else than the being to which they are added, but without its indefiniteness and vagueness: they are, as it were, being lighted up from within and thus rendered determinate and distinct. Being, then, is determined by what is called logical composition.

69. Manner in which the modes of being are evolved out of being. But some one might ask, how is it possible to evolve the above named modes out of being? Suggest the concept of being to some one, and then leave him to himself; do you think that by the closest scrutiny and analysis of that notion, he could develop the four primary modes from it?

To understand this the better, recall what was said before that a concept may include a given perfection in two ways. Sometimes it actually expresses the entity under consideration, and thus contains it explicitly, as, for example, the concept "man" in relation to its essential constituents, bodily substance, life, sensation, and intellect. Now, in this case, mere analysis of the preceding notion suffices without going out-

side of it, to discover any of the notes comprised within the compass of its meaning. Look attentively at the notion "man," and you will perceive in it, substance, body, life, sensation and reason; these, then, are involved explicitly or "formally" in the concept "man," in as far as this latter expresses them, each according to its own peculiar form and character.

But there is still another way in which a concept may comprise a perfection; not, indeed, as before, by expressing it, but as including it virtually or as containing it under its extension. In this case, the implied attribute cannot be drawn out of the containing concept by a merely analytical process; but in order to perceive the involved perfection, I need outside information, gotten independently of the concept which I am contemplating; and thus, and thus only, can I come to a knowledge of the modes as included in being. Inclusion of this sort is called "virtual" in opposition to "formal," because the containing concept possesses the virtue or power, as it were, of expanding and unfolding itself into what it bears within. The case is very similar to what we meet with in the syllogism or reasoning process. For the antecedent may contain the conclusion either "virtually" or "formally." The latter happens whenever we can arrive at a knowledge of the consequent by mere analysis of the antecedent. Thus when I

say, "man is an animal," by merely searching into the notion "animal," I can at once infer that man is a living being or a substance. But it often happens that no amount of analysis of the antecedent will enable you to deduce a certain conclusion. To do so, you require information, not to be gotten from the consideration of the major premise alone. Take the assertion, "All men are mortal"; no matter, how closely you examine this proposition, you will never learn from it that Togo is mortal, unless you first ascertain from other sources that Togo is a man. This knowledge is furnished by the minor of the syllogism.

But perhaps some one wants to know how the modes of being are evolved out of being with the aid of outside information. This is amply explained in "Natural Theology," as regards God and creatures, and in another part of Ontology in respect to substance and accident. It might not be out of place, however, briefly to indicate the lines on which this is done. Thus I can find out the two modes of being —"conditioned" (*ab alio*) and "unconditioned" (*a se*), by noting how all visible things are imperfect, subject to change and hence conditioned, and then rising from their existence to that of a first, absolute cause, God. And I form the concepts "existent in itself" (*per se*) and "existing in a subject of inhesion" (*in alio*), by

observing the objects round about me and noticing that there is something which is permanent (*per se*) and something which is changeable (*in alio*) in them. The permanent (e. g. a lump of wax) I call substance and the changeable (e. g. its divers forms) I name accident.

In order to hold what we have said more firmly, it might be useful to illustrate this abstruse matter by a concrete example. The particular points on which we wish to shed a little additional light by our comparison are these: how it is possible for being to be *one* as to what it represents, and yet *manifold* as to what it contains, and, how the manifold of its content can be evolved by a more distinct apprehension of the vaguer concept "being."

Suppose I take a piece of chalk, reduce it to powder and form it into a tiny heap. Alongside of it, I place three other little piles, one of salt, a second of flour, and a third of sugar. Let us assume further that the four small mounds agree perfectly in appearance as far as the eye is concerned, though, of course, they are very different in substance. Now, in regard to these four masses, I might truly say that, as represented by the eye, they are the same, yet as to what they contain, they are very different. Further, to ascertain the diversity in material, I need data not furnished by sight alone.

I must have recourse to the taste, chemical tests, and the like.

Thus, in a similar manner, "being," as predicated of God, creatures, substance, and accident, presents itself under the same guise to the intellect, yet what it includes in each case is wholly different; and to apprehend this diversity, I must go beyond the concept of mere abstract being for further knowledge.

The reason why we insist so much on the proper understanding of the preceding matter is, that the right explanation of the analogousness of being, one of the most important doctrines in philosophy, hinges, to a very great extent, on the acceptance of the doctrine expressed in the last thesis.

CHAPTER 7

Unity of Being Imperfect

Summary: Subject of inquiry outlined — Thesis: Unity of being imperfect — Proof of thesis — A question answered — Resemblance of creatures to God imperfect — Points of difference between Infinite being and being in general.

70. **Subject of inquiry outlined.** There still remains one more point, which we must clear up before we pass to the analogousness of being; it regards the kind of logical unity possessed by being. The solution of this question will at once supplement and round off what has gone before and help to elucidate what is to follow. Let us cast our views on the matter under discussion into the following thesis:

THESIS 7

The general concept of being, although possessed of true unity, is not one in the fullest sense of the term.

71. **Proof of thesis.** The unity which we claim for being is, of course, logical. Now

logical unity consists in this, that *one* concept represents the common essence of several things. It is *perfect* when the several things agree in the common essence without any difference in that essence; if such is not the case, it is *imperfect*. Thus, "animal" is a notion possessing perfect unity; for man and brute beast resemble each other in animality, and are in no wise distinguished by it. But this cannot be said of being in regard to its four primary divisions. For we have shown that they are at once like and unlike each other in being, since the very being of substance, for example, is other than that of accident. Hence the unity of being cannot be called perfect.

