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BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES
AND
THE MONROE DOCTRINE

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ALBERTO L. A. DE VILH
HOWARD BRANTUOS

The importance of the article we reprint from the columns of the great leading newspaper of Brazil, the *Jornal do Commercio*, of Rio de Janeiro, lies chiefly in the assertion it makes, accompanied with historical evidence, that *fifty-nine days* after the reading of President Monroe's celebrated Message of the 23rd December, 1823, the Brazilian Government issued instructions to its Representative in Washington to propose to the United States an offensive and defensive alliance on the basis of that Message, acting on the principle that it was *not in accordance with reason, justice and right that sacrifices such as those which the United States undertook to make for the other American Nations should be accepted gratuitously*. This article is generally attributed to Baron do Rio Branco, the Foreign Minister of Brazil.

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BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The demonstrations of friendship between the Governments of Rio de Janeiro and Washington have been criticized of late with injustice and passion by a few Brazilian writers, who consider themselves the exponents of the policy of our statesmen under the Empire. The policy followed by Presidents Rodrigues Alves and Roosevelt for the closer approximation of Brazil and the United States was taken in bad part by those critics. On several occasions they showed an ungrateful contempt for the Monroe Doctrine and condemned the simultaneous resolution of the two Governments to raise their respective diplomatic representatives to the dignity of Ambassadors.

The documents which we are going to reproduce, or give extracts from, show that President Rodrigues Alves was amply justified when he said in his last Message to Congress: *"It is a great satisfaction to me to note that the ties of cordial friendship which bind Brazil and the United States together are ever drawing closer. In striving to strengthen them I have done no more than follow the policy inaugurated after 1882 by the founders of our Independence, which has ever since been observed by all the Governments that Brazil has had."*

I.

The Manifesto of the Prince Regent of Brazil to the Governments and Friendly Nations bears the date of August 6, 1822. This document, as is well known, was drawn up

by José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, at that time Minister of the Kingdom of Brazil and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

We take the following from its last part :

“My firm resolve and that of the people whom I govern are legitimately promulgated. I trust then that intelligent and impartial men, all the world over, and the Governments and Nations friendly to Brazil will do justice to such fair and wise sentiments. I invite them to continue their friendly relations with the Kingdom of Brazil for our mutual interest. *I shall be ready to receive their Ministers and diplomatic agents and to send mine to them* so long as the captivity of my August Father continues.”

Six days later, on August 12th, the Prince Regent Dom Pedro signed the decree nominating a Chargé d’Affaires of the Kingdom of Brazil in the United States of America and on the following day he left for São Paulo, where on September 7th he proclaimed the Independence of Brazil.

The decree countersigned by José Bonifacio is therefore, *prior to the Independence and the Proclamation of the Empire*, since the Independence took place on the 7th of September and the Proclamation of the Empire on October 12th of the same year, 1822.

The decree runs as follows :

“As in the present condition of politics it is essential to nominate in My Royal Name a person in the United States of America to treat directly the affairs affecting both Countries, and having taken into consideration the well known ability, patriotism and zeal of Luiz Moutinho Lima Alves e Silva, officer in the Department of State for Foreign Affairs, I have been pleased to appoint him to occupy the position of My Chargé d’Affaires in the said United States of America with the annual salary of two contos and four hundred mil réis.

“José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva of My Council of State and of the Council of His Most Faithful Majesty, Minister and Secretary for the Home and Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom, whom I have instructed in this sense, will carry out the present order.

“Palace of Rio de Janeiro, August 12, 1822.—With the Rubric of His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent.—*José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva.*”

This was the *first diplomatic appointment* signed by the Prince Regent Dom Pedro on the advice of José Bonifacio; later, in the same day, two more decrees were signed appointing two Chargés d’Affaires: to London, the Marshal de Campo Felisberto Caldeira Brant Pontes, afterwards Marquis of Barbacena, and to Paris, Manoel Rodrigues Gameiro Pessoa, afterwards Viscount of Itabayana. Before these only one appointment had been made, that of Manoel Antonio Corrêa da Camara as Consul to Buenos Aires on May 24th.

On January 15, 1823, Antonio Goncalves da Cruz, who had taken part in the Pernambuco revolution of 1817, was appointed Consul General in the United States of America.

