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- ART. I.—1. *Cours de Littérature Française*. Par M. Villemain, Pair de France, Membre de l'Académie Française. Tableau de la littérature au Moyen Age, en France, en Italie, en Espagne, et en Angleterre. 3me édition. Paris, 1841. 2 tomes, 8vo.
2. *Allgemeine Geschichte der christlichen Religion und Kirche*. Von Dr. August Neander. Fünften Bandes Zweite Abtheilung. Hamburg, 1845.

THIS new volume of Neander gives us occasion to say a little about the school-divinity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and in attempting this, we must premise that it will be impossible, without such an admixture of bad Latin with our English, as cannot fail to be annoying to those squeamish persons, who are troubled at ancient quotations. The truth is, every new science makes its own language, and the schoolmen made a Latinity which would have been to Varro or Cæsar what Scotch dialect is to us. We may, perhaps, be allowed to say a little on this point—the decay of Latinity—before proceeding to our principal topic.

Taking M. Villemain as our guide, then, we observe that the classic Latin was difficult, even for those who spoke it, and this gave rise to many treatises on grammar. When this language spread itself everywhere, with the conquests of

Christianity, these difficulties must have led to great and rapid changes. Augustin, addressing an African and Numidian auditory, says to them, "The Carthaginian proverb is well known, which I will cite in Latin, because you do not all understand Punic: *Nūmmum quaerit pestilentia; duos illi da, et ducat se.*" The sermons and prayers of the Church were in Latin, all over Africa; but it was a Latin much depraved, and the eloquent admirer of Virgil and Tully admits that he often used phrases adapted to the sailors of Hippo. He complains that the hymns were becoming barbarous, and that they persisted in singing, "Super ipsum *floriet* sanctificatio mea." The invasion of the Gauls still further debased the ancient tongue. The words 'war' or 'her' perpetually in their mouths, became a low latin word, *guerra*. Such is the origin of hundreds of words in the Glossary of Ducange. Pope Zachary was under the necessity of declaring valid a number of baptisms, solemnized in the north, with this formula, *In nomine de Patria, et Filia, et Spiritua Sancta*. Still, Latin was the popular tongue of the Italians. When Charlemagne came to Rome, the acclamation of the multitude was, *Vivat Carolus, Augustus, Imperator*. But the confusion produced by the mixture of Gothic endings and forms was prodigious. Bills of sale, and marriage contracts, had such phrases as these: "Cedo tibi de rem paupertatis meae tam pro sponsalia quam pro largitate tuae, hoc est casa cum curte circumaucta, mobile et immobile. . . . Cedo tibi bracele valente solidus tantus, etc." This was the Latin of the seventh and eighth centuries. Declensions gave place to particles and auxiliaries, as in the terrible forms; *Donabo ad conjux; Donatio de omnia bona; mercatum de omnes negociantes; in praesentia de judices;* and other the like passages, which savour of Westminster Hall. Even in Italy, the military words of command were: *Non vos turbatis; ordinem servate; bandum sequite; nemo dimittat bandum, et inimicos seque:* it must have been worse in France.

The law-latin of England has made us familiar with such expressions as *adjournamentum, attornatus, cacepollus*, a catchpoll, *constabularius, covina, daggerius, damisella*, a damsel, *decenna*, a dozen, *yarda*, a yard, *felonia, feoffamentum, warrantum, guerrinus, guttera*, a gutter, *murdrum*,

murder, *hachethum*, a hatchet, *toalia*, a towel, *rogus*, a rogue, *replegiamentum*, *potagium*; *curia pedis pulverizati*, the court of pie-powder, *mustratio*, a mustering, and *pola*, a pole. The reader must not smile, as though we had invented these words, they are all to be found in Ainsworth's vocables. What wonder that the schools of logic, in like manner, should give origin to analogous terms, such as *entitas*, *quidditas*, *aseitas*, *praesentialitas*, *praedicamentalis*, *qualisqualis*, *quietorium*, *remissa*, *repromissor*, *salvificus*, *sanctificator*, *symbolicus*.

It will be found, that the metaphysical and theological Latin of the Middle Ages is made up in a great degree of such words. Many of the schoolmen were eminent scholars, but the revival of letters had not yet come, and in writing on the niceties of dialectic argument, their narrow stock of classical phrases carried them but a little way. The colloquial dialect of the convents was no doubt odious. Even after the days of Petrarch and Pico Mirandola, we have a ludicrous specimen of the church-latinity in that broad satire, the *Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum*. Luther himself is not to be lauded for his grammar. In his familiar letters, he frequently uses *biblia* as a noun of the singular number, with other slip-shod expressions of the same kind. It is not to be wondered then, if, at a time when the famous Ciceronians had not yet risen to be scourged by the satire of Erasmus, the monkish combatants of France and Germany should be found to employ a diction and style far below the classic model. And this will be the less surprising, when we consider, that at a later day so few have attained to the glories of a Melancthon, a Calvin, a Grotius or a Milton. England has not many Latinists, to place by the side of Lowth, Barton, Baker, Jones, and Parr. There are none such among the schoolmen, and yet they were the chief scholars of the age in which they lived, and some of them justly ranked among the prodigies of genius and talent. Having said enough of their diction, let us proceed to what is more substantial. The terms *schoolman* and *scholastic* are daily used by persons who are altogether in the dark about their meaning; and multitudes decri certain modes of theology as *scholastic*, with no other notion of them, than that they are beyond their own comprehension. A statement on this point seems to be demanded.

It has been said by Coleridge, that the philosophy of every age has a tendency to branch into two great divisions, of which the representatives may be sought in Plato and Aristotle. The remark admits of an easy application to the middle ages, and the two schools may in general be designated as the Mystics and the Scholastics. As the philosophy of the early ages was a nursling of Christianity, and would scarcely have existed but for the speculations of ecclesiastics, we are to look for its most striking changes to the fathers. At first, it was a modified Platonism, after the fashion of the Alexandrian Academies; mingled, however, with a strong addition from the Aristotelian dialectics; both being held in union by the doctrinal system of Christianity. About the beginning of the Middle Ages, properly so called, this combination of the academic and peripatetic methods underwent a change. The dialectic and mystic elements tended to separate, and the former presented itself to view, as a more regular and avowed Aristotelianism. In the subsequent progress of this system, historians have distinguished two periods. In the former of these, Plato was not without some authority: in the latter, he was completely dethroned by the Stagirite. For a long time, dialectic philosophy was considered only as ministering to theological inquiry, and this phrase of school-metaphysics may be called Scholastic Theology. But by the natural tendency of every science to purge itself from accidental mixtures, the theological ingredient was precipitated, leaving what is properly known as Scholastic Philosophy. In this condition of things, the physical as well as the logical works of Aristotle were studied. This had already taken place among the Arabian disciples of the philosopher. Among Christians, this period falls somewhat later than the one to which our particular attention is drawn.

Concerning the former of these periods, or that of Scholastic Theology, strictly so called, we introduce only so much as may open the way for our main purpose. It is sufficient to name Peter of Pisa, the teacher of Charlemagne, and Paul Warnefried, chancellor of the last Lombard king; for we know nothing of any contributions made by them to the systems of the age. In Spain, under the Visigoths, an archbishop of Seville, Isidore of Carthage by name, published a work of

an encyclopedic character, in which are found extracts from many books no longer extant. The Venerable Bede mingled theology and logic in his writings, as was the custom of his age. Alcuin of York may be named among the forerunners of the schoolmen. But the catalogue may fairly commence, under the succeeding monarchs of the Carlovingian line, with Johannes Scotus Erigena, of whose adventures and transcendental views, we gave some hints in a former article.*

As we intend nothing more than a few sketches, within a limited period, in regard to which we shall presently take up Neander as our authority, we content ourselves at present with a glance at the great masters. In an age when learning, science and religion spoke no language but the Latin, and in which a professor or a disputant could pass with ease and honour from Salerno, Naples or Bologna, to Ratisbon or Cambridge, there was a noble prize held out to aspiring toil, and he who was crowned at a great university, frequented, as was then common, by thousands, might be said to have a reputation all over the world. This may partly account for the laudatory and endearing appellations bestowed on famous teachers. Thus Alanus ab Insulis was called Doctor universalis; Alexander of Hales, Doctor irrefragabilis; Albertus Magnus; Thomas Aquinas, Doctor angelicus; Henry von Göthüls, Doctor solemnis; Richard de Media Villa, doctor solidus; Aegidius de Colonna, Doctor fundatissimus; Duns Scotus, Doctor subtilis; Raymond Lully, Doctor illuminatus; Francis de Mayrone, Magister acutus abstractionum; William Durand, Doctor resolutissimus; and Walter Burleigh, Doctor planus et perspicuus.

As the large volume of Neander's history, to the consideration of which we are now about to proceed, is chiefly occupied with this very subject, we cannot expect to do more than give a specimen of the copious information which he furnishes. It is a field, in regard to which, we must, for the most part, follow our leader, with implicit deference; as the works to which he refers as sources, are in a number of instances beyond our reach.

The twelfth and thirteenth centuries present some of the

*Princeton Review, 1841, page 551.

most remarkable phenomena in the history of mind and opinion. It was a period in which both science and religion were breaking out from their wintry concealment with a sudden vegetative force. The very waste of penetrative and subtle faculties on endless hair-splittings in the schools, evinced a new and lavish dialectic power, reviving in all the learned world. The study of Boethius had led to the problem of general ideas; and the controversies which were perpetually carried on, about the reality or non-reality, the objective or subjective value of universals, virtually involved the gravest questions respecting the relation of thought to being, and of the general to the particular. It is the warfare, waged, ever and anon, in varied guise, in every generation of men. It employs the Soofie of Persia, and the Hindoo Bramin; it has been carried on at the tent-door of the Arab, in the cloisters of the Spanish Moor, and in the cell of the Rabbin. But its chief arena is within the courts of middle-age monasteries. It was to the shaven pallid monk, what the tournament or the crusade was to the armed knight.

Augustin was too dear to the Romish scholars not to leave his impress on their metaphysics. His blending of Peripatetic and Academic views resulted in a realism, which for this cause prevailed very much in the Church. Universals are the prototypes in the Divine Mind, *universalia ante rem*, afterwards embodied in the phenomenal world, the *universalia in re*. But a new school was founded, as every one knows, by Roscellinus of Compiegne. He held that, as all knowledge must proceed from experience, only the individual can have reality, and all universal ideas are devoid of objective significance. They are only abstractions, helps to the intellect, in grasping the multitude of things, *nomina non res*; hence the name of *Nominalists*, given to his sect. Roger Bacon, long afterwards, expressed the difference thus: *Aliqui ponunt ea (universalia) solum in anima, aliqui extra, aliqui medio modo*. It is amusing to observe the skeptical gravity with which this daring schoolman denies objective reality to the notions of *whole* and *part*. "I remember" says the too famous Abelard, "that our master Roscellinus held the unsound opinion, that no thing really consisted of parts; but as he made species merely nominal, he made parts so likewise."

In the twelfth century, the University of Paris became a sort of Mecca to the wandering sciences. But before this, cathedrals and famous monasteries were centres, distinguished by their respective great masters. Two neighboring cities of France, for example, contained the champions of the two antagonist schools. At Lille was Raimbert the Nominalist; at Tournay was Odo, or Udardus, the Realist. Odo attracted scholars from every part of France, Germany, and the Low Countries. It would be difficult, in few words, to express the height of interest to which philosophical inquiry then attained, more graphically, than by the following words of a contemporary, speaking of Tournay. "If one were to go through the streets, and see the groups of disputants, he would be ready to think that all the citizens had left all other business, to devote themselves to philosophy. And if he came near the school, he would descry Odo, sometimes walking about with his pupils and instructing them after the Peripatetic manner, and sometimes sitting, answering the questions which might be proposed. In the very evening, and until late at night, you might hear them disputing before the Church-doors, or see Odo pointing out with his finger the course of the heavenly bodies. His scholars, two hundred in number, hung upon him with enthusiastic love."

A total revolution took place in the nomenclature of the schools. New-coined Latinity produced as much wonder among scholars, as the new-coined German and English of our modern Transcendentalists. He who could not gain a name by his mother-tongue, might strive after it, like certain doctors of our own day, through a barbarous jargon :

A Babylonish dialect,
Which learned pedants much affect ;
It was a particoloured dress
Of patched and piebald languages ;
'Twas English cut on Greek and Latin,
Like fustian heretofore on saïn.

In the twelfth century, John of Salisbury complains, that the ancient classics were neglected, and a new grammar introduced. "To call an ass, or a man," said he, "by its ordinary name was to offend against philosophy :"
Asinum nominare hominem aut aliquid operum naturae instar criminis erat et a philosopho alienum. And as the shibboleth of our new philosophy

is a perpetual reiteration of "the Reason," so good John laments that in his day a man was scarcely thought to say any thing rational unless he had the word 'Reason' continually in his mouth. *Impossibile credebatur convenienter et ad rationis normam quicquam dicere aut facere, nisi convenientis et rationis mentio expressim esset inserta.*

There were some instances of happy change in those who had been only disputers of this world. Such a one was Odo. For five years he had led the party of the Realists, and studied such ancient works on philosophy as were in Latin; but of the Fathers and the Bible he knew little. On a certain occasion he bought, from one of his scholars, Augustin's work *de libero arbitrio*, and put it into the library, without attending to it. But two months after, when he was lecturing on Boethius *de consolatione philosophiae*, he was called to treat of free-will; and, remembering this treatise, he had it brought to him. So greatly was he attracted, that he began at once to expound the whole book to his disciples. At this we do not marvel; for if there ever was a fascinating master of diction or philosophy, it is Augustin. Let critics talk as they please about his 'dulcibus vitiis,' he invests the dullest subjects with the charms of fervour, imagination and wit. Odo came at length to a place in the third book, which speaks of the wretchedness of one who is sunk in a worldly life. This he was forced to apply to the speculations of himself and his associates. He arose, and went, bitterly weeping, into the Church. Afterwards he became an eminently holy man after the Romish pattern, was a predecessor of Fenelon at Cambray, and left a work on Original Sin.

While Neander ascribes a skeptical tendency to the Nominalism of Roscellinus, he acquits him of any direct leaning towards an undue exaltation of Reason. He never speaks of proving faith by reason, but of defending faith by reason. He deemed his own hypotheses indispensable to the vindication of the Trinity and the Atonement; and for this purpose he employed his doctrine of the whole and the parts, already mentioned. In 1093 his tenet was condemned as tritheistical by the Council of Soissons. When he fled to England, he found an archbishop of Canterbury who was a champion of Realism; he returned to France, and at length withdrew from public notice.

The great Realist of the twelfth century was Anselm, the Augustin of his age. "Love" says Neander, "was the soul as well of his thinking as of his acting." He became archbishop of Canterbury in 1093, and died in 1109. He was equally distinguished for his genius and his piety. It was not, in his case, as our author observes, the reaction of natural reason against divine things, it was not the stimulus of doubt, which prompted his speculations in theology. He did not seek by reasoning to arrive at solid peace and assurance of judgment. His Christian faith was a certainty, elevated above all doubt. The experience of the heart was his strongest assurance of that which was revealed. But he was at the same time convinced, that what was highest in faith and in experience, must also be consistent with the highest reason. Hence he laboured perpetually to harmonize philosophy and revelation. His name is connected with the ontological argument for the being of God. While he was meditating on the divine existence, and earnestly endeavouring to comprise in one summary argument all that was adduced, in regard to God and his perfections, he was so possessed with the thought, that he could neither eat nor sleep. Sometimes he was led to look on this as a visitation of Satan ; but the more he fought against it, the more it overmastered him. On a certain night of vigil, all became suddenly clear. High joy filled his soul, and he immediately wrote down that which afterwards became his *Proslogion*. So nearly akin were speculation and religion, in this great, good man : and the books which he most read (the same may be recorded of Luther and of Calvin) were the Bible and Augustin. Even in opposing Nominalism, he was governed by a religious interest. To him, it was a system which could never lift itself above sense, and which by denying the reality of ideas, makes knowledge impossible. He engrafted on the middle-age theology, the Augustinian maxim, *Fides praeedit intellectum*.

It is one of those striking observations which sparkle every where in the histories of Neander, that in Anselm we behold conjoined those opposing types of theology, which appear severally in Abelard and Bernard, the element of intellect, and the element of devotion. In Bernard, every thing bowed to experience. That was true in theology, which went to the

heart, and made a man better. High contemplation, anticipating the beatific vision, was what he prized, above all ratiocination. “Omnino maximus, qui spreto ipso usu rerum et sensuum, quantum quidem humane fragilitati fas est, non ascensoriis gradibus, sed inopinatis excessibus avolare interdum contemplando ad illa sublimia consuevit.” A sublime and characteristic sentence! All tends, so he maintains, to experience of the Divinity; and this is to be sought, not so much by reasoning, as by humiliation, by prayer, by rapture. His gradation (which we cannot stop to explain) is threefold, *opinio—fides—intellectus*. The difference between faith and intelligence, is not in the degree of certainty, but the degree of clearness; “nor is there any thing which we more long to know, than that which, by faith, we know already; nothing will be wanting to our bliss, when those things shall be as naked, as by faith they are certain.” These are beautiful and ennobling views, and they mark the whole teaching of the monk of Clairvaux.

The other pole of the antithesis is found in Peter Abelard. We need not tell the story of his crimes, his sorrows, and his greatness. Our concern with him is as a dialectician. He early fell into controversy with William de Champeaux, a great Realist of Paris. Here, as well as at Melun and Corbeil, he acquired reputation as a debater. With Anselm, he came into contact at Laon; but the two men had little congeniality. When he set himself up as a teacher at Paris, his schools were frequented by youth from Rome, Germany, Holland, and all parts of Italy and France. He became inflated, as many a philosophical theologian has done, and gave way, as he tells us, to his two reigning sins, pride and voluptuousness. About the year 1119, he entered the cells of St. Denis, but he was unable to remain hidden from an admiring world, and was drawn out once more into theology.

Abelard's *Introductio in Theologiam* revealed the opening conflict between the philosophical and the church-party. He is sharp upon those good ecclesiastics who eschew dialectics, from lack of learning and skill. He satirizes the traditionary and slavish Hooks and Newmans of his day. He indicated different degrees in the progress of faith. The first step was no more than rational conviction. Such faith has no merit

with God; this it derives from the accession of love. He admitted that a few truths were enough for salvation. He ascribed saving faith to the work of the Holy Ghost. He distinguished boldly between the objects of such faith and the subsequent deductions of reason. The latter constitute systematic theology. He illustrates, by comparing Peter with Paul, and St. Martin with St. Austin. Simple unlettered piety is safe, but weak. Neander discerns in such reasonings a departure from the doctrine of his age concerning inspiration. He was in favour of subsidizing all human learning and art in behalf of religion. He distinguished between the *intelligere* of faith and the *cognoscere* of future vision.

Abelard says in his *Dialectic*, that he had not been able to read Plato, because he was ignorant of Greek. Yet he held the ancient philosophers in great admiration, and supposed that in many cases they were assisted by divine grace.

Anselm and Abelard agreed in the maxim, *Fides præcedit intellectum*: but their definitions reveal a serious divergence. Abelard held indeed that religion resides in the heart, but he differed as to the origin of this faith. According to him, faith is the development of intellectual conviction, which it presupposes. Faith grows out of argument. We must know what, and why we believe, before we believe. The system of Abelard sprang from doubt, seeking the aid of argument: that of Anselm from experimental assurance, claiming the concurrence of reason.

The formidable antagonist of Abelard was Walter of Mauretania, a town in Flanders, sometimes called from his canonry, Walter a Sancto Victore. From the students of Abelard, he heard that this master ventured to make the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation comprehensible by reason. Afterwards, from his books, he ascertained that Abelard went perilous lengths in representing the deep things of God as not altogether unfathomable.

In a work entitled *Sic et Non*, (Yes and No,) Abelard presented a *Catena Patrum*, on many topics of theology and morals; the intent of which, as some shrewdly suspected, was to throw the apple of discord among the Churchmen, by setting the discrepancy of the fathers in strong relief. The inference was, that a dialectical process was needed to harmonize them.

Bernard, after being much offended by the rationalism of sundry passages, in Abelard's 'Scito teipsum' and his Commentary on the Romans, sought a private interview. It resulted in nothing. The two men were too far apart even to understand one another. After Abelard had been pronounced a heretic by the Council of Sens, in 1140, Bernard wrote to the pope, in particular reference to his errors. He especially charges on him the absurdity of seeking rational grounds for things above reason. *Quid enim magis contra rationem, quam ratione rationem conari transcendere?* On the other hand, Abelard, in his letters to Heloise, rejects all philosophical honours, which are to be at the expense of his Christianity. *Nolo sic esse philosophus, ut recalcitrem Paulo; nolo sic esse Aristoteles, ut secludar a Christo.*

Time and paper would fail us, if we were to follow our historian in his instructive and entertaining notices of Hugo a Sancto Victore, Pullein, Porretanus, Ruprecht of Deutz, and others. We proceed rather to consider some of the schoolmen of the thirteenth century.

The Aristotelian philosophy had an influence, which we observe even in the twelfth century. The Latin world was acquainted, however, with only a few scattered treatises of this philosopher. But in the next century, his whole works were made known by translations, partly from the Arabic and partly from the original. His metaphysical and ethical works were studied with enthusiasm. The sudden revival of a metaphysical system, which threatened to undermine all the foundations of Christianity, could not but awaken some fear. In 1228, Pope Gregory IX addressed a letter to the University of Paris, putting them on their guard against overmuch philosophizing. He complained, with justice, that those who placed the sentences of the Greeks by the side of revelation, and demonstrated everything by human logic, made the word of revelation superfluous. *Dum fidem conantur plus debito ratione adstruere naturali, nonne illam reddunt quomodo inutilem et inancm?* A story is told of Simon de Tournay, one of the first zealous Aristotelians, which may well match anything related of Fichte, Hegel, or other transcendental atheists of Germany. On a certain day, when Simon had accumulated all manner of objections to the doctrine of the

Trinity, he put off the resolution of these doubts until the next lecture. Crowds assembled in his auditorium; and he answered all arguments, to the amazement of his hearers. Some, who were familiar with him, besought him to dictate to them his remarks, lest so great wisdom should be lost. Upon which Simon burst into laughter, and exclaimed, "O my Jesus, my Jesus! how much have I contributed to the defence and glory of thy doctrine! But truly, if I had taken the other side, I could have adduced stronger things still!" Such is the anecdote, as given by Matthew of Paris.* It reminds us of what Madame de Stael relates of Fichte, that on a certain occasion, he said to his pupils, "In the next lecture, I will proceed to create God." We feel justified in rehearsing these impieties, only in order to guard youthful and reverent minds against any tampering with the proud and boastful philosophy of the Germans; and at the same time to show the identity of reckless speculation in all ages. As the ravings of such teachers have always been viewed by us as a form of insanity, so we believe the speech of Simon de Tournay to have been the same: for (to conclude the story) he had no sooner uttered these words, than he lost his speech and memory, and for two years was in a condition of infantine imbecility.

The growing influence of Aristotelian doctrines was not without modification from the Platonism which came through Augustin, the Pseudo-Dionysian writings, and the latin versions of the Platonists; but Aristotle obtained the pre-eminence, by his peculiar union of dialectic keenness with experimental soundness, by the multiform character of his researches, and above all by the fertility of his logical formulas, which were weapons precisely fitted for the combat of the schools.

Let us look at the method of the Schoolmen. Its peculiarity was this. On every subject which they handled, they threw out a number of questions, which they examined on both sides, giving arguments pro and contra, and adding a brief decision, *conclusio* or *resolutio*, in which reference was had to the proofs on either hand. Never was there a scheme better fitted to make sharp disputants. Almost all the deistical objections of modern times may be found at the negative pole of these

* Ed. London, 1686, p. 173.

batteries. At the same time, it was a method which whetted the mind to special-pleading, and produced a wire-edge sophistry, but did not tend towards a right dissection of the truths. The divines of that day had one eye fixed on the Bible, and the other on Aristotle. Every thing was to be demonstrated, and their lives were spent in doing it.

The greatest schoolmen came out of the orders of begging-monks. Of the Franciscans, were Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura. The latter entered this order, in 1238, at the age of sixteen, and he became at length its general. He united the mystical and the dialectical theology, and was the author of many well-known books of devotion. Of the Dominicans, were Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. These are great names. Albert taught at Hildesheim, Freiburg, Ratisbon, Strasburg and Paris, but chiefly at Cologne. His extraordinary mind embraced the whole structure of human science, as existing in his day; he was rich in germs of thought, and aroused the age by the utterance of oracles which seemed like divination. But he was eclipsed by his pupil.

Thomas Aquinas was born in 1225 or 1227, near Aquino, on the borders of the Ecclesiastical and Neapolitan territories, at Rocca Sicca, a castle belonging to his house. His friends endeavoured to drag him from the order, and even had him imprisoned for two years; but he spent the time in the study of Peter Lombard. While at Cologne under Albert, his silence gained him the nickname of *Bos Mutus*. Once in the schools, Albert the great, cried out after a debate in which the young man had distinguished himself: "We call him Dumb Ox, but he is to be a teacher, whose voice shall pervade the world." In 1253 he was made a doctor, and during the following twenty years composed his voluminous works, including his *Summa Theologiae*, his Commentary on the Sentences, his Defence of Christianity against the Heathen, and a number of Opuscula. Meanwhile he was employed constantly as a teacher, so that there was scarcely any public hall which could contain his hearers. He also preached, and was interrupted by frequent journeys. It is related that he used to keep three and four amanuenses, engaged at the same time, on different subjects. Every day he spent some time upon Rufin's *Collationes Patrum*, a book of experimental piety, saying that he

regarded devotional exercises as the best preparation for theological inquiry. Every kind of business was commenced with prayer for divine guidance. When sudden difficulties arose, he betook himself to prayer. His mind was so engrossed with his high topics, that once at the dinner-table of Louis IX, of France, being in profound meditation, he brought down his hand with great force upon the board, crying out, *Conclusum est contra Manichaeos!* He had just arrived at a clenching argument against the Manichean heresy. The religious king was considerate enough to call in a scribe, to take down an argument so absorbing.

In addition to what is said in the volume under review, we insert a testimonial from other sources, especially as the Reformers, and even the Puritans, were much indebted to the "angelical doctor." "There was a time" says Döderlein, "when I stood in horror of Lombard, and the name and barbarism of Albert the Great, Aquinas, and Bonaventura. But when, at length, I came to examine the residence of this scholastic barbarism, my opinion was greatly changed, so that I much oftener admired their erudition, subtilty, discrimination, copiousness of argument, and perspicuity of method; and I am persuaded they are unjustly denied the title of great and most ingenious men."

Roger Bacon is a familiar name. He had the spirit of a philosopher and a reformer. In his *Opus Majus*, he rebukes the slavish deference of his contemporaries to human authority; a bold utterance for the thirteenth century. In the very temper of Daillé, he alludes to the differences between Augustin and Jerome, and says that if the fathers had lived till our day, they would have known and taught better. His doctrine respecting scripture is strikingly protestant; for it is beautifully said, *Tota sapientia est ibi principaliter contenta et fontaliter*. He allowed that philosophy and canon law might draw out these latent waters. Under such a method, he pictured to himself a period of blessed theocracy and universal peace. All social evils he ascribed to ignorance of the scriptures; and he therefore laboured, that they might be dispersed among the laity, and studied, not in the Vulgate, but the originals. He lamented that at Paris and Bologna, lectures were delivered on the Sentences, but none on the Bible. All truth,

in his view, flowed from the central truth, the light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. He cites Augustine as testifying, that man discerns truth, only *in veritate increata et in regulis aeternis*: a fascinating doctrine, which constantly reappears in the literature of the middle ages. As God therefore has enlightened the Gentile philosophers, their teachings are not so foreign to the gospel, as might at first be thought. Bacon regarded what is practical as the ultimate end, to which all must be subsidiary. The Will, or practical reason, is higher than the speculative reason, and moral philosophy higher than speculative philosophy. The place however which is occupied among unbelievers by Moral Philosophy is, among Christians, filled by Theology. Philosophy relates to that which is common to all things and sciences, and therefore determines the number and domain of the sciences; whence, from consciousness of her inability to reach the chief necessity of man, she must teach that there is another source of knowledge, above herself, whose peculiarities she indicates in general, without being able to assign the particular contents.*

Roger Bacon most acutely distinguishes between Philosophy, as perfected under revelation, on the one hand, and Theology, on the other. Christian Philosophy stands related to Theology, precisely as Ethnic Philosophy to Moral Philosophy. She is a handmaid to theology. He expresses joy at the corroboration of truth, which reason gives; not however, as the basis of faith, but as an encouragement, *after* faith.

It is pleasant wandering among these cloisters of an age which we usually condemn as grossly dark, but in which we find many burning and shining lights. Many of these we must omit, but we cannot entirely pass by Raymund Lully. The life of Raymund's spirit, says Neander, proceeded from glowing love to God. The same God who was the object of his love, claimed also, he said, to be the object of his knowledge. Thus the whole powers were carried on in a heavenward motion. In the mixed Latin of his day, but in language common to all gracious souls, he exclaims: "Lift up thy knowledge, and thou shalt lift up thy love. Heaven is not

* Quod oportet esse aliam scientiam ultra philosophiam, cujus proprietates tangit in universali, licet in particulari non possit eam assignare.

so high, as the love of a holy man. The more thou shalt strive to ascend, the more thou shalt ascend." *Eleva tuum intelligere, et elevabis tuum amare. Coelum non est tam altum, sicut amare sancti hominis. Quo magis laborabis ad ascendendum, eo magis ascendes.*

Lully wrote a book at Montpellier, in 1304, on the concurrence of faith and intellect in the same object. In this he relates the following story, to show what a hinderance to the propagation of truth exists in the seeming conflict of faith and reason. There was a king of Tunis, Miranmolin by name, who being well versed in logic and physics, entered into dispute with a missionary monk who was in his country. The monk was well acquainted with ethics and history, and with the Arabic language, but was rather to seek in logic and physics. When the monk had proved, on moral grounds, that the doctrine of Mohammed was false, the king declared himself ready to embrace Christianity, as soon as it should be demonstrated to be true. To which the monk replied, that the Christian religion was so high, that it could not be proved. 'Only believe,' said he, 'and thou shalt be saved.' The king replied, that he would not change one creed for another, after such a fashion. So he remained, neither Christian, Moslem, or Jew: but he drove the monk out of his dominions: and Raymund adds, *Et ego vidi fratrem, cum suis sociis, et sum locutus cum ipsis.*

One of his works takes the form of a philosophical dialogue between himself and a hermit whom he met in the environs of Paris. Their chief topic was that most common in their age, to wit, the relation of faith to reason; and subordinately to this, whether Theology is properly a science. Raymund distinguishes between that which belongs to a thing, in respect to its essence and primary notion, and that which belongs to it, in certain circumstances. In the first sense, *intelligere* belongs only to intellect, in the latter to faith. It is only when, from certain hinderances, the mind cannot rise to knowledge, that faith intervenes, for the acquisition of truth. As imagination supplies the place of sense, in the absence of the object, so does faith supply the place of reason. As the soul is made to contemplate God, so it is permitted to know something, but not with absolute comprehension. Raymund wrote a book, on

the conflict of Faith and Intellect. In this, Intellect says to Faith: "Thou art the preparation; by thee I attain to that mental disposition, whereby I may ascend to the highest objects." The *habitus* of faith passes over into *intellectus*, and thus there is intellect in faith, and faith in intellect. The two are represented as aiding one another to higher and higher flights; and Intellect says to Faith, "When I ascend by intelligence to the degree where thou art, thou ascendest by believing to a higher degree above me." As it is the nature of fire to rise above all the other elements, so it is the nature of faith to rise above reason. For the operation of human reason proceeds jointly from the sensual and the intellectual; but the operation of faith is uncompounded, single, and situated at the very extreme point of what is intellectually known; *stans super extremitates intellectualitatum intellectarum*. There can be no contradiction between faith and reason. Nothing which reason could demonstrate to be false, can be the object of faith.

On a former occasion, when treating of this subject, we adverted to the Pantheism of the middle ages, and indicated a parallel between the speculations of that and of our own day.* The Theism of Christianity, which in the early age had to contend with Dualism, was now called into the field, says Neander, against *Monism*, or Pantheism. There had been a leaning towards this error in the famous John Scotus Erigena; and his writings were more influential in the thirteenth century than in his own. These opinions were favoured by the circulation of the Pseudo-Dionysian writings, and by the famous work *De Causis*, which was translated from the Arabic as one of Aristotle's, and received great credit among the schoolmen, so as to have been commented on by Aquinas; but which is really a Neo-Platonic treatise, perhaps by Proclus himself. This book treats of God as the fundamental essence, from which all that is phenomenal proceeds, in an everlasting development. As cited by Aquinas, it declares that this highest principle, which we call spirit, as being the source of spirit, is something far higher. Neander thinks the traces of this scheme very apparent in Aquinas himself. Some men, such as Al-

* Princeton Review, vol. 1841.

marie of Bena and David of Dinanto, brought out the hideous dogma more boldly. The latter is quoted, as teaching that all things proceed from God, and return to God again. Almaric was named from his native place, Bena, in France. He taught in Paris, early in the thirteenth century. He held that no man could be saved, who had not a positive belief that he was himself a member of Christ. He was condemned and deprived of his chair, by the University, in 1204. His doctrines were propagated by his disciple, David of Dinanto. This schoolman taught that God was the *principium materiale omnium rerum* and that the universe is only a manifestation of the divine being. He distinguished three principles; the 'first indivisible,' *matter*, lying as the basis of the material world; the 'first indivisible,' *mind*, in like manner the basis of the spiritual world; and the 'first indivisible' in the eternal substances (ideas,) *God*. These three he further declares to be identical; various modes of one and the same divinity, under the forms of body, spirit, and ideas. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between the doctrine of master and pupil: the former considered God the *principium formale* of all things, the latter the *materia prima*. According to this, they were able to regard all nature as the body of God, and God as the one abiding subject. All other things are without real being, mere accidents, under which God, the sole essence, hides himself. And they boasted that this was set forth in the mystery of transubstantiation. By means of an alliance with certain mystical doctrines, this error was diffused even among the laity, and books were written in French to set it forth. They taught such things as might be admitted by our own Emerson and Parker; as that there is no heaven and hell but in this life; that God spake by Ovid as truly as by Augustin; that those who believe have already attained the true resurrection, and are in Paradise. Many of them proceeded to a denial of moral distinctions, which is the genuine product of the Hegelianism of our own time; for no one who has opened a German book of pantheism has failed to find out that he must reject all his ancient definitions of the word 'sin.' William of Aria, a transcendental goldsmith, came forward as a prophet among these people, uttering predictions about the judgments which were soon to come on the corrupt Church. A priest,

named Bernard, avowed his faith in so very gross a manner, as to say they could not burn him, because he was God.

These pantheistic systems met with powerful opponents. Albertus Magnus urged against them, that God is not the material, and not the essential, but the causal *esse* of all that exists; the causal, formal, operative, principle, the model, the ultimate end, of all things. Thomas Aquinas, in like manner, says, God is the *esse omnium effective et exemplariter*, but not *per essentiam*.

The same speculations came in through another channel, by means of the Arabian philosopher Averroes, who professed to represent the genuine Aristotelian tenets. It was here maintained that reason is identical in all the race, a true German conceit. On this subject, one of them went so far as to say: "Reason forces me to conclude that there is one intellect in all; but, by faith, I hold firmly the exact opposite." And again: "The Latins, according to their principles, do not admit this; perhaps because it is repugnant to *their law*." Aquinas, in quoting these words, takes just offence at one who, professing Christianity, could nevertheless coldly speak of its doctrines as *positiones Catholicorum*. The great schoolmen wrote a particular treatise against this form of atheistical error, proving it to be both absurd and anti-Aristotelian.

It is not our intention to detail, however valuable and interesting they might be, the statements of our author respecting the scholastic mode of representing the divine attributes. But we propose to dwell, for a little, on some of the information which occurs under the title of Predestination and the Decrees.

We have met with a few persons, so stupidly ignorant, as to consider the whole question of liberty and necessity as belonging to the Calvinists. Such persons have never heard of the controversies among the old Jewish sects; of the philosophical arguments, on the same subject, rehearsed in the dialogues of Cicero; or of the endless combat between the Franciscans and the Dominicans. In a former article, we offered some history of the Predestinarian controversy in the Ninth Century.* The same problems reappeared in the period we are considering.