We can show this also from the notion of transcendental unity.

"The one" in its broadest meaning is defined as that which is undivided in itself and divided from all else. Now neither the first nor the second part of this description of the one is fully verified in the concept of being. Not the first; for a notion is undivided in itself when it represents only that in which several things agree and shuts out that by which they are discriminated. Thus, to recur to our typical example, animality is endowed with logical unity in the fullest sense of the word, because it is the common element of man and brute to the exclusion of everything that holds the two apart.

The differences "rational" and "irrational" are entirely extrinsic to animal. But not so with being. It contains its modes within itself as being, and it, moreover, includes them in so far as they are identified with it, not only in the physical, but also in the metaphysical order. Hence, being does not fulfil the first condition required for perfect unity.

Here a difficulty suggests itself. How is it possible for being to include or to be identified with the four modes, considering that they are *exclusive* of one another. To meet this objection, note that being may be regarded in two ways, either as unapplied, or as applied to its respective subjects of predication, viz. God, creatures, substance, and accident. If viewed as unapplied, it contains the modes, not *conjointly*, indeed, but, as it were, indefinitely and *disjunctively*, in so far as being is *either* self-existent *or* dependent, existing in itself *or* in another. But if being is considered as applied to the determinate subjects above named, then it necessarily includes some one particular, definite mode, without, however, representing it. Thus when I say, "God is being," the predicate comprises self-existent, because self-existence is of the very essence of being as referred to God, and so for the rest.

As regards the other part of the definition of unity, which demands that the one be divided

from all else, it is not strictly verified in the case of being either. For being is essentially contained in its modes, since it is impossible to conceive a mode without conceiving it as something, as being.

Hence being cannot be *one* in the best sense of oneness; it is so only in so far as it does not set forth the modes, and it does not set them forth, merely because the mind does not represent them. There is no separation between being and its modes on the part of the object expressed. The separation is purely logical, not metaphysical; in other words, being prescinds from its modes inadequately only.

72. **A question answered.** In connection with the unity of being it might be asked, is it correct to say that being contains the modes in its *comprehension?* — We answer with a distinction. You may say that being includes the modes *as being* in its comprehension, but not *as such* definitely taken. For what forms part of the comprehension of a concept, must be in some way represented by it; now, as we have said over and over again, being represents the modes as being, but not in any other manner.

73. **Resemblance of creatures to God imperfect.** This last thesis also gives a reason why creatures are similar to God only *imperfectly.* For in order that two (or more) things may resemble each other *perfectly,* it is neces-

sary that we should be able to conceive them by means of one concept, which cuts off their differentiating marks fully; that is, by a concept in which the things held to be similar do not at once agree and differ. Now as we have shown repeatedly, being is not a concept of this sort. But more about this in connection with the analogy of being.

74. **Points of difference between infinite being and being in general.** Before we leave this aspect of our subject and proceed to consider the analogousness of being, let us add a remark or two by way of scholia to complete our doctrine.

The concept of being, by reason of its universality and owing to the fact that it is essential to all reality, has been actually mistaken by some for God himself, who is essential to all things. Thus a misunderstanding of the doctrine of being is at the root of Monism, a false philosophical system, which refers all phenomena to one common underlying principle. It is surprising how the ambiguity of words can lead to such vital errors. For it would be hard to ascribe the confounding of concepts so radically different and so faintly resembling one another to anything else than mere quibbling. True, both God and being in general possess an all-embracing universality, but in senses altogether different. God is the *pattern,* the *efficient* and

final cause and the *preserver* of *all* things contingent; being in the abstract is *predicable* of *all* things. God is external to all but himself; being, on the other hand, is intrinsic to all reality. God does not constitute what he made; being is the very essence of that to which it is attributed. Being as such, then, expresses less than any other concept; for its content is but one single note; and for this reason it is predicable of everything. The idea of God, on the contrary, is the most comprehensive of all. It embraces unlimited perfections, and on this account is referable to none but the Infinite God.

Let us add one more remark pointing in the same direction. By a strange freak of language, it has come about that both being in general and God are said to be "simply" being. Being in general is so named by reason of its indefiniteness and vagueness, as expressive of nothing except that in which all things agree. Hence, it is called "simply" being *negatively*, as denying all determination. God, on the other hand, is called "simply" being, because he is limited to no form of being, but possesses all being in an supereminent degree. This appellation then is given him in a *positive* sense, not as abstracting or prescinding from all definite perfections, but as including them all in his own unspeakable way.

CHAPTER EIGHTH

Analogousness of Being

ARTICLE 1

Notion of Analogy

Summary: Problem stated — Univocal terms — Equivocal terms — Analogous terms — Univocal, equivocal, and analogous concepts —Analogues — General division of analogy — Analogy of attribution — Extrinsic and intrinsic analogy of attribution — Analogy of proportion — Extrinsic and intrinsic analogy of proportion — Metaphysical and physical analogy — Metaphysical, physical, and logical univocation.

75. Problem stated. We now come to the last part in our study of being, namely its analogousness. Is being a univocal or analogous concept? This is a much debated question; it has been, and still is, the battleground of many a philosophical discussion. True, the general trend of opinion, at least nowadays, is, it would seem, to consider being as an analogous notion; yet as regards the manner of explaining and defending this abstruse point, philosophers

are far from being unanimous; and this divergence of opinion often proves very confusing and troublesome. It shall be our endeavour, to remove some of the stumbling blocks obstructing the path of the sincere inquirer, both because this subject is of deepest interest in itself and because the solution of this problem one way or another is thought to have very far reaching bearings on many other vital doctrines. Thus Father Liberatore S. J., a man of no mean fame in matters philosophical, writes in his treatise "On Universals": "This point is of no little moment, because the admission, that with respect to God and creatures, Being is univocal, ultimately leads to pantheism."