II.

Luiz Moutinho was unable to go to the United States in 1822, as he was delayed by special duties in the Foreign Office, where shortly afterwards he was promoted to the position of Director General.

By decree of January 21st of 1824, José Silvestre Rebello was appointed Chargé d’Affaires of Brazil in the United States of America. He was therefore the first diplomatic representative we actually had in that country.

On March 28th he landed at Baltimore and on April 3rd arrived at Washington. The President was James Monroe,

who in his last Message, read to Congress on December 3rd of the preceding year, had promulgated the doctrine of the opposition of the United States to foreign conquests in our Continent. The Secretary of State was John Quincy Adams, who succeeded Monroe in the Presidency a year later, on March 4, 1825.

On April 5, 1824, Rebello wrote to Adams asking for an audience for the presentation of the credentials of which he was the bearer, signed by Luiz José de Carvalho e Mello, afterwards Viscount de Cachoeira, then Minister and Secretary of State for Home and Foreign Affairs of Brazil. Interviews and conversations took place between them and on April 20th Rebello sent to Adams a Memorial headed as follows: *Succinct and true exposition of the facts that led the Prince, now Emperor, and the Brazilian People to declare Brazil a free and Independent Nation.*

On May 26th of the same year Rebello was presented by Adams to President Monroe and was affirmed in the position of Chargé d'Affaires of Brazil.

On the following day *The Daily National Intelligence* of Washington, No. 3,554, thus noticed the event: "Senhor José Silvestre Rebello was yesterday presented by Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, to whom he had handed his credentials, to the President of the United States, as Chargé d'Affaires of the Emperor of Brazil, and was received and recognized by the President in that capacity."

In a despatch dated May 31st, Rebello said to Carvalho e Mello:

"I trust that those despatches have arrived, but I take this further occasion of apprising Your Excellency that this Government recognized the Independence and the Empire of Brazil on the 26th of this month, when I was presented to the President as Chargé d'Affaires of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, with the same formalities as are ex-

tended to representatives of other Sovereigns. I therefore congratulate Your Excellency and beg that you will kiss the hands of His Majesty the Emperor on the occasion of this happy event."

The author of the book *A Ilusão Americana* (The American Delusion) was therefore misinformed when he wrote in 1893: "On the occasion of the Independence of Brazil we received no proofs of goodwill from the Americans and only after other countries had recognized the emancipation of Brazil did the United States recognize our autonomy."

The Government of the United States of America was *the first* to recognize the Independence and the Empire of Brazil, being the only Nation indeed to precede in that course Portugal, which signed a Treaty in Rio de Janeiro on August 29, 1824.

Pereira Pinto writes in his *Apointamentos para o Direito Internacional ou Collecção completa dos Tratados celebrados pelo Brasil*, vol. II, page 386; Rio, 1865:

"The American Union was the first Power to recognize the Independence of Brazil. Whilst Great Britain hesitated, impelled, on the one side, to favor our emancipation by her trade, her liberal form of government and by her determined intention of abolishing the slave trade and, on the other hand, detained out of the respect which she was obliged to show to her ancient and faithful ally, the Portuguese Nation; whilst Austria, bound by the closest ties to the founder of the Empire, was even more bound by promises to the Holy Alliance, which looked askance at the independence of the American countries, the United States, in pursuance of the enlightened policy which it had adopted with all the Peoples of America, when they separated themselves from their Mother Countries, extended to us a brotherly hand and invited us to take our place in the great assembly of the Nations of the World. We here register our grati-

tude to the people of this, the most powerful Nation of the New World.”

III.

Which Government on our Continent was the first to accept the so-called Monroe Doctrine?

Without hesitation we may answer: The Government of the Empire of Brazil.

The Message of President James Monroe, which we have already mentioned, was dated December 3, 1823. Fifty-nine days later, on January 31, 1824, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carvalho e Mello, signed the instructions of the Imperial Government to the Chargé d’Affaires of Brazil.

In paragraph 6 of this interesting document we read:

“Thus, if the United States of America, for reasons of national interest ought to recognize the Independence of the Empire of Brazil, as has been proved, so much more ought that to be looked for from this great Nation, when it is considered that those very interests are in accordance with the principles of its Government and of its policy.