*Princeton Review for 1840, page 228.

Anselm wrote a work to show how prescience and predestination might be reconciled to free-will. His hypothesis, according to Neander, is something like this. The divine prescience does by no means exclude human free determination. God foresees what is necessary and what is free, severally, according to their nature. A parallel is drawn between this and the relation of eternity to time. From a point of view in eternity, all is an 'eternal now;' but in the progress of events in time, they are subject to the predicates of past and future: yet here is no contradiction. In like manner, it is quite conceivable, that what, from a point of view in eternity, is immutable and necessary, shall nevertheless, when viewed from the human side, and in reference to temporal development, manifest itself as dependent on the free determination of the creature.* In Romans viii. 28, Paul uses the past tense, even when speaking of what is future, to shew that he means no action in time, but was in want of an adequate word, to express the eternal present; and he uses the past, because *what is past is as immutable as what is eternal*: a subtle and truly scholastic reason. Anselm anticipates an objection. Must not then the cause of evil fall back upon God, since he knows nothing *as given*, and since all things proceed from his prescience? To which he replies, that whatever is positive proceeds from God, but that moral evil is purely negative. Even in wicked acts, so much as is positive proceeds from him, but not what is morally evil; this originates in the defect of the creature.

Alexander of Hales sets out with the position, that what happens in time cannot stand in the relation of a *datum* to the divine Mind, for this would be to make the temporal causative of the eternal; the Divine knowledge cannot be conceived of, as dependent on any thing extraneous. To harmonize the prescience of God with the contingency of free actions, he distinguishes between what is necessary in itself, and what is necessary in certain connexions; between a conditioned, and an unconditioned necessity; "*necessitas consequentiae et necessitas consequentis, necessitas antecedens et necessitas consequens, necessitas absoluta et ordinis.*" Hales is the first to

* Hoc propositum, secundum quod vocati sunt sancti, in aeternitate, in qua non est praeteritum vel futurum, sed tantum praesens, immutabile est, sed in ipsis hominibus ex libertate arbitrii aliquando est mutabile.

speak of fate, a term, which subsequently is much used in the schools. "The divine disposition of things, viewed as it lies in the Divine Reason, suggests the notion of providence: viewed as in the succession of actual events, it suggests the notion of fate. These he distinguishes, in scholastic phrase, as *dispositio quae est in disponente, et dispositio quae est in re disposita*. So far as the arrangement is *exemplaris ratio in arte divina*, it is called providence: so far as it is shown *in re vel effectu operis*, it is fate. Free-will and fate are not contradictory; for our own free-will is one of the causes, according to whose ordination, the series of fate runs on to its effects. By connexion with fate, the operations of free-will are coerced, so as to be kept from straying beyond the limits marked by divine Providence. God has knowledge of evil, but through his knowledge of good. If light could behold itself, it must by the same means behold all that is incapable of receiving it, that is, darkness. Moral evil is the shadow in the picture. "Propter ipsam bonorum pulchritudinem permisit Deus mala fieri."

Albertus Magnus, in like manner, is represented as teaching, that "the first ground and archetype of all that is or can be, in men or angels, is the divine prescience. Fate is the disposition, proceeding from providence, as it is realized and embodied in the chain of temporal events, and in the connexion of natural and of free causes. Providence and fate differ from one another, as model and copy, *ut exemplar et exemplatum, causa influens et forma influxa*. Contingent causes, or free-will, being the true and proximate causes of whatever comes to pass, do not lose their proper causality, though subordinated to the decree, and hence the same acts, in a different respect, proceed both from predestination and free-will. Sin itself is ordered to good, inasmuch as good is deduced from it; and moral evil is, in reference to the universal plan, no longer evil, but is removed by the fore-ordination, which does not force to evil, but only determines the fact. As it is one and the same power, in nature, which works formatively in the seed, generates from the seed, and preserves and matures what is generated, so is there one and the same power in the Creator, whereby he forms the world, and whereby he works in every member and in the organism of the whole, so that all the individual parts shall be brought into the unity of the scheme."

As there is no one of the schoolmen, who has treated this title of theology with so much labour as Aquinas, one author has been at the pains of digesting a little summary of his opinions. According to St. Thomas, God knows all things, in an eternal manner, as immediately present; *prout sunt in sua praesentialitate*. Hence, even what is contingent is certainly known by God as present. And future things may be regarded as contingent, when considered in reference to their proximate causes.* So that although the supreme cause operates necessarily, the actions resulting may be considered as causal, in regard to the second cause immediately preceding, which is contingent. Aquinas further maintained, according to Neander, that the Will of God works many things necessarily, but not all things. The operation of the first cause, may, in reference to the second-cause, be contingent, when the operation of the first-cause is hindered by defect in the second; as when the influence of the sun is hindered by defect in the plant on which he shines. But no defect of a second-cause can hinder the will of God in its operation. If therefore we should apply this similitude to the case of free actions, we should have to admit that the will of God is thwarted, which would be inconsistent with Omnipotence. We are therefore constrained to seek the reason of future contingencies in the Divine Mind itself. As the will of God is the greatest of all causes, it follows not only that all things take place, *which* he wills, but *as* he wills. And therefore it is God's will which causes some things to happen necessarily, and others contingently; and these are the two forms, according to which all divine purposes are carried into effect. And all this he maintains in such a manner, as to hold his position firm against those who deny the subjection of all events to the divine predestination. All is referred to the sovereignty of God. "It is necessary that the divine goodness, which in itself is one and simple, should be represented in things by a multiplicity of forms, for the reason that created things cannot attain to the simplicity of God. And hence it is, that for the completion of the universe different degrees of things are required; and of these some hold the highest, some the lowest place in the

*Et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis proximis comparata.

universe. And that uniformity of gradation may be observed, God permits some evils to be done, lest more good should be hired." He applies this in all its force to election and reprobation. This idea of a universe necessarily multiform, is a favourite one with Aquinas: the creatures are thus complementary of one another; "ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia." Moral evil, in this view, is necessary to the completeness of the universe.

Aquinas compares the knowledge of God to the knowledge of an artificer, in respect to his work. Knowledge, as knowledge, implies no causality; but in so far as it is the knowledge of a constructive artificer, it stands in a causal relation to the result of art. First, the knowledge of the artificer defines the end; next, the will proposes this as the end; then the same will disposes the action, by which the idea shall be realized. If every thing, in the process of execution, is found to differ from this idea, it must not be ascribed to the artificer's knowledge, as its cause; and moral evil falls under this case, as deviating from the divine idea and end.* Notwithstanding which, Aquinas does not ascribe proper causality to the human will, but traces back all to the divine mind. He is much engaged in shewing that his system does not destroy liberty. He says expressly, God works in free-will, *agreeably to the nature of free-will*; "and though he turn the will of man in another direction, he nevertheless secures it by his omnipotence, that that, to which it is turned, is effected voluntarily."

Raymund Lully attempts the solution of this same problem of ages. Like Thomas Aquinas, he distinguishes between things as viewed in the divine mind, and the same things as existing in time. The Universe with all its parts is from eternity in the divine idea. The divine idea is God himself. But God willed to create out of nothing, and this was easy to his omnipotence. That which is eternal, however, in the divine mind, cannot be transferred to the domain of time and space. Actual existences are therefore something different and new. Hence we must distinguish between the thought of God and the events of time. That which is predestinated, is

* Unde patet, quod malum, quod est deviati a forma et a fine, non causatur a scientia Dei. In Sentent. lib. I. Distinct. 38. Quaest. I. Art. 1

God himself, since the idea and God are one ; hence it is immutable and necessary. But in so far as predestination terminates on man, it becomes something difficult. And though the new-created man is, in essence, not different from the idea, yet he is different so far as he exists in time and space. He labours to show that the divine prescience carries with it nothing compulsory. As the vegetative power in nature produces dates in one tree and figs in another, so the mighty power of God operates in physical and moral beings, according to their respective nature. He always returns to this, that predestination does not exclude the validity of intermediate causes, and that it would be a perverse reverence for God, which should ascribe this to him. This abuse of the doctrine, he represents as fatal to morals. In one of his curious illustrations, he says : “ As when a man sows bad seed, without knowing it, and holds it to be fruitful when it is not, he all the while esteems that to be possible, which indeed is not ; in like manner, two persons, of whom one is ordained to life and one to death, know not their respective destiny, and both believe that life and death are in their own power. As they hold this to be true, they act with an unconstrained free choice. Just as the husbandman thinks a good crop will come of what he sows, when, in fact, only that will come which is predetermined by the character of the seed, so do William and Peter attain to the very thing which is predetermined, while they fully believe that to be *potentialiter* possible to them which is both *potentialiter* and *actualiter* impossible.” He acknowledges that such illustrations are liable to great abuse.

We have remained as long among these subjects as our readers will well bear. If we could follow our author, in his account of the teachings of this period on Original Sin, Atonement, and Faith, we should find new reasons to reconsider the judgment, which would condemn all the labours of the schoolmen, as quibbles and logomachies. The analogy of other arts and other learning might well contradict such an assumption. The period which we have considered is not without its brilliancy. It includes the triumphs of knighthood, and the principal crusade. It is commemorated by some of the most striking architecture of the world. It embraces the faery-land of the Trouveres and the Troubadours. It witnesses the

revival of painting in Italy, and the birth of Dante Alighieri. The mention of this name leads us to observe the remarkable scholastic tinge which prevails in the *Divina Commedia*, and the frequent allusion to the religious speculators whom we have named. We may be pardoned for devoting a page to this subject, which has not been often treated. Mr. Cary justly observes: "the contemporary of Thomas Aquinas, it is not to be wondered if he has given his poem a tincture of the scholastic theology, which the writings of that extraordinary man had rendered so prevalent, and without which it could not perhaps have been made acceptable to the generality of his readers." Scholastic refinements in theology are subjects of frequent allusion, as in the ninth canto of the *Paradise*, where the poet requests experimental proof of the doctrine, that the thoughts of all created spirits are beheld by the blessed, reflected mirror-like in God himself; and in the thirteenth of the same, where there is an assumption of the metaphysical tenet of a first motive, agreeably to the scholastic maxim, *Repugnat in causis processus in infinitum*. The division of the virtues and vices, in the seventh canto of *Purgatory*, is the same which commentators find in Thomas Aquinas, (lib. 1. Quaest. 72. Art. 2.) Of Aquinas himself, Dante often speaks; alluding to his supposed murder;* in *Paradise*, where he appears as one of the chief speakers;† and in a noted passage, where he is conjoined with Albertus and Peter Lombard:

"He, nearest on my right hand, brother was,
 "And master to me, Albert of Cologne
 "Is this; and of Aquinum, Thomas I.
 "The other, nearest, who adorns our quire,
 "Was Peter, he that with the widow gave
 "To holy Church his treasure.‡

Anselm is assigned to his due place in heaven, in the twelfth canto of the *Paradise*; in which also, the poet describes his meeting with Bonaventura. To Bernard, notwithstanding his vehement opposition to the feast of the Immaculate Conception, Dante, in the thirty-second canto of the *Paradise*,

* Purg. xx. 65. † Par. xii. xiii.

‡ Questi, che m'è a destra più vicino,
 Frate e maestro fummi; ed esso Alberto
 E de Cologna, ed io Thomas d' Aquino,
 L'altro, ch'appres so adorna il nostro coro,
 Quel Pietro, &c.--Par. x.

assigns the place of guide, vacated by Beatrice; he leads the way to the contemplation of Mary, as an old man, in glorious apparel, with joyful and paternal countenance and demeanour.* As to the infidel Averroes, he is thus classified, in hell:

“Orpheus I marked,
 “And Linus, Tully, and moral Seneca,
 “Euclid and Ptolemy, Hippocrates,
 “Galenus, Avicen, and him who made
 “That commentary vast, Averroes.”

In giving such prominence to a single work, we feel justified by a consideration of its peculiar place in the literature of its day. “Notwithstanding the prodigious difference of the period,” says M. Villemain, “the poem of Dante reproduces the character of the great primitive poems of antiquity: it is *encyclopedic*; it embraces in its vast bosom the entire history, science, and poetry of an age.”

Before dismissing this subject, we cannot refrain from indicating a comparison between the Scholastic metaphysicians, and the philosophers of modern Germany. It has no doubt struck our readers as obvious, and it has certainly forced itself upon us, at every step of our investigation. The points of resemblance are numerous. In both cases, the dreams of the cloister have become the sole occupation of the dreamers. In both cases, men of the highest genius have consecrated themselves to the pursuit. In both cases, religion has been deeply implicated with the researches of the parties; vast patience, subtilty and erudition, have been expended; system after system has arisen; and the grand result, in a majority of instances, has been simply nothing. In regard to extent of varied science, especially in its cognate branches, as well as in elegance and taste, the advantage is with the modern. But, in our judgment, he has not all the advantage. In that which is the boast of both, namely ratiocination, we are clearly of opinion, that the school-doctors have never been surpassed. So far as the science of dialectic attack and fence is concerned, the world has gained nothing by abandoning the Aristotelian logic: theology has gained nothing by the fashionable contempt for the

* Vestito con le gente gloriose,
 Diffuso era per gli occhi e per le gene
 Di benigna letizia in atto pio,
 Quale a tenero padre si conviene.

sylogism. The influence of the scholastic divines is very clearly to be discerned in every one of the reformed theologians, of the best and purest period, in clearness of definition, in exactness of statement, transparency of method, and closeness of argument. Nothing of all this is sought or offered by the German. We further judge, that more of absolute truth is on the side of the schoolmen. This is a principal point. The chief defences of revelation are still borrowed from the middle-ages. The sovereignty and grace of God have had no abler champions, since the time of Augustin. Stripped of the prickly coat of technical logic, their works are found to contain much that is scriptural, and much that has since been anathematized by the church of Rome. The instances are numerous in which their lucubrations have been adopted, and their names forgotten. "It is an observation made by many modern writers," says Tiraboschi, "that the demonstration of the existence of God, taken from the idea of a Supreme Being, of which Des Cartes is thought to be the author, was so many ages back discovered and brought to light by Anselm. Leibnitz himself makes the remark, vol. v., Oper. p. 570, ed. Genev. 1768."

In one capital particular, the schoolmen are far to be preferred to the Germans and their admirers, we mean in reverence for God and the scriptures. Highly as they sometimes exalt reason, they are never found to sneer at revelation. There is no Paulus or Röhr among them, to travestie the miracles; no Hegel and Strauss and Parker, to reduce Jesus to the level of Socrates, or even of Shakspeare or Montaigne. There is no laxity in regard to morals, after the school of Pückler-Muskau or Heine; nor any project for the 'rehabilitation' of the flesh; nor any of the aesthetic ravings and apotheosis of Art, which would make the very Torso or Laocoon a realization of the divine idea. The schoolmen are often perilously erroneous, and often devoid of due fear in their speculations, but they never approach the 'depths of Satan,' which modern Germany has uncovered. And when we hear of Christian ministers in our own country, casting a veil over the apostasy of such men as Schleiermacher, and vindicating the frightful absurdities of Marheineke, we are almost tempted to wish that our rising youth might gain a glimpse of what is offered to them, if it were only *in terrorem*. The progress of pantheistic absurdity

has kept pace with the decline of evangelical piety. In accordance with this statement, our best hope for the future development of American theology is founded, not in any light which, after two or three reflections and refractions, is to beam from the works of Cousin or Coleridge or Emerson, but in the increased and devout study of the lively oracles, under the guidance and inspiration of the sanctifying spirit.

ART. II.—*The Soul; or an Inquiry into Scriptural Psychology, as developed by the use of the terms soul, spirit, life, etc., viewed in its bearings on the doctrine of the Resurrection.* By George Bush, Professor of Hebrew in the New York City University. New York: 1845. pp. 141.

PROFESSOR BUSH seems determined to sow his tares broadcast over the fields of theology. He is out with another book on the subject of the resurrection. In his former work, he endeavoured to make nature speak, in the stead of revelation, on the subject of the resurrection; to make physiology an oracle of God, rather to be consulted on this subject than his revelation recorded in the sacred scriptures. And though in the work now before us, he *seemingly* attempts to make scripture speak for itself, it is clear as light, that the whole inquiry is conducted under the guidance of the preconceived opinions taught him by his physiology, and proclaimed so loudly in his former work. The whole form of his inquiry shows that he had framed his theory outside of the scriptures, and then sought within their pages for proofs to sustain it. And if he proved himself, in his former work, no philosopher, one incapable of seeing, with a knowing eye, the truths indicated in the unwritten records of nature; he has equally in this work, shown himself a shallow interpreter of the written word of the spirit of the living God. As a physiologist, he showed himself one, in as far as he is one at all, from books, and not from observation; and as an interpreter of scripture, he shows that he has threaded its meaning by a clew furnished from the shallow teachings of what he has erroneously supposed to be ancient

philosophy. Indeed, his whole theory is built rather upon his own and other people's fancies, than upon scripture. And in reading this last book, we have been more impressed than we ever were before, with the wide difference between a grammarian and an expounder of doctrines, between the superficial, etymological, and synthetical work of the former, and the profound, truth-realizing, hearty work of the latter. The mere grammarian can never realize the truth of the great canon of interpretation, *Qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice*.

The first thing which arrests our attention is the fact that our author, forgetting that possibly there may be a beam in his own eye, strongly intimates that whoever differs from the doctrines set forth in the work, must be under the influence of passion or prejudice. "If I have given a wrong interpretation" (says he in the preface), "of the language of scripture, it can doubtless be shown by confronting it with the right; and I must be allowed to demand that whoever assumes the work of refutation, he shall not content himself with a bare negation, of results, and especially that he shall not think to overwhelm the argument by the violent outcry of *Rationalism*, *Neologism*, or *Infidelity*, as characterizing the principles of exegesis which bring out these results." We shall certainly do our very best not to deserve the animadversion thus thrown out in anticipation of whatever may be urged against the theological discovery, which the learned Professor has brought up from those recondite depths, which lie far below that "sense which floats, as it were, on the surface of scripture." And although all that we may have to advance upon the subject under consideration, may be nothing more than "the sense which floats, as it were, on the surface of scripture," still we are persuaded that it will at least deserve some consideration before the new discovery can be received as true Christian doctrine.

What then, is the new discovery which Professor Bush has made in the teachings of revelation? Let us hear it announced in his own words. "The present work" (says he in the preface), "has grown, by a very natural sequence out of the further investigations to which I have been prompted by the tenor of several elaborate critiques on the volume recently given to the world under the title of 'Anastasis' or the Resurrection of the body considered. So far as that work could be consid-

ered as propounding a distinct theory of the resurrection, it is that of a *spiritual* or rather *physical* body, developed, by a natural law, from the material body at death. To establish this position is the drift of that portion of the volume embraced under the head of 'The Rational Argument.'—As there is clearly to be a resurrection after death—as *something* must rise and live again in another world—and as I have assumed to show that that something is *not* the body which is deposited in the grave—I was obviously called upon to designate affirmatively *what it is*. This I have stated to be a *psychical body* eliminated at death from the material body, the essential nature of which, however, I do not hold it incumbent upon me to define, inasmuch as all parties are alike ignorant of the ontological attributes of the psyche ($\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$), which at the same time all parties alike acknowledge to exist. The extent of my position is, that the psychical body, whatever be its essential nature is assumed at death, and not at some indefinitely future period. In support of this hypothesis, I relied rather upon physiological and psychological considerations, than upon the direct testimony of scripture. In consequence, however, of the stern arraignment, at the bar of the pulpit and the press, of the views propounded, I have been led to a closer investigation of its merits as submitted to the test of scripture, and in the ensuing pages have planted my defence of it not solely upon a rational but upon a strictly exegetical basis. What was before suggested is here affirmed. I claim to have shown, by a rigid and unimpeachable process of interpretation, that the inspired oracles unequivocally recognise the tripartite distinction of man's nature into spirit, soul, and body; that when the body is forsaken at death, the spiritual and psychical elements survive in coexistence together, and constitute the true man, which in actual usage is commonly designated by the single term soul; that inasmuch as the psychical principle, even in the present life, is the true seat and subject of what are commonly called bodily sensations, this principle is legitimately to be regarded as performing the same office for the spirit in the other life; or in other words, that the soul necessarily involves the idea conveyed by the phrase spiritual body; and finally, that the fact of the immediate possession of such a body after death pre-

cludes the hypothesis of the investiture of the spirit at any future period, with any other corporeity derived from the relics, however formed or fashioned, of the present material body. These are the points which I profess to establish by the course of reasoning pursued in the present essay."

We have thus given Professor Bush's own statement of the doctrines which he promulgates and assumes to have proved, in the work before us. We beg the reader to read it over again, in order that he may have it definitely fixed in his mind; as we wish it to be seen, that we shall deal with what Professor Bush has really written, and not with some notions of our own, which we have substituted for his doctrines. His main doctrine or theory is, that the resurrection-body is "a psychical body developed by a natural law, from the material body at death." In the work on the resurrection, he attempted to prove this doctrine from the light of philosophy; but in the present work, he attempts to prove it from the teachings of revelation. As the foundation of his proofs, he holds "that the inspired oracles unequivocally recognise the tripartite distinction of man's nature into spirit, soul, and body." This is the centre-point of his whole argument; the point from which every train of thought sets out, and the point to which every train of thought returns. In order to prove this main point, he examines at large the scripture usage of the words *πνεῦμα* (spirit) and *ψυχή* (soul) and the corresponding Hebrew words; and claims to have established in this way his theory. We will in the first place, examine the validity of this mode of investigating the subject, as our author boasts that he has used "a rigid and unimpeachable process of interpretation;" and then we will pass to a full consideration of the question, whether the scriptures recognise the tripartite distinction of man's nature, and its bearing upon the doctrine of the resurrection.

First, then, as to the mode of investigating the subject which Professor Bush has used, and boasts as "a rigid and unimpeachable process of interpretation." It is precisely the old exploded mode of the Greek philosophers. These philosophers to some extent sought the elements of their inductions in the phenomena of nature. But they did not seek them in a careful and scientific analysis of facts; but by a minute examina-

tion of the words and forms of language of common parlance ; thereby taking it for granted that these words and language are perfect expressions of facts, when in reality they are, as the language of common parlance generally is, the crude expressions of superficial observation. To study this language, therefore, as the perfect representation of nature, and to classify things according to its indications, and to make corresponding deductions, and thus to build up philosophy, must result in rearing a system as far removed from true philosophy, as the crude language of common parlance with its rhetorical analogies, is from those accurate and studied forms of speech which constitute the language of modern science. This is the mode of philosophizing which Aristotle pursued. The points from which he generally starts in his inquiries, are common remarks of ordinary language, such as, we say so or so in common parlance. This method of procedure assumes that words express facts in nature with scientific precision. And accordingly, in Aristotelian statics and dynamics, light is considered as the contrary of heavy, instead of a less degree of it, to the utter confusion of all accurate ideas on the subject, just as Plato in his *Phaedon* makes big the contrary of little instead of a greater degree of it. And in this way the doctrine of contraries which holds so prominent a place in the physics of Aristotle, and is so largely employed in the *Phaedon* of Plato, originated. From the fact that common language expresses perfect antitheses between things, the Aristotelian philosophy, as well as the Platonic, assumed that the antithesis existed in nature.* It was then, to facts as they stand misrepresented in common language, that Greek philosophy appealed, without looking to nature and reading them there.

Now this is just what Professor Bush has done in his work on the soul, and thus revived the old exploded Aristotelian di-

* It will be well to remark, for the sake of greater precision than we have used in the text, that the doctrine of contraries which is used with precisely the same absurd results in the Platonic philosophy as in the Aristotelian, did not originate in the same empirical way in the Platonic philosophy, that it did in the Aristotelian, but originated in the Platonic philosophy, from the fundamental doctrine of that philosophy, "that the species of things have a real subsistence," and as big expresses one species, and little another, therefore they are substantive contraries, and as such can be employed in all our reasonings. The result of the doctrine of contraries in our reasonings, is however the same, no matter how the doctrine originates.

alectics, which the schoolmen used in their wonderful logomachies, to the utter confusion of accurate views of scriptural truth. He founds his whole theory of the resurrection, so far as scriptural proofs are concerned, on the meaning of the Greek words ψυχή and πνεῦμα, and the corresponding Hebrew words; and takes it for granted, throughout his whole inquiry, that these words are founded upon an accurate and scientific view of psychology. Nothing can be more erroneous. Where did this verbal tripartite distinction of man's nature come from? From the common language of the day. And the New Testament writers merely used the expressions of common parlance, and "had no purpose of pointing to a threefold metaphysical division of the elements of human nature." When they speak of spirit, soul, and body, they merely use a cumulative expression of the whole man. As, for an analogous instance, where we are commanded to love God with all our hearts (καρδία), soul (ψυχή), and mind (διανοία), Mat. ch. xxii. v. 37, it is the mere cumulative form of expression of common parlance in a practical discourse, and not the precise language of a metaphysical essay.

The question then, cleared of all embarrassment is, Did the New Testament writers intend to recognise as a truth, the doctrine of a tripartite division of man's nature, as Professor Bush sets forth that doctrine? The question is not merely, whether they recognised as a truth a doctrine of a tripartite division, but whether they recognized as a truth the doctrine of a tripartite division, as set forth by Professor Bush, with all its bearings upon the doctrine of the resurrection, upon which Professor Bush has based his peculiar theory. Or in other words, is the very same tripartite division of man's nature, which constitutes the foundation by means of a natural law, of Professor Bush's theory of the resurrection, recognised as a truth in the scriptures? For this is what Professor Bush undertakes to show; as is seen by reference to the statement of his doctrines which we have already quoted, and as will more clearly appear at large in the book before us.

It will be of assistance to our judgments in the examination of this question, to look for a moment at the intellectual condition of the world at the time of the first promulgation of Christianity. For we shall thereby be the better able to judge

of the relation which Christianity bore to the various philosophies of the times ; and to estimate the probability of Christianity having adopted any philosophical tenet there taught, as a basis for its great fundamental doctrine of the resurrection.

At no period in the history of the world, was there a greater rage for philosophical speculation, than at the time of the first promulgation of Christianity. And never did so many sects contend together on the intellectual arena, for the prize of wisdom. The wide conquests of Alexander of Macedon had long before broken up the ancient barriers to national intercourse, and thereby brought into contact, the more rational systems of European thought, with the mystic systems of Oriental speculation. And there were now advocates, not only of each system of the more ancient philosophy, but of systems of eclecticism formed out of what were considered the truths of each system. Athens, Corinth, and Tarsus, were great schools of philosophy, and Cicero had introduced the Greek philosophy into Rome. And the learning of all ages and nations flowing for ages into Alexandria, had constituted that great city the depository of the concentrated wisdom of the world. And yet amidst all this wisdom man searched in vain for answers to the great problems of human destiny. The questions, Whence did we originate ? and Whither are we going ? were asked with as intense anxiety, and answered with as little satisfaction as ever. The accumulated wisdom of all nations had proved wholly inadequate to solve the great questions.

In this intellectual condition of the world, Jesus Christ appeared amongst men, with the glad tidings of an answer to the great questions of human destiny. And what did he do ? Did he join himself to any one of the various systems of philosophy ? Did he affiliate himself with any school ? Not at all. Did he choose the philosophers of the day as his disciples, to teach his doctrines ? By no means. He taught his own sublime doctrines upon his own authority, and their intrinsic truth ; and claimed for them affiliation with no system of doctrine but that of the despised Jews, an unimportant people far removed from the great centres of human wisdom and refinement. And his disciples, he chose from among the unlettered and unschooled men of this same despised people. And the chief city of this same people, he made the head-

quarters of his operations, the point from which his doctrines were to emanate, and go forth over the world. In a word, he cut off his doctrines from all connection with human wisdom. And what a noble spectacle it is, and how humbling to the pride of human learning, to behold the disciples preaching their great doctrines with the sincere simplicity of children, amidst all the affected pretension of the so-called wisdom of the learned. And such they ever continued, through all their labours of spreading the great doctrines of their master. They never once bowed before the philosophy of the times, or paid the least respect to its teachings; but intent upon their great mission, they went on teaching answers to the great questions to which philosophy had proved wholly inadequate. It is true that Christ did choose the great Apostle to the Gentiles from amongst learned men; but then, his manner of life had been such as to bring him into constant contact with the realities of active life, and thus secured him from the absolute dominion of the extravagancies of speculation. And it was important to a successful mission amongst the Gentiles, that the apostle should be endued with much learning, in order that he might be able to silence the arrogant pretensions of human wisdom. But however all this may be, it is certain that the apostle with whatever of learning he had, shows no more respect for the philosophy of the times, than do his more unlettered fellow labourers. In his writings, he on all proper occasions cast contempt on the most prominent philosophies, and takes great pains to place Christianity in open hostility to them. And Irenaeus and Jerome both assert that John wrote his gospel with particular hostile reference to the Gnostic philosophy. And this appears to be so from the first chapter. And there is not in all the New Testament a single favourable remark made relative to any doctrine of any one of the many systems of philosophy which then engrossed the attention of man, and were esteemed such rich treasures of wisdom. And yet no sooner were the apostles laid in their graves, and there were left in the world no teachers inspired by the Holy Ghost, than the teachers of Christianity began to mix up philosophy with Christianity. And from the writings of Origen down to those of Professor Bush, we have instances of gross corruptions of

the simple truths of the gospel, by the profane attempt to render them more intelligible, by the pretended profounder insight of philosophy. During the lapse of ages intervening between these two writers, theology has often steered its course, by first one and then another of those stars in the intellectual firmament by which men had been so long misled, although the star of Bethlehem had now taken its place in the firmament, to guide by its mild beams, the helpless voyager over the trackless waters of human destiny.

With then this view of the hostile position in which Christ and his apostles placed Christianity toward philosophy, let us inquire whether the particular philosophical doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature forms an exception to the general rule, and is recognised as a truth in the scriptures, as Professor Bush strives to show. This he infers from the particular use of the two Greek words *psyche* and *pneuma* in the New Testament and the corresponding Hebrew words in the Old Testament, but more especially the former. We shall therefore confine our examination to the Greek words.

And in the first place, what does Professor Bush himself establish as to the use of these words? Not that each word is used in one fixed meaning, thereby finding, as it were, the footsteps of his doctrine all over the scriptures, but that each word is used in all its various historic meanings, from the primitive meaning of breath, through various shades of meaning, up to the metaphysical sense of the immortal part of man. In other words, he shows that the terms are used in every meaning which belongs to them, from their lowest etymological to their highest metaphysical meaning. And consequently the meaning of either word in any given passage must be determined by the context. Now this is precisely such a usage of the words as might have been expected from writers who did not intend to recognise as a truth necessary to their doctrines the tripartite division of man's nature; and therefore, as the doctrine cannot be inferred from this usage, it can have no place in the scriptures, unless it is substantially taught or recognised somewhere in express terms, which Prof. Bush does not claim to be the case. But before we proceed to examine Prof. Bush's proofs that the usage of these words recognises the tripartite division of man's nature, we will examine the bear-

ing of their usage upon the interpretation of that part of scripture which treats particularly of the resurrection.

From the fact that the words in question are used in the scriptures in all their meanings, we come to that portion of scripture which treats particularly of the resurrection, without being tied down to any one meaning for either of the words : but the meaning of each is to be determined by the context. For even if either or both of the words had been used in only one sense in every other part of the scriptures, yet if the context, where the resurrection is spoken of, clearly required from them a different meaning, the rules of interpretation would compel us to give them the required meaning. This truth of interpretation is clearly shown in 1 Cor. iv. 3, where the word ἡμέρα (day) means judgment, contrary to its universal signification ; because the context requires such a meaning for it. But in the inquiry before us, the words under consideration are used in many meanings throughout the New Testament, and the context in this particular part which treats of the resurrection, will merely require us to give to them one of these meanings, rather than another, and not a meaning which they have nowhere else in the scriptures.

What then is the meaning of the two words in 1 Cor. xv : 44? Professor Bush says in speaking of this passage, that it is raised a σῶμα ψυχικόν; and when told that Paul says otherwise, he replies, "Spiritual [πνευματικόν] in this connexion is not to be understood in a metaphysical sense as distinguished from material, but in a moral sense, as distinguished from fleshly, fallen, sensual. Metaphysically speaking, the appropriate term is psychical body, but as the term psychical, like the term fleshly, has two senses, the one alluding to but not defining the substance called psyche, the other to the character superinduced upon it, by sin ; and as the apostle is here expressly contrasting the soma psychikon, natural body, with the soma pneumatikon, spiritual body, in moral rather than metaphysical respects, we must be governed in our interpretation by this fact." Now, we join issue with Professor Bush, and utterly deny that these words are used here in a moral rather than in a metaphysical sense. On the contrary, we maintain that they are used in a metaphysical and not a moral sense ; and therefore, "we must be governed in our interpretation by this fact."

What is the question discussed? "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" This is the question? Surely this is not a moral question. The question is not merely, "With what body do they come?" but also, "How are the dead raised up?" With what show of sense can it be pretended, that this last question is a moral one? The whole discourse shows that the apostle was considering the matter in a metaphysical sense. He answers the first part of the inquiry by an analogical reference to grain sown. "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." He then goes on to show with what body they come, by referring to the body of wheat and other grain. Then, changing the subject matter used for illustration, he goes further back in the inquiry, from the genus body to the species flesh; and says, "all flesh is not the same flesh: but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes and another of birds." This certainly is not an illustration of a moral kind. No torturing can make such a construction even plausible. And if the illustrations are not of a moral kind, of course the subject illustrated cannot be. The apostle then goes back to the original idea, body. "There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another of the stars: for one star differeth from another star in glory." These illustrations are clearly not moral. The point illustrated is that there are different sorts of bodies. The illustrations are intended to prepare the mind for receiving the doctrine to be inculcated about man, that he may also have two different sorts of bodies, one for this life, and another for the future state of existence. He then likens the resurrection-body to all the instances adduced, from the wheat to the stars. "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. It is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power." He then terminates the statement by announcing the doctrine to be inculcated, in express terms. "It is sown a natural (psychical) body, it is raised a spiritual (pneumatic) body. There is a natural (psychikon) body, and there is a spiritual (pneumatikon) body." It is seen then, that the apostle runs through a series of illustrations, not one of which

is of a moral character, and then announces the doctrine intended to be explained by the illustrations. But surely if the doctrine be of a moral character, the illustrations must be inapposite.

The apostle, having thus fully announced this great doctrine of the resurrection of the body, then proceeds to show that it corresponds with the great doctrines of the connexion of all men with Adam as their natural head, and with Christ as their spiritual head. "And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul (psyche) the last Adam was made a quickening spirit (pneuma)." This is nothing more than a reiteration of what the Apostle had already said in the 21st and 22d verses. "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Instead of living soul we might read living animal. For the words translated living soul are applied in the Septuagint version of Genesis, to all animals, and this expression of the apostle is evidently borrowed thence. In the 7th verse of the 2d chapter of Genesis, from which the expression is quoted, it is merely said how man was created, and it is not intended in the verse to designate his pre-eminence. That had already been done in ch. i. 27. "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he them." Here is man's pre-eminence asserted. But in the verse quoted by the apostle, it is said: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." Here the superiority of man is not designated. That had already been done, as we have shown. The several works of creation are rehearsed in this chapter, and the manner of the creation of man is pointed out, just like that of the other works. The words translated living soul, are the same words which are translated "living creature" in the nineteenth verse of this chapter, and the twenty-fourth verse of the first chapter; and are in both instances applied to the beasts of the field and other lower animals. We may also use the word animal in the sentence in Corinthians: "It is sown an animal body, it is raised a spiritual body." This appears to be the precise meaning of the apostle; and it corresponds with the fact, for it is sown an animal body; it is moreover in exact accordance with the leading ideas of the

discourse ; and the apostle in the 50th verse substitutes "flesh and blood" for natural body.