The satisfactory settlement of the topic under discussion depends almost entirely on the conclusions established in the previous part, as well as on the correct and precise definitions of the notions on which this perplexing question chiefly turns. In fact, it would seem that many of the heated controversies in regard to the analogy of being, are mere wars of words.

Let us then first of all, clearly and sharply determine the meaning of such terms as have been the bone of contention in the past. The concept that claims our chief attention is, of course, that of analogy; but we must, at the same time, define the notions of the terms "univocal" and "equivocal" on account of their

close connection with the former. The exposition of these three notions, expressing as they do certain peculiarities of both ideas and terms, by right, belongs to Dialectics; the requirements of our disquisition, however, render a somewhat exhaustive development of these concepts absolutely indispensable in this place.

76. **Univocal terms.** A *univocal* term is one which signifies an essence common to several objects and predicable of all of them in exactly the same way. Terms of this sort are the same not only in sound, but also in sense. Thus "animal" is a univocal term in reference to men and brute beasts; hence if I say, "An Indian is an animal," "A lion is an animal," "A sparrow is an animal," etc., "animal" invariably "means the same thing," viz. a living, sensitive being, and it is predicable of all its subjects of predication in the same way, namely as essentially dependent on the Creator and independent of a subject of inhesion. So, in like manner, "virtue" as applied to prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, stands, in each case, for the same identical perfection, to wit, moral excellence.

77. **Equivocal terms.** *Equivocal* terms, on the other hand, are those which are affirmed of their various subjects in entirely different meanings. Thus, the noun "mass" as referred to a quantity of matter and to a religious service is

such a term; also the word "light" in the following propositions: "A feather is light," and "God said: Be light made." It will be hardly necessary to call attention to the fact that all puns and plays of words are due to this peculiarity of terms.

That the same word should signify things entirely different, is a mere coincidence. For either as a result of mere chance, or, perhaps of the laws regulating the alterations and permutations of vowels and consonants, it may happen that two words, resembling each other somewhat in their general make-up, give rise to derived forms which are identical in sound. Thus, to take the two instances used before, "mass," a quantity of matter, comes from "massa," (a lump) and "mass," a religious service, from "missa," (dismissal), whilst "light" in the sense of "not heavy" owes its origin to the German "leicht," and "light" meaning "energy making objects visible," is traceable to another word of that language, namely "Licht."

Equivocal terms are frequently called "homonyms," and that very appropriately. For a homonym (from ὁμός, the same, and ὄνυμα, name), is understood to be a word which is one in name, but manifold in meaning; in fact, taking it all in all, "homonymy" would seem to be preferable to "equivocation" in the scientific

meaning in which we take it here, as this latter term generally signifies the use of expressions susceptible of a double meaning with a purpose *to mislead.* For the same reason, the word "equivocalness," which is acknowledged by lexicographers as perfectly legitimate, would perhaps be more suitable in a logical and metaphysical treatise than equivocation.

78. **Analogous terms.** *Analogous terms* hold a middle place between the univocal and equivocal; for they are those which, when affirmed of their various subjects of predication, express notions (or objects) that are partly the same and partly different. Such is the term "gloomy," as referred to a man's looks and the weather. The same name is applied to the two, either because a gloomy countenance bears some sort of resemblance to gloomy weather, or because a gloomy facial expression can often be traced to the gloomy condition of the air. It will be readily seen that the notions expressed by the common term, although somewhat similar and connected, are, at the same time, very dissimilar, that is, they are partly the same and partly different.

79. **Univocal, equivocal, and analogous concepts.** From *terms,* the epithets univocal, homonymous (equivocal), and analogous have been transferred to the (objective) concepts signified.

Hence univocal concepts are those which are

identical in every way, that is, both as to what they signify, and as to the manner in which they are referred to their respective subjects; whilst analogous notions, expressing as they do, things which are partly the same and partly different, are not strictly *identical,* but only *similar.*

There are, properly speaking, no homonymous concepts, homonymy (or equivocalness) being exclusively a property of terms. For, a concept being a *natural,* and not, like a term, a *conventional* sign, cannot possibly express more than one object (or one group of objects). However, if you so choose, you may call homonymous concepts those which are signified by homonymous terms, thus transferring, by a trope, what is characteristic of the sign (the term) to the concept signified. The Scholastics say that concepts are styled homonymous by an "extrinsic denomination," that is, by reason of something extrinsic to them (namely the common homonymous term).

From what we have just said, we can readily infer that univocalness, homonymy, and analogy necessarily imply reference to several subjects of predication, and that the question whether a given term is univocal, homonymous, or analogous, cannot be answered, until at least two objects, to which it can be ascribed, have been mentioned. Thus, if you ask me under which of these three classes of terms the word "bark"

falls, I cannot satisfy you, unless you first name some of the things to which it is attributed. For it can be any of the three according to the divers subjects of predication. It is *univocal,* if applied to the outer covering, say, of a poplar and a sycamore, or to the cry uttered by a mastiff and a terrier at the approach of a stranger; it is *homonymous* (equivocal) when referred to the rind of a tree and the peculiar sound made by an angry dog; it is *analogous* when predicated of a small boat and the exterior envelope of a tree, or of reproachful, scolding language and the short, explosive noise made by one of the canine species.