“Such are the principles of the policy of those States, which alone were sufficient to hasten to our recognition, *principles which in the Message of the President to both Houses in December last assumed a more generic application to all the States of this Continent*, since in that Message the necessity of our combining and standing shoulder to shoulder for the defence of our rights and of our territory is clearly pointed out.”

And in paragraph 15:

“*You will sound the Government as to its attitude toward an offensive and defensive alliance with this Empire as a part of the American Continent*, on the supposition that

such alliance should not be based on any mutual concessions, but only on the general principle of the mutual benefits arising from such alliance."

Thus Brazil, after the first days of the revolution which separated her from her Mother country, was at particular pains to insure political approximation with the United States of America, adhered to the Monroe doctrine and endeavored to conclude, *on the basis of that doctrine*, an offensive and defensive alliance with the *Great Nation of the North*, as it was even then called by the great statesmen of the Brazilian Independence.

The Ministers of State in January, 1824, besides Carvalho de Mello, made Viscount da Cachoeira, were Villela Barbosa, Marquis de Paranguá, Navy; Maciel da Costa, Marquis de Queluz, Empire; Pereira da Fonseca, Marquis de Maricá, Finance; Tinoco da Silva, Justice; and Silveira Mendonca, Marquis de Sabará, War.

IV.

The Imperial Government continued to pursue the policy of approximation and alliance between the two countries and after 1824 began to consider it advisable and important that their two Representatives should be raised to a higher diplomatic rank.

In a despatch, dated September 15th, Carvalho e Mello said to our Agent in Washington:

"Certainly the Nations of that Hemisphere (that of Europe) will ever be on the lookout for and afraid of the union and alliance which we might make with the Government of the United States and which would thus form a policy wholly American, that would make them anxious as to what might arise from it. In view of this, His

Imperial Majesty desires Your Excellency to do all in your power to get for Mr. Condy Raguét, who is already here, the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary with eventual powers, or for any other person, provided that he will help to get the resolution confirmed. Further His Imperial Majesty charges Your Excellency to propose an alliance intended to preserve and support the liberty of the American countries. Your Excellency will also ascertain on what conditions these States would be willing to take part in such an alliance and will give an account as briefly as possible and by the usual channels as to what they say on the subject. On this point I refer to the instructions given to Your Excellency, which call attention to the *speech of the President of the United States* there quoted" the Message of Monroe, 1823, "in which the President clearly lays down that those States will not interfere, if the Mother countries make attempts to reconquer their old Colonies, but will prevent the intervention of other Powers, which principle has also been admitted by the British Government. . . ."

On January 28, 1825, the same Minister wrote as follows:

" . . . I have received the command of His Majesty the Emperor to recommend Your Excellency to do all you can to persuade the Government of the United States of the necessity of making a Treaty of Alliance, defensive and offensive, with the Brazilian Government in the case of attack. Your Excellency should also bear in mind the orders which you have received in this respect, not only in the Instructions, but also in my despatch of September 15th of last year. Your Excellency, however, should come to no final decision during the negotiations which will take place, and will leave everything to an *ad referendum*, so that the Imperial Government may not be bound either by reasons of

civility or of consideration, but may with complete liberty deliberate as to what it considers to be just."

And again on May 14th of the same year, 1825 :

"I have received, and submitted to His Majesty the Emperor, the despatch No. 14 which Your Excellency forwarded to me under date of January 26th of the present year and His Majesty is aware of how much you have done to ensure the nomination of a diplomat to this Court. From what Your Excellency says, and from an American paper which appeared at a later date than your despatch, I see that Condé Raguet has been appointed Chargé d'Affaires and that you are stated to have been instrumental in the matter. Nevertheless Your Excellency ought to insist with persuasive and telling arguments on the nomination of a Minister Plenipotentiary, not only out of consideration to the Empire, but also because American Ministers of this rank have already been here. Your Excellency will also give it to be understood that the United States Government must take the first step in the matter, since it recognized the Empire, and that it is a natural corollary to such recognition, and Your Excellency will also give an assurance that His Majesty the Emperor will immediately nominate a Minister of equal rank.