In the verse, then, under consideration, we are justified in saying, that the apostle merely intended to say the first man Adam was made a living animal, for it is as to the life of the body that the apostle is reasoning, the second Adam, a life-giving spirit. The first Adam was liable to die upon disobeying the commands of God, that is, to die physically as well as spiritually, and had no power to raise himself or his offspring from the grave. But the last Adam, Christ, had power to raise from the dead the body, as well as to impart new life to the spirit. "For as the father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the son likewise," John v. 21. "And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life ; and I will raise him up at the last day," John vi. 40. It is then merely asserted that the last Adam has a quickening (life-giving) power, a power to raise from the dead ; and that it is by this new life, which is imparted by Christ, that the body is raised, and not by a natural law, as Professor Bush maintains. This truth is inculcated in the 11th verse of the 8th chapter of Romans : "But if the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his spirit that dwelleth in you." The same train of ideas is continued by the Apostle, until in the 50th verse he brings out the broad doctrine in plain words : "Now this I say brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." It is the body, which he has in view throughout the discourse. We have dwelt so long on this particular topic, because Professor Bush from page 49 to 55, contends that there is no interpretation of the statement that "the first man Adam was made a living soul ; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit" consistent with the idea that "it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body," in a metaphysical sense ; but that the only way to reconcile the two passages is to give to both of them a moral meaning.

Looking back from the point of view on which we are now standing, over this discourse of the apostle relative to the resurrection, what meaning are we to attach to the words *soma psychikon*, and *soma pneumatikon*? Unless we conclude, as

Professor Bush does, that there is no resurrection of the wicked, and that the word pneumatikon is used in a moral and not a metaphysical sense, there is not a shadow of evidence for the notion of Professor Bush, that the word is not used by the apostle in the sense of spiritual as opposed to material. Without adducing proofs from other parts of the scriptures that there is a resurrection of both the just and the unjust, and thereby refuting this view of the text in question, we will confine our examination entirely to the discourse under consideration. If then, the word pneumatikon be used in a moral sense, so must the word psychikon; for otherwise the apostle does not present a contrast or antithesis, as he evidently designs. The declaration of the apostle then will read: "It is sown a sinful body; it is raised a holy body." Professor Bush cannot object to this rendering; because on page 94 he gives the sense of sinful and of holy to these words, when treating of the point now under consideration. And indeed, these are the true meanings of the words according to Professor Bush's doctrine. Now if this be the true meaning of the apostle, he does not answer the question which he propounds to himself for solution: "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" The question is the common broad one which any common man would ask, who thought it a thing incredible that God should raise the dead, and who wished to know whether flesh and blood, our present animal body, would constitute the resurrection-body. These considerations then, as well as all the illustrations employed, show that the words psychikon and pneumatikon are used, not in a moral sense, but to designate the natural body and the glorified body in a metaphysical sense. It is true, however, that there is a current of moral ideas running through the whole discourse, as is always the case in the apostle's writings; and sometimes he seems to blend the metaphysical with the moral.

It is easy to show how unsettled is Professor Bush's opinion as to the meaning of this word rendered spiritual. In his work on the resurrection, page 66, he thinks it very doubtful whether it is ever used in a metaphysical sense, "it is not entirely clear that this latter term (pneumatikos) is used in the scriptures in a metaphysical sense." This broad position he has abandoned in his last work, and only contends for a moral meaning in

the chapter under consideration. He was compelled to give up this broad position taken in the former work, by the number of instances of metaphysical usage of its correlative substantive, *pneuma*, (for there is no difference in the usage of the substantive and the adjective, as we have assumed in our reasonings), which he has adduced himself from the scriptures. Indeed, the book before us betrays great want of an extensive knowledge as to the usage of the words *pneuma* and *psyche*. If then these words upon which we have been commenting are used in a metaphysical sense, Professor Bush's theory is overturned. For let it be borne in mind, that in this article we are merely endeavouring to overthrow his theory, and not to prove the commonly received doctrine.

We have now examined the bearing which the scriptural usage of the words *psyche* and *pneuma* have on that portion of scripture where the doctrine of the resurrection is explicitly taught; we have found that as they are used in every variety of sense which they ever bear, we were at liberty to adopt the sense which the context requires; and we have seen that the sense which the context requires is just the reverse of that assumed by Professor Bush.

But in order to test Professor Bush's theory still further, we will now examine how far the scriptural usage of the words *psyche* and *pneuma* recognises the doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature. And here a question starts up, and comes upon us with resistless force. If this doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature is recognised in the scriptures, and is the essential and natural basis of the resurrection, why did not the apostle Paul seize upon it in his argument and show that the resurrection-body is eliminated at death by a natural law, out of the *psyche*, as Professor Bush has done? Why did he not take his stand upon this philosophical doctrine which Professor Bush says is written all over the scriptures, and proclaim to the world that there is nothing incredible that God should raise the dead, even according to the well known truths of philosophy; for that the laws of nature were fully adequate to the task, as the resurrection-body was nothing more than the *psyche* which all recognised, as a part of man's nature, which passed off with the *pneuma* (spirit) and with it constituted man in a future state?

This argument certainly would have had great force with those who believed in the doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature ; and would have added great force to the illustrations employed by the apostle. And it does not lie in the mouth of Professor Bush to say that the apostle was not acquainted with the doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature ; for that would be giving up the point which we are combatting ; as it would be admitting that the doctrine is merely casually recognised in the scriptures, as any other popular notion incorporated in the language of the times ; and then the stress laid upon this recognition in the book before us is sheer trifling. We consider that this view alone of the matter is conclusive, that no such doctrine, so important to a just apprehension of the doctrine of the resurrection, being its psychological basis, was intended to be recognised in the scriptures ; yet we will inquire what Professor Bush himself has made out of the usage.

After examining a great variety of texts in both the Old and the New Testament, in which the words under consideration are used, and showing under proper classifications of the texts, the various meanings of each, he gives in the sixth chapter the general results in the following remarks. "The reader has now had arrayed before him the evidence on which a judgment is to be formed of the scriptural import of the word soul, and consequently of the degree to which it acquaints us with the true and essential nature of that part of our being. He has seen that the usage is, in many respects peculiar, the original term (psyche) sometimes conveying the import of breath, sometimes of life, sometimes of person in general, and in some few cases of the dead body. If then the question be asked which of all these various senses is to be fixed upon as leading and paramount, we do not hesitate to answer that of person. In other words, the soul is that principle in man which constitutes his true personality, and this is but another form of saying, that the soul is the man himself as a living, thinking, feeling, active being. We think it will unquestionably appear, upon a recurrence to the illustrations given above of the various usages of the term, that they easily resolve themselves into the prevailing sense of person, indicating that a man's soul is himself. . . We see not what room can remain for doubt, that the dominant usage of the term soul in the sacred writers makes it

equivalent to a man's self, and the great question now before us, is the question of scriptural usage. If then a man's soul is himself, even in the present life, and yet it is the soul which exists after death, is it not inevitable that we must carry the same fulness of import into the usage of the term in its relation to the soul as translated from the body into the world of spirits? The meaning of the word soul must be commensurate with the real truth of man's nature as man. If we can satisfy ourselves on competent grounds, of the true constitutive elements of our being apart from the body, then we virtually attain to a correct definition of the term soul. Now, it is clear, from what has been advanced above, that besides the body, there enters into the constitution of our nature the two distinct elements denominated *psyche* and *pneuma*. These both live after death, and live together. Yet in ordinary parlance it is usual to say the soul lives when the body dies: The soul therefore cannot be a monad, a simple uncompounded substance, but the term must be understood as representing the complex idea of *psyche* and *pneuma*, and this notwithstanding that soul is in a multitude of cases in actual usage, applied as a designation of the first of the principles in contradistinction from the second. It seems therefore essential to the just idea of the soul as a term indicative of the future man, that it should embrace both these elements of existence, and we have already given our reasons for believing that the former stands to the latter in the relation of a *vehiculum* or body."

We boldly assert that a more confused, incoherent, and at the same time *sophistical* paragraph cannot be found within the whole range of theological discussion. It entirely abandons, though of course unintentionally, the theory of the tripartite division of man's nature, as indicated by the three words, body, soul, and spirit. Here the drift of the argument is to show that the word soul (*psyche*) means the whole man; "that the soul is the man himself, as a living, thinking, feeling, active being." And that the soul being the entire man in this life, it must be so in the next. "If then, a man's soul is himself, even in the present life, and yet it is the soul which exists after death, is it not inevitable that we must carry the same fulness of import into the usage of the term in its relation to the soul as translated from the body into the world of spirits. The mean-

ing of the word soul must be commensurate with the real truth of man's nature, as man." The sophistry of this reasoning, if it can be called reasoning, is that the English word soul is used, instead of the Greek word psyche. The English word soul generally conveys the idea of the whole immortal part of man, and so also does the Greek word psyche, frequently. But then it is not upon this signification of the word psyche, that Professor Bush's theory is founded. His theory is, that the resurrection-body is formed by a natural law out of the psyche at death, and that it is a vehiculum or body for the *pneuma* (spirit), "the former stands to the latter in the relation of a vehiculum or body." And yet the whole drift of this paragraph, and it must be borne in mind that the author is here summing up the conclusions from the whole inquiry, is to show that the soul (psyche) in scriptural usage, means the whole man, both in this life and the life to come. Now, certainly, this usage does not indicate a tripartite division of man's nature: but just the reverse. The reasoning is, that as the psyche is employed in the scriptures to designate the whole man in this life, or in other words, his personality, therefore, that, it has the same fulness of meaning in regard to the translated man; and that, therefore, the psyche is the spiritual body, stands to the *pneuma* in the relation of a vehiculum or body. Is it possible to frame an example of a more perfect non-sequitur? If we were writing a treatise of logic, we could not desire a better one, for illustrating this species of fallacy. The premises and conclusion do not belong to each other. There is no illation from the one to the other. Indeed, the one is a contradiction of the other. The truth is, Professor Bush sets out with propositions, and then pursues such a course of inconsequent remark, as hardly even to appear to be attempting a proof of the propositions, and then winds up the whole, with conclusions that are not only not indicated by the course of his remarks, but do not correspond with the propositions which he sets out to prove. He seems to be lost amidst incomprehensible vagaries, to be constantly striving to see things which illude his vision, to be grasping at shadows, and imagining that he feels them tight between his fingers. Satisfied with the reality of his work, he pushes on in his inquiry, with the same confidence as if he had really, at each step, established something

from which a conclusion could be drawn. As a proof of this confusion, we need only point to the confused and undefined notions which he has about the nature of the psyche, even in his own theory. He maintains in his "Anastasis," that the psyche is immortal in its own nature, and in the work before us, he maintains that it is not. On page 70 of the "Anastasis," he says: "It constitutes the inner essential vitality of our bodies, and it lives again in another state, because it never dies. It is immortal in its own nature, and is called body—a spiritual body—because of the poverty of human language, or perhaps, the weakness of the human mind forbids the adoption of any more fitting term to express it." Now, on the 28th page of the work before us, he notices the fact which we have already mentioned, that, in the first and second chapters of Genesis, the very "same language is employed in reference to the creation of man and beasts. They were both made *ψυχαι ζῶσαι*, living souls, a fact from which some have inferred that beasts are as immortal as man, and others, that man is as mortal as beasts." In order to get rid of this difficulty, which did not occur to him when writing the "Anastasis," it became necessary for Professor Bush to abandon the theory of the "Anastasis," that the psyche is immortal in its own nature, and he therefore does it boldly. "While the psyche is not immortal in itself, and therefore secures not immortality to its brute possessors, it is made immortal in man by its connection with the pneuma or spirit, an element which belongs to human nature alone." Now this is a flat contradiction to what he says in the sentence from his former work. But this is not all. If we turn back only one leaf of the present book, to page 26, we find that our author there states that it is the *ζωή* which gives man his pre-eminence over beasts, and makes him immortal, while on the 28th page, just now before us, it was the pneuma. "It is in a great measure by the *ζωή* that man is distinguished from the brute creation, which possesses the psyche, but not the *ζωή*. It is by this also that man is to be supposed pre-eminently conjoined to the Deity, and thus made secure of immortal existence, which is not to be conceived of beasts, because they lack the principle on which it is founded." This is not only a flat contradiction of what is said above, but is clearly contrary to the usage

of the word ζωή. Though this word is used in the scriptures metaphorically to signify immortal life, yet every scholar knows that both it and its corresponding verb denote *life*, in its very largest sense, so as to embrace man, animals, and vegetables, or in other words, has a meaning commensurate with organic life. Professor Bush was here obliged either to abandon the position taken in the former book, that the psyche was immortal in itself, or to embrace the conclusion, that beasts are immortal also, as they have the psyche in common with man. And it is to nothing but the confusion of mind in which these dilemmas so often place him, or to the fact, that he considers whatever he has already written, so certainly true, that it is not necessary to keep it in his memory, that we can ascribe the contradiction between his views about ζωή and ψευμα.

Let us, however, return from this little digression, into which these contradictions made it necessary for us to step aside for a moment, and inquire what Professor Bush does prove in the paragraphs which we have examined, as to the doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature. It is clear that he utterly fails to prove that this doctrine is recognised in the scriptures. Indeed, he abandons it in his conclusions in summing up his proofs. He says, as we have shown, that the predominant usage of psych is person, the whole man, while the tripartite doctrine makes it merely a part. If then, the tripartite doctrine be set forth in scripture, the predominant usage of psyche cannot be the whole man, unless this doctrine is expressly taught; which Professor Bush will not affirm. For it is only from the scriptural usage of this word and the others, that the book before us, infers that the tripartite doctrine is recognised in the scriptures. Either one or the other view of the subject must be false. Professor Bush cannot be permitted thus to blow hot and cold as the exigencies of his argument require the one or the other.

So then, according to Professor Bush himself, the scriptural usage of the words under consideration does not recognise the doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature, as a psychological truth. We could easily show, that other words, besides those selected by Professor Bush, might with equal plausibility be employed in an inquiry, to show a different division of man's nature: which shows that all such expressions are

merely cumulative for the whole man, being borrowed from the loose language of common parlance. And thus it is seen that Professor Bush in his whole inquiry exemplifies the truth of the canon of interpretation, *Qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice*, which in the very outset, we held up as the touchstone by which we intended to detect the fallacy of his doctrines.

We claim then, to have shown that there is no recognition, in the scriptures, of the tripartite division of man's nature as a psychological truth. But in order to show how unfounded is this doctrine of a tripartite division of man's nature which Prof. Bush sets forth as the basis of his theory of the resurrection, we will now prove that no such doctrine was ever taught in any philosophy, and consequently could not have been adopted by the New Testament writers as a philosophical truth. We will also show where the dry bones came from, which Professor Bush has shaken so lustily, but has failed to reanimate. And finally we will show that the doctrine, though said by Professor Bush to be recognised by every one, is utterly repudiated by well established physiological facts.

On page 85, speaking of the tripartite distinction of man's nature, Professor Bush says: "This distinction was clearly recognised in the ancient philosophies. The τριμερης ἰποστασις σωματος, πνευματος, ψυχης, the three-parted hypostasis of body, spirit, and soul was familiar even among the fathers of the Christian church, of whom no one is no more explicit than Irenaeus." Now, what fact does this declaration affirm? Why, that the tripartite distinction of man's nature into soma, pneuma, and psyche, "was clearly recognised in the ancient philosophies" and "was even familiar among the fathers of the Christian church." It is here asserted that even the fathers of the Christian church recognised this doctrine; thereby intimating that the doctrine belonged more peculiarly to the ancient philosophies than to the fathers, but that such is its obvious truth, that even the Christian Fathers recognise it. Now, we are persuaded that Professor Bush is labouring under great error as to this whole subject. In his anxiety to prove his theory of the resurrection, he has seized upon any and every thing which seems to favour his theory, whether it be ancient philosophy or no philosophy at all. If our author includes the Greek philosophy among the ancient philosophies which em-

brace this doctrine, we join issue with him, first on this point, and utterly deny that it is so. The word *pneuma* was never used by any ancient classic Greek writer in a psychological or metaphysical sense. It was never applied by any classic Greek writer to signify any part of the intellectual or moral nature of man. In the ancient Greek literature, it has none but a physical signification, such as wind, breath, life, &c. Life is the nearest approximation which it made in classic Greek literature, towards a spiritual meaning; and it was but rarely used in this sense. Its metaphysical or spiritual meaning is a Hebrew idiom, and does not belong to the domain of pure Greek. It was used as a Hebrew idiom long before the Greek ceased to be a classic language, or in other words, long before the end of the classic period of Greek literature; and yet it was never used in a metaphysical or spiritual sense by any ancient classic writer. The oldest writing, in which we have found it used in a metaphysical sense, is the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament. In this translation, we find it used in such sense, and also, to signify the Spirit of God. It is then important to inquire whence this usage originated. It is evidently, we think, derived from the notions which coming from a high oriental source, had for a long time prevailed among the Hellenistic Jews, and which finally were worked up into the systems of the Gnostics. In the Gnostic philosophy it was maintained that there are three orders of created beings, the *pneumatikon*, from *pneuma*, the *psychikon*, from *psyche*, and the *hylikon*, from *hyle* (matter). The *pneumatikon* is the highest order, of which the very highest intellects among men partake, the *psychikon* is the next order, of which men of the next degree of intellect partake; and the *hylikon* is the lowest order, of which men partake who were supposed to be little removed in their natures from beasts. These doctrines sufficiently indicate the metaphysical usage of the two words *pneuma* and *psyche*. The first applies to a higher nature than the latter in the Gnostic philosophy. And as the same doctrines which were finally worked up into this system, had prevailed for several centuries before the Christian era, it is to be presumed that a usage somewhat corresponding with this signification of the words had obtained in the language of common parlance. That the doctrines which were afterwards called

Gnosticism prevailed before the Christian era, Michaelis adduces as proof the fact that in the Septuagint translation of the 6th verse of the 6th chapter of Genesis, instead of the idea of repentance, the translators have introduced that of deliberation and omitted translating the Hebrew phrase, "and it grieved him at his heart." And again in Exodus xxxii. 12-14 verses, repentance is avoided by circumlocution. The force of this proof rests upon the fact that the Gnostics maintained the opinion that the God of the Hebrews and the creator of the world was not the supreme God, but the same as their Demiurgos, liable to mistakes, repentance, and other like affections, and that in order to avoid these doctrines as inferences from the language of the Hebrew scriptures themselves, the translators garbled the original in their translation. The fact, however, that these doctrines did prevail several centuries before the Christian era, is clear we think, from other evidences which we deem it unnecessary to adduce. And therefore it cannot but be, that a usage of words corresponding with the doctrines of this philosophy would obtain in the common language of the day. For at the present day, we find that the highest terms of science, and even the most technical expressions, soon find their way into the language of common parlance. And therefore, in the Septuagint, the translators, though avoiding the Gnostic doctrines, in their translation, have used the words *pneuma* and *psyche* in senses so far corresponding with the senses which these words have in that philosophy, as to give to the word *pneuma* a higher signification than to *psyche*, the first being applied to the Deity, while the latter never is; for this usage had obtained in common language. But in their application to man and other subjects, to which these words are applied in the scriptures, they are generally used synonymously; though on an accurate comparison of their several significations, it will be found that *pneuma*, on the whole, has rather a higher range of signification, indicating the source from whence its meaning originated.

Such, we are persuaded, is the origin of the usage of the words *pneuma* and *psyche* in the dialect of the New Testament Greek. Bearing this in mind, we are the better able to examine Professor Bush's assertion that the tripartite distinction of man's nature is clearly recognised in the ancient phi-

osophies, the Christian fathers, and also, in the New Testament; and therefore is a sure foundation for his theory of the resurrection.

Let us then, with this light thrown upon the subject, return to the issue which we have just now made, and inquire whether the tripartite doctrine of Professor Bush is to be found in the Greek philosophy. In order to prove that it is, it will be necessary, among other things, to show, that in any tripartite division which this philosophy may recognise, that some word used in the stead of *pneuma*, signifies the very same part of man's nature, which *pneuma* does in the doctrine ascribed to the scriptures.

Was there, then, a tripartite doctrine recognised in the ancient Greek philosophies? We are persuaded that there was not. The great division of man's nature set forth in these philosophies, is the broad and obvious one which now prevails, of soul and body, the former expressed by the word *psyche* and the latter by the word *soma*. If we turn to the treatise, which of all others within the whole range of Greek philosophy, one might suppose, would teach any great psychological doctrine common to the ancient philosophies, the *Phaedon* of Plato, where the whole question of the immortality of the soul is discussed, and the various opinions entertained on the subject are canvassed, we find that any tripartite division of man's nature, is clearly rejected; and the doctrine that man is compounded of soul (*psyche*) and body (*soma*) and nothing more, is explicitly taught. "Let us see then" (says Plato;) "are we not compounded of a body and soul? Or are there any other ingredients in our composition?"

"Certainly none.

"Which of the two things, does our body mostly resemble?"

"All men own that it is most conformable to the visible sort.

"And pray my dear Cebes, is our soul visible or invisible?"

"It is invisible to men at least.

"But when we speak of visible or invisible things, we mean with regard to men, without minding any other nature.

"Once more, then, is the soul visible or not?"

"It is invisible.

"Then it is invisible or immaterial?"

“ Yes.

“ And of course the soul is more conformable than the body to the invisible kind of things ; and the body suits better with the visible ?

“ That is self-evident.

“ After all then, which sort of things does the soul seem to resemble most ?

“ In my mind, Soerates, there is no man so stupid and stiff as not to be obliged, by your method of reasoning, to acknowledge that the soul bears a greater resemblance and conformity to the immutable being than to that which is always upon change.

“ And as for the body ?

“ It bears a greater resemblance to the other.

“ Let us try another way. During the conjunction of body and soul, nature orders the one to obey and be a slave, and the other to command and hold empire. Which of these two characters are most suitable to the Divine Being, or that which is mortal ? Are you not sensible, that the divine is only capable of commanding and ruling ; and what is mortal is only worthy of obedience and slavery ?

“ Most certainly.

“ Which of these two, then, agrees best with the soul ?

“ It is evident, Soerates, that our soul resembles what is divine, and our body what is mortal.

“ You see, then, my dear Cebes, the necessary result of all is, that our soul bears strict resemblance to what is divine, immortal, intellectual, simple, indissoluble ; and is always the same and always like it : and that our body does perfectly what is human, mortal, sensible, compounded, dissoluble ; always changing and never like itself. Can any thing be supposed to destroy that consequence, or make out the contrary ?

“ Certainly not, Soerates.

“ Does it not then suit with the body to be quickly dissolved, and with the soul to be always indissoluble or something very near it ?

“ That is a standing truth.”

Here then, we see that Plato's celebrated dialogue on the immortality of the soul, which embodies the highest knowledge on the subject of which it treats known to the ancient Greek

philosophy, expressly maintains that man is compounded of soul (psyche) and body (soma) only; and that the former is immaterial and immortal, and the latter material and corruptible. The words psyche and soma are the words translated soul and body throughout the quotation which we have made. And there is not in the whole dialogue the least mention of any tripartite division of man's nature. And it is especially taught that the soul of those who have been purified by philosophy, "departs pure and simple from the body," and "repairs to a being like itself, a being that is divine, immortal, and full of wisdom." Indeed, there is no philosophy whatever that maintains with more earnestness than the Platonic, that the soul in its future state of existence is a simple essence entirely free from any thing which belonged to this state of existence. For the Platonic philosophy is full of the oriental notion that matter is the source of sin. It therefore labours continually in all its teachings to prove that philosophy purifies the soul from every thing that has the least resemblance to matter. And to show how the oriental idea, that matter is the source of sin, is interwoven into this philosophy, it need but be remarked, that Plato in the dialogue before us, teaches that the pollution of wicked souls makes them visible and constitutes them a sort of corporeity. "This pollution, my dear Cebes, is a gross, heavy, earthly, and visible mass; and the soul, loaded with such a weight is dragged into that visible place, not only by the weight, but by its own dreading the light and the invisible place; and as we commonly say, it wanders in the grave-yards, round the tombs, where dark phantoms and apparitions are often seen; such are these souls that did not depart the body in purity or simplicity, but polluted with that earthly and visible matter, and makes them degenerate into a visible form."

It is at once seen by these cardinal notions of the Platonic philosophy, that nothing could be more inconsistent with that philosophy than the idea that the soul existed in a future state in a corporeity developed at death from the material body by a natural law. It is true, that the wicked are connected in some way with matter; but this matter is not a *tertium quid*, something half-way between matter and spirit, like Professor Bush's resurrection-body; it is matter itself. And the spirit or soul,

in the view of that philosophy, is never regenerated until it is entirely free from every thing pertaining to matter.

If we turn to the first book of the Tusculan Questions, which is a rehearsal of Greek philosophy on the immortality of the soul, we find that Cicero maintains the very same doctrines with Plato. Does not the conclusion seem to be, that the doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature, such as Professor Bush makes the basis of his theory of the resurrection, has no place in Greek philosophy; and that any incidental or casual expressions, indicating a tripartite division of man's nature, are nothing more than the loose classifications of the language of common parlance?

It appears, then, that in Greek philosophy, man is divided into soul and body, psyche and soma, and that psyche means the immortal part of man; and it may be well to remark that psyche is applied by Plato, to the nature or essence of God. That this was the general and peculiar meaning of this word in all ancient Greek literature, is undeniable, even down to the time of the New Testament writers. No other word was ever used within the domain of pure Greek, to signify the soul of man. For this word, like the English word soul, was used to signify the whole immortal part of man. In this sense it is used by all the ancient Greek philosophers whose writings have come down to us. There is nothing left, then, of man's nature to be embraced by any third word, so as to form a tripartite division in man. Soma, body, and psyche, soul, make up the entire man.

We are saved the trouble of examining the doctrines of the other Greek philosophers by the fact that Professor Bush in his "Anastasis," page 142, admits that all the heathen philosophers except Plato, maintained the doctrine that the soul in a future state was connected with no sort of body. "So far as they (the heathen philosophers) taught any thing relative to the future mode of existence, with the exception, perhaps of Plato, it was the existence of the soul as a mere disembodied intellect—as the abstract power of thought, apart from any kind of corporeity, whether material or spiritual." We have shown, that Plato does form an exception, as Professor Bush, although doubtingly, affirms. Professor Bush, like some other writers, has, we presume, mistaken Plato's doctrine about

wicked souls being visible and walking about grave-yards, for his general doctrine as to the mode of existence of the soul in a future state. If then, the heathen philosophers maintained that the soul in a future state was connected with no sort of corporeity, they are of course no authority for Professor Bush's tripartite doctrine; and any expressions used by them indicating such a doctrine are purely casual.

Whence then, it may perhaps be asked, did the notion originate, which is so often circulated at second hand, that the Greek philosophers did recognise a tripartite division of man's nature? It comes from casual expressions culled the Greeks writers, as well poets as philosophers; for some have thought, and we think with a good deal of truth, that the Greek poets were quite as good philosophers as the professed philosophers themselves; just as a similar doctrine might be inferred from casual expressions in English literature. For example, in the *Quaest Platon* of Plutarch, it is said, "The soul (*psyche*) is older than the body (*soma*) and the cause and origin of its existence; not but that the soul (*psyche*) exists without the body (*somatus*), or the understanding (*nous*) without the soul (*psyche*); but that the soul (*psyche*) is in the body (*soma*) and the understanding (*nous*) in the soul (*psyche*)." In this sentence there is a tripartite division into soul (*psyche*), body (*soma*), and understanding (*nous*). But that this a casual expression, is manifest from what Plutarch himself says, in the same treatise. He says that the *psyche* is a part of the Creator himself. "The soul (*psyche*) is not only his work, but a part of himself; it was created, not by him, but from him and out of him." The *psyche* (soul) being a part of God, must be what we mean by soul in its highest sense, and wants no *nous* to complete it. We find in English literature, the expression mind, soul, and body; but this is nothing more than a casual expression, without any very definite ideas attached to each word, as is often the case in common language, and indeed very often in philosophical treatises, though all the words, in their cumulative meaning, import a plain verity. Such expressions are not assigned to convey notions of scientific accuracy. We employ language expressing a division of the mind into faculties; but we do not thereby mean that the mind is divided into parts. The language is merely expressive of different pheno-

mena exhibited by the mind, which it is important to classify for accuracy of thought. So Plutarch, in saying that the nous is in the psyche, and the psyche in the soma, did not thereby intend to make two distinct parts of the immortal part of man, but merely to express some such division of the soul into pure intellect (nous) and its other attributes, as we make of the mind into faculties.

But suppose that Plutarch did intend to teach a tripartite division as a precise psychological doctrine; yet unless nous corresponds in meaning exactly with pneuma in the tripartite division of Professor Bush, the two doctrines are not the same; and consequently the doctrine of Plutarch is not an expression of a great psychological truth, which Professor Bush thinks is so obvious as to be admitted by all of the present day as well as of ancient times; whereas it is nothing more than the loose expression of notions founded upon a shallow insight into the various phenomena exhibited by the whole man. Unless the words of Plutarch, soma, psyche, and nous, are expressive of the very same ideas which the words soma, psyche, and pneuma express, in the doctrine of Professor Bush, the doctrine of Plutarch and that of Professor Bush are not the same. Now, we have seen that Plutarch expressly maintains that the psyche is a part of the Deity or Creator. And Professor Bush, as we have shown, maintains, in support of his peculiar theory, as to the meaning of psyche, that the term is not ever applied to the Deity by the Septuagint or New Testament writers; but that the psyche is an element which man has in common with beasts. This then alone, shows that the psyche of Plutarch and that of Professor Bush are very different. The word nous, too, which Plutarch employs, is not used in the same sense that pneuma has in the New Testament; and Professor Bush must confine himself to scriptural usage of pneuma, and is not at liberty to get a meaning for it from other usage, in making out his tripartite doctrine; for his tripartite division is founded upon the scriptural usage of the word. The word nous means merely the intellect, while pneuma, in scriptural usage, means the whole immortal part of man. The only word then in the tripartite phrases of Plutarch and Professor Bush, which is used to designate the same part of man by both, is soma, body. All this shows that these tripartite phrases are not

founded upon a great obvious psychological division of man's nature, but the random language of an imperfect classification of human phenomena, which, however, is sufficiently accurate for the ordinary purposes of thought. And it appears to us very clear, that not only is the peculiar tripartite doctrine of Professor Bush not found in the Greek philosophy, but no tripartite doctrine at all.

But Professor Bush has appealed to the opinions of the Fathers of the Christian Church, in support of his tripartite doctrine; and in doing this he has come nearer to hitting the nail on the head, than any where else in his book. On page 88, he quotes Irenaeus to the following effect. "There are three things of which the entire perfect man consists, flesh, soul, spirit—the one spirit, giving form, the other the flesh, receiving form. The soul is intermediate between these two, and sometimes following the spirit is elevated by it, and sometimes consenting to the flesh, falls into earthly concupiscencies." The following extract from Origen is also laid hold on. "There is a threefold partition of man, the body or flesh, the lowest part of our nature, on which the old serpent, by original sin, inscribed the law of sin, and by which we are tempted to will things, and as oft as we are overcome by the temptation are joined fast to the devil; the first by which we express the likeness of the divine nature, in which the creator from the archetype of his own mind, engraved the eternal law of the honest, by his own finger, and by which we are finally conjoined to him and made one with him; and then the soul, intermediate between these two, and which, as in a factious commonwealth, cannot but join with one or other of the former parties, being solicited this way and that, and having liberty to which it will adhere. If it renounce the flesh and join with the spirit, it will itself become spiritual, but if it cast itself down to the desires of the flesh, it will itself degenerate into the body." Now, that any man, in so grave a matter as scriptural interpretation, should seize upon such idle fancies as these, as a touchstone to try his interpretation by, or that he should adduce these whims as a philosophical foundation for a theory of the resurrection which is at variance with the one generally received, is an extremity to which none but one struggling hard to sustain himself, and catching like a drowning man at straws, would ever

resort. To exhume this fossil nonsense from the writings of the fathers, as an antiquarian doctrinal curiosity, might be well enough; but to make it the foundation of a theory of the resurrection, is truly an employment more fitted for Sidrophel, the philosopher of *Hudibras*, than for a biblical commentator. That there is a tripartite division of man's nature spoken of in these quotations, we readily admit. But, certainly, Professor Bush betrays the extreme weakness of his cause, when he quotes these fanciful notions, and by not making a single other quotation half so pertinent, thereby admits that these are the best that he can press into his service. It would be an easy matter to show, that even these quotations do not teach the same tripartite division which he assumes as the foundation of his theory of the resurrection; and that they are, therefore, of no avail on the ground even of such poor authority as the fathers are on subjects of philosophy. But our Professor is welcome to these two old rotten planks, to buoy him up, on the troubled waters into which he has precipitated himself.

But let us see where the Fathers got this doctrine. It originated in an endeavour to reconcile the peculiar system of Gnosticism with Christianity. The Gnostics taught that there is a supreme God, who is perfect; and a Demiurgus, who is a subordinate being, standing between good and evil; and also that matter (*Hyle*) is eternal, and from its resistance to all fashioning and forming, is the source of all evil. In accordance with the notion of the eternal co-existence of the Supreme God, the Demiurgus, and *Hyle* (matter), they maintained that there are three orders of men: the pneumatikoi who partake of the nature of the Supreme God, the psychikoi, who partake of the nature of the Demiurgus, and the hylikoi, who partake of the nature of matter. In this way they supposed they got rid of what to them seemed incredible, that men of such widely different natures could be created by one Supreme God. They maintained that the pneumatikoi derived their nature from the Supreme God, the psychikoi from the Demiurgus, and the hylekoi, from matter. In accordance with these notions, they believed that none but the pneumatikoi could ever attain to the enjoyments of heaven, in communion with the Supreme God, of whose nature they partake; and that the psychikoi in

a considerable degree, and the hylekoi in a greater degree, were doomed by their very natures, to sin and evil. This was substantially, with various shades of difference, the doctrine held by the Gnostic sects.

It is at once seen that this view of the nature of men is utterly at war with the doctrines of Christianity. It, therefore, became important for the teachers of Christianity to confute these Gnostic doctrines. "In contradiction to these Gnostics (says Neander) the church-teachers were especially concerned to show that evil was no necessary result of the composition of nature, but had its origin in the free will of beings created by God for good, and also that there were no natures either essentially wicked, in consequence of their derivation from one source, or essentially good in consequence of their derivation from another; but that in consequence of their derivation, equal moral capabilities were present to all, and the use or neglect of them was wholly dependent on the free will of the individual." And the different church-teachers did oppose these Gnostic doctrines. But then some of these church-teachers themselves were so entangled in the doctrines of the Gnostics, as not to be able to exercise an unbiassed mind, in expounding the great doctrines of Christianity, but coloured them with Gnosticism. Tertullian who founded the North African school, was entirely free from these Gnostic prejudices, and he opposed these notions of the essential differences in the natures of men, broadly and flatly, without any reservation. "With regard to the Gnostic doctrine (says Neander) of essential difference in the natures of men, in consequence of which they maintained that no Pneumaticus could be formed from a Hyleticus, or vice versa, Tertullian contrasted with this doctrine, the omnipotence of grace, and the unchangeableness of the human will. When the Gnostics appealed to the declaration of Christ, that no good tree brings forth evil fruit, and no evil tree good fruit, Tertullian answered them thus, "If this be so, then God cannot raise up children to Abraham out of stones, nor could the generation of vipers bring forth fruits of repentance, and the Apostle was in error when he wrote as follows: "And we too once were in darkness, and we also were once the children of wrath, among whom ye were once also, but ye are washed." In this uncompromising way did the North African school op-

pose the Gnostic doctrines. But far different was the course of the Alexandrian school. This school was greatly under the influence of Gnostic, as well as Neo-platonic ideas. Origen, its greatest teacher, and Professor Bush's chief authority, was deeply imbued with Gnosticism; and consequently in expounding Christianity, he incorporated in his teachings much of Gnostic doctrine. Origen (says Neander) like the Gnostics, supposed three principles in human nature in its fallen state, the sarkikon, the psychikon, and the pneumatikon, and also three different conditions of human nature, corresponding to these principles. But he separated himself from them in an essential point; namely, that as he recognised all human souls as similar, he accordingly supposes the same principles in every one of them, and that he therefore considered their different conditions to proceed, not from an original difference of nature in them, but from the predominance of one or the other of those three principles in them, dependent on the different directions of their will." Here, then, in this extract from Neander's Church History, we have shown that the doctrine of the tripartite division of man's nature originated in an endeavour to subordinate Christianity to ideas derived from Gnosticism. And Origen, the very person signalled by Neander as engaged in this attempt, is the chief authority whom Professor Bush adduces in support of the truth of this pretended psychological doctrine, upon which he builds his whole theory of the resurrection. Professor Bush, then, is attempting to unlock the scriptures with the very same old rusty Gnostic key which Origen used.