80. Analogues. Before we pass on to the various divisions of analogy, we must explain the signification of yet another expression which we shall have frequent occasion of using, namely that of "analogues." By "analogues" (or analoga) we mean the subjects of which analogous terms (or concepts) are predicable. For example, when we speak of the countenance and the weather as gloomy, of love and fire as burning, of the eye and the intellect as seeing, of God and creatures as beings, then countenance and weather, love and fire, eye and intellect, God and creatures, are the "analogues" of their respective predicates, gloomy, burning, seeing, and being. Analogue, taken in this restricted sense, is the exact equivalent of the Latin "analoga-

tum," out of which Father Harper S. J. makes "analogate"; however, this word has not as yet found its way into any English dictionary.

These analogues, or objects to which the analogous terms are applied, are distinguished into principal (primary) and secondary; the principal being those to which the common, analogous name is applied in its proper and original meaning; and the secondary, those to which the same term has been merely transferred on account of some connection of theirs with the principal.

81. General division of analogy. We now come to the *various kinds* of analogy on which we must dwell at greater length, as having a special bearing on the subject under consideration.

Analogy, then, in general, as here understood, is a term's capability of being applied to two or more objects with a meaning which is partly the same and partly different.

It is divided into two classes, called analogy of attribution and analogy of proportion, according as the ground for attributing the same name to several things is either a simple relation of one thing to another, or else a resemblance of relations.

82. Analogy of attribution. *Analogy is of attribution* when the essence signified by the analogous term is found in one of the analogues (namely the principal), primarily, first in order,

and in its fulness, whilst in the others (the secondary), it is found only, in as far as they bear some sort of relation to the principal. To illustrate, the words "health" and "healthy" are applied to many objects widely different from each other. Thus we call men healthy, as when we say that Robert is in good health or has been restored to health. We also speak of healthy recreation, of healthy employment, of healthy exercise, of a healthy climate, of a healthy complexion, of a healthy pulse, of healthy sleep, and the like. We all know that "health" is predicated primarily and properly of animals alone; for health is the sound condition of a sensitive organism. It is attributed to other things only because connected in some way or other with a sound, sensitive organism. Thus recreation, employment, exercise, and climate are named healthy as conducive to health — complexion, the pulse, and sleep, as indicative of it.

83. Extrinsic and intrinsic analogy of attribution. Analogy of attribution is again subdivided into extrinsic and intrinsic. It is extrinsic when the essence expressed by the common term is intrinsic *to one only* of the analogues (the principal) and extrinsic to the others (the secondary), to which it is attributed on account of some relation they have to the primary analogue. This happens, e. g. in case of the notion "healthy" just given. "Healthy" is an in-

herent quality of none but animals; other things may be conducive to health or tokens of it; they bear an extrinsic relation to the health of an animal; and thus come to appropriate the name "healthy" to themselves.

It would seem from the preceding that what philosophers call analogy of extrinsic attribution, rhetoricians style metonymy or synecdoche. For these two figures of speech are founded on one or the other of the relations obtaining between cause and effect, sign and thing signified, container and contained, material and thing made of it, and the like.

We now pass to the other subdivision of analogy of attribution, namely the intrinsic. In this, what is signified by the common term (e. g. wise), is intrinsic to *all* the analogues (and not to the principal only); but the manner in which it exists in each of them is essentially different; for in one of them (the principal), it is found independent, unconditioned and in its fulness, whilst in the others (the secondary), it is dependent, conditioned, and in an essentially less perfect state. Thus the property expressed by the term "wise," truly belongs to both God and man, with this vast difference, however, that the wisdom of the creature is limited and dependent on that of the Creator, who possesses it without restriction or in an infinite degree.

It is now easy to assign a reason why the

word "attribution" is used to describe this kind of analogy. For the original meaning of the verb "to attribute" is "to join in addition," "to add by way of increase." Since, then, in our case, a term (e. g. healthy), attributable primarily and properly to objects of a certain definite class (e. g. to animals), has been transferred and, as it were, "joined in addition" to others of a very different character (e. g. to medicine or complexion), hence it is that the analogy in question is said to be of "attribution." But another way of accounting for the choice of the above denomination suggests itself to us. The phrase "analogy of attribution" was probably first used to describe "extrinsic" analogy, since in this, a certain quality (e. g. healthy), truly and properly inherent in one thing, is *merely* ascribed or attributed to others in which it is not thus inherent. Both the above explanations, however, come practically to the same. As regards the combination of words, "analogy of attribution" we wish to remark, that it is not acknowledged by any of our standard dictionaries, although it is used by several distinguished English writers on philosophy. As the relation between the primary and secondary analoga is generally causal, we might perhaps be allowed to substitute "causal or causative analogy" for analogy of attribution. Such modes of speech are at once more suggestive

and intelligible, and hence of a less pedantic character.

84. Analogy of proportion. We now come to the last kind of analogy, namely that of "proportion."

Analogy is so named when a term is attributed to something in a meaning different from its primary or proper one, and that by reason of a certain resemblance of relations. This sort of analogy, then, is based on the resemblance or agreement of relations; and it is for this reason that it is called analogy of proportion; for proportion consists in an equality of ratios, or, in a wider sense, in any similarity of relations. The similarity in the present case, however, is not perfect.