"With regard to the question of the Treaty of Alliance you should proceed on the lines intimated in the Instructions and in subsequent despatches and I have also to inform you that, in view of the steps taken by you in the matter, His Majesty the Emperor is not pleased that Your Excellency should have proposed the inclusion of the other States which form the Spanish colonies, on which point nothing was said in the aforesaid Instructions, nor was it convenient to associate us with those States without having previously approached them privately on the matter."

V.

On January 28, 1825, Rebello proposed the alliance to Adams in writing, Adams having said to him on the 22d :

“What you have just said I will repeat in the presence of the President, but it will be more convenient if you send it to me in a note. After he has read it the President will decide what steps it is most convenient for the Government to take.” (Despatch of January 26th, No. 14, from the Brazilian Legation in Washington.)

The following are the most essential portions of the Note which on January 28, 1825, Rebello sent to Secretary of State Adams, a Note which began with a reference to the Monroe Message of 1823 :

“The Government of Brazil being convinced that the declaration made by the Government of the United States in the Message of His Excellency the President at the First Session of the 18th Congress is effective, and it having been said in it, with regard to those American countries which had declared their Independence and maintained it, and whose Independence had been recognized by the Government as founded on reasonable bases and on the principles of justice, that this Government would not allow any interference for the purpose of oppressing or limiting in any way whatsoever the destinies of those countries on the part of any European Power, but that such interference would be looked upon by the Government of the United States as an unfriendly act; and considering that, while it is to be hoped that the said European Powers, enlightened by the true ideas which all Governments ought to have as to the justice and principles on which Brazil founded her Independence, will not interfere in the question which she has with Portugal, it is at the same time human to err, and Governments are human, and it is possible therefore that some of the said

Governments might desire to help exhausted Portugal to re-colonize Brazil, for which the latter has but little desire; and considering that in such an event the United States would be bound to put into practice the policy laid down in the said Message, giving proofs of the generosity and justice which animates her, which could not be done without sacrifice of life and treasure; *and it not being in accordance with reason, justice and right that the Government of Brazil should accept such sacrifices gratuitously*: that Government is ready to enter into a Convention with the Government of the United States, the object of which will be the preservation of the Independence of Brazil in the case of any Power aiding Portugal in its vain and chimerical projects for the re-colonization of Brazil.

“The same reason which moves the Government of Brazil to hope that the Government of the United States will propose the conditions for the said Convention permits it also to hope that the Government of the United States will also offer conditions for entering into of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Government of Brazil. . . .”

The reply to this note was sent after James Monroe had passed on the Presidency to his successor, John Quincy Adams.

The new Secretary of State, Henry Clay, in a note dated April 13, 1825, expressed himself as follows:

“Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt at this Department of your two notes, the one under date the 28th January, and the other the 6th day of April, 1825. The delay, in transmitting an answer to the former, has arisen from arrangements incident to the formation of a new Administration, and not from any insensibility to the important propositions which it announces, or disrespect to the Government of Brazil, or its respectable Representative here. To those propositions, the President has given the most atten-

tive consideration. They are, first, that the United States shall enter into a Convention with your Government to maintain its independence, in the event of Portugal being assisted by any foreign power to re-establish its former sway, and secondly, that a Treaty of Alliance and defence be formed between the United States and the Government of Brazil to expel the arms of Portugal from any portion of the Brazilian Territory of which they might happen, in the progress of the War, to take possession.

“The President of the United States adheres to the principles of his predecessor, as set forth in his message of the 7th December, 1823, to the American Congress. But with respect to your first proposition, as there does not appear, at present, any likelihood of Portugal being able to draw to her aid other Powers to assist her in re-subjugating the Brazils, there would not seem to be any occasion for a convention founded upon that improbable contingency. The President, on the contrary, sees with satisfaction that there is a reasonable probability of a speedy peace between Portugal and the Government of Brazil, founded upon that Independence of it, which the United States were the first to acknowledge. In declining, therefore, to enter into the proposed convention, you will be pleased to assure your Government that the determination of the President does not proceed from any abatement of the interest which the United States have constantly felt in the establishment of the Independence of Brazil, but is dictated solely by the want of those circumstances which would appear to be necessary to justify the formation of such a Convention. If in the progress of events there should be a renewal of demonstrations, on the part of the European allies to attack the Independence of the American States, the President will give to that new state of things, should it arise, every consideration, which its importance would undoubtedly demand.