We have now shown, we think, that Professor Bush has founded his peculiar theory of the resurrection upon a doctrine which had its origin in an endeavour to reconcile Christianity with one of the most extravagant systems of thought ever put forth to the world as philosophy. Searching amongst the strata of patristic lore, he has stumbled upon this fossil doctrine, and supposing it to be a great truth of a primeval age, which perhaps had fallen from the lips of him who created man, he has endeavoured to reconstruct out of it the true theory of the human soul. But we are persuaded, that we have shown its true nature; and that it was the pro-

duct of an attempt to reconcile truth with error, human presumption with divine wisdom, just the very thing which Professor Bush is now attempting.

But what would it all avail, if every philosophy of every country of ancient times taught the very same tripartite division of man which Professor Bush teaches? Nothing whatever; unless it can be shown to be a doctrine which philosophy has borrowed from revelation. For unless it is a supernaturally revealed doctrine, the same sources of information which the ancients had are open to us, and this too with the light of a better logic to direct us in the path of inquiry; and therefore, the proper mode of investigation is to look to nature, and see whether its phenomena give any warrant to this doctrine. We will, therefore, now direct our inquiry from this point of departure, and show that the phenomena disclosed in physiology and psychology give no sort of warrant to the very fundamental fact, on which Professor Bush bases his theory of the resurrection-body being eliminated from the psyche by a natural law at death. And this will take us back to the first book of Professor Bush on the resurrection; as it is in that book that he discusses the question on physiological grounds.

What then is the fundamental fact, the germ of the whole argument in proof of the theory, that the resurrection-body is eliminated by a natural law, out of the material body, at death? It is this: "as the fact is incontestible, that a vital principle pervading the whole frame, co-exists with the intellectual principle in the body, is not the presumption perfectly legitimate that they co-exist also out of the body? The life then retires, and with the life goes forth the intelligence, which conjointly constitute the essence of the man." p. 66. This is the basis of the whole argument, the germ of the whole theory. It is out of this vital principle or life, that the resurrection-body is eliminated at death. "The resurrection-body is that part of our present being to which the essential life of the man pertains. It constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and it lives again in another state, because it never dies. It is immortal in its own nature, and is called a body—a spiritual body—because of the poverty of human language, or perhaps, the weakness of the human mind forbids the adoption of any more fitting term to express it." p. 70. It is ascertained, too, beyond

question that our vital functions are closely connected, if not identified, with the operation of certain invisible forces and elements, which we denominate electric or galvanic. These aerial agencies are, we must admit, too subtle and fugitive to be retained within our grasp. But science has reached results which certainly warrant the conclusion that all nature is pervaded by these active energies, and that we are living and moving in the midst of elements which directly take hold of the inner vitalities of our being, and from the action of which a spiritual body may be developed by established laws as soon as the present tenement is forsaken of its informing principle." p. 75. "The intimate connexion between electrical phenomena and light, goes undoubtedly to favour the idea, that the spiritual body will be essentially luminous." note p. 75. Such is the theory of Professor Bush. A spiritual body which is essentially luminous, is developed at death from the vital principle, by electric or galvanic elements, "which directly take hold of the inner vitalities of our being, and from the action of which a spiritual body may be developed by established laws." Now, this whole theory is founded upon the assumption, "that, as the fact is incontestible, that a vital principle pervading the whole frame co-exists with the intellectual principle in the body, that the presumption is perfectly legitimate that they co-exist also out of the body," that at death, "the life retires, and with the life goes forth the intelligence, which conjointly constitute the essence of the man." This, we have before said, is the foundation of the whole theory. And a more unwarranted assumption was never made; as we will show by incontestible physiological facts.

But before we examine this point, it will be necessary to a clear logical continuity in our argument, to identify the doctrine here set forth, with that of the psyche and the pneuma, which holds so prominent a place in the last book. By the psyche, Professor Bush means the vital principle of life, and by the pneuma he means the intellectual principle, or intelligence. The theory set forth above ties these Greek words down to these meanings; for the theory constitutes the physiological basis of the philological doctrine of the psyche and the pneuma. Let us keep these meanings fixed in our minds; for Professor Bush, in his logical gyrations, has, as the exigencies of his

argument required it, given a more or less extended meaning to psyche; just as he has said above, that it is immortal in itself, because his argument at the particular point required it; and in the second book, as we have shown, he says that it is not immortal, because as he was compelled to admit in this book that beasts have it in common with man, he was forced to say that it is not immortal to avoid the notion that beasts are immortal.

Identifying, then, the psyche with the vital principle or life, and the pneuma with the intellectual principle or intelligence, Professor Bush's fundamental notion, on which his whole theory reposes, is, that the psyche is the vital principle or life, and that as whenever the pneuma intellectual principle or intelligence leaves the body at death, the psyche, which is immortal, also departs at the same time from the body, that as there was a connexion between them in the body, there must also be a connexion out of the body, and they therefore live or co-exist in union in a future state. Now this notion is utterly opposed to well established physiological facts; and let the reader bear in mind, that we are now examining the physiological basis on which Professor Bush avowedly founds his philosophical theory which we have examined in the first part of this article, and that consequently, we are dealing now exclusively with physiology, and our sole object is to show that physiology, to which Professor Bush has appealed, is clearly against his theory. It is Professor Bush's own witness that we are examining. And what does this witness say? Why, that there is not this indissoluble connexion between the life and the intelligence, which the doctrine under consideration assumes. The brain, which all admit to be the organ of the intelligence, has been frequently cut away from the inferior animals, and yet they continue to live. But if it should be objected that the inferior animals have no intelligence, and that therefore the case is not in point; we reply that children have frequently been born, without brains, and yet continued to live for some time. Dr. Carpenter, in his *Human Physiology*, p. 77, Am. ed. in noticing the experiment of cutting out the brains of inferior animals, says: "A similar experiment is sometimes made by nature for the physiologist, in the production of fœtuses as well of human as of other species, in which the brain is

absent ; these can breathe, and suck, and swallow, and perform all their organic functions ; and there is no assignable limit to their existence so long as they are duly supplied with food." The facts here set forth in this treatise of the very highest authority are so well known to physiologists, that it is scarcely necessary to adduce authority to the point. In these children, the intelligence (*pneuma*) was wanting, and yet the (*psyche*) life was in the body. If it be replied that such children never had an intelligence (*pneuma*) and are not, therefore, cases in point ; we think the objection has no force ; because as the inferior animals who have brains can live after they are cut away (and infants who never had brains can live without them) the inference is irresistible that a man can live after his brains are taken away. Indeed, there is no difference in the animal economy of a man and a beast in this particular. Every physiologist knows that there is precisely the same cause for the continuance of life in both instances. What then becomes of this physiological corner-stone of Professor Bush's theory, that there is an indissoluble connexion between the life and the intelligence ? It may, perhaps, be said that Professor Bush does not maintain that there is an indissoluble connexion between the life and the intelligence, but merely a very intimate connexion. But it will be at once seen that this is giving up the strength of the point ; because the argument is that such is the character or nature of this connexion that the presumption is that it is eternal. But then Professor Bush has himself settled the point ; for on page 52 he says : " But in truth the vital principle of the body is indissolubly connected—we do not say identical—with the soul." Soul is here used to signify the spiritual or intellectual part of man. Again, on page 63 he says, " The vital principle, whatever that be, is intimately and probably indissolubly connected with the intellectual and moral principle, but no philosophy has yet shown that it is identical with it." Here it is seen that he makes the connexion so intimate that he seems tempted to say that they are identical. But knowing that he was standing on slippery ground he is a little cautious.

But let us look a little further into this theory of Professor Bush. In both of his works, he gives to *psyche* any latitude of meaning which the particular exigencies of his argument,

at any particular point, may require. Accordingly he not only makes it immortal or mortal, as may be convenient, but he also makes it the principle of organic life, as we have up to this point been considering it, or the seat of sensation, as it may suit his purposes. And on page 116 of his second book, he declares it to be both. "But the psyche is the sensitive principle, and constitutes, undoubtedly, the material of that exquisite apparatus by means of which the body is said to feel. The psyche, moreover, we are taught to regard as the grand intermediate agent in what are termed the vital functions, which we enjoy in common with the lower animals, and in a still inferior degree with the vegetable world." Now, this is confounding together, as identical, though producing different classes of phenomena, the sensitive principle or *vis nervosa*, and the principle of organic life. Nothing can be more erroneous. The operations of the first are called by physiologists, animal functions, those of the latter, organic functions. "Now it will serve to show (says Dr. Carpenter, page 76) the distinction between these powers and those which are merely subservient to organic life, if we advert to the case, which is not of unfrequent occurrence of a human being deprived by some morbid condition of the brain, of all the powers of animal life; sensation, thought, volition, &c., and yet capable of maintaining a vegetative existence; all the organic functions going on as usual, the morbid conditions not having affected the division of the nervous system, which is concerned in the movements on which some of them depend. It is evident that we can assign no definite limits to such a state, so long as the necessary food is placed within reach of the grasp of the muscles that will carry food to the stomach." And that the principle of organic life is different from the sensitive principle, is clear from the least examination into physiology. It is the principle of organic life which, from a single cell, forms the whole animal, under the guidance of the hand of the Creator. The basis of all organization, whether of vegetables or animals, is aggregated cells. These cells are finally formed into the various parts of the system, muscles, nerves, bones, &c. These are the operations of the principle of organic life. It forms the organism. But after the organism is formed, it has various endowments. The brain, for example, has the endowment of thought, &c. Now, surely this is not the same as

the principle of organic life which formed the brain. So also, the nerves are endowed with an internuncial function, to carry on communication between the world of matter and the mind. Now surely this is not the same with the principle which formed the nerves, any more so than the steam, which moves the engine, is the mechanic who made it. And so of every other endowment of any part of the animal organism; it is not the same with the principle which formed the organism. How then can the sensitive principle, which is the endowment of that peculiar nervous apparatus by which the body feels, be the same as the principle which forms the apparatus? If it be, then is it the same as the mind or intellectual principle also; for there is precisely the same reason for making the vital principle the same with the intellectual principle, as there is for making it the same with the sensitive principle; for it equally forms the organ of each, the brain and the nerves. And again, the bones, the nails, and the hair all have life, but are not sensitive; and consequently the function or endowment of organized matter is an entirely different thing from the principle which forms the organization. For, otherwise, as long as any organization was pervaded by the principle of life, it would be sensitive, which the instances adduced show is not the case.

This doctrine of Professor Bush is not only physiologically erroneous, but also psychologically erroneous. By making the sensitive principle reside in the psyche, he thereby makes the whole emotional element of our nature dwell in a different substance from the intelligence. This is altogether fallacious. Man has instincts, emotions and intelligence. Now, the instincts such as hunger, thirst, &c., certainly belong to the body, as physiological facts sufficiently prove. But emotions, such as love, anger, sorrow, &c., belong to the soul or spirit, and are as indispensable an element of it as intelligence. Now instincts precede intelligence, and put it in operation to gain the object of the particular instinct. But emotions succeed intelligence. And so far from there being emotions without intelligence, it is impossible under the laws of our psychical economy. There cannot be in the mind an emotion without there being in the mind either by perception, memory, or imagination, an intellectual conception as its antecedent. For instance, you cannot have the emotion of love without having in the mind an object to be loved; and so

in regard to all the other emotions. The emotion is an intellectual feeling, is an element in the mental act in perceiving or contemplating certain classes of ideas; and the one cannot exist without the other. The two together constitute a whole, and this is what is meant by spiritual discernment. Without emotions man would not be a moral agent; and to make these belong to an inferior part of his nature, is a gross error. If man were without the emotional element in his nature, he could only perceive all classes of truths, just as he now perceives mathematical truths, with perfect indifference. Indeed, it may be well doubted, whether there are not many truths which he could not realize at all—perhaps all which belong to aesthetics and morals; for emotion seems to be a necessary constituent of the very perception of these truths. But as man is now constituted, he cannot even follow out a chain of mathematical reasoning, without the emotion of delight which necessarily ensues upon the contemplation of the harmony of even mathematical truths, which in themselves have no connexion with the internal sympathies of man. Emotion then seems to be a constitutive element of intelligence itself.

But if Professor Bush should say, that he does not make the psyche the seat of the emotional element of our nature, though it can be easily shown that he does, still he is in the dilemma of making it the seat of the mere bodily appetites, which men have in common with beasts, and thereby making these immortal and functions of that spiritual body which shall be “raised in glory.” But the truth is, that his views of the nature of the psyche are so indefinite, so confused and so incoherent and contradictory, that it is perfectly obvious, that at least one half of the time he writes about it perfectly at random. As an instance read the note on the 89th, 90th, and 91st pages. At one time in this note, the psyche is the animal life, at another, it is the receptacle of animal life, and finally it is both the machinery and power by which the body is formed and its waste repaired. In this note, too, it is said that “Life is not an object of creation. It is a perpetual influx from God. The life of beasts which is also but influx, returns and is reabsorbed into the infinite ocean of life.” “Ocean of life” can mean here nothing but God. The life of beasts then returns and is reabsorbed into God. This surely is strange doctrine in

the mouth of a Christian philosopher. It is one of the very worst suggestions of pantheism. This note makes confusion worse confounded. The whole book is evidently a piece of patchwork, made up of disconnected thoughts and occasional suggestions ; and this note might just as well have been served into the text, as stitched upon the margin.

But there is another point in Professor Bush's theory of the resurrection that we cannot pass over in silence. It is, that the resurrection-body is developed by a natural law, and that "it is by no means impossible that the most signal miracles on record may not ultimately resolve themselves into the operation of some higher law which may never have been previously known except to its author." p. 35 Anastasis. This is the same absurd and atheistic principle of development, which has recently been pushed out to such a ridiculous extent in the work entitled "Vestiges of Creation." If there be one fact clearly written on the pages of the scriptures, it is the doctrine of the special interference of the Creator in the operations of this world, by supernatural power. The deluge, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea, and the other miracles recorded in the Old Testament, attest it under the old dispensation ; and the incarnation of Christ and his resurrection from the dead, and the turning water into wine, and the other miracles recorded in the New Testament, attest it under the Christian dispensation. And if we look beyond scripture into the domain of nature itself, we are irresistibly led to believe from the indications of geology, that the Creator has at various times, since the beginning, exercised special creative acts, and not left even the inferior parts of creation to be developed by a blind cause from natural capabilities. If then, supernatural power be exercised within the domain of nature itself, *a fortiori*, we might expect it to be exercised in the transition from nature to a future state of things. If God shows his hand in the operations of the present state of things and does not leave every thing to the agency of natural causes, it may certainly be inferred, that he would not hide his hand, in the change from this state of things to another, and let natural causes effect the operation. Accordingly, in the Apocalyptic description of the events which follow the dissolution of the present material world, the new

heaven and the new earth are not described as developed by a natural law, from the present system, but the idea seems to be excluded by the declaration, that the first heaven and the first earth pass away. The New Jerusalem, the future abode of the blessed, is represented as coming down from God, and of course is not formed out of the present material creation, but produced by the direct agency of the Creator. "For the former things are passed away. Behold I make all things new." When, then, the barriers of this stage of existence are to be passed by man, when the frontier of time is to be crossed, and the vast theatre of eternity with its solemn realities, is to be entered, that the whole process should be effected by a natural law (cause?) or that natural law should have any agency in the great work, such as making a body for the enfranchised soul, is to our minds an outrage upon common sense, and wholly at variance with the special teachings of Christianity as well as the whole tenor of the scriptures.

ART. III.—*The Elements of Morality, including Polity.* By William Whewell, D.D., Author of the *History and the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. In two volumes. Harpers, New York. 1845.

WE do not think that this work will add much to Dr. Whewell's fame, and we greatly doubt whether it will "find its way to the next generation." In the preface he says, "The reader will perceive that this work is not described in the title as having Moral Philosophy for its object, but is entitled *Elements of Morality*. Morality and the Philosophy of Morality differ in the same manner, and in the same degree, as Geometry and the Philosophy of Geometry." From the few remarks of the author in regard to this distinction, we are led to infer that he has not a very clear conception of the objects and the province of philosophy, whether physical or moral. The questions with which the Philosophy of Geometry, according to his view, is concerned, belong rather to the philosophy of scholastic metaphysics; we are not therefore much surprised to find

in this connexion, the equally imperfect statement that the peculiar business of Moral Philosophy is "to inquire what is the nature and evidence of moral axioms, and what are the faculties by which we know them to be true," inquiries which belong quite as much to the domain of mental as of moral science.

The whole work is divided into six books; the 1st is devoted to Elementary notions and Definitions; the 2d to Rights and Obligations; the 3d to Morality; the 4th to Religion, Natural and Revealed; the 5th to Polity; the 6th to International Jus. Its contents are given in the form of a series of propositions, so that the work has very much of a geometrical look; but beyond the outward garb, we must confess that we are unable to discover in it that analogy to geometry, which the author fancies to exist. We have neither the clear definition, nor the lucid order, nor the close reasoning of that noble science.

In proof of this statement we might adduce numerous passages from the first book—of Elementary notions and Definitions. Dr. Whewell affects indeed, great exactness and precision; but unfortunately while labouring hard to be clear, he becomes obscure, partly from his attempting to explain what every person understands, and partly from an excessive fondness for coining new names, which is displayed in the work before us, and still more in his history of the Inductive Sciences. For instance, he rejects the term "principles of action," because it is used equivocally, and adopts instead of it, "springs of action," as if the latter term were not quite as equivocal in meaning as that for which it is substituted. Again, after a needlessly minute explanation of certain mental operations, he observes: "Of the processes which have been mentioned as belonging to the reason, some are also ascribed to the understanding, but not all. The Reason and the Understanding have not been steadily distinguished by English writers. The most simple way to use the substantive understanding in a definite sense, is to make it correspond in its extent with the verb understand. To understand any thing, is to apprehend it according to certain assumed ideas and rules; we do not include in the meaning of the word, an examination of the ground of the ideas and rules, by reference to which we understand the thing. We understand a language, when we apprehend what is said,

without reasoning about the etymology and syntax." Here surely is the proper place for a clear statement of the distinction—overlooked by most English writers—between the understanding and the reason, but no such statement is given by the author. From the remarks which he does make upon the subject, his readers would naturally infer that he uses the term reason very much in the sense of reasoning; we find, however, in other parts of this same chapter of definitions, occasional statements which show that a great deal more is included under the term, but, how much, we are left to guess. Thus he says, "the reason is employed both in understanding and in reasoning;" "our desires and actions are influenced by our knowledge, that is by our Reason;" "the Reason is the light of man's constitution, which reveals to him himself, and enables him to choose between different objects." Now it must be owned that these varying if not conflicting definitions do not come with a very good grace from one who affects to use mathematical exactness in his investigations of moral subjects. If we might hazard a conjecture, we should say that Mr. Whewell, when penning the paragraph first quoted, had his eye upon the modern German distinction between the understanding and the reason; but whether he has actually adopted it (so far as his English mind would admit of his comprehending it) is a point which we are quite unable to determine.

Pascal, in his fragment "*De L'Esprit Geometrique*," has an observation to this effect, "that there are some things which it is worse than useless to define, or to attempt to prove; Geometry does not attempt to define all the terms employed in its investigations, nor to prove all the truths with which it is conversant." If this had been kept in mind by Dr. Whewell, while preparing his chapter of elementary notions and definitions, this part of his work would have been very considerably abbreviated, and very much improved.

But we pass to that portion of the work in which the elements of Christian Morality are discussed and laid down. Here indeed we meet with many sentiments with which we cordially concur; but looking at the system as a whole, we must confess that we are utterly amazed to find such a scheme of Christian morals put forth by one who says in his preface, "I am desirous that the reader should understand that though

I do not speak of my work as a Philosophy of morality, I have tried to make it a work of rigorous reasoning, and therefore, so far at least, philosophical." Yet this system of Christian morals, rigorously reasoned out, embraces such topics as the following: Christian ordinances, consecrated places, funeral rites, Christian ministry; and under each of these heads, doctrines are asserted which no one but a prelatist will for a moment admit to be true. It seems rather out of place for the Moral Philosopher, as distinguished from the Theologian, to discuss such points as, the observance of Easter and Whitsunday, the consecration of churches, catholic tradition, the power of the church in matters ceremonial, liturgies, and prelacy; but we could easily forgive the philosopher who thus goes beyond his appropriate sphere, if he can only make good his pretensions, and furnish us with an argument rigorously reasoned out, whose conclusions therefore must forever settle those vexed questions of church-order and government, which have occasioned so much debate and division in the Christian world. Dr. Whewell might justly hope that his book would "find its way to the next generation," and to many succeeding ones, if for no other reason, at least for the sake of its theological achievements, effected by means of the application of geometrical reasoning to questions in morals.

If he does not mean, that all his statements on all the points before named rest upon the firm basis of "rigorous reasoning," we do not know what the import of his language is. His work consists of a series of propositions numbered from 1 to 1216, which he declares to be intimately and logically connected, as an analogous series of propositions in geometry, and among these, we find the peculiar tenets of prelacy respecting the constitution, government, and worship of the church. With most persons, we apprehend that the simple statement of this fact will be sufficient to fix the character and value of the work. But let us look a little more closely into this system of Christian morality which claims to bear the stamp of a rigorous logic, particularly that part of it which treats of Christian ordinances.

These, in addition to Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are said to be "the appointment of sacred times, as the Lord's day, and other Christian festivals; marriages and funerals may

be also looked upon as Christian ordinances ; oaths likewise, in a Christian community ; finally, the appointment of an order of men for religious instruction ; and the mode of admission into this order." These things may be called Christian ordinances, in a loose sense, and so may all the customs prevalent in the nominal Christian world, that is to say, they are ordinances observed by professing Christians ; but such is not the commonly understood meaning of the phrase. A Christian ordinance is an institution whose observance is binding upon Christians in virtue of a divine command made known in the divine word. Dr. Whewell virtually admits that no outward institution deserves to be regarded as a Christian ordinance, unless it be invested with divine authority ; but having made so many things ordinances, he very naturally, though unwarrantably observes that the will of God respecting them must be gathered from other sources than the word of God ; "the rules of Christian duty with regard to ordinances cannot be collected from scripture in the same manner as the precepts of Christian morality, hence we must collect the will of God respecting ordinances from other sources, viz. natural piety, early revelation, apostolic institution, and catholic tradition."

This is a strange sentence considered merely as an expression of the author's opinion, but stranger still, when we remember his pretensions on the score of reasoning. Dr. Whewell surely cannot be ignorant, that there are thousands of Christians who deny and utterly protest against his doctrine that the will of God respecting Christian ordinances is to be looked for not so much in his own word, as in catholic traditions. Yet he does not bring forward even the shadow of an argument to sustain his position. What light, we ask, is to be obtained from "natural piety," or any sources to which he says we must look respecting the forms of marriage, funerals, oaths, and ordination, or the observance of Easter and Whitsunday, and the like ? The decisions of the apostles on any of these points, we confess, would have great weight, if we only had them, but, where are they to be found ? Dr. Whewell, as usual, asserts what it is impossible to prove, that "Easter has been observed from the first." "Pentecost was adopted into the Christian church, and bears the name of Whitsunday." "Set forms of worship, or liturgies have been in use in the

Christian church from its origin;" all this is mere assumption. The learned Suicer* declares that all the festivals, which Dr. Whewell would have us believe are to be numbered among Christian ordinances, were introduced into the church, not by divine but by human authority, and among other testimonies, he quotes that of the historian Socrates, (Lib. v. cap. xxii.) who says expressly "there is no law either of the Saviour or his apostles, enjoining the observance of these days."

As to liturgies, Dr. Whewell does venture upon a show of reasoning, but it has much more show than substance. He states the considerations so often urged by the advocates of their exclusive use, that they secure decency in divine worship, and guard against heresy; considerations, however, which have been proved to be of no weight, by the experience of liturgical and of non-liturgical churches. But he adduces no evidence to show that "liturgies have been in use in the Christian church from its origin," and for the very good reason that no such evidence exists. Mr. Palmer,† the most eminent ritualist the church of England has produced for a hundred years, confesses that the public services of the primitive church were all performed *ex tempore*, or *memoriter*, and that not one office was reduced to writing till the 4th century.

Under the head of "Christian ministers," Dr. Whewell says, "it is an ancient requirement of the church that every minister must be ordained to a special local ministry. The priest was ordained as the pastor of a particular place." If he had said the bishops were ordained, &c. the statement would have been correct; but in the sense in which its terms are used by the author, it is as unfounded as those on which we have already commented. We have looked through the earliest collections of canons, and we have not been able to discover the least trace of any such requirement respecting priests. Blackstone‡ shows that no such law was known in England for many ages; "how ancient," says he, "the division of parishes is, may at present be difficult to ascertain, for it seems to be agreed on all hands, that in the early ages of Christianity in this land, parishes were unknown, or at least signified the

* Thes. Eccles. sub 'Εορτη.

† Origines Liturgicæ vol. i. 9-12.

‡ Commentaries vol. i. 3.

same that a diocese now does. Mr. Selden has clearly shown that the clergy lived in common without any division of parishes, long after the time mentioned by Camden" (A. D. 630). This account of the primitive ecclesiastical condition of England, by the great expounder of English law, exhibits a state of things which appears to us to be perfectly inexplicable on the supposition that prelacy was the original form of church government, at all events it proves that in England, Dr. Whewell's "ancient requirement" was unknown for centuries.

One of the most shocking things (at least to an American) connected with the Anglican church, is the sale of church livings. Dr. Whewell has a few words upon this topic, and comes to the conclusion that the sale of advowsons, next presentations, &c., is quite in accordance with sound Christian morals. He admits, indeed, that it "may appear to be at variance with the prohibition of the sale of spiritual offices. But this is not so. The right of private patronage implies rather a sacred aspect in property, than a secular aspect in the ministry." We venture to think that to any other than an English patron, or an English dignitary, such sales will wear no other aspect than that of an intolerable abomination.

As might be inferred from what has been already said, Dr. Whewell is a decided advocate of the union of church and state, though not in the sense in which that formula is used by such men as Dr. Chalmers. He has not a word to say respecting the supreme dominion of the Lord Jesus Christ, or the duty of nations favoured with the gospel to recognise the truth and the law of God, in a way consistent with the rights of conscience, and the spiritual independence of the church. What he pleads for is a magnificent establishment, a splendid hierarchy amply endowed, bishops clothed with civil power,—in a word, a church converted into the mere tool and slave of the state. In order to prevent "an ecclesiastical supremacy," in other words, the spiritual freedom of the church, "an established church must be placed under Royal Supremacy, or in some other way subjected to the sovereignty of the state. The sovereign, who is the head of the state, must also be the head of the church, so far as its government on earth is concerned. He must convoke and dissolve the legislative assemblies of the

church, as of the state. He must be the supreme judge of appeals.”—“Bishops must be connected with the state, and associated in the government. They must possess places in the executive or legislative councils; they must have the aid of the civil power in enforcing the sentences they pronounce as ecclesiastical judges; they must have maintenance and rank suitable to the place thus assigned them in the business of the state.” That is to say, things as they are in England, are just as they should be. We can make great allowance for one who, educated under such a system as that which obtains in England, simply pleads that it may be endured, that there is no imperative necessity for its removal; but we cannot listen with any degree of patience to the man who exhibits this system, with its notorious Erastianism, its enslavement of the church, its lay patronage, its sale of church livings—as one which is not only sanctioned by Christianity, but which should be adopted by every Christian nation.

With all the defects of Paley's Moral Philosophy—and these are very serious—the work before us does not deserve to be compared with it, either as an academic text-book, or as an exposition of morality for the use of the general reader. The very form which Dr. Whewell has adopted, Paley justly and strongly condemns. “It has,” says he, “become of late a fashion to deliver moral institutes in strings or scores of propositions, which, by crowding too fast upon the mind, gains not sufficient hold upon the attention.” Paley's views on various important principles of morality are radically unsound, but no one can be at a loss to know what he means. “No writer,” as Dr. Chalmers observes, “ever had less nonsense about him;” for clearness of vision, strong sense, the art of making abstract things plain, of condensing an argument, and bringing it down to the level of the common understanding, he is almost unrivalled. His work possesses undoubtedly great excellencies, but it also labours under radical defects; and when we think of the unsound principles which it inculcates, and some of the worst of these are adopted by Dr. Whewell, we cannot refrain from saying that its introduction into our colleges, and for many years its universal use as a text-book is much to be deplored.

The question has often occurred to us, of what use is this

whole class of books? What good purpose do they serve; or are they designed to serve? They relate, indeed, to one of the noblest branches of human knowledge—the science of man's duty; their authors are professedly expounders of morality, yet are we inclined to believe, that in the general mass of readers, it would be difficult to find a single person who has ever thought of taking up any one of our many systems of moral philosophy with the view to learn the nature and extent of his moral obligations, or to determine a particular question of duty. The truth is, that beyond the precincts of the college and the academy, these works are practically unknown, or to say the least, they are used by no one, except the speculative moralist. And even within our educational establishments, we fear that their use as text-books has been designed, not so much to fix in the minds of students the eternal principles of truth and justice; but rather to give a sort of moral colouring to the system of education. Doubtless there are exceptions, but in too many of our colleges, this branch of study has been deemed and treated as a purely intellectual one, or else the moral instruction imparted has amounted to nothing more than the dry, bald statement of particular virtues contained in the text-book, a statement producing no impression upon the student's heart, and perhaps forgotten almost as soon as learned. Hence, among the hundreds of young men who go forth every year from our academic halls, how few can be found who look back to the class-book of moral philosophy as to the place where they learned many of the most valuable and influential lessons of collegiate life. If any one who takes a just view of the nature of moral science, must admit, that we are entitled to look for rich results intellectual and moral, from the study of it by those who resort to our seats of learning; certainly, for far richer results than have been produced by that system of education of which it forms a component part. Whence this comparative failure of precious fruit? Shall we find the cause of it in the nature of the tree itself, or in the method of its cultivation? These inquiries appear to us to be worthy of deep consideration, and before we close our article we beg to say a few words on the subject to which they refer.

Dugald Stewart observes "that it is from the school of Grotius that most of our best writers on ethics have proceeded.

But in Britain, for more than a century, there have been two distinct schools, or we should rather say, two distinct methods of treating moral philosophy, viewed as one of the branches of an academic education. There is the Scottish school, of which Hutchinson was, in one sense, the founder, a school with which are associated some of Scotland's most illustrious names. But with all the fame acquired by Smith, Ferguson, Reid and others, rich as was the lustre which they shed for so many years upon the universities of their native land, a careful examination of their history will show, that as moral teachers, their labours were fruitless. They, no doubt, gave to Scottish intellect a mighty impulse in a direction in which it had never before travelled: they did much for the literature of Scotland, and for the cause of metaphysical philosophy; but when it was asked what moral fruit did they bring forth, we are compelled to answer, none at all. With all their eloquence, and many of these men possessed an uncommon share of it, the great lessons of morality were cold and unimpressively enforced; their aim appears to have been, not to make their students virtuous, not to educate and elevate their moral nature, but to teach them how to speculate about virtue, to sharpen their intellectual faculties by means of the investigation of those deep moral problems which, in all ages, have engaged the attention of thinking minds. Hence, in the Scottish universities, the Moral Philosophy class, has long been regarded as *the* class, not so much because of the moral lessons which were taught in it, but because of the eminent intellectual advantages with which it is associated.

We are not disposed to deny that the study of those ethical problems which moral philosophers have laboured so hard to solve, affords a fine field for the exercise of the mental powers, but as respects the cultivation of the heart, the improvement of the moral affections, we believe that their discussions, whether carried on in the professor's chair, or in the pulpit, is perfectly valueless. Take, for instance, Bishop Butler's sermons at the Rolls; who that reads them, can believe that the learned lawyers before whom they were preached, went away from their chapel, either with any newly awakened desires after virtue, or with conformed resolutions to strive after it. Sir James McIntosh tells us, that the chief result of his labours as

a moral philosopher, was the strengthening the basis on which Butler built his doctrine of the supremacy of conscience. Viewing the matter in a merely scientific light, we may admit the necessity for this, which McIntosh affirms to have existed: but looking at it as a practical doctrine, we very much doubt if there is one among the readers of the fine speculations of that eminent man, who has been impelled by them to listen to the voice of conscience with a deeper reverence than before.

In the English universities a very different method of conducting this branch of education has obtained. Practical ethics have been there most in vogue. The kind of ethics taught, as well as the manner of teaching, may be gathered from the work of Dr. Paley, who was an instructor in this department in the university of Cambridge for many years previous to the publication of his *Moral Philosophy*. As our collegiate system is of Anglican origin, the early and very general adoption of Paley's work as a text-book, is not surprising. Is this, however, the kind of morality which is desirable for our young men to carry with them from college? Even supposing that Paley's system were purged of all its unsound principles, is it reasonable to expect that, in the use of that or any similar text-book, all those intellectual and moral ends can be attained which should be proposed? In other words, may not a far higher and nobler use be made of *Moral Philosophy* in the business of collegiate education, than has been made of it in past years? Reform has become of late so much a cant word, that we are almost ashamed to use it, yet we cannot forbear saying, with reference to the question just proposed, that in our judgment there is great room for improvement in most of our colleges, if not in all of them. We believe that the study of *Moral Philosophy* if rightly conducted, and its true aim be kept steadily in view, could scarcely fail to imbue the student's mind with noble principles, to give a proper form and complexion to his character, and at the same time would be an admirable instrument for developing his powers of investigation, reasoning and judgment.

We have no desire that *Moral Philosophy* should be taught in our colleges after the fashion of the Smiths, the Reids, or the Stewarts, of Scotland. They made quite too much of its intellectual element. The history of *Scottish Philosophy* proves,

that where such a system of instruction prevails, there is great danger of its putting into the hands of the student, an intellectual power which he will almost inevitably abuse, because of the absence of its appropriate guardian—a sanctified heart. Still we believe that a method of study may be so framed, including a well proportioned combination of the speculative and the practical, or the mental and the moral, as to make it a most fit means of expanding, and educating the whole of the student's higher nature. Christian morality and Christian theology though closely connected, are not identical: no one can desire or expect the teacher of the former to do the work of a professor of divinity, but inasmuch as morality and the philosophy of it form an integral part of the collegiate curriculum, we do wish most earnestly, that this branch of knowledge shall be so taught, that our educated young men may carry with them from our seats of learning, not a few barren notions about virtue, but the true morality: that they shall be imbued not with the philosophy falsely so called, which begins with speculation and ends in scepticism; but the "true philosophy, baptised

In the pure fountain of eternal love."

This department of study affords the teacher many fine opportunities of bringing the grand verities of the Christian faith to bear upon the student's mind, of doing it in a very impressive way, and without awakening any prejudice; surely these opportunities ought not to be neglected.

In order to attain this end, the Moral Philosopher must be content to take for the basis of his system, the morality of the scriptures; his "elements" of morality, as distinguished from its philosophy, must be derived from the sure testimony of Him who made man what he is—who knows his frame—his whole nature, with all the circumstances of its condition, and who has revealed to him a perfect rule of action, in His holy word.

We look upon that portion of Dr. Whewell's work for example, in which he treats of natural morality, as in a great measure useless, at least in a text-book designed for the instruction of the young. To us it seems to be little better than a waste of time and labour, to analyze the moral nature of man,

for the purpose of deriving from that nature the laws by which it should be governed, or in other words, a natural morality, when we have a moral code resting upon divine authority, embracing every thing that pertains to practical ethics, pointing out as well the proper motive of action, as the proper rule. Favoured as we are with "the Law of the Lord which is perfect," what possible reason can we have for endeavouring to "determine what man's business is, or what conduct he is obliged to pursue, by inspecting his constitution, taking every part to pieces, examining their mutual relations one to the other, and the common effect or tendency of the whole." *

Such researches into the constitution of human nature were very proper in the schools of antiquity, destitute as they were of those lively oracles which we possess; but why should we take up their feeble lamp, after the Sun of Righteousness hath arisen upon us; why should we resort to the oracle of human nature, when a divine voice is heard declaring, in terms plain and peremptory, "what his business is, and what conduct he is obliged to pursue." Admitting that Moral Philosophy, by her researches into the nature of man, could learn what he should do, there is still one most essential element of true morality which she can neither discover nor teach, the *spirit* in which he should do it. The utmost that she can attain in the way of discovery, is a law; but more than this is needed, we want a power to render it operative.