But let us make our definition clearer by an example. We have all heard a brave warrior, e. g. Judas Machabeus, called a lion in battle. "Lion" is here an analogous term of the kind we are just now discussing. In its proper signification it is applied to a well known animal. But why is it also referred to Judas Machabeus, a man? On account of an agreement or resemblance of relations. For a brave warrior bears himself towards his foes in battle in a manner similar to that of a lion in his attack on other brute beasts. "Brave warrior" and "lion," then, stand in certain relations to "foes in battle" and "brute beasts" respec-

tively; and these relations are similar to a certain extent. For the behavior of both when defending themselves or attacking, is characterized by boldness, fierceness, and rage. However, the resemblance of the conduct of a warrior and a lion in their conflicts is by no means perfect. For the wrath of the self-sacrificing defender of his country is calculating; it is guided by reason and proceeds from self-devotion: it is a virtue in him; it is heroism. The ferocious onrush of the maddened beast is blind; it is the result of unreasoning instinct; it is the outcome of mere brutish passion.

Sometimes the comparison of the first members of the relations involved in the analogy is made with one object only; not, however, just as one, but as doing service for two; and hence this case is included in the former. Such would seem to be the case in the following citation from the "Merchant of Venice"; "How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank," that is, just as the sight of one stretched on his couch in deep, healthy sleep, gives rise to a sense of peace and repose in a looker-on, so also does the view of the moonlight peacefully shining on a grassy bank. Here the tranquil sleeper and the moonlight may be both considered as referred to the same third term, namely the same spectator.

The phrase "analogy of proportion" is not

recognized by lexicographers any more than the other, "analogy of attribution." We might perhaps not inappropriately replace it by "analogy based on resemblance of relations." In rhetoric, this kind of analogy is called metaphor. For, according to Webster, "a metaphor is the transference of the relation between one set of objects to another set for the purpose of brief explanation, e. g. the ship plows the sea."

As stated before, the resemblance between the two sets of relations, into which the so-called analogy of proportion can be resolved, is not perfect. For where the relations compared are identical, as, e. g. the two ratios 3:6 and 4:8, the common predicate (in our case ½), is affirmed not analogously, but univocally.

85. Extrinsic and intrinsic analogy of proportion. Like analogy of attribution, the analogy resting on resemblance of relations is either extrinsic or intrinsic, and that for the same reason as in the previous case.

It is *extrinsic* when what is expressed by the analogous term (e. g. lion) is intrinsic to one of the analogues only, namely the principal, the others, the secondary, merely bearing some sort of resemblance to the principal. It is *intrinsic* when the essence signified by the analogous term is found in all the analogues truly and properly, although the manner in which it is referred to each of them is not the same.

As an example of this kind of analogy, we might take the term "accident," as applied to quality and quantity. Both are truly and really accidents, because they both inhere in substance; and hence what is designated by the word "accident" is intrinsic to both quality and quantity; but the manner in which each is related to the same subject (substance), is held to be essentially different. As the relations in which these two accidents stand to substance can be expressed by a sort of geometrical proportion, thus, "just as quality determines substance, so also does quantity, though not just in the same way," we can easily see why this and similar cases are supposed to fall under the head of analogy of proportion.

86. **Metaphysical and physical analogy.** There still remains the subdivision of intrinsic analogy into metaphysical and physical, which claims our attention here, as bearing directly on the proofs of our next thesis.

Intrinsic analogy (whether based on causal relations or on resemblance of relations) is *metaphysical* when an essence, conceived even as stripped of all its differentiating marks, is partly the same and partly different in relation to its various analogues. An instance of this kind of analogy is "being" as applied to its four primary divisions. The qualifying term "metaphysical"

is used because abstract essences belong to the metaphysical order.

Intrinsic analogy is *physical* when the essence signified by the common name taken together with its distinguishing notes, is partly the same and partly different. Thus "living being" as predicated of an elm-tree and a mocking bird is such an essence, if it (living being) is regarded as coupled with non-sensitive and sensitive respectively. In fact, if we include individuality as one of the attributes of a predicate, then all common concepts are *physically* analogous, since individuality in created things can never be the same. In this sense, "man," as predicated of Daniel Webster and Benjamin Franklin is physically analogous; for "man" in the one case is identified with what makes Daniel Webster *this* individual, and in the other, with what constitutes Benjamin Franklin *that* person. This kind of analogy is denominated as "physical," because it regards essences, as they are in themselves in the physical world.

87. **Metaphysical, physical, and logical univocation.** The two classes of analogy just explained stand in a close relationship to a threefold univocalness (or univocation), namely metaphysical, physical, and logical; and as the proper understanding of the analogy of being cannot be rightly appreciated without some knowledge

of this tripartite division, we must briefly consider it in this place.

A *metaphysical* univocal concept is one which expresses the same essence wherever predicated; however, it does so only as prescinded in thought from its differentiating marks, and hence in the metaphysical order. Thus "living organism" is applied in the same way to an oak-tree, to a pheasant concealed within its branches and to the huntsman bringing it down with his gun; but only in as far as it abstracts from whatever is peculiar to its three subjects of predication.

A *physical* univocal concept expresses an essence which, even when taken together with all its differentiating essential or specific marks, is the same wherever applied; and this is the reason why this kind of univocalness is qualified as physical, that is, independent of mental abstraction. However, when we say this, we, of course, except the individuating differences; for these must necessarily be prescinded to have a common concept. Thus, "living organism" as referred to Joseph, Charles, and Albert is a physically univocal concept. For Joseph, Charles, and Albert do not differ in any essential or specific note from one another.