“With respect to your second proposition of a Treaty of Alliance offensive and defensive to repel any invasion of the Brazilian Territories by the forces of Portugal, if the expected peace should take place, that also would be unnecessary. But such a Treaty would be inconsistent with the policy which the United States have heretofore prescribed to themselves. That policy is, that whilst the war is confined to the parent country and its former Colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties. From that policy they did not deviate during the whole of the long contest between Spain and the several Independent Governments which have been erected on her former American Territories. If an exception to it were now for the first time made, the justice of your Sovereign will admit that the other new Governments might have some cause to complain of the United States.

“Whilst I regret that these considerations of policy which the United States feel themselves bound to respect, will not allow them to enter at this time into either of the two compacts suggested by you, I have much satisfaction in concurring with you in the expediency of permanently uniting our two Nations in the ties of Friendship, Peace, and Commerce. With that view I am instructed to say to you, that the United States are disposed to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce with the Government of Brazil, and that they are willing to adopt, as the basis of the mutual regulations of the Commerce and Navigation of the two countries, a principle of equity and perfect reciprocity. If you should be empowered to negotiate such a Treaty, I shall take great pleasure in entering upon the discussion and consideration of its terms at such time as may be mutually convenient.

“I pray you, Sir, to accept the assurances of my distinguished consideration. (Signed) H. Clay.

The Treaty of Friendship, Navigation and Commerce between the two countries was signed in the City of Rio de Janeiro on December 12, 1828, by the two Brazilian Plenipotentiaries, the Marquis of Aracaty, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Miguel de Souza Mello e Alvim, Minister of the Navy, and by the Plenipotentiary of the United States, William Tudor.

VI.

To the documents already quoted let us add the following significant passage from a despatch of the Marquis of Aracaty, Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed on April 6, 1827, to our representative in Washington:

“And in this connection when Your Excellency is in conference with the said Minister you will do all in your power to make him understand that *His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, in his high and well considered policy, understands perfectly what the country is and its value, and of how great mutual importance it is to both countries that their Governments should do all in their power to make their political relations closer and grasp each other by the hand. . . .*”

VII.

After touching on the recognition of our Independence by the United States, Pereira Pinto (Work cited above, page 390 of vol. II) says:

“The basis for a good understanding between Brazil and the United States having thus been cemented they have ever remained on the same footing of perfect cordiality, which has not been disturbed by small incidents or disputes which from time to time have arisen. . . .”

The author is referring to the unpleasant incidents which were caused by three diplomatic representatives of the

United States in Brazil: Condy Raguet in 1827, Wise in 1846 and Webb after 1863, as well as to the insult to our sovereignty offered by Captain Collins of the cruiser *Massachusetts* by the seizure of the *Florida*, privateer, in 1864, in the bay of Bahia. The American Government in the three first cases censured the action of their agents and replaced them by others who, by the contrast they presented, smoothed into oblivion the mistakes and arrogance of their predecessors; in the case of the *Florida*, immediate and honorable satisfaction was given.

We will now quote again Pereira Pinto to show what was the dominating trend of our political thought in the time of the Empire (Work cited above, vol. II, page 425):

“Whilst expressing heartfelt wishes for the consolidation of our alliance with the United States by means of a sincere and enlightened policy, the reader will allow us to quote in these pages certain impressions in this respect which we wrote in *O Correio Mercantil* of April 7th of the current year (1865):

“.....

“It is not possible to imagine any advantage which could possibly accrue to us by repelling the United States. Our interests in America are homogeneous, and as a result they should be our natural allies and they have done all in their power to bring about this consummation. Facts prove it. . . .

When European intervention was suggested, to put an end to the Civil War, the two Governments said that the traditional policy of Monroe excluded such intervention and that if they required arbitration they would show preference to Brazil.

“All these acts show on the part of the United States the best and most pronounced desire to form an intimate alliance with Brazil and such an alliance would have avoided,

who knows? the unjustified interference of Spain, and France in the affairs of Mexico and Perú and the insults which the powerful Nations of Europe have heaped on the weak peoples of the New World. Perhaps our form of Government stood in the way of such intimacy? We do not think so. The Imperial institutions are also democratic and the monarchical element, which is inherent in them, gives lustre to and strengthens the Brazilian form of Government, it being certain that, in spite of the difference, liberal principles amongst us are freer and more tolerant, we have no disabilities and every man can take a part in public business provided he possesses talent and virtue. . .”