The justness of this view of the subject is confirmed by a due consideration of the actual state of man as blinded and depraved by sin. In all his researches as a Moral Philosopher, he is at once the investigator, and the subject of investigation; how then can he be expected to make a complete and correct analysis of his own moral nature, unless in God's light he sees light! In fact, among all the systems of morality constructed in this way, we cannot call to mind one which is not positively erroneous, or materially defective. We do not remember to have seen in any one of them, for example, a just statement of what may be called "the law of faith;" by which we mean, to use the language of Cudworth, "not the mere believing of historical things upon inartificial arguments or tes-

* Ency. Brit. Art. Mor. Philos.

timonies only, but a certain higher and diviner power in the soul that peculiarly correspondeth with divinity." Dr. Whewell introduces this subject when he comes to treat of Christian ethics, and has many excellent observations respecting it; but there is not a word of it in his natural morality. We repeat it then, that the philosophy which aims to discover moral rules for the guidance of human conduct is, to say the least, useless, because we have a code of moral law established by divine authority, and therefore the very code that would result from a complete and perfectly accurate analysis of human nature, if we were able—which we are not—to make it. What then is the proper business of Moral Philosophy? We answer not to discover laws, but adaptations; not to find out rules of conduct, but to show the perfect fitness which exists between those moral laws which God has enacted, and that moral nature which he has given to man the subject of these laws. A nobler field of investigation is thus opened for the Moral Philosopher, and in the prosecution of his researches, he will find, especially if he is an instructor of youth, that there is ample room afforded for the exercise of all his intellectual powers, and that the stores of a varied learning will be called into requisition. The study of man in this point of view is as profitable as it is interesting; for if it be rightly prosecuted, the student will get at every step not only a clearer insight into the mysteries of his own being as God made it, and of that condition into which sin has brought it; but also fresh discoveries of the glory and the goodness of the great lawgiver, and of that immutable law whose essential elements are love, faith and justice; full scope will be afforded for bringing into use, the attainments of the student in every other branch of knowledge. To explain more clearly what we mean, take the divine law of property, "thou shalt not steal," and let us suppose that the youngest student of moral philosophy is required to solve the problems which this law suggests, or in other words, to show the necessary conditions of such an enactment, and their exact fulfillment in the nature of man and in the constitution of society; we ask whether such an exercise would not be productive to him of far greater advantage intellectual and moral, than to go over the rules of a dry and barren morality, or to study those metaphysico-moral problems which, even if solved, in

the present state of man, could produce no practicable good. It seems to us that any one who begins the study of the rights of property from the stand-point of the divine law will be compelled by the spirit of true philosophy to conclude, that the regeneration of society, or even the diminution of existing evils by means of the socialist scheme, in any of its forms is a simple impossibility, for that scheme is equally contrary to the law of God's moral government, and to the nature of man, who, whether we view him individually or socially is the subject of that law.

It would be needless to multiply illustrations. What has been already said, although by no means doing justice to the subject, which merits a full and thorough discussion, will at least suffice to show what we mean by the assertion, that Moral Philosophy considered as an instrument of intellectual and moral education, admits of a higher and better use than has commonly been made of it.

There is another branch of Moral Philosophy which deserves the attention of those who are called to teach the science; for want of a better name, we may call it comparative morality. By this we mean a comparison of the moral systems which obtained amongst the most enlightened nations of antiquity, with the perfect law of God, in two points of view, as systems of rules, and as systems of motives. The classical reader cannot but be deeply struck with particular sentiments in the moral writers of Greece and Rome, e. g. in Cicero *De Officiis* and *De Legibus*. But compare the most perfect body of moral rules with which they were acquainted, with the law of God, and how great the difference; how many virtues are omitted. But even supposing it to be complete as a code of moral laws, how destitute of power to enforce them. On the other hand how grand, how mighty the motives which the Christian moralist can employ. We need not point them out; we shall only observe, that while the study of comparative morality would bring the collegian's classic stores into requisition, it would afford his teacher an admirable opportunity of inculcating some of the most distinctive and important truths of the Gospel.

ART. IV.—*Principles of the Interior or Hidden Life, designed particularly for the consideration of those who are seeking assurance of faith and perfect love.* By Thomas C. Upham. Third edition. Boston. Waite, Pierce & Co. 1845.

THAT the book on the Interior Life is seeing its third edition, is evidence that many Christian people have felt some interest in its contents; and we doubt not that all who have read it with serious and candid minds, have derived benefit from it. The work is full of decided and impressive signs of an enlightened understanding and a pious heart. As an effusion of a devout mind, it awakens sympathy with the author in other devout minds, and is one of a sort of instruments by which the spirit of Christ may be excited and nourished in his people.

The great variety of forms under which the principles of religious experience are discussed, affords ample opportunity for observing the diversity of gifts in writers, and the diversity of aspects which the same religious experience assumes in the lives of believers. The spirit of true religion is one. The forms of thought and action in which this spirit may find expression, are innumerable. The thoughts of pious writers are, for the most part, arranged and presented for other purposes than merely to give expression to their piety; and hence it comes to pass that the selection and arrangement of the intellectual views which are employed to conduct the devout emotions of one mind to others, will be as various as the aims of the different writers. Every one hath a doctrine, hath a psalm, hath a revelation. The doctrine of one may, only with great difficulty, be reconciled with the doctrine of another. The psalm of one may harmonize ill with that of another. The revelation of one may have a very obscure logical consistency with the revelation of another; while the inward, hidden experience of all, considered apart from the intellectual forms in which that experience presents itself as an object of thought and of discussion, may not be essentially various. Faith, in different minds, may have a leading apprehension of different features of the character of God, and still be, in all those minds, in its spiritual nature the same; equally pure, and equally efficacious towards salvation. There are doctrines of the scriptures

which may be variously received and expressed by different persons, and still do their proper work by giving intelligent exercise to faith, as an element of the spiritual life in the soul. In this matter the great truth which must possess the minds of all believers as the foundation of Christian charity is this: that all their exercises of thought and forms of expression are diverse phenomena, put forth, in different circumstances by the same principle of life.

This truth claims the habitual consideration of Christians. It pervades all the instructions of the gospel. Forbid not him who casteth out devils in the name of Jesus, though he may not follow with us. This sentiment has as bold and decisive expression in the scriptures as any other portion of the mind of God. Every true Christian learns it from the Holy Spirit which dwells in his own heart. It is acceptable, in theory, among all professed believers; and is only when under the dominion of false and pernicious reasonings, that the true Christian can endure the contraction of bigotry.

In the book before us we have a discussion of religious experience presented in a form intentionally peculiar. The writer has his theological object distinctly before him throughout. The work is the offspring of patient and intense reflection, and gives on every page, abundant proof of a habit of discriminating thought. Its air of scientific precision makes the reader suspect his author of a somewhat presumptuous confidence in the accuracy and utility of his views. From the title page itself we learn that the author writes for the particular benefit of "those who are seeking assurance of faith and perfect love." And although we have no design of shaping this article into a formal examination and refutation of the system of perfectionism, we promise our readers a few plain thoughts which, in our judgment, are worthy of the serious regard of Christian writers as to the tendency and the value of all this sort of speculation on the subject of religious experience.

"That man," says Jeremy Taylor, "does certainly belong to God, who believes and is baptised into all the articles of the Christian faith, and studies to improve his knowledge in the matters of God, so as may best make him to live a holy life; 2. Who, in obedience to Christ, worships God diligently, frequently and constantly, with natural religion, that is, of prayer,

praises and thanksgiving; 3. Who takes all opportunities to remember Christ's death, by frequent sacrament as it can be had, or else by inward acts of understanding, will and memory, which as the spiritual communion, supplies the want of the external rite; 4. Who lives chastely; 5. and is merciful; 6. and despises the world, using it as a man, but never suffering it to rifle a duty; 7. and is just in his dealing and diligent in his calling; 8. He that is humble in spirit; 9. and obedient to government; 10. and content in his fortune and employment; 11. He that does his duty because he loves God; 12. and especially, if, after all this, he be afflicted and patient, or prepared to suffer affliction for the cause of God. The man that hath these twelve signs of grace and predestination, does as certainly belong to God, and is his son, as surely as he is his creature." These twelve signs of true religion are, all except the eleventh, outward duties of the Christian, which indicate to the view of men, the religion which reigns in the soul. But they are no part of the religion itself. The eleventh refers to the love of God, as the motive to all duty; the comprehensive element, the sum of religion in the heart.

We have here one of the forms adopted by an eminently intelligent man to express the evidence of a true religious experience. It is a form which strikes every one as proper for the purposes of religious instruction. It appeals to outward acts, palpable, intelligible, the natural fruit of the inward quality of the mind. It expands and divides into numerous particulars, the concise definition of pure religion and undefiled, given by the apostle James: "To visit the fatherless and the widow in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world."

The remarkably diffuse and extended analysis of the religious affections, by President Edwards, affords an illustrious instance of what may be expected from a mind of unusual clearness and penetration, when employed upon the physiological distinctions of spiritual phenomena. It will detract nothing from the good influence of the book as an instrument of edification for the pious reader, a book which bears on every page the fruit of the extraordinary spiritual intelligence and glowing piety for which the author was distinguished, and which has embalmed his memory in the hearts of so many of

the friends of truth and goodness, if to serve our present purpose, we examine here his twelve non-signs, and his twelve signs of true religious affections, and state our ground of doubt in relation to their practical utility.

As to the first;—it is no sign of gracious affections, 1. That they are very great and are raised very high; 2. That they have great effects upon the body; 3. That they cause fluent, fervent, and abundant talking of the things of religion; 4. That persons did not make them themselves, or excite them of their own contrivance, or by their own strength; 5. That they come with texts of scripture remarkably brought to the mind; 6. That there is an appearance of love in them; 7. That there are many kinds of religious affections accompanying one another; 8. That comforts and joys seem to follow awakenings and convictions of conscience in a certain order; 9. That they dispose persons to spend much time in religion, and to be zealously engaged in the external duties of worship; 10. That they much dispose persons with their mouths to praise and glorify God; 11. That they make persons who have them exceeding confident that what they experience is divine, and that they are in a good estate; and 12. That the outward manifestations of them, and the relations persons give of them, are very affecting and pleasing to the truly godly, and such as greatly gain their charity and win their hearts.

As to those signs which President Edwards gives as decisive, they are these: 1. That they arise from those influences and operations on the heart which are spiritual, supernatural, and divine; 2. That they have regard to the transcendently excellent and amiable nature of divine things as they are in themselves; and not any conceived relation they bear to self or to self-interest; 3. That they be primarily founded on the loveliness of the moral excellency of divine things; or, to express it otherwise, a love to divine things, for the beauty and sweetness of their moral excellency, is the first beginning and spring of all holy affections; 4. That they do arise from the mind's being enlightened, richly and spiritually to understand or apprehend divine things; 5. That they be attended with a reasonable and spiritual conviction of the judgment, of the reality and certainty of divine things; 6. That they be attended with evangelical humiliation; 7. That they are attend-

ed with a change of nature ; 8. That they tend to, and are attended with the lamb-like and dove-like spirit and temper of Jesus Christ, or in other words, they naturally beget and promote such a spirit of love, meekness, quietness, forgiveness, and mercy, as appeared in Christ ; 9. That they soften the heart, and are attended and followed with a Christian tenderness of spirit ; 10. That they have beautiful symmetry and proportion ; 11. That the higher they are raised, the more is a spiritual appetite and longing of soul after spiritual attainments increased, while, on the contrary, false affections rest satisfied in themselves ; and 12. That they have their exercise and fruit in Christian practice ; that is, that they have that influence and power upon him who is the subject of them ; that they cause that a practice which is universally conformed to, and directed by Christian rules, should be the practice and business of his life.

As we pass to the remark for the sake of which this list of signs has been quoted, we will notice, what the reader will see by a moment's inspection, the extreme logical and metaphysical defect of the series. There is evidently no reason why such an enumeration of signs of gracious affection should stop at twelve, or at twelve times twelve. Such distinctions and propositions may be indefinitely multiplied on any subject whatever, and with no approximation towards an exhaustion of the matter. The first is no sign at all, but on the contrary, without signs, cannot itself be known. The second and third are identical. The fourth and fifth must exist in order to the two preceding, and, as signs, are therefore included in them ; and the fifth may exist without them, and is consequently no sign of gracious affection. The sixth, eighth, ninth, and eleventh, are only periphrastic names for gracious affections themselves. The seventh, like the first, is a *petitio principii*, making the thing to be signified a sign. The tenth, as a general characteristic of believers in this life, is false ; or, if really intended to denote some general fact of the spiritual life of Christians in this world, is unintelligible. The twelfth is truly and properly what it purports to be—a sign ; and taken in connexion with the one which is numbered above as the second and third, is entirely synonymous with Jeremy Taylor's "twelve signs of grace and predestination."

But to our main point. The evidences of regeneration, as stated by President Edwards, with the exception of his twelfth sign are, by the necessity of nature, confined to this condition: That they are principles deduced from the revealed doctrines of the scriptures, respecting the nature of religion as a property of the human soul; and are in no proper sense obtained from the experience of the spiritual life or from observation of its phenomena. They are chiefly suggested by those scriptural statements concerning God and man, which are designed as instruments of the Holy Spirit in producing the phenomena of the religious life, and which can be employed only with extreme difficulty, and very doubtful utility, as tests of the phenomena they are instrumental in producing. They are not matter of consciousness in the human mind. The mind cannot know them as objects of thought, except in the form of theological or philosophical propositions. It can institute no satisfactory comparison between them and any of the facts of its own consciousness, and is of course unable to settle the question of agreement or disagreement between its conscious experience, and this theological description of religion.

It is therefore not wonderful, that an attempt to state these scriptural principles in the form of signs or evidences of a genuine religious experience should result, as in the case presented above, in an enumeration of religious doctrines, with a merely verbal modification to adapt them to the form and design of the discourse. The usefulness of exercising the mind on these doctrines thus presented we do not call in question. We speak now only of their validity as evidences, and the perplexity they tend to produce in a reflecting mind whenever they are considered, for the sake of their practical benefit, strictly in this character. There can be no doubt that some of the most painful and discouraging forms of mental trouble, in Christians of a timid and delicate frame, come from this source. Still, if the trouble were either legitimate as an effect of truth on the mind, or salutary in its results, it could not be prudently deprecated. But the very suspicion that it is the effect of error and not of truth, and that it does great harm and no good to the comfort and character of the Christian, warrants an inquiry into the manner in which it arises.

There is undeniable truth in the energetic assertion of Dr.

Dwight, Vol. I., p. 29, "That the man who repents of his sins, who believes in Christ, who loves and fears God, who disinterestedly loves his neighbour and forgives his enemies, and who employs himself daily in resisting and subduing his own passions and appetites, must have some consciousness that he does these things. In this consciousness, as it continually rises up to the view of the mind, consists the primary or original evidence that we are Christians. Indeed all the evidence of this nature which we ever possess, is no other than this consciousness, variously modified and rendered more explicit and satisfactory by the aid of several things, with which, from time to time, it becomes connected."

The practical value of this fact is no less important than its truth is unquestionable. We are seriously concerned to inquire how far "this consciousness, variously modified, as it rises up continually to the view of the mind," and is made matter of discussion, and of formal and scientific statement, can either promote a genuine religious experience, or establish the standard by which such an experience can be known.

"The experimental exercises of religion," says Dr. Alexander, "are sure to take their complexion from the theory of doctrine entertained, or which is inculcated at the time." "There is what may be called a sectarian peculiarity in the experimental religion of all the members of a religious denomination." These facts, and others of a similar character, bear an important relation to what are currently denominated evidences of a true religious experience. They reveal the power which determines not only the forms of expression which are used in relating the experience, but the very conceptions which the mind entertains of its own religious state and operations. It would doubtless be matter of amazement to many a minister of the gospel who is in any good degree efficient in his instructions, to observe how few of his people express their religious experience in any other language than that which they have learned from himself. So entirely does the spiritual state of the mind, as far as it can be expressed in words, appear to be formed by the instructions received;—as the impression on wax is formed by the seal. The words of most religious persons of ordinary intelligence and little reflec-

tion, evidently take the lead of their thoughts, and produce what they express.

There are probably few ministers of the gospel accustomed to careful and intelligent observation in their intercourse with religious people, who have not found abundant occasion to remark the great difficulty of applying the evidences of holiness to particular cases. The agitation and bias of the mind, from a sense of the extreme importance of the case, the variety of natural dispositions in the persons concerned, the diversities of education and of prepossession, the similarity of natural and evangelical affections, the transient nature of the emotions, the infinite diversity of the mental states with which the religious affections are combined, the acknowledged imperfection of the religious character, and the frequent instances in which persons of accredited piety relapse, are certainly sufficient to inspire a prudent and conscientious Christian with caution in judging both of others and of himself. In these multifarious cases what standard can be stated in words as the decisive test of true religion? The elaborate attempt of President Edwards, and its confusion and deficiency, may well discourage persons of ordinary discernment and smaller knowledge, from attempting to erect the standard. Dr. Dwight gives the substance of the same evidences thus: 1. The renewed mind relishes all spiritual objects; 2. Real religion is always accordant with the dictates of reason enlightened by revelation; 3. The prevalence of a meek and humble disposition furnishes the mind with good reason to believe that it is renewed; 4. Without a prevailing spirit of gentleness towards others we cannot have sound and scriptural evidence of our Christianity; 5. A willingness to perform, accompanied by the actual performance of the duties required by the gospel, is an indispensable evidence of our Christianity. Then, to render all this evidence satisfactory, it must be, first, uniform, second, universal; or manifest in all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the man, and in relation to all branches of religious duty. "Real Christianity," he adds, "is the energy, the active power of the soul, steadily directed to that which is believed to be right, and thus directed to it because it is right." The signs here given are substantially those of President Edwards expressed in other and fewer words.

It is difficult to read the discussions of those authors, and similar discussions of the same subject by other writers, without feeling that one's thoughts are led in a circle; and we occasionally meet with a passage where the few steps of this circle are fully expressed in their order; as when the Rev. Thomas Boston writes to a Christian who is supposed to doubt respecting his own regeneration, and who complains of the prevailing love of the world. "Although the Christian may find himself more moved in his love of the creature than in his love of God, yet it is not therefore to be said that he loves the creature more than God, seeing love to God is always more firmly rooted in a gracious heart than love towards any creature whatever." We have therefore little hope of benefit from anything like a scientific discussion of the evidences of a true religious experience. The moment our terms on this subject become technical they become worse than useless. But the chief difficulty seems to be, that we are utterly unable to maintain in these discussions the appearance of logical consistency. We either set down, as signs of gracious affections, the gracious affections themselves, or adopt as signs those outward expressions of thought and feeling which, according to Edwards, *may* all exist without discernible defect, in the absence of true religion.

These remarks on discussions of religious experience in general will be found to contain the main principles by which we propose to judge of the practical value of the book before us. The work is divided into three parts. I. On the Inward Life in its connexion with Faith and Love. II. The Life of Faith and Love, followed by the crucifixion of the Life of Nature. III. On Inward Divine Guidance. At the end of the book are given forty "Religious Maxims, having a connexion with the Doctrines and the Practice of Holiness." The whole is the most elaborate attempt to construct a science of holiness that we have recently seen. It is a reproduction of the system of mysticism taught by William Law.

The first part of the book is composed of definitions and statements of the various principles of experimental religion, and illustrations of the distinctions between different religious affections, and of the relations of different affections to one another. In this portion of the book, the author states his

“Doctrine of Holiness” with directions to aid in the attainment of holiness. He treats of three sorts of Faith, appropriating faith, faith of acceptance, assurance of faith. He treats also of a life of special signs and manifestations, as compared with a life of faith; and having drawn several distinctions at large between various affections, pure and impure, natural and spiritual, &c., he closes this part with a chapter on the nature of the temptations of a sanctified heart.

The first chapter of the book gives the reader a very just idea of what he may expect in the sequel, as a theory of Inward Religion. We give the first sentence. “There is a modification or form of religious experience, which may conveniently and probably with a considerable degree of propriety be denominated the Interior or Hidden Life.” This phrase, “the Hidden Life,” he says, “we employ to indicate a degree of Christian experience greatly in advance of that which so often lingers darkly and doubtfully at the threshold of the Christian’s career;”—“a greatly advanced state of religious feeling, resulting in a sacred and intimate union with the Infinite Mind.” With this Hidden Life thus defined, he associates the language of the psalmist, “Thou art my hiding-place and my shield.” “He that dwelleth in the secret places of the Most High shall abide under the shadow of the Almighty;” and the language of the apostle, “I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me;” “ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God;” a series of exegetical suggestions which we presume will strike our intelligent readers as a curiosity. But not to dwell on the exegesis, we have here an Interior or Hidden Life; a vitality or living principle which differs in various particulars from every other form of life; which consists in a very advanced degree of Christian experience, “a greatly advanced state of religious feeling, resulting in a sacred and intimate union with the Infinite Mind.”

We are really unable to see with what principles of either scripture or philosophy a sound and clear mind could produce such an analysis of Christian experience as this. Does Christian principle become changed in its “vitality or living principle” by being increased in degree? Is there indeed a sort of life which belongs to a greatly advanced state of religious

feeling, but which exists in no degree at the threshold of the Christian's career? Is it true that there is a hidden life which is the endowment of a few favoured believers, and of which a person may be entirely destitute and yet be a believer? We presume the general view of Christians on this subject to be this. That the distinguishing endowment of the Christian is spiritual life; that this life every person possesses in his degree when he is born again, and is thus quickened from his death of trespasses and sins; and that as he grows in Christian virtue his life is strengthened and enlarged, and manifests itself in the various forms of outward exercise; but does not receive the addition of any new principles. The new-born soul is a believing soul, a holy soul, and has the true spiritual life, the hidden life. Whatever the scriptures say of one believer, as to his being united to Christ, they say of all believers; and to set up an arbitrary distinction between the nature or kind of life, the vitality or living principle of one stage of religious experience and that of another is evidently at variance with scripture and with all that reason can perceive in the facts.

But we are further instructed, that this "hidden life," this "greatly advanced state of religious feeling" results in a sacred and intimate union with the Infinite Mind. We are accustomed to reverse this order, and are quite sure that no Christian, who has taken his theory of the spiritual life directly from the scriptures, can be made to conceive the phenomena of that life in the order in which they are here presented. "Abide in me and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit, for without me ye can do nothing." But "a greatly advanced state of religious feeling, resulting in a sacred and intimate union with the Infinite Mind," is abundant fruitfulness resulting in the branch being united to the vine; the fruit in order to the life and vigour of the branch. As to the doctrine of two species of union with the Infinite Mind, differing not in degree only, but in kind, the one a cause, the other an effect of great advancement in holiness, we do not find it in the scriptures; nor is it taught by the consciousness of Christians. It can only spring, as we judge, from some conceptions formed entirely without the

scriptures, and without a proper observation of spiritual phenomena. That successive stages of advancement in holiness should be attended with an enlivened consciousness of intimacy with God, is both conceivable and undeniable. We learn this from the scriptural theory of the divine operation on the human heart, in which the Holy Spirit, the energetic form or person of God, is represented as awakening in the minds of his subjects, "the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father. It accords with the entire scriptural doctrine of sanctification by the power of the Holy Ghost," that the sanctified should feel the agreement between their own holy dispositions and the holy mind of God revealed in his word. It is the conscious sympathy of like with like. It is a recognition of oneness; in which is involved the whole idea of the most intimate union conceivable between different persons. But we do not receive from the scriptures the notion of any sacred and intimate union with the Infinite Mind which belongs rather to one true believer than to another. Every true Christian must be as intimately united to Christ as any other; and any difference among different Christians, respecting the consciousness of that union, and the manifestation of its fruits, cannot amount to a different kind of life, but only to a different degree, or conception, or manifestation of the same life.

We cannot doubt that all believers sometimes, and the vast majority always, live in the exercise of their faith in Jesus as a Saviour, and the quiet hope of salvation, without having so much as a thought of their union with God distinctly in their minds. It is obvious also, that when this notion of union arises to them, it comes not out of their consciousness or from the attention of the mind to its own state, but entirely from suggestions out of the mind itself. And even when the term becomes familiar to them as a sign of somewhat belonging to their Christian relations, their idea of its meaning is indistinct and fruitless. The mass of Christians really bestow little attention upon the theology of their own religious experience, and scarcely know anything of their spiritual state, except that their feelings are interested in the doctrines and the hopes of the gospel. They are free from entire insensibility on the subject of their future welfare, and from the perplexity and peril of unbelief; they have a calm persuasion of their secu-

rity in the favour of God for the present and the future, and submit themselves habitually to such means of religious improvement as are in use in their church connexion; and beyond this the multitude of professed believers never go. This, it must be admitted, is the chief that their conditions in life seem to allow. Little beyond this is ordinarily attained except by those who renounce the pursuits of the present life to a greater extent than the majority believe it their duty to do. They are not accustomed to study their own mental states. They do not stop to classify their feelings, and give them names. They observe few distinctions between their various exercises, except that they discern between the agreeable and the painful; and when they are calm and happy in the devout occupation of their thoughts, they have neither a natural nor spiritual instinct which makes them endeavour to confirm their assurance or increase their enjoyment by any close inspection, or laborious analysis of their mental phenomena.

Yet many of these Christians have true religious enjoyment. Their pious exercises are lively and pure. They are even the more clear and happy in their meditations from being the less occupied with themselves and the more engaged with the truths of divine revelation. They have true spiritual life. They manifest its properties in their various ways and degree. Whatever of that life is interior or hidden belongs to them, from the first in due proportion to their spiritual growth. We can understand the process by which the outward manifestations of this spiritual life may change as the Christian advances towards maturity; but that a new principle of life should be added we cannot conceive from any analogy of nature, from experience or from the scripture. As this class of believers advance in their spiritual course, they acquire more clear and comprehensive views of religious doctrine; they become better acquainted with the meaning and spirit of the scriptures; their religious emotions acquire more firmness and consistency, their worldly feelings decline in strength, their habits of devotion become established, and the affections which are proper to the Christian life become the leading affections of their minds. They see more of the love and the glory of God revealed in Christ. Their hope of everlasting blessedness is enlivened, and has greater power over all their mental exercises;

and their enjoyment in spiritual respects is proportionably refined and enlarged.

This course of experience, probably continues, in the majority of cases till death; without passing through any point recognised by the believer as a crisis; and in cases of distinguished spiritual thrift, the advance suggests, at no stage, the thought of entering upon a new sort of life. There is even nothing, in the majority of intelligent and growing Christians, which becomes memorable in their consciousness of progress; nothing which seems to them a transition from one field or one level or one form of religious experience to another; nothing which their consciousness receives or presents as "a modification or form" of religious experience, a vitality or living principle which must, for convenience or propriety, be called by a peculiar name; but as they advance in the riches of knowledge and the blessedness of love, they take their present state as the proper enlargement and maturity of the past, induced upon it as manhood upon youth.

If it be only intended to signify by these terms "Interior or Hidden Life" a stage of spiritual progress ordinarily situated between the beginning and the end of the earthly life of the growing believer; if it be only recommended that the epoch of the attainment of a certain degree of knowledge, perchance of God, or of sin, or of holiness, or of the way of salvation, or of all these together; or that the epoch of the arrival at a certain degree in the scale of religious enjoyment, shall be called the beginning of an interior or hidden life, then provided always, that the stage thus designated be strictly defined we have nothing to say against the designation; except that it is useless. But such a use of the terms does not agree with their construction in this book. The author has this hidden life before him as a specific and desirable state "unknown to many in the beginning of their Christian career;" "appropriately and peculiarly the life of those who, advancing beyond the first elements of Christianity, may properly be said to be sanctified in Christ Jesus." It is in his view a form of life distinct from that which exists "in numbers of persons who profess to be Christians, and who are probably to be regarded as such in the ordinary sense of the term, but in whom the natural life still remains in part;" distinct from "the ordinary

forms of the religious state, where there is such a mixture of worldly and religious motives, such an impregnation of what is gracious with what is natural, that men of the world can tolerably estimate the principles which govern the conduct of its possessors." It is a state which the author gives specific directions for attaining; in which, if we understand it, the Christian is stationary, and beyond which there is in this life no advancement. We are therefore constrained to expose the fallacy of such a distinction, not so much to overthrow the structure of theological deformity which the author very confidently rears upon it, as to avert the confusion, error, and delusion it is adapted to beget in the experience and self-contemplation of the Christian.

If then this principle of interior life mean anything else than the principle of holiness begotten by the power of God, in every regenerate mind, we freely say we do not understand it. We have received no hint of such a thing from the Bible. And when Mr. Upham defines its characteristics, 1. that it is the life of the soul incorporated into the life of Christ; by which we suppose he means the union of the soul with Christ by faith; 2, that its moving principles its interior and powerful springs of action are not known to the world; 3, that it is lowly and retiring; 4, that it is not identical with the places and formalities and observances of religion; and finally, that it has its principles, inward and fixed, and is not wholly emotional, we recognise in his description nothing else than what we suppose to be the common Christianity of all true Christians. It is then, in our judgment, an error in doctrine, and an injury to the thoughts of the sincere and simple-minded among Christians, to offer such a distinction to their attention. If it were only useless we would not spend thought upon it. But believing, as we do, that such speculations, recommended to common readers by the pretence of explaining and assisting a true religious experience, do not unfrequently gain pernicious ascendancy over the thoughts, and by consequence over the religious conduct of pious people, we deem it important that their tendencies should be well considered. But of this more after a glance or two farther at the book.

Having presented the reader with an interior or hidden life, divine in its origin, inappreciable by the world, unobtrusive,

spiritual, and permanent, as a vital characteristic of the "desirable state" for the Christian, the author entertains the question, in what way we shall 'gain admission' into it; and with all didactic assurance and precision, as if starting from the chair of authority the laws of the spiritual experience he gives as his first and indispensable pre-requisite for admission to this desirable state, holiness of heart. Holiness of heart as a means of attaining inward life! If this order of spiritual phenomena can appear to any well instructed mind as true, we shall be compelled to regard the diversity of discernment among candid and intelligent persons in plain matters as far greater than we have hitherto supposed. This is no doubt the order of thought on this subject in many minds which are disciplined and led by theological teachings of a certain class; but how can it be regarded the order of things in the kingdom of spiritual life? Is holiness of heart the antecedent of the life of God in the soul of man, or the consequent of it, or identical with it? We do not propose to follow the author into the minute discussions on this and other points, with which the book abounds; for most of the errors there presented will, in the view of our readers, be sufficiently refuted by being stated. The idea of a perfect holiness as a condition of attaining what we are compelled to understand by the hidden life, is entirely preposterous. The author evidently has something occasionally in his mind as the image of the hidden life which we do not clearly conceive, and of which he himself has no definite and steady conception. "It is generally supposed" he remarks, "that God may exhibit pity and pardon to those in whom there still exist some relics or stains of inward corruption; in other words, that those may be forgiven or pardoned who are not entirely sanctified. But those who would walk acceptably with their Maker, who would receive from him his secret communications, and enjoy the hidden embraces of his love, must see to it first of all, that they are pure in heart." Now this sort of formal classification, placing under one description those who are only pitied and pardoned, and under another, those who receive the secret communications and the hidden embraces of their Maker, does not seem to us a very sensible, scriptural or useful way of denoting the different degrees of divine manifestations vouchsafed by him "who distributeth to every

man severally as he will." For, first, we have no scriptural suggestions that one sort of divine communication with the hearts of believers is more secret than another, or that any one kind of spiritual intercourse between God and his people, can more properly be called a hidden embrace than another. And, second, we know nothing from scripture of higher intimacies with God, than those with which the ideas of pity and pardon are strictly congenial. And what can be the use of such classifications as these? With no illustration from scripture, and lending no illustration to it, and with no discernible basis in the nature of things, how can they occupy the thoughts of the people to edification. Where is the ground for saying that the soul imperfectly sanctified is only pitied and pardoned, while the perfectly pure in heart may "cheerfully and boldly take the condition of sons?" Are there not some "weak in faith" for whom Christ died, and who by their faith in Christ Jesus, are children of God?

We take for granted that this author believes sanctification to be the work of the Holy Spirit, although he speaks as if he believed it to be the work of the sinner himself. But if the spirit of sanctification be the same with the spirit of adoption, how is it that the believer partially sanctified does not have the spirit of adoption in a corresponding degree. It seems to us much more agreeable to the common sense of Christians and the sense of scripture to represent the matter thus: That the believers whom Mr. Upham classes among the imperfectly sanctified, are those whose minds are under the power of Christian truth, and of the Holy Spirit, and have a comfortable persuasion of their peace with God, and rest in the hope of heaven, while they bestow little attention upon the doctrines of religion in their abstract forms, are altogether too little given to meditation on the objects of our faith, and are given least of all to the contemplation of their own mental states: that from a very low degree of Christian principle upward, we may observe all stages of increase in the power and the fruits of the spiritual life, until we come to those who appear to have reached the stature of mature piety; whose spirituality of mind, whose heavenly temper, and lively joys; whose humility, constancy, and devotion to Christ, are so conspicu-

ous and complete, as to render them worthy to be recommended as models of religious character.

Now it is doubtless possible, for reasons which have been mentioned above, and which are very obvious, to train these Christians to some extent, into a habit of watching their vicissitudes of feeling, of measuring with grave precision the comparative strength of contemporaneous emotions and giving different names to those states respectively in which different emotions or views are imagined to predominate; of exercising their fancy with representations of their spiritual state to be expressed in technicalities acquired by rote, and used with fluency and fervour, and self-complacency in their narratives of religious experience. This might indeed be done, but to what good purpose? Certainly not to any advantage in the clearness of their views of revealed truth concerning God. It could not tend to exalt their conceptions of the love of God towards them, or advance the power or purity of their love towards him; nor could it by any known law of the mind, help in the least their discernment of their own moral character and state. It would not tend at all to quicken their sense of the evil of what is wrong in them, or even assist their discovery of the wrong itself. And while we could hope for no good from such a discipline, we are warned by the history of these habits among professors of religion in different denominations, to beware of thus multiplying facilities for self-delusion, and propagating the seeds of error in regard to the nature of religion in the soul.

Of the author's directions to aid in the attainment of holiness, the first is that we "believe in the attainableness of sanctification or holiness at the present time; for," says he, "it is not according to the nature of the human mind to feel an obligation to be what the man feels it impossible for him to be." He also asserts as the second ground of his direction, that such is the relation between the will and belief, that no person can put forth a volition to do a thing, which at the same time he believes impossible to be done.

The foregoing assertions involve the long agitated question of the connexion between the conviction of ability and the consciousness of obligation, and also the relation between

ability and will. We do not now propose to go at large into this discussion. We shall only take this occasion to present a few thoughts on this subject for the consideration of this writer and such of his readers as may have their attention drawn to these remarks.

We shall apply our present remarks on the intellectual conditions of the sense of obligation directly to the doctrines and language of the book before us. We have not space nor inclination here to discuss the subject on general principles. The assertions we have quoted above relate to the perfect sanctification of the believer in the present life. And we take for granted that the "belief of the possibility" of this sanctification means the belief that the state of perfect holiness is attainable in the present life, at the pleasure or wish or determination of the believer himself.

It is proper then, first to ask Mr. Upham how he knows what he so confidently asserts, that no man can feel himself under obligation to be what he believes it impossible for him to be? Upon what settled and acknowledged principle of human nature is that doctrine supported? If that be true, and we will not now deny it, we wish to see the proof of it, that we may believe it. The author propounds a certain doctrine respecting the necessary and universal connexion of a sense of obligation in the human mind with a given intellectual perception of the possibility of something; the relation of a certain feeling to a certain exercise of the understanding on a given object. He asserts that the two are in their nature mutually dependent; that the one cannot exist without the other. We demand, therefore, on what ground this is asserted? Under what general principles of the moral and intellectual nature of man is this proposition comprehended? Where is the process of induction from the facts of the moral nature of man, the result of which is this proposition, that the feeling of obligation is necessarily and universally joined with the particular intellectual state called the belief of ability. If any such process of induction has been given we are unacquainted with the fact; and therefore to us, the proposition, though it might be true, can as yet be only an hypothesis.