Lastly, a *logical* univocal concept is one possessing imperfect logical unity, that is to say, one which is indeed common to many things, yet which is only inadequately prescinded from

its differentiating modes. Such a concept is "being" as predicated of God, creatures, substance, and accident. It will be seen from this, that logical univocalness and metaphysical analogy (No. 86) coincide.

ARTICLE 2

Intrinsic Metaphysical Analogy of Being

Summary: Discussion indicated — Thesis: Analogy of being intrinsic and metaphysical — Proofs of thesis.

88. Discussion indicated. We are now done with the task, tedious perhaps, but important, of defining the notions requisite for the proper understanding of the subject under consideration. In the following thesis we shall begin to unfold our views in regard to the analogousness of being.

THESIS 8

"Being in general," as predicated of God and creatures, substance and accident, is an analogous notion: the analogy in the case being at once intrinsic and metaphysical.

89. First proof of thesis. As all the unusual terms occurring in the thesis have been

explained in the preceding pages, we can at once set out with our proof. For the sake of simplicity we shall first speak of being as referred to God and creatures, and then point out that what applies to them applies to substance and accident as well.

Let us begin by showing that the analogy of being, if such there be at all, must be *intrinsic*. This is so plain that it hardly needs an explanation. For being is truly inherent in God and creatures; it is identical with them in the strictest sense of the word; were it not so, the contradictory of being, "non-being," would have to be predicated of them. Hence, it only remains to show that "being as such," namely, being prescinded from all its differentiating modes, is partly the same and partly different, when attributed to God and creatures. This follows as a corollary from the fifth thesis, where we stated that it is impossible to cut off the differentiating modes fully or adequately from being; for the very being of God is infinite, all-perfect, underived, independent, unconditioned and self-existent, whilst the very being of the creature is finite, imperfect, derived, dependent, conditioned, and produced. Hence God and creatures at once agree and differ in being; and therefore "being" is analogous in regard to them.— What we have said concerning God and creatures, holds with equal right of substance and accident.

For, on the one hand, being truly inheres in both, and on the other, as predicated of either, it cannot be fully separated from "existing in itself" and "existing in another," the respective modes of substance and accident. But as we have developed these ideas so fully before, we refrain from any further exposition.

The idea conveyed in the previous argument is sometimes presented in another form by saying that "being" is, indeed, common to its four primary divisions, but that the mode, according to which it exists in each of them, is not the same, and that this is the reason why it is partly the same and partly different when predicated of God, creatures, substance, and accident. This way of putting the case is perfectly correct; it must, however, be viewed in the light of the exposition just given. "Mode" must be taken in a very restricted sense for a qualification which affects and enters the very essence of the entity which it modifies in such wise that it cannot be fully prescinded from that entity. For there are other modifications which can be perfectly abstracted from the concepts they limit, and therefore do not render them analogous. Thus, "rational" and "irrational" modify "animal" without, however, altering its nature. Man and brute possess the same animality; in this they are perfectly alike in spite of the added specifications of rationality and its opposite. To ex-

press it technically, the modes of being are intrinsic to being, the differences (or quasi-modes) of animality are extrinsic to animal.

90. **The analogy of being is intrinsic and metaphysical: Second proof.** Let us subjoin another argument to prove the analogousness of the concept "being," founded on a process of elimination. It runs thus:

The abstract concept or term of being, is either homonymous (equivocal), analogous, or univocal; if univocal, the univocation is either metaphysical or logical; and if analogous, the analogy is either extrinsic or intrinsic. These would seem to be all the possible suppositions which can affect the question. Now we can at once drop logical univocation; for, as we showed (No. 87), it coincides with metaphysical analogy. Further, it will be readily granted, being is not a *homonymous* term, that is, a term which is one in name only, and is applied to many things without any agreement in meaning whatsoever, as, e. g. the word "light" in the following two sentences: "Down is light," and "It is beginning to be light." Nor is it a *univocal* concept; because in that case, being, as abstracted from its distinguishing modes, would be altogether the same both as to what it expresses and as to what it implies; in other words, it would be predicated of all the objects ranged under its scope, in the same manner; but this is not so,

as we pointed out in the previous proof. Being, then, must be analogous. But the analogy cannot be extrinsic, since in extrinsic analogy there are always two concepts (recall the various meanings of "healthy"), whereas the term being stands for but one undivided concept. Moreover, in extrinsic analogy, the reality signified by the common term is intrinsic to one only of the analogues, whilst being is intrinsic to all.

Whence it follows that being is an analogous concept, and that its analogy is at once *intrinsic* and *metaphysical* (No. 86); for we have excluded every other rival claimant which can allege any title to describing the character of being in relation to its four primary subjects of predication.

ARTICLE 3

Analogy of Being Analogy of Attribution

Summary: Question proposed — Thesis: Analogy of being analogy of attribution — An introductory remark — Proof — A warning — Being and analogy of proportion — Accident not a univocal but an analogous concept — Explanatory remarks — Being sometimes strictly univocal — A stumbling block removed — "Analogical" as opposed to "univocal" and "proper" — Being rightly called a logical univocal notion — A tangled skein unravelled — No predicate affirmable of God and creatures univocally — Conclusion.

91. Question proposed. The further question now arises, is the analogy of being that of "attribution" or that of "proportion" or both? We shall give our reply to these queries in the next thesis.

THESIS 9

The analogy of being, in reference to God and creatures, substance and accident, is what is technically known as analogy of attribution.

92. An introductory remark. Before entering upon our proof, we want to note that, just as terms and concepts are named analogous, so likewise are the objects (entities, realities, or essences) signified by them. Thus, the two objective qualities of animal organisms, viz. "possessing health" and "indicative of health," both of which are denoted by the adjective "healthy," are analogous entities.