VIII.

* * * * *

By having recourse to the Parliamentary Annals of Brazil, books, pamphlets and papers, published during the two reigns of the Imperial epoch, we might multiply such quotations as we have already given, illustrative of the conviction the governing class had of the advantages for the country of a cordial understanding with the United States of America.

Those who were in touch with the late Emperor Dom Pedro know how he shared the sentiments which had been inspired to his father by José Bonifacio, Carvalho e Mello, Villela Barbosa and other Ministers who, like Viscount Sepetiba and Uruguay, settled or consolidated the bases of our foreign policy. These sentiments were proved, not only by the visit which he made to the United States of America in 1876, during which he, whilst on board ship, took pleasure in translating the popular hymn of the *Star-spangled banner*, but by the promptitude and pleasure with which he

nominated the Brazilian Delegates to the First Pan-American Congress at Washington in 1889.

On the other hand, to pass in review the proofs of friendship to Brazil, the interest taken in its progress and its prestige, the appreciation given to its Government by the United States, from 1824, to the present day, would necessitate a great expansion of this article, which is mainly a collection of quotations. It will suffice to remember that the French occupation of Amapá in 1836 came to an end in 1840, owing to the representations of the Government of the United States, in support of Brazil and England in Paris; that the second military occupation, planned in 1895 by M. Lebon, Minister of the Colonies, was avoided because M. Hanotaux, Minister of Foreign Affairs, better advised than his colleague, understood that the Monroe Doctrine and British interests were opposed to such a policy; that, at the request of the United States and Great Britain, Brazil was called to appoint one of the members of the Geneva Arbitration Court to decide the claims of the United States against England in the case of the *Alabama*, having appointed to that effect Viscount de Itajubá; that, at the suggestion of the Government of the United States a Brazilian, the Viscount de Arinos, presided over the Franco-American Arbitration Court, which sat in Washington from 1880 to 1884, and that when certain of the Great Powers proffered their good offices at a critical moment during the Civil War, President Lincoln replied that the question was an American one and that respect for the Monroe Doctrine would not allow him to accept any European intervention, adding that, if—as was not probable—the moment arrived for the intervention of a friendly Government the natural arbiter between the two combatants would be the Government of Brazil.

X.

We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of giving at this point, from the papers of the day, the following essential extracts from the speech which the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, Richard Vidder Meade, read on December 5, 1857, when he presented his credentials to the Emperor Dom Pedro II.

“

“By accrediting a Minister to this Government, the Government of the United States intends not only to extend due courtesy to the greatest Power of the South American Continent, but also to show its sincere desire to act with the Imperial Government of Brazil for the maintenance of a policy which has ever united the two countries in the bonds of peace and of friendship, which gives added force and vigor to an already prosperous and increasing trade and, finally, tends to the permanent prosperity and the development of the power of the two great Nations on whose destinies depend those of the two great continents in which they lie.

“My Government is well aware of the points of similarity and the community of interests which ought to make the bonds between the two countries unbreakable and give the same direction to the policy and aspirations of them both. An equal extent of territory, of vast proportions, insures for the two Nations an indisputable preponderance in the future, and gives their position an importance due principally to a consciousness of their own power.

“The similarity which in many ways exists between the Constitutional organism of both countries tends to political and social sympathy, both factors for mutual well-being and future commercial progress; we are at a point when a policy common to both Nations, stable and deeply rooted on

their own soil, a policy which will have to meet many attacks from outside, will establish an alliance between them and will ensure for mutual defence a unity of action and feeling, that will prove invincible in the future. . . .”

These sentiments manifested then and on many other occasions are identical with those that to-day inspire the Governments of Washington and Rio de Janeiro, as recent events, which are matters of public knowledge and therefore need not be recapitulated, have proved. . . . All intrigues against this country in Washington from 1823 down to recent times have been met by the invincible barrier opposed to it by the ancient friendship, which so happily unites Brazil and the United States and which it is the duty of the present generation to perpetuate with the same diligence and enthusiasm as was displayed by our ancestors.

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