It avails nothing here to declare that the question is settled by the consciousness of men. The feeling of obligation, in-

deed, is matter of consciousness, but the fact of ability is matter, not of consciousness, but of intellectual perception. If presented as a truth, and perceived as such by the mind, it is matter of belief. If one believes this doctrine of ability, he is conscious of his belief. But, for aught that consciousness can know about it, that belief may be groundless. And in that case a man is liable to be represented as feeling bound to do what is in fact impossible, because he falsely believes it to be possible. But besides all this, how can consciousness testify to a necessary and universal union of these two mental phenomena, the sense of obligation and a particular belief? It may be true that the feeling of obligation in Mr. Upham is always joined with the belief of a particular doctrine concerning ability because that may be a belief which he habitually entertains. Yet even in him, how can consciousness determine that these co-existent states of mind are mutually dependent. But suppose, what he cannot deny to be fact, that a very large proportion of those whose views on that question have been formed from deliberate and intelligent investigation, entertain the contrary belief, and yet feel as lively a sense of obligation as himself; and suppose moreover, what is also the fact, that the mass of mankind are conscious of their feelings of obligation in all their relations and circumstances, while they never have a thought of the matter of possibility at all. And if, in view of such facts, this theory of obligation and ability is still upheld, it must be regarded not as having a recognized connexion with the observed phenomena of human nature, but as an arbitrary conception, a figment of particular minds.

The second ground of the author's first direction for attaining holiness is, that no person,—such is the relation between will and belief,—can put forth a volition to do a thing which, at the same time, he believes impossible to be done.

Here is a fearless and sweeping assertion involving the great question of the nature of volition as a state of the human mind. It is an assertion which indicates an entire misconception as to what, in the present state of mental science, we are warranted to declare as truth. How can a philosopher, who understands what he says, and has a due regard for the sacredness of truth, allow himself to assert, at this day, a proposition the truth of which is to be determined by some settled

and acknowledged principle respecting the nature of volition? To illustrate some of the difficulties of this question, which, if not insurmountable, are as yet unsurmounted, let us take the examples given by the author of the paragraph before us. 'I do not believe in the possibility of flying in the air; and I am unable to put forth a volition to do any such thing. I may exercise a desire to fly in the air; but while I have an utter disbelief in its possibility, I shall never put forth a volition to do it. So if I disbelieve in the possibility of being holy, I can never put forth a volition, that is to say, a fixed determination, to be so. I may put forth a volition to do many good things; I may put forth a volition to grow in grace; but to put forth a volition, a fixed unalterable determination, with divine assistance, to resist and overcome every sin, to be wholly the Lord's,—to be holy,—when I believe such a result to be unattainable, is what, on the principles of the philosophy of the mind, I am unable to do?'

There has never a definition of volition been given, which if substituted for the word in the passage before us would not show the paragraph to be nonsense. If we take this one definition which all will admit to be sufficiently indefinite, namely, that volition is the state of mind which immediately precedes action, we are then gravely told that according to the laws of nature, it is impossible for a man to have a state of mind which immediately precedes the act of flying in the air. So also is it impossible that one who believes holiness unattainable should have the state of mind which immediately precedes being holy! In following up this method of philosophy, we are required to construct a definition of action; and it becomes no enviable task to frame such a definition of action taken for a single consequent of volition, as shall cover the two cases of flying and being holy; even if we could frame one that will apply to either of them. The volition to fly must either be resolved into the innumerable volitions which precede and produce severally the many muscular motions of which flying is the comprehensive name, or it must be put as a single and general antecedent of those volitions,—a general volition to put forth a series of particular volitions. In either case it must be allowed to be a thing of somewhat difficult conception. As to a volition to be holy, we acknowledge that

we have no metaphysical ideas which help us to form a conception of such a thing at all. But this volition, to crown all, is in the language of this book, a volition to be holy, *with divine assistance!* And all this is stated with the grave appearance of philosophical formality. What is that mental state to which this writer gives the name of volition? He would undoubtedly apply the term to that state of mind which he considers the simple impulsive cause of lifting up his hand. But here he calls by the same name that more complex, comprehensive, remote, and continuous propension which is conceived as belonging among the antecedents of particular and direct volitions and having only a share with other antecedents in determining severally the actions of the man. Such are the permanent propensions of men to seek wealth, honour, or holiness. With such use of language what progress can be hoped for towards the attainment of clear and established results from our investigation of the facts and laws of human nature.

But the climax of absurdity seems to be reached by directing those who desire perfect sanctification to believe the attainment to be possible. The reader is, of course, expected to remember that this is the direction of a perfectionist, addressed to one who is supposed to be not yet fully persuaded that the doctrine of his author is true. The question is whether it be a doctrine of the Holy Scriptures that the people of God, can expect entire freedom from sin in the present life. The evidence which is to settle this question is, not the command to be perfectly holy; for that no more proves the fact of perfect holiness in any believer on earth than the preceptive prohibition of sin in the world proves the entire non-existence of sin. But the evidence must be, either some instance or instances known and undeniable, or, which is equivalent to actual cases, some unquestionable declaration of God that such things shall be. When these things are presented, either or both of them, to a conscientious mind, they will do their legitimate work. The belief produced by them will be rational, sound, and safe. A person who should resist their force might properly be held blameable for perverseness, and for rejecting the testimony of God. And it would be lawful to suggest to such a person inducements to belief which should address the feelings hostile to the right use of reason, and persuade in favour of proper

evidence, where the evidence itself has failed. But to attempt to persuade without evidence, or beyond it, where men are supposed to assert the lack of it, is ridiculous. It is the logic of fanaticism. When Mr. Upham, upon such grounds as himself can deem worthy the reason of man, has gained the assent of his readers to his doctrine, he may offer his counsels as the guide of his followers. But to urge considerations which no man can rely upon as the safe guide of rational and moral beings, and which, notwithstanding, lead captive weak minds without true reasons, and often against them, is, either to lead them right, by irrational and unlawful means, or to lead them wrong, by means which destroy the reasonable hope of correction.

Our author represents a permanent and devout personal consecration as an act without which no one can reasonably expect to make much advancement in religion. "Unless the Christian is willing to make such a consecration, and unless he actually adds the execution of the thing to the willingness or desire to do it, by a formal and decisive act, we can see no encouragement that he will reach those results of personal and inward experience which will be hereafter indicated." This act of consecration is given as one of the indispensable things to the attainment of holiness. He guards his reader against confounding consecration with the full or complete state of sanctification. This confusion of ideas, he says, ought to be avoided. Sanctification is something more than the consecrating act. To give an epitome of his theology of consecration, it is simply putting forth the volition to be wholly the Lord's. A fixed purpose, not to be altered during the whole period of our existence, to break off from every known sin, and to walk, to the full extent of our ability, in the way of the divine requirements. This can be done, for the persons are supposed to be Christians in a justified state, whose dead wills have been partially quickened by the Holy Ghost. This act of consecration is necessary, first, because we have no available faith in the promises of God without it; second, because we have no encouragement to believe that God will sanctify us in the state of personal and spiritual inactivity and declension. "God recognizes," says the author, "the moral agency of man, fallen as he is, and especially when, after having justified him by the

application of the Saviour's blood, he has given him the principle of a new spiritual life. It is because he has given us the power of distinguishing between good and evil ; because he has given us judgment, and conscience, and will ; because he has breathed into us the breath of a new spiritual life, thereby putting us into communication with himself, and opening to us the fountains of everlasting strength, that he has the right, and exercises the right, of requiring us to surrender all to him." This confusion of ideas can afford no light to an enquiring mind. What can a reader understand of the true connexion between the agency of God and the moral agency of man, from the assertion that God will never sanctify him in a state of spiritual and personal inactivity and declension? In what other state does he find us when he sanctifies us? The majority of Christians are incapable of discerning a distinction between a state of spiritual declension, and a want of sanctification. Even if there were a distinction between them in reality, it seems entirely unintelligible to the mass of believers, and incapable of being explained to them. They cannot be made to see a difference between the act of sanctification and the act of imparting spiritual life. The verbal distinction may be set before them, and so inculcated as to work a permanent conformation of their modes of speech, while it produces no change in their thoughts of the nature of things.

There lies at the bottom of this theory of consecration a notion of holiness in the abstract as an object of desire and of active pursuit. "It will of course be understood, that in making this act of consecration we have a sincere and earnest desire for holiness." The common idea of holiness, and an idea which could not easily be changed, makes it the state or quality of being conformed to the will of God ; of a disposition to do right ; of the disposition of one who loves God with all his heart and his neighbour as himself. Now we can understand a desire for wealth in a person who is not rich ; a desire for knowledge in a mind which is ignorant, a desire for distinction in a person who is living in obscurity. But in a miser we cannot conceive the existence of a desire to be liberal ; in a selfish mind the desire to love another as himself ; in an ungodly mind the desire to love God. The consciousness of obligation to love is not what we rightly express by desire to

love. The sense of obligation in a miser to be liberal, is not a desire to be liberal. Nor would a desire for the credit of liberality, and for any of its rewards, be a desire to be liberal. The desires of a spiritual mind seem to us most properly represented as having for their object not holiness in the abstract, but the view and enjoyment of God, and of all the things on which the spiritual affections are set. We are able with this view to understand our language. When we speak of a desire for holiness, if we consider holiness to mean not a quality of our own disposition, but a property of the object of our contemplation, we use language on this subject as we use it on others. But the desire for subjective holiness appears to us as holiness itself, implying and presupposing the holiness which is verbally placed as its object. In any sense in which we are accustomed to use the language, to say of a man whose affections are set on things on the earth that he desires to set his affections on things above, is to assert a contradiction in terms. We might say that he desires the benefits of a spiritual mind; that he desires release from the apprehension of the wrath of God, and from the disquietude of a wounded conscience; and the happiness of indulging his worldly affections in security from evil. But we have no knowledge of any usage of language which would make it strictly proper to say that any man *desires* holiness which he does not possess.

“To desire holiness” is a common expression, indeed; but when we look, in the nature of things, for the signification of the phrase, we find that the words do not express any theological idea. For all the ordinary purposes of religious conversation, like the terms of common parlance respecting the rising and setting of the sun, it is sufficiently correct. It is strongly descriptive of a state of mind common to all true Christians in their respective degrees. But when taken in its literal sense, and built into a philosophical theory of religious experience, it destroys every part of the structure that rests upon it.

The use which the author makes of the literal sense of these terms is important for his theological purpose. He could not well get on without it, in the construction of his theory of religious experience. He conceives a modification or form of religious experience which he denominates the *Hidden Life*,

the life not of those "who are probably to be regarded as Christians in the ordinary sense of the term," but of those "who, advancing beyond the first elements of Christianity, may properly be said to be sanctified in Christ Jesus." This Hidden Life must be represented as attainable; and attainable too, in some sense, at the option of the believer. The subjective and causal antecedents of the interior or hidden life are the act of religious consecration, and the efficient virtue of this consecrating act, on which all its validity depends, is the desire for holiness. With this desire for holiness, Mr. Upham gives to his act or covenant of religious consecration a theological validity indispensable to its usefulness in his system. Without that desire, the first step in the process of attaining the interior life cannot be taken. But if the phrase "desire for holiness," is not a strictly theological form of speech; if there is no mental state known to the experience of the Christian which can in the precise language of theological science be called by that name; but if what is usually denominated the "desire of holiness," is in truth the longing of the holy mind after God, after the lively and comforting view of his character, and his words, and his works, and after the lively apprehensions of his promised favour; that longing which is proper to the sanctified mind not favored, for the time, with the fulness of gracious manifestations; then to represent the desire of holiness as a condition of attaining holiness is to speak without meaning. It is a desire which can have no place in a mind not already holy, and the degree of holiness in the heart is the only degree in which this desire can exist. The act of consecration and the desires, whatever they may be, which attend it, are the fruit of holiness already in the heart. They are the effect of which holiness is the cause; and the Christian, when he makes the entire consecration of himself to the service of God, does it rather from an impulse of holy feeling within him, than from a regard to holy feeling which he does not possess, and which he may thereby acquire.

It is an error to make so much of an act of consecration as a means of attaining holiness. It is also an error to lay so much stress on an outward and formal act of any kind. The strong feeling of devotion, it is true, will invariably produce the form; and it is also true, that the formal act of consecration has its in-

fluence in aiding the holy purposes of the mind. But the readers of Mr. Upham can hardly fail to receive the impression that he considers the outward act as possessing something like intrinsic validity ; without which he can see no encouragement that the Christian will reach the higher results of personal inward experience.

In relation to this subject of religious consecration, the truth, as it arises out of experience to the view of most believers, will doubtless be found to accord, in the main, with the following statement. When the sinner is renewed by the Spirit of God, and becomes clearly sensible of the divine favour towards himself, in forgiving his sins, and giving him the comfort of faith, he feels the corresponding spirit of obedience, and is prompted to inquire for the will of God. "Lord what wilt thou have me to do?" This question is asked with an ardour of self-devotion usually corresponding to the clearness of the spiritual perception of the authority, and the views which the convert is enabled to take of the benefits he has received from God. As he gradually gains the knowledge of truth, and his thoughts and feelings become more freely and fully conformed to the objects of his Christian faith, he finds himself more cheerfully engaged in the performance of his religious duties, and more happy in his meditations and prayers. He laments his defects of understanding and of feeling. The growing propensity of his mind is towards the contemplation of God, as revealed in his works and his word ; and especially as revealed in the work of grace upon his own heart. He acquires a better judgment in relation to Christian morals ; gains a more accurate and extensive acquaintance with the doctrines of Christ ; and a greater facility in deducing from them the rules of the Christian life. Meanwhile he becomes more fully established in his communion with God by faith and prayer ; and experiences something like what Archbishop Leighton calls being "knit to God," as one spirit may be said to be knit by love and fellowship to a kindred spirit. He becomes gradually more assured of the divine favour, by the constant experience of it ; until he is enabled in the strength of his confidence to say, "I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to sep-

arate me from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”

The whole of this process is pervaded by the spirit of consecration. The principle of devotion to God, corresponds to a considerable extent, with the other forms of his pious affection. He finds himself increasingly disposed, as he grows in knowledge and love, to present himself, soul and body, unto God as his reasonable service. The more he meditates upon the love of Christ, the more that love constrains him “that he should not live henceforth any more unto himself, but unto him who died for him and rose again;” and this spirit of consecration, whether it puts forth the “formal and decisive act,” or not, according as its circumstances and training may determine, seeks its natural and informal expression in all good words and works. Its very instinct corresponds with the all comprehensive law of Christian devotion: “Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.”

Among the excellent thoughts which appear on almost every page of this book, and which prove that the author has read extensively and thought deeply on the subject of religious experience; we find evidence of a degree of spiritual discernment and knowledge altogether sufficient to render the book attractive among a large class of religious people. There are few persons of lively temperament, and strong religious emotion, who will not become interested in the discussion; pious persons who either may not comprehend the theological relations of the various topics of the book as they are here erected, with unusual skill and precision into a peculiar system; or who have discernment enough to perceive, and decision of judgment enough to disregard the false relations in which the good thoughts are placed, will read the book with advantage. The author all along gives clear and vehement expression to the most absorbing emotions of the pious mind. Many of the operations of the mind under the influence of religious truth, he traces and analyzes with remarkable discrimination and precision: and were it not for the technical and intensely systematic aspect under which his thoughts are presented, a large part of his book might be recommended as a valuable help to the religious meditations of Christians. As it is, however, many will read the treatise with far more attention and interest

than profit. The things really valuable in the discussion in a religious point of view, are the just descriptions and expressions of many evangelical sentiments; but the manner of the author draws the reader's attention continually away from the things he has written to his theological aim in writing them. The work will greatly assist those who "are seeking" a plausible, compact, and well digested theory of perfectionism, but to readers who are striving according to the gospel method, for assurance of faith and perfect love, it will give far less help than they themselves may suppose.

They are few if any Christians in this world who would not feel their evidences of inward perfection severely sifted, if not entirely dissipated by the author's exposition of the characteristics of perfect love. The perfect love which he describes, "when in actual exercise, implies a forgetfulness of self. Whenever our thoughts return upon ourselves; whenever, in the exercise of "reflex acts," we begin to enquire into the specific nature of our feelings for the purpose of estimating the amount of their enjoyment; whenever we experience a jealousy that God does not give to us all those returns and caresses of love that we should be pleased with; we may be assured that although we may love much, we might love much more. In other words, our love, whatever other terms may be applied to it, cannot be regarded as perfect. It is the nature of perfect love, in its forgetfulness of self, to array the object towards which it is directed, in every possible excellence. To that object, so far as it is truly worthy of its attachment, it gives the strength of its affections without reservation and without limits. It is perfectly self-sacrificing; and it would account itself dishonoured and degraded if it turned back on itself for a moment to estimate its own reward. It has its reward, it is true. Perfect love is necessarily its own rewarder. But the reward comes without seeking, and is enjoyed so entirely without notice, that it does not turn the mind away for a moment from the object of its affections." If any person can read the latter part of this description of perfect love without feeling that it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for him to acquire such love, and to be fully assured that he possesses it, he must have both an exquisiteness and simplicity of affection and a precision of self-knowledge to which,

in any conceivable conditions of the present life of a believer, we should not dare to lay claim. It looks like a complete evisceration of the spiritual system. It leaves no organ in the soul of a perfect man which may perform an office appropriate to his earthly state. If a perfect love so rigidly excludes hope, we should say that in a man whose affections are "perfect" in their adaptation to his present relations, its possibility is inconceivable. If such a state of the religious affections be in any case really brought about, it must be by an artificial workmanship, a distortion of the spiritual frame, which unfits it for its place in this world. With such a theory of perfect love, we must take exceptions to Paul's commendation of the religious affections of Abraham, who looked for a city that hath foundations whose builder and maker is God; of Moses, who had respect unto the recompense of the reward; of Jesus himself, who, for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross.

In treating of the varieties of Christian character, the author describes three classes of Christians, "easily distinguishable from each other." The first class are those who may yet be said to possess faith, though destitute in a considerable degree of any marked spiritual manifestations and joys. Some exhibit a little more strength and activity than others, and God honours them by employing them in the smaller charges and duties of his church. They often have the trait of humble perseverance. They grow in grace, but not rapidly, and not unfrequently become strong in the end. They are "not wanting in sincerity, and they cling to the cross of Christ as the foundation of their hope." They seldom "make any strong impression on the world, but their example is generally salutary." This is a description of a class of Christians.

The second class are those who "have had striking manifestations in the way of strong convictions, and of subsequent great illuminations. . . . They may be said to have a considerable degree of faith; but they evidently have less faith than feeling. Their mental history, under its various changes, partakes in no small degree of the striking, the marvellous. They are generally the marked ones, the particular and bright stars in the church; . . . undoubtedly very useful, aiding themselves in the things of religion, and aiding others; but it can hardly be said of them, that their life is hid with

Christ in God. They think too much of their own efforts and powers. They place too high an estimate on human instrumentality. They do not fully understand the secret of their own nothingness ; nor do they know in their own experience to its full extent, the meaning of self-crucifixion. . . . They are not destitute of Christian graces ; but they need more lowliness of heart and more faith. Nevertheless . . . God owns and blesses them, and their memorial is often written in multitudes of grateful hearts." This is the author's description of another class of Christians, intended, of course, for otherwise it were no classification to exclude the individuals of the first.

The third class are those whose life may be said to be emphatically a life of faith ; . . . in whom the spiritual life does not at all mingle "with the tendencies and activities of nature ;" who "hold all in subjection to God, and rest calmly in the great central power." They are "men of grave countenance ; of a retired life, except when duty calls to public action ; of few words, simple manners, and inflexible principle. They have renounced self, and they naturally seek a low place, remote from public observation, and unreachd by human applause." "These," he exclaims in fine, proceeding in a strain which to us seems far more fervid than intelligible, "these are the men of whom martyrs are made. When the day of great tribulation comes, when dungeons are ready, and fires and burning, then God permits his children, who are weak in the faith, to stand aside. Then the illuminated Christians, those who live in the region of high emotion rather than of quiet faith, who have been conspicuous in the world of Christian activity, and have been as a pleasant and a loud song, and in many things have done nobly, will unfold to the right and the left, and let this little company of whom the world is ignorant, and whom it cannot know, come up from their secret places to the great battle of the Lord. To them the prison is as acceptable as the throne ; the place of degradation, as the place of honour. They eat of the 'hidden manna,' and have the secret name given them 'which no man knoweth.' Ask them how they feel and they will perhaps be startled, because their thoughts are thus turned from God to themselves. And will answer by asking what God wills. They have no feeling separate from the will of God. All high and low, all joy and sorrow, all

honour and dishonour, all friendship and enmity, are brought to a level, and are merged and lost in the great realization of God present in the heart. Hence chains and dungeons have no terrors; a bed of fire is as a bed of down. It is here in this class of persons, that we find the great grace of sanctification—a word, alas, too little understood in the church. These are they who, in the spirit of self-crucifixion, live by faith, and faith only.”

We have, we are free to say, no knowledge from experience in ourselves or from observation of religious phenomena in others, which enables us to assign any meaning to a great portion of this description of the author's third class of Christians; and we are constrained to admit as literally true that it is a sort of religion “which no man knoweth.” It is a sanctification which leaves not only no self, but no humanity behind. We have never seen any thing in good men, either of the past or the present, which we recognized to be true religion, and which would bear to be described in such terms.

But to return a moment to our author's classification. It appears to us in the first place unfounded in the facts of practical Christianity. It cannot have arisen from any scientific contemplation of the great varieties of Christian character as they are actually presented to the enlightened student of the works of God. The traits of character assigned to each class so far as they can be considered abiding properties of the mind, are found, in their respective degrees, in all true believers. The imperfections of the first class, the consciousness of weakness in faith, slow growth in grace, limited views of truth, and imperfect satisfaction in duty; belong at times to all Christians; or, if there are any exceptions, they are the doubtful ones belonging to the class of the “sanctified.” The imperfections of the second class, their thinking too much of their own efforts and powers, and placing too high an estimate on their own instrumentality, their not fully understanding their own nothingness, and not knowing in their own experience and to its full extent the meaning of self-crucifixion; are not all these a subject of lamentation in those whom we have always been accustomed to regard as examples of piety in the church; and is not a lively sensibility on these points one of the things which

recommends to us the consistency and completeness of character which are proper to the prisoners of hope?

Again, the Christian virtues assigned to the third class of Christians, that is, the perfect, are universally presumed to belong, in various degrees to all persons who are known as Christians by their fruits. As to the spiritual life not "mingling more or less with the tendencies and activities of nature," we do not know what it means; but gravity, simplicity, meekness, quietness, firmness, self-renunciation, contempt for the applause of the world, communion with God, and inward spiritual strength from union with God, are universal in the true members of the body of Christ, according to the measure in which each has received the Holy Spirit. And as for the martyrs; their sufferings were severe, their constancy was exemplary, they were noble and faithful witnesses for Christ; but will Mr. Upham pretend to say, that, of the millions whose lot it has been to suffer death for the name of Christ, every one was unquestionably perfect in his self-renunciation, his forgetfulness of the reward, his disrelish for public observation, and his freedom from all the affections of the natural man? And does not the spirit of self-denial for Christ's sake appear in its measure in every sense where spiritual duty is done in Christian love, and with intention of the Saviour's glory? When we hear a broken-hearted suppliant pouring out before God, the sorrows of his penitence, the devotion of his gratitude, and the trembling joy of his struggling faith, though he have to lament numerous short comings in his daily life, and many deficiencies in his affections towards God and his fellow-men, we feel quite as sure of his sincerity and of the firmness of his soul in any emergency of the Christian warfare, as we should feel in relation to one who had imbibed from some theory of experience a persuasion of his own perfection in faith and love.

The assurance or conceit of strong faith is not strong faith itself; nor is the one inseparable from the other. From all we can understand of the origin and sustenance of the two principles, and from their natural relations to each other, in the ordinary state of believers in this world, we are not inclined to consider the one as an indication or support of the purity and strength of the other. Assurance of faith, however, as defined

by Mr. Upham himself, is nothing but a very high degree of faith. "I know not," says he, "that the faith, which is experienced in these marked and triumphant instances of the religious life," the instances of assurance of faith, "is different from what is experienced in other cases, except in the single circumstance of degree." In this admission he is unquestionably right; but the admission is inconsistent with his entire discussion of the nature and relations of assurance of faith. He represents it as a distinct and well defined modification of personal religious experience, which has for many ages been known and recognised in a number of Christian sects, under the denomination of assurance of faith. Substituting now his own definition of assurance of faith, we have a distinct and well defined modification of religious experience, under the denomination of "a very high degree of faith."

And this distinct and well defined modification of religious experience is "known and recognised by a number of Christian sects." It is a sectarian distinction. The dogmatical persuasion of the possibility of a very high degree of faith has been, by our author's showing, for many ages a characteristic of certain Christian sects! This is indeed the fact. And a humiliating fact it is. It is a mortifying illustration of the absurd sectarian dissensions into which Christian people are often led by the blind power of words.

The Confession of Faith adopted by the Congregational churches in England in 1658, and afterwards, with slight variations by the American Congregational churches, in the synod of ministers and delegates assembled at Boston, in 1680, devotes a chapter to this subject; and in that chapter occurs the following passage, of which Mr. Upham avails himself as a valuable authority. "Such as believe in the Lord Jesus, and love him in sincerity, endeavouring to walk in all good conscience before him, may in this life, be certainly assured that they are in a state of grace; and may rejoice in the hope of the glory of God, which hope shall never make them ashamed. This certainty is not a bare conjectural or probable persuasion, grounded upon a fallible hope, but an infallible assurance of faith, founded on the blood and righteousness of Christ revealed in the gospel, and also upon the inward evidence of those graces unto which promises are made, and upon the immediate

witness of the Spirit, testifying our adoption, and as a fruit thereof, leaving the heart more humble and holy." The Confession holds this infallible assurance, as "not so belonging to the essence of Faith," but that a true believer may struggle long without it; until being enabled by the Spirit to know the things that are freely given him of God, he may, without extraordinary revelation, in the right use of ordinary means, attain thereunto." It also admits divers ways in which true believers may have the assurance of their salvation "shaken, diminished and intermitted; as by negligence in preserving it, by falling into some special sin which woundeth the conscience and grieveth the Spirit, by some sudden or vehement temptation, by God's withdrawing the light of his countenance," &c. The Confession aforesaid holds, moreover, concerning faith, that though it may be many times assailed and weakened, it yet grows up "in many to the attainment of a full assurance through Christ."

As this Confession had been brought to our notice by Mr. Upham's quotation from it, we have ourselves extracted the substance of several short passages for the purpose of showing the confusion of ideas in which this branch of experimental theology originates, or to which it leads. The Confession considers assurance as being not so of the essence of faith, but that a true believer may live long without it, and having attained, may lose it in part, or entirely; while the same document represents faith itself as growing to the attainment of full assurance; that is, to such strength as to set the believer free, for the time, from all doubt of the saving mercy of God towards him. Mr. Upham too defines assurance to be a very high degree of faith; and yet holds it as a distinct and well defined modification of religious experience. Now the reader of these two authorities, who is striving after clear ideas on this subject takes the substance of the matter as thus given him with all formality and precision, and finds it to be this: that while a very high degree of faith is not of the essence of faith, a true believer may, without extraordinary revelation, and by the faithful use of the ordinary means, attain a distinct and well-defined modification of religious experience which may be denominated a very high degree of faith. And this is a per-

suation, "which has been known and recognised, for many ages, in a number of Christian sects!"

We referred above to a confusion of ideas on this subject. We find it in all the writers who attempt to treat assurance as a distinct religious characteristic. It consists of confounding the personal and mental properties of genuine Christian faith with the evidences of its existence in the soul. The inward spiritual properties which distinguish the mind of a true believer in Jesus, are those which would prompt the evangelical answer to the question, Who and what is Jesus Christ in relation to the universe, to the church, to yourself? The evidences of faith in the soul are the grounds on which a believer would rest his reply to the question, How do you know that you entertain concerning Christ the views and feelings of a true believer and a child of God? It is to the latter question that the Congregational Confession assigns the grace of assurance, when it says that "such as believe in the Lord Jesus . . . may in this life be certainly assured that they are in a state of grace;" and also when it signifies that this assurance is "not of the essence of faith." But when it speaks of faith as growing into assurance, it seems to present assurance as denoting an unwavering conviction of the truth asserted in answer to the former question. Mr. Upham makes assurance to relate to the former question, when he represents it as only a very high degree of faith. But when he speaks of it as an assurance of our being accepted with God, and of our being subjects of his gracious influence and regard, he seems to refer it to the latter. President Edwards introduces several paragraphs on the subject of assurance, under the proposition that we have no certainty that religious affections are genuine from the fact that the persons who are the subjects of them are very confident that they are genuine. By bringing in assurance in this connexion he sufficiently indicates his view of assurance as referring to the evidences of the existence of saving faith in the soul. But in his remarks on assurance, he speaks of the pious patriarchs as placing an assured reliance on the word of God; which again is only faith in a very high degree. He refers, however, to the experience of the apostles and of other saints in a way which proves that he did not consider assurance of faith at all distinguishable from assurance

of hope. John Wesley has recorded the statements of several members of the Moravian brotherhood with whom he conversed with particular reference to their experience of assurance of faith. And from those statements it is obvious that they all regarded assurance of faith as a special gift distinct from justifying faith, a belief of the fact of their justification; while they still sought it not by consulting the evidences of the existence of faith in their minds, but by contemplating the faithfulness of God in his word. In other words, they confounded the properties of faith itself with the evidences of its existence in the soul.

The sole question with which we are concerned in relation to this subject, is this: What is that state of mind which so many Christians are so happy as to attain, and which all are exhorted to attain in this life; and what are the conditions and circumstances of its existence, so far as they can be reduced to general rules? That a strictly scriptural and philosophical answer to this question is possible we will not take it upon ourselves positively to deny; but we think it is very generally felt by the intelligent and inquiring portion of the Christian church, that no such answer has ever yet been given. As a sign that the principles which have hitherto directed the investigation of this subject exhibit no very obvious agreement with scripture and with the common sense of religious people, we take the fact that the rigid inculcation of any of the theories hitherto propounded results in confusion and inconsistency of doctrine, and in embarrassment and obliquity in practice. In those cases in which the experience of the Christian goes before his theory, and the theory comes to explain to him the nature and course of his experience, all is well. But when, as it happens with the majority, the theory precedes the experience, and the person has his mind pre-occupied with this or that description of the nature and order of the religious affections before he has felt those affections in exercise, the theoretical teaching, while it neither directs nor hastens the growth of the thriving believer, embarrass and retard the progress of the weak, by drawing their attention "to doubtful disputations."

To plead in recommendation of this species of theology, as Mr. Upham does, for instance, in behalf of his theory of as-

assurance of faith, that correct views on such subjects are of great importance to the purity and value of the religious experience of Christians, is inadmissible; because the plea is proved by the history of experimental religion to be false. And were it true, it would be unavailing with two classes of people, who compose a large proportion of those Christians whose judgment in these matters is worthy of regard: first, those who distrust the correctness of the prevailing speculations, and secondly, those who regard the study of any philosophical theory of religious experience, at present known, as tending to distorted and inconsistent views of the great facts of revelation, and to impair the influence of those facts upon the mind. It will not be denied that some of the greatest proficients in the spiritual life, whose examples engage our admiration, appear to have had no knowledge of any general laws of religious phenomena to which they studied subjection, but to have followed, as it were, the instincts of their renewed nature; and of those who began with theoretical teaching as to the order and mutual relations of the Christian affections it will hardly be made clear, that any were either the purer or more consistent and stedfast on account of their having formed their conceptions of their state and progress by the demands of their theory.

The persons described by Mr. Wesley were able to specify the hour and the place in which they passed from the state of incomplete experience to the assurance of faith. They belonged to the society of United Brethren, whose views on the subject of assurance were strict. In the early period of their history as a denomination, they are said to have regarded none but those who claimed to have assurance of faith, as having true faith at all. No others were for a time received to their communion. One of their distinguished teachers, as late as the seventeenth century, entertained the opinion, which was one of the primitive articles of the society, and was retained by that branch of the society of which he was the head, that without assurance of faith no person could give satisfactory evidence of the faith which justifies. It might therefore be expected that such a theory of experience would beget the corresponding experience in all whose minds were strongly wrought upon by the Spirit of God in view of truth

presented in such connexion. But that the belief and inculcation of these peculiar views of inward religion, and the prevailing experience which attended them, were not remarkable for the unadulterated fruits of entire sanctification in the life, and for producing entire freedom from the "tendencies and activities of nature," appears probable from the fact, that while that body of Christians are worthy of imitation in their persevering devotion to the propagation of the gospel among the heathen, and in other truly Christian characteristics they were not unfrequently rent with dissensions, which sometimes threatened the extinction of the society; and which were not matters of so sacred relation to conscience, but that the interposition of some judicious and influential individual could prevail to allay them. While therefore the assertion is doubtless true, that of the whole number of Christians of that denomination, the proportion of cases of triumphant assurance of faith is greater than in any other denomination, the natural principles which may have contributed to such a result, together with some conspicuous portions of the history of that denomination, will prevent many candid and intelligent Christians from presuming that their assurance was inseparable from a general completeness of religious character.

The strenuous disputes which not long ago enlisted some strong minds in this country respecting the order in which certain Christian affections are produced in the regenerate mind, have mostly had their day; and the reason for the present silence on those points is probably not so much that the truth was settled by the controversy, and that it was clearly established that faith comes before repentance, or that repentance comes before faith, but that the controversy was clearly shown to be unprofitable. The only question strictly of this character, now presented for public attention, is one which Mr. Upham raises, and, in his judgment, decides. Faith, in his philosophy, goes before love; and for this reason, which, in his view, is decisive; that on natural principles, we cannot love a being whom we do not previously believe to have good and interesting traits of character. If requested to say, how any traits of character come to appear to us good and interesting, he might perhaps find it convenient to represent the feeling which constitutes the perception or discernment of loveliness,

as not precisely love ; or, if it be love, then not love for a person ; or, if lovely traits of character be found inseparable from a person, then, while insisting that faith comes, in fact, before love, in the order of nature if not in the order of time, he might say, (and so he does say,) that it is entirely admissible to hold perfect faith and perfect love to be identical ; the two terms being only different names “ for one great phasis of experimental Christianity ;” and inasmuch as one believer may designate his experience as that of perfect faith, and another his, that of perfect love, it will often be found convenient to have two names for the same thing.

The perfectionism of this book, although, in our judgment an unscriptural and barren hypothesis, by which to investigate, judge, and explain the facts of religion in the soul of the believer, is not the fundamental fault of the work. The author might have disclaimed all belief of the doctrine of “ sanctification” in this life, without removing the pervading theological defect, which we feel anxious to expose in his production. Whether perfection be attainable or not, he will not pretend that all attain it, nor that any do at their first conversion, except in some extraordinary case : and the texture of his book throughout is wrought on the presumption that these instructions are applicable to all Christians as guides of their exertions for spiritual advancement and tests of their success. If they are found useful to those who finally obtain the higher faith, they must be used by all who seek progress. And with our present knowledge of Christianity and of man, we hold the fundamental principles of religious experience laid down in the work, to be, in the present state of human knowledge, undemonstrable, and to any valuable end, impracticable.

To illustrate : We imagine ourselves proceeding by these instructions in the administration of the gospel to a promiscuous congregation. While explaining the nature of that religion which we desire our hearers to seek, we endeavour to produce in their minds a conception of an interior or hidden life which is the superior endowment of some favorites of Christ ; and to fix the idea of that life within them as what they will endeavour, and what we propose to help their endeavour to realize. We have to make this peculiar life an object of contemplation to them, and an object of pursuit. Let a

truly philosophical practitioner with human minds estimate the difficulty of this first step of our work. But supposing this is accomplished, we then instruct them that to gain this endowment, their first work is to obtain holiness of heart; for which purpose they must, first of all, settle in their minds that holiness is attainable; next perform a solemn act of consecration with desire for holiness; next, establish the unwavering conviction that the consecration is accepted of God. They have then reached the point of assurance of faith; from which, to the point of perfect love, there is but one step, even if there be any. In this state of sinless perfection, they must still confess to God, not that they are sinners, but that they have been; and their present failings they must for consistency, confess, not strictly as sins, but as errors of judgment; morally wrong, indeed, yet only relatively so; requiring atonement, indeed, yet not like voluntary transgression, tending to condemnation.