93. Proof of thesis. Let us now take up the thesis, which is really no more than a corollary of the preceding. We have just shown that the analogy of being is intrinsic, because being is truly inherent in all the things of which it is affirmed; and we know further that intrinsic analogy is of "attribution," when the analogous entity as found in one of the analogues (the secondary), is essentially inferior to

the same entity as realized in the other (the primary), the inferiority of the secondary being due to its entire dependence on the principal. Now this is just what happens in regard to being as identified with God and creatures. For the creature cannot have any being whatsoever, unless God exists, because he is the ultimate ground not only of the existence, but also of the possibility of all that can be conceived outside of him. And as a result of this utter dependence of creatable things on God, their "being" is conditioned, limited, subject to change and capable of destruction or annihilation; in a word, it is imperfect in countless ways. The "being" of God, on the contrary, has attributes, the very opposite of the preceding: it is unconditioned, infinite, immutable: it is the plenitude of all perfection.

We can argue in a similar manner in regard to substance and accident. For accidents are, of their very nature, modifications of substance, incapable of existing apart from it (at least naturally), and hence, in entire dependence upon it, whilst substance subsists in itself and needs no subject in which to inhere; for it is its own subject.

The analogy of being then is that which philosophers have styled "analogy of intrinsic attribution."

94. **A warning.** Let us add, by way of

warning, that it would be a great blunder to mistake the analogy of being for that of "extrinsic" attribution, as if creatures were called "being" solely because God has made them, just as the regular beat of the pulse is called "healthy" for this alone, that it is the effect of the sound condition of the body, although in other respects it does not bear the faintest resemblance to what the *proper* concept of health suggests. For were the analogy of being of that sort, the universe would in no way be similar to its Maker, and hence tell us nothing of his nature; God would consequently be and ever remain completely hidden; and well might mankind, like the Athenians in St. Paul's time, erect an altar and dedicate it "to the unknown God."

95. **Being and analogy of proportion.** It might be further asked in this connection whether the concept of being also partakes of the character of the analogy, which goes under the name of "analogy of proportion." Putting aside all mere fanciful conceptions and idle subtleties in this matter, we would say, no. For, in the first place, there can be no question of analogy of *extrinsic* proportion, because in this the essence expressed by the common term is not intrinsic to all the analogues, whilst being is thus intrinsic. Nor can the analogy under consideration be that of *intrinsic* proportion, since this supposes

that the various analogues of which the common term is predicated, whilst independent of each other, yet stand in different relations to some *third* reality, as, for instance, the accidents quality and relation do to substance. Such, however, does not happen in the case of being as affirmed of its four main divisions. For, God and creatures are not related to any common third object; since God, who is altogether independent, is related to nothing, whilst creatures are immediately referred to God.

What we have said just now can be readily adapted to substance and accident, "mutatis mutandis."

96. **Accident not a univocal, but an analogous concept.** Let us next make a few remarks about a question sometimes mooted and very closely connected with our previous discussions, namely whether "accident" is a univocal or an analogous term.

Our answer is, that, like being, it is an analogous term. For the nine categories of accidents (viz. relation, quantity, quality, action, passion, place, time, position, and possession or manner of holding), whilst agreeing in this, that they are all modifications of substance, differ essentially in the manner in which they are referred to it; and for this reason, accident as predicated of the above nine genera is partly the same and partly different, that is, analogous. To prove

this, we would have to show, just as in the case of being, that accident is determined, or restricted in its applicability by "logical composition." This point once demonstrated, we could then infer by way of corollary that it is predicated of the aforenamed nine categories in an analogical sense. The method of procedure is very similar to the one by which we endeavored to establish the analogy of being. On this account, and also because this matter is of lesser importance and passed over in silence by very many writers on metaphysics, we do not intend to enter more fully into it. We shall content ourselves with illustrating our view by a concrete example. Thus, "relation" is an accident, and so is "quality." Both modify substance; but quality (e. g. science) perfects it exclusively within; relation (e. g. similarity), on the other hand, so modifies substance as to lead our thoughts to something beyond, and apart from it. This shows that the manner in which quality and relation determine the same subject is different; consequently both are named "accident" only analogically.

The analogy, in this case, however, is not analogy of attribution, but of proportion. For the various classes of accidents are all coördinated; none takes precedence of the rest; they are subordinated to substance alone. Now since this dependence of accidents on their substance

can be expressed by a sort of mathematical proportion (as exemplified before, No. 85), hence it is that the analogy here is analogy of proportion.

97. **Explanatory remark.** Before bringing our exposition of analogy to a close, let us add a few explanatory remarks, which will help us to gain a more thorough mastery of this subject.

98. **Being sometimes strictly univocal.** In our previous discussions, we spoke chiefly of being as related to God, creatures, substance, and accident. It might be asked what sort of a concept being is, when applied to the genera, species, and individuals contained within the scope of one and the same category. What kind of a concept is being, e. g. when predicated of plants, animals, men, this man Joseph, and the like? Our answer is that then it is a univocal concept. For being, in that case, is opposed to nothingness in the same way; the being predicated of plant, animal, man, Joseph, is of the same sort, namely created substantial being. Since being then is predicated after the same manner of all *finite* substances, it is a true genus, and hence a univocal concept in regard to them. Thus, if I say, "an Indian is a being" and "his horse is a being," "being," in each instance, means altogether the same, namely "something finite, existing in itself."