When the proper effects of the gospel, through the power of the Spirit, begin to appear in the serious and inquiring minds of our people, we converse with enquirers altogether in the language of our theory. Religion, when complete as matter of experience, we comprehend under the general denomination of interior or hidden life; and we proceed to treat the cases of hopeful concern according to our experimental regime. The subjects, as they themselves know, are expected to answer in the affirmative, the questions, Have you obtained entire holiness of heart? If not, have you, for the purpose of obtaining it, adopted the unwavering belief that it is attainable in this life? Have you performed the act of entire consecration to God, never to be recalled, and have you done it with a desire for holiness? And have you voluntarily and explicitly, renounced all doubt of your having been accepted of God in your act of consecration? An enlightened and unbiased observer of men will, of course, be able to judge to his own satisfaction, how many reasonable and even religious considerations would prevent an intelligent, ingenuous and conscientious mind from answering these questions, perhaps, either way, but especially in the affirmative; considerations too, which must be presumed, in a mind that wishes to know what it does and whereof it affirms, to be arguments rather in favour of its Christian virtue than against it. We can also judge for our-

selves how many people of another class, not sufficiently excited to swallow pure mysticism in the mass, and too ignorant to take direction from our theory, become bewildered in the confusion of half-formed notions, or in the darkness arising from the absence of all notions respecting our meaning and fall out of the reach of our influence. Of the rest, who compose the majority of persons brought by these means, into the church, we are left to judge as we best can, how many conclude that because they now have any experience at all it must be such as we have taught them to anticipate. Being really moved by the Spirit of God, with almost no discrimination of their own mental states, except between the agreeable and the painful, they gain the requisite facility in calling their feelings by the classical names; and in describing their experience, either follow one another, or follow their teachers. Of ten who are cleansed, one only stands up in the intelligence and integrity of a conscious assurance, to give glory to God.

“When it is required,” says Dr. Alexander, “in order that persons be admitted to communion, that they publicly give a narrative of the exercises of their minds, there will commonly be observed a striking similarity. There is a certain mould into which they all seem to be cast. . . . Weak and ignorant persons often profess to be happy, and to be full of the love of God when they know not what they say. . . . They know what kind of answers is expected of them, and they come as near as they can to what is wished.” These remarks assert the tendency of human nature, under the most prudent instruction; and this tendency is powerfully assisted by such kinds of systematic instruction on religious experience as we have now before us. The work to which our attention has been directed partakes of these detrimental properties, as it seems to us, in an extreme degree. It is not at all wonderful that great numbers of people of intelligence and piety, lay very little stress on formal examination with reference to past experience as evidence of personal religion. It may help to ascertain the individual’s present state of mind, and that end is equally attained whether the story of the past experience be of one sort or another.

The grand difficulty lies in applying abstract tests of religious feeling. It is found no less in the use of the tests of President

Edwards with the exception of the twelfth sign, than in the use of any others. What satisfaction can we obtain by asking a candidate for admission to the church whether his affections are such as indicate a change of nature, or whether he has only experienced such a change in his feelings as mere natural affections may undergo? What can we gain by asking the person who professes to love divine things, whether he loves them for the beauty and sweetness of the things themselves, or only for some advantage sought from loving them? Not to stop here to expose the nonsense of talking about loving a thing for the beauty, and sweetness, and excellence of it, rather than for some other reason; while beauty, sweetness, excellence, are nothing but correlatives of love; being inconceivable and indescribable without it; we would further ask what can any examiner expect from enquiring into the symmetry and harmony of the affections of a convert: whether he is as humble as he is joyful, and whether his faith, and hope, and love, and zeal are properly balanced in his mind? How would any supposable inequality be selected by the subject, and suppose either principle were detected in comparative excess, what judgment should we pronounce upon it as a Christian grace? Ask him whether his affections are spiritual and not carnal, that is to say whether they originate in a divine influence or only in the influence of some created things. Questions of this sort occasion the exhibition of the present state of mind as to knowledge of doctrine, and in the case of honest and communicative persons, the prevailing temper towards Christianity; but in ordinary cases do they go farther? We do not disparage conversation on all these matters for Christian communion and edification; but we question their validity, as formal and rational tests of the religious experience. Besides, all these questions involve points which very few Christians, even among those of very high attainments in religion, are found ready at any period of their life to decide, if left to the unbiased course of their own thoughts under the influence of the scriptures, and without a disposition to prejudge the matter by an adopted theory. The bold and glaring marks of hypocrisy are obvious even to the hypocrite himself, as his very name implies; and these are the marks which Flavel most pointedly applies in his "Touchstone of Sincerity."

Flavel's Touchstone commends itself to thousands who can make no profitable use whatever of the tests of President Edwards, or the theory of Mr. Upham. Flavel waits and watches to see the effects of prosperity, &c., of adversity, of all worldly influences, of indwelling sin, upon the comfort and behaviour of his professors; and if through the trials they manifest the gospel spirit, and hold fast their profession to the end, he accounts them sincere. But the other examiners would still come after him, and put us upon deciding by direct and immediate self-inspection, whether the fair appearances during and after the trial, be not the specious and refined imitations of Christian virtue produced in the secret laboratory of self love.

We have no theory of religious experience of our own to offer. It is true, indeed, that the rudiments of theory respecting all matters of careful observation, reside in every thinking mind. No intelligent observer of any phenomena thinks much and rationally on what he sees, without the rise of some conceptions which bind together sundry facts of his observation, present them in some mutual relation, and reduce his diverse impressions to the mental form to which we give the name of knowledge. In other words, every thinking man has a theory respecting every thing he truly thinks of. And by the accumulation of just and clear observations and the steady and constant application of thought, by suggesting hypothesis, and rejecting or retaining them as our facts direct, we mature and establish our theories, and command for them in due time and under the proper conditions, the approbation of mankind.

Such is yet to be the fact on the subject of religious experience. But this subject belongs to the department of metaphysics. It is exclusively a branch of the science of mind; and is not otherwise connected with the holy scriptures, than as those scriptures present some examples of the facts to which the science must resort for the suggestion and the verification of its laws. But the true science of metaphysics is not yet born. The age has for some time seemed pregnant with it; we witness occasional and effective throes of parturition and really believe the birth is at hand. The triumphant emergence of several branches of physical science from darkness into noon-day light, gives promise on behalf of all the sciences which

can engage the thoughts of man ; most of all on behalf of the absorbing and sublime science of human nature. When the facts of the mind shall be observed with that comprehensive and minute observation, and that clear discrimination, which result from rigid discipline in the most profound branches of physics, we may begin to expect some felicitous conception of a truly scientific mind, which will supply the bond of union among our facts, and gradually commend itself to all seekers for truth, as the law of the phenomena. At present we have neither the facts nor the conceptions. We have no conceptions in metaphysics, which correspond with the conception of force in mechanics, or that of polarity in chemistry ; and as to our discrimination of facts it is sufficient to refer, as a sign of its imperfection, to the questions continually agitated in theology respecting the facts of faith, conscience, will ; and in mental philosophy, even those which are ascribed to memory.

But when, if ever, the true theory comes, it will lend no aid to the experience of religion in the heart. It may prevent the unprofitable direction of the thoughts of religious people, and the misdirection of their feelings, by removing in part from enlightened teachers the incitements of zeal for false and seductive systems ; but it will have no place among the proper means of religious instruction. Religion in the soul of man is exclusively the work of God ; though not in such sense as denies the intervention of means, yet strictly in such sense as implies independence on them. And the means of the work of God in the heart, even the means of producing assurance of faith and perfect love, consist in a far lower degree than we are wont to suppose, of our doctrines of ability or of inability, of our theories of consecration and assurance, and even of the form and ceremonies of our spiritual worship. They consist of the holding forth of Christ crucified for us. We shall think on these subjects. We shall investigate their nature and relations until we arrive at established truth respecting them ; and we may yet have our views so improved concerning the relation of all that is metaphysical and physical connected with religion, that we shall find fewer occasions of sectarian division, and less provocation to brand any communion of professed believers with our anathemas.

ART. V.—*Essays in the Presbyterian by Theophilus on the question: Is Baptism in the Church of Rome valid?* Nos. XI. XII.

IT is very plain that our remarks, in our number for July last, in favour of the validity of Romish baptism, have not met the approbation of a large portion of our brethren. This, though a matter of regret, is not a matter of surprise. The large majority of the last Assembly, by which the resolution pronouncing such baptism null and void, was carried, as well as other indications of the public mind in the church, made it plain from the beginning that we should be for the present, at least, and probably for some years, in a small minority on this question. Our confidence, however, in the correctness of our position, has not been shaken. That confidence rests partly on the conviction we cannot help feeling of the soundness of the arguments on which our conclusion rests; and partly on the fact that those arguments have satisfied the minds of the vast majority of the people of God from the Reformation to the present time. We have, however, waited, with minds we hope open to conviction, to hear what was to be said on the opposite side. The religious papers early announced that full replies to our arguments would speedily appear. Providential circumstances, it seems, have prevented, until recently, the accomplishment of their purpose thus early announced. All that we have seen in the shape of argument on the subject, are two numbers of a series of articles now in the course of publication in the *Watchman and Observer*, of Richmond, and the essays of Theophilus, in the *Presbyterian*. Our respect for the writer in the *Watchman*, and for the thoroughness and ability which distinguish his opening numbers, imposes on us the duty of silence as to the main point in dispute, until his series of articles is completed. It will then be time enough to decide whether the discussion can with profit be further continued in our pages. We are also as yet without any light from Theophilus. After writing ten weeks he is but approaching the subject. He closes his tenth number with saying: "We are now prepared to begin the argument." All that precedes, therefore, is not properly, in his

judgment, of the nature of argument ; though doubtless regarded as pertinent to the discussion. Under these circumstances it is obvious that the way is not open for us to attempt to justify our position. We gave the definition of Baptism contained in our standards—and then endeavoured to show that Romish baptism falls within that definition. Neither of these points has, as yet, been seriously assailed. This is what the writer in the *Watchman and Observer* proposes to do, and we respectfully wait to hear what he has to say. In the meantime the topic discussed by Theophilus in his eleventh and twelfth numbers, is so important in itself and so intimately connected with this whole subject, that we have determined to devote a few pages to the consideration of the question, Whether the church of Rome is still a portion of the visible church of Christ ?

Those taking the negative of this question, have every advantage of an adventitious kind in their favour. They have no need of definitions, or distinctions, or of affirming in one sense and denying in another. The round, plump, intelligible no, answers all their purposes. They make no demand upon the discrimination, or the candour of the public. They deal in what is called plain common sense, repudiating all metaphysical niceties. They have in this respect the same advantages that the ultra temperance man and the abolitionist possess. The former disembarasses himself of all need of distinctions and qualifications by affirming that the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage is sinful ; not sometimes right and sometimes wrong, according to circumstances, which implies the necessity of determining what those circumstances are which give character to the act. He takes the common sense view of the case ; and asserts that a practice which produces all the drunkenness that is in the world, and all the vice and misery which flow from drunkenness, is a sinful practice. He therefore hoots at those who beg him to discriminate between what is wrong in itself and universally, and what is wrong only in certain circumstances ; and cries them down as the friends of publicans and sinners. The abolitionist is still more summary. Slavery is a heinous crime ; it degrades human beings into things ; it forbids marriage ; it destroys the domestic relations ; it separates parents and children, husbands and wives ;

it legalizes what God forbids, and forbids what God enjoins ; it keeps its victims in ignorance even of the gospel ; it denies to labour its wages, subjects the persons, the virtue, and the happiness of many to the caprice of one ; it involves the violation of all social rights and duties, and therefore is the greatest of social crimes. It is as much as any man's character for sense, honesty or religion is worth, to insist that distinctions must here be made ; that we must discriminate between slavery and its separable adjuncts ; between the relation itself and the abuse of it ; between the possession of power and the unjust exercise of it. Let any man in some portions of our country, in England, in Scotland, or Ireland, attempt to make such distinctions, and see with what an outburst of indignation he will be overwhelmed. It is just so in the present case. Rome is antichrist, the mystical Babylon, the scarlet woman, the mother of harlots, drunk with the blood of the saints. What room, asks Theophilus, is there for argument here ? Is Babylon Zion ? Is the synagogue of Satan the church of Christ, the scarlet woman the bride of the Lamb ? Woe to the man who ventures to ask for definitions, and discrimination ; or to suggest that possibly these antagonistic designations are not applied to the same subject, or to the same subject under the same aspect ; that as of old the prophets denounced the Hebrew community under the figure of an adulterous woman, and almost in the same breath addresses them as the beloved of God, his chosen people, compared to the wife of one's youth ; so it may be here. The case is pronounced too plain for argument ; the appeal is made at once to the feelings of the reader, and those who do not join in the cry are represented as advocates of popery, or at best very doubtful protestants.

We do not mean to complain of anything of this kind we may have ourselves experienced. We gratefully acknowledge the general courtesy of Theophilus and the Christian spirit and gentlemanly bearing of the writer in the *Watchman*. Our object in these remarks is to call attention to the fact that there is very great danger of our being carried away by the mere sound and appearance of argument in all such cases, and that while an easy triumph may be gained for the moment by taking things in the gross, and refusing the trouble of determining accurately the meaning of the terms we use, yet that the

evils which flow from this course are often serious and lasting. We have seen churches rent asunder by the anti-slavery agitation, when it is probable, if the different parties had calmly sat down to compare their views and define their terms, it would have been found they were substantially of the same mind.

It is neither by research nor argument the question whether Romanists are members of the visible church is to be answered. It is a simple matter of definition and statement. All that can be done is first to determine what is meant by the word church; and secondly what is meant by Rome, church of Rome, Romanists, or whatever term is used, and then see whether the two agree, whether Rome falls within or without the definition of the church.

By a definition we do not mean a description including a specification of all the attributes which properly pertain to the thing defined; but an enumeration of its essential attributes and of none other. We may say that a Christian is a man who believes all that Christ taught, who obeys all that he commanded, and trusts all his promises. This, however, is a description of an ideal or perfect Christian. It is not a definition which is to guide our judgment, whether a particular individual is to be regarded and treated as a Christian. We may say that a church is a society in which the pure word of God is preached, the sacraments duly administered, and discipline properly exercised by legitimate officers. This, however, is a description of a pure and orderly church, and not an enumeration of the essential attributes of such a body. If we use that description as a definition, we must exclude all but orthodox Presbyterians from the pale of the church. The eastern churches, the Church of England, the Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists would without exception be cut off. Every one of these classes of Christians fails, according to our standard, in some one or more of the above specifications. They are all defective either as to doctrine, or as to the sacraments, or as to the proper exercise of discipline, or as to the organs through which such discipline is exercised. This distinction between a description and definition, between an enumeration of what belongs to a pure church, and what is necessary to the being of a church, is often disregarded. We think The-

ophilus overlooks it. He quotes largely from Turretin as sustaining his views on this subject ; whereas Turretin is on precisely the opposite ground ; affirming what Theophilus denies, and denying what Theophilus affirms. Turretin expressly makes the distinction between "a true church," i. e., a church which conforms to the true standard of what a church ought to be, and a heretical, corrupt, and apostate church. True, in his use of the term, corresponds with orthodox or pure ; not with real. A body, therefore, according to him may be a church, and yet not a true church. We adverted to this fact in our former article, and referred so distinctly to the statement of Turretin that we are surprised to find Theophilus quoting him as he does. "Since the church of Rome," says Turretin, "may be viewed under a two-fold aspect, either in reference to the profession of Christianity and of the evangelical truths which she retains, or in reference to her subjection to the pope, and to her corruptions both in matters of faith and morals, we can speak of her in two different ways. Under one aspect, we do not deny she retains some truth ; under the other we deny that she is Christian and apostolical, and affirm her to be anti-christian and apostate. In one sense, we admit she may be still called a CHRISTIAN CHURCH. 1st. In reference to the people of God, or the elect, who are called to come out of her even at the time of her destruction, Rev. xviii. 4. 2d. In reference to external form, or certain elements of a dispersed church, the vestiges of which are still conspicuous, as well as regards the word of God and the preaching thereof, which she still retains, although corrupted, as the administration of the sacraments, especially baptism, which as to its substance is there retained in its integrity. 3d. In reference to the evangelical truths, as concerning the Trinity, Christ the mediator, God and man, by which she is distinguished from a congregation of pagans or infidels. But we deny that she can properly and simply (i. e. without qualification) be called a true church much less the only and the catholic church, as they would wish to have her called."

In the next paragraph but one, he explains what he means by *verity* as affirmed of a church, when we say she is *vera ecclesia*. It includes "verity in faith," or freedom from heresy ; purity, or freedom from all superstition and idolatry ; liberty

in government, freedom from servitude and tyranny ; sanctity of morals, as opposed to corruption of manners ; and certainty and consolation, or freedom from doubt or diffidence."

Again, in answer to the objection that if Romanists have true baptism they must be a true church, he says : " True baptism does indeed suppose a true church, as far as Christianity in the general is concerned, as opposed to a congregation of infidels ; but not as it relates to pure Christianity, free from heretical errors ; since true baptism may be found among heretics, who are not a true church." p. 151.

It is very evident, therefore, that Rome, according to Turretin, is to be viewed under two aspects ; under the one she is a church, i. e., a body in which the people of God still are ; which retains the word of God and the preaching of it, though corrupted, and the sacraments, especially baptism. Under the other aspect, i. e., as a papal body, she is not a church ; i. e., her popery and all her corruptions are anti-christian and apostate. She is not therefore a *true* church, for a *true* church is free from heresy, from superstition, from oppressive regimen, from corruption of manners, and from doubt or diffidence. Whether Theophilus approves of these distinctions or not ; whether he thinks that the English word *true* can be used in the latitude which Turretin gives the Latin word *verus*, or not ; still he ought to give the Geneva professor the benefit of his own statements and definitions ; and not represent him as denying that the church of Rome is a church, when he denies that she is a *true* i. e., a pure church. Turretin says Romish baptism is valid. Theophilus says it is not. Both however agree that if Rome is in no sense a church, her baptism is in no case valid. It is obvious, therefore, that Turretin admits her to be a church in the sense in which Theophilus denies it.

Professor Thornwell very correctly remarked, in his effective speech before the General Assembly, that it is very plain that though the Reformers denied Rome to be the true church, they admitted her to be in some sense a church. The fact is, they used the word *true* as Turretin does, as implying conformity with the true model or standard. They made a distinction between a description of a church including all the excellencies such a body ought to possess ; and a definition including

nothing but what is essential to the being of a church. It is to the danger of confounding these two things, that the foregoing remarks are directed.

The real difficulty in the case is that it is impossible to give any one definition of a church, except in the most general terms, which includes all the established uses of the word. Among Congregationalists a church is a number of persons giving credible evidence of regeneration, united by a covenant for the purposes of Christian worship and mutual watch and care. It is not to be denied that such a body is a church, it falls within the legitimate sense and wider definition of the term. This narrow sense has gradually diffused itself through our common modes of speech. We talk of a man's being admitted to the church, or excluded from it, meaning by the church the body of communicants, to the exclusion of the great body of the baptized. To those accustomed to this use of the term, no body larger than a single congregation can be a church, and none composed in great part of those who give no evidence and make no profession of regeneration. Men possessed with this idea of the church, and unable to get a wider conception of it, ask with confidence, Can a corrupt, wicked, persecuting body be a church? Are its members the called of God, believers, saints, the temples of the Holy Ghost and members of Christ? Of course not. No such body falls within their definition of the church; and if they can prove that that definition is the only proper one, there can be no further dispute about the matter. But the *usus loquendi* neither of the Bible nor of the English language is determined by Congregationalists. It is an undeniable fact that we speak and speak correctly of the Dutch Reformed church; of the Episcopal church, and of the Presbyterian church, without intending to affirm that the several bodies thus designated are composed of persons giving credible evidence of regeneration, and united by covenant for worship and discipline. It will not do therefore to conclude that the church of England or that of Scotland is no church, because it does not fall within the New England definition of a church.

When we turn to the scriptures and to the common language of Christians, we do not find the word church used in senses which admit of being embraced under one definition. In other

words, the essential attributes of the church, in one established sense of the term, are not its essential attributes in another equally authorized sense. Thus we are told that the church consists of the whole number of the elect who ever have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the head thereof. In this sense of the word, it is essential to the church that it consist of the elect only, and that it should include them all. That this definition is sustained by scriptural usage cannot be disputed. It is in this sense the church is the body of Christ, the fulness of him that filleth all in all. It is by the church, thus understood, God is to manifest to principalities and powers his manifold wisdom. This is the church which Christ loved, and for which he gave himself that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it to himself a glorious church. It would of course be absurd to contend that no society is a church which does not come under that definition.

Again the word is often used as equivalent with saints, believers, the true people of God, existing at any one time on earth, or in any one place. The word is used in this sense when Paul exhorts us to give no offence to the church, i. e. the people of God; and when he says he persecuted the church. In like manner, when we pray for the church, either in the whole world, or in a particular country, or city, we surely do not mean the Presbyterian, or Episcopal, or Methodist church, or any one organized body. We have in our mind the true people of God, scattered abroad it may be, existing in every Christian denomination. In this sense of the word it is essential to the church that it consist of true believers.

A third sense of the word is that in which it is used when we say the church consists of all those throughout the world who profess the true religion, together with their children. This is a legitimate established meaning of the term. In this view of the church, nothing is essential to it but the profession of the true religion; and in this sense every individual making that profession is a member, and every society composed of such individuals is a portion of the church, or is included in it.

Theophilus expresses great surprise that we should venture the assertion that organization is not essential to the church. He ridicules the statement, and appeals to the language of the

Psalmist when he bids us walk above Zion and tell the tower thereof, as a sufficient refutation of it. By organization we meant, and it is very evident he means, external ordered union. We presume Theophilus himself will not maintain that in either of the three established senses of the word above stated, organization is among its essential attributes. It is not enumerated in the definitions as given from our standards and from scripture; nor is it necessarily included in the complex conception to which we give the name church. When we conceive of the whole body of the elect, which have been or are to be gathered into one under Christ, it is not as an external organized body furnished with ministers and sacraments, but simply as the great body of the redeemed united to Christ and to each other by the indwelling of the Spirit. So too when we speak of the church as consisting of true believers, we do not conceive of them as an external organized body. We pray for no such body when we pray for the church of God throughout the world. The word is but a collective term for the saints, or children of God. It is equivalent to the true Israel; Israel *κατα πνευμα* as distinguished from the Israel *κατα σαρκα*. In like manner, when the word is used for all those throughout the world who profess the true religion; the idea of organization is of necessity excluded from that of the church. The visible church catholic is not an organized body on any but Romish principles. We are therefore surprised that Theophilus should be thrown off his balance, by a remark so obviously true, and of such constant recurrence in the writings of protestants.

There is a fourth established meaning of the word church, which has more direct reference to the question before us. It often means an organized society professing the true religion, united for the purpose of worship and discipline, and subject to the same form of government and to some common tribunal. A multitude of controversies turn upon the correctness of this definition. It includes the following particulars. 1. A church is an organized society. It is thus distinguished from the casual or temporary assemblies of Christians, for the purpose of divine worship. 2. It must profess the true religion. By the true religion cannot be meant all the doctrines of the true religion, and nothing more or less. For then no human society

would be a church unless perfect both in knowledge and faith. Nor can it mean all the clearly revealed and important doctrines of the Bible. For then no man could be a Christian and no body of men a church, who rejects or is ignorant of any of those doctrines. But it must mean the essential doctrines of the gospel, those doctrines without the knowledge and possession of which, no man can be saved. This is plain, because nothing can be essential, as far as truth is concerned, to a church, which is not essential to union with Christ. We are prohibited by our allegiance to the word of God from recognising as a true Christian, any man who rejects any doctrine which the scriptures declare to be essential to salvation; and we are bound by that allegiance not to refuse such recognition, on account of ignorance or error, to any man who professes what the Bible teaches is saving truth. It is absurd that we should make more truth essential to a visible church, than Christ has made essential to the church invisible and to salvation. This distinction between essential and unessential doctrines Protestants have always insisted upon, and Romanists and Anglicans as strenuously rejected. It is, however, so plainly recognised in scripture, and so obviously necessary in practice, that those who reject it in terms in opposition to Protestants, are forced to admit it in reality. They make substantially the same distinction when they distinguish between matters of faith and matters of opinion, and between those truths which must be received with explicit faith, (i. e., known as well as believed) and those which may be received with implicit faith; i. e., received without knowledge, as a man who believes the Bible to be the word of God may be said to believe all it teaches, though it may contain many things of which he is ignorant. Romanists say that every doctrine on which the church has pronounced judgment as part of the revelation of God, is a matter of faith, and essential to the salvation of those to whom it is duly proposed. Anglicans say the same thing of those doctrines which are sustained by tradition. Here is virtually the same distinction between fundamental and other doctrines, which Protestants make. The only difference is as to the criterion by which the one class is to be distinguished from the other. Romanists and Anglicans say that criterion is the judgment of the church; Protestants say it is a decision of the

word of God. What the Bible declares to be essential to salvation, is essential: what it does not make absolutely necessary to be believed and professed, no man can rightfully declare to be absolutely necessary. And what is not essential to the true church, the spiritual body of Christ, or to salvation, cannot be essential to the visible church. This is really only saying that those whom Christ declares to be his people, we have no right to say are not his people. If any man thinks he has such a right, it would be well for him to take heed how he exercises it. By the true religion, therefore, which a society must profess in order to its being recognised as a church, must be meant those doctrines which are essential to salvation.

3. Such society must not only profess the true religion, but its object must be the worship of God and the exercise of discipline. A church is thus distinguished from a Bible, missionary, or any similar society of Christians.

4. To constitute it a church, i. e., externally one body, it must have the same form of government and be subject to some common tribunal. The different classes of Presbyterians in this country, though professing the same doctrines and adopting the same form of government, are not all members of the same external church, because subject to different tribunals.

Now the question is, Is this a correct definition of a church? Does it omit any thing that is essential, or include any thing that is unessential? The only things which we can think of as likely to be urged as omissions, are the ministry and the sacraments. Few things in our July number seem to have given Theophilus more pain than our saying that the ministry is not essential to the church. With regard to this point, we would remark. 1. That we believe the ministry is a divine institution. 2. That it was designed to be perpetual. 3. That it has been perpetuated. 4. That it is necessary to the edification and extension of the church. But we are very far from believing the Popish doctrine that the ministry is essential to the being of a church, and that there is no church where there is no ministry. Officers are necessary to the well-being of a nation, and no nation can long exist without them. But a nation does not cease to exist when the king or president dies. The nation would continue though every civil officer was cut off in a night; and blessed be God, the church would still live,

though all ministers should die or apostatize at once. We believe with Professor Thornwell, and with the real living church of God in all ages, that if the ministry fails, the church can make a ministry; or rather that Christ, who is in his church by the Spirit, would then, as he does now, by his divine call constitute men ministers. It strikes us as most extraordinary for a Presbyterian to say that the ministry is essential to the church, and that it must enter into the definition; when our own book makes provision, first, for the organization of a church, and then for the election of its officers. A number of believers are constituted a church, and then, and not until they are a church, they elect their elders and call a pastor. Every vacant church is a practical proof that the ministry does not enter into the definition of the church. Theophilus amuses himself at our expense for our venturing to say, "Bellarmine has the credit of being the first writer who thus corrupted the definition of the church," that is, by introducing subjection to lawful pastors as part of that definition. We were well aware of the danger of asserting a negative. We knew that we had not read every writer before the time of Bellarmine, and that we could remember very little of the little we had read. We were, therefore, wise enough not to say that no man before the Popish cardinal had perpetrated a like interpolation into the definition of the church, but contented ourselves with the safe remark that he has the credit of being the first who was guilty of that piece of priestcraft. That he has that credit among Protestants can hardly be disputed. Dean Sherlock says: "I know indeed of late the clergy have in a great measure monopolized the name of the church, whereas, in propriety of speech, they do not belong to the definition of a church," any more than a shepherd to the definition of a flock, which is his illustration. "The learned Launoy," he adds, "has produced texts of scripture for this definition of the church, viz: that it is the company of the faithful; and has proved by the testimony of the fathers in all ages, even down to the Council of Trent itself, that this was the received notion of the church, till it was altered by Canisius and Bellarmine," the former "putting Christ's vicar into the definition," the latter, subjection "to lawful pastors." "Whereas," continues the Dean, 'before these men, neither pastors nor bishops, much less the

Pope of Rome, were ever put into the general definition of a church.* Very much the same complaint is uttered by Dr. Thomas Jackson, against "Bellarmine, Valentia, Stapelton, and some others," for troubling the stream of God's word as to the nature and definition of the church.† It surely does not become Presbyterians to exalt the clergy beyond the place assigned them by these strong Episcopalians, and make them essential to the being of the church, and of course an element in the definition of the term.

Very much the same remarks may be made in reference to the sacraments. We of course believe 1. That the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper are of divine appointment. 2. That they are of perpetual obligation. 3. That they are signs and seals of the covenant, and means of grace. 4. That the observance of them is a high duty and privilege, and consequently the neglect or want of them, a great sin or defect; but to make them essential to the church is to make them essential to salvation, which is contrary to scripture. If baptism made a man a Christian, if it communicated a new nature which could be received in no other way, then indeed there could be no Christians and no church without baptism. But such is not the protestant or scriptural doctrine of the sacraments. The Hebrew nation would not cease to be Hebrews, if they ceased to practice circumcision. They did not in fact cease to be the church, though they neglected that rite for the forty years they wandered in the wilderness, until there was not a circumcised man among them, save Caleb and Joshua. Yet far more is said of the duty and necessity of circumcision in the Old Testament than is said of baptism in the New. It is the doctrine of our church that baptism recognises, but does not constitute membership in the church. Plain and important, therefore, as is the duty of administering and observing these ordinances, they are not to be exalted into a higher place than that assigned them in the word of God. Though the due celebration of the sacraments may very properly be enumerated, in one sense, among the signs of the church, we do not feel authorized or permitted by the author

* See *Preservative against Popery*, vol. i., tit. iii., ch. i., p. 36.

† See *treatise on the church* p. 50, Goode's edition.

ity of scripture, to make such celebration essential to salvation or the existence of the church. If any of our brethren should differ from us as to this point, it would not follow that they must reject the definition above given. For as the sacraments are a means and a mode of divine worship, the due celebration of them may be considered as included in that clause of the definition, which declares that a church is a society for the worship of God.

We revert therefore to the question, Is the definition given above correct? Is a church an organized society professing the true religion, united for the worship of God and the exercise of discipline, and subject to the same form of government and to some common tribunal? It certainly has in its favour the common *usus loquendi*. When we speak of the church of England, of Scotland, the Free church, the Secession church, the Protestant Episcopal church; or when we speak of a single congregation as a church, as the church at Easton, or the first, second, or third Presbyterian church in Philadelphia; or if we take the term in the New England sense, as distinguished from parish or congregation, still all these cases fall under the definition. By the word church, in all such cases, we mean an organized society, professing the true religion, united for the worship of God and the exercise of discipline, under the same form of government and some common tribunal. That common tribunal in a Congregational church, is the brotherhood; in a Presbyterian church, the session; in the Presbyterian church in the United States, our General Assembly; in the episcopal church, the general convention; in the Church of England, the reigning sovereign; in the evangelical church of Prussia, the king. In all these cases it is subjection to some independent tribunal that gives unity to a church, in the light in which it is here contemplated.

2. This definition is substantially the one given in our standards. "A particular church consists of a number of professing Christians with their offspring, voluntarily associated together, for divine worship and godly living agreeably to the holy scriptures; and submitting to a certain form of government.* "Professing Christians" is here used as equivalent to "those

* Form of Government ch. 2, sec. 4.

professing the true religion," the form of expression adopted in the Confession of Faith and Larger Catechism. It is obvious that the definition suits all the cases mentioned above, applying equally well to a single congregation, and to a whole denomination united in one body.

3. This definition suits the use of the term as it occurs in many passages of scripture. When we read of the church of Corinth, of Antioch, of Rome, the word is universally admitted to designate a number of persons professing the true religion, united for religious worship and discipline, under some common tribunal.

4. This definition is one to which the principles laid down on this subject in scripture necessarily lead. The scriptures teach that the faith in Christ makes a man a Christian; the profession of that faith makes him a professing Christian. The true, or invisible church consists of true believers; the visible church catholic, of all professed believers; a particular visible church, of a society of such professors, united for church purposes and separated from other societies by subjection to some one tribunal. These seem to be plain scriptural principles. If any thing else or more than faith in Christ is absolutely necessary to union with him, and therefore to salvation; then something more than faith is necessary to make a man a Christian, and something more than the profession of that faith to make him a professing Christian, and consequently some other sign of a visible church must be necessary than the profession of the true religion. But we do not see how consistently with the evangelical system of doctrine, and especially with the great doctrine that salvation is by faith, we can avoid the conclusion that all true believers are in the true church, and all professing believers are in the visible church.

5. Did time permit, or were it necessary, it could easily be proved that in all ages of the church, this idea of the church has been the prevailing one. We have already quoted the testimony of Sherlock against the Romanists in proof of this point, and it would be easy to fill volumes with quotations from ancient and modern writers, to the same effect. "Church," says Hooker in his *Eccles. Polity*, vol. ii., 17, "is a word which art hath devised, thereby to sever and distinguish that society of men which professeth the true religion from the rest, which

profess it not, . . . whereupon, because the only object which separateth ours from other religions, is Jesus Christ, in whom none but the church doth believe, and whom none but the church doth worship; we find that accordingly the apostles do every where distinguish hereby the church from infidels and Jews, accounting them which call upon the name of the Lord Jesus to be his church." And again, B. 3, § 1, "The visible church of Jesus Christ is one by outward profession of those things which supernaturally appertain to the essence of Christianity, and are necessarily required in every particular Christian man." Barrow, in his Discourse on the Unity of the Church says, "It is evident that the church is one by consent in faith and opinion concerning all principal matters of opinion." Bishop Taylor, in his Dissuasive against Popery, says "The church (visible) is a company of men and women professing the saving doctrines of Jesus Christ." This is but saying what Tertulian, Augustin, Jerome, Hilary, Chrysostom and the whole line of God's people have said from the beginning.

6. Finally, we appeal in support of the essential element of the definition of a church given above, to the constant testimony of the Spirit. The scriptures teach that the Spirit operates through the truth; that we have no right to expect his influence (as far as adults are concerned) where the truth is not known, and that where it is known, he never fails to give it more or less effect; that wherever the Spirit is, there is the church, since it is by receiving the Spirit, men become members of the true church; and wherever the true or invisible church is, there is the church visible, because profession of the faith is a sure consequence of the possession of faith; and, therefore, where these true believers are united in the profession of that truth by which they are saved, with a society or community—then such society is within the limits of the visible church, i. e. is a constituent portion of that body which embraces all those who profess the true religion. All we contend for is that the church is the body of Christ, that those in whom the Holy Spirit dwells are members of that body; and consequently that whenever we have evidence of the presence of the Spirit there we have evidence of the presence of the church. And if these evidences occur in a society professing certain doctrines by which men are thus born unto God, it is God's own testi

mony that such society is still a part of the visible church. It strikes us as one of the greatest absurdities of Ritualism, whether among Romanists or Anglicans, that it sets up a definition of the church, not at all commensurate with its actual and obvious extent. What more glaring absurdity can be uttered than that the Episcopal church in this country is here the only church, when nine-tenths of the true religion of the country exists without its pale. It may be man's church, but God's church is much wider. Wherever, therefore, there is a society professing truth, by which men are actually born unto God, that society is within the definition of the church given in our standards, and if as a society, it is united under one tribunal, for church purposes, it is itself a church.

The next step in the argument is, of course, the consideration of the question, whether the church of Rome comes within the definition, the correctness of which we have endeavoured to establish? It was very common with the reformers and their successors to distinguish between the Papacy, and the body of people professing Christianity under its dominion. When, by the church of Rome they meant the Papacy, they denounced it as the Mystical Babylon, and Synagogue of Satan; when they meant by it the people, considered as a community professing the essential doctrines of the gospel, they admitted it to be a church. This distinction is natural and just, though it imposes the necessity of affirming and denying the same proposition. If by the church of Rome, you mean one thing, it is not a church; if you mean another, it is a church. People will not trouble themselves, however, with such distinctions, though they often unconsciously make them, and are forced to act upon them. Thus by the word England, we sometimes mean the country, sometimes the government, and sometimes the people. If we mean by it the government, we may say (in reference to some periods of its history), that it is unjust, cruel, persecuting, rapacious, opposed to Christ and his kingdom: when these things could not be said with truth of the people.*

* "The church of Rome," says Bishop Sanderson, "may be considered, 1. *Materialiter*, as it is a church professing the faith of Christ, as we also do in the common points of agreement. 2. *Formaliter*, and in regard to that we call Popery, viz., the point of difference, whether concerning the doctrine or worship, wherein we charge her with having added to the substance of faith her own inven-

Though we regard the above distinction as sound, and though we can see no more real contradiction in saying Rome is a church, and is not a church, than in saying man is mortal and yet immortal, spiritual yet carnal, a child of God yet sold under sin; yet as the distinction is not necessary for the sake either of truth or perspicuity, we do not intend to avail ourselves of it. All that we have to beg is, that brethren would not quote against us the sweeping declarations and denunciations of our Protestant forefathers against Popery as the man of sin, antichrist, the mystical Babylon, and synagogue of Satan, as proof of our departure from the Protestant faith. In all those denunciations we could consistently join; just as our fathers, as Professor Thornwell acknowledges, while uttering those denunciations, still admitted Rome, in one sense, to be a church. Our present object is to enquire whether the church of Rome, taking the term as Bishop Sanderson says, *Conjunctim pro toto aggregato*, just as we take the term, Church of England, falls within the definition of a church given above.