99. **A stumbling block removed.** There are, it is true, a few stumbling blocks in the

path of the sincere inquirer into the analogousness of being; they are not, however, such as cannot be removed with a little thought, patience, and good will. Thus, it is urged that according to our doctrine, God would not be the highest being, since there is something above and prior to him, namely "indefinite being"; for God is contained under it. In answer to this we reply that "being," thus taken in its greatest generality, is prior to God in the order of *cognition,* in so far as God is not that which *we* know *first;* what first presents itself to our intellects is the creature; the consideration of this enables us to form the concept of being in general and of some other notions, such as cause and effect, and then by a simple process of reasoning to rise to the knowledge of the Creator, the Being of beings. Again, being is prior to God in the *purely logical* order, because God is contained under the extension of the transcendental notion "being." But if we speak of being as it is *independently* of *thought,* then the being first in excellence, which is above all and to which none is prior, is God.

100. **"Analogical" as opposed to both "univocal" and "proper."** To clear up this particular point a little more, let us call attention to a double use of the word "analogical." Sometimes it is opposed to "univocal"— and this is the signification in which we have taken

it all along — and sometimes to "proper." What then is the meaning of an "analogical" concept as contrasted with a "proper"? To understand this, let us give the definition of both.

The proper concept presents an object to the mind by means of the very nature constituting that object, whilst the analogical concept presents an object, not by means of the nature of that object, but by means of the nature of something else, known by a proper concept and resembling the object presented.

To illustrate the definitions just given: Suppose a man born blind and another possessing the power of seeing should both make the statement, "Swans are white," it is clear that the one only who is blessed with eyesight has a proper concept of "white"; for he knows the nature of "whiteness" by conceiving what properly constitutes that quality. But the blind man can have but an improper or analogical concept of "whiteness." He can form an idea of that color, only because the sensation of "whiteness" is somewhat like the other sensations (e. g. those experienced through the senses of hearing and smell), of which he has proper and direct perceptions.

In a similar manner, we derive the concept of Infinite Wisdom from finite wisdom, which we conceive by a proper concept and which bears some faint resemblance to the former.—

This much will suffice for our purpose; a fuller development of the formation of analogical concepts belongs to Natural Theology.

According to this acceptation of the word "analogical," being as predicated of *finite* things is a *proper* concept, and as affirmed of God, an *analogical* one; (for I know God by means of the concept "being" as derived from creatures). — This will help us to appreciate the statement sometimes heard that what the *notion* of being *signifies first,* is created being, but that the *reality* signified by the notion of being is *found first* and foremost in uncreated Being.

101. **Being as related to God, creatures, substance, and accident, a logical univocal notion.** Let us now pass to another point. There are certain philosophers, principally the Scotists, who call being as related to God, creatures, substance, and accident univocal, but want it understood that the univocation in question is merely *logical.*— We fully agree with their view; for logical (not metaphysical) univocation consists in nothing else but this, that the concept of being, inadequately conceived is one in itself; and this kind of unity we claim for being, too. What we deny is, that being is metaphysically univocal, in other words, that being fully conceived remains one. The divergence of opinion is purely verbal, and all disputes concerning this phase of the subject

have been, to a great extent at least, mere logomachies, mere wars of words.

102. **A tangled skein unravelled.** There still remains one more tangled skein to unravel. We asserted more than once, that the being in creatures is of an entirely different order from that in God, *because* the former depends on the latter. But it is hard to see why this reason should hold. For is not, for instance, the being and the existence of the son dependent on the father, and yet neither being nor human nature are on that account different in father and son. Father and son are being and man univocally. Why then should created being be essentially diverse from self-existent being, because, forsooth, the one depends on the other? Here is our reply. We readily admit that "being" and "man" are predicated of father and son in altogether the same meaning; we also grant that the son depends on the father; but we maintain that there is an essential difference between the dependence of the son on the father, and that of the creature on God, which justifies us in asserting the radical diversity of being as found in God and creatures. The son is merely indebted to the father for his existence; once he has been brought into being, the processes of his development go on within him in virtue of his own vital energy independently of his parents. The case as regards God is of quite another

description. For all finite things not only have their existence from the *creative* act of God but are also kept from annihilation by the continual inflow of his Almighty power; they, moreover, owe it to him that they are conceivable, that they are possible, that they are being at all (as is fully explained in the treatise on "Possible Being"). And it is on account of this entire dependence of creatures in their very being on God, that their being is essentially inferior to that of their Creator, whereas the dependence of an effect on a *finite* cause does not necessarily imply an essential difference of the two in their very nature.

103. **No predicate affirmable of God and creatures univocally.** Since then the being of God is essentially different from that of the creature, it follows that no attributes whatsoever can be affirmed of the Infinite and the finite univocally; for all attributes are identical with being and thus share all its characteristics. Hence when I say, "God is wise, good, just, and merciful," and "every perfect man is wise, good, just, and merciful," the predicates are all applied analogically. This is the reason why it is more correct to say, that God is Wisdom rather than that he is wise, in order thus to distinguish his perfections from those of his handiworks.

104. **Conclusion.** We have thus arrived at

the end of our long, toilsome journey through the far-stretching plain of being. The labor expended in traversing it has not been, we hope, misspent; for as being is the most fundamental and universal notion of all, it is clear that any error in regard to it could not but have most disastrous consequences; what St. Thomas says (*S. th.* 1. q. 85. a. 2), applies here, namely, " Parvus error in principio magnus est in fine."

ALPHABETICAL INDEX

(THE NUMBERS REFER TO THE PAGES.)