That it is an organized society, is of course plain; that it is united for the purpose of worship and discipline is no less so. That is, it is the professed ostensible object of the society, to teach and promote the Christian religion, to convert men to the faith, to edify believers, to celebrate the worship of God, and to exercise the power of the keys, i. e., the peculiar prerogatives of a church in matters of doctrine and discipline. This is the ostensible professed object of the society. That its rulers have left its true end out of view, and perverted it into an engine of government and self-aggrandizement is true, and very

tions. 3. *Conjunctim pro toto aggregato*, taking both together. As in an unsound body, we may consider the body by itself; the disease by itself; and the body and the disease both together, as they make a diseased body." Considered in the first sense, he says, it is a church; considered in the second sense or "formally, in regard of those points which are properly of Popery it has become a false and corrupt church; and is indeed an anti-Christian synagogue, and not a true Christian church taking truth in the second sense." He had previously said, "The word *truth* applied to any subject is taken either absolute or respective. *Absolutely* a thing is true, when it hath *veritatem entis et essentiae*, with all those essential things, which are requisite to the being and existence of it. *Respectively*, when over and above these essentials, it hath also such accidental conditions and qualities, as should make it perfect and commendably good. A thing may be true in the first sense, and yet not true in the second, but false. As a man may be a true man (*animal rationale*) and yet a false knave." Treatise on the Church, p. 214 and 219.

wicked; but the same thing is true of almost all established churches. It has been palpably true of the church of England, and scarcely less obviously true of the church of Prussia, as well as of the Greek church in Russia. When a church is perverted by its rulers into an engine of state, it does not cease to be a church, because it is by the church as such, i. e., as a society designed for the worship of God and the edification of his people, such rulers endeavour to secure their own secular ends.

The only point really open to debate is, whether the Romish church as a society professes the true religion. In reference to this point we would remark, 1st. That by true religion in this connection, has ever been understood, and from the nature of the case must be understood, the essential doctrines of the gospel. Men may enlarge or contract their list of such doctrines; but it involves a contradiction to say, that those who hold the essentials of the gospel, do not hold the gospel. This would be saying that the essence of a thing, is not the thing itself, but something else. By the essential doctrines of the gospel we mean, and Protestants have been accustomed to mean, those doctrines, which, in the language of Hooker, "are necessarily required in every particular Christian man." The question therefore as correctly stated by Professor Thornevell really is, Whether Rome as a society still teaches truth enough to save the soul? 2. Our second preliminary remark is, that in determining what are the essential doctrines of the gospel, we cannot consent to bow to any other authority than the word of God. We cannot with Romanists and Anglicans, on the one hand, consent to make the judgment of the church the criterion of decision on this subject; nor on the other, can we submit to the judgment of individuals or sects, some of which would close not the church only, but heaven itself, against all Presbyterians, others against all Calvinists, others against all Arminians, others against all who sing hymns. 3d. A third remark is, that we must distinguish between what is essential to the gospel, and what is essential for a particular individual to believe. The former is a fixed, the other is a variable quantity. The gospel in its essential principles is now what it always was and always must be. But what is essential for a man to believe depends upon that man's opportunities of knowledge. A poor

Hottentot may get to heaven though he knows nothing about, or should unintelligently reject many doctrines which it would argue an unsanctified heart in a man nurtured in the bosom of a pure church, even to question. 4th. We must interpret language according to the *usus loquendi* of those who use it, and not according to our own usage. If a man defines justification so as to include sanctification, and says that justification is by works as well as by faith, we must understand him accordingly. We may say a man is sanctified by love, hope, and other Christian graces and works; meaning that all these tend to promote his conformity to God; when we could not say, that he is justified, in our sense of the term, by those things.

It is then impossible to give any list of essential doctrines of the gospel, if so doing were to imply that all doctrines not included in such list, might be safely rejected, by men, no matter what their opportunities for knowledge may be. By essential doctrines we mean, as already stated, those which no man can be saved, without believing. We shall not undertake the delicate task of giving a list of such doctrines, but content ourselves with remarking that the scriptures adopt a two-fold mode of statement on this subject. First, they give certain doctrines which they declare if any man believes he shall be saved. And, secondly, they state certain doctrines which if a man rejects, he shall be lost. These two modes of statement must be consistent, i. e., they cannot lead logically to contradictory conclusions, even though the Bible arranges under the one head some doctrines which it does not place under the other. One reason why more particulars are found under the latter head than the former, no doubt is, that the rejection of a doctrine implies the knowledge of it. And the rejection of a doctrine when known may be fatal, when the knowledge of it, as a distinct proposition, may not be essential to salvation. These essential doctrines therefore may be learned both from the affirmative and negative statements of the Bible. For example, it is said, whosoever believes in Christ shall be saved; whosoever believes that Jesus is the Son of God, is born of God; whosoever believes and confesses that Christ is Lord, does it by the Holy Ghost; on the other hand, it is fatal to deny God, for he that cometh unto God must believe that he is; so is also the denial of God's mercy, for we must believe that he

is the rewarder of those who diligently seek him. He who denies the Son, the same hath not the Father; he who denies sin, or that he is a sinner, the truth is not in him; he who rejects the sacrifice of Christ, has only a fearful looking for of judgment; he who seeks justification from the law, has fallen from grace, and Christ shall profit him nothing; he who denies the resurrection of Christ, makes our preaching and our faith vain; he who denies holiness, and the obligation of holiness, has denied the faith and is worse than an infidel; so he who says that the resurrection is past already, has made shipwreck of the faith. The denial of these doctrines is said to forfeit salvation; but it does not follow that they must all be clearly known and intelligently received in order to salvation. It is a historical fact, as far as such a fact can be historically known, that men have been saved who knew nothing of the gospel but that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners. The scriptures do not warrant us in fixing the minimum of divine truth by which the Spirit may save the soul. We do know however that if any man believes that Jesus is the Son of God, he is born of God; that no true worshipper of Christ ever perishes. Paul sends his Christian salutations to all in every place, theirs and ours, who call upon the name of the Lord Jesus, their Lord and ours.

That Romanists as a society profess the true religion, meaning thereby the essential doctrines of the gospel, those doctrines which if truly believed will save the soul, is, as we think plain. 1. Because they believe the scriptures to be the word of God. 2. They direct that the Scriptures should be understood and received as they were understood by the Christian Fathers. 3. They receive the three general creeds of the church, the Apostle's, the Nicene, and the Athanasian, or as these are summed up in the creed of Pius V. 4. They believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible. In one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made. Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the virgin Mary, and was made man. And

was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, suffered and was buried. And the third day rose again, according to the scriptures; and ascended into heaven and sitteth at the right hand of the Father. And he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead, whose kindom shall have no end. And they believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father and the Son, who with the Father and the Son is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets. And they believe in one catholic apostolic church. They acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins, and look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.

If this creed were submitted to any intelligent Christian, without his knowing whence it came, could he hesitate to say that it was the creed of a Christian church? Could he deny that these are the very terms in which for ages the general faith of Christendom has been expressed? Could he, without renouncing the Bible, say that the sincere belief of these doctrines would not secure eternal life? Can any man take it upon himself in the sight of God, to assert, there is not truth enough in the above summary to save the soul? If not, then a society professing that creed professes the true religion, in the sense stated above. 5. We argue from the acknowledged fact that God has always had, still has, and is to have a people in that church until its final destruction; just as he had in the midst of corrupt and apostate Israel. We admit that Rome has grievously apostatized from the faith, the order and the worship of the church, that she has introduced a multitude of false doctrines, a corrupt and superstitious and even idolatrous worship, and a most oppressive and cruel government; but since as a society she still retains the profession of saving doctrines, and as in point of fact, by those doctrines men are born unto God and nurtured for heaven, we dare not deny that she is still a part of the visible church. We consider such a denial a direct contradiction of the Bible, and of the facts of God's providence. It was within the limits of the church the great anti-christian power was to arise; it was in the church the man of sin was to exalt himself; and it was over the church he was to exercise his baneful and cruel power.

The most common and plausible objections to the admission

that the church of Rome is still a part of the visible church are the following. First, it is said that she does not profess the true religion, because though she retains the forms or propositions in which the truth is stated, she vitiates them by her explanations. To which we answer 1, That in her general creeds, adopted and professed by the people, no explanations are given. The doctrines are asserted in the general terms, just as they were presented and professed before the Romish apostacy. 2. That the explanations, as given by the Council of Trent, are as stated by Theophilus, designedly two-sided and ambiguous; so that while one class of Romanists take them in a sense consistent with their saving efficacy, others take them in a sense which destroys their value. It is notorious that the 39 Articles of the church of England are taken in a Calvinistic sense, by one class of her theologians; in a semi-Pelagian sense by another class; and in a Romish sense by a third. 3. While we admit the truth of the objection as a fact, viz., that the dominant class of Romish theologians do explain away most of the saving doctrines of her ancient creeds, yet we deny that this destroys the argument from the profession of those creeds, in proof that as a society she retains saving truth. Because it is the creeds and not the explanations, that constitute the profession of the people.

Secondly, it is objected that Rome professes fundamental errors. To this we answer 1, That we acknowledge that the teaching of many of her most authoritative authors is fatally erroneous. 2. That the decisions of the council of Trent, as understood by one class of the Romish theologians, are not less at variance with the truth; but not as they are in fact explained by another class of her doctors. 3. That these decisions and explanations are not incorporated in the creed professed by the people. 4. That the profession of fundamental error by a society, does not necessarily destroy its character as a church, provided it retains with such error, the essential truths of religion. The Jewish church at the time of Christ, by her officers, in the synagogues and in the sanhedrim, and by all her great parties, professed fundamental error, justification by the law for example; and yet retained its being as a church, in the bosom of which the elect of God still lived.

Thirdly, Rome is idolatrous and therefore in no sense a

church. To this we answer 1, That the practice of the great body of the church of Rome is beyond doubt idolatrous. 2. That the avowed principles of the majority of her teachers, are also justly liable to the same charge. 3. That the principles of another class of her doctors, who say they worship neither the images themselves, nor through them, but simply in the presence of them, are not idolatrous in the ordinary meaning of that term. 4. That it is not necessary that every man should be, in the fatal sense of that word, an idolater in order to remain in that church; otherwise there could be no true children of God within its pale. But the contrary is, as a fact, on all hands conceded. 5. We know that the Jewish church, though often overrun with idolatry never ceased to exist.

Fourthly, it is objected that the people of God are commanded to come out of the church of Rome, which would not be the case were she still a part of the visible church. To this we answer, that the people of God are commanded to come out of every church, which either professes error, or which imposes any terms of communion which hurt an enlightened conscience. The non-conformists in the time of Charles II., were bound to leave the church of England, and yet did not thereby assert that it was no longer a church.

Fifthly, it is said we give up too much to the Papists if we admit Romanists to be in the church. To this we answer, Every false position is a weak position. The cause of truth suffers in no way more than from identifying it with error, which is always done when its friends advocate it on false principles. When one says, we favour intemperance, unless we say that the use of intoxicating liquors, is sinful; another, that we favour slavery, unless we say slaveholding is a sin; and a third, that we favour Popery unless we say the church of Rome is no church, they all, as it seems to us, make the same mistake, and greatly injure the cause in which they are engaged. They give the adversary an advantage over them, and they fail to enlist the strength of their own side. Men who are anxious to promote temperance, cannot join societies which avow principles which they believe to be untrue; and men who believe Popery to be the greatest modern enemy of the gospel, cannot co-operate in measures of opposition to that growing evil, which are founded on the denial of what appears

to them important scriptural principles. It is a great mistake to suppose that Popery is aided by admitting what truth it does include. What gives it its power, what constitutes its peculiarly dangerous character, is that it is not pure infidelity ; it is not the entire rejection of the gospel, but truth surrounded with enticing and destructive error. Poison by itself is not so seductive, and therefore not so dangerous, as when mixed with food. We do not believe that those of our brethren from whom we are so unfortunate as to differ on this subject, have a deeper impression than we have either of the destructive character of the errors of Popery, or of the danger to which religion and liberty are exposed from its progress. We believe it to be by far the most dangerous form of delusion and error that has ever arisen in the Christian world, and all the more dangerous from its having arisen and established itself in the church, or temple of God.

SHORT NOTICES.

Missionary Life in Samoa, as exhibited in the Journals of the late George Archibald Lundie, during the revival in Tutuila in 1840-41. Edited by his mother, author of "Memoir of Mary Lundie Duncan," &c. New York: Robert Carter. 1846. 18mo. pp. 313.

GEORGE LUNDIE was a younger brother of Mary Lundie Duncan ; and this touching tribute is from the same maternal pen. Whoever reads one, will read the other. It is a beautiful addition to Missionary biography, and contains a narrative of a wonderful religious awakening. The instances of bodily affections, accompanying religious feeling, in this revival, may be compared with what we know of like cases in our own country ; and the study of the phenomena will produce caution as well as amazement.

The Fruit of the Spirit. By George Bethune, D. D., Minister of the Third Reformed Dutch Church, Philadelphia. Philá. 1845. Third edition. pp. 304.

THOUGH not the latest, this is in our judgment the best of the author's productions, which we have seen. The demand for a third edition shows that it is fitted to the public taste. Dr. Bethune has this distinction, that while he is one of our most popular preachers, he has not sacrificed purity and perspicuity of style to that false point and exaggeration which betoken the downfall of good English. This we attribute to his sound scholarship and cultivated taste. The affecting truths of the gospel are not less powerful when conveyed with the felicity of classical style. Here and there the good-natured satire of the author lurks in a sentence, which those who know him well recognise as characteristic. Without any attempt at profound discussion, this little work abounds in evangelical truth, conveyed in a vehicle of unusual beauty.

The Midshipman in China; or Recollections of the Chinese.

London: The Religious Tract Society. Philadelphia: American Sunday School Union.

THE American Sunday School Union have made an arrangement with the London Tract Society, to publish, concurrently with them, such of their valuable works as are best suited to America. The present volume is issued under this arrangement. There are several other juvenile works, which came within the same plan, but of which we have not the precise titles at this moment of going to press. The attention of parents and teachers cannot be too often drawn to such works as the "Jew at Home and Abroad," "Life in Earnest," "A Casket of Brilliants," the "Life of Mrs. Ramsey," the "Life of Mrs. Judson," "Reuben Kent," and the "Curiosities of Egypt."

There has been a constant and equable advance in the character of these publications. They are better in regard to usefulness, and far better in style and decoration. If tracts and books are good, as forming the national mind, they are especially and invaluable good, in forming the youthful mind. It is too late to be handling and pressing the clay after it has grown stiff in the mould. Good books are given in vain to those who have no taste for reading. This is not sufficiently considered. In vain do we spread the most valuable treatises before a sluggish, undisciplined mind. "Wherefore is there a

price in the hand of a fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it?" It is to give him a heart to it that we would begin early, even with the horn-book and the nursery, and bring him on by degrees, through the delightful paths of Sunday-school literature. We shall ever resist those saturnine and surly critics, "whose visages do cream and mantle like a standing pool" at every mention of story-books, pictures, and the like attractions. To prevent such 'vinegar aspect' in the future days of our little ones, we place before them these grateful enticements to what is good. It is an ancient an approved way :

Quid vetat ? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi
Doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima.

For these "bland doctors" we would direct our children and grand children to the new edifice, No.146, Chesnut street.

The Light Hearted Girl, a tale for children. By Joseph Alden, D. D., author of the "Great Secret Discovered." Boston: Benjamin Perkins & Co. 1845.

WHOEVER rightly estimates the effect of early impressions will not regard with indifference the volumes prepared for the rising generation ; and it is an omen of auspicious import to the children of our day that men of high intellectual endowments and acquirements are found willing to devote a portion of their time to this important field of labour. The above-named little volume we have read with much interest, and regard it as well calculated to captivate and instruct the juvenile mind. It "is intended to be the first of a series similar in character and design." The "Cardinal Flower," "Lost Lamb," and some others, have already appeared.

Anecdotes for the Family and Social Circle. Selected for the American Tract Society. Published by the Society. New York. 18mo. pp. 408.

MANY readers will remember the series of little volumes containing religious anecdotes, published by the Religious Tract Society of London. We have often gone to them for instruction and entertainment. The selection now before us is from the same hand which prepared those volumes. We commend the book to Christian households.

The Method of Grace, in the Holy Spirit's applying to the souls of Men the Eternal Redemption continued by the Father and accomplished by the Son. By Rev. John Flavel. First American edition. Revised and somewhat abridged. American Tract Society. 12mo. pp. 560.

THE very title of this book carries with it a savour which is familiar and delightful; like the fragrance of flowers or fruit which we have loved in our childhood. We know the region from which these things come: it is "as the smell of a field which the Lord hath blessed." We love the book, and the author, and the doctrine, and the enchanting, quaint, memorable style. The charm of all is, that it breathes from every page that which closes the last one: Blessed be God for Jesus Christ! From beginning to end, the treatise exalts Immanuel, and the author seems to rejoice because of the savour of his "good ointments," and in that name which is "as ointment poured forth."

The Duty of interesting Children in the Missionary Cause, and how this is to be done. By Rev. Thomas Smyth, D. D., Charleston, S. C. 1846..

THIS interesting essay relates to one branch of a subject of more real importance to the church in this country, than any other that can be named, viz. the education of the children. That the character of a nation or of a church depends on the training of its children, is a truth which God has not only taught us in his word, but which he is perpetually teaching in his providence. It is one, however, which we are apparently more and more forgetting. The whole tendency of the last twenty-five years has been to rely more on spasmodic efforts, on exhortations from the pulpit, and appeals to the feelings of the people, as a means of building up the church, than upon the teaching of Christianity. The church seems disposed to forget that her great commission is to make disciples of all nations; to teach them the great and comprehensive science of religion. What other science do men try to teach by declamation? What rational expectation can be entertained that religion can be thus taught? And what melancholy evidence do we see on every hand of the failure of this new method of making men wise unto salvation? A missionary recently returned to this

country, after an absence of five and twenty years, remarked to us, that the church here seemed to him to have gone back fifty years in all matters connected with the religious training of the young. We hope an interest in this subject is beginning to be aroused, and we trust that the example set us by our wiser and more experienced missionaries of really teaching Christianity to the whole population, as distinguished from mere exhortation and declamation, will react on the church, and lead her to train up her children in the knowledge of God.

Thoughts of Blaise Pascal. Translated from the French. Preceded by a sketch of his Life. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New York: M. H. Newman. 1846. pp. 384.

“IN this edition of Pascal’s thoughts, the translation of the Rev. Edward Craig, published in England, in 1825, has been carefully compared with the original, and such amendments have been made, as a strict adherence to the sense, and as far as possible, to the expression of the author, seemed to require.” As our readers may all be presumed to know the worth of a work of such long established reputation, it will be sufficient for us to state, that the edition above referred to, is beautifully printed, and preceded by an interesting biography of the author, compiled from the best sources.

The Design of the Church, as an Index to her Real Nature and the Law of her true Communion. By John Miller, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Frederick, Md. Philadelphia: James M. Campbell. 1846. pp. 167.

THIS is the production of an original and logical mind. The writer having, in the first chapter, established what he calls the principle that the nature of a thing is to be inferred from the end it was intended to answer, proceeds to infer the nature of religion from the design of religion, the efficacy and kind of necessity due to externals in religion, from their design; the nature of an external church from its obvious design. The whole plan is carried out with great acumen and force of argument; and the book rendered an effective weapon against the prevailing Ritualism of the age. We are not prepared to agree with the writer either in all his assumptions,

or in all his conclusions ; but we are not the less impressed by the ability the work displays, and hope it may prove extensively useful.

An Exposition of the Ten Commandments. By the Rt. Rev. Ezekiel Hopkins, D. D., successively Bishop of Raphoe and Derry, who died in London, A. D. 1690. Revised and slightly abridged. American Tract Society. 12mo. pp. 442.

BISHOP HOPKINS was a sound divine of the Anglican Church, and as a preacher was esteemed one of the best of his times. His writings are well known and highly honoured among orthodox Christians for their argument, energy and practical point. A more important theme than this can scarcely be named. The author treats it in such a way as to convey instruction without weariness. One such volume as this is worth whole warehouses full of the new-fangled ethics of modern improvers. Let them come hither and be ashamed of their pestilent froth. Here is a clear, humble, pungent, exposition of God's law ; and we will boldly stake it against all the recent inventions of those who would be wiser than God, and better than Christ.

Letters to a Friend on the Evidences, Doctrines and Duties of the Christian Religion. By Olinthus Gregory, LL. D., F. R. A. S., late Professor of Mathematics in the Royal Military Academy of Woolwich. From the Fourth London Edition. Revised and slightly abridged.

THIS is a new edition of a celebrated and invaluable work. For a certain class of readers there is no treatise on the Evidences, which is more suitable than this. Scientific men ; scholars who have been so far misled as to consider the gospel beneath inquiry ; men of the world ; gentlemen of the army and navy ; such are the class of readers who have found cause to bless God that they ever met with the writings of Dr. Gregory. It is a leading excellency of the treatise, that it enters somewhat largely into the cardinal doctrines of the gospel ; such as providence, atonement, and justification by faith. To contemplate these, from the point of view of a distinguished and scientific layman, is a privilege which no wise man will neglect.

Jacob's Well. By George Albert Rogers, M. A., Sunday evening Lecturer and Senior Curate of St. Mary's, Islington, and Domestic Chaplain to the Right Hon. Viscount Lifford. New York: Robert Carter. 1846. 18mo. pp. 232.

It is to us an occasion of unfeigned thankfulness, that God continues to raise up men of such a spirit in the Church of England. The doctrine is that ancient evangelical Calvinism, of Romaine and Milner, Newton and Cowper, which we sometimes listen for, fruitlessly, in Presbyterian churches. The pleasing, perspicuous, striking style of Mr. Rogers places him in the same class with Krummacher. As the title indicates, the book contains a popular exposition of the fourth chapter of the gospel of John. We feel safe in recommending it, not as a great or novel production, but as one eminently fitted to be useful to every class of readers.

Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England, 1740.

To which is prefixed a Narrative of the Surprising work of God in Northampton, 1735. By Jonathan Edwards, A. M., Published by the American Tract Society. 12mo. pp. 446.

It is something to get a standard work in a comely shape and convenient size, and the favour is doubled when we have it very cheap. On the subject of Revivals this is the book, by way of eminence. Would to God that this renewed circulation of it might be owned and blessed to the revival of primitive piety, in every minister and in every church.

A Sermon preached, in commemoration of Professor Dod, in the Chapel of the College of New Jersey. March 1, 1846.

By John Maclean, Vice President of the College. Published at the request of the Students. Princeton. 1846.

THE church, the College of New Jersey, literature and science, have rarely, in our country, been called upon to mourn a greater loss than the death of our late beloved and admired associate Professor Dod. His fine mind was improved by manifold culture, and stored with various knowledge. His amiable and cheerful disposition, was refined by social intercourse, at once intimate and extended. His piety was enlightened and sincere, his faith in the gospel unwavering, and his attachment to its great doctrines devoted. As a teacher

of mathematics, this country has, probably, never produced his superior ; as an agreeable companion we have never met his equal ; as a disputant, whether in the social circle, or on the floor of the deliberative bodies of the church, we never saw his rival ; as a preacher, he was one of the most attractive and convincing on our list of ministers. His mind was always active ; always beaming with bright or elevated thoughts, and always alive to every topic of interest or importance. It was not in mathematics only, or chiefly, that he delighted and excelled. He was discriminating and profound as a metaphysician ; and highly accomplished in literature and art. Poetry and architecture were among his favourite subjects of study. He excelled in every thing to which he directed his powers, and was ever ready to exert them when the emergency demanded the effort. The conductors of this work relied upon him, as a general relies upon his reserves. His contributions to our pages present one aspect of his many-sided mind ; but those who knew him in the lecture-room, in the social circle, in the pulpit, must ever lament that he has left in writing, no adequate memorial of himself.

His last illness was rapidly and unexpectedly brought to a fatal termination. On his death-bed he commissioned his friend, Dr. Macleau, to deliver in his name, his parting counsels to the students of the college. The intervening vacation and other circumstances, prevented his friend's performing this duty until the delivery of the discourse above mentioned. In that sermon, with simplicity and feeling, Dr. Maclean forcibly presents some of those great lessons of religion and morality, which Professor Dod was accustomed to urge upon his pupils. This he does under the following heads. 1. Religion should be made the governing principle of life. 2. We are bound to improve our intellectual and moral powers to the utmost. 3. A life of pleasure is not only wicked, but the height of folly. 4. Men are responsible for their doctrinal belief. 5. Faith in Jesus Christ is necessary to salvation. These are the lessons which the preacher made his departed friend utter anew, and as from the grave, in ears which had often listened to the persuasive eloquence of that voice which is never more to be heard in those ancient halls of science and religion.

Devotional Aids for the Chamber of Sickness. Prepared for the Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia : Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 176. 32mo.

THIS little volume is characterised by great simplicity of arrangement and style ; and though it is exceedingly brief, is yet sufficiently comprehensive for its purpose. A great variety of texts of scripture are quoted, arranged under suitable heads, and adapted to the circumstances of sick persons. It also contains a collection of prayers to be used by the sick, and for the sick, by their attendants, select thoughts from various authors, narratives of the dying experience of eminent Christians, meditations on scriptural passages, and a selection of hymns for the sick room.

Meditations of a Christian Mother ; or a practical application of scripture to the Circumstances of herself and her children. Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 151, 24mo.

THE title-page describes accurately the character of this book. It may serve to suggest thoughts, and to sustain through a train of pious and sensible meditations, minds that are not much accustomed, or not very well qualified, to think continuously on any subject. It brings to notice a great many points which no serious or thoughtful parents can contemplate, and much less dwell upon, without benefit, both to themselves and their children.

1. *Seventeenth Annual Report of the Inspectors of the Eastern State Penitentiary of Pennsylvania.* Transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives, Feb., 1846. Philadelphia : Printed by Ed. Barrington and George D. Haswell. 1846.
2. *The Pennsylvania Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy.* Published under the direction of "The Philadelphia Society for the alleviation of the Miseries of Public Prisons," instituted 1787. Vol. II. No. 1. January, 1846. Philadelphia : James M. Campbell, 98 Chesnut St. London : Charles Gilpin. Paris : Hector Bossange. Hamburg : Perthes, Besser & Manke. 1846.

THE interest excited by the discussions on the subject of Prison Discipline, throughout the civilized world, is one of the

remarkable characteristics of this age. It has been among our purposes for some time, to bring this subject before our readers by a review of these discussions, with their effects in different countries. The attention of Howard was first called to the subject, when he was Sheriff of the County of Bedford in England, in 1773. His explorations of European prisons and lazarettos and his exposure of their enormities roused the sensibilities of the whole Christian world, and the subject has, especially within the last twenty years, attracted great attention not only from distinguished philanthropists, but likewise from nearly all the leading governments in Christendom: and more than one of the crowned heads of Europe has entered the lists in these exciting discussions.

We have not time, at present, to trace the history or results of the attention which the subject has received. Our own country has the distinguished honour of having brought the matters in dispute to a clear issue, and instituted a series of experiments to settle it. The two systems of prison discipline, between which philanthropists are divided, are known as the Auburn or silent, and the Pennsylvania or separate system. We cannot now enter into the argument; but we wish to recommend to the attention of all who are interested in the welfare of the miserable victims of crime, the documents we have placed at the head of these remarks. The Report of the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania is a masterly array of facts, adapted to correct the false views which the opponents of the system have adopted and propagated, in regard to its nature, to relieve the apprehensions of horrible cruelty associated with, and dependent upon, those false views, and to set its effects upon the physical and moral well-being of the convicts, in the clearest light. We especially commend to attention, the elaborate and able report of the physician, Dr. Given, on the subject of health generally; and particularly on the influence of the system upon the minds of the convicts. The Journal is expressly devoted to the discussion of all the subjects brought into dispute, between the rival systems. The papers are, of course, of unequal ability; but it furnishes ample means of studying the side of the question to which it is friendly.

Traditions of the Covenanters; or Gleanings among the Moun-

tains. Second Series. By the Rev. Robert Simpson, Sanguahar. Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

EVERY BODY knows enough of the faith, patience, and persecutions of the Covenanters of Scotland, to make him anxious to know more. The love of incident and heroism, which is so strong a passion in the human mind, will find its gratification in these narratives; and perhaps with that gratification some better impressions may find access to the mind and heart of the reader. Besides the illustrations which are here furnished of the truth and power of Christian principles, it is very desirable that this master passion of the mind, should feed upon the details of veracious history, instead of being pampered by the extravagant and monstrous creations of fiction; which, we are sorry to say, abound more and more, in our juvenile literature; and even in that portion of it, which professes to be religious, and proceeds from quarters from which we have a right to expect better things. If we could gain the ear of those who control the issues of our religious juvenile literature, we would urge a caution, with all the emphasis we could command, against spicing too strongly the intellectual food of our young people. The tendency, we are confident, is all in this direction. The rage is for exciting, or in the milder phraseology of the day, for *interesting* books, not for those which are *instructive*, and require and teach their readers to *think*. Minds trained in this school, of course, carry the same tastes into the church, and demand the same qualities in sermons. And the end of these things, our foresight is not adequate to predict.

The course of our Board, in this respect, has been commendable. We hope they will persevere; and if their juvenile books are less in demand, for the time, than some others, they will be more useful in the end.

Phrenology Examined. By P. Flourens, member of the French Academy, Perpetual Secretary of The Royal Academy of Sciences, &c. &c. &c. Translated from the second edition of 1845, by Charles De Lucena Meigs, M. D. member of the Amer. Philos. Soc. &c. &c. Philadelphia: Hogan & Thompson. 1846.

THERE are probably some intelligent people who honestly

believe in the doctrines of Gall, Spurzheim and Broussais; there are perhaps still more, who suppose they may be true, for aught that appears to the contrary; and we are quite sure, there are still a great many, for whose intelligence, however, we could not in every case vouch, who are liable to be hoaxed, not only by the professors of the phrenological art, but by those of arts, which may be considered as the legitimate spawn of phrenology, phreno-mesmerism, clairvoyance, &c. We strongly recommend all such persons to read this critique. It is one of the most masterly and conclusive morsels of argumentation, that has fallen into our hands for a long time. The accomplished author first strikes through the tap-root of the system, and having laid it on the ground, proceeds to lop off every branch, and ends by scattering them all to the winds. The whole argument is comprised in a pamphlet of 144 pages, 18mo., of large, open, beautiful type. "My wish," says the author, "is to be brief. There is, however, one great secret in the art of being brief: it is to be clear."

Gall was a man of genius and science, an ingenious and skilful anatomist, but an enthusiast. Spurzheim was his pupil in phrenology, and his inferior in every respect, except in the prudent skill, with which he adjusted his published views to the state of public sentiment. Broussais was perhaps superior to Gall in mental vigour and originality, and far exceeded him in the boldness and recklessness with which he embraced and promulgated the extreme opinions to which the system seemed to lead by logical necessity.

Phrenology has attempted to overthrow the received doctrines, and established itself in the three great departments of knowledge; physiology, anatomy, psychology and morals.

In regard to the first, it maintains that the brain is the organ of the mind in all its operations, including the senses and the instincts; and further, that the whole encephalon or contents of the cranium, are employed in this office, and that each faculty of the mind has a particular organ of its own, in which it resides separately and exclusively. Now modern science has settled the matter by experiment, that of the four divisions of the brain, viz: the medulla oblongata, the cerebellum, the corpora quadrigemina and the cerebrum; only the last has any thing whatever to do with the operations of the

mind ; that it is not a congeries of separate organs, but a single organ, the whole of which is necessary to the full functions of any one of our mental faculties, and that the removal of any part of it, instead of obliterating one faculty, weakens the whole intellect. It is also perfectly ascertained by experiment, and a more accurate knowledge of comparative anatomy, that Gall and his disciples blundered throughout, in assigning the uses of the different portions of the brain. For example, they locate the instinct of propagation in the cerebellum, whereas it is now well known, that that organ is employed solely in generating the power of motion for the voluntary muscles, i. e. those muscles subject to the control of the will ; as the medulla oblongata performs the same office for the muscles of involuntary motion—respiration, for example. Again, Gall considers the posterior portions of the lobes of the cerebrum, as the seat of the organs appropriated to those faculties which are common to animals and men, and the anterior to those which are peculiar to rational and moral beings. But comparative anatomy has since revealed the fact, that the anterior portions of the brain are never wanting in any of the genera of the mammiferous animals, while the posterior are often entirely absent—the precise reverse of what should occur, according to phrenology.*

In the anatomy of the brain, we are mainly, though not wholly, indebted to Dr. Gall, for the present improved method of dissection and study by unfolding its convolutions, and tracing the fibres not only of the nerves which issue from it, but of the white portion of the brain itself, from their origin towards their destination. But neither Gall, nor any of his followers, was ever able to detect the slightest anatomical foundation for the division of the brain into twenty-seven distinct organs. On the contrary its structure utterly precludes the doctrine. Like the tubular nerves and the animal spirits of Haller, the twenty-seven cerebral organs of Gall must be sought, not in the anatomy of the brain, but in the hypothesis which required them.

But the psychological doctrines of the Phrenologists are still more amusing. The mind, like the brain, instead of being a unit, is dissected nicely into twenty-seven distinct faculties, each

* See Leuret's *Anat. Compar. du Système Nerveux, considéré dans ses rapports avec l'intelligence.* Paris, 1839.

gifted with a perception, a memory, an imagination, a judgment, &c., &c., of its own, and each totally independent of every other. In these respects the understanding, the conscience, and the instincts, are all on the same level, and all equally the result of mere organization. In other words our mental and moral faculties are all nothing but instincts. Reason and Will have no positive existence, but are mere abstract terms, to express the result of the separate action of the faculties or instincts.

It is easy to imagine that this system makes the wildest work of all with the doctrines of morals. As all our moral acts are nothing but organic functions, it follows, in the language of Dr. Gall, that "moral liberty is nothing more than the faculty of *being determined*." And of course with this sort of moral liberty, moral *responsibility* is nothing but a term of the schools. If, for example, the organ of love of offspring is but feeble, and that of murder powerfully developed, it is easy to understand what the consequence must be. "These facts show us," says Dr. Gall, "that this detestable inclination (to commit murder,) has its source in a vice of the organization." And again, "let those haughty men, who cause nations to be slaughtered by thousands, know that they do not act of their own accord, but that nature herself has filled their hearts with rage and destructiveness!" Surely this is sufficiently clear and cool.

As for craniotomy, or the art of determining character, from the protuberances on the skull, having any foundation in anatomical or physiological science, the idea is now beyond argument; and we should not expend a word upon it, if there were not still certain professors of the art, who are living at the expense of those, who do not happen to have the means of knowing better. It is not necessary to make a stand upon the well known fact, that the cavities and other irregularities in the substance of the skull, make its outer surface a very uncertain indication of the shape of the brain.

But setting this difficulty aside, does the inner surface express the faculties of which the brain is the organ? To make out this point, Dr. Gall maintains, that "the organs of the soul are situated at the surface of the brain." M. Flourens in a series of experiments,* has shown, that you "can slice off a conside-

* See *Recherches Experimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions du système Nerveux*, Paris, 1842.

able portion of an animal's brain, either in front, behind, on one side, or on the top, without its losing any one of its faculties." If therefore, there were distinct organs in the brain, on the presence and development of which the mental and moral faculties are dependent, it is perfectly clear that they are not situated in the outer surface of the brain; and consequently, if the outside of the cranium did perfectly correspond with the surface of the brain, it could be no index in regard to the existence and strength of these separate faculties. But we have already stated that there is not the slightest evidence that such organs exist anywhere in the brain; and that they certainly do not exist where Gall places them